{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_5669/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_5669","id":"gutenberg_5669","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/5669","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Politics","Philosophy","Politics","Representative government and representation"],"text":"Produced by Curtis A. Weyant\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT\n\nBy John Stuart Mill\n\n\nAuthor Of \"A System Of Logic, Ratiocinative And Inductive\"\n\n\n\n[Redactor's note: Italics are indicated by underscores surrounding the\n_italicized text_.]\n\n[Footnotes initially found throughout the text have been numbered and\nplaced at the end of the text.]\n\n\n\n\nPreface\n\n\nThose who have done me the honor of reading my previous writings will\nprobably receive no strong impression of novelty from the present\nvolume; for the principles are those to which I have been working up\nduring the greater part of my life, and most of the practical\nsuggestions have been anticipated by others or by myself. There is\nnovelty, however, in the fact of bringing them together, and\nexhibiting them in their connection, and also, I believe, in much that\nis brought forward in their support. Several of the opinions at all\nevents, if not new, are for the present as little likely to meet with\ngeneral acceptance as if they were.\n\nIt seems to me, however, from various indications, and from none more\nthan the recent debates on Reform of Parliament, that both\nConservatives and Liberals (if I may continue to call them what they\nstill call themselves) have lost confidence in the political creeds\nwhich they nominally profess, while neither side appears to have made\nany progress in providing itself with a better. Yet such a better\ndoctrine must be possible; not a mere compromise, by splitting the\ndifference between the two, but something wider than either, which, in\nvirtue of its superior comprehensiveness, might be adopted by either\nLiberal or Conservative without renouncing any thing which he really\nfeels to be valuable in his own creed. When so many feel obscurely the\nwant of such a doctrine, and so few even flatter themselves that they\nhave attained it, any one may without presumption, offer what his own\nthoughts, and the best that he knows of those of others, are able to\ncontribute towards its formation.\n\n\n\n\nLIST OF CONTENTS\n\n\nCHAP.  I.\n  To What Extent Forms of Government Are a Matter of Choice.\n\nCHAP.  II.\n  The Criterion of a Good Form of Government.\n\nCHAP.  III.\n  That the Ideally Best Form of Government is Representative\n  Government.\n\nCHAP.  IV.\n  Under What Social Conditions Representative Government is\n  Inapplicable.\n\nCHAP.  V.\n  Of the Proper Functions of Representative Bodies.\n\nCHAP.  VI.\n  Of the Infirmities and Dangers to Which Representative Government\n  Is Liable.\n\nCHAP.  VII.\n  Of True and False Democracy; Representation of All, and\n  Representation of the Majority Only.\n\nCHAP.  VIII.\n  Of the Extension of the Suffrage.\n\nCHAP.  IX.\n  Should There Be Two Stages of Election?\n\nCHAP.  X.\n  Of the Mode of Voting.\n\nCHAP.  XI.\n  Of the Duration of Parliaments.\n\nCHAP.  XII.\n  Ought Pledges to Be Required from Members of Parliament.\n\nCHAP.  XIII.\n  Of a Second Chamber.\n\nCHAP.  XIV.\n  Of the Executive in a Representative Government.\n\nCHAP.  XV.\n  Of Local Representative Bodies.\n\nCHAP.  XVI.\n  Of Nationality as Connected with Representative Government.\n\nCHAP.  XVII.\n  Of Federal Representative Governments.\n\nCHAP.  XVIII.\n  Of the Government of Dependencies by a Free State.\n\n\n\n\nChapter I--To What Extent Forms of Government are a Matter of Choice.\n\n\nAll speculations concerning forms of government bear the impress, more\nor less exclusive, of two conflicting theories respecting political\ninstitutions; or, to speak more properly, conflicting conceptions of\nwhat political institutions are.\n\nBy some minds, government is conceived as strictly a practical art,\ngiving rise to no questions but those of means and an end. Forms of\ngovernment are assimilated to any other expedients for the attainment\nof human objects. They are regarded as wholly an affair of invention\nand contrivance. Being made by man, it is assumed that man has the\nchoice either to make them or not, and how or on what pattern they\nshall be made. Government, according to this conception, is a problem,\nto be worked like any other question of business. The first step is to\ndefine the purposes which governments are required to promote. The\nnext, is to inquire what form of government is best fitted to fulfill\nthose purposes. Having satisfied ourselves on these two points, and\nascertained the form of government which combines the greatest amount\nof good with the least of evil, what further remains is to obtain the\nconcurrence of our countrymen, or those for whom the institutions are\nintended, in the opinion which we have privately arrived at. To find\nthe best form of government; to persuade others that it is the best;\nand, having done so, to stir them up to insist on having it, is the\norder of ideas in the minds of those who adopt this view of political\nphilosophy. They look upon a constitution in the same light\n(difference of scale being allowed for) as they would upon a steam\nplow, or a threshing machine.\n\nTo these stand opposed another kind of political reasoners, who are so\nfar from assimilating a form of government to a machine, that they\nregard it as a sort of spontaneous product, and the science of\ngovernment as a branch (so to speak) of natural history. According to\nthem, forms of government are not a matter of choice. We must take\nthem, in the main, as we find them. Governments can not be constructed\nby premeditated design. They \"are not made, but grow.\" Our business\nwith them, as with the other facts of the universe, is to acquaint\nourselves with their natural properties, and adapt ourselves to them.\nThe fundamental political institutions of a people are considered by\nthis school as a sort of organic growth from the nature and life of\nthat people; a product of their habits, instincts, and unconscious\nwants and desires, scarcely at all of their deliberate purposes. Their\nwill has had no part in the matter but that of meeting the necessities\nof the moment by the contrivances of the moment, which contrivances,\nif in sufficient conformity to the national feelings and character,\ncommonly last, and, by successive aggregation, constitute a polity\nsuited to the people who possess it, but which it would be vain to\nattempt to superinduce upon any people whose nature and circumstances\nhad not spontaneously evolved it.\n\nIt is difficult to decide which of these doctrines would be the most\nabsurd, if we could suppose either of them held as an exclusive\ntheory. But the principles which men profess, on any controverted\nsubject, are usually a very incomplete exponent of the opinions they\nreally hold. No one believes that every people is capable of working\nevery sort of institution. Carry the analogy of mechanical\ncontrivances as far as we will, a man does not choose even an\ninstrument of timber and iron on the sole ground that it is in itself\nthe best. He considers whether he possesses the other requisites which\nmust be combined with it to render its employment advantageous, and,\nin particular whether those by whom it will have to be worked possess\nthe knowledge and skill necessary for its management. On the other\nhand, neither are those who speak of institutions as if they were a\nkind of living organisms really the political fatalists they give\nthemselves out to be. They do not pretend that mankind have absolutely\nno range of choice as to the government they will live under, or that\na consideration of the consequences which flow from different forms of\npolity is no element at all in deciding which of them should be\npreferred. But, though each side greatly exaggerates its own theory,\nout of opposition to the other, and no one holds without modification\nto either, the two doctrines correspond to a deep-seated difference\nbetween two modes of thought; and though it is evident that neither of\nthese is entirely in the right, yet it being equally evident that\nneither is wholly in the wrong, we must endeavour to get down to what\nis at the root of each, and avail ourselves of the amount of truth\nwhich exists in either.\n\nLet us remember, then, in the first place, that political institutions\n(however the proposition may be at times ignored) are the work of\nmen--owe their origin and their whole existence to human will. Men did\nnot wake on a summer morning and find them sprung up. Neither do they\nresemble trees, which, once planted, \"are aye growing\" while men \"are\nsleeping.\" In every stage of their existence they are made what they\nare by human voluntary agency. Like all things, therefore, which are\nmade by men, they may be either well or ill made; judgment and skill\nmay have been exercised in their production, or the reverse of these.\nAnd again, if a people have omitted, or from outward pressure have not\nhad it in their power to give themselves a constitution by the\ntentative process of applying a corrective to each evil as it arose,\nor as the sufferers gained strength to resist it, this retardation of\npolitical progress is no doubt a great disadvantage to them, but it\ndoes not prove that what has been found good for others would not have\nbeen good also for them, and will not be so still when they think fit\nto adopt it.\n\nOn the other hand, it is also to be borne in mind that political\nmachinery does not act of itself. As it is first made, so it has to be\nworked, by men, and even by ordinary men. It needs, not their simple\nacquiescence, but their active participation; and must be adjusted to\nthe capacities and qualities of such men as are available. This\nimplies three conditions. The people for whom the form of government\nis intended must be willing to accept it, or, at least not so\nunwilling as to oppose an insurmountable obstacle to its\nestablishment. They must be willing and able to do what is necessary\nto keep it standing. And they must be willing and able to do what it\nrequires of them to enable it to fulfill its purposes. The word \"do\"\nis to be understood as including forbearances as well as acts. They\nmust be capable of fulfilling the conditions of action and the\nconditions of self-restraint, which are necessary either for keeping\nthe established polity in existence, or for enabling it to achieve the\nends, its conduciveness to which forms its recommendation.\n\nThe failure of any of these conditions renders a form of government,\nwhatever favorable promise it may otherwise hold out, unsuitable to\nthe particular case.\n\nThe first obstacle, the repugnance of the people to the particular\nform of government, needs little illustration, because it never can in\ntheory have been overlooked. The case is of perpetual occurrence.\nNothing but foreign force would induce a tribe of North American\nIndians to submit to the restraints of a regular and civilized\ngovernment. The same might have been said, though somewhat less\nabsolutely, of the barbarians who overran the Roman Empire. It\nrequired centuries of time, and an entire change of circumstances, to\ndiscipline them into regular obedience even to their own leaders, when\nnot actually serving under their banner. There are nations who will\nnot voluntarily submit to any government but that of certain families,\nwhich have from time immemorial had the privilege of supplying them\nwith chiefs. Some nations could not, except by foreign conquest, be\nmade to endure a monarchy; others are equally averse to a republic.\nThe hindrance often amounts, for the time being, to impracticability.\n\nBut there are also cases in which, though not averse to a form of\ngovernment--possibly even desiring it--a people may be unwilling or\nunable to fulfill its conditions. They may be incapable of fulfilling\nsuch of them as are necessary to keep the government even in nominal\nexistence. Thus a people may prefer a free government; but if, from\nindolence, or carelessness, or cowardice, or want of public spirit,\nthey are unequal to the exertions necessary for preserving it; if they\nwill not fight for it when it is directly attacked; if they can be\ndeluded by the artifices used to cheat them out of it; if, by\nmomentary discouragement, or temporary panic, or a fit of enthusiasm\nfor an individual, they can be induced to lay their liberties at the\nfeet even of a great man, or trust him with powers which enable him to\nsubvert their institutions--in all these cases they are more or less\nunfit for liberty; and though it may be for their good to have had it\neven for a short time, they are unlikely long to enjoy it. Again, a\npeople may be unwilling or unable to fulfill the duties which a\nparticular form of government requires of them. A rude people, though\nin some degree alive to the benefits of civilized society, may be\nunable to practice the forbearances which it demands; their passions\nmay be too violent, or their personal pride too exacting, to forego\nprivate conflict, and leave to the laws the avenging of their real or\nsupposed wrongs. In such a case, a civilized government, to be really\nadvantageous to them, will require to be in a considerable degree\ndespotic; one over which they do not themselves exercise control, and\nwhich imposes a great amount of forcible restraint upon their actions.\nAgain, a people must be considered unfit for more than a limited and\nqualified freedom who will not co-operate actively with the law and\nthe public authorities in the repression of evil-doers. A people who\nare more disposed to shelter a criminal than to apprehend him; who,\nlike the Hindoos, will perjure themselves to screen the man who has\nrobbed them, rather than take trouble or expose themselves to\nvindictiveness by giving evidence against him; who, like some nations\nof Europe down to a recent date, if a man poniards another in the\npublic street, pass by on the other side, because it is the business\nof the police to look to the matter, and it is safer not to interfere\nin what does not concern them; a people who are revolted by an\nexecution, but not shocked at an assassination--require that the\npublic authorities should be armed with much sterner powers of\nrepression than elsewhere, since the first indispensable requisites of\ncivilized life have nothing else to rest on. These deplorable states\nof feeling, in any people who have emerged from savage life, are, no\ndoubt, usually the consequence of previous bad government, which has\ntaught them to regard the law as made for other ends than their good,\nand its administrators as worse enemies than those who openly violate\nit. But, however little blame may be due to those in whom these mental\nhabits have grown up, and however the habits may be ultimately\nconquerable by better government, yet, while they exist, a people so\ndisposed can not be governed with as little power exercised over them\nas a people whose sympathies are on the side of the law, and who are\nwilling to give active assistance in its enforcement. Again,\nrepresentative institutions are of little value, and may be a mere\ninstrument of tyranny or intrigue, when the generality of electors are\nnot sufficiently interested in their own government to give their\nvote, or, if they vote at all, do not bestow their suffrages on public\ngrounds, but sell them for money, or vote at the beck of some one who\nhas control over them, or whom for private reasons they desire to\npropitiate. Popular election thus practiced, instead of a security\nagainst misgovernment, is but an additional wheel in its machinery.\n\nBesides these moral hindrances, mechanical difficulties are often an\ninsuperable impediment to forms of government. In the ancient world,\nthough there might be, and often was, great individual or local\nindependence, there could be nothing like a regulated popular\ngovernment beyond the bounds of a single city-community; because there\ndid not exist the physical conditions for the formation and\npropagation of a public opinion, except among those who could be\nbrought together to discuss public matters in the same agora. This\nobstacle is generally thought to have ceased by the adoption of the\nrepresentative system. But to surmount it completely, required the\npress, and even the newspaper press, the real equivalent, though not\nin all respects an adequate one, of the Pnyx and the Forum. There have\nbeen states of society in which even a monarchy of any great\nterritorial extent could not subsist, but unavoidably broke up into\npetty principalities, either mutually independent, or held together by\na loose tie like the feudal: because the machinery of authority was\nnot perfect enough to carry orders into effect at a great distance\nfrom the person of the ruler. He depended mainly upon voluntary\nfidelity for the obedience even of his army, nor did there exist the\nmeans of making the people pay an amount of taxes sufficient for\nkeeping up the force necessary to compel obedience throughout a large\nterritory. In these and all similar cases, it must be understood that\nthe amount of the hindrance may be either greater or less. It may be\nso great as to make the form of government work very ill, without\nabsolutely precluding its existence, or hindering it from being\npractically preferable to any other which can be had. This last\nquestion mainly depends upon a consideration which we have not yet\narrived at--the tendencies of different forms of government to promote\nProgress.\n\nWe have now examined the three fundamental conditions of the\nadaptation of forms of government to the people who are to be governed\nby them. If the supporters of what may be termed the naturalistic\ntheory of politics, mean but to insist on the necessity of these three\nconditions; if they only mean that no government can permanently exist\nwhich does not fulfill the first and second conditions, and, in some\nconsiderable measure, the third; their doctrine, thus limited, is\nincontestable. Whatever they mean more than this appears to me\nuntenable. All that we are told about the necessity of an historical\nbasis for institutions, of their being in harmony with the national\nusages and character, and the like, means either this, or nothing to\nthe purpose. There is a great quantity of mere sentimentality\nconnected with these and similar phrases, over and above the amount of\nrational meaning contained in them. But, considered practically, these\nalleged requisites of political institutions are merely so many\nfacilities for realising the three conditions. When an institution, or\na set of institutions, has the way prepared for it by the opinions,\ntastes, and habits of the people, they are not only more easily\ninduced to accept it, but will more easily learn, and will be, from\nthe beginning, better disposed, to do what is required of them both\nfor the preservation of the institutions, and for bringing them into\nsuch action as enables them to produce their best results. It would be\na great mistake in any legislator not to shape his measures so as to\ntake advantage of such pre-existing habits and feelings when\navailable. On the other hand, it is an exaggeration to elevate these\nmere aids and facilities into necessary conditions. People are more\neasily induced to do, and do more easily, what they are already used\nto; but people also learn to do things new to them. Familiarity is a\ngreat help; but much dwelling on an idea will make it familiar, even\nwhen strange at first. There are abundant instances in which a whole\npeople have been eager for untried things. The amount of capacity\nwhich a people possess for doing new things, and adapting themselves\nto new circumstances; is itself one of the elements of the question.\nIt is a quality in which different nations, and different stages of\ncivilization, differ much from one another. The capability of any\ngiven people for fulfilling the conditions of a given form of\ngovernment can not be pronounced on by any sweeping rule. Knowledge of\nthe particular people, and general practical judgment and sagacity,\nmust be the guides.\n\nThere is also another consideration not to be lost sight of. A people\nmay be unprepared for good institutions; but to kindle a desire for\nthem is a necessary part of the preparation. To recommend and advocate\na particular institution or form of government, and set its advantages\nin the strongest light, is one of the modes, often the only mode\nwithin reach, of educating the mind of the nation not only for\naccepting or claiming, but also for working, the institution. What\nmeans had Italian patriots, during the last and present generation, of\npreparing the Italian people for freedom in unity, but by inciting\nthem to demand it? Those, however, who undertake such a task, need to\nbe duly impressed, not solely with the benefits of the institution or\npolity which they recommend, but also with the capacities, moral,\nintellectual, and active, required for working it; that they may\navoid, if possible, stirring up a desire too much in advance of the\ncapacity.\n\nThe result of what has been said is, that, within the limits set by\nthe three conditions so often adverted to, institutions and forms of\ngovernment are a matter of choice. To inquire into the best form of\ngovernment in the abstract (as it is called) is not a chimerical, but\na highly practical employment of scientific intellect; and to\nintroduce into any country the best institutions which, in the\nexisting state of that country, are capable of, in any tolerable\ndegree, fulfilling the conditions, is one of the most rational\nobjects to which practical effort can address itself. Every thing\nwhich can be said by way of disparaging the efficacy of human will and\npurpose in matters of government might be said of it in every other of\nits applications. In all things there are very strict limits to human\npower. It can only act by wielding some one or more of the forces of\nnature. Forces, therefore, that can be applied to the desired use must\nexist; and will only act according to their own laws. We can not make\nthe river run backwards; but we do not therefore say that watermills\n\"are not made, but grow.\" In politics, as in mechanics, the power\nwhich is to keep the engine going must be sought for _outside_ the\nmachinery; and if it is not forthcoming, or is insufficient to\nsurmount the obstacles which may reasonably be expected, the\ncontrivance will fail. This is no peculiarity of the political art;\nand amounts only to saying that it is subject to the same limitations\nand conditions as all other arts.\n\nAt this point we are met by another objection, or the same objection\nin a different form. The forces, it is contended, on which the greater\npolitical phenomena depend, are not amenable to the direction of\npoliticians or philosophers. The government of a country, it is\naffirmed, is, in all substantial respects, fixed and determined\nbeforehand by the state of the country in regard to the distribution\nof the elements of social power. Whatever is the strongest power in\nsociety will obtain the governing authority; and a change in the\npolitical constitution can not be durable unless preceded or\naccompanied by an altered distribution of power in society itself. A\nnation, therefore, can not choose its form of government. The mere\ndetails, and practical organization, it may choose; but the essence of\nthe whole, the seat of the supreme power, is determined for it by\nsocial circumstances.\n\nThat there is a portion of truth in this doctrine I at once admit; but\nto make it of any use, it must be reduced to a distinct expression and\nproper limits. When it is said that the strongest power in society\nwill make itself strongest in the government, what is meant by power?\nNot thews and sinews; otherwise pure democracy would be the only form\nof polity that could exist. To mere muscular strength, add two other\nelements, property and intelligence, and we are nearer the truth, but\nfar from having yet reached it. Not only is a greater number often\nkept down by a less, but the greater number may have a preponderance\nin property, and individually in intelligence, and may yet be held in\nsubjection, forcibly or otherwise, by a minority in both respects\ninferior to it. To make these various elements of power politically\ninfluential they must be organized; and the advantage in organization\nis necessarily with those who are in possession of the government. A\nmuch weaker party in all other elements of power may greatly\npreponderate when the powers of government are thrown into the scale;\nand may long retain its predominance through this alone: though, no\ndoubt, a government so situated is in the condition called in\nmechanics unstable equilibrium, like a thing balanced on its smaller\nend, which, if once disturbed, tends more and more to depart from,\ninstead of reverting to, its previous state.\n\nBut there are still stronger objections to this theory of government\nin the terms in which it is usually stated. The power in society which\nhas any tendency to convert itself into political power is not power\nquiescent, power merely passive, but active power; in other words,\npower actually exerted; that is to say, a very small portion of all\nthe power in existence. Politically speaking, a great part of all\npower consists in will. How is it possible, then, to compute the\nelements of political power, while we omit from the computation any\nthing which acts on the will? To think that, because those who wield\nthe power in society wield in the end that of government, therefore it\nis of no use to attempt to influence the constitution of the\ngovernment by acting on opinion, is to forget that opinion is itself\none of the greatest active social forces. One person with a belief is\na social power equal to ninety-nine who have only interests. They who\ncan succeed in creating a general persuasion that a certain form of\ngovernment, or social fact of any kind, deserves to be preferred, have\nmade nearly the most important step which can possibly be taken toward\nranging the powers of society on its side. On the day when the\nprotomartyr was stoned to death at Jerusalem, while he who was to be\nthe Apostle of the Gentiles stood by \"consenting unto his death,\"\nwould any one have supposed that the party of that stoned man were\nthen and there the strongest power in society? And has not the event\nproved that they were so? Because theirs was the most powerful of then\nexisting beliefs. The same element made a monk of Wittenberg, at the\nmeeting of the Diet of Worms, a more powerful social force than the\nEmperor Charles the Fifth, and all the princes there assembled. But\nthese, it may be said, are cases in which religion was concerned, and\nreligious convictions are something peculiar in their strength. Then\nlet us take a case purely political, where religion, if concerned at\nall, was chiefly on the losing side. If any one requires to be\nconvinced that speculative thought is one of the chief elements of\nsocial power, let him bethink himself of the age in which there was\nscarcely a throne in Europe which was not filled by a liberal and\nreforming king, a liberal and reforming emperor, or, strangest of all,\na liberal and reforming pope; the age of Frederic the Great, of\nCatherine the Second, of Joseph the Second, of Peter Leopold, of\nBenedict XIV., of Ganganelli, of Pombal, of D'Aranda; when the very\nBourbons of Naples were liberals and reformers, and all the active\nminds among the noblesse of France were filled with the ideas which\nwere soon after to cost them so dear. Surely a conclusive example how\nfar mere physical and economic power is from being the whole of social\npower. It was not by any change in the distribution of material\ninterests, but by the spread of moral convictions, that negro slavery\nhas been put an end to in the British Empire and elsewhere. The serfs\nin Russia owe their emancipation, if not to a sentiment of duty, at\nleast to the growth of a more enlightened opinion respecting the true\ninterest of the state. It is what men think that determines how they\nact; and though the persuasions and convictions of average men are in\na much greater degree determined by their personal position than by\nreason, no little power is exercised over them by the persuasions and\nconvictions of those whose personal position is different, and by the\nunited authority of the instructed. When, therefore, the instructed in\ngeneral can be brought to recognize one social arrangement, or\npolitical or other institution, as good, and another as bad--one as\ndesirable, another as condemnable, very much has been done towards\ngiving to the one, or withdrawing from the other, that preponderance\nof social force which enables it to subsist. And the maxim, that the\ngovernment of a country is what the social forces in existence compel\nit to be, is true only in the sense in which it favors, instead of\ndiscouraging, the attempt to exercise, among all forms of government\npracticable in the existing condition of society, a rational choice.\n\n\n\nChapter II--The Criterion of a Good Form of Government.\n\n\nThe form of government for any given country being (within certain\ndefinite conditions) amenable to choice, it is now to be considered by\nwhat test the choice should be directed; what are the distinctive\ncharacteristics of the form of government best fitted to promote the\ninterests of any given society.\n\nBefore entering into this inquiry, it may seem necessary to decide\nwhat are the proper functions of government; for, government\naltogether being only a means, the eligibility of the means must\ndepend on their adaptation to the end. But this mode of stating the\nproblem gives less aid to its investigation than might be supposed,\nand does not even bring the whole of the question into view. For, in\nthe first place, the proper functions of a government are not a fixed\nthing, but different in different states of society; much more\nextensive in a backward than in an advanced state. And, secondly, the\ncharacter of a government or set of political institutions can not be\nsufficiently estimated while we confine our attention to the\nlegitimate sphere of governmental functions; for, though the goodness\nof a government is necessarily circumscribed within that sphere, its\nbadness unhappily is not. Every kind and degree of evil of which\nmankind are susceptible may be inflicted on them by their government,\nand none of the good which social existence is capable of can be any\nfurther realized than as the constitution of the government is\ncompatible with, and allows scope for, its attainment. Not to speak of\nindirect effects, the direct meddling of the public authorities has no\nnecessary limits but those of human life, and the influence of\ngovernment on the well-being of society can be considered or estimated\nin reference to nothing less than the whole of the interests of\nhumanity.\n\nBeing thus obliged to place before ourselves, as the test of good and\nbad government, so complex an object as the aggregate interests of\nsociety, we would willingly attempt some kind of classification of\nthose interests, which, bringing them before the mind in definite\ngroups, might give indication of the qualities by which a form of\ngovernment is fitted to promote those various interests respectively.\nIt would be a great facility if we could say the good of society\nconsists of such and such elements; one of these elements requires\nsuch conditions, another such others; the government, then, which\nunites in the greatest degree all these conditions, must be the best.\nThe theory of government would thus be built up from the separate\ntheorems of the elements which compose a good state of society.\n\nUnfortunately, to enumerate and classify the constituents of social\nwell-being, so as to admit of the formation of such theorems is no\neasy task. Most of those who, in the last or present generation, have\napplied themselves to the philosophy of politics in any comprehensive\nspirit, have felt the importance of such a classification, but the\nattempts which have been made toward it are as yet limited, so far as\nI am aware, to a single step. The classification begins and ends with\na partition of the exigencies of society between the two heads of\nOrder and Progress (in the phraseology of French thinkers); Permanence\nand Progression, in the words of Coleridge. This division is plausible\nand seductive, from the apparently clean-cut opposition between its\ntwo members, and the remarkable difference between the sentiments to\nwhich they appeal. But I apprehend that (however admissible for\npurposes of popular discourse) the distinction between Order, or\nPermanence and Progress, employed to define the qualities necessary in\na government, is unscientific and incorrect.\n\nFor, first, what are Order and Progress? Concerning Progress there is\nno difficulty, or none which is apparent at first sight. When Progress\nis spoken of as one of the wants of human society, it may be supposed\nto mean Improvement. That is a tolerably distinct idea. But what is\nOrder? Sometimes it means more, sometimes less, but hardly ever the\nwhole of what human society needs except improvement.\n\nIn its narrowest acceptation, Order means Obedience. A government is\nsaid to preserve order if it succeeds in getting itself obeyed. But\nthere are different degrees of obedience, and it is not every degree\nthat is commendable. Only an unmitigated despotism demands that the\nindividual citizen shall obey unconditionally every mandate of persons\nin authority. We must at least limit the definition to such mandates\nas are general, and issued in the deliberate form of laws. Order, thus\nunderstood, expresses, doubtless, an indispensable attribute of\ngovernment. Those who are unable to make their ordinances obeyed, can\nnot be said to govern. But, though a necessary condition, this is not\nthe object of government. That it should make itself obeyed is\nrequisite, in order that it may accomplish some other purpose. We are\nstill to seek what is this other purpose, which government ought to\nfulfill abstractedly from the idea of improvement, and which has to be\nfulfilled in every society, whether stationary or progressive.\n\nIn a sense somewhat more enlarged, Order means the preservation of\npeace by the cessation of private violence. Order is said to exist\nwhere the people of the country have, as a general rule, ceased to\nprosecute their quarrels by private force, and acquired the habit of\nreferring the decision of their disputes and the redress of their\ninjuries to the public authorities. But in this larger use of the\nterm, as well as in the former narrow one, Order expresses rather one\nof the conditions of government, than either its purpose or the\ncriterion of its excellence; for the habit may be well established of\nsubmitting to the government, and referring all disputed matters to\nits authority, and yet the manner in which the government deals with\nthose disputed matters, and with the other things about which it\nconcerns itself, may differ by the whole interval which divides the\nbest from the worst possible.\n\nIf we intend to comprise in the idea of Order all that society\nrequires from its government which is not included in the idea of\nProgress, we must define Order as the preservation of all kinds and\namounts of good which already exist, and Progress as consisting in the\nincrease of them. This distinction does comprehend in one or the other\nsection every thing which a government can be required to promote.\nBut, thus understood, it affords no basis for a philosophy of\ngovernment. We can not say that, in constituting a polity, certain\nprovisions ought to be made for Order and certain others for Progress,\nsince the conditions of Order, in the sense now indicated, and those\nof Progress, are not opposite, but the same. The agencies which tend\nto preserve the social good which already exists are the very same\nwhich promote the increase of it, and _vice versa_, the sole\ndifference being, that a greater degree of those agencies is required\nfor the latter purpose than for the former.\n\nWhat, for example, are the qualities in the citizens individually\nwhich conduce most to keep up the amount of good conduct, of good\nmanagement, of success and prosperity, which already exist in society?\nEvery body will agree that those qualities are industry, integrity,\njustice, and prudence. But are not these, of all qualities, the most\nconducive to improvement? and is not any growth of these virtues in\nthe community in itself the greatest of improvements? If so, whatever\nqualities in the government are promotive of industry, integrity,\njustice, and prudence, conduce alike to permanence and to progression,\nonly there is needed more of those qualities to make the society\ndecidedly progressive than merely to keep it permanent.\n\nWhat, again, are the particular attributes in human beings which seem\nto have a more especial reference to Progress, and do not so directly\nsuggest the ideas of Order and Preservation? They are chiefly the\nqualities of mental activity, enterprise, and courage. But are not all\nthese qualities fully as much required for preserving the good we have\nas for adding to it? If there is any thing certain in human affairs,\nit is that valuable acquisitions are only to be retained by the\ncontinuation of the same energies which gained them. Things left to\ntake care of themselves inevitably decay. Those whom success induces\nto relax their habits of care and thoughtfulness, and their\nwillingness to encounter disagreeables, seldom long retain their good\nfortune at its height. The mental attribute which seems exclusively\ndedicated to Progress, and is the culmination of the tendencies to it,\nis Originality, or Invention. Yet this is no less necessary for\nPermanence, since, in the inevitable changes of human affairs, new\ninconveniences and dangers continually grow up, which must be\nencountered by new resources and contrivances, in order to keep things\ngoing on even only as well as they did before. Whatever qualities,\ntherefore, in a government, tend to encourage activity, energy,\ncourage, originality, are requisites of Permanence as well as of\nProgress, only a somewhat less degree of them will, on the average,\nsuffice for the former purpose than for the latter.\n\nTo pass now from the mental to the outward and objective requisites of\nsociety: it is impossible to point out any contrivance in politics, or\narrangement of social affairs, which conduces to Order only, or to\nProgress only; whatever tends to either promotes both. Take, for\ninstance, the common institution of a police. Order is the object\nwhich seems most immediately interested in the efficiency of this part\nof the social organization. Yet, if it is effectual to promote Order,\nthat is, if it represses crime, and enables every one to feel his\nperson and property secure, can any state of things be more conducive\nto Progress? The greater security of property is one of the main\nconditions and causes of greater production, which is Progress in its\nmost familiar and vulgarest aspect. The better repression of crime\nrepresses the dispositions which tend to crime, and this is Progress\nin a somewhat higher sense. The release of the individual from the\ncares and anxieties of a state of imperfect protection sets his\nfaculties free to be employed in any new effort for improving his own\nstate and that of others, while the same cause, by attaching him to\nsocial existence, and making him no longer see present or prospective\nenemies in his fellow creatures, fosters all those feelings of\nkindness and fellowship towards others, and interest in the general\nwell-being of the community, which are such important parts of social\nimprovement.\n\nTake, again, such a familiar case as that of a good system of taxation\nand finance. This would generally be classed as belonging to the\nprovince of Order. Yet what can be more conducive to Progress? A\nfinancial system which promotes the one, conduces, by the very same\nexcellences, to the other. Economy, for example, equally preserves the\nexisting stock of national wealth, and favors the creation of more. A\njust distribution of burdens, by holding up to every citizen an\nexample of morality and good conscience applied to difficult\nadjustments, and an evidence of the value which the highest\nauthorities attach to them, tends in an eminent degree to educate the\nmoral sentiments of the community, both in respect of strength and of\ndiscrimination. Such a mode of levying the taxes as does not impede\nthe industry, or unnecessarily interfere with the liberty of the\ncitizen, promotes, not the preservation only, but the increase of the\nnational wealth, and encourages a more active use of the individual\nfaculties. And _vice versa_, all errors in finance and taxation which\nobstruct the improvement of the people in wealth and morals, tend\nalso, if of sufficiently serious amount, positively to impoverish and\ndemoralize them. It holds, in short, universally, that when Order and\nPermanence are taken in their widest sense for the stability of\nexisting advantages, the requisites of Progress are but the requisites\nof Order in a greater degree; those of Permanence merely those of\nProgress in a somewhat smaller measure.\n\nIn support of the position that Order is intrinsically different from\nProgress, and that preservation of existing and acquisition of\nadditional good are sufficiently distinct to afford the basis of a\nfundamental classification, we shall perhaps be reminded that Progress\nmay be at the expense of Order; that while we are acquiring, or\nstriving to acquire, good of one kind, we may be losing ground in\nrespect to others; thus there may be progress in wealth, while there\nis deterioration in virtue. Granting this, what it proves is, not that\nProgress is generically a different thing from Permanence, but that\nwealth is a different thing from virtue. Progress is permanence and\nsomething more; and it is no answer to this to say that Progress in\none thing does not imply Permanence in every thing. No more does\nProgress in one thing imply Progress in every thing. Progress of any\nkind includes Permanence in that same kind: whenever Permanence is\nsacrificed to some particular kind of Progress, other Progress is\nstill more sacrificed to it; and if it be not worth the sacrifice, not\nthe interest of Permanence alone has been disregarded, but the general\ninterest of Progress has been mistaken.\n\nIf these improperly contrasted ideas are to be used at all in the\nattempt to give a first commencement of scientific precision to the\nnotion of good government, it would be more philosophically correct to\nleave out of the definition the word Order, and to say that the best\ngovernment is that which is most conducive to Progress. For Progress\nincludes Order, but Order does not include Progress. Progress is a\ngreater degree of that of which Order is a less. Order, in any other\nsense, stands only for a part of the prerequisites of good government,\nnot for its idea and essence. Order would find a more suitable place\namong the conditions of Progress, since, if we would increase our sum\nof good, nothing is more indispensable than to take due care of what\nwe already have. If we are endeavouring after more riches, our very\nfirst rule should be, not to squander uselessly our existing means.\nOrder, thus considered, is not an additional end to be reconciled with\nProgress, but a part and means of Progress itself. If a gain in one\nrespect is purchased by a more than equivalent loss in the same or in\nany other, there is not Progress. Conduciveness to Progress, thus\nunderstood, includes the whole excellence of a government.\n\nBut, though metaphysically defensible, this definition of the\ncriterion of good government is not appropriate, because, though it\ncontains the whole of the truth, it recalls only a part. What is\nsuggested by the term Progress is the idea of moving onward, whereas\nthe meaning of it here is quite as much the prevention of falling\nback. The very same social causes--the same beliefs, feelings,\ninstitutions, and practices--are as much required to prevent society\nfrom retrograding as to produce a further advance. Were there no\nimprovement to be hoped for, life would not be the less an unceasing\nstruggle against causes of deterioration, as it even now is. Politics,\nas conceived by the ancients, consisted wholly in this. The natural\ntendency of men and their works was to degenerate, which tendency,\nhowever, by good institutions virtuously administered, it might be\npossible for an indefinite length of time to counteract. Though we no\nlonger hold this opinion; though most men in the present age profess\nthe contrary creed, believing that the tendency of things, on the\nwhole, is toward improvement, we ought not to forget that there is an\nincessant and ever-flowing current of human affairs toward the worse,\nconsisting of all the follies, all the vices, all the negligences,\nindolences, and supinenesses of mankind, which is only controlled, and\nkept from sweeping all before it, by the exertions which some persons\nconstantly, and others by fits, put forth in the direction of good and\nworthy objects. It gives a very insufficient idea of the importance of\nthe strivings which take place to improve and elevate human nature and\nlife to suppose that their chief value consists in the amount of\nactual improvement realized by their means, and that the consequence\nof their cessation would merely be that we should remain as we are. A\nvery small diminution of those exertions would not only put a stop to\nimprovement, but would turn the general tendency of things toward\ndeterioration, which, once begun, would proceed with increasingly\nrapidity, and become more and more difficult to check, until it\nreached a state often seen in history, and in which many large\nportions of mankind even now grovel; when hardly any thing short of\nsuperhuman power seems sufficient to turn the tide, and give a fresh\ncommencement to the upward movement.\n\nThese reasons make the word Progress as unapt as the terms Order and\nPermanence to become the basis for a classification of the requisites\nof a form of government. The fundamental antithesis which these words\nexpress does not lie in the things themselves, so much as in the types\nof human character which answer to them. There are, we know, some\nminds in which caution, and others in which boldness, predominates; in\nsome, the desire to avoid imperilling what is already possessed is a\nstronger sentiment than that which prompts to improve the old and\nacquire new advantages; while there are others who lean the contrary\nway, and are more eager for future than careful of present good. The\nroad to the ends of both is the same; but they are liable to wander\nfrom it in opposite directions. This consideration is of importance in\ncomposing the _personnel_ of any political body: persons of both types\nought to be included in it, that the tendencies of each may be\ntempered, in so far as they are excessive, by a due proportion of the\nother. There needs no express provision to insure this object,\nprovided care is taken to admit nothing inconsistent with it. The\nnatural and spontaneous admixture of the old and the young, of those\nwhose position and reputation are made and those who have them still\nto make, will in general sufficiently answer the purpose, if only this\nnatural balance is not disturbed by artificial regulation.\n\nSince the distinction most commonly adopted for the classification of\nsocial exigencies does not possess the properties needful for that\nuse, we have to seek for some other leading distinction better adapted\nto the purpose. Such a distinction would seem to be indicated by the\nconsiderations to which I now proceed.\n\nIf we ask ourselves on what causes and conditions good government in\nall its senses, from the humblest to the most exalted, depends, we\nfind that the principal of them, the one which transcends all others,\nis the qualities of the human beings composing the society over which\nthe government is exercised.\n\nWe may take, as a first instance, the administration of justice; with\nthe more propriety, since there is no part of public business in which\nthe mere machinery, the rules and contrivances for conducting the\ndetails of the operation, are of such vital consequence. Yet even\nthese yield in importance to the qualities of the human agents\nemployed. Of what efficacy are rules of procedure in securing the ends\nof justice if the moral condition of the people is such that the\nwitnesses generally lie, and the judges and their subordinates take\nbribes? Again, how can institutions provide a good municipal\nadministration if there exists such indifference to the subject that\nthose who would administer honestly and capably can not be induced to\nserve, and the duties are left to those who undertake them because\nthey have some private interest to be promoted? Of what avail is the\nmost broadly popular representative system if the electors do not care\nto choose the best member of Parliament, but choose him who will spend\nmost money to be elected? How can a representative assembly work for\ngood if its members can be bought, or if their excitability of\ntemperament, uncorrected by public discipline or private self-control,\nmakes them incapable of calm deliberation, and they resort to manual\nviolence on the floor of the House, or shoot at one another with\nrifles? How, again, can government, or any joint concern, be carried\non in a tolerable manner by people so envious that, if one among them\nseems likely to succeed in any thing, those who ought to cooperate\nwith him form a tacit combination to make him fail? Whenever the\ngeneral disposition of the people is such that each individual regards\nthose only of his interests which are selfish, and does not dwell on,\nor concern himself for, his share of the general interest, in such a\nstate of things good government is impossible. The influence of\ndefects of intelligence in obstructing all the elements of good\ngovernment requires no illustration. Government consists of acts done\nby human beings; and if the agents, or those who choose the agents, or\nthose to whom the agents are responsible, or the lookers-on whose\nopinion ought to influence and check all these, are mere masses of\nignorance, stupidity, and baleful prejudice, every operation of\ngovernment will go wrong; while, in proportion as the men rise above\nthis standard, so will the government improve in quality up to the\npoint of excellence, attainable but nowhere attained, where the\nofficers of government, themselves persons of superior virtue and\nintellect, are surrounded by the atmosphere of a virtuous and\nenlightened public opinion.\n\nThe first element of good government, therefore, being the virtue and\nintelligence of the human beings composing the community, the most\nimportant point of excellence which any form of government can possess\nis to promote the virtue and intelligence of the people themselves.\nThe first question in respect to any political institutions is how far\nthey tend to foster in the members of the community the various\ndesirable qualities, moral and intellectual, or rather (following\nBentham's more complete classification) moral, intellectual, and\nactive. The government which does this the best has every likelihood\nof being the best in all other respects, since it is on these\nqualities, so far as they exist in the people, that all possibility of\ngoodness in the practical operations of the government depends.\n\nWe may consider, then, as one criterion of the goodness of a\ngovernment, the degree in which it tends to increase the sum of good\nqualities in the governed, collectively and individually, since,\nbesides that their well-being is the sole object of government, their\ngood qualities supply the moving force which works the machinery. This\nleaves, as the other constituent element of the merit of a government,\nthe quality of the machinery itself; that is, the degree in which it\nis adapted to take advantage of the amount of good qualities which may\nat any time exist, and make them instrumental to the right purposes.\nLet us again take the subject of judicature as an example and\nillustration. The judicial system being given, the goodness of the\nadministration of justice is in the compound ratio of the worth of the\nmen composing the tribunals, and the worth of the public opinion which\ninfluences or controls them. But all the difference between a good and\na bad system of judicature lies in the contrivances adopted for\nbringing whatever moral and intellectual worth exists in the community\nto bear upon the administration of justice, and making it duly\noperative on the result. The arrangements for rendering the choice of\nthe judges such as to obtain the highest average of virtue and\nintelligence; the salutary forms of procedure; the publicity which\nallows observation and criticism of whatever is amiss; the liberty of\ndiscussion and cinsure through the press; the mode of taking evidence,\naccording as it is well or ill adapted to elicit truth; the\nfacilities, whatever be their amount, for obtaining access to the\ntribunals; the arrangements for detecting crimes and apprehending\noffenders-all these things are not the power, but the machinery for\nbringing the power into contact with the obstacle; and the machinery\nhas no action of itself, but without it the power, let it be ever so\nample, would be wasted and of no effect. A similar distinction exists\nin regard to the constitution of the executive departments of\nadministration. Their machinery is good, when the proper tests are\nprescribed for the qualifications of officers, the proper rules for\ntheir promotion; when the business is conveniently distributed among\nthose who are to transact it, a convenient and methodical order\nestablished for its transaction, a correct and intelligible record\nkept of it after being transacted; when each individual knows for what\nhe is responsible, and is known to others as responsible for it; when\nthe best-contrived checks are provided against negligence, favoritism,\nor jobbery in any of the acts of the department. But political checks\nwill no more act of themselves than a bridle will direct a horse\nwithout a rider. If the checking functionaries are as corrupt or as\nnegligent as those whom they ought to check, and if the public, the\nmainspring of the whole checking machinery, are too ignorant, too\npassive, or too careless and inattentive to do their part, little\nbenefit will be derived from the best administrative apparatus. Yet a\ngood apparatus is always preferable to a bad. It enables such\ninsufficient moving or checking power as exists to act at the greatest\nadvantage; and without it, no amount of moving or checking power would\nbe sufficient. Publicity, for instance, is no impediment to evil, nor\nstimulus to good, if the public will not look at what is done; but\nwithout publicity, how could they either check or encourage what they\nwere not permitted to see? The ideally perfect constitution of a\npublic office is that in which the interest of the functionary is\nentirely coincident with his duty. No mere system will make it so, but\nstill less can it be made so without a system, aptly devised for the\npurpose.\n\nWhat we have said of the arrangements for the detailed administration\nof the government is still more evidently true of its general\nconstitution. All government which aims at being good is an\norganization of some part of the good qualities existing in the\nindividual members of the community for the conduct of its collective\naffairs. A representative constitution is a means of bringing the\ngeneral standard of intelligence and honesty existing in the\ncommunity, and the individual intellect and virtue of its wisest\nmembers, more directly to bear upon the government, and investing them\nwith greater influence in it than they would have under any other mode\nof organization; though, under any, such influence as they do have is\nthe source of all good that there is in the government, and the\nhindrance of every evil that there is not. The greater the amount of\nthese good qualities which the institutions of a country succeed in\norganizing, and the better the mode of organization, the better will\nbe the government.\n\nWe have now, therefore, obtained a foundation for a twofold division\nof the merit which any set of political institutions can possess. It\nconsists partly of the degree in which they promote the general mental\nadvancement of the community, including under that phrase advancement\nin intellect, in virtue, and in practical activity and efficiency, and\npartly of the degree of perfection with which they organize the moral,\nintellectual, and active worth already existing, so as to operate with\nthe greatest effect on public affairs. A government is to be judged by\nits action upon men and by its action upon things; by what it makes of\nthe citizens, and what it does with them; its tendency to improve or\ndeteriorate the people themselves, and the goodness or badness of the\nwork it performs for them, and by means of them. Government is at once\na great influence acting on the human mind, and a set of organized\narrangements for public business: in the first capacity its beneficial\naction is chiefly indirect, but not therefore less vital, while its\nmischievous action may be direct.\n\nThe difference between these two functions of a government is not,\nlike that between Order and Progress, a difference merely in degree,\nbut in kind. We must not, however, suppose that they have no intimate\nconnection with one another. The institutions which insure the best\nmanagement of public affairs practicable in the existing state of\ncultivation tend by this alone to the further improvement of that\nstate. A people which had the most just laws, the purest and most\nefficient judicature, the most enlightened administration, the most\nequitable and least onerous system of finance, compatible with the\nstage it had attained in moral and intellectual advancement, would be\nin a fair way to pass rapidly into a higher stage. Nor is there any\nmode in which political institutions can contribute more effectually\nto the improvement of the people than by doing their more direct work\nwell. And reversely, if their machinery is so badly constructed that\nthey do their own particular business ill, the effect is felt in a\nthousand ways in lowering the morality and deadening the intelligence\nand activity of the people. But the distinction is nevertheless real,\nbecause this is only one of the means by which political institutions\nimprove or deteriorate the human mind, and the causes and modes of\nthat beneficial or injurious influence remain a distinct and much\nwider subject of study.\n\nOf the two modes of operation by which a form of government or set of\npolitical institutions affects the welfare of the community--its\noperation as an agency of national education, and its arrangements for\nconducting the collective affairs of the community in the state of\neducation in which they already are, the last evidently varies much\nless, from difference of country and state of civilization, than the\nfirst. It has also much less to do with the fundamental constitution\nof the government. The mode of conducting the practical business of\ngovernment, which is best under a free constitution, would generally\nbe best also in an absolute monarchy, only an absolute monarchy is not\nso likely to practice it. The laws of property, for example; the\nprinciples of evidence and judicial procedure; the system of taxation\nand of financial administration, need not necessarily be different in\ndifferent forms of government. Each of these matters has principles\nand rules of its own, which are a subject of separate study. General\njurisprudence, civil and penal legislation, financial and commercial\npolicy, are sciences in themselves, or, rather, separate members of\nthe comprehensive science or art of government; and the most\nenlightened doctrines on all these subjects, though not equally likely\nto be understood and acted on under all forms of government, yet, if\nunderstood and acted on, would in general be equally beneficial under\nthem all. It is true that these doctrines could not be applied without\nsome modifications to all states of society and of the human mind;\nnevertheless, by far the greater number of them would require\nmodifications solely of detail to adapt them to any state of society\nsufficiently advanced to possess rulers capable of understanding them.\nA government to which they would be wholly unsuitable must be one so\nbad in itself, or so opposed to public feeling, as to be unable to\nmaintain itself in existence by honest means.\n\nIt is otherwise with that portion of the interests of the community\nwhich relate to the better or worse training of the people themselves.\nConsidered as instrumental to this, institutions need to be radically\ndifferent, according to the stage of advancement already reached. The\nrecognition of this truth, though for the most part empirically rather\nthan philosophically, may be regarded as the main point of superiority\nin the political theories of the present above those of the last age,\nin which it was customary to claim representative democracy for\nEngland or France by arguments which would equally have proved it the\nonly fit form of government for Bedouins or Malays. The state of\ndifferent communities, in point of culture and development, ranges\ndownwards to a condition very little above the highest of the beasts.\nThe upward range, too, is considerable, and the future possible\nextension vastly greater. A community can only be developed out of one\nof these states into a higher by a concourse of influences, among the\nprincipal of which is the government to which they are subject. In all\nstates of human improvement ever yet attained, the nature and degree\nof authority exercised over individuals, the distribution of power,\nand the conditions of command and obedience, are the most powerful of\nthe influences, except their religious belief, which make them what\nthey are, and enable them to become what they can be. They may be\nstopped short at any point in their progress by defective adaptation\nof their government to that particular stage of advancement. And the\none indispensable merit of a government, in favor of which it may be\nforgiven almost any amount of other demerit compatible with progress,\nis that its operation on the people is favorable, or not unfavorable,\nto the next step which it is necessary for them to take in order to\nraise themselves to a higher level.\n\nThus (to repeat a former example), a people in a state of savage\nindependence, in which every one lives for himself, exempt, unless by\nfits, from any external control, is practically incapable of making\nany progress in civilization until it has learned to obey. The\nindispensable virtue, therefore, in a government which establishes\nitself over a people of this sort is that it make itself obeyed. To\nenable it to do this, the constitution of the government must be\nnearly, or quite despotic. A constitution in any degree popular,\ndependent on the voluntary surrender by the different members of the\ncommunity of their individual freedom of action, would fail to enforce\nthe first lesson which the pupils, in this stage of their progress,\nrequire. Accordingly, the civilization of such tribes, when not the\nresult of juxtaposition with others already civilized, is almost\nalways the work of an absolute ruler, deriving his power either from\nreligion or military prowess--very often from foreign arms.\n\nAgain, uncivilized races, and the bravest and most energetic still\nmore than the rest, are averse to continuous labor of an unexciting\nkind. Yet all real civilization is at this price; without such labor,\nneither can the mind be disciplined into the habits required by\ncivilized society, nor the material world prepared to receive it.\nThere needs a rare concurrence of circumstances, and for that reason\noften a vast length of time, to reconcile such a people to industry,\nunless they are for a while compelled to it. Hence even personal\nslavery, by giving a commencement to industrial life, and enforcing it\nas the exclusive occupation of the most numerous portion of the\ncommunity, may accelerate the transition to a better freedom than that\nof fighting and rapine. It is almost needless to say that this excuse\nfor slavery is only available in a very early state of society. A\ncivilized people have far other means of imparting civilization to\nthose under their influence; and slavery is, in all its details, so\nrepugnant to that government of law, which is the foundation of all\nmodern life, and so corrupting to the master-class when they have once\ncome under civilized influences, that its adoption under any\ncircumstances whatever in modern society is a relapse into worse than\nbarbarism.\n\nAt some period, however, of their history, almost every people, now\ncivilized, have consisted, in majority, of slaves. A people in that\ncondition require to raise them out of it a very different polity from\na nation of savages. If they are energetic by nature, and especially\nif there be associated with them in the same community an industrious\nclass who are neither slaves nor slave-owners (as was the case in\nGreece), they need, probably, no more to insure their improvement than\nto make them free: when freed, they may often be fit, like Roman\nfreedmen, to be admitted at once to the full rights of citizenship.\nThis, however, is not the normal condition of slavery, and is\ngenerally a sign that it is becoming obsolete. A slave, properly so\ncalled, is a being who has not learned to help himself. He is, no\ndoubt, one step in advance of a savage. He has not the first lesson of\npolitical society still to acquire. He has learned to obey. But what\nhe obeys is only a direct command. It is the characteristic of _born_\nslaves to be incapable of conforming their conduct to a rule or law.\nThey can only do what they are ordered, and only when they are ordered\nto do it. If a man whom they fear is standing over them and\nthreatening them with punishment, they obey; but when his back is\nturned, the work remains undone. The motive determining them must\nappeal, not to their interests, but to their instincts; immediate hope\nor immediate terror. A despotism, which may tame the savage, will, in\nso far as it is a despotism, only confirm the slaves in their\nincapacities. Yet a government under their own control would be\nentirely unmanageable by them. Their improvement can not come from\nthemselves, but must be superinduced from without. The step which they\nhave to take, and their only path to improvement, is to be raised from\na government of will to one of law. They have to be taught\nself-government, and this, in its initial stage, means the capacity to\nact on general instructions. What they require is not a government of\nforce, but one of guidance. Being, however, in too low a state to\nyield to the guidance of any but those to whom they look up as the\npossessors of force, the sort of government fittest for them is one\nwhich possesses force, but seldom uses it; a parental despotism or\naristocracy, resembling the St. Simonian form of Socialism;\nmaintaining a general superintendence over all the operations of\nsociety, so as to keep before each the sense of a present force\nsufficient to compel his obedience to the rule laid down, but which,\nowing to the impossibility of descending to regulate all the minutiae\nof industry and life, necessarily leaves and induces individuals to do\nmuch of themselves. This, which may be termed the government of\nleading-strings, seems to be the one required to carry such a people\nthe most rapidly through the next necessary step in social progress.\nSuch appears to have been the idea of the government of the Incas of\nPeru, and such was that of the Jesuits of Paraguay. I need scarcely\nremark that leading-strings are only admissible as a means of\ngradually training the people to walk alone.\n\nIt would be out of place to carry the illustration further. To attempt\nto investigate what kind of government is suited to every known state\nof society would be to compose a treatise, not on representative\ngovernment, but on political science at large. For our more limited\npurpose we borrow from political philosophy only its general\nprinciples. To determine the form of government most suited to any\nparticular people, we must be able, among the defects and shortcomings\nwhich belong to that people, to distinguish those that are the\nimmediate impediment to progress--to discover what it is which (as it\nwere) stops the way. The best government for them is the one which\ntends most to give them that for want of which they can not advance,\nor advance only in a lame and lopsided manner. We must not, however,\nforget the reservation necessary in all things which have for their\nobject improvement or Progress, namely, that in seeking the good which\nis needed, no damage, or as little as possible, be done to that\nalready possessed. A people of savages should be taught obedience, but\nnot in such a manner as to convert them into a people of slaves. And\n(to give the observation a higher generality) the form of government\nwhich is most effectual for carrying a people through the next stage\nof progress will still be very improper for them if it does this in\nsuch a manner as to obstruct, or positively unfit them for, the step\nnext beyond. Such cases are frequent, and are among the most\nmelancholy facts in history. The Egyptian hierarchy, the paternal\ndespotism of China, were very fit instruments for carrying those\nnations up to the point of civilization which they attained. But\nhaving reached that point, they were brought to a permanent halt for\nwant of mental liberty and individuality--requisites of improvement\nwhich the institutions that had carried them thus far entirely\nincapacitated them from acquiring--and as the institutions did not\nbreak down and give place to others, further improvement stopped. In\ncontrast with these nations, let us consider the example of an\nopposite character afforded by another and a comparatively\ninsignificant Oriental people--the Jews. They, too, had an absolute\nmonarchy and a hierarchy, and their organized institutions were as\nobviously of sacerdotal origin as those of the Hindoos. These\ndid for them what was done for other Oriental races by their\ninstitutions--subdued them to industry and order, and gave them a\nnational life. But neither their kings nor their priests ever\nobtained, as in those other countries, the exclusive moulding of their\ncharacter. Their religion, which enabled persons of genius and a high\nreligious tone to be regarded and to regard themselves as inspired\nfrom heaven, gave existence to an inestimably precious unorganized\ninstitution--the Order (if it may be so termed) of Prophets. Under the\nprotection, generally though not always effectual, of their sacred\ncharacter, the Prophets were a power in the nation, often more than a\nmatch for kings and priests, and kept up, in that little corner of the\nearth, the antagonism of influences which is the only real security\nfor continued progress. Religion, consequently, was not there what it\nhas been in so many other places--a consecration of all that was once\nestablished, and a barrier against further improvement. The remark of\na distinguished Hebrew, M. Salvador, that the Prophets were, in Church\nand State, the equivalent of the modern liberty of the press, gives a\njust but not an adequate conception of the part fulfilled in national\nand universal history by this great element of Jewish life; by means\nof which, the canon of inspiration never being complete, the persons\nmost eminent in genius and moral feeling could not only denounce and\nreprobate, with the direct authority of the Almighty, whatever\nappeared to them deserving of such treatment, but could give forth\nbetter and higher interpretations of the national religion, which\nthenceforth became part of the religion. Accordingly, whoever can\ndivest himself of the habit of reading the Bible as if it was one\nbook, which until lately was equally inveterate in Christians and in\nunbelievers, sees with admiration the vast interval between the\nmorality and religion of the Pentateuch, or even of the historical\nbooks (the unmistakable work of Hebrew Conservatives of the sacerdotal\norder), and the morality and religion of the prophecies--a distance as\nwide as between these last and the Gospels. Conditions more favorable\nto Progress could not easily exist; accordingly, the Jews, instead of\nbeing stationary like other Asiatics, were, next to the Greeks, the\nmost progressive people of antiquity, and, jointly with them, have\nbeen the starting-point and main propelling agency of modern\ncultivation.\n\nIt is, then, impossible to understand the question of the adaptation\nof forms of government to states of society, without taking into\naccount not only the next step, but all the steps which society has\nyet to make; both those which can be foreseen, and the far wider\nindefinite range which is at present out of sight. It follows, that to\njudge of the merits of forms of government, an ideal must be\nconstructed of the form of government most eligible in itself, that\nis, which, if the necessary conditions existed for giving effect to\nits beneficial tendencies, would, more than all others, favor and\npromote, not some one improvement, but all forms and degrees of it.\nThis having been done, we must consider what are the mental conditions\nof all sorts necessary to enable this government to realize its\ntendencies, and what, therefore, are the various defects by which a\npeople is made incapable of reaping its benefits. It would then be\npossible to construct a theorem of the circumstances in which that\nform of government may wisely be introduced; and also to judge, in\ncases in which it had better not be introduced, what inferior forms of\npolity will best carry those communities through the intermediate\nstages which they must traverse before they can become fit for the\nbest form of government.\n\nOf these inquiries, the last does not concern us here, but the first\nis an essential part of our subject; for we may, without rashness, at\nonce enunciate a proposition, the proofs and illustrations of which\nwill present themselves in the ensuing pages, that this ideally best\nform of government will be found in some one or other variety of the\nRepresentative System.\n\n\n\nChapter III--That the ideally best Form of Government is Representative Government.\n\n\nIt has long (perhaps throughout the entire duration of British\nfreedom) been a common form of speech, that if a good despot could be\ninsured, despotic monarchy would be the best form of government. I\nlook upon this as a radical and most pernicious misconception of what\ngood government is, which, until it can be got rid of, will fatally\nvitiate all our speculations on government.\n\nThe supposition is, that absolute power, in the hands of an eminent\nindividual, would insure a virtuous and intelligent performance of all\nthe duties of government. Good laws would be established and enforced,\nbad laws would be reformed; the best men would be placed in all\nsituations of trust; justice would be as well administered, the public\nburdens would be as light and as judiciously imposed, every branch of\nadministration would be as purely and as intelligently conducted as\nthe circumstances of the country and its degree of intellectual and\nmoral cultivation would admit. I am willing, for the sake of the\nargument, to concede all this, but I must point out how great the\nconcession is, how much more is needed to produce even an\napproximation to these results than is conveyed in the simple\nexpression, a good despot. Their realization would in fact imply, not\nmerely a good monarch, but an all-seeing one. He must be at all times\ninformed correctly, in considerable detail, of the conduct and working\nof every branch of administration, in every district of the country,\nand must be able, in the twenty-four hours per day, which are all that\nis granted to a king as to the humblest laborer, to give an effective\nshare of attention and superintendence to all parts of this vast\nfield; or he must at least be capable of discerning and choosing out,\nfrom among the mass of his subjects, not only a large abundance of\nhonest and able men, fit to conduct every branch of public\nadministration under supervision and control, but also the small\nnumber of men of eminent virtues and talents who can be trusted not\nonly to do without that supervision, but to exercise it themselves\nover others. So extraordinary are the faculties and energies required\nfor performing this task in any supportable manner, that the good\ndespot whom we are supposing can hardly be imagined as consenting to\nundertake it unless as a refuge from intolerable evils, and a\ntransitional preparation for something beyond. But the argument can do\nwithout even this immense item in the account. Suppose the difficulty\nvanquished. What should we then have? One man of superhuman mental\nactivity managing the entire affairs of a mentally passive people.\nTheir passivity is implied in the very idea of absolute power. The\nnation as a whole, and every individual composing it, are without any\npotential voice in their own destiny. They exercise no will in respect\nto their collective interests. All is decided for them by a will not\ntheir own, which it is legally a crime for them to disobey. What sort\nof human beings can be formed under such a regimen? What development\ncan either their thinking or their active faculties attain under it?\nOn matters of pure theory they might perhaps be allowed to speculate,\nso long as their speculations either did not approach politics, or had\nnot the remotest connection with its practice. On practical affairs\nthey could at most be only suffered to suggest; and even under the\nmost moderate of despots, none but persons of already admitted or\nreputed superiority could hope that their suggestions would be known\nto, much less regarded by, those who had the management of affairs. A\nperson must have a very unusual taste for intellectual exercise in and\nfor itself who will put himself to the trouble of thought when it is\nto have no outward effect, or qualify himself for functions which he\nhas no chance of being allowed to exercise. The only sufficient\nincitement to mental exertion, in any but a few minds in a generation,\nis the prospect of some practical use to be made of its results. It\ndoes not follow that the nation will be wholly destitute of\nintellectual power. The common business of life, which must\nnecessarily be performed by each individual or family for themselves,\nwill call forth some amount of intelligence and practical ability,\nwithin a certain narrow range of ideas. There may be a select class of\n_savants_ who cultivate science with a view to its physical uses or\nfor the pleasure of the pursuit. There will be a bureaucracy, and\npersons in training for the bureaucracy, who will be taught at least\nsome empirical maxims of government and public administration. There\nmay be, and often has been, a systematic organization of the best\nmental power in the country in some special direction (commonly\nmilitary) to promote the grandeur of the despot. But the public at\nlarge remain without information and without interest on all greater\nmatters of practice; or, if they have any knowledge of them, it is but\na _dilettante_ knowledge, like that which people have of the\nmechanical arts who have never handled a tool. Nor is it only in their\nintelligence that they suffer. Their moral capacities are equally\nstunted. Wherever the sphere of action of human beings is artificially\ncircumscribed, their sentiments are narrowed and dwarfed in the same\nproportion. The food of feeling is action; even domestic affection\nlives upon voluntary good offices. Let a person have nothing to do for\nhis country, and he will not care for it. It has been said of old that\nin a despotism there is at most but one patriot, the despot himself;\nand the saying rests on a just appreciation of the effects of absolute\nsubjection even to a good and wise master. Religion remains; and here,\nat least, it may be thought, is an agency that may be relied on for\nlifting men's eyes and minds above the dust at their feet. But\nreligion, even supposing it to escape perversion for the purposes of\ndespotism, ceases in these circumstances to be a social concern, and\nnarrows into a personal affair between an individual and his Maker, in\nwhich the issue at stake is but his private salvation. Religion in\nthis shape is quite consistent with the most selfish and contracted\negoism, and identifies the votary as little in feeling with the rest\nof his kind as sensuality itself.\n\nA good despotism means a government in which, so far as depends on the\ndespot, there is no positive oppression by officers of state, but in\nwhich all the collective interests of the people are managed for them,\nall the thinking that has relation to collective interests done for\nthem, and in which their minds are formed by, and consenting to, this\nabdication of their own energies. Leaving things to the government,\nlike leaving them to Providence, is synonymous with caring nothing\nabout them, and accepting their results, when disagreeable, as\nvisitations of Nature. With the exception, therefore, of a few\nstudious men who take an intellectual interest in speculation for its\nown sake, the intelligence and sentiments of the whole people are\ngiven up to the material interests, and when these are provided for,\nto the amusement and ornamentation of private life. But to say this is\nto say, if the whole testimony of history is worth any thing, that the\nera of national decline has arrived; that is, if the nation had ever\nattained any thing to decline from. If it has never risen above the\ncondition of an Oriental people, in that condition it continues to\nstagnate; but if, like Greece or Rome, it had realized any thing\nhigher, through the energy, patriotism, and enlargement of mind,\nwhich, as national qualities, are the fruits solely of freedom, it\nrelapses in a few generations into the Oriental state. And that state\ndoes not mean stupid tranquillity, with security against change for\nthe worse; it often means being overrun, conquered, and reduced to\ndomestic slavery either by a stronger despot, or by the nearest\nbarbarous people who retain along with their savage rudeness the\nenergies of freedom.\n\nSuch are not merely the natural tendencies, but the inherent\nnecessities of despotic government; from which there is no outlet,\nunless in so far as the despotism consents not to be despotism; in so\nfar as the supposed good despot abstains from exercising his power,\nand, though holding it in reserve, allows the general business of\ngovernment to go on as if the people really governed themselves.\nHowever little probable it may be, we may imagine a despot observing\nmany of the rules and restraints of constitutional government. He\nmight allow such freedom of the press and of discussion as would\nenable a public opinion to form and express itself on national\naffairs. He might suffer local interests to be managed, without the\ninterference of authority, by the people themselves. He might even\nsurround himself with a council or councils of government, freely\nchosen by the whole or some portion of the nation, retaining in his\nown hands the power of taxation, and the supreme legislative as well\nas executive authority. Were he to act thus, and so far abdicate as a\ndespot, he would do away with a considerable part of the evils\ncharacteristic of despotism. Political activity and capacity for\npublic affairs would no longer be prevented from growing up in the\nbody of the nation, and a public opinion would form itself, not the\nmere echo of the government. But such improvement would be the\nbeginning of new difficulties. This public opinion, independent of the\nmonarch's dictation, must be either with him or against him; if not\nthe one, it will be the other. All governments must displease many\npersons, and these having now regular organs, and being able to\nexpress their sentiments, opinions adverse to the measures of\ngovernment would often be expressed. What is the monarch to do when\nthese unfavorable opinions happen to be in the majority? Is he to\nalter his course? Is he to defer to the nation? If so, he is no longer\na despot, but a constitutional king; an organ or first minister of the\npeople, distinguished only by being irremovable. If not, he must\neither put down opposition by his despotic power, or there will arise\na permanent antagonism between the people and one man, which can have\nbut one possible ending. Not even a religious principle of passive\nobedience and \"right divine\" would long ward off the natural\nconsequences of such a position. The monarch would have to succumb,\nand conform to the conditions of constitutional royalty, or give place\nto some one who would. The despotism, being thus chiefly nominal,\nwould possess few of the advantages supposed to belong to absolute\nmonarchy, while it would realize in a very imperfect degree those of a\nfree government, since, however great an amount of liberty the\ncitizens might practically enjoy, they could never forget that they\nheld it on sufferance, and by a concession which, under the existing\nconstitution of the state might at any moment be resumed; that they\nwere legally slaves, though of a prudent or indulgent master.\n\nIt is not much to be wondered at if impatient or disappointed\nreformers, groaning under the impediments opposed to the most salutary\npublic improvements by the ignorance, the indifference, the\nuntractableness, the perverse obstinacy of a people, and the corrupt\ncombinations of selfish private interests, armed with the powerful\nweapons afforded by free institutions, should at times sigh for a\nstrong hand to bear down all these obstacles, and compel a\nrecalcitrant people to be better governed. But (setting aside the fact\nthat for one despot who now and then reforms an abuse, there are\nninety-nine who do nothing but create them) those who look in any such\ndirection for the realization of their hopes leave out of the idea of\ngood government its principal element, the improvement of the people\nthemselves. One of the benefits of freedom is that under it the ruler\ncan not pass by the people's minds, and amend their affairs for them\nwithout amending _them_. If it were possible for the people to be well\ngoverned in spite of themselves, their good government would last no\nlonger than the freedom of a people usually lasts who have been\nliberated by foreign arms without their own co-operation. It is true,\na despot may educate the people, and to do so really would be the best\napology for his despotism. But any education which aims at making\nhuman beings other than machines, in the long run makes them claim to\nhave the control of their own actions. The leaders of French\nphilosophy in the eighteenth century had been educated by the Jesuits.\nEven Jesuit education, it seems, was sufficiently real to call forth\nthe appetite for freedom. Whatever invigorates the faculties, in\nhowever small a measure, creates an increased desire for their more\nunimpeded exercise; and a popular education is a failure if it\neducates the people for any state but that which it will certainly\ninduce them to desire, and most probably to demand.\n\nI am far from condemning, in cases of extreme exigency, the assumption\nof absolute power in the form of a temporary dictatorship. Free\nnations have, in times of old, conferred such power by their own\nchoice, as a necessary medicine for diseases of the body politic which\ncould not be got rid of by less violent means. But its acceptance,\neven for a time strictly limited, can only be excused, if, like Solon\nor Pittacus, the dictator employs the whole power he assumes in\nremoving the obstacles which debar the nation from the enjoyment of\nfreedom. A good despotism is an altogether false ideal, which\npractically (except as a means to some temporary purpose) becomes the\nmost senseless and dangerous of chimeras. Evil for evil, a good\ndespotism, in a country at all advanced in civilization, is more\nnoxious than a bad one, for it is far more relaxing and enervating to\nthe thoughts, feelings, and energies of the people. The despotism of\nAugustus prepared the Romans for Tiberius. If the whole tone of their\ncharacter had not first been prostrated by nearly two generations of\nthat mild slavery, they would probably have had spirit enough left to\nrebel against the more odious one.\n\nThere is no difficulty in showing that the ideally best form of\ngovernment is that in which the sovereignty, or supreme controlling\npower in the last resort, is vested in the entire aggregate of the\ncommunity, every citizen not only having a voice in the exercise of\nthat ultimate sovereignty, but being, at least occasionally, called on\nto take an actual part in the government by the personal discharge of\nsome public function, local or general.\n\nTo test this proposition, it has to be examined in reference to the\ntwo branches into which, as pointed out in the last chapter, the\ninquiry into the goodness of a government conveniently divides itself,\nnamely, how far it promotes the good management of the affairs of\nsociety by means of the existing faculties, moral, intellectual, and\nactive, of its various members, and what is its effect in improving or\ndeteriorating those faculties.\n\nThe ideally best form of government, it is scarcely necessary to say,\ndoes not mean one which is practicable or eligible in all states of\ncivilization, but the one which, in the circumstances in which it is\npracticable and eligible, is attended with the greatest amount of\nbeneficial consequences, immediate and prospective. A completely\npopular government is the only polity which can make out any claim to\nthis character. It is pre-eminent in both the departments between\nwhich the excellence of a political Constitution is divided. It is\nboth more favorable to present good government, and promotes a better\nand higher form of national character than any other polity\nwhatsoever.\n\nIts superiority in reference to present well-being rests upon two\nprinciples, of as universal truth and applicability as any general\npropositions which can be laid down respecting human affairs. The\nfirst is, that the rights and interests of every or any person are\nonly secure from being disregarded when the person interested is\nhimself able, and habitually disposed to stand up for them. The second\nis, that the general prosperity attains a greater height, and is more\nwidely diffused, in proportion to the amount and variety of the\npersonal energies enlisted in promoting it.\n\nPutting these two propositions into a shape more special to their\npresent application--human beings are only secure from evil at the\nhands of others in proportion as they have the power of being, and\nare, self-_protecting_; and they only achieve a high degree of success\nin their struggle with Nature in proportion as they are\nself-_dependent_, relying on what they themselves can do, either\nseparately or in concert, rather than on what others do for them.\n\nThe former proposition--that each is the only safe guardian of his own\nrights and interests--is one of those elementary maxims of prudence\nwhich every person capable of conducting his own affairs implicitly\nacts upon wherever he himself is interested. Many, indeed, have a\ngreat dislike to it as a political doctrine, and are fond of holding\nit up to obloquy as a doctrine of universal selfishness. To which we\nmay answer, that whenever it ceases to be true that mankind, as a\nrule, prefer themselves to others, and those nearest to them to those\nmore remote, from that moment Communism is not only practicable, but\nthe only defensible form of society, and will, when that time arrives,\nbe assuredly carried into effect. For my own part, not believing in\nuniversal selfishness, I have no difficulty in admitting that\nCommunism would even now be practicable among the _elite_ of mankind,\nand may become so among the rest. But as this opinion is any thing but\npopular with those defenders of existing institutions who find fault\nwith the doctrine of the general predominance of self-interest, I am\ninclined to think they do in reality believe that most men consider\nthemselves before other people. It is not, however, necessary to\naffirm even thus much in order to support the claim of all to\nparticipate in the sovereign power. We need not suppose that when\npower resides in an exclusive class, that class will knowingly and\ndeliberately sacrifice the other classes to themselves: it suffices\nthat, in the absence of its natural defenders, the interest of the\nexcluded is always in danger of being overlooked; and, when looked at,\nis seen with very different eyes from those of the persons whom it\ndirectly concerns. In this country, for example, what are called the\nworking-classes may be considered as excluded from all direct\nparticipation in the government. I do not believe that the classes who\ndo participate in it have in general any intention of sacrificing the\nworking classes to themselves. They once had that intention; witness\nthe persevering attempts so long made to keep down wages by law. But\nin the present day, their ordinary disposition is the very opposite:\nthey willingly make considerable sacrifices, especially of their\npecuniary interest, for the benefit of the working classes, and err\nrather by too lavish and indiscriminating beneficence; nor do I\nbelieve that any rulers in history have been actuated by a more\nsincere desire to do their duty towards the poorer portion of their\ncountrymen. Yet does Parliament, or almost any of the members\ncomposing it, ever for an instant look at any question with the eyes\nof a working man? When a subject arises in which the laborers as such\nhave an interest, is it regarded from any point of view but that of\nthe employers of labor? I do not say that the working men's view of\nthese questions is in general nearer to the truth than the other, but\nit is sometimes quite as near; and in any case it ought to be\nrespectfully listened to, instead of being, as it is, not merely\nturned away from, but ignored. On the question of strikes, for\ninstance, it is doubtful if there is so much as one among the leading\nmembers of either House who is not firmly convinced that the reason of\nthe matter is unqualifiedly on the side of the masters, and that the\nmen's view of it is simply absurd. Those who have studied the question\nknow well how far this is from being the case, and in how different,\nand how infinitely less superficial a manner the point would have to\nbe argued, if the classes who strike were able to make themselves\nheard in Parliament.\n\nIt is an adherent condition of human affairs that no intention,\nhowever sincere, of protecting the interests of others can make it\nsafe or salutary to tie up their own hands. Still more obviously true\nis it that by their own hands only can any positive and durable\nimprovement of their circumstances in life be worked out. Through the\njoint influence of these two principles, all free communities have\nboth been more exempt from social injustice and crime, and have\nattained more brilliant prosperity than any others, or than they\nthemselves after they lost their freedom. Contrast the free states of\nthe world, while their freedom lasted, with the cotemporary subjects\nof monarchical or oligarchical despotism: the Greek cities with the\nPersian satrapies; the Italian republics and the free towns of\nFlanders and Germany, with the feudal monarchies of Europe;\nSwitzerland, Holland, and England, with Austria or ante-revolutionary\nFrance. Their superior prosperity was too obvious ever to have been\ngainsayed; while their superiority in good government and social\nrelations is proved by the prosperity, and is manifest besides in\nevery page of history. If we compare, not one age with another, but\nthe different governments which coexisted in the same age, no amount\nof disorder which exaggeration itself can pretend to have existed\namidst the publicity of the free states can be compared for a moment\nwith the contemptuous trampling upon the mass of the people which\npervaded the whole life of the monarchical countries, or the\ndisgusting individual tyranny which was of more than daily occurrence\nunder the systems of plunder which they called fiscal arrangements,\nand in the secrecy of their frightful courts of justice.\n\nIt must be acknowledged that the benefits of freedom, so far as they\nhave hitherto been enjoyed, were obtained by the extension of its\nprivileges to a part only of the community; and that a government in\nwhich they are extended impartially to all is a desideratum still\nunrealized. But, though every approach to this has an independent\nvalue, and in many cases more than an approach could not, in the\nexisting state of general improvement, be made, the participation of\nall in these benefits is the ideally perfect conception of free\ngovernment. In proportion as any, no matter who, are excluded from it,\nthe interests of the excluded are left without the guaranty accorded\nto the rest, and they themselves have less scope and encouragement\nthan they might otherwise have to that exertion of their energies for\nthe good of themselves and of the community, to which the general\nprosperity is always proportioned.\n\nThus stands the case as regards present well-being--the good\nmanagement of the affairs of the existing generation. If we now pass\nto the influence of the form of government upon character, we shall\nfind the superiority of popular government over every other to be, if\npossible, still more decided and indisputable.\n\nThis question really depends upon a still more fundamental one, viz.,\nwhich of two common types of character, for the general good of\nhumanity, it is most desirable should predominate--the active or the\npassive type; that which struggles against evils, or that which\nendures them; that which bends to circumstances, or that which\nendeavours to make circumstances bend to itself.\n\nThe commonplaces of moralists and the general sympathies of mankind\nare in favor of the passive type. Energetic characters may be admired,\nbut the acquiescent and submissive are those which most men personally\nprefer. The passiveness of our neighbors increases our sense of\nsecurity, and plays into the hands of our wilfulness. Passive\ncharacters, if we do not happen to need their activity, seem an\nobstruction the less in our own path. A contented character is not a\ndangerous rival. Yet nothing is more certain than that improvement in\nhuman affairs is wholly the work of the uncontented characters; and,\nmoreover, that it is much easier for an active mind to acquire the\nvirtues of patience, than for a passive one to assume those of energy.\n\nOf the three varieties of mental excellence, intellectual, practical,\nand moral, there never could be any doubt in regard to the first two,\nwhich side had the advantage. All intellectual superiority is the\nfruit of active effort. Enterprise, the desire to keep moving, to be\ntrying and accomplishing new things for our own benefit or that of\nothers, is the parent even of speculative, and much more of practical,\ntalent. The intellectual culture compatible with the other type is of\nthat feeble and vague description which belongs to a mind that stops\nat amusement or at simple contemplation. The test of real and vigorous\nthinking, the thinking which ascertains truths instead of dreaming\ndreams, is successful application to practice. Where that purpose does\nnot exist, to give definiteness, precision, and an intelligible\nmeaning to thought, it generates nothing better than the mystical\nmetaphysics of the Pythagoreans or the Veds. With respect to practical\nimprovement, the case is still more evident. The character which\nimproves human life is that which struggles with natural powers and\ntendencies, not that which gives way to them. The self-benefiting\nqualities are all on the side of the active and energetic character,\nand the habits and conduct which promote the advantage of each\nindividual member of the community must be at least a part of those\nwhich conduce most in the end to the advancement of the community as a\nwhole.\n\nBut on the point of moral preferability, there seems at first sight to\nbe room for doubt. I am not referring to the religious feeling which\nhas so generally existed in favor of the inactive character, as being\nmore in harmony with the submission due to the divine will.\nChristianity, as well as other religions, has fostered this sentiment;\nbut it is the prerogative of Christianity, as regards this and many\nother perversions, that it is able to throw them off. Abstractedly\nfrom religious considerations, a passive character, which yields to\nobstacles instead of striving to overcome them, may not indeed be very\nuseful to others, no more than to itself, but it might be expected to\nbe at least inoffensive. Contentment is always counted among the moral\nvirtues. But it is a complete error to suppose that contentment is\nnecessarily or naturally attendant on passivity of character; and\nuseless it is, the moral consequences are mischievous. Where there\nexists a desire for advantages not possessed, the mind which does not\npotentially possess them by means of its own energies is apt to look\nwith hatred and malice on those who do. The person bestirring himself\nwith hopeful prospects to improve his circumstances is the one who\nfeels good-will towards others engaged in, or who have succeeded in\nthe same pursuit. And where the majority are so engaged, those who do\nnot attain the object have had the tone given to their feelings by the\ngeneral habit of the country, and ascribe their failure to want of\neffort or opportunity, or to their personal ill luck. But those who,\nwhile desiring what others possess, put no energy into striving for\nit, are either incessantly grumbling that fortune does not do for them\nwhat they do not attempt to do for themselves, or overflowing with\nenvy and ill-will towards those who possess what they would like to\nhave.\n\nIn proportion as success in life is seen or believed to be the fruit\nof fatality or accident and not of exertion in that same ratio does\nenvy develop itself as a point of national character. The most envious\nof all mankind are the Orientals. In Oriental moralists, in Oriental\ntales, the envious man is remarkably prominent. In real life, he is\nthe terror of all who possess any thing desirable, be it a palace, a\nhandsome child, or even good health and spirits: the supposed effect\nof his mere look constitutes the all-pervading superstition of the\nevil eye. Next to Orientals in envy, as in activity, are some of the\nSouthern Europeans. The Spaniards pursued all their great men with it,\nembittered their lives, and generally succeeded in putting an early\nstop to their successes. [1] With the French, who are essentially\na Southern people, the double education of despotism and Catholicism\nhas, in spite of their impulsive temperament, made submission and\nendurance the common character of the people, and their most received\nnotion of wisdom and excellence; and if envy of one another, and of\nall superiority, is not more rife among them than it is, the\ncircumstance must be ascribed to the many valuable counteracting\nelements in the French character, and most of all to the great\nindividual energy which, though less persistent and more intermittent\nthan in the self-helping and struggling Anglo-Saxons, has nevertheless\nmanifested itself among the French in nearly every direction in which\nthe operation of their institutions has been favorable to it.\n\nThere are, no doubt, in all countries, really contented characters,\nwho not merely do not seek, but do not desire, what they do not\nalready possess, and these naturally bear no ill-will towards such as\nhave apparently a more favored lot. But the great mass of seeming\ncontentment is real discontent, combined with indolence or\nself-indulgence, which, while taking no legitimate means of raising\nitself, delights in bringing others down to its own level. And if we\nlook narrowly even at the cases of innocent contentment, we perceive\nthat they only win our admiration when the indifference is solely to\nimprovement in outward circumstances, and there is a striving for\nperpetual advancement in spiritual worth, or at least a disinterested\nzeal to benefit others. The contented man, or the contented family,\nwho have no ambition to make any one else happier, to promote the good\nof their country or their neighborhood, or to improve themselves in\nmoral excellence, excite in us neither admiration nor approval. We\nrightly ascribe this sort of contentment to mere unmanliness and want\nof spirit. The content which we approve is an ability to do cheerfully\nwithout what can not be had, a just appreciation of the comparative\nvalue of different objects of desire, and a willing renunciation of\nthe less when incompatible with the greater. These, however, are\nexcellences more natural to the character, in proportion as it is\nactively engaged in the attempt to improve its own or some other lot.\nHe who is continually measuring his energy against difficulties,\nlearns what are the difficulties insuperable to him, and what are\nthose which, though he might overcome, the success is not worth the\ncost. He whose thoughts and activities are all needed for, and\nhabitually employed in, practicable and useful enterprises, is the\nperson of all others least likely to let his mind dwell with brooding\ndiscontent upon things either not worth attaining, or which are not so\nto him. Thus the active, self-helping character is not only\nintrinsically the best, but is the likeliest to acquire all that is\nreally excellent or desirable in the opposite type.\n\nThe striving, go-ahead character of England and the United States is\nonly a fit subject of disapproving criticism on account of the very\nsecondary objects on which it commonly expends its strength. In itself\nit is the foundation of the best hopes for the general improvement of\nmankind. It has been acutely remarked that whenever any thing goes\namiss, the habitual impulse of French people is to say, \"Il faut de la\npatience;\" and of English people, \"What a shame!\" The people who think\nit a shame when any thing goes wrong--who rush to the conclusion that\nthe evil could and ought to have been prevented, are those who, in the\nlong run, do most to make the world better. If the desires are low\nplaced, if they extend to little beyond physical comfort, and the show\nof riches, the immediate results of the energy will not be much more\nthan the continual extension of man's power over material objects; but\neven this makes room, and prepares the mechanical appliances for the\ngreatest intellectual and social achievements; and while the energy is\nthere, some persons will apply it, and it will be applied more and\nmore, to the perfecting, not of outward circumstances alone, but of\nman's inward nature. Inactivity, unaspiringness, absence of desire,\nare a more fatal hindrance to improvement than any misdirection of\nenergy, and is that through which alone, when existing in the mass,\nany very formidable misdirection by an energetic few becomes possible.\nIt is this, mainly, which retains in a savage or semi-savage state the\ngreat majority of the human race.\n\nNow there can be no kind of doubt that the passive type of character\nis favored by the government of one or a few, and the active\nself-helping type by that of the many. Irresponsible rulers need the\nquiescence of the ruled more than they need any activity but that\nwhich they can compel. Submissiveness to the prescriptions of men as\nnecessities of nature is the lesson inculcated by all governments upon\nthose who are wholly without participation in them. The will of\nsuperiors, and the law as the will of superiors, must be passively\nyielded to. But no men are mere instruments or materials in the hands\nof their rulers who have will, or spirit, or a spring of internal\nactivity in the rest of their proceedings, and any manifestation of\nthese qualities, instead of receiving encouragement from despots, has\nto get itself forgiven by them. Even when irresponsible rulers are not\nsufficiently conscious of danger from the mental activity of their\nsubjects to be desirous of repressing it, the position itself is a\nrepression. Endeavour is even more effectually restrained by the\ncertainty of its impotence than by any positive discouragement.\nBetween subjection to the will of others and the virtues of self-help\nand self-government there is a natural incompatibility. This is more\nor less complete according as the bondage is strained or relaxed.\nRulers differ very much in the length to which they carry the control\nof the free agency of their subjects, or the supersession of it by\nmanaging their business for them. But the difference is in degree, not\nin principle; and the best despots often go the greatest lengths in\nchaining up the free agency of their subjects. A bad despot, when his\nown personal indulgences have been provided for, may sometimes be\nwilling to let the people alone; but a good despot insists on doing\nthem good by making them do their own business in a better way than\nthey themselves know of. The regulations which restricted to fixed\nprocesses all the leading branches of French manufactures were the\nwork of the great Colbert.\n\nVery different is the state of the human faculties where a human being\nfeels himself under no other external restraint than the necessities\nof nature, or mandates of society which he has his share in imposing,\nand which it is open to him, if he thinks them wrong, publicly to\ndissent from, and exert himself actively to get altered. No doubt,\nunder a government partially popular, this freedom may be exercised\neven by those who are not partakers in the full privileges of\ncitizenship; but it is a great additional stimulus to any one's\nself-help and self-reliance when he starts from even ground, and has\nnot to feel that his success depends on the impression he can make\nupon the sentiments and dispositions of a body of whom he is not one.\nIt is a great discouragement to an individual, and a still greater one\nto a class, to be left out of the constitution; to be reduced to plead\nfrom outside the door to the arbiters of their destiny, not taken into\nconsultation within. The maximum of the invigorating effect of freedom\nupon the character is only obtained when the person acted on either\nis, or is looking forward to becoming, a citizen as fully privileged\nas any other. What is still more important than even this matter of\nfeeling is the practical discipline which the character obtains from\nthe occasional demand made upon the citizens to exercise, for a time\nand in their turn, some social function. It is not sufficiently\nconsidered how little there is in most men's ordinary life to give any\nlargeness either to their conceptions or to their sentiments. Their\nwork is a routine; not a labor of love, but of self-interest in the\nmost elementary form, the satisfaction of daily wants; neither the\nthing done, nor the process of doing it, introduces the mind to\nthoughts or feelings extending beyond individuals; if instructive\nbooks are within their reach, there is no stimulus to read them; and,\nin most cases, the individual has no access to any person of\ncultivation much superior to his own. Giving him something to do for\nthe public supplies, in a measure, all these deficiencies. If\ncircumstances allow the amount of public duty assigned him to be\nconsiderable, it makes him an educated man. Notwithstanding the\ndefects of the social system and moral ideas of antiquity, the\npractice of the dicastery and the ecclesia raised the intellectual\nstandard of an average Athenian citizen far beyond any thing of which\nthere is yet an example in any other mass of men, ancient or modern.\nThe proofs of this are apparent in every page of our great historian\nof Greece; but we need scarcely look further than to the high quality\nof the addresses which their great orators deemed best calculated to\nact with effect on their understanding and will. A benefit of the same\nkind, though far less in degree, is produced on Englishmen of the\nlower middle class by their liability to be placed on juries and to\nserve parish offices, which, though it does not occur to so many, nor\nis so continuous, nor introduces them to so great a variety of\nelevated considerations as to admit of comparison with the public\neducation which every citizen of Athens obtained from her democratic\ninstitutions, makes them nevertheless very different beings, in range\nof ideas and development of faculties, from those who have done\nnothing in their lives but drive a quill, or sell goods over a\ncounter. Still more salutary is the moral part of the instruction\nafforded by the participation of the private citizen, if even rarely,\nin public functions. He is called upon, while so engaged, to weigh\ninterests not his own; to be guided, in case of conflicting claims, by\nanother rule than his private partialities; to apply, at every turn,\nprinciples and maxims which have for their reason of existence the\ngeneral good; and he usually finds associated with him in the same\nwork minds more familiarized than his own with these ideas and\noperations, whose study it will be to supply reasons to his\nunderstanding, and stimulation to his feeling for the general\ninterest. He is made to feel himself one of the public, and whatever\nis their interest to be his interest. Where this school of public\nspirit does not exist, scarcely any sense is entertained that private\npersons, in no eminent social situation, owe any duties to society\nexcept to obey the laws and submit to the government. There is no\nunselfish sentiment of identification with the public. Every thought\nor feeling, either of interest or of duty, is absorbed in the\nindividual and in the family. The man never thinks of any collective\ninterest, of any objects to be pursued jointly with others, but only\nin competition with them, and in some measure at their expense. A\nneighbor, not being an ally or an associate, since he is never engaged\nin any common undertaking for joint benefit, is therefore only a\nrival. Thus even private morality suffers, while public is actually\nextinct. Were this the universal and only possible state of things,\nthe utmost aspirations of the lawgiver or the moralist could only\nstretch to make the bulk of the community a flock of sheep innocently\nnibbling the grass side by side.\n\nFrom these accumulated considerations, it is evident that the only\ngovernment which can fully satisfy all the exigencies of the social\nstate is one in which the whole people participate; that any\nparticipation, even in the smallest public function, is useful; that\nthe participation should every where be as great as the general degree\nof improvement of the community will allow; and that nothing less can\nbe ultimately desirable than the admission of all to a share in the\nsovereign power of the state. But since all can not, in a community\nexceeding a single small town, participate personally in any but some\nvery minor portions of the public business, it follows that the ideal\ntype of a perfect government must be representative.\n\n\n\nChapter IV--Under what Social Conditions Representative Government is Inapplicable.\n\n\nWe have recognized in representative government the ideal type of the\nmost perfect polity for which, in consequence, any portion of mankind\nare better adapted in proportion to their degree of general\nimprovement. As they range lower and lower in development, that form\nof government will be, generally speaking, less suitable to them,\nthough this is not true universally; for the adaptation of a people to\nrepresentative government does not depend so much upon the place they\noccupy in the general scale of humanity as upon the degree in which\nthey possess certain special requisites; requisites, however, so\nclosely connected with their degree of general advancement, that any\nvariation between the two is rather the exception than the rule. Let\nus examine at what point in the descending series representative\ngovernment ceases altogether to be admissible, either through its own\nunfitness or the superior fitness of some other regimen.\n\nFirst, then, representative, like any other government, must\nbe unsuitable in any case in which it can not permanently\nsubsist--_i.e._, in which it does not fulfill the three fundamental\nconditions enumerated in the first chapter. These were, 1. That the\npeople should be willing to receive it. 2. That they should be willing\nand able to do what is necessary for its preservation. 3. That they\nshould be willing and able to fulfill the duties and discharge the\nfunctions which it imposes on them.\n\nThe willingness of the people to accept representative government only\nbecomes a practical question when an enlightened ruler, or a foreign\nnation or nations who have gained power over the country, are disposed\nto offer it the boon. To individual reformers the question is almost\nirrelevant, since, if no other objection can be made to their\nenterprise than that the opinion of the nation is not yet on their\nside, they have the ready and proper answer, that to bring it over to\ntheir side is the very end they aim at. When opinion is really\nadverse, its hostility is usually to the fact of change rather than to\nrepresentative government in itself. The contrary case is not indeed\nunexampled; there has sometimes been a religious repugnance to any\nlimitation of the power of a particular line of rulers; but, in\ngeneral, the doctrine of passive obedience meant only submission to\nthe will of the powers that be, whether monarchical or popular. In any\ncase in which the attempt to introduce representative government is at\nall likely to be made, indifference to it, and inability to understand\nits processes and requirements, rather than positive opposition, are\nthe obstacles to be expected. These, however, are as fatal, and may be\nas hard to be got rid of as actual aversion; it being easier, in most\ncases, to change the direction of an active feeling than to create one\nin a state previously passive. When a people have no sufficient value\nfor, and attachment to, a representative constitution, they have next\nto no chance of retaining it. In every country, the executive is the\nbranch of the government which wields the immediate power, and is in\ndirect contact with the public; to it, principally, the hopes and\nfears of individuals are directed, and by it both the benefits, and\nthe terrors, and _prestige_ of government are mainly represented to\nthe public eye. Unless, therefore, the authorities whose office it is\nto check the executive are backed by an effective opinion and feeling\nin the country, the executive has always the means of setting them\naside or compelling them to subservience, and is sure to be well\nsupported in doing so. Representative institutions necessarily depend\nfor permanence upon the readiness of the people to fight for them in\ncase of their being endangered. If too little valued for this, they\nseldom obtain a footing at all, and if they do, are almost sure to be\noverthrown as soon as the head of the government, or any party leader\nwho can muster force for a _coup de main_, is willing to run some\nsmall risk for absolute power.\n\nThese considerations relate to the first two causes of failure in a\nrepresentative government. The third is when the people want either\nthe will or the capacity to fulfill the part which belongs to them in\na representative constitution. When nobody, or only some small\nfraction, feels the degree of interest in the general affairs of the\nstate necessary to the formation of a public opinion, the electors\nwill seldom make any use of the right of suffrage but to serve their\nprivate interest, or the interest of their locality, or of some one\nwith whom they are connected as adherents or dependents. The small\nclass who, in this state of public feeling, gain the command of the\nrepresentative body, for the most part use it solely as a means of\nseeking their fortune. If the executive is weak, the country is\ndistracted by mere struggles for place; if strong, it makes itself\ndespotic, at the cheap price of appeasing the representatives, or such\nof them as are capable of giving trouble, by a share of the spoil; and\nthe only fruit produced by national representation is, that in\naddition to those who really govern, there is an assembly quartered on\nthe public, and no abuse in which a portion of the assembly are\ninterested is at all likely to be removed. When, however, the evil\nstops here, the price may be worth paying for the publicity and\ndiscussion which, though not an invariable, are a natural\naccompaniment of any, even nominal, representation. In the modern\nkingdom of Greece, for example, it can hardly be doubted, that the\nplace-hunters who chiefly compose the representative assembly, though\nthey contribute little or nothing directly to good government, nor\neven much temper the arbitrary power of the executive, yet keep up the\nidea of popular rights, and conduce greatly to the real liberty of the\npress which exists in that country. This benefit, however, is entirely\ndependent on the coexistence with the popular body of an hereditary\nking. If, instead of struggling for the favors of the chief ruler,\nthese selfish and sordid factions struggled for the chief place\nitself, they would certainly, as in Spanish America, keep the country\nin a state of chronic revolution and civil war. A despotism, not even\nlegal, but of illegal violence, would be alternately exercised by a\nsuccession of political adventurers, and the name and forms of\nrepresentation would have no effect but to prevent despotism from\nattaining the stability and security by which alone its evils can be\nmitigated or its few advantages realized.\n\nThe preceding are the cases in which representative government can not\npermanently exist. There are others in which it possibly might exist,\nbut in which some other form of government would be preferable. These\nare principally when the people, in order to advance in civilization,\nhave some lesson to learn, some habit not yet acquired, to the\nacquisition of which representative government is likely to be an\nimpediment.\n\nThe most obvious of these cases is the one already considered, in\nwhich the people have still to learn the first lesson of civilization,\nthat of obedience. A race who have been trained in energy and courage\nby struggles with Nature and their neighbors, but who have not yet\nsettled down into permanent obedience to any common superior, would be\nlittle likely to acquire this habit under the collective government of\ntheir own body. A representative assembly drawn from among themselves\nwould simply reflect their own turbulent insubordination. It would\nrefuse its authority to all proceedings which would impose, on their\nsavage independence, any improving restraint. The mode in which such\ntribes are usually brought to submit to the primary conditions of\ncivilized society is through the necessities of warfare, and the\ndespotic authority indispensable to military command. A military\nleader is the only superior to whom they will submit, except\noccasionally some prophet supposed to be inspired from above, or\nconjurer regarded as possessing miraculous power. These may exercise a\ntemporary ascendancy, but as it is merely personal, it rarely effects\nany change in the general habits of the people, unless the prophet,\nlike Mohammed, is also a military chief, and goes forth the armed\napostle of a new religion; or unless the military chiefs ally\nthemselves with his influence, and turn it into a prop for their own\ngovernment.\n\nA people are no less unfitted for representative government by the\ncontrary fault to that last specified--by extreme passiveness, and\nready submission to tyranny. If a people thus prostrated by character\nand circumstances could obtain representative institutions, they would\ninevitably choose their tyrants as their representatives, and the yoke\nwould be made heavier on them by the contrivance which _prima facie_\nmight be expected to lighten it. On the contrary, many a people has\ngradually emerged from this condition by the aid of a central\nauthority, whose position has made it the rival, and has ended by\nmaking it the master, of the local despots, and which, above all, has\nbeen single. French history, from Hugh Capet to Richelieu and Louis\nXIV., is a continued example of this course of things. Even when the\nking was scarcely so powerful as many of his chief feudatories, the\ngreat advantage which he derived from being but one has been\nrecognized by French historians. To him the eyes of _all_ the locally\noppressed were turned; he was the object of hope and reliance\nthroughout the kingdom, while each local potentate was only powerful\nwithin a more or less confined space. At his hands, refuge and\nprotection were sought from every part of the country against first\none, then another of the immediate oppressors. His progress to\nascendancy was slow; but it resulted from successively taking\nadvantage of opportunities which offered themselves only to him. It\nwas, therefore, sure; and, in proportion as it was accomplished, it\nabated, in the oppressed portion of the community, the habit of\nsubmitting to oppression. The king's interest lay in encouraging all\npartial attempts on the part of the serfs to emancipate themselves\nfrom their masters, and place themselves in immediate subordination to\nhimself. Under his protection numerous communities were formed which\nknew no one above them but the king. Obedience to a distant monarch is\nliberty itself compared with the dominion of the lord of the\nneighboring castle; and the monarch was long compelled by necessities\nof position to exert his authority as the ally rather than the master\nof the classes whom he had aided in affecting their liberation. In\nthis manner a central power, despotic in principle, though generally\nmuch restricted in practice, was mainly instrumental in carrying the\npeople through a necessary stage of improvement, which representative\ngovernment, if real, would most likely have prevented them from\nentering upon. There are parts of Europe where the same work is still\nto be done, and no prospect of its being done by any other means.\nNothing short of despotic rule or a general massacre could effect the\nemancipation of the serfs in the Russian Empire.\n\nThe same passages of history forcibly illustrate another mode in which\nunlimited monarchy overcomes obstacles to the progress of civilization\nwhich representative government would have had a decided tendency to\naggravate. One of the strongest hindrances to improvement, up to a\nrather advanced stage, is an inveterate spirit of locality. Portions\nof mankind, in many other respects capable of, and prepared for\nfreedom, may be unqualified for amalgamating into even the smallest\nnation. Not only may jealousies and antipathies repel them from one\nanother, and bar all possibility of voluntary union, but they may not\nyet have acquired any of the feelings or habits which would make the\nunion real, supposing it to be nominally accomplished. They may, like\nthe citizens of an ancient community, or those of an Asiatic village,\nhave had considerable practice in exercising their faculties on\nvillage or town interests, and have even realized a tolerably\neffective popular government on that restricted scale, and may yet\nhave but slender sympathies with any thing beyond, and no habit or\ncapacity of dealing with interests common to many such communities. I\nam not aware that history furnishes any example in which a number of\nthese political atoms or corpuscles have coalesced into a body, and\nlearned to feel themselves one people, except through previous\nsubjection to a central authority common to all. [2] It is through\nthe habit of deferring to that authority, entering into its plans and\nsubserving its purposes, that a people such as we have supposed\nreceive into their minds the conception of large interests common to a\nconsiderable geographical extent. Such interests, on the contrary, are\nnecessarily the predominant consideration in the mind of the central\nruler; and through the relations, more or less intimate, which he\nprogressively establishes with the localities, they become familiar to\nthe general mind. The most favorable concurrence of circumstances\nunder which this step in improvement could be made would be one which\nshould raise up representative institutions without representative\ngovernment; a representative body or bodies, drawn from the\nlocalities, making itself the auxiliary and instrument of the central\npower, but seldom attempting to thwart or control it. The people being\nthus taken, as it were, into council, though not sharing the supreme\npower, the political education given by the central authority is\ncarried home, much more effectually than it could otherwise be, to the\nlocal chiefs and to the population generally, while, at the same time,\na tradition is kept up of government by general consent, or at least,\nthe sanction of tradition is not given to government without it,\nwhich, when consecrated by custom, has so often put a bad end to a\ngood beginning, and is one of the most frequent causes of the sad\nfatality which in most countries has stopped improvement in so early a\nstage, because the work of some one period has been so done as to bar\nthe needful work of the ages following. Meanwhile, it may be laid down\nas a political truth, that by irresponsible monarchy rather than by\nrepresentative government can a multitude of insignificant political\nunits be welded into a people, with common feelings of cohesion, power\nenough to protect itself against conquest or foreign aggression, and\naffairs sufficiently various and considerable of its own to occupy\nworthily and expand to fit proportions the social and political\nintelligence of the population.\n\nFor these several reasons, kingly government, free from the control\n(though perhaps strengthened by the support) of representative\ninstitutions, is the most suitable form of polity for the earliest\nstages of any community, not excepting a city community like those of\nancient Greece; where, accordingly, the government of kings, under\nsome real, but no ostensible or constitutional control by public\nopinion, did historically precede by an unknown and probably great\nduration all free institutions, and gave place at last, during a\nconsiderable lapse of time, to oligarchies of a few families.\n\nA hundred other infirmities or shortcomings in a people might be\npointed out which _pro tanto_ disqualify them from making the best use\nof representative government; but in regard to these it is not equally\nobvious that the government of One or a Few would have any tendency to\ncure or alleviate the evil. Strong prejudices of any kind; obstinate\nadherence to old habits; positive defects of national character, or\nmere ignorance, and deficiency of mental cultivation, if prevalent in\na people, will be in general faithfully reflected in their\nrepresentative assemblies; and should it happen that the executive\nadministration, the direct management of public affairs, is in the\nhands of persons comparatively free from these defects, more good\nwould frequently be done by them when not hampered by the necessity of\ncarrying with them the voluntary assent of such bodies. But the mere\nposition of the rulers does not in these, as it does in the other\ncases which we have examined, of itself invest them with interests and\ntendencies operating in the beneficial direction. From the general\nweaknesses of the people or of the state of civilization, the One and\nhis councillors, or the Few, are not likely to be habitually exempt;\nexcept in the case of their being foreigners, belonging to a superior\npeople or a more advanced state of society. Then, indeed, the rulers\nmay be, to almost any extent, superior in civilization to those over\nwhom they rule; and subjection to a foreign government of this\ndescription, notwithstanding its inevitable evils, is often of the\ngreatest advantage to a people, carrying them rapidly through several\nstages of progress, and clearing away obstacles to improvement which\nmight have lasted indefinitely if the subject population had been left\nunassisted to its native tendencies and chances. In a country not\nunder the dominion of foreigners, the only cause adequate to producing\nsimilar benefits is the rare accident of a monarch of extraordinary\ngenius. There have been in history a few of these who, happily for\nhumanity, have reigned long enough to render some of their\nimprovements permanent, by leaving them under the guardianship of a\ngeneration which had grown up under their influence. Charlemagne may\nbe cited as one instance; Peter the Great is another. Such examples\nhowever are so unfrequent that they can only be classed with the happy\naccidents which have so often decided at a critical moment whether\nsome leading portion of humanity should make a sudden start, or sink\nback towards barbarism--chances like the existence of Themistocles at\nthe time of the Persian invasion, or of the first or third William of\nOrange. It would be absurd to construct institutions for the mere\npurpose of taking advantage of such possibilities, especially as men\nof this calibre, in any distinguished position, do not require\ndespotic power to enable them to exert great influence, as is\nevidenced by the three last mentioned. The case most requiring\nconsideration in reference to institutions is the not very uncommon\none in which a small but leading portion of the population, from\ndifference of race, more civilized origin, or other peculiarities of\ncircumstance, are markedly superior in civilization and general\ncharacter to the remainder. Under those conditions, government by the\nrepresentatives of the mass would stand a chance of depriving them of\nmuch of the benefit they might derive from the greater civilization of\nthe superior ranks, while government by the representatives of those\nranks would probably rivet the degradation of the multitude, and leave\nthem no hope of decent treatment except by ridding themselves of one\nof the most valuable elements of future advancement. The best prospect\nof improvement for a people thus composed lies in the existence of a\nconstitutionally unlimited, or at least a practically preponderant\nauthority in the chief ruler of the dominant class. He alone has by\nhis position an interest in raising and improving the mass, of whom he\nis not jealous, as a counterpoise to his associates, of whom he is;\nand if fortunate circumstances place beside him, not as controllers\nbut as subordinates, a body representative of the superior caste,\nwhich, by its objections and questionings, and by its occasional\noutbreaks of spirit, keeps alive habits of collective resistance, and\nmay admit of being, in time and by degrees, expanded into a really\nnational representation (which is in substance the history of the\nEnglish Parliament), the nation has then the most favorable prospects\nof improvement which can well occur to a community thus circumstanced\nand constituted.\n\nAmong the tendencies which, without absolutely rendering a people\nunfit for representative government, seriously incapacitate them from\nreaping the full benefit of it, one deserves particular notice. There\nare two states of the inclinations, intrinsically very different, but\nwhich have something in common, by virtue of which they often coincide\nin the direction they give to the efforts of individuals and of\nnations; one is, the desire to exercise power over others; the other\nis disinclination to have power exercised over themselves. The\ndifference between different portions of mankind in the relative\nstrength of these two dispositions is one of the most important\nelements in their history. There are nations in whom the passion for\ngoverning others is so much stronger than the desire of personal\nindependence, that for the mere shadow of the one they are found ready\nto sacrifice the whole of the other. Each one of their number is\nwilling, like the private soldier in an army, to abdicate his personal\nfreedom of action into the hands of his general, provided the army is\ntriumphant and victorious, and he is able to flatter himself that he\nis one of a conquering host, though the notion that he has himself any\nshare in the domination exercised over the conquered is an illusion. A\ngovernment strictly limited in its powers and attributions, required\nto hold its hands from overmeddling, and to let most things go on\nwithout its assuming the part of guardian or director, is not to the\ntaste of such a people; in their eyes the possessors of authority can\nhardly take too much upon themselves, provided the authority itself is\nopen to general competition. An average individual among them prefers\nthe chance, however distant or improbable, of wielding some share of\npower over his fellow-citizens, above the certainty, to himself and\nothers, of having no unnecessary power exercised over them. These are\nthe elements of a people of place-hunters, in whom the course of\npolitics is mainly determined by place-hunting; where equality alone\nis cared for, but not liberty; where the contests of political parties\nare but struggles to decide whether the power of meddling in every\nthing shall belong to one class or another, perhaps merely to one knot\nof public men or another; where the idea entertained of democracy is\nmerely that of opening offices to the competition of all instead of a\nfew; where, the more popular the institutions, the more innumerable\nare the places created, and the more monstrous the overgovernment\nexercised by all over each, and by the executive over all. It would be\nas unjust as it would be ungenerous to offer this, or any thing\napproaching to it, as an unexaggerated picture of the French people;\nyet the degree in which they do participate in this type of character\nhas caused representative government by a limited class to break down\nby excess of corruption, and the attempt at representative government\nby the whole male population to end in giving one man the power of\nconsigning any number of the rest, without trial, to Lambessa or\nCayenne, provided he allows all of them to think themselves not\nexcluded from the possibility of sharing his favors. The point of\ncharacter which, beyond any other, fits the people of this country for\nrepresentative government, is that they have almost universally the\ncontrary characteristic. They are very jealous of any attempt to\nexercise power over them not sanctioned by long usage and by their own\nopinion of right; but they in general care very little for the\nexercise of power over others. Not having the smallest sympathy with\nthe passion for governing, while they are but too well acquainted with\nthe motives of private interest from which that office is sought, they\nprefer that it should be performed by those to whom it comes without\nseeking, as a consequence of social position. If foreigners understood\nthis, it would account to them for some of the apparent contradictions\nin the political feelings of Englishmen; their unhesitating readiness\nto let themselves be governed by the higher classes, coupled with so\nlittle personal subservience to them, that no people are so fond of\nresisting authority when it oversteps certain prescribed limits, or so\ndetermined to make their rulers always remember that they will only be\ngoverned in the way they themselves like best. Place-hunting,\naccordingly, is a form of ambition to which the English, considered\nnationally, are almost strangers. If we except the few families or\nconnections of whom official employment lies directly in the way,\nEnglishmen's views of advancement in life take an altogether different\ndirection--that of success in business or in a profession. They have\nthe strongest distaste for any mere struggle for office by political\nparties or individuals; and there are few things to which they have a\ngreater aversion than to the multiplication of public employments; a\nthing, on the contrary, always popular with the bureaucracy-ridden\nnations of the Continent, who would rather pay higher taxes than\ndiminish, by the smallest fraction, their individual chances of a\nplace for themselves or their relatives, and among whom a cry for\nretrenchment never means abolition of offices, but the reduction of\nthe salaries of those which are too considerable for the ordinary\ncitizen to have any chance of being appointed to them.\n\n\n\nChapter V--Of the Proper Functions of Representative Bodies.\n\n\nIn treating of representative government, it is above all necessary to\nkeep in view the distinction between its idea or essence, and the\nparticular forms in which the idea has been clothed by accidental\nhistorical developments, or by the notions current at some particular\nperiod.\n\nThe meaning of representative government is, that the whole people, or\nsome numerous portion of them, exercise through deputies periodically\nelected by themselves the ultimate controlling power, which, in every\nconstitution, must reside somewhere. This ultimate power they must\npossess in all its completeness. They must be masters, whenever they\nplease, of all the operations of government. There is no need that the\nconstitutional law should itself give them this mastery. It does not\nin the British Constitution. But what it does give practically amounts\nto this: the power of final control is as essentially single, in a\nmixed and balanced government, as in a pure monarchy or democracy.\nThis is the portion of truth in the opinion of the ancients, revived\nby great authorities in our own time, that a balanced constitution is\nimpossible. There is almost always a balance, but the scales never\nhang exactly even. Which of them preponderates is not always apparent\non the face of the political institutions. In the British\nConstitution, each of the three co-ordinate members of the sovereignty\nis invested with powers which, if fully exercised, would enable it to\nstop all the machinery of government. Nominally, therefore, each is\ninvested with equal power of thwarting and obstructing the others; and\nif, by exerting that power, any of the three could hope to better its\nposition, the ordinary course of human affairs forbids us to doubt\nthat the power would be exercised. There can be no question that the\nfull powers of each would be employed defensively if it found itself\nassailed by one or both of the others. What, then, prevents the same\npowers from being exerted aggressively? The unwritten maxims of the\nConstitution--in other words, the positive political morality of the\ncountry; and this positive political morality is what we must look to\nif we would know in whom the really supreme power in the Constitution\nresides.\n\nBy constitutional law, the crown can refuse its assent to any act of\nParliament, and can appoint to office and maintain in it any minister,\nin opposition to the remonstrances of Parliament. But the\nconstitutional morality of the country nullifies these powers,\npreventing them from being ever used; and, by requiring that the head\nof the administration should always be virtually appointed by the\nHouse of Commons, makes that body the real sovereign of the state.\n\nThese unwritten rules, which limit the use of lawful powers, are,\nhowever, only effectual, and maintain themselves in existence on\ncondition of harmonising with the actual distribution of real\npolitical strength. There is in every constitution a strongest\npower--one which would gain the victory if the compromises by which\nthe Constitution habitually works were suspended, and there came a\ntrial of strength. Constitutional maxims are adhered to, and are\npractically operative, so long as they give the predominance in the\nConstitution to that one of the powers which has the preponderance of\nactive power out of doors. This, in England, is the popular power. If,\ntherefore, the legal provisions of the British Constitution, together\nwith the unwritten maxims by which the conduct of the different\npolitical authorities is in fact regulated, did not give to the\npopular element in the Constitution that substantial supremacy over\nevery department of the government which corresponds to its real power\nin the country, the Constitution would not possess the stability which\ncharacterizes it; either the laws or the unwritten maxims would soon\nhave to be changed. The British government is thus a representative\ngovernment in the correct sense of the term; and the powers which it\nleaves in hands not directly accountable to the people can only be\nconsidered as precautions which the ruling power is willing should be\ntaken against its own errors. Such precautions have existed in all\nwell-constructed democracies. The Athenian Constitution had many such\nprovisions, and so has that of the United States.\n\nBut while it is essential to representative government that the\npractical supremacy in the state should reside in the representatives\nof the people, it is an open question what actual functions, what\nprecise part in the machinery of government, shall be directly and\npersonally discharged by the representative body. Great varieties in\nthis respect are compatible with the essence of representative\ngovernment, provided the functions are such as secure to the\nrepresentative body the control of every thing in the last resort.\n\nThere is a radical distinction between controlling the business of\ngovernment and actually doing it. The same person or body may be able\nto control every thing, but can not possibly do every thing; and in\nmany cases its control over every thing will be more perfect the less\nit personally attempts to do. The commander of an army could not\ndirect its movements effectually if he himself fought in the ranks or\nled an assault. It is the same with bodies of men. Some things can not\nbe done except by bodies; other things can not be well done by them.\nIt is one question, therefore, what a popular assembly should control,\nanother what it should itself do. It should, as we have already seen,\ncontrol all the operations of government. But, in order to determine\nthrough what channel this general control may most expediently be\nexercised, and what portion of the business of government the\nrepresentative assembly should hold in its own hands, it is necessary\nto consider what kinds of business a numerous body is competent to\nperform properly. That alone which it can do well it ought to take\npersonally upon itself. With regard to the rest, its proper province\nis not to do it, but to take means for having it well done by others.\n\nFor example, the duty which is considered as belonging more peculiarly\nthan any other to an assembly representative of the people is that of\nvoting the taxes. Nevertheless, in no country does the representative\nbody undertake, by itself or its delegated officers, to prepare the\nestimates. Though the supplies can only be voted by the House of\nCommons, and though the sanction of the House is also required for the\nappropriation of the revenues to the different items of the public\nexpenditure, it is the maxim and the uniform practice of the\nConstitution that money can be granted only on the proposition of the\ncrown. It has, no doubt, been felt that moderation as to the amount,\nand care and judgment in the detail of its application, can only be\nexpected when the executive government, through whose hands it is to\npass, is made responsible for the plans and calculations on which the\ndisbursements are grounded. Parliament, accordingly, is not expected,\nnor even permitted, to originate directly either taxation or\nexpenditure. All it is asked for is its consent, and the sole power it\npossesses is that of refusal.\n\nThe principles which are involved and recognized in this\nconstitutional doctrine, if followed as far as they will go, are a\nguide to the limitation and definition of the general functions of\nrepresentative assemblies. In the first place, it is admitted in all\ncountries in which the representative system is practically\nunderstood, that numerous representative bodies ought not to\nadminister. The maxim is grounded not only on the most essential\nprinciples of good government, but on those of the successful conduct\nof business of any description. No body of men, unless organized and\nunder command, is fit for action, in the proper sense. Even a select\nboard, composed of few members, and these specially conversant with\nthe business to be done, is always an inferior instrument to some one\nindividual who could be found among them, and would be improved in\ncharacter if that one person were made the chief, and all the others\nreduced to subordinates. What can be done better by a body than by any\nindividual is deliberation. When it is necessary or important to\nsecure hearing and consideration to many conflicting opinions, a\ndeliberative body is indispensable. Those bodies, therefore, are\nfrequently useful, even for administrative business, but in general\nonly as advisers; such business being, as a rule, better conducted\nunder the responsibility of one. Even a joint-stock company has always\nin practice, if not in theory, a managing director; its good or bad\nmanagement depends essentially on some one person's qualifications,\nand the remaining directors, when of any use, are so by their\nsuggestions to him, or by the power they possess of watching him, and\nrestraining or removing him in case of misconduct. That they are\nostensibly equal shares with him in the management is no advantage,\nbut a considerable set-off against any good which they are capable of\ndoing: it weakens greatly the sense in his own mind, and in those of\nother people, of that individual responsibility in which he should\nstand forth personally and undividedly.\n\nBut a popular assembly is still less fitted to administer, or to\ndictate in detail to those who have the charge of administration. Even\nwhen honestly meant, the interference is almost always injurious.\nEvery branch of public administration is a skilled business, which has\nits own peculiar principles and traditional rules, many of them not\neven known in any effectual way, except to those who have at some time\nhad a hand in carrying on the business, and none of them likely to be\nduly appreciated by persons not practically acquainted with the\ndepartment. I do not mean that the transaction of public business has\nesoteric mysteries, only to be understood by the initiated. Its\nprinciples are all intelligible to any person of good sense, who has\nin his mind a true picture of the circumstances and conditions to be\ndealt with; but to have this he must know those circumstances and\nconditions; and the knowledge does not come by intuition. There are\nmany rules of the greatest importance in every branch of public\nbusiness (as there are in every private occupation), of which a person\nfresh to the subject neither knows the reason or even suspects the\nexistence, because they are intended to meet dangers or provide\nagainst inconveniences which never entered into his thoughts. I have\nknown public men, ministers of more than ordinary natural capacity,\nwho, on their first introduction to a department of business new to\nthem, have excited the mirth of their inferiors by the air with which\nthey announced as a truth hitherto set at nought, and brought to light\nby themselves, something which was probably the first thought of every\nbody who ever looked at the subject, given up as soon as he had got on\nto a second. It is true that a great statesman is he who knows when to\ndepart from traditions, as well as when to adhere to them; but it is a\ngreat mistake to suppose that he will do this better for being\nignorant of the traditions. No one who does not thoroughly know the\nmodes of action which common experience has sanctioned is capable of\njudging of the circumstances which require a departure from those\nordinary modes of action. The interests dependent on the acts done by\na public department, the consequences liable to follow from any\nparticular mode of conducting it, require for weighing and estimating\nthem a kind of knowledge, and of specially exercised judgment, almost\nas rarely found in those not bred to it, as the capacity to reform the\nlaw in those who have not professionally studied it. All these\ndifficulties are sure to be ignored by a representative assembly which\nattempts to decide on special acts of administration. At its best, it\nis inexperience sitting in judgment on experience, ignorance on\nknowledge; ignorance which, never suspecting the existence of what it\ndoes not know, is equally careless and supercilious, making light of,\nif not resenting, all pretensions to have a judgment better worth\nattending to than its own. Thus it is when no interested motives\nintervene; but when they do, the result is jobbery more unblushing and\naudacious than the worst corruption which can well take place in a\npublic office under a government of publicity. It is not necessary\nthat the interested bias should extend to the majority of the\nassembly. In any particular case it is of ten enough that it affects\ntwo or three of their number. Those two or three will have a greater\ninterest in misleading the body than any other of its members are\nlikely to have in putting it right. The bulk of the assembly may keep\ntheir hands clean, but they can not keep their minds vigilant or their\njudgments discerning in matters they know nothing about; and an\nindolent majority, like an indolent individual, belongs to the person\nwho takes most pains with it. The bad measures or bad appointments of\na minister may be checked by Parliament; and the interest of ministers\nin defending, and of rival partisans in attacking, secures a tolerably\nequal discussion; but _quis custodiet custodes?_ who shall check the\nParliament? A minister, a head of an office, feels himself under some\nresponsibility. An assembly in such cases feels under no\nresponsibility at all; for when did any member of Parliament lose his\nseat for the vote he gave on any detail of administration? To a\nminister, or the head of an office, it is of more importance what will\nbe thought of his proceedings some time hence, than what is thought of\nthem at the instant; but an assembly, if the cry of the moment goes\nwith it, however hastily raised or artificially stirred up, thinks\nitself and is thought by every body, to be completely exculpated,\nhowever disastrous may be the consequences. Besides, an assembly never\npersonally experiences the inconveniences of its bad measures until\nthey have reached the dimensions of national evils. Ministers and\nadministrators see them approaching, and have to bear all the\nannoyance and trouble of attempting to ward them off.\n\nThe proper duty of a representative assembly in regard to matters of\nadministration is not to decide them by its own vote, but to take care\nthat the persons who have to decide them shall be the proper persons.\nEven this they can not advantageously do by nominating the\nindividuals. There is no act which more imperatively requires to be\nperformed under a strong sense of individual responsibility than the\nnomination to employments. The experience of every person conversant\nwith public affairs bears out the assertion that there is scarcely any\nact respecting which the conscience of an average man is less\nsensitive; scarcely any case in which less consideration is paid to\nqualifications, partly because men do not know, and partly because\nthey do not care for, the difference in qualifications between one\nperson and another. When a minister makes what is meant to be an\nhonest appointment, that is, when he does not actually job it for his\npersonal connections or his party, an ignorant person might suppose\nthat he would try to give it to the person best qualified. No such\nthing. An ordinary minister thinks himself a miracle of virtue if he\ngives it to a person of merit, or who has a claim on the public on any\naccount, though the claim or the merit may be of the most opposite\ndescription to that required. _Il fallait un calculateur, ce fut un\ndanseur qui l'obtint_, is hardly more of a caricature than in the days\nof Figaro; and the minister doubtless thinks himself not only\nblameless, but meritorious, if the man dances well. Besides, the\nqualifications which fit special individuals for special duties can\nonly be recognized by those who know the individuals, or who make it\ntheir business to examine and judge of persons from what they have\ndone, or from the evidence of those who are in a position to judge.\nWhen these conscientious obligations are so little regarded by great\npublic officers who can be made responsible for their appointments,\nhow must it be with assemblies who can not? Even now, the worst\nappointments are those which are made for the sake of gaining support\nor disarming opposition in the representative body; what might we\nexpect if they were made by the body itself? Numerous bodies never\nregard special qualifications at all. Unless a man is fit for the\ngallows, he is thought to be about as fit as other people for almost\nany thing for which he can offer himself as a candidate. When\nappointments made by a public body are not decided, as they almost\nalways are, by party connection or private jobbing, a man is appointed\neither because he has a reputation, often quite undeserved, for\n_general_ ability, or oftener for no better reason than that he is\npersonally popular.\n\nIt has never been thought desirable that Parliament should itself\nnominate even the members of a cabinet. It is enough that it virtually\ndecides who shall be prime minister, or who shall be the two or three\nindividuals from whom the prime minister shall be chosen. In doing\nthis, it merely recognizes the fact that a certain person is the\ncandidate of the party whose general policy commands its support. In\nreality, the only thing which Parliament decides is, which of two, or\nat most three, parties or bodies of men shall furnish the executive\ngovernment: the opinion of the party itself decides which of its\nmembers is fittest to be placed at the head. According to the existing\npractice of the British Constitution, these things seem to be on as\ngood a footing as they can be. Parliament does not nominate any\nminister, but the crown appoints the head of the administration in\nconformity to the general wishes and inclinations manifested by\nParliament, and the other ministers on the recommendation of the\nchief; while every minister has the undivided moral responsibility of\nappointing fit persons to the other offices of administration which\nare not permanent. In a republic, some other arrangement would be\nnecessary; but the nearer it approached in practice to that which has\nlong existed in England, the more likely it would be to work well.\nEither, as in the American republic, the head of the executive must be\nelected by some agency entirely independent of the representative\nbody; or the body must content itself with naming the prime minister,\nand making him responsible for the choice of his associates and\nsubordinates. In all these considerations, at least theoretically, I\nfully anticipate a general assent; though, practically, the tendency\nis strong in representative bodies to interfere more and more in the\ndetails of administration, by virtue of the general law, that whoever\nhas the strongest power is more and more tempted to make an excessive\nuse of it; and this is one of the practical dangers to which the\nfuturity of representative governments will be exposed.\n\nBut it is equally true, though only of late and slowly beginning to be\nacknowledged, that a numerous assembly is as little fitted for the\ndirect business of legislation as for that of administration. There is\nhardly any kind of intellectual work which so much needs to be done\nnot only by experienced and exercised minds, but by minds trained to\nthe task through long and laborious study, as the business of making\nlaws. This is a sufficient reason, were there no other, why they can\nnever be well made but by a committee of very few persons. A reason no\nless conclusive is, that every provision of a law requires to be\nframed with the most accurate and long-sighted perception of its\neffect on all the other provisions; and the law when made should be\ncapable of fitting into a consistent whole with the previously\nexisting laws. It is impossible that these conditions should be in any\ndegree fulfilled when laws are voted clause by clause in a\nmiscellaneous assembly. The incongruity of such a mode of legislating\nwould strike all minds, were it not that our laws are already, as to\nform and construction, such a chaos, that the confusion and\ncontradiction seem incapable of being made greater by any addition to\nthe mass. Yet even now, the utter unfitness of our legislative\nmachinery for its purpose is making itself practically felt every year\nmore and more. The mere time necessarily occupied in getting through\nbills, renders Parliament more and more incapable of passing any,\nexcept on detached and narrow points. If a bill is prepared which even\nattempts to deal with the whole of any subject (and it is impossible\nto legislate properly on any part without having the whole present to\nthe mind), it hangs over from session to session through sheer\nimpossibility of finding time to dispose of it. It matters not though\nthe bill may have been deliberately drawn up by the authority deemed\nthe best qualified, with all appliances and means to boot; or by a\nselect commission, chosen for their conversancy with the subject, and\nhaving employed years in considering and digesting the particular\nmeasure: it can not be passed, because the House of Commons will not\nforego the precious privilege of tinkering it with their clumsy hands.\nThe custom has of late been to some extent introduced, when the\nprinciple of a bill has been affirmed on the second reading, of\nreferring it for consideration in detail to a select committee; but it\nhas not been found that this practice causes much less time to be lost\nafterwards in carrying it through the committee of the whole House:\nthe opinions or private crotchets which have been overruled by\nknowledge always insist on giving themselves a second chance before\nthe tribunal of ignorance. Indeed, the practice itself has been\nadopted principally by the House of Lords, the members of which are\nless busy and fond of meddling, and less jealous of the importance of\ntheir individual voices, than those of the elective House. And when a\nbill of many clauses does succeed in getting itself discussed in\ndetail, what can depict the state in which it comes out of committee!\nClauses omitted which are essential to the working of the rest;\nincongruous ones inserted to conciliate some private interest, or some\ncrotchety member who threatens to delay the bill; articles foisted in\non the motion of some sciolist with a mere smattering of the subject,\nleading to consequences which the member who introduced or those who\nsupported the bill did not at the moment foresee, and which need an\namending act in the next session to correct their mischiefs. It is one\nof the evils of the present mode of managing these things, that the\nexplaining and defending of a bill, and of its various provisions, is\nscarcely ever performed by the person from whose mind they emanated,\nwho probably has not a seat in the House. Their defense rests upon\nsome minister or member of Parliament who did not frame them, who is\ndependent on cramming for all his arguments but those which are\nperfectly obvious, who does not know the full strength of his case,\nnor the best reasons by which to support it, and is wholly incapable\nof meeting unforeseen objections. This evil, as far as government\nbills are concerned, admits of remedy, and has been remedied in some\nrepresentative constitutions, by allowing the government to be\nrepresented in either House by persons in its confidence, having a\nright to speak, though not to vote.\n\nIf that, as yet considerable, majority of the House of Commons who\nnever desire to move an amendment or make a speech would no longer\nleave the whole regulation of business to those who do; if they would\nbethink themselves that better qualifications for legislation exist,\nand may be found if sought for, than a fluent tongue, and the faculty\nof getting elected by a constituency, it would soon be recognized\nthat, in legislation as well as administration, the only task to which\na representative assembly can possibly be competent is not that of\ndoing the work, but of causing it to be done; of determining to whom\nor to what sort of people it shall be confided, and giving or\nwithholding the national sanction to it when performed. Any government\nfit for a high state of civilization would have as one of its\nfundamental elements a small body, not exceeding in number the members\nof a cabinet, who should act as a Commission of Legislation, having\nfor its appointed office to make the laws. If the laws of this country\nwere, as surely they will soon be, revised and put into a connected\nform, the Commission of Codification by which this is effected should\nremain as a permanent institution, to watch over the work, protect it\nfrom deterioration, and make further improvements as often as\nrequired. No one would wish that this body should of itself have any\npower of _enacting_ laws; the Commission would only embody the element\nof intelligence in their construction; Parliament would represent that\nof will. No measure would become a law until expressly sanctioned by\nParliament; and Parliament, or either house, would have the power not\nonly of rejecting but of sending back a bill to the commission for\nreconsideration or improvement. Either house might also exercise its\ninitiative by referring any subject to the commission, with directions\nto prepare a law. The commission, of course, would have no power of\nrefusing its instrumentality to any legislation which the country\ndesired. Instructions, concurred in by both houses, to draw up a bill\nwhich should effect a particular purpose, would be imperative on the\ncommissioners, unless they preferred to resign their office. Once\nframed, however, Parliament should have no power to alter the measure,\nbut solely to pass or reject it; or, if partially disapproved of,\nremit it to the commission for reconsideration. The commissioners\nshould be appointed by the crown, but should hold their offices for a\ntime certain, say five years, unless removed on an address from the\ntwo Houses of Parliament, grounded either on personal misconduct (as\nin the case of judges), or on refusal to draw up a bill in obedience\nto the demands of Parliament. At the expiration of the five years a\nmember should cease to hold office unless reappointed, in order to\nprovide a convenient mode of getting rid of those who had not been\nfound equal to their duties, and of infusing new and younger blood\ninto the body.\n\nThe necessity of some provision corresponding to this was felt even in\nthe Athenian Democracy, where, in the time of its most complete\nascendancy, the popular Ecclesia could pass psephisms (mostly decrees\non single matters of policy), but laws, so called, could only be made\nor altered by a different and less numerous body, renewed annually,\ncalled the Nomothetae, whose duty it also was to revise the whole of\nthe laws, and keep them consistent with one another. In the English\nConstitution there is great difficulty in introducing any arrangement\nwhich is new both in form and in substance, but comparatively little\nrepugnance is felt to the attainment of new purposes by an adaptation\nof existing forms and traditions. It appears to me that the means\nmight be devised of enriching the Constitution with this great\nimprovement through the machinery of the House of Lords. A commission\nfor preparing bills would in itself be no more an innovation on the\nConstitution than the Board for the administration of the Poor Laws,\nor the Inclosure Commission. If, in consideration of the great\nimportance and dignity of the trust, it were made a rule that every\nperson appointed a member of the Legislative Commission, unless\nremoved from office on an address from Parliament, should be a peer\nfor life, it is probable that the same good sense and taste which\nleave the judicial functions of the peerage practically to the\nexclusive care of the law lords would leave the business of\nlegislation, except on questions involving political principles and\ninterests, to the professional legislators; that bills originating in\nthe Upper House would always be drawn up by them; that the government\nwould devolve on them the framing of all its bills; and that private\nmembers of the House of Commons would gradually find it convenient,\nand likely to facilitate the passing of their measures through the two\nhouses, if, instead of bringing in a bill and submitting it directly\nto the house, they obtained leave to introduce it and have it referred\nto the Legislative Commission; for it would, of course, be open to the\nHouse to refer for the consideration of that body not a subject\nmerely, but any specific proposal, or a Draft of a Bill _in extenso_,\nwhen any member thought himself capable of preparing one such as ought\nto pass; and the House would doubtless refer every such draft to the\ncommission, if only as materials, and for the benefit of the\nsuggestions it might contain, as they would, in like manner, refer\nevery amendment or objection which might be proposed in writing by any\nmember of the House after a measure had left the commissioners' hands.\nThe alteration of bills by a committee of the whole House would cease,\nnot by formal abolition, but by desuetude; the right not being\nabandoned, but laid up in the same armoury with the royal veto, the\nright of withholding the supplies, and other ancient instruments of\npolitical warfare, which no one desires to see used, but no one likes\nto part with, lest they should any time be found to be still needed in\nan extraordinary emergency. By such arrangements as these, legislation\nwould assume its proper place as a work of skilled labor and special\nstudy and experience; while the most important liberty of the nation,\nthat of being governed only by laws assented to by its elected\nrepresentatives, would be fully preserved, and made more valuable by\nbeing detached from the serious, but by no means unavoidable drawbacks\nwhich now accompany it in the form of ignorant and ill-considered\nlegislation.\n\nInstead of the function of governing, for which it is radically unfit,\nthe proper office of a representative assembly is to watch and control\nthe government; to throw the light of publicity on its acts; to compel\na full exposition and justification of all of them which any one\nconsiders questionable; to cinsure them if found condemnable, and, if\nthe men who compose the government abuse their trust, or fulfill it in\na manner which conflicts with the deliberate sense of the nation, to\nexpel them from office, and either expressly or virtually appoint\ntheir successors. This is surely ample power, and security enough for\nthe liberty of the nation. In addition to this, the Parliament has an\noffice not inferior even to this in importance; to be at once the\nnation's Committee of Grievances and its Congress of Opinions; an\narena in which not only the general opinion of the nation, but that of\nevery section of it, and, as far as possible, of every eminent\nindividual whom it contains, can produce itself in full light and\nchallenge discussion; where every person in the country may count upon\nfinding somebody who speaks his mind as well or better than he could\nspeak it himself--not to friends and partisans exclusively, but in the\nface of opponents, to be tested by adverse controversy; where those\nwhose opinion is overruled, feel satisfied that it is heard, and set\naside not by a mere act of will, but for what are thought superior\nreasons, and commend themselves as such to the representatives of the\nmajority of the nation; where every party or opinion in the country\ncan muster its strength, and be cured of any illusion concerning the\nnumber or power of its adherents; where the opinion which prevails in\nthe nation makes itself manifest as prevailing, and marshals its hosts\nin the presence of the government, which is thus enabled and compelled\nto give way to it on the mere manifestation, without the actual\nemployment of its strength; where statesmen can assure themselves, far\nmore certainly than by any other signs, what elements of opinion and\npower are growing and what declining, and are enabled to shape their\nmeasures with some regard not solely to present exigencies, but to\ntendencies in progress. Representative assemblies are often taunted by\ntheir enemies with being places of mere talk and _bavardage_. There\nhas seldom been more misplaced derision. I know not how a\nrepresentative assembly can more usefully employ itself than in talk,\nwhen the subject of talk is the great public interests of the country,\nand every sentence of it represents the opinion either of some\nimportant body of persons in the nation, or of an individual in whom\nsome such body have reposed their confidence. A place where every\ninterest and shade of opinion in the country can have its cause even\npassionately pleaded, in the face of the government and of all other\ninterests and opinions, can compel them to listen, and either comply,\nor state clearly why they do not, is in itself, if it answered no\nother purpose, one of the most important political institutions that\ncan exist any where, and one of the foremost benefits of free\ngovernment. Such \"talking\" would never be looked upon with\ndisparagement if it were not allowed to stop \"doing\"; which it never\nwould, if assemblies knew and acknowledged that talking and discussion\nare their proper business, while _doing_, as the result of discussion,\nis the task not of a miscellaneous body, but of individuals specially\ntrained to it; that the fit office of an assembly is to see that those\nindividuals are honestly and intelligently chosen, and to interfere no\nfurther with them, except by unlimited latitude of suggestion and\ncriticism, and by applying or withholding the final seal of national\nassent. It is for want of this judicious reserve that popular\nassemblies attempt to do what they can not do well--to govern and\nlegislate--and provide no machinery but their own for much of it, when\nof course every hour spent in talk is an hour withdrawn from actual\nbusiness. But the very fact which most unfits such bodies for a\ncouncil of legislation, qualifies them the more for their other\noffice--namely, that they are not a selection of the greatest\npolitical minds in the country, from whose opinions little could with\ncertainty be inferred concerning those of the nation, but are, when\nproperly constituted, a fair sample of every grade of intellect among\nthe people which is at all entitled to a voice in public affairs.\nTheir part is to indicate wants, to be an organ for popular demands,\nand a place of adverse discussion for all opinions relating to public\nmatters, both great and small; and, along with this, to check by\ncriticism, and eventually by withdrawing their support, those high\npublic officers who really conduct the public business, or who appoint\nthose by whom it is conducted. Nothing but the restriction of the\nfunction of representative bodies within these rational limits will\nenable the benefits of popular control to be enjoyed in conjunction\nwith the no less important requisites (growing ever more important as\nhuman affairs increase in scale and in complexity) of skilled\nlegislation and administration. There are no means of combining these\nbenefits except by separating the functions which guaranty the one\nfrom those which essentially require the other; by disjoining the\noffice of control and criticism from the actual conduct of affairs,\nand devolving the former on the representatives of the Many, while\nsecuring for the latter, under strict responsibility to the nation,\nthe acquired knowledge and practiced intelligence of a specially\ntrained and experienced Few.\n\nThe preceding discussion of the functions which ought to devolve on\nthe sovereign representative assembly of the nation would require to\nbe followed by an inquiry into those properly vested in the minor\nrepresentative bodies, which ought to exist for purposes that regard\nonly localities. And such an inquiry forms an essential part of the\npresent treatise; but many reasons require its postponement, until we\nhave considered the most proper composition of the great\nrepresentative body, destined to control as sovereign the enactment of\nlaws and the administration of the general affairs of the nation.\n\n\n\nChapter VI--Of the Infirmities and Dangers to which Representative Government is Liable.\n\n\nThe defects of any form of government may be either negative or\npositive. It is negatively defective if it does not concentrate in the\nhands of the authorities power sufficient to fulfill the necessary\noffices of a government, or if it does not sufficiently develop by\nexercise the active capacities and social feelings of the individual\ncitizens. On neither of these points is it necessary that much should\nbe said at this stage of our inquiry.\n\nThe want of an amount power in the government adequate to preserve\norder and allow of progress in the people is incident rather to a wild\nand rude state of society generally than to any particular form of\npolitical union. When the people are too much attached to savage\nindependence to be tolerant of the amount of power to which it is for\ntheir good that they should be subject, the state of society (as\nalready observed) is not yet ripe for representative government. When\nthe time for that government has arrived, sufficient power for all\nneedful purposes is sure to reside in the sovereign assembly; and if\nenough of it is not intrusted to the executive, this can only arise\nfrom a jealous feeling on the part of the assembly toward the\nadministration, never likely to exist but where the constitutional\npower of the assembly to turn them out of office has not yet\nsufficiently established itself. Wherever that constitutional right is\nadmitted in principle and fully operative in practice, there is no\nfear that the assembly will not be willing to trust its own ministers\nwith any amount of power really desirable; the danger is, on the\ncontrary, lest they should grant it too ungrudgingly, and too\nindefinite in extent, since the power of the minister is the power of\nthe body who make and who keep him so. It is, however, very likely,\nand is one of the dangers of a controlling assembly, that it may be\nlavish of powers, but afterwards interfere with their exercise; may\ngive power by wholesale, and take it back in detail, by multiplied\nsingle acts of interference in the business of administration. The\nevils arising from this assumption of the actual function of\ngoverning, in lieu of that of criticising and checking those who\ngovern, have been sufficiently dwelt upon in the preceding chapter. No\nsafeguard can in the nature of things be provided against this\nimproper meddling, except a strong and general conviction of its\ninjurious character.\n\nThe other negative defect which may reside in a government, that of\nnot bringing into sufficient exercise the individual faculties, moral,\nintellectual, and active, of the people, has been exhibited generally\nin setting forth the distinctive mischiefs of despotism. As between\none form of popular government and another, the advantage in this\nrespect lies with that which most widely diffuses the exercise of\npublic functions; on the one hand, by excluding fewest from the\nsuffrage; on the other, by opening to all classes of private citizens,\nso far as is consistent with other equally important objects, the\nwidest participation in the details of judicial and administrative\nbusiness; as by jury-trial, admission to municipal offices, and, above\nall, by the utmost possible publicity and liberty of discussion,\nwhereby not merely a few individuals in succession, but the whole\npublic, are made, to a certain extent, participants in the government,\nand sharers in the instruction and mental exercise derived from it.\nThe further illustration of these benefits, as well as of the\nlimitations under which they must be aimed at, will be better deferred\nuntil we come to speak of the details of administration.\n\nThe _positive_ evils and dangers of the representative, as of every\nother form of government, may be reduced to two heads: first, general\nignorance and incapacity, or, to speak more moderately, insufficient\nmental qualifications, in the controlling body; secondly, the danger\nof its being under the influence of interests not identical with the\ngeneral welfare of the community.\n\nThe former of these evils, deficiency in high mental qualifications,\nis one to which it is generally supposed that popular government is\nliable in a greater degree than any other. The energy of a monarch,\nthe steadiness and prudence of an aristocracy, are thought to contrast\nmost favorably with the vacillation and shortsightedness of even the\nmost qualified democracy. These propositions, however, are not by any\nmeans so well founded as they at first sight appear.\n\nCompared with simple monarchy, representative government is in these\nrespects at no disadvantage. Except in a rude age, hereditary\nmonarchy, when it is really such, and not aristocracy in disguise, far\nsurpasses democracy in all the forms of incapacity supposed to be\ncharacteristic of the last. I say, except in a rude age, because in a\nreally rude state of society there is a considerable guaranty for the\nintellectual and active capacities of the sovereign. His personal will\nis constantly encountering obstacles from the willfulness of his\nsubjects, and of powerful individuals among their number. The\ncircumstances of society do not afford him much temptation to mere\nluxurious self-indulgence; mental and bodily activity, especially\npolitical and military, are his principal excitements; and among\nturbulent chiefs and lawless followers he has little authority, and is\nseldom long secure even of his throne, unless he possesses a\nconsiderable amount of personal daring, dexterity, and energy. The\nreason why the average of talent is so high among the Henries and\nEdwards of our history may be read in the tragical fate of the second\nEdward and the second Richard, and the civil wars and disturbances of\nthe reigns of John and his incapable successor. The troubled period of\nthe Reformation also produced several eminent hereditary\nmonarchs--Elizabeth, Henri Quatre, Gustavus Adolphus; but they were\nmostly bred up in adversity, succeeded to the throne by the unexpected\nfailure of nearer heirs, or had to contend with great difficulties in\nthe commencement of their reign. Since European life assumed a settled\naspect, any thing above mediocrity in an hereditary king has become\nextremely rare, while the general average has been even below\nmediocrity, both in talent and in vigor of character. A monarchy\nconstitutionally absolute now only maintains itself in existence\n(except temporarily in the hands of some active-minded usurper)\nthrough the mental qualifications of a permanent bureaucracy. The\nRussian and Austrian governments, and even the French government in\nits normal condition, are oligarchies of officials, of whom the head\nof the state does little more than select the chiefs. I am speaking of\nthe regular course of their administration; for the will of the master\nof course determines many of their particular acts.\n\nThe governments which have been remarkable in history for sustained\nmental ability and vigor in the conduct of affairs have generally been\naristocracies. But they have been, without any exception,\naristocracies of public functionaries. The ruling bodies have been so\nnarrow, that each member, or at least each influential member of the\nbody, was able to make, and did make, public business an active\nprofession, and the principal occupation of his life. The only\naristocracies which have manifested high governing capacities, and\nacted on steady maxims of policy through many generations, are those\nof Rome and Venice. But, at Venice, though the privileged order was\nnumerous, the actual management of affairs was rigidly concentrated in\na small oligarchy within the oligarchy, whose whole lives were devoted\nto the study and conduct of the affairs of the state. The Roman\ngovernment partook more of the character of an open aristocracy like\nour own. But the really governing body, the Senate, was in exclusively\ncomposed of persons who had exercised public functions, and had either\nalready filled, or were looking forward to fill the highest offices of\nthe state, at the peril of a severe responsibility in case of\nincapacity and failure. When once members of the Senate, their lives\nwere pledged to the conduct of public affairs; they were not permitted\neven to leave Italy except in the discharge of some public trust; and\nunless turned out of the Senate by the censors for character or\nconduct deemed disgraceful, they retained their powers and\nresponsibilities to the end of life. In an aristocracy thus\nconstituted, every member felt his personal importance entirely bound\nup with the dignity and estimation of the commonwealth which he\nadministered, and with the part he was able to play in its councils.\nThis dignity and estimation were quite different things from the\nprosperity or happiness of the general body of the citizens, and were\noften wholly incompatible with it. But they were closely linked with\nthe external success and aggrandisement of the state; and it was,\nconsequently, in the pursuit of that object almost exclusively, that\neither the Roman or the Venetian aristocracies manifested the\nsystematically wise collective policy and the great individual\ncapacities for government for which history has deservedly given them\ncredit.\n\nIt thus appears that the only governments, not representative, in\nwhich high political skill and ability have been other than\nexceptional, whether under monarchical or aristocratic forms, have\nbeen essentially bureaucracies. The work of government has been in the\nhands of governors by profession, which is the essence and meaning of\nbureaucracy. Whether the work is done by them because they have been\ntrained to it, or they are trained to it because it is to be done by\nthem, makes a great difference in many respects, but none at all as to\nthe essential character of the rule. Aristocracies, on the other hand,\nlike that of England, in which the class who possessed the power\nderived it merely from their social position, without being specially\ntrained or devoting themselves exclusively to it (and in which,\ntherefore, the power was not exercised directly, but through\nrepresentative institutions oligarchically constituted), have been, in\nrespect to intellectual endowments, much on a par with democracies;\nthat is, they have manifested such qualities in any considerable\ndegree only during the temporary ascendancy which great and popular\ntalents, united with a distinguished position, have given to some one\nman. Themistocles and Pericles, Washington and Jefferson, were not\nmore completely exceptions in their several democracies, and were\nassuredly much more splendid exceptions, than the Chathams and Peels\nof the representative aristocracy of Great Britain, or even the Sullys\nand Colberts of the aristocratic monarchy of France. A great minister,\nin the aristocratic governments of modern Europe, is almost as rare a\nphenomenon as a great king.\n\nThe comparison, therefore, as to the intellectual attributes of a\ngovernment has to be made between a representative democracy and a\nbureaucracy; all other governments may be left out of the account. And\nhere it must be acknowledged that a bureaucratic government has, in\nsome important respects, greatly the advantage. It accumulates\nexperience, acquires well-tried and well-considered traditional\nmaxims, and makes provision for appropriate practical knowledge in\nthose who have the actual conduct of affairs. But it is not equally\nfavorable to individual energy of mind. The disease which afflicts\nbureaucratic governments, and which they usually die of, is routine.\nThey perish by the immutability of their maxims, and, still more, by\nthe universal law that whatever becomes a routine loses its vital\nprinciple, and, having no longer a mind acting within it, goes on\nrevolving mechanically, though the work it is intended to do remains\nundone. A bureaucracy always tends to become a pedantocracy. When the\nbureaucracy is the real government, the spirit of the corps (as with\nthe Jesuits) bears down the individuality of its more distinguished\nmembers. In the profession of government, as in other professions, the\nsole idea of the majority is to do what they have been taught; and it\nrequires a popular government to enable the conceptions of the man of\noriginal genius among them to prevail over the obstructive spirit of\ntrained mediocrity. Only in a popular government (setting apart the\naccident of a highly intelligent despot) could Sir Rowland Hill have\nbeen victorious over the Post-office. A popular government installed\nhim _in_ the Post-office, and made the body, in spite of itself, obey\nthe impulse given by the man who united special knowledge with\nindividual vigor and originality. That the Roman aristocracy escaped\nthis characteristic disease of a bureaucracy was evidently owing to\nits popular element. All special offices, both those which gave a seat\nin the Senate and those which were sought by senators, were conferred\nby popular election. The Russian government is a characteristic\nexemplification of both the good and bad side of bureaucracy: its\nfixed maxims, directed with Roman perseverance to the same\nunflinchingly-pursued ends from age to age; the remarkable skill with\nwhich those ends are generally pursued; the frightful internal\ncorruption, and the permanent organized hostility to improvements from\nwithout, which even the autocratic power of a vigorous-minded emperor\nis seldom or never sufficient to overcome; the patient obstructiveness\nof the body being in the long run more than a match for the fitful\nenergy of one man. The Chinese government, a bureaucracy of Mandarins,\nis, as far as known to us, another apparent example of the same\nqualities and defects.\n\nIn all human affairs, conflicting influences are required to keep one\nanother alive and efficient even for their own proper uses; and the\nexclusive pursuit of one good object, apart from some other which\nshould accompany it, ends not in excess of one and defect of the\nother, but in the decay and loss even of that which has been\nexclusively cared for. Government by trained officials can not do for\na country the things which can be done by a free government, but it\nmight be supposed capable of doing some things which free government\nof itself can not do. We find, however, that an outside element of\nfreedom is necessary to enable it to do effectually or permanently\neven its own business. And so, also, freedom can not produce its best\neffects, and often breaks down altogether, unless means can be found\nof combining it with trained and skilled administration. There could\nnot be a moment's hesitation between representative government, among\na people in any degree ripe for it, and the most perfect imaginable\nbureaucracy. But it is, at the same time, one of the most important\nends of political institutions, to attain as many of the qualities of\nthe one as are consistent with the other; to secure, as far as they\ncan be made compatible, the great advantage of the conduct of affairs\nby skilled persons, bred to it as an intellectual profession, along\nwith that of a general control vested in, and seriously exercised by,\nbodies representative of the entire people. Much would be done towards\nthis end by recognizing the line of separation, discussed in the\npreceding chapter, between the work of government properly so called,\nwhich can only be well performed after special cultivation, and that\nof selecting, watching, and, when needful, controlling the governors,\nwhich in this case, as in all others, properly devolves, not on those\nwho do the work, but on those for whose benefit it ought to be done.\nNo progress at all can be made towards obtaining a skilled democracy,\nunless the democracy are willing that the work which requires skill\nshould be done by those who possess it. A democracy has enough to do\nin providing itself with an amount of mental competency sufficient for\nits own proper work, that of superintendence and check.\n\nHow to obtain and secure this amount is one of the questions to taken\ninto consideration in judging of the proper constitution of a\nrepresentative body. In proportion as its composition fails to secure\nthis amount, the assembly will encroach, by special acts, on the\nprovince of the executive; it will expel a good, or elevate and uphold\na bad ministry; it will connive at, or overlook in them, abuses of\ntrust, will be deluded by their false pretenses, or will withhold\nsupport from those who endeavour to fulfill their trust\nconscientiously; it will countenance or impose a selfish, a capricious\nand impulsive, a short-sighted, ignorant, and prejudiced general\npolicy, foreign and domestic; it will abrogate good laws, or enact bad\nones; let in new evils, or cling with perverse obstinacy to old; it\nwill even, perhaps, under misleading impulses, momentary or permanent,\nemanating from itself or from its constituents, tolerate or connive at\nproceedings which set law aside altogether, in cases where equal\njustice would not be agreeable to popular feeling. Such are among the\ndangers of representative government, arising from a constitution of\nthe representation which does not secure an adequate amount of\nintelligence and knowledge in the representative assembly.\n\nWe next proceed to the evils arising from the prevalence of modes of\naction in the representative body, dictated by sinister interests (to\nemploy the useful phrase introduced by Bentham), that is, interests\nconflicting more or less with the general good of the community.\n\nIt is universally admitted that, of the evils incident to monarchical\nand aristocratic governments, a large proportion arise from this\ncause. The interest of the monarch, or the interest of the\naristocracy, either collective or that of its individual members, is\npromoted, or they themselves think that it will be promoted, by\nconduct opposed to that which the general interest of the community\nrequires. The interest, for example, of the government is to tax\nheavily; that of the community is to be as little taxed as the\nnecessary expenses of good government permit. The interest of the king\nand of the governing aristocracy is to possess and exercise unlimited\npower over the people; to enforce, on their part, complete conformity\nto the will and preferences of the rulers. The interest of the people\nis to have as little control exercised over them in any respect as is\nconsistent with attaining the legitimate ends of government. The\ninterest, or apparent and supposed interest of the king or\naristocracy, is to permit no censure of themselves, at least in any\nform which they may consider either to threaten their power or\nseriously to interfere with their free agency. The interest of the\npeople is that there should be full liberty of censure on every public\nofficer, and on every public act or measure. The interest of a ruling\nclass, whether in an aristocracy or an aristocratic monarchy, is to\nassume to themselves an endless variety of unjust privileges,\nsometimes benefiting their pockets at the expense of the people,\nsometimes merely tending to exalt them above others, or, what is the\nsame thing in different words, to degrade others below themselves. If\nthe people are disaffected, which under such a government they are\nvery likely to be, it is the interest of the king or aristocracy to\nkeep them at a low level of intelligence and education, foment\ndissensions among them, and even prevent them from being too well off,\nlest they should \"wax fat, and kick,\" agreeably to the maxim of\nCardinal Richelieu in his celebrated \"Testament Politique.\" All these\nthings are for the interest of a king or aristocracy, in a purely\nselfish point of view, unless a sufficiently strong counter-interest\nis created by the fear of provoking resistance. All these evils have\nbeen, and many of them still are, produced by the sinister interests\nof kings and aristocracies, where their power is sufficient to raise\nthem above the opinion of the rest of the community; nor is it\nrational to expect, as a consequence of such a position, any other\nconduct.\n\nThese things are superabundantly evident in the case of a monarchy or\nan aristocracy; but it is sometimes rather gratuitously assumed that\nthe same kind of injurious influences do not operate in a democracy.\nLooking at democracy in the way in which it is commonly conceived, as\nthe rule of the numerical majority, it is surely possible that the\nruling power may be under the dominion of sectional or class\ninterests, pointing to conduct different from that which would be\ndictated by impartial regard for the interest of all. Suppose the\nmajority to be whites, the minority negroes, or _vice versa_: is it\nlikely that the majority would allow equal justice to the minority?\nSuppose the majority Catholics, the minority Protestants, or the\nreverse; will there not be the same danger? Or let the majority be\nEnglish, the minority Irish, or the contrary: is there not a great\nprobability of similar evil? In all countries there is a majority of\npoor, a minority who, in contradistinction, may be called rich.\nBetween these two classes, on many questions, there is complete\nopposition of apparent interest. We will suppose the majority\nsufficiently intelligent to be aware that it is not for their\nadvantage to weaken the security of property, and that it would be\nweakened by any act of arbitrary spoliation. But is there not a\nconsiderable danger lest they should throw upon the possessors of what\nis called realized property, and upon the larger incomes, an unfair\nshare, or even the whole, of the burden of taxation, and having done\nso, add to the amount without scruple, expending the proceeds in modes\nsupposed to conduce to the profit and advantage of the laboring class?\nSuppose, again, a minority of skilled laborers, a majority of\nunskilled: the experience of many Trade Unions, unless they are\ngreatly calumniated, justifies the apprehension that equality of\nearnings might be imposed as an obligation, and that piecework, and\nall practices which enable superior industry or abilities to gain a\nsuperior reward, might be put down. Legislative attempts to raise\nwages, limitation of competition in the labor market, taxes or\nrestrictions on machinery, and on improvements of all kinds tending to\ndispense with any of the existing labor--even, perhaps, protection of\nthe home producer against foreign industry--are very natural (I do not\nventure to say whether probable) results of a feeling of class\ninterest in a governing majority of manual laborers.\n\nIt will be said that none of these things are for the _real_ interest\nof the most numerous class: to which I answer, that if the conduct of\nhuman beings was determined by no other interested considerations than\nthose which constitute their \"real\" interest, neither monarchy nor\noligarchy would be such bad governments as they are; for assuredly\nvery strong arguments may be, and often have been, adduced to show\nthat either a king or a governing senate are in much the most enviable\nposition when ruling justly and vigilantly over an active, wealthy,\nenlightened, and high-minded people. But a king only now and then, and\nan oligarchy in no known instance, have taken this exalted view of\ntheir self-interest; and why should we expect a loftier mode of\nthinking from the laboring classes? It is not what their interest is,\nbut what they suppose it to be, that is the important consideration\nwith respect to their conduct; and it is quite conclusive against any\ntheory of government that it assumes the numerical majority to do\nhabitually what is never done, nor expected to be done, save in very\nexceptional cases, by any other depositaries of power--namely, to\ndirect their conduct by their real ultimate interest, in opposition to\ntheir immediate and apparent interest. No one, surely, can doubt that\nmany of the pernicious measures above enumerated, and many others as\nbad, would be for the immediate interest of the general body of\nunskilled laborers. It is quite possible that they would be for the\nselfish interest of the whole existing generation of the class. The\nrelaxation of industry and activity, and diminished encouragement to\nsaving which would be their ultimate consequence, might perhaps be\nlittle felt by the class of unskilled laborers in the space of a\nsingle lifetime. Some of the most fatal changes in human affairs have\nbeen, as to their more manifest immediate effects, beneficial. The\nestablishment of the despotism of the Caesars was a great benefit to\nthe entire generation in which it took place. It put a stop to civil\nwar, abated a vast amount of malversation and tyranny by praetors and\nproconsuls; it fostered many of the graces of life, and intellectual\ncultivation in all departments not political; it produced monuments of\nliterary genius dazzling to the imaginations of shallow readers of\nhistory, who do not reflect that the men to whom the despotism of\nAugustus (as well as of Lorenzo de' Medici and of Louis XIV.) owes its\nbrilliancy were all formed in the generation preceding. The\naccumulated riches, and the mental energy and activity produced by\ncenturies of freedom, remained for the benefit of the first generation\nof slaves. Yet this was the commencement of a _regime_ by whose\ngradual operation all the civilization which had been gained\ninsensibly faded away, until the empire, which had conquered and\nembraced the world in its grasp so completely lost even its military\nefficiency that invaders whom three or four legions had always\nsufficed to coerce were able to overrun and occupy nearly the whole of\nits vast territory. The fresh impulse given by Christianity came but\njust in time to save arts and letters from perishing, and the human\nrace from sinking back into perhaps endless night.\n\nWhen we talk of the interest of a body of men, or even of an\nindividual man, as a principle determining their actions, the question\nwhat would be considered their interest by an unprejudiced observer is\none of the least important parts of the whole matter. As Coleridge\nobserves, the man makes the motive, not the motive the man. What it is\nthe man's interest to do or refrain from depends less on any outward\ncircumstances than upon what sort of man he is. If you wish to know\nwhat is practically a man's interest, you must know the cast of his\nhabitual feelings and thoughts. Every body has two kinds of\ninterests--interests which he cares for and interests which he does\nnot care for. Every body has selfish and unselfish interests, and a\nselfish man has cultivated the habit of caring for the former and not\ncaring for the latter. Every one has present and distant interests,\nand the improvident man is he who cares for the present interests and\ndoes not care for the distant. It matters little that on any correct\ncalculation the latter may be the more considerable, if the habits of\nhis mind lead him to fix his thoughts and wishes solely on the former.\nIt would be vain to attempt to persuade a man who beats his wife and\nill-treats his children that he would be happier if he lived in love\nand kindness with them. He would be happier if he were the kind of\nperson who _could_ so live; but he is not, and it is probably too late\nfor him to become that kind of person. Being what he is, the\ngratification of his love of domineering and the indulgence of his\nferocious temper are to his perceptions a greater good to himself than\nhe would be capable of deriving from the pleasure and affection of\nthose dependent on him. He has no pleasure in their pleasure, and does\nnot care for their affection. His neighbor, who does, is probably a\nhappier man than he; but could he be persuaded of this, the persuasion\nwould, most likely, only still further exasperate his malignity or his\nirritability. On the average, a person who cares for other people, for\nhis country, or for mankind, is a happier man than one who does not;\nbut of what use is it to preach this doctrine to a man who cares for\nnothing but his own ease or his own pocket? He can not care for other\npeople if he would. It is like preaching to the worm who crawls on the\nground how much better it would be for him if he were an eagle.\n\nNow it is a universally observed fact that the two evil dispositions\nin question, the disposition to prefer a man's selfish interests to\nthose which he shares with other people, and his immediate and direct\ninterests to those which are indirect and remote, are characteristics\nmost especially called forth and fostered by the possession of power.\nThe moment a man, or a class of men, find themselves with power in\ntheir hands, the man's individual interest, or the class's separate\ninterest, acquires an entirely new degree of importance in their eyes.\nFinding themselves worshipped by others, they become worshippers of\nthemselves, and think themselves entitled to be counted at a hundred\ntimes the value of other people, while the facility they acquire of\ndoing as they like without regard to consequences insensibly weakens\nthe habits which make men look forward even to such consequences as\naffect themselves. This is the meaning of the universal tradition,\ngrounded on universal experience, of men's being corrupted by power.\nEvery one knows how absurd it would be to infer from what a man is or\ndoes when in a private station, that he will be and do exactly the\nlike when a despot on a throne; where the bad parts of his human\nnature, instead of being restrained and kept in subordination by every\ncircumstance of his life and by every person surrounding him, are\ncourted by all persons, and ministered to by all circumstances. It\nwould be quite as absurd to entertain a similar expectation in regard\nto a class of men; the Demos, or any other. Let them be ever so modest\nand amenable to reason while there is a power over them stronger than\nthey, we ought to expect a total change in this respect when they\nthemselves become the strongest power.\n\nGovernments must be made for human beings as they are, or as they are\ncapable of speedily becoming; and in any state of cultivation which\nmankind, or any class among them, have yet attained, or are likely\nsoon to attain, the interests by which they will be led, when they are\nthinking only of self-interest, will be almost exclusively those which\nare obvious at first sight, and which operate on their present\ncondition. It is only a disinterested regard for others, and\nespecially for what comes after them, for the idea of posterity, of\ntheir country, or of mankind, whether grounded on sympathy or on a\nconscientious feeling, which ever directs the minds and purposes of\nclasses or bodies of men towards distant or unobvious interests; and\nit can not be maintained that any form of government would be rational\nwhich required as a condition that these exalted principles of action\nshould be the guiding and master motives in the conduct of average\nhuman beings. A certain amount of conscience and of disinterested\npublic spirit may fairly be calculated on in the citizens of any\ncommunity ripe for representative government. But it would be\nridiculous to expect such a degree of it, combined with such\nintellectual discernment, as would be proof against any plausible\nfallacy tending to make that which was for their class interest appear\nthe dictate of justice and of the general good. We all know what\nspecious fallacies may be urged in defense of every act of injustice\nyet proposed for the imaginary benefit of the mass. We know how many,\nnot otherwise fools or bad men, have thought it justifiable to\nrepudiate the national debt. We know how many, not destitute of\nability and of considerable popular influence, think it fair to throw\nthe whole burden of taxation upon savings, under the name of realized\nproperty, allowing those whose progenitors and themselves have always\nspent all they received, to remain, as a reward for such exemplary\nconduct, wholly untaxed. We know what powerful arguments, the more\ndangerous because there is a portion of truth in them, may be brought\nagainst all inheritance, against the power of bequest, against every\nadvantage which one person seems to have over another. We know how\neasily the uselessness of almost every branch of knowledge may be\nproved to the complete satisfaction of those who do not possess it.\nHow many, not altogether stupid men, think the scientific study of\nlanguages useless, think ancient literature useless, all erudition\nuseless, logic and metaphysics useless, poetry and the fine arts idle\nand frivolous, political economy purely mischievous? Even history has\nbeen pronounced useless and mischievous by able men. Nothing but that\nacquaintance with external nature, empirically acquired, which serves\ndirectly for the production of objects necessary to existence or\nagreeable to the senses, would get its utility recognized if people\nhad the least encouragement to disbelieve it. Is it reasonable to\nthink that even much more cultivated minds than those of the numerical\nmajority can be expected to be, will have so delicate a conscience,\nand so just an appreciation of what is against their own apparent\ninterest, that they will reject these and the innumerable other\nfallacies which will press in upon them from all quarters as soon as\nthey come into power, to induce them to follow their own selfish\ninclinations and short-sighted notions of their own good, in\nopposition to justice, at the expense of all other classes and of\nposterity?\n\nOne of the greatest dangers, therefore, of democracy, as of all other\nforms of government, lies in the sinister interest of the holders of\npower: it is the danger of class legislation, of government intended\nfor (whether really effecting it or not) the immediate benefit of the\ndominant class, to the lasting detriment of the whole. And one of the\nmost important questions demanding consideration in determining the\nbest constitution of a representative government is how to provide\nefficacious securities against this evil.\n\nIf we consider as a class, politically speaking, any number of persons\nwho have the same sinister interest--that is, whose direct and\napparent interest points towards the same description of bad\nmeasures--the desirable object would be that no class, and no\ncombination of classes likely to combine, shall be able to exercise a\npreponderant influence in the government. A modern community, not\ndivided within itself by strong antipathies of race, language, or\nnationality, may be considered as in the main divisible into two\nsections, which, in spite of partial variations, correspond on the\nwhole with two divergent directions of apparent interest. Let us call\nthem (in brief general terms) laborers on the one hand, employers of\nlabor on the other; including, however, along with employers of labor\nnot only retired capitalists and the possessors of inherited wealth,\nbut all that highly paid description of laborers (such as the\nprofessions) whose education and way of life assimilate them with the\nrich, and whose prospect and ambition it is to raise themselves into\nthat class. With the laborers, on the other hand, may be ranked those\nsmaller employers of labor who by interests, habits, and educational\nimpressions are assimilated in wishes, tastes, and objects to the\nlaboring classes, comprehending a large proportion of petty tradesmen.\nIn a state of society thus composed, if the representative system\ncould be made ideally perfect, and if it were possible to maintain it\nin that state, its organization must be such that these two classes,\nmanual laborers and their affinities on one side, employers of labor\nand their affinities on the other, should be, in the arrangement of\nthe representative system, equally balanced, each influencing about an\nequal number of votes in Parliament; since, assuming that the majority\nof each class, in any difference between them, would be mainly\ngoverned by their class interests, there would be a minority of each\nin whom that consideration would be subordinate to reason, justice,\nand the good of the whole; and this minority of either, joining with\nthe whole of the other, would turn the scale against any demands of\ntheir own majority which were not such as ought to prevail. The reason\nwhy, in any tolerable constituted society, justice and the general\ninterest mostly in the end carry their point, is that the separate and\nselfish interests of mankind are almost always divided; some are\ninterested in what is wrong, but some, also, have their private\ninterest on the side of what is right; and those who are governed by\nhigher considerations, though too few and weak to prevail alone,\nusually, after sufficient discussion and agitation, become strong\nenough to turn the balance in favor of the body of private interests\nwhich is on the same side with them. The representative system ought\nto be so constituted as to maintain this state of things; it ought not\nto allow any of the various sectional interests to be so powerful as\nto be capable of prevailing against truth and justice, and the other\nsectional interests combined. There ought always to be such a balance\npreserved among personal interests as may render any one of them\ndependent for its successes on carrying with it at least a large\nproportion of those who act on higher motives, and more comprehensive\nand distant views.\n\n\n\nChapter VII--Of True and False Democracy; Representation of All, and Representation of the Majority only.\n\n\nIt has been seen that the dangers incident to a representative\ndemocracy are of two kinds: danger of a low grade of intelligence in\nthe representative body, and in the popular opinion which controls it;\nand danger of class legislation on the part of the numerical majority,\nthese being all composed of the same class. We have next to consider\nhow far it is possible so to organize the democracy as, without\ninterfering materially with the characteristic benefits of democratic\ngovernment, to do away with these two great evils, or at least to\nabate them in the utmost degree attainable by human contrivance.\n\nThe common mode of attempting this is by limiting the democratic\ncharacter of the representation through a more or less restricted\nsuffrage. But there is a previous consideration which, duly kept in\nview, considerably modifies the circumstances which are supposed to\nrender such a restriction necessary. A completely equal democracy, in\na nation in which a single class composes the numerical majority, can\nnot be divested of certain evils; but those evils are greatly\naggravated by the fact that the democracies which at present exist are\nnot equal, but systematically unequal in favor of the predominant\nclass. Two very different ideas are usually confounded under the name\ndemocracy. The pure idea of democracy, according to its definition, is\nthe government of the whole people by the whole people, equally\nrepresented. Democracy, as commonly conceived and hitherto practiced,\nis the government of the whole people by a mere majority of the people\nexclusively represented. The former is synonymous with the equality of\nall citizens; the latter, strangely confounded with it, is a\ngovernment of privilege in favor of the numerical majority, who alone\npossess practically any voice in the state. This is the inevitable\nconsequence of the manner in which the votes are now taken, to the\ncomplete disfranchisement of minorities.\n\nThe confusion of ideas here is great, but it is so easily cleared up\nthat one would suppose the slightest indication would be sufficient to\nplace the matter in its true light before any mind of average\nintelligence. It would be so but for the power of habit; owing to\nwhich, the simplest idea, if unfamiliar, has as great difficulty in\nmaking its way to the mind as a far more complicated one. That the\nminority must yield to the majority, the smaller number to the\ngreater, is a familiar idea; and accordingly, men think there is no\nnecessity for using their minds any further, and it does not occur to\nthem that there is any medium between allowing the smaller number to\nbe equally powerful with the greater, and blotting out the smaller\nnumber altogether. In a representative body actually deliberating, the\nminority must of course be overruled; and in an equal democracy (since\nthe opinions of the constituents, when they insist on them, determine\nthose of the representative body), the majority of the people, through\ntheir representatives, will outvote and prevail over the minority and\ntheir representatives. But does it follow that the minority should\nhave no representatives at all? Because the majority ought to prevail\nover the minority, must the majority have all the votes, the minority\nnone? Is it necessary that the minority should not even be heard?\nNothing but habit and old association can reconcile any reasonable\nbeing to the needless injustice. In a really equal democracy, every or\nany section would be represented, not disproportionately, but\nproportionately. A majority of the electors would always have a\nmajority of the representatives, but a minority of the electors would\nalways have a minority of the representatives. Man for man, they would\nbe as fully represented as the majority. Unless they are, there is not\nequal government, but a government of inequality and privilege: one\npart of the people rule over the rest: there is a part whose fair and\nequal share of influence in the representation is withheld from them,\ncontrary to all just government, but, above all, contrary to the\nprinciple of democracy, which professes equality as its very root and\nfoundation.\n\nThe injustice and violation of principle are not less flagrant because\nthose who suffer by them are a minority, for there is not equal\nsuffrage where every single individual does not count for as much as\nany other single individual in the community. But it is not only a\nminority who suffer. Democracy, thus constituted, does not even attain\nits ostensible object, that of giving the powers of government in all\ncases to the numerical majority. It does something very different; it\ngives them to a majority of the majority, who may be, and often are,\nbut a minority of the whole. All principles are most effectually\ntested by extreme cases. Suppose, then, that, in a country governed by\nequal and universal suffrage, there is a contested election in every\nconstituency, and every election is carried by a small majority. The\nParliament thus brought together represents little more than a bare\nmajority of the people. This Parliament proceeds to legislate, and\nadopts important measures by a bare majority of itself. What guaranty\nis there that these measures accord with the wishes of a majority of\nthe people? Nearly half the electors, having been outvoted at the\nhustings, have had no influence at all in the decision; and the whole\nof these may be, a majority of them probably are, hostile to the\nmeasures, having voted against those by whom they have been carried.\nOf the remaining electors, nearly half have chosen representatives\nwho, by supposition, have voted against the measures. It is possible,\ntherefore, and even probable, that the opinion which has prevailed was\nagreeable only to a minority of the nation, though a majority of that\nportion of it whom the institutions of the country have erected into a\nruling class. If democracy means the certain ascendancy of the\nmajority, there are no means of insuring that, but by allowing every\nindividual figure to tell equally in the summing up. Any minority left\nout, either purposely or by the play of the machinery, gives the power\nnot to the majority, but to a minority in some other part of the\nscale.\n\nThe only answer which can possibly be made to this reasoning is, that\nas different opinions predominate in different localities, the opinion\nwhich is in a minority in some places has a majority in others, and on\nthe whole every opinion which exists in the constituencies obtains its\nfair share of voices in the representation. And this is roughly true\nin the present state of the constituency; if it were not, the\ndiscordance of the House with the general sentiment of the country\nwould soon become evident. But it would be no longer true if the\npresent constituency were much enlarged, still less if made\nco-extensive with the whole population; for in that case the majority\nin every locality would consist of manual laborers; and when there was\nany question pending on which these classes were at issue with the\nrest of the community, no other class could succeed in getting\nrepresented any where. Even now, is it not a great grievance that in\nevery Parliament a very numerous portion of the electors, willing and\nanxious to be represented, have no member in the House for whom they\nhave voted? Is it just that every elector of Marylebone is obliged to\nbe represented by two nominees of the vestries, every elector of\nFinsbury or Lambeth by those (as is generally believed) of the\npublicans? The constituencies to which most of the highly educated and\npublic spirited persons in the country belong, those of the large\ntowns, are now, in great part, either unrepresented or misrepresented.\nThe electors who are on a different side in party politics from the\nlocal majority are unrepresented. Of those who are on the same side, a\nlarge proportion are misrepresented; having been obliged to accept the\nman who had the greatest number of supporters in their political\nparty, though his opinions may differ from theirs on every other\npoint. The state of things is, in some respects, even worse than if\nthe minority were not allowed to vote at all; for then, at least, the\nmajority might have a member who would represent their own best mind;\nwhile now, the necessity of not dividing the party, for fear of\nletting in its opponents, induces all to vote either for the first\nperson who presents himself wearing their colors, or for the one\nbrought forward by their local leaders; and these, if we pay them the\ncompliment, which they very seldom deserve, of supposing their choice\nto be unbiassed by their personal interests, are compelled, that they\nmay be sure of mustering their whole strength, to bring forward a\ncandidate whom none of the party will strongly object to--that is, a\nman without any distinctive peculiarity, any known opinions except the\nshibboleth of the party. This is strikingly exemplified in the United\nStates; where, at the election of President, the strongest party never\ndares put forward any of its strongest men, because every one of\nthese, from the mere fact that he has been long in the public eye, has\nmade himself objectionable to some portion or other of the party, and\nis therefore not so sure a card for rallying all their votes as a\nperson who has never been heard of by the public at all until he is\nproduced as the candidate. Thus, the man who is chosen, even by the\nstrongest party, represents perhaps the real wishes only of the narrow\nmargin by which that party outnumbers the other. Any section whose\nsupport is necessary to success possesses a veto on the candidate. Any\nsection which holds out more obstinately than the rest can compel all\nthe others to adopt its nominee; and this superior pertinacity is\nunhappily more likely to be found among those who are holding out for\ntheir own interest than for that of the public. Speaking generally,\nthe choice of the majority is determined by that portion of the body\nwho are the most timid, the most narrow-minded and prejudiced, or who\ncling most tenaciously to the exclusive class-interest; and the\nelectoral rights of the minority, while useless for the purposes for\nwhich votes are given, serve only for compelling the majority to\naccept the candidate of the weakest or worst portion of themselves.\n\nThat, while recognizing these evils, many should consider them as the\nnecessary price paid for a free government, is in no way surprising;\nit was the opinion of all the friends of freedom up to a recent\nperiod. But the habit of passing them over as irremediable has become\nso inveterate, that many persons seem to have lost the capacity of\nlooking at them as things which they would be glad to remedy if they\ncould. From despairing of a cure, there is too often but one step to\ndenying the disease; and from this follows dislike to having a remedy\nproposed, as if the proposer were creating a mischief instead of\noffering relief from one. People are so inured to the evils that they\nfeel as if it were unreasonable, if not wrong, to complain of them.\nYet, avoidable or not, he must be a purblind lover of liberty on whose\nmind they do not weigh; who would not rejoice at the discovery that\nthey could be dispensed with. Now, nothing is more certain than that\nthe virtual blotting out of the minority is no necessary or natural\nconsequence of freedom; that, far from having any connection with\ndemocracy, it is diametrically opposed to the first principle of\ndemocracy, representation in proportion to numbers. It is an essential\npart of democracy that minorities should be adequately represented. No\nreal democracy, nothing but a false show of democracy, is possible\nwithout it.\n\nThose who have seen and felt, in some degree, the force of these\nconsiderations, have proposed various expedients by which the evil may\nbe, in a greater or less degree, mitigated. Lord John Russell, in one\nof his Reform Bills, introduced a provision that certain\nconstituencies should return three members, and that in these each\nelector should be allowed to vote only for two; and Mr. Disraeli, in\nthe recent debates, revived the memory of the fact by reproaching him\nfor it, being of opinion, apparently, that it befits a Conservative\nstatesman to regard only means, and to disown scornfully all\nfellow-feeling with any one who is betrayed, even once, into thinking\nof ends. [3] Others have proposed that each elector should be\nallowed to vote only for one. By either of these plans, a minority\nequalling or exceeding a third of the local constituency, would be\nable, if it attempted no more, to return one out of three members. The\nsame result might be attained in a still better way if, as proposed in\nan able pamphlet by Mr. James Garth Marshall, the elector retained his\nthree votes, but was at liberty to bestow them all upon the same\ncandidate. These schemes, though infinitely better than none at all,\nare yet but makeshifts, and attain the end in a very imperfect manner,\nsince all local minorities of less than a third, and all minorities,\nhowever numerous, which are made up from several constituencies, would\nremain unrepresented. It is much to be lamented, however, that none of\nthese plans have been carried into effect, as any of them would have\nrecognized the right principle, and prepared the way for its more\ncomplete application. But real equality of representation is not\nobtained unless any set of electors amounting to the average number of\na constituency, wherever in the country they happen to reside, have\nthe power of combining with one another to return a representative.\nThis degree of perfection in representation appeared impracticable\nuntil a man of great capacity, fitted alike for large general views\nand for the contrivance of practical details--Mr. Thomas Hare--had\nproved its possibility by drawing up a scheme for its accomplishment,\nembodied in a Draft of an Act of Parliament; a scheme which has the\nalmost unparalleled merit of carrying out a great principle of\ngovernment in a manner approaching to ideal perfection as regards the\nspecial object in view, while it attains incidentally several other\nends of scarcely inferior importance.\n\nAccording to this plan, the unit of representation, the quota of\nelectors who would be entitled to have a member to themselves, would\nbe ascertained by the ordinary process of taking averages, the number\nof voters being divided by the number of seats in the House; and every\ncandidate who obtained that quota would be returned, from however\ngreat a number of local constituencies it might be gathered. The votes\nwould, as at present, be given locally; but any elector would be at\nliberty to vote for any candidate, in whatever part of the country he\nmight offer himself. Those electors, therefore, who did not wish to be\nrepresented by any of the local candidates, might aid by their vote in\nthe return of the person they liked best among all those throughout\nthe country who had expressed a willingness to be chosen. This would\nso far give reality to the electoral rights of the otherwise virtually\ndisfranchised minority. But it is important that not those alone who\nrefuse to vote for any of the local candidates, but those also who\nvote for one of them and are defeated, should be enabled to find\nelsewhere the representation which they have not succeeded in\nobtaining in their own district. It is therefore provided that an\nelector may deliver a voting paper containing other names in addition\nto the one which stands foremost in his preference. His vote would\nonly be counted for one candidate; but if the object of his first\nchoice failed to be returned, from not having obtained the quota, his\nsecond perhaps might be more fortunate. He may extend his list to a\ngreater number in the order of his preference, so that if the names\nwhich stand near the top of the list either can not make up the quota,\nor are able to make it up without his vote, the vote may still be used\nfor some one whom it may assist in returning. To obtain the full\nnumber of members required to complete the House, as well as to\nprevent very popular candidates from engrossing nearly all the\nsuffrages, it is necessary, however many votes a candidate may obtain,\nthat no more of them than the quota should be counted for his return;\nthe remainder of those who voted for him would have their votes\ncounted for the next person on their respective lists who needed them,\nand could by their aid complete the quota. To determine which of a\ncandidate's votes should be used for his return, and which set free\nfor others, several methods are proposed, into which we shall not here\nenter. He would, of course, retain the votes of all those who would\nnot otherwise be represented; and for the remainder, drawing lots, in\ndefault of better, would be an unobjectionable expedient. The voting\npapers would be conveyed to a central office, where the votes would be\ncounted, the number of first, second, third, and other votes given for\neach candidate ascertained, and the quota would be allotted to every\none who could make it up, until the number of the House was complete;\nfirst votes being preferred to second, second to third, and so forth.\nThe voting papers, and all the elements of the calculation, would be\nplaced in public repositories, accessible to all whom they concerned;\nand if any one who had obtained the quota was not duly returned, it\nwould be in his power easily to prove it.\n\nThese are the main provisions of the scheme. For a more minute\nknowledge of its very simple machinery, I must refer to Mr. Hare's\n\"Treatise on the Election of Representatives\" (a small volume\nPublished in 1859), and to a pamphlet by Mr. Henry Fawcett, published\nin 1860, and entitled \"Mr. Hare's Reform Bill simplified and\nexplained.\" This last is a very clear and concise exposition of the\nplan, reduced to its simplest elements by the omission of some of Mr.\nHare's original provisions, which, though in themselves beneficial,\nwe're thought to take more from the simplicity of the scheme than they\nadded to its practical advantages. The more these works are studied,\nthe stronger, I venture to predict, will be the impression of the\nperfect feasibility of the scheme and its transcendant advantages.\nSuch and so numerous are these, that, in my conviction, they place Mr.\nHare's plan among the very greatest improvements yet made in the\ntheory and practice of government.\n\nIn the first place, it secures a representation, in proportion to\nnumbers, of every division of the electoral body: not two great\nparties alone, with perhaps a few large sectional minorities in\nparticular places, but every minority in the whole nation, consisting\nof a sufficiently large number to be, on principles of equal justice,\nentitled to a representative. Secondly, no elector would, as at\npresent, be nominally represented by some one whom he had not chosen.\nEvery member of the House would be the representative of a unanimous\nconstituency. He would represent a thousand electors, or two thousand,\nor five thousand, or ten thousand, as the quota might be, every one of\nwhom would have not only voted for him, but selected him from the\nwhole country; not merely from the assortment of two or three perhaps\nrotten oranges, which may be the only choice offered to him in his\nlocal market. Under this relation the tie between the elector and the\nrepresentative would be of a strength and a value of which at present\nwe have no experience. Every one of the electors would be personally\nidentified with his representative, and the representative with his\nconstituents. Every elector who voted for him would have done so\neither because he is the person, in the whole list of candidates for\nParliament, who best expresses the voter's own opinions, or because he\nis one of those whose abilities and character the voter most respects,\nand whom he most willingly trusts to think for him. The member would\nrepresent persons, not the mere bricks and mortar of the town--the\nvoters themselves, not a few vestrymen or parish notabilities merely.\nAll, however, that is worth preserving in the representation of places\nwould be preserved. Though the Parliament of the nation ought to have\nas little as possible to do with purely local affairs, yet, while it\nhas to do with them, there ought to be members specially commissioned\nto look after the interests of every important locality; and these\nthere would still be. In every locality which contained many more\nvoters than the quota (and there probably ought to be no local\nconsitituency which does not), the majority would generally prefer to\nbe represented by one of themselves; by a person of local knowledge,\nand residing in the locality, if there is any such person to be found\namong the candidates, who is otherwise eligible as their\nrepresentative. It would be the minorities chiefly, who, being unable\nto return the local member, would look out elsewhere for a candidate\nlikely to obtain other votes in addition to their own.\n\nOf all modes in which a national representation can possibly be\nconstituted, this one affords the best security for the intellectual\nqualifications desirable in the representatives. At present, by\nuniversal admission, it is becoming more and more difficult for any\none who has only talents and character to gain admission into the\nHouse of Commons. The only persons who can get elected are those who\npossess local influence, or make their way by lavish expenditure, or\nwho, on the invitation of three or four tradesmen or attorneys, are\nsent down by one of the two great parties from their London clubs, as\nmen whose votes the party can depend on under all circumstances. On\nMr. Hare's system, those who did not like the local candidates would\nfill up their voting papers by a selection from all the persons of\nnational reputation on the list of candidates with whose general\npolitical principles they were in sympathy. Almost every person,\ntherefore, who had made himself in any way honorably distinguished,\nthough devoid of local influence, and having sworn allegiance to no\npolitical party, would have a fair chance of making up the quota, and\nwith this encouragement such persons might be expected to offer\nthemselves in numbers hitherto undreamed of. Hundreds of able men of\nindependent thought, who would have no chance whatever of being chosen\nby the majority of any existing constituency, have by their writings,\nor their exertions in some field of public usefulness, made themselves\nknown and approved by a few persons in almost every district of the\nkingdom; and if every vote that would be given for them in every place\ncould be counted for their election, they might be able to complete\nthe number of the quota. In no other way which it seems possible to\nsuggest would Parliament be so certain of containing the very _elite_\nof the country.\n\nAnd it is not solely through the votes of minorities that this system\nof election would raise the intellectual standard of the House of\nCommons. Majorities would be compelled to look out for members of a\nmuch higher calibre. When the individuals composing the majority would\nno longer be reduced to Hobson's choice, of either voting for the\nperson brought forward by their local leaders, or not voting at all;\nwhen the nominee of the leaders would have to encounter the\ncompetition not solely of the candidate of the minority, but of all\nthe men of established reputation in the country who were willing to\nserve, it would be impossible any longer to foist upon the electors\nthe first person who presents himself with the catchwords of the party\nin his mouth, and three or four thousand pounds in his pocket. The\nmajority would insist on having a candidate worthy of their choice, or\nthey would carry their votes somewhere else, and the minority would\nprevail. The slavery of the majority to the least estimable portion of\ntheir numbers would be at an end; the very best and most capable of\nthe local notabilities would be put forward by preference; if\npossible, such as were known in some advantageous way beyond the\nlocality, that their local strength might have a chance of being\nfortified by stray votes from elsewhere. Constituencies would become\ncompetitors for the best candidates, and would vie with one another in\nselecting from among the men of local knowledge and connections those\nwho were most distinguished in every other respect.\n\nThe natural tendency of representative government, as of modern\ncivilization, is towards collective mediocrity: and this tendency is\nincreased by all reductions and extensions of the franchise, their\neffect being to place the principal power in the hands of classes more\nand more below the highest level of instruction in the community. But,\nthough the superior intellects and characters will necessarily be\noutnumbered, it makes a great difference whether or not they are\nheard. In the false democracy which, instead of giving representation\nto all, gives it only to the local majorities, the voice of the\ninstructed minority may have no organs at all in the representative\nbody. It is an admitted fact that in the American democracy, which is\nconstructed on this faulty model, the highly-cultivated members of the\ncommunity, except such of them as are willing to sacrifice their own\nopinions and modes of judgment, and become the servile mouthpieces of\ntheir inferiors in knowledge, do not even offer themselves for\nCongress or the State Legislatures, so certain is it that they would\nhave no chance of being returned. Had a plan like Mr. Hare's by good\nfortune suggested itself to the enlightened and disinterested founders\nof the American Republic, the federal and state assemblies would have\ncontained many of these distinguished men, and democracy would have\nbeen spared its greatest reproach and one of its most formidable\nevils. Against this evil the system of personal representation\nproposed by Mr. Hare is almost a specific. The minority of instructed\nminds scattered through the local constituencies would unite to return\na number, proportioned to their own numbers, of the very ablest men\nthe country contains. They would be under the strongest inducement to\nchoose such men, since in no other mode could they make their small\nnumerical strength tell for any thing considerable. The\nrepresentatives of the majority, besides that they would themselves be\nimproved in quality by the operation of the system, would no longer\nhave the whole field to themselves. They would indeed outnumber the\nothers, as much as the one class of electors outnumbers the other in\nthe country: they could always outvote them, but they would speak and\nvote in their presence, and subject to their criticism. When any\ndifference arose, they would have to meet the arguments of the\ninstructed few by reasons, at least apparently, as cogent; and since\nthey could not, as those do who are speaking to persons already\nunanimous, simply assume that they are in the right, it would\noccasionally happen to them to become convinced that they were in the\nwrong. As they would in general be well-meaning (for thus much may\nreasonably be expected from a fairly-chosen national representation),\ntheir own minds would be insensibly raised by the influence of the\nminds with which they were in contact, or even in conflict. The\nchampions of unpopular doctrines would not put forth their arguments\nmerely in books and periodicals, read only by their own side; the\nopposing ranks would meet face to face and hand to hand, and there\nwould be a fair comparison of their intellectual strength in the\npresence of the country. It would then be found out whether the\nopinion which prevailed by counting votes would also prevail if the\nvotes were weighed as well as counted. The multitude have often a true\ninstinct for distinguishing an able man when he has the means of\ndisplaying his ability in a fair field before them. If such a man\nfails to obtain any portion of his just weight, it is through\ninstitutions or usages which keep him out of sight. In the old\ndemocracies there were no means of keeping out of sight any able man:\nthe bema was open to him; he needed nobody's consent to become a\npublic adviser. It is not so in a representative government; and the\nbest friends of representative democracy can hardly be without\nmisgivings that the Themistocles or Demosthenes whose councils would\nhave saved the nation, might be unable during his whole life ever to\nobtain a seat. But if the presence in the representative assembly can\nbe insured of even a few of the first minds in the country, though the\nremainder consist only of average minds, the influence of these\nleading spirits is sure to make itself insensibly felt in the general\ndeliberations, even though they be known to be, in many respects,\nopposed to the tone of popular opinion and feeling. I am unable to\nconceive any mode by which the presence of such minds can be so\npositively insured as by that proposed by Mr. Hare.\n\nThis portion of the assembly would also be the appropriate organ of a\ngreat social function, for which there is no provision in any existing\ndemocracy, but which in no government can remain permanently\nunfulfilled without condemning that government to infallible\ndegeneracy and decay. This may be called the function of Antagonism.\nIn every government there is some power stronger than all the rest;\nand the power which is strongest tends perpetually to become the sole\npower. Partly by intention and partly unconsciously, it is ever\nstriving to make all other things bend to itself, and is not content\nwhile there is any thing which makes permanent head against it, any\ninfluence not in agreement with its spirit. Yet, if it succeeds in\nsuppressing all rival influences, and moulding every thing after its\nown model, improvement, in that country, is at an end, and decline\ncommences. Human improvement is a product of many factors, and no\npower ever yet constituted among mankind includes them all: even the\nmost beneficent power only contains in itself some of the requisites\nof good, and the remainder, if progress is to continue, must be\nderived from some other source. No community has ever long continued\nprogressive but while a conflict was going on between the strongest\npower in the community and some rival power; between the spiritual and\ntemporal authorities; the military or territorial and the industrious\nclasses; the king and the people; the orthodox and religious\nreformers. When the victory on either side was so complete as to put\nan end to the strife, and no other conflict took its place, first\nstagnation followed, and then decay. The ascendancy of the numerical\nmajority is less unjust, and, on the whole, less mischievous than many\nothers, but it is attended with the very same kind of dangers, and\neven more certainly; for when the government is in the hands of One or\na Few, the Many are always existent as a rival power, which may not be\nstrong enough ever to control the other, but whose opinion and\nsentiment are a moral, and even a social support to all who, either\nfrom conviction or contrariety of interest, are opposed to any of the\ntendencies of the ruling authority. But when the democracy is supreme,\nthere is no One or Few strong enough for dissentient opinions and\ninjured or menaced interests to lean upon. The great difficulty of\ndemocratic government has hitherto seemed to be, how to provide in a\ndemocratic society--what circumstances have provided hitherto in all\nthe societies which have maintained themselves ahead of others--a\nsocial support, a _point d'appui_, for individual resistance to the\ntendencies of the ruling power; a protection, a rallying-point, for\nopinions and interests which the ascendant public opinion views with\ndisfavor. For want of such a _point d'appui_, the older societies, and\nall but a few modern ones, either fell into dissolution or became\nstationary (which means slow deterioration) through the exclusive\npredominance of a part only of the conditions of social and mental\nwell-being.\n\nNow, this great want the system of Personal Representation is fitted\nto supply in the most perfect manner which the circumstances of modern\nsociety admit of. The only quarter in which to look for a supplement,\nor completing corrective to the instincts of a democratic majority, is\nthe instructed minority; but, in the ordinary mode of constituting\ndemocracy, this minority has no organ: Mr. Hare's system provides one.\nThe representatives who would be returned to Parliament by the\naggregate of minorities would afford that organ in its greatest\nperfection. A separate organization of the instructed classes, even if\npracticable, would be invidious, and could only escape from being\noffensive by being totally without influence. But if the _elite_ of\nthese classes formed part of the Parliament, by the same title as any\nother of its members--by representing the same number of citizens, the\nsame numerical fraction of the national will--their presence could\ngive umbrage to nobody, while they would be in the position of highest\nvantage, both for making their opinions and councils heard on all\nimportant subjects, and for taking an active part in public business.\nTheir abilities would probably draw to them more than their numerical\nshare of the actual administration of government; as the Athenians did\nnot confide responsible public functions to Cleon or Hyperbolus (the\nemployment of Cleon at Pylos and Amphipolis was purely exceptional),\nbut Nicias, and Theramenes, and Alcibiades were in constant employment\nboth at home and abroad, though known to sympathize more with\noligarchy than with democracy. The instructed minority would, in the\nactual voting, count only for their numbers, but as a moral power they\nwould count for much more, in virtue of their knowledge, and of the\ninfluence it would give them over the rest. An arrangement better\nadapted to keep popular opinion within reason and justice, and to\nguard it from the various deteriorating influences which assail the\nweak side of democracy, could scarcely by human ingenuity be devised.\nA democratic people would in this way be provided with what in any\nother way it would almost certainly miss--leaders of a higher grade of\nintellect and character than itself. Modern democracy would have its\noccasional Pericles, and its habitual group of superior and guiding\nminds.\n\nWith all this array of reasons, of the most fundamental character, on\nthe affirmative side of the question, what is there on the negative?\nNothing that will sustain examination, when people can once be induced\nto bestow any real examination upon a new thing. Those indeed, if any\nsuch there be, who, under pretense of equal justice, aim only at\nsubstituting the class ascendancy of the poor for that of the rich,\nwill of course be unfavorable to a scheme which places both on a\nlevel. But I do not believe that any such wish exists at present among\nthe working classes of this country, though I would not answer for the\neffect which opportunity and demagogic artifices may hereafter have in\nexciting it. In the United States, where the numerical majority have\nlong been in full possession of collective despotism, they would\nprobably be as unwilling to part with it as a single despot or an\naristocracy. But I believe that the English democracy would as yet be\ncontent with protection against the class legislation of others,\nwithout claiming the power to exercise it in their turn.\n\nAmong the ostensible objectors to Mr. Hare's scheme, some profess to\nthink the plan unworkable; but these, it will be found, are generally\npeople who have barely heard of it, or have given it a very slight and\ncursory examination. Others are unable to reconcile themselves to the\nloss of what they term the local character of the representation. A\nnation does not seem to them to consist of persons, but of artificial\nunits, the creation of geography and statistics. Parliament must\nrepresent towns and counties, not human beings. But no one seeks to\nannihilate towns and counties. Towns and counties, it may be presumed,\nare represented when the human beings who inhabit them are\nrepresented. Local feelings can not exist without somebody who feels\nthem, nor local interests without somebody interested in them. If the\nhuman beings whose feelings and interests these are have their proper\nshare of representation, these feelings and interests are represented\nin common with all other feelings and interests of those persons. But\nI can not see why the feelings and interests which arrange mankind\naccording to localities should be the only one thought worthy of being\nrepresented; or why people who have other feelings and interests,\nwhich they value more than they do their geographical ones, should be\nrestricted to these as the sole principle of their political\nclassification. The notion that Yorkshire and Middlesex have rights\napart from those of their inhabitants, or that Liverpool and Exeter\nare the proper objects of the legislator's care, in contradistinction\nthe population of those places, is a curious specimen of delusion\nproduced by words.\n\nIn general, however, objectors cut the matter short by affirming that\nthe people of England will never consent to such a system. What the\npeople of England are likely to think of those who pass such a summary\nsentence on their capacity of understanding and judgment, deeming it\nsuperfluous to consider whether a thing is right or wrong before\naffirming that they are certain to reject it, I will not undertake to\nsay. For my own part, I do not think that the people of England have\ndeserved to be, without trial, stigmatized as insurmountably\nprejudiced against any thing which can be proved to be good either for\nthemselves or for others. It also appears to me that when prejudices\npersist obstinately, it is the fault of nobody so much as of those who\nmake a point of proclaiming them insuperable, as an excuse to\nthemselves for never joining in an attempt to remove them. Any\nprejudice whatever will be insurmountable if those who do not share it\nthemselves truckle to it, and flatter it, and accept it as a law of\nnature. I believe, however, that of prejudice, properly speaking,\nthere is in this case none except on the lips of those who talk about\nit, and that there is in general, among those who have yet heard of\nthe proposition, no other hostility to it than the natural and healthy\ndistrust attaching to all novelties which have not been sufficiently\ncanvassed to make generally manifest all the pros and cons of the\nquestion. The only serious obstacle is the unfamiliarity: this,\nindeed, is a formidable one, for the imagination much more easily\nreconciles itself to a great alteration in substance than to a very\nsmall one in names and forms. But unfamiliarity is a disadvantage\nwhich, when there is any real value in an idea, it only requires time\nto remove; and in these days of discussion and generally awakened\ninterest in improvement, what formerly was the work of centuries often\nrequires only years.\n\n\n\nChapter VIII--Of the Extension of the Suffrage.\n\n\nSuch a representative democracy as has now been\nsketched--representative of all, and not solely of the majority--in\nwhich the interests, the opinions, the grades of intellect which are\noutnumbered would nevertheless be heard, and would have a chance of\nobtaining by weight of character and strength of argument an influence\nwhich would not belong to their numerical force--this democracy, which\nis alone equal, alone impartial, alone the government of all by all,\nthe only true type of democracy, would be free from the greatest evils\nof the falsely-called democracies which now prevail, and from which\nthe current idea of democracy is exclusively derived. But even in this\ndemocracy, absolute power, if they chose to exercise it, would rest\nwith the numerical majority, and these would be composed exclusively\nof a single class, alike in biases, prepossessions, and general modes\nof thinking, and a class, to say no more, not the most highly\ncultivated. The constitution would therefore still be liable to the\ncharacteristic evils of class government; in a far less degree,\nassuredly, than that exclusive government by a class which now usurps\nthe name of democracy, but still under no effective restraint except\nwhat might be found in the good sense, moderation, and forbearance of\nthe class itself. If checks of this description are sufficient, the\nphilosophy of constitutional government is but solemn trifling. All\ntrust in constitutions is grounded on the assurance they may afford,\nnot that the depositaries of power will not, but that they can not\nmisemploy it. Democracy is not the ideally best form of government\nunless this weak side of it can be strengthened; unless it can be so\norganized that no class, not even the most numerous, shall be able to\nreduce all but itself to political insignificance, and direct the\ncourse of legislation and administration by its exclusive class\ninterest. The problem is to find the means of preventing this abuse\nwithout sacrificing the characteristic advantages of popular\ngovernment.\n\nThese twofold requisites are not fulfilled by the expedient of a\nlimitation of the suffrage, involving the compulsory exclusion of any\nportion of the citizens from a voice in the representation. Among the\nforemost benefits of free government is that education of the\nintelligence and of the sentiments which is carried down to the very\nlowest ranks of the people when they are called to take a part in acts\nwhich directly affect the great interests of their country. On this\ntopic I have already dwelt so emphatically that I only return to it\nbecause there are few who seem to attach to this effect of popular\ninstitutions all the importance to which it is entitled. People think\nit fanciful to expect so much from what seems so slight a cause--to\nrecognize a potent instrument of mental improvement in the exercise of\npolitical franchises by manual laborers. Yet, unless substantial\nmental cultivation in the mass of mankind is to be a mere vision, this\nis the road by which it must come. If any one supposes that this road\nwill not bring it, I call to witness the entire contents of M. de\nTocqueville's great work, and especially his estimate of the\nAmericans. Almost all travelers are struck by the fact that every\nAmerican is in some sense both a patriot and a person of cultivated\nintelligence; and M. de Tocqueville has shown how close the connection\nis between these qualities and their democratic institutions. No such\nwide diffusion of the ideas, tastes, and sentiments of educated minds\nhas ever been seen elsewhere, or even conceived as attainable. Yet\nthis is nothing to what we might look for in a government equally\ndemocratic in its unexclusiveness, but better organized in other\nimportant points. For political life is indeed in America a most\nvaluable school, but it is a school from which the ablest teachers are\nexcluded; the first minds in the country being as effectually shut out\nfrom the national representation, and from public functions generally,\nas if they were under a formal disqualification. The Demos, too, being\nin America the one source of power, all the selfish ambition of the\ncountry gravitates towards it, as it does in despotic countries\ntowards the monarch; the People, like the despot, is pursued with\nadulation and sycophancy, and the corrupting effects of power fully\nkeep pace with its improving and ennobling influences. If, even with\nthis alloy, democratic institutions produce so marked a superiority of\nmental development in the lowest class of Americans, compared with the\ncorresponding classes in England and elsewhere, what would it be if\nthe good portion of the influence could be retained without the bad?\nAnd this, to a certain extent, may be done, but not by excluding that\nportion of the people who have fewest intellectual stimuli of other\nkinds from so inestimable an introduction to large, distant, and\ncomplicated interests as is afforded by the attention they may be\ninduced to bestow on political affairs. It is by political discussion\nthat the manual laborer, whose employment is a routine, and whose way\nof life brings him in contact with no variety of impressions,\ncircumstances, or ideas, is taught that remote causes, and events\nwhich take place far off, have a most sensible effect even on his\npersonal interests; and it is from political discussion and collective\npolitical action that one whose daily occupations concentrate his\ninterests in a small circle round himself, learns to feel for and with\nhis fellow-citizens, and becomes consciously a member of a great\ncommunity. But political discussions fly over the heads of those who\nhave no votes, and are not endeavouring to acquire them. Their\nposition, in comparison with the electors, is that of the audience in\na court of justice compared with the twelve men in the jury-box. It is\nnot _their_ suffrages that are asked, it is not their opinion that is\nsought to be influenced; the appeals are made, the arguments\naddressed, to others than them; nothing depends on the decision _they_\nmay arrive at, and there is no necessity and very little inducement to\nthem to come to any. Whoever, in an otherwise popular government, has\nno vote, and no prospect of obtaining it, will either be a permanent\nmalcontent, or will feel as one whom the general affairs of society do\nnot concern; for whom they are to be managed by others; who \"has no\nbusiness with the laws except to obey them,\" nor with public interests\nand concerns except as a looker-on. What he will know or care about\nthem from this position may partly be measured by what an average\nwoman of the middle class knows and cares about politics compared with\nher husband or brothers.\n\nIndependently of all these considerations, it is a personal injustice\nto withhold from any one, unless for the prevention of greater evils,\nthe ordinary privilege of having his voice reckoned in the disposal of\naffairs in which he has the same interest as other people. If he is\ncompelled to pay, if he may be compelled to fight, if he is required\nimplicitly to obey, he should be legally entitled to be told what for;\nto have his consent asked, and his opinion counted at its worth,\nthough not at more than its worth. There ought to be no pariahs in a\nfull-grown and civilized nation; no persons disqualified except\nthrough their own default. Every one is degraded, whether aware of it\nor not, when other people, without consulting him, take upon\nthemselves unlimited power to regulate his destiny. And even in a much\nmore improved state than the human mind has ever yet reached, it is\nnot in nature that they who are thus disposed of should meet with as\nfair play as those who have a voice. Rulers and ruling classes are\nunder a necessity of considering the interests and wishes of those who\nhave the suffrage; but of those who are excluded, it is in their\noption whether they will do so or not; and, however honestly disposed,\nthey are, in general, too fully occupied with things which they _must_\nattend to to have much room in their thoughts for any thing which they\ncan with impunity disregard. No arrangement of the suffrage,\ntherefore, can be permanently satisfactory in which any person or\nclass is peremptorily excluded--in which the electoral privilege is\nnot open to all persons of full age who desire to obtain it.\n\nThere are, however, certain exclusions, required by positive reasons,\nwhich do not conflict with this principle, and which, though an evil\nin themselves, are only to be got rid of by the cessation of the state\nof things which requires them. I regard it as wholly inadmissible that\nany person should participate in the suffrage without being able to\nread, write, and, I will add, perform the common operations of\narithmetic. Justice demands, even when the suffrage does not depend on\nit, that the means of attaining these elementary acquirements should\nbe within the reach of every person, either gratuitously, or at an\nexpense not exceeding what the poorest, who can earn their own living,\ncan afford. If this were really the case, people would no more think\nof giving the suffrage to a man who could not read, than of giving it\nto a child who could not speak; and it would not be society that would\nexclude him, but his own laziness. When society has not performed its\nduty by rendering this amount of instruction accessible to all, there\nis some hardship in the case, but it is a hardship that ought to be\nborne. If society has neglected to discharge two solemn obligations,\nthe more important and more fundamental of the two must be fulfilled\nfirst; universal teaching must precede universal enfranchisement. No\none but those in whom an _a priori_ theory has silenced common sense\nwill maintain that power over others, over the whole community, should\nbe imparted to people who have not acquired the commonest and most\nessential requisities for taking care of themselves--for pursuing\nintelligently their own interests, and those of the persons most\nnearly allied to them. This argument, doubtless, might be pressed\nfurther, and made to prove much more. It would be eminently desirable\nthat other things besides reading, writing, and arithmetic could be\nmade necessary to the suffrage; that some knowledge of the\nconformation of the earth, its natural and political divisions, the\nelements of general history, and of the history and institutions of\ntheir own country, could be required from all electors. But these\nkinds of knowledge, however indispensable to an intelligent use of the\nsuffrage, are not, in this country, nor probably any where save in the\nNorthern United States, accessible to the whole people, nor does there\nexist any trustworthy machinery for ascertaining whether they have\nbeen acquired or not. The attempt, at present, would lead to\npartiality, chicanery, and every kind of fraud. It is better that the\nsuffrage should be conferred indiscriminately, or even withheld\nindiscriminately, than that it should be given to one and withheld\nfrom another at the discretion of a public officer. In regard,\nhowever, to reading, writing, and calculating, there need be no\ndifficulty. It would be easy to require from every one who presented\nhimself for registry that he should, in the presence of the registrar,\ncopy a sentence from an English book, and perform a sum in the rule of\nthree; and to secure, by fixed rules and complete publicity, the\nhonest application of so very simple a test. This condition,\ntherefore, should in all cases accompany universal suffrage; and it\nwould, after a few years, exclude none but those who cared so little\nfor the privilege, that their vote, if given, would not in general be\nan indication of any real political opinion.\n\nIt is also important, that the assembly which votes the taxes, either\ngeneral or local, should be elected exclusively by those who pay\nsomething towards the taxes imposed. Those who pay no taxes, disposing\nby their votes of other people's money, have every motive to be lavish\nand none to economize. As far as money matters are concerned, any\npower of voting possessed by them is a violation of the fundamental\nprinciple of free government, a severance of the power of control from\nthe interest in its beneficial exercise. It amounts to allowing them\nto put their hands into other people's pockets for any purpose which\nthey think fit to call a public one, which, in the great towns of the\nUnited States, is known to have produced a scale of local taxation\nonerous beyond example, and wholly borne by the wealthier classes.\nThat representation should be coextensive with taxation, not stopping\nshort of it, but also not going beyond it, is in accordance with the\ntheory of British institutions. But to reconcile this, as a condition\nannexed to the representation, with universality, it is essential, as\nit is on many other accounts desirable, that taxation, in a visible\nshape, should descend to the poorest class. In this country, and in\nmost others, there is probably no laboring family which does not\ncontribute to the indirect taxes, by the purchase of tea, coffee,\nsugar, not to mention narcotics or stimulants. But this mode of\ndefraying a share of the public expenses is hardly felt: the payer,\nunless a person of education and reflection, does not identify his\ninterest with a low scale of public expenditure as closely as when\nmoney for its support is demanded directly from himself; and even\nsupposing him to do so, he would doubtless take care that, however\nlavish an expenditure he might, by his vote, assist in imposing upon\nthe government, it should not be defrayed by any additional taxes on\nthe articles which he himself consumes. It would be better that a\ndirect tax, in the simple form of a capitation, should be levied on\nevery grown person in the community; or that every such person should\nbe admitted an elector on allowing himself to be rated _extra ordinem_\nto the assessed taxes; or that a small annual payment, rising and\nfalling with the gross expenditure of the country, should be required\nfrom every registered elector, that so every one might feel that the\nmoney which he assisted in voting was partly his own, and that he was\ninterested in keeping down its amount.\n\nHowever this may be, I regard it as required by first principles that\nthe receipt of parish relief should be a peremptory disqualification\nfor the franchise. He who can not by his labor suffice for his own\nsupport, has no claim to the privilege of helping himself to the money\nof others. By becoming dependent on the remaining members of the\ncommunity for actual subsistence, he abdicates his claim to equal\nrights with them in other respects. Those to whom he is indebted for\nthe continuance of his very existence may justly claim the exclusive\nmanagement of those common concerns to which he now brings nothing, or\nless than he takes away. As a condition of the franchise, a term\nshould be fixed, say five years previous to the registry, during which\nthe applicant's name has not been on the parish books as a recipient\nof relief. To be an uncertificated bankrupt, or to have taken the\nbenefit of the Insolvent Act, should disqualify for the franchise\nuntil the person has paid his debts, or at least proved that he is not\nnow, and has not for some long period been, dependent on eleemosynary\nsupport. Non-payment of taxes, when so long persisted in that it can\nnot have arisen from inadvertence, should disqualify while it lasts.\nThese exclusions are not in their nature permanent. They exact such\nconditions only as all are able, or ought to be able, to fulfill if\nthey choose. They leave the suffrage accessible to all who are in the\nnormal condition of a human being; and if any one has to forego it, he\neither does not care sufficiently for it to do for its sake what he is\nalready bound to do, or he is in a general condition of depression and\ndegradation in which this slight addition, necessary for the security\nof others, would be unfelt, and on emerging from which this mark of\ninferiority would disappear with the rest.\n\nIn the long run, therefore (supposing no restrictions to exist but\nthose of which we have now treated), we might expect that all, except\nthat (it is to be hoped) progressively diminishing class, the\nrecipients of parish relief, would be in possession of votes, so that\nthe suffrage would be, with that slight abatement, universal. That it\nshould be thus widely expanded is, as we have seen, absolutely\nnecessary to an enlarged and elevated conception of good government.\nYet in this state of things, the great majority of voters in most\ncountries, and emphatically in this, would be manual laborers, and the\ntwofold danger, that of too low a standard of political intelligence,\nand that of class legislation, would still exist in a very perilous\ndegree. It remains to be seen whether any means exist by which these\nevils can be obviated.\n\nThey are capable of being obviated if men sincerely wish it; not by\nany artificial contrivance, but by carrying out the natural order of\nhuman life, which recommends itself to every one in things in which he\nhas no interest or traditional opinion running counter to it. In all\nhuman affairs, every person directly interested, and not under\npositive tutelage, has an admitted claim to a voice, and when his\nexercise of it is not inconsistent with the safety of the whole, can\nnot justly be excluded from it. But (though every one ought to have a\nvoice) that every one should have an equal voice is a totally\ndifferent proposition. When two persons who have a joint interest in\nany business differ in opinion, does justice require that both\nopinions should be held of exactly equal value? If with equal virtue,\none is superior to the other in knowledge and intelligence--or if with\nequal intelligence, one excels the other in virtue--the opinion, the\njudgment of the higher moral or intellectual being is worth more than\nthat of the inferior; and if the institutions of the country virtually\nassert that they are of the same value, they assert a thing which is\nnot. One of the two, as the wiser or better man, has a claim to\nsuperior weight: the difficulty is in ascertaining which of the two it\nis; a thing impossible as between individuals, but, taking men in\nbodies and in numbers, it can be done with a certain approach to\naccuracy. There would be no pretense for applying this doctrine to any\ncase which can with reason be considered as one of individual and\nprivate right. In an affair which concerns only one of two persons,\nthat one is entitled to follow his own opinion, however much wiser the\nother may be than himself. But we are speaking of things which equally\nconcern them both; where, if the more ignorant does not yield his\nshare of the matter to the guidance of the wiser man, the wiser man\nmust resign his to that of the more ignorant. Which of these modes of\ngetting over the difficulty is most for the interest of both, and most\nconformable to the general fitness of things? If it be deemed unjust\nthat either should have to give way, which injustice is greatest? that\nthe better judgment should give way to the worse, or the worse to the\nbetter?\n\nNow national affairs are exactly such a joint concern, with the\ndifference that no one needs ever be called upon for a complete\nsacrifice of his own opinion. It can always be taken into the\ncalculation, and counted at a certain figure, a higher figure being\nassigned to the suffrages of those whose opinion is entitled to\ngreater weight. There is not in this arrangement any thing necessarily\ninvidious to those to whom it assigns the lower degrees of influence.\nEntire exclusion from a voice in the common concerns is one thing: the\nconcession to others of a more potential voice, on the ground of\ngreater capacity for the management of the joint interests, is\nanother. The two things are not merely different, they are\nincommensurable. Every one has a right to feel insulted by being made\na nobody, and stamped as of no account at all. No one but a fool, and\nonly a fool of a peculiar description, feels offended by the\nacknowledgment that there are others whose opinion, and even whose\nwish, is entitled to a greater amount of consideration than his. To\nhave no voice in what are partly his own concerns is a thing which\nnobody willingly submits to; but when what is partly his concern is\nalso partly another's, and he feels the other to understand the\nsubject better than himself, that the other's opinion should be\ncounted for more than his own accords with his expectations, and with\nthe course of things which in all other affairs of life he is\naccustomed to acquiese in. It is only necessary that this superior\ninfluence should be assigned on grounds which he can comprehend, and\nof which he is able to perceive the justice.\n\nI hasten to say that I consider it entirely inadmissible, unless as a\ntemporary makeshift, that the superiority of influence should be\nconferred in consideration of property. I do not deny that property is\na kind of test; education, in most countries, though any thing but\nproportional to riches, is on the average better in the richer half of\nsociety than in the poorer. But the criterion is so imperfect;\naccident has so much more to do than merit with enabling men to rise\nin the world; and it is so impossible for any one, by acquiring any\namount of instruction, to make sure of the corresponding rise in\nstation, that this foundation of electoral privilege is always, and\nwill continue to be, supremely odious. To connect plurality of votes\nwith any pecuniary qualification would be not only objectionable in\nitself, but a sure mode of compromising the principle, and making its\npermanent maintenance impracticable. The democracy, at least of this\ncountry, are not at present jealous of personal superiority, but they\nare naturally and must justly so of that which is grounded on mere\npecuniary circumstances. The only thing which can justify reckoning\none person's opinion as equivalent to more than one is individual\nmental superiority, and what is wanted is some approximate means of\nascertaining that. If there existed such a thing as a really national\neducation or a trustworthy system of general examination, education\nmight be tested directly. In the absence of these, the nature of a\nperson's occupation is some test. An employer of labor is on the\naverage more intelligent than a laborer; for he must labor with his\nhead, and not solely with his hands. A foreman is generally more\nintelligent than an ordinary laborer, and a laborer in the skilled\ntrades than in the unskilled. A banker, merchant, or manufacturer is\nlikely to be more intelligent than a tradesman, because he has larger\nand more complicated interests to manage. In all these cases it is not\nthe having merely undertaken the superior function, but the successful\nperformance of it, that tests the qualifications; for which reason, as\nwell as to prevent persons from engaging nominally in an occupation\nfor the sake of the vote, it would be proper to require that the\noccupation should have been persevered in for some length of time (say\nthree years). Subject to some such condition, two or more votes might\nbe allowed to every person who exercises any of these superior\nfunctions. The liberal professions, when really and not nominally\npracticed, imply, of course, a still higher degree of instruction; and\nwherever a sufficient examination, or any serious conditions of\neducation, are required before entering on a profession, its members\ncould be admitted at once to a plurality of votes. The same rule might\nbe applied to graduates of universities; and even to those who bring\nsatisfactory certificates of having passed through the course of study\nrequired by any school at which the higher branches of knowledge are\ntaught, under proper securities that the teaching is real, and not a\nmere pretense. The \"local\" or \"middle class\" examination for the\ndegree of associate, so laudably and public-spiritedly established by\nthe University of Oxford, and any similar ones which may be instituted\nby other competent bodies (provided they are fairly open to all\ncomers), afford a ground on which plurality of votes might with great\nadvantage be accorded to those who have passed the test. All these\nsuggestions are open to much discussion in the detail, and to\nobjections which it is of no use to anticipate. The time is not come\nfor giving to such plans a practical shape, nor should I wish to be\nbound by the particular proposals which I have made. But it is to me\nevident that in this direction lies the true ideal of representative\ngovernment; and that to work towards it by the best practical\ncontrivances which can be found is the path of real political\nimprovement.\n\nIf it be asked to what length the principle admits of being carried,\nor how many votes might be accorded to an individual on the ground of\nsuperior qualifications, I answer, that this is not in itself very\nmaterial, provided the distinctions and gradations are not made\narbitrarily, but are such as can be understood and accepted by the\ngeneral conscience and understanding. But it is an absolute condition\nnot to overpass the limit prescribed by the fundamental principle laid\ndown in a former chapter as the condition of excellence in the\nconstitution of a representative system. The plurality of votes must\non no account be carried so far that those who are privileged by it,\nor the class (if any) to which they mainly belong, shall outweigh by\nmeans of it all the rest of the community. The distinction in favor of\neducation, right in itself, is farther and strongly recommended by its\npreserving the educated from the class legislation of the uneducated;\nbut it must stop short of enabling them to practice class legislation\non their own account. Let me add, that I consider it an absolutely\nnecessary part of the plurality scheme that it be open to the poorest\nindividual in the community to claim its privileges, if he can prove\nthat, in spite of all difficulties and obstacles, he is, in point of\nintelligence, entitled to them. There ought to be voluntary\nexaminations at which any person whatever might present himself, might\nprove that he came up to the standard of knowledge and ability laid\ndown as sufficient, and be admitted, in consequence, to the plurality\nof votes. A privilege which is not refused to any one who can show\nthat he has realized the conditions on which in theory and principle\nit is dependent, would not necessarily be repugnant to any one's\nsentiment of justice; but it would certainly be so if, while conferred\non general presumptions not always infallible, it were denied to\ndirect proof.\n\nPlural voting, though practiced in vestry elections and those of\npoor-law guardians, is so unfamiliar in elections to Parliament that\nit is not likely to be soon or willingly adopted; but as the time will\ncertainly arrive when the only choice will be between this and equal\nuniversal suffrage, whoever does not desire the last can not too soon\nbegin to reconcile himself to the former. In the mean time, though the\nsuggestion, for the present, may not be a practical one, it will serve\nto mark what is best in principle, and enable us to judge of the\neligibility of any indirect means, either existing or capable of being\nadopted, which may promote in a less perfect manner the same end. A\nperson may have a double vote by other means than that of tendering\ntwo votes at the same hustings; he may have a vote in each of two\ndifferent constituencies; and though this exceptional privilege at\npresent belongs rather to superiority of means than of intelligence, I\nwould not abolish it where it exists, since, until a truer test of\neducation is adopted, it would be unwise to dispense with even so\nimperfect a one as is afforded by pecuniary circumstances. Means might\nbe found of giving a farther extension to the privilege, which would\nconnect it in a more direct manner with superior education. In any\nfuture Reform Bill which lowers greatly the pecuniary conditions of\nthe suffrage, it might be a wise provision to allow all graduates of\nuniversities, all persons who have passed creditably through the\nhigher schools, all members of the liberal professions, and perhaps\nsome others, to be registered specifically in those characters, and to\ngive their votes as such in any constituency in which they choose to\nregister; retaining, in addition, their votes as simple citizens in\nthe localities in which they reside.\n\nUntil there shall have been devised, and until opinion is willing to\naccept, some mode of plural voting which may assign to education as\nsuch the degree of superior influence due to it, and sufficient as a\ncounterpoise to the numerical weight of the least educated class, for\nso long the benefits of completely universal suffrage can not be\nobtained without bringing with them, as it appears to me, more than\nequivalent evils. It is possible, indeed (and this is perhaps one of\nthe transitions through which we may have to pass in our progress to a\nreally good representative system), that the barriers which restrict\nthe suffrage might be entirely leveled in some particular\nconstituencies, whose members, consequently, would be returned\nprincipally by manual laborers; the existing electoral qualification\nbeing maintained elsewhere, or any alteration in it being accompanied\nby such a grouping of the constituencies as to prevent the laboring\nclass from becoming preponderant in Parliament. By such a compromise,\nthe anomalies in the representation would not only be retained, but\naugmented; this, however, is not a conclusive objection; for if the\ncountry does not choose to pursue the right ends by a regular system\ndirectly leading to them, it must be content with an irregular\nmakeshift, as being greatly preferable to a system free from\nirregularities, but regularly adapted to wrong ends, or in which some\nends equally necessary with the others have been left out. It is a far\ngraver objection, that this adjustment is incompatible with the\nintercommunity of local constituencies which Mr. Hare's plan requires;\nthat under it every voter would remain imprisoned within the one or\nmore constituencies in which his name is registered, and, unless\nwilling to be represented by one of the candidates for those\nlocalities, would not be represented at all.\n\nSo much importance do I attach to the emancipation of those who\nalready have votes, but whose votes are useless, because always\noutnumbered--so much should I hope from the natural influence of truth\nand reason, if only secured a hearing and a competent advocacy, that I\nshould not despair of the operation even of equal and universal\nsuffrage, if made real by the proportional representation of all\nminorities, on Mr. Hare's principle. But if the best hopes which can\nbe formed on this subject were certainties, I should still contend for\nthe principle of plural voting. I do not propose the plurality as a\nthing in itself undesirable, which, like the exclusion of part of the\ncommunity from the suffrage, may be temporarily tolerated while\nnecessary to prevent greater evils. I do not look upon equal voting as\namong the things which are good in themselves, provided they can be\nguarded against inconveniences. I look upon it as only relatively\ngood; less objectionable than inequality of privilege grounded on\nirrelevant or adventitious circumstances, but in principle wrong,\nbecause recognizing a wrong standard, and exercising a bad influence\non the voter's mind. It is not useful, but hurtful, that the\nconstitution of the country should declare ignorance to be entitled to\nas much political power as knowledge. The national institutions should\nplace all things that they are concerned with before the mind of the\ncitizen in the light in which it is for his good that he should regard\nthem; and as it is for his good that he should think that every one is\nentitled to some influence, but the better and wiser to more than\nothers, it is important that this conviction should be professed by\nthe state, and embodied in the national institutions. Such things\nconstitute the _spirit_ of the institutions of a country; that portion\nof their influence which is least regarded by common, and especially\nby English thinkers, though the institutions of every country, not\nunder great positive oppression, produce more effect by their spirit\nthan by any of their direct provisions, since by it they shape the\nnational character. The American institutions have imprinted strongly\non the American mind that any one man (with a white skin) is as good\nas any other; and it is felt that this false creed is nearly connected\nwith some of the more unfavorable points in American character. It is\nnot small mischief that the constitution of any country should\nsanction this creed; for the belief in it, whether express or tacit,\nis almost as detrimental to moral and intellectual excellence any\neffect which most forms of government can produce.\n\nIt may, perhaps, be said, that a constitution which gives equal\ninfluence, man for man, to the most and to the least instructed, is\nnevertheless conducive to progress, because the appeals constantly\nmade to the less instructed classes, the exercise given to their\nmental powers, and the exertions which the more instructed are obliged\nto make for enlightening their judgment and ridding them of errors and\nprejudices, are powerful stimulants to their advance in intelligence.\nThat this most desirable effect really attends the admission of the\nless educated classes to some, and even to a large share of power, I\nadmit, and have already strenuously maintained. But theory and\nexperience alike prove that a counter current sets in when they are\nmade the possessors of all power. Those who are supreme over every\nthing, whether they be One, or Few, or Many, have no longer need of\nthe arms of reason; they can make their mere will prevail; and those\nwho can not be resisted are usually far too well satisfied with their\nown opinions to be willing to change them, or listen without\nimpatience to any one who tells them that they are in the wrong. The\nposition which gives the strongest stimulus to the growth of\nintelligence is that of rising into power, not that of having achieved\nit; and of all resting-points, temporary or permanent, in the way to\nascendancy, the one which develops the best and highest qualities is\nthe position of those who are strong enough to make reason prevail,\nbut not strong enough to prevail against reason. This is the position\nin which, according to the principles we have laid down, the rich and\nthe poor, the much and the little educated, and all the other classes\nand denominations which divide society between them, ought as far as\npracticable to be placed; and by combining this principle with the\notherwise just one of allowing superiority of weight to superiority of\nmental qualities, a political constitution would realize that kind of\nrelative perfection which is alone compatible with the complicated\nnature of human affairs.\n\nIn the preceding argument for universal but graduated suffrage, I have\ntaken no account of difference of sex. I consider it to be as entirely\nirrelevant to political rights as difference in height or in the color\nof the hair. All human beings have the same interest in good\ngovernment; the welfare of all is alike affected by it, and they have\nequal need of a voice in it to secure their share of its benefits. If\nthere be any difference, women require it more than men, since, being\nphysically weaker, they are more dependent on law and society for\nprotection. Mankind have long since abandoned the only premises which\nwill support the conclusion that women ought not to have votes. No one\nnow holds that women should be in personal servitude; that they should\nhave no thought, wish, or occupation but to be the domestic drudges of\nhusbands, fathers, or brothers. It is allowed to unmarried, and wants\nbut little of being conceded to married women to hold property, and\nhave pecuniary and business interests in the same manner as men. It is\nconsidered suitable and proper that women should think, and write, and\nbe teachers. As soon as these things are admitted, the political\ndisqualification has no principle to rest on. The whole mode of\nthought of the modern world is, with increasing emphasis, pronouncing\nagainst the claim of society to decide for individuals what they are\nand are not fit for, and what they shall and shall not be allowed to\nattempt. If the principles of modern politics and political economy\nare good for any thing, it is for proving that these points can only\nbe rightly judged of by the individuals themselves; and that, under\ncomplete freedom of choice, wherever there are real diversities of\naptitude, the greater number will apply themselves to the things for\nwhich they are on the average fittest, and the exceptional course will\nonly be taken by the exceptions. Either the whole tendency of modern\nsocial improvements has been wrong, or it ought to be carried out to\nthe total abolition of all exclusions and disabilities which close any\nhonest employment to a human being.\n\nBut it is not even necessary to maintain so much in order to prove\nthat women should have the suffrage. Were it as right as it is wrong\nthat they should be a subordinate class, confined to domestic\noccupations and subject to domestic authority, they would not the less\nrequire the protection of the suffrage to secure them from the abuse\nof that authority. Men, as well as women, do not need political rights\nin order that they may govern, but in order that they may not be\nmisgoverned. The majority of the male sex are, and will be all their\nlives, nothing else than laborers in corn-fields or manufactories; but\nthis does not render the suffrage less desirable for them, nor their\nclaim to it less irresistible, when not likely to make a bad use of\nit. Nobody pretends to think that woman would make a bad use of the\nsuffrage. The worst that is said is that they would vote as mere\ndependents, the bidding of their male relations. If it be so, so let\nit be. If they think for themselves, great good will be done; and if\nthey do not, no harm. It is a benefit to human beings to take off\ntheir fetters, even if they do not desire to walk. It would already be\na great improvement in the moral position of women to be no longer\ndeclared by law incapable of an opinion, and not entitled to a\npreference, respecting the most important concerns of humanity. There\nwould be some benefit to them individually in having something to\nbestow which their male relatives can not exact, and are yet desirous\nto have. It would also be no small matter that the husband would\nnecessarily discuss the matter with his wife, and that the vote would\nnot be his exclusive affair, but a joint concern. People do not\nsufficiently consider how markedly the fact that she is able to have\nsome action on the outward world independently of him, raises her\ndignity and value in a vulgar man's eyes, and makes her the object of\na respect which no personal qualities would ever obtain for one whose\nsocial existence he can entirely appropriate. The vote itself, too,\nwould be improved in quality. The man would often be obliged to find\nhonest reasons for his vote, such as might induce a more upright and\nimpartial character to serve with him under the same banner. The\nwife's influence would often keep him true to his own sincere opinion.\nOften, indeed, it would be used, not on the side of public principle,\nbut of the personal interest or worldly vanity of the family. But,\nwherever this would be the tendency of the wife's influence, it is\nexerted to the full already in that bad direction, and with the more\ncertainty, since under the present law and custom she is generally too\nutter a stranger to politics in any sense in which they involve\nprinciple to be able to realize to herself that there is a point of\nhonor in them; and most people have as little sympathy in the point of\nhonor of others, when their own is not placed in the same thing, as\nthey have in the religious feelings of those whose religion differs\nfrom theirs. Give the woman a vote, and she comes under the operation\nof the political point of honor. She learns to look on politics as a\nthing on which she is allowed to have an opinion, and in which, if one\nhas an opinion, it ought to be acted upon; she acquires a sense of\npersonal accountability in the matter, and will no longer feel, as she\ndoes at present, that whatever amount of bad influence she may\nexercise, if the man can but be persuaded, all is right, and his\nresponsibility covers all. It is only by being herself encouraged to\nform an opinion, and obtain an intelligent comprehension of the\nreasons which ought to prevail with the conscience against the\ntemptations of personal or family interest, that she can ever cease to\nact as a disturbing force on the political conscience of the man. Her\nindirect agency can only be prevented from being politically\nmischievous by being exchanged for direct.\n\nI have supposed the right of suffrage to depend, as in a good state of\nthings it would, on personal conditions. Where it depends, as in this\nand most other countries, on conditions of property, the contradiction\nis even more flagrant. There something more than ordinarily irrational\nin the fact that when a woman can give all the guarantees required\nfrom a male elector, independent circumstances, the position of a\nhouseholder and head of a family, payment of taxes, or whatever may be\nthe conditions imposed, the very principle and system of a\nrepresentation based on property is set aside, and an exceptionally\npersonal disqualification is created for the mere purpose of excluding\nher. When it is added that in the country where this is done a woman\nnow reigns, and that the most glorious ruler whom that country ever\nhad was a woman, the picture of unreason and scarcely disguised\ninjustice is complete. Let us hope that as the work proceeds of\npulling down, one after another, the remains of the mouldering fabric\nof monopoly and tyranny, this one will not be the last to disappear;\nthat the opinion of Bentham, of Mr. Samuel Bailey, of Mr. Hare, and\nmany other of the most powerful political thinkers of this age and\ncountry (not to speak of others), will make its way to all minds not\nrendered obdurate by selfishness or inveterate prejudice; and that,\nbefore the lapse another generation, the accident of sex, no more than\nthe accident of skin, will be deemed a sufficient justification for\ndepriving its possessor of the equal protection and just privileges of\na citizen.\n\n\n\nChapter IX--Should there be Two Stages of Election?\n\n\nIn some representative constitutions, the plan has been adopted of\nchoosing the members of the representative body by a double process,\nthe primary electors only choosing other electors, and these electing\nthe member of Parliament. This contrivance was probably intended as a\nslight impediment to the full sweep of popular feeling, giving the\nsuffrage, and with it the complete ultimate power, to the Many, but\ncompelling them to exercise it through the agency of a comparatively\nfew, who, it was supposed, would be less moved than the Demos by the\ngusts of popular passion; and as the electors, being already a select\nbody, might be expected to exceed in intellect and character the\ncommon level of their constituents, the choice made by them was\nthought likely to be more careful and enlightened, and would, in any\ncase, be made under a greater feeling of responsibility than election\nby the masses themselves. This plan of filtering, as it were, the\npopular suffrage through an intermediate body admits of a very\nplausible defense; since it may be said, with great appearance of\nreason, that less intellect and instruction are required for judging\nwho among our neighbors can be most safely trusted to choose a member\nof Parliament than who is himself fittest to be one.\n\nIn the first place, however, if the dangers incident to popular power\nmay be thought to be in some degree lessened by this indirect\nmanagement, so also are its benefits; and the latter effect is much\nmore certain than the former. To enable the system to work as desired,\nit must be carried into effect in the spirit in which it is planned;\nthe electors must use the suffrage in the manner supposed by the\ntheory, that is, each of them must not ask himself who the member of\nParliament should be, but only whom he would best like to choose one\nfor him. It is evident that the advantages which indirect is supposed\nto have over direct election require this disposition of mind in the\nvoter, and will only be realized by his taking the doctrine _au\nserieux_, that his sole business is to choose the choosers, not the\nmember himself. The supposition must be, that he will not occupy his\nthoughts with political opinions and measures or political men, but\nwill be guided by his personal respect for some private individual, to\nwhom he will give a general power of attorney to act for him. Now if\nthe primary electors adopt this view of their position, one of the\nprincipal uses of giving them a vote at all is defeated; the political\nfunction to which they are called fails of developing public spirit\nand political intelligence, of making public affairs an object of\ninterest to their feelings and of exercise to their faculties. The\nsupposition, moreover, involves inconsistent conditions; for if the\nvoter feels no interest in the final result, how or why can he be\nexpected to feel any in the process which leads to it? To wish to have\na particular individual for his representative in Parliament is\npossible to a person of a very moderate degree of virtue and\nintelligence, and to wish to choose an elector who will elect that\nindividual is a natural consequence; but for a person who does not\ncare who is elected, or feels bound to put that consideration in\nabeyance, to take any interest whatever in merely naming the worthiest\nperson to elect another according to his own judgment, implies a zeal\nfor what is right in the abstract, an habitual principle of duty for\nthe sake of duty, which is possible only to persons of a rather high\ngrade of cultivation, who, by the very possession of it, show that\nthey may be, and deserve to be, trusted with political power in a more\ndirect shape. Of all public functions which it is possible to confer\non the poorer members of the community, this surely is the least\ncalculated to kindle their feelings, and holds out least natural\ninducement to care for it, other than a virtuous determination to\ndischarge conscientiously whatever duty one has to perform; and if the\nmass of electors cared enough about political affairs to set any value\non so limited a participation in them, they would not be likely to be\nsatisfied without one much more extensive.\n\nIn the next place, admitting that a person who, from his narrow range\nof cultivation, can not judge well of the qualifications of a\ncandidate for Parliament, may be a sufficient judge of the honesty and\ngeneral capacity of somebody whom he may depute to choose a member of\nParliament for him, I may remark, that if the voter acquiesces in this\nestimate of his capabilities, and really wishes to have the choice\nmade for him by a person in whom he places reliance, there is no need\nof any constitutional provision for the purpose; he has only to ask\nthis confidential person privately what candidate he had better vote\nfor. In that case the two modes of election coincide in their result,\nand every advantage of indirect election is obtained under direct. The\nsystems only diverge in their operation if we suppose that the voter\nwould prefer to use his own judgment in the choice of a\nrepresentative, and only lets another choose for him because the law\ndoes not allow him a more direct mode of action. But if this be his\nstate of mind; if his will does not go along with the limitation which\nthe law imposes, and he desires to make a direct choice, he can do so\nnotwithstanding the law. He has only to choose as elector a known\npartisan of the candidate he prefers, or some one who will pledge\nhimself to vote for that candidate. And this is so much the natural\nworking of election by two stages, that, except in a condition of\ncomplete political indifference, it can scarcely be expected to act\notherwise. It is in this way that the election of the President of the\nUnited States practically operates. Nominally, the election is\nindirect; the population at large does not vote for the President; it\nvotes for electors who choose the President. But the electors are\nalways chosen under an express engagement to vote for a particular\ncandidate; nor does a citizen ever vote for an elector because of any\npreference for the man; he votes for the Breckinridge ticket or the\nLincoln ticket. It must be remembered that the electors are not chosen\nin order that they may search the country and find the fittest person\nin it to be President or to be a member of Parliament. There would be\nsomething to be said for the practice if this were so; but it is not\nso, nor ever will be, until mankind in general are of opinion, with\nPlato, that the proper person to be intrusted with power is the person\nmost unwilling to accept it. The electors are to make choice of one of\nthose who have offered themselves as candidates, and those who choose\nthe electors already know who these are. If there is any political\nactivity in the country, all electors who care to vote at all have\nmade up their minds which of these candidates they would like to have,\nand will make that the sole consideration in giving their vote. The\npartisans of each candidate will have their list of electors ready,\nall pledged to vote for that individual; and the only question\npractically asked of the primary elector will be, which of these lists\nhe will support.\n\nThe case in which election by two stages answers well in practice is\nwhen the electors are not chosen solely as electors, but have other\nimportant functions to discharge, which precludes their being selected\nsolely as delegates to give a particular vote. This combination of\ncircumstances exemplifies itself in another American institution, the\nSenate of the United States. That assembly, the Upper House, as it\nwere, of Congress, is considered to represent not the people directly,\nbut the States as such, and to be the guardian of that portion of\ntheir sovereign rights which they have not alienated. As the internal\nsovereignty of each state is, by the nature of an equal federation,\nequally sacred whatever be the size or importance of the state, each\nreturns to the Senate the same number of members (two), whether it be\nlittle Delaware or the \"Empire State\" of New York. These members are\nnot chosen by the population, but by the State Legislatures,\nthemselves elected by the people of each state; but as the whole\nordinary business of a legislative assembly, internal legislation and\nthe control of the executive, devolves upon these bodies, they are\nelected with a view to those objects more than to the other; and in\nnaming two persons to represent the state in the federal Senate they\nfor the most part exercise their own judgment, with only that general\nreference to public opinion necessary in all acts of the government of\na democracy. The elections thus made have proved eminently successful,\nand are conspicuously the best of all the elections in the United\nStates, the Senate invariably consisting of the most distinguished men\namong those who have made themselves sufficiently known in public\nlife. After such an example, it can not be said that indirect popular\nelection is never advantageous. Under certain conditions it is the\nvery best system that can be adopted. But those conditions are hardly\nto be obtained in practice except in a federal government like that of\nthe United States, where the election can be intrusted to local bodies\nwhose other functions extend to the most important concerns of the\nnation. The only bodies in any analogous position which exist, or are\nlikely to exist, in this country, are the municipalities, or any other\nboards which have been or may be created for similar local purposes.\nFew persons, however, would think it any improvement in our\nParliamentary constitution if the members for the City of London were\nchosen by the aldermen and Common Council, and those for the borough\nof Marylebone avowedly, as they already are virtually, by the vestries\nof the component parishes. Even if those bodies, considered merely as\nlocal boards, were far less objectionable than they are, the qualities\nthat would fit them for the limited and peculiar duties of municipal\nor parochial aedileship are no guaranty of any special fitness to judge\nof the comparative qualifications of candidates for a seat in\nParliament. They probably would not fulfill this duty any better than\nit is fulfilled by the inhabitants voting directly; while, on the\nother hand, if fitness for electing members of Parliament had to be\ntaken into consideration in selecting persons for the office of\nvestrymen or town councillors, many of those who are fittest for that\nmore limited duty would inevitably be excluded from it, if only by the\nnecessity there would be of choosing persons whose sentiments in\ngeneral politics agreed with those of the voters who elected them. The\nmere indirect political influence of town-councils has already led to\na considerable perversion of municipal elections from their intended\npurpose, by making them a matter of party politics. If it were part of\nthe duty of a man's book-keeper or steward to choose his physician, he\nwould not be likely to have a better medical attendant than if he\nchose one for himself, while he would be restricted in his choice of a\nsteward or book-keeper to such as might, without too great danger to\nhis health, be intrusted with the other office.\n\nIt appears, therefore, that every benefit of indirect election which\nis attainable at all is attainable under direct; that such of the\nbenefits expected from it as would not be obtained under direct\nelection will just as much fail to be obtained under indirect; while\nthe latter has considerable disadvantages peculiar to itself. The mere\nfact that it is an additional and superfluous wheel in the machinery\nis no trifling objection. Its decided inferiority as a means of\ncultivating public spirit and political intelligence has already been\ndwelt upon; and if it had any effective operation at all--that is, if\nthe primary electors did to any extent leave to their nominees the\nselection of their Parliamentary representative, the voter would be\nprevented from identifying himself with his member of Parliament, and\nthe member would feel a much less active sense of responsibility to\nhis constituents. In addition to all this, the comparatively small\nnumber of persons in whose hands, at last, the election of a member of\nParliament would reside, could not but afford great additional\nfacilities to intrigue, and to every form of corruption compatible\nwith the station in life of the electors. The constituencies would\nuniversally be reduced, in point of conveniences for bribery, to the\ncondition of the small boroughs at present. It would be sufficient to\ngain over a small number of persons to be certain of being returned.\nIf it be said that the electors would be responsible to those who\nelected them, the answer is obvious, that, holding no permanent office\nor position in the public eye, they would risk nothing by a corrupt\nvote except what they would care little for, not to be appointed\nelectors again: and the main reliance must still be on the penalties\nfor bribery, the insufficiency of which reliance, in small\nconstituencies, experience has made notorious to all the world. The\nevil would be exactly proportional to the amount of discretion left to\nthe chosen electors. The only case in which they would probably be\nafraid to employ their vote for the promotion of their personal\ninterest would be when they were elected under an express pledge, as\nmere delegates, to carry, as it were, the votes of their constituents\nto the hustings. The moment the double stage of election began to have\nany effect, it would begin to have a bad effect. And this we shall\nfind true of the principle of indirect election however applied,\nexcept in circumstances similar to those of the election of senators\nin the United States.\n\nIt is unnecessary, as far as England is concerned, to say more in\nopposition to a scheme which has no foundation in any of the national\ntraditions. An apology may even be expected for saying so much against\na political expedient which perhaps could not, in this country, muster\na single adherent. But a conception so plausible at the first glance,\nand for which there are so many precedents in history, might perhaps,\nin the general chaos of political opinions, rise again to the surface,\nand be brought forward on occasions when it might be seductive to some\nminds; and it could not, therefore, even if English readers were alone\nto be considered, be passed altogether in silence.\n\n\n\nChapter X--Of the Mode of Voting.\n\n\nThe question of greatest moment in regard to modes of voting is that\nof secrecy or publicity, and to this we will at once address\nourselves.\n\nIt would be a great mistake to make the discussion turn on\nsentimentalities about skulking or cowardice. Secrecy is justifiable\nin many cases, imperative in some, and it is not cowardice to seek\nprotection against evils which are honestly avoidable. Nor can it be\nreasonably maintained that no cases are conceivable in which secret\nvoting is preferable to public; but I must contend that these cases,\nin affairs of a political character, are the exception, not the rule.\n\nThe present is one of the many instances in which, as I have already\nhad occasion to remark, the _spirit_ of an institution, the impression\nit makes on the mind of the citizen, is one of the most important\nparts of its operation. The spirit of vote by ballot--the\ninterpretation likely to be put on it in the mind of an elector, is\nthat the suffrage is given to him for himself--for his particular use\nand benefit, and not as a trust for the public. For if it is indeed a\ntrust, if the public are entitled to his vote, are not they entitled\nto know his vote? This false and pernicious impression may well be\nmade on the generality, since it has been made on most of those who of\nlate years have been conspicuous advocates of the ballot. The doctrine\nwas not so understood by its earlier promoters; but the effect of a\ndoctrine on the mind is best shown, not in those who form it, but in\nthose who are formed by it. Mr. Bright and his school of democrats\nthink themselves greatly concerned in maintaining that the franchise\nis what they term a right, not a trust. Now this one idea, taking root\nin the general mind, does a moral mischief outweighing all the good\nthat the ballot could do, at the highest possible estimate of it. In\nwhatever way we define or understand the idea of a right, no person\ncan have a right (except in the purely legal sense) to power over\nothers: every such power, which he is allowed to possess is morally,\nin the fullest force of the term, a trust. But the exercise of any\npolitical function, either as an elector or as a representative, is\npower over others. Those who say that the suffrage is not a trust, but\na right, will scarcely accept the conclusions to which their doctrine\nleads. If it is a right, if it belongs to the voter for his own sake,\non what ground can we blame him for selling it, or using it to\nrecommend himself to any one whom it is his interest to please? A\nperson is not expected to consult exclusively the public benefit in\nthe use he makes of his house, or his three per cent. stock, or any\nthing else to which he really has a right. The suffrage is indeed due\nto him, among other reasons, as a means to his own protection, but\nonly against treatment from which he is equally bound, so far as\ndepends on his vote, to protect every one of his fellow-citizens. His\nvote is not a thing in which he has an option; it has no more to do\nwith his personal wishes than the verdict of a juryman. It is strictly\na matter of duty; he is bound to give it according to his best and\nmost conscientious opinion of the public good. Whoever has any other\nidea of it is unfit to have the suffrage; its effect on him is to\npervert, not to elevate his mind. Instead of opening his heart to an\nexalted patriotism and the obligation of public duty, it awakens and\nnourishes in him the disposition to use a public function for his own\ninterest, pleasure, or caprice; the same feelings and purposes, on a\nhumbler scale, which actuate a despot and oppressor. Now an ordinary\ncitizen in any public position, or on whom there devolves any social\nfunction, is certain to think and feel, respecting the obligations it\nimposes on him, exactly what society appears to think and feel in\nconferring it. What seems to be expected from him by society forms a\nstandard which he may fall below, but which he will seldom rise above.\nAnd the interpretation which he is almost sure to put upon secret\nvoting is that he is not bound to give his vote with any reference to\nthose who are not allowed to know how he gives it; but may bestow it\nsimply as he feels inclined.\n\nThis is the decisive reason why the argument does not hold, from the\nuse of the ballot in clubs and private societies to its adoption in\nparliamentary elections. A member of a club is really, what the\nelector falsely believes himself to be, under no obligation to\nconsider the wishes or interests of any one else. He declares nothing\nby his vote but that he is or is not willing to associate, in a manner\nmore or less close, with a particular person. This is a matter on\nwhich, by universal admission, his own pleasure or inclination is\nentitled to decide; and that he should be able so to decide it without\nrisking a quarrel is best for every body, the rejected person\nincluded. An additional reason rendering the ballot unobjectionable in\nthese cases is that it does not necessarily or naturally lead to\nlying. The persons concerned are of the same class or rank, and it\nwould be considered improper in one of them to press another with\nquestions as to how he had voted. It is far otherwise in Parliamentary\nelections, and is likely to remain so as long as the social relations\nexist which produce the demand for the ballot--as long as one person\nis sufficiently the superior of another to think himself entitled to\ndictate his vote. And while this is the case, silence or an evasive\nanswer is certain to be construed as proof that the vote given has not\nbeen that which was desired.\n\nIn any political election, even by universal suffrage (and still more\nobviously in the case of a restricted suffrage), the voter is under an\nabsolute moral obligation to consider the interest of the public, not\nhis private advantage, and give his vote, to the best of his judgment,\nexactly as he would be bound to do if he were the sole voter, and the\nelection depended upon him alone. This being admitted, it is at least\na _prima facie_ consequence that the duty of voting, like any other\npublic duty, should be performed under the eye and criticism of the\npublic; every one of whom has not only an interest in its performance,\nbut a good title to consider himself wronged if it is performed\notherwise than honestly and carefully. Undoubtedly neither this nor\nany other maxim of political morality is absolutely inviolable; it may\nbe overruled by still more cogent considerations. But its weight is\nsuch that the cases which admit of a departure from it must be of a\nstrikingly exceptional character.\n\nIt may unquestionably be the fact, that if we attempt, by publicity,\nto make the voter responsible to the public for his vote, he will\npractically be made responsible for it to some powerful individual,\nwhose interest is more opposed to the general interest of the\ncommunity than that of the voter himself would be, if, by the shield\nof secrecy, he were released from responsibility altogether. When this\nis the condition, in a high degree, of a large proportion of the\nvoters, the ballot may be the smaller evil. When the voters are\nslaves, any thing may be tolerated which enables them to throw off the\nyoke. The strongest case for the ballot is when the mischievous power\nof the Few over the Many is increasing. In the decline of the Roman\nrepublic, the reasons for the ballot were irresistible. The oligarchy\nwas yearly becoming richer and more tyrannical, the people poorer and\nmore dependent, and it was necessary to erect stronger and stronger\nbarriers against such abuse of the franchise as rendered it but an\ninstrument the more in the hands of unprincipled persons of\nconsequence. As little can it be doubted that the ballot, so far as it\nexisted, had a beneficial operation in the Athenian constitution. Even\nin the least unstable of the Grecian commonwealths, freedom might be\nfor the time destroyed by a single unfairly obtained popular vote; and\nthough the Athenian voter was not sufficiently dependent to be\nhabitually coerced, he might have been bribed or intimidated by the\nlawless outrages of some knot of individuals, such as were not\nuncommon even at Athens among the youth of rank and fortune. The\nballot was in these cases a valuable instrument of order, and conduced\nto the Eunomia by which Athens was distinguished among the ancient\ncommonwealths.\n\nBut in the more advanced states of modern Europe, and especially in\nthis country, the power of coercing voters has declined and is\ndeclining; and bad voting is now less to be apprehended from the\ninfluences to which the voter is subject at the hands of others, than\nfrom the sinister interests and discreditable feelings which belong to\nhimself, either individually or as a member of a class. To secure him\nagainst the first, at the cost of removing all restraint from the\nlast, would be to exchange a smaller and a diminishing evil for a\ngreater and increasing one. On this topic, and on the question\ngenerally as applicable to England at the present date, I have, in a\npamphlet on Parliamentary Reform, expressed myself in terms which, as\nI do not feel that I can improve upon, I will venture here to\ntranscribe.\n\n\"Thirty years ago it was still true that in the election of members of\nParliament the main evil to be guarded against was that which the\nballot would exclude--coercion by landlords, employers, and customers.\nAt present, I conceive, a much greater source of evil is the\nselfishness, or the selfish partialities of the voter himself. A base\nand mischievous vote is now, I am convinced, much oftener given from\nthe voter's personal interest, or class interest, or some mean feeling\nin his own mind, than from any fear of consequences at the hands of\nothers; and to these influences the ballot would enable him to yield\nhimself up, free from all sense of shame or responsibility.\n\n\"In times not long gone by, the higher and richer classes were in\ncomplete possession of the government. Their power was the master\ngrievance of the country. The habit of voting at the bidding of an\nemployer or of a landlord was so firmly established that hardly any\nthing was capable of shaking it but a strong popular enthusiasm,\nseldom known to exist but in a good cause. A vote given in opposition\nto those influences was therefore, in general, an honest, a\npublic-spirited vote; but in any case, and by whatever motive\ndictated, it was almost sure to be a good vote, for it was a vote\nagainst the monster evil, the overruling influence of oligarchy. Could\nthe voter at that time have been enabled, with safety to himself, to\nexercise his privilege freely, even though neither honestly nor\nintelligently, it would have been a great gain to reform, for it would\nhave broken the yoke of the then ruling power in the country--the\npower which had created and which maintained all that was bad in the\ninstitutions and the administration of the state--the power of\nlandlords and boroughmongers.\n\n\"The ballot was not adopted; but the progress of circumstances has\ndone and is doing more and more, in this respect, the work of the\nballot. Both the political and the social state of the country, as\nthey affect this question, have greatly changed, and are changing\nevery day. The higher classes are not now masters of the country. A\nperson must be blind to all the signs of the times who could think\nthat the middle classes are as subservient to the higher, or the\nworking classes as dependent on the higher and middle, as they were a\nquarter of a century ago. The events of that quarter of a century have\nnot only taught each class to know its own collective strength, but\nhave put the individuals of a lower class in a condition to show a\nmuch bolder front to those of a higher. In a majority of cases, the\nvote of the electors, whether in opposition to or in accordance with\nthe wishes of their superiors, is not now the effect of coercion,\nwhich there are no longer the same means of applying, but the\nexpression of their own personal or political partialities. The very\nvices of the present electoral system are a proof of this. The growth\nof bribery, so loudly complained of, and the spread of the contagion\nto places formerly free from it, are evidence that the local\ninfluences are no longer paramount; that the electors now vote to\nplease themselves, and not other people. There is, no doubt, in\ncounties and in the smaller boroughs, a large amount of servile\ndependence still remaining; but the temper of the times is adverse to\nit, and the force of events is constantly tending to diminish it. A\ngood tenant can now feel that he is as valuable to his landlord as his\nlandlord is to him; a prosperous tradesman can afford to feel\nindependent of any particular customer. At every election the votes\nare more and more the voter's own. It is their minds, far more than\ntheir personal circumstances, that now require to be emancipated. They\nare no longer passive instruments of other men's will--mere organs for\nputting power into the hands of a controlling oligarchy. The electors\nthemselves are becoming the oligarchy.\n\n\"Exactly in proportion as the vote of the elector is determined by his\nown will, and not by that of somebody who is his master, his position\nis similar to that of a member of Parliament, and publicity is\nindispensable. So long as any portion of the community are\nunrepresented, the argument of the Chartists against ballot in\nconjunction with a restricted suffrage is unassailable. The present\nelectors, and the bulk of those whom any probable Reform Bill would\nadd to the number, are the middle class, and have as much a class\ninterest, distinct from the working classes, as landlords or great\nmanufacturers. Were the suffrage extended to all skilled laborers,\neven these would, or might, still have a class interest distinct from\nthe unskilled. Suppose it extended to all men--suppose that what was\nformerly called by the misapplied name of universal suffrage, and now\nby the silly title of manhood suffrage, became the law; the voters\nwould still have a class interest as distinguished from women. Suppose\nthat there were a question before the Legislature specially affecting\nwomen--as whether women should be allowed to graduate at universities;\nwhether the mild penalties inflicted on ruffians who beat their wives\ndaily almost to death's door should be exchanged for something more\neffectual; or suppose that any one should propose in the British\nParliament what one state after another in America is enacting, not by\na mere law, but by a provision of their revised Constitutions; that\nmarried women should have a right to their own property--are not a\nman's wife and daughters entitled to know whether he votes for or\nagainst a candidate who will support these propositions?\n\n\"It will of course be objected that these arguments' derive all their\nweight from the supposition of an unjust state of the suffrage: that\nif the opinion of the non-electors is likely to make the elector vote\nmore honestly or more beneficially than he would vote if left to\nhimself, they are more fit to be electors than he is, and ought to\nhave the franchise; that whoever is fit to influence electors is fit\nto be an elector; that those to whom voters ought to be responsible\nshould be themselves voters, and, being such, should have the\nsafeguard of the ballot, to shield them from the undue influence of\npowerful individuals or classes to whom they ought not to be\nresponsible.\n\n\"This argument is specious, and I once thought it conclusive. It now\nappears to me fallacious. All who are fit to influence electors are\nnot, for that reason, fit to be themselves electors. This last is a\nmuch greater power than the former, and those may be ripe for the\nminor political function who could not as yet be safely trusted with\nthe superior. The opinions and wishes of the poorest and rudest class\nof laborers may be very useful as one influence among others on the\nminds of the voters, as well as on those of the Legislature, and yet\nit might be highly mischievous to give them the preponderant\ninfluence, by admitting them, in their present state of morals and\nintelligence, to the full exercise of the suffrage. It is precisely\nthis indirect influence of those who have not the suffrage over those\nwho have, which, by its progressive growth, softens the transition to\nevery fresh extension of the franchise, and is the means by which,\nwhen the time is ripe, the extension is peacefully brought about. But\nthere is another and a still deeper consideration, which should never\nbe left out of the account in political speculations. The notion is\nitself unfounded that publicity, and the sense of being answerable to\nthe public, are of no use unless the public are qualified to form a\nsound judgment. It is a very superficial view of the utility of public\nopinion to suppose that it does good only when it succeeds in\nenforcing a servile conformity to itself. To be under the eyes of\nothers--to have to defend oneself to others--is never more important\nthan to those who act in opposition to the opinion of others, for it\nobliges them to have sure ground of their own. Nothing has so\nsteadying an influence as working against pressure. Unless when under\nthe temporary sway of passionate excitement, no one will do that which\nhe expects to be greatly blamed for, unless from a preconceived and\nfixed purpose of his own, which is always evidence of a thoughtful and\ndeliberate character, and, except in radically bad men, generally\nproceeds from sincere and strong personal convictions. Even the bare\nfact of having to give an account of their conduct is a powerful\ninducement to adhere to conduct of which at least some decent account\ncan be given. If any one thinks that the mere obligation of preserving\ndecency is not a very considerable check on the abuse of power, he has\nnever had his attention called to the conduct of those who do not feel\nunder the necessity of observing that restraint. Publicity is\ninappreciable, even when it does no more than prevent that which can\nby no possibility be plausibly defended--than compel deliberation, and\nforce every one to determine, before he acts, what he shall say if\ncalled to account for his actions.\n\n\"But, if not now (it may be said), at least hereafter, when all are\nfit to have votes, and when all men and women are admitted to vote in\nvirtue of their fitness, _then_ there can no longer be danger of class\nlegislation; then the electors, being the nation, can have no interest\napart from the general interest: even if individuals still vote\naccording to private or class inducements, the majority will have no\nsuch inducement; and as there will then be no non-electors to whom\nthey ought to be responsible, the effect of the ballot, excluding none\nbut the sinister influences, will be wholly beneficial.\n\n\"Even in this I do not agree. I can not think that even if the people\nwere fit for, and had obtained universal suffrage, the ballot would be\ndesirable. First, because it could not, in such circumstances, be\nsupposed to be needful. Let us only conceive the state of things which\nthe hypothesis implies: a people universally educated, and every\ngrown-up human being possessed of a vote. If, even when only a small\nproportion are electors, and the majority of the population almost\nuneducated, public opinion is already, as every one now sees that it\nis, the ruling power in the last resort, it is a chimera to suppose\nthat over a community who all read, and who all have votes, any power\ncould be exercised by landlords and rich people against their own\ninclination, which it would be at all difficult for them to throw off.\nBut, though the protection of secrecy would then be needless, the\ncontrol of publicity would be as needful as ever. The universal\nobservation of mankind has been very fallacious, if the mere fact of\nbeing one of the community, and not being in a position of pronounced\ncontrariety of interest to the public at large, is enough to insure\nthe performance of a public duty, without either the stimulus or the\nrestraint derived from the opinion of our fellow-creatures. A man's\nown particular share of the public interest, even though he may have\nno private interest drawing him in the opposite direction, is not, as\na general rule, found sufficient to make him do his duty to the public\nwithout other external inducements. Neither can it be admitted that,\neven if all had votes, they would give their votes as honestly in\nsecret as in public.\n\n\"The proposition that the electors, when they compose the whole of the\ncommunity, can not have an interest in voting against the interest of\nthe community, will be found, on examination, to have more sound than\nmeaning in it. Though the community, as a whole, can have (as the\nterms imply) no other interest than its collective interest, any or\nevery individual in it may. A man's interest consists of whatever he\ntakes an interest _in_. Every body has as many different interests as\nhe has feelings; likings or dislikings, either of a selfish or of a\nbetter kind. It can not be said that any of these, taken by itself,\nconstitutes 'his interest:' he is a good man or a bad according as he\nprefers one class of his interests or another. A man who is a tyrant\nat home will be apt to sympathize with tyranny (when not exercised\nover himself); he will be almost certain not to sympathize with\nresistance to tyranny. An envious man will vote against Aristides\nbecause he is called the Just. A selfish man will prefer even a\ntrifling individual benefit to his share of the advantage which his\ncountry would derive from a good law, because interests peculiar to\nhimself are those which the habits of his mind both dispose him to\ndwell on and make him best able to estimate. A great number of the\nelectors will have two sets of preferences--those on private and those\non public grounds. The last are the only ones which the elector would\nlike to avow. The best side of their character is that which people\nare anxious to show, even to those who are no better than themselves.\nPeople will give dishonest or mean votes from lucre, from malice, from\npique, from personal rivalry, even from the interests or prejudices of\nclass or sect, more readily in secret than in public. And cases\nexist--they may come to be more frequent--in which almost the only\nrestraint upon a majority of knaves consists in their involuntary\nrespect for the opinion of an honest minority. In such a case as that\nof the repudiating states of North America, is there not some check to\nthe unprincipled voter in the shame of looking an honest man in the\nface? Since all this good would be sacrificed by the ballot, even in\nthe circumstances most favorable to it, a much stronger case is\nrequisite than can now be made out for its necessity (and the case is\ncontinually becoming still weaker) to make its adoption desirable.\"\n[4]\n\nOn the other debateable points connected with the mode of voting, it\nis not necessary to expend so many words. The system of personal\nrepresentation, as organized by Mr. Hare, renders necessary the\nemployment of voting papers. But it appears to me indispensable that\nthe signature of the elector should be affixed to the paper at a\npublic polling-place, or if there be no such place conveniently\naccessible, at some office open to all the world, and in the presence\nof a responsible public officer. The proposal which has been thrown\nout of allowing the voting papers to be filled up at the voter's own\nresidence, and sent by the post, or called for by a public officer, I\nshould regard as fatal. The act would be done in the absence of the\nsalutary and the presence of all the pernicious influences. The briber\nmight, in the shelter of privacy, behold with his own eyes his\nbargain fulfilled, and the intimidator could see the extorted\nobedience rendered irrevocably on the spot; while the beneficent\ncounter-influence of the presence of those who knew the voter's real\nsentiments, and the inspiring effect of the sympathy of those of his\nown party or opinion, would be shut out. [5]\n\nThe polling places should be so numerous as to be within easy reach of\nevery voter, and no expenses of conveyance, at the cost of the\ncandidate, should be tolerated under any pretext. The infirm, and they\nonly on medical certificate, should have the right of claiming\nsuitable carriage conveyance at the cost of the state or of the\nlocality. Hustings, poll clerks, and all the necessary machinery of\nelections, should be at the public charge. Not only the candidate\nshould not be required, he should not be permitted to incur any but a\nlimited and trifling expense for his election. Mr. Hare thinks it\ndesirable that a sum of L50 should be required from every one who\nplaces his name on the list of candidates, to prevent persons who have\nno chance of success, and no real intention of attempting it, from\nbecoming candidates in wantonness or from mere love of notoriety, and\nperhaps carrying off a few votes which are needed for the return of\nmore serious aspirants. There is one expense which a candidate or his\nsupporters can not help incurring, and which it can hardly be expected\nthat the public should defray for every one who may choose to demand\nit--that of making his claims known to the electors, by\nadvertisements, placards, and circulars. For all necessary expenses of\nthis kind the L50 proposed by Mr. Hare, if allowed to be drawn upon\nfor these purposes (it might be made L100 if requisite), ought to be\nsufficient. If the friends of the candidate choose to go to expense\nfor committees and canvassing, there are no means of preventing them;\nbut such expenses out of the candidates's own pocket, or any expenses\nwhatever beyond the deposit of L50 (or L100), should be illegal and\npunishable. If there appeared any likelihood that opinion would refuse\nto connive at falsehood, a declaration on oath or honor should be\nrequired from every member, on taking his seat, that he had not\nexpended, nor would expend, money or money's worth beyond the L50,\ndirectly or indirectly, for the purposes of his election; and if the\nassertion were proved to be false or the pledge to have been broken,\nhe should be liable to the penalties of perjury. It is probable that\nthose penalties, by showing that the Legislature was in earnest, would\nturn the course of opinion in the same direction, and would hinder it\nfrom regarding, as has hitherto done, this most serious crime against\nsociety as a venial peccadillo. When once this effect has been\nproduced, there need be no doubt that the declaration on oath or honor\nwould be considered binding. [6] \"Opinion tolerates a false\ndisclaimer only when it already tolerates the thing disclaimed.\" This\nis notoriously the case with regard to electoral corruption. There has\nnever yet been, among political men, any real and serious attempt to\nprevent bribery, because there has been no real desire that elections\nshould not be costly. Their costliness is an advantage to those who\ncan afford the expense by excluding a multitude of competitors; and\nany thing, however noxious, is cherished as having a conservative\ntendency, if it limits the access to Parliament to rich men. This is a\nrooted feeling among our legislators of both political parties, and is\nalmost the only point on which I believe them to be really\nill-intentioned. They care comparatively little who votes, as long as\nthey feel assured that none but persons of their own class can be\nvoted for. They know that they can rely on the fellow-feeling of one\nof their class with another, while the subservience of _nouveaux\nenrichis_ who are knocking at the door of the class is a still surer\nreliance; and that nothing very hostile to the class interests or\nfeelings of the rich need be apprehended under the most democratic\nsuffrage, as long as democratic persons can be prevented from being\nelected to Parliament. But, even from their own point of view, this\nbalancing of evil by evil, instead of combining good with good, is a\nwretched policy. The object should be to bring together the best\nmembers of both classes, under such a tenure as shall induce them to\nlay aside their class preferences, and pursue jointly the path traced\nby the common interest, instead of allowing the class feelings of the\nMany to have full swing in the constituencies, subject to the\nimpediment of having to act through persons imbued with the class\nfeelings of the Few.\n\nThere is scarcely any mode in which political institutions are more\nmorally mischievous--work greater evil through their spirit--than by\nrepresenting political functions as a favor to be conferred, a thing\nwhich the depositary is to ask for as desiring it for himself, and\neven pay for as if it were designed for his pecuniary benefit. Men are\nnot fond of paying large sums for leave to perform a laborious duty.\nPlato had a much juster view of the conditions of good government when\nhe asserted that the persons who should be sought out to be invested\nwith political power are those who are personally most averse to it,\nand that the only motive which can be relied on for inducing the\nfittest men to take upon themselves the toils of government is the\nfear of being governed by worse men. What must an elector think when\nhe sees three or four gentlemen, none of them previously observed to\nbe lavish of their money on projects of disinterested beneficence,\nvying with one another in the sums they expend to be enabled to write\nM.P. after their names? Is it likely he will suppose that it is for\n_his_ interest they incur all this cost? And if he form an\nuncomplimentary opinion of their part in the affair, what moral\nobligation is he likely to feel as to his own? Politicians are fond of\ntreating it as the dream of enthusiasts that the electoral body will\never be uncorrupt: truly enough, until they are willing to become so\nthemselves; for the electors, assuredly, will take their moral tone\nfrom the candidates. So long as the elected member, in any shape or\nmanner, pays for his seat, all endeavours will fail to make the\nbusiness of election any thing but a selfish bargain on all sides. \"So\nlong as the candidate himself, and the customs of the world, seem to\nregard the function of a member of Parliament less as a duty to be\ndischarged than a personal favor to be solicited, no effort will avail\nto implant in an ordinary voter the feeling that the election of a\nmember of Parliament is also a matter of duty, and that he is not at\nliberty to bestow his vote on any other consideration than that of\npersonal fitness.\"\n\nThe same principle which demands that no payment of money for election\npurposes should be either required or tolerated on the part of the\nperson elected, dictates another conclusion, apparently of contrary\ntendency, but really directed to the same object. It negatives what\nhas often been proposed as a means of rendering Parliament accessible\nto persons of all ranks and circumstances--the payment of members of\nParliament. If, as in some of our colonies, there are scarcely any fit\npersons who can afford to attend to an unpaid occupation, the payment\nshould be an indemnity for loss of time or money, not a salary. The\ngreater latitude of choice which a salary would give is an illusory\nadvantage. No remuneration which any one would think of attaching to\nthe post would attract to it those who were seriously engaged in other\nlucrative professions, with a prospect of succeeding in them. The\noccupation of a member of Parliament would therefore become an\noccupation in itself, carried on, like other professions, with a view\nchiefly to its pecuniary returns, and under the demoralizing\ninfluences of an occupation essentially precarious. It would become an\nobject of desire to adventurers of a low class; and 658 persons in\npossession, with ten or twenty times as many in expectancy, would be\nincessantly bidding to attract or retain the suffrages of the\nelectors, by promising all things, honest or dishonest, possible or\nimpossible, and rivaling each other in pandering to the meanest\nfeelings and most ignorant prejudices of the vulgarest part of the\ncrowd. The auction between Cleon and the sausage-seller in\nAristophanes is a fair caricature of what would be always going on.\nSuch an institution would be a perpetual blister applied to the most\npeccant parts of human nature. It amounts to offering 658 prizes for\nthe most successful flatterer, the most adroit misleader of a body of\nhis fellow-countrymen. Under no despotism has there been such an\norganized system of tillage for raising a rich crop of vicious\ncourtiership. [7] When, by reason of pre-eminent qualifications\n(as may at any time happen to be the case), it is desirable that a\nperson entirely without independent means, either derived from\nproperty or from a trade or profession, should be brought into\nParliament to render services which no other person accessible can\nrender as well, there is the resource of a public subscription; he may\nbe supported while in Parliament, like Andrew Marvel, by the\ncontributions of his constituents. This mode is unobjectionable for\nsuch an honor will never be paid to mere subserviency: bodies of men\ndo not care so much for the difference between one sycophant and\nanother as to go to the expense of his maintenance in order to be\nflattered by that particular individual. Such a support will only be\ngiven in consideration of striking and impressive personal qualities,\nwhich, though no absolute proof of fitness to be a national\nrepresentative, are some presumption of it, and, at all events, some\nguaranty for the possession of an independent opinion and will.\n\n\n\nChapter XI--Of the Duration of Parliaments.\n\n\nAfter how long a term should members of Parliament be subject to\nre-election? The principles involved are here very obvious; the\ndifficulty lies in their application. On the one hand, the member\nought not to have so long a tenure of his seat as to make him forget\nhis responsibility, take his duties easily, conduct them with a view\nto his own personal advantage, or neglect those free and public\nconferences with his constituents which, whether he agrees or differs\nwith them, are one of the benefits of representative government. On\nthe other hand, he should have such a term of office to look forward\nto as will enable him to be judged, not by a single act, but by his\ncourse of action. It is important that he should have the greatest\nlatitude of individual opinion and discretion compatible with the\npopular control essential to free government; and for this purpose it\nis necessary that the control should be exercised, as in any case it\nis best exercised, after sufficient time has been given him to show\nall the qualities he possesses, and to prove that there is some other\nway than that of a mere obedient voter and advocate of their opinions,\nby which he can render himself, in the eyes of his constituents, a\ndesirable and creditable representative. It is impossible to fix, by\nany universal rule, the boundary between these principles. Where the\ndemocratic power in the constitution is weak or over-passive, and\nrequires stimulation; where the representative, on leaving his\nconstituents, enters at once into a courtly or aristocratic\natmosphere, whose influences all tend to deflect his course into a\ndifferent direction from the popular one, to tone down any democratic\nfeelings which he may have brought with him, and make him forget the\nwishes and grow cool to the interests of those who chose him, the\nobligation of a frequent return to them for a renewal of his\ncommission is indispensable to keeping his temper and character up to\nthe right mark. Even three years, in such circumstances, are almost\ntoo long a period, and any longer term is absolutely inadmissible.\nWhere, on the contrary, democracy is the ascendant power, and still\ntends to increase, requiring rather to be moderated in its exercise\nthan encouraged to any abnormal activity; where unbounded publicity,\nand an ever-present newspaper press give the representative assurance\nthat his every act will be immediately known, discussed, and judged by\nhis constituents, and that he is always either gaining or losing\nground in the estimation, while, by the same means, the influence of\ntheir sentiments, and all other democratic influences, are kept\nconstantly alive and active in his own mind, less than five years\nwould hardly be a sufficient period to prevent timid subserviency. The\nchange which has taken place in English politics as to all these\nfeatures explains why annual Parliaments, which forty years ago stood\nprominently in front of the creed of the more advanced reformers, are\nso little cared for and so seldom heard of at present. It deserves\nconsideration that, whether the term is short or long, during the last\nyear of it the members are in position in which they would always be\nif Parliaments were annual; so that, if the term were very brief,\nthere would virtually be annual Parliaments during a great proportion\nof all time. As things now are, the period of seven years, though of\nunnecessary length, is hardly worth altering for any benefit likely to\nbe produced, especially since the possibility, always impending, of an\nearlier dissolution keeps the motives for standing well with\nconstituents always before the member's eyes.\n\nWhatever may be the term most eligible for the duration of the\nmandate, it might seem natural that the individual member should\nvacate his seat at the expiration of that term from the day of his\nelection, and that there should be no general renewal of the whole\nHouse. A great deal might be said for this system if there were any\npractical object in recommending it. But it is condemned by much\nstronger reasons than can be alleged in its support. One is, that\nthere would be no means of promptly getting rid of a majority which\nhad pursued a course offensive to the nation. The certainty of a\ngeneral election after a limited, which would often be a nearly\nexpired period, and the possibility of it at any time when the\nminister either desires it for his own sake, or thinks that it would\nmake him popular with the country, tend to prevent that wide\ndivergence between the feelings of the assembly and those of the\nconstituency, which might subsist indefinitely if the majority of the\nHouse had always several years of their term still to run--if it\nreceived new infusions drop by drop, which would be more likely to\nassume than to modify the qualities of the mass they were joined to.\nIt is as essential that the general sense of the House should accord\nin the main with that of the nation as is that distinguished\nindividuals should be able, without forfeiting their seats, to give\nfree utterance to the most unpopular sentiments. There is another\nreason, of much weight, against the gradual and partial renewal of a\nrepresentative assembly. It is useful that there should be a\nperiodical general muster of opposing forces to gauge the state of the\nnational mind, and ascertain, beyond dispute, the relative strength of\ndifferent parties and opinions. This is not done conclusively by any\npartial renewal, even where, as in some of the French constitutions, a\nlarge fraction--a fifth or a third--go out at once.\n\nThe reasons for allowing to the executive the power of dissolution\nwill be considered in a subsequent chapter, relating to the\nconstitution and functions of the executive in a representative\ngovernment.\n\n\n\nChapter XII--Ought Pledges to be Required from Members of Parliament?\n\n\nShould a member of the legislature be bound by the instructions of his\nconstituents? Should he be the organ of their sentiments, or of his\nown? their ambassador to a congress, or their professional agent,\nempowered not only to act for them, but to judge for them what ought\nto be done? These two theories of the duty of a legislator in a\nrepresentative government have each its supporters, and each is the\nrecognized doctrine of some representative governments. In the Dutch\nUnited Provinces, the members of the States-General were mere\ndelegates; and to such a length was the doctrine carried, that when\nany important question arose which had not been provided for in their\ninstructions, they had to refer back to their constituents, exactly as\nan ambassador does to the government from which he is accredited. In\nthis and most other countries which possess representative\nconstitutions, law and custom warrant a member of Parliament in voting\naccording to his opinion of right, however different from that of his\nconstituents; but there is a floating notion of the opposite kind,\nwhich has considerable practical operation on many minds, even of\nmembers of Parliament, and often makes them, independently of desire\nfor popularity or concern for their re-election, feel bound in\nconscience to let their conduct on questions on which their\nconstituents have a decided opinion be the expression of that opinion\nrather than of their own. Abstractedly from positive law, and from the\nhistorical traditions of any particular people, which of these notions\nof the duty of a representative is the true one?\n\nUnlike the questions which we have hitherto treated, this is not a\nquestion of constitutional legislation, but of what may more properly\nbe called constitutional morality--the ethics of representative\ngovernment. It does not so much concern institutions as the temper of\nmind which the electors ought to bring to the discharge of their\nfunctions, the ideas which should prevail as to the moral duties of an\nelector; for, let the system of representation be what it may, it will\nbe converted into one of mere delegation if the electors so choose. As\nlong as they are free not to vote, and free to vote as they like, they\ncan not be prevented from making their vote depend on any condition\nthey think fit to annex to it. By refusing to elect any one who will\nnot pledge himself to all their opinions, and even, if they please, to\nconsult with them before voting on any important subject not foreseen,\nthey can reduce their representative to their mere mouthpiece, or\ncompel him in honor, when no longer willing to act in that capacity,\nto resign his seat. And since they have the power of doing this, the\ntheory of the Constitution ought to suppose that they will wish to do\nit, since the very principle of constitutional government requires it\nto be assumed that political power will be abused to promote the\nparticular purposes of the holder; not because it always is so, but\nbecause such is the natural tendency of things, to guard against which\nis the especial use of free institutions. However wrong, therefore, or\nhowever foolish, we may think it in the electors to convert their\nrepresentative into a delegate, that stretch of the electoral\nprivilege being a natural and not improbable one, the same precautions\nought to be taken as if it were certain. We may hope that the electors\nwill not act on this notion of the use of the suffrage; but a\nrepresentative government needs to be so framed that even if they do,\nthey shall not be able to effect what ought not to be in the power of\nany body of persons--class legislation for their own benefit.\n\nWhen it is said that the question is only one of political morality,\nthis does not extenuate its importance. Questions of constitutional\nmorality are of no less practical moment than those relating to the\nconstitution itself. The very existence of some governments, and all\nthat renders others endurable, rests on the practical observance of\ndoctrines of constitutional morality; traditional notions in the minds\nof the several constituted authorities, which modify the use\nthat might otherwise be made of their powers. In unbalanced\ngovernments--pure monarchy, pure aristocracy, pure democracy--such\nmaxims are the only barrier which restrains the government from the\nutmost excesses in the direction of its characteristic tendency. In\nimperfectly balanced governments, where some attempt is made to set\nconstitutional limits to the impulses of the strongest power, but\nwhere that power is strong enough to overstep them with at least\ntemporary impunity, it is only by doctrines of constitutional\nmorality, recognized and sustained by opinion, that any regard at all\nis preserved for the checks and limitations of the constitution. In\nwell-balanced governments, in which the supreme power is divided, and\neach sharer is protected against the usurpations of the others in the\nonly manner possible, namely, by being armed for defense with weapons\nas strong as the others can wield for attack, the government can only\nbe carried on by forbearance on all sides to exercise those extreme\npowers, unless provoked by conduct equally extreme on the part of some\nother sharer of power; and in this case we may truly say that only by\nthe regard paid to maxims of constitutional morality is the\nconstitution kept in existence. The question of pledges is not one of\nthose which vitally concern the existence of representative\ngovernments, but it is very material to their beneficial operation.\nThe laws can not prescribe to the electors the principles by which\nthey shall direct their choice, but it makes a great practical\ndifference by what principles they think they ought to direct it; and\nthe whole of that great question is involved in the inquiry whether\nthey should make it a condition that the representative shall adhere\nto certain opinions laid down for him by his constituents.\n\nNo reader of this treatise can doubt what conclusion, as to this\nmatter, results from the general principles which it professes.\nWe have from the first affirmed, and unvaryingly kept in\nview, the coequal importance of two great requisites of\ngovernment--responsibility to those for whose benefit political power\nought to be, and always professes to be, employed; and jointly\ntherewith, to obtain, in the greatest measure possible, for the\nfunction of government, the benefits of superior intellect, trained by\nlong meditation and practical discipline to that special task. If this\nsecond purpose is worth attaining, it is worth the necessary price.\nSuperior powers of mind and profound study are of no use, if they do\nnot sometimes lead a person to different conclusions from those which\nare formed by ordinary powers of mind without study; and if it be an\nobject to possess representatives in any intellectual respect superior\nto average electors, it must be counted upon that the representative\nwill sometimes differ in opinion from the majority of his\nconstituents, and that when he does, his opinion will be the oftenest\nright of the two. It follows that the electors will not do wisely if\nthey insist on absolute conformity to their opinions as the condition\nof his retaining his seat.\n\nThe principle is thus far obvious; but there are real difficulties in\nits application, and we will begin by stating them in their greatest\nforce. If it is important that the electors should choose a\nrepresentative more highly instructed than themselves, it is no less\nnecessary that this wiser man should be responsible to them; in other\nwords, they are the judges of the manner in which he fulfils his\ntrust; and how are they to judge, except by the standard of their own\nopinions? How are they even to select him in the first instance but by\nthe same standard? It will not do to choose by mere brilliancy--by\nsuperiority of showy talent. The tests by which an ordinary man can\njudge beforehand of mere ability are very imperfect; such as they are,\nthey have almost exclusive reference to the arts of expression, and\nlittle or none to the worth of what is expressed. The latter can not\nbe inferred from the former; and if the electors are to put their own\nopinions in abeyance, what criterion remains to them of the ability to\ngovern well? Neither, if they could ascertain, even infallibly, the\nablest man, ought they to allow him altogether to judge for them,\nwithout any reference to their own opinions. The ablest candidate may\nbe a Tory, and the electors Liberals; or a Liberal, and they may be\nTories. The political questions of the day may be Church questions,\nand he may be a High-Churchman or a Rationalist, while they may be\nDissenters or Evangelicals, and _vice versa_. His abilities, in these\ncases, might only enable him to go greater lengths, and act with\ngreater effect, in what they may conscientiously believe to be a wrong\ncourse; and they may be bound, by their sincere convictions, to think\nit more important that their representative should be kept, on these\npoints, to what they deem the dictate of duty, than that they should\nbe represented by a person of more than average abilities. They may\nalso have to consider, not solely how they can be most ably\nrepresented, but how their particular moral position and mental point\nof view shall be represented at all. The influence of every mode of\nthinking which is shared by numbers ought to be felt in the\nLegislature; and the Constitution being supposed to have made due\nprovision that other and conflicting modes of thinking shall be\nrepresented likewise, to secure the proper representation for their\nown mode may be the most important matter which the electors on the\nparticular occasion have to attend to. In some cases, too, it may be\nnecessary that the representative should have his hands tied to keep\nhim true to their interest, or rather to the public interest as they\nconceive it. This would not be needful under a political system which\nassured them an indefinite choice of honest and unprejudiced\ncandidates; but under the existing system, in which the electors are\nalmost always obliged, by the expenses of election and the general\ncircumstances of society, to select their representative from persons\nof a station in life widely different from theirs, and having a\ndifferent class interest, who will affirm that they ought to abandon\nthemselves to his discretion? Can we blame an elector of the poorer\nclasses, who has only the choice among two or three rich men, for\nrequiring from the one he votes for a pledge to those measures which\nhe considers as a test of emancipation from the class interests of the\nrich? It will, moreover, always happens to some members of the\nelectoral body to be obliged to accept the representative selected by\na majority of their own side. But, though a candidate of their own\nchoosing would have no chance, their votes may be necessary to the\nsuccess of the one chosen for them, and their only means of exerting\ntheir share of influence on his subsequent conduct may be to make\ntheir support of him dependent on his pledging himself to certain\nconditions.\n\nThese considerations and counter-considerations are so intimately\ninterwoven with one another; it is so important that the electors\nshould choose as their representatives wiser men than themselves, and\nshould consent to be governed according to that superior wisdom, while\nit is impossible that conformity to their own opinions, when they have\nopinions, should not enter largely into their judgment as to who\npossesses the wisdom, and how far its presumed possessor has verified\nthe presumption by his conduct, that it seems quite impracticable to\nlay down for the elector any positive rule of duty; and the result\nwill depend less on any exact prescription or authoritative doctrine\nof political morality than on the general tone of mind of the\nelectoral body in respect to the important requisite of deference to\nmental superiority. Individuals and peoples who are acutely sensible\nof the value of superior wisdom are likely to recognize it, where it\nexists, by other signs than thinking exactly as they do, and even in\nspite of considerable differences of opinion; and when they have\nrecognized it they will be far too desirous to secure it, at any\nadmissible cost, to be prone to impose their own opinion as a law upon\npersons whom they look up to as wiser than themselves. On the other\nhand, there is a character of mind which does not look up to any one;\nwhich thinks no other person's opinion much better than its own, or\nnearly so good as that of a hundred or a thousand persons like itself.\nWhere this is the turn of mind of the electors, they will elect no one\nwho is not, or at least who does not profess to be, the image of their\nown sentiments, and will continue him no longer than while he reflects\nthose sentiments in his conduct; and all aspirants to political honors\nwill endeavour, as Plato says in the Gorgias, to fashion themselves\nafter the model of the Demos, and make themselves as like to it as\npossible. It can not be denied that a complete democracy has a strong\ntendency to cast the sentiments of the electors in this mould.\nDemocracy is not favorable to the reverential spirit. That it destroys\nreverence for mere social position must be counted among the good, not\nthe bad part of its influences, though by doing this it closes the\nprincipal _school_ of reverence (as to merely human relations) which\nexists in society. But also democracy, in its very essence, insists so\nmuch more forcibly on the things in which all are entitled to be\nconsidered equally than on those in which one person is entitled to\nmore consideration than another, that respect for even personal\nsuperiority is likely to be below the mark. It is for this, among\nother reasons, I hold it of so much importance that the institutions\nof the country should stamp the opinions of persons of a more educated\nclass as entitled to greater weight than those of the less educated;\nand I should still contend for assigning plurality of votes to\nauthenticated superiority of education were it only to give the tone\nto public feeling, irrespective of any direct political consequences.\n\nWhen there does exist in the electoral body an adequate sense of the\nextraordinary difference in value between one person and another, they\nwill not lack signs by which to distinguish the persons whose worth\nfor their purposes is the greatest. Actual public services will\nnaturally be the foremost indication: to have filled posts of\nmagnitude, and done important things in them, of which the wisdom has\nbeen justified by the results; to have been the author of measures\nwhich appear from their effects to have been wisely planned; to have\nmade predictions which have been of verified by the event, seldom or\nnever falsified by it; to have given advice, which when taken has been\nfollowed by good consequences--when neglected, by bad. There is\ndoubtless a large portion of uncertainty in these signs of wisdom; but\nwe are seeking for such as can be applied by persons of ordinary\ndiscernment. They will do well not to rely much on any one indication,\nunless corroborated by the rest, and, in their estimation of the\nsuccess or merit of any practical effort, to lay great stress on the\ngeneral opinion of disinterested persons conversant with the subject\nmatter. The tests which I have spoken of are only applicable to tried\nmen, among whom must be reckoned those who, though untried\npractically, have been tried speculatively; who, in public speech or\nin print, have discussed public affairs in a manner which proves that\nthey have given serious study to them. Such persons may, in the mere\ncharacter of political thinkers, have exhibited a considerable amount\nof the same titles to confidence as those who have been proved in the\nposition of practical statesmen. When it is necessary to choose\npersons wholly untried, the best criteria are, reputation for ability\namong those who personally know them, and the confidence placed and\nrecommendations given by persons already looked up to. By tests like\nthese, constituencies who sufficiently value mental ability, and\neagerly seek for it, will generally succeed in obtaining men beyond\nmediocrity, and often men whom they can trust to carry on public\naffairs according to their unfettered judgment; to whom it would be an\naffront to require that they should give up that judgment at the\nbehest of their inferiors in knowledge. If such persons, honestly\nsought, are not to be found, then indeed the electors are justified in\ntaking other precautions, for they can not be expected to postpone\ntheir particular opinions, unless in order that they may be served by\na person of superior knowledge to their own. They would do well,\nindeed, even then, to remember that when once chosen, the\nrepresentative, if he devotes himself to his duty, has greater\nopportunities of correcting an original false judgment than fall to\nthe lot of most of his constituents; a consideration which generally\nought to prevent them (unless compelled by necessity to choose some\none whose impartiality they do not fully trust) from exacting a pledge\nnot to change his opinion, or, if he does, to resign his seat. But\nwhen an unknown person, not certified in unmistakable terms by some\nhigh authority, is elected for the first time, the elector can not be\nexpected not to make conformity to his own sentiments the primary\nrequisite. It is enough if he does not regard a subsequent change of\nthose sentiments, honestly avowed, with its grounds undisguisedly\nstated, as a peremptory reason for withdrawing his confidence.\n\nEven supposing the most tried ability and acknowledged eminence of\ncharacter in the representative, the private opinions of the electors\nare not to be placed entirely in abeyance. Deference to mental\nsuperiority is not to go the length of self-annihilation--abnegation\nof any personal opinion. But when the difference does not relate to\nthe fundamentals of politics, however decided the elector may be in\nhis own sentiments, he ought to consider that when an able man differs\nfrom him there is at least a considerable chance of his being in the\nwrong, and that even if otherwise, it is worth while to give up his\nopinion in things not absolutely essential, for the sake of the\ninestimable advantage of having an able man to act for him in the many\nmatters in which he himself is not qualified to form a judgment. In\nsuch cases he often endeavours to reconcile both wishes by inducing\nthe able man to sacrifice his own opinion on the points of difference;\nbut for the able man to lend himself to this compromise is treason\nagainst his especial office--abdication of the peculiar duties of\nmental supremacy, of which it is one of the most sacred not to desert\nthe cause which has the clamor against it, nor to deprive of his\nservices those of his opinions which need them the most. A man of\nconscience and known ability should insist on full freedom to act as\nhe in his own judgment deems best, and should not consent to serve on\nany other terms. But the electors are entitled to know how he means to\nact; what opinions, on all things which concern his public duty, he\nintends should guide his conduct. If some of these are unacceptable to\nthem, it is for him to satisfy them that he nevertheless deserves to\nbe their representative; and if they are wise, they will overlook, in\nfavor of his general value, many and great differences between his\nopinions and their own. There are some differences, however, which\nthey can not be expected to overlook. Whoever feels the amount of\ninterest in the government of his country which befits a freeman, has\nsome convictions on national affairs which are like his life-blood;\nwhich the strength of his belief in their truth, together with the\nimportance he attaches to them, forbid him to make a subject of\ncompromise, or postpone to the judgment of any person, however greatly\nhis superior. Such convictions, when they exist in a people, or in any\nappreciable portion of one, are entitled to influence in virtue of\ntheir mere existence, and not solely in that of the probability of\ntheir being grounded in truth. A people can not be well governed in\nopposition to their primary notions of right, even though these may be\nin some points erroneous. A correct estimate of the relation which\nshould subsist between governors and governed does not require the\nelectors to consent to be represented by one who intends to govern\nthem in opposition to their fundamental convictions. If they avail\nthemselves of his capacities of useful service in other respects at a\ntime when the points on which he is vitally at issue with them are not\nlikely to be mooted, they are justified in dismissing him at the first\nmoment when a question arises involving these, and on which there is\nnot so assured a majority for what they deem right as to make the\ndissenting voice of that particular individual unimportant. Thus (I\nmention names to illustrate my meaning, not for any personal\napplication) the opinions supposed to be entertained by Mr. Cobden and\nMr. Bright on resistance to foreign aggression might be overlooked\nduring the Crimean war, when there was an overwhelming national\nfeeling on the contrary side, and might yet very properly lead to\ntheir rejection by the electors at the time of the Chinese quarrel\n(though in itself a more doubtful question), because it was then for\nsome time a moot point whether their view of the case might not\nprevail.\n\nAs the general result of what precedes, we may affirm that actual\npledges should not be required unless, from unfavorable social\ncircumstances or family institutions, the electors are so narrowed in\ntheir choice as to be compelled to fix it on a person presumptively\nunder the influence of partialities hostile to their interest: That\nthey are entitled to a full knowledge of the political opinions and\nsentiments of the candidate; and not only entitled, but often bound to\nreject one who differs from themselves on the few articles which are\nthe foundation of their political belief: that, in proportion to the\nopinion they entertain of the mental superiority of a candidate, they\nought to put up with his expressing and acting on opinions different\nfrom theirs on any number of things not included in their fundamental\narticles of belief: that they ought to be unremitting in their search\nfor a representative of such calibre as to be intrusted with full\npower of obeying the dictates of his own judgment: that they should\nconsider it a duty which they owe to their fellow-countrymen, to do\ntheir utmost toward placing men of this quality in the Legislature,\nand that it is of much greater importance to themselves to be\nrepresented by such a man than by one who professes agreement in a\ngreater number of their opinions; for the benefits of his ability are\ncertain, while the hypothesis of his being wrong and their being right\non the points of difference is a very doubtful one.\n\nI have discussed this question on the assumption that the electoral\nsystem, in all that depends on positive institution, conforms to the\nprinciples laid down in the preceding chapters. Even on this\nhypothesis, the delegation theory of representation seems to me false,\nand its practical operation hurtful, though the mischief would in that\ncase be confined within certain bounds. But if the securities by which\nI have endeavoured to guard the representative principle are not\nrecognized by the Constitution; if provision is not made for the\nrepresentation of minorities, nor any difference admitted in the\nnumerical value of votes, according to some criterion of the amount of\neducation possessed by the voters--in that case, no words can\nexaggerate the importance in principle of leaving an unfettered\ndiscretion to the representative; for it would then be the only\nchance, under universal suffrage, for any other opinions than those of\nthe majority to be heard in Parliament. In that falsely called\ndemocracy which is really the exclusive rule of the operative classes,\nall others being unrepresented and unheard, the only escape from class\nlegislation in its narrowest, and political ignorance in its most\ndangerous form, would lie in such disposition as the uneducated might\nhave to choose educated representatives, and to defer to their\nopinions. Some willingness to do this might reasonably be expected,\nand every thing would depend upon cultivating it to the highest point.\nBut, once invested with political omnipotence, if the operative\nclasses voluntarily concurred in imposing in this or any other manner\nany considerable limitation upon their self-opinion and self-will,\nthey would prove themselves wiser than any class possessed of absolute\npower has shown itself, or, we may venture to say, is ever likely to\nshow itself under that corrupting influence.\n\n\n\nChapter XIII--Of a Second Chamber.\n\n\nOf all topics relating to the theory of representative government,\nnone have been the subject of more discussion, especially on the\nContinent, than what is known as the question of the Two Chambers. It\nhas occupied a greater amount of the attention of thinkers than many\nquestions of ten times its importance, and has been regarded as a sort\nof touchstone which distinguishes the partisans of limited from those\nof uncontrolled democracy. For my own part, I set little value on any\ncheck which a Second Chamber can apply to a democracy otherwise\nunchecked; and I am inclined to think that if all other constitutional\nquestions are rightly decided, it is of comparatively little\nimportance whether the Parliament consists of two Chambers or only of\none.\n\nIf there are two chambers, they may either be of similar or of\ndissimilar composition. If of similar, both will obey the same\ninfluences, and whatever has a majority in one of the houses will be\nlikely to have it in the other. It is true that the necessity of\nobtaining the consent of both to the passing of any measure may at\ntimes be a material obstacle to improvement, since, assuming both the\nhouses to be representative and equal in their numbers, a number\nslightly exceeding a fourth of the entire representation may prevent\nthe passing of a bill; while, if there is but one house, a bill is\nsecure of passing if it has a bare majority. But the case supposed is\nrather abstractedly possible than likely to occur in practice. It will\nnot often happen that, of two houses similarly composed, one will be\nalmost unanimous, and the other nearly equally divided; if a majority\nin one rejects a measure, there will generally have been a large\nminority unfavorable to it in the other; any improvement, therefore,\nwhich could be thus impeded, would in almost all cases be one which\nhad not much more than a simple majority in the entire body, and the\nworst consequence that could ensue would be to delay for a short time\nthe passing of the measure, or give rise to a fresh appeal to the\nelectors to ascertain if the small majority in Parliament corresponded\nto an effective one in the country. The inconvenience of delay, and\nthe advantages of the appeal to the nation, might be regarded in this\ncase as about equally balanced.\n\nI attach little weight to the argument oftenest urged for having two\nChambers--to prevent precipitancy, and compel a second deliberation;\nfor it must be a very ill-constituted representative assembly in which\nthe established forms of business do not require many more than two\ndeliberations. The consideration which tells most, in my judgment, in\nfavor of two Chambers (and this I do regard as of some moment), is the\nevil effect produced upon the mind of any holder of power, whether an\nindividual or an assembly, by the consciousness of having only\nthemselves to consult. It is important that no set of persons should\nbe able, even temporarily, to make their _sic volo_ prevail without\nasking any one else for his consent. A majority in a single assembly,\nwhen it has assumed a permanent character--when composed of the same\npersons habitually acting together, and always assured of victory in\ntheir own House--easily becomes despotic and overweening if released\nfrom the necessity of considering whether its acts will be concurred\nin by another constituted authority. The same reason which induced the\nRomans to have two consuls makes it desirable there should be two\nChambers--that neither of them may be exposed to the corrupting\ninfluence of undivided power even for the space of a single year. One\nof the most indispensable requisites in the practical conduct of\npolitics, especially in the management of free institutions, is\nconciliation; a readiness to compromise; a willingness to concede\nsomething to opponents, and to shape good measures so as to be as\nlittle offensive as possible to persons of opposite views; and of this\nsalutary habit, the mutual give and take (as it has been called)\nbetween two houses is a perpetual school--useful as such even now, and\nits utility would probably be even more felt in a more democratic\nconstitution of the Legislature.\n\nBut the houses need not both be of the same composition; they may be\nintended as a check on one another. One being supposed democratic, the\nother will naturally be constituted with a view to its being some\nrestraint upon the democracy. But its efficacy in this respect wholly\ndepends on the social support which it can command outside the House.\nAn assembly which does not rest on the basis of some great power in\nthe country is ineffectual against one which does. An aristocratic\nHouse is only powerful in an aristocratic state of society. The House\nof Lords was once the strongest power in our Constitution, and the\nCommons only a checking body; but this was when the barons were almost\nthe only power out of doors. I can not believe that, in a really\ndemocratic state of society, the House of Lords would be of any\npractical value as a moderator of democracy. When the force on one\nside is feeble in comparison with that on the other, the way to give\nit effect is not to draw both out in line, and muster their strength\nin open field over against one another. Such tactics would insure the\nutter defeat of the less powerful. It can only act to advantage by not\nholding itself apart, and compelling every one to declare himself\neither with or against it, but taking a position among the crowd\nrather than in opposition to it, and drawing to itself the elements\nmost capable of allying themselves with it on any given point; not\nappearing at all as an antagonist body, to provoke a general rally\nagainst it, but working as one of the elements in a mixed mass,\ninfusing its leaven, and often making what would be the weaker part\nthe stronger, by the addition of its influence. The really moderating\npower in a democratic constitution must act in and through the\ndemocratic House.\n\nThat there should be, in every polity, a centre of resistance to the\npredominant power in the Constitution--and in a democratic\nconstitution, therefore, a nucleus of resistance to the democracy--I\nhave already maintained; and I regard it as a fundamental maxim of\ngovernment. If any people who possess a democratic representation are,\nfrom their historical antecedents, more willing to tolerate such a\ncentre of resistance in the form of a Second Chamber or House of Lords\nthan in any other shape, this constitutes a stronger reason for having\nit in that shape. But it does not appear to me the best shape in\nitself, nor by any means the most efficacious for its object. If there\nare two houses, one considered to represent the people, the other to\nrepresent only a class, or not to be representative at all, I can not\nthink that, where democracy is the ruling power in society, the second\nHouse would have any real ability to resist even the aberrations of\nthe first. It might be suffered to exist in deference to habit and\nassociation, but not as an effective check. If it exercised an\nindependent will, it would be required to do so in the same general\nspirit as the other House; to be equally democratic with it, and to\ncontent itself with correcting the accidental oversights of the more\npopular branch of the Legislature, or competing with it in popular\nmeasures.\n\nThe practicability of any real check to the ascendancy of the majority\ndepends henceforth on the distribution of strength in the most popular\nbranch of the governing body; and I have indicated the mode in which,\nto the best of my judgment, a balance of forces might most\nadvantageously be established there. I have also pointed out that,\neven if the numerical majority were allowed to exercise complete\npredominance by means of a corresponding majority in Parliament, yet\nif minorities also are permitted to enjoy the equal right due to them\non strictly democratic principles, of being represented proportionally\nto their numbers, this provision will insure the perpetual presence in\nthe House, by the same popular title as its other members, of so many\nof the first intellects in the country, that without being in any way\nbanded apart, or invested with any invidious prerogative, this portion\nof the national representation will have a personal weight much more\nthan in proportion to its numerical strength, and will afford, in a\nmost effective form, the moral centre of resistance which is needed. A\nsecond Chamber, therefore, is not required for this purpose, and would\nnot contribute to it, but might even, in some degree, tend to\ncompromise it. If, however, for the other reasons already mentioned,\nthe decision were taken that there should be such a Chamber, it is\ndesirable that it should be composed of elements which, without being\nopen to the imputation of class interests adverse to the majority,\nwould incline it to oppose itself to the class interests of the\nmajority, and qualify it to raise its voice with authority against\ntheir errors and weaknesses. These conditions evidently are not found\nin a body constituted in the manner of our House of Lords. So soon as\nconventional rank and individual riches no longer overawe the\ndemocracy, a House of Lords becomes insignificant.\n\nOf all principles on which a wisely conservative body, destined to\nmoderate and regulate democratic ascendancy, could possibly be\nconstructed, the best seems to be that exemplified in the Roman\nSenate, itself the most consistently prudent and sagacious body that\never administered public affairs. The deficiencies of a democratic\nassembly, which represents the general public, are the deficiencies of\nthe public itself, want of special training and knowledge. The\nappropriate corrective is to associate with it a body of which special\ntraining and knowledge should be the characteristics. If one House\nrepresents popular feeling, the other should represent personal merit,\ntested and guaranteed by actual public service, and fortified by\npractical experience. If one is the People's Chamber, the other should\nbe the Chamber of Statesmen--a council composed of all living public\nmen who have passed through important political office or employment.\nSuch a Chamber would be fitted for much more than to be a merely\nmoderating body. It would not be exclusively a check, but also an\nimpelling force. In its hands, the power of holding the people back\nwould be vested in those most competent, and who would then be most\ninclined to lead them forward in any right course. The council to whom\nthe task would be intrusted of rectifying the people's mistakes would\nnot represent a class believed to be opposed to their interest, but\nwould consist of their own natural leaders in the path of progress. No\nmode of composition could approach to this in giving weight and\nefficacy to their function of moderators. It would be impossible to\ncry down a body always foremost in promoting improvements as a mere\nobstructive body, whatever amount of mischief it might obstruct.\n\nWere the place vacant in England for such a Senate (I need scarcely\nsay that this is a mere hypothesis), it might be composed of some such\nelements as the following: All who were or had been members of the\nLegislative Commission described in a former chapter, and which I\nregard as an indispensable ingredient in a well constituted popular\ngovernment. All who were or had been chief justices, or heads of any\nof the superior courts of law or equity. All who had for five years\nfilled the office of puisne judge. All who had held for two years any\ncabinet office; but these should also be eligible to the House of\nCommons, and, if elected members of it, their peerage or senatorial\noffice should be held in suspense. The condition of time is needed to\nprevent persons from being named cabinet ministers merely to give them\na seat in the Senate; and the period of two years is suggested, that\nthe same term which qualifies them for a pension might entitle them to\na senatorship. All who had filled the office of commander-in-chief;\nand all who, having commanded an army or a fleet, had been thanked by\nParliament for military or naval successes. All governors general of\nIndia or British America, and all who had held for ten years any\ncolonial governorships. The permanent civil service should also be\nrepresented; all should be senators who had filled, during ten years,\nthe important offices of under-secretary to the Treasury, permanent\nunder-secretary of State, or any others equally high and responsible.\nThe functions conferring the senatorial dignity should be limited to\nthose of a legal, political, or military or naval character.\nScientific and literary eminence are too indefinite and disputable:\nthey imply a power of selection, whereas the other qualifications\nspeak for themselves; if the writings by which reputation has been\ngained are unconnected with politics, they are no evidence of the\nspecial qualities required, while, if political, they would enable\nsuccessive ministries to deluge the House with party tools.\n\nThe historical antecedents of England render it all but certain that,\nunless in the improbable case of a violent subversion of the existing\nConstitution, any second Chamber which could possibly exist would have\nto be built on the foundation of the House of Lords. It is out of the\nquestion to think practically of abolishing that assembly, to replace\nit by such a Senate as I have sketched or by any other; but there\nmight not be the same insuperable difficulty in aggregating the\nclasses or categories just spoken of to the existing body in the\ncharacter of peers for life. An ulterior, and perhaps, on this\nsupposition, a necessary step, might be, that the hereditary peerage\nshould be present in the House by their representatives instead of\npersonally: a practice already established in the case of the Scotch\nand Irish peers, and which the mere multiplication of the order will\nprobably at some time or other render inevitable. An easy adaptation\nof Mr. Hare's plan would prevent the representative peers from\nrepresenting exclusively the party which has the majority in the\npeerage. If, for example, one representative were allowed for every\nten peers, any ten might be admitted to choose a representative, and\nthe peers might be free to group themselves for that purpose as they\npleased. The election might be thus conducted: All peers who were\ncandidates for the representation of their order should be required to\ndeclare themselves such, and enter their names in a list. A day and\nplace should be appointed at which peers desirous of voting should be\npresent, either in person, or, in the usual Parliamentary manner, by\ntheir proxies. The votes should be taken, each peer voting for only\none. Every candidate who had as many as ten votes should be declared\nelected. If any one had more, all but ten should be allowed to\nwithdraw their votes, or ten of the number should be selected by lot.\nThese ten would form his constituency, and the remainder of his voters\nwould be set free to give their votes over again for some one else.\nThis process should be repeated until (so far as possible) every peer\npresent either personally or by proxy was represented. When a number\nless than ten remained over, if amounting to five they might still be\nallowed to agree on a representative; if fewer than five, their votes\nmust be lost, or they might be permitted to record them in favor of\nsomebody already elected. With this inconsiderable exception, every\nrepresentative peer would represent ten members of the peerage, all of\nwhom had not only voted for him, but selected him as the one, among\nall open to their choice, by whom they were most desirous to be\nrepresented. As a compensation to the peers who were not chosen\nrepresentatives of their order, they should be eligible to the House\nof Commons; a justice now refused to Scotch peers, and to Irish peers\nin their own part of the kingdom, while the representation in the\nHouse of Lords of any but the most numerous party in the peerage is\ndenied equally to both.\n\nThe mode of composing a Senate which has been here advocated not only\nseems the best in itself, but is that for which historical precedent\nand actual brilliant success can to the greatest extent be pleaded. It\nis not however the only feasible plan that might be proposed. Another\npossible mode of forming a Second Chamber would be to have it elected\nby the First; subject to the restriction that they should not nominate\nany of their own members. Such an assembly, emanating, like the\nAmerican Senate, from popular choice only once removed, would not be\nconsidered to clash with democratic institutions, and would probably\nacquire considerable popular influence. From the mode of its\nnomination, it would be peculiarly unlikely to excite the jealousy of,\nor to come into hostile collision with the popular House. It would,\nmoreover (due provision being made for the representation of the\nminority), be almost sure to be well composed, and to comprise many of\nthat class of highly capable men who, either from accident or for want\nof showy qualities, had been unwilling to seek, or unable to obtain,\nthe suffrages of a popular constituency.\n\nThe best constitution of a Second Chamber is that which embodies the\ngreatest number of elements exempt from the class interests and\nprejudices of the majority, but having in themselves nothing offensive\nto democratic feeling. I repeat, however, that the main reliance for\ntempering the ascendancy of the majority can be placed in a Second\nChamber of any kind. The character of a representative government is\nfixed by the constitution of the popular House. Compared with this,\nall other questions relating to the form of government are\ninsignificant.\n\n\n\nChapter XIV--Of the Executive in a Representative Government.\n\n\nIt would be out of place in this treatise to discuss the question into\nwhat departments or branches the executive business of government may\nmost conveniently be divided. In this respect the exigencies of\ndifferent governments are different; and there is little probability\nthat any great mistake will be made in the classification of the\nduties when men are willing to begin at the beginning, and do not hold\nthemselves bound by the series of accidents which, in an old\ngovernment like ours, has produced the existing division of the public\nbusiness. It may be sufficient to say that the classification of\nfunctionaries should correspond to that of subjects, and that there\nshould not be several departments independent of one another, to\nsuperintend different parts of the same natural whole, as in our own\nmilitary administration down to a recent period, and in a less degree\neven at present. Where the object to be attained is single (such as\nthat of having an efficient army), the authority commissioned to\nattend to it should be single likewise. The entire aggregate of means\nprovided for one end should be under one and the same control and\nresponsibility. If they are divided among independent authorities, the\nmeans with each of those authorities become ends, and it is the\nbusiness of nobody except the head of the government, who has probably\nno departmental experience, to take care of the real end. The\ndifferent classes of means are not combined and adapted to one another\nunder the guidance of any leading idea; and while every department\npushes forward its own requirements, regardless of those of the rest,\nthe purpose of the work is perpetually sacrificed to the work itself.\n\nAs a general rule, every executive function, whether superior or\nsubordinate, should be the appointed duty of some given individual. It\nshould be apparent to all the world who did every thing, and through\nwhose default any thing was left undone. Responsibility is null when\nnobody knows who is responsible; nor, even when real, can it be\ndivided without being weakened. To maintain it at its highest, there\nmust be one person who receives the whole praise of what is well done,\nthe whole blame of what is ill. There are, however, two modes of\nsharing responsibility; by one it is only enfeebled, by the other\nabsolutely destroyed. It is enfeebled when the concurrence of more\nthan one functionary is required to the same act. Each one among them\nhas still a real responsibility; if a wrong has been done, none of\nthem can say he did not do it; he is as much a participant as an\naccomplice is in an offense: if there has been legal criminality, they\nmay all be punished legally, and their punishment needs not be less\nsevere than if there had been only one person concerned. But it is not\nso with the penalties any more than with the rewards of opinion; these\nare always diminished by being shared. Where there has been no\ndefinite legal offense, no corruption or malversation, only an error\nor an imprudence, or what may pass for such, every participator has an\nexcuse to himself and to the world in the fact that other persons are\njointly involved with him. There is hardly any thing, even to\npecuniary dishonesty, for which men will not feel themselves almost\nabsolved, if those whose duty it was to resist and remonstrate have\nfailed to do it, still more if they have given a formal assent.\n\nIn this case, however, though responsibility is weakened, there still\nis responsibility: every one of those implicated has in his individual\ncapacity assented to, and joined in the act. Things are much worse\nwhen the act itself is only that of a majority--a board deliberating\nwith closed doors, nobody knowing, or, except in some extreme case,\nbeing ever likely to know, whether an individual member voted for the\nact or against it. Responsibility in this case is a mere name.\n\"Boards,\" it is happily said by Bentham, \"are screens.\" What \"the\nBoard\" does is the act of nobody, and nobody can be made to answer for\nit. The Board suffers, even in reputation, only in its collective\ncharacter; and no individual member feels this further than his\ndisposition leads him to identify his own estimation with that of the\nbody--a feeling often very strong when the body is a permanent one,\nand he is wedded to it for better for worse; but the fluctuations of a\nmodern official career give no time for the formation of such an\n_esprit de corps_, which, if it exists at all, exists only in the\nobscure ranks of the permanent subordinates. Boards, therefore, are\nnot a fit instrument for executive business, and are only admissible\nin it when, for other reasons, to give full discretionary power to a\nsingle minister would be worse.\n\nOn the other hand, it is also a maxim of experience that in the\nmultitude of councillors there is wisdom, and that a man seldom judges\nright, even in his own concerns, still less in those of the public,\nwhen he makes habitual use of no knowledge but his own, or that of\nsome single adviser. There is no necessary incompatibility between\nthis principle and the other. It is easy to give the effective power\nand the full responsibility to one, providing him when necessary with\nadvisers, each of whom is responsible only for the opinion he gives.\n\nIn general, the head of a department of the executive government is a\nmere politician. He may be a good politician, and a man of merit; and,\nunless this is usually the case, the government is bad. But his\ngeneral capacity, and the knowledge he ought to possess of the general\ninterests of the country, will not, unless by occasional accident, be\naccompanied by adequate, and what may be called professional knowledge\nof the department over which he is called to preside. Professional\nadvisers must therefore be provided for him. Wherever mere experience\nand attainments are sufficient--wherever the qualities required in a\nprofessional adviser may possibly be united in a single well-selected\nindividual (as in the case, for example, of a law officer), one such\nperson for general purposes, and a staff of clerks to supply knowledge\nof details, meet the demands of the case. But, more frequently, it is\nnot sufficient that the minister should consult some one competent\nperson, and, when himself not conversant with the subject, act\nimplicitly on that person's advice. It is often necessary that he\nshould, not only occasionally, but habitually, listen to a variety of\nopinions, and inform his judgment by the discussions among a body of\nadvisers. This, for example, is emphatically necessary in military and\nnaval affairs. The military and naval ministers, therefore, and\nprobably several others, should be provided with a Council, composed,\nat least in those two departments, of able and experienced\nprofessional men. As a means of obtaining the best men for the purpose\nunder every change of administration, they ought to be permanent; by\nwhich I mean that they ought not, like the Lords of the Admiralty, to\nbe expected to resign with the ministry by whom they were appointed;\nbut it is a good rule that all who hold high appointments to which\nthey have risen by selection, and not by the ordinary course of\npromotion, should retain their office only for a fixed term, unless\nreappointed, as is now the rule with staff appointments in the British\narmy. This rule renders appointments somewhat less likely to be\njobbed, not being a provision for life, and the same time affords a\nmeans, without affront to any one, of getting rid of those who are\nleast worth keeping, and bringing in highly qualified persons of\nyounger standing, for whom there might never be room if death\nvacancies, or voluntary resignations were waited for.\n\nThe councils should be consultative merely, in this sense, that the\nultimate decision should rest undividedly with the minister himself;\nbut neither ought they to be looked upon, or to look upon themselves\nas ciphers, or as capable of being reduced to such at his pleasure.\nThe advisers attached to a powerful and perhaps self-willed man ought\nto be placed under conditions which make it impossible for them,\nwithout discredit, not to express an opinion, and impossible for him\nnot to listen to and consider their recommendations, whether he adopts\nthem or not. The relation which ought to exist between a chief and\nthis description of advisers is very accurately hit by the\nconstitution of the Council of the Governor General and those of the\ndifferent Presidencies in India. These councils are composed of\npersons who have professional knowledge of Indian affairs, which the\ngovernor general and governors usually lack, and which it would not be\ndesirable to require of them. As a rule, every member of council is\nexpected to give an opinion, which is of course very often a simple\nacquiescence; but if there is a difference of sentiment, it is at the\noption of every member, and is the invariable practice, to record the\nreasons of his opinion, the governor general, or governor, doing the\nsame. In ordinary cases the decision is according to the sense of the\nmajority; the council, therefore, has a substantial part in the\ngovernment; but if the governor general, or governor, thinks fit, he\nmay set aside even their unanimous opinion, recording his reasons. The\nresult is, that the chief is individually and effectively responsible\nfor every act of the government. The members of council have only the\nresponsibility of advisers; but it is always known, from documents\ncapable of being produced, and which, if called for by Parliament or\npublic opinion always are produced, what each has advised, and what\nreasons he gave for his advice; while, from their dignified position,\nand ostensible participation in all acts of government, they have\nnearly as strong motives to apply themselves to the public business,\nand to form and express a well-considered opinion on every part of it,\nas if the whole responsibility rested with themselves.\n\nThis mode of conducting the highest class of administrative business\nis one of the most successful instances of the adaptation of means to\nends which political history, not hitherto very prolific in works of\nskill and contrivance, has yet to show. It is one of the acquisitions\nwith which the art of politics has been enriched by the experience of\nthe East India Company's rule; and, like most of the other wise\ncontrivances by which India has been preserved to this country, and an\namount of good government produced which is truly wonderful\nconsidering the circumstances and the materials, it is probably\ndestined to perish in the general holocaust which the traditions of\nIndian government seem fated to undergo since they have been placed at\nthe mercy of public ignorance and the presumptuous vanity of political\nmen. Already an outcry is raised for abolishing the councils as a\nsuperfluous and expensive clog on the wheels of government; while the\nclamor has long been urgent, and is daily obtaining more countenance\nin the highest quarters, for the abrogation of the professional civil\nservice, which breeds the men that compose the councils, and the\nexistence of which is the sole guaranty for their being of any value.\n\nA most important principle of good government in a popular\nconstitution is that no executive functionaries should be appointed by\npopular election, neither by the votes of the people themselves, nor\nby those of their representatives. The entire business of government\nis skilled employment; the qualifications for the discharge of it are\nof that special and professional kind which can not be properly judged\nof except by persons who have themselves some share of those\nqualifications, or some practical experience of them. The business of\nfinding the fittest persons to fill public employments--not merely\nselecting the best who offer, but looking out for the absolutely best,\nand taking note of all fit persons who are met with, that they may be\nfound when wanted--is very laborious, and requires a delicate as well\nas highly conscientious discernment; and as there is no public duty\nwhich is in general so badly performed, so there is none for which it\nis of greater importance to enforce the utmost practicable amount of\npersonal responsibility, by imposing it as a special obligation on\nhigh functionaries in the several departments. All subordinate public\nofficers who are not appointed by some mode of public competition\nshould be selected on the direct responsibility of the minister under\nwhom they serve. The ministers, all but the chief, will naturally be\nselected by the chief; and the chief himself, though really designated\nby Parliament, should be, in a regal government, officially appointed\nby the crown. The functionary who appoints should be the sole person\nempowered to remove any subordinate officer who is liable to removal,\nwhich the far greater number ought not to be, except for personal\nmisconduct, since it would be vain to expect that the body of persons\nby whom the whole detail of the public business is transacted, and\nwhose qualifications are generally of much more importance to the\npublic than those of the minister himself, will devote themselves to\ntheir profession, and acquire the knowledge and skill on which the\nminister must often place entire dependence, if they are liable at any\nmoment to be turned adrift for no fault, that the minister may gratify\nhimself, or promote his political interest, by appointing somebody\nelse.\n\nTo the principle which condemns the appointment of executive officers\nby popular suffrage, ought the chief of the executive, in a republican\ngovernment, to be an exception? Is it a good rule which, in the\nAmerican Constitution, provides for the election of the President once\nin every four years by the entire people? The question is not free\nfrom difficulty. There is unquestionably some advantage, in a country\nlike America, where no apprehension needs be entertained of a _coup\nd'etat_, in making the chief minister constitutionally independent of\nthe legislative body, and rendering the two great branches of the\ngovernment, while equally popular both in their origin and in their\nresponsibility, an effective check on one another. The plan is in\naccordance with that sedulous avoidance of the concentration of great\nmasses of power in the same hands, which is a marked characteristic of\nthe American federal Constitution. But the advantage, in this\ninstance, is purchased at a price above all reasonable estimates of\nits value. It seems far better that the chief magistrate in a republic\nshould be appointed avowedly, as the chief minister in a\nconstitutional monarchy is virtually, by the representative body. In\nthe first place, he is certain, when thus appointed, to be a more\neminent man. The party which has the majority in Parliament would\nthen, as a rule, appoint its own leader, who is always one of the\nforemost, and often the very foremost person in political life; while\nthe President of the United States, since the last survivor of the\nfounders of the republic disappeared from the scene, is almost always\neither an obscure man, or one who has gained any reputation he may\npossess in some other field than politics. And this, as I have before\nobserved, is no accident, but the natural effect of the situation. The\neminent men of a party, in an election extending to the whole country,\nare never its most available candidates. All eminent men have made\npersonal enemies, or, have done something, or at the lowest, professed\nsome opinion obnoxious to some local or other considerable division of\nthe community, and likely to tell with fatal effect upon the number of\nvotes; whereas a man without antecedents, of whom nothing is known but\nthat he professes the creed of the party, is readily voted for by its\nentire strength. Another important consideration is the great mischief\nof unintermitted electioneering. When the highest dignity in the state\nis to be conferred by popular election once in every few years, the\nwhole intervening time is spent in what is virtually a canvass.\nPresident, ministers, chiefs of parties, and their followers, are all\nelectioneerers: the whole community is kept intent on the mere\npersonalities of politics, and every public question is discussed and\ndecided with less reference to its merits than to its expected bearing\non the presidential election. If a system had been devised to make\nparty spirit the ruling principle of action in all public affairs, and\ncreate an inducement not only to make every question a party question,\nbut to raise questions for the purpose of founding parties upon them,\nit would have been difficult to contrive any means better adapted to\nthe purpose.\n\nI will not affirm that it would at all times and places be desirable\nthat the head of the executive should be so completely dependent upon\nthe votes of a representative assembly as the prime minister is in\nEngland, and is without inconvenience. If it were thought best to\navoid this, he might, though appointed by Parliament, hold his office\nfor a fixed period, independent of a Parliamentary vote, which would\nbe the American system minus the popular election and its evils. There\nis another mode of giving the head of the administration as much\nindependence of the Legislature as is at all compatible with the\nessentials of free government. He never could be unduly dependent on a\nvote of Parliament if he had, as the British prime minister\npractically has, the power to dissolve the House and appeal to the\npeople; if, instead of being turned out of office by a hostile vote,\nhe could only be reduced by it to the alternative of resignation or\ndissolution. The power of dissolving Parliament is one which I think\nit desirable he should possess, even under the system by which his own\ntenure of office is secured to him for a fixed period. There ought not\nto be any possibility of that deadlock in politics which would ensue\non a quarrel breaking out between a president and an assembly, neither\nof whom, during an interval which might amount to years, would have\nany legal means of ridding itself of the other. To get through such a\nperiod without a _coup d'etat_ being attempted, on either side or on\nboth, requires such a combination of the love of liberty and the habit\nof self-restraint as very few nations have yet shown themselves\ncapable of; and though this extremity were avoided, to expect that the\ntwo authorities would not paralyze each other's operations is to\nsuppose that the political life of the country will always be pervaded\nby a spirit of mutual forbearance and compromise, imperturbable by the\npassions and excitements of the keenest party struggles. Such a spirit\nmay exist, but even where it does there is imprudence in trying it too\nfar.\n\nOther reasons make it desirable that some power in the state (which\ncan only be the executive) should have the liberty of at any time, and\nat discretion, calling a new Parliament. When there is a real doubt\nwhich of two contending parties has the strongest following, it is\nimportant that there should exist a constitutional means of\nimmediately testing the point and setting it at rest. No other\npolitical topic has a chance of being properly attended to while this\nis undecided; and such an interval is mostly an interregnum for\npurposes of legislative or administrative improvement, neither party\nhaving sufficient confidence in its strength to attempt things likely\nto provoke opposition in any quarter that has either direct or\nindirect influence in the pending struggle.\n\nI have not taken account of the case in which the vast power\ncentralized in the chief magistrate, and the insufficient attachment\nof the mass of the people to free institutions, give him a chance of\nsuccess in an attempt to subvert the Constitution, and usurp sovereign\npower. Where such peril exists, no first magistrate is admissible whom\nthe Parliament can not, by a single vote, reduce to a private station.\nIn a state of things holding out any encouragement to that most\naudacious and profligate of all breaches of trust, even this\nentireness of constitutional dependence is but a weak protection.\n\nOf all officers of government, those in whose appointment any\nparticipation of popular suffrage is the most objectionable are\njudicial officers. While there are no functionaries whose special and\nprofessional qualifications the popular judgment is less fitted to\nestimate, there are none in whose case absolute impartiality, and\nfreedom from connection with politicians or sections of politicians,\nare of any thing like equal importance. Some thinkers, among others\nMr. Bentham, have been of opinion that, although it is better that\njudges should not be appointed by popular election, the people of\ntheir district ought to have the power, after sufficient experience,\nof removing them from their trust. It can not be denied that the\nirremovability of any public officer to whom great interests are\nintrusted is in itself an evil. It is far from desirable that there\nshould be no means of getting rid of a bad or incompetent judge,\nunless for such misconduct as he can be made to answer for in a\ncriminal court, and that a functionary on whom so much depends should\nhave the feeling of being free from responsibility except to opinion\nand his own conscience. The question however is, whether,\nin the peculiar position of a judge, and supposing that all\npracticable securities have been taken for an honest appointment,\nirresponsibility, except to his own and the public conscience, has\nnot, on the whole, less tendency to pervert his conduct than\nresponsibility to the government or to a popular vote. Experience has\nlong decided this point in the affirmative as regards responsibility\nto the executive, and the case is quite equally strong when the\nresponsibility sought to be enforced is to the suffrages of electors.\nAmong the good qualities of a popular constituency, those peculiarly\nincumbent upon a judge, calmness and impartiality, are not numbered.\nHappily, in that intervention of popular suffrage which is essential\nto freedom they are not the qualities required. Even the quality of\njustice, though necessary to all human beings, and therefore to all\nelectors, is not the inducement which decides any popular election.\nJustice and impartiality are as little wanted for electing a member of\nParliament as they can be in any transaction of men. The electors have\nnot to award something which either candidate has a right to, nor to\npass judgment on the general merits of the competitors, but to declare\nwhich of them has most of their personal confidence, or best\nrepresents their political convictions. A judge is bound to treat his\npolitical friend, or the person best known to him, exactly as he\ntreats other people; but it would be a breach of duty, as well as an\nabsurdity, if an elector did so. No argument can be grounded on the\nbeneficial effect produced on judges, as on all other functionaries,\nby the moral jurisdiction of opinion; for even in this respect, that\nwhich really exercises a useful control over the proceedings of a\njudge, when fit for the judicial office, is not (except sometimes in\npolitical cases) the opinion of the community generally, but that of\nthe only public by whom his conduct or qualifications can be duly\nestimated, the bar of his own court. I must not be understood to say\nthat the participation of the general public in the administration of\njustice is of no importance; it is of the greatest; but in what\nmanner? By the actual discharge of a part of the judicial office in\nthe capacity of jurymen. This is one of the few cases in politics in\nwhich it is better that the people should act directly and personally\nthan through their representatives, being almost the only case in\nwhich the errors that a person exercising authority may commit can be\nbetter borne than the consequences of making him responsible for them.\nIf a judge could be removed from office by a popular vote, whoever was\ndesirous of supplanting him would make capital for that purpose out of\nall his judicial decisions; would carry all of them, as far as he\nfound practicable, by irregular appeal before a public opinion wholly\nincompetent, for want of having heard the case, or from having heard\nit without either the precautions or the impartiality belonging to a\njudicial hearing; would play upon popular passion and prejudice where\nthey existed, and take pains to arouse them where they did not. And in\nthis, if the case were interesting, and he took sufficient trouble, he\nwould infallibly be successful, unless the judge or his friends\ndescended into the arena, and made equally powerful appeals on the\nother side. Judges would end by feeling that they risked their office\nupon every decision they gave in a case susceptible of general\ninterest, and that it was less essential for them to consider what\ndecision was just, than what would be most applauded by the public, or\nwould least admit of insidious misrepresentation. The practice\nintroduced by some of the new or revised State Constitutions in\nAmerica, of submitting judicial officers to periodical popular\nre-election, will be found, I apprehend, to be one of the most\ndangerous errors ever yet committed by democracy; and, were it not\nthat the practical good sense which never totally deserts the people\nof the United States is said to be producing a reaction, likely in no\nlong time to lead to the retraction of the error, it might with reason\nbe regarded as the first great downward step in the degeneration of\nmodern democratic government.\n\nWith regard to that large and important body which constitutes the\npermanent strength of the public service, those who do not change with\nchanges of politics, but remain to aid every minister by their\nexperience and traditions, inform him by their knowledge of business,\nand conduct official details under his general control--those, in\nshort, who form the class of professional public servants, entering\ntheir profession as others do while young, in the hope of rising\nprogressively to its higher grades as they advance in life--it is\nevidently inadmissible that these should be liable to be turned out,\nand deprived of the whole benefit of their previous service, except\nfor positive, proved, and serious misconduct. Not, of course, such\ndelinquency only as makes them amenable to the law, but voluntary\nneglect of duty, or conduct implying untrustworthiness for the\npurposes for which their trust is given them. Since, therefore, unless\nin case of personal culpability, there is no way of getting rid of\nthem except by quartering them on the public as pensioners, it is of\nthe greatest importance that the appointments should be well made in\nthe first instance; and it remains to be considered by what mode of\nappointment this purpose can best be attained.\n\nIn making first appointments, little danger is to be apprehended from\nwant of special skill and knowledge in the choosers, but much from\npartiality, and private or political interest. Being all appointed at\nthe commencement of manhood, not as having learned, but in order that\nthey may learn, their profession, the only thing by which the best\ncandidates can be discriminated is proficiency in the ordinary\nbranches of liberal education; and this can be ascertained without\ndifficulty, provided there be the requisite pains and the requisite\nimpartiality in those who are appointed to inquire into it. Neither\nthe one nor the other can reasonably be expected from a minister, who\nmust rely wholly on recommendations, and, however disinterested as to\nhis personal wishes, never will be proof against the solicitations of\npersons who have the power of influencing his own election, or whose\npolitical adherence is important to the ministry to which he belongs.\nThese considerations have introduced the practice of submitting all\ncandidates for first appointments to a public examination, conducted\nby persons not engaged in politics, and of the same class and quality\nwith the examiners for honors at the Universities. This would probably\nbe the best plan under any system; and under our Parliamentary\ngovernment it is the only one which affords a chance, I do not say of\nhonest appointment, but even of abstinence from such as are manifestly\nand flagrantly profligate.\n\nIt is also absolutely necessary that the examinations should be\ncompetitive, and the appointments given to those who are most\nsuccessful. A mere pass examination never, in the long run, does more\nthan exclude absolute dunces. When the question, in the mind of an\nexaminer, lies between blighting the prospects of an individual and\nperforming a duty to the public which, in the particular instance,\nseldom appears of first rate importance, and when he is sure to be\nbitterly reproached for doing the first, while in general no one will\neither know or care whether he has done the latter, the balance,\nunless he is a man of very unusual stamp, inclines to the side of\ngood-nature. A relaxation in one instance establishes a claim to it in\nothers, which every repetition of indulgence makes it more difficult\nto resist; each of these, in succession, becomes a precedent for more,\nuntil the standard of proficiency sinks gradually to something almost\ncontemptible. Examinations for degrees at the two great Universities\nhave generally been as slender in their requirements as those for\nhonors are trying and serious. Where there is no inducement to exceed\na certain minimum, the minimum comes to be the maximum: it becomes the\ngeneral practice not to aim at more; and as in every thing there are\nsome who do not attain all they aim at, however low the standard may\nbe pitched, there are always several who fall short of it. When, on\nthe contrary, the appointments are given to those, among a great\nnumber of candidates, who most distinguish themselves, and where the\nsuccessful competitors are classed in order of merit, not only each is\nstimulated to do his very utmost, but the influence is felt in every\nplace of liberal education throughout the country. It becomes with\nevery schoolmaster an object of ambition and an avenue to success to\nhave furnished pupils who have gained a high place in these\ncompetitions, and there is hardly any other mode in which the state\ncan do so much to raise the quality of educational institutions\nthroughout the country. Though the principle of competitive\nexaminations for public employment is of such recent introduction in\nthis country, and is still so imperfectly carried out, the Indian\nservice being as yet nearly the only case in which it exists in its\ncompleteness, a sensible effect has already begun to be produced on\nthe places of middle-class education, notwithstanding the difficulties\nwhich the principle has encountered from the disgracefully low\nexisting state of education in the country, which these very\nexaminations have brought into strong light. So contemptible has the\nstandard of acquirement been found to be, among the youths who obtain\nthe nomination from the minister, which entitles them to offer\nthemselves as candidates, that the competition of such candidates\nproduces almost a poorer result than would be obtained from a mere\npass examination; for no one would think of fixing the conditions of a\npass examination so low as is actually found sufficient to enable a\nyoung man to surpass his fellow-candidates. Accordingly, it is said\nthat successive years show on the whole a decline of attainments, less\neffort being made, because the results of former examinations have\nproved that the exertions then used were greater than would have been\nsufficient to attain the object. Partly from this decrease of effort,\nand partly because, even at the examinations which do not require a\nprevious nomination, conscious ignorance reduces the number of\ncompetitors to a mere handful, it has so happened that though there\nhave always been a few instances of great proficiency, the lower part\nof the list of successful candidates represents but a very moderate\namount of acquirement; and we have it on the word of the commissioners\nthat nearly all who have been unsuccessful have owed their failure to\nignorance, not of the higher branches of instruction, but of its very\nhumblest elements--spelling and arithmetic.\n\nThe outcries which continue to be made against these examinations by\nsome of the organs of opinion are often, I regret to say, as little\ncreditable to the good faith as to the good sense of the assailants.\nThey proceed partly by misrepresentation of the kind of ignorance\nwhich, as a matter of fact, actually leads to failure in the\nexaminations. They quote with emphasis the most recondite questions\n[8] which can be shown to have been ever asked, and make it appear\nas if unexceptionable answers to all these were made the _sine qua\nnon_ of success. Yet it has been repeated to satiety that such\nquestions are not put because it is expected of every one that he\nshould answer them, but in order that whoever is able to do so may\nhave the means of proving and availing himself of that portion of his\nknowledge. It is not as a ground of rejection, but as an additional\nmeans of success, that this opportunity is given. We are then asked\nwhether the kind of knowledge supposed in this, that, or the other\nquestion, is calculated to be of any use to the candidate after he has\nattained his object. People differ greatly in opinion as to what\nknowledge is useful. There are persons in existence, and a late\nForeign Secretary of State is one of them, who think English spelling\na useless accomplishment in a diplomatic attache or a clerk in a\ngovernment office. About one thing the objectors seem to be unanimous,\nthat general mental cultivation is not useful in these employments,\nwhatever else may be so. If, however (as I presume to think), it is\nuseful, or if any education at all is useful, it must be tested by the\ntests most likely to show whether the candidate possesses it or not.\nTo ascertain whether he has been well educated, he must be\ninterrogated in the things which he is likely to know if he has been\nwell educated, even though not directly pertinent to the work to which\nhe is to be appointed. Will those who object to his being questioned\nin classics and mathematics, tell us what they would have him\nquestioned in? There seems, however, to be equal objection to\nexamining him in these, and to examining him in any thing _but_ these.\nIf the Commissioners--anxious to open a door of admission to those who\nhave not gone through the routine of a grammar-school, or who make up\nfor the smallness of their knowledge of what is there taught by\ngreater knowledge of something else--allow marks to be gained by\nproficiency in any other subject of real utility, they are reproached\nfor that too. Nothing will satisfy the objectors but free admission of\ntotal ignorance.\n\nWe are triumphantly told that neither Clive nor Wellington could have\npassed the test which is prescribed for an aspirant to an engineer\ncadetship; as if, because Clive and Wellington did not do what was not\nrequired of them, they could not have done it if it had been required.\nIf it be only meant to inform us that it is possible to be a great\ngeneral without these things, so it is without many other things which\nare very useful to great generals. Alexander the Great had never heard\nof Vauban's rules, nor could Julius Caesar speak French. We are next\ninformed that book-worms, a term which seems to be held applicable to\nwhoever has the smallest tincture of book-knowledge, may not be good\nat bodily exercises, or have the habits of gentlemen. This is a very\ncommon line of remark with dunces of condition; but, whatever the\ndunces may think, they have no monopoly of either gentlemanly habits\nor bodily activity. Wherever these are needed, let them be inquired\ninto and separately provided for, not to the exclusion of mental\nqualifications, but in addition. Meanwhile, I am credibly informed\nthat in the Military Academy at Woolwich the competition cadets are as\nsuperior to those admitted on the old system of nomination in these\nrespects as in all others; that they learn even their drill more\nquickly, as indeed might be expected, for an intelligent person learns\nall things sooner than a stupid one; and that in general demeanor they\ncontrast so favorably with their predecessors, that the authorities of\nthe institutions are impatient for the day to arrive when the last\nremains of the old leaven shall have disappeared from the place. If\nthis be so, and it is easy to ascertain whether it is so, it is to be\nhoped we shall soon have heard for the last time that ignorance is a\nbetter qualification than knowledge for the military, and, _a\nfortiori_, for every other profession, or that any one good quality,\nhowever little apparently connected with liberal education, is at all\nlikely to be promoted by going without it.\n\nThough the first admission to government employment be decided by\ncompetitive examination, it would in most cases be impossible that\nsubsequent promotion should be so decided; and it seems proper that\nthis should take place, as it usually does at present, on a mixed\nsystem of seniority and selection. Those whose duties are of a routine\ncharacter should rise by seniority to the highest point to which\nduties merely of that description can carry them, while those to whom\nfunctions of particular trust, and requiring special capacity, are\nconfided, should be selected from the body on the discretion of the\nchief of the office. And this selection will generally be made\nhonestly by him if the original appointments take place by open\ncompetition, for under that system his establishment will generally\nconsist of individuals to whom, but for the official connection, he\nwould have been a stranger. If among them there be any in whom he, or\nhis political friends and supporters, take an interest, it will be but\noccasionally, and only when to this advantage of connection is added,\nas far as the initiatory examination could test it, at least equality\nof real merit; and, except when there is a very strong motive to job\nthese appointments, there is always a strong one to appoint the\nfittest person, being the one who gives to his chief the most useful\nassistance, saves him most trouble, and helps most to build up that\nreputation for good management of public business which necessarily\nand properly redound to the credit of the minister, however much the\nqualities to which it is immediately owing may be those of his\nsubordinates.\n\n\n\nChapter XV--Of Local Representative Bodies.\n\n\nIt is but a small portion of the public business of a country which\ncan be well done or safely attempted by the central authorities; and\neven in our own government, the least centralized in Europe, the\nlegislative portion at least of the governing body busies itself far\ntoo much with local affairs, employing the supreme power of the State\nin cutting small knots which there ought to be other and better means\nof untying. The enormous amount of private business which takes up the\ntime of Parliament and the thoughts of its individual members,\ndistracting them from the proper occupations of the great council of\nthe nation, is felt by all thinkers and observers as a serious evil,\nand, what is worse, an increasing one.\n\nIt would not be appropriate to the limited design of this treatise to\ndiscuss at large the great question, in no way peculiar to\nrepresentative government, of the proper limits of governmental\naction. I have said elsewhere [9] what seemed to me most essential\nrespecting the principles by which the extent of that action ought to\nbe determined. But after subtracting from the functions performed by\nmost European governments those which ought not to be undertaken by\npublic authorities at all, there still remains so great and various an\naggregate of duties, that, if only on the principle of division of\nlabor, it is indispensable to share them between central and local\nauthorities. Not solely are separate executive officers required for\npurely local duties (an amount of separation which exists under all\ngovernments), but the popular control over those officers can only be\nadvantageously exerted through a separate organ. Their original\nappointment, the function of watching and checking them, the duty of\nproviding or the discretion of withholding the supplies necessary for\ntheir operations, should rest, not with the national Parliament or the\nnational executive, but with the people of the locality. That the\npeople should exercise these functions directly and personally is\nevidently inadmissable. Administration by the assembled people is a\nrelic of barbarism opposed to the whole spirit of modern life; yet so\nmuch has the course of English institutions depended on accident, that\nthis primitive mode of local government remained the general rule in\nparochial matters up to the present generation; and, having never been\nlegally abolished, probably subsists unaltered in many rural parishes\neven now. There remains the plan of representative sub-Parliaments for\nlocal affairs, and these must henceforth be considered as one of the\nfundamental institutions of a free government. They exist in England\nbut very incompletely, and with great irregularity and want of system;\nin some other countries much less popularly governed, their\nconstitution is far more rational. In England there has always been\nmore liberty but worse organization, while in other countries there is\nbetter organization but less liberty. It is necessary, then, that, in\naddition to the national representation, there should be municipal and\nprovisional representations; and the two questions which remain to be\nresolved are, how the local representative bodies should be\nconstituted, and what should be the extent of their functions.\n\nIn considering these questions, two points require an equal degree of\nour attention: how the local business itself can be best done, and how\nits transaction can be made most instrumental to the nourishment of\npublic spirit and the development of intelligence. In an earlier part\nof this inquiry I have dwelt in strong language--hardly any language\nis strong enough to express the strength of my conviction--on the\nimportance of that portion of the operation of free institutions which\nmay be called the public education of the citizens. Now of this\noperation the local administrative institutions are the chief\ninstrument. Except by the part they may take as jurymen in the\nadministration of justice, the mass of the population have very little\nopportunity of sharing personally in the conduct of the general\naffairs of the community. Reading newspapers, and perhaps writing to\nthem, public meetings, and solicitations of different sorts addressed\nto the political authorities, are the extent of the participation of\nprivate citizens in general politics during the interval between one\nParliamentary election and another. Though it is impossible to\nexaggerate the importance of these various liberties, both as\nsecurities for freedom and as means of general cultivation, the\npractice which they give is more in thinking than in action, and in\nthinking without the responsibilities of action, which with most\npeople amounts to little more than passively receiving the thoughts of\nsome one else. But in the case of local bodies, besides the function\nof electing, many citizens in turn have the chance of being elected,\nand many, either by selection or by rotation, fill one or other of the\nnumerous local executive offices. In these positions they have to act\nfor public interests, as well as to think and to speak, and the\nthinking can not all be done by proxy. It may be added that these\nlocal functions, not being in general sought by the higher ranks,\ncarry down the important political education which they are the means\nof conferring to a much lower grade in society. The mental discipline\nbeing thus a more important feature in local concerns than in the\ngeneral affairs of the state, while there are not such vital interests\ndependent on the quality of the administration, a greater weight may\nbe given to the former consideration, and the latter admits much more\nfrequently of being postponed to it than in matters of general\nlegislation and the conduct of imperial affairs.\n\nThe proper constitution of local representative bodies does not\npresent much difficulty. The principles which apply to it do not\ndiffer in any respect from those applicable to the national\nrepresentation. The same obligation exists, as in the case of the more\nimportant function, for making the bodies elective; and the same\nreasons operate as in that case, but with still greater force, for\ngiving them a widely democratic basis; the dangers being less, and the\nadvantages, in point of popular education and cultivation, in some\nrespects even greater. As the principal duty of the local bodies\nconsists of the imposition and expenditure of local taxation, the\nelectoral franchise should vest in all who contribute to the local\nrates, to the exclusion of all who do not. I assume that there is no\nindirect taxation, no _octroi_ duties, or that, if there are, they are\nsupplementary only, those on whom their burden falls being also rated\nto a direct assessment. The representation of minorities should be\nprovided for in the same manner as in the national Parliament, and\nthere are the same strong reasons for plurality of votes; only there\nis not so decisive an objection, in the inferior as in the higher\nbody, to making the plural voting depend (as in some of the local\nelections of our own country) on a mere money qualification; for the\nhonest and frugal dispensation of money forms so much larger a part of\nthe business of the local than of the national body, that there is\nmore justice as well as policy in allowing a greater proportional\ninfluence to those who have a larger money interest at stake.\n\nIn the most recently established of our local representative\ninstitutions, the Boards of Guardians, the justices of peace of the\ndistrict sit _ex officio_ along with the elected members, in number\nlimited by law to a third of the whole. In the peculiar constitution\nof English society, I have no doubt of the beneficial effect of this\nprovision. It secures the presence in these bodies of a more educated\nclass than it would perhaps be practicable to attract thither on any\nother terms; and while the limitation in number of the _ex officio_\nmembers precludes them from acquiring predominance by mere numerical\nstrength, they, as a virtual representation of another class, having\nsometimes a different interest from the rest, are a check upon the\nclass interests of the farmers or petty shopkeepers who form the bulk\nof the elected guardians. A similar commendation can not be given to\nthe constitution of the only provincial boards we possess, the Quarter\nSessions, consisting of the justices of peace alone, on whom, over and\nabove their judicial duties, some of the most important parts of the\nadministrative business of the country depend for their performance.\nThe mode of formation of these bodies is most anomalous, they being\nneither elected, nor, in any proper sense of the term, nominated, but\nholding their important functions, like the feudal lords to whom they\nsucceeded, virtually by right of their acres; the appointment vested\nin the crown (or, speaking practically, in one of themselves, the lord\nlieutenant) being made use of only as a means of excluding any one who\nit is thought would do discredit to the body, or, now and then, one\nwho is on the wrong side in politics. The institution is the most\naristocratic in principle which now remains in England; far more so\nthan the House of Lords, for it grants public money and disposes of\nimportant public interests, not in conjunction with a popular\nassembly, but alone. It is clung to with proportionate tenacity by our\naristocratic classes, but is obviously at variance with all the\nprinciples which are the foundation of representative government. In a\nCounty Board there is not the same justification as in Boards of\nGuardians for even an admixture of _ex officio_ with elected members,\nsince the business of a county being on a sufficiently large scale to\nbe an object of interest and attraction to country gentlemen, they\nwould have no more difficulty in getting themselves elected to the\nBoard than they have in being returned to Parliament as county\nmembers.\n\nIn regard to the proper circumscription of the constituencies which\nelect the local representative bodies, the principle which, when\napplied as an exclusive and unbending rule to Parliamentary\nrepresentation, is inappropriate, namely community of local interests,\nis here the only just and applicable one. The very object of having a\nlocal representation is in order that those who have any interest in\ncommon which they do not share with the general body of their\ncountrymen may manage that joint interest by themselves, and the\npurpose is contradicted if the distribution of the local\nrepresentation follows any other rule than the grouping of those joint\ninterests. There are local interests peculiar to every town, whether\ngreat or small, and common to all its inhabitants; every town,\ntherefore, without distinction of size, ought to have its municipal\ncouncil. It is equally obvious that every town ought to have but one.\nThe different quarters of the same town have seldom or never any\nmaterial diversities of local interest; they all require to have the\nsame things done, the same expenses incurred; and, except as to their\nchurches, which it is probably desirable to leave under simply\nparochial management, the same arrangements may be made to serve for\nall. Paving, lighting, water supply, drainage, port and market\nregulations, can not, without great waste and inconvenience, be\ndifferent for different quarters of the same town. The subdivision of\nLondon into six or seven independent districts, each with its separate\narrangements for local business (several of them without unity of\nadministration even within themselves), prevents the possibility of\nconsecutive or well-regulated co-operation for common objects,\nprecludes any uniform principle for the discharge of local duties,\ncompels the general government to take things upon itself which would\nbe best left to local authorities if there were any whose authority\nextended to the entire metropolis, and answers no purpose but to keep\nup the fantastical trappings of that union of modern jobbing and\nantiquated foppery, the Corporation of the City of London.\n\nAnother equally important principle is, that in each local\ncircumscription there should be but one elective body for all local\nbusiness, not different bodies for different parts of it. Division of\nlabor does not mean cutting up every business into minute fractions;\nit means the union of such operations as are fit to be performed by\nthe same persons, and the separation of such as can be better\nperformed by different persons. The executive duties of the locality\ndo indeed require to be divided into departments for the same reason\nas those of the state--because they are of divers kinds, each\nrequiring knowledge peculiar to itself, and needing, for its due\nperformance, the undivided attention of a specially qualified\nfunctionary. But the reasons for subdivision which apply to the\nexecution do not apply to the control. The business of the elective\nbody is not to do the work, but to see that it is properly done, and\nthat nothing necessary is left undone. This function can be fulfilled\nfor all departments by the same superintending body, and by a\ncollective and comprehensive far better than by a minute and\nmicroscopic view. It is as absurd in public affairs as it would be in\nprivate, that every workman should be looked after by a superintendent\nto himself. The government of the crown consists of many departments,\nand there are many ministers to conduct them, but those ministers have\nnot a Parliament apiece to keep them to their duty. The local, like\nthe national Parliament, has for its proper business to consider the\ninterest of the locality as a whole, composed of parts all of which\nmust be adapted to one another, and attended to in the order and ratio\nof their importance. There is another very weighty reason for uniting\nthe control of all the business of a locality under one body. The\ngreatest imperfection of popular local institutions, and the chief\ncause of the failure which so often attends them, is the low calibre\nof the men by whom they are almost always carried on. That these\nshould be of a very miscellaneous character is, indeed, part of the\nusefulness of the institution; it is that circumstance chiefly which\nrenders it a school of political capacity and general intelligence.\nBut a school supposes teachers as well as scholars: the utility of the\ninstruction greatly depends on its bringing inferior minds into\ncontact with superior, a contact which in the ordinary course of life\nis altogether exceptional, and the want of which contributes more than\nany thing else to keep the generality of mankind on one level of\ncontented ignorance. The school, moreover, is worthless, and a school\nof evil instead of good, if, through the want of due surveillance, and\nof the presence within itself of a higher order of characters, the\naction of the body is allowed, as it so often is, to degenerate into\nan equally unscrupulous and stupid pursuit of the self-interest of its\nmembers. Now it is quite hopeless to induce persons of a high class,\neither socially or intellectually, to take a share of local\nadministration in a corner by piecemeal, as members of a Paving Board\nor a Drainage Commission. The entire local business of their town is\nnot more than a sufficient object to induce men whose tastes incline\nthem, and whose knowledge qualifies them for national affairs, to\nbecome members of a mere local body, and devote to it the time and\nstudy which are necessary to render their presence any thing more than\na screen for the jobbing of inferior persons, under the shelter of\ntheir responsibility. A mere Board of Works, though it comprehend the\nentire metropolis, is sure to be composed of the same class of persons\nas the vestries of the London parishes; nor is it practicable, or even\ndesirable, that such should not form the majority; but it is important\nfor every purpose which local bodies are designed to serve, whether it\nbe the enlightened and honest performance of their special duties, or\nthe cultivation of the political intelligence of the nation, that\nevery such body should contain a portion of the very best minds of the\nlocality, who are thus brought into perpetual contact, of the most\nuseful kind, with minds of a lower grade, receiving from them what\nlocal or professional knowledge they have to give, and, in return,\ninspiring them with a portion of their own more enlarged ideas, and\nhigher and more enlightened purposes.\n\nA mere village has no claim to a municipal representation. By a\nvillage I mean a place whose inhabitants are not markedly\ndistinguished by occupation or social relations from those of the\nrural districts adjoining, and for whose local wants the arrangements\nmade for the surrounding territory will suffice. Such small places\nhave rarely a sufficient public to furnish a tolerable municipal\ncouncil: if they contain any talent or knowledge applicable to public\nbusiness, it is apt to be all concentrated in some one man, who\nthereby becomes the dominator of the place. It is better that such\nplaces should be merged in a larger circumscription. The local\nrepresentation of rural districts will naturally be determined by\ngeographical considerations, with due regard to those sympathies of\nfeeling by which human beings are so much aided to act in concert, and\nwhich partly follow historical boundaries, such as those of counties\nor provinces, and partly community of interest and occupation, as in\nagriculture, maritime, manufacturing, or mining districts. Different\nkinds of local business require different areas of representation. The\nUnions of parishes have been fixed on as the most appropriate basis\nfor the representative bodies which superintend the relief of\nindigence; while, for the proper regulation of highways, or prisons,\nor police, a large extent, like that of an average county, is not more\nthan sufficient. In these large districts, therefore, the maxim, that\nan elective body constituted in any locality should have authority\nover all the local concerns common to the locality, requires\nmodification from another principle, as well as from the competing\nconsideration of the importance of obtaining for the discharge of the\nlocal duties the highest qualifications possible. For example, if it\nbe necessary (as I believe it to be) for the proper administration of\nthe poor-laws that the area of rating should not be more extensive\nthan most of the present Unions, a principle which requires a Board of\nGuardians for each Union, yet, as a much more highly qualified class\nof persons is likely to be obtainable for a County Board than those\nwho compose an average Board of Guardians, it may, on that ground, be\nexpedient to reserve for the County Boards some higher descriptions of\nlocal business, which might otherwise have been conveniently managed\nwithin itself by each separate Union.\n\nBesides the controlling council or local sub-Parliament, local\nbusiness has its executive department. With respect to this, the same\nquestions arise as with respect to the executive authorities in the\nstate, and they may, for the most part, be answered in the same\nmanner. The principles applicable to all public trusts are in\nsubstance the same. In the first place, each executive officer should\nbe single, and singly responsible for the whole of the duty committed\nto his charge. In the next place, he should be nominated, not elected.\nIt is ridiculous that a surveyor, or a health officer, or even a\ncollector of rates should be appointed by popular suffrage. The\npopular choice usually depends on interest with a few local leaders,\nwho, as they are not supposed to make the appointment, are not\nresponsible for it; or on an appeal to sympathy, founded on having\ntwelve children, and having been a rate-payer in the parish for thirty\nyears. If, in cases of this description, election by the population is\na farce, appointment by the local representative body is little less\nobjectionable. Such bodies have a perpetual tendency to become\njoint-stock associations for carrying into effect the private jobs of\ntheir various members. Appointments should be made on the individual\nresponsibility of the chairman of the body, let him be called mayor,\nchairman of Quarter Sessions, or by whatever other title. He occupies\nin the locality a position analogous to that of the prime minister in\nthe state, and under a well organized system the appointment and\nwatching of the local officers would be the most important part of his\nduty; he himself being appointed by the council from its own number,\nsubject either to annual re-election, or to removal by a vote of the\nbody.\n\nFrom the constitution of the local bodies, I now pass to the equally\nimportant and more difficult subject of their proper attributions.\nThis question divides itself into two parts: what should be their\nduties, and whether they should have full authority within the sphere\nof those duties, or should be liable to any, and what, interference on\nthe part of the central government.\n\nIt is obvious, to begin with, that all business purely local--all\nwhich concerns only a single locality--should devolve upon the local\nauthorities. The paving, lighting, and cleansing of the streets of a\ntown, and, in ordinary circumstances, the draining of its houses, are\nof little consequence to any but its inhabitants. The nation at large\nis interested in them in no other way than that in which it is\ninterested in the private well-being of all its individual citizens.\nBut among the duties classed as local, or performed by local\nfunctionaries, there are many which might with equal propriety be\ntermed national, being the share belonging to the locality of some\nbranch of the public administration in the efficiency of which the\nwhole nation is alike interested: the jails, for instance, most of\nwhich in this country are under county management; the local police;\nthe local administration of justice, much of which, especially in\ncorporate towns, is performed by officers elected by the locality, and\npaid from local funds. None of these can be said to be matters of\nlocal, as distinguished from national importance. It would not be a\nmatter personally indifferent to the rest of the country if any part\nof it became a nest of robbers or a focus of demoralization, owing to\nthe maladministration of its police; or if, through the bad\nregulations of its jail, the punishment which the courts of justice\nintended to inflict on the criminals confined therein (who might have\ncome from, or committed their offenses in, any other district) might\nbe doubled in intensity or lowered to practical impunity. The points,\nmoreover, which constitute good management of these things are the\nsame every where; there is no good reason why police, or jails, or the\nadministration of justice should be differently managed in one part of\nthe kingdom and in another, while there is great peril that in things\nso important, and to which the most instructed minds available to the\nstate are not more than adequate, the lower average of capacities\nwhich alone can be counted on for the service of the localities might\ncommit errors of such magnitude as to be a serious blot upon the\ngeneral administration of the country. Security of person and\nproperty, and equal justice between individuals, are the first needs\nof society and the primary ends of government: if these things can be\nleft to any responsibility below the highest, there is nothing except\nwar and treaties which requires a general government at all. Whatever\nare the best arrangements for securing these primary objects should be\nmade universally obligatory, and, to secure their enforcement, should\nbe placed under central superintendence. It is often useful, and with\nthe institutions of our own country even necessary, from the scarcity,\nin the localities, of officers representing the general government,\nthat the execution of duties imposed by the central authority should\nbe intrusted to functionaries appointed for local purposes by the\nlocality. But experience is daily forcing upon the public a conviction\nof the necessity of having at least inspectors appointed by the\ngeneral government to see that the local officers do their duty. If\nprisons are under local management, the central government appoints\ninspectors of prisons, to take care that the rules laid down by\nParliament are observed, and to suggest others if the state of the\njails shows them to be requisite, as there are inspectors of factories\nand inspectors of schools, to watch over the observance of the Acts of\nParliament relating to the first, and the fulfillment of the\nconditions on which state assistance is granted to the latter.\n\nBut if the administration of justice, police and jails included, is\nboth so universal a concern, and so much a matter of general science,\nindependent of local peculiarities, that it may be, and ought to be,\nuniformly regulated throughout the country, and its regulation\nenforced by more trained and skillful hands than those of purely local\nauthorities, there is also business, such as the administration of the\npoor-laws, sanitary regulation, and others, which, while really\ninteresting to the whole country, can not, consistently with the very\npurposes of local administration, be managed otherwise than by the\nlocalities. In regard to such duties, the question arises how far the\nlocal authorities ought to be trusted with discretionary power, free\nfrom any superintendence or control of the state.\n\nTo decide this question, it is essential to consider what is the\ncomparative position of the central and the local authorities as\ncapacity for the work, and security against negligence or abuse. In\nthe first place, the local representative bodies and their officers\nare almost certain to be of a much lower grade of intelligence and\nknowledge than Parliament and the national executive. Secondly,\nbesides being themselves of inferior qualifications, they are watched\nby, and accountable to an inferior public opinion. The public under\nwhose eyes they act, and by whom they are criticized, is both more\nlimited in extent and generally far less enlightened than that which\nsurrounds and admonishes the highest authorities at the capital, while\nthe comparative smallness of the interests involved causes even that\ninferior public to direct its thoughts to the subject less intently\nand with less solicitude. Far less interference is exercised by the\npress and by public discussion, and that which is exercised may with\nmuch more impunity be disregarded in the proceedings of local than in\nthose of national authorities. Thus far, the advantage seems wholly on\nthe side of management by the central government; but, when we look\nmore closely, these motives of preference are found to be balanced by\nothers fully as substantial. If the local authorities and public are\ninferior to the central ones in knowledge of the principles of\nadministration, they have the compensatory advantage of a far more\ndirect interest in the result. A man's neighbors or his landlord may\nbe much cleverer than himself, and not without an indirect interest in\nhis prosperity, but, for all that, his interests will be better\nattended to in his own keeping than in theirs. It is further to be\nremembered that, even supposing the central government to administer\nthrough its own officers, its officers do not act at the centre, but\nin the locality; and however inferior the local public may be to the\ncentral, it is the local public alone which has any opportunity of\nwatching them, and it is the local opinion alone which either acts\ndirectly upon their own conduct, or calls the attention of the\ngovernment to the points in which they may require correction. It is\nbut in extreme cases that the general opinion of the country is\nbrought to bear at all upon details of local administration, and still\nmore rarely has it the means of deciding upon them with any just\nappreciation of the case. Now the local opinion necessarily acts far\nmore forcibly upon purely local administrators. They, in the natural\ncourse of things, are permanent residents, not expecting to be\nwithdrawn from the place when they cease to exercise authority in it;\nand their authority itself depends, by supposition, on the will of the\nlocal public. I need not dwell on the deficiencies of the central\nauthority in detailed knowledge of local persons and things, and the\ntoo great engrossment of its time and thoughts by other concerns to\nadmit of its acquiring the quantity and quality of local knowledge\nnecessary even for deciding on complaints, and enforcing\nresponsibility from so great a number of local agents. In the details\nof management, therefore, the local bodies will generally have the\nadvantage, but in comprehension of the principles even of purely local\nmanagement, the superiority of the central government, when rightly\nconstituted, ought to be prodigious, not only by reason of the\nprobably great personal superiority of the individuals composing it,\nand the multitude of thinkers and writers who are at all times engaged\nin pressing useful ideas upon their notice, but also because the\nknowledge and experience of any local authority is but local knowledge\nand experience, confined to their own part of the country and its\nmodes of management, whereas the central government has the means of\nknowing all that is to be learned from the united experience of the\nwhole kingdom, with the addition of easy access to that of foreign\ncountries.\n\nThe practical conclusion from these premises is not difficult to draw.\nThe authority which is most conversant with principles should be\nsupreme over principles, while that which is most competent in details\nshould have the details left to it. The principal business of the\ncentral authority should be to give instruction, of the local\nauthority to apply it. Power may be localized, but knowledge, to be\nmost useful, must be centralized; there must be somewhere a focus at\nwhich all its scattered rays are collected, that the broken and\ncolored lights which exist elsewhere may find there what is necessary\nto complete and purify them. To every branch of local administration\nwhich affects the general interest there should be a corresponding\ncentral organ, either a minister, or some specially appointed\nfunctionary under him, even if that functionary does no more than\ncollect information from all quarters, and bring the experience\nacquired in one locality to the knowledge of another where it is\nwanted. But there is also something more than this for the central\nauthority to do. It ought to keep open a perpetual communication with\nthe localities--informing itself by their experience, and them by its\nown; giving advice freely when asked, volunteering it when seen to be\nrequired; compelling publicity and recordation of proceedings, and\nenforcing obedience to every general law which the Legislature has\nlaid down on the subject of local management. That some such laws\nought to be laid down few are likely to deny. The localities may be\nallowed to mismanage their own interests, but not to prejudice those\nof others, nor violate those principles of justice between one person\nand another of which it is the duty of the state to maintain the rigid\nobservance. If the local majority attempts to oppress the minority, or\none class another, the state is bound to interpose. For example, all\nlocal rates ought to be voted exclusively by the local representative\nbody; but that body, though elected solely by rate-payers, may raise\nits revenues by imposts of such a kind, or assess them in such a\nmanner, as to throw an unjust share of the burden on the poor, the\nrich, or some particular class of the population: it is the duty,\ntherefore, of the Legislature, while leaving the mere amount of the\nlocal taxes to the discretion of the local body, to lay down\nauthoritatively the mode of taxation and rules of assessment which\nalone the localities shall be permitted to use. Again, in the\nadministration of public charity, the industry and morality of the\nwhole laboring population depends, to a most serious extent, upon\nadherence to certain fixed principles in awarding relief. Though it\nbelongs essentially to the local functionaries to determine who,\naccording to those principles, is entitled to be relieved, the\nnational Parliament is the proper authority to prescribe the\nprinciples themselves; and it would neglect a most important part of\nits duty if it did not, in a matter of such grave national concern,\nlay down imperative rules, and make effectual provision that those\nrules should not be departed from. What power of actual interference\nwith the local administrators it may be necessary to retain, for the\ndue enforcement of the laws, is a question of detail into which it\nwould be useless to enter. The laws themselves will naturally define\nthe penalties, and fix the mode of their enforcement. It may be\nrequisite, to meet extreme cases, that the power of the central\nauthority should extend to dissolving the local representative council\nor dismissing the local executive, but not to making new appointments\nor suspending the local institutions. Where Parliament has not\ninterfered, neither ought any branch of the executive to interfere\nwith authority; but as an adviser and critic, an enforcer of the laws,\nand a denouncer to Parliament or the local constituencies of conduct\nwhich it deems condemnable, the functions of the executive are of the\ngreatest possible value.\n\nSome may think that, however much the central authority surpasses the\nlocal in knowledge of the principles of administration, the great\nobject which has been so much insisted on, the social and political\neducation of the citizens, requires that they should be left to manage\nthese matters by their own, however imperfect lights. To this it might\nbe answered that the education of the citizens is not the only thing\nto be considered; government and administration do not exist for that\nalone, great as its importance is. But the objection shows a very\nimperfect understanding of the function of popular institutions as a\nmeans of political instruction. It is but a poor education that\nassociates ignorance with ignorance, and leaves them, if they care for\nknowledge, to grope their way to it without help, and to do without it\nif they do not. What is wanted is the means of making ignorance aware\nof itself, and able to profit by knowledge; accustoming minds which\nknow only routine to act upon, and feel the value of principles;\nteaching them to compare different modes of action, and learn, by the\nuse of their reason, to distinguish the best. When we desire to have a\ngood school, we do not eliminate the teacher. The old remark, \"As the\nschoolmaster is, so will be the school,\" is as true of the indirect\nschooling of grown people by public business as of the schooling of\nyouth in academies and colleges. A government which attempts to do\nevery thing is aptly compared by M. Charles de Remusat to a\nschoolmaster who does all the pupils' tasks for them; he may be very\npopular with the pupils, but he will teach them little. A government,\non the other hand, which neither does any thing itself that can\npossibly be done by any one else, nor shows any one else how to do any\nthing, is like a school in which there is no schoolmaster, but only\npupil-teachers who have never themselves been taught.\n\n\n\nChapter XVI--Of Nationality, as connected with Representative Government.\n\n\nA portion of mankind may be said to constitute a nationality if they\nare united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist\nbetween them and any others--which make them co-operate with each\nother more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the\nsame government, and desire that it should be government by\nthemselves, or a portion of themselves, exclusively. This feeling of\nnationality may have been generated by various causes. Sometimes it is\nthe effect of identity of race and descent. Community of language and\ncommunity of religion greatly contribute to it. Geographical limits\nare one of its causes. But the strongest of all is identity of\npolitical antecedents; the possession of a national history, and\nconsequent community of recollections; collective pride and\nhumiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in\nthe past. None of these circumstances, however, are either\nindispensable or necessarily sufficient by themselves. Switzerland has\na strong sentiment of nationality, though the cantons are of different\nraces, different languages, and different religions. Sicily has\nhitherto felt itself quite distinct in nationality from Naples,\nnotwithstanding identity of religion, almost identity of language, and\na considerable amount of common historical antecedents. The Flemish\nand the Walloon provinces of Belgium, notwithstanding diversity of\nrace and language, have a much greater feeling of common nationality\nthan the former have with Holland, or the latter with France. Yet in\ngeneral the national feeling is proportionally weakened by the failure\nof any of the causes which contribute to it. Identity of language,\nliterature, and, to some extent, of race and recollections, have\nmaintained the feeling of nationality in considerable strength among\nthe different portions of the German name, though they have at no time\nbeen really united under the same government; but the feeling has\nnever reached to making the separate states desire to get rid of their\nautonomy. Among Italians, an identity far from complete of language\nand literature, combined with a geographical position which separates\nthem by a distinct line from other countries, and, perhaps more than\nevery thing else, the possession of a common name, which makes them\nall glory in the past achievements in arts, arms, politics, religious\nprimacy, science, and literature, of any who share the same\ndesignation, give rise to an amount of national feeling in the\npopulation which, though still imperfect, has been sufficient to\nproduce the great events now passing before us, notwithstanding a\ngreat mixture of races, and although they have never, in either\nancient or modern history, been under the same government, except\nwhile that government extended or was extending itself over the\ngreater part of the known world.\n\nWhere the sentiment of nationality exists in any force, there is a\n_prima facie_ case for uniting all the members of the nationality\nunder the same government, and a government to themselves apart. This\nis merely saying that the question of government ought to be decided\nby the governed. One hardly knows what any division of the human race\nshould be free to do if not to determine with which of the various\ncollective bodies of human beings they choose to associate themselves.\nBut, when a people are ripe for free institutions, there is a still\nmore vital consideration. Free institutions are next to impossible in\na country made up of different nationalities. Among a people without\nfellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages,\nthe united public opinion necessary to the working of representative\ngovernment can not exist. The influences which form opinions and\ndecide political acts are different in the different sections of the\ncountry. An altogether different set of leaders have the confidence of\none part of the country and of another. The same books, newspapers,\npamphlets, speeches, do not reach them. One section does not know what\nopinions or what instigations are circulating in another. The same\nincidents, the same acts, the same system of government, affect them\nin different ways, and each fears more injury to itself from the other\nnationalities than from the common arbiter, the state. Their mutual\nantipathies are generally much stronger than jealousy of the\ngovernment. That any one of them feels aggrieved by the policy of the\ncommon ruler is sufficient to determine another to support that\npolicy. Even if all are aggrieved, none feel that they can rely on the\nothers for fidelity in a joint resistance; the strength of none is\nsufficient to resist alone, and each may reasonably think that it\nconsults its own advantage most by bidding for the favor of the\ngovernment against the rest. Above all, the grand and only reliable\nsecurity in the last resort against the despotism of the government is\nin that case wanting--the sympathy of the army with the people. The\nmilitary are the part of every community in whom, from the nature of\nthe case, the distinction between their fellow-countrymen and\nforeigners is the deepest and strongest. To the rest of the people\nforeigners are merely strangers; to the soldier, they are men against\nwhom he may be called, at a week's notice, to fight for life or death.\nThe difference to him is that between friends and enemies--we may\nalmost say between fellow-men and another kind of animals; for, as\nrespects the enemy, the only law is that of force, and the only\nmitigation the same as in the case of other animals--that of simple\nhumanity. Soldiers to whose feelings half or three fourths of the\nsubjects of the same government are foreigners will have no more\nscruple in mowing them down, and no more desire to ask the reason why,\nthan they would have in doing the same thing against declared enemies.\nAn army composed of various nationalities has no other patriotism than\ndevotion to the flag. Such armies have been the executioners of\nliberty through the whole duration of modern history. The sole bond\nwhich holds them together is their officers and the government which\nthey serve, and their only idea, if they have any, of public duty, is\nobedience to orders. A government thus supported, by keeping its\nHungarian regiments in Italy and its Italian in Hungary, can long\ncontinue to rule in both places with the iron rod of foreign\nconquerors.\n\nIf it be said that so broadly-marked a distinction between what is due\nto a fellow-countryman and what is due merely to a human creature is\nmore worthy of savages than of civilized beings, and ought, with the\nutmost energy, to be contended against, no one holds that opinion more\nstrongly than myself. But this object, one of the worthiest to which\nhuman endeavour can be directed, can never, in the present state of\ncivilization, be promoted by keeping different nationalities of any\nthing like equivalent strength under the same government. In a\nbarbarous state of society the case is sometimes different. The\ngovernment may then be interested in softening the antipathies of the\nraces, that peace may be preserved and the country more easily\ngoverned. But when there are either free institutions, or a desire for\nthem, in any of the peoples artificially tied together, the interest\nof the government lies in an exactly opposite direction. It is then\ninterested in keeping up and envenoming their antipathies, that they\nmay be prevented from coalescing, and it may be enabled to use some of\nthem as tools for the enslavement of others. The Austrian court has\nnow for a whole generation made these tactics its principal means of\ngovernment, with what fatal success, at the time of the Vienna\ninsurrection and the Hungarian contest the world knows too well.\nHappily there are now signs that improvement is too far advanced to\npermit this policy to be any longer successful.\n\nFor the preceding reasons, it is in general a necessary condition of\nfree institutions that the boundaries of governments should coincide\nin the main with those of nationalities. But several considerations\nare liable to conflict in practice with this general principle. In the\nfirst place, its application is often precluded by geographical\nhindrances. There are parts even of Europe in which different\nnationalities are so locally intermingled that it is not practicable\nfor them to be under separate governments. The population of Hungary\nis composed of Magyars, Slovaks, Croats, Serbs, Roumans, and in some\ndistricts Germans, so mixed up as to be incapable of local separation;\nand there is no course open to them but to make a virtue of necessity,\nand reconcile themselves to living together under equal rights and\nlaws. Their community of servitude, which dates only from the\ndestruction of Hungarian independence in 1849, seems to be ripening\nand disposing them for such an equal union. The German colony of East\nPrussia is cut off from Germany by part of the ancient Poland, and\nbeing too weak to maintain separate independence, must, if\ngeographical continuity is to be maintained, be either under a\nnon-German government, or the intervening Polish territory must be\nunder a German one. Another considerable region in which the dominant\nelement of the population is German, the provinces of Courland,\nEsthonia, and Livonia, is condemned by its local situation to form\npart of a Slavonian state. In Eastern Germany itself there is a large\nSlavonic population; Bohemia is principally Slavonic, Silesia and\nother districts partially so. The most united country in Europe,\nFrance, is far from being homogeneous: independently of the fragments\nof foreign nationalities at its remote extremities, it consists, as\nlanguage and history prove, of two portions, one occupied almost\nexclusively by a Gallo-Roman population, while in the other the\nFrankish, Burgundian, and other Teutonic races form a considerable\ningredient.\n\nWhen proper allowance has been made for geographical exigencies,\nanother more purely moral and social consideration offers itself.\nExperience proves that it is possible for one nationality to merge and\nbe absorbed in another; and when it was originally an inferior and\nmore backward portion of the human race, the absorption is greatly to\nits advantage. Nobody can suppose that it is not more beneficial to a\nBreton, or a Basque of French Navarre, to be brought into the current\nof the ideas and feelings of a highly civilized and cultivated\npeople--to be a member of the French nationality, admitted on equal\nterms to all the privileges of French citizenship, sharing the\nadvantages of French protection, and the dignity and _prestige_ of\nFrench power--than to sulk on his own rocks, the half-savage relic of\npast times, revolving in his own little mental orbit, without\nparticipation or interest in the general movement of the world. The\nsame remark applies to the Welshman or the Scottish Highlander as\nmembers of the British nation.\n\nWhatever really tends to the admixture of nationalities, and the\nblending of their attributes and peculiarities in a common union, is a\nbenefit to the human race. Not by extinguishing types, of which, in\nthese cases, sufficient examples are sure to remain, but by softening\ntheir extreme forms, and filling up the intervals between them. The\nunited people, like a crossed breed of animals (but in a still greater\ndegree, because the influences in operation are moral as well as\nphysical), inherits the special aptitudes and excellences of all its\nprogenitors, protected by the admixture from being exaggerated into\nthe neighboring vices. But, to render this admixture possible, there\nmust be peculiar conditions. The combinations of circumstances which\noccur, and which effect the result, are various.\n\nThe nationalities brought together under the same government may be\nabout equal in numbers and strength, or they may be very unequal. If\nunequal, the least numerous of the two may either be the superior in\ncivilization, or the inferior. Supposing it to be superior, it may\neither, through that superiority, be able to acquire ascendancy over\nthe other, or it may be overcome by brute strength and reduced to\nsubjection. This last is a sheer mischief to the human race, and one\nwhich civilized humanity with one accord should rise in arms to\nprevent. The absorption of Greece by Macedonia was one of the greatest\nmisfortunes which ever happened to the world; that of any of the\nprincipal countries of Europe by Russia would be a similar one.\n\nIf the smaller nationality, supposed to be the more advanced in\nimprovement, is able to overcome the greater, as the Macedonians,\nre-enforced by the Greeks, did Asia, and the English India, there is\noften a gain to civilization, but the conquerors and the conquered can\nnot in this case live together under the same free institutions. The\nabsorption of the conquerors in the less advanced people would be an\nevil: these must be governed as subjects, and the state of things is\neither a benefit or a misfortune, according as the subjugated people\nhave or have not reached the state in which it is an injury not to be\nunder a free government, and according as the conquerors do or do not\nuse their superiority in a manner calculated to fit the conquered for\na higher stage of improvement. This topic will be particularly treated\nof in a subsequent chapter.\n\nWhen the nationality which succeeds in overpowering the other is both\nthe most numerous and the most improved, and especially if the subdued\nnationality is small, and has no hope of reasserting its independence,\nthen, if it is governed with any tolerable justice, and if the members\nof the more powerful nationality are not made odious by being invested\nwith exclusive privileges, the smaller nationality is gradually\nreconciled to its position, and becomes amalgamated with the larger.\nNo Bas-Breton, nor even any Alsatian, has the smallest wish at the\npresent day to be separated from France. If all Irishmen have not yet\narrived at the same disposition towards England, it is partly because\nthey are sufficiently numerous to be capable of constituting a\nrespectable nationality by themselves, but principally because, until\nof late years, they had been so atrociously governed that all their\nbest feelings combined with their bad ones in rousing bitter\nresentment against the Saxon rule. This disgrace to England and\ncalamity to the whole empire has, it may be truly said, completely\nceased for nearly a generation. No Irishman is now less free than an\nAnglo-Saxon, nor has a less share of every benefit either to his\ncountry or to his individual fortunes than if he were sprung from any\nother portion of the British dominions. The only remaining real\ngrievance of Ireland, that of the State Church, is one which half, or\nnearly half the people of the larger island have in common with them.\nThere is now next to nothing, except the memory of the past, and the\ndifference in the predominant religion, to keep apart two races\nperhaps the most fitted of any two in the world to be the completing\ncounterpart of one another. The consciousness of being at last treated\nnot only with equal justice, but with equal consideration, is making\nsuch rapid way in the Irish nation as to be wearing off all feelings\nthat could make them insensible to the benefits which the less\nnumerous and less wealthy people must necessarily derive from being\nfellow-citizens instead of foreigners to those who are not only their\nnearest neighbors, but the wealthiest, and one of the freest, as well\nas most civilized and powerful nations of the earth.\n\nThe cases in which the greatest practical obstacles exist to the\nblending of nationalities are when the nationalities which have been\nbound together are nearly equal in numbers and in the other elements\nof power. In such cases, each, confiding in its strength, and feeling\nitself capable of maintaining an equal struggle with any of the\nothers, is unwilling to be merged in it; each cultivates with party\nobstinacy its distinctive peculiarities; obsolete customs, and even\ndeclining languages, are revived, to deepen the separation; each deems\nitself tyrannized over if any authority is exercised within itself by\nfunctionaries of a rival race; and whatever is given to one of the\nconflicting nationalities is considered to be taken from all the rest.\nWhen nations thus divided are under a despotic government which is a\nstranger to all of them, or which, though sprung from one, yet feeling\ngreater interest in its own power than in any sympathies of\nnationality, assigns no privilege to either nation, and chooses its\ninstruments indifferently from all, in the course of a few generations\nidentity of situation often produces harmony of feeling, and the\ndifferent races come to feel towards each other as fellow-countrymen,\nparticularly if they are dispersed over the same tract of country. But\nif the era of aspiration to free government arrives before this fusion\nhas been effected, the opportunity has gone by for effecting it. From\nthat time, if the unreconciled nationalities are geographically\nseparate, and especially if their local position is such that there is\nno natural fitness or convenience in their being under the same\ngovernment (as in the case of an Italian province under a French or\nGerman yoke), there is not only an obvious propriety, but, if either\nfreedom or concord is cared for, a necessity for breaking the\nconnection altogether. There may be cases in which the provinces,\nafter separation, might usefully remain united by a federal tie; but\nit generally happens that if they are willing to forego complete\nindependence, and become members of a federation, each of them has\nother neighbors with whom it would prefer to connect itself, having\nmore sympathies in common, if not also greater community of interest.\n\n\n\nChapter XVII--Of Federal Representative Governments.\n\n\nPortions of mankind who are not fitted or not disposed to live under\nthe same internal government may often, with advantage, be federally\nunited as to their relations with foreigners, both to prevent wars\namong themselves, and for the sake of more effectual protection\nagainst the aggression of powerful states.\n\nTo render a federation advisable several conditions are necessary. The\nfirst is that there should be a sufficient amount of mutual sympathy\namong the populations. The federation binds them always to fight on\nthe same side; and if they have such feelings toward one another, or\nsuch diversity of feeling toward their neighbors that they would\ngenerally prefer to fight on opposite sides, the federal tie is\nneither likely to be of long duration, nor to be well observed while\nit subsists. The sympathies available for the purpose are those of\nrace, language, religion, and, above all, of political institutions,\nas conducing most to a feeling of identity of political interest. When\na few free states, separately insufficient for their own defense, are\nhemmed in on all sides by military or feudal monarchs, who hate and\ndespise freedom even in a neighbor, those states have no chance for\npreserving liberty and its blessings but by a federal union. The\ncommon interest arising from this cause has in Switzerland, for\nseveral centuries, been found adequate to maintain efficiently the\nfederal bond, in spite not only of difference of religion when\nreligion was the grand source of irreconcilable political enmity\nthroughout Europe, but also in spite of great weakness in the\nconstitution of the federation itself. In America, where all the\nconditions for the maintenance of union existed at the highest point,\nwith the sole drawback of difference of institutions in the single but\nmost important article of slavery, this one difference goes so far in\nalienating from each other's sympathies the two divisions of the Union\nas to be now actually effecting the disruption of a tie of so much\nvalue to them both.\n\nA second condition of the stability of a federal government is that\nthe separate states be not so powerful as to be able to rely for\nprotection against foreign encroachment on their individual strength.\nIf they are, they will be apt to think that they do not gain, by union\nwith others, the equivalent of what they sacrifice in their own\nliberty of action; and consequently, whenever the policy of the\nconfederation, in things reserved to its cognizance, is different from\nthat which any one of its members would separately pursue, the\ninternal and sectional breach will, through absence of sufficient\nanxiety to preserve the Union, be in danger of going so far as to\ndissolve it.\n\nA third condition, not less important than the two others, is that\nthere be not a very marked inequality of strength among the several\ncontracting states. They can not, indeed, be exactly equal in\nresources; in all federations there will be a gradation of power among\nthe members; some will be more populous, rich, and civilized than\nothers. There is a wide difference in wealth and population between\nNew York and Rhode Island; between Berne, and Zug or Glaris. The\nessential is, that there should not be any one state so much more\npowerful than the rest as to be capable of vying in strength with many\nof them combined. If there be such a one, and only one, it will insist\non being master of the joint deliberations; if there be two, they will\nbe irresistible when they agree; and whenever they differ, every thing\nwill be decided by a struggle for ascendancy between the rivals. This\ncause is alone enough to reduce the German Bund to almost a nullity,\nindependently of its wretched internal constitution. It effects none\nof the real purposes of a confederation. It has never bestowed on\nGermany a uniform system of customs, nor so much as a uniform coinage,\nand has served only to give Austria and Prussia a legal right of\npouring in their troops to assist the local sovereigns in keeping\ntheir subjects obedient to despotism, while, in regard to external\nconcerns, the Bund would make all Germany a dependency of Prussia if\nthere were no Austria, and of Austria if there were no Prussia; and,\nin the mean time, each petty prince has little choice but to be a\npartisan of one or the other, or to intrigue with foreign governments\nagainst both.\n\nThere are two different modes of organizing a federal union. The\nfederal authorities may represent the governments solely, and their\nacts may be obligatory only on the governments as such, or they may\nhave the power of enacting laws and issuing orders which are binding\ndirectly on individual citizens. The former is the plan of the German\nso-called Confederation, and of the Swiss Constitution previous to\n1847. It was tried in America for a few years immediately following\nthe War of Independence. The other principle is that of the existing\nConstitution of the United States, and has been adopted within the\nlast dozen years by the Swiss Confederacy. The Federal Congress of the\nAmerican Union is a substantive part of the government of every\nindividual state. Within the limits of its attributions, it makes laws\nwhich are obeyed by every citizen individually, executes them through\nits own officers, and enforces them by its own tribunals. This is the\nonly principle which has been found, or which is ever likely to\nproduce an effective federal government. A union between the\ngovernments only is a mere alliance, and subject to all the\ncontingencies which render alliances precarious. If the acts of the\nPresident and of Congress were binding solely on the governments of\nNew York, Virginia, or Pennsylvania, and could only be carried into\neffect through orders issued by those governments to officers\nappointed by them, under responsibility to their own courts of\njustice, no mandates of the federal government which were disagreeable\nto a local majority would ever be executed. Requisitions issued to a\ngovernment have no other sanction or means of enforcement than war,\nand a federal army would have to be always in readiness to enforce the\ndecrees of the federation against any recalcitrant state, subject to\nthe probability that other states, sympathizing with the recusant, and\nperhaps sharing its sentiments on the particular point in dispute,\nwould withhold their contingents, if not send them to fight in the\nranks of the disobedient State. Such a federation is more likely to be\na cause than a preventive of internal wars; and if such was not its\neffect in Switzerland until the events of the years immediately\npreceding 1847, it was only because the federal government felt its\nweakness so strongly that it hardly ever attempted to exercise any\nreal authority. In America, the experiment of a federation on this\nprinciple broke down in the first few years of its existence, happily\nwhile the men of enlarged knowledge and acquired ascendancy who\nfounded the independence of the Republic were still alive to guide it\nthrough the difficult transition. The \"Federalist,\" a collection of\npapers by three of these eminent men, written in explanation and\ndefense of the new federal Constitution while still awaiting the\nnational acceptance, is even now the most instructive treatise we\npossess on federal government. In Germany, the more imperfect kind of\nfederation, as all know, has not even answered the purpose of\nmaintaining an alliance. It has never, in any European war, prevented\nsingle members of the confederation from allying themselves with\nforeign powers against the rest. Yet this is the only federation which\nseems possible among monarchical states. A king, who holds his power\nby inheritance, not by delegation, and who can not be deprived of it,\nnor made responsible to any one for its use, is not likely to renounce\nhaving a separate army, or to brook the exercise of sovereign\nauthority over his own subjects, not through him, but directly by\nanother power. To enable two or more countries under kingly government\nto be joined together in an effectual confederation, it seems\nnecessary that they should all be under the same king. England and\nScotland were a federation of this description during the interval of\nabout a century between the union of the crowns and that of the\nParliaments. Even this was effective, not through federal\ninstitutions, for none existed, but because the regal power in both\nConstitutions was so nearly absolute as to enable the foreign policy\nof both to be shaped according to a single will.\n\nUnder the more perfect mode of federation, where every citizen of each\nparticular state owes obedience to two governments, that of his own\nstate and that of the federation, it is evidently necessary not only\nthat the constitutional limits of the authority of each should be\nprecisely and clearly defined, but that the power to decide between\nthem in any case of dispute should not reside in either of the\ngovernments, or in any functionary subject to it, but in an umpire\nindependent of both. There must be a Supreme Court of Justice, and a\nsystem of subordinate courts in every state of the Union, before whom\nsuch questions shall be carried, and whose judgment on them, in the\nlast stage of appeal, shall be final. Every state of the Union, and\nthe federal government itself, as well as every functionary of each,\nmust be liable to be sued in those courts for exceeding their powers,\nor for non-performance of their federal duties, and must in general be\nobliged to employ those courts as the instrument for enforcing their\nfederal rights. This involves the remarkable consequence, actually\nrealized in the United States, that a court of justice, the highest\nfederal tribunal, is supreme over the various governments, both state\nand federal, having the right to declare that any law made, or act\ndone by them, exceeds the powers assigned to them by the federal\nConstitution, and, in consequence, has no legal validity. It was\nnatural to feel strong doubts, before trial had been made, how such a\nprovision would work; whether the tribunal would have the courage to\nexercise its constitutional power; if it did, whether it would\nexercise it wisely, and whether the governments would consent to\nsubmit peaceably to its decision. The discussions on the American\nConstitution, before its final adoption, give evidence that these\nnatural apprehensions were strongly felt; but they are now entirely\nquieted, since, during the two generations and more which have\nsubsequently elapsed, nothing has occurred to verify them, though\nthere have at times been disputes of considerable acrimony, and which\nbecame the badges of parties, respecting the limits of the authority\nof the federal and state governments. The eminently beneficial working\nof so singular a provision is probably, as M. de Tocqueville remarks,\nin a great measure attributable to the peculiarity inherent in a court\nof justice acting as such--namely, that it does not declare the law\n_eo nomine_ and in the abstract, but waits until a case between man\nand man is brought before it judicially, involving the point in\ndispute; from which arises the happy effect that its declarations are\nnot made in a very early stage of the controversy; that much popular\ndiscussion usually precedes them; that the Court decides after hearing\nthe point fully argued on both sides by lawyers of reputation; decides\nonly as much of the question at a time as is required by the case\nbefore it, and its decision, instead of being volunteered for\npolitical purposes, is drawn from it by the duty which it can not\nrefuse to fulfil, of dispensing justice impartially between adverse\nlitigants. Even these grounds of confidence would not have sufficed to\nproduce the respectful submission with which all authorities have\nyielded to the decisions of the Supreme Court on the interpretation of\nthe Constitution, were it not that complete reliance has been felt,\nnot only on the intellectual pre-eminence of the judges composing that\nexalted tribunal, but on their entire superiority over either private\nor sectional partialities. This reliance has been in the main\njustified; but there is nothing which more vitally imports the\nAmerican people than to guard with the most watchful solicitude\nagainst every thing which has the remotest tendency to produce\ndeterioration in the quality of this great national institution. The\nconfidence on which depends the stability of federal institutions has\nbeen for the first time impaired by the judgment declaring slavery to\nbe of common right, and consequently lawful in the Territories while\nnot yet constituted as states, even against the will of a majority of\ntheir inhabitants. The main pillar of the American Constitution is\nscarcely strong enough to bear many more such shocks.\n\nThe tribunals which act as umpires between the federal and the state\ngovernments naturally also decide all disputes between two states, or\nbetween a citizen of one state and the government of another. The\nusual remedies between nations, war and diplomacy, being precluded by\nthe federal union, it is necessary that a judicial remedy should\nsupply their place. The Supreme Court of the federation dispenses\ninternational law, and is the first great example of what is now one\nof the most prominent wants of civilized society, a real international\ntribunal.\n\nThe powers of a federal government naturally extend not only to peace\nand war, and all questions which arise between the country and foreign\ngovernments, but to making any other arrangements which are, in the\nopinion of the states, necessary to their enjoyment of the full\nbenefits of union. For example, it is a great advantage to them that\ntheir mutual commerce should be free, without the impediment of\nfrontier duties and custom-houses. But this internal freedom can not\nexist if each state has the power of fixing the duties on interchange\nof commodities between itself and foreign countries, since every\nforeign product let in by one state would be let into all the rest;\nand hence all custom duties and trade regulations in the United States\nare made or repealed by the federal government exclusively. Again, it\nis a great convenience to the states to have but one coinage, and but\none system of weights and measures, which can only be insured if the\nregulation of these matters is intrusted to the federal government.\nThe certainty and celerity of post-office communication is impeded,\nand its expense increased, if a letter has to pass through half a\ndozen sets of public offices, subject to different supreme\nauthorities: it is convenient, therefore, that all post-offices should\nbe under the federal government; but on such questions the feelings of\ndifferent communities are liable to be different. One of the American\nstates, under the guidance of a man who has displayed powers as a\nspeculative political thinker superior to any who has appeared in\nAmerican politics since the authors of the \"Federalist,\" [10]\nclaimed a veto for each state on the custom laws of the federal\nCongress; and that statesman, in a posthumous work of great ability,\nwhich has been printed and widely circulated by the Legislature of\nSouth Carolina, vindicated this pretension on the general principle of\nlimiting the tyranny of the majority, and protecting minorities by\nadmitting them to a substantial participation in political power. One\nof the most disputed topics in American politics during the early part\nof this century was whether the power of the federal government ought\nto extend, and whether by the Constitution it did extend, to making\nroads and canals at the cost of the Union. It is only in transactions\nwith foreign powers that the authority of the federal government is of\nnecessity complete. On every other subject the question depends on how\nclosely the people in general wish to draw the federal tie; what\nportion of their local freedom of action they are willing to\nsurrender, in order to enjoy more fully the benefit of being one\nnation.\n\nRespecting the fitting constitution of a federal government within\nitself, much need not be said. It of course consists of a legislative\nbranch and an executive, and the constitution of each is amenable to\nthe same principles as that of representative governments generally.\nAs regards the mode of adapting these general principles to a federal\ngovernment, the provision of the American Constitution seems\nexceedingly judicious, that Congress should consist of two houses, and\nthat while one of them is constituted according to population, each\nstate being entitled to representatives in the ratio of the number of\nits inhabitants, the other should represent not the citizens, but the\nstate governments, and every state, whether large or small, should be\nrepresented in it by the same number of members. This provision\nprecludes any undue power from being exercised by the more powerful\nstates over the rest, and guarantees the reserved rights of the state\ngovernments by making it impossible, as far as the mode of\nrepresentation can prevent, that any measure should pass Congress\nunless approved not only by a majority of the citizens, but by a\nmajority of the states. I have before adverted to the further\nincidental advantage obtained of raising the standard of\nqualifications in one of the houses. Being nominated by select bodies,\nthe Legislatures of the various states, whose choice, for reasons\nalready indicated, is more likely to fall on eminent men than any\npopular election--who have not only the power of electing such, but a\nstrong motive to do so, because the influence of their state in the\ngeneral deliberations must be materially affected by the personal\nweight and abilities of its representatives--the Senate of the United\nStates, thus chosen, has always contained nearly all the political men\nof established and high reputation in the Union; while the Lower House\nof Congress has, in the opinion of competent observers, been generally\nas remarkable for the absence of conspicuous personal merit, as the\nUpper House for its presence.\n\nWhen the conditions exist for the formation of efficient and durable\nfederal unions, the multiplication of them is always a benefit to the\nworld. It has the same salutary effect as any other extension of the\npractice of co-operation, through which the weak, by uniting, can meet\non equal terms with the strong. By diminishing the number of those\npetty states which are not equal to their own defense, it weakens the\ntemptations to an aggressive policy, whether working directly by arms,\nor through the _prestige_ of superior power. It of course puts an end\nto war and diplomatic quarrels, and usually also to restrictions on\ncommerce, between the states composing the Union; while, in reference\nto neighboring nations, the increased military strength conferred by\nit is of a kind to be almost exclusively available for defensive,\nscarcely at all for aggressive purposes. A federal government has not\na sufficiently concentrated authority to conduct with much efficiency\nany war but one of self-defense, in which it can rely on the voluntary\nco-operation of every citizen; nor is there any thing very flattering\nto national vanity or ambition in acquiring, by a successful war, not\nsubjects, nor even fellow-citizens, but only new, and perhaps\ntroublesome independent members of the confederation. The warlike\nproceedings of the Americans in Mexico was purely exceptional, having\nbeen carried on principally by volunteers, under the influence of the\nmigratory propensity which prompts individual Americans to possess\nthemselves of unoccupied land, and stimulated, if by any public\nmotive, not by that of national aggrandizement, but by the purely\nsectional purpose of extending slavery. There are few signs in the\nproceedings of Americans, nationally or individually, that the desire\nof territorial acquisition for their country as such has any\nconsiderable power over them. Their hankering after Cuba is, in the\nsame manner, merely sectional, and the Northern States, those opposed\nto slavery, have never in any way favored it.\n\nThe question may present itself (as in Italy at its present uprising)\nwhether a country which is determined to be united should form a\ncomplete or a merely federal union. The point is sometimes necessarily\ndecided by the mere territorial magnitude of the united whole. There\nis a limit to the extent of country which can advantageously be\ngoverned, or even whose government can be conveniently superintended\nfrom a single centre. There are vast countries so governed; but they,\nor at least their distant provinces, are in general deplorably ill\nadministered, and it is only when the inhabitants are almost savages\nthat they could not manage their affairs better separately. This\nobstacle does not exist in the case of Italy, the size of which does\nnot come up to that of several very efficiently governed single states\nin past and present times. The question then is, whether the different\nparts of the nation require to be governed in a way so essentially\ndifferent that it is not probable the same Legislature, and the same\nministry or administrative body, will give satisfaction to them all.\nUnless this be the case, which is a question of fact, it is better for\nthem to be completely united. That a totally different system of laws\nand very different administrative institutions may exist in two\nportions of a country without being any obstacle to legislative unity,\nis proved by the case of England and Scotland. Perhaps, however, this\nundisturbed coexistence of two legal systems under one united\nLegislature, making different laws for the two sections of the country\nin adaptation to the previous differences, might not be so well\npreserved, or the same confidence might not be felt in its\npreservation, in a country whose legislators are more possessed (as is\napt to be the case on the Continent) with the mania for uniformity. A\npeople having that unbounded toleration which is characteristic of\nthis country for every description of anomaly, so long as those whose\ninterests it concerns do not feel aggrieved by it, afforded an\nexceptionally advantageous field for trying this difficult experiment.\nIn most countries, if it was an object to retain different systems of\nlaw, it might probably be necessary to retain distinct legislatures as\nguardians of them, which is perfectly compatible with a national\nParliament and king, or a national Parliament without a king, supreme\nover the external relations of all the members of the body.\n\nWhenever it is not deemed necessary to maintain permanently, in the\ndifferent provinces, different systems of jurisprudence, and\nfundamental institutions grounded on different principles, it is\nalways practicable to reconcile minor diversities with the maintenance\nof unity of government. All that is needful is to give a sufficiently\nlarge sphere of action to the local authorities. Under one and the\nsame central government there may be local governors, and provincial\nassemblies for local purposes. It may happen, for instance, that the\npeople of different provinces may have preferences in favor of\ndifferent modes of taxation. If the general Legislature could not be\ndepended on for being guided by the members for each province in\nmodifying the general system of taxation to suit that province, the\nConstitution might provide that as many of the expenses of the\ngovernment as could by any possibility be made local should be\ndefrayed by local rates imposed by the provincial assemblies, and that\nthose which must of necessity be general, such as the support of an\narmy and navy, should, in the estimates for the year, be apportioned\namong the different provinces according to some general estimate of\ntheir resources, the amount assigned to each being levied by the local\nassembly on the principles most acceptable to the locality, and paid\n_en bloc_ into the national treasury. A practice approaching to this\nexisted even in the old French monarchy, so far as regarded the _pays\nd'etats_, each of which, having consented or been required to\nfurnish a fixed sum, was left to assess it upon the inhabitants by its\nown officers, thus escaping the grinding despotism of the royal\n_intendants_ and _subdelegues;_ and this privilege is always mentioned\nas one of the advantages which mainly contributed to render them, as\nsome of them were, the most flourishing provinces of France.\n\nIdentity of central government is compatible with many different\ndegrees of centralisation, not only administrative, but even\nlegislative. A people may have the desire and the capacity for a\ncloser union than one merely federal, while yet their local\npeculiarities and antecedents render considerable diversities\ndesirable in the details of their government. But if there is a real\ndesire on all hands to make the experiment successful, there needs\nseldom be any difficulty in not only preserving these diversities, but\ngiving them the guaranty of a constitutional provision against any\nattempt at assimilation except by the voluntary act of those who would\nbe affected by the change.\n\n\n\nChapter XVIII--Of the Government of Dependencies by a Free State.\n\n\nFree states, like all others, may possess dependencies, acquired\neither by conquest or by colonization, and our own is the greatest\ninstance of the kind in modern history.  It is a most important\nquestion how such dependencies ought to be governed.\n\nIt is unnecessary to discuss the case of small posts, like\nGibraltar, Aden, or Heligoland, which are held only as naval or\nmilitary positions. The military or naval object is in this case\nparamount, and the inhabitants can not, consistently with it, be\nadmitted to the government of the place, though they ought to be\nallowed all liberties and privileges compatible with that restriction,\nincluding the free management of municipal affairs, and, as a\ncompensation for being locally sacrificed to the convenience of the\ngoverning state, should be admitted to equal rights with its native\nsubjects in all other parts of the empire.\n\nOutlying territories of some size and population, which are held as\ndependencies, that is, which are subject, more or less, to acts of\nsovereign power on the part of the paramount country, without being\nequally represented (if represented at all) in its Legislature, may be\ndivided into two classes. Some are composed of people of similar\ncivilization to the ruling country, capable of, and ripe for,\nrepresentative government, such as the British possessions in America\nand Australia. Others, like India, are still at a great distance from\nthat state.\n\nIn the case of dependencies of the former class, this country has at\nlength realized, in rare completeness, the true principle of\ngovernment. England has always felt under a certain degree of\nobligation to bestow on such of her outlying populations as were of\nher own blood and language, and on some who were not, representative\ninstitutions formed in imitation of her own; but, until the present\ngeneration, she has been on the same bad level with other countries as\nto the amount of self-government which she allowed them to exercise\nthrough the representative institutions that she conceded to them. She\nclaimed to be the supreme arbiter even of their purely internal\nconcerns, according to her own, not their ideas of how those concerns\ncould be best regulated. This practice was a natural corollary from\nthe vicious theory of colonial policy--once common to all Europe, and\nnot yet completely relinquished by any other people--which regarded\ncolonies as valuable by affording markets for our commodities that\ncould be kept entirely to ourselves; a privilege we valued so highly\nthat we thought it worth purchasing by allowing to the colonies the\nsame monopoly of our market for their own productions which we claimed\nfor our commodities in theirs. This notable plan for enriching them\nand ourselves by making each pay enormous sums to the other, dropping\nthe greatest part by the way, has been for some time abandoned. But\nthe bad habit of meddling in the internal government of the colonies\ndid not at once die out when we relinquished the idea of making any\nprofit by it. We continued to torment them, not for any benefit to\nourselves, but for that of a section or faction among the colonists;\nand this persistence in domineering cost us a Canadian rebellion\nbefore we had the happy thought of giving it up. England was like an\nill brought-up elder brother, who persists in tyrannizing over the\nyounger ones from mere habit, till one of them, by a spirited\nresistance, though with unequal strength, gives him notice to desist.\nWe were wise enough not to require a second warning. A new era in the\ncolonial policy of nations began with Lord Durham's Report; the\nimperishable memorial of that nobleman's courage, patriotism, and\nenlightened liberality, and of the intellect and practical sagacity of\nits joint authors, Mr. Wakefield and the lamented Charles Buller.\n[11]\n\nIt is now a fixed principle of the policy of Great Britain, professed\nin theory and faithfully adhered to in practice, that her colonies of\nEuropean race, equally with the parent country, possess the fullest\nmeasure of internal self-government. They have been allowed to make\ntheir own free representative constitutions by altering in any manner\nthey thought fit the already very popular constitutions which we had\ngiven them. Each is governed by its own Legislature and executive,\nconstituted on highly democratic principles. The veto of the crown and\nof Parliament, though nominally reserved, is only exercised (and that\nvery rarely) on questions which concern the empire, and not solely the\nparticular colony. How liberal a construction has been given to the\ndistinction between imperial and colonial questions is shown by the\nfact that the whole of the unappropriated lands in the regions behind\nour American and Australian colonies have been given up to the\nuncontrolled disposal of the colonial communities, though they might,\nwithout injustice, have been kept in the hands of the imperial\ngovernment, to be administered for the greatest advantage of future\nemigrants from all parts of the empire. Every colony has thus as full\npower over its own affairs as it could have if it were a member of\neven the loosest federation, and much fuller than would belong to it\nunder the Constitution of the United States, being free even to tax at\nits pleasure the commodities imported from the mother country. Their\nunion with Great Britain is the slightest kind of federal union; but\nnot a strictly equal federation, the mother country retaining to\nitself the powers of a federal government, though reduced in practice\nto their very narrowest limits. This inequality is, of course, as far\nas it goes, a disadvantage to the dependencies, which have no voice in\nforeign policy, but are bound by the decisions of the superior\ncountry. They are compelled to join England in war without being in\nany way consulted previous to engaging in it.\n\nThose (now happily not a few) who think that justice is as binding on\ncommunities as it is on individuals, and that men are not warranted in\ndoing to other countries, for the supposed benefit of their own\ncountry, what they would not be justified in doing to other men for\ntheir own benefit, feel even this limited amount of constitutional\nsubordination on the part of the colonies to be a violation of\nprinciple, and have often occupied themselves in looking out for means\nby which it may be avoided. With this view it has been proposed by\nsome that the colonies should return representatives to the British\nLegislature, and by others that the powers of our own, as well as of\ntheir Parliaments, should be confined to internal policy, and that\nthere should be another representative body for foreign and imperial\nconcerns, in which last the dependencies of Great Britain should be\nrepresented in the same manner, and with the same completeness as\nGreat Britain itself. On this system there would be a perfectly equal\nfederation between the mother country and her colonies, then no longer\ndependencies.\n\nThe feelings of equity and conceptions of public morality from which\nthese suggestions emanate are worthy of all praise, but the\nsuggestions themselves are so inconsistent with rational principles of\ngovernment that it is doubtful if they have been seriously accepted as\na possibility by any reasonable thinker. Countries separated by half\nthe globe do not present the natural conditions for being under one\ngovernment, or even members of one federation. If they had\nsufficiently the same interests, they have not, and never can have, a\nsufficient habit of taking council together. They are not part of the\nsame public; they do not discuss and deliberate in the same arena, but\napart, and have only a most imperfect knowledge of what passes in the\nminds of one another. They neither know each other's objects, nor have\nconfidence in each other's principles of conduct. Let any Englishman\nask himself how he should like his destinies to depend on an assembly\nof which one third was British American, and another third South\nAfrican and Australian. Yet to this it must come if there were any\nthing like fair or equal representation; and would not every one feel\nthat the representatives of Canada and Australia, even in matters of\nan imperial character, could not know or feel any sufficient concern\nfor the interests, opinions, or wishes of English, Irish, and Scotch?\nEven for strictly federative purposes the conditions do not exist\nwhich we have seen to be essential to a federation. England is\nsufficient for her own protection without the colonies, and would be\nin a much stronger, as well as more dignified position, if separated\nfrom them, than when reduced to be a single member of an American,\nAfrican, and Australian confederation. Over and above the commerce\nwhich she might equally enjoy after separation, England derives little\nadvantage, except in _prestige_, from her dependencies, and the little\nshe does derive is quite outweighed by the expense they cost her, and\nthe dissemination they necessitate of her naval and military force,\nwhich, in case of war, or any real apprehension of it, requires to be\ndouble or treble what would be needed for the defense of this country\nalone.\n\nBut, though Great Britain could do perfectly well without her\ncolonies, and though, on every principle of morality and justice, she\nought to consent to their separation, should the time come when, after\nfull trial of the best form of union, they deliberately desire to be\ndissevered, there are strong reasons for maintaining the present\nslight bond of connection so long as not disagreeable to the feelings\nof either party. It is a step, as far as it goes, towards universal\npeace and general friendly co-operation among nations. It renders war\nimpossible among a large number of otherwise independent communities,\nand, moreover, hinders any of them from being absorbed into a foreign\nstate, and becoming a source of additional aggressive strength to some\nrival power, either more despotic or closer at hand, which might not\nalways be so unambitious or so pacific as Great Britain. It at least\nkeeps the markets of the different countries open to one another, and\nprevents that mutual exclusion by hostile tariffs which none of the\ngreat communities of mankind except England have yet outgrown. And in\nthe case of the British possessions it has the advantage, especially\nvaluable at the present time, of adding to the moral influence and\nweight in the councils of the world of the power which, of all in\nexistence, best understands liberty--and, whatever may have been its\nerrors in the past, has attained to more of conscience and moral\nprinciple in its dealings with foreigners than any other great nation\nseems either to conceive as possible or recognize as desirable. Since,\nthen, the union can only continue, while it does continue, on the\nfooting of an unequal federation, it is important to consider by what\nmeans this small amount of inequality can be prevented from being\neither onerous or humiliating to the communities occupying the less\nexalted position.\n\nThe only inferiority necessarily inherent in the case is that the\nmother country decides, both for the colonies and for herself, on\nquestions of peace and war. They gain, in return, the obligation on\nthe mother country to repel aggressions directed against them; but,\nexcept when the minor community is so weak that the protection of a\nstronger power is indispensable to it, reciprocity of obligation is\nnot a full equivalent for non-admission to a voice in the\ndeliberations. It is essential, therefore, that in all wars, save\nthose which, like the Caffre or New Zealand wars, are incurred for the\nsake of the particular colony, the colonists should not (without their\nown voluntary request) be called on to contribute any thing to the\nexpense except what may be required for the specific local defense of\ntheir ports, shores, and frontiers against invasion. Moreover, as the\nmother country claims the privilege, at her sole discretion, of taking\nmeasures or pursuing a policy which may expose them to attack, it is\njust that she should undertake a considerable portion of the cost of\ntheir military defense even in time of peace; the whole of it, so far\nas it depends upon a standing army.\n\nBut there is a means, still more effectual than these, by which, and\nin general by which alone, a full equivalent can be given to a smaller\ncommunity for sinking its individuality, as a substantive power among\nnations, in the greater individuality of a wide and powerful empire.\nThis one indispensable, and, at the same time, sufficient expedient,\nwhich meets at once the demands of justice and the growing exigencies\nof policy, is to open the service of government in all its\ndepartments, and in every part of the empire, on perfectly equal\nterms, to the inhabitants of the colonies. Why does no one ever hear a\nbreath of disloyalty from the Islands in the British Channel? By race,\nreligion, and geographical position they belong less to England than\nto France; but, while they enjoy, like Canada and New South Wales,\ncomplete control over their internal affairs and their taxation, every\noffice or dignity in the gift of the crown is freely open to the\nnative of Guernsey or Jersey. Generals, admirals, peers of the United\nKingdom are made, and there is nothing which hinders prime ministers\nto be made from those insignificant islands. The same system was\ncommenced in reference to the colonies generally by an enlightened\ncolonial secretary, too early lost, Sir William Molesworth, when he\nappointed Mr. Hinckes, a leading Canadian politician, to a West Indian\ngovernment. It is a very shallow view of the springs of political\naction in a community which thinks such things unimportant because the\nnumber of those in a position actually to profit by the concession\nmight not be very considerable. That limited number would be composed\nprecisely of those who have most moral power over the rest; and men\nare not so destitute of the sense of collective degradation as not to\nfeel the withholding of an advantage from even one person, because of\na circumstance which they all have in common with him, an affront to\nall. If we prevent the leading men of a community from standing forth\nto the world as its chiefs and representatives in the general councils\nof mankind, we owe it both to their legitimate ambition and to the\njust pride of the community to give them in return an equal chance of\noccupying the same prominent position in a nation of greater power and\nimportance. Were the whole service of the British crown opened to the\nnatives of the Ionian Islands, we should hear no more of the desire\nfor union with Greece. Such a union is not desirable for the people,\nto whom it would be a step backward in civilization; but it is no\nwonder if Corfu, which has given a minister of European reputation to\nthe Russian Empire, and a president to Greece itself before the\narrival of the Bavarians, should feel it a grievance that its people\nare not admissable to the highest posts in some government or other.\n\nThus far of the dependencies whose population is in a sufficiently\nadvanced state to be fitted for representative government; but there\nare others which have not attained that state, and which, if held at\nall, must be governed by the dominant country, or by persons delegated\nfor that purpose by it. This mode of government is as legitimate as\nany other, if it is the one which in the existing state of\ncivilization of the subject people most facilitates their transition\nto a higher stage of improvement. There are, as we have already seen,\nconditions of society in which a vigorous despotism is in itself the\nbest mode of government for training the people in what is\nspecifically wanting to render them capable of a higher civilization.\nThere are others, in which the mere fact of despotism has indeed no\nbeneficial effect, the lessons which it teaches having already been\nonly too completely learned, but in which, there being no spring of\nspontaneous improvement in the people themselves, their almost only\nhope of making any steps in advance depends on the chances of a good\ndespot. Under a native despotism, a good despot is a rare and\ntransitory accident; but when the dominion they are under is that of a\nmore civilized people, that people ought to be able to supply it\nconstantly. The ruling country ought to be able to do for its subjects\nall that could be done by a succession of absolute monarchs,\nguaranteed by irresistible force against the precariousness of tenure\nattendant on barbarous despotisms, and qualified by their genius to\nanticipate all that experience has taught to the more advanced nation.\nSuch is the ideal rule of a free people over a barbarous or\nsemi-barbarous one. We need not expect to see that ideal realized;\nbut, unless some approach to it is, the rulers are guilty of a\ndereliction of the highest moral trust which can devolve upon a\nnation; and if they do not even aim at it, they are selfish usurpers,\non a par in criminality with any of those whose ambition and rapacity\nhave sported from age to age with the destiny of masses of mankind.\n\nAs it is already a common, and is rapidly tending to become the\nuniversal condition of the more backward populations to be either held\nin direct subjection by the more advanced, or to be under their\ncomplete political ascendancy, there are in this age of the world few\nmore important problems than how to organize this rule, so as to make\nit a good instead of an evil to the subject people, providing them\nwith the best attainable present government, and with the conditions\nmost favorable to future permanent improvement. But the mode of\nfitting the government for this purpose is by no means so well\nunderstood as the conditions of good government in a people capable of\ngoverning themselves. We may even say that it is not understood at\nall.\n\nThe thing appears perfectly easy to superficial observers. If India\n(for example) is not fit to govern itself, all that seems to them\nrequired is that there should be a minister to govern it, and that\nthis minister, like all other British ministers, should be responsible\nto the British Parliament. Unfortunately this, though the simplest\nmode of attempting to govern a dependency, is about the worst, and\nbetrays in its advocates a total want of comprehension of the\nconditions of good government. To govern a country under\nresponsibility to the people of that country, and to govern one\ncountry under responsibility to the people of another, are two very\ndifferent things. What makes the excellence of the first is, that\nfreedom is preferable to despotism: but the last _is_ despotism. The\nonly choice the case admits is a choice of despotisms, and it is not\ncertain that the despotism of twenty millions is necessarily better\nthan that of a few or of one; but it is quite certain that the\ndespotism of those who neither hear, nor see, nor know any thing about\ntheir subjects, has many chances of being worse than that of those who\ndo. It is not usually thought that the immediate agents of authority\ngovern better because they govern in the name of an absent master, and\nof one who has a thousand more pressing interests to attend to. The\nmaster may hold them to a strict responsibility, enforced by heavy\npenalties, but it is very questionable if those penalties will often\nfall in the right place.\n\nIt is always under great difficulties, and very imperfectly, that a\ncountry can be governed by foreigners, even when there is no extreme\ndisparity in habits and ideas between the rulers and the ruled.\nForeigners do not feel with the people. They can not judge, by the\nlight in which a thing appears to their own minds, or the manner in\nwhich it affects their feelings, how it will affect the feelings or\nappear to the minds of the subject population. What a native of the\ncountry, of average practical ability, knows as it were by instinct,\nthey have to learn slowly, and, after all, imperfectly, by study and\nexperience. The laws, the customs, the social relations for which they\nhave to legislate, instead of being familiar to them from childhood,\nare all strange to them. For most of their detailed knowledge they\nmust depend on the information of natives, and it is difficult for\nthem to know whom to trust. They are feared, suspected, probably\ndisliked by the population; seldom sought by them except for\ninterested purposes; and they are prone to think that the servilely\nsubmissive are the trustworthy. Their danger is of despising the\nnatives; that of the natives is, of disbelieving that any thing the\nstrangers do can be intended for their good. These are but a part of\nthe difficulties that any rulers have to struggle with, who honestly\nattempt to govern well a country in which they are foreigners. To\novercome these difficulties in any degree will always be a work of\nmuch labor, requiring a very superior degree of capacity in the chief\nadministrators, and a high average among the subordinates; and the\nbest organization of such a government is that which will best insure\nthe labor, develop the capacity, and place the highest specimens of it\nin the situations of greatest trust. Responsibility to an authority\nwhich has gone through none of the labor, acquired none of the\ncapacity, and for the most part is not even aware that either, in any\npeculiar degree, is required, can not be regarded as a very effectual\nexpedient for accomplishing these ends.\n\nThe government of a people by itself has a meaning and a reality, but\nsuch a thing as government of one people by another does not and can\nnot exist. One people may keep another as a warren or preserve for its\nown use, a place to make money in, a human-cattle farm to be worked\nfor the profit of its own inhabitants; but if the good of the governed\nis the proper business of a government, it is utterly impossible that\na people should directly attend to it. The utmost they can do is to\ngive some of their best men a commission to look after it, to whom the\nopinion of their own country can neither be much of a guide in the\nperformance of their duty, nor a competent judge of the mode in which\nit has been performed. Let any one consider how the English themselves\nwould be governed if they knew and cared no more about their own\naffairs than they know and care about the affairs of the Hindoos. Even\nthis comparison gives no adequate idea of the state of the case; for a\npeople thus indifferent to politics altogether would probably be\nsimply acquiescent, and let the government alone; whereas in the case\nof India, a politically active people like the English, amid habitual\nacquiescence, are every now and then interfering, and almost always in\nthe wrong place. The real causes which determine the prosperity or\nwretchedness, the improvement or deterioration of the Hindoos, are too\nfar off to be within their ken. They have not the knowledge necessary\nfor suspecting the existence of those causes, much less for judging of\ntheir operation. The most essential interests of the country may be\nwell administered without obtaining any of their approbation, or\nmismanaged to almost any excess without attracting their notice. The\npurposes for which they are principally tempted to interfere, and\ncontrol the proceedings of their delegates, are of two kinds. One is\nto force English ideas down the throats of the natives; for instance,\nby measures of proselytism, or acts intentionally or unintentionally\noffensive to the religious feelings of the people. This misdirection\nof opinion in the ruling country is instructively exemplified (the\nmore so, because nothing is meant but justice and fairness, and as\nmuch impartiality as can be expected from persons really convinced) by\nthe demand now so general in England for having the Bible taught, at\nthe option of pupils or of their parents, in the government schools.\nFrom the European point of view nothing can wear a fairer aspect, or\nseem less open to objection on the score of religious freedom. To\nAsiatic eyes it is quite another thing. No Asiatic people ever\nbelieves that a government puts its paid officers and official\nmachinery into motion unless it is bent upon an object; and when bent\non an object, no Asiatic believes that any government, except a feeble\nand contemptible one, pursues it by halves. If government schools and\nschoolmasters taught Christianity, whatever pledges might be given of\nteaching it only to those who spontaneously sought it, no amount of\nevidence would ever persuade the parents that improper means were not\nused to make their children Christians, or, at all events, outcasts\nfrom Hindooism. If they could, in the end, be convinced of the\ncontrary, it would only be by the entire failure of the schools, so\nconducted, to make any converts. If the teaching had the smallest\neffect in promoting its object, it would compromise not only the\nutility and even existence of the government education, but perhaps\nthe safety of the government itself. An English Protestant would not\nbe easily induced, by disclaimers of proselytism, to place his\nchildren in a Roman Catholic seminary; Irish Catholics will not send\ntheir children to schools in which they can be made Protestants; and\nwe expect that Hindoos, who believe that the privileges of Hindooism\ncan be forfeited by a merely physical act, will expose theirs to the\ndanger of being made Christians!\n\nSuch is one of the modes in which the opinion of the dominant country\ntends to act more injuriously than beneficially on the conduct of its\ndeputed governors. In other respects, its interference is likely to be\noftenest exercised where it will be most pertinaciously demanded, and\nthat is, on behalf of some interest of the English settlers. English\nsettlers have friends at home, have organs, have access to the public;\nthey have a common language, and common ideas with their countrymen;\nany complaint by an Englishman is more sympathetically heard, even if\nno unjust preference is intentionally accorded to it. Now if there be\na fact to which all experience testifies, it is that, when a country\nholds another in subjection, the individuals of the ruling people who\nresort to the foreign country to make their fortunes are of all others\nthose who most need to be held under powerful restraint. They are\nalways one of the chief difficulties of the government. Armed with the\n_prestige_ and filled with the scornful overbearingness of the\nconquering nation, they have the feelings inspired by absolute power\nwithout its sense of responsibility. Among a people like that of\nIndia, the utmost efforts of the public authorities are not enough for\nthe effectual protection of the weak against the strong; and of all\nthe strong, the European settlers are the strongest. Wherever the\ndemoralizing effect of the situation is not in a most remarkable\ndegree corrected by the personal character of the individual, they\nthink the people of the country mere dirt under their feet: it seems\nto them monstrous that any rights of the natives should stand in the\nway of their smallest pretensions; the simplest act of protection to\nthe inhabitants against any act of power on their part which they may\nconsider useful to their commercial objects they denounce, and\nsincerely regard as an injury. So natural is this state of feeling in\na situation like theirs, that, even under the discouragement which it\nhas hitherto met with from the ruling authorities, it is impossible\nthat more or less of the spirit should not perpetually break out. The\ngovernment, itself free from this spirit, is never able sufficiently\nto keep it down in the young and raw even of its own civil and\nmilitary officers, over whom it has so much more control than over the\nindependent residents. As it is with the English in India, so,\naccording to trustworthy testimony, it is with the French in Algiers;\nso with the Americans in the countries conquered from Mexico; so it\nseems to be with the Europeans in China, and already even in Japan:\nthere is no necessity to recall how it was with the Spaniards in South\nAmerica. In all these cases, the government to which these private\nadventurers are subject is better than they, and does the most it can\nto protect the natives against them. Even the Spanish government did\nthis, sincerely and earnestly, though ineffectually, as is known to\nevery reader of Mr. Helps' instructive history. Had the Spanish\ngovernment been directly accountable to Spanish opinion, we may\nquestion if it would have made the attempt, for the Spaniards,\ndoubtless, would have taken part with their Christian friends and\nrelations rather than with pagans. The settlers, not the natives, have\nthe ear of the public at home; it is they whose representations are\nlikely to pass for truth, because they alone have both the means and\nthe motive to press them perseveringly upon the inattentive and\nuninterested public mind. The distrustful criticism with which\nEnglishmen, more than any other people, are in the habit of scanning\nthe conduct of their country towards foreigners, they usually reserve\nfor the proceedings of the public authorities. In all questions\nbetween a government and an individual, the presumption in every\nEnglishman's mind is that the government is in the wrong. And when the\nresident English bring the batteries of English political action to\nbear upon any of the bulwarks erected to protect the natives against\ntheir encroachments, the executive, with their real but faint\nvelleities of something better, generally find it safer to their\nParliamentary interest, and, at any rate, less troublesome, to give up\nthe disputed position than to defend it.\n\nWhat makes matters worse is that, when the public mind is invoked (as,\nto its credit, the English mind is extremely open to be) in the name\nof justice and philanthropy in behalf of the subject community or\nrace, there is the same probability of its missing the mark;\nfor in the subject community also there are oppressors and\noppressed--powerful individuals or classes, and slaves prostrate\nbefore them; and it is the former, not the latter, who have the means\nof access to the English public. A tyrant or sensualist who has been\ndeprived of the power he had abused, and, instead of punishment, is\nsupported in as great wealth and splendor as he ever enjoyed; a knot\nof privileged landholders, who demand that the state should relinquish\nto them its reserved right to a rent from their lands, or who resent\nas a wrong any attempt to protect the masses from their\nextortion--these have no difficulty in procuring interested or\nsentimental advocacy in the British Parliament and press. The silent\nmyriads obtain none.\n\nThe preceding observations exemplify the operation of a\nprinciple--which might be called an obvious one, were it not that\nscarcely anybody seems to be aware of it--that, while responsibility\nto the governed is the greatest of all securities for good government,\nresponsibility to somebody else not only has no such tendency, but is\nas likely to produce evil as good. The responsibility of the British\nrulers of India to the British nation is chiefly useful because, when\nany acts of the government are called in question, it insures\npublicity and discussion; the utility of which does not require that\nthe public at large should comprehend the point at issue, provided\nthere are any individuals among them who do; for a merely moral\nresponsibility not being responsibility to the collective people, but\nto every separate person among them who forms a judgment, opinions may\nbe weighed as well as counted, and the approbation or disapprobation\nof one person well versed in the subject may outweigh that of\nthousands who know nothing about it at all. It is doubtless a useful\nrestraint upon the immediate rulers that they can be put upon their\ndefense, and that one or two of the jury will form an opinion worth\nhaving about their conduct, though that of the remainder will probably\nbe several degrees worse than none. Such as it is, this is the amount\nof benefit to India from the control exercised over the Indian\ngovernment by the British Parliament and people.\n\nIt is not by attempting to rule directly a country like India, but by\ngiving it good rulers, that the English people can do their duty to\nthat country; and they can scarcely give it a worse one than an\nEnglish cabinet minister, who is thinking of English, not Indian\npolitics; who does not remains long enough in office to acquire an\nintelligent interest in so complicated a subject; upon whom the\nfactitious public opinion got up in Parliament, consisting of two or\nthree fluent speakers, acts with as much force as if it were genuine;\nwhile he is under none of the influences of training and position\nwhich would lead or qualify him to form an honest opinion of his own.\nA free country which attempts to govern a distant dependency,\ninhabited by a dissimilar people, by means of a branch of its own\nexecutive, will almost inevitably fail. The only mode which has any\nchance of tolerable success is to govern through a delegated body of a\ncomparatively permanent character, allowing only a right of inspection\nand a negative voice to the changeable administration of the state.\nSuch a body did exist in the case of India; and I fear that both India\nand England will pay a severe penalty for the shortsighted policy by\nwhich this intermediate instrument of government was done away with.\n\nIt is of no avail to say that such a delegated body can not have all\nthe requisites of good government; above all, can not have that\ncomplete and over-operative identity of interest with the governed\nwhich it is so difficult to obtain even where the people to be ruled\nare in some degree qualified to look after their own affairs. Real\ngood government is not compatible with the conditions of the case.\nThere is but a choice of imperfections. The problem is, so to\nconstruct the governing body that, under the difficulties of the\nposition, it shall have as much interest as possible in good\ngovernment, and as little in bad. Now these conditions are best found\nin an intermediate body. A delegated administration has always this\nadvantage over a direct one, that it has, at all events, no duty to\nperform except to the governed. It has no interests to consider except\ntheirs. Its own power of deriving profit from misgovernment may be\nreduced--in the latest Constitution of the East India Company it was\nreduced--to a singularly small amount; and it can be kept entirely\nclear of bias from the individual or class interests of any one else.\nWhen the home government and Parliament are swayed by such partial\ninfluences in the exercise of the power reserved to them in the last\nresort, the intermediate body is the certain advocate and champion of\nthe dependency before the imperial tribunal. The intermediate body,\nmoreover, is, in the natural course of things, chiefly composed of\npersons who have acquired professional knowledge of this part of their\ncountry's concerns; who have been trained to it in the place itself,\nand have made its administration the main occupation of their lives.\nFurnished with these qualifications, and not being liable to lose\ntheir office from the accidents of home politics, they identify their\ncharacter and consideration with their special trust, and have a much\nmore permanent interest in the success of their administration, and in\nthe prosperity of the country which they administer, than a member of\na cabinet under a representative constitution can possibly have in the\ngood government of any country except the one which he serves. So far\nas the choice of those who carry on the management on the spot\ndevolves upon this body, their appointment is kept out of the vortex\nof party and Parliamentary jobbing, and freed from the influence of\nthose motives to the abuse of patronage for the reward of adherents,\nor to buy off those who would otherwise be opponents, which are always\nstronger with statesmen of average honesty than a conscientious sense\nof the duty of appointing the fittest man. To put this one class of\nappointments as far as possible out of harm's way is of more\nconsequence than the worst which can happen to all other offices in\nthe state; for, in every other department, if the officer is\nunqualified, the general opinion of the community directs him in a\ncertain degree what to do; but in the position of the administrators\nof a dependency where the people are not fit to have the control in\ntheir own hands, the character of the government entirely depends on\nthe qualifications, moral and intellectual, of the individual\nfunctionaries.\n\nIt can not be too often repeated that, in a country like India, every\nthing depends on the personal qualities and capacities of the agents\nof government. This truth is the cardinal principle of Indian\nadministration. The day when it comes to be thought that the\nappointment of persons to situations of trust from motives of\nconvenience, already so criminal in England, can be practiced with\nimpunity in India, will be the beginning of the decline and fall of\nour empire there. Even with a sincere intention of preferring the best\ncandidate, it will not do to rely on chance for supplying fit persons.\nThe system must be calculated to form them. It has done this hitherto;\nand because it has done so, our rule in India has lasted, and been one\nof constant, if not very rapid improvement in prosperity and good\nadministration. As much bitterness is now manifested against this\nsystem, and as much eagerness displayed to overthrow it, as if\neducating and training the officers of government for their work were\na thing utterly unreasonable and indefensible, an unjustifiable\ninterference with the rights of ignorance and inexperience. There is a\ntacit conspiracy between those who would like to job in first-rate\nIndian offices for their connections here, and those who, being\nalready in India, claim to be promoted from the indigo factory or the\nattorney's office to administer justice or fix the payments due to\ngovernment from millions of people. The \"monopoly\" of the civil\nservice, so much inveighed against, is like the monopoly of judicial\noffices by the bar; and its abolition would be like opening the bench\nin Westminster Hall to the first comer whose friends certify that he\nhas now and then looked into Blackstone. Were the course ever adopted\nof sending men from this country, or encouraging them in going out, to\nget themselves put into high appointments without having learned their\nbusiness by passing through the lower ones, the most important offices\nwould be thrown to Scotch cousins and adventurers, connected by no\nprofessional feeling with the country or the work, held to no previous\nknowledge, and eager only to make money rapidly and return home. The\nsafety of the country is, that those by whom it is administered be\nsent out in youth, as candidates only, to begin at the bottom of the\nladder, and ascend higher or not, as, after a proper interval, they\nare proved qualified. The defect of the East India Company's system\nwas that, though the best men were carefully sought out for the most\nimportant posts, yet, if an officer remained in the service,\npromotion, though it might be delayed, came at last in some shape or\nother, to the least as well as to the most competent. Even the\ninferior in qualifications among such a corps of functionaries\nconsisted, it must be remembered, of men who had been brought up to\ntheir duties, and had fulfilled them for many years, at lowest without\ndisgrace, under the eye and authority of a superior. But, though this\ndiminished the evil, it was nevertheless considerable. A man who never\nbecomes fit for more than an assistant's duty should remain an\nassistant all his life, and his juniors should be promoted over him.\nWith this exception, I am not aware of any real defect in the old\nsystem of Indian appointments. It had already received the greatest\nother improvement it was susceptible of, the choice of the original\ncandidates by competitive examination, which, besides the advantage of\nrecruiting from a higher grade of industry and capacity, has the\nrecommendation that under it, unless by accident, there are no\npersonal ties between the candidates for offices and those who have a\nvoice in conferring them.\n\nIt is in no way unjust that public officers thus selected and trained\nshould be exclusively eligible to offices which require specially\nIndian knowledge and experience. If any door to the higher\nappointments, without passing through the lower, be opened even for\noccasional use, there will be such incessant knocking at it by persons\nof influence that it will be impossible ever to keep it closed. The\nonly excepted appointment should be the highest one of all. The\nViceroy of British India should be a person selected from all\nEnglishmen for his great general capacity for government. If he have\nthis, he will be able to distinguish in others, and turn to his own\nuse, that special knowledge and judgment in local affairs which he has\nnot himself had the opportunity of acquiring. There are good reasons\nwhy the viceroy should not be a member of the regular service. All\nservices have, more or less, their class prejudices, from which the\nsupreme ruler ought to be exempt. Neither are men, however able and\nexperienced, who have passed their lives in Asia, so likely to possess\nthe most advanced European ideas in general statesmanship, which the\nchief ruler should carry out with him, and blend with the results of\nIndian experience. Again, being of a different class, and especially\nif chosen by a different authority, he will seldom have any personal\npartialities to warp his appointments to office. This great security\nfor honest bestowal of patronage existed in rare perfection under the\nmixed government of the crown and the East India Company. The supreme\ndispensers of office--the governor general and governors--were\nappointed, in fact though not formally, by the crown, that is, by the\ngeneral government, not by the intermediate body, and a great officer\nof the crown probably had not a single personal or political\nconnection in the local service, while the delegated body, most of\nwhom had themselves served in the country, had, and were likely to\nhave, such connections. This guaranty for impartiality would be much\nimpaired if the civil servants of government, even though sent out in\nboyhood as mere candidates for employment, should come to be\nfurnished, in any considerable proportion, by the class of society\nwhich supplies viceroys and governors. Even the initiatory competitive\nexamination would then be an insufficient security. It would exclude\nmere ignorance and incapacity; it would compel youths of family to\nstart in the race with the same amount of instruction and ability as\nother people; the stupidest son could not be put into the Indian\nservice, as he can be into the Church; but there would be nothing to\nprevent undue preference afterwards. No longer, all equally unknown\nand unheard of by the arbiter of their lot, a portion of the service\nwould be personally, and a still greater number politically, in close\nrelation with him. Members of certain families, and of the higher\nclasses and influential connections generally, would rise more rapidly\nthan their competitors, and be often kept in situations for which they\nwere unfit, or placed in those for which others were fitter. The same\ninfluences would be brought into play which affect promotions in the\narmy; and those alone, if such miracles of simplicity there be, who\nbelieve that these are impartial, would expect impartiality in those\nof India. This evil is, I fear, irremediable by any general measures\nwhich can be taken under the present system. No such will afford a\ndegree of security comparable to that which once flowed spontaneously\nfrom the so-called double government.\n\nWhat is accounted so great an advantage in the case of the English\nsystem of government at home has been its misfortune in India--that it\ngrew up of itself, not from preconceived design, but by successive\nexpedients, and by the adaptation of machinery originally created for\na different purpose. As the country on which its maintenance depended\nwas not the one out of whose necessities it grew, its practical\nbenefits did not come home to the mind of that country, and it would\nhave required theoretic recommendations to render it acceptable.\nUnfortunately, these were exactly what it seemed to be destitute of;\nand undoubtedly the common theories of government did not furnish it\nwith such, framed as those theories have been for states of\ncircumstances differing in all the most important features from the\ncase concerned. But in government as in other departments of human\nagency, almost all principles which have been durable were first\nsuggested by observation of some particular case, in which the general\nlaws of nature acted in some new or previously unnoticed combination\nof circumstances. The institutions of Great Britain, and those of the\nUnited States, have the distinction of suggesting most of the theories\nof government which, through good and evil fortune, are now, in the\ncourse of generations, reawakening political life in the nations of\nEurope. It has been the destiny of the government of the East India\nCompany to suggest the true theory of the government of a\nsemi-barbarous dependency by a civilized country, and after having\ndone this, to perish. It would be a singular fortune if, at the end of\ntwo or three more generations, this speculative result should be the\nonly remaining fruit of our ascendancy in India; if posterity should\nsay of us that, having stumbled accidentally upon better arrangements\nthan our wisdom would ever have devised, the first use we made of our\nawakened reason was to destroy them, and allow the good which had been\nin course of being realized to fall through and be lost from ignorance\nof the principles on which it depended. _Di meliora;_ but if a fate so\ndisgraceful to England and to civilization can be averted, it must be\nthrough far wider political conceptions than merely English or\nEuropean practice can supply, and through a much more profound study\nof Indian experience and of the conditions of Indian government than\neither English politicians, or those who supply the English public\nwith opinions, have hitherto shown any willingness to undertake.\n\n\nThe End\n\n\n\n\nFootnotes:\n\n\n[Footnote 1: I limit the expression to past time, because I would say nothing\nderogatory of a great, and now at last a free, people, who are\nentering into the general movement of European progress with a vigor\nwhich bids fair to make up rapidly the ground they have lost. No one\ncan doubt what Spanish intellect and energy are capable of; and their\nfaults as a people are chiefly those for which freedom and industrial\nardor are a real specific.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Italy, which alone can be quoted as an exception, is only so in\nregard to the final stage of its transformation. The more difficult\nprevious advance from the city isolation of Florence, Pisa, or Milan,\nto the provincial unity of Tuscany or Lombardy, took place in the\nusual manner.]\n\n[Footnote 3: This blunder of Mr. Disraeli (from which, greatly to his credit,\nSir John Pakington took an opportunity soon after of separating\nhimself) is a speaking instance, among many, how little the\nConservative leaders understand Conservative principles. Without\npresuming to require from political parties such an amount of virtue\nand discernment as that they should comprehend, and know when to\napply, the principles of their opponents, we may yet say that it would\nbe a great improvement if each party understood and acted upon its\nown. Well would it be for England if Conservatives voted consistently\nfor every thing conservative, and Liberals for every thing liberal. We\nshould not then have to wait long for things which, like the present\nand many other great measures, are eminently both the one and the\nother. The Conservatives, as being by the law of their existence the\nstupidest party, have much the greatest sins of this description to\nanswer for; and it is a melancholy truth, that if any measure were\nproposed on any subject truly, largely, and far-sightedly\nconservative, even if Liberals were willing to vote for it, the great\nbulk of the Conservative party would rush blindly in and prevent it\nfrom being carried.]\n\n[Footnote 4: \"Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform,\" 2nd ed. p. 32-36.]\n\n[Footnote 5: \"This expedient has been recommended both on the score of saving\nexpense and on that of obtaining the votes of many electors who\notherwise would not vote, and who are regarded by the advocates of the\nplan as a particularly desirable class of voters. The scheme has been\ncarried into practice in the election of poor-law guardians, and its\nsuccess in that instance is appealed to in favor of adopting it in the\nmore important case of voting for a member of the Legislature. But the\ntwo cases appear to me to differ in the point on which the benefits of\nthe expedient depend. In a local election for a special kind of\nadministrative business, which consists mainly in the dispensation of\na public fund, it is an object to prevent the choice from being\nexclusively in the hands of those who actively concern themselves\nabout it; for the public interest which attaches to the election being\nof a limited kind, and in most cases not very great in degree, the\ndisposition to make themselves busy in the matter is apt to be in a\ngreat measure confined to persons who hope to turn their activity to\ntheir own private advantage; and it may be very desirable to render\nthe intervention of other people as little onerous to them as\npossible, if only for the purpose of swamping these private interests.\nBut when the matter in hand is the great business of national\ngovernment, in which every one must take an interest who cares for any\nthing out of himself, or who cares even for himself intelligently, it\nis much rather an object to prevent those from voting who are\nindifferent to the subject, than to induce them to vote by any other\nmeans than that of awakening their dormant minds. The voter who does\nnot care enough about the election to go to the poll is the very man\nwho, if he can vote without that small trouble, will give his vote to\nthe first person who asks for it, or on the most trifling or frivolous\ninducement. A man who does not care whether he votes is not likely to\ncare much which way he votes; and he who is in that state of mind has\nno moral right to vote at all; since, if he does so, a vote which is\nnot the expression of a conviction, counts for as much, and goes as\nfar in determining the result as one which represents the thoughts and\npurposes of a life.\"--_Thoughts_, etc., p. 39.]\n\n[Footnote 6: Several of the witnesses before the Committee of the House of\nCommons in 1860, on the operation of the Corrupt Practices Prevention\nAct, some of them of great practical experience in election matters,\nwere favorable (either absolutely or as a last resort) to the\nprinciple of requiring a declaration from members of Parliament, and\nwere of opinion that, if supported by penalties, it would be, to a\ngreat degree, effectual. (_Evidence_, pp. 46, 54-7, 67, 123, 198-202,\n208.) The chief commissioner of the Wakefield Inquiry said (in\nreference certainly to a different proposal), \"If they see that the\nLegislature is earnest upon the subject, the machinery will work.... I\nam quite sure that if some personal stigma were applied upon\nconviction of bribery, it would change the current of public opinion\"\n(pp. 26 and 32). A distinguished member of the committee (and of the\npresent cabinet) seemed to think it very objectionable to attach the\npenalties of perjury to a merely promissory as distinguished from an\nassertory oath; but he was reminded that the oath taken by a witness\nin a court of justice is a promissory oath; and the rejoinder (that\nthe witness's promise relates to an act to be done at once, while the\nmember's would be a promise for all future time) would only be to the\npurpose if it could be supposed that the swearer might forget the\nobligation he had entered into, or could possibly violate it unawares:\ncontingencies which, in a case like the present, are out of the\nquestion.\n\nA more substantial difficulty is, that one of the forms most\nfrequently assumed by election expenditure is that of subscriptions to\nlocal charities or other local objects; and it would be a strong\nmeasure to enact that money should not be given in charity within a\nplace by the member for it. When such subscriptions are _bona fide_,\nthe popularity which may be derived from them is an advantage which it\nseems hardly possible to deny to superior riches. But the greatest\npart of the mischief consists in the fact that money so contributed is\nemployed in bribery, under the euphonious name of keeping up the\nmember's interest. To guard against this, it should be part of the\nmember's promissory declaration that all sums expended by him in the\nplace, or for any purpose connected with it or with any of its\ninhabitants (with the exception perhaps of his own hotel expenses)\nshould pass through the hands of the election auditor, and be by him\n(and not by the member himself or his friends) applied to its declared\npurpose.\n\nThe principle of making all lawful expenses of a charge, not upon the\ncandidate, but upon the locality, was upheld by two of the best\nwitnesses (pp. 20, 65-70, 277).]\n\n[Footnote 7: \"As Mr. Lorimer remarks, by creating a pecuniary inducement to\npersons of the lowest class to devote themselves to public affairs,\nthe calling of the demagogue would be formally inaugurated. Nothing is\nmore to be deprecated than making it the private interest of a number\nof active persons to urge the form of government in the direction of\nits natural perversion. The indications which either a multitude or an\nindividual can give when merely left to their own weaknesses, afford\nbut a faint idea of what those weaknesses would become when played\nupon by a thousand flatterers. If there were 658 places of certain,\nhowever moderate emolument, to be gained by persuading the multitude\nthat ignorance is as good as knowledge, and better, it is terrible\nodds that they would believe and act upon the lesson.\"--(Article in\n_Fraser's Magazine_ for April, 1859, headed \"Recent Writers on\nReform.\")]\n\n[Footnote 8: Not always, however, the most recondite; for one of the latest\ndenouncers of competitive examination in the House of Commons had the\n_naeivete_ to produce a set of almost elementary questions in algebra,\nhistory, and geography, as a proof of the exorbitant amount of high\nscientific attainment which the Commissioners were so wild as to\nexact.]\n\n[Footnote 9: On Liberty, concluding chapter; and, at greater length, in the\nfinal chapter of \"Principles of Political Economy.\"]\n\n[Footnote 10: Mr. Calhoun.]\n\n[Footnote 11: I am speaking here of the _adoption_ of this improved policy, not,\nof course, of its original suggestion. The honor of having been its\nearliest champion belongs unquestionably to Mr. Roebuck.]","title":"Considerations on Representative Government","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":95209}