{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_56634/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_56634","id":"gutenberg_56634","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/56634","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Archaeology & Anthropology","Category: Journals","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Psychiatry/Psychology","Category: Science - Biology","Philosophy -- Periodicals"],"text":"Produced by Bryan Ness and the Online Distributed\nProofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was\nproduced from images generously made available by The\nInternet Archive/Canadian Libraries)\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTRANSCRIBER'S NOTE:\n\nItalics have been transcribed using _underscores_, bold with =equal\nsigns=, small capitals as ALL CAPITALS. Sidenotes are placed between\n#hashtags# and are placed either above the paragraph they refer to or\ninline. Inconsistencies in spelling and hyphenation have not been\ncorrected. Minor punctuation errors and typographical discrepancies\nhave been silently corrected. A list of other corrections can be found\nat the end of the document.\n\n\n\n\nTHE MONIST\n\nA\n\nQUARTERLY MAGAZINE\n\n\nVOL. I.\n\n\nCHICAGO:\nTHE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING CO\n1890-1891\n\n\n\n\nCOPYRIGHT BY\n\nTHE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING CO.\n\n1890-1891\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS OF VOLUME I.\n\n\nARTICLES.\n\n PAGE.\n\nAnarchists, The Physiognomy of the. By Cesare Lombroso 336\n\nAnarchist's Reply to Professor Lombroso, A Convicted. By Michael\n Schwab 520\n\nArchitecture of Theories, The. By Charles S. Peirce 161\n\nCriminal Anthropology, Illustrative Studies in. (1) \"La B\u00eate\n Humaine\" and Criminal Anthropology. (2) Criminal Anthropology\n and Psychiatry. By Cesare Lombroso 177\n\nEthics, The Criterion of\u2014\u2014an Objective Reality. Editor 552\n\nEvolution, The Factors of. By Joseph Le Conte 321\n\nEvolution, The Right of. By Moncure D. Conway 506\n\nFeelings and the Elements of Feelings. Editor 401\n\nFive Souls with but a Single Thought. By Carus Sterne 245\n\nH\u00f6ffding on the Relation of the Mind to the Body. By W. M. Salter 118\n\nImmortality. By George M. Gould 372\n\nInfusoria, The Immortality of. By Alfred Binet 21\n\nInnovation and Inertia in the World of Psychology. By Cesare\n Lombroso 344\n\nMagic Mirror, The. By Max Dessoir 87\n\nMind, The Origin of. By Paul Carus 69\n\nMind, The Question of Duality of. By R. Meade Bache 362\n\nPhilosophy in American Colleges and Universities 148-156\n\nPsycho-Physics, Some Questions of. A Discussion. (1) Sensations\n and the Elements of Reality. By Ernst Mach 393\n (2) Feelings and the Elements of Feelings. Editor 401\n\nPsychology of Conception. By J. Sully 481\n\nSensations, The Analysis of the. By Ernst Mach 48\n\nSensations and the Elements of Reality. By Ernst Mach 393\n\nSex, On the Material Relations of\u2014in Human Society. By E. D. Cope 38\n\nSquaring of the Circle, The. By Hermann Schubert 197\n\nThought and Language, On. F. Max M\u00fcller 572\n\nTruth, The Criterion of. Editor 229\n\nWallace on Physiological Selection, A. R. George J. Romanes 1\n\nWelfare, The Principle of. By Harald H\u00f6ffding 525\n\n\nLITERARY CORRESPONDENCE.\n\n France. By Lucien Arr\u00e9at 124, 278, 421, 590\n\n German Philosophy in the XIX Century. By F. Jodl 263\n\n The Modern Literature of Italy since 1870. By C. Lombroso 428\n\n The Science of Pedagogy in Germany. Chr. Ufer 597\n\n\nBOOK REVIEWS.\n\n Abbott, Francis Ellingwood. _The Way Out of Agnosticism_ 129\n\n Bois-Reymond, Paul Du. _Ueber die Grundlagen der Erkenntnis in\n den exacten Wissenschaften_ 608\n\n Booth, General. _In Darkest England and the Way Out_ 451\n\n Bray, Charles. _The Philosophy of Necessity_ 136\n\n Brinton, Daniel G. _Races and Peoples_ 131\n\n B\u00fcchner, Ludwig. _Fremdes und Eigenes aus dem geistigen Leben\n der Gegenwart_ 303\n\n Carneri, B. _Der Moderne Mensch_ 607\n\n Carus, Paul. _The Soul of Man_ 620\n\n Clarke, James Freeman. _Deacon Herbert's Bible Class_ 305\n\n Coit, Stanton. _Die ethische Bewegung in der Religion_ 301\n\n Cox, Charles F. _Protoplasm and Life_ 297\n\n Dewey, John. _Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics_ 600\n\n Dillmann, C. _Die Mathematik die Fackeltr\u00e4gerin einer neuen Zeit_ 617\n\n Edinger, Ludwig. _Twelve Lectures on the Structure of the Central\n Nervous System_ 604\n\n Everett, Charles Carroll. _The Science of Thought_ 287\n\n Forel, August. _Der Hypnotismus_ 605\n\n Fullerton, George Stuart. _On Sameness and Identity_ 291\n\n Geddes, Patrick, and J. Arthur Thomson. _The Evolution of Sex_ 439\n\n Haeckel, Ernst. _Plankton-Studien_ 455\n\n Harris, William T. _Introduction to the Study of Philosophy_ 438\n\n H\u00f6ffding, Harald. _Ethik_ 139\n\n James, William. _The Principles of Psychology_ 284\n\n Jastrow, Joseph. _The Time-Relations of Mental Phenomena_ 290\n\n Jodl, Friedrich. _Geschichte der Ethik in der neueren Philosophie_ 137\n\n Krause, Ernst. _Tuisko-Land der arischen St\u00e4mme und\n G\u00f6tter-Urheimat_ 612\n\n Kroman, K. _Kurzgefasste Logik und Psychologie_ 142\n\n Lehmann, Alfred. _Die Hypnose und die damit verwandten normalen\n Zust\u00e4nde_ 298\n\n Loeb, Jacques. _Der Heliotropismus der Thiere_ 300\n\n Loeb, Jacques. _Untersuchungen zur physiologischen Morphologie\n der Thiere_ 300\n\n Lombroso, Cesare. _Der geniale Mensch_ 146\n\n Mackenzie, John S. _An Introduction to Social Philosophy_ 601\n\n Mantegazza, Paolo. _Physiognomy and Expression_ 447\n\n Moll, Albert. _Hypnotism_ 604\n\n Morgan, C. Lloyd. _Animal Life and Intelligence_ 443\n\n Naden, Constance C. W. _Induction and Deduction_ 292\n\n Natorp, Paul. _Einleitung in die Psychologie nach kritischer\n Methode_ 143\n\n Peet, Stephen D. _Emblematic Mounds and Animal Effigies_ 295\n\n Post, Albert Hermann. _Ueber die Aufgaben einer allgemeinen\n Rechtswissenschaft_ 457\n\n Royer, Madame Cl\u00e9mence. _Nouveaux aper\u00e7us sur la Phylogenie\n de l'Homme_ 297\n\n Savage, M. J. _Life_ 296\n\n Schopenhauer, Arthur. _Le Monde comme Volont\u00e9 et comme\n Representation_ 298\n\n Sterrett, J. Macbride. _Studies in Hegel's Philosophy of Religion_ 133\n\n Sterne, Carus. _Die allgemeine Weltanschauung_ 456\n\n Taylor, Isaac. _The Origin of the Aryans_ 435\n\n Ufer, Christian. _Geistesst\u00f6rungen in der Schule_ 619\n\n Wolff, Joh. _Das Bewusstsein und sein Object_ 147\n\n\nPERIODICALS 157-160; 307-320; 459-480; 621-640\n\n\n\n\n VOL. I. OCTOBER, 1890. NO. 1.\n\n\n\n\nTHE MONIST.\n\n\n\n\nMR. A. R. WALLACE ON PHYSIOLOGICAL SELECTION.[1]\n\n [1] In a private letter to the editor of this magazine\n Professor Geo. J. Romanes writes: \"The article refers to a\n completely new departure in the theory of evolution, striking\n in the principle of homogamy, the root-principle of the whole,\n and in physiological selection, one of the main branches.\n Yet neither principle has so far been perceived except by\n Mr. Gulick.... The theory of physiological selection has\n been better understood in America than in this country; and\n I should like the naturalists there, who have taken such a\n warm and appreciative interest in it, to see my reply to Mr.\n Wallace published in an American periodical.\"\n\n\nIn 1886 I published a paper entitled \"Physiological Selection: an\nadditional suggestion on the origin of species,\" (Zo\u00f6logical Journal of\nthe Linnean Society, Vol. XIX, p. 337). The view there expressed is,\nbriefly, as follows.\n\nGiven the facts of heredity and variability, the whole theory of\norganic evolution becomes neither more nor less than a theory of\nthe causes which determine the breeding of like with like, to the\nexclusion of unlike. For the more firmly that we believe in heredity\nwith variability as the fundamental principle of organic evolution,\nthe stronger must become our persuasion that segregate breeding (or\nexclusive mating of like with like) must lead to divergence, while\nindiscriminate breeding (or free intercrossing of all varieties) must\nlead to uniformity. So long as there is free intercrossing, heredity\nmakes in favor of fixity of type\u2014or, at most, can permit change only\nin a single line, where successive generations undergo a continuous\nimprovement, which may give rise to a ladder-like series of species in\ntime. But in order that there should be a tree-like multiplication of\nspecies in space, or a simultaneous divergence of type, it is essential\nthat free intercrossing be prevented at the origin, and throughout the\ndevelopment, of each branch. In other words, it is only when assisted\nby some form of segregation\u2014which determines exclusive breeding of\nlike with like\u2014that heredity can effect arborescent or polytypic, as\ndistinguished from catenated or monotypic, evolution. For the sake of\ngreater clearness, I will call segregation in this sense _homogamy_, or\nthe exclusive mating of individuals which belong to the same variety.\n\nNow homogamy may be secured in a very great number of different\nways. Of these the most important, from every point of view, is\nnatural selection. Here the exclusive breeding of like with like is\ndetermined by general fitness, and is effected by extermination of the\nunlike\u2014i. e., the comparatively unfit. Moreover, this process leads\nto a continuous improvement in the way of adaptation, and in this\nimportant respect it stands alone among all the forms of homogamy.\nNevertheless, we must note that, unless assisted by some other form of\nhomogamy, natural selection can only produce monotypic evolution; never\npolytypic. Successive generations may thus continuously mount to higher\nstages of adaptation on the steps supplied by their own dead selves;\nbut although they may thus give rise to a linear series of species in\ntime, they can never thus give rise to a multiplication of species\nin space. In order to effect such multiplication, or _divergence_ of\ntypes, natural selection must be supplemented by some other form of\nhomogamy, which can prevent intercrossing between the equally fit at\nthe origin, and throughout the development, of every separate branch.\n\nWell, as I have said, these other forms of homogamy are very numerous.\nFirst we may notice geographical isolation. When a comparatively small\nportion of a species is thus separated from the rest of its kind,\nintercrossing is effectually prevented between the two sections; and\ninasmuch as the general average of specific characters in the isolated\nsection will be somewhat different from that of the other section,\nheredity will determine that the two sections shall not run parallel\nin their subsequent lines of evolutionary history: there will arise\nan increasing divergence between them, as was first pointed out by the\nmathematician Delb\u0153uf, subsequently by the naturalist Weismann, and\nmore recently, with greater emphasis, by Mr. Gulick as well as myself.\n\nAgain, there is homogamy that arises as a result of sexual preference,\nor, as I have called it, \"psychological selection.\" It is a matter of\nobservation that the breeding of like with like is often determined\namong the higher vertebrata by individuals of each variety preferring\nto mate with other individuals of their own variety; and this is\nhomogamy.\n\nNot to occupy space with any attempt at enumerating all the many forms\nof homogamy[2] I will at once pass on to the form which constitutes the\nsubject-matter of the present paper\u2014and the form which, in my opinion,\nis probably of more importance than any other in the multiplication of\nspecies. This is the form of homogamy which I have termed Physiological\nSelection, or Segregation of the Fit, and Mr. Gulick\u2014who independently\nperceived the principle\u2014has called Segregate Fecundity.\n\n [2] This has been done in a most careful and exhaustive manner\n by Mr. Gulick in his papers which have succeeded mine in the\n publications of the Linnean Society.\n\nAs my object on the present occasion is to answer criticisms which\nhave been passed on my enunciation of this principle, I do not propose\nto go into further detail by way of explanation than is necessary in\norder to render intelligible both the criticisms and my reply thereto.\nMoreover, this reply is only an abstract of a fuller one which has been\nprepared for publication in a forthcoming book. Therefore it deals only\nwith the main points. Lastly, I may remark that the criticisms which\nhave hitherto appeared have all been derived from the same source,\nviz., from Mr. A. R. Wallace; for, although many other naturalists have\nexpressed themselves as more or less opposed to the new theory, or\n\"additional suggestion on the origin of species,\" they have all done so\non the grounds, or for the reasons supplied by Mr. Wallace. Therefore,\nin dealing with Mr. Wallace's objections, I shall be dealing with the\nonly objections which have thus far been advanced.\n\nIn order at once to restate the theory of physiological selection,\nand to do so in a form which cannot be suspected of being in any way\ninfluenced by Mr. Wallace's more recent criticisms, I will begin by\nreproducing the main features of the theory in the words which were\nemployed for this purpose more than three years ago, when I supplied\nan article to the _Nineteenth Century_ in answer to one by him in the\n_Fortnightly Review_. Moreover, for the most part this restatement of\nthe theory is quoted _verbatim_ from my original paper\u2014the differences\nbeing due only to the conditions imposed by limits of an article.\n\nThe following, then, is quoted from the _Nineteenth Century_ for\nJanuary, 1887:\n\n \"According to the Darwinian theory [which, as elsewhere\n fully explained, the present theory is in no way capable\n of supplanting, but only of supplementing, and this among\n other ways, by explaining why it is that some degree of\n mutual infertility is so general a phenomenon as between\n allied species\u2014a phenomenon which Darwin expressly regarded\n as not explicable by the theory of natural selection], it\n is for the most part only those variations which happen to\n have been useful that have been preserved: yet, even as thus\n limited, the principle of variability is held able to furnish\n sufficient material out of which to construct the whole\n adaptive morphology of nature. How immense, therefore, must\n be the number of unuseful variations. Yet these are all, for\n the most part, still-born, or allowed to die out immediately\n by intercrossing. Should such intercrossing be prevented,\n however, there is no reason why unuseful variations should\n not be perpetuated by heredity quite as well as useful ones\n when under the nursing influence of natural selection\u2014as,\n indeed, we see to be the case in our domesticated productions.\n Consequently, if from any reason a section of a species is\n prevented from intercrossing with the rest of its species,\n new varieties of a trivial or unuseful kind might be expected\n to arise within that section. And this is just what we\n find. Oceanic islands, for example, are well known to be\n extraordinarily rich in peculiar species; and this can best\n be explained by considering that a complete separation of the\n fauna and flora on such an island permits them to develop\n varietal histories of their own, without interference by\n intercrossing with their originally parent forms. We see the\n same principle exemplified by the influence of geographical\n barriers of any kind, and also by the consequences of\n migration. Therefore, given an absence of overwhelming\n intercrossing, and the principle of what I term independent\n variability may be trusted to evoke new species, without the\n aid of natural selection. [Homogamy.]\n\n \"Were it not for the very general occurrence of some degree\n of sterility between even closely allied species and were\n it not also for the fact, that closely allied species are\n not always\u2014or even generally\u2014separated from one another\n by geographical barriers, we might reasonably attribute all\n cases of species-formation by independent variability to the\n prevention of intercrossing by geographical barriers or by\n migration. But it is evident that these two facts can no more\n be explained by the influence of geographical barriers, or\n by migration, than they can be by the influence of natural\n selection.\n\n \"Now, of all parts of those variable objects which we call\n organisms, the most variable is the reproductive system; and\n the variations may be either in the direction of increased\n or diminished fertility. Consequently, variations in the\n way of greater or less sterility frequently take place both\n in plants and animals; and probably, if we had adequate\n means of observing this point, we should find that there is\n no one variation more common. But, of course, whenever it\n arises\u2014whether as a result of changed conditions of life, or,\n as we say, spontaneously\u2014it immediately becomes extinguished,\n seeing that the individuals which it affects are less able\n (if able at all) to propagate the variation. If, however, the\n variation should be such that, while showing some degree of\n sterility with the parent form, it continues to be as fertile\n as before within the limits of the varietal form, it would\n neither be swamped by intercrossing nor die out on account of\n sterility.\n\n \"For example, suppose the variation in the reproductive\n system is such that the season of flowering, or of pairing,\n becomes either advanced or retarded. Whether this variation\n be \"spontaneous,\" or due to change of food, climate, habitat,\n etc., does not signify. The only point we need attend to\n is that some individuals, living on the same geographical\n area as the rest of their species, have demonstrably varied\n in their reproductive systems, so that they are perfectly\n fertile _inter se_, while absolutely sterile with the rest\n of their species. By inheritance there would thus arise a\n variety living on the same geographical area as its parent\n form, and yet prevented from intercrossing with that form by\n a barrier quite as effectual as a thousand miles of ocean;\n the only difference would be that the barrier, instead of\n being geographical, is physiological. And now, of course, the\n two sections of the physiologically divided species would be\n able to develop independent histories of their own without\n intercrossing; even though they are living together on the\n same geographical area, their physiological isolation would\n lead to their taking on distinct specific characters by\n independent variations, [or homogamy,] just as is the case\n with sections of a species when separated from each other by\n geographical isolation.\n\n \"To state this suggestion in another form, it enables us to\n regard many, if not most, species as the records of variations\n in the reproductive systems of ancestors. When variations of\n a non-useful kind occur in any of the other systems or parts\n of organisms, they are, as a rule, immediately extinguished\n by intercrossing. But whenever they happen to arise in the\n reproductive system in the way here suggested, they must\n tend to be preserved as new natural varieties, or incipient\n species. At first the difference would only be in respect\n of the reproductive systems; but eventually, on account of\n independent variation, other differences would supervene, and\n the new variety would take rank as a true species.\n\n \"The principle thus briefly sketched in some respects\n resembles, and in other respects differs from, the principle\n of natural selection, or survival of the fittest. For the sake\n of convenience, therefore, and in order to preserve analogies\n with already existing terms, I have called this principle\n Physiological Selection, or Segregation of the Fit.\n\n \"Let it be noted that we are not concerned either with the\n causes or the degrees of the particular kind of variation on\n which this principle depends. Not with the causes, because\n in this respect the theory of physiological selection is in\n just the same position as that of natural selection: it is\n enough for both that the needful variations are provided,\n without its being incumbent on either to explain the causes\n which in all cases underlie them. Neither are we concerned\n with the degrees of sterility which the variation in question\n may in any particular case supply. For whether the degree of\n sterility with the parent form be originally great or small,\n the result of it will be in the long run the same: the only\n difference will be that in the latter case a greater number\n of generations would be required in order to separate the\n varietal from the parent form. [In other words, homogamy due\n to such physiological isolation is cumulative.]\n\n \"The object of this paper being that of furnishing a general\n answer to criticisms on the hypothesis of physiological\n selection, I will not occupy space by detailing evidence\n of that hypothesis, further than is needful for the object\n just mentioned.[3] This evidence abundantly proves that the\n particular kind of variation which the theory of physiological\n selection requires does take place, (_a_) in individuals,\n (_b_) in races, and (_c_) in species. Next, the evidence goes\n on to show that the facts of organic nature are such as they\n ought to be, supposing it true that this variation has played\n any considerable part in the differentiation of specific\n types. In particular, it is shown that the general association\n between the one primary, or relatively constant, specific\n distinction (mutual sterility), and the innumerable secondary,\n or relatively variable, distinctions (slight morphological\n changes which may effect _any_ parts of _any_ organisms),\n of itself indicates that the former has been the original\n condition to the occurrence of the latter, in all cases where\n free intercrossing has not been otherwise prevented. For even\n in cases where the secondary distinctions may be supposed to\n have induced the primary,\u2014or where morphological changes\n taking place in other parts of an organic type have exercised\n a reflex influence on the reproductive system, such that the\n changed organism is no longer fertile with its unchanged\n parent form,\u2014even in such cases the theory of physiological\n selection is available to explain the association in question.\n For even in these cases, notwithstanding that the secondary\n changes are historically the prior changes, they still depend\n for their preservation on the principles of physiological\n selection. These principles have, in all such cases,\n _selected_ the particular kinds of secondary distinction\n which have proved themselves capable of so reacting on the\n reproductive system as to bring about the primary distinction,\n and thus to protect themselves against the destructive power\n of free intercrossing.\"\n\n [3] The evidence, so far as yet published, may be read by\n any one who cares to purchase the original paper, which can\n be obtained from the Linnean Society in a separate form.\n\nNow for Mr. Wallace's criticism of this theory, as presented in his\nrecently published work on \"Darwinism.\"\n\nBriefly put, he furnishes a numerical calculation, showing that when\n\"the physiological peculiarity is not correlated with any external\ndifferences of form or color, or with inherent peculiarities of likes\nor dislikes leading to any choice as to pairing,\" even when so large\na proportion as ten per cent. of the exceptional variety arises every\nyear in the midst of the species, \"it is unable to increase its numbers\nmuch above its starting-point, and remains wholly dependent on the\ncontinued renewal of the variety for its existence beyond a few years.\"\n\nThis, it must be observed, is a reproduction of the criticism which I\nanswered in 1888; but, as Mr. Wallace ignores that answer, I must now\nrepeat it.\n\nThe criticism does not dispute the fact that the required variation in\nthe way of \"selective sterility\" occurs. Indeed, Mr. Wallace allows\nthat it certainly must be of very general occurrence as between\nincipient species (or pronounced varieties in a state of nature),\nseeing that it is of such general occurrence as between allied species\nwhen fully differentiated as such. In other words, this variation in\nthe way of selective sterility must be recognised as a very general\n_fact_, even if it be not regarded as a _condition_, or a _cause_, of\nspecific differentiation. Which is merely another way of saying that\nthe particular variation which is required by the theory in question\nis admittedly a variation which does occur; and occurs, moreover, in\nvery frequent association with the origin of a new species. But Mr.\nWallace's objection to regarding this variation as itself a cause of\n(or condition to) the origin of a new species is, as we have seen, that\nthe changes must always be greatly against the similar variations of\nthe opposite sexes meeting\u2014i. e., of the \"physiological complements\"\nhappening to pair. Now, I have already shown, in the _Nineteenth\nCentury_ of three years ago, that this criticism can only apply to\nspecies the sexes of which unite for every birth; but as Mr. Wallace\ncontinues to ignore this important consideration, I will now present it\nin somewhat more detail.\n\nIn considering any \"supplementary theory\" of the origin of species,\nit is obviously absurd to disregard the realm of organic nature as a\nwhole, and to fasten attention exclusively upon the part of it where\na particular difficulty against the theory may be supposed to lie. As\nwill presently be shown, Mr. Wallace is entirely mistaken in supposing\nthat his particular difficulty does lie against the theory in any\npart of organic nature; but, even if this could not have been shown,\nit would not have followed that the theory of physiological selection\nis inapplicable to _all_ the classes of the animal and vegetable\nkingdoms, because it is taken to be inapplicable to _some_. One might\njust as well argue against Mr. Darwin's theory of sexual selection\non the ground that it cannot be held to apply to the coloration and\nthe sculpture of shells. If either sexual selection or physiological\nselection were put forward as an _exclusive_ theory of the origin of\n_all_ species, this kind of argument would, of course, have been valid;\nbut as the matter actually stands, it is largely irrelevant.\n\nI say _largely_ irrelevant, because I do not dispute that there is\nthis much force in it. If the theory of physiological selection can be\nproved inapplicable to Birds and Mammals (which are the only classes\nthat Mr. Wallace considers in connection with it), its applicability to\nall other divisions, both of the animal and vegetable kingdoms, would\nbe rendered doubtful; seeing that the process of species-formation\nappears to have been _everywhere_ more or less associated with the\noccurrence of \"selective sterility\"; and hence, if in any division\nof organic nature it could be shown that selective sterility cannot\npossibly have been a cause of specific differentiation, we might well\ndoubt whether it has been such a cause elsewhere\u2014just as we may doubt\nwhether sexual selection has been a cause of the brilliant colors of\nbirds and butterflies, because we know, that it cannot have been a\ncause of the equally brilliant colors of corals and flowers. But,\nas far as physiological selection is concerned, no such question can\narise, as I will presently proceed to show.\n\nFirst of all, however, it is desirable briefly to indicate the strength\nof this theory in the parts of organic nature where Mr. Wallace's\nsole criticism cannot possibly be held to apply\u2014viz., the larger\npart of the vegetable kingdom, where ovules are fertilised either by\ninsects or by the wind. Here the phenomena of \"prepotency\" are highly\nsuggestive\u2014not to say, in my opinion, virtually demonstrative\u2014of\nphysiological selection; seeing that, as Mr. Darwin remarks in another\nconnexion:\n\n \"There can be no doubt that if the pollen of all these species\n (of Compositae) could be simultaneously or successively placed\n on the stigma of any one species, this one would elect with\n unerring certainty its own pollen. This elective capacity is\n all the more wonderful; as it must have been acquired since\n the many species of this great group of plants branched off\n from a common progenitor.\"[4]\n\n [4] _Variation_, etc., Vol. ii.\n\nDarwin is here speaking of elective affinity in its more\nfully developed form, as this so often obtains between fully\ndifferentiated species. But we meet with all lower degrees of its\ndevelopment\u2014sometimes between \"incipient species,\" or varieties, and\nat other times between closely allied species. It is then known as\n\"prepotency\" of the pollen belonging to the same variety, or species,\nover the pollen of the other variety or species, when both sets of\npollen are applied to the same stigma. This is one form of what I have\ncalled physiological selection, and in my view it serves to explain\nwhy it is that hybrids between closely allied forms growing on common\nareas (whether they be called \"species\" or \"constant varieties\")\nare so comparatively rare in nature, even in cases where there is\nno difficulty in producing hybrids artificially by an intentional\nexclusion of the pollen belonging to the same form. And I allude to\nthese facts in the present connexion for two reasons. In the first\nplace, they serve to show how entirely irrelevant Mr. Wallace's\nwhole criticism is to the vegetable kingdom, as well as to the\nmajority of aquatic animals. In the next place, they serve to show\nhow entirely unwarranted is his statement, that \"we have at present\nno evidence whatever\" in support of my belief that a physiological\nincompatibility may affect a whole race or strain. Not only have we\nthe multitudinous cases of prepotency, where the incompatibility is\n_partial_ (or in course of becoming, as Mr. Darwin says in the above\nquotation, \"acquired\"); but we have also multitudinous cases where the\nincompatibility has become _absolute_, both as between closely allied\nspecies, and even as between varieties of the same species growing on\ncommon areas\u2014as M. Jordan has experimentally proved. Therefore in the\nabove remark we have but an additional example of Mr. Wallace's entire\nforgetfulness, in the present connexion, of any organisms other than\nthose which belong to the class of Birds or of Mammals.[5]\n\n [5] It seems scarcely worth while to add that Mr. Wallace\n is doubly mistaken where he says, \"Mr. Romanes's theory\n of Physiological Selection\u2014which assumes sterility or\n infertility between first crosses as the fundamental fact\n in the origin of species\u2014does not accord with the general\n phenomena of hybridism in nature.\" In the first place, as\n shown above, \"infertility between the first crosses\" is by no\n means out of accord with \"the general phenomena of hybridism\n in nature\"\u2014seeing that all degrees of such infertility, from\n the slightest perceptible amount of prepotency up to absolute\n sterility, are of the most general occurrence in nature. In\n the second place, why Mr. Wallace should suppose that in my\n view physiological selection can only act as regards first\n crosses, and not also as regards hybrid progeny, I have no\n means of surmising.\n\nTurning, then, to the only parts of organic nature where his criticism\ncan even appear to apply, I have here the sufficiently easy task of\nproving, that this appearance of application arises wholly and entirely\nout of Mr. Wallace's misapprehension of the theory against which the\ncriticism is directed. In other words, he is not criticising the theory\nof physiological selection at all, but merely his own travesty of it.\nFor, as repeatedly stated in my original paper, and again reiterated\nthree years ago in the _Nineteenth Century_, it constitutes no part of\nmy theory to deny the co-operation of other forms of segregate breeding\nor homogamy. On the contrary, I have always insisted\u2014and Mr. Gulick\nhas proved by calculation\u2014that the more efficient the co-operation of\nother forms of homogamy, the _greater_ must become the importance of\nthe physiological form. Yet, as I trust has already been made fully\napparent, the whole of Mr. Wallace's criticism (even as regards Birds\nand Mammals) goes upon the supposition that Mr. Gulick and I believe\nthat, if physiological selection ever acts in any case _at all_, it\nmust necessarily act _alone_. For reasons afterwards to be given, I do\nindeed believe that in some cases it may act alone (in this differing\nfrom Mr. Gulick); but, clearly, whether or not there are any such\ncases, is a question quite distinct from that touching the validity\nof a criticism which attributes to our theory the absurd dogma, that\nsegregate breeding which arises from physiological isolation, can\nnever be associated with segregate breeding that may arise from any\nother form of isolation. And that the whole of Mr. Wallace's criticism\ncollapses when once this correction has been supplied, is proved most\neffectually by the curious fact that, _after having himself supplied\nthe correction, he reproduces our theory as an original one of his\nown_. How he can have supposed that I did not entertain the possibility\nof physiological selection being associated with natural selection,\n\"psychological selection,\" or any other known form of isolation\n(excepting only the geographical), I am quite at a loss to understand;\nseeing that from end to end of my paper I continually refer to such\nassociation\u2014especially as regards natural selection. And, if possible,\nI am still less able to understand Mr. Wallace's carelessness in this\nconnection with reference to Mr. Gulick's paper; because there the\nbelief is repeatedly and most clearly expressed, that without such\nassociation, \"segregate fecundity\" _can never act at all_\u2014which is\nprecisely the theory which Mr. Wallace proceeds to elaborate on his own\naccount.\n\nIt is now time to show, by means of quotations, how unequivocal and\ncomplete is Mr. Wallace's adoption of our theory:\n\n \"The simplest case to consider will be that in which two forms\n or varieties of a species, occupying an extensive area, are\n in process of adaptation to somewhat different modes of life\n within the same area. If these two forms freely intercross\n with each other, and produce mongrel offspring which are quite\n fertile _inter se_, then the further differentiation of the\n forms into two distinct species will be retarded, or perhaps\n entirely prevented; for the offspring of the crossed unions\n will be, perhaps, more vigorous on account of the cross,\n although less perfectly adapted to the conditions of existence\n than either of the pure breeds; and this would certainly\n establish a powerful antagonistic influence to the further\n differentiation of the two forms.\n\n \"Now, let us suppose that a partial sterility of the hybrids\n between the two forms arises, in correlation with the\n different modes of life and the slight external or internal\n peculiarities that exist between them, both of which we have\n seen to be real causes of infertility. The result will be\n that, even if the hybrids between the two forms are still\n freely produced, these hybrids will not themselves increase\n so rapidly as the two pure forms; and as these latter are, by\n the terms of the problem, better suited to their conditions\n of life than are the hybrids between them, they will not only\n increase more rapidly, but will also tend to supplant the\n hybrids altogether whenever the struggle for existence becomes\n exceptionally severe. Thus, the more complete the sterility of\n the hybrids the more rapidly will they die out and leave the\n two parent forms pure. Hence it will follow that, _if there\n is greater infertility between the two forms in one part of\n the area than the other, these forms will be kept more pure\n wherever this greater infertility prevails_, will therefore\n have an advantage at each recurring period of severe struggle\n for existence, and will thus ultimately supplant the less\n infertile or completely fertile forms that may exist in other\n portions of the area. It thus appears that, in such a case as\n here supposed, natural selection would preserve those portions\n of the two breeds which were most infertile with each other,\n or whose hybrid offspring were most infertile; and would,\n therefore, if variations in fertility continued to arise, tend\n to increase that infertility. It must particularly be noted\n that this effect would result, not by the preservation of the\n infertile variations on account of their infertility, but by\n the inferiority of the hybrid offspring, both as being fewer\n in numbers, less able to continue their race, and less adapted\n to the conditions of existence than either of the pure forms.\n It is this inferiority of the hybrid offspring that is the\n essential point; and as the number of these hybrids will be\n permanently less where the infertility is greatest, therefore\n those portions of the two forms in which infertility is\n greatest will have the advantage, and will ultimately survive\n in the struggle for existence.\"\n\nWe have here a full acceptance of the theory of physiological\nselection. For it is represented, as Mr. Gulick and I have represented,\nthat, if \"two forms or varieties\" occupying a common area are to\nundergo further differentiation at the hands of natural selection, it\nbecomes a highly favoring condition to the process that some degree\nof segregate fecundity should arise (if it has not already arisen)\nbetween these two forms or varieties; seeing that \"if these two forms\nfreely intercross with each other, and produce mongrel offspring\nwhich are quite fertile _inter se_, then the further differentiation\nof the forms into two distinct species will be retarded, or perhaps\nentirely prevented.\" Here the importance of segregate fecundity, or\nphysiological selection, as a factor in the differentiation of specific\ntypes on common areas is _fully recognised_; and the _only_ respect\nin which Mr. Wallace alleges that his view of the matter differs from\nthe view of Mr. Gulick and myself, is in drawing special attention to\nthe part which is played by the infertility, or other \"inferiority,\"\nof the mongrels. But clearly, this infertility, or other inferiority,\nof the mongrels, in all cases where it occurs, _is part and parcel of\nthe segregate fecundity of the parent forms_. Whether the segregate\nfecundity has reference to first crosses alone, or likewise to\nsecond crosses, it is segregate fecundity all the same; and the only\ndifference is that for the same degree of segregate fecundity in first\ncrosses, the process of physiological selection will become the more\neffective in proportion to the degree in which the infertility extends\nalso to second crosses. But I think it is very doubtful whether such\ninfertility (or inferiority) on the part of mongrels can react upon\nthe sexual system of their parent forms, so as directly to increase\nwhatever degree of segregate fecundity may have already arisen between\nthese forms. Does the high sterility of mules and mutes, for instance,\ntend to diminish the degree of fertility that obtains between horses\nand asses? The only way in which even an absolute degree of sterility\n(or other inferiority) on the part of mongrels or hybrids may clearly\nbe seen to operate in this direction, is as a negative condition; not\nas an active cause. In the proportion that mongrels are impotent with\none another, they will not so much compete with their parent forms\nfor food, etc.; and in the proportion that they are impotent with\ntheir parent forms, they will not counteract any tendency which the\nlatter may continue to develop in the direction of a still further\nsegregation. If the mongrels are fully vigorous and fully fertile, both\n_inter se_ and with their parent forms, the effect will be to retard,\nif not altogether to prevent, any further progress of physiological\nseparation between the parent forms; because the free intercrossing of\nthe mongrels with one another, and also with their parent forms, will\nbe continually supplying progeny in which the physiological peculiarity\nis either attenuated or altogether abolished. But this is quite a\ndifferent thing from supposing that infertility (or inferiority) of\nthe mongrels can react upon the generative system of the parent forms,\nso as to increase in them the physiological peculiarity on which\ntheir segregate breeding depends: infertility (or inferiority) of the\nmongrels is but a negative condition which favors the preservation of\nfurther degrees of this segregate breeding, if such further degrees\nshould be induced by any other causes.\n\nNow, it does not appear that Mr. Wallace has clearly perceived\nthis important distinction, because he throughout speaks of \"this\ninferiority of the hybrid offspring as the essential point.\" Obviously,\nhowever, the essential point is the physiological variation in the\nparent forms, i. e., the original occurrence and subsequent development\nof infertility between the first crosses. Granting to Mr. Wallace, for\nthe sake of argument, that this development could not proceed at all,\nwere it not for the inferiority of the mongrels; still the inferiority\nof the mongrels need not be the cause of this development. Therefore\nit is most incorrect to say, \"it must be particularly noted that this\neffect (i. e., increase of infertility between the parent forms)\nwould result, not by the preservation of the infertile variations on\naccount of their infertility, but by the inferiority of the hybrid\noffspring.\" \"This effect\" must be due to causes which act upon the\ngenerative systems of the parent forms, even though such causes might\nbe _counteracted_ by the _withdrawal_ of the negative condition in\nquestion.\n\nI trust, then, it has now been rendered sufficiently clear that, no\nmatter how infertile the hybrid progeny may become, and no matter at\nhow great a disadvantage they may thus (or otherwise) be placed in\ntheir struggle for existence with the parent varieties, it is not\napparent that their infertility (or their extinction) can ever become\nthe cause of a further increase of infertility arising between their\nparent forms. Consequently, although this is the cause assigned by Mr.\nWallace, when he comes to \"the essential point\" of showing how it is\nto act so as to increase cross-sterility between the parent forms, he\nna\u00efvely substitutes the sentence which I have printed in italics\u2014which\nassumes a \"greater infertility between the two forms\" as arising\nthrough any other causes that we may choose to suppose. The very thing\nthat his entire argument professes to explain (i. e., the rise and\ndevelopment of cross-sterility between the parent varieties) is slipped\nin as granted, or given by other causes than those which are said to\nexplain it.[6]\n\n [6] The only conceivable way in which infertility (or other\n inferiority) of hybrids could react on the sexual system of\n their parent forms, is one which Mr. Wallace appears to have\n missed: at all events he has nowhere stated it. This way is\n as follows. Suppose A and B to be two varieties which produce\n comparatively infertile hybrids. In the proportion that the\n hybrids are infertile, or otherwise inferior, it must be a\n disadvantage to both varieties for individuals belonging\n to one to cross with individuals belonging to the other,\n because by so doing they are wasting their time and their\n energy in propagating comparatively poor offspring\u2014thereby\n failing to impress their characters on the next generation as\n effectually as they might have done by pairing homogamously.\n Hence, those individuals which do pair homogamously will\n leave a larger number\u2014or better quality\u2014of offspring\n to the next generation, than is left by those which fail\n to pair homogamously. Hence, also, in the course of many\n generations a selective premium will be set on the homogamous\n pairing, A plus A, B plus B, whether such pairing be due\n to a sexual instinct or to a sexual incompatibility. For\n example, if horses and asses were to occupy the same area\n for a sufficient length of time, it is conceivable that the\n instinct which many horses now present of preferring asses\n to their own kind would become obsolete; because the horses\n or mares which have such an instinct would always fail to\n leave progeny that could transmit it, while such would not be\n the case with the horses and mares which preferred to pair\n homogamously, and so it might be if a physiological instead\n of a psychological character were concerned. But now observe,\n if this consideration were adduced, I should not be concerned\n to dispute it. For, even if such a principle of segregation\n does obtain, to what category does the principle belong?\n Clearly it does not belong to natural selection, inasmuch\n as a mere failure to impress individual characters on the\n next generation is not a matter of life and death in the\n struggle for existence. But, no less clearly, it does belong\n to physiological selection; and therefore, if it be an active\n principle in nature, it is an additional cause of segregate\n fecundity in first crosses. Moreover, such a principle, if\n it ever acts, presupposes some considerable degree of sexual\n differentiation as already given by some other cause.\n\nHaving thus endeavored to make it as clear as I can, that the causes of\nsegregate fecundity, both in its origin and subsequent \"increase,\" must\nbe causes acting on the physiology of the segregating forms themselves,\nand not the effects of these causes in the character of their mongrel\noffspring; I must next comment upon the extraordinary idea which\nunderlies the whole of Mr. Wallace's exposition, and which in one place\nhe expressly states. This extraordinary idea is that the theory of\nphysiological selection, as held both by Mr. Gulick and myself, takes\nno cognizance of the possible effects of cross-sterility in leading\nto infertility or inferiority on the part of mongrel progeny. I call\nthis an extraordinary idea, because it appears to me most extraordinary\nthat Mr. Wallace can have read our papers, and then have supposed that\nhe was adding anything to our theory by arguing the points which he\ndoes argue in the above quotation. When once this argument is correctly\nstated, it amounts, as we have just seen, to nothing more than pointing\nout how a segregate fecundity of first crosses will have a better\nchance of increasing, if the mongrel progeny are infertile or inferior.\nBut surely this goes without saying; or, if it be said, let it be added\nthat physiological selection, when it thus extends to second crosses,\nis really or ultimately due to physiological selection as regards the\nfirst crosses. If the segregate fecundity of the first crosses is of\nsuch a kind, that, besides tending to a physiological isolation of the\nparent forms, it leads to inferiority of the mongrel progeny; this is\nmerely a further expression of the segregate fecundity in question.\nIts effect is that of so far extinguishing the influence of progeny in\nthe subsequent history of parental segregation: therefore, its effect\nis just the same as if, owing to a somewhat higher degree of segregate\nfertility in the first instance (i. e., in the first crosses), a\nproportionately smaller number of mongrel offspring had been produced\nat all. In either case the result (physiological differentiation) is\nequally due to causes acting on the sexual system of the parent forms;\nand whether this effect is brought about by a suppression of progeny\nas to their numbers alone, or likewise as to their efficiency, is\nquite immaterial to the theory of physiological selection. Which shows\nonce more how wide of the mark is Mr. Wallace's statement, that \"the\ninferiority of the hybrid offspring is the essential point\" in any\nprocess of sexual segregation. The \"essential point\" must always be\nthe original occurrence and subsequent \"preservation of the infertile\nvariations\" arising between the parent forms, whether these variations\nare only in the direction of producing a smaller number of mongrels, or\nalso in that of suppressing their efficiency when produced.\n\nUpon the whole, then, it is surely the oddest of misconceptions on Mr.\nWallace's part that has led him to present the above-quoted \"argument\"\nas a substitute for the theory of physiological selection. As far as\nit goes, and as far as it is sound, it is the theory of physiological\nselection pure and simple\u2014neither adding to, nor detracting from it\none iota. Nevertheless, the \"argument\" has not yet gone far enough to\nembody some of the other elements of the theory. Therefore I will now\ncontinue the quotation:\n\n \"The differentiation of the two forms into distinct\n species, with the increase of infertility between them,\n would be greatly assisted by two other important factors\n in the problem. It has already been shown that, with each\n modification of form and habits, and especially with\n modifications of color, there arises a disinclination of the\n two forms to pair together; and this would produce an amount\n of isolation which would greatly assist the specialisation of\n the forms in adaptation to their different conditions of life.\n Again, evidence has been adduced that change of conditions\n or of mode of life is a potent cause of disturbance of the\n reproductive system, and, consequently, of infertility. We may\n therefore assume that, as the two forms adopted more and more\n different modes of life, and perhaps acquired also decided\n peculiarities of form and coloration, the infertility between\n them would increase or become more general; and as we have\n seen that every such increase of infertility would give that\n portion of the species in which it arose an advantage over\n the remaining portions in which the two varieties were more\n fertile together, all this induced infertility would maintain\n itself, and still further increase the general infertility\n between the two forms of the species.\"\n\nHere we perceive that Mr. Wallace, after having adopted the theory\nof physiological selection in its main elements, next proceeds to\nsupplement that theory (as Mr. Gulick and myself had previously done),\nby showing how greatly the principle of physiological selection\nmust be assisted by any association with other forms of isolation,\nor segregate breeding. The only difference between Mr. Wallace and\nourselves here is, that while he instances but three or four forms of\nsegregate breeding (or homogamy) with which physiological selection\nmay be associated, I had previously considered several others in\naddition to these, while Mr. Gulick had gone into the matter still\nmore exhaustively. Therefore, here as elsewhere, I can only account\nfor the character of Mr. Wallace's criticism by supposing that he read\nour papers inattentively in the first instance, and was afterwards\ninfluenced by \"unconscious memory\" in his subsequent cogitations upon\nthe problem of cross-sterility.\n\nAnd now, finally, in order to show this still more completely, I may\nquote the whole paragraph which concludes his long discussion of that\nproblem:\n\n \"The preceding argument, it will be seen, depends entirely\n upon the assumption that some amount of infertility\n characterises the distinct varieties which are in process of\n differentiation into species; and it may be objected that of\n such infertility there is no proof. This is admitted: but\n it is urged that facts have been adduced which render such\n infertility probable, at least in some cases, and this is\n all that is required. It is by no means necessary that all\n varieties should exhibit incipient infertility, but only some\n varieties; for we know that, of the innumerable varieties\n that occur, but few become developed into distinct species;\n and it may be that the absence of infertility, to obviate the\n effects of intercrossing, is one of the usual causes of their\n failure. All I have attempted to show is, that when incipient\n infertility does occur in correlation with other varietal\n differences, that infertility can be, and in fact must be,\n increased by natural selection; and this, it appears to me, is\n a decided step in advance in the solution of the problem.\"\n\nThis serves to convey a very accurate summary of the whole \"preceding\nargument\"; and it is likewise an admirably concise restatement of the\ntheory of physiological selection. The only points in it to which I\nobject\u2014considered as an epitome of my own paper\u2014are as follows.\nFirst, Mr. Wallace has not proved quite so good an advocate as he might\nhave proved, had he looked more closely into the evidence \"that some\namount of infertility characterises the distinct varieties which are\nin process of differentiation into species.\" For although he says,\nproperly enough, that his \"preceding argument\"\u2014i. e., the theory of\nphysiological selection\u2014\"depends entirely upon the assumption\" that\nsuch infertility does \"characterise distinct varieties which are in\nprocess of differentiation into species\"; still he is wrong in saying\nit is \"admitted\" that in favor of this assumption there is \"no proof\"\nbeyond what he has himself \"urged\" in the way of \"facts which render\nsuch infertility probable\": there are many other facts which not only\nrender such infertility probable, but prove it to be actual. Secondly,\nalthough I quite agree with Mr. Wallace in holding that natural\nselection must often, as I said in my original paper, \"co-operate\" with\nphysiological selection, still I must point out that the particular\nform of segregate breeding to which he here alludes is not natural\nselection at all; but (as explained in the foot-note to page 15)\nphysiological selection pure and simple. My objections, however, with\nregard to these two points have no reference to the validity of Mr.\nWallace's restatement of my views; and the fact that this restatement\nhas been given with the most incomprehensible unconsciousness that\nit is a restatement, does not appear to me to detract from the\nsignificance of the argumentative suicide in which his entire criticism\nis thus found to terminate.[7]\n\n [7] I am the more surprised that Mr. Wallace did not perceive\n his almost complete adoption of my views in this latest\n publication of his own, because I had previously had occasion\n to point out a partial adoption of them in an earlier\n publication of his on the same subject. The following is what\n I said upon that occasion\u2014viz., in the _Nineteenth Century_,\n January, 1888:\n\n \"One very obvious and probably frequent instance of what may\n be termed collective variation in the reproductive system\u2014or\n a variation due to a common cause acting on many individuals\n simultaneously\u2014is actually quoted from my paper by Mr.\n Wallace himself, namely, changes in the season of flowering\n or of pairing, which insure that any section of a species\n so affected shall be fertile only within itself. Collective\n variation of this kind may be directly due to the incidence\n of some common cause, such as changed conditions of life with\n respect to food, climate, station, etc.; or, as in the case\n of bud-variation, it may be due to a single \"sport\" affecting\n all the blossoms growing upon the same branch. But besides\n such direct action of a common cause, it is easy to see\n that natural selection, use and disuse, etc., by operating\n in the production of organic changes elsewhere, may not\n unfrequently react on the sexual system indirectly, and so\n induce the sexual change required in a number of individuals\n simultaneously.\"\n\n Now, in his _Darwinism_, Mr. Wallace again reproduces this\n instance of \"physiological selection,\" without even yet\n appearing to perceive that both in my original paper upon the\n subject and in my answer to his criticism as above quoted, I\n adduce this particular instance of physiological selection\n as a typical one. Therefore, when he now says:\u2014\"Another mode\n of isolation is brought about by the variety\u2014either owing\n to habits, climate, or constitutional change\u2014breeding at a\n slightly different time from the parent species: this is known\n to produce complete isolation in the case of many varieties of\n plants\": he is merely restating what I have repeatedly given\n as an unquestionable case of physiological selection.\n\nWith the self-destruction of this criticism I am left without any other\nto answer; and I should not have occupied so much space in dealing\nwith this one, were it not that the high estimation in which Mr.\nWallace is so deservedly held by all other naturalists is calculated\nto render almost incredible the peculiar position to which he has\neventually gravitated with reference to my views\u2014professing hostility\non the one hand, while reproducing them as original on the other. The\nmisunderstanding of my ideas which this state of matters represents,\nmight have led me to wonder whether I could possibly have rendered\nmy meaning more clear in the first instance, were it not that this\nmisunderstanding extends in an even greater measure to Mr. Gulick's\npaper than it does to mine. For seeing that the whole criticism is\nfounded on the erroneous idea that our theory supposes physiological\nselection always to act alone, the misconception becomes positively\nludicrous in its relation to Mr. Gulick's views; seeing that, as\npreviously stated, Mr. Gulick not only agrees with me in holding that\nphysiological selection must be greatly fortified by being associated\nwith any other form of homogamy, but even goes so far as to agree with\nMr. Wallace that, unless it is so fortified, it can never act at all.\nSo that, as far as physiological selection is concerned, Mr. Gulick's\ntheory is precisely identical with that of Mr. Wallace, and differs\nfrom his statement of it only in recognising a number of forms of\nhomogamy, in addition to natural selection, sexual selection, etc.,\nwith which the principle of physiological selection may be associated.\n\n GEORGE J. ROMANES.\n\n\n\n\nTHE IMMORTALITY OF INFUSORIA.\n\n\nThe ingenious hypothesis that Weismann, the eminent Freiburg professor,\npromulgated several years ago regarding the vitality of all unicellular\nbeings, but more especially of the Protozoans, is undoubtedly widely\nknown. Weismann maintained that the Protozoans were distinguished from\nthe Metazoans, or organisms composed of a number of cells, by the\ncurious property they possessed of exemption from decay and death.\nThe Protozoans exhibited, in the very words of the German savant,\nan instance of potential immortality;[8] that is to say, a natural\nphysiological death did not exist for them; if they perished, it was\nby accident or chance, extraneous to the laws of their organisation.\nA great many authors have written upon this subject since Weismann,\neither in support of his opinion, or in refutation of it, and of them\nwe may mention principally Goette,[9] Minot,[10] and M. Delboeuf.[11]\n\n [8] _Ueber die Dauer des Lebens._ Jena, 1882.\n\n [9] _Ueber den Ursprung des Todes_, 1883.\n\n [10] _La Mort et l'Individualit\u00e9._ (_Bulletin Scientifique du\n Nord_, 1884-85.)\n\n [11] _La Mati\u00e8re Brute et la Mati\u00e8re Vivante._ Paris 1887.\n\nIt is to be observed that this idea of potential immortality is not\nthe exclusive property of Weismann. We find it clearly indicated by\nEhrenberg. And, moreover, as B\u00fctschli remarks, it is so natural that\nit ought to occur of itself to the mind of every tolerably thoughtful\nobserver that has devoted his time to the study of the biology of these\nminute creatures.[12]\n\n [12] _Gedanken \u00fcber Leben und Tod_ (_Zoologische Anzeige_,\n Vol. v, 1882), cited by M. Maupas in _Multiplication des\n Infusoires Cili\u00e9s\u2014Arch. de Zool. Experimen._, No. 2, 1888.\n\nWeismann founded his theory in part upon metaphysical, or at least\ntheoretical, considerations, which we deem it useless to discuss at\nthis point. But it is also supported by observed facts, and these facts\nit will be profitable to recapitulate from the very onset. The idea\nof the immortality of Infusoria occurs naturally to the mind when one\nexamines with care what happens when an Infusorian reproduces. We know\nthat the reproduction consists in a bipartition of the body of the\nanimal, and that consequently the parent does not die but lives in the\ntwo products of its bipartition. In subsequent multiplications the same\nphenomenon is always observed to occur, so that the entire substance\nof the parent is found preserved and living in the individuals to\nwhich it gives birth. This process Weismann expressed by the emphatic\nstatement: In multiplication by division there are no corpses. It is\nwholly otherwise with the metazoans, and the reason of this fundamental\ndifference is easily explained by the comparison of the organisation\nof the body of a metazoan with that of a protozoan. Whereas the\nprotozoan is represented by a single cell that comprehends all the\nvital functions, the functions of reproduction as well as those of\nnutrition and relation, the metazoan, on the other hand, is composed of\nan aggregation, of a colony of distinct cells, among which a division\nof labor has been effected varying in complexity with the height that\nthe animal has attained in the classificatory scale. It results from\nthis division of labor that in the metazoan certain cells only\u2014those\nnamely which are called the sexual cells\u2014are entrusted with the office\nof the conservation of the species, while the various other cells are\nmore especially adapted to the conservation of the individual. When\na metazoan reproduces, the sexual cells alone enter into activity,\nand after having suffered various modifications, the principal one of\nwhich is fecundation, the sexual cells become the seat of numerous\nsegmentations that go to constitute a new animal distinct from the\none that gave it birth. The moment the parent individual ceases to\nbe blended with the individual it produces, it can perish without\nimperilling the conservation of the species, and thus it is that death\nappears in the animal kingdom as a logical consequence of division of\nlabor.\n\nWe also know that Weismann, in developing these interesting facts,\nwas led with many other naturalists to establish the doctrine that\nevery metazoan may be considered as made up of two entirely distinct\ngroups of cells: 1) of somatic cells, which represent the individual,\nand which are invested with the care of its nourishment, its\nsense-mechanism, its movements, and all the functions that have to do\nwith individual life; and 2) of sexual cells, charged with the office\nof the maintenance of the species in time. Whereas the somatic cells\nare destined to perish, the sexual cells on the contrary, multiplying\nby division after the mode of the reproduction of micro-organisms,\nrepresent the protozoan type, which is immortal; and, by the\nintermediary agency of the fecundated ovum, the sexual cells pass\nfrom generation to generation, thus forming a material bond between\nsuccessive generations. Though we have to succumb to death, there is\nat least a portion of us that ought not to die, from the fact that it\nis transmittible to our descendants. Naegeli expressed this idea in a\nfelicitous form, when he compared the species to a creeping branch that\nsent out at successive points annual buds. The buds, which die, are the\nindividuals\u2014that is the somatic group; while the branch that survives\nafter the death of the buds, and which represents the species, is the\nsystem of sexual cells. Weismann, finally, has described the same\nphenomenon by the expression 'continuity of the germinative plasm.'\n\nA great many discussions have arisen with regard to this germinative\nplasm; for everything touches upon this domain, and Weismann has\nconceived a theory that endeavors to explain not only the phenomenon\nof fecundation, but also that of heredity. I cannot mention here the\nnumerous works upon this subject, and refer the inquisitive reader for\na knowledge of the same to a series of lectures by Professor Balbiani\nthat I have epitomized in the _Revue Philosophique_ for December 1889.\n\nThe theory of the potential immortality of the Infusoria has recently\nbeen attacked by M. Maupas, whose observations tend to show that\nnatural death, caused by senescence, does obtain among the Infusoria,\nand that it is comparable in many points of view to the natural death\nof the metazoans. The researches of M. Maupas upon the multiplication\nof ciliate Infusoria are of a relatively recent date, having appeared\nin 1888 in Vol. VI. of the \"Archives de Zoologie Exp\u00e9rimentale.\"\n\nIt is scarcely necessary to say that the ciliate Infusoria can\npropagate without previous coition. The agamic mode of reproduction\nappears to be almost the same, save in a few details, as that which\nfollows coition. It consists in a bipartition or division of the body\nof the animal along a plane usually perpendicular to the grand axis of\nthe nucleus, and it is a matter of course that that element takes part\nin the division at the same time with the protoplasm. These phenomena\nof reproduction it is possible to study upon a grand scale by supplying\nInfusoria kept in captivity with abundance of nourishment. The easiest\nway is to produce a putrid fermentation by means of vegetable fragments\ncrushed and macerated in water. The Infusoria contained in this water\nfind abundant food furnished by the bacteria developed in it, and they\ntherefore multiply in great numbers. By means of appropriate methods of\ntreatment and isolation we are able to follow the phenomenon step by\nstep and to examine what the animal actually becomes after each agamic\nbipartition.\n\nWeismann, when he laid the foundation of his theory of the immortality\nof Infusoria, supposed that the development of the Infusoria by\nbipartition had no limits and could be prolonged indefinitely without\ninjury to the vitality of the protoplasm. Various authors had already\nmade observations which were directly in contradiction with this view.\nM. Balbiani, in 1860, in a communication entitled, \"Observations and\nExperiments upon the Phenomena of Fissiparous Reproduction among\nCiliate Infusoria,\"[13] concludes thus: \"one of the most important\nquestions ... has been to determine whether this mode of propagation\nis really unlimited, or whether, after being continued throughout\na greater or lesser number of generations, it becomes by degrees\nenfeebled, finally to disappear completely.... We have established\nthat this mode of propagation has its limits, and ends invariably\nin one of the three following ways: either by the _natural_ and\nalmost simultaneous _death_ of all the individuals belonging to the\nsame cycle, or by the recurrence of sexual generation leading to the\ntermination of one of the cycles and the commencement of a new cycle,\nor finally by the phenomenon of encystment, which in fact brings\nabout only a momentary interruption of the process of reproduction by\nfissiparity\" M. Balbiani, apropos of this subject, has called attention\nto a curious observation made by the celebrated Danish micrographer O.\nF. M\u00fcller, who lived in the last century. M\u00fcller had observed that the\nindividuals of any one species most ordinarily found in coition were\nalmost all of small stature. But he took them for the young individuals\nof the species. Now these individuals of small size are in reality\nthe oldest, that is to say, they are the ones that are the result of\na great number of successive bipartitions; and it is to be observed,\nthat, in a great many species, in proportion as the bipartitions\nincrease the size of the Infusoria decreases.\n\n [13] _C. R. Acad. des Sciences._ Vol. iv. p. 1191.\n\nIn fine, without further concerning ourselves with the history of this\nquestion, we see that according to M. Balbiani the agamic reproduction\nof Infusoria has its limits, and that, when coition, that is to say\nfecundation, does not intervene, it may terminate by the natural death\nof the individuals or in certain species by encystment.\n\nThe chief new element contained in the recent researches of M.\nMaupas, which were made twenty years after the date of the preceding\ninvestigations, consists in his study of the various phenomena of\nsenescence that the Infusoria after a long series of bipartitions\npresent. M. Maupas has established that there exists in the Infusoria\nno part, no element, that by itself and by its own faculties, can live\nand be maintained indefinitely. The first outward sign of degeneration\nis manifested in a reduction of size. The individuals, according as\nthe number of generations increases, become smaller and smaller.\nWith _Stylonichia pustulata_, which in the normal state measures one\nhundred and sixty \u03bc, the size of the body is seen gradually to fall\nto one hundred and thirty-five, one hundred and ten, seventy, and\neven to forty \u03bc. When the effects of senescence become marked, the\nanimal in its external organs undergoes atrophies and new and more\nprofound degenerations. In _Stylonichia pustulata_ the vibratile buccal\napparatus becomes gradually atrophied and partly disappears, and in\nall species the body is reduced and becomes more and more shrunken,\nassuming forms and contours very far removed from the specific type.\nThe degeneration of the nuclear apparatus at once begins. The first\nmodifications affect the accessory or attendant nucleus, a cut of\nwhich will be found at page 118 of my work on Micro-organisms,[14]\nand of which the principal function seems to be the maintenance\nand conservation of the species, and which, therefore, ought to be\nconsidered as the real substratum of the immortal plasma. Far from\nenjoying the attribute of eternal youth, the accessory nucleus seems on\nthe contrary to be affected with a weakness greater and more premature\nthan that of the other parts of the organism. In fact it is this organ\nthat is first atrophied and that disappears under the influence of\nsenile degenerescence. Then, in its turn, the principal nucleus is\naffected. It takes, according to the species, a different form. Now it\ndiminishes in volume, now it divides into two minute bodies that assume\nirregular contours, and at other times it assumes a ribbon-like shape.\n\n [14] English translation by The Open Court Pub. Co., Chicago.\n Longmans & Co., London.\n\nIt is interesting to note that even after the disappearance of the\naccessory nucleus, whenever the principal nucleus still subsists, the\nInfusoria continue to live and divide by fission. This life, says M.\nMaupas, has some features of abnormality about it, since it has become\nwholly purposeless. The animals still live an individual life, but they\nare dead to the life of the species.[15]\n\n [15] Page 262.\n\nIn concluding upon this point, I must mention the reservations that\nmay be entertained with regard to the exactitude of the preceding\nobservations and the value of the method employed in their attainment.\nA competent critic has remarked that it is difficult to assume that\nnine hundred and thirty-five specimens of the genus _Stylonichia_\ncould find the gases necessary for the support of life, seeing that\nM. Maupas kept them under the same stage where they only had at their\ndisposal a mass of water equal to one hundred cubic millimetres; and it\nmay thus be asked whether the phenomena of senescence produced under\nthese special conditions were not pathological. This criticism seems to\nbe especially strengthened by the fact, that according to M. Maupas,\nthe animalcula placed beneath the shield, all finally congregate at the\nedge of the preparation, evidently to seek there the air of which they\nare in need.\n\nIf we took our stand, however, upon the facts before cited we could\nconclude without hesitation that the celebrated thesis of Weismann\nregarding the immortality of the ciliate Infusoria had been overthrown.\nBut the phenomena are not presented with this simplicity. When the\nvitality of the Infusoria has become weakened by a considerable\nnumber of agamic reproductions, and the animalcule is upon the point\nof dying a natural death, a new biological phenomenon can intervene,\nrejuvenating the animal and rendering it capable of reproducing itself\nanew for a long series of generations. That phenomenon is fecundation.\n\n * * * * *\n\nIn our work upon Micro-Organisms we have spoken at length of the\nmaterial process of fecundation in ciliate Infusoria, and of the\nphenomena preliminary to it, following as our guide the observations\nof Balbiani, Gruber, B\u00fctschli, and Engelmann. It will be necessary to\nrecur here to that subject and to supplement our preceding exposition\nwith some important details. Moreover, recent researches, added to\nother older ones, afford us interesting information with regard to\nthe conditions and determining causes of conjugation and also of the\nsignificance of fecundation itself.\n\nWe have seen above that according to M. Balbiani an active period\nof agamic bipartition in Infusoria can terminate in a period of\nconjugation; a circumstance which produces in effect a cyclical\nalternation between agamic generations and a sex-generation. The very\nword cycle is used in the observations of M. Balbiani. M. Maupas\nelevated this observation of M. Balbiani to the rank of a method;\nusing, in order to procure the great number of coitions necessary for\nhis investigations, the following process. He placed the Infusoria in\nwater in which he had produced a putrid fermentation. The Infusoria,\nthanks to the abundance of the nutriment developed in great numbers.\nWhile thus swarming they were lifted out with a drop of water, which\nwas kept upon the stage in a moist chamber. The Infusoria there\ncontinued to grow larger and multiply; but by reason of their great\nnumbers it was not long before they exhausted the food brought with\nthem in the drop of water. When the last remains of their nutriment had\ndisappeared they were seen in the majority of cases to seek each other\nand to copulate.\n\nAccording to M. Maupas, it is not solely the weakness produced by a\nseries of bipartitions, but, in addition to that and more particularly,\nthe scarcity of food, that excites in the ciliate Infusoria the\nconjugal appetite. The epidemics of conjugation of which the authors\nspeak, are not otherwise explainable. M. Maupas even says, that when\na number of pairs are about to copulate, it is only necessary to give\nthem food to put an end to their conjugation. Scarcity, that author\nfurther remarks, ought evidently not to modify in any essential the\ninternal organic state of the Infusoria in question; no more indeed\nthan the opposed condition, that is, an abundance of rich food (page\n403 of his memoir). But in the first case they copulate without any\nado; in the second, they refuse to do so entirely. Rich alimentation\ndeadens the conjugal appetite; fasting, on the contrary awakens and\nexcites it. There exists moreover, according to the author last\nmentioned, in ciliate Infusoria, a particular period beyond which\nfecund coitions cannot take place. It is what he calls the period\nof karyogamic maturity. Thus, in _Leucophrys_, for example, fecund\ncoitions are observed to take place only after the three-hundredth\ngeneration. Before that time the Infusoria may be placed in all\nthe other conditions favorable to copulation, without being seen\nto contract a single union. On the other hand, beyond that time, a\nperiod extends in which numerous coitions are obtained. Although,\nindeed, the cyclical alternation of agamic generations and copulations\nis indisputable, further researches are still necessary to obtain\na thorough knowledge of the extent of these cycles. It is certain\nthat their duration varies in the different species, and perhaps,\nin conditions as yet imperfectly known, may in any one species be\nconsiderably abridged.\n\nWe are now come to the preliminaries of copulation. We have described\nthem in our work, making use of the observations of Balbiani, Gruber,\nand of Engelmann, some of which we found confirmed by B\u00fctschli. M.\nMaupas, who has recently again taken up this question, believes he\nhas discovered in his predecessors, or rather in the observations\nof M. Balbiani, grave errors. I shall transcribe the passage in\nquestion: \"When a numerous group of Infusoria of the same species are\nfound in the conditions that determine copulation, these animalcula\nabandon themselves to certain movements, and exhibit an agitation\nthe significance of which has been much exaggerated. Balbiani, who\nin fact always seeks analogies with the higher animals, has given\nus an animated description of these movements, to which a poetical\nimagination has contributed at least as much as exact and scientific\nobservation. This description has met with a most favorable reception\namong certain philosophers and psychologists who have taken up with\nit in the belief that they could thereby reveal in microzoans the\nrudiments of the instincts and psychic faculties of higher-organized\nbeings. As there is very much inexactitude and exaggeration in all\nthat, it is time to calm this enthusiasm and to refer the facts and\ntheir explanation to some more exact criterion.\" (Page 413.)\n\nI believe it useless to occupy my time in dealing with the aggressive\ntone that this author has seen fit to assume towards me, and which\nseems to be habitual with him when he criticises the works of people\nwith whom he does not agree. I shall carefully examine his observations\nand seek to derive from them some profit, to the improvement and\ncorrection of my work upon the Psychic Life of Micro-Organisms, if it\nis true that I have committed the grave errors of which he speaks.\nBesides, the question of the preliminaries of copulation is so\ninteresting in itself that I have no fear of turning to it a second\ntime.\n\nIt is necessary, here, clearly to distinguish two things: the facts\nand their explanations. In that which concerns observed facts, the\nerrors that M. Maupas endeavors to point out in the descriptions of M.\nBalbiani appear to me to be capable of a reduction to a matter of so\nlittle significance\u2014admitting that it comes at all from error\u2014that if\nI had not been apprised of it, I should have regarded the researches\nof the first author as a confirmation in most details of those of the\nsecond. It is to be observed, in fact, that M. Maupas gives almost the\nsame description that Balbiani does of the movements of _Param\u00e6cium\naurelia_. \"I have followed animals of that species a number of times,\"\nhe says, \"during the preparations for copulation. They exhibit at that\nmoment a very great agitation. They are seen to go and come, rapidly\nchanging their direction. They approach and throw themselves against\ntheir congeners, halt in front of them, feel them an instant with\ntheir cilia, then leave them, assume the most varied positions, and,\nfinally, when two individuals equally ready for union chance to meet\neach other, they face about by their anterior extremities so that the\ntwo bodies come together and join, with the exception of the posterior\nextremities, along their whole extent; the union is thus definitively\neffected.\"\n\nUp to this point, let it be observed, our author's description is but\na paraphrase of that of M. Balbiani, which we have given on page 69 of\nour work; and a simple comparison of the two suffices to prove this.\nThe divergences of fact extend, as it seems to me, to the two following\npoints only: The duration of the preliminaries, and the existence\nof an epidemic of copulation. M. Maupas thinks that the movements\nin question never last very long, at the most a quarter of or half\nan hour among individuals that have arrived at karyogamic maturity.\nWhereas M. Balbiani has observed these same movements last for several\ndays. I do not know which of these two observations is the more exact;\nin fact, I do not think it necessary to choose between them, since\nboth may be exact, the duration of the phenomenon generally being\ndependent upon conditions subject to great change, while M. Maupas\nhimself remarks that the ciliate Infusoria in the variability of all\ntheir biological phenomena are veritable thermometers of a very great\nsensibility. However that may be, whether the movements that precede\ncopulation in _Param\u00e6cium_ last a quarter of an hour, half an hour,\nor several days, that fact does not change their real character. The\nsecond divergence relates to the epidemics of copulation in the case of\n_Param\u00e6cium aurelia_; observed by M. Balbiani and denied by M. Maupas.\n\"All the individuals of a group,\" says M. Maupas, \"are never found\nsimultaneously in this condition. Hence the tentative preliminaries of\ncopulation, that fail in their object and end in the individuals going\nto seek elsewhere another partner.\" I confess, I do not understand this\nstatement, involving, as it does, M. Maupas in a contradiction; for two\npages before this he speaks of the mode of the appearance of copulation\nas in the epidemic form. All observers, he says, that have occupied\nthemselves with this phenomenon, state that it is suddenly developed\nin the little aquariums in which the animals are contained, and very\nrapidly becomes general (page 41).\n\nTo this then the divergences of fact are reduced\u2014a matter entirely\ninsignificant; and I believe it useless to dwell upon it longer. The\nquestion of interpretation remains. I shall also say a few words with\nreference to this, although the disagreement is at bottom not much more\nserious.\n\nWe have seen, that, according to M. Maupas, the Infusoria do not\nseek each other and copulate until after a fast of considerable\nduration caused by exhaustion of the store of food in the medium\nin which they live. The author concludes from this that scarcity\nof food is the sole and real cause of the great agitation in which\nthey are then seen. \"When an infusion thickly populated begins to\nget exhausted, the animalcula congregate together, always forming\nthose whitish cloud-spots that we have described as the prelude\nto copulation.... Not until afterwards do the actual movements of\ncopulation occur, which never last very long.\" Accordingly, there is\nfirst an agitation produced by hunger, and only in consequence of\nthat are the preliminaries of copulation brought about. Admitting\nthis interpretation as exact, which is indeed a question that I\nreserve, I conclude that M. Maupas completely accepts the facts of the\npreliminaries of copulation, distinguishing them from other phenomena\nthat precede them. He says, moreover, and these are his own words,\nthat the sexual impulse does indeed exist in these little creatures.\nUnquestionably he is right in adding that this sexual impulse presents\nin the ciliate Infusoria manifestations much simpler than in the higher\nanimals, and that it is otherwise in accord with their simplicity of\norganisation. That is evident, and no one I believe has ever maintained\nthe contrary.\n\nFinally, the author refuses to admit that the sexual manifestations\nof the Infusoria can be compared with the phenomena of _rut_.\n\"Rut,\" he says, \"the external and psychic manifestations of which\nwe know with any degree of exactitude only in mammals, is a reflex\nphenomenon concomitant with and consecutive to the maturation of the\nGraafian vesicles. It is therefore an especial phenomenon peculiar\nto the females of the highest group of the animal series. Males are\nnot subject to rut, but are always ready to experience the sexual\nexcitation whenever they find themselves in contact with females that\nare fallen into that condition\" (page 414).\n\nNaturalists will certainly read with great astonishment this definition\nof rut, which is wholly new and personal to the author. Hitherto the\nword rut has not been reserved for mammals; it has been applied to all\nclasses of animals, even to the lowest, and Duvernoy, for example, has\ndevoted an article to the rut of zo\u00f6phytes.\n\nWe now come, following the chronological order of the phenomena, to the\nmaterial processes of conjugation, otherwise called fecundation, in the\nciliate Infusoria. It is needless to take up in its entirety a question\nthat we have already examined, and which will be found treated of at\npage 65 of our work. But it is certainly interesting to dwell upon the\ngeneral significance of the question of fecundation. It is known that\nall ciliate Infusoria, excepting some species such as _Opalina_, a\nparasitic infusory of the frog, exhibit in their protoplasm two kinds\nof nuclear corpuscles. First a nucleus, a principal nucleus, which the\nauthors designate by the names endoplast and macronucleus; this element\nis in some ways comparable to the nucleus of the cells of tissues.\nBesides this the ciliate Infusoria possess a smaller nuclear element\nthan the former, called by the authors nucleolus, or endoplastule, or\nattendant nucleus, or finally micronucleus. This micronucleus comprises\nin its evolution the internal phenomena of the process of conjugation.\nThe principal nucleus plays in the process but an accessory r\u00f4le, for\nit is a wasted element destined to be replaced by a nucleus of new\nformation; when it undergoes more or less complete elimination. The\nattendant nucleus passes through a series of complicated modifications\nwhich vary much in detail for each species. First, there are stages of\ndivision destined to prepare the way for the elimination of the used\nup corpuscles. But the most important fact is that at a given moment\nthere exists in the protoplasm of each ciliate Infusory in conjugation,\ntwo corpuscles derived from the nucleus; then an exchange is effected\nbetween the two individuals in copulation; each transmits to the other\none of the corpuscles, which copulates with the remaining corpuscle\nleft in the interior of the body. These two little nuclei that play\nparts so different are, according to M. Maupas, completely identical\nwith one another and do not show the least difference either in form,\nvolume, or structure. \"In the twelve species in which I have succeeded\nin closely studying these organs,\" says that author, \"I have always\nseen them act with the most perfect similitude under the influence of\ncoloring and fixitive re-agents.\" Nevertheless, in view of the future\ncondition of these two elements, M. Maupas is led to give them the very\nsignificant names of male pronucleus and female pronucleus. The female\npronucleus is the one that remains immobile in the body of the parent\ngamete; while the other, the male, is exchanged and passes into the\nbody of the other gamete.\n\nIn what does the real nature of the copulation of these two pronuclei\nconsist? Does it consist in a fusion of the elements mentioned, or,\nindeed, do the latter preserve their original independence and autonomy\nin the midst of the new mixed nucleus, standing in juxtaposition\nwith and moving in and about one another? This is the question that\nM. Maupas immediately proceeded to examine. The recent researches\nof M. Ed. Van Beneden upon the internal mechanism of fecundation in\n_Ascaris megalocephala_ are well known. We have published in the _Revue\nPhilosophique_, following M. Balbiani, a r\u00e9sum\u00e9 of these important\ninvestigations, and we may be permitted to reproduce here a few\npassages therefrom; for nothing is more interesting than the evolution\nfollowed by our ideas in that which concerns fecundation.\n\nThe notions that were formed of this phenomenon only took definite and\nprecise shape from the time when the existence of the two elements\nof fecundation, the spermatozo\u00f6n and the ovum, could be established.\nIt was at first believed that the spermatozo\u00f6n impregnated the ovum\nby the exercise of a purely physical action\u2014an action of contact\nand influence. But observation demonstrated that something more took\nplace, namely, an actual conjugation, a union, a blending of the\nspermatozo\u00f6n and the ovule. A further step was made in 1875, when\nit was discovered, in studying the ova of Echinoderms, that but one\nsingle part of the ovule, the germinative vesicle, conjugated with but\none part of the spermatozo\u00f6n, namely the head, and that since these\ntwo elements have each the value of a nucleus, fecundation consisted\nin the conjugation of two nuclei. But there was still an element of\nobscurity in this idea, simple as it was. If the nuclei were vesicles\nlike soap-bubbles they might burst, the one within the other; but\nthe nucleus contains a great number of differentiated elements, the\nchromatic reticulated substance, the nuclear substance, the nucleoli,\netc.: what becomes of all these elements during the conjugation of\nthe two nuclei? In 1881, Flemming made a new advance in the question.\nHe determined more precisely the nature of the fusion of the two\npronuclei, establishing that it consisted in the blending of their\nchromatic substances. This he observed in the ova of the Echinoderms.\nAccording to the very recent works of M. Van Beneden upon _Ascaris\nmegalocephala_, the great nematoid of the horse, there is no fusion\nwhatever between the two pronuclei. They always remain distinct. Each\npasses through, separately, all the phases of karyokinesis, when the\nfecundated ovum divides. In this connection the recent observations of\nM. Balbiani confirm the opinion of Van Beneden, who had been sharply\nattacked by Carnoy and Zacharias. First, in each of the two pronuclei\neach reticulate substance is observed to present the initial phases\nof karyokinesis; the net-works form into a skein that contracts and\nthickens; the ribbon-like body thus formed divides into two segments,\nwhich bend so as to form acute-angled crooks or loops. There are thus\nproduced two loops in the male pronucleus, and two in the female\npronucleus. Then the two male loops approach the two female loops in\na manner such that a sort of star is formed with eight branches turned\ntowards the periphery of the ovum (nuclear or equatorial disk). Then\nthe fecundated ovum begins to divide into segments. Now at every new\nequatorial stage of the subsequent divisions of the ovum these four\nloops are seen to reappear in such a manner that fusion never takes\nplace between the male element and the female element. Each of the four\nprimitive chromatic loops divides by longitudinal division into two\nsecondary loops, whence result two equatorial semi-disks, each formed\nof four secondary loops, of which two come from the male pronucleus and\ntwo from the female pronucleus. Each of the two new nuclei contains\ntherefore a certain number of male and female chromatic loops, and\nconsequently presents an hermaphroditic constitution.\n\nFor Van Beneden, therefore, fecundation consists essentially in the\npresence in the ovum of two nuclei, one male and one female. The\nconjugation of the two nuclei is a phenomenon of no importance; it\nmay take place, or it may not. The physiological signification of\nfecundation is a process of rejuvenation, in which the ovum replaces\nits old male element with a new male element, the spermatozo\u00f6n.[16]\n\n [16] _Recherches sur la Maturation de l'\u0152uf, etc. Arch. de\n Biol. Vol. iv. 1883. Nouvelles Recherches sur la F\u00e9condation.\n Bul. de l'Acad. Roy. des Sciences de Belgique, 3 S\u00e9rie, Vol.\n xiv. 1887._\n\nM. Maupas remarks that the pronuclei of the Infusoria by reason\nof their complicated structures do not admit of these difficult\ninvestigations. Nevertheless he mentions the fact that these pronuclei\nare, in the elements mentioned, composed of two distinct substances,\nhyaloplasm and chromatin. He puts forth the opinion that the hyaloplasm\nconstitutes an accessory portion, and that the chromatin is endowed\nwith the fecundative properties. Which means that in certain ciliate\nInfusoria the male pronucleus at the moment of its migration is\ncomposed solely of chromatin. Finally, M. Maupas arrives at the\nconclusion that the supreme end of fecundationis the renovation, the\nreconstitution, of a rejuvenated nucleus formed by the copulation\nof two fecundative nuclei having distinct origins and of which the\nchromatin elements represent the essential part (page 434).\n\n * * * * *\n\nIt is now time to return a moment to the theory of Weismann and to see\nif it has not been shaken by the new data that we have just placed\nbefore the reader. Accepting the results of the experiments of M.\nMaupas, who, as a matter of fact, has arrived at the same conclusions\nas M. Balbiani, we are led to the admission that when a ciliate\nInfusorian multiplies by agamic division a great number of times, the\noffspring that appear after from 50 to 100 bipartitions has not the\nsame physiological value as its original progenitor; and that agamic\nmultiplication ends in exhaustion and in natural death. But it must, on\nthe other hand, be taken into account that this process of senescence\nis counteracted by that of conjugation, which consists in a nuclear\nrenovation; and since the substance, the protoplasm, of the rejuvenated\nindividual escapes death, a new argument might be found in these last\nmentioned facts for the theory of the immortality of Infusoria.\n\nThe question is, at bottom, whether the individual after conjugation is\nidentically the same as before conjugation, or whether it constitutes a\nnew animal. In that the solution rests. Now, the new element that the\nindividual acquires by the act of conjugation is the male pronucleus of\nits partner. In addition it loses the greater part of its old accessory\nnucleus and the whole of its old principal nucleus. In return, by way\nof compensation, it preserves the integrity of its protoplasm and of\nits other organs. M. Gruber believes that physical identity persists in\nspite of these modifications. M. Maupas maintains the contrary.\n\nIt seems to us that a question of this character does not admit of\na satisfactory solution, and this opinion will be shared by all\nwho have considered the idea of physical identity. It is a notion\nobscure, uncertain, and full of contradictions. We have formed it\nbecause it answers our practical needs. But it is certainly evident\nthat it corresponds to no well defined external phenomenon. In fact,\nwe understand by physical identity the constant reunion of certain\nelements in a certain order. If the order of these elements is very\nslightly modified, or if a very small number of these elements is\nreplaced by others, we do not hesitate to say that the physical\nidentity in question has not been altered by these insignificant\nmodifications. If, on the other hand, the order has been almost totally\ndestroyed, if the greater portion of the elements has been renewed, we\nshould, on the contrary, say that the identity of the thing in question\nhad been lost in these alterations and that a new object had replaced\nthe old. Replace a stone in a house and the latter remains the same\nhouse; rebuild the house upon a new plan and with different materials\nretaining very little of the first construction, and it is a different\nhouse. But between these two extreme cases there is a whole series of\npossible intermediate changes, and we are not able to establish clearly\nby any exterior mark the point where physical identity ends. This is a\nmatter of personal estimation; I might even say of caprice; and all the\ndiscussions raised upon these questions appear to me wholly idle.\n\nI believe, accordingly, that the thesis of Weismann regarding the\nimmortality of Infusoria eludes a direct refutation. It is neither\nconfirmed nor overturned by observed facts.\n\n ALFRED BINET.\n\n\n\n\nON THE MATERIAL RELATIONS OF SEX IN HUMAN SOCIETY.\n\n\nMuch interest is displayed at present in the development of woman,\nboth as to her personal characteristics, and in her relations to her\nsurroundings in human society. It is justly said that the civilisation\nof a nation may be measured by the degree of humanity displayed by its\nmen towards its women. This is for the reason that, since women are\nthe weaker sex, man has only ethical reasons for self-restraint in his\ntreatment of her. Nowhere is the sex-interest under better ethical\ncontrol than in the United States; and it is in this country also that\nwe hear the most of reforms which are necessary in order that woman\nmay attain a further development, and assume a higher position in\nrelation to the state. This being the case, it is extremely important\nthat the foundation facts, or in other words the necessary natural\nconditions, under which the sexes co-operate in society, should be\nfully understood. That they are not understood, or that they are\nintentionally ignored in some quarters, is evident to any one who reads\nthe current literature of the subject.\n\nThe relation of the male man to his environment involves the usual\nstruggle for existence more or less active. His _pi\u00e8ce de resistance_\nis the mineral and vegetable world and its atmosphere, and his\nantagonist is his fellow man. The former generally yields more or less\nabundantly to his solicitations. What he gets from his fellow man is\nacquired through the necessities of the latter, and the benefit may be\nmutual, or it may be all on one side. His best friend may unconsciously\nand unintentionally, in the regular order of trade, reduce him to\nbeggary, or compel him, as an alternative, to emigrate to a distant\nland. Such results are more frequent as population increases. To\nmaintain himself against the destructive forces of nature, such as\ncold, heat, rains, tempests, fires, blights, etc., is his necessary\noccupation. If he pursue a profession, or if he be in trade, he must\nsupply the actual needs of his fellow man, and beware that competition\nand monopoly do not deprive him of all return for his labor.\n\nWoman, considered by herself, is subject to identical conditions.\nHer needs are the same and her environment is the same. But she is\nnot so well endowed as man to supply the one or to meet the other.\nHer disabilities are of two kinds, physical and mental. The physical\nare: first, inferior muscular strength, and secondly, childbearing.\nThe latter means more or less incompetence for active work at monthly\nperiods, or several months of gestation and lactation, and some years\nof care of children. The mental disabilities are: first, inferior power\nof mental co-ordination; and secondly, greater emotional sensibility,\nwhich interferes more or less with rational action.[17]\n\n [17] This is, of course, only true where the sexes of the same\n subspecies or race are compared.\n\nFrom these facts it is evident that, were woman of the same sex as\nman, that is, were she simply another kind of man, she would soon be\neliminated from the earth under the operation of the ordinary law of\nthe survival of the fittest. This need not be through any agencies\ndifferent from those now actually in operation among men under the\ncircumstances of peaceful trade. And such is often the actual history\nof male men who possess marked feminine characteristics. It does\nnot follow from this, that some women might not sustain themselves\napart from men, in agriculture, trade, and the professions. This is\nespecially possible where the struggle is not very severe; but in the\ncases which exist, few are really independent of male assistance, which\nhas furnished the capital, either of cleared land, money, or as an\nappointing power. The general result, as above stated, is self-evident\nfrom the facts.\n\nRemedies for this disability are frequently proposed. A higher\neducation, while an unquestioned advantage, does not remove it. The\nballot would only result in removing any disability of an artificial\ncharacter which might exist, but could not effect those imposed by\nnature. There is no method of human contrivance by which the natural\ndifficulty may be overcome.\n\nBut Nature has supplied a most effective remedy. Woman not being of\nthe same sex as man, supplies a necessity which is almost universal,\nso that she is placed, if she exercise reasonable care, in a position\nbetter than that of man in relation to the struggle for existence.\nThe antagonist of man, his fellow man, is eliminated from the list of\nthe antagonists of woman, and that is an advantage which cannot be\noverestimated. Not only is man removed from the field as a competitor,\nbut he becomes an active helper in resisting the forces of nature. More\nthan this, he is willing under the circumstances, to divide with her\nwhat he extracts from both man and nature. Were these the only benefits\nthat woman derives from man they would constitute a sufficient reason\nfor the usual preference which she displays for his protection, rather\nthan for a life of independence. But she is herself possessed of a\nsex-interest which is satisfied by such a relation. Not only this, but\nher love of children constitutes a further inducement, which is highly\neffective in bringing about her customary relation with man.\n\nIt is self-evident then that any system which looks to a career for\nwomen independent of man, such as man pursues, is abnormal, and\ninjurious to her interests.\n\nThe support and protection given by man to woman is then clearly\nrendered as an equivalent for the services she renders him in the\ncapacity of a wife. It is universally implied, if not distinctly stated\nin the contract between them, that she shall not be the wife of some\nother man, and that the children she bears shall be also those of the\nmale party to the contract, or the husband. It is not necessary that\nany such obligation should be entered into by the man, for the obvious\nreason that he does not bear children. If the woman violates this\ncontract, the man is under no moral or legal obligation to support her.\nIf the man has other wives he does not thereby forfeit protection and\nsupport of the wife, since she has none to offer him. This general fact\nwould not prevent a woman possessed of wealth who supported a husband,\nfrom withdrawing such support in case he should become polygamous. But\nsuch a situation is so exceptional as to deserve but a passing notice\nin a consideration of the whole question.\n\nIt is frequently insisted that responsibility of man to woman in the\nmatter of monogamic relations, is ethically the same as that of woman\nto man. This has not been the view of mankind generally, and it is\ndistinctly negatived by the facts in the case. The marriage relation is\nclearly a contract in which the consideration on one side is support\nand protection, and the consideration on the other is monogamic\nwifehood, or the definite paternity of children and their care and\neducation. The immediate reason why particular men and women marry\nparticular women and men, is, or ought to be, love and affection; but\nthese admirable sentiments, are the offspring of natural conditions of\nsex, without which woman, and especially man, would not marry at all.\nAnd these natural conditions are clearly satisfied by the maintenance\nof the contract as above described. In order to further enforce this\nposition I merely refer to the well-known fact that man cannot commit\nmarital infidelity in the same sense that woman can, on account of his\nphysical diversity. His unfaithfulness introduces no new blood into\na family, and makes no defect in the inheritance, as does the same\nact on the part of the woman. The woman is in a position of trust,\nprecisely like the responsible officers of a bank. It is in the power\nof both to defraud those who trust them. Hence it is that woman has\nbeen always held to stricter account in this matter than man, and\nalways must be. For this reason the jealousy displayed by husbands\nis more justifiable than that displayed by wives; and the result of\nmarital infidelity on the part of wives is usually more disastrous to\nthe offending parties. It is in consequence of these facts that there\nexists some difference in the ethical feelings of the sexes on this\nquestion. It is undoubtedly true that there are more women willing\nto live in polygamy than men willing to live in polyandry, in spite\nof the verbal objections that women make to such a system in modern\ntimes. I do not now refer to promiscuity, in which the affections\nare in no wise concerned. In this everyway inferior relation, men\nare the most numerous offenders. It is for the reasons above stated\nthat women are more monogamous in their tendencies than men. Not only\ndoes the question of support and protection during child-bearing and\nat other times make it more to their interest to be so, but they are\nmore inclined to attach themselves to particular persons than men, on\naccount of their superior affectional endowments. This is an inevitable\nresult of their occupation in the family and with the family for\ncountless ages, and is as much a product of their evolution, as is the\nsuperior rationality and self-control of the male sex.\n\nThe above picture may seem to some persons of progressive views on\n\"the woman question\" somewhat onesided. But the relation of man to\nthe contract is not yet completely described. Meanwhile I refer to a\nsentiment attributed to a single woman, a teacher in a girls' school,\nI believe near Pittsburg, quoted by a lady writer in the _Popular\nScience Monthly_, several months ago. This lady, believing that the\nstrength of the emotional elements of character in women constitutes a\ndisability, and stands in the way of her so-called equality with man,\nhad resolved to suppress that part of her nature, and to live a life\nfree from its consequences. She hoped thus to attain a condition not\nonly equal, but superior to that of men, and was prepared to teach the\ngirls committed to her care that this was their duty to themselves\nand to the world. For this reason she would not marry. The fallacy in\nthis reasoning consists in the omission of certain important premises.\nThe principal one of these is, that neither she nor any other woman\ncan exterminate in a life-time, the heritage which woman has derived\nfrom the entire history of the human species, to say nothing of the\ninheritance from the ancestors of mankind, where the same traits exist\nin the diminished ratio of a smaller mentality. In order to accomplish\nthis change in female character, it would be necessary that the same\ncourse should be pursued by many successive generations of women; how\nmany, it is impossible to calculate. This would require that such women\nshould marry, which is what the lady whose views are referred to above,\ndesired to avoid. In fact it is typical women who will marry, and\ntypical women will be therefore produced to the end of time, unless\nsome new system of sex relations shall be introduced.\n\nIt is sometimes suggested that a change in intersex relations is\ndesirable in order to effect a fuller emancipation of women from\npresent conditions. With the remark in passing, that the natural\nrestraints imposed by the present marriage system on woman are not\ngreater than those imposed on man, although different, we may refer\nto the alternative arrangement which has been sometimes adopted. This\nis that woman should be free from all obligation to fidelity to any\nparticular man, and that man should be free from the obligation to\nsupport any particular woman. In other words it is sometimes proposed\nthat we return to the primitive state of human society. Such a system\nhas descended to us from ancient times, and it only needs to be\nmentioned to satisfy us that woman is the loser by it to a degree that\nis disastrous to the interests of society in every respect. It is only\na being devoid of the developed traits of womanhood who could succeed\nin a polyandrous career, since she must renounce the pleasures of\nfamily life, even if she is exceptionally able to accumulate the means\nof support for her self and children in later years.\n\nA second alternative, that woman may secure the support of one man,\nwhile her marital relations are polyandrous, is an impossible dream of\nthe imagination. This could be only possible under the condition that\nthe child-bearing sex should be the stronger sex, and fully capable of\nself-support and self-protection; a condition which is not found in\nmankind.\n\nA third alternative is the communistic relation where the state\nsupports women and children, without inquiry as to parentage, and\nwithout reference to the monogamic or promiscuous relation of the\nsexes. Such a system, could it continue long enough, would result\nin the breaking up of the sentiment of conjugal affection which now\ncharacterises our race, and the destruction of marital fidelity. The\nquestion is whether or not this system would be preferable to that of\nmonogamic marriage above described. As it is a proposition for the\namelioration of the present condition of women, the decision should\nrest with them. The women of the white race would probably declare\nagainst it by a very large majority, were a vote to be taken. This\nvote would be, however, largely influenced by custom, and not by a\ndeliberate conclusion derived from experience. Since experience of\nsuch system cannot be had at present, we are compelled to rely on such\nknowledge as we possess in the premises.\n\nIt may be safely assumed that the monogamic tendency is constitutional\nwith the majority of women. In spite of curiosity and other\ninducements, the idea of love for a single person is deeply ingrained\nin her nature. It is an ideal to be realised somehow and at some time,\nand anything short of it is a disaster only to be endured through\nsome irresistible necessity. No normal woman would hazard the risks\nto person and property involved in indefinite matrimonial relations.\nThe idea of the family becomes the more fixed in proportion as it is\nrealised in actual experience. In spite of pessimists and unfortunates,\nthe mutual love of man and woman is a sentiment deeply seated in the\nnature of both. Its strength is attested by the enormous popularity\nof the literature of which it forms the theme, and of the drama where\nits history and vicissitudes are depicted. Men and women who underrate\nits power, or who attempt to resist its effects, are like dead leaves\nbefore the winds. Would men and women be satisfied with a system\nwhich should place these affections in constant suspense, and which\nshould afford no safeguard for the protection of inexperience, or\ndefense against the temporary effects of superficial attractions and\nrepulsions? I suspect not, for more would be lost than gained by such\npossibilities. Relief from unfortunate connections is certainly proper,\nbut this can be had in such a way as to render it certain that the best\ninterests of both parties are subserved, by a system of time contracts\nof marriage, such as I crudely suggested in _The Open Court_ for\nNovember 1888. But the emotions of sex cannot be safely left without\nsafeguards derived from the experience of mankind. This is not only on\naccount of the force of these passions themselves, but because of the\nmaterial necessities which are so intimately involved with them. The\nelement of paternal interest will have to be eliminated from the man,\nand of conjugal fidelity from the woman before a communal system can\nbe possible. And the absence of these traits is only characteristic of\nsome of the lower races of men at the present time. Evolution has not\nweakened, but has greatly strengthened them, and it is not likely that\nour race will go backward in this respect.\n\nOf course it may be asserted that this evolution has taken the wrong\ndirection, and is not an improvement. I think the contrary may be shown\nto be true. The paternal instinct is as important to the adolescent\nstages of man as the maternal is for the period of infancy. Paternity\nstimulates the man to labor for the support and education of his\nchildren, and for their general well-being. Without such support many\nwould die, reach an imperfect development, or become feeble members\nof society. The fidelity of the woman develops the same trait in\nman, and it stimulates him to the greatest exertions to secure her\nwell-being also. Such forces as these cannot be withdrawn from society\nwithout infinite loss. It is the knowledge that this is _my_ wife\nand that these are _my_ children, that sustains more than half of\nhuman industry. With a communistic system these inducements would be\nwithdrawn, and mankind would sink into comparative apathy, were it\npossible for the system to endure long enough.\n\nIt is evident that monogamic and polygamic systems are the only ones\npossible to modern society. The polygamic requires little notice\nbecause the general equality in numbers of the sexes deprives it of\nfoundation. It is only possible where women are in excess, and where\nthey are willing to sustain it. No man who is successfully married is\nlikely to incur the additional obligations which it imposes. It may\nbe therefore dismissed from notice with the further remark that it is\nnot on the other hand deserving of the obloquy cast upon it by certain\npersons who are evidently \"compounding for sins they have a mind to by\ndamning those they're not inclined to.\"\n\nThe monogamic relation having been defined in the preceding paragraphs\nI recur to some of its obligations. I have spoken of the infidelity of\nwoman as of a higher degree of criminality than that of man, and have\nshown the basis of justice on which this general sentiment rests. But\nit must not be forgotten that while he who hires a murderer, and he who\nreceives stolen goods does not commit the actual crime, he is highly\nculpable, and shares in the condemnation which should follow it. In\nthe case of the marital infidelity of the woman, he may be the greater\ncriminal of the two, as the instigator to a deed which would not have\nbeen otherwise even suggested. In any case his folly is extraordinary,\nas he takes his life in his hands, and risks that of his partner; for\nmen are wont to preserve their family rights by summary process. It\nwould be incredible that such risks should be taken were it not that\nhistory and contemporary literature offer many examples. The few cases\nwhere palliating circumstances could be claimed would chiefly occur in\ncountries where divorce laws do not exist.\n\nThe advantages to woman, arising from the monogamic relation, are then,\nsupport and protection, and undivided affection if she deserve it,\ntogether with the satisfaction of the conjugal and maternal instincts.\nIn order to secure these advantages she must pursue a course towards\nher husband in some degree comparable to that by which her husband\nsecures the confidence and esteem of his fellow man. Faithfulness in\nadhering to contracts, and personal complaisance cover much of the\nground. As regards the man, he must see to it, that he does nothing\nthat tends to the disintegration of the family relations of other men.\nThe ill disguised laudation of the infidelity of wives which is so\nprominent in French literature, is a mark of a low civilisation, and\nit rightly excites the disgust of all men who have any respect for\ntheir own rights. It looks as though certain French literature had\nbeen written by boys. Men who are responsible for such invasion of the\nrights of others, cannot expect better treatment themselves, and they\nmust not be surprised if they are repaid in their own coin. While the\npreservation of the rights of the marriage contract lies primarily with\nwoman, for natural reasons; man is held by his fellow man to a strict\naccountability, and he attempts any invasion of them at his personal\nperil.\n\nThe principles above laid down are those out of which have grown\nour laws on the subject. Some women and men appear to think them\nunjust to women. It is true that in some respects, woman is at a\ndisadvantage. This disadvantage is, however, of natural origin and\ncannot be overcome. On the other hand, she has a full equivalent in the\nadvantages which she also derives from the natural order of things. The\nresult is that there is no real cause of complaint, unless it be that\nsometimes the gallantry of men towards women whom they do not know,\nleads them to do injustice to man in cases of dispute. And here is\nan advantage to women which is an offset to the injustice which they\nsometimes experience from the same source. The correction of these\nfaults is a part of the process of ethical development which is going\non in human society. And perhaps the most effective agency in this\ndevelopment is the relation of the members of the family to each other,\nwhere affection takes the place of force, since it is the source of our\ndeepest pleasures and our severest pains.\n\n E. D. COPE.\n\n\n\n\nTHE ANALYSIS OF THE SENSATIONS.\n\nANTIMETAPHYSICAL.\n\n\nI.\n\nThe great results that physical research in the last centuries has\nachieved, not only in its own domain, but also, by the assistance it\nhas afforded, in the domain of other sciences, have brought it about\nthat physical ways of thinking and physical methods of procedure have\neverywhere attained to especial prominence, and that the greatest\nexpectations are associated with their employment. In conformity with\nthis drift of modern research the physiology of the senses, gradually\nleaving the paths that had been entered upon by men like Goethe,\nSchopenhauer, and others, but especially with the greatest success\nby Johannes M\u00fcller, has also almost exclusively assumed a physical\ncharacter. This tendency must appear to us as not exactly the proper\nand the desirable one, when we reflect that physics despite its\nconsiderable development nevertheless constitutes but a _portion_ of a\ngreater collective body of knowledge, and that it is incompetent with\nits limited intellectual methods, created for especial and limited\npurposes, to exhaust the entire material of the province now under\nconsideration. However, without renouncing the support of the science\nof physics, it is possible for the physiology of the senses not only\nto continue its own special development, but also to afford physical\nscience itself valuable assistance. The following simple considerations\nwill serve to illustrate this relation.\n\n\nII.\n\nColors, sounds, temperatures, pressures, spaces, times, and the like,\nare united with one another in the most manifold ways; and to these are\njoined moods of mind, feelings, and wills. Out of this complication,\nthat which is relatively the more fixed and the more permanent stands\nprominently forth, engraves itself in the memory, and expresses itself\nin language. As relatively more permanent appear, first, _complexes_\nof colors, sounds, pressures, and so forth, that are connected in time\nand space, that therefore receive special names, and are designated as\n_bodies_. Such complexes are by no means absolutely permanent.\n\nMy table is now brightly and now darkly lighted. It may be warmer or\ncolder. It may receive an ink stain. One of its legs may get broken. It\ncan be repaired, polished, and replaced part for part. But for me, amid\nall, it remains the table at which I daily write.\n\nMy friend can put on a different coat. His countenance can assume a\nserious or joyful expression. The complexion of his face, under the\neffects of light or of emotion, can change. His shape can be altered by\na movement, or can be permanently transformed. But the sum total of the\npermanent, as compared with gradual alterations of this kind, always\nremains so great, that the latter vanish. It is the same friend with\nwhom I take my daily walk.\n\nMy coat can receive a stain, a tear. The very manner of my expression\nindicates that the gist of the thing is a quantity of permanency, to\nwhich the new element is added and from which that which is lacking is\nsubsequently deducted.\n\nOur greater intimacy with this quantity of permanency, and its\npreponderance as contrasted with the changeable, impel us to the\npartly instinctive, partly voluntary and conscious economy of mental\nrepresentation and designation which is expressed in ordinary thought\nand speech. That which has been _once_ perceptually represented\nreceives _a single_ designation, _a single_ name.\n\nAs relatively permanent, is exhibited, further, that complex of\nmemories, moods, and feelings, joined to a particular body (the human\nbody), which is denominated the \"I\" or \"Ego.\" I can be engaged with\nthis subject or with that subject, I can be quiet or animated, excited\nor ill-humoured. Yet\u2014pathological cases not considered\u2014enough that is\npermanent remains to recognise the ego as the same. Moreover, the ego\nalso is only of relative permanency.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe apparent permanency of the ego consists pre-eminently in the\nfact of its _continuity_, and in its slow change. The many thoughts\nand plans of yesterday that are continued to-day, and of which our\nenvironment in waking hours continually reminds us (and therefore in\ndreams the ego can be very indistinct, doubled, or entirely wanting),\nand the little habits that are unconsciously and involuntarily kept up\nfor longer periods of time, constitute the fundamental root of the ego.\nThere can hardly be greater differences in the ego of different people,\nthan occur in the course of years in _one_ person. When I recall\nto-day my early youth, I should take the boy that I then was, with the\nexception of a few single features, for a different person, did not the\nchain of memories that make up my personality now lie before me. Many\na treatise that I myself wrote twenty years ago, now makes upon me a\nvery strange impression. The very gradual character of the changes of\nthe body also contributes to the permanency of the ego, but in a much\nless degree than people imagine. Such things are much less analysed\nand noticed than the intellectual and the moral ego. Individually,\npersonally, people have a very poor knowledge of themselves.\n\nOnce, when a young man, I espied in the street a face in profile that\nwas very displeasing and repulsive to me. I was not a little taken\naback when a moment afterwards I found that it was my own, which, in\npassing by a place where mirrors were sold, I had perceived reflected\nfrom two mirrors that stood at the proper inclination to each other.\n\nNot long ago, after a trying railway journey by night, being much\nfatigued, I got into an omnibus just as another gentleman appeared\nat the other end. \"What degenerated pedagogue is that, who has just\nentered,\" thought I. It was myself: opposite me hung a large mirror.\nMy ordinary dress, accordingly, was more familiar to me than my\ntravelling attire.\n\nThe ego is as little absolutely permanent as bodies. That which we so\ngreatly fear in death, the annihilation of our permanency, actually\noccurs in life in abundant measure. That which is most valued by us,\nremains preserved in countless copies, or, in cases of exceptional\nexcellence, as a rule preserves itself. In the best human being,\nhowever, there are individual traits the loss of which neither he\nhimself nor others need regret. Indeed, at times, death, viewed as\nliberation from individuality, can even become a pleasant thought.\n\n * * * * *\n\nAfter the first survey has been obtained, by the formation of the\nconcepts of substance, \"body\" \"ego\" (matter, soul), the will is\nimpelled to a more exact examination of the _changes_ that take place\nin this relatively permanent existence. The changeable element in\nbodies and in the ego, indeed, is the very thing that moves the will.\nNow, for the first time, do the constituent elements of the complex\nstand forth as properties of the same. A fruit is sweet; but it can\nalso be bitter. So, too, other fruits can be sweet. The red color that\nis sought is found in many bodies. The neighborhood of some bodies is\npleasant, that of others unpleasant. Thus, gradually, do different\ncomplexes appear to be composed of common constituent elements. The\nvisible, the audible, the tangible, are separated from bodies. The\nvisible is broken up into color and into form. Out of the manifold\nconstitution of colors issue, again, in lesser numbers, certain other\nconstituent elements\u2014the primary colors, and so forth. The complexes\nare disintegrated into _elements_.\n\n\nIII.\n\nThe proper and useful habit of designating that which is permanent by\na _single_ name, and of comprehending the same in a _single_ thought,\nwithout analysing at each operation its constituent parts, is liable\nto come into singular conflict with the tendency to separate these\nconstituent parts. The obscure image formed of the permanent, which\ndoes not perceptibly change when one or another constituent part is\ntaken away, appears to be something existent _by itself_. Inasmuch as\nit is possible to take away _singly_ every constituent part without\neffecting the capacity of the image formed to _represent_ the totality\ninvolved, or effecting its subsequent recognition, it is imagined that\nit is possible to take away _all_ these parts and yet have something\nremaining. Thus arises the monstrous idea of a _thing of itself_,\ndifferent from, and incognisable with relation to, its \"phenomenal\"\nexistence.\n\nThing, body, matter, are nothing apart from this complex of\ncolors, sounds, and so forth\u2014apart from their so-called marks, or\ncharacteristics. That Protean, illusory philosophical problem of\na _single_ independent thing with _many_ properties, arises from\nthe misunderstanding of the fact, that extensive comprehension and\naccurate separation, although both are temporarily justifiable and\nprofitable for a number of purposes, can not and must not be employed\n_simultaneously_. A body is _single_ and unchangeable so long as it\nis not required to take details into consideration. Thus both the\nearth and a billiard ball are _spheres_ so long as we disregard all\nminor deviations from the spherical form, and greater exactitude is\nnot necessary. But if we are compelled to carry on investigations in\norography or microscopy both bodies cease to be spheres.\n\n\nIV.\n\nMan possesses in pre-eminence the power to determine arbitrarily\nand consciously his point of view. He can at one time disregard the\nmost salient features, and immediately afterwards take into account\nthe smallest trifles; now regard a current of electricity as fixed,\nwithout consideration of its contents, and now determine the width of\na Frauenhofer line in the solar spectrum; he can rise, at will, to the\nmost general abstractions, or bury himself in the minutest particulars.\nThe animal possesses this capacity in a much less degree. It does not\nassume a point of view, but usually is brought to it by impressions.\nThe baby that does not recognise its father with his hat on, the dog\nthat is perplexed at the new coat of its master, have succumbed in the\nconflict of points of view. Who has not been thus worsted in similar\ncases? Even the man of philosophy at times succumbs, as the fantastic\nproblem above referred to, shows.\n\nIndeed, do not certain circumstances actually appear to furnish a\njustification of that problem? Colors, sounds, the odors of bodies\nare evanescent. But the tangible part, as a sort of constant, durable\nnucleus, not easily liable to annihilation, remains behind; appearing\nas the vehicle of the more fugitive properties annexed to it. Habit\nfirmly affixes our thought to this central nucleus, even where the\nknowledge has found its way, that seeing, hearing, smelling, and\n_touching_ are intimately akin in character. Added to this, also, comes\nthe fact, that in consequence of the singularly extensive development\nof mechanical physics a kind of _higher reality_ is ascribed to Space\nand Time than to colors, sounds, and odors. Agreeably to which, the\njunction in space and time of colors, sounds, and odors appears _more\nreal_ than colors, sounds, and odors themselves. The physiology of the\nsenses, however, demonstrates, that spaces and times can with as much\njustice be termed sensations, as colors and sounds.\n\n\nV.\n\nAlso the ego, as well as the relation of bodies to the ego, occasions\nthe rise of analogous seeming-problems, the character of which may be\nbriefly presented in the following manner.\n\nThe complexes of colors, sounds, and so forth, that are commonly called\nbodies, we shall designate for the sake of simplicity by _A B C_ ...;\nthe complex that is known as our own body, and which constitutes a\npart of the former, we shall call _K L M_ ...; the complex composed\nof volitions, memory-images, and the like, we shall represent by \u03b1 \u03b2\n\u03b3. Usually, now, the complex \u03b1 \u03b2 \u03b3 ... _K L M_ ... is opposed as ego,\nto the complex _A B C_ ... regarded as world of substance; sometimes,\ntoo, \u03b1 \u03b2 \u03b3 ... is comprehended as ego, and _K L M_ ... _A B C_ ...\ncomprehended as world of substance. Now _A B C_ ... first appears as\nindependent of the ego. But this independence is only relative, and\ngives way before closer inspection. Much, it is true, may change in\nthe complex \u03b1 \u03b2 \u03b3 ... without much becoming noticeable in _A B C_ ...;\nand so _vice versa_. But many changes in \u03b1 \u03b2 \u03b3 ... pass, by way of\nchanges in _K L M_ ..., over to _A B C_ ...; and _vice versa_. (As,\nfor example, when vivid ideas break forth into acts, or our environment\nbrings about perceptible changes in our body.) At the same time _K L M_\n... appears to be more closely connected with \u03b1 \u03b2 \u03b3 ... and _A B C_ ...\nrespectively, than the latter do with one another; relations that find\ntheir commonest expression in thought and speech.\n\nClosely examined, however, it appears that _A B C_ ... is _always_\ndetermined with and by _K L M_. A die, when seen close at hand,\nlooks large; when seen at a distance, small; it looks different with\nthe right eye from what it does with the left; sometimes it appears\ndouble; with closed eyes it is invisible. The properties of the same\nbody, therefore, appear as modified by our own body; they appear\nas conditioned by it. But where, pray, is this _same_ body that\nphenomenally appears so _different_? All that can be said is, that\ndifferent _A B C_ ... are annexed to different _K L M_.[18]\n\n [18] I expressed this thought many years ago (in the\n _Vierteljahrsschrift f\u00fcr Psychiatrie_, Leipsic and Neuwied,\n 1868: _Ueber die Abh\u00e4ngigkeit der Netzhautstellen von\n einander_) as follows: The expressions \"sense-deception\"\n and \"illusion of the senses\" prove, that we are not yet\n fully conscious, or at least that we have not yet found it\n necessary to incorporate this consciousness into our ordinary\n terminology, _that the senses represent things neither\n wrongly nor correctly_. All that can be truly said of the\n sensory organs is, that, _under different circumstances they\n produce different sensations and perceptions_. Since these\n \"circumstances\" are of so extremely manifold a character,\n being partly external (inherent in the objects), partly\n internal (inherent in the sensory organs), and partly interior\n (having the seat of their activity in the central organs), it\n would naturally seem, especially when attention is paid only\n to external circumstances, that an organ acts differently\n under like conditions. And it is customary to call the unusual\n effects, deceptions or illusions.\n\nWe see an object with a point _S_. If we touch _S_, that is bring\nit into relation with our body, we receive a prick. We can see _S_,\nwithout feeling the prick. But as soon as we feel the prick we find\n_S_. The visible point therefore is a _permanent fact_ or _nucleus_, to\nwhich the prick is annexed, according to circumstances, as something\naccidental. From the frequency of occurrences analogous to this we\nultimately accustom ourselves to regard _all_ properties of bodies as\n\"effects\" proceeding from permanent persistent nuclei and conveyed\nto the ego through the mediation of the body; which effects we call\n_sensations_. By this very operation, however, these imagined nuclei\nlose their entire sensory content, and become mere mental symbols.\nThe assertion is correct then that the world consists only of our\nsensations. In which case we have knowledge _only_ of sensations, and\nthe assumption of the nuclei mentioned, as well as of a reciprocal\naction between the same, from which sensations might be supposed\noriginally to proceed, turns out to be wholly idle and superfluous.\nSuch a view can only suit a halting realism or a half-matured\nphilosophic criticism.\n\n\nVI.\n\nOrdinarily the complex \u03b1 \u03b2 \u03b3 ... _K L M_ ... is opposed as ego to the\ncomplex _A B C_. Those elements only of _A B C_ ... that more actively\nalter \u03b1 \u03b2 \u03b3 ..., as a prick, a pain, are we accustomed to comprehend in\nthe ego. Afterwards, however, through observations of the kind above\nmentioned, it appears that the right to annex _A B C_ ... to the ego at\nno point ceases. In conformity to which the ego can be so extended as\nultimately to comprehend the entire world.\n\n * * * * *\n\nWhen I say that the table, the tree, and so forth, are sensations of\nmine, there is contained in this, as contrasted with the method of\nrepresentation of the ordinary man, an actual extension of my ego. And\nso, too, upon the emotional side, such extensions actually occur; as\nfor the virtuoso, who possesses as perfect a mastery of his instrument\nas he does of his own body; for the skilful orator in whom the eyes of\nan audience converge, and who controls the thoughts of his hearers; for\nthe energetic politician who directs with ease his party; and so on.\nIn conditions of depression, on the other hand, such as nervous people\noften have to endure, the ego contracts and shrinks. A wall seems to\nseparate it from the world.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe ego is not sharply defined, its limits are very indefinite, and\narbitrarily displaceable. Only by mistaking this, and by unconsciously\nnarrowing these limits, as well also as by enlarging them, do\nmetaphysical difficulties, in the conflict of points of view, arise.\n\nAs soon as we have recognised that the supposed unities \"body\" and\n\"ego\" are only make-shifts for a _provisional_ survey and for certain\npractical ends (that we may apprehend bodies, protect _ourselves_ from\npain, and so forth), we are obliged, in many thorough-going scientific\ninvestigations, to abandon them as insufficient and inappropriate. The\nopposition between ego and world, sensation (or phenomenon) and thing,\nthen vanishes, and we are brought to deal simply with the _connection\nand relation of the elements_ \u03b1 \u03b2 \u03b3 ... _A B C_ ... _K L M_ ..., for\nwhich indeed this very opposition was only a partially appropriate,\nimperfect expression. This connection is nothing more than the\ncombination of those elements with other homologous elements (time and\nspace). This connection science has simply to _accept_, and set itself\naright with regard to it, without attempting to explain its existence.\n\nUpon superficial examination the complex \u03b1 \u03b2 \u03b3 ... appears to consist\nof much more _evanescent_ elements than _A B C_ ... and _K L M_ ..., in\nwhich two last the elements appear to be joined with _more stability_\nand _in a more permanent manner_ (being joined to solid nuclei as it\nwere). Although upon closer inspection the elements of all complexes\nappear as _homologous_, yet even in spite of the recognition of\nthis fact, the ancient notion of an opposition of body and spirit\neasily creeps in. The spiritualist feels, at times, the difficulty of\nimparting the necessary solidity to his world of substance created\nby mind: the materialist is at a loss what to do when called upon to\nanimate and endow with sensation the world of matter. The _monistic_\npoint of view that reflection and reason have evolved, is easily\novercast by the older and more powerful instinctive notions.\n\n\nVII.\n\nThe difficulty described is especially felt in the following\nconsiderations. In the complex _A B C_ ... which we have designated\nas the material world, we find as part, not only our own body _K L M_\n..., but also the bodies of other persons (or animals) _K' L' M'_ ...,\n_K\" L\" M\"_ ..., annexed to which, after the analogy of the complex \u03b1\n\u03b2 \u03b3 ..., we conceive similar \u03b1' \u03b2' \u03b3' ..., \u03b1\" \u03b2\" \u03b3\". As long as we\ndeal with _K' L' M'_ ..., we find ourselves in a thoroughly familiar\nprovince, at every point sensorially accessible to us. But when we\ninquire after the sensations or feelings that belong to the body _K'\nL' M'_ ..., we no longer find in the province of sense the elements we\nseek: but we add them in thought. Not only is the domain into which we\nnow enter much less familiar to us, but also the transition to it is\nrelatively unsafe. We are possessed of a feeling as if we were about to\nplunge into an abyss. They that always pursue this direction of thought\nand this direction _only_, will never get completely rid of the feeling\nof insecurity that is very productive as a source of apparent problems.\n\nBut we are not limited to this way of reasoning. Let us consider first\nthe reciprocal relation of the elements of the complex _A B C_ ...,\nwithout regarding _K L M_ ... (our body). Every physical investigation\nis of this kind. A white bullet falls upon a bell; a sound is heard.\nThe bullet turns yellow before a sodium lamp, red before a lithium\nlamp. Here the elements (_A B C_ ...) appear to be connected only\n_among each other_ and to be independent of our body (_K L M_ ...).\nBut if we take santonine the bullet turns yellow again. If we turn one\neye sidewise we see two bullets. If we close our eyes entirely we see\nno bullet at all. If we sever our auditory nerve no sound is heard.\nThe elements _A B C_ ..., therefore, are not only connected among\neach other, but also with _K L M_. To this extent and to this extent\n_only_ do we call _A B C_ ... _sensations_, and regard _A B C_ ... as\nbelonging to the ego. In this way, accordingly, we do not meet with\nthe gap between bodies and sensations before described, between that\nwhich is without and that which is within, between the material and the\nspiritual world.[19] All elements _A B C_ ... _K L M_ ... constitute\nbut _one single_ coherent mass, which when any one element in it is\ndisturbed _all_ is put in motion; except that a disturbance has a more\nextensive and profound action in _K L M_ ..., than in _A B C_. A magnet\nin our neighborhood disturbs the particles of iron near it; a falling\nboulder shakes the earth; but the severing of a nerve sets in motion\nthe _entire_ system of elements. Quite involuntarily does this relation\nof things suggest the picture of a viscous mass, at certain places (as\nin the ego) more firmly coherent than at others.\n\n [19] Compare my _Grundlinien der Lehre von den\n Bewegungsempfindungen_. Leipsic, Engelmann, 1875, p. 54.\n\n * * * * *\n\nWhen I first came to Vienna from the country, as a boy four or five\nyears of age, and was taken by my father upon the walls of the city's\nfortifications, I was very much surprised to see people below in the\nmoat and could not understand how, regarded from my point of view, they\ncould have gotten down there; for the thought of another possible way\nnever occurred to me. I remarked the same amazement, once afterwards\nin life, in the case of a three-year old boy of mine, while taking a\nwalk with him upon the walls about Prague. I recall this feeling to\nmind every time I engage myself with the reflection above referred to,\nand I frankly confess that this accidental experience of mine greatly\nhelped to strengthen the opinion upon this point that I adopted a long\ntime ago. The habit of pursuing the same ways in material and psychical\nthings operates to confuse greatly our field of survey. A child forcing\nits way through a wall in a house in which it has long dwelt, can\nexperience an actual enlargement of its view of the world, and a slight\nscientific hint can bring much enlightenment.\n\n\nVIII.\n\nAccordingly, the great chasm between physical and psychological\nresearch exists only for the common stereotyped method of observation.\nA color is a physical object when, for example, we regard its\ndependence upon its luminous source (upon other colors, upon heat,\nupon space, and so forth). Regarding however its dependence upon\nthe retina (the elements _K L M_ ...), it becomes a psychological\nobject, a sensation. Not the subject-matter, but the direction of our\ninvestigation is different in the two domains.\n\nWhen, from the observation of the bodies of other men or animals,\nwe infer their sensations, as well also as when we investigate the\ninfluence of our own body upon our own sensations, we are forced to\ncomplete observed facts by analogy. This work of completion by analogy\nis done with much more accuracy and facility, when it relates, let\nus say, to nervous processes, which cannot be fully observed in our\nown bodies\u2014that is when it occurs in the more familiar physical\ndomain\u2014than when the completion relates to psychical processes.\nOtherwise there is no material difference.\n\n\nIX.\n\nThe thoughts presented gain greatly in fixity and vividness if in\naddition to simply expressing them in abstract form we bring ourselves\nface to face with the facts from which they arise. For example, I lie\nupon my sofa. If I close my right eye the picture represented in the\naccompanying cut is presented to my left eye. In a frame formed by the\nridge of my eyebrow, by my nose, and by my moustache, appears a part\nof my body, so far as it is visible, and also the things and space\nabout it. _My_ body differs from other human bodies\u2014leaving out of\naccount the fact that every vivid motory idea immediately passes into\nmovement and that contact with it determines more perceptible changes\nthan contact with other bodies\u2014by the circumstance, that it is only\npartly seen, and, especially, is seen without a head. If I observe an\nelement _A_ within my field of vision, and investigate its connection\nwith another element _B_ within the same field, I go out of the domain\nof physics into that of physiology or psychology, if _B_, to use the\napposite expression that a friend[20] of mine employed upon seeing this\ndrawing, passes through my skin. Reflections like that for the field\nof vision may be made with regard to the province of touch and the\nperceptual domains of the other senses.\n\n [20] J. Popper of Vienna.\n\n[Illustration]\n\n\nX.\n\nReference has already been made to the different character of the\ngroups of elements that we have designated by _A B C_ ... and \u03b1 \u03b2\n\u03b3. As a matter of reality, when we _see_ a green tree before us, or\n_remember_ a green tree, that is _conceive_ a green tree to ourselves,\nwe know right well how to distinguish these two cases. The imaged tree\nhas a much less determinate, a much more changeable form; its green\nis much paler and more evanescent; and, what is of especial note,\nit distinctly appears in a _different_ sphere. A movement that we\n_propose_ to execute is always only a _conceived_ movement, and appears\nin a different field or sphere from that of the executed movement,\nwhich moreover always takes place where the image becomes vivid enough.\nThe statement that the elements _A_ or \u03b1 appear in a different sphere,\nmeans, if we go to the bottom of it, nothing more than that they are\nunited with divers other elements. To this extent, accordingly, the\n_basal component parts_ in _A B C_ ..., \u03b1 \u03b2 \u03b3 ... would be _the same_\n(colors, sounds, spaces, times, motory sensations, innervations ...),\nand only the character of their union different.\n\nPain and pleasure are ordinarily regarded as different from sensory\nsensations. Yet not only tactile sensations, but also all other kinds\nof sensations, can gradually pass into pleasure and pain. Pleasure and\npain can also justly be called sensations. Only they are not so well\nanalysed and so familiar as sensory sensations. Sensations of pleasure\nand pain, however faint the mode of their appearance, make up indeed\nthe real content of all so-called feelings. Thus perceptions, as well\nas ideas, volition, and feelings, in short the entire inner and outer\nworld, are composed of a small number of homologous elements united in\nrelations now more evanescent and now more lasting. These elements are\ncommonly called sensations. But since vestiges of a one-sided theory\nnow inhere in this term, we prefer to speak simply of _elements_, as we\nhave already done. All research aims at the resolution of the union of\nthese elements.[21]\n\n [21] Compare the remarks appended to my treatise: _Die\n Geschichte und die Wurzel des Satzes der Erhaltung der\n Arbeit_. Prague. Calve. 1872.\n\n\nXI.\n\nThat out of this complex of elements which at bottom is simply _one_,\nthe limits of bodies and the ego do not admit of being fixed in a\nmanner certain and sufficient for all cases, has already been said.\nThe composition of the elements, intimately connected with pleasure\nand pain, into an ideal mental-economical unity, the ego, is a work of\nthe highest significance for the intellectual functions that act in\nthe service of the pain-avoiding, pleasure-seeking will. The formation\nof the ego by this process of circumscription and delimitation is\ntherefore instinctively effected, it grows familiar and natural, and\nfixes itself perhaps through heredity. By their high _practical_\nvalue, not only for the individual, but also for the entire race, the\ncomposites \"ego\" and \"body\" instinctively assert their existence,\nand operate with the power of original elements. In _special_\ncircumstances, however, in which practical ends are not concerned, but\nknowledge becomes an object in itself, this delimitation often turns\nout to be insufficient, obstructive, and untenable.\n\nProfessional _esprit de corps_, and even professional bias, the\nsentiment of nationality, the most narrow-minded local patriotism may\nalso have a high value, for certain _purposes_. But such conceptions\nwill not characterise the far-sighted investigator, at least not in the\nmoment of research. All these egoistic conceptions are adequate for\npractical purposes only. Of course, even the investigator can succumb\nto custom. Trifling scholastic fiddle-faddle, the cunning appropriation\nof others' labor and perfidious silence with regard to it, the\nnumerous objections and complaints when unavoidably compelled to give\nrecognition, and the scanty illumination of others' performances on\nsuch occasions, abundantly show that the scientist and scholar have\nalso to fight the battle of existence, that the ways of science yet\nlead to the mouth, and that the _pure_ quest of knowledge amid our\npresent social relations is still an ideal.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe primary fact is not the _I_, the ego, but the elements\n(sensations). The elements _constitute_ the _I_. _I_ perceive the\nsensation green, means, that the element green occurs in a given\ncomplex of other elements (sensations, memories). When _I_ cease to\nperceive the sensation green, when _I_ die, then the elements no longer\noccur in their customary, common way of association. That is all. Only\nan ideal mental-economical unity, not a real unity, has ceased to exist.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe ego is not an unchangeable, definite, sharply-defined unity.\nThe important factor is not _unchangeability_, not determinate\n_distinguishability_ from other things, and not accurate _limitation_,\nfor all these factors even vary within the sphere of individual life\nitself, and their alteration is even _sought_ by the individual.\n_Continuity_ alone is important. This view admirably accords with\nthat to which Weismann recently attained by biological investigations\n(\"Regarding the Immortality of Unicellular Beings,\" _Biolog.\nCentralbl._, Vol. IV, Nos. 21, 22; compare especially pp. 654 and\n655, where the division of the individual into two _equal_ halves is\nspoken of). But this continuity is only a _means_ to dispose and to\nassure the content of the ego. This _content_ and not the _ego_ is the\nprincipal thing. But this content is not confined to the individual.\nWith the exception of insignificant, valueless, personal memories or\nreminiscences, it remains preserved in _others_ even after the death of\nthe individual. The _ego_ is unsavable. It is partly the discernment\nof this fact, partly the fear of the same, that leads to the most\nextravagant pessimistic and optimistic, religious and philosophical\nabsurdities. We shall not be able in the long run to close our eyes\nto this simple truth, the immediate result of psychological analysis.\nWe shall then no longer place so high a value upon the ego which even\nduring individual life greatly changes, and which, indeed, in sleep\nor during absorption in some conception or in some thought, just in\nour happiest moments, may be partially or wholly absent. We shall then\ngladly renounce individual immortality, and shall not place more value\nupon the accessory elements than upon the principal. We shall in this\nway arrive at a freer and a _more enlightened_ conception of life,\nwhich will exclude the neglect of other egos and the over-estimation of\nour own.\n\n * * * * *\n\nIf, now, the knowledge of the connection of the elements (sensations)\ndoes not suffice us, and we must ask _Who_, _What_, possesses this\nconnection of sensations, _Who_, _What_, perceives sensations? we have\nsuccumbed, we may be sure, to our old habit of arranging every element\n(every sensation) within some _unanalysed_ complex, and we are falling\nback imperceptibly to an older, lower, and more limited point of view.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe habit of treating the unanalysed ego-complex as an indivisible\nunity is often scientifically presented in peculiar ways. First, the\nnervous system is separated from the body as the seat of sensations.\nIn the nervous system again the brain is selected as fitted for the\nperformance of this function, and finally, to save the pretended\npsychical _unity_, a further _point_ is sought in the brain as the\nseat of the soul. But rough conceptions like these are hardly adapted\nto trace out even in the crudest lines the ways that future research\nwill follow in investigating the connection of the physical and\nthe psychical. The fact that the different organs of sensation and\nmemory are physically _connected_ with one another, and can be easily\n_excited_ by one another is probably the foundation of the \"psychical\nunity.\"\n\nI once heard the question seriously discussed of \"How the percept\nof a very large tree found room in the little head of a man?\" Now\nthough this \"problem\" does not exist, yet we perceive by the question\nthe absurdity that is so easily committed in conceiving sensations\nto exist spacially in the brain. When I speak of the sensations of\n_another_ person, these sensations of course present no activity in my\noptical space or my physical space generally; they are mentally added,\nand I conceive them to be _causally_ annexed, not spacially, to the\nbrain observed or represented. When I speak of _my_ sensations, these\nsensations do not exist spacially in my head, but rather my \"head\"\n_shares_ with them the same spacial field, as was explained above\n(compare what was said regarding the cut).\n\n * * * * *\n\nLet there be no mention of the so-called unity of consciousness. Since\nthe apparent opposition of the _real_ and the _perceived_ world exists\nonly in the mode according to which it is viewed, and no real chasm\nexists, a multiplex interconnected content of consciousness is in no\nrespect more difficult to understand than the multiplex interconnection\nof the world.\n\nIf we are determined to regard the ego as an actual unity, we cannot\nextricate ourselves from the following dilemma: either to set over\nagainst it\u2014viz., the ego\u2014the world of incognisable substances (which\nwould be wholly idle and purposeless), or to regard the whole world,\nthe egos of other people included, as only contained in our own ego (to\nwhich, seriously, we could hardly make up our minds).\n\nBut if we take the ego merely as a _practical_ unity, composed for\npurposes of provisional survey; in fact, take it as a more strongly\ncoherent group of elements, which is less strongly connected with other\ngroups of this kind; questions like these will not arise and research\nwill have a free outlook.\n\nIn his philosophical notes Lichtenberg says: \"We become conscious of\ncertain ideas that are not dependent upon us; and there are other\nideas that, at least as we think, are dependent upon us. Where\nis the border-line? We know only the existence of our sensations,\npercepts, and thoughts. We should say, _It thinks_, just as we say,\n_It lightens_. It is going too far to say _cogito_, when we translate\nit by _I think_. Assuming the _I_, postulating it, is merely practical\nnecessity.\" Though the method by which Lichtenberg arrives at this\nresult is somewhat different from our own, we must nevertheless give\nour assent to the conclusion itself.\n\n\nXII.\n\nBodies do not produce sensations, but complexes of sensations\n(complexes of elements) form bodies. If bodies appear to the physicist\nas that which is permanent, that which is real, and sensations as\ntheir evanescent transitory semblance, the physicist forgets that all\nbodies are but thought-symbols for complexes of sensation (complexes\nof elements). The _elements_ designated also form here the real,\nimmediate, and ultimate foundation which physiological research has now\nfurther to investigate. Through the discernment of this, many things in\npsychology and physics assume more distinct and economical forms, and\nmany imagined problems are disposed of.\n\nThe world therefore does not consist for us of mysterious substances,\nwhich through their interaction with another equally mysterious\nsubstance, the ego, produce sensations as solely accessible. Colors,\nsounds, spaces, times, ... are for us the ultimate elements, whose\ngiven connection it is our task to investigate. In this investigation\nwe dare not allow ourselves to be hindered by the composites and\ncircumscriptions (body, ego, matter, mind ...) that have been formed\nfor especial, practical, provisional, and limited purposes. On the\ncontrary, the appropriate and best adapted forms of thought must arise\nwithin research itself, as happens in every special science. In the\nplace of the traditional instinctive conception must come a freer,\nfresher view, conforming with developed experience.\n\n * * * * *\n\nI have always felt it as a special good fortune, that early in my\nlife, at about the age of 15, I came across in the library of my\nfather Kant's \"Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic.\" The book made at\nthat time a powerful, ineffaceable impression upon me, that I never\nafterwards experienced to the same degree in any of my philosophical\nreading. Some two or three years later I suddenly discovered the\nsuperfluous r\u00f4le that \"the thing in itself\" plays. On a bright summer\nday under the open heavens the world together with my ego all at once\nappeared to me as _one_ coherent mass of sensations, but in the ego\nmore strongly coherent. Although the actual working out of this thought\ndid not occur until a later time, yet this moment became decisive for\nmy whole view.\n\nMoreover I had still to struggle long and hard before I was able to\nretain, in my own special department, the conception I had acquired.\nWith what is valuable in physical doctrines we necessarily absorb\na good dose of false metaphysics, which it is very difficult to\nseparate from that which must be preserved, especially where these\ndoctrines have become current and familiar. So, too, the traditional,\ninstinctive conceptions often arose with great power and placed\nimpediments in my way. Only by alternate studies in physics and the\nphysiology of the senses and by historico-physical investigations,\nsince about 1863, after having endeavored in vain to settle the\nconflict by a physico-psychological monadology, did I acquire in my\nviews any considerable firmness. I make no pretensions to the title\nof philosopher. I only wish to adopt in physics a point of view that\nneed not be instantly changed the moment our glance is carried into\nthe domain of another science; since indeed, ultimately, all must form\none whole. The molecular physics of to-day does certainly _not_ meet\nthis demand. What I say I have probably not been the _first_ to say.\nI also do not wish to hold forth this exposition of mine as a special\nperformance. It is rather my belief that every one will collaterally\nadopt the same view, who in a reflective manner holds survey in any\nprovince of science that is not too limited.[22]\n\n [22] I have recently (1886) propounded these views in a\n pamphlet _Beitr\u00e4ge zur Analyse der Empfindungen_. Avenarius,\n with whom I recently became acquainted, approaches my point of\n view (_Philosophie als Denken der Welt nach dem Princip des\n kleinsten Kraftmasses_, 1876). Hering, too, in his treatise\n upon Memory (_Almanach der Wiener Akademie_, 1870, p. 258;\n also published in Nos. 6 and 7 of _The Open Court_), and J.\n Popper in his beautiful book, \"The Right to Live and the\n Duty to Die\" (Leipsic 1878, p. 62), have advanced similar\n thoughts. Compare also my paper _Ueber die \u00f6konomische Natur\n der physikalischen Forschung_ (_Almanach der Wiener Akademie_,\n 1882, p. 179, note). Finally let me also refer here to the\n introduction to W. Preyer's _Reine Empfindungslehre_, and to\n Riehl's _Freiburger Antrittsrede_, p. 14. I should probably\n have to cite much additional matter that is in some way\n related to my line of thought if I possessed a more extensive\n bibliographical knowledge.\n\n\nXIII.\n\nScience always arises through a process of adaptation of thoughts to\na certain department of experience. The results of this process are\nthought-elements, which represent the entire department. The result,\nof course, is different according to the character and extent of\nthe province surveyed. If the province of experience in question is\nextended, or if several provinces hitherto separated become united,\nthe traditional, familiar thought-elements no longer suffice for the\nprovince thus extended. In the struggle of acquired habit with the\neffort after adaptation, _problems_ arise, which disappear when the\nadaptation is completed, to give way to others that have sprung up in\nthe mean time.\n\nTo the physicist, pure and simple, the idea of a body facilitates\nthe acquisition of a comprehensive survey in his department, and\ndoes not operate as a disturbance. So, also, the person that pursues\npurely practical ends, is materially assisted by the concept of the\n_I_ or Ego. For, unquestionably, every form of thought that has\nbeen voluntarily or involuntarily constructed for some especial\npurpose, possesses for that particular purpose a _permanent_ value.\nAs soon, however, as physics and physiology touch, the ideas held\nin the one domain are discovered to be untenable in the other. From\nthe striving after an adaptation of the one to the other arise the\nvarious atomic and monad theories\u2014which are unsuccessful, however, in\nthe attainment of their object. If we regard _sensations_, taken in\nthe sense above defined, as _world-elements_ or elements of the All,\nthe problems referred to are practically removed, and the _first_\nand most important adaptation therefore effected. This basal notion\n(without any pretension to being a philosophy for all eternity) can at\npresent be adhered to with respect to all provinces of experience;\nit is consequently the one that accommodates itself with the least\nexpenditure, that is, more economically than any other, to the present\n_temporary state of collective science_. Moreover, in the consciousness\nof its purely economical office, this basal notion acts with most\nperfect tolerance. It does not obtrude itself into provinces in which\nthe current conceptions are still adequate. It will ever be ready, upon\nsubsequent extensions of the domain of experience, to give way to a\nbetter one.\n\nThe philosophical point of view of the average man\u2014if that term may\nbe applied to the na\u00efve realism of the ordinary individual\u2014has a\nclaim to the highest consideration. It has arisen in the progress of\nimmeasurable time without the purposed assistance of man. It is a\nproduct of nature, and is preserved and sustained by nature. Everything\nthat philosophy has accomplished\u2014the _biological_ title of every\nadvance, nay of every error, admitted\u2014is, compared with _it_, but an\ninsignificant and ephemeral product of art. And in reality, we see\nevery thinker, every philosopher, the moment he is forced away from\nhis one-sided intellectual occupation by some practical necessity,\nimmediately fall back upon the universal point of view that all men\nhold in common.\n\nWe seek by no means to discredit this point of view. The task that\nwe have set ourselves is simply to show _why_ and to what _purpose_\nfor the greatest part of our life we occupy this point of view, and\n_why_ and for what _purpose_ we are provisorily obliged to abandon it.\nNo point of view has an absolute _permanent_ validity. Each has an\nimportance but for some one given end.\n\n ERNST MACH.\n\n\n\n\nTHE ORIGIN OF MIND.\n\n\n#Given facts and deduced facts.#\n\nWe must distinguish between two kinds of facts; viz., given facts or\ndata, and deduced facts or inferences. With regard to the facts of\nsoul-life we recognise that the former class, that of given facts,\nnecessarily consists of states of consciousness only; they are feelings\nof any description, varying greatly in their nature. They are different\nin the rhythmical forms of their vibrations, in their intensity, and in\ntheir distinctness. The latter class, that of inferences, is deduced\nfrom the former, and serves no other purpose than that of explanation.\nThis class is mostly representative of external facts, and knowledge of\nexternal facts exists only in so far as external facts are represented\nin deduced facts. What a thinking being would call external facts is\nnothing but the contents of certain deduced facts.\n\nDeduced facts, and among them the conception of external facts\n(wherever they exist), have been produced by the effort of accounting\nfor given facts\u2014viz., the elementary data of consciousness and their\nrelations. Deduced facts are the interpretation of given facts. They\nare, so to say, conjectures concerning their causes as well as their\ninterconnections.\n\n#Definition of mind.#\n\nThe organised totality of deduced facts, as it is developed in feeling\nsubstance, is called mind. Feelings are the condition of mind. From\nfeelings alone mind can grow. But there is a difference between\nfeelings and mind. Feelings develop into mind, they grow to be mind by\nbeing interpreted, by becoming representative. Representative feelings\nare mind. Accordingly, we characterise mind as the representativeness\nof feelings.\n\n#The growth of mind.#\n\nAlthough deduced facts are an interpretation of given facts, this\n\"interpretation\" is not expressly designed. These inferences from\ngiven facts are not invented with a premeditated purpose; they are\nnot constructed with foresight or intention. Deduced facts grow\nnaturally and spontaneously from given facts, which are the elements of\nsense-activity. There is not an agent that oversees their fabrication;\nthere is not a devising \"subject\" that surmises the existence of\nexternal facts and thus matures their conception into deduced facts.\nDeduced facts are rather the natural product of a certain group of\ngiven facts. Deduced facts issue from a co-operation of a number of\nfeelings. They are the result of an organisation of certain repeated\nsense-impressions which produce a disposition not only to receive\nsense-impressions of the same kind, but also to react upon them in a\ncertain way. Mind is not the factor that organised the given facts of\nmere sense-impressions so that they became representations. There was\nno mind as long as feelings remained unorganised. Feelings acquire\nmeaning; and as soon as they have acquired meaning they are what we\ncall \"deduced facts,\" representations\u2014especially representations of\nexternal facts. Deduced facts are the elements of mind; and mind is not\ntheir root, but their fruit.\n\n#Subjective and objective existence.#\n\nThe whole domain of mind-activity (i. e., of the representativeness of\nfeelings) is called subjective; while the totality of all facts that\nare represented in the mind is called objective. Subjective existence\nconsists of feelings and of states of consciousness; objective\nexistence is represented as things that are in motion. Motion and\nfeeling are quite different things, yet in spite of their radical\ndifference experience teaches us that both spheres are intimately\ninterwoven. Subjective existence constantly draws upon objective\nexistence. Not only do states of consciousness exist as they are by\nvirtue merely of the objects represented, but also that group of facts\ncalled our body, the action of which appears in a constant connection\nwith and as a condition of our consciousness, is kept in running order\nonly through a constant renewal of its waste products out of the\nresources of objective existence.\n\nWe distinguish between our body and external facts; but the boundary\nbetween both provinces is not distinct. There is constantly an exchange\nof substance taking place, proving that our body is in kind not\ndifferent from the substance of which external facts consist. It must\nbe regarded as a group of the same kind as external facts, existing\nin a constant interaction with and among the external facts. In other\nwords, the body of the thinking subject is an object in the objective\nworld.\n\n#The origin of feeling from the elements of subjective existence.#\n\nConcerning the subjective sphere of existence we recognise that\nconsciousness does not act uninterruptedly; there are moments when\nconsciousness is lost. If they are normal, we call them sleep; if\nthey are abnormal, swoons or trances. Former conscious states can\nbe revived; they form a chain of memories which is very limited in\ncomparison with the extension of the objective world. There is a\ntime in the past beyond which our memory does not reach. Moreover we\nhave reason to believe, that there will be a time when the chain of\nconscious states will be broken forever. This consummation is called\ndeath. In short the subjective world is transient; it grows by degrees;\nits existence is very precarious; it flickers like a candle in the\nwind and will disappear again. The objective world however is eternal,\nit is indestructible. Experience teaches that it constantly undergoes\nchanges, but that in its totality it is imperishable.\n\n#Feeling with the help of memory acquires meaning.#\n\nThe objective world is in a certain sense a part of the subject. In\nanother sense, we must say that the subject is a part of the objective\nworld. Indeed these two sentences represent the same truth, only viewed\nfrom two standpoints. The subjective world being transient and the\nobjective world being eternal, the question presents itself, \"How does\nthe subject originate in or among the objects of the objective world?\"\n\nThe problem is complicated and we must approach it step by step.\nFirst, we are inevitably driven to the conclusion, that the subjective\nworld of feelings forms an inseparable whole together with a special\ncombination of certain facts of the objective world, namely our body.\nIt originates with this combination, and disappears as soon as that\ncombination breaks to pieces. And, secondly, we must assume that the\nconditions for building up such material dispositions as have the\npower of developing the subjectivity of consciousness are an intrinsic\nquality of the objective world. Subjectivity cannot originate out of\nnothing; it must be conceived as the product of a co-operation of\ncertain elements which are present in the objective world. In other\nwords, the elements of the subjective world are features that we must\nsuppose to be inseparably united with the elements of the objective\nworld, which are represented in our mind as motions. This leads to\nthe conclusion that feeling has to be considered not as a simple but\nas a complex phenomenon. Feelings originate through a combination of\nelements of feeling; and the presence of the elements of feeling must\nbe supposed to be an intrinsic property of the objective world.[23]\nThe objective elements, the action of which is accompanied with\nthe elements of feeling, arrange themselves, we suppose, into such\ncombinations as display actual feelings, in exact agreement with the\nlaws of molar and molecular mechanics. This, we must assume, takes\nplace with the same spontaneity as, for instance, an acid and a base\ncombine into a salt. To use another example, it takes place with the\nsame necessity as, under special conditions, a certain amount of molar\nmotion is transformed into the molecular motion of ether-waves, called\nelectricity. Motions are not transformed into feelings, but certain\nmotions (all being separately accompanied with elements of feeling),\nwhen co-operating in a special form, are accompanied in that form with\nactual feelings.\n\n [23] For further details see the author's article _Feeling and\n Motion_; published first in _The Open Court_, Nos. 153 and 154.\n\n#Neither feeling nor mind can be considered as incidental phenomena.#\n\nThere is a certain class of philosophers who look upon feeling as an\nincidental effect, as a fortuitous by-play of the interacting elements\nof matter. This conception has little if anything in its favor. On\nthe contrary, if the elements of feeling are throughout inseparably\nconnected with the elements of objective existence, it must appear\nnatural that wherever the conditions fitted for organised life appear,\nirritable substance will originate. We may fairly assume that feeling\nwill arise on the cooled surface of a planet with the same necessity\nas, for instance, a collision between non-luminous celestial bodies\nwill cause them to blaze forth in the brilliant light of a nebula\ncontaining all the elements for the production in the course of ages of\na planetary system.\n\nWherever a combination of substances originates that displays the\nquality of feeling, it will form a basis for given facts of soul-life.\nFeeling substance having been exposed to a special stimulus, or having\nperformed a certain function, has thereby undergone a rearrangement\nin its molecular parts. The structure has suffered a change in its\nconfiguration, the form of which is preserved in the general flux\nof matter, and there is thus produced in the feeling substance a\ndisposition to respond more quickly to impressions of the same kind.\nThe feeling accompanying a subsequent impression of the same nature is\ncoincidently felt to be a revival of a former feeling, similar or the\nsame in kind. In other words, feeling substance, preserving the forms\nof its functions, is possessed with memory.[24] The preservation of\nform in a function which is accompanied with feeling makes it possible\nthat the feeling accompanying a special form of function will become\na mark of signification. By being felt to be the same in kind as a\nformer feeling it will come to denote a certain condition of feeling\ntissues. A feeling that is felt to be the same as or similar in kind\nto a former feeling, the revival or memory of which it causes, is in\nthis way endowed with meaning; by which we understand the awareness of\nthe congruence or similarity of two or several feelings. Thus in the\nlapse of time, by constantly renewed experience, one special feeling,\nwhenever repeated, will naturally become the indicator showing the\npresence of certain external facts that cause it. An isolated feeling\nis naturally meaningless; yet through a preservation of form, viz.,\nthrough memory, it is by repetition necessarily changed into a symbol\nof representative value.\n\n [24] Memory is no mysterious power; it is the preservation\n of form in feeling organisms. See Ewald Hering's treatise\n on Memory, English translation in Nos. 6 and 7 of _The Open\n Court_. Compare also the author's article _Soul-life and the\n Preservation of Form_, in No. 143 of _The Open Court_.\n\nFeelings, accordingly, in the course of time, necessarily acquire\nmeaning; they naturally and spontaneously develop mind. They can as\nlittle avoid co-ordinating into a mental organism, as water at a low\ntemperature can escape congealing into ice; or as a seed can keep\nfrom sprouting when it is exposed, with sufficient moisture, to the\nlight. Mind, accordingly, is the necessary outcome of a combination\nof feelings. It is as necessary an effect of special causes, as, for\nexample, a triangle is the product of a combination of three lines.\nThe first step in the organisation of feeling, which will throughout\nremain the determining feature of its development, is the fact that\nwith the help of memory the different sets of feeling acquire meaning,\nand in this way the mere feelings are transformed from given facts into\ndeduced facts.\n\n * * * * *\n\n#Subjectivity and objectivity.#\n\nThe nature of given facts is subjectivity, while the character of\ninferred facts is objectivity. The latter having grown out of the\nformer will nevertheless, so far as they are states of consciousness,\nalways remain subjective; yet they contain representations of that\nwhich is delineated by certain given facts. Thus they contain an\nelement which stamps upon them the nature of objectivity. They\nrepresent objects, the existence of which the feeling subject cannot\nhelp assuming, because this is the simplest way of indicating certain\nchanges that are not caused within the realm of its own subjectivity.\n\nObjectivity, accordingly, does not mean absolute objectivity.\nObjectivity means subjective states, i. e., given facts or feelings\nrepresentative of outside facts, i. e., of facts that are not\nsubjective, but objective.\n\n#The projection of objective facts.#\n\nThe sense-impression of a white rectangle covered with little black\ncharacters is a given fact; yet the aspect of a sheet of paper is an\ninferred fact. The former is a subjective state within; the latter\nis the representation of an objective thing without. The process of\nrepresenting is a function of the subject, but the fact represented\nis projected as it were into the objective world, where experience\nhas taught us to expect it. And the practice of projection grows so\nnaturally by inherited adaptation and repeated experience that the\nthing represented appears to us to be external. We no longer feel a\nsensation as a state of consciousness but conceive it as an independent\nreality.\n\n#Projection, an economy of labor.#\n\nThe practice of projecting subjective sensations into the outside world\nis not an act of careless inference, but the inevitable result of a\nnatural law. This natural law is that of the \"economy of labor.\" When\na blind man has undergone a successful operation, he will first have\nthe consciousness of vague color-sensations taking place in his eye.\nExperience will teach him the meaning of these color-sensations and his\nmotions will inform him where to find the corresponding outside facts.\nHis consciousness will more and more be concentrated upon the meaning\nof the sensations. The less difficulty he has in arriving at their\nproper interpretation, the more unconscious his sense-activity will\nbecome and at length consciousness will be habitually attached to the\nresult of the sensation alone, i. e., to its interpretation.\n\nIn the same way, every one who learns to play an instrument will first\nfeel that part only which his hand touches. By and by, however, he\nwill acquire a consciousness of the effects produced by the slightest\ntouch. Constant practice forms in the brain of an expert certain living\nstructures which are correspondent to the action of the instrument\nand represent it with great accuracy. Whenever these structures are\nstimulated, the action of the instrument is felt to take place. In\nthis way consciousness is projected into the work performed by the\ninstrument. The touch of the hand has become purely automatic, and\nthe operator now feels the full effects of his manipulation although\nhe is not in direct contact with all the parts of his instrument.\nThe instrument becomes as if alive under his treatment, he feels it\nas a part of himself; for its action stands _en rapport_ with his\nbrain-activity.\n\n * * * * *\n\n#The subject-superstition and agnosticism.#\n\nStates of consciousness, collectively considered, have been termed\n\"subject,\" and we have also employed the phrase \"subjective world.\" But\nwe must not forget the fact, that the adoption of the name \"subject\"\nis based upon a misconception. Subject means \"that which underlies,\"\nand the subject was supposed to be that something which formed the\nbasis of all the states of consciousness present in any one special\ncase\u2014in you or in me, or in any person like you and me. The subject\nwas considered as a being that was in possession of sense-impressions,\nof feelings, of thoughts, of intentions, etc.; and the existence of\nthis subject was proved by Descartes's famous syllogism _Cogito ergo\nsum_. The subject was supposed to produce the states of consciousness,\nwhile in fact (as we have explained above) it is exactly the opposite.\nFeelings change into mind, they produce the subject which thinks. The\nsubject is nothing underlying but rather overlying. It is the growth\nout of and upon feelings. It is the sum of many feelings in a state of\norganisation.\n\nThe fallacy of Descartes's dictum has been pointed out by Kant. The\nexistence of states of consciousness, or the fact _cogito_, does\nnot prove the existence of something that underlies the states of\nconsciousness. It simply proves the existence of feelings and thoughts.\nThere are certain sense-impressions, there are perceptions, there\nare ideas. Ideas develop from perceptions, and perceptions develop\nfrom sense-impressions. States of consciousness are nothing but the\nawareness or the feeling that is connected with certain perceptions and\nideas.\n\nDescartes's subjectivism is a transitory phase leading from the\nauthoritative objectivism of the middle ages to the critical\nobjectivism of modern times. The authoritative philosophy of the\nSchoolmen yielded to the arbitrary philosophy of metaphysical\nsubjectivity, commencing as a matter of principle with doubt, instead\nof commencing with positive data, and establishing anarchy through lack\nof any objective method of arriving at truth. The reaction against\nthe arbitrary authority of scholasticism was indispensable to further\nprogress. But we must not rest satisfied with its negative result. We\ncannot commence a business without capital and without making a start.\nSo we cannot begin philosophy with nothing. Knowledge is not possible\nwithout positive facts to serve as a basis to stand upon.\n\nThe negative features of Descartes's philosophy naturally found their\nultimate completion in agnosticism. The assumption of the existence\nof a subject led to the doctrine, that this subject is unknowable.\nMoreover, the assumption of something that underlies the acts of\nthought leads to the assumption of something that underlies objective\nexistence, and thus it begets the theory of things in themselves. This\ntheory involves us in innumerable contradictions and thus it ends\nultimately in the proposition that things in themselves are unknowable.\n\nThere are few who know the historical meaning of agnosticism; but those\nwho can survey philosophical thought in its evolution, its growth, and\ndecay, know that agnosticism means failure in philosophy. The word is a\nforeign-sounding name for \"knownothingism,\" denoting a half-concealed\nconfession of bankruptcy. The philosophy of the future, in order to\nescape from the fatal consequences of agnosticism, has to discard the\nsubject-superstition inherited from Descartes. Descartes was a great\nthinker, a star of first magnitude in the realm of thought, but it is\ntime that, without returning to the authoritative philosophy of the\nSchoolmen, we should free ourselves from the errors of his one-sided\nsubjectivism.\n\nLet us not forget, that all subjective states contain an objective\nelement. Objectivity is no chimera, and we are very well enabled to\nestablish the truth or untruth of objective facts. The philosophy of\nthe future, accordingly, will be a philosophy of facts, it will be\n_positivism_; and in so far as a unitary systematisation of facts is\nthe aim and ideal of all science, it will be MONISM.\n\nFrom the standpoint of positivism, the subject, in the old sense,\ndoes not exist, and things in themselves do not exist either.\nTheir existence is an unwarranted assumption, a superstition of\nphilosophy, and we can retain the word subject only on the condition\nof a complete change of its meaning. The word subject, accordingly,\n(which has acquired a place in philosophical language and is for\nseveral purposes quite an appropriate expression,) must be corrected\nso as to mean, not an underlying substratum, nor an agent which does\nthe thinking, but simply a collective term designating a certain\ngroup of sense-impressions, perceptions, ideas, and volitions. These\nsense-impressions, perceptions, ideas, and volitions, which form,\nsimultaneously as well as successively, the elements of soul-life,\ncarrying consciousness upon the waves of many subconscious states, make\nup the reality of the subject; they are the facts of its existence, and\nit is the states of consciousness only, not an underlying something,\nthe existence of which is beyond all doubt. They form the basis of all\nknowledge.\n\n * * * * *\n\n#The objective element in subjective states.#\n\nWe must bear in mind that states of feeling are not empty feelings,\nbut always feelings of a certain kind. There is no consciousness pure\nand simple, but only consciousness of a certain state. Let us suppose,\nfor instance, the consciousness of a certain pressure. What is it but\na feeling of being pressed in a certain direction and with a certain\nintensity? If a certain pressure is resisted, the feeling indicates a\nstate of active reaction against pressure, and experience teaches by\ncomparison with other pressures how much counterpressure is necessary\nto resist or overcome it.\n\nAmong the states of consciousness there are accordingly some that\nrepresent an awareness of _receiving_ impressions, and there are others\nof _making_ impressions. There are some feelings of a passive nature,\nwhich are felt to be produced by impacts from a something that is not\nthe subject, and there are other feelings of an active nature, which\nare felt to produce effects on something that is not the subject. This\nsomething that is not the subject is called \"object.\" It is represented\nas lying outside the subject, although the latter stands in a close\nand inseparable relation to the object, which, so far as this relation\nis considered, forms a part of the subject. A given subjective state\npossesses a definite form; it exists as it is on account of the object\nonly; for its form has been produced by its relation to the object, and\nit represents this relation. The object, therefore, is no unimportant\npart of, and indeed is an essential element in, the constitution of the\nsubjective state.\n\n#All data are states of subject-object-ness.#\n\nIdealist philosophers are apt to say that the subject alone is known\nto us, while the existence of the object must forever remain a vague\nhypothesis. This, however, is incorrect. It involves an unjustifiable\ndeprecation of the objective element in the given facts of conscious\nstates, and is based on a misconception of the entire state of\nthings. The data of knowledge are not mere subjective states, they are\nrelations between subject and object. Neither the subject is given,\nnor the object; but an interaction between subject and object. From\nthis interaction we derive by a very complicated process of abstraction\nboth concepts, the subject as well as the object. It is true that the\nsubjective world of feelings and of representative feeling is very\ndifferent from the objective world of things. Nevertheless they are\none. The subject together with all objects forms one inseparable whole\nof subject-object-ness.\n\nEvery special object, accordingly, must be conceived as a part of\nthis inseparable whole\u2014of the All; it is a certain set of facts,\nrepresented in a certain group of experiences, and is to be described\nas that something which in a special way affects the subject and can\nagain in a special way be reacted upon by the subject.\n\n#Idealism and realism.#\n\nHere we have the clue for the proper meaning of objectivity. What is a\npiece of lead but something that at a definite distance from the centre\nof the earth exerts a certain pressure proportionate to its mass; that\nis seen to become liquid at a certain temperature; etc., etc.? If it\nis treated in a particular way, it will be observed to suffer certain\nchanges. What lead is has been established by experience; i. e., by\nsystematic observation through sense-impressions.\n\nFrom this standpoint the differences between the schools of idealism\nand realism appear as antiquated. The questions whether matter is real,\nwhether objects exist, and whether there is any reality at all, have\nlost their meaning. That which produces effects upon the subject and\nagainst which the subject does or can react, is called object. The\nsense-effects produced by the object upon the subject, and also the\nreactions of the subject upon the object, are realities; and every name\nof a special object signifies a certain group of such effects and their\nrespective reactions. Thus, for instance, the word lead comprises a\ncertain set of experiences that have always been found combined with\ncertain whitish objects.\n\n#Space and Reality.#\n\nSome philosophers have denied not only the existence of objects, but\nalso the reality of space. What is space but a certain group of\nexperiences? The conception of space originates by moving and by being\nmoved about. The conception of space is the consciousness that by\nmoving, or by being moved, a change is effected; that is, a certain\nobject serving as a point of reference is either approached or left\nat a greater distance. The acts of approach or withdrawal are as much\nrealities as are any other acts of the subject. Discussions concerning\nthe reality of space accordingly become mere verbal quibbles as soon as\nwe understand by space the condition common to all motion-experiences.\n\n * * * * *\n\n#Perception and concepts.#\n\nThe mental state in which through contact with external facts one or\nseveral of the senses are affected so as to produce a direct awareness\nof their presence, is called perception. The effects of external facts\nupon the sense of touch appear as different forms of resistance. To\nthe other senses they appear as odors, tastes, sounds, and images. All\nthese sensations are so many subjective methods of representing certain\nobjective processes. Perceptions represent immediate reality because\nthe objects perceived, i. e., the objects represented by an image in\nthe eye, a taste on the tongue, etc., are in an immediate contact\nwith our senses. The feeling subject is directly conscious of their\nexistence by their present effects. They are our _Anschauung_, i. e.,\nthe living presence of objective reality.\n\nBesides this living presence of objective reality, of which our\nimmediate surroundings consist,\u2014besides our _Anschauung_\u2014, man is\nin possession of more general representations, which comprise all the\nmemories of a certain class of percepts. We call them concepts. Man\nalone through the mechanism of word-symbols has been able to form\nconcepts. Abstract reasoning as well as scientific thought will grow\nwith the assistance of concepts in the course of a higher development.\n\n#Hallucinations and errors.#\n\nThe higher we rise in the evolution of representative feelings, i. e.,\nin the development of mind, the more numerous are the opportunities\nfor going astray. A scientific hypothesis, if erroneous, is more\nsweeping in its fallacies than a single hallucination, which is a\nmisinterpretation merely of certain feelings. The subjective part of an\nhallucination, namely the feeling itself, is real; but the objective\npart, the representative element of the feeling, is not real; that\nwhich it is supposed to mean, does not exist. The interpretation of the\nfeeling is erroneous in a hallucination.\n\nHallucinations are possible, and in the more abstract domains of mental\nactivity errors are possible also; and will be ever more frequent.\nNevertheless the reality of outside facts in the sense stated above can\nas little be doubted as the reality of immediate perception; and all\nthe facts established by science, if they are but true, are as much\nrealities as is the resistance of the table to the pressure of my hand\nor the perception of the sheet of paper by my eye.\n\n#Inferential facts, if true, are real.#\n\nFacts established by science are those observations which are made\nwith all the necessary exactness as well as completeness from certain\ngroups of experiences, and formulated with precision. The theory of\natoms, for instance, is true in so far as all elements combine in\ncertain proportions, which shows that the ultimate particles of which\nthe elements consist are of a definite mass. Atoms, if the word is\nunderstood in this sense, are realities. The theory of atoms, however,\nis not proved in the sense that atoms are \u1f04\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9; or single, isolated,\nminute bodies of a peculiar individuality\u2014separate, indivisible, and\neternal entities. Whether they are concrete things or certain forms of\nmotion in a continuous substance, whether they are vortices or whirls\nof a certain density and velocity in an ether ocean, or whatever else\nbe their character, is not yet known. If we exclude from the concept\n\"atoms\" all hypothetical views and confine their meaning strictly to\nthe formulation of certain experiences, we have to deal with facts that\nare real. Theories are true in so far as they comprehend in a formula a\ncertain group of facts, and a hypothesis becomes reliable to the extent\nthat it agrees with facts. The slightest actual disagreement with facts\nis sufficient to overthrow the most ingenious hypothesis.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThis leads us to the question, What is meant by _true_? What is truth?\n\n#Facts and reality. Truth and mind.#\n\nThe epitheton \"true\" has reference to representative states only. A\nrepresentation is true, if it conforms to, or agrees with, experience;\nin other words, if it is an interpretation of given facts, is free from\ncontradiction, and nowhere collides with any one of the given facts\nand their consistent interpretation. There is no sense in speaking of\nmere feelings as being true. We can never meet, in our own experience,\nwith given facts that are nothing but meaningless feelings; for we\n(as thinking beings) are incapable of bringing meaningless feelings\ninto the scope of consciousness, since in the very act of thinking we\ncomment upon the given facts of our feelings. But supposing there are\nmere given facts, mere meaningless feelings void of any representative\nelement, the application of the word true to such non-representative\nfeelings would be improper. States of consciousness become true or\nuntrue only by being representative of objective conditions or things.\nThere is no trace of truth in mere feelings, but only in representative\nfeelings. Truth and error are the privilege of mind. A representation\nis true, if all the various experiences concerning a certain thing or\nstate of things agree with the representation; it is untrue if they do\nnot agree.\n\nWe observe that certain classes of facts, in spite of all variety,\nexhibit in one or another respect a sameness, and science attempts to\nexpress the sameness in exact formulas. These formulas we call natural\nlaws. If a natural law covers all cases of a class that have come or\neven that possibly can come within the range of our experience, if it\nagrees with every one of them, we call it a truth.\n\n\"Truth\" accordingly is not at all identical with \"fact.\" These two\nwords are often used as synonyms, but properly employed they are quite\ndistinct. Truth is the agreement of a representation with the facts\nrepresented. The fall of a stone is a fact; it is an inferred fact\ndeduced from certain sense-impressions. In so far as the inference is\nmade with necessity as the only proper and simplest explanation of a\ncertain given fact or sense-impression, it must be considered as a\nfact or as real. The law of gravitation, however, is not a fact, but a\ntruth.\n\nFacts are real. There is no sense in speaking of facts as being\ntrue. Representations of facts are true or untrue. Reality is the\ncharacteristic feature of all facts, but truth is a quality that can\nreside in mind alone.\n\n#Facts and truth.#\n\nFacts are always single, concrete, and individual. Every fact is a\n_hic_ and _nunc_. It is in a special place, and it is as it is, at a\ncertain time. It is definite and of a particular kind. Yet a truth,\nalthough representing certain objects or their relations, is never\na concrete object, nor is it a _hic_ and a _nunc_. It possesses a\ngenerality applicable to all instances wherever and whenever the\nobjects in their particular relation appear represented in that truth.\nTruth accordingly possesses as it were an ubiquity; it is omnipresent\nand eternal.\n\nTruth in one sense is objective; it represents objects or their\nrelations conceived in their objectivity, in their independence of\nthe subject. This means that the representation of certain objective\nstates will under like conditions agree with the experiences of all\nsubjects\u2014i. e., of all feeling beings having the same channels of\ninformation.\n\nTruth in another sense is subjective. Truth exists in thinking subjects\nonly. Truth affirms that certain subjective representations of the\nobjective world can be relied upon, that they are deduced from facts\nand agree with facts. Based upon past experience, they can be used as\nguides for future experience. If there were no subjective beings, no\nfeeling and comprehending minds, there would be no truth. Facts in\nthemselves, whether they are or are not represented in the mind of a\nfeeling and thinking subject, are real, yet representations alone,\nsupposing they agree with facts, are true.\n\n * * * * *\n\n#The problem of the origin of mind.#\n\nMind, or the representation of facts in feeling substance, is the\ncreation of a new and a spiritual realm above the facts of material\nexistence. By spiritual we understand feelings that are representative;\nand we say that it is a new creation because it does not exist in the\nisolated facts of the world. It is formed under special conditions.\nIt rises from certain combinations of facts; being built upon those\nfacts which produce in their co-operation the subjective state of\nfeeling. The activity of mind if methodically disciplined is called\nscience. Science attempts to make the mental representations correct:\nit is the search for truth. The object of all the sciences and of\nphilosophy is to systematise knowledge, i. e., all the innumerable\ndata of experience, so that we can understand and survey the facts of\nreality in their harmonious interconnection. The most important problem\nof philosophy has always been the problem of the origin of mind; for we\nare anxious to comprehend how it is possible that feeling can spring\nup in a universe of not-feeling objects, and that thinking beings can\noriginate in a world of not-thinking elements.\n\nDualism assumes that the gulf between the two empires, the thinking and\nfeeling on one side and the not-thinking and not-feeling on the other\nside, is insurmountable; Monism however maintains that there is no\ngulf, for there is no reason for such an assumption. Both realms, the\nfeeling and thinking on the one hand, and the unfeeling and unthinking\non the other hand, are not at all distinct and separate provinces. The\ntransition from the one to the other takes place by degrees, and there\nis no boundary line between them. The atoms of oxygen which we inhale\nat present are not engaged in any action that is accompanied with\nfeeling, but some of them will be very soon active in the generation\nof our best thought accompanied with most intense consciousness. After\nthat they are thrown aside in the organism and pass out as waste\nproducts in the shape of carbonic acid.\n\n#Telepathy.#\n\nThe spiritual originates from and disappears into the non-spiritual\nnot otherwise than light originates out of, and dissolves again into,\ndarkness. Light is usually considered as the emblem of mind, for\nlight also discloses to our eye those objects which are so far away\nthat we can never expect to touch them with our hands. So mind, the\nrepresentation of the objective world in feeling substance, unveils\nthe riddles of the universe and shows the secret connections of most\ndistant things and events.\n\nSpiritualists discuss with great enthusiasm the problem of telepathy.\nTelepathy means \"far-feeling.\" Mental activity exhibits in all its\nelements instances of telepathy in the literal sense of the word. We do\nnot feel our sense-organs; but in and through our sense-organs objects\noutside of us are felt. In and through our eyes most distant stars are\nseen. If telepathy has no other but its natural and proper meaning we\nmust confess that the whole activity of the mind rests upon telepathy.\n\nHowever, we cannot recognise telepathy in the sense in which the word\nis often employed by spiritualists. With many it denotes a process of\nsuch far-feeling as is not caused in the natural way and as stands in\ncontradiction to the mechanical interconnection of causes and effects\nin the universe. It is supposed to supersede the order of nature. We\nrecognise telepathy fully in the sense that feelings represent distant\nevents and that mind can thus penetrate into the remotest regions of\ntime and space, but not in any other sense that stands in contradiction\nwith the universal order of mechanical causation.\n\nWhat is the soul but a telepathic machine! It is an organised totality\nof representations in feeling substance employed for the purpose of\nreacting appropriately upon the stimuli of external things. Man is a\npart of the cosmos, he consists of a certain group of facts, belonging\nto and being in intimate connection with the whole universe. Man's mind\nis the cosmos represented in this special group of facts. A correct\nrepresentation of the cosmos includes a proper adaptation. Accordingly\nthe human soul is a microcosm and its function is the endeavoring to\nconform to the macrocosm.\n\n#Mind and light.#\n\nLight is a most wonderful phenomenon; and yet we know that the\nobjective process taking place in luminous bodies and thence\ntransmitted through ether vibrations to our eye where it causes\nthe sensation of light, is a mode of motion that can be produced\nmechanically by changing simple or mechanical motion (i. e., change\nof place) through friction into molecular motion. As light originates\nout of darkness, being a special mode of motion, so feeling originates\nout of the not-feeling. The not-feeling accordingly contains the\nconditions of feeling in a similar way as potential energy contains\nthe potentiality of kinetic energy, or as molar motion contains\npotentially the molecular motion of heat, light, and electricity.\n\nMind sheds light upon the interconnection of all things and gives\nmeaning to the world. If the world consisted of purely objective facts\nonly, it would remain a meaningless play of forces. Mind and the whole\nrealm of spiritual existence rises from most insignificant beginnings;\nyet is it so grand and divine because it represents the world in its\nwonderful harmony and cosmic order.\n\n#Continuity in the transient.#\n\nThe function of spiritual activity appears to us as transient; but\nmind is not as transient as it seems. The continuous light of a\nflame depends in every instance upon the conditions of the moment.\nBut the continuity of mind shows a preservation of mind-forms, the\ncorresponding spiritual activity of which is called memory. Memory or\nthe mind-form of former states is the most important factor in the\ndetermination of the representative value of present states of mind.\nThe continuity thus effected makes it possible for mind to represent\nnot only things and processes distant in space, but also those distant\nin time.\n\nThe continuation of form in feeling substance, not merely in the life\nof single individuals, but also in the life of the race, produces the\ngrowth, the development, and evolution of mind. Thus facts can be\nrepresented in their connections, and the necessity of their connection\ncan be understood. To use Spinoza's phrase: The world can be viewed\n_sub specie \u00e6ternitatis_.\n\n#Mind and Eternity.#\n\nThe fulfilment of mind is truth, or a correct representation of facts,\nnot as they are now and here, but as, according to conditions which\nconstitute a given state of things, they must be here and everywhere.\nMind expands in the measure that it contains and reflects the eternity\nof truth.\n\nThe activity of mind is in one respect as transient a process as is\nthe phenomenon of light. Yet in other respects mind is able to grasp\neternity within the narrow span of the moment.\n\n PAUL CARUS.\n\n\n\n\nTHE MAGIC MIRROR.\n\n\nThe famous time-honored saying of Rabbi Ben Akiba, \"There is nothing\nnew under the sun,\" has often been verified to our astonishment in the\nhistory of the sciences. No observation is proclaimed that has not been\nmade before, no position upheld that has not been before maintained.\nThe more extensive the survey that one acquires over any given province\nof science, and the more deeply one penetrates into the past history of\nthat science, the more surely will one arrive at the conviction, that\neven that which is apparently very new is at bottom old.\n\nBut the unceasing progress of the natural and mental sciences, on the\nother hand, is an indisputable fact; and the true characteristic of\nthis progress must consequently be sought in some other element than in\nthe accession of new material. The subject-matter with which science\ndeals, remains almost unchanged throughout prolonged periods of time;\nthe treatment of that material alone changes. Accordingly, the factor\nthat determines the extension of our knowledge is pre-eminently the\ngrowing comprehension that proceeds from the illumination of that which\nwas before in our possession. Apples fell from trees in all ages, but\nNewton was the first who placed the event in its proper light, thereby\ncreating a tangible principle by means of which a great number of other\nphenomena were successfully apprehended. Our system of scientific\nideas was increased by the addition of one conception that illuminated\nphenomena hitherto but half or not at all explained.\n\nEven the most enthusiastic advocate of the present state of knowledge\ncannot maintain that it is perfect. On the contrary, he will recognise\nthat an advance of the barriers that separate that which is now\nunderstood from what is not understood, is not only possible, but even\non his part devoutly to be wished. Indeed, a very large province of\nknowledge\u2014that of superstition\u2014still remains almost wholly unworked.\nIt is absurd to imagine that all the tales of magic and demonology are\nfounded entirely in deception. For how could it happen that in all\nhistorical epochs, and among all the peoples of the earth, the same\nphenomena should be uniformly reported, if something true and real\nwere not concealed behind it all! The illuminate, of course, looking\nupon our present code of ideas as ultimate, shrugs his shoulders with\na superior air and banishes what to him is \"supernatural\" into the\nrealm of fables; the cautious observer, on the other hand, refrains\nfrom passing judgment thus prematurely, for he knows that departments\nformerly very extensive have passed out of the realm of superstition\ninto the kingdom of science, and that in the future the same will\nalso occur. Thus the divine summons in the medi\u00e6val trial by ordeal\nhave turned out to be effects of suggestion, and the majority of the\nperformances of witches have proved to be the effects of hysterical\ntemperament. So that we are now in a position to comprehend the tales\nof the Magic Mirror[25] in their true light and to bring them, without\nconstraint, into accord with the doctrines of a developed science of\npsychology.\n\n [25] The Japanese \"Magic Mirrors\" consist of ingenious\n physical contrivances and are in no way concerned with our\n present subject.\n\nA brief recountal of the most important of the stories of this\nkind, must be prefaced by the paradoxical statement that the Magic\nMirror need not by any means be a mirror. People are also reported\nto have seen future and distant things in shining metal surfaces, in\nrock-crystals, and in glasses filled with water. The Old Testament\nmentions a divination made by the radiance of _gems_\u2014where it speaks\nof Urim and Thummim, the breast-ornament of six bright and six dark\nstones which the high priest donned to receive revelations from\nJehovah. In a like manner, too, in _dactylomancy_ (divination by\nrings) the abnormal condition is said to have been induced by fixedly\ngazing at the stones of finger-rings. Likewise in the Bible we find an\ninstance of divination by means of polished metal cups; for according\nto the Septuagint, the cup that Joseph caused to be placed in the sack\nof Benjamin, was the cup from which he was wont to divine. Instead of\ncups, use was also made of metal balls, arrows, swords, knives, and\nmetal mirrors. Even Jacob B\u00f6hme practised the art of clairvoyance by\nthe help of the \"lovely jovial lustre\" of a tin cup, \"with the result\nthat he was now introduced into the innermost depths or centre of\nrecondite nature, and was enabled to look into the hearts and innermost\ncharacter of all creatures.\"\n\nWhen gold and silver leaves marked with mysterious characters were\nthrown into a basin filled with water, and it was sought by gazing at\nthe surface thus furnished, to arouse the \"higher powers,\" the art was\ncalled _lecanomancy_. If the surface of the water alone was gazed at,\nit was called _hydromancy_; a method which communicated oracles by\nmeans of the images that appeared in the water.\n\nThe only distinction between hydromancy and _gastromancy_ was, that in\nthe latter case the water was poured into distended vessels. Cardanus\nhas minutely described some gastromantic experiments that came under\nhis observation. A bottle filled with holy water was placed in the sun\nupon a white-covered table; over the mouth of the bottle two olive\nleaves were laid crosswise; three lighted wax candles were then placed\nabout the leaves and fumigated with incense, during which performance\na prayer to Saint Helena was uttered. Very soon the mantic adepts\nstanding in the background saw forms in the water; once a man with a\nbald head, slightly inclined forward; a second time a man dressed in\nscarlet. Cardanus himself could see nothing more than a disturbance in\nthe water, as if produced by the motes of a sunbeam, and a peculiar\ngeneration of bubbles.\n\nThe same principle lies at the foundation of _onychomancy_, where\nthe thumb-nail of some suitable person, or the palm of the hand was\nanointed with oil and soot, and the images appeared in the shining\nsurface illuminated either by the rays of the sun or by a candle.[26]\nInk was often poured into the palm of the bent hand and divination made\nfrom the reflecting surface of the ink.\n\n [26] The facts cited are taken from Karl Kiesewetter's\n essay _Hypnotisches Hellsehen_, in _Sphinx_, I, 130, 1886.\n Perty's work on the Magical Phenomena of Human Nature, and\n Adolf Bastian's treatise _Psychische Beobachtungen bei\n Naturvolkern_ in No. 2 of the _Schriften der Gesellschaft f\u00fcr\n Experimental-Psychologie_ (Leipsic, Ernst G\u00fcnther, 1890), may\n also be consulted.\n\nIt will appear from the very enumeration of these multifarious methods\nof procedure that the effect does not depend upon the especial\ncharacter or constitution of the \"magic mirror.\" It is a remarkable\ntrait of human thought, however, that it first endeavors to trace all\nphenomena back to external facts before it seeks the cause of the\nsame within itself: the child of nature sees in all his thoughts the\ninspirations of good or evil spirits, and even the modern believer\nfinds the source of all extraordinary enlightenment not in himself\nbut in another\u2014the Highest Being. A very high degree of culture is\nrequisite for man approximately to comprehend what marvellous forces\nslumber within him, and to what a great extent, in the truest sense\nof the word, he is the creator of his own perceptions and emotions.\nAnd thus it was that throughout the long space of three thousand\nyears people did not clearly discover that in the case of magic\nmirrors the most important factor was the _person that saw_, and not\nthe instruments of seeing. If we will use the word \"superstition,\"\ntherefore, we can justly do so with reference to the improper\ndisposition of the two factors involved.\n\nThis incorrect interpretation of the phenomenon, as being necessarily\ndependent in its origin upon the material object employed, then called\nforth the fables regarding some particularly rare and miraculous\nmirror which was kept in a certain family as a holy relic, and whose\npossession admitted people to a knowledge of the secrets of nature and\nof the future. Countless sacrifices of money and human life have been\nmade to these extravagant fancies. Indeed, even to-day, certain English\nbusiness-houses deal in magic mirrors \"manufactured after the best\nprescripts,\" and certainly derive much profit from their traffic. In\nall the treatises upon occult science, in those of ancient Egypt as\nwell as in those of the present time,\u2014and the literature of divination\nby mirrors (catoptromancy) fills whole libraries,\u2014in all I say are\nfound directions for the manufacture of especially effective glass\nor metal mirrors. True, in addition to this, there is now and then a\npresentiment to be detected of the importance of personality. Tradition\nprefers in such experiments chaste maidens, pure boys, or pregnant\nwomen\u2014a choice that despite its material faultiness at any rate\npursues the correct principle of emphasising individual character.\n\nMirror-gazing was formerly, and is to-day, most extensively practised\nin the Orient. We possess an account written by Lane in 1834 of an\nadventure he had in Egypt in company with the English Consul Salt.\nThe magician in charge of the ceremonies first wrote upon a slip of\npaper invocations summoning his two Genii; and then a few verses from\nthe Koran, \"to open the boy's eyes in a supernatural manner, ... to\nmake his sight pierce into what is to us the invisible world.\" The\nslip of paper was thrown into a chafing-dish containing live charcoal,\nfrankincense, coriander seed, and benzoin. A boy eight or nine years\nof age had been chosen at random from a number who happened to be\npassing in the street, and the magician, taking hold of his right hand,\ndrew in the palm of it a magic square, that is to say, one square\ninscribed within another, and in the space between certain Arabic\nnumerals; then, pouring ink in the centre, bade the boy look into it\nattentively. At first the boy could only see the face of the magician,\nbut proceeding with his inspection, while the other continued to drop\nwritten invocations into the chafing-dish, he at length described a\nman sweeping with a broom, then a scene in which flags and soldiers\nappeared, and finally when Lane asked that Lord Nelson should be called\nfor, the boy described a man in European clothes of dark blue, who\nhad lost his _left_ arm, but added, on looking more intently, \"No, it\nis placed to his breast.\" Lord Nelson generally had an empty sleeve\nattached to the breast of his coat, but as it was the _right_ arm he\nhad lost, Lane, without saying that he suspected the boy had made a\nmistake, asked the magician whether the object appeared in the ink\nas if actually before the eyes, or as if in a glass, which makes the\nright appear left. He answered they appeared as in a mirror; and this\nrendered the divination faultless.\n\nA counterpart to this in more recent times may be cited. When\nSeringapatam was stormed by General Harris and Sir David Baird, the\nunfortunate Tippoo Saib retired to discover by means of divination\nby a cup what the future prospects were for the continuance of his\nrule. After he had remained seated for a long time deeply absorbed\nin meditation, he suddenly sprang up and in despair rushed into the\nforemost ranks of the combatants and fell covered with wounds; so\ndeeply had the fatal aspect of the image in the cup moved him.\n\nIn Europe, during the period of classic antiquity, hydromancy was\nespecially practised. The Byzantine Andronicus Comnenus also put his\nfaith concerning the knowledge of future things, in water. Christianity\ndenounced the practice of these magic arts as the work of the devil.\nSt. Thomas Aquinas says that the gift of seeing visions possessed by\nchildren, is not to be ascribed to any power of innocence but to evil\ninfluences. Despite this however the art did not perish. Indeed, in the\nsixteenth century, under the protection of physicians and University\nprofessors, it attained the acme of its development.\n\nThe celebrated humanist Pico de Mirandola was firmly convinced of the\npower of magic mirrors, and declared that it was sufficient in order to\nread in a magic mirror the past, the present, and the future, simply\nto construct one under a favorable constellation and at the proper\ntemperature.\n\nBut the most successful of all in the practice of crystallomancy was\nDr. Dee, who flourished from 1527 to 1608. His seer or scryer was a man\nnamed Kelly, who could hardly be described as \"unpolluted\" or as \"one\nthat had not known sin,\" for he had been the perpetrator of so many\nvillainies that as a testimony of his character both his ears had been\ncut off. A crystal served as the vehicle of the ecstatic revelations,\nto which according to the conception of the times numerous spirits\nwere attached, who made themselves intelligible to Kelly by dramatic\nscenes and often by sounds. The Shew-Stone, or Holy Stone, was round\nand rather large; it is said to have come into Dee's hands in a very\nwonderful manner. The large folio volume of the English mathematician\nupon crystallomancy was very probably used later by Cagliostro,\nalthough the latter practised a somewhat different method and used a\ncarafe of water instead of the stone. The prophecy of the magician who\npredicted the regency of the Duke of Orleans through the death of the\nPrince, is to be noticed as the last historical case of the use of the\nmagic mirror.\n\nIn our century Courts and Universities no longer form the stage upon\nwhich the drama of crystal-gazing is enacted, but almost exclusively\nthe circles of the Spiritists, or, as they are commonly called,\nSpiritualists. Spiritualism has artfully confiscated a great quantity\nof psychological data, and has made an impartial examination of\nphenomena very difficult by always presenting the data to the novice\nin connection with spirit-theories. Having learned much from evil\nexperience, the public has assumed a sceptical position with regard\nto everything that comes from spiritualistic quarters, and easily\noverlooks what is actual and real beneath the cover of uncritical\ndrivel. I shall also introduce here one or two instances which plainly\nshow that after the stupendous advances which made chemistry an exact\nscience the cause of these phenomena was no longer sought in the\nproperties of stones and mirrors, but was attributed to ghosts and\nspirits, by which still greater confusion was produced.\n\nIn Justinus Kerner's \"Magikon\" we read: \"Questions are put to the\nunsubstantial beings that appear in shining objects and the seer hears\nthe answer in dull tones. These beings also make signs and often appear\nin great numbers, but again only three at a time,\u2014and within five or\nten minutes in the case of practised scryers, but in the case of the\nunpractised not until a longer space has elapsed. The objects described\nappear in a few seconds and vanish when they are no longer needed.\nIn Athens a female seer of this description is said to have seen a\nsick person in Vienna and everything described in minutest detail was\nconfirmed by the next post. A boy who beheld absent persons and their\nacts in a medicine glass filled with water is said to have discovered\nby this means unknown thieves.\"\n\nBarth gives the following directions for crystal-gazing: \"When the\ncrystal has been ground and polished it is dedicated to some spirit\nor other; this is called its consecration. Before being used it is\n'charged'; that is, an invocation is made to the spirit, wherein a\nvision is requested of the things that one wishes to experience.\nOrdinarily a young person is chosen to look into the glass and behold\nthe prayed for vision. After a little time the crystal becomes\nenveloped in a cloud, and a tiny vision appears which represents in\nminiature the persons, scenes, and things that are necessary to supply\nthe required information. When the information has been obtained the\ncrystal is 'discharged,' and after receiving thanks for the services he\nhas performed the spirit is dismissed.\"\n\nPerty from whom I take this citation aptly adds, \"One's own spirit,\naccordingly, is here invoked as a stranger.\"\n\nThe recent reports of Anglo-American Spiritualists are less crude, yet\nare similarly permeated by ghost-hypotheses. For example, a Mr. Rogers\nrelates that he had put a crystal into the hands of a lady who knew\nnothing at all of its magical powers, yet who a short time afterwards\nvery minutely described a scene in which a lecturer, evidently of\nEnglish nationality, was addressing a foreign audience, while behind\nhis chair the shade of a North-American Indian stood\u2014the source of his\ninspiration. A few months later the lady was by chance introduced to\nthe United States Consul at Trebizond whom she immediately recognised\nas the principal character of her vision, and who upon being questioned\ndeclared that at the time mentioned he had given an address at that\nplace, and moreover, that according to the declaration of Spiritualist\nmediums he was controlled by the spirit of a North-American Indian.\n\nIn Germany the best known work is probably the \"Visionen im\nWasserglass,\" by Frau Adelma Von Vay, n\u00e9e Countess Wurmbrand. She\nreports in her little book some ninety experiments that were made in\nthe years from 1869 to 1875. Frau Von Vay sees her pictures without\ndifficulty, at times in their natural colors, at times in shades\nbetween white and black; often they are of only momentary duration,\nthen again they persist for some time or gradually melt into confused\nand nebulous spots. The lady dictates to her husband the description of\nwhat is presented to her gaze; the \"Spirit\" furnishes commentaries and\nsupplementary interpretations, and the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of\nthe prophecies and divinations is carefully noted down.\n\n * * * * *\n\nBefore passing on from the history of this subject to the presentation\nof a number of systematic experiments, and to the development of the\ntheory underlying them, I shall briefly consider the part that the\nmagic mirror has played in poetry and fiction. For we often find\nhere, especially in popular poetry, fairy tales, and traditions,\nan artistic anticipation of ideas that only the advanced knowledge\nof later centuries is able scientifically to verify. The illumined\neye of genius prematurely seizes upon what in the distant future\nbecomes the conscious property of all humanity. And this is true of\nthe half-unconscious art of the individual poet. The imagination\nof the poet, borne aloft by the immediate sense of truth and the\nself-consciousness of typical humanity, casts flashes of illumination\nvery frequently into the dark regions of our inner world. In the facts\ninherent in popular instinct it discovers intuitively a multitude of\ncombinations, long before they possess for the average perception\ncreditable possibility, or even possible reality. The minute analysis,\nhowever, of symbolic art belongs to the most difficult problems of\ncomparative psychology.\n\nTo present at once from the multitude of examples a singularly striking\none, \"The History of the Youthful King Zein Alasnam and the Prince\nof Spirits\" may be chosen. Zein Alasnam, who possesses eight statues\nof great value, is in quest of a ninth of marvellous beauty, which\nthe Prince of Spirits promises him as soon as \"thou shalt bring me a\nyoung maiden who shall be at least fifteen years of age and of perfect\nbeauty; the maiden shall not be vain of her beauty and shall have never\nspoken an untruth.\" With the help of his magic mirror, Zein, after many\nvain attempts,\u2014for the mirror was always murky when he looked into it\nin the presence of a girl,\u2014finally found a maiden in whose presence a\nbrilliant image shone forth from the mirror. By strategy Zein brought\nthe noble girl, with whom in the mean time he had fallen passionately\nin love, to the Prince of Spirits\u2014but it must be confessed that it was\nonly at the earnest entreaty of his faithful servant, for he would have\nvery much liked to possess the maiden himself. The Prince of Spirits\nthanked him and told him to return to his home where he would find\nthe ninth statue that was promised him upon a golden pedestal in the\ncentre of the others. Zein hastened to his palace and flew into his\ntreasure-chamber. Upon the ninth pedestal there stood attired in silk\nof roseate hue, with modest blushing countenance, an immovable statue.\nZein Alasnam, dazzled by the brilliancy of the other forms, stepped\ninto the glittering circle to behold his treasure close at hand, when\nbehold! the statue suddenly descended from its pedestal and fell into\nhis arms. It was the same beautiful and virtuous maiden that he had\nconducted into the presence of the Prince of Spirits. She wept tears of\njoy and Zein Alasnam wept with her.\n\nThe factor here emphasised\u2014namely, a mirror that only exhibits a clear\nsurface to its possessor when a chaste maiden is in its presence\u2014is\nnot at all as fabulous as at first sight appears. It depends of course\nupon the person gazing whether the reflecting surface will appear murky\nor not; for it is a question here merely of subjective perception,\nand not of an objective blurring of the glass. In the case in which\nthe girl made no impression upon the youth,\u2014that is where the soul\nunconsciously passed an unfavorable judgment,\u2014the picture will have\nbeen dimly perceived and will thus have expressed in a strangely\nroundabout way, that which lay slumbering in the depths of his heart.\nThe mirror furnishes no other information than that which we put into\nit; but it communicates it to our every-day consciousness which knows\nlittle or nothing of the recondite processes of our inner life. The\nfabulous performances of other magic mirrors may be similarly explained\nif we discard the unnecessary adornment in which they are generally\nset forth. The \"buch aller verbotenen kunst\" (published in 1455), a\nmedi\u00e6val collection of stories of this character, is supplied with\nmarginal annotations of moral purport that possess some historical\nvalue. We shall therefore transcribe a passage illustrative of its\ncharacter.\n\n \"Die maister und iregleichen die treiben die kunst pyromancia\n auch in ainem schlechten spiegel und lassen kinder darein\n sehen die sie dan auch vast beswern und in auch verporgne\n wort einraunen und mainent vast vil darin zu erfragen. das\n ist alles ein ungelaub und des boesen tewfels gespenst und\n verfuerung. huet dich du christen, ich warn dich gar treulich.\n auch treibt man die sach in ainem sch\u00f6nen glanzen pulierten\n swert ... In der kunst pyromancia sind auch gar vil ander\n ungelauben, und nemlich ainer der sol des gewiss sein, der ist\n der allerschnoedest und boesest, wann so man ie vester gelaubt\n an soelich zauberey so si ie mer is s\u00fcnd. das stueck gat zu,\n das die knaben kuenftige und alle ding suellen sehen in ainem\n cristallen. das stueck treiben die valschen verzweifelten und\n verzagten cristen, den dann lieber ist des tiuefels gespenst\n und trugnuss, dan die warheit gottes in maniger hand weis.\n ettlich haben gar ain lautern schoenen gepulierten cristallen\n oder parillen, den lassen sie waihen und halten in gar rain\n und lesen dazu weirrauch, mirren und desgleichen, und wann sie\n die kunst treiben woellen, so warten si uf gar ainen schoen\n tag oder haben ain rain gemach und darin gar vil geweichter\n kerzen; die maister gan den gen bad und nemen dann das rain\n chind mit in und beclaiden sich dan in raines weiss gewand,\n und sitzen nider und sprechen in zauber bact, und prennen den\n ir zauberopfer und lassen dan den knaben in den stain sehen\n und raunen im in seine oren verporgen wort die suellen vast\n hailig sein, warlich, die wort sind tewflisch.\"[27]\n\n [27] \"The Masters and their like also practice the art\n Pyromancia in a wretched mirror, and make children look into\n it, whom they then do conjure and also whisper secret words\n in their ears, and fancy they get much information thereby.\n But it is all a heresy, the work and allurement of the wicked\n devil. Christian, have a care! I give thee honest warning.\n They practise the thing, too, in a beautiful, shining,\n polished sword.... In the art Pyromancia there is also much\n other heresy, and especially there is one that is so, the\n worst and wickedest of all: and the firmer one's belief in\n it is, the greater is his sinfulness. Here, young boys are\n said to behold future things and all things in a crystal.\n Base, desperate, and faint-hearted Christians practise it, to\n whom the shadow and the phantom of the devil are dearer than\n the truth of God. Some take a clear and beautifully polished\n crystal or beryl, which they consecrate and keep clean, and\n treat with incense, myrrh, and the like. And when they propose\n to practise their art, they wait for a clear day, or select\n some clean chamber in which are many candles burning; the\n masters then bathe, and take the pure child into the room with\n them, and clothe themselves in pure white garments, and sit\n down and speak in magic sentences, and then burn their magic\n offering, and make the boy look into the stone, and whisper\n in his ears secret words, which have, as they ween, some holy\n import: verily, those words are of the Devil.\"\n\nExactly one hundred years after this, a similar _pot-pourri_ appeared,\nintermingled with references to modern affairs and Christian\nEthics, entitled the \"Neupolierte Geschicht-Kunst- und Sittenspiegel\nausl\u00e4ndischer V\u00f6lker.\" Wherein we may read this:\n\n \"Es ist bekannt | dass | in manchen Staedten | bey uns |\n unterweilen alte Weiber | auch wol zu zeiten M\u00e4nner | den\n Leuten | welchen Gott eine Straffe schuldig ist | in Spiegeln\n und Krystallen weisen | was sie zu wissen begehren. Also hat\n | fuer einigen Jahren | zu Elbingen in Preussen | einer sich\n aufgehalten | welcher | aus einem solchen Wahrsager-Spiegel\n | die Verborgenheiten verkuendiget | und den Fuerwitzigen\n angedeutet hat. Mit dem Krystall-Gucken | wird zwar mancher\n | von den alten Sagen-Sprecherinnen | getaeuscht und falsche\n Mutmassungen | oder behende Augenblendungen | ihm fuer eine\n Gewissheit verkauft: weil solche Vetteln vielmals | unter dem\n Schein der Wahrsager-Kunst | ihren Betrug spielen | und weder\n Gutes noch Boeses wissen. Nichts destoweniger stehen dennoch\n auch viel solcher alten Sibyllen mit dem schwarzen Kaspar in\n guter Vertraulichkeit und koennen | in den Spiegeln | oder\n Krystallen | durch Huelfe und Vermittelung dieses boesen\n Geistes | den Erfolg kuenfftiger Begebenheiten fuerbilden. Wie\n dessen Herr Johannes Rist ein merkliches Exempel erzaehlet\n welches er | in seiner Jugend | mit seinen leiblichen Augen\n | gesehen | in einer grossen Stadt: darin er sich damals\n | bei fuernehmen Leuten | aufgehalten | die einen feinen\n wohlgearteten Sohn gehabt | welcher nachgehends zu hohen\n Ehren-Aemtern gestiegen.\"[28]\n\n [28] \"It is known that in many of our towns old women,\n possibly at times men, sojourn, who show to people to whom\n God owes punishment that which they want to know, by means\n of mirrors and crystals. Some years ago one such person was\n staying in Elbingen, in Prussia, who predicted hidden truths\n by the help of a divining mirror of this kind, and announced\n them to his curious customers. Many indeed are deceived in\n crystal-seeing by the old fortune-tellers that practice it,\n and baseless guesses and cunning deceptions of the eye are\n often sold them for certainties: for these hags frequently\n practise their impostures only under the cover and semblance\n of the art of divination, knowing neither good nor bad.\n Nevertheless, many of these old Sibyls stand upon terms of\n intimacy with Black Kaspar, and are able with the assistance\n and intermediation of this evil spirit to foreshow in their\n mirrors and crystals the issue and outcome of future events.\n Such was the remarkable case that Herr Johannes Rist tells of,\n which he saw in his youth with his own corporeal eyes; it was\n in a great city wherein at the time he was staying with very\n distinguished people who had a handsome and well-mannered son\n who afterwards rose to high offices of honor.\"\n\nAgain, we have a \"Denckwuerdige Geschichte von der Krystall-Guckery,\"\nwhich makes skilful use of all the fabulous elements of the magic\nmirror legends. It tells of a mirror that always reveals to its\npossessor the truth, and by means of which the future may be divined.\nA prominent feature of the nursery tales of to-day is discoverable in\nit\u2014that if children look at night into a mirror an ugly, forbidding\nface will gaze out upon them. The book, however, presents few\ninteresting details, and we may therefore pass it and others of the\nsame period by in order to hasten on to the present.\n\nAnd to whom would not the name of Hoffmann at once occur! He who\ndelighted to employ, and weave in the magic web of his fiction, all\nthat was marvellous and mysterious, will undoubtedly have dealt with\nthe subject we now have in hand. In fact the magic mirror has three\ntimes figured in his works: once in \"Der Goldene Topf,\" again in the\n\"Lebensansichten des Kater Murr,\" and finally in the novel \"Das \u00f6de\nHaus.\" A few passages may be taken from the last-mentioned novel as\nillustrations of the point we are considering.\n\nA small forsaken cottage bears an evil name; it hides a secret from the\nworld.\n\n \"This was what people said in the town, and I who tell this\n story could get no rest with thinking of it; daily I walked by\n the house with the curtained windows. Once, as I was passing,\n I saw the curtain move and a beautifully-shaped hand adorned\n with a brilliant diamond ring place a crystal carafe upon the\n window-sill. The memory of this picture aroused in my mind a\n visionary dream, and on the following day when I looked up to\n the window at which the hand had appeared, the countenance\n of the vision I had seen was regarding me with a look of\n sorrowful entreaty. I seated myself upon a bench opposite,\n the back of which was turned to the house, so that by leaning\n over the arm I could gaze without disturbance at the fatal\n window and the lovely maiden. Absorbed in contemplation, I\n failed to observe an Italian pedlar who was offering me his\n wares. But being seized by the arm I at last gave attention\n to the importunities of the pedlar, who, with the words 'I\n have other beautiful things here,' pulled out the lower drawer\n of his box, and held at a short distance before me, at an\n angle, a little round pocket-mirror that lay in the drawer\n among a number of other trinkets. I beheld the desolate\n house behind me, the window, and, marked in the distinctest\n outlines, the lovely angelic form of my vision. I quickly\n purchased the little glass, which now made it possible for\n me, in easy posture and without attracting the attention of\n the neighbors, to look towards the window of my hopes.... The\n little mirror that so deceptively reflected the lovely form,\n I had now devoted to domestic purposes. I was in the habit\n of tying my cravat before it. And so it happened once, while\n I was in the act of performing this important duty, that it\n appeared tarnished to me. With a view to brightly polishing\n it, I breathed upon it in the usual manner. My pulse ceased\n its beating, my heart trembled with delight and dismay.\n Delight and dismay! Yes, thus I must describe the emotion\n that overpowered me, as, when my breath fell upon the mirror,\n I beheld in a bluish mist the lovely face that had looked\n upon me with that sorrowful, heart-penetrating glance!\u2014You\n laugh?\u2014Denounce me, believe me an incurable dreamer! But say\n and think what you will\u2014it is enough\u2014the fair one gazed upon\n me from the mirror, and as soon as the breath disappeared her\n face vanished in the darkness of the glass.\n\n \"But I will not weary you, I will not tell all that came\n of this. Only this much will I say, that I again and again\n renewed my experiments with the mirror, that I was often\n successful in calling forth by my breath the picture I so\n loved, but that oftentimes my most strenuous efforts were in\n vain.... I lived only in the thought of her; all else was\n dead to me; I neglected my friends and my studies.... Often\n when that picture grew pale and wan, a physical indisposition\n seized me, the figure came forth as never before with such\n life-like reality and brilliancy that I almost fancied I\n could seize it. And then it seemed to my horror that I myself\n was the figure, veiled and encompassed by the mists of the\n glass. A sharp pain in my breast and then total apathy\n terminated this torturing condition, which invariably left\n me exhausted, and shaken to my inmost core. In these moments\n every attempt with the mirror miscarried; but when I had\n become strengthened, and the picture appeared again from the\n mirror in life-like form, I cannot indeed deny that a peculiar\n physical charm otherwise foreign to me was united with it....\"\n\nWe see what brilliantly colored creations tradition and fiction have\nwoven about the magic mirror. It is now the duty of science to cull\nfrom these shining husks, by sober investigation, the kernels of\ntruth; and that, it will be seen, can be done only by experiment.\nUnfortunately I myself am unable to report any successful experiments;\nfor, despite repeated attempts, I have been unsuccessful in obtaining\nany images whatever from mirrors, or crystals, or reflecting surfaces\nof any kind. Similarly several members of the Berlin Society of\nExperimental Psychology have only had exclusively negative results\nto recount. But on the other hand, a member of the English Society\nfor Psychical Research has been enabled to report a great number of\npertinent observations. And although to my regret I am not permitted to\npublish the name of the lady[29] in question, yet every doubt as to the\ntruth of her utterances is excluded, and the material she has furnished\nforms a valuable enrichment of psychological literature. I shall,\naccordingly, collect from the communications of this lady, who is a\nfriend of Professor and Mrs. Henry Sidgwick, several cases which appear\nto me especially adapted to throw light upon the nature of the strange\nphenomena we are examining.\n\n [29] I afterwards received permission to publish her name: it\n is Miss A. Goodrich of London.\n\nThe lady made more than seventy experiments of her own, of which\u2014a\nfact of the greatest value for passing upon their exactness\u2014she always\nmade notes at once, or at the most never more than an hour afterwards.\nShe employed various means for the production of the hallucinations. At\nfirst she used the colored balls that are hung upon Christmas trees,\nor the back of a gold watch; but it turned out that both these objects\ntried the eyes by their strong brilliancy and grotesquely distorted\nthe visions that were evoked. A glass filled with water proved to be\ninconvenient to handle, especially in the dark; while mirrors also\npossessed many disturbing peculiarities. A magnifying glass set on a\ndark background proved to be very effective, especially by daylight;\nas did also a black-framed photograph placed upon the wall of the\nroom opposite the light. The gaze and the attention, however, were\nbest concentrated upon a well-polished rock-crystal. The method of\nprocedure\u2014since happily all the appurtenances of mysticism were\ndiscarded\u2014was very simple. The lady draped the crystal in black,\nplaced it where none of the surrounding objects could be reflected in\nit, and waited for whatever might happen.\n\nWhat occurred? The simplest instance is perhaps No. 7, which we here\nintroduce:\n\n \"I find in the Crystal a bit of dark wall, covered with white\n jessamine, and I ask myself, 'Where have I walked to-day?'\n I have no recollection of such a sight, not a common one\n in the London streets, but to-morrow I will repeat my walk\n of this morning, with a careful regard for creeper-covered\n walls. To-morrow solves the mystery. I find the very spot,\n and the sight brings with it the further recollection that\n at the moment we passed this spot I was engaged in absorbing\n conversation with my companion, and my voluntary attention was\n preoccupied.\"\n\nThis is a very simple case. A visual image, recently yet unconsciously\nreceived, springs up from the subterranean strata of the soul into\nwhich it had sunk. No. 68 affords a similar instance:\n\n \"I had carelessly destroyed a letter without preserving the\n address of my correspondent. I knew the county, and searching\n in a map, recognised the name of the town, one unfamiliar\n to me, but which I was sure I should know when I saw it. But\n I had no clue to the name of the house or street, till at\n last it struck me to test the value of the crystal as a means\n of recalling forgotten knowledge. A very short inspection\n supplied me with 'Hibbs House' in grey letters on a white\n ground, and having nothing better to suggest from any other\n source, I risked posting my letter to the address so strangely\n supplied.\n\n \"A day or two brought me an answer, headed 'Hibbs House' in\n grey letters on a white ground.\"\n\nTricks of the memory like these appear still more strange when they\nare due merely to an indirect excitation. It may happen that one is\nsuddenly reminded of a friend who is long since dead, by the accidental\nsight of his favorite dish. No direct excitation is here presented,\nbut the image of the friend remembered is indirectly revived through a\ncertain concatenation of ideas. This we find in the eleventh experiment:\n\n \"One of my earliest experiences was of a picture, perplexing\n and wholly unexpected\u2014a quaint oak chair, an old hand, a worn\n black coat-sleeve resting on the arm of the chair,\u2014slowly\n recognised as a recollection of a room in a country vicarage,\n which I had not entered and but seldom recalled since I was a\n child of ten. But whence came this vision, what association\n has conjured up this picture? What have I done to-day?... At\n length the clue is found. I have to-day been reading Dante,\n first enjoyed with the help of our dear old vicar many a year\n ago.\"\n\nThe process here carried on, which takes place for the most part\noutside of the sphere of consciousness, is therefore the following: The\nreading of Dante revives the image 'Vicar'; the image 'Vicar' produces\nthe image of the room; the latter image is externalised.\n\nBut we can penetrate _consciously_ into these processes. There\nare any number of people who, with their eyes closed, can produce\nphantasy-pictures surprisingly realistic; and geniuses especially have\ncommand of rich powers in this direction. George Sand's biographer\ntells us, that sitting at the feet of her mother before the chimney\nfire, she would often watch the old green-colored fire-guard in order\nto form from the reflections of the flames figures and scenes. And this\nis the case of our English lady. Just as an imaginative child tells\nitself stories, so she, to while away the time, builds in the twilight\nhours groups of figures, and projects them into her crystals; and so\nstrange is the unconscious \"I\" to the conscious \"I,\" that oftentimes\nthe miniature drama that is unfolded is the source of the greatest\nsurprises to its own creator. This independence of our consciousness in\ntwo spheres, is exhibited with surprising distinctness where especial\naids and expedients must be employed to decipher the visions. Thus:\n\n \"On March 20th, I happened to want the date of Ptolemy\n Philadelphus, which I could not recall, though feeling sure\n that I knew it, and that I associated it with some event of\n importance. When looking in the Crystal some hours later, I\n found a picture of an old man with long white hair and beard,\n dressed like a Lyceum Shylock, and busy writing in a large\n book with tarnished massive clasps. I wondered much who he\n was, and what he could possibly be doing, and thought it\n a good opportunity of carrying out a suggestion which had\n been made to me, of examining objects in the Crystal with\n a magnifying glass. The glass revealed to me that my old\n gentleman was writing in Greek, though the lines faded away\n as I looked, all but the characters he had last traced, the\n Latin numerals LXX. Then it flashed into my mind, that he was\n one of the Jewish Elders at work on the Septuagint, and that\n its date, 277 B. C., would serve equally well for Ptolemy\n Philadelphus! It may be worth while to add, though the fact\n was not in my conscious memory at the moment, that I had once\n learnt a chronology on a mnemonic system which substituted\n letters for figures, and that the memoria technica for this\n date was 'Now Jewish Elders indite a Greek copy.'\" (No. 74.)\n\nThe employment of a magnifying glass, which by reason of external\ndifficulties is seldom possible, is a convincing proof of the degree\nof independence of the two personalities within us. Anything more\nmarvellous than the fact before us can hardly be imagined. We create\nsomething which is immediately wrested from our control and which leads\na totally independent life; we produce something which becomes for our\nown selves a mute enigma, and which can only be aroused by artificial\nmeans out of its ghost-like silence.\n\n \"The rent that gapes throughout creation,\n Goes also through the human heart.\"\n\nAnd thus it may happen that our second \"I\" actually mystifies at times\nour first and principal \"I.\"\n\nOnce a number of letters appeared to her in the crystal, each letter\nseen separately, of a bright red color. At first they seemed to be\nabsolutely meaningless, but it was at length discovered that they\ncomposed words, spelt backwards, in the following fashion:\u2014\n\n d e t n a w a e n o e m o s o t n i o j a e t a v i r p e l c\n r i c t s u m e b g n i l l i w o t e v i g s e v l e s m e h\n t p u o t e h t t c e j b u s\n\nand the message at length became intelligible as follows:\u2014\n\n\"Wanted a someone to join a private circle, must be willing to give\nthemselves up to the subject.\"\n\nWe now come to a third group of experiments in which an entirely\nnew element enters into play. Whereas hitherto we have seen things\nrevealed in the magic mirror which were demonstrably or presumably\nalready present in the brain of the operator, or, where this was not\nthe case, in any event possessed no external significance, we now\nhear of experiments in which unknown events are said to have been\npresented. I should take no notice whatever of this class of reports\nregarding clairvoyance in space and time, if our informant did not\ngive the impression of being thoroughly conscientious and scientific.\nThe English lady possesses, as I believe I have discerned from our\ncorrespondence, a highly critical mind, and is well acquainted with\nthe common sources of error in this department of investigation, and\nher testimony is in my opinion more valuable than that of all the\nearly authors together. It were indeed more acceptable if the results\nof recent investigations had been to show that all the phenomena of\ncrystallomancy were referable to the hitherto misunderstood dominance\nof the soul of the individual gazing; but since a number of cases\nremain that will not fit into this explanation, we must as honest\npeople openly acknowledge the fact. Accordingly, without attempting\nany detailed explanation, I shall select a few cases as illustrations,\nleaving it to the reader to discard them as \"accidental\" or to retain\nthem as worthy of consideration:\n\n \"On Saturday, March 9th, I had written a somewhat impatient\n note to a friend, accusing her of having, on her return\n from a two months' absence on the Continent, spent ten days\n in London without paying me a visit. I was not, therefore,\n surprised, when on Sunday evening she appeared before me\n in the Crystal, but could not understand why she should\n hold up, with an air of deprecation, what appeared to be a\n music portfolio. On Monday I received an answer, written the\n previous day, pleading guilty to my charge, but urging, in\n excuse, that she was attending the Royal Academy of Music,\n and was engaged there during the greater part of every day.\n This intelligence was to the last degree unexpected, for my\n friend is a married woman, who has never studied music in any\n but amateur style, and who, according to the standard of most\n ladies of fashion, had \"finished her education\" some years\n ago. I have since ascertained that she, in fact, carries a\n portfolio corresponding with the sketch I made of that seen in\n the vision.\" (No. 64.)\n\nThe simplest explanation of this case would be the assumption that\nour informant had at some time or other cursorily heard of her friend\nhaving again taken up music. The whole thing would then be a revived\nmemory; and the agreement in appearance of the portfolio seen with the\nreal portfolio, an accidental coincidence. But this presumption being\nexcluded, psychologists who believe in the possibility of telepathic\ncommunication might propose a different explanation. In this way. The\nlady's friend, in writing her note of excuse, is vividly thinking\nof her work, which is to her to a certain extent represented by her\nportfolio, and conveys this picture to the receptive sub-consciousness\nof the other lady. There the image lies latent until it is translated\ninto sensory life through the agency of the magic mirror\u2014the very\nprocess with which we have at a previous place become acquainted,\nand will more exactly explain further on. The question, therefore,\nis reduced simply to the truth of the premise first assumed\u2014namely,\ntelepathic communication; and all that we can at present say, is,\nthat it is considered as an actual fact, upon the basis of personal\nexperience, by many prominent investigators, but is rejected by the\nmajority as undemonstrated. For our part, we admit that an hypothesis\nof this kind would prove to be very useful, since reports similar to\nthe last mentioned one, have recently been published in great numbers.\nWe select as an illustration the following note by Mrs. L. M., from the\nProceedings of the American Society for Psychical Research:\n\n \"I was anxious to see a Mr. H., but was uncertain on what day\n he would call. On the 19th [July, 1887] I was called out of\n the office, and, before going out, I put on the door a card\n having these words on it, 'Will return soon.' I was absent\n about an hour. On my return I came upstairs, but did not ask\n the elevator boy if any one had called; nor did he tell me\n any one had done so. As I came within a short distance of the\n door, I saw some characters written upon the card I had left,\n and just below the printed words 'Will return soon,' I stooped\n down and read, 'Mr. H. has been here, and will return.' As\n I looked the words faded away. I entered the office, and in\n a very short time Mr. H. came in. He had left no name or\n message. He had impressed my face upon his mind very strongly,\n with the intention of seeing if I would be in any way affected\n by it, or conscious of his approach.\"\n\nIf the fact of accident, intensified by the strained expectation of\nMrs. M., cannot be accepted as a satisfactory explanation, it is to\nbe considered that the white surface of the card in this case acted\nin the same externalising manner as the crystal in the instance\ngiven just above. The remotely-operative excitation penetrated the\nsoul unobserved, and was first translated into a conscious image\nat the moment when the glance at the card favored the formation of\nhallucinations.\n\nFinally a number of other cases are to be mentioned, in which even\nthese suppositions seem insufficient; and for the reason that the\nevents seen were not to happen until some future time. But that which\nhas not yet happened, and which is not to be foreseen in detail,\ncan neither originate in the repositories of memory, nor from the\ntelepathic influence exercised by another person. We should in\nthat case be obliged to accept some hypothesis of clairvoyance in\ntime\u2014_granting of course that all sources of error are excluded_. The\nreader may judge for himself:\n\n \"In January last I saw in the Crystal the figure of a man\n crouching at a small window, and looking into the room from\n the outside. I could not see his features, which appeared\n to be muffled, but the Crystal was particularly dark that\n evening, and the picture being an unpleasant one, I did\n not persevere. I concluded the vision to be a result of a\n discussion in my presence of the many stories of burglary with\n which the newspapers had lately abounded, and reflected with\n a passing satisfaction, that the only windows in the house\n divided into four panes as were those of the Crystal-picture,\n were in the front attic and almost inaccessible. Three days\n later a fire broke out in that very room, which had to be\n entered from outside through the window, the face of the\n fireman being covered with a wet cloth, as a protection from\n the smoke which rendered access through the door impossible.\"\n (No. 36.)\n\nIs this a case of prevision? Granting that the agreement of the facts\nwith the vision is not due to mere accident, the possibility yet\nremains of a falsification of memory; that is, the possibility that\na vision originally _similar_ to the event afterwards observed, was\nsubsequently taken to be the _same_ as that event. Such obscurations\nand falsifications of memory are very frequent. Indeed they get to\nbe epidemic, the moment a second factor, that of _expectation_, is\nadded. We need only have a foreboding that something will eventually\nhappen, and we shall inevitably form certain indefinite notions of its\nparticular character. If now the event actually happens, our obliging\nmemory is at once at hand with the lie, '_Exactly_ as I knew before.'\n'I told you so,' is the assertion. And it is therefore no accident\nthat in the literature of clairvoyance, the arrival of letters of\nthis or that tenor plays so great a part; for expectation has a broad\nand acceptable arena in this very connection. The extent to which\nthe falsification of memory and intense expectation take part in the\nobservation which we shall now cite, it would be hardly possible to\ndetermine accurately:\n\n \"On the evening of March 11th, being tired, I was about to go\n early to my room, when it occurred to me to wait for the last\n post, already late, that I might not be again disturbed by\n having the letters brought to my room. I took up the Crystal\n rather to pass the time than with much expectation of seeing\n anything; for as a rule, when one is tired, the concentration\n of attention necessary to Crystal-vision is somewhat difficult\n to attain. However, I perceived a white object on a dark\n ground, soon becoming more clearly defined as a letter in a\n very large envelope torn at the edges, as if not sufficiently\n strong to hold its contents. Another envelope, of ordinary\n size, lying at the top, concealed the address, and the writing\n on the smaller one was too much blurred to decipher. The\n vision was momentary only, or I might have applied the test of\n the magnifying glass, which is sometimes, though not always,\n of use in such cases. I thought it possible that the vision\n might be merely the result of expectation, but it seemed\n at least worth while, after making a note of the fact,\u2014my\n invariable rule whenever possible,\u2014to test its significance.\n As a matter of fact, the letters were lying on a seat in the\n hall, showing white against the dark polished wood\u2014placed\n there possibly by some one leaving the house who had met the\n postman before he had time to ring. The letters were two,\u2014the\n lower one, which had burst the envelope, was the size of a\n sheet of letter-paper not folded, and was for myself, the\n upper one, the usual size of a note, and not for me, which may\n have accounted for my inability to read the address.\" (No. 66.)\n\nI repeat it\u2014with accounts of this character, though in the highest\ndegree acceptable, science cannot at present deal; and in proceeding\nnow to attempt an explanation of the phenomena illustrated by the\nexperiments of the English communication mentioned, I shall entirely\nleave out of consideration the cases that point to telepathic causes or\nclairvoyance in time and space.\n\nWe have already made the acquaintance of some few theories which have\narisen historically. Formerly, and even at the present day in fact,\ncertain objects and qualities of objects were made accountable for the\noccurrence of striking hallucinations. The great cycle of legends that\nadhere to the magic mirror, has thus arisen. Often a pentahedronal\nquartz-crystal, often the fusion of the seven ancient metals into\npolished surfaces was supposed to possess especial virtue. Gregory, of\nEdinburgh, asserted that the phenomena were most easily produced by\nlooking into a double-convex plate of zinc into the centre of which\na small polished copper disk had been set. We now know that in the\nimportance attached to these and similar directions the salient point\nwas missed and an incidental factor pushed into the foreground. But\nin any event it is worthy of remark, that through belief in notions\nof this kind the seer gained a greater confidence in the success of\nhis experiments. Even incorrect theories prove to be useful. When any\none finally came into the possession of a famous magic stone, his firm\nbelief in its powers induced a disposition to visions that perhaps\nnever before existed in his organism to the same degree.\n\nA second hypothesis regards the phenomena as manifestations of the\nDevil or the work of spirits. Dr. Dee gives a very minute description\nof his regular spirit visitors. He tells of an old woman in a red\npetticoat, and of a pretty little girl with her hair rolled up in\nfront and hanging down very long behind. This constant personification\nis very significant, since it indicates the approach of recognised\nforms of mental alienation; however, the \"Daimon\" of Socrates proves\nthat it does not in every case necessarily lead to this. We are come,\nhere, into a border-land, from which some roads lead into the dark\nregions of insanity and others up to the luminous heights of inspired\ngenius: but in every case we are concerned with a region in _our own_\nmind, and no natural propensity to externalisation must be allowed to\ndeceive us with regard to it. The intrusion of foreign \"spirits\" into\nour psycho-physical organism, the assumption that incorporeal beings\ninfluence our nervous system so as to produce external effects,\nviolently contradicts all human experience. If the spiritist doctrine\ncould be mathematically proved it would be the most interesting\nsolution imaginable of all these problems; and I must confess, the\nestablishment of the existence of intelligent incorporeal beings would\nin my opinion eclipse all other events of our time. But the probability\nof this is at present _very_ small.\n\nA third theory, of modern origin, seeks the explanation of the question\nin a species of magic power inherent in man, as yet unfathomed, which\nis manifested especially in ecstatic conditions. The vehicles of the\n_magic gaze_ are shining mirrors or reflecting surfaces, which forming\na means of attraction for individuals of the proper constitution induce\nthat peculiar state of alienation from every other subject, that\nconcentration in the innermost self, which often rises to insensibility\nand unconsciousness, or even to cataleptic torpidity, wherein the\nconsciousness of All-existence is liberated. Future events and distant\noccurrences are seen in pictures which appear to be reflected in the\nmirror or the fluid employed, but which in reality exist in the person\ngazing and are represented by projection outwards. Thus Perty.\n\nOther philosophers speak of the \"transcendental\" capacities and powers\nof the human soul, or of the liberation of a metaphysical essentiality\nwithin us.\n\nBut these theories and suppositions are plainly the outcome of a\npremature simplification of our difficult problem. People are always\ntoo ready to thrust forward a new \"power\" or \"force\" to unify with\ndispatch and celerity uncomfortable phenomena of the present sort,\nand overlook the fact that every single phenomenon demands an exact\ninvestigation and explanation. Nothing is accomplished by calling\nphenomena \"magical\" or \"transcendental.\" The work demanded is, to\nascertain the connection and relation of the phenomena in question\nwith the province of soul-life as a whole. To put an _x_ in the place\nof a _y_ contributes nothing to the solution of a problem. We cannot\nbe too closely upon our guard against comprehensive syntheses of this\ncharacter; for their splendid appearance dazzles woefully the eye of\nresearch.\n\nMuch nearer the truth is the position that hypnosis merely is concerned\nhere. A well-known author, Louis Maury, who wrote in the middle part of\nthis century, says:\n\n \"Among the principal methods of divination a great number aim\n at producing a sort of vertigo by acting upon the eyes and\n consequently upon the brain, in a manner something like that\n in which shining bodies act in hypnotism.\"\n\nMrs. De Morgan speaks in a similar strain:\n\n \"Crystal-vision is a well attested fact, having its laws and\n conditions like other phenomena in this world of known and\n hidden causes, and a little careful observation may clear away\n some of that obscurity which has kept it as the property of\n witches and sorcerers. The Crystal ... seems to produce on the\n eye of the seer an effect exactly like what would ensue under\n the fingers of a powerful mesmeriser. The person who looks at\n it often becomes sleepy. Sometimes the eyes close. At other\n times tears flow.\"\n\nMrs. De Morgan's very description renders it doubtful whether we have\nto deal here with true, developed hypnotism. Other accounts are also\ncalculated to shake this assumption. Cahagnet, for example, required\nonly a moment of mental concentration for his eyes to become fixed; he\nlost all sight of the objects he had a moment before gazed upon, and\nthose which he wished to call up appeared between him and the former.\nAll spontaneous visions were fulfilled. When voluntarily evoked, but\nseven out of ten were true. When he wanted to produce the visions he\nfixed his eyes upon the first fit object, and he often saw hundreds\nand thousands of persons running hither and thither in one little\nshining point. Or he beheld a great city distinctly drawn in a mirror\nbut one inch in diameter. This is not very easily reconciled with\nour conceptions of the character of hypnotism. Nor less so\u2014to close\nour list of examples\u2014the observations of an experimenter mentioned\nby Mrs. De Morgan, that the perceptions of crystal-vision are not\ninterfered with by those of normal vision, but that the percipient\ncould discontinue her observation at will, and returning would find the\nscene as she left it.\n\nThere is evidently involved here the condition of mind called\n\"temporary\" or \"momentary\" hypnosis, or what Eduard Von Hartmann more\naptly calls \"masked somnambulism.\" It is not fully developed hypnosis,\nbut simply its incipient forms\u2014hypnoid states of manifold variations.\nNow the question arises, Of what do these states consist? What are\ntheir essential characteristics? And how are they to be psychologically\nexplained? For even our appeal to hypnotism simply puts a new empty\nname into the place of an old one. If we do not understand hypnosis,\nits production for the explanation of the magic mirror profits us\nvery little. The task, accordingly, presents itself of referring,\nin connection with some psychological theory of hypnotism, the\nwell-established facts at our disposal to one and the same cause.\n\nThe theory from which I shall proceed in attempting an explanation, has\nalready been frequently touched upon in the course of this article;\nfor certain observations indicated it so clearly that mention of it\nwas not to be avoided. It is the doctrine of the double consciousness\nof the human soul.[30] Acts are done in the course even of our\nevery-day life, which presuppose for their origin and execution all the\nfaculties of the soul, yet nevertheless occur without the knowledge of\nthe individual; they require a sort of consciousness and a separate\nmemory beyond the _cognisance_ of the normal person. One of the most\nfrequent cases in practical experience is where the thoughts of a\nperson reading aloud wander and become occupied with an entirely\ndifferent subject; and where despite this aberration the person in\nquestion reads correctly with the proper emphasis and expression,\nturns the leaves, and in short performs acts which without intelligent\ncontrol are hardly conceivable. An English psychologist, Mr. Barkworth,\nhas acquired such expertness in the practice of this, that during\nan animated debate he can rapidly and correctly add long columns of\nfigures without having his attention diverted in the least. This points\nnot only to an unconscious intelligence, but\u2014which is of still greater\nconsequence\u2014to an unconscious memory. Mr. Barkworth must keep two\nseries of figures in his mind in order to obtain from them a third;\nthis latter sum he is again obliged to retain in order to add to it\na newly acquired fourth; and so on. The latter chain of memories,\nlet it be remarked, performs its office entirely independently of\nthat upon which the recollection of the debate is constructed; and it\nmay therefore be reasonably maintained that there exists beyond the\ncognisance of the individual, both consciousness and memory; and if the\nessential components of the ego are found in these two last-mentioned\nfactors, then every person conceals within himself the germs of a\nsecond personality. I designate the two halves of consciousness that\nthus operate in greater or less independence of each other,\u2014in a\nfigurative sense of course,\u2014as super-and sub-consciousness, and\ncomprehend the whole as the doctrine of double consciousness or the\ndouble ego.\n\n [30] Compare my treatise _Das Doppel-Ich_, the first number of\n the \"Publications of the Society of Experimental Psychology\n of Berlin,\" Leipsic 1890, Ernst G\u00fcnther. I must refer\n here, moreover, to an acute criticism of my views by Adolf\n Bentivegni, published as No. 4 of the above-named series, and\n entitled _Die Hypnose und ihre civilrechtliche Bedeutung_,\n Leipsic, 1890. The views set forth in the present article will\n be found in the German magazine _Vom Fels zum Meer_.\n\nThe division very clearly appears in the opposition between waking and\ndreaming. Even when we very accurately remember a dream which we have\njust had,\u2014which happens very seldom,\u2014we feel the difference of the\ntwo states of consciousness with unmistakable distinctness. We have no\npower over the tricks that phantasy plays with us in our sleep, and in\nspite of the often present belief that it is all but a dream, yet every\npower fails us of penetrating into its independent activity. Moreover\nthe images are generally of a very definite signification, since they\nare merely reproduced from the store-house of impressions that have\nsunk into the unfathomable depths of our soul. In this way many a dream\nreveals to us the true character of our Self; in this manner sub-basal\ndream-images exhibit the thoughts and emotions that principally occupy\nus in our innermost heart. Closer investigation teaches further, that\nin dreams, states of intoxication, in somnambulistic and epileptic\nattacks, not only does a consciousness different from the normal\nconsciousness rule, but that also between separate successive periods\nmemory-links of greater or lesser stability are wont to form. But this\nis most strikingly exhibited in the case of hypnosis. The hypnotic\nstate is nothing more than an artificially produced ascendancy\nof the secondary or subordinate ego. All its peculiarities are\nexplainable from this; for psychology endows the dream-consciousness\nprevailing in this state, with sensibility and suggestibility, the\nwaking consciousness on the other hand with the inhibitory ideas\nthat represent reality. It has established, moreover, that our fully\nconscious soul-life rests upon an automatically operating substratum\nof hallucinatory character, in which images, long since forgotten,\nhave their abode. By virtue of these properties the subconsciousness\nbecomes the source of bold and fantastic creations, while the\nsuperconsciousness is made the vehicle of our psychic life-work,\nlaboriously sustaining and regulating itself in its relations with the\noutside world.\n\nTo this conception, which explains crystal-visions as a _form of the\nactivity of the subconsciousness_, it will be variously objected, that\nsuch a simultaneous coexistence of two divisions of consciousness does\nnot possess the same degree of probability as an alternation of states\nof consciousness. But how, upon this latter supposition, could the\n\"Hibbs House\" case be explained? In this instance, two psychical groups\ndo not alternate, but one operates during the existence of the other.\n\nFurther, the propriety in general is questioned of speaking of\nhalf-conscious or unconscious ideas and mental processes. It is the\nopinion of the G\u00f6ttingen philosopher G. E. M\u00fcller, that just as every\nexcitation of the brain immediately occasioned by a sensory stimulus\nis not competent to produce a sensation, so also all reproduced\nnervous excitations are not necessarily accompanied by perceptual\nimages. In the cases mentioned, and in many others, there is no reason\nwhy groups of true _psychical_ states should be admitted, which, in\ncontradistinction to other psychical states, only lack consciousness;\non the contrary, we have to deal with simply a series of nervous\nexcitations, which, as distinguished from other excitations, are not\naccompanied by corresponding states of our consciousness.\n\nThis conception of soul-life, which has been of late very favorably\nreceived, Hugo M\u00fcnsterberg has formulated thus\u2014that the psychical\nphenomenon is to a certain extent the subjective internal aspect of\na thus and thus constituted objective physical phenomenon. We are\nto bear in mind that the succession of the physical processes is\nnowhere interrupted, and that in addition certain of these physical\nprocesses, those namely which are carried on with a certain intensity\nin particular apparatuses of the brain, possess a psychical internal\naspect; so that this excitation of the nervous cells is, without losing\nthereby anything in physical effect, the condition of the appearance of\ncertain sensations in consciousness.\n\nBut by the side of the physiological theory legitimately exist as\npossibilities a psychological one and a psycho-physical one. It is the\ndoctrine of the latter theories that not only are physical vestiges\nleft behind in the cortex of the brain after every perception, but also\npsychical dispositions to the formation of ideas and images; and that\nit is possible for images of all kinds to continue to exist without\ndistinctly attaining to consciousness. These theories distinguish\nbetween degrees of luminosity in our percepts and images, the three\nmost important degrees of which I have designated as consciousness,\nsubconsciousness, and unconsciousness. There exists a gradation of\ndegrees of consciousness, and the fully-conscious course of mental\nrepresentation is everywhere conditioned by its connection with the\nobscured spheres beyond. Our attention surveys but a small area, on\nthe boundary lines of which the altitudes of consciousness decrease,\nand finally approach the zero point. I say _approach_, for they never\nreach it. Our experiments with the magic mirror in fact show us how\nthe oldest impressions, and impressions of ridiculous insignificance,\nafter long long years awake as it were from the slumber of the fabled\nSleeping Beauty. If our millions of perceptions were to live on\nin _consciousness_ we should no longer have a past, but live in a\ncontinuous celestial present; but were the operation of consciousness\nso limited that it destroyed great numbers of images, the very facts\nupon which the belief in supernatural powers rests, would lose their\nonly rational explanation. One result of our study of crystal-visions\nis assuredly this, that we shall have to erase the word \"forgotten\"\nwith all its derivatives from the dictionary, and at the most employ\nthe phrase \"not remembered.\" With more ardent yearning than ever before\nwill we long for a river of Lethe, and join with our whole hearts in\nthe cry of Themistocles, \"O that some one might teach me the art of\nforgetting!\"\n\nAlong with the inner process the outward form of the hallucination\nstill requires a brief explanation. The circumstance, namely,\nwhich lends magic-mirror phenomena their salient feature, is the\nsensory reproduction of the images that have sprung up from the\nsubconsciousness. The subterranean ideas produced do not reach the\nsurface as thoughts, but as pseudo-perceptions. To refer the latter\nto the place to which they belong, I shall first remind the reader of\nthe well-known after-images which arise when an excitation produced\nin the sensory organ and in the sensory nerves does not immediately\ndisappear with the cessation of the excitatory action. By gazing at\nthe sun we can at once obtain this effect. But despite the fact that\nthe last-mentioned class of images possesses the full distinctness\nof real sensations as distinguished from mere memory and imagination\nimages, they still bear no relation to our subject on account of their\nunion with _recently_ occurring sensory impressions. Still less do the\nrepetition-sensations in the dark field of vision\u2014as of revolving\nwheels\u2014belong here; or illusions. There remain accordingly only\n_hallucinations_, which are withdrawn from all conscious control, and\nwhich possess the exact character of sensory perceptions externally\nawakened, without any object or objective stimulation actually being\npresent in the outer world to correspond to them.\n\nHallucinations, the production of which are facilitated by the fixation\nof shining surfaces, do not occur with all persons; and there may be a\nkernel of truth in the tradition which designates women and children as\nendowed with especial capacities in this respect. The investigations\nof Fechner upon the varying vividness of after-images; the statistics\nof Galton upon hallucinatory phantasms in artists; and the extensive\nstatistical work of the Society for Psychical Research, appear to\npoint to a connection of this character. Miss Goodrich told me that\nher dreams were few in number and colorless. I must confess that I was\nsurprised at this; but she added that all her recollections of places\nwere accompanied with the vividness of actual sensory impressions.\nIf, for example, she desires to describe a room in a friend's house,\nshe returns in recollection to the occasion of her last visit; she\nagain occupies the same chair; the carpet at her feet becomes visible,\nthen the furniture nearest her, then the walls and ceiling, until a\ntrue picture of the whole room is extended before her mind's eye.\nCrystal-visions are distinguished from internal visions of this\ncharacter only by the single circumstance that they are projected\noutwards to or upon a reflecting point. These visions often consist\nof a room that Miss Goodrich has lately seen, or a street sign, or\nof some movement that has startled her, as of a servant letting a\nplate fall, or of a dog running under a wagon. No consideration that\nthe objects are not before her is of avail; the force of out-rushing\nmemory-formations and the acquired established connection of the\nelements of soul-life are reduced to the primitive state that obtains\nin the soul of a child, to whom life is in reality a dream without\ndefinite limits. I well remember from the period of my early boyhood,\nthe peculiar sensation of a state flickering between reality and fancy,\nand I understand the condition of those primitive tribes with whom\ndreamland and life intermingle in the strangest way; but capacities in\nthis direction have disappeared down to the striking want of a normally\ndeveloped faculty for colors.\n\n * * * * *\n\nSumming up then, we may say, that with regard to their _contents_\nthe phenomena produced by the agency of the magic mirror proceed\nfrom the realm of subconsciousness; and that with regard to their\n_form_ they belong to the category of hallucinations. Their contents,\nnot regarded as a performance of memory, appear to possess no great\nvalue\u2014so grotesque and ordinary are the few ideas brought up from this\ninvisible storehouse. But they often supply us with a deep view into\nthe secrets of character, and inculcate with terrible emphasis the\ntruth that nothing is lost in the realms of the soul, any more than\nin the external world which is ruled by the law of the conservation\nof energy. Every thought that ever traversed our brain, every emotion\nthat has ever thrilled our heart, every wish that has ever animated\nfor a fleeting moment our breast\u2014has all been entered in ineffaceable\ncharacters in the day-book of our earthly existence. Would that this\nknowledge could strengthen our feeling of moral responsibility!\n\nThus does the expansion of our psychological conceptions not\ninfrequently lead to an enrichment of our notions of morality. But\nwhether we place a higher value upon this aspect last mentioned, or\nupon the purely scientific object to which we referred at the beginning\nof our article, or finally upon a factor connected therewith, namely\nthe enlightenment of society\u2014at any rate we must confess that in the\nmuch abused \"magic mirror\" a rich and attractive source of treasures\nhas been opened.\n\n MAX DESSOIR.\n\n\n\n\nH\u00d6FFDING ON THE RELATION OF THE MIND TO THE BODY.\n\n\nFew topics are of greater speculative or indeed practical interest\nthan that of the relation of the body to the mind. Rarely has the\nsubject been treated with such perspicuity and at the same time with\nsuch candor and avoidance of hasty dogmatism as by Professor Harald\nH\u00f6ffding, of Copenhagen, in his \"Psychology\" (translated into German\nfrom the Danish and published in Leipsic, Reisland). A leading American\nprofessor of philosophy remarked to me recently that this for its\nsize (the volume contains 452 pages) was the best all-around work on\nPsychology; and an examination of the section entitled _Seele und\nK\u00f6rper_ (Mind and Body) certainly gives countenance to the statement.\n\nProfessor H\u00f6ffding does not indeed oppose himself to metaphysical\nspeculation; he believes that the human mind will never consent to\nbeing shut out from the task of searching after the ultimate principles\nof the universe, of which it is a part. But his standpoint in this\nwork is the purely empirical one, as one's standpoint must be in every\npositive science. Positive science deals with the facts of experience;\nmetaphysics with their ultimate explanation. He regards it as a\nmisfortune to confuse the two, as popular thinking in psychology does;\nand scientific thinking in this realm is characterised by the effort\nto avoid the confusion and keep solely to the facts of observation and\nexperience. Accordingly both materialism and spiritualism are excluded\nfrom the field\u2014each theory involving a transcending of the realm of\nexperience, i. e., being metaphysical.\n\nThere are two subdivisions of the realm of experience according to\nProfessor H\u00f6ffding,\u2014one coextensive with psychical phenomena, such as\nfeelings, thoughts, and volitions, the other with physical phenomena,\ni. e., with what moves in space. They may be called respectively inner\nexperience and outer experience. Each must be grasped in its distinct\nfeatures; and only after doing so can we feel the _problem_ involved in\nthe question of their relation to or connection with one another. For\nit happens that one set of outer experiences stands in an indisputably\npeculiar relation to the phenomena of consciousness, namely, the set\nwhich we describe by the term \"body\" and, more particularly, by that of\n\"nervous system\" or \"brain.\" Much of what we call the physical world\nstands in relation to consciousness as the thing known to the knower;\nbut a part of the physical world (i. e., the body or brain) seems a\npart of the knower as well\u2014a body or nervous system of some kind seems\nan indispensable requirement or at least concomitant of anything like\nfeeling, or thought, or act of volition.\n\nNow, different as the movements of the nervous system, the processes\nof the brain are from the phenomena of consciousness, there are a\nnumber of resemblances between them. Professor H\u00f6ffding specifies\nsix: (1) As the nervous system is the central, unifying organ of the\nbody, so does consciousness bring together into a unity all the varied\nphenomena of experience, scattered though they be in time and space.\n(2) Just as a change is necessary that consciousness may be awakened,\n(an absence of contrasts tending in the direction of unconsciousness,)\nso a stimulus is necessary that the nerves may act. (3) A stimulus\nmay produce a commotion in the nervous system out of all proportion\nto its immediate efficacy, just as a spark may act on a magazine of\npowder; so a simple sensation may set in motion a whole train of ideas\nand emotions, owing to the complicated structure and multitudinous\ninner relations of consciousness. (4) The movements of the body are\nslow in proportion as they are conscious; now the nerves which appear\nto be closely related to consciousness act more slowly than those\nwhich direct purely physiological (i. e., unconscious) processes. (5)\nThe lower nerve-centres form a system comparatively independent of\nthe higher ones; corresponding to this is the fact that many bodily\nprocesses go on unconsciously and only make us aware of them when the\ncircumstances attending them are particularly favorable or unfavorable.\nThe _consciousness_ of the physical state corresponds to the excitation\nof the higher nerve-centres. Similarly the action of the will has its\nphysiological counterpart; in the struggle between \"the flesh and the\nspirit,\" the lower nerve-centres with their reflex and involuntary\nactions correspond to the flesh, the higher centres to the spirit. (6)\nThe construction of the nervous system is similar to the constitution\nof consciousness; just as consciousness is at once receptive and\nactive, with more or less of intervening reflection or thought, so the\nnervous system has both sensory and motor organs, with an intervening\nsphere.\n\nNot only are there these formal resemblances, there is a real\nconnection, according to Professor H\u00f6ffding, as is shown by the fact\nthat with the evolution of the nervous system go higher and higher\nforms of consciousness, that irritation on the surface of an organism\nmust be communicated to the brain that conscious sensations may arise,\nand that when arterial blood fails to reach the brain unconsciousness\nsupervenes. What hypothesis do these facts conduct to us? All of them\nmust be born in mind that any special hypothesis may be legitimated.\nThere are only four possibilities: (1) Either consciousness and the\nbrain, mind and body, act upon one another as two separate things or\nsubstances; (2) or the mind is only a form or product of the body; (3)\nor the body is only a form or product of one or more mental substances;\n(4) or mind and body, consciousness and the brain, grow and develop\nas different manifestations of one and the same substance. It must be\nadmitted that the author at this point somewhat deserts the empirical\nstandpoint to which he declared at the outset that he should keep. The\n_facts_ of correspondence or parallelism are all that come within the\nrealm of experience; their _explanation_ must be more or less a matter\nof inference and theoretical construction and involves a departure in\nthe direction of metaphysics. Professor H\u00f6ffding is aware of this and\nsays that these hypotheses belong to the border-land between positive\nscience and metaphysics. Moreover, he confesses that any conclusion\nhe may reach will have only a provisional value and may need revision,\nbefore it can serve as a final part of a philosophical system. He will,\nhowever, follow as closely as possible the leadings of experience, as\nindeed he says we should do in all metaphysical speculation.\n\nIn considering the first hypothesis, (namely, that mind and body act\non one another as two things,) Professor H\u00f6ffding shows that it is\ninconsistent with the law of the conservation of energy. For, at the\npoint where the nervous process is converted into mental activity,\none sum of physical energy would disappear without being replaced by\nanother sum of the same kind. As matter of fact no disappearance of\nenergy takes place on account of the arising of a conscious state. The\nchain of psychical causation is not broken; its completeness no more\nsuffers than if states of consciousness did not arise at all. Nor on\nthe other hand does consciousness affect the sum of physical energy;\nit is hardly conceivable that it should even change the _direction_ of\nsuch energy (the sum supposably remaining constant, as is sometimes\nheld), since to do this it must itself become a physical force.\nMoreover, if there is a relation of cause and effect between the brain\nand consciousness it would seem as if an interval of time must elapse\nbetween the process in the brain and the rising of the conscious state,\na view to which the teachings of physiology lend no likelihood.\n\nThe second hypothesis regards matter as the real or actual thing and\nmind as an effect or form of it. Such materialism is certainly older\nthan the now prevalent doctrine of the interaction of two distinct\nthings. Homer and the earliest Greek philosophers held to it. Similar\nviews prevailed among the early Christian fathers before Augustine.\nModern materialists, however, regard the mind, not in the earlier\nfashion as semi-corporeal, but as a function or form of the corporeal.\nYet when we closely consider the matter, we find that to conceive of\nthe function of a bodily organ is simply to conceive of that organ as\nin activity. As Goethe said, \"Function is das Dasein in Th\u00e4tigkeit\ngedacht.\" But a bodily organ in activity is just as much corporeal as\none at rest, and anything without corporeal attributes can no more be\nthe function of such an organ than it can be the organ itself. The\nconception of function (in the physiological sense) as truly as that of\nmatter implies something that exists in spacial form; while thoughts\nand feelings are without spacial form.\n\nIn dealing with the third hypothesis, (namely, that body is a form or\nproduct of mind,) Professor H\u00f6ffding does not so much criticise it as\nexplain a modified and interesting form in which Lotze held it. It is\nnot, however, the view which he adopts.\n\nTo the fourth hypothesis he gives his adhesion. The parallel and\nproportional relations between consciousness and brain-activity point,\naccording to him, to an underlying identity between the two. One and\nthe same principle, he says, has found its expression in a two-fold\nform. The physical interaction between the elements of which the\nnervous system is composed, is an outward form of the inner ideal unity\nof consciousness. What we immediately experience as thoughts, feelings,\nvolitions, has its physical representation in certain brain-processes,\nwhich as such are under the law of the conservation of energy, though\nthis law has no application to the relation between brain-processes\n_and_ consciousness. It is as if one and the same content were\nexpressed in two languages.\n\nThis conclusion, however, he repeats, is but an empirical formula\nand has provisional value only. One substance, he says, acts in both\nconsciousness and the bodily organism, but what kind of a substance\nis this, and why does it have this twofold form of manifestation?\nThese are questions, he replies, beyond the reach of our knowledge. We\ncan simply make a statement which seems to be required by the facts,\nnamely, that the same thing which lives, grows, and takes on form in\nthe outward world, apprehends itself inwardly as thinking, feeling, and\nwilling. No opinion is thereby ventured as to whether mind or matter\nis the more original form of existence. By no means is metaphysical\nspeculation upon this question excluded. The hypothesis of identity\n(for so Professor H\u00f6ffding terms it) is consistent with philosophical\nidealism and also with the view that the innermost nature of being\nis not identical with consciousness. He simply claims for it that it\nis the most natural conclusion with regard to the relation between\ntwo empirical sciences, physiology and psychology. These sciences,\naccording to the hypothesis, treat of the same material viewed from\ntwo different sides, and there can be no more conflict between them\nthan between one person who looks on the convex side of a circle and\nanother who looks on the concave side (to borrow an illustration used\nby Fechner).\n\nOn another occasion I may give my own views, and content myself now\nwith saying that I have followed with the greatest interest and with\nmuch (if not unlimited) satisfaction the treatment of the subject at\nthe hands of the genial, large-minded Danish professor.\n\n W. M. SALTER.\n\n\n\n\nLITERARY CORRESPONDENCE.\n\n\nFRANCE.\n\nThe work of M. FOUILL\u00c9E which I announced in my last communication\n(to your other magazine), bears the title of _L'Evolutionnisme des\nId\u00e9es-Forces_. It is a voluminous work; and it contains a great many\nthings\u2014perhaps too many. We have from M. Fouill\u00e9e, the promise of a\nconstructive work\u2014_La Psychologie des Id\u00e9es-Forces_, in two volumes;\nbut his present book is chiefly devoted to the labor of demolition. As\ncontemporaneous psychology has its weak sides, and as M. Fouill\u00e9e is a\nskilful critic, you may imagine that his attacks upon Wundt, Herbert\nSpencer, Taine, Ribot, W. James, and numbers of others, both living\nand dead, are conducted with spirit. The successful fulfilment of the\ntask he has set himself would necessitate the ruin of the hypothesis,\navowed or concealed, that has supported psychological research as well\nas furnished occasional excellent conclusions; for it is the aim of\nM. Fouill\u00e9e to overthrow what he has ingeniously termed the theory of\n\"idea-reflexes,\" and the place once cleared, to substitute for it the\ntheory of \"idea-forces.\"\n\nThe chief feature of the book is therefore M. Fouill\u00e9e's criticisms of\nthe theories \"that make consciousness the intermittent illumination\nof a mechanism\"; of the theories \"that reduce the sentiments and the\nemotions to simple reverberations of organic movements and even of\nexpressive movements\"; of those finally \"that make of desire and the\nfeeling of effort, simple passive muscular sensations, the reflexions\nof movements already executed.\" Solid objections are not wanting in\nthese pages. M. Fouill\u00e9e does not refrain from playing when he has a\ngood hand.\n\nSo far so good. But\u2014we ask\u2014would psychology have ever made any\nadvances if it lacked the hypothesis that M. Fouill\u00e9e condemns? And,\nas a matter of fact, are the majority of psychologists really thus\nirretrievably bent upon establishing a mechanical explanation of life,\na theory of \"man as automaton\"? The truth of the matter is that the\nopposed point of view has rendered no results, and that in taking\nconsciousness for our central position we too easily go astray in\nfanciful speculations. On the other hand, by the endeavor to grasp\nthe bonds of mind through the medium of the body, it _has_ been found\npossible to throw some light upon unobserved facts. It would not do to\nlet this be too quickly forgotten; and if some have seen fit to pass\nbeyond and to attempt to reduce the Universe to a mechanism, imprudent\nsaltations of this character into open materialistic metaphysics\nconcern them alone.\n\nWill M. Fouill\u00e9e be more fortunate in his reduction of the world to\nidealism? It yet appears doubtful. The definition of 'idea-forces'\npresents at the outset elements of embarrassment. That every idea,\nevery mental image, however absolutely an image it may be, of emotions\nor of passions, always contains some motor elements, and consequently\nacts like a force, is easily comprehended, and every body allows it.\nWhen physiologists speak of the power of ideas, they mean nothing else.\nBut beyond that we cannot go. The idea, in M. Fouill\u00e9e's sense, is\nevery state of consciousness. Now, all the facts of consciousness are\nreducible to the following elementary connected process: sensation,\nperceptual excitation, reaction; and the three factors of this process\ncannot be separated or reduced to one. Every idea, or state of\nconsciousness, is accordingly the source of motion since it contains\ndesire. Desire is basal to the nervous act; the nervous act does not\nprecede and does not explain the higher states that psychologists,\nviewing things from a different point of view, have regarded as\nepiphenomena. The essence, not only of man, but also of the world,\nis desire. The idea-force, \"the abridged formula of the appetitive\nprocess,\" becomes the shaper of universal evolution, and, in a word,\nthe physical is a reflection of the psychical.\n\nSuch are, if I am not deceived, the chief propositions of the work, put\ninto a logical form, from which no doubt you will judge that the facts\ndo not correspond without evident hiatus.\n\nYou do not believe in absolute truth, and I no more hope for it.\nThe mind does not escape certain illusions, which come from what it\nnecessarily places in the reality that it wishes to know, or which it\nacquires from itself. Meanwhile both the opposing doctrines triumph,\nseeing that there is always something in each that cannot be explained;\nbut let them not be too severe on each other, and not forget that if\nthey succeed in explaining something, it is perhaps as well that they\nresign themselves to not explaining everything.\n\nI had intended to give in this letter a detail of the theory of Mme.\nCL\u00c9MENCE ROYER, in order to compare it with that of M. Fouill\u00e9e; I had\nprepared it from certain published memoirs, as her great manuscript\nwork has unfortunately not found a publisher. But _The Open Court_ has\ngiven a r\u00e9sum\u00e9 of it sufficiently complete to excuse me from returning\nto the subject. Whatever service can be rendered by the hypothesis of\nMme. Cl\u00e9mence Royer, or, more strictly whatever use can be made of the\nmathematical formul\u00e6 which explain them, or which are deducible from\nthem, it will belong to special scientists to inform us. She begins the\nexplanation of the world by physics, and M. Fouill\u00e9e by psychology. It\nis a difference in the point of departure. Let us add that M. Fouill\u00e9e\nappears to imagine an activity without substance, a mind without\nmuscles, if it can be thus expressed; on the contrary, in that which\nshe calls world-stuff Mme. Cl\u00e9mence Royer distinguishes a hyperethereal\nor vital state, and she assigns for the substratum of life this simple\nstate of the cosmical substance.\n\nOpposed as may be the character of the minds of these two authors, the\ntwo theories seem to coincide in the notion of a living and conscious\nmonad. We meet it when they are farthest apart! Thus, for Mme. Cl\u00e9mence\nRoyer, life and consciousness are everywhere, they are in the atom, and\nfrom the beginning. There, in the great \"romance of being,\" is a scene\nwhich reappears almost always the same. As to the ultimate explanation\nwe have no great choice, and each of the hypotheses that we form almost\nproduces the other. All the value of a system of philosophy is really\nin the help it lends to scientific curiosity or to the conduct of life.\n\n * * * * *\n\nM. ERNEST NAVILLE is one of those who cannot comprehend moral conduct\nin life apart from spiritualism. He endeavors, accordingly, in a work\ncalled _La Physique Moderne_, to prove that the study of the phenomena\nof matter does not imply materialism and does not necessarily lead to\natheism. The argument of M. Naville is well worn. We shall grant to\nhim only that \"it is necessary to avoid implicitly solving questions\nby saying that we do not deal with them at all.\" On the whole, this\npledges to nothing. Practically, and in good faith, abstention is\nnevertheless a solution.\n\n * * * * *\n\nI have now to point out _L'Esth\u00e9tique d'Aristote et de ses\nSuccesseurs_, by M. CH. B\u00c9NARD, an _Etude sur Francois Bacon_ by M.\nJ. BARTH\u00c9LEMY ST. HILAIRE, and _L'Anthropologie Criminelle et ses\nR\u00e9cents Progr\u00e8s_, by M. CESARE LOMBROSO. M. B\u00e9nard is one of the good\nold masters, who, what they do know, know well, and his book is one\nof those that it is profitable to possess. The study of M. Barth\u00e9lemy\nSt. Hilaire is followed by the Report on the Memoirs presented to\nthe Academy of Moral and Political Sciences, which had proposed as a\nsubject \"The Philosophy of Bacon.\" As to M. Lombroso, the celebrated\nItalian criminologist, he has wished to reply to the objections that\nhave been made to his views, especially by the French medical alienists\nat the Congress of 1889, and this is why he has written on this\noccasion in our language: he supports by new facts the notion, hitherto\ncontested, of a \"criminal type.\"\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe last work of which I have to speak, is the _Souvenirs de M. Charles\nMismer_,[31] of which the third volume which recently appeared, has\nfor its title _Souvenirs de la Martinique et du Mexique pendant\nl'Intervention Francaise_. There is in these volumes no express\nphilosophy, as this term is understood, but they are the work of an\nobserving, reflecting mind, and in these pages one sees a man living\nand growing. In the course of his adventurous existence, M. Mismer,\nalready instructed by experience, by chance acquired knowledge of the\n_Cours_ of August Comte; he became attached to it, and found there an\nopening into sociology, a tie by which to link together his personal\nideas. He afterwards published several articles[32] in the Review\nconducted by M. Littr\u00e9, and he records to-day in his _Souvenirs_\nthe valuable observations which he has had occasion to make on very\ndifferent races of men and strongly opposed social states. He is one\nof those whom the philosophic spirit has led to a philosophic life,\nand the persons who read his work will thank me for having made them\nacquainted with a unique and worthy character.\n\n [31] In course of publication by Hachette. The other works\n mentioned are published by Alcan.\n\n [32] A part of these articles formed a volume entitled\n _Principes Sociologiques_.\n\n LUCIEN ARR\u00c9AT.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK REVIEWS.\n\n\nTHE WAY OUT OF AGNOSTICISM, or, THE PHILOSOPHY OF FREE RELIGION. By\n _Francis Ellingwood Abbott_, Ph. D., Boston: Little, Brown & Co.\n\n\"This book aims to show that, in order to refute agnosticism and\nestablish enlightened theism, nothing is now necessary but to\nphilosophise that very scientific method which agnosticism barbarously\nmisunderstands and misuses ... It aims to develop the philosophy\nwhich must (consciously or unconsciously) underlie any and every free\nreligious movement or institution: namely the philosophy which results\nfrom the faithful application of the scientific method to the universe\nas a whole.\"\n\nThe author further observes that \"nothing is more common or more\nconfusing than a loose vague and indeterminate use of this phrase\"\n[scientific method] and that his object is \"to give definiteness and\nscientific precision to a much abused expression by showing that the\nScientific Method ... is neither more nor less than the SCIENTIFIC\nTHEORY OF UNIVERSALS APPLIED IN PRACTICE TO THE ACQUISITION OF\nKNOWLEDGE.\"\n\nNow whether or not the identification of the scientific method with\nthe practical application of the theory mentioned, will give the\nmuch needed definiteness and precision, depends very much upon the\ndefiniteness and precision of that theory itself.\n\nThe Scientific Theory of Universals, the author tells us, receives \"no\nadequate exposition\" in this book. We are in possession, however, of\nseveral other publications of the author, one of which\u2014\"Scientific\nTheism\"\u2014is largely devoted to that purpose.\n\nWe will endeavor in a spirit of studious candor and fidelity, to state\nas well as we can the essentials of that theory. We must protest,\nhowever, that we cannot undertake to clear up the obscurity that must\nnecessarily involve any theory that is stated by the aid of such shifty\nand inconstant terms, as objective, subjective, knowledge, relation,\nexistence, reality, etc., when the same are used without rigorous\ndefinitions of the respective senses thereof that are intended.\n\nThe Scientific Theory of Universals affirms, that objectively real\nindividuals do exist, that objectively real genera do exist, that\nobjectively real relations do exist, that the objectively real genera\nare in every instance constituted as such by that set of objectively\nreal relations uniquely appropriate to it; that in every instance of a\ngenus the objectively real relations \"reproduce\" themselves _in specie_\nin the mind separate from aught of the objective realities that are\nbrought into relation by them, that these \"reproduced\" relations in the\nmind constitute the subjective concept that is designated by the word\nappropriate thereto, and that the single objective Universal is _at\nonce_ and integrally the objective genus, the subjective concept, and\nthe term or word. The Universe is the _summum genus_, concept and word,\nwhich is, means, and expresses the correlated totality of all genera\ntogether.\n\nDr. Abbott neglects reference to genera of purely mental existences,\nand relies for proof of his theory upon the single argument that no\npostulate is used that Science has not taken for granted, and proved by\nthe finding that the facts are in agreement with the postulates.\n\nNow \"the only possible justification of any theory is that it\nmakes things clear and reasonable.\" In this theory the central and\ncontrolling position is that the objectively real relations invade\nthe mind in person and there obtain as the concept.\u2014This doctrine\nis so far as we can see the original idea of Dr. Abbott and must be\nconsidered as his contribution to philosophy. It is by this that his\nwork is to be tested. Does the addition of this new postulate clear up\nany obscurity?\u2014Is this new postulate one of the assumptions of Science?\n\nThe truth about this whole matter of universals seems to be that it\nbelongs to the theory of notation primarily, and then to psychology and\nontology.\n\nThe mind proceeds to obtain correspondence with its alternative by\nanalysis and synthesis. The recognition of difference or otherness\nis an indispensable condition of consciousness itself. One phase of\nthe recognition of difference is that activity called abstraction.\nBut along with difference comes the recognition of what is different\nfrom difference, or likeness in all its grades and involutions. The\nsense of relation, and the impulse of generalisation also arise,\nand altogether these mentalities become effectual in virtue of some\nsystem or some plexus of systems of notation. Long before man ever\nbegan to reflect upon his mental operations and the means or tools\nemployed on that behalf, his mental manners and customs had become a\nsecond mental nature. What warrant have we for taking these mental\nmanners and customs as the same are reflected in ordinary language as\nadequate criteria for the world-problems, or even as representative\nof the very constitutional laws of thought itself? Just as philosophy\nfound it profitable to postpone ontology to psychology, so it is\nsubmitted may it again find it profitable to postpone psychology to a\nstudy not merely of language but of notation generally, of which the\nnotation of mathematics will undoubtedly be found the most significant.\nHere we have distinction, abstraction, assimilation, relation, and\ngeneralisation carried on and carried out with unchecked thoroughness,\nand systems of universals ascertained that not only correspond exactly\nwith every acquired and incoming item of our experience, but are also\nin respect to one another continuous throughout the whole of their\nrange. It will be impossible for any one who once appreciates the\nnature and competence of mathematical notation to regard any theory of\nuniversals relating to ordinary language as a solution of its problem\nthat does not conform to the perfect models set in mathematics.\n\nDr. Abbott claims that _scientific method_ is neither more nor less\nthan the application of his theory. Granting that science makes the\nsame presumptions, can scientific method be said to be neither more\nnor less than the application of his theory in any other sense than it\ncould be said to be neither more nor less than the application of the\ntheory of the existence of matter, energy, ether, and mind?\n\nThe scientific method consists not in its data but in the ways in which\nit deals with its data, in other words it consists in its logic. It\nobserves and infers. It never stops to inquire if what it observes\nare the \"things in themselves\" or only phenomena. That is an utterly\ninconsequential question to it. It tests the validity of inductive and\nhypothetical inferences by comparison with experience, and phenomenal\nexperience is every whit as good a criterion for it as any other.\nIt has a metaphysics of its own which is mathematics and which it\nacknowledges as the supreme and unquestionable arbiter over whatever of\nits presumptions and theories that arbiter may undertake to govern.\n\nNo philosophy that neglects to comprehend and apply the now supremely\nimportant methods and results of mathematics can be anything but an\nineffectual attempt. No doubt this will seem to most of those who\naffect philosophy a statement worthy only of scorn. Prof. Crystal,\nat the close of his article on \"Parallels,\" in the ninth edition of\nthe Encyclopedia Britannica \"calls the attention of those who busy\nthemselves with mental philosophy\" to that geometrical subject and its\naffiliations \"as one of the results of modern mathematical research\nwhich they cannot afford to overlook.\" We can imagine with what an air\nof conscious eminence one or more of our dilettanti philosophers may\nhave perused this suggestion, wondering what in the world parallels and\nmeasurement have to do with philosophy.\n\nBut, nevertheless, so it is that a new departure in philosophy has been\nmade inevitable by the stupendous researches of modern mathematics and\nthis the philosophical world is just beginning to find out. It seems\nto us, that the incomplete view taken by Dr. Abbott will prevent that\nsuccess for his theory which his most distinguished ability might\notherwise achieve, and which his devoted efforts well merit.\n\n F. C. R.\n\n\nRACES AND PEOPLES: LECTURES ON THE SCIENCE OF ETHNOGRAPHY. By _Daniel\n G. Brinton_, A.M., M.D., etc., etc. New York: N. D. C. Hodges.\n\nThese lectures, which are dedicated to Mr. Horatio Hale, the veteran\nphilologist and ethnographer to the United States exploring expedition\nin 1832-42, go over a very wide ground. The ground traversed is,\nindeed, so extensive that Dr. Brinton feels bound to apologise for\nbeing often superficial, as otherwise he could not have compressed into\nso small a space the subjects of which he treats. This apology must\nnecessarily to some extent disarm the critic, although it should do\nso only where a conclusion is not supported by sufficient evidence.\nWhere a statement made is not merely unsupported by, but is contrary\nto, the best evidence available, the author must expect to be called\nto account. We were prepared to act on this principle, thinking that\npossibly confession like charity would be found to cover a multitude\nof sins, but we must admit that with certain exceptions, the chief of\nwhich are to be found in the lecture on \"the psychical elements of\nEthnography,\" we were mistaken.\n\nWe do not propose to follow the author in his classification of the\nvarieties of mankind, or in his views of the origin of the various\nraces into which they are divided, both of which will meet with keen\nopposition from most of the anthropologists of Western Europe, although\nthose of Germany may receive them with more favor. We are concerned\nchiefly with the opening and the closing chapters of the work before\nus, from which we may draw some conclusions bearing on the race\nquestion, that disturbs the minds of so many people in this country.\nDr. Brinton remarks that the physical traits of man are correlated to\nthe physiological functions in such a manner as profoundly to influence\nthe destiny of nations. He adds that from the physical point of view,\nthe pure white is weaker than the dark races, worse prepared for the\ncombat of life, with inferior viability; but in the white this is\nmore than compensated by the development of the nervous system and\nintellectual power. The white \"can bear greater mental strain than any\nother race, and the activity of his mind supplies him with means to\novercome the inferiority of his body, and thus places him at the head\nof the whole species.\" It might be supposed that a mixture of races\nhaving these different qualities, would result in the formation of a\nhybrid race, superior to either of the parent stocks.\n\nDr. Brinton, who is strongly opposed to the practice of miscegenation,\nendorses the opinion that the offspring of a cross between the white\nand the black races are deficient in physical vigor, and that such\nhybrids gradually die out. He admits, however, that it was not so\nwithin the African area in early times, and he suggests that special\ncauses are now at work to affect the results of race-mixture. One of\nthese is the fact that the white blood is derived exclusively from the\nfather, and the dark blood exclusively from the mother. Now, if it be\ntrue, as is supposed, that physical qualities are derived chiefly from\nthe father and the psychical qualities chiefly from the mother, we\nmay reasonably expect, as is indeed recognised, that the children of\nsuch unions will be physically superior to members of the black stock,\nalthough inferior to those of the white race. It is admitted, moreover,\nthat mulattoes are, as a rule, intellectually superior to pure negroes;\nso that miscegenation is undoubtedly of relative advantage to the\nimmediate offspring, whatever may be its result on their descendants.\nWhat Dr. Brinton and other writers of the same opinion object to,\nhowever, is the deterioration of the white stock. If there was any\nreason to believe this possible, the objection would have weight. But\nit supposes miscegenation to become general, which, in the first place,\nis an event which could never happen, unless the women of this country\ndescended to the level of a Messalina. And in the second place, Dr.\nBrinton admits that \"in the earlier conditions of social life, no\nsuch debility attended the crossing of the Eurafrican [white race]\nand African race as seems at present to be the case.\" It is possible,\ntherefore, that if the mixture of the two races became general, and\nwere regarded as perfectly legitimate, the present physical and\nintellectual debility attending such unions might disappear. We do not\nadvocate miscegenation, but we wish to point out, that those who oppose\nit under the present limitations of our knowledge, do so either on\ninsufficient grounds, or because they are influenced, consciously or\nunconsciously, by sentimental considerations.\n\nWe are glad to see that Dr. Brinton does not endorse the views so\nprevalent among English Ethnologists as to the existence of \"communal\nmarriage\" among the lower races of mankind. In his recent work on \"The\nOrigin and Development of Marriage and Kinship,\" Mr. C. Staniland Wake\nhas dealt exhaustively with that subject, and shown that the \"marriage\nlaw\" is fully recognised among the most savage peoples. We cannot\naccept Dr. Brinton's statements where he says that the Australian\naborigines are led to associate \"by much the same motives as prompt\nbuffaloes to gather in a herd,\" or when he speaks of the \"rare\" custom\nof polyandry, or declares that mutual affection has no existence among\nthe Australians and many other tribes, and that romantic love is\npractically absent among the African and Mongolian races. Our author\nis equally at fault when he says that no Asiatic nation respects truth\ntelling, and that \"the idea of independent personal ownership does\nnot exist among them.\" These errors, and such misstatements as that\n\"the excellent results of the extension of the Slavonian supremacy in\nCentral Asia have been studiously ignored by British writers,\" which\nare due to Dr. Brinton's preference for Continental authorities, are\nserious blemishes. Nevertheless, his book is an excellent one, and we\ncan heartily recommend it as an introductory Manual of Ethnology.\n\n \u03a9.\n\n\nSTUDIES IN HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. With a Chapter On Christian\n Unity in America. By _J. Macbride Sterrett_, D. D., Professor of\n Ethics and Apologetics in Seabury Divinity School. New York: D.\n Appleton & Co.\n\nThese studies in Hegel's Philosophy of Religion, except Chapters III\nand VIII, claim to be something more than a mere expository paraphrase\nof Hegel, although following Hegel's argument in Chapter IV. The\nauthor's purpose is strictly theological and _apologetic_. His work\nis written with faith, and in the interest of \"the faith.\" In fact,\nin England and America the theological rather than philosophical\ninterest taken in the study of Hegel has mainly been called forth\nby the supposed intimate relation of his thought to religion and to\nChristianity regarded as the absolute, full, and final religion. To\nthis pseudo-Hegelian school of England and America, Hegel, above all,\nis radically a _theologian_; all his thoughts beginning and ending in\nthat of divinity. It regards Hegel's Philosophy of Religion as the\nvery heart of his thinking, as \"the highest bloom of his philosophy.\"\nIt is supposed to reconcile Christian theology with the modern science\nof religion (or comparative religion), with anthropology, and with the\nclassification of positive, pre-Christian religions. American students\nof Hegelian philosophy, as a rule, do not desire to be regarded as\nHegelians. \"Bound to swear in the name of no master in philosophy,\nand only in the name of Christ in religion, would better characterise\nthem all. They are simply using his _method_ ... they are getting\ngreat help, and looking for still greater from the method, which was\ngreater than even Hegel's own employment of it.\" Hegel's method is thus\ndeclared to be greater than himself, and is received like an article\nof faith. In these studies, while freely discussing and criticising\nall that Hegel has thought or said upon the subject of the philosophy\nof religion, the author entirely omits to enter into a critical\ndiscussion of precisely the most important point; namely, the absolute\nvalue of Hegel's philosophical _method_. He overlooks the interesting\nfact, that all that is permanently true and great in Hegel was really\nreached by Hegel himself, and understood, from a point of view that\nwas _diametrically opposed to his own accepted method_; in glaring\ncontrast to his evolution of the logical idea, and to his theory of\n\"pure thought\" or \"reines Denken.\" \"To reconcile reason with religion,\nby finding reason in religion and religion in reason,\" is doubtless a\ncorrect Hegelian statement, yet, at the same time, it only expresses an\nexclusive, one-sided aspect of the system.\n\nThere was a time when the Hegelian system ranked as a foremost\nintellectual phenomenon. It was, perhaps, the highest that philosophy\never had achieved; but its manifest fault consisted in its being\na purely philosophical and _a priori_ system. A philosophy that\nexisted in external opposition to the sciences remained only an empty\nabstraction, just as force when severed from the phenomenon, or Deity\nwhen opposed to the outside world. Hegel's philosophy ultimately\nrecognised, that force only is or exists in the phenomenon; that the\ninternal itself constitutes the external, the Deity is only present in\nthe universe, the infinite in the finite. Any philosophy proclaiming\nall this must be said to have succumbed with a vengeance to its own\ndialectic process.\n\nA philosophy of this kind would seem to have signed its own\ndeath-warrant\u2014or according to the popular German saying, \"hat\nselbst den Stab \u00fcber sich gebrochen!\" And thus it really happened to\nHegelianism\u2014we mean to _genuine German_ Hegelianism. From that moment\nit forfeited its claim to be regarded as the highest truth. It was\ncompelled to step forth out of its one-sided exclusiveness, out of\nits opposition to empirical science. Hegelianism was not expected to\neffect any kind of compromise or reconciliation with empirical science,\nbecause any yielding on its own part would have been illogical, and\ncould only have brought about a momentary truce, but no lasting peace.\nOn the contrary, Hegelianism had to suffer the infinitely bitter pang\nof self-immolation. It had deliberately to commit suicide, in order\nthereupon to be welded with empirical science into a much higher and\nmore comprehensive _unity_. In other words,\u2014in fact in _Hegel's own\nwords_\u2014\"when the old principle thus reappears, it is no longer what\nit was before, for it is changed and purified by the higher element\ninto which it is now taken up.\"\n\nThe Hegelian system was thus compelled to acknowledge, that not only\nmust philosophy agree with experience, but moreover, the creation of\na philosophical science premises as an indispensable condition the\nhypothesis of an empirical science, which itself implies that the ideas\nof space, of time, of movement, and of matter cannot be obtained _a\npriori_,\u2014that is before the experience of the things themselves,\u2014or\nbe purely evolved, according to the Hegelian method, from the logical\nidea. To attempt to reconcile reason with religion by finding reason\nin religion and religion in reason, is simply to evolve _a priori_\na philosophy of religion from the logical idea. This is believed to\nbe possible by means of the mystic factors\u2014\"the Hegelian method\"\nand the \"Logos.\" The original contents of eternal reason itself\u2014of\nthe _logos_\u2014are supposed to exist within our mind in a form that\nconstitutes our inmost truth; our spontaneous logical thinking\ncoincides with the innate eternal reason in form and contents, and thus\nattains to the full revelation of itself.\n\nBut all this is purely an hypothesis, or a kind of belief in reason,\n\"der Glaube an die Vernunft!\" Hegel himself in conclusion was forced to\nadmit that philosophy must closely observe the method of nature. (See\nEncycl. III, 22.) The editor of Hegel's Philosophy of History (Gans,\npage XV) says, \"Hegel did not wish to personate the deity that creates\nor evolves history, but to be a man who contemplates created rational\nhistory\"; and Hegel himself says (page 13), \"we must take history as it\nis; we have to proceed according to an historical, empirical method.\n... Only from the study of history itself are we allowed to infer\nthat historical events are really rational events.\" And in Hegel's\n\"Naturphilosophie,\" (page 24,) and elsewhere there are to be found\nperfectly analogous passages.\n\nIt cannot be denied, that the author of this work on Hegel's philosophy\nof religion has made a deep study of all the vast details of the\nHegelian system; but his one-sided theological criticism exclusively\naims at representing Hegel himself as a theologian. This American\npseudo-Hegelianism may probably have had the effect of stimulating\nAmerican thinkers, but in other respects it has only retained the\nphantom and empty shadow of Hegelianism, playing fast and loose with\nthe old system under the captious name of the \"Hegelian method,\" and\nmaking a free use of its obscure, obsolete phraseology. The cry \"back\nto Kant\" by English Neo-Kantianism, is declared to mean a speedy\nreturn to Hegel's method, and to be only the first step of the protest\n\"against temporary, materialistic, and psychological thought.\"\n\nThe last chapter, in the form of an appendix, is devoted to the\ndiscussion of \"Christian Unity.\" The author deplores the current\nabstract conceptions of the church, and regards them as the main\nobstacle to its visible organic unity. The Hegelian ideas on religion\nand the state are believed to suggest a more concrete, historical view,\nand to destroy the abstract conception.\n\n \u03b3\u03bd\u03bb\u03bd.\n\n\nTHE PHILOSOPHY OF NECESSITY; OR, LAW IN MIND AS IN MATTER. By _Charles\n Bray_. Third edition, revised and abridged. London and New York:\n Longmans, Green, & Co.\n\nThis work was originally published in 1841, and comprised an Exposition\nof the Doctrine of the Philosophy of Necessity, or the Law of\nConsequences, first, in its relation to Mental Science, secondly, in\nits relation to Ethics, and thirdly, an application of its principles\nto the social questions of the day. The third part has been omitted\nfrom the present edition, as being out of date, but many of its\nstatistics and observations are given as an Appendix. In a prefatory\nnote it is stated as a reason for preserving in an accessible form the\nconclusions arrived at by Mr. Bray, that he \"worked out for himself a\ntheory as to the purpose of existence that satisfied his own mind, and\nbecame to him a cheerful philosophy which intensified his enjoyment\nof all things good and pleasant, helped him to bear the troubles of\nlife, and to meet the end in a spirit as bright as it was resigned\"\u2014a\nstatement which those who knew him personally will heartily endorse.\n\nMr. Bray's theory is embodied in the title of the work under review,\nand its key-note is \"order in nature.\" His object is to show \"that the\nmind of man is not an exception to nature's other works; that like\neverything else it has received a determinate character; that all our\nknowledge of it is precisely of the same kind as that of material\nthings, and consists in the observation of _its order_ of action, or\nof the relation of cause and effect.\" According to this view we can\nknow the real nature of neither matter nor mind, Nature herself having\nfixed the boundaries beyond which human knowledge cannot extend. It\nwould be a mistake, however, to suppose that Mr. Bray regarded Nature\nas something apart, giving to man laws from the operation of which it\nis itself free. A little consideration shows that such is not his idea.\nNature is with Mr. Bray only another name for God. Moreover, man is\nnothing, God is all; \"individuality, or anything separate from Him,\nis a mode of thought, and has no real existence.\" Electricity, heat,\nlight, and other forces of nature are modes of the Unknowable, and\nare transformable into each other and into the other modes which we\ndistinguish as sensation, emotion, thought. The qualities or properties\nof matter are mere force or power, and as they are qualities of God,\nthe assumption of the existence of matter is not necessary. God \"is\nthe Universal Being, of which all things are the manifestations. Every\nthing is a mode of God's attribute of extension; every thought, wish,\nor feeling, is a mode of His attribute of thought.\"\n\nTo Mr. Bray the only _reality_ is God, the great Unknown, and as He is\nalso the Unknowable, we have in the Philosophy of Necessity a system of\nAgnosticism. And yet Mr. Bray is hardly consistent with himself. For,\nunlike Mr. Herbert Spencer, he speaks of God in terms of Spirit, which\nbecomes in his system identical with force. When, moreover, he declares\nthat \"the whole sensitive existence is but the innumerable individual\neyes with which the Infinite World Spirit beholds Himself,\" we have a\nkind of Monism. This view however recognises God as \"the only real and\nefficient power in the universe,\" and, as the Great First Cause and\nthe Great Last Cause of all things, a Divine Being. Mr. Bray does not\nenter into the question of the personality of God, but that he supposes\nthe Deity to possess consciousness is evident from his reference to\nthe Great Soul of Nature, and his statement that the operation of its\nforces is governed by thought. His ideas are summed up in the words,\n\"we feel ourselves a part\n\n \"Of that stupendous whole,\n Whose body nature is, and God the Soul.\"\n\nHolding this opinion, Mr. Bray could not be otherwise than a\nNecessitarian and an Utilitarian in his practical views. These are well\nshown in his treatment of the question of the freedom of will, as to\nwhich he accepts the opinion of Locke that a man is free within the\nrange of the preferences or directions of his own mind. Mr. Bray's own\nconclusion is: \"Since, then, the only freedom we have is limited to\naction in accordance with our natural powers and capacities, our aim\nmust be to develop fully these powers and capacities, and to remove all\nimpediments, external and internal, to their free and complete action.\nThere must be no external compulsion from physical impediment, or\ninternal compulsion from defect in the mind itself; no obstacle to the\nfull exercise of our natural powers both of body and mind. Education in\nits full meaning is the developing and perfecting of all these powers.\"\n\n \u03a9\n\n\nGESCHICHTE DER ETHIK IN DER NEUEREN PHILOSOPHIE. By _Friedrich\n Jodl_. Volume II. Kant and the Ethics of the Nineteenth Century.\n Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta.\n\nIn this volume Professor Jodl continues his history of theoretical\nethics; starting with Kant and coming down to contemporary\nphilosophers. His work is thus mainly concerned with the classical\nphilosophy of Germany till Feuerbach's time, and the spiritualistic\nand positivist philosophy of France and England down to the time\nof Cousin, Jouffroy, and Mill. Professor Jodl has been obliged to\nforego his original intention of appending to his work an epitome\nof the logical constructive results of his investigations, and has\nexclusively applied himself to the investigation and historical\npresentment of the fundamental and central principles of the ethical\nthought of the past century. He has therefore ever held in view the\neconomical and historical purpose of his work, and avoided on the one\nhand an exposition of all systems in which originality of principles\nis lacking, and on the other abstained from the critical examination\nof the systems of his contemporaries. Thus he has aspired, by the\nconstant emphasis of central basal principles and of the points whereon\nall have agreed, to refute the belief that the history of his science\nis a chaotic mass of contradictory views, and that ethical opinion\npresents in its historical expression only diversity, and never\ncommunity of mental possession. Professor Jodl has only collaterally\ndealt with the non-ethical literature and tendencies of the times of\nwhich he treats, and he has disclaimed all intention of portraying the\neffects and influence that ethical systems have produced and exerted\nin practical spheres; France and England being the only instances in\nwhich, for manifest reasons, the discussion of literature and politics\nhas preceded the criticism and analysis of philosophies. Nevertheless,\nhis work throughout is interspersed with many well-judged and apposite\nthoughts upon the effective, though not always apparent, influence of a\nnation's intellectual activity upon its practical conduct of affairs;\nas well as, also, regarding the lamentable fact that, often, a people\nare violently and dangerously engaged in the solution of questions that\ntheir thinkers have solved decades before.\n\nLet us look at Professor Jodl's examination of the historical position\nof Kantian Ethics. The element of non-interest in ethical judgment we\nfind not to have been first emphasised by Kant. Whatever the success\nand worth of their speculations, a great many of Kant's predecessors\nsought to realise this very factor in their systems; thus it was with\nPlato as opposed to Protagoras, with Shaftesbury and Butler as opposed\nto Hobbes, Locke, and Hume; while Cudworth, Clarke, Wollaston, and\nPrice were similarly actuated by the purely speculative consideration.\nKant's real and original advance upon previous systems of ethics, was\nhis emphasis of the element of conscious volition in ethical judgment\nand the statement of its imperative character. It was just in this last\nrespect that his ethical philosophy formed so marked a contrast to the\neud\u00e6monism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The imperative\nand absolute nature of duty, eud\u00e6monism neglected to inculcate; Kant\naroused the conscience of his time, and presented in contrast to the\nmoral weakness then prevalent the strength and earnest grandeur of an\nabsolute conception of duty.\n\nSo too in the conflict between the metaphysics of ethics and the\npractical postulates, wherein the great philosopher displayed so much\ningenuity, Professor Jodl is unable to distinguish Kant's position very\nsharply from that of the English intellectualists when in a similar\nplight. Not that the idea of the practical postulates is valueless;\nthis Professor Jodl afterwards explains. Our historian merely shows\nthat Kant had not yet gotten clear of the ancient conflict that had\nagitated the Schoolmen of the Middle Ages as well as the utilitarian\nand rationalistic theologians of more modern times. Yet despite the\nmysticism that inheres in Kant's argument for the practical existence\nof God, the kernel of the truth he emphasises in the alliance of\nethics with religion still remains; namely that religious ideas are\nessentially ethical, that in this relation only have they meaning,\nand that religious ideas which are ethically valueless are to be\nuncompromisingly discarded.\n\nEspecial attention should be called to Professor Jodl's estimate of\nFeuerbach, whose merits have been strangely neglected. Feuerbach's\nethical system, in perfect form, has not been independently set forth\nin his works, but is intermingled with the subjects dealt with in his\nreligious treatises. Yet he left few of the fundamental questions of\nethics untouched and his works contain a great store of most excellent\nand pertinent thoughts which must be characterised, says our author,\nin the widest sense of the term, as the real foundation in ethics of\nmodern scientific empiricism.\n\nWith regard to the presentment of English and French ethical\nphilosophy, Professor Jodl's work, it is claimed, is the first\nhistorical exposition in the German language of this special department\nof thought in its connection with the universal intellectual progress\nof these two countries. His analysis of Bentham and Mill is very\naccurate and full.\n\nProfessor Jodl exhibits an extensive acquaintance with English\nphilosophical literature; indeed, he has even discovered the little\nbook known as \"Kant's Ethics,\" by Dr. Noah Porter, whom he calls the\n\"Nestor\" of American philosophy.\n\nUnity of execution, and the skilful employment of historical\nperspective in dealing with the various phases of ethical thought, may\nbe characterised as prominent merits of Professor Jodl's performance.\nIn the books of its class it stands unique.\n\n \u03bc\u03ba\u03c1\u03ba.\n\n\nETHIK. Eine Darstellung der ethischen Principien und deren Anwendung\n auf besondere Lebensverh\u00e4ltnisse. By Dr. _Harald H\u00f6ffding_,\n Professor an der Universit\u00e4t zu Kopenhagen. Unter Mitwirkung des\n Verfassers aus dem D\u00e4nischen \u00fcbersetzt von F. Benedixen. Leipsic:\n 1888.\n\nHarald H\u00f6ffding, Professor at the University of Copenhagen, is a\nrepresentative thinker among ethical scholars. Unhesitatingly he takes\nhis stand upon the real facts of life and attempts to construct a\nsystem of ethics which shall be a science among the other sciences.\nProfessor H\u00f6ffding says in his preface:\n\n\"If we see the snow-covered peaks of a mountain range from a far\ndistance, they seem to hover in the air. Not until we approach do we\ndiscover plainly that they rest upon solid ground. It is the same with\nethical principles. In the first enthusiasm one imagines that a place\nshould be assigned to them above the reality of nature and life. On\nfurther reflection and after a longer experience, which must perhaps\nbe dearly bought, we discover that the ethical principles can regulate\nlife only if they have really proceeded from life.\"\n\nProfessor H\u00f6ffding is in a certain sense a utilitarian. The influence\nof utilitarian systems upon his mode of thought can be traced\nthroughout the whole work, and it is this influence perhaps to which\nthe Danish Professor owes his positive standpoint as well as the\nscientific method of his procedure. Nevertheless he differs from the\nordinary utilitarian school and prefers to characterise his system as\nan ethics of general welfare. He says:\n\n\"The so-called utilitarianism,\u2014that ethical conception which has been\nfounded mainly by Bentham,\u2014has the merit of having for the first\ntime energetically propounded the principle of welfare. Yet Bentham\nhas detracted from his cause by proceeding from a psychological\ntheory which considers consciousness as a sum of ideas and feelings,\nand dissolves society into a number of individuals. The import of\npleasurable and painful feelings for the continuous and general welfare\ncannot be established by a mere process of calculation.\" (P. 37.)\n\nProfessor H\u00f6ffding opens the first chapter of his work with the\nfollowing sentence:\n\n\"Ethical judgments contain a valuation of human actions.... The\ncriterion of the ethical valuation is the contents of ethics.\"\n\nIf life consisted of isolated sovereign moments, every one of them\nwould have an equal right, and no one would be obliged to resign in\nfavor of any other moment. No valuation, no discrimination would be\nrequired. But the life of each individual, as well as the life of\nsociety, makes up a \"life-totality,\" and we possess a conception of\nthis life-totality. \"If the state of feeling in a single moment agrees\nwith the conception of the life-totality, a new feeling arises which\nis determined by this mutual relation.... The ethical valuation is\nconditioned by this feeling.\" (p. 27.) Taking this ground, Professor\nH\u00f6ffding defines good and bad in the following way:\n\n\"'Good' accordingly becomes that which preserves the life-totality\nand gives fulness and life to its contents; 'bad,' on the contrary,\nthat which has more or less the tendency to dissolve or to limit the\nlife-totality and its contents. Bad accordingly is the single moment,\nthe separate impulse in its revolutionary isolation from the rest of\nlife....\" (P. 29.)\n\n\"The Bad, therefore, is egotism in its various degrees and various\nforms. And the verdict about it will be the severer the more conscious\nthis egotism is.\"\n\nUtilitarianism as a rule has been hedonistic. Utilitarians have\nproposed as the criterion of an ethical valuation the consequences of\nan act; if the consequences give more pleasure than pain, it is said\nto be good; if they are attended with more pain than pleasure, it is\nsaid to be bad. In the above quoted definitions by Prof. H\u00f6ffding there\nis no trace of hedonism, and I should consider an ethical system based\nupon these definitions as being in strong opposition to hedonism.\nBut Prof. H\u00f6ffding appears to have been so strongly biased by the\ninfluence of hedonistic utilitarianism, that he introduces again its\nfundamental idea, which identifies the good with the pleasurable.\nAlthough he objects to employing the terms \"utility\" and \"happiness,\"\n\"because they are liable to lead to misunderstandings and have indeed\ndone so\"; although he declares that \"momentary feelings of pleasure\nand pain are no sure criterion for the total state\" (p. 37); although\nfor such reasons he proposes the word welfare, saying, \"by the word\n'welfare' I think of everything which serves to satisfy the wants of\nhuman nature in its whole entirety\": still Prof. H\u00f6ffding again returns\nto hedonism by limiting the idea \"welfare\" to the hedonistic conception\nof goodness. He defines welfare as \"a continuous state of pleasurable\nfeelings.\" (P. 98.)\n\nThus we are presented with two definitions of what constitutes the\ncriterion of an ethical valuation: (1) that which promotes the\nlife-totality, and (2) that which produces a continuous state of\npleasurable feeling.\n\nThese two definitions are in many respects harmonious, but on the other\nhand they may come into conflict; and if they come into conflict, which\nof the two is to be sacrificed? Supposing that a contemplation of the\nevolution of organised life should teach us that the development of\na \"life-totality\" is not at all a pleasurable process; that on the\ncontrary it is attended with excessive and innumerable pains. Inorganic\nnature so far as we can judge is free from pain. The isolated atom, we\nmay assume, exists in a state of indifference. Supposing now that pain\ncould be proved to increase, the higher we rise in the development of a\nlife-totality; supposing that the growth of a life-totality had to be\nbought with pain, what would be the consequence? I will not here enter\ninto the subject, but I may mention that this supposition is not at\nall without foundation. Assuming that it were so, would not, in such a\ncase, the good be as Schopenhauer, Hartmann, and Mainlaender propose,\nthat which destroys the life-totality of consciousness and with it\nthe whole world of civilised humanity, built up of the innumerable\nconsciousnesses of individuals?\n\nProfessor H\u00f6ffding has seen this difficulty, which arises from a\nconflict of the two criteria of ethical valuation (1) the hedonistic\nprinciple and (2) the principle of progress, i. e., the constant\nevolution of a higher life-totality. He says:\n\n\"John Stuart Mill has declared that it is better to be a dissatisfied\nman than a satisfied pig, a dissatisfied Socrates than a satisfied\nfool. He bases this assertion upon the fact that even if the pig and\nthe fool were of a contrary mind, their opinion would have to be\nrejected, since they possess no knowledge of the higher point of view\nfrom which man and Socrates consider life, whereas man knows the needs\nof the pig and Socrates fathoms the fool. We most be regulated by the\njudgment of those that know the two kinds of needs in question and that\nare consequently able to institute an estimation of the value of the\nsame.\n\n\"But I feel obliged to put in a word for the pig and the fool. The\ndifficulty is greater than Mill imagines. Man, it is true, knows all\nthe wants of the pig, and it would not be difficult for a Socrates to\ncomprehend those of the fool. But man does not have the wants of the\npig, nor Socrates those of the fool, as his _sole and only dominant_\nwants. And yet this is the very circumstance that determines the\nmatter. Man cannot transform himself into a pig without ceasing to\nbe a man, and a Socrates will hardly be able so to identify himself\nwith a fool as to lose completely his Socratic wants. If, now, the pig\ncan attain the _complete_ satisfaction of all _his_ wants, is not his\nhappiness greater than that of man whose desires and whose longings\nare never wholly satisfied? And the fool, who does not nourish many\nthoughts and makes no great demands upon life, is he not happier than\nSocrates who spends his whole life in striving to know himself and\nto stimulate others, only finally to declare that death is really\npreferable to life?\"\n\nProfessor H\u00f6ffding's solution of the difficulty is summed up in the\nfollowing paragraph:\n\n\"Welfare is an illusion if we understand by it a passive condition\nof things, created once for all. It must consist in _action_, work,\ndevelopment. Rest can only mean a termination for the time being, the\nattainment of a new level, upon which it is possible for a new course\nof development to proceed.\"\n\nThus it appears that Professor H\u00f6ffding decides in favor of the second\nprinciple. The evolution of the life-totality is considered higher\nthan a continuous state of pleasurable feeling. Nevertheless Professor\nH\u00f6ffding adds:\n\n\"On that account, however, we are not obliged to retract our first\ndefinition of welfare as that of a continuous state of pleasurable\nfeeling. That which must be rejected is only the notion of a passive\nstate.\"\n\nTruly, as Professor H\u00f6ffding says, \"the difficulty is greater than\nMr. Mill imagined.\" The difficulty is great enough to undermine the\nwhole basis upon which welfare is defined as \"a state of continuous\npleasurable feeling.\" If, as Professor H\u00f6ffding declares, welfare is to\nbe interpreted as activity, work, development; if this kind of active\nwelfare is the greatest good, whatever admixture of pain and whatever\nabsence of pleasurable feeling it may have; if the greatest amount\nof a state of continuous pleasurable feeling is not welfare in an\nethical sense, what becomes of the utilitarian definition of welfare as\npleasurable feeling? If, however, welfare is \"the state of a continuous\npleasurable feeling,\" how can we declare that the life of a pessimistic\nphilosopher is preferable to that of a joyful fool?\n\nMust not the ultimate reason of this conflict be sought in Professor\nH\u00f6ffding's statement that\u2014\n\n\"The proposition of a purpose presupposes in the subject which makes\nthe proposition feelings of pleasure and displeasure.\" (P. 30.)\n\nShould we not rather say that the proposition of a purpose presupposes\nan expression of _will_ in the subject which makes the proposition?\nWherever there is will, there is also approval and disapproval, but\napproval is not always pleasurable and disapproval is not always\nattended with displeasure. Does it not often happen that we cannot help\ndisapproving of things which please us?\n\nWe have mainly limited our review to some topics of the first division\nentitled \"The Conditions of Ethics,\" because we have regarded them\nas most important in a representation of the ethical principles. The\ndoubts we have raised as to the consistency of the author are less\nnoticeable in the remaining chapters, which contain an unusual store\nof ideas presented with great lucidity. The doctrine of the freedom of\nwill is excellently treated (chap. v.). Social ethics, family life,\nmarriage, the position of woman, and the education of children are\nseparately and exhaustively discussed, and there is no chapter which\neven if we cannot always give assent to the author's views, does not\nrichly repay a careful perusal.\n\n P. C.\n\n\nKURZGEFASSTE LOGIK UND PSYCHOLOGIE. By _Dr. K. Kroman_. Translated from\n the second edition of the Original by F. Bendixen. Leipsic: O. R.\n Reisland.\n\nDr. Kroman is professor of philosophy at the University of Copenhagen.\nHe has sought to present in this book of three hundred and eighty nine\npages the elements of Logic and Psychology. The work was principally\nintended for the use of the general reader and the beginner, although\nits author hopes it will not be altogether without interest to the\nspecialist, and that it will find its way into the schools of pedagogy\n(the subject of the art of education being also incidentally dealt with\nin its pages).\n\nDr. Kroman's method of presentation is concise and lucid; the elements\nof logic occupy but some one hundred and four pages, and form a good\nintroduction to the common phases of that science.\n\nBut his psychology is, from our standpoint, more open to objection; or\nrather his philosophy. He says: \"Unless we assume the law of causation,\nresearch is impossible; but assuming this, it is impossible to stop\nwith states of consciousness, we must assume a subject and _real_\nobjects.\" What Dr. Kroman means by _real_ is seen from the following.\n\"Our senses give us knowledge only of _properties_ of things, not of\n_things_. We do not perceive the apple, but only its form, color, etc.\nBut all these sensations thus derived form an interconnected whole;\nand the law of causality forces us to the assumption of a _thing_\nbehind these sensory manifestations. Yet, our belief that we know this\n_thing in itself_ has only a practical value; in reality it is an\nunknown quantity. It is a single point, a nucleus, of which _direct\nand positive_ knowledge is unobtainable; yet exist it must if our\nassumption of the law of causation is to be upheld.\" Thus Dr. Kroman\nshows in an admirable manner how our everyday conceptual life _is_\nformed; but it is the office of philosophy, in our view, to point out\nhow this same conceptual life _should be_ formed. However, Dr. Kroman\nsupplements this explanation\u2014which we have much abbreviated\u2014by\nconsiderations that lead one to believe that he seeks only to\ndemonstrate the reality of existence and has collaterally accepted the\ndoctrine of the independent, 'outside' thing in itself. We may refer\nour readers, regarding this question, to Prof. Mach's article in this\nnumber of _The Monist_.\n\n \u03bc\u03ba\u03c1\u03ba\n\n\nEINLEITUNG IN DIE PSYCHOLOGIE NACH KRITISCHER METHODE. By _Paul\n Natorp_. Freiburg: J. C. Mohr.\n\nIn this exhaustive monograph Dr. Paul Natorp does not deal with\npsychology itself, but proceeding from a number of novel points of\nview he opens up the road by which the principles of psychology may be\nreached. The author frankly assumes that psychology even as yet has\nnot absolutely and clearly defined its own _fundamental problem_, and\nthat this is chiefly the reason why we still disagree concerning the\nsignificance and value of many of the results of psychology. Before\nwe approach the solution of the special problems, psychology _itself_\nmust be laid down as a problem. The author, therefore, in the first\npart of his introductory task has sought to indicate the _objects_ of\npsychology,\u2014namely, what it will and rationally can pursue; and in\nthe second part, he points out, the only correct _method_ according to\nwhich psychology can accomplish its aims.\n\nSince Descartes, says our author, real and possible consciousness\nconstitutes the true limits of the province of psychic research, the\nfundamental problem of psychology, and the characteristic distinction\nbetween the old and new philosophy. But, in order to find out, whether\nthis tendency of the new philosophy has been entirely successful, it\nwill be necessary to examine more closely the nature of the fundamental\npsychic phenomenon, and the problem that it involves.\n\nIn the fact of consciousness we can distinguish several elements which\nreally are inseparable, but which in the study of the problem ought\nto be separated. There is the content of which one is conscious,\nand secondly, the consciousness thereof, or its relation to the\nego; and, by a further abstraction, this relation itself might be\ndistinguished from the total fact of consciousness. The relation to\nthe ego, in ever varied contents, is one and the same; it makes up\nboth the common and specific element of consciousness, and as the\nthird abstract element of consciousness (Bewusstsein) it might aptly\nbe called self-consciousness (Bewusstheit). The ego, being a common\npoint of relation to all contents of consciousness, cannot itself\nbecome the content of consciousness, because it represents a contrast\nto any idea of content. We do not correctly conceive consciousness as\na thing, a cause, a force, an explanatory principle, but simply as a\nphenomenon\u2014the fundamental phenomenon of psychology. We thereupon ask,\nwhat contains this phenomenon, and by what is it characterised? It is,\nabove all, characterised by _subjective_ experience. This denotes, that\nit is _I_ who am conscious of a content. The reflective expression\n\"I am conscious\" implies a \"subject\" that is conscious. Without this\nreflective relation to the ego, consciousness no longer conveys any\nmeaning. Consciousness denotes _self_-consciousness. This reflective\nrelation is therefore the only distinctive mark of all conscious\nphenomena.\n\nContent we call anything that can be related to the ego. In the\nlanguage adopted by psychologists, a feeling or a desire can also\nbe regarded as content of consciousness. But our investigation\ncannot proceed beyond this reflective relation. If we attempt a\n_representation_ of the ego, we should turn it into _object_, and\nwe should have ceased to regard it as _ego_. The ego is never an\nobject\u2014not even to itself.\n\nIt is not denied, that in every consciousness there can be\ndistinguished two elements\u2014the existence of a content, and its\nrelation to the ego; but it is denied, that this relation can be made\nobjective, even to itself. This correctly describes the character\nof consciousness, as content and activity, and moreover, precisely\ndelimits the domain of the psychical and determines the _positive_ task\nof psychology. Those, who assume a consciousness of consciousness,\nought logically to admit the consciousness of a consciousness of\nconsciousness, etc.; as indeed some metaphysicians have done.\n\nIt may be maintained, however, that the distinction of the activities\nof consciousness, of sensation, representation, and thinking, is\nindispensable in psychology; but, at any rate, there are no different\n_kinds_, or even degrees or stages of consciousness. The consciousness\nof any simple sensation in kind is not different from the consciousness\nof a world; the factor of consciousness in both is the same; the\ndifference lies exclusively in the content. This also applies to clear\nand obscure consciousness.\n\nIn order to determine the positive task of psychology, we ought to\ndiscover in every content and in every repeated act of consciousness, a\ncertain common characteristic. Perception, as such, does not constitute\nconsciousness, but merely denotes the presence of a multiple content;\napperception, on the other hand, indicates only consciousness in the\ndefinite sense of a \"unity\" of that multiple content. This unity\nof consciousness properly does not appear, or only appears in the\nconnection of the contents. That peculiarity of consciousness which we\ncall apperception, is psychologically only apparent in the contents\nof consciousness; it does not constitute an object of psychology, but\nforms only its extreme limits. The common characteristic of every\ncontent of consciousness is therefore really to be found in the\n_connection_ (Verbindung) in which the simple contents are represented\nin the repeated acts of consciousness. This connection exists only\nsubjectively, irrespective of all objective meaning or value.\n\nThe existence of phenomena purely as phenomena, their subjective\nexistence irrespective of object, constitutes their psychic existence\nor that side of the phenomenon from which it becomes an object of\npsychological research. Under this head come all those phenomena to\nwhich science denies an objective value: illusions of the senses,\nmental hallucinations, and the normal non-scientific representations\nof things, the creations of the imagination in music and in art, the\nentire subjective life of feeling and of aspiration, regarded only as a\nparticularly characteristic association of representation, irrespective\nof all objective truth, which lies beyond the limits of psychology as\nsuch.\n\nThe characteristic, accordingly, is found in the _unity_ in which\nthe content represents itself in the single or reiterated acts of\nconsciousness. In each act of consciousness the content is simply\npresent, and no time is distinguished. When we distinguish time, a\nplurality of consciousness also must be distinguished. It may seem\ndifficult to understand how two or more original acts of consciousness\nare again united into one act; but in reality this takes place.\nThe idea of unity is thus enlarged, and becomes the consciousness\nof a multiplicity, the necessary unity of a multiple, a successive\nconnection in time, and a simultaneous connection. All consciousness\n(representation) depends on connection, as is indirectly shown by\ntrying to discover whether the elementary contents of consciousness can\nbe represented in absolute isolation.\n\nAbstract consciousness is thus found to be the relation of given\ncontents to an ego, and connection constitutes the manner in which a\nmultiple content appears or is represented in the reiterated relation\nto one and the same ego. Connection is the _concrete expression_ of\nthat relation itself, through which consciousness attains its definite\nand positive value. Abstract consciousness seems poor, but the\nmultiplicity of a definite connection of contents affords a vast field\nof psychological research, for on that connection depends the concrete\nsignificance of the ego, which to us is not subject in general, but\nabove all, is our own particular subject.\n\nAnd finally at this point there spontaneously arises the question of a\ntheory of the psychic phenomena. Every theory essentially presupposes\nan _objective_ tendency, while consciousness, as the expression of the\npurest _subjectivity_ of phenomena, cannot be rendered objective. It\nclearly follows, therefore, that the _method_ of psychology must be\nradically different from all methods of the objective sciences.\n\n \u03b3\u03bd\u03bb\u03bd\n\n\nDER GENIALE MENSCH. By _Cesare Lombroso_. German Translation\n by Dr. M. O. Fraenkel. Hamburg: Verlagsanstalt und\n Druckerei-Actien-Gesellschaft (vormals J. F. Richter).\n\nThe French edition of Lombroso's \"Man of Genius\" has already appeared.\nThe work is introduced by a preface written by M. Charles Richet,\nwhich reviews the subject with great clearness. All in all, this is\nan admirable book, well stocked with interesting facts and incidents,\nand well adapted to obtain a large number of readers outside of\nscientific circles. There is necessarily a dearth of abundant and\nwell-authenticated facts in this subject,\u2014historians until lately not\nhaving occupied themselves with the psychological phases of life; and\naccordingly there is great danger in universal generalisation from\nthose that we have. This, however, Prof. Lombroso has recognised.\n\nGenius, the author claims, is a variety of psychosis, an instance of\ndegeneration. Degeneration of certain parts is the condition of the\nacquisition of others; thus the loss of a number of ribs and muscles,\nof a tail, etc., has in man been compensated by the acquisition and\ndevelopment of the brain; and so in the genius the possession of very\ngreat intellectual or emotional faculties has been counterbalanced by\nthe loss of equilibrium in the other parts. Moreover, there are no\nexceptions in nature; the occurrence of insanity, abnormalities, and\neccentricities in a few cases leads us inevitably to the conclusion\nthat there are correspondent defects in all others. And this we find to\nbe true in all historical instances. Popular speech and tradition have\nidentified genius and demency: in Hebrew and Sanskrit the words prophet\nand insane are synonymous; and so we have the proverbs\u2014'Children and\nfools speak the truth,' 'Un fol avise bien un sage,' 'Saepe etiam\nest morio valde opportune locutus.' The line of demarcation between\nthe two is hardly traceable. Genius is the exception, a deviation\nfrom the common type of humanity, and nature avenges the aberration\nby denying it permanency and inflicting upon it abnormality. Whether\ndegeneration or progression, genius is unusual and unstable. But\none thing distinguishes genius from mental alienation, and it is\nthis\u2014that genius possesses the power of inhibition, of concentration,\nof _critique_, and far-sightedness, while demency has no control of\nthe ideas it has formed; both possess the swift and unerring power of\norigination; the one can command what it has originated, the other\ncannot.\n\nIt must be admitted that the method employed for the verification of\nthis thesis, is not absolutely safe. Wherever an eccentricity in a\nman of genius is found, it is accredited to psychosis, even though\nthe genius in question be upon the whole more normal than the average\n\"normal\" man; as, for instance, Goethe. If the same method were applied\nto all men, would not normality be the exception and abnormality the\nrule?\n\n \u03bc\u03ba\u03c1\u03ba\n\n\nDAS BEWUSSTSEIN UND SEIN OBJECT. By _Dr. Joh. Wolff_, Professor of\n Philosophy at the University of Freiburg (Switzerland). Berlin:\n Mayer & M\u00fcller.\n\nThis is a huge closely printed volume of six hundred and twenty pages.\nIt is the enlargement and development of a treatise offered several\nyears ago to the faculty of the University of Bonn, upon application by\nDr. Wolff for a University instructorship, and contains the results of\nthe author's thoughts and researches since that time upon the subject\nthere dealt with.\n\nAmong many valuable isolated speculations and suggestions, we find\nfundamental theses with which it is impossible for us to agree. Thus,\nDr. Wolff says that when he speaks of soul he means 'a substance,\na substratum, a vehicle, a cause of psychical phenomena, and not\na phenomenon or sum of phenomena'; and he says it is no more a\npre-judgment or prejudice on _his_ part to begin with this thesis than\nit is on the part of those who hold a different view to begin with the\nopposed one,\u2014in fact less so, since he starts from the notion which\nall men hold in common, while the others do not.\n\nDoes the mathematician, in propounding a new method, or a physicist\nin explaining an unsolved problem, proceed from the mathematical and\nphysical notions all men hold in common? And if the soul is made an\nobject of scientific research, why should an exception be made of\n_it_? It is not so much what we begin with as what we end with, and\nit is perhaps superfluous to say that Dr. Wolff has ended where he\nbegan\u2014with the simplicity, the substantiality, the unity, and the\npermanency of the ego.\n\n \u03bc\u03ba\u03c1\u03ba\n\n\n\n\nPHILOSOPHY IN AMERICAN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES.\n\n\nWe had originally intended, in this first number of _The Monist_,\nto present to our readers a comprehensive statement of the courses\nannounced by American Universities in the departments of Philosophy,\nEthics, and Psychology; first, in order to supply students proposing\nto pursue these studies and others interested, with information at\nfirst-hand, and secondly to give the non-academic world, which is\nconsiderable, an insight into what our higher professional schools are\ndoing in these branches.\n\nSince then _The American Journal of Psychology_ has published a very\nfull and gratifying account of the state of psychological research\nin our Universities, made up of the reports of the professors at the\nhead of these departments; and we therefore refer our readers for\ninformation regarding this branch to the article entitled \"Psychology\nin American Universities,\" published in Vol. III, No. 2, of that\nably-conducted magazine.\n\nIt was also difficult to obtain the required information: most of\nour professors, in the last few months, having been absent from the\nuniversity towns.\n\nBut reports from the most representative universities in different\nparts of the country have been obtained. They are intended merely to\nexhibit the general nature and extent of philosophical instruction in\nAmerica and do not profess to be complete.\n\n * * * * *\n\nA review of the Registers, Catalogues, and Programmes of a large\nnumber of our colleges has led us to the conviction that the acquiring\nin America of a broad philosophical training is not the fault of the\n_professions_ of our academical authorities. The courses offered are\nset forth in our college catalogues at very great length; they are very\nexhaustive; and their specification is accompanied with analyses of the\nwork of the various departments and with bibliographical schedules that\nin point of thoroughness leave nothing to be desired. This fulness of\nexposition is noticeable in all the departments.\n\nBut under the obligatory system of study, the separate departments,\nor rather the professions of the separate departments, must certainly\nconflict: and the question arises in the mind of the observing\noutsider, To which is justice done?\n\nAnd, except where a specialty is exclusively followed, wherein under\nthe professed conditions, does the elective system differ from the\nobligatory? Only that in the one case, the student is made the author\nof his embarrassment, and in the other the victim of it. However, in\nthe absence of a decided educational sentiment in our nation, and in\nthe lack of a uniformity of opinion as to what must be _demanded_ of\nour schools instead of a submissive acquiescence in what they give us,\nthe question whether a college has fulfilled what it has professed,\nmust be left to the faithful individual student who is forced to devote\nthe best years of his life to the solution of it. It seems impossible\nto determine it otherwise. And yet, except in the case of our foremost\ninstitutions, to which all of us cannot go, this is true.\n\nWe have observed, too, that the extension of the departments of\nphilosophy proper is not keeping pace with that of many other\ndepartments\u2014as, for instance, the departments of history and economics.\n\nPerhaps this is inevitable; the last-mentioned sciences having been\nuntil of late very much neglected.\n\nBut the tendency threatens to overbalance the curriculum; and where\npretensions to universality are made, it is not justified.\n\nOn the other hand, the firm hold that experimental psychology has\nobtained in some of our foremost schools, is gratifying; though\nenthusiasm may also lead too far in this direction.\n\nLack of co-operation in cognate branches is, with very few notable\nexceptions, universal. Preparatory training is not emphasised.\nAt least, where so much is said of the character and method of\ninstruction, and where the elective system prevails, we should expect\nsome mention of it. But it is not found.\n\nPhilosophy would seem to be something that is to be obtained only in\nthe lecture-rooms of the \"philosophical department,\" and in most cases\nit is sought nowhere else. The study of Mathematics, Physics, Natural\nScience, and Philology, is greatly neglected. Philosophy becomes an\naim and a means in itself, and the student at the close of his course\noften discovers himself in the quest of philosophy, but with no means\nof finding it.\n\nThis necessity of co-operation has been fully recognised, for instance,\nat Harvard. \"When a student applies for Honors,\" says Professor\nPalmer, \"we require from him not merely an acquaintance with technical\nphilosophy but _also with the subjects most nearly adjacent to the\nspecial philosophical field he has chosen_.\"\n\nAnd so it is in other of our advanced and enlightened schools. Yet\nin the majority of cases, the _foundations_ of philosophical culture\nare not insisted upon, but left to chance and the uncertainties of a\nuniversal elective curriculum.\n\nLastly, philosophy at some institutions exhibits a sectarian and\ntheological complexion.\n\nThis, one thinks, might be left to the theological seminaries. But it\nis not.\n\nWe have Baptist Philosophy, and Presbyterian Philosophy, and\ndenominational philosophies of divers other descriptions.\n\nA president of a prominent Eastern University, (a gentleman to whom the\nphilosophic spirit of this country is greatly indebted for inspiration\nand expansion,) has taken,\u2014let it be remarked in this connection,\u2014a\nmuch more liberal step, and urged the necessity of establishing a\nschool of _American_ Philosophy.\n\nThis is laudable; and in harmony with the present resuscitation of\nAmerican patriotism in\u2014\u2014matters of learning.\n\nIt was this spirit that dictated the witty proposition of a Chicago\ngentleman to found a \"school\" of American _Geometry_.\n\n * * * * *\n\nWe hope that the appended syllabuses of courses in philosophy will\nafford a general idea of the scope of philosophical teaching in\nAmerica. The professors who have supplied us with the information we\nrequested, we thank for their courtesy and obligingness.\n\n\nUNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.\n\nThe Philosophical Courses of the University of Michigan may be\nconveniently classified under three heads:\u2014\n\n\nI. BEGINNING.\n\n1. ELEMENTARY LOGIC, in which there are two courses, one general\ncovering the rudiments of syllogistic and deductive logic in which\nJevons is used as the basis, the other in inductive logic, intended\nespecially for scientific students, in which Fowler is used.\n\n2. ELEMENTARY PSYCHOLOGY. The main facts regarding modern scientific\nresearches and methods, and the various attempts at their philosophic\ninterpretation. Dewey's Psychology is the book used in connection with\nthis course.\n\n3. INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY. A course of lectures on the main\nproblems and principles of the theory of knowledge and reality. Each of\nthe foregoing courses is for one semester.\n\n\nII. INTERMEDIATE COURSES.\n\n1. HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. Ancient and Modern. Lectures and readings\ndesigned to give information regarding both the historical development\nof thought, and the main problems developed in its course. The\ndepartment of philosophy owns a large number of copies of the chief\nthinkers in modern philosophy, Locke, Descartes, etc., etc., and these\nare assigned to members of the class for readings and reports. Each\nstudent thus becomes acquainted with at least half-a-dozen of the\nleading writers at first-hand.\n\nThe course runs through the year.\n\n2. ETHICS, THEORETICAL (one-half year) AND SOCIAL (Political\nPhilosophy, one-half year also). The theoretical course attempts to\narrive at an account of the ethical ideal by means of a critical\nconsideration of the principal modern ethical theories, especial\nattention being paid to Utilitarianism, Evolutionary Ethics, and\nKantianism. The second division of the course discusses the ethical\nbasis and value of society and the state, law and rights, in connection\nwith an account of the political theories of Plato, Aristotle, Grotius,\nHobbes, Locke, Kant, Rousseau, Hegel, etc.\n\n3. \u00c6STHETICS. This course, like the previous one, unites the historical\nand theoretical treatment of \u00e6sthetic doctrines and results. It is\ndesigned largely to aid students in the interpretation and criticism of\nliterature. It is a half-year course, and is followed by a half-year\ncourse (given in the English Department) on the Principles and Methods\nof Literary Criticism.\n\n4. PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY. Lectures, assigned readings and elementary\nexperiments, and demonstrations. There is established, as yet, no\nseparate psycho-physical laboratory, but the new-equipped physiological\nlaboratory of the University is, through the courtesy of the Professor\nof Physiology, at the disposal of students in this line. Half-year\ncourse.\n\n5. SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. Lectures, readings, etc.,\ndesigned to give an account of the chief methods employed and results\nachieved in the modern historical and comparative study of religions.\nAnd also an account of the principal theoretical interpretations of\nreligion. Half-year course.\n\n\nIII. ADVANCED COURSES.\n\n1. KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON. A study of Kant's masterpiece\nat first-hand. This is accompanied by a shorter subsidiary course,\ntreating of the development of the Kantian system, and criticisms upon\nit. Caird's Critical Philosophy of Kant, is read and discussed in\nconnection with the latter course. Half-year course.\n\n2. HEGEL'S LOGIC. A study of Wallace's translation of the lesser Logic\nof Hegel. Half-year course.\n\n3. THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHODS. A lecture course taking up the\nstudy of the Logic of Science, and intended to make the hearers\nacquainted with the standpoint and spirit of such authors as Lotze,\nSigwart, Wundt, Mill, Jevons, Bradley, Bosanquet, and the modern\nmovement in logic generally. Half-year course.\n\n4. PROBLEMS IN HIGHER \u00c6STHETICS. A brief course for graduate students\nin \u00c6sthetics.\n\n5. SEMINARY IN ETHICS. Discussion of the treatment of some main ethical\nproblems by the chief modern ethical writers.\n\nThe Elementary courses are conducted mainly by text-books and\nrecitations; the Intermediate courses by lectures and assigned\nreadings, reports and essay-writings. The Advanced courses are pursued\nby class discussions, conversations, etc. on basis of work done\nindependently by the student.\n\nThe teaching is carried on by John Dewey, J. H. Tufts, and F. N. Scott.\n\n JOHN DEWEY.\n\n\nHARVARD UNIVERSITY.\n\nThe courses at Harvard are, we believe, the most complete offered in\nany American University. They consist (for 1890-91) of four groups:\n\n\nI. INTRODUCTORY COURSES.\n\nIN LOGIC, METAPHYSICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY.\n\n\nII. SYSTEMATIC COURSES\n\nPSYCHOLOGY, COSMOLOGY, ETHICS, PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION, THE\nPSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF RELIGIOUS FAITH, AND THE CONTENT OF CHRISTIAN\nFAITH.\n\n\nIII. HISTORICAL COURSES.\n\nIncluding lectures on COMPARATIVE RELIGION, GREEK PHILOSOPHY,\nDESCARTES-SPINOZA-LEIBNITZ, ENGLISH PHILOSOPHY FROM HOBBES TO HUME, THE\nMOVEMENT OF GERMAN THOUGHT FROM 1770-1830, CONTEMPORARY SYSTEMS AND\nAPPLIED ETHICS.\n\n\nIV. COURSES OF ORIGINAL RESEARCH.\n\nIncluding the Psychological, Metaphysical, and Ethical Seminaries.\nThese do not include the additional and auxilliary courses in other\nsubjects, which are required for Honors.\n\n\"Holding that there is one best way for the young student to begin\nhis philosophical study,\" says Prof. G. H. Palmer, \"we have planned\na single introductory course and have given it variety by setting\nthree instructors to teach it. When these elementary matters have been\nmastered, we offer the student a choice among half-a-dozen dogmatic\ncourses, or among as many more historical. These last two sets of\ncourses are open alike to graduates and to undergraduates. For graduate\nspecialists three or four lines of Seminary work are provided, with a\nview to giving the most advanced students ample opportunity to develop\ntheir individual powers.... But the chief aim of our Honors is to test\npowers rather than acquirement.\"\n\nIn Harvard there are six instructors engaged in the department of\nphilosophy alone: Prof. G. H. Palmer, Prof. C. C. Everett, Prof. W.\nJames, Prof. F. G. Peabody, Prof. J. Royce, and Dr. G. Santayana.\nA dozen or more courses of philosophical content are offered, and\nacquaintance with auxilliary branches is necessary to take Honors.\n\n\nUNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.\n\nThe instruction given in the various branches of philosophy at this\ninstitution is conducted according to the following scheme:\n\n1. PROP\u00c6DEUTIC TO PHILOSOPHY. Empirical psychology, including formal\nlogic, deductive and inductive. Four times a week.\n\n2. INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY. History of European philosophy, in\noutline. Four times a week.\n\n3. ELEMENTARY ETHICS, INCLUDING CIVIL POLITY. Sketch of the history\nof ethical and political theories; critique of the conflict between\nperfectionism and hedonism, freedom and necessity, optimism and\npessimism; investigation of the nature of a state, and of its bearing\non the limits of liberty and allegiance. Four times a week.\n\n4. FIRST ALTERNATING COURSE. Exposition of some principal movement\nor conflict in the history of philosophy, by a critical study of its\nleading participants; or the like, the subject being changed from year\nto year. Twice a week.\n\n5. SECOND ALTERNATING COURSE. Some additional topic, similar to that\nof Course IV., and similarly changed, but drawn, preferably, from the\nfield of practical philosophy. Four times a week.\n\n6. GRADUATE COURSE. First-hand study of certain philosophic\nmasterpieces, such as Plato's _Parmenides_, _The\u00e6tetus_ and _Sophist_,\nAristotle's _De Anima_, Kant's _Kritiken_, or Hegel's _Ph\u00e6nomenologie\ndes Geistes_; etc. Four times a week throughout the year.\n\nCourses 1, 2, and 3, in this scheme are permanent, and are repeated\nfrom year to year in substantially the same form; Course 4 is continued\nthroughout a whole year; the rest throughout a single term. Courses\n4 and 5 are projected with the intention of furnishing a variety of\ntopics, a new one being usually presented each year; though a subject\nis sometimes continued, if it proves to excite the special interest\nor meet the particular wants of the incoming Senior class. Course 6,\nprovided for graduate students only, is sufficiently described in its\nsub-title.\n\nThe specific subjects for the ensuing year 1890-91, under these courses\nwith varying topics, will be as follows:\n\nCourse 4. PHILOSOPHY FROM KANT TO HEGEL. The Development of\nRationalistic Idealism, from its negative and partial to its complete\nand positive form. Twice a week.\n\nText-Books: (1) Watson's Philosophy of Kant; (2) Everett's Fichte's\nScience of Knowledge; (3) Watson's Schelling's Transcendental Idealism;\n(4) Caird's Hegel; (5) Hegel's Logic, translated by Wallace. With the\nstandard works of reference.\n\nCourse 5. HIGHER ETHICS. Based on a criticism of Sidgwick and\nMartineau. Four times a week during the second term.\n\nText-Books: (1) Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics; (2) Martineau's Types of\nEthical Theory.\n\nCourse 6. GRADUATE COURSE. The Dialektik and Methodenlehre in Kant's\nKritik, followed by Hegel's Lesser Logic in Wallace's translation. Four\ntimes a week throughout the year.\n\nFrom this statement it will be seen that some important text covering\neach topic is in the hands of each student. The object of this is to\nfurnish an actual historical basis for the discussion of the subject,\nwhich is conducted by the professor's lectures. These proceed from\na criticism, partly appreciative, partly destructive, of the texts\nchosen, to a constructive and positive presentation of the subject,\naccording to the reasoned views of the lecturer.\n\nThe interest in philosophical studies is steadily increasing in this\ninstitution. The instruction in them was opened in the academic year\n1884-85, and the growth of interest is well indicated by the fact that\nthe number of students now annually electing these courses is more than\ndouble the number during the first and second year.\n\n G. H. HOWISON.\n\n\nUNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA.\n\nThe Courses offered in Logic, Psychology, Ethics, and Philosophy, at\nthis institution for the year 1890-91, are as follows:\n\n\nUNDERGRADUATE COURSES.\n\n1. A ELEMENTARY COURSE IN LOGIC. Two hours a week.\n\n2. THE ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY. One hour a week.\n\n3. SCIENTIFIC METHODS IN PSYCHOLOGY. Lectures with Laboratory Work. Two\nhours.\n\n4. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. Lectures with Laboratory Work. Two hours.\n\n5. A COURSE IN ETHICS. Two hours.\n\n6. A COURSE ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF ETHICS. One hour.\n\n7. A COURSE ON THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. Two hours.\n\n8. A COURSE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF IDEALISM. Two hours.\n\n\nGRADUATE COURSES.\n\n1. COMPARATIVE, SOCIAL, AND ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY. Two hours.\n\n2. SPECIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS. Lectures with Laboratory Work. Two\nhours.\n\n3. ADVANCED PSYCHOLOGY. Two hours.\n\n4. ETHICAL THEORIES. One hour.\n\n5. HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. Two hours.\n\nEach course of undergraduate lectures will extend through half the\nyear. Courses 1, 2, 3, and 7, will be delivered during the first term;\nCourses 4, 5, 6, and 8 during the second. Of the graduate lectures,\nCourses 1 and 2 will be given during the first and second terms\nrespectively. Courses 3, 4, and 5 will extend throughout the year. The\npsychological laboratory is open at all hours to students engaged in\nspecial researches.\n\nIn addition to these courses, mention may be made of those delivered on\nPhysiological, Abnormal, and Comparative Psychology in the Biological\nand Medical Schools of the University; and of the numerous courses,\nmore or less directly ethical, which are delivered in the field of\nSociology. In several of these there is a purposed effort to bring out\nthe significance for ethics of the subject treated.\n\n GEO. S. FULLERTON.\n\n\nCLARK UNIVERSITY.\n\nFrom the well-classified and thorough courses offered at Clark\nUniversity, (conducted by Dr. Hall, Prof. Donaldson, Dr. Sanford, Dr.\nBoas, Dr. Cook, Dr. Strong, and others,) we select, for its uniqueness,\nan account of the instruction at that institution in\u2014\n\n\nAPPLIED ETHICS.\n\nUnder this head, come among others, the different forms of abnormal and\npathological humanity. The most extreme form is treated of in Criminal\nAnthropology, which takes up the study of man as criminal. As an\nintroduction, the acts that would be considered criminal in man's case,\nare investigated, as they appear in the whole realm of nature. This\ndivision we call Criminal Embryology.\n\nThe other divisions to be considered in the lectures are: the\nAnthropometry, Craniology, Physiognomy, Cerebrology, Psychology,\nSociology, Teratology, and Prophylaxis of criminals; also criminality\nin relation to Psychiatry and Psychiatrical Anthropology. The general\nrelation of Ethics to Criminal Anthropology, is one of degree; crime\nbeing an exaggerated form of wrong. We can illustrate the method of\napplication in this way: If a nerve of a normal organism is cut, the\norgans in which irregularities are produced, are those which the nerve\ncontrols. In this way the office of a nerve in the normal state may be\ndiscovered. The criminal is, so to speak, the severed-nerve of society;\nand the study of him is a very practical way (though indirect) of\nstudying normal men. And since the criminal is seven-eights like other\nmen, such a study is also a direct inquiry into normal humanity.\n\nThe lesser degrees of abnormal and pathological cases will be discussed\nunder the head of Charitology. These are represented by the different\nkinds of benevolent institutions, such as almshouses, asylums for\nthe insane, imbecile, and epileptic; for the deaf, dumb, and blind;\nhospitals, dispensaries, and infirmaries; homes for truants, orphans,\nand for the friendless and aged.\n\nThe characteristics of inmates of such institutions and the methods\nof treatment and prevention, will be the main considerations. The\nfacts gathered, and the principles underlying such institutions, will\nbe utilised in an attempt to give a scientific basis to ethics. The\nproblems of right, duty and freedom, will be carefully considered.\n\nAccepting the sociological truism, that the community is more important\nthan any individual in it, the ethical standpoint of the lecturer is:\n_that the idea of wrong depends upon the moral, intellectual, physical\nor financial danger or injury, which a thought, feeling, willing or\nacting, brings to humanity_.\n\nThe decision, as to what thoughts, feelings, actions, etc., are\ndangerous or injurious, will depend upon the results from the\napplication of the scientific method to the different departments of\nknowledge.\n\nThe direct practical object of the course, will be the study of\npreventatives, based on a thorough diagnosis.\n\nVisitations and practical investigations of charitable and penal\ninstitutions will be made as occasion shall offer.\n\nThe lectures will be delivered in the latter part of the year.\n\n ARTHUR MACDONALD.\n\n\nUNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.\n\nBesides the comprehensive courses in psychology, the following are\noffered:\n\n1. HISTORY OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. A brief survey of the development of\nphilosophical thought in Greece. Zeller's Hand-book of Greek Philosophy\nis the reference book. Twice a week. Elective. (Prof. Jastrow.)\n\n2. THE HISTORY OF MODERN ENGLISH PHILOSOPHY. Three times a week.\nElective. (Prof. Stearns.)\n\n3. ETHICS. Four times a week. Elective. (Prof. Stearns.)\n\n4. \u00c6STHETICS. In addition to the study of the physiological and\npsychological basis of \u00e6sthetics an elementary knowledge of the history\nof art and the principles of art criticism is given by lectures and\ndiscussions. Five times a week. Elective. (Prof. Stearns.)\n\n5. ELEMENTARY LOGIC, DEDUCTIVE AND INDUCTIVE. The analysis of\narguments, the construction and elaboration of syllogisms; the symbolic\nand diagrammatic methods of representing logical operations, and modern\nand ancient systems of logic will form the main topics of the deductive\nlogic; while in inductive logic special emphasis will be laid upon the\nmethods of scientific reasoning, the logic of chance, the detection of\nfallacies, and the estimation of evidence. Daily in winter term. (Prof.\nJastrow.)\n\n6. ADVANCED LOGIC. Special attention paid to the logic of the sciences;\nto mathematical logic as introduced by Boole and developed by Venn,\nPeirce, Schroeder and others; to the theory of probabilities, and the\nhistory of logical doctrines. Twice weekly. Elective. (Prof. Jastrow.)\n\n7. MILL'S LOGIC. A general course upon the philosophy of reasoning and\nthe principles of inductive science. Killick's Handbook to Mill's Logic\nused. Three times weekly. (Prof. Jastrow.) Each course extends over a\nsingle term only.\n\nIn Ethics an effort is made to introduce the students to three phases\nof the subject, the historical, theoretical, and practical. The first\nis at present limited to a brief review, by lectures, of the chief\nEnglish ethical theories. In the second Prof. Fowler's Progressive\nMorality is made the basis of the instruction. The third is pursued\nchiefly in the form of topics, relating generally to current ethical\nquestions, which are assigned for special study to members of the\nclass, and their presentation is, when desirable, made the basis of\ngeneral discussion.\n\n J. W. STEARNS.\n\n\nBOSTON UNIVERSITY.\n\nThe following are the courses for the present year, at Boston\nUniversity, under the direction of Prof. B. P. Bowne and Dean\nHuntington.\n\nPSYCHOLOGY. Thought studied as a fact; its forms and laws investigated;\nCurrent Theories expounded and criticised. Five hours.\n\nLOGIC. Thought studied not as a fact, but as an instrument of\nknowledge. Investigation of the laws, forms, aims, and methods of\nmental activity. Five hours.\n\nTHEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. The study of thought as a process supplemented\nby the study of knowledge as its product. Knowledge defined, and the\nconditions, subjective and objective, of its validity investigated. The\nclaims of scepticism, agnosticism, etc., considered at length. Three\nhours.\n\nMETAPHYSICS. Modifications of ontological and cosmological ideas in the\nlight of rational criticism. Four hours.\n\nPHILOSOPHY OF THEISM. The logical value and foundation of Theism\nconsidered. Four hours.\n\nHISTORY OF ETHICAL THOUGHT. Christian Ethics. Text-book and lectures.\nFive hours.\n\nPHILOSOPHY OF ETHICS. Critical and constructive review of ethical\ntheories. Psychological questions as to the nature and origin of moral\nfaculty ruled out as irrelevant. Two hours.\n\nHISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. From Descartes to the present time. Five hours.\n\nThe Philosophical Club, organised in 1886, has since that time\nmaintained stated meetings for the furtherance of its members in\nphilosophical studies.\n\nLast year, under the auspices of the University, a special course\nof five lectures on Educational Psychology was given before large\naudiences by William T. Harris, LL. D. The topics treated were as\nfollows:\n\n1. Introspection contrasted with external Sense Perception.\n\n2. Mental Pictures _versus_ General Ideas.\n\n3. The Logical Constitution of Sense Perception.\n\n4. Physiological Psychology.\n\n5. The Psychology of Mathematics, \u00c6sthetics, and Ethics.\n\nThe courses are for single terms only.\n\n B. P. BOWNE.\n\n\nJOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.\n\nThe Undergraduate instruction in philosophy provides five hours a week\nof required work for one year:\n\n1) IN DEDUCTIVE AND INDUCTIVE LOGIC; 2) IN PSYCHOLOGY; 3) IN ETHICS.\n\nThe courses are unified and thorough. A voluntary course in the History\nof Philosophy is given; and advanced courses will be offered this year\nin Modern Philosophy from Descartes to Kant, and in English Ethics from\nHobbes to Stephen. The instructors are Professors Griffin and Emmot.\n\n\n\n\nPERIODICALS.\n\n\nMIND. July 1890. No. LIX.\n\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n OUR SPACE-CONSCIOUSNESS. A Reply. By _Herbert Spencer_.\n\n VOLKMANN'S PSYCHOLOGY (I). By _Thomas Whittaker_.\n\n THE LOGIC OF THE ETHIC OF EVOLUTION. By _William Mitchell_.\n\n THE ANTINOMY OF THOUGHT. By _Alexander F. Shand_.\n\n MENTAL TESTS AND MEASUREMENTS. By Prof. _J. McK. Cattell_.\n\n DISCUSSION: 1) The Evolution of Inductive Thought. By _Hiram M.\n Stanley_.\n 2) The Genesis of the Cognition of Physical Reality. By _Julius\n Pikler_.\n\n CRITICAL NOTICES: \"Fouill\u00e9e's L'Avenir de la M\u00e9taphysique fond\u00e9e\n sur l'Exp\u00e9rience\"; Tarde's \"Lois de l'Imitation\"; B\u00e6umker's\n \"Das Problem der Materie in der Griechischen Philosophie.\"\n\n SOME NEWLY-DISCOVERED LETTERS OF HOBBES. By the _Editor_.\n\n_Our Space-Consciousness._ In this article Mr. Herbert Spencer replies\nto criticisms, by adherents of Kantian doctrine, of objections\ncontained in \u00a7\u00a7 326-335 of _The Principles of Psychology_. He objects\nthat the disciples of Kant \"cannot imagine how it is possible that\nour space-consciousness can have arisen out of that which was not\noriginally a space-consciousness.\"\n\n_Volkmann's Psychology._ Shows that the really important point in\nVolkmann's doctrine of \"psychological mechanism\" is its theory of the\ninteraction of contemporaneous presentations, and of the existence\namong them of unconscious presentations. Herbartian psychology is\nstrictly scientific system, but when its superfluous mechanism is\ncleared away, its explanations become those of associationism.\n\nIn _The Logic of the Ethic of Evolution_, Mr. William Mitchell points\nout that the two conditions of an ethical end are that it be the\nmotive of individual action, and that it furnish a critical system of\nuniversal laws; and further that those conditions are fulfilled by\nthe end variously propounded in the ethic of evolution only if it be\nrepresented, not as an external limit forcing itself on men, but as\npresenting a more desirable character and medium to the individual than\nany other. The end and means of moral progress given by the Ethic of\nEvolution are perfectly true, but they do not express the essence of\nthe matter.\n\n_The Antinomy of Thought._ This paper investigates an antinomy which\ninfects all our thought of reality that is not intuitive. The source\nof error is the confusion of the judgment with the consciousness or\nintuition of reality.\n\nIn the article on _Mental Tests and Measurements_, Prof. J. McK.\nCattell describes certain tests which are used in the Psychological\nLaboratory of the University of Pennsylvania, with the object of\nproviding data for the discovery of the rules which govern the\nconstancy of mental processes, their interdependence, and their\nvariations under different circumstances.\n\n_The Evolution of Inductive Thought._ A primary element in all\nexperience is its inductive quality. The struggle of existence awakens\nexperience to the thought-stage where it knows and directs itself,\nbut this very slowly. Development precedes self-development, and this\nprecedes a self-development which is self-conscious. This conclusion is\nconfirmed by some analyses of thought in the divisions of conception,\njudgment, and reasoning.\n\n_The Genesis of the Cognition of Physical Reality._ This is a criticism\nby Mr. Julius Pikler of Mr. Stout's criticism on Mill, which appeared\nin the January number of _Mind_. His opinion is that Mr. Strong's\nstatements are simply negations of Mill's theory, and as such prove\nnothing.\n\n_Some newly-discovered Letters of Hobbes._ These letters, seventeen\nin number, were written to the French physician Sorbi\u00e8re, and have\nbeen discovered by Dr. F. T\u00f6nnies in the National Library at Paris.\nAll of them, with related letters of Sorbi\u00e8re and others, are given at\nlength in the _Archiv f. Gesch. d. Phil._ iii. 58-71, 192-232, and the\nfirst nine, which are the only ones of real importance, are set out in\nthis number of _Mind_. They have reference to the important period of\nHobbes's life and work that led up to _Leviathan_ in 1651. (London:\nWilliams & Norgate.)\n\n\nREVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. No. 175. July 1890.\n\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n L'HOMOGENEITE MORALE. By _G. Fonsegrive_.\n\n CONTRIBUTIONS PSYCHO-PHYSIQUES A L'ETUDE ESTHETIQUE (fin). By _G.\n Sorel_.\n\n LA FOLIE DE J. J. ROUSSEAU. By _H. Joly_.\n\n LA PERCEPTION DES LONGUEURS ET DES NOMBRES CHEZ QUELQUES PETITS\n ENFANTS. By _Alfred Binet_.\n\n ANALYSES ET COMPTES RENDUS.\n\nM. Fonsegrive in _L'Homog\u00e9n\u00e9it\u00e9 morale_ points out the necessity of a\nproper system of education for developing in the mind of the young a\nmoral homogeneity to replace the heterogeneity which psychologists find\nin the nature of man.\n\nIn _Contributions psycho-physiques a l'Etude esth\u00e9tique_, M. G. Sorel\ncontinues his studies on the psychology of \u00e6sthetics, and concludes\nthat experimental psychology and especially psycho-physics form the\nbase of practical \u00e6sthetics.\n\nM. H. Joly in _La Folie de J. J. Rousseau_ points out that the problem\nof the agreement of genius with insanity, so far as concerns Rousseau,\nis reduced to small dimensions.\n\n_La Perception des Longueurs et des Nombres ches quelques petits\nEnfants_ by M. Alfred Binet, describes certain original experiments\nwhich indicate that young children have an accurate perception of\ndifferences in length, but that their perception of number is very\nlimited. (Paris: F. Alcan.)\n\n\nREVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. No. 176. August 1890.\n\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n LES ORIGINES DE LA TECHNOLOGIE. By _A. Espinas_.\n\n L'INHIBITION DANS LES PH\u00c9NOMENES DE CONSCIENCE. By _A. Binet_.\n\n LA G\u00c9OM\u00c9TRIE G\u00c9N\u00c9RALE ET LES JUGEMENTS SYNTH\u00c9TIQUES A PRIORI. By\n _G. Lechalas_.\n\n ANALYSES ET COMPTES RENDUS.\n\n REVUE DES PERIODIQUES RUSSES.\n\n CORRESPONDANCE: \"Les Manuscrits de M. de Biran.\"\n\nIn _Les Origines de la Technologie_ M. Espinas aims at giving a\nhistory of philosophy in action. The present paper is devoted to\nphysico-theological technology, and concludes with the observation\nthat it was undoubtedly a progress to conceive the technical arts as\na whole, as a divine gift in like manner as the fruits of the earth\nand the beneficent phenomena of _nature_, since this conception by\nopposition gave rise to the idea of _art_, that is of human initiative\nacting differently according to diversity of circumstances.\n\nIn _L'Inhibition dans les Ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes de Conscience_ M. Alfred Binet\nexplains certain phenomena by showing that under various circumstances\ncertain images and sensations cannot coexist with others in the same\nfield of consciousness; the presence of one excludes that of another.\nAntagonism and exclusion are the two simple facts which explain the\nphenomena in question.\n\n_La G\u00e9om\u00e9trie G\u00e9n\u00e9rale et les Jugements Synth\u00e9tiques a priori_ is a\nreply by M. G. Lechalas to an article by M. Renouvier in the _Critique\nPhilosophique_ criticising M. Calinon's theory of geometrical spaces\nembodied in the system of \"general geometry.\" While showing that spaces\nwith three dimensions are rationally included in a space with four\ndimensions, M. Lechalas recognises the impossibility of establishing\nsuch a geometry, seeing that we have no figure that answers to what a\nfour-dimensional space would be, as well as the purely formal character\nof the presentations of non-Euclidian figures. (Paris: F. Alcan.)\n\n\nZEITSCHRIFT F\u00dcR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE. Vol. I,\nNo. 2.\n\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n UEBER DIE WAHRNEHMUNG UND LOKALISATION VON SCHWEBUNGEN UND\n DIFFERENZT\u00d6NEN. By _Carl L. Schaefer_.\n\n DIE ASSOCIATION SUCCESSIVER VORSTELLUNGEN. By _H. M\u00fcnsterberg_.\n\n BRIEFE VON G. TH. FECHNER: UEBER NEGATIVE EMPFINDUNGSWERTE.\n (Concluded.) Edited by _W. Preyer_.\n\n LITERATUR-BERICHT.\n\nThe results of Mr. Schaefer's researches are that for the localisation\nof the vibrations of two tones, in the case of their unequal relative\nintensity, the direction and distance of the relatively louder tone are\ndeterminate. If the relative intensity of the primary tones is equal,\nthe vibrations are heard to proceed from the region between the two\nsounding points. Differential tones are heard between the ears, when\nthe sounding sources are in the median plane; but when both primary\ntones come from the same side, in or immediately before the ear on that\nside; and in case of unequal intensity, when both come from different\nsides, on the side of the softer sound.\n\nProf. M\u00fcnsterberg concludes that there is no _successive_ association\nof ideas; when successively appearing, they are received singly into\nthe memory.\n\nThe letters of Fechner are continued from No. 1.\n\n\nZEITSCHRIFT F\u00dcR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE. Vol. I,\nNo. 3.\n\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n UEBER DIE KLEINSTEN WAHRNEHMBAREN GESICHTSWINKEL IN DEN\n VERSCHIEDENEN TEILEN DES SPEKTRUMS. By _W. Uhthoff_.\n\n DIE \u00c6STHETISCHEN GEFUEHLE. By _A. D\u00f6ring_.\n\n BESPRECHUNGEN: (1) A. Mosso's und A. Maggiora's \"Ueber die\n Gesetze der Erm\u00fcdung.\" (2) M\u00fcnsterberg's \"Beitraege zur\n Experimentellen Psychologie.\"\n\n LITERATUR-BERICHT.\n\nDr. Uhthoff, in order to determine the least visual angle of\nperception, has employed a grating in a pure-monochromatic spectral\nfield. His results were that the angles in the different parts of the\nspectrum are essentially equal.\n\n\u00c6sthetic emotions, Mr. D\u00f6ring contends, proceed from the unhindered\nplay of the functions of psychical faculties; their contrary, from the\ninhibition of the same.\n\nThis periodical is edited by H. Ebbinghaus and A. K\u00f6nig, with H.\nAubert, S. Exner, H. v. Helmholtz, E. Hering, J. v. Kries, Th.\nLipps, G. E. M\u00fcller, W. Preyer, and C. Stumpf as collaborators. It\nappears every two months. The review of the literature of its special\ndepartment of research is very comprehensive. (Hamburg and Leipsic: L.\nVoss.)\n\n\nLA NUOVA FILOSOFIA.\n\n RAGIONI E IDEALI. By _La Direzione_.\n\n LA SENSAZIONE E LA SUA CONOSCIBILITA. By _R. Ardigo_.\n\n J. E. ALAUX'S LE PROBLEME RELIGIEUX AU XIX^e SI\u00c8CLE. By _A.\n Torre_.\n\n ECONOMIA SCIENTIFICA ED ECONOMIA UTOPISTA. By _A. Loria_.\n\n P. LEROY-BEAULIEU'S L'ETAT MODERNE ET SES FONCTIONS. By _F. S.\n Nitti_.\n\n C. JANNET'S LE SOCIALISME D'ETAT ET LA REFORME SOCIALE. By _F. S.\n Nitti_.\n\n LOMBROSO'S AND LASCHI'S IL DELITTO POLITICO E LE RIVOLUZIONI. By\n _G. Fioretti_.\n\n CRITICA LETTERARIA.\n\n A. Angiulli\u2014A. Saffi\u2014F. Petruccelli della Gattina. (MEMORIE.)\n By _A. Torre_.\n\n LA POLITICA.\n\n QUESTIONI E PROBLEMI. La responsabilit\u00e0 filosofica, secondo\n _Paolo Janet_.\n\nThis is the first number of _La Nuova Filosofia_ which is established,\nunder the editorship of Dr. Andrea Torre, to diffuse in Europe\nand America the best results of contemporary culture, in relation\nespecially to the life and development of society. (Naples: Dr. Andrea\nTorre, Vico Lungo Avvocata, 66.)\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX.\n\n\nCut exhibiting modifications that affect the accessory nucleus.\nReferred to on page 26 of this number of _The Monist_, in M. Binet's\narticle \"The Immortality of Infusoria.\"\n\n[Illustration: CONJUGATION OF CHILODON CUCULLULUS.]\n\n_A_, beginning of conjugation; _b_, mouth; _n_, nucleus; _nu_,\nnucleolus; _v. c._, multiple contracticle vesicles.\n\n_B_, division of the nucleolus into two segments, _nu'_, _nu'_; the\nnucleus _n_ begins to show signs of regression.\n\n_C_, each of the two individuals in conjugation contains two nucleolar\nsegments, brought near together, of which one probably comes from the\nindividual opposite by course of exchange, and will fuse with the\nsegment not exchanged, to form a compound segment (Maupas).\n\n_D_, division of the segment into two portions which grow to unequal\nsizes; the larger, _nn_, will become the new nucleus, the smaller, the\nnucleolus of the new formation, _nun_.\n\n_E_, the old nucleus, _n_, reduced to a small pale and rumpled mass,\nis replaced by the new nucleus _nn_, near by which is seen the new\nnucleolus _nun_.\n\n\n\n\n VOL. I. JANUARY, 1891. NO. 2.\n\n\n\n\nTHE MONIST.\n\n\n\n\nTHE ARCHITECTURE OF THEORIES.\n\n\nOf the fifty or hundred systems of philosophy that have been advanced\nat different times of the world's history, perhaps the larger number\nhave been, not so much results of historical evolution, as happy\nthoughts which have accidently occurred to their authors. An idea which\nhas been found interesting and fruitful has been adopted, developed,\nand forced to yield explanations of all sorts of phenomena. The English\nhave been particularly given to this way of philosophising; witness,\nHobbes, Hartley, Berkeley, James Mill. Nor has it been by any means\nuseless labor; it shows us what the true nature and value of the\nideas developed are, and in that way affords serviceable materials\nfor philosophy. Just as if a man, being seized with the conviction\nthat paper was a good material to make things of, were to go to\nwork to build a _papier m\u00e2ch\u00e9_ house, with roof of roofing-paper,\nfoundations of paste-board, windows of paraffined paper, chimneys, bath\ntubs, locks, etc., all of different forms of paper, his experiment\nwould probably afford valuable lessons to builders, while it would\ncertainly make a detestable house, so those one-idea'd philosophies are\nexceedingly interesting and instructive, and yet are quite unsound.\n\nThe remaining systems of philosophy have been of the nature of reforms,\nsometimes amounting to radical revolutions, suggested by certain\ndifficulties which have been found to beset systems previously in\nvogue; and such ought certainly to be in large part the motive of any\nnew theory. This is like partially rebuilding a house. The faults that\nhave been committed are, first, that the dilapidations have generally\nnot been sufficiently thoroughgoing, and second, that not sufficient\npains has been taken to bring the additions into deep harmony with the\nreally sound parts of the old structure.\n\nWhen a man is about to build a house, what a power of thinking he has\nto do, before he can safely break ground! With what pains he has to\nexcogitate the precise wants that are to be supplied! What a study to\nascertain the most available and suitable materials, to determine the\nmode of construction to which those materials are best adapted, and\nto answer a hundred such questions! Now without riding the metaphor\ntoo far, I think we may safely say that the studies preliminary to\nthe construction of a great theory should be at least as deliberate\nand thorough as those that are preliminary to the building of a\ndwelling-house.\n\nThat systems ought to be constructed architectonically has been\npreached since Kant, but I do not think the full import of the maxim\nhas by any means been apprehended. What I would recommend is that every\nperson who wishes to form an opinion concerning fundamental problems,\nshould first of all make a complete survey of human knowledge, should\ntake note of all the valuable ideas in each branch of science, should\nobserve in just what respect each has been successful and where it has\nfailed, in order that in the light of the thorough acquaintance so\nattained of the available materials for a philosophical theory and of\nthe nature and strength of each, he may proceed to the study of what\nthe problem of philosophy consists in, and of the proper way of solving\nit. I must not be understood as endeavoring to state fully all that\nthese preparatory studies should embrace; on the contrary, I purposely\nslur over many points, in order to give emphasis to one special\nrecommendation, namely, to make a systematic study of the conceptions\nout of which a philosophical theory may be built, in order to ascertain\nwhat place each conception may fitly occupy in such a theory, and to\nwhat uses it is adapted.\n\nThe adequate treatment of this single point would fill a volume, but I\nshall endeavor to illustrate my meaning by glancing at several sciences\nand indicating conceptions in them serviceable for philosophy. As to\nthe results to which long studies thus commenced have led me, I shall\njust give a hint at their nature.\n\nWe may begin with dynamics,\u2014field in our day of perhaps the\ngrandest conquest human science has ever made,\u2014I mean the law of\nthe conservation of energy. But let us revert to the first step\ntaken by modern scientific thought,\u2014and a great stride it was,\u2014the\ninauguration of dynamics by Galileo. A modern physicist on examining\nGalileo's works is surprised to find how little experiment had to do\nwith the establishment of the foundations of mechanics. His principal\nappeal is to common sense and _il lume naturale_. He always assumes\nthat the true theory will be found to be a simple and natural one. And\nwe can see why it should indeed be so in dynamics. For instance, a body\nleft to its own inertia, moves in a straight line, and a straight line\nappears to us the simplest of curves. In _itself_, no curve is simpler\nthan another. A system of straight lines has intersections precisely\ncorresponding to those of a system of like parabolas similarly placed,\nor to those of any one of an infinity of systems of curves. But the\nstraight line appears to us simple, because, as Euclid says, it lies\nevenly between its extremities; that is, because viewed endwise it\nappears as a point. That is, again, because light moves in straight\nlines. Now, light moves in straight lines because of the part which the\nstraight line plays in the laws of dynamics. Thus it is that our minds\nhaving been formed under the influence of phenomena governed by the\nlaws of mechanics, certain conceptions entering into those laws become\nimplanted in our minds, so that we readily guess at what the laws are.\nWithout such a natural prompting, having to search blindfold for a law\nwhich would suit the phenomena, our chance of finding it would be as\none to infinity. The further physical studies depart from phenomena\nwhich have directly influenced the growth of the mind, the less we can\nexpect to find the laws which govern them \"simple,\" that is, composed\nof a few conceptions natural to our minds.\n\nThe researches of Galileo, followed up by Huygens and others,\nled to those modern conceptions of _Force_ and _Law_, which have\nrevolutionised the intellectual world. The great attention given\nto mechanics in the seventeenth century soon so emphasised these\nconceptions as to give rise to the Mechanical Philosophy, or doctrine\nthat all the phenomena of the physical universe are to be explained\nupon mechanical principles. Newton's great discovery imparted a new\nimpetus to this tendency. The old notion that heat consists in an\nagitation of corpuscles was now applied to the explanation of the\nchief properties of gases. The first suggestion in this direction\nwas that the pressure of gases is explained by the battering of the\nparticles against the walls of the containing vessel, which explained\nBoyle's law of the compressibility of air. Later, the expansion of\ngases, Avogadro's chemical law, the diffusion and viscosity of gases,\nand the action of Crookes's radiometer were shown to be consequences\nof the same kinetical theory; but other phenomena, such as the ratio\nof the specific heat at constant volume to that at constant pressure\nrequire additional hypotheses, which we have little reason to suppose\nare simple, so that we find ourselves quite afloat. In like manner\nwith regard to light, that it consists of vibrations was almost proved\nby the phenomena of diffraction, while those of polarisation showed\nthe excursions of the particles to be perpendicular to the line of\npropagation; but the phenomena of dispersion, etc., require additional\nhypotheses which may be very complicated. Thus, the further progress of\nmolecular speculation appears quite uncertain. If hypotheses are to be\ntried haphazard, or simply because they will suit certain phenomena, it\nwill occupy the mathematical physicists of the world say half a century\non the average to bring each theory to the test, and since the number\nof possible theories may go up into the trillions, only one of which\ncan be true, we have little prospect of making further solid additions\nto the subject in our time. When we come to atoms, the presumption in\nfavor of a simple law seems very slender. There is room for serious\ndoubt whether the fundamental laws of mechanics hold good for single\natoms, and it seems quite likely that they are capable of motion in\nmore than three dimensions.\n\nTo find out much more about molecules and atoms, we must search out a\nnatural history of laws of nature, which may fulfil that function which\nthe presumption in favor of simple laws fulfilled in the early days\nof dynamics, by showing us what kind of laws we have to expect and by\nanswering such questions as this: Can we with reasonable prospect of\nnot wasting time, try the supposition that atoms attract one another\ninversely as the seventh power of their distances, or can we not? To\nsuppose universal laws of nature capable of being apprehended by the\nmind and yet having no reason for their special forms, but standing\ninexplicable and irrational, is hardly a justifiable position.\nUniformities are precisely the sort of facts that need to be accounted\nfor. That a pitched coin should sometimes turn up heads and sometimes\ntails calls for no particular explanation; but if it shows heads every\ntime, we wish to know how this result has been brought about. Law is\n_par excellence_ the thing that wants a reason.\n\nNow the only possible way of accounting for the laws of nature and for\nuniformity in general is to suppose them results of evolution. This\nsupposes them not to be absolute, not to be obeyed precisely. It makes\nan element of indeterminacy, spontaneity, or absolute chance in nature.\nJust as, when we attempt to verify any physical law, we find our\nobservations cannot be precisely satisfied by it, and rightly attribute\nthe discrepancy to errors of observation, so we must suppose far more\nminute discrepancies to exist owing to the imperfect cogency of the law\nitself, to a certain swerving of the facts from any definite formula.\n\nMr. Herbert Spencer wishes to explain evolution upon mechanical\nprinciples. This is illogical, for four reasons. First, because\nthe principle of evolution requires no extraneous cause; since the\ntendency to growth can be supposed itself to have grown from an\ninfinitesimal germ accidentally started. Second, because law ought\nmore than anything else to be supposed a result of evolution. Third,\nbecause exact law obviously never can produce heterogeneity out\nof homogeneity; and arbitrary heterogeneity is the feature of the\nuniverse the most manifest and characteristic. Fourth, because the law\nof the conservation of energy is equivalent to the proposition that\nall operations governed by mechanical laws are reversible; so that\nan immediate corollary from it is that growth is not explicable by\nthose laws, even if they be not violated in the process of growth.\nIn short, Spencer is not a philosophical evolutionist, but only a\nhalf-evolutionist,\u2014or, if you will, only a semi-Spencerian. Now\nphilosophy requires thoroughgoing evolutionism or none.\n\nThe theory of Darwin was that evolution had been brought about by the\naction of two factors: first, heredity, as a principle making offspring\nnearly resemble their parents, while yet giving room for \"sporting,\"\nor accidental variations,\u2014for very slight variations often, for wider\nones rarely; and, second, the destruction of breeds or races that are\nunable to keep the birth rate up to the death rate. This Darwinian\nprinciple is plainly capable of great generalisation. Wherever there\nare large numbers of objects, having a tendency to retain certain\ncharacters unaltered, this tendency, however, not being absolute but\ngiving room for chance variations, then, if the amount of variation\nis absolutely limited in certain directions by the destruction of\neverything which reaches those limits, there will be a gradual tendency\nto change in directions of departure from them. Thus, if a million\nplayers sit down to bet at an even game, since one after another will\nget ruined, the average wealth of those who remain will perpetually\nincrease. Here is indubitably a genuine formula of possible evolution,\nwhether its operation accounts for much or little in the development of\nanimal and vegetable species.\n\nThe Lamarckian theory also supposes that the development of species\nhas taken place by a long series of insensible changes, but it\nsupposes that those changes have taken place during the lives of\nthe individuals, in consequence of effort and exercise, and that\nreproduction plays no part in the process except in preserving\nthese modifications. Thus, the Lamarckian theory only explains the\ndevelopment of characters for which individuals strive, while the\nDarwinian theory only explains the production of characters really\nbeneficial to the race, though these may be fatal to individuals.[33]\nBut more broadly and philosophically conceived, Darwinian evolution\nis evolution by the operation of chance, and the destruction of bad\nresults, while Lamarckian evolution is evolution by the effect of habit\nand effort.\n\n [33] The neo-Darwinian, Weismann, has shown that mortality\n would almost necessarily result from the action of the\n Darwinian principle.\n\nA third theory of evolution is that of Mr. Clarence King. The testimony\nof monuments and of rocks is that species are unmodified or scarcely\nmodified, under ordinary circumstances, but are rapidly altered after\ncataclysms or rapid geological changes. Under novel circumstances, we\noften see animals and plants sporting excessively in reproduction,\nand sometimes even undergoing transformations during individual life,\nphenomena no doubt due partly to the enfeeblement of vitality from the\nbreaking up of habitual modes of life, partly to changed food, partly\nto direct specific influence of the element in which the organism is\nimmersed. If evolution has been brought about in this way, not only\nhave its single steps not been insensible, as both Darwinians and\nLamarckians suppose, but they are furthermore neither haphazard on the\none hand, nor yet determined by an inward striving on the other, but\non the contrary are effects of the changed environment, and have a\npositive general tendency to adapt the organism to that environment,\nsince variation will particularly affect organs at once enfeebled and\nstimulated. This mode of evolution, by external forces and the breaking\nup of habits, seems to be called for by some of the broadest and most\nimportant facts of biology and paleontology; while it certainly has\nbeen the chief factor in the historical evolution of institutions as in\nthat of ideas; and cannot possibly be refused a very prominent place in\nthe process of evolution of the universe in general.\n\nPassing to psychology, we find the elementary phenomena of mind fall\ninto three categories. First, we have Feelings, comprising all that\nis immediately present, such as pain, blue, cheerfulness, the feeling\nthat arises when we contemplate a consistent theory, etc. A feeling\nis a state of mind having its own living quality, independent of any\nother state of mind. Or, a feeling is an element of consciousness which\nmight conceivably override every other state until it monopolised the\nmind, although such a rudimentary state cannot actually be realised,\nand would not properly be consciousness. Still, it is conceivable,\nor supposable, that the quality of blue should usurp the whole\nmind, to the exclusion of the ideas of shape, extension, contrast,\ncommencement and cessation, and all other ideas, whatsoever. A feeling\nis necessarily perfectly simple, _in itself_, for if it had parts these\nwould also be in the mind, whenever the whole was present, and thus the\nwhole could not monopolise the mind.[34]\n\n [34] A feeling may certainly be compound, but only in virtue\n of a perception which is not that feeling nor any feeling at\n all.\n\nBesides Feelings, we have Sensations of reaction; as when a person\nblindfold suddenly runs against a post, when we make a muscular\neffort, or when any feeling gives way to a new feeling. Suppose I had\nnothing in my mind but a feeling of blue, which were suddenly to give\nplace to a feeling of red; then, at the instant of transition there\nwould be a shock, a sense of reaction, my blue life being transmuted\ninto red life. If I were further endowed with a memory, that sense\nwould continue for some time, and there would also be a peculiar\nfeeling or sentiment connected with it. This last feeling might\nendure (conceivably I mean) after the memory of the occurrence and\nthe feelings of blue and red had passed away. But the _sensation_ of\nreaction cannot exist except in the actual presence of the two feelings\nblue and red to which it relates. Wherever we have two feelings and pay\nattention to a relation between them of whatever kind, there is the\nsensation of which I am speaking. But the sense of action and reaction\nhas two types: it may either be a perception of relation between two\nideas, or it may be a sense of action and reaction between feeling and\nsomething out of feeling. And this sense of external reaction again\nhas two forms; for it is either a sense of something happening to us,\nby no act of ours, we being passive in the matter, or it is a sense of\nresistance, that is, of our expending feeling upon something without.\nThe sense of reaction is thus a sense of connection or comparison\nbetween feelings, either, _A_, between one feeling and another, or _B_,\nbetween feeling and its absence or lower degree; and under _B_ we have,\nFirst, the sense of the access of feeling, and Second, the sense of\nremission of feeling.\n\nVery different both from feelings and from reaction-sensations or\ndisturbances of feeling are general conceptions. When we think, we are\nconscious that a connection between feelings is determined by a general\nrule, we are aware of being governed by a habit. Intellectual power is\nnothing but facility in taking habits and in following them in cases\nessentially analogous to, but in non-essentials widely remote from, the\nnormal cases of connections of feelings under which those habits were\nformed.\n\nThe one primary and fundamental law of mental action consists in a\ntendency to generalisation. Feeling tends to spread; connections\nbetween feelings awaken feelings; neighboring feelings become\nassimilated; ideas are apt to reproduce themselves. These are so many\nformulations of the one law of the growth of mind. When a disturbance\nof feeling takes place, we have a consciousness of gain, the gain of\nexperience; and a new disturbance will be apt to assimilate itself\nto the one that preceded it. Feelings, by being excited, become more\neasily excited, especially in the ways in which they have previously\nbeen excited. The consciousness of such a habit constitutes a general\nconception.\n\nThe cloudiness of psychological notions may be corrected by connecting\nthem with physiological conceptions. Feeling may be supposed to exist,\nwherever a nerve-cell is in an excited condition. The disturbance\nof feeling, or sense of reaction, accompanies the transmission of\ndisturbance between nerve-cells or from a nerve-cell to a muscle-cell\nor the external stimulation of a nerve-cell. General conceptions arise\nupon the formation of habits in the nerve-matter, which are molecular\nchanges consequent upon its activity and probably connected with its\nnutrition.\n\nThe law of habit exhibits a striking contrast to all physical laws\nin the character of its commands. A physical law is absolute. What\nit requires is an exact relation. Thus, a physical force introduces\ninto a motion a component motion to be combined with the rest by the\nparallelogram of forces; but the component motion must actually take\nplace exactly as required by the law of force. On the other hand, no\nexact conformity is required by the mental law. Nay, exact conformity\nwould be in downright conflict with the law; since it would instantly\ncrystallise thought and prevent all further formation of habit. The\nlaw of mind only makes a given feeling _more likely_ to arise. It thus\nresembles the \"non-conservative\" forces of physics, such as viscosity\nand the like, which are due to statistical uniformities in the chance\nencounters of trillions of molecules.\n\nThe old dualistic notion of mind and matter, so prominent in\nCartesianism, as two radically different kinds of substance, will\nhardly find defenders to-day. Rejecting this, we are driven to some\nform of hylopathy, otherwise called monism. Then the question arises\nwhether physical laws on the one hand, and the psychical law on the\nother are to be taken\u2014\n\n(_A_) as independent, a doctrine often called _monism_, but which I\nwould name _neutralism_; or,\n\n(_B_) the psychical law as derived and special, the physical law alone\nas primordial, which is _materialism_; or,\n\n(_C_) the physical law as derived and special, the psychical law alone\nas primordial, which is _idealism_.\n\nThe materialistic doctrine seems to me quite as repugnant to scientific\nlogic as to common sense; since it requires us to suppose that a\ncertain kind of mechanism will feel, which would be a hypothesis\nabsolutely irreducible to reason,\u2014an ultimate, inexplicable\nregularity; while the only possible justification of any theory is that\nit should make things clear and reasonable.\n\nNeutralism is sufficiently condemned by the logical maxim known as\nOckham's razor, i. e., that not more independent elements are to be\nsupposed than necessary. By placing the inward and outward aspects of\nsubstance on a par, it seems to render both primordial.\n\nThe one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective\nidealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming\nphysical laws. But before this can be accepted it must show itself\ncapable of explaining the tridimensionality of space, the laws\nof motion, and the general characteristics of the universe, with\nmathematical clearness and precision; for no less should be demanded of\nevery Philosophy.\n\nModern mathematics is replete with ideas which may be applied\nto philosophy. I can only notice one or two. The manner in which\nmathematicians generalise is very instructive. Thus, painters are\naccustomed to think of a picture as consisting geometrically of the\nintersections of its plane by rays of light from the natural objects\nto the eye. But geometers use a generalised perspective. For instance,\nin the figure let _O_ be the eye, let _A B C D E_ be the edgewise view\nof any plane, and let _a f e D c_ be the edgewise view of another\nplane. The geometers draw rays through _O_ cutting both these planes,\nand treat the points of intersection of each ray with one plane as\nrepresenting the point of intersection of the same ray with the other\nplane. Thus, _e_ represents _E_, in the painter's way. _D_ represents\nitself. _C_ is represented by _c_, which is further from the eye; and\n_A_ is represented by _a_ which is on the other side of the eye. Such\ngeneralisation is not bound down to sensuous images. Further, according\nto this mode of representation every point on one plane represents\na point on the other, and every point on the latter is represented\nby a point on the former. But how about the point _f_ which is in a\ndirection from _O_ parallel to the represented plane, and how about the\npoint _B_ which is in a direction parallel to the representing plane?\nSome will say that these are exceptions; but modern mathematics does\nnot allow exceptions which can be annulled by generalisation. As a\npoint moves from _C_ to _D_ and thence to _E_ and off toward infinity,\nthe corresponding point on the other plane moves from _c_ to _D_ and\nthence to _e_ and toward _f_. But this second point can pass through\n_f_ to _a_; and when it is there the first point has arrived at _A_. We\ntherefore say that the first point has passed _through infinity_, and\nthat every line joins in to itself somewhat like an oval. Geometers\ntalk of the parts of lines at an infinite distance as points. This is a\nkind of generalisation very efficient in mathematics.\n\n[Illustration]\n\nModern views of measurement have a philosophical aspect. There is\nan indefinite number of systems of measuring along a line; thus, a\nperspective representation of a scale on one line may be taken to\nmeasure another, although of course such measurements will not agree\nwith what we call the distances of points on the latter line. To\nestablish a system of measurement on a line we must assign a distinct\nnumber to each point of it, and for this purpose we shall plainly have\nto suppose the numbers carried out into an infinite number of places\nof decimals. These numbers must be ranged along the line in unbroken\nsequence. Further, in order that such a scale of numbers should be\nof any use, it must be capable of being shifted into new positions,\neach number continuing to be attached to a single distinct point.\nNow it is found that if this is true for \"imaginary\" as well as for\nreal points (an expression which I cannot stop to elucidate), any\nsuch shifting will necessarily leave two numbers attached to the same\npoints as before. So that when the scale is moved over the line by\nany continuous series of shiftings of one kind, there are two points\nwhich no numbers on the scale can ever reach, except the numbers fixed\nthere. This pair of points, thus unattainable in measurement, is called\nthe Absolute. These two points may be distinct and real, or they may\ncoincide, or they may be both imaginary. As an example of a linear\nquantity with a double absolute we may take probability, which ranges\nfrom an unattainable absolute certainty _against_ a proposition to an\nequally unattainable absolute certainty _for_ it. A line, according\nto ordinary notions, we have seen is a linear quantity where the two\npoints at infinity coincide. A velocity is another example. A train\ngoing with infinite velocity from Chicago to New York would be at all\nthe points on the line at the very same instant, and if the time of\ntransit were reduced to less than nothing it would be moving in the\nother direction. An angle is a familiar example of a mode of magnitude\nwith no real immeasurable values. One of the questions philosophy has\nto consider is whether the development of the universe is like the\nincrease of an angle, so that it proceeds forever without tending\ntoward anything unattained, which I take to be the Epicurean view, or\nwhether the universe sprang from a chaos in the infinitely distant\npast to tend toward something different in the infinitely distant\nfuture, or whether the universe sprang from nothing in the past to go\non indefinitely toward a point in the infinitely distant future, which,\nwere it attained, would be the mere nothing from which it set out.\n\nThe doctrine of the absolute applied to space comes to this, at either\u2014\n\nFirst, space is, as Euclid teaches, both _unlimited_ and\n_immeasurable_, so that the infinitely distant parts of any plane seen\nin perspective appear as a straight line, in which case the sum of the\nthree angles of a triangle amounts to 180\u00b0; or,\n\nSecond, space is _immeasurable_ but _limited_, so that the infinitely\ndistant parts of any plane seen in perspective appear as a circle,\nbeyond which all is blackness, and in this case the sum of the three\nangles of a triangle is less than 180\u00b0 by an amount proportional to the\narea of the triangle; or,\n\nThird, space is _unlimited_ but _finite_, (like the surface of a\nsphere,) so that it has no infinitely distant parts; but a finite\njourney along any straight line would bring one back to his original\nposition, and looking off with an unobstructed view one would see the\nback of his own head enormously magnified, in which case the sum of the\nthree angles of a triangle exceeds 180\u00b0 by an amount proportional to\nthe area.\n\nWhich of these three hypotheses is true we know not. The largest\ntriangles we can measure are such as have the earth's orbit for base,\nand the distance of a fixed star for altitude. The angular magnitude\nresulting from subtracting the sum of the two angles at the base\nof such a triangle from 180\u00b0 is called the star's _parallax_. The\nparallaxes of only about forty stars have been measured as yet. Two of\nthem come out negative, that of Arided (\u03b1 Cygni), a star of magnitude\n1-1/2, which is -0.\"082, according to C. A. F. Peters, and that of a\nstar of magnitude 7-3/4, known as Piazzi III 422, which is -0.\"045\naccording to R. S. Ball. But these negative parallaxes are undoubtedly\nto be attributed to errors of observation; for the probable error\nof such a determination is about \u00b10.\"075, and it would be strange\nindeed if we were to be able to see, as it were, more than half way\nround space, without being able to see stars with larger negative\nparallaxes. Indeed, the very fact that of all the parallaxes measured\nonly two come out negative would be a strong argument that the smallest\nparallaxes really amount to +0.\"1, were it not for the reflexion that\nthe publication of other negative parallaxes may have been suppressed.\nI think we may feel confident that the parallax of the furthest star\nlies somewhere between -0.\"05 and +0.\"15, and within another century\nour grandchildren will surely know whether the three angles of a\ntriangle are greater or less than 180\u00b0,\u2014that they are _exactly_ that\namount is what nobody ever can be justified in concluding. It is true\nthat according to the axioms of geometry the sum of the three sides\nof a triangle are precisely 180\u00b0; but these axioms are now exploded,\nand geometers confess that they, as geometers, know not the slightest\nreason for supposing them to be precisely true. They are expressions of\nour inborn conception of space, and as such are entitled to credit, so\nfar as their truth could have influenced the formation of the mind. But\nthat affords not the slightest reason for supposing them exact.\n\nNow, metaphysics has always been the ape of mathematics. Geometry\nsuggested the idea of a demonstrative system of absolutely certain\nphilosophical principles; and the ideas of the metaphysicians have at\nall times been in large part drawn from mathematics. The metaphysical\naxioms are imitations of the geometrical axioms; and now that the\nlatter have been thrown overboard, without doubt the former will be\nsent after them. It is evident, for instance, that we can have no\nreason to think that every phenomenon in all its minutest details is\nprecisely determined by law. That there is an arbitrary element in the\nuniverse we see,\u2014namely, its variety. This variety must be attributed\nto spontaneity in some form.\n\nHad I more space, I now ought to show how important for philosophy is\nthe mathematical conception of continuity. Most of what is true in\nHegel is a darkling glimmer of a conception which the mathematicians\nhad long before made pretty clear, and which recent researches have\nstill further illustrated.\n\nAmong the many principles of Logic which find their application\nin Philosophy, I can here only mention one. Three conceptions are\nperpetually turning up at every point in every theory of logic, and in\nthe most rounded systems they occur in connection with one another.\nThey are conceptions so very broad and consequently indefinite that\nthey are hard to seize and may be easily overlooked. I call them the\nconceptions of First, Second, Third. First is the conception of being\nor existing independent of anything else. Second is the conception of\nbeing relative to, the conception of reaction with, something else.\nThird is the conception of mediation, whereby a first and second are\nbrought into relation. To illustrate these ideas, I will show how\nthey enter into those we have been considering. The origin of things,\nconsidered not as leading to anything, but in itself, contains the\nidea of First, the end of things that of Second, the process mediating\nbetween them that of Third. A philosophy which emphasises the idea of\nthe One, is generally a dualistic philosophy in which the conception of\nSecond receives exaggerated attention; for this One (though of course\ninvolving the idea of First) is always the other of a manifold which\nis not one. The idea of the Many, because variety is arbitrariness and\narbitrariness is repudiation of any Secondness, has for its principal\ncomponent the conception of First. In psychology Feeling is First,\nSense of reaction Second, General conception Third, or mediation. In\nbiology, the idea of arbitrary sporting is First, heredity is Second,\nthe process whereby the accidental characters become fixed is Third.\nChance is First, Law is Second, the tendency to take habits is Third.\nMind is First, Matter is Second, Evolution is Third.\n\nSuch are the materials out of which chiefly a philosophical theory\nought to be built, in order to represent the state of knowledge to\nwhich the nineteenth century has brought us. Without going into other\nimportant questions of philosophical architectonic, we can readily\nforesee what sort of a metaphysics would appropriately be constructed\nfrom those conceptions. Like some of the most ancient and some of the\nmost recent speculations it would be a Cosmogonic Philosophy. It\nwould suppose that in the beginning,\u2014infinitely remote,\u2014there was\na chaos of unpersonalised feeling, which being without connection or\nregularity would properly be without existence. This feeling, sporting\nhere and there in pure arbitrariness, would have started the germ of\na generalising tendency. Its other sportings would be evanescent, but\nthis would have a growing virtue. Thus, the tendency to habit would be\nstarted; and from this with the other principles of evolution all the\nregularities of the universe would be evolved. At any time, however, an\nelement of pure chance survives and will remain until the world becomes\nan absolutely perfect, rational, and symmetrical system, in which mind\nis at last crystallised in the infinitely distant future.\n\nThat idea has been worked out by me with elaboration. It accounts for\nthe main features of the universe as we know it,\u2014the characters of\ntime, space, matter, force, gravitation, electricity, etc. It predicts\nmany more things which new observations can alone bring to the test.\nMay some future student go over this ground again, and have the leisure\nto give his results to the world.\n\n CHARLES S. PEIRCE.\n\n\n\n\nILLUSTRATIVE STUDIES IN CRIMINAL ANTHROPOLOGY.\n\n\nI.\n\n\"LA B\u00caTE HUMAINE\" AND CRIMINAL ANTHROPOLOGY.\n\nIf I had to be the judge of M. Zola I could be only a very partial\njudge. To me the books of Zola are, with those of Dostoyewski and\nTolsto\u00ef, the only ones which have struck a fresh tone in the literary\nmonotony of this quarter of a century, in which it is said the\npolitical levelling and the general abasement of character extend\neven to the republic of letters. Thus I am partial to Zola, for, as\nthe chief of a school which pushes the science of psychiatry far into\nthe field of psychology and of sociology, I find in Zola an ally\nthe more valuable that he has not been sought and that he reigns in\na very different empire. To the scientific charlatans who deny, as\ndoes M. Colajanni, the importance and the gravity of alcoholism, its\nassociations with crime and degeneracy, \"L'Assommoir\" is perhaps the\nbest of refutations. \"Germinal\" and \"La Fortune des Rougon\" give us the\ndemonstration of that cruelty which is born for the crowd and in the\ncrowd, and both prove the influence that criminals and lunatics have\nin rebellions. Zola is the only one of the Latin race who endeavors to\nintroduce the scientific method into literary work.\n\nHis romances are modern histories which are founded upon living data,\nas histories in general are on dead data. And in history he knows also\nhow to employ soberness, by contenting himself with a very simple\nsketch, disdaining the vulgar tricks which are as easy to invent as\nthey are far from the truth.\n\nI ought to be still more partial to \"La B\u00eate Humaine\"; for, with a\ngenerosity not very frequent in men of letters, M. Zola avows that he\nhad recourse to my \"Homme Criminel\" and my \"Homme de G\u00e9nie\" for the\nmaterial for his romance. Nevertheless, I cannot forbear mixing some\ncriticism with the praises merited by this work, for I do not find\nsatisfied by it that which I regard more than my personal vanity: my\nlove of truth. In \"La B\u00eate Humaine\" all those artifices which the\nromanticists had accustomed us to, and from which Zola was freed,\nreappear, and that alas too often!\n\nIn the first place, it is a sufficiently strange fatality that the same\nknife that was given as a mark of conjugal love should be by turns the\ninstrument of every murder committed, and that all the assassinations,\nderailments, and suicides invariably occur at the Croix-de-Maufras,\nwhere the first lewd practices of the President Grandmorin took place.\nThat a great number of criminals should be congregated in the small\nenclosure of a second-rate railway station and of its approaches, is in\nitself a strange fact, but it is still more strange that every crime\nalways derives its character from that accursed place which already\nbears a fateful and dismal name. This is contrary to the laws of\nprobability; for we know by statistics that the number of criminals, as\nwell as of crimes, is always the same for a certain number of people,\nor a certain number of square miles, or years, and cannot be massed\nand restricted to a small space of ground, to so few individuals,\nand so short a time. This is an atavistic reversion, or, we might\nsay, a return to the old ways of romance, in which fatal events\nalways followed each other in certain fatal localities, or through\nparticular men and by certain fated weapons, etc. In \"La Fortune des\nRougon,\" also, there is a certain musket which serves for the murder\nof gendarmes by a grandfather and his nephew, and of the nephew by\ngendarmes; as if the cause of the fatality was not the hereditary\ninstinct, but this silent and unconscious instrument.\n\nHowever, the greatest fault is not here; but rather in the delineation\nof character. Zola, who, in my opinion, has admirably depicted people\npoisoned by alcohol, and the common middle classes of the towns and\nof the country, has not studied criminals according to nature:\nundoubtedly because the latter are not so easily met with; nor allow\nthemselves to be studied even in prisons. Zola's figures of criminals\ngive me the false pictorial effect produced by certain photographs\ntaken from portraits, and not from the living subjects. For this\nreason it is then that I, who have studied thousands and thousands\nof criminals, should not know how to class his Roubaud, a good clerk\nand a good husband, who on accidentally discovering the secret of\nthe old amours of his wife with Grandmorin, which were not yet done\nwith, throws himself upon her, wishes to kill her, finally changes\nhis mind, and ends by deciding on the murder of the pseudo-adulterer,\nwith the complicity of his wife. Can he be called a criminal through\npassion? But then it is _she_ that he should have killed, or at least\nthe adulterer being killed he should have repented of it. And again,\ncriminals through passion are, like Roubaud, very good and respectable\npeople, but in their crimes they rush blindly and headlong forward,\nwithout accomplices, without premeditation, and without artifices.\nAnd they repent, they confess: they are the only criminals who feel\nremorse. He has no remorse; for some time he leads a life of revenge,\nand, afterwards, suddenly, he gives himself up to vice, to wine, to\ngambling, and forgets his wife, and he is jealous of her no more; on\nthe contrary, indifferent, he assists in her infidelities. Can he be\ncalled a born criminal, a _b\u00eate_? But then how explain that he had\nlived so long without vices, free from debauchery, and that he had been\nso good a clerk? He could still be a criminal incidentally; but for a\ncorrect, steady, quiet man, as a railway official ought to be, would\nthe discovery of the old amour of his wife be a proportionate reason\nfor him to commit a premeditated murder, the greatest of crimes? And\nthen, as we shall see, criminaloids are born criminals in part; they\nhave many of the latters' psychological and physical characteristics.\nNow Roubaud has a full beard, red hair, and quick eyes: the only\nanomalies are meeting eyebrows, a low forehead, and a flat head:\nnothing is said of hysterical or epileptical ancestors.\n\nAccording to Henry H\u00e9ricourt (_Revue Bleue_, p. 14), M. Zola was\ninspired by a recent trial, that of the apothecary Fenayron, who\nis said to have had much resemblance to Roubaud. Marin Fenayron,\nthe apothecary, was a man of forty-one, intelligent, steady, and\nindustrious. He had married, twelve years before, the youngest daughter\nof his old employer, whom he had succeeded. His wife, who was eighteen\nyears old at the time of her marriage, and who had consented to the\nunion only with repugnance, was not slow to deceive him, and soon\nformed an intimacy with his assistant. This triangular relation lasted\na time, not precisely stated by the proceedings, but sufficiently\nlong for Gabrielle Fenayron, tired of her first lover, to take the\nopportunity to replace him by several others. The husband, who during\nthis time has become a gambler and idle fellow, is informed of the\nmisconduct of his wife. Although he did not put much credit in this at\nfirst, yet in the quarrels which followed and were continually renewed\nhe ended by abusing her, striking her, and menacing her with death: and\nat last he obtained from her the confession of her relations with his\nold assistant Aubert, then himself established as a chemist. According\nto her recital, the woman could obtain the pardon of her husband only\nby the promise that she would assist him in his plans of revenge,\nand she had consented through shame without protesting. Then, by the\norder of her husband, she writes several letters to her old lover,\nrenews relations with him, and finally, under the pretext of a country\nexcursion, draws him into an ambush where she aided her husband in\nkilling him with a hammer. It will be remembered that Aubert, after\nthe first blow, turned round, recognised his murderer, and prepared to\ndefend himself: but his mistress threw herself on him, twined her arms\nabout him, and the husband could thus finish his work in safety.\n\nAfter the crime there was no remorse on the part of either the one\nor the other. Far to the contrary. The criminal pair delivered\nthemselves anew to their accustomed distractions with the most perfect\ntranquillity, and the performance appeared without doubt very natural\nto Fenayron, for one day, meeting his mother-in-law, he accosted her,\nsaying, \"Well, Mother, it is done. I have killed Aubert.\"\n\nBut let it be remarked how this Marin Fenayron, who figures as an\noccasional criminal, this time reveals himself a criminal by habit,\nmeditating and premeditating his vengeance, waiting two long months\nbefore putting it into execution, surrounding himself with every\nprecaution to secure immunity for the crime. Such a one certainly is\nnot the violent man whom passion blinds and who is instantaneously\ninflamed with anger. It is rather the degenerated man with whom\npredisposition has found the opportunity to reveal and to develop\nitself. It is necessary to add that Marin had a brother feeble in mind:\nan hereditary defect.\n\nThe true _b\u00eate humaine_, Jacques Lantier, possesses the anatomical\ncharacters of the born criminal; \"his thick black locks were curled,\nlike his moustaches, so heavy and dark that they increased greatly\nthe natural paleness of his complexion.\" Moreover, the inclination to\ncrime in him was justified by inheritance. And this passion for murder\nwhich supplants the sensual passion is truly intoxicating. Where the\nauthor has gone astray is where he makes Jacques find pleasure for a\nconsiderable time with S\u00e9verine without any thought of murder; while\nthese unfortunates, at least all that I have studied, do not experience\nsexual pleasure except in murder. On the other hand, the vertigo of\nepileptic amnesia which Zola often causes Jacques to suffer, is based\non fact and actually accords with the most recent observations:\n\n \"He had finally found himself on the brink of the Seine\n without being able to explain to himself how. That of which he\n retained a very clear impression, was of having thrown from\n the top of the bank the knife that his hand held clutched in\n his pocket. Then he knew no more, stupefied and absent of\n mind, out of which the other, and the knife too, had entirely\n vanished.... He was in his narrow chamber in the Rue Cardinet,\n fallen across his bed, fully dressed. Instinct had brought him\n back there, as a worn out dog crawls to his kennel. Besides\n he remembered neither having ascended the stairs, nor of\n having slept. He awoke from a heavy sleep, scared to re-enter\n abruptly into possession of himself, as after a profound\n fainting fit. Perhaps he had slept three hours, perhaps three\n days.\"\n\nNever have I found a more perfect description of that which I have\ntermed criminal, epileptoid vertigo. But here again is a mistake of\nfact arising from a velleity not content with knowledge. It is that the\nnovelist several times explains these bloodthirsty sexual instincts by\na peculiar kind of atavism: the tendency, namely, to avenge the evil\nthat women had done to his race; the spite accumulated from male to\nmale since the first deceit in the depths of caverns. This is an error\nof fact. Primitive women have never done wrong to men. More feeble than\nmen, they have always been their victims. These bloodthirsty sexual\ninstincts are explained by a quite different atavism, which goes back\nto inferior animals, to the conflict between the males for the conquest\nof the female, who remained for the strongest; and by the blows\nthat were inflicted on the woman in order to reduce her to conjugal\nslavery, conflicts of which traces still remain in Roman history (the\nRape of the Sabines), and in the nuptial rites of almost all European\ncountries, and in those of New Zealand, where the husband knocks down\nhis wife before carrying her off to the matrimonial bed.\n\nAnother technical defect is, that a man who has arrived at the degree\nof degeneracy that Jacques has, ought to have still other vices: as\ngreat violence of character, impulsiveness without cause, profound\nimmorality; while, as a matter of fact, except in moments of sexual\nfury, he appears as a good and honorable man. However, even recognising\nthe force of his bloody sexual monomania, I find that instinctive\naversion, characteristic of the good man, to be proper which Jacques\nfeels at the thought of killing some one who is not a young and\nbeautiful woman; for instance, to killing his rival, notwithstanding\nthe favorable circumstances and the suggestions of S\u00e9verine.\n\n \"To kill that man, my God! Had he the right to do it? When a\n fly troubled him he would crush it with a blow. One day when\n a cat had got between his legs, he had broken its back with\n a kick. But to kill this man, his fellow-creature! He must\n reason with himself, he must prove his right to murder; the\n right of the strong whom the weak are troublesome to.... But\n afterwards that appeared to him monstrous, impracticable,\n impossible. The civilised man revolted in him, the acquired\n force of education, the slow and indestructible concretion of\n inherited ideas. His cultivated brain, filled with scruples,\n repelled murder with horror, as soon as he began to reason\n about it. Yes, to kill in a case of necessity, in a transport\n of rage! But to kill voluntarily by design, and from interest,\n no never, never could he do it!\"\n\nAll that is very true. Where the author has certainly copied after\nnature is in the personality of S\u00e9verine. She is not a true criminal;\nsensual, depraved though still young, experiencing love only in\nadultery. Though deceitful, she is nevertheless a good wife and a good\nhousekeeper up to the day where chance had thrown her into evil doing.\nShe is united to her husband, and for that reason she becomes his\naccomplice in crime, without horror or dread; but afterwards, seized\nwith love for Jacques, she experiences dislike for her husband and\nwishes to turn the lover into his murderer.\n\n \"The need increased in her of having Jacques for herself,\n all for herself, to live together, days and nights, without\n ever more parting. Her hatred of her husband grew greater,\n the mere presence of this man threw her into a morbid and\n intolerable condition of excitement. Tractable, and with all\n the amiability of a delicate woman, she became enraged at\n everything in which he was concerned; she flew into a passion\n at the least obstacle he put to her wishes.... The stupid\n tranquillity in which she saw him, the indifferent glance\n and manner with which he received her anger, his round back,\n his enlarged stomach, all that greasy dullness which has the\n appearance of happiness, made her exasperation complete. Oh!\n to go far away from him.... One day when he returned, pale and\n livid, to say that in passing before a locomotive he had felt\n the buffer graze his elbow, she thought to herself that if\n he were dead she would be free.... She would go with Jacques\n to America.... She who at other times so rarely went out now\n conceived a passion for going to see the steamships sail. She\n would go to the pier, and would lean on her elbow watching\n the smoke of the departing vessels.... [And at the decisive\n moment] she threw herself passionately on Jacques's neck.\n She fastened her burning lips to his. How she loved him and\n how she hated the other! Oh! if she had dared, twenty times\n already would she have done the deed ... but she felt herself\n too gentle, it required the hand of a man. And this kiss which\n would never come to an end, was all that she could communicate\n to him of her courage, the full possession that she promised\n him, the communion of her body. When she finally withdrew her\n lips nothing more was left to her; she believed that she had\n passed completely into him.\"\n\nAnd is this, then, the woman criminal, the criminaloid, as I have\ncalled her (Vol. II of my \"Uomo Delinquente\")? A criminal who, when\nshe is not urged onward by opportunities, (and these opportunities\nalways have love for their origin,) is not capable of any true crime,\nand who when she commits it always makes use of the arm of another;\nand this latter is always her lover, for she finds herself too feeble\nto accomplish it herself. Her anatomical characters, as well as her\nphysiognomy, if not those of the born criminal, have at least some\nfeatures which those of other females have not, and which unite her\nwith the animal. \"She had very black and very thick hair, which stood\nlike a helmet on her forehead, a long face, a strong mouth, and large\nblue-green eyes.\"\n\nM. H\u00e9ricourt justly finds that many features of this woman are to\nbe met with in Gabrielle Fenayron, the accomplice of her husband.\nGabrielle Fenayron is about thirty years of age: she is a tall dark\nwoman with a very pale complexion; her hair is very black, the oval\nof her face elongated, and her eyes have a certain hardness that\naccentuate the projecting and unsightly cheek-bones. Gabrielle\nFenayron, as we know, pretended to have been terrorised by the threats\nwhich her husband had uttered against her, and to have been infatuated,\non the other hand, by the love that she felt for him; she had thus\nsubmitted her will in order to repair her fault. In the appreciation\nof this system of defence, the bill of indictment stated that the\nenergy and the coolness exhibited by this woman in the preparation of\nassassination, the facilities that she had during the course of the\nlong premeditation which had preceded the murder to warn Aubert without\ndanger to herself, induced the belief that she had in the commission\nof the crime yielded to a profound hatred against her old lover. But\nthis interpretation appears to me, psychologically, to be a clumsy and\na forced one. It is not necessary to have recourse to motives left\nmysterious in order to explain the absolutely strange conduct of some\nwomen.\n\nPerhaps Zola would have completed his picture if he had known Gabrielle\nGompard; who allies and unites the passion of murder with prostitution\nwhen she attaches herself to a wicked man, but who grows animated\nfor virtue and denounces herself an accomplice when she becomes the\nmistress of a virtuous man. These women change their personality in\nchanging a lover, and then make a point of playing a role in the\nmiserable world where their fickle passions destroy them.\n\nLess happy, perhaps, has Zola been in the case of Flora, \"fair, strong,\nwith thick lips, and great greenish eyes, with low forehead set\nbeneath heavy hair.\" According to the plot of the novel, she should\nbe a criminal of passion. A good woman throughout her whole life, she\ncommits a crime through jealousy. But the method of the crime (the\nderailment of a train with a view to striking her rival and her lover)\nis not that which is chosen by criminals of passion, who are unable\nto meditate long on their crimes, and who kill in day-light without\npremeditation. It is true that it is natural to the mind of female\ncriminals to deal indirect and very complicated blows, and without\nproportion to the end to be attained: but all this is only the effect\nof their weakness. In a virago as strong as Flora is depicted, (a\nbellicose maid with the strong and hard arms of a boy,) this reason\nfails to satisfy us; and when she meditates her crime she is urged much\nless by thoughts of revenge, than by a necessity to commit the wrong\nin order to become cured of her own; she is then a born criminal, an\nepileptic rather than a creature of passion; and in this sense the\nattribute that he gives to Flora of a monstrous muscular force, that is\nobserved very frequently in born criminals, would be reasonable. Thus\nthe girl who always wore masculine clothes had a remarkable muscular\npower. Her weapon was a hammer, and with it she struck down many men.\n\nI knew at Turin a murderess, a courtesan, who when a model in Paris,\nkilled for money and love an artist, whose portrait she carried\ntattooed on her arm. This unfortunate woman fought two or three times\nwith the five wardens of her prison. When liberated she was the head of\nall the scoundrels of Turin, challenging them to contest. One day even\nI found her in a red shirt, with epaulettes on. \"It is my ensign,\" said\nshe to me, \"I am the captain of the scoundrels of Turin.\" But all these\nwomen are very different from Flora. Of course, a single and only love\nis wanting in their case.\n\nIt will finally be said, that the propensity which casts the two\ncriminaloid women into the arms of the born criminal, the _b\u00eate\nhumaine_, is copied from nature. As a matter of fact, there does\nexist a true elective affinity which unites the two sexes of these\nunfortunates; a cause that gives rise to criminal families, which form\nthe nucleus of gangs. Nevertheless, the demonstration of it in this\ninstance is not evident, for in crowding a large number of criminals\ninto so narrow a space, great liberty of choice is excluded.\n\n\nII.\n\nCRIMINAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND PSYCHIATRY.\n\nSecretions.\u2014Dr. Ottolenghi[35] has made in my laboratory a number of\nobservations with 15 born criminals and 3 occasional criminals, for the\npurpose of ascertaining the proportional quantities of urea, chlorides,\nand phosphates eliminated under the same alimentary conditions. Here\nare the average results:\n\n GRAMMES.\n Urea per 100 grammes of the weight {Born criminals 0\u00b739\n of the body {Occasional criminals 8\u00b753\n\n Phosphates do {Born criminals 0\u00b7024\n {Occasional criminals 0\u00b70195\n\n Chlorides do {Born criminals 0\u00b728\n {Occasional criminals 0\u00b729\n\n [35] _Journal of the Medical Academy of Turin_, 1888, _Archiv.\n di Psichiatria, Scienze penali ed Antropologia Criminale_,\n Turin, 1888, x, Lombroso.\n\nThere is therefore amongst the born criminals a diminution in the\nelimination of urea; and an augmentation in that of phosphates, while\nthe elimination of chlorides does not vary. He has obtained the same\nresults in the case of psychical epilepsy; while the occasional\ncriminal offers no anomaly.\n\nIn connection with this it may be stated, that, on the other hand, Mr.\nRivano[36] found amongst epileptics on the days of paroxysm a greater\nquantity of urea and less phosphates.\n\n [36] _Archiv. di Freniatria_, Turin, 1889.\n\nPower of Smell.\u2014Dr. Ottolenghi has also studied the power of\nsmell amongst criminals. He has contrived with this object in view\nan osmometer, containing 12 aqueous solutions of the essence of\ncloves varying from 1 part in 50,000 to 1 part in 100. He made his\nobservations in several series, one each day only; the conditions of\nventilation being about the same, and the solutions being renewed for\neach observation, to avoid errors caused by evaporation. He looked\nfirst for the lowest degree at which olfactory perception began.\nIn former experiments he proceeded differently. He disarranged the\ndifferent bottles, and requested the subject to replace the same in\nthe order of the intensity of their odor. He has divided the errors\nof disposition which resulted into serious and less serious errors,\naccording as, in the order of the solutions, there occurred a distance\nof several or only one degree. He examined 80 criminals (50 men, 30\nwomen) and 50 normal persons (30 men, mostly chosen amongst the prison\nwarders, and 20 respectable women). Here are the results:\n\nWhile amongst the normal males the average power of smell varied\nbetween the third and fourth degree of the osmometer, amongst the\ncriminals it varied from the fifth to the sixth degree; 44 individuals\nhad no power of smell at all. While the honest men made an average of\nthree errors in the disposition of the bottles, the criminals made\nfive, of which three were so-called serious ones.\n\nThe normal women touched the fourth degree of the osmometer, the\ncriminal women the sixth degree; with two the power of smell was\nwanting entirely. While the normal women made an average of four faults\nin the disposition, the criminal women made five.\n\nIn eight cases of anosmia (loss of the sense of smell), presented in a\ncertain set of criminals, two cases were due to nasal deformities; the\nothers were a kind of smell-blindness; the subjects were susceptible to\nodoriferous excitations, but were unable to specify them and still less\nto classify them.\n\nTo verify what was really true in the assertion,[37] that criminal\noffenders against morality and customs have a highly developed power of\nsmell, he examined this power in 30 ravishers and 40 prostitutes. In\nthe former he found olfactory blindness in the ratio of 33 to 100; the\nremainder possessed an average power corresponding to the fifth degree\nof the osmometer. Arranging, then, the different solutions according to\ntheir intensity, he observed three so-called serious errors. In 19 per\ncent. of the girls submitted, he found olfactory blindness; and for the\nothers an average acuteness corresponding to the fifth degree of the\nosmometer. Comparing these results with those obtained for the normal\nsubjects and for regular criminals, the power of smell appears much\nless developed in the class just considered.\n\n [37] Krafft-Ebing, _Psychopatia sexualis_, 4th ed., Stuttgart,\n 1889.\u2014_Archiv. di Psichiatria_, 1889.\n\nTaste.\u2014Dr. Ottolenghi has also examined the sense of taste of 100\ncriminals (60 born criminals, 20 occasional criminals, and 20 criminal\nwomen). He compared them with 20 men taken from the lower classes, 20\nprofessors and students, 20 respectable women, and 40 prostitutes.\nThese series of experiments were made with 11 solutions of strychnine\n(graduated 1/80000 to 1/50000) and of saccharine (from 1/100000 to\n1/10000), and 10 of chloride of sodium (1/500 to 3/100). The criminals\nshowed remarkable obtuseness. The lowest degree of acuteness was\nfound in the proportion of 38 to 100 in born criminals, 30 to 100 in\noccasional criminals, 20 to 100 in criminal women; while we found it\nin 14 per cent. of the professors and the students, in 25 per cent. of\nthe men from the lower classes, in 30 per cent. of the prostitutes, and\nfinally in 10 per cent. of the respectable women.\n\nWalk.\u2014A study which I have made with Perachia,[38] shows us that,\ncontrary to the case of normal men, the step of the left foot of\ncriminals is generally longer than that of the right; besides they turn\noff from the line of the axis more to the right than to the left; their\nleft foot, on being placed on the ground, forms with this line an angle\nof deviation more pronounced than the angle formed by their right foot;\nall these characteristics are very often found among epileptics.\n\n [38] _Sur la Marche suivant la M\u00e9thode de Gilles de la Tourette._\n\nGestures.\u2014It is an ancient habit among criminals to communicate\ntheir thoughts by gestures. Av\u00e9-Lallemant describes a set of gestures\nused among German thieves,\u2014a real language executed solely with the\nfingers, like the language of the deaf. Vidocq says that pickpockets,\nwhen they are watching a victim, give each other the signal of Saint\nJohn, which consists in putting their hand to their cravat or even\nin taking off their hat. But Pitr\u00e9 especially has published the most\nimportant information on this point. In his \"Usi e Costumi della\nSicilia\" (Usages and Customs of Sicily,) he describes 48 special kinds\nof gestures employed by delinquents. This phenomenon is explained by\nthe exaggerated mobility with which born criminals are endowed, as is\nthe case with children.\n\n\nMORPHOLOGICAL ANOMALIES.\n\nThe Skeleton.\u2014Mr. Tenchini, having made studies upon 63 skeletons\nof criminals, has found in the proportion of 6 out of 100 cases, the\nperforation of the olecranon (the bony prominence at the back of the\nelbow) which one observes in 36 out of 100 Europeans, and in 34 out of\n100 Polynesians; he likewise observed additional ribs and vertebr\u00e6 in\n10 cases out of 100 of them, and also too few, in the same proportion;\nwhich reminds us of the great variableness of these bones in the lower\nvertebrates. Lately he has even found in a criminal 4 sacral vertebr\u00e6\ntoo few, made up by 4 supplementary cervical vertebr\u00e6.\n\nMadame Tarnorosky in her study of prostitutes, female thieves, and\npeasant women has demonstrated,[39] that the cranial capacity of\nprostitutes is inferior to that of female thieves and peasant women\nand particularly to that of women of good society;[40] _vice versa_,\nthe zygomas (bones of the upper jaw) and the mandibles (lower jaw)\nwere more developed among the prostitutes, who also exhibited a\ngreater number of anomalies, in the proportion of 87 to 100, while the\nproportion of the female thieves showing anomalies was 79 to 100, and\nthe proportion of peasant women was 12 to 100. The prostitutes had 33\nin 100 of their parents addicted to drink, while the female thieves had\n41 in 100 and the peasant women 16 in 100. Mr. De Albertis has found\ntattooing among 300 prostitutes of Genoa in the enormous proportion of\n70 in 100.[41] He has also found the tactile sensibility of the women\nvery much diminished: 3\u00b76 millimetres to the right and 4 millimetres to\nthe left.\n\n [39]\n 50 100 100 50 50 50\n PROSTITUTES. PROSTITUTES. FEMALE PEASANT PEASANT LADIES OF\n MEASUREMENTS. THIEVES. WOMEN. WOMEN. GOOD\n (NORTH.) (SOUTH.) SOCIETY.\n Anteropost. diam. 17\u00b77 17\u00b78 17\u00b79 18\u00b73 18 18\u00b73\n Max. trans. diam. 13\u00b79 14\u00b74 14\u00b79 14\u00b75 14\u00b75 14\u00b75\n Max. circumference 52\u00b79 53\u00b73 53\u00b75 52\u00b77 53\u00b76 58\u00b78\n Zygomatic dist. 11\u00b74 11\u00b73 11\u00b72 10\u00b79 11\u00b74 11\u00b73\n Mandib. biang.\n distance 10\u00b71 10\u00b718 9\u00b71 9\u00b71 9\u00b79 9\u00b78\n\n\n [40] _Archiv. di Psichiatria_, Mierjeivki, 1887.\u2014Ibid., 1888,\n p. 196.\n\n [41] _Arch. di Psichiatria_, x, 1889.\n\nAmong criminal women, Saloalto has made studies altogether new; he\nhas recognised among 130 female thieves the degenerative character,\nanomalies of the skull and of the physiognomy, in a less degree than\namong the men; he has found brachycephaly in 7, oxycephaly in 29,\nplatycephaly in 7, the retreating forehead in 7, strabismus in 11,\nprotruding ears in 6; the sense of touch was normal in 2 out of 100,\nthe reflexions of the tendons decreasing in 4 out of 100, exaggerated\nin 12 out of 100.\n\nMarro and Marselli have explained by sexual selection this enormous\ndifference, which one also finds among epileptics and particularly\nin insane people; the men in fact do not choose ugly women with\ndegenerative characters, while the women have no choice, and very often\nan ugly man, criminal, but vigorous, for this reason triumphs over all\nobstacles; sometimes he is even preferred. (Flaubert, \"Correspondance,\"\n1889.) Let us add that the cares of maternity soften the character of\nwomen, and augment in them the sentiment of pity.\n\nDr. Ottolenghi[42] has studied in my laboratory the wrinkles of 200\ncriminals and 200 normal persons (workingmen and peasants), and he\nhas found that they occur earlier and much more frequently among\nthe criminals; in fact, two to five times more so than among normal\npersons, with predominance of the zygomatic wrinkle (situated in the\nmiddle of each cheek), which wrinkle may well be called the wrinkle of\nvice, and is the characteristic wrinkle of criminals.\n\n [42]\n UNDER 25 YEARS. BETWEEN 25 AND 50 YEARS.\n NORMAL. CRIMINAL. NORMAL. CRIMINAL.\n LOCATION. p. 100. p. 100. p. 100. p. 100.\n\n Wrinkles of the forehead 7\u00b71 34 62 86\n Nasolabial wrinkles 22 69 62 78\n Zygomatic wrinkles 0 16 18 33\n\n\nIn criminal women (80) also, wrinkles have been found more frequent\nthan in normal women, although here the difference is not so marked.\nOne calls to mind at once the wrinkle of the sorcerers. It is enough\nto look at the bust of the celebrated Sicilian woman poisoner,\npreserved in the National Museum of Palermo, and whose face is one heap\nof wrinkles.\n\nDr. Ottolenghi, studying with me the frequency of canities (turning\ngrey) and baldness in people, has demonstrated either absence or\nlateness of the same among criminals,[43] as also among epileptics\nand among cretins. Among the first, swindlers only tend to approach\nmore the normal type.[44] On the other hand, among 280 criminal women\ncanities was found more frequently, and baldness less frequently, than\nin the case of 200 honest workingmen.\n\n [43] _La Calvizie, la Canizie e le Rughe nei normali,\n nei criminali negli epiletis e nei cretini_. _Archiv. di\n Psichiatria_, 1889, x.\n\n [44]\n CLASSES. WITH CANITIES. WITH BALDNESS.\n p. 100. p. 100.\n\n 400 Normal people 62\u00b75 19\n 80 Epileptics 31\u00b75 12\u00b77\n 40 Cretins 11\u00b77 13\u00b75\n 490 Criminals 25\u00b79 48\n Thieves 24\u00b74 2\u00b76\n Swindlers 47 13\u00b71\n Maimers 23\u00b77 5\u00b73\n 80 Criminal women 45 9\u00b77\n 200 Honest women 60 13\n\n\nWe shall not terminate this part of our discussion without making\nmention of the beautiful discovery that we owe\u2014it pleases us to\nstate\u2014to a lawyer, Mr. Anfosso. The tachyanthropometer which he has\nconstructed is a real automatic measurer. (Archiv. di Psych., Art.\nIX. p. 173.) We might name it,\u2014if the word did not possess a little\ntoo much local color,\u2014an anthropometric guillotine; so quickly and\nwith the precision of a machine, does it give the most important\nmeasurements of the body, which makes the practice of anthropometry\nvery easy, even to people who are entire strangers to the science;\nand it facilitates, moreover, the examination of the description of\nindividual criminals, the perfection of which will always remain one of\nthe most glorious distinctions of M. Bertillon. And at the same time\nthat this instrument renders services to the administration of justice,\nit permits on a grand scale observations which hitherto were only\nobtainable by the learned.\n\nExperiments were made a short time ago by Mr. Rossi, who studied the\nresult of these measurements in 100 criminals (nearly all thieves). He\nfound the breadth of the span of the arms to be greater than the height\nof body in 88; and in 11 to be less. In 30 he found the right foot\nlarger; in 58 he found the left foot larger; in 12 both feet equal.\nThe right arms of 43 per cent. were longer than the left, and the left\nin 54 per cent. longer than the right. Which confirms to a marvellous\ndegree the _gaucherie_, mancinism, or structural misproportion, that\nhad before been indicated by dynamometry and the study of the walk of\ncriminals.[45]\n\n [45] _Archiv. di Psichiatria_, 1889, Vol. x. p. 191.\n\nThe very frequent recurrence of anatomical misproportion and\n_gaucherie_ could not be better confirmed; and there are in this\natavistic symptoms, for Rollet has observed in 42 anthropoids the\nleft humerus to be longer than the right, in the proportion of 60 to\n100, while among men the proportion is only 7 out of 100. (_Revue\nScientifique_, 1889.)\n\nThis anatomical misproportion I have very recently verified with Mr.\nOttolenghi by measurements of the two hands, the middle fingers,\nand the feet, right and left, in 90 normal persons and in 100 born\ncriminals.[46] (Archiv. di Psichiatria, X. 8.)\n\n [46]\n HAND LONGER. MIDDLE FINGER. FOOT.\n TYPES. RIGHT. LEFT. RIGHT. LEFT. RIGHT. LEFT.\n PER CENTUM. PER CENTUM. PER CENTUM.\n\n Normal persons 14\u00b74 11 16\u00b76 15\u00b75 38\u00b75 15\u00b76\n Criminals 5 25 10 27 27 35\n Swindlers 4\u00b73 13 13 21\u00b77 21\u00b77 26\n Ravishers 7 14\u00b72 14\u00b72 28\u00b74 35\u00b77 35\u00b77\n Maimers 15 25 5 25 20 55\n Thieves 0 34\u00b78 13 30\u00b74 26 26\u00b76\n Pickpockets 0 35 5 30 35 25\n\n\nTattooing.\u2014I was under the belief that in this respect nothing more\nwas to be said after the beautiful studies of Messrs. Lacassagne and\nMarro, and after my own.[47]\n\n [47] See _Nouvelle Revue_; also my _Uomo Delinquente_, 4th ed., 1889.\n\nHowever, the researches made by Messrs. Severi, Lucchini, and Boselli\non 4,000 new criminals have given results of a high importance and\nfirst of all a proportion eight fold greater than that of the\nalienists of the same district (Florence and Lucca). The prevalency\nof this practice is enormous; it amounts to 40 in 100 among military\ncriminals and to 33 in 100 among criminals under age; the women give a\nproportion of only 1\u00b76 in 100, but this would be increased to 2 in 100\nif we included certain kinds of fly-tattooing (_tatouages mouches_)\nresembling beauty spots, which are found even in high life prostitution.\n\nWhat chiefly astonishes us in these researches, next to the frequency\nof the phenomena, is the specific character of the tattooings: their\nobscenity, the vaunting of crime, and the strange contrast of evil\npassions and the highest sentiments.\n\nM. C..., aged 27 years, convicted at least fifty times for affrays, and\nthe assaulting and wounding of men and horses, has the history of his\ncrimes literally written on his skin; and in this respect, let us note\nthat the infamous De Rosny, who only lately committed suicide in Lyons,\nhad her body covered with tattooings in the form of erotic figures; one\ncould read there the list of her lovers and the dates at which she left\nthem.\n\nF. L..., a carrier, aged 26 years, several times convicted, bears on\nhis breast a heart pierced by a poniard (the sign of vengeance), and\non his right hand a female singer of a _caf\u00e9 chantant_, of whom he was\nenamoured. By the side of these tattooings, and others which propriety\nforbids us to cite,[48] one sees with surprise the picture of a tomb\nwith the epitaph: \"To my beloved father.\" Strange contradictions of the\nhuman mind!\n\n [48] See _Atlas de L'Homme Criminel_. 1888. Alcan.\n\nA certain B..., a deserter, has on his chest a St. George and the cross\nof the Legion of Honor, and on the right arm a woman, very little\ndressed, who drinks with the inscription: \"Let us wet the interior a\nlittle.\"\n\nQ. A..., a laborer, convicted many times for theft, expelled from\nFrance and Switzerland, has on his chest two Swiss gendarmes with the\nwords \"Long live the Republic!\" On his right arm he has a heart pierced\nthrough, and at the side the head of a fish\u2014a mackerel, to signify\nthat he will poniard a bully, his rival.\n\nWe have seen on the left arm of another thief, a pot with a lemon tree,\nand the initials V. G. (_vengeance_); which in the strange language\nof the criminals means: treason, and, afterwards, revenge. He did not\nconceal from us the fact that his constant thought was to revenge\nhimself on the woman who loved him and then abandoned him. His desire\nwas to cut off her nose. His brother offered to perform the operation\nfor him, but this he refused, reserving for himself the pleasure of\nexecuting his purpose when he should ultimately be liberated.\n\nOne sees, therefore, from these few examples, that there is among\ncriminals a kind of hieroglyphical writing, but which is not regulated\nor fixed. The system is founded on daily happenings and slang, as\nwould be the case among primitive mankind. Very often, in fact, a key\nsignifies among thieves the silence of secrecy; and a death's-head (the\nbare skull), revenge. Sometimes points are used instead of figures. In\nthis way one criminal marked himself with 17 points, which means, to\nhis mind, that he proposes to inflict injury on his enemy seventeen\ntimes, whenever he meets with him.\n\nThe criminal tattooers of Naples have the habit of making long\ninscriptions on their bodies; but initials are used instead of words.\nMany Camorrists of Naples carry a tattooing which represents iron bars,\nbehind which there is a prisoner and underneath the initials Q. F. Q.\nP. M.; which means: \"Quando finiranno queste pene? Mai!\" (When will\nthese pains end? Never!) Others bear the epigraph C. G. P. V., etc.,\nwhich means: \"Courage, galeriens, pour voler et piler; nous devons tout\nmettre \u00e0 sang et \u00e0 feu!\" (Courage, convicts, to steal and to rob; we\nmust put all to the sword and fire!) We see here at once that certain\nforms of tattooing are employed by criminal federations, and serve as\na sort of rallying-call. In Bavaria and in the South of Germany, the\npickpockets, who are united together in real alliances, recognise each\nother by the epigraphic tattooing \"T and L,\" which means _Thal und\nLand_ (valley and country); words which they must exchange in a low\nvoice when they meet each other, in order not to be denounced to the\npolice. A thief R..., who has on his right arm a design representing\ntwo hands crossed, and the word _union_ (unity) surrounded by a\ngarland of flowers, told us that this tattooing is extensively adopted\nby malefactors in the South of France (Draguignan). According to the\nrevelations made to us by emerited Camorrists, a lizard or a serpent\ndenotes the first grade of this dangerous association.\n\nI pass over in silence, and for good reasons, the tattooings spread\nover all the remaining parts of the body.\n\nIn the _Revista de Antropologia Criminal_, a new publication which\nhas just appeared in Madrid, Mr. Sallilas has published an excellent\nstudy relative to the tattooing of Spanish criminals. According to\nhim, this is a frequent custom among murderers. The predominance of\nthe religious character is there noticeable, but always with the seal\nof lewd obscenity, universally observed. I have lately had occasion to\nverify up to what point the impulsion which leads criminals to inflict\non themselves this strange operation, is atavistic. One of the most\nincorrigible thieves I have met, who has six brothers tattooed like\nhimself, begged of me, notwithstanding he was half covered with the\nmost obscene tattooings, to find him a professional tattooer who should\ncomplete what might well be called the carpeting of his skin. \"When\nthe tattooing is very odd and grotesque, and spreads over the whole\nbody,\" he said, \"it is for us thieves what the black dress coat and\nthe decorated vest is to society. The more we are tattooed the greater\nis our esteem for one another; the more an individual is tattooed, the\nmore authority has he over his companions. On the other hand, he who\nis not much tattooed enjoys no influence whatsoever with us; is not\nconsidered a thorough scoundrel, and has not the estimation of his\nfellows.\" \"Very often,\" another told me, \"when we visited prostitutes,\nand they saw us covered all over with tattooings, they overwhelmed us\nwith presents, and gave us money instead of demanding it.\" If all that\nis not atavism, atavism does not exist in science.\n\nOf this characteristic, of course, as of all the other characteristics\nof criminals, one may say that it is to be met with among normal\npeople. But the chief thing here is its proportion, its commonness,\nand the exaggerated extent to which it is practised. Among honest,\nrespectable people its peculiar complexion, its local and obscene\ncoloring, and the useless, vain, and imprudent display of crime are\nwanting.\n\nAgain, it will probably be objected that this is not psychology, and\nthat only through the latter science can we trace out the picture of\nthe criminal. I could well answer here, that these tattooings are\nreally psychological phenomena. And I may add that Mr. Ferri, in the\nintroductory part of his work on Homicides, has given us in addition to\na real statistical psychology, an analysis of all criminal propensities\nand of their extent before and after the crime.\n\nAmong born criminals, for example, 42 in 100 always deny the crime\nwith which they are charged, while among occasional criminals, and in\nparticular among maimers, only 21 in 100 deny all; of the first 1 in\n100, and of the second 2 in 100 confess their crime with tears; etc.[49]\n\n [49] _L'Omicidio_, Turin, 1890.\n\n CESARE LOMBROSO.\n\n [Prof. Lombroso has in preparation for this series of\n criminological studies, an essay on the physiognomy of the\n Anarchists.\u2014ED.]\n\n\n\n\nTHE SQUARING OF THE CIRCLE.\n\nAN HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE PROBLEM FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE\nPRESENT DAY.[50]\n\n [50] From Holtzendorff and Virchow's _Sammlung\n gemeinverst\u00e4ndlicher wissenschaftlicher Vortr\u00e4ge_, Heft 67.\n Hamburg: Verlagsanstalt, etc.\n\n\nI.\n\n#Universal interest in the problem.#\n\nFor two and a half thousand years, both trained and untrained minds\nhave striven in vain to solve the problem known as the squaring of the\ncircle. Now that geometers have at last succeeded in giving a rigid\ndemonstration of the impossibility of solving the problem with ruler\nand compasses, it seems fitting and opportune to cast a glance into the\nnature and history of this very ancient problem. And this will be found\nall the more justifiable in view of the fact that the squaring of the\ncircle, at least in name, is very widely known outside of the narrow\nlimits of professional mathematicians.\n\n#The resolution of the French Academy.#\n\nThe Proceedings of the French Academy for the year 1775 contain at\npage 61 the resolution of the Academy not to examine from that time\non, any so-called solutions of the quadrature of the circle that\nmight be handed in. The Academy was driven to this determination\nby the overwhelming multitude of professed solutions of the famous\nproblem, which were sent to it every month in the year,\u2014solutions\nwhich of course were an invariable attestation of the ignorance and\nself-consciousness of their authors, but which suffered collectively\nfrom a very important error in mathematics: they were _wrong_. Since\nthat time all professed solutions of the problem received by the\nAcademy find a sure haven in the waste-basket, and remain unanswered\nfor all time. The circle-squarer, however, sees in this high-handed\nmanner of rejection only the envy of the great towards his grand\nintellectual discovery. He is determined to meet with recognition, and\nappeals therefore to the public. The newspapers must obtain for him\nthe appreciation that scientific societies have denied. And every year\nthe old mathematical sea-serpent more than once disports itself in the\ncolumns of our papers, that a Mr. N. N., of P. P., has at last solved\nthe problem of the quadrature of the circle.\n\n#General ignorance of quadrators.#\n\nBut what kind of people are these circle-squarers, when examined by\nthe light? Almost always they will be found to be imperfectly educated\npersons, whose mathematical knowledge does not exceed that of a modern\ncollege freshman. It is seldom that they know accurately what the\nrequirements of the problem are and what its nature; they never know\nthe two and a half thousand years' history of the problem; and they\nhave no idea whatever of the important investigations and results\nwhich have been made with reference to the problem by great and real\nmathematicians in every century down to our time.\n\n#A cyclometric type.#\n\nYet great as is the quantum of ignorance that circle-squarers intermix\nwith their intellectual products, the lavish supply of conceit and\nself-consciousness with which they season their performances is still\ngreater. I have not far to go to furnish a verification of this. A book\nprinted in Hamburg in the year 1840 lies before me, in which the author\nthanks Almighty God at every second page that He has selected him and\nno one else to solve the 'problem phenomenal' of mathematics, \"so long\nsought for, so fervently desired, and attempted by millions.\" After\nthe modest author has proclaimed himself the unmasker of Archimedes's\ndeceit, he says: \"It thus has pleased our mother nature to withhold\nthis mathematical jewel from the eye of human investigation, until she\nthought it fitting to reveal truth to simplicity.\"\n\nThis will suffice to show the great self-consciousness of the author.\nBut it does not suffice to prove his ignorance. He has no conception\nof mathematical demonstration; he takes it for granted that things are\nso because they seem so to him. Errors of logic, also, are abundantly\nfound in his book. But apart from this general incorrectness let us see\nwherein the real gist of his fallacy consists. It requires considerable\nlabor to find out what this is from the turgid language and bombastic\nstyle in which the author has buried his conclusions. But it is this.\nThe author inscribes a square in a circle, circumscribes another about\nit, then points out that the inside square is made up of four congruent\ntriangles, whereas the circumscribed square is made up of eight such\ntriangles; from which fact, seeing that the circle is larger than the\none square and smaller than the other, he draws the bold conclusion\nthat the circle is equal in area to six such triangles. It is hardly\nconceivable that a rational being could infer that something which is\ngreater than 4 and less than 8 must necessarily be 6. But with a man\nthat attempts the squaring of the circle this kind of ratiocination\n_is_ possible.\n\nSimilarly in the case of all other attempted solutions of the problem,\neither logical fallacies or violations of elementary arithmetical or\ngeometrical truths may be pointed out. Only they are not always of such\na trivial nature as in the book just mentioned.\n\nLet us now inquire whence the inclination arises which leads people to\ntake up the quadrature of the circle and to attempt to solve it.\n\n#The allurements of the problem.#\n\nAttention must first be called to the antiquity of the problem. A\nquadrature was attempted in Egypt 500 years before the exodus of the\nIsraelites. Among the Greeks the problem never ceased to play a part\nthat greatly influenced the progress of mathematics. And in the middle\nages also the squaring of the circle sporadically appears as the\nphilosopher's stone of mathematics. The problem has thus never ceased\nto be dealt with and considered. But it is not by the antiquity of the\nproblem that circle-squarers are enticed, but by the allurement which\neverything exerts that is calculated to raise the individual out of the\nmass of ordinary humanity, and to bind about his temples the laurel\ncrown of celebrity. It is ambition that spurred men on in ancient\nGreece and still spurs them on in modern times to crack this primeval\nmathematical nut. Whether they are competent thereto is a secondary\nconsideration. They look upon the squaring of the circle as the grand\nprize of a lottery that can just as well fall to their lot as to that\nof any other. They do not remember that\u2014\n\n \"Toil before honor is placed by sagacious decrees of Immortals,\"\n\nand that it requires years of continued studies to gain possession of\nthe mathematical weapons that are indispensably necessary to attack\nthe problem, but which even in the hands of the most distinguished\nmathematical strategists have not sufficed to take the stronghold.\n\n#About the only problem known to the lay world.#\n\nBut how is it, we must further ask, that it happens to be the squaring\nof the circle and not some other unsolved mathematical problem upon\nwhich the efforts of people are bestowed who have no knowledge of\nmathematics yet busy themselves with mathematical questions? The\nquestion is answered by the fact that the squaring of the circle is\nabout the only mathematical problem that is known to the unprofessional\nworld,\u2014at least by name. Even among the Greeks the problem was very\nwidely known outside of mathematical circles. In the eyes of the\nGrecian layman, as at present among many of his modern brethren,\noccupation with this problem was regarded as the most important and\nessential business of mathematicians. In fact they had a special word\nto designate this species of activity; namely, \u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, which\nmeans to busy one's self with the quadrature. In modern times, also,\nevery educated person, though he be not a mathematician, knows the\nproblem by name, and knows that it is insolvable, or at least, that\ndespite the efforts of the most famous mathematicians it has not yet\nbeen solved. For this reason the phrase \"to square the circle,\" is now\nused in the sense of attempting the impossible.\n\n#Belief that rewards have been offered.#\n\nBut in addition to the antiquity of the problem, and the fact also\nthat it is known to the lay world, we have yet a third factor to point\nout that induces people to take up with it. This is the report that\nhas been spread abroad for a hundred years now, that the Academies,\nthe Queen of England, or some other influential person, has offered a\ngreat prize to be given to the one that first solves the problem. As a\nmatter of fact we find the hope of obtaining this large prize of money\nthe principal incitement to action with many circle-squarers. And the\nauthor of the book above referred to begs his readers to lend him their\nassistance in obtaining the prizes offered.\n\n#The problem among mathematicians.#\n\nAlthough the opinion is widely current in the unprofessional world,\nthat professional mathematicians are still busied with the solution of\nthe problem, this is by no means the case. On the contrary, for some\ntwo hundred years, the endeavors of many considerable mathematicians\nhave been solely directed towards demonstrating with exactness that\nthe problem is insolvable. It is, as a rule,\u2014and naturally,\u2014more\ndifficult to prove that something is impossible than to prove that\nit is possible. And thus it has happened, that up to within a few\nyears ago, despite the employment of the most varied and the most\ncomprehensive methods of modern mathematics, no one succeeded in\nsupplying the wished-for demonstration of the problem's impossibility.\nAt last, Professor Lindemann, of K\u00f6nigsberg, in June, 1882, succeeded\nin furnishing a demonstration,\u2014and the first demonstration,\u2014that it\nis impossible by the exclusive employment of ruler and compasses to\nconstruct a square that is mathematically exactly equal in area to a\ngiven circle. The demonstration, naturally, was not effected with the\nhelp of the old elementary methods; for if it were, it would surely\nhave been accomplished centuries ago; but methods were requisite\nthat were first furnished by the theory of definite integrals and\ndepartments of higher algebra developed in the last decades; in other\nwords it required the direct and indirect preparatory labor of many\ncenturies to make finally possible a demonstration of the insolvability\nof this historic problem.\n\nOf course, this demonstration will have no more effect than the\nresolution of the Paris Academy of 1775, in causing the fecund race of\ncircle-squarers to vanish from the face of the earth. In the future\nas in the past, there will be people who know nothing, and will not\nwant to know anything of this demonstration, and who believe that they\ncannot help but succeed in a matter in which others have failed, and\nthat just they have been appointed by Providence to solve the famous\npuzzle. But unfortunately the ineradicable passion of wanting to solve\nthe quadrature of the circle has also its serious side. Circle-squarers\nare not always so self-contented as the author of the book we\nhave mentioned. They often see or at least divine the insuperable\ndifficulties that tower up before them, and the conflict between their\naspirations and their performances, the consciousness that they want to\nsolve the problem but are unable to solve it, darkens their soul and,\nlost to the world, they become interesting subjects for the science of\npsychiatry.\n\n\nII.\n\n#Nature of the problem. Numerical rectification.#\n\nIf we have a circle before us, it is easy for us to determine the\nlength of its radius or of its diameter, which must be double that\nof the radius; and the question next arises to find the number that\nrepresents how many times larger its circumference, that is the length\nof the circular line, is than its radius or its diameter. From the fact\nthat all circles have the same shape it follows that this proportion\nwill always be the same for both large and small circles. Now, since\nthe time of Archimedes, all civilised nations that have cultivated\nmathematics, have called the number that denotes how many times larger\nthan the diameter the circumference of a circle is, \u03c0,\u2014the Greek\ninitial letter of the word periphery. To compute \u03c0, therefore, means to\ncalculate how many times larger the circumference of a circle is than\nits diameter. This calculation is called \"the numerical rectification\nof the circle.\"\n\n#The numerical quadrature.#\n\nNext to the calculation of the circumference, the calculation of the\nsuperficial contents of a circle by means of its radius or diameter is\nperhaps most important; that is, the computation of how much area that\npart of a plane which lies within a circle measures. This calculation\nis called the \"numerical quadrature.\" It depends, however, upon the\nproblem of numerical rectification; that is, upon the calculation of\nthe magnitude of \u03c0. For it is demonstrated in elementary geometry,\nthat the area of a circle is equal to the area of a triangle produced\nby drawing in the circle a radius, erecting at the extremity of the\nsame a tangent,\u2014that is, in this case, a perpendicular,\u2014cutting off\nupon the latter the length of the circumference, measuring from the\nextremity, and joining the point thus obtained with the centre of the\ncircle. But it follows from this that the area of a circle is as many\ntimes larger than the square upon its radius as the number \u03c0 amounts to.\n\n#Constructive rectification and quadrature.#\n\nThe numerical rectification and numerical quadrature of the circle\nbased upon the computation of the number \u03c0, are to be clearly\ndistinguished from problems that require a straight line equal in\nlength to the circumference of a circle, or a square equal in area\nto a circle, to be _constructively_ produced out of its radius or\nits diameter; problems which might properly be called \"constructive\nrectification\" or \"constructive quadrature.\" Approximately, of\ncourse, by employing an approximate value for \u03c0 these problems are\neasily solvable. But to solve a problem of construction, in geometry,\nmeans to solve it with mathematical exactitude. If the value \u03c0 were\nexactly equal to the ratio of two whole numbers to one another, the\nconstructive rectification would present no difficulties. For example,\nsuppose the circumference of a circle were exactly 3-1/7 times greater\nthan its diameter; then the diameter could be divided into seven equal\nparts, which could be easily done by the principles of planimetry with\nruler and compasses; then we would produce to the amount of such a\npart a straight line exactly three times larger than the diameter, and\nshould thus obtain a straight line exactly equal to the circumference\nof the circle. But as a matter of fact, and as has actually been\ndemonstrated, there do not exist two whole numbers, be they ever so\ngreat, that exactly represent by their proportion to one another the\nnumber \u03c0. Consequently, a rectification of the kind just described does\nnot attain the object desired.\n\nIt might be asked here, whether from the demonstrated fact that the\nnumber \u03c0 is not equal to the ratio of two whole numbers however great,\nit does not immediately follow that it is impossible to construct\na straight line exactly equal in length to the circumference of a\ncircle; thus demonstrating at once the impossibility of solving the\nproblem. This question is to be answered in the negative. For there\nare in geometry many sets of two lines of which the one can be easily\nconstructed from the other, notwithstanding the fact that no two whole\nnumbers can be found to represent the ratio of the two lines. The side\nand the diagonal of a square, for instance, are so constituted. It is\ntrue the ratio of the latter two magnitudes is nearly that of 5 to 7.\nBut this proportion is not exact, and there are in fact no two numbers\nthat represent the ratio exactly. Nevertheless, either of these two\nlines can be easily constructed from the other by the sole employment\nof ruler and compasses. This might be the case, too, with the\nrectification of the circle; and consequently from the impossibility of\nrepresenting \u03c0 by the ratio between two whole numbers the impossibility\nof the problem of rectification is not inferable.\n\nThe quadrature of the circle stands and falls with the problem of\nrectification. This is based upon the truth above mentioned, that\na circle is equal in area to a right-angled triangle, in which one\nside is equal to the radius of the circle and the other to the\ncircumference. Supposing, accordingly, that the circumference of the\ncircle were rectified, then we could construct this triangle. But every\ntriangle, as is taught in the elements of planimetry, can, with the\nhelp of ruler and compasses be converted into a square exactly equal\nto it in area. So that, therefore, supposing the rectification of the\ncircumference of a circle were successfully performed, a square could\nbe constructed that would be exactly equal in area to the circle.\n\nThe dependence upon one another of the three problems of the\ncomputation of the number \u03c0, of the quadrature of the circle, and its\nrectification, thus obliges us, in dealing with the history of the\nquadrature, to regard investigations with respect to the value of \u03c0 and\nattempts to rectify the circle as of equal importance, and to consider\nthem accordingly.\n\n#Conditions of the geometrical solution.#\n\nWe have used repeatedly in the course of this discussion the expression\n\"to construct with ruler and compasses.\" It will be necessary to\nexplain what is meant by the specification of these two instruments.\nWhen such a number of conditions is annexed to a requirement in\ngeometry to construct a certain figure that the construction only of\n_one_ figure or a limited number of figures is possible in accordance\nwith the conditions given; such a complete requirement is called a\nproblem of construction, or briefly a problem. When a problem of this\nkind is presented for solution it is necessary to reduce it to simpler\nproblems, already recognised as solvable; and since these latter depend\nin their turn upon other, still simpler problems, we are finally\nbrought back to certain fundamental problems upon which the rest are\nbased but which are not themselves reducible to problems less simple.\nThese fundamental problems are, so to speak, the undermost stones of\nthe edifice of geometrical construction. The question next arises as to\nwhat problems may be properly regarded as fundamental; and it has been\nfound, that the solution of a great part of the problems that arise in\nelementary planimetry rests upon the solution of only five original\nproblems. They are:\n\n1. The construction of a straight line which shall pass through two\ngiven points.\n\n2. The construction of a circle the centre of which is a given point\nand the radius of which has a given length.\n\n3. The determination of the point that lies coincidently on two given\nstraight lines extended as far as is necessary,\u2014in case such a point\n(point of intersection) exists.\n\n4. The determination of the two points that lie coincidently on a given\nstraight line and a given circle,\u2014in case such common points (points\nof intersection) exist.\n\n5. The determination of the two points that lie coincidently on two\ngiven circles,\u2014in case such common points (points of intersection)\nexist.\n\nFor the solution of the three last of these five problems the eye\nalone is needed, while for the solution of the two first problems,\nbesides pencil, ink, chalk, and the like, additional special\ninstruments are required: for the solution of the first problem a\nruler is most generally used, and for the solution of the second a\npair of compasses. But it must be remembered that it is no concern\nof geometry what mechanical instruments are employed in the solution\nof the five problems mentioned. Geometry simply limits itself to\nthe presupposition that these problems are solvable, and regards\na complicated problem as solved if, upon a specification of the\nconstructions of which the solution consists, no other requirements are\ndemanded than the five above mentioned. Since, accordingly, geometry\ndoes not itself furnish the solution of these five problems, but\nrather exacts them, they are termed _postulates_.[51] All problems of\nplanimetry are not reducible to these five problems alone. There are\nproblems that can be solved only by assuming other problems as solvable\nwhich are not included in the five given; for example, the construction\nof an ellipse, having given its centre and its major and minor axes.\nMany problems, however, possess the property of being solvable with the\nassistance solely of the five postulates above formulated, and where\nthis is the case they are said to be \"constructible with ruler and\ncompasses,\" or \"elementarily\" constructible.\n\n [51] Usually geometers mention only two postulates (Nos. 1 and\n 2). But since to geometry proper it is indifferent whether\n only the eye, or additional special mechanical instruments are\n necessary, the author has regarded it more correct in point of\n method to assume five postulates.\n\nAfter these general remarks upon the solvability of problems of\ngeometrical construction, which an understanding of the history of the\nsquaring of the circle makes indispensably necessary, the significance\nof the question whether the quadrature of the circle is or is not\nsolvable, that is elementarily solvable, will become intelligible.\nBut the conception just discussed of elementary solvability only\ngradually took clear form, and we therefore find among the Greeks as\nwell as among the Arabs, endeavors, successful in some respects, that\naimed at solving the quadrature of the circle with other expedients\nthan the five postulates. We have also to take these endeavors into\nconsideration, and especially so as they, no less than the unsuccessful\nefforts at elementary solution, have upon the whole advanced the\nscience of geometry, and contributed much to the clarification of\ngeometrical ideas.\n\n\nIII.\n\n#The Egyptian quadrature.#\n\nIn the oldest mathematical work that we possess we find a rule that\ntells us how to make a square which is equal in area to a given\ncircle. This celebrated book, the Papyrus Rhind of the British Museum,\ntranslated and explained by Eisenlohr (Leipsic, 1887), was written,\nas it is stated in the work, in the thirty-third year of the reign of\nKing Ra-a-us, by a scribe of that monarch, named Ahmes. The composition\nof the work falls accordingly into the period of the two Hiksos\ndynasties, that is, in the period between 2000 and 1700 B.C. But there\nis another important circumstance attached to this. Ahmes mentions\nin his introduction that he composed his work after the model of old\ntreatises, written in the time of King Raenmat; whence it appears that\nthe originals of the mathematical expositions of Ahmes, are half a\nthousand years older yet than the Papyrus Rhind.\n\nThe rule given in this papyrus for obtaining a square equal to a\ncircle, specifies that the diameter of the circle shall be shortened\none ninth of its length and upon the shortened line thus obtained a\nsquare erected. Of course, the area of a square of this construction\nis only approximately equal to the area of the circle. An idea may\nbe obtained of the degree of exactness of this original, primitive\nquadrature by our remarking, that if the diameter of the circle in\nquestion is one metre in length, the square that is supposed to be\nequal to the circle is a little less than half a square decimetre\nlarger; an approximation not so accurate as that computed by\nArchimedes, yet much more correct than many a one later employed. It\nis not known how Ahmes or his predecessors arrived at this approximate\nquadrature; but it is certain that it was handed down in Egypt from\ncentury to century, and in late Egyptian times it repeatedly appears.\n\n#The Biblical and Babylonian quadratures.#\n\nBesides among the Egyptians, we also find in pre-Grecian antiquity an\nattempt at circle-computation among the Babylonians. This is not a\nquadrature; but aims at the rectification of the circumference. The\nBabylonian mathematicians had discovered, that if the radius of a\ncircle be successively inscribed as chord within its circumference,\nafter the sixth inscription we arrive at the point of departure, and\nthey concluded from this that the circumference of a circle must be a\nlittle larger than a line which is six times as long as the radius,\nthat is three times as long as the diameter. A trace of this Babylonian\nmethod of computation may even be found in the bible; for in 1 Kings\nvii. 23, and 2 Chron. iv. 2, the great laver is described, which under\nthe name of the \"molten sea\" constituted an ornament of the temple of\nSolomon; and it is said of this vessel that it measured ten cubits from\nbrim to brim, and thirty cubits round about. The number 3 as the ratio\nbetween the circumference and the diameter is still more plainly given\nin the Talmud, where we read that \"that which measures three lengths in\ncircumference is one length across.\"\n\n#Among the Greeks.#\n\nWith regard to the earlier Greek mathematicians,\u2014as Thales and\nPythagoras,\u2014we know that they acquired the foundations of their\nmathematical knowledge in Egypt. But nothing has been handed down\nto us which shows that they knew of the old Egyptian quadrature, or\nthat they dealt with the problem at all. But tradition says, that,\nsubsequently, the teacher of Euripides and Pericles, the great\nphilosopher and mathematician Anaxagoras, whom Plato so highly praised,\n\"drew the quadrature of the circle\" in prison, in the year 434. This\nis the account of Plutarch in the seventeenth chapter of his work \"De\nExilio.\" #Anaxagoras.# The method is not told us in which Anaxagoras\nhad supposably solved the problem, and it is not said whether knowingly\nor unknowingly he accomplished an approximate solution after the manner\nof Ahmes. But at any rate, to Anaxagoras belongs the merit of having\ncalled attention to a problem that bore great fruit, in having incited\nGrecian scholars to busy themselves with geometry, and thus more and\nmore to advance that science.\n\n#The quadratrix of Hippias of Elis.#\n\nAgain, it is reported that the mathematician Hippias of Elis invented\na curved line that could be made to serve a double purpose: first,\nto trisect an angle, and second, to square the circle. This curved\nline is the \u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1 so often mentioned by the later Greek\nmathematicians, and by the Romans called \"quadratrix.\" Regarding the\nnature of this curve we have exact knowledge from Pappus. But it will\nbe sufficient, here, to state that the quadratrix is not a circle\nnor a portion of a circle, so that its construction is not possible\nby means of the postulates enumerated in the preceding section. And\ntherefore the solution of the quadrature of the circle founded on the\nconstruction of the quadratrix is not an elementary solution in the\nsense discussed in the last section. We can, it is true, conceive a\nmechanism that will draw this curve as well as compasses draw a circle;\nand with the assistance of a mechanism of this description the squaring\nof the circle is solvable with exactitude. But if it be allowed to\nemploy in a solution an apparatus especially adapted thereto, every\nproblem may be said to be solvable. Strictly taken, the invention\nof the curve of Hippias substitutes for one insuperable difficulty\nanother equally insuperable. Some time afterwards, about the year 350,\nthe mathematician Dinostratus showed that the quadratrix could also\nbe used to solve the problem of rectification, and from that time on\nthis problem plays almost the same r\u00f4le in Grecian mathematics as the\nrelated problem of quadrature.\n\n#The Sophists' solution.#\n\nAs these problems gradually became known to the non-mathematicians of\nGreece, attempts at solution at once sprang up that are worthy of a\nplace by the side of the solutions of modern amateur circle-squarers.\nThe Sophists, especially, believed themselves competent by seductive\ndialectic to take a stronghold that had defied the intellectual\nonslaughts of the greatest mathematicians. With verbal nicety,\namounting to puerility, it was said that the squaring of the circle\ndepended upon the finding of a number which represented in itself\nboth a square and a circle; a square by being a square number, a\ncircle in that it ended with the same number as the root number from\nwhich, by multiplication with itself, it was produced. The number 36,\naccordingly, was, as they thought, the one that embodied the solution\nof the famous problem.\n\n#Antiphon's attempt.#\n\nContrasted with this twisting of words the speculations of Bryson and\nAntiphon, both contemporaries of Socrates, though inexact, appear in\nhigh degree intelligent. Antiphon divided the circle into four equal\narcs, and by joining the points of division obtained a square; he\nthen divided each arc again into two equal parts and thus obtained an\ninscribed octagon; thence he constructed an inscribed dodecagon, and\nperceived that the figure so inscribed more and more approached the\nshape of a circle. In this way, he said, one should proceed, until\nthere was inscribed in the circle a polygon whose sides by reason of\ntheir smallness should coincide with the circle. Now this polygon\ncould, by methods already taught by the Pythagoreans, be converted\ninto a square of equal area; and upon the basis of this fact Antiphon\nregarded the squaring of the circle as solved.\n\nNothing can be said against this method except that, however far the\nbisection of the arcs is carried, the result must still remain an\napproximate one.\n\n#Bryson of Heraclea.#\n\nThe attempt of Bryson of Heraclea was better still; for this scholar\ndid not rest content with finding a square that was very little smaller\nthan the circle, but obtained by means of circumscribed polygons\nanother square that was very little larger than the circle. Only Bryson\ncommitted the error of believing that the area of the circle was the\narithmetical mean between an inscribed and a circumscribed polygon\nof an equal number of sides. Notwithstanding this error, however, to\nBryson belongs the merit, first, of having introduced into mathematics\nby his emphasis of the necessity of a square which was too large and\none which was too small, the conception of maximum and minimum \"limits\"\nin approximations; and secondly, by his comparison with a circle of\nthe inscribed and circumscribed regular polygons, the merit of having\nindicated to Archimedes the way by which an approximate value for \u03c0 was\nto be reached.\n\n#Hippocrates of Chios.#\n\nNot long after Antiphon and Bryson, Hippocrates of Chios treated the\nproblem, which had now become more and more famous, from a new point\nof view. Hippocrates was not satisfied with approximate equalities,\nand searched for curvilinearly bounded plane figures which should be\nmathematically equal to a rectilinearly bounded figure, and therefore\ncould be converted by ruler and compasses into a square equal in area.\nFirst, Hippocrates found that the crescent-shaped plane figure produced\nby drawing two perpendicular radii in a circle and describing upon the\nline joining their extremities a semicircle, is exactly equal in area\nto the triangle that is formed by this line of junction and the two\nradii; and upon the basis of this fact the endeavors of the untiring\nscholar were directed towards converting a circle into a crescent.\nNaturally he was unable to attain this object, but by his efforts to\nthis end he discovered many a new geometrical truth; among others the\ngeneralised form of the theorem mentioned, which bears to the present\nday the name of \"Lunulae Hippocratis,\" the lunes of Hippocrates. Thus\nit appears, in the case of Hippocrates, in the plainest light, how the\nvery insolvable problems of science are qualified to advance science;\nin that they incite investigators to devote themselves with persistence\nto its study and thus to fathom its depths.\n\n#Euclid's avoidance of the problem.#\n\nFollowing Hippocrates in the historical line of the great Grecian\ngeometricians comes the systematist Euclid, whose rigid formulation of\ngeometrical principles has remained the standard presentation down to\nthe present century. The Elements of Euclid, however, contain nothing\nrelating to the quadrature of the circle or to circle-computation.\nComparisons of surfaces which relate to the circle are indeed found in\nthe book, but nowhere a computation of the circumference of a circle\nor of the area of a circle. This palpable gap in Euclid's system was\nfilled by Archimedes, the greatest mathematician of antiquity.\n\n#Archimedes's calculations.#\n\nArchimedes was born in Syracuse in the year 287 B. C., and devoted his\nlife, there spent, to the mathematical and the physical sciences, which\nhe enriched with invaluable contributions. He lived in Syracuse till\nthe taking of the town by Marcellus, in the year 212 B. C., when he\nfell by the hand of a Roman soldier whom he had forbidden to destroy\nthe figures he had drawn in the sand. To the greatest performances of\nArchimedes the successful computation of the number \u03c0 unquestionably\nbelongs. Like Bryson he started with regular inscribed and\ncircumscribed polygons. He showed how it was possible, beginning with\nthe perimeter of an inscribed hexagon, which is equal to six radii,\nto obtain by way of calculation the perimeter of a regular dodecagon,\nand then the perimeter of a figure having double the number of sides\nof the preceding one. Treating, then, the circumscribed polygons in a\nsimilar manner, and proceeding with both series of polygons up to a\nregular 96-sided polygon, he perceived on the one hand that the ratio\nof the perimeter of the inscribed 96-sided polygon to the diameter\nwas greater than 6336 : 2017-1/4, and on the other hand, that the\ncorresponding ratio with respect to the circumscribed 96-sided polygon\nwas smaller than 14688 : 4673-1/2. He inferred from this, that the number\n\u03c0, the ratio of the circumference to the diameter, was greater than\nthe fraction 6336/2017-1/4 and smaller than 14688/4673-1/2. Reducing\nthe two limits thus found for the value of \u03c0, Archimedes then showed\nthat the first fraction was greater than and that 3-10/71 and that\nthe second fraction was smaller than 3-1/7, whence it followed with\ncertainty that the value sought for \u03c0 lay between 3-1/7 and 3-10/71.\nThe larger of these two approximate values is the only one usually\nlearned and employed. That which fills us most with astonishment in the\nArchimedean computation of \u03c0, is, first, the great acumen and accuracy\ndisplayed in all the details of the computation, and then the unwearied\nperseverance that he must have exercised in calculating the limits of\n\u03c0 without the advantages of the Arabian system of numerals and of the\ndecimal notation. For it must be considered that at many stages of the\ncomputation what we call the extraction of roots was necessary, and\nthat Archimedes could only by extremely tedious calculations obtain\nratios that expressed approximately the roots of given numbers and\nfractions.\n\n#The later mathematicians of Greece.#\n\nWith regard to the mathematicians of Greece that follow Archimedes,\nall refer to and employ the approximate value of 3-1/7 for \u03c0, without\nhowever, contributing anything essentially new or additional to the\nproblems of quadrature and of cyclometry. Thus Heron of Alexandria,\nthe father of surveying, who flourished about the year 100 B. C.,\nemploys for purposes of practical measurement sometimes the value\n3-1/7 for \u03c0 and sometimes even the rougher approximation \u03c0 = 3. The\nastronomer Ptolemy, who lived in Alexandria about the year 150 A.\nD., and who was famous as being the author of the planetary system\nuniversally recognised as correct down to the time of Copernicus, was\nthe only one who furnished a more exact value; this he designated, in\nthe sexigesimal system of fractional notation which he employed, by 3,\n8, 30,\u2014that is 3 and 8/60 and 30/3600, or as we now say 3 degrees,\n8 minutes (partes minutae primae), and 30 seconds (partes minutae\nsecundae). As a matter of fact, the expression 3 + 8/60 + 30/3600 =\n3-17/120 represents the number \u03c0 more exactly than 3-1/7; but on the\nother hand, is, by reason of the magnitude of the numbers 17 and 120 as\ncompared with the numbers 1 and 7, more cumbersome.\n\n\nIV.\n\n#Among the Romans.#\n\nIn the mathematical sciences, more than in any other, the Romans stood\nupon the shoulders of the Greeks. Indeed, with respect to cyclometry,\nthey not only did not add anything to the Grecian discoveries, but\noften evinced even that they either did not know of the beautiful\nresult obtained by Archimedes, or at least did not know how to\nappreciate it. For instance, Vitruvius, who lived during the time\nof Augustus, computed that a wheel 4 feet in diameter must measure\n12-1/2 feet in circumference; in other words, he made \u03c0 equal to\n3-1/8. And, similarly, a treatise on surveying, preserved to us in\nthe Gudian manuscript of the library at Wolfenb\u00fcttel, contains the\nfollowing instructions to square the circle: Divide the circumference\nof a circle into four parts and make one part the side of a square;\nthis square will be equal in area to the circle. Aside from the fact\nthat the rectification of the arc of a circle is requisite to the\nconstruction of a square of this kind, the Roman quadrature, viewed as\na calculation, is more inexact even than any other computation; for its\nresult is that \u03c0 = 4.\n\n#Among the Hindus.#\n\nThe mathematical performances of the Hindus were not only greater than\nthose of the Romans, but in certain directions even surpassed those of\nthe Greeks. In the most ancient source for the mathematics of India\nthat we know of, the Culvas\u00fbtras, which date back to a little before\nour chronological era, we do not find, it is true, the squaring of\nthe circle treated of, but the opposite problem is dealt with, which\nmight fittingly be termed the circling of the square. The half of the\nside of a given square is prolonged one third of the excess in length\nof half the diagonal over half the side, and the line thus obtained\nis taken as the radius of the circle equal in area to the square. The\nsimplest way to obtain an idea of the exactness of this construction\nis to compute how great \u03c0 would have to be if the construction were\nexactly correct. We find out in this way that the value of \u03c0 upon\nwhich the Indian circling of the square is based, is about from five\nto six hundredths smaller than the true value, whereas the approximate\n\u03c0 of Archimedes, 3-1/7, is only from one to two thousandths too large,\nand the old Egyptian value exceeds the true value by from one to two\nhundredths. Cyclometry very probably made great advances among the\nHindus in the first four or five centuries of our era; for Aryabhatta,\nwho lived about the year 500 after Christ, states, that the ratio of\nthe circumference to the diameter is 62832 : 20000, an approximation that\nin exactness surpasses even that of Ptolemy. The Hindu result gives\n3.1416 for \u03c0, while \u03c0 really lies between 3.141592 and 3.141593. How\nthe Hindus obtained this excellent approximate value is told by Gane\u00e7a,\nthe commentator of Bh\u00e2skara, an author of the twelfth century. Gane\u00e7a\nsays that the method of Archimedes was carried still farther by the\nHindu mathematicians; that by continually doubling the number of sides\nthey proceeded from the hexagon to a polygon of 384 sides, and that by\nthe comparison of the circumferences of the inscribed and circumscribed\n384-sided polygons they found that \u03c0 was equal to 3927: 1250. It will\nbe seen that the value given by Bh\u00e2skara is identical with the value of\nAryabhatta. It is further worthy of remark that the earlier of these\ntwo Hindu mathematicians does not mention either the value 3-1/7 of\nArchimedes or the value 3-17/120 of Ptolemy, but that the later knows\nof both values and especially recommends that of Archimedes as the\nmost useful one for practical application. Strange to say, the good\napproximate value of Aryabhatta does not occur in Bramagupta, the great\nHindu mathematician who flourished in the beginning of the seventh\ncentury; but we find the curious information in this author that the\narea of a circle is exactly equal to the square root of 10 when the\nradius is unity. The value of \u03c0 as derivable from this formula,\u2014a\nvalue from two to three hundredths too large,\u2014has unquestionably\narisen upon Hindu soil. For it occurs in no Grecian mathematician; and\nArabian authors, who were in a better position than we to know Greek\nand Hindu mathematical literature, declare that the approximation\nwhich makes \u03c0 equal to the square root of 10, is of Hindu origin. It\nis possible that the Hindu people, who were addicted more than any\nother to numeral mysticism, sought to find in this approximation some\nconnection with the fact that man has ten fingers; and ten accordingly\nis the basis of their numeral system.\n\nReviewing the achievements of the Hindus generally with respect to\nthe problem of the quadrature, we are brought to recognise that this\npeople, whose talents lay more in the line of arithmetical computation\nthan in the perception of spatial relations, accomplished as good as\nnothing on the pure geometrical side of the problem, but that the merit\nbelongs to them of having carried the Archimedean method of computing \u03c0\nseveral stages farther, and of having obtained in this way a much more\nexact value for it\u2014a circumstance that is explainable when we consider\nthat the Hindus are the inventors of our present system of numeral\nnotation, possessing which they easily outdid Archimedes, who employed\nthe awkward Greek system.\n\n#Among the Chinese.#\n\nWith regard to the Chinese, this people operated in ancient times\nwith the Babylonian value for \u03c0, or 3; but possessed knowledge of\nthe approximate value of Archimedes at least since the end of the\nsixth century. Besides this, there appears in a number of Chinese\nmathematical treatises an approximate value peculiarly their own, in\nwhich \u03c0 = 3-7/50; a value, however, which notwithstanding it is written\nin larger figures, is no better than that of Archimedes. Attempts at\nthe _constructive_ quadrature of the circle are not found among the\nChinese.\n\n#Among the Arabs.#\n\nGreater were the merits of the Arabians in the advancement and\ndevelopment of mathematics; and especially in virtue of the fact that\nthey preserved from oblivion both Greek and Hindu mathematics, and\nhanded them down to the Christian countries of the West. The Arabians\nexpressly distinguished between the Archimedean approximate value and\nthe two Hindu values the square root of 10 and the ratio 62832 : 20000.\nThis distinction occurs also in Muhammed Ibn Musa Alchwarizm\u00ee, the\nsame scholar who in the beginning of the ninth century brought the\nprinciples of our present system of numerical notation from India and\nintroduced the same into the Mohammedan world. The Arabians, however,\ndid not study the numerical quadrature of the circle only, but also\nthe constructive; as, for instance, Ibn Alhaitam, who lived in Egypt\nabout the year 1000 and whose treatise upon the squaring of the circle\nis preserved in a Vatican codex, which has unfortunately not yet been\nedited.\n\n#In Christian times.#\n\nChristian civilisation, to which we are now about to pass, produced up\nto the second half of the fifteenth century extremely insignificant\nresults in mathematics. Even with regard to our present problem we have\nbut a single important work to mention; the work, namely, of Frankos\nVon L\u00fcttich, upon the squaring of the circle, published in six books,\nbut only preserved in fragments. The author, who lived in the first\nhalf of the eleventh century, was probably a pupil of Pope Sylvester\nII, himself a not inconsiderable mathematician for his time, and who\nalso wrote the most celebrated book on geometry of the period.\n\n#Cardinal Nicolaus De Cusa.#\n\nGreater interest came to be bestowed upon mathematics in general, but\nespecially on the problem of the quadrature of the circle, in the\nsecond half of the fifteenth century, when the sciences again began\nto revive. This interest was especially aroused by Cardinal Nicolaus\nDe Cusa, a man highly esteemed on account of his astronomical and\ncalendarial studies. He claimed to have discovered the quadrature\nof the circle by the employment solely of compasses and ruler, and\nthus attracted the attention of scholars to the now historic problem.\nPeople believed the famous Cardinal, and marvelled at his wisdom,\nuntil Regiomontanus, in letters which he wrote in 1464 and 1465 and\nwhich were published in 1533, rigidly demonstrated that the Cardinal's\nquadrature was incorrect. The construction of Cusa was as follows. The\nradius of a circle is prolonged a distance equal to the side of the\ninscribed square; the line thus obtained is taken as the diameter of a\nsecond circle and in the latter an equilateral triangle is described;\nthen the perimeter of the latter is equal to the circumference of the\noriginal circle. If this construction, which its inventor regarded as\nexact, be considered as a construction of approximation, it will be\nfound to be more inexact even than the construction resulting from\nthe value \u03c0 = 3-1/7. For by Cusa's method \u03c0 would be from five to six\nthousandths smaller than it really is.\n\n#Bovillius and Orontius Finaeus.#\n\nIn the beginning of the sixteenth century a certain Bovillius appears,\nwho announced anew the construction of Cusa; meeting however with\nno notice. But about the middle of the sixteenth century a book was\npublished which the scholars of the time at first received with\ninterest. It bore the proud title \"De Rebus Mathematicis Hactenus\nDesideratis.\" Its author, Orontius Finaeus, represented that he had\novercome all the difficulties that had ever stood in the way of\ngeometrical investigators; and incidentally he also communicated to the\nworld the \"true quadrature\" of the circle. His fame was short-lived.\nFor soon afterwards, in a book entitled \"De Erratis Orontii,\" the\nPortuguese Petrus Nonius demonstrated that Orontius's quadrature, like\nmost of his other professed discoveries, was incorrect.\n\n#Simon Van Eyck.#\n\nIn the period following this the number of circle-squarers so increased\nthat we shall have to limit ourselves to those whom mathematicians\nrecognise. And particularly is Simon Van Eyck to be mentioned, who\ntowards the close of the sixteenth century published a quadrature which\nwas so approximate that the value of \u03c0 derived from it was more exact\nthan that of Archimedes; and to disprove it the mathematician Peter\nMetius was obliged to seek a still more accurate value than 3-1/7. The\nerroneous quadrature of Van Eyck was thus the occasion of Metius's\ndiscovery that the ratio 355 : 113, or 3-16/113, varied from the true\nvalue of \u03c0 by less than one one-millionth, eclipsing accordingly all\nvalues hitherto obtained. Moreover, it is demonstrable by the theory of\ncontinued fractions, that, admitting figures to four places only, no\ntwo numbers more exactly represent the value of \u03c0 than 355 and 113.\n\n#Joseph Scaliger.#\n\nIn the same way the quadrature of the great philologist Joseph\nScaliger led to refutations. Like most circle-squarers who believe\nin their discovery, Scaliger also was little versed in the elements\nof geometry. He solved, however,\u2014at least in his own opinion he\ndid,\u2014the famous problem; and published in 1592 a book upon it, which\nbore the pretentious title \"Nova Cyclometria\" and in which the name of\nArchimedes was derided. The worthlessness of his supposed discovery was\ndemonstrated to him by the greatest mathematicians of his time; namely,\nVieta, Adrianus Romanus, and Clavius.\n\n#Longomontanus, John Porta, and Gregory St. Vincent.#\n\nOf the erring circle-squarers that flourished before the middle\nof the seventeenth century three others deserve particular\nmention\u2014Longomontanus of Copenhagen, who rendered such great services\nto astronomy, the Neapolitan John Porta, and Gregory of St. Vincent.\nLongomontanus made \u03c0 = 3-14185/100000, and was so convinced of the\ncorrectness of his result that he thanked God fervently, in the preface\nto his work \"Inventio Quadraturae Circuli,\" that He had granted him in\nhis high old age the strength to conquer the celebrated difficulty.\nJohn Porta followed the initiative of Hippocrates, and believed he had\nsolved the problem by the comparison of lunes. Gregory of St. Vincent\npublished a quadrature, the error of which was very hard to detect but\nwas finally discovered by Descartes.\n\n#Peter Metius and Vieta.#\n\nOf the famous mathematicians who dealt with our problem in the period\nbetween the close of the fifteenth century and the time of Newton,\nwe first meet with Peter Metius, before mentioned, who succeeded\nin finding in the fraction 355 : 113 the best approximate value for\n\u03c0 involving only small numbers. The problem received a different\nadvancement at the hands of the famous mathematician Vieta. Vieta\nwas the first to whom the idea occurred of representing \u03c0 with\nmathematical exactness by an infinite series of continuable operations.\nBy comparison of inscribed and circumscribed polygons, Vieta found\nthat we approach nearer and nearer to \u03c0 if we allow the operations\nof the extraction of the square root of 1/2, and of addition and of\nmultiplication to succeed each other in a certain manner, and that\n\u03c0 must come out exactly, if this series of operations could be\nindefinitely continued. Vieta thus found that to a diameter of 10000\nmillion units a circumference belongs of 31415 million and from 926535\nto 926536 units of the same length.\n\n#Adrianus Romanus, Ludolf Van Ceulen.#\n\nBut Vieta was outdone by the Netherlander Adrianus Romanus, who added\nfive additional decimal places to the ten of Vieta. To accomplish this\nhe computed with unspeakable labor the circumference of a regular\ncircumscribed polygon of 1073741824 sides. This number is the thirtieth\npower of 2. Yet great as the labor of Adrianus Romanus was, that\nof Ludolf Van Ceulen was still greater; for the latter calculator\nsucceeded in carrying the Archimedean process of approximation for the\nvalue of \u03c0 to 35 decimal places, that is, the deviation from the true\nvalue was smaller than one one-thousand quintillionth, a degree of\nexactness that we can hardly have any conception of. Ludolf published\nthe figures of the tremendous computation that led to this result. His\ncalculation was carefully examined by the mathematician Griemberger\nand declared to be correct. Ludolf was justly proud of his work, and\nfollowing the example of Archimedes, requested in his will that the\nresult of his most important mathematical performance, the computation\nof \u03c0 to 35 decimal places, be engraved upon his tombstone; a request\nwhich is said to have been carried out. In honor of Ludolf, \u03c0 is called\nto-day in Germany the Ludolfian number.\n\n#The new method of Snell. Huygens's verification of it.#\n\nAlthough through the labor of Ludolf a degree of exactness for\ncyclometrical operations was now obtained that was more than sufficient\nfor any practical purpose that could ever arise, neither the problem\nof constructive rectification nor that of constructive quadrature was\nthereby in any respect theoretically advanced. The investigations\nconducted by the famous mathematicians and physicists Huygens and\nSnell about the middle of the seventeenth century, were more important\nfrom a mathematical point of view than the work of Ludolf. In his book\n\"Cyclometricus\" Snell took the position that the method of comparison\nof polygons, which originated with Archimedes and was employed by\nLudolf, need by no means be the best method of attaining the end\nsought; and he succeeded by the employment of propositions which state\nthat certain arcs of a circle are greater or smaller than certain\nstraight lines connected with the circle, in obtaining methods that\nmake it possible to reach results like the Ludolfian with much less\nlabor of calculation. The beautiful theorems of Snell were proved a\nsecond time, and better proved, by the celebrated Dutch promoter of the\nscience of optics, Huygens (Opera Varia, p. 365 et seq.; \"Theoremata De\nCirculi et Hyperbolae Quadratura,\" 1651), as well as perfected in many\nways. Snell and Huygens were fully aware that they had advanced only\nthe problem of numerical quadrature, and not that of the constructive\nquadrature. This, in Huygens's case, plainly appeared from the vehement\ndispute he conducted with the English mathematician James Gregory.\nThis controversy has some significance for the history of our problem,\nfrom the fact that Gregory made the first attempt to prove that the\nsquaring of the circle with ruler and compasses must be impossible.\n#The controversy between Huygens and Gregory.# The result of the\ncontroversy, to which we owe many valuable treatises, was, that Huygens\nfinally demonstrated in an incontrovertible manner the incorrectness\nof Gregory's proof of impossibility, adding that he also was of\nopinion that the solution of the problem with ruler and compasses was\nimpossible, but nevertheless was not himself able to demonstrate this\nfact. And Newton, later, expressed himself to a similar effect. As a\nmatter of fact it took till the most recent period, that is over 200\nyears, until higher mathematics was far enough advanced to furnish a\nrigid demonstration of impossibility.\n\n\nV.\n\nBefore we proceed to consider the promotive influence which the\ninvention of the differential and the integral calculus had upon our\nproblem, we shall enumerate a few at least of that never-ending line\nof mistaken quadrators who delighted the world by the fruits of their\ningenuity from the time of Newton to the present period; and out of a\npious and sincere consideration for the contemporary world, we shall\nentirely omit in this to speak of the circle-squarers of our own time.\n\n#Hobbes's quadrature.#\n\nFirst to be mentioned is the celebrated English philosopher Hobbes.\nIn his book \"De Problematis Physicis,\" in which he chiefly proposes\nto explain the phenomena of gravity and of ocean tides, he also takes\nup the quadrature of the circle and gives a very trivial construction\nthat in his opinion definitively solved the problem, making \u03c0 = 3-1/5.\nIn view of Hobbes's importance as a philosopher, two mathematicians,\nHuygens and Wallis, thought it proper to refute Hobbes at length.\nBut Hobbes defended his position in a special treatise, in which\nto sustain at least the appearance of being right, he disputed the\nfundamental principles of geometry and the theorem of Pythagoras; so\nthat mathematicians could pass on from him to the order of the day.\n\n#French quadrators of the Eighteenth Century.#\n\nIn the last century France especially was rich in circle-squarers.\nWe will mention: Oliver de Serres, who by means of a pair of scales\ndetermined that a circle weighed as much as the square upon the side\nof the equilateral triangle inscribed in it, that therefore they\nmust have the same area, an experiment in which \u03c0 = 3; Mathulon, who\noffered in legal form a reward of a thousand dollars to the person\nwho would point out an error in his solution of the problem, and who\nwas actually compelled by the courts to pay the money; Basselin, who\nbelieved that his quadrature must be right because it agreed with the\napproximate value of Archimedes, and who anathematised his ungrateful\ncontemporaries, in the confidence that he would be recognised by\nposterity; Liger, who proved that a part is greater than the whole\nand to whom therefore the quadrature of the circle was child's play;\nClerget, who based his solution upon the principle that a circle is a\npolygon of a definite number of sides, and who calculated, also, among\nother things, how large the point is at which two circles touch.\n\n#Germany and Poland.#\n\nGermany and Poland also furnish their contingent to the army of\ncircle-squarers. Lieutenant-Colonel Corsonich produced a quadrature\nin which \u03c0 equalled 3-1/8, and promised fifty ducats to the person\nwho could prove that it was incorrect. Hesse of Berlin wrote an\narithmetic in 1776, in which a true quadrature was also \"made known,\"\n\u03c0 being exactly equal to 3-14/99. About the same time Professor\nBischoff of Stettin defended a quadrature previously published by\nCaptain Leistner, Preacher Merkel, and Schoolmaster B\u00f6hm, which made\n\u03c0 _implicite_ equal to the square of 62/35, not even attaining the\napproximation of Archimedes.\n\n#Constructive approximations. Euler. Kochansky.#\n\nFrom attempts of this character are to be clearly distinguished\nconstructions of approximation in which the inventor is aware that\nhe has not found a mathematically exact construction, but only\nan approximate one. The value of such a construction will depend\nupon two things\u2014first, upon the degree of exactness with which\nit is numerically expressed, and secondly on the fact whether the\nconstruction can be more or less easily made with ruler and compasses.\nConstructions of this kind, simple in form and yet sufficiently exact\nfor practical purposes, have for centuries been furnished us in great\nnumbers. The great mathematician Euler, who died in 1783, did not think\nit out of place to attempt an approximate construction of this kind. A\nvery simple construction for the rectification of the circle and one\nwhich has passed into many geometrical text books, is that published\nby Kochansky in 1685 in the _Leipziger Berichte_. It is as follows:\n\"Erect upon the diameter of a circle at its extremities perpendiculars;\nwith the centre as vertex, mark off upon the diameter an angle of 30\u00b0;\nfind the point of intersection with the perpendicular of the line\nlast drawn, and join this point of intersection with that point upon\nthe other perpendicular which is at a distance of three radii from\nthe base of the perpendicular. The line of junction thus obtained is\nthen very approximately equal to one-half of the circumference of the\ngiven circle.\" Calculation shows that the difference between the true\nlength of the circumference and the line thus constructed is less than\n3/100000 of the diameter.\n\n#Inutility of constructive approximations.#\n\nAlthough such constructions of approximation are very interesting\nin themselves, they nevertheless play but a subordinate r\u00f4le in the\nhistory of the squaring of the circle; for on the one hand they can\nnever furnish greater exactness for circle-computation than the\nthirty-five decimal places which Ludolf found, and on the other hand\nthey are not adapted to advance in any way the question whether the\nexact quadrature of the circle with ruler and compasses is possible.\n\n#The researches of Newton, Leibnitz, Wallis, and Brouncker.#\n\nThe numerical side of the problem, however, was considerably advanced\nby the new mathematical methods perfected by Newton and Leibnitz,\ncommonly called the differential and the integral calculus. And about\nthe middle of the seventeenth century, some time before Newton and\nLeibnitz represented \u03c0 by series of powers, the English mathematicians\nWallis and Lord Brouncker, Newton's predecessors in a certain sense,\nsucceeded in representing \u03c0 by an infinite series of figures combined\nby the first four rules of arithmetic. A new method of computation was\nthus opened. Wallis found that the fourth part of \u03c0 is represented more\nexactly by the regularly formed product\n\n 2/3 \u00d7 4/3 \u00d7 4/5 \u00d7 6/5 \u00d7 6/7 \u00d7 8/7 \u00d7 8/9 \u00d7 etc.\n\nthe farther the multiplication is continued, and that the result always\ncomes out too small if we stop at a proper fraction but too large if\nwe stop at an improper fraction. Lord Brouncker, on the other hand,\nrepresents the value in question by a continued fraction in which all\nthe denominators are equal to 2 and the numerators are odd square\nnumbers. Wallis, to whom Brouncker had communicated his elegant result\nwithout proof, demonstrated the same in his \"Arithmetic of Infinites.\"\n\nThe computation of \u03c0 could hardly be farther advanced by these results\nthan Ludolf and others had carried it, though of course in a more\nlaborious way. However, the series of powers derived by the assistance\nof the differential calculus of Newton and Leibnitz furnished a means\nof computing it to hundreds of decimal places.\n\n#Other calculations.#\n\nGregory, Newton, and Leibnitz next found that the fourth part of \u03c0 was\nequal exactly to\n\n 1 - 1/3 + 1/5 - 1/7 + 1/9 - 1/11 + 1/13 - ...\n\nif we conceive this series, which is called the Leibnitzian,\nindefinitely continued. This series is indeed wonderfully simple, but\nis not adapted to the computation of \u03c0, for the reason that entirely\ntoo many members have to be taken into account to obtain \u03c0 accurately\nto a few decimal places only. The original formula, however, from which\nthis series is derived, gives other formulas which are excellently\nadapted to the actual computation. This formula is the general series:\n\n \u03b1 = _a_ - 1/3_a_^3 + 1/5_a_^5 - 1/7_a_^7 + ...,\n\nwhere \u03b1 is the length of the arc that belongs to any central angle in\na circle of radius 1, and where _a_ is the tangent to this angle. From\nthis we derive the following:\n\n \u03c0/4 = (_a_ + _b_ + _c_ + ...) - 1/3(_a_^3 + _b_^3 + _c_^3 + ...)\n + 1/5(_a_^5 + _b_^5 + _c_^5 + ...) - ...,\n\nwhere _a_, _b_, _c_ ... are the tangents of angles whose sum is\n45\u00b0. Determining, therefore, the values of _a_, _b_, _c_ ..., which\nare equal to small and easy fractions and fulfil the condition just\nmentioned, we obtain series of powers which are adapted to the\ncomputation of \u03c0. The first to add by the aid of series of this\ndescription additional decimal places to the old 35 in the number \u03c0\nwas the English arithmetician Abraham Sharp, who following Halley's\ninstructions, in 1700, worked out \u03c0 to 72 decimal places. A little\nlater Machin, professor of astronomy in London, computed \u03c0 to 100\ndecimal places; putting, in the series given above, _a_ = _b_ = _c_ =\n_d_ = 1/5 and _e_ =-1/239, that is employing the following series:\n\n \u03c0/4 = 4. [1/5 - 1/3.5^3 + 1/5.5^5 - 1/7.5^7 + ...]\n - [1/239 - 1/3.239^3 + 1/5.239^5 - ...]\n\n#The computation of \u03c0 to many decimal places.#\n\nIn the year 1819, Lagny of Paris outdid the computation of Machin,\ndetermining in two different ways the first 127 decimal places of \u03c0.\nVega then obtained as many as 140 places, and the Hamburg arithmetician\nZacharias Dase went as far as 200 places. The latter did not use\nMachin's series in his calculation, but the series produced by putting\nin the general series above given _a_ = 1/2, _b_ = 1/5, _c_ = 1/8.\nFinally, at a recent date, \u03c0 has been computed to 500 places.\n\n#Idea of exactness obtainable with the approximate values of \u03c0.#\n\nThe computation to so many decimal places may serve as an illustration\nof the excellence of the modern method as contrasted with those\nanciently employed, but otherwise it has neither a theoretical nor a\npractical value. That the computation of \u03c0 to say 15 decimal places\nmore than sufficiently satisfies the subtlest requirements of practice\nmay be gathered from a concrete example of the degree of exactness thus\nobtainable. Imagine a circle to be described with Berlin as centre, and\nthe circumference to pass through Hamburg; then let the circumference\nof the circle be computed by multiplying its diameter with the value of\n\u03c0 to 15 decimal places, and then conceive it to be actually measured.\nThe deviation from the true length in so large a circle as this even\ncould not be as great as the 18 millionth part of a millimetre.\n\nAn idea can hardly be obtained of the degree of exactness produced by\n100 decimal places. But the following example may possibly give us\nsome conception of it. Conceive a sphere constructed with the earth\nas centre, and imagine its surface to pass through Sirius, which is\n134-1/2 million million kilometres distant from us. Then imagine\nthis enormous sphere to be so packed with microbes that in every\ncubic millimetre millions of millions of these diminutive animalcula\nare present. Now conceive these microbes to be all unpacked and so\ndistributed singly along a straight line, that every two microbes are\nas far distant from each other as Sirius from us, that is 134-1/2\nmillion million kilometres. Conceive the long line thus fixed by\nall the microbes, as the diameter of a circle, and imagine the\ncircumference of it to be calculated by multiplying its diameter with \u03c0\nto 100 decimal places. Then, in the case of a circle of this enormous\nmagnitude even, the circumference thus calculated would not vary from\nthe real circumference by a millionth of a millimetre.\n\nThis example will suffice to show that the calculation of \u03c0 to 100 or\n500 decimal places is wholly useless.\n\n#Professor Wolff's curious method.#\n\nBefore we close this chapter upon the evaluation of \u03c0, we must mention\nthe method, less fruitful than curious, which Professor Wolff of Zurich\nemployed some decades ago to compute the value of \u03c0 to 3 places. The\nfloor of a room is divided up into equal squares, so as to resemble\na huge chess-board, and a needle exactly equal in length to the side\nof each of these squares, is cast haphazard upon the floor. If we\ncalculate, now, the probabilities of the needle so falling as to lie\nwholly within one of the squares, that is so that it does not cross\nany of the parallel lines forming the squares, the result of the\ncalculation for this probability will be found to be exactly equal to \u03c0\n- 3. Consequently, a sufficient number of casts of the needle according\nto the law of large numbers must give the value of \u03c0 approximately. As\na matter of fact, Professor Wolff, after 10000 trials, obtained the\nvalue of \u03c0 correctly to 3 decimal places.\n\n#Mathematicians now seek to prove the insolvability of the problem.#\n\nFruitful as the calculus of Newton and Leibnitz was for the evaluation\nof \u03c0, the problem of converting a circle into a square having exactly\nthe same area was in no wise advanced thereby. Wallis, Newton,\nLeibnitz, and their immediate followers distinctly recognised this.\nThe quadrature of the circle could not be solved; but it also\ncould not be proved that the problem was insolvable with ruler and\ncompasses, although everybody was convinced of its insolvability. In\nmathematics, however, a conviction is only justified when supported\nby incontrovertible proof; and in the place of endeavors to solve\nthe quadrature there accordingly now come endeavors to prove the\nimpossibility of solving the celebrated problem.\n\n#Lambert's contribution.#\n\nThe first step in this direction, small as it was, was made by the\nFrench mathematician Lambert, who proved in the year 1761 that \u03c0 was\nneither a rational number nor even the square root of a rational\nnumber; that is, that neither \u03c0 nor the square of \u03c0 can be exactly\nrepresented by a fraction the denominator and numerator of which are\nwhole numbers, however great the numbers be taken. Lambert's proof\nshowed, indeed, that the rectification and the quadrature of the\ncircle could not be possibly accomplished in the particular way in\nwhich its impossibility was demonstrated, but it still did not exclude\nthe possibility of the problem being solvable in some other more\ncomplicated way, and without requiring further aids than ruler and\ncompasses.\n\n#The conditions of the demonstration.#\n\nProceeding slowly but surely it was next sought to discover the\nessential distinguishing properties that separate problems solvable\nwith ruler and compasses, from problems the construction of which is\nelementarily impossible, that is by solely employing the postulates.\nSlight reflection showed, that a problem elementarily solvable, must\nalways possess the property of having the unknown lines in the figure\nrelating to it connected with the known lines of the figure by an\nequation for the solution of which equations of the first and second\ndegree alone are requisite, and which may be so disposed that the\ncommon measures of the known lines will appear only as integers. The\nconclusion was to be drawn from this, that if the quadrature of the\ncircle and consequently its rectification were elementarily solvable,\nthe number \u03c0, which represents the ratio of the unknown circumference\nto the known diameter, must be the root of a certain equation, of a\nvery high degree perhaps, but in which all the numbers that appear are\nwhole numbers; that is, there would have to exist an equation, made\nup entirely of whole numbers, which would be correct if its unknown\nquantity were made equal to \u03c0.\n\n#Final success of Prof. Lindemann.#\n\nSince the beginning of this century, consequently, the efforts of a\nnumber of mathematicians have been bent upon proving that \u03c0 generally\nis not algebraical, that is, that it cannot be the root of any equation\nhaving whole numbers for coefficients. But mathematics had to make\ntremendous strides forward before the means were at hand to accomplish\nthis demonstration. After the French Academician, Professor Hermite,\nhad furnished important preparatory assistance in his treatise \"Sur la\nFonction Exponentielle,\" published in the seventy-seventh volume of\nthe \"Comptes Rendus,\" Professor Lindemann, at that time of Freiburg,\nnow of K\u00f6nigsberg, finally succeeded, in June 1882, in rigorously\ndemonstrating that the number \u03c0 is not algebraical,[52] thus supplying\nthe first proof that the problems of the rectification and the squaring\nof the circle, with the help only of algebraical instruments like ruler\nand compasses are insolvable. Lindemann's proof appeared successively\nin the Reports of the Berlin Academy (June, 1882), in the \"Comptes\nRendus\" of the French Academy (Vol. 115. pp. 72 to 74), and in the\n\"Mathematischen Annalen\" (Vol. 20. pp. 213 to 225).\n\n [52] For the benefit of my mathematical readers I shall\n present here the most important steps of Lindemann's\n demonstration, M. Hermite in order to prove the transcendental\n character of\n\n _e_ = 1 + 1/1 + 1/1.2 + 1/1.2.3 + 1/1.2.3.4 + ....\n\n developed relations between certain definite integrals\n (_Comptes Rendus_ of the Paris Academy, Vol. 77, 1873).\n Proceeding from the relations thus established, Professor\n Lindemann first demonstrates the following proposition: If\n the coefficients of an equation of _n_th degree are all real\n or complex whole numbers and the n roots of this equation\n _z_{1}, _z_{2}, ..., _z_{_n_} are different from zero and\n from each other it is impossible for\n\n _e_^_z_{1} + _e_^_z_{2} + _e_^_z_{3} ... + _e_^_z_{_n_}\n\n to be equal to _a_/_b_, where _a_ and _b_ are real or complex\n whole numbers. It is then shown that also between the functions\n\n _e_^{_rz_{1}} + _e_^{_rz_{2}} + _e_^{_rz_{3}}\n + ... _e_^{_rz_{_n_}},\n\n where _r_ denotes an integer, no linear equation can exist\n with rational coefficients variant from zero. Finally\n the beautiful theorem results: If _z_ is the root of an\n irreducible algebraic equation the coefficients of which are\n real or complex whole numbers, then _e_^_z_ cannot be equal\n to a rational number. Now in reality _e_^{t\u221a-1} is equal to a\n rational number, namely,-1. Consequently, \u03c0\u221a-1, and therefore\n \u03c0 itself, cannot be the root of an equation of _n_th degree\n having whole numbers for coefficients, and therefore also not\n of such an equation having rational coefficients. The property\n last mentioned, however, \u03c0 would have if the squaring of the\n circle with ruler and compasses were possible.\n\n#The verdict of mathematics.#\n\n\"It is impossible with ruler and compasses to construct a square\nequal in area to a given circle.\" These are the words of the final\ndetermination of a controversy which is as old as the history of the\nhuman mind. But the race of circle-squarers, unmindful of the verdict\nof mathematics, that most infallible of arbiters, will never die out so\nlong as ignorance and the thirst for glory shall be united.\n\n HERMANN SCHUBERT.\n\n\n\n\nTHE CRITERION OF TRUTH.\n\nA DISSERTATION ON THE METHOD OF VERIFICATION.\n\n\nModern science rests upon the recognition of the truth that all\nknowledge is a statement of facts. The formulation of natural laws is\nnothing but a comprehensive description of certain kinds of natural\nprocesses. Natural laws are generalisations of facts. Similarly,\nany philosophical theory is, or from the modern standpoint ought to\nbe, simply a systematised representation of facts. Facts are the\nbottom-rock to which, everywhere, we have to go down.\n\nThe recognition of this maxim is called, most appropriately,\npositivism; and I take it that as a matter of principle all modern\nthinkers can and perhaps do agree to it. A Roman Catholic philosopher\nmay consider some things as facts which a scientist of heretic England,\nfor instance, does not; yet it is from facts, or what is thought to be\nfacts, that every one derives his conception of the world.\n\nIt is natural that the range of individual experience should be\nvery limited in comparison with the knowledge indispensably needed\nfor acquiring an adequate conception of the world in which we live.\nWe have, to a great extent, to rely on statements of facts which\nwe ourselves have not observed. To enrich and to enlarge our own\nexperience we have to imbibe the experience of others. Sometimes we\ncan, but sometimes we cannot, verify what we have been told. For\ninstance, that stones fall through empty space with a velocity of\n32\u00b718 English feet at the end of the first second can be verified\nby experiment, i. e., the experiment can be repeated under the same\ncircumstances. But historical data such as whether Buddha died under\na fig-tree, or whether Christ was crucified under Pontius Pilate,\ncannot be verified by experiment. Historical data are statements, not\nof general truths, but of single facts, which, if they are accepted\nat all, have to be taken on authority. The authority may be weak or\nstrong; it may be strong enough to be equivalent practically to a\ncertainty, which latter case occurs, for instance, when the fact in\nquestion in its direct consequences perceptibly affects our life, and\nits causal connection can thus be directly and indubitably traced.\n\nIt is not intended here to emphasise the difference between facts\nverifiable by experiment, and historical facts; yet it is desirable\nwith reference to all kinds of facts stated on authority, to understand\nthe importance of a criterion of truth. We do accept and we have to\naccept, every one of us, without any exception, the most discriminate\nscientist even and most of all the philosopher, innumerable statements\nof facts as they have been observed by others. We all have to rely on\nthe authority of others. The time of the longest human life would be\ntoo short to repeat all the experiments made by others, with a view\nto verifying them in detail. On the other hand, it is obvious that no\nstatement of facts should be accepted on pure authority. We must have\na means, a sieve as it were, by which the wheat can easily be winnowed\nfrom the chaff; a sieve that will enable us to discard at once those\nstatements that are positively erroneous. In this way our attention\ncan be confined to statements of things that are possible, those that\nneed not, but _may_ be true. \"Possible\" in German is very appropriately\ncalled _m\u00f6glich_, i. e. _mayable_.\n\nThe criterion of that which 'may be' true is the first step towards\nascertaining truth; and although it does not exhaust the methods of\narriving at truth it is of greatest consequence, for if properly\nunderstood and applied, it would save from the start many useless\nefforts in the investigation of truth.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe question arises then, What is the criterion of the possible? We\nreject statements, sometimes, as _prima facie_ untrue. Have we a right\nto do so? And if we have, by what standard do we determine this?\n\nLet us first take into consideration how people really behave when a\nstatement of new facts is made. Take, for instance, the following case.\nTwo strangers meet; A. and B. Mr. A. relates to Mr. B. some incident\nof his life. He is apparently a very trustworthy person and during\nthe conversation remains perfectly serious. He tells a ghost story in\ndetail, how a departed friend of his appeared to him in distinctly\nvisible form; he says that the spirit spoke to him and told him many\nstrange things, and that he pointed out to him an imminent danger.\n\nWe suppose that on the one hand A. makes his statement in good faith\nand that on the other hand B. is a spiritualist. Will B. consider\nA.'s story as possible? B., being a spiritualist, most probably will\nconsider A.'s story as possible, and, if he is convinced of A.'s\nhonesty, he will believe the story the same as if he had experienced\nit himself; no less than a scientist will rely on the statement of an\nexperiment made by one of his colleagues whose scientific veracity he\nhas no reason to doubt.\n\nSuppose A. tells the same story to C. Mr. C. is an infidel and a\nmaterialist. As characteristic features of his personality we might\nmention that he considers religion as pure superstition originated by\nthe fraud of cunning priests. This man will, we may fairly suppose,\nlaugh at A.'s story, because it appears to him an out and out lie. Mr.\nA. as well as Mr. B., he who tells and he who believes the story, C.\nwill declare, are either insane or they are both impostors.\n\nThe difference of opinion in B. and C. indicates that the criterion\nof truth is different with different persons and that it depends upon\ntheir conception of the world. Men who have the same world-conception\nwill also have the same criterion of truth.\n\nThe problem consequently is, whether this criterion of truth (i. e. the\ncriterion of what is possible) is necessarily wholly subjective, or\nwhether we can arrive at an objective criterion. It is apparent that\nthis question is intimately connected with another problem, namely,\nIs every world-conception necessarily subjective, or, Is it possible\nto arrive at an objective world-conception? It appears to me that we\ncan; and the ideal of philosophy to-day is just such an objective\nrepresentation of facts.\n\nThe difficulty that presents itself lies mainly in the confusion\nbetween facts and our interpretation of facts. If A. declares that he\nsaw a ghost, he does not relate a fact, but his interpretation of a\nfact. Let us suppose that he tells his story again to a third person\nD., who is a psychologist. D. most likely will not think him a liar.\nD. will accept the statement _bona fide_ as a mere interpretation of a\nfact and will inquire after the causes that produced the hallucination.\nHe may be able, possibly, to lay bare the facts disfigured by the wrong\ninterpretation of A. And having clearly stated the objective state\nof things he may with the assistance of his experience explain the\norigin of the whole process, partly from the mental condition and the\nphysiological constitution of A., partly from individual circumstances\nthat gave rise to the hallucination. He will not doubt that something\nextraordinary has happened to Mr. A. The latter's mind has been, and\nperhaps still is in an abnormal state. And as to B.'s believing the\nghost story, Mr. D. will not think that he is insane; though we may\npresume that he will regard B.'s views of the world as resting upon\nunfirm grounds; and he will not believe him to be a man of critical\nability.\n\nThe notion is very common among idealists that we can never go beyond\nour subjective states of consciousness. This would be tantamount to\nsaying that there is no difference between dreams and real life, except\nthat a dream is cut off by awaking while life lasts comparatively much\nlonger and ceases with death, which may also be an awakening from\na dream. In that case hallucinations would be of the same value as\nsensations. Both would be interpretations of facts for which we do not\nhave an objective criterion of truth. Interpretations of facts would\nbe the sole facts, and it would be quite indifferent whether they were\nmisinterpretations or correct interpretations.\n\nTake a simple instance. We see a tree. The perception of a tree is an\ninterpretation of a set of facts. Interpretations of facts, whether\ncorrect or not, are of course also facts. Thus the perception of a tree\nis a fact which, if all matter were transparent, would, physiologically\nconsidered, appear to the eye of an observer as special vibrations in\nthe brain. But the peculiarity of this fact is that it represents\nother facts. The question is no longer whether there is a perception of\na tree taking place in a brain, but whether this perception is true,\ni. e., whether it agrees with the facts represented. Every perception\nhas a meaning beyond itself; every perception is a fact representing\nother facts, and the question of truth or untruth has reference to the\nagreement between representations and facts represented.\n\nProfessor Mach says in his essay \"The Analysis of Sensations\" (_The\nMonist_, Vol. I. No. I, p. 65):\n\n \"Bodies do not produce sensations, but complexes of sensations\n (complexes of elements) form bodies.\"[53]\n\n [53] Professor Mach in thus speaking of bodies uses the\n word in the sense of representations and not in the sense\n of objects represented. He calls them in the sentence next\n following \"thought-symbols for complexes of sensations\n (complexes of elements).\"\n\nAnd, certainly, we do not deny that upon a closer analysis the\nperception of a tree appears as a bundle, or a complex of sensations;\nthere is the green of the leaves, the color of the bark, the different\nshades of the color indicating its bodily form, the shape of the\nbranches, and their slight motions in the breeze that gently shakes the\ntree. Yet the perception of a tree does not consist of these sensations\nalone. All these sensations might be so many isolated sensations; and\nif they remained isolated, they would not produce the percept of a\ntree. These sensations are interpreted; they have acquired a meaning\nand are combined into a unity. It is this unity which constitutes the\nperception of a tree. This unity has grown from sensations; and that\nprocess which develops and, as we have learned, naturally must develop\nsensations from sense-impressions, and from sensations perceptions\nthat are representative of a group of facts outside of the perceptions\nthemselves,\u2014that process we define as mind-activity.\n\nWhat does the 'perception of a tree' mean? It means that if the person\nperceiving it moves in a certain direction and over a certain distance,\nhe will have certain sensations which upon the whole can be correctly\nanticipated. Every perception and also every sensation contains a\nnumber of anticipations. The perception of a tree is in so far to be\nconsidered correct, as the anticipations which it contains, and of\nwhich it actually consists, can be realised. If and in so far as these\nanticipations when realised tally with the perception, if and in so far\nas they justify it, or can justify it, if and in so far as they fulfil\nthe expectations produced by the perception, if and in so far as they\nmake no alteration of the perception necessary, but being in agreement\nwith it confirm the representation it conveys: the perception is said\nto be true. Moreover, we can predict similar results with regard to\nbeings of a similar constitution.\n\n * * * * *\n\nNow let us suppose that an apple falls from a considerable height to\nthe ground. Knowing, from former experiences, the hardness of the soil\nas well as the density of the apple, we can anticipate the effect of\nthe fall. The soil will not show any considerable impression, yet\none side of the apple will be crushed. In predicting this result\nwe anticipate sensations that we shall have under a certain set of\ncircumstances. In so far as we shall necessarily have these sensations\nwe have to deal with facts. Not as if our sensations constitute the\nentire existence of facts; our sensations, being the effects of\nso-called objective processes upon our senses, are only one end of a\nrelation, which as a matter of course never exists without the other\nend. Sensations are the one end; they depend upon and vary with the\nother end. Showing within certain limits as many varieties here as\noccur there, they represent the other end.\n\nWe can, and for certain purposes we must, entirely eliminate the\nsubjective and sensory part of our sensations, in order to represent\nin our minds not how two objects affect our senses of sight or touch\nbut how two or more objects affect each other. Thus we arrive at an\nobjective statement of facts, how the falling apple affects the soil,\nand the soil the apple; while the relation of both to our senses is\nto be eliminated. This objective statement of facts is the ideal of\nall natural sciences. The physicist states the interaction between the\nfalling apple and the soil. He does not care how many sentient beings\nwitness the fall; he does not care about the psychological element in\ntheir observations. He abstracts from the subjective elements in their\nobservations as well as in his own, and confines his attention to the\nobjective facts represented in their minds.\n\nThe objection to this conception of things is made by a consistent\nidealist, that these observations must always exist in some mind, they\ndo not exist outside of a mind, and mind can as little go beyond itself\nas a person can walk outside of his skin. Certainly, observations\nalways exist in some mind; they have always a subjective element. But\nthey have also an objective element. No sensation, no perception, no\nobservation is without an objective feature. This objective feature\nin a sensation or a perception, and also in an abstract idea, is the\nelement that if true has to agree with other facts outside of the\nsentient being of whose mind the perception is a part. An idealist who\nis pleased to deny this would either have to identify hallucinations\nwith sensations, or he would be obliged to consider the objective\nelements of his mind merely and solely as subjective states, having\nno representative value. In that case he would necessarily be obliged\nto consider the facts represented, i. e. the things outside the body,\nas parts of his mind. This being granted, every mind would appear\nas congruent and coextensive with the universe. We should have as\nmany universes as there are minds, and yet all universes would be\nonly one and the same universe, their sole difference being that of\na difference of centres. With the death of every living creature a\nuniverse would die; but notwithstanding the chain of consciousness were\nbroken forever in death, the existence of his mind, being that which\nis commonly considered as the objective universe, would not cease;\nmerely a view-centre would be lost. That which we have characterised\nas representations in feeling-substance (which according to our\nterminology constitutes mind) would be a transient and unessential\nfeature of mind only; and if it should cease to be, mind would\nstill exist in what we have defined as the outside facts, the facts\nrepresented in mental symbols. In short, mind would be the All, it\nwould be a synonym of God. And not only all mental beings actually\nexisting or having existed would each, one and all, constitute the\nuniverse, but also all potential minds, every atom and all possible\ncombinations of atoms that possibly might play a part in the mental\nactivity of a sentient being, would constitute it.\n\nThe views of an idealist who accepts these consequences are undeniably\ncorrect, although we may quarrel about the propriety of his\nterminology. Yet an idealist of this type, we may fairly assume, will\nhave little difficulty in adapting himself to our terminology, and in\nthat case we might easily agree about the possibility of arriving at a\ncriterion of truth; for his world-conception (aside from a difference\nin terms) might, or rather would be practically the same as ours.\n\nIf truth is the agreement of certain mental facts with other\nfacts outside of the mind\u2014if it is the agreement of subjective\nrepresentations with objective things or states of things represented,\nthe problem is whether we have any means of revising or examining this\nagreement.\n\n * * * * *\n\nIf the world were a chaos, i. e. if the facts of nature were not ruled\nby law; if every fact were not only individually but also generically\ndifferent from every other fact, so that no single fact had anything in\ncommon with other facts; if they thus had no features in common, there\nwould exist no general properties, and we could form no concepts of\n_genera_; facts would vary radically and totally, without exhibiting\nregularities or uniformities other than such as might occasionally and\nwithout any reason incidentally originate by haphazard,\u2014in short, if\nour world were a world of chance and not of law, there would be no\ncriterion of truth. Our world, however, is a world of law and not of\nchance. Thus all facts, although individually different, are found\ngenerically to agree among themselves. No two atoms are, with regard to\ntheir position, the same at a given moment; all of them are different\nsomehow in their operation and effectiveness. Nevertheless every one of\nthem moves in strict accordance with exactly the same law of causation.\nThere is not the least change taking place in the universe which is not\nthe precise effect of a special cause. There is rigidity in mutability,\nunity in variety, determinateness in irregularity, law in freedom,\norder in anarchy. The unity of law, which in its oneness is comprised\nin the universality of causation, is so perfect that the different\nfacts cannot be thought of as being generically different. However much\nthey differ specifically, they represent the action of the same law,\nand this same oneness of nature is the basis of all monism.\n\nMonism of this kind, it has been remarked by a critic of ours,[54] is\nidentical with philosophy. Certainly it is. Every philosophy is or\nat least attempts to be monism, and in so far only as a philosophy\nrecognises monism does it possess a criterion of truth. This monism may\nbe based upon a correct or a mistaken conception of unity. Upon the\ncorrectness of this monism will depend the correctness of the criterion\nof truth. But it must be understood that without a monism there can be\nno criterion of truth, and philosophy must become either scepticism,\nmysticism, or agnosticism.\n\n [54] _The Nation_ quotes the following passage from a former\n essay of mine: \"The philosophy of the future will be a\n philosophy of facts, it will be _positivism_; and in so far\n as a unitary systematisation of facts is the aim and ideal\n of all science, it will be _monism_.\" _The Nation_ rejects\n this definition of monism and adds: \"The search for a unitary\n conception of the world or for a unitary systematisation of\n science would be a good definition of _philosophy_; and with\n this good old word at hand we want no other.\"\n\n Very well. Call that which we call monism or a unitary\n systematisation of knowledge, \"philosophy\"; we will not\n quarrel about names\u2014_dummodo conveniamus in re_. We agree\n perfectly with our critic; for we also maintain that monism\n (at least, what we consider monism) is philosophy; it is _the_\n philosophy.\n\nWhat then is the criterion of truth for a single fact, be it a\nsensation, a perception, or an observation? It is this, that if the\nobservation be repeated under the same circumstances it will, to the\nextent that the circumstances are the same, be again the same; the\nobserver will always make the same observation.\n\nThis maxim will do for a statement of facts. If according to this maxim\nwe are in the position to ascertain that the same observation can be\nmade again and again under certain conditions, we gain the assurance\nthat we have to deal with a fact of some kind. But how shall we inquire\ninto the correctness of the interpretation of the fact?\n\n * * * * *\n\nEvery living creature and furthermore among human beings every\nindividual man has an idiosyncracy of his own. How can we avoid the\nerrors arising therefrom? We substitute other observers so that we can\ndetect to what extent the individual way of observation influences the\nresult of the experiment. Thus we shall find that some persons are\ncolor-blind with reference to red or to green, and we can in this way\nexplain certain mistakes caused by such conditions.\n\nSupposing that all human beings were color-blind we should consider\nthis state as normal; and the discovery of science that certain colors\nwhich appear alike to us, are after all, considering their wave-lengths\nand other qualities, more different than certain other tints which are\neasily discerned by the eye, would be an unexpected surprise. It would\nto some extent be analogous to the well-known fact that there are rays\nof light which are not perceptible to the eye, namely, the so-called\nchemical rays; their existence has been discovered by their chemical\neffects.\n\nIt might be, although it is not probable, that what appears green to me\nand what I call green, may appear different to other people, perhaps\ngray, red, or brown, or some other color that I know not of: yet\nother people will\u2014just as much as I do\u2014call that peculiar sensation\ngreen which they experience under the same conditions, for instance,\nwhen seeing the fresh leaves of a tree. It is quite indifferent how\nvariegated in single minds the feelings may be that accompany each kind\nof sensation. So long as they have for every special objective state a\nspecial analogue, they can map out in their minds their surroundings,\nthey can have a correct representation of the world, and so long as\nthey employ the same symbols (words or other signs) for indicating\nthe same objective states, it is quite indifferent whether or not the\nfeelings that are produced in the process of observation vary. It would\nmake no more difference for the general purpose of mental operations,\nthan it would if we were to employ Roman letters, or Italics, or Greek\nor Hebrew characters to designate the lines and points in explaining a\nmathematical figure. The main thing is that certain points are marked\nand represented by some sign which stands for this or that point and\nfor that alone.\n\nTo cite another example in illustration of the subjective element of\nfeeling in cognition, we may compare our knowledge of the world to\nthe map of a city. The map may be printed in black, green, red, blue,\nor any other color. The color in which the map is printed represents\nthe subjective element of feeling, while the form of the lines, their\ngeometrical configuration, contains the objective element of the things\nrepresented. The map is good, i. e. its representations are true, if\nthe squares and the streets of the city stand in the same relation\namong each other, as the little blocks and divisions on the map do.\nWhether the map is printed in green or blue will make no difference so\nlong as we find everything we want to know about the city represented\nin a way such that we should be able to set ourselves aright and to\nfind our bearings if we went astray.\n\nThe subjective element in mind is not of one half the importance\ngenerally attributed to it. The objective element, being that which is\nrepresented, is paramount, and it is the aspiration of all the sciences\nto concentrate their entire attention upon the objective features of\nobservation. Objective truth is what we want, and objective truth is\nidentical with a scientific description of facts.\n\n * * * * *\n\nWhat then is the criterion of objective truth for the interpretation\nof facts? Is it not wanting? May it not be that a person, Mr. A., will\nunder given circumstances regularly see a ghost. Indeed we do not doubt\nthat he will, and we can even prove it by experiment. This being so, is\nnot the interpretation of facts as to whether the phenomenon is a real\nghost or a mere vision, beyond any criterion of truth?\n\nIf the methods of science are reliable, (and they have been justified\nby their brilliant success,) we have indeed a criterion for the\ninterpretation of facts; and this criterion for the interpretation of\nfacts, no less than the criterion of single observations is based upon\nmonism. If the world is really a universe, if there is oneness in the\nAll, if there is a unity of law throughout nature, our interpretations\nof the different facts must agree among themselves. They cannot\nand should not contradict one another; and whenever they do, it\nis a certain sign that somewhere there is something wrong in our\ninterpretation of facts.\n\nPhilosophy has ceased to be a metaphysical world-theory. The\ninterpretation of facts no longer means a hypothetical assumption which\nwill square all the irregularities among facts that we are unable to\naccount for, but simply a methodical systematisation of facts, enabling\nus to recognise the sameness of law in the irregularities apparent in\ninnumerable individual instances. Interpretation in this sense means\nharmonisation; it means an orderly arrangement; classification with due\ndiscrimination. An explanation of natural phenomena is not the carrying\nof an hypothesis in to facts out of the realms of our imagination, out\nof depths unknown, by what might be styled revelation or inspiration,\nbut it is a comparison of facts with facts. The hypothesis we apply to\nfacts must come from facts and must cover facts. That element in an\nhypothesis which does not cover facts is redundant as an explanation;\nit is useless as such, or even dangerous; and unless it serves as an\naid to thought where ignorance of facts requires some assistance, some\nallegorical symbol, some auxiliary construction,\u2014unless it is to the\nscientist what crutches are to the lame,\u2014it must be dropped.\n\nAccordingly, the criterion of truth is the perfect agreement of\nall facts, of all interpretations and explanations of facts among\nthemselves. If two facts (such as we conceive them) do not agree with\neach other, we must revise them; and it may be stated as a matter\nof experience, that our mind will find no peace until a monistic\nconception is reached. A monistic conception is the perfect agreement\nof all facts in a methodical system, so that the same law is recognised\nto prevail in all instances, and the most different events are\nconceived as acting under different conditions yet in accord with the\nsame law.\n\n * * * * *\n\nIt does not lie within the scope of this essay to enter upon the\npractical application of the principle which we have set forth as the\ncriterion of truth. One hint only may be supplied, to point out the\nmost obvious maxim derivable from it\u2014a maxim that is instinctively\nobeyed by all scientists and has often been popularly expressed in the\nsentence: An ounce of fact is worth a hundred pounds of hypothesis,\nor of any interpretation of facts. All the theories in the world,\nscientific and economical, our dearest ideals not excepted, and all the\nmost ingenious hypotheses have no value unless they have been derived\nfrom, and agree with, the laws that live in the facts of our experience.\n\nThe trouble of applying this rule lies mainly in the difficulty\nof distinguishing between facts and our interpretation of facts.\nConsidering that mind is representativeness in feelings we have to\nanalyse the mind in order to come down to objective facts. The percept\nof a tree is not the tree; it is an interpretation of a group of\nfacts; it is a mental picture produced by a synthesis of sensations,\nthe latter being caused by sense-impressions. Considering that all\nthe images, ideas, abstract concepts, and theories of which our mind\nconsists are not the facts represented by them but their several\ninterpretations, we at once see how careful we have to be for purposes\nof philosophical and scientific exactness in the statement of facts.\n\n * * * * *\n\nOn this occasion, a few critical remarks concerning the leading essay\nof this number, \"The Architecture of Theories,\" by Mr. Charles S.\nPeirce, may be added. Mr. Peirce is one of our subtlest thinkers\nand logicians, and it is incumbent upon one to reflect twice before\ncriticising any sentence of a man who writes upon the most recondite\ntopics,\u2014upon what I should call the higher mathematics, the\ndifferential and integral calculus of logic,\u2014with ease and masterly\naccuracy. Mr. Peirce's essay \"The Architecture of Theories,\"[55]\npresented in this number of _The Monist_, is the first publication of\nhis in which he propounds not mere criticism or the discussion of\nabstruse logical subjects, but his own positive opinion, presenting in\ngreat and clear outlines the foundations of his philosophy.\n\n [55] The term \"architecture of theories\" seems inappropriate\n from the standpoint of a positive conception of the world.\n Many monisms have been constructed in the way Mr. Peirce\n so well describes in his comparison of these philosophical\n systems to the building a house of one and the same material,\n for instance _papier m\u00e2ch\u00e9_, with roof of roofing paper,\n foundations of paste-board, windows of paraffined paper, etc.,\n etc. Philosophy, however, is not a construction of a theory\n comparable to the building of an edifice; it is rather the\n mapping out of the house in which we live for the purpose of\n orientation.\n\nThe world-conception of Mr. Peirce agrees in one fundamental maxim\nwith our own, but it disagrees with the latter in the main and most\nimportant application of this maxim. Mr. Peirce says, \"Law is _par\nexcellence_ the thing that wants a reason.\" This maxim was the guiding\nstar of our inquiry into the fundamental problems of philosophy.[56]\nThe world considered as a universe displaying in all its innumerable\nactions one and the same law is called a cosmos; if considered as a\nheap of processes with no common law pervading them it is called a\nchaos. We found in our inquiry into the forms of existence that the\nlaws of form possess intrinsic necessity. The laws of the form of\nexistence are represented in the laws of formal thought (arithmetic,\nmathematics, logic, mechanics, and pure natural science). So long as\nthe formal laws hold good, (and we have found in the chapter \"Form and\nFormal Thought\" that they will hold good under all circumstances,)\nany kind of world, whatever materially or dynamically it be, must be\na cosmos, and cannot be a chaos. We can imagine that we had a world\nconsisting of some other substance and being different either in the\namount or in the action of its energy to this world of ours, but we\ncannot imagine that a world should exist which does not exhibit the\nharmony of form, and is not regulated as it were by the formal laws\nof existence. One plus one would be two in any kind of a world, and\nobviously all the other more complex statements of formal laws would\nremain true with the same intrinsic necessity. The truth 'one plus one\nmakes two' contains the universal applicability of causation and of\nthe conservation of matter and energy. Taking this ground we arrived\nat the conclusion that the world is a cosmos: there is no chaos and\nthere never has been a chaos. A chaos, in the sense of an absolute\nnon-existence of law, is an impossibility.\n\n [56] See the author's _Fundamental Problems_.\n\nAccordingly, we cannot agree with Mr. Peirce that the occurrence of\nchance \"calls for no particular explanation.\" There is no chance,\nif chance means absence of law. Chance, if the word be admissible,\nis a mere subjective conception produced by limited knowledge and\nsignifying a state of things not determinable with the means of\nknowledge at our disposal. Law once recognised is the death of chance\n(in the objective sense of the word); and chance, or sport, or chaos,\nor indeterminacy, or whatever one may call the absence or at least\nthe imperfect cogency of law, far from \"calling for no particular\nexplanation,\" must be classed _prima facie_ among those theories that\nare _per se_ impossible: These conceptions whether applied to the\nworld at large or to special processes of nature are in contradiction\nto those interpretations and systematised statements of facts which\nare most fundamental, most reliable, most indispensable and universal.\nWhatever generalisation the theory of evolution may be capable of, it\nis certainly not capable of being applied to law. The formal order of\nNature and especially the mechanical laws of physics cannot be thought\nof as having been developed out of a state of sportive chance; they\nmust be considered as having always been the same as they are now: they\nare eternal.[57]\n\n [57] Mr. Peirce seems to define Mind as sportive chance; for\n according to his theory, as soon as sportiveness assumes fixed\n habits, it settles into the mechanical motions which physical\n science observes in gravitating masses; and matter is thus\n defined as \"effete mind.\"\n\nIn stating this difference of opinion, I apprehend a possibility that\nalthough Mr. Peirce has stated his case with most admirable and I\nshould say unequivocal clearness, I have misunderstood his views. In a\nformer article of his, Mr. Peirce makes a statement concerning Nature\nconsidered as a possible chaos, which seems to concur rather with my\nviews on the subject than with his own. Mr. Peirce says in his fourth\nPaper on the \"Illustrations of the Logic of Science\":\n\n \"If there be any way of enumerating the possibilities of\n Nature so as to make them equally probable, it is clearly\n one which should make one arrangement or combination of the\n elements of Nature as probable as another.... It would be to\n assume that Nature is a pure chaos, or chance combination of\n independent elements, in which reasoning from one fact to\n another would be impossible; and since, as we shall hereafter\n see, there is no judgment of pure observation without\n reasoning, it would be to suppose all human cognition illusory\n and no real knowledge possible. It would be to suppose that\n if we have found the order of Nature more or less regular in\n the past, this has been by a pure run of luck which we may\n expect is now at an end. Now, it may be we have no scintilla\n of proof to the contrary, but reason is unnecessary in\n reference to that belief which is of all the most settled,\n which nobody doubts or can doubt, and which he who should deny\n would stultify himself in so doing.\n\n \"The relative probability of this or that arrangement of\n Nature is something which we should have a right to talk about\n if universes were as plenty as blackberries, if we could put\n a quantity of them in a bag, shake them well up, draw out a\n sample, and examine them to see what proportion of them had\n one arrangement and what proportion another. But, even in\n that case, a higher universe would contain us, in regard to\n whose arrangements the conception of probability could have no\n applicability.\"\n\nI rest the case here in the hope that the statement of both sides of\nthe problem will contribute to elucidate truth.\n\n EDITOR.\n\n\n\n\nFIVE SOULS WITH BUT A SINGLE THOUGHT.\n\nTHE PSYCHOLOGICAL LIFE OF THE STAR-FISH.\n\n\nThe investigation of the psychical faculties of animals is comparable\nto a journey into fairy-land. We do not know, and according to Du\nBois-Reymond, we shall never know, how our own mental activity has\noriginated, yet in spite of this we deliberately form theories and\nopinions concerning the psychical powers and faculties of other beings\nthat in point of nervous organisation are perhaps altogether different\nfrom us! The ancients wisely limited themselves to expressing the\nintelligence of animals in the form of instructive fables, and in the\nfamous park of Versailles the charming idea was actually carried out of\nrepresenting the fables of \u00c6sop in a so-called labyrinth, every turn\nof the intricate lanes of which led to a different group of animals\nwhose speech was symbolised by streams of water spouting from their\nmouths, and the purport of their imagined utterances was to be read in\ngolden letters upon marble tablets placed at the side. How often have\nI wandered over the scene of those long since ruined mazes and have\nthought of the deep meaning that frequently lies in childish pastime of\nthis kind.\n\nBut labyrinth aside\u2014when we see an animal perform before our eyes\npurposive acts; and we recognise that our own thought operates in\naccordance with definite, rigorous laws; we shall still have to say\nto ourselves that a comparative animal psychology is after all not\nnecessarily so hopeless a thing as one might be led to believe from the\nbold, and yet faint-hearted, \"Ignorabimus\" of the distinguished Berlin\nphysiologist. And as a matter of fact the range of insight obtained\nin very recent times into this very field is highly encouraging. On\nthis occasion I should like to select for discussion one of the most\nremarkable of questions, that, namely, which concerns the psychical\nactivity of _many-souled_ animals.\n\nQuite a stir was made some years ago in the scientific world when\nHaeckel began to philosophise about the souls of cells, or so-called\nplastidule-souls; for it was patent that the course of life in the\nindividual single cell of an animal or vegetable body flowed on in\nsuch strict conformity with reason that it was logically necessary to\nposit the presence of psychical guidance in the instance in question as\nmuch as in the case of composite cellular colonies in higher organic\nbeings,\u2014especially since every single one of these composite organisms\nbegins its life as a simple cell, from which the others afterward\nspring. The wide-spread opposition that Haeckel's view met with, must\nbe regarded as the result of current and common ignorance of the\nhistory of philosophy; since otherwise it must have been known that\nthe idea of a cell-soul or a germ-soul which controls the development\nof the young, has been propounded by innumerable philosophers, and\nthat it was proclaimed by Daniel Sennert, of Wittenberg, who died in\n1637, with perfect consistency as the foundation of all psychological\nknowledge. Many beings, such as Alg\u00e6, Fungi, and Infusoria, never in\ntheir lives get beyond the state of a single cell, and yet under the\nmicroscope we may observe them seeking light, capturing prey, and in\nthe majority of cases founding families. And when the Genevan Trembley\ndiscovered, in 1740, the fact of the divisibility of fresh-water Polyps\nand showed that after cutting them up every piece grew and developed\ninto a new individual endowed with sensation, will, and other psychical\ncapacities, philosophers began to debate whether there were initially\npresent in every divisible polyp a number of souls in the germinal\nstate, or, if such were not the case, whether the simple soul of a\npolyp possessed the property of divisibility. The Leipsic theologian\nCrusius, who died in 1775, declared in favor of the presence in every\npolyp of a plurality of germinal souls; the Dutch insect anatomist,\nPeter Lyonnet (died 1796) declared in favor of the divisibility of the\nsingle polyp soul.\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 1.\u2014STAR-FISH. (After Haeckel.)]\n\nBut let us pass by these subtle speculations to turn to a class of\nanimals in the case of which we may speak with more propriety than\nin the case of polyps and other zo\u00f6phytes of a plural soul, since\nphysically and psychically they act in every respect as if they had\ngrown together out of five or more individuals,\u2014I mean the Echinoderms\nin general and the Star-fish (_Asteroidea_) in particular. In the\nfollowing paragraphs, for the sake of brevity, I shall speak of only\nfive-rayed star-fishes, because the sacred number five is the one that\nlies at the basis of the physical structure of the great majority of\nstar-fishes developed from the egg, and of all other echinoderms,\nalthough there really do occur star-fishes which are supplied, some\nwith more and some with less than five rays,\u2014single rays often being\ncast off and a larger number growing out in their places,\u2014and although\nmany species are regularly and normally supplied with more than five\nrays. From visits to the sea-shore or to aquariums, at any rate from\npictures, my readers all know how a star-fish in general looks. In the\nfirst cut which accompanies this article a number of echinoderms are\npresented. The star-fish is in the centre to the left. It resembles the\ndecorative star of an Order, and has short or long, broad or slender\nrays, as the case may be, and a disc-shaped central body.\n\nThe observation which is most important for our present discussion,\nand which strikes us on first seeing a star-fish, or its relatives the\nsea-urchin and the sea-anemone, consists of the fact that these animals\npossess no head, which even the most insignificant worm or insect does\nnot lack, and that consequently its organs are in want of a guiding,\nregulative member, possessing externally organs of sense and having\nwithin a brain with the power to communicate the requisite commands for\nthe movement and the conduct of the same. On the contrary, each single\nbranch or ray possesses its own individual nervous system; and in the\ncase of the voluntary separation of the rays, which frequently occurs,\nis able to continue life of its own independent accord, developing\nitself by the growth of new rays into a new and complete star-fish.\n(See Fig. 2.) But these five or more nervous systems do not radiate\nfrom a common central nerve-ganglion which might be termed a central\nbrain, but are merely joined to a nerve-ring which lies in a common\ncentral portion, encircling the esophagus; this nerve-ring in the\nmajority of cases forms a regular polygonic figure, and into each angle\nof the polygon the nerve-cord of a ray enters. It will be seen from\nthis structural arrangement of things, that the psychical and mental\nguidance of these animals is entrusted to a board of five members who\npossess, it is true, sentient communication with each other, but act\nwithout the intermediation of a presiding officer.\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 2.\u2014COMET-FORM OF ARM OF A STAR-FISH.\n\nA cast-off arm re-forming by the sprouting of four new rays.]\n\nWe may well look forward with intense interest to the outcome of a\npsychical administration of this kind, and to tell the truth, until\nrecently its importance has been greatly underestimated. Every\ninference made with respect to the psychical excitability of an\nanimal must be derived from its movements and actions in various\nnatural and artificially produced positions, by observing what its\nconduct under these conditions is. To start with, star-fishes, like\nsea-urchins (which psychically are similarly governed), admit with\nrespect to the position of their bodies a distinction of top and\nbottom; that is to say, the side on which the mouth lies situated in\nthe centre of the five rays belongs properly face downwards, while\nthe opposite surface is to be regarded as the dorsal side. But the\nconceptions of a forepart and a hindpart, of a right and a left are\nnot applicable. The rays of the star-fish, like the central disc, also\nplainly exhibit a distinction of lower and upper parts. Among the real\nstar-fishes (_Asteroidea_) the inferior or ventral surface of the\narms is supplied either with two or with four rows of sucker-feet or\npedicels, consisting of long, extensile, hollow sacs, which when filled\nand extended by the water let into their widely ramified ambulacral\nsystems, protrude into the grooves of the arm through openings in the\nhardened calcareous integument. To level surfaces they easily cling\nfast by simply drawing back the terminal discs of their tubular feet\nand thus creating a rarefied atmosphere in the space between the object\nto which they adhere and the puffed out walls of the extremities of\nthe pedicels. Star-fishes may be seen climbing in this way, with their\nhundreds and hundreds of tube-feet, up slippery cliffs and even the\nperpendicular glass walls of aquariums, and they are even able to hang\nsuspended from a horizontal glass ceiling for a considerable length of\ntime after they have been taken out of the water. When they wish to\nchange their position they do it by alternately loosening and fastening\ntheir extensile feet in such a way that those loosened reach forward\nin one and the same direction uniform in all the arms, and fasten\nthemselves to the surface anew, whereupon the others also let loose and\ngo through the same movement in the same direction. The sucker-feet\nalso help to convey to the mouth the food seized at the end of the arms.\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 3.\u2014MODE OF LOCOMOTION OF SAND-STARS. (After\nPreyer.)\n\nIn the cut to the left _1_ first advances, then (_5_) and (_2_); _3_\nand _4_ remaining at rest. Whereupon (_5_) and (_2_) simultaneously\ncome back to the positions _5_ and _2_, _c_ is lifted and pushed\nforwards with _1_, while the two rays _3_ and _4_ are pulled along\nbehind. In the figure to the right the same animal first shoves forward\nthe pairs (_1_) (_2_) and (_5_) (_3_), _4_ remaining at rest, and then\nbends both pairs backwards, dragging only _4_ behind; _c_ is lifted and\nthrown forward in the direction of the arrow.]\n\nWhile in this instance, accordingly, the arms, although they are\nnot immovable and bend and approach each other, officiate rather as\nthe bearers of organs than as prehensile and locomotory apparatuses\nthemselves,\u2014the sucker-feet performing the principal tasks and\nrequiring for their work a very finely ramified nervous system; in the\ncase of a certain other division of the star-fishes, the so-called\nsand-stars (_Ophiuridae_), the arms are thinner and more supple, and\nact as organs of prehension and locomotion, dispensing more or less\nentirely with their suctorial pedicels. By alternately thrusting three\nfeet forward (Fig. 3) and then drawing back the two side feet of these\nthree, the five-footed sea-stars move more swiftly than the others,\nsometimes proceeding by jumps even; but they cannot climb up smooth\nsurfaces, or cliffs, unless irregularities are present which may be\ngrasped by their pliant arms, whereas on the other hand the common\nstar-fishes, which are furnished with sucker-feet, climb best of all\non smooth and slippery surfaces, each one of their countless pedicels\nbeing able to suspend a considerable weight, in some species as much as\ntwenty-five grammes. In other respects, especially with regard to the\nring-shaped connection of the five nerve-cords, their organisation is\nessentially the same; only in the sand-stars the central portion forms\na disc more distinctly separate from the arms, in which former the\ncommon organs of feeling and digestion have more fully retracted.\n\nRecognising thus, that the star-fishes and all their relatives act\nphysically like a federal animal-union, composed of five independent\nanimal-states, I called attention in the first edition of my work\n\"Werden und Vergehen\" (1876) to the psychological enigma that we\nwere here confronted with a five-fold Siamese monster, as it were,\nin which five separate persons were brought mentally under the same\nguidance, or where five minds had to pull, simultaneously, one rope.\nOn account of the absence of a head and a brain in these animals,\ncertain well-known modern animal psychologists have taken the position\nthat their powers of psychical performance are very scanty, and that,\nin a much fuller sense than was predicated of all animals by the\nCartesians, these especially were irrational automatons, or, to use a\ntechnical expression, were mere \"reflex-organisms,\" animals in which\nonly direct external excitations evoke with unalterable regularity\nresponsive movements, so that, for example, if any unpleasant\nexcitation were brought to bear on them from any direction they would\nmove in the opposite direction, but world approach if anything became\nperceptible that excited their desire for food. On this ground the\ndistinguished English animal psychologists Romanes and Ewart claim to\nhave established that these animals actually do respond like machines\nto external excitations; if they were excited at any part of their body\nby a wound, by the application of acids, an electric current, or any\nother irritant, they would run without exception in a straight line in\nthe opposite direction, but if the excitation were applied to any two\nparts of their body at some distance from each other they would move\nin the line of the diagonal of the two directions, in accordance with\nthe principle of the parallelogram of forces. Similarly their movements\nafter prey and food (the presence of which at a distance was made\nknown by the emission of odors), their movements toward more brightly\nilluminated parts of the containing vessel, their flight from the air\ninto the water, their recovery of their normal position when placed on\ntheir backs, and finally their so-called autotomy or self-amputation,\nthat is the casting off of their members under the irritation of\npowerful stimuli\u2014were all held to represent mere automatic responses\nto prearranged conditions without a trace of intelligence being\nexhibited.\n\nIn view of this condition of things it was a very welcome announcement,\nthat one of the most brilliant representatives of modern experimental\nphysiology and psychology, Professor W. Preyer, at present of Berlin,\nhad determined to undertake a comprehensive series of experiments with\nthese very animals, and was able to carry out his intention at the\nzo\u00f6logical station in Naples, so admirably adapted to the purpose. To\nobtain clear ideas generally with regard to animal reflex-mechanisms,\nfitter specimens for experiment could scarcely be presented than the\nstar-fishes, which unite a rare degree of decentralisation, power of\nindependent action, and absence of a cerebral centre, with a nervous\nsystem of the minutest ramifications. Here, if anywhere, were simple,\nclear and transparent results to be expected, and finally information\nrelating to the co-operative activity of different nervous systems.\nPreyer published the results of his observations in the \"Mittheilungen\nder Zoologischen Station in Neapel\" for the years 1886 and 1887, and\nalthough he does not regard his labors as completed, the scientific\nreading public may nevertheless take sufficient interest in the present\nstate of his researches to justify a presentment of the principal and\nmost general results obtained.\n\nIn confirmation of the view that previously obtained it was found that\nthese animals actually did respond in a rare degree to given stimuli in\na manner determined once for all; it could be foretold with a degree\nof sureness verging on astronomical certainty, how, for example, the\nsucker-feet of a star-fish would act if the animal in its normal and\nsound condition was irritated at this or that place, powerfully or\nweakly, one time or many times successively, by mechanical or chemical\napplications, by electric currents, or heated instruments. With all\nthe means of irritation employed the result was always identical, and\nconsisted in the fact that the distensible feet were drawn in at the\npoint of application when the irritation did not extend beyond its\nregion, no matter whether it was applied at the inferior or superior\nsurface of the animal, but that protrusion of the feet never resulted\nfrom local irritations of this character so long as they did not\nexceed a certain intensity. A more powerful irritation, on the other\nhand, radiating over a greater portion, or over the whole animal,\nproduces a general protrusion of the distensible pedicels, so far as\nthe irritation extends, with the single exception of the point of\napplication itself when the same lies on the inferior surface.\n\nInasmuch as this swarming protrusion of pedicels may spread over the\nentire inferior surface when only a single arm is irritated in the\nneighborhood of its extremity, it follows from this that the nervous\nexcitation must first be conveyed to the ring at the centre in order to\nradiate thence to the pedicels of the other arms; and from the manner\nin which the irritation is propagated, the course of the radiation can\nbe accurately followed. Thus, if the irritation of an arm proceeded\nfrom the dorsal region, the distensible pedicels of this arm were the\nfirst to protrude, then those of the two adjacent arms, and finally\nthose of the two remaining arms, but in the latter not quite out to\nthe extremities unless the irritation exceeded a certain intensity.\nThat is to say, the effect of the irritation was propagated through\nthe inner nerve-ring according to the same laws by which a fluid under\npressure or an electric current in a similar conductory system would\nproceed. But if the connection of the ring was severed at both sides of\nthe irritated arm, the effect would remain confined to that arm. If the\nconnection was broken only on one side the irritation advanced round\nthe other side and reached the severed neighbor last. On the other\nhand, a powerful irritation of the central disc immediately provoked\nthe extension of all the pedicels. The phenomena recorded occurred\nmoreover in accordance with simple mechanical laws as was expected from\nthe outset, and when the irritations were unusually powerful the effect\nwas manifested by a continuous alternate extension and contraction of\nthe pedicels.\n\nAmputated arms of the common sucker-footed star-fish act like arms\nisolated at both sides by severance of the nerve-ring, as just\nexplained. Upon local irritation they draw in their pedicels, and\nprotrude them upon being powerfully irritated; they creep forward in\na definite direction, and when placed upon their backs are able even\nto turn themselves over like the uninjured animal. The severed arms\nof sand-stars are less independent. They twist about aimlessly hither\nand thither, but if any considerable portion of the central disc and\nnerve-ring adheres to them they are able to perform adaptive movements.\nSimilarly the disc, with one or two arms attached, is not helpless; and\nis able to get along quite alone without any arms. We could explain all\nthese movements by so-called reflex actions and might grant also that\nthe mechanism that effects these results operates in this case upon\na greater scale and with more independence than in other classes of\nanimals, for the reason that here a real guiding organ is not present.\n\nBut whatever might be inferred from the experiments just described in\nfavor of a senseless and unintelligent life of star-fishes, Professor\nPreyer was nevertheless able by extending his experiments to win the\nconviction that the old conception of star-fishes being real reflex\nanimals was wholly untenable, since a great number of capacities and\ncapabilities could be verified and provoked, which are intelligible\nonly on the basis of adaptive co-operation and mutual concerted action\nin the five rays. We shall not discuss here whether this is also proved\nby the wonderful fact that a star-fish, which fastens its arms to\neverything possible, never seizes its own arm and thus, like Moli\u00e8re's\nmiser, in its visits to its oyster beds never catches itself for a\nthief. We might say, indeed, that the arm seeking a hold does not seize\nits companion because it feels it and has learned by experience that\nit takes a M\u00fcnchausen to pull one's self out of a swamp by the tops of\none's boots. But we find exactly the same phenomenon among creeping\nplants, which clasp every kind of support in their way, but never,\nas Darwin observed, take hold of their own stalks; whence we might\nassume that there probably exists in these beings some sort of power of\nreflex inhibition dependent upon a property of the body and developed\nin consequence of the fact that clasping and grasping parts of itself\nwould involve a useless waste of energy. We shall see, however, that\nunder certain circumstances this instinctive \"dread\" of contact with\nself is inoperative.\n\nBut to our main task. In the simplest changes of place and position,\nintelligent co-operation of the arms is manifest. For if in moving from\none place to another, or in turning around each arm tended to perform\non its own account the necessary movements of extension or rotation,\nwithout giving any heed to the others, the animal would endure the\ntorments of Tantalus before it could reach, if ever at all, the\nchoice bit of food that it had scented from afar, or the ray of light\ntowards which an obscure impulsion drove it. On the contrary, when a\nstar-fish is spying after food, we observe it lift the ends of its\npedicel-covered arms so that the downward deflected eye there situated\nmay obtain a good view of things in the neighborhood, and if in any\ndirection an object worth going after is discovered we see the many\nhundreds of sucker-feet on the five arms push out in one and the same\ndirection,\u2014a phenomenon that requires the presence of a very widely\nramified nervous system, since every tactile pedicel needs its separate\ntelegraph wire in order to be properly moved and not always in the same\ndirection, as for example when the animal wishes to perform a rotation\nabout its own axis. For these comical animals sometimes do rotate about\ntheir axis, although our simple mind wonders why a Janus-head should\nwant to turn around, these animals being able to look simultaneously\nin the four directions of the compass, and having still another eye\nfor looking downward. Similarly in the sand-stars, to which the\nMedusa-heads with branched arms belong, an adaptive co-operation of the\narms in creeping and swimming occurs; which can be explained only as\nthe result of a common understanding issuing from the central ring.\n\nIt would seem to follow from Preyer's extensive observations, that as\na rule no one individual arm of a star-fish enjoys to the exclusion of\nits fellows the prerogative of universal or even general precedence;\nthe lead of any one arm is rather solely determined by the object\nsought, so that the one next to the object generally starts first\nand assumes the lead of the little army of arms. Of course in the\ncase of new-growing star-fishes which have sprung from a single arm\nby sprouting, this is different; for in this instance the old arm\nwill undoubtedly retain control of the others for some length of time\nuntil the young ones have reached a certain size. Preyer does not seem\nto have instituted observations to ascertain this, but it would be\ninteresting to determine whether an arm of this kind always takes the\nlead, or in the proper cases acts as driver from behind and pushes the\nbaby-carriage with the children before it.\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 4.\u2014RECOVERY OF NORMAL POSITION BY ASTROPECTEN\nAURANTIACUS. (After Preyer.)\n\nThrough the end of each ray of the animal a thread is drawn and\naffixed to a cork; the animal lying back downwards. At first the\ncreature swung the corks alternately inwards and outwards, taking the\npositions represented in the above figure. After the lapse of an hour\nthe ray with the smallest cork attached, upon which thus the least\nupward pressure was exerted, was pulled downwards and sidewise and\nbrought beneath an adjacent ray; the two opposite rays were retracted\ncentrally, the disc lifted, the centre of gravity of the animal thus\ndisplaced, and the turning effected.]\n\nExamples of surprisingly dexterous co-operation and concerted adaptive\naction are observed in these animals in their climbing on difficult\nsurfaces, and in their attempts, also, to regain their normal position\nwhen placed on their backs or made to swim in reversed positions by\ndiscs of cork fastened to the extremities of their arms. Scientists\nhave observed members of the orders _Asteroidea_ and _Ophiuroidea_,\nin difficult positions of this kind, display an astounding sense of\nequilibrium and a skilfulness in gaining firm holds, suggestive of the\nathletic feats of monkeys, and that even when placed in very unusual\npositions such as never occur in nature. Thus many star-fishes let\nthemselves drop from steep rocks and cliffs, if that happens to be the\nbest way of getting down; but in such cases before they let their whole\nweight go hold fast to the last moment with one or two arms, as if it\nwere previously necessary to calculate the leap into the depths below.\nTo furnish the counter-test of this, and to prove that the central\nnerve-ring is, as assumed, the indispensable and necessary condition\nof this united co-operation, Preyer severed the ring in individual\nspecimens of the class between every two arms, sparing the other parts\nas much as possible. In this way the nervous systems of the five\nrays were disconnected. As was expected, it was found that the more\nconnections there were severed, the more difficult the animal found it\nwhen placed on its back to regain its normal position. For since the\nrecovery of the normal position must be introduced by the groping about\nand the fastening of the pedicels of one or of several adjacent and\nhalf-turned arms, two arms or pairs of arms might for want of a mutual\nunderstanding act directly in opposition to one another and thus make\nthe turning impossible. On the other hand, the central disc was able,\nthough deprived of all arms, to accomplish the turning, if only the\nnerve-ring were preserved intact; and the more there remained of the\nnerve-ring on a single arm the better the single arm was able to do it.\n\nBut in circumstances which were wholly new, the adaptive co-operation\nof the arms demonstrated itself in so striking a manner that we may\nsay they are not to be easily put out of countenance or confounded.\nWhen Professor Preyer, for example, slipped narrow rubber bands or\ncylinders over their rough spiny arms, they rid themselves as a rule of\nthese unwonted fetters in a very short time, and in the most various\nbut always well calculated ways. Generally the two nearest ones seized\ntheir poor imprisoned fellow \"under the arms,\" bracing themselves with\ntheir rough spiny surface against the rubber sleeve, and thus finally\nstripping it off. (See Fig. 5; next page.) Sometimes, when the band was\nloosely adjusted, twisting movements of the arm in the water sufficed\ngradually to loosen it, until it could be finally cast off. Often the\npeeling off was effected by pressing against a rough surface, whereby\nsometimes an adjacent arm held the sleeve fast; and when no other\nexpedient was of avail the animal cast the arm, sleeve and all, away\nfrom itself; and the latter may possibly have not gotten rid of it at\nall. At times the casting off of the arm occurred subsequently, after\nthe obstacle had been entirely removed, and often even a day later, as\nif the impeded arm was still sensible of some obstruction which caused\nit to afterwards separate from its companions.\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 5.\u2014REMOVAL BY OPHIOMYXA OF A RUBBER SLEEVE. (After\nPreyer.)\n\nThe figure represents the moment at which the band is about to be\nremoved. An adjacent arm is braced against the lower edge of the band,\nforcing it off in the direction of the extremity of the ray.]\n\nAttempts at flight and liberation from unwonted compulsory positions\nor narrow confinement, also deserve special attention. Many a person\nwho has put a star-fish into a cage and fancied that he was assured\nof its possession, has been disappointed on finding that the animal\nhad effected its escape through the meshes. But star-fishes have, in\nconsequence of their abhorrence of the air, been made to creep into\nthe narrow necks of bottles filled with water. Professor Preyer,\nfor example, thrust two of the arms of a common star-fish species\n(_Asterias glacialis_) into a tube filled with salt water leaving\nthe three other arms exposed to the atmosphere outside; and although\nit would have been impossible to force the animal into the tube\nwithout crushing it, the three arms exposed to the air were also\npulled in within the space of three minutes. If the tube was placed\nperpendicularly in water the animal quickly crept out again. The\nperformance seemed utterly impossible, for each single arm of the\nstar-fish was almost as thick at its base as the greatest width of\nthe tube, and yet three of these arms had to pass in side by side.\nThis was made possible by the animal emptying during the passage all\nthe numerous water-vesicles in the interior of the arms which serve\nto fill and to empty the distensible pedicels therein; the star-fish,\nafter the expulsion of the water, becomes very soft in all its parts\nand does not harden again until it has forced itself completely through\nand refilled itself with water. In order to accomplish these emptyings,\nbendings, turnings, and rollings, thousands of muscular fibres must\nwork in harmony within the body of the animal. This experiment was also\nsuccessfully carried out with other star-fishes, but I cannot agree\nwith the observer when he says that in so doing he brought the animals\ninto a completely new and hitherto unexperienced position. In their\nhaunts on rocky coasts they must assuredly often have to force their\nway through narrow fissures and holes; and they must find occasion to\nmake use of the advantages of being able to evacuate water in the case\nalso of single arms, as when they search with them in narrow apertures\nand snail-houses.\n\nBut undoubtedly new for these animals was the position in which they\nwere fastened to a board by five long pins with broad heads, which\nPreyer drove in close to the central disc between the rays, so that\nthe star-fish, as it seemed, was fastened to its resting-place in a\nway that admitted of no escape. Nevertheless, the star-fish found a\nmeans of freeing itself with ease and elegance from this constrained\nimprisonment in a great variety of ways, even when the exterior parts\nof their bodies were girded in by a much greater number of pins.\nOrdinarily they began by shoving one of their rays, accompanied by a\nbackward bending movement of its two companions, far out between the\ntwo encompassing pins, and then drew with the greatest care first the\none and then the other adjacent ray through the same narrow avenue\nof escape, whereupon then the two remaining rays, the one slightly\noverlapping the other, were enabled to follow with perfect ease. (See\nFig. 6.) A practised knot-untier who had studied the position could not\nhave given them better advice. But if no agreement of plan and purpose\nexisted in this case between the separate rays, if each ray sought\nto free itself of its own accord, a successful extrication from the\ndifficulty could hardly have been foreseen; and we must infer from this\ngreat unanimity of action in times of danger.\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 6.\u2014EXTRICATION OF STAR-FISH IMPRISONED\nINTERRADIALLY BY TACKS. (After Preyer.)\n\n_1._ Original encompassment. _2._ First stage of extrication. _3._\nSecond stage. _4._ Third and last stage. The smaller figures indicate\nthe successive positions of the same rays.]\n\nPreyer thinks that at times the concurrence of all the rays in matters\nof concerted action might have to be effected by first obtaining the\nconcurrence and assent of any individual ray that might be hostilely\ndisposed; he holds it as not improbable that profound dissensions may\narise between the united brothers, and refers to the fact that perhaps\nthe voluntary section of a star-fish into a three-rayed and a two-rayed\nportion,\u2014which frequently takes place,\u2014may have to be regarded as the\nviolent dissolution of a community of fellow animals formerly living\nin harmony, but now lapsed into a state of conflict. We shall pass\nthis view by, however, to point out in a few words Preyer's general\ninferences with regard to the mutual relation of the five communal\nsouls. Progression and flight in a direction once taken and unimpeded\nby obstacles,\u2014an observation often made and easily verified,\u2014the\nacrobatic performances, and lastly the intelligent behavior, so to\nsay, of imprisoned and fettered star-fishes, prove that generally, and\nespecially in moments of peril, strength-giving unanimity prevails.\n\nBut Preyer is nevertheless of opinion that it is not therefore\nnecessary to assume the existence of a permanent central government,\na central soul, holding simultaneous sway over the five radial souls,\nand in which is lodged, especially in times of battle, full executive\npower. He employs the simile of five hunting-dogs yoked together in\nthe form of a ring, of like age, like power, and the same training,\nwho hunt a hare in concert, or stand simultaneously and mechanically\nbefore a partridge; when thrown into the water make for the shore all\nin the same direction, and when equally tired fall simultaneously\nasleep. \"Like the Siamese twins,\" he says, \"these yolked-together\ndogs will have upon the whole apparently but one will, although\nthey often obey only necessity in this and not their own impulses.\"\nPreyer arrives in this at the same conclusion that I pronounced in\n1876 in the work I have mentioned, where I compared the concerted\nactions and movements of star-fishes and sea-urchins to the walking\nand dancing of human twin-monsters, who in spite of a difference of\nmental individuality, often very far reaching, nevertheless bring\nabout perfect harmony in their external movements. In this I had\nespecially in mind the so-called \"two-headed nightingale,\" two girls\nclosely united in growth, who often violently quarreled but sang and\ndanced so harmoniously with one another that for the time being the\nsorrowful fate of the indissoluble union of two so different natures\nwas completely forgotten. In the majority of their relations the five\nor more associates united in the star-fish are much better off than\nunfortunate human beings like those just described, and especially in\nthis one particular that they do not have to die with one another,\nbut are able to break loose with impunity from a companion whom death\nthreatens, when they observe that he has suffered a wound or loss,\nsimply expelling him from the community.\n\n CARUS STERNE.\n\n\n\n\nLITERARY CORRESPONDENCE.\n\n\nI.\n\nGERMAN PHILOSOPHY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.\n\nYou have requested me to write you for your new quarterly magazine\na review of the philosophy of contemporary Germany as manifested in\nits most important tendencies and endeavors. In setting out to comply\nwith your wish, I feel that this is no simple task. With mere titles\nof books neither you nor your public will be satisfied. The readers\nof _The Monist_ will demand a deeper insight into the workshops of\nGerman philosophy; they will want to know if the old mother soil of\nspeculative thought has retained its pristine fertility. Fertile it\nhas remained. But in quite another sense from formerly. In a few\nyears a century will have elapsed since Schelling published in the\n_Philosophische Journal_ of Niethammer and Fichte, his \"General Survey\nof Modern Philosophical Literature,\" and it is well to recall to mind\nthat treatise and that period in attempting to characterise the present\nstate of philosophy in Germany; contrasts, we all know, are quite\nas important for the acquisition of knowledge as resemblances. One\ncentral problem stood at that time predominantly in the foreground; the\nproblem, namely, of the unification of knowledge. Neither the idea nor\nthe tendency it involves, is unknown to the philosophy of to-day, but\nits meaning has become a different one. At that epoch it was sought\nto solve the problem from within, to solve it from the centre; it was\nsought to find a supreme species of knowledge possessing a certainty\nfounded unconditionally in itself, and to expand this dialectically\ninto a system of ideas.\n\nI do not need to set forth here the great and peculiar acquisitions\nthat this method has won for us, nor to point out what wealth of noble\npower was dissipated by it in the treatment of impossible problems.\nThese things belong to history. The speculative period of German\nphilosophy is dead. Ludwig Feuerbach in the middle of this century\nsung its funeral dirge. But it took some time before people accustomed\nthemselves to regard it as really dead,\u2014a time in which countless\nattempts were made to resuscitate it; it took some time before\nphilosophers began generally to bestow upon the corpse the kicks of\nabuse that Schopenhauer in its own lifetime administered to it, and for\nwhich he was rebuked by a universal silence of indignation.\n\nEarlier history, still under the influence of the speculative masters,\nhad characterised the progress of German philosophy from Kant to Hegel\nas the necessary and logical evolution of the idea of philosophy in\nits highest sense. But the present prevailing method of presentation\nis accustomed to draw a sharp, deep line at the termination of Kant's\nactivity, and to regard the entire subsequent speculative development\nof the Kantian philosophy as a fallacious digression and an abandonment\nof the fundamental critical idea. \"Back to Kant\" is the watchword that\nhas resounded since the beginning of the sixties, at first in solitary\nutterances, and then with greater, ever-increasing emphasis\u2014the\nincipient condemnation of a period in which German philosophy had\ncelebrated its grandest and most brilliant triumphs, and at a time when\nGerman speculative thought had just begun to grow better known and more\ninfluential abroad.\n\n * * * * *\n\nBack to Kant. Yes. But to which Kant? To the Kant of the first or the\nsecond edition of the Critique of the Pure Reason? To the Critique\nof the Pure or the Critique of the Practical Reason? Very perplexing\nquestions these. The philosophy of Kant is not so easily reducible\nto a simple and comprehensive formula. It is a veritable Proteus,\nthat changes at will form and appearance. Every one interprets it,\nin the end, as he wishes Kant should have thought. The cry \"Back to\nKant\" has become in the ranks of German philosophers a veritable\napple of discord. An enormous Kantian literature has sprung up;\ncritical, exegetical, constructive. No one can dispute its acumen,\nlearning, erudition, and profundity. But the traits of Alexandrianism\nunmistakably cling to it. A more pernicious waste of intellectual\npower, perhaps, than that of the much deplored speculative period. One\nhas the feeling often as if one would like to cast into the tumultuous,\nstruggling crowd of combatants a different battle cry\u2014\"Back to Nature!\nBack to to the examination of the true contents of things!\"\n\nI shall select on this occasion from the superabundant store of Kantian\nliterature the works of two writers only to whom the characterisation\njust advanced does not apply, and to whom independent and fundamental\nimportance belongs. They are, first, ERNST LAAS,[58] professor at\nthe University of Strassburg, who died in 1885, and second, ALOIS\nRIEHL,[59] formerly of Gratz, now of Freiburg. Both began with Kantian\nresearch. Neither remained identified with it. Both sought to supply\na new foundation for that branch of philosophy that deals with the\ntheory of cognition; both brought to the service of their task, in\naddition to eminent critical and analytical acumen, comprehensive\nhistorical knowledge. Widely different in method, both pursued the same\nend\u2014the eradication of that transcendent bias which had so pernicious\nan influence with Kant himself and his immediate followers, and the\nreplacing of all dualistic opposition of a higher and a lower, or a\nreal and a phantom world, by a philosophy of reality based upon the\nrigid analysis of pure experience. Both, therefore, are, in this sense,\nindispensable preconditions of every monistic philosophy that is not\nfounded on immediate intellectual perception, or mere postulates, but\naims at a critical foundation.\n\n [58] Laas, _Idealismus und Positivismus_, 3 Vols. 1876-87.\n\n [59] Riehl, _Der philosophische Kriticismus und seine\n Bedeutung f\u00fcr die positive Wissenschaft_, 3 Vols. 1876-87.\n\n * * * * *\n\nSimultaneously with this battle for the \"real\" Kant and the measure\nof that in his philosophy which could be utilised as the groundwork\nof a new structure conforming to the conditions of the times, German\nphilosophy in the second half of this century waged another war. No\nfratricidal struggle this, no mere scholastic feud, but a battle\nfor existence with a foreign foe\u2014the physical sciences. After the\nspeculative philosophy had retired from the throne that it had so\nlong occupied, and the vacancy seemed yet unfilled, the attempt was\nmade to place in the unoccupied seat another intellectual power whose\ncredit and authority with the contemporary world had begun to keep\npace with the success that attended its endeavors. We shall designate\nthese attempts briefly as \"materialism,\" and understand by the term\nany and every endeavor that aims at constructing a conception of the\nworld with the means and methods of the mathematical and mechanical\nsciences alone. That which was here sought after was the exact opposite\nof the state of things that obtained in the speculative period; and\nthe treatment that the speculative philosophy had to submit to at the\nhands of many of the spokesmen of the new movement was not entirely\nundeserved. The battle that German philosophy here had to fight was\nno easy one. Its foe occupied every position of vantage. The real or\napparent exactness of its principles, the detailed character of the\nstructure of the world that it bade fair to offer were a power. What we\nwant is facts, not ideas; intelligibility, not profundity\u2014these were\nthe demands with which philosophy was confronted. It was impossible\nto outflank, in this direction, the representatives of a scientific\ndiscipline that admitted of skilful popularisation. There was nothing\nsimilar to oppose to it. Philosophers were accordingly compelled\nto confine themselves to criticism, to show forth the unmistakable\ndefectiveness of the pure-mechanical philosophy, the weaknesses\nand flaws in its demonstrations and the arbitrary character of its\nconstruction; and to point out by a display of much acute reasoning\nwhat fifty years before was self-evident, that mind and mental life are\nnot merely an accidental phase of things, not a product incidentally\nresulting, but an indestructible feature of the inward nature of the\nworld itself.\n\nMuch of this extensive antimaterialistic literature, in which may also\nbe included by far the greater part of anti-Darwinian literature, can\nput forth no claim to lasting worth, and is to-day wholly antiquated.\nFor the simple reason that people no longer understand, or at least\nwill soon no longer be able to understand, the circumstances and\nconditions out of which this polemical activity sprung: namely the\ntranscendent metaphysical philosophy; mistaken idealism which imagined\nthat existence and reality had to be transfigured in and by cognition\ninstead of through will and action; the secret fear of an endangerment\nor indeed of a dislodgment of the religio-theological world-conception,\nthe supernatural God-idea, the pure spiritual and immortal soul, the\nfreedom of the will, and other phantoms whatsoever the designations\nthey may bear.\n\nBut this warfare against materialism, which was waged by minds of\nwidely varying rank and power, resulted at least in the substantial\nadvantage of having brought the hostile parties closer together, of\nhaving forced them to the reciprocal study of their respective means of\ninvestigation, and of having put an end to the complete estrangement\nthat formerly existed between them. Not only did it enrich philosophy,\nbut it also led physical science to a correction of many of its\nconceptions and to a re-examination of its methodological hypotheses.\n\nThis is best to be studied, perhaps, by taking to hand the writings\nof a man who may be characterised pre-eminently as a spokesman of\nthe materialistic movement in Germany,\u2014I mean JAKOB MOLESCHOTT. His\nwell known work _Der Kreislauf des Lebens_ has become in its last,\nthe eighth edition, something quite different from what it was in\nits first; and the rich collection of his lesser writings (_Kleinere\nSchriften_, 2 Vols., 1879-87) also offers the philosopher, especially\nfrom a methodological point of view, much that is worthy of especial\nattention. Moreover, this reciprocal influence of mind upon mind is\nmanifested in the case of many of the most distinguished investigators\nof the last thirty years, in the most remarkable and gratifying manner.\nIt is impossible to study the discourses and treatises of physiologists\nlike DU BOIS-REYMOND and WILHELM PREYER, of physicists like HELMHOLTZ\nand ERNST MACH, and the discussions occasioned by their works, without\nbeing surprised at the extent to which the points of view of psychology\nand of the theory of cognition have penetrated into the problems and\ninquiries of the physical sciences. And _vice versa_ philosophical\nworks, like FR. A. LANGE'S History of Materialism (_Geschichte\ndes Materialismus und Kritik seiner Bedeutung in der Gegenwart_),\nUEBERWEG'S Collected Essays (_Gesammelte Abhandlungen_, just recently\nedited in a commendable manner by Moritz Brasch), the numerous works of\nLUDWIG NOIR\u00c9, and, last but not least, the entire scientific activity\nof WILHELM WUNDT,\u2014all show an intimate familiarity with the methods\nof the physical sciences and an assimilation of materials from these\nbranches of knowledge such as the speculative period can furnish no\nexample of.\n\n * * * * *\n\nNevertheless, this intellectual revolution, far-reaching as it was,\nhas led neither to solid systematic construction nor even to the\nsuccessful development of positive methods of thought. Since the\ndecline of speculative philosophy,\u2014in which in this connection the\nHerbartian may also be included,\u2014two systems only have dominantly\ninfluenced the German mind: the system of ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER and\nthat of HERMANN LOTZE. In both a resonance still lingers of the older\ntime. In Schopenhauer we detect the spirit of Schelling's nature- and\nart-philosophy; in Lotze, traces of the finely studied subtlety of\nHerbartian metaphysics. But though both are indebted for a portion\nof their real intrinsic worth to this organic though involuntary\nconnection with a great epoch, their influence upon the present time\nrests upon very different grounds; and primarily upon the symmetrical,\nfinished, and compact totality of their intellectual creations. They\narose at a time in which philosophers had begun to lay aside the older\nsystems as useless, and in which that multitudinous dismemberment of\nknowledge already began to make itself felt which to-day seems to be\nstill growing greater. Although it may be difficult in many phases of\nthe development of science to satisfy the impulse latent in us to unify\nknowledge, and although this endeavor is characterised ever anew by the\nrepresentatives of special research as a delusion, nay as a ruinous\ndelusion,\u2014yet this impulse is not to be eradicated from the human mind\nand in some way or other it will ever procure itself recognition. Works\nlike _Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_ (World as Will and Idea),\nor _Der Mikrokosmus_ (Microcosm) embrace in fact the entire sphere of\nknowledge, not in an extensive, but in an intensive sense: they furnish\na definite view of the complete inter-relation and meaning of life.\n\nIt will perhaps appear strange to the reader that works are here\nmentioned in the same breath and their effects upon the present time\ndiscussed, which are separated in origin from each other by a space\nof about forty years. Yet this very anomaly is characteristic of the\ndevelopment of the German mind. When Schopenhauer published, in 1819,\nhis principal work, the time for it had not yet come. The philosophy\nof Hegel, a rationalistic panlogism, was then in the very midst of its\ncareer of triumph. The irrationalistic and pessimistic elements of\nSchopenhauerian thought were repulsive. We now know that the two first\neditions of the _Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_ mouldered in the shops\nof the booksellers. Not until shortly before Schopenhauer's death in\n1860 did the literary public and the scholastic circles of Germany\nbegin to occupy themselves more seriously with this philosopher.\nNot until then did he really enter as an active factor into our\nintellectual life.\n\nThis influence, in the case both of Schopenhauer and Lotze,\nrests, aside from the fact of the universal character of their\nthought-creations, already referred to, pre-eminently in the\ncircumstance that both made thoroughly their own the scientific theory\nof things and recognised that conception as one whose justification\nwas contained in itself, and which, regarded from the standpoint of\nits own hypotheses, was irrefutable, though they were nevertheless\nfar removed from perceiving in it the final and irreversible verdict\nof human knowledge. In this endeavor to fix the limits of scientific\ncognition Schopenhauer and Lotze form important pillars of the\nantimaterialistic movement in Germany, and are just in this respect\nalso intimately related with the task of the modern Critical Philosophy\nor Neo-Kantianism. But while the latter movements came to a stop with\npredominantly negative or preparatory criticism, Schopenhauer and Lotze\nowe a great portion of their wide-spread influence on German culture\nto the circumstance that they undertook, from the point of view of the\ncritical theory of knowledge already acquired, to sketch the plans\nof structures of the world which would furnish a general background\nand scheme of synthetic connection for the collective special\nresults of the physical and mental sciences. That these sketches of\nworld-construction have an individual coloring can only lessen their\nvalue in the eyes of those who believe they are privileged to apply\nto such a synthetic, constructive formulation of the highest ideas of\nall existence and thought, the standard of the exact determination\nof a single law. And so I shall only hastily point to the fact, that\nthe contrariety and oppositeness that permeates the world and all our\nthought about the world also comes sharply to light in the case of\nthese two philosophers, not to their mutual destruction, but to the\nheightenment of the effect by the contrast.\n\nThe fortunes of the two systems, which began about the same time to\nacquire influence, were dissimilar. The pessimistic element alone\nevinced itself fruitful, in the sense that it came immediately into\ncontact with general culture through manifold forms of presentation\nand extensive discussion. The royal structure of the Schopenhauerian\nphilosophy has given a host of dispensing draymen for thirty years an\nabundance to do. The leader of this army, EDUARD VON HARTMANN, has\nlong since taken a place by the side of the sage of Frankfort, as\nindependent master-builder, and presented a system planned and executed\nwith the most diffuse architectural details. The nuclear idea of the\nPhilosophy of the Unconscious (_Die Philosophie des Unbewussten_) has\nbeen amplified by the author himself in every direction, extended,\nexhibited in its historical relationships, and applied to the special\ndepartments of philosophical science. The theory of cognition, ethics,\n\u00e6sthetics, the philosophy of religion have all been treated of by\nHartmann in the last two decades in voluminous works, and often\nrepeatedly elaborated. In addition thereto, come several volumes of\nessays in which the philosopher has had something to say upon every\nconceivable topic, political, literary, \u00e6sthetical, pedagogical,\nand politico-economical. Hartmann's fecundity is only surpassed by\nhis volubility. In him appears anew that union of philosophy and\njournalism that had remained disunited since the close of the period\nof illumination. The utility, nay the necessity, of this combination,\nwith which, unfortunately, the academical philosophy of the passing\ncentury would have naught to do, Hartmann knew the value of, and\nskilfully exhibited his appreciation; though one often wishes that its\npopular character had, in places, been made to do service in behalf of\ndifferent ideas.\n\nThe writings of no other philosopher have obtained so wide a\ncirculation as those of Hartmann. His chief work, \"The Philosophy of\nthe Unconscious,\" first published in 1870, has long since been put\nin stereotype form, and from time to time passes through repeated\nnew editions. Also his numerous other writings have for the greater\npart been repeatedly republished. We possess a collection entitled\n\"Select Works,\" and have just received a \"Popular Edition.\" And it is\nmoreover generally known that it has only been since the appearance of\nthe Philosophy of the Unconscious, that the sale of the writings of\nSchopenhauer has assumed great proportions. Through the mediation of\nHartmann Schopenhauer's fundamental ideas first reached the general\npublic.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe philosophy of Lotze lacked an interpreter of like versatility\nand fecundity, although it had need of such a one in a much higher\ndegree. Both thinkers were masters of the philosophical style. But\nLotze's symmetrically rounded and intricate periods, with their\ninexhaustible influx of incident relations, makes very different\ndemands upon the patient resignation of the reader than the lightly\nmoving, epigrammatically pointed style of Schopenhauer. Lotze for this\nreason never really became popular. His influence has remained rather\na scholastic and academic one. It has been fruitful in high degree\nin its effect on the special departments of philosophical science,\nparticularly on psychology, whose present representatives in Germany\nalmost without exception received from him incitation and a solid\nscientific view-point. Not unimportant, too, is his influence upon\nacademic instruction in philosophy, through the \"Dictations\" to his\nlectures, published after his death, which are in every student's hands\nand serve in many ways as a substitute for the study of his principal\nwork. Lotze's authority, finally, stands like a rock with all whose\ngreat concern it is to find ways of reconciling the claims of theology\nand of religious belief with the present state of science.\n\nAnd their number is by no means inconsiderable. Official Germany has\nbecome pious, or, at least, would like to appear so; and although this\nis not to be understood exactly in the sense of especial dogmatic zeal,\nyet people adhere nevertheless with a certain tenacity to the religious\nbackground of the prevailing world-conception. Abroad it is the custom\nto regard the Germans upon the whole as a nation of atheists, because\nthey have produced several curious fellows like Strauss and Feuerbach,\nenjoy having a good time on Sunday, and drink plentifully. Nothing\ncan be more erroneous than this opinion. The average German has long\nsince learned to place implicit confidence in the declaration of\nhis teachers, that the great critical liberal movement of the later\nHegelian school is not to be seriously taken but to be looked upon\nmerely as the outcome of a \"pathologically over-excited\" epoch. Nowhere\nin the great civilised countries has freethought practically found\nso little footing; nowhere is its dependence upon the central powers\nof government greater; nowhere is it more impossible to wrest even\na tittle from the authority of the old system of education with its\nfoundation laid in the theological world-theory.\n\nThis condition of things, the obstinacy, the timidity with which state\nand public opinion hold fast to religion,\u2014and now in times of imminent\nsocial danger more so than ever,\u2014must be borne in mind if we wish\nto understand the comparatively great success that the philosophy of\nSchopenhauer and Hartmann has had in Germany. In the support of these\ntwo systems the philosophical opposition of freethought has simply\nfound expression\u2014the opposition that has arisen against the official\nphilosophy, of which it cannot exactly be said that it theologises, but\nwhich carefully avoids coming into conflict with theology, and does\nnot, in its aristocratic academic exclusion, endeavor to influence more\nextended circles. The factor that made this philosophy of opposition\naccord with the spirit of the times\u2014its proximity, namely, to the\nscientific world-theory\u2014has already been emphasised; and the fact\nthat its pessimistic coloring has not been changed by its connection\ntherewith will be found intelligible when we consider the turn that\npessimism took in the hands of Hartmann. Only the quietistic Buddhism\nthat Schopenhauer taught, could, in an age of the highest expansion and\ndisplay of power both at home and abroad, appear as an incomprehensible\nriddle of the national mind. The evolutionistic pessimism of Hartmann,\nhowever, which demands of the individual complete and resigned\nsubmission to the struggle for existence, although it is able to\noffer him in the remotest background of time no better outlook than\nthe ultimate annihilation of existence itself\u2014is in its immediate\npractical commands too closely akin to an optimistic conception not\nto satisfy fully the needs of life, and is again too analogous to\ncertain cosmological prophecies of natural science not to pass as the\nmetaphysical expression of a truth otherwise accredited.\n\nAs opposed to this state of things Neo-Kantianism or the Critical\nPhilosophy in its various forms has taken no firm position; no more\nthan its master Kant himself did. To a great extent it makes use of the\nlimitations of knowledge that have been critically determined, in order\nto leave open behind the same a realm of transcendent possibilities\nin which religion may lead a passably secured existence. Behind the\ngreatest critical acumen theological prejudice is only too often\nconcealed.\n\nFew only of the intellectually eminent representatives of this movement\nlike Alois Riehl and Ernst Laas exhibit in this respect perfect\ndetermination and the consciousness that the consequences of modern\nscience unavoidably demand the laying aside of current religious\nconceptions and the substitution for them of more correct ones. Laas\nespecially, in many passages of his principal work (Idealism and\nPositivism), as also in his readable little treatise _Kant's Stellung\nim Conflicte zwischen Glauben und Wissen_,[60] has emphasised strongly\nthe view that there can be ideals only for the man who acts, and that\nso-called ideals where mingled with the function of pure cognition only\nfalsify reality and lead to irresolvable conflicts. And Laas likewise\nbelongs to the few who have laid prominent stress upon the educational\ntask of modern philosophy as a substitute for systems of religious\nideas.\n\n [60] _Kant's Position in the Struggle between Faith and Knowledge._\n\n * * * * *\n\nFrom the point of view of different systematic hypotheses, but\nsubstantially with exactly the same tendencies, analogous ideas find\nrepresentation in EUGEN D\u00dcHRING, who in versatility of talent and\nliterary activity is perhaps to be placed directly by the side of\nLotze and Hartmann, though the favor in which his works stand and the\ncirculation they have obtained fall far below the position of the\nlatter. He presents a different form of positivistic philosophy in\nGermany, a philosophy not preponderantly critical but constructive,\nand begins with what Ludwig Feuerbach about the middle of this century\nin his Principles of a Philosophy of the Future (_Grunds\u00e4tze einer\nPhilosophie der Zukunft_) once propounded as programme. His chief work,\n_Cursus der Philosophie als strengwissenschaftlicher Weltanschauung\nund Lebensgestaltung_ (Course of Philosophy as Exact-Scientific\nWorld-Conception and Conduct of Life), and the treatise against\npessimism entitled _Der Werth des Lebens_ (The Value of Life) sketch\na world-picture that is intended theoretically to be but the simple\nconceptual interpretation of the present contents of experience, and\ntherefore rejects the metaphysical constructions of Lotze, as well\nas the new conceptual mythology of Hartmann, and criticistic doubts\nconcerning the objective reality of the world given in consciousness.\nIn the practical direction, as an offset to the world-throe of\nhumanity, the gladdening power of a life and action based on universal\nsympathy is emphasised. D\u00fchring is a unique, but isolated phenomenon;\nstanding, like Schopenhauer once did, in sullen antagonism towards\nthe official academic philosophy, and totally ignored by it; unable\nby virtue of the conditions already delineated to influence wider\ncircles, which the unanimated rigidity of his manner of presentation\ndoes not contribute to make easy. Eminent mental endowment and\nextensive knowledge are perhaps displayed in a higher degree in his\nhistorical works (_Kritische Geschichte der Allgemeinen Principien der\nMechanik_[61]; _Kritische Geschichte der Philosophie_[62]; _Kritische\nGeschichte der National\u00f6konomie und des Socialismus_[63]) than in his\nsystematic treatises.\n\n [61] _Critical History of the General Principles of Mechanics._\n\n [62] _Critical History of Philosophy._\n\n [63] _Critical History of Political Economy and Socialism._\n\nNevertheless, D\u00fchring can at the farthest be regarded only as one of\nthe forerunners of that Messiah that is destined for German philosophy\nand German intellectual culture perhaps in the coming century; of\nthat man who shall be able to cast up the accounts of the work of the\npresent period, with its infinite analyses, its historical comparative\ncharacter, and its pyramidal yield of material, and to condense that\nwhich now everywhere surges about us like a spiritual ether, but\nnowhere palpable or tangible, into the unity of a system that shall\npoint out the paths to be followed and shall dominate all minds.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThere are many,\u2014and among them eminent investigators and estimable\nscholars,\u2014who smile at this prophecy as an Utopian dream; nay, almost\nstand in dread of such hopes, as perilous to science. The day of\nsystems, say they, is past. Philosophy, too,\u2014perhaps it were more\nproper to say \"mental science,\"\u2014is breaking up into a number of\nspecial sciences, over which it is sought to place a general science\nof knowledge or theory of science, as the last representative of that\nwhich was once called philosophy and was recognised as the queen of the\nsciences.\n\nAs intimated, I do not know whether the impulse toward unity that\ninheres in the human mind is to be so easily driven from the field;\nwhether we shall be satisfied in the long run to behold that light\nthat irradiates the universe, broken a hundred-fold by the prisms of\nthe single sciences. But one thing is certain. The more irresolute\nthey are in whom the science of the future places its confidence,\nthe more actively will they press forward who hold that the precious\ntreasure of truth has long since been granted unto man, and who would\nfain forge with this heritage of the past the fetters of the future.\nAfter the Catholic church under Pius IX. had hurled in the face of\nmodern culture and science its frantic _Anathema sit_, it began under\nhis successor a much quieter, yet far more determined warfare. Like\none of the famed lianas of the primeval tropical forests, it entwines\nthe giant Science, to sap his best powers and slowly but surely to\nstifle his life. Whatever the modern mind with the help of freedom\nwon by bitter struggles has gained in the knowledge of nature and\nof history, is twisted and turned, falsified and misinterpreted by\nhundreds and hundreds of busy hands until it has been fashioned to fit\nthat ready-made scheme of things composed on the one hand of Catholic\ndogmatical teachings, and on the other of the Aristotelian-Thomistic\nphilosophy. As many representatives as secular freethought can show,\nthere will be found beside them to-day an ecclesiastical _advocatus\ndiaboli_ who will neither rest nor cease until of the hero has been\nmade a wretch and mangy heresiarch.\n\nUnder protection of the principle of free inquiry, and with all the\nhelps of science, a warfare of extermination is here carried on against\nall freedom of mind and all science, which is the more dangerous in\nproportion as the opponent loves to decorate himself with the borrowed\nplumes of science, and as he is able skilfully to mask his real\ndesigns. Catholicism is striving with untiring efforts to gain by the\nhelp of this reformed and modernised scholasticism, the mastery of the\nschools, of education, of the universities, and of the entire activity\nof science. And compared with the position of the representatives of\nmodern thought it has decidedly the advantage. Not only is it in the\npossession of a unitary world-theory, but it defends that theory with\nmost determined vigor and heedlessness against all differing views.\nThe representatives of modern science, on the contrary, are not so\nfortunate as to possess inherited truth and infallible authority, and\nthey not only have to contend with the formidable internal difficulties\nthat stand in the way of a unitary formulation of their conception\nof the world, but frequently even avoid entering on this task with\ndetermination in order to make less prominent the contrast with the\nreligio-theological system to which every exact scientific conception\nof the world must of necessity lead.\n\nAgainst these aggressive endeavors of the theological mind, neither\nlofty indifference, nor calm historical contemplation, nor mere\nliterary warring will avail. The power of freethought must be\ndisplayed, and the positive work that it can do must be shown.\nOtherwise the time may come when the fame of rigid scientific thought\nand successful research in special fields will not exonerate German\nphilosophy from the reproach of having left the nation in the lurch\nat a period of momentous spiritual crisis. To make useful the rich\nacquisitions of these labors toward the construction of a general\ntheory of the world, remains, therefore, the serious task of the German\nphilosophy of the future.\n\nI shall be permitted, perhaps, in a future article to present an\naccount of the literature of these special departments.\n\n FRIEDRICH JODL.\n\n\nII.\n\nRECENT FRENCH PUBLICATIONS.\n\nThe works that have appeared during the last three months belong to\nauthors of different nationalities\u2014Italian, Roumanian, Belgian, and\nI ought to add Russian; but I shall not speak on this occasion of the\nimportant work of Sergneyeff, _Physiologie de la Veille et du Sommeil_.\n\nIt is, as you see, a gathering of good company, on French soil.[64]\n\n [64] All these works are published by Alcan.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe only French work to be mentioned is that of M. CH. ADAM,\n_Philosophie de Fran\u00e7ois Bacon_, a memoir presented in the prize\ncompetition of which M. Barth\u00e9lemy Saint-Hilaire was the reporter and\npreferred by the Academy of Moral and Political sciences.\n\nM. Ch. Adam is already known by several works relating to the\nhistory of philosophy. The study which he now gives to the public\nis conscientious; we must commend his erudition and the moderation\nhe has displayed both in his praise and in his criticism. I am not\nsure, however, if he is right in asserting that the fame of Bacon\nwill increase and diminish alternately, according to whether patient\nanalyses or daring hypotheses find the more favor in the scientific\nworld. I have known many a savant, profoundly metaphysical and\nimaginative, who, in admiring Bacon, delusively believed himself in\nthe possession of a solid safeguard against metaphysics. There is more\nchance, to my mind, of finding the admirers of the Chancellor among\npure philosophers than among men of science. This is why I subscribe\ncompletely to the judgment of M. Ch. Adam, when he subordinates Bacon\nto Descartes and to Galileo. Especially should he be put below Galileo,\nwho was the great initiator of modern science, at least the first to\nadd a link to the chain of human science then being forged; one, I\nmight say, who by his solid contributions really founded physical\nscience, as chemistry was founded by Lavoisier and his contemporaries a\ncentury and a half later.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe Roumanian writer is M. BASILE CONTA, whose unfinished work, _Les\nFondements de la M\u00e9taphysique_, has been translated by M. Tescanu.\nM. Conta died in the heyday of his powers. Born in 1845, he was\nsuccessively, from 1875 to 1881, professor of jurisprudence at the\nUniversity of Jassy, deputy, and minister of public instruction. The\nauthor and his works have, therefore, serious claims to our attention.\nNevertheless, I can hardly believe that M. Conta always kept in the\npath in which he started, for if he had, it would have led him to\nconsiderable results.\n\nM. Conta held that every combination of ideas, that is to say every\nultimate generalisation, is essentially mobile, alterable in character,\nand that there will never be any final, definitive philosophical\nsystem. Subject to the benefit of this wise reserve, he undertook,\nnevertheless, to frame a \"materialist\" metaphysic, founded like the\npositive sciences on induction, and he attempted to rise to a general\nsystem, from which it appeared to him that the ancient notions of the\nsoul, of freedom, and of God could not be legitimately excluded.\n\nAccording to my mind, the defect of his method was the allowing too\nmuch to reasoning, the too great desire to create reality by simple\nlogic. Unfortunately, the intellectual necessity that he proclaimed,\nof reducing all to unity, does not carry with it the means of properly\nmaking this reduction by a subtle operation of the mind. In order to\nadvance towards his end, M. Conta found himself led to formulate a\ncompendious sketch of a theory of cognition, a psychology, and a logic,\nat the risk of sinking at times in the quicksands of a treacherous\ndiscussion. As a matter of fact, metaphysics, spiritualism, and\nmaterialism, are conceptions of great vagueness, and the problem to\nreconcile them by any fashion of union, is rather like inquiring how\nmany ways there are of placing three persons at table, or even a\ngreater number.\n\nThis is not said by way of disputing the merits of a writer whose loss\nis justly regretted, or to discourage the reading of a book in which\nmany will find much to accept.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe Belgian author is M. ALBERT BONJEAN, a barrister of Verviers. His\nbook, _L' Hypnotisme, ses Rapports avec le Droit et la Therapeutique,\nla Suggestion Mentale_, affects too much the style of an address\nbefore a court in which the orator wishes to exhibit wit and acumen.\nNevertheless, it is written with clearness, is agreeable to read, and\nthe verbal nicety sought does not impair its good sense.\n\nM. Bonjean has developed the three following theses: First, that the\naction of magnetism is not explained by the hypothesis of a fluid,\nthat we cannot speak with M. Ochorowicz, of \"a certain tonic vibratory\nmovement which propagates itself outward from the periphery of the\nbody,\" but that it is explainable by simple suggestion; second, that\nthe power of suggestion is almost unlimited; and third, that though\nverbal suggestion is incontestable, mental suggestion remains doubtful\nuntil proof to the contrary.\n\nM. Bonjean thus sides with MM. Ochorowicz and Delb\u0153uf, and the whole\nschool of Nancy, against that of the Salp\u00eatri\u00e8re. He endeavors\nespecially to show the serious consequences, in criminal and civil\naffairs, of immoral suggestions, the dangers of which he reproaches M.\nGilles de la Tourette with having concealed far too much. His personal\nconviction does not rest itself solely on the expositions of others,\nbut on experiments which seem to have been conducted with prudence.\n\nExtraordinary as this almost passive obedience of a subject to the\nsuggestion of an act which is repugnant to his moral tendencies\nappears, we come in a position, it seems to me, to comprehend it by\nthe observation of the degenerate patients of our asylums in their\nvarious manias. The dipsomaniac resists with all his power the impulse\nto drink, and the kleptomaniac the impulse to steal; they fight against\nit even to agony, but they end always by yielding to it. \"It was\nstronger than I\"; such is the formula that we have noted most often in\nthe answers of these unfortunates. And remark, that the dipsomaniac\ndoes not drink for pleasure, but by compulsion, be the beverage what\nit may, water, urine, or petroleum; just as the kleptomaniac does\nnot steal with a view to enjoying the product of his theft, which he\nordinarily abandons or restores, but steals to deliver himself from\nagonising torture. In this manner also the onomatomaniac acts, who\nis seeking a word, and who rises at night to consult the dictionary,\netc. The hypnotised subject is in the same predicament, whatever\npathological difference there may be between the two; his personality\nhas momentarily sunk in hypnosis, as does that of an insane person\nduring the attack of insanity; his moral resistance must finally yield,\nand it is not at all remarkable that it does.\n\nThe volume of M. Bonjean ends with an interesting discussion of the\ncelebrated case of Lully. The deceit that gave rise to belief in\nsuggestion without words or gestures appears to be established; the\nsubject reads from the lips of his magnetiser.\n\n * * * * *\n\nLet us turn to the fine work of M. R. GAROFALO, _La Criminologie, Etude\nsur la Nature du Crime et la Th\u00e9orie de la P\u00e9nalit\u00e9_. M. Garofalo has\nhimself translated his work from the Italian; this second edition is\nentirely recast.\n\nThe Italians have always had a taste for juridical studies. Their\nschool of criminologists has placed itself at the head of the movement\nwhich ought to result in the reform of all criminal codes. Two\nprincipal tendencies are predominant in the works of this school:\nthe physicians and anthropologists, for example M. Lombroso, have\nconformably to their mental tendencies, particularly studied the\n_criminal_, of whom they have endeavored to fix the type; the jurists,\nlike M. Garofalo, vice-president of the civil tribunal of Naples,\nconsider by preference the _crime_, which they determine by reference\nto our social organisation. M. Garofalo shows himself at once an\ninnovator, in that he endeavors to give a positive definition of crime,\nto take the place of the vague and incomplete definition which was\naccepted by the old jurists, and conforming to which anthropologists\nhave thought themselves able to mark the characteristics of the\ncriminal man. That definition has relation to the average morality of\nthe societies of to-day; crime or criminal offence is to be sought,\naccording to him, only in the violation of altruistic sentiments\nacquired and consolidated in the average social individual\u2014compassion\nand probity. New categories ought then to be established; that of\n\"revolutionists,\" for example, with whom the offence does not proclaim\nmoral monstrosity.\n\nThe violation of altruistic sentiments certainly reveals in the\noffender a grave anomaly; it marks him as not adapted to the\nconditions of society, and even incapable of adapting himself to\nthem, in consequence of psychical and physiological irregularities.\nThe principle, then, is correct, although M. Garofalo has based it\non an analysis of sentiments which appears to me insufficient. The\nsympathetic emotions which compassion embraces, are not the only source\nof our moral activity; probity arises in part from intelligence,\nand the logical sense intervenes to give the form of justice or\ninjustice to an act of passion. Now, feebleness of judgment becomes,\nincidentally, an important element of the diagnosis of the criminal.\nLet us agree, nevertheless, that the absence of compassion and of\nprobity upon the whole makes up the \"natural crime.\" This suffices\nsurely in practice.\n\nOn the other hand, it is not convenient, and it is unquestionably not\nindispensable, to make a difference between an anomaly \"in relation to\na superior civilised type,\" and an anomaly \"in relation to the human\ntype itself.\" Here is the criterion that M. Garofalo\u2014prepossessed\nas he is to take away from born criminals the benefit, too easily\nobtained, of disease\u2014proposes to us, in order to distinguish from the\nanomaly truly morbid, an anomaly not pathological, but which depends\nin some way on the cerebral organisation. Subtle is this distinction\nwhich he opposes to the opinion of French alienists, according to whom\nthe immoral are always more or less physically degenerated. I will\nconfine myself to recalling on this point a remark of Dr. Magnan. Very\noften, said this eminent clinician one day to me, a father of poor\nmoral stability but otherwise healthy of body, has a son well balanced\nin his moral and intellectual tendencies but already on the way to\ndegeneracy. The anatomical anomaly invoked by M. Garofalo would be\nthen not far from the physiological anomaly; functional disturbance of\nthe higher faculties is not alone concerned. Fundamentally, this is\nof little moment to the practical conclusions of his system, which we\nmust rapidly indicate. With regard to the repression of crime, and as\nto a large category of criminals, the social point of view necessarily\ndominates the medical point of view.\n\nM. Garofalo inquires what the power of education and of the increase\nof well-being is in diminishing crime. He has found them extremely\nweak. Severity of repression alone appears of some efficacy; indulgence\naugments crime. For the sake of social selection, the criminal ought\nto be eliminated, by capital punishment, perpetual banishment, etc.,\naccording as the case demands. Temporary imprisonment has no place\nin this system. Finally, the only criterion of penality is lack of\nadaptability to social life; this criterion will replace the false\nprinciples of \"moral responsibility\" and \"proportionment of the\npunishment to the crime.\" It is too apparent that the prevailing penal\ntheory and the jurisprudence in agreement with it, seem to tend to\nprotect the criminal against society, rather than society against the\ncriminal. And what absurdities besides! The attempt is less severely\ntreated than the consummated offence; preparatory acts are _never_\npunished, the attempt at a crime is _always_ punished.\n\nThe criterion of penality once accepted, it is necessary to find the\nindices of this lack of fitness, of the impossibility of adaptation\nto social life, which justifies repression. M. Garofalo seeks them\nno longer in \"premeditation,\" but he finds them in the motive of the\ncrime and in the way in which it has been prepared or perpetrated. We\ncannot follow him into the details of this discussion, which presents\nthe highest interest. Our exceptions would turn on the interpretation\nof certain features; they do not bear on the general principles of this\ngreat and solid work.\n\n LUCIEN ARR\u00c9AT.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK REVIEWS.\n\n\nTHE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. By _William James_, Professor of\n Psychology in Harvard University. In two volumes. New York: Henry\n Holt & Co., American Science Series. Advanced Course.\n\nIn the present status of psychological science every attempt to gather\nthe diversified facts and views and present them in a single, though\nextensive work, cannot but be scrutinised with great care and interest;\nand when this work comes from the pen of one who has gained so wide and\nappreciative a circle of readers, the interest becomes deeper and more\npersonal.\n\nIt was, perhaps, the professor of mental science, struggling for years\nwith text-books, inadequate, or antiquated, or narrow, or unscientific,\nor dry, or unpedagogic, who most anxiously awaited the appearance of\nProfessor James's volumes; and his expectation was the more warranted,\nas the work was announced in a series of text-books deservedly\nsuccessful and popular. To such a one, the work itself does not come\nto fill the place of a text-book; not alone the great length (1,400\npages), but the general supposition of knowledge on the part of the\nreader which it is the object of college courses to supply, together\nwith the selection of topics and the peculiar division of space amongst\nthem, limit the work to students of a much more advanced type than\n(unfortunately, perhaps) American education as yet supplies. But while\nour professor must still patiently hope for some work that will present\nin brief and convenient form the main facts of Psychology, he will find\nhis task made easier and more interesting by these welcome volumes.\nHe will find in them an original and frequently brilliant treatment\nof many of the deepest problems of modern Psychology: and it is as a\ncontribution to science and as an aid to the professional student that\na discussion of their contents and tenets will be pertinent in these\npages.\n\nTo begin with, the attitude of the author to his subject is that of a\nprofessional scientist to his specialty. \"I have kept close,\" he says,\n\"to the point of view of natural science throughout the book. Every\nnatural science assumes certain data uncritically, and declines to\nchallenge the elements between which its own 'laws' obtain, and from\nwhich its own deductions are carried on.... This book, assuming that\nthoughts and feelings exist, and are vehicles of knowledge, thereupon\ncontends that Psychology, when she has ascertained the empirical\ncorrelation of the various sorts of thought or feeling with definite\nconditions of the brain, can go no farther\u2014can go no farther that is\nas a natural science. If she goes farther she becomes metaphysical.\"\n\nThis position does not carry with it the condemnation of all matters\nmetaphysical, but simply excludes them from Psychology; nor does\nthis independence place Psychology in a position unrelated to other\nsciences. Such relation is a cardinal fact in the mental world, and\nnowhere is it more necessary to bear in mind that the division of the\nsciences is largely an expression of the lines of men's interests and\nthe inevitable specialisation of knowledge. Those forms of adaptations\nof means to ends which we study as forms of psychic action, while\ntheoretically distinguishable from other modes of action, in fact,\noften resemble them; in other words, \"the boundary line of the mental\nfaculty is certainly vague. It is better not to be pedantic, but to let\nthe science be as vague as the subject,\" and include all facts, whether\nthey are usually called physiological, or biological, or not, that shed\nlight on the main problems dealt with.\n\nThis conception accordingly views mind as distinctly related to and\nan essential part of its environment; it views mental phenomena as\ninfinitely varied, as most intricately conditioned by and in turn\nconditioning other natural phenomena. For the complete survey of\nits domain, it calls upon experiment, observation, introspection,\ncomparison, analysis, hypothesis, deduction, each properly controlled\nby the others, and limited by community of purpose to a firm foundation\nof fact.\n\nIt is true that in the more intricate problems, those with the smallest\nconnection with sensation and the largest with inference and analysis,\nthe author will be regarded as more metaphysical than psychological and\nplainly admits his fault; it is true that the personal leanings of the\nauthor lead him to lengthy discussions of these more intricate points,\nbut none the less the positive, broad, and evolutionary spirit that\ndominates the general view of the subject leaves a clear impress of\nvitality, progress, and interest on every page.\n\nPassing from point of view and purpose to content we do not look\nfor and do not find any 'closed system,' but \"a mass of descriptive\ndetails\" in the selection of which personal interest has been the\ncontrolling factor. The articles which Professor James has written from\ntime to time in the periodicals appear, sometimes a little remodelled,\nin the larger work; each chapter is thus largely an independent essay\nupon the topic printed at the head of it. On the physiological side we\nhave an admirable chapter on the functions of the brain, but elsewhere\nthe student is referred to other works for the physiological points\ninvolved.\n\nFollowing this is an excellent essay on Habit and Automatism,\nwhereupon without further ceremony the reader is invited to a somewhat\nspeculative series of chapters upon 'Mind Stuff,' 'Knowledge and\nReality,' and the like, and may resume the more concrete chapters on\nAttention, Conception, Discrimination and Comparison, Association, only\nafter struggling with the complex picture of 'the Stream of Thought,'\n'the Consciousness of Self,' and 'the Snares of Psychology.' Each\nof these chapters presents a distinct problem, presents it well and\npositively, and contributes much that is original to the discussion.\n\nIn all this there is strongly emphasised the subjective contribution\nto Psychology,\u2014the value of a discerning and critical introspection\nand the importance of the subject in all processes of sense, judgment,\nattention, association, and the like. The mind is not a passive\nreceptacle of experiences, but is continually active, making and\nshaping, seizing and transforming, absorbing and assimilating the\nstimuli of its environment.\n\nA second series of topics take up the perception of those general\nconcepts, Time, 'Things,' Space, Reality, and Form, the largest and\nheaviest chapters in the work, amongst which, as if to whet the\nappetite, are distributed more concrete pages dealing with Memory,\nSensation, and Imagination. The former devote much space to criticism,\nand would, perhaps, border upon the metaphysics that was to have been\navoided, were it not that they spring from considerations much more\nconcrete and provable; the latter group of chapters are amongst the\nmost interesting of the volume, and though treating but a small and\nsomewhat arbitrarily selected portion of each of the topics, treat them\nin a suggestive and inspiring way. Discerning and ingenious sketches\nof single mental traits and processes, happy illustrations, suggestive\nside issues make these pages a striking contrast to the usual text-book\ntone, and will attract students of all shades and grades of agreement\nor disagreement with the author's views.\n\nThe remaining chapters deal with Reasoning, Movement, Instinct,\nEmotions, Will, Hypnotism, Necessary Truths; in addition to the\ncharacteristics already indicated, we find here a wise use of the\nfacts of Morbid Psychology, of the inferences from the abnormal to\nthe normal. This naturally stands out prominently in the discussion\nof Hypnotism\u2014so recent and yet so essential a department of mental\nscience.\n\nWhen we close the cover of the second volume we do so with the feeling\nthat our mental horizon has been enlarged, our interests have been\nquickened, our attention has been held, our time agreeably spent,\u2014and\nyet the result of all this reading seems intangible, diffuse,\nscattered, unsatisfactory. The scholar and the professor always retain\nthe student feeling and the student habit of thought; and what is\nunpedagogic for the one is uneconomical for the other. A logical order\nof exposition, a unifying grouping of topics, a just perspective of\ndetails, a painstaking selection of facts, constitute much to convert\nuseless knowledge into useful science; such works contain a large\nelement of drudgery, must be impersonal in one sense of the term, and\nyet are not inconsistent with a high degree of originality, but it is\nsuch works that are enormously helpful, that form landmarks by which\nprogress is measured and retained. These useful qualities we miss in\nProfessor James's work. True, it does not pretend to possess them,\nbut psychological text-books are not written every day, and when so\ninfluential a one appears, the wish that its utility shall reach a\nmaximum demands expression. Finally, it is a work destined to be much\nquoted, to arouse considerable discussion, to excite quite different\nopinions from different critics, and so, every one interested in modern\nPsychology will find it necessary and profitable to learn at first hand\nthis important American contribution to the science of Psychology.\n\n J. J.\n\n\nTHE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT. By _Charles Carroll Everett, D. D._ Boston: De\n Wolfe Fiske & Co. Revised edition.\n\nAn excellent manual of that which is accepted as logic. The author\nis a disciple of Hegel, and throughout conforms his treatment of\nthe topic to the lines laid down by his master, although in various\nconnections where these lines permit, the author contributes from his\nown resources, and from other masters, much needed supplementary matter.\n\nThe appearance of late of so many essays, manuals, and treatises\nprofessing to deal with logic and its affiliated topics is quite\nnoteworthy, and is the manifestation of a need that has become, not\nmerely a crying, but an absolutely groaning one. It is scarcely a\nmetaphor to say that to-day the intellectual world is in great travail\nover its need of an organon. We are crying unto our logical desire\nfrom the depths of our souls and waiting for it as they that wait for\nthe morning. This intensity of our want makes us intolerant of the\nold incompetences and sets us to fault-finding in the hope of better\ninsight when the current obscurities shall have been dissipated. We\nscan each effort as it appears, and as it discovers no even single\nclear organic general principle around which the wealth of knowledge\nnow ascertained can set in order we lay it aside with a feeling of\nbeing merely tantalised. We cannot but assimilate our condition to that\nof the Haunted Man in Bret Harte's clever travesty of Dickens: \"'Here\nagain?' said the Haunted Man. 'Here again,' assented the phantom, in a\nlow tone. 'Another novel?' 'Another novel.' 'The old story?' 'The old\nstory.' 'It won't do, Charles! It won't do!' and the Haunted Man buried\nhis head in his hands and groaned.\"\n\nWhen the singular difficulties of the search are considered, all\nthis is, no doubt, void of that sweet reasonableness that should\nobtain. Still the interests of progress are too supreme to permit any\ncompromise with error or incompetence.\n\nSo, although the excellent manual under notice makes no pretensions\nthat are unwarrantable, according to the customs usually observed\nin such cases, it yet affords salient features, apt as texts for\na course of comment that applies, not merely to the doctrine and\ntreatment adopted in it but to the doctrine and methods of the accepted\nlogic-books in general.\n\nThe book is entitled, \"The Science of Thought.\" This exposes an\nincompetent comprehension of the topic. The Science of Thought should\nbe a mere branch of psychology. In logic, we of course, have an almost\nprime need of information concerning the anatomy and physiology of\nthought. But this is not the peculiar motive of logic. The _raison\nd'\u00eatre_ of logic is not the _general_ economy of thought, but the\nphenomena of _untrue_, _incompetent_, or _fallacious_ thought, or,\nin other words, _erroneous thought_. Did but the mind of man always\nsupply him with true and competent thoughts he would find no need of\nseeking logical criteria, however much he might be interested in the\nphenomenology of thought in general.\n\nMan being, however, what he is, informed by a mind, prone to error,\nand he, in consequence, frequently subjected to evils and misses that\nbetter information would have enabled him to avoid or mitigate, he\nnaturally seeks to solve the causes of his errors, and to discover\nmeans of testing the worth of his thoughts and of deriving thoughts\nthat are true and competent. This search is the study of logic; the\ntrue information relevant thereto is logic, and no other device of\nman ought to trespass upon the name. Using for this turn the word\ntruth in a broader sense than usual, so as to include the sense of\ncompetence, we may say that Logic is the Science of Truth and Untruth\nin Thought,\u2014take notice, _in thought_\u2014for we are supposing that there\nneither is, nor can be, any other or further _means_ of becoming aware\nof aught of the nature or features, of aught that is pure alternate to\nmind, than thought merely, and that, therefore, truth and untruth in\nthought exhausts all the proper possibilities of truth and untruth.\n\nFollowing Hegel, and concurring with so many others, our author\nstarts with Being as the proper primordial universal notion. Is this\nnot taking note merely of the comprehensive meaning of thought, in\nignorance of its denominate meaning? Prior, at least logically, to\nBeing, Form, Mode, Limit, Relation, and the like, must there not\nbe posited or supposed somewhat to _be_, to _be formed_, to _be\nmodulated_, to _be limited_, to _be related_, etc? Must not Quality\nbe quality _of_ somewhat, and Quantity, quantity _of_ somewhat? So it\nseems to us and we therefore posit Ground as primordial in thought.\nGround as intended here is not the same as the Absolute Being of Hegel.\nIt is in general independent of the notions either of existence or\nreality, being in general that of which aught is predicative either\nin discourse or thought. It is pure logical denomination free of all\nlogical comprehension. The imaginary number and the ideal number of\nmathematics are each just as truly grounds according to this intent as\nis a house or a tree.\n\nGround is the seat or basis of Being, Mind, Form, Mode, Limitation,\nRelation, etc. Behind any momented thought, say Sun shines, Mind\nthinks, or It is, lies, it may be latent, but all potential, the\nmere thought stripped of all comprehension: Sun, Mind, or It. It is\nwholly irrelevant that a ground is manifest only by means of its\ncomprehension if it be true that it _must_ be supposed as the seat of\nthat comprehension. Undistributed and therefore unrelated or absolute\nground from its very nature admits of no other predicate than mere\nbeing. It is in general at once the All and Existence. Its negative\nor Naught has no ground, being, or comprehension whatever, and no\nproper denomination, its name being only quasi-denominative and for\nconvenience of notation merely. Form or Thought breaks this barren\nuniverse of mere Ground and Being by the formation of modes of Ground\nand by the more or less arbitrary fiats and finds of Limitation.\n\nBy the formation of Mode emerge Form, Time, and Extent, and perhaps\nCause and Aim. By Limitation emerge Part and Whole, Number, and\nRelation in all their manifold involutions. Attribute being only\n_degraded_ Relation, and Quantity being only one _power_ of Relation.\n\nIt is a most notable peculiarity of thought that it has the ability and\nthat it is its custom to take any form or phase of Being, and regard\nand deal with it as a ground.\n\nHence every momented thought (which in effect embraces every thought\nproperly speaking) makes two distinct references, its ground reference\nand its being or predicate reference. This seems to be the bottom truth\nin respect to the much vexed topic of extension and comprehension.\nThere would seem to be, therefore, in reality only two ultimate\ncategories, Ground and Being.\n\nAs to how the categories, usually taken as such, and their complements,\nshould be distributed between Ground and Being, would seem to be a\nmatter requiring much pondering to arrange. Owing to the double quality\nof so many of the mental alternates, as in one regard Being and in\nanother regard Ground, much difficulty might well be anticipated.\n\nNeglecting this distribution we may say that very universal terms of\nthought are Ground, Being, Form, Mode, Limit, Number, Part, Relation.\nEpoch, Place, Alteration, Event, Cause, Effect, Aim, and the like.\n\nThe cardinal mental activities which _produce_ thought seem to be, in\norder, Attention, Conception, Recognition, Induction, and Deduction.\nIn all these operations there is opportunity for not only true, but\nerroneous thought, and logic in its office as the inspector and judge\nof thought in respect of its truth or error, should study all these\noperations and those which are subsidiary to them, and ascertain the\ncauses of error and the means of truth, and perfect methods of deriving\ntruth with certainty and ease.\n\nIt is very presumptuous and hazardous to essay a definition of truth,\nyet since such a definition is a great desideratum, and since it will\nnot be effected except by earnest trial, and since also, in such a\nmatter, even failures that are consequent on devoted attempts are\ninstructive to subsequent attempts, we venture our submission:\n\nA thought is true which while representing its applicate (that is\nwhatever to which it is directly applied) also, in so far as its\npurport implies, represents in mind a thorough and respective parity\nand ratio, through which each thought-analyton and thought-syntheton\n(whether ground, mode, limit, number, part, relation, etc.) corresponds\nto its proper applicate-analyton or applicate-syntheton. Truth is this\nrepresentative and correspondent parity and ratio in general. A thought\nmay be true and yet incompetent, that is unfit to serve some assigned\npurpose or turn in view, by reason, it may be, of its irrelevancy, or\nit may be of its restricted application or purport. It is a question\nthat has been much mooted whether or not our sensations are true to\ntheir mind-alternate excitants. The argument towards showing that they\nare would be prolix and must be passed. If however they are not true it\nwould be interesting to hear by what quality or nature they are to be\ncharacterised in respect to their verity.\n\nAttention is a mental activity of considerable importance in logic in\nconnection with that very fruitful source of error, mal-observation.\nBut by far the most important mental activity to be studied and\nthoroughly known for the behests of logic is Conception, with its\nall important adjunct of denomination. The verity or error of all\nother mental operations that generate thought depends largely on the\ntruth or untruth, the competence or incompetence of Conception. On\nour conceptions as a basis is erected and must ever be erected every\nscheme of our notation, and in so far as our conceptions are untrue\nor incompetent, so probably is, and so will be, in perhaps a multiple\nmeasure, all our knowledge. Very much more ought to be said in this\nconnection, but space will not permit.\n\nThe mental operation which is here called Recognition, but which has\nbeen called hypothesis and otherwise, and which the author reviewed\ncalls Identification, has not received the attention from logicians\nin general which its importance requires. It is a true variety of\ninference, as Mr. C. S. Peirce has fully shown. Our conceptions which\nare the central facts of logic would be of little value to us were\nwe not able truly to subsume our perceptions under them. A variety\nof facts are available to show how very often we do this wrongly,\nimperfectly, or not at all.\n\nInduction, and its rationale, depends also very largely upon conception\nand its intimate consequences, denomination, attribution, and\nrelationising. Deduction and the Syllogism are trite themes, although\nthe part that attribution plays in the process has been insufficiently\nnoticed, and although the rules of deduction from relation-terms,\nthe most important and fruitful of all, are as yet very partially\nascertained. What is needed as an indispensable prerequisite to\nthis last, seems to be a census and classification of the manifold\nrelations that are known, after the model of say Roget's Thesaurus,\nand then a determination of the consequences of such combinations and\nconstructions as are admissible and fruitful, and a tabulation of the\nsame as our multiplication table is a tabulation of the consequences of\nthe multiplication of numbers. The Logic of Relatives as it is called\nsuffers from its having been formed thus far on so very abstract and\nformal a plan that its formation lacks the check and correction of\nfrequent comparison with concrete knowledge, while its results are\nalmost if not quite useless owing to their extreme generality, which in\ndefect of the mediate formula leaves them inapplicable to aught that\ncan manifest their utility or power.\n\n F. C. R.\n\n\nTHE TIME-RELATIONS OF MENTAL PHENOMENA. By _Joseph Jastrow_. New York:\n N. D. C. Hodges.\n\nThe accomplished Professor of Psychology at the University of Wisconsin\ngives in this publication, which forms one of the series of \"Facts\nand Theory Papers\" issued by Mr. Hodges, the results of numerous\nobservations by Cattell, M\u00fcnsterberg and other observers. His object\nis to present a general view of what has been done already in this\ndepartment of research. The study of the time-relations of mental\nphenomena is of importance in various connections. As Professor Jastrow\nremarks:\n\n\"It serves as an index of mental complexity, giving the sanction of\nobjective demonstration to the results of subjective observation; it\nindicates a mode of analysis of the simpler mental acts, as well as\nthe relation of these laboratory products to the processes of daily\nlife; it demonstrates the close interrelation of psychological with\nphysiological facts, an analysis of the former being indispensable to\nthe right comprehension of the latter; it suggests means of lightening\nand shortening mental operations, and thus offers a mode of improving\neducational methods; and it promises in various directions to deepen\nand widen our knowledge of those processes by the complication and\nelaboration of which our mental life is so wonderfully built up.\"\n\nThe results of the observations referred to by Professor Jastrow are\ngiven in Tables of Simple Reaction Times and of Complex Reaction Times.\nOne of the most important points considered is \"the overlapping of\nmental processes,\" as to which Cattell made a special study. From the\nfact that the time needed for the performance of complete operations,\nas multiplying numbers and reciting a verse or two at the same time, is\nshorter than the sum of the times required to do each separately, it\nis inferred that the mind should be likened not \"to a point at which\nbut a single object can impinge at one time, but rather to a surface\nof variable extension.\" Moreover, \"the performance of a complex and\nextended mental task is not the same thing as the separate performance\nof the several elements into which that task may be analysed.\" The\naddition of a classified Bibliography adds much to the value of\nProfessor Jastrow's interesting little work.\n\n \u03a9.\n\n\nON SAMENESS AND IDENTITY. By _George Stuart Fullerton_. Philadelphia:\n University of Pennsylvania Press.\n\nMr. Fullerton's psychological study is the first of a series of\ncontributions to Philosophy to be issued by the University of\nPennsylvania. It is truly entitled a \"contribution to the foundations\nof a Theory of Knowledge,\" and is an attempt to arrive at an accurate\nconclusion as to the several senses in which the word _same_ is\nused; with an historical and critical statement of the use of the\nword in a wrong sense. Mr. Fullerton finds that _same_ has seven\ndifferent meanings according to the mode in which it is applied. In\nthe first case it has the sense of _identity_, and in the second that\nof _similarity_. Thirdly, the \"external\" bundle of qualities may be\nregarded as being the same at two different times, while in a fourth\nsense, two \"external\" things, or \"external\" qualities, existing at one\ntime, may be called the same to mark similarity. Again, an \"external\"\nthing or an \"external\" quality may be called the _same_ with its\nexternal representative, as the identification of a thing with its\nreflection in a mirror. This is the fifth sense; the sixth is where\nthe _same_ \"external\" object is said to be perceived by different\npersons. Finally, an \"external\" thing may be said to be the same \"with\nits representative in consciousness or with the substance or noumenon\nassumed to underlie it.\"\n\nOn searching for the reason why such various experiences are expressed\nby the use of one word, Mr. Fullerton discovers that the common notion\nwhich unites them is the idea of similarity. But how can we speak of\nsimilarity when strictly only one thing is in question? The answer\ngiven is that we have \"a series of experiences, beginning with one in\nwhich two objects are recognised as similar and yet are very clearly\ndistinguished as two objects, continued in others in which the sense\nof duality falls more and more into the background, and ending in one\nin which there is no consciousness of duality at all.\" The last of\nthese experiences is not wholly different from the others. It differs\nfrom them \"not in the element which has led us to declare two objects\nsimilar\u2014the element which they have in common\u2014but in that which has\nled us to declare them two and different. It is by adding to this last\nexperience, so to speak, that we get the others. They contain it and\nmore.\" The experience in which two things are not distinguished, is\nat the bottom of all our experiences of similarity. The use of the\nexpression \"X is X,\" then, emphasises the fact that one is not to\npass from X to any Y or Z, and it, moreover, puts a period to one's\nthinking, and fixes the thought upon X alone. When the words \"identity\"\nand \"sameness\" are intended to be used with some degree of precision,\nthe former word indicates \"sameness in which there is no consciousness\nof duality, or in which the consciousness of duality has fallen into\nthe background and may easily be overlooked.\"\n\nMore than half of Mr. Fullerton's work is occupied by an historical and\ncritical consideration of the use of the word _same_ in a wrong sense,\nbeginning with Heraclitus and coming down to Prof. W. K. Clifford.\nThe examples he has given of that confusion of thought justifies the\nassertion of \"the need of much greater care and exactitude than one\ncommonly finds in metaphysical reasonings,\" and at the same time the\nhair-splitting for which Mr. Fullerton needlessly considers himself\ncalled on to plead guilty.\n\n \u03a9.\n\n\nINDUCTION AND DEDUCTION. WITH OTHER ESSAYS. By _Constance C. W. Naden_.\n Edited by R. Lewins, M. D. London: Bickers & Son.\n\nThe chief of the essays comprised in this volume is an \"historical and\ncritical sketch of successive philosophical conceptions respecting the\nrelations between inductive and deductive thought.\" It was awarded\nthe Heslop Gold Medal as the best dissertation by a student of Mason\nCollege, Birmingham (England), in 1887, and Miss Naden was also\nrewarded for it by being made an Associate of the College, an honor she\nwell deserved. The dissertation displays a wide knowledge of scientific\nfacts with a rare capacity for dealing with them in a philosophical\nspirit, and a power of acute reasoning such as few other women have\never possessed. Whether her opinions are always correct is another\nquestion. It is a profound remark that we are obliged to regard nature\nas a system, \"because we can consider its multiplicity only in relation\nto one thinking subject.\" But we must challenge her statement that we\nhave no certainty for assuming that the laws of nature will always\nremain unchanged. A change in the laws of nature would be the replacing\nof it by a different nature of which man could not take cognisance, and\nwhich therefore we cannot reasonably conceive to be possible. There\nmight be a change of conditions which would introduce other laws, but\nthese must be in conformity with, and not in opposition to, the present\nlaws of nature, as otherwise they could not exist for us, seeing that\n\"experience is possible in virtue of the original constitution of the\nmind,\" and therefore, according to the views of which Miss Naden is an\nexponent, they could not exist at all.\n\nThe most interesting of her essays are those which explain the system\nto which her editor Dr. Robert Lewins gives the name of Hylo-Idealism.\nThis is described as the \"brain theory of mind and matter,\" and it is\nso described because it asserts that every man is the maker of his\nown cosmos, all his perceptions having merely a subjective existence\nand being generated by the brain, \"which focuses converging rays of\nsense from all parts of the body, and unites them into the white light\nof consciousness.\" It would be a mistake, however, to think that,\naccording to this theory there is nothing outside of the percipient\nsubject, that is, beyond man himself. The real existence of matter is\nnot denied and, indeed, \"so far from being a nonentity, matter is the\n_fons et origo_ of all entities.\" Hylo-Idealism deals only with the\nrelative, \"ignoring the absolute as utterly beyond human _gnosis_.\"\nWhile asserting that \"the only cosmos known to man, or in any way\nconcerning him, is manufactured in his own brain-cells,\" it affirms the\nexistence of another cosmos, the external universe of other systems.\nThe mind does not however passively apprehend external objects, but\nactively constructs them. \"We make the mountains, and the sea, and the\nsun himself; for sunshine is nothing if not visible, and if there were\nno eye and no brain, there could be no sunshine.\" The defect of this\nreasoning is that it makes man the only measure of all things. Because\nour senses are necessary to us to distinguish certain phenomena, it\ndoes not follow that the same phenomena cannot be distinguished under\nother conditions. The protozoa which have no organs of special sense\nare affected by the vibrations of light, sound, and probably smell,\nwhich would not be possible if those phenomena are \"constructed\" by the\nhuman mind.\n\nThe utmost that can be said with any show of reason is that the\nimaging in our consciousness of external objects does not give an\nactual representation of them. This is required by the theory of\nHylo-Idealism, which goes still further, however, and declares that\nthe universe does not exist as we know it. It seems to us that this\nview is not consistent with even the principles of Hylo-Idealism. Dr.\nLewins specially points out that this system \"in no sense denies the\nobjective, but only contends for _identity_ of object and subject,\nproved as it is by natural Realism itself, from the doctrine of\n_molecular metamorphosis_, which shows the Ego continually undergoing\ntransubstantiation with the 'Non-Ego,' and _vice vers\u00e2_, so far as\nto form _one_ indivisible organism.\" He compares the Ego and the\nNon-Ego, that is, subject and object, or our bodies and the \"external\nuniverse,\" to a porous vessel of ice, filled with water, immersed in\nan infinite ocean. \"What is within and without, and the septum that\nseems to divide the two, are all three consubstantial or identical.\"\nIf they are identical, however, they must perfectly respond to each\nother, which would not be the case if the object in the mind did not\ngive a true representation of the objects in external nature. Otherwise\nthe identity of subject and object can be predicated, on the condition\nonly of abolishing the \"external universe,\" and affirming of it, as\nDr. Lewins affirms of the stars, \"What you see is a vision, or organic\nfunction, of your own _sensifacient_ organism.\"\n\nWe have not space to critically consider Miss Naden's essay on\n\"Evolutionary Ethics,\" which is a valuable study in Sociology. She\ngives logical form to Mr. Herbert Spencer's quasi-utilitarian system\nin the words, \"the _inclination_ is always in the direction most\npleasurable or least painful; the _results_ of the action, if it\nbe a moral one, are such as in the long run and on a large scale,\nmust increase happiness; but the _object_ of the action need not be\nconnected in the mind of the actor with any thought of happiness,\npersonal or general.\" The practical objection to this view of moral\nconduct is the reference to _personal_ happiness. This should be\nexcluded altogether as an actual motive of such conduct where self is\nthe chief object concerned. Here duty or virtue should be the guiding\nprinciple, as it should be ultimately in all moral conduct. This\nindeed is really admitted when it is said that rational utilitarianism\n\"aims, not straight at happiness, but at the essential conditions\nof happiness.\" The weak point in Mr. Spencer's system of ethics is\nthe origin it assigns for the altruistic sentiment. This is based in\nsympathy, the germ of which, says our author, is to be found in the\nfact that the ideal or \"representative\" world possesses an emotional\naspect and therefore \"the thought of a fellow creature carries with it\nthe thought of his feelings.\" This thought is not necessarily, however,\naccompanied with an active feeling of sympathy. It requires some other\ninfluence to give it external expression, and this must be sought in\nthe activity of the sexual instinct. Traced to this source we can\nunderstand how the altruistic sentiment may become instinctive, giving\nrise through parental and fraternal affection, to the higher love of\ncountry and of race, which in time will also become instinctive.\n\nIn taking leave of Miss Naden's work, we must say that, much as we\ndisagree with its Hylo-Idealistic views, it deserves to be read by all\nwho are interested in the search for the key to the great problem of\nnature. Its examination of the logical system of Kant is slight, and\nit is not surprising, therefore, that the name of the great German\nphilosopher is omitted from among the precursors of Darwin. Miss Naden\nis in error, too, in describing Haeckel as a pronounced Materialist. He\nis no more so than was Darwin himself. Such mistakes were probably due\nto the bent of the mind of our authoress, whose too early death is a\nloss to the cause of truth and to humanity itself.\n\n \u03a9.\n\n\nEMBLEMATIC MOUNDS AND ANIMAL EFFIGIES. By _Stephen D. Peet_. Chicago:\n American Antiquarian office.\n\nThe author of this work is well known, not only as the editor of\nthe _American Antiquarian_, but as a careful explorer of aboriginal\nmonuments in the Northwest. His attention has not been limited,\nhowever, to the results of personal observation; he has utilised the\nresearches of other explorers, and is thus able to present to his\nreaders an amazing amount of information, which is rendered doubly\nvaluable by the profuse use of maps and illustrations. The points which\nMr. Peet has sought to bring out in his book are, that (1) the works\ndescribed as effigies were imitations of the wild animals which were\nonce common in the region where they are found, which is chiefly in\nWisconsin and Ohio, and were also totemic in their character; (2) the\neffigies were used for practical purposes, such as screens for hunters,\nguards for villages, foundations for houses, heaps on which sentinels\nwere stationed; (3) they embodied \"certain superstitions and customs\nwhich are rarely found, but which are suggestive of the religious\nsystem prevalent in prehistoric times.\"\n\nThe consideration of the first and second of these points does not\ncome within our province, but it will be interesting to see what\nlight the curious monuments described throw on the religious ideas\nof the aborigines. Mr. Peet states that the location of the effigies\ngives the idea of the prevalence among their builders of a kind of\nnature-worship. They are closely associated with the natural features\nof the earth, \"the streams and lakes, hills and valleys, woods and\nprairies,\" being overshadowed by them. The animals represented were\ndivinities to the people, and the effigies were intended to be symbols\nof such divinities, associated for particular reasons with special\nlocalities. In support of this view, Mr. Peet refers to the fact that\nthe \"myths which fix upon scenes in nature are those which remind one\nof the animal divinities which were worshipped. The figure of the\nmoose and the turtle and other animals have been recognised in certain\nstrange and contorted figures in the rocks and mountains, and myths\nhave been connected with them, the myth having evidently been made to\naccount for the resemblances.\" The most remarkable example of this kind\nis the great serpent mound of Adams County, Ohio. Serpent mounds are\nfound in various other localities, and usually they correspond with the\nnatural features of the ground on which they are placed.\n\nBut if the effigies are to be regarded as symbols of a totemic\nanimal-worship, it may be thought that they cannot be taken as evidence\nof the existence of nature-worship. Mr. Peet remarks, however, that\nthe symbolism of Ohio was that of sun-worship, and the existence of\nthis phase of nature-worship among the American aborigines is an\nimportant fact. It connects their religious ideas with those which\nwere at one time almost universally prevalent in the Old World. The\nSun as the source of life and energy was from an early date the object\nround which centered the religious ideas of the ancient world, and the\nserpent occupied a chief place as symbolical of the most important of\nthose ideas. The veneration for deceased ancestors represented similar\nideas with those embodied in sun-worship, and the animal totemism of\nwhich the effigy mounds are symbolic was connected with the latter\nsuperstition through ancestral worship, the mythical ancestor being\nidentified with the totem. If this is so, the study of the mythology\nof the aboriginal inhabitants of this country may be expected to throw\nlight on the origin of Old World superstitions, and Mr. Peet may be\ncongratulated on having done so much to make known the symbolical\nand other works which will soon be the only relics of an ancient and\nwide-spread race.\n\n \u03a9.\n\n\nLIFE. By _M. J. Savage_. Boston: Geo. H. Ellis.\n\nIn this volume of sermons we have a most interesting series of studies\non a subject which is probably attracting at the present time more\nintelligent interest than at any past epoch. The views entertained\nby Mr. Savage are so well known that it is not necessary to give any\nelaborate review of the present work. Among other themes he treats of\nthe Nature and Origin of Life, Goodness and Moral Evil, Life's Meaning,\nNationalism and other social dreams, Morality and Religion. Everywhere\nwe find much material for thought, and, although from the very nature\nof the case many of Mr. Savage's conclusions will not be generally\naccepted, his words will be read with more than a passing interest.\n\nHis statement that right and wrong \"are to be understood by studying\nthe progress, the development, of the race, just as we find out\nany other truth,\" cannot well be contested by the advocate of any\nethical theory. When he affirms this life \"to be only manifestations\nas the years go by, out-blossomings everywhere of that life which is\nGod,\u2014the mystery and yet the explanation of all things,\" he expresses\nan opinion that most men who have given the subject serious thought\nwill accept\u2014subject only to the reservation that they are allowed to\nunderstand \"God\" in their own way.\n\nThe answer given by Mr. Savage, in his concluding discourse, to the\nquestion \"What is it all for?\" will meet with less acceptance. He\nremarks that all the theories which can be found as to the outcome\nof things are only variations of three chief theories: (1) that of\na future life of rewards and punishments, the theory of Milton's\n\"Paradise Lost\"; (2) that of M. Comte, which is well named the religion\nof humanity; (3) that which regards _spirit_ as having the pre-eminence\nover matter. As to the first theory, Mr. Savage declares it to be\ncondemned by the intellect, the heart, and the conscience of men. He\naffirms that the second theory ends in _nothing_, and he endorses the\nstatement of Mr. John Fiske, that \"considered intellectually, such a\ntheory puts the world to permanent intellectual confusion.\" Mr. Savage,\ntherefore, accepts the third theory which \"makes immortality a wholly\nrational thought.\" He sees the proof of it in the existence of the\nbrain, the conscience, the heart of man, which \"are prophecies, since\nthey are the expression of the nature of things, and since they demand\nthe perfect thought, and love, and right.\"\n\n \u03a9.\n\n\nPROTOPLASM AND LIFE. By _Charles F. Cox_, M. A. New York: N. D. C.\n Hodges.\n\nThe first part of Mr. Cox's contribution to the study of what may be\ntermed the literature of the interesting subject he discusses, treats\nof the Cell doctrine. He traces clearly the changes that have taken\nplace in the protoplasm theory, to which that doctrine belongs, with\nparticular reference to Doctor Beale's _germinal matter_ and Prof.\nHuxley's _physical basis of life_. In his summary of conclusions,\nMr. Cox shows that the original idea of the cell, as propounded by\nSchleiden and Schwann, has gradually faded away. As he states, the\nattention of the defenders of the cell doctrine has been forced from\none position to another until it is fixed on a germinal point. The same\nfate has befallen Dr. Beale's ideal living matter, which if an actually\nvisible thing is reduced to \"a mere skeleton of his original bioplasm,\"\nan attenuated reticulum; while Huxley's physical basis of life, like\nhis _Bathybius_, is relegated to the realm of the imagination. Thus\nthere is \"no one visible and tangible substance to which the name\nprotoplasm is rigidly and exclusively applied.\" Mr. Cox's conclusion as\nto the nature of the _basal life-stuff_ is that \"the only admissible\nalternative is matter plus vitality or matter minus vitality.\" This\nbrings us to \"the impassable gulf between the not-living and the\nliving\"; which we would observe, however, might cease to be impassable\nif we could properly define the terms \"matter\" and \"vitality.\"\n\nThe second part of Mr. Cox's _brochure_ is devoted to a consideration\nof the spontaneous generation theory, and its relation to the general\ntheory of evolution. Mr. Cox's personal conclusion is, that, to the\nbetter part of the scientific authorities, \"the spontaneous generation\ntheory is a necessary part of the general theory of evolution, but\nthat no experimental evidence has as yet been produced in support of\nthe belief in the occurrence of abiogenesis, and that therefore the\nevolution theory hangs upon a link of pure faith.\" Mr. Cox finds in the\ngap between lifeless substances and living forms the veritable \"Missing\nLink.\"\n\n \u03a9.\n\n\nNOUVEAUX APER\u00c7US SUR LA PHYLOGENIE DE L'HOMME. By _Madame Cl\u00e9mence\n Royer_. Extracted from the Bulletin de la Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 d'Anthropologie\n for 1890.\n\nMadame Royer, in this admirable memoir, taking for a text the fact\nthat an Australian lizard was seen by M. de Vis walking on its hind\nfeet, criticises severely Haeckel's genealogy of man, whose line of\ndescent she declares to be distinct from that of the apes. The first\nterrestrial ancestors of man and of other anthropomorphous animals\nissued from pelagic forms of distinct origins, whose evolution had\nbeen parallel, but the human ancestors acquired the upright position\nin a phase of amphibious ichthyophagy, while the ape ancestors adapted\nthemselves directly to an oblique position. This original difference of\nattitude adapted men from the first to an entirely pedestrian motion,\nand the apes to a life more or less arboreal, but neither men nor apes\nhave had any terrestrial ancestor adapted to the horizontal position.\n\n \u03a9.\n\n\nLE MONDE COMME VOLONT\u00c9 ET COMME REPRESENTATION. Par _Arthur\n Schopenhauer_. Traduit en Fran\u00e7ais par _A. Burdeau_. Tome\n troisi\u00e8me. Paris: F\u00e9lix Alcan.\n\nM. Burdeau's translation of the chief work of the renowned philosopher\nof pessimism is the only perfect translation into the French language.\nIt is made with a scrupulous exactness, and its style is said to be as\nclear as that of Schopenhauer himself, \"by which he is distinguished\nfrom all other German philosophers and is recognised as a disciple\nof Voltaire, Rousseau, and Chamfort.\" The present volume contains\nimportant appendices in which Schopenhauer recapitulated and developed\nvarious points treated of in the first edition of his work. We may\nrefer particularly to the chapters on Instinct, Genius, Insanity, the\nMetaphysic of Music, and the Metaphysic of Love.\n\n\nDIE HYPNOSE UND DIE DAMIT VERWANDTEN NORMALEN ZUSTAENDE. Vorlesungen\n gehalten an der Universit\u00e4t Kopenhagen im Herbste 1889. By _Alfred\n Lehmann_, Ph. D. Leipsic: O. R. Reisland.\n\nThis little book will in one respect be of special interest to\npsychologists. The author confesses in the preface that when he\ncommenced his hypnotic investigations, he attempted to explain the\nfacts under consideration by the Cartesian theory which hitherto, he\nsays, had proved perfectly sufficient to explain the data of normal\nsoul-life. What the author understands by the Cartesian theory appears\nfrom the following passage:\n\n\"The popular conception of the relation between soul and body is, that\nthe soul is a being distinct from the body and endowed with certain\nfaculties. This conception is still defended by a certain, not very\nnumerous school of philosophers whom we may briefly call Cartesians\nfrom the fact that their theory can be traced back to Descartes,\nalthough in the lapse of time it has been considerably modified.\"\n\nIn a word the Cartesian theory is the theory that still accepts the\nexistence of a mythical or metaphysical soul-unity called the ego. Dr.\nLehmann says:\n\n\"It was argued since 'I' in spite of a constant change of my\nconsciousness, am in possession of the certainty that it is the same\nidentical 'I' that has all these states, sensations, feelings, this\n'I' or the soul must be a unity. And this unity must stand in a causal\nconnection with the outside world, with the domain of nature in the\nwidest sense of the word,\" etc.\n\nIt is perhaps exceptional that a teacher at a University of Protestant\nNorthern Europe has been under the influence of Cartesianism, but it\nis highly commendable that he openly confesses his change of opinion\nbecause the facts under observation demonstrate its erroneousness.\nDr. Lehmann no doubt will find that the normal phenomena of psychic\nlife are by no means in accord with the Cartesian doctrine. Indeed\nby showing how the abnormal and normal states agree, he implicitly\nconfesses that the theory that proves untenable for the former ought\nto be regarded as untenable for the latter. We have instances of\nmen who believe in the Cartesian doctrine, or at least by a natural\npredisposition have a tendency to believe in it, wavering in their\nbelief, because the data of the normal states of psychic life so little\nfavor the dualism of the great French philosopher. Now it almost\nseems as if the discoveries and the strangeness of hypnotic phenomena\nhad contributed a great deal towards turning the tendency toward a\nmonistic solution of the psychological problems back to the almost\nabandoned dualistic solution. We are fully confident that this reaction\nwill not last, because in spite of all the strange mysteries that\nsurround modern hypnotism, it will after all only find a satisfactory\ninterpretation in some monistic conception.\n\nDr. Lehmann in abandoning the Cartesian theory, says: \"The bodily and\npsychical states are as a matter of experience given as two series\nintimately connected the one with the other. Their connection can be\nexplained in two different ways: Either the phenomena of the one are\neffects of the other, or both series are effects of one and the same\nunknown cause.\"\n\nDr. Lehmann considers either solution as a priori equally acceptable,\nyet he favors the latter, which might briefly be called (although\nthe author does not use the expression) \"the agnostic solution.\" Dr.\nLehmann characterises it as \"_die Spinozistische Annahme_\" and calls it\nPsycho-physical Materialism.\n\nOne of his colleagues, Professor Kroman has proposed in his \"Logik and\nPsychologie\" a theory that is called by the same name. Yet Kroman's\npsycho-physical materialism, Dr. Lehmann declares, is widely different\nfrom his own; the former being \"a mutual causal relation between the\nPhysical and Psychical within the limits of the Atom,\" which, says Dr.\nLehmann, \"would make the explanation of complex psychical phenomena\nimpossible.\"\n\nThe psycho-physical materialism of Dr. Lehmann, our author maintains,\nagrees in all essential points with the views of Professor M\u00fcnsterberg\n(Freiburg in Baden).[65]\n\n [65] The observations of Professor M\u00fcnsterberg were reviewed\n in _The Open Court_ No. 134.\n\nThe laboratory work done by Professor M\u00fcnsterberg was published after\nDr. Lehmann had finished his lectures. A certain similarity between Dr.\nLehmann's views and those of the Freiburg Professor cannot be denied,\nyet it is more than doubtful whether Professor M\u00fcnsterberg would\nrecognise this similarity in the same measure as Dr. Lehmann does. The\nfact is that Dr. Lehmann has progressed in the direction which the\nGerman school of Wundt has taken; yet he has not as yet reached the\nsame clearness; he is still entangled in Cartesian ideas, as is shown\nby his way of proposing problems: for instance in his treatment of the\nproblem of will, which he justly calls \"_der eigentliche Probirstein\nder Hypothese_,\" and of Attention, \"the most enigmatic of all states\nof the soul\" (_der r\u00e4thselhafteste aller Seelenzust\u00e4nde_). In these\nand in other considerations Dr. Lehmann shows that he is still far\nfrom the positive standpoint by which M\u00fcnsterberg's investigations\nare distinguished. It is very strange that in speaking of Attention\nM. Ribot's name has not even been alluded to. If the author had\nshown a familiarity with some of the monographs of this great French\npsychologist, he might have saved himself much work.\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nDER HELIOTROPISMUS DER THIERE UND SEINE UEBEREINSTIMMUNG MIT DEM\n HELIOTROPISMUS DER PFLANZEN. By _Dr. J. Loeb_. W\u00fcrzburg: Verlag von\n George Hertz.\n\nThe object of this work is to fill a gap in the treatment of the\nsubject of animal movement depending on light, and to explain it by\na consideration of the actual facts. After stating that the effect\nof light upon animal movement is purely mechanical, and that it is\ngoverned partly by the action of the light as the exciting cause,\nand partly by the structure of the sensitive organisation, Dr. Loeb\nproceeds, \"I will now prove that the direction of the light rays\ndetermines quite generally the movements induced in animals by the\nlight, no less than the direction of plant movement, and that the\norientation not only of plants but of animals, depends upon the bodily\nform of the latter, in so far as the dorsiventral animals themselves\nmove with the median plane in the direction of the light rays,\" etc.\nThe more refrangible are the rays of light the more efficacious is its\nmechanical action upon animal and plant movement, which is affected\nalso by the constant intensity of the light and its temperature. Thus\nit appears that the moth's flight into a flame must be considered\nas the same mechanical process as, for instance, the motions of\nsunflowers, the growth of the sprouting axis in buds, etc. Dr. Loeb's\nconclusion that the circumstances which govern the movements of animals\ntowards the light are conformable to those which have been already\nrecognised in relation to plant-movement, is supported by numerous\nfacts, which appear to fully establish the accuracy of his observations\nand deductions.\n\nThe diligent author who is at present engaged in scientific\ninvestigations at the _stazione zoologica_ in Naples, has in the mean\ntime published a series of further observations on the same question,\nall of which, as was to be expected, corroborate the propositions\nset forth in the above mentioned little book. We have before us two\nreprints, one from the _Biologische Centralblatt_, Vol. X, Nos. 5 and\n6, 1890, the other the _Archiv f. d. ges. Phys._, Vol. XLVII, with one\nplate and two wood-cuts, the former treating of the heliotropism of\nthe nauplii of _Balanus perforatus_, whose periodical migrations are\nshown to depend upon the action of the light, the latter discussing the\ncommon features of heliotropism in animals and plants.\n\n\nUNTERSUCHUNGEN ZUR PHYSIOLOGISCHEN MORPHOLOGIE DER THIERE. 1. UEBER\n HETEROMORPHOSE. By _Dr. Jacques Loeb_. With 1 plate and 3 figures.\n W\u00fcrzburg: George Hertz.\n\nJulius von Sachs, V\u00f6chting, Noll, and other botanists have successfully\nopened the way to a knowledge of the growth of plants in their causal\nconditions. This method has been applied to the physiology of animals\nby Pfl\u00fcger. The present pamphlet is a contribution to this endeavor by\nDr. Loeb, whose special object has been to determine the laws of the\nrestoration of lost organs in animal organisms. Botanists have found\nthat if a plant that has undergone the loss of an organ has to build it\nup again, the new organ will be different from the original organ, and\nthis difference can be determined by law. Dr. Loeb inquires whether the\nsame can be said of the reconstruction of the lost organs of animals.\n\nThere are, as a rule, in animal organisms two poles, viz. the oral\npole, forming the head, and the aboral forming the tail. It has\nbeen generally supposed that living animal substance possesses the\ntendency to develop in one special direction oral organs, and in the\nother aboral organs. This was called Polarity and is based upon the\nexperiments of Allman, Trembley, Dalyell, and others. The experiments\nof Dr. Loeb, made with the view of testing the polarity theory, show\nthat it is possible to develop in animals possessing physiologically\ndistinct heads and tails, heads instead of tails in the aboral pole,\nand to do so without any serious interference with the vitality of\nthe creature. The experiments have been made chiefly on _Tubularia\nmesembryanthemum_, _Aglaophenia pluma_, _Plumularia pinnata_, and other\nspecies.\n\nDr. Loeb proves by his experiments that external conditions control the\nreproduction of organs, so that artificially oral organs can be made\nto grow where aboral organs have been, and _vice versa_. It is this\nfaculty of animal organisms which Dr. Loeb calls _heteromorphosis_.\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nDIE ETHISCHE BEWEGUNG IN DER RELIGION. By _Stanton Coit_, Ph. D.\n Uebersetzung von Georg von Gizycki. Leipsic: O. R. Reisland.\n\nThis series of Sunday lectures by Dr. Stanton Coit, the speaker of the\nSouth Place Ethical Society of London, England, has been translated\ninto German, in the shape it is now before us, by Dr. Coit's friend\nand teacher Prof. George von Gizycki; they have not yet appeared in\nEnglish. The South Place Ethical Society is not directly affiliated\nto the Ethical Societies of North America, but it stands with them in\nfriendly relations. Dr. Coit, a native American, is strongly biased\nin his views by his American co-workers; he is the youngest among\nthem, and is, I believe, to be considered as a disciple of Professor\nAdler. He has inherited from Professor Adler the idea that we can have\nethics without a world-conception or a religion; yet this idea has been\nconsiderably modified, and an approach to more positive and practical\nviews is perceptible in many passages of his sermons.\n\nIn the lecture \"Which Ethics?\" Dr. Coit says: \"We need (_bed\u00fcrfen_) a\ntheory concerning the universe and our position in it instead of the\nold faith.\" Yet in contradiction to this, he declares that theories\nare of little use. He adds: \"If two men come down from their abstract\ntheories into real life and to the forces which create action, it is as\nif they descend from two opposite mountain peaks into a warm and rich\nvalley where rivulets run down from both sides to unite their waters\ninseparably into one continuous stream.\"\n\nIs not this beautiful allegory, true as it certainly is in one sense,\nafter all misleading? Is not theory and theory different? If theory\nmeans mere speculation, we heartily agree with the proposition to keep\nclear of and far away from theorising. It is at best a harmless play,\nand certainly a loss of valuable time. Yet if theory means methodical\nsystematisation of facts, it is not mere waste of time; in that case it\nis the indispensable condition of all truly practical work. And it is\nthis latter kind of theory which also in the practical work of ethical\nculture must be sought to be established. We must at least be clear as\nto basic principles so that the efforts of ethical teachers may not be\nat random, but directed by the progressive spirit of the age in harmony\nwith our best scientific and philosophic thought.\n\nConcerning religion Dr. Coit says (p. 19) in his article \"Why Ethics\nInstead of Religion\": \"My own opinion is that there is one feature\nwhich distinguishes Religion from all other doctrines, ceremonies,\nand rules. This feature characterised Matthew Arnold's view. For he\ninsisted not only upon morals and their importance, and thought of\nmeans for their propagation, but he proclaimed also that there was a\npower above the will of man to which he must bow. In the very moment\nhe proposed that power which we have to obey, his ethics became\nreligious.... But the recognition of this higher power, if I am allowed\nto propose my own views, appears to me of very little importance.\"\n\nIf there is such a power, and we have sufficient reasons not to\ndoubt its existence, I should say that for ethical purposes it is of\nparamount importance to recognise it and to obey it. In another and a\nmore recent lecture, Dr. Coit pronounces a very different view, he says:\n\n\"Anybody who has ever reflected a moment, must have discovered how\ndependent he is upon a power outside of his own will. He has no\nstrength either for good or for evil, which he has made himself. The\nmore he thinks about it, the deeper must become the feeling of his\ndependence. And being aware that God, or whatever we call that power\nin all things, does not mind his whims, he will find it easier not to\nmind, himself, his own whims. The constant thought that we are not\nthe powers of life and death, will take away conceit and vanity and\nfoolishness. And in this way, it brings us in times of tribulation to a\nquick resignation. It makes us loving brothers and sons.\"\n\nDr. Coit indeed aspires to make of ethical culture a religion for the\npeople. He speaks on this subject in his last lecture. He opposes\nthe Churches for mixing their ethics with theology, and he speaks\nwith great enthusiasm about the poetry of ethics, which is much more\npowerful than the prose of ethics. He does not seem to see that the\ninfluence of the churches is mainly due to their poetry of ethics.\nWould it not be advisable to point out the prosaic truth in this poetry\nfor the purpose of freeing the human mind of the obnoxious elements of\na misunderstood poetry? Would it not be advisable to investigate the\npoetry of the basic idea in ethics, viz., of the God-idea, so as to let\nthe ethical movement develop itself historically from the past. Dr.\nCoit's method of dealing with the God-idea is far from satisfactory. He\nis neither a theist nor an atheist. Sometimes he appears to appreciate\nthe moral importance of the God-idea in its purified shape, and then\nagain he seems to consider it as an ethically indifferent idea. Should\nnot this problem be settled by every one who undertakes to preach\nethics. It appears almost as if all the leaders of the ethical culture\nsocieties underrated the ethical importance and indispensableness of\nthought in general and of science and philosophy in particular.\n\nThe contradictions which appear in Dr. Coit's lectures show that he is\nstill developing. The book is full of promise and we have every reason\nto hope that its author will overcome the unclearness that is still\nlurking in his mind, and that he will grow with the work he is doing.\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nFREMDES UND EIGENES AUS DEM GEISTIGEN LEBEN DER GEGENWART. By Prof. Dr.\n _Ludwig B\u00fcchner_. Leipsic: Max Spohr.\n\nOpinions admittedly are still divided with respect to the laudable\nefforts of a large class of scientists and writers whose main object\nis that of presenting the results of scientific research in an\nintelligible, popular form. Every department of the natural sciences,\ngeology, astronomy, even psychology and comparative philology, each\nand all, are now represented by able and ardent popular interpreters,\nwho at the same time by their aggressive style and by their polemical\nmethods not unfrequently seem to impart a kind of militant and\napostolic attitude to the cause of science. It must further be\nadmitted, that many of these writers, by the unanimous verdict of the\npresent age, are among the most instructive, readable, and actually\nthe most widely read authors of contemporaneous German, French,\nand Anglo-American literature. At first glance, it accordingly may\nseem rather strange, that these same popular authors should also be\nsubjected, not unfrequently, to their commensurate share of unfair, and\neven offensive, popular criticism; and yet it could hardly be otherwise.\n\nThe well-known writer of these scientific and critical essays, Prof.\nLudwig B\u00fcchner, affords an exceptionally striking instance of the\nunenviable lot of some of our most popular writers of science. In\none of these essays inscribed \"Meine Philosophie,\" Professor B\u00fcchner\nhas been compelled to defend the arduous work of his laborious life\nagainst a decidedly unfriendly and unappreciative criticism of his\nphilosophy and whole scientific activity, that some time ago appeared\nin the American _Freidenker_ of Milwaukee. Prof. B\u00fcchner, with a touch\nof legitimate bitterness, repudiates the imputation of having been,\nor still being, as he himself calls it, only the \"popularisator,\"\nexpounder and commentator, of the theories and systems of other\nthinkers; that, on the contrary, in Germany and elsewhere, among\nthe highest representatives of science, for more than thirty years\nProfessor B\u00fcchner himself has been recognised and honored as an\noriginal worker and thinker. His book on \"Force and Matter\" (_Kraft\nund Stoff_) was published five years before Darwin's great work on the\n\"Origin of Species.\" Subsequently his well-known popular Lectures\nin connection with Darwin's work claim the distinguished merit, of\nhaving more widely generalised and extended the Darwinian theory by\nembracing the origin and evolution of man, which had until then been\noverlooked by Darwin himself. By the contemporary press of Germany\nProfessor B\u00fcchner was then charged with premature rashness, and with\nbeing only a shallow, imitative scientific dilettante; but all this\nvituperative criticism was for ever silenced, when in the year 1871\nDarwin's own work appeared on the \"Descent of Man,\" in which Darwin\nhimself accepted all the consequences of the theory of evolution,\nas set forth in Professor B\u00fcchner's Lectures, and, somewhat later,\nin Professor Haeckel's \"Natural History of Creation\" (_Nat\u00fcrliche\nSch\u00f6pfungsgeschichte_). Professor B\u00fcchner, moreover, is the author\nof the widely popular work \"The Future Life and Modern Science\"\n(_Das k\u00fcnftige Leben und die moderne Wissenschaft_). To deny him,\naccordingly, the rank and merit of a solid and original scientist\nand thinker, as he himself says, is to do him a signal injustice, a\npositive injury.\n\nLet all this be willingly granted; but this concession, at all\nevents, does not settle his final, mediating attitude to the entire\nsatisfaction of philosophy, regarded as an independent science.\nProfessor B\u00fcchner openly declares himself in favor of popular science.\nHe maintains, that \"Philosophy ought to step down from her lofty\nstate of independent science, and henceforth content herself with the\nhumble r\u00f4le of simply mediating the results of individual scientific\nresearch; that science, in such case, would no longer run the risk\nof being exposed to the scorn and contempt of the masses(!) ... In\npopular scientific writings, at all times, there can and must occur\ncontradictions, superficial estimates, even trivialities, but all this\nis perfectly understood by any fair-minded reader.\" ... These remarks\nmight almost tempt the reader to believe, that Professor B\u00fcchner,\nin his eagerness to popularise science, really ignores the value of\nphilosophy as an independent science, and of philosophical research,\nirrespective of all popular results, and that the Professor wishes to\ninculcate a narrow and purely utilitarian estimate of philosophy. But,\nthe impulsive Professor, of course, knows better; his mental vision\nembraces the entire field of the sciences, and he has written admirably\nand entertainingly upon almost every scientific topic, and moreover he\nadmits, that possibly he sometimes contradicts himself.\n\nOne might further be inclined to ask, whether, in view of his\nself-imposed, familiar contact with the popular mind, Professor B\u00fcchner\nupon the whole displays the expected equanimity and broad-minded\nconsistency when resenting the harsh criticism of antagonists, which\nhe does with a singularly thin-skinned sensitiveness scarcely worthy\nof a true philosopher. In all his other works and throughout these\ncritical essays, Professor B\u00fcchner himself shows no tender regard\nfor the feelings of his philosophical antagonists. In the critical\nessay \"Against Materialism,\" (_Wider den Materialismus_), for\nexample,\u2014mainly directed against Prof. Harald H\u00f6ffding,\u2014he bluntly\naffirms that Professor H\u00f6ffding's works have produced upon him the\nimpression that the author is a man without the philosophical and\nscientific knowledge requisite for the solution of the problems he has\nventured to approach.\n\nFrom what has been said, the reader may expect to find much important,\ninstructive, and readable matter even in Professor B\u00fcchner's critical\nessays, bearing upon the intellectual life of the period; but he also\nmust be prepared to find them leavened in no small degree with the\ncharacteristic mental idiosyncrasies of their ever polemical author.\n\n \u03b3\u03bd\u03bb\u03bd.\n\n\nDEACON HERBERT'S BIBLE CLASS. By _James Freeman Clarke_. Boston: Geo.\n H. Ellis.\n\nThis booklet is an unassuming little publication, but it is important\nas a symptom of the times. It was written by the late Mr. James\nFreeman Clarke many years ago as a series of papers for the _Christian\nInquirer_. Yet it is well that they should not be forgotten and the\nlessons contained therein should be heeded by the clergy as well as the\nlaity of this country. It is an attempt to make religion practical and\nto point out the true direction in which church-life has to develop.\n\nThere is a great truth in the general complaint made throughout the\nworld that the religion of civilised mankind, especially Christianity\nin the shape it exists at present, has lost its life, its influence,\nand its usefulness. Our religious views must be transformed, they must\nbe reconciled with the principles of science and must be adapted to the\nreal needs of the people. The problem is, how to do it.\n\nIf a solution of the problem shall be found, it is certain that it will\nbe first put into practice in the United States of America; for here\nthe church is free. The many different churches of our country, with\nfew exceptions (the Roman Catholic Church is perhaps the only one) are\nin principle churches of the people. A change of opinion, of belief, of\nreligious conviction among the people will result in the appointment of\nsuch pastors and leaders as are in agreement with their congregations.\nClergy and laity form here one organic body. The clergy are not imposed\nupon their congregations by the state; they are the exponents of their\ncongregations, the representatives of the religious ideas (perhaps upon\nthe whole of the conservative religious ideas) of their churches.\n\nHow different things are in Europe, where the state-churches of England\nand Germany, for instance, prevent all progress in religion, theology,\nand church-life.\n\nMr. Clarke's book, if read with these considerations in mind, shows\nthe agencies that are at work in this country and that will (as we\nconfidently hope) result in a new phase of religious life. Among the\nchapters of the book we note the following titles: \"The way we helped\nour minister to write good sermons\"; \"Aim of Life\"; \"Temptation of\nJesus\"; \"The Miracles\"; \"The Sermon on the Mount\"; and others. The\nspirit in which the book is written is not exactly rationalistic,\nyet it shows in every line a strong monistic bias. For instance, the\nusual definition of miracles as a suspension of the laws of nature is\ndiscarded; and yet it would be erroneous to suppose that the style\nof the book is marked by a radical tendency. Not at all. Every\nfaithful Christian can read it line for line without feeling the least\noffence. But it is plain that herein lies the author's force. The\nbook is popular, but behind its popularity, unusual depth of thought\nis noticeable. In a similar way St. Paul gave milk to his followers\nbecause they were babes in Christ, and could not bear heavier food.\nMr. Clarke's book is written especially for babes in Christ, yet\nevery one who has given any serious thought to the religious problem\nwill appreciate at once the difficulty and the importance of such an\nundertaking.\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\n\n\nPERIODICALS.\n\n\nTHE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. September, 1890. Vol. III. No. 3.\n\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n ON THE BRAIN OF LAURA BRIDGMAN. By _H. H. Donaldson_.\n\n A SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF REFLEX ACTION (II). By _C. F. Hodge_.\n\n ON A CURIOUS VISUAL PHENOMENON. By _Joseph Le Conte_.\n\n A COUNTING ATTACHMENT FOR THE PENDULUM CHRONOSCOPE. By _William\n Noyes_.\n\n PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. The Nervous System\u2014by _H. H.\n Donaldson_; Experimental Psychology; Criminology\u2014by _Arthur\n MacDonald_; Psychiatry\u2014by _William Noyes_; Miscellaneous.\n\nThe full title of Dr. Donaldson's elaborate article is _Anatomical\nObservations on the Brain and Several Sense-Organs of the blind\nDeaf-Mute, Laura Dewey Bridgman_. The object had in view in the\nexamination of the brain was \"to determine, if possible, whether the\npeculiar mental existence of Laura Bridgman, which was the result of\nher defective sense-organs, has left any trace on her brain, or whether\nsuch anomalies as may be observed are sufficiently explained when\nconsidered as the direct consequences of the initial defect alone.\"\nThe article is therefore \"a special study in the general field of the\ninter-relation of brain-structure and intelligence.\" The final results\nare reserved for a second article, but it appears from the present\none that the total area of Laura's brain is somewhat small for its\nweight, and that it is slightly inferior to two other female brains\nwith which comparison was made, the inferiority depending mainly on the\nsmaller average depth of the sulci, that of the left side being the\nmost manifest. The difference can be explained in part at best, by the\nfailure of certain portions of the brain to develop completely. Dr.\nDonaldson's article is illustrated by very carefully prepared plates.\n\nIn the present part of his sketch of the history of reflex action, Dr.\nHodge treats of the law demonstrated by Bell, that the _posterior roots\nof the spinal nerves are sensory, the anterior motor_, which forms the\nbeginning of the modern history of the nervous system, and of \"the\nphysical versus the psychic theory of reflex action.\" The mechanical\ntheory of reflex action was first elaborated by Marshall Hall. It was\nopposed by Volkmann and others, among them Pfl\u00fcgel and Auerbach. On the\nother hand, Lotze supported the former view, but he advanced \"a step\nbeyond the comparatively crude, simple mechanism of Marshall Hall to a\nmechanism of the utmost delicacy, a mechanism susceptible of the nicest\nadjustments, capable of education, and of prolonged, independent, and\ncomplex activity.\" Habit is only another name for mechanism.\n\nUnder the head of Psychiatry, Dr. William Noyes gives an elaborate\nsketch of the life of Jean Jacques Rousseau bearing on the question of\nhis insanity, which is exciting considerable interest at the present\ntime. (E. C. Sanford, Clark University, Worcester, Mass.)\n\n\nMIND. October, 1890. No. LX.\n\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n THE ORIGIN OF MUSIC. By _Herbert Spencer_.\n\n MENTAL ELABORATION. By _James Sully_.\n\n VOLKMANN'S PSYCHOLOGY (II). By _Thomas Whittaker_.\n\n BERKELEY AS A MORAL PHILOSOPHER. By _Hugh W. Orange_.\n\n MUENSTERBERG ON 'MUSCULAR SENSE' AND 'TIME-SENSE.' By the\n _Editor_.\n\n DISCUSSION: 1) Mr. Spencer's Derivation of Space. By _Prof. John\n Watson_.\n 2) Dr. Pikler on the Cognition of Physical Reality. By _G. F.\n Stout_.\n\n CRITICAL NOTICES: Lewis's \"A Text-Book of Mental Diseases.\"\n Mercier's \"Sanity and Insanity\"; Jones's \"Elements of Logic as\n a Science of Propositions\"; Coupland's \"The Gain of Life and\n other Essays.\"\n\n ON THE UTILITARIAN FORMULA. By _James Sutherland_.\n\n_The Origin of Music._ This article is intended as a postscript to Mr.\nSpencer's essay on \"The Origin and Function of Music,\" included in\nhis _Essays, Scientific, Political, and Speculative_, of which he is\npreparing a final edition. It is a reply to Mr. Darwin, who supposes\nmusic to have originated from a particular class of vocal noises, the\namatory class, instead of, as Mr. Spencer asserts, its being derived\nfrom the sounds which the voice emits under excitement, eventually\ngaining this or that character according to the kind of excitement.\nAfter considering various objections by Mr. Edmund Gurney and others,\nMr. Spencer concludes: \"The origin of music as the developed language\nof motion seems to be no longer an inference but simply a description\nof the fact.\"\n\nMr. James Sully deals with Differentiation, Assimilation, and\nAssociation as the intellectual constituents in the process of Mental\nElaboration. Differentiation is considered first as a process of\nmarking off, by means of special adjustments of attention, particular\nsensations; followed by Discrimination, which involves change of\npsychical state, the dependence of mental life on which has been\nformulated as the Law of Relativity. Assimilation, described as a\nmode of unification or integration, is treated of under the headings,\n_Psychological Nature of Likeness_; _Automatic Assimilation_;\n_Recognition_; and _Transition to Comparative Assimilation_.\nAssociation is the \"process of psychical combination or integration\nwhich binds together presentative elements occurring together or in\nimmediate succession.\" This supposes _Retention_ or the tendency of\na sensation to persist, and _Reproduction_, or the reappearance \"in\nconsciousness\" of the impression under a new representative form. The\nthree processes of Differentiation, Assimilation, and Association do\nnot follow each other, but are closely interconnected.\n\nPart II. of _Volkmann's Psychology_ deals with the problem of Time and\nSpace, and with the subjects of Space of Time (_Zeitraum_), Motion,\nNumber, and Intuition. \"Out of sensations intuitions are evolved in\nconsequence of the properties immanent in the sensations.\" While\ntheir localisation progresses in the region of the more strongly\ntoned sensations, projection, or the \"assignment of sensations to the\nexternal world,\" goes on simultaneously in the region of toneless\nsensations. By the addition of \"consciousness of dependence in having\nthe sensation,\" there is the completion of the presentation of the\nExternal Thing as _thing_. Illusions are divided into two classes;\nnamely, 'illusions of internal perception' and 'illusions of sense.'\nThe Ego is purely a psychical result of the soul \"becoming conscious of\nan interaction between one of its presentations and the most ramified\nof its presentation-masses.\" Self-consciousness is defined as \"internal\nperception within the Ego.\" The mind is then dealt with as thinking,\nfeeling, desiring, and willing. Ethical feeling is a kind of \u00e6sthetic\nfeeling, distinguished from others by the peculiarity of its objective\nbasis, which is the actual will of the subject. Moral freedom is to\nhave the will determined by reason. Psychological freedom permanently\nextended over the whole of volition is Character; its opposite is\nPassion.\n\nMr. Orange furnishes a different explanation of Berkeley's ethical\nsystem from that given by Professor Fraser, in a note to the third\ndialogue of _Alciphron_ (ii. 107), and points out its agreement with\nBerkeley's _Principles of Human Knowledge_. \"Moral laws are laws of\nnature; but there is no value or force in them as laws, save in so far\nas they are the orderly expression of God's ideas.\" Man's ideas are\ntrue or good, when the human spirit is at one with the divine. Both in\nnatural and moral philosophy the laws of nature are to be attained by\nthe use of reason.\n\nProf. Robertson draws attention to the concessions involved in\nM\u00fcnsterberg's idea of 'Muscular Sense.' To the term 'muscle-sensation'\nno exception can be taken, \"provided it is meant for no more than\nmere external designation, as when we speak of 'eye-sensation,'\n'skin-sensation,' or the like,\" and is not called 'sensation of\nmovement.' M\u00fcnsterberg finds that a whole class of factors have\nbeen overlooked, or hardly regarded, by previous inquirers into\n'Time-Sense.' These are sensations (or representations) of muscular\ntension, by synthesis of which with sense-elements (sounds by\npreference) time-apprehension is explicable. He is struck particularly\nwith the part played in his experiments by the breath-rhythm, and\n\"it seems impossible to doubt that breathing has a prerogative\nposition among the sense-factors concerned in the estimation of short\ntime-intervals.\" The name 'Time-Sense' has through M\u00fcnsterberg's\ninvestigations \"more justification than it ever got from its\ninventors, for whom it has marked only the apparent immediacy of\ntime-apprehension.\"\n\nIn his criticism of Mr. Spencer's theory of the derivation of\nspace Prof. John Watson lays down as the fundamental position of\nTranscendentalism, or Idealism, as he prefers to call it, \"that the\nuniverse is intelligible, and that man in virtue of his intelligence is\ncapable of grasping it in its essential nature. It therefore rejects\nas unmeaning the doctrine of Mr. Spencer, that we know reality to be\nunknowable.\" While recognising that Mr. Spencer and others have done\ngood service in drawing attention to certain outward aspects of the\nevolution of mind, Professor Watson \"concludes that no psychology\ncan be adequate which does not recognise that perception is not the\nmere occurrence of transient feelings, but the first step in that\nrecognition of the true nature of reality which culminates in the\ncomprehension of the world as a single organic unity of which the\nsource and explanation is intelligence.\"\n\nMr. Stout points out, in reply to Dr. Pikler (_Mind_, No. 59), that the\nsole aim of his article on \"The Genesis of the Cognition of Physical\nReality\" (_Mind_, No. 57) was to trace \"the genesis of the presentation\nof physical reality as it appears to the ordinary consciousness: not as\nit may be modified, and perhaps rectified, by the reflective criticism\nof this or that philosopher,\" and that what he urged against Mill was\nsimply that \"he has confounded his own philosophical view of physical\nreality with the view which men ordinarily take when they are not in a\nphilosophical mood.\"\n\nIt is shown by Mr. Sutherland that in the utilitarian ultimate\nconception there is, in addition to \"the greatest happiness, _plus_ an\narithmetical truth,\" the element of absolute justice, the existence of\nwhich requires that \"all subsidiary rights as means to greatest general\nhappiness should at utmost be classed under relative justice.\" (London:\nWilliams & Norgate.)\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. October, 1890. Vol. I. No. I.\n\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n THE MORALITY OF STRIFE. By _Professor Henry Sidgwick_.\n\n THE FREEDOM OF ETHICAL FELLOWSHIP. By _Felix Adler_, Ph. D.\n\n THE LAW OF RELATIVITY IN ETHICS. By _Professor Harald H\u00f6ffding_.\n\n THE ETHICS OF LAND TENURE. By _Professor J. B. Clark_.\n\n THE COMMUNICATION OF MORAL IDEAS AS A FUNCTION OF AN ETHICAL\n SOCIETY By _Bernard Bosanquet_, M. A.\n\n DR. ABBOT'S \"WAY OUT OF AGNOSTICISM.\" By _Professor Josiah Royce_.\n\n A SERVICE OF ETHICS TO PHILOSOPHY. By _Wm. H. Salter_.\n\nThis is the first number of the _International Journal of Ethics_,\nwhich is intended to take the place of the _Ethical Record_. In\nthe opening article, Professor Sidgwick affirms that the idea of a\nuniversal and complete harmony of the earthly interests of all human\nbeings is \"an optimistic illusion as to human relations, which in the\npresent age of the world has nearly faded away.\" Nevertheless, \"a very\nsubstantial gain would result if we could remove from men's minds\nall errors of judgment as to right and wrong, good and evil, even if\nwe left other causes of bad conduct unchanged.\" What is practically\nwanted is improvement in moral insight, and the aim of the paper is to\naid in the solution of certain intellectual difficulties which arise\nwhen we try to get a clear idea of duty. Warfare among modern nations\n\"is normally not a mere conflict of interests, but also a conflict\nof opposing views of right and justice.\" Disputants may therefore be\nbrought into harmony if they can be really and completely enlightened\nas to their true rights, as distinguished from their interests. The\ninternational law administered by arbitrators may be most useful \"in\nremoving minor occasions of controversy and in minimising the mischief\nresulting from graver conflicts,\" but it will not provide a settlement\nof all occasions of strife. Where the sphere of arbitration ends\nthat of the moral method of attaining international peace begins;\n\"if we must be judges in our own cause, we must endeavor to be just\njudges.\" The impartiality required is difficult, but \"the judicial\nfunction\u2014which, in a modern state under popular government, has\nbecome, in some degree, the business of every man\"\u2014might be performed\nwith success, \"if national consciences could be roused to feel the\nnobility and grapple practically and persistently with the difficulties\nof the task.\"\n\nProfessor Adler's article is devoted to an account of the Ethical\nSocieties, which are described as being \"consecrated to the knowledge\nof the Good, but not to any special theory of the Good.\" To adopt\na philosophical formula as the basis of union would be to become a\nphilosophical sect, which he declares is \"the most contemptible of\nall sects, because the sectarian bias is most repugnant to the spirit\nof genuine philosophy.\" The accepted norms of moral behavior form the\nstarting points of Ethical Societies and their basis of union. They\nbuild on the common stock of moral judgment, which may be called the\ncommon conscience. Ethics is both a science and an art. As a science\nit has to explain the facts of the moral life, and it is necessary to\nbegin with the facts and to test theories by their fitness to account\nfor them. It is \"the prime duty of every one in his individual capacity\nto rise to the ever clearer apprehension of first principles,\" but for\nthis very reason Ethical Societies in their collective capacity abstain\nfrom laying down any set of first principles as binding.\n\nIt is not quite clear how Professor Adler can declare that the Ethical\nSocieties are consecrated to the knowledge of the good, and yet make\nso strong an opposition to their stating such knowledge in the exact\nterms of a philosophical formula. Philosophy is nothing but knowledge\nof the world systematised into a world-conception. It will hardly be\nsufficient to make the \"common conscience\" the corner stone of any\nsociety devoted to the elevation of morality. Not only would it be\ndifficult to ascertain what that \"common conscience\" at present is,\nbut, in addition, we can be assured that the \"common conscience\" is\nconstantly changing.\n\nEthics as a science means philosophical ethics; and Professor Adler's\nethics is, in fact, the expression of a philosophy. Yet in spite of the\nadvanced position of the Ethical Societies, which have discarded all\nreligious views and ceremonial practices, we find that their leader\nstill stands upon the ground of a dualistic extra-naturalism. Professor\nAdler says:\n\n\"There is a reality other than that of the senses, and the ultimate\nreality in things is, in a sense, transcending our comprehension, akin\nto the moral nature of men. But how shall we acquaint ourselves with\nthis Supersensible. The ladder of science does not reach so far.\"\n\nIt is true that there are realities other than that of the senses;\ntake as a most simple instance mathematical points and lines. But\nthere is no reality which theoretically considered can not become\nan object of science. The statement that there are facts to which\nthe ladder of science does not reach, is tantamount to a declaration\nof supernaturalism and dualism. Professor Adler has discarded the\nterminology of the old dogmatism, but he has not discarded its basic\nerror. Instead of developing the old faith into a monistic religion, he\nthrows away religion as a basis of ethics, but preserves carefully that\nelement in it which is hostile to science and philosophy.\n\nThe _Law of Relativity_ is a very important contribution by Professor\nH\u00f6ffding to the Science of Ethics. After stating that the moral law, if\nit is to be truly universal, must \"only judge the general direction of\nthe _tendency_ of the will,\" he affirms that the individual relativity\nof ethics, or its personal equation, is a factor which enters into\nthe ethical question, \"when different individuals with like ethical\nprinciples and in like circumstances, but with different dispositions\nand capacities have to be considered.\" The individual is always a part\nof society, and the life of society is no other than that contained\nin its members, the ideal being \"reached only when the individual's\nefforts in the cause of society also serve the free and harmonious\ndevelopment of his own faculties and impulses.\" In an ideal State only\nthat would be demanded of each individual which lay within his range\nand power. Self-control, as a negative virtue, is a psychological\nimpossibility. It is necessary to take note whether there is room for\nother inclinations that could absorb the store of energy. The struggle\nof self-control lasts until the new application of energy gains\ncomplete ascendancy. The happiest man is where morality has become\norganic and \"there is an agreement between the task arising from the\ngeneral principles and the particular circumstances, and the capacities\nand desires of the individual.\" Professor H\u00f6ffding objects to the views\nof the Italian _criminal-psychological_ school that atavism is a sign\nof social imperfection, that it \"does not justify placing society and\nthe criminal over against each other as absolute right and absolute\nwrong.\" He concludes that it is at least an open question whether there\nare any human beings \"in whom no sympathy for the moral law can be\nawakened, however much the law may be individualised.\"\n\nThe arguments of Professor Clark on _The Ethics of Land Tenure_ are\nsummed up in the following passage: \"If a state originally owned its\nland, in the fullest sense of the term, it had the right of voluntary\nalienation which is inherent in such ownership. Increments of value,\npresent and future, are its property; in alienating them it gives\naway its own. If the attainment of its ends requires that they be\ntransferred to others, the title of the grantees is valid. To deny to\nthe state the privilege of alienation is to essentially abridge its\nnatural rights; it is to make its ownership of the land incomplete.\"\nIn relation to what is incorrectly termed \"unearned increments,\" it is\nremarked, \"if the essence of property is regarded, and not its form,\nthe increments of value attaching to land are not unearned by their\nproprietors. In an active market land has its fair price, and this is\nbased partly on the future increments themselves.\" The loss arising\nfrom a confiscation of land-value would fall \"not merely on millions\nwho have titles in fee simple, but on all who have made loans on land\nas security.... To every one it would come in the shape of a seizure\nby the state of property invested in accordance with its own positive\ninvitation.\"\n\n_The communication of moral ideas_, and not ideas about morality, which\nare the abstract or scientific renderings of moral ideas, is considered\nby Mr. Bosanquet as the proper function of an Ethical Society. The\nfault of the present time is distraction, and \"one great cause of this\ndistraction is the notion of a general duty to do good, or something\nother than and apart from doing one's work well and intelligently.\"\nThe only certain way of communicating moral ideas is contagion, and\nthe most useful teacher of morality is \"not so much a man of abstract\ntheory as a man of reasonable experience.\"\n\nEthics may be of service to philosophy, says Mr. Salter, in opening\nup the realm of \"what ought to be,\" beyond the realm of \"what is and\nhappens.\" Moral ideas belong to the realm of unverifiable ideas, which\nare believed in because of \"their own intrinsic attractiveness and\nauthority.\" Ethics tells us of the law according to which men should\nact, the law of justice and brotherhood; we may conclude \"that whatever\nmay be the actual forces in the world at any time, justice and love\nare rightfully supreme over them all, and that these are so interwoven\nwith the order of things that nothing out of harmony with them can\nlong stand.\" It is \"the imperishable glory of transcendentalism in our\ncountry that in the decay and disintegration of the ancient creed,\" it\nsounded the high-note \"that the soul can in some sense know the object\nof its worship; that it need not feed on hearsay, and tradition, and\narguments, but can have vision.\" (Philadelphia: _International Journal\nof Ethics_, 1602 Chestnut St.)\n\n\nREVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. September, 1890. No. 177.\n\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n REMARQUES SUR LE PRINCIPE DE CAUSALITE. By _A. Lalande_.\n\n PHILOSOPHES ESPAGNOLS.\u2014J. HUARTE. By _J. M. Guardia_.\n\n LES ORIGINES DE LA TECHNOLOGIE (_fin_). By _A. Espinas_.\n\n UN DOCUMENT INEDIT SUR LES MANUSCRITS DE DESCARTES. By _V. Egger_.\n\n NOTICES BIBLIOGRAPHIQUES.\n\n REVUE DES PERIODIQUES ETRANGERS.\n\nThe principle of causality belongs only to the world of sense, that\nof children and of the commonality of mankind who neither reflect nor\nanalyse their knowledge. It represents confusedly the continuity and\ninertia which are proper to the scientific stage, as colors represent\nimperfectly the undulations of the ether, and sound the vibrations\nof ponderable matter. To make of causality a scientific property of\nthings, a law of the phenomenal and mechanical world, is to affirm that\nbodies preserve their color in the absence of an eye to perceive it, or\ntheir sonorousness when no one hears them. Moreover, from a scientific\nstandpoint, the words sound and color lose all proper meaning; while\nthe principle of causality retains a sense, but then expresses a false\nproposition, and one which leads us incessantly into error. Several\nconsequences flow from M. Lalande's conception of causality. The first\nis that this law is not a rational principle, but is an _empirical_\nformula, in the mathematical sense of that word. The second is that\nwe are thereby led to see in the idea of _efficiency_ an artificial\nconcept, and, as would be said by philologists, a disease of language,\ninstead of a mysterious \"power\" that emanates from one phenomenon\nin order to create its effect. A third consequence is the great\nsimplification it leads to in the problem of induction, which requires\nus merely to believe in the stability of the laws of nature, which are\nonly mathematical laws proved by experience. The true foundation of\ninduction is the universal value of mathematics, which rests finally\non the principle of identity. The degree of perfection of a science\ncan be measured by the quantity of mathematics it employs; and it is\nthis preconceived idea which has given birth to all the psycho-physical\nmeasures that have been recently introduced into psychology.\n\nM. Guardia's paper gives a sketch of the philosophical system laid\ndown in the work of the Spanish writer J. Huarte, _The Trial of the\nSpirits_, with an introductory account of the author and his book,\nwhich first appeared in 1575. Huarte is described as unique among\nSpanish thinkers, and as a leading figure among natural philosophers on\naccount of the daring novelty of his original views and the excellence\nof his method, which is that of the inductive philosophy. His doctrine\nis founded on that of Galen, and he proclaims the principle that the\nphysical determines the moral. All his metaphysics reduce themselves\nto the recognition of the action of exterior causes, which are of\ninorganic nature, and of the organism which reacts to them. He thus\nexplains all the manifestations of life, heredity intervening as a\nfactor in its evolution. Huarte was less concerned, however, with\nphysiology and psychology, than with the amelioration of the social\nstate. He worked for the future by creating of psychology an organic\nscience of observation and experience, founded on the knowledge of\nhuman nature, and by basing on it the art of education.\n\nIn concluding his valuable study of the _Origin of Technology_, M.\nEspinas, after giving numerous examples drawn from ancient Greek\nlife, says: \"All the technical arts of this epoch have the same\ncharacters. They are religious, traditional, local. The myths referred\nto are at first the faithful as well as the symbolic expression of\nthem.\" This mythological symbolism is \"the product of a psychological\nand sociological projection, that is to say, the things of art are\nconceived as benevolent or angered feelings, as intelligent inventions\nor combinations that are attributed to fictitious idealised men, as\nexchanges that are made with them, as gifts or precepts that are\nreceived from them, or as orders imposed by their will. They are thus\npsychical operations or social products drawn from human consciousness\nunknown to it which, personified, find themselves invoked by it in\norder to explain to itself its own creations.\"\n\nThe unpublished matter referring to the manuscripts of Descartes is\ncontained in a copy of the 1659 edition of the _Principes_ of the\nFrench philosopher, and consists of numerous notes in the handwriting\nof its former owner Joseph de Beaumont. (Paris: F\u00e9lix Alcan.)\n\n\nREVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. No. 178. October, 1890.\n\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n LE DELIT POLITIQUE. By _G. Tarde_.\n\n UNE NOUVELLE TH\u00c9ORIE DE LA LIBERT\u00c9. By _A. Belot_.\n\n NOTE SUR LA PHYSIOLOGIE DE L'ATTENTION. By _Ch. F\u00e9r\u00e9_.\n\n LES BASES EXP\u00c9RIMENTALES DE LA GEOMETRIE. By _Jules Andrade_.\n\n NOTE SUR LE PRINCIPE DE LA CAUSALITE. By _J.-J. Gourd_.\n\n ANALYSES ET COMPTES RENDUS.\n\n REVUE DES PERIODIQUES ETRANGERS.\n\nM. Tarde finds M. Lombroso too severe and at the same time too\nkind towards the spirit of conservatism. Too severe in terming it\nmisoneism and too kind in regarding it as the only normal condition of\nsocieties. The hospitable reception given to novelties is an equally\nnormal function, although intermittent. If instead of making all his\nsociological ideas circle round the idea of the _new_, and creating\nan unfruitful antithesis between the love and the hatred of novelty,\nhe had taken as his central notion the idea of imitation, and proved\nthe universal distinction between the imitation of the new and the\nimitation of the old, M. Lombroso would have escaped many errors. In\nall of us, caprice exists by the side of habit, due to physiological\nmisoneism; and the conflict between them goes on in each individual\nthroughout our life. Caprice triumphs at the commencement, but the\ncontest is terminated in old age by the definite victory of habit. It\nis the same in the social life. The inclination to adopt new ideas is\ndue to the law of imitation, which is a more important factor in great\nsocial movements than misoneism.\n\nM. Belot remarks that he would not dare to write the title _Une th\u00e9orie\nnouvelle de la libert\u00e9_ if it referred to a theory of his own. Under\nit he criticises the theory advanced by M. Bergson in his _Essai sur\nles donn\u00e9es imm\u00e9diates de la conscience_; according to which freedom\nbelongs, not to the empirical personality of the superficial ego, but\nto the deeper ego, the subjectivity itself, the alteration of which\nthrough the laws of thought and exigencies of science gives rise to the\nformer. According to M. Belot, on the contrary, the will and freedom\nare shown in the forcing back of the lower ego, which comes to the\nsurface, and its impulses by enlightened ideas. To act in harmony with\nthese is freedom, which is not inconsistent with determinism in the\nproper sense. Determinism becomes freedom in becoming intelligent.\nUntil then we obey concealed impulses, which may belong to our parents,\nour ancestors, or our social surroundings, and therefore we are not\nfree.\n\nBy an excellent series of experiments, M. F\u00e9r\u00e9 has demonstrated that in\nattention all the qualities of movement are modified; its rapidity, its\nenergy, and its precision, the physiological condition of the process\nbeing a general tension of the muscles. It is an error to suppose the\nintervention of arrestive action, of inhibition, in the physiology of\nattention. Voluntary immobility results from very intense muscular\nactivities, and has for its physiological condition the general\ntension of the muscular system, which places the subject in such a\ncondition that he can react in the quickest and most energetic manner\npossible to an excitation from whatever point it may come. This is\nthe physiological condition of attention. The exercise of immobility\nis the most favorable to the development of intelligence, while the\nrelaxation of the muscles which results from the removal of the tension\ntends to the suppression of attention, and of the psychical activity.\nExcitations of the skin determine exaggerated reflex activities, more\nrapid and more energetic movements. As intelligence is developed, the\nreflex movements become less imperious, the multiplicity of motives\nof action gives the illusion of freedom of choice. When the excitable\ncentres are incompletely developed, as with women and children, and\nespecially with degenerates, the impulsions and the reflex activities\ngenerally, of which the centres are better developed, are more violent\nand more uncontrollable. (Paris: F\u00e9lix Alcan).\n\n\nZEITSCHRIFT F\u00dcR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE. Vol. I.\nNos. 4 and 5.\n\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n UEBER DAS ERKENNEN DER SCHALLRICHTUNG. By _J. v. Kries_.\n\n ZUR PSYCHOLOGIE DER KAUSALITAET. By _Th. Lipps_.\n\n ZUR INTERAUREALEN LOKALISATION DIOTISCHER WAHRNEHMUNGEN. By _Karl\n L. Schaefer_.\n\n ZUR PSYCHOLOGIE DER FRAGE. By _Rich. Wahle_.\n\n UEBER NEGATIVE EMPFINDUNGSWERTE (I). By _H. Ebbinghaus_.\n\n VERSAMMLUNGEN: Internationaler medizinischer Kongress zu Berlin\n 1890. I. Sektion f\u00fcr Augenheilkunde. Referiert von _Claude du\n Bois-Reymond_.\u2014II. Sektion f\u00fcr Ohrenheilkunde. Referiert von\n _Krakauer_.\n\n LITERATURBERICHT.\n\nProfessor J. von Kries examines the hypotheses propounded of late\nconcerning the recognition of the direction in which sound-waves\nreach the ear. Professor Preyer maintains that different irritations,\naccording to the source of sound, take place in the semi-circular\ncanals, and M\u00fcnsterberg, on the basis of his own experiments, has\nwith some essential modifications accepted Preyer's views. The\nauthor devotes his chief attention to the localisation of sounds\noriginating either to the right or to the left of the median plane.\nThe experiments were made with two movable whistles, the intensity of\nwhich could easily be regulated. The result was that concerning right\nand left direction, and also with regard to simultaneous sounds from\nboth directions at a different pitch, each note could be correctly\nlocalised. He adds that, so far as he can judge, even he who adopts\nM\u00fcnsterberg's view has to fall back upon a comparison of the intensity\nin both ears. A localisation of whistle-sounds in the median line, be\nit in front or at the back, was not so certain. A single tone was, upon\nthe whole, correctly localised; yet it was difficult to discriminate\ntwo sounds in the median plane.\n\nIn another article on the same subject, entitled _On Interaureal\nLocalisation of Diotic Sensations_ Karl L. Schaefer of Jena\nrecapitulates in brief the monotic and diotic experiments made by\nSilvanus B. Thompson, Purkyn\u00e9s, Urbantschitsch, and Preyer; completing\nthe inquiries of Fechner on the subject he states the following result:\n\"Let two tuning forks be placed at an equal distance from the median\nplane in front of the ears, so that their sound is medianly localised:\n1) Synchronal vibrations of any pitch, at the same distance, and in\nexactly opposite directions, produce median oscillations; 2) If the\nforks are moved a tempo to the right or to the left, i. e. in the same\ndirection, the sound rolls from ear to ear, so long as the motions\nare not too rapid; 3) If they are executed as quickly as possible the\nvibrations have their seats in both ears.\"\n\n_The Psychology of Causality_ is the subject of a longer article (47\npages) by Prof. Th. Lipps. Lipps declares that his \"investigation\nintends to reduce causality to association, and the law of causality\nto the law of association.\" The author does not identify his\nundertaking with the psychology of association, and protests against\nconsidering mind-activity as passive processes. He devotes almost too\nmuch space to stating what is, or can easily become, an anthropomorphic\nconception of causation. Where he propounds his positive views,\nwe miss discriminative exactness. _Ursache_ and _Grund_ are not\nsufficiently distinguished, and the definitions of formal and material\ncognitions, are not lucidly stated. Dr. Lipps says: \"All cognition\nis objectively conditioned representation; respectively associations\nof representations. In purely formal cognition the objective\n_raison d'\u00eatre_ (_Grund_) consists in the presence of a contents of\nconsciousness. In material cognition, or cognition by experience in\nthe narrower sense, it consists in the consciousness of the objective\nreality of a contents of consciousness.\"[66] The author's conclusion is\nsummarised as follows:\n\n [66] The passage being so difficult to translate, we quote\n the original in full: \"Alle Erkenntniss ist objectiv\n begr\u00fcndetes Vorstellen, bezw. Verbinden von Vorstellungen.\n Bei der lediglich formalen Erkenntniss besteht der\n objective Grund im Dasein eines Bewusstseinsinhaltes, bei\n der materialen oder Erfahrungserkenntniss im engeren Sinne\n besteht er im Bewusstsein der objectiven Wirklichkeit eines\n Bewusstseinsinhaltes.\"\n\n\"Hume's work and his mistake can thus plainly be recognised. That\ncausal connection is a connection among our ideas, not a connection\namong the objects represented, that the necessity which distinguishes\nthis connection consists in the psychological compulsion to combine one\nfact with another, that this compulsion has its reason in association,\nis the discovery of Hume; and this discovery of Hume is one of the\nmost important in the history of philosophy. That the world becomes a\nworld regulated by law, by being subjected to the law of our mind, this\nanthropocentric standpoint was therewith determined. Hume's mistake\nconsisted only in this: He did not recognise the full importance of the\nlaw of association. Therefore he did not see what associative relations\nare directly identical with the causal relation. An attempt was made\nto cover the defect rising therefrom by the principle of habit. Not\nthe principle of association, but the principle of habit depriving the\nprinciple of association of its strength, hindered Hume from proposing\nthe correct answer to the question, 'How in experience are general and\nnecessary judgments possible?'\" Professor Lipps does not answer this\nquestion satisfactorily either; he gives no explanation of the fact\nthat in experience general and necessary judgments are possible. He\nsimply states the fact. Every natural scientist, he says, expects that\na certain result that has been observed once, will always take place\nagain if the experiment be repeated under exactly the same conditions.\n\nProfessor Lipps states, in concluding, that he is fully conscious of\nhaving discussed only a small part of that which might be said on this\nsubject, and adds: \"Perhaps objections or criticisms will give me an\noccasion for additional remarks.\" We here call his attention to the\ntreatment of the subject in Dr. Paul Carus's pamphlet _Ursache, Grund\nund Zweck_ (Dresden: Grumbkow, 1881) and also to his articles on Form\nand Formal Thought and on Causality in _Fundamental Problems_.\n\nDr. Richard Wahle, Privat-docent in Vienna, defines in a short sketch\non _The Psychology of the Question_ the meaning of Question in the\nfollowing way: a question is \"the preparation during a state of\nindecision for a perception of the decision.\" In explaining the meaning\nof this decision Richard Wahle makes an occasional fling at that kind\nof psychology which divorced from physiology confines itself to the\nmethod of introspection.\n\nThe last article, by Prof. H. Ebbinghaus, is the first part of a\ncriticism of Fechner's posthumous letters on _Negative Empfindungs\nverthe_, published in the first numbers of this periodical. These\nletters, Ebbinghaus declares, afford an interesting insight into\nthe scientific personality of Fechner; yet the doctrine contained\ntherein, he adds, has its drawbacks. Ebbinghaus does not accept\nFechner's presentation of the case, but refers us to Delb\u0153uf from\nwhose experiments alone, he says, the correct interpretation of\nnegative values of sensations can be derived. Delb\u0153uf's views are not\nso clearly presented in his first statement as in a later article\nwritten in answer to the objections of Tannery, published in the\n_Revue Philosophique_ V. 1878, and republished under the title _Examen\ncritique de la loi psychophysique_ (Paris, 1883). Ebbinghaus adopts\nLanger's definition of negative values of sensations. They are \"such\nas under all circumstances if additively connected with equally great\npositive ones produce as a result zero.\"\n\nThe reports of the proceedings of the International Congress of\nPhysicians, Berlin, 1890, will be of special value to physicians. The\npresent number contains those of the sections of oculists and aurists.\n\nThe number contains a valuable bibliographical catalogue of the chief\nworks on physiological psychology for the year 1889. (Hamburg and\nLeipsic: L. Voss.)\n\n\nPHILOSOPHISCHE MONATSHEFTE. Vol. XXVII. Nos. 1 and 2.\n\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n QUANTITAET UND QUALITAET IN BEGRIFF, URTHEIL UND\n GEGENSTAENDLICHER ERKENNTNISS. By _Paul Natorp_.\n\n ZUM BEGRIFF DES NAIVEN REALISMUS. By _E. von Hartmann_.\n\n BEMERKUNGEN ZU VORSTEHENDEM AUFSATZ. By _A. D\u00f6ring_.\n\n RECENSIONEN.\n\n LITTERATURBERICHT.\n\nProfessor Paul Natorp, the editor, discusses Quantity and Quality in\nConcept, Judgment, and Objective Cognition. His object is the attempt\nnot to proceed subjectively, or psychologically, or genetically, or\ncausally, or teleologically, but purely objectively in the same sense\nas mathematics proceeds objectively. The result which he reaches is\nsummarily expressed in the statement \"that there is no formal logic\n... and that it cannot exist at all\u2014except it be based upon the logic\nof objective cognition (transcendental logic), or represents a part\nthereof, the severance of which from the whole to which it belongs\ncan have merely technical not scientific reasons.\" (Heidelberg: Georg\nWeiss.)\n\n\nRIVISTA ITALIANA DI FILOSOFIA. September and October, 1890.\n\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n DELLA PERCEZIONE DEL CORPO UMANO. By _L. Pietrobono_.\n\n LE IDEE PEDAGOGICHE DI PIETRO CERETTI.\n\n DELL' ATTENZIONE. By _V. Benini_.\n\n LA SCUOLA E LA FILOSOFIA PITAGORICHE. By _S. Ferrari_.\n\n BIBLIOGRAFIA.\n\n BOLLETTINO PEDAGOGICO E FILOSOFICO.\n\n NOTIZIE.\n\n RECENTI PUBBLICAZIONI.\n\n\nRIVISTA ITALIANA DI FILOSOFIA. November and December, 1890.\n\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n IL PRESENTE DELLA STORIA DELLA FILOSOFIA. By _L. Credaro_.\n\n LA PEDAGOGIA DI JACOPO SADOLETO. By _A. Piazzi_.\n\n DELLA PERCEZIONE DEL CORPO UMANO. By _L. Pietrobono_.\n\n BIBLIOGRAFIA, etc.\n\nThere are two problems which at present command a general and a keen\ninterest in all countries; viz. the psychological problem and the\nethical problem, the latter comprising all the questions of education\nand instruction, religious as well as secular. If this is true of\nGermany, France, England, and the United States, it is no less true of\nItaly. The _Rivista Italiana di Filosofia_, so ably edited by Luigi\nFerri, Professor at the University of Rome, shows this tendency in its\nlatest numbers in a marked degree. They contain among other valuable\nmaterials an article by Luigi Pietrobono on the perception of the\nhuman body, a psycho-physiological investigation of sentient substance\nwith special reference to sensation and perception. The author arrives\nat a result, which, if it could be sustained, would lead to an\noutspoken dualism. Pietrobono believes in two principles, a psychical\nand an organical, forming an original synthesis and antithesis,\ninterdependent upon and inseparable from each other. Vittorio Benini\ndiscusses in the same number the captivating subject of Attention,\nstarting from a discussion of Ribot's monograph on the subject, and\ndevoting his main interest to what he calls \"l' attenzione perceptiva\n\u00e8 accompagnata dall' intelligenza.\" The latter kind of attention is\nof especial importance in education, a subject which is discussed in\nthe conclusion of the article. This leads us to another essay which\ntreats of an exclusively educational subject, proposing the pedagogical\nideas of Pietro Ceretti. This article does not contain new truths,\nbut emphasises truths which have perhaps been too little recognised\nin Italy. Starting from the maxim that all education must develop the\nfaculties of body, soul, and mind (le facolt\u00e0 del corpo, dell' anima e\ndella mente), and that all education must be conducted so as to let the\nsocial body derive the benefits therefrom, he urges besides demanding\nthe moral and intellectual culture of man a technical instruction, and\namong the sciences, literature, and history, he would give mathematics\na prominent place.\n\nIt may be added that the department of Bibliography contains among\nother reviews discussions of the following works: 1) Reich's book on\nGian Vincenzo Gravina as an author of \u00e6sthetics; 2) Antonio Rosmini's\nFragments of a Philosophy of Law and Politics; 3) Robert Benzoni's The\nPhilosophy of Our Day; 4) Pietro Ellero's The Social Question; 5),\nin the December number, Ferdinando Puglia's Evolution in the History\nof Italian Philosophical Systems; 6) The national edition of Galileo\nGalilei's works; and 7) La Somiglianza nella Scuola Positivista e\nl'Identit\u00e0 nella Metafisica Nuova, by Donato Jaia.\n\n\nVOPROSY FILOSOFI I PSICHOLOGUII.[67] Vol. I. No. 4.\n\n [67] _Questions of Philosophy and Psychology._ In the Russian\n language.\n\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n (PART I.)\n\n REMARKS. By the Editor, _Prof N. Grote_.\n\n THE POLITICAL IDEALS OF PLATO AND OF ARISTOTLE IN THEIR UNIVERSAL\n HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE. By _Prince E. N. Trubetzkoi_.\n\n THE RELATIONS OF VOLTAIRE TO ROUSSEAU. (Conclusion.) By _E.\n Radlow_.\n\n THE ETHICAL DOCTRINE OF KANT. By _L. Lopatine_.\n\n HYPNOTISM IN PEDAGOGY. By _A. Tokarsky_.\n\n CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF FREEWILL FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF\n HISTORICAL PROCESS. By _N. Karyew_.\n\n THE VITAL PROBLEMS OF PSYCHOLOGY. By _N. Grote_.\n\n NECROLOGY. M. I. Vladislavlew, Rector of the University of St.\n Petersburg. By _K._\n\n\n (PART II.)\n\n EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: The Elements of Will. By _N. Lange_.\n\n CRITIQUE AND BIBLIOGRAPHY.\n\n COMMON CHARACTERISTICS. Concerning the conflict with the Occident\n in connection with the literary activity of a Slavophil. By _V.\n Rotzanow_. The ethical doctrine of Count Tolstoi and its most\n recent criticism. By _P. E. Astafiew_.\n\n BOOK REVIEWS. Reviews of Russian philosophical works on\n Metaphysics, Logic, Psychology, Ethics, and \u00c6sthetics. Reviews\n of foreign philosophical periodicals. Philosophical articles in\n Russian ecclesiastical periodicals.\n\n MATERIALS FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN RUSSIA. (1855-1888).\n\n TRANSACTIONS OF THE MOSCOW PSYCHOLOGICAL SOCIETY.\n\nThe distinguished Editor, Prof. N. Grote, in his introductory\nremarks calls attention to the fact that the present issue of this\nphilosophical and literary review in the Russian language, completes\nthe series that had been promised during the first year of its\nexistence. The review does not claim, during this brief lapse of time,\nto have been able to solve all the many problems incident to the task\nthat it had assumed at the outset of its career; but it may at least\nmodestly claim to have won the hearty sympathy of an intelligent\nfraction of the Russian people, expressed by the acquisition of a\ncomparatively large number of subscribers. This material success,\nmoreover, attests the fact that the editor did not deceive himself\nwhen at the original publication of the review he seemed to notice an\nawakening in his country of more serious intellectual interests, and\nthe rise of a desire for a philosophical analysis of the principles of\nknowledge and of life.\n\nOn the other hand, with regard to whether the problems treated of\nin the pages of the review are identical with those that occupy by\npreference the minds of intelligent Russian readers; or whether the\nexposition and the methods of investigation have been properly adjusted\nto the degree of development and to the mental calibre of the mass of\nits readers, it will suffice to remark, says the editor, that the full\ndevelopment of all the potential forces of nature and of mind can be\nattained only through slow and persistent action. We have to bear in\nmind that the attempt is by no means easy to organise for the first\ntime in a project of this kind the many active workers of a country in\nwhich people had never before been associated in a similar undertaking.\nYet in confidently entering upon the publication of this review, the\neditor well knew that there existed in Russia abundant intellectual\npowers, perfectly adequate to the demands of a high-class philosophical\nmagazine\u2014scientists, learned specialists, talented thinkers, and men\nof letters; and the review without doubt will not fail to enlist the\nvaluable assistance of all these men in the arduous task, which it will\ncontinue steadily to pursue. The main task above all, is to advance\nthe development of _self-consciousness_ in modern Russian society, but\nthe success of this aspiration depends of necessity on the continued\nsympathy and good will of the public.\n\nAs regards the external form of the review, for the greater convenience\nof the public, instead of four volumes of 20 sheets, as hitherto, there\nwill be issued during the present year five volumes in all\u2014one volume\nof 15-16 sheets bimonthly, except during the midsummer months.\n\nThe editor in conclusion expresses his acknowledgment to several\nof his western colleagues, to the editors of _Mind_, the _Revue\nPhilosophique_, the _Archiv f\u00fcr Geschichte der Philosophie_, and _The\nOpen Court_\u2014all of whom have promised to note with genuine interest\nthe contents of the Russian review \"Questions of Philosophy and of\nPsychology.\" (Moscow, 1890.)\n\n\n\n\n VOL. I. APRIL, 1891. NO. 3.\n\n\n\n\nTHE MONIST.\n\n\n\n\nTHE FACTORS OF EVOLUTION.\n\n\nTHEIR GRADES AND THE ORDER OF THEIR INTRODUCTION.\n\nThe usually recognised factors of evolution are at least five; viz.:\n(1) Pressure of a changing _environment_ affecting function and\nfunction affecting structure, and the changed structure and function\ninherited and integrated through successive generations indefinitely.\n(2) _Use and disuse_ of organs reacting on growth-force and producing\nchange in form, structure, and relative size of parts, and such change\ninherited and integrated through successive generations. (3) _Natural\nselection_ among individuals of a varying progeny, of those most in\naccord with an ever-changing environment\u2014or as it has been otherwise\ncalled \"_survival of the fittest_\" in each successive generation. (4)\n_Sexual selection_: the selection by the female, among varying male\nindividuals all competing for her possession, of the strongest or the\nmost attractive. Among mammals the selection is mainly of the strongest\nas decided by _battle_; among birds, of the most attractive as\ndetermined by splendor of color or beauty of song. (5) _Physiological\nselection_, or selection of those varieties, the individuals of\nwhich are fertile among themselves, but sterile or less fertile with\nother varieties and with the parent stock. This has also been called\n\"_segregate fecundity_\" by Gulick, and homogamy by Romanes.\n\nThese five factors are all usually but not universally recognised. The\nfirst two are Lamarckian, the second two Darwinian factors. In the\nLamarckian factors the changes occur _during individual life_, and\nthe offspring is supposed to inherit them unchanged. In the Darwinian\nfactors on the contrary the _changes are in the offspring_, and the\nindividuals during life are supposed to remain substantially unchanged.\nThe fifth factor has, only very recently, been brought forward by\nRomanes and Gulick and is not yet universally recognised; but we\nbelieve that with perhaps some modifications it is certain to triumph.\n(6) To these recognised factors of organic evolution must now be added,\nin _human evolution_, another and far higher factor, viz. conscious,\nvoluntary _co-operation in the work of evolution_, conscious striving\nfor the betterment of the individual and of the race. This factor\nconsists essentially in the _formation and pursuit of ideals_. We call\nthis a factor, but it is also much more than a factor. It stands in\nplace of nature herself\u2014it is a higher-rational nature using all the\nfactors of physical nature for its own higher purposes. To distinguish\nthe evolution determined by this factor from organic evolution, we\noften call it _progress_.\n\nUnderlying all these factors as their necessary condition, and\ntherefore themselves not called factors, are two opposite operative\nprinciples, viz. _heredity and variability_. Like the conservative and\nprogressive elements in society, one tends to fixedness, the other to\nchange. The one initiates change, the other accumulates its effects in\nsuccessive generations. The one tries all things, the other holds fast\nto whatever is good. They are both equally necessary to the successful\noperation of any or all of the factors.\n\nLet us now compare these six factors, as to their grade or position in\nthe scale of energy and as to the order of their introduction.\n\nThe first two\u2014Pressure of the environment and Use and disuse, i. e.\nthe Lamarckian factors\u2014are the lowest in position, most fundamental\nin importance, and therefore most universal in their operation. They\nare therefore also first in the order of time. They precede all other\nfactors and were _for a long time the only ones in operation_. For\nobserve: all the selective factors, viz. those of Darwin and Romanes,\nare wholly conditioned on Reproduction; for the changes in the case of\nthese are not in the individual life but only in the offspring. And\nnot only so but they are also strictly _conditioned on sexual modes\nof reproduction_. For all non-sexual modes of reproduction such as\nfission and budding are but slight modifications of the process of\ngrowth, and the resulting multitude of organisms may be regarded as in\nsome sense _only an extension of the first individual_. There is thus a\nkind of immortality in these lowest protozoa. Of course therefore the\nidentical characters of the first individual are continued indefinitely\n_except in so far as they are modified_ in successive generations by\nthe effect of the environment or by use and disuse of organs\u2014i. e.\nby _Lamarckian factors_. In sexual generation, on the contrary, the\ncharacters of two diverse individuals are funded in a common offspring;\nand the same continuing through successive generations, it is evident\nthat the inheritance in each individual offspring is infinitely\nmultiple. Now the tendency to variation in offspring is in proportion\nto the multiplicity of the inheritance: for among the infinite number\nof slightly different characters, as it were offered for inheritance in\nevery generation, some individuals will inherit more of one and some\nmore of another character. In a word, sexual generation, by multiple\ninheritance, tends to variation of offspring and thus _furnishes\nmaterial for natural selection_.\n\nThus then I repeat, all the selective factors are absolutely dependent\nfor their operation upon sexual reproduction. _But there was a time\nwhen this mode of reproduction did not exist._ It is certain the\nnon-sexual preceded the sexual modes of reproduction. I cannot stop\nnow to give the reasons for believing this. I have already given them\nin some detail in a previous article[68] to which I would refer the\nreader. Suffice it to say now that the order of introduction of the\nvarious modes of reproduction culminating in the highest sexual modes\nis briefly as follows: (1) _Fission._ An organism of the lowest kind\ngrows and divides into two. Each half grows to mature size and again\ndivides; and so on indefinitely. In this case there is no distinction\nbetween parents and offspring. Each seems either or neither. (2)\n_Budding._ Growth-force concentrating in one part produces a _bud_,\nwhich continues to grow and individuate itself more and more until\nit separates as a distinct individual. This is a higher form than\nthe last because in this case the individual is not sacrificed. Only\na small part separates and the separated part is in some sense an\n_offspring_. We have therefore for the first time the distinction\nof parent and offspring. (3) By the _law of differentiation and\nlocalisation of functions_, the bud-forming function is next relegated\nto a special place and we now have a bud-forming organ. (4) By another\ngeneral law, the law of _interior transfer_, the bud-forming organ is\nnext transferred for greater safety to an interior surface and thus\n_simulates_ an ovary, although not yet a true ovary or _egg-forming_\norgan. Examples of all these steps are found among existing animals.\n\n [68] _Genesis of Sex, Pop. Sci. Monthly_, 1879, Vol. xvi. p.\n 167. _Revue Scientifique_, Feb. 14, 1880.\n\nThus far reproduction is non-sexual. But now comes the great step,\ni. e. the introduction of sexual reproduction, in its lowest forms.\n(5) This simulated ovary or bud-forming organ becomes a true ovary or\negg-forming organ; or rather, at first, a combination of ovary and\nspermary. The same organ prepares two kinds of cells, male and female,\ngerm-cell and sperm-cell, which by their union produce an egg which\ndevelops into an offspring; and not only an offspring in the sense of\na separated part of a previous individual, but in some sense a new\ncreature, the creation of a _new individual_. There is an enormous\ndifference and even contrast between this and all preceding modes. In\nnon-sexual modes one individual becomes two; in this, two individual\ncells unite to form one. It is an expensive, even wasteful mode unless\nattended with some great advantage. The nature of this advantage we\nwill presently see.\n\nThus far we have given only the lowest form of sexual generation. The\ntwo sexual _elements_ only, germ-cell and sperm-cell are separated\nfrom each other, but not yet even the sexual organs, ovary and\nspermary, much less the sexual individuals, male and female. (6) The\nsex-element-forming function is next differentiated and localised in\ntwo different organs, ovary and spermary, but not yet in two different\nindividuals. This is hermaphroditism so common in plants and in lower\nanimals. (7) The already separated sexual organs are next localised in\ndifferent individuals, and we now have male and female individuals.\nThis is the case in many plants and in all the higher animals. (8) And\nfinally these male and female individuals become more and more diverse\nin character.\n\nThe object of this whole process of separation, first of the elements,\nthen of the organs, then of the individuals, and last the increasing\ndivergence of the individuals, is undoubtedly the funding of more and\nmore diverse characters in a common offspring; and thus by increasing\nmultiplicity of inheritance to insure larger variation in offspring and\nthereby furnish more abundant material for natural selection. This is\nfar more than a compensation for the apparent wastefulness of this mode\nof reproduction.\n\nIf then the non-sexual preceded the sexual modes of reproduction,\nevidently, _at first, only Lamarckian factors could operate_. Evolution\nwas then carried forward wholly by changes in the individual produced\nby _the environment_ and by _use and disuse of organs_, continued and\nincreased through successive generations indefinitely. It is probable\ntherefore that for want of the selective factors, the rate of evolution\nwas at first comparatively slow; unless indeed, as seems probable, the\nearliest forms were, as the lowest forms are now, more plastic under\npressure of physical conditions than are the present higher forms.\nThe great contrast between the Lamarckian and Darwinian factors in\nthis regard, and the slowness of change _now_ in higher forms under\n_Lamarckian factors alone_, is best shown in plants where either kind\nof factors may be used at pleasure. In these, if we wish to _make_\nvarieties, we propagate by seeds\u2014sexual reproduction\u2014but if we wish\nto _preserve_ varieties, we propagate by buds and cuttings\u2014non-sexual\nreproduction.\n\nWe have taken the two Lamarckian factors together, in contrast with\nthe Darwinian. But even in the two Lamarckian factors there is a great\ndifference in grade. Undoubtedly the lowest and first introduced was\npressure of the _physical environment_. For even _use and disuse_\nof organs implies some degree of volition and voluntary motion, and\ntherefore already some advance in the scale of evolution.\n\nWith the introduction of sex another entirely different and higher\nfactor was introduced, viz. _natural selection_, among a varying\nprogeny, of the fittest individuals. We have already seen how sexual\ngeneration produces variation of offspring and how this furnishes\nmaterial for natural selection. As soon, therefore, as this form\nof generation was evolved, this higher factor came into operation,\nand immediately, as it were, _assumed control_ of evolution, and\nthe previous factors _became subordinate_ though still underlying,\nconditioning, modifying the higher. The result was an immediate\nincrease in the speed and in the diversity of evolution. It is very\nworthy of note too, that it is in the higher animals, such as birds\nand mammals, where we find the highest form of sexual generation,\nwhere the diversity of funded characters and therefore the variation\nin the offspring is the greatest, and natural selection most active:\nit is precisely among these that the Lamarckian factors are most\nfeeble, because during the most plastic portion of life the offspring\nis removed from the influence of the physical environment and from the\neffects of use and disuse, by their enclosure within the womb or within\na large egg well supplied with nourishment. In these, development is\nalready far advanced before Lamarckian factors can operate at all.\n\nNext I suppose _Physiological selection_ or Romanes's factor came into\noperation. After the introduction of sex, it became necessary, that the\nindividuals of some varieties should be in some way _isolated_, so as\nto prevent the swamping of varietal characters as fast as formed, in a\ncommon stock by cross breeding. In very low forms with slow locomotion,\nsuch isolation might easily take place accidentally. Even in higher\nforms, changes in physical geography or accidental dispersion by winds\nand currents, would often produce _geographical isolation_; and thus\nby preventing crossing with the parent stock, secure the formation of\nnew species from such isolated varieties. But in order to insure in\nall cases the preservation of commencing species, _sexual isolation_\nwas introduced or evolved as I suppose later, and according to Romanes\nsomewhat as follows:\n\nAll organs are subject to variation in offspring, but none are so\nsensitive in this regard as the reproductive organs; and these in no\nrespect more than in relative fertility under different conditions.\nSuppose then the offspring of any parent to vary in many directions.\nBy cross-breeding among themselves and with the parent stock, these\nare usually merged in a common type, their differences pooled, and the\nspecies remains fixed or else advances slowly by natural selection,\nalong _one line_, as physical conditions change in geological time. But\nfrom time to time there arises a variation in the reproductive organs\nof some individuals, of such kind that these individuals are fertile\namong themselves, but sterile or less fertile with other varieties\nand with the parent stock. Such individuals are _sexually isolated_\nfrom others, or _sexually segregated_ among themselves. Their varietal\ndifferences of all kinds are no longer swamped by cross-breeding, but\ngo on to increase until they form a new species. It is evident then,\nas Romanes claims, that natural selection alone tends to _monotypal_\nevolution. Isolation of some sort seems necessary to _polytypal_\nevolution. The tree of evolution under the influence of natural\nselection alone grows palm-like from its terminal bud. Isolation was\nnecessary to the starting of lateral buds, and thus for the _profuse\nramification_ which is its most conspicuous character.\n\nNext, I suppose, was introduced, _sexual selection_, or contest\namong the males by battle or by display, for the possession of the\nfemale, the success of the strongest or the most attractive, and the\nperpetuation and increase of these superior qualities of strength\nor beauty in the next generation. This I suppose was later, because\nconnected with a higher development of the psychical nature. This is\nespecially true when beauty of color or song determines the selection.\nAs might be supposed therefore, this factor is operative only among the\nhighest animals, especially birds and mammals, and perhaps some insects.\n\nNext and last, and only with the appearance of man, another entirely\ndifferent and far higher factor was introduced, viz. _conscious,\nvoluntary co-operation in the work of evolution_\u2014a conscious voluntary\n_effort to attain an Ideal_. As already said, we call this a factor,\nbut it is much more than a factor. It is another nature working in\nanother world\u2014the spiritual\u2014and like physical nature using all\nfactors, but in a new way and on a higher plane. In early stages man\ndeveloped much as other animals, unconscious and careless whither he\ntended and therefore with little or no voluntary effort to attain a\nhigher stage. But this voluntary factor, this striving toward a goal\nor ideal, in the individual and in the race, increased more and more\nuntil in civilised communities of modern times it has become by far the\ndominant factor. Reason, instead of physical nature, takes control,\nthough still using the same factors.\n\nNow, in this whole process, we observe two striking stages. The one is\nthe introduction of Sex, the other the introduction of Reason.[69] They\nmight be compared to two equally striking stages in the evolution of\nthe individual, viz. the moment of _fertilisation_ and the moment of\n_birth_. As the ontogenic evolution receives fresh impulse at the two\nmoments of fertilisation and of birth; so the evolution of the organic\nkingdom at the two periods mentioned. With the appearance of _sex_,\nthree new and higher factors are introduced, and these immediately\nassumed control and quickened the rate of evolution. With the\nappearance of reason in man another and far higher factor is introduced\nwhich in its turn assumes control, and not only again quickens the\nrate, but elevates the whole plane of evolution. This voluntary,\nrational factor not only assumes control itself, but transforms all\nother factors and uses them in a new way and for its own higher\npurposes.\n\n [69] By Reason I mean the faculty of dealing with the\n phenomena of the inner world of consciousness and ideas, or\n _reflection_ on the facts of consciousness. Animals live in\n _one_ world, the outer _world of sense_; man in _two_ worlds,\n in the outer world like animals, but also in the inner and\n higher _world of ideas_. All that is characteristic of man\n comes of this capacity of dealing with this inner world. In\n default of a better word I call it Reason. If any one can\n suggest a better word I will gladly adopt it.\n\nThis last is by far the greatest change which has ever occurred in\nthe history of evolution. In organic evolution nature operates by\nnecessary law without the voluntary co-operation of the thing evolving.\nIn human progress man voluntarily co-operates with nature in the work\nof evolution and even assumes to take the process mainly into his\nown hands. Organic evolution is by _necessary_ law, human progress\nby _free_, or at least by _freer_, law. Organic evolution is by a\n_pushing_ upward and onward from below and behind, human progress by\nan aspiration, an attraction toward an ideal\u2014a _pulling_ upward and\nonward from above and in front.\n\nThis great change may well be likened to a _birth_.[70] Spirit or\nReason or the Psyche\u2014call it what you like\u2014was in embryo in animals\nin increasing degrees of development through all geological times\nand came to birth and capacity of free activity, became free spirit\ninvestigating its own phenomena in man. In animals the evolution of\nPsyche was the unconscious result of organic evolution. In man the\nPsyche is _born_ into a new world of freer activity and undertakes to\ndevelop itself.\n\n [70] See _Evolution and its Relation to Religious Thought_,\n Part iii. Chap. iv, where the writer's views are more fully\n brought out.\n\nIt may be well to stop a moment and show briefly some of the striking\ndifferences between organic and human evolution, differences resulting\nwholly from the introduction of this new factor, or rather this\nevolution on a new and higher plane.\n\n(1) In organic evolution the fittest are those most in _harmony with\nthe environment_ and therefore they _survive_. In human evolution\nthe fittest are those most _in harmony with the ideal_, and often,\nespecially in the early stages of evolution, during the dominance of\nnatural selection, they _do not survive_ because not in harmony with\nthe social environment.\n\n(2) In organic evolution the weak, the helpless, the unfit in any way,\n_perish_, and ought to perish, because this is the most efficient way\nof _strengthening the blood_, or _physical_ nature. In human evolution\nthe weak, the helpless, the physically unfit, are _sustained_, and\nought to be sustained, because sympathy, love, pity _strengthens\nthe spirit or moral nature_. But the spirit or moral nature is also\nsustained by, and conditioned on, the physical nature. In all our\nattempts therefore to help the weak we must be careful that we avoid\npoisoning the blood and weakening the physical health of the race. This\nwe believe can and will be done by _rational education_, physical,\nmental, and moral. We only allude to this. It is too wide a subject to\nfollow up here.\n\n(3) In organic evolution the _form must_ continually _change_ in order\nto keep in harmony with the changing environment. In other words\nevolution is by constant _change of species_, genera, etc.; there must\nbe a continual evolution of _new forms_. In human evolution, and more\nand more as civilisation goes on, man modifies the environment so as to\nbring it in harmony with himself and his wants, and therefore there is\n_no necessity for_ change of form or _making of new species of man_.\nHuman evolution is not by modification of _form_\u2014new species, but by\nmodification of spirit\u2014new planes of activity.\n\n(4) In organic evolution as a higher factor arises it assumes control,\nand previous factors sink into subordinate position. But in human\nevolution the rational factor not only assumes control but transforms\nall other factors, using them in a new way and for its own higher\npurposes. Thus the Lamarckian factor\u2014_environment_\u2014is modified and\neven changed so as to affect suitably the human organism. This is\n_Hygiene_ or _Sanitation_. Again, the various organs of the body and\nfaculties of the mind are deliberately _used_ (another Lamarckian\nfactor) in such wise as to produce their highest efficiency. This\nis _education_, or _training_, physical, mental, moral. So also the\nselective factors are similarly transformed, and natural selection\nbecomes rational selection. This is freely applied to domestic animals\nand with limitations imposed by reason itself will be applied to man.\n\n(5) The way of evolution toward the highest, i. e. from Protozoa to\nman and from lowest man to the ideal man, is a _very narrow way_, and\nfew there be that find it. In the case of organic evolution it is _so_\nnarrow, that once get off the track and it is impossible to get on\nagain. No living form of animal is now on the way to form man, can by\nany possibility develop manward. They are all gone out of the way. They\nare all off the trunk line. The golden opportunity is past. The tree of\nevolution is an _excurrent_ stem continuous to the terminal shoot\u2014man.\nOnce leave the main stem as a branch, it is easy to continue growing in\nthe direction chosen, but impossible to get back again on the straight\nupward way to the highest. In human evolution whether individual or\nracial, the same law holds, but with a difference. If an individual or\na race gets off from the straight and narrow way toward the highest,\nthe Divine ideal, it is _hard_ to get back on the track; hard but\nnot _impossible_. Man's own effort is the chief factor in his own\nevolution. By virtue of his self-activity, and through the use of\nreason, man alone is able to rectify an error of direction and return\nagain to the deserted way.\n\n\nREFLECTIONS ON THE ABOVE PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION TO SOME\nQUESTIONS OF THE DAY.\n\n\nI.\n\nJust now there is much controversy in regard to the factors of\nevolution. Both Darwin and Spencer, the two greatest expounders of the\nmodern theory of evolution, acknowledge and insist upon at least four\nfactors; viz. the two Lamarckian and the two distinctively Darwinian.\nThe only difference between them is in the relative importance of\nthe two sets; Spencer regarding the former and Darwin the latter\nas the more potent. But some late Darwinians have gone far beyond\nDarwin himself in their estimate of the power of the most distinctive\nDarwinian factor, viz. natural selection. Weismann and Wallace have\neach written a book, and Lankester many excellent articles to show that\nnatural selection is the one sole and sufficient cause of evolution,\nthat changes during the individual life whether by effect of the\nenvironment or by the use and disuse of organs _are not inherited at\nall_, that Lamarck was wholly wrong and that Darwin (in connection\nwith Wallace) is the sole founder of the true theory of evolution, and\nfinally that Darwin himself was wrong only in making any terms whatever\nwith Lamarck.\n\nThe argument for this view has, perhaps, been most strongly put\nby Weismann and is based partly on experiments, but mainly on his\ningenious and now celebrated theory of the _immortality of germ-plasm_.\nThe animal body consists of two kinds of cells wholly different in\nfunction, somatic cells and germ-cells, including in this last the\nsexual elements both male and female. Somatic cells are modified and\nspecialised for the various functions of the body; germ-cells are\nwholly unmodified. The somatic cells are for the conservation of the\n_individual_ life, germ-cells for the conservation of the _species_.\nNow according to Weismann, _inheritance is only through germ-cells_.\nEnvironment affects only the somatic cells and therefore changes\nproduced by environment cannot be inherited. Sexual generation was\nintroduced for the purpose of producing variability in progeny and\nthus furnishing material for natural selection, as this was the only\nmeans of evolutionary advance. Weismann made many experiments on\nanimals, especially by mutilation, to show that somatic changes are not\ninherited.\n\nWe shall not argue this question but content ourselves with making\nthree brief remarks.\n\n1. If the views presented in this article be true, then the Lamarckian\nfactors must be true factors, because _there was a time when there\nwere no others_. They were necessary therefore to start the process of\nevolution, even if no longer necessary at present.\n\n2. But if the Lamarckian factors were ever operative, _they must be so\nstill_, though possibly in a subordinate degree. A lower factor is not\nabolished, but only becomes subordinate to a higher factor when the\nlatter is introduced. Thus it may well be that Lamarckian factors are\ncomparatively feeble at the present time and among present species,\nespecially of the higher animals, and yet not absent altogether. In\nthe earliest stages of evolution there was a complete _identification\nof germ-cells and somatic cells_\u2014of the individual with the species.\nIn such cases, of course, the effect of environment must be inherited\nand increased from generation to generation. But the differentiation of\ngerm and somatic cells was not all at once; it was a _gradual process_,\nand therefore the effect of the environment _on the germ-cells through\nthe somatic cells_ must have continued, though in decreasing degree,\nand still continues. The differentiation is now, in the higher animals,\nso complete that germ-cells are probably not at all affected by changes\nin somatic cells, unless these changes are _long continued in the same\ndirection and are not antagonised by natural selection_.\n\n3. It is a general principle of evolution that _the law of the whole\nis repeated with modifications, in the part_. This is a necessary\nconsequence of the Unity of Nature. We ought to expect therefore and\ndo find, that the order of the use of the factors of evolution is\nthe same in the evolution of the _organic kingdom_, in the evolution\nof _each species_, and in the evolution of _each individual_. In all\nthese the physical factors are first powerfully operative, then become\nsubordinate to organic factors, and these in their turn to psychical\nand rational factors. Therefore, as the individual in its early stages,\ni. e. in embryo and infancy, is peculiarly plastic under the influence\nof the physical environment and afterwards becomes more and more\nindependent of these: so a species when first formed is more plastic\nunder the influence of the Lamarckian factors and afterwards becomes\nmore rigid to the same. And so also the organic kingdom was doubtless\nat first more plastic under Lamarckian factors, and has become less\nso in the present species, especially of the higher animals. The\nprincipal reason for this, as we have already seen, is the increasing\ndifferentiation of germ and somatic cells, and the removal of the\nformer to the interior where they are more and more protected from\nexternal influence.\n\n\nII.\n\nSome evolutionists\u2014the materialistic\u2014insist on making human evolution\nidentical in all respects with organic evolution. This we have shown is\nnot strictly true. The very least that can be said is that a new and\nfar more potent factor is introduced with man, which modifies greatly\nthe process. But we may claim much more, viz. that evolution is here on\na wholly different and higher plane. The factors of organic evolution\nare indeed still present and condition the whole process; but they are\nnot left to be used by nature alone. On the contrary, they are used in\na new way and for higher purposes by Reason.\n\nBut by a revulsion from the materialistic extreme, some have gone to\nthe opposite extreme. They would place human progress and organic\nevolution in violent antagonism, as if subject to entirely different\nand even opposite laws. But we have also shown, that although the\ndistinctive human factor is indeed dominant, yet it is underlaid and\nconditioned by all the lower factors\u2014that these lower factors are\nstill necessary as the agents used by Reason.\n\n\nIII.\n\nWe have already alluded to Weismann's and Wallace's views, but there is\none important aspect not yet touched.\n\nIf Weismann and Wallace are right, if natural selection be indeed the\nonly factor used by nature in organic evolution and therefore available\nfor use by Reason in human evolution, then alas for all our hopes of\nrace-improvement, whether physical, mental, or moral! All enlightened\nschemes of _physical culture_ and of _hygiene_, although directed\nindeed primarily for the strength, health, and happiness of the\n_present generation_, yet are sustained and ennobled by the conviction\nthat the physical improvement of the individual, by inheritance enters\ninto a similar improvement of the race. All our schemes of _education_,\nintellectual and moral, although certainly intended mainly for the\nimprovement of the individual, are glorified by the hope that the\nrace is also thereby gradually elevated. It is true that these hopes\nare usually extravagant; it is true that the whole improvement of the\nindividuals of one generation is not carried over by inheritance into\nthe next; it is true therefore that we cannot by education raise a\nlower race up to the plane of a higher race _in a few generations_; but\nthere must be a small residuum, be it ever so small, carried forward\nby inheritance and accumulated from age to age, which enters into the\nslow growth of the race. If it be true that reason must direct the\ncourse of human evolution, and if it be also true that selection of the\nfittest is the only method available for that purpose; then, if we are\nto have any race-improvement at all, the dreadful law of _destruction\nof the weak and helpless_ must with Spartan firmness be carried out\nvoluntarily and deliberately. Against such a course all that is best\nin us revolts. The use of the Lamarckian factors, on the contrary,\nis not attended with any such revolting consequences. All that we\ncall education, culture, training, is by the use of these. Our hopes\nof race-improvement therefore are strictly conditioned on the fact\nthat the Lamarckian factors are still operative, that changes in the\nindividual, if in useful direction, are to some extent inherited and\naccumulated in the race.\n\n\nIV.\n\nWe have said that the new factor introduced with man is a voluntary\nco-operation in the process of evolution, a conscious upward striving\ntoward a higher condition, a pressing forward toward an ideal. Man\ncontrary to all else in nature is transformed, not in _shape_ by\nexternal environment, but in _character by his own ideals_. Now this\ncapacity of forming ideals and the voluntary pursuit of such ideals,\nwhence comes it? When analysed and reduced to its simplest terms, it\nis naught else than the consciousness in man of his relation to the\ninfinite and the attempt to realise the divine ideal in human character.\n\n JOSEPH LE CONTE.\n\n\n\n\nILLUSTRATIVE STUDIES IN CRIMINAL ANTHROPOLOGY.\n\n\nIII.\n\nTHE PHYSIOGNOMY OF THE ANARCHISTS.\n\nOne of the most curious applications, and perhaps the most practical,\nof Criminal Anthropology, (of that new science which has associated\nitself with sociology, psychiatry, and history,) is that which flows\nfrom the study of the physiognomy of the political criminal. For not\nonly does it appear to succeed in furnishing us with the juridical\nbasis of political crime, which hitherto seemed to escape all our\nresearches, so completely that until now all jurists had ended by\nsaying that there was no political crime; but it seems also to supply\nus with a method for distinguishing true revolution, always fruitful\nand useful, from utopia, from rebellion, which is always sterile. It\nis for me a thoroughly established fact, and one of which I have given\nthe proofs in my \"Delitto Politico,\"[71] that true revolutionists,\nthat is to say, the initiators of great scientific and political\nrevolutions, who excite and bring about a true progress in humanity,\nare almost always geniuses or saints, and have all a marvellously\nharmonious physiognomy; and to verify this it is sufficient simply to\nlook at the plates in my \"Delitto Politico.\" What noble physiognomies\nhave Paoli, Fabrizi, Dandolo, Moro, Mazzini, Garibaldi, Bandiera,\nPisacane, la Petrowskaia, la Cidowina, la Sassulich! Generally we see\nin them a very large forehead, a very bushy beard, and very large and\nsoft eyes; sometimes we meet with the jaw much developed, but never\nhypertrophic; sometimes, finally, with paleness of the face (Mazzini,\nBrutus, Cassius); but these characteristics seldom accumulate in the\nsame individual to the extent of constituting what I call the criminal\ntype.\n\n [71] 1890.\n\nIn a study that I have made with three hundred and twenty-one of our\nItalian revolutionists, (against Austria etc.,) nearly all males,\n(there were twenty-seven women to one hundred men,) the proportion of\nthe criminal type was 0\u00b757 per cent.; i. e. 2 per cent. less than in\nnormal men. Out of thirty celebrated Nihilists, eighteen have a very\nfine physiognomy, twelve present some isolated anomalies, two only\npresent the criminal type (Rogagiew and Oklasdky), that is to say 6\u00b78\nper cent. And if from these unfortunate men who represent to us, even\npsychologically, the Christian martyrs, we pass to the regicides, to\nthe presidenticides, such as Fieschi, Guiteau, Nobiling, and to the\nmonsters of the French Revolution of 1789, such as Carrier, Jourdan,\nand Marat, we there at once find in all, or in nearly all, the criminal\ntype. And the type again frequently appears among the Communards and\nthe Anarchists. Taking fifty photographs of Communards I have found the\ncriminal type in 12 per cent.; and the insane type in 10 per cent. Out\nof forty-one Parisian Anarchists that I have studied with Bertillon at\nthe office of the police of Paris, the proportion of the criminal type\nwas 31 per cent.\n\nIn the rebellion of the 1st of May last I was able to study one\nhundred Turin Anarchists. I found the criminal type among these in the\nproportion of 34 per cent., while in two hundred and eighty ordinary\ncriminals of the prison at Turin the type was 43 per cent.\n\nTABLE OF PERCENTAGE OF CHARACTERISTICS.\n\n ================================+==========+=========\n | TURIN | ORDINARY\n CHARACTERISTICS. |ANARCHISTS|CRIMINALS\n --------------------------------+----------+---------\n Exaggerated plagiocephaly | 11 | 21\n Facial asymmetry | 36 | 60\n Other cranial anomalies | |\n (ultra-brachycephaly etc.) | 15 | 44\n Very large jaw | 19 | 29\n Exaggerated zygomas | 16 | 23\n Enormous frontal sinus | 17 | 19\n Dental anomalies | 30 | 20\n Anomalies of the ears | 64 | 75\n Anomalies of the nose | 40 | 57\n Anomalous coloration of skin | 30 | 8\n Old wounds | 10 | 26\n Tattooing | 4 | 10\n Neuro-pathological anomalies | 8 | 26\n\nAmong the 100 individuals arrested on the 1st of May, 30 per cent. were\nrecidivists for common crimes; among the others, 50 per cent. Of true\nprison _habitu\u00e9s_ there were 8 among the former and 20 among the latter.\n\nThanks to the assistance of Dr. Carus of _The Open Court Publishing\nCompany_, who has sent me many curious data and also the work of\nSchaack, \"Anarchy and Anarchists\" (Chicago, 1889), which is very\npartial, although rich in facts, I have been able to study the\nphotographs of 43 Chicago anarchists, and I have found among them\nalmost the same proportion of the criminal type, that is 40 per cent.\nThe ones that presented this type are the two Djeneks, Potoswki, Cloba,\nSeveski, Stimak, Sugar, Micolanda, Bodendick, Lieske, Lingg, Oppenheim,\nEngel and his wife, Fielden, G. Lehm, Thiele, and Most. Especially\nin Potowski, Sugar, and Micolanda I mark facial asymmetry, enormous\njaws, developed frontal sinus, protruding ears; and the same (except\nthe asymmetry) in Seveski and Novak. Fielden has a turned up nose\nand enormous jaws; Most has acrocephaly and facial asymmetry. On the\ncontrary a very fine physiognomy has Marx, with his very full forehead,\nbushy hair and beard, and soft eyes; and likewise Lassalle, Hermann,\nSchwab, the two Spies, Neebe, Schnaubelt, Waller, and Seeger.\n\nIn studying the chief anarchists separately,\u2014the martyrs of the\nChicago anarchists, it might well be said,\u2014there is found in them\nall an anomaly, very frequent in normal men as well; that is to say\nthe ears are without lobes; the ears are also developed a little more\nthan normally in all (except in Spies), they are protruding in Lingg,\nFischer, and Engel; the jaw is much developed in Lingg, Spies, Fischer,\nand Engel; all have, however, except Spies,[72] the forehead fine\nand full, with great intelligence. In the plates of the journal _Der\nVorbote_ we find a Mongolic cast of feature in Engel and Lingg, both\nof whom should have much of the degenerative characters, enormous jaw\nand zygoma, and Lingg oblique eyes. But these characters are much less\napparent in the photographs that I received from _The Monist_ and in\nwhich the jaw of Fischer even decreases. Perhaps these photographs\nwere taken some years before the crime, when they were very young.\nCertainly in both instances (in the _Vorbote_ and the photographs from\n_The Monist_) I find a very noble and truly genial physiognomy in\nParsons and Neebe. The physiognomy of August Spies is morbid. He has a\nsenile auricle, voluminous jaw bones and a strongly developed frontal\nsinus. And, it is necessary to remark, the physiognomy corresponds with\nhis autobiography, written with a fierce fanaticism; whilst in the\nposthumous writings of Parsons and in the writings of Neebe we remark a\ncalm and reflective enthusiasm.\n\n [72] Thus according to the portrait in Schaack's book; but\n according to information which I later received from General\n Trumbull of Chicago, this portrait is not true to life. It\n would seem, then, that the features upon which my opinion is\n based do not exist.\n\nSchwab has the physiognomy of a _savant_, of a student; he much\nresembles the nihilist Antonoff, beheaded in Russia. (See Plate IV in\nmy \"Delitto Politico.\") Neebe is quite like an Italian economist well\nknown in America, Luigi Luzzatti.\n\nFielden has a wild physiognomy, not without sensuality. Parsons\nresembles Bodio, the great Italian statistician, and in the upper part\nof the face, Stanley.\n\nWhen I say that the anarchists of Turin and of Chicago are frequently\nof the criminal type, I do not mean that political criminals, even the\nmost violent anarchists, are true criminals; but that they possess the\ndegenerative characters common to criminals and to the insane, being\nanomalies and possessing these traits by heredity; as a fact, the\nfather of Booth was called Junius Brutus, and gave to his son the name\nof a revolutionist, Wilkes. The fathers of Guiteau and of Nobiling,\nand the mother of Staps were religious lunatics; and Staps also, like\nRavaillac, Clement, Brutus, had hallucinations. In the autobiographies\nof the _Vorbote_ I find that Parsons had a very religious Methodist\nmother and a father who had much to do with the movement of the\nTemperance League. Indeed, the Parsons since 1600 had as a family taken\npart in all revolutionary movements. A Tompkin, a relation of his\nmother, had taken part in the battles of Brandywine and of Monmouth; a\nGeneral Parsons was an officer in the Revolution of 1776, and a captain\nParsons engaged in the battle of Bunker Hill.\n\nSpies was born in a chateau celebrated for feudal robberies\u2014called on\nthat account the \"Raubschloss.\"\n\nThe father of Louis Lingg suffered through his labor as a workman a\nconcussion of the brain\u2014according to the _Vorbote_.\n\nThe father of Fielden, an orator of power notwithstanding his\noccupation as a workman, was one of the agitators of the question\nof agricultural lands for workingmen in England; he was one of the\nfounders of the \"Consumers' Co-operative Society\" and a prime mover in\nthe society of \"Odd Fellows.\" For those who will object that in many\nof these relations they see only geniuses, I have only to cite my work\n\"L'Homme de G\u00e9nie,\" where I have proved how often genius is nervous\nepilepsy, and how almost all the sons of men of genius are lunatics,\nidiots, or criminals.\n\nThis hereditary influence is seen also in the great number of brothers\ncharged together, the two Spies, the two Djeneks, the two Fieldens, and\nthe two Lehms. According to their autobiographies also their fathers or\ntheir mothers died early; from which we may presume that they were old\nor diseased.\n\nThe morbid impressibility of Engel has been admitted by himself. \"I\ncannot,\" he said to his wife, \"hold within me what I feel. I must\nexplode. The enthusiasm takes possession of me; it is a disease.\"\nLingg could not remain quiet an instant; in his room he always\nhad some dynamite in store. Bodendick was a thief and a mattoid;\nfull of cunning, mischief and mad tricks, even according to the\n_Arbeiter-Zeitung_. He was always dreaming of new explosives. Though\ninsane he was a genius as appears from his poetry, which is published\nby Schick and is in the style of the celebrated \"Song of the Shirt.\"\nThe suicide of Lingg with dynamite shows his moral insensibility, as do\nthe words of Parsons addressed to the society of anarchists: \"Strangle\nthe spies and throw them out of the window.\" In Lingg we see a truly\nungovernable epileptoid idea driving him to political action. \"I cannot\ncontrol myself;\" he said, \"it is stronger than I.\"\n\nI repeat that among the anarchists there are no true criminals;\neven Schaack, the police historian, can name but two criminals, and\ncertainly he would not have spared them if he could have stigmatised\nthem.\n\nTheir heroic-like deaths, with their ideal on their lips, proves that\nthey were not common criminals. Nevertheless the psychology of the\nleaders of the Commune shows in them a true moral insensibility, an\ninnate cruelty, which found a pretext and a scope in politics; and\nwhich accords too well with their criminal physiognomies. Marat demands\ntwo hundred and ten thousand heads; Vall\u00e9s speaks of his family with a\ntrue hatred; Carrier wrote, \"We will make a cemetery of France\"; Ferr\u00e9\nsmiled while by his orders they killed Veisset; and Rigault said in\nslang to his pistol, \"Il faut peter sur le chipau.\" The last words of\nSpies before the court express a ferocious hatred towards the rich; and\nthe project of the anarchists of Chicago (if it is true) to blow up a\npart of the city with bombs attests an absence of the moral sense. We\nknow that many anarchists regard brigands and thieves, such as Pini,\nKammerer, and Gasparoni, as their brothers in arms. Booth had for\naccomplice Payne, a true murderer by profession. See also the journal\npublished at Geneva _L'Explosion_, and the Como journal _Le Poignard_.\n\nBut it is necessary to note that hereditary anomaly, if it provokes an\nanomaly in the moral sense, also suppresses misoneism, the horror of\nnovelty which is almost the general rule of humanity; it thus makes\nof them innovators, apostles of progress, though the education is too\nrude: and the fight with relative misery of which all the anarchists\nof Chicago except Neebe have been the victims, not affording material\nfor useful novelties made of them only failures and rebels, hindering\nthem from comprehending that humanity as a part of nature, which it is,\ncannot progress at a gallop, _non facit saltus_. Spies on his last day\ndiscovered that humanity is misoneic, the slave of custom, and said,\nquoting the lines in German, \"I now understand the poet's words,\n\n '_Denn aus Gemeinem ist der Mensch gemacht,\n Und die Gewohnheit nennt er seine Amme._'\"\n\n [Man has been shaped of what is common,\n And habit is the nurse by whom he's reared.]\n\nEvidently if he had understood it before he would not have been an\nanarchist. Whoever has observed in asylums the conduct of lunatics,\nwill understand that one of their characteristics is originality, just\nas in men of genius; only the originality of the insane and of moral\nlunatics, or of born criminals, is very often absurd or unavailable.\n\nThis is why I, although I am an extremist in my partisanship for the\ndeath-penalty, cannot approve the shooting of the Communards and the\nhanging of the anarchist martyrs of Chicago. I deem it highly necessary\nto suppress born criminals, when they reach the persuasion that being\nborn for evil they can do nothing but evil; and I believe that their\ndeath thus saves the lives of many honest men. But we have to do with a\nvery different thing here, where the criminal type is, as shown above,\nless frequent than among born criminals.\n\nIt is also necessary to consider here the youthful condition of almost\nall these persons\u2014Lingg 23 years, Schwab 33 years, Neebe 32 years.\nFor at this age men are at the maximum point of their audacity and\nmisoneism; and I remember a leading Russian Nihilist saying to me\nthat there was not an honest man in Russia who was not a nihilist at\n20 years of age and ultra-moderate at 40 years. If the inclination to\nevil here exists in greater proportion than in law-abiding men, it\nnevertheless takes an altruistic turn, which is quite the contrary\nto that which is observed among born criminals, and which commands\nour admiration and arouses our just pity. This inclination, in\nassociating itself with the want of the new, which is also abnormal in\nhumanity, could, if it were properly directed and were not crossed by\nmisery, prove itself of great value to humanity; it could trace for\nit new routes, and in every case be practically useful to it. A born\ncriminal imprisoned for life will kill some gaoler, in a colony will\nally himself with the savages, and will never work; while political\ncriminals in a colony will become more useful pioneers even than\nlaw-abiding men. An example is seen in Louise Michel, who in New\nCaledonia was the most charitable of the sick nurses.\n\nAnd then there is no political crime against which the punishment of\ndeath can be directed. An idea is never stifled with the death of its\nabettors: it gains with the death of the martyrs if it is good, as\nis the case in revolutions; and it falls at once into vacuity if it\nis sterile, as is the case, perhaps, with the anarchists. And then,\nas judgment cannot be formed of a great man during his life, so a\ngeneration cannot in its ephemeral life judge with certainty of the\njustice of an idea, and for that reason it is not proper to inflict so\nradical a punishment on its abettors.\n\n CESARE LOMBROSO.\n\n\n\n\nINNOVATION AND INERTIA IN THE WORLD OF PSYCHOLOGY.\n\n\nI. MISONEISM.\n\nIn the moral world the law which is seen to dominate all the others\nis the law of inertia. This law of inertia is so powerful that even\nafter having been overcome by the friction of ages it always leaves,\neven among beings that have most progressed, traces of its original\noscillation, in survivals, in rudimentary organs, when it is not\nrenewed in all its completeness in certain atavistic forms.\n\n_Inertia in the moral world._\u2014Granting that it were possible and\ndesirable to contest this law in the organic world, it could certainly\nnot be done in the moral world. In fact, although we are thought to\nbe making great progress, yet if we form a graphic chart showing the\nprogress made on the globe, we shall see to what miserable proportions\nit is reduced. It may be said that all Africa, except certain points\nencroached on by the Aryans, Australia, and a good half part of\nAmerica, are almost in the prehistoric state, or at best in the state\nof the great Asiatic empires of the earliest historic epochs. Or\nperhaps (as in South America, Hayti, and Siberia) civilisation has\nonly changed the appearances of primitive life, by substituting for\nimmobility an unstable equilibrium, which is almost worse still.\n\nThe most certain proof of the extension and of the predominance in the\nmoral world of the law of inertia, is the hatred of novelty, so little\nnoticed, which we call Misoneism, and which arises from the effort\nand the repugnance we experience when we have to substitute a new\nsensation for an old one. And this is so common among animals that it\ncan be regarded as a physiological character.\n\nMinds feeble, enfeebled, or primitive in character, show themselves the\nmost susceptible of repugnance to what is novel; it being understood,\nhowever, that it is not a question here of small innovations, such\nas fashion for women, the change from the elliptic to the circular,\ntattooing for savages, and sports for children; for not only have the\nlatter no dread of such changes, but on the contrary they wish heartily\nfor them, as they excite the nervous centres, which require change,\nwithout irritating them, and without causing pain.\n\nBut when the innovation is too radical, it is not merely the savage and\nthe child who repel it with dread; the great majority of men, for whom\nmisoneism is a law of nature, are sensible of a feeling of repugnance,\nas the result of the pain produced by the necessity in which they\nare placed of causing their brains to be traversed by too rapid\ntransitions, a task not within their power, inertia and the repetition\nof movements (individual or atavistic) before performed, being natural\nto ordinary men, as to all animals.\n\n_Misoneism in manners._\u2014This may be seen, for example, in the manners\nand customs of the modern Greeks; notwithstanding the vicissitudes of\ntime, we find in them the ancient Greek.\n\nThe French of the nineteenth century are still in many respects such as\nthey are depicted by Strabo (IV, 4), and by C\u00e6sar (De Bello Gallico,\nIV, 5), lovers of arms and of ostentation, incurably vain, facile of\nspeech, easily carried away by words, and imprudent in their resolves.\n\n_Misoneism in religion._\u2014As much can be said of this in relation\nto religion, literature, and art, where we see misoneism triumph.\nWith respect to religion it can even be affirmed that this is the\ninstitution most completely based on misoneism; to the extent that we\nsee the Christian religion preserve of ancient religions, not only\nmusical harmony (the chant), sacred vestments (the mitre and fibula\nof the Egyptian priests), the scapular and the sandals of the Roman\nplebeian, etc., but also the Mithraic legends in certain dogmas which\nhave relation to the sun, and even to ancient fetichism.\n\n_Misoneism in morality._\u2014The misoneistic instinct, fed by religion,\nmay leave traces profound enough to form a morality _sui generis_, and\nprovoke among savages remorse at having failed in a brutal custom, be\nit ever so repugnant, such as among us is provoked in good men by crime.\n\n_Misoneism in science._\u2014In the domain of science the history of the\nvarious persecutions of men of genius, inventors or reformers, will\nsuffice to prove the terrible influence of misoneism, which is the more\nintolerant and the more fanatical the more ignorant it is; and we need\nonly cite the names of Columbus, of Galileo, and of Salomon de Caus,\nthe first inventor of steam apparatus, who was sent to the Bic\u00eatre by\nRichelieu.\n\n_Misoneism in literature._\u2014Likewise to misoneism we owe, in great\npart, our admiration for old works and ancient ruins, however hideous\nthey may be. Because admired by our fathers and by our forefathers they\nobtain, so to say, a way of entrance into us, to impose themselves on\nour veneration. Thus the Sanscrit language for the Hindoo, the Hebrew\nlanguage for the Jews, and to some extent Latin for many Christian\nEuropeans have become a kind of sacred tongue and linguistic fetich\neven outside the precincts of religious usage.\n\nThe enormous influence of grammarians in imperial Rome, and afterwards\nduring the epoch of decadence, as well as in the middle ages, explains\nalso the persistence of the modern fetichism for grammar, which seems\nabsurd in an age of naturalists and mathematicians.\n\nAnd from thence comes the not less absurd and yet unshakable faith in\nclassicism, rooted deeply even in men worthy of respect, who cause\nus to lose the best years of life in stammering in an almost useless\ntongue.\n\n_Misoneism in politics._\u2014The same may be said with much more fitness\nof many social and political institutions which are thought to be\nmodern and which are only relics of other times; it is for this reason\nonly that they attract the admiration and the respect of the majority\nof people, constituting true conventional lies, as Nordau calls them,\nbut which have their _bourgeois_ believers and apostles.\n\nIn fact, the past is so incorporated in our inward being that even\nthe most refractory of us feel a powerful attraction towards it. Thus\nwe may be as unbelieving as can be wished, and yet at every hour of\nthe day we feel ourselves struck and attracted by the cajoleries of\npriests. We may be lovers of equality, but, as we have already said,\nwe feel a secret veneration for the heirs of our barons. It is in\nvain that the uselessness of certain laws is accepted; he who upholds\nand defends them will meet with the approbation of multitudes, called\nforth by the sole circumstance that the laws have existed. And if\ncivilisation progresses often, it is because it finds in the changes\nof climate, of race, or in the appearance of men of genius or madmen,\ncircumstances which end in combining a great many small movements in\nsuch a manner as to make of them in time a great one. Max Nordau thinks\n(with some exaggeration) that progress is due more to a few enlightened\ndespots than to all revolutionists. But this progress was very slow;\nhe who wished to precipitate it, contravened the physiological nature\nof man; consequently a revolution which is not an evolution, is\npathological and criminal.\n\n_Misoneism in the punishment of crimes against custom._\u2014This is why\nin primitive legislation we see offences against custom constitute the\n_maximum_ of delict, of immorality.\n\n\nII. PHILONEISM.\n\nThis theory of misoneism, previously expounded in my \"Delitto\nPolitico,\" has aroused opposition from all sides; especially in France,\non the part of Bruneti\u00e8re, Proal, Tarde, Joly, and Merlino. \"Children,\"\nsay they, \"women, savages are curious, lovers of novelties, and\nmisoneists are so far from being ignorant that you yourself refer to\nthem as being among the academicians, (these last are still it appears\nin the Latin world admirers of good faith); artists have success\nonly in attempting new paths; all peoples have the love of change;\nthey prove it by their emigrations and by their invasions; the great\ninvasions of the barbarians were an example of it.\"\n\n\"Besides, if there are _misoneists_, there are also _neophiles_, and\nthe one makes up for the other.\"\n\n\"In each of us,\" writes Tarde, \"by the side of habit, a sort of\nphysiological misoneism, exists caprice; by the side of the inclination\nto repeat, the inclination to innovate. The first of these two\nnecessities is fundamental, but the second is the essential, the\n_raison d'\u00eatre_ of the others.\"[73]\n\n [73] _Revue Philosophique_, October, 1890.\n\nIn order to reply to all these objections it is necessary above\nall to be well understood. As to minor innovations, and caprices\nthat satisfy the need of movement of our organs, from the very fact\nthat they are animate, it is certain that we are all very eager for\nthese; in proportion of course to our sex, our age, and our degree of\nintellectual culture. The little child will be happy with a toy, he\nwill experience fear or dread at the sight of a mask, of a large animal\nor even of a small one; I have seen children frightened by a sparrow,\nby a fly. Woman takes pleasure in disguising herself in a striking\nmanner, in wearing new garments in which to attend great plays in the\ntheatres, but she has a horror of new religious rites, and of new\ndiscoveries, to such a degree that a great number still refuse to use\nlinen and knitted work made by machinery; sewing machines themselves\nfind their way among them only very slowly. (Merlino.)\n\nWhen it is claimed (Merlino) that savages love novelties, from the\nfact, related by Ellis, that some of them endeavored to procure Bibles,\n(taking them, perhaps, for playthings,) or arms of which they had seen\nthe useful effects, their nature is misjudged; since even after many\nyears passed in contact with European civilisation, after having worn\nits clothing and ornaments, they return naked to their forests, where\na warm garment would certainly not be an object of embarrassment. To\nbelieve with Cardinal Massaia that they offer themselves voluntarily\nfor vaccination, that they even ask it, is to ignore that even among\nourselves, vaccination encounters a great number of adversaries. Does\nnot Stanley relate that in his last journey, an epidemic of smallpox\nhaving broken out in the camp, many of the porters, although they\nsaw that the vaccinated Zanzibaris did not die, refused to submit to\nvaccination?\n\nAccording to Tarde, the superstitious admiration, the enthusiastic\nveneration by barbarous peoples of various forms of insanity, often\nbaptised as prophetism and saintliness, scarcely accords with the\naversion for novelties, that is to say for singularities, which I\nattribute to them too liberally. But the cause of that admiration is\nnothing else than the fear, the ignorance which leads them to take\na disease for the inspiration of a God. Nevertheless, I am far from\ndenying the influence of madmen in philoneism and in revolutions (as we\nshall see in the sequel of this article); yet if we observe the Santons\nof Africa and their obscenities, we see that it is not for their useful\nand innovating ideas that barbarians venerate madmen.\n\nThe Academician will admire a new species of snail, he will thrill with\njoy at the discovery of a Ph\u0153nician inscription that will enable him\nto learn the name of a tribal chief, he will go into ecstasies before\na greater curvity given to a screw, but he will excommunicate the\ntelephone, the telegraph, the railway, the new laws of Darwin.\n\nThe artist, also, will love to trace a new arabesque, to change to\nblue the prevailing color of the rose, but he will never attempt,\ndirectly, with success, new methods. The hatred by all the elevated\nand academical classes which still besets Zola, Balzac, and Flaubert,\nthe action brought against the last named, and the universal scandals\nraised by De Goncourt, Boito, Rossini, and Verdi, are there to prove\nit. The first, at least, who attempts a new method in painting, in\nliterature, etc., will encounter only hatred and contempt. And when we\nsmile at models unchangeably fixed by Egyptian art, we do not think\nthat the Madonna and the Jesus of our painters have not changed for\neighteen centuries.\n\nHorace wrote:\n\n \"Adeo sanctum est vetus omne poema.\n\n * * * * *\n\n Indignor quicquam reprehendi, non quia crasse\n Compositum, illepideve putetur, sed quia nuper.\"\n\nIt is then not true, as is objected against me in France (_Journal des\nEconomistes_, 1890), that in extending misoneism to the academies, its\ngreatest intensity is excluded from among the ignorant. Each class,\neach caste has a proportionate ignorance, and a repugnance equally\nproportional for that of which it is ignorant. We have demonstrated it\nfor genius itself, which is sublime on certain sides only to be the\nlowest on some others, and we could have a proof of it even in the\nopposition that the most ardent neophiles, the anarchists, make to this\ntheory of misoneism, of which they are thus themselves a confirmation.\n\nBismarck despises parliamentarianism, peace, arbitration, and even the\nLatin, or rather European, alphabet. Flaubert and Rossini had a dread\nof railways. The statesmen who govern Europe are not all geniuses,\nbut they are men not destitute of intellectual culture; and yet how\ncan it be explained that they so strive with ever increasing tenacity\nand zeal to increase armaments and armies, to the extent of causing\nruin to their peoples,\u2014a greater and more complete ruin perhaps, than\nthat which even a disastrous war might occasion? And this for the\npurpose, they declare, (and it seems to be sincere,) of more surely\nescaping war, when as a fact one fourth of the money spent for that end\nwould be sufficient to assure the happiness of the peoples governed\nby affording the social questions which they all pretend to have at\nheart, a solution which, as things now are, it is ever becoming more\ndifficult to reach. The true cause is in the repugnance they experience\nto the idea of starting on a fresh path, in the tendency to adhere to\nold habits which go back even to the epochs of the warrior castes.\nIndeed in the minds of a very great number, at least among the Germans,\na good corporal of the guard is more worthy of consideration than a\ngreat scholar; debate in parliament on the erection of a fortress is\nnot permitted, however costly it may be, whilst every one may speak on\nthe establishment of a school; in France, in Italy, and in Germany,\nto touch the war budget, unproductive and ruinous as it may be, is to\nraise the hand to the ark of the covenant,\u2014a veritable state crime.\nBut science is a new thing, while the art of war goes back to remotest\nantiquity; it descends from Achilles and from Cain.\n\nI was not guilty of a self-contradiction when I said that the modern\nFrench love novelty as much as their ancestors did. I am too much the\nfriend and too fond of the French to flatter them, and not to tell\nthem exactly what I think. France is undeniably at the head of the\nLatin races, but to the same extent, and perhaps more than they, it\nprefers novelties to the new. It has always had the stormy agitations,\nrather than the useful results, of revolutions. The great religious\nreform, Protestantism, touched it without affecting it; the great\nconstitutional reform has taken but slight root, and that two centuries\nand a half after it was accomplished in England.\n\nBalzac wrote: \"In France the provisional is eternal although the French\nare suspected of loving change.\"\n\nNovelties to be accepted by the French must be such as do not interfere\nwith their habits. And it is they who have invented the words\n_routine_, _blague_, and _chauvinism_. It is because they are still in\nthe military period of Spencer. So far as that goes, they have cried\nout beware! to the English, then, beware to the Russians, now beware\nto the Germans and the Italians. They change voluntarily their dress,\ntheir ministers, their external form of government, but always there\nremains in them at bottom a slight attachment to the ancient druidical\nand C\u00e6sarian tendencies. It is not many years since the priest still\ncommanded in Vend\u00e9e. We have seen the French, while extreme republican,\nmake war for the Pope.\n\nAfter having a Fourier and Proudhon and, what is more, universal\nsuffrage, they have not yet a social law which gives satisfaction to\nthe just demands of the indigent, or of workingmen, beyond that of the\n\"probi viri.\"\n\nIt is true that they have had their peasant wars\u2014their Jacquerie\u2014and\n'89; but these were explosions that aroused them but for a moment\nonly to allow them afterwards to fall much lower. Indeed, but a few\ncenturies after the Jacquerie, they saw the same peasants who had\nraised the insurrection, kiss the horses of the couriers who brought\ngood news of the health of the king. And what a king! Louis XV, who\nmight rather be called the executioner, than the administrator of his\npeople. And after having driven away so many C\u00e6sars, little was wanting\nto make them fall again under such a trumpery C\u00e6sar as Boulanger if the\nhighest classes of the capital had not been opposed to it.\n\nMoreover certain particular facts, which portray much better their\nphysiognomy, show how fundamentally conservative they are.\n\nLet us cite for example the veneration exhibited by the high classes\nfor the Academies and the passion for heraldic titles and decorations.\n\"France is academic,\" wrote De Goncourt in _Manette Salomon_.\n\nSarcey relates that during the siege of Paris, the flesh of the animals\nof the Jardin des Plantes, having been put up for sale, the common\npeople preferred to suffer hunger rather than eat of it, so that the\neducated classes alone fed on it.\n\nWe know what resistance the French made, under a thousand pretexts, to\nthe reform of their orthography, which is in part merely the relics of\nthe old pronunciation.\n\nRecently, an engineer at Bordeaux wrote to me, that, on his inventing\nmachinery for the easy transference of merchandise from ships to the\nquays, sturdy opposition was met with on the part of the stevedores of\nthe port, who would have been the first to derive great advantage from\nit.\n\nThe medical faculty at Paris has not only anathematised tartar emetic,\nvaccine, ether, and the antiseptic method, but also the physicians who\nsubstituted the use of horses for the ancient employment of mules to\nexpedite their visits to their patients.[74]\n\n [74] _Revue Scientifique_, 1889.\n\nIs it not in learned Germany that we find Anti-semitism in fashion? And\nhas not Russia made it a law of the state?\n\nIn certain districts of Sicily is not the ancient method still\npreserved of embalming and of painting the bodies of the dead which was\npractised among the ancient Egyptians?\n\nA recent law-suit tried at Turin has proved that not only the lower\nclasses, but also numbers of persons belonging to the higher classes\nprotect themselves by practices that distinctly recall those of the\nsorcerers of antiquity. All this would prove that philoneism is rather\nthe exception than the rule.\n\nIt is objected to my position, that nations and peoples are such\nlovers of change that they have always emigrated. But before making\nthis affirmation, we ought to study the causes which impel them to\nemigration.\n\nDay by day the peasants see their wages decrease; yet even then they do\nnot remove from the land that they love more than themselves, and to\nwhich they are more closely bound than they ever were by feudal laws.\nWhen epidemics produced by the bad quality of cereals, as pellagra\nand acrodynia, when mortal diseases and the most cruel famine destroy\nthem by thousands, then only, and even then not always, do they come\nto a determination; while for many years they keep before them the\nremembrance of their native soil, of that country, which, like a true\nstepmother, gave them only diseases and sufferings.\n\nI have listened to poor emigrants say to me: \"We have only to die! The\nlife that we lead is certain death; and it is for this reason alone\nthat we have determined to emigrate.\"\n\nAs to the invasions of the barbarians, only ill-informed minds can\nbelieve that it was the effect of a sudden movement, of a caprice\nhurrying away masses almost without a reason. On the contrary, all now\nadmit (as was really mentioned in Tacitus, Bk. II., Chap. 2, of the\nAnnals) that it was a very slow movement, already begun three centuries\nbefore Christ, and of which that of the Cimbri, who came from Jutland,\nwas an episode. The crossing of the Baltic was an easy enterprise. The\ninhabitants of the coast had a sufficient number of vessels, and from\nCarlsroon to the nearest ports of Russia and of Pomerania was only a\ndistance of thirty-four leagues.\n\nIf the tribes of Germans, Suevians, and Goths were repulsed from\nItalian soil, they had already taken a firm position on the soil of\nGaul. C\u00e6sar (De Bello Gallico) speaks of Ariovistus and the Suevians\nwhom he met there as his most formidable enemies. They did not appear\nto him as forming an isolated body, detached from Germany; on the\ncontrary, he relates that the Germans time and again forced their way\ninto Gaul. Movements within continued, for even after Augustus we find\nthat the Romans did not always encounter the same peoples in the same\ncountries. This is affirmed by Procopius, Paulus Diaconus, and many\nothers.\n\nLet us recall here that already after the death of Nero, Civilis, who\nwas in the service of Rome, led eight cohorts from his country into\nGaul where he was defeated, but he was able to make an arrangement,\nthanks to which he could settle as an ally at a small distance from the\nborders which he had betrayed (Gibbon).\n\nThe Germans (a people composed of voluntary associations of soldiers,\nalmost savages) being hunters rather than cultivators, were naturally\nobliged to change their residence; we know indeed with what rapidity\nthe game was exhausted, which obliged those who live by it to overrun\nan immense extent of territory and continually to transfer their\nresidence to other places; this is why emigration is in this case the\nresult of the law of inertia, the people not knowing how to replace\na precarious form of existence by one that is more stable. They had\nno towns, but real movable villages that could be compared to those\nof the Arabs of Africa. Like all nomad peoples and hunters, when the\nhope of a conquest shone before them, they abandoned their forests\nand, desiring to reach warmer regions, went from them with their wives\nand children to war. During long years their efforts were impotent,\nbecause until the time of Marcus Aurelius they were divided, precisely\nlike the savages of America, into a great number (40) of small tribes,\ndispersed over an immense territory and enemies of one another; it was,\nconsequently, the more easy to subdue them, the rather that not knowing\nthe use of the breast-plate and but little that of iron and of cavalry,\nthey found themselves powerless against the Roman legions, of whose\ntactics besides they were ignorant.\n\nBut when Rome, at the decadence, commenced to recruit its army with\nGermans, and when less vigilant in guarding the frontiers, she allowed\nGerman families, if not even tribes, to pass the same, she found\nherself in great part disarmed against an enemy who had already set\nfoot against her, bearing her own weapons, and what is worse, who knew\nher treasures, her tactics, and her weaknesses. Under Tiberius even, it\nwas known that the auxiliary soldiers constituted the principal force\nof the Roman armies (nihil validum in exercitibus nisi quod externum);\nat first equal in number to the legionary soldiers, they much exceeded\nthem afterwards, when the citizens evaded military services, and when\nunder Gallienus the Senators were forbidden to command the army. To all\nthese causes can still be added secondary ones.\n\nBefore the historic invasion, emigration had taken place. \"When,\" says\nGibbon, \"a cruel famine befell the Germans, they had no other resource\nthan to send a third or a fourth part of their young men to seek their\nfortune elsewhere.\"\n\nAccording to the national historians, emigration was due to the\ndisproportion between the size of the population and the means of\nsubsistence in the region where they dwelt (Paulus Diaconus): the\nGermans were very prolific. As they were not agriculturists, nothing\nbound them to the soil; pestilence or famine, a victory or a defeat,\nan oracle of the Gods, or the eloquence of a chief sufficed to attract\nthem to the warmer countries of the south. Germany was then much colder\nthan it is at present. (Gibbon.)\n\nThe necessity of fleeing from the domination of a victorious enemy\nforced the Huns towards the west; religious fanaticism drove the nomad\nArabs towards the great Byzantine and Persian empires; religious terror\nurged the Cimbri and the Teutons to throw themselves on the Gauls and\non Italy.[75] Often also the taste for wine and liquors led them to\ninvade rich countries for these gifts of God.\n\n [75] _Revue des deux mondes._ June 11, 1889. Berthollet.\n\nAccording to a legend, doubted by some historians, but accepted by\nothers, among them Cipolla, the descent of the Lombards into Italy\nappears to have been caused by the fact that some of their companions,\nafter having served Narses, conveyed into their country some Italian\nfruits which excited their curiosity.\n\nAll this will suffice to explain the movement we are considering, which\ncommenced slowly among the Northern peoples and afterwards became\nunrestrainable, and to show how the law of inertia was counteracted\namong them.\n\nAnd it is necessary to remark that this need of movement thus begun,\ndid not end with the conquest; but, obeying perfectly the law of\ninertia, according to which a movement being started it continues\nindefinitely if friction does not occur to arrest it, it was continued\nby the crusades, by the Norman invasion of Sicily, and by the epidemics\nof pilgrimage that may be regarded as the continuation of the movement\ntowards the South, begun three centuries before Christ, and become a\nhabit when even the necessity was no longer so great as at other times,\nand when it was even no longer urgent.\n\nHere is still another cause of philoneism; the successive movements\nwhich grow out of those first started.\n\nAs the historians very well observe, Mahomet was a continuation\nof the Judaic Christian revolutionary initiative. \"Mahomet was a\nNazarene, a Jud\u00e6o-Christian. Semitic monotheism regained its rights\nthrough him, and avenged itself for the mythological and polytheistic\ncomplications that Greek genius had introduced into the theology\nof the first disciples of Jesus.\" (Renan.) There is more of this\nin revolutions and still more in rebellions; progress, philoneism,\nfollowing the law of accelerated movement and of the same law of\ninertia, once begun, blindly precipitates itself to opposite excesses,\nthe very thing that causes its ruin. Thus Cromwell in a country almost\nfeudal and ultra-monarchical reached, or rather was driven by his\nparty, to regicide, and to the foundation of a democratic republic in\nwhich the peers were consigned to oblivion and his partisans (of the\nBarebones parliament) went so far as to wish to do away with lawyers\nand universities, to forbid dances, theatrical representations, and\neven Christmas festivities, to mutilate statues on behalf of decency,\nand to burn sacred pictures. (Macaulay.) This led to a reaction which\nunder Charles II. reached absolute power by consent of parliament.\nIn Christianity castration, and even the abolition of property was\nreached. We know the excesses of '89.\n\nPassion explains many of these facts, which proceed even to insanity.\nSt. Paul, from an enemy became an apostle of Christ. Clarendon after\nabandoning himself to despair at seeing his son go over from the\nservice of James to that of William, became a rebel at the end of\nfifteen days. The parliament of James, ultra-monarchical as it was,\nrebelled. The conventional Baudot said: \"There are men who have fever\nfor twenty-four hours. I have had it for ten years.\" \"In the days of\nterrible crises,\" wrote Valbert, \"the law of cause and effect seems\nsuspended, the work is accomplished in an hour. To ask revolution to\nbe wise, is to ask the tempest to break nothing.\"[76]\n\n [76] _Valbert._ _Le centennaire de 1789._ Paris, 1889.\n\n\"In every revolution,\" writes Renan, \"the authors of it are absorbed\nand suppressed by those who succeed them. The first century of the\nHegira saw the extermination of the relations and friends of Mahomet by\nthose who pretended to confiscate for their own profit the revolution\nhe had created. In the Franciscan movement the true friends of Saint\nFran\u00e7ois d'Assisi, were, after a generation, regarded as heretics and\nas dangerous men, and were led to the stake by hundreds.\"\n\nAn idea in the first days of creative activity proceeds with giant\nsteps, and we can say, the movement once begun continues by virtue of\nthe law of inertia always to increase; its originator falls behind, and\nbecomes an obstacle to his own idea which persists in moving forward\nin spite of him. The Ebionites who gave to Christianity its first\nstart became after a century a scandal to the church; their doctrine a\nblasphemy.[77]\n\n [77] Renan. _L'Eglise chr\u00e9tienne._\n\nIt is this very tendency, caused by the arousing of passion, that makes\nall revolutions abortive, that causes them through their own excesses\nto be the authors of their own destruction, and which neutralises or\nmuch decreases the progress made by revolutions.\n\nThe gravest objection against misoneism constitutes, accordingly, the\nstrongest proof of it. Like the plant, the animal, and the stone, man\nremains motionless, unless a disturbance of his state occurs through\nother forces, and through the law of inertia itself, which after having\nat first rendered him immovable afterwards drives him to opposite\nexcess, but to replunge him anew into immobility.\n\nThe most potent cause is that of physical environment, change of\nclimate. Next comes the crossing of one race with another, and it is to\nthis we owe in great part the marvellous productions of Greek art that\narose in Magna Grecia. Then, often, the influence of climate is active,\nto which is owing the transformation of the Jew; so persecutions, and\nthe great calamities which races experience and which determine the\nselection of the strongest. And to this result contribute above all the\nimpulses impressed by geniuses and by mattoids, who, as I have already\npointed out in my work on \"Genius\" alone possess an intense love for\nthe new, for the very reason that their organisation is different from\nthat of other people. The intensity of individual violence and power\nhere unbalances the tendency to immobility; but almost always\u2014and I\nshow it in the work referred to\u2014when that intensity is not favored\nby circumstances, when it does not arise as the final synthesis of\na general desire, a latent and universal necessity, but simply as a\npathological phenomenon, it becomes again valueless, for the very\nreason that it is individual. It is owing to this that the efforts\nof a madman like Cola de Rienzi, and of such geniuses as Alexander,\nNapoleon, Pombal, and Peter the Great, result in nothing. To beneficent\ngeniuses, as Bolivar, the Gracchi, etc., are attributed all the merit\nof revolutions which triumph because they were prepared long before\nby history and by circumstances, and which were only precipitated by\nthem and summed up in them. It suffices to note that the genius of\nGaribaldi, of Cavour, and of Mazzini, has been able to give us nothing\nmore than Italy as it now is, in order to comprehend that in spite of\ngeniuses and, up to a certain point, in spite of circumstances the\nwork of revolution is durable only when the circumstances that have\ncommenced it persist, and men are profoundly modified by it.\n\nHowever, the law of inertia always prevailing, (since primitive\ntendencies always concern it,) these changes are but very slow and, as\nwe have seen, give place to easy relapses; they become fixed and swell\nto new movements only when the causes which provoke them continue and\nbecome more intense.\n\nIn fine, philoneism, progress, also sometimes triumphs\u2014at least with\nthe white race and frequently with the yellow races; but it is not the\nresult of a sudden movement or of a natural human tendency, but the\neffect of external physical forces, whether social, historical or the\nlike, which have caused the law of inertia to change its direction. It\nis therefore the slow result, we might say, of the small and sensible\nvariations peculiar to men according to their condition, added to\ngrander movements, as well as momentarily barren ones, of geniuses and\nforces, and to those more powerful ones of the physical and historical\nenvironment. Of the resulting product we see only the effects, because\nwithout the telescope of history and of sociology we do not perceive\nthe slowness with which they have reached us, and the smallness of the\nefforts which contribute to it. It is thus that we do not imagine that\nthe great Coral Islands can be the work of billions of small zo-ophytes\naccumulated the one on the other during thousands of years. The organic\nkingdom, like the social, is made up of the sum total of slow and small\nefforts.\n\nThe idea of the Christ and that of Buddha, the way for which had been\nprepared for several centuries by other geniuses less fortunate than\nthey, miscarries among the people in which it was conceived, and\nbecomes fruitful elsewhere. But dating from the epoch in which its\nvotaries, nihilists of the reverse type, began to multiply and spread,\nin the lowest and least intelligent strata of society, employing as\narms not violence but gentleness, more than three centuries elapsed\nbefore it was tolerated and officially recognised. For two hundred and\nfifty years the plebeians fought at Rome for their liberty. Yet they\nalways heard the Senators say, \"Your propositions are too novel.\" And\nliberty was granted by the one, and acquired by the others, only soon\nto be lost, first, in anarchy, then under the dictatorship, and then\nunder the empire.\n\nIt is in this sense, that revolutions at the start can be the work\nof a small number, but they represent, they are the sign of a latent\nuniversal sentiment; this is why they grow in direct proportion to time\n(and time is very long) and gain partisans among their own adversaries.\nThe apostles of Christ numbered only twelve, but a hundred and fifty\nyears later, at Rome alone, there were in the catacombs 737 tombs of\nChristians; and Renan calculates that at the time of Commodus 35,000\nChristians existed. We know that Saint Paul himself was one of the\nbitterest adversaries of the Christians.\n\nThe English revolution, up to the time Charles I. sought to cause the\narrest of the four parliamentarians, was anti-republican, and strictly\nroyalist even; but ultimately revolutionary ideas spread throughout\nall England, and the zealous but not blind partisans of the king were\nthe first to turn against him after his excesses and his treasons.\n\nIn the revolution of Flanders, the chief citizens and a great part\nof the nobility, held aloof from the movement for a long period; but\nall possessed in embryo the feeling uttered by the first apostles and\npioneers of the movement. Time, in its slow development, gives rise to\nthe complete expansion of the latent sentiments expressed by misoneism.\n\nFor example let us now transfer ourselves to another field; I wish to\nspeak of the abolition of classical studies. There are perhaps actually\nfive or six of us in Italy who proclaim without fear its absolute\nnecessity; as we were only three when we proclaimed the necessity of\nchanging the penal laws and of bringing them to examine the criminal\nrather than the crime.\n\nThe first statesman who should attempt to carry out our ideas would\nfall amid universal scandal; and yet these very ideas are entertained\nby all who are not blinded by arch\u00e6ological and academic misoneism. But\nthey have not the courage to avow them and still less to realise them.\nIn a few years these ideas will no longer admit even of discussion.\n\nThat is revolution. Let us look, on the other hand, at the ideas of\nthe anarchists; they are in the heads, and unfortunately in the hands\nof certain diseased persons, but they are not in the thought of the\nmajority; consequently all their agitation will be in vain, and result\nonly in isolated commotions and frays.\n\nThat is revolt, insurrection. And let no one say that philoneism and\nprogress are found as proportional reaction to misoneic action, an\noscillation of the pendulum excluding the law of inertia. The pendulum\nitself does not oscillate, but remains perpetually motionless until\nmoved; and its oscillations, even the smallest, are produced the most\noften by external causes entirely accidental. And the law of inertia is\nhere also so constant, that if it did not find in the friction of the\natmosphere a cause of impediment the movement once begun would continue\n_ad infinitum_. So a ball flies and rebounds, when a force propels\nit; and here also if friction did not retard it, it would continue\nforever the motion once commenced. Inertia is the rule, and mutations\nare produced by special external incidents, which being usually less\npersistent, less tenacious, change more the appearance than the\nreality. And these modifications which are very slow and proceed from\nexternal causes, are produced not only among men and among animals, but\nare met with even in the inorganic world; it is thus that the salts\nof copper and of lime, in certain conditions of a warm medium, change\ntheir color but not their nature nor their molecular arrangement, and\nalways give the same chemical reactions.\n\n CESARE LOMBROSO.\n\n\n\n\nTHE QUESTION OF DUALITY OF MIND.\n\n\nIt is certainly conceded by all who come in general estimation within\nthe category of thinkers, that psychology, as formerly studied, without\nbasis in physiology, was most unfruitful, as compared with the modern\nstudy of it upon that basis. It is therefore quite remarkable to find\nin quarters of repute, where psychological problems are discussed, some\ninto which enter, even inferentially, either momentary obliviousness,\nor temporary disregard of truths that are held indisputable by\nmodern thinkers within the lines of the subjects indicated. Yet such\ncontradiction and conflict are found in the constantly recurring\nattempted demonstration of the dual nature of the mind or the soul,\ncall the entity what one will. That man has within his organisation\ntendencies which are relatively higher or lower than others within\nhimself, is not to be disputed; but that such mixture of nature is to\nbe regarded as constituting him of dual mental nature, is a proposition\nuntenable coincidently with the maintenance of the proposition that he\nis in nature physiologically single. It has been maintained lately,\nthat he is physiologically double, but this view has not met with\nany acceptance worthy of the name. In short, it would seem, from all\nthat we know, that in every individual, psychical being must bear\nthe same relation to physiological that the latter does to physical,\nand that they are all interdependent. And if this be true, the same\nrelations must hold good when the physical and physiological nature\ndegenerate into the pathological, and we find by observation that\nthey do hold good. So far, therefore, as the lesson inculcated by\nStevenson's Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde presents to the popular mind\nthe idea of dual mental nature in man, it is false. Viewed from the\nscientific standpoint, the case exhibits nothing more or less than a\nphase of physical, physiological, and psychical action, terminating in\npathological manifestations. Gradually, the physical, physiological,\nand psychical natures suffer, _pari passu_, and the whole being\nexhibits profound retrograde metamorphosis, through the continuous\ndegenerations that have been so often and so ably described by Dr.\nHenry Maudsley, in which all will-power passes away, the whole being\nbecomes involved, and direful death of all higher attributes finally\nensues. That, during the struggle in this decadence between the will\nand the instincts it is natural that it should seem to the outside\nuninstructed view, and even to the individual sufferer himself, that\nthe phenomenon witnessed is evidence of a dual nature of mind, is not\nsurprising; but it is surprising to find any one of the present day who\ndeems himself scientific, implying that the observed changing mental,\nmoral, and bodily manifestations are not witnesses to co-ordinated\nchange; it is surprising that any scientific inquirer should lend the\nslightest countenance to the belief that changed psychical phenomena\nare possible without changed physical and physiological conditions, and\nyet that is what we often see proclaimed through maintenance of the\nproposition of the duality of mental nature.\n\nThe point mentioned belongs to the most flagrantly unscientific view of\nthe relations and effects of the forces in play under the conditions\ndiscussed. But there may be in the inclusive subject-matter of the\nquestion minor points as to which erroneous views are sometimes\npresented to the public as emanating from sources otherwise scientific.\nSuch a one it is my intention to make the principal subject of this\npaper. In the October number of _The Monist_, in the article \"The Magic\nMirror,\" Max Dessoir, the author, says, pages 111 and 112:\n\n \"The theory from which I shall proceed in attempting an\n explanation, has already been frequently touched upon in the\n course of this article; for certain observations indicated it\n so clearly that mention of it was not to be avoided. It is\n the doctrine of the double consciousness of the human soul.\n Acts are done in the course even of our every-day life, which\n presuppose for their origin and execution all the faculties\n of the soul, yet nevertheless occur without the knowledge of\n the individual; they require a sort of consciousness and a\n separate memory beyond the _cognisance_ of the normal person.\n One of the most frequent cases in practical experience is\n where the thoughts of a person reading aloud wander and become\n occupied with an entirely different subject; and where despite\n this aberration the person in question reads correctly with\n the proper emphasis and expression, turns the leaves, and in\n short performs acts which without intelligent control are\n hardly conceivable. An English psychologist, Mr. Barkworth,\n has acquired such expertness in the practice of this, that\n during an animated debate he can rapidly and correctly\n add long columns of figures without having his attention\n diverted in the least. This points not only to an unconscious\n intelligence, but\u2014which is of still greater consequence\u2014to\n an unconscious memory. Mr. Barkworth must keep two series of\n figures in his mind in order to obtain from them a third;\n this latter sum he is again obliged to retain in order to\n add to it a newly acquired fourth; and so on. The latter\n chain of memories, let it be remarked, performs its office\n entirely independently of that upon which the recollection\n of the debate is constructed; and it may therefore be\n reasonably maintained that there exists beyond the cognisance\n of the individual, both consciousness and memory; and if\n the essential components of the ego are found in these two\n last-mentioned factors, then every person conceals within\n himself the germs of a second personality. I designate the\n two halves of consciousness that thus operate in greater or\n less independence of each other,\u2014in a figurative sense of\n course,\u2014as super-and sub-consciousness, and comprehend the\n whole as the doctrine of double consciousness or the double\n ego.\"\n\nNo one will at this late day, it is to be presumed, dispute\nthe existence in the same individual of subconsciousness, as\ncontra-distinguished from superconsciousness; superconsciousness\nbeing that which is more familiarly known as self-consciousness, and\nsubconsciousness as that latent consciousness of which we are not at\nall conscious, and which yet receives impressions which may or may not\nrise soon, late, or at all into the sphere of self-consciousness; an\nimpress which cannot be summed into self-consciousness by an effort\nof will, for the obvious reason that the memory has yet taken no\ncognisance of them. That this subconscious function of the brain is\nsimply a phenomenon dependent upon cell-storage of the brain, the\nproduct of which may or may not ever reach self-consciousness, is\nproved by many circumstances attested by our memory of collated facts\nconcerned in our waking and dream life. Sir Walter Scott, in his\nstory of the \"Tapestried Chamber,\" gives an admirable account of its\nworking under the lead of a sleeper's unconscious cerebration risen\nto self-consciousness, for let it be here parenthetically noted that\nit is absurd, as is sometimes attempted, to rule dream-thoughts out of\nthe realm of self-consciousness, the individuality of the dreamer never\nbeing lost, however modified the mental and moral ideation of that\nindividuality may be.\n\nBut Max Dessoir evidently confounds subconsciousness with unconscious\ncerebration. He makes subconsciousness, in the intellection described,\na primary factor in execution. Now subconsciousness is the mere\ntablet, as it were, upon which impressions are made, and unconscious\ncerebration that faculty of the brain which, without immediate, and\nperchance future, cognisance of self-consciousness, may evolve from all\nbrain-impressions, whether subconsciously or self-consciously received,\nthought of which not even the individual himself becomes aware that\nhe is the possessor until it is presented to him as a free gift. This\nproceeds during sleep as well as during waking, sometimes anticipating,\ncoincidently with waking, the routine subject of thought for the\nday. It sometimes in sleep, as well as in waking moments, presents\nitself with the startling effect of a revelation. Subconsciousness,\ntherefore, is a condition of passivity, and unconscious cerebration one\nof activity, although, of course, of even unknown existence unless a\nproduct of it reaches self-consciousness. They are not to be crudely\nconceived of as different manifestations of the same thing, any more\nthan an emotion is to be thought of as another aspect of the sensation\nwhich produced it, the emotion being qualitatively an entirely new\ndeparture from the sensation. Both sensation and emotion represent\nconditions of activity, whereas, so far as self-consciousness is equal\nto differentiating them, subconsciousness and unconscious cerebration\nrespectively represent passivity and activity.\n\nBut the admission of the coexistence in the same individual of\nunconscious cerebration with self-consciousness does not involve the\nconcession of the existence of dual mentality, any more than recognised\npossession of striped and unstriped, voluntary and involuntary\nmuscle, involves the concession that man is physically dual in\nmechanical motive power. Yet it is upon the basis of the recognised\ncoexistence of double consciousness in man that Max Dessoir reaches\nthe conclusion that, figuratively speaking, as he says, there is a\ndouble ego, by means of whose duplex action different mental processes\nare simultaneously carried forward. Now, neither figuratively nor\notherwise, as should be clearly apparent from what has been said,\nis there in man a double ego. For although while there is life\nsubconsciousness must exist, and unconscious cerebration proceed,\nnothing is more open to observation than that subconsciousness and\nunconscious cerebration, although always present, do not always rise\ninto the sphere of self-consciousness. That, during self-conscious\nactivity of thought on a particular subject, if continued for a long\ntime, subconsciousness may, through unconscious cerebration, in a\nmeasure yield tribute to self-conscious thought is undeniable, for\nwe see their effect sometimes visible in the sudden inspiration of\nthe orator and the writer, but that they are factors in ordinary\nthought-evolution, for immediate use, within very limited spaces of\ntime, is impossible, for we by definition limit subconsciousness\nand unconscious cerebration to pure unguided automatism, while to\nself-consciousness we concede the direction of all automatic processes\nthat represent conceptions of the mind. Obviously, to imagine that we\ndirect that which may or may not appear at all in the sensorium, to\nbe directed, and which from its nature, as known from observation,\nis not likely to appear within moderate time-limits of special\nthought-evolution, is inadmissible, involving the assertion of two\ncontradictory propositions, for, as matter of experience, we know that\nthe product of unconscious cerebration, even when it appears clearly\nrecognisable as such, seldom manifests itself before the lapse of a few\nhours.\n\nThe simple and complete explanation of the phenomenon observed, in\nwhat are deemed simultaneous mental processes, is that they are not\nabsolutely simultaneous. The best illustration that can be given of\nthe manner in which they take place is afforded by the system known as\nsynchronous multiple telegraphy, in which, by means of an admirable\napparatus, points on discs, representing makes and breaks of electric\ncurrent, are, at stations distant from each other, adjusted to\nsynchronous relations with each other, by means of electro-magnetic\nagency, tuning-forks, and self-adjusting varying resistances to\nthe currents, so that receiving and transmitting proceeds with a\ncontinuousness just short of perfect continuity. I am not attempting\nto liken the rapidity of thought to that of electricity, even\nwhen electricity is embarrassed and slowed by mechanism of man's\nconstruction; but otherwise the analogy between so-called simultaneous\nmental processes and the results obtained from so-called synchronous\nmultiple telegraphy, is as perfect as any analogy can be. Thus the\nmake and break impulses of the will direct the self-conscious flow\nof nerve-force in receiving and transmitting impulses of almost\nsynchronous time upon various subject-matter successively taken up\nand dropped. The thought for each is not simultaneous, nor of equal\nduration, but so nearly simultaneous as to appear so, and of duration\nsufficient for its task. The individual thought-times are not,\ntherefore, represented, as in the telegraphic instrument described,\nby equal spaces of time, but bear due relations to the respective\ndifficulties of the subject-matter almost synchronously attacked. It is\nself-conscious thought that is here involved, whether in sleeping or\nwaking, that is, will-directed thought, for even in sleep we observe\nthe will as imperfectly directing; striving, however, always to direct.\nAs has been admitted, if the process of self-conscious cerebration\nlast over a long space of time, it is possible that some fragment\nderived from unconscious cerebration may contribute to the grand\ntotal of primary flow. This, however, is not of normal occurrence,\nseeing that unconscious cerebration often deals with matter entirely\nalien to present self-conscious mental occupation. The fruits of\nsuch cerebration are therefore impossible to be counted upon, and\ntherefore cannot be insisted upon as proving from the experience cited\nby Max Dessoir the existence, even figuratively speaking, of double\nconsciousness construed as forming with self-consciousness a double\nself; while the well-known action of subconsciousness, unconscious\ncerebration, and conscious cerebration, as related to one another,\namply explain all the phenomena in waking, sleep, and even in hypnotism\nif we include in that hysteric diathesis.\n\nWhen, in abstraction, in wrapt attention to a single idea, we are\ncarried past the door at which we had intended to stop, or continue to\nread aloud, unobservantly of the sense of words, or otherwise betray\nthat we are buried deep in one absorbing thought; it is not, in the\nfirst case, that our automaton has unwontedly borne us along, or in the\nsecond, that we are not permitting it to take a partial holiday, for\nit is our automaton that serves our commonest daily needs; but only\nthat we have, in the first case, forgotten to arrest its movements in\ndue time, and in the second, have not thought it worth while to do so;\nfor when decrepitude overtakes us, and our automaton, sharing in the\nmisfortune, toils wearily along, or requires intense purposiveness for\nspecial brain-accomplishment, ideation can no longer afford to give to\nit its former liberty, but dwells in concentration on a single action;\nunless, indeed, when that still lower grade is reached, when the\nautomatic man is almost all that remains, and ideation but the fitful\nglow that may start to futile movement the once efficient mechanism\nof the human frame. By easy stages, receptivity and communicability,\never lowering in degree, in quantity, and in quality, may dwindle\nto a single point, and movement be but faint automatic habit; the\nformer high being now occupying the opposite extreme from rapid\nthought-transmission and receipt, and bodily response to ideation, upon\nthe basis of life's whole energised experience.\n\nMax Dessoir remarks, in a passage shortly following the one already\nquoted at length:\n\n \"Closer investigation teaches further, that in dreams, states\n of intoxication, in somnambulistic and epileptic attacks,\n not only does a consciousness different from the normal\n consciousness rule, but that also between successive periods\n memory-links of greater or less stability are wont to form.\"\n\nAs to the greater or less closeness, as well as greater or less\nstability, of the memory-links to which Max Dessoir refers, there\ncan be no dispute; but it is demonstrable that sleeping and waking\nconsciousness of both kinds exactly correspond. The difference\nobservable in waking and dream thought-evolution does not chiefly\nrelate to modified consciousness, but to modified conscientiousness;\nthe defect in both being the necessary consequence of temporary\nabeyance of normal co-ordination between the nerve-centres.\nDeterminately directed thought, which is necessarily waking thought,\nproceeds upon the basis of memorabilia that are the cash in hand\nof the kind of currency that is temporarily available for logical\ntransactions; while in sleep, conscious cerebration only partially\ncontrols its treasures, and often regretfully sees them squandered\nbefore its face. Determinately directed thought is necessarily derived\nfrom the will, unless one believes with Lord Kames, that thought\npreserves unbroken heredity; in which case the ego becomes only the\nwitness through life of pure automatism\u2014a position which is easily\nrefuted. The will directs the thought upon the basis of cognate\nmemorabilia, be the channels many or few, by means of semi-synchronous,\nrotative attention.\n\nThe great lapse of time during which the action of subconsciousness may\nremain unrevealed until, through unconscious cerebration, it reaches\nself-consciousness, through the medium of recognition of a particular\nevent as of actual occurrence, and how, finally, this recognition,\nas true, of a particular event, may be restricted for a while to the\ncondition of sleep, and after a long period of incubation at last rise\nto waking knowledge, is so admirably exemplified by an experience of my\nown that I here put it on record.\n\nAbout five years ago I had a dream of a landscape, where there were\nrocky escarpments partially covered with trees, with a plain as\nforeground, upon which a carriage drew up to take me home after a\nday's topographical surveying. Both in dreaming and upon awaking I was\nvividly impressed with the idea that the place was one in which the\ntopography remained to be finished by me. But when awake, I fruitlessly\nwent over in memory all parts of the coast where I had ever executed\ntopographical surveys, and where by any chance, at any time, I could\nhave left unfinished anything that I was in duty bound to finish. Some\ntime elapsed, and I had the same dream again. Coming at once to the\nconclusion that, if I should dream it a third time, I should be told\n(as I should be, if I mentioned it at the second to any indifferent\nperson) that I had dreamed that I dreamed it, I at once described in\ndetail to a member of my family the landscape, the rocks, the trees,\nthe plain, and the coming of the carriage, and requested that all\nthese be memorised. Some months again passed, and the dream in all its\nvividness recurred, and was repeated to the same person, agreeing as\nto its details with those introduced in the recital of the preceding\nones.\n\nI never had from the first a doubt that the dream had a foundation in\nsome one concrete fact, but from the lapse of time without a solution\nof it being afforded, I was all but hopeless that its subject-matter\nwould ever rise into the sphere of full waking knowledge. However, at\nmoderate intervals I dreamt it again and again, each time simply saying\nto my confidant, \"I have had that dream again,\" and at length, without\nany special effort directed to its solution, that which had heretofore\neluded all efforts to explain, was presented solved.\n\nThe uncomfortableness of the dream, it is to be borne in mind, lay in\nthe impression, although contradicted by memory, that I had neglected\nto finish some piece of topography which it was my duty to finish.\nHence the direction of self-conscious thought towards its solution had\nalways been wrong. There was no piece of work of any kind that I had\never neglected to finish. There was, however, a piece of topographical\nwork, which, when I was about to finish it, I was prevented from\ncompleting by orders taking me away from the locality to another\nfar distant. The whole tract originally intended to be executed in\ntopography was of about one hundred square miles, a tract of much\ngeological as well as topographical interest, over a portion of which\nI had been accompanied two or three times by Prof. James D. Dana, who\nwas deeply interested in the execution of the topography, on account\nof his development from it of the minute geological characteristics of\nthe region. At one boundary of the area mentioned there was a ridge\nand summit of some nine hundred feet in height, densely covered with\na stunted growth of trees. How to get the contours of this ridge by\nsome original plan I had been obliged in advance to settle in my mind,\nfor on the ridge itself nothing could, on account of the dense growth,\nbe seen for any great distance, and over it no roads passed. I had\nconcluded to have simultaneous horizontal and vertical angles taken to\nstaffs, from a line of foot-hills lying parallel with the ridge, when\nI was ordered to Florida to make there a survey. This was succeeded by\nsurveys in other far-distant localities during successive years. Not,\nhowever, as it appears, until seven years after leaving the locality\nintimately described, did the first dream related to it take place, and\nnot until rather more than two years thereafter did its repetitions\ncease with its solution. I said to my confidant when, about three years\nago, that solution was reached, \"I shall never have that dream again,\"\nand it has never since appeared; as why should it, the mystery with\nwhich the unco\u00f6rdinated ego struggled being solved?\n\nWe can readily comprehend, from such an experience as this, how it has\nbeen possible, as we have learned from well authenticated cases, for a\nperson to lead two somewhat independent thought-lives. What, however,\nis clearly shown by it is the possibility, for it has been proved,\nof subconscious record remaining for years dormant, proceeding at\nlast through unconscious cerebration to reach conscious cerebration,\nbut even then conscious cerebration only during sleep, until finally\nconscious cerebration of waking moments being reached, the judgment\nseat of co-ordinated faculties, the dream departs, no longer abusing\nthe curtained sleeper, nor ghost-like rising to disturb his waking\nself-consciousness.\n\n R. MEADE BACHE.\n\n\n\n\nIMMORTALITY.\n\n\nIf you sit down in the quiet of your own room and calmly ask yourself\nwhat it is in reference to a life after death that you really desire\nand what you may reasonably expect, you will probably be surprised to\nfind what a blank your mind is upon the subject. I doubt if you will\nfind that you inwardly desire it, in the same manner, for example, that\nyou desire wealth, or fame, or beauty. You have grown up in the belief\nthat it is right to desire and believe, but that, you know, is quite a\ndifferent affair from actual yearning.\n\nNearly every one puts the thought aside as beyond solution. One\nsays, \"My thinking will not change the fact nor my longing bring it\nabout. The duty of the passing day is all I can fulfil.\" Under this\ncover of postponed examination the world has grown as indifferent to\nthe question as it was formerly engrossed by it. Fear of offending\ndelicate sensibilities and established beliefs keeps the doubter and\nmodifier silent; whilst the extreme of the omnivorous believer is set\nover against the out-and-out denier. But the great majority of people\nare neither believers nor disbelievers, but indifferentists\u2014slowly\nsettling toward an agnostic non-committalism that is destructive of all\nintellectual and moral earnestness.\n\nIt is my conviction that this abrogation of curiosity and examination\nis a most culpable and dangerous fact. If we live after death it is\nof tremendous importance; if we do not it is of no less vital import,\nand the belief, the disbelief, or the evasion is of the most constant\ninfluence, unconsciously, subtly, upon every thought and act of every\nday's living.\n\nSuppose now we divest ourselves of the creeps and shudders usually\naccompanying a discussion of death and immortality, and fearlessly test\nthe common dogma with a little analysis in the light of scientific\nresearch and reason. Let us suppose you are a believer: what is it you\nbelieve? You desire: what is it you desire, and how far is your desire\nfeasible? You are convinced: but what is the truth? If possible, in\nwhat way and to what extent is a future life possible? If attainable,\nby whom and by what means? Moreover, the _kind_ of belief makes all the\ndifference in the world. I have read somewhere about an African chief\nwho killed his wife's lover, and was defeated at last by his wife's\nunswerving belief in immortality, she committing suicide in order to\njoin her lover. But the chief was equal to the emergency and he in\nturn killed himself in order to follow the pair and break up their\nt\u00eate-\u00e0-t\u00eates in the other world! It all depends upon what you propose\ndoing with a future life after you get it. You might just as well be\ndigging clams on this earth as \"singing Hosannas around the throne\" in\nheaven.\n\nDo you believe in or fervently desire what, with splendid bravery and\n_abandon_ the old creed called \"the resurrection of the body\"? Terrible\ncounter-queries arise: At what age in your life would you choose as\nbest representing the ideal body for your resurrection? Would you\nprefer your body as it was when you were a child, when youthful, when\nmature, or when old? Moreover, it is changing every minute, this body.\nIt is estimated that something like five million blood-corpuscles\ndie every second of your life. Even the two or three pounds of\nminerals in one's bones are only a little more permanently fixed. All\ncomponent parts are undergoing change every instant: they soon become\ngrass, grain, or tree, passing again into others' bodies, and so on\nforever. Is it the form and feature you desire to preserve and not the\nconstituent particles? But form and feature change every day or year,\nand are as impossible to fix as the atoms themselves. Indeed, is not\nthe whole matter put beyond choice by the evident fact that unless by\nthe fiat of an extramundane deity the only moment possible to fix the\nbodily form in the mould of eternity would be the death-moment? And\nyet this were the most undesirable of all seasons, since at that hour\nthe body is in the weakest, most useless, and most wretched condition\nof all the hours it has served us. Supposing therefore, that you are\nso in love with your own body that you would wish to call it into\nlife again and for forever, we see at once that no moment or phase of\ndevelopment could be chosen, except perhaps the dying moment, the least\ndesirable of all, and that the particles of one's body have served\ntheir turn in myriad other bodies each having an equally valid claim to\nhis \"property.\" Besides this the absurdity of the whole is emphasised\nby the crushing fact that all the organic matter of the world has been\nused over and over for bodies and the earth has not enough hydrocarbons\nto fit out again with bodies a small fraction of the souls that have\nlived upon it. Doubtless the combined weight of all the organic bodies\nthat have lived on the earth would be many times the total weight\nof the globe including its minerals, elements, and gases. It may be\nfrankly admitted that no bodily resurrection is possible.\n\nAnd it is as certainly undesirable. The old dogma was the crudest\nmaterialism, wholly unworthy of the credence of those who pretended to\nbelieve that God was a spirit, and that they were his children. The\nbelief in bodily resurrection was a natural concomitant of the age\nof sensualism before the mind and spirit had risen to their modern\nheritage. The desire for such a resurrection stamps the person with\na self-confessed imperfection of mental and moral development. The\nimpossibility of such a resurrection is one of many proofs that life\nis no sensualist at heart and that ideality is the final outcome, the\ntrend of actuality. Nature compels us to take wings though the sluggish\nPsyche lingers lovingly in the pretty little cocoon of materiality she\nhas built about herself.\n\nIs it perhaps your understanding, reason, or intellect that you\ndesire to perpetuate forever? Frankly, now, are you so in love with\nyour mental outfit? In your more modest and sane hours are you not\nsadly conscious how very imperfect it is? While we are young and very\nconceited we may be filled with self-satisfaction and trust in our own\njudgment, but as the years drag by, we, looking back over the past,\ngrow more and more conscious that our intellect is not to be trusted.\nThink of the interminable series of blunders of which your life is the\nrecord! How poorly you have misjudged people and circumstances! How\nyour reason has fooled you many times and again! How many illusions and\ndelusions you have lived through! With what sad clearness you now see\nyour former stupidities, and with what blindness you fail to see your\npresent ones! Looking about you, you find others equally as gifted as\nyourself holding your opinions as loathsome. Looking above you, you\nsee the most intellectual and the most educated diametrically opposed\nin their opinions of God, man, and nature. Two great men, two brothers\nlearned and trained in dialectic and logic, soon grow apart. One\nbecomes a cardinal of the Romish church, accepting papal infallibility\nand a thousand such absurdities, the other as firmly convinced that\nthe fallacies of the English church are God's gospel. Looking below\nyou, you see the great mass of men wrecking their minds and lives\nupon a thousand outrageous beliefs and prejudices. There is no sadder\nspectacle in the world than this that the people love error. But each\none with imperturbable conceit is convinced that he sees better and\nplainer than another. Every partisan democrat or republican has no\nsort of doubt that he is right about every financial or governmental\nmeasure, though he has never studied finance, history, or political\neconomy five minutes. He does not dream that he is a dupe of the lousy\npoliticians and of his own _lack_ of intellect. All history is a tangle\nof such poverty-stricken intellection. One can but be amazed at the\nproneness of everybody to see things and do things every way but the\nright way. And this is the kind of a mental equipment you would stamp\nwith the seal of eternity!\n\nPossibly you may protest that it is a more perfect and purified\nintellect that you wish. Ah, yes, but that would not be your intellect.\nYou want to be made over, made into another person. That would not be\nyour immortality but that of another. That would imply that it is pure\nintellect and perfect, in the abstract, that you are interested in.\nHave you shown much interest in that sort of intellect in the past?\nIf you wish such an immortality of a perfected intellect you must\ncertainly possess it before it can be made everlasting.\n\nPerhaps, again, you will say that it is the ever-progressive\never-growing intellect you desire. This is subterfuge. That is not\nwhat you wish but what you would take in default of your first choice.\nLessing said that if God held out to him absolute truth in one hand\nand in the other the everlasting search for truth he would choose the\nlatter. But the condition of everlasting search would be the condition\nof everlasting imperfection of intellect. Lessing's choice seems to me\nimpious.\n\nI therefore conclude, that at heart you do not wish to eternalise your\ncrude imperfect intellect, and that the sole method of getting an\nexalted and perfected intellect is to cultivate it here and now. Have\nyou in the past obeyed reason and not passion or self-interest? Have\nyou studied logic, history, and science with a sincere desire to do\nyour political and social duty, and to free yourself from prejudice,\nerror, superstition, and conceit? If not why should God suddenly endow\nyou with a perfect intellect ready-made? Is it God's way in this world,\nto give excellencies unasked and unearned? Rest assured he will not do\nit at your dying hour. It is no particular merit in you to die; why\nshould you be rewarded with a new intellect then?\n\nOr, again, you may say that it is not so much your intellect that\nyou wish to make immortal as it is your emotional nature, affection,\netc. Love and friendship, you complain, are cut off by death and\nthe tendrils of the heart die because they find nothing to cling to\nor rest upon. You would like to renew beyond the grave the love and\nsympathy that has made the earth-life endurable, and even beautiful.\nNow is this, in very truth, just so? Are you really satisfied with\nyour devotion and love? Have not your outgoings of the heart been\nquite fickle, illogical, selfish, and calculating? Has not your love\nand gratitude been often a lively sense of benefits to come? Has your\nlove to woman not been of the \"Kreutzer-Sonata\" type, a little better\nand more subtly-concealed perhaps, but at heart the same? If you are\na woman have you been seeking to get or to give love, and has your\nlittle affection been but payment for protection and a home? Have you\nchosen true and noble friends and been true and noble to them? Has your\ncharity been but alms-giving without kind sympathy and helpfulness?\nHave you as married folk, perhaps, been, as the cant phrase has it,\n\"devoted to each other,\" but oblivious of the duty of affection toward\nthe rest of the world,\u2014grinning examples of _\u00e9goisme \u00e0 deux_? Is your\nfamily a fetich, an enlarged sort of selfishness? Do you at heart care\nmuch for anybody except your own precious self? And a too exclusive\nlove, even of the purest type may be sin in God's eyes. If you bind all\nyour affection upon one weak life you risk a precious value upon too\nsingle and narrow an object, and deprive others of the sympathy that\nneed it more. \"Just wrapt up in one,\" as the sentimental jargon has\nit, is often if not always a pleasant way of great sin. Affection may\nbecome morbid\u2014a disease, quite as well as any abuse or exaggeration of\nany other characteristic.\n\nI take it that they who are the most satisfied with the strength,\npurity, and constancy of their love and emotional nature are precisely\nthey that have neither actual strength, purity, and constancy\nof sentiment, and are thus accurately they that should not have\nimmortality.\n\nLastly, if neither body, intellect, nor the affectional nature are\nsuch as you wish made eternal, are you any better contented with your\nmoral nature? The question at once raises a smile. The feeling of our\nown ethical unworthiness has crystallised into the great Christian\ndogma of Christ's vicarious sacrifice. In the words of the old hymn,\n\"Jesus died and paid it all, all the debt I owe.\" No man hoped to get\nto heaven on his own merits. Much of the zeal of religion has consisted\nin the joy of the belief that by a sleight-of-hand trick, a big sponge\nof forgiveness was wiped over the ethical debit and credit account by\nthe lachrymose deity, whose occupation, as Heine said, was to forgive.\nHistory is one long monotonous list of man's sins and inhumanities. I\nthink it probable that you will not urge the ethical aspect; I would\nleave that plea aside. We all know that we are very much like a lot\nof pigs, each after the most and best corn and the warmest bed. The\namazing immorality of trying to get to heaven on another's merits was\nthe most brazen example of how little heavenliness there was in the\nheaven-hunters and heaven-scalers. Of course the desire for heaven\nitself, the desire for one's happiness was immoral when conditioned\nupon the misery of others. Nature in this respect is better than man,\ndenying him his childish materialistic desires and forcing him to wait\nfor immortality until he can learn to live in the spirit and seek no\nselfish heaven.\n\nJust as the body is ever changing, and it is impossible to seize\nupon any hour when we could eternalise it, except at the undesirable\ndeath-hour, so it is the same in reference to intellect, love, and\nmorality. There are no two days in life when we are the same. As\nto intellect we have little before adult life is reached, and most\npeople have little after fifty or sixty years. It is proverbial\nthat no one changes his opinion after that age, but lives on old\nprejudices and ideas. The mental powers get into ruts and habits, true\nreason being abrogated. As to love we laugh at our fickleness, and\nour habits and ideals of friendship get sordid as each year strips\noff the freedom and expansiveness of youth and the dear cold ghost\nof self is more exclusively worshipped. And our ethical standards\nchange with each day's passing. We have at every hour to clutch\nourselves by the throat and cry, \"Stay! Who art thou?\" And lo! while\nwe ask our protean self the question, we have become another. We seek\nperpetuity of existence for something ever becoming other. We seek\npersonal identity after death, but we have no personal identity before\ndeath: how then can we have it afterward? Do you not see that what\nmakes you recognisable, different from other individuals, and what\nwould make personal immortality possible depends upon the accidents\nof organisation,\u2014depends firstly upon the bodily peculiarity, and\nsecondly upon imperfections of mind that you do not wish to perpetuate?\nTwins sometimes wear a knot of ribbon as a signal whereby their friends\nmay recognise them. Our faces and bodies are but such little symbols\nor signals that our souls have hung out for the day. Divest your best\nfriend of his body and would you recognise him? Have you ever thought\nhow the photograph of your friend's soul would look? If bodily form\nand imperfections make up the most of what we call individuality it\nbecomes evident that in casting off imperfection we become less narrow,\nless individual. As you become freed from the cramping littleness of\nself-love and the bonds of self-gratification, as you rise into the\nlife of the spirit, you find yourself less individual. One fitted for\na true heaven would not care for the old immortality. What is good\nto carry over into the future life is not so much personal identity\nas personal non-identity, not so much the imperfections that make\nus individuals as the perfections that free us from individualism.\nWe must lose our life to find it. We have overestimated the value\nof individuality. Self-consciousness has become hypertrophied, and\nthe summum bonum of life is held to be the preservation of a little\npuckered-up individuality. This over-development of individualism is\ndoubtless due to the fierce struggle man has had to elevate himself out\nof savagery. It has been possible only through excessive carefulness\nand love of the ego. The struggle for existence is now taking on\nclass and corporate characteristics so that the common weal is an\nideal quite as much as individual satisfaction and safety. Hence\nthe exaggeration of personality may now return to something like a\nhealthy normalism. As a natural outgrowth and consequence of this\nover-development of the individual consciousness, there came the absurd\nattempt to carry over into the after-life the same sort of existence\nthat had been developed here,\u2014consisting in a neglect of the actual\nworld of one's descendants, an ignoring of death that ends the body\nand products of organisation, and a failure to see that a future life\nafter death must be a life of the spirit, of perfections, and of the\ncommon life, not of peculiarities and imperfections. If this seems an\naery height and a too rare air it argues against your preparation for\nthe only desirable as well as the only possible kind of immortality.\nIt argues against you just in the same way that your horror of death\ndoes. It is only participation in the divine life of the spirit that\ncan see death as right and good. Death comes to shatter our baseless\ntrust in the evanescent physical and teach us dependence upon the\neverlasting spiritual. They dread death whose life is of the physical\ntype. God never gave to man a greater blessing, after life itself,\nthan death, and nothing more strikingly proves the divine government\nof the world than the certainty of its coming to us all. If death is\nyour enemy, life is not your friend. The brutal attempt to ignore the\nfact, the belief that the body with its pack of heathenish appetites\nand needs could push through death and come out fresh and renewed\non the other side is the very insanity of individualism and the\nintoxication of materialism. The mourning, shudder, gloom, and horror\nof death,\u2014God-sent if anything is\u2014is practical pessimism and reckless\natheism. Death's one lesson is that we must love and cultivate what he\ncannot touch. One who has lived a life of kindness and spirituality\nhas no horror of death, and to him it has little mystery. But to him\nwhose divinity has been self and whose religion the worship of his\nphysiological senses, death must be the ugliest of enemies who is to\nrob him of his all. Did you ever notice how life is plastic and free\nwhen first fashioning for itself a body? \"All heaven lies about us in\nour infancy.\" In youth we are unselfish, aspiring, and noble. As the\nyears go by the power of the organisation, the material grows, and\nlimits more and more the freedom of the spirit. Frankenstein turns upon\nits maker. With age men get narrow, cold, calculating; women snakey,\nscheming, cruel. The soul finds itself more and more the slave instead\nof the master, and by and by when the slavery becomes unendurable, it\ntakes flight, and this you call death. It is the body's reward for\ninsubordination. I think we deserve little sympathy for dying. Most of\nus have well-merited death before it comes\u2014I speak, of course only\nof the death of those in life's afternoon. Few keep the young life\npliant and free beyond the age of fifty. If people could see that\nlife is the maker and moulder of organisation, and if they would seek\nimmortality upon earth, I believe men might come to live a hundred\nyears. Trees learn to live thousands of years, but they keep youth,\nand spring, and trust, and love, forever nestling with the birds among\nthe rejuvenescent leaves of spring. We die not because the body is\nweak, but because it has become too strong. We die because there is no\nreal continuance and strength in anything but the non-physical, and\nwe have trusted in the physical. Matter without free life is inert,\nmoved only from without: the dead body is simply matter without life.\nIt is not the blacksmith's arm that is strong: without nerve-force it\ncannot raise an ounce, cannot raise itself. Whence the nerve-force?\nFrom the ganglionic gray cells of the spinal cord and brain. And whence\nthese little gray cells? The dear stupid physiologist has now reached\nhis limit, and you can confidently answer for him that it was Life\ncreated these things, Life that existed before muscles, nerves, and\ncells, and that slowly fashioned them; Life, an order of existence\nin no imaginable way analogous to, or to be confounded with matter\nor mechanics. There is in the history of thought no more ludicrous\nand dismal failure than the attempt to explain life in terms of\nmechanics. The hope of the materialist that science would prove his\nprejudice is torn to tatters. The children of the spirit are amazed\nat the bat-blind inability to see the fact,\u2014to see that life is more\ncertain and enduring than matter, soul than sense. The organs of the\nbody are changed, diseased, die; the body itself dies; generations\nof bodies die, but like a containing cord of silk, on which all the\nglittering beads of flesh are strung, there is the soul, the life,\never the same, persisting unchanged through all change, giving unity\nto diversity, moulding, making, discarding, choosing, healing, working\nto far-away ends with blind, and dead, and obstinate materials. You\nlove the flesh over-much and jealous life says to you, \"Take it then,\nthis so loved and wondrous flesh; me you have not loved,\"\u2014and lo! the\ndead body, useless, decaying, lies before you. Let no materialistic\nmisreading of science hoodwink you into any blurring of the outlines\nbetween matter and life.[78] The two are as far apart as heaven and\nearth, are as dissimilar as thought can conceive,\u2014perhaps in a final\nanalysis, are the only two things of the universe. There is no fact\nof science showing the faintest warrant for confounding the two. Even\nHuxley calls materialism the most baseless of all dogmas. It will\nprobably be found that there is but one element, of which all others\nare duplications and combinations, atoms being but centres of force.\nBut life is irresolvable into any form of matter or mechanical energy.\nIt is not only unthinkable that matter could originate life, but it\nis demonstrably absurd. No scientist to-day believes in spontaneous\ngeneration. _Omne vivum ex vivo_ is an axiom. The plant has no nervous\nsystem and yet has every physiological function possessed by the human\nbody. It has contractility, irritability, respiration, anabolism,\ncatabolism, and reproductivity,\u2014that is, it has spontaneous movement,\nit responds to stimulation, it breathes, it assimilates, it excretes,\nit begets its like,\u2014and physiologically this is all you can do. Nay,\nmore than this, even a drop of the jelly-like protoplasm that makes\nup the basis of all cell-structures, animal or vegetable, has also\nall of these qualities or powers.[79] There are bundles of wholly\nstructureless, unorganised jelly that exhibit these capacities in a\nwonderful degree. There is, for instance, _Hydra viridis_, that has\nno eyes and yet sees, no brain or nerves and yet lies in wait for\nprey, pursues and fights, or flees from danger. Turned inside out it\nlives and digests its food as well as before. It holds live worms\ndown with an improvised arm when they try to get out of its stomach.\nAny part reproduces all. Cut off the bottom of its stomach and it\ngoes on eating, quite untroubled by the little accident,\u2014and so\non. A great, wise, blind man has defined evolution, or life, as the\nintegration of matter and the dissipation of motion during which the\nmatter passes from an indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a definite\ncoherent heterogeneity, and during which the motion undergoes a\nparallel transformation. Some one else improved upon this by saying\nthat it was \"a change from a no-howish, untalkaboutable all-alikeness,\nto a some-howish and in general talkaboutable not-all-alikeness, by\ncontinuous something-elsifications and all-togetherations.\" Schelling\nsaid that life was the tendency to individuation. But the crystal or\nthe planet shows that, and they are not living. As the hand cannot\ngrasp itself, neither can life define itself. All definitions I have\nseen miss the essential and primal characteristics of spontaneous\nmovement. But all definitions begin by begging the question,\u2014assuming\nthe thing explained. The truth is that there is no definition or\nexplanation possible. The dualism of matter and life must be accepted.\nThere is no monism can bridge the gulf between mechanics and life.\nInorganic matter with its inherent forces and laws cannot be conceived\nas ever coming into or as passing out of existence. From all eternity\nit was as it is, and so it will remain. The physical universe shows\nno hint of design, no glimpse of freedom, no trace of intelligence,\nno suggestion of a maker or God. It has no power of choice, no\nspontaneous motion. But the merest speck of living matter is utterly\nand absolutely different. It may have eyes or no eyes, and yet it\nsees, ears or not and yet it hears, nerves or not and yet it feels\nand reacts, brain or not and yet it thinks and plans, and acts in\naccordance with intellectual resolves. The dead body of your child is\nmost inconceivably different from the living body of an hour ago. The\none fundamental mystery of the explainable world is why life seeks\nobjectification in material forms, and why it seeks it with such\nvehemence and ardor. Life seems to bite at matter as if with famishing\nhunger. One wonders if from some other planet life is being suddenly\nstarved out or banished by some catastrophe, and as a consequence\nthere is thence an over-emigration of the hungry Huns upon our earth.\nCertain confused and confusion-breeding philosophers in the interests\nof a theoretical monism or pantheism pretend to find, or to believe\nthat the organic is born out of the inorganic, that the physical world\nshows evidence of design, that life and mentality were implicate and\nlatent in pre-existent matter. Yet they will accept the evidence\nagainst spontaneous generation derived from the fact that if you kill\nall organic life by intense heat and then exclude life from without you\nwill never find life to arise. But it is plain that in the condensation\nof the dust of space into suns and planets all organic life was killed\nin the hottest of all conceivable heat. But as the planets cool, life\nappears. It must have come from without, and must therefore be an\nuniversal self-existent power. Why, or how, or whence life comes to us\nwe do not know now, but the transcendent miracle is ever before our\neyes: infinitely rich and free, life is filling, thrilling, surcharging\nevery molecule of matter to which with wondrous power and ingenuity it\ncan gain access. It covers every thousandth of an inch of the earth's\nsurface, dives into the deepest ocean depths, fills the air as high as\nthe mountain tops, ever unsatisfied, ever grasping up a million million\nrenaissant forms, never resting, never baffled. Before this omnipresent\ngod one stands in rapt amazement and worship. To matter, then, life\nfirst brought, and still ever brings the power of organisation, of\nadaptation, of spontaneous energy, and of movement. But when the death\nof the organisation takes place, the life that preceded and formed it\nis not lessened or affected. When the watch wears out does it prove\nthat the watchmaker is dead? It is more rational to suppose that the\nwatchmaker has kept on with his work, that he has made and will make\nmany more watches, and I therefore judge that the life of each of us,\nthat existed before our bodies, that formed our bodies, will still form\nother bodies after ours. The Oriental doctrine of the transmigration of\nsouls is not to be accepted in its crude details, but it is doubtless\na great truth. It is more rational and more consonant with what we\nknow of life, than the theory of wasted life implicate in the barbaric\nnotion of sending numberless millions of souls to hell to do nothing\nbut suffer useless pain, and other millions to heaven to suffer (I use\nthe word advisedly) useless pleasure. Any theory of immortality that\nrests upon the assumption of uselessness and waste may be quickly set\naside. Just as matter and force are indestructible, various forms of\nforce being interchangeable, so it must be with life. There must be a\nconservation of life-energy just as rigid, and this truth must remake\nand remould the whole conception of immortality. When a mechanical\nforce disappears in one phase, it at once reappears in another aspect.\nSo vegetable, animal, and mental life are but different aspects of\nlife-force, and suffer no loss when transformed one into the other, or\nwhen the body disappears altogether. And as it is the inherent nature\nof force never to rest so there is no rest for life. Banishment of life\nto a heaven of inaction is as impossible as it is absurd.\n\n [78] Those who think this view is the voice of faith and not\n of true science may profitably read a little book that has\n come to my notice since writing these pages: _Life Theories\n and Religious Thought_, by Lionel S. Beale.\n\n [79] According to the latest scientific researches the\n dependence of all organisation upon life is more clearly shown\n than ever. My friend Dr. Edmund Montgomery twenty-five years\n ago, as a result of extended experiment and research, showed\n that the body of animals is not an aggregation of cells,\n the force of the whole being derived from the enslaving and\n utilising these subordinate organisms, but that the whole\n body is a single protoplasmic living connected mass or unit\n with functionally specialised parts. That this view is the\n scientific view of to-day and that the cell-aggregate theory\n is dead may be seen by consulting the article \"Zelle,\" by\n Prof. Frommen in _Eulenburg's Real-Encyclop\u00e4die der gesammten\n Heilkunde_, 1890.\n\nThis extension of the law of the conservation of force to things\nbiologic and psychic is a two-edged sword: it offers conclusive\nevidence of the fallacy of the materialist and unbeliever. There is\nno annihilation; your life at death not only may not stop but cannot\nstop. Life is as inextinguishable as physical force. On the other\nhand this sword deals the death blow to two equally shallow fallacies\nof believers. Just so sure as it insures the preservation of your\nlife, of all that is worth preservation, just so sure it denies the\npossibility of preserving what was bound up with and produced by\norganisation,\u2014that is individuality and personal identity. These\nthings, if not entirely, are certainly largely the products of your\npeculiar physical and physiological organisation. Whatever is born of\nthe flesh must perish with the flesh; what is born of the spirit shall\ninherit eternal life. But the profoundest and most distinguishing\nrebuke is given the unscientific, puerile, selfish assumption of\nthe waste, loss, and uselessness of life involved in the old theory\nof heaven and hell. When from a chemical compound you take away and\nliberate one element or compound radicle, does it then shoot off into\nspace, to \"flock all by itself\" for eternity? By no means! It at once\nrushes into a new combination with its nearest neighbor, quickly\npicking up again the round of its duty and function. The curious notion\nthat after having done work in one body, life or souls should at once\nrush off to some far-away star, there to sing or howl for eternity was\na childish absurdity. One wonders where even an omnipotent God could\nget material for such an amazing manufacture and loss of souls. The\ntheory also forgot that logic demands that what should live forever in\nthe future must perforce have lived forever in the past. A rope if it\nhave one end, must have two ends. What, therefore have our souls been\ndoing during this past eternity? The truth is that absolutely speaking\nthere cannot be souls, but only soul. Life is a unit, and indivisible.\nThe tiniest bit of bioplasm holds and represents all of life. Neither\nyou nor it are separable from the whole. There may be education and\nprogressive evolution of life as a whole but there can be no individual\nand selfish salvation apart from the salvation of all other souls. The\nidea that release from the body at once releases a soul from action,\nduty, and the work of life, is an illogicality that could have arisen\nin no mind conversant with the demonstrated law of the non-wastage of\nforce in any work of energy elsewhere. Life is never tired; it is the\nbody that requires rest not the spirit. The old doctrine of heaven,\nan eternity of laziness, was the sigh of the sluggish flesh whipped\nto ceaseless work by the unresting life. The desire of heaven was the\ndesire of eternal death.\n\nThis extension of the idea of the non-wastage, the rigid conservation\nand interconvertibility of force to things of life, gains a new\nsignificance and grandeur when we consider that whatever proves the\nimmortality of man proves the immortality of every other animal or\nvegetable form. The tree and horse have a soul quite as well as you,\nand must live after death quite as surely as you will. It is the\nflimsiest of conceits that makes men think they are endowed with a\nspecial sort of soul or divine life, different from that of animals or\nplants. Don't flatter yourself. God takes quite the same loving pains\nand care in the elimination of a leaf that he does of a brain-cell. Man\nis but a small part of the animal world, and the whole animal world\nis but a small part of the total life of the globe. Don't despise the\nvegetable kingdom: it can do something you cannot do\u2014make living\nmatter out of mineral substances. You could not live a day without the\nfood furnished you by \"your brothers, the plants.\" Hence if human life\nor souls cannot be sent off into space to do nothing, neither can the\nsouls of animals and plants. If we are to have our heaven they must\nhave theirs also. Does not this tangential theory begin to be clumsy\nand work with huge creakings and difficulties? It looks like _reductio\nad absurdum_.\n\nNot only is the tangential theory contradictory of all physical\nanalogies and all known laws, but it is positively immoral. It is but\na refined selfishness. Worldliness is none the less sinful because\nit is other-worldliness. If billions of souls could thus be wasted\nin an eternity of useless pain or pleasure, could thus, drunken with\nindividuation, hug their own sweet ghosts for never-ending time\u2014then\nwere life a farce, the universe a huge meaningless machine for grinding\nout waste and useless souls. But if all life, past or future, is one\nand indivisible, purposive, educational, then the world becomes full of\nmeaning and the face of the Father, Life, smiles out at us from every\nliving thing. The faith of all good men that goodness is at the heart\nof things is justified. The Earth becomes our home, that we can love;\nour Father ever dwelleth here; we cannot be banished. When we have\nfinished our task, when our body has worn out, tireless life, of which\nwe are the children and heirs, gives us here and now other work to do.\n\nTo matter, this tremendous cosmical game of incarnation can mean\nnothing. We see the dead flesh break up into simpler chemical forms and\nthe atoms finally spin off unaltered by their flesh-dance, again to be\ncaught up by the mystic and unseen Master, again to be pressed into\norganic forms,\u2014forms that like empty sea-shells only show where life\nhas been. And so on forever. But to life some educative purpose must be\noperative through it all. Life that made eyes must see more than eyes;\nlife that made brains must know more than brains. There is doubtless\npain and strain; but is there to be no ultimate justification? We may\ncatch glimpses of reasons. Do we not see an increase both of quantity\nand quality of life in geologic times? Is life trying to do away with\ndeath and heredity? Are they but makeshifts, death but a discarding of\ntoo obstinate material? Birth but a retempering and reworking of the\nsame material? Heredity but the temporary means of passing life and its\nexperiences onward until death and birth shall be found unnecessary in\na growing command of chemical and physical forces that shall banish old\nage out of the world? There is no inherent reason why a body should\ngrow decrepit. If it can be made to preserve its suppleness for fifty\nyears why not for a thousand? It may transpire that the dream of an\nelixir of life may come true through scientific progress despite the\nsavage death-blow given it by Brown-S\u00e9quard. The more sin, selfishness,\nand wrong there is the shorter is the average length of human lives. If\nyou will look into the rich and awful science of statistics you will\nfind proof of this in every class of society. When we apply ourselves\nto enrich and lengthen our life-time with the same zeal we now use\nin killing each other\u2014when the endowments of the world's scientific\nschools equal the cost of the world's armies then there will be a very\ndifferent life-table found in the insurance-offices.\n\nFinally with mournful echoing recurrence comes the old question: How\nmuch of individuality persists and passes untouched through death's\nfingers? How far does the graduate life carry with it the results of\nexperience? I would answer: all that you ought to desire, all that\nis best, all that you will want when you fully understand how little\nand poor is individuality and that there is something including it\nand far better. I have a strange inability, personally, to understand\nthe to me absurd hunger after personal identity. It appears to me a\nchildish obtuseness of character. The great and glorious freeness and\nlargeness of life, the decentralised, impersonal quality of it seems\nto be unappreciated. I do not see how people can fail to understand\nthat personal identity is not only impossible, does not exist now\nand here, but that the desire of it is the renunciation of progress.\nWe grow and advance only by change, only by breaking up identity and\nbecoming other. Think also of the lack of identity or individuality\nin nature. There is no personality and individualism there, and yet\nthere is something that includes personality and is much more. There\nis will, consciousness, intelligence, life,\u2014but not identity or\nindividuality. So the life that is the heart of us invites us to leave\nour little self and find a larger self. Religion is our _yes_ to that\ninvitation. Materialism and pessimism is the saying _no_ to it. The\nimmortality that is alone possible or desirable is the losing our\nlife, the individual identity-loving life, again to find it as the\nimpersonal but richer, deeper life of nature and God. God denies you\nan immortality of individualism and identity because he loves you so\nwell that he refuses you your crude childish desire in order to offer\nyou something infinitely better. People do not seem to see how narrow,\nsmall, and partial is the dissociate speck of the individual, and\nthat as an individual progresses in all the virtues of character he\nevermore becomes proportionally less individual and less centralised,\nalways more like the divine prototype of his impersonal father, Life.\nThe love of individualism is the love of imperfection. This may to\nsome seem a hard doctrine. It is not perhaps an easy task for the\nbutterfly to break its way out through the million-fold bonds of its\ncocoon, but when risen into the large air and sunshine does it regret\nthe birth-struggle? They who think they are being cheated of reality\nfor a metaphysic illusion will find in breaking through the bonds of\nflesh that they also have brought with them splendid wings for rising\nin the no less real but rarer air of spiritual trust in life. It is\nnot that we love less the thousand ties of flesh, home and kindred,\nbut that in recognising the paternity and fraternity of all life, we\nfind love commensurate with that life. I do not think there was any\ncold stony harshness in the face of Jesus when he uttered those most\nprofoundly significant of all words, \"Who is my mother, and who are\nmy brethren? Whosoever shall do the will of my Father, the same is my\nbrother, and sister, and mother.\" What a recall to the common life of\nthe spirit! What unity with the common life based upon loving obedience\nto the will of the Father. What a wonderful rebuke of the love of\nindividualism. He did not love his mother less but humanity more. The\nmore we rise into that impersonal atmosphere the more are we careless\nof the fate of personal identity. The composite photograph shows the\nfundamental and enduring quality, the average feature. In a certain\nsense life and history are taking humanity's composite photograph;\nbut, inordinately-loving individualism, each sitter conceitedly\ndemands that his own picture be left untouched and unblurred by that\nof the others, and that his poor little portrait shall stand alone\nand forever\u2014precisely what the divine photographer does not wish and\nwill not permit. Obstinacy persists and God smashes the negative to\nthe ground with the unanswerable argument called death. Because it\nis more than metaphor that in any ways your body may be likened unto\na photographer's negative: created, for example, by the in-flashing\nof a heavenly ray of light among the highly unstable chemicals of\nmatter; useless, except as an intermediate step to a clearer showing\nof the character; black and invisible unless shone through by the pure\nlight of life and love; fragile as glass,\u2014and lastly the poor, weak,\nshadowy, dead counterfeit of a throbbing, marvellous, living reality.\nThe hunger for an immortality of the body, of the senses, the lust of\nimmortality, is, in empty fatuousness, only comparable to the mania of\na crazy photographer interested only in his negatives, and who never\n\"develops\" one, or to the foolishness that values photographs more than\nthe friends themselves. If we once get our spiritual eye fixed upon the\ndeep reality and unity hidden by the Maia-veilings of individuality\nand flesh, the cravings of our weak hearts for eternal continuance of\nour little bundle of littlenesses, would fall away from us as softly\nas the wayward longings of childhood. We could then see that it is the\nquality of all life, the progressive purity, power, and increase of\nlife in the abstract, that become all-important. Religion would become\nthe love and veneration of Life the Father of us; morality the cheerful\nobedience of the individual to that Father; Heaven the re-entrance of\nthe individual life into the great unity. Much of the old religion\nwas irreligious; its God a far-away dead abstraction, not a living,\never-present love; its immortality was at heart a desire for death,\nits spiritualism at heart a barbaric materialism. To this death of\nfaith and irreligious religion, comes the sympathetic study and love\nof nature\u2014that is, science\u2014and reveals to us the opulence of life,\nthe infinity of intellect in nature, the inexhaustibleness of her\nresources and of her diversity, her beauty, and her splendor. The old\nmaterialistic degradation of religion forefelt its doom would come from\nthis spiritualistic revivification, and the devotees cried out against\nscience as atheistic. And science found some foolish enemies in her own\ncamp who, misreading their divine book, joined in the cry\u2014\"Nothing\nbut mechanics.\" It was a dismal short-lived croak. We now see that not\nonly are science and her workers religious, but without scientific\nknowledge there can be no adequate idea or practice of religion. You\ncan't love God unless you love and know what he is doing in this\nuniverse. The man who in a walk goes neglectfully and obliviously by a\nmillion mysteries and wonders that God has been toiling to eliminate\nfor ages,\u2014such a man cannot lay much claim to God's friendship. If\nwe love our friend, we have some interest in the deepest concern of\nhis life. The foolishest of all fears is the fear that science is\nsomehow going to destroy all good things of faith and life. In truth\nit reveals all good things. It demonstrates and manifests both God and\nimmortality,\u2014God as the Father of all life, immortality as the surety\nof the conservation and non-wastage of that life. Much of the fear of\nscience, is as I have said the fear of the old materialistic religion\nin presence of the larger faith that burns up its beloved errors. They\nwho had been promised and had argued themselves into a groundless\nbelief in the value and immortality of a bundle of sensual appetites,\nselfish desires, and imperfections saw far in advance that any large\nstudy of life and nature would dash their wretched faith to atoms. And\nscience has overridden this unfaithful faith. \"He that soweth to his\nflesh shall of the flesh reap corruption; but he that soweth to the\nSpirit shall of the Spirit reap life everlasting.\" This is as true\nscientifically as it is true morally and religiously.\n\nIt requires but a little study of neurology and psychology to give\ndemonstration to this truth. The products of organisation die with\ndisorganisation. Most, if not all, of what people mean by individuality\nand personal identity is a product of organisation, is an accident\nof incarnation. Children are similar to each other; they are lovable\npartly because idiosyncrasy and individualism haven't yet developed.\nAs we grow older we cultivate individuality, until the very old are\nusually angular, cranky, individual with a vengeance! Death, thank\nheaven, is the end of that, the certainty of a non-eternalising of the\nimperfect. Birth is a new trial. Incarnation and reincarnation are\nthe ever-renewed work of Life. Through the laws of heredity, through\nphysiology, sociology, and biology, science is tirelessly illustrating\nto us how all life holds together, how individualism is valueless,\nand sacrificed to the common weal. There is no escape, sensual or\nsupersensual from the world's great common life. The old selfish dream\nof a heaven apart from incarnation, from doing and becoming was a\npitiful mistake. You cannot clutch your cake of happiness and like a\nspoiled child run into the attic of heaven to eat it alone. Life will\nsee to it that you do not slip off. And if you have been born again of\nthe spirit you will have no such desire, but will beg for kindred work\nupon the old earth-home.\n\nIn the meantime the conclusion is clear: to love and aid the work of\nour master Life we need not wait for death. We may not seek our own\nsalvation; it is no matter whether you and I are saved or not. The\nreincarnation of life is our work here and now. It took you twenty\nyears to fashion out of a microscopically-small speck of unorganised\nprotoplasm your body and brain. Within us we are to keep that\norganisation from cramping and binding the life,\u2014keep life as large\nand free and pliant as possible. Outside of us the incarnation goes on\nas well, and every person you influence either for good or for ill,\nthus by the fact, becomes a product of your incarnating work. Every\nday you have a hundred opportunities to give, without lessening your\nown supply, some of your own life, to increase the quantity and to\nelevate the quality of the general stock of the world's life. Help the\nyoung, they inherit the world and will use it well or ill according\nto your teaching and example. Stop cruelty to animals, they are your\nbrothers, filled with the same life as your own; fight the political\nruin we are preparing for ourselves by partisanship, bribery, and\nclass-legislation; discourage war and intemperance and lessen the\ntyranny of the strong and wealthy. Wage a ceaseless war to the death\nagainst luxury, the poison that is eating and rotting the hearts of all\nof us; love trees, meadows, clear brooks, the mountains and silences\nof Nature. Love, not so much your own or another's individual life, as\nLife itself. There is otherwise no immortality.\n\nThe divine story tells us that after measureless suffering and\nself-purification, Buddha had gained the right to enter Nirvana. With\ncompassion filling his heart he put his merited reward aside and\nresolved to remain without to teach and to help until every child of\nearth should have become his disciple, and until every disciple should\nhave entered Nirvana before him. Such must be the resolve of every true\nlover of life and of every right seeker after immortality.\n\n GEORGE M. GOULD.\n\n\n\n\nSOME QUESTIONS OF PSYCHO-PHYSICS.[80]\n\nSENSATIONS AND THE ELEMENTS OF REALITY.\n\n [80] This article is the substance of a private communication\n from Prof. Ernst Mach to the Editor of _The Monist_\u2014published\n in the present form with Prof. Mach's consent. Translated from\n Professor Mach's MS. by Thomas J. McCormack.\n\n\nI have read Dr. Carus's article \"Feeling and Motion\"[81] with care,\nand have also perused Clifford's essay on \"The Nature of Things\nin Themselves.\" Let me attempt to present the points in which our\nagreements and differences consist.\n\n [81] _The Open Court_, Nos. 153 and 154.\n\nTo begin with, I state with pleasure that the monistic tendency of both\nendeavors is in the direction that appears to me to be the true one and\nthat is most likely to afford elucidation. Consequently, agreement in\nmatters of detail is of subordinate importance and is only a question\nof time.\n\nLet me cite, first, a few passages from \"Feeling and Motion\" to which I\ngive my full assent. They are the following:\n\n\"The interconvertibility of motion and feeling is an error.\"\n\n\"Feeling is real as much as are matter and motion.\"\n\n\"Its reality accordingly is most immediate and direct, so that it would\nbe ridiculous to doubt it.\"\n\n\"Man's method of understanding the process of nature is that of\nabstraction.\"\n\n\"Every concept is formed for some purpose, and every concept by serving\none purpose necessarily becomes one-sided.... We must bear in mind....\n(1) the purpose it has to serve, and (2) that the totality of things\nfrom which abstractions can be made is one indivisible whole.... We\nmust not imagine that the one side only is true reality.\"\n\nSome years ago I should also have agreed _in toto_ with the passages\nin which Dr. Carus speaks of the animation of all nature, and of the\nfeeling that accompanies _every_ motion. To-day this form of expression\nwould not, it seems to me, correctly characterise the matter. If I were\nnow prematurely to advance a definitive formulation, I should fear\nlest, so far as myself and perhaps others are concerned, important\naspects might remain concealed.\n\nI shall next cite the passages with respect to which I do not agree\nwith Dr. Carus, and then I shall endeavor to state wherein our\ndifferences of opinion consist:\n\n\"All series _A B C_ ... are _accompanied_ by \u03b1 \u03b2 \u03b3.\" [The _A B C_ ...\nseries of Dr. Carus has a different meaning from mine.]\n\n\"We may represent _motion_ or we may represent _mind_ as the basis of\nthe world, or we may conceive them as being on equal terms.\" [I cannot\nagree with a co-ordination of \"motion\" and \"mind.\"]\n\n\"They [viz. feeling and motion] are as inseparable as are the two sides\nof a sheet of paper.\" [Fechner says, \"As inseparable as the concave\nand convex sides of the same circle.\" This appears to me an inapposite\nsimile in so far as a _duality_ is predicated where in my view a\n_unity_ alone exists.]\n\nMy view of the problem is as follows: We have colors, sounds,\npressures, and so forth (_A B C_ ...), which, as simplest component\nparts, make up the world. In addition thereto, percepts (resolvable\ninto \u03b1 \u03b2 \u03b3 ...), feelings, and so forth, more or less composite. How \u03b1\n\u03b2 \u03b3 ... differ from _A B C_ ... I will not define here, for I do not\nknow exactly. It is enough for the time being that they do differ from\n_A B C_ ..., as the latter do from one another. And let us now leave \u03b1\n\u03b2 \u03b3 ... entirely out of account and put ourselves in a time and state\nin which there are only _A B C_. Now I say, that if I see a tree with\ngreen leaves (_A_), with a hard (_B_), gray (_C_) trunk, that _A B C_\nare _elements_ of the world. I say _elements_\u2014and not sensations,\nalso not motions\u2014because it is not my purpose at this place to arrive\nat either a psychological or a physiological or a physical _theory_,\nbut to proceed _descriptively_. The every-day man, indeed, takes\ngreenness, grayness, hardness, or complexes thereof it may be, for\nconstituent parts of the world\u2014for he does not trouble himself about a\npsychologico-physiological theory\u2014and does not learn moreover anything\nmore about the world; from his point of view he is right. Similarly,\nfor the descriptive physicist the question is also one merely of the\ndependencies of _A B C_ ... on one another; for him too _A B C_ ..., or\ncomplexes thereof, are and remain constituent parts of the world.\n\nIf, however, I close my eye (_K_), withdraw my feeling hand (_L_), _A\nB C_ ... disappear. If I contemplate _A B C_ ... in _this_ dependence\nthey are my _sensations_. This is but a special point of view within\nthe first.\n\nAccording to my conception, therefore, _the same A B C_ ... is both\nelement of the _world_ (the \"outer\" world, namely) and element of\n_feeling_.\n\nThe question how feeling arises out of the physical element has for me\nno significance, since both are _one and the same_. The parallelism\nstands to reason, since each is parallel to itself. It is not _two_\nsides of the same paper (which latter is invested with a metaphysical\nr\u00f4le in the simile), but simply the _same_ thing.\n\nA perfect physics could strive to accomplish nothing more than to\nmake us familiar beforehand with whatever it were possible for us\nto come across _sensorily_; that is, we should have knowledge of\nthe interrelation of _A B C_. A perfect psychology would supply\nthe interrelation of \u03b1 \u03b2 \u03b3. Leaving out of account the theoretical\nintermediaries of physics\u2014physiology and psychology\u2014questions like\n\"How does feeling arise from motion\" would never come up. However, the\nartificial inventions of a physical or psychological theory, must not\nbe introduced into a general discussion of this character\u2014for they are\nnecessarily \"one-sided.\"\n\nI may now set forth my differing point of view with regard to the idea\nof \"motion.\" A motion is either perceptible by the senses, as the\ndisplacing of a chair in a room or the vibration of a string, or it\nis only supplied, added (hypothetical), like the oscillation of the\nether, the motion of molecules and atoms, and so forth. In the first\ninstance the motion is _composed_ of _A B C_ ..., it is itself merely\na certain relation between _A B C_ ..., and plays therefore in the\ndiscussion now in hand no especial part. In the second instance the\nhypothetical motion, under especially favorable circumstances, can\nbecome perceptible by the senses. In which case the first instance\nrecurs. As long as this is not the case, or in circumstances in\nwhich this _can never happen_ (the case of the motions of atoms and\nmolecules), we have to do with a _noumenon_, that is, a mere mental\nauxiliary, an artificial expedient, the purpose of which is solely to\nindicate, to represent, after the fashion of a model, the connection\nbetween _A B C_ ..., to make it more familiar to us. It is a thing\nof thought, an entity of the mind (\u03b1 \u03b2 \u03b3 ...). I cannot believe that\nthis is to be co-ordinated with _A B C_ ... in the same way as _A B C_\n... among each other are. Putting together motion and feeling goes as\nmuch against me as would say the co-ordination of numbers and colors.\nPerhaps I stand quite alone in this, for physicists have accustomed us\nto regard the motions of atoms as \"more real\" than the green of trees.\nIn the latter I see a (sensory) fact, in the former a _Gedankending_, a\nthing of thought. The billions of ether-vibrations which the physicist\nfor his special purposes _mentally annexes_ to the green, are not to be\nco-ordinated with the green, which is given immediately.\n\nWhen a piece of zinc and a piece of copper, united by a wire, are\ndipped in sulphuric acid and deflect a magnetic needle in the vicinity\nof the wire, the unprepossessed _discoverer_ of the fact discerns\nnaught of motion beyond the deflection of the needle and the diffusion\nin the fluid. Everything reverts to certain combinations of _A B\nC_. Electricity is a thing of thought, a mental adjunct; its motion\nanother; its magnetic field still another. All these noumena are\nimplements of physical science, contrived for very special purposes.\nThey are discarded, cast aside, when the interconnection of _A B C_ ...\nhas become familiar; for _this last_ is the very gist of the affair.\nThe implement is not of the same _dignity_, or reality, as _A B C_ ...,\nand must not be placed in the same category, must not be co-ordinated\nwith it where general considerations are involved to which physics with\nits special objects does not extend.\n\nThe green (_A_) of the tree is not only adjoined to the presence of\nthe sun (_B_), but also to the deflection of the needle (_X_), by my\noptic nerve. Familiarising intermediary connections to-day by motions,\nto-morrow by some other means, is the business of the special sciences,\nand can only disturb and obscure a general discussion. What should we\nsay of a cosmology from a pharmaceutical point of view? In principle,\nthis very thing is done, it seems to me, when physical augers and saws\nare employed in all fields of work, as is universally the case.\n\nSo much for the juxtaposition of motion and feeling. Perhaps I alone am\nright, perhaps I alone am wrong.\n\n * * * * *\n\nAccording to my conception accordingly \"material\" processes are not\n\"_accompanied_\" by \"feelings,\" but are _the same_ (_A B C_ ...); only\nthe relation in which we consider them makes them at one time physical\nelements and at another time feelings.\n\nThe relation in which \"percepts\" and \"feelings\" as distinguished\nfrom \"sensations\" stand to sensations, is not clear to me. I am\nmuch inclined to regard these feelings as a species of sensation\n(co-ordinate with sensations). How the representative percepts of\nimagination and memory are connected with sensations, what relation\nthey bear to them, I dare venture no opinion. The relation of \u03b1 \u03b2 \u03b3 ...\nto _A B C_ ... is the point regarding which I do not feel sufficiently\nsure. Regarding _A B C_ ... (world of sense in its objective and\nsubjective significance) I believe I am clear.\n\nDr. Carus in a private letter to me says: \"It almost seems as if you\ntransform all _A B C_ ... series into the corresponding \u03b1 \u03b2 \u03b3 ...\nseries.\"\n\nThis is not the case. I designate by \u03b1 \u03b2 \u03b3 ... representative percepts\n(not sensations), and say simply that _A B C_ ..., _the same A B\nC_ ..., play, according to circumstances, now the r\u00f4le of physical\nelements, now the role of sensations. I call _A B C_ ..., therefore,\n_elements_, pure and simple.\n\nMine is not the Berkeleian point of view. The latter has been\nmistakenly attributed to me time and again, the separation that I make\nof _A B C_ ... from \u03b1 \u03b2 \u03b3 ... not having been sharply discriminated\nand it not having been borne in mind that I call _A B C_ ... alone\n_sensations_, not however \u03b1 \u03b2 \u03b3. Clifford, with his \"mind-stuff,\"\napproaches very near to Berkeley.\n\nMonism, as yet, I cannot thoroughly _follow out_; because I am lacking\nin clearness with regard to the relation of \u03b1 \u03b2 \u03b3 ... to _A B C_ ...,\nwhich can only be supplied by further physiologico-psychological\ninvestigations; but I believe that the first step towards a\ncompetent monism lies in the assertion that the same _A B C_ ...\nare both physical and psychical elements. As regards the psychical\n\"accompanying\" the physical, the question How? continually recurs.\nEither they are two incompatible things (Dubois) or their relation is\nbound up in a third thing (\"thing-of-itself\"). By viewing the matter\nas _two sides_ of the same thing, not much more is gained, to my mind,\nthan a momentary satisfaction.\n\nAll non-monistic points of view are, in my opinion, artificial\nconstructions, which arise by investing with very far-reaching\nextensions of meaning psychological or physical special-conceptions,\nwhich have a limited value, applicable only within the department in\nquestion for the elucidation of the facts of that department. The\novervaluing of psychological conceptions leads to spiritualistic\nsystems, the overrating of physical conceptions to materialistic\nsystems. Naturally in the latter systems _motion_ plays a great r\u00f4le;\nfor through a mistaken conception of the _principle of energy_, people\nhave come to believe that everything in physics can be explained by\nmotion. But explanations by motions have, as a matter of fact, nothing\nto do with the principle of energy. The majority of physicists, it is\ntrue, believe and disseminate this opinion. If, when a physicist speaks\nof motion and nothing but motion, the question is asked _What_ moves?\nin ninety-nine cases out of a hundred nothing palpable or demonstrable\nis brought forward in answer, but hypothetical atoms or hypothetical\nfluids are adduced which execute motions still more hypothetical.\nEven in the domain of physics itself, the business of which is to\nproceed from the sensory and to return to the sensory, I can regard\nthese \"motions\" at best only as provisorily tolerated intermediaries\nof _thoughts_, that have no right to be ranked on equal terms with\nreality, let alone placed above it.\n\nStill less can I allow \"motion\" the right to create a world-problem\nwhere none exists, and thereby to conceal the real point of attack in\nthe investigation of reality.\n\nI may add that some years ago I took exactly Dr. Carus's point of view,\nwhich I presented in a lecture on Psycho-physics published in 1863 in\nthe _Oesterreichische Zeitschrift f\u00fcr praktische Heilkunde_.\n\nWith regard to Clifford I may make the following remarks. The notion\n\"eject\" pleases me very much. I have long had the idea in mind, but\nhave not defined it because its limitation is not clear to me; nor\nhas Clifford given me any light on the subject. Is the representation\nin us of the material nature of things we _cannot lay hold of_ (the\nsun, the moon) to be called an eject? Are the abstract concepts of\nphysical hypotheses, which in their very nature can never become\nsense-affective, ejects? Such things are abstract in widely differing\ndegrees, and are bound up with the sensory in very unequal proportions;\nthe impossibility of becoming sense-affective is partly absolute,\npartly only relative, that is, it exists for the time being.\n\nI do not at all agree with Clifford's notion \"mind-stuff\"; in this I\nwholly concur with Dr. Carus. It is not unbiased philosophising to come\ndown in the end to a _psychological_ notion as _comprehensive of the\nworld_,\u2014a notion on the face of it pre-eminently one-sided.\n\n * * * * *\n\nIn connection with the subject under discussion, I might incidentally\nmake mention of Mr. Charles S. Peirce's article \"The Architecture\nof Theories\" in the last number of _The Monist_. One Mr. Peirce, a\nmathematician,[82] has made some very valuable investigations, similar\nto Grassmann's. This author's view of the evolution of natural laws\ndoes not strike me as so singular. If predominance be given in our\nconception of the world to the spiritualistic or psychical aspect, the\nlaws of nature may be regarded as tremendous phenomena of memory; as I\nattempted some years ago to set forth in a lecture of mine. The idea\nof their evolution is then very near at hand. Of course I do not think\nthat for the time being we can gain much light from this view. For\nthe present the \"scientific method\" in the grooves of which we have\nmoved for three hundred years, continues to be the most fruitful. It is\nadvisable to be very cautious in advancing beyond this. It is for this\nreason also that I do not think very much of the fruitfulness of the\nidea that the entire world is animated and feeling. We have as yet too\nlittle insight into the psychical, and still less into the connection\nbetween brain-organisation and brain-function and psychical process.\nOf what advantage to us is the assumption of feeling in cells in which\nevery clue is missing by which to proceed from the psychical assumed\nto the physical connected with it. It seems to me that the physical\nand psychical investigation of sensations is for the time being the\nonly thing that can be entered upon with any prospect of accomplishing\nanything. In this we shall first learn the proper formulation of\nquestions that are to form the subject of further investigations.\n\n [82] Mr. Benjamin Peirce, father of Mr. Charles S. Peirce.\u2014ED.\n\n ERNST MACH.\n\n\n\n\nSOME QUESTIONS OF PSYCHO-PHYSICS.\n\nFEELINGS AND THE ELEMENTS OF FEELINGS.\n\n\nEXPOSITION.\n\nWhen a man who has done so much valuable work for the progress of\nscience as Professor Ernst Mach finds it necessary to change the\nposition he has taken,\u2014a position which has appeared to many thinkers\nas a satisfactory solution of the most intricate problem in the\nphilosophical and psycho-physical field,\u2014there must exist in the\nsolution some difficulty which has either been overlooked or at least\ntoo little appreciated. If there is a flaw in it, I wish it to be\nexposed. And convinced that its discovery must be of general interest,\nI take pleasure in publishing Professor Mach's criticism of the view\nwhich I have defended in a former article of mine.\n\nThe main source of most differences, it seems to me, springs from\nmisapprehensions. I shall therefore attempt to elucidate the subject\nwith reference to the objections presented by Professor Mach.\n\n#Recapitulation.#\n\nThe main idea set forth in my article \"Feeling and Motion\" may be\nbriefly recapitulated as follows. Our feelings are phenomena which to\nan observer who could see all the processes taking place in our brain,\nwould appear as motions of a special kind. Motions and feelings are two\naspects of one and the same reality. But feeling cannot be explained\nas transformed motion. Accordingly, the elements of the conscious\nfeeling which now exists and now disappears, must have existed before.\nThe presence of elements of feeling must be an additional feature of\nthe processes of nature not included in the term motion, and not\nobservable in motions, yet inseparably bound up in motions. Or, in\nother words, feelings and the elements of feeling are the subjective\naspect of what objectively appears as and is called motions.\n\nThe term \"elements of feeling\" employed in this sense has been adopted\nfrom Clifford. The idea that feelings and motions are two aspects of\none and the same reality has been held by several psychologists; among\nwhom are the founders of the science of psycho-physics, especially\nFechner.\n\n\nI. MOTION AND FEELING.\n\nProfessor Mach says: \"Putting together motion and feeling goes as much\nagainst me as would, say, the co-ordination of numbers and colors.\"\n\n#Justification of juxtaposition.#\n\nThe putting together of two concepts depends upon the purpose of our\ninvestigation. Motion and feeling, in spite of their disparity, have\none quality in common which justifies their juxtaposition. Both in\ntheir spheres are terms of the most general circumscription.\n\n#Feeling described.#\n\nBy feelings I understand those features of our experience which\nconstitute what may be called the awareness of the present state.\nFeeling comprehends all the many degrees of awareness in pleasures and\npains, sensations and thoughts, emotions and ideals. It constitutes the\nsubjectivity of our existence and furnishes the basis of all psychic\nlife. Feeling is the most general term of its kind.\n\n#Motion described.#\n\nBy motion I understand all kinds of changes in the objective world\nthat can either be directly observed or are supposed to be observable.\nIndeed all changes taking place must, objectively represented, be\nthought of as motions.\n\nFeeling and motion being each the broadest concept of its kind, the\nquestion, In what relation do motions stand to feelings? appears to be\nquite legitimate.\n\n * * * * *\n\nConcerning the relation that obtains between feeling and motion,\nProfessor Mach objects to the use of the expression \"feeling\naccompanies motion.\" \"Material processes,\" he says, \"are not\naccompanied by feeling, but both are the same.\" And in another passage,\n\"The parallelism stands to reason, since everything is parallel to\nitself.\"\n\n#The term \"accompany\" inadequate.#\n\nI grant most willingly that the term \"accompany\" is inadequate, and I\nadmit that a certain feeling and a certain motion form one inseparable\nprocess. There is no duality of feeling and motion, both are different\nabstractions made from one and the same reality. I do not say that\nfeeling and motion are identical, not that they are one and the same;\nbut I do say that they are one. There is no such thing as pure feeling;\nreal feeling is at the same time motion. Feeling by itself does not\nexist in reality. Pure feeling is a mere abstraction. And wherever the\nexpression parallelism between feeling and motion has been used, it can\nmean only a parallelism between the two spheres of abstraction.\n\nProfessor Mach continues: \"They [motion and feeling] are not two sides\nof the same paper (which latter is invested with a metaphysical r\u00f4le in\nthe simile), but simply the _same_ thing.\"\n\n#Fechner's simile.#\n\nFor the same reason Professor Mach objects to Fechner's comparison.\nYet it seems to me that Fechner hit the mark when he compared feeling\nand motion to the inside and the outside curves of a circle; they are\nentirely different and yet the same. The inside curve is concave,\nthe outside curve is convex. If we construct rules relating first to\nthe concave inside and then to the convex outside, we shall notice a\nparallelism in the formulas; yet this parallelism will appear only in\nthe abstractions which have been made of one and the same thing from\ndifferent standpoints and serving different purposes. The abstract\nconceptions form two parallel systems, but the real thing can be\nrepresented as parallel only in the sense that it is parallel to\nitself. If we consider the real thing, it represents a parallelism of\nidentity. There is but one line, and this one line is concave if viewed\nfrom the inside, it is convex if viewed from the outside.\n\n#The simile of a sheet of paper.#\n\nThe simile which I introduced of the two sides of one and the same\nsheet of paper was devised to convey no other meaning than this\nconstruction of Fechner's comparison. The paper is invested with\na metaphysical r\u00f4le only in the case where the simile is otherwise\nconstrued. There is no page which exists of itself as a mere\nmathematical plane independent of the paper of which it forms a side.\nThus there can never be in reality a page without its counterpage.\nThe paper, its size and color, belong to the page and constitute its\nproperties.\n\nThus the abstraction 'feeling' represents my looking at the one side\nof reality. I leave, and from the subjective standpoint I have to\nleave, the other side out of account. Yet the other side of the sheet\nis inseparable from the one at which I am now looking, just as much as\nfeeling is inseparable from motion. And I am constrained to admit the\ntruth of the reverse also: motion is inseparable from feeling, but with\nthe limitation that motions need not be on their subjective side actual\nfeelings; they may be only elements of feeling which under certain\nconditions become actual.\n\n#The metaphysical misinterpretation.#\n\nI am aware that my comparison of feeling and motion to the two sides\nof one sheet of paper may be easily misinterpreted. But is not that a\ndanger to which all comparisons are subject? A comparison is always\nimperfect, or as the Romans used to say, it limps: \"Omne simile\nclaudicat.\" And is not reality liable to be misinterpreted in the\nsame way? Have not some philosophers thus introduced the metaphysical\nexplanation of the unknowableness of things in themselves? Such\nphilosophers conceive the two sides of a sheet of paper (the abstract\nmathematical planes of the pages) as phenomenal and the paper as their\nmetaphysical essence. The size of the sheet, the color of the paper,\nand all its other qualities are in a metaphysical world-conception\nrepresented as properties of which the thing is possessed\u2014not as\nconstituting the thing, but as essentially different from it.\n\nIt appears to me that Professor Mach in spite of his opposition to\nFechner's simile and to the expression that feeling and motion are two\naspects of one and the same reality, entertains the same view. At least\nhis words: \"Only the relation in which we consider them makes them at\none time physical elements, at another time feelings,\" are to that\neffect.\n\n\nII. SENSATIONS AND THOUGHTS.\n\n#Professor Mach's problem.#\n\nThe difference between Professor Mach's view and mine may appear\ngreater than it is, because the problem which Professor Mach treats in\nhis article \"The Analysis of the Sensations,\" lies in quite a different\nfield from that of the problem of the relation of feeling to motion.\nThe problem being different, the same and similar terms are not only\nused for different purposes, but demand also different comparisons.\nProfessor Mach's symbols _A B C_ ... and \u03b1 \u03b2 \u03b3 ... represent a contrast\ndifferent from that of feeling and motion. They represent the contrast\nof sensations and thoughts. Sensations, such as green and hard, are\ncolors, pressures, tastes, etc; thoughts are memory-images, concepts,\nvolitions, etc.\n\nProfessor Mach says: \"How the representative percepts of imagination\nand memory are connected with sensations, what relations they bear to\nthem, as to this I dare venture no opinion.... Monism, as yet, I cannot\nthoroughly follow out; because I am lacking in clearness with regard to\nthe relation of \u03b1 \u03b2 \u03b3 ... to _A B C_ ...; but I believe that the first\nstep towards a competent monism lies in the assertion that the same _A\nB C_ ... are both physical and psychical elements.\"\n\nMy symbols _A B C_ ... and \u03b1 \u03b2 \u03b3 ... represent the contrast of physical\nand psychical elements, not of sensations and thoughts. Concerning\nthoughts, Professor Mach says he is much inclined to co-ordinate them\nwith sensations so that his Greek symbols might differ from his Italic\nsymbols not otherwise than the latter, viz. _A B C_ ...; differ among\nthemselves. Taking this ground, I believe, it would be preferable to\nsymbolise them accordingly among the Italic letters, perhaps as _X Y\nZ_. In the diagrams on page 407 they are called \u039c\u03bc, \u039d\u03bd, \u03a3\u03c2.\n\n#Feeling, sense-impression and sensation defined.#\n\nAccording to my terminology, feeling, as explained above, is the most\ngeneral term expressing any kind and degree of subjective awareness.\nA sense-impression is a single irritation of one of the senses,\nthe irritation being a special kind of motion plus a special and\ncorrespondent kind of feeling. A sensation is a sense-impression that\nhas by repetition acquired meaning. A later sense-impression, when\nfelt to be the same in kind as a former sense-impression, constitutes,\nbe it ever so dimly, an awareness of having to deal with the same\nkind of cause of a sense-impression; thus giving meaning to it. By\nsensation, accordingly, I understand a sense-impression which has\nacquired meaning. And feelings that have acquired meaning, I should\ncall mental states. Representative feelings (feelings that have a\nmeaning) are the elements of mind.\n\n#Thought and thinking defined.#\n\nBy thinking I understand the interaction that takes place between\nrepresentative feelings. Such are the comparisons of sensations\nwith memory-pictures, or of memory-pictures among themselves, the\nexperimenting with memory-pictures so as to plan new combinations, etc.\nThe products of thinking are called thoughts; and by thought in the\nnarrower sense is commonly understood abstract thought which on earth\nis the exclusive privilege of man.\n\nIf I am not mistaken Professor Mach understands by sensations\n(represented by him as _A B C_ ...) what I should call\nsense-impressions; while thoughts, memories, and volitions (represented\nby him as \u03b1 \u03b2 \u03b3 ...) form what I should call mind, or all kinds of\nmental states, that is, the domain of representations.\n\nThe higher spheres of thought, or representative feelings, grow out\nof and upon the lower spheres. Sense-impressions, as I have attempted\nto explain in the article \"The Origin of Mind\" (_The Monist_, No. 1),\nare the data which are worked out into concepts and ideas; they are\nthe basis upon which the whole structure of mind rests. The reflex\nmotions of simple irritations, being modified in higher spheres by the\nrich material of experience consisting of memory-images, and by the\npossibility of forethought created through experience, become volitions.\n\n#Monism and the origin of mind.#\n\nA monistic explanation of the rise of mind from elements that are not\nmind is possible only on the supposition that the objective processes\nof motion are not mere motions but that they are at the same time\nelements of feeling.\n\nIs this not the same position as Professor Mach's, where he says that\n\"the first step towards a competent monism lies in the assertion that\nthe same _A B C_ ... are both physical and psychical elements\"? and\nagain: \"The same _A B C_ ... are both elements of the _world_ (the\n'outer'[83] world namely) and elements of feeling.\"\n\n [83] Professor Mach here says \"outer world.\" I should prefer\n to replace it by the expression \"objective world,\" because\n the motions of a man's brain belong to the outer world of\n all other men. To make sure of including the actions of\n my own body in this outer world, I should prefer the term\n \"objective world,\" making feelings alone (to the exclusion of\n the subject's own motions) the constituents of the subjective\n world.\n\n#Agreement with Professor Mach.#\n\nConsidering the two last-quoted sentences of Professor Mach, it appears\nto me that all differences vanish into verbal misunderstandings. Yet\nsince I am not at all sure about it, I may be pardoned for becoming\nrather too explicit. The adjoined diagram may assist me in making my\nideas clear.\n\n[Illustration: Fig. I. Fig. II.]\n\n#Explanation of the diagrams.#\n\nLet the large circle of both figures represent a sentient being, a man.\nThe periphery is his skin. The small circle enclosing _K_ and _L_ is a\nsensory organ; the other small circle enclosing _M_ and _N_ represents\nthe hemispheres of his brain. _A_ and _B_ are processes taking place\noutside of the skin of this man. _A_ produces an effect in _K_; _B_ in\n_L_. The line _R_ represents a reflex motion. _M_ and _N_ are concepts\nand abstract ideas derived from such impressions as _K_ and _L_. The\nline _S_ represents an act of volition.\n\nAll these symbols represent motions in the objective world. We know\nthrough physiological investigations that _K_, _L_, _M_, and _N_ are\nmotions; in our individual experience they appear as feelings.\n\nThe second figure represents in agreement with my system of symbols\nthe states of awareness, in Greek letters. Certain physiological\nprocesses (_K L R_, _M N S_ of Figure I) appear subjectively as states\nof awareness (i. e. \u03ba \u03bb \u03c1, \u03bc \u03bd \u03c2 of Figure II). Yet _A_ and _B_ remain\nto the thinking subject mere motions. If they possess also a subjective\nside, although only in the shape of potential feeling, it does not and\nit cannot appear.\n\n#Sensations not elementary.#\n\nProfessor Mach calls green, hard, etc., which in a certain relation\nare our sensations, \"the elements of the world.\" These processes\ncharacterised as \"green,\" \"hard,\" etc., are in my opinion too special\nand at the same time too complicated to be considered elementary. I\ngrant that they are elements of mind, because if further analysed, they\ncease to be mental phenomena. But they are not elements _per se_, not\nelements of the world. It remains doubtful to me whether Professor Mach\nunderstands by his term \"sensation\" only _K_ \u03ba and _L_ \u03bb or the whole\nrelations _A K_ \u03ba, and _B L_ \u03bb. Taking it that he represents _A B C_\n... as both elements of the world and sensations, it almost appears\ncertain to me that his term \"sensation\" stands for the whole process\n_A K_ \u03ba, and that he considers the scientific analysis of this process\ninto _A_ the outside thing, into _K_ the nerve-vibration corresponding\nin form to the outside thing, and \u03ba the feeling that takes place in\nexperiencing the sense-impression _A K_, as an artificial procedure\nthat serves no other purpose than that of familiarising us with certain\ngroups of elements and their connections. The processes _A K_ \u03ba, _B L_\n\u03bb, in that case would be considered by Professor Mach as the actual\nfacts, while the _A_ and _B_, the _K_ and _L_, the \u03ba and \u03bb represent\nmere abstract representations without real existence, invented by\nscientists in order to describe the realities _A K_ \u03ba, _B L_ \u03bb, etc.,\nwith the greatest exactness as well as economy of thought. In their\nseparate abstractness they are the tools of science only and we must\nnot take them for more than they are worth.\n\n#Thoughts as mental implements.#\n\nIf this be so, I understand Professor Mach very well and I agree with\nhim when he looks upon all _M_ and _N_ with their respective \u03bc and \u03bd as\nbeing \"noumena, _Gedankendinge_, things of thought.\" They are mental\ntools. Sense-impressions are realities, but mental representations are\nimplements; they are auxiliaries for dealing with realities; they are\n\"the augers and saws\" employed in the different fields of cognition.\n\n#Persistence of the elements of mind.#\n\nProfessor Mach says in his article \"The Analysis of the Sensations\":\n\"When _I_ (the ego) cease to perceive the sensation green, when I die,\nthen the elements no longer occur in their customary, common way of\nassociation. That is all. Only an ideal mental economical unity, not\na real unity, has ceased to exist.\" The term sensations, it appears\nto me, can in this passage be interpreted neither as _K_ \u03ba only, nor\nas the whole relations _A K_ \u03ba, but as any _A B C_ ... relations; and\nsince Professor Mach has not excluded from them the element of feeling,\nI should have to represent them by _A_ \u03b1, _B_ \u03b2, _C_ \u03b3.... Sensations\nas I understand the term (viz. _A K_ \u03ba, _B L_ \u03bb), are elements of\nmind; if they are further analysed they cease to be mental states.\nSays Professor Mach: \"If I close my eye (_K_) withdraw my feeling hand\n(_L_), _A B C_ ... disappear. In this dependence _A B C_ ... are called\nsensations.\" Should we not rather say, they cease to be sensations, if\nthis dependence ceases? Accordingly, sensations and sense-impressions\nare for this and for other reasons not indecomposable, not ultimate\natoms. The elements of mind can be further analysed into the elements\nof the elements of mind. The elements of mind do not persist; but the\nultimate elements of the elements of mind, whatever they are, do (or at\nleast may) persist.\n\nWhen speaking of the elements of the elements of mind we cease to deal\nwith objects of actual experience as much as a physicist or chemist\ndoes who speaks about atoms. Nevertheless the analysis is as legitimate\nin our case as it is in the chemist's. If in the above quoted passage\nI am allowed to replace Professor Mach's term \"sensations\" by elements\nof sense-impressions, I should not hesitate unreservedly to accept\nhis idea. These elements of sensations would be all kinds of natural\nprocesses, all kinds of motion. They would be physical actions which\nare not mere motions but also and at the same time elements of feeling.\n\n#Ideas as contrivances for comprehension.#\n\nIt is true that abstract concepts, and especially scientific terms and\ntheories, are mere contrivances to understand the connections among,\nand the qualities of, real things. Ideas are not the real things, but\ntheir representations, and some ideas are not even representations;\nthey are solely of an auxiliary nature and comparable to tools. They\nare used as working hypotheses wherever the real state of things is in\npart hidden from us, until we have found the actual connections. As\nsoon as the actual connections are found we can and must lay down our\ntools.\n\nIn a certain sense all words and concepts are tools for dealing with\nthe realities they represent. But some words are tools in a special\nsense. They have been invented for acquiring a proper representation.\n\n#The dignity of mental tools.#\n\nProfessor Mach says: \"The implement is not of the same dignity or\nreality as _A B C_....\" It appears to me that these implements (if\nthey are of the right kind) have almost a higher dignity (although not\nreality) than the material to which they are applied. My respect for\ntools is very great, for tools are the most important factors, perhaps\nthe decisive factors, in the evolution of man. The usage of tools\nhas matured, nay created the human mind, and words,\u2014scientific and\nabstract terms and theories not excluded,\u2014are the most important and\nmost sacred tools of all.\n\nSome ideas, it is true, have to be laid aside like tools that are\nno longer wanted; but there are other ideas which we cannot lay\naside, because they have more value than the ideas of a mere working\nhypothesis. Some ideas are indispensable and will remain indispensable;\nwe shall always have to employ them in order to represent in our mind\nthe connection between certain facts. If we see a train pass into a\ntunnel and emerge from it at the other end, we will connect in our mind\nthese two sensations by the thought of the train's passage from one end\nto the other. This idea is not a sensation; it is a noumenon. Shall it\ntherefore be called a _mere_ noumenon, a tool that has to be discarded\nas soon as we are accustomed to expect a train to emerge from the one\nend of a tunnel soon after it has disappeared into it at the other end?\n\n#Noumena legitimate, if representing realities.#\n\nThere are scientific concepts which, for some reason or other, can\nnever become objects of direct observation; they can never become\nsensations. Nevertheless we must think them together with certain\nsensations as indispensable connecting events taking place behind the\nstage and hidden from our eyes. Our conception of a train hidden from\nsight in a tunnel, it is true, is a noumenon, but it is a legitimate\nnoumenon, it represents a reality. So also many scientific ideas,\nalthough undoubtedly things of thought, are legitimate noumena. If\nthey contain and in so far as they do contain nothing but formulated\nfeatures of reality or inevitable conclusions from verified and\nverifiable experiences, these things of thought represent something\nreal, which means that if we were in possession of microscopes of\nsufficient power, or if we could look behind the veil that hides them\nfrom our sight, we should see them, just as we should see the train if\nthe rock through which the tunnel leads were transparent.\n\n\nIII. THE ORIGIN OF FEELING.\n\nConcerning the origin of feeling Professor Mach says: \"The question how\nfeeling arises out of the physical element has for me no significance.\"\nI agree that we cannot ask how feeling arises out of the physical\nelement. But feeling being a fleeting phenomenon, to propose the\nproblem of the origin of feeling _has_ a significance.\n\n#Physical elements with and without feeling.#\n\nSome physical elements\u2014namely, those of our own body\u2014are indubitably\npossessed of the subjective phenomena of feeling. And as to certain\nother physical elements, observable in our fellow creatures, that is in\nmen and animals, no one would think of denying their presence either.\nBut there are physical elements which we regard as bare of all feeling.\nThe wind that blows, and the avalanche that plunges into the valley are\nnot supposed to be feelings. Yet the energy of the wind and the energy\nof the avalanche may be utilised and ultimately stored up in food. The\nfood may be changed into human energy and then the element of feeling\nappears as if called forth out of the void. We agree that feeling has\nnot been changed from motion. But if feeling was not motion before,\nwhat was it? Feeling cannot be a creation from nothing. Consequently\nit must in its elements have existed before. Feeling, namely actual\nfeeling, must be regarded as a special mode of action of the elements\nof feeling. If all that which we can observe in motion, all that\nwhich the term motion comprises, constituting the objective changes\ntaking place in nature, contains nothing of feeling or of the elements\nof feeling, we must yet attach to every motion the presence of this\nelement of feeling.\n\n#Elements of feeling not observable.#\n\nThat the potential subjectivity of the physical elements, namely\nthe elements of feeling, cannot be seen; as motions can be seen and\nobjectively observed, is not a reason that militates against this view;\nfor it is the nature of all subjective states to be felt only by the\nfeeling subject. If all feelings are objectively unobservable except\nby their correspondent motions, the elements of feeling can form no\nexception to the general rule.\n\n * * * * *\n\n#The animation of all nature.#\n\nProfessor Mach says: \"Some years ago I should have agreed _in toto_\nwith the passages in which Dr. Carus speaks of the animation of all\nnature and of the feeling that accompanies every motion.\"\n\n#Nature not all feeling.#\n\nLet me here emphasise that I have termed nature \"alive\" not in the\nsense that every motion is supposed to be accompanied with sensation,\nnor with any kind of feeling, but with an element of feeling only. I\nam aware that the term element of feeling may be easily misunderstood,\nand it seems advisable to guard against such misconceptions. Actual\nfeeling I suppose originates from the elements of feeling similarly\nas an electric current originates under certain special conditions.\nSulphuric acid dissolves zinc and sets energy free which appears in the\ncopper wire as electricity. It is an instance of the transformation of\npotential energy into kinetic energy.\n\n#The term \"elements of feeling\" inappropriate.#\n\nTo use the expression \"elements of feeling\" is no more or less\nallowable than to speak of the stored up energy from which electricity\nis produced, as elements of electricity. The latter expression is\ninappropriate, because we are in possession of better terms, because\nour range of experience in the subject is wider. But suppose that\namong all molar and molecular motions we were only acquainted with\nelectricity and knew nothing of potential energy, could we not for want\nof a better word form the term \"elements of electricity\"?\n\n#What the elements of feeling are not.#\n\nThe elements of feeling should not be supposed to be feelings on a\nvery small scale. The elements of feeling may be and for aught we know\nare as much unlike actual feelings as mechanical motion, or chemical\ndissolution is unlike electricity. The essential features of feeling\nmay be, and I believe they are, produced through the form in which\ntheir elements co-operate. Similarly the different pieces of a clock\nand the atoms of which it consists contain nothing of the clock; and\nif we should call the heaviness of a weight, the swinging property\nof the pendulum, the tension of the spring, etc., etc., elements of\nchronometry, it might appear ridiculous, because we know so many other\nprocesses, viz. all different ways of performing work, for which these\nqualities can be used. The action of a spring, of a suspended weight,\nof a mere pendulum are not by themselves elements of chronometry; they\nbecome a chronometrical arrangement only by their proper combination\nwith a dial and hands attached, and by being correctly regulated in\nadaptation to temperature and many other conditions.\n\n * * * * *\n\nIt is not plausible that the earth, when in its gaseous state, was the\nhabitation of any feeling beings, and it is actually impossible that\nit harbored feeling beings as they exist now. Feeling accordingly must\nhave originated, and the question how feeling originates is a problem\nthat suggests itself naturally to the psychologist as well as the\nphilosopher.\n\n#Vital energy a unique form of energy.#\n\nThe kinetic energy liberated in our actions, in brain-activity as well\nas muscular motions, is produced from the potential energy stored up\nin our tissues. This energy, _qua_ energy, is the same energy which we\nmeet everywhere in nature. All kinds of energy are interconvertible.\nYet we must bear in mind that the vital energy displayed in animal\norganisms is a special and indeed a unique form of energy. It is as\ndifferent from other forms of energy as is, for instance, electricity\nfrom molar motion.\n\n#Physiology and psychology not applied mechanics.#\n\nIn former times physics and chemistry were considered as applied\nmechanics, and physiology as applied chemistry. This position,\nhowever, is wrong and had to be abandoned. Mechanical, chemical,\nphysiological, and psychical processes exhibit radically different\nconditions. The student of mechanics, the chemist, the physiologist,\nthe psychologist, each one of them attempts to solve a different\nproblem. They accordingly deal with different sets of abstractions. The\nprocesses which constitute the subject-matter of the physiologist's\nand psychologist's work are different from those of the mechanical\nphilosopher and of the chemist. The abstraction of the so-called\npurely mechanical excludes such processes as chemical combinations;\nit is limited to molar mechanics only. The term molecular mechanics\nis an attempt at widening the domain of mechanics. But the terms\nof neither molecular nor molar mechanics contain anything of the\nproperly physiological nature observed in vegetal and animal life. The\nlatter is a very complicated process which may briefly be described\nas assimilation of living forms. The laws of molar and molecular\nmotions are not annulled, yet they are superseded; they remain, yet\nsome additional important traits appear. Different conditions and\ncomplications show different features and the characteristics of\norganised life are not the molar or molecular mechanics of their\nmotions but their properly physiological features.\n\nMechanical laws accordingly cannot explain physiological action, and\nstill less have they anything in common with ideas, or thoughts, or\nfeelings. Accordingly, the attempt to apply mechanics to any other than\nmechanical considerations is _prima facie_ to be rejected. We must\nnever forget that all our scientific inquiries deal with certain sides\nof reality only.\n\n#The higher view of the whole.#\n\nThe abstractions of the mechanical philosopher as well as those of the\nphysiologist and psychologist are one-sided aspects only of reality.\nYet it is quite legitimate to take a higher standpoint in order to\nclassify our notions so that the general views comprise the special\nviews and to determine the relations among the several in their kind\nmost general views. In this way we can shape our entire knowledge into\nan harmonious world-conception representing the whole as a whole. This\nI tried to do when, following the precedent of Fechner and Clifford,\nI proposed the problem of the origin of actual feelings from the\nnon-feeling elements-of-feeling, the former depending upon a special\ncombination or form of action of the latter, and the latter being a\nuniversal feature of reality.\n\n#The additional feature in a stone's fall.#\n\nWhen we observe some very simple process in nature, e. g. the fall of\na stone, we represent it as a motion. We formulate the operation of\nthe stone's fall into a law, describing its mode of action as it holds\ngood in all cases of the same kind. But the motion observable and\nrepresentable in our mind is not all that takes place. There must be\nsome additional feature which in a further development will appear as\nman's consciousness.\n\nTo regard the fall of a stone as only a very simple instance of\nessentially the same process that takes place when a man does an act,\ni. e. performs a motion accompanied with consciousness, appears at\nfirst sight strange or even absurd. But we cannot escape the assumption\nthat in a certain respect it is the same thing. We are inevitably\ndriven to adopt this monistic conception of things by inexorable\nlogical arguments; and we are supported in it by the observation of\nnatural processes.\n\n#Human activity and energy.#\n\nHuman action develops by degrees out of other natural processes,\nand we have sufficient evidence to believe that humanity with its\ncivilisation, science, art, and all its ideals\u2014so far as the energy\nalone, spent in human activity, is considered\u2014is but a differentiation\nof natural forces that has come to pass on the cooled off surface\nof the earth under the influence of solar heat. Man is transformed\nsolar heat. All the forces animating the planetary system are\ndifferentiations from the heat of which our solar system was possessed\nwhen in a nebular state. And what is the heat of which nebular masses\nare possessed? It is the motion of celestial bodies, of comets, or of\nso called world-dust, changed by collision into molecular motion.\n\nBut in human activity there is some additional element, that of purely\nsubjective awareness, which is neither energy in itself nor can have\nbeen transformed from energy; it must have existed potentially.\nAccordingly we assume that also in the more primitive processes of\nnature there is some additional element which in its full development\nappears as feeling and reaches its highest stage known to us, in the\nconsciousness of man.\n\n\nIV. THE ORIGIN OF ORGANISED LIFE.\n\n#Organised life and feeling.#\n\nThere is a very original view concerning the origin of life advocated\nin this number of _The Monist_ by Dr. George M. Gould in his article\non \"Immortality.\"[84] The problem of the origin of life (namely, of\norganised life) is so closely connected with the problem of the origin\nof feeling, that the one cannot be solved without solving the other.\nFeeling such as we are familiar with is an exclusive property of\norganised life and a few incidental remarks on Dr. Gould's proposition\nwill therefore not be out of place.\n\n [84] It cannot be denied that many ideas set forth by Dr.\n Gould in his presentation of the problem of immortality\n contain a deep truth. The brilliant and forcible language in\n which the author treats his subject is admirable. But the\n passages on the externality of life present a conception\n which stands in direct opposition to the views that have been\n editorially upheld in _The Open Court_ as well as the _Monist_.\n\n#Dr. Gould's dualism.#\n\nIn introducing here the views of Dr. Gould in a discussion with\nProfessor Mach, I am fully aware of the great difference that obtains\nbetween the two. While Professor Mach's thought moves in an outspoken\nmonistic direction, Dr. Gould presents a bold dualism, attributing to\nall life, to the lichen on the withered rock no less than to the human\nsoul, an extramundane origin. Why should we not then rather adopt\nthe more consistent theological supernaturalism which attributes to\ninorganic nature also an extramundane origin, thus to realise by a\nshort cut a complete unitary world-conception?\n\nDr. Gould's proposition is contained in the following:\n\n \"Certain confused and confusion-breeding philosophers, in\n the interests of a theoretical monism or pantheism pretend\n to find, or to believe, that the organic is born out of\n the inorganic, that the physical world shows evidence of\n design, that life and mentality were implicate and latent in\n pre-existent matter. Yet they will accept the evidence against\n spontaneous generation derived from the fact that if you kill\n all organic life by intense heat and then exclude life from\n without you will never find life to arise. But it is plain\n that in the condensation of the dust of space into suns and\n planets, all organic life was killed in the hottest of all\n conceivable heat. But as the planets cool, life appears. It\n must have come from without, and must therefore be a universal\n self-existent power.\"\n\n#What can externality of life mean?#\n\nThe idea that \"life must have come from without\" is not quite clear.\nDoes Dr. Gould mean \"from without our planetary system, out of\nother planetary systems\"? If so, the same objection holds good: In\nother planetary systems also when they were in a nebular state \"all\norganic[85] life was killed in the hottest of all conceivable heat.\"\nShall we perhaps consider the cold interstellar regions as the place\nwhence life does come? And if \"from without\" means \"from without the\nwhole universe,\" we should be driven back to the old supernaturalistic\ndualism which regards nature as dead and life as a foreign element that\nhas been blown into the nostrils of material forms so as to animate\nthem.\n\n [85] Dr. Gould does not seem to make a distinction between\n \"organic\" and \"organised.\" We should here prefer the\n expression \"organised life.\" Carbon is an \"organic substance\"\n but not an \"organised substance.\" A cell and its protoplasm,\n however, are \"organised substance.\"\n\n#A modern thinker on the externality of life.#\n\nDr. Gould proposes his theory of the external origin of life, with\ngreat confidence, in the name of modern science. Must we add that\nmodern science is very far from sustaining his view? Professor Clifford\ntouches the subject of spontaneous generation in his article \"Virchow\non the Teaching of Science.\" He says:\n\n \"Why do the experiments all 'go against' spontaneous\n generation? What the experiments really prove is that the\n coincidence which would form a _Bacterium_\u2014already a definite\n structure reproducing its like\u2014does not occur in a test-tube\n during the periods yet observed.... The experiments have\n nothing whatever to say to the production of enormously\n simpler forms, in the vast range of the ocean, during the ages\n of the earth's existence.... We know from physical reasons\n that the earth was once in a liquid state from excessive heat.\n Then there could have been no living matter upon it. Now\n there is. Consequently non-living matter has been turned into\n living matter _somehow_. We can only get out of spontaneous\n generation by the supposition made by Sir W. Thompson, in jest\n or earnest, that some piece of living matter came to the earth\n from outside, perhaps with a meteorite. I wish to treat all\n hypotheses with respect, and to have no preferences which are\n not entirely founded on reason; and yet whenever I contemplate\n this\n\n simpler protoplasmic shape\n Which came down in a fire-escape,\n\n an internal monitor, of which I can give no rational account,\n invariably whispers 'Fiddlesticks!'\"\n\n#Difficulties of Dr. Gould's position.#\n\nSuppose, however, Dr. Gould's assumption were accepted, suppose that\nlife had come from without, matter were of itself lifeless, and life,\nthe \"self-existent power,\" had ensouled some dead organic substances\nso as to cause their organisation, would we be any wiser through this\nhypothesis? The assumption instead of diminishing the difficulties in\nthe problem of life, would increase them. New questions arise: What\nmust this \"self-existent power\" be conceived to be? Does it exist\nwithout a physical basis (to use Professor Huxley's phrase)? How does\nit differ from energy? Is not all power energy of some kind? And are\nnot all kinds of energy interconvertible? Has this self-existent power\nthe faculty of changing other energy into itself, into life, or is it\nonly supposed to utilise it? In the latter case it would be a _Ding an\nsich_, not in but behind the functions of organisms; and in both cases\nit would form an exception to the law of the conservation of energy,\nfor \"the self-existent power of life\" would be an ever-increasing\npower. One life-germ only may have come from spheres unknown into the\nuniverse, and by utilising the mechanical energy of the material world\nhas animated at least our earth, and may animate in a similar way\nall the globes in the milky way. That life-germ, however,\u2014if it was\nanything like a real life-germ, such as our naturalists know of,\u2014must\nhave consisted of organic substance. What a strange coincidence, that\noutside of the world also organic substances are found! Life-germs\nare not simple substance, but highly complex organisms. Accordingly,\nthe question presents itself, How has this life-germ been formed?\nWhat conditions in another world radically different from ours have\nmoulded it and combined its parts into this special life-germ so\nextraordinarily adaptable to our material universe? Or must we suppose\nthat the first life-germ was formed out of the cosmic substance of our\nuniverse by a non-material spark of life, (whatever life may mean,)\nthat had dropped in somehow into the material world from without?\n\nIf life is a self-existent power, why does it always appear dependent\nupon and vary with the organisation, which it is supposed to have\nformed? Why has life never been observed in its self-existence? So far\nas we have ever been able to observe life, it is matter organised and\norganising more matter. All the difficulties disappear if we say, Life\ndoes not produce organisation, it is organisation.\n\n * * * * *\n\n#Organisms nor aggregates of cells.#\n\nDr. Gould, in appealing to the latest scientific researches as proving\n\"the dependence of all organisation upon life,\" especially mentions\nhis friend Dr. Edmund Montgomery and also Professor Frommen's article\n\"Zelle\" (Eulenburg's \"Realencyclop\u00e4die der gesammten Heilkunde,\" 1890).\nNow it is true, as Dr. Gould says, that \"the body of animals is not an\naggregate of cells.\" It is as little a mere aggregate of cells as a\nwatch is a mere aggregate of metal, or as a hexagon a mere aggregate\nof lines. The body of animals is an organism; which means, it is an\ninteracting whole of a special form built of irritable substance. A\nhighly complex organism is not and cannot be considered as a compound\nof its diverse organs, but as a differentiation. Its unity is preserved\nin the differentiation, yet this unity does not exist outside of or\napart from the differentiated parts.\n\n#Disparity of life and matter.#\n\nI fully assent to Professor Huxley's proposition, approvingly quoted\nby Dr. Gould, that \"materialism is the most baseless of all dogmas.\"\nI also believe in the _omne vivum ex vivo_; but I do not consider it\nwith Dr. Gould as an axiom, nor can I accept the consequence which Dr.\nGould derives from it, \"that life [viz. organised life] is more certain\nand enduring than matter, soul than sense.\" It is true that \"matter\nand life\" are \"as far apart as heaven and earth.\" Farther indeed,\nfor they are two abstractions of an entirely disparate character. No\npassage through spatial distance, be it ever so large, could bring\nboth concepts together. They are and remain as different, as is for\ninstance the idea expressed in a sentence from the ink with which it is\nwritten. Ideas contain no ink and ink contains no ideas. Yet this does\nnot prove that ideas exist by themselves in a ghostlike abstractness\napart not only from ink, but also from feeling brain-substance. Nor\ndoes the disparity of the terms life and matter prove the abstract or\nindependent existence of life outside of matter.\n\nIf life for some such reasons as hold good only in so far as they\nrefute the old-style materialism, could or should be considered as\nbeing some self-existent power having come into the world \"to bite\"\nat matter, we might also consider the hexagon as a something that\ncame into the mathematical world from without. The hexagon cannot be\nexplained as a mere aggregate of lines, accordingly hexagoneity must be\na self-existent power; it must have come from without, utilising lines\nfor its hexagonic existence.\n\nOrganised life must have originated from non-organised elements by\norganisation, and thus a new sphere is created which introduces new\nconditions. The laws of organised life are not purely mechanical laws,\nnor physical laws, nor chemical laws, but they are a peculiar kind of\nlaws; just as different as chemical laws are from purely mechanical\nlaws (the latter not including such phenomena as are generally called\nchemical affinity).\n\n#Natural laws and monism.#\n\nNatural laws are formulas describing facts as they take place under\ncertain conditions. Accordingly if special conditions arise we shall\nhave a special set of laws. Monism assumes that all the laws of nature\nagree among themselves; there is no contradiction among them possible.\nYet there may be an infinite variety of applications. The processes\nof organised life are not mere mechanical processes. The abstractions\nwhich we comprise under our mechanical terms do not cover certain\nfeatures of vital activity and cannot explain them. Physiology is not\nmerely applied physics; it is a province of natural processes that has\nconditions of its own and the physiological conditions are different\nfrom physical conditions. This however does not overthrow monism. We\nbelieve none the less in the unity of all natural laws and trust that\nif the constitution of the cosmos were transparent in its minutest\ndetails to our inquiring mind, we should see the same law operating\nin all the different provinces; we should see in all instances a\ndifference of conditions and consequent thereupon a difference of\nresults that can be formulated in different natural laws, among which\nthere is none contradictory to any other.\n\n EDITOR.\n\n\n\n\nLITERARY CORRESPONDENCE.\n\n\nI.\n\nFRENCH PUBLICATIONS.\n\nWhy do we sleep? Some have said, through cerebral congestion; others,\nthrough cerebral an\u00e6mia. In reality the question remains undecided. M.\nS. SERGUEYEFF has attempted to resolve it in his scholarly lectures\npublished under the title of _Le Sommeil et le Syst\u00e8me nerveux,\nPhysiologie de la Veille et du Sommeil_.[86] He considers it under a\nnew and very general point of view.\n\n [86] In two thick octavo volumes. Alcan, publisher.\n\nAccording to him, wake and sleep would be the two alternating phases\nof one and the same function, necessarily vegetative, and absolutely\nindispensable to life. Sleep would respond to an assimilation; wake to\na dis-assimilation.\n\nTo this vegetative function, nevertheless, it is necessary to assign an\naliment, an organ, a mechanism. Now as yet we know of only two material\nforms of assimilative activity, the one semi-liquid for digestion,\nthe other gaseous for respiration. The aliment of sleep would be, as\nopposed to this, an ethereal matter, or, if we wish, a dynamic form,\nsusceptible of being accumulated and of being transformed in various\nways. At first sight, no doubt, it seems difficult to accept a sthenic\naliment, without a ponderable substratum, and it sounds a little\nstrange to seek in the phenomena of wake and sleep \"an assimilative\ngroup the object of which belongs to the ambient dynamism,\" in other\nterms, \"a functional activity,\" which should be influenced by the\ncondition of the alimentary source\u2014that which would give at the same\ntime the explication of the fact, that, in a general way, the two\nphases of wake and sleep are related to the planetary periodicity of\nday and night, summer and winter. Let us, however, follow M. Sergueyeff\nin his interesting researches, where the scientific spirit does not\ncease, at any rate, to sustain him.\n\nIn his theory the cerebro-spinal system is no longer the organ, as\nit is in the theories of congestion and an\u00e6mia; but it is rather the\nso-called sympathetic elements, the ganglio-epidermic system, of which\nthe imperfectly known functions rightly require to be explained.\nStruck with the insufficient reasons given of the phenomenon of\ncaloricity resulting from the section of a sympathetic nerve, or from\nthe obstruction of a ganglion, M. Sergueyeff has been led to assume an\naction of the great sympathetic, different from the vaso-motor action.\nHe does not hesitate, in order to explain the caloricity, to admit\ninto physiology the principle of the mechanical equivalence of heat.\nHe endeavors to prove, by an ingenious argument, that the heat which\nis produced after the section of the sympathetic nerves, finds its\nimmediate origin in the arrest of a nervous centripetal movement; that\nthis arrested movement owes its existence to dynamic condensations,\nto which certain organs of the ganglionic system are adapted, being\nendowed with a condensatory capacity; and finally that in the normal\nstate the movement represents, not an expenditure of energy, but a\ncontribution, that is to say, it is a movement of a trophical character.\n\nThe sanguineous condition of the brain remains to be considered; but\nthe difference in this respect between wake and sleep, would be purely\ndistributive instead of being quantitative. Schiff has remarked that\nwhite rats deprived of their cerebral lobes and corpora striata sleep\nand wake; which leads us to think that the phenomena of cerebral\nirrigation are consequentials, and not essentials, of wake and sleep.\nIn short, these two alternating phases serve in turns as chief moving\ncauses for the vaso-motor excitation which differences, in one or\nthe other period, the sanguineous condition of this or that medullar\nlocality.\n\nWe cannot follow the author in the special study he makes, first\nof the sensitive nerves and the motor nerves, then of the \"cerebral\nactivities\" in the conditions of wake and sleep. It would be laborious\nto disengage his psychological doctrine from the long discussions\nwhich envelop it, and which, well carried out as they may be, do\nnot always allow it to appear with as much distinctness as could\nbe wished. We will note only the care that he takes to restore the\n_psychic initiative_, contrary to the theories most in favor to-day.\nHe supposes a prefunctional movement of the sensitive nerves, in\norder to determine the sensorial impression; \"attentive volitions\" in\norder to explain attention, voluntary or involuntary. According to\nhim, the physiological phenomenon which necessarily corresponds to\nsufficient attention, that is to say to the laying hold of an object by\nconsciousness, can only be a volitional nervous movement. He remains\nconvinced that \"the cells of the brain must project incessantly in\ncertain of their afferent fibres centrifugal influxes which tend to\nmeet with perceptive images\"; and feeble and involuntary as these\ninfluxes may be, he ranks them nevertheless in the somewhat mysterious\ncategory of so-called attentive volitions. These are not reflexes, but\nautomatic movements. And definitively, every act of attention belongs\nto the category of volitional movement, be it involuntary or voluntary;\nor in short, \"attentive volition exists prior to its voluntary\nstrengthening.\"\n\nAs to the revival of images, it is necessary to admit the intervention\nof a previous tendency to association. The difficulty remains then\nto know how we are to be able to keep these images before the\nconsciousness, in order to apply our attention to them, and what secret\ncause has power to arouse the signals, the nervous movements, which\npresent them to it. The author resolves the difficulty by accepting,\nfor cases of intentional reviviscence, _ideo-motor_ volitions, to which\nhe attributes a considerable r\u00f4le; their intervention distinguishes\nprecisely, says he, the active memory from the passive memory.\n\nIn reality, for M. Sergueyeff the consciousness is not, as we have\nsaid, a simple result of the image, an epiphenomenon; it is permanent\n(thus he affirms that we always think, that we always dream); the\n_Ego_, the _We_ is for him an irreducible factor. This way of looking\nat things has evidently influenced the choice of his terminology, more\nthan it has vitiated his analysis, and its conclusions, moreover, he\nhas not put down to the credit of any system of metaphysics whatever.\nFar from having exhausted the matter of his book, which is replete with\ncriticisms and facts, I have hardly sketched its outlines, and I should\nbe his false interpreter if I did not recall, in conclusion, the hope\nstrongly expressed by himself, that the great assimilative work of an\nimponderable aliment reserves for us many other solutions beyond that\nof the phenomena of wake and sleep. \"Though it may be,\" says he to his\nhearers, \"that in all the recent words I have uttered, the truth shines\nonly by a spark, do not disdain this spark, gentlemen. May one of you\nreceive it within him, for it can, I have the confidence, by a more\npowerful breath than mine suddenly increase, like a polar aurora, and\nilluminate unbounded horizons.\"\n\n * * * * *\n\nWe now come to a book of less scope, rudely constructed perhaps,\nbut very instructive. As indicated by the title chosen by him, _La\nPsychologie de l'Idiot et de l'Imb\u00e8cile_,[87] Dr. PAUL SOLLIER has\nattempted to draw the portrait of the idiot and the imbecile _in\ngeneral_; which I sincerely approve of persuaded as I am that we shall\nfind profit in sketching generic types and in tracing the composite\nphotographs of social individuals grouped in various ways, in order\nto establish on solid basis a \"natural history\" of societies. The\nnovelists have approached this difficult enterprise at random; it is\nfor the psychologists to direct it with a method more sure and a tact\nnot less delicate.\n\n [87] Alcan, publisher.\n\nIdiocy is not always congenital; the lesions which produce it are\nextremely varied and do not consist by any means in a simple arrest of\ndevelopment. In short, idiots form a very diversified clinical group;\nand here was the first difficulty necessary to overcome in order to\nwrite their psychology. Profiting by the insufficient definitions\nthat authors have given of idiocy, M. Sollier thinks he is able in\nhis turn to define it as \"a chronic cerebral affection with varied\nlesions, characterised by troubles of the intellectual, sensitive,\nand motory functions, going possibly as far as their almost complete\nabolition, and which assumes its special character, particularly in\nwhat concerns intellectual troubles, only in the youthful age of the\nsubjects it strikes.\" Then, discussing the proposed classification, he\nstops to form three categories, which he connects with the intellectual\ndevelopment, for which attention serves him as the touch-stone. They\nare: (1) absolute idiocy\u2014complete absence and impossibility of\nattention; (2) simple idiocy\u2014feebleness and difficulty of attention;\n(3) imbecility\u2014instability of attention. These differences in the\nstate of attention (we recognise the fruit of the excellent teaching\nof M. Ribot) separate with sufficient clearness the imbecile from the\nidiot: the latter remains extra-social, the former becomes anti-social.\nM. Sollier, for whom the imbecile, let us say in passing, is an\nexceedingly disagreeable personage, follows out throughout the whole of\nhis book this distinction, which seems to us one of the most curious\nand the most piquant aspects of it. How many people in the world\nborder on imbecility, without belonging clinically to this type, and\nmaintain the mischievous r\u00f4le of destroyers and marplots!\n\nReaders familiar with the study of mental maladies will not be\nastonished to find among idiots the following signs of degeneracy:\ndulled senses, obtuse perceptions, a poor condition of sensibility\nand consequently of mobility, and anomalies or perversions of the\ninstincts, sentiments, etc. But that which makes of them a group apart,\nis the constitution of the perfect type from infancy, while among the\ndegenerates properly so-called, the perversions, the manias, etc.\npresent, are the episodical concurrences of a morbid evolution which\nunrolls itself capriciously in the course of a whole life.\n\nM. Sollier has interesting remarks nearly everywhere in his book. We\nmay refer, for example, to what he says concerning pity, courage; of\nwriting; of hereditary organic memory; of ideas, etc. It is curious,\ncertainly, to see idiots suddenly show themselves skilful in playing\nan instrument which was that of their father and of their grandfather.\nA passing observation on impressionability, greater for color in girls\nand for form in boys, deserves to be developed: I regret that the\nauthor should have been sparing of details on this point as on some\nothers. M. Sollier appears, we may say, to have aimed not so much at\ngiving new explanations in psychology, as at verifying those which\nhave been proposed by good authors. He is precise, positive; from the\nmedico-legal point of view, he presents practical conclusions, and does\nnot embarrass himself in sentimentalism, from which the _Philosophie\np\u00e9nale_[88] of M. TARDE, let it be said parenthetically, is not always\nsufficiently free.\n\n [88] First volume of the _Biblioth\u00e8que de Criminologie_.\n Masson, publisher.\n\nA word more with reference to the \"great suggestibility\" of imbeciles,\non which M. Sollier reasonably insists. Since I spoke in this place,\nthree months ago, of the work of M. Bonjean, the awkward intervention\nof M. Li\u00e9geois in the Eyraud-Gabrielle Bompard case has contributed to\ncompromise the Nancy school, much more than to serve it. M. Brouardel\nis able to object with ingenuity that certain persons, supposed to be\nvictims of hypnotism, unfortunately obey suggestions \"which are the\nmost agreeable to them.\" It is good advice to be cautious. Still it is\nnecessary to take into account (it is what I had omitted to say) the\ncharacter of the subjects, in order to be able to judge of the possible\naccomplishment of acts suggested in sleep. For, it is not doubtful\nthat among the abnormal, the imbecile, the mentally feeble, one could\nnot count much on the revolt of a moral personality which is not\nconstituted, on the efficiency of a power of inhibition which is almost\nnull, and that generally criminal suggestion can become formidable when\nit is attended by bad instincts.\n\nIt remains to speak of a work by M. A. RICARDOU, _De l'Id\u00e9al, Etude\nphilosophique_.[89] I avow without any disguise that I have not taken\nany interest in it. M. Ricardou declares himself a deist, spiritualist;\nthe misfortune is that he follows so much the vague and wavering manner\nof his school. A fine rhetoric, elevated aspirations; but few facts,\nnot sufficient realities freely seen. What end is served by rebelling\nagainst physiological psychology, and by laying claim to the rights of\nthe method of introspection? In truth, no one denies its right; it is\nsuspected only when it affects supremacy, and rejects all control.\n\n [89] Alcan, publisher.\n\nI simply mention, in conclusion, the interesting work, which appeared\nlast year, of M. L. LEVY-BRUHL: _L'Allemagne depuis Leibniz, Essai\nsur le developpement de la conscience nationale en Allemagne_.[90] It\nbelongs, in great part, to the history of philosophy, and furnishes to\nit a valuable contribution.\n\n [90] Hachette, publisher.\n\n Paris, March, 1891. LUCIEN ARR\u00c9AT.\n\n\nII.\n\nTHE MODERN LITERATURE OF ITALY SINCE THE YEAR 1870.\n\nNot being a man of letters, but an alienist, I will give you a\npsychological rather than a literary description of the condition of\nliterature in Italy. My presentation will undoubtedly have many defects\nand deficiencies in details, but it will perhaps thereby gain in\noriginality of treatment.\n\nIt is one of the characteristics of European writers, and especially of\nItalians, to isolate themselves completely from scientific research.\nBeauty for itself, the imitation of the ancients\u2014this is the defect,\nor the strength, of our poets. ALEARDI, it is true, put some years ago\na little botany and geology into his poetry, as did, nearly a century\nago, Mascheroni, in his celebrated epistle _Invito a Lesbia Sidonia_.\nZANELLA, a true priest, has sung in a celebrated ode the _Coquille\nFossile_, which portrays in colors truly poetical the last discoveries\nof paleontology. But this naturalism was only a light varnish, like the\ngolden powder that coquettes sprinkle on their hair, and which falls\nat the first movement. It is nevertheless true that some poets, not\nappreciated yet as they deserve, draw their inspiration from nature or\nfrom history.\n\nSuch is ARTUR GRAF, who in my opinion owes his genius to an\nintermixture of race, Italian, Greek, and German, and also to a\nclimatic graft, as he comes from Roumania; which shows the favorable\ninfluence of the double race-infusion. (See my work on \"Genius.\") In\nhis poem _Medusa_, Graf has mingled naturalism and Schopenhauerianism\nwith a poetical spirit which is highly original. He has also written\n_Il Diabolo_ and the _Legend of Rome among the Nations of the Middle\nAges_; a work which has philological and historical merit, especially\nin connection with the Folk-lore of past centuries. These books are in\nprose; but their form is wholly poetical.\n\nRAPISARDI is truly the Juvenal, and we may also say the Lucretius,\nof contemporaneous Italy. He began by giving us the best translation\nof the great Roman poet, and he has absorbed much of his spirit, and\nperhaps also of the asperity of his verses, and of his contempt for\nform. His great original poem is the _Giobbe_ (Catania), in which\nhe has given a bitter satire of modern society and of contemporary\nliterary men; however, he would seem to be sometimes too personal;\nso much so that many persons have not forgiven him. Lately he has\npublished a collection of _Religious Poems_ (Catania, 1888), in which,\ndespite its title, there is much less religion than naturalism. It is a\nhymn, worthy of its master, to the religion of nature and to the beauty\nof truth, without forgetting the grand social ideas of justice which\nour poets so often forget.\n\nPRAGA may be described as the Baudelaire of Italy. He too, like the\nlatter, lived and died an alcoholist and paralytic. He was the first to\nbreak with the Gr\u00e6co-Latin traditions; and has drawn his inspiration\nfrom the caprices of his disease, which has given him a powerful and\noriginal stamp. His best works are _Penombre_ and _Tavolozza_. The\nsame lot, induced by the same disease, has befallen ROVANI, who in his\nhistorical novels (_Giulio Cesare_ and _la Storia di centi anni_) has\nperformed good work in history and psychology.\n\nAmong writers truly original, MANTEGAZZA excels in prose. His is one\nof those many-sided, versatile minds that are met with in the Latin\nraces; such as Cardano, Leonardo da Vinci, L. B. Alberti, Voltaire,\nTaine, Richet. He is by turns pathologist, physiologist, chemist,\nanthropologist, geographer, traveller, and novelist. His novel _Dio\nIgnoto_ is semi-naturalistic. In his _Fisiologia del piacere_ he has\nattempted a new kind of personal observations, although it is met\nwith in the novels of Balzac, of Flaubert, and of Gonoret. In his\n_Physiology of pain_ he has again become pathological, serious; this\nbook has, accordingly, not obtained the success that it merited. In\nthe _Feste ed Ebbrezze_ he describes the pleasures of the people.\nBut Mantegazza, who has the originality of genius, has also its evil\nand treacherous volubility; and we cannot say what is his patriotic\nand philosophic faith. He has written pages that seem dictated by a\ncatholic priest, by the side of others worthy of Aretino (_Amore degli\nuomini_), and still other pages which could be signed by Victor Hugo.\n\nLess original perhaps, but much more consistent with himself, is M.\nTREZZA, another versatile writer, a theologist, poet, historian,\ncritic, philosopher, philologist, but who has not changed the facets\nof his genius, or the conscience of his faith. At one time a priest,\nhe was one of the most ardent preachers; but the study of natural\nscience and of philosophy drew him away from his faith and plunged him\nin naturalism. He has preserved all the apostolic warmth of the ardent\nand honest priest of his youth. Thus he has emerged from it a new being\nimmovable in his faith:\n\n \"_Come torre che non crolla\n Giammai la cima per soffiar dei venti._\"[91]\n\n [91]\n Like a tower that shakes not\n In the blasts of the storm.\n\nHis works in religious criticism _La Religione e le Religioni_, and\nalso in history and philosophy (_Lucrezio_, _Epicuro e l'Epicurismo_,\n_La Critica Moderna_) have received from it a peculiar impress,\nin which the enthusiasm of the apostle is mingled with the calm\nobservation of science, and history confounds metaphysics. He is the\nfirst and the only one perhaps, who has attempted criticism in Italy\nwhile preserving a literary brilliancy which reminds us of Carlyle.\n\nBut according to universal opinion, among all these stars, the star\nof first magnitude is GIOSUE CARDUCCI. He is the true representative\nof the Italians, a graft of antiquity on the moderns, but in which\nantiquity predominates. His poems (_Le Nuove Poesie_, _Le Odi barbare_,\n_Le Nuove Odi barbare_, _Le Terze Odi barbare_, _Le Nuove Rime_)\nhave attracted the greatest attention. He has introduced and revived\na new metre, many times tried, but never with success, by Trissino,\nCampanella, Chiabrera, and others; a new metre which reproduces the\nancient rhythm of Greek and Roman poetry, especially the elegy\nand the Alcaic ode. His is a new pagan Renaissance with a certain\ngloss of modernness but with outbursts sometimes patriotic and even\nrevolutionary which the Renaissance lacked. His prose works also\nconsist of archaic reconstructions of Italian literary history and of\nvigorous polemics, sometimes too personal, but always with a refinement\nof critique.\n\nBy the side of these productions which are known everywhere, and which\ncan be truly called national, there is a substratum, of considerable\nextent, of literary works that have a local character. Such is the\npoetry of dialect which has however a great weight with us; for\nthe best satirical poems and the best comedies are almost always\nwritten in dialect (_Pascarella_ in the Roman dialect, _Fucini_\nin the Tuscan dialect, _Di Giacomo_ in Neapolitan, _Bersezio_ in\nPiedmontese, _Rizzotto_ in Sicilian). It must be remarked also that\nthis local division is still maintained in the rolls of the great\narmy of literature, although this does not prevent such works passing\nbeyond the geographical limits of their territory and becoming known\nthroughout the whole of Italy.\n\nWe have a Ligurian-Piedmontese school with DE AMICIS at the head,\u2014De\nAmicis, who now however often attempts social studies with much\nintrepidity,\u2014and BARILI, FARINA, BERSEZIO, GIACOSA, and FALDELLA, who\npossess the common characteristic of a sentimentality almost feminine,\naltogether opposed to the rugged country of which they constitute the\nglory.\n\nThere is the Tuscan-Bolognese school of which CARDUUI is the chief\npontiff and which hovers about the old school. M. PANZACCHI, RICCI,\nMARRADI, and STECCHETTI belong to it; there was an epoch in the\nlife of the last named in which he launched into a style which\nseemed naturalistic, but which was at bottom only pornographic; but\nhe immediately compensated for his escapade by a great number of\nphilological memoirs of an erudition truly oppressive, ultra-academical.\n\nThere is the Abruzzian school, of which D'ANNUNZIO is the head. Its\ncharacteristics are variegated tropical coloring, and a certain studied\nornamentation sometimes burdened with similes and metaphors, and an\nexaggerated objectivity; it lays hold of the outside of things, but\ndoes not reach to and grasp the soul of the inner life of nature.\n\nThe Neapolitan school is made up of compilers and ingenious critics,\nwho will make you an elegant embroidery with gossamer threads on\nthe point of a needle. The most celebrated names of this school are\nSETTEMBRINI, DESANCTIS, BONGHI, and VITTORIO IMBRIANI.\n\nThe Sicilian is the rudest, but it is the most powerful and most\noriginal. We could name the great historians CEMARI, LA LUMIA,\nLAFARINA; and PITTRE, who created Italian Folklore, and who has\nmaintained it with a special journal. Sicily has also given us two\ngreat novelists, VERGA and CAPUANA, who are improved Zolas. The\n_Malavoglia_ and _Don Gesualdo_ of M. Verga give us the home life of\nthe Sicilian people. In the _Giacinta_ of Capuana we have the life of\nthe citizens and of the Italian nobility photographed.\n\nWomen always preserve the local type; but with special features.\nHardly any write in verse; they compose novels and light productions\nrather than romances, sketches rather than true portraits. They choose\nthe young girl and the unfortunate married woman; very often they\nwrite autobiographies, or the biography of their friends or their\nhusbands. The land-question has nevertheless been dealt with very well\nby the Marchioness COLOMBI, (pseudonym of Madame Torelli Viollet)\nand the woman's question has been treated of with great vigor and\nstatistically by KULISCHIOFF; I have not spoken of ANNIE VIVANTI,\nanother proof of the advantages of crossing, for she is Anglo-American\nand Anglo-Italian, and a Jewess to boot; she writes in verses which\nhave nothing of the classical element in them\u2014an extraordinary thing\nin Italy. Her works possess originality, which goes as far as the most\nextreme naturalism. (_Lirica di Annie Vivanti_, 1890.)\n\nIn fine, modern Italy has not many literary masterpieces to show. And\nthis is due to a number of causes. In romances and comedies, dash and\nspirit demand a certain stock of observations that can be found only\nin great cities (capitals), and in Italy, Rome and Milan are only\nbeginning to be such.\n\nOriginality, multiplicity, and energy of types are very scarce in\nItaly, for everywhere the conventional lie dominates; it is much more\ndifficult to choose models here than it is in certain other countries,\nfor example in Russia; for genius alone can draw inspiration from\ninferior and ordinary material.\n\nThe classical system of education has prevented us from going to the\nsource of social anomalies, mattoids, madmen, etc.\n\nBesides, classicism, which has dominated us for so many centuries,\nand which has inspired us with its marvellous beauties, has, like\nthe old, (and it is very old,) lost all its vital force. People have\nmade believe to warm themselves by it; but they have not succeeded;\nthey remain cold; and they admire its adepts only in deference to the\nconventional lie. Yet the entire education of our youth consists of\nthat. It is the same as in religion. People have made Madonnas and\nJesuses of it to such an extent that now there is no longer any means\nof contriving anything new. Naturalism without being the natural\nfoundation of the people is nevertheless sufficiently advanced not to\nallow of serious inspiration in religion.\n\nMany authors who have sought new paths have been led out of their way\nby journalism and politics, which always end in exhausting people, even\ngeniuses. SCARFOGLIO, BONGHI, TORELLI, DEZERBI, and FERRI are among the\nnumber.\n\nThe difficulty of securing a place in the literary world also very\nquickly exhausts many. Thus many men, especially of Southern Italy,\nproduce a very good work; but they have become fathers too late in\nlife, and have only a single son; such are BERSEZIO, with his _Travet_,\nBOITO with his _Ballate_, VALCARENGHI with his _Confessioni d'Andrea_.\n\nPolitical liberty, if it has given an impulse to social and political\nstudies, has prejudiced great literary production, perhaps because\nunder the incitement of foreign domination and of rebellion, the heart\ndraws from a grand source of inspiration, and the pen finds powerful\nexcitation, more powerful perhaps, than liberty gives it.\n\nArt finds more numerous elements of success in minds highly excited.\nIt is the property of great revolutions to elevate the souls of all\ncontemporaries, to impart to them a peculiar disposition unknown\nbefore, and which is not slow to disappear. The most humble, the\nmost obscure, those even who have not taken any part in the events\nand who have hardly studied them, express, a long time afterwards\neven, sentiments much superior to those which their ordinary condition\nallows. It is sufficient to have lived during some passionate epoch to\nissue from it better, purer, and stronger. The new ideas, the generous\nimpulses which then carry away nations, penetrate into all classes and\nennoble a whole generation. We had in our revolutionary epoch, Manzoni,\nMassimo d'Azeglio, Guerazzi, Giusti, Porta, Miceli, Brofferio, Berchet,\nMameli, Boerio, Laquacci, Aleardi, Grassi, Prati. Who have we now to\ncompare with them?\n\n Turin, March, 1891. CESARE LOMBROSO.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK REVIEWS.\n\n\nTHE ORIGIN OF THE ARYANS. An Account of the Prehistoric Ethnology and\n Civilisation of Europe. By _Isaac Taylor_, M. A., L. L. D. New\n York: Scribner & Welford.\n\nThe author of this extremely interesting work states in the preface\nthat it does not aim at setting forth new views or speculations. His\nopinions on its main thesis, that is, as to the place of origin of the\nprimitive Aryans, are those of Spiegel and Schrader, except where he\nprefers the conclusions of Cuno. These writers, with the majority of\nthe latest investigators of the subject, accept the view originated[92]\nby the English philologist Dr. R. G. Latham in 1851, that the original\nhome of the primitive Aryans was on the great plain of Central Europe.\nCuno insisted also on what Dr. Taylor affirms is now an axiom in\nethnology, that race is not coextensive with language. This is a most\nimportant principle, as it completely changes the aspects of the\nproblem by making it more complex. It introduces, in fact, a fresh\nelement; as it requires the Aryan to be identified before his primitive\nhabitat can be sought for.\n\n [92] Dr. Daniel G. Brinton in his _Races and Peoples_ points\n out that the view referred to in the text was first stated by\n the Belgian naturalist M. D'Halloy; but it has always been\n accredited to Dr. Latham by German writers and, as mentioned\n by Dr. Taylor, was regarded by them as an English \"fad.\"\n\nThe difficulties attending this identification are clearly pointed out\nin the present work. During the neolithic period, Europe was inhabited\nby four distinct races, all of which are represented among the present\nAryan-speaking peoples of the continent. If the primitive Aryans are to\nbe identified with one of those races it must have imposed its speech\non the other three. Moreover, of those four races, two are decidedly\ndolichocephalic, or long-headed, the other two being as decidedly\nbrachycephalic, or broad-headed. The latter are now represented by the\nSlavo-Celtic, and the Ligurian, or Swiss and Savoyard, peoples; while\nthe present representatives of one primitive long-headed race are the\nSwedes, the North Germans and the Friesians, and of the other, the\nCorsicans, the Spanish Basques, and some of the Welsh and Irish. There\nare grounds for believing, however, that the two dolichocephalic races\nwere derived from a single root, and that the two brachycephalic races\nwill ultimately be identified as one. There would thus be left only\ntwo primitive stocks, one long-headed and the other short-headed, and\nDr. Taylor concludes, not only that the primitive Aryans belonged to\nthe latter, but that they were racially connected with the Finno-Ugric\ntribes of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. He shows that the culture\nof the Slavo-Celtic race, as exhibited in the round barrows of Britain\nand the pile-dwellings of Central Europe, comes nearest to that of the\nprimitive Aryans, as disclosed by linguistic pal\u00e6ontology. Further,\nthat anthropologically this belongs to the same type as that of the\ntall, fair, broad-headed Finno-Ugrian tribes; agreeably to which, the\ngrammatical resemblances between the Aryan languages and those of the\nUral-Altaic stock point to a primitive unity of speech.\n\nThere would seem to be no doubt that the greater part of Europe was\noriginally occupied by peoples of the long-headed type, and Dr. Taylor\nconjectures \"that at the close of the reindeer age a Finnic people\nappeared in Western Europe, whose speech remaining stationary, is\nrepresented by the agglutinative Basque, and that much later, at the\nbeginning of the pastoral age, when the ox had been tamed, a taller\nand more powerful Finno-Ugrian people developed in Central Europe the\ninflective Aryan speech.\" This theory requires that the non-Aryan\nlong-headed race should have acquired in some way the Aryan speech,\nand it is not surprising that the North Germans reject the \"Turanian\"\ntheory accepted by the French and espoused by our author, and maintain\nthat the physical type of the primitive Aryans was that of their own\ntall, fair, dolichocephalous race. On this view, the ancestors of\nthe brachycephalic Lithuanians, whose language best represents among\nthose of Europe the primitive Aryan speech, must have been Aryanised\nby the ancestors of the Teutons, whose language approaches nearest to\nthe Lithuanian. Dr. Taylor points out, however, that this would leave\nunexplained \"how the speech of the brachycephalic Celts and Umbrians,\nto say nothing of the Greeks, the Armenians, and the Indo-Iranians,\nwas obtained from that of the dolichocephalic Teutons; how a people\nwhich in neolithic times was few in numbers, and in a low state of\nculture, succeeded in Aryanising so many tribes more numerous and more\ncivilised.\"\n\nThe question arises as to how far this \"Aryanising\" process extended.\nWas it limited to language or did it include certain physical\ncharacters as well? As a fact the superficial characters of the tall\ndolichocephalic type which, according to Nilsson and Von D\u00fcben, has\nprevailed in Sweden continuously from the earliest times to the present\nday, make an approach to the florid complexion, light eyes, and reddish\nhair of the tall brachycephalic race. The former have lighter hair, a\nwhiter skin, and eyes of blue instead of gray, but these are just the\ndifferences that might be expected, as the result of the admixture\nof the Slavo-Celtic stock with that to which the famous Neanderthal\nskull belongs, and which is now known as the Canstadt type. At the\nsame time it is possible that the difference in color as well as in\nstature which distinguishes the tall from the short races belonging\nto both the long-headed and the broad-headed stocks may be the result\nof external influences, such as climate, food, and clothing, and the\ngeneral conditions of life in a mountainous or northern region. This\nwould apply at all events to the Teutonic or Scandinavian type, and\nalso to the Celto-Slavic which represents the primitive Aryan type, or\nrather their Ugro-Finnic predecessors, if it is true, as Dr. Schrader\nconcludes, that the undivided Aryans had only two seasons, winter and\nspring, or at most three. This fact does not necessarily imply that\nthey lived in a northern region; for the same climatic conditions could\nbe met with in a mountainous district. Dr. Schrader thinks, however,\nthat the precise region can be approximately indicated by reference\nto the beech tree. We are told that this tree does not now grow east\nof a line drawn from K\u00f6nigsberg to the Crimea, and its northern limit\nmust formerly have been still more restricted. Hence the cradle of\nthe Latin, Hellenic, and Teutonic races, which have the same name\nfor this tree, must have been to the west of the ancient beech-line.\nBut since the Slavo-Lithuanian name is a Teutonic loan-word, we must\nplace the cradle of the Lithuanians and the Slaves to the east of this\nline. But since there are philological reasons for believing in the\nunbroken geographical continuity of the European Aryans previous to the\nlinguistic separation, they must be placed in northern Europe astride\nof the beech line; the Slavo-Lithuanian in European Russia; and the\nCelts, Latins, Hellenes, and Teutons farther to the West. It may be\ndoubted, however, whether this necessarily indicates northern Europe\nas the primitive Aryan home. Dr. Latham in his \"Native Races of the\nRussian Empire\" insisted on Podolia being the region where Sanskrit\nand Zend developed themselves, the Slavo-Lithuanic region lying to the\nnorth and west of it. Curiously enough the beech-line passes directly\nthrough Podolia, which might therefore claim to be the classic Aryan\nabode. Too much stress should not be laid, however, on such an incident\nas the occurrence of a particular name for a tree. It is quite possible\nthat the beech may not have been known to the brachycephalic Aryans\nuntil after they came in contact with the dolichocephalic Teutons.\nThis would seem, indeed, to be required if the Ugro-Finnic origin of\nthe Aryans is well founded. At the same time it should be pointed out\nthat while, according to Keith Johnston's \"Physical Atlas,\" the region\nof deciduous trees extends as far east as the Aral Sea, Latham refers\nthe beech to the Caucasus as its special habitat; and the mountain\nslopes of the Caucasus are shown by Peschel to be the best fitted\ngeographically for the original home of the Indo-European race.\n\nAfter all the question of the _place_ of origin of the primitive\nAryans is not so important as that of their race affinities, on which,\nindeed, the former question ultimately depends, and Dr. Taylor has\ndone well to follow up what he terms the \"pregnant suggestion\" of Dr.\nThurnam, the joint author with Dr. J. Barnard Davis of their great\nwork \"Crania Britannica,\" as to the identification of the primitive\nAryans with the \"Turanian\" race of the British round barrows. That he\nhas conclusively established this point it would be rash to affirm,\nbut he has presented a very strong argument in its favor, which is not\nweakened by Prof. Huxley's attempt to locate the fair dolichocephali\nin Latham's Sarmatia, as the primitive Aryan race. It should not be\nlost sight of, however, that the Ugro-Finnic relationship of the Aryans\nwould restore to them the Asiatic origin of which recent discussion\nhas tended to deprive them, for the Ugrians undoubtedly belong to the\nAsiatic area. On the other hand, if Dr. Topinard, the distinguished\nFrench anthropologist, is correct in his assertion that the Aryan blood\nhas disappeared, the question resolves itself into \"a discussion of the\nethnical affinities of those numerous races which have acquired Aryan\nspeech.\" This is not our author's own opinion, although it is perhaps\ncountenanced by Cuno's maxim. We must leave here Dr. Taylor's work\nwhich will be universally recognised as one of great merit, whatever\nview may be taken as to the Aryans and their origin.\n\n \u03a9.\n\n\nINTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. By _William T. Harris_. New\n York: D. Appleton & Co., 1890.\n\nThe merits of Dr. William T. Harris in the awakening and the fostering\nof philosophical interests in this country are extraordinary. As the\neditor of the _Journal of Speculative Philosophy_ he has published\ntranslations of the most effective and important chapters of the\nEuropean, mainly German, philosophers, and also original articles\nby American thinkers. Among the latter we find contributions from\nnames of highest rank, as well as essays by the editor himself. Dr.\nHarris was also one of the most brilliant lights of the Concord\nSchool of Philosophy; indeed, he may be considered as its centre and\nrepresentative, for whatever divergence of thought may have appeared\nin the Concord lectures, the general character of what goes by the\nname of Concord Philosophy was determined by him. The present work\naccordingly will command no common attention among those interested\nin the historical growth of American thought and especially American\nphilosophy, it being a systematic arrangement of extracts made by\nMarietta Kies from Professor Harris's essays, compiled for the purpose\nof serving as a class-book at Mt. Holyoke Seminary and College.\n\nHowever great may be the historical importance of Dr. Harris as the\nNestor of American philosophy, we cannot suppress our doubt as to\nwhether his philosophy can be recommended as a study for beginners.\nDr. Harris is too original a thinker, and his originality is not in\naccord with the present time. His cast of mind may be characterised\nas Hegelian; not that he should be called a follower of Hegel, but\nhis way of thinking follows in many respects the method of abstract\nratiocination pursued by that great German philosopher. Still, the\nresults of Dr. Harris are even in closer contact with the religious\nideas of Christianity than those of Hegel. We shall delineate here\na few characteristic traits of Dr. Harris's speculative thought:\n\"Philosophy attempts to find the necessary _a priori_ elements or\nfactors in experience, and arrange them into a system by deducing them\nfrom a first principle.\" We should prefer according to the method of\npositivism to derive the so-called _a priori_ or the \"formal\", and\nwith it the conditions of cognition, not from a first principle but\nfrom the facts of experience. Dr. Harris calls Space, Time, Causality\n\"presuppositions of experience\": they make experience possible. We\nconsider them as parts of experience as characteristic properties, and\nour concepts of time, space, and causality have been abstracted from\nexperience. Dr. Harris says: \"Space in limiting itself is infinite\n... time is infinite, and yet it is the condition necessary to the\nexistence of events and changes.... The principle of causality implies\nboth time and space.... If we examine it, we shall see that it again\npresupposes a ground deeper than itself. In order that a cause shall\nsend a stream of influence over to an effect, it must first separate\nthat portion of influence from itself. Self-separation is, then, the\nfundamental presupposition of the action of causality.... Causa sui,\nspontaneous origination of activity, is the ultimate presupposition\nunderlying all objects and each object of experience.... Causa\nsui, or self-cause, is properly the principle _par excellence_ of\nphilosophy.... Here is the necessary ground of the idea of God.\"\nIn the last chapter Dr. Harris discusses \"the immortality of man,\"\ndenoting thereby the immortality of the individual and the continuance\nof consciousness after death. He expresses his argument in admirable\nterseness in the following sentence: \"How is it possible that in\nthis world of perishable beings there can exist an immortal and\never progressive being? Without the personality of God it would be\nimpossible, because an unconscious first principle would be incapable\nof producing conscious being, or if they were produced, it would\novercome them as incongruous and inharmonious elements in the world.\nIt would finally draw all back into its image and reduce conscious\nindividuality to unconsciousness.\" This is a different solution of the\nproblem from that presented in the article \"The Origin of Mind\" in the\nfirst number of this magazine.\n\n \u039a.\n\n\nTHE EVOLUTION OF SEX. By Prof. _Patrick Geddes_ and _J. Arthur\n Thomson_. New York: Scribner & Welford.\n\nThe present work is in some sense a reproduction of the articles\n\"Reproduction,\" \"Sex,\" and \"Variation and Selection,\" contributed\nby Professor Geddes to the most recent edition of the \"Encyclop\u00e6dia\nBritannica.\" It goes further, however, and not only contains much\nadditional information, but the views of the authors on the factors\nof organic evolution and on biology in general are more precisely\nformulated and developed. The central thesis of the work, as stated\nin the preface, is \"in the first place, to present an outline of the\nmain processes for the continuance of organic life with such unity as\nour present knowledge renders possible; and in the second, to point\nthe way toward the interpretation of these processes in those ultimate\nbiological terms which physiologists are already reaching as regards\nthe functions of individual life,\u2014those of the constructive and\ndestructive changes (anabolism and katabolism) of living matter or\nprotoplasm.\" The authors seek to prepare the way for the restatement\nof the theory of organic evolution, that of \"definite variation,\nwith progress and survival essentially through the subordination of\nindividual struggle and development of species-maintaining ends.\"\n\nAmong the subjects treated of are Sexual characters and the\ndetermination of Sex, the analysis of Sex-organs, tissues, and\ncells\u2014the nature and origin of Sex, and the processes and theory of\nreproduction. This is a sufficiently broad field, and it embraces\nvarious biological questions recently discussed, especially that of\nsexual selection and the theories of Professor Weismann. The authors\nclaim that their view of the processes concerned with the maintenance\nof the species leads necessarily to a profound alteration of the\nconclusions usually held as to its origin. What is meant by this\nstatement appears from the last chapter, in which the reproductive\nfunction as a factor in evolution is considered. Here it is stated that\nthe usual perspective which places the theory of natural selection in\nthe foreground, sexual selection being a mere harmonious corollary,\nhas to be reversed. Recent investigations on heredity \"forbid that\nattention should any longer be concentrated on the individual type,\nor reproduction regarded as a mere repetition process; the living\ncontinuity of the species is seen to be of more importance than the\nindividualities of the separate links.... The species is a continuous\nundying chain of unicellular reproductive units, which indeed build\nout of and around themselves transient multicellular bodies, but\nthe processes of nutritive differentiation and other individual\ndevelopments are secondary, not primary\" (p. 308).\n\nThe study of the reproductive process is thus of supreme importance\nfor the understanding of organic evolution. What then is the authors'\ntheory of reproduction? It may be stated in the terms of their own\nsummary. The essential fact in reproduction is the separation of part\nof the parent organism to start a fresh life. Hence, it begins with\nrupture, a katabolic crisis, at which occurs cell-division, this\nbeing always associated with the act of reproduction. This is favored\nby katabolic conditions of the environment. The opposition between\nnutrition and reproduction is the most obvious antithesis in nature\nafter that of life and death\u2014with the latter of which, indeed, as has\nbeen shown by Goette, reproduction is intimately associated\u2014and it\nmay be stated in the terms that \"as a continued surplus of anabolism\ninvolves growth, so a relative preponderance of katabolism necessitates\nreproduction\" (p. 237).\n\nThe organic relation between nutrition and reproduction is thus\nshown to be one of great importance, but its significance becomes\nmore apparent when it is seen, as pointed out by the authors, that\n\"throughout organic life there is a contrast or rhythm between growth\nand multiplication, between nutrition and reproduction, corresponding\nto the fundamental organic seesaw between anabolism and katabolism.\nThis contrast may be read in the distribution of organs, in the periods\nof life, and in the different grades of reproduction; and the contrasts\nbetween continuous growth and discontinuous multiplication, between\nasexual and sexual reproduction, between parthenogenesis and sexuality,\nbetween alternating generations, are all different expressions of the\nfundamental antithesis\" (p. 231). Elsewhere, the essential importance\nis referred to of \"the continual correlation, yet antithesis\u2014the\naction and reaction\u2014of vegetative and reproductive processes in\nalternate preponderance,\" to which the general rhythm of individual\nand social life runs parallel. And yet this life is essentially\na unity, of which the specific characters are but the symptoms,\nwhatever may be \"their subsequent measure of importance and utility in\nadaptation, their modification by environment, their enhancement or\ndiminution by natural selection\" (p. 314).\n\nThis conclusion as to the unity of the life of the individual\nand that of the species, is based on the fact that nutrition and\nreproduction are nearly akin. Hatschek goes so far, indeed, as to\naffirm that nutrition is reproduction, an apparent paradox which is\njustified by the statement that \"not only do hunger and love become\nindistinguishable in that equal-sided conjugation which has been\ncuriously called 'isophagy,' but nutrition in turn is nothing more than\ncontinual reproduction of the protoplasm.\" The real unity is found\nin the fact that anabolism and katabolism, which are the determining\nfactors of growth and reproduction, are the two sides of protoplasmic\nlife. This conclusion has an important bearing on the question of the\norigin of sex. In his theory of _genoblasts_, or sexual elements, Minot\ntreats male and female as derivatives of primitive hermaphroditism\nin two opposite directions, the differentiation taking place \"by\nthe extrusion or separation of the contradictory elements, the ovum\ngetting rid of male polar globules, the sperm leaving behind a female\nmother-cell remnant.\" The authors of the present work accept this\nview, which however has become extremely improbable since Weismann\nhas called attention to the fact that the same process takes place\nin the parthenogenetic summer-eggs of Daphnidae\u2014a fact which has\nbeen overlooked by our authors. They also adopt Rolph's view that\nthe less nutritive, and therefore smaller, hungrier, and more mobile\ncells are what we call male; the more nutritive and usually more\nquiescent cell being the female, as consistent with the conclusion\nalready inferred from other facts that \"the female is the outcome and\nexpression of preponderant anabolism, and in contrast the male of\npredominant katabolism\" (p. 132). This conclusion is elsewhere stated\nas that \"the males live at a loss, are more _katabolic_,\u2014disruptive\nchanges tending to preponderate in the sum of changes in their living\nmatter or protoplasm. The females, on the other hand, live at a\nprofit, are more _anabolic_,\u2014constructive processes predominating in\ntheir life, whence indeed the capacity of bearing offspring\" (p. 26).\nHere is the same contrast as that seen in the alternating phases of\ncell-life, of activity and repose, and in the great antithesis between\ngrowth and reproduction. The argument is put into diagrammatic form,\nwhere the sum-total of the functions are divided into nutritive and\nreproductive, the former into anabolic and katabolic processes, and\nthe latter into male and female activities. This theory of Rolph, if\nit contains a grain of truth, needs a thorough revision; and the same\nmay be said about the authors' special theory, which is, that there is\na parallelism in the two sets of processes, \"the male reproduction is\nassociated with preponderating katabolism, and the female with relative\nanabolism, according to which view both primary and secondary sexual\ncharacters express the fundamental physiological bias characteristic\nof either sex\" (p. 27). This has a special bearing on the question\nof sexual selection, the true relation of which to natural selection,\naccording to the authors of the present work, must be expressed in\ntheir own words. It is embodied in the conclusion that sexual selection\nis a minor accelerant, natural selection a retarding 'brake,' \"on\nthe differentiation of sexual characters, which essentially find a\nconstitutional or organismal origin in the katabolic or anabolic\ndiathesis which preponderates in males and females respectively\" (p.\n31).\n\nBefore concluding this notice, it may be pointed out what are the\nparticular conditions on which the determination of sex depends, in\nregard to any given organism. The various suggestions proposed as to\nthe influence of parents, according to age or otherwise, the time\nof fertilisation, Starkweather's law that sex is determined by the\nsuperior parent, and that the superior parent produces the opposite\nsex, and D\u00fcsing's theory as to the regulation of the proportions of the\nsexes, are referred to by the authors and either rejected or considered\nas insufficient. The conclusion they arrive at after considering\nthe influence of nutrition, temperature, and other conditions, is,\nthat adverse circumstances affecting the parents, especially of\nnutrition, but also age and the like, tend to the production of males,\nthe reverse conditions favoring females; a highly nourished ovum\nand fertilisation when the ovum is fresh and vigorous, tend to the\ndevelopment of a female rather than of a male. Further, the longer the\nperiod of sexual indifference continues, the more important become the\noutside factors, and here again \"favorable conditions of nutrition,\ntemperature, and the like, tend toward the production of females; the\nreverse increase the probability of male preponderance.\" This agrees\nwith the conclusion independently arrived at that the male germs are\n\"of smaller size, more active habit, higher temperature, shorter life,\nand the females the larger, more passive, vegetative, and conservative\nforms\" (pp. 50, 51). Thus the authors' proposition that the male is\nthe outcome of predominant katabolism, and the female of equally\nemphatic anabolism, might seem to be justified, and it is confirmed\nby the curious phenomenon of alternation of generations, and by\nvarious facts connected with growth and reproduction. However, it does\nnot definitively exclude the theory (see Dr. Heinrich Janke's work.\nStuttgart, 1889) that the male is the outcome of katabolism of the male\nelement coincident with _anabolism_ of the female element, and the\nfemale of the opposite state.\n\nIn considering the psychological and ethical aspects of sex from\nthe physiological standpoint the authors remark truly that in order\nto obliterate the distinctions between male and female, it would be\nnecessary to have evolution over again on a new basis. Although so\ndifferent, however, the two sexes are complementary and mutually\ndependent, \"not merely because they are males and females, but also\nin functions not directly associated with those of sex.\" Males, as\nthe more katabolic organisms, are more active and variable than the\nanabolic females, who are more passive and stable. The former have\nlarger brains and more intelligence, but the latter have more of the\naltruistic sentiment and greater constancy in affection and sympathy.\n\"Man thinks more, woman feels more. He discovers more, but remembers\nless; she is more receptive, and less forgetful.\" All this is true\nwithin certain limits, but whether or not it may be explained by other\ntheories remains an open question.\n\n \u03a9.\n\n\nANIMAL LIFE AND INTELLIGENCE. By _C. Lloyd Morgan_, F. G. S. London:\n Edward Arnold.\n\nThe chief aim which the author of this important work had originally\nin view was the consideration of Animal Intelligence. But the subject\nof Intelligence being so closely associated with that of Life, and\nthe questions of Heredity and Natural Selection with those of Habit\nand Instinct, he has devoted the first part of the work to Organic\nEvolution, as introductory to Mental Evolution. This was rendered\nnecessary, however, by the direct bearing of Professor Weismann's\nrecent contributions to biological science on questions of Instinct.\nIt would be impossible to treat of the mental constitution of the\nlower animals without reference to that of man, and in his preface\nProfessor Morgan forestals certain results arrived at by a comparison\nof them. He states that in man alone, and in no dumb animal, is the\nrational faculty, as defined by him, developed; and he adds, \"it is\ncontended that among human folk that process of natural selection,\nwhich is so potent in the lower reaches of organic life, sinks into\ncomparative insignificance. Man is a creature of ideas and ideals. For\nhim the moral factor becomes one of the very highest importance. He\nconceives an ideal self which he strives to realise; he conceives an\nideal humanity towards which he would raise his fellow-man. He becomes\na conscious participator in the evolution of man, in the progress of\nhumanity.\"\n\nSo great a variety of topics are dealt with by the present work that\nwe shall be able to do little more than refer critically to the\nauthor's special views, particularly those which concern the mental\ncharacters of the lower animals. There are, however, various points\nin the earlier part of the work well deserving of consideration. Such\nis the suggestion that, instead of likening an organism as a whole\nto a steam-engine, it would be better to liken each cell, with its\nfluid explosive material, to a gas-engine, and the mixed air and gas\nto whose explosion its motion is due. The importance of _segregation_\nas a factor in the formation of improved varieties is insisted on,\nbut Professor Morgan doubts whether differential fertility, on which\nMr. Romanes lays great stress[93], would, without the co-operation of\nother segregation-factors, give rise to separate varieties capable of\nmaintaining themselves as distinct species (p. 105).\n\n [93] _The Monist_, No. 1. p. 5.\n\nDealing with the knotty question whether, if the egg produces the\nhen, the hen produces the egg, the author criticises Professor\nWeismann's idea of the continuity of germ-plasm, which he regards as\n\"an unknowable, invisible, hypothetical entity, \"that may be made\nto account for anything and everything, and prefers the hypothesis\nof cellular continuity (138 et seq.). The cells which become ova or\nsperms never become differentiated into anything else, and \"hereditary\nsimilarity is due to the fact that parents and offspring are derived\neventually from the same germinal cells\" (p. 175). Finally, Professor\nMorgan criticises Mr. Wallace's views on the subject of sexual\nselection, which he is inclined to think is a factor with natural\nselection in the guidance of evolution (p. 200 et seq.).\n\nMore than half of the book, which contains more than 500 pages, is\ntaken up with these preliminary disquisitions, the remainder being\nconcerned with the nature and development of the mental activities.\nThe first branch of this inquiry is that of the senses of animals.\nWe cannot follow the author in his very interesting remarks on this\nsubject, beyond referring to his suggestion that the lower animals may\nhave senses not known to man. After mentioning the muciparous canals\nmet with in fishes, he says, \"apart from the possibility of unknown\nreceptive organs as completely hidden from anatomical and microscopic\nscrutiny as the end-organs of our temperature-sense, there are in the\nlower animals organs which may be fitted to receive modes of influence\nto which we human folk are not attuned\" (p. 298). For example, insects\nmay be sensitive to tones of heat; while on the other hand, their\ncolor phenomena may vary greatly from ours consequent on structural\ndifferences in the sense-organs. In dealing with mental processes in\nman the author states as a well-known fact that \"a person whose leg\nhas been amputated experiences at times tickling and uneasiness in the\nabsent member\" (p. 307). This is not, however, an accurate description\nof the phenomenon. There can be no feeling in a lost limb. The idea\nthat the sensations are \"referred outward to the normal source of\norigin of impressions,\" has arisen from the remark sometimes made by\npersons thus affected that they feel as though they still had toes.\nThis is true to some extent, but as a fact the sensation is as though\nthe toes were bent and tightly bound at the end of the _stump_, and not\nat the end of the missing limb.\n\nIt is advisable before proceeding further to see what view Professor\nMorgan entertains as to the mental process in animals. This is apparent\nfrom the statement that, although there is no difference in kind\nbetween the mind of man and the mind of a dog, yet that \"we have, in\nthe introduction of the analytic faculty, so definite and marked a new\ndeparture, that we should emphasise it by saying that the faculty of\nperception, in its various specific grades, differs generically from\nthe faculty of conception.\" The author adds, \"believing, as I do, that\nconception is beyond the power of my favorite and clever dog, I am\nforced to believe that his mind differs generically from my own\" (p.\n350). Elsewhere he says, \"if I deny them self-consciousness and reason,\nI grant to the higher animals perceptions of marvellous acuteness and\nintelligent inferences of wonderful accuracy and precision\u2014intelligent\ninferences in some cases, no doubt, more perfect even than those of\nman, who is often distracted by many thoughts\" (p. 377). If we would\nunderstand these conclusions aright we must know the sense in which\nProfessor Morgan uses the terms employed, and to do this we must refer\nto the explanation he gives of mental processes in man. He tells us\nthat in the first place we obtain knowledge of the existence of the\nobjects around us through perception, which is attended with a process\nof construction. An object is in fact a _construct_, at the bidding of\ncertain sensations, which suggest to the mind the associated qualities.\nIn what sense such an object is regarded as real we shall see later\non. As to the constructs, their formation is followed by examination,\n\"by which they are rendered more definite, particular and special,\nand supplemented by intelligent inferences.\" Out of this intelligent\nexamination arises a new mental process, the _analysis of constructs_.\nAttention is paid to certain qualities of objects to the exclusion\nof others, a process termed by the author _isolation_, the products\nbeing _isolates_. This process is constantly going on, and all the\nqualities, relationships, and feelings thus isolated have applied to\nthem arbitrary symbols. They are in fact _named_, and \"hence arises all\nour science, all our higher thought.\" At this stage we enter the field\nof conception, as the isolates are _concepts_, whereas throughout the\nprocess of the formation of constructs and their definition we have\nto do with perception and percepts. Here Professor Morgan agrees with\nNoir\u00e9 in holding that \"the image, in so far as it is an image, whether\nsimple or composite, is a percept,\" while so far as there enter into\nthe idea of objects elements which have been isolated by analysis, the\nwords for those objects stand for concepts. There is another important\nfeature of the mental processes in man. The primary aim of the\nreception of the influences of the external world, or environment, is\n\"to enable the organism to answer to them in activity.\" Moreover, out\nof perceptions through association there arise certain expectations,\nand \"the activities of organisms are moulded in accordance with\nthese expectations.\" Phenomena are perceived as linked or woven, and\nexpectations are the outcome of that perception, the mental process by\nwhich we pass from one link to another being called _inference_. Again,\nwe have perceptual inference, or inference from direct experience, and\nconceptual inference, or \"inference based on experience, but reached\nthrough the exercise of the reasoning faculties\" (p. 328 et seq.).\n\nApplying these principles to the mental processes in animals, the\nauthor affirms that, granting the theory of evolution, \"the early\nstages of the process of construction\u2014discrimination, localisation,\nand outward projection\u2014are the same in kind throughout the whole\nrange of animal life, wherever we are justified in surmising that\npsychical processes occur, and the power of registration and revival\nin memory has been established\" (p. 338). But, though the higher\nmammalia form _constructs_ analogous to, if not closely resembling\nours, the resemblance cannot be in any sense close, \"seeing to how\nlarge an extent our constructs are literally our _handiwork_.\" To the\nquestion whether the higher animals have \"the power of analysing their\nconstructs and forming isolates, or abstract ideas of qualities apart\nfrom the constructs of which these qualities are elements,\" Professor\nMorgan answers negatively. He supposes, for example, that a dog may\nhave a vague representation in memory of things good to eat, \"in which\nthe element of eatability is predominant and comparatively distinct,\nwhile the rest is vague and indistinct\"; and to mark the difference\nhe calls the prominent quality a _predominant_, \"as opposed to the\nisolate when the quality is floated off from the object.\" Hence he\nagrees with Locke that abstraction, in the sense of isolation, is not\npossessed by the lower animals, and he thinks that the line should\nbe drawn there between brute intelligence and human intelligence and\nreason (p. 349). As soon as predominant qualities are named they\nbecome isolates, and thus \"body and mind became separable in thought;\nthe self was differentiated from the not-self; the mind was turned\ninwards upon itself through the isolation of its varying phases; and\nthe consciousness of the brute became the self-consciousness of man.\"\nThe agent in this upward progress is language, and hence, granting\nthe possibility of a transitional stage where word-signs stood for\npredominants, and not yet for isolates, the author accepts Prof. Max\nM\u00fcller's view that language and thought are practically inseparable (p.\n371). If any serious objection can be made to this reasoning, it must\nbe we think to the opinion that language made, not merely conceptual\nthought, but analysis and isolation possible. This is preceded, as\nwe have seen by \"intelligent examination,\" and we are expressly told\nthat out of this arises the mental process of _analysis of constructs_\nwhich animals do not possess. To this faculty then must be traced the\nultimate distinction between them and man. It may be doubted, moreover,\nwhether animals have any idea of even a predominant quality apart from\nsome object. The formation of \"constructs,\" that is the recognition\nof objects, as the result of external stimuli, is instinctive, except\nso far as it depends upon association through experience in past\ngenerations. If animals can even vaguely represent a single quality\napart from an object, it is the first step in analysis, and there is\nno reason why they should not go on to abstraction or isolation, and\nthence to reason. That animals do not possess reason, in the sense of\nconceptual inference, is we think unquestionable, and Professor Morgan\ndoes well in restricting them to intelligence, by which he intends the\nprocess by which perceptual inferences are reached (p. 330).\n\nWe have not space to refer to the views expressed in the chapter\non \"Appetence and Emotion,\" beyond stating that the author, while\nadmitting that in animals are to be found the perceptual germs of even\nthe higher emotional states, concludes that \"ethics, like conceptual\nthought and \u00e6sthetics, are beyond the reach of the brute. Morality is\nessentially a matter of ideals, and these belong to the conceptual\nsphere\" (p. 414). In the chapter on \"Habit and Interest,\" after\nspeaking of Mr. Romanes's treatment of instinct as most admirable and\nmasterly, he compares Mr. Romanes's views as to the origin of secondary\ninstincts with those of Professor Weismann as to the non-inheritance of\nacquired characters, coming to the conclusion that lapsed intelligence\nis not a necessary factor in the formation of instincts, and that\nthere is a probability of some inheritance of experience (p. 436 et\nseq.). We must refer our readers to the work itself for the author's\nexplanation of the \"monistic\" theory, according to which the two sets\nof phenomena, the physical and the mental, are identical, differing\nonly in being viewed from without or felt from within (p. 417). This\nview is developed in the chapter on Mental Evolution, where we read,\n\"according to the monistic hypothesis, kinesis and metakinesis are\nco-ordinate. The physiologist may explain all the activities of men\nand animals in terms of kinesis. The psychologist may explain all\nthe thoughts and emotions of man in thoughts of metakinesis. They\nare studying the different phenomenal aspects of the same noumenal\nsequences\" (p. 472). For Professor Morgan the idea of the object is\nthe object, but he is not a pure idealist. Phenomena are something\nmore than states of consciousness. There is a noumenal reality which\nunderlies the reality of the phenomena, and the enduring ego, of which\ncertain states of consciousness are occasional manifestations, is\nthe metakinetic equivalent of the organic kinesis. Here he sees the\nsolution of the problem which baffles alike materialists and idealists\n(p. 475).\n\nWe must now take leave of this work which, notwithstanding its\noccasional abstruse and technical character, is not \"beyond the ready\ncomprehension of the general reader of average intelligence.\" It\ndeserves to be widely read, not only for its subject-matter, but for\nits clearness of explanation and wide grasp of thought. The value of\nthe book is much added to by its diagrams and illustrations, and by an\nexcellent index and table of contents.\n\n \u03a9.\n\n\nPHYSIOGNOMY AND EXPRESSION. By _Paolo Mantegazza_. New York: Scribner &\n Welford, 1890.\n\nThis work of the versatile Italian Anthropologist is probably one of\nthose which best represent his many-sided mind, and which will be the\nmost extensively read. Although strictly scientific, both in its end\nand method, it is popular in style and contains matter which must\nrecommend it to the ordinary as well as the scientific reader. As the\nauthor informs us, he has taken up the study of expression at the\npoint where Darwin left it. But he has made a further step. He has set\nhimself the task \"of separating, once for all, positive observations\nfrom the number of bad guesses, ingenious conjectures,\" which have\nhitherto encumbered the path of the study of the human countenance\nand human expression. His book is a \"page of psychology,\" and he has\nendeavored to supply the psychologist, and also the artist, with new\nfacts, as well as old facts interpreted by new theories, and to bring\ninto view \"some of the laws to which human expression is subject.\"\n\nA glance at the table of contents shows that the author has fully\ncarried out the promise thus made. The first chapter of the work after\ngiving an historical sketch of the science of Physiognomy and of Human\nExpression\u2014which in its infancy was \"seasoned with the magic which\nis one of the original sins of the human family\"\u2014and tracing it from\nDalla Porta to Darwin, through Niquetius, Ghiradelli, and Lavater,\nproceeds to treat of the human countenance in general, and of each of\nits features in particular. The possible judgments on the human face\nare reduced in number to five: the physiological, the ethnological,\nthe \u00e6sthetic, the moral, and the intellectual. Of these verdicts, the\nethnological and \u00e6sthetic are based almost exclusively on anatomical\ncharacters, while the physiological, moral, and intellectual verdicts\ndepend chiefly on expression. The coloration of the human skin is an\nimportant ethnological feature, and M. Mantegazza thinks that it\nmay be reduced to three tints, white, black, and \"dried bean\" (_fave\nseche_), which last he explains by saying that it results from the\nsuperposition of two colors, \"most frequently from a sort of black\nor very dark brown dust deposited on a ground of dried bean\" (p.\n31). Among other interesting ethnological generalisations, is the\nremark that the Aryans, Semites, and many negroes have large eyes,\nwhile Mongols and many Malays have small eyes. In determining the\ncolor of the eyes, hair, and skin, the author found the table of\ntints prepared by M. Broca for the Anthropological Society of Paris\ninsufficient, as the colors there used are opaque, while transmitted\nas well as reflected rays are combined to give the natural coloration.\nIn the iris of the Lapps fourteen different and graduated shades are\ndistinguishable, from dark chestnut brown to green. M. Mantegazza\nconfirms the observation that a certain hue of the eyes is nearly\nalways associated with a particular hair-color, and he states that\nthis union is one of the most unvarying ethnical characters by which\nto judge of the purity of race. The nose is nearly as important as\nthe eye as an ethnical and \u00e6sthetic feature. The author reproduces M.\nTopinard's curious table of its morphological characteristics observing\nthat it omits only one, which nevertheless is somewhat important,\nthat is, the angle made by the root of the nose with the forehead.\nIn relation to the mouth we have the suggestive remark, \"the eye is\nthe centre of the expression of thought; the mouth is the expressive\ncentre of feeling and of sensuality.\" As to the color of the hair, M.\nMantegazza has brought together many important facts. Among the higher\nraces, the hair may be of almost any of the ordinary tints. The Jews\ndo not differ from the Europeans in this respect, as they exhibit fair\nhair as well as dark hair, and light and dark eyes. Although in Germany\nthe Jewish population generally is much darker than the rest of the\npeople, many of them have blonde hair, blue eyes, and fair complexion.\nFor some reason not yet ascertained, there is a tendency in Europe\nand especially in England for the blonde type to disappear. We would\nsuggest that it is a case of reversion to the type of the primitive\ninhabitants. M. Mantegazza remarks that the beard does not correspond\nto any intellectual type, as it is strongly developed as well among the\nAustralian aborigines as among the Aryans and Semites. Nevertheless,\nthe beard is worthy of further study as an ethnological feature. It may\nbe noted that the Australian aborigines have been connected with the\nprimitive inhabitants of Western Europe by other characters.\n\nIn treating of the expression of the emotions, we are told that\nphysical expression has two different functions\u2014to replace a complete\nlanguage, and \"to defend the nerve-centres and other parts of the body\nagainst dangers of different kinds.\" Much more might have been said on\nthe first subject, as gesture language has within the last few years\nbecome an important ethnological study, and, indeed, a supplementary\nchapter has been written for the English edition of this work on the\nphysiognomy of gesture. There is great truth in the remarks, that\n\"every religion and many philosophical schools have been founded by\nword and by expression more than by books\"; and that \"the more feeling\na nation has, the more rich and eloquent are its methods of physical\nexpression.\" M. Mantegazza does full justice to the great wealth of\ndetails and the discoveries on which the Darwinian laws of expression\nare based, while supplementing them with original observations and\nresults. It is in the classification of expressions we have probably\nthe most important feature of the present work. Full synoptical tables\nare given of the expressions of Sense, Passion, and Intellect, and of\nthe various expressions of Pleasure and Pain, Love and Hatred. These\nare illustrated by ingenious remarks, as an example of which we may\nquote the somewhat cynical statement that \"many ladies laugh little\nlest they should have precocious wrinkles, while others laugh too\nmuch and on every pretext that they may show their beautiful teeth.\"\nThe author well says that in love and pleasure, hatred and pain,\n\"we have two binary compounds, two such energetic psycho-expressive\ncombinations that the formidable and the destructive voltaic pile of\nour analytic methods is needed to separate the elements.\" He has some\ncurious remarks on the fact that laughter and smiling are very frequent\nphenomena in the expression of hatred, for which we refer our readers\nto the work itself.\n\nTo pleasure and pain, love and hatred, M. Mantegazza adds pride and\nhumiliation, as \"the fundamental psychical movements of human nature,\nas ancient as man, and common to all the inhabitants of the globe.\"\nThus, he is of opinion that aristocracy is one of the most natural\nfeatures of humanity, and that democrats \"make history recede instead\nof advancing when they deny the most elementary laws of heredity and of\nhuman nature.\" We must pass over the expressions of personal feelings,\nand those of thought, to reach the chapter on racial and professional\nexpression. Here races are classified, according to their expression,\ninto ferocious, gentle, apathetic, grotesque or simian, stupid, and\nintelligent, but the classification, like all others from single\ncharacters, is imperfect. Probably as good a classification could be\nmade on the basis of modes of salutation, beginning with nose-kissing,\nor the still more primitive smelling. Raden-Saleh, an artist of Java\npreferred nose-_breathing_, as by it we put our soul into contact with\nthat of the beloved one! It is undoubtedly true, as M. Mantegazza\nremarks, that the expression of different peoples is replete with\ntheir most prominent psychical characters. The beautiful impassioned\nexpression of the Italians is yet defiant and not always frank, owing\nto their having been so long subjected to tyrants. Speaking generally,\nthe European peoples have an expansive or a concentric expression, of\nwhich \"the first is found in the Italians, the French, the Slaves, the\nRussian: the second in the Germans, the Scandinavians, the Spanish.\"\nThe author adds that there is also \"a beautiful expression full of\ngrace, that of the people of Gr\u00e6co-Latin origin; and another hard,\nquite angular, without roundness, that of the Germans, the English, and\nthe Scandinavians.\"\n\nM. Mantegazza gives a very skilful analysis of the \"moderators\nand disturbers of expression,\" referring to his earlier work the\n\"Physiology of Pain\" for further details. In the next chapter he\ntreats of the criteria for the determination of the strength of an\nemotion with reference to the accompanying expression. In addition to\nthe _force_ and the _persistency_ of the contraction of the expressing\nmuscles, there is a diffusion of expression in gradually increasing\ncircles from the face downwards to the legs, and lastly, alternate\ncontractions and relaxations of the muscles according to the intensity\nof the central movement which accompanies the emotion. The expression\nof pleasure is always centrifugal, that of pain being centripetal,\ntending to bring the arms and lower limbs towards the median line of\nthe body. In dealing with the criteria for judging the moral work of\na physiognomy, we are told that the two most certain signs of a good\nface, are the permanent expression of benevolence, and the absolute\nabsence of all hypocrisy. Let us add the remark, accredited to Charles\nDickens, that it is advisable to see how a person looks when silent\nand apparently unobserved. There are two sources of error in forming\nthat judgment, one arising from the fact that beautiful things give\npleasure, the chances of error increasing when a man has to judge a\nwoman, or _vice versa_; the other is due to a false induction, from\nthe observed association in one individual of a particular physical\nfeature with a special moral character. The anatomical characters of\nthe intelligent face and of the stupid face are given in a tabulated\nform, but M. Mantegazza states that the most important characters are\nthose drawn from the expression, the two great centres of which are\nthe eye and the mouth. Probably the non-observation of the expression\naccounts for the mistake made by Goethe, who, when dining at the house\nof an Englishman, was struck with the intellectual appearance of one of\nthe guests and thought he must be a man of genius. Goethe anticipated\npleasure in hearing him speak, but great was his horror, when apple\ndumplings were placed on the table, to hear the guest shout out \"them's\nthe jockies for me\"!\n\nIn an appendix the author treats of the eyes, hair, and beard among\nthe Italian races, which gives numerous statistics collected by the\nItalian Anthropological Society. It appears that the men of Tuscany as\nwell as of Piedmont are noted for scantiness of beard. Probably this\nfact is due to the existence of a special race element, rather than a\ndifference of climate as would seem to be suggested. The presence of\nred hair in all parts of Italy, although only in small quantities, is\nalso difficult of explanation. Strange to say it is the most common in\nregions which are poorest in fair hair. From this we must suppose it\nto have some relation to dark hair, an opinion which agrees with the\nobservation that in England dark hair in young children is sometimes\ninterspersed with red hairs, which either change or disappear with age.\nThe hair is known to darken considerably after puberty is reached,\nand possibly red hair may be due to the persistence, through special\nconditions of which we are not aware, of an infantile character.\n\nWe must not leave M. Mantegazza's excellent and entertaining work\nwithout referring to the plates given in the Appendix, among which are\nmorphological, \u00e6sthetic, and intellectual trees of the human race, and\nfigures of ethnic types illustrative of remarks made in the text. It\nalso has a good index.\n\n \u03a9.\n\n\nIN DARKEST ENGLAND AND THE WAY OUT. By _Gen. Booth_, of the Salvation\n Army. New York: Funk & Wagnalls.\n\nIn this book,\u2014which is considered by many to be the most profound,\nserious, and comprehensive study of the social problem that has\nyet appeared, as much so because it seems to strike at the root of\nthe grievance as because it offers a practical remedy,\u2014the author\nproposes to so ameliorate the conditions of the abandoned classes\nin England as not only to make the members of them self-supporting\nand respectable, but after a twenty years' trial of his scheme to so\nchange the industrial condition of the kingdom that there will not\nbe found an able-bodied man or woman in all England unable to find\nwork or food. What politico-economical reformers have had most to\ncontend with is the poverty or lack of opportunity for labor which\nseems to be inherent in the present social structure,\u2014a condition\nwhere, to express it clearly, there seems to be not enough work for\nall the people. Hence the standing army of tramps to the number of\n30,000 in America and more than 20,000 in the city of London alone.\nThe submerged class that the author of this book seeks to elevate or\nsave from sin and utter uselessness has been variously estimated. Mr.\nChamberlain says that there is in England a population equal to that of\nthe metropolis\u2014between four and five millions\u2014who are in a state of\nabject destitution and misery. Mr. Griffin estimates the number to be\n1,800,000, while the author of \"In Darkest England\" thinks 3,000,000 to\nbe a moderate statement. Many causes may be ascribed to this deplorable\nstate of humanity, such as natural incapacity for work, predisposition\nto idleness, enforced beggary, crime, misfortune, poverty, drunkenness,\nand waste,\u2014all of which operate to drag these unfortunate ones to\nthe lowest level of life. He thinks that the inability of a large\nproportion of the people to obtain work drives them either into\ndespair, sin, crime, and suicide, or to merely exist, carrying with\nthem, year by year, the bitter ashes of a life from which the furnace\nof misfortune has burned away all joy and hope and strength. They are a\nhelpless and pathetic class,\u2014men and women who \"are being sucked down\ninto the quicksands of modern life.\" And when it is known that England\nis rich enough to drink rum in quantities which appal the chancellor\nof the exchequer and yet not rich enough to provide any other shelter\nfor her homeless ones and outcasts than the midnight sky, modern\ncivilisation with all its boasted Christianity and humanitarianism\npresents indeed a deplorable aspect, appearing to be but a mockery and\na farce.\n\nThe method which this book seeks to popularise and use as the means\nof elevating to usefulness the outcasts, the indigent, and unemployed\nclasses of England and of the civilised world, is none other than the\nscheme originally applied in Bavaria by Count Rumford\u2014an American\nbetter known as Benjamin Thompson, a graduate of Harvard, who, having\nentered the Bavarian service at the close of the war for independence,\nbecame the governor of Munich. The scheme is threefold. It is proposed\nto organise the submerged classes, with their consent of course, into\na gigantic co-operative society, subdivided into (1) The City Colony,\n(2) The Farm Colony, (3) The Over-Sea Colony. \"The scheme in its\nentirety,\" we are informed, \"may aptly be compared to a great machine\nfoundationed in the lowest slums and purlieus of our great towns and\ncities, drawing up into its embrace the depraved and destitute of all\nclasses; receiving thieves, harlots, paupers, drunkards, prodigals,\nall alike, on the simple conditions of their being willing to work and\nconform to discipline. Drawing up these poor outcasts, reforming them,\nand creating in them habits of industry, honesty, and truth; teaching\nthem methods by which alike the bread that perishes and that which\nendures to everlasting life can be won; forwarding them from the city\nto the country and there continuing the process of regeneration and\nthen pouring them forth on the virgin soils that await their coming\nin other lands.\" The scheme is so comprehensive that it includes\nslum crusades, wagon hospitals, a brigade of Christian apostles near\nprison-gates to meet and help discharged prisoners, rescue homes for\nunfallen girls when on the danger line between sin and starvation,\nbureaus of intelligence, refuges for street children, industrial\nschools, asylums for moral lunatics, a matrimonial bureau, and banks\nfor the poor. The project is not to be summarily rejected as utopian.\nIt is a gigantic effort to utilise the human refuse that sieves itself\nthrough all the means available for enlightenment to the very bottom of\nthe social structure. Into this vast machine the whole mass of soiled\nhumanity would be taken and by the refining process which is clearly\nelaborated in the book we could touch this material with a new spirit\nand thus reclaim the men, women, and children to self-support, honor,\nhonesty, and usefulness. For the success of the project \"General\" Booth\nhas asked for one million pounds.\n\nThree serious objections may be made to the scheme. The first is the\nplacing into the hands of one man or one organisation the power of\ndisposing, and the custody, of five millions of dollars\u2014an objection\nwhich Professor Huxley makes with good reason. The second is, the\ntheological environment which is a seeming part and parcel of the whole\nmachine. And the third is, the superficial and unradical character of\nthe remedy. Concerning the first objection it may be simply said, that\nhistory proves that the experiment which the \"General\" is about to make\nis a dangerous one. Professor Huxley maintains with more than usual\ngravity, that the unquestionable obedience which every soldier in the\nSalvation Army is expected, and by verbal contract is duly bound, to\nmaintain for all orders from headquarters, gives the most suspicious\naspect to the probable tyrannical development of his army in the\nfuture, as was illustrated for example in the Franciscan order founded\nin the thirteenth century by St. Francis. After his death, although the\norder was pledged by him to mendicancy and absolute separation from all\nworldly entanglements, it became \"one of the most powerful, wealthy,\nand worldly corporations in all Christendom, with their fingers in\nevery sink of political and social corruption.\" What guarantee is there\nthat the Salvation Army may not become likewise involved and exercise\nan imperialism and fanaticism not to be exceeded even by the Jesuits\nor Mormons? \"It is\" writes Professor Huxley in the _London Times_, \"a\ngreater evil to have the intellect of a nation put down by organised\nfanaticism, to see its political and industrial affairs at the mercy\nof a despot whose chief thought is to make that fanaticism prevail, to\nwatch the degradation of men who should feel themselves individually\nresponsible for their own and their country's fate, to mere brute\ninstruments ready to the hand of a master for any use to which he may\nput them.\"\n\nAnother objection and one equally as fatal is the religious aspect\nwhich is given to the movement. As such it bears a relation to the\nproblem of civilisation which is all important. To insist that every\nwicked man or woman in order to be righteous and happy must, ought,\nor will, believe in historical Christianity, is absurd enough, and to\nproject or infuse into the whole character of a social reform movement\na theological idea as a necessary element in its efficacy is certainly\nridiculous, but to make the work of the elevation of the degenerate\nmasses of mankind a mere accessory to a belief in an irrational and\nalready obsolete religious doctrine or contingent upon it,\u2014at least\nto emphasize it as a means to the adoption of the unfortunates into\none organisation where all believe alike, or where by virtue of the\ngratitude they bear to those who have materially helped them, they\nconform or try to conform to their mode of thinking,\u2014is indeed one\nof the sad mistakes upon which the \"General's\" social project is\nbuilt. For in the submerged class, there are doubtless many who are\nnot Christians in belief, who indeed, however fortunate they may\nbecome, yet could not subscribe to the creed of the Evangelical Church\nor honestly engage in a work organised in the interest of so-called\nhistorical Christianity. It is not necessary in order to make man good\nto make him a Christian, or a Jew, or a Buddhist, in belief. The point\nto emphasise is goodness of character and not merely an intellectual\nprofession of faith. Once get a man to be good, or to hate sin and love\nrighteousness, and he will, if he never makes a Christian profession,\nbe as useful a man as society might wish. Righteousness will take any\nman or woman safely and happily through the world. The truth is just as\nthe poet stated it:\n\n \"A man may cry 'Church! Church!' at every word,\n And have no more grace than other people;\n The daw's not reckoned a religious bird\n Because he keeps a-cawing in the steeple.\"\n\nIt is not, therefore, necessary, to the success of \"General\" Booth's\nscheme that it should be hitched to some popular, although unscientific\nand unreasonable religious conception of life; or that he should\nconsider a reform in the life of any man a miracle, and therefore\nattribute all such to the direct interposition of God. The scheme, if a\nsuccess at all, will depend, as the organisation of the Salvation Army\nhas depended, upon the enthusiasm and enterprise of the \"General\" and\nhis constituency. And all reliance upon God without any intelligent\nhuman effort in behalf of the outcasts of society would only gorge a\ngreater multitude of humanity into the bogs and sinks of iniquity. As\nwell might we expect a locomotive to move by tacking scripture all over\nit, as to expect any great social reform movement to be a success by\nassociating it or making it depend upon some sort of religious creed.\nStill whatever may be said against religious interference with social\nproblems, the work of \"General\" Booth puts to shame the church whose\ntrifling doctrinal and polemical controversies have so blinded its\njudgment as to neglect its duties toward the submerged classes and\nleave them to so enormously increase that in order to save the world\nfrom almost hopeless ruin a new organisation such as the Salvation Army\nhad to come forth. The church has a far more important duty to perform\nthan that of merely existing, and it will never emblason the record\nwhich its founder gave it by his self-sacrificing life and his noble\ndeath upon the cross until it takes its wealth of brain, heart, and\nmoney, and becomes indeed the modern Saviour of the world.\n\nThe third objection and doubtless the most important one of all is\nthe superficial and unradical character of the remedy. It is not here\nimplied that the project is useless although inclusive. The point made\nis this, that whatever the \"General\" may do to dredge the bogs of sin\nand clean the streets of beggars, the idlers, the unemployed, the\nwaifs, the prostitutes, the drunkards, and the criminal class, and put\nall such in the way of usefulness, manliness, and respectability, what\ndoes he do or what is to be done to keep the new or fresh material from\nsinking into mire? While the \"General\" is working among the lowest,\nthousands are being prepared among the highest for the inevitable\nfate from which he is plucking the helpless ones as brands from the\nburning. While he is gathering up the submerged and placing them in\nhis machine, the mill without still grinds on and on, crushing as\nlarge a number year by year as he may help and save. His method might\nconsistently be compared to one where a man would transform rotten\napples into good ones without affecting the tree that produces them.\nAlthough the criminal and sinful classes influence the innocent and\nunsophisticated, yet it cannot be proven that the bulk of the people\nwill remain pure, true, honest, upright, if there were no sinful or\ncriminal class! And hence even if all such who are avowedly sinful were\nmade better and their pernicious influence removed from the world by\nthe method here proposed, sin itself would still inhere in the nature\nof man's life and would drag thousands down to ruin and misery. Like\nthe mosaic paintings which can only be destroyed by destroying the\nstones upon which they are impressed, so sin seems to be bound up\nin human nature. To get at it and destroy it utterly by one _coup_\none must annihilate the constitution of the universe. The problem of\ncivilisation is such that it cannot be solved by one specific reform.\nFor to develop man it seems to be necessary that he should pass through\nthe treatment which the long and inevitable process of experience and\neducation can give. Although sin like poverty is but relative, yet it\nis the name for the conduct into which man is led either by a neglect\nor abuse of opportunity, or by some inevitable fatality. It is not here\ncontended that man cannot rid himself or society of any disposition to\nsin. What is maintained is that it cannot be abolished from the world\nby any spasmodic effort such as that which characterises the present\nproject, but that it will pass away only where and when humanity\nbecomes perfectly educated. And this state of civilisation, by the way,\ndoes not seem to be so surprisingly near at hand. Nor can material\nhelp, such as food, shelter, clothing, and what not, altogether effect\nor even change the moral status of a man's life. Thousands whose\nmaterial wants are amply provided for revel in sin and corruption,\nand the dreadful orgy where vice holds carnival reels and swaggers in\nthe palaces where amid gilded refinements and dazzling splendor the\nso-called better classes disport themselves. It is true that when a\nman is starving or naked, bread and clothing are the things which will\nsatisfy his most immediate wants, and not prayers or sermons. To supply\nsuch wants is easy enough, but to so arouse or kindle into a flame of\nfortitude and manliness, the diseased conscience and the perverted\njudgment, to so operate upon the will as to make the man able to not\nonly choose but do the right, is the great and radical difficulty which\nis not so easily overcome. Psychology and medicine seem to have no\nremedy to offer, while religion for these many years has simply touched\nthe hem of the garment\u2014while the abandoned classes have seemingly\nmultiplied on our hands.\n\nIn concluding these remarks we cannot forbear to express our regret\nthat the real author of the book has given it over to \"General\" Booth\nand allowed him not only the credit of authorship, but most likely also\nthe privilege of mixing up a scheme of social reform with the politics\nof the Salvation Army. The book was \"boomed\" in this way, but we fear\nthat it will at the same time be doomed in this way. The Salvation Army\nand its founder have reaped much undeserved praise. \"General\" Booth\nhas received incredible sums from enthusiasts to support the scheme,\nand these sums have to a great extent been used to advertise it. It\nappears to us that \"General\" Booth has contracted a debt which he will\nbe unable to pay. The better situated classes of society do not lack in\nsympathy for their wretched fellow-men, and it sets us thinking, how\nstrong human sentimentality must be that the propagation of the mere\nidea of curing the evils of mankind proposed in this book as feasible\nwith the aid of one million pounds furnishes ample means to a religious\nenthusiast whose method of salvation is rather noisy than thorough,\nrepresenting a kind of barbarous relapse and only adapted to the lowest\nand most uneducated classes. We should know that sentimentality cannot\nsave. Sentiment and sympathy are good things, but unless they are\nbacked by a cold consideration of fact and rational foresight, they are\nworse than useless.\n\nIt will be wise to consider the propositions made in \"In Darkest\nEngland\" without taking into consideration the r\u00f4le to be played in the\nscheme by the Salvation Army. But while the reader may be just enough\nto consider the plan of social reform on its own merits, \"General\"\nBooth is in possession of the funds and will be the general manager of\nthe experiment.\n\n \u0393\u03ba.\n\n\nPLANKTON-STUDIEN. Vergleichende Untersuchungen ueber die Bedeutung\n und Zusammensetzung der pelagischen Fauna und Flora. By _Ernst\n Haeckel_. Jena: Gustav Fischer.\n\nThe first systematic studies of the innumerable organisms which almost\neverywhere drift about in the ocean, were made by Professor Johannes\nM\u00fcller who some forty years ago made excursions in the North Sea.\nHaeckel, then a student twenty years old, accompanied him on one of\nthese excursions to Heligoland. Since then these investigations have\nbeen conducted on a larger scale. The English vessel \"Challenger\"\ncruised in different oceans for no less than forty months, and the\nresults of this great undertaking were published by John Murray in\nthe \"Voyage of H. M. S. Challenger\"\u2014a voluminous work consisting\nof eighty-two zo-ological reports, to which Professor Haeckel also\nhas contributed his \"Report on the Deep-Sea Keratosa.\" The German\ngovernment sent out the German cruiser \"National\" on the same errand.\nThe scientists of the expedition were Hensen, Brandt, Dahl, Sch\u00fctt,\nFischer, Kr\u00fcmmel. They were at sea altogether ninety-three days making\na circuitous trip on the Atlantic ocean, touching at the Bermudas,\nBrazil, and the Azores. The results of the expedition, published\nin reports by Hensen, Brandt, Du Bois-Reymond, and Kr\u00fcmmel, were\nconsidered as very satisfactory and received the unreserved applause\nof the German press. Professor Haeckel is of a different opinion. He\nconsiders the reports as standing in flat contradiction to former\nvaluable observations, especially to those of the English \"Challenger\"\nand the Italian \"Vettor Pisani\" expeditions. Hensen's results rest upon\na weak supposition and contain wrong generalisations; even his method\nis, according to Haeckel, entirely useless, giving a wrong presentation\nof the problems of pelagic biology.\n\nThe word \"plancton\" was introduced by Hensen. Haeckel adopts it because\nhe considers the Greek term preferable to Johannes M\u00fcller's _Auftrieb_\nor pelagic _Mulder_ (the latter has been adopted also by English,\nFrench, and Italian planctologists). By plancton (\u03c0\u03bb\u03b1\u03b3\u03ba\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd), derived\nfrom \u03c0\u03bb\u03ac\u03b6\u03c9, to roam about, is understood the drifting micro-organisms\nof the sea.\n\nProfessor Haeckel in the present volume not only corrects Professor\nHensen's errors, but also gives a report of his own observations. Not\nthe least valuable part of the brochure is the exact terminology which\nProfessor Haeckel proposes in order to escape the confusion necessarily\nresulting from a looseness of terms.\n\n \u039a.\n\n\nDIE ALLGEMEINE WELTANSCHAUUNG IN IHRER HISTORISCHEN ENTWICKELUNG.\n Charakterbilder aus der Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften. By\n _Carus Sterne_. Mit zahlreichen Portr\u00e4ts und Textabbildungen.\n Stuttgart: Otto Weisert.\n\nDr. Ernst Krause, better known by the _nom de plume_ of \"Carus\nSterne,\" has here undertaken to present the modern world-conception\nas contrasted with the olden one. We have scarcely ever met with a\nbook that contains in so popular a form all the noteworthy facts of\nthe great progress that has been achieved in science since the time\nof Copernicus. The results of the evolution-theory are generally\nknown, but the road and the stations of the road on which science has\nreached its present position, now almost universally recognised among\nmen, are almost forgotten. No one perhaps is better able to tell us\nof this great struggle for truth than the enthusiastic disciple of\nDarwin, Carus Sterne. Carus Sterne and his friend Prof. Ernst Haeckel,\nhave done no small work in obtaining recognition for the theory of\nevolution in Germany. While Haeckel's work has been confined to the\nfield of exact science, Carus Sterne has complemented the labors of\nhis co-worker by pointing out the moral truths contained in Darwinism.\nWe are aware of the fact that Carus Sterne has also written purely\nscientific works, \"Werden und Vergehen,\" for instance; but what we\nwish to emphasise as his especial merit is that he was, so far as we\nknow, the first to call attention to the moral workings of nature in\nher great cosmic empire. As an article characteristic of this trait in\nCarus Sterne's writings we refer the reader not familiar with German\nliterature to his article \"The Education of Parents by their Children,\"\na translation of which appeared in Nos. 22 and 23 of _The Open Court_.\n\nThe present book (over 400 pages) discusses the following subjects:\nPagan and Christian Cosmology; Copernicus, Tycho Brahe, and Kepler;\nThe Controversy Concerning the Geo-centric View; The Infinitude of\nHabitable Worlds; From Bacon to Newton; The Beginnings of an Animal-\nand Plant-Geography; The Doctrine of Spontaneous Generation; The\nDiscussion Concerning the Origin of Birds; The Terrestrial Globe\nand Its Fossils; Diluvianism; The Mongrel Theory; The Doctrines\nof Preformation and Metamorphosis; The Doctrine of Catastrophes;\nPersistence or Mutability; The Controversy on the Anthropocentric View;\nThe Origin of Language; On the History of Evolution.\n\n \u039a.\n\n\nUEBER DIE AUFGABEN EINER ALLGEMEINEN RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT. By Dr. _Alb.\n Herm. Post_. Oldenburg and Leipsic: A. Schwartz.\n\nThe author of this little book, Dr. Albert Hermann Post, a Judge of\nthe courts of the free city of Bremen, Germany, has made the study of\nethnological jurisprudence the scientific work of his life. His idea\nand purpose are to establish a positive science of jurisprudence in\nthe widest and most comprehensive sense of the word, on the basis of\nan investigation of all the forms of law, available to research, that\nhave ever appeared. A universal science of jurisprudence, according to\nthis conception, would have for its subject-matter the contents of the\njural sense or consciousness of the entire human race,\u2014the jural facts\nof the totality of human society. In other words, this science must\nbe, not only historical, but _ethnological_. It must include the jural\nlife not only of the civilised, but also of the uncivilised races of\nmankind: it must comprehend _all_. It thus constitutes a step beyond\nthat great movement of the beginning of this century which gave us\nthe science of the history of law. It extends the latter, supplements\nit, and aims to find in the juro-social existence of undeveloped and\nuncivilised races the germs of legal practices and institutions that\nthe literary history and traditions of civilised peoples would never\nsupply.\n\nThe matter of the present work of Dr. Post takes up some 215 pages. It\ntreats of the available sources of such a universal science of law, of\nthe elaboration of these sources; it gives a concise and illustrative\nepitome of the most important parallel phenomena met with in the\njural life of the human race,\u2014e. g. in the departments of the Law of\nInheritance, of Property, of Marriage, etc., etc.,\u2014and a survey of the\nseparate ethnic divisions of law over the whole earth.\n\nIt is a grand task\u2014the realisation of this conception. And its\nexecution in its enormous magnitude is only possible through the\nspeedy and intelligent co-operation of scientists and travellers as\nwell as jurists. It will make of jurisprudence a _natural science_,\nas distinguished from the _a priori_ character this study has up till\nnow assumed; and its prosecution will impart into the science a light\nand freshness which it sadly needs. Next to theology, the science of\nlaw is least pervaded with the spirit of modern research. And this is\neminently so in our country, where hardly the history, let alone the\nethnology of law, is studied.\n\nWe are tempted to give a much more thorough and detailed exposition of\nDr. Post's ideas. But an original article will appear from his pen in a\nfuture number of _The Monist_, and therefore we are brief.\n\n \u03bc\u03ba\u03c1\u03ba.\n\n\n\n\nPERIODICALS.\n\n\nMIND. January, 1891. No. LXI.\n\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n ON PHYSIOLOGICAL EXPRESSION IN PSYCHOLOGY. By Prof. _A. Bain_.\n\n APPERCEPTION AND THE MOVEMENT OF ATTENTION. By _G. F. Stout_.\n\n HELMHOLTZ'S THEORY OF SPACE-PERCEPTION. By _J. H. Hyslop_.\n\n THE PRINCIPLE OF INDUCTION. By _L. T. Hobhouse_.\n\n THE UNDYING GERM-PLASM AND THE IMMORTAL SOUL. By _R. von\n Lendenfeld_.\n\n CRITICAL NOTICES: Pikler's \"The Psychology of the Belief in\n Objective Existence\"; Ferrier's \"The Croonian Lectures on\n Cerebral Localisation\"; Jevons's \"Pure Logic and other\n Minor Works\"; Marshall's \"Principles of Economics, I\";\n Mackenzie's \"An Introduction to Social Philosophy\"; Fouill\u00e9e's\n \"L'Evolutionnisme des Id\u00e9es-Forces\"; Koenig's \"Die Entwicklung\n des Causalproblems.\"\n\n_On Physiological Expression in Psychology._ In opposition to the\n\"subjective purism\" in psychology advocated by Mr. Stout and Mr.\nBradley. The mixture of the psychical with the physical is such as to\nprove that mental processes, however distinct from bodily processes,\nhave never owned even a vocabulary of their own. Pleasure and pain\nare psychical states, but we cannot theorise fully upon them without\nadverting to their physical causes or conditions. The action of\ndrugs proves that the physical constitution of the nerve-substance\nis a paramount condition of our sensibility, pleasurable or painful.\nBy taking the organs of special sense in separation we can exhaust\nthe modes of sensibility under each, and when we look minutely into\nthe anatomy of the several organs, we obtain further helps to the\nsubdivision and distinction of the individual sensations. Connected\nwith the physics of the brain, apart from the nervous substance and\nits conditions, is the important state known as excitement, with\nits opposites quiescence, languor, repose, drowsiness, sleep, and\ninsensibility. The theory of the Will must rely, in the first instance,\nupon subjective sequences, but the physical consequences of pleasure\nand pain are a two-fold activity\u2014Expression and Volition, and for\nverification of any hypothesis as to priority between these two forms\nof the physical outcome of feeling, the sequence must be taken on the\nphysical side alone. As regards the emotions, taken in themselves, the\ntracing of physical concomitance is unavoidable. In Psycho-physics\nthe experiments are made upon the physical side, though not to the\nexclusion of subjective reference. A law relating to the seat of\nideas obtained in the first instance through the senses, declares the\nnervous tracts to be the same in both, thus connecting Sense with\nIntellect. It has always been impossible to avoid describing ideas as\nmodified repetitions of sensation, and employing for that purpose the\nmaterialism of the sense-organs. While eminently applicable to all the\nphenomena of mind at their elementary stage\u2014Sensation, Intellect,\nEmotion, Will\u2014physiological conditions cease to have the like bearing\nin the higher complications. In all that part of Association that\nstates the order of recurrence of our ideas in Memory, subjective\ninvestigation is paramount and exclusive. But the state described as\nconscious intensity, excitement, mental concentration, attention,\ninterest, is expressible both subjectively and physiologically. The\nconstant application of spiritual remedies to bodily ailments is an\nimportant aspect of the union of mind and body, and their interaction\nin those instances is of great significance.\n\n_Apperception and the Movement of Attention._ Thinking is action\ndirected towards intellectual ends. Intellectual ends are attained\nby an appropriate combination of movements of attention. Attention\nand apperception, as this word is applied by Steinthal, reciprocally\ndetermine each other. The nature of attention is explained in\naccordance with the monoideism of M. Ribot, but contrary to his view it\nis declared to be a constant character of our mental life, although the\nmonoideism is not always complete. Apperception is the process by which\na mental system incorporates or tends to incorporate a new element.\nThe effect of attention is largely dependent on the apperception which\naccompanies it, and of which it is an auxiliary process. The movement\nof attention fastening upon the presentation to be apperceived, fixes\nit in the focus of consciousness, until the appercipient system has\nfinally succeeded or failed in assimilating it. The reason why one\nideal group becomes appercipient in preference to the others lies\nmainly in its greater affinity with the presentation to be apperceived.\nThe conditions determining the strength of apperceptive systems may\nbe either extrinsic or intrinsic. The extrinsic consist in passing\ncircumstances which from time to time favor its activity. The intrinsic\nconditions are inherent in the constitution of the system itself.\nAmong the former are the co-operation of another system; the recovery\nor the intensity of its own previous action; the influence of organic\nsensation; its own freshness arising from previous repose. Of these\nthe organic sensation is of fundamental importance. The influence of\nthe c\u0153n\u00e6sthesis pervades the whole mental life. Every specific kind of\nemotion is accompanied by a characteristic mode of organic reaction.\nThe intrinsic conditions are the comprehensiveness of the system; its\ninternal organisation, of which the philosophy of Hegel is cited as an\nexample; the strength of the cohesion between its parts; the nature of\nthe sensory material which enters predominantly into its composition,\nthat is, the comparative excitability of ideas derived from different\nsenses. The normal working of competition, co-operation, and conflict,\nmay be illustrated by contrasting it with the pathological state\ncalled _suggestibility_, in which those processes are more or less\ncompletely in abeyance. The conditions which determine the train of\nideas arise from the fact that attention, being a motor process,\ndepends on feeling, which dependence cannot be separated from that on\napperception. Feeling gives unity to mental process, and is a simple\nmode of consciousness resulting from the excitement of a multiplicity\nof elements, and it causes attention to be concentrated on the central\npresentation from which the wave of excitement is radiated. The\nessential characteristic of a train of _thought_, as distinguished\nfrom a mere train of ideas, is that the relation linking each idea to\nits predecessor forms also a source of the interest through which it\nattracts attention. The ground of the distinction is that thinking\ninvolves the activity of a proportional system as such, that is \"a\nsystem adapted to apperceive objects in other respects most diverse\nfrom each other, merely because they agree in being capable of entering\ninto certain relations.\" The modified working of the principle of\nassociation through the apperceptive activity of a proportional system,\nis _proportional_ or _analogical production_, which may possibly\noperate in every instance of the suggestion of one idea by another.\nA reversion of attention to a previous link in a chain of ideas,\ngiving rise to a modified repetition of it, is a distinctive feature\nof _thinking_. In a separate article will be dealt with the special\npart played by language, which from a psychological point of view\nis \"a peculiar movement of attention having a peculiar influence on\napperceptive process.\"\n\n_Helmholtz's Theory of Space-Perception._ The doctrine of \"unconscious\ninference\" is explicitly founded upon the general theory of knowledge\nformed by Helmholtz, which is identical with that of Kant, and\nHelmholtz's investigation into the genesis of space-perception applied\nto the problem which Kant did not consider, namely, the perception\nof particular or concrete spaces. The distinction made by the former\nbetween the inference from the data of sense and that in which the\ndata are consciously known to be signs, by calling the inductive\ninferences of the sciences _conscious_, and those involved in external\nperception of world _unconscious_, is open to the charge of involving a\ncontradiction. On the one hand, the theory of \"unconscious inference\"\nsupports the empirical doctrine of perception only in consequence\nof calling the process an inference. On the other hand, to call the\nprocess \"unconscious\" is to restore the conception of immediacy which\nthe idea of inference is supposed to exclude. This contradiction may\nnot be insisted on, but, as the phenomena of binocular adjustment\ndiscussed in a previous article showed in the visual consciousness a\n_quale_ which, with or without its relation to tactual and muscular\nextension, was other than plane dimension, Helmholtz must, unless\nthis _quale_ can be proved to be result of inference, limit the\napplication of his theory to the synthetic connection between touch\nand sight. _Parallax of motion_, which consists of the different\nafferent movements or velocities of bodies in horizontal meridians,\nand situated at different distances from the observer, seems to do\nthe same for monocular vision that adjustment and fusion do for\nbinocular vision. The phenomena attending certain experiments in\nwhich the parallax of motion was observed \"correspond exactly to\nthe conception of those who hold that the representative of plane\ndimension in the retinal image decides the nature of all perceptions\nwhose character is not presented in the image except as a visual\nsign, and hence that aught beyond magnitude must be the result of\ninfluence.\" An examination of Helmholtz's fundamental principle,\n\"the denial of all pre-established harmony between the nature of\nimpressions and the nature of the external world,\" confirms the view\nthat the conception of space may be properly a visual one, requiring\nthe superior constancy of touch to correct illusions growing out of the\ncomplexities of vision. If we limit visual phenomena as data to mere\nvariations of kind and distinctness in color, we cannot account for\nsuch cases as the appearance and inversion of mathematical perspective,\nbinocular localisation and translocation, and the distinct effect of\nthe monocular parallax of motion, qualities which are dimensional in\ntheir nature. \"While the complexities of space-perception make the\nco-operation of inferential agencies very probable, yet the spacial\nquality must be originally given somewhere in consciousness either\nas an object of perception or as a mental construction, in order to\nfurnish a basis for inferences to its existence or its relations where\nthey are not immediately cognised. This makes the developed conceptions\nof abstract and synthetic space a complex of inferences and intuitions.\"\n\n_The Principle of Induction._ The ultimate major premiss of Induction\naccording to Mill is the Law of Causation which, as he treats it, is\na wide generalisation true of sequences just as other generalisations\nare true of the facts of space. Hence it is itself an induction like\nother inductions. What is wanted is \"an axiom expressing in general\nterms what we do when we make a particular statement universal, which\nmakes explicit the truth implied by the making of any generalisation\nwhatever.\" The Law of Causation will be found to be a particular\napplication of this wider axiom, and the axiom itself must be sought\nfrom the analysis of ordinary simple generalisations. When we connect\ntruths together, or reason, we _support_ an inferred judgment by some\nother assertion. That we should be able to reason at all involves that\nany fact, as _B_, should have some other fact, as _C_, to which it\nis always related; that is, \"any fact precisely resembling this _B_,\nwhatever its other attributes and concomitants may be, will be found in\na precisely similar relation to a precisely similar _C_.\" A relation\nexists between two facts whenever the mind can at once distinguish the\nfacts as two, and at the same time attend to them together and assert\nsomething of them considered together. We may speak of a relation\nbetween different aspects of the same existing thing. The three\nalternatives afforded by the axiom as ultimately stated correspond to\nthe three cases in which _A_ is the \"sum of the conditions of _B_,\" or\nin any way a universal correlate of _B_; in which it is the cause of\n_B_ in the popular sense of the term; and in which its connection with\n_B_ is merely 'causal,' that is, \"the Law of Causation is the Axiom\nof Reasoning as applied to the sequences of phenomena.\" Every fact\nobserved stands in universal relation to some other fact. The judgment\nof that relation \"is implied in the rudimentary inference which states\nonly the particular fact observed and the particular fact now expected.\nIt is explicit in the reason that is conscious of its own grounds and\nmethods, and takes there the form of the universal judgment, or major\npremiss.\"\n\n_The Undying Germ-Plasm and the Immortal Soul._ All unicellular beings\nsuch as the Protozoa and the simpler Alg\u00e6, Fungi, etc., reproduce\nthemselves by means of simple fission, and consequently they are\nimmortal. All the single individuals of a family of unicellular beings\nbelong to each other, although they be isolated. Amongst certain\ninfusoria they do, in fact, remain together and build up branching\ncolonies. Later on, division of labor made its appearance and increased\nthe dependence of the individuals upon one another, so that their\nindividuality was to a great extent lost. By the development of this\nprocess, multicellular Metazoa arose from colonies of similar Protozoa,\nand at length culminated in the higher animals and man. All the\ncell-series are immortal, but they all must die because the structure\nwhich is built up by them collectively is mortal. The reproductive\ncells are the only kind adapted for existence outside the body, and\nfrom time to time some of the human reproductive cells succeed in\nconjugating, and from them a new individual arises. The whole structure\nof man is acquired with the one object in view of maintaining the\nseries of reproductive cells, of which he is, so to speak, the slave.\nThey are the most important and essential and also the undying parts\nof the organism. The series of reproductive cells thus possess the\nessential attributes of the human soul. If we compare the conception\nof the soul as held by various related religions, and take the\ncharacteristics invariably ascribed to the soul, we find that they hold\nalso for the series of reproductive cells continually developing within\nthe body. The ordinary conception of the fate of the soul after death\nagrees fundamentally with the result of observation on the prosperity\nof the series of germ-cells. That fate depends on conduct in the body,\nand the only possible definition of a good deed, that is approved by\nconscience, is one which will benefit the series of germ-cells arising\nfrom one individual, that is ourselves and our family, and further\nwhich will be of use to others with their own series of germ-cells, and\nthat in proportion to the degree of connection or relationship. Thus,\n\"the apparently enigmatical conception of the eternal soul is founded\non the actual immortality and continuity of the germ-plasma.\" (London:\nWilliams & Norgate.)\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. January, 1891. Vol. I. No. 2.\n\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES. By _D. G. Ritchie_.\n\n A NEW STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. By _Prof. Josiah Royce_.\n\n THE INNER LIFE IN RELATION TO MORALITY. By _J. H. Muirhead_.\n\n MORAL THEORY AND PRACTICE. By _Prof. John Dewey_.\n\n MORALS IN HISTORY. By _Prof. Fr. Jodl_.\n\n THE ETHICS OF DOUBT\u2014CARDINAL NEWMAN. By _W. L. Sheldon_.\n\n THE ETHICS OF SOCIALISM. Steinthal\u2014The Social Utopia;\n Paulsen\u2014Socialism and Social Reform. By _Prof. Franklin H.\n Giddings_.\n\n ETHICAL AND KINDRED SOCIETIES IN GREAT BRITAIN. By _Mrs. M.\n McCallum_.\n\n_A New Study of Psychology._ There are three fairly distinct types\nof treatment in text-books of psychology. The first type, is the\nscience of the \"mind\" considered as an entity, of whose nature we\nmight otherwise know much or little, but of which we at all events\nknew that it had a certain substantial unity. This was supplemented,\nor succeeded, by the theory of the 'ideas,' and their 'associations.'\nA third method confines its investigations to the facts and laws of\nthe nervous system, with only such use of introspection as was found\nabsolutely indispensable. Professor James, in his \"Principles of\nPsychology,\" does not accept primarily any one of these views. The\nunit he adopts in mental analysis might be defined as \"so much of the\nmental process as may be supposed to run parallel to a relatively\nsimple nervous function in the cortex of the living brain, in so\nfar as this cortex functions with a certain unity.\" Professor James\nrejects the unconscious in every form, and above all the unconscious\nmind-atom. He says, \"the special natural science of psychology must\nstop with the mere functional formula. If the passing be the directly\nverifiable existent, which no school has hitherto doubted it to be,\nthen that thought is itself the thinker, and psychology need not look\nbeyond.\" This life of passing thoughts needs only the fundamental\nhypothesis that the moments as they pass really know one another, that\nthe present is actually acquainted with the past, in order to give as\na resultant of the whole life such unity as we need for purposes of\npsychological science. In relation to volition and freedom, Professor\nJames holds that the idea of the end tends more and more to make itself\nall-sufficient, and that \"motives,\" so-called, are \"ideas of ends\"\nwhich owing to their conflict, are unable to pass over into acts so\nlong as they remain mere motives. The experience of deciding a conflict\nof motives is \"the experience of the triumph of one idea of the end\nover other ideas.\" The act of voluntary decision is experienced as an\nact of \"conscious attention to an idea,\" and nothing else. Volition is\nprimarily a relation, \"not between ourself and extra-mental matter,\nbut between ourself and our own states of mind.\" Professor James's\nown belief is that the question of freewill is insolvable on strictly\npsychological grounds, although on ethical grounds he ascribes to the\nalternative of freedom. In relation to the question of pleasure and\npain as motives, he points out that the 'idea-motor' acts, even on\na very high plane, express the presence of the 'idea of an end,' and\nthis end may itself be very painful, yet it tends to carry itself out.\nIt wins because we attend to it, and whether or no attention is free,\ncertain it is that attention often rather determines pleasure and\npain themselves, than is determined by them. In conclusion Professor\nRoyce says in relation to Professor James's book: \"His 'passing\nmoments,' which can 'know' and which can freely 'attend,' which\nare 'self-related,' and which have 'unity,' and which are still so\nintimately bound to the 'neural process,' have just the paradoxical and\nhypothetical character which requires one, in one's philosophy, to go\nbeyond them, and to declare them but illusory expressions in phenomenal\nform of an infinitely deeper truth.\"\n\n_The Inner Life in Relation to Morality._ The emotions that are called\nup by the thought of the world as an organic whole constitute the inner\nlife, that which Clifford calls 'cosmic emotion.' These emotions,\nalthough they do not end in the human soul, impart a spirit and diffuse\nan air over the rest of life: they have no separate external expression\nof their own. The pivot of man's inner life is the thought of himself\nas a part or member of a universal order. The object of the paper is\nto answer the questions: what this thought is, or ought to be; what\nare some of the forms which the feeling it rouses takes; what are\nsome of its special relations to social morality; and what practical\nmeans may be suggested under modern conditions for the cultivation of\nit. The view of the world most characteristic of the time in which we\nlive, has laid the foundation for an entirely new attitude of mind\ntowards the cosmos at large. The world is now known to be an organic\nwhole. This organism is the invisible background which is presupposed\nin the partial glimpses of it which we call common perception and the\nspecial sciences. If we look _inwards_ we have the _human conscience_\nas the symbol of a microcosm of moral relations between the different\nparts of our nature on the one hand and the different members of human\nsociety on the other. The cosmic principle clothing itself in the\ntwofold garb of which we know it, is the ultimate object of the emotion\ndescribed as the inner life. This brings with it that which lies at\nthe root of all religion\u2014the sense of dependence, by which is meant,\nthe feeling that we are born into and supported by a world which our\nindividual wills did not make. This at first produces a vague sense of\nfear in the presence of forces other and mightier than ourselves. But\ngenerally it has passed in us into a higher form, a sense of fearless\nfaith in truth and right, which are the laws of nature. The faculty\nof relating ourselves to the world in its widest, which is also its\ndeepest, aspects, with its appropriate feeling invests our everyday\nduties with a new meaning, and gives them a wider range by connecting\nthem with the general life of the world. Morality is thus raised to a\nhigher power; it passes from \"mere morality\" into \"morality touched\nwith emotion,\" and thus becomes a species of religion. Among other\nmeans of cultivating the inner life are the attending the _services_\nof the churches, although faith has been lost in their dogmas; the\nreading of the books, whether belonging to Christian literature or not,\nwhich are in the best sense religious; the study of philosophy. We\nare on the right lines if we cling to the great watchwords of our own\ntime,\u2014Evolution, Progress, Organic Order.\n\n_Moral Theory and Practice._ Moral theory is the analytic perception\nof the conditions and relations in hand in a given act,\u2014it is the\naction in idea. It is the construction of the act in thought against\nits outward construction. It is, therefore, the doing,\u2014the act itself,\nin its emerging. So far are we from any divorce of moral theory and\npractice, that theory is the ideal act, and conduct is the executed\ninsight. Moral conduct is absolutely individualised, and it is\nprecisely that which realises an idea, a conception. The breadth of\naction is measured by the insight of the agent. Just so far as the\nquestion, What are the conditions which require action and what the\naction they demand, is raised and answered, is action moral and not\nmerely instinctive or sentimental. This is a work of analysis, which\nrequires the possession of certain working tools. What we call moral\nrules are precisely such tools of analysis. The Golden Rule is a\nmarvellous tool of analysis but it gives no knowledge, of itself, of\nwhat we should do. As a tool of analysis the moral rule is an idea.\nA philosophic theory of ethics is a similar idea to the Golden Rule,\nbut one of deeper grasp, and therefore wider hold. It bears much the\nsame relation to the particular rule as this to the special case. It\nis a tool for the analysis of its meaning, and thereby a tool for\ngiving it greater effect. At the back of the Golden Rule are other\nlarger ideas which have realised themselves, and been so buried in the\ncommon consciousness of men, that they have become integrated with the\ncontent of the Golden Rule which itself has become a vast idea, or\nworking tool, of practice. Every philosophic theory of ethics performs\nin its degree this same service. A man's duty is, not to obey rules,\nbut to respond to the nature of the actual demands which he finds made\nupon him. The rule is merely an aid toward discriminating what the\nnature of these relations and demands is. A man has not to do Justice,\nand Love, and Truth; he has to do justly and truly and lovingly. The\nrelative distinction between the \"is\" and the \"ought,\" is that the\n\"ought\" is the \"is\" of _action_. The difference between a practical\nand a theoretical consciousness is that the former is consciousness\nof _something to be done_. And this consciousness of something to be\ndone is the consciousness of duty. Theory is the cross-section made by\nintelligence of the given state of action in order to know the conduct\nthat should be; practice is the realisation of the idea thus gained: it\nis theory in action.\n\n_Morals in History._ A glance at the history of morals reveals\nindependence and changeableness always and everywhere side by side. So\nfar as we are acquainted with man in social community, the will of the\ncommunity speaks to the individual concerning his practical conduct\nwith authority; and as an inner appropriation of that will, \"the\nauthority of conscience, of practical reason, which naturally exists\nonly in the individual, but through friction with the community becomes\nfilled with a universally valid content.\" The origin of the common will\nis lost in the mysterious darkness of primitive times, or of divine\nrevelation. It is science which first extends the individual's circle\nof experience. Morality is a product of evolution, and is in a state of\ncontinual transformation. The sum of the ethical principles or ideals\nwhich at any time are current in any nation, presents nothing else than\nthe conception of all that is reciprocally required in a practical\ndirection of its members, for the advantage and profit of the community\nand the individual persons in it. The requirements of social adaptation\nare raised into the consciousness of the community. Thus full harmony\nbetween the practical needs of a time and its ethics can only be a\ntransitory one. The conditions which evoke the individual will to carry\nout its own ideals over against the current ones, are none other than\nthose upon which the formation of new organs in general is dependent.\nThe new principles must be of assistance to felt needs; they must be\nfounded in the vital relations of the social body. In answer to the\nquestion whether there is progress in morality, it must be said that\nthe circle is becoming continually greater of those over whom the\nstrict import of the conception of humanity is extended. And this is\naccompanied by an increasing tenderness towards individuals within the\nlimits unchangeably set by the needs of the community. The means by\nwhich we strive to actualise our ideals are becoming more rational,\nand \"the consciousness is continually becoming clearer, with which all\nmoral principles and judgments are referred to what they signify for\nthe welfare of the race and for its capacity to develop.\" But do men\nbecome better? Probably, on the whole, the inner relations of morality\nremain unchanged, although quite important shifting may take place at\nspecial times and in special stages. It may be that \"considered from\nthe highest historical point of view, subjective morality\u2014that is,\nthe conformity of individuals to the standard\u2014relatively declines as\nthe higher elaboration of the moral ideals advances.\" But this need\nby no means be the last word of historical development. Intelligence\ncarries illumination into unknown paths which no one as yet has\ntraversed, making the surrounding darkness blacker. But the will finds\nthe means of achieving what is clearly conceived. We have no occasion\nto be distrustful of the energies of our race. We must not overlook\nthe increasing influence which our scientific knowledge must exercise,\nnot only upon the industrial but also upon the social instinct. The\nconviction is making rapid strides that even the widest lordship of man\nover nature must ultimately be a curse to the ruler himself, unless he\nsucceeds in establishing the more beautiful and important supremacy\nover man; that is, over the natural forces in his own breast\u2014the\nbrutality of passion, the hardness of egoism, and the crudity of moral\nignorance. But this can be the work only of scientific knowledge and of\nits increasing application to social ethical problems.\n\n_The Ethics of Doubt\u2014Cardinal Newman._ There was an ethical trend in\nthe character and spirit of Cardinal Newman, which lifted him above\nany one sect or creed and made him a power to all classes of serious\nminds. The especial influence now excited upon us by his thought,\ncomes from his very antagonism to what is the conspicuous feature in\nthe intellectual life of our century,\u2014the prevalence of doubt, and\nthe growth of rationalism. Goethe sounded the note of warning as to\nthe chief menace that would come to our age through rationalism; that\nthere are few who have a great mind and at the same time are disposed\nto action; intellect broadens the thought, but tends to weaken the\nwill. Newman has brought it home to us that there is a certain kind of\nrationalism which is dangerous to character, and we may be forced to\nconsider whether we shall not soon be required in the sphere of ethics\nto discourage somewhat the universal tendency of doubt and distrust\nwith reference to elemental convictions. There is no question that\nfor many minds the first doubt as to whether a certain class of acts\nis wrong was the first step in moral decline. A principle of external\nauthority in ethics is required, although not such an authority as that\nof the state or an absolute church. What we are in need of is that\nstrength of conviction which would make us willing to die for a belief\nwith reference to the _human_ world. If we were more and more given to\nrecognising the value of this other external authority,\u2014that is, the\nconsensus of all the past voices of history when they speak to us on\nthe moral life,\u2014we might find, more and more, that enthusiasm coming\nback and firing once more the hearts of the great men of the age, just\nas the other kind of authority gave hope, fire, and enthusiasm to\nthe purpose of Newman. Notwithstanding the contrast between Newman,\nthe apostle of faith, and Emerson who has been called the apostle\nof scepticism or of individualism, they had the same intensity of\nfeeling and appalling sincerity, and both had a like expression of\nspiritual repose. A mediocre follower of either of them can never be a\nsatisfactory character. An ultra-individualism in everything enfeebles\nthe will, just as the complete abnegation of the freedom of thought\ndwarfs the intellect. In order to have a perfect solution of the\ndifficulty, we need to draw both from Emerson and Newman.\n\n_The Ethics of Socialism._ The question may be raised whether the\nphilosophical ground of ethical truth does not afford philosophical\nstanding to some sort of socialism. This view of the problem has\nevidently pervaded the thinking of Professor Paulsen in his \"System\nder Ethik mit einem Umriss der Staats- und Gesellschaftslehre,\" and\nit is prominent in the \"Allgemeine Ethik\" of D. H. Steinthal. The\nfirst question that ought to be raised in regard to socialism is the\nsociological question, whether society is a product of that universal\nevolution which brought man himself into existence and conditions all\nhis thought and doings. If so, we may be sure that there are certain\ngeneral principles, or laws, to which social evolution has conformed\nin the past, and to which it will go on conforming in the future.\nThe ethical problems involved in the socialistic propositions now\nbefore the public may be reduced to two. _First_, if not all men are\nconverted in thought and feeling to socialism, can a majority have any\nethical right to compel a minority to surrender individual initiative\nand submit to dictation of occupation? _Secondly_ what is an ethical\ndistribution of product among the workers that create it? Plato and\nAristotle alone laid the foundation for a rationalistic argument from\npurely ethical premises, showing that majorities may rightfully do more\nthan enforce contracts and keep the peace, but the modern restatement\nand completion of that argument remains to be made. As to the second\nproblem, a strong argument could be made in support of the proposition\nthat an ethical distribution of wealth would be one that should afford\nequality of satisfaction throughout society, of the desires that are\nethically commendable. When the clever literary people hypnotised\nby Mr. Bellamy's dazzling vision begin to resume their intellectual\nself-direction, they will discover that equality of income and equality\nof satisfaction, of legitimate desires, are two different things.\n\n_Ethical and Kindred Societies in Great Britain._ Speaking broadly\nthe attitude of the societies towards theology and its exponents may\nbe described as one of non-interference or neutrality. They desire\nto be rather constructive than destructive in their action, for they\nbelieve that desirable changes can only be effected by the slow\nprocesses of organic growth. With one exception they have none of the\ncharacteristics of a church, and they may be described as lecturing and\ndebating societies with or without the addition of what is commonly\nknown as \"practical work.\" They do not retain the services of a single\nlecturer, but prefer to have speakers who are independent of each\nother. (Philadelphia: _International Journal of Ethics_, 1602 Chestnut\nSt.)\n\n\nREVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. February, 1891. No. 182.\n\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n REALISME ET IDEALISME. By _Paul Janet_.\n\n L'ART ET LA LOGIQUE. (1st Art.) By _G. Tarde_.\n\n MORALE ET M\u00c9TAPHYSIQUE. By _J. J. Gourd_.\n\n ANALYSES ET COMPTES RENDUS.\n\n REVUE DES PERIODIQUES ETRANGERS.\n\n SOCI\u00c9T\u00c9 DE PSYCHOLOGIE PHYSIOLOGIQUE.\n\nM. Janet remarks, in his article on _Realism and Idealism_, that since\nKant philosophy has concentrated all its efforts on the problem of the\nobjectivity of knowledge. The agreement of reality and thought is a\ntruth of which no one doubts, although many centuries were necessary\nfor its observation. Not only is there agreement between nature and\nmind, but there is analogy, resemblance, affinity, between these two\nterms. Not only does nature obey the laws of our mind, implying that\nthere is in it a logical and rational element, but it seems to act\nwith the art which intelligence would employ, if it wished to create\nthe products of nature. How is this union of nature and the mind to\nbe explained? Two solutions present themselves: in which thought can\nbe explained by nature, or nature by thought. The first of these\nsolutions is that called _realism_; the second is _idealism_. Each\nof these systems has strong reasons in its favor. As to the first,\nthought and nature are not commensurate and opposed. Thought makes\nitself part of nature, and the only thought we know directly is our\nown. For human intelligence is bound to the organisation, and appears\nto follow all its vicissitudes. The basis of idealism is not less\nfirm. External things exist for us only on the condition of passing\nthrough our consciousness. Further, the psychological and physiological\nanalysis of sensations reclaims them all as being only states of the\nego. But there are serious objections to both hypotheses. Realism is\nsusceptible of two forms. If thought, considered in relation to the\norigin of ideas, is explained by sensation, it becomes empiricism; if\nconsidered in relation to the substratum of thought, this is explained\nby organisation, it becomes materialism. As against empiricism, may\nbe objected with Kant that sensation does not explain the necessity\nand universality of scientific judgments. Against materialism,\nFichte showed that a thing which is only a thing could never attain\nto thought. Thus empiricism is overthrown by the impossibility of\nexplaining science; materialism by the impossibility of explaining\nthought. In order to meet the objection of Kant, and to explain the\nappearance of _a priori_, the new empiricists have invoked: (1) the\nprinciple of inseparable associations; (2) the principle of hereditary\nassociations. On the other side, the new defenders of materialism\nin order to explain the transformation of motion into thought, have\ninvoked the great principle of the correlation and transformation of\nforces in nature. But as to inseparable associations, it may be said,\nthat they give us rather a necessity of fact, than a necessity of law.\nWhat science requires is absolute and not relative necessity. The\nsame may be said of the principle of hereditary associations, which\nmerely prolong the chain of experiences. But, further, association\nitself requires explanation, which shows that it cannot account\nfor the principle of causality. As to the use of the principle of\ntransformation of forces to explain the passage of motion into thought,\nif the objective and physical cause of our sensations is meant, there\nis merely transformation of motion into motion. If it is said that\nsensations are only transformed motions, this affirms what is in\nquestion, how motion can transform itself into thought. There are no\nless serious objections against idealism. The principal one is: all\nour reasonings about nature are established only on condition that we\ntake nature as our basis. We thus reach the double conclusion: neither\nnature has produced thought, nor thought has produced nature. The ego\nis, however, in nature, and nature is a representation of the ego, but,\nwhile admitting the reciprocal penetration of the two principles, we\nare obliged to recognise their mutual independence. There is harmony,\nnot identity. But is there not some being in which the real of nature\nand the real of thought coexist, and who, according to the formula of\nSchelling, is the absolute subject-object? Idealism, to be consequent,\nought to go as far as the absolute consciousness, to the union of\nthe subjective and objective thought. If the two inferior terms are\nidentified in the absolute mind, this will find in nature and in the\nmind a double expression of itself. Nothing prevents us then, says our\nauthor, from understanding nature, with Schelling, as the drowsy mind\nseeking to arouse itself, and the ego on the contrary as a nature which\nawakens itself.\n\nM. Tarde in _Art and Logic_ remarks that the word art has two\nsenses. In its wide conception, it includes all the exercises of the\nimagination and of human ingenuity, invention in a thousand forms.\nBut in another sense of the word, it answers to the \u00e6sthetic needs of\nsociety. If we had regard only to the art of the most advanced epochs,\nwe should perhaps say that it serves to satisfy the need of inventive\nexpression or of expressive invention. It seems then, in effect, to\nbe before all expressive or inventive, and the second of these traits\nappears the most essential. The property of art and also of morality\nis to seek and to believe to find a divine end in life, a great end\nworthy of individual sacrifice. When art presents itself separated from\nmorality, when it is an agent not of harmony but of social dissolution,\nit is a sign that it is imported from abroad. Art is then immoral and\ndissolvent. In all ages truly logical art has been only the translator\nand the illuminator of morality.\n\nThe work of art is not like a product of industry, an artificial organ\nadded to the individual, it is an artificial, imaginary mistress. The\nprivilege of art is to arouse in us sentiments which play in the social\nlife and logic, precisely the r\u00f4le of love in the individual life and\nlogic. The sentiment of art is a _collective love_ and rejoices to be\nsuch. Art is social joy, as love is individual joy.\n\n_Morality and Metaphysics._ Between practical philosophy and\ntheoretical philosophy there is a real difference of nature. The\nformer concerns the action and the latter the perception, and as we\ncannot do what yet is not, nor see what is already done, the one has\nrelation to the future, the other to the present or the past. With this\ndifference, they resemble each other, in that both consist in a putting\nin order, a co-ordination of their objects. Experience is sufficient\nto furnish all that is necessary for the explanation of practical\nco-ordination. This requires a fundamental notion of practical order,\nwhich metaphysicians see in the notion of the good, but, as the reality\nof the good cannot be established, it is a chimerical and arbitrary\nconception. We must seek in the co-ordinated objects themselves the\nfundamental element around which they will be disposed according to\ntheir proper nature. This cannot be the good, since this is the result\nof practical co-ordination. It is pleasure, not a particular kind of\npleasure, but that which is possessed in common by all that pleases,\nall that satisfies. Volition can never go beyond pleasure. If we desire\nbefore having really been sensible of pleasure, it is because we have\nbeen ideally sensible of it. Pleasure is inherent in every practical\nfunction, it is practically constant, it is practically categorical.\nWe cannot go beyond pleasure of some kind. It cannot be said that\npleasure is preceded by function, life. These are only results,\ngroups which have components, and therefore they cannot be the last\nprinciple of action. Thus one problem is resolved without recourse to\nmetaphysics.\u2014After the principle of simple co-ordination, must be\nsought that of the co-ordination which subordinates, which marks a\nsort of hierarchy. For this the idea of pleasure is not sufficient.\nIt is necessary to limit the point of view, and in the difference of\nquantity of pleasure will be found the rule of co-ordination. The\ndistinction of more or less offers itself at once, and gives place\nnaturally to degrees, then to a subordination. The rule of the good is:\nthe amplitude of the co-ordination, the degree of intelligibility, the\nnumber of facts which compose the object of volition. It is necessary\nto distinguish between urgency and superiority in proper value.\nThings which are the most urgent have not necessarily the most value\nin themselves. Thus the practical subordination ought to dispose its\nobjects inversely, according to whether it is occupied with their\nurgency or their proper value. Here also practical philosophy is not\nobliged to have recourse to metaphysics. Practical philosophy not only\nought to regulate its objects on the basis that it has previously\nfixed, but still ought to assure this regulation for the future. This\nrequires that its co\u00f6rdinations should be made objects of commandment,\nobligation. The conception of the future pleasure enters into the\npresent; and to each volition is bound by anticipation, ideally,\nbut positively, the future benefit of the practical co-ordination.\nThus obligation has its source in a volition imposing practical\nco-ordination on future volitions. Obligation is in reality causal\ndetermination, and as there is a volition more or less marked in\neach act, and the causal chain is never interrupted, we can be said\nto be always under the influence of obligation, the power of which\nincreases with life. Determination is uniformisation; and nothing else\nis asked for the moral imperative. Causal determination is opposed\ndirectly to the unconditionment of liberty; but obligation, as well as\ncausal determination in general, remains, moreover, in every partial\nstate, limited by its opposite, liberty, which ever recoils before\nthe continual encroachments of obligation, but without ceasing to be.\nThere is no difficulty in admitting a sanction for the good, although\nit does not constitute a distinct and new element. The sanction is the\nconsequences of actions from the point of view of pleasures. By the\nside of moral happiness or unhappiness, should be reserved a place\nfor a happiness or unhappiness in some sort \"amoral.\" The moral good\ndoes not exhaust all the good. It is necessary to distinguish between\nthe moral good and the unrestrained good (bien libre). There is an\nimmoralisable element which represents the veritable autonomy of the\nwill. As in all co\u00f6rdinations, by reason of all bending under the\nrule, the moral hierarchy will sometimes injure the reality. Here the\nnotion of the unrestrained good happily intervenes. The reality always\nreserves its rights in the face of co-ordinations, whatever be their\nnature. When it asserts itself it is sublime, it is, so to say, raised\nabove every rule, majestic in its sovereign liberty. (Paris: F\u00e9lix\nAlcan.)\n\n\nZEITSCHRIFT F\u00dcR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE. Vol. II.\nNos. 1 and 2.\n\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n VERSUCH EINER ERWEITERTEN ANWENDUNG DES FECHNERSCHEN GESETZES IM\n FARBENSYSTEM. By _H. v. Helmholtz_.\n\n WAS IST UNSER NERVENSYSTEM UND WAS GEHT DARIN VOR? By _Justus\n Gaule_.\n\n PHYSIOLOGISCH-PSYCHOLOGISCHE STUDIEN UEBER DIE ENTWICKELUNG\n DER GESICHTSWAHRNEHMUNGEN BEI KINDERN UND BEI OPERIERTEN\n BLINDGEBORENEN. By _E. Raehlrnann_.\n\n ZWANGSVORSTELLUNGEN OHNE WAHNIDEEN. By _D. Hack-Tuke_.\n\n EIN VERSUCH UEBER DIE INTRAKRANIELLE LEITUNG LEISESTER TOENE VON\n OHR ZU OHR. By _Karl L. Schaefer_.\n\n BESPRECHUNGEN. Wundt, Ueber die Methoden der Messung des\n Bewusstseinsumfanges. By _Schumann_.\n\n LITTERATURBERICHT.\n\nProfessor E. Hering introduced the method of defining colors by data\nof measurement derived from sensations. He thus became the founder of\na new conception in Optics which in many respects promises to give\nmore correct and better explanations not only of the physiology of\nsight but also of the theory of colors; his views collide however in\nsome important points with the views of the old school, the leader\nof which is Professor Helmholtz of Berlin. The first article of the\npresent number of this magazine treats of one of these problems,\nand the author, Professor Helmholtz, believes that the results of\nhis experiments do not show a gradation of the perceptibility of\ndifferences which would justify Professor Hering's theory of colors.\nProfessor Helmholtz applies Fechner's law concerning the measurement\nof perceptible differences to color-sensations. For the experiments\nhe has made, a wheel was employed (after the method of Maxwell) into\nwhich slips of colored paper of various breadth could be inserted. He\nfound by this \"photometrical\" method that \"the effect of an additional\ncolor upon the luminosity is effectually weakened by the amount of\nthe same color present in the whole mixture.... Equal small amounts\nof the quantity of light produce the smaller effects the larger the\nquantities of the same light are in the whole field.\" We pass by other\nresults of Professor Helmholtz's experiments, for it takes a specialist\nto go over his calculations and tables; and the investigation has by\nno means been brought to a final conclusion. \"If the strong deviation\nis not based upon an error,\" Professor Helmholtz says, \"quite another\nand a different hypothesis would come into question, viz, whether it\nmay not always be the clearest sensation which has effect and that\nwhich remains below the threshold does not come into consideration.\"\nThe revision of his \"Handbuch der physiologischen Optik\" has been the\noccasion for these experiments of Professor Helmholtz.\n\nProfessor Gaule of Zurich propounds a most interesting theory about\nthe development of the trophic functions and the chemical actions of\nthe nervous system. He starts with the idea that the processes of\nthe nervous system are in accord with the law of the conservation of\nenergy. Du Bois Reymond's remark that love and hatred, pleasure and\npain would remain unexplained even if all the changes that take place\nin the arrangement of atoms in our nerves were known and mathematically\ncomputable, has made a deep impression because it expresses the\ndisparity of our definitions of atoms on the one side and feelings\non the other. Yet our atomistic theory is not final; it is only an\nauxiliary conception which will simplify thought so long as the\npresent method of considering phenomena from a chemical or physical\nand geometrical standpoint is retained. As soon as we create a common\nauxiliary conception to comprise all these sciences, we shall have to\nbroaden our definitions. Taking this position as his philosophical\nbasis, Professor Gaule attempts to consider nervous processes as\nreflex actions, the latter being clearly conceivable as subject to the\nlaw of the conservation of energy. Living beings appear as complexes\nof forces developed from the chemical actions taking place in their\norganisms. Through a saturation of the affinities of their carbon and\nhydrogen atoms with oxygen their potential energy is changed into\nkinetic energy. The latter is used in many various ways, partly for\nbuilding up more complex molecules, partly for again storing potential\nenergy, and partly,\u2014and this is a predominant process in animal\norganisms,\u2014for setting forces free which will serve as a source of\ntheir activity. It is such a source of activity which the impressions\nof the outside world affect. The impression is called _Reiz_ or\nirritation, and the irritation has often been compared to the fuse or\nthe spark igniting a powder-mine. We must however bear in mind that\nthe organism is unlike the powder-mine, not at rest but in constant\naction and the irritation does not properly speaking evoke a reflex\nbut it only modifies the action taking place. All this is generally\nconceded by the physiologist. Professor Gaule then proceeds to explain\nhis idea of the nervous development. The cells of the epithelium in the\nskin perform a peculiar process, called in German _Verhornung_; they\nturn into horn (keratine) by the protoplasm's losing its albuminoids.\nThe process does not take place in one cell but in several layers of\ncells and represents like all actions a play of forces, raising the\nmore keratinised strata from the basal membrane to the surface. The\nkeratinising however is, according to Gaule, only the less important\nsurface-phenomenon of another peculiar process which is directed\ntoward the interior of the organism. An excretion takes place forming\nextremely fine threads around the cells which pass through the pores\nof the basal membrane (a fact proved by Caninis and Fraenkel) where\nthey form a plexus. Out of the net-like meshes of these plexuses grow\nincreasingly strong filaments which form the trunks of the nerves.\nThese views agree very well with the observations of Professor His on\nthe f\u0153tal development of the nerves. Professor His has indubitably\nproved that the olfactory nerve for instance does not grow out of\nbut into the hemispheres. The direction of the nervous growth is the\nsame as the direction of their function. Many of the sensory nerves\nhave been proven to, and it is probable that all of them do grow\nfrom the periphery into the central organ. Hensen in opposition to\nthis has proposed the theory of an original connection between the\nperipheral root of the nerve and the central organ; yet whatever side\nof the controversy may be found in the end to be correct, the result\ndoes not much affect Professor Gaule's theory, that the ends of the\nnerves represent the roots from which they grow and every special\nirritation must specially affect the secretion which forms the nerve.\nHaving been rather explicit in the basal ideas of Professor Gaule's\nproposition we can now be brief. The axis-cylinder of the nervous fibre\ncorresponds to the secretion of the nervous root; around it is found\nthe marrow-sheath, a tube of absorbing cells containing, also as proved\nby Ruehne, a net of neuro-keratine; this neuro-keratine again absorbs\nthe axis-cylinder. To the question Why does not the axis-cylinder\ndisappear? Professor Gaule answers, Because it is constantly renewed.\nThus we have a constant flow in the nervous substance, an exchange of\nmaterials, an absorption, a secretion, and re-absorption; and in this\nway it can be, a progress of chemical action conditioning the vertical\ndirection of the nerves upon their plexuses and also the form of the\nmarrow-sheath which appears like craters, one inserted within the other\nand filed upon the axis-cylinder. Professor Gaule proposes no definite\nopinion as to the development of the motor nerves; he makes some\nsuggestions which need however further explanation and demonstration.\nHe has apparently not yet finished his investigations and we may expect\nto hear again from him.\n\nE. Raehlmann, Professor Of Ophthalmology at Dorpat, presents a r\u00e9sum\u00e9\nof his experiences as to the visual development of persons blind from\nbirth to whom by a successful operation sight had been restored. We\nconfine ourselves to a few quotations. \"Four weeks after the operation\nof the right eye and a fortnight after that of the left, on April 28th,\nthe first experiments were made on Johann Rubens. April 30th, patient\nmoved his head more than his eyes. He declared he saw perfectly; yet he\nwas unable to recognise any object except his drinking mug, which on\nthe previous day he had felt with his fingers. Also his shoe was not\nrecognised until he had touched it. May 4th, patient could see that a\nwooden ball differed from a wooden cube, both being of the same color,\nbut was unable to tell that one was round, the other square. Nor could\nhe distinguish the ball from a disc. After much handling the objects\nhe learned to recognise by sight the roundness of the ball and the\nsquareness of the cube, but he remained unable to distinguish the ball\nfrom the disc. He learned quickly to grasp objects in the median line\nof his eyes but had great difficulty in finding them with his hand\nwhen placed at an angle before him.\n\n\"May 23d, a glass is again presented to the patient; he sees his\npicture; noticing the frame, he declares the glass to be a picture.\n(A picture had been presented to him repeatedly.) Now a second face\nis shown to him in the glass by the side of his own. Patient becomes\ngreatly bewildered, declaring the picture to be familiar to him. Being\nasked whether it is that of the Professor, he denies the fact, because\nthe Professor stood beside him. Looking over his shoulder he notices\nthe Professor, and seeing him twice he is confounded.... Patient is\nleft alone and remains almost half an hour before the glass. He moves\nhis arm constantly up and down, observing with a smile how the picture\nin the glass makes the same movements. Requested to touch his nose,\nhe first grasps into the glass, then behind the glass, repeating this\nseveral times. His hand then is put on his nose. Now he laughs and\ntouches the several parts of his face, constantly observing the motions\nof his hand in the glass.\"\n\nMost instructive cases of diseases of mind are those in which patients\ncannot help having and obeying certain ideas which are not, however,\nhallucinations. Dr. Hack Tuke in the fourth article of this number\nsays: \"I was consulted once in the case of a lady, the most important\nsymptom of whose disease was that she had to count up to a certain\nnumber before doing the most trivial thing; when she turned at night\nin bed from one side to the other, or when she took out her watch, or\nin the morning before she rose; when she went downstairs to breakfast,\nshe would suddenly stop on one of the steps and count; at the breakfast\ntable when about to take the tea-pot before touching its handle\";\netc. (Arithmomania). Another case. \"A young law-student who had\ndistinguished himself at school, one day read the English sentence 'it\nwas not compatible' and shortly after that he found the sentence, 'I\nlike it not' in German. It struck him that the negative in the one case\nwas placed before and in the other after the word negatived, and he\ncommenced to ponder on negations in general. It became an all-important\nand all-absorbing problem to him. It kept him from work. For some time\nhe proposed questions to himself like: Why do we not have cold blood\nlike some other animals? etc. He is at present in great danger of\nbecoming undecisive and wavering in his actions, for his passion of\nruminating on his problem of negatives weakens his will and threatens\nto destroy his energy.\" (Folie du doute.) Esquirol calls cases of\n_Zwangsvorstellungen_, in which a patient otherwise healthy is forced\nto pursue a certain trivial thought, \"monomanie raisonnante\"; Professor\nBall, \"intellectual impulses.\" Although hereditary influences most\nlikely play an important part in this disease they seem to originate\nin emotions, and R\u00e9gis for this reason calls them \"d\u00e9lire \u00e9motif,\"\nstating that their ultimate cause must be sought in a diseased state\nof the ganglionic system of the intestines. Dr. Tuke favors Charcot's\nterm \"onomatomanie.\" The disease is a _Wortbesessenheit_, a word-mania.\nCertain expressions or phrases are pressing heavily upon the patient's\nconsciousness so as to force him irresistibly to think them or to\npronounce them again and again. Not all cases can be classified\nunder word-mania, but such cases as doubt-mania (_Zweifelsucht_) or\narithmomania are akin to it. Dr. Tuke's advice is not to fight the\ndisease but to teach the patient to ignore it, to treat it as trivial,\nfor the diseased ideas derive new strength from the opposition made to\nthem.\n\nProfessor E. Mach explains Weber's discovery that \"if a tuning fork\nis placed upon the head of a person, one ear being shut, the sound is\nheard and located in the shut ear,\" in the following way: The sound\npasses through the bones of the cranium to the labyrinth of the\near and thence out of the ear into the air, thus taking the inverse\ndirection of other sounds we hear. If the flow in one ear be stopped,\nthe sound-waves are reflected and the drum vibrates stronger. Hence the\ntone will be heard more plainly in the shut ear and will be located\nthere. Professor Schaefer in the last article of this number describes\nan experiment in the same line, which in another way\u2014the transmission\nof sound through air waves being excluded\u2014proves the intercranial\nconductibility of very weak sounds from ear to ear. (Hamburg and\nLeipsic: L. Voss.)\n\n\nSCHRIFTEN DER GESELLSCHAFT FUER PSYCHOLOGISCHE FORSCHUNG. No. 1.\n\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n DIE BEDEUTUNG NARCOTISCHER MITTEL FUER DEN HYPNOTISMUS. By _Dr.\n Freiherrn von Schrenck-Notzing_.\n\n EIN GUTACHTEN UEBER EINEN FALL VON SPONTANEM SOMNAMBULISMUS. By\n _Prof. Dr. August Forel_.\n\nThe psychological societies of Munich and Berlin have started under\nthe above title a periodical the first number of which is very\npromising. Dr. von Schrenck-Notzing makes some critical remarks\non Prof. Bernheim's view to consider hypnosis as an increase of\nsuggestibility produced by suggestion. There are observations which\ndo not justify this definition. He then investigates the substitution\nof narcotics as a means for producing hypnosis and their \"suggestive\"\neffects. In the second part of his essay Dr. Schrenck-Notzing speaks\nabout the \"suggestive\" effects of Indian hemp which in a special\npreparation under the name of hashish is used in the Orient as a means\nof intoxication. Reference is made to the Ismaelite secret society\n\"Megalis et Hiemit\" (the house of wisdom) consisting of missionaries\n(_Da\u00efs_), adepts (_Feda\u00efs_) and laymen (_Refiks_), all of which are\nbound blindly to obey their grand master (_Dai-al-Doal_). Hassan, an\nadept of this society, was obliged to flee, 1090, on account of some\nquarrels. He founded a similar sect at the head of which stood the old\nman of the mountains (_Shaik-al-Djabal_). Their members, especially\nthe lower classes, the _hashishin_, made themselves formidable in the\ntimes of the crusades by their reckless obedience in executing murder\nand other crimes. The order consisted of 60,000 members and their blind\nobedience was effected through suggestibility in the state of hashish\nintoxication. The word assassin is derived from their name. In the year\n1255 a Mongolian governor ordered 12,000 hashishin to be executed on\naccount of the dangerous character of their sect. The secret of their\nformidable obedience appears to have been the method of intoxicating\nthe neophyte before his admission to the order with hashish in some\ngrand mountain scenery and suggesting to him all the pleasures of\nparadise which he would find in blind faith and unreserved obedience to\nthe old man of the mountain. Contempt of death, insensibility under the\nseverest tortures, and an unspeakable joy in the fulfilment of their\nleader's command were the result. It can readily be perceived what a\ndangerous drug hashish is; nevertheless it is said that the cultivation\nof Indian hemp, especially among some negro tribes of Africa according\nto the reports of Wissmann, exercises in several respects a good\ninfluence. Some of the barbarians of darkest Africa have given up\ncannibalism and accustom themselves to more civilised habits. The\npsychical effects of hashish are described as: (1) a feeling of\ncomfort; (2) dissociation of ideas and a lack of their control;\n(3) illusion concerning space and time; (4) an increased sense of\nhearing; (5) fixed ideas and delirium; (6) a disturbance of affective\nstates, e. g. suspicion; (7) irresistible impulses; (8) illusions and\nhallucinations. Dr. v. Schrenck-Notzing freely quotes from Moreau,\n_Du Hashish et de l'ali\u00e9nation mentale, Etude psychologique_ (Paris:\nMasson, 1845), and adds several experiments of his own.\n\nMrs. Fay, a somnambule accused of imposition and fraud, was delivered\nby the County Court of Zurich to Professor Forel for observation who\nkept her for several days in his institute. The professor's report\nto the County Court is very interesting in so far as Mrs. Fay, a\nwoman without education, must be considered as a genuine somnambule\nexhibiting all the symptoms observed in other cases. She had been\na servant girl in Basel and since her fifteenth year fell twice a\nday in an hypnotic sleep. She married and had several children, her\nyoungest child was born while she was in her hypnotic sleep. She made\na living by curing patients who consulted her when asleep, and was\npunished before on that account for imposition. During one of her\nhypnotic states patients were introduced to her in the presence of\nProfessor Forel and she made her statements in vague terms as almost\nall somnambules do. The experiment showed that her diagnosis consisted\nof random guesses which in exceptional cases happened to be correct;\nsometimes they were not wholly incorrect, but mostly erroneous.\nShe believes herself to be possessed by a spirit whom she calls\n\"Ernst.\" Professor Forel without considering the woman as a model of\ntruthfulness, believes in her sincerity. He cured her of her hypnotic\nsleep on her own request. She stated that the money she earned by\ncuring patients did not make up for the loss she endured by not being\nable to earn a living by work. Professor Forel succeeded with his cure,\nbut he states in a postscript that the woman having returned to her\nformer surroundings, has since suffered from relapses. (Leipsic: Ambr.\nAbel.)\n\n\nPHILOSOPHISCHE MONATSHEFTE. Vol. XXVII. Nos. 3 and 4.\n\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n QUANTITAET UND QUALITAET IN BEGRIFF, URTHEIL UND\n GEGENSTAENDLICHER ERKENNTNISS. Ein Kapitel der transcendentalen\n Logik. (Concluded.) By _P. Natorp_.\n\n RECENSIONEN.\n\n LITTERATURBERICHT.\n\n BIBLIOGRAPHIE. By Prof. Dr. _F. Ascherson_.\n\nThe conclusion of Prof. P. Natorp's article on _Quantity and Quality\nin Concept, Judgment, and Objective Cognition_ appears to be the most\nimportant part of the essay. Professor Natorp is a transcendentalist.\nHe understands Kant in a dualistic sense where the latter says\nthat \"the unity of apperception (Einheit der Apperception) is the\nradical faculty of all our cognition\" (Radical-Verm\u00f6gen aller unserer\nErkentniss). Cognition is defined as \"limitation of that which is _per\nse_ infinite.\" It is natural that for a transcendentalist the greatest\ndifficulty arises when he attempts to let his _a priori_ face the\nfacts of reality. Professor Natorp shows great skill and ingenuity in\nthis respect. It is but consistent with his premisses to arrive at an\n\"invincible dualism,\" yet he adapts his transcendentalism sufficiently\nto fulfil the demands of experience. Thus he does not come to a real\nsolution but to a _modus vivendi_, which is after all the purpose of\nphilosophy.\n\nProfessor Natorp considers the synthetic unity not as given, but as\nto be realised; a concept is created through definition. The data of\nexperience on the other hand are not the defined, but the definable.\nThey are to be defined by the forms of the concepts, and their\nfundamental forms are quantity and quality. He says: \"The definition\nas this and as that (as something identical) is a function of the\nconcept, but the concept presupposes sensation as the material to be\ndefined. To consider sensation as given in this its absolute identity\nwhich is demanded by the concept, is after all an illusion. Therefore\npositivism and not idealism confounds the demands of cognition with\nthe given reality, thus adjusting facts to our wants of knowledge.\nSensation conceived as a datum and not as a postulate is and remains\nthe infinitely definable and never absolutely defined.... It appears\neasy thus to reduce the dualism of form and matter, concept and\nsensation, the defined and the definable to one ultimate unity. In one\nrespect positivism succeeds, attributing full definedness, and not mere\ndefinableness, to the data; and then, it finds no difficulty in letting\nthe defining function of the concept in its peculiarity disappear by\nreducing it to a quality of the data.\"\n\nWe do not know to what kind of positivism Professor Natorp refers; yet\nit seems that it cannot be applied either to Comte's or to Littr\u00e9's\nviews. Nor does it dispose of the positivism editorially set forth in\n_The Monist_. Positivism, according to Professor Natorp, is at fault\nin dropping the definite function of the concept. But he endeavors to\navoid the opposite mistake also, viz. \"to entirely drop the definable,\nwhich might be supposed to be a mere _X_, scarcely representable in\nclear concepts, or to deduce it from the defining function. This other\nexaggeration is that of idealism which has found its purest expression\nin Fichte's philosophy.\" Professor Natorp by keeping aloof from both\nerrors declares dualism to be insuperable; \"dualism,\" he says, \"'is a\nhard fact'\u2014_eine starre Thatsache_.\"\n\nThe trouble with transcendentalists, it seems to us, originates in\ntheir method of starting with cognition, with the synthetic unity of\napperception, with the forms of concepts. Experience means to them the\nsense-element of sensation, the contents of concepts without their\nform. They start with a dualism. When they have completed their system\nof transcendental forms, they find it hard to explain how to change\ntheir rigid laws into the constant flux of reality as presented to\nus by experience. Should the philosopher not rather start from the\nfunction of cognising, which in itself is a unity? He will find that\ncognition, concept, the synthetic unity of apperception, and all the\ncomplex laws of transcendental thought are products of the cognising\nfunction. If these laws are rigid, we have made them so. We have made\nthem stable, we have fixed them for a certain purpose. Their rigidity\nis a legitimate fiction for that purpose, but beyond it it finds no\napplication. Pure logic draws distinctions which do not exist in\nreality; pure mathematics operates with lines which considered as real\nthings are mere nonentities. The dualism between concept and sensation,\nbetween the _a priori_ and the _a posteriori_, between thought and\nthing, between form and matter, is not given in experience, for in\nexperience the formal and the material are one inseparable whole; it\nis the product of cognition. The cognising function differentiates\nthe data of experience into formal and material aspects; the formal\nbeing always of a general character serves as a help for systematising\nand classifying the material. This appears to us the only way of\nrealising a monistic positivism, and no philosophy can be considered\nas satisfactory until it represents the data of experience or positive\nfacts in a unitary view, i. e. a harmonious conception free of\ncontradictions.\n\nProfessor Natorp has still to battle with the Eleatic question. He\nbegins the conclusion of his article with the following words: \"Let\nus consider only the most important results of our deduction. An\nexplanation of 'becoming,' of 'change' has in this way become possible;\nthe solution of the Eleatic problem how 'change' can _be_ at all,\nsince _being_ means unchangeable definedness; or, how becoming can\nbe, since it includes not-being, for being means the transition from\nnot-being into being, or from being into not-being. How can we think\nthis combination of position and negation without contradiction, a\ncombination of position and negation being a contradiction\"? This is\nrather a late flower of Hegelian thought: but, being presented so\nvigorously and unequivocally, it illustrates clearly the mistake of\ntranscendentalism in starting from abstract concepts or pure thought,\nthence coming down to the facts of reality. There transcendentalists\nhave to fit their ideas about being and not-being to experience, and\nfinding insuperable difficulties must consistently become dualists.\nProfessor Natorp's solution of the Eleatic question is \"to find a\nmethod of thought which overcomes the absolute contradiction of\nposition and negation.... This is done by the comprehensive unity,\nwhich means identity and at the same time difference, viz. that one\nis the same as the other and yet not the same.\"\n\nWe should say that the Eleatic question will best be understood by a\nclear comprehension of the function, the purpose, and the products of\ncognition.\n\nSays Professor Natorp: \"Since Kant has restored in its purity the\ndistinction made by the ancients between \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03ac and \u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u03ac, \u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\nand \u03bd\u03bf\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, the authors of this distinction, the philosophers of\nElea are almost nearer to us than Aristotle.\" The distinction between\nthought and sensation is indeed of extraordinary importance. Ideas\n(thoughts) and sensations are different, but the recognition of this\ndifference is no reason to declare dualism as permanently established.\nIs not the reason of their difference the difference of abstraction\nmade in each case.\n\nBy noumena, i. e. thoughts or ideas, we understand all mental symbols\nrepresenting things. The ideas \"man,\" \"manhood,\" \"virtue,\" etc., are\nnot sensations, but symbols representing some qualities abstracted from\nsensations. In making the abstraction \"idea\" we confine the term, i.\ne. the symbol \"idea,\" to its representative element alone. We leave\nout of sight that real ideas vibrating through our brain are at the\nsame time nervous structures in actions; we leave also out of sight\nthat they possess the state of awareness in common with sensations. We\ndo it because their representative nature is of paramount importance.\nHowever, in making the abstraction \"sensation\" we do not exclude the\nstate of awareness, we think first of all of the feeling of a sensation\nand then also of its form, viz. the special sense-impression. \"I have\na sensation\" is almost equivalent to the phrase \"I have a feeling\";\na sensation of light means a feeling of the effect of ether-waves\nupon the retina; a sensation of sound is a feeling of the effect of\nair-waves upon the drum of the ear; etc. Just as much as ether-waves\nare not light, and air-waves not sound, (the latter being the effect\nof the former upon specially adapted feeling substance), so also the\nsensations light and sound are not the ideas we have of light and\nsound. The ideas of light and sound are symbols representing in feeling\nsubstance the sensations light and sound. These symbols, we suppose,\nhave developed from the memory-images of sensations. They must in\ntheir turn also be considered as effects. They are the effects of\nsense-impressions upon specially adapted feeling substance, viz. upon\na higher system of nervous structures, not in direct contact with the\nperiphery, but growing upon and from the peripheral sensory reflex\ncentres. The physiological activity of thoughts is accompanied also\nwith the feeling element; or in other words, thoughts are, as much as\nsensations, states of awareness. Yet they differ from sensations in\nthat they do not contain anything of sense-impressions; the latter\nbeing an exclusive characteristic of the action of sensory organs.\nThe memory-picture of blackness is not a sensation and the idea of\nblackness still less.\n\nThe distinction between noumena or things of thought and \u00e6stheta\nor sensations is by no means so distinct as is often assumed; for,\nas we have seen, the most prominent feature of the noumenon is its\nrepresentative character. Isolated sense-impressions possess no\nrepresentative character, but sensations do possess it. Sensations are\nthe connecting link between sense-impressions and thoughts, between\nmeaningless feeling and mental states or mind, i. e. representative\nstates of awareness. Ideas are, as it were, an extract of the\nrepresentative value contained in sensations. This is my conception\nof the distinction to be made between \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03ac and \u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u03ac, between\nsense-activity and thought-activity, between the phenomenon and\nnoumenon. It is set forth at length in the discussion with Professor E.\nMach in this number. It has been here again set forth at such length,\nbecause I am convinced that a final solution of the problem is of great\nimportance. (Heidelberg: George Weiss.)\n\n \u03ba.\n\n\nMINERVA. Rassegna Internazionale. January, 1891.\n\n_Minerva_ will represent the first Italian venture in the direction\nof a comprehensive magazine of international reference and literary\nrecord. The editors, in stating the aims of their new publication,\nacknowledge that Italy keenly feels the lack of an international\nintellectual magazine. In Italy the reading public, and persons of\nan average culture, still seem to be cut off from all stimulating\nintellectual contact with the outside civilised world; while beyond\nthe Alps, on the contrary, and across the seas, any book, or a simple\nmagazine-article even, be it written in German, English, or French,\nand legitimately claim from any point of view a certain importance, is\nat once read by innumerable persons from San Francisco all the way to\nSt. Petersburg. Through the intellectual medium of their international\nreviews, these nations seem actually to have realised one of Goethe's\nmost ardent aspirations,\u2014the dream of a noble and humanising\n\"world-literature.\" Nearly all of the articles contained in the present\nissue of _Minerva_ are ably condensed translations and epitomes of\narticles that have recently appeared in leading English, American, and\nGerman reviews and magazines. _La Minerva_ is under the direction of\nProf. Federico Garlanda of the University of Rome. (Rome: La Societ\u00e0\nLaziale. Tip Editrice.)\n\n\nVOPROSY FILOSOFII I PSICHOLOGII.[94]\n\n [94] _Questions of Philosophy and Psychology._ In the Russian\n language.\n\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n FURTHER REMARKS CONCERNING THE TASK OF THIS REVIEW. By the Editor\n _Prof. N. Grote_.\n\n ETHICS AND EVOLUTION. By _B. N. Beketov_.\n\n LETTERS ON COUNT TOLSTOI'S BOOK \"FROM LIFE.\" By _A. A. Kozlow_.\n\n CONCERNING THE LAW OF THE CONSERVATION OF ENERGY. By _N. N.\n Strachov_.\n\n ON THE NATURE OF HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS. By _Prince C. N.\n Trubetzkoi_.\n\n CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY.\n\n THE DOCTRINE OF WILL IN THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY. By _K. Ventzel_.\n\n BOOK REVIEWS.\n\n REVIEW OF PERIODICALS: 1) Of foreign philosophical Reviews; 2) Of\n philosophical articles in Russian ecclesiastical papers.\n\n POLEMICAL.\n\n APPENDIX: 1) Materials for the History of Philosophy in Russia;\n 2) Transactions of the Moscow Psychological Society.\n\nRussia is perhaps that country of all civilised nations of which we\nknow least, and even such authors as Tolsto\u00ef who are read all over the\nworld, are perhaps, severed from their surroundings, not correctly\nunderstood by us as the Russian understands them. The present magazine,\n_Problems of Philosophy and Psychology_, being a strictly scientific\nperiodical, is less peculiarly Russian without entirely losing the\nnational characteristics of its home. The intention of the editor has\nbeen to develop and to give a chance for a further development of an\nindependent Russian philosophy. The philosophy of the West, we are\ninformed, does not satisfy the Russian mind; the English philosophy\nis one-sided empirical, the French mathematical, the German too\nabstract and logical. The Russian philosophy aspires to bring about\na well-balanced and harmonious method of thinking in which reason,\nsentiment, and action\u2014science, art and religion\u2014are reconciled.\nProfessor Grote, the editor of _Problems of Philosophy and Psychology_,\nby placing the ethical interest in the foreground, hopes that Russian\nphilosophy will become \"the salvation of the world from evil.\"\n\nAmong the book reviews we find six pages devoted to _The Ethical\nProblem_, by Dr. Paul Carus, a translation of which was made for us\nby Prof. A. Gunlogsen of Chicago. We find however that the reviewer,\nMr. P. Astafiew, mixes the position of the author up with that of the\nsocieties for ethical culture. If he represents the Magazine's view\nof reconciling Science, Art, and Religion, it is sure that Religion\nin the shape Of his peculiar creed would get the lion's share. The\ninterest of the little book consists to him in the fact that it clearly\ncharacterises a singular anarchical condition; by having lost the old\nfaith, it is utterly unable to replace it. It is an assumption to\nbase ethics and religion on positive and scientific foundations; yet\nthe attempt is curious as a symptom of the times and especially of\n\"enlightened\" America.\n\nIn answer to one of the most important errors in Mr. Astafiew's\nreview, we have to state that basing ethics upon the facts of life,\nverified and verifiable by science, does not mean that we have to study\npsychology in order to be moral. A man can lead a moral life without\nunderstanding anything of ethics, the science of morality. Ethics is\nnot an indispensable condition of morality. But it is of paramount\nimportance that ethics\u2014as a science\u2014is not an impossibility.\nThe data of moral life, the impulses of duty, of conscience, of\nthe ought, are not mystical or supernatural, i. e. extra-natural,\nstanding in contradiction to other natural facts; they are not, as the\nintuitionists maintain, \"unanalysable,\" they are not, as Professor\nAdler, the founder of the Ethical Societies declares, beyond the pale\nof science; \"the ladder of science,\" he says, \"does not reach so\nfar.\" The data of moral life are facts of the natural development of\nman and of human society; they can be investigated by science, they\ncan be compared with other natural facts, they can be classified and\nunderstood.\n\nA man can throw a stone without understanding anything of Newton's\nlaws, he can build a hut without understanding architecture. Yet for\nthat reason the study of ballistics and of architecture are not\nuseless. The man who has studied architecture may bridge the Niagara,\nwhich the mound-builders were unable to do. And if a bridge breaks down\nwhile the mounds of the mound-builders are still standing, it proves\nnothing against architecture. An ethical student may have proposed\nuntenable theories in ethics, he may have preached a wrong morality,\nand may have gone astray himself: all that would prove nothing against\nthe science of ethics. It is to be expected that ethical knowledge,\nif it leaveneth the whole lump of human society, will raise man's\nmoral life higher, as surely as our knowledge of architecture made it\npossible that we now build palaces upon the places where in former\ntimes stood the wigwams of the Indians. (Moscow, 1891.)\n\n \u03ba.\n\n\n\n\n VOL. I. JULY, 1891. NO. 4.\n\n\n\n\nTHE MONIST.\n\n\n\n\nPSYCHOLOGY OF CONCEPTION.\n\n\n_General Nature of Thought._\u2014The processes marked off by the\npsychologist as thinking or thought constitute the highest stage\nof intellectual elaboration (intellection). By taking our concrete\npercepts and resolving them into so many abstractions, (qualities\nor attributes of things, relations between things,) we are enabled\nto carry out the process of cognition to the furthest point of\nunification. As long as we view a particular object, or an event, alone\napart from other things, we merely _apprehend_ it. But when we bring it\ninto relation to kindred things we _comprehend_ it. Thus, we comprehend\nthe tiger by classing it with other members of the feline group.\nSo we comprehend or understand the movement of the steam-engine by\nassimilating it to the more familiar action of the steam in the kettle\nin forcing up the lid.\n\nLike imaginative production thinking is nothing but the sum of\nprocesses of separation and combination, carried out on sense-material.\nBut in this case the elaborative processes assume a new and peculiar\nform. It is one thing to build up a pictorial image as the poet does,\nanother thing to elaborate an abstract idea, such as the scientific\nnotion of force, fulcrum, and so forth. We must now try to investigate\nmore thoroughly the nature of this thought-elaboration.\n\n_Thought as Activity._\u2014It is evident that the processes here roughly\ndescribed are active processes, that is to say they involve a special\nexertion of the forces of attention. In perception, reproduction, and\nconstructive imagination, this active factor is at work. But it is\nonly in thought proper that this activity becomes fully developed. To\nthink of a particular attribute in an object, say the color of a rose,\nis as we all know a conscious effort or strain. A child first called\nupon to think about abstract qualities, and the general relations of\nobjects finds the operation difficult and fatiguing. All thinking is\nin truth an exercise of the higher form of attention, viz. volitional\nconcentration of consciousness. We only think when we have some purpose\nas the discovery of the likeness or difference among objects, and\nsuch a purpose only develops itself as the individual and the race\nattain a certain measure of development or culture. The child and the\nsavage, like the animal, get on very well without thinking. And even a\nlarge proportion of civilised adults think only in an occasional and\nrudimentary way. Thought is thus in all cases a kind of artificial\nactivity sustained only for short periods and under the stress of\nimpulses or motives which belong to a high stage of intellectual and\nmoral development.\n\n The high degree of activity in thought presumably involves\n a special amount of that muscular strain which forms the\n sensuous base of the attitude of attention. To think is\n thus to concentrate consciousness by aid of energetic motor\n adjustments. These include the innervation of certain muscles,\n more particularly those by which movements of the eyes and\n head are carried out. To think is to keep certain ideational\n elements in persistent consciousness, and this is probably\n effected in part at least by an energetic and sustained\n innervation of particular groups of muscles. To this it may\n be added that since as we shall see presently all thinking is\n bringing together in their relations a number of ideational\n elements, the muscular activity in the case is of a specially\n difficult kind. Such special muscular efforts would probably\n effect a cutting off of other elements and so subserve that\n severe narrowing of consciousness which is so marked a feature\n in thought.\n\n_Directions of Thought-Activity._\u2014This thought-activity may be viewed\nas having two aspects or as following two directions, which it may\nbe well to view apart, even though, as we shall presently see, they\nare inseparable aspects of one process. Just as all intellectual\nelaboration is at once differentiation or separation and integration\nor combination of what is differentiated, so thought itself is but a\nhigher development of each phase.\n\n_a_) _Analysis, Abstraction._\u2014First of all, then, thought may be\nviewed as a carrying further and into higher forms the process of\ndifferentiation or separation of presentative elements by means of\nisolating acts of attention. Thus on selectively considering the\ncolor of a rose, or the form of a crystal, we are it is evident\ndifferentiating what is given in perception as a complex into a number\nof parts, and rendering one of these specially prominent and distinct.\nSuch thought-separation is commonly spoken of as Analysis, i. e. the\ntaking apart of what is conjoined in a whole, and also as Abstraction\nor the withdrawal of attention from what is for the moment irrelevant\nand confining it to one particular point, feature, or quality (Latin ab\nor abs, and traho).\n\nHere it is evident a special attitude and effort of attention is\nrequired. It is one thing to note carefully a presentative complex just\nas it is, another thing to single out some element of this and fix the\nattention on it. The peculiar difficulty of this analytic attention\nis due to the firm coherence of the complex. The child cannot see the\ncolor of the orange just because the orange as a whole stands in the\nway. Hence this analytic attention is abstraction in the fullest sense,\nthat is a deliberate turning aside from what stimulates or attracts\nthis attention at the moment.\n\nSuch abstract singling out of an element may be supposed to involve\na special modification of the muscular adjustment in attention.\nHence perhaps the comparative ease with which we can single out for\nobservation locally distinct features of an object, to which correspond\ndifferent movements of the sense-organ. On the other hand the great\ndifficulty of mentally separating the color from the form of an object\nmay arise from the common element in the muscular adjustments concerned.\n\nThe nature of this process of analysis or abstract attention is best\nseen in those comparatively simple operations in which an actual\npresentation-complex as a group of tones or colors is being analysed.\nThe carrying out of such a process of analysis is aided by certain\nconditions objective or external, and subjective or internal. Thus\nit is found that the closer the degree of the complication the more\ndifficult the isolating fixation. Thus while it is comparatively\neasy to attend to one detail of color in an object locally separated\nfrom other color-details it is exceedingly difficult to attend to\nthe brightness or the degree of saturation of a color apart from the\nquality of the tone itself. In the case of tone-masses, again, it is\nfound that certain combinations, more especially that of the octave,\nare difficult to distinguish because of the tendency in this case to\nfusion.[95]\n\n [95] This is Stumpf's explanation. See his account of the\n different degrees of fusion. _Tonpsychologie_ ii. p. 65, and\n p. 127 et seqq.\n\nComing now to subjective conditions we find that the detection of an\nelement in a complex is aided by a previous familiarity with this apart\nfrom its present concomitants. Thus the singling out of the partial\ntones of a clang is greatly aided by the circumstance that these occur\nand so are known apart from the ground-tone and thus are more readily\npicked out and recognised.[96] Again, the separate detection of a\npresentative element is aided by special interest in the particular\nmaterial. A fine ear for clang-effect or timbre can more readily fix\nits attention on this.\n\n [96] According to Helmholtz this previous familiarity with\n the elements of a composite whole when it gives rise to a\n vivid expectation may produce an illusory analysis, as when\n certain opticians affirmed that they could detect the supposed\n constituents of green, blue, and yellow, in that color. See\n _Physiol. Optik_, p. 273.\n\nSuch special interest works mainly through what is known as practice.\nWhat we are accustomed to note, and exercised in picking out from its\nsurroundings, we are able to detect readily. This effect of practice\nin facilitating analysis or abstract attention to this and that\nconstituent of a presentation-complex is abundantly shown throughout\nthe whole domain of recent experimental inquiry into the nature and\nrelations of sensation.\n\nOf course all such analytical separation of presentative constituents\nis limited by certain conditions in our sensibility. Thus the limits\nof local discrimination obviously confine the range of isolating\nattention to local detail in our tactual and visual presentations.\nSince too such isolation is differentiation, i. e. the singling out\nof some trait or feature different in quality or intensity from\nsurrounding features, it follows that our abstraction is in all cases\nlimited by our discrimination. We cannot separately fixate a local\ndetail of color if this is not qualitatively distinguishable from its\nsurroundings, nor a local detail of form if this is not distinguishable\nin luminous intensity from its entourage. Similarly with respect to\nthe difficult analysis of complex tone-presentations or clangs and\ntaste-presentations, as the mixed flavors of a dish.\n\n_b_) _Synthesis: Conscious Relating._\u2014In the second place all thought\nis integrating or combining, or, as it is commonly expressed, a\nprocess of Synthesis. In thinking we never merely isolate or abstract.\nWe analytically resolve the presentative complexes of our concrete\nexperience only in order to establish certain relations among them. The\nmost appropriate term for all such conscious relating or discernment of\nrelation is Comparison.\n\nAll our sensational or presentative material is given in certain\nrelations or connections, including the relation of coexistence, or\ncoinherence in a substance, of the several qualities of a thing.\nThus the several parts of an extended body stand in certain spatial\nrelations one to another, one part being situated to the right of the\nother, and the object as a whole being above and behind another object,\nand so forth. To these space-relations must be added the time-relations\nof all events, such as the movements of objects, their changes of form,\nand so forth. Lastly with these 'external' relations are given the\nso-called 'internal' relations of difference and likeness. The colors,\nforms, and so forth that present themselves from time to time exhibit a\nlarge variety of such relations.\n\nAs long as we perceive or imagine the concrete object as such we have\nonly a vague 'implicit' knowledge of these relations. Thus a child\nin looking at a house sees _implicitly_ the chimney in a definite\nspatial relation to the mass of the building, but the clear explicit\ngrasp of the relation is a subsequent process going beyond perception\nand involving a rudiment of what we mark off as thought. In like\nmanner when in recollection we recall a sequence of experiences, we\nmay implicitly recognise one as following another; yet it is only by\na process of thought that we explicitly single out this relation for\nspecial consideration.\n\nThe same holds good with regard to the all-comprehensive relations\nof dissimilarity and similarity. A child in perceiving a particular\nobject, say a tree, differentiates it from surrounding objects, other\ntrees, the background of the sky, etc., and in recognising a familiar\nobject as his toy, or as an orange, he assimilates it to previous like\npresentations. But in these cases the consciousness of difference\nand likeness is implicit only. It is some way from this implicit or\nunconscious discrimination and assimilation to comparison proper,\nissuing in a clear or explicit consciousness of a relation of likeness\nor of unlikeness.\n\nIt follows from this that thought grows by insensible gradations out\nof the lower intellective operations. The perception of objects in\nspace, and still more, the recollection of events in time, is itself\nan incipient subconscious stage of the thought process, i. e. grasp of\nrelations. Hence our demarcations of the spheres of sense and thought,\nof concrete or pictorial and abstract representations, are not to be\ntaken absolutely. The germ of thought is present throughout, yet as we\nshall see presently it is a considerable step from the implicit to the\nexplicit seizing of these relations.[97]\n\n [97] Cf. Lotze, _Mikrokosmus_, English translation, i. p. 655;\n Ward, article \"Psychology,\" _Encycl. Britannica_, p. 75.\n\nAll such explicit grasp of relation involves a new direction of\nadjustive effort, or of (volitional) attention. Just as the analytic\nresolution of a complex demands a special effort in the way of limited\nconcentration and resistance to irrelevant concomitants, so the\ncomparison of two presentations in order to discern their relation\nimposes a further special task in the shape of a comprehensive grasp.\nThe special difficulties of the process are manifest. Comparative\nattention to two presentations, say two colors in local, or two tones\nin temporal juxtaposition is not merely the carrying out of a simple\nadjustive process in one direction only, but the carrying out of a\ndouble and yet co-ordinated adjustive process.\n\nThe fact that there is a general tendency to simple modes of\nadjustment subserving a comparatively simple structure or pattern of\nconsciousness, and the fact that complex simultaneous adjustments, as\nin the case of doing different things at the same time, and in that\nof the synthetic relating process of thought, are rare and acquired\nwith difficulty, suggest that a special nervous process is involved,\nconsisting of a double and divergent stream of innervation, each branch\nof which has to be kept going in certain relations of time, as also of\nproportionate strength, with the other branch.\n\nThe process of synthetic or relating activity just described may\ntake the direction of consciously grasping the relations immediately\npresented along with presentation, and more particularly the\nco-existence of attributes in the same object, and the space and\ntime relations of presentations. To note the juxtaposition of yellow\nand white in a daisy or the co-existence of its form and color, or\nthe spatial inclusion of its yellow centre in an extended whole,\nis evidently to discern relations and so to carry out a process of\nconscious synthesis.\n\nIt is however in discerning the most comprehensive relations of\nlikeness and unlikeness that thought shows itself most clearly to be\na synthetic process. Thinking has in a special manner to do with the\ndetection of similarity and dissimilarity or difference. Such relating\nby way of difference or agreement is what we ordinarily understand by\ncomparison.\n\nThe relations of similarity and dissimilarity as comprehensive\nrelations connecting presentations remote as well as proximate in\ntime are spoken of as internal and thus marked off from the external\nrelations of time and place. It is true as we have just seen that\nthey are involved along with the latter. Thus in discerning the\nrelations of the parts of an object, we must differentiate them. Yet\nthe two modes of relating are distinct. I discriminate two colors in\nlocal juxtaposition not _qu\u00e2_ juxtaposed but _qu\u00e2_ different in their\nquality. The juxtaposition may greatly assist the discriminative\nprocess, but this circumstance does not make the juxtaposition and the\nqualitative difference one whit less distinct as relations.\n\nIt may be added that the greater comprehensiveness of the so-called\ninternal relations is seen in the circumstance that the relations of\ntime and place, just like the separate qualities or attributes of\nobjects, are themselves modes of similarity and dissimilarity. Thus the\nrelation of local contiguity between two elements is something _common_\nto these and other contiguous pairs. Moreover, it is evident that in\nsuch a case each element is recognised as having a different position\nfrom the other. Similarity with the temporal relations of events.\n\n_Comparison._\u2014We may now glance at the operations here brought under\nthe head of comparison, the bringing of different presentative or\nrepresentative materials before the mind simultaneously and keeping\nthem in consciousness in order to note their relations of similarity or\ndissimilarity. Here as in the case of Analysis or Abstraction we shall\nillustrate the process by selecting relatively simple modes of the\noperation carried out on immediately presented sense-material.\n\n_Likeness and Difference._\u2014We may here assume that likeness and\nunlikeness are two perfectly distinct relations. To apprehend a\nsimilarity between two sensations, say tones, is an intellectual\nprocess which we all recognise as radically unlike that of apprehending\na difference.\n\nYet while the consciousness of likeness and that of difference are thus\nradically distinct, as psychical processes, it is evident that the\nrelations of likeness and difference are presented together in close\nconnection. As we all know similarity discloses itself in the midst of\ndifference. This is obvious in the case of all complex presentations,\nas when we assimilate two objects on the ground of a color resemblance.\nNot only so, since even in the case of sensation-elements (e. g.\ncolor-sensations) likeness is a thing of degree shading off from\nperfect likeness or indistinguishableness to just recognisable\naffinity, it follows that here, too, likeness and difference are given\ntogether in mutual implication.\n\nSince resemblance and difference are thus uniformly presented together,\nit is to be expected that comparison will commonly include the two\nprocesses, assimilation and discrimination. And this is so. We see\nlikeness amid difference, e. g. a common trait in two faces along with\nstriking dissimilarities. On the other hand we contrast two objects in\nrespect of some _common_ quality as color, form, beauty and so forth,\nwhich common element constitutes the ground or _fundamentum_ of the\ncomparison.\n\nAt the same time it is evident that the one process usually, if not\nin all cases, preponderates over the other. We are now specially\ninterested in the likeness of two objects, say two faces, or two\nliterary styles, the moment after, perhaps, in their differences.\nAccordingly we may say that comparison is the noting of likeness\nagainst a dimly apprehended background of difference, or a difference\nagainst a dimly apprehended background of similarity.\n\n_Conditions of Comparison._\u2014Comparison whether specially directed to\nlikeness or unlikeness has certain common conditions. As in the case of\nAbstraction these conditions may be divided into objective, or those\ninvolved in the nature or concomitants of the presentations considered\nas external objects, or objects of common perception; and subjective or\nthose connected with the nature of the individual mind. As I have given\na full account[98] of these elsewhere, I must content myself here with\na general remark or two on the subject.\n\n [98] In _Mind_, x. p. 489 et seqq.\n\nOf the objective conditions the most important are the following:\n(_a_) There must be a moderate and favorable degree of strength or\nintensity in the presentations to be compared. We compare fairly bright\ncolors better than very dull ones. (_b_) The common factor or _ground_\nof comparison must be sufficiently distinct. We cannot compare two\ntones in respect of pitch if this is unsteady. (_c_) Comparison is\ngreatly aided by juxtaposition in space or time. Thus local proximity\nis a condition of a nice comparison of colors. With respect to\ntemporal conditions it was found by Fechner and has been confirmed by\nothers that immediate succession is more helpful to comparison than\nsimultaneity. We compare sensations of weight, tone, etc., best of all\nwhen they are made to succeed one another.\n\nWith respect to subjective conditions, comparison will, it is obvious,\nbe assisted by a good power of concentration. It will also be aided by\na special sensibility for, and interest in, the particular sensuous\nmaterial: witness the musician's comparison of tones as to pitch,\npurity, etc. Lastly reference may be made to special preparation or\nmental preadjustment. It is manifest that if we are expecting to see\ntwo things like one another we shall in general be more disposed to do\nso; similarly if we are on the lookout for difference.\n\nIt may be added that there is a special interest in likeness _as such_,\nand also in difference. Such interest predisposes a person to detect\nthe one relation rather than the other. Hence the familiar observation\nthat some people are particularly acute in seeing likenesses, e. g. in\nfaces, whereas others are habitually more observant of differences.\n\n_Connection between Analysis and Comparison._\u2014There is a close\nconnection between the two directions of thought-activity just dealt\nwith. To begin with, it has become evident that in the processes of\ncomparison, analysis is always involved. Sometimes the analysis seems\nto precede the comparison, as when we are asked to compare two flowers\nin respect of their color. In other cases it appears rather as the\nresult of comparison. Thus it is by successive comparisons of different\nmembers of a class of things, as flowers, that we gradually come to\nanalyse out the common features of the group.\n\nWhile comparison thus involves abstraction, abstraction even in\nthe case of a single object may be said to involve the rudiments\nof comparison. Thus in analytically singling out for consideration\nthe spherical form of a rain drop, we implicitly and subconsciously\nassimilate it to other previously known spherical objects. But for this\nvague imperfect accompaniment of assimilation, the analytic separation\nof the constituent would be difficult if not impossible. Such a\nsubconscious reference to one or more similar things helps to direct\nthe operation of analysis by intensifying and rendering prominent for\nthe moment the particular constituent assimilated through the addition\nof an ideational element to the sensation.[99]\n\n [99] This is well brought out by W. James, _Principles of\n Psychology_, i. p. 434 et seqq.\n\nIt follows that the thought-process is one process having two aspects\nor distinguishable factors. Either of these may become predominant\naccording to special circumstances. In this way we obtain two varieties\nof operation, viz. Analysis or Abstraction, in which the recognition of\nlikeness is subconscious, and Assimilative Comparison where the process\nof analysis is preliminary and subordinate to a conscious apprehension\nof likeness.\n\nA somewhat like relation holds between analysis as a subconscious\nprocess of differentiation and a conscious act of discrimination. Thus\nin analysing a clang we must, agreeably to what was said above, have\na vague impression of the difference between one tone and another. And\nsuch subconscious differentiation readily becomes the starting-point in\na full conscious apprehension by an act of comparing attention of the\ndifferences between the several ingredients.[100]\n\n [100] Stumpf uses the term Analysis for the mere vague\n detection of plurality of elements in a sensation-complex\n which he considers to be distinct from, and preliminary to\n a discrimination of them as different one from the other.\n _Tonpsychologie_ ii. p. 104 et seqq.\n\nThus far we have been occupied with the two fundamental processes\nin thought and we have illustrated these in their simplest form\nas employed about presentations or their equivalents, concrete\nrepresentations. But as already pointed out what we mean by thought\nis the representation of things as classes or generalities. All the\nmore interesting and momentous problems relating to thought, such\nas the question whether the lower animals think or reason as we do,\nhave reference to such _general_ thinking. We have now to examine the\nprocesses involved in this thinking.\n\nThese fully developed thought-processes are marked off by the use of\nwhat is known as the general idea or notion such as _man_ or _virtue_.\nSuch general ideas when reduced to a precise form as by the logician\nare spoken of as concepts. And since the science of logic assumes\nthinking to take place by help of such conceptual products we may\nalso speak of these full or explicit thought-processes as Conceptual\nThought.[101]\n\n [101] The use of such expressions must not, however, blind\n us to the fact that a concept strictly speaking is something\n logical, an _ideal_ form of the general idea rarely if ever\n realised in our actual thinking processes. Of this more\n presently.\n\n_General Ideas and their Formation._\u2014In seeking to trace the\ndevelopment of this general thinking we have first of all to consider\nthe nature and origin of general ideas. It is evident that we only\nthink about things generally in a distinct manner when we are able to\nform such ideas. Thus I cannot think out the proposition 'The mushroom\nis a fungus' until I am able to form the general ideas mushroom and\nfungus. The difficult problems respecting the nature of thought, its\nrelation to language, and its extension beyond man to the lower\nanimals, have been discussed in close connection with the nature and\norigin of general ideas.\n\nA general idea may for our present purpose be defined as an idea having\na general import or reference. Thus a child's idea of dog, home, or\nfather, becomes general when he consciously employs the term as the\nsign of this, that, and any other particular object which may answer\nto a certain description or be found to present certain characteristic\nattributes or traits; or, as the logicians express it, a general idea\nis a representation of a general class of things.[102]\n\n [102] The reader must be careful to distinguish the meaning of\n the term class as here used from its meaning when applied to a\n definite number of objects viewed as a collection, as a class\n of children in a school. In thinking of man as a (logical)\n class I do not represent a definite number at all; nor do I\n represent men as a collection. It would be more correct to say\n that I am representing in a more or less distinct way the fact\n that this, that, and an indefinite list of other things are\n related as like or answering to one description. How this mode\n of representation is effected will appear presently.\n\nNow it is evident that general ideas as thus defined are reached slowly\nand by degrees. It is exceedingly doubtful whether any of the lower\nanimals possess them. The baby does not possess them and even after\nattaining to speech remains for a long time with only the rudiments\nof them. In their perfected articulate form as required for exact\nscientific thought they are confined to a few highly trained minds.\n\n_Generic Images._\u2014The first stage in the formation of such general\nideas is the welding together of a number of concrete images into what\nhas been called a generic image. The idea tree or house may be taken\nas an example. Such generic images appear to be formed by a process of\nassimilative cumulation. Let us suppose that a child after observing\none dog, sees a second. In this case the strong resemblance in the\nsecond to the first effects a process of assimilation analogous to\nautomatic or \"unconscious\" assimilation. That is to say, the percept\ncorresponding to the second animal is instantly fused with the\nsurviving image of the first by reason of easily apprehended points\nof likeness. By such successive assimilations a cumulative effect is\nproduced which has been likened to that of the superposition of a\nnumber of photographic impressions received from different members of a\nclass, (e. g. criminal,) whereby common features get accentuated and so\na typical form is produced.[103]\n\n [103] For an account of such composite photographic pictures,\n and their analogy to generic (mental) images, see Mr. F.\n Galton's _Inquiries into Human Faculty_. Appendix, \"Generic\n Images.\"\n\nSuch a process of deepening and accentuating common traits and effacing\nindividual or variable ones can only be looked on as a tendency never\nperfectly fulfilled. Interesting differences would in all cases tend to\nreinstate themselves. Thus my own generic image of a church happens to\nbe a building with a tall spire, because the finest church in my native\ntown was of this form. Recent examples would also tend to contribute\nvariable peculiarities. Thus the baby's generic image of a dog might\nhave the distinguishing characters of the dog last seen.\n\nThis process of cumulative assimilation would be largely passive and\nindependent of those active processes of comparison, just described.\nIt would further be capable of being carried forward (to some extent\nat least) independently of language. Hence we may, with some degree of\nconfidence, attribute generic images to the child before he comes to\nthe use of words and to many of the lower animals. Thus it is highly\nprobable that a baby of six months forms a generic image of the human\nface out of the percepts answering to its mother's face, nurse's face,\netc., and that when suffering from loneliness it has this image in\nits mind. Similarly a predatory animal may be supposed to compound a\ngeneric image out of the percepts gained from this, that, and the other\nspecimen of his prey, so that when seized with hunger, this typical\nimage is recalled.\n\nIn order to illustrate what is meant by a generic image, it is\nimportant to take the case of a pure representation detached from\na presentation. Thus we cannot say that because a diving bird\nrecognises a new sheet of water, it must have at the moment, a\ngeneric image answering to water. The recognition of a thing does not\nimply a distinct representation of the thing as previously seen. The\npresentative and representative ingredients are fused in this case, or\nto express it otherwise, the image is latent and undeveloped. Similarly\nwith respect to such rudimentary processes of conception or general\nideation as those here considered. We can only attribute a developed\nand detached generic image to baby or animal when we have reason to\nthink that these occur in the absence of percepts, e. g. in states of\ndesire, in dreams, and so forth.[104]\n\n [104] The argument in support of the proposition that generic\n images, or (as the writer calls them) \"recepts\" are actually\n reached by the lower animals is ably set forth by Dr. Romanes,\n _Mental Evolution in Man_, p. 51 et seqq.\n\n_Relation of Generic Image to General Idea._\u2014The question still\nremains how far such generic images are, properly speaking, _general_\nideas in the sense defined above. Is, for example, the typical face\nthat is pictured by the lonely infant thought of as something common to\nthis, that, and the other concrete object? Does it carry with it any\nclear consciousness of a general class of things? There is no certain\nproof that this is so. It must be remembered here that the mental\nimage corresponding to one and the same individual object, as the\ninfant's mother, is composite also and in the same way as the generic\nimage. Thus the baby forms the image of its mother out of a number of\npractically unlike percepts, corresponding to varying appearances of\nthe object in different positions, different light, different dress,\nand so forth.[105] Generic images accordingly differ not in kind, but\nonly in degree (viz. proportion of common to variable feature taken\nup and accentuated) from particular or concrete images. And so long\nas they remain merely pictorial _images_, there seems no reason to\nattribute to them any general function or import.\n\n [105] Cf. Taine, _On Intelligence_, Part i, Book ii, Ch. 2.\n\nThe true process of conception, as generalisation or general ideation,\nthat is a conscious representation of something as common to many as\ndistinguished from one, involves the active processes of thought,\nanalysis and synthesis, abstraction and comparison. It is only when\nthe child begins consciously to break up its images to mark off this\nelement or feature from that, and by help of such analysis discerns\nand demarcates common features that general thought properly so\ncalled, appears. In this way it reaches a distinct idea at once of an\nindividual thing and of general or common aspects among individuals. We\nhave now to examine into this true thought-process.\n\n_Transition to Conception Proper._\u2014The transition from merely\nimagining to thinking proper is effected by processes of reflective\nattention in which abstraction and comparison play a chief part. In\norder to understand how this occurs we may suppose the process of\nautomatic assimilation checked by the introduction of some impressive\ndifference. Thus a child proceeds to play with a visitor's dog and\nfinds it wanting in the friendly sentiments of his own pet. Here\ndifference which, in the earlier stage of automatic assimilation,\nremained indistinct in the background of consciousness, is brought\nforward. The unlikeness of _morale_ in spite of the likeness of\n_physique_ is forced on his attention, the present percept is separated\nfrom and opposed to the image, and a step is taken in marking off\nlikeness from surrounding difference.\n\nAs differences thus come into distinct view and impress themselves\non the mind as the constant accompaniment of likenesses, a new and\nexplicit grasp of likeness-in-difference ensues. This starts from a\nmental separation of the several perceptual constituents of the generic\nimage, and a reflective comparison of these one with another, so as\nto demarcate common features or likenesses from peculiar features or\nunlikeness. Such comparison, or series of comparisons, begins with\nincomplete analysis and vague apprehension of likeness and ends in a\nmore complete analysis and more definite apprehension of likeness. In\nthis way, for example, the child waking up to differences among apples,\ngoes back on his various experiences, and by noticing and setting aside\nvariability of taste, size, etc., gets a clear grasp of the common\nessential features. Such a conscious active separation of definite\npoints of resemblance from among a confusing mass of difference is what\npsychologists and logicians more especially mean by Abstraction.\n\n_Differentiation of Notions of Individual and Class._\u2014As was pointed\nout just now the coexistence of likeness with unlikeness in the child's\nexperience, may mean one of two things, viz. persistence or identity\nof one individual object, in spite of certain changes, or a general\nsimilarity among a number of different individuals. The process of\nconception is sometimes described as if the child started with a\ndefinite knowledge of individuals and then proceeded to generalise or\nform a class-idea. There is, however, every reason for saying that\nthe two modes of interpreting likeness-in-difference are reached\nconcurrently and by processes largely similar. Thus it seems most\nreasonable to suppose that the baby which 'da-das' every bearded person\nit sees is as yet clearly conscious neither of individuality nor of\ngenerality. In other words we must not assume that it is stupidly\nconfounding its sire with a stranger, or, on the other hand, forming\nan idea of a general class. At this stage the child merely recognises\ncertain interesting similarities and proceeds to express the fact. We\nhave to suppose that the clear apprehension of individual sameness\nis reached but slowly and in close connection with the first clear\nconsciousness of different things attached by a bond of likeness.\n\nTo say that the child's knowledge begins with the concrete individual\nis not to say that it attains a clear consciousness of what we mean by\nan individual thing persisting and the same (in spite of change) before\nit begins to generalise. We must remember that the cognition of a thing\nas persistent and continuous is the result of lengthy and complex\nprocesses of comparative reflection. To individualise is thus to think\njust as to generalise is to think.[106] In truth, the psychological\ndevelopment of the idea of individuality proceeds along with that of\ngenerality, each being grasped as a different way of interpreting\npartial similarity among our percepts.[107]\n\n [106] Hence the logician can speak of the idea answering to a\n proper name as a singular _concept_. See Lotze, _Logic_, p. 34.\n\n [107] The question of the priority in the individual of\n the knowledge of the individual or of the general class,\n the question known as the _primum cognitum_ has been much\n discussed in connection with the linguistic problem whether\n names are first used as proper names or as general names.\n\n_The Process of Generalisation._\u2014When once this differentiation of\nthe individual idea from the class idea has advanced far enough the\nprocess of generalisation proper, or the grasp of common or general\nqualities, is able to be carried out in the way usually described\nby psychologists. That is to say, a number of individual things,\nrepresented as such, are now compared, the attention withdrawn by a\nvolitional effort, from points of difference and concentrated on points\nof likeness (abstraction) and so a true process of generalisation\ncarried out.\n\nThe common account of the process of conception here followed, as a\nsequence of three stages, Comparison, Abstraction, and Generalisation,\nrather describes the ideal form of the process as required by logic\nthan the mental process actually carried out. As we saw above a vague\nanalysis or abstraction precedes that methodical comparison of things\nby which the abstraction becomes precise and perfect, that is to say,\ndefinite points of likeness (or unlikeness) are detected. With regard\nto generalisation it has been pointed out that a rudimentary form of\nthis process is involved in abstraction. To see the roundness of the\nball is vaguely and implicitly to assimilate the ball to other round\nobjects. It is to be added that an imperfect grasp of general features\nas such (commonly) precedes the methodical process here described.\nThe child realises in a measure, the general function of the name\n'horse' before he carries out a careful comparative analysis of the\nhorse-characters. At the same time the use of the word generalisation\nis important, as marking off the clear mental grasp of the class-idea\nas such, that is the idea of an indeterminate number, of objects, known\nand unknown, answering to a certain description.[108]\n\n [108] On the relation of Abstraction to Generalisation see\n Hamilton's _Lectures_, Vol. ii, Lec. xxxv.\n\n_Conception and Naming._\u2014We have so far supposed that the processes\nof conception are carried out without any help from language. But it\nis exceedingly doubtful whether any such orderly process as that just\ndescribed, the comparison of a number of percepts and the marking off\nof common attributes could be carried out without the aid of words or\nsome equivalent. It is probable that even the clear grasp of individual\nthings as unities and as permanent identical things, depends on the use\nof a name (proper name) which as one and the same sound seems to mark\nin an emphatic way the continued oneness of the object.[109] And the\nsame applies still more manifestly to the apprehension of a general\nclass of things. It is certain that in later life at least all clear\ngeneral thinking takes place by help of language. The general idea is\nheld together, and retained by means of a name; and, as already pointed\nout, it is very uncertain whether in the absence of such general signs,\nthe infant or the lower animal ever attains to a clear consciousness\nof the 'one in the many,' the common aspect of a number of different\nobjects.\n\n [109] It seems to follow that animals cannot attain the clear\n consciousness of individual things as permanent unities, as we\n attain it.\n\n_Is Generalisation Possible Without Language?_\u2014The question how far we\ncan generalise or form a general idea apart from the use of names or\nother signs is one of the standing _cruces_ in psychology. If we judge\nby introspective examination of our own minds we do no doubt now and\nagain carry on processes of thought of a quasi-general character with\nlittle if any help from words. Yet it is doubtful whether we attain\na clear consciousness of the _generality_ of our thinking in this\ncase. It must be remembered too that even if we can, as is alleged,\nemploy a particular image or succession of images as representative\nof generalities without any aid from language (as when we intuitively\nfollow the proof of a particular case in geometry and at the same time\nrecognise its general validity) we are employing powers of thought that\nhave been developed by help of language.[110]\n\n [110] On the nature of such speechless thought see Venn,\n _Empirical Logic_, p. 147.\n\nIf now we turn from the developed to the undeveloped mind, and ask\nwhether children think apart from the use of language, we find the\nquestion exceedingly difficult. It has been alleged that a born mute\nreached prior to his mastery of a deaf-mute language the highly\nabstract idea of maker or creator and applied this to the world or sum\nof objects about him.[111] It must be borne in mind however, that born\nmutes make a certain spontaneous use of articulate sounds or signs, and\nsuch articulations, though unintelligible to others, and not even heard\nby themselves, may be of great assistance in carrying out the process\nof Abstraction. It must be further remembered that a child understands\nothers' words and may probably make some internal use of them as signs\nbefore he proceeds to imitatively articulate them.\n\n [111] See a very interesting account of the experience of\n a born mute by Prof. S. Porter, in an article \"Is Thought\n Possible without Language?\" in the _Princeton Review_,\n January, 1881.\n\nLastly with respect to the lower animals, while it must be admitted\nthat they display something closely resembling the germ of general\nthinking, it is manifest that we cannot in their case, be certain of\nthe degree of clear consciousness of generality attained. The actions\nof a fox caught in a difficulty and inventing a way of escape seem\nindistinguishable from those of a man thinking by help of general ideas\nand general rules: yet the mental process may after all be non-ceptual,\nand pictorial. It seems safe therefore to conclude that apart from\nverbal or other general signs the full consciousness of generality does\nnot arise.[112]\n\n [112] It must be remembered that some of the most intelligent\n of the lower animals, e. g. ants, have a system of tactual\n signs analogous to our language. On the whole subject of the\n germ of linguistic and conceptional power in animals, see\n Romanes, _Mental Evolution in Man_, Chap. v and following.\n\n_Psychological Function of General Names._\u2014A name is commonly\ndefined as a mark or sign by the help of which the idea of a thing\nmay be called up in our own mind or in the mind of another. Signs are\neither self-explaining, as in the case of a drawing, or an imitative\ngesture, or conventionally attached to objects as the larger number\nof linguistic signs or names, the symbols used in music, etc.[113]\nLanguage signs consist either of articulated sounds or other\npercept-producing movements, as the finger movements[114] used by the\ndeaf and dumb.\n\n [113] Articulate sounds so far as imitative (onomatopoetic)\n words, are of course to be classed with self-explaining signs.\n\n [114] On the general function and the possible varieties of\n language-signs, tone-language, gesture-language, etc., see\n Romanes, _Mental Evolution in Man_, Chap. v and following. Cf.\n Venn, _Empirical Logic_, Chap. vi.\n\nA name may be given to one thing (proper name) or to a general class\n(common or general name). In either case, as explained above, the\nname psychologically considered is the expression or indication of a\nsimilarity among our percepts. To name a thing is thus the outward\nmanifestation of a process of assimilation.\n\nThe name (articulation-sound complex) becomes attached to the idea\nit stands for by a process of contiguous integration. Looking at it\nas accompanying and perfecting the process of assimilation, we may\nsay that a name, whether as employed by ourselves or as heard used by\nothers, becomes specially associated with, and so expressive of, some\nsimilar feature or features of our perceptual experience. Thus the\nname 'home' specially emphasises the recurring or constant features\nof the child's surroundings, the name 'horse' the common features of\nstructure in the objects so named. The name thus becomes specially\nattached to, and so a mark of the effects of superposition of common\npresentative elements in our experience.\n\nThis is well brought out in Herbart's view that the general idea is the\nresult of \"apperception,\" or the coalescence of a new presentation with\nprevious like representations (apperceptive masses). Such apperceptive\nfusion or assimilation would according to Herbart help to explain\nthe prominence or distinct emergence of the common element in a new\npresentation, and the falling back of the particular or variable\nfeatures into indistinct consciousness.[115]\n\n [115] See Mr. Stout's account of Herbart's view. _Mind_, Vol.\n xiv. p. 15.\n\n_Use of Names in Early Life._\u2014In the beginning of life linguistic\nsigns are used in close connection with the process of automatic\nassimilation. Thus the recurrence of the presentative complex answering\nto a particular animal as the dog, calls forth, by a process analogous\nto a reflex movement, the articulation, let us say, of the sound\n'bow-wow.' This use of words by the child to mark likeness is partly\nspontaneous, partly imitative. As is well known, children often invent\nnames of their own, as their pet names for nurse, doll, and so forth,\nand their names for classes of objects, as when one child used the\nsound 'mum' as a name of eatables, generally, and another, the sound\n'appa' as a name for this, that, and the other animal (kitten, chick,\netc.). They also spontaneously extend the use of names supplied by\nothers as when the sound \"ba\" (ball) was extended to a bubble and other\nround objects. This spontaneous use of names gives place in time to an\nimitative use of names as heard by others.[116]\n\n [116] For interesting illustrations of children's spontaneous\n invention, as also of their extension of names, see Preyer,\n _Die Seele des Kindes_, 3er Theil; P\u00e9rez, _The First Three\n Years of Childhood_, Chap. xii; Taine, _On Intelligence_, Book\n iv, Chap. i, \u00a7 1; and Darwin's _Notes_ on his child, _Mind_,\n Vol. ii. p. 285, et seqq.\n\nFrom what we said above we have to suppose that names are used at the\nbeginning neither as proper or Singular, nor as General names. They\nmerely serve to mark off and register common features of the child's\nexperience. As the processes of comparison gain in strength and the\ndifference between the individual and the general class becomes\ndistinct, the two uses of names as singular and general grow clearly\ndifferentiated. Thus the names Charles, Papa, Rose, and so forth, come\nto be marks of particular things, those organised experience-unities\nwhich are thought of as having continued existence independently of\nour intermittent percepts. Similarly, the general name, dog, man,\nand so forth, come to be consciously applied to a number of such\nobject-unities on the ground of common attributes.\n\n_How Names Further Conception._\u2014At first we find this use of\ngeneral names confined to classes of objects having numerous points\nof similarity and so easily representable in the pictorial form of\nGeneric Image, as \"dog,\" \"house,\" etc. Here, as pointed out above, the\nname is not used with a clear consciousness of its general character\nor function. Yet the very application of one and the same name to a\nnumber of percepts is an important aid to those processes of reflective\ncomparison and selection of common features by which the apprehension\nof generality arises. To begin with, any use of a name to mark the\nresult of an assimilative process, serves to call attention to and\nto emphasise the existence of like features. Not only so, the name\nbeing applied to each of a number of percepts is a valuable means of\nrecalling these together, and so furthering that extended process of\ncomparing a number of things which underlies generalisation. More\nthan this, since the name from the beginning serves to emphasise and\nregister the fact of likeness, it greatly facilitates the subsequent\ncareful analysis and definition of the points of likeness. Of special\nservice here is the hearing of names applied by others to a variety of\nthings, as when a multitude of unlike things are called 'plants' and\nso on. Such announcement of likeness as yet undiscovered by the child\nserves as we know as a powerful stimulus to a comparative examination\nof the things and this urges the child on along the conceptual path.\n\nThe greatest use of general names, however, in connection with\ngeneral ideation or conception is in definitely marking off and\nrendering permanent each new result of analysis and comparison. Thus\non reflecting upon dogs with a view to see in what exactly they do\nagree in spite of their differences, and on gradually gaining clear\nconsciousness of this, that, and the other characteristic features\nof form, action, etc., a child demarcates and definitely registers\nthese results of abstraction by help of the name. That is to say, the\nname is used as a defining mark as one might mark off an ill-defined\nlocal feature in a piece of board by drawing a chalk circle about the\nspot. When the name is thus definitely and exclusively applied to such\nproducts of comparison and abstraction it henceforth serves as a means\nof recalling these and keeping them distinctly before the mind.\n\nWhen thus definitely attached by association to the points of\nsimilarity singled out by abstraction from a number of particular\nobjects, the name is used as a true general sign. The image now takes\non a much more definite function as a typical or representative image,\nthrough the circumstance that by help of the demarcating sign certain\nof its features stand out distinctly, and are at the same time realised\nas belonging not merely to one particular thing, but to what we call\na general class. Thus the name dog, though probably still calling up\nan image of a more or less concrete character, that is, including\ntraits of some individual dog or variety of dogs, becomes a general\nsign inasmuch as it throws prominently forward, and so secures special\nattention to certain definitely apprehended common class-features (the\ncommon canine form, action of barking, etc.).[117]\n\n [117] Since the result of abstraction though representing\n concrete things does not represent them fully and explicitly\n we may, with Mr. Spencer, call the general or abstract idea a\n re-representation. See his _Principles of Psychology_, ii, p.\n 513.\n\nUsed now in this way as a general sign of certain definitely\napprehended points of likeness or common qualities, the name acquires\nthe double function attributed to it by logicians. That is to say, it\n_denotes_ any one of a certain order or class of things: the class or\ngroup being determined in respect not of the number of things included,\nbut only of the common qualification or description of its number, that\nis to say of the qualities which the name is said to _connote_.[118]\n\n [118] According to logicians a general name denotes certain\n things (members of a class) and connotes certain qualities in\n these things. For the terms denotation and connotation those\n of extension and intension are often substituted. See Jevons,\n _Elementary Lessons on Logic_, Lesson v.\n\n_Formation of more Abstract Notions._\u2014A similar process of comparison\nand abstraction clinched by a linguistic sign takes place in the\nformation of those general ideas which answer to few common qualities,\nand are altogether removed from the plane of the generic image,\nas for example 'animal.' It is obvious that we cannot compound a\nquasi-concrete image of animal as we can, roughly at least, compound\nan image of dog. There is no common form running through the vast\nvariety of animals that renders this possible.[119] There is indeed an\nimage-element here, for in thinking of animals most people probably\nimage imperfectly one of the more familiar quadrupeds. Here the\n_general_ representative function of the image is still more evident. A\nchild cannot form the idea animal till he has attained a considerable\nskill in the use of verbal signs as general. For to represent animal\n(in general) is to repress the tendency to image particular concrete\nexamples, and to give peculiar and exclusive prominence to a few\nproperties, such as spontaneous movement, sensation, which can only be\ngrasped by a special effort of abstraction; and can only be brought\nbefore the mind by the medium of a verbal sign.\n\n [119] Cf. Lotze, _Logic_, p. 38.\n\nThese higher steps in the thought-process become possible by means of\nthe verbally embodied results of the lower steps. It is after the child\nhas formed the general ideas, dog, horse, and so forth, that he climbs\nto the more difficult, more comprehensive, and more abstract idea,\nanimal. In this way, we may say with Hamilton, that language is to the\nmind what the arch is to the tunnel, the necessary precondition of all\nadvanced thought-work.\n\nIt is not meant by this that the child progresses regularly from\nnotions of a comparatively small range to more comprehensive ones. It\nmust be remembered that it is often easier for a child to form an idea\nof a larger class or genus than of one of its constituent sub-classes\nor species, viz. when the form presents prominent easily discernible\npoints of likeness, and when the distinctive features of the latter are\nobscure. Thus the child uses the name tree before he uses the name\noak-tree, and so forth. This is what is meant by saying that the child\nsees likenesses before he sees differences.\n\nIn this brief account of the name-embodied concept reference has been\nmade only to those names which grammarians call nouns, and of these\nonly to such as are names of things. By the same mental process by\nwhich the child reaches the idea orange, it reaches the idea yellow,\nround, and so forth. The clear use of adjectives as qualifying epithets\nmarks a higher stage of analysis than the first use of names, viz.\nthe separating out for special consideration of _single_ qualities in\nthings. Hence in the imitative speech of the child, the first use of\nadjectives follows by an appreciable interval that of names.[120] This\nseparate apprehension of single qualities becomes still more distinct\nwhen abstract nouns such as whiteness, height, come to be used. As the\netymology of such names shows they come after concrete names in the\ndevelopment of the thought of the race and community, and are invented\nby help of such concrete names. The individual only acquires the use\nof these abstract names when intelligence has developed under the\nstimulating and controlling influence of education.\n\n [120] One or two adjectives as ni-ni (nice) are used along\n with nouns from the first, but these probably so far as names\n are on the level of nouns, i. e. names of things as concrete\n wholes. It must not be supposed however, that the child or\n the race begins with a clear apprehension of any one class\n of words. The several classes of words distinguished by the\n grammarian are confused at first and are only differentiated\n as intelligence advances. All that is meant here is, that the\n child knows and names things as concrete wholes before it\n begins to qualify them, or discern particular qualities in\n them. On the differentiation of nouns etc., in the early use\n of language, see Romanes, _Mental Evolution in Man_, p. 219 et\n seqq. and p. 295 et seqq.\n\nIt is only when analysis is thus carried up to the point of a\nseparate consideration of single qualities that the class-notion, the\nrepresentative of a _group_ of qualities, becomes definite and concise.\nA perfectly clear general idea of a class means one of the constituent\nelements of which we can separately attend to and name.\n\n_Conception as Dependent on Social Environment._\u2014It is evident from\nthis brief sketch of the development of the general idea that it\nis a process that is largely dependent on the action of the social\nenvironment. Language is pre-eminently the invention and instrument of\nsocial life. It is the medium by which we communicate one to another\nour ideas, wishes, and so forth. In the early years of life the\nundeveloped intelligence of the child is continually roused to activity\nthrough his desire to enter into the system of language which he finds\nothers using. In this way the results of ages of thought-processes\nembodied in the language of educated men and women are brought to\nbear on the growing mind, and these constitute a main ingredient\nin the educational influence of the community upon the individual.\nThe profound and far reaching influence of this medium of common\nword-embodied ideas is clearly seen in the arrest of intellectual\ndevelopment when contact with the general mind through language is\nexcluded, as in the case of neglected deaf-mutes. As Professor Huxley\nsays, \"A race of dumb men deprived of all communication with those who\ncould speak would be little indeed removed from the brutes.\"[121]\n\n [121] Quoted by Professor Horatio Hale, in _The Origin of\n Language_, p. 42.\n\n J. SULLY.\n\n\n\n\nTHE RIGHT OF EVOLUTION.\n\n\nIn the Royal Academy's Exhibition which opened May 2, 1890, I remarked\na fine picture of the Lord Mayor's Show. That Show is the monument of\na mercantile evolution by which poor men,\u2014one, 'tis said, with only a\ncat for capital,\u2014clubbed together in guilds, largely socialistic, and,\nso increasing means, accumulated the wealth which controlled kings, and\ninaugurated the epoch of peace, so necessary for commerce.\n\nBut the Academy picture was not so striking as one I had seen the day\nbefore (May-day) in Hyde Park. There, amid a motley crowd with red\nand black flags inscribed 'Anarchy,' stood William Morris,\u2014artist,\nscholar, and poet,\u2014announcing to the workmen that they are slaves,\nrich men their owners, their natural enemies, and existing society a\nwar.\n\nThe Guild-Socialism of London is past. Its gorgeous ghost may presently\nmasquerade for the last time through November fog and London squalor.\nBut the Hyde Park scene has its career yet to run. What its orators\ndemanded was a new privilege. It was not the equal rights of labor, but\nprivilege. This new lordship is to dictate my limits of education, my\nmode of production, my hours of work, my wages. The poet leader told\nthe toilers that they alone did what was useful, all others were doing\nwhat was useless; the man who wrote \"The Earthly Paradise\" declared\nhimself one of the mere \"parasitic class,\" climbing and flourishing\non the manual laborers. I did not see how his remorseless logic could\nhave spared Shakespeare himself, and it appears certain that under this\nlevelling scheme no dreamer, no poet, could ever have the culture,\nor the leisure, necessary to bear his literary fruit. When the\ndistribution of work and wages is left to a majority of the millions,\nwill they agree that writing \"The Earthly Paradise\" is as productive\nas the mining of coal? Among these millions, how many fools, how many\nsots! Shakespeare drew, in Christopher Sly, a character familiar to\nus as to him. Christopher is taken, while in a drunken sleep, into\na nobleman's mansion, and, on waking, is treated as a lord who has\nbeen wandering in his mind, fancying himself a boor. He is surrounded\nby liveried servants; his lady comes to welcome his recovery; he is\nfeasted; a beautiful drama is performed before him. In the height of\nhis glory Christopher calls for a tankard of beer; he drinks deep; and\njust as his players are entering on the poetic drama, Christopher rolls\nfrom his cushioned throne and lies snoring on the floor. Had it been\nleft to Christopher Sly's vote to determine whether higher wages should\nbe paid Shakespeare or the brewer, the bard might have come off badly.\nAnd were the wages of actors and actresses dependent on a government\nchosen by the masses, not only the Slys throughout England, but the\nmillions remote from theatres, and the Methodists, Salvationists,\nPresbyterians, would certainly unite to close all theatres. Even Edward\nBellamy \"looking backward\" finds no provision for a theatre. Little by\nlittle we should find ourselves in a prosaic world. Men and women would\nbe born; they might eat, and sleep; they would die. But our little life\nmight bid farewell to the beautiful dreams that clothe its dry bones\nwith beauty.\n\nSuch is my impression of every constructive scheme of Socialism. I\nrecognise the evils that give rise to such schemes; I feel their\nurgency. Their strong appeal to our humanity might silence criticism\nof their crudity, were their method evolutionary. We could then feel\ncertain that every practical step would be traceable if not confirmed\nby experience. But when a theory adopts the revolutionary method,\nwhen it proposes a complete, irreversible overthrow of existing\ninstitutions; it is necessary to ask whether its own system would be\nany improvement on the old.\n\nIt may be said that English Socialism does not advocate violence.\nBut violence is only an incident of revolution. There never was a\nrevolution in which the fighting did not come as a surprise. Those who\ninflame the masses with aims that cannot be gained but by bloodshed,\nare really advocating violence. Reforms of a political or a social\nsystem are secured peacefully, but a revolutionary subversion of the\nfoundations in a whole nation can only come by war. It is a declaration\nof war to deal with the whole existing order with hostility, with\nacrimony and hatred, as wholly bad. Such order is thereby sentenced to\ndeath; its execution is merely a question of power.\n\nEven supposing a revolution not attended by bloodshed, assuming it\nextorted from authority by fear of violence, what can be gained?\nWhat new materials, with which to make the earthly paradise? None.\nWe see what men are, what motives now rule; such and such parties,\npoliticians, official people, \"400\" people; a vast population of\nworking people who have no definite principle of social equality,\nmuch less of fraternity. The mass, in the distance, may appear in\nsolidarity, like the distant ocean; but, seen closely, it is made\nup of distinct waves. The bootblack looks down on the sweep, as the\nmillionaire looks down on the tradesman. There is as much social\ninequality in Washington as in London. Revolutions pass and leave\nyou the same old human nature. Whence is socialism to get a cabinet\nof angels who will administer the new order,\u2014run the farms, public\nworks, railways, and so on,\u2014without selfishness, jobbery, personal\nends, or corruption? And shall our schools train intelligence downward,\nso that it shall not rise above mediocrity? \"The snow may fall level\none day, the next it is piled into drifts.\" Property might be equally\ndistributed this year; the next it would be in the hands of the\ncleverest. You seize a man by the throat and say \"You've got to be\nfraternal.\" He may gasp out \"I will\"; but when his throat is free he\nwill love you no better.\n\nBut we are told that the selfish forces of human nature, its tendency\nto social inequality, can themselves be revolutionised. It was so\nwith the early Christians. Jesus was not a socialist, he advised\ntribute to C\u00e6sar, and respect for those who sat in Moses's seat;\nbut, some two centuries after his death, the Christians did give up\ntheir private possessions, and had all things in common. The avowed\ncause of this, however, was that the world was just coming to an end.\nWhy labor and accumulate in a world about to be consumed? No sooner\ndid that superstitious expectation fade away than socialism ceased.\nThe forces of human nature resumed their sway. Those forces,\u2014the\nlove of property, of luxury, competition, enterprise,\u2014have since\nbeen dissolved, here and there, but only by similar superstitions. A\nhundred communities were formed for secular interests, about Robert\nOwen's time. They all failed. The only ones existing are those founded\nin the belief that this world is a wilderness of woe, destined to\ndestruction, and heaven the only true investment. Such are the Oneida,\nShaker, and Mormon communities. The modern socialists can appeal to\nno such superstition. And yet, though many of them believe themselves\n\"infidels,\" their movement is the afterglow of Christianity. Their\nmethod is millennial. They look for the destruction of the old\npolitical world in much the same way as the early Christians looked\nfor the destruction of the physical world. There is to be a grand\ntransformation scene. Some Bellamy is to sound a trumpet, a lucifer\nmatch is to be scratched, and, puff! away go the pomp and glories of\nthis world. The high are to be laid low, the low raised high, and a new\nsocial kingdom to be established.\n\nAll this, though uttered by some atheists, is supernaturalism.\nIt is a survival from the millennial superstition. It is secular\nsecond-adventism. It will pass away like its forerunners, though it may\nlike them cause revolutions. The socialistic fathers and their children\nwill fall asleep, and the old world roll on much the same as before,\ndiurnally, but on its moral orbit somewhat slower. For revolutionary\nchanges invariably retard human progress. Because, while they cannot\nalter the inherited habitudes of a people,\u2014their motives, prejudices,\nsuperstitions,\u2014they give these unreformed feelings a new habitation,\nswept and garnished, so that the last state of that nation is worse\nthan the first. So long as outgrown notions remain only in antiquated\ninstitutions, their error is demonstrated by their folly; their\ntumbling walls instruct them in new needs; and when at last the old\ninstitution falls, as it must, the experience induces adaptation of the\nnew one to the forces that laid low the old. When the outer embodies\nan inner reform, there is no reaction. The progress is permanent. Such\nis not the case when decrepit sentiments are suddenly given the sinews\nof youth.\n\nThis view is not speculative. It is derived from the study of\nrevolutions. Near 250 years ago the English people began a revolution\nwhich presently beheaded the king, and disestablished the church.\nBut monarchal superstition was not beheaded; religious superstition\nwas not disestablished. In place of Charles I. was set up a monarch\nof unlimited power, whose little finger was heavier than Charles's\nwhole body,\u2014that same Cromwell whose massacres of people in Ireland\nis represented to-day in the one-sided feud that makes the curse of\nEngland. The disestablishment of a church, at least scholarly and\npicturesque, was followed by the inauguration of a primitive God of\nwrath, whose prophet was Calvin, and Cromwell his destroying angel.\nBonfires were made of the most beautiful works of art in England. The\nfinest statues and monuments were destroyed because a barbarian said,\n\"Thou shalt not make a graven image.\" The revolution provided a fresh\nstronghold for the grossest prejudices and superstitions; and, despite\nthe weakness of Charles I. and the faults of the clergy, the last state\nof England was so much worse than the first, that the revolution was\nreversed, the old monarchy restored, the church re-established, and the\nfuture of that country given to the forces of evolution.\n\nThe French revolution beheaded a weak king, and raised a monster in his\nplace. Robespierre concentrated in his year or two all crimes spread\nthrough the history of tyranny. The masses threw down the Virgin Mary,\nand raised on her chief altar a goddess of Reason. Much pious horror\nhas been expressed about that worship of a beautiful Woman instead of\nan image; but the real evil was the superstition, which, as it had\nbeheaded a helpless king now shattered a helpless image, but without\nbeheading itself\u2014that is, superstition itself. The worship of the\ngoddess Reason was entirely too reasonable; so she was set aside,\nand the revolution established a ceremonial worship of Nature, which\nconsecrated all that was natural,\u2014the passions, the revolutionary\nwrath, the natural desire to guillotine a Count, take possession of\nhis house, drink his wine, and imitate his revelries. Robespierre\npresently turned to butchering revolutionists too, if not submissive to\nhim, so he was put out of the way. But the whole revolution naturally\nled to the destructive imperialism of the first Napoleon,\u2014the enemy\nof mankind. He so paralysed the forces of progress that, even in 1848,\nthe French had not learned the lesson of their first revolution. They\ntried another, and history repeated itself. They formed a revolutionary\ndemocracy,\u2014that is, a disguised imperialism,\u2014as they were soon shown.\nTheir president proved to be an emperor, who destroyed liberty in\nFrance and Italy for twenty years, and nearly destroyed his country.\n\nBut what of America? It was from the romantic success of the American\nrevolution,\u2014a handful of colonists throwing off the yoke of\nEngland,\u2014that France caught fire; and the revolutionary spirit in\nEurope has been kept alive by the magnificent material development\nof America. All these fruits of the century of independence are\nascribed to our revolution; although the more astonishing growth of\nAustralia, which had no white settler fifty years ago, might as justly\nbe ascribed to the English throne. It is due to a false patriotism\nthat Americans competent to do so have not exposed the superstitions\nabout their country. To love one's native land more than humanity, is\nno better than to love a king more than our country. There appears to\nme nothing more important than that the world should be undeceived\nabout America, whose political history is, really, the great warning\nagainst revolution,\u2014a handwriting on the walls of the world, the\nmisunderstanding of which is a peril to mankind.\n\nThe independence of America was a necessary thing, but it came in\nthe worst way possible. The colonies resisted taxation, imposed by a\nparliament 3000 miles away,\u2014in those days fifteen times that distance\nin time,\u2014in which parliament they had no voice. The quarrel came to\nblows; but the colonists had no idea of separation from England, until\nThomas Paine persuaded them that independence alone could end such\nquarrels. That was true, but it was a heavy misfortune, from which we\nstill suffer, that independence was secured by war. The colonies had\nexhausted their resources in their success; but they had not exhausted\nEngland. The British government, sore and humiliated, still held\nthe north and northwest of America, commanded the force of the great\naboriginal tribes, controlled the whole American coast with its ships.\nThe Colonies, still confronted by the powerful enemy they had made,\nwere compelled to unite for common defence. These colonies had radical\ndifferences, political, religious, commercial; some were free, some\nheld slaves. But in presence of the common foe they had to unite at\nonce, and sink their differences. When they met to frame a constitution\nfor their union the majority had no notion of any constitution save\nthat of England, and little accurate knowledge of that. What they\nframed was a crude imitation of the undeveloped English constitution of\na hundred years ago. They made two legislatures because England seemed\nto have two; but made them equal, not knowing that in England the two\nwere not equal. They supposed England was really governed by the king;\nso, having knocked down George III. they set up a monarch much more\npowerful, who to-day under the name of president possesses more power\nthan any throne on earth. They formed a Senate, able to defeat the\npopular House.\n\nThe Senate is a peerage of states, in which New York has no more power\nthan states hardly larger than some of its counties. This anomaly was\nadvocated on the ground that in England boroughs of a few hundred\nvoters had equal representation with others of many thousands. The\nold monstrosity, now the extinct \"rotten borough\" system, was here\nactually raised into a constitutional principle. Command of the Army\nand Navy, there nominally lodged in the crown, was really lodged\nwith the American monarch, so that he may slip from his civil to his\nmilitary throne, and rule by martial law. This powerful monarch is\nnot elected by the people of the United States, but of the states\nseparately, through electors proportioned to their members of Congress.\nConsequently, as New York has the greatest number of electors, the\nmonarch in nine cases out of ten, is chosen by one state. The present\nPresident got a trifling majority in New York, and was elected. Mr.\nCleveland received some 100,000 majority of votes in the nation, and\nwas defeated. A popular superstition calls that the Great Republic.\nSince the electors ceased to be real electors, as the constitution\nintended, and became mere messenger-boys carrying votes they never\ncast, this government is not so republican as is now that its\nrevolution overthrew a hundred years ago. Even at its best our hasty\nconstitution gave new lease to an England discredited at home, and a\nnew lease to slavery, which had been decaying. Slavery entered its\nnew stronghold, and ruled America for generations; had it not lost\nits head and assailed its own stronghold, it might be ruling still.\nOur much eulogised constitution, by its compromise with slavery, cost\nAmerica a million lives, and a billion of money. And all of those\nevils, involving a steady degradation of our politics, are due to\nthe fact that America got its independence not by evolution,\u2014which\nwould have surely secured it, leaving England its friend,\u2014but by\nrevolution, which made England its enemy; necessitating a premature,\ncrude, military union; preventing the mature discussion and development\nwhich could have made the constitution an advance in political\ncivilisation instead of a retrogression. When our fathers had swept\nEnglish authority out of the country, they had not swept political\nsuperstitions, monarchal notions, out of it; so they re-enthroned\nin their garnished habitation the defects of the system they had\nfought. When Washington was presently both reigning and governing in\nAmerica, when he was the idol of monarchs, with a petted courtier\nrepresenting him in every European Court, poor Thomas Paine, who made\nthe revolution, was a prisoner in Paris for trying to moderate the gory\ngiant he had evoked; and pleading for something like the ministerial\ngovernment of England, which was steadily adopting his principles of\ntoleration, and the rights of man, by sure forces of evolution. By such\nforces,\u2014by argument, petition, parliamentary influence,\u2014England has\nsecured something like republican government under its mask of monarchy.\n\nWhen people are suffering, it is natural for them to attribute their\nsufferings to this or that institution which has an appearance of\nanachronism and injustice. But it is precisely when institutions are\nthus antiquated and anomalous that evolution is able to utilise them\nfor an advance. The United States monarch is able to transfer office\nfrom his opponents to his supporters. He is powerful because he is\nremoved every four years. He can claim that the nation has freshly\ngiven him all that power. The English sovereign has no political\npower at all. The nation is governed by responsible ministers. The\npresident may snap his fingers at a parliamentary majority; the English\nexecutive may be dismissed in a night. Why has the English monarch\nbeen thus deprived of power? The cause is traceable to its hereditary\ncharacter,\u2014that same hereditary character which seems so anomalous. It\nwas found of old that the throne, because it was hereditary, sometimes\nfell to a baby, who could not rule. Grown up people had to act for the\nchild. To escape interruptions of government, when the monarch might be\nincapable, ministers became essential; and thus ministerial government\nand responsibility were developed out of the antiquated hereditary\nanomaly. Popular government, in its development, was able to act\nthrough this elected ministry, and the monarch, though an adult, could\nnot claim that he had the national authority behind him, except by\naccordance with an elected ministry. Moreover in a monarchy all classes\nare interested to reduce a power which only one family can enjoy; but\nunder a presidency all are anxious to enhance the power of an office to\nwhich all may aspire,\u2014especially where it is renewed every four years\nby an electoral revolution.\n\nIn England other antiquated things have subserved progress. For the\nvery reason that hereditary legislation is anomalous, antiquated,\nthe peers became weak; the \"upper\" house became \"under,\" by an\nevolution that had been impossible had it been elective. But in this\nvery irresponsibility to the popular vote lay that independence of\npopularity which gives their House weight as a debating and revising\nbody. A further step in evolution, which should determine the exact\nnumber of times that the Lords might reject a measure, after which its\npassage through the Commons would make it law, might make the peers a\nuseful body in checking popular passion and haste. Their independence\ncauses the Lords to pass bills for opening Museums and Art Galleries on\nSunday, which are killed by the Commoners for fear of the Sabbatarians\namong their constituents. This independence of the popular breath makes\nthe House of Lords the source of a Supreme Court whose justice was\nlately shown by the redress it gave Bradlaugh at the very moment when\nthe Commons were inflicting wrongs on him, in fear of their sectarian\nconstituents. The like may be said of another antiquated institution\nin England\u2014the Church. By reason of its anomalous establishment in a\nnation of various creeds and a hundred and fifty sects, that Church is\ntheologically disestablished. Subjected to the forces of political and\nethical evolution, it is now preserving the vast property bequeathed by\nEngland's superstitious Past to its free-thinking Future, keeping it\nfrom being divided up among the sects, before the religious thought of\nthe country has come of age to claim its endowment. The Church cannot\nspend this wealth for sectarian ends, precisely because that Church is\nantiquated, and without authority to represent spiritually the nation\nof to-day.\n\nWe might thus go through one after another anachronistic institution\nand show each subservient to agencies of evolution, whereas, if\ndestroyed by revolution, they could only be succeeded by new\ninstitutions embodying, in stronger forms, the snobbery, the\nsuperstition, the sectarianism, still remaining in the country. It\nbeing certain, at the same time, that no revolution can possibly reach\nthe troubles which alone could cause one. In England the troubles of\nlabor are due to the fact that the birth rate is double the death rate.\nSo long as paupers are multiplied twice as fast as they are removed,\npauperism must increase. The more charity and medical care lower\nthe death rate, the more they intensify the struggle for existence.\nIn other swarming countries of Europe overpopulation once led to\nbrigandage, but they are now largely relieved by emigration. This\ninvolves a steady flood of paupers to America, in addition to those\nspawned by native animalism. That evil may be checked when in welcoming\nthe sound world, we shall quarantine the unsound world,\u2014the diseased,\nthe criminal, the ignorant. An immigrant without a dollar may be more\nsafely admitted than one who cannot write his name.\n\nWe have a right to evolutionary legislation. We should prevent the\ncongestion of our cities with paupers while millions of our fields are\nwaiting to be tilled. New York will not be comforted, weeping for her\nchildren because they are not counted in the census. Rather should she\nweep for a multitude of those that are counted,\u2014immigrants from its\nown slums as well as from the slums of Europe. Evolutionary legislation\nwould prevent early marriage, and forbid marriage where there is\nno means of supporting offspring. Such unions are just as illicit\nas if there were no ceremony at all, and the children more cruelly\nillegitimate.\n\nUntil there is a high moral standard which shall restrain such cruelty\nto the unborn, Pauperism, prolific parent of both vices and crimes, can\nonly be mitigated by a development of communal life. A hundred people,\ndining at a common table, can get the same dinner for ten cents each,\nthat, separately would cost each twenty-five cents. That is, so far as\nfood is concerned, communal life more than doubles every man's wages.\nThere is no more reason why a poor family should support a kitchen of\nits own than that it should support a carriage of its own, instead of\ngoing in the omnibus. Gentlemen in their clubs get the advantage of\nwholesale prices, while the poor do not. The principle of combination\nis more largely applicable to lodgings also than is now the case. It\ncosts far less to procure and keep clean one large tenement than a\nnumber of separate houses, to say nothing of the humanising influence,\non manners and morals, of communal interests, and the social spirit\nso engendered. The home brute would be checked, the drunkard sobered,\nby amenability to the larger social censorship, and to a standard of\ncommunal conduct. When the working people have learned to utilise in\nnormal life such combination as they occasionally use for strikes,\nthey will find their means increasing enough even to strike, when\nnecessary, with less recoil on themselves. They will also find that\nwhere institutions of that kind once take root, endowments and bequests\nseek them out, and make them centres of happiness and culture.\n\nPolitical and social evolution must not be confused with natural\nselection: it is human selection. Some years ago a cotton-planter in\nGeorgia observed that the leaves on one of his plants was unlike the\nusual leaf; it was divided as if into fingers. So far nature had gone.\nThe planter added his intelligence. He concluded that such a divided\nleaf would let in more sunshine on the cotton. Also such a leaf would\nnot be comfortable for caterpillars. So he searched out one or two\nof these peculiar plants, transplanted them to a field by themselves;\nas they propagated, he plucked up those with the old leaf, cultivated\nthose with the new,\u2014and now these new cotton plants, finer than the\nold, free from caterpillars, are spread through many regions. That\nis human selection, based on natural selection, securing the fruits\nof evolution. It is just as applicable to man as to vegetation. A\nbetter man may be bred as well as a better kind of cotton. Already\nmany old forms of crime have been largely bred out of society, by\nthe substitution of imprisonment for thefts instead of the capital\npunishments which juries refused to inflict. Crime being largely\nhereditary, the offenders used to get free, and multiplied their bad\nspecies. But when punishments were assigned which juries were ready\nto inflict, the criminals were isolated for years, or transported,\nand their race diminished. The crime that now flourishes most is\nmurder; because its death penalty survives. It was recently shown in\nParliament that about three fourths of English murderers escape, mainly\nthrough aversion of juries, and merciful people, to inflict a savage\nand irrevocable penalty. Were capital punishment abolished the three\nfourths would be isolated for life. They would be kindly treated, but\nmust have no offspring. No such survival of autocracy as a pardoning\npower could exist; no individual would be able to alter decrees of\ncourts and juries. Instead of aiming at the murderer evolution aims\nat the murder. It will secure a survival of the peaceful, and breed\nferocity out of man as it has bred the wolf out of dogs.\n\nBut that implies breeding the wolf out of our law. The eye for eye,\nblood for blood, spirit is wolfish. So is the whole revolutionary\nspirit, whether shown in armed violence, or in arbitrary laws. It can\nbe acted upon, controlled, shamed out of society, only by pure moral\nand intellectual forces. There is no greater power than instructed\nthought, animated by love to man, enforced by honor and character.\n\nThere is as yet no civilised nation; civilisation exists in oases,\nwhich gradually encroach on the deserts. They have largely encroached\non some of these already, but civilisation can only extend as it is\nreal. The European nations are slicing up Africa among them. This we\nare told is Christian civilisation: they are taking their neighbor's\nproperty only because they love him like themselves. What is the\ncivilisation going out there? You can see it in the dens of European\ncities. The Africans have got to be dragged through all that. What\nkind of religion will go there? A Bible recording divinely ordered\nmassacres will be put in every savage hand. Stanley says that when in\nsore trouble, in the African forest, he made a vow that if God would\nonly help him, he would acknowledge his aid among men. His troubles\nbegan to clear next day. God was indifferent, it seems, so long as\nman and beast were suffering, but when this great temptation was held\nout to Jehovah\u2014this promise of distinguished patronage\u2014he at once\ninterfered. There is nothing new about that God. In the Bible, his\nprovidence is always purchasable by glory. There are thousands of such\ngods in Africa. But Europeans are going there as representatives of\ncivilisation, and will say to them in the name of German and English\nScience, in the name of Berlin, Oxford, and Cambridge,\u2014\"These be thy\ngods, O Africa! Only agree to call their name Jehovah, who helped\nJephtha, when he vowed a sacrifice which proved to be his daughter, and\nwho helped Stanley on condition that the service would be reported in\nthe press.\"\n\nThe intellect of Europe knows better than that; but it has very few\norgans of its protest against surviving barbarisms that devour the\nworld under pretence of civilising it. And it forms few such organs\nbecause itself needs humanising. Just there America may lend a hand.\nOur science, our literature, and art, still lack moral earnestness,\nand human sympathy. The value of our every liberal moral movement and\norgan is therefore incalculable. It was a hopeful sign to see lately\non the platform of the Ethical Congress in New York leaders in various\ndenominations,\u2014Heber Newton, President Andrews, Lyman Abbott, Rabbi\nIsaacs, Felix Adler,\u2014uniting to establish a College for Moral Culture;\nall admitting that the theological seminaries, public schools, and\nuniversities, had left them uninstructed in the great social, economic,\nethical, and political problems which have now come urgently to the\nfront. The prophets of Jehovah once said of Baal, \"Peradventure he\nsleepeth.\" The prophets of Jehovah now admit the same concerning\ntheir ancient Syrian deity. But the divine humanity is awaking. It\nwill rise above prejudice and party. It will inspire no man to lay\nan axe at the root of his neighbor's holy tree because it is not his\nown, but to plant beside it one which they both agree is good, and\nagree to nourish, and which shall prove so fruitful, so sweet, that\nstrength shall be drawn away from the roots of evil institutions, and\nthey shall wither away. That which, assailed by revolution, is sure to\nbe defended, and, if felled, to be reared again, evolution may gently\nwither by production of the more fit. The sacred groves of the Past\nmay still cherish their traditional names, but, if not shattered by\nrevolutionary lightnings, they will turn themselves to fences around\nthe garden where fruits of knowledge and the happier life are growing.\n\n MONCURE D. CONWAY.\n\n\n\n\nA CONVICTED ANARCHIST'S REPLY TO PROFESSOR LOMBROSO.\n\n\nI have read with much interest Professor Lombroso's article about the\nanarchists, and I found many things in it that are true, but also many\nerrors. Even should we admit Professor Lombroso's theory to be correct,\nit would in the present case avail but little, because the portraits\nfrom which he made his deductions are not sufficiently truthful for\nhis purpose. 'Schaak's' book is said to be a fictitious 'robber\nstory,' and I am informed that it contains many untruths absolutely\ninvented for ornament and decoration. It is in the highest degree\nimprobable that such a book should not have caricatured the portraits\nof the anarchists. In books designed for sale to the masses, the\nillustrations are not, as a rule, of any value as works of art, even if\nthe persons pictured in them enjoy the author's favor. The only true\nto life pictures are the photographs which Dr. Carus sent to Professor\nLombroso, and these were taken in the county jail; but it appears that\nthe Professor thought little of them, for he says, 'Perhaps these\nphotographs were taken some years before the crime, when they were\nvery young,' and the pictures in the _Vorbote_ were drawn after the\nphotographs, and are therefore of no account so long as the photographs\nthemselves are accessible.\n\nCertain as it is that vice, crime, and brutality very often find a\ncharacteristic expression of face, so equally certain is it also that\nprominent physiognomists very often judge inaccurately and falsely.\nThere are many instances of this. In Mantegazza's work are found\nexamples. Now, if it is difficult to arrive at a correct opinion under\nfavorable circumstances, it is almost impossible to do so if such\npictures as those of Schaak's, with Schaak's explanations, form the\nbasis and starting point of the inquiry.\n\nJohann Most has an unsymmetric face; this however, is not the fault of\nnature, but of an unskilful surgeon. Of Engel I know nothing, except\nthat he joined the socialists at an advanced age. In his earlier years\nhe advocated anti-Socialistic ideas. After his first arrest he was set\nfree upon the good word of Coroner Herz, who declared that he knew\nEngel for years as a quiet and well-behaved citizen.\n\nWith Lingg I was not on friendly terms, and therefore propriety demands\nthat I keep silent about him.\n\nSpies was born in the house of a forester, which had formerly been a\n_Raubschloss_. The connection between this fact and the other one that\nSpies twenty years later was converted to socialism by an American,\nis not very clear to me. He was undoubtedly the most gifted of all\nthe indicted anarchists, and he had a most intelligent appearance;\nhis forehead was well developed. Temperance in eating and drinking\nwas one of his qualities, but as regards his intellectual activity,\nI regret to say that this was not the case. Many of his articles\nbetrayed nervous over-excitement. In the beginning of the year 1886,\nall intellectual work was forbidden him by his physician, and for a\nfew weeks he followed his advice. He was full of compassion for the\npoor and wretched, and he helped them wherever he could. Concerning\nhis charities he observed strict silence. Any reference to them was\ndisagreeable to him, and made him angry. A man who had once rudely\noffended him without cause, being in distress Spies obtained work for\nhim. I came to the knowledge of this by accident. One of the employees\nof the _Arbeiter-Zeitung_ who received but a small salary told me that\nSpies out of his own pocket gave him for some months $2.00 a week to\npay a doctor and procure medicine. The salary of Spies was only $19.00\na week, and from this he supported his mother. Spies was of a very\ntender nature, and what his comrades thought of his blood-thirstiness\nmay be gathered from the following anecdote. A certain man by the\nname of Matzinger had translated an article from the French, \"The Day\nAfter the Revolution,\" and Spies asked an acquaintance of mine, \"What\nwould you do the day after the revolution?\" The answer was, \"I should\nimprison you till all was over, for your sentimentality would prevent\nus from any energetic methods.\" The bystanders laughed; Spies flushed\nand said nothing.\n\nFielden has been treated worst by Professor Lombroso. His father has\nbeen characterised as a sort of genius, and in closest connection with\nit, the Professor says, \"Almost all the sons of men of genius are\nlunatics, idiots, or criminals.\" I hope the Professor, mindful of this,\nis not married.\n\nIf the term genius has so wide a meaning, the above statement is\ncertainly incorrect. Goethe on his mother's side had very talented\nancestors, and his father was extremely well gifted. The son of Goethe\nwas a drunkard, but we know that this unfortunate inheritance came from\nhis mother's side. The Darwin family was famous for two hundred years.\nThe sons of Hegel and Schelling were also able men. Many more instances\nof that kind could be adduced; and whenever a genius or his posterity\ngoes to the wall, there are often external circumstances that cause it.\nThe Fielden who became famous as a Member of Parliament at the time of\nthe Chartist movement in England, was a relative, but not the father\nof Sam Fielden. Sam Fielden's father was a very intelligent laborer,\nwho also took part in the Chartist movement, without, however, becoming\nvery prominent in it. By the bye, the descendants of the first named\nFielden are neither \"lunatics, idiots, nor criminals,\" but wealthy\nmanufacturers. And now to Sam Fielden; no lunatic, idiot, or criminal\ncould make the speech which he made when asked why sentence of death\nshould not be pronounced against him, a speech concerning which Mr.\nGrinnell, the prosecutor, said that \"had it been made to the jury, they\nwould have acquitted him.\" Mr. Luther Laflin Mills, formerly States\nAttorney, declared in my presence that it was a masterpiece. That\nthere was any criminal disposition in Sam nobody ever had any idea. He\nwas nearly forty years old when arrested, and his wealthy employers\nconsidered him an honest man, and a harmless enthusiast of an amiable\nnature. He had become entangled in the Anarchist prosecution by a\nstrange concatenation of circumstances.\n\nProfessor Lombroso's opinion concerning Fielden, formed by the study of\nportraits, stands in a strange contrast to the estimate of character\nmade by the judge who tried and sentenced the anarchists. Three days\nbefore the execution Judge Gary wrote the following letter to Governor\nOglesby:\n\n Chicago, Ill., November 8, 1887.\n\n To the Hon. Richard J. Oglesby, Governor of Illinois.\n\n Sir: In the application of Samuel Fielden for a commutation of\n his sentence, it is not necessary as to the case itself that I\n should do more than refer to the decision of the Supreme Court\n for a history of his crime.\n\n Outside of what is there shown, there is in the nature and\n private character of the man, a natural love of justice, an\n impatience at all undeserved suffering, an impulsive temper;\n and an intense love of and thirst for the applause of his\n hearers made him an advocate of force as a heroic remedy for\n the hardships that the poor endure. In his own private life he\n was the honest, industrious, and peaceable laboring man.\n\n In what he said in court before sentence he was respectful\n and decorous. His language and conduct since have been\n irreproachable. As there is no evidence that he knew of any\n preparation to do the specific act of throwing the bomb that\n killed Degan he does not understand even now that general\n advice to large masses to do violence makes him responsible\n for the violence done by reason of that advice, nor that\n being joined by others in an effort to subvert law and order\n by force makes him responsible for the acts of those others\n tending to make that effort effectual.\n\n In short, he was more a misguided enthusiast than a criminal\n conscious of the horrible nature and effect of his teachings\n and of his responsibility therefor. What shall be done in his\n case is partly a question of humanity, and partly a question\n of state policy, upon which it seems to me action on the part\n of your excellency favorable to him is justifiable.\n\n I attach this to a copy of his petition to your excellency and\n refer to that for what he says of the change that has come\n upon himself.\n\n Respectfully Yours,\n\n JOSEPH E. GARY.\n\nProfessor Lombroso wrote his article with the best intentions, I\nfully recognise the fact; and certainly he was governed by the most\nhumane motives. But even conceding the correctness of his theory he\nnecessarily failed from the insufficiency of his materials.\n\nOne thing more, Anarchism is a collective term like Liberalism. People\nunderstand by it many different and sometimes contradictory theories.\nThat part of it which is not in harmony with human progress will fail,\nshall fail, and must fail, but that part of it which is good will live\nin spite of all. The mistake, however, which has been made in our\nspecial case will not again be made in America; and that also will be\nfor the general good.\n\nJoliet Penitentiary.\n M. SCHWAB.\n\n\n\n\nTHE PRINCIPLE OF WELFARE.\n\n\nI.\n\nIf we wish to discuss ethical problems in a fruitful manner and form\njust judgments of ethical theories, we must always bear in mind the\nfact that there is not merely one single ethical problem, but many.\nWith the solution of one of these problems the solution of the others\nis not necessarily given, and thinkers who have treated a single\nproblem have not, in dealing with that problem, always determined\ntheir position with reference to the others. At all events, it will\nbe an especial and separate task to investigate the relation to each\nother, the reciprocal dependence or independence, of the different\nethical problems. When we speak of _the_ ethical problem as an especial\nphilosophical problem, we must not forget that upon closer examination\nit resolves itself into a number of different problems.\n\nThe reason of this tendency to regard the ethical problem as simple\nand indivisible throughout, may be partly sought in the fact that\nphilosophical ethics did not develop until the positive religions had\nlost their undisputed control over the minds of men. Religious ethics\nis simple and indivisible by virtue of its principle. It is founded\non authority. Its _contents_ are the revealed commands of authority;\nthe _feeling_ which impels us _to pass ethical judgments_ is the fear\nor reverence or love with which men are filled in the presence of\ndivine authority; the same motives impel man to follow in his conduct\nthe commands of the authority; and the principles of the education\nof individuals and of the order of society are just as immediately\ngiven by definite relation to this authority. It is upon the whole\nthe peculiarity of positive religions and the cause of their great\nimportance in the history of mankind that they grant man satisfaction\nin a lump for _all_ his intellectual wants. The true believer has\nconcentrated in his belief his whole mental life; his belief is at once\nthe highest science, the highest virtue, the highest good, and the\nhighest \u00e6sthetics. Philosophical ethics has sought too long to retain\nthe simple unity which is peculiar to religious ethics. The mistakes\nof the greatest philosophical ethicists may be in part traced to this\nsource. A criticism of Kant and Bentham would more fully illustrate\nthis. The fundamental error\u2014one so often found in the science of the\npast\u2014is too great a love of simplicity.\n\nI shall try, in the briefest possible manner, to give an outline of the\nmost important ethical problems.\n\nEthical judgments, judgments concerning good and bad, in their simplest\nform are expressions of feeling, and never lose that character however\nmuch influence clear and reasoned knowledge may acquire with respect to\nthem. An act or an institution that could awaken no feeling whatsoever\nwould never become the object of an ethical judgment, could never be\ndesignated as good or bad. And the character of the judgment will be\ndependent upon the character of the feeling that dictates the judgment.\nFrom the point of view of pure egoism the judgment of the same act will\nbe wholly different from what it is when regarded, say, from a point\nof view that is determined by motives of sympathy embracing a larger\nor smaller circle of living beings. An ethical system, accordingly,\nwill acquire its character from the _motive principle of judgment_ upon\nwhich it builds. This motive principle is the power that originally and\nconstantly again gives rise to ethical judgments.\n\nIf our motive principle is to operate with clearness and logical\nconsequence it must set up a definite standard. A _test principle of\njudgment_ must be established that will furnish guidance in individual\ncases by enabling us to infer consequences from it in instances where\nsimple, instinctive feeling fails. The natural course will be that the\ntest-principles will correspond directly with the motive principles at\ntheir base. The relation between the two may, however, be more or less\nsimple. If we fix upon the feeling of sympathy as our basis, regarding\nit as the main element of ethical feelings, it follows of itself that\nthe criterion we adopt must be the principle of general welfare,\nthat is the principle that all acts and institutions shall lead to\nthe greatest possible feeling of pleasure among living beings. This\nprinciple merely defines with greater precision what is unconsciously\ncontained in the feeling of sympathy and in the instinct that springs\nfrom this feeling. The same test-principle (as Bentham's \"Deontology,\"\nfor example, shows) may also be accepted as valid from the point of\nview of pure egoism, only in this case the relation between the motive\nprinciple and the test-principle is more indirect. We must in this case\nendeavor to prove that the happiness of others is a necessary _means_\nto our own happiness. Our own happiness is then the real end, but in\norder to reach this end we must take a roundabout course, and ethics is\nthe presentation of the system of the courses thus taken. Kant arrives\nin a different way again at establishing the happiness of others as an\nend of ethics. It would be the business of a special investigation to\ndetermine the extent to which this varying motivation of the principle\nof test must influence the consequences derivable from it.\n\nA third question is, By what motive shall an individual act be\ndetermined? The _motive to action_ is not necessarily the same as\nthe motive that dictates judgment. The man who is animated with love\nfor his fellow-creatures has reason to rejoice that ambition and the\ninstinct of acquisition constitute grounds of action of so very general\na character; in that results become thereby possible which,\u2014for such\nis the unalterable character of human nature,\u2014would otherwise remain\nunaccomplished. A special investigation would have to point out whether\ncases occur in which motive of action and motive of judgment must\ncoincide if the act is to be approved of, and whether there are not\nmotives to action which would rob the act of all ethical character.\n\nDifferent from the problems already mentioned is the pedagogic problem:\nHow can the proper and necessary motives be developed in man? This\nproblem arises as well with respect to the motive principle of\njudgment as with respect to the motive principle of action. It is\nclear that between points of view that rest upon entirely different\npsychological foundations, (the one, for example, starting from\negoism, the other from sympathy, and the third from pure reason,) the\ndiscussion can be carried only to a certain point. The person who with\nconscious logic makes himself the highest and only aim can never be\nrefuted from a point of view which regards every individual as a member\nof society and of the race, and therefore not only as an end but also\nas a means. If an understanding is to become possible, the emotional\nfoundation adopted (the motive spring of judgment) must be changed; but\nthe change is not effected by mere theoretical discussion: a practical\neducation is demanded in addition thereto which life does not afford\nall individuals, although our inclination to make ourselves an absolute\ncentre is always obstructed by the tendency of society to subject us\nall to a general order of things. There is an education of humanity\nby history the same as there is an education of single individuals\nin more limited spheres. This education demands its special points\nof view, which are not always directly furnished by general ethical\nprinciples. The same is true of the motive to action. For pedagogical\nreasons it may be necessary to produce or to preserve motives that do\nnot satisfy the highest demand, because such motives are necessary\ntransitional stages to the highest motives. Thus, ambition and the\ninstinct of acquisition may be the means of attaining to true ethical\nself-assertion. Reverence for authorities historically given can be\nof extraordinary effectiveness in the development of character, since\nonly thereby are concentration or fixity of endeavor as well as the\npower of joyful resignation acquired,\u2014without our being able to see in\nsuch reverence the highest ethical qualities. A ground-color in fact\nmust often be laid on before the final, required tint can be applied.\nThe law of the displacement of motives operates here which in ethical\nestimation generally is of the utmost importance.\n\nThere must still be mentioned here finally the socio-political problem.\nThis problem has reference to that particular ordered arrangement of\nsociety which is best adapted to a development in the direction of\nethical ideals. As the former problem leads inquiry out of the domain\nof ethics into that of pedagogics, so this one leads us from ethics\ninto political economy and political science.\n\nAlthough in the present discussion I intend to occupy myself only with\na single one of these problems, I have nevertheless mentioned them all\nin order that the light that I shall attempt to throw upon the problem\nI deal with may be seen in its proper setting. As will be observed from\nwhat follows, the principle of welfare will be misunderstood if the\nproblem to whose solution it is adapted is confounded with any one of\nthe other ethical problems. The systematism of ethical science is still\nso little advanced that it is necessary to draw out a general outline\nbefore we pass on to any single feature. The value of systematism is\nnamely this, that we are immediately enabled to see the connection of\nthe single questions with one another as well as their distinctive\npeculiarity. In ethics we are not yet so far advanced.\n\n\nII.\n\n1) If we accept the principle of welfare as our test or criterion in\njudging of the value of actions and of institutions, these are then\ngood or bad according as in their effects (so far as we can trace them)\nthey produce a predominance of pleasurable feeling or a predominance of\npainful feeling in a larger or smaller circle of sentient beings. Every\naction may be compared to a stone thrown into the water. The motion\nproduced is propagated in large or in small circles; and the estimation\nof its value depends upon whether it produces in the places it strikes\npredominant pleasure or pain. Just as theoretical science explains\nthe single natural phenomenon by its connection with other natural\nphenomena, so ethics tests the single feeling by its relation to other\nfeelings: the satisfaction of a person acting over the accomplishment\nof the act is only then to be called justifiable or good when it does\nnot create a disturbance in the pleasurable feeling of other beings,\nor when such a disturbance can be proved to be a necessary means of\na greater or more extended pleasurable feeling. This principle, as a\nprinciple of test or valuation, corresponds directly with sympathy as\nmotive of judgment. The extent to which it is possible to accept this\nfrom other points of view I cannot here investigate in detail.\n\nThe act of estimation, the testing, does not stop at the outer action\nbut goes down to the motives of the person acting, to the qualities\nof his character, to the whole inner life from which the act has\nsprung. This has its ground in the nature and significance of the\nestimating judgment. Ethical judgments, in fact, are in their original\nand simplest form spontaneous expressions of feeling. But the great\npractical significance of such expressions of feeling lies in the fact\nthat they operate decisively upon the will (upon the individual will\nand that of others) and produce motives of future action. Logically,\naccordingly, they must be directed towards the point at which an\naltering effect on the power that produces the act is possible, and\nthis point lies precisely in the inner life, in the character of\nmind of the person acting. For this reason feelings and impulses,\ndisturbances and desires, are also judged of according to the tendency\nwhich they have of producing acts and effects that will increase\npleasurable feeling or avoid unpleasurable feeling in more extended or\nmore limited circles.\n\nOnly by its effects do we know the power. We form by inferences our\nconclusions as to what takes place in the mind of a man, his motives\nand his capacity. Goodness or greatness that never expressed itself in\naction could never become the object of ethical approbation; it would\nnot even exist in fact, but would rest upon a self-deception, upon\nan illusion. At least some inner activity, a longing and endeavor in\nthe direction demanded by the ethical principle must manifest itself.\nThe individual in self-judgment must often take refuge in this inner\nactivity, and any deep-going, unpharisaical ethical estimation will\nhave to follow him there;[122] but just here do we have a beginning\nof that which is demanded by the principle of welfare, except that in\nconsequence of individual circumstances its prosecution is impossible.\n\n [122] Compare my article \"The Law of Relativity in Ethics\" in\n the _International Journal of Ethics_, Vol. I. p. 37, et seqq.\n\nEqually important as the principle that we can know the power only from\nthe effects is the other principle that the effect need not appear\nat once. When good and great men are so often mistaken by their\ncontemporaries the fact is explained by the circumstance that only\na very wide-embracing glance can measure the significance of their\nefforts and activity. Their goodness and greatness is founded in the\nfact that their thought, their feeling, their will, comprehend far\nmore than their short-sighted and narrow-minded contemporaries see. A\nlong time may elapse before it is possible for them to be generally\nunderstood, and for what they have done to be assimilated. It is\ntherefore by no means implied in the principle of welfare that people\nare to direct their conduct so as to be in accord with impulses and\nwants which men have at the moment. The principle of welfare demands\nin very fact that we should not shrink from the battle with prejudice\nand with inertia. The best thing, often, that we can do for others is\nto make them feel that they stand on entirely too low a level in their\nwishes and wants and do not make adequate demands generally. Thus,\nto take a single instance, the great artist often treads a solitary\npath ununderstood or even mistaken by the great mass. Yet in so doing\nhe follows, perhaps without being aware of it, the principle of\nwelfare,\u2014if he rigorously observes the demands of art. He increases\nthe mental capital of the species, and gives it a power which later\non can operate in broad spheres. Only a short-sighted conception and\napplication of the principle of welfare stops with the need of the\nmoment and dismisses the consideration of the permanent conditions of\nlife and the permanent sources of new life and new activity.[123]\n\n [123] This last argument is taken from my _Ethics_ (Danish\n edition, p. 94, German edition, p. 110).\n\n2) The principle of welfare simply furnishes a norm which may be laid\nat the foundation of the testing of all classes of actions. But it by\nno means demands, as has at times been supposed, that consideration\nfor welfare should also be the ground and motive for every act. We\nhave recourse to general principles only in order to be able to set\nourselves aright in cases in which direct judgment, instinctive feeling\ncannot determine the question presented, that is in cases of doubt,\nor when we have in view a systematic treatment of ethical questions.\nThe ethical feeling may operate quite involuntarily and without real\nratiocination, in that we can be moved directly by the act (whether\npossible or real) as it appears to us, just as in our \u00e6sthetical\nfeeling we may without \u00e6sthetical reasoning be struck by the beauty\nof a work of art or of a landscape. Or, we follow with confidence\nthe \"unwritten laws\" that are contained in custom, in tradition, and\ngenerally in so-called \"positive morality.\" And in agreement precisely\nwith the principle of welfare, is immediacy of this kind to be\nrecommended and maintained, so long as it does not lead to the neglect\nof real problems and questions. It is the state of innocence out of\nwhich no one dare be wrested unnecessarily. Abstract principles become\nnecessary aids when direct reliance fails; but frequently they can only\nbe applied to individual concrete cases by the employment of a great\nnumber of complicated intermediary steps, and do not easily acquire a\npractical influence upon the will. Indeed, the principle of welfare may\neven demand quite different motives from ethical feeling or devotion to\nthe requirements of positive morality. It is in fact most beautiful and\nbest that a man should care for his wife and children because he loves\nthem and not because his ethical instinct requires it. Where conscious\nduty has to be invoked in the innermost relations between man and man,\nit is as a rule a sign of an unfortunate state of affairs. Perfect love\ndispels not only fear but also duty.\n\nIn his \"Ethics,\" at page 339, Wundt advances the following objection\nto the principle of welfare: \"It is conceivable that a person should\nsacrifice himself for another; it is conceivable that a person should\nyield up life and possessions for definite ideal ends, for his country,\nfor freedom, for religion, for science. But it has never come to pass,\nand never will, that people shall renounce a thing solely to increase\nthe sum of happiness of the world.\" This objection overlooks the fact\nthat the principle of the valuation of an act that is regarded as good\nneed not be the motive to this act. The thought and feeling of the\nperson acting may stop very properly at country, freedom, or any other\nideal object, without the person's instituting any formal reflections\nwhatsoever with regard to the reasons of the value of the ideal ends\nfor which he sacrifices himself. But in systematic ethics or in\npractical cases of doubt we inquire what value and importance love of\ncountry, freedom, poetry, and science possess for human life. If, for\nexample, freedom were not a good for a people, the individual would do\nwrong to sacrifice his life for it. It is never of course a question of\nthe abstract notion of welfare of and in itself, just as in a single\ntheoretical problem it is never a question of the abstract idea of\ncause. But in ethics we lay down the principle of welfare and in the\ntheory of knowledge the principle of causality; endeavoring, thus, to\ngo back through analysis to the final assumptions of our practical and\ntheoretical intellectual activity.\n\n3) It is no argument against the principle of welfare that pleasure\nmust be so often bought with pain. Pain is in that case only the\nnecessary transitional step, and the significance of the principle\nof welfare is precisely the requirement it makes that the duty of\ndemonstration shall rest on those who maintain the necessity of such\nan intermediary step. Any infliction of pain must be supplied with a\nmotive, whereas the feeling of pleasure in and of itself (that is if\nits causes do not at the same time produce additional painful effects)\nis justified. The principle of welfare simply says: Produce by thy\nconduct as much pleasure and as little pain as is possible! The degree\nto which it is possible to realise this demand, of this the principle\nin and of itself says nothing. A principle is not subverted by the\ndifficulties of its application.\n\nAs experience teaches, there is a happiness that is not bought too\ndearly with pain. Clara's song in Goethe's \"Egmont\":\n\n \"Himmelhoch jauchzend, _zum Tode betr\u00fcbt_!\"\n\nhas been cited in disproof of the principle of welfare. But let us hear\nClara to the end and note the last line of the song, in which she gives\nthe result of the entire train of her emotion. She says:\n\n \"_Gl\u00fccklich_ allein ist die Seele die liebt!\"\n\nThe phenomenon is this. There is a movement of the heart and mind,\na life of feeling, which are joined with a satisfaction so deep and\ngreat that the powerful oscillation between pleasure and pain does\nnot destroy the total feeling of happiness, but strengthens it. Two\npsychological factors co-operate here. The one is, that the pain\n(the dis-pleasure or grief), unless it transcends a certain degree,\nforms the background of the pleasurable feeling and is thereby able\nto intensify the latter. In this very fact a sufficient motive lies\nto choose conditions of this sort in preference to such as do not\nstand so high in intensity but are nevertheless conditions of more\nunmixed pleasure. The other factor is, that there can be an element\nof attraction even in grief, simply because intense life, powerful\nmovement, and the straining of faculties that come with it, produce\nof themselves satisfaction. All exertion of power which is not out of\nproportion is connected with a feeling of pleasure. The feeling of\npleasure that accompanies grief and anxiety asserts itself in the fact\nthat we do not _wish_ to be transported out of it. An important element\nhere is also the organic process connected with every powerful state of\nmind (the effect of the condition of the brain on the circulation of\nthe blood, on breathing, and on the organs of digestion), granting that\nit is not the whole cause.\n\nWhen Auguste Comte lost the woman who exerted so decisive an influence\non the direction of his mind in the last period of his life, he said\nonce in an outburst of sorrow evoked by her memory: \"I owe it to thee\nalone that I shall not leave this life without having known in a worthy\nmanner the best emotion of human nature.... Amid the severest pains\nthat this emotion can bring with it I have never ceased to feel that\nthe _true condition of happiness_ is, to have filled the heart\u2014though\nit be with pain, aye with bitterest pain.\"\n\nAuguste Comte and Clara are accordingly quite in agreement, and the\nethics of welfare is in agreement with them both. If we desire to be\nwholly secure against pain and anxiety, then we dare not love anything.\nBut what if love were the greatest happiness, even though it brought as\nmuch sorrow again with it! With powerful action and great fulness of\nlife come also great costs, great contrasts, and great vibrations. Yet\nwho has said that the highest was to be had for little expenditure?\n\nThe feeling of pleasure is the only psychological criterion of health\nand power of life. That which in all its immediate or remote effects in\nall the creatures that it touches produces only pleasurable feeling,\ncannot possibly be condemned. Welfare, therefore, in the sense of\npermanent pleasurable feeling, is the final test-principle of action.\nPain is everywhere the sign of an incipient dissolution of life.[124]\nThis is exhibited in the simplest manner in the \"physical\" pain that\narises through the tearing of organic tissue. But it also holds true of\nthe \"mental\" pain that arises from anxiety, doubt, or repentance. It\npoints to a disharmony between the different forces and impulses of the\nmind, a disharmony that can lead to the dissolution of consciousness.\nIf pain is a necessary intermediary step, the fact is partly founded\nin the two psychological laws above mentioned, partly also in the\ncircumstance that it means the dissolution of something in us that\nimpedes a more free and more varied development of life. Childbirth\nis accompanied with pain because the new life can only come into the\nworld at the cost of the old. Analogously the knowledge of truth is\noften gained with pain because prejudices and illusions must first be\nshattered. In the pain of repentance a lower self is dissolved in order\nthat a new and higher self may develop.\n\n [124] Compare my _Psychology_ (Danish edition, pp. 315-318;\n German edition, pp. 343-347).\n\n4) A circumstance that has especially fostered the opposition to the\nprinciple of welfare is undoubtedly the tendency to think exclusively,\nin connection with the expression 'pleasurable feeling,' of the most\nelementary sensual forms of pleasure. The latter are not excluded\nby the principle of welfare; the principle, however, takes all the\naspects of human character into consideration, maintaining that\npermanent pleasurable feeling is not to be established with certainty\nif an essential aspect of this character is neglected. The defect\nof elementary feelings of pleasure is that for the great part they\ncorrespond to only momentary and limited relations.\n\nA being whose feeling is of a purely elementary kind can maintain\nitself as long as the simple conditions of life to which it is adapted\ndo not change. Thus some of the lowest animal forms like the infusoria\nand rhizopods appear to have existed throughout infinitely long periods\nof time in exactly their present condition. Here the adaptation to the\ngiven conditions is as good as perfect. The same may be the case with\nbeings that at an earlier stage of their development have possessed\nmore developed organs and forms. Animals that live free in their youth,\nafterwards however as parasites, lead a purely elementary life and\nlose all the nerves and muscles that do not directly subserve this\nform of existence. This is also true of man. Of the Fuegians, whose\nwretched existence (wretched in our eyes) he portrays in vivid colors\nin his \"Journey Around the World,\" Darwin says: \"There is no reason\nfor believing that the Fuegians are diminishing in number; we must\ntherefore assume that they enjoy a sufficient measure of happiness\n(of whatever character this may be) to give life value in their eyes.\nNature, which makes habit an irresistible power and its effects\nhereditary, has fitted the Fuegian to the climate and the products of\nhis wretched country.\" Primitive peoples of a higher type even (and not\nonly primitive peoples) afford examples of an adaptation to conditions\nwhich excludes all motives to change and progress. It is dire necessity\nthat has brought man into the path of progress. Where such a compulsion\ndoes not operate human emotional life is conditioned by a narrow sphere\nof relations only and is therefore itself narrow and restricted.\nPerhaps more complete, more unmixed satisfaction can be obtained\nhere than would be possible under more manifold and more complicated\ncircumstances. A small vessel may be fuller than a large one although\nit holds less.[125]\n\n [125] Fieri potest, ut vas aliquod minus majore plenius sit,\n quamvis liquoris minus contineat. Cartesius, Epistola iv, Ad\n principem Palatinam de sita beata.\n\nIt might perhaps be objected to the principle of welfare, that we\nshould really be obliged, in consistency with it, to make ourselves\nall little vessels, and that agreeably to the principle an existence\nlimited to the primitive necessities of life and to purely elementary\nfeelings, would stand just as high as a life taken up with intellectual\nlabor and the activity of culture, or even higher, since an existence\nof the latter kind could scarcely be accompanied with so unmixed and\nsecure a well-being, but would be united with trials and efforts\nconstantly renewed and with unrest ever recurring. If\u2014as it might\nbe suggested\u2014an existence like that of the Fuegians appears poor and\nwretched to us, since they often suffer from scarcity and want, let us\ntake another example. Alexander von Humboldt came across a tribe in\nSouth America that lived from banana trees,\u2014trees so fruitful that\nan acre of land planted with them would supply food for fifty human\nbeings. The trees require no real expenditure of labor; only the earth\nabout their roots must be broken with implements once or twice a year.\nThe consequence is that the tribe is stupid and uncivilised. But the\nwants that it has are satisfied.\n\nThat which would make such a life unendurable for us, _the strong\ndesire for activity, development, and progress_, this desire does not\nexist at such stages. It is,\u2014a fact that must be remarked,\u2014_itself a\nconsequence of development and progress_.\n\nWhereas Lamarck assumed an inner, innate impulse to development in all\nliving creatures,[126] Darwin maintains, on the ground of experience,\nthat development is invariably introduced by the influence of external\ncauses. It was a difficulty to Lamarck how the very lowest forms of\nlife could continue their existence, why they had not long since\ndeveloped to higher stages. In Darwin's theory, which takes into\nconsideration the external conditions of development, there is no\ndifficulty on this point. A development that is favored _in no way_ by\nexternal circumstances is simply impossible. As regards human beings,\nthe anthropologist Th. Waitz has clearly proved, that the impulse and\ndesire of development is itself a product of development. To this\neffect he speaks in his treatise \"The Indians of North America,\" page\n69: \"A people without intercourse and not in competition with other\npeoples, a people which supplies its natural wants with relative\nease or only by overcoming long accustomed difficulties regarded as\ninevitable, directly from its natural environment, and that feels\nsatisfied therewith and lives a happy life: from such a people it\nis not to be expected that it will make any endeavors to civilise\nitself. He that has what he needs and therefore feels satisfied in all\nrespects, will not work; people do not civilise themselves voluntarily\nin following some noble instinct of the heart. Is it different in fact\nin our modern society? Is not a long period of schooling and culture\npreviously necessary to instil in man an interest for work as work?\nHow many are there among the so-called learned and cultured that make\nendeavors in behalf of the education of themselves and others without\nthey are required!\"\n\n [126] The theory of Lamarck is made the subject of an\n interesting criticism by Herbert Spencer in his _Principles of\n Biology_, Part iii, Chap. 3.\n\nIt is peculiar to the state of nature in contrast to the state of\ncivilisation, (in so far as a distinct contrast may be asserted,)\nthat in the former the impulse to change of manner of life and\nthought must come from without, whereas in the latter an impulse to\nprogress operates which be it now powerful be it now feeble never\nceases entirely to operate. This difference is analogous to that that\nprevails between inorganic and organic existence. It is the peculiar\ncharacter of an organism that the play of forces is preserved in it\nwith a certain independence of the effects of the moment and of its\nimmediate environment. So in civilised peoples an impulse is aroused to\nchange life in all directions, to differentiate, to shape it, and to\nbring it to a point in every single direction. Spiritual antenn\u00e6 are\ngrown which are in never ceasing movement. Through this a new species\nof feeling also is possible, _a feeling that is determined not only by\nthe definite ends that are attained but which links itself with the\nwork, with the activity itself which is requisite to the acquisition\nof these ends_. Man is thereby become more independent and more free,\nand his mental life, especially his emotional life, has gained in depth\nand intensity, it now being no longer determined merely by the external\nworld, but essentially by the forces that are awakened in the inner\nworld. Now ideal, and not merely elementary feelings act, and higher\ndemands are made in life.\n\nWhat I wish to maintain here is that _the rise of the impulse to\ndevelopment is in perfect accord with the principle of welfare_. That\nstability of the \"state of nature\" which now appears to us wretched\nnow paradisian, is itself dependent on the stability of external\nconditions. Absolute stability, however, is not found in nature. If\nthe immediate surroundings do not change, changes yet occur in other\nlocalities of nature and among other creatures, and the struggle\nfor existence then either causes them to perish or to change in a\ncorresponding manner. The beings that have changed by adaptation will\nobtain a decided advantage in the struggle for life over those that\nhave remained stationary. This is the fate of many primitive peoples,\nor indeed civilised peoples, that have remained stationary or in a low\nstate of culture. Extinction awaits them when a higher civilisation\napproaches.\n\nWhat is true of peoples and races also holds good for individuals.\nA perfect adaptation to limited circumstances always involves a\ndanger,\u2014the danger that the individual when its conditions of life\nare changed and its horizon is enlarged will lack the inner conditions\nnecessary to self-assertion. Childish _na\u00efvet\u00e9_, dreaming phantasy,\nsensual enjoyment, have each their rights, but they easily lead to a\ncondition of somnambulism; security and happiness are always precarious\nhere, and on awakening the greatest helplessness may take their place.\nHere, let us add, we leave entirely out of consideration the fact that\nsuch a condition often exists only at the cost of other individuals.\n\nWelfare, accordingly, cannot be conceived as a passive state of\nthings produced once for all and that is not itself in turn the point\nof departure of new and progressive development. Welfare, in the\nhighest conception of it, must consist of a condition in which power\nis gathered and rich possibilities gained for the future, and which\ngenerates an impulse to frame new ends and to begin new endeavors. It\nis a condition that is desirable in and of itself as well as one that\ncontains the germ of new desirable conditions,\u2014a condition therefore\nthat is not only an end but also a means, that has value not only as\neffect but also as cause. The feeling of pleasure is here directly\nbound up with activity, work, development, the unfolding of forces\nthemselves, and not merely with the result that is obtained by the\nemployment of the forces. Where such feeling of pleasure is possible\nthere much suffering is endurable that at a lower stage would be the\nsign of the dissolution of all life. Expectation and longing, privation\nand disappointment will not be lacking; they will accompany with\ndefinite rhythmical alternation the joyful advancement toward the aim\nthat man has set himself; but amid all oscillations the fundamental\ndirection and the fundamental activity will be asserted. We will not\nwork to live, we will not live to work; but _in_ work will we find life.\n\nThis is the ideal that the principle of welfare holds up to us when\nthoroughly reasoned out. In how far it can be realised is a question\nthat can only be answered experimentally for the time and the\nindividual in question. It demands not only a change of the nature of\nindividuals but also of the relations of society. The essential thing\nhowever is, that we here have a criterion by which we are able to test\nactions and institutions. This criterion corresponds to a tendency\nthat leads throughout all organic nature, in that pleasure as a rule\nmeans life and progress, pain, retrogression and death. The principle\nof welfare asserts the right of life: every creature has the right to\nexist, to develop, and to obtain its full satisfaction, unless greater\npain is thereby produced to itself or to others. The ethics that\nbuilds upon the principle of welfare seeks accordingly to continue the\nevolution of nature in a conscious and harmonious manner. It demands\nthat means be found which the unconscious development of nature have\nnot supplied, and it strives to mitigate or to exclude the unnecessary\npain which the struggle for existence brings with it. It embraces a\nseries of problems from compassionate alleviation and assistance up to\nthe highest social, intellectual, and \u00e6sthetical endeavors. It is the\nbusiness of special ethics to treat these questions in detail.\n\n5) From the fact, however, that welfare, properly understood, consists\nin activity and development, it does not follow that _vice versa_\nactivity and development are always joined with welfare or lead to\nwelfare. Because limitation of wants does not always lead to the aim\nset, unlimited variety of wants is not necessarily the proper state.\nCivilisation can assume forms and enter on paths that do not harmonise\nwith the principle of welfare. We find in history accordingly, at\ntimes, distinct and decisive warnings against existing civilisations.\nThus it was in Greece on the part of Socrates, the Cynics, and the\nStoics, in the eighteenth century on the part of Rousseau, and in our\nday on the part of Leo Tolsto\u00ef. The opposition of such great minds\nshould surely make us watchful.\n\nI leave out of consideration here the question in how far that which we\ncall civilisation can be imparted to a people forthwith. The capacity\nfor civilisation has, it is true, been prematurely and overhastily\ndenied many primitive peoples.[127] But it is not therefore necessarily\na good thing for a people to give up the forms of life that it has\ndeveloped by its own fortunes and endeavors to allow itself to be\nregulated in accordance with forms and ideals that have been developed\nunder entirely different circumstances. Thus directly, even the\nbest-founded and most perfect civilisation cannot be communicated.\nWaitz who expressly maintains that no proof has been brought forward\nof the Indian's incapacity for civilisation, praises nevertheless the\nIndian chieftains who oppose the obtrusion of civilisation on their\npeople, for their love to their people and their just comprehension of\nits true well-being.\n\n [127] Compare my article in the _International Journal of\n Ethics_, No. I. p. 60.\n\nThe reason why conflict can arise between civilisation and welfare lies\nin the restiveness and restlessness of the aspirations of civilisation.\nIt is the same with it as with that spontaneous, involuntary impulse\nto movement that leads to the use of forces and of the members merely\nbecause sufficient energy is present, without their use being guided\nby the consideration of a more valuable end, so that the results are\naccidental. The effort that goes with civilisation may lead in part\nto over-exertion, to an overstraining of forces; in part (in the case\nof extreme differentiation) to a one-sided direction of effort; and\npartly to isolation, to the fragmentary elimination of individual\nactivities. In the single individual certain faculties are fostered\n(in the one intelligence, in the other physical power for work) at the\ncost of other faculties; the harmony, the capacity of feeling oneself\nas totality and unity is lacking. By such one-sidedness the individual\nbecomes of value only as a wheel in a great machine: he serves merely\nas a means, not as an end. And such a one-sided individual development\nis connected with a one-sided social development. The suppression of\ncertain features of the nature of the individual goes hand in hand\nwith the suppression of single estates and classes of society. If we\nidentify civilisation and ethics, without qualification, and regard\nprogress as a safer criterion than welfare, we should overlook the fact\nthat there exists also a _social question_. The social question is an\nethical question and at the same time a question of the correction of\ncivilisation,\u2014both by means of the principle of welfare. Would it be\nright that the products of material and ideal civilisation should only\nfall to the share of a small minority, while all the rest should not be\nable to participate therein? This would clash completely with the ideal\nof society that flows from the principle of welfare. For the greatest\nwelfare is present when every single individual so develops himself\nin an independent manner that just by this independent development of\nhis own he assists others to a similar development from their point\nof view. Then does there exist _a harmonious society of independent\npersonalities_. The idea of such a society is the highest ethical idea\nthat flows from the principle of welfare. Every individual is then a\nlittle world for himself and yet stands in the most intimate reciprocal\nconnection with the great world of which he is a part. The individual\nserves the race and the race serves the individual. Every position of\nisolation, every inequality in the distribution of possessions and of\nemployments must be founded in the demands of the various circumstances\nand problems of life, and the faculties and impulses of each individual\nshall be developed as fully and richly as is compatible with the\nconditions of life of the whole race.\n\n6) It follows from the considerations presented, that it is by no means\nalways easy to apply the principle of welfare in individual cases. The\nparticular relations of the affairs in question can be so complicated\nthat we are not able to take a broad survey of them and foresee the\nresults of our interference. We cannot deduce _a priori_ from the\nprinciple of welfare any system of particular acts, any determinate\norder of society, any civilisation. Its value (like that of the\nprinciple of causality in the theoretical field) is to present and to\nformulate problems, and to serve as a guide to their treatment. It is\nregulative, not constructive. It presumes the immediate involuntary\nlife of the individual and of society, and its function does not begin\nuntil the conscious discussion and treatment occurs of the value on the\none hand of that which has thus been developed, and on the other of\nthe manner in which the development shall be conducted in the future.\nAll ethics thus acquires an _historical_ character. We never\u2014either in\nour own individuality or in society\u2014commence from the very beginning,\nbut are always obliged to start with a definite foundation and to work\nour way further under the guidance of the principles and ideals that\nspring from our nature.\n\n\nIII.\n\n1) In the previous remarks I have essayed a discussion of the principle\nof welfare which may perhaps make clearer what was not so distinct in\nmy former expositions (\"Ethik,\" Chapters III and VII). The difficulty\nalways occurs in the enunciation of a principle, that a direct\ndemonstration of its validity cannot be given. Of so much greater\nsignificance is it then if an indirect proof can be adduced by showing\nthat the very ones who contest it are themselves forced to employ it\nand actually to employ it without being aware of it.\n\nI maintain now that Dr. Paul Carus in his book \"The Ethical Problem,\"\nin which he combats the principle of welfare, has not been able to\navoid giving such an indirect confirmation of the validity of this\nprinciple. Before attempting to show this in detail I shall make a few\nremarks concerning the criticism of my \"Ethics\" which Dr. Carus wrote\nin the first number of _The Monist_, and which in an abbreviated form\nis also embodied in the treatise above mentioned.\n\nDr. Carus thinks that I have practically surrendered the principle of\nwelfare when I define welfare to consist in activity. His words are:\n\n \"If welfare is to be interpreted as activity, work,\n development; if this kind of active welfare is the greatest\n good, whatever admixture of pain and whatever absence of\n pleasurable feeling it may have; if the greatest amount of a\n state of continuous pleasurable feeling is not welfare in an\n ethical sense, what becomes of the utilitarian definition of\n welfare as pleasurable feeling? If, however, welfare is 'the\n state of a continuous pleasurable feeling,' how can we declare\n that the life of a pessimistic philosopher is preferable to\n that of a joyful fool?\"\n\nTo this I answer, that _if_ it could be proved that increasing pain\nfollowed necessarily on _all_ advancement of civilisation (without\nthis pain being compensated for, as Clara's philosophy demanded, by\nnew and proportionately greater feelings of pleasure), in that case\nit would be impossible to combine civilisation and welfare. But only\na pessimistic dogmatism\u2014which is just as current in the atmosphere\nof to-day as optimistic dogmatism\u2014could assert this. What experience\nteaches us is this, that we find ourselves amid a development, in\na line of tendencies the final results of which we cannot foresee\nbut which hitherto have evoked at many points new forces and have\nthereby opened new sources of satisfaction. Everything that arouses\nour greatest and most permanent pleasurable feeling has arisen within\nthis development. This justifies our courage and our hope in behalf of\nfurther progress, although conflict and pain will as we may foresee\nnot be wanting, and although the way leads through many deserts.\nExperience alone can show how far we shall be able to get. I agree\nwith Dr. Carus that \"this world of ours is not a world suited to the\ntaste of a pleasure-seeker,\" if we understand by pleasure passive\nsensual enjoyment, an enjoyment which is not united with the rest and\nnourishment with which not only an immediate pleasurable feeling is\nconnected but whereby power is also gathered for continued endeavor.\nIf so many pleasure-seekers go through life without having their eyes\nopened to its true significance and purpose, this fact is precisely one\nof the things that clash with the principle of welfare, for the latter\nclaims all faculties and powers, and demands that they that sleep be\nawakened,\u2014that is if they really possess useful faculties. For perhaps\nthe \"joyful fool\" cannot accomplish more than he does. Wherefore then\ndisturb him, if his pleasure harms neither himself nor others and if\nhis awakening will only lead to unrest and pain for himself and perhaps\nalso for others? I pointed out the fact in my \"Ethics,\"[128] that we\ncan determine by the principle of welfare alone in what cases we are to\ndestroy a state of equilibrium or shatter an illusion.\n\n [128] Danish edition, p. 94. German edition, p. 109.\n\nI have admitted the _possibility_ of a conflict between civilisation\nand welfare. Wherever such a conflict arises, there, according to my\nconception, appears an ethical problem, which must be determined by the\nprinciple of welfare, since any order of things or any development that\nbrought with it permanent and everlasting pain would be in effect a\ndissolution of life itself. Such pain, however, (as even pessimistic\nphilosophers are optimistic enough to hope,) would destroy the will\nto live. If we live in spite of pain it is because there is always a\nsurplus of satisfaction.\n\nI give the idea of welfare no arbitrary extension when I deny that\nit should be limited to denote a passive condition produced once\nfor all time. For our nature is at no stage wholly complete; no one\ncondition can stand therefore as definitive. The future, and the new\nhorizons opened, will make new demands on our capacities and our will,\nand in the testing of any state of things it must accordingly be a\nnecessary point of view to establish whether in addition to the direct\nsatisfaction which it probably affords it at the same time prepares the\ncapacities and the possibilities of a continued development answering\nto the new relations. It may be necessary to choose some arduous\nemployment which later necessarily brings with it long continued rest\nand inactivity. Darwin's struggle with his feeble health is a good\nexample. The man who from love of country or to save a fellow-being\nrisks his life, prefers the active satisfaction of a single moment\n(the satisfaction, namely, which he feels beforehand at the thought of\nsaving his country or a human life) to the passive joys of years and\nyears. It was such a moment in which Faust saw himself living in mind\n\n \"Auf freiem Grund mit freiem Volk\"\n\nand which thereby made life of value to him, which all the earthly\ngratifications that the demon was able to obtain for him could not\naccomplish. In the face of the pleasure that such a moment can produce\nthe thought of pain and death vanishes. Thus alone is self-sacrifice\npsychologically intelligible.\n\n2) While I cannot see that Dr. Carus has pointed out a contradiction\nin my theory of welfare, I may further assert that he himself cannot\nwithout a self-contradiction escape recognising the principle of\nwelfare. Dr. Carus indeed, in a certain sense, himself enunciates this\nvery principle. He says, in the preface to \"The Ethical Problem,\" page\niii, \"The aim of ethics is neither the welfare of self nor that of\nother individuals, but of those interests that are superindividual.\"\nThe aim therefore is to be welfare, not however the welfare of\nindividuals but of \"superindividual interests.\" This strange expression\nis defined in certain subsequent passages of the book. Dr. Carus\nspeaks, namely, later on, of \"that superindividual soul-life which\nwe call society.\"[129] It is admitted in this, that when we speak of\nwelfare we speak impliedly of soul-life. But how can we give to society\nas such a soul-life that is different from the soul-life of the single\nindividuals that have their existence simultaneously and successively\nin that society? This is merely a mythical and mystical personification\nof society, which may have arisen in the comparison, in many respects\ninstructive, between society and an organism, which however can possess\nat best a poetical, but no scientific, value. The idea of society, if\nit is to be scientifically employed, must always be so applied that at\nevery point the definite group of individuals which it represents may\nbe established. The great importance of this idea consists in the fact\nthat it expresses the common and permanent interests of individuals\nsimultaneously and successively existing, in opposition to the\ninterests of single individuals, or of a smaller group, or of a limited\nperiod of time. Ethical perception, (unless it starts from the point\nof view of egoistical individualism,) must apply its test from the\npoint of view of society. It leads in this case to the consideration\nof our own and others' actions not only with respect to our own\nindividual circumstances but _sub specie \u00e6terni_ so to speak, that is\nwith respect to their relation to the great whole of which not only\nwe, but also other human beings are parts. Along with the educative\npower of authorities, it is due to the sympathy in virtue of which the\nindividual causes to re-echo in his own bosom the feelings of others,\nthat ethical ideals have been formed in the human mind. But as soon as\nit is made impossible to transpose the idea of society into the idea\nof individuals that live under certain definite conditions, this idea\ncontains no instruction for us in ethical respects. No ethical norms\ncan in this case be deduced from it. Emotional mysticism takes the\nplace of ethical thought and volition.\n\n [129] Pages 33, 38, and 40.\n\nSuch a mysticism has of course its value. Powerful emotion leads\nnaturally to a state in which all definite ideas recede, the mind\nbecoming entirely occupied by emotional feeling. It will furthermore be\ndifficult to represent by any adequate conception the great multitude\nof human characters on which our conduct in given circumstances can\nacquire decisive influence. The expression 'society,' or 'race,'\ncharacterises very well the unconcluded and the unsurveyable in so\nmany of the consequences of human methods of action and order of\nlife, and it will therefore not be possible to dispense with it. But\ntransposition into concrete conceptions must always be possible. A\nwelfare that at one or another stage is not the welfare of definite\nindividuals is a self-contradiction, and any act that at one period or\nanother does not lead to the welfare of definite individuals has no\nvalue.\n\nIn Wundt's \"Ethics,\" pages 429 to 431, the same line of thought is\nfound as this of Dr. Carus. Public well-being and progress, according\nto Wundt, do not consist in the well-being of the greatest possible\nnumber of individuals: for the individual is ephemeral! \"However richly\nblest and however perfect the individual existence may be, it is but a\ndrop in the ocean of life. What can individual happiness and individual\npain mean to the world?\" I should say to this: Yes, it is true, the\nocean does not exist for the sake of the individual drops; but what is\nan ocean that does not consist of drops? And is not the whole ocean\nclear if every single drop is clear? And only then is it _wholly_ clear.\n\nJust as there are people who cannot see the woods for the trees, so\nthere are also people who cannot see the trees for the woods. In\nethics this method of conception leads to the consideration of human\naspiration as the means of superhuman ends. Every ethics that seeks to\nstand on a basis of experience and remain within the possibility of\nprogressive verification, must cling to the standpoint of \"man with\nmen.\" It need not for this reason overlook the fact, that ethical\nconduct, like all unfolding of power, is connected with the universal\nworld-process.\n\n3) Dr. Carus also approaches the principle of welfare upon another,\nless mystical path. He maintains, with great emphasis, that ethics must\nbe based on facts, on insight into the real, the actual, order of\nnature. Our ideals\u2014this is the opinion of Dr. Carus\u2014arise through the\nwants which the relations of reality awaken in us, and must be realised\nby the means which the relations of reality supply.\n\n \"The new ethics is based upon facts and is applied to facts\"\n (p. 18).\n\n \"Man wants something, so he conceives the idea how good it\n would be if he had it.... Only by studying facts will he be\n enabled to realise his ideals\" (pp. 19 and 20).\n\n \"If you wish to exist, obey reason. Reason teaches us how to\n regulate our actions in conformity with the order of natural\n laws. If we do regulate them in conformity with the order of\n natural laws, they will stand; otherwise not. In the former\n case they will be good, they will agree with the cosmical\n conditions of existence; in the latter case they are bad, they\n will not agree with the cosmical conditions of existence;\n therefore they will necessarily produce disorder and evil\"\n (pp. 31, 32).\n\nIt appears to me clear from this, that the reason why we must regulate\nour actions to conform with natural laws, must be the fact that\notherwise they cannot \"stand,\" which is explained more in detail in\nwhat follows, to mean that they are constituted to produce \"disorder\nand evil,\"\u2014which in its turn must be surely understood as meaning\nthat disorder is itself an evil. If disorder were no evil, and if no\nfurther evils resulted from actions which are not \"in conformity with\nthe order of natural laws,\" what foundation would Dr. Carus in that\ncase be able to give his ethics? I wholly agree with Dr. Carus that our\nconduct if it is to be ethical must support itself upon as profound\na comprehension of the relations of reality as physical science,\npsychology, and social science alone can furnish. But _this requirement\ncan only be made good through and by the principle of welfare_. It has\nvalidity only for the person who wills that his conduct shall \"stand\"\nand produce no evil, either in extended or in limited circles. If pain\nand death were not evils, this requirement would have no validity.\n\nTo judge from his somewhat indefinite expressions one might suspect in\nDr. Carus here a votary of egoistic hedonism, were it not that a number\nof other passages in his book exclude this suspicion.\n\nHowever, it seems quite clear to me that his final criterion must\ncoincide with the principle of welfare. His ethics is an ethics of\nexpediency, in that his ultimate criterion is the influence of actions\non the life of mankind.\n\n4) Dr. Carus justly emphasises the relation of ethics to our\nworld-conception at large. But this connection does not mean that\nethics can be derived by deduction from a philosophical system\npreviously given. Ethics is an independent discipline which starts\nfrom its own peculiar assumptions (which cannot of course stand in\ncontradiction to other established assumptions), although it is obliged\nto make much use of the results furnished by other sciences. Ethics\nhas an independent foundation in the laws of feeling and volitional\nlife, just as the theory of knowledge has its foundation in the laws\nof sensations and perceptions. In conformity with the law of economy,\n(which must prevail in science even though it should not prevail in\nnature,) we must restrict the established postulates of the single\nsciences to the least possible limit. If after doing this agreement\nbetween the single sciences finally occurs, this result will be all the\nmore valuable.\n\nAccording to Dr. Carus ethics is to be derived now from a philosophical\ntotal world-conception, as according to his view (\"The Ethical\nProblem,\" p. 71) it originally arose through the influence of the\npositive religions.[130] Very weighty objections can be made in my\nopinion against this latter assumption. It is a fact that the lower\na religion stands the less ethical character it possesses, and\nthe very lowest religions it is probable possess no ethical value\nwhatever. The question then arises how religion gradually acquired\nits ethical character. The ethical ideas which were perceived in the\nnature of the deity must have had a natural origin, and this origin\ncan be sought only in the life of man with men. The ethical norms and\nideas developed themselves here spontaneously and have been just as\nspontaneously projected or hypostatised as the attributes of divinity.\nIn the history of the religion of Greece we can see clearly exhibited\nthe development of gods as powers of nature to gods as the expression\nof an ethical order of nature. Compare for instance, the Dodon\u00e6an\nand the Homeric Zeus with the Zeus that appears in the ideal belief\nof \u00c6schylus. The experiences are made in human life that lead to the\nformation of divine ideals. Gods grow better and more gentle according\nas men themselves grow better and gentler. Religious conceptions are\nidealised experiences. If religion is a factor in the development of\nethics it is because man conceives and represents his essential ideals\nin a religious form. The movement proceeds therefore from experience\nto experience; that which acts on nature is, as Shakespeare says,\nalways an art that has been produced by nature itself. How could man\nunderstand the meaning of the ethical qualities attributed to his\ndeities if he were not acquainted to some extent with these qualities\nthrough experience?\n\n [130] Dr. Carus expresses himself differently in _The Open\n Court_ (1890, p. 2549), where religion and ethics are called\n twins; whereas in _The Ethical Problem_ the latter is the\n daughter of the former.\n\nThat which distinguishes philosophical from theological ethics is\nnot the fact that the former is constructed on the basis of some\nphilosophical system and the latter upon ecclesiastical dogmatism, but\nthe fact that philosophical ethics brings out into full consciousness\nthe psychological basis upon which ethical life has actually always\nmore or less indirectly builded, and draws all the consequences\nimplied in this. In this it furnishes an independent contribution to a\nphilosophical system.\n\n5) It seems to me to be perfectly justified, that the distinguished\nmen who lead the Ethical Societies keep these institutions as\nindependent as possible not only of all definite dogmatic tendency\nof thought but also of all unnecessary philosophical hypotheses and\nspeculations. With respect to what concerns the first principles of\nethics itself, it is not necessary for the practical ethicist to occupy\nany definite point of view, although it would be very fortunate if he\nwere acquainted with the discussion of these principles and could take\npart in an independent manner in the same. He who proposes to teach\napplied mathematics or employ it in practice need not begin with a\ndefinite position with respect to the nature and origin of mathematical\nprinciples. So also in ethics there is a complete group of ideas and\nendeavors which are independent of the manner in which the first\nprinciples are conceived. The essential thing for the Ethical Societies\nis, (as Dr. Stanton Coit has said in his beautiful book \"Die Ethische\nBewegung in der Religion,\") agreement as to the methods of development\nof character and as to the type of character to be developed.\n\nDr. Carus can have really nothing to object to in this method of\nconception, inasmuch as it is his conviction that in the passage from\nthe supernatural to the natural establishment of ethics the \"substance\nof our morality\" will not be changed. In an article in _The Open\nCourt_, at page 2575, he says: \"The most important moral rules are\nnot to be altered.... Some of them will be altered as little as our\narithmetical table can be changed.\" In this passage less importance\nfor the _contents_ of ethics is attributed to the various points of\nview than I should be obliged to assign. Yet all the sooner should Dr.\nCarus really admit that the Ethical Societies have added to their other\nservices that of holding a proper course between the different dogmatic\nand philosophical systems.\n\n6) This last dispute it appears to me also testifies to the expediency\nof distinguishing between the different ethical problems. By so doing\nDr. Carus would also have been more just in his position with regard to\nutilitarianism. The latter has not arisen so much from the impulse to\nsupply a _motive_ for ethical conduct as from the impulse to acquire\nan absolute criterion. It is true the powerful influence of Hobbes and\nLocke brought it about that many of the later utilitarians embraced the\negoistic theory; but by their side marched another group of utilitarian\nethicists (among the earlier, Bacon, Cumberland, Shaftesbury, and\nHutcheson) who did not subscribe to this theory. So far as I know,\nHutcheson was the first with whom the formula occurs: \"The greatest\nhappiness of the greatest number.\" These very historical facts show how\nimportant it is in the treatment of ethical problems to apply the maxim\n\"Divide et impera!\" I have therefore prefaced this my apology for the\nprinciple of welfare by calling attention to the relative and mutual\nindependence of ethical problems.\n\n HARALD H\u00d6FFDING.\n\n\n\n\nTHE CRITERION OF ETHICS AN OBJECTIVE REALITY.\n\n\nI. TWO DEFINITIONS OF GOOD.\n\nWhile Mr. Herbert Spencer in his \"Data of Ethics\" may be considered as\nthe most persuasive and popular, Prof. Harald H\u00f6ffding, it appears to\nme, is the most scholarly and learned expounder of that ethical theory\nwhich bases morality upon the principle of the greatest happiness\nfor the greatest number. _The Monist_ No. 1 contained (pp. 139-141)\na criticism of Professor H\u00f6ffding's work on Ethics, and Professor\nH\u00f6ffding's article in this number is in part a further exposition of\nhis views, and in part an answer to the criticism of _The Monist_.\n\nProfessor H\u00f6ffding proposes, as pointed out in the criticism of\n_The Monist_, two criteria of ethics, (1) that which promotes the\nlife-totality, and (2) that which produces a continuous and permanent\nstate of pleasurable feelings. These two criteria happen to come in\nconflict. John Stuart Mill calls attention to the fact that a well\nfed pig is more satisfied than man and a jolly fool is happier than\nSocrates. When Professor H\u00f6ffding considers the state of man preferable\nto that of a pig, while granting that the latter, and not the former,\nenjoys a continuous state of pleasurable feelings, when he similarly\nprefers the doleful disposition of a sombre philosopher to the empty\nmerriness of a happy fool, he does in my opinion unquestionably\nsurrender the second criterion in favor of the first.\n\nProfessor H\u00f6ffding's present explanation of the subject does not\nsatisfy me. The main point of my criticism, it seems to me, has not\nbeen answered, and the difficulty is not overcome. Professor H\u00f6ffding\ndeclares that the strong desire for activity, development, and progress\ndoes not exist at all stages. It is itself a consequence of development\nand progress (p. 537). This, it may be granted, explains why a\ncivilised society cannot help developing workers that plod and toil,\nfinding no satisfaction unless they plod and toil; but it does not\nexplain why (if after all the criterion of our ethical judgment remains\nhappiness or the continuous state of pleasurable feelings) their state\nis preferable to that of indolent and happy savages.\n\nProfessor H\u00f6ffding says:\n\n \"_If_ it could be proved that increasing pain followed\n necessarily on all advancement of civilisation ... in that\n case it would be impossible to combine civilisation and\n welfare\" (i. e. a continuous state of pleasurable feelings).\n\nWell, _if_ that be so,\u2014as Professor H\u00f6ffding himself in the comparison\nof man to a pig and of Socrates to a fool has actually conceded to be\ntrue,\u2014if we stand between the dilemma of civilisation and welfare, or\nin other words if we have the choice only between a higher stage of\nlife and a happier state of existence, which is preferable? That which\nProfessor H\u00f6ffding considers as preferable is his true criterion of\nwhat he calls good. The other one holds only so long as it agrees with\nhis true and final criterion, so long as it does not come in conflict\nwith it.\n\nSuppose we select as the final criterion of ethics not the growth and\ndevelopment of the life-totality, but that of procuring to the greatest\nnumber of men, as much as possible, a continuous state of pleasurable\nfeelings,\u2014what will be the outcome of it? Can we suppose that, if\nthese two principles collide, we shall be able to stop growth? Can we\nexpect to overcome nature and to curtail natural evolution so as to\nbring about a more favorable balance between our pleasures and pains?\nIf we do, we shall soon find out that we have reckoned without our host.\n\nA conflict between civilisation and welfare, (i. e. between natural\nevolution and our pleasurable feelings,) would not discontinue\ncivilisation as Professor H\u00f6ffding supposes, it would rather produce a\nchange in what we have to consider as welfare. We _have to_ be pleased\nwith the development of our race according to the laws of nature, and\nthose who are displeased might just as well commit suicide at once,\nfor they will go to the wall, they will disappear from the stage of\nlife. Those alone will survive who are pleased with that which the laws\nof nature demand.\n\nOur pleasurable feelings are subjective, nature and the laws of\nevolution are objective. The criterion of ethics is not subjective but\nobjective. The question is not what produces pleasurable feelings, but\nwhat is the unalterable order of the world with which we have to be\npleased.\n\nThe question of ethics, in my mind, is not what we wish to do or what\nwe think we ought to do, but _what we must do_. Nature prescribes a\ndefinite course. If we choose another one, we shall not reach our aim,\nand if we reach it, it will be for a short time only.\n\nThe aim of nature is not the happiness of living beings, the aim\nof nature, in the realm of organised life, is growth, development,\nevolution. Pleasures and pains are phases in the household of life,\nthey are not life's aim. Experience shows that in reaching a higher\nstage we acquire an additional sensibility for both, for new pleasures\nand new pains. The pleasures of human existence in comparison with\nthose of animals have been as much intensified and increased as the\npains. The ratio has on the average remained about the same and it has\nrarely risen in favor of pleasures. Rather the reverse takes place:\nthe higher man loses the taste of enjoying himself without losing the\nsensitiveness of pain.\n\nEthics, as a science and from the standpoint of positivism, has to\ninquire what according to the nature of things we must do. It has\nto study facts and from facts it has to derive rules (the moral\nprescripts) which will assist us in doing at once what we shall after\nall _have to_ do. The criterion of ethics is not some standard which we\nput up ourselves, the criterion of ethics is agreement with facts.\n\n\nII. THE AUTHORITY OF MORAL COMMANDS.\n\nProfessor H\u00f6ffding emphasises \"the fact that there is not merely one\nsingle ethical problem but many\"\u2014a fact which cannot be denied,\nfor there are, indeed, innumerable problems of an ethical nature.\nHowever, we must bear in mind that all the ethical problems are closely\ninterconnected. The better we understand them, the more shall we\nrecognise that all together form one great system of problems, and that\none problem lies at the bottom of all. This one basic problem I have\ncalled _the_ ethical problem.\n\nThe solution of the basic problem of ethics will not involve the ready\nsolution of all the rest, but we can be sure that it will throw light\nupon any question that is of an ethical nature.\n\nProfessor H\u00f6ffding recognises the importance of system in ethics. He\nsays:\n\n \"The systematism of ethical science is still so little\n advanced that it is necessary to draw out a general outline\n before we pass on to any single feature. The value of\n systematism is namely this, that we are immediately enabled to\n see the connection of the single questions with one another as\n well as their distinctive peculiarity.\"\n\nIt appears almost unfair toward the present state of ethical science\nwhen Professor H\u00f6ffding adds:\n\n \"In ethics we are not yet so far advanced.\"\n\nIf we were not, we should do our best to advance so as to recognise the\nunity of all ethical problems. We must first recognise _the_ ethical\nproblem, before we can with any hope of success approach the many,\nwhich are dependent upon the one.\n\nWhich is the one basic problem of ethics?\n\nWe read in Matthew, xxi. 23:\n\n \"And when Jesus was come into the temple, the chief priests\n and the elders of the people came unto him as he was teaching\n and said, By what authority doest thou these things? and who\n gave thee this authority?\"\n\nThis question is legitimate and all our ethical conceptions must\nnecessarily depend upon the answer which we accept as satisfactory.\nThe basic problem of ethics is the foundation of ethics, it is the\njustification of the ethical prescripts, it is the discovery of the\nauthority upon which ethical rules are based. If there were no power\nthat enforces a certain line of conduct, ethics in my opinion would\nhave no right of existence; and if any one preaches certain commands,\nhe is bound to give satisfactory reasons why we must obey his commands.\n\nProfessor H\u00f6ffding says that ethics \"starts from its own assumptions\"\n(p. 111). Ethics should not start from any assumptions.\n\nIf we are to come to a mutual understanding we must drop all\nsubjectivism, we must not study ethics from special points of view,\nfrom the principles or standards of any individual or group of\nindividuals. There is not the slightest use of a person making himself\nany \"highest and only aim\" which, it may be true, \"from his point of\nview can never be refuted.\" So long as ethics starts from assumptions\nor principles, it will be no science; for truly, as Professor H\u00f6ffding\nsays in excuse of the inability to prove principles, \"The difficulty\nalways occurs in the enunciation of a principle that a direct\ndemonstration of its validity cannot be given.\"\n\nThe requirement of ethics is to arrive at statements of fact. Let us\nbuild upon facts and we shall stand upon solid ground.\n\nEthics in order to be scientific must be based upon the objective and\nunalterable order of things, upon the ascertainable data of experience,\nupon the laws of nature.\n\nProfessor H\u00f6ffding says:\n\n \"Religious ethics is founded on authority. Its _contents_\n are the revealed commands of authority; the _feeling_ which\n impels us _to pass ethical judgments_ is the fear or reverence\n or love with which men are filled in the presence of divine\n authority.\"\n\nScientific ethics can in this respect not be different from religious\nethics, for it is also based upon authority. A scientific ethicist has\nto proceed like any other naturalist; he must observe the course of\nevents and attempt to discover the laws in accordance with which the\nevents take place. These laws are no less unalterable than any other\nnatural laws, and we may appropriately call them the natural laws of\nethics. The moral commands of ethical teachers have been derived,\neither instinctively or with a clear scientific insight, from the\nnatural laws of ethics. The authority of the natural laws of ethics\nhas been decked out by different religious teachers with more or less\nmythological tinsel or wrapped in mystic darkness; for practical\npurposes it remained to some limited extent the same and will to some\nextent always remain the same, for we shall have to obey the moral law,\nbe it from fear, or reverence, or love.\n\nThe unity of all the ethical problems will be preserved, however\nmuch they may be differentiated. Indeed Professor H\u00f6ffding in his\nenumeration sufficiently indicates their interconnection. He speaks\nof (1) the motive principle of judgment, (2) the test-principle of\njudgment, and (3) of the motive to action. Whatever difference he makes\nbetween these three terms, it is obvious that whether and how far\njudgments, tests, or motives are sound will depend upon their agreement\nwith the authority of the natural law of ethics. The pedagogic problem\nis also connected with the ethical problem because upon our solution\nof the latter will directly depend the aim and indirectly also the\nmethod of education. Such complex motives as \"ambition or the instinct\nof acquisition\" will become \"the means of attaining to true ethical\nself-assertion\" in the degree proportional to the elements they contain\nwhich will strengthen our efforts of setting us at one with the natural\nlaw of ethics.\n\nTo sum up: The natural law of ethics has to be derived from facts like\nall other natural laws. The natural law of ethics is the authority upon\nwhich all moral commands are based, and agreement with the natural law\nof ethics is the final criterion of ethics.\n\n\nIII. ETHICS AND WELFARE.\n\nI have no objection to an ethics of welfare; on the contrary, I\nconsider every ethics as an ethics of welfare. My objection to\nProfessor H\u00f6ffding's ethics is solely directed against his definition\nof welfare as \"a continuous state of pleasurable feelings.\" Welfare is\naccording to my terminology that state of things which is in accord\nwith the natural law of ethics, and it so happens that welfare must as\na rule not only be bought, but also constantly maintained with many\npains, troubles, anxieties, and sacrifices. It is true that upon the\nwhole there may be a surplus of happiness and of satisfaction, if not\nof pleasures; but the surplus of happiness (important though it is)\ndoes not constitute that which is morally good in welfare. Morally good\n(the characteristic feature of the ethical idea of welfare) is that\nwhich is in accord with the natural law of ethics.\n\nIf the term \"utility\" were defined by Utilitarians in the sense\nin which I define welfare, I should also have no objection to\nutilitarianism. The Utilitarians, however, define their theory as\n\"the Greatest Happiness Principle,\" and if \"useful\" is taken in its\nordinary sense as that which is profitable or advantageous, it makes of\nutilitarianism an ethics of expediency.\n\n\nIV. FEELINGS AND JUDGMENTS.\n\nThe fundamental difference between Professor H\u00f6ffding and myself, and\nas it seems to me his \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c8\u03b5\u1fe6\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2, lies in his definition of ethical\njudgments. He says:\n\n \"Ethical judgments, judgments concerning good and bad, in\n their simplest form are expressions of feeling, and never\n lose that character however much influence clear and reasoned\n knowledge may acquire with respect to them.\"\n\nI am very well aware of the fact that all thinking beings are first\nfeeling beings. Thought cannot develop in the absence of feeling.\nWithout feeling there is no thought; but thought is not feeling, and\nfeeling is not thought.[131] By thought I understand the operations\nthat take place among representative feelings, and the essential\nfeature of these feelings is not whether they are pleasurable or\npainful, but that they are correct representations. Judgments are\nperhaps the most important mental operations. There are logical\njudgments, legal judgments, ethical judgments, etc. In none of them is\nthe feeling element of mental activity of any account. That which makes\nof them judgments is the reasoning or the thought-activity. Whether a\njudgment is correct or not does not depend upon the feeling that may be\nassociated with it, but it depends upon the truth of its several ideas\nand the propriety of their connection.\n\n [131] See the chapter \"The Nature of Thought\" in _The Soul of\n Man_, p. 354.\n\nA judgment, be it logical, juridical, ethical, or any other, is the\nmore liable to be wrong, the more we allow the feeling element to play\na part in it. Judgments swayed by strong feelings become biassed; they\ncan attain to the ideal of truth only by an entire elimination of\nfeeling.[132]\n\n [132] Professor H\u00f6ffding says: \"The feeling of pleasure is the\n only psychological criterion of health and power of life.\"\n Every physician knows the insufficiency of this criterion.\n Many consumptives declare that they feel perfectly well even a\n few hours before their death.\n\nEthics in which the feeling element is the main spring of action, is\ncalled sentimentalism. Sentimental ethics have no more right to exist\nthan a sentimental logic or a sentimental jurisprudence.\n\nThe philosophy of Cl\u00e4rchen in \"Egmont\" appears to be very strong\nsentimentalism, and I do not believe that her demeanor can be set up\nas an example for imitation. Her love happiness is an intoxication.\nShe vacillates between two extremes, now _himmelhoch jauchzend_ and\nnow _zum Tode betr\u00fcbt_, and her life ends in insanity.\n\nTo consider ethical or any other judgments as feelings, and to explain\ntheir nature accordingly, seems to me no better than to speak of\nconcepts as consisting of vowels and consonants, and to explain the\nnature of conceptual thought from the sounds of the letters. We cannot\nspeak without uttering sounds, but the laws of speech or of grammar\nhave nothing to do with sound and cannot be explained in terms of\nsound. When we think and judge, we are most assuredly feeling, but\nthe feeling is of no account, and whether the feeling is pleasurable,\nor painful, or indifferent, has nothing to do whatever with the\ncorrectness or the ethical value of judgments.\n\n\nV. PLEASURE AND PAIN.\n\nIt is very strange that, so far as I am aware, no ethicist who bases\nethics upon the Happiness Principle has ever investigated the nature\nof pleasure and pain. It is generally assumed that pleasure is an\nindication of growth and pain of decay, but it has never been proved,\nand after a careful consideration of this theory I have come to the\nconclusion that it is based upon an error. Growth is rarely accompanied\nwith pleasure and decay is mostly painless.\n\nOptimistic philosophers look upon pleasure as positive and pain as\nnegative, while the great pessimist Schopenhauer turns the tables and\nsays pleasure is negative and pain positive.\n\nAn impartial consideration of the subject will show that both pleasure\nand pain are positive. Pain is felt whenever disturbances take place,\npleasure is felt whenever wants are satisfied, and unsatisfied wants\nare perhaps the most prominent among the disturbances that produce\npain.[133]\n\n [133] See the chapter \"Pleasure and Pain\" in _The Soul of\n Man_, p. 338.\n\nProfessor H\u00f6ffding says:\n\n \"I agree with Dr. Carus that \"this world of ours is not\n a world suited to the taste of a pleasure-seeker,\" if we\n understand by pleasure passive sensual enjoyment, an enjoyment\n which is not united with the rest and nourishment with which\n not only an immediate pleasurable feeling is connected, but\n whereby power is also gathered for continued endeavor.\"\n\nWhen I say that this world of ours is not a world suited to the taste\nof the pleasure-seeker, I do not restrict the meaning of pleasure to\n\"passive sensual enjoyment,\" but to all kinds of pleasure. There are\nalso intellectual and artistic voluptuaries who sacrifice anything,\neven the performance of duty, to their pleasure, which I grant is far\nsuperior to any kind of passive sensual enjoyment. The pursuit of\npleasure is not wrong in itself; but it is not ethical either. Ethics\nin my opinion has nothing to do either with my own pleasures or with\nthe pleasures of anybody else. The object of ethics is the performance\nof duty; and the main duty of man is the performance of that which he\nneeds must do according to the laws of nature, to let his soul grow and\nexpand, and to develop to ever higher and nobler aims.\n\n\nVI. PLEASURABLE FEELINGS AS AN ETHICAL CRITERION.\n\nI know of a French teacher who has an excellent French pronunciation\nand speaks with perfect accuracy, but whenever he is asked to give\na rule which may serve as a guide and a help to correct grammer and\nelocution, he says: \"The chief rule in French is euphony.\"\u2014\"Exactly!\nBut the same rule holds good in a certain sense for all languages.\"\u2014\"O\nno,\" he says, \"the German is harsh and the English is tongue-breaking;\nonly in French is the supreme law euphony.\"\u2014\"Now for instance,\" we\nventure to object, \"you say _la harpe_ and not _l'arpe_; you pronounce\nthe _ai_ different in different words you say _j'ai_, but you say _il\nfait_ and you have again a different pronunciation of the _ai_ in _nous\nfaisons_.\" He replies, \"To pronounce _j'a\u00ee_, or as the Germans say\n_cha\u00ee_ would be barbarous. To say _l'arpe_, instead of _la harpe_ is\nsimply ridiculous.\"\u2014\"The question is,\" we continued in our attempts\nto understand him, \"what is euphonious to the ear of an educated\nFrenchman?\"\u2014\"Well,\" he says, \"the ear will tell you. That which jars\non the ear is wrong. To say _quat'_ instead of _quatre_, or _vot'_\ninstead of _votre_, is wrong, it is vulgar. Why? it jars on the ear.\"\n\nThis method of teaching French appears to me a good illustration of\nour objection to the happiness principle of ethics. It is perfectly\ntrue that instances of immorality jar on the feelings of ethically\ntrained minds. Why? They have become accustomed to them and look upon\nthem as barbarous. Ungrammatical expressions and such pronunciations\nas do not agree with the spirit of a language are suppressed by those\nwho recognise them as incongruous elements. Mistakes jar on their ears\nbecause they are incorrect, but they are not incorrect because they jar.\n\nOatmeal is a favorite dish among the Scotch. If you ask them why they\neat it, they will most likely tell you, because it has an agreeable\ntaste. But why do they like it? Because they have through generations\ngrown accustomed to a dish which is conducive to health. Most of the\ndishes that are wholesome have an agreeable taste to a non-corrupted\ntongue. But agreeable taste for that reason cannot be considered as\nthe supreme rule in selecting our menu. Agreeable taste is in cases of\nsickness a very unreliable guide and it is no criterion for a wholesome\ndinner. Surely the ethics of eating could not be based on agreeable\ntaste.\n\nThe pleasurable feeling that is perceived in the satisfaction of hunger\nthrough appropriate food or in the satisfaction of any want, is not the\nbedrock of fact to which we can dig down; it is in itself a product\nof custom, of inherited habits, and other circumstances; and it can\nthe less be used as a criterion because it varies greatly with the\nslightest change of its conditions.\n\nLiberty is generally and rightly considered as a good, even though the\nslave may have and very often actually has enjoyed more happiness than\nthe freed man. Stupidity is considered as an evil, although it inflicts\nno direct pains and may be the source of innumerable pleasures insipid\nin the view of others, but delightful to the jolly fool. Professor\nH\u00f6ffding quotes from Waitz that the Indian does not progress because\nhe \"lives a happy life.\" Unhappiness is the cause of progress. We look\ndown upon the Fuegians and upon the indolent South American tribe\ndescribed by Humboldt. But have they not reached the aim of ethics, if\nhappiness be that aim? Professor H\u00f6ffding says in explanation of their\ncondition:\n\n \"That which would make such a life unendurable for us, _the\n strong desire for activity, development, and progress_, this\n desire does not exist at such stages.\"\n\nIf that is so, our strong desire for activity should be denounced as\nthe source of evil. It would be ethical in that case, as some labor\nunions and trusts actually propose, to stop, or at least, to impede\nfurther progress. The attempt of the Jesuits in Paraguay, which to\nsome extent was an unequivocal success, to rule the people through a\nspiritual dependence satisfying all their wants and keeping them in\nperfect contentment, cannot be condemned from that principle of welfare\nwhich defines welfare as a continuous state of pleasurable feelings.\n\nI can see how a man can be induced to submit to a moment of pain in\norder to escape more pain in the future, but I cannot see on what\nground one man can be requested to sacrifice himself to suffer pain\nor to forego his pleasures in order that a dozen or a hundred men may\nhave a jolly time. It appears to me that a greater error has never been\npronounced than that of making \"the greatest happiness of the greatest\nnumber\" the maxim of ethics.\n\nFor the same reason that prevents us from regarding the principle of\nhappiness as the aim of ethics or as its test and criterion, we cannot\nconsider self-humiliation, contrition, misery, and the abandonment of\ngayety and merriness as moral or meritorious. Joy and grief are in\nthemselves as little wrong as they are virtuous. Any ethics the end\nof which is a morose austerity, simply because it makes life dreary,\nis at least as much mistaken as a philosophy which finds the purpose\nof life in mere pleasure, be it ever so vain, simply because it is\npleasure. To pursue happiness or renounce it, either may sometimes be\nmoral and sometimes immoral. Again, to undergo pain and to inflict\npain on others, or to avoid pain, either may also be moral or immoral.\nThe criterion of ethics will not be found in the sphere of feelings.\nMorality cannot be measured by and it cannot be expressed in pleasures\nand pains.\n\n\nVII. THE SUPERINDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY.\n\nProfessor H\u00f6ffding criticises my view of \"that superindividual\nsoul-life which we call society,\" as based upon a mystical\npersonification of society.\n\nThe superindividual motives of the human soul as I use the term, are\nactual realities, they are no less actual and concrete than are the\nimage and the concept of a tree in my brain. I have sufficiently\nexplained their origin and natural growth (\"Ethical Problem,\" pp.\n34-44), and feel that Professor H\u00f6ffding's charge rests upon a\nmisunderstanding. It appears to me that his term \"sympathy,\" which\nhe regards as the main element of ethical feelings leading to the\nadoption of the principle of general welfare, is much more liable to\nbe interpreted in a mystical way. At least Schopenhauer's idea of\nsympathy (which he calls _Mitleid_) is undoubtedly a very mysterious\nthing, and its existence is supposed to be a direct manifestation of\nthe metaphysical. I do not say that Professor H\u00f6ffding uses the word\nsympathy in the sense of Schopenhauer's idea of _Mitleid_, but I am\nsure that if he attempts to explain its natural origin, he will (in\norder to remain positive and scientific) have to go over the same\nground and arrive at the same conclusion as I did, although he may\nexpress himself in different words.\n\nThe truth is that man's ideas consist in representations of things and\nof relations without him, and these ideas are not the product of his\nindividual exertions alone, they are the product of social work and\nof the common activity and intercourse of human society. This is true\nof language as a whole and of every single word which we use. This is\ntrue of all conceptual thought and most so of all ethical impulses.\nIn spite of all individualism and in spite of the truth that lies in\ncertain claims of individualism as to personal liberty and freedom of\nself-determination, I maintain that there is no individual in the sense\nof a separate ego-existence. That which makes of us human beings is the\nproduct of social life. I call the ideas and the impulses naturally\ndeveloping in this way, superindividual, and if we could take them out\nof the soul of a man, he would cease to be a man. What is man but an\nincarnation of mankind! Social intercourse and common work produce the\nsuperindividual ideas and impulses in man, and these superindividual\nideas and impulses in their action constitute the life of society.\n\nThis view is not \"a mystical personification of society\" under the\nsimile of an organism, but it is a description of certain facts in the\ndevelopment of the human soul.\n\nSociety is not an aggregation of individuals, it is constituted by the\nsuperindividual element in the souls of individual men. The number of\npeople in a society is for ethical purposes unessential. Professor\nH\u00f6ffding accordingly makes an unimportant feature prominent, when he\nsays:\n\n \"The idea of society, if it is to be scientifically employed,\n must always be so applied that at every point the definite\n group of individuals which it represents may be established.\"\n\nIf the greatest happiness of the greatest number among a definite group\nof individuals constitutes the morality of an act, would not the man\nwho falls among thieves be under the moral obligation to renounce his\nproperty because the robbers constitute the majority?\n\nIf we leave the superindividual element out of sight, we shall\nnaturally fall into the error of counting the individuals and deciding\nright and wrong by majority votes. The pleasure of a majority however\ndoes not constitute justice, and the greatest happiness of the greatest\nnumber is no criterion of that which is to be considered as morally\ngood.\n\nSociety in the sense of a mere number of individuals will by and by\ncreate but does not constitute morality; nor can the majority of a\nsociety propose a criterion. The nature of moral goodness is not a\nmatter of number nor of size nor of quantity. It must be sought in the\nquality of our ideas and motives. Moral are those ideas which tend to\nbuild up the life-totality of our souls so as to engender more and more\nof mankind in man, or still broader expressed, so as to keep man in\nharmony with the whole cosmos\u2014with God.\n\n\nVIII. THE POLICY OF THE ETHICAL SOCIETIES.\n\nProfessor H\u00f6ffding considers it perfectly justified that the leaders\nof the ethical societies \"keep these institutions as independent as\npossible not only of all dogmatic tendency of thought but also of\nall unnecessary philosophical hypotheses and speculations.\" So do\nwe, for we object to dogmas, to hypotheses, and mere speculations.\nWe consider the era of dogmatic religion as past, and trust in the\nrise of a religion based on truth, i. e. a natural and cosmical\nreligion which stands on facts verifiable by science. Every religion,\nbe it ever so adulterated by superstitions which as a rule, the less\ntenable they appear, are the more tenaciously defended as infallible\ndogmas\u2014contains in its world-conception at least the germ of becoming\na cosmical religion. The development of all religions aims at one and\nthe same goal, namely the recognition of the truth and the aspiration\nto live accordingly. Those religions which remain faithful to this\nspirit of the religious sentiment will survive; they will drop the\nerrors of dogmatic belief, they will free themselves of the narrowness\nof sectarianism and develop the cosmic religion of truth\u2014of that one\nand sole truth which need not shun the light of criticism and which is\nat one with science.\n\nWe do not object to the ethical societies that they have no dogmas\nand that they do not identify themselves with a special philosophy;\nwe object solely to their proposition to preach ethics without having\na religion, or without basing ethics upon a conception of the world.\nAnd why do we object? Simply because it is impossible to preach ethics\nwithout basing it upon a definite view of the world, for ethics is\nnothing more or less than the endeavor to act according to a certain\nconception, to realise it in deeds. Can you realise in deeds a\nconception without having any? Can you live the truth without knowing\nthe truth? You must at least have an instinctive inkling of what the\ntruth is.\n\nMr. Salter separates the domains of ethics and science. He does not\nbelieve that ethics can be established on science, for he declares that\nscience deals with facts, i. e. that which is, while ethics deals with\nideals, i. e. that which ought to be. \"We have to believe in ethics if\nwe believe in them at all,\" Mr. Salter says, \"not because they have the\nfact on their side but because of their own intrinsic attractiveness\nand authority.\"[134] This reminds me of one of Goethe and Schiller's\nXenions in which the German poets criticise the one-sided positions of\nenthusiasts (_Schw\u00e4rmer_) and philistines:\n\n [134] _What Can Ethics Do For Us_, p. 5. By W. M. Salter. C.\n H. Kerr, Chicago, 1891.\n\n Had you the power, enthusiasts, to grasp your ideals completely,\n Certainly you would revere Nature. For that is her due.\n Had you the power philistines, to grasp the total of Nature,\n Surely your path would lead up to th' idea's domain.\n\nIdeals have no value unless they agree with the objective world-order\nwhich is ascertained through inquiry into the facts of nature. Ideals\nwhose ultimate justification is intrinsic attractiveness and whose\nauthority is professedly not founded on reality but on rapt visions of\ntranscendental beauty, must be characterised as pure subjectivism. They\nare not ideals but dreams.\n\nThe ethical societies have as yet\u2014so far as I am aware of\u2014not given\na clear and definite definition of good. Professor Adler treats\nthis question with a certain slight. Concerning the facts of moral\nobligation he believes in \"a general agreement _among good men and\nwomen_ everywhere.\" (The italics are ours.) _The Open Court_ (in No.\n140) has challenged _the Ethical Societies_, saying that \"we should\nbe very much obliged to the _Ethical Record_, if it would give us a\nsimple, plain, and unmistakable definition of what the leaders of the\nethical movement understand by good, i. e. morally good.\" But this\nchallenge remained unanswered.\n\nIt will appear that as soon as good is defined not in tautologies,[135]\nbut in definite and unmistakable terms, the conception of good will\nbe the expression of a world-conception. Is it possible to do an act\nwhich is not expressive of an opinion? And if an act is not expressive\nof a clear opinion, it is based upon an instinctive, an unclear, and\nundefined opinion. When the ethical societies declare that they do\nnot intend to commit themselves to religious or philosophical views,\nthey establish an anarchy of ethical conviction. Religion, as we have\ndefined it, is man's inmost and holiest conviction, in accord with\nwhich he regulates his conduct. The ethical societies implicitly\ndeclare that we can regulate our conduct without having any conviction.\n\n [135] It is obvious that such definitions as \"good is that\n which produces welfare\" are meaningless, so long as we are not\n told what it is that makes a certain state _well_ faring or\n _well_ being.\n\nIs not an ethical society without any definite convictions upon which\nto base its ethics like a ship without a compass in foggy weather?\n\nThe attitude of the ethical societies in not committing themselves to\nany religious or philosophical view is after all\u2014and how can it be\notherwise?\u2014a palpable self-delusion, for their whole policy bears\nunmistakably a definite and characteristic stamp. The leaders of the\nethical societies will most likely repudiate my interpretation of their\nposition, because it appears to me that they are not clear themselves\nconcerning the philosophical basis upon which they stand and thus (as I\nam fully aware) many contradictory features appear by the side of those\nwhich I should consider as most significant.\n\n\nIX. PROFESSOR ADLER'S POSITION.\n\nProfessor Adler is the founder of the Ethical Societies, he is their\nleader, and however much Mr. Salter, Dr. Coit, Mr. Sheldon, and Mr.\nWeston may disagree from him in minor matters, his views are decisive\nin the management, and the policy of the whole movement depends on\nhim. Through his indefatigable zeal in the holy cause of ethics, his\nunflinching courage in the defense of what he regards as right, his\nenergetic devotion to his ideals, and through the influence of his\npowerful oratory he has made the ethical societies what they now\nare. He determines their character and he is the soul of the whole\nmovement. Now it is true that Professor Adler has never presented us\nwith a systematic philosophy, but all his activity, his speeches, his\npoems, and the plans of his enterprises represent a very definite\nphilosophical conception, which, to give it a name, may briefly be\ncalled Kantian Agnosticism.\n\nProfessor Adler is an agnostic, although not after the pattern of\nSpencer or Huxley. His agnosticism has been impressed upon his mind by\nKant.\n\nI expect that Mr. Adler will repudiate the name of agnostic, and it is\nquite indifferent with what name he may characterise his views. His\nposition remains the same, whatever name he may choose to call it, if\nhe chooses any; and he will choose none for he is too consistent an\nagnostic to define his position by a name.\n\nIt devolves upon me to prove my assertion and I hope to be able to do\nso.\n\nProfessor Adler looks upon ethics as something which lies outside the\npale of human knowledge. He says in one of his lectures:\n\n \"And now one point more of utmost importance. If there be an\n existence corresponding to our highest idea, as we have said\n there is, yet we know not what kind of existence that may\n be ... why then should we speak of it at all, why should we\n try to mention in words an existence which we cannot know? I\n will answer why. Because it is necessary to remind mankind\n constantly that _there is an existence which they do not\n know_.... Because otherwise the sense of mystery will fade out\n of human lives....\"\n\nIs \"the sense of mystery\" really a necessary element in human lives to\nmake men aware of the grandeur of the universe. Is there no holiness\nin clearness of thought, and is ethics only sacred if it is surrounded\nwith the hazy halo of an unknowable transcendentalism?\n\nIf our moral ideal does not come by the special revelation of God, as\nthe dogmatic religions maintain, and if we cannot find it in nature, if\nit is beyond the ken of human cognition, if it is unascertainable by\nscience, whence does it come? Professor Adler says:\n\n \"We must, indeed, be always on our guard, lest we confuse the\n idea of the Perfect with notions of the good derived from\n human experience. This has been the mistake of theology in\n the past, the point wherein every theodicy has invariably\n broken down. When we think of the Perfect we think of a\n transcendental state of existence, when we think of the moral\n law in its completeness we think of a transcendental law,\n a law which can only be wholly fulfilled in the regions of\n the Infinite, but which can never be fully realised within\n the conditions of space and time. The formula of that law\n when applied to human relations, yields the specific moral\n commandments, but these commandments can never express the\n full content, can never convey the far off spiritual meanings\n of the supreme law itself. The specific commandments do,\n indeed, partake of the nature of the transcendental law, they\n are its effects. The light that shines through them comes from\n beyond, but its beams are broken as they pass our terrestrial\n medium, and the full light in all its glory we can never see.\"\n\nIn this passage I believe to recognise the influence of Kant's\ntranscendentalism. I differ from Professor Adler's conception of\nKantian transcendentalism, but that is of no account here. One point\nonly is of consequence. Professor Adler uses the word transcendental in\nthe sense of transcendent and thus he changes the ethics of pure reason\ninto mysticism. Professor Adler says:\n\n \"Though I can never be scientifically certain, I can be\n _morally_ sure that the mystery of the universe is to be read\n in terms of moral perfection.\"\n\nI do not deny that moral instinct ripens quicker than scientific\ncomprehension. Why? Because in a time when science is not as yet so\nfar advanced as to understand the operations of the moral law, those\npeople who instinctively obey the rules that can be derived from the\nmoral law, will survive and all the rest will go to the wall. But\nthe fact that we can have a reliable moral guide in an instinctive\ncertainty which is generally called conscience, even before we attain\nto scientific clearness, does not prove that science will be forever\nexcluded from the world of moral ideals.\n\nProfessor Adler's agnosticism found a very strong expression in a poem\nwhich resembles in its tone and ideas the church hymns of the New\nJerusalem. The poem is very unequivocal on the point that moral action\nis comparable to building an ideal city, the plan of which is unknown\nto the builders. Professor Adler says:\n\n \"Have you heard the Golden City\n Mentioned in the legends old?\n Everlasting light shines o'er it,\n Wondrous tales of it are told.\n\n Only righteous men and women\n Dwell within its gleaming wall;\n Wrong is banished from its borders,\n Justice reigns supreme o'er all.\n\n Do you ask, Where is that City,\n Where the perfect Right doth reign?\n I must answer, I must tell you,\n That you seek its site in vain.\n\n You may roam o'er hill and valley,\n You may pass o'er land and sea,\n You may search the wide earth over,\u2014\n 'T is a City yet to be!\n\n We are builders of that City,\u2014\n All our joys and all our groans\n Help to rear its shining ramparts;\n All our lives are building-stones.\n\n * * * * *\n\n _What that plan may be we know not._[136]\n How the seat of Justice high,\n How the City of our vision\n Will appear to mortal eye,\u2014\n\n That no mortal eye can picture,\n That no mortal tongue can tell.\n We can barely dream the glories\n Of the Future's citadel.\"\n\n [136] The italics are ours.\n\nHow great an importance is attributed to this song by the leaders of\nthe ethical movement may be learned from Mr. Salter's opinion of it.\nMr. Salter says in criticising Unitarianism:\n\n \"Not from Unitarianism, not from Christianity, has come the\n song that best utters and almost chants this thought [of\n an ideal fellowship]. It is from Felix Adler, upon whom, I\n sometimes think, more than upon any other man of our day, the\n mantle and prophetic spirit of Channing have fallen, and whose\n words, I almost believe, are those which Jesus himself would\n utter, should he come and put his solemn thought and passion\n into the language of to-day.\"\n\nAgnosticism is in our opinion no sound basis upon which to erect\nethics. The unknowable is like quicksand, it gives way under our\nfeet. The ethics of agnosticism must necessarily become mysticism.\nThe ethereal dreams of mysticists need no solid basis, they hover in\nthe air. Mr. Spencer who for some reason or other tried to escape\nthe consequences of his agnosticism in the ethical field, adopted\nUtilitarianism, basing his moral maxims not upon the unknowable, as\nconsistency would require, but upon the principle of the greatest\nhappiness for the greatest number.\n\nProfessor Adler is not a Spencerian agnostic and here lies the strength\nof his ethics. Although he does not attain to a clear and scientific\nconception of the origin and natural growth of morality, he sounds\nno uncertain voice with regard to the Happiness Principle. He has\non several occasions, like his great master Kant, uncompromisingly\nrejected any Hedonism or Eud\u00e6monism. Among all societies aspiring\nto foster moral ideals, the societies for ethical culture are\ndistinguished for their seriousness and ardor; and there can be no\ndoubt about the cause: it is the spirit of Professor Adler's zeal not\nto give way to a hedonistic conception of ethics.\n\n\nX. THE UNITY OF THE ETHICAL PROBLEM.\n\nWe conclude. Although the ethical problem can and must be split up in\ninnumerable different problems, we should never lose sight of its unity.\n\nOur age is a period of specialisation, of a division of labor and\nof detail work. This is true. But the more will it be necessary\nto survey the whole field and keep in mind the unity of which all\npiecemeal efforts are but parts. As soon as we lose sight of the\nunity in a certain system of problems, we are most liable to drop\ninto inconsistencies. This is true of all things, of every science in\nparticular, and of philosophy, the science of the sciences, also. It is\nno less true of ethics. We cannot engage, with any hope of success, in\nany of the diverse ethical questions unless we have first solved _the_\nethical problem.\n\n EDITOR.\n\n\n\n\nON THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE.\n\nA LECTURE DELIVERED BEFORE THE PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY OF GLASGOW, ON\nJAN. 21, 1891.\n\n\nIt seems impossible to many people to look upon language as anything\nbut an instrument of thought. In one sense this is perfectly true. We\nthink by means of words, just as we see by means of eyes, and hear by\nmeans of ears, and walk by means of legs. But could we walk without our\nlegs, or see without our eyes? We can walk with artificial legs, no\ndoubt, and so we can think and speak in foreign languages, and in every\nkind of artificial sign-language. But as artificial legs presuppose\nnatural legs, foreign and artificial languages presuppose our own\nnatural language.\n\nWhen we speak of instruments we mean generally such things as knives\nwith which we cut, or pens with which we write. They are instruments\nwhich are useful, but they are not indispensable, and can be replaced\nby other instruments. This does not, however, apply to eyes, ears,\nor language, and in order to mark that distinction the former are\ngenerally called instruments, the latter organs.\n\nNow, if we call language the organ of thought, we, no doubt, admit\nthat we can distinguish between the _organon_, that which works, and\nthe _ergon_, i. e. the work which it performs. But it does by no\nmeans follow that therefore the _ergon_ could ever exist without the\n_organon_. We can easily distinguish between the act of spoken thought\nand the organ of spoken thought, but it does by no means follow that\ntherefore the act of spoken thought could ever exist without the organ\nof spoken thought.\n\nIt may seem unfair in this argument to call thought \"spoken thought.\"\nIt looks like begging the whole question. But it really is not so. By\ncalling thought \"spoken thought,\" we only supply a deficiency of our\nmodern languages. If we were Greeks, we should use the simple word\n_Logos_, and instead of begging the question, we should show that our\nproposition is, really self-evident, or, it may be, even tautological,\nnamely that _logos_ is impossible without _logos_.\n\nHere we can see at once how intimately thought is connected with\nlanguage, how it is dependent on it, or, more correctly, how\ninseparable the two really are. If, like the Greeks, we had a word\nsuch as logos, we should probably never have doubted that what we call\nspeech and thought are but two sides of the same thing. And the same\nlesson is taught us again and again, if only we are inclined to listen\nto it.\n\nSuppose we had no such word as _matter_, would not our whole system of\nthought be different? Matter is not an object, perceived by our senses.\nWe may even go further and say that matter by itself never exists. This\nor that matter exists, chemical substances, say, gold or silver, oxygen\nor hydrogen, exist; but matter, which some philosophers look upon as\nthe most certain and concrete of all things, is simply an abstraction,\nsomething that may be predicated of many things, but that is never\nfound by itself _in rerum natur\u00e2_.\n\nSome people define matter as what is ponderable and impenetrable, but\nhere again, nothing exists that is simply ponderable, or impenetrable.\nIt is always something else; it is iron, wood, stone, vapor, gas, but\nnever matter, _pur et simple_.\n\nIt is clear, therefore, that matter is made by us, and that without\nsome such word as matter, we could never have the faintest idea or\nconcept of matter. For how should we call it? On the other hand, it\nis equally clear that we could not have the word matter, without the\nconcept of matter. For what would be the use of it? Now, what follows\nfrom this apparent dilemma? If the concept cannot be prior to the\nname and the name cannot be prior to the concept, they must needs be\nsimultaneous, or, more correctly, they must be the same thing under two\naspects.\n\nFrom an historical point of view, that is, if we consider the genesis\nof words and concepts, not in modern times, but during that period when\nwords and concepts were framed for the first time, we are bound to\nadmit that the word is really the _prius_. That period may be ever so\nfar distant, but it was nevertheless a very real and truly historical\nperiod.\n\nHow did man arrive at such a word as matter? The word itself tells its\nown story. It came to us from French, it came into French from Latin.\nIn Latin _materies_ or _materia_ still means wood and timber, though it\nhas also assumed the meaning of matter, like the Greek \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7, which means\nboth wood and matter. The process by which _materies_ came to mean\nmatter is clear. If _materies_ meant originally the wood out of which a\nhut, a table, a chair, or a stick was made, it was naturally applied to\nother substances also, such as stone, bricks, or metal when used in the\nmaking of huts, tables, chairs, or sticks. In the same way we speak of\na pen, i. e. a quill, though we mean a steel pen.\n\nWhen the original special meaning of wood thus disappeared, there\nremained only the meaning of building material, material, and, at last,\nof matter and substance. We say now, What is the matter? What does\nit matter? but we little think of the solid beams out of which such\nexpressions were hewn and fashioned. In this sense, therefore, we may\nsay that historically the word _materies_ came first, meaning a beam,\nand that gradually it shed its various attributes, one after the other,\ntill there remained nothing but its trunk, and that is what we now mean\nby matter.\n\nHere, therefore, we see the process of generalisation which is very\nimportant, particularly in the later periods of language and thought.\n\nBut it is the greatest mistake to suppose that language, such as we\nknow it, what we might call historical language, always begins with\nthe particular and then proceeds to the general. Adam Smith was one of\nthe ablest defenders of the theory that the _Primum Cognitum_ and the\n_Primum Appellatum_ must have been the particular. But all the facts of\nlanguage are dead against this theory. And yet, that theory has once\nmore been put forward by a philosopher who prides himself on nothing\nso much as that his philosophy rests throughout on positive facts. I\ndo not blame a philosopher who is ignorant of the results obtained by\nthe Science of Language, so long as he abstains from touching on the\nsubject. But constantly to appeal to language, and yet to ignore what\nhas been achieved by comparative philologists, is unpardonable. No one\nis a greater sinner in that respect than Mr. Herbert Spencer.\n\nWhen speaking of the process by which the abstract idea of color was\nformed he says:[137] 'The idea of each color had originally entire\nconcreteness given to it by an object possessing the color; as some\nof the unmodified names, such as orange and violet, show us. The\ndissociation of each color from the object specially associated with\nit in thought at the outset, went on as fast as the color came to be\nassociated in thought with objects unlike the first, and unlike one\nanother. The idea of orange was conceived in the abstract more fully in\nproportion as the various orange-colored objects remembered, cancelled\none another's diverse attributes, and left outstanding their common\nattribute. So it is if we ascend a stage, and note how there arises the\nabstract idea of color, apart from particular colors.'\n\n [137] _Data of Ethics_, p. 124.\n\nNow this is all untrue. Such names as orange and violet are some of the\nlatest names of color. They presuppose such late, nay exotic, concepts,\nas _orange_ and _violet_. The question why an orange was called an\norange, and a violet a violet remains unasked and unanswered. In the\nold names for _black_, _white_, _red_, _green_, and _blue_, there is\nnot a trace of ink, or snow, or blood, or sea, or sky. They are all\nderived, so far as we can analyse them at all, from roots meaning to\nshine, to grow, to beat black and blue, and not from oranges, roses, or\nviolets.\n\nAgain, what can be the meaning of such a sentence as:[138] 'Words\nreferring to quantity furnish cases of more marked dissociation of\nabstract from concrete. Grouping various things as small in comparison\neither with those of their kind or with those of other kinds; and\nsimilarly grouping some objects as comparatively great, we get the\nopposite abstract notions of smallness and greatness.' Does Mr. Spencer\nreally believe that we can call things small and great, that our\nlanguage can possess two adjectives expressive of these qualities,\nand that yet at the same time we are without an abstract notion of\nsmallness and greatness? Mr. H. Spencer constantly calls on the\nfacts of language, to confirm his views, but his facts are hardly\never correct. For instance: after having explained that, according\nto his ideas, greater coherence among its component motions broadly\ndistinguishes the conduct we call moral from the conduct we call\nimmoral, he appeals to the word _dissolute_, when meaning immoral, as\nproving this theory. But _dissolutus_ in Latin meant originally no\nmore than negligent, remiss. _Dissolutio_ meant languor, weakness,\neffeminacy, and then only licentiousness and immorality. Language,\ntherefore, in no way confirms Mr. H. Spencer's speculations, still less\ndoes experience, for no man is so coherent in his acts, so calculating,\nso self-restrained, as the confirmed criminal; no one is often so\ncareless, so little shrewd, so easily duped as the thoroughly moral and\ntherefore trustful and confiding man.\n\n [138] L. c., p. 125.\n\nBut to return to the history of the word for matter. The process\nby which _materies_, wood, came to mean matter, is intelligible\nenough, whether we call it generalisation, or abstraction. But how\ncame _materies_ to mean wood? That is the question which has to be\nsolved, and in solving it, we shall find that while in the second\nperiod of thought-language the progress is from the particular to\nthe general, the progress in the first period is the reverse, namely\nfrom the general to the particular. In the case of _materes_ this is\nvery clear. No one can doubt that in _materies_ the radical element\nis _m\u00e2_, the derivatives _ter_ and _ies_. The radical element _m\u00e2_ is\nfound in Sanskrit _m\u00e2-tram_, measure, _m\u00e2-nam_, measuring, _m\u00e2-na-s_,\na building; in Greek \u03bc\u03ad-\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd, measure; in Latin _me-tare_, to measure.\nWe can hardly doubt that the oldest Aryan name for mother also, namely\n_m\u00e2tar_, Greek \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b7\u03c1, Latin _mater_, English _mother_, is derived from\nthat root, though it is doubtful in what sense. It may have meant\noriginally no more than maker or fashioner, and it is important to\nobserve that in the Veda the same word _m\u00e2tar_, occurs as a masculine\nand means maker, and actually governs an accusative. But it may also\nhave meant arranger, controller, and mistress of all household affairs.\nWhatever its original intension was, _m\u00e2tar_ soon became a mere name.\nIts etymological keynote was no longer audible, and _m\u00e2tar_ meant\nmother and all that was implied in that name when used by children and\nothers.\n\nIf we compare all the words which contain this _m\u00e2_ as their common\nelement, we can see that it meant originally to put two or more things\ntogether. This led to two applications. What we call measuring is\nreally putting two things together, one by the side of another, to see\nhow far they agree and how far they differ. Thus _m\u00e2_ took the special\nmeaning of measuring, in such words as Greek \u03bc\u03ad\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd and Sanskrit\n_m\u00e2tram_. But to put together could also be used in the sense of\njoining, carpentering, building, and making, and this meaning we find\nin such words as (Sanskrit) _m\u00e2nas_, a building, _m\u00e2ti_, he measures,\nhe makes, and likewise _materies_, what has been fashioned, what can\nbe used for building a hut, timber, wood, building material, then any\nkind of material, and at last matter, substance in its most general\nacceptation.\n\nYou can see here very clearly the twofold process in the formation\nof words, first, from the general to the particular,\u2014from measuring\nto wood, and then from the particular to the general, from timber to\nmatter.\n\nIf you ask, what is this syllable _m\u00e2_ which has the general meaning of\nmeasuring and making, I can only answer, We know, and we do not know.\nWe know as a fact that it is the common element in a number of words,\nwhich are differentiated by a number of derivative elements, called\nsuffixes, prefixes, and infixes, but which can all be shown to share\nin common the general meaning of making and measuring. These common\nelements have been called roots. The question whether these roots\never existed by themselves, and whether any language could ever have\nconsisted of these roots, is a foolish question. For as soon as a root\noccurs in a sentence, it is either a subject or a predicate, a noun or\na verb, and it has ceased to be a mere root. But on the other hand, it\nis quite true that in certain languages, as, for instance, in Chinese\nthere is no formal difference between a root and a word\u2014there are no\nsuffixes or prefixes. But the strict rules of the collocation of words\nin every sentence make it quite clear whether a word is to be taken as\na substantive, a verb, an adjective, an adverb, and all the rest.\n\nBy the same process by which we have reduced a number of words to the\nroot _m\u00e2_, the whole dictionary of Sanskrit, and of English also, in\nfact of all the Aryan and likewise of the Semitic languages, has been\nreduced to a small number of roots. Given that small number of roots,\nwe undertake to account for the whole wealth of words in any language,\nsimply by means of derivation with suffixes and prefixes, and by means\nof composition.\n\nIn all this we are dealing with fact, facts which are as well\nascertained as any facts in physical science.\n\nMaking allowance for a small margin of words which have as yet resisted\nall attempts at etymological analysis, we can state that the vast\nmajority of words in Sanskrit has been reduced to about 800 roots. In\nthe progress of language whole families of words derived from some of\nthese roots become extinct while others continue prolific and take\ntheir place. The consequence is that the number of roots in English has\ndwindled down to 461, while the sum total of words has risen to about\n250,000.\n\nEvery one of these roots has a general or conceptual meaning, such\nas striking, pushing, rubbing, cutting, bearing, binding, measuring,\nbuilding, moving, going, falling, and all the rest.\n\nIt often happens, however, that two or more roots have the same or\nnearly the same meaning, and this explains why, when we count the\nfundamental concepts expressed by our 800 roots in Sanskrit, we find\nthat they amount to no more than 121.\n\nI say again that in all this we are dealing with well ascertained facts.\n\nThe next step, however, leads us into the domain of theory. If we\nare asked, how these roots came into existence, we may decline to\nanswer the question as outside the limits of science. A chemist would\nprobably do the same, if he were asked how the chemical elements came\ninto existence. In fact, the students of the Science of Language have\nalways taken their stand here and have treated roots as ultimate facts.\n\nI ought to mention, however, two theories which, though they have long\nbeen surrendered by students of the Science of Language still enjoy\na certain popularity, and commend themselves to many people by their\nextreme simplicity and plausibility.\n\nThe first consists in ascribing the roots of all languages to a direct\ncommunication from God. It is impossible to refute such an opinion;\nall we can say is that such a communication, if we try to realise it\nin imagination, would imply such a crude anthropomorphism that one\nnaturally shrinks from entering into details.\n\nThe second consists in looking upon roots as imitations of the\nsounds of nature or as interjections. Here all we can say is that\nthe experiment has been tried again and again, and has failed. Every\nlanguage contains a number of such words which are imitations of the\nsounds of nature or interjections. No one can doubt of the origin of\n_bow wow_, a dog, or of _pooh-poohing_, in the sense of rejecting. But\nthe great stock of words, however, cannot be accounted for by this easy\nprocess, and no serious scholar would think of resuscitating what many\nyears ago I described as the Bow-wow and Pooh-pooh theories.\n\nBut while the student of language seems to me to have a perfect right\nto treat the roots of language as ultimate facts, it is difficult for\nthe philosopher not to look beyond. He cannot hope to do more than\nto suggest an hypothesis, but if his hypothesis accounts for the few\nfacts he has to deal with, such an hypothesis is legitimate, though, no\ndoubt, it is very far from being an established truth.\n\nThe hypothesis which I suggested on the origin of roots, was suggested\nto me by Professor Noir\u00e9's hypothesis as to the origin of concepts.\nMy late friend, Professor Noir\u00e9, was one of those who discovered\ndifficulties where no one else saw them. While most philosophers were\nsatisfied with the fact that man possessed the power of forming, not\nonly percepts, but concepts also, while no trace of conceptual thought\nwas found in animals, Noir\u00e9 subjected this power of forming concepts\nto a most minute psychological analysis, and thus was brought face to\nface with the question, what was, from a psychogenetic point of view,\nthe real impulse to the formation of conceptual thought. Questions like\nthis, which to most people, seem perfectly superfluous, often mark the\nreal progress in the history of philosophy. Logicians see no difficulty\nin explaining how, either by addition or subtraction, positively\nor negatively, concepts are formed out of percepts. White, they\nsay, is either what snow, milk, and marble share in common, or what\nremains if we drop from snow, milk, and marble all but their color.\nThe psychologist who looks upon the human mind as the result of an\nevolution, whether in the individual or in the race, asks, not _how_,\nbut _why_ such concepts should have been formed. Now Professor Noir\u00e9\nshowed, as I thought, with great sagacity, that the first inevitable\nconcepts arose from man's consciousness of his own repeated acts; that\nnowhere in nature could we find a similar primitive and irresistible\nimpulse to conceptual thought, but that if the beginning had once been\nmade, there was no longer any difficulty in accounting for the further\ndevelopment of conceptual thought in all directions.\n\nI call this no more than an hypothesis, or, if you like, a guess, and\nI do not see how in the regions in which we find ourselves, we can\nexpect anything more than an hypothesis. But when one hypothesis, like\nthat of Noir\u00e9's, harmonises with another hypothesis, that was formed\nquite independently, we cannot help seeing that the two lend each other\npowerful mutual support.\n\nLet us remember then that a most careful psychological analysis had\nled Noir\u00e9 to the conclusion that the germs of all conceptual thought\nwere to be found in the consciousness of our own repeated acts. And\nlet us place by the side of this, the well-ascertained fact that the\ngerms of all conceptual language, what we call the roots, express with\nfew exceptions the repeated acts of men. Is not the conclusion almost\ninevitable that these two processes were in reality but two sides of\none and the same process in the evolution of human thought and human\nlanguage? Professor Noir\u00e9 did not know of the linguistic fact, when\nhe arrived at his psychological conclusions. I did not know of his\npsychological conclusions, when I arrived at my linguistic facts. But\nwhen I saw that by different roads we had both arrived at exactly the\nsame point, I thought that this could not be by an accident.\n\nThere remained, however, one more question to be answered, and that\nquestion again could be answered hypothetically only. How can we\naccount for the sounds of the roots, which we have recognised as the\ngerms of conceptual thought and conceptual language? Why should, for\ninstance, the concept of rubbing be expressed by MAR, and that of\ntearing by DAR? Here again Noir\u00e9 and others before him have pointed\nto the well-known fact that men, when engaged in common acts, find a\nrelief in emitting their breath in more or less musical modulation. It\nhas therefore been supposed that our roots are the remnants of sounds\nwhich accompanied these acts, and which, being used, not by one man\nonly, but by men acting in common, were therefore intelligible to the\nwhole community.\n\nNo one would dream of representing this theory of the origin of our\nconceptual roots as a well-ascertained historical fact. It is and can\nonly be an hypothesis. But, as such, it fulfils all the requirements of\na working hypothesis. It explains all that has to be explained, and it\ndoes not run counter to any facts, or any well established theories.\nIt explains the sounds of our roots, not as mere interjections, which\nwould be the signs of momentary feelings, and not, what we want,\nthe signs of our consciousness of a number of repeated acts as one\naction. Our roots are, if we may venture to say so, conceptual, not\ninterjectional sounds. They are, in fact, exactly what, according to\nNoir\u00e9's philosophical system, the primary elements of language ought to\nbe.\n\nI do not say that this theory is the only possible theory of the origin\nof roots, and therefore of language. Let a better theory be started,\nand I shall be delighted to accept it. But don't let us try to revive\nexploded theories, unless there are new facts to support them. I can\nonly give you my own experience. For many years I was satisfied to look\nupon roots as ultimate facts. But when Professor Noir\u00e9 showed that the\nfundamental concepts of our thought must be concepts expressive of our\nown acts, and when thereupon I went carefully through the list of our\nAryan roots and found that with few exceptions, every one of them, as a\nmatter of fact, expressed the ordinary acts of men in a simple state of\ncivilisation, I was driven to the conclusion that the primitive roots\nof Aryan speech may owe their origin to the sounds which naturally\naccompany many acts performed in common by members of a family, a clan,\nor a village. This would vindicate once more the conviction which I\nhave always held that language was from the beginning conceptual, and\nconfirm the well-known statement of Locke, that 'the having of general\nideas is that which puts a perfect distinction between man and brutes,\nand is an excellency which the faculties of brutes do by no means\nattain to.'\n\nAllow me in conclusion to say a few words on what I can hardly call\na criticism, but rather a misrepresentation, or, I ought perhaps\nto say, a complete misapprehension of this theory of the origin of\nroots which appeared in a book lately published by Professor Romanes,\n\"Mental Evolution in Man,\" as a continuation of an earlier work of his,\ncalled \"Mental Evolution in Animals.\" My learned friend, Professor\nRomanes, labors to show that there is an unbroken mental evolution from\nthe lowest animal to the highest man. But he sees very clearly and\nconfesses very honestly that the chief difficulty in this evolution is\nlanguage and all that language implies. He tries very hard to remove\nthat barrier between beast and man. For that purpose he devotes a whole\nchapter, the thirteenth, to a consideration of the roots of language,\nand yet he says at the end of the chapter, \"I wish in conclusion to\nmake it clear that the matter\u2014that is the question whether roots\nare imitations of sound or interjections\u2014is not one which seriously\naffects the theory of evolution.\"\n\nIf it were so, why should Professor Romanes have devoted a whole\nchapter to it? But it is not my intention to argue this question with\nProfessor Romanes, but rather to show how difficult it is for any\none, not acquainted with the Science of Language, even to apprehend\nthe problems that have to be solved. Professor Romanes is, I believe,\na most eminent biologist, and the mantle of Darwin is said to have\nfallen on his shoulders. Far be it from me to venture to criticise his\nbiological facts. But we see in his case how dangerous it is for a\nman who can claim to speak with authority on his own special subject,\nto venture to speak authoritatively on subjects not his own. Professor\nRomanes has, no doubt, read several books on philology and philosophy,\nbut he is not sufficiently master of his subject to have the slightest\nright to speak of men like Noir\u00e9, Huxley, Herbert Spencer, to say\nnothing of Hobbes, with an air of superiority. That is entirely out of\nplace. When he points out differences of opinion between philologists,\nhe does not even understand how they have arisen, and he ought to know\nbetter than anybody else that mere difference of opinion between two\ncompetent scholars does not prove that both are wrong and can never be\nused to throw discredit on the whole science.\n\nBut as I said just now, I am not going to argue with Professor Romanes\nbecause, as he says himself (p. 276), if I were right, his whole theory\nwould collapse. I hope this is not the case, but I feel sure that,\nif it were, Professor Romanes would only rejoice at it. Anyhow why\nintroduce so much of the _meum_ and _tuum_ into these discussions? If\nit could be proved that the Aryas came from Europe, then, no doubt,\nthe other theory that they came from Asia, would collapse. But among\nserious students every such collapse would be greeted with gratitude,\nand would be looked upon simply as a step in advance. We are all fellow\nworkers, we all care for one thing only, the discovery of truth. It is\nin this spirit, and without a thought of any collapse, that I venture\nto point out a number of clear mistakes which occur on almost every\npage when Mr. Romanes touches linguistic questions, and which fully\naccount for his not perceiving the true character of the evidence\nplaced before us by the Science of Language.\n\nOn page 267 he says that I profess, as a result of more recent\nresearches, to have reduced the number of Sanskrit roots to 121.\n\nI wish I had. But the number of roots in Sanskrit stands as yet at\nabout 800; the number 121, of which he speaks, is the number of\nconcepts expressed by these roots, many of them conveying the same, or\nnearly the same idea. A root is one thing, a concept quite another. To\nconfuse the two is like confusing thought and expression.\n\nI thought I had made it quite clear, that these 121 concepts, conveyed\nby about 800 roots, are simply and solely the residue of a careful\nanalysis of Sanskrit, and of Sanskrit only. I took particular care to\nmake this clear. 'They constitute the stock in trade,' I said, 'with\nwhich every thought that has ever passed through the mind of India, so\nfar as it is known to us in its literature, has been expressed.' What\ncan be clearer? Still Professor Romanes thinks it necessary to remark\nthat 'these concepts do not represent the ideation of primitive man!'\nI never said they did. I never pretended to be acquainted with the\nideation of primitive man. All I maintained was that, making allowance\nfor obscure words, every thought, that of the lowest savage as well as\nthat of the most minute philosopher, can be expressed with these 800\nroots, and traced back to these 121 concepts. I even hinted that the\nnumber of these concepts might be considerably reduced. The question\nis not whether forms of activity, such as _to yawn_, _to spew_,\n_to vomit_, _to sweat_, were of vital importance to the needs of a\nprimitive community, but whether they were known and therefore named,\nin the early vocabulary of India. If on the other hand some of these\nconcepts, such as _to cook_, _to roast_, _to measure_, _to dig_, _to\nplat_, _to milk_, betoken an advanced condition of life, all we can say\nis that they would probably not occur in the dictionary of primeval\nsavages, wherever such a being can be found, and that they do not\nprofess to be the first utterances of the _Homo alalus_, whoever that\nmay be.\n\nImmediately after this, Professor Romanes dwells on what he calls\nthe interesting feature of all roots being verbs. This is simply\na contradiction in terms. In giving the meaning of roots scholars\ngenerally employ the infinitive or the participle, to go, or going,\nbut they have stated again and again that a root ceases to be a root\nas soon as it is used in a sentence, either as a subject or as a\npredicate, either as a noun or a verb. All his arguments therefore\nthat archaic words, expressive of actions, would have stood a better\nchance of surviving as roots than those which may have been expressive\nof objects, are simply out of place. The question whether verbs came\nfirst or nouns, may be argued _ad infinitum_, quite as much as the\nquestion whether the egg came first or the chicken. Every sentence\nrequires a subject as well as a predicate. If Professor Romanes\napproves of my saying that roots stood for any part of speech, just as\nthe monosyllabic expressions of children do, I can only say that if I\never said so, I expressed myself incorrectly. A root never stands for\nany part of speech, because as soon as it is a part of speech, it is no\nlonger a root.\n\nAfter that, Professor Romanes returns once more to his statement that\nthe roots of Aryan speech are not the aboriginal elements of language,\nas first spoken by man. Why deny what has never been asserted? I know\nnothing of the language as first spoken by man. I say with Steinthal,\n'Who was present when the first sound of language burst forth from the\nbreast of the first man, as yet dumb?' All that we, the students of\nlanguage, undertake to do is to take language as we find it, to analyse\nit, and to reduce it to its simplest component elements. What we cannot\nanalyse, we leave alone. The utmost we venture to do is to suggest\nan hypothesis as to the possible origin of these elements. Of the\n_Homo alalus_, the speechless progenitor of _Homo sapiens_, with whom\nProfessor Romanes seems so intimately acquainted, students of human\nspeech naturally know nothing. Professor Romanes assures us (p. 211)\nthat the reducing of language to a certain small number of roots, and\nthe fact that all the roots of language are expressive of general and\ngeneric ideas, yield no support whatever to the doctrine either, that\nthese roots were themselves the aboriginal elements of language, or, _a\nfortiori_, that the aboriginal elements of language were expressive of\ngeneral ideas. He evidently does not see that we are speaking of two\nquite different things. I am speaking of the facts of language, he is\nspeaking of the postulates of a biological theory which may be right or\nwrong, but which certainly derives no support whatever from the Science\nof Language. If, like Professor Romanes, we begin with the 'immense\npresumption that there has been no interruption in the developmental\nprocess in the course of psychological history,' the protest of\nlanguage counts for nothing; the very fact that no animal has ever\nformed a language, is put aside simply as an unfortunate accident. But\nto students to whom facts are facts, immense presumptions count for\nnothing: on the contrary they are looked upon as the most dangerous\nmerchandise and most likely to lead to shipwreck and ruin.\n\nInstead of closing with these facts, Professor Romanes tries to show\nthat those who try to explain them are not always consistent. That may\nbe so, and I should be sorry indeed if my latest views were not more\nadvanced and more correct than those which I expressed forty years ago.\nBut very often where Professor Romanes sees inconsistency, there is\nnone at all.\n\nSpeaking of roots in my \"Science of Thought,\" I said: 'Although during\nthe time when the growth of language becomes historical and most\naccessible, therefore, to our observation, the tendency certainly is\nfrom the general to the special, I cannot resist the conviction that\nbefore that time there was a pre-historic period during which language\nfollowed an opposite direction. During that period, roots beginning\nwith special meanings, (though, of course, always general in character)\nbecame more and more generalised, and it was only after reaching that\nstage, that they branched off again into special channels.'\n\nThe observation which I recorded in these words, was simply this, that\na root meaning originally to yawn, may in time assume the meaning of\nopening, while during a latter period, a root meaning to open, may come\nto be used in the more special sense of yawning. Facts are there to\nprove this. But whether a root expresses the act of yawning or opening,\nit remains general and conceptual in either case, though the intension\nof the concept may be smaller or larger. Where Professor Romanes sees\ninconsistency, he only shows that he has not apprehended the drift of\nmy remarks.\n\nWhen all the facts of real language are against him, Professor Romanes\nbetakes himself to baby-language. Here he is safe, and he knows quite\nwell, why I refuse to argue with him or any other philosopher either\nin the nursery, or in the menagerie, either about Mamma and Papa, or\nabout 'Poor Polly.' But if all he wants is to prove the possibility\nof onomatop\u0153ia, he could have found much ampler evidence in my own\nlaboratory, only with this restriction that, after we have analysed\nthese onomatop\u0153ic words which in some languages are far more numerous\nthan even Professor Romanes seems to be aware of, we are only on the\nthreshold of the real problem, namely how to deal with real language,\nthat is, with those conceptual words which _cannot_ be traced back to\nnatural sounds or interjections.\n\nProfessor Romanes appeals to philology in support of his theory, and,\nto use a favorite phrase of his own, to philology let him go! It was\nlong considered an irrefragable proof in support of the onomatop\u0153ic\ntheory that _thunder_ was called _thunder_. People imagined they heard\nthe rumbling noise of the clouds echoed in the sound of thunder.\nHowever, the word was taken to pieces by comparative philologists,\n_thunder_ was found out to be closely connected with the Latin\n_tonitru_ and the Sanskrit _tanyatu_, and there could be no doubt that\nthese words were all derived from the root TAN, to stretch, from which\nthe Greek \u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2, stretching, tension, and tone. Thunder, therefore,\nwas clearly shown to owe its origin to this root TAN, in which there\nis very little trace of distant rumble. But what does Professor\nRomanes do? He appeals in his distress to Archdeacon Farrar, who is\nreported to have said that the word _thunder_, even if not originally\nonomatop\u0153ic, became so from a feeling of the need that it should be!\nNow, this fairly takes away one's breath, and I cannot believe that\nProfessor Romanes could have used this argument seriously. He begins\nby maintaining that words are formed by imitation of natural sounds.\nHe quotes _thunder_ as a case in point. He is told by comparative\nphilologists that thunder is derived from a root TAN, to stretch. He\ndoes not attempt to deny this, but he appeals to Archdeacon Farrar, who\nsays that the word became afterwards onomatop\u0153ic, from a feeling of the\nneed that it should be so. If that is not shirking the question, I do\nnot know what is. Suppose it were true that thunder had been supposed\nto be an imitation of a rumbling noise by those who, like Professor\nRomanes, are convinced that all words must be more or less onomatop\u0153ic.\nWhat in all the world has that to do with the real origin of the word?\nWe want to know how the word thunder came to be, and we are told, if\nit was not onomatop\u0153ic, it ought to have been so, nay that by certain\nignorant people it was supposed to be so. This goes beyond the limits\nof what is allowed in any serious discussion.\n\nBut Professor Romanes attempts a still greater triumph in forensic\nadroitness, when he suddenly turns round and declares himself\naltogether convinced by the theory proposed by Noir\u00e9 and myself, though\nat the same time placing it on a level with the Bow-wow and Pooh-pooh\ntheories. Now the fact is, that both Noir\u00e9 and myself have been most\nanxious to show the fundamental difference between these two exploded\ntheories and our own. The theory which I, for clearness' sake, was\nquite willing to call the _Yo-he-ho_ theory, is the very opposite of\nwhat Noir\u00e9 called the _Synergastic_ theory. Those who appeal to words\nlike _thunder_ as derived from the rumbling sound in the clouds,\nwithout any conceptual root standing between our conceptual word\n_thunder_ and these unconceptual noises, hold the Bow-wow theory. Those\nwho hold that _fiend_ is derived direct from the interjection _fie_,\nwithout any conceptual root standing between the unconceptual _fie_ and\nthe conceptual word _fiend_, hold the Pooh-pooh theory. Those who would\nderive _to heave_ and _to hoist_ from sounds like _Yo-he-ho_ would hold\nwhat may be called the _Yo-he-ho_ theory. I have never denied that\nthere are some words in every language which may be so explained.\n\nBut what similarity is there between these theories and our own? We\nbegin with the fact that the great bulk of a language consists of\nwords, derived, according to the strictest rules, not from cries, but\nfrom articulate roots. No one denies this. We follow this up with\na second fact, that nearly all these roots express acts of men. No\none denies that. We then propound an hypothesis that possibly the\nphonetic elements of these roots may be the remnants of utterances\nsuch as even now sailors make when rowing, soldiers when marching,\nbuilders in pulling and lifting, and that as expressing originally\nthe consciousness of such repeated acts, performed in common, these\nroots would fulfil what is wanted, they would express conceptual\nthought, such as beating, cutting, rubbing, binding, and all the other\n121 concepts from which, as a matter of fact, all the words that\nfill our dictionaries have been derived. Those who cannot see the\ndifference between a man, or, for all that, between a mocking bird,\nsaying _Cuckoo_, and a whole community fixing on the sound of TAN, as\ndifferentiated by various suffixes and prefixes, and expressing the\nconcept of stretching in such words as _tonos_, _tone_, _tonitru_,\n_thunder_, _tanu_, _tenuis_, _thin_, should not meddle with the Science\nof Language.\n\nObservations, for instance, on the language of children, or on what I\ncall Nursery psychology, are very interesting and may be useful for\nother purposes. But what have they to do with the problem of the origin\nof language? The two problems, how a child learns to speak English, and\nhow language was elaborated for the first time, are as remote from each\nother as the two poles. The one is perfectly clear, though it may vary\nin different children. No child makes its language, it simply accepts\nwhat has been made. What _we_ are concerned with is, how each word was\noriginally made, how the first impulse to speech was given, what were\nthe rough materials out of which words were shaped, how words assumed\ndifferent meanings by becoming specialised or generalised, or by being\nused metaphorically\u2014how, in the end, some words became purely formal,\nand served as the grammatical articulations of human speech. What has\nthat to do with a child learning to say _Bread_ or _Milk_, or with a\nparrot learning to say _Poor Polly_? We might as well try to study the\ngeological stratification of the earth from watching the layers of a\nwedding-cake. I know quite well that every philosopher, when he becomes\na father thinks that he may discover the origin of language in his\nnursery. The books which owe their origin to these paternal experiments\nare endless. But they have thrown hardly one ray of pure light on the\ndark problem of the origin and evolution of human speech. That problem,\nif it can be solved at all, can only be solved by a careful analysis\nof language, such as it exists in the immense varieties of spoken\nlanguages all over the globe. This is the work which the Science of\nLanguage has carried out for nearly a century, and which will occupy\nthe minds of many students and philosophers for centuries to come.\n\n F. MAX MUELLER.\n\n\n\n\nLITERARY CORRESPONDENCE.\n\n\nI.\n\nSome distinguished foreigners have called my attention to the _Manuals\nof Moral and Civic Instruction_ which circulate in our schools,\nthinking with reason that they mark perhaps the most important reform\nin public teaching. There have been published in France a dozen or\nmore during the last ten years or so. The clerical party has thundered\nagainst these little books: it had good reason for alarm, for they aim\nat nothing less than to take the place of the catechism.\n\nHow do they replace it? What is their inferiority, or, what their\nadvantages? What is their principle, their disposition? This can be\nsufficiently judged of by the five we have before us, signed by names\nmore or less known, those of PAUL BERT, PIERRE LALOI, CHARLES BIGOT,\nMME. HENRY GR\u00c9VILLE, and GABRIEL COMPAYR\u00c9.[139]\n\n [139] Paul Bert, _L'Instruction civique \u00e0 l'\u00e9cole_,\n Picard-Bernheim, Pub.; Pierre Laloi, _La premi\u00e8re ann\u00e9e\n d'instruction morale et civique_, Armand Colin, Pub.; Charles\n Bigot, _Le petit Fran\u00e7ais_, Weill et Maurice, Pub.; Mme.\n Henry Gr\u00e9ville, _Instruction morale et civique des jeunes\n filles_, Weill et Maurice, Pub.; Gabriel Compayr\u00e9, _El\u00e9ments\n d'instruction morale et civique_, Paul Delaplane, Pub.\n\nThe manuals of MM. Paul Bert and Laloi, are models of style: the one in\nfamiliar, easy dialogues; the other in simple and clear precepts, set\noff and illustrated by pleasant stories. Lists of questions facilitate\nthe use of the book by the master. The divisions or chapters relate to\nspecial subjects,\u2014the military service, taxes, the fatherland, the\nparliament, the law, the government, etc. So much as to the form; let\nus look at the groundwork.\n\nThe catechism imparted general moral precepts which concerned the man,\nand particular commands which concerned the Christian. Our manuals also\ntend to form the man; but in the man, above all, the good Frenchman.\nWe find there glowing pages on the love of one's native land, and on\nthe beauty of one's country, which we must love. Far be it from me to\ncast censure on this noble sentiment. Nevertheless, I do not think\nexaggeration on that point is desirable, lest we should seek a cause\nof patriotism even in the acknowledged superiority, from a gastronomic\npoint of view, of the hare of France over the hare of Germany! Our\nwriters, undoubtedly, have too much tact to lay themselves open to\nthis ridicule. It is very striking, though, that the notion of the\nmoral man considered as a Frenchman, German, Englishman, or Italian, is\nnarrower than that of the Christian man: this reversion into the folds\nof nationality is a characteristic phenomenon of our old world in this\nlatter end of the century. If our encyclop\u00e6dists had hit on the idea\nof writing a laic catechism, the tone of it would have been different.\nOur authors of to-day alas! have only too much excuse to wish to form\nat first the _little Frenchman_, and to promote the reaction against a\ncosmopolitanism which had become dangerous to our national existence.\nThey have done it, however, with sufficient caution, and without\ndetriment to justice.\n\nI shall not say as much for M. Paul Bert, in relation to his manual\ndedicated to the Revolution. Still here, undoubtedly, it is necessary\nto make allowance for the political necessities of the present time.\nBut what a danger to sanctify at any cost the sanguinary epoch of our\ndemocracy; what an error to date the French era from 1789, and to\nmake our children believe that our fathers should have had hardly the\nsentiment of public virtue! The worst is not that their young souls\nare thus embittered, but that their judgment on the facts of history\nis falsified. We are here only too much inclined to disregard the\nnecessity of human evolution, and to imagine that it suffices to change\nthe label of the sack to improve the merchandise. M. Bigot and M.\nLaloi, at least, have more wisdom, more prudence in this respect.\n\nThe ambition of the catechism, on another point, seems to go beyond\nthat of our manuals. It offered an explanation of the world, a complete\nconception of human destiny, in a word, a doctrine which _returns into\nitself_. This doctrine holds no longer, it is known nevertheless, and\nit is necessary now to replace it. Unfortunately scientific morality\nhas not yet found its formula in a practical book, and the divergences\nof views are confessed in our manuals, where the conception of a\nfundamental ensemble almost entirely fails. It is sufficient to read\nthe tables of contents to convince oneself of this. The work of M.\nCompayr\u00e9, who addresses himself especially to the \"middle and higher\ngrades,\" changes suddenly in Book III. entitled _La Nature humaine et\nla morale_. What signifies the definition, that \"morality is nothing\nmore than the ensemble of the laws that nature has engraved in your\nsoul before human legislators inscribed them in their codes\"? What is\ndoing here the vain affirmation of the existence of God and of the\nimmortality of the soul, and this \"let us contemplate and adore\" which\nsums it up? In the mouth of M. Compayr\u00e9 it is only a concession and an\navowal of infirmity. A frank spiritualist will resolutely establish\nhis moral conception on his belief; but nominal deism causes God to\nplay the r\u00f4le of an ignominious personage who has no longer a suitable\noccupation on the scene.\n\nAfter all is said, however, our manuals have the advantage over the\ncatechism in the clearness of their definitions (not all correct, it\nis true) and in the immediate value of the instruction. For example,\nM. Laloi gives information as to the placing out of money, reproduces\nthe formulas in use in the ordinary acts of life, etc. I should take\ncare not to blame, either this good practical sense, or this manner of\ninstructing the child according to his capacity to understand himself\nand understand the world which surrounds him. In the modest articles of\nour little class-books, is found summed up, definitively, the secular\nexperience of human societies, and this also has an aggregative value.\n\n * * * * *\n\nNumerous are the works written among us by distinguished authors to\nintroduce youthful minds into the various sciences. The _Biblioth\u00e8que\nutile_ already includes several, and among them one of the best will\nalways be the book of ADOLPHE COSTE, _La Richesse et le Bonheur_,[140]\nwith which that library is about to enrich itself. M. Coste has\nreproduced here, in order to express them in a simple form, the\ndoctrines expounded in his large works. But there is also contributed\nsomething new, as to what he calls property, for example. The _Manuals_\nof which I just spoke base all property on labor alone. Mme. Henry\nGr\u00e9ville defines it \"a right, based on the difficulty that any one has\nhad in acquiring a thing.\" It would be proper to add\u2014\"and to save a\nthing,\" in taking account of the more exact analysis made by M. Coste.\nFor if it is true that \"consumable goods\" are always due to labor in\nsome manner, it is no less true that \"productive capital,\" can only\nbe acquired by putting a part of these goods outside of the current\nconsumption, that is to say by saving something of that which one\npossesses. Saving is to-day the only regular source of accumulation of\nwealth; it is one of the indispensable factors of property. The usual\ndefinition sees only the other factor of wealth, labor, and opens thus\nthe road to the dangerous sophism of which the workmen make a weapon,\nwhen they claim that they alone ought to possess, as they produce.\n\n [140] Publisher of the _Biblioth\u00e8que utile_, F. Alcan.\n\nLet us quote the passage. It is exact. \"By his labor man takes\npossession of the fruits, he enters into the enjoyment of his part\nof the product: this is in some sort only a personal right which\ndisappears at once with consumption. But from the time that this man\nsaves something from consumption and establishes capital, he becomes a\nproprietor, he acquires a social right. Fundamentally, property is the\npublic acknowledgment of the service rendered to the community by the\nincrease of the productive capital\" (p. 25).\n\nI will notice further, in the work of M. Coste, the difficulty that it\ndescribes, and that greatly embarrasses economists, of reconciling the\nvalue of labor, due to individual effort, with the value of exchange,\nimposed by the general needs. As to the relations between Wealth and\nHappiness, he judges them intimate enough: happiness resides chiefly,\naccording to him, in activity, which has for its principal forms the\nacquisition of wealth and the productive employment of wealth. The\nquestion would appear undoubtedly more complex, from the psychological\npoint of view. But we could very well content ourselves with this\nnotion, clear and sound, of an economical happiness.\n\nOne has always pleasure in reading M. Coste, because he has just ideas,\nbecause he approaches questions of political economy as a naturalist\nand studies the facts in their evolution. It is the best method for\nunderstanding the subject. The deductive economists have never failed\nto deceive us. I would wish in the public interest for numerous readers\nof treatises of this kind.\n\n * * * * *\n\nSome day or other, the occasion will present itself for us to speak\nsomewhat fully of pedagogy. Certainly, if the passion of _magister_ was\never exaggerated, it is in our day, and, through logic and principles,\nit will become in time more difficult to make a little boy eat his\nporridge than to govern an empire. In all that has been done, I see\nsome good, but much evil; I am afraid that little artificial prodigies\nwill in time be produced, and that we shall be given hot-house oranges\ninstead of fine fruit ripened in full sunshine. Books follow books,\nand mistakes succeed mistakes. There is everywhere an embarrassment\nof _talents_, scarcity of _characters_. Have the causes of it been\nunravelled and the remedy discovered? In order to judge the results,\nlet us wait half a century!\n\nM. EUGENE MAILLET, whose work\u2014_L'Education, Elements de psychologie\nde l'homme et de l'enfant appliqu\u00e9e \u00e0 la p\u00e9dagogie_\u2014I have formally\nto announce,[141] will readily excuse, I hope, this quarter of an\nhour's bad humor. It is not from him that I take it, and his work gives\nevidence of too much experience, too much study, that a high value\nshould not be placed on it. The present volume is only the first part\nof it; \"the second part will have for its object education itself,\nconsidered at first in its idea, then in its various forms,\u2014physical\neducation, education of the heart, education of the mind, education of\nthe will and of the character, finally in the general principles of\nlogic and morality which ought to dominate it and without which the\nrules of a wisely graduated methodology or of a rational discipline\ncannot be established.\"\n\n [141] Belin fr\u00e8res, Publishers.\n\nIn these _Elements of Psychology_, M. Maillet shows himself acquainted\nwith new studies and methods. It is regrettable only that he does\nnot enter into them with sufficient freedom. He has not consented\nto rid himself of the old terminology, he preserves the outlines\nalmost of spiritual psychology, and appears even to seek in the\naffirmation of spiritualism the indispensable completion of a science\nof education. His work will perhaps be better welcomed for it by the\nuniversity public; but we should have preferred, for our part, that\nhe had remained less \"classic,\" while retaining his entire freedom of\ncriticism.\n\nWith this limitation we can recommend his work without mental\nreservation; some portions of it are excellent, and many readers will\nprofit by consulting it. It is written with order, clearness, and good\nsense.\n\n * * * * *\n\nHere now is a curiosity, the first number of the _Annales des sciences\npsychiques, recueil d'observations et d'exp\u00e9riences_, appearing every\ntwo months, founded under the patronage of M. Charles Richet, with M.\nDr. Dariex as editor.[142] This magazine will publish \"Observations\nrelative to so-called occult facts, _telepathy_, _lucidity_,\n_presentiment_, _objective apparitions_, etc.\" _Experiences_,\u2014there\ncan hardly yet be any question of them except in appearance; M. Richet\nso avows with good grace in a letter forming an introduction,\u2014a very\ncurious letter, rich in excellent advice which will perhaps not be\nsufficiently listened to, and with a declaration of principle which has\na chance of being far too much so.\n\n [142] Felix Alcan, Publisher.\n\n\"We have the firm conviction,\" writes M. Richet, in effect, \"that there\nis, mixed up with the known and described forces, forces that we do not\nknow; that the simple, vulgar mechanical explanation will not suffice\nto explain all that passes around us; in a word, that there are occult\npsychic phenomena, and, if we say 'occult,' it is a word intended to\nexpress simply what is unknown.\"\n\nWhat is meant here by the word forces? We are told \"for three hundred\nyears electricity was an unknown force.\" But it is always _occult_,\nas _force_; and if science is become positive, it is because it\nhas neglected the vain entity, in order to see only a new group of\nempirical data, a new series of facts, that it is more or less easy\nto translate into unities of heat and of work. What then would forces\nbe subtracted from mechanics, if not occult forces, with \"chimerical\nfunctions\"? The expression _vulgar mechanics_, does not suffice to\ncorrect the sense of the phrase and rather aggravates it, in allowing\nto be supposed that there exist two kinds of forces, one of which has\nno _measure_. But the comparison, then, is not worth anything, and it\nis not necessary to speak of electricity or chemical affinity in this\nmatter.\n\nAs to the \"observations,\" of what value are such as are presented to\nus? But little, after all, and many other facts will be necessary to\nlead us to accept the non-fortuitous relation of certain hallucinations\nwith an objective event. Notwithstanding the wise reservations of\nthe editor, it is to be regretted that we find already in this first\nnumber, under the title of _Une chambre hant\u00e9e_, a real ghost story.\nStory for story, I would prefer much to read the _Chambre bleu_ of\nM\u00e9rim\u00e9e; so also, I doubt not, would M. Richet.\n\nThis little censure is not meant in jest, which would be out of place.\nThere is always advantage in collecting _facts_, on condition that they\nare chosen with care, and that haste is not made to interpret them. MM.\nRichet and Dariex insist on this point with the greatest force. Curious\nreaders will not be wanting for these Annals, even among sceptics. It\nhas always been necessary to carry the lamp to cause the phantoms to\nvanish.[143]\n\n [143] Reference may be made to the first number of the _Revue\n mensuelle de l'Ecole d'Anthropologie de Paris_, published by\n the Professors at the _Librairie Alcan_. In this number will\n be found a lecture by M. Andr\u00e9 Lef\u00e8vre, under this interesting\n title: _Du Cri \u00e0 la Parole_.\n\n LUCIEN ARR\u00c9AT.\n\n\nII.\n\nTHE SCIENCE OF PEDAGOGICS IN GERMANY.\n\nIn view of the great care with which _The Monist_ cultivates\npsychology, I may be permitted in my first letter, consistently I\njudge, to speak of the most important application of this science\u2014its\napplication namely to pedagogics.\n\nPsychological pedagogics, in the true sense of the word, exists with\nus in Germany only since the days of J. F. Herbart who abandoned the\nancient psychological theory of the faculties and discovered in ideas\nthe sole component elements of all psychical activity, derived feelings\nand volitions from the interrelation and interoperation of ideas, thus\ndenied the absolute freedom which the possibility of formation of will,\nor education, excludes, and upheld the determinability of the will by\nthe ideas.\n\nAlthough Herbart himself applied his system of psychology\npedagogically, yet it bore in the life-time of its author only scanty\nfruit in this direction. Psychological pedagogics was not developed\nbeyond its original generality and unprofitableness of character until\nProfessor STOY of Jena and especially Professor ZILLER of Leipsic took\nup, with an energy that equalled their tact, the practical construction\nof psychological pedagogics.\n\nPedagogics now exerted a reactive promotive influence, if not on\nthe further development of psychology, yet on its study. After the\npsychological writings of Herbart, it was eminently the _Empirical\nPsychology_[144] of M. W. DROBISCH, sustained in the Herbartian spirit\nbut written more in agreement with \"scientific\" (i. e. inductive)\nmethods, that supplied psychological pedagogists with nourishment.\nThe last-named work, which in many respects possesses value even\nto-day, was received with especial favor, since it avoided happily the\nmetaphysical tendencies which Herbart rather assiduously employed.\nA like excellence and a like favorable reception were the merit and\nreward of the large work, later appearing, of LAZARUS: _Das Leben der\nSeele in Monographien_. Subsequently, were effective two little books\nby I. DRBAL and by LINDNER: _Lehrbuch der empirischen Psychologie_ and\n_Handbuch der empirischen Psychologie_. Lindner's treatise has recently\nappeared in an English translation, published by Heath of Boston, under\nthe title of \"A Manual of Empirical Psychology as an Inductive Science.\nA Text-book for High Schools and Colleges. By Dr. G. A. Lindner, of\nPrague. Translated by Chas. de Garmo.\" The English edition of this\nbook received an unfavorable review in the London _Academy_ (Nov. 1,\n1891); yet in one respect the criticism was in our opinion justified.\nToo little use, namely, has been made of the results of experimental\npsychology.\n\n [144] Leipsic, 1842.\n\nThis is, moreover, not only true of Lindner's book but holds for all\nthe psychological books that have exerted any considerable influence\nin pedagogical circles, is true in fact of the great _Lehrbuch der\nPsychologie_ by VOLKMANN, the latest edition of which, prepared by\nCornelius, is not in this respect abreast of the position of the times.\n\nNeglect in such a matter in the country of a Wundt appears striking\nat first glance; yet it has its good reasons. The labors of the\nschool of Wundt were antagonistic to the Herbartian psychology and\nthe pedagogics founded thereon, to the extent that a goodly portion\nof the old theory of the faculties has been re-introduced into those\nlabors. The English association-psychology could have counted on a much\nmore welcome reception. Happily, there has appeared within the last\nfew months a remarkably clear, and withal handy, volume which will\nsucceed in introducing into the pedagogical circles of Germany this\nassociation-psychology. It bears the modest title of _Leitfaden der\nphysiologischen Psychologie_ (The Elements of Physiological Psychology,\nJena, Fischer, 1891), and consists of lectures delivered by PROF. DR.\nZIEHEN at the University of Jena. In many respects the book of Ziehen\nis like the recent work of Dr. Paul Carus[145]: except that everything\nof a speculative character is lacking in the former, of which from our\npoint of view we cannot approve.\n\n [145] _The Soul of Man_, Chicago, 1891.\n\nNow that I am speaking of pedagogics particularly, I will mention\nstill another work of Lindner, to whom I referred above, which is\nthe first of its kind in Germany. Its peculiarity appears from its\ntitle: _Grundriss der P\u00e4dagogik als Wissenschaft, auf Grund der\nEntwickelungslehre und der Sociologie neu aufgebaut_ (Outlines of\nPedagogics as a Science, Newly Constructed on the Basis of the Doctrine\nof Evolution and of Sociology, Vienna, 1890). The endeavor of the\nauthor of this work has been, to make fruitful within the domain of\nthe Herbartian system the principles of evolution and of the science\nof sociology; and though he has not been successful in this respect as\nregards all the details of educational methods, the book nevertheless\nrepresents a good beginning.\n\n CHRISTIAN UFER.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK REVIEWS.\n\n\nOUTLINES OF A CRITICAL THEORY OF ETHICS. By _John Dewey_. Ann Arbor:\n Register Publishing Company. 1891.\n\nThe title of this very thoughtful book expresses well the author's\nmethod of comparing opposite one-sided views with the aim of\ndiscovering a more adequate theory. In carrying out this aim not only\nis an analysis given of the main elements of the theory of ethics, but\nthe main methods and problems of contemporary ethics are considered\nalso. Professor Dewey rejects both Hedonism and Kantism. He rejects\nHedonism because pleasure fails as a standard of ethics, and he rejects\nKantism because it is a barren abstraction. Kant's \"ought\" does not\nroot in and does not flower from the \"is.\" Professor Dewey says:\n\n\"Hedonism finds the end of conduct, or the desirable, wholly\ndetermined by the various particular desires which a man happens to\nhave; Kantianism holds that to discover the end of conduct, we must\nwholly exclude the desires. Hedonism holds that the rightness of\nconduct is determined wholly by its consequences; Kantianism holds\nthat the consequences have nothing to do with the rightness of an\nact, but that it is decided wholly by the motive of the act. From\nthis contrast we may anticipate both our criticism of the Kantian\ntheory and our conception of the true end of action. The fundamental\nerror of Hedonism and Kantianism is the same\u2014the supposition that\ndesires are for pleasure only. Let it be recognised that desires are\nfor objects conceived as satisfying or developing the self, and that\npleasure is incidental to this fulfilment of capacities of self, and\nwe have the means of escaping the one-sidedness of Kantianism as well\nas of Hedonism. We can see that the end is neither the procuring of\nparticular pleasures through the various desires, nor action from the\nmere idea of abstract law in general, but that it is the satisfaction\nof desires according to law\" (pp. 82-83)\n\nThe author acknowledges his indebtedness to the writings of the late\nProfessor Green and others for the \"backbone\" of his theory, which he\nstates to be \"the conception of the will as the expression of ideas,\nand of social ideas; the notion of an objective ethical world realised\nin institutions which afford moral ideals, theatre and impetus to the\nindividual; the notion of the moral life as growth in freedom, as the\nindividual finds and conforms to the law of his social placing.\" Among\nthe specific forms which the author calls particular attention to, as\ngiving \"a flesh and blood of its own\" to that backbone, are the idea\nof desire as the ideal activity in contrast with actual possession;\nthe analysis of individuality into function including capacity and\nenvironment, and the statement of an ethical postulate.\n\nThis postulate may be regarded as summing up the ethical theory as\npresented by Professor Dewey. It is thus expressed: In the realisation\nof individuality there is found also the needed realization of some\ncommunity of persons of which the individual is a member; and,\nconversely, the agent who duly satisfies the community in which he\nshares, by that same conduct satisfies himself. We have here postulated\na community of persons, and a good which realised by the will of one\nis made public. In \"this unity of individuals as respects the end\nof action, this existence of a practical common good,\" we have what\nis called \"the moral order of the world.\" This view would seem to\nsatisfy the requirements of both Individualism and Socialism, but is\nit consistent with the law of progress elsewhere insisted on by the\nauthor? He affirms, as against the Hedonism of Spencer, that moral\nideals are always developing. Progress is itself the ideal, since\n\"permanence of _specific_ ideals means moral death.\" But this progress\nmust originate with the individual, who by the formation of the new\nideal ceases to be in perfect accord with the community, and will\ncontinue to be in disaccord with it until the community has accepted\nhis ideal. A perfect realisation of individuality in the community\nwould be the \"fixed millennium\" which the author properly objects to,\nand to escape which it is necessary, that the equilibration towards\nwhich the individual, as well as the social, organism is ever tending\nshall never be actually attained. Its attainment would mean stagnation\nand death.\n\nWe have not space to say more of Professor Dewey's book than that it is\na very thoughtful work, most so in its critical parts, and will form an\nexcellent help for the student of ethics.\n\n \u03a9.\n\n\nAN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY. By _John S. Mackenzie_. New\n York: Macmillan & Co. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co. 1890.\n\nWe have here, in an enlarged form, the substance of the Shaw Lectures\ndelivered by the author, at the University of Edinburg, in January,\n1889. The work is professedly, not a systematic treatise on the\nsubject dealt with, but only a slight contribution to the discussion\nof it; and it is said to be \"not so much a book as an indication\nof the lines on which a book might be written.\" The force of these\napparently deprecatory remarks depends entirely on the result attained.\nIf an introductory study is based on true principles it may be of\nmore general value than an elaborate work, because it will probably\npresent the conclusions of the latter in a simpler and less technical\nform. This presupposes, however, a knowledge of previous inquiry,\nand, therefore, the use of the term \"Introduction\" is somewhat of\na misnomer. Mr. Mackenzie remarks, indeed, that his inquiry may\nbe thought to belong to the end rather than to the beginning of\nphilosophic study.\n\nThe leading idea of Mr. Mackenzie's work is embodied in the sentence\njust quoted. The value of social life depends on the ultimate end to\nbe attained, and the author sets himself to discover what is the true\naim of society. The existence of a society of human beings cannot\nbe accounted for without the conception of purpose, for to whatever\nelement of accident may be due the bringing of those human beings\ninto relation to each other, \"the particular direction in which their\nrelations become developed is obviously due to certain aims by which\nthey are guided.\" The inquiry into the principles which determine the\nnature of those aims, and as to the ideal to which such principles\nlead, is what constitutes Social Philosophy. This falls within the\nthird of Hegel's chief divisions of philosophic study, the _Philosophy\nof Spirit_, which is concerned with objects in so far as they are\nthemselves creations of thought; and the objects of Social Philosophy\nmay be described as the relations of men to each other, their relations\nto the material world, and the development of individual character\nin so far as that is affected by these relations. Before treating of\nthe aim which constitutes the social ideal, our author states the\nconditions of the social problem, those of _difficulty_ on the one\nhand, and of _hope_ on the other, and he finds that the general state\nof society for a number of generations back has been one of \"tumultuous\nprogress.\" There is a great improvement in the condition of nearly\nall classes of people and \"a very great brightening of our general\noutlook.\" But life has become in many directions more chaotic and\nuncertain. What is now wanted is \"some principle which will enable\nus to bring about a more perfect connection between the parts of our\nsociety, to form new links and ties, so that men may no longer be\nsubject to the directions of iron laws over which they have no control.\nWe have to overcome individualism, on the one hand, and the power of\nmaterial conditions, on the other.\" To do this will be the chief step\ntowards the realisation of the social ideal, which is dependent on the\nnature of society and on the nature of men.\n\nThe recognition of the fact that everything deepest in nature, and\nespecially in human nature is a product of growth has, says Mr.\nMackenzie, \"passed over into popular thought, and become a part of\nour intellectual atmosphere.\" Nature is thus regarded as _organic_,\nby which our author means \"a systematic unity, in which neither the\nparts exist independently of the whole nor the whole independently of\nits parts.\" This view is distinguished from that of Monadism, which\nregards the world as a collection of mutually independent parts, and\nof Monism, according to which Mr. Mackenzie declares the world is a\nsingle system, in which the nature of every part is predetermined by\nthe whole. According to the organic view the world is a real unity,\nthough it is a unity which expresses itself through difference. It goes\nwithout saying that there is no Monism of Mr. Mackenzie's description.\nNo Monist would ever deny that the unity of the world expresses itself\nthrough difference.\n\nWhether or not our author is right in rejecting what he describes as\nthe monistic view of nature, does not really affect the conclusion\nas to the nature of Society. This he declares to be organic, and it\nis shown that society possesses the three conditions which belong\nessentially to the nature of an organic system; that is, the relations\nof the parts which form the whole are _intrinsic_, changes in it take\nplace by an internal adaptation or growth, and its end forms an element\nin its own nature. This conclusion would, indeed, seem to be required\nby the fact that society consists of a number of individuals who are\nthemselves organic units. At the same time it might be objected that,\nalthough many of the lower animals dwell together in societies, these\ncan hardly be regarded as organic. This consideration gives rise to\nthe thought that the organic nature of human society depends on the\nconditions by which man is differentiated from other animals. In\ntreating of this point, Mr. Mackenzie shows that there are several\nstages in the development of the \"self,\" and he concludes that although\nan animal is conscious of a self, yet that it is not conscious of \"the\nunity of its individual life, the connected system of its experiences\nas a whole, in which each single experience has a definite place,\"\nbeing that which constitutes the highest development of self, and which\nis the distinguishing self-consciousness of humanity.\n\nThis faculty of self-consciousness might be reduced to simpler\nelements, but it is that by which, as Mr. Mackenzie shows, we are\nenabled to understand the organic nature of human society. The\nrecognition of the fact that the universe is a systematic whole\nconstitutes an ideal, which, although consciously aimed at by few,\ngives a progressive character to the general mind. Man is the only\ncreature that has an ideal, because he has been able to catch a glimpse\nof a kind of consciousness of that which he has not attained, but which\nhe is bound to strive to attain. He begins with vague impressions\nand animal impulses, \"and his whole life is a struggle towards\nclearness\u2014clearness in the conceptions which he applies to things in\nknowledge, clearness in the conception of ends of which he makes use\nin conduct.\" The struggle between the immediate experience of what\nis present in sense and \"the 'still small voice' of the ideal, which\nbids us have regard for the Universal,\" would be fruitless, however,\nif the individual were alone. Society is necessary for the proper\ndevelopment of the more ideal elements in human nature, as it provides\nthe rational environment required for a rational being. This leads to\na consideration of the ultimate end of society. In the course of the\ndiscussion of this question the author deals with the different views\nentertained as to the principles by which we are guided in conduct and\nby which human progress is determined. He points out that what we seek\nis some definitely ascertainable end, which we recognise as good, and\nwhich is the happiness or well-being of persons. He rejects, however,\nthe Utilitarian theory, showing that pleasure cannot be the end of\nconduct, and concludes that, if \"we have any rational end at all, it\nmust consist in some kind of realisation of our nature as a whole\"; of\nknowledge, and will, and feeling, taken together. The true end is in\nfact self-realisation, and this includes society, for we cannot suppose\nthat the ideal should be realised within our lives. It is conceivable\nonly \"by our being able to see the world as a system of intelligent\nbeings who are mutually worlds for each other.\" The true nature of\nman's end is thus necessarily a social one, and it includes everything\nthat belongs to the highest good. It embraces the realisation of\nReason, Order, and Beauty in the world; the realisation of Life; the\nperfection of Knowledge and Wisdom, of Will and of Feeling.\n\nWe have given so full a summary of Mr. Mackenzie's argument that we\ncan add only a mere outline of what he considers \"the form of social\nunion in which, under given conditions, the progress will be most rapid\nand most secure towards that good which we must regard as the ultimate\nend.\" The social ideal is said to depend on three chief elements of\nwell-being, Individual Culture, Subjugation of Nature, and Social\nOrganisation; which give rise to the one-sided ideals of Liberty,\nEquality, and Aristocracy, not of birth but of talent. The Organic\nideal, which is that of Fraternity, is the true one, and it consists in\nconstant progress. This progress includes the three elements of human\nwell-being, personal development being the most important, as education\nreacts on social life generally, by bringing new ideals of life as well\nas a new sense of duty. In leaving Mr. Mackenzie's excellent work, we\nmay say that it deals in a clear and logical manner with the important\nquestions considered, and that it fully justifies the author's remark\nthat \"Social Philosophy is a subject which at present will repay a\ncareful study.\"\n\n \u03a9.\n\n\nTWELVE LECTURES ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM. By\n _Ludwig Edinger_. Philadelphia and London: F. A. Davis, Publisher,\n 1890.\n\nDr. Edinger, of Frankfort-on-the-Main, Germany, is one of the very\nbest authorities on the anatomy of the nervous system and the brain.\nHis twelve lectures contain a statement of our present knowledge of\nthe subject, to which the author has added considerably in several\nnot unimportant details. No one who is a student of the human brain\ncan do without Edinger's book, and we are glad that so soon after its\nappearance in German it has been translated by competent men into\nEnglish.\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nHYPNOTISM. By _Albert Moll_. New York: Scribner & Welford. 1890.\n Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Company.\n\nThe present book is a translation from the second edition of the German\noriginal. It reviews in 410 pages the main facts of Hypnotism. The\nauthor begins with the history of Hypnotism (Chap. i); he then explains\nthe different hypnotic methods and stages of hypnotism (Chap. ii). The\nsymptoms of hypnotism (Chap. iii) are contrasted and compared with\ncognate states (Chap. iv). Information is given concerning several\ntheories of hypnotism (Chap. v); all of them, however, are meagrely\nsketched and the author does not arrive at a conclusion himself.\nSimulation and its influences are briefly treated (Chap. vi). The\nmedical and legal aspects of hypnotism (Chap. vii and viii) are good\nexpositions of the matter, presented in lucid terms and impartially.\nThe last chapter, on Animal Magnetism, treats of a series of questions\nwhich, as the author rightly remarks, refer to \"phenomena which are\noften mentioned in connection with hypnotism, although the connection\nis rather historical than essential.\" In Mr. Moll's view they \"are\nthe consequences of erroneously interpreted observations.\" The topics\nhere discussed are (1) animal magnetism, (2) telepathy, (3) supernormal\nacts of somnambulism, (4) the experiments with the magnet, and (5) the\neffects of the mere approach of drugs.\n\nThe author does not present new views of his subject, but he is\nconsiderate in his statements, as well as scientific and clear. He is\nnot blind to the dangers of hypnotism, yet upon the whole he looks upon\nit favorably, saying that \"hypnotism and suggestion will outlive many\nremedies whose praises fill the columns of medical journals at present.\"\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nDER HYPNOTISMUS: SEINE PSYCHO-PHYSIOLOGISCHE, MEDICINISCHE,\n STRAFRECHTLICHE BEDEUTUNG UND SEINE HANDHABUNG. By Dr. _August\n Forel_. Zweite umgearbeitete und vermehrte Auflage. Stuttgart:\n Verlag von Ferdinand Enke. 1891.\n\nProf. August Forel's pamphlet on hypnotism was, even in its first\nedition, one of the best publications of its kind. The second edition\nwhich now lies before us is enlarged and improved. The author has not\nchanged his views; he retains his old definitions, explaining hypnosis\nas a state of abnormally increased suggestibility; but at the same\ntime he has added some chapters which present his position much more\naccurately than he has ever done before. He rejects most positively the\nfluidum theories; he opposes the views of Dr. Luys whose experiments\nDr. Forel repeated with his most sensitive somnambulists and obtained\nnegative results.\n\nThe position which Professor Forel takes is unequivocal Monism. He says\nin his preface:\n\n\"A psychological introduction seemed to me indispensable, for it is\na daily discovery with me, how much the monistic foundation of the\ndoctrine of suggestion is misunderstood. Normal dream-life, the theory\nof suggestion, and the relation of the latter to medicine and to\nmental disorders generally, demanded substantial complements, and the\naddition of a few new instances of therapeutic suggestion seemed to me\nadvantageous.\"\n\nIn agreement with this proposition he says in the first chapter of his\npamphlet:\n\n\"Hypnotism throws much light on the phenomenon we call consciousness,\nand in a manner that substantially agrees with the monistic\nworld-conception. To understand hypnotism in other relations, we must\nknow what we have to understand by consciousness and its relation to\nnervous activity....\n\n\"With dualists, who regard the soul as one thing and the body together\nwith all matter and all the forces of nature thereto appurtenant as\na totally different thing, the doctrine of the psychical faculties\nfollows of itself: herein the consciousness, the will, the mind, and\nthe rest must be regarded as separate departments of the soul....\n\n\"The monistic conception of the world aims to reduce all cosmic\nphenomena to a single unity, and regards matter, force, and\nconsciousness ultimately as only forms of appearance of a same\nprimitive potency. Especially, however, it denies, that the soul is\nanything else than forces of nature....\n\n\"Considered from the monistic point of view, consciousness by itself\nis nothing; as Ribot ('The Diseases of Memory') correctly remarks\nwith Huxley and others, 'Consciousness is merely the accompaniment of\ncertain nervous processes; it is as incompetent to influence the latter\nas the shadow is the steps of the wayfarer it follows.' It follows,\nhowever, immediately from this, that the notions of consciousness and\nsubject, or subjectivism, are identical and undefinable. Consciousness\nis merely the subjective form of appearance of nervous activity....\n\n\"Consequently, our human consciousness denotes only a summarised,\nsynthetical, subjective illumination Of the more powerful portion of\nour cerebral activity....\n\n\"A very important phenomenon of consciousness takes place, further, in\nthe reviviscence of previous combinations of cerebral activity, that is\nin the play of memory-images. We have here to deal with the connection\nin time of the activity of the brain, that is with the relative\nillumination of this activity by consciousness. Especially on this\nfield does hypnotism throw valuable light. The whole process of memory\nis in itself completely independent of consciousness and exhibits\nvery interesting laws, for which I refer the reader to Ribot (l. c.).\nWe discover the laws of the memory in ourselves for the greater part\nthrough the illumination by consciousness of the activity of the brain.\nBut it is not proper to oppose a conscious memory to the organic or\nunconscious memory. There is but one memory, which consists _a_) in\nthe weakened preservation of the vibrations of every cerebral action\n(nervous activity in general), _b_) in the powers of reviviscence, or,\nbetter, power of re-invigoration of these actions, and often, _c_) in\nthe re-cognition, that is in the identification, of the re-invigorated\nactivity with the original one (localisation in time)....\n\n\"We all possess a second consciousness, the consciousness of dreams or\nsleep, which, qualitatively, does not differ in essential respects from\nthe consciousness of the waking state....\n\n\"We may not, accordingly, place conscious and unconscious activity in\nopposition to each other.\"\n\nDr. Forel discusses in other chapters of his pamphlet the relation\nof nervous activity and nervous substance to the states of\nconsciousness (Chap. ii). He explains suggestion, compares sleep with\nhypnosis, treats the symptoms of hypnosis, resistance of hypnotised\npersons, auto-suggestions, the \"suggestion \u00e0 \u00e9ch\u00e9ance,\" retroactive\nhallucinations or suggested memory falsifications, the import and\nnature of suggestions (Chap. iv). He then proceeds to investigate\ndiseased states of mind with reference to hypnotism, and maintains that\ninsane people are least suggestible (Chap. v). He gives some valuable\nhints for suggestive or psycho-therapeutic treatment to hypnotisers\n(Chap. vii), and presents cases of successful cures (Chap. viii). The\nlegal aspect is treated in Chap. x, the hypnotisation of animals in\nChap. xi. An interesting and indeed candid chapter is Forel's views on\nquackery (Chap. ix); acknowledging the fact that at best one sixth only\nof patients are cured by physicians, our author hopes that the full\nrecognition of the suggestion theory in therapeutics will contribute\nnot a little to the advancement of medical science and also to the\nmoral attitude of the profession.\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nDER MODERNE MENSCH. Versuche \u00fcber Lebensf\u00fchrung. By _B. Carneri_. Bonn:\n Emil Strauss. 1891.\n\nDuring a long and laborious life Mr. Carneri has been an indefatigable\nchampion of the monistic world-conception. With a keen eye he\nrecognised years ago the importance Of physiological investigations for\npsychology, and he saw at once the moral import of the evolution theory\neven at a time when most of its defenders denounced it as the immoral\nlaw of nature. Carneri thus became the preacher of a new ethics; he\ntaught the morality of science and helped us out of the pessimism that\nnaturally followed a time when the old foundations had been overthrown\nand the new ones had not as yet been built. The author is now at a very\nadvanced age and the present book contains his maturest and dearest\nideas. He is a man whose burden of life has been heavier than that the\naverage man has to bear. Physical weakness, since birth, long periods\nof illness accompanied with almost incessant pain, later on periods of\nrecovery and transient happiness followed. He married and had children.\nBut new visitations came. He buried his wife, and also a little son at\nthe premature age of ten years.\n\nThese are some facts of the author's life not mentioned in any one\nof his books; they are only hinted at in a line of the preface of\nthe present book, quoted below. But his readers should know these\nfacts, because they bring the author so much nearer to us. We learn to\nunderstand him better and shall the more appreciate his genuine courage\nin working out a noble conception of life and sound rules of moral\nconduct.\n\nThe present book contains a number of articles on various subjects,\nand the author has as he says in the preface \"put into them his whole\nheart.\" It differs from former publications of his. The latter are\nas a rule scientific and objective, they are investigations into the\nlaws of life and of ethics. The present book is subjective; it shows\nthe aim and the path of the author's conduct of life. Carneri adds:\n\"And that I, visited with ills above the average measure, have found\nlife beautiful, and being in my seventieth year now, find it beautiful\nstill, speaks in favor of this path. It speaks also for a happy\nindividuality, but I hope that this will not detract from the truth\nthat the present book is not mere imagination but is taken from the\nthrilling pulse of life.\"\n\nCarneri is fully convinced that morality will find a better foundation\nin the unitary nature of man than in the old conception Of his\ndouble nature and in this sense he discusses the following topics,\nGratitude, Labor, Egotism, Justice, Versatility, Passion, the Ideal,\nthe Inevitable, the God-idea, Truthfulness, Morality, Love, Family,\nImagination, Continence, Honor, God-everywhere, Death, Tolerance,\nCharacter, Art, and Humor. The whole tenor of the book is very\nsympathetic and we might describe the author as one of the high priests\nof the coming Religion of Science.\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nUEBER DIE GRUNDLAGEN DER ERKENNTNIS IN DEN EXACTEN WISSENSCHAFTEN. By\n _Paul du Bois-Reymond_. Nach einer hinterlassenen Handschrift. Mit\n einem Bildnis des Verfassers. T\u00fcbingen: H. Laupp'sche Buchhandlung.\n 1890.\n\nThis little book of the late Prof. Paul du Bois-Reymond has been\nprepared for print by Dr. Guido Hauck with the assistance of the\nauthor's brother from a posthumous manuscript. The pamphlet contains in\npopular form the final r\u00e9sum\u00e9 of a thinker's life-work; complementing\nand completing his investigations, and maturing mainly his favorite\nideas which he had presented to his students in a course of lectures on\ngravitation during the winter '87-88 at the Technical High School of\nBerlin, where he was Professor of Mathematics.\n\nProf. Paul du Bois-Reymond is not only as powerful and at the same time\nas subtle a thinker as his more famous brother Emil du Bois-Reymond,\nbut he also agrees with the latter's philosophical attitude. Both are\nagnostics and both represent an unusually profound and scientifically\nelaborate agnosticism. They have become agnostics because they have\narrived at results which, to their mind, present an insolvable problem.\nProf. Paul du Bois-Reymond does not despair of a final solution of the\nproblem of life, which according to Emil du Bois-Reymond decidedly\nbelongs to \"the seven world-riddles,\" but he considers gravitation as\nincomprehensible. The purpose of all our attempts to explain phenomena\nis to limit the incomprehensible to the smallest space possible and\nto reduce it to the simplest expression (p. 13). Comprehension,\naccording to Paul du Bois-Reymond, can be attained by three methods,\n(1) the empirical, (2) the mechanical, and (3) the meta-mechanical.\nThe empirical is inductive, the mechanical is deductive, and the\nmeta-mechanical attacks those problems which are at the bottom of all\nour fundamental conceptions. The meta-mechanical tendency of science\nis not satisfied with the results of the empirical and mechanical\ninvestigations; it attempts to conquer all the difficulties or at least\nto arrive at the limits of human comprehension. \"Its province is to\ncomprehend matter, how matter can have effect on other matter, how\nactio in distans can produce pressure or motion; it tries to understand\nthe great concepts of time and space and whatever profound problems may\nnow or during the further progress of science be proposed.\"\n\nHaving explained these preliminary views concerning the methods of\ncomprehension, the author discusses the following topics: Is the\nSpace-filling Substance Continuous or Atomistic? (Chap. iii).\u2014Actio\nin Distans (_Fernkraft_) (Chap. iv).\u2014Several Syntheses (Chap.\nv).\u2014The Idealistic and the Empiristic World Conception (Chap.\nvi).\u2014Atomism and Actio in Distans with Reference to the Absolute\n(Chap. vii).\u2014Concerning World-Conceptions (Chap. viii). In the first\nof these chapters (viz. in Chap. iii. of the book) the author presents\nthe difficulties which beset the theory of a continuous substance.\nAt first sight it appears most plausible to conceive of that which\nfills space as something constant and uninterrupted, but continuity of\nsubstance, our author declares, excludes a possible change of volume;\ncompressibility and expansibility, properties which we predicate of\nany kind of substance, stand in a patent contradiction to a continuous\nfilling of space. Substance therefore cannot be continuous, it must\nconsist of a material which can be shifted, which is compressible, can\nbe mixed, is liable to chemical changes, and allows imponderabilia to\npass freely through; it is porous, or in other words it is permeated\nby space free from substance. Prof. Paul du Bois-Reymond conceives\nof substance as dust-like, viz. it consists of spatially distinct\ncorpuscles, and he thinks that there must be supposed to be different\nkinds of dust. These dust-particles are in his synthesis the vehicles\nof any actio in distans, their properties are energy and inertia. Actio\nin distans, we are informed in the next chapter, cannot be explained\nby constructing a world-synthesis either out of absolutely rigid\nelements or out of absolutely elastic elements. Since we cannot derive\na construction of actio in distans from mechanical concepts, we are led\nto the conclusion that we have reached here the limit of cognition.\nIndeed, the incomprehensible in all forces is and remains the actio in\ndistans. All the hypotheses which try to explain the problem, will only\ndefer it by introducing some medium which is to be the vehicle of the\nactio in distans, and the simplest method is after all to consider the\natom as this vehicle. \"The far-effective atom, conceived as a centre\nof activity, endowed with inertia, freely movable, is the simplest\nmechanism that can be used as the basis of our synthesis, and we call\nit briefly the far-effective (fernwirkende) atom\" (p. 52).\n\nIt seems to us that Professor du Bois-Reymond has disposed of the idea\nof a continuous substance too easily, and that he is at the same time\ntoo easily satisfied with the shortcomings of his atomistic theory of a\ndust-like substance. We grant most willingly that the idea of an actio\nin distans is inconceivable, for an action can be effective only where\nit takes place, it can have no effect in other and more distant places.\nBut action is never confined to a limited point: it always stretches\nover a field of some size. Suppose an action _a_ takes place along the\nline _b c_, can we speak of _b_ as being effective in _c_; or is it not\nrather _a_, i. e. the whole process, which takes place in _b_ and in\n_c_. The sun's mass exercises an effect upon the earth; and yet they\nare about 80,000,000 miles distant. But let us use an instance which\ncan become a more direct object of our observation. We have a pair of\nscales and put a weight on one of them. At once, simultaneously with\nthe sinking of the weighted scale, the other scale rises. Is this not\njust as much an actio in distans as any other instance of gravity? In\nfact our astronomers compare the gravitating celestial bodies quite\nfrequently to the action of a balance. It may be objected to this\ncomparison that we see the beam of the scales, while there is no beam\nbetween the sun and the earth. If there is no beam, there must be a\nconnection of some kind. If the earth and the sun are two disconnected\nbodies, we see no possibility for an explanation that the effects of\nthe sun's mass are felt upon the earth. Is not after all the hypothesis\nof a continuous world-substance the easiest explanation of gravity?\nIt seems to me that it is the only possible way of explaining what is\ncommonly and perhaps awkwardly called actio in distans. The atomistic\nphilosophers are bound to have the world a composition of innumerable\nparticles of dust; they wish to construct the universe mechanically and\nthis view of things appears for certain purposes very well adapted. Yet\nthey cannot construct the world of isolated world-dust particles, they\nmust have some glue or cement to fasten their atoms into a single whole\nthat sticks together. Professor Du Bois-Reymond is consistent enough\nto see the impossibility of this construction. The cement of which the\nmortar of atomism consists is the inconceivable, unthinkable idea of an\nactio in distans.\n\nLet us try to look at things from the other side. Our world-conception\nconsists of the sum of all the divers things we are acquainted with;\nbut daily experience teaches, that the world is not a composition of\nthings or of atoms, the world is one inseparable whole, and the least\nchange in one part affects the whole universe. Some one said, if I\nraise my finger the entire cosmos is shaken; and this we know is true,\nalthough the vibrations are too insignificant to be noticed by our dull\nsenses. We speak of the earth and we speak of the sun, but in reality\nthere is neither an isolated sun on the one side nor an isolated earth\non the other, there is a whole and continuous world, one part of it is\ncalled sun and another part is called earth. Every action of every part\nof the world has its effects on all the other parts, and there is no\naction taking place in the world which in this sense is not an actio in\ndistans. If we call the part played by the sun alone his action, then\nthere is certainly actio in distans, and actio in distans would be the\nbasis of the existence of the world as a cosmic whole. Yet we should\nremember that the sun does not perform any action alone for itself. The\nactions that take place in reality are relations among the inseparable\nparts of the universe. The sphere of every action extends, closely\nconsidered, over the whole world.\n\nThis view of things is not a construction of the world, it has not been\ninvented for making a philosophical synthesis, it is a description of\nthe world as we know it by experience. The description is imperfect\nand it presents many difficulties which will have to be formulated in\nproblems. But we are confident that this descriptive method is the only\nprocedure that promises success and will produce results in the future.\n\nAttempts to reconstruct a world-system from its analysed elements have\nbeen made and, although we have not as yet reached a general consensus,\nwe must consider these attempts as being at least in part successful.\nSuppose we call the simplest and most original state of substance ether\nand consider matter as ether-whirls of a certain kind. The ether must\nhave a peculiar aggregate state of its own which in some respect is\nlike a fluid, for its parts are continuous as well as interchangeable.\nAn ether whirl, or an atom, being a condensation of ether, would\nnaturally produce a tension which stands in some proportion to the\ncondensed mass.\n\nLet an india-rubber plate in a frame such as the designers use for\naltering the size of a picture represent the normal relation among the\ndifferent parts of pure ether. Now put the finger-tips of both hands\nupon the india-rubber and contract them so as to condense in both\nplaces the india-rubber inside your finger-tips. Would not the tension\nbetween both condensations be increased? and suppose the two condensed\nspots were swimming freely in the india-rubber, they would in that\ncase attract each other in a similar way as masses of matter gravitate\ntoward each other.\n\nThis comparison is of course rude, but it may serve here as an\nillustration of how we can conceive of actio in distans without\ncommitting ourselves to the assumption that an action has its effects\nin a place where it does not operate. We should not venture to speak\nof the absolute rigidity or absolute elasticity of the world-substance\nuntil the phenomena which urge us to form our views about ether have\nbeen better classified and understood.\n\nIn the chapter on \"Several Syntheses\" the author discusses problems\nwithout coming to any conclusion. The synthesis of organised life may\nlead us to something which is quite as incomprehensible as actio in\ndistans and cannot be reduced to it (p. 70). The riddles grow before\nour eyes, \"above the fog of that which lies near us rises the imposing\nproblem of the soul and towering above all other things appears the\nawful question of the consciousness of the ego.\" Prof. Du Bois-Reymond\ndoes not attempt any solution and proposes no reconciliation between\nthe empirical and idealistic world-conceptions (which are contrasted\nin Chapter vi). This lack of arriving at a definite solution leads\nour author into mysticism, in which he indulges in the last chapters\nto a greater extent than we are inclined to allow a man of science.\nHe speaks of a treble world in which we are shut up as if in a\ntreble cage, (1) the world of immediate apprehensions, (2) the world\nof conceptions, and (3) the world of reality. The third world is\n\"extra-phenomenal,\" it is the physical beyond our ego included. But\n\"we are lacking the organ of reality\" (p. 120) and \"in the physical\nbeyond nothing is impossible\" (p. 122). It is strange that Prof. Du\nBois-Reymond mentions Professor Kirchhoff's famous preface to his\nmechanics, in which he replaces the word \"explain\" by \"describe\" (p.\n13). He also mentions Professor Helmholtz's term that phenomena (i. e.\nsensations) are symbols or signs of reality, _Zeichen der Wirklichkeit_\n(p. 121). But he overlooks entirely that the world-conception derived\nfrom these ideas can be developed in a positive world-conception\nthat can satisfactorily reconcile idealism with empiricism. As soon\nas we know that cognition means description, we can dispense with\nmeta-mechanics and need not join in the disheartening cry of the\nagnostic _ignorabimus_. The inscrutableness of reality, says our\nauthor, is almost a matter of course. Happily we forget it constantly,\nfor the idea is one of the dreariest and the most weird (trostlosest\nand unheimlichst).\n\nThe whole result is negative, for we can predicate of reality nothing\nsave that it is contained in a space and that there is motion taking\nplace in it. But of what kind this space and the time depending on the\nmotion are, and in what relation they stand to our conceptions of time\nand space we can say nothing.\n\nThis is sad, but, adds Prof. Du Bois-Reymond, \"world-pain is of no\navail and yet, the world is not so bad after all\" (p. 124).\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nTUISKO-LAND DER ARISCHEN STAEMME UND GOETTER-URHEIMAT. Erl\u00e4uterungen\n zum Sagenschatze der Veden, Edda, Ilias, und Odyssee. By Dr. _Ernst\n Krause_. Mit 76 Abbildungen im Text und einer Karte. Glogau: Carl\n Flemming. 1891.\n\nDr. Ernst Krause, better known by the nom de plume of \"Carus Sterne,\"\nhas of late made a special study of comparative mythology, and\nmany interesting articles of his have appeared in different German\nperiodicals, analysing and collating the myths of the Aryan nations\nand investigating their material as to their probable origin. Dr.\nKrause distinguishes between two kinds of myths, (1) those which might\nand actually do originate in any place, and (2) those which could\noriginate only in a certain and limited locality. The former are most\ninteresting to the psychologist. We can expect that they will afford\nus an important clue to the development of the human soul. The latter,\nhowever, are valuable material to the historian and ethnologist, and\nfrom their rich mines Dr. Krause quarries his main arguments to prove\nthe European origin of the Aryas. The course and the effects of the\nsun vary so greatly in the south and in the north that it would have\nbeen strange if the solar myths also did not vary. Now it is natural\nthat such a myth as that of Baldur's death, for instance, could only\noriginate in a northern climate, and if we find the same legend told\nwith slight modifications in the south, we must assume that it has been\ntransplanted there. The attempt has often been made to explain the\nsimilarities between the Edda on the one hand and the Greek or Hindoo\nlegends on the other by the influence of the latter on the former; yet\nwe find that this theory is no longer tenable and we must grant, if not\nto the Edda itself, certainly to the substance of the Edda traditions\na far greater antiquity than we ever could have anticipated. Let us\ncompare, for instance, the Baldur myth with the account of Herodotus in\n\"Klio\" (Chaps. 34-45), and let us bear in mind that here we have not\nto deal with history, but with legends, for Plutarch already observes,\nthe ancient historians had noticed that Solon died soon after Kroesos's\naccession to the throne (563 B. C.); accordingly it was little probable\nthat he saw the Lydian King while at the height of his power. The\nstriking similarity of the two versions can be seen in eight points:\n\n 1. King Odin has two sons, of 1. King Kroesos has two sons of\n whom the one is a model of whom the one excels by his\n perfection, beloved by God and virtues all his companions,\n men, while the other appears to while the other appears to be\n be excluded from the succession unable to succeed his father\n by the fact of his being blind. on the throne. He is deaf.\n\n 2. The Ases have evil dreams, 2. Kroesos dreams that a\n indicating that some danger is pointed iron will kill his\n threatening to Baldur. favorite son Atys.\n\n 3. Frigga takes an oath from 3. Kroesos removes all iron\n all created things not to arms within reach of his son.\n injure her son.\n\n 4. Baldur is married young, the 4. Atys is married young, his\n name of his wife being Nanna. mother's name is Nana.\n\n 5. The Ases make a sport of 5. Atys goes a hunting, because\n shooting at Baldur because no in this sport he need not fear\n missile can hurt him. the tooth of the boar.\n\n 6. Baldur's own brother kills 6. A friend (who was a fratricide\n him without intention. by accident) kills Atys\n unintentionally.\n\n 7. Loki is accused of being 7. Not he who threw the fatal\n guilty of the murder. missile is accused, but the God\n who predicted Atys's fate in\n the dream.\n\n 8. The innocent murderer is 8. The innocent murderer\n slain. commits suicide.\n\nWe must consider it as an additional proof of the theory that the\nsouthern version has been taken from northern sources when we find\nincidental features which have sense only so long as they appear\nconnected with their original surroundings. The Ilias also contains\na modified version of the Baldur myth in the account of Patroclus's\ndeath. Patroclus is the kind hero, obliging and friendly to all who\nknew him, the brightest and purest figure of the whole poem. He falls\nby the intrigues of a God. When Patroclus's body is burned the same\nthing happens as with Baldur. Achilles lights the funeral pyre but it\nwill not burn, and as in the Edda a giant-woman is called in, so in the\nIliad, Iris is sent for in order to call Boreas and Zephyr who by the\npromise of considerable sacrifices are induced to make the fire burn.\nThere is no reason here why the fire should not burn, but in the Edda\nthere is a very obvious reason, for all the elements had promised by\noath not to harm Baldur's body. The flames were not allowed to burn\nhim, the logs on which the funeral ship should roll into the waves\nwere not allowed to carry him down, and the waves were not allowed to\nreceive him.\n\nGreat interest attaches also to the similarities between the Baldur\nmyth and Christianity, and not long ago a Danish theologian has\nattempted to show that the sagas of the Edda were imported into the\nNorth by Christian monks, the world-tree Yggdrasil was said to be the\nbiblical tree of life, the same from which the wood of Christ's cross\nhad been taken, Loki was identified with Lucifer, the blind H\u00f6der\nwith Longinus, the Roman captain who thrust the lance into the side\nof Christ, etc. It is a strange coincidence that Longinus was blind,\naccording to the Gospel of Nicodemus, which may have been written in\nthe eighth century. Longinus, it is told, acquired sight through the\nblood of Jesus, thus interpreting the passage \"they shall look at him\nwhom they pierced\" in the sense as if Longinus had not been able to\nlook at Jesus before.\n\nA Jewish libel against Christianity, _Toledoth Jeshu_, (reprinted\nin Eisenmenger's \"Entdecktes Judenthum\") contains a very striking\nsimilarity with the Baldur myth. It is told:\n\n\"When the wise had ordered Jesus, after he had been stoned, to be\nhanged to the wood and the wood would not bear him but broke, his\ndisciples saw it and they wept and said: 'Lo the justice of our Lord\nJesus; no wood will bear him.' The disciples did not know that he had\nextorted an oath from all the wood while he had still the name (viz.,\nthe mystical and miracle-working name of God) in his power, for he\nknew his fate that he would be condemned to be hanged.... But when\nJudas saw that no wood would bear him, he said to the wise: Consider\nthe shrewdness of his mind. He has taken oaths from all wood that it\nshould not bear him, but in my garden grows an enormous cabbage-stock.\nI shall go and bring it; perhaps it will bear him. The wise said: Do as\nyou say. Then Judas went and brought the cabbage-stock, and they hanged\nJesus on it.\"\n\nThis account being older than 1278, it was supposed to have contributed\nto form the Baldur myth of the Edda, but M\u00fcllenhoff refuted all the\nattempts to attribute a recent origin to the Edda. The mistle does\nnot grow in Iceland, accordingly the main parts of the Baldur myth in\nwhich the mistle plays so prominent a part must have existed before the\nIcelanders left their Scandinavian homes.\n\nDr. Krause's investigations strongly tend to corroborate the new view\nof placing the home of the Aryas in Europe.\n\nBy Aryas in the old sense of the name were understood those families\nof nations which spoke the Aryan languages, viz., the Hindoo, the\nPersians, the Greeks, the Romans, the Slaves, the Germans, and\nthe Celts, and some few smaller ones. These Aryas were formerly\nconsidered as kin in blood and their home was sought somewhere in\nAsia. Of late, however, many considerations tend to prove that these\nAryan nations were by no means one family; they are the product of\na mixture of several races among which one has forced its language\nupon the others. If we call this race the Aryans proper we find that\nthey are represented most purely in the Teutonic nations, the Saxons,\nLow Germans, and Scandinavians. These Aryans are a tall, blond, and\ndolichocephalic race. They appear as the conquerors of India, the\nmasters of Persia, the Dorian immigrators of Greece, showing everywhere\nthe same attributes. It is natural that they were swallowed up again\nby the dark brachycephalic races whom they had conquered, because the\nlatter were better adapted to the southern climate than their masters.\n\nThere are three long-headed races: (1) the blond long-heads or\nAryas, (2) the dark South European long-heads, and (3) the dark and\nwoolly-haired long-heads of Africa or the Negroes. There are also\nseveral broad-headed races, among them the Ugro-Finnians, Turanians,\nSouth European broad-heads are represented as the Savoyards. The\noriginal Aryans (by A. de Quatrefages called the Cannstadt race) were\nextremely long-headed, the proportion sinking below 75 : 100. This race,\nso called after the discovery of graves in Cannstadt, shows a strong\nsimilarity with, and must be considered as, an evolution from the\nNeanderthal type. The eyebrows of the male Neanderthal type skulls\nprotrude (slightly reminding us of the Gorilla) making the smallness\nof the forehead still more noticeable. The hind part of the head is\nwell developed. The bones are extremely strong, the skull is thick, and\nthe proportion of length to breadth averages in both, the Neanderthal\nand Cannstadt types, 71\u00b73. This race inhabited the banks of the Rhine\nand Seine and has been called the Germanic type by H\u00f6lder, the Saxon\ntype by Englishmen, Cymrians by Broca, while Dr. Krause calls them\nAryans. The South European long-heads with dark hair are called by\nA. de Quatrefages the Cro-Magnon type, named after a place in the\nV\u00e9s\u00e8re valley where as its first specimen a tall old man had been\ndiscovered. The Cro-Magnon type varies greatly from the Cannstadt\ntype; the forehead is broad and high, and the cranium is also well\nformed. The proportion of breadth to length is also dolichocephalic,\nit averages 73\u00b776. The orbits are broad but closely set, and the size\nof the lower parts of the face from the middle downward is strongly\nlessened in proportion to the higher parts, ending in a pointed and\nprotruding chin. This race lived in Greece, Southern Italy, France, and\nSpain, and is found also in England, where its descendants even to-day\ncan be traced in some of the Silurian inhabitants of South Wales and\nIreland. Tacitus says that the Silurians have come from Spain, and even\nto-day the people of Berkshire resemble greatly, as Boyd-Dawkins says,\nthe Basques of the Western Pyrenees, near Bagn\u00e8res de Bogorre. Their\nstature is sometimes small but not always, they are sometimes tall,\ntheir gait is light, their nose narrow and long, sometimes approaching\nJewish features, their skin dark, their hair coarse, black, and usually\ncurled.\n\nLong after the appearance of these long-heads arrived several varieties\nof broad-heads, among them Mongoloid, Ugro-Finnish, and Turanian types.\nDr. Krause arrives at the following r\u00e9sum\u00e9, that the Cannstadt skull\nrepresents the Germanic or better the Aryan type. \"This race lived in\nMiddle Europe in the oldest times to which prehistoric investigation\ndescends and has not immigrated from Asia since the great ice-era. This\nconclusion has been adopted by the most prominent anthropologists, in\nFrance by Hamy, Topinard, Quatrefages, in England by Beddoe, Flower,\nThurnam, in Germany by Ecker, Lindenschmit, H\u00f6lder, Virchow, and\nothers.\"\n\nDr. Krause adds: \"Virchow however takes in this question of the\ncharacteristic features of the Aryan race a strange and isolated\nposition, in so far as he believes that from the beginning there had\nbeen and are still broad-heads as well as long-heads among the Germanic\nraces.\" With respect to the conflict between Virchow and Dr. Krause,\nwe should prefer to call the old and original races by new names, as\nQuatrefages did; we should speak of them as the Cannstadt type, the\nCro-Magnon type, etc. When we speak of Aryans, or Saxons, or Germanic\nnations, we should know that they are no longer the pure Cannstadt\ntype, but a mixture, and this mixture has not even to-day become\nsufficiently fixed to produce one uniform race. There are certain\nfeatures predominant in certain nations, and certainly the blond\nlong-heads are purest in the Teutonic nations; nevertheless, it is not\nan uncommon occurrence that in one and the same family both types are\ndistinctly represented. Johannes Ranke on the strength of this fact has\nno faith in the constancy of the skull and does not regard it as a fit\nmethod of settling any race problem.\n\nThe Aryans, i. e. the tall, blond broad-heads of the Cannstadt type\nare distinguished by strength and by power of will. They were hunters,\nfishermen, sea-faring people, and warriors. They loved the sea,\nthey loved rivers and lakes. They appear repeatedly in history as\nconquerors. The arts and industries, however, the use of metals, the\ninvention of pottery, do not seem to have originated among them.\n\nIt seems to us that Dr. Krause exhibits an excusable partiality for\nthe blond tall Aryas in comparison with the dark South-European\nlong-heads as well as the broad-heads. The Aryans were chiefly the\nrulers, except in Palestine, where the tall blond Amorites had been\nconquered by Semites. It appears that the conquest of a country by\nthe Aryas for instance in India, in Persia, in Greece, gave a start\nto civilisation, as the Ostro-Goths restored peace and reawakened the\narts in Italy. But at the same time we notice that the Aryas were most\nlikely more savage than their broad-headed fellowmen. The present\nTeutonic population represents so little the pure type of the old tall\nlong-heads that Professor Virchow refuses to recognise long-headedness\nas a race symptom at all. We find long-heads and broad-heads in the\nsame family. Both long-headed parents may have broad-headed children\nand _vice versa._ This need not prove the correctness of Professor\nVirchow's position, but it may very well prove that the present\nnations, the Teutonic race not excluded, are the product of a mixture.\nAs the most important feature of Aryan character Dr. Krause considers\ntheir religion, and we are inclined to accept Dr. Krause's opinion as\nthoroughly sound. The Aryan religion, he says, is the cult of light\nin opposition to the southern cult of darkness. The original Semites\nworshipped the earth, the moon, the night; the Aryan, worshipped\nthe sun, the sky, the day, the former bowed before womanhood and\nsentimentality; the latter represented manhood and will-power. (The\nJews are not pure Semites, they show a constant proportion in the north\nof a little over 14/100 and in the south of a little over 13/100 of\ntall, blond long-heads. These blond Jews, are according to Virchow,\nthe Amorites with which the Israelites mixed after the conquest of\nPalestine. The religion of the Jews also shows very strong Aryan\ninfluences especially since their contact with the Persians.)\n\nThe Aryan religions as a rule begin the world with male motherless\nGods; while the Semitic religions begin with female mother-gods\nwithout fathers. There is the giant Ymir or in Alfadur, here the\ngoddess Kybele, Isis, Rhea, or Demeter. This difference is founded on\na social difference which again depends upon climatic conditions. In\nthe south we find in the beginning a state of matriarchy. There was\nno great difficulty in bringing up large families and the assistance\nof the father was not needed. In consequence thereof the father was\nand remained a stranger, an occasional visitor. There were no lasting\nfamily ties between himself and the mother of his children, the sexual\nrelations remained free, and the right of heredity recognised the\nmother only. How different was it in the north! Without their father a\nfamily had to perish. The severe struggle for life created the family\nand eventually the monogamic family, it made the men strong, active,\nliberty-loving. There was undoubtedly much rudeness among the northern\nnations; they were savages in many respects, but wherever they appeared\nas conquerors they introduced their religion of light, activity, and\nsubmission to moral laws. The conquered tribes contributed undoubtedly\nmany most valuable qualities to the mixture from which the future races\narose, qualities which the Aryans would perhaps never have been able to\nevolve out of themselves alone. Nevertheless the Aryans gave character\nto the nations, impressed upon them their speech, their thought, their\nworld-conception and their morality.\n\nDr. Krause's treatment of comparative mythology with reference to the\nphysical and geographical conditions under which myths originate, is\nvery suggestive, and we wish he had also taken into consideration the\nparallelism of the northern Sun-myths with Christianity. Dr. Krause\nmentions that the idea of immortality is an Aryan thought, he might\nhave added that the idea of a dying God who will again rise from the\ndead can only have originated in the home of the Baldur myth.\n\nDr. Krause's work contains in 624 pages an almost inexhaustible store\nof investigations. It is one of the most interesting books we have ever\nseen. We mention here only the chapters on the Megalithian Monuments,\non Orion, on the northern animals of Apollo, on little Red Ridinghood,\non the Wagon in the Skies and Tom Thumb, on Helen and her northern\nrepresentatives, and on the history of the Odyssee. The book would be\nmore valuable to the reader if it possessed an index.\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nDIE MATHEMATIK DIE FACKELTRAEGERIN EINER NEUEN ZEIT. By _C. Dillmann_.\n Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1889.\n\nThe importance of this little book does not lie so much in the theories\nas in the practical aims of the author. Oberstudienrath Dillmann is a\nreformer in the system of higher education; he is not a mere theorist,\nbut a man of experience who has now been for years the principal of a\nschool like that which he advocates. Mr. Dillmann's idea is very simple\nand obviously correct. He claims that the old so-called classical\nmethod, where the teaching of dead languages is made the basis of\neducation, no longer meets the needs of our time; that there is however\nanother discipline, which for its universality and its fundamental\nimportance in every branch of knowledge should be made the corner-stone\nof education, and that is mathematics. So he proposes to have our boys\neducated in mathematical high schools.\n\nWe may insert here some information concerning Mr. Dillmann, which\nis not found in his book but will throw light upon his plans and\ntheories. Mr. Dillmann is the son of a schoolmaster. He inherited\nfrom his father the aspiration of acquiring a higher education and\nhaving passed through the gymnasium he went to the university to\nstudy theology. The study of theology is the only one in which a poor\nyouth finds support and material help from his fellowmen. Having\npassed his examinations he was engaged for about seven years as a\nvicar in the service of the church. He felt however the need of\ncompleting his education in mathematics and the natural sciences. He\nwent again to the university (this time to the polytechnic school\nat Stuttgart) and devoted himself with great zeal to his favorite\nstudies. Having passed his examinations in these branches he was\nappointed professor of mathematics at the Stuttgart gymnasium. While\nhere engaged in preparing his pupils for the university, he became more\nand more convinced that the whole plan of teaching then followed was\ninadequate. Our youth receive much information about trifles which are\nuseless to them in after life, while the main things are treated with\nindifference. He wrote a book \"The demands of the Realistic Sciences\non Education,\" which excited general interest and called the attention\nof Kultus-minister von Golther to his ideas. Herr von Golther founded\na new kind of a high school which besides giving good philological\ninstruction, Latin included, was to be devoted mainly to a thorough\nmathematical education; and Professor Dillmann was appointed president\nof the school, which first bore the name of \"mathematical gymnasium.\"\nThe authorities soon considered it best to change the name into\nReal-gymnasium. The school was started in 1867 as a mere trial and in\n1871, when its success appeared to be assured, it became a permanent\ninstitution. For 15 years it counts an average of from 800 to 900\npupils.\n\nIn spite of the confidence of the public, the new school had and\nhas still its hard times. The views now prevalent among the German\nauthorities are less favorable to great reformatory ideas than\never. The restrictions put upon the Real-gymnasia have also hit Mr.\nDillmann's school, although his institution is different in plan from\nthe other Real-gymnasia, the latter being, as a rule, schools in which\nthe scholastic severity of the gymnasia is neglected without replacing\nit by other systematic studies.\n\nThe present book has been written to explain and justify Mr. Dillmann's\nmethods, and we cannot but say that we heartily sympathise with his\naspirations. At the same time we express here the sincere hope that\nanother Dillmann might rise on American soil and institute a real\nmathematical high school which will give a more solid foundation for\nthe education of scientists than our present educational systems can\ngive. We do not mean that the philological and historical studies\nshould be neglected in such a mathematical school. We trust that they\ncan be taught with less waste of energy than has been done in the past.\nThere is perhaps no need of preaching against Greek and Latin in our\nAmerican schools, because philology, it appears, is the most neglected\nstudy on this side of the Atlantic and the ignorance in classics often\nof highly educated scholars is sometimes astounding and would be\nshocking to pedants of European philology. But I have not as yet been\nable to discover that this ignorance concerning a few grammatical rules\nof two dead languages has wrought great harm. At the same time I have\nnoticed that European savants in spite of their enormous philological\nscholarship are sometimes grossly ignorant of the spirit that lived\nin the so-called classic nations. They have translated Homer, have\nanalysed the Ionic and Aeolian and Dorian forms of Homeric speech,\nbut they have rarely read Homer and imbibed the beauties of Greek\npoetry. Philological scholarship is dry and hard work, but the study of\nhistorical evolution, to be nourished with the spirit of the past and\nto see it develop into the spirit of modern times is rather recreation\nthan drudgery. We can keep the latter without plaguing our boys so much\nas before with the former.\n\nThe present book contains as introduction an \"open word\" by the\nauthor to his Excellency the Prussian Secretary of Education, Dr. von\nGossler, pointing out the error of his policy not to admit the pupils\nof Real-gymnasia to the universities. The bulk of the book is devoted\nto an explanation of the importance of mathematics in all the sciences.\nMr. Dillmann declares it is a mistake to believe that the objective\nworld is unknowable. Kant has torn the world in two halves and by\nmaking space and time purely subjective, he created a gap between the\nsubject and the object, between mind and nature, a gap which, if Kant's\nassumption be true, cannot be bridged. Kant's division of the world\nhowever is wrong. Does not every thinking subject with his feelings and\nconcepts lie in the sphere of objectivity of other subjects? Time and\nspace are not purely subjective and the science of time and space is\ndestined to reconcile the conflicting parties, it will restore peace\nand harmony again between mind and nature. Our world of conception is\nin immediate contact and interconnection with the world of reality. All\nintellectual activity is motion of our organ of thought. Sensations\nare produced by motions of the objective world and these sensations\nare gradually transformed into concepts. Words are the embodiment of\nconcepts. The phenomena of the outer world reappear in the symbolism\nof language, and thus our intellectual activity can lead to a faithful\nrepresentation of nature. The world is cognisable, truth can be born in\nus and we need not lose the self-confidence in our own abilities.\n\nThese theoretical explanations are of great interest, and we need\nscarcely add that Mr. Dillmann's plan would still retain its value,\nif they were proved to contain inaccuracies or errors. We look upon\nit as the author's philosophical confession of faith, the main idea\nof which is indubitably correct while many of its details are without\ngreat consequence. We would express the main idea of Mr. Dillmann's\nbook in the following way: Formal thought is the basis of all knowledge\nand a correct comprehension of the main formal sciences especially of\nmathematics is the primary condition of a scientific education.\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nGEISTESSTOERUNGEN IN DER SCHULE. Ein Vortrag nebst 13 Krankenbildern.\n By _Christian Ufer_. Wiesbaden: J. F. Bergmann. 1891.\n\nThe subject-matter of this pamphlet was read as a lecture on November\n9th, 1890, before the _Verein f\u00fcr wissenschaftliche P\u00e4dagogik_ at\nWeissenfels. The author's aim is, to bring home to parents and teachers\nthe important idea, that the treatment of psychical disturbances\nmust be based on our best knowledge of psychology, and especially\nof physiological psychology. A deeper insight into pathological\nconditions, says Krafft-Ebing, will remove many mistakes and tyrannies\nin our education. Teachers as a rule have to deal with healthy\nchildren, but diseased conditions are sufficiently frequent to demand\nof our teachers that they should learn how to treat them. The cases\nwith which the author illustrates his doctrines show that one of the\nmost common causes of psychic diseases in children must be sought in\nthe nervous disposition of their parents, their unequal treatment and\nalso their over-anxious ambition which produces excitement in the\nchild's mind without helping him to overcome the rather heavy demands\nof German school-life.\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nTHE SOUL OF MAN. An Investigation of the Facts of Physiological and\n Experimental Psychology. By Dr. _Paul Carus_. Chicago: The Open\n Court Publishing Co. 1891.\n\nThe Editor of _The Monist_ has collected and collated in this book the\nresults of the work done in the field of psychology and its auxiliary\nsciences. The author's philosophical standpoint is characterised in\nthe first chapter where he contrasts feeling and motion. Feeling\nis defined as the subjective aspect of certain processes which,\nviewed objectively, appear as motions, and it is described as a\nstate of awareness. Feeling originates from the simpler elements of\nsubjectivity and becomes naturally representative, i. e. it acquires\nmeaning. Mind is an organised totality of meaning-endowed feelings.\nThe author reconciles from his standpoint idealism with realism. He\nshows that \"the fulfilment of mind is truth.... Mind expands in the\nmeasure that it contains and reflects truth\" (p. 46). The question\nof telepathy is touched, yet telepathy has here a different meaning\nfrom mystic thought-transference without any means of communication.\nEvery sensation is a \"far feeling\" in the literal sense of the word,\nfor \"we do not feel our sense-organs but in and through our sense\norgans objects outside of us are felt. In and through our eyes most\ndistant stars are seen.... What is the soul but a telepathic machine?\"\n(p. 44) In the chapters following are described the characteristic\nfeatures of organised life and its rise from non-organised life. The\nphysiological part of the book treats of the soul-life of plants, then\nof animals, and gives by the aid of profuse illustrations an account\nof the evolution of nervous systems up to man. The chapter on the seat\nof consciousness proposes a new theory which will be of interest to\nphysiologists as well as psychologists.\n\nThe recapitulation of the present state of experimental psychology\npresents the most telling facts of hypnotism, compares them with their\ncorrespondent normal states of soul-life, and explains them from the\nstandpoint of the author. The conclusion of the book is devoted to the\nethical and religious application of this conception of psychology.\nThe practical importance of the new truths in the psychological field\nis vigorously maintained, but at the same time it is shown that the\nold conceptions psychological as well as religious are by no means\nworthless. They contain great truths and cannot be discarded offhand.\nIn this sense are discussed among others the problems of Freewill and\nResponsibility, of Immortality and of the God-idea.\n\n\n\n\nPERIODICALS.\n\n\nMIND. April, 1891. No. LXII.\n\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n FREE-WILL: AN ANALYSIS. By _Shadworth H. Hodgson_.\n\n THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE. By _G. F. Stout_.\n\n THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS. By _Alexander F. Shand_.\n\n ARNOLD GEULINCX AND HIS WORKS. By Professor _J. P. N. Land_.\n\n DISCUSSION: 1) On Thought-Relations. By _Arthur Eastwood_. 2)\n Notes on Volition. By _Professor A. Bain_. 3) On Psychology and\n Metaphysic. By _J. S. Mackenzie_.\n\n CRITICAL NOTICES: Morgan's \"Animal Life and Intelligence\";\n Croll's \"Philosophical Basis of Evolution\"; Ladd's\n \"Introduction to Philosophy\"; Stumpf's \"Tonpsychologie, II.\"\n\nMr. Hodgson states that the kernel of the problem of Free-Will lies\nin the question whether, as imagined by Compulsory Determinists, the\nstrongest motive has from the first governed the deliberation or\nprocess of choosing, as it subsequently governs the action chosen, or\nwhether the victorious motive owes its superior strength to the act\nor process of deliberation, which terminates in choice, as much as\nto its own initial degree of strength. In favor of the latter view,\nhe states that choice involves deliberation, and such deliberation\ninvolves a consciousness of incompatible or alternative desires, and\na comparison of their relative degrees of desirability. The act of\nchoice is the same in nature as the act of selective attention in\nperception and thought, and is known by the sense of effort or tension\nwhich gives it the character of an _act_, and the consciousness of\na decisive change in the relative desirabilities of the alternative\ndesires represented in the deliberation, which gives it the character\nof an act of _choice_. All true volition is choice, whether the\ndesire, almost instantaneously adopted, is adopted because the will\nis weak, or because it is strong. In the former case, the will is\nmastered by a powerful motive; in the latter case, the motive which it\nfollows receives its strength from the will itself, in the character\nof a deliberating agency. To the extent of the deliberation there is\nfreedom. Freedom in willing is merely the power to will. Volition is\nthe name for the whole action of which Freedom is the potential state,\nand Choice or Resolve the completing act.\n\nMr. Stout's article is in continuation of that on \"Apperception and\nthe Movement of Attention\" in the last number of _Mind_. Intuitional\nthinking is independent of language and other expressive signs.\nLanguage is a way of attending indirectly to that which cannot be\nattended to directly, and signs which fulfil such a function are\n_expressive_ signs. An expressive sign must be carefully distinguished\nfrom a _suggestive_ sign, which merely calls up a certain idea which\nmay then be attended to independently of it, and a _substitute_\nsign, which is a means of _not_ thinking about the meaning which\nit symbolises. The development of language is a development of\nself-consciousness. A concept is an apperceptive system objectified\nby means of an expressive sign. Expressive signs are the form, as\ndistinguished from the matter, of conceptual thought. The distinction\nbetween formal and formless languages acts as a line of demarcation\nbetween the language of natural signs and that of conventional\nsigns. Gesture-language may be described as formless. It is an\ninstrument of conceptual thinking, in which the natural signs are\neither demonstrative or imitative. Onomatop\u0153ia is a phonetic gesture.\nConventional signs, being free from the necessary limitations of\nnatural signs, are capable of expressing adequately and accurately the\nmost specific and the most abstract concepts.\n\nIn his article on the \"Nature of Consciousness,\" Mr. Shand seeks to\nshow that consciousness, when abstracted from the other acts combined\nwith it, is a unique judgment, and as an act of judging it is simple\nand unanalysable. As a union of act and object, however, consciousness\nis complex. The whole is a judgment which, besides its object, contains\nalso the difference between its act and its object. Here is shown\nits contrast with the Transcendent Judgment, which merely judges its\nobject. But there is a fundamental unity between them. Each is a\njudgment\u2014an act concerned about an object different from its act, and,\nas an act, each is a simple reality. Judgment, universally as an act,\nis such a simple reality. Reality in consciousness means no more than\npresentation, and the act of being conscious is the subject exercising\none of its functions. This mysterious something, the subject, cannot\nbe resolved into any association of presentations, nor into any one of\nthem, nor be derived by abstraction from them, so far at least as the\nact of being conscious is concerned, which is a genuine function of the\nsubject.\n\nProfessor Land gives a sketch of the life and work of Arnold Geulincx,\nthe Flemish thinker of the seventeenth century known to students of\nphilosophy in connection with the doctrine of Occasionalism. The key\nto Geulincx's view of philosophy is to be found in his statement that\nthe utterances of our own reason are far less regarded than the shows\nof senses and fantasy; although they have their source in the bodily\nlife, which is radically foreign to the soul, and can only darken\nthe knowledge of our self and of its true interests. The dualism of\nmind and body is for Geulincx a determined fact. Professor Land has\nundertaken to prepare a complete edition of Geulincx's works, the\nexpenses of the publication of which will be defrayed from the balance\nremaining over from the Spinoza Memorial fund.\n\nIn his discussion on \"thought-relations,\" Mr. Eastwood states that\nthis puzzling expression is interwoven with the whole of Green's\nwritings, and requires to be thoroughly explained. The proof that the\nReal is identical with the Thinkable was Green's great problem, and\nto Hegel's inquiry what are the essential features of thought? he\nreplied: the constitution of relations. Green found, however, that\nthey are not fully adequate in themselves and he called to their\naid a spiritual principle or eternal subject. But the reference of\nrelations to the Eternal Mind as their subject is a reference to the\nunknown, and therefore is, on grounds of strict reason, illegitimate.\nThought-relations are essentially finite, and are the connecting links\nof the phenomenal world. In the evolution of thought the absolute is\nnothing short of the whole, and especially, it is the whole _process of\ntransition_ from Being to the Idea. The more we try to externalise it\nor to arrest its movement, by impressing it with the immutability of\nthought-relations, the more it recedes from our grasp.\n\nIn his Notes on Volition, Professor Bain considers whether pain is to\nbe regarded as the sole motive in voluntary action, or whether the\nmotive is a growing pleasure or a diminishing pleasure, in concurrence\nwith some form of active exertion. Considerations arising from the\ngreat differences among pleasures themselves leads him to reject the\nview that the stimulus of the will is uneasiness pure and simple, and\nthat pleasure, as such, leads to quiescence and contentment. A taste of\npleasure constitutes an impetus to seek for more and may be accepted as\nthe normal situation of the human will. The graded scale of voluntary\naction ranges from the lowest depths of pain, at which the motive power\nis at its maximum, to the highest assignable or attainable modes of\npleasure, approaching which the motive power gradually dies away.\n\nMr. Mackenzie points out, in considering Mr. Alexander's criticisms\nof his _Introduction to Social Philosophy_, the importance of\ndistinguishing, when dealing with the subject of organic development,\nbetween the psychological and the metaphysical points of view, and\nthat he wrote entirely from the metaphysical point of view. (London:\nWilliams & Norgate.)\n\n \u03a9.\n\n\nTHE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY.\n\n\nCONTENTS: February, 1891. Vol. III. No. 4.\n\n AUTOMATIC MUSCULAR MOVEMENTS AMONG THE INSANE; THEIR\n PHYSIOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE. By _C. P. Bancroft_.\n\n ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. By _Herbert Nichols_.\n\n ON THE RECOVERY OF STIMULATED GANGLION CELLS. By _C. F. Hodge_.\n\n PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. The Nervous System\u2014by _H. H.\n Donaldson_; Psychiatry\u2014by _William Noyes_\u2014Experimental;\n Miscellaneous.\n\n\nCONTENTS: April, 1891. Vol. IV. No. 1.\n\n ARITHMETICAL PRODIGIES. By _E. W. Scripture_.\n\n THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. By _Herbert Nichols_.\n\n PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE: Cerebral Localisation. By _Henry H.\n Donaldson_; Notes on Models of the Brain. By _H. H. Donaldson_;\n A Laboratory Course in Physiological Psychology. By _E. C.\n Sanford_; Contemporary Psychologists\u2014Prof. Edward Zeller. By\n _The Editor_.\n\nIt is pointed out by Dr. Bancroft that the close relationship between\nautomatic muscular movement and the inhibitory power renders a study\nof the latter essential to a complete understanding of the subject of\nautomaticity in health and disease. The inhibitory power is intimately\nassociated with all the higher faculties, and as it must, in common\nwith them, seek expression through functional activity of the cerebral\ncortex, functional or organic disturbance of this region should be\nattended by disordered inhibition. In many cases of insanity that\nportion of the brain that \"originates the will impulse\" is cut off by\nreason of organic or functional disturbance, and consequently the areas\nthat lie nearer the centrifugal nerves are left to act independently\nof will and inhibition. The development of mechanical attitudes among\nthe chronic insane is illustrated by a plate exhibiting two cases of\nmelancholia with stupor and two cases of chronic dementia.\n\nThe literature of the Psychology of Time is dealt with by Mr.\nNichols from the historical and the experimental standpoints. The\nmost striking feature of the whole time investigation is, that of\nall the philosophers and psychologists who have touched upon the\nproblem, only two of the whole number, Condillac obscurely, and James\nMill definitely, have solved the mystery by _letting the sequences\nthemselves be the ultimate mystery_\u2014by letting their process, as\nprocess and of itself, show forth its own explanation. The results\nof experimental investigations in time psychology are scarcely more\nsatisfactory. Most experimenters have confined themselves to the\ndetermination of the Constant Error, Sensibility, and Weber's Law,\nyet with difficulty, if at all, can the results of any two of such\ndeterminations be harmonised. The majority of evidence is strongly\nagainst the validity of Weber's Law; also against any fixed or constant\nPeriodicity. Later investigators look to physiological processes for\nexplanation of time-judgments, and particularly to rhythmic habits of\nnerve centres.\n\nDr. Hodge's paper is a continuation of chapters which appeared in\nthe _American Journal of Psychology_ in May 1888 and May 1889. His\nexperiments on cats show that spinal ganglion cells do recover from\nthe effects of injuries by electrically stimulating the nerve going to\nthem, but that the recovery is a slow process.\n\nAn account is given by Dr. Scripture of the known Arithmetical\nProdigies. The opinion of Bidder was that \"mental calculation depends\non two faculties of the mind in simultaneous operation\u2014computing and\nregistering the result\"! The power to do long calculations in the mind\nwithout making a mistake is the most remarkable fact in regard to ready\nreckoners; next the wonderful rapidity which some of them have shown.\nAll of them possessed a remarkable impressibility, and practised modes\nby which arithmetical associations may be enormously shortened. Dr.\nScripture offers for consideration the points that the power of mental\ncalculation could be greatly developed under cultivation; that numbers\nand their values may be learned before figures, just as a child learns\nwords and their meanings long before he can read; that it is best to\nteach \"calculation\" by the _abacus_ before \"ciphering.\"\n\nMr. Nichols records in his second article the result of a series\nof experiments made by him at Clark University to investigate the\napparently contradictory results obtained by various experimenters\nregarding the Constant Error of Time-judgments. The experiments\nteach nothing of the cause of the Constant Error, but it is shown\nthat those individuals who make the largest constant error, make\nthe error most constantly in one direction, and are apt to make a\nconstantly increasing error throughout the series of experiments. Mr.\nNichols's final conclusion is that \"the processes of our environment,\nof our bodily organism, and of the sensations and images which\ncorrespond thereto, are, in themselves a sufficient explanation of\ntime-psychology, and that time perception cannot be explained by any\nsingle state or disparate sense, but alone be accounted for as a\n_process_.\" (E. C. Sanford, Clark University, Worcester, Mass.)\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. April, 1891. Vol. I. No. 2.\n\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n SOCIAL EQUALITY. By _Leslie Stephen_.\n\n THE RELIGIOUS ELEMENT IN ETHICAL CODES. By _Prof. C. H. Toy_.\n\n THE RIGHT FINAL AIM OF LIFE. By _Prof. G. von Gizycki_.\n\n THE MORAL PHILOSOPHER AND THE MORAL LIFE. By _Prof. William\n James_.\n\n ANOTHER VIEW OF THE ETHICS OF LAND-TENURE. By _Prof. Simon N.\n Patten_.\n\n MORAL TALES. By _Clara E. Collet_.\n\nMr. Leslie Stephen affirms that it is our duty to try to make men equal\nby raising the grade of culture in all classes. The distribution of\nclasses would continue, but it would correspond purely to the telling\noff of each man to the duties which he is best fitted to discharge. The\nessential condition of all social improvement is that the individual\nshould be manly, self-respecting, doing his duty as well as getting\nhis pay. Nothing will do any permanent good which does not imply the\nelevation of the individual in his standard of honesty, independence,\nand good conduct.\n\nOne of the earliest studies of life, says Professor Toy, is that\nwhich is known as the clan-constitution of society, during which two\nimportant facts are exhibited, (1) ethical ideas are determined by\nthose of the community, and (2) the deity of the community is regarded\nas a member of the clan. Both these characteristics have become\nmodified in the progress of civilisation. Moral rules and principles\nhave become clearer, broader, and higher, and society has come to be\nan efficient moral guide and support. Religion has moved away from the\nconception of the tribal god, and the conception has been formed of the\nabsolute dominion of natural law in the moral world. The end to which\nhuman moral history points is a conscience absolutely independent and\nyet absolutely dependent,\u2014independent in that it refuses to recognise\nany other authority than its own ideals, dependent in that it receives\nits ideals from the life of man, which is the highest revelation of God.\n\nAccording to Professor von Gizycki, the ultimate basis of all ethical\ndemonstration is the supreme standard of good and evil, the greatest\npossible happiness of all mankind. Various objections urged against\nthis, as the final aim of life, are examined by Professor von Gizycki\nand declared not to constitute a decisive case against it. As to the\ndesire to obtain peace of conscience he affirms that this can only\nfollow upon such action as is in conformity with the greatest possible\nhappiness of mankind. The Professor has modified his former position.\nThe injunction, \"Seek peace of conscience in devoting thyself to the\nwelfare of mankind,\" which he had proposed in his \"Moral Philosophy,\"\nimplies an impracticable combination of two distinct final aims. Either\nthe one or the other must abdicate the supremacy to its rival. We must\ninvoke the aid of _ethical_ self-love in order to insure the victory\nto the forces which make for good. But our ruling aim ought to be the\nadvancement of the universal happiness of mankind.\n\nThe main purpose of Professor James's paper is to show that there is\nno such thing possible as an ethical philosophy dogmatically made\nup in advance. Three questions in ethics must be kept apart\u2014the\n_psychological_, the _metaphysical_, and the _casuistic_. The\npsychological question asks after the historical _origin_ of our\nmoral ideas and judgments; the metaphysical question asks the very\n_meaning_ of the words good, ill, and obligation; the casuistic\nquestion asks what is the _measure_ of the various goods and ills\nwhich men recognise, so that the philosopher may settle the true order\nof human obligation. As to the _psychological_ question,\u2014relations\nexist in our thought which do not merely repeat the couplings of\nexperience. Our ideals have certainly many sources. They are not all\nexplicable as signifying corporeal pleasures to be gained, and pains\nto be escaped. As to the _metaphysical_ question,\u2014goodness, badness,\nand obligation must be _realised_ somewhere in order really to exist.\nWithout a claim actually made by some concrete person there can be no\nobligation, but there is some obligation wherever there is a claim.\nClaim and obligation are co-extensive terms. The words good, bad,\nobligation, are objects of feeling and desire, which have no foothold\nor anchorage in Being apart from the existence of actually living\nminds. \"The religion of humanity\" affords a basis for ethics as well\nas theism does. As to the _casuistic_ question\u2014The best of the marks\nand measures of goodness is the capacity to bring happiness, but in\nseeking for an universal principle we find that the essence of good is\nsimply to _satisfy demand_. But the actual possible in this world is\nvastly narrower than all that is demanded, and the guiding principle\nfor ethical philosophy must be simply to satisfy at all times _as many\ndemands as we can_. So far as the casuistic question goes, ethical\nscience is just like physical science, and must be ready to revise its\nconclusions from day to day. Concrete ethics cannot be final because\nthey have to wait on metaphysics. The final conclusion is that the\nstable and systematic moral universe for which the ethical philosopher\nasks is fully possible only in a world where there is a divine thinker\nwith all-enveloping demands. If he now exist, then actualised in his\nthought already must be that ethical philosophy which we seek after as\nthe pattern which our own must ever more approach.\n\nProfessor Patten treats of the economical data bearing on the facts\nof land-tenure, and concludes that if no surplus land value goes to\nthe monopolies or to privileged classes, there is no ethical problem\ninvolved. If some of the surplus goes in this way, then the ethical\nproblem is the same as if all of the produce of industry above a\nminimum of wages went to increase the surplus. The growth of society\nin wealth and numbers often makes the man without wealth and land\nless productive, because he must use poorer land or less productive\ninstruments. The loss being due to social changes the workman is\nentitled to compensation for which he should look to society, which\nmay choose the concrete form in which it shall be made. The expense\nof doing this should be borne by those who have profited from the\nprosperity of society.\n\nIn her interesting paper on Moral Tales, Mrs. Collet passes in review\ncertain books which, read in childhood, have left an indelible\nimpression on her mind. Chief among them are the \"Sandford and Merton\"\nof Thomas Day, who was deeply impressed by the writings of Rousseau;\nthe stories of Maria Edgeworth, the most truly democratic of our moral\nwriters; and those of Dr. Aiken and his sister, Mrs. Barbauld, whose\nwritings although pervaded by a strong religious spirit, are very\nstriking for their unaggressive and yet open declaration of the right\nto think independently in religion. Mrs. Collet gives her verdict, with\nregard to the moral education of children, in favor of the voluntary\n\"consumption of moral tales.\" (Philadelphia: _International Journal of\nEthics_, 1602 Chestnut St.)\n\n\nREVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE.\n\n\nCONTENTS: March, 1891. No. 183.\n\n POURQUOI MOURONS-NOUS? By _J. Delb\u0153uf_.\n\n SUR UN CAS D'ABOULIE ET D'IDEES FIXES. By _Pierre Janet_.\n\n L'ART ET LA LOGIQUE. (Fin.) By _G. Tarde_.\n\n ANALYSES ET COMPTES RENDUS.\n\n REVUE DES PERIODIQUES ETRANGERS.\n\n\nCONTENTS: April, 1891. No. 184.\n\n QU'EST-CE QUE LA PHYSIOLOGIE GENERALE? By _Ch. Richet_.\n\n LA PHILOSOPHIE DE BACON. By _Victor Brochard_.\n\n SUR UN CAS D'ABOULIE ET D'IDEES FIXES (Fin.) By _Pierre Janet_.\n\n POURQUOI MOURONS-NOUS? (Fin.) By _J. Delb\u0153uf_.\n\n NOTES ET DISCUSSIONS.\n\n ANALYSES ET COMPTES RENDUS.\n\n SUR UN OLFACTOMETRE. By _Ch. Henry_.\n\nM. Delb\u0153uf's article is the complement to his studies on the origin\nof death, and was inspired by the work of M. Maupas, _Recherches\nexp\u00e9rimentales sur la multiplication des infusoires cili\u00e9s_, some of\nthe conclusions of which he thinks are not supported by observation\nand emanate from the sophism, \"that which has not been seen does not\nexist.\" Nevertheless he accepts the opinion of M. Maupas, as against\nM. Weismann, that the protozoa as well as the metazoa, are mortal\nas individuals, although immortal in and by the species. M. Delb\u0153uf\naccounts for the change from fissiparity to sexuality by reference\nto mathematical law applicable to the transformation of species,\naccording to which from the moment that a _constant_ cause begins to\nmake a type vary, in however small a degree, the variations will end by\nvictoriously disputing the position with it. The death of the ciliated\ninfusoria is then not due, as supposed by M. Maupas, to the effect of\na _senile_ alteration of their elements proceeding from an internal\ncause,\u2014which would render inexplicable the unaltered maintenance of\nthe species,\u2014but the effect of a _disequilibration_ of their organism\ndue to a sort of mathematically fatal external physical constraint.\nThe two corpuscles in the union of which the conjugation of those\ninfusoria consists are regarded by M. Delb\u0153uf as truly male and female,\nand he affirms that before uniting they make a _choice_ of individuals\napt to rejuvenate. Intelligence is thus the indispensable factor of\nthe perpetuity of races. The answer to the double question, Why is\nindividual matter mortal and specific matter immortal, is reserved for\nanother number.\n\nM. Janet's interesting study is of a subject, a young girl of 22, who,\nas the title denotes, exhibits an almost total loss of the faculty\nof will, partly through hereditary causes and partly consequent on a\nserious attack Of typhoid fever. Marcelle has a singular difficulty of\nmovement, which extends to all the voluntary movements of the arms,\nthe legs, and even the tongue and the lips, and is due to a kind of\nparalysis. She is, however, extremely suggestible, and very easily\nhypnotised. By experiment M. Janet found that the difficulty of a\nmovement is in proportion to its novelty. The difficulty consisted\nin forming the synthesis of ideas and images which constitutes the\ncommencement of the act, but its repetition is easy when the act has\nbeen once done. Marcelle sometimes went into a demi-cataleptic state\nduring which she had a crisis of ideas, which she described as a\ncloud passing. She complained that during the cloud her head spoke\nconstantly. This M. Janet explains by reference to the theory of M.\nS\u00e9glas that there are several kinds of verbal hallucinations as of\nlanguage, that is hallucinations of hearing, of visual images, and of\ntactile and muscular sensations attendant on speaking or writing, the\nlast named being the psychic hallucinations or the epigastric voices of\nthe insane. During the lucid intervals Marcelle performed the commands\ngiven to her by her hallucinations while under the cloud, like a person\nwho while in a state of somnambulism receives a posthypnotic suggestion.\n\nIn this concluding article on \"Art and Logic,\" M. Tarde, after\nconsidering the characteristic differences between industry and art,\nfrom the point of view of the desires of consumption and production\nproper to them, deals with the distinctive characters of the work of\nart considered in itself and the reason of its being. The attribute of\nthe work of art is to be interesting. Art is a game, but a serious and\nprofound game, like love, and it is born of leisure and pleasure. The\nunity of the work of art consists simply in the coupling of a question\nand an answer, a problem and a solution, a combat and a victory. Every\nphrase, musical or spoken, is a wave which rises and descends, and in\nevery art whatever all is phrases and waves, and their combination is\nitself a complex wave, a period. In the undulating mirror of art we\nsee again social life in action; since esthetics reflect the dynamic,\nand not the static, social logic. M. Tarde criticises the theory of\nSpencer that all the arts are derived from architecture, and shows that\nthe first art was speech and that from speech, spoken or written, all\nart is derived. Narrative poetry, the epic poem, is the complex germ\nof all artistic development; and as art began in narration, it ends in\nthe drama, because man is above all social. Art, or reflection of man,\nborrows by turns its dominant inspiration from the passions of life or\nthe inspirations of society.\n\nM. Richet sums up his description of General Physiology in the formula:\nLife is a chemical function. His most important conclusions are that\nthe general laws of life are chemical laws, and respond to the chemical\nconditions of hydratation, temperature, electricity and pressure; force\nis condensed in living beings under the form of chemical energy, and\nmanifests itself outwardly, by movement, by electricity, by light, by\nheat, or by thought. (We consider this juxtaposition of \"electricity,\nlight, heat and thought\" as extremely misleading, and so is the\ndefinition of life as \"a chemical function.\" It appears, then, that M.\nRichet considers thought also a chemical process. That physiological\nactions are processes which have their own conditions and are different\nfrom chemical and physical processes, has been explained in _The\nMonist_, No. 3. p. 413-414.) M. Richet continues: Living beings are\ncellular aggregates, but in animals the nervous system forms a centre\nof unity, from whence proceed motor excitations and where sensible\nexcitations terminate; cellules and beings are organised to live: they\nare adapted to the ambient medium, and to all the causes of destruction\nwhich can reach them. Thus their acts, although often automatic and\ndeprived of all intelligence, appear to us admirably intelligent; the\nsensations and consciousness of intelligent beings are in agreement\nwith the needs of the organism, and tend to strengthen the automatic\nmechanisms by means of which beings resist death, whether it be the\ndeath of the individual or that of the species.\n\nM. Brochard takes exception to M. Barth\u00e9lemy Saint-Hilaire's opinion of\nBacon as a philosopher, and endorses the views expressed by M. Charles\nAdam in his Memoir crowned by the Academy. Bacon not only saw what\nscientific induction should be, but indicated with perfect precision\nthe conditions that it ought to fulfil. Added to the theory of method\nis the theory of forms, which is the culminating point of Bacon's\nphilosophy. M. Adam shows that the word _form_ is used by Bacon to\nexpress the true difference, or that by which a thing is defined; the\nessence or the thing in its intimate constitution; and a law of pure\nact, (_lex actus puri_). M. Brochard adopts M. Adam's explanation, that\nby this law is to be understood a disposition in space, an arrangement\nof material parts, in other terms, a mechanical or mathematical\nrelation\u2014and he justifies M. Adam's assertion, and shows that Bacon\nresembled Galileo and Descartes in divining that physics rested on\nmathematics, and that the pure act was produced whenever certain\narrangements of material molecules are formed according to mechanical\nconditions. Bacon superposes, in some sort, a philosophy of quality\non a philosophy of quantity, and achieves the passage from movement\nto quality so embarrassing for every doctrine which gives a place to\nmechanism.\n\nM. Janet concludes his study of the curious case of aboulism presented\nby Marcelle, giving details of her experiences under the influence of\nhypnotism and suggestion, which greatly ameliorated her condition,\ntemporarily at least. The nature of her disease approaches much the\nmental feebleness described elsewhere by M. Janet under the name\nof \"psychological disaggregation with contracting of the field of\nconsciousness,\" but differs from it in several particulars. It consists\nessentially in a weakening of the faculty of synthesis which ought,\nat every moment of life, to co-ordinate afresh our sensations and our\nimages. The study of this enfeeblement shows the importance of the\nnovelty of acts in connection with the will, the r\u00f4le of the will in\napparently the most simple perceptions, the necessity of voluntary\nsynthesis for originating habits and recollections, the connection\nbetween doubt and defective perception, and the development of various\nhallucinations.\n\nBefore answering the question why we die, M. Delb\u0153uf considers the\norigin of life. He makes a distinction between dead matter and living\nmatter. On this subject he has published a book entitled \"_La mati\u00e8re\nbrute et la mati\u00e8re vivante_.\" He affirms that life in the universe\nbegan with living, sensible atoms, endowed with will and liberty,\nand having a knowledge of their own movement. This life gradually\nconcentrated itself in germs having the faculty of perpetuating\nthemselves. They remained naked and some of those germs still continue\ncomposed almost entirely of reproductive, that is essentially living,\nsubstance. The others have gradually become clothed with a body, a kind\nof protective envelope. The life of this envelope is not inherent; it\nhas been communicated by the germs that it protects, and at the end\nof a period of a greater or less duration it becomes useless, fades\nand dies. Life is sustained by nutrition but the assimilating faculty\ndiminishes by degrees, until it ceases, and at last, the reparation of\nour organs not being equal to their wear, they are not able to fulfil\ntheir mission. The decay of living matter is due to the operation of\nphysical and chemical laws. Assimilation is at the base of life, and it\nis exhibited in inorganic nature as well as in living beings. Living\nbodies must have some permanent centres of assimilation around which\nthe nutritive elements group. The earliest of these centres was the\ngerm, in which is the supreme or immortal life, and which immortalises\nthat part of the nutriment which becomes incorporated with it.\nAlthough the organs of nutrition deteriorate and die, the reproductive\norgans remain eternally young, in power at least. Nutrition itself is\nmanifested either as alimentation, or as conjugation or fecundation,\nand is a phenomenon analogous to copulation. M. Delb\u0153uf then proceeds\nto show the uniformity in the modes of propagation, and gives reasons\nfor believing, contrary to the views of Van Beneden, that the\ncellule-egg, and not the spermatozoid, is hermaphrodite. The ovary is\nthe true depository of the immortal propagative substance. Woman is the\ninexhaustible source of life. (Paris: Felix Alcan.)\n\n\nZEITSCHRIFT F\u00dcR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE. Vol. II.\nNo. 3.\n\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n ZUR PSYCHOLOGIE DER SPRACHE. By _Robert Sommer_.\n\n ZUR THEORIE DES RAEUMLICHEN VORSTELLENS MIT RUECKSICHT AUF EINE\n NACHBILDLOKALISATION. By _C. S. Cornelius_.\n\n DIE SEELENFRAGE. By _J. Rehmke_.\n\n LITTERATURBERICHT.\n\nProfessor Grashey, now of Munich, formerly of W\u00fcrzburg, has published\nin the _Archiv f\u00fcr Psychiatrie_ (Vol. XVI, p. 654 ff.) an interesting\ncase of a peculiar kind of aphasia. A man whose name is Voit, 32\nyears old, engaged for menial service in the brewing business,\nreceived an injury on the head. He was treated at the psychiatric\nclinic of W\u00fcrzburg by Professor Grashey and dismissed as cured,\nyet five years after the accident he was again submitted to the\nprofessor's investigations and it was found that he was suffering from\n\"amnestic aphasia.\" He could not remember the name of anything for\na few seconds. Professor Grashey drew the following conclusion from\nVoit's case: \"There is an aphasia which is based neither upon the\nfunctionary inability of certain centres nor upon the interruption\nof commissural connections, but exclusively upon a diminution of the\nsense-impressions, which causes a disturbance of apprehension and\nassociation.\" Voit was unable to name any object shown him unless he\ncould spell it with the assistance of his hands, legs, or even his\ntongue. By writing only could he find the names of objects. Dr. Sommer\nobjects to Professor Grashey's interpretation of the case and shows\nconvincingly from the symptoms, as represented in the _Archiv f\u00fcr\nPsychiatrie_ by Grashey himself, that whenever Voit was prevented from\nmaking writing gestures (which was done by holding his hands and legs\nimmovable and by ordering him to show his tongue so that he could not\nemploy it for writing on the roof of his mouth) he could never find the\nname of any object. Accordingly it is no case of amnesia; Voit actually\nhas only one way left for finding words, that is by spelling them. Now\nit is generally supposed, that we first see an object, and recognise it\nat the centre of vision. The nervous irritation is thence transmitted\nto the centre of language; the sight of a knife evokes in the centre of\nspeech the word knife and we suppose that the spoken or heard word will\nin the centre of writing awaken the motor stimuli of spelling the word.\nThe present case proves that if this be the rule there are exceptions\nto it and Dr. Sommer proposes the question, How can we explain the\ncase? It is strange that the man is not deprived of concepts; so long\nas he is prevented from writing he is only deprived of naming things\nor concepts. He never failed to recognise similar things as belonging\nto the same class, but so long as he was tied at tongue and limb, he\ncould never find their common name. For instance a guitar and a trumpet\nwere shown him while he was bound, as it was called. When asked, Do\nthey belong together? he nodded emphatically. (He had to answer by\nnods because he had to show his tongue.) When asked, Do you know their\nnames? he shook his head and could never find their names until he was\nallowed to make writing gestures with either one of his limbs or his\ntongue. In this way he recognised and classified things correctly,\nbut he never named them except by spelling the names. Such things or\npictures of things shown him were the following:\n\n Guitar\u2014trumpet\u2014: musical instruments.\n Gun\u2014canon\u2014: arms.\n Sickle\u2014watering-pot\u2014: utensils.\n Lantern\u2014lamp\u2014: lights.\n Palace\u2014barn\u2014: buildings, etc.\n\nDr. Sommer says: \"Suppose that those parts of the brain the loss of\nwhich according to modern experiments and pathological observations\ncause a loss of memory-pictures, are thought of as motor apparatuses,\nthe destruction of which has a similar effect as in the present case,\nthe binding which prevented Voit from spelling: in this case amnesia\nmight find an explanation without the crude materialistic assumption\nthat they are localised in the injured cells.\" Dr. Sommer only throws\nout the hint without finding space to explain himself. Yet it appears\nto us that whether amnesia is produced by the destruction of the\ncentres or of their supposed motor apparatuses that the one is not\nless and not more crude materialism than the other. The problem it\nappears has nothing to do with materialism, but with the mechanism\nof the brain. The fibres of association seem to work in Voit's brain\nin the opposite direction to what we should expect. The normal path\nis apparently interrupted. The sight of an object does not evoke its\nname. Yet are there not innumerable fibres of association which may\nreach the desired end\u2014in this case the pronunciation of the name\u2014in\na roundabout way? There must be, for the facts prove it. One thing in\nthe case of Voit is patent. When Voit finds the names by writing them,\nhe apparently knows the written word, he cannot pronounce it, because\nhe does not know the spoken word, the centre of spoken words being the\nseat of the injury. He has a concept of the thing, he could write it,\nbut he cannot pronounce it. The roundabout way leads through a province\nnot directly accessible to consciousness. The written word is not in\nthe same immediate contact with consciousness as the spoken word. That\nthis is so we know from actual and daily experience. Who has not tried\nto assure himself of the correct spelling of a word by writing it down\nand thus leaving the test to the unconscious memory of the motions of\nour hand?\n\nC. S. Cornelius discusses the theory of spatial conception with special\nreference to a localisation of after-images. He takes the position\nthat we are in relation to the outer world through sensation only,\nrejecting all assumptions of innate ideas, of a special space sense,\netc. \"Sensation,\" he says, \"is an intensive state. The conception of\nspace-relations can originate only by a multiplicity of sensations\nwhich through the qualitative contrasts affect each other and arrange\nthemselves in a certain order beside each other. The vertical and\nhorizontal conception height and breadth, are easily explained, but\ndepth, the third dimension of space affords some difficulty.\" Th.\nLipps denies the existence of an apprehension of depth, yet Cornelius\nmaintains that it actually exists. He explains it in the same way as\nthe vertical and horizontal space-conceptions as originating from\nmuscle sensation.\n\nIt cannot be denied that upon the whole space-sense is the product and\nthe interpretation of motion experiences mainly due to the activity\nof the muscles of the eye. But it appears that the conception of the\nthird dimension of sight is not due alone, as says Cornelius, to\nmuscle activity. The investigations of Wundt and of Mach, which are\nnot taken into consideration by Cornelius, prove that the perspective\nand the distribution of light and shade are essential elements in\nour perception of the third dimension in space. Our eyes have become\naccustomed by the information received through other channels,\nespecially the sense of touch, to interpret perspective in combination\nwith certain shadings as depth so that _even the one-eyed_ man sees\nthings not as two dimensional pictures but as three dimensional\ncorporeal forms.\n\nA subject of extraordinary interest is discussed by J. Rehmke, who\ncriticises O. Fl\u00fcgel's position and contrasts it with his own. O.\nFl\u00fcgel has published a book, entitled _Die Seelenfrage_, treating\nthe subject from the narrow standpoint of Herbart's school. It is\nunnecessary to state that Herbart has great merits in the evolution\nof our psychological views. He attempted to introduce mathematical\nmethods in order to define exactly the dynamics and statics of the\nsoul. Herbart failed, although he gave new impulses to psychological\ninvestigations which have proved valuable in many ways. Many of his\ndisciples are now busy perpetuating his mistakes. Fl\u00fcgel is one among\nthem. Fl\u00fcgel emphasises the immateriality of the soul, but being like\nhis master an advocate of atomism he postulates soul atoms which are\nmathematical points. \"Atomism,\" Fl\u00fcgel declares, \"must reject actio\nin distans\" because it is (1) inconceivable, (2) nonsensical and\ncontradictory, and (3) because force is an accidens of matter, matter\nbeing the substance. The accidens can have no effects, it cannot\nexist, where the substance is not. Fl\u00fcgel also lays much stress on\nthe disparity of feeling and motion, and of thought and motion. Soul\nand body are to him two distinct things and their interaction is\nexplained through the contact of the point-like, immaterial soul atom\nand the brain atoms. Rehmke points out that this view in spite of its\nprofessed hostility toward materialism is extremely materialistic,\nbut the view which he proposes himself suffers from similar errors.\nFl\u00fcgel has preserved the unity and the immortality of the soul which is\nan indestructible immaterial mathematical point, moving about in our\nbrain. Rehmke also preserves the unity and immortality of the soul: he\nbelieves in a \"subjectum,\" in an ego which is the essence having the\nstates of consciousness as attributes. The soul according to Rehmke is\nnot space-given, it is an immaterial something which has sensations. We\nshould accordingly make a distinction between the ego as the subject\nand the ego as our bodily existence; moreover we should distinguish\nbetween the state of consciousness and the object of consciousness.\nRehmke takes the word contents of consciousness in the sense of\nsignifying that which the \"ego\" possesses. The state of consciousness\nis always the same, it has no evolution, no growth, no development.\nThe object of consciousness however constantly changes. The subject\nof consciousness is the soul. The interconnection between soul and\nbody is not denied, but there can be no thought of a contact between\nthe immaterial and the material. The soul is, but it is not in space,\nit is nowhere, and its co-operation with the body is described as \"an\nexemplary together\"\u2014an expression to which, we are sorry to say, we\ncannot attach any meaning.\n\nJ. Rehmke objects also to the theory that feeling and motion, soul and\nbody, the spiritual and the material are two sides of one and the same\nthing. If this two sides theory were correct, he says, the soul would\nbe an abstract and so would be the body. But, he adds, all abstracts\nare immutable, unchangeable and the object of psychology is something\nthat is observed to possess evolution. Now it is true that some\nabstracts represent immutable concepts; matter is such an abstract.\nMatter is that which all matters have in common and the abstract matter\nis everywhere the same; we cannot speak of the evolution of matter as\nsuch. But other abstracts are not so rigid. Take for instance life.\nLife is an abstract, but it would be a strange proposition to say that\nthere can be no evolution of life because life is an abstract, all\nabstracts being unchangeable, immutable, invariable.\n\nWe cannot agree with Fl\u00fcgel, but J. Rehmke's psychological views are\nstill less acceptable. (Hamburg and Leipsic: L. Voss.)\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nVIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT F\u00dcR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE. Vol. XV. Nos. 1\nand 2.\n\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n DER SOGENANNTE NAIVE REALISMUS. By _R. Seydel_.\n\n DAS PROBLEM DER AUSSENWELT. By _S. Hansen_.\n\n EXPERIMENTELLE PATHO-PSYCHOLOGIE. (Erster Artikel.) By _M.\n Dessoir_.\n\n UEBER ANSCHAUUNG UND IHRE PSYCHISCHE VERARBEITUNG. By _B. Kerry_.\n\n DER FOLGERUNGSCALCUL UND DIE INHALTSLOGIK. By _E. G. Husserl_.\n\n EXPERIMENTELLE PATHO-PSYCHOLOGIE. (Zweiter Artikel.) By _M.\n Dessoir_.\n\nR. Seydel regards sight alone as space-sense and the other senses\nas time-senses. This, he says, is the reason why there is no \"na\u00efve\nrealism\" for any other sense but sight.\n\nS. Hansen, taking our concepts and sensations as the data from which we\nhave to start, discusses the problem of the reality of the outer world.\nHe arrives at the conclusion, that \"if there is a thing in itself, the\nphenomenon is only one side of it, viz, that side which it reveals.\nThe thing in itself is the real world in which we live and of which we\nspeak in daily life, although we know it only through phenomena, i. e.\nour concepts.\"\n\nMax Dessoir presents a review of Experimental Patho-psychology as it\nhas developed in the last decades through the extraordinary attention\nbestowed upon the phenomena of hypnotism and kindred subjects. He\ndiscusses experimental patho-psychology with special reference to the\ngreat problems of (1) consciousness, (2) the relation between feeling\nand motion, (3) memory, and (4) personality. The two former points are\ndiscussed in the first article, the two latter in the conclusion. Max\nDessoir emphasises in this essay again his theory of the double ego\nwhich he proposed in his pamphlet, _Das Doppel-Ich_.\n\nB. Kerry's article is the conclusion of a series of essays on intuition\n(i. e. apprehension or sensation) and its psychical transformation.\nThe author distinguishes between subjective concepts and objective\nconcepts. If I think for instance of all the grapes that will grow\nthis year in Italy, I do not know in my subjective conception their\ndefinite number. It is a definite number nevertheless. This concept is\nthe objective concept. He devotes much space to a discussion of the\nrigidity of Kant's aprioristic judgment 7+5=12. The most important\npoint is ultimately _how_ this judgment possesses necessity. The author\nobserves that the theorems of arithmetic possess necessity while we\ncannot attribute necessity to the results of calculation. Our faculty\nof calculation, B. Kerry says, should be considered as aprioristic,\nor more correctly, it is a complex of primitive faculties, and these\nare: \"our faculty to apprehend in some contents of our apprehension\nsomething else which is designated afterwards as a concept derived\nfrom that contents; that is our faculty of forming abstracts. Further\nour faculty of comparison and at last our faculty of combining and\nseparating. These faculties are aprioristic in the psychological\nsense of the word, which to-day is not recognised, in the sense of\nbeing innate.\" The whole article is written in a heavy style and\nin extra-Teutonic constructions with innumerable dashes containing\nparenthetical sentences and other bewildering explanations. We have\nafter all not been able to discover how the judgment 7+5=12 possesses\nnecessity.\n\nE. G. Husserl criticises the position of several modern logicians,\nBoole, Venn, Peirce, and especially E. Schroeder, who published in the\n_G\u00f6ttinger Gelehrten Anzeigen_ an article on the Logical Calculus.\nHusserl says that \"the logic of the logical calculus is in a wretched\ncondition still. Its advocates have attained to clearness neither\nconcerning the limits of this discipline nor its relation to deductive\nlogic and to arithmetic. The logical considerations upon which the\ntechnique is built, are as a rule of such a kind that they cannot\nbear the most superficial criticism. And this calculus pretends to be\na thoroughly reformed and the truly exact logic. It is natural that\namong the logicians the more scientific upon the whole keep aloof here.\nHowever the logical foundation of arithmetic is just as weak, yet this\ndoes not suffice to discard it. I believe that logical algebra in spite\nof its limited practical applicability should not be underrated, and\nthat it should be of high interest to the logician for the sake of its\nactual merits.\" In the struggle between the logic of circumference\nand the logic of contents, Husserl maintains that a calculus of pure\ndeductions can be constructed upon the basis of operations which are\nstrictly without any contents. (Leipsic: O. R. Reisland.)\n\n \u039a.\n\n\nPHILOSOPHISCHE MONATSHEFTE. Vol. XXVII. Nos. 5 and 6.\n\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n WILHELM WUNDT'S \"SYSTEM DER PHILOSOPHIE.\" By _Johannes Volkelt_.\n\n DIE DAENISCHE PHILOSOPHIE DES LETZTEN JAHRZEHNTS. By _Knud Ipsen_.\n\n RECENSIONEN.\n\n LITTERATURBERICHT.\n\n BIBLIOGRAPHIE. By Prof. Dr. _F. Ascherson_.\n\nJohannes Volkelt criticises in a long article Wundt's _System der\nPhilosophie_. We do not have the work under discussion at hand, but\njudging simply from the quotations made in the present article, we can\nconfidently say that Volkelt has misunderstood Wundt's position. We\nshall here confine ourselves to one point only which is of paramount\nimportance, and Johannes Volkelt fully appreciates its importance. This\npoint is the problem, \"Can we have any objective knowledge at all?\"\nThis is the way we should formulate the question. Volkelt, however,\nasks whether the trans-subjective can successfully be made object of\nour cognition. It is maintained that there is a trace of na\u00efve Realism\nleft in Wundt, because his trans-subjectivism remains unproven, and\nsubject and object are treated as inseparably connected. Wundt says:\n\"As soon as we make the erroneous proposition that the object of our\nperception is only a perception, we shall in vain try to get somehow\nout from our subjective perception and to regain in some way the\nlost object.\" This idea is objected to. Also the following passages\nare quoted from Wundt: \"Reality once destroyed cannot be restored\nmerely through pure thought,\" and \"the theory of cognition has not\nto create reality from elements that do not as yet contain it.\" We\nagree perfectly with Wundt and have expressed similar ideas in the\narticle \"The Origin of Mind,\" No. 1 of _The Monist_. Perception is a\nrelation between object and subject. It is an error of idealism to\nconsider the subject alone as given. The data of experience are states\nof subject-object-ness. The idea of mere subjectivity is as much an\nabstraction as the idea of things in themselves. Accordingly the term\n\"trans-subjective\" is a misnomer. All perceptions being impressions\nof objects and serving as symbols for their correspondent objects\ncontain an objective element. As soon as we disregard this truth, we\nshut ourselves up in the hollow globe of pure ideality; objectivity\nbecomes an unwarrantable assumption and there is no way out of our own\nsubjectivism.\n\nKnud Ipsen sketches the history of the Danish philosophy during the\nlast ten years. He mentions five philosophers, H\u00f6ffding, Kroman,\nWilkens, Lehmann, and Starcke, among whom H\u00f6ffding is by far the most\nprominent. All the Danish philosophers have one feature in common.\nKroman made a distinction between philosophy and world-conception;\nphilosophy should make such propositions only as can be logically\nproven, not otherwise than theories have to be proven in the\nsciences. Yet a world-conception is the work mainly of our emotion\nand imagination. Accordingly philosophy and world-conception are two\ndistinct things which have nothing in common. This position seems to\nbe generally accepted by the Danish philosophers, and as a natural\nconsequence Ipsen says, we can speak no more of \"philosophy,\" but\nonly of philosophical disciplines. The unity of philosophy, its ideal\nof system is lost. Metaphysics is dead in Denmark and the search\nfor the universal laws of existence is also given up. Philosophy has\nceased to be the science of the sciences and has become an aggregate\nof scientific disciplines. On this point there is a tacit agreement\nso that there is no \"useless struggle about great and insolvable\nproblems,\" and since H\u00f6ffding wrote on the relation between faith\nand science, our Danish philosophers also shun all theological\ninterference. A division of labor has taken place so that psychology\nhas been treated by H\u00f6ffding, Kroman, and Lehmann, Ethics by H\u00f6ffding\nand Starcke, Logic by H\u00f6ffding and Kroman, Sociology by Wilkens and\nStarcke, and \u00c6sthetics by Wilkens.\n\nProfessor H\u00f6ffding and Kroman in spite of their consensus in rejecting\nthe unity of philosophy represent a very strong contrast, which is\nbest characterised by their method of treating the law of causation.\nKroman rejects all the former evidences employed to prove the law of\ncause and effect. Empiricism is wrong because it can at best show the\ntemporal succession of two phenomena, and apriorism is wrong because\n_a priori_ knowledge lies in the subject alone and not in the object.\nIn causation, however, the objects play an important part, and we can\nnever know whether the objects will always conform to the subjective\nand _a priori_ laws. Kroman's view of the subject is that the causal\nlaw is the sole condition by which we can acquire any knowledge at\nall, accordingly for the sake of self-preservation we _hope_ that this\ncondition will be fulfilled. The causal law accordingly is not only the\ncondition of all knowledge, it is also the postulate with which we have\nto start.\n\nH\u00f6ffding attacks the problem in a different way. He asks first: \"How do\nwe come at all to a reality supposed to be independent of the subject?\"\nand \"What is the import of this reality?\" Reality according to H\u00f6ffding\nis not yet given in sense-perception, we arrive at the idea of reality\nnot until our sense-perceptions are arranged in a coherent system. If\nI see a picture at the wall, this may be an hallucination, but if my\nsense of touch corroborates the perception of sight, I consider it as\na reality. Thus the idea of reality originates and this reality is\nnot distinguishable from a coherent and self-consistent dream. To the\ndreamer his dream is reality. Now the question of causality is not\nlegitimate, whether things conform to the law of causation, for indeed\nwe know things only by their being causes or effects. The main function\nof our consciousness is to recognise similarities and dissimilarities,\nit searches for unity and this search is performed through the\napplication of the causal law. H\u00f6ffding accordingly considers both\nideas, the causal nexus and reality, as being of the same value. His\ncausal law is more than a postulate, it is in part a result. Our\norgan of cognition would die of atrophy if it were not constantly\nnourished, and we should share the fate of Tantalus were we condemned\nto investigate and always unable to discover.\n\nKroman looks upon the law of inertia as a special application of\nthe causal law. To him the conservation of matter and energy is an\nhypothesis. H\u00f6ffding looks upon the law of inertia as a material\nprinciple. Where Kroman speaks of energy, H\u00f6ffding speaks of corporeal\nenergy. (It may be that here the German translation _k\u00f6rperliche Kraft_\nis at fault.) As a material principle the law of inertia is something\nmore than a mere corollary of the causal law, for in its present form\nit has made science possible. The conservation of matter and energy is\nconceived in an analogous manner, but considered as natural laws both\npropositions possess a mere hypothetical value.\n\nIt appears to us that the law of cause and effect lies deeper still,\nand there can be no doubt that the law of the conservation of matter\nand energy is the same thing only formulated for different purposes.\nHume's merit was exceedingly great when he laid his finger on the sore\nspot of philosophical thought, pointing out the prevailing confusion\nabout the law of causation. But when investigating the subject, he led\nus on a wrong track. Cause and effect are not two objects following one\nanother, and not even two phenomena following one another. It is not\na synthesis of two events. It is on the contrary an analysis of one\nevent. Cause and effect is a change. In this change the same amount of\nmatter and energy is preserved, yet the form is altered. Hume broke\nthe process of cause and energy into pieces, he lost sight of their\ninterconnection and was astonished that one piece was not exactly the\nsame as the other. Hence his skepticism.\n\nThe law of cause and effect can be proved, except to him who would\nobstinately refuse to acknowledge the law of identity that _A_=_A_.\nThere may be some one who thinks that something can come out of\nnothing, or that something can suddenly disappear into nothing. If\nthere is, the weight of the argument rests with him, yet we shall not\nlisten to him until he presents an unequivocal case in which we can\nobserve a transition from being into not-being or _vice versa_. Until\nthen we consider the law of identity and also its practical application\nand corollary, the conservation of matter and energy as unrefuted.\n\nThe law of cause and effect and its corollary the conservation\nof matter and energy rest ultimately upon our recognition of the\n_Gesetzm\u00e4ssigkeit_ of formal laws. He who acknowledges the correctness\nof the statement \"2\u00d72=4\" as universal and necessary, implicitly accepts\nalso the law of causation and of the conservation of matter and energy.\nThe law of the conservation of matter and energy contains no other\nproposition than this that 2\u00d72 will always be 2\u00d72 or its product, i. e.\n4; it will never be less, it will never be more.\n\nThe ultimate basis of the law of causation lies in the laws of form.\nWe may call causality and the law of inertia and the conservation of\nmatter and energy hypotheses, but in that case the meaning of the term\nhypothesis would have to be changed, for if these laws are hypotheses,\nthe statement 2\u00d72=4 would be just as much an hypothesis.\n\n * * * * *\n\nIn psychology Kroman and H\u00f6ffding are more antagonistic than in any\nother subject. Both consider the soul as an _x_, but Kroman attributes\nto this _x_, unity and the faculty of feeling, willing and thinking;\nH\u00f6ffding however looks upon feeling and motion as two sides of the\nsame unknown object. Kroman in spite of his formal opposition to\nmetaphysicism still believes in a subject underlying the acts of\nconsciousness. After all, the name only of metaphysicism seems to be\ndead in Denmark, not metaphysicism itself. H\u00f6ffding has shown how\nKroman's psychological theory has led him into a highly mythical\nconception of the activity of the soul.\n\nWe may add that the proposition of non-interference with theological\nviews may be excellent in preserving peace, but we cannot help\nconsidering this kind of peace as a mistaken policy. If there are\nconflicts between theology and philosophy, they should be settled, for\nthere cannot be two contradictory truths, and it is wrong also to leave\nerrors alone simply for the sake of peace. Yet it is objected that\nreligion is a matter of the heart and philosophy a matter of the brain.\nCertainly, but the heart should have its emotion regulated by the\nbrain. If our world-conception is the product mainly of our emotions\nand of our imagination, it would be simply foolish to let the heart\nbuild its world-conception just as it pleases without consulting the\nhead. Wherever philosophy and religion or our world-conception (the\nlatter considered as the product of our emotion) have nothing to say to\neach other, wherever they are kept distinct, it will lead to confusion\nin all the departments of our existence, it will put our philosophy,\nour scientific thought, and our ethics out of joint. A rent will go\nthrough the world of our life producing disharmony in every spot and\nthe end will be a dreary pessimism. Our emotions are not a separate\nchamber of our being which should be kept private and unaffected by\nscientific knowledge, our emotions are springs of action, and it is\nof paramount importance to keep them in harmony with our knowledge of\nfacts. The policy of theological non-interference may do for some time,\nbut certainly not long. It is a mere armistice but no peace, and honest\nwar is better than a sham-truce which is an ill-concealed state of\nintolerable hostility. (Heidelberg: G. Weiss.)\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nVOPROSUI FILOSOFII I PSICHOLOGII. Vol. II. No. 3. March, 1891.\n\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n SCHILLER'S DOCTRINE OF BEAUTY AND \u00c6STHETICAL ENJOYMENT. By _P.\n Kalenov_.\n\n ON THE NATURE OF HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS. (Conclusion.) By _Prince C.\n N. Trubetzkoi_.\n\n IDEALS AND REALITY. By _B. V. A. Golzev_.\n\n LETTERS ON COUNT L. N. TOLSTOI'S BOOK \"OF LIFE.\" (Continuation.)\n By _A. A. Kozlov_.\n\n RELIGIOUS METAPHYSICS OF THE MOSLEM ORIENT. A Sketch. By _C.\n Umanetz_.\n\n THE MORALITY OF MENTALLY DISEASED PERSONS. Ethics Of Mental\n Diseases. By _V. Tchij_.\n\n CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY. 1) Introduction to the history of\n the new philosophy. Problems of history and of the history\n of philosophy. The significance of ancient and medi\u00e6val\n philosophy. By _N. Grote_.\n\n 2) The ideals of most recent Ethics. A review of W. Wundt's \"Eine\n Untersuchung der Thatsachen und Gesetze des sittlichen Lebens.\"\n By _A. Bao_.\n\n REVIEW OF SCIENTIFIC PERIODICALS.\n\n BOOK REVIEWS. Russian and foreign books on Methodology, Logic,\n Psychology, Psycho-pathology and Philosophy of history.\n\n POLEMICS ON N. N. LANGE'S ARTICLE. By _E. Tchelpanov_.\n\n APPENDIX: 1) Materials for the history of philosophy in Russia.\n 1855-1888. (Continuation.) _Y. Kohibovsky._ 2) Bibligraphical\n Index. 3) Proceedings of The Psychological Society.\n\n_Schiller's Doctrine of Beauty and \u00c6sthetical Enjoyment._ The nations\nof western Europe have been long familiar with Schiller's doctrine of\nbeauty and of \u00e6sthetical enjoyment; but one must agree with the writer,\nthat it is still a subject that has not outlived, probably never will\noutlive, that unfading freshness and deep interest which it ever must\npossess to all cultured and thinking minds. The writer, moreover, calls\nattention to the fact, that as regards Russia, Schiller, although\nwell-known as a poet, is too little known as a philosopher.\n\n_On the Nature of Consciousness._ Concluding his series of articles\non the nature of human consciousness with an internal analysis of\nconsciousness, the writer remarks, that without having recourse to the\ntestimony of hypnotic experiments or to the phenomenon of so-called\n\"mental suggestion,\" which so conspicuously demonstrates the reciprocal\ncompenetration of the individual sphere of consciousness, we find a\nconstant, normal, and substantial bond between that which constitutes\nand conditions the whole accord or harmony of the spiritual life of\nindividual man; because, if from our individual consciousness this\nvital bond is removed which unites us to other consciousnesses, to\nthe preceding as well as the following ones; if there is removed from\nour individual consciousness the connection and partnership of all\nsuccession, of all that is suggested and suggestible, it will lose\nboth form and contents, and be turned into nothing.... We know that\nman is the heir of the work of previous races, of their organisation\nand feeling. All human feelings,\u2014the results of adaptation,\u2014all the\ninstincts and appetites are precisely just as our organs, they are\nour psycho-physical organisation. Feeling is the original basis of\nindividual consciousness; and thus, in consciousness itself, in our\nfeeling itself,\u2014we are able to disclose several radical, universal\nelements. We, unaccountably, attribute every reality to particular\nfeelings, and we cannot imagine that these peculiarities depend\nexclusively upon our subjective individual feeling, on our own eyes\nand ears. Light, warmth, hardness, sound, colors are na\u00efvely conceived\nwithin our consciousness, irrespective of the objective properties of\nthe things themselves. Usually we suppose that the sun shines, the sea\nroars, flowers are fragrant simply through our personal presumption. We\ndo not understand that our own feelings experience certain sensations\nin the presence of the given phenomena.... If we now conceive that\nall sensation presupposes something that is sentient; it is clear\nthat feeling, as conditioning the perception of the material world,\ncannot be merely subjective. Recognising the objective reality of the\nmaterial world, we presuppose anthropomorphically a general feeling.\nThe elements of which the external world consists correspond to\nthe fundamental aspects of sensation and to the elements of sense.\nA sensual universe, in so far as we recognise its objectivity,\npresupposes a universal sense, with which our own individual sensation\nmust be connected. In reference to the analysis of moral consciousness\nthe writer refers the reader to the works of Kant. If there is a\nsolidarity of myself with all things, then it is clear that I am bound\nto live up to it. As in a general way I am conscious of the existence\nand reality of other beings, so I likewise feel an ideal, moral\nnecessity of a common altruism, of a common and perfect love toward\nall. This general love is distinguished from natural inclination,\nand is contrary to it; this constitutes my bounden _duty_ in my\nrelation to all, and is a general ethical law. One cannot maintain\nthat man knew this law _a priori_, because he was moral before and he\nknew it not. Still, it is less possible, that man knew this general\nand unconditional verity _a posteriori_\u2014that he knew good without\ngoodness, morals without morality. But, when man attains to a certain\ndegree of self-knowledge, when he has detached himself from the\nomnipotent tyranny of prejudices, and of all traditional principles of\ncongenital morals, then he grows conscious of this law, and finds it in\nhimself. This law is not anything external to us, but it is deposited\nwithin us. In just the same proportion as we recognise the law of\ncausality, we shall also recognise the moral law. _Reason_ itself\nis compelled to arouse in us conscience,\u2014theoretical consciousness\nawakens ethical consciousness.\n\nThe law of causality is a formal law, that does not impart to us\nany real cognition; it is, precisely, the form of our knowledge.\nThe ethical law, the law of the general solidarity of ethical aims,\ndoes not presuppose this form without contents, but presupposes an\nideal content, the true essence of a common _general_ consciousness,\nas something that unconditionally must be. Its sanction is not in\nthe formal agreement of individual beings, but in their being in a\nnecessary, ideal union.\n\nMan is conscious of the fact that he cannot attain the ethical ideal\nthrough himself only. He must seek for it in perfect love. Only a\nperfect and all-comprehensive love can atone and justify man. But this\nlove is not a natural instinct of man, but a grace, independent of man,\nwhich is acquired by faith. This faith itself is already a fact of\nlove, and by those who believe, it is conceived as a manifestation of\ngrace.\n\n_Letters on Tolsto\u00ef's book \"Of Life.\"_ The writer of these letters on\nCount Tolsto\u00ef's book \"Of Life\" undertakes an analysis of the peculiar\nphilosophical truths and errors which it contains. He points out the\n_method_ employed by Tolsto\u00ef and the causes of his contradictions and\nerrors. By so doing he hopes in conclusion to formulate the theory of\nthe philosophical system to which belongs the work itself.\n\nThe writer first calls his correspondent's attention to Tolsto\u00ef's\npositive statement to the effect, that \"the world is subordinated to\nthe law of reason\u2014in the heavenly bodies, in animals and plants. This\nlaw, without our own interference, prevails throughout all creation,\nand within ourselves we know this law, and are obliged to fulfil the\nsame.\" Yet how does Count Tolsto\u00ef know that the whole world is subject\nto the law of reason? By virtue of the principle of cognition that was\nmooted in the writer's previous letter, we can know it with a degree of\ncertitude only concerning ourselves. Tolsto\u00ef himself maintains, that\n\"much less are we able to know anything about the external, material\nworld which is subject to the laws of space and time.\" In other words,\nTolsto\u00ef contradicts his own theory. As regards his other statement, his\nestimate of \"true and false life,\" the two can only be reconciled by\nadmitting certain other hypotheses that are manifestly contradictory to\nconstant human experience, such as the gratuitous hypothesis that men\nwho follow \"the teaching of this world\" and not that of wise men \"do\nnot live,\" they \"exist\" only. Tolsto\u00ef's theory, expressing a definition\nof life, would oblige us to turn our attention only to a few facts of\nimmediate consciousness, but to ignore many others that are not subject\nto doubt. But, setting aside Tolsto\u00ef's peculiar theory of consciousness\nand cognition, the writer turns to the problem of the Ego, as the\nmost important for the solution of the points involved in the present\ndiscussion.\n\nIn reply to this letter the writer regrets that he himself, having but\nlittle taste for deep philosophical discussion, finds it exceedingly\ndifficult to defend Count Tolsto\u00ef's views against attacks such as those\nof Mr. Kozlov. Still, it seems to him that Mr. Kozlov in his whole\nanalysis of Tolsto\u00ef's book seeks to evade the main question; namely,\nCan we call a human life a life so long as men tear each other to\npieces like wild beasts?\n\nTolsto\u00ef's critic in conclusion asks, what, precisely, ought to be\nunderstood by life? In his reply, after investigating the nature of\nthe Ego, Mr. Kozlov concludes: Man, according to Tolsto\u00ef, is only a\ncollective term. It is no more than a name for groups of a few special\nobjects, in their arbitrary relation to a totality. These collective\nobjects are purely _entia rationis_, as the names forest, river,\narmy, crowd, etc. This collective subject is called man. Matter, in\nTolsto\u00ef's metaphysics, represents the only element, the reality and\nsubstantiality of which is not subject to the least doubt. Matter\nis uncreated and indestructible, it remains identical with itself,\nconstantly through motion combining itself into different aggregates\ncalled bodies. In the formation of the living body, matter serves\nas the basis, on which exist other subjects, that also constitute\nman, by Tolsto\u00ef called \"animal personalities.\" This subject, in its\nfunctions and manifestations answers to that which is usually called\nman, and with Tolsto\u00ef it has a doubtful substantiality. Thus, although\nman is indefinitely continued, preserved through reproduction, and\nconstantly renewed in fresh specimens, still this subject might\ndisappear, be destroyed, for example, by a catastrophe happening to\nthe terrestrial globe. On the other hand, this subject arose in\ntime. At all events, all that is individual, existing in the separate\nspecimens of the human race, disappears, is destroyed at the physical\ndeath of the individual, animal body. Consciousness belongs to this\nanimal personality; it exists in time, and is subject to the laws of\ntime. On the soil and foundation of this animal individuality there\narises a third existence that enters into the composition of man,\nnamely\u2014reason or rational consciousness. This element displays the\ncharacter of substance in a much higher degree than animal personality.\nLike matter it is uncreated, indestructible, and eternal. But eternity\nof reason is distinguished from eternity of matter in this, that reason\nis not subject to the laws of time and space, to which matter is\nsubject notwithstanding its eternity. Yet here we have an unavoidable\ncombination of two conceptions of eternity,\u2014the one as endless time,\nthe other as absence of time, which means that the idea of time should\nnot be attributed to it at all. Reason, according to Tolsto\u00ef, is not\nparticular and individual, but purely universal and common. It does not\npossess a detached or transcendental being. (Moscow, March, 1891.)\n\n \u03b3\u03bb\u03bd.\n\n\n\n\nTRANSCRIBER'S CORRECTIONS\n\n\n page original text correction\n 12 in correllation with in correlation with\n 27 one hundred cubic millemetres one hundred cubic millimetres\n 41 by the maintainance of by the maintenance of\n 67 by the concept of of the _I_ by the concept of the _I_\n 82 often used as synomyms, often used as synonyms,\n 89 annointed with oil and soot, anointed with oil and soot,\n 133 and such mistatements as and such misstatements as\n 173 that of Arided (\u03b1 Cycni), that of Arided (\u03b1 Cygni),\n 208 in the seventeeth chapter in the seventeenth chapter\n 225 employd some decades ago employed some decades ago\n 265 dispute it acumen dispute its acumen\n 301 world-conception or are ligion world-conception or a religion\n 315 seats in both ears. seats in both ears.\"\n 425 border on imbecilty, border on imbecility,\n 467 ANALYSES ET COMTES RENDUS. ANALYSES ET COMPTES RENDUS.\n 477 There trenscendentalists There transcendentalists\n 559 her life ends in insaniyt. her life ends in insanity.\n 566 the German poets critiicise the German poets criticise\n 574 an historial point of view an historical point of view\n 585 (Sankrit) _m\u00e2nas_ (Sanskrit) _m\u00e2nas_\n 590 Weil et Maurice, Pub. Weill et Maurice, Pub.\n 624 Nr. Nichols's final conclusion Mr. Nichols's final conclusion\n 631 affords some difficulty. affords some difficulty.\"","title":"The Monist, Vol. 1, 1890-1891 : $b A quarterly magazine","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":258971}