{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_5682/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_5682","id":"gutenberg_5682","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/5682","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Ethics","Philosophy, German"],"text":"1785\n\n          FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS\n\n                           by Immanuel Kant\n\n                translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\n\nAncient Greek philosophy was divided into three sciences: physics,\nethics, and logic. This division is perfectly suitable to the nature\nof the thing; and the only improvement that can be made in it is to\nadd the principle on which it is based, so that we may both satisfy\nourselves of its completeness, and also be able to determine correctly\nthe necessary subdivisions.\n\nAll rational knowledge is either material or formal: the former\nconsiders some object, the latter is concerned only with the form of\nthe understanding and of the reason itself, and with the universal\nlaws of thought in general without distinction of its objects.\nFormal philosophy is called logic. Material philosophy, however, which has\nto do with determinate objects and the laws to which they are subject,\nis again twofold; for these laws are either laws of nature or of\nfreedom. The science of the former is physics, that of the latter,\nethics; they are also called natural philosophy and moral philosophy\nrespectively.\n\nLogic cannot have any empirical part; that is, a part in which the\nuniversal and necessary laws of thought should rest on grounds taken\nfrom experience; otherwise it would not be logic, i.e., a canon for\nthe understanding or the reason, valid for all thought, and capable of\ndemonstration. Natural and moral philosophy, on the contrary, can each\nhave their empirical part, since the former has to determine the\nlaws of nature as an object of experience; the latter the laws of\nthe human will, so far as it is affected by nature: the former,\nhowever, being laws according to which everything does happen; the\nlatter, laws according to which everything ought to happen. Ethics,\nhowever, must also consider the conditions under which what ought to\nhappen frequently does not.\n\nWe may call all philosophy empirical, so far as it is based on\ngrounds of experience: on the other hand, that which delivers its\ndoctrines from a priori principles alone we may call pure\nphilosophy. When the latter is merely formal it is logic; if it is\nrestricted to definite objects of the understanding it is metaphysic.\n\nIn this way there arises the idea of a twofold metaphysic- a\nmetaphysic of nature and a metaphysic of morals. Physics will thus\nhave an empirical and also a rational part. It is the same with\nEthics; but here the empirical part might have the special name of\npractical anthropology, the name morality being appropriated to the\nrational part.\n\nAll trades, arts, and handiworks have gained by division of\nlabour, namely, when, instead of one man doing everything, each\nconfines himself to a certain kind of work distinct from others in the\ntreatment it requires, so as to be able to perform it with greater\nfacility and in the greatest perfection. Where the different kinds\nof work are not distinguished and divided, where everyone is a\njack-of-all-trades, there manufactures remain still in the greatest\nbarbarism. It might deserve to be considered whether pure philosophy\nin all its parts does not require a man specially devoted to it, and\nwhether it would not be better for the whole business of science if\nthose who, to please the tastes of the public, are wont to blend the\nrational and empirical elements together, mixed in all sorts of\nproportions unknown to themselves, and who call themselves independent\nthinkers, giving the name of minute philosophers to those who apply\nthemselves to the rational part only- if these, I say, were warned not\nto carry on two employments together which differ widely in the\ntreatment they demand, for each of which perhaps a special talent is\nrequired, and the combination of which in one person only produces\nbunglers. But I only ask here whether the nature of science does not\nrequire that we should always carefully separate the empirical from\nthe rational part, and prefix to Physics proper (or empirical physics)\na metaphysic of nature, and to practical anthropology a metaphysic\nof morals, which must be carefully cleared of everything empirical, so\nthat we may know how much can be accomplished by pure reason in both\ncases, and from what sources it draws this its a priori teaching,\nand that whether the latter inquiry is conducted by all moralists\n(whose name is legion), or only by some who feel a calling thereto.\n\nAs my concern here is with moral philosophy, I limit the question\nsuggested to this: Whether it is not of the utmost necessity to\nconstruct a pure thing which is only empirical and which belongs to\nanthropology? for that such a philosophy must be possible is evident\nfrom the common idea of duty and of the moral laws. Everyone must\nadmit that if a law is to have moral force, i.e., to be the basis of\nan obligation, it must carry with it absolute necessity; that, for\nexample, the precept, \"Thou shalt not lie,\" is not valid for men\nalone, as if other rational beings had no need to observe it; and so\nwith all the other moral laws properly so called; that, therefore, the\nbasis of obligation must not be sought in the nature of man, or in the\ncircumstances in the world in which he is placed, but a priori\nsimply in the conception of pure reason; and although any other\nprecept which is founded on principles of mere experience may be in\ncertain respects universal, yet in as far as it rests even in the\nleast degree on an empirical basis, perhaps only as to a motive,\nsuch a precept, while it may be a practical rule, can never be\ncalled a moral law.\n\nThus not only are moral laws with their principles essentially\ndistinguished from every other kind of practical knowledge in which\nthere is anything empirical, but all moral philosophy rests wholly\non its pure part. When applied to man, it does not borrow the least\nthing from the knowledge of man himself (anthropology), but gives laws\na priori to him as a rational being. No doubt these laws require a\njudgement sharpened by experience, in order on the one hand to\ndistinguish in what cases they are applicable, and on the other to\nprocure for them access to the will of the man and effectual influence\non conduct; since man is acted on by so many inclinations that, though\ncapable of the idea of a practical pure reason, he is not so easily\nable to make it effective in concreto in his life.\n\nA metaphysic of morals is therefore indispensably necessary, not\nmerely for speculative reasons, in order to investigate the sources of\nthe practical principles which are to be found a priori in our reason,\nbut also because morals themselves are liable to all sorts of\ncorruption, as long as we are without that clue and supreme canon by\nwhich to estimate them correctly. For in order that an action should\nbe morally good, it is not enough that it conform to the moral law,\nbut it must also be done for the sake of the law, otherwise that\nconformity is only very contingent and uncertain; since a principle\nwhich is not moral, although it may now and then produce actions\nconformable to the law, will also often produce actions which\ncontradict it. Now it is only in a pure philosophy that we can look for\nthe moral law in its purity and genuineness (and, in a practical\nmatter, this is of the utmost consequence): we must, therefore,\nbegin with pure philosophy (metaphysic), and without it there cannot\nbe any moral philosophy at all. That which mingles these pure\nprinciples with the empirical does not deserve the name of\nphilosophy (for what distinguishes philosophy from common rational\nknowledge is that it treats in separate sciences what the latter\nonly comprehends confusedly); much less does it deserve that of\nmoral philosophy, since by this confusion it even spoils the purity of\nmorals themselves, and counteracts its own end.\n\nLet it not be thought, however, that what is here demanded is\nalready extant in the propaedeutic prefixed by the celebrated Wolf\nto his moral philosophy, namely, his so-called general practical\nphilosophy, and that, therefore, we have not to strike into an\nentirely new field. Just because it was to be a general practical\nphilosophy, it has not taken into consideration a will of any\nparticular kind- say one which should be determined solely from a\npriori principles without any empirical motives, and which we might\ncall a pure will, but volition in general, with all the actions and\nconditions which belong to it in this general signification. By this\nit is distinguished from a metaphysic of morals, just as general\nlogic, which treats of the acts and canons of thought in general, is\ndistinguished from transcendental philosophy, which treats of the\nparticular acts and canons of pure thought, i.e., that whose\ncognitions are altogether a priori. For the metaphysic of morals has\nto examine the idea and the principles of a possible pure will, and\nnot the acts and conditions of human volition generally, which for the\nmost part are drawn from psychology. It is true that moral laws and\nduty are spoken of in the general moral philosophy (contrary indeed to\nall fitness). But this is no objection, for in this respect also the\nauthors of that science remain true to their idea of it; they do not\ndistinguish the motives which are prescribed as such by reason alone\naltogether a priori, and which are properly moral, from the\nempirical motives which the understanding raises to general\nconceptions merely by comparison of experiences; but, without noticing\nthe difference of their sources, and looking on them all as\nhomogeneous, they consider only their greater or less amount. It is in\nthis way they frame their notion of obligation, which, though anything\nbut moral, is all that can be attained in a philosophy which passes no\njudgement at all on the origin of all possible practical concepts,\nwhether they are a priori, or only a posteriori.\n\nIntending to publish hereafter a metaphysic of morals, I issue in\nthe first instance these fundamental principles. Indeed there is\nproperly no other foundation for it than the critical examination of a\npure practical reason; just as that of metaphysics is the critical\nexamination of the pure speculative reason, already published. But\nin the first place the former is not so absolutely necessary as the\nlatter, because in moral concerns human reason can easily be brought\nto a high degree of correctness and completeness, even in the\ncommonest understanding, while on the contrary in its theoretic but\npure use it is wholly dialectical; and in the second place if the\ncritique of a pure practical Reason is to be complete, it must be\npossible at the same time to show its identity with the speculative\nreason in a common principle, for it can ultimately be only one and\nthe same reason which has to be distinguished merely in its\napplication. I could not, however, bring it to such completeness here,\nwithout introducing considerations of a wholly different kind, which\nwould be perplexing to the reader. On this account I have adopted\nthe title of Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals\ninstead of that of a Critical Examination of the pure practical\nreason.\n\nBut in the third place, since a metaphysic of morals, in spite of\nthe discouraging title, is yet capable of being presented in popular\nform, and one adapted to the common understanding, I find it useful to\nseparate from it this preliminary treatise on its fundamental\nprinciples, in order that I may not hereafter have need to introduce\nthese necessarily subtle discussions into a book of a more simple\ncharacter.\n\nThe present treatise is, however, nothing more than the\ninvestigation and establishment of the supreme principle of\nmorality, and this alone constitutes a study complete in itself and\none which ought to be kept apart from every other moral investigation.\nNo doubt my conclusions on this weighty question, which has hitherto\nbeen very unsatisfactorily examined, would receive much light from the\napplication of the same principle to the whole system, and would be\ngreatly confirmed by the adequacy which it exhibits throughout; but\nI must forego this advantage, which indeed would be after all more\ngratifying than useful, since the easy applicability of a principle\nand its apparent adequacy give no very certain proof of its soundness,\nbut rather inspire a certain partiality, which prevents us from\nexamining and estimating it strictly in itself and without regard to\nconsequences.\n\nI have adopted in this work the method which I think most\nsuitable, proceeding analytically from common knowledge to the\ndetermination of its ultimate principle, and again descending\nsynthetically from the examination of this principle and its sources\nto the common knowledge in which we find it employed. The division\nwill, therefore, be as follows:\n\n\n\n1 FIRST SECTION. Transition from the common rational knowledge of\nmorality to the philosophical.\n\n\n\n2 SECOND SECTION. Transition from popular moral philosophy to the\nmetaphysic of morals.\n\n\n\n3 THIRD SECTION. Final step from the metaphysic of morals to the\ncritique of the pure practical reason.\n\nSEC_1\n\n                      FIRST SECTION\n\n\n\n       TRANSITION FROM THE COMMON RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE\n\n            OF MORALITY TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL\n\n\n\nNothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it,\nwhich can be called good, without qualification, except a good will.\nIntelligence, wit, judgement, and the other talents of the mind,\nhowever they may be named, or courage, resolution, perseverance, as\nqualities of temperament, are undoubtedly good and desirable in many\nrespects; but these gifts of nature may also become extremely bad\nand mischievous if the will which is to make use of them, and which,\ntherefore, constitutes what is called character, is not good. It is\nthe same with the gifts of fortune. Power, riches, honour, even\nhealth, and the general well-being and contentment with one's\ncondition which is called happiness, inspire pride, and often\npresumption, if there is not a good will to correct the influence of\nthese on the mind, and with this also to rectify the whole principle\nof acting and adapt it to its end. The sight of a being who is not\nadorned with a single feature of a pure and good will, enjoying\nunbroken prosperity, can never give pleasure to an impartial\nrational spectator. Thus a good will appears to constitute the\nindispensable condition even of being worthy of happiness.\n\nThere are even some qualities which are of service to this good will\nitself and may facilitate its action, yet which have no intrinsic\nunconditional value, but always presuppose a good will, and this\nqualifies the esteem that we justly have for them and does not\npermit us to regard them as absolutely good. Moderation in the\naffections and passions, self-control, and calm deliberation are not\nonly good in many respects, but even seem to constitute part of the\nintrinsic worth of the person; but they are far from deserving to be\ncalled good without qualification, although they have been so\nunconditionally praised by the ancients. For without the principles of\na good will, they may become extremely bad, and the coolness of a\nvillain not only makes him far more dangerous, but also directly makes\nhim more abominable in our eyes than he would have been without it.\n\nA good will is good not because of what it performs or effects,\nnot by its aptness for the attainment of some proposed end, but simply\nby virtue of the volition; that is, it is good in itself, and\nconsidered by itself is to be esteemed much higher than all that can\nbe brought about by it in favour of any inclination, nay even of the\nsum total of all inclinations. Even if it should happen that, owing to\nspecial disfavour of fortune, or the niggardly provision of a\nstep-motherly nature, this will should wholly lack power to accomplish\nits purpose, if with its greatest efforts it should yet achieve\nnothing, and there should remain only the good will (not, to be\nsure, a mere wish, but the summoning of all means in our power), then,\nlike a jewel, it would still shine by its own light, as a thing\nwhich has its whole value in itself. Its usefulness or fruitlessness\ncan neither add nor take away anything from this value. It would be,\nas it were, only the setting to enable us to handle it the more\nconveniently in common commerce, or to attract to it the attention\nof those who are not yet connoisseurs, but not to recommend it to true\nconnoisseurs, or to determine its value.\n\nThere is, however, something so strange in this idea of the absolute\nvalue of the mere will, in which no account is taken of its utility,\nthat notwithstanding the thorough assent of even common reason to\nthe idea, yet a suspicion must arise that it may perhaps really be the\nproduct of mere high-flown fancy, and that we may have misunderstood\nthe purpose of nature in assigning reason as the governor of our will.\nTherefore we will examine this idea from this point of view.\n\nIn the physical constitution of an organized being, that is, a being\nadapted suitably to the purposes of life, we assume it as a\nfundamental principle that no organ for any purpose will be found\nbut what is also the fittest and best adapted for that purpose. Now in\na being which has reason and a will, if the proper object of nature\nwere its conservation, its welfare, in a word, its happiness, then\nnature would have hit upon a very bad arrangement in selecting the\nreason of the creature to carry out this purpose. For all the\nactions which the creature has to perform with a view to this purpose,\nand the whole rule of its conduct, would be far more surely prescribed\nto it by instinct, and that end would have been attained thereby\nmuch more certainly than it ever can be by reason. Should reason\nhave been communicated to this favoured creature over and above, it\nmust only have served it to contemplate the happy constitution of\nits nature, to admire it, to congratulate itself thereon, and to\nfeel thankful for it to the beneficent cause, but not that it should\nsubject its desires to that weak and delusive guidance and meddle\nbunglingly with the purpose of nature. In a word, nature would have\ntaken care that reason should not break forth into practical exercise,\nnor have the presumption, with its weak insight, to think out for\nitself the plan of happiness, and of the means of attaining it. Nature\nwould not only have taken on herself the choice of the ends, but\nalso of the means, and with wise foresight would have entrusted both\nto instinct.\n\nAnd, in fact, we find that the more a cultivated reason applies\nitself with deliberate purpose to the enjoyment of life and happiness,\nso much the more does the man fail of true satisfaction. And from this\ncircumstance there arises in many, if they are candid enough to\nconfess it, a certain degree of misology, that is, hatred of reason,\nespecially in the case of those who are most experienced in the use of\nit, because after calculating all the advantages they derive, I do not\nsay from the invention of all the arts of common luxury, but even from\nthe sciences (which seem to them to be after all only a luxury of\nthe understanding), they find that they have, in fact, only brought\nmore trouble on their shoulders, rather than gained in happiness;\nand they end by envying, rather than despising, the more common\nstamp of men who keep closer to the guidance of mere instinct and do\nnot allow their reason much influence on their conduct. And this we\nmust admit, that the judgement of those who would very much lower\nthe lofty eulogies of the advantages which reason gives us in regard\nto the happiness and satisfaction of life, or who would even reduce\nthem below zero, is by no means morose or ungrateful to the goodness\nwith which the world is governed, but that there lies at the root of\nthese judgements the idea that our existence has a different and far\nnobler end, for which, and not for happiness, reason is properly\nintended, and which must, therefore, be regarded as the supreme\ncondition to which the private ends of man must, for the most part, be\npostponed.\n\nFor as reason is not competent to guide the will with certainty in\nregard to its objects and the satisfaction of all our wants (which\nit to some extent even multiplies), this being an end to which an\nimplanted instinct would have led with much greater certainty; and\nsince, nevertheless, reason is imparted to us as a practical\nfaculty, i.e., as one which is to have influence on the will,\ntherefore, admitting that nature generally in the distribution of\nher capacities has adapted the means to the end, its true\ndestination must be to produce a will, not merely good as a means to\nsomething else, but good in itself, for which reason was absolutely\nnecessary. This will then, though not indeed the sole and complete\ngood, must be the supreme good and the condition of every other,\neven of the desire of happiness. Under these circumstances, there is\nnothing inconsistent with the wisdom of nature in the fact that the\ncultivation of the reason, which is requisite for the first and\nunconditional purpose, does in many ways interfere, at least in this\nlife, with the attainment of the second, which is always\nconditional, namely, happiness. Nay, it may even reduce it to nothing,\nwithout nature thereby failing of her purpose. For reason recognizes\nthe establishment of a good will as its highest practical destination,\nand in attaining this purpose is capable only of a satisfaction of its\nown proper kind, namely that from the attainment of an end, which\nend again is determined by reason only, notwithstanding that this\nmay involve many a disappointment to the ends of inclination.\n\nWe have then to develop the notion of a will which deserves to be\nhighly esteemed for itself and is good without a view to anything\nfurther, a notion which exists already in the sound natural\nunderstanding, requiring rather to be cleared up than to be taught,\nand which in estimating the value of our actions always takes the\nfirst place and constitutes the condition of all the rest. In order to\ndo this, we will take the notion of duty, which includes that of a\ngood will, although implying certain subjective restrictions and\nhindrances. These, however, far from concealing it, or rendering it\nunrecognizable, rather bring it out by contrast and make it shine\nforth so much the brighter.\n\nI omit here all actions which are already recognized as inconsistent\nwith duty, although they may be useful for this or that purpose, for\nwith these the question whether they are done from duty cannot arise\nat all, since they even conflict with it. I also set aside those\nactions which really conform to duty, but to which men have no\ndirect inclination, performing them because they are impelled\nthereto by some other inclination. For in this case we can readily\ndistinguish whether the action which agrees with duty is done from\nduty, or from a selfish view. It is much harder to make this\ndistinction when the action accords with duty and the subject has\nbesides a direct inclination to it. For example, it is always a matter\nof duty that a dealer should not over charge an inexperienced\npurchaser; and wherever there is much commerce the prudent tradesman\ndoes not overcharge, but keeps a fixed price for everyone, so that a\nchild buys of him as well as any other. Men are thus honestly\nserved; but this is not enough to make us believe that the tradesman\nhas so acted from duty and from principles of honesty: his own\nadvantage required it; it is out of the question in this case to\nsuppose that he might besides have a direct inclination in favour of\nthe buyers, so that, as it were, from love he should give no advantage\nto one over another. Accordingly the action was done neither from duty\nnor from direct inclination, but merely with a selfish view.\n\nOn the other hand, it is a duty to maintain one's life; and, in\naddition, everyone has also a direct inclination to do so. But on this\naccount the often anxious care which most men take for it has no\nintrinsic worth, and their maxim has no moral import. They preserve\ntheir life as duty requires, no doubt, but not because duty\nrequires. On the other hand, if adversity and hopeless sorrow have\ncompletely taken away the relish for life; if the unfortunate one,\nstrong in mind, indignant at his fate rather than desponding or\ndejected, wishes for death, and yet preserves his life without\nloving it- not from inclination or fear, but from duty- then his maxim\nhas a moral worth.\n\nTo be beneficent when we can is a duty; and besides this, there\nare many minds so sympathetically constituted that, without any\nother motive of vanity or self-interest, they find a pleasure in\nspreading joy around them and can take delight in the satisfaction\nof others so far as it is their own work. But I maintain that in\nsuch a case an action of this kind, however proper, however amiable it\nmay be, has nevertheless no true moral worth, but is on a level with\nother inclinations, e.g., the inclination to honour, which, if it is\nhappily directed to that which is in fact of public utility and\naccordant with duty and consequently honourable, deserves praise and\nencouragement, but not esteem. For the maxim lacks the moral import,\nnamely, that such actions be done from duty, not from inclination. Put\nthe case that the mind of that philanthropist were clouded by sorrow\nof his own, extinguishing all sympathy with the lot of others, and\nthat, while he still has the power to benefit others in distress, he\nis not touched by their trouble because he is absorbed with his own;\nand now suppose that he tears himself out of this dead\ninsensibility, and performs the action without any inclination to\nit, but simply from duty, then first has his action its genuine\nmoral worth. Further still; if nature has put little sympathy in the\nheart of this or that man; if he, supposed to be an upright man, is by\ntemperament cold and indifferent to the sufferings of others,\nperhaps because in respect of his own he is provided with the\nspecial gift of patience and fortitude and supposes, or even requires,\nthat others should have the same- and such a man would certainly not\nbe the meanest product of nature- but if nature had not specially\nframed him for a philanthropist, would he not still find in himself\na source from whence to give himself a far higher worth than that of a\ngood-natured temperament could be? Unquestionably. It is just in\nthis that the moral worth of the character is brought out which is\nincomparably the highest of all, namely, that he is beneficent, not\nfrom inclination, but from duty.\n\nTo secure one's own happiness is a duty, at least indirectly; for\ndiscontent with one's condition, under a pressure of many anxieties\nand amidst unsatisfied wants, might easily become a great temptation\nto transgression of duty. But here again, without looking to duty, all\nmen have already the strongest and most intimate inclination to\nhappiness, because it is just in this idea that all inclinations are\ncombined in one total. But the precept of happiness is often of such a\nsort that it greatly interferes with some inclinations, and yet a\nman cannot form any definite and certain conception of the sum of\nsatisfaction of all of them which is called happiness. It is not\nthen to be wondered at that a single inclination, definite both as\nto what it promises and as to the time within which it can be\ngratified, is often able to overcome such a fluctuating idea, and that\na gouty patient, for instance, can choose to enjoy what he likes,\nand to suffer what he may, since, according to his calculation, on\nthis occasion at least, he has not sacrificed the enjoyment of the\npresent moment to a possibly mistaken expectation of a happiness which\nis supposed to be found in health. But even in this case, if the\ngeneral desire for happiness did not influence his will, and supposing\nthat in his particular case health was not a necessary element in this\ncalculation, there yet remains in this, as in all other cases, this\nlaw, namely, that he should promote his happiness not from inclination\nbut from duty, and by this would his conduct first acquire true\nmoral worth.\n\nIt is in this manner, undoubtedly, that we are to understand those\npassages of Scripture also in which we are commanded to love our\nneighbour, even our enemy. For love, as an affection, cannot be\ncommanded, but beneficence for duty's sake may; even though we are not\nimpelled to it by any inclination- nay, are even repelled by a natural\nand unconquerable aversion. This is practical love and not\npathological- a love which is seated in the will, and not in the\npropensions of sense- in principles of action and not of tender\nsympathy; and it is this love alone which can be commanded.\n\nThe second proposition is: That an action done from duty derives its\nmoral worth, not from the purpose which is to be attained by it, but\nfrom the maxim by which it is determined, and therefore does not\ndepend on the realization of the object of the action, but merely on\nthe principle of volition by which the action has taken place, without\nregard to any object of desire. It is clear from what precedes that\nthe purposes which we may have in view in our actions, or their\neffects regarded as ends and springs of the will, cannot give to\nactions any unconditional or moral worth. In what, then, can their\nworth lie, if it is not to consist in the will and in reference to its\nexpected effect? It cannot lie anywhere but in the principle of the\nwill without regard to the ends which can be attained by the action.\nFor the will stands between its a priori principle, which is formal,\nand its a posteriori spring, which is material, as between two roads,\nand as it must be determined by something, it follows that it must be\ndetermined by the formal principle of volition when an action is done\nfrom duty, in which case every material principle has been withdrawn\nfrom it.\n\nThe third proposition, which is a consequence of the two\npreceding, I would express thus: Duty is the necessity of acting from\nrespect for the law. I may have inclination for an object as the\neffect of my proposed action, but I cannot have respect for it, just\nfor this reason, that it is an effect and not an energy of will.\nSimilarly I cannot have respect for inclination, whether my own or\nanother's; I can at most, if my own, approve it; if another's,\nsometimes even love it; i.e., look on it as favourable to my own\ninterest. It is only what is connected with my will as a principle, by\nno means as an effect- what does not subserve my inclination, but\noverpowers it, or at least in case of choice excludes it from its\ncalculation- in other words, simply the law of itself, which can be an\nobject of respect, and hence a command. Now an action done from duty\nmust wholly exclude the influence of inclination and with it every\nobject of the will, so that nothing remains which can determine the\nwill except objectively the law, and subjectively pure respect for\nthis practical law, and consequently the maxim * that I should follow\nthis law even to the thwarting of all my inclinations.\n\n\n\n* A maxim is the subjective principle of volition. The objective\nprinciple (i.e., that which would also serve subjectively as a\npractical principle to all rational beings if reason had full power\nover the faculty of desire) is the practical law.\n\n\n\nThus the moral worth of an action does not lie in the effect\nexpected from it, nor in any principle of action which requires to\nborrow its motive from this expected effect. For all these effects-\nagreeableness of one's condition and even the promotion of the\nhappiness of others- could have been also brought about by other\ncauses, so that for this there would have been no need of the will\nof a rational being; whereas it is in this alone that the supreme\nand unconditional good can be found. The pre-eminent good which we\ncall moral can therefore consist in nothing else than the conception\nof law in itself, which certainly is only possible in a rational\nbeing, in so far as this conception, and not the expected effect,\ndetermines the will. This is a good which is already present in the\nperson who acts accordingly, and we have not to wait for it to\nappear first in the result. *\n\n\n\n* It might be here objected to me that I take refuge behind the\nword respect in an obscure feeling, instead of giving a distinct\nsolution of the question by a concept of the reason. But although\nrespect is a feeling, it is not a feeling received through\ninfluence, but is self-wrought by a rational concept, and,\ntherefore, is specifically distinct from all feelings of the former\nkind, which may be referred either to inclination or fear, What I\nrecognise immediately as a law for me, I recognise with respect.\nThis merely signifies the consciousness that my will is subordinate to\na law, without the intervention of other influences on my sense. The\nimmediate determination of the will by the law, and the\nconsciousness of this, is called respect, so that this is regarded\nas an effect of the law on the subject, and not as the cause of it.\nRespect is properly the conception of a worth which thwarts my\nself-love. Accordingly it is something which is considered neither\nas an object of inclination nor of fear, although it has something\nanalogous to both. The object of respect is the law only, and that the\nlaw which we impose on ourselves and yet recognise as necessary in\nitself. As a law, we are subjected too it without consulting\nself-love; as imposed by us on ourselves, it is a result of our\nwill. In the former aspect it has an analogy to fear, in the latter to\ninclination. Respect for a person is properly only respect for the law\n(of honesty, etc.) of which he gives us an example. Since we also look\non the improvement of our talents as a duty, we consider that we see\nin a person of talents, as it were, the example of a law (viz., to\nbecome like him in this by exercise), and this constitutes our\nrespect. All so-called moral interest consists simply in respect for\nthe law.\n\n\n\nBut what sort of law can that be, the conception of which must\ndetermine the will, even without paying any regard to the effect\nexpected from it, in order that this will may be called good\nabsolutely and without qualification? As I have deprived the will of\nevery impulse which could arise to it from obedience to any law, there\nremains nothing but the universal conformity of its actions to law\nin general, which alone is to serve the will as a principle, i.e., I\nam never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim\nshould become a universal law. Here, now, it is the simple\nconformity to law in general, without assuming any particular law\napplicable to certain actions, that serves the will as its principle\nand must so serve it, if duty is not to be a vain delusion and a\nchimerical notion. The common reason of men in its practical\njudgements perfectly coincides with this and always has in view the\nprinciple here suggested. Let the question be, for example: May I when\nin distress make a promise with the intention not to keep it? I\nreadily distinguish here between the two significations which the\nquestion may have: Whether it is prudent, or whether it is right, to\nmake a false promise? The former may undoubtedly often be the case. I see\nclearly indeed that it is not enough to extricate myself from a\npresent difficulty by means of this subterfuge, but it must be well\nconsidered whether there may not hereafter spring from this lie much\ngreater inconvenience than that from which I now free myself, and\nas, with all my supposed cunning, the consequences cannot be so easily\nforeseen but that credit once lost may be much more injurious to me\nthan any mischief which I seek to avoid at present, it should be\nconsidered whether it would not be more prudent to act herein\naccording to a universal maxim and to make it a habit to promise\nnothing except with the intention of keeping it. But it is soon\nclear to me that such a maxim will still only be based on the fear\nof consequences. Now it is a wholly different thing to be truthful\nfrom duty and to be so from apprehension of injurious consequences. In\nthe first case, the very notion of the action already implies a law\nfor me; in the second case, I must first look about elsewhere to see\nwhat results may be combined with it which would affect myself. For to\ndeviate from the principle of duty is beyond all doubt wicked; but\nto be unfaithful to my maxim of prudence may often be very\nadvantageous to me, although to abide by it is certainly safer. The\nshortest way, however, and an unerring one, to discover the answer\nto this question whether a lying promise is consistent with duty, is\nto ask myself, \"Should I be content that my maxim (to extricate myself\nfrom difficulty by a false promise) should hold good as a universal\nlaw, for myself as well as for others?\" and should I be able to say\nto myself, \"Every one may make a deceitful promise when he finds\nhimself in a difficulty from which he cannot otherwise extricate\nhimself?\" Then I presently become aware that while I can will the lie,\nI can by no means will that lying should be a universal law. For\nwith such a law there would be no promises at all, since it would be\nin vain to allege my intention in regard to my future actions to those\nwho would not believe this allegation, or if they over hastily did\nso would pay me back in my own coin. Hence my maxim, as soon as it\nshould be made a universal law, would necessarily destroy itself.\n\nI do not, therefore, need any far-reaching penetration to discern\nwhat I have to do in order that my will may be morally good.\nInexperienced in the course of the world, incapable of being\nprepared for all its contingencies, I only ask myself: Canst thou also\nwill that thy maxim should be a universal law? If not, then it must be\nrejected, and that not because of a disadvantage accruing from it to\nmyself or even to others, but because it cannot enter as a principle\ninto a possible universal legislation, and reason extorts from me\nimmediate respect for such legislation. I do not indeed as yet discern\non what this respect is based (this the philosopher may inquire),\nbut at least I understand this, that it is an estimation of the\nworth which far outweighs all worth of what is recommended by\ninclination, and that the necessity of acting from pure respect for\nthe practical law is what constitutes duty, to which every other\nmotive must give place, because it is the condition of a will being\ngood in itself, and the worth of such a will is above everything.\n\nThus, then, without quitting the moral knowledge of common human\nreason, we have arrived at its principle. And although, no doubt,\ncommon men do not conceive it in such an abstract and universal\nform, yet they always have it really before their eyes and use it as\nthe standard of their decision. Here it would be easy to show how,\nwith this compass in hand, men are well able to distinguish, in\nevery case that occurs, what is good, what bad, conformably to duty or\ninconsistent with it, if, without in the least teaching them\nanything new, we only, like Socrates, direct their attention to the\nprinciple they themselves employ; and that, therefore, we do not\nneed science and philosophy to know what we should do to be honest and\ngood, yea, even wise and virtuous. Indeed we might well have\nconjectured beforehand that the knowledge of what every man is bound\nto do, and therefore also to know, would be within the reach of\nevery man, even the commonest. Here we cannot forbear admiration\nwhen we see how great an advantage the practical judgement has over\nthe theoretical in the common understanding of men. In the latter,\nif common reason ventures to depart from the laws of experience and\nfrom the perceptions of the senses, it falls into mere\ninconceivabilities and self-contradictions, at least into a chaos of\nuncertainty, obscurity, and instability. But in the practical sphere\nit is just when the common understanding excludes all sensible springs\nfrom practical laws that its power of judgement begins to show\nitself to advantage. It then becomes even subtle, whether it be that\nit chicanes with its own conscience or with other claims respecting\nwhat is to be called right, or whether it desires for its own\ninstruction to determine honestly the worth of actions; and, in the\nlatter case, it may even have as good a hope of hitting the mark as\nany philosopher whatever can promise himself. Nay, it is almost more\nsure of doing so, because the philosopher cannot have any other\nprinciple, while he may easily perplex his judgement by a multitude of\nconsiderations foreign to the matter, and so turn aside from the right\nway. Would it not therefore be wiser in moral concerns to acquiesce in\nthe judgement of common reason, or at most only to call in\nphilosophy for the purpose of rendering the system of morals more\ncomplete and intelligible, and its rules more convenient for use\n(especially for disputation), but not so as to draw off the common\nunderstanding from its happy simplicity, or to bring it by means of\nphilosophy into a new path of inquiry and instruction?\n\nInnocence is indeed a glorious thing; only, on the other hand, it is\nvery sad that it cannot well maintain itself and is easily seduced. On\nthis account even wisdom- which otherwise consists more in conduct\nthan in knowledge- yet has need of science, not in order to learn from\nit, but to secure for its precepts admission and permanence. Against\nall the commands of duty which reason represents to man as so\ndeserving of respect, he feels in himself a powerful counterpoise in\nhis wants and inclinations, the entire satisfaction of which he sums\nup under the name of happiness. Now reason issues its commands\nunyieldingly, without promising anything to the inclinations, and,\nas it were, with disregard and contempt for these claims, which are so\nimpetuous, and at the same time so plausible, and which will not allow\nthemselves to be suppressed by any command. Hence there arises a\nnatural dialectic, i.e., a disposition, to argue against these\nstrict laws of duty and to question their validity, or at least\ntheir purity and strictness; and, if possible, to make them more\naccordant with our wishes and inclinations, that is to say, to corrupt\nthem at their very source, and entirely to destroy their worth- a\nthing which even common practical reason cannot ultimately call good.\n\nThus is the common reason of man compelled to go out of its\nsphere, and to take a step into the field of a practical philosophy,\nnot to satisfy any speculative want (which never occurs to it as\nlong as it is content to be mere sound reason), but even on\npractical grounds, in order to attain in it information and clear\ninstruction respecting the source of its principle, and the correct\ndetermination of it in opposition to the maxims which are based on\nwants and inclinations, so that it may escape from the perplexity of\nopposite claims and not run the risk of losing all genuine moral\nprinciples through the equivocation into which it easily falls.\nThus, when practical reason cultivates itself, there insensibly arises\nin it a dialectic which forces it to seek aid in philosophy, just as\nhappens to it in its theoretic use; and in this case, therefore, as\nwell as in the other, it will find rest nowhere but in a thorough\ncritical examination of our reason.\n\nSEC_2\n\n                   SECOND SECTION\n\n\n\n       TRANSITION FROM POPULAR MORAL PHILOSOPHY\n\n            TO THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS\n\n\n\nIf we have hitherto drawn our notion of duty from the common use\nof our practical reason, it is by no means to be inferred that we have\ntreated it as an empirical notion. On the contrary, if we attend to\nthe experience of men's conduct, we meet frequent and, as we ourselves\nallow, just complaints that one cannot find a single certain example\nof the disposition to act from pure duty. Although many things are\ndone in conformity with what duty prescribes, it is nevertheless\nalways doubtful whether they are done strictly from duty, so as to\nhave a moral worth. Hence there have at all times been philosophers\nwho have altogether denied that this disposition actually exists at\nall in human actions, and have ascribed everything to a more or less\nrefined self-love. Not that they have on that account questioned the\nsoundness of the conception of morality; on the contrary, they spoke\nwith sincere regret of the frailty and corruption of human nature,\nwhich, though noble enough to take its rule an idea so worthy of\nrespect, is yet weak to follow it and employs reason which ought to\ngive it the law only for the purpose of providing for the interest\nof the inclinations, whether singly or at the best in the greatest\npossible harmony with one another.\n\nIn fact, it is absolutely impossible to make out by experience\nwith complete certainty a single case in which the maxim of an action,\nhowever right in itself, rested simply on moral grounds and on the\nconception of duty. Sometimes it happens that with the sharpest\nself-examination we can find nothing beside the moral principle of\nduty which could have been powerful enough to move us to this or\nthat action and to so great a sacrifice; yet we cannot from this infer\nwith certainty that it was not really some secret impulse of\nself-love, under the false appearance of duty, that was the actual\ndetermining cause of the will. We like them to flatter ourselves by\nfalsely taking credit for a more noble motive; whereas in fact we\ncan never, even by the strictest examination, get completely behind\nthe secret springs of action; since, when the question is of moral\nworth, it is not with the actions which we see that we are\nconcerned, but with those inward principles of them which we do not\nsee.\n\nMoreover, we cannot better serve the wishes of those who ridicule\nall morality as a mere chimera of human imagination over stepping\nitself from vanity, than by conceding to them that notions of duty\nmust be drawn only from experience (as from indolence, people are\nready to think is also the case with all other notions); for or is\nto prepare for them a certain triumph. I am willing to admit out of\nlove of humanity that even most of our actions are correct, but if\nwe look closer at them we everywhere come upon the dear self which\nis always prominent, and it is this they have in view and not the\nstrict command of duty which would often require self-denial.\nWithout being an enemy of virtue, a cool observer, one that does not\nmistake the wish for good, however lively, for its reality, may\nsometimes doubt whether true virtue is actually found anywhere in\nthe world, and this especially as years increase and the judgement\nis partly made wiser by experience and partly, also, more acute in\nobservation. This being so, nothing can secure us from falling away\naltogether from our ideas of duty, or maintain in the soul a\nwell-grounded respect for its law, but the clear conviction that\nalthough there should never have been actions which really sprang from\nsuch pure sources, yet whether this or that takes place is not at\nall the question; but that reason of itself, independent on all\nexperience, ordains what ought to take place, that accordingly actions\nof which perhaps the world has hitherto never given an example, the\nfeasibility even of which might be very much doubted by one who founds\neverything on experience, are nevertheless inflexibly commanded by\nreason; that, e.g., even though there might never yet have been a\nsincere friend, yet not a whit the less is pure sincerity in\nfriendship required of every man, because, prior to all experience,\nthis duty is involved as duty in the idea of a reason determining\nthe will by a priori principles.\n\nWhen we add further that, unless we deny that the notion of morality\nhas any truth or reference to any possible object, we must admit\nthat its law must be valid, not merely for men but for all rational\ncreatures generally, not merely under certain contingent conditions or\nwith exceptions but with absolute necessity, then it is clear that\nno experience could enable us to infer even the possibility of such\napodeictic laws. For with what right could we bring into unbounded\nrespect as a universal precept for every rational nature that which\nperhaps holds only under the contingent conditions of humanity? Or how\ncould laws of the determination of our will be regarded as laws of the\ndetermination of the will of rational beings generally, and for us\nonly as such, if they were merely empirical and did not take their\norigin wholly a priori from pure but practical reason?\n\nNor could anything be more fatal to morality than that we should\nwish to derive it from examples. For every example of it that is set\nbefore me must be first itself tested by principles of morality,\nwhether it is worthy to serve as an original example, i.e., as a\npattern; but by no means can it authoritatively furnish the conception\nof morality. Even the Holy One of the Gospels must first be compared\nwith our ideal of moral perfection before we can recognise Him as\nsuch; and so He says of Himself, \"Why call ye Me (whom you see)\ngood; none is good (the model of good) but God only (whom ye do not\nsee)?\" But whence have we the conception of God as the supreme good?\nSimply from the idea of moral perfection, which reason frames a priori\nand connects inseparably with the notion of a free will. Imitation\nfinds no place at all in morality, and examples serve only for\nencouragement, i.e., they put beyond doubt the feasibility of what the\nlaw commands, they make visible that which the practical rule\nexpresses more generally, but they can never authorize us to set aside\nthe true original which lies in reason and to guide ourselves by\nexamples.\n\nIf then there is no genuine supreme principle of morality but what\nmust rest simply on pure reason, independent of all experience, I\nthink it is not necessary even to put the question whether it is\ngood to exhibit these concepts in their generality (in abstracto) as\nthey are established a priori along with the principles belonging to\nthem, if our knowledge is to be distinguished from the vulgar and to\nbe called philosophical.\n\nIn our times indeed this might perhaps be necessary; for if we\ncollected votes whether pure rational knowledge separated from\neverything empirical, that is to say, metaphysic of morals, or whether\npopular practical philosophy is to be preferred, it is easy to guess\nwhich side would preponderate.\n\nThis descending to popular notions is certainly very commendable, if\nthe ascent to the principles of pure reason has first taken place\nand been satisfactorily accomplished. This implies that we first found\nethics on metaphysics, and then, when it is firmly established,\nprocure a hearing for it by giving it a popular character. But it is\nquite absurd to try to be popular in the first inquiry, on which the\nsoundness of the principles depends. It is not only that this\nproceeding can never lay claim to the very rare merit of a true\nphilosophical popularity, since there is no art in being\nintelligible if one renounces all thoroughness of insight; but also it\nproduces a disgusting medley of compiled observations and\nhalf-reasoned principles. Shallow pates enjoy this because it can be\nused for every-day chat, but the sagacious find in it only\nconfusion, and being unsatisfied and unable to help themselves, they\nturn away their eyes, while philosophers, who see quite well through\nthis delusion, are little listened to when they call men off for a\ntime from this pretended popularity, in order that they might be\nrightfully popular after they have attained a definite insight.\n\nWe need only look at the attempts of moralists in that favourite\nfashion, and we shall find at one time the special constitution of\nhuman nature (including, however, the idea of a rational nature\ngenerally), at one time perfection, at another happiness, here moral\nsense, there fear of God. a little of this, and a little of that, in\nmarvellous mixture, without its occurring to them to ask whether the\nprinciples of morality are to be sought in the knowledge of human\nnature at all (which we can have only from experience); or, if this is\nnot so, if these principles are to be found altogether a priori,\nfree from everything empirical, in pure rational concepts only and\nnowhere else, not even in the smallest degree; then rather to adopt\nthe method of making this a separate inquiry, as pure practical\nphilosophy, or (if one may use a name so decried) as metaphysic of\nmorals, * to bring it by itself to completeness, and to require the\npublic, which wishes for popular treatment, to await the issue of this\nundertaking.\n\n\n\n* Just as pure mathematics are distinguished from applied, pure\nlogic from applied, so if we choose we may also distinguish pure\nphilosophy of morals (metaphysic) from applied (viz., applied to human\nnature). By this designation we are also at once reminded that moral\nprinciples are not based on properties of human nature, but must\nsubsist a priori of themselves, while from such principles practical\nrules must be capable of being deduced for every rational nature,\nand accordingly for that of man.\n\n\n\nSuch a metaphysic of morals, completely isolated, not mixed with any\nanthropology, theology, physics, or hyperphysics, and still less\nwith occult qualities (which we might call hypophysical), is not\nonly an indispensable substratum of all sound theoretical knowledge of\nduties, but is at the same time a desideratum of the highest\nimportance to the actual fulfilment of their precepts. For the pure\nconception of duty, unmixed with any foreign addition of empirical\nattractions, and, in a word, the conception of the moral law,\nexercises on the human heart, by way of reason alone (which first\nbecomes aware with this that it can of itself be practical), an\ninfluence so much more powerful than all other springs * which may be\nderived from the field of experience, that, in the consciousness of\nits worth, it despises the latter, and can by degrees become their\nmaster; whereas a mixed ethics, compounded partly of motives drawn\nfrom feelings and inclinations, and partly also of conceptions of\nreason, must make the mind waver between motives which cannot be\nbrought under any principle, which lead to good only by mere\naccident and very often also to evil.\n\n\n\n* I have a letter from the late excellent Sulzer, in which he asks\nme what can be the reason that moral instruction, although containing\nmuch that is convincing for the reason, yet accomplishes so little? My\nanswer was postponed in order that I might make it complete. But it is\nsimply this: that the teachers themselves have not got their own\nnotions clear, and when they endeavour to make up for this by raking\nup motives of moral goodness from every quarter, trying to make\ntheir physic right strong, they spoil it. For the commonest\nunderstanding shows that if we imagine, on the one hand, an act of\nhonesty done with steadfast mind, apart from every view to advantage\nof any kind in this world or another, and even under the greatest\ntemptations of necessity or allurement, and, on the other hand, a\nsimilar act which was affected, in however low a degree, by a\nforeign motive, the former leaves far behind and eclipses the\nsecond; it elevates the soul and inspires the wish to be able to act\nin like manner oneself. Even moderately young children feel this\nimpression, ana one should never represent duties to them in any other\nlight.\n\n\n\nFrom what has been said, it is clear that all moral conceptions have\ntheir seat and origin completely a priori in the reason, and that,\nmoreover, in the commonest reason just as truly as in that which is in\nthe highest degree speculative; that they cannot be obtained by\nabstraction from any empirical, and therefore merely contingent,\nknowledge; that it is just this purity of their origin that makes them\nworthy to serve as our supreme practical principle, and that just in\nproportion as we add anything empirical, we detract from their genuine\ninfluence and from the absolute value of actions; that it is not\nonly of the greatest necessity, in a purely speculative point of view,\nbut is also of the greatest practical importance, to derive these\nnotions and laws from pure reason, to present them pure and unmixed,\nand even to determine the compass of this practical or pure rational\nknowledge, i.e., to determine the whole faculty of pure practical\nreason; and, in doing so, we must not make its principles dependent on\nthe particular nature of human reason, though in speculative\nphilosophy this may be permitted, or may even at times be necessary;\nbut since moral laws ought to hold good for every rational creature,\nwe must derive them from the general concept of a rational being. In\nthis way, although for its application to man morality has need of\nanthropology, yet, in the first instance, we must treat it\nindependently as pure philosophy, i.e., as metaphysic, complete in\nitself (a thing which in such distinct branches of science is easily\ndone); knowing well that unless we are in possession of this, it would\nnot only be vain to determine the moral element of duty in right\nactions for purposes of speculative criticism, but it would be\nimpossible to base morals on their genuine principles, even for common\npractical purposes, especially of moral instruction, so as to\nproduce pure moral dispositions, and to engraft them on men's minds to\nthe promotion of the greatest possible good in the world.\n\nBut in order that in this study we may not merely advance by the\nnatural steps from the common moral judgement (in this case very\nworthy of respect) to the philosophical, as has been already done, but\nalso from a popular philosophy, which goes no further than it can\nreach by groping with the help of examples, to metaphysic (which\ndoes allow itself to be checked by anything empirical and, as it\nmust measure the whole extent of this kind of rational knowledge, goes\nas far as ideal conceptions, where even examples fail us), we must\nfollow and clearly describe the practical faculty of reason, from\nthe general rules of its determination to the point where the notion\nof duty springs from it.\n\nEverything in nature works according to laws. Rational beings\nalone have the faculty of acting according to the conception of\nlaws, that is according to principles, i.e., have a will. Since the\ndeduction of actions from principles requires reason, the will is\nnothing but practical reason. If reason infallibly determines the\nwill, then the actions of such a being which are recognised as\nobjectively necessary are subjectively necessary also, i.e., the\nwill is a faculty to choose that only which reason independent of\ninclination recognises as practically necessary, i.e., as good. But if\nreason of itself does not sufficiently determine the will, if the\nlatter is subject also to subjective conditions (particular\nimpulses) which do not always coincide with the objective\nconditions; in a word, if the will does not in itself completely\naccord with reason (which is actually the case with men), then the\nactions which objectively are recognised as necessary are subjectively\ncontingent, and the determination of such a will according to\nobjective laws is obligation, that is to say, the relation of the\nobjective laws to a will that is not thoroughly good is conceived as\nthe determination of the will of a rational being by principles of\nreason, but which the will from its nature does not of necessity\nfollow.\n\nThe conception of an objective principle, in so far as it is\nobligatory for a will, is called a command (of reason), and the\nformula of the command is called an imperative.\n\nAll imperatives are expressed by the word ought [or shall], and\nthereby indicate the relation of an objective law of reason to a will,\nwhich from its subjective constitution is not necessarily determined\nby it (an obligation). They say that something would be good to do\nor to forbear, but they say it to a will which does not always do a\nthing because it is conceived to be good to do it. That is practically\ngood, however, which determines the will by means of the conceptions\nof reason, and consequently not from subjective causes, but\nobjectively, that is on principles which are valid for every\nrational being as such. It is distinguished from the pleasant, as that\nwhich influences the will only by means of sensation from merely\nsubjective causes, valid only for the sense of this or that one, and\nnot as a principle of reason, which holds for every one. *\n\n\n\n* The dependence of the desires on sensations is called\ninclination, and this accordingly always indicates a want. The\ndependence of a contingently determinable will on principles of reason\nis called an interest. This therefore, is found only in the case of\na dependent will which does not always of itself conform to reason; in\nthe Divine will we cannot conceive any interest. But the human will\ncan also take an interest in a thing without therefore acting from\ninterest. The former signifies the practical interest in the action,\nthe latter the pathological in the object of the action. The former\nindicates only dependence of the will on principles of reason in\nthemselves; the second, dependence on principles of reason for the\nsake of inclination, reason supplying only the practical rules how the\nrequirement of the inclination may be satisfied. In the first case the\naction interests me; in the second the object of the action (because\nit is pleasant to me). We have seen in the first section that in an\naction done from duty we must look not to the interest in the\nobject, but only to that in the action itself, and in its rational\nprinciple (viz., the law).\n\n\n\nA perfectly good will would therefore be equally subject to\nobjective laws (viz., laws of good), but could not be conceived as\nobliged thereby to act lawfully, because of itself from its subjective\nconstitution it can only be determined by the conception of good.\nTherefore no imperatives hold for the Divine will, or in general for a\nholy will; ought is here out of place, because the volition is already\nof itself necessarily in unison with the law. Therefore imperatives\nare only formulae to express the relation of objective laws of all\nvolition to the subjective imperfection of the will of this or that\nrational being, e.g., the human will.\n\nNow all imperatives command either hypothetically or\ncategorically. The former represent the practical necessity of a\npossible action as means to something else that is willed (or at least\nwhich one might possibly will). The categorical imperative would be\nthat which represented an action as necessary of itself without\nreference to another end, i.e., as objectively necessary.\n\nSince every practical law represents a possible action as good\nand, on this account, for a subject who is practically determinable by\nreason, necessary, all imperatives are formulae determining an\naction which is necessary according to the principle of a will good in\nsome respects. If now the action is good only as a means to\nsomething else, then the imperative is hypothetical; if it is\nconceived as good in itself and consequently as being necessarily\nthe principle of a will which of itself conforms to reason, then it is\ncategorical.\n\nThus the imperative declares what action possible by me would be\ngood and presents the practical rule in relation to a will which\ndoes not forthwith perform an action simply because it is good,\nwhether because the subject does not always know that it is good, or\nbecause, even if it know this, yet its maxims might be opposed to\nthe objective principles of practical reason.\n\nAccordingly the hypothetical imperative only says that the action is\ngood for some purpose, possible or actual. In the first case it is a\nproblematical, in the second an assertorial practical principle. The\ncategorical imperative which declares an action to be objectively\nnecessary in itself without reference to any purpose, i.e., without\nany other end, is valid as an apodeictic (practical) principle.\n\nWhatever is possible only by the power of some rational being may\nalso be conceived as a possible purpose of some will; and therefore\nthe principles of action as regards the means necessary to attain some\npossible purpose are in fact infinitely numerous. All sciences have\na practical part, consisting of problems expressing that some end is\npossible for us and of imperatives directing how it may be attained.\nThese may, therefore, be called in general imperatives of skill.\nHere there is no question whether the end is rational and good, but\nonly what one must do in order to attain it. The precepts for the\nphysician to make his patient thoroughly healthy, and for a poisoner\nto ensure certain death, are of equal value in this respect, that each\nserves to effect its purpose perfectly. Since in early youth it cannot\nbe known what ends are likely to occur to us in the course of life,\nparents seek to have their children taught a great many things, and\nprovide for their skill in the use of means for all sorts of arbitrary\nends, of none of which can they determine whether it may not perhaps\nhereafter be an object to their pupil, but which it is at all events\npossible that he might aim at; and this anxiety is so great that\nthey commonly neglect to form and correct their judgement on the value\nof the things which may be chosen as ends.\n\nThere is one end, however, which may be assumed to be actually\nsuch to all rational beings (so far as imperatives apply to them,\nviz., as dependent beings), and, therefore, one purpose which they not\nmerely may have, but which we may with certainty assume that they\nall actually have by a natural necessity, and this is happiness. The\nhypothetical imperative which expresses the practical necessity of\nan action as means to the advancement of happiness is assertorial.\nWe are not to present it as necessary for an uncertain and merely\npossible purpose, but for a purpose which we may presuppose with\ncertainty and a priori in every man, because it belongs to his\nbeing. Now skill in the choice of means to his own greatest well-being\nmay be called prudence, * in the narrowest sense. And thus the\nimperative which refers to the choice of means to one's own happiness,\ni.e., the precept of prudence, is still always hypothetical; the\naction is not commanded absolutely, but only as means to another\npurpose.\n\n\n\n* The word prudence is taken in two senses: in the one it may bear\nthe name of knowledge of the world, in the other that of private\nprudence. The former is a man's ability to influence others so as to\nuse them for his own purposes. The latter is the sagacity to combine\nall these purposes for his own lasting benefit. This latter is\nproperly that to which the value even of the former is reduced, and\nwhen a man is prudent in the former sense, but not in the latter, we\nmight better say of him that he is clever and cunning, but, on the\nwhole, imprudent.\n\n\n\nFinally, there is an imperative which commands a certain conduct\nimmediately, without having as its condition any other purpose to be\nattained by it. This imperative is categorical. It concerns not the\nmatter of the action, or its intended result, but its form and the\nprinciple of which it is itself a result; and what is essentially good\nin it consists in the mental disposition, let the consequence be\nwhat it may. This imperative may be called that of morality.\n\nThere is a marked distinction also between the volitions on these\nthree sorts of principles in the dissimilarity of the obligation of\nthe will. In order to mark this difference more clearly, I think\nthey would be most suitably named in their order if we said they are\neither rules of skill, or counsels of prudence, or commands (laws)\nof morality. For it is law only that involves the conception of an\nunconditional and objective necessity, which is consequently\nuniversally valid; and commands are laws which must be obeyed, that\nis, must be followed, even in opposition to inclination. Counsels,\nindeed, involve necessity, but one which can only hold under a\ncontingent subjective condition, viz., they depend on whether this\nor that man reckons this or that as part of his happiness; the\ncategorical imperative, on the contrary, is not limited by any\ncondition, and as being absolutely, although practically, necessary,\nmay be quite properly called a command. We might also call the first\nkind of imperatives technical (belonging to art), the second\npragmatic * (to welfare), the third moral (belonging to free conduct\ngenerally, that is, to morals).\n\n\n\n* It seems to me that the proper signification of the word\npragmatic may be most accurately defined in this way. For sanctions\nare called pragmatic which flow properly not from the law of the\nstates as necessary enactments, but from precaution for the general\nwelfare. A history is composed pragmatically when it teaches prudence,\ni.e., instructs the world how it can provide for its interests better,\nor at least as well as, the men of former time.\n\n\n\nNow arises the question, how are all these imperatives possible?\nThis question does not seek to know how we can conceive the\naccomplishment of the action which the imperative ordains, but\nmerely how we can conceive the obligation of the will which the\nimperative expresses. No special explanation is needed to show how\nan imperative of skill is possible. Whoever wills the end, wills\nalso (so far as reason decides his conduct) the means in his power\nwhich are indispensably necessary thereto. This proposition is, as\nregards the volition, analytical; for, in willing an object as my\neffect, there is already thought the causality of myself as an\nacting cause, that is to say, the use of the means; and the imperative\neduces from the conception of volition of an end the conception of\nactions necessary to this end. Synthetical propositions must no\ndoubt be employed in defining the means to a proposed end; but they do\nnot concern the principle, the act of the will, but the object and its\nrealization. E.g., that in order to bisect a line on an unerring\nprinciple I must draw from its extremities two intersecting arcs; this\nno doubt is taught by mathematics only in synthetical propositions;\nbut if I know that it is only by this process that the intended\noperation can be performed, then to say that, if I fully will the\noperation, I also will the action required for it, is an analytical\nproposition; for it is one and the same thing to conceive something as\nan effect which I can produce in a certain way, and to conceive myself\nas acting in this way.\n\nIf it were only equally easy to give a definite conception of\nhappiness, the imperatives of prudence would correspond exactly with\nthose of skill, and would likewise be analytical. For in this case\nas in that, it could be said: \"Whoever wills the end, wills also\n(according to the dictate of reason necessarily) the indispensable\nmeans thereto which are in his power.\" But, unfortunately, the\nnotion of happiness is so indefinite that although every man wishes to\nattain it, yet he never can say definitely and consistently what it is\nthat he really wishes and wills. The reason of this is that all the\nelements which belong to the notion of happiness are altogether\nempirical, i.e., they must be borrowed from experience, and\nnevertheless the idea of happiness requires an absolute whole, a\nmaximum of welfare in my present and all future circumstances. Now\nit is impossible that the most clear-sighted and at the same time most\npowerful being (supposed finite) should frame to himself a definite\nconception of what he really wills in this. Does he will riches, how\nmuch anxiety, envy, and snares might he not thereby draw upon his\nshoulders? Does he will knowledge and discernment, perhaps it might\nprove to be only an eye so much the sharper to show him so much the\nmore fearfully the evils that are now concealed from him, and that\ncannot be avoided, or to impose more wants on his desires, which\nalready give him concern enough. Would he have long life? who\nguarantees to him that it would not be a long misery? would he at\nleast have health? how often has uneasiness of the body restrained\nfrom excesses into which perfect health would have allowed one to\nfall? and so on. In short, he is unable, on any principle, to\ndetermine with certainty what would make him truly happy; because to\ndo so he would need to be omniscient. We cannot therefore act on any\ndefinite principles to secure happiness, but only on empirical\ncounsels, e.g. of regimen, frugality, courtesy, reserve, etc., which\nexperience teaches do, on the average, most promote well-being.\nHence it follows that the imperatives of prudence do not, strictly\nspeaking, command at all, that is, they cannot present actions\nobjectively as practically necessary; that they are rather to be\nregarded as counsels (consilia) than precepts precepts of reason, that\nthe problem to determine certainly and universally what action would\npromote the happiness of a rational being is completely insoluble, and\nconsequently no imperative respecting it is possible which should,\nin the strict sense, command to do what makes happy; because happiness\nis not an ideal of reason but of imagination, resting solely on\nempirical grounds, and it is vain to expect that these should define\nan action by which one could attain the totality of a series of\nconsequences which is really endless. This imperative of prudence\nwould however be an analytical proposition if we assume that the means\nto happiness could be certainly assigned; for it is distinguished from\nthe imperative of skill only by this, that in the latter the end is\nmerely possible, in the former it is given; as however both only\nordain the means to that which we suppose to be willed as an end, it\nfollows that the imperative which ordains the willing of the means\nto him who wills the end is in both cases analytical. Thus there is no\ndifficulty in regard to the possibility of an imperative of this\nkind either.\n\nOn the other hand, the question how the imperative of morality is\npossible, is undoubtedly one, the only one, demanding a solution, as\nthis is not at all hypothetical, and the objective necessity which\nit presents cannot rest on any hypothesis, as is the case with the\nhypothetical imperatives. Only here we must never leave out of\nconsideration that we cannot make out by any example, in other words\nempirically, whether there is such an imperative at all, but it is\nrather to be feared that all those which seem to be categorical may\nyet be at bottom hypothetical. For instance, when the precept is:\n\"Thou shalt not promise deceitfully\"; and it is assumed that the\nnecessity of this is not a mere counsel to avoid some other evil, so\nthat it should mean: \"Thou shalt not make a lying promise, lest if\nit become known thou shouldst destroy thy credit,\" but that an\naction of this kind must be regarded as evil in itself, so that the\nimperative of the prohibition is categorical; then we cannot show with\ncertainty in any example that the will was determined merely by the\nlaw, without any other spring of action, although it may appear to\nbe so. For it is always possible that fear of disgrace, perhaps also\nobscure dread of other dangers, may have a secret influence on the\nwill. Who can prove by experience the non-existence of a cause when\nall that experience tells us is that we do not perceive it? But in\nsuch a case the so-called moral imperative, which as such appears to\nbe categorical and unconditional, would in reality be only a pragmatic\nprecept, drawing our attention to our own interests and merely\nteaching us to take these into consideration.\n\nWe shall therefore have to investigate a priori the possibility of a\ncategorical imperative, as we have not in this case the advantage of\nits reality being given in experience, so that [the elucidation of]\nits possibility should be requisite only for its explanation, not\nfor its establishment. In the meantime it may be discerned\nbeforehand that the categorical imperative alone has the purport of\na practical law; all the rest may indeed be called principles of the\nwill but not laws, since whatever is only necessary for the attainment\nof some arbitrary purpose may be considered as in itself contingent,\nand we can at any time be free from the precept if we give up the\npurpose; on the contrary, the unconditional command leaves the will no\nliberty to choose the opposite; consequently it alone carries with\nit that necessity which we require in a law.\n\nSecondly, in the case of this categorical imperative or law of\nmorality, the difficulty (of discerning its possibility) is a very\nprofound one. It is an a priori synthetical practical proposition; *\nand as there is so much difficulty in discerning the possibility of\nspeculative propositions of this kind, it may readily be supposed that\nthe difficulty will be no less with the practical.\n\n\n\n* I connect the act with the will without presupposing any\ncondition resulting from any inclination, but a priori, and\ntherefore necessarily (though only objectively, i.e., assuming the\nidea of a reason possessing full power over all subjective motives).\nThis is accordingly a practical proposition which does not deduce\nthe willing of an action by mere analysis from another already\npresupposed (for we have not such a perfect will), but connects it\nimmediately with the conception of the will of a rational being, as\nsomething not contained in it.\n\n\n\nIn this problem we will first inquire whether the mere conception of\na categorical imperative may not perhaps supply us also with the\nformula of it, containing the proposition which alone can be a\ncategorical imperative; for even if we know the tenor of such an\nabsolute command, yet how it is possible will require further\nspecial and laborious study, which we postpone to the last section.\n\nWhen I conceive a hypothetical imperative, in general I do not\nknow beforehand what it will contain until I am given the condition.\nBut when I conceive a categorical imperative, I know at once what it\ncontains. For as the imperative contains besides the law only the\nnecessity that the maxims * shall conform to this law, while the law\ncontains no conditions restricting it, there remains nothing but the\ngeneral statement that the maxim of the action should conform to a\nuniversal law, and it is this conformity alone that the imperative\nproperly represents as necessary.\n\n\n\n* A maxim is a subjective principle of action, and must be\ndistinguished from the objective principle, namely, practical law. The\nformer contains the practical rule set by reason according to the\nconditions of the subject (often its ignorance or its inclinations),\nso that it is the principle on which the subject acts; but the law\nis the objective principle valid for every rational being, and is\nthe principle on which it ought to act that is an imperative.\n\n\n\nThere is therefore but one categorical imperative, namely, this: Act\nonly on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it\nshould become a universal law.\n\nNow if all imperatives of duty can be deduced from this one\nimperative as from their principle, then, although it should remain\nundecided what is called duty is not merely a vain notion, yet at\nleast we shall be able to show what we understand by it and what\nthis notion means.\n\nSince the universality of the law according to which effects are\nproduced constitutes what is properly called nature in the most\ngeneral sense (as to form), that is the existence of things so far\nas it is determined by general laws, the imperative of duty may be\nexpressed thus: Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by\nthy will a universal law of nature.\n\nWe will now enumerate a few duties, adopting the usual division of\nthem into duties to ourselves and ourselves and to others, and into\nperfect and imperfect duties. *\n\n\n\n* It must be noted here that I reserve the division of duties for a\nfuture metaphysic of morals; so that I give it here only as an\narbitrary one (in order to arrange my examples). For the rest, I\nunderstand by a perfect duty one that admits no exception in favour of\ninclination and then I have not merely external but also internal\nperfect duties. This is contrary to the use of the word adopted in the\nschools; but I do not intend to justify there, as it is all one for my\npurpose whether it is admitted or not.\n\n\n\n1. A man reduced to despair by a series of misfortunes feels wearied\nof life, but is still so far in possession of his reason that he can\nask himself whether it would not be contrary to his duty to himself to\ntake his own life. Now he inquires whether the maxim of his action\ncould become a universal law of nature. His maxim is: \"From\nself-love I adopt it as a principle to shorten my life when its longer\nduration is likely to bring more evil than satisfaction.\" It is\nasked then simply whether this principle founded on self-love can\nbecome a universal law of nature. Now we see at once that a system\nof nature of which it should be a law to destroy life by means of\nthe very feeling whose special nature it is to impel to the\nimprovement of life would contradict itself and, therefore, could\nnot exist as a system of nature; hence that maxim cannot possibly\nexist as a universal law of nature and, consequently, would be\nwholly inconsistent with the supreme principle of all duty.\n\n2. Another finds himself forced by necessity to borrow money. He\nknows that he will not be able to repay it, but sees also that nothing\nwill be lent to him unless he promises stoutly to repay it in a\ndefinite time. He desires to make this promise, but he has still so\nmuch conscience as to ask himself: \"Is it not unlawful and\ninconsistent with duty to get out of a difficulty in this way?\"\nSuppose however that he resolves to do so: then the maxim of his\naction would be expressed thus: \"When I think myself in want of money,\nI will borrow money and promise to repay it, although I know that I\nnever can do so.\" Now this principle of self-love or of one's own\nadvantage may perhaps be consistent with my whole future welfare;\nbut the question now is, \"Is it right?\" I change then the suggestion\nof self-love into a universal law, and state the question thus: \"How\nwould it be if my maxim were a universal law?\" Then I see at once that\nit could never hold as a universal law of nature, but would\nnecessarily contradict itself. For supposing it to be a universal\nlaw that everyone when he thinks himself in a difficulty should be\nable to promise whatever he pleases, with the purpose of not keeping\nhis promise, the promise itself would become impossible, as well as\nthe end that one might have in view in it, since no one would consider\nthat anything was promised to him, but would ridicule all such\nstatements as vain pretences.\n\n3. A third finds in himself a talent which with the help of some\nculture might make him a useful man in many respects. But he finds\nhimself in comfortable circumstances and prefers to indulge in\npleasure rather than to take pains in enlarging and improving his\nhappy natural capacities. He asks, however, whether his maxim of\nneglect of his natural gifts, besides agreeing with his inclination to\nindulgence, agrees also with what is called duty. He sees then that\na system of nature could indeed subsist with such a universal law\nalthough men (like the South Sea islanders) should let their talents\nrest and resolve to devote their lives merely to idleness,\namusement, and propagation of their species- in a word, to\nenjoyment; but he cannot possibly will that this should be a universal\nlaw of nature, or be implanted in us as such by a natural instinct.\nFor, as a rational being, he necessarily wills that his faculties be\ndeveloped, since they serve him and have been given him, for all sorts\nof possible purposes.\n\n4. A fourth, who is in prosperity, while he sees that others have to\ncontend with great wretchedness and that he could help them, thinks:\n\"What concern is it of mine? Let everyone be as happy as Heaven\npleases, or as he can make himself; I will take nothing from him nor\neven envy him, only I do not wish to contribute anything to his\nwelfare or to his assistance in distress!\" Now no doubt if such a mode\nof thinking were a universal law, the human race might very well\nsubsist and doubtless even better than in a state in which everyone\ntalks of sympathy and good-will, or even takes care occasionally to\nput it into practice, but, on the other side, also cheats when he can,\nbetrays the rights of men, or otherwise violates them. But although it\nis possible that a universal law of nature might exist in accordance\nwith that maxim, it is impossible to will that such a principle should\nhave the universal validity of a law of nature. For a will which\nresolved this would contradict itself, inasmuch as many cases might\noccur in which one would have need of the love and sympathy of others,\nand in which, by such a law of nature, sprung from his own will, he\nwould deprive himself of all hope of the aid he desires.\n\nThese are a few of the many actual duties, or at least what we\nregard as such, which obviously fall into two classes on the one\nprinciple that we have laid down. We must be able to will that a maxim\nof our action should be a universal law. This is the canon of the\nmoral appreciation of the action generally. Some actions are of such a\ncharacter that their maxim cannot without contradiction be even\nconceived as a universal law of nature, far from it being possible\nthat we should will that it should be so. In others this intrinsic\nimpossibility is not found, but still it is impossible to will that\ntheir maxim should be raised to the universality of a law of nature,\nsince such a will would contradict itself It is easily seen that the\nformer violate strict or rigorous (inflexible) duty; the latter only\nlaxer (meritorious) duty. Thus it has been completely shown how all\nduties depend as regards the nature of the obligation (not the\nobject of the action) on the same principle.\n\nIf now we attend to ourselves on occasion of any transgression of\nduty, we shall find that we in fact do not will that our maxim\nshould be a universal law, for that is impossible for us; on the\ncontrary, we will that the opposite should remain a universal law,\nonly we assume the liberty of making an exception in our own favour or\n(just for this time only) in favour of our inclination. Consequently\nif we considered all cases from one and the same point of view,\nnamely, that of reason, we should find a contradiction in our own\nwill, namely, that a certain principle should be objectively necessary\nas a universal law, and yet subjectively should not be universal,\nbut admit of exceptions. As however we at one moment regard our action\nfrom the point of view of a will wholly conformed to reason, and\nthen again look at the same action from the point of view of a will\naffected by inclination, there is not really any contradiction, but an\nantagonism of inclination to the precept of reason, whereby the\nuniversality of the principle is changed into a mere generality, so\nthat the practical principle of reason shall meet the maxim half\nway. Now, although this cannot be justified in our own impartial\njudgement, yet it proves that we do really recognise the validity of\nthe categorical imperative and (with all respect for it) only allow\nourselves a few exceptions, which we think unimportant and forced from\nus.\n\nWe have thus established at least this much, that if duty is a\nconception which is to have any import and real legislative\nauthority for our actions, it can only be expressed in categorical and\nnot at all in hypothetical imperatives. We have also, which is of\ngreat importance, exhibited clearly and definitely for every practical\napplication the content of the categorical imperative, which must\ncontain the principle of all duty if there is such a thing at all.\nWe have not yet, however, advanced so far as to prove a priori that\nthere actually is such an imperative, that there is a practical law\nwhich commands absolutely of itself and without any other impulse, and\nthat the following of this law is duty.\n\nWith the view of attaining to this, it is of extreme importance to\nremember that we must not allow ourselves to think of deducing the\nreality of this principle from the particular attributes of human\nnature. For duty is to be a practical, unconditional necessity of\naction; it must therefore hold for all rational beings (to whom an\nimperative can apply at all), and for this reason only be also a law\nfor all human wills. On the contrary, whatever is deduced from the\nparticular natural characteristics of humanity, from certain\nfeelings and propensions, nay, even, if possible, from any\nparticular tendency proper to human reason, and which need not\nnecessarily hold for the will of every rational being; this may indeed\nsupply us with a maxim, but not with a law; with a subjective\nprinciple on which we may have a propension and inclination to act,\nbut not with an objective principle on which we should be enjoined\nto act, even though all our propensions, inclinations, and natural\ndispositions were opposed to it. In fact, the sublimity and\nintrinsic dignity of the command in duty are so much the more evident,\nthe less the subjective impulses favour it and the more they oppose\nit, without being able in the slightest degree to weaken the\nobligation of the law or to diminish its validity.\n\nHere then we see philosophy brought to a critical position, since it\nhas to be firmly fixed, notwithstanding that it has nothing to support\nit in heaven or earth. Here it must show its purity as absolute\ndirector of its own laws, not the herald of those which are\nwhispered to it by an implanted sense or who knows what tutelary\nnature. Although these may be better than nothing, yet they can\nnever afford principles dictated by reason, which must have their\nsource wholly a priori and thence their commanding authority,\nexpecting everything from the supremacy of the law and the due respect\nfor it, nothing from inclination, or else condemning the man to\nself-contempt and inward abhorrence.\n\nThus every empirical element is not only quite incapable of being an\naid to the principle of morality, but is even highly prejudicial to\nthe purity of morals, for the proper and inestimable worth of an\nabsolutely good will consists just in this, that the principle of\naction is free from all influence of contingent grounds, which alone\nexperience can furnish. We cannot too much or too often repeat our\nwarning against this lax and even mean habit of thought which seeks\nfor its principle amongst empirical motives and laws; for human reason\nin its weariness is glad to rest on this pillow, and in a dream of\nsweet illusions (in which, instead of Juno, it embraces a cloud) it\nsubstitutes for morality a bastard patched up from limbs of various\nderivation, which looks like anything one chooses to see in it, only\nnot like virtue to one who has once beheld her in her true form. *\n\n\n\n* To behold virtue in her proper form is nothing else but to\ncontemplate morality stripped of all admixture of sensible things\nand of every spurious ornament of reward or self-love. How much she\nthen eclipses everything else that appears charming to the affections,\nevery one may readily perceive with the least exertion of his\nreason, if it be not wholly spoiled for abstraction.\n\n\n\nThe question then is this: \"Is it a necessary law for all rational\nbeings that they should always judge of their actions by maxims of\nwhich they can themselves will that they should serve as universal\nlaws?\" If it is so, then it must be connected (altogether a priori)\nwith the very conception of the will of a rational being generally.\nBut in order to discover this connexion we must, however\nreluctantly, take a step into metaphysic, although into a domain of it\nwhich is distinct from speculative philosophy, namely, the\nmetaphysic of morals. In a practical philosophy, where it is not the\nreasons of what happens that we have to ascertain, but the laws of\nwhat ought to happen, even although it never does, i.e., objective\npractical laws, there it is not necessary to inquire into the\nreasons why anything pleases or displeases, how the pleasure of mere\nsensation differs from taste, and whether the latter is distinct\nfrom a general satisfaction of reason; on what the feeling of pleasure\nor pain rests, and how from it desires and inclinations arise, and\nfrom these again maxims by the co-operation of reason: for all this\nbelongs to an empirical psychology, which would constitute the\nsecond part of physics, if we regard physics as the philosophy of\nnature, so far as it is based on empirical laws. But here we are\nconcerned with objective practical laws and, consequently, with the\nrelation of the will to itself so far as it is determined by reason\nalone, in which case whatever has reference to anything empirical is\nnecessarily excluded; since if reason of itself alone determines the\nconduct (and it is the possibility of this that we are now\ninvestigating), it must necessarily do so a priori.\n\nThe will is conceived as a faculty of determining oneself to\naction in accordance with the conception of certain laws. And such a\nfaculty can be found only in rational beings. Now that which serves\nthe will as the objective ground of its self-determination is the end,\nand, if this is assigned by reason alone, it must hold for all\nrational beings. On the other hand, that which merely contains the\nground of possibility of the action of which the effect is the end,\nthis is called the means. The subjective ground of the desire is the\nspring, the objective ground of the volition is the motive; hence\nthe distinction between subjective ends which rest on springs, and\nobjective ends which depend on motives valid for every rational being.\nPractical principles are formal when they abstract from all subjective\nends; they are material when they assume these, and therefore\nparticular springs of action. The ends which a rational being proposes\nto himself at pleasure as effects of his actions (material ends) are\nall only relative, for it is only their relation to the particular\ndesires of the subject that gives them their worth, which therefore\ncannot furnish principles universal and necessary for all rational\nbeings and for every volition, that is to say practical laws. Hence\nall these relative ends can give rise only to hypothetical\nimperatives.\n\nSupposing, however, that there were something whose existence has in\nitself an absolute worth, something which, being an end in itself,\ncould be a source of definite laws; then in this and this alone\nwould lie the source of a possible categorical imperative, i.e., a\npractical law.\n\nNow I say: man and generally any rational being exists as an end\nin himself, not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or\nthat will, but in all his actions, whether they concern himself or\nother rational beings, must be always regarded at the same time as\nan end. All objects of the inclinations have only a conditional worth,\nfor if the inclinations and the wants founded on them did not exist,\nthen their object would be without value. But the inclinations,\nthemselves being sources of want, are so far from having an absolute\nworth for which they should be desired that on the contrary it must be\nthe universal wish of every rational being to be wholly free from\nthem. Thus the worth of any object which is to be acquired by our\naction is always conditional. Beings whose existence depends not on\nour will but on nature's, have nevertheless, if they are irrational\nbeings, only a relative value as means, and are therefore called\nthings; rational beings, on the contrary, are called persons,\nbecause their very nature points them out as ends in themselves,\nthat is as something which must not be used merely as means, and so\nfar therefore restricts freedom of action (and is an object of\nrespect). These, therefore, are not merely subjective ends whose\nexistence has a worth for us as an effect of our action, but objective\nends, that is, things whose existence is an end in itself; an end\nmoreover for which no other can be substituted, which they should\nsubserve merely as means, for otherwise nothing whatever would possess\nabsolute worth; but if all worth were conditioned and therefore\ncontingent, then there would be no supreme practical principle of\nreason whatever.\n\nIf then there is a supreme practical principle or, in respect of the\nhuman will, a categorical imperative, it must be one which, being\ndrawn from the conception of that which is necessarily an end for\neveryone because it is an end in itself, constitutes an objective\nprinciple of will, and can therefore serve as a universal practical\nlaw. The foundation of this principle is: rational nature exists as an\nend in itself. Man necessarily conceives his own existence as being\nso; so far then this is a subjective principle of human actions. But\nevery other rational being regards its existence similarly, just on\nthe same rational principle that holds for me: * so that it is at the\nsame time an objective principle, from which as a supreme practical\nlaw all laws of the will must be capable of being deduced. Accordingly\nthe practical imperative will be as follows: So act as to treat\nhumanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in\nevery case as an end withal, never as means only. We will now\ninquire whether this can be practically carried out.\n\n\n\n* This proposition is here stated as a postulate. The ground of it\nwill be found in the concluding section.\n\n\n\nTo abide by the previous examples:\n\nFirstly, under the head of necessary duty to oneself: He who\ncontemplates suicide should ask himself whether his action can be\nconsistent with the idea of humanity as an end in itself. If he\ndestroys himself in order to escape from painful circumstances, he\nuses a person merely as a mean to maintain a tolerable condition up to\nthe end of life. But a man is not a thing, that is to say, something\nwhich can be used merely as means, but must in all his actions be\nalways considered as an end in himself. I cannot, therefore, dispose\nin any way of a man in my own person so as to mutilate him, to\ndamage or kill him. (It belongs to ethics proper to define this\nprinciple more precisely, so as to avoid all misunderstanding, e.\ng., as to the amputation of the limbs in order to preserve myself,\nas to exposing my life to danger with a view to preserve it, etc. This\nquestion is therefore omitted here.)\n\nSecondly, as regards necessary duties, or those of strict\nobligation, towards others: He who is thinking of making a lying\npromise to others will see at once that he would be using another\nman merely as a mean, without the latter containing at the same time\nthe end in himself. For he whom I propose by such a promise to use for\nmy own purposes cannot possibly assent to my mode of acting towards\nhim and, therefore, cannot himself contain the end of this action.\nThis violation of the principle of humanity in other men is more\nobvious if we take in examples of attacks on the freedom and\nproperty of others. For then it is clear that he who transgresses\nthe rights of men intends to use the person of others merely as a\nmeans, without considering that as rational beings they ought always\nto be esteemed also as ends, that is, as beings who must be capable of\ncontaining in themselves the end of the very same action. *\n\n\n\n* Let it not be thought that the common \"quod tibi non vis fieri,\netc.\" could serve here as the rule or principle. For it is only a\ndeduction from the former, though with several limitations; it\ncannot be a universal law, for it does not contain the principle of\nduties to oneself, nor of the duties of benevolence to others (for\nmany a one would gladly consent that others should not benefit him,\nprovided only that he might be excused from showing benevolence to\nthem), nor finally that of duties of strict obligation to one another,\nfor on this principle the criminal might argue against the judge who\npunishes him, and so on.\n\n\n\nThirdly, as regards contingent (meritorious) duties to oneself: It\nis not enough that the action does not violate humanity in our own\nperson as an end in itself, it must also harmonize with it. Now\nthere are in humanity capacities of greater perfection, which belong\nto the end that nature has in view in regard to humanity in\nourselves as the subject: to neglect these might perhaps be consistent\nwith the maintenance of humanity as an end in itself, but not with the\nadvancement of this end.\n\nFourthly, as regards meritorious duties towards others: The\nnatural end which all men have is their own happiness. Now humanity\nmight indeed subsist, although no one should contribute anything to\nthe happiness of others, provided he did not intentionally withdraw\nanything from it; but after all this would only harmonize negatively\nnot positively with humanity as an end in itself, if every one does\nnot also endeavour, as far as in him lies, to forward the ends of\nothers. For the ends of any subject which is an end in himself ought\nas far as possible to be my ends also, if that conception is to have\nits full effect with me.\n\nThis principle, that humanity and generally every rational nature is\nan end in itself (which is the supreme limiting condition of every\nman's freedom of action), is not borrowed from experience, firstly,\nbecause it is universal, applying as it does to all rational beings\nwhatever, and experience is not capable of determining anything\nabout them; secondly, because it does not present humanity as an end\nto men (subjectively), that is as an object which men do of themselves\nactually adopt as an end; but as an objective end, which must as a law\nconstitute the supreme limiting condition of all our subjective\nends, let them be what we will; it must therefore spring from pure\nreason. In fact the objective principle of all practical legislation\nlies (according to the first principle) in the rule and its form of\nuniversality which makes it capable of being a law (say, e. g., a\nlaw of nature); but the subjective principle is in the end; now by the\nsecond principle the subject of all ends is each rational being,\ninasmuch as it is an end in itself. Hence follows the third\npractical principle of the will, which is the ultimate condition of\nits harmony with universal practical reason, viz.: the idea of the\nwill of every rational being as a universally legislative will.\n\nOn this principle all maxims are rejected which are inconsistent\nwith the will being itself universal legislator. Thus the will is\nnot subject simply to the law, but so subject that it must be regarded\nas itself giving the law and, on this ground only, subject to the\nlaw (of which it can regard itself as the author).\n\nIn the previous imperatives, namely, that based on the conception of\nthe conformity of actions to general laws, as in a physical system\nof nature, and that based on the universal prerogative of rational\nbeings as ends in themselves- these imperatives, just because they\nwere conceived as categorical, excluded from any share in their\nauthority all admixture of any interest as a spring of action; they\nwere, however, only assumed to be categorical, because such an\nassumption was necessary to explain the conception of duty. But we\ncould not prove independently that there are practical propositions\nwhich command categorically, nor can it be proved in this section; one\nthing, however, could be done, namely, to indicate in the imperative\nitself, by some determinate expression, that in the case of volition\nfrom duty all interest is renounced, which is the specific criterion\nof categorical as distinguished from hypothetical imperatives. This is\ndone in the present (third) formula of the principle, namely, in the\nidea of the will of every rational being as a universally\nlegislating will.\n\nFor although a will which is subject to laws may be attached to this\nlaw by means of an interest, yet a will which is itself a supreme\nlawgiver so far as it is such cannot possibly depend on any\ninterest, since a will so dependent would itself still need another\nlaw restricting the interest of its self-love by the condition that it\nshould be valid as universal law.\n\nThus the principle that every human will is a will which in all\nits maxims gives universal laws, * provided it be otherwise\njustified, would be very well adapted to be the categorical\nimperative, in this respect, namely, that just because of the idea\nof universal legislation it is not based on interest, and therefore it\nalone among all possible imperatives can be unconditional. Or still\nbetter, converting the proposition, if there is a categorical\nimperative (i.e., a law for the will of every rational being), it\ncan only command that everything be done from maxims of one's will\nregarded as a will which could at the same time will that it should\nitself give universal laws, for in that case only the practical\nprinciple and the imperative which it obeys are unconditional, since\nthey cannot be based on any interest.\n\n\n\n* I may be excused from adducing examples to elucidate this\nprinciple, as those which have already been used to elucidate the\ncategorical imperative and its formula would all serve for the like\npurpose here.\n\n\n\nLooking back now on all previous attempts to discover the\nprinciple of morality, we need not wonder why they all failed. It\nwas seen that man was bound to laws by duty, but it was not observed\nthat the laws to which he is subject are only those of his own giving,\nthough at the same time they are universal, and that he is only\nbound to act in conformity with his own will; a will, however, which\nis designed by nature to give universal laws. For when one has\nconceived man only as subject to a law (no matter what), then this law\nrequired some interest, either by way of attraction or constraint,\nsince it did not originate as a law from his own will, but this will\nwas according to a law obliged by something else to act in a certain\nmanner. Now by this necessary consequence all the labour spent in\nfinding a supreme principle of duty was irrevocably lost. For men\nnever elicited duty, but only a necessity of acting from a certain\ninterest. Whether this interest was private or otherwise, in any\ncase the imperative must be conditional and could not by any means\nbe capable of being a moral command. I will therefore call this the\nprinciple of autonomy of the will, in contrast with every other\nwhich I accordingly reckon as heteronomy.\n\nThe conception of the will of every rational being as one which must\nconsider itself as giving in all the maxims of its will universal\nlaws, so as to judge itself and its actions from this point of view-\nthis conception leads to another which depends on it and is very\nfruitful, namely that of a kingdom of ends.\n\nBy a kingdom I understand the union of different rational beings\nin a system by common laws. Now since it is by laws that ends are\ndetermined as regards their universal validity, hence, if we\nabstract from the personal differences of rational beings and likewise\nfrom all the content of their private ends, we shall be able to\nconceive all ends combined in a systematic whole (including both\nrational beings as ends in themselves, and also the special ends which\neach may propose to himself), that is to say, we can conceive a\nkingdom of ends, which on the preceding principles is possible.\n\nFor all rational beings come under the law that each of them must\ntreat itself and all others never merely as means, but in every case\nat the same time as ends in themselves. Hence results a systematic\nunion of rational being by common objective laws, i.e., a kingdom\nwhich may be called a kingdom of ends, since what these laws have in\nview is just the relation of these beings to one another as ends and\nmeans. It is certainly only an ideal.\n\nA rational being belongs as a member to the kingdom of ends when,\nalthough giving universal laws in it, he is also himself subject to\nthese laws. He belongs to it as sovereign when, while giving laws,\nhe is not subject to the will of any other.\n\nA rational being must always regard himself as giving laws either as\nmember or as sovereign in a kingdom of ends which is rendered possible\nby the freedom of will. He cannot, however, maintain the latter\nposition merely by the maxims of his will, but only in case he is a\ncompletely independent being without wants and with unrestricted power\nadequate to his will.\n\nMorality consists then in the reference of all action to the\nlegislation which alone can render a kingdom of ends possible. This\nlegislation must be capable of existing in every rational being and of\nemanating from his will, so that the principle of this will is never\nto act on any maxim which could not without contradiction be also a\nuniversal law and, accordingly, always so to act that the will could\nat the same time regard itself as giving in its maxims universal laws.\nIf now the maxims of rational beings are not by their own nature\ncoincident with this objective principle, then the necessity of acting\non it is called practical necessitation, i.e., duty. Duty does not\napply to the sovereign in the kingdom of ends, but it does to every\nmember of it and to all in the same degree.\n\nThe practical necessity of acting on this principle, i.e., duty,\ndoes not rest at all on feelings, impulses, or inclinations, but\nsolely on the relation of rational beings to one another, a relation\nin which the will of a rational being must always be regarded as\nlegislative, since otherwise it could not be conceived as an end in\nitself. Reason then refers every maxim of the will, regarding it as\nlegislating universally, to every other will and also to every\naction towards oneself; and this not on account of any other practical\nmotive or any future advantage, but from the idea of the dignity of\na rational being, obeying no law but that which he himself also gives.\n\nIn the kingdom of ends everything has either value or dignity.\nWhatever has a value can be replaced by something else which is\nequivalent; whatever, on the other hand, is above all value, and\ntherefore admits of no equivalent, has a dignity.\n\nWhatever has reference to the general inclinations and wants of\nmankind has a market value; whatever, without presupposing a want,\ncorresponds to a certain taste, that is to a satisfaction in the\nmere purposeless play of our faculties, has a fancy value; but that\nwhich constitutes the condition under which alone anything can be an\nend in itself, this has not merely a relative worth, i.e., value,\nbut an intrinsic worth, that is, dignity.\n\nNow morality is the condition under which alone a rational being can\nbe an end in himself, since by this alone is it possible that he\nshould be a legislating member in the kingdom of ends. Thus\nmorality, and humanity as capable of it, is that which alone has\ndignity. Skill and diligence in labour have a market value; wit,\nlively imagination, and humour, have fancy value; on the other hand,\nfidelity to promises, benevolence from principle (not from\ninstinct), have an intrinsic worth. Neither nature nor art contains\nanything which in default of these it could put in their place, for\ntheir worth consists not in the effects which spring from them, not in\nthe use and advantage which they secure, but in the disposition of\nmind, that is, the maxims of the will which are ready to manifest\nthemselves in such actions, even though they should not have the\ndesired effect. These actions also need no recommendation from any\nsubjective taste or sentiment, that they may be looked on with\nimmediate favour and satisfaction: they need no immediate propension\nor feeling for them; they exhibit the will that performs them as an\nobject of an immediate respect, and nothing but reason is required\nto impose them on the will; not to flatter it into them, which, in the\ncase of duties, would be a contradiction. This estimation therefore\nshows that the worth of such a disposition is dignity, and places it\ninfinitely above all value, with which it cannot for a moment be\nbrought into comparison or competition without as it were violating\nits sanctity.\n\nWhat then is it which justifies virtue or the morally good\ndisposition, in making such lofty claims? It is nothing less than\nthe privilege it secures to the rational being of participating in the\ngiving of universal laws, by which it qualifies him to be a member\nof a possible kingdom of ends, a privilege to which he was already\ndestined by his own nature as being an end in himself and, on that\naccount, legislating in the kingdom of ends; free as regards all\nlaws of physical nature, and obeying those only which he himself\ngives, and by which his maxims can belong to a system of universal\nlaw, to which at the same time he submits himself. For nothing has any\nworth except what the law assigns it. Now the legislation itself which\nassigns the worth of everything must for that very reason possess\ndignity, that is an unconditional incomparable worth; and the word\nrespect alone supplies a becoming expression for the esteem which a\nrational being must have for it. Autonomy then is the basis of the\ndignity of human and of every rational nature.\n\nThe three modes of presenting the principle of morality that have\nbeen adduced are at bottom only so many formulae of the very same law,\nand each of itself involves the other two. There is, however, a\ndifference in them, but it is rather subjectively than objectively\npractical, intended namely to bring an idea of the reason nearer to\nintuition (by means of a certain analogy) and thereby nearer to\nfeeling. All maxims, in fact, have:\n\n1. A form, consisting in universality; and in this view the\nformula of the moral imperative is expressed thus, that the maxims\nmust be so chosen as if they were to serve as universal laws of\nnature.\n\n2. A matter, namely, an end, and here the formula says that the\nrational being, as it is an end by its own nature and therefore an end\nin itself, must in every maxim serve as the condition limiting all\nmerely relative and arbitrary ends.\n\n3. A complete characterization of all maxims by means of that\nformula, namely, that all maxims ought by their own legislation to\nharmonize with a possible kingdom of ends as with a kingdom of\nnature. * There is a progress here in the order of the categories of\nunity of the form of the will (its universality), plurality of the\nmatter (the objects, i.e., the ends), and totality of the system of\nthese. In forming our moral judgement of actions, it is better to\nproceed always on the strict method and start from the general formula\nof the categorical imperative: Act according to a maxim which can at\nthe same time make itself a universal law. If, however, we wish to\ngain an entrance for the moral law, it is very useful to bring one and\nthe same action under the three specified conceptions, and thereby\nas far as possible to bring it nearer to intuition.\n\n\n\n* Teleology considers nature as a kingdom of ends; ethics regards a\npossible kingdom of ends as a kingdom nature. In the first case, the\nkingdom of ends is a theoretical idea, adopted to explain what\nactually is. In the latter it is a practical idea, adopted to bring\nabout that which is not yet, but which can be realized by our conduct,\nnamely, if it conforms to this idea.\n\n\n\nWe can now end where we started at the beginning, namely, with the\nconception of a will unconditionally good. That will is absolutely\ngood which cannot be evil- in other words, whose maxim, if made a\nuniversal law, could never contradict itself. This principle, then, is\nits supreme law: \"Act always on such a maxim as thou canst at the same\ntime will to be a universal law\"; this is the sole condition under\nwhich a will can never contradict itself; and such an imperative is\ncategorical. Since the validity of the will as a universal law for\npossible actions is analogous to the universal connexion of the\nexistence of things by general laws, which is the formal notion of\nnature in general, the categorical imperative can also be expressed\nthus: Act on maxims which can at the same time have for their object\nthemselves as universal laws of nature. Such then is the formula of an\nabsolutely good will.\n\nRational nature is distinguished from the rest of nature by this,\nthat it sets before itself an end. This end would be the matter of\nevery good will. But since in the idea of a will that is absolutely\ngood without being limited by any condition (of attaining this or that\nend) we must abstract wholly from every end to be effected (since this\nwould make every will only relatively good), it follows that in this\ncase the end must be conceived, not as an end to be effected, but as\nan independently existing end. Consequently it is conceived only\nnegatively, i.e., as that which we must never act against and which,\ntherefore, must never be regarded merely as means, but must in every\nvolition be esteemed as an end likewise. Now this end can be nothing\nbut the subject of all possible ends, since this is also the subject\nof a possible absolutely good will; for such a will cannot without\ncontradiction be postponed to any other object. The principle: \"So act\nin regard to every rational being (thyself and others), that he may\nalways have place in thy maxim as an end in himself,\" is accordingly\nessentially identical with this other: \"Act upon a maxim which, at the\nsame time, involves its own universal validity for every rational\nbeing.\" For that in using means for every end I should limit my\nmaxim by the condition of its holding good as a law for every subject,\nthis comes to the same thing as that the fundamental principle of\nall maxims of action must be that the subject of all ends, i.e., the\nrational being himself, be never employed merely as means, but as\nthe supreme condition restricting the use of all means, that is in\nevery case as an end likewise.\n\nIt follows incontestably that, to whatever laws any rational being\nmay be subject, he being an end in himself must be able to regard\nhimself as also legislating universally in respect of these same laws,\nsince it is just this fitness of his maxims for universal\nlegislation that distinguishes him as an end in himself; also it\nfollows that this implies his dignity (prerogative) above all mere\nphysical beings, that he must always take his maxims from the point of\nview which regards himself and, likewise, every other rational being\nas law-giving beings (on which account they are called persons). In\nthis way a world of rational beings (mundus intelligibilis) is\npossible as a kingdom of ends, and this by virtue of the legislation\nproper to all persons as members. Therefore every rational being\nmust so act as if he were by his maxims in every case a legislating\nmember in the universal kingdom of ends. The formal principle of these\nmaxims is: \"So act as if thy maxim were to serve likewise as the\nuniversal law (of all rational beings).\" A kingdom of ends is thus\nonly possible on the analogy of a kingdom of nature, the former\nhowever only by maxims, that is self-imposed rules, the latter only by\nthe laws of efficient causes acting under necessitation from\nwithout. Nevertheless, although the system of nature is looked upon as\na machine, yet so far as it has reference to rational beings as its\nends, it is given on this account the name of a kingdom of nature. Now\nsuch a kingdom of ends would be actually realized by means of maxims\nconforming to the canon which the categorical imperative prescribes to\nall rational beings, if they were universally followed. But although a\nrational being, even if he punctually follows this maxim himself,\ncannot reckon upon all others being therefore true to the same, nor\nexpect that the kingdom of nature and its orderly arrangements shall\nbe in harmony with him as a fitting member, so as to form a kingdom of\nends to which he himself contributes, that is to say, that it shall\nfavour his expectation of happiness, still that law: \"Act according to\nthe maxims of a member of a merely possible kingdom of ends\nlegislating in it universally,\" remains in its full force, inasmuch as\nit commands categorically. And it is just in this that the paradox\nlies; that the mere dignity of man as a rational creature, without any\nother end or advantage to be attained thereby, in other words, respect\nfor a mere idea, should yet serve as an inflexible precept of the\nwill, and that it is precisely in this independence of the maxim on\nall such springs of action that its sublimity consists; and it is this\nthat makes every rational subject worthy to be a legislative member in\nthe kingdom of ends: for otherwise he would have to be conceived\nonly as subject to the physical law of his wants. And although we\nshould suppose the kingdom of nature and the kingdom of ends to be\nunited under one sovereign, so that the latter kingdom thereby\nceased to be a mere idea and acquired true reality, then it would no\ndoubt gain the accession of a strong spring, but by no means any\nincrease of its intrinsic worth. For this sole absolute lawgiver must,\nnotwithstanding this, be always conceived as estimating the worth of\nrational beings only by their disinterested behaviour, as prescribed\nto themselves from that idea [the dignity of man] alone. The essence\nof things is not altered by their external relations, and that\nwhich, abstracting from these, alone constitutes the absolute worth of\nman, is also that by which he must be judged, whoever the judge may\nbe, and even by the Supreme Being. Morality, then, is the relation\nof actions to the relation of actions will, that is, to the autonomy\nof potential universal legislation by its maxims. An action that is\nconsistent with the autonomy of the will is permitted; one that does\nnot agree therewith is forbidden. A will whose maxims necessarily\ncoincide with the laws of autonomy is a holy will, good absolutely.\nThe dependence of a will not absolutely good on the principle of\nautonomy (moral necessitation) is obligation. This, then, cannot be\napplied to a holy being. The objective necessity of actions from\nobligation is called duty.\n\nFrom what has just been said, it is easy to see how it happens that,\nalthough the conception of duty implies subjection to the law, we\nyet ascribe a certain dignity and sublimity to the person who\nfulfils all his duties. There is not, indeed, any sublimity in him, so\nfar as he is subject to the moral law; but inasmuch as in regard to\nthat very law he is likewise a legislator, and on that account alone\nsubject to it, he has sublimity. We have also shown above that neither\nfear nor inclination, but simply respect for the law, is the spring\nwhich can give actions a moral worth. Our own will, so far as we\nsuppose it to act only under the condition that its maxims are\npotentially universal laws, this ideal will which is possible to us is\nthe proper object of respect; and the dignity of humanity consists\njust in this capacity of being universally legislative, though with\nthe condition that it is itself subject to this same legislation.\n\n\n\nThe Autonomy of the Will as the Supreme Principle of Morality\n\n\n\nAutonomy of the will is that property of it by which it is a law\nto itself (independently of any property of the objects of\nvolition). The principle of autonomy then is: \"Always so to choose\nthat the same volition shall comprehend the maxims of our choice as\na universal law.\" We cannot prove that this practical rule is an\nimperative, i.e., that the will of every rational being is necessarily\nbound to it as a condition, by a mere analysis of the conceptions\nwhich occur in it, since it is a synthetical proposition; we must\nadvance beyond the cognition of the objects to a critical\nexamination of the subject, that is, of the pure practical reason, for\nthis synthetic proposition which commands apodeictically must be\ncapable of being cognized wholly a priori. This matter, however,\ndoes not belong to the present section. But that the principle of\nautonomy in question is the sole principle of morals can be readily\nshown by mere analysis of the conceptions of morality. For by this\nanalysis we find that its principle must be a categorical imperative\nand that what this commands is neither more nor less than this very\nautonomy.\n\n\n\nHeteronomy of the Will as the Source of all spurious Principles\n\n                        of Morality\n\n\n\nIf the will seeks the law which is to determine it anywhere else\nthan in the fitness of its maxims to be universal laws of its own\ndictation, consequently if it goes out of itself and seeks this law in\nthe character of any of its objects, there always results\nheteronomy. The will in that case does not give itself the law, but it\nis given by the object through its relation to the will. This\nrelation, whether it rests on inclination or on conceptions of reason,\nonly admits of hypothetical imperatives: \"I ought to do something\nbecause I wish for something else.\" On the contrary, the moral, and\ntherefore categorical, imperative says: \"I ought to do so and so, even\nthough I should not wish for anything else.\" E.g., the former says: \"I\nought not to lie, if I would retain my reputation\"; the latter says:\n\"I ought not to lie, although it should not bring me the least\ndiscredit.\" The latter therefore must so far abstract from all objects\nthat they shall have no influence on the will, in order that practical\nreason (will) may not be restricted to administering an interest not\nbelonging to it, but may simply show its own commanding authority as\nthe supreme legislation. Thus, e.g., I ought to endeavour to promote\nthe happiness of others, not as if its realization involved any\nconcern of mine (whether by immediate inclination or by any\nsatisfaction indirectly gained through reason), but simply because a\nmaxim which excludes it cannot be comprehended as a universal law in\none and the same volition.\n\n\n\n  Classification of all Principles of Morality which can be\n\n         founded on the Conception of Heteronomy\n\n\n\nHere as elsewhere human reason in its pure use, so long as it was\nnot critically examined, has first tried all possible wrong ways\nbefore it succeeded in finding the one true way.\n\nAll principles which can be taken from this point of view are either\nempirical or rational. The former, drawn from the principle of\nhappiness, are built on physical or moral feelings; the latter,\ndrawn from the principle of perfection, are built either on the\nrational conception of perfection as a possible effect, or on that\nof an independent perfection (the will of God) as the determining\ncause of our will.\n\nEmpirical principles are wholly incapable of serving as a foundation\nfor moral laws. For the universality with which these should hold\nfor all rational beings without distinction, the unconditional\npractical necessity which is thereby imposed on them, is lost when\ntheir foundation is taken from the particular constitution of human\nnature, or the accidental circumstances in which it is placed. The\nprinciple of private happiness, however, is the most objectionable,\nnot merely because it is false, and experience contradicts the\nsupposition that prosperity is always proportioned to good conduct,\nnor yet merely because it contributes nothing to the establishment\nof morality- since it is quite a different thing to make a\nprosperous man and a good man, or to make one prudent and\nsharp-sighted for his own interests and to make him virtuous- but\nbecause the springs it provides for morality are such as rather\nundermine it and destroy its sublimity, since they put the motives\nto virtue and to vice in the same class and only teach us to make a\nbetter calculation, the specific difference between virtue and vice\nbeing entirely extinguished. On the other hand, as to moral feeling,\nthis supposed special sense, * the appeal to it is indeed superficial\nwhen those who cannot think believe that feeling will help them out,\neven in what concerns general laws: and besides, feelings, which\nnaturally differ infinitely in degree, cannot furnish a uniform\nstandard of good and evil, nor has anyone a right to form judgements\nfor others by his own feelings: nevertheless this moral feeling is\nnearer to morality and its dignity in this respect, that it pays\nvirtue the honour of ascribing to her immediately the satisfaction and\nesteem we have for her and does not, as it were, tell her to her\nface that we are not attached to her by her beauty but by profit.\n\n\n\n* I class the principle of moral feeling under that of happiness,\nbecause every empirical interest promises to contribute to our\nwell-being by the agreeableness that a thing affords, whether it be\nimmediately and without a view to profit, or whether profit be\nregarded. We must likewise, with Hutcheson, class the principle of\nsympathy with the happiness of others under his assumed moral sense.\n\n\n\nAmongst the rational principles of morality, the ontological\nconception of perfection, notwithstanding its defects, is better\nthan the theological conception which derives morality from a Divine\nabsolutely perfect will. The former is, no doubt, empty and indefinite\nand consequently useless for finding in the boundless field of\npossible reality the greatest amount suitable for us; moreover, in\nattempting to distinguish specifically the reality of which we are now\nspeaking from every other, it inevitably tends to turn in a circle and\ncannot avoid tacitly presupposing the morality which it is to explain;\nit is nevertheless preferable to the theological view, first,\nbecause we have no intuition of the divine perfection and can only\ndeduce it from our own conceptions, the most important of which is\nthat of morality, and our explanation would thus be involved in a\ngross circle; and, in the next place, if we avoid this, the only\nnotion of the Divine will remaining to us is a conception made up of\nthe attributes of desire of glory and dominion, combined with the\nawful conceptions of might and vengeance, and any system of morals\nerected on this foundation would be directly opposed to morality.\n\nHowever, if I had to choose between the notion of the moral sense\nand that of perfection in general (two systems which at least do not\nweaken morality, although they are totally incapable of serving as its\nfoundation), then I should decide for the latter, because it at\nleast withdraws the decision of the question from the sensibility\nand brings it to the court of pure reason; and although even here it\ndecides nothing, it at all events preserves the indefinite idea (of\na will good in itself free from corruption, until it shall be more\nprecisely defined.\n\nFor the rest I think I may be excused here from a detailed\nrefutation of all these doctrines; that would only be superfluous\nlabour, since it is so easy, and is probably so well seen even by\nthose whose office requires them to decide for one of these theories\n(because their hearers would not tolerate suspension of judgement).\nBut what interests us more here is to know that the prime foundation\nof morality laid down by all these principles is nothing but\nheteronomy of the will, and for this reason they must necessarily miss\ntheir aim.\n\nIn every case where an object of the will has to be supposed, in\norder that the rule may be prescribed which is to determine the\nwill, there the rule is simply heteronomy; the imperative is\nconditional, namely, if or because one wishes for this object, one\nshould act so and so: hence it can never command morally, that is,\ncategorically. Whether the object determines the will by means of\ninclination, as in the principle of private happiness, or by means\nof reason directed to objects of our possible volition generally, as\nin the principle of perfection, in either case the will never\ndetermines itself immediately by the conception of the action, but\nonly by the influence which the foreseen effect of the action has on\nthe will; I ought to do something, on this account, because I wish for\nsomething else; and here there must be yet another law assumed in me\nas its subject, by which I necessarily will this other thing, and this\nlaw again requires an imperative to restrict this maxim. For the\ninfluence which the conception of an object within the reach of our\nfaculties can exercise on the will of the subject, in consequence of\nits natural properties, depends on the nature of the subject, either\nthe sensibility (inclination and taste), or the understanding and\nreason, the employment of which is by the peculiar constitution of\ntheir nature attended with satisfaction. It follows that the law would\nbe, properly speaking, given by nature, and, as such, it must be known\nand proved by experience and would consequently be contingent and\ntherefore incapable of being an apodeictic practical rule, such as the\nmoral rule must be. Not only so, but it is inevitably only heteronomy;\nthe will does not give itself the law, but is given by a foreign\nimpulse by means of a particular natural constitution of the subject\nadapted to receive it. An absolutely good will, then, the principle of\nwhich must be a categorical imperative, will be indeterminate as\nregards all objects and will contain merely the form of volition\ngenerally, and that as autonomy, that is to say, the capability of the\nmaxims of every good will to make themselves a universal law, is\nitself the only law which the will of every rational being imposes\non itself, without needing to assume any spring or interest as a\nfoundation.\n\nHow such a synthetical practical a priori proposition is possible,\nand why it is necessary, is a problem whose solution does not lie\nwithin the bounds of the metaphysic of morals; and we have not here\naffirmed its truth, much less professed to have a proof of it in our\npower. We simply showed by the development of the universally received\nnotion of morality that an autonomy of the will is inevitably\nconnected with it, or rather is its foundation. Whoever then holds\nmorality to be anything real, and not a chimerical idea without any\ntruth, must likewise admit the principle of it that is here\nassigned. This section then, like the first, was merely analytical.\nNow to prove that morality is no creation of the brain, which it\ncannot be if the categorical imperative and with it the autonomy of\nthe will is true, and as an a priori principle absolutely necessary,\nthis supposes the possibility of a synthetic use of pure practical\nreason, which however we cannot venture on without first giving a\ncritical examination of this faculty of reason. In the concluding\nsection we shall give the principal outlines of this critical\nexamination as far as is sufficient for our purpose.\n\nSEC_3\n\n                     THIRD SECTION\n\n\n\n      TRANSITION FROM THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS TO THE\n\n           CRITIQUE OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON\n\n\n\nThe Concept of Freedom is the Key that explains the Autonomy of\nthe Will\n\n\n\nThe will is a kind of causality belonging to living beings in so far\nas they are rational, and freedom would be this property of such\ncausality that it can be efficient, independently of foreign causes\ndetermining it; just as physical necessity is the property that the\ncausality of all irrational beings has of being determined to activity\nby the influence of foreign causes.\n\nThe preceding definition of freedom is negative and therefore\nunfruitful for the discovery of its essence, but it leads to a\npositive conception which is so much the more full and fruitful.\n\nSince the conception of causality involves that of laws, according\nto which, by something that we call cause, something else, namely\nthe effect, must be produced; hence, although freedom is not a\nproperty of the will depending on physical laws, yet it is not for\nthat reason lawless; on the contrary it must be a causality acting\naccording to immutable laws, but of a peculiar kind; otherwise a\nfree will would be an absurdity. Physical necessity is a heteronomy of\nthe efficient causes, for every effect is possible only according to\nthis law, that something else determines the efficient cause to\nexert its causality. What else then can freedom of the will be but\nautonomy, that is, the property of the will to be a law to itself? But\nthe proposition: \"The will is in every action a law to itself,\" only\nexpresses the principle: \"To act on no other maxim than that which can\nalso have as an object itself as a universal law.\" Now this is\nprecisely the formula of the categorical imperative and is the\nprinciple of morality, so that a free will and a will subject to moral\nlaws are one and the same.\n\nOn the hypothesis, then, of freedom of the will, morality together\nwith its principle follows from it by mere analysis of the conception.\nHowever, the latter is a synthetic proposition; viz., an absolutely\ngood will is that whose maxim can always include itself regarded as\na universal law; for this property of its maxim can never be\ndiscovered by analysing the conception of an absolutely good will. Now\nsuch synthetic propositions are only possible in this way: that the\ntwo cognitions are connected together by their union with a third in\nwhich they are both to be found. The positive concept of freedom\nfurnishes this third cognition, which cannot, as with physical causes,\nbe the nature of the sensible world (in the concept of which we find\nconjoined the concept of something in relation as cause to something\nelse as effect). We cannot now at once show what this third is to\nwhich freedom points us and of which we have an idea a priori, nor can\nwe make intelligible how the concept of freedom is shown to be\nlegitimate from principles of pure practical reason and with it the\npossibility of a categorical imperative; but some further\npreparation is required.\n\n\n\n   Freedom must be presupposed as a Property of the Will\n\n                 of all Rational Beings\n\n\n\nIt is not enough to predicate freedom of our own will, from Whatever\nreason, if we have not sufficient grounds for predicating the same\nof all rational beings. For as morality serves as a law for us only\nbecause we are rational beings, it must also hold for all rational\nbeings; and as it must be deduced simply from the property of freedom,\nit must be shown that freedom also is a property of all rational\nbeings. It is not enough, then, to prove it from certain supposed\nexperiences of human nature (which indeed is quite impossible, and\nit can only be shown a priori), but we must show that it belongs to\nthe activity of all rational beings endowed with a will. Now I say\nevery being that cannot act except under the idea of freedom is just\nfor that reason in a practical point of view really free, that is to\nsay, all laws which are inseparably connected with freedom have the\nsame force for him as if his will had been shown to be free in\nitself by a proof theoretically conclusive. * Now I affirm that we\nmust attribute to every rational being which has a will that it has\nalso the idea of freedom and acts entirely under this idea. For in\nsuch a being we conceive a reason that is practical, that is, has\ncausality in reference to its objects. Now we cannot possibly conceive\na reason consciously receiving a bias from any other quarter with\nrespect to its judgements, for then the subject would ascribe the\ndetermination of its judgement not to its own reason, but to an\nimpulse. It must regard itself as the author of its principles\nindependent of foreign influences. Consequently as practical reason or\nas the will of a rational being it must regard itself as free, that is\nto say, the will of such a being cannot be a will of its own except\nunder the idea of freedom. This idea must therefore in a practical\npoint of view be ascribed to every rational being.\n\n\n\n* I adopt this method of assuming freedom merely as an idea which\nrational beings suppose in their actions, in order to avoid the\nnecessity of proving it in its theoretical aspect also. The former\nis sufficient for my purpose; for even though the speculative proof\nshould not be made out, yet a being that cannot act except with the\nidea of freedom is bound by the same laws that would oblige a being\nwho was actually free. Thus we can escape here from the onus which\npresses on the theory.\n\n\n\n    Of the Interest attaching to the Ideas of Morality\n\n\n\nWe have finally reduced the definite conception of morality to the\nidea of freedom. This latter, however, we could not prove to be\nactually a property of ourselves or of human nature; only we saw\nthat it must be presupposed if we would conceive a being as rational\nand conscious of its causality in respect of its actions, i.e., as\nendowed with a will; and so we find that on just the same grounds we\nmust ascribe to every being endowed with reason and will this\nattribute of determining itself to action under the idea of its\nfreedom.\n\nNow it resulted also from the presupposition of these ideas that\nwe became aware of a law that the subjective principles of action,\ni.e., maxims, must always be so assumed that they can also hold as\nobjective, that is, universal principles, and so serve as universal\nlaws of our own dictation. But why then should I subject myself to\nthis principle and that simply as a rational being, thus also\nsubjecting to it all other being endowed with reason? I will allow\nthat no interest urges me to this, for that would not give a\ncategorical imperative, but I must take an interest in it and\ndiscern how this comes to pass; for this properly an \"I ought\" is\nproperly an \"I would,\" valid for every rational being, provided only\nthat reason determined his actions without any hindrance. But for\nbeings that are in addition affected as we are by springs of a\ndifferent kind, namely, sensibility, and in whose case that is not\nalways done which reason alone would do, for these that necessity is\nexpressed only as an \"ought,\" and the subjective necessity is\ndifferent from the objective.\n\nIt seems then as if the moral law, that is, the principle of\nautonomy of the will, were properly speaking only presupposed in the\nidea of freedom, and as if we could not prove its reality and\nobjective necessity independently. In that case we should still have\ngained something considerable by at least determining the true\nprinciple more exactly than had previously been done; but as regards\nits validity and the practical necessity of subjecting oneself to\nit, we should not have advanced a step. For if we were asked why the\nuniversal validity of our maxim as a law must be the condition\nrestricting our actions, and on what we ground the worth which we\nassign to this manner of acting- a worth so great that there cannot be\nany higher interest; and if we were asked further how it happens\nthat it is by this alone a man believes he feels his own personal\nworth, in comparison with which that of an agreeable or disagreeable\ncondition is to be regarded as nothing, to these questions we could\ngive no satisfactory answer.\n\nWe find indeed sometimes that we can take an interest in a\npersonal quality which does not involve any interest of external\ncondition, provided this quality makes us capable of participating\nin the condition in case reason were to effect the allotment; that\nis to say, the mere being worthy of happiness can interest of itself\neven without the motive of participating in this happiness. This\njudgement, however, is in fact only the effect of the importance of\nthe moral law which we before presupposed (when by the idea of freedom\nwe detach ourselves from every empirical interest); but that we\nought to detach ourselves from these interests, i.e., to consider\nourselves as free in action and yet as subject to certain laws, so\nas to find a worth simply in our own person which can compensate us\nfor the loss of everything that gives worth to our condition; this\nwe are not yet able to discern in this way, nor do we see how it is\npossible so to act- in other words, whence the moral law derives its\nobligation.\n\nIt must be freely admitted that there is a sort of circle here\nfrom which it seems impossible to escape. In the order of efficient\ncauses we assume ourselves free, in order that in the order of ends we\nmay conceive ourselves as subject to moral laws: and we afterwards\nconceive ourselves as subject to these laws, because we have\nattributed to ourselves freedom of will: for freedom and\nself-legislation of will are both autonomy and, therefore, are\nreciprocal conceptions, and for this very reason one must not be\nused to explain the other or give the reason of it, but at most only\nlogical purposes to reduce apparently different notions of the same\nobject to one single concept (as we reduce different fractions of\nthe same value to the lowest terms).\n\nOne resource remains to us, namely, to inquire whether we do not\noccupy different points of view when by means of freedom we think\nourselves as causes efficient a priori, and when we form our\nconception of ourselves from our actions as effects which we see\nbefore our eyes.\n\nIt is a remark which needs no subtle reflection to make, but which\nwe may assume that even the commonest understanding can make, although\nit be after its fashion by an obscure discernment of judgement which\nit calls feeling, that all the \"ideas\" that come to us involuntarily\n(as those of the senses) do not enable us to know objects otherwise\nthan as they affect us; so that what they may be in themselves remains\nunknown to us, and consequently that as regards \"ideas\" of this kind\neven with the closest attention and clearness that the understanding\ncan apply to them, we can by them only attain to the knowledge of\nappearances, never to that of things in themselves. As soon as this\ndistinction has once been made (perhaps merely in consequence of the\ndifference observed between the ideas given us from without, and in\nwhich we are passive, and those that we produce simply from ourselves,\nand in which we show our own activity), then it follows of itself that\nwe must admit and assume behind the appearance something else that\nis not an appearance, namely, the things in themselves; although we\nmust admit that as they can never be known to us except as they affect\nus, we can come no nearer to them, nor can we ever know what they\nare in themselves. This must furnish a distinction, however crude,\nbetween a world of sense and the world of understanding, of which\nthe former may be different according to the difference of the\nsensuous impressions in various observers, while the second which is\nits basis always remains the same, Even as to himself, a man cannot\npretend to know what he is in himself from the knowledge he has by\ninternal sensation. For as he does not as it were create himself,\nand does not come by the conception of himself a priori but\nempirically, it naturally follows that he can obtain his knowledge\neven of himself only by the inner sense and, consequently, only\nthrough the appearances of his nature and the way in which his\nconsciousness is affected. At the same time beyond these\ncharacteristics of his own subject, made up of mere appearances, he\nmust necessarily suppose something else as their basis, namely, his\nego, whatever its characteristics in itself may be. Thus in respect to\nmere perception and receptivity of sensations he must reckon himself\nas belonging to the world of sense; but in respect of whatever there\nmay be of pure activity in him (that which reaches consciousness\nimmediately and not through affecting the senses), he must reckon\nhimself as belonging to the intellectual world, of which, however,\nhe has no further knowledge. To such a conclusion the reflecting man\nmust come with respect to all the things which can be presented to\nhim: it is probably to be met with even in persons of the commonest\nunderstanding, who, as is well known, are very much inclined to\nsuppose behind the objects of the senses something else invisible\nand acting of itself. They spoil it, however, by presently\nsensualizing this invisible again; that is to say, wanting to make\nit an object of intuition, so that they do not become a whit the\nwiser.\n\nNow man really finds in himself a faculty by which he\ndistinguishes himself from everything else, even from himself as\naffected by objects, and that is reason. This being pure spontaneity\nis even elevated above the understanding. For although the latter is a\nspontaneity and does not, like sense, merely contain intuitions that\narise when we are affected by things (and are therefore passive),\nyet it cannot produce from its activity any other conceptions than\nthose which merely serve to bring the intuitions of sense under\nrules and, thereby, to unite them in one consciousness, and without\nthis use of the sensibility it could not think at all; whereas, on the\ncontrary, reason shows so pure a spontaneity in the case of what I\ncall ideas [ideal conceptions] that it thereby far transcends\neverything that the sensibility can give it, and exhibits its most\nimportant function in distinguishing the world of sense from that of\nunderstanding, and thereby prescribing the limits of the understanding\nitself.\n\nFor this reason a rational being must regard himself qua\nintelligence (not from the side of his lower faculties) as belonging\nnot to the world of sense, but to that of understanding; hence he\nhas two points of view from which he can regard himself, and recognise\nlaws of the exercise of his faculties, and consequently of all his\nactions: first, so far as he belongs to the world of sense, he finds\nhimself subject to laws of nature (heteronomy); secondly, as belonging\nto the intelligible world, under laws which being independent of\nnature have their foundation not in experience but in reason alone.\n\nAs a rational being, and consequently belonging to the\nintelligible world, man can never conceive the causality of his own\nwill otherwise than on condition of the idea of freedom, for\nindependence of the determinate causes of the sensible world (an\nindependence which reason must always ascribe to itself) is freedom.\nNow the idea of freedom is inseparably connected with the conception\nof autonomy, and this again with the universal principle of morality\nwhich is ideally the foundation of all actions of rational beings,\njust as the law of nature is of all phenomena.\n\nNow the suspicion is removed which we raised above, that there was a\nlatent circle involved in our reasoning from freedom to autonomy,\nand from this to the moral law, viz.: that we laid down the idea of\nfreedom because of the moral law only that we might afterwards in turn\ninfer the latter from freedom, and that consequently we could assign\nno reason at all for this law, but could only [present] it as a\npetitio principii which well disposed minds would gladly concede to\nus, but which we could never put forward as a provable proposition.\nFor now we see that, when we conceive ourselves as free, we transfer\nourselves into the world of understanding as members of it and\nrecognise the autonomy of the will with its consequence, morality;\nwhereas, if we conceive ourselves as under obligation, we consider\nourselves as belonging to the world of sense and at the same time to\nthe world of understanding.\n\n\n\n         How is a Categorical Imperative Possible?\n\n\n\nEvery rational being reckons himself qua intelligence as belonging\nto the world of understanding, and it is simply as an efficient\ncause belonging to that world that he calls his causality a will. On\nthe other side he is also conscious of himself as a part of the\nworld of sense in which his actions, which are mere appearances\n[phenomena] of that causality, are displayed; we cannot, however,\ndiscern how they are possible from this causality which we do not\nknow; but instead of that, these actions as belonging to the\nsensible world must be viewed as determined by other phenomena,\nnamely, desires and inclinations. If therefore I were only a member of\nthe world of understanding, then all my actions would perfectly\nconform to the principle of autonomy of the pure will; if I were\nonly a part of the world of sense, they would necessarily be assumed\nto conform wholly to the natural law of desires and inclinations, in\nother words, to the heteronomy of nature. (The former would rest on\nmorality as the supreme principle, the latter on happiness.) Since,\nhowever, the world of understanding contains the foundation of the\nworld of sense, and consequently of its laws also, and accordingly\ngives the law to my will (which belongs wholly to the world of\nunderstanding) directly, and must be conceived as doing so, it follows\nthat, although on the one side I must regard myself as a being\nbelonging to the world of sense, yet on the other side I must\nrecognize myself as subject as an intelligence to the law of the world\nof understanding, i.e., to reason, which contains this law in the idea\nof freedom, and therefore as subject to the autonomy of the will:\nconsequently I must regard the laws of the world of understanding as\nimperatives for me and the actions which conform to them as duties.\n\nAnd thus what makes categorical imperatives possible is this, that\nthe idea of freedom makes me a member of an intelligible world, in\nconsequence of which, if I were nothing else, all my actions would\nalways conform to the autonomy of the will; but as I at the same\ntime intuite myself as a member of the world of sense, they ought so\nto conform, and this categorical \"ought\" implies a synthetic a\npriori proposition, inasmuch as besides my will as affected by\nsensible desires there is added further the idea of the same will\nbut as belonging to the world of the understanding, pure and practical\nof itself, which contains the supreme condition according to reason of\nthe former will; precisely as to the intuitions of sense there are\nadded concepts of the understanding which of themselves signify\nnothing but regular form in general and in this way synthetic a priori\npropositions become possible, on which all knowledge of physical\nnature rests.\n\nThe practical use of common human reason confirms this reasoning.\nThere is no one, not even the most consummate villain, provided only\nthat he is otherwise accustomed to the use of reason, who, when we set\nbefore him examples of honesty of purpose, of steadfastness in\nfollowing good maxims, of sympathy and general benevolence (even\ncombined with great sacrifices of advantages and comfort), does not\nwish that he might also possess these qualities. Only on account of\nhis inclinations and impulses he cannot attain this in himself, but at\nthe same time he wishes to be free from such inclinations which are\nburdensome to himself. He proves by this that he transfers himself\nin thought with a will free from the impulses of the sensibility\ninto an order of things wholly different from that of his desires in\nthe field of the sensibility; since he cannot expect to obtain by that\nwish any gratification of his desires, nor any position which would\nsatisfy any of his actual or supposable inclinations (for this would\ndestroy the pre-eminence of the very idea which wrests that wish\nfrom him): he can only expect a greater intrinsic worth of his own\nperson. This better person, however, he imagines himself to be when be\ntransfers himself to the point of view of a member of the world of the\nunderstanding, to which he is involuntarily forced by the idea of\nfreedom, i.e., of independence on determining causes of the world of\nsense; and from this point of view he is conscious of a good will,\nwhich by his own confession constitutes the law for the bad will\nthat he possesses as a member of the world of sense- a law whose\nauthority he recognizes while transgressing it. What he morally\n\"ought\" is then what he necessarily \"would,\" as a member of the\nworld of the understanding, and is conceived by him as an \"ought\" only\ninasmuch as he likewise considers himself as a member of the world\nof sense.\n\n\n\n     Of the Extreme Limits of all Practical Philosophy.\n\n\n\nAll men attribute to themselves freedom of will. Hence come all\njudgements upon actions as being such as ought to have been done,\nalthough they have not been done. However, this freedom is not a\nconception of experience, nor can it be so, since it still remains,\neven though experience shows the contrary of what on supposition of\nfreedom are conceived as its necessary consequences. On the other side\nit is equally necessary that everything that takes place should be\nfixedly determined according to laws of nature. This necessity of\nnature is likewise not an empirical conception, just for this\nreason, that it involves the motion of necessity and consequently of a\npriori cognition. But this conception of a system of nature is\nconfirmed by experience; and it must even be inevitably presupposed if\nexperience itself is to be possible, that is, a connected knowledge of\nthe objects of sense resting on general laws. Therefore freedom is\nonly an idea of reason, and its objective reality in itself is\ndoubtful; while nature is a concept of the understanding which proves,\nand must necessarily prove, its reality in examples of experience.\n\nThere arises from this a dialectic of reason, since the freedom\nattributed to the will appears to contradict the necessity of\nnature, and placed between these two ways reason for speculative\npurposes finds the road of physical necessity much more beaten and\nmore appropriate than that of freedom; yet for practical purposes\nthe narrow footpath of freedom is the only one on which it is possible\nto make use of reason in our conduct; hence it is just as impossible\nfor the subtlest philosophy as for the commonest reason of men to\nargue away freedom. Philosophy must then assume that no real\ncontradiction will be found between freedom and physical necessity\nof the same human actions, for it cannot give up the conception of\nnature any more than that of freedom.\n\nNevertheless, even though we should never be able to comprehend\nhow freedom is possible, we must at least remove this apparent\ncontradiction in a convincing manner. For if the thought of freedom\ncontradicts either itself or nature, which is equally necessary, it\nmust in competition with physical necessity be entirely given up.\n\nIt would, however, be impossible to escape this contradiction if the\nthinking subject, which seems to itself free, conceived itself in\nthe same sense or in the very same relation when it calls itself\nfree as when in respect of the same action it assumes itself to be\nsubject to the law of nature. Hence it is an indispensable problem\nof speculative philosophy to show that its illusion respecting the\ncontradiction rests on this, that we think of man in a different sense\nand relation when we call him free and when we regard him as subject\nto the laws of nature as being part and parcel of nature. It must\ntherefore show that not only can both these very well co-exist, but\nthat both must be thought as necessarily united in the same subject,\nsince otherwise no reason could be given why we should burden reason\nwith an idea which, though it may possibly without contradiction be\nreconciled with another that is sufficiently established, yet\nentangles us in a perplexity which sorely embarrasses reason in its\ntheoretic employment. This duty, however, belongs only to\nspeculative philosophy. The philosopher then has no option whether\nhe will remove the apparent contradiction or leave it untouched; for\nin the latter case the theory respecting this would be bonum vacans,\ninto the possession of which the fatalist would have a right to\nenter and chase all morality out of its supposed domain as occupying\nit without title.\n\nWe cannot however as yet say that we are touching the bounds of\npractical philosophy. For the settlement of that controversy does\nnot belong to it; it only demands from speculative reason that it\nshould put an end to the discord in which it entangles itself in\ntheoretical questions, so that practical reason may have rest and\nsecurity from external attacks which might make the ground debatable\non which it desires to build.\n\nThe claims to freedom of will made even by common reason are founded\non the consciousness and the admitted supposition that reason is\nindependent of merely subjectively determined causes which together\nconstitute what belongs to sensation only and which consequently\ncome under the general designation of sensibility. Man considering\nhimself in this way as an intelligence places himself thereby in a\ndifferent order of things and in a relation to determining grounds\nof a wholly different kind when on the one hand he thinks of himself\nas an intelligence endowed with a will, and consequently with\ncausality, and when on the other he perceives himself as a\nphenomenon in the world of sense (as he really is also), and affirms\nthat his causality is subject to external determination according to\nlaws of nature. Now he soon becomes aware that both can hold good,\nnay, must hold good at the same time. For there is not the smallest\ncontradiction in saying that a thing in appearance (belonging to the\nworld of sense) is subject to certain laws, of which the very same\nas a thing or being in itself is independent, and that he must\nconceive and think of himself in this twofold way, rests as to the\nfirst on the consciousness of himself as an object affected through\nthe senses, and as to the second on the consciousness of himself as an\nintelligence, i.e., as independent on sensible impressions in the\nemployment of his reason (in other words as belonging to the world\nof understanding).\n\nHence it comes to pass that man claims the possession of a will\nwhich takes no account of anything that comes under the head of\ndesires and inclinations and, on the contrary, conceives actions as\npossible to him, nay, even as necessary which can only be done by\ndisregarding all desires and sensible inclinations. The causality of\nsuch actions lies in him as an intelligence and in the laws of effects\nand actions [which depend] on the principles of an intelligible world,\nof which indeed he knows nothing more than that in it pure reason\nalone independent of sensibility gives the law; moreover since it is\nonly in that world, as an intelligence, that he is his proper self\n(being as man only the appearance of himself), those laws apply to him\ndirectly and categorically, so that the incitements of inclinations\nand appetites (in other words the whole nature of the world of\nsense) cannot impair the laws of his volition as an intelligence. Nay,\nhe does not even hold himself responsible for the former or ascribe\nthem to his proper self, i.e., his will: he only ascribes to his\nwill any indulgence which he might yield them if he allowed them to\ninfluence his maxims to the prejudice of the rational laws of the\nwill.\n\nWhen practical reason thinks itself into a world of understanding,\nit does not thereby transcend its own limits, as it would if it\ntried to enter it by intuition or sensation. The former is only a\nnegative thought in respect of the world of sense, which does not give\nany laws to reason in determining the will and is positive only in\nthis single point that this freedom as a negative characteristic is at\nthe same time conjoined with a (positive) faculty and even with a\ncausality of reason, which we designate a will, namely a faculty of so\nacting that the principle of the actions shall conform to the\nessential character of a rational motive, i.e., the condition that the\nmaxim have universal validity as a law. But were it to borrow an\nobject of will, that is, a motive, from the world of understanding,\nthen it would overstep its bounds and pretend to be acquainted with\nsomething of which it knows nothing. The conception of a world of\nthe understanding is then only a point of view which reason finds\nitself compelled to take outside the appearances in order to\nconceive itself as practical, which would not be possible if the\ninfluences of the sensibility had a determining power on man, but\nwhich is necessary unless he is to be denied the consciousness of\nhimself as an intelligence and, consequently, as a rational cause,\nenergizing by reason, that is, operating freely. This thought\ncertainly involves the idea of an order and a system of laws different\nfrom that of the mechanism of nature which belongs to the sensible\nworld; and it makes the conception of an intelligible world\nnecessary (that is to say, the whole system of rational beings as\nthings in themselves). But it does not in the least authorize us to\nthink of it further than as to its formal condition only, that is, the\nuniversality of the maxims of the will as laws, and consequently the\nautonomy of the latter, which alone is consistent with its freedom;\nwhereas, on the contrary, all laws that refer to a definite object\ngive heteronomy, which only belongs to laws of nature and can only\napply to the sensible world.\n\nBut reason would overstep all its bounds if it undertook to\nexplain how pure reason can be practical, which would be exactly the\nsame problem as to explain how freedom is possible.\n\nFor we can explain nothing but that which we can reduce to laws, the\nobject of which can be given in some possible experience. But\nfreedom is a mere idea, the objective reality of which can in no\nwise be shown according to laws of nature, and consequently not in any\npossible experience; and for this reason it can never be\ncomprehended or understood, because we cannot support it by any sort\nof example or analogy. It holds good only as a necessary hypothesis of\nreason in a being that believes itself conscious of a will, that is,\nof a faculty distinct from mere desire (namely, a faculty of\ndetermining itself to action as an intelligence, in other words, by\nlaws of reason independently on natural instincts). Now where\ndetermination according to laws of nature ceases, there all\nexplanation ceases also, and nothing remains but defence, i.e., the\nremoval of the objections of those who pretend to have seen deeper\ninto the nature of things, and thereupon boldly declare freedom\nimpossible. We can only point out to them that the supposed\ncontradiction that they have discovered in it arises only from this,\nthat in order to be able to apply the law of nature to human\nactions, they must necessarily consider man as an appearance: then\nwhen we demand of them that they should also think of him qua\nintelligence as a thing in itself, they still persist in considering\nhim in this respect also as an appearance. In this view it would no\ndoubt be a contradiction to suppose the causality of the same\nsubject (that is, his will) to be withdrawn from all the natural\nlaws of the sensible world. But this contradiction disappears, if they\nwould only bethink themselves and admit, as is reasonable, that behind\nthe appearances there must also lie at their root (although hidden)\nthe things in themselves, and that we cannot expect the laws of\nthese to be the same as those that govern their appearances.\n\nThe subjective impossibility of explaining the freedom of the will\nis identical with the impossibility of discovering and explaining an\ninterest * which man can take in the moral law. Nevertheless he does\nactually take an interest in it, the basis of which in us we call\nthe moral feeling, which some have falsely assigned as the standard of\nour moral judgement, whereas it must rather be viewed as the\nsubjective effect that the law exercises on the will, the objective\nprinciple of which is furnished by reason alone.\n\n\n\n* Interest is that by which reason becomes practical, i.e., a cause\ndetermining the will. Hence we say of rational beings only that they\ntake an interest in a thing; irrational beings only feel sensual\nappetites. Reason takes a direct interest in action then only when the\nuniversal validity of its maxims is alone sufficient to determine\nthe will. Such an interest alone is pure. But if it can determine\nthe will only by means of another object of desire or on the\nsuggestion of a particular feeling of the subject, then reason takes\nonly an indirect interest in the action, and, as reason by itself\nwithout experience cannot discover either objects of the will or a\nspecial feeling actuating it, this latter interest would only be\nempirical and not a pure rational interest. The logical interest of\nreason (namely, to extend its insight) is never direct, but\npresupposes purposes for which reason is employed.\n\n\n\nIn order indeed that a rational being who is also affected through\nthe senses should will what reason alone directs such beings that they\nought to will, it is no doubt requisite that reason should have a\npower to infuse a feeling of pleasure or satisfaction in the\nfulfilment of duty, that is to say, that it should have a causality by\nwhich it determines the sensibility according to its own principles.\nBut it is quite impossible to discern, i.e., to make it intelligible a\npriori, how a mere thought, which itself contains nothing sensible,\ncan itself produce a sensation of pleasure or pain; for this is a\nparticular kind of causality of which as of every other causality we\ncan determine nothing whatever a priori; we must only consult\nexperience about it. But as this cannot supply us with any relation of\ncause and effect except between two objects of experience, whereas\nin this case, although indeed the effect produced lies within\nexperience, yet the cause is supposed to be pure reason acting through\nmere ideas which offer no object to experience, it follows that for us\nmen it is quite impossible to explain how and why the universality\nof the maxim as a law, that is, morality, interests. This only is\ncertain, that it is not because it interests us that it has validity\nfor us (for that would be heteronomy and dependence of practical\nreason on sensibility, namely, on a feeling as its principle, in which\ncase it could never give moral laws), but that it interests us because\nit is valid for us as men, inasmuch as it had its source in our will\nas intelligences, in other words, in our proper self, and what belongs\nto mere appearance is necessarily subordinated by reason to the nature\nof the thing in itself.\n\nThe question then, \"How a categorical imperative is possible,\" can\nbe answered to this extent, that we can assign the only hypothesis\non which it is possible, namely, the idea of freedom; and we can\nalso discern the necessity of this hypothesis, and this is\nsufficient for the practical exercise of reason, that is, for the\nconviction of the validity of this imperative, and hence of the\nmoral law; but how this hypothesis itself is possible can never be\ndiscerned by any human reason. On the hypothesis, however, that the\nwill of an intelligence is free, its autonomy, as the essential formal\ncondition of its determination, is a necessary consequence.\nMoreover, this freedom of will is not merely quite possible as a\nhypothesis (not involving any contradiction to the principle of\nphysical necessity in the connexion of the phenomena of the sensible\nworld) as speculative philosophy can show: but further, a rational\nbeing who is conscious of causality through reason, that is to say, of\na will (distinct from desires), must of necessity make it practically,\nthat is, in idea, the condition of all his voluntary actions. But to\nexplain how pure reason can be of itself practical without the aid\nof any spring of action that could be derived from any other source,\ni.e., how the mere principle of the universal validity of all its\nmaxims as laws (which would certainly be the form of a pure\npractical reason) can of itself supply a spring, without any matter\n(object) of the will in which one could antecedently take any\ninterest; and how it can produce an interest which would be called\npurely moral; or in other words, how pure reason can be practical-\nto explain this is beyond the power of human reason, and all the\nlabour and pains of seeking an explanation of it are lost.\n\nIt is just the same as if I sought to find out how freedom itself is\npossible as the causality of a will. For then I quit the ground of\nphilosophical explanation, and I have no other to go upon. I might\nindeed revel in the world of intelligences which still remains to\nme, but although I have an idea of it which is well founded, yet I\nhave not the least knowledge of it, nor an I ever attain to such\nknowledge with all the efforts of my natural faculty of reason. It\nsignifies only a something that remains over when I have eliminated\neverything belonging to the world of sense from the actuating\nprinciples of my will, serving merely to keep in bounds the\nprinciple of motives taken from the field of sensibility; fixing its\nlimits and showing that it does not contain all in all within\nitself, but that there is more beyond it; but this something more I\nknow no further. Of pure reason which frames this ideal, there remains\nafter the abstraction of all matter, i.e., knowledge of objects,\nnothing but the form, namely, the practical law of the universality of\nthe maxims, and in conformity with this conception of reason in\nreference to a pure world of understanding as a possible efficient\ncause, that is a cause determining the will. There must here be a\ntotal absence of springs; unless this idea of an intelligible world is\nitself the spring, or that in which reason primarily takes an\ninterest; but to make this intelligible is precisely the problem\nthat we cannot solve.\n\nHere now is the extreme limit of all moral inquiry, and it is of\ngreat importance to determine it even on this account, in order that\nreason may not on the one hand, to the prejudice of morals, seek about\nin the world of sense for the supreme motive and an interest\ncomprehensible but empirical; and on the other hand, that it may not\nimpotently flap its wings without being able to move in the (for it)\nempty space of transcendent concepts which we call the intelligible\nworld, and so lose itself amidst chimeras. For the rest, the idea of a\npure world of understanding as a system of all intelligences, and to\nwhich we ourselves as rational beings belong (although we are likewise\non the other side members of the sensible world), this remains\nalways a useful and legitimate idea for the purposes of rational\nbelief, although all knowledge stops at its threshold, useful, namely,\nto produce in us a lively interest in the moral law by means of the\nnoble ideal of a universal kingdom of ends in themselves (rational\nbeings), to which we can belong as members then only when we carefully\nconduct ourselves according to the maxims of freedom as if they were\nlaws of nature.\n\n\n\n                   Concluding Remark\n\n\n\nThe speculative employment of reason with respect to nature leads to\nthe absolute necessity of some supreme cause of the world: the\npractical employment of reason with a view to freedom leads also to\nabsolute necessity, but only of the laws of the actions of a\nrational being as such. Now it is an essential principle of reason,\nhowever employed, to push its knowledge to a consciousness of its\nnecessity (without which it would not be rational knowledge). It is,\nhowever, an equally essential restriction of the same reason that it\ncan neither discern the necessity of what is or what happens, nor of\nwhat ought to happen, unless a condition is supposed on which it is or\nhappens or ought to happen. In this way, however, by the constant\ninquiry for the condition, the satisfaction of reason is only\nfurther and further postponed. Hence it unceasingly seeks the\nunconditionally necessary and finds itself forced to assume it,\nalthough without any means of making it comprehensible to itself,\nhappy enough if only it can discover a conception which agrees with\nthis assumption. It is therefore no fault in our deduction of the\nsupreme principle of morality, but an objection that should be made to\nhuman reason in general, that it cannot enable us to conceive the\nabsolute necessity of an unconditional practical law (such as the\ncategorical imperative must be). It cannot be blamed for refusing to\nexplain this necessity by a condition, that is to say, by means of\nsome interest assumed as a basis, since the law would then cease to be\na supreme law of reason. And thus while we do not comprehend the\npractical unconditional necessity of the moral imperative, we yet\ncomprehend its incomprehensibility, and this is all that can be fairly\ndemanded of a philosophy which strives to carry its principles up to\nthe very limit of human reason.\n\n\n                             THE END","title":"Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":30798}