{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_5683/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_5683","id":"gutenberg_5683","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/5683","summary":null,"tags":["Banned Books from Anne Haight's list","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Ethics","Philosophy, German","Practical reason"],"text":"Produced by Matthew Stapleton\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\t\t\t\t 1788\n\n\t\t   THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON\n\n\t\t\t   by Immanuel Kant\n\n\t\ttranslated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott\n\n\nPREFACE.\n\nThis work is called the Critique of Practical Reason, not of the\npure practical reason, although its parallelism with the speculative\ncritique would seem to require the latter term. The reason of this\nappears sufficiently from the treatise itself. Its business is to show\nthat there is pure practical reason, and for this purpose it\ncriticizes the entire practical faculty of reason. If it succeeds in\nthis, it has no need to criticize the pure faculty itself in order\nto see whether reason in making such a claim does not presumptuously\noverstep itself (as is the case with the speculative reason). For\nif, as pure reason, it is actually practical, it proves its own\nreality and that of its concepts by fact, and all disputation\nagainst the possibility of its being real is futile.\n\nWith this faculty, transcendental freedom is also established;\nfreedom, namely, in that absolute sense in which speculative reason\nrequired it in its use of the concept of causality in order to\nescape the antinomy into which it inevitably falls, when in the\nchain of cause and effect it tries to think the unconditioned.\nSpeculative reason could only exhibit this concept (of freedom)\nproblematically as not impossible to thought, without assuring it\nany objective reality, and merely lest the supposed impossibility of\nwhat it must at least allow to be thinkable should endanger its very\nbeing and plunge it into an abyss of scepticism.\n\nInasmuch as the reality of the concept of freedom is proved by an\napodeictic law of practical reason, it is the keystone of the whole\nsystem of pure reason, even the speculative, and all other concepts\n(those of God and immortality) which, as being mere ideas, remain in\nit unsupported, now attach themselves to this concept, and by it\nobtain consistence and objective reality; that is to say, their\npossibility is proved by the fact that freedom actually exists, for\nthis idea is revealed by the moral law.\n\nFreedom, however, is the only one of all the ideas of the\nspeculative reason of which we know the possibility a priori (without,\nhowever, understanding it), because it is the condition of the moral\nlaw which we know. * The ideas of God and immortality, however, are\nnot conditions of the moral law, but only conditions of the necessary\nobject of a will determined by this law; that is to say, conditions of\nthe practical use of our pure reason. Hence, with respect to these\nideas, we cannot affirm that we know and understand, I will not say\nthe actuality, but even the possibility of them. However they are\nthe conditions of the application of the morally determined will to\nits object, which is given to it a priori, viz., the summum bonum.\nConsequently in this practical point of view their possibility must be\nassumed, although we cannot theoretically know and understand it. To\njustify this assumption it is sufficient, in a practical point of\nview, that they contain no intrinsic impossibility (contradiction).\nHere we have what, as far as speculative reason is concerned, is a\nmerely subjective principle of assent, which, however, is\nobjectively valid for a reason equally pure but practical, and this\nprinciple, by means of the concept of freedom, assures objective\nreality and authority to the ideas of God and immortality. Nay,\nthere is a subjective necessity (a need of pure reason) to assume\nthem. Nevertheless the theoretical knowledge of reason is not hereby\nenlarged, but only the possibility is given, which heretofore was\nmerely a problem and now becomes assertion, and thus the practical use\nof reason is connected with the elements of theoretical reason. And\nthis need is not a merely hypothetical one for the arbitrary\npurposes of speculation, that we must assume something if we wish in\nspeculation to carry reason to its utmost limits, but it is a need\nwhich has the force of law to assume something without which that\ncannot be which we must inevitably set before us as the aim of our\naction.\n\n\n\n                                                    {PREFACE ^paragraph 5}\n\n* Lest any one should imagine that he finds an inconsistency here\nwhen I call freedom the condition of the moral law, and hereafter\nmaintain in the treatise itself that the moral law is the condition\nunder which we can first become conscious of freedom, I will merely\nremark that freedom is the ratio essendi of the moral law, while the\nmoral law is the ratio cognoscendi of freedom. For had not the moral\nlaw been previously distinctly thought in our reason, we should\nnever consider ourselves justified in assuming such a thing as\nfreedom, although it be not contradictory. But were there no freedom\nit would be impossible to trace the moral law in ourselves at all.\n\n\n\nIt would certainly be more satisfactory to our speculative reason if\nit could solve these problems for itself without this circuit and\npreserve the solution for practical use as a thing to be referred\nto, but in fact our faculty of speculation is not so well provided.\nThose who boast of such high knowledge ought not to keep it back,\nbut to exhibit it publicly that it may be tested and appreciated. They\nwant to prove: very good, let them prove; and the critical\nphilosophy lays its arms at their feet as the victors. Quid statis?\nNolint. Atqui licet esse beatis. As they then do not in fact choose to\ndo so, probably because they cannot, we must take up these arms\nagain in order to seek in the mortal use of reason, and to base on\nthis, the notions of God, freedom, and immortality, the possibility of\nwhich speculation cannot adequately prove.\n\nHere first is explained the enigma of the critical philosophy, viz.:\nhow we deny objective reality to the supersensible use of the\ncategories in speculation and yet admit this reality with respect to\nthe objects of pure practical reason. This must at first seem\ninconsistent as long as this practical use is only nominally known.\nBut when, by a thorough analysis of it, one becomes aware that the\nreality spoken of does not imply any theoretical determination of\nthe categories and extension of our knowledge to the supersensible;\nbut that what is meant is that in this respect an object belongs to\nthem, because either they are contained in the necessary determination\nof the will a priori, or are inseparably connected with its object;\nthen this inconsistency disappears, because the use we make of these\nconcepts is different from what speculative reason requires. On the\nother hand, there now appears an unexpected and very satisfactory\nproof of the consistency of the speculative critical philosophy. For\nwhereas it insisted that the objects of experience as such,\nincluding our own subject, have only the value of phenomena, while\nat the same time things in themselves must be supposed as their basis,\nso that not everything supersensible was to be regarded as a fiction\nand its concept as empty; so now practical reason itself, without\nany concert with the speculative, assures reality to a supersensible\nobject of the category of causality, viz., freedom, although (as\nbecomes a practical concept) only for practical use; and this\nestablishes on the evidence of a fact that which in the former case\ncould only be conceived. By this the strange but certain doctrine of\nthe speculative critical philosophy, that the thinking subject is to\nitself in internal intuition only a phenomenon, obtains in the\ncritical examination of the practical reason its full confirmation,\nand that so thoroughly that we should be compelled to adopt this\ndoctrine, even if the former had never proved it at all. *\n\n\n\n                                                   {PREFACE ^paragraph 10}\n\n* The union of causality as freedom with causality as rational\nmechanism, the former established by the moral law, the latter by\nthe law of nature in the same subject, namely, man, is impossible,\nunless we conceive him with reference to the former as a being in\nhimself, and with reference to the latter as a phenomenon- the\nformer in pure consciousness, the latter in empirical consciousness.\nOtherwise reason inevitably contradicts itself.\n\n\n\nBy this also I can understand why the most considerable objections\nwhich I have as yet met with against the Critique turn about these two\npoints, namely, on the one side, the objective reality of the\ncategories as applied to noumena, which is in the theoretical\ndepartment of knowledge denied, in the practical affirmed; and on\nthe other side, the paradoxical demand to regard oneself qua subject\nof freedom as a noumenon, and at the same time from the point of\nview of physical nature as a phenomenon in one's own empirical\nconsciousness; for as long as one has formed no definite notions of\nmorality and freedom, one could not conjecture on the one side what\nwas intended to be the noumenon, the basis of the alleged\nphenomenon, and on the other side it seemed doubtful whether it was at\nall possible to form any notion of it, seeing that we had previously\nassigned all the notions of the pure understanding in its\ntheoretical use exclusively to phenomena. Nothing but a detailed\ncriticism of the practical reason can remove all this\nmisapprehension and set in a clear light the consistency which\nconstitutes its greatest merit.\n\nSo much by way of justification of the proceeding by which, in\nthis work, the notions and principles of pure speculative reason which\nhave already undergone their special critical examination are, now and\nthen, again subjected to examination. This would not in other cases be\nin accordance with the systematic process by which a science is\nestablished, since matters which have been decided ought only to be\ncited and not again discussed. In this case, however, it was not\nonly allowable but necessary, because reason is here considered in\ntransition to a different use of these concepts from what it had\nmade of them before. Such a transition necessitates a comparison of\nthe old and the new usage, in order to distinguish well the new path\nfrom the old one and, at the same time, to allow their connection to\nbe observed. Accordingly considerations of this kind, including\nthose which are once more directed to the concept of freedom in the\npractical use of the pure reason, must not be regarded as an\ninterpolation serving only to fill up the gaps in the critical\nsystem of speculative reason (for this is for its own purpose\ncomplete), or like the props and buttresses which in a hastily\nconstructed building are often added afterwards; but as true members\nwhich make the connexion of the system plain, and show us concepts,\nhere presented as real, which there could only be presented\nproblematically. This remark applies especially to the concept of\nfreedom, respecting which one cannot but observe with surprise that so\nmany boast of being able to understand it quite well and to explain\nits possibility, while they regard it only psychologically, whereas if\nthey had studied it in a transcendental point of view, they must\nhave recognized that it is not only indispensable as a problematical\nconcept, in the complete use of speculative reason, but also quite\nincomprehensible; and if they afterwards came to consider its\npractical use, they must needs have come to the very mode of\ndetermining the principles of this, to which they are now so loth to\nassent. The concept of freedom is the stone of stumbling for all\nempiricists, but at the same time the key to the loftiest practical\nprinciples for critical moralists, who perceive by its means that they\nmust necessarily proceed by a rational method. For this reason I beg\nthe reader not to pass lightly over what is said of this concept at\nthe end of the Analytic.\n\nI must leave it to those who are acquainted with works of this\nkind to judge whether such a system as that of the practical reason,\nwhich is here developed from the critical examination of it, has\ncost much or little trouble, especially in seeking not to miss the\ntrue point of view from which the whole can be rightly sketched. It\npresupposes, indeed, the Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of\nMorals, but only in so far as this gives a preliminary acquaintance\nwith the principle of duty, and assigns and justifies a definite\nformula thereof; in other respects it is independent. * It results\nfrom the nature of this practical faculty itself that the complete\nclassification of all practical sciences cannot be added, as in the\ncritique of the speculative reason. For it is not possible to define\nduties specially, as human duties, with a view to their\nclassification, until the subject of this definition (viz., man) is\nknown according to his actual nature, at least so far as is\nnecessary with respect to duty; this, however, does not belong to a\ncritical examination of the practical reason, the business of which is\nonly to assign in a complete manner the principles of its possibility,\nextent, and limits, without special reference to human nature. The\nclassification then belongs to the system of science, not to the\nsystem of criticism.\n\n                                                   {PREFACE ^paragraph 15}\n\n\n\n* A reviewer who wanted to find some fault with this work has hit\nthe truth better, perhaps, than he thought, when he says that no new\nprinciple of morality is set forth in it, but only a new formula.\nBut who would think of introducing a new principle of all morality and\nmaking himself as it were the first discoverer of it, just as if all\nthe world before him were ignorant what duty was or had been in\nthorough-going error? But whoever knows of what importance to a\nmathematician a formula is, which defines accurately what is to be\ndone to work a problem, will not think that a formula is insignificant\nand useless which does the same for all duty in general.\n\n\n\nIn the second part of the Analytic I have given, as I trust, a\nsufficient answer to the objection of a truth-loving and acute\ncritic * of the Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals- a\ncritic always worthy of respect- the objection, namely, that the\nnotion of good was not established before the moral principle, as he\nthinks it ought to have been. *(2) I have also had regard to many of\nthe objections which have reached me from men who show that they have\nat heart the discovery of the truth, and I shall continue to do so\n(for those who have only their old system before their eyes, and who\nhave already settled what is to be approved or disapproved, do not\ndesire any explanation which might stand in the way of their own\nprivate opinion.)\n\n\n\n                                                   {PREFACE ^paragraph 20}\n\n* [See Kant's \"Das mag in der Theoric ricktig seyn,\" etc. Werke,\nvol. vii, p. 182.]\n\n*(2) It might also have been objected to me that I have not first\ndefined the notion of the faculty of desire, or of the feeling of\nPleasure, although this reproach would be unfair, because this\ndefinition might reasonably be presupposed as given in psychology.\nHowever, the definition there given might be such as to found the\ndetermination of the faculty of desire on the feeling of pleasure\n(as is commonly done), and thus the supreme principle of practical\nphilosophy would be necessarily made empirical, which, however,\nremains to be proved and in this critique is altogether refuted. It\nwill, therefore, give this definition here in such a manner as it\nought to be given, in order to leave this contested point open at\nthe beginning, as it should be. LIFE is the faculty a being has of\nacting according to laws of the faculty of desire. The faculty of\nDESIRE is the being's faculty of becoming by means of its ideas the\ncause of the actual existence of the objects of these ideas.\nPLEASURE is the idea of the agreement of the object, or the action\nwith the subjective conditions of life, i.e., with the faculty of\ncausality of an idea in respect of the actuality of its object (or\nwith the determination of the forces of the subject to action which\nproduces it). I have no further need for the purposes of this critique\nof notions borrowed from psychology; the critique itself supplies\nthe rest. It is easily seen that the question whether the faculty of\ndesire is always based on pleasure, or whether under certain\nconditions pleasure only follows the determination of desire, is by\nthis definition left undecided, for it is composed only of terms\nbelonging to the pure understanding, i.e., of categories which contain\nnothing empirical. Such precaution is very desirable in all philosophy\nand yet is often neglected; namely, not to prejudge questions by\nadventuring definitions before the notion has been completely\nanalysed, which is often very late. It may be observed through the\nwhole course of the critical philosophy (of the theoretical as well as\nthe practical reason) that frequent opportunity offers of supplying\ndefects in the old dogmatic method of philosophy, and of correcting\nerrors which are not observed until we make such rational use of these\nnotions viewing them as a whole.\n\n\n\nWhen we have to study a particular faculty of the human mind in\nits sources, its content, and its limits; then from the nature of\nhuman knowledge we must begin with its parts, with an accurate and\ncomplete exposition of them; complete, namely, so far as is possible\nin the present state of our knowledge of its elements. But there is\nanother thing to be attended to which is of a more philosophical and\narchitectonic character, namely, to grasp correctly the idea of the\nwhole, and from thence to get a view of all those parts as mutually\nrelated by the aid of pure reason, and by means of their derivation\nfrom the concept of the whole. This is only possible through the\nmost intimate acquaintance with the system; and those who find the\nfirst inquiry too troublesome, and do not think it worth their while\nto attain such an acquaintance, cannot reach the second stage, namely,\nthe general view, which is a synthetical return to that which had\npreviously been given analytically. It is no wonder then if they\nfind inconsistencies everywhere, although the gaps which these\nindicate are not in the system itself, but in their own incoherent\ntrain of thought.\n\nI have no fear, as regards this treatise, of the reproach that I\nwish to introduce a new language, since the sort of knowledge here\nin question has itself somewhat of an everyday character. Nor even\nin the case of the former critique could this reproach occur to anyone\nwho had thought it through and not merely turned over the leaves. To\ninvent new words where the language has no lack of expressions for\ngiven notions is a childish effort to distinguish oneself from the\ncrowd, if not by new and true thoughts, yet by new patches on the\nold garment. If, therefore, the readers of that work know any more\nfamiliar expressions which are as suitable to the thought as those\nseem to me to be, or if they think they can show the futility of these\nthoughts themselves and hence that of the expression, they would, in\nthe first case, very much oblige me, for I only desire to be\nunderstood: and, in the second case, they would deserve well of\nphilosophy. But, as long as these thoughts stand, I very much doubt\nthat suitable and yet more common expressions for them can be found. *\n\n                                                   {PREFACE ^paragraph 25}\n\n\n\n* I am more afraid in the present treatise of occasional\nmisconception in respect of some expressions which I have chosen\nwith the greatest care in order that the notion to which they point\nmay not be missed. Thus, in the table of categories of the Practical\nreason under the title of Modality, the Permitted, and forbidden (in a\npractical objective point of view, possible and impossible) have\nalmost the same meaning in common language as the next category,\nduty and contrary to duty. Here, however, the former means what\ncoincides with, or contradicts, a merely possible practical precept\n(for example, the solution of all problems of geometry and mechanics);\nthe latter, what is similarly related to a law actually present in the\nreason; and this distinction is not quite foreign even to common\nlanguage, although somewhat unusual. For example, it is forbidden to\nan orator, as such, to forge new words or constructions; in a\ncertain degree this is permitted to a poet; in neither case is there\nany question of duty. For if anyone chooses to forfeit his\nreputation as an orator, no one can prevent him. We have here only\nto do with the distinction of imperatives into problematical,\nassertorial, and apodeictic. Similarly in the note in which I have\npared the moral ideas of practical perfection in different\nphilosophical schools, I have distinguished the idea of wisdom from\nthat of holiness, although I have stated that essentially and\nobjectively they are the same. But in that place I understand by the\nformer only that wisdom to which man (the Stoic) lays claim; therefore\nI take it subjectively as an attribute alleged to belong to man.\n(Perhaps the expression virtue, with which also the Stoic made great show,\nwould better mark the characteristic of his school.) The expression of\na postulate of pure practical reason might give most occasion to\nmisapprehension in case the reader confounded it with the\nsignification of the postulates in pure mathematics, which carry\napodeictic certainty with them. These, however, postulate the\npossibility of an action, the object of which has been previously\nrecognized a priori in theory as possible, and that with perfect\ncertainty. But the former postulates the possibility of an object\nitself (God and the immortality of the soul) from apodeictic practical\nlaws, and therefore only for the purposes of a practical reason.\nThis certainty of the postulated possibility then is not at all\ntheoretic, and consequently not apodeictic; that is to say, it is\nnot a known necessity as regards the object, but a necessary\nsupposition as regards the subject, necessary for the obedience to its\nobjective but practical laws. It is, therefore, merely a necessary\nhypothesis. I could find no better expression for this rational\nnecessity, which is subjective, but yet true and unconditional.\n\n\n\nIn this manner, then, the a priori principles of two faculties of\nthe mind, the faculty of cognition and that of desire, would be\nfound and determined as to the conditions, extent, and limits of their\nuse, and thus a sure foundation be paid for a scientific system of\nphilosophy, both theoretic and practical.\n\nNothing worse could happen to these labours than that anyone\nshould make the unexpected discovery that there neither is, nor can\nbe, any a priori knowledge at all. But there is no danger of this.\nThis would be the same thing as if one sought to prove by reason\nthat there is no reason. For we only say that we know something by\nreason, when we are conscious that we could have known it, even if\nit had not been given to us in experience; hence rational knowledge\nand knowledge a priori are one and the same. It is a clear\ncontradiction to try to extract necessity from a principle of\nexperience (ex pumice aquam), and to try by this to give a judgement\ntrue universality (without which there is no rational inference, not\neven inference from analogy, which is at least a presumed universality\nand objective necessity). To substitute subjective necessity, that is,\ncustom, for objective, which exists only in a priori judgements, is to\ndeny to reason the power of judging about the object, i.e., of knowing\nit, and what belongs to it. It implies, for example, that we must\nnot say of something which often or always follows a certain\nantecedent state that we can conclude from this to that (for this\nwould imply objective necessity and the notion of an a priori\nconnexion), but only that we may expect similar cases (just as animals\ndo), that is that we reject the notion of cause altogether as false\nand a mere delusion. As to attempting to remedy this want of objective\nand consequently universal validity by saying that we can see no\nground for attributing any other sort of knowledge to other rational\nbeings, if this reasoning were valid, our ignorance would do more\nfor the enlargement of our knowledge than all our meditation. For,\nthen, on this very ground that we have no knowledge of any other\nrational beings besides man, we should have a right to suppose them to\nbe of the same nature as we know ourselves to be: that is, we should\nreally know them. I omit to mention that universal assent does not\nprove the objective validity of a judgement (i.e., its validity as a\ncognition), and although this universal assent should accidentally\nhappen, it could furnish no proof of agreement with the object; on the\ncontrary, it is the objective validity which alone constitutes the\nbasis of a necessary universal consent.\n\n                                                   {PREFACE ^paragraph 30}\n\nHume would be quite satisfied with this system of universal\nempiricism, for, as is well known, he desired nothing more than\nthat, instead of ascribing any objective meaning to the necessity in\nthe concept of cause, a merely subjective one should be assumed, viz.,\ncustom, in order to deny that reason could judge about God, freedom,\nand immortality; and if once his principles were granted, he was\ncertainly well able to deduce his conclusions therefrom, with all\nlogical coherence. But even Hume did not make his empiricism so\nuniversal as to include mathematics. He holds the principles of\nmathematics to be analytical; and if his were correct, they would\ncertainly be apodeictic also: but we could not infer from this that\nreason has the faculty of forming apodeictic judgements in\nphilosophy also- that is to say, those which are synthetical\njudgements, like the judgement of causality. But if we adopt a\nuniversal empiricism, then mathematics will be included.\n\nNow if this science is in contradiction with a reason that admits\nonly empirical principles, as it inevitably is in the antinomy in\nwhich mathematics prove the infinite divisibility of space, which\nempiricism cannot admit; then the greatest possible evidence of\ndemonstration is in manifest contradiction with the alleged\nconclusions from experience, and we are driven to ask, like\nCheselden's blind patient, \"Which deceives me, sight or touch?\" (for\nempiricism is based on a necessity felt, rationalism on a necessity\nseen). And thus universal empiricism reveals itself as absolute\nscepticism. It is erroneous to attribute this in such an unqualified\nsense to Hume, * since he left at least one certain touchstone (which\ncan only be found in a priori principles), although experience\nconsists not only of feelings, but also of judgements.\n\n\n\n* Names that designate the followers of a sect have always been\naccompanied with much injustice; just as if one said, \"N is an\nIdealist.\" For although he not only admits, but even insists, that our\nideas of external things have actual objects of external things\ncorresponding to them, yet he holds that the form of the intuition\ndoes not depend on them but on the human mind.\n\n\n\n                                                   {PREFACE ^paragraph 35}\n\nHowever, as in this philosophical and critical age such empiricism\ncan scarcely be serious, and it is probably put forward only as an\nintellectual exercise and for the purpose of putting in a clearer\nlight, by contrast, the necessity of rational a priori principles,\nwe can only be grateful to those who employ themselves in this\notherwise uninstructive labour.\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n                     INTRODUCTION.\n\n\n\n     Of the Idea of a Critique of Practical Reason.\n\n\n\nThe theoretical use of reason was concerned with objects of the\ncognitive faculty only, and a critical examination of it with\nreference to this use applied properly only to the pure faculty of\ncognition; because this raised the suspicion, which was afterwards\nconfirmed, that it might easily pass beyond its limits, and be lost\namong unattainable objects, or even contradictory notions. It is quite\ndifferent with the practical use of reason. In this, reason is\nconcerned with the grounds of determination of the will, which is a\nfaculty either to produce objects corresponding to ideas, or to\ndetermine ourselves to the effecting of such objects (whether the\nphysical power is sufficient or not); that is, to determine our\ncausality. For here, reason can at least attain so far as to determine\nthe will, and has always objective reality in so far as it is the\nvolition only that is in question. The first question here then is\nwhether pure reason of itself alone suffices to determine the will, or\nwhether it can be a ground of determination only as dependent on\nempirical conditions. Now, here there comes in a notion of causality\njustified by the critique of the pure reason, although not capable\nof being presented empirically, viz., that of freedom; and if we can\nnow discover means of proving that this property does in fact belong\nto the human will (and so to the will of all rational beings), then it\nwill not only be shown that pure reason can be practical, but that\nit alone, and not reason empirically limited, is indubitably\npractical; consequently, we shall have to make a critical examination,\nnot of pure practical reason, but only of practical reason\ngenerally. For when once pure reason is shown to exist, it needs no\ncritical examination. For reason itself contains the standard for\nthe critical examination of every use of it. The critique, then, of\npractical reason generally is bound to prevent the empirically\nconditioned reason from claiming exclusively to furnish the ground\nof determination of the will. If it is proved that there is a\n[practical] reason, its employment is alone immanent; the\nempirically conditioned use, which claims supremacy, is on the\ncontrary transcendent and expresses itself in demands and precepts\nwhich go quite beyond its sphere. This is just the opposite of what\nmight be said of pure reason in its speculative employment.\n\nHowever, as it is still pure reason, the knowledge of which is\nhere the foundation of its practical employment, the general outline\nof the classification of a critique of practical reason must be\narranged in accordance with that of the speculative. We must, then,\nhave the Elements and the Methodology of it; and in the former an\nAnalytic as the rule of truth, and a Dialectic as the exposition and\ndissolution of the illusion in the judgements of practical reason. But\nthe order in the subdivision of the Analytic will be the reverse of\nthat in the critique of the pure speculative reason. For, in the\npresent case, we shall commence with the principles and proceed to the\nconcepts, and only then, if possible, to the senses; whereas in the\ncase of the speculative reason we began with the senses and had to end\nwith the principles. The reason of this lies again in this: that now\nwe have to do with a will, and have to consider reason, not in its\nrelation to objects, but to this will and its causality. We must,\nthen, begin with the principles of a causality not empirically\nconditioned, after which the attempt can be made to establish our\nnotions of the determining grounds of such a will, of their\napplication to objects, and finally to the subject and its sense\nfaculty. We necessarily begin with the law of causality from\nfreedom, that is, with a pure practical principle, and this determines\nthe objects to which alone it can be applied.\n\nBOOK_1|CHAPTER_1\n\n                    FIRST PART.\n\n\n\n         ELEMENTS OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON.\n\n\n\n    BOOK I. The Analytic of Pure Practical Reason.\n\n\n\n CHAPTER I. Of the Principles of Pure Practical Reason.\n\n                                           {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 5}\n\n\n\n                    I. DEFINITION.\n\n\n\nPractical principles are propositions which contain a general\ndetermination of the will, having under it several practical rules.\nThey are subjective, or maxims, when the condition is regarded by\nthe subject as valid only for his own will, but are objective, or\npractical laws, when the condition is recognized as objective, that\nis, valid for the will of every rational being.\n\n\n\n                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 10}\n\n                       REMARK.\n\n\n\nSupposing that pure reason contains in itself a practical motive,\nthat is, one adequate to determine the will, then there are\npractical laws; otherwise all practical principles will be mere\nmaxims. In case the will of a rational being is pathologically\naffected, there may occur a conflict of the maxims with the\npractical laws recognized by itself. For example, one may make it\nhis maxim to let no injury pass unrevenged, and yet he may see that\nthis is not a practical law, but only his own maxim; that, on the\ncontrary, regarded as being in one and the same maxim a rule for the\nwill of every rational being, it must contradict itself. In natural\nphilosophy the principles of what happens, (e.g., the principle of\nequality of action and reaction in the communication of motion) are at\nthe same time laws of nature; for the use of reason there is\ntheoretical and determined by the nature of the object. In practical\nphilosophy, i.e., that which has to do only with the grounds of\ndetermination of the will, the principles which a man makes for\nhimself are not laws by which one is inevitably bound; because\nreason in practical matters has to do with the subject, namely, with\nthe faculty of desire, the special character of which may occasion\nvariety in the rule. The practical rule is always a product of reason,\nbecause it prescribes action as a means to the effect. But in the case\nof a being with whom reason does not of itself determine the will,\nthis rule is an imperative, i.e., a rule characterized by \"shall,\"\nwhich expresses the objective necessitation of the action and\nsignifies that, if reason completely determined the will, the action\nwould inevitably take place according to this rule. Imperatives,\ntherefore, are objectively valid, and are quite distinct from\nmaxims, which are subjective principles. The former either determine\nthe conditions of the causality of the rational being as an\nefficient cause, i.e., merely in reference to the effect and the means\nof attaining it; or they determine the will only, whether it is\nadequate to the effect or not. The former would be hypothetical\nimperatives, and contain mere precepts of skill; the latter, on the\ncontrary, would be categorical, and would alone be practical laws.\nThus maxims are principles, but not imperatives. Imperatives\nthemselves, however, when they are conditional (i.e., do not determine\nthe will simply as will, but only in respect to a desired effect, that\nis, when they are hypothetical imperatives), are practical precepts\nbut not laws. Laws must be sufficient to determine the will as will,\neven before I ask whether I have power sufficient for a desired\neffect, or the means necessary to produce it; hence they are\ncategorical: otherwise they are not laws at all, because the necessity\nis wanting, which, if it is to be practical, must be independent of\nconditions which are pathological and are therefore only\ncontingently connected with the will. Tell a man, for example, that he\nmust be industrious and thrifty in youth, in order that he may not\nwant in old age; this is a correct and important practical precept\nof the will. But it is easy to see that in this case the will is\ndirected to something else which it is presupposed that it desires;\nand as to this desire, we must leave it to the actor himself whether\nhe looks forward to other resources than those of his own acquisition,\nor does not expect to be old, or thinks that in case of future\nnecessity he will be able to make shift with little. Reason, from\nwhich alone can spring a rule involving necessity, does, indeed,\ngive necessity to this precept (else it would not be an imperative),\nbut this is a necessity dependent on subjective conditions, and cannot\nbe supposed in the same degree in all subjects. But that reason may\ngive laws it is necessary that it should only need to presuppose\nitself, because rules are objectively and universally valid only\nwhen they hold without any contingent subjective conditions, which\ndistinguish one rational being from another. Now tell a man that he\nshould never make a deceitful promise, this is a rule which only\nconcerns his will, whether the purposes he may have can be attained\nthereby or not; it is the volition only which is to be determined a\npriori by that rule. If now it is found that this rule is\npractically right, then it is a law, because it is a categorical\nimperative. Thus, practical laws refer to the will only, without\nconsidering what is attained by its causality, and we may disregard\nthis latter (as belonging to the world of sense) in order to have them\nquite pure.\n\n\n\n                    II. THEOREM I.\n\n                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 15}\n\n\n\nAll practical principles which presuppose an object (matter) of\nthe faculty of desire as the ground of determination of the will are\nempirical and can furnish no practical laws.\n\nBy the matter of the faculty of desire I mean an object the\nrealization of which is desired. Now, if the desire for this object\nprecedes the practical rule and is the condition of our making it a\nprinciple, then I say (in the first place) this principle is in that\ncase wholly empirical, for then what determines the choice is the idea\nof an object and that relation of this idea to the subject by which\nits faculty of desire is determined to its realization. Such a\nrelation to the subject is called the pleasure in the realization of\nan object. This, then, must be presupposed as a condition of the\npossibility of determination of the will. But it is impossible to know\na priori of any idea of an object whether it will be connected with\npleasure or pain, or be indifferent. In such cases, therefore, the\ndetermining principle of the choice must be empirical and,\ntherefore, also the practical material principle which presupposes\nit as a condition.\n\nIn the second place, since susceptibility to a pleasure or pain\ncan be known only empirically and cannot hold in the same degree for\nall rational beings, a principle which is based on this subjective\ncondition may serve indeed as a maxim for the subject which\npossesses this susceptibility, but not as a law even to him (because\nit is wanting in objective necessity, which must be recognized a\npriori); it follows, therefore, that such a principle can never\nfurnish a practical law.\n\n\n\n                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 20}\n\n                   III. THEOREM II.\n\n\n\nAll material practical principles as such are of one and the same\nkind and come under the general principle of self-love or private\nhappiness.\n\nPleasure arising from the idea of the idea of the existence of a\nthing, in so far as it is to determine the desire of this thing, is\nfounded on the susceptibility of the subject, since it depends on\nthe presence of an object; hence it belongs to sense (feeling), and\nnot to understanding, which expresses a relation of the idea to an\nobject according to concepts, not to the subject according to\nfeelings. It is, then, practical only in so far as the faculty of\ndesire is determined by the sensation of agreeableness which the\nsubject expects from the actual existence of the object. Now, a\nrational being's consciousness of the pleasantness of life\nuninterruptedly accompanying his whole existence is happiness; and the\nprinciple which makes this the supreme ground of determination of\nthe will is the principle of self-love. All material principles, then,\nwhich place the determining ground of the will in the pleasure or pain\nto be received from the existence of any object are all of the same\nkind, inasmuch as they all belong to the principle of self-love or\nprivate happiness.\n\n\n\n                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 25}\n\n                      COROLLARY.\n\n\n\nAll material practical rules place the determining principle of\nthe will in the lower desires; and if there were no purely formal laws\nof the will adequate to determine it, then we could not admit any\nhigher desire at all.\n\n\n\n                       REMARK I.\n\n                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 30}\n\n\n\nIt is surprising that men, otherwise acute, can think it possible to\ndistinguish between higher and lower desires, according as the ideas\nwhich are connected with the feeling of pleasure have their origin\nin the senses or in the understanding; for when we inquire what are\nthe determining grounds of desire, and place them in some expected\npleasantness, it is of no consequence whence the idea of this pleasing\nobject is derived, but only how much it pleases. Whether an idea has\nits seat and source in the understanding or not, if it can only\ndetermine the choice by presupposing a feeling of pleasure in the\nsubject, it follows that its capability of determining the choice\ndepends altogether on the nature of the inner sense, namely, that this\ncan be agreeably affected by it. However dissimilar ideas of objects\nmay be, though they be ideas of the understanding, or even of the\nreason in contrast to ideas of sense, yet the feeling of pleasure,\nby means of which they constitute the determining principle of the\nwill (the expected satisfaction which impels the activity to the\nproduction of the object), is of one and the same kind, not only\ninasmuch as it can only be known empirically, but also inasmuch as\nit affects one and the same vital force which manifests itself in\nthe faculty of desire, and in this respect can only differ in degree\nfrom every other ground of determination. Otherwise, how could we\ncompare in respect of magnitude two principles of determination, the\nideas of which depend upon different faculties, so as to prefer that\nwhich affects the faculty of desire in the highest degree. The same\nman may return unread an instructive book which he cannot again\nobtain, in order not to miss a hunt; he may depart in the midst of a\nfine speech, in order not to be late for dinner; he may leave a\nrational conversation, such as he otherwise values highly, to take his\nplace at the gaming-table; he may even repulse a poor man whom he at\nother times takes pleasure in benefiting, because he has only just\nenough money in his pocket to pay for his admission to the theatre. If\nthe determination of his will rests on the feeling of the\nagreeableness or disagreeableness that he expects from any cause, it\nis all the same to him by what sort of ideas he will be affected.\nThe only thing that concerns him, in order to decide his choice, is,\nhow great, how long continued, how easily obtained, and how often\nrepeated, this agreeableness is. Just as to the man who wants money to\nspend, it is all the same whether the gold was dug out of the mountain\nor washed out of the sand, provided it is everywhere accepted at the\nsame value; so the man who cares only for the enjoyment of life does\nnot ask whether the ideas are of the understanding or the senses,\nbut only how much and how great pleasure they will give for the\nlongest time. It is only those that would gladly deny to pure reason\nthe power of determining the will, without the presupposition of any\nfeeling, who could deviate so far from their own exposition as to\ndescribe as quite heterogeneous what they have themselves previously\nbrought under one and the same principle. Thus, for example, it is\nobserved that we can find pleasure in the mere exercise of power, in\nthe consciousness of our strength of mind in overcoming obstacles\nwhich are opposed to our designs, in the culture of our mental\ntalents, etc.; and we justly call these more refined pleasures and\nenjoyments, because they are more in our power than others; they do\nnot wear out, but rather increase the capacity for further enjoyment\nof them, and while they delight they at the same time cultivate. But\nto say on this account that they determine the will in a different way\nand not through sense, whereas the possibility of the pleasure\npresupposes a feeling for it implanted in us, which is the first\ncondition of this satisfaction; this is just as when ignorant\npersons that like to dabble in metaphysics imagine matter so subtle,\nso supersubtle that they almost make themselves giddy with it, and\nthen think that in this way they have conceived it as a spiritual\nand yet extended being. If with Epicurus we make virtue determine\nthe will only by means of the pleasure it promises, we cannot\nafterwards blame him for holding that this pleasure is of the same\nkind as those of the coarsest senses. For we have no reason whatever\nto charge him with holding that the ideas by which this feeling is\nexcited in us belong merely to the bodily senses. As far as can be\nconjectured, he sought the source of many of them in the use of the\nhigher cognitive faculty, but this did not prevent him, and could\nnot prevent him, from holding on the principle above stated, that\nthe pleasure itself which those intellectual ideas give us, and by\nwhich alone they can determine the will, is just of the same kind.\nConsistency is the highest obligation of a philosopher, and yet the\nmost rarely found. The ancient Greek schools give us more examples\nof it than we find in our syncretistic age, in which a certain shallow\nand dishonest system of compromise of contradictory principles is\ndevised, because it commends itself better to a public which is\ncontent to know something of everything and nothing thoroughly, so\nas to please every party.\n\nThe principle of private happiness, however much understanding and\nreason may be used in it, cannot contain any other determining\nprinciples for the will than those which belong to the lower\ndesires; and either there are no [higher] desires at all, or pure\nreason must of itself alone be practical; that is, it must be able\nto determine the will by the mere form of the practical rule without\nsupposing any feeling, and consequently without any idea of the\npleasant or unpleasant, which is the matter of the desire, and which\nis always an empirical condition of the principles. Then only, when\nreason of itself determines the will (not as the servant of the\ninclination), it is really a higher desire to which that which is\npathologically determined is subordinate, and is really, and even\nspecifically, distinct from the latter, so that even the slightest\nadmixture of the motives of the latter impairs its strength and\nsuperiority; just as in a mathematical demonstration the least\nempirical condition would degrade and destroy its force and value.\nReason, with its practical law, determines the will immediately, not\nby means of an intervening feeling of pleasure or pain, not even of\npleasure in the law itself, and it is only because it can, as pure\nreason, be practical, that it is possible for it to be legislative.\n\n\n\n                      REMARK II.\n\n                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 35}\n\n\n\nTo be happy is necessarily the wish of every finite rational\nbeing, and this, therefore, is inevitably a determining principle of\nits faculty of desire. For we are not in possession originally of\nsatisfaction with our whole existence- a bliss which would imply a\nconsciousness of our own independent self-sufficiency this is a\nproblem imposed upon us by our own finite nature, because we have\nwants and these wants regard the matter of our desires, that is,\nsomething that is relative to a subjective feeling of pleasure or\npain, which determines what we need in order to be satisfied with\nour condition. But just because this material principle of\ndetermination can only be empirically known by the subject, it is\nimpossible to regard this problem as a law; for a law being\nobjective must contain the very same principle of determination of the\nwill in all cases and for all rational beings. For, although the\nnotion of happiness is in every case the foundation of practical\nrelation of the objects to the desires, yet it is only a general\nname for the subjective determining principles, and determines nothing\nspecifically; whereas this is what alone we are concerned with in this\npractical problem, which cannot be solved at all without such specific\ndetermination. For it is every man's own special feeling of pleasure\nand pain that decides in what he is to place his happiness, and even\nin the same subject this will vary with the difference of his wants\naccording as this feeling changes, and thus a law which is\nsubjectively necessary (as a law of nature) is objectively a very\ncontingent practical principle, which can and must be very different\nin different subjects and therefore can never furnish a law; since, in\nthe desire for happiness it is not the form (of conformity to law)\nthat is decisive, but simply the matter, namely, whether I am to\nexpect pleasure in following the law, and how much. Principles of\nself-love may, indeed, contain universal precepts of skill (how to\nfind means to accomplish one's purpose), but in that case they are\nmerely theoretical principles; * as, for example, how he who would\nlike to eat bread should contrive a mill; but practical precepts\nfounded on them can never be universal, for the determining principle\nof the desire is based on the feeling pleasure and pain, which can\nnever be supposed to be universally directed to the same objects.\n\n\n\n* Propositions which in mathematics or physics are called practical\nought properly to be called technical. For they have nothing to do\nwith the determination of the will; they only point out how a certain\neffect is to be produced and are, therefore, just as theoretical as\nany propositions which express the connection of a cause with an\neffect. Now whoever chooses the effect must also choose the cause.\n\n\n\n                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 40}\n\nEven supposing, however, that all finite rational beings were\nthoroughly agreed as to what were the objects of their feelings of\npleasure and pain, and also as to the means which they must employ\nto attain the one and avoid the other; still, they could by no means\nset up the principle of self-love as a practical law, for this\nunanimity itself would be only contingent. The principle of\ndetermination would still be only subjectively valid and merely\nempirical, and would not possess the necessity which is conceived in\nevery law, namely, an objective necessity arising from a priori\ngrounds; unless, indeed, we hold this necessity to be not at all\npractical, but merely physical, viz., that our action is as inevitably\ndetermined by our inclination, as yawning when we see others yawn.\nIt would be better to maintain that there are no practical laws at\nall, but only counsels for the service of our desires, than to raise\nmerely subjective principles to the rank of practical laws, which have\nobjective necessity, and not merely subjective, and which must be\nknown by reason a priori, not by experience (however empirically\nuniversal this may be). Even the rules of corresponding phenomena\nare only called laws of nature (e.g., the mechanical laws), when we\neither know them really a priori, or (as in the case of chemical laws)\nsuppose that they would be known a priori from objective grounds if\nour insight reached further. But in the case of merely subjective\npractical principles, it is expressly made a condition that they rest,\nnot on objective, but on subjective conditions of choice, and hence\nthat they must always be represented as mere maxims, never as\npractical laws. This second remark seems at first sight to be mere\nverbal refinement, but it defines the terms of the most important\ndistinction which can come into consideration in practical\ninvestigations.\n\n\n\n                     IV. THEOREM II.\n\n\n\nA rational being cannot regard his maxims as practical universal\nlaws, unless he conceives them as principles which determine the will,\nnot by their matter, but by their form only.\n\n                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 45}\n\nBy the matter of a practical principle I mean the object of the\nwill. This object is either the determining ground of the will or it\nis not. In the former case the rule of the will is subjected to an\nempirical condition (viz., the relation of the determining idea to the\nfeeling of pleasure and pain), consequently it can not be a\npractical law. Now, when we abstract from a law all matter, i.e.,\nevery object of the will (as a determining principle), nothing is left\nbut the mere form of a universal legislation. Therefore, either a\nrational being cannot conceive his subjective practical principles,\nthat is, his maxims, as being at the same time universal laws, or he\nmust suppose that their mere form, by which they are fitted for\nuniversal legislation, is alone what makes them practical laws.\n\n\n\n                       REMARK.\n\n\n\nThe commonest understanding can distinguish without instruction what\nform of maxim is adapted for universal legislation, and what is not.\nSuppose, for example, that I have made it my maxim to increase my\nfortune by every safe means. Now, I have a deposit in my hands, the\nowner of which is dead and has left no writing about it. This is\njust the case for my maxim. I desire then to know whether that maxim\ncan also bold good as a universal practical law. I apply it,\ntherefore, to the present case, and ask whether it could take the form\nof a law, and consequently whether I can by my maxim at the same\ntime give such a law as this, that everyone may deny a deposit of\nwhich no one can produce a proof. I at once become aware that such a\nprinciple, viewed as a law, would annihilate itself, because the\nresult would be that there would be no deposits. A practical law which\nI recognise as such must be qualified for universal legislation;\nthis is an identical proposition and, therefore, self-evident. Now, if\nI say that my will is subject to a practical law, I cannot adduce my\ninclination (e.g., in the present case my avarice) as a principle of\ndetermination fitted to be a universal practical law; for this is so\nfar from being fitted for a universal legislation that, if put in\nthe form of a universal law, it would destroy itself.\n\n                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 50}\n\nIt is, therefore, surprising that intelligent men could have thought\nof calling the desire of happiness a universal practical law on the\nground that the desire is universal, and, therefore, also the maxim by\nwhich everyone makes this desire determine his will. For whereas in\nother cases a universal law of nature makes everything harmonious;\nhere, on the contrary, if we attribute to the maxim the universality\nof a law, the extreme opposite of harmony will follow, the greatest\nopposition and the complete destruction of the maxim itself and its\npurpose. For, in that case, the will of all has not one and the same\nobject, but everyone has his own (his private welfare), which may\naccidentally accord with the purposes of others which are equally\nselfish, but it is far from sufficing for a law; because the\noccasional exceptions which one is permitted to make are endless,\nand cannot be definitely embraced in one universal rule. In this\nmanner, then, results a harmony like that which a certain satirical\npoem depicts as existing between a married couple bent on going to\nruin, \"O, marvellous harmony, what he wishes, she wishes also\"; or\nlike what is said of the pledge of Francis I to the Emperor Charles V,\n\"What my brother Charles wishes that I wish also\" (viz., Milan).\nEmpirical principles of determination are not fit for any universal\nexternal legislation, but just as little for internal; for each man\nmakes his own subject the foundation of his inclination, and in the\nsame subject sometimes one inclination, sometimes another, has the\npreponderance. To discover a law which would govern them all under\nthis condition, namely, bringing them all into harmony, is quite\nimpossible.\n\n\n\n                     V. PROBLEM I.\n\n\n\nSupposing that the mere legislative form of maxims is alone the\nsufficient determining principle of a will, to find the nature of\nthe will which can be determined by it alone.\n\n                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 55}\n\n Since the bare form of the law can only be conceived by reason, and\nis, therefore, not an object of the senses, and consequently does\nnot belong to the class of phenomena, it follows that the idea of\nit, which determines the will, is distinct from all the principles\nthat determine events in nature according to the law of causality,\nbecause in their case the determining principles must themselves be\nphenomena. Now, if no other determining principle can serve as a law\nfor the will except that universal legislative form, such a will\nmust be conceived as quite independent of the natural law of phenomena\nin their mutual relation, namely, the law of causality; such\nindependence is called freedom in the strictest, that is, in the\ntranscendental, sense; consequently, a will which can have its law\nin nothing but the mere legislative form of the maxim is a free will.\n\n\n\n                     VI. PROBLEM II.\n\n\n\nSupposing that a will is free, to find the law which alone is\ncompetent to determine it necessarily.\n\n                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 60}\n\nSince the matter of the practical law, i.e., an object of the maxim,\ncan never be given otherwise than empirically, and the free will is\nindependent on empirical conditions (that is, conditions belonging\nto the world of sense) and yet is determinable, consequently a free\nwill must find its principle of determination in the law, and yet\nindependently of the matter of the law. But, besides the matter of the\nlaw, nothing is contained in it except the legislative form. It is the\nlegislative form, then, contained in the maxim, which can alone\nconstitute a principle of determination of the [free] will.\n\n\n\n                          REMARK.\n\n\n\nThus freedom and an unconditional practical law reciprocally imply\neach other. Now I do not ask here whether they are in fact distinct,\nor whether an unconditioned law is not rather merely the consciousness\nof a pure practical reason and the latter identical with the\npositive concept of freedom; I only ask, whence begins our knowledge\nof the unconditionally practical, whether it is from freedom or from\nthe practical law? Now it cannot begin from freedom, for of this we\ncannot be immediately conscious, since the first concept of it is\nnegative; nor can we infer it from experience, for experience gives us\nthe knowledge only of the law of phenomena, and hence of the mechanism\nof nature, the direct opposite of freedom. It is therefore the moral\nlaw, of which we become directly conscious (as soon as we trace for\nourselves maxims of the will), that first presents itself to us, and\nleads directly to the concept of freedom, inasmuch as reason\npresents it as a principle of determination not to be outweighed by\nany sensible conditions, nay, wholly independent of them. But how is\nthe consciousness, of that moral law possible? We can become conscious\nof pure practical laws just as we are conscious of pure theoretical\nprinciples, by attending to the necessity with which reason prescribes\nthem and to the elimination of all empirical conditions, which it\ndirects. The concept of a pure will arises out of the former, as\nthat of a pure understanding arises out of the latter. That this is\nthe true subordination of our concepts, and that it is morality that\nfirst discovers to us the notion of freedom, hence that it is\npractical reason which, with this concept, first proposes to\nspeculative reason the most insoluble problem, thereby placing it in\nthe greatest perplexity, is evident from the following\nconsideration: Since nothing in phenomena can be explained by the\nconcept of freedom, but the mechanism of nature must constitute the\nonly clue; moreover, when pure reason tries to ascend in the series of\ncauses to the unconditioned, it falls into an antinomy which is\nentangled in incomprehensibilities on the one side as much as the\nother; whilst the latter (namely, mechanism) is at least useful in the\nexplanation of phenomena, therefore no one would ever have been so\nrash as to introduce freedom into science, had not the moral law,\nand with it practical reason, come in and forced this notion upon\nus. Experience, however, confirms this order of notions. Suppose\nsome one asserts of his lustful appetite that, when the desired object\nand the opportunity are present, it is quite irresistible. [Ask\nhim]- if a gallows were erected before the house where he finds this\nopportunity, in order that he should be hanged thereon immediately\nafter the gratification of his lust, whether he could not then control\nhis passion; we need not be long in doubt what he would reply. Ask\nhim, however- if his sovereign ordered him, on pain of the same\nimmediate execution, to bear false witness against an honourable\nman, whom the prince might wish to destroy under a plausible\npretext, would he consider it possible in that case to overcome his\nlove of life, however great it may be. He would perhaps not venture to\naffirm whether he would do so or not, but he must unhesitatingly admit\nthat it is possible to do so. He judges, therefore, that he can do a\ncertain thing because he is conscious that he ought, and he recognizes\nthat he is free- a fact which but for the moral law he would never\nhave known.\n\n                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 65}\n\n\n\n       VII. FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF THE PURE PRACTICAL REASON.\n\n\n\nAct so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold\ngood as a principle of universal legislation.\n\n\n\n                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 70}\n\n                       REMARK.\n\n\n\nPure geometry has postulates which are practical propositions, but\ncontain nothing further than the assumption that we can do something\nif it is required that we should do it, and these are the only\ngeometrical propositions that concern actual existence. They are,\nthen, practical rules under a problematical condition of the will; but\nhere the rule says: We absolutely must proceed in a certain manner.\nThe practical rule is, therefore, unconditional, and hence it is\nconceived a priori as a categorically practical proposition by which\nthe will is objectively determined absolutely and immediately (by\nthe practical rule itself, which thus is in this case a law); for pure\nreason practical of itself is here directly legislative. The will is\nthought as independent on empirical conditions, and, therefore, as\npure will determined by the mere form of the law, and this principle\nof determination is regarded as the supreme condition of all maxims.\nThe thing is strange enough, and has no parallel in all the rest of\nour practical knowledge. For the a priori thought of a possible\nuniversal legislation which is therefore merely problematical, is\nunconditionally commanded as a law without borrowing anything from\nexperience or from any external will. This, however, is not a\nprecept to do something by which some desired effect can be attained\n(for then the will would depend on physical conditions), but a rule\nthat determines the will a priori only so far as regards the forms\nof its maxims; and thus it is at least not impossible to conceive that\na law, which only applies to the subjective form of principles, yet\nserves as a principle of determination by means of the objective\nform of law in general. We may call the consciousness of this\nfundamental law a fact of reason, because we cannot reason it out from\nantecedent data of reason, e.g., the consciousness of freedom (for\nthis is not antecedently given), but it forces itself on us as a\nsynthetic a priori proposition, which is not based on any intuition,\neither pure or empirical. It would, indeed, be analytical if the\nfreedom of the will were presupposed, but to presuppose freedom as a\npositive concept would require an intellectual intuition, which cannot\nhere be assumed; however, when we regard this law as given, it must be\nobserved, in order not to fall into any misconception, that it is\nnot an empirical fact, but the sole fact of the pure reason, which\nthereby announces itself as originally legislative (sic volo, sic\njubeo).\n\n\n\n                     COROLLARY.\n\n                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 75}\n\n\n\nPure reason is practical of itself alone and gives (to man) a\nuniversal law which we call the moral law.\n\n\n\n                       REMARK.\n\n\n\n                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 80}\n\nThe fact just mentioned is undeniable. It is only necessary to\nanalyse the judgement that men pass on the lawfulness of their\nactions, in order to find that, whatever inclination may say to the\ncontrary, reason, incorruptible and self-constrained, always\nconfronts the maxim of the will in any action with the pure will, that\nis, with itself, considering itself as a priori practical. Now this\nprinciple of morality, just on account of the universality of the\nlegislation which makes it the formal supreme determining principle of\nthe will, without regard to any subjective differences, is declared by\nthe reason to be a law for all rational beings, in so far as they have\na will, that is, a power to determine their causality by the\nconception of rules; and, therefore, so far as they are capable of\nacting according to principles, and consequently also according to\npractical a priori principles (for these alone have the necessity that\nreason requires in a principle). It is, therefore, not limited to\nmen only, but applies to all finite beings that possess reason and\nwill; nay, it even includes the Infinite Being as the supreme\nintelligence. In the former case, however, the law has the form of\nan imperative, because in them, as rational beings, we can suppose a\npure will, but being creatures affected with wants and physical\nmotives, not a holy will, that is, one which would be incapable of any\nmaxim conflicting with the moral law. In their case, therefore, the\nmoral law is an imperative, which commands categorically, because\nthe law is unconditioned; the relation of such a will to this law is\ndependence under the name of obligation, which implies a constraint to\nan action, though only by reason and its objective law; and this\naction is called duty, because an elective will, subject to\npathological affections (though not determined by them, and,\ntherefore, still free), implies a wish that arises from subjective\ncauses and, therefore, may often be opposed to the pure objective\ndetermining principle; whence it requires the moral constraint of a\nresistance of the practical reason, which may be called an internal,\nbut intellectual, compulsion. In the supreme intelligence the elective\nwill is rightly conceived as incapable of any maxim which could not at\nthe same time be objectively a law; and the notion of holiness,\nwhich on that account belongs to it, places it, not indeed above all\npractical laws, but above all practically restrictive laws, and\nconsequently above obligation and duty. This holiness of will is,\nhowever, a practical idea, which must necessarily serve as a type to\nwhich finite rational beings can only approximate indefinitely, and\nwhich the pure moral law, which is itself on this account called holy,\nconstantly and rightly holds before their eyes. The utmost that finite\npractical reason can effect is to be certain of this indefinite\nprogress of one's maxims and of their steady disposition to advance.\nThis is virtue, and virtue, at least as a naturally acquired\nfaculty, can never be perfect, because assurance in such a case\nnever becomes apodeictic certainty and, when it only amounts to\npersuasion, is very dangerous.\n\n\n\n                     VIII. THEOREM IV.\n\n\n\nThe autonomy of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws and\nof all duties which conform to them; on the other hand, heteronomy\nof the elective will not only cannot be the basis of any obligation,\nbut is, on the contrary, opposed to the principle thereof and to the\nmorality of the will.\n\n                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 85}\n\nIn fact the sole principle of morality consists in the\nindependence on all matter of the law (namely, a desired object),\nand in the determination of the elective will by the mere universal\nlegislative form of which its maxim must be capable. Now this\nindependence is freedom in the negative sense, and this\nself-legislation of the pure, and therefore practical, reason is\nfreedom in the positive sense. Thus the moral law expresses nothing\nelse than the autonomy of the pure practical reason; that is, freedom;\nand this is itself the formal condition of all maxims, and on this\ncondition only can they agree with the supreme practical law. If\ntherefore the matter of the volition, which can be nothing else than\nthe object of a desire that is connected with the law, enters into the\npractical law, as the condition of its possibility, there results\nheteronomy of the elective will, namely, dependence on the physical\nlaw that we should follow some impulse or inclination. In that case\nthe will does not give itself the law, but only the precept how\nrationally to follow pathological law; and the maxim which, in such\na case, never contains the universally legislative form, not only\nproduces no obligation, but is itself opposed to the principle of a\npure practical reason and, therefore, also to the moral disposition,\neven though the resulting action may be conformable to the law.\n\n\n\n                       REMARK.\n\n\n\nHence a practical precept, which contains a material (and\ntherefore empirical) condition, must never be reckoned a practical\nlaw. For the law of the pure will, which is free, brings the will into\na sphere quite different from the empirical; and as the necessity\ninvolved in the law is not a physical necessity, it can only consist\nin the formal conditions of the possibility of a law in general. All\nthe matter of practical rules rests on subjective conditions, which\ngive them only a conditional universality (in case I desire this or\nthat, what I must do in order to obtain it), and they all turn on\nthe principle of private happiness. Now, it is indeed undeniable\nthat every volition must have an object, and therefore a matter; but\nit does not follow that this is the determining principle and the\ncondition of the maxim; for, if it is so, then this cannot be\nexhibited in a universally legislative form, since in that case the\nexpectation of the existence of the object would be the determining\ncause of the choice, and the volition must presuppose the dependence\nof the faculty of desire on the existence of something; but this\ndependence can only be sought in empirical conditions and,\ntherefore, can never furnish a foundation for a necessary and\nuniversal rule. Thus, the happiness of others may be the object of the\nwill of a rational being. But if it were the determining principle\nof the maxim, we must assume that we find not only a rational\nsatisfaction in the welfare of others, but also a want such as the\nsympathetic disposition in some men occasions. But I cannot assume the\nexistence of this want in every rational being (not at all in God).\nThe matter, then, of the maxim may remain, but it must not be the\ncondition of it, else the maxim could not be fit for a law. Hence, the\nmere form of law, which limits the matter, must also be a reason for\nadding this matter to the will, not for presupposing it. For\nexample, let the matter be my own happiness. This (rule), if I\nattribute it to everyone (as, in fact, I may, in the case of every\nfinite being), can become an objective practical law only if I include\nthe happiness of others. Therefore, the law that we should promote the\nhappiness of others does not arise from the assumption that this is an\nobject of everyone's choice, but merely from this, that the form of\nuniversality which reason requires as the condition of giving to a\nmaxim of self-love the objective validity of a law is the principle\nthat determines the will. Therefore it was not the object (the\nhappiness of others) that determined the pure will, but it was the\nform of law only, by which I restricted my maxim, founded on\ninclination, so as to give it the universality of a law, and thus to\nadapt it to the practical reason; and it is this restriction alone,\nand not the addition of an external spring, that can give rise to\nthe notion of the obligation to extend the maxim of my self-love to\nthe happiness of others.\n\n                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 90}\n\n\n\n                     REMARK II.\n\n\n\nThe direct opposite of the principle of morality is, when the\nprinciple of private happiness is made the determining principle of\nthe will, and with this is to be reckoned, as I have shown above,\neverything that places the determining principle which is to serve\nas a law, anywhere but in the legislative form of the maxim. This\ncontradiction, however, is not merely logical, like that which would\narise between rules empirically conditioned, if they were raised to\nthe rank of necessary principles of cognition, but is practical, and\nwould ruin morality altogether were not the voice of reason in\nreference to the will so clear, so irrepressible, so distinctly\naudible, even to the commonest men. It can only, indeed, be maintained\nin the perplexing speculations of the schools, which are bold enough\nto shut their ears against that heavenly voice, in order to support\na theory that costs no trouble.\n\nSuppose that an acquaintance whom you otherwise liked were to\nattempt to justify himself to you for having borne false witness,\nfirst by alleging the, in his view, sacred duty of consulting his\nown happiness; then by enumerating the advantages which he had\ngained thereby, pointing out the prudence he had shown in securing\nhimself against detection, even by yourself, to whom he now reveals\nthe secret, only in order that he may be able to deny it at any\ntime; and suppose he were then to affirm, in all seriousness, that\nhe has fulfilled a true human duty; you would either laugh in his\nface, or shrink back from him with disgust; and yet, if a man has\nregulated his principles of action solely with a view to his own\nadvantage, you would have nothing whatever to object against this mode\nof proceeding. Or suppose some one recommends you a man as steward, as\na man to whom you can blindly trust all your affairs; and, in order to\ninspire you with confidence, extols him as a prudent man who\nthoroughly understands his own interest, and is so indefatigably\nactive that he lets slip no opportunity of advancing it; lastly,\nlest you should be afraid of finding a vulgar selfishness in him,\npraises the good taste with which he lives; not seeking his pleasure\nin money-making, or in coarse wantonness, but in the enlargement of\nhis knowledge, in instructive intercourse with a select circle, and\neven in relieving the needy; while as to the means (which, of\ncourse, derive all their value from the end), he is not particular,\nand is ready to use other people's money for the purpose as if it were\nhis own, provided only he knows that he can do so safely, and\nwithout discovery; you would either believe that the recommender was\nmocking you, or that he had lost his senses. So sharply and clearly\nmarked are the boundaries of morality and self-love that even the\ncommonest eye cannot fail to distinguish whether a thing belongs to\nthe one or the other. The few remarks that follow may appear\nsuperfluous where the truth is so plain, but at least they may serve\nto give a little more distinctness to the judgement of common sense.\n\n                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 95}\n\nThe principle of happiness may, indeed, furnish maxims, but never\nsuch as would be competent to be laws of the will, even if universal\nhappiness were made the object. For since the knowledge of this\nrests on mere empirical data, since every man's judgement on it\ndepends very much on his particular point of view, which is itself\nmoreover very variable, it can supply only general rules, not\nuniversal; that is, it can give rules which on the average will most\nfrequently fit, but not rules which must hold good always and\nnecessarily; hence, no practical laws can be founded on it. Just\nbecause in this case an object of choice is the foundation of the rule\nand must therefore precede it, the rule can refer to nothing but\nwhat is [felt], and therefore it refers to experience and is founded\non it, and then the variety of judgement must be endless. This\nprinciple, therefore, does not prescribe the same practical rules to\nall rational beings, although the rules are all included under a\ncommon title, namely, that of happiness. The moral law, however, is\nconceived as objectively necessary, only because it holds for everyone\nthat has reason and will.\n\nThe maxim of self-love (prudence) only advises; the law of\nmorality commands. Now there is a great difference between that\nwhich we are advised to do and that to which we are obliged.\n\nThe commonest intelligence can easily and without hesitation see\nwhat, on the principle of autonomy of the will, requires to be done;\nbut on supposition of heteronomy of the will, it is hard and\nrequires knowledge of the world to see what is to be done. That is\nto say, what duty is, is plain of itself to everyone; but what is to\nbring true durable advantage, such as will extend to the whole of\none's existence, is always veiled in impenetrable obscurity; and\nmuch prudence is required to adapt the practical rule founded on it to\nthe ends of life, even tolerably, by making proper exceptions. But the\nmoral law commands the most punctual obedience from everyone; it must,\ntherefore, not be so difficult to judge what it requires to be done,\nthat the commonest unpractised understanding, even without worldly\nprudence, should fail to apply it rightly.\n\nIt is always in everyone's power to satisfy the categorical\ncommand of morality; whereas it is seldom possible, and by no means so\nto everyone, to satisfy the empirically conditioned precept of\nhappiness, even with regard to a single purpose. The reason is that in\nthe former case there is question only of the maxim, which must be\ngenuine and pure; but in the latter case there is question also of\none's capacity and physical power to realize a desired object. A\ncommand that everyone should try to make himself happy would be\nfoolish, for one never commands anyone to do what he of himself\ninfallibly wishes to do. We must only command the means, or rather\nsupply them, since he cannot do everything that he wishes. But to\ncommand morality under the name of duty is quite rational; for, in the\nfirst place, not everyone is willing to obey its precepts if they\noppose his inclinations; and as to the means of obeying this law,\nthese need not in this case be taught, for in this respect whatever he\nwishes to do he can do.\n\nHe who has lost at play may be vexed at himself and his folly, but\nif he is conscious of having cheated at play (although he has gained\nthereby), he must despise himself as soon as he compares himself\nwith the moral law. This must, therefore, be something different\nfrom the principle of private happiness. For a man must have a\ndifferent criterion when he is compelled to say to himself: \"I am a\nworthless fellow, though I have filled my purse\"; and when he approves\nhimself, and says: \"I am a prudent man, for I have enriched my\ntreasure.\"\n\n                                         {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 100}\n\nFinally, there is something further in the idea of our practical\nreason, which accompanies the transgression of a moral law- namely,\nits ill desert. Now the notion of punishment, as such, cannot be\nunited with that of becoming a partaker of happiness; for although\nhe who inflicts the punishment may at the same time have the\nbenevolent purpose of directing this punishment to this end, yet it\nmust first be justified in itself as punishment, i.e., as mere harm,\nso that if it stopped there, and the person punished could get no\nglimpse of kindness hidden behind this harshness, he must yet admit\nthat justice was done him, and that his reward was perfectly\nsuitable to his conduct. In every punishment, as such, there must\nfirst be justice, and this constitutes the essence of the notion.\nBenevolence may, indeed, be united with it, but the man who has\ndeserved punishment has not the least reason to reckon upon this.\nPunishment, then, is a physical evil, which, though it be not\nconnected with moral evil as a natural consequence, ought to be\nconnected with it as a consequence by the principles of a moral\nlegislation. Now, if every crime, even without regarding the\nphysical consequence with respect to the actor, is in itself\npunishable, that is, forfeits happiness (at least partially), it is\nobviously absurd to say that the crime consisted just in this, that he\nhas drawn punishment on himself, thereby injuring his private\nhappiness (which, on the principle of self-love, must be the proper\nnotion of all crime). According to this view, the punishment would\nbe the reason for calling anything a crime, and justice would, on\nthe contrary, consist in omitting all punishment, and even\npreventing that which naturally follows; for, if this were done, there\nwould no longer be any evil in the action, since the harm which\notherwise followed it, and on account of which alone the action was\ncalled evil, would now be prevented. To look, however, on all\nrewards and punishments as merely the machinery in the hand of a\nhigher power, which is to serve only to set rational creatures\nstriving after their final end (happiness), this is to reduce the will\nto a mechanism destructive of freedom; this is so evident that it need\nnot detain us.\n\nMore refined, though equally false, is the theory of those who\nsuppose a certain special moral sense, which sense and not reason\ndetermines the moral law, and in consequence of which the\nconsciousness of virtue is supposed to be directly connected with\ncontentment and pleasure; that of vice, with mental dissatisfaction\nand pain; thus reducing the whole to the desire of private\nhappiness. Without repeating what has been said above, I will here\nonly remark the fallacy they fall into. In order to imagine the\nvicious man as tormented with mental dissatisfaction by the\nconsciousness of his transgressions, they must first represent him\nas in the main basis of his character, at least in some degree,\nmorally good; just as he who is pleased with the consciousness of\nright conduct must be conceived as already virtuous. The notion of\nmorality and duty must, therefore, have preceded any regard to this\nsatisfaction, and cannot be derived from it. A man must first\nappreciate the importance of what we call duty, the authority of the\nmoral law, and the immediate dignity which the following of it gives\nto the person in his own eyes, in order to feel that satisfaction in\nthe consciousness of his conformity to it and the bitter remorse\nthat accompanies the consciousness of its transgression. It is,\ntherefore, impossible to feel this satisfaction or dissatisfaction\nprior to the knowledge of obligation, or to make it the basis of the\nlatter. A man must be at least half honest in order even to be able to\nform a conception of these feelings. I do not deny that as the human\nwill is, by virtue of liberty, capable of being immediately determined\nby the moral law, so frequent practice in accordance with this\nprinciple of determination can, at least, produce subjectively a\nfeeling of satisfaction; on the contrary, it is a duty to establish\nand to cultivate this, which alone deserves to be called properly\nthe moral feeling; but the notion of duty cannot be derived from it,\nelse we should have to suppose a feeling for the law as such, and thus\nmake that an object of sensation which can only be thought by the\nreason; and this, if it is not to be a flat contradiction, would\ndestroy all notion of duty and put in its place a mere mechanical play\nof refined inclinations sometimes contending with the coarser.\n\nIf now we compare our formal supreme principle of pure practical\nreason (that of autonomy of the will) with all previous material\nprinciples of morality, we can exhibit them all in a table in which\nall possible cases are exhausted, except the one formal principle; and\nthus we can show visibly that it is vain to look for any other\nprinciple than that now proposed. In fact all possible principles of\ndetermination of the will are either merely subjective, and\ntherefore empirical, or are also objective and rational; and both\nare either external or internal.\n\n\n\nPractical Material Principles of Determination taken as the\nFoundation of Morality, are:\n\n                                         {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 105}\n\n\n\n                       SUBJECTIVE.\n\n\n\n          EXTERNAL                 INTERNAL\n\n        Education                Physical feeling\n\n                                         {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 110}\n\n        (Montaigne)              (Epicurus)\n\n        The civil                Moral feeling\n\n        Constitution             (Hutcheson)\n\n        (Mandeville)\n\n\n\n                                         {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 115}\n\n                       OBJECTIVE.\n\n\n\n          INTERNAL                  EXTERNAL\n\n        Perfection                Will of God\n\n        (Wolf and the             (Crusius and other\n\n                                         {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 120}\n\n        Stoics)                   theological Moralists)\n\n\n\nThose of the upper table are all empirical and evidently incapable\nof furnishing the universal principle of morality; but those in the\nlower table are based on reason (for perfection as a quality of\nthings, and the highest perfection conceived as substance, that is,\nGod, can only be thought by means of rational concepts). But the\nformer notion, namely, that of perfection, may either be taken in a\ntheoretic signification, and then it means nothing but the\ncompleteness of each thing in its own kind (transcendental), or that\nof a thing merely as a thing (metaphysical); and with that we are\nnot concerned here. But the notion of perfection in a practical\nsense is the fitness or sufficiency of a thing for all sorts of\npurposes. This perfection, as a quality of man and consequently\ninternal, is nothing but talent and, what strengthens or completes\nthis, skill. Supreme perfection conceived as substance, that is God,\nand consequently external (considered practically), is the sufficiency\nof this being for all ends. Ends then must first be given,\nrelatively to which only can the notion of perfection (whether\ninternal in ourselves or external in God) be the determining principle\nof the will. But an end- being an object which must precede the\ndetermination of the will by a practical rule and contain the ground\nof the possibility of this determination, and therefore contain also\nthe matter of the will, taken as its determining principle- such an\nend is always empirical and, therefore, may serve for the Epicurean\nprinciple of the happiness theory, but not for the pure rational\nprinciple of morality and duty. Thus, talents and the improvement of\nthem, because they contribute to the advantages of life; or the will\nof God, if agreement with it be taken as the object of the will,\nwithout any antecedent independent practical principle, can be motives\nonly by reason of the happiness expected therefrom. Hence it\nfollows, first, that all the principles here stated are material;\nsecondly, that they include all possible material principles; and,\nfinally, the conclusion, that since material principles are quite\nincapable of furnishing the supreme moral law (as has been shown), the\nformal practical principle of the pure reason (according to which the\nmere form of a universal legislation must constitute the supreme and\nimmediate determining principle of the will) is the only one\npossible which is adequate to furnish categorical imperatives, that\nis, practical laws (which make actions a duty), and in general to\nserve as the principle of morality, both in criticizing conduct and\nalso in its application to the human will to determine it.\n\n\n\nI. Of the Deduction of the Fundamental Principles of Pure\nPractical Reason.\n\n                                         {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 125}\n\n\n\nThis Analytic shows that pure reason can be practical, that is,\ncan of itself determine the will independently of anything\nempirical; and this it proves by a fact in which pure reason in us\nproves itself actually practical, namely, the autonomy shown in the\nfundamental principle of morality, by which reason determines the will\nto action.\n\nIt shows at the same time that this fact is inseparably connected\nwith the consciousness of freedom of the will, nay, is identical\nwith it; and by this the will of a rational being, although as\nbelonging to the world of sense it recognizes itself as necessarily\nsubject to the laws of causality like other efficient causes; yet,\nat the same time, on another side, namely, as a being in itself, is\nconscious of existing in and being determined by an intelligible order\nof things; conscious not by virtue of a special intuition of itself,\nbut by virtue of certain dynamical laws which determine its\ncausality in the sensible world; for it has been elsewhere proved that\nif freedom is predicated of us, it transports us into an\nintelligible order of things.\n\nNow, if we compare with this the analytical part of the critique\nof pure speculative reason, we shall see a remarkable contrast.\nThere it was not fundamental principles, but pure, sensible\nintuition (space and time), that was the first datum that made a\npriori knowledge possible, though only of objects of the senses.\nSynthetical principles could not be derived from mere concepts without\nintuition; on the contrary, they could only exist with reference to\nthis intuition, and therefore to objects of possible experience, since\nit is the concepts of the understanding, united with this intuition,\nwhich alone make that knowledge possible which we call experience.\nBeyond objects of experience, and therefore with regard to things as\nnoumena, all positive knowledge was rightly disclaimed for speculative\nreason. This reason, however, went so far as to establish with\ncertainty the concept of noumena; that is, the possibility, nay, the\nnecessity, of thinking them; for example, it showed against all\nobjections that the supposition of freedom, negatively considered, was\nquite consistent with those principles and limitations of pure\ntheoretic reason. But it could not give us any definite enlargement of\nour knowledge with respect to such objects, but, on the contrary,\ncut off all view of them altogether.\n\nOn the other hand, the moral law, although it gives no view, yet\ngives us a fact absolutely inexplicable from any data of the\nsensible world, and the whole compass of our theoretical use of\nreason, a fact which points to a pure world of the understanding, nay,\neven defines it positively and enables us to know something of it,\nnamely, a law.\n\n                                         {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 130}\n\nThis law (as far as rational beings are concerned) gives to the\nworld of sense, which is a sensible system of nature, the form of a\nworld of the understanding, that is, of a supersensible system of\nnature, without interfering with its mechanism. Now, a system of\nnature, in the most general sense, is the existence of things under\nlaws. The sensible nature of rational beings in general is their\nexistence under laws empirically conditioned, which, from the point of\nview of reason, is heteronomy. The supersensible nature of the same\nbeings, on the other hand, is their existence according to laws\nwhich are independent of every empirical condition and, therefore,\nbelong to the autonomy of pure reason. And, since the laws by which\nthe existence of things depends on cognition are practical,\nsupersensible nature, so far as we can form any notion of it, is\nnothing else than a system of nature under the autonomy of pure\npractical reason. Now, the law of this autonomy is the moral law,\nwhich, therefore, is the fundamental law of a supersensible nature,\nand of a pure world of understanding, whose counterpart must exist\nin the world of sense, but without interfering with its laws. We might\ncall the former the archetypal world (natura archetypa), which we only\nknow in the reason; and the latter the ectypal world (natura\nectypa), because it contains the possible effect of the idea of the\nformer which is the determining principle of the will. For the moral\nlaw, in fact, transfers us ideally into a system in which pure reason,\nif it were accompanied with adequate physical power, would produce the\nsummum bonum, and it determines our will to give the sensible world\nthe form of a system of rational beings.\n\nThe least attention to oneself proves that this idea really serves\nas the model for the determinations of our will.\n\nWhen the maxim which I am disposed to follow in giving testimony\nis tested by the practical reason, I always consider what it would\nbe if it were to hold as a universal law of nature. It is manifest\nthat in this view it would oblige everyone to speak the truth. For\nit cannot hold as a universal law of nature that statements should\nbe allowed to have the force of proof and yet to be purposely\nuntrue. Similarly, the maxim which I adopt with respect to disposing\nfreely of my life is at once determined, when I ask myself what it\nshould be, in order that a system, of which it is the law, should\nmaintain itself. It is obvious that in such a system no one could\narbitrarily put an end to his own life, for such an arrangement\nwould not be a permanent order of things. And so in all similar cases.\nNow, in nature, as it actually is an object of experience, the free\nwill is not of itself determined to maxims which could of themselves\nbe the foundation of a natural system of universal laws, or which\ncould even be adapted to a system so constituted; on the contrary, its\nmaxims are private inclinations which constitute, indeed, a natural\nwhole in conformity with pathological (physical) laws, but could not\nform part of a system of nature, which would only be possible\nthrough our will acting in accordance with pure practical laws. Yet we\nare, through reason, conscious of a law to which all our maxims are\nsubject, as though a natural order must be originated from our will.\nThis law, therefore, must be the idea of a natural system not given in\nexperience, and yet possible through freedom; a system, therefore,\nwhich is supersensible, and to which we give objective reality, at\nleast in a practical point of view, since we look on it as an object\nof our will as pure rational beings.\n\nHence the distinction between the laws of a natural system to\nwhich the will is subject, and of a natural system which is subject to\na will (as far as its relation to its free actions is concerned),\nrests on this, that in the former the objects must be causes of the\nideas which determine the will; whereas in the latter the will is\nthe cause of the objects; so that its causality has its determining\nprinciple solely in the pure faculty of reason, which may therefore be\ncalled a pure practical reason.\n\nThere are therefore two very distinct problems: how, on the one\nside, pure reason can cognise objects a priori, and how on the other\nside it can be an immediate determining principle of the will, that\nis, of the causality of the rational being with respect to the reality\nof objects (through the mere thought of the universal validity of\nits own maxims as laws).\n\n                                         {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 135}\n\nThe former, which belongs to the critique of the pure speculative\nreason, requires a previous explanation, how intuitions without\nwhich no object can be given, and, therefore, none known\nsynthetically, are possible a priori; and its solution turns out to be\nthat these are all only sensible and, therefore, do not render\npossible any speculative knowledge which goes further than possible\nexperience reaches; and that therefore all the principles of that pure\nspeculative reason avail only to make experience possible; either\nexperience of given objects or of those that may be given ad\ninfinitum, but never are completely given.\n\nThe latter, which belongs to the critique of practical reason,\nrequires no explanation how the objects of the faculty of desire are\npossible, for that being a problem of the theoretical knowledge of\nnature is left to the critique of the speculative reason, but only how\nreason can determine the maxims of the will; whether this takes\nplace only by means of empirical ideas as principles of determination,\nor whether pure reason can be practical and be the law of a possible\norder of nature, which is not empirically knowable. The possibility of\nsuch a supersensible system of nature, the conception of which can\nalso be the ground of its reality through our own free will, does\nnot require any a priori intuition (of an intelligible world) which,\nbeing in this case supersensible, would be impossible for us. For\nthe question is only as to the determining principle of volition in\nits maxims, namely, whether it is empirical, or is a conception of the\npure reason (having the legal character belonging to it in general),\nand how it can be the latter. It is left to the theoretic principles\nof reason to decide whether the causality of the will suffices for the\nrealization of the objects or not, this being an inquiry into the\npossibility of the objects of the volition. Intuition of these objects\nis therefore of no importance to the practical problem. We are here\nconcerned only with the determination of the will and the\ndetermining principles of its maxims as a free will, not at all with\nthe result. For, provided only that the will conforms to the law of\npure reason, then let its power in execution be what it may, whether\naccording to these maxims of legislation of a possible system of\nnature any such system really results or not, this is no concern of\nthe critique, which only inquires whether, and in what way, pure\nreason can be practical, that is directly determine the will.\n\nIn this inquiry criticism may and must begin with pure practical\nlaws and their reality. But instead of intuition it takes as their\nfoundation the conception of their existence in the intelligible\nworld, namely, the concept of freedom. For this concept has no other\nmeaning, and these laws are only possible in relation to freedom of\nthe will; but freedom being supposed, they are necessary; or\nconversely freedom is necessary because those laws are necessary,\nbeing practical postulates. It cannot be further explained how this\nconsciousness of the moral law, or, what is the same thing, of\nfreedom, is possible; but that it is admissible is well established in\nthe theoretical critique.\n\nThe exposition of the supreme principle of practical reason is now\nfinished; that is to say, it has been shown first, what it\ncontains, that it subsists for itself quite a priori and independent\nof empirical principles; and next in what it is distinguished from all\nother practical principles. With the deduction, that is, the\njustification of its objective and universal validity, and the\ndiscernment of the possibility of such a synthetical proposition a\npriori, we cannot expect to succeed so well as in the case of the\nprinciples of pure theoretical reason. For these referred to objects\nof possible experience, namely, to phenomena, and we could prove\nthat these phenomena could be known as objects of experience only by\nbeing brought under the categories in accordance with these laws;\nand consequently that all possible experience must conform to these\nlaws. But I could not proceed in this way with the deduction of the\nmoral law. For this does not concern the knowledge of the properties\nof objects, which may be given to the reason from some other source;\nbut a knowledge which can itself be the ground of the existence of the\nobjects, and by which reason in a rational being has causality,\ni.e., pure reason, which can be regarded as a faculty immediately\ndetermining the will.\n\nNow all our human insight is at an end as soon as we have arrived at\nfundamental powers or faculties, for the possibility of these cannot\nbe understood by any means, and just as little should it be\narbitrarily invented and assumed. Therefore, in the theoretic use of\nreason, it is experience alone that can justify us in assuming them.\nBut this expedient of adducing empirical proofs, instead of a\ndeduction from a priori sources of knowledge, is denied us here in\nrespect to the pure practical faculty of reason. For whatever requires\nto draw the proof of its reality from experience must depend for the\ngrounds of its possibility on principles of experience; and pure,\nyet practical, reason by its very notion cannot be regarded as such.\nFurther, the moral law is given as a fact of pure reason of which we\nare a priori conscious, and which is apodeictically certain, though it\nbe granted that in experience no example of its exact fulfilment can\nbe found. Hence, the objective reality of the moral law cannot be\nproved by any deduction by any efforts of theoretical reason,\nwhether speculative or empirically supported, and therefore, even if\nwe renounced its apodeictic certainty, it could not be proved a\nposteriori by experience, and yet it is firmly established of itself.\n\n                                         {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 140}\n\nBut instead of this vainly sought deduction of the moral\nprinciple, something else is found which was quite unexpected, namely,\nthat this moral principle serves conversely as the principle of the\ndeduction of an inscrutable faculty which no experience could prove,\nbut of which speculative reason was compelled at least to assume the\npossibility (in order to find amongst its cosmological ideas the\nunconditioned in the chain of causality, so as not to contradict\nitself)- I mean the faculty of freedom. The moral law, which itself\ndoes not require a justification, proves not merely the possibility of\nfreedom, but that it really belongs to beings who recognize this law\nas binding on themselves. The moral law is in fact a law of the\ncausality of free agents and, therefore, of the possibility of a\nsupersensible system of nature, just as the metaphysical law of events\nin the world of sense was a law of causality of the sensible system of\nnature; and it therefore determines what speculative philosophy was\ncompelled to leave undetermined, namely, the law for a causality,\nthe concept of which in the latter was only negative; and therefore\nfor the first time gives this concept objective reality.\n\nThis sort of credential of the moral law, viz., that it is set forth\nas a principle of the deduction of freedom, which is a causality of\npure reason, is a sufficient substitute for all a priori\njustification, since theoretic reason was compelled to assume at least\nthe possibility of freedom, in order to satisfy a want of its own. For\nthe moral law proves its reality, so as even to satisfy the critique\nof the speculative reason, by the fact that it adds a positive\ndefinition to a causality previously conceived only negatively, the\npossibility of which was incomprehensible to speculative reason, which\nyet was compelled to suppose it. For it adds the notion of a reason\nthat directly determines the will (by imposing on its maxims the\ncondition of a universal legislative form); and thus it is able for\nthe first time to give objective, though only practical, reality to\nreason, which always became transcendent when it sought to proceed\nspeculatively with its ideas. It thus changes the transcendent use\nof reason into an immanent use (so that reason is itself, by means\nof ideas, an efficient cause in the field of experience).\n\nThe determination of the causality of beings in the world of\nsense, as such, can never be unconditioned; and yet for every series\nof conditions there must be something unconditioned, and therefore\nthere must be a causality which is determined wholly by itself. Hence,\nthe idea of freedom as a faculty of absolute spontaneity was not found\nto be a want but, as far as its possibility is concerned, an\nanalytic principle of pure speculative reason. But as it is absolutely\nimpossible to find in experience any example in accordance with this\nidea, because amongst the causes of things as phenomena it would be\nimpossible to meet with any absolutely unconditioned determination\nof causality, we were only able to defend our supposition that a\nfreely acting cause might be a being in the world of sense, in so\nfar as it is considered in the other point of view as a noumenon,\nshowing that there is no contradiction in regarding all its actions as\nsubject to physical conditions so far as they are phenomena, and yet\nregarding its causality as physically unconditioned, in so far as\nthe acting being belongs to the world of understanding, and in thus\nmaking the concept of freedom the regulative principle of reason. By\nthis principle I do not indeed learn what the object is to which\nthat sort of causality is attributed; but I remove the difficulty,\nfor, on the one side, in the explanation of events in the world, and\nconsequently also of the actions of rational beings, I leave to the\nmechanism of physical necessity the right of ascending from\nconditioned to condition ad infinitum, while on the other side I\nkeep open for speculative reason the place which for it is vacant,\nnamely, the intelligible, in order to transfer the unconditioned\nthither. But I was not able to verify this supposition; that is, to\nchange it into the knowledge of a being so acting, not even into the\nknowledge of the possibility of such a being. This vacant place is now\nfilled by pure practical reason with a definite law of causality in an\nintelligible world (causality with freedom), namely, the moral law.\nSpeculative reason does not hereby gain anything as regards its\ninsight, but only as regards the certainty of its problematical notion\nof freedom, which here obtains objective reality, which, though only\npractical, is nevertheless undoubted. Even the notion of causality-\nthe application, and consequently the signification, of which holds\nproperly only in relation to phenomena, so as to connect them into\nexperiences (as is shown by the Critique of Pure Reason)- is not so\nenlarged as to extend its use beyond these limits. For if reason\nsought to do this, it would have to show how the logical relation of\nprinciple and consequence can be used synthetically in a different\nsort of intuition from the sensible; that is how a causa noumenon is\npossible. This it can never do; and, as practical reason, it does\nnot even concern itself with it, since it only places the\ndetermining principle of causality of man as a sensible creature\n(which is given) in pure reason (which is therefore called practical);\nand therefore it employs the notion of cause, not in order to know\nobjects, but to determine causality in relation to objects in general.\nIt can abstract altogether from the application of this notion to\nobjects with a view to theoretical knowledge (since this concept is\nalways found a priori in the understanding even independently of any\nintuition). Reason, then, employs it only for a practical purpose, and\nhence we can transfer the determining principle of the will into the\nintelligible order of things, admitting, at the same time, that we\ncannot understand how the notion of cause can determine the\nknowledge of these things. But reason must cognise causality with\nrespect to the actions of the will in the sensible world in a definite\nmanner; otherwise, practical reason could not really produce any\naction. But as to the notion which it forms of its own causality as\nnoumenon, it need not determine it theoretically with a view to the\ncognition of its supersensible existence, so as to give it\nsignificance in this way. For it acquires significance apart from\nthis, though only for practical use, namely, through the moral law.\nTheoretically viewed, it remains always a pure a priori concept of the\nunderstanding, which can be applied to objects whether they have\nbeen given sensibly or not, although in the latter case it has no\ndefinite theoretical significance or application, but is only a\nformal, though essential, conception of the understanding relating\nto an object in general. The significance which reason gives it\nthrough the moral law is merely practical, inasmuch as the idea of\nthe law of causality (of the will) has self causality, or is\nits determining principle.\n\n\n\nII. Of the Right that Pure Reason in its Practical use has to an\nExtension which is not possible to it in its Speculative Use.\n\n                                         {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 145}\n\n\n\nWe have in the moral principle set forth a law of causality, the\ndetermining principle of which is set above all the conditions of\nthe sensible world; we have it conceived how the will, as belonging\nto the intelligible world, is determinable, and therefore have\nits subject (man) not merely conceived as belonging to a world of\npure understanding, and in this respect unknown (which the critique of\nspeculative reason enabled us to do), but also defined as regards\nhis causality by means of a law which cannot be reduced to any\nphysical law of the sensible world; and therefore our knowledge is\nextended beyond the limits of that world, a pretension which the\nCritique of Pure Reason declared to be futile in all speculation. Now,\nhow is the practical use of pure reason here to be reconciled with the\ntheoretical, as to the determination of the limits of its faculty?\n\nDavid Hume, of whom we may say that he commenced the assault on\nthe claims of pure reason, which made a thorough investigation of it\nnecessary, argued thus: The notion of cause is a notion that\ninvolves the necessity of the connexion of the existence of\ndifferent things (and that, in so far as they are different), so that,\ngiven A, I know that something quite distinct there from, namely B,\nmust necessarily also exist. Now necessity can be attributed to a\nconnection, only in so far as it is known a priori, for experience\nwould only enable us to know of such a connection that it exists,\nnot that it necessarily exists. Now, it is impossible, says he, to\nknow a priori and as necessary the connection between one thing and\nanother (or between one attribute and another quite distinct) when\nthey have not been given in experience. Therefore the notion of a\ncause is fictitious and delusive and, to speak in the mildest way,\nis an illusion, only excusable inasmuch as the custom (a subjective\nnecessity) of perceiving certain things, or their attributes as\noften associated in existence along with or in succession to one\nanother, is insensibly taken for an objective necessity of supposing\nsuch a connection in the objects themselves; and thus the notion of\na cause has been acquired surreptitiously and not legitimately; nay,\nit can never be so acquired or authenticated, since it demands a\nconnection in itself vain, chimerical, and untenable in presence of\nreason, and to which no object can ever correspond. In this way was\nempiricism first introduced as the sole source of principles, as far\nas all knowledge of the existence of things is concerned\n(mathematics therefore remaining excepted); and with empiricism the\nmost thorough scepticism, even with regard to the whole science of\nnature( as philosophy). For on such principles we can never conclude\nfrom given attributes of things as existing to a consequence (for this\nwould require the notion of cause, which involves the necessity of\nsuch a connection); we can only, guided by imagination, expect similar\ncases- an expectation which is never certain, however often it has\nbeen fulfilled. Of no event could we say: a certain thing must have\npreceded it, on which it necessarily followed; that is, it must have a\ncause; and therefore, however frequent the cases we have known in\nwhich there was such an antecedent, so that a rule could be derived\nfrom them, yet we never could suppose it as always and necessarily\nso happening; we should, therefore, be obliged to leave its share to\nblind chance, with which all use of reason comes to an end; and this\nfirmly establishes scepticism in reference to arguments ascending from\neffects to causes and makes it impregnable.\n\nMathematics escaped well, so far, because Hume thought that its\npropositions were analytical; that is, proceeded from one property\nto another, by virtue of identity and, consequently, according to\nthe principle of contradiction. This, however, is not the case, since,\non the contrary, they are synthetical; and although geometry, for\nexample, has not to do with the existence of things, but only with\ntheir a priori properties in a possible intuition, yet it proceeds\njust as in the case of the causal notion, from one property (A) to\nanother wholly distinct (B), as necessarily connected with the former.\nNevertheless, mathematical science, so highly vaunted for its\napodeictic certainty, must at last fall under this empiricism for\nthe same reason for which Hume put custom in the place of objective\nnecessity in the notion of cause and, in spite of all its pride,\nmust consent to lower its bold pretension of claiming assent a\npriori and depend for assent to the universality of its propositions\non the kindness of observers, who, when called as witnesses, would\nsurely not hesitate to admit that what the geometer propounds as a\ntheorem they have always perceived to be the fact, and,\nconsequently, although it be not necessarily true, yet they would\npermit us to expect it to be true in the future. In this manner Hume's\nempiricism leads inevitably to scepticism, even with regard to\nmathematics, and consequently in every scientific theoretical use of\nreason (for this belongs either to philosophy or mathematics). Whether\nwith such a terrible overthrow of the chief branches of knowledge,\ncommon reason will escape better, and will not rather become\nirrecoverably involved in this destruction of all knowledge, so that\nfrom the same principles a universal scepticism should follow\n(affecting, indeed, only the learned), this I will leave everyone to\njudge for himself.\n\nAs regards my own labours in the critical examination of pure\nreason, which were occasioned by Hume's sceptical teaching, but went\nmuch further and embraced the whole field of pure theoretical reason\nin its synthetic use and, consequently, the field of what is called\nmetaphysics in general; I proceeded in the following manner with\nrespect to the doubts raised by the Scottish philosopher touching\nthe notion of causality. If Hume took the objects of experience for\nthings in themselves (as is almost always done), he was quite right in\ndeclaring the notion of cause to be a deception and false illusion;\nfor as to things in themselves, and their attributes as such, it is\nimpossible to see why because A is given, B, which is different,\nmust necessarily be also given, and therefore he could by no means\nadmit such an a priori knowledge of things in themselves. Still less\ncould this acute writer allow an empirical origin of this concept,\nsince this is directly contradictory to the necessity of connection\nwhich constitutes the essence of the notion of causality, hence the\nnotion was proscribed, and in its place was put custom in the\nobservation of the course of perceptions.\n\n                                         {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 150}\n\nIt resulted, however, from my inquiries, that the objects with which\nwe have to do in experience are by no means things in themselves,\nbut merely phenomena; and that although in the case of things in\nthemselves it is impossible to see how, if A is supposed, it should be\ncontradictory that B, which is quite different from A, should not also\nbe supposed (i.e., to see the necessity of the connection between A as\ncause and B as effect); yet it can very well be conceived that, as\nphenomena, they may be necessarily connected in one experience in a\ncertain way (e.g., with regard to time-relations); so that they\ncould not be separated without contradicting that connection, by means\nof which this experience is possible in which they are objects and\nin which alone they are cognisable by us. And so it was found to be in\nfact; so that I was able not only to prove the objective reality of\nthe concept of cause in regard to objects of experience, but also to\ndeduce it as an a priori concept by reason of the necessity of the\nconnection it implied; that is, to show the possibility of its\norigin from pure understanding without any empirical sources; and\nthus, after removing the source of empiricism, I was able also to\noverthrow the inevitable consequence of this, namely, scepticism,\nfirst with regard to physical science, and then with regard to\nmathematics (in which empiricism has just the same grounds), both\nbeing sciences which have reference to objects of possible experience;\nherewith overthrowing the thorough doubt of whatever theoretic\nreason professes to discern.\n\nBut how is it with the application of this category of causality\n(and all the others; for without them there can be no knowledge of\nanything existing) to things which are not objects of possible\nexperience, but lie beyond its bounds? For I was able to deduce the\nobjective reality of these concepts only with regard to objects of\npossible experience. But even this very fact, that I have saved\nthem, only in case I have proved that objects may by means of them\nbe thought, though not determined a priori; this it is that gives them\na place in the pure understanding, by which they are referred to\nobjects in general (sensible or not sensible). If anything is still\nwanting, it is that which is the condition of the application of these\ncategories, and especially that of causality, to objects, namely,\nintuition; for where this is not given, the application with a view to\ntheoretic knowledge of the object, as a noumenon, is impossible and,\ntherefore, if anyone ventures on it, is (as in the Critique of Pure\nReason) absolutely forbidden. Still, the objective reality of the\nconcept (of causality) remains, and it can be used even of noumena,\nbut without our being able in the least to define the concept\ntheoretically so as to produce knowledge. For that this concept,\neven in reference to an object, contains nothing impossible, was shown\nby this, that, even while applied to objects of sense, its seat was\ncertainly fixed in the pure understanding; and although, when referred\nto things in themselves (which cannot be objects of experience), it is\nnot capable of being determined so as to represent a definite object\nfor the purpose of theoretic knowledge; yet for any other purpose (for\ninstance, a practical) it might be capable of being determined so as\nto have such application. This could not be the case if, as Hume\nmaintained, this concept of causality contained something absolutely\nimpossible to be thought.\n\nIn order now to discover this condition of the application of the\nsaid concept to noumena, we need only recall why we are not content\nwith its application to objects of experience, but desire also to\napply it to things in themselves. It will appear, then, that it is not\na theoretic but a practical purpose that makes this a necessity. In\nspeculation, even if we were successful in it, we should not really\ngain anything in the knowledge of nature, or generally with regard\nto such objects as are given, but we should make a wide step from\nthe sensibly conditioned (in which we have already enough to do to\nmaintain ourselves, and to follow carefully the chain of causes) to\nthe supersensible, in order to complete our knowledge of principles\nand to fix its limits; whereas there always remains an infinite\nchasm unfilled between those limits and what we know; and we should\nhave hearkened to a vain curiosity rather than a solid-desire of\nknowledge.\n\nBut, besides the relation in which the understanding stands to\nobjects (in theoretical knowledge), it has also a relation to the\nfaculty of desire, which is therefore called the will, and the pure\nwill, inasmuch as pure understanding (in this case called reason) is\npractical through the mere conception of a law. The objective\nreality of a pure will, or, what is the same thing, of a pure\npractical reason, is given in the moral law a priori, as it were, by a\nfact, for so we may name a determination of the will which is\ninevitable, although it does not rest on empirical principles. Now, in\nthe notion of a will the notion of causality is already contained, and\nhence the notion of a pure will contains that of a causality\naccompanied with freedom, that is, one which is not determinable by\nphysical laws, and consequently is not capable of any empirical\nintuition in proof of its reality, but, nevertheless, completely\njustifies its objective reality a priori in the pure practical law;\nnot, indeed (as is easily seen) for the purposes of the theoretical,\nbut of the practical use of reason. Now the notion of a being that has\nfree will is the notion of a causa noumenon, and that this notion\ninvolves no contradiction, we are already assured by the fact- that\ninasmuch as the concept of cause has arisen wholly from pure\nunderstanding, and has its objective reality assured by the deduction,\nas it is moreover in its origin independent of any sensible\nconditions, it is, therefore, not restricted to phenomena (unless we\nwanted to make a definite theoretic use of it), but can be applied\nequally to things that are objects of the pure understanding. But,\nsince this application cannot rest on any intuition (for intuition can\nonly be sensible), therefore, causa noumenon, as regards the theoretic\nuse of reason, although a possible and thinkable, is yet an empty\nnotion. Now, I do not desire by means of this to understand\ntheoretically the nature of a being, in so far as it has a pure\nwill; it is enough for me to have thereby designated it as such, and\nhence to combine the notion of causality with that of freedom (and\nwhat is inseparable from it, the moral law, as its determining\nprinciple). Now, this right I certainly have by virtue of the pure,\nnot-empirical origin of the notion of cause, since I do not consider\nmyself entitled to make any use of it except in reference to the moral\nlaw which determines its reality, that is, only a practical use.\n\nIf, with Hume, I had denied to the notion of causality all objective\nreality in its [theoretic] use, not merely with regard to things in\nthemselves (the supersensible), but also with regard to the objects of\nthe senses, it would have lost all significance, and being a\ntheoretically impossible notion would have been declared to be quite\nuseless; and since what is nothing cannot be made any use of, the\npractical use of a concept theoretically null would have been\nabsurd. But, as it is, the concept of a causality free from\nempirical conditions, although empty, i.e., without any appropriate\nintuition), is yet theoretically possible, and refers to an\nindeterminate object; but in compensation significance is given to\nit in the moral law and consequently in a practical sense. I have,\nindeed, no intuition which should determine its objective theoretic\nreality, but not the less it has a real application, which is\nexhibited in concreto in intentions or maxims; that is, it has a\npractical reality which can be specified, and this is sufficient to\njustify it even with a view to noumena.\n\n                                         {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 155}\n\nNow, this objective reality of a pure concept of the understanding\nin the sphere of the supersensible, once brought in, gives an\nobjective reality also to all the other categories, although only so\nfar as they stand in necessary connexion with the determining\nprinciple of the will (the moral law); a reality only of practical\napplication, which has not the least effect in enlarging our\ntheoretical knowledge of these objects, or the discernment of their\nnature by pure reason. So we shall find also in the sequel that\nthese categories refer only to beings as intelligences, and in them\nonly to the relation of reason to the will; consequently, always\nonly to the practical, and beyond this cannot pretend to any knowledge\nof these beings; and whatever other properties belonging to the\ntheoretical representation of supersensible things may be brought into\nconnexion with these categories, this is not to be reckoned as\nknowledge, but only as a right (in a practical point of view, however,\nit is a necessity) to admit and assume such beings, even in the case\nwhere we [conceive] supersensible beings (e.g., God) according to\nanalogy, that is, a purely rational relation, of which we make a\npractical use with reference to what is sensible; and thus the\napplication to the supersensible solely in a practical point of view\ndoes not give pure theoretic reason the least encouragement to run\nriot into the transcendent.\n\nBOOK_1|CHAPTER_2\n\nCHAPTER II. Of the Concept of an Object of Pure Practical Reason.\n\n\n\nBy a concept of the practical reason I understand the idea of an\nobject as an effect possible to be produced through freedom. To be\nan object of practical knowledge, as such, signifies, therefore,\nonly the relation of the will to the action by which the object or its\nopposite would be realized; and to decide whether something is an\nobject of pure practical reason or not is only to discern the\npossibility or impossibility of willing the action by which, if we had\nthe required power (about which experience must decide), a certain\nobject would be realized. If the object be taken as the determining\nprinciple of our desire, it must first be known whether it is\nphysically possible by the free use of our powers, before we decide\nwhether it is an object of practical reason or not. On the other hand,\nif the law can be considered a priori as the determining principle\nof the action, and the latter therefore as determined by pure\npractical reason, the judgement whether a thing is an object of pure\npractical reason or not does not depend at all on the comparison\nwith our physical power; and the question is only whether we should\nwill an action that is directed to the existence of an object, if\nthe object were in our power; hence the previous question is only as\nthe moral possibility of the action, for in this case it is not the\nobject, but the law of the will, that is the determining principle\nof the action. The only objects of practical reason are therefore\nthose of good and evil. For by the former is meant an object\nnecessarily desired according to a principle of reason; by the\nlatter one necessarily shunned, also according to a principle of\nreason.\n\nIf the notion of good is not to be derived from an antecedent\npractical law, but, on the contrary, is to serve as its foundation, it\ncan only be the notion of something whose existence promises pleasure,\nand thus determines the causality of the subject to produce it, that\nis to say, determines the faculty of desire. Now, since it is\nimpossible to discern a priori what idea will be accompanied with\npleasure and what with pain, it will depend on experience alone to\nfind out what is primarily good or evil. The property of the\nsubject, with reference to which alone this experiment can be made, is\nthe feeling of pleasure and pain, a receptivity belonging to the\ninternal sense; thus that only would be primarily good with which\nthe sensation of pleasure is immediately connected, and that simply\nevil which immediately excites pain. Since, however, this is opposed\neven to the usage of language, which distinguishes the pleasant from\nthe good, the unpleasant from the evil, and requires that good and\nevil shall always be judged by reason, and, therefore, by concepts\nwhich can be communicated to everyone, and not by mere sensation,\nwhich is limited to individual [subjects] and their susceptibility;\nand, since nevertheless, pleasure or pain cannot be connected with any\nidea of an object a priori, the philosopher who thought himself\nobliged to make a feeling of pleasure the foundation of his\npractical judgements would call that good which is a means to the\npleasant, and evil, what is a cause of unpleasantness and pain; for\nthe judgement on the relation of means to ends certainly belongs to\nreason. But, although reason is alone capable of discerning the\nconnexion of means with their ends (so that the will might even be\ndefined as the faculty of ends, since these are always determining\nprinciples of the desires), yet the practical maxims which would\nfollow from the aforesaid principle of the good being merely a\nmeans, would never contain as the object of the will anything good\nin itself, but only something good for something; the good would\nalways be merely the useful, and that for which it is useful must\nalways lie outside the will, in sensation. Now if this as a pleasant\nsensation were to be distinguished from the notion of good, then there\nwould be nothing primarily good at all, but the good would have to\nbe sought only in the means to something else, namely, some\npleasantness.\n\nIt is an old formula of the schools: Nihil appetimus nisi sub\nratione boni; Nihil aversamur nisi sub ratione mali, and it is used\noften correctly, but often also in a manner injurious to philosophy,\nbecause the expressions boni and mali are ambiguous, owing to the\npoverty of language, in consequence of which they admit a double\nsense, and, therefore, inevitably bring the practical laws into\nambiguity; and philosophy, which in employing them becomes aware of\nthe different meanings in the same word, but can find no special\nexpressions for them, is driven to subtile distinctions about which\nthere is subsequently no unanimity, because the distinction could\nnot be directly marked by any suitable expression. *\n\n\n\n* Besides this, the expression sub ratione boni is also ambiguous.\nFor it may mean: \"We represent something to ourselves as good, when\nand because we desire (will) it\"; or \"We desire something because we\nrepresent it to ourselves as good,\" so that either the desire\ndetermines the notion of the object as a good, or the notion of good\ndetermines the desire (the will); so that in the first case sub\nratione boni would mean, \"We will something under the idea of the\ngood\"; in the second, \"In consequence of this idea,\" which, as\ndetermining the volition, must precede it.\n\n                                           {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 5}\n\n\n\nThe German language has the good fortune to possess expressions\nwhich do not allow this difference to be overlooked. It possesses\ntwo very distinct concepts and especially distinct expressions for\nthat which the Latins express by a single word, bonum. For bonum it\nhas das Gute [good], and das Wohl [well, weal], for malum das Bose\n[evil], and das Ubel [ill, bad], or das Well [woe]. So that we express\ntwo quite distinct judgements when we consider in an action the good\nand evil of it, or our weal and woe (ill). Hence it already follows\nthat the above quoted psychological proposition is at least very\ndoubtful if it is translated: \"We desire nothing except with a view to\nour weal or woe\"; on the other hand, if we render it thus: \"Under\nthe direction of reason we desire nothing except so far as we esteem\nit good or evil,\" it is indubitably certain and at the same time quite\nclearly expressed.\n\nWell or ill always implies only a reference to our condition, as\npleasant or unpleasant, as one of pleasure or pain, and if we desire\nor avoid an object on this account, it is only so far as it is\nreferred to our sensibility and to the feeling of pleasure or pain\nthat it produces. But good or evil always implies a reference to the\nwill, as determined by the law of reason, to make something its\nobject; for it is never determined directly by the object and the idea\nof it, but is a faculty of taking a rule of reason for or motive of an\naction (by which an object may be realized). Good and evil therefore\nare properly referred to actions, not to the sensations of the person,\nand if anything is to be good or evil absolutely (i.e., in every\nrespect and without any further condition), or is to be so esteemed,\nit can only be the manner of acting, the maxim of the will, and\nconsequently the acting person himself as a good or evil man that\ncan be so called, and not a thing.\n\nHowever, then, men may laugh at the Stoic, who in the severest\nparoxysms of gout cried out: \"Pain, however thou tormentest me, I will\nnever admit that thou art an evil (kakov, malum)\": he was right. A bad\nthing it certainly was, and his cry betrayed that; but that any evil\nattached to him thereby, this he had no reason whatever to admit,\nfor pain did not in the least diminish the worth of his person, but\nonly that of his condition. If he had been conscious of a single\nlie, it would have lowered his pride, but pain served only to raise\nit, when he was conscious that he had not deserved it by any\nunrighteous action by which he had rendered himself worthy of\npunishment.\n\nWhat we call good must be an object of desire in the judgement of\nevery rational man, and evil an object of aversion in the eyes of\neveryone; therefore, in addition to sense, this judgement requires\nreason. So it is with truthfulness, as opposed to lying; so with\njustice, as opposed to violence, &c. But we may call a thing a bad [or\nill] thing, which yet everyone must at the same time acknowledge to be\ngood, sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly. The man who submits to\na surgical operation feels it no doubt as a bad thing, but by their\nreason he and everyone acknowledge it to be good. If a man who\ndelights in annoying and vexing peaceable people at last receives a\nright good beating, this is no doubt a bad thing; but everyone\napproves it and regards it as a good thing, even though nothing else\nresulted from it; nay, even the man who receives it must in his reason\nacknowledge that he has met justice, because he sees the proportion\nbetween good conduct and good fortune, which reason inevitably\nplaces before him, here put into practice.\n\n                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 10}\n\nNo doubt our weal and woe are of very great importance in the\nestimation of our practical reason, and as far as our nature as\nsensible beings is concerned, our happiness is the only thing of\nconsequence, provided it is estimated as reason especially requires,\nnot by the transitory sensation, but by the influence that this has on\nour whole existence, and on our satisfaction therewith; but it is\nnot absolutely the only thing of consequence. Man is a being who, as\nbelonging to the world of sense, has wants, and so far his reason\nhas an office which it cannot refuse, namely, to attend to the\ninterest of his sensible nature, and to form practical maxims, even\nwith a view to the happiness of this life, and if possible even to\nthat of a future. But he is not so completely an animal as to be\nindifferent to what reason says on its own account, and to use it\nmerely as an instrument for the satisfaction of his wants as a\nsensible being. For the possession of reason would not raise his worth\nabove that of the brutes, if it is to serve him only for the same\npurpose that instinct serves in them; it would in that case be only\na particular method which nature had employed to equip man for the\nsame ends for which it has qualified brutes, without qualifying him\nfor any higher purpose. No doubt once this arrangement of nature has\nbeen made for him he requires reason in order to take into\nconsideration his weal and woe, but besides this he possesses it for a\nhigher purpose also, namely, not only to take into consideration\nwhat is good or evil in itself, about which only pure reason,\nuninfluenced by any sensible interest, can judge, but also to\ndistinguish this estimate thoroughly from the former and to make it\nthe supreme condition thereof.\n\nIn estimating what is good or evil in itself, as distinguished\nfrom what can be so called only relatively, the following points are\nto be considered. Either a rational principle is already conceived, as\nof itself the determining principle of the will, without regard to\npossible objects of desire (and therefore by the more legislative form\nof the maxim), and in that case that principle is a practical a priori\nlaw, and pure reason is supposed to be practical of itself. The law in\nthat case determines the will directly; the action conformed to it\nis good in itself; a will whose maxim always conforms to this law is\ngood absolutely in every respect and is the supreme condition of all\ngood. Or the maxim of the will is consequent on a determining\nprinciple of desire which presupposes an object of pleasure or pain,\nsomething therefore that pleases or displeases, and the maxim of\nreason that we should pursue the former and avoid the latter\ndetermines our actions as good relatively to our inclination, that is,\ngood indirectly, (i.e., relatively to a different end to which they are\nmeans), and in that case these maxims can never be called laws, but\nmay be called rational practical precepts. The end itself, the\npleasure that we seek, is in the latter case not a good but a welfare;\nnot a concept of reason, but an empirical concept of an object of\nsensation; but the use of the means thereto, that is, the action, is\nnevertheless called good (because rational deliberation is required\nfor it), not however, good absolutely, but only relatively to our\nsensuous nature, with regard to its feelings of pleasure and\ndispleasure; but the will whose maxim is affected thereby is not a\npure will; this is directed only to that in which pure reason by\nitself can be practical.\n\nThis is the proper place to explain the paradox of method in a\ncritique of practical reason, namely, that the concept of good and\nevil must not be determined before the moral law (of which it seems as\nif it must be the foundation), but only after it and by means of it.\nIn fact, even if we did not know that the principle of morality is a\npure a priori law determining the will, yet, that we may not assume\nprinciples quite gratuitously, we must, at least at first, leave it\nundecided, whether the will has merely empirical principles of\ndetermination, or whether it has not also pure a priori principles;\nfor it is contrary to all rules of philosophical method to assume as\ndecided that which is the very point in question. Supposing that we\nwished to begin with the concept of good, in order to deduce from it\nthe laws of the will, then this concept of an object (as a good) would\nat the same time assign to us this object as the sole determining\nprinciple of the will. Now, since this concept had not any practical a\npriori law for its standard, the criterion of good or evil could not\nbe placed in anything but the agreement of the object with our feeling\nof pleasure or pain; and the use of reason could only consist in\ndetermining in the first place this pleasure or pain in connexion with\nall the sensations of my existence, and in the second place the\nmeans of securing to myself the object of the pleasure. Now, as\nexperience alone can decide what conforms to the feeling of\npleasure, and by hypothesis the practical law is to be based on this\nas a condition, it follows that the possibility of a priori\npractical laws would be at once excluded, because it was imagined to\nbe necessary first of all to find an object the concept of which, as a\ngood, should constitute the universal though empirical principle of\ndetermination of the will. But what it was necessary to inquire\nfirst of all was whether there is not an a priori determining\nprinciple of the will (and this could never be found anywhere but in a\npure practical law, in so far as this law prescribes to maxims\nmerely their form without regard to an object). Since, however, we\nlaid the foundation of all practical law in an object determined by\nour conceptions of good and evil, whereas without a previous law\nthat object could not be conceived by empirical concepts, we have\ndeprived ourselves beforehand of the possibility of even conceiving\na pure practical law. On the other hand, if we had first\ninvestigated the latter analytically, we should have found that it\nis not the concept of good as an object that determines the moral\nlaw and makes it possible, but that, on the contrary, it is the\nmoral law that first determines the concept of good and makes it\npossible, so far as it deserves the name of good absolutely.\n\nThis remark, which only concerns the method of ultimate ethical\ninquiries, is of importance. It explains at once the occasion of all\nthe mistakes of philosophers with respect to the supreme principle\nof morals. For they sought for an object of the will which they\ncould make the matter and principle of a law (which consequently could\nnot determine the will directly, but by means of that object\nreferred to the feeling of pleasure or pain; whereas they ought\nfirst to have searched for a law that would determine the will a\npriori and directly, and afterwards determine the object in accordance\nwith the will). Now, whether they placed this object of pleasure,\nwhich was to supply the supreme conception of goodness, in\nhappiness, in perfection, in moral [feeling], or in the will of God,\ntheir principle in every case implied heteronomy, and they must\ninevitably come upon empirical conditions of a moral law, since\ntheir object, which was to be the immediate principle of the will,\ncould not be called good or bad except in its immediate relation to\nfeeling, which is always empirical. It is only a formal law- that\nis, one which prescribes to reason nothing more than the form of its\nuniversal legislation as the supreme condition of its maxims- that can\nbe a priori a determining principle of practical reason. The\nancients avowed this error without concealment by directing all\ntheir moral inquiries to the determination of the notion of the summum\nbonum, which they intended afterwards to make the determining\nprinciple of the will in the moral law; whereas it is only far\nlater, when the moral law has been first established for itself, and\nshown to be the direct determining principle of the will, that this\nobject can be presented to the will, whose form is now determined a\npriori; and this we shall undertake in the Dialectic of the pure\npractical reason. The moderns, with whom the question of the summum\nbonum has gone out of fashion, or at least seems to have become a\nsecondary matter, hide the same error under vague (expressions as in\nmany other cases). It shows itself, nevertheless, in their systems, as\nit always produces heteronomy of practical reason; and from this can\nnever be derived a moral law giving universal commands.\n\nNow, since the notions of good and evil, as consequences of the a\npriori determination of the will, imply also a pure practical\nprinciple, and therefore a causality of pure reason; hence they do not\noriginally refer to objects (so as to be, for instance, special\nmodes of the synthetic unity of the manifold of given intuitions in\none consciousness) like the pure concepts of the understanding or\ncategories of reason in its theoretic employment; on the contrary,\nthey presuppose that objects are given; but they are all modes\n(modi) of a single category, namely, that of causality, the\ndetermining principle of which consists in the rational conception\nof a law, which as a law of freedom reason gives to itself, thereby\na priori proving itself practical. However, as the actions on the\none side come under a law which is not a physical law, but a law of\nfreedom, and consequently belong to the conduct of beings in the world\nof intelligence, yet on the other side as events in the world of sense\nthey belong to phenomena; hence the determinations of a practical\nreason are only possible in reference to the latter and, therefore, in\naccordance with the categories of the understanding; not indeed with a\nview to any theoretic employment of it, i.e., so as to bring the\nmanifold of (sensible) intuition under one consciousness a priori; but\nonly to subject the manifold of desires to the unity of\nconsciousness of a practical reason, giving it commands in the moral\nlaw, i.e., to a pure will a priori.\n\n                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 15}\n\nThese categories of freedom- for so we choose to call them in\ncontrast to those theoretic categories which are categories of\nphysical nature- have an obvious advantage over the latter, inasmuch\nas the latter are only forms of thought which designate objects in\nan indefinite manner by means of universal concept of every possible\nintuition; the former, on the contrary, refer to the determination\nof a free elective will (to which indeed no exactly corresponding\nintuition can be assigned, but which has as its foundation a pure\npractical a priori law, which is not the case with any concepts\nbelonging to the theoretic use of our cognitive faculties); hence,\ninstead of the form of intuition (space and time), which does not\nlie in reason itself, but has to be drawn from another source, namely,\nthe sensibility, these being elementary practical concepts have as\ntheir foundation the form of a pure will, which is given in reason\nand, therefore, in the thinking faculty itself. From this it happens\nthat as all precepts of pure practical reason have to do only with the\ndetermination of the will, not with the physical conditions (of\npractical ability) of the execution of one's purpose, the practical\na priori principles in relation to the supreme principle of freedom\nare at once cognitions, and have not to wait for intuitions in order\nto acquire significance, and that for this remarkable reason,\nbecause they themselves produce the reality of that to which they\nrefer (the intention of the will), which is not the case with\ntheoretical concepts. Only we must be careful to observe that these\ncategories only apply to the practical reason; and thus they proceed\nin order from those which are as yet subject to sensible conditions\nand morally indeterminate to those which are free from sensible\nconditions and determined merely by the moral law.\n\n\n\nTable of the Categories of Freedom relatively to the Notions of Good\nand Evil.\n\n\n\n                   I. QUANTITY.\n\n                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 20}\n\n Subjective, according to maxims (practical opinions of the\n\n   individual)\n\n Objective, according to principles (Precepts)\n\n A priori both objective and subjective principles of freedom\n\n   (laws)\n\n                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 25}\n\n\n\n                   II. QUALITY.\n\n Practical rules of action (praeceptivae)\n\n Practical rules of omission (prohibitivae)\n\n Practical rules of exceptions (exceptivae)\n\n                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 30}\n\n\n\n                   III. RELATION.\n\n To personality\n\n To the condition of the person.\n\n Reciprocal, of one person to the others of the others.\n\n\n\n                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 35}\n\n                    IV. MODALITY.\n\n The Permitted and the Forbidden\n\n Duty and the contrary to duty.\n\n Perfect and imperfect duty.\n\n\n\n                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 40}\n\nIt will at once be observed that in this table freedom is considered\nas a sort of causality not subject to empirical principles of\ndetermination, in regard to actions possible by it, which are\nphenomena in the world of sense, and that consequently it is\nreferred to the categories which concern its physical possibility,\nwhilst yet each category is taken so universally that the\ndetermining principle of that causality can be placed outside the\nworld of sense in freedom as a property of a being in the world of\nintelligence; and finally the categories of modality introduce the\ntransition from practical principles generally to those of morality,\nbut only problematically. These can be established dogmatically only\nby the moral law.\n\nI add nothing further here in explanation of the present table,\nsince it is intelligible enough of itself. A division of this kind\nbased on principles is very useful in any science, both for the sake\nof thoroughness and intelligibility. Thus, for instance, we know\nfrom the preceding table and its first number what we must begin\nfrom in practical inquiries; namely, from the maxims which every one\nfounds on his own inclinations; the precepts which hold for a\nspecies of rational beings so far as they agree in certain\ninclinations; and finally the law which holds for all without regard\nto their inclinations, etc. In this way we survey the whole plan of\nwhat has to be done, every question of practical philosophy that has\nto be answered, and also the order that is to be followed.\n\n\n\nOf the Typic of the Pure Practical Judgement.\n\n\n\n                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 45}\n\nIt is the notions of good and evil that first determine an object of\nthe will. They themselves, however, are subject to a practical rule of\nreason which, if it is pure reason, determines the will a priori\nrelatively to its object. Now, whether an action which is possible\nto us in the world of sense, comes under the rule or not, is a\nquestion to be decided by the practical judgement, by which what is\nsaid in the rule universally (in abstracto) is applied to an action in\nconcreto. But since a practical rule of pure reason in the first place\nas practical concerns the existence of an object, and in the second\nplace as a practical rule of pure reason implies necessity as\nregards the existence of the action and, therefore, is a practical\nlaw, not a physical law depending on empirical principles of\ndetermination, but a law of freedom by which the will is to be\ndetermined independently on anything empirical (merely by the\nconception of a law and its form), whereas all instances that can\noccur of possible actions can only be empirical, that is, belong to\nthe experience of physical nature; hence, it seems absurd to expect to\nfind in the world of sense a case which, while as such it depends only\non the law of nature, yet admits of the application to it of a law\nof freedom, and to which we can apply the supersensible idea of the\nmorally good which is to be exhibited in it in concreto. Thus, the\njudgement of the pure practical reason is subject to the same\ndifficulties as that of the pure theoretical reason. The latter,\nhowever, had means at hand of escaping from these difficulties,\nbecause, in regard to the theoretical employment, intuitions were\nrequired to which pure concepts of the understanding could be applied,\nand such intuitions (though only of objects of the senses) can be\ngiven a priori and, therefore, as far as regards the union of the\nmanifold in them, conforming to the pure a priori concepts of the\nunderstanding as schemata. On the other hand, the morally good is\nsomething whose object is supersensible; for which, therefore, nothing\ncorresponding can be found in any sensible intuition. Judgement\ndepending on laws of pure practical reason seems, therefore, to be\nsubject to special difficulties arising from this, that a law of\nfreedom is to be applied to actions, which are events taking place\nin the world of sense, and which, so far, belong to physical nature.\n\nBut here again is opened a favourable prospect for the pure\npractical judgement. When I subsume under a pure practical law an\naction possible to me in the world of sense, I am not concerned with\nthe possibility of the action as an event in the world of sense.\nThis is a matter that belongs to the decision of reason in its\ntheoretic use according to the law of causality, which is a pure\nconcept of the understanding, for which reason has a schema in the\nsensible intuition. Physical causality, or the condition under which\nit takes place, belongs to the physical concepts, the schema of\nwhich is sketched by transcendental imagination. Here, however, we\nhave to do, not with the schema of a case that occurs according to\nlaws, but with the schema of a law itself (if the word is allowable\nhere), since the fact that the will (not the action relatively to\nits effect) is determined by the law alone without any other\nprinciple, connects the notion of causality with quite different\nconditions from those which constitute physical connection.\n\nThe physical law being a law to which the objects of sensible\nintuition, as such, are subject, must have a schema corresponding to\nit- that is, a general procedure of the imagination (by which it\nexhibits a priori to the senses the pure concept of the\nunderstanding which the law determines). But the law of freedom\n(that is, of a causality not subject to sensible conditions), and\nconsequently the concept of the unconditionally good, cannot have\nany intuition, nor consequently any schema supplied to it for the\npurpose of its application in concreto. Consequently the moral law has\nno faculty but the understanding to aid its application to physical\nobjects (not the imagination); and the understanding for the\npurposes of the judgement can provide for an idea of the reason, not a\nschema of the sensibility, but a law, though only as to its form as\nlaw; such a law, however, as can be exhibited in concreto in objects\nof the senses, and therefore a law of nature. We can therefore call\nthis law the type of the moral law.\n\nThe rule of the judgement according to laws of pure practical reason\nis this: ask yourself whether, if the action you propose were to\ntake place by a law of the system of nature of which you were yourself\na part, you could regard it as possible by your own will. Everyone\ndoes, in fact, decide by this rule whether actions are morally good or\nevil. Thus, people say: \"If everyone permitted himself to deceive,\nwhen he thought it to his advantage; or thought himself justified in\nshortening his life as soon as he was thoroughly weary of it; or\nlooked with perfect indifference on the necessity of others; and if\nyou belonged to such an order of things, would you do so with the\nassent of your own will?\" Now everyone knows well that if he\nsecretly allows himself to deceive, it does not follow that everyone\nelse does so; or if, unobserved, he is destitute of compassion, others\nwould not necessarily be so to him; hence, this comparison of the\nmaxim of his actions with a universal law of nature is not the\ndetermining principle of his will. Such a law is, nevertheless, a type\nof the estimation of the maxim on moral principles. If the maxim of\nthe action is not such as to stand the test of the form of a universal\nlaw of nature, then it is morally impossible. This is the judgement\neven of common sense; for its ordinary judgements, even those of\nexperience, are always based on the law of nature. It has it therefore\nalways at hand, only that in cases where causality from freedom is\nto be criticised, it makes that law of nature only the type of a law\nof freedom, because, without something which it could use as an\nexample in a case of experience, it could not give the law of a pure\npractical reason its proper use in practice.\n\nIt is therefore allowable to use the system of the world of sense as\nthe type of a supersensible system of things, provided I do not\ntransfer to the latter the intuitions, and what depends on them, but\nmerely apply to it the form of law in general (the notion of which\noccurs even in the commonest use of reason, but cannot be definitely\nknown a priori for any other purpose than the pure practical use of\nreason); for laws, as such, are so far identical, no matter from\nwhat they derive their determining principles.\n\n                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 50}\n\nFurther, since of all the supersensible absolutely nothing [is\nknown] except freedom (through the moral law), and this only so far as\nit is inseparably implied in that law, and moreover all\nsupersensible objects to which reason might lead us, following the\nguidance of that law, have still no reality for us, except for the\npurpose of that law, and for the use of mere practical reason; and\nas reason is authorized and even compelled to use physical nature\n(in its pure form as an object of the understanding) as the type of\nthe judgement; hence, the present remark will serve to guard against\nreckoning amongst concepts themselves that which belongs only to the\ntypic of concepts. This, namely, as a typic of the judgement, guards\nagainst the empiricism of practical reason, which founds the practical\nnotions of good and evil merely on experienced consequences (so-called\nhappiness). No doubt happiness and the infinite advantages which would\nresult from a will determined by self-love, if this will at the same\ntime erected itself into a universal law of nature, may certainly\nserve as a perfectly suitable type of the morally good, but it is\nnot identical with it. The same typic guards also against the\nmysticism of practical reason, which turns what served only as a\nsymbol into a schema, that is, proposes to provide for the moral\nconcepts actual intuitions, which, however, are not sensible\n(intuitions of an invisible Kingdom of God), and thus plunges into the\ntranscendent. What is befitting the use of the moral concepts is\nonly the rationalism of the judgement, which takes from the sensible\nsystem of nature only what pure reason can also conceive of itself,\nthat is, conformity to law, and transfers into the supersensible\nnothing but what can conversely be actually exhibited by actions in\nthe world of sense according to the formal rule of a law of nature.\nHowever, the caution against empiricism of practical reason is much\nmore important; for mysticism is quite reconcilable with the purity\nand sublimity of the moral law, and, besides, it is not very natural\nor agreeable to common habits of thought to strain one's imagination\nto supersensible intuitions; and hence the danger on this side is\nnot so general. Empiricism, on the contrary, cuts up at the roots\nthe morality of intentions (in which, and not in actions only,\nconsists the high worth that men can and ought to give to themselves),\nand substitutes for duty something quite different, namely, an\nempirical interest, with which the inclinations generally are secretly\nleagued; and empiricism, moreover, being on this account allied with\nall the inclinations which (no matter what fashion they put on)\ndegrade humanity when they are raised to the dignity of a supreme\npractical principle; and as these, nevertheless, are so favourable\nto everyone's feelings, it is for that reason much more dangerous than\nmysticism, which can never constitute a lasting condition of any great\nnumber of persons.\n\nBOOK_1|CHAPTER_3\n\n  CHAPTER III. Of the Motives of Pure Practical Reason.\n\n\n\nWhat is essential in the moral worth of actions is that the moral\nlaw should directly determine the will. If the determination of the\nwill takes place in conformity indeed to the moral law, but only by\nmeans of a feeling, no matter of what kind, which has to be\npresupposed in order that the law may be sufficient to determine the\nwill, and therefore not for the sake of the law, then the action\nwill possess legality, but not morality. Now, if we understand by\nmotive (elater animi) the subjective ground of determination of the\nwill of a being whose reason does not necessarily conform to the\nobjective law, by virtue of its own nature, then it will follow,\nfirst, that no motives can be attributed to the Divine will, and that\nthe motives of the human will (as well as that of every created\nrational being) can never be anything else than the moral law, and\nconsequently that the objective principle of determination must always\nand alone be also the subjectively sufficient determining principle of\nthe action, if this is not merely to fulfil the letter of the law,\nwithout containing its spirit. *\n\n\n\n* We may say of every action that conforms to the law, but is not\ndone for the sake of the law, that it is morally good in the letter,\nnot in the spirit (the intention).\n\n\n\nSince, then, for the purpose of giving the moral law influence\nover the will, we must not seek for any other motives that might\nenable us to dispense with the motive of the law itself, because\nthat would produce mere hypocrisy, without consistency; and it is even\ndangerous to allow other motives (for instance, that of interest) even\nto co-operate along with the moral law; hence nothing is left us but\nto determine carefully in what way the moral law becomes a motive, and\nwhat effect this has upon the faculty of desire. For as to the\nquestion how a law can be directly and of itself a determining\nprinciple of the will (which is the essence of morality), this is, for\nhuman reason, an insoluble problem and identical with the question:\nhow a free will is possible. Therefore what we have to show a priori\nis not why the moral law in itself supplies a motive, but what\neffect it, as such, produces (or, more correctly speaking, must\nproduce) on the mind.\n\n                                           {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_3 ^paragraph 5}\n\nThe essential point in every determination of the will by the\nmoral law is that being a free will it is determined simply by the\nmoral law, not only without the co-operation of sensible impulses, but\neven to the rejection of all such, and to the checking of all\ninclinations so far as they might be opposed to that law. So far,\nthen, the effect of the moral law as a motive is only negative, and\nthis motive can be known a priori to be such. For all inclination\nand every sensible impulse is founded on feeling, and the negative\neffect produced on feeling (by the check on the inclinations) is\nitself feeling; consequently, we can see a priori that the moral\nlaw, as a determining principle of the will, must by thwarting all our\ninclinations produce a feeling which may be called pain; and in this\nwe have the first, perhaps the only, instance in which we are able\nfrom a priori considerations to determine the relation of a\ncognition (in this case of pure practical reason) to the feeling of\npleasure or displeasure. All the inclinations together (which can be\nreduced to a tolerable system, in which case their satisfaction is\ncalled happiness) constitute self-regard (solipsismus). This is either\nthe self-love that consists in an excessive fondness for oneself\n(philautia), or satisfaction with oneself (arrogantia). The former\nis called particularly selfishness; the latter self-conceit. Pure\npractical reason only checks selfishness, looking on it as natural and\nactive in us even prior to the moral law, so far as to limit it to the\ncondition of agreement with this law, and then it is called rational\nself-love. But self-conceit reason strikes down altogether, since\nall claims to self-esteem which precede agreement with the moral law\nare vain and unjustifiable, for the certainty of a state of mind\nthat coincides with this law is the first condition of personal\nworth (as we shall presently show more clearly), and prior to this\nconformity any pretension to worth is false and unlawful. Now the\npropensity to self-esteem is one of the inclinations which the moral\nlaw checks, inasmuch as that esteem rests only on morality.\nTherefore the moral law breaks down self-conceit. But as this law is\nsomething positive in itself, namely, the form of an intellectual\ncausality, that is, of freedom, it must be an object of respect;\nfor, by opposing the subjective antagonism of the inclinations, it\nweakens self-conceit; and since it even breaks down, that is,\nhumiliates, this conceit, it is an object of the highest respect\nand, consequently, is the foundation of a positive feeling which is\nnot of empirical origin, but is known a priori. Therefore respect\nfor the moral law is a feeling which is produced by an intellectual\ncause, and this feeling is the only one that we know quite a priori\nand the necessity of which we can perceive.\n\nIn the preceding chapter we have seen that everything that\npresents itself as an object of the will prior to the moral law is\nby that law itself, which is the supreme condition of practical\nreason, excluded from the determining principles of the will which\nwe have called the unconditionally good; and that the mere practical\nform which consists in the adaptation of the maxims to universal\nlegislation first determines what is good in itself and absolutely,\nand is the basis of the maxims of a pure will, which alone is good\nin every respect. However, we find that our nature as sensible\nbeings is such that the matter of desire (objects of inclination,\nwhether of hope or fear) first presents itself to us; and our\npathologically affected self, although it is in its maxims quite unfit\nfor universal legislation; yet, just as if it constituted our entire\nself, strives to put its pretensions forward first, and to have them\nacknowledged as the first and original. This propensity to make\nourselves in the subjective determining principles of our choice serve\nas the objective determining principle of the will generally may be\ncalled self-love; and if this pretends to be legislative as an\nunconditional practical principle it may be called self-conceit. Now\nthe moral law, which alone is truly objective (namely, in every\nrespect), entirely excludes the influence of self-love on the\nsupreme practical principle, and indefinitely checks the\nself-conceit that prescribes the subjective conditions of the former\nas laws. Now whatever checks our self-conceit in our own judgement\nhumiliates; therefore the moral law inevitably humbles every man\nwhen he compares with it the physical propensities of his nature.\nThat, the idea of which as a determining principle of our will humbles\nus in our self-consciousness, awakes respect for itself, so far as\nit is itself positive and a determining principle. Therefore the moral\nlaw is even subjectively a cause of respect. Now since everything that\nenters into self-love belongs to inclination, and all inclination\nrests on feelings, and consequently whatever checks all the feelings\ntogether in self-love has necessarily, by this very circumstance, an\ninfluence on feeling; hence we comprehend how it is possible to\nperceive a priori that the moral law can produce an effect on feeling,\nin that it excludes the inclinations and the propensity to make them\nthe supreme practical condition, i.e., self-love, from all\nparticipation in the supreme legislation. This effect is on one side\nmerely negative, but on the other side, relatively to the\nrestricting principle of pure practical reason, it is positive. No\nspecial kind of feeling need be assumed for this under the name of a\npractical or moral feeling as antecedent to the moral law and\nserving as its foundation.\n\nThe negative effect on feeling (unpleasantness) is pathological,\nlike every influence on feeling and like every feeling generally.\nBut as an effect of the consciousness of the moral law, and\nconsequently in relation to a supersensible cause, namely, the subject\nof pure practical reason which is the supreme lawgiver, this feeling\nof a rational being affected by inclinations is called humiliation\n(intellectual self-depreciation); but with reference to the positive\nsource of this humiliation, the law, it is respect for it. There is\nindeed no feeling for this law; but inasmuch as it removes the\nresistance out of the way, this removal of an obstacle is, in the\njudgement of reason, esteemed equivalent to a positive help to its\ncausality. Therefore this feeling may also be called a feeling of\nrespect for the moral law, and for both reasons together a moral\nfeeling.\n\nWhile the moral law, therefore, is a formal determining principle of\naction by practical pure reason, and is moreover a material though\nonly objective determining principle of the objects of action as\ncalled good and evil, it is also a subjective determining principle,\nthat is, a motive to this action, inasmuch as it has influence on\nthe morality of the subject and produces a feeling conducive to the\ninfluence of the law on the will. There is here in the subject no\nantecedent feeling tending to morality. For this is impossible,\nsince every feeling is sensible, and the motive of moral intention\nmust be free from all sensible conditions. On the contrary, while\nthe sensible feeling which is at the bottom of all our inclinations is\nthe condition of that impression which we call respect, the cause that\ndetermines it lies in the pure practical reason; and this impression\ntherefore, on account of its origin, must be called, not a\npathological but a practical effect. For by the fact that the\nconception of the moral law deprives self-love of its influence, and\nself-conceit of its illusion, it lessens the obstacle to pure\npractical reason and produces the conception of the superiority of its\nobjective law to the impulses of the sensibility; and thus, by\nremoving the counterpoise, it gives relatively greater weight to the\nlaw in the judgement of reason (in the case of a will affected by\nthe aforesaid impulses). Thus the respect for the law is not a\nmotive to morality, but is morality itself subjectively considered\nas a motive, inasmuch as pure practical reason, by rejecting all the\nrival pretensions of self-love, gives authority to the law, which now\nalone has influence. Now it is to be observed that as respect is an\neffect on feeling, and therefore on the sensibility, of a rational\nbeing, it presupposes this sensibility, and therefore also the\nfiniteness of such beings on whom the moral law imposes respect; and\nthat respect for the law cannot be attributed to a supreme being, or\nto any being free from all sensibility, in whom, therefore, this\nsensibility cannot be an obstacle to practical reason.\n\nThis feeling (which we call the moral feeling) is therefore produced\nsimply by reason. It does not serve for the estimation of actions\nnor for the foundation of the objective moral law itself, but merely\nas a motive to make this of itself a maxim. But what name could we\nmore suitably apply to this singular feeling which cannot be\ncompared to any pathological feeling? It is of such a peculiar kind\nthat it seems to be at the disposal of reason only, and that pure\npractical reason.\n\n                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_3 ^paragraph 10}\n\nRespect applies always to persons only- not to things. The latter\nmay arouse inclination, and if they are animals (e.g., horses, dogs,\netc.), even love or fear, like the sea, a volcano, a beast of prey;\nbut never respect. Something that comes nearer to this feeling is\nadmiration, and this, as an affection, astonishment, can apply to\nthings also, e.g., lofty mountains, the magnitude, number, and\ndistance of the heavenly bodies, the strength and swiftness of many\nanimals, etc. But all this is not respect. A man also may be an object\nto me of love, fear, or admiration, even to astonishment, and yet\nnot be an object of respect. His jocose humour, his courage and\nstrength, his power from the rank he has amongst others, may inspire\nme with sentiments of this kind, but still inner respect for him is\nwanting. Fontenelle says, \"I bow before a great man, but my mind\ndoes not bow.\" I would add, before an humble plain man, in whom I\nperceive uprightness of character in a higher degree than I am\nconscious of in myself,- my mind bows whether I choose it or not,\nand though I bear my head never so high that he may not forget my\nsuperior rank. Why is this? Because his example exhibits to me a law\nthat humbles my self-conceit when I compare it with my conduct: a law,\nthe practicability of obedience to which I see proved by fact before\nmy eyes. Now, I may even be conscious of a like degree of uprightness,\nand yet the respect remains. For since in man all good is defective,\nthe law made visible by an example still humbles my pride, my standard\nbeing furnished by a man whose imperfections, whatever they may be,\nare not known to me as my own are, and who therefore appears to me\nin a more favourable light. Respect is a tribute which we cannot\nrefuse to merit, whether we will or not; we may indeed outwardly\nwithhold it, but we cannot help feeling it inwardly.\n\nRespect is so far from being a feeling of pleasure that we only\nreluctantly give way to it as regards a man. We try to find\nout something that may lighten the burden of it, some fault\nto compensate us for the humiliation which such an example\ncauses. Even the dead are not always secure from this criticism,\nespecially if their example appears inimitable. Even the moral law\nitself in its solemn majesty is exposed to this endeavour to save\noneself from yielding it respect. Can it be thought that it is for any\nother reason that we are so ready to reduce it to the level of our\nfamiliar inclination, or that it is for any other reason that we all\ntake such trouble to make it out to be the chosen precept of our own\ninterest well understood, but that we want to be free from the\ndeterrent respect which shows us our own unworthiness with such\nseverity? Nevertheless, on the other hand, so little is there pain\nin it that if once one has laid aside self-conceit and allowed\npractical influence to that respect, he can never be satisfied with\ncontemplating the majesty of this law, and the soul believes itself\nelevated in proportion as it sees the holy law elevated above it and\nits frail nature. No doubt great talents and activity proportioned\nto them may also occasion respect or an analogous feeling. It is\nvery proper to yield it to them, and then it appears as if this\nsentiment were the same thing as admiration. But if we look closer\nwe shall observe that it is always uncertain how much of the ability\nis due to native talent, and how much to diligence in cultivating\nit. Reason represents it to us as probably the fruit of cultivation,\nand therefore as meritorious, and this notably reduces our\nself-conceit, and either casts a reproach on us or urges us to\nfollow such an example in the way that is suitable to us. This\nrespect, then, which we show to such a person (properly speaking, to\nthe law that his example exhibits) is not mere admiration; and this is\nconfirmed also by the fact that when the common run of admirers\nthink they have learned from any source the badness of such a man's\ncharacter (for instance Voltaire's) they give up all respect for\nhim; whereas the true scholar still feels it at least with regard to\nhis talents, because he is himself engaged in a business and a\nvocation which make imitation of such a man in some degree a law.\n\nRespect for the moral law is, therefore, the only and the\nundoubted moral motive, and this feeling is directed to no object,\nexcept on the ground of this law. The moral law first determines the\nwill objectively and directly in the judgement of reason; and freedom,\nwhose causality can be determined only by the law, consists just in\nthis, that it restricts all inclinations, and consequently\nself-esteem, by the condition of obedience to its pure law. This\nrestriction now has an effect on feeling, and produces the\nimpression of displeasure which can be known a priori from the moral\nlaw. Since it is so far only a negative effect which, arising from the\ninfluence of pure practical reason, checks the activity of the\nsubject, so far as it is determined by inclinations, and hence\nchecks the opinion of his personal worth (which, in the absence of\nagreement with the moral law, is reduced to nothing); hence, the\neffect of this law on feeling is merely humiliation. We can,\ntherefore, perceive this a priori, but cannot know by it the force\nof the pure practical law as a motive, but only the resistance to\nmotives of the sensibility. But since the same law is objectively,\nthat is, in the conception of pure reason, an immediate principle of\ndetermination of the will, and consequently this humiliation takes\nplace only relatively to the purity of the law; hence, the lowering of\nthe pretensions of moral self-esteem, that is, humiliation on the\nsensible side, is an elevation of the moral, i.e., practical, esteem\nfor the law itself on the intellectual side; in a word, it is\nrespect for the law, and therefore, as its cause is intellectual, a\npositive feeling which can be known a priori. For whatever\ndiminishes the obstacles to an activity furthers this activity itself.\nNow the recognition of the moral law is the consciousness of an\nactivity of practical reason from objective principles, which only\nfails to reveal its effect in actions because subjective\n(pathological) causes hinder it. Respect for the moral law then must\nbe regarded as a positive, though indirect, effect of it on feeling,\ninasmuch as this respect weakens the impeding influence of\ninclinations by humiliating self-esteem; and hence also as a subjective\nprinciple of activity, that is, as a motive to obedience to the law,\nand as a principle of the maxims of a life conformable to it. From the\nnotion of a motive arises that of an interest, which can never be\nattributed to any being unless it possesses reason, and which\nsignifies a motive of the will in so far as it is conceived by the\nreason. Since in a morally good will the law itself must be the\nmotive, the moral interest is a pure interest of practical reason\nalone, independent of sense. On the notion of an interest is based\nthat of a maxim. This, therefore, is morally good only in case it\nrests simply on the interest taken in obedience to the law. All\nthree notions, however, that of a motive, of an interest, and of a\nmaxim, can be applied only to finite beings. For they all suppose a\nlimitation of the nature of the being, in that the subjective\ncharacter of his choice does not of itself agree with the objective\nlaw of a practical reason; they suppose that the being requires to\nbe impelled to action by something, because an internal obstacle\nopposes itself. Therefore they cannot be applied to the Divine will.\n\nThere is something so singular in the unbounded esteem for the\npure moral law, apart from all advantage, as it is presented for our\nobedience by practical reason, the voice of which makes even the\nboldest sinner tremble and compels him to hide himself from it, that\nwe cannot wonder if we find this influence of a mere intellectual idea\non the feelings quite incomprehensible to speculative reason and\nhave to be satisfied with seeing so much of this a priori that such\na feeling is inseparably connected with the conception of the moral\nlaw in every finite rational being. If this feeling of respect were\npathological, and therefore were a feeling of pleasure based on the\ninner sense, it would be in vain to try to discover a connection of it\nwith any idea a priori. But [it] is a feeling that applies merely to\nwhat is practical, and depends on the conception of a law, simply as\nto its form, not on account of any object, and therefore cannot be\nreckoned either as pleasure or pain, and yet produces an interest in\nobedience to the law, which we call the moral interest, just as the\ncapacity of taking such an interest in the law (or respect for the\nmoral law itself) is properly the moral feeling.\n\nThe consciousness of a free submission of the will to the law, yet\ncombined with an inevitable constraint put upon all inclinations,\nthough only by our own reason, is respect for the law. The law that\ndemands this respect and inspires it is clearly no other than the\nmoral (for no other precludes all inclinations from exercising any\ndirect influence on the will). An action which is objectively\npractical according to this law, to the exclusion of every determining\nprinciple of inclination, is duty, and this by reason of that\nexclusion includes in its concept practical obligation, that is, a\ndetermination to actions, however reluctantly they may be done. The\nfeeling that arises from the consciousness of this obligation is not\npathological, as would be a feeling produced by an object of the\nsenses, but practical only, that is, it is made possible by a\npreceding (objective) determination of the will and a causality of the\nreason. As submission to the law, therefore, that is, as a command\n(announcing constraint for the sensibly affected subject), it contains\nin it no pleasure, but on the contrary, so far, pain in the action. On\nthe other hand, however, as this constraint is exercised merely by the\nlegislation of our own reason, it also contains something elevating,\nand this subjective effect on feeling, inasmuch as pure practical\nreason is the sole cause of it, may be called in this respect\nself-approbation, since we recognize ourselves as determined thereto\nsolely by the law without any interest, and are now conscious of a\nquite different interest subjectively produced thereby, and which is\npurely practical and free; and our taking this interest in an action\nof duty is not suggested by any inclination, but is commanded and\nactually brought about by reason through the practical law; whence\nthis feeling obtains a special name, that of respect.\n\n                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_3 ^paragraph 15}\n\nThe notion of duty, therefore, requires in the action,\nobjectively, agreement with the law, and, subjectively in its maxim,\nthat respect for the law shall be the sole mode in which the will is\ndetermined thereby. And on this rests the distinction between the\nconsciousness of having acted according to duty and from duty, that\nis, from respect for the law. The former (legality) is possible even\nif inclinations have been the determining principles of the will;\nbut the latter (morality), moral worth, can be placed only in this,\nthat the action is done from duty, that is, simply for the sake of the\nlaw. *\n\n\n\n* If we examine accurately the notion of respect for persons as it\nhas been already laid down, we shall perceive that it always rests\non the consciousness of a duty which an example shows us, and that\nrespect, therefore, can never have any but a moral ground, and that it\nis very good and even, in a psychological point of view, very useful\nfor the knowledge of mankind, that whenever we use this expression\nwe should attend to this secret and marvellous, yet often recurring,\nregard which men in their judgement pay to the moral law.\n\n\n\nIt is of the greatest importance to attend with the utmost exactness\nin all moral judgements to the subjective principle of all maxims,\nthat all the morality of actions may be placed in the necessity of\nacting from duty and from respect for the law, not from love and\ninclination for that which the actions are to produce. For men and all\ncreated rational beings moral necessity is constraint, that is\nobligation, and every action based on it is to be conceived as a duty,\nnot as a proceeding previously pleasing, or likely to be pleasing to\nus of our own accord. As if indeed we could ever bring it about that\nwithout respect for the law, which implies fear, or at least\napprehension of transgression, we of ourselves, like the independent\nDeity, could ever come into possession of holiness of will by the\ncoincidence of our will with the pure moral law becoming as it were\npart of our nature, never to be shaken (in which case the law would\ncease to be a command for us, as we could never be tempted to be\nuntrue to it).\n\n                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_3 ^paragraph 20}\n\nThe moral law is in fact for the will of a perfect being a law of\nholiness, but for the will of every finite rational being a law of\nduty, of moral constraint, and of the determination of its actions\nby respect for this law and reverence for its duty. No other\nsubjective principle must be assumed as a motive, else while the\naction might chance to be such as the law prescribes, yet, as does not\nproceed from duty, the intention, which is the thing properly in\nquestion in this legislation, is not moral.\n\nIt is a very beautiful thing to do good to men from love to them and\nfrom sympathetic good will, or to be just from love of order; but this\nis not yet the true moral maxim of our conduct which is suitable to\nour position amongst rational beings as men, when we pretend with\nfanciful pride to set ourselves above the thought of duty, like\nvolunteers, and, as if we were independent on the command, to want\nto do of our own good pleasure what we think we need no command to do.\nWe stand under a discipline of reason and in all our maxims must not\nforget our subjection to it, nor withdraw anything therefrom, or by an\negotistic presumption diminish aught of the authority of the law\n(although our own reason gives it) so as to set the determining\nprinciple of our will, even though the law be conformed to, anywhere\nelse but in the law itself and in respect for this law. Duty and\nobligation are the only names that we must give to our relation to the\nmoral law. We are indeed legislative members of a moral kingdom\nrendered possible by freedom, and presented to us by reason as an\nobject of respect; but yet we are subjects in it, not the sovereign,\nand to mistake our inferior position as creatures, and\npresumptuously to reject the authority of the moral law, is already to\nrevolt from it in spirit, even though the letter of it is fulfilled.\n\nWith this agrees very well the possibility of such a command as:\nLove God above everything, and thy neighbour as thyself. * For as a\ncommand it requires respect for a law which commands love and does not\nleave it to our own arbitrary choice to make this our principle.\nLove to God, however, considered as an inclination (pathological\nlove), is impossible, for He is not an object of the senses. The\nsame affection towards men is possible no doubt, but cannot be\ncommanded, for it is not in the power of any man to love anyone at\ncommand; therefore it is only practical love that is meant in that\npith of all laws. To love God means, in this sense, to like to do\nHis commandments; to love one's neighbour means to like to practise\nall duties towards him. But the command that makes this a rule\ncannot command us to have this disposition in actions conformed to\nduty, but only to endeavour after it. For a command to like to do a\nthing is in itself contradictory, because if we already know of\nourselves what we are bound to do, and if further we are conscious\nof liking to do it, a command would be quite needless; and if we do it\nnot willingly, but only out of respect for the law, a command that\nmakes this respect the motive of our maxim would directly counteract\nthe disposition commanded. That law of all laws, therefore, like all\nthe moral precepts of the Gospel, exhibits the moral disposition in\nall its perfection, in which, viewed as an ideal of holiness, it is\nnot attainable by any creature, but yet is the pattern which we should\nstrive to approach, and in an uninterrupted but infinite progress\nbecome like to. In fact, if a rational creature could ever reach\nthis point, that he thoroughly likes to do all moral laws, this\nwould mean that there does not exist in him even the possibility of\na desire that would tempt him to deviate from them; for to overcome\nsuch a desire always costs the subject some sacrifice and therefore\nrequires self-compulsion, that is, inward constraint to something that\none does not quite like to do; and no creature can ever reach this\nstage of moral disposition. For, being a creature, and therefore\nalways dependent with respect to what he requires for complete\nsatisfaction, he can never be quite free from desires and\ninclinations, and as these rest on physical causes, they can never\nof themselves coincide with the moral law, the sources of which are\nquite different; and therefore they make it necessary to found the\nmental disposition of one's maxims on moral obligation, not on ready\ninclination, but on respect, which demands obedience to the law,\neven though one may not like it; not on love, which apprehends no\ninward reluctance of the will towards the law. Nevertheless, this\nlatter, namely, love to the law (which would then cease to be a\ncommand, and then morality, which would have passed subjectively\ninto holiness, would cease to be virtue) must be the constant though\nunattainable goal of his endeavours. For in the case of what we highly\nesteem, but yet (on account of the consciousness of our weakness)\ndread, the increased facility of satisfying it changes the most\nreverential awe into inclination, and respect into love; at least this\nwould be the perfection of a disposition devoted to the law, if it\nwere possible for a creature to attain it.\n\n\n\n* This law is in striking contrast with the principle of private\nhappiness which some make the supreme principle of morality. This\nwould be expressed thus: Love thyself above everything, and God and\nthy neighbour for thine own sake.\n\n                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_3 ^paragraph 25}\n\n\n\nThis reflection is intended not so much to clear up the\nevangelical command just cited, in order to prevent religious\nfanaticism in regard to love of God, but to define accurately the\nmoral disposition with regard directly to our duties towards men,\nand to check, or if possible prevent, a merely moral fanaticism\nwhich infects many persons. The stage of morality on which man (and,\nas far as we can see, every rational creature) stands is respect for\nthe moral law. The disposition that he ought to have in obeying this\nis to obey it from duty, not from spontaneous inclination, or from\nan endeavour taken up from liking and unbidden; and this proper\nmoral condition in which he can always be is virtue, that is, moral\ndisposition militant, and not holiness in the fancied possession of\na perfect purity of the disposition of the will. It is nothing but\nmoral fanaticism and exaggerated self-conceit that is infused into the\nmind by exhortation to actions as noble, sublime, and magnanimous,\nby which men are led into the delusion that it is not duty, that is,\nrespect for the law, whose yoke (an easy yoke indeed, because reason\nitself imposes it on us) they must bear, whether they like it or\nnot, that constitutes the determining principle of their actions,\nand which always humbles them while they obey it; fancying that\nthose actions are expected from them, not from duty, but as pure\nmerit. For not only would they, in imitating such deeds from such a\nprinciple, not have fulfilled the spirit of the law in the least,\nwhich consists not in the legality of the action (without regard to\nprinciple), but in the subjection of the mind to the law; not only\ndo they make the motives pathological (seated in sympathy or\nself-love), not moral (in the law), but they produce in this way a\nvain, high-flying, fantastic way of thinking, flattering themselves\nwith a spontaneous goodness of heart that needs neither spur nor\nbridle, for which no command is needed, and thereby forgetting their\nobligation, which they ought to think of rather than merit. Indeed\nactions of others which are done with great sacrifice, and merely\nfor the sake of duty, may be praised as noble and sublime, but only so\nfar as there are traces which suggest that they were done wholly out\nof respect for duty and not from excited feelings. If these,\nhowever, are set before anyone as examples to be imitated, respect for\nduty (which is the only true moral feeling) must be employed as the\nmotive- this severe holy precept which never allows our vain self-love\nto dally with pathological impulses (however analogous they may be\nto morality), and to take a pride in meritorious worth. Now if we\nsearch we shall find for all actions that are worthy of praise a law\nof duty which commands, and does not leave us to choose what may be\nagreeable to our inclinations. This is the only way of representing\nthings that can give a moral training to the soul, because it alone is\ncapable of solid and accurately defined principles.\n\nIf fanaticism in its most general sense is a deliberate over\nstepping of the limits of human reason, then moral fanaticism is\nsuch an over stepping of the bounds that practical pure reason sets to\nmankind, in that it forbids us to place the subjective determining\nprinciple of correct actions, that is, their moral motive, in anything\nbut the law itself, or to place the disposition which is thereby\nbrought into the maxims in anything but respect for this law, and\nhence commands us to take as the supreme vital principle of all\nmorality in men the thought of duty, which strikes down all\narrogance as well as vain self-love.\n\nIf this is so, it is not only writers of romance or sentimental\neducators (although they may be zealous opponents of\nsentimentalism), but sometimes even philosophers, nay, even the\nseverest of all, the Stoics, that have brought in moral fanaticism\ninstead of a sober but wise moral discipline, although the\nfanaticism of the latter was more heroic, that of the former of an\ninsipid, effeminate character; and we may, without hypocrisy, say of\nthe moral teaching of the Gospel, that it first, by the purity of\nits moral principle, and at the same time by its suitability to the\nlimitations of finite beings, brought all the good conduct of men\nunder the discipline of a duty plainly set before their eyes, which\ndoes not permit them to indulge in dreams of imaginary moral\nperfections; and that it also set the bounds of humility (that is,\nself-knowledge) to self-conceit as well as to self-love, both which\nare ready to mistake their limits.\n\nDuty! Thou sublime and mighty name that dost embrace nothing\ncharming or insinuating, but requirest submission, and yet seekest not\nto move the will by threatening aught that would arouse natural\naversion or terror, but merely holdest forth a law which of itself\nfinds entrance into the mind, and yet gains reluctant reverence\n(though not always obedience), a law before which all inclinations are\ndumb, even though they secretly counter-work it; what origin is\nthere worthy of thee, and where is to be found the root of thy noble\ndescent which proudly rejects all kindred with the inclinations; a\nroot to be derived from which is the indispensable condition of the\nonly worth which men can give themselves?\n\n                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_3 ^paragraph 30}\n\nIt can be nothing less than a power which elevates man above himself\n(as a part of the world of sense), a power which connects him with\nan order of things that only the understanding can conceive, with a\nworld which at the same time commands the whole sensible world, and\nwith it the empirically determinable existence of man in time, as well\nas the sum total of all ends (which totality alone suits such\nunconditional practical laws as the moral). This power is nothing\nbut personality, that is, freedom and independence on the mechanism of\nnature, yet, regarded also as a faculty of a being which is subject to\nspecial laws, namely, pure practical laws given by its own reason;\nso that the person as belonging to the sensible world is subject to\nhis own personality as belonging to the intelligible [supersensible]\nworld. It is then not to be wondered at that man, as belonging to both\nworlds, must regard his own nature in reference to its second and\nhighest characteristic only with reverence, and its laws with the\nhighest respect.\n\nOn this origin are founded many expressions which designate the\nworth of objects according to moral ideas. The moral law is holy\n(inviolable). Man is indeed unholy enough, but he must regard humanity\nin his own person as holy. In all creation every thing one chooses and\nover which one has any power, may be used merely as means; man\nalone, and with him every rational creature, is an end in himself.\nBy virtue of the autonomy of his freedom he is the subject of the\nmoral law, which is holy. Just for this reason every will, even\nevery person's own individual will, in relation to itself, is\nrestricted to the condition of agreement with the autonomy of the\nrational being, that is to say, that it is not to be subject to any\npurpose which cannot accord with a law which might arise from the will\nof the passive subject himself; the latter is, therefore, never to\nbe employed merely as means, but as itself also, concurrently, an end.\nWe justly attribute this condition even to the Divine will, with\nregard to the rational beings in the world, which are His creatures,\nsince it rests on their personality, by which alone they are ends in\nthemselves.\n\nThis respect-inspiring idea of personality which sets before our\neyes the sublimity of our nature (in its higher aspect), while at\nthe same time it shows us the want of accord of our conduct with it\nand thereby strikes down self-conceit, is even natural to the\ncommonest reason and easily observed. Has not every even moderately\nhonourable man sometimes found that, where by an otherwise inoffensive\nlie he might either have withdrawn himself from an unpleasant\nbusiness, or even have procured some advantages for a loved and\nwell-deserving friend, he has avoided it solely lest he should despise\nhimself secretly in his own eyes? When an upright man is in the\ngreatest distress, which he might have avoided if he could only have\ndisregarded duty, is he not sustained by the consciousness that he has\nmaintained humanity in its proper dignity in his own person and\nhonoured it, that he has no reason to be ashamed of himself in his own\nsight, or to dread the inward glance of self-examination? This\nconsolation is not happiness, it is not even the smallest part of\nit, for no one would wish to have occasion for it, or would,\nperhaps, even desire a life in such circumstances. But he lives, and\nhe cannot endure that he should be in his own eyes unworthy of life.\nThis inward peace is therefore merely negative as regards what can\nmake life pleasant; it is, in fact, only the escaping the danger of\nsinking in personal worth, after everything else that is valuable\nhas been lost. It is the effect of a respect for something quite\ndifferent from life, something in comparison and contrast with which\nlife with all its enjoyment has no value. He still lives only\nbecause it is his duty, not because he finds anything pleasant in\nlife.\n\nSuch is the nature of the true motive of pure practical reason; it\nis no other than the pure moral law itself, inasmuch as it makes us\nconscious of the sublimity of our own supersensible existence and\nsubjectively produces respect for their higher nature in men who are\nalso conscious of their sensible existence and of the consequent\ndependence of their pathologically very susceptible nature. Now with\nthis motive may be combined so many charms and satisfactions of life\nthat even on this account alone the most prudent choice of a\nrational Epicurean reflecting on the greatest advantage of life\nwould declare itself on the side of moral conduct, and it may even\nbe advisable to join this prospect of a cheerful enjoyment of life\nwith that supreme motive which is already sufficient of itself; but\nonly as a counterpoise to the attractions which vice does not fail\nto exhibit on the opposite side, and not so as, even in the smallest\ndegree, to place in this the proper moving power when duty is in\nquestion. For that would be just the same as to wish to taint the\npurity of the moral disposition in its source. The majesty of duty has\nnothing to do with enjoyment of life; it has its special law and its\nspecial tribunal, and though the two should be never so well shaken\ntogether to be given well mixed, like medicine, to the sick soul,\nyet they will soon separate of themselves; and if they do not, the\nformer will not act; and although physical life might gain somewhat in\nforce, the moral life would fade away irrecoverably.\n\n\n\n                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_3 ^paragraph 35}\n\nCritical Examination of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason.\n\n\n\nBy the critical examination of a science, or of a portion of it,\nwhich constitutes a system by itself, I understand the inquiry and\nproof why it must have this and no other systematic form, when we\ncompare it with another system which is based on a similar faculty\nof knowledge. Now practical and speculative reason are based on the\nsame faculty, so far as both are pure reason. Therefore the difference\nin their systematic form must be determined by the comparison of both,\nand the ground of this must be assigned.\n\nThe Analytic of pure theoretic reason had to do with the knowledge\nof such objects as may have been given to the understanding, and was\nobliged therefore to begin from intuition and consequently (as this is\nalways sensible) from sensibility; and only after that could advance\nto concepts (of the objects of this intuition), and could only end\nwith principles after both these had preceded. On the contrary,\nsince practical reason has not to do with objects so as to know\nthem, but with its own faculty of realizing them (in accordance with\nthe knowledge of them), that is, with a will which is a causality,\ninasmuch as reason contains its determining principle; since,\nconsequently, it has not to furnish an object of intuition, but as\npractical reason has to furnish only a law (because the notion of\ncausality always implies the reference to a law which determines the\nexistence of the many in relation to one another); hence a critical\nexamination of the Analytic of reason, if this is to be practical\nreason (and this is properly the problem), must begin with the\npossibility of practical principles a priori. Only after that can it\nproceed to concepts of the objects of a practical reason, namely,\nthose of absolute good and evil, in order to assign them in accordance\nwith those principles (for prior to those principles they cannot\npossibly be given as good and evil by any faculty of knowledge), and\nonly then could the section be concluded with the last chapter,\nthat, namely, which treats of the relation of the pure practical\nreason to the sensibility and of its necessary influence thereon,\nwhich is a priori cognisable, that is, of the moral sentiment. Thus\nthe Analytic of the practical pure reason has the whole extent of\nthe conditions of its use in common with the theoretical, but in\nreverse order. The Analytic of pure theoretic reason was divided\ninto transcendental Aesthetic and transcendental Logic, that of the\npractical reversely into Logic and Aesthetic of pure practical\nreason (if I may, for the sake of analogy merely, use these\ndesignations, which are not quite suitable). This logic again was\nthere divided into the Analytic of concepts and that of principles:\nhere into that of principles and concepts. The Aesthetic also had in\nthe former case two parts, on account of the two kinds of sensible\nintuition; here the sensibility is not considered as a capacity of\nintuition at all, but merely as feeling (which can be a subjective\nground of desire), and in regard to it pure practical reason admits no\nfurther division.\n\nIt is also easy to see the reason why this division into two parts\nwith its subdivision was not actually adopted here (as one might\nhave been induced to attempt by the example of the former critique).\nFor since it is pure reason that is here considered in its practical\nuse, and consequently as proceeding from a priori principles, and\nnot from empirical principles of determination, hence the division\nof the analytic of pure practical reason must resemble that of a\nsyllogism; namely, proceeding from the universal in the major\npremiss (the moral principle), through a minor premiss containing a\nsubsumption of possible actions (as good or evil) under the former, to\nthe conclusion, namely, the subjective determination of the will (an\ninterest in the possible practical good, and in the maxim founded on\nit). He who has been able to convince himself of the truth of the\npositions occurring in the Analytic will take pleasure in such\ncomparisons; for they justly suggest the expectation that we may\nperhaps some day be able to discern the unity of the whole faculty\nof reason (theoretical as well as practical) and be able to derive all\nfrom one principle, which, is what human reason inevitably demands, as\nit finds complete satisfaction only in a perfectly systematic unity of\nits knowledge.\n\n                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_3 ^paragraph 40}\n\nIf now we consider also the contents of the knowledge that we can\nhave of a pure practical reason, and by means of it, as shown by the\nAnalytic, we find, along with a remarkable analogy between it and\nthe theoretical, no less remarkable differences. As regards the\ntheoretical, the faculty of a pure rational cognition a priori could\nbe easily and evidently proved by examples from sciences (in which, as\nthey put their principles to the test in so many ways by methodical\nuse, there is not so much reason as in common knowledge to fear a\nsecret mixture of empirical principles of cognition). But, that pure\nreason without the admixture of any empirical principle is practical\nof itself, this could only be shown from the commonest practical use\nof reason, by verifying the fact, that every man's natural reason\nacknowledges the supreme practical principle as the supreme law of his\nwill- a law completely a priori and not depending on any sensible\ndata. It was necessary first to establish and verify the purity of its\norigin, even in the judgement of this common reason, before science\ncould take it in hand to make use of it, as a fact, that is, prior\nto all disputation about its possibility, and all the consequences\nthat may be drawn from it. But this circumstance may be readily\nexplained from what has just been said; because practical pure\nreason must necessarily begin with principles, which therefore must be\nthe first data, the foundation of all science, and cannot be derived\nfrom it. It was possible to effect this verification of moral\nprinciples as principles of a pure reason quite well, and with\nsufficient certainty, by a single appeal to the judgement of common\nsense, for this reason, that anything empirical which might slip\ninto our maxims as a determining principle of the will can be detected\nat once by the feeling of pleasure or pain which necessarily\nattaches to it as exciting desire; whereas pure practical reason\npositively refuses to admit this feeling into its principle as a\ncondition. The heterogeneity of the determining principles (the\nempirical and rational) is clearly detected by this resistance of a\npractically legislating reason against every admixture of inclination,\nand by a peculiar kind of sentiment, which, however, does not\nprecede the legislation of the practical reason, but, on the contrary,\nis produced by this as a constraint, namely, by the feeling of a\nrespect such as no man has for inclinations of whatever kind but for\nthe law only; and it is detected in so marked and prominent a manner\nthat even the most uninstructed cannot fail to see at once in an\nexample presented to him, that empirical principles of volition may\nindeed urge him to follow their attractions, but that he can never\nbe expected to obey anything but the pure practical law of reason\nalone.\n\nThe distinction between the doctrine of happiness and the doctrine\nof morality, in the former of which empirical principles constitute\nthe entire foundation, while in the second they do not form the\nsmallest part of it, is the first and most important office of the\nAnalytic of pure practical reason; and it must proceed in it with as\nmuch exactness and, so to speak, scrupulousness, as any geometer in\nhis work. The philosopher, however, has greater difficulties to\ncontend with here (as always in rational cognition by means of\nconcepts merely without construction), because he cannot take any\nintuition as a foundation (for a pure noumenon). He has, however, this\nadvantage that, like the chemist, he can at any time make an\nexperiment with every man's practical reason for the purpose of\ndistinguishing the moral (pure) principle of determination from the\nempirical; namely, by adding the moral law (as a determining\nprinciple) to the empirically affected will (e.g., that of the man who\nwould be ready to lie because he can gain something thereby). It is as\nif the analyst added alkali to a solution of lime in hydrochloric\nacid, the acid at once forsakes the lime, combines with the alkali,\nand the lime is precipitated. Just in the same way, if to a man who is\notherwise honest (or who for this occasion places himself only in\nthought in the position of an honest man), we present the moral law by\nwhich he recognises the worthlessness of the liar, his practical\nreason (in forming a judgement of what ought to be done) at once\nforsakes the advantage, combines with that which maintains in him\nrespect for his own person (truthfulness), and the advantage after\nit has been separated and washed from every particle of reason\n(which is altogether on the side of duty) is easily weighed by\neveryone, so that it can enter into combination with reason in other\ncases, only not where it could be opposed to the moral law, which\nreason never forsakes, but most closely unites itself with.\n\nBut it does not follow that this distinction between the principle\nof happiness and that of morality is an opposition between them, and\npure practical reason does not require that we should renounce all\nclaim to happiness, but only that the moment duty is in question we\nshould take no account of happiness. It may even in certain respects\nbe a duty to provide for happiness; partly, because (including\nskill, wealth, riches) it contains means for the fulfilment of our\nduty; partly, because the absence of it (e.g., poverty) implies\ntemptations to transgress our duty. But it can never be an immediate\nduty to promote our happiness, still less can it be the principle of\nall duty. Now, as all determining principles of the will, except the\nlaw of pure practical reason alone (the moral law), are all\nempirical and, therefore, as such, belong to the principle of\nhappiness, they must all be kept apart from the supreme principle of\nmorality and never be incorporated with it as a condition; since\nthis would be to destroy all moral worth just as much as any empirical\nadmixture with geometrical principles would destroy the certainty of\nmathematical evidence, which in Plato's opinion is the most\nexcellent thing in mathematics, even surpassing their utility.\n\nInstead, however, of the deduction of the supreme principle of\npure practical reason, that is, the explanation of the possibility\nof such a knowledge a priori, the utmost we were able to do was to\nshow that if we saw the possibility of the freedom of an efficient\ncause, we should also see not merely the possibility, but even the\nnecessity, of the moral law as the supreme practical law of rational\nbeings, to whom we attribute freedom of causality of their will;\nbecause both concepts are so inseparably united that we might define\npractical freedom as independence of the will on anything but the\nmoral law. But we cannot perceive the possibility of the freedom of an\nefficient cause, especially in the world of sense; we are fortunate if\nonly we can be sufficiently assured that there is no proof of its\nimpossibility, and are now, by the moral law which postulates it,\ncompelled and therefore authorized to assume it. However, there are\nstill many who think that they can explain this freedom on empirical\nprinciples, like any other physical faculty, and treat it as a\npsychological property, the explanation of which only requires a\nmore exact study of the nature of the soul and of the motives of the\nwill, and not as a transcendental predicate of the causality of a\nbeing that belongs to the world of sense (which is really the\npoint). They thus deprive us of the grand revelation which we obtain\nthrough practical reason by means of the moral law, the revelation,\nnamely, of a supersensible world by the realization of the otherwise\ntranscendent concept of freedom, and by this deprive us also of the\nmoral law itself, which admits no empirical principle of\ndetermination. Therefore it will be necessary to add something here as\na protection against this delusion and to exhibit empiricism in its\nnaked superficiality.\n\nThe notion of causality as physical necessity, in opposition to\nthe same notion as freedom, concerns only the existence of things so\nfar as it is determinable in time, and, consequently, as phenomena, in\nopposition to their causality as things in themselves. Now if we\ntake the attributes of existence of things in time for attributes of\nthings in themselves (which is the common view), then it is impossible\nto reconcile the necessity of the causal relation with freedom; they\nare contradictory. For from the former it follows that every event,\nand consequently every action that takes place at a certain point of\ntime, is a necessary result of what existed in time preceding. Now\nas time past is no longer in my power, hence every action that I\nperform must be the necessary result of certain determining grounds\nwhich are not in my power, that is, at the moment in which I am acting\nI am never free. Nay, even if I assume that my whole existence is\nindependent on any foreign cause (for instance, God), so that the\ndetermining principles of my causality, and even of my whole\nexistence, were not outside myself, yet this would not in the least\ntransform that physical necessity into freedom. For at every moment of\ntime I am still under the necessity of being determined to action by\nthat which is not in my power, and the series of events infinite a\nparte priori, which I only continue according to a pre-determined\norder and could never begin of myself, would be a continuous\nphysical chain, and therefore my causality would never be freedom.\n\n                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_3 ^paragraph 45}\n\nIf, then, we would attribute freedom to a being whose existence is\ndetermined in time, we cannot except him from the law of necessity\nas to all events in his existence and, consequently, as to his actions\nalso; for that would be to hand him over to blind chance. Now as\nthis law inevitably applies to all the causality of things, so far\nas their existence is determinable in time, it follows that if this\nwere the mode in which we had also to conceive the existence of\nthese things in themselves, freedom must be rejected as a vain and\nimpossible conception. Consequently, if we would still save it, no\nother way remains but to consider that the existence of a thing, so\nfar as it is determinable in time, and therefore its causality,\naccording to the law of physical necessity, belong to appearance,\nand to attribute freedom to the same being as a thing in itself.\nThis is certainly inevitable, if we would retain both these\ncontradictory concepts together; but in application, when we try to\nexplain their combination in one and the same action, great\ndifficulties present themselves which seem to render such a\ncombination impracticable.\n\nWhen I say of a man who commits a theft that, by the law of\ncausality, this deed is a necessary result of the determining causes\nin preceding time, then it was impossible that it could not have\nhappened; how then can the judgement, according to the moral law, make\nany change, and suppose that it could have been omitted, because the\nlaw says that it ought to have been omitted; that is, how can a man be\ncalled quite free at the same moment, and with respect to the same\naction in which he is subject to an inevitable physical necessity?\nSome try to evade this by saying that the causes that determine his\ncausality are of such a kind as to agree with a comparative notion\nof freedom. According to this, that is sometimes called a free effect,\nthe determining physical cause of which lies within the acting thing\nitself, e.g., that which a projectile performs when it is in free\nmotion, in which case we use the word freedom, because while it is\nin flight it is not urged by anything external; or as we call the\nmotion of a clock a free motion, because it moves its hands itself,\nwhich therefore do not require to be pushed by external force; so\nalthough the actions of man are necessarily determined by causes which\nprecede in time, we yet call them free, because these causes are ideas\nproduced by our own faculties, whereby desires are evoked on\noccasion of circumstances, and hence actions are wrought according\nto our own pleasure. This is a wretched subterfuge with which some\npersons still let themselves be put off, and so think they have\nsolved, with a petty word- jugglery, that difficult problem, at the\nsolution of which centuries have laboured in vain, and which can\ntherefore scarcely be found so completely on the surface. In fact,\nin the question about the freedom which must be the foundation of\nall moral laws and the consequent responsibility, it does not matter\nwhether the principles which necessarily determine causality by a\nphysical law reside within the subject or without him, or in the\nformer case whether these principles are instinctive or are\nconceived by reason, if, as is admitted by these men themselves, these\ndetermining ideas have the ground of their existence in time and in\nthe antecedent state, and this again in an antecedent, etc. Then it\nmatters not that these are internal; it matters not that they have a\npsychological and not a mechanical causality, that is, produce actions\nby means of ideas and not by bodily movements; they are still\ndetermining principles of the causality of a being whose existence\nis determinable in time, and therefore under the necessitation of\nconditions of past time, which therefore, when the subject has to act,\nare no longer in his power. This may imply psychological freedom (if\nwe choose to apply this term to a merely internal chain of ideas in\nthe mind), but it involves physical necessity and, therefore, leaves\nno room for transcendental freedom, which must be conceived as\nindependence on everything empirical, and, consequently, on nature\ngenerally, whether it is an object of the internal sense considered in\ntime only, or of the external in time and space. Without this\nfreedom (in the latter and true sense), which alone is practical a\npriori, no moral law and no moral imputation are possible. Just for\nthis reason the necessity of events in time, according to the physical\nlaw of causality, may be called the mechanism of nature, although we\ndo not mean by this that things which are subject to it must be really\nmaterial machines. We look here only to the necessity of the\nconnection of events in a time-series as it is developed according\nto the physical law, whether the subject in which this development\ntakes place is called automaton materiale when the mechanical being is\nmoved by matter, or with Leibnitz spirituale when it is impelled by\nideas; and if the freedom of our will were no other than the latter\n(say the psychological and comparative, not also transcendental,\nthat is, absolute), then it would at bottom be nothing better than the\nfreedom of a turnspit, which, when once it is wound up, accomplishes\nits motions of itself.\n\nNow, in order to remove in the supposed case the apparent\ncontradiction between freedom and the mechanism of nature in one and\nthe same action, we must remember what was said in the Critique of\nPure Reason, or what follows therefrom; viz., that the necessity of\nnature, which cannot co-exist with the freedom of the subject,\nappertains only to the attributes of the thing that is subject to\ntime-conditions, consequently only to those of the acting subject as a\nphenomenon; that therefore in this respect the determining\nprinciples of every action of the same reside in what belongs to\npast time and is no longer in his power (in which must be included his\nown past actions and the character that these may determine for him in\nhis own eyes as a phenomenon). But the very same subject, being on the\nother side conscious of himself as a thing in himself, considers his\nexistence also in so far as it is not subject to time-conditions,\nand regards himself as only determinable by laws which he gives\nhimself through reason; and in this his existence nothing is\nantecedent to the determination of his will, but every action, and\nin general every modification of his existence, varying according to\nhis internal sense, even the whole series of his existence as a\nsensible being is in the consciousness of his supersensible\nexistence nothing but the result, and never to be regarded as the\ndetermining principle, of his causality as a noumenon. In this view\nnow the rational being can justly say of every unlawful action that he\nperforms, that he could very well have left it undone; although as\nappearance it is sufficiently determined in the past, and in this\nrespect is absolutely necessary; for it, with all the past which\ndetermines it, belongs to the one single phenomenon of his character\nwhich he makes for himself, in consequence of which he imputes the\ncausality of those appearances to himself as a cause independent on\nsensibility.\n\nWith this agree perfectly the judicial sentences of that wonderful\nfaculty in us which we call conscience. A man may use as much art as\nhe likes in order to paint to himself an unlawful act, that he\nremembers, as an unintentional error, a mere oversight, such as one\ncan never altogether avoid, and therefore as something in which he was\ncarried away by the stream of physical necessity, and thus to make\nhimself out innocent, yet he finds that the advocate who speaks in his\nfavour can by no means silence the accuser within, if only he is\nconscious that at the time when he did this wrong he was in his\nsenses, that is, in possession of his freedom; and, nevertheless, he\naccounts for his error from some bad habits, which by gradual\nneglect of attention he has allowed to grow upon him to such a\ndegree that he can regard his error as its natural consequence,\nalthough this cannot protect him from the blame and reproach which\nhe casts upon himself. This is also the ground of repentance for a\nlong past action at every recollection of it; a painful feeling\nproduced by the moral sentiment, and which is practically void in so\nfar as it cannot serve to undo what has been done. (Hence Priestley,\nas a true and consistent fatalist, declares it absurd, and he deserves\nto be commended for this candour more than those who, while they\nmaintain the mechanism of the will in fact, and its freedom in words\nonly, yet wish it to be thought that they include it in their system\nof compromise, although they do not explain the possibility of such\nmoral imputation.) But the pain is quite legitimate, because when\nthe law of our intelligible [supersensible] existence (the moral\nlaw) is in question, reason recognizes no distinction of time, and\nonly asks whether the event belongs to me, as my act, and then\nalways morally connects the same feeling with it, whether it has\nhappened just now or long ago. For in reference to the supersensible\nconsciousness of its existence (i.e., freedom) the life of sense is\nbut a single phenomenon, which, inasmuch as it contains merely\nmanifestations of the mental disposition with regard to the moral\nlaw (i.e., of the character), must be judged not according to the\nphysical necessity that belongs to it as phenomenon, but according\nto the absolute spontaneity of freedom. It may therefore be admitted\nthat, if it were possible to have so profound an insight into a\nman's mental character as shown by internal as well as external\nactions as to know all its motives, even the smallest, and likewise\nall the external occasions that can influence them, we could calculate\na man's conduct for the future with as great certainty as a lunar or\nsolar eclipse; and nevertheless we may maintain that the man is\nfree. In fact, if we were capable of a further glance, namely, an\nintellectual intuition of the same subject (which indeed is not\ngranted to us, and instead of it we have only the rational concept),\nthen we should perceive that this whole chain of appearances in regard\nto all that concerns the moral laws depends on the spontaneity of\nthe subject as a thing in itself, of the determination of which no\nphysical explanation can be given. In default of this intuition, the\nmoral law assures us of this distinction between the relation of our\nactions as appearance to our sensible nature, and the relation of this\nsensible nature to the supersensible substratum in us. In this view,\nwhich is natural to our reason, though inexplicable, we can also\njustify some judgements which we passed with all conscientiousness,\nand which yet at first sight seem quite opposed to all equity. There\nare cases in which men, even with the same education which has been\nprofitable to others, yet show such early depravity, and so continue\nto progress in it to years of manhood, that they are thought to be\nborn villains, and their character altogether incapable of\nimprovement; and nevertheless they are judged for what they do or\nleave undone, they are reproached for their faults as guilty; nay,\nthey themselves (the children) regard these reproaches as well\nfounded, exactly as if in spite of the hopeless natural quality of\nmind ascribed to them, they remained just as responsible as any\nother man. This could not happen if we did not suppose that whatever\nsprings from a man's choice (as every action intentionally performed\nundoubtedly does) has as its foundation a free causality, which from\nearly youth expresses its character in its manifestations (i.e.,\nactions). These, on account of the uniformity of conduct, exhibit a\nnatural connection, which however does not make the vicious quality of\nthe will necessary, but on the contrary, is the consequence of the\nevil principles voluntarily adopted and unchangeable, which only\nmake it so much the more culpable and deserving of punishment. There\nstill remains a difficulty in the combination of freedom with the\nmechanism of nature in a being belonging to the world of sense; a\ndifficulty which, even after all the foregoing is admitted,\nthreatens freedom with complete destruction. But with this danger\nthere is also a circumstance that offers hope of an issue still\nfavourable to freedom; namely, that the same difficulty presses much\nmore strongly (in fact as we shall presently see, presses only) on the\nsystem that holds the existence determinable in time and space to be\nthe existence of things in themselves; it does not therefore oblige us\nto give up our capital supposition of the ideality of time as a mere\nform of sensible intuition, and consequently as a mere manner of\nrepresentation which is proper to the subject as belonging to the\nworld of sense; and therefore it only requires that this view be\nreconciled with this idea.\n\nThe difficulty is as follows: Even if it is admitted that the\nsupersensible subject can be free with respect to a given action,\nalthough, as a subject also belonging to the world of sense, he is\nunder mechanical conditions with respect to the same action, still, as\nsoon as we allow that God as universal first cause is also the cause\nof the existence of substance (a proposition which can never be\ngiven up without at the same time giving up the notion of God as the\nBeing of all beings, and therewith giving up his all sufficiency, on\nwhich everything in theology depends), it seems as if we must admit\nthat a man's actions have their determining principle in something\nwhich is wholly out of his power- namely, in the causality of a\nSupreme Being distinct from himself and on whom his own existence\nand the whole determination of his causality are absolutely dependent.\nIn point of fact, if a man's actions as belonging to his modifications\nin time were not merely modifications of him as appearance, but as a\nthing in itself, freedom could not be saved. Man would be a marionette\nor an automaton, like Vaucanson's, prepared and wound up by the\nSupreme Artist. Self-consciousness would indeed make him a thinking\nautomaton; but the consciousness of his own spontaneity would be\nmere delusion if this were mistaken for freedom, and it would\ndeserve this name only in a comparative sense, since, although the\nproximate determining causes of its motion and a long series of\ntheir determining causes are internal, yet the last and highest is\nfound in a foreign hand. Therefore I do not see how those who still\ninsist on regarding time and space as attributes belonging to the\nexistence of things in themselves, can avoid admitting the fatality of\nactions; or if (like the otherwise acute Mendelssohn) they allow\nthem to be conditions necessarily belonging to the existence of finite\nand derived beings, but not to that of the infinite Supreme Being, I\ndo not see on what ground they can justify such a distinction, or,\nindeed, how they can avoid the contradiction that meets them, when\nthey hold that existence in time is an attribute necessarily belonging\nto finite things in themselves, whereas God is the cause of this\nexistence, but cannot be the cause of time (or space) itself (since\nthis must be presupposed as a necessary a priori condition of the\nexistence of things); and consequently as regards the existence of\nthese things. His causality must be subject to conditions and even\nto the condition of time; and this would inevitably bring in\neverything contradictory to the notions of His infinity and\nindependence. On the other hand, it is quite easy for us to draw the\ndistinction between the attribute of the divine existence of being\nindependent on all time-conditions, and that of a being of the world\nof sense, the distinction being that between the existence of a\nbeing in itself and that of a thing in appearance. Hence, if this\nideality of time and space is not adopted, nothing remains but\nSpinozism, in which space and time are essential attributes of the\nSupreme Being Himself, and the things dependent on Him (ourselves,\ntherefore, included) are not substances, but merely accidents inhering\nin Him; since, if these things as His effects exist in time only, this\nbeing the condition of their existence in themselves, then the actions\nof these beings must be simply His actions which He performs in some\nplace and time. Thus, Spinozism, in spite of the absurdity of its\nfundamental idea, argues more consistently than the creation theory\ncan, when beings assumed to be substances, and beings in themselves\nexisting in time, are regarded as effects of a Supreme Cause, and\nyet as not [belonging] to Him and His action, but as separate\nsubstances.\n\n                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_3 ^paragraph 50}\n\nThe above-mentioned difficulty is resolved briefly and clearly as\nfollows: If existence in time is a mere sensible mode of\nrepresentation belonging to thinking beings in the world and\nconsequently does not apply to them as things in themselves, then\nthe creation of these beings is a creation of things in themselves,\nsince the notion of creation does not belong to the sensible form of\nrepresentation of existence or to causality, but can only be\nreferred to noumena. Consequently, when I say of beings in the world\nof sense that they are created, I so far regard them as noumena. As it\nwould be a contradiction, therefore, to say that God is a creator of\nappearances, so also it is a contradiction to say that as creator He\nis the cause of actions in the world of sense, and therefore as\nappearances, although He is the cause of the existence of the acting\nbeings (which are noumena). If now it is possible to affirm freedom in\nspite of the natural mechanism of actions as appearances (by regarding\nexistence in time as something that belongs only to appearances, not\nto things in themselves), then the circumstance that the acting beings\nare creatures cannot make the slightest difference, since creation\nconcerns their supersensible and not their sensible existence, and,\ntherefore, cannot be regarded as the determining principle of the\nappearances. It would be quite different if the beings in the world as\nthings in themselves existed in time, since in that case the creator\nof substance would be at the same time the author of the whole\nmechanism of this substance.\n\nOf so great importance is the separation of time (as well as\nspace) from the existence of things in themselves which was effected\nin the Critique of the Pure Speculative Reason.\n\nIt may be said that the solution here proposed involves great\ndifficulty in itself and is scarcely susceptible of a lucid\nexposition. But is any other solution that has been attempted, or that\nmay be attempted, easier and more intelligible? Rather might we say\nthat the dogmatic teachers of metaphysics have shown more shrewdness\nthan candour in keeping this difficult point out of sight as much as\npossible, in the hope that if they said nothing about it, probably\nno one would think of it. If science is to be advanced, all\ndifficulties must be laid open, and we must even search for those that\nare hidden, for every difficulty calls forth a remedy, which cannot be\ndiscovered without science gaining either in extent or in exactness;\nand thus even obstacles become means of increasing the thoroughness of\nscience. On the other hand, if the difficulties are intentionally\nconcealed, or merely removed by palliatives, then sooner or later they\nburst out into incurable mischiefs, which bring science to ruin in\nan absolute scepticism.\n\nSince it is, properly speaking, the notion of freedom alone amongst all\nthe ideas of pure speculative reason that so greatly enlarges our\nknowledge in the sphere of the supersensible, though only of our\npractical knowledge, I ask myself why it exclusively possesses so great\nfertility, whereas the others only designate the vacant space for\npossible beings of the pure understanding, but are unable by any means\nto define the concept of them. I presently find that as I cannot think\nanything without a category, I must first look for a category for the\nrational idea of freedom with which I am now concerned; and this is the\ncategory of causality; and although freedom, a concept of the reason,\nbeing a transcendent concept, cannot have any intuition corresponding to\nit, yet the concept of the understanding- for the synthesis of which the\nformer demands the unconditioned- (namely, the concept of causality)\nmust have a sensible intuition given, by which first its objective\nreality is assured. Now, the categories are all divided into two\nclasses- the mathematical, which concern the unity of synthesis in the\nconception of objects, and the dynamical, which refer to the unity of\nsynthesis in the conception of the existence of objects. The former\n(those of magnitude and quality) always contain a synthesis of the\nhomogeneous, and it is not possible to find in this the unconditioned\nantecedent to what is given in sensible intuition as conditioned in\nspace and time, as this would itself have to belong to space and time,\nand therefore be again still conditioned. Whence it resulted in the\nDialectic of Pure Theoretic Reason that the opposite methods of\nattaining the unconditioned and the totality of the conditions were both\nwrong. The categories of the second class (those of causality and of the\nnecessity of a thing) did not require this homogeneity (of the\nconditioned and the condition in synthesis), since here what we have to\nexplain is not how the intuition is compounded from a manifold in it,\nbut only how the existence of the conditioned object corresponding to it\nis added to the existence of the condition (added, namely, in the\nunderstanding as connected therewith); and in that case it was allowable\nto suppose in the supersensible world the unconditioned antecedent to\nthe altogether conditioned in the world of sense (both as regards the\ncausal connection and the contingent existence of things themselves),\nalthough this unconditioned remained indeterminate, and to make the\nsynthesis transcendent. Hence, it was found in the Dialectic of the Pure\nSpeculative Reason that the two apparently opposite methods of obtaining\nfor the conditioned the unconditioned were not really contradictory,\ne.g., in the synthesis of causality to conceive for the conditioned in\nthe series of causes and effects of the sensible world, a causality\nwhich has no sensible condition, and that the same action which, as\nbelonging to the world of sense, is always sensibly conditioned, that\nis, mechanically necessary, yet at the same time may be derived from a\ncausality not sensibly conditioned- being the causality of the acting\nbeing as belonging to the supersensible world- and may consequently be\nconceived as free. Now, the only point in question was to change this\nmay be into is; that is, that we should be able to show in an actual\ncase, as it were by a fact, that certain actions imply such a causality\n(namely, the intellectual, sensibly unconditioned), whether they are\nactual or only commanded, that is, objectively necessary in a practical\nsense. We could not hope to find this connexion in actions actually\ngiven in experience as events of the sensible world, since causality\nwith freedom must always be sought outside the world of sense in the\nworld of intelligence. But things of sense are the only things offered\nto our perception and observation. Hence, nothing remained but to find\nan incontestable objective principle of causality which excludes all\nsensible conditions: that is, a principle in which reason does not\nappeal further to something else as a determining ground of its\ncausality, but contains this determining ground itself by means of that\nprinciple, and in which therefore it is itself as pure reason practical.\nNow, this principle had not to be searched for or discovered; it had\nlong been in the reason of all men, and incorporated in their nature,\nand is the principle of morality. Therefore, that unconditioned\ncausality, with the faculty of it, namely, freedom, is no longer merely\nindefinitely and problematically thought (this speculative reason could\nprove to be feasible), but is even as regards the law of its causality\ndefinitely and assertorially known; and with it the fact that a being (I\nmyself), belonging to the world of sense, belongs also to the\nsupersensible world, this is also positively known, and thus the reality\nof the supersensible world is established and in practical respects\ndefinitely given, and this definiteness, which for theoretical purposes\nwould be transcendent, is for practical purposes immanent. We could not,\nhowever, make a similar step as regards the second dynamical idea,\nnamely, that of a necessary being. We could not rise to it from the\nsensible world without the aid of the first dynamical idea. For if we\nattempted to do so, we should have ventured to leave at a bound all that\nis given to us, and to leap to that of which nothing is given us that\ncan help us to effect the connection of such a supersensible being with\nthe world of sense (since the necessary being would have to be known as\ngiven outside ourselves). On the other hand, it is now obvious that this\nconnection is quite possible in relation to our own subject, inasmuch as\nI know myself to be on the one side as an intelligible [supersensible]\nbeing determined by the moral law (by means of freedom), and on the\nother side as acting in the world of sense. It is the concept of freedom\nalone that enables us to find the unconditioned and intelligible for the\nconditioned and sensible without going out of ourselves. For it is our\nown reason that by means of the supreme and unconditional practical law\nknows that itself and the being that is conscious of this law (our own\nperson) belong to the pure world of understanding, and moreover defines\nthe manner in which, as such, it can be active. In this way it can be\nunderstood why in the whole faculty of reason it is the practical reason\nonly that can help us to pass beyond the world of sense and give us\nknowledge of a supersensible order and connection, which, however, for\nthis very reason cannot be extended further than is necessary for pure\npractical purposes.\n\nLet me be permitted on this occasion to make one more remark,\nnamely, that every step that we make with pure reason, even in the\npractical sphere where no attention is paid to subtle speculation,\nnevertheless accords with all the material points of the Critique of\nthe Theoretical Reason as closely and directly as if each step had\nbeen thought out with deliberate purpose to establish this\nconfirmation. Such a thorough agreement, wholly unsought for and quite\nobvious (as anyone can convince himself, if he will only carry moral\ninquiries up to their principles), between the most important\nproposition of practical reason and the often seemingly too subtle and\nneedless remarks of the Critique of the Speculative Reason,\noccasions surprise and astonishment, and confirms the maxim already\nrecognized and praised by others, namely, that in every scientific\ninquiry we should pursue our way steadily with all possible\nexactness and frankness, without caring for any objections that may be\nraised from outside its sphere, but, as far as we can, to carry out\nour inquiry truthfully and completely by itself. Frequent\nobservation has convinced me that, when such researches are concluded,\nthat which in one part of them appeared to me very questionable,\nconsidered in relation to other extraneous doctrines, when I left this\ndoubtfulness out of sight for a time and only attended to the business\nin hand until it was completed, at last was unexpectedly found to\nagree perfectly with what had been discovered separately without the\nleast regard to those doctrines, and without any partiality or\nprejudice for them. Authors would save themselves many errors and much\nlabour lost (because spent on a delusion) if they could only resolve\nto go to work with more frankness.\n\nBOOK_2|CHAPTER_1\n\n      BOOK II. Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I. Of a Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason Generally.\n\n\n\nPure reason always has its dialetic, whether it is considered in its\nspeculative or its practical employment; for it requires the\nabsolute totality of the 'conditions of what is given conditioned, and\nthis can only be found in things in themselves. But as all conceptions\nof things in themselves must be referred to intuitions, and with us\nmen these can never be other than sensible and hence can never\nenable us to know objects as things in themselves but only as\nappearances, and since the unconditioned can never be found in this\nchain of appearances which consists only of conditioned and\nconditions; thus from applying this rational idea of the totality of\nthe conditions (in other words of the unconditioned) to appearances,\nthere arises an inevitable illusion, as if these latter were things in\nthemselves (for in the absence of a warning critique they are always\nregarded as such). This illusion would never be noticed as delusive if\nit did not betray itself by a conflict of reason with itself, when\nit applies to appearances its fundamental principle of presupposing\nthe unconditioned to everything conditioned. By this, however,\nreason is compelled to trace this illusion to its source, and search\nhow it can be removed, and this can only be done by a complete\ncritical examination of the whole pure faculty of reason; so that\nthe antinomy of the pure reason which is manifest in its dialectic\nis in fact the most beneficial error into which human reason could\never have fallen, since it at last drives us to search for the key\nto escape from this labyrinth; and when this key is found, it\nfurther discovers that which we did not seek but yet had need of,\nnamely, a view into a higher and an immutable order of things, in\nwhich we even now are, and in which we are thereby enabled by definite\nprecepts to continue to live according to the highest dictates of\nreason.\n\nIt may be seen in detail in the Critique of Pure Reason how in its\nspeculative employment this natural dialectic is to be solved, and how\nthe error which arises from a very natural illusion may be guarded\nagainst. But reason in its practical use is not a whit better off.\nAs pure practical reason, it likewise seeks to find the\nunconditioned for the practically conditioned (which rests on\ninclinations and natural wants), and this is not as the determining\nprinciple of the will, but even when this is given (in the moral\nlaw) it seeks the unconditioned totality of the object of pure\npractical reason under the name of the summum bonum.\n\nTo define this idea practically, i.e., sufficiently for the maxims\nof our rational conduct, is the business of practical wisdom, and this\nagain as a science is philosophy, in the sense in which the word was\nunderstood by the ancients, with whom it meant instruction in the\nconception in which the summum bonum was to be placed, and the conduct\nby which it was to be obtained. It would be well to leave this word in\nits ancient signification as a doctrine of the summum bonum, so far as\nreason endeavours to make this into a science. For on the one hand the\nrestriction annexed would suit the Greek expression (which signifies\nthe love of wisdom), and yet at the same time would be sufficient to\nembrace under the name of philosophy the love of science: that is to\nsay, of all speculative rational knowledge, so far as it is\nserviceable to reason, both for that conception and also for the\npractical principle determining our conduct, without letting out of\nsight the main end, on account of which alone it can be called a\ndoctrine of practical wisdom. On the other hand, it would be no harm\nto deter the self-conceit of one who ventures to claim the title of\nphilosopher by holding before him in the very definition a standard of\nself-estimation which would very much lower his pretensions. For a\nteacher of wisdom would mean something more than a scholar who has not\ncome so far as to guide himself, much less to guide others, with\ncertain expectation of attaining so high an end: it would mean a\nmaster in the knowledge of wisdom, which implies more than a modest\nman would claim for himself. Thus philosophy as well as wisdom would\nalways remain an ideal, which objectively is presented complete in\nreason alone, while subjectively for the person it is only the goal of\nhis unceasing endeavours; and no one would be justified in\nprofessing to be in possession of it so as to assume the name of\nphilosopher who could not also show its infallible effects in his\nown person as an example (in his self-mastery and the unquestioned\ninterest that he takes pre-eminently in the general good), and this\nthe ancients also required as a condition of deserving that honourable\ntitle.\n\n                                           {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 5}\n\nWe have another preliminary remark to make respecting the\ndialectic of the pure practical reason, on the point of the definition\nof the summum bonum (a successful solution of which dialectic would\nlead us to expect, as in case of that of the theoretical reason, the\nmost beneficial effects, inasmuch as the self-contradictions of pure\npractical reason honestly stated, and not concealed, force us to\nundertake a complete critique of this faculty).\n\nThe moral law is the sole determining principle of a pure will.\nBut since this is merely formal (viz., as prescribing only the form of\nthe maxim as universally legislative), it abstracts as a determining\nprinciple from all matter that is to say, from every object of\nvolition. Hence, though the summum bonum may be the whole object of\na pure practical reason, i.e., a pure will, yet it is not on that\naccount to be regarded as its determining principle; and the moral law\nalone must be regarded as the principle on which that and its\nrealization or promotion are aimed at. This remark is important in\nso delicate a case as the determination of moral principles, where the\nslightest misinterpretation perverts men's minds. For it will have\nbeen seen from the Analytic that, if we assume any object under the\nname of a good as a determining principle of the will prior to the\nmoral law and then deduce from it the supreme practical principle,\nthis would always introduce heteronomy and crush out the moral\nprinciple.\n\nIt is, however, evident that if the notion of the summum bonum\nincludes that of the moral law as its supreme condition, then the\nsummum bonum would not merely be an object, but the notion of it and\nthe conception of its existence as possible by our own practical\nreason would likewise be the determining principle of the will,\nsince in that case the will is in fact determined by the moral law\nwhich is already included in this conception, and by no other\nobject, as the principle of autonomy requires. This order of the\nconceptions of determination of the will must not be lost sight of, as\notherwise we should misunderstand ourselves and think we had fallen\ninto a contradiction, while everything remains in perfect harmony.\n\nBOOK_2|CHAPTER_2\n\n  CHAPTER II. Of the Dialectic of Pure Reason in defining the\n\n            Conception of the \"Summum Bonum\".\n\n\n\nThe conception of the summum itself contains an ambiguity which\nmight occasion needless disputes if we did not attend to it. The\nsummum may mean either the supreme (supremum) or the perfect\n(consummatum). The former is that condition which is itself\nunconditioned, i.e., is not subordinate to any other (originarium);\nthe second is that whole which is not a part of a greater whole of the\nsame kind (perfectissimum). It has been shown in the Analytic that\nvirtue (as worthiness to be happy) is the supreme condition of all\nthat can appear to us desirable, and consequently of all our pursuit\nof happiness, and is therefore the supreme good. But it does not\nfollow that it is the whole and perfect good as the object of the\ndesires of rational finite beings; for this requires happiness also,\nand that not merely in the partial eyes of the person who makes\nhimself an end, but even in the judgement of an impartial reason,\nwhich regards persons in general as ends in themselves. For to need\nhappiness, to deserve it, and yet at the same time not to\nparticipate in it, cannot be consistent with the perfect volition of a\nrational being possessed at the same time of all power, if, for the\nsake of experiment, we conceive such a being. Now inasmuch as virtue\nand happiness together constitute the possession of the summum bonum\nin a person, and the distribution of happiness in exact proportion\nto morality (which is the worth of the person, and his worthiness to\nbe happy) constitutes the summum bonum of a possible world; hence this\nsummum bonum expresses the whole, the perfect good, in which, however,\nvirtue as the condition is always the supreme good, since it has no\ncondition above it; whereas happiness, while it is pleasant to the\npossessor of it, is not of itself absolutely and in all respects good,\nbut always presupposes morally right behaviour as its condition.\n\nWhen two elements are necessarily united in one concept, they must\nbe connected as reason and consequence, and this either so that\ntheir unity is considered as analytical (logical connection), or as\nsynthetical (real connection) the former following the law of\nidentity, the latter that of causality. The connection of virtue and\nhappiness may therefore be understood in two ways: either the\nendeavour to be virtuous and the rational pursuit of happiness are not\ntwo distinct actions, but absolutely identical, in which case no maxim\nneed be made the principle of the former, other than what serves for\nthe latter; or the connection consists in this, that virtue produces\nhappiness as something distinct from the consciousness of virtue, as a\ncause produces an effect.\n\nThe ancient Greek schools were, properly speaking, only two, and\nin determining the conception of the summum bonum these followed in\nfact one and the same method, inasmuch as they did not allow virtue\nand happiness to be regarded as two distinct elements of the summum\nbonum, and consequently sought the unity of the principle by the\nrule of identity; but they differed as to which of the two was to be\ntaken as the fundamental notion. The Epicurean said: \"To be\nconscious that one's maxims lead to happiness is virtue\"; the Stoic\nsaid: \"To be conscious of one's virtue is happiness.\" With the former,\nPrudence was equivalent to morality; with the latter, who chose a\nhigher designation for virtue, morality alone was true wisdom.\n\nWhile we must admire the men who in such early times tried all\nimaginable ways of extending the domain of philosophy, we must at\nthe same time lament that their acuteness was unfortunately misapplied\nin trying to trace out identity between two extremely heterogeneous\nnotions, those of happiness and virtue. But it agrees with the\ndialectical spirit of their times (and subtle minds are even now\nsometimes misled in the same way) to get rid of irreconcilable\ndifferences in principle by seeking to change them into a mere contest\nabout words, and thus apparently working out the identity of the\nnotion under different names, and this usually occurs in cases where\nthe combination of heterogeneous principles lies so deep or so high,\nor would require so complete a transformation of the doctrines assumed\nin the rest of the philosophical system, that men are afraid to\npenetrate deeply into the real difference and prefer treating it as\na difference in questions of form.\n\n                                           {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 5}\n\nWhile both schools sought to trace out the identity of the practical\nprinciples of virtue and happiness, they were not agreed as to the way\nin which they tried to force this identity, but were separated\ninfinitely from one another, the one placing its principle on the side\nof sense, the other on that of reason; the one in the consciousness of\nsensible wants, the other in the independence of practical reason on\nall sensible grounds of determination. According to the Epicurean, the\nnotion of virtue was already involved in the maxim: \"To promote\none's own happiness\"; according to the Stoics, on the other hand,\nthe feeling of happiness was already contained in the consciousness of\nvirtue. Now whatever is contained in another notion is identical\nwith part of the containing notion, but not with the whole, and\nmoreover two wholes may be specifically distinct, although they\nconsist of the same parts; namely if the parts are united into a whole\nin totally different ways. The Stoic maintained that the virtue was\nthe whole summum bonum, and happiness only the consciousness of\npossessing it, as making part of the state of the subject. The\nEpicurean maintained that happiness was the whole summum bonum, and\nvirtue only the form of the maxim for its pursuit; viz., the\nrational use of the means for attaining it.\n\nNow it is clear from the Analytic that the maxims of virtue and\nthose of private happiness are quite heterogeneous as to their supreme\npractical principle, and, although they belong to one summum bonum\nwhich together they make possible, yet they are so far from coinciding\nthat they restrict and check one another very much in the same\nsubject. Thus the question: \"How is the summum bonum practically\npossible?\" still remains an unsolved problem, notwithstanding all\nthe attempts at coalition that have hitherto been made. The Analytic\nhas, however, shown what it is that makes the problem difficult to\nsolve; namely, that happiness and morality are two specifically\ndistinct elements of the summum bonum and, therefore, their\ncombination cannot be analytically cognised (as if the man that\nseeks his own happiness should find by mere analysis of his conception\nthat in so acting he is virtuous, or as if the man that follows virtue\nshould in the consciousness of such conduct find that he is already\nhappy ipso facto), but must be a synthesis of concepts. Now since this\ncombination is recognised as a priori, and therefore as practically\nnecessary, and consequently not as derived from experience, so that\nthe possibility of the summum bonum does not rest on any empirical\nprinciple, it follows that the deduction [legitimation] of this\nconcept must be transcendental. It is a priori (morally) necessary\nto produce the summum bonum by freedom of will: therefore the\ncondition of its possibility must rest solely on a priori principles\nof cognition.\n\n\n\n        I. The Antinomy of Practical Reason.\n\n\n\n                                          {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 10}\n\nIn the summum bonum which is practical for us, i.e., to be\nrealized by our will, virtue and happiness are thought as\nnecessarily combined, so that the one cannot be assumed by pure\npractical reason without the other also being attached to it. Now this\ncombination (like every other) is either analytical or synthetical. It\nhas been shown that it cannot be analytical; it must then be\nsynthetical and, more particularly, must be conceived as the\nconnection of cause and effect, since it concerns a practical good,\ni.e., one that is possible by means of action; consequently either the\ndesire of happiness must be the motive to maxims of virtue, or the\nmaxim of virtue must be the efficient cause of happiness. The first is\nabsolutely impossible, because (as was proved in the Analytic)\nmaxims which place the determining principle of the will in the desire\nof personal happiness are not moral at all, and no virtue can be\nfounded on them. But the second is also impossible, because the\npractical connection of causes and effects in the world, as the result\nof the determination of the will, does not depend upon the moral\ndispositions of the will, but on the knowledge of the laws of nature\nand the physical power to use them for one's purposes; consequently we\ncannot expect in the world by the most punctilious observance of the\nmoral laws any necessary connection of happiness with virtue\nadequate to the summum bonum. Now, as the promotion of this summum\nbonum, the conception of which contains this connection, is a priori a\nnecessary object of our will and inseparably attached to the moral\nlaw, the impossibility of the former must prove the falsity of the\nlatter. If then the supreme good is not possible by practical rules,\nthen the moral law also which commands us to promote it is directed to\nvain imaginary ends and must consequently be false.\n\n\n\n II. Critical Solution of the Antinomy of Practical Reason.\n\n\n\nThe antinomy of pure speculative reason exhibits a similar\nconflict between freedom and physical necessity in the causality of\nevents in the world. It was solved by showing that there is no real\ncontradiction when the events and even the world in which they occur\nare regarded (as they ought to be) merely as appearances; since one\nand the same acting being, as an appearance (even to his own inner\nsense), has a causality in the world of sense that always conforms\nto the mechanism of nature, but with respect to the same events, so\nfar as the acting person regards himself at the same time as a\nnoumenon (as pure intelligence in an existence not dependent on the\ncondition of time), he can contain a principle by which that causality\nacting according to laws of nature is determined, but which is\nitself free from all laws of nature.\n\n                                          {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 15}\n\nIt is just the same with the foregoing antinomy of pure practical\nreason. The first of the two propositions, \"That the endeavour after\nhappiness produces a virtuous mind,\" is absolutely false; but the\nsecond, \"That a virtuous mind necessarily produces happiness,\" is\nnot absolutely false, but only in so far as virtue is considered as\na form of causality in the sensible world, and consequently only if\nI suppose existence in it to be the only sort of existence of a\nrational being; it is then only conditionally false. But as I am not\nonly justified in thinking that I exist also as a noumenon in a\nworld of the understanding, but even have in the moral law a purely\nintellectual determining principle of my causality (in the sensible\nworld), it is not impossible that morality of mind should have a\nconnection as cause with happiness (as an effect in the sensible\nworld) if not immediate yet mediate (viz., through an intelligent\nauthor of nature), and moreover necessary; while in a system of nature\nwhich is merely an object of the senses, this combination could\nnever occur except contingently and, therefore, could not suffice\nfor the summum bonum.\n\nThus, notwithstanding this seeming conflict of practical reason with\nitself, the summum bonum, which is the necessary supreme end of a will\nmorally determined, is a true object thereof; for it is practically\npossible, and the maxims of the will which as regards their matter\nrefer to it have objective reality, which at first was threatened by\nthe antinomy that appeared in the connection of morality with\nhappiness by a general law; but this was merely from a\nmisconception, because the relation between appearances was taken\nfor a relation of the things in themselves to these appearances.\n\nWhen we find ourselves obliged to go so far, namely, to the\nconnection with an intelligible world, to find the possibility of\nthe summum bonum, which reason points out to all rational beings as\nthe goal of all their moral wishes, it must seem strange that,\nnevertheless, the philosophers both of ancient and modern times have\nbeen able to find happiness in accurate proportion to virtue even in\nthis life (in the sensible world), or have persuaded themselves that\nthey were conscious thereof. For Epicurus as well as the Stoics\nextolled above everything the happiness that springs from the\nconsciousness of living virtuously; and the former was not so base\nin his practical precepts as one might infer from the principles of\nhis theory, which he used for explanation and not for action, or as\nthey were interpreted by many who were misled by his using the term\npleasure for contentment; on the contrary, he reckoned the most\ndisinterested practice of good amongst the ways of enjoying the most\nintimate delight, and his scheme of pleasure (by which he meant\nconstant cheerfulness of mind) included the moderation and control\nof the inclinations, such as the strictest moral philosopher might\nrequire. He differed from the Stoics chiefly in making this pleasure\nthe motive, which they very rightly refused to do. For, on the one\nhand, the virtuous Epicurus, like many well-intentioned men of this\nday who do not reflect deeply enough on their principles, fell into\nthe error of presupposing the virtuous disposition in the persons\nfor whom he wished to provide the springs to virtue (and indeed the\nupright man cannot be happy if he is not first conscious of his\nuprightness; since with such a character the reproach that his habit\nof thought would oblige him to make against himself in case of\ntransgression and his moral self-condemnation would rob him of all\nenjoyment of the pleasantness which his condition might otherwise\ncontain). But the question is: How is such a disposition possible in\nthe first instance, and such a habit of thought in estimating the\nworth of one's existence, since prior to it there can be in the\nsubject no feeling at all for moral worth? If a man is virtuous\nwithout being conscious of his integrity in every action, he will\ncertainly not enjoy life, however favourable fortune may be to him\nin its physical circumstances; but can we make him virtuous in the\nfirst instance, in other words, before he esteems the moral worth of\nhis existence so highly, by praising to him the peace of mind that\nwould result from the consciousness of an integrity for which he has\nno sense?\n\nOn the other hand, however, there is here an occasion of a vitium\nsubreptionis, and as it were of an optical illusion, in the\nself-consciousness of what one does as distinguished from what one\nfeels- an illusion which even the most experienced cannot altogether\navoid. The moral disposition of mind is necessarily combined with a\nconsciousness that the will is determined directly by the law. Now the\nconsciousness of a determination of the faculty of desire is always\nthe source of a satisfaction in the resulting action; but this\npleasure, this satisfaction in oneself, is not the determining\nprinciple of the action; on the contrary, the determination of the\nwill directly by reason is the source of the feeling of pleasure,\nand this remains a pure practical not sensible determination of the\nfaculty of desire. Now as this determination has exactly the same\neffect within in impelling to activity, that a feeling of the pleasure\nto be expected from the desired action would have had, we easily\nlook on what we ourselves do as something which we merely passively\nfeel, and take the moral spring for a sensible impulse, just as it\nhappens in the so-called illusion of the senses (in this case the\ninner sense). It is a sublime thing in human nature to be determined\nto actions immediately by a purely rational law; sublime even is the\nillusion that regards the subjective side of this capacity of\nintellectual determination as something sensible and the effect of a\nspecial sensible feeling (for an intellectual feeling would be a\ncontradiction). It is also of great importance to attend to this\nproperty of our personality and as much as possible to cultivate the\neffect of reason on this feeling. But we must beware lest by falsely\nextolling this moral determining principle as a spring, making its\nsource lie in particular feelings of pleasure (which are in fact\nonly results), we degrade and disfigure the true genuine spring, the\nlaw itself, by putting as it were a false foil upon it. Respect, not\npleasure or enjoyment of happiness, is something for which it is not\npossible that reason should have any antecedent feeling as its\nfoundation (for this would always be sensible and pathological); and\nconsciousness of immediate obligation of the will by the law is by\nno means analogous to the feeling of pleasure, although in relation to\nthe faculty of desire it produces the same effect, but from\ndifferent sources: it is only by this mode of conception, however,\nthat we can attain what we are seeking, namely, that actions be done\nnot merely in accordance with duty (as a result of pleasant feelings),\nbut from duty, which must be the true end of all moral cultivation.\n\nHave we not, however, a word which does not express enjoyment, as\nhappiness does, but indicates a satisfaction in one's existence, an\nanalogue of the happiness which must necessarily accompany the\nconsciousness of virtue? Yes this word is self-contentment which in\nits proper signification always designates only a negative\nsatisfaction in one's existence, in which one is conscious of\nneeding nothing. Freedom and the consciousness of it as a faculty of\nfollowing the moral law with unyielding resolution is independence\nof inclinations, at least as motives determining (though not as\naffecting) our desire, and so far as I am conscious of this freedom in\nfollowing my moral maxims, it is the only source of an unaltered\ncontentment which is necessarily connected with it and rests on no\nspecial feeling. This may be called intellectual contentment. The\nsensible contentment (improperly so-called) which rests on the\nsatisfaction of the inclinations, however delicate they may be\nimagined to be, can never be adequate to the conception of it. For the\ninclinations change, they grow with the indulgence shown them, and\nalways leave behind a still greater void than we had thought to\nfill. Hence they are always burdensome to a rational being, and,\nalthough he cannot lay them aside, they wrest from him the wish to\nbe rid of them. Even an inclination to what is right (e.g., to\nbeneficence), though it may much facilitate the efficacy of the\nmoral maxims, cannot produce any. For in these all must be directed to\nthe conception of the law as a determining principle, if the action is\nto contain morality and not merely legality. Inclination is blind\nand slavish, whether it be of a good sort or not, and, when morality\nis in question, reason must not play the part merely of guardian to\ninclination, but disregarding it altogether must attend simply to\nits own interest as pure practical reason. This very feeling of\ncompassion and tender sympathy, if it precedes the deliberation on the\nquestion of duty and becomes a determining principle, is even annoying\nto right thinking persons, brings their deliberate maxims into\nconfusion, and makes them wish to be delivered from it and to be\nsubject to lawgiving reason alone.\n\n                                          {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 20}\n\nFrom this we can understand how the consciousness of this faculty of\na pure practical reason produces by action (virtue) a consciousness of\nmastery over one's inclinations, and therefore of independence of\nthem, and consequently also of the discontent that always\naccompanies them, and thus a negative satisfaction with one's state,\ni.e., contentment, which is primarily contentment with one's own\nperson. Freedom itself becomes in this way (namely, indirectly)\ncapable of an enjoyment which cannot be called happiness, because it\ndoes not depend on the positive concurrence of a feeling, nor is it,\nstrictly speaking, bliss, since it does not include complete\nindependence of inclinations and wants, but it resembles bliss in so\nfar as the determination of one's will at least can hold itself free\nfrom their influence; and thus, at least in its origin, this enjoyment\nis analogous to the self-sufficiency which we can ascribe only to\nthe Supreme Being.\n\nFrom this solution of the antinomy of practical pure reason, it\nfollows that in practical principles we may at least conceive as\npossible a natural and necessary connection between the\nconsciousness of morality and the expectation of a proportionate\nhappiness as its result, though it does not follow that we can know or\nperceive this connection; that, on the other hand, principles of the\npursuit of happiness cannot possibly produce morality; that,\ntherefore, morality is the supreme good (as the first condition of the\nsummum bonum), while happiness constitutes its second element, but\nonly in such a way that it is the morally conditioned, but necessary\nconsequence of the former. Only with this subordination is the\nsummum bonum the whole object of pure practical reason, which must\nnecessarily conceive it as possible, since it commands us to\ncontribute to the utmost of our power to its realization. But since\nthe possibility of such connection of the conditioned with its\ncondition belongs wholly to the supersensual relation of things and\ncannot be given according to the laws of the world of sense,\nalthough the practical consequences of the idea belong to the world of\nsense, namely, the actions that aim at realizing the summum bonum;\nwe will therefore endeavour to set forth the grounds of that\npossibility, first, in respect of what is immediately in our power,\nand then, secondly, in that which is not in our power, but which\nreason presents to us as the supplement of our impotence, for the\nrealization of the summum bonum (which by practical principles is\nnecessary).\n\n\n\n  III. Of the Primacy of Pure Practical Reason in its\n\n         Union with the Speculative Reason.\n\n                                          {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 25}\n\n\n\nBy primacy between two or more things connected by reason, I\nunderstand the prerogative, belonging to one, of being the first\ndetermining principle in the connection with all the rest. In a\nnarrower practical sense it means the prerogative of the interest of\none in so far as the interest of the other is subordinated to it,\nwhile it is not postponed to any other. To every faculty of the mind\nwe can attribute an interest, that is, a principle, that contains\nthe condition on which alone the former is called into exercise.\nReason, as the faculty of principles, determines the interest of all\nthe powers of the mind and is determined by its own. The interest of\nits speculative employment consists in the cognition of the object\npushed to the highest a priori principles: that of its practical\nemployment, in the determination of the will in respect of the final\nand complete end. As to what is necessary for the possibility of any\nemployment of reason at all, namely, that its principles and\naffirmations should not contradict one another, this constitutes no\npart of its interest, but is the condition of having reason at all; it\nis only its development, not mere consistency with itself, that is\nreckoned as its interest.\n\nIf practical reason could not assume or think as given anything\nfurther than what speculative reason of itself could offer it from its\nown insight, the latter would have the primacy. But supposing that\nit had of itself original a priori principles with which certain\ntheoretical positions were inseparably connected, while these were\nwithdrawn from any possible insight of speculative reason (which,\nhowever, they must not contradict); then the question is: Which\ninterest is the superior (not which must give way, for they are not\nnecessarily conflicting), whether speculative reason, which knows\nnothing of all that the practical offers for its acceptance, should\ntake up these propositions and (although they transcend it) try to\nunite them with its own concepts as a foreign possession handed over\nto it, or whether it is justified in obstinately following its own\nseparate interest and, according to the canonic of Epicurus, rejecting\nas vain subtlety everything that cannot accredit its objective reality\nby manifest examples to be shown in experience, even though it\nshould be never so much interwoven with the interest of the\npractical (pure) use of reason, and in itself not contradictory to the\ntheoretical, merely because it infringes on the interest of the\nspeculative reason to this extent, that it removes the bounds which\nthis latter had set to itself, and gives it up to every nonsense or\ndelusion of imagination?\n\nIn fact, so far as practical reason is taken as dependent on\npathological conditions, that is, as merely regulating the\ninclinations under the sensible principle of happiness, we could not\nrequire speculative reason to take its principles from such a\nsource. Mohammed's paradise, or the absorption into the Deity of the\ntheosophists and mystics would press their monstrosities on the reason\naccording to the taste of each, and one might as well have no reason\nas surrender it in such fashion to all sorts of dreams. But if pure\nreason of itself can be practical and is actually so, as the\nconsciousness of the moral law proves, then it is still only one and\nthe same reason which, whether in a theoretical or a practical point\nof view, judges according to a priori principles; and then it is clear\nthat although it is in the first point of view incompetent to\nestablish certain propositions positively, which, however, do not\ncontradict it, then, as soon as these propositions are inseparably\nattached to the practical interest of pure reason, it must accept\nthem, though it be as something offered to it from a foreign source,\nsomething that has not grown on its own ground, but yet is\nsufficiently authenticated; and it must try to compare and connect\nthem with everything that it has in its power as speculative reason.\nIt must remember, however, that these are not additions to its\ninsight, but yet are extensions of its employment in another,\nnamely, a practical aspect; and this is not in the least opposed to\nits interest, which consists in the restriction of wild speculation.\n\nThus, when pure speculative and pure practical reason are combined\nin one cognition, the latter has the primacy, provided, namely, that\nthis combination is not contingent and arbitrary, but founded a priori\non reason itself and therefore necessary. For without this\nsubordination there would arise a conflict of reason with itself;\nsince, if they were merely co-ordinate, the former would close its\nboundaries strictly and admit nothing from the latter into its domain,\nwhile the latter would extend its bounds over everything and when\nits needs required would seek to embrace the former within them. Nor\ncould we reverse the order and require pure practical reason to be\nsubordinate to the speculative, since all interest is ultimately\npractical, and even that of speculative reason is conditional, and\nit is only in the practical employment of reason that it is complete.\n\n                                          {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 30}\n\n\n\n   IV. The Immortality of the Soul as a Postulate of\n\n                Pure Practical Reason.\n\n\n\nThe realization of the summum bonum in the world is the necessary\nobject of a will determinable by the moral law. But in this will the\nperfect accordance of the mind with the moral law is the supreme\ncondition of the summum bonum. This then must be possible, as well\nas its object, since it is contained in the command to promote the\nlatter. Now, the perfect accordance of the will with the moral law\nis holiness, a perfection of which no rational being of the sensible\nworld is capable at any moment of his existence. Since,\nnevertheless, it is required as practically necessary, it can only\nbe found in a progress in infinitum towards that perfect accordance,\nand on the principles of pure practical reason it is necessary to\nassume such a practical progress as the real object of our will.\n\n                                          {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 35}\n\nNow, this endless progress is only possible on the supposition of an\nendless duration of the existence and personality of the same rational\nbeing (which is called the immortality of the soul). The summum bonum,\nthen, practically is only possible on the supposition of the\nimmortality of the soul; consequently this immortality, being\ninseparably connected with the moral law, is a postulate of pure\npractical reason (by which I mean a theoretical proposition, not\ndemonstrable as such, but which is an inseparable result of an\nunconditional a priori practical law.\n\nThis principle of the moral destination of our nature, namely,\nthat it is only in an endless progress that we can attain perfect\naccordance with the moral law, is of the greatest use, not merely\nfor the present purpose of supplementing the impotence of\nspeculative reason, but also with respect to religion. In default of\nit, either the moral law is quite degraded from its holiness, being\nmade out to be indulgent and conformable to our convenience, or else\nmen strain their notions of their vocation and their expectation to an\nunattainable goal, hoping to acquire complete holiness of will, and so\nthey lose themselves in fanatical theosophic dreams, which wholly\ncontradict self-knowledge. In both cases the unceasing effort to\nobey punctually and thoroughly a strict and inflexible command of\nreason, which yet is not ideal but real, is only hindered. For a\nrational but finite being, the only thing possible is an endless\nprogress from the lower to higher degrees of moral perfection. The\nInfinite Being, to whom the condition of time is nothing, sees in this\nto us endless succession a whole of accordance with the moral law; and\nthe holiness which his command inexorably requires, in order to be\ntrue to his justice in the share which He assigns to each in the\nsummum bonum, is to be found in a single intellectual intuition of the\nwhole existence of rational beings. All that can be expected of the\ncreature in respect of the hope of this participation would be the\nconsciousness of his tried character, by which from the progress he\nhas hitherto made from the worse to the morally better, and the\nimmutability of purpose which has thus become known to him, he may\nhope for a further unbroken continuance of the same, however long\nhis existence may last, even beyond this life, * and thus he may\nhope, not indeed here, nor in any imaginable point of his future\nexistence, but only in the endlessness of his duration (which God\nalone can survey) to be perfectly adequate to his will (without\nindulgence or excuse, which do not harmonize with justice).\n\n\n\n* It seems, nevertheless, impossible for a creature to have the\nconviction of his unwavering firmness of mind in the progress\ntowards goodness. On this account the Christian religion makes it come\nonly from the same Spirit that works sanctification, that is, this\nfirm purpose, and with it the consciousness of steadfastness in the\nmoral progress. But naturally one who is conscious that he has\npersevered through a long portion of his life up to the end in the\nprogress to the better, and this genuine moral motives, may well\nhave the comforting hope, though not the certainty, that even in an\nexistence prolonged beyond this life he will continue in these\nprinciples; and although he is never justified here in his own eyes,\nnor can ever hope to be so in the increased perfection of his\nnature, to which he looks forward, together with an increase of\nduties, nevertheless in this progress which, though it is directed\nto a goal infinitely remote, yet is in God's sight regarded as\nequivalent to possession, he may have a prospect of a blessed\nfuture; for this is the word that reason employs to designate\nperfect well-being independent of all contingent causes of the\nworld, and which, like holiness, is an idea that can be contained only\nin an endless progress and its totality, and consequently is never\nfully attained by a creature.\n\n\n\n                                          {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 40}\n\nV. The Existence of God as a Postulate of Pure Practical Reason.\n\n\n\nIn the foregoing analysis the moral law led to a practical problem\nwhich is prescribed by pure reason alone, without the aid of any\nsensible motives, namely, that of the necessary completeness of the\nfirst and principle element of the summum bonum, viz., morality;\nand, as this can be perfectly solved only in eternity, to the\npostulate of immortality. The same law must also lead us to affirm the\npossibility of the second element of the summum bonum, viz., happiness\nproportioned to that morality, and this on grounds as disinterested as\nbefore, and solely from impartial reason; that is, it must lead to the\nsupposition of the existence of a cause adequate to this effect; in\nother words, it must postulate the existence of God, as the\nnecessary condition of the possibility of the summum bonum (an\nobject of the will which is necessarily connected with the moral\nlegislation of pure reason). We proceed to exhibit this connection\nin a convincing manner.\n\nHappiness is the condition of a rational being in the world with\nwhom everything goes according to his wish and will; it rests,\ntherefore, on the harmony of physical nature with his whole end and\nlikewise with the essential determining principle of his will. Now the\nmoral law as a law of freedom commands by determining principles,\nwhich ought to be quite independent of nature and of its harmony\nwith our faculty of desire (as springs). But the acting rational being\nin the world is not the cause of the world and of nature itself. There\nis not the least ground, therefore, in the moral law for a necessary\nconnection between morality and proportionate happiness in a being\nthat belongs to the world as part of it, and therefore dependent on\nit, and which for that reason cannot by his will be a cause of this\nnature, nor by his own power make it thoroughly harmonize, as far as\nhis happiness is concerned, with his practical principles.\nNevertheless, in the practical problem of pure reason, i.e., the\nnecessary pursuit of the summum bonum, such a connection is postulated\nas necessary: we ought to endeavour to promote the summum bonum,\nwhich, therefore, must be possible. Accordingly, the existence of a\ncause of all nature, distinct from nature itself and containing the\nprinciple of this connection, namely, of the exact harmony of\nhappiness with morality, is also postulated. Now this supreme cause\nmust contain the principle of the harmony of nature, not merely with a\nlaw of the will of rational beings, but with the conception of this\nlaw, in so far as they make it the supreme determining principle of\nthe will, and consequently not merely with the form of morals, but\nwith their morality as their motive, that is, with their moral\ncharacter. Therefore, the summum bonum is possible in the world only\non the supposition of a Supreme Being having a causality corresponding\nto moral character. Now a being that is capable of acting on the\nconception of laws is an intelligence (a rational being), and the\ncausality of such a being according to this conception of laws is\nhis will; therefore the supreme cause of nature, which must be\npresupposed as a condition of the summum bonum is a being which is the\ncause of nature by intelligence and will, consequently its author,\nthat is God. It follows that the postulate of the possibility of the\nhighest derived good (the best world) is likewise the postulate of the\nreality of a highest original good, that is to say, of the existence\nof God. Now it was seen to be a duty for us to promote the summum\nbonum; consequently it is not merely allowable, but it is a\nnecessity connected with duty as a requisite, that we should\npresuppose the possibility of this summum bonum; and as this is\npossible only on condition of the existence of God, it inseparably\nconnects the supposition of this with duty; that is, it is morally\nnecessary to assume the existence of God.\n\nIt must be remarked here that this moral necessity is subjective,\nthat is, it is a want, and not objective, that is, itself a duty,\nfor there cannot be a duty to suppose the existence of anything (since\nthis concerns only the theoretical employment of reason). Moreover, it\nis not meant by this that it is necessary to suppose the existence\nof God as a basis of all obligation in general (for this rests, as has\nbeen sufficiently proved, simply on the autonomy of reason itself).\nWhat belongs to duty here is only the endeavour to realize and promote\nthe summum bonum in the world, the possibility of which can\ntherefore be postulated; and as our reason finds it not conceivable\nexcept on the supposition of a supreme intelligence, the admission\nof this existence is therefore connected with the consciousness of our\nduty, although the admission itself belongs to the domain of\nspeculative reason. Considered in respect of this alone, as a\nprinciple of explanation, it may be called a hypothesis, but in\nreference to the intelligibility of an object given us by the moral\nlaw (the summum bonum), and consequently of a requirement for\npractical purposes, it may be called faith, that is to say a pure\nrational faith, since pure reason (both in its theoretical and\npractical use) is the sole source from which it springs.\n\n                                          {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 45}\n\nFrom this deduction it is now intelligible why the Greek schools\ncould never attain the solution of their problem of the practical\npossibility of the summum bonum, because they made the rule of the use\nwhich the will of man makes of his freedom the sole and sufficient\nground of this possibility, thinking that they had no need for that\npurpose of the existence of God. No doubt they were so far right\nthat they established the principle of morals of itself\nindependently of this postulate, from the relation of reason only to\nthe will, and consequently made it the supreme practical condition\nof the summum bonum; but it was not therefore the whole condition of\nits possibility. The Epicureans had indeed assumed as the supreme\nprinciple of morality a wholly false one, namely that of happiness,\nand had substituted for a law a maxim of arbitrary choice according to\nevery man's inclination; they proceeded, however, consistently\nenough in this, that they degraded their summum bonum likewise, just\nin proportion to the meanness of their fundamental principle, and\nlooked for no greater happiness than can be attained by human prudence\n(including temperance and moderation of the inclinations), and this as\nwe know would be scanty enough and would be very different according\nto circumstances; not to mention the exceptions that their maxims must\nperpetually admit and which make them incapable of being laws. The\nStoics, on the contrary, had chosen their supreme practical\nprinciple quite rightly, making virtue the condition of the summum\nbonum; but when they represented the degree of virtue required by\nits pure law as fully attainable in this life, they not only\nstrained the moral powers of the man whom they called the wise\nbeyond all the limits of his nature, and assumed a thing that\ncontradicts all our knowledge of men, but also and principally they\nwould not allow the second element of the summum bonum, namely,\nhappiness, to be properly a special object of human desire, but made\ntheir wise man, like a divinity in his consciousness of the excellence\nof his person, wholly independent of nature (as regards his own\ncontentment); they exposed him indeed to the evils of life, but made\nhim not subject to them (at the same time representing him also as\nfree from moral evil). They thus, in fact, left out the second element\nof the summum bonum namely, personal happiness, placing it solely in\naction and satisfaction with one's own personal worth, thus\nincluding it in the consciousness of being morally minded, in which\nthey Might have been sufficiently refuted by the voice of their own\nnature.\n\nThe doctrine of Christianity, * even if we do not yet consider it\nas a religious doctrine, gives, touching this point, a conception of\nthe summum bonum (the kingdom of God), which alone satisfies the\nstrictest demand of practical reason. The moral law is holy\n(unyielding) and demands holiness of morals, although all the moral\nperfection to which man can attain is still only virtue, that is, a\nrightful disposition arising from respect for the law, implying\nconsciousness of a constant propensity to transgression, or at least a\nwant of purity, that is, a mixture of many spurious (not moral)\nmotives of obedience to the law, consequently a self-esteem combined\nwith humility. In respect, then, of the holiness which the Christian\nlaw requires, this leaves the creature nothing but a progress in\ninfinitum, but for that very reason it justifies him in hoping for\nan endless duration of his existence. The worth of a character\nperfectly accordant with the moral law is infinite, since the only\nrestriction on all possible happiness in the judgement of a wise and\nall powerful distributor of it is the absence of conformity of\nrational beings to their duty. But the moral law of itself does not\npromise any happiness, for according to our conceptions of an order of\nnature in general, this is not necessarily connected with obedience to\nthe law. Now Christian morality supplies this defect (of the second\nindispensable element of the summum bonum) by representing the world\nin which rational beings devote themselves with all their soul to\nthe moral law, as a kingdom of God, in which nature and morality are\nbrought into a harmony foreign to each of itself, by a holy Author who\nmakes the derived summum bonum possible. Holiness of life is\nprescribed to them as a rule even in this life, while the welfare\nproportioned to it, namely, bliss, is represented as attainable only\nin an eternity; because the former must always be the pattern of their\nconduct in every state, and progress towards it is already possible\nand necessary in this life; while the latter, under the name of\nhappiness, cannot be attained at all in this world (so far as our\nown power is concerned), and therefore is made simply an object of\nhope. Nevertheless, the Christian principle of morality itself is\nnot theological (so as to be heteronomy), but is autonomy of pure\npractical reason, since it does not make the knowledge of God and\nHis will the foundation of these laws, but only of the attainment of\nthe summum bonum, on condition of following these laws, and it does\nnot even place the proper spring of this obedience in the desired\nresults, but solely in the conception of duty, as that of which the\nfaithful observance alone constitutes the worthiness to obtain those\nhappy consequences.\n\n\n\n* It is commonly held that the Christian precept of morality has no\nadvantage in respect of purity over the moral conceptions of the\nStoics; the distinction between them is, however, very obvious. The\nStoic system made the consciousness of strength of mind the pivot on\nwhich all moral dispositions should turn; and although its disciples\nspoke of duties and even defined them very well, yet they placed the\nspring and proper determining principle of the will in an elevation of\nthe mind above the lower springs of the senses, which owe their\npower only to weakness of mind. With them therefore, virtue was a sort\nof heroism in the wise man raising himself above the animal nature\nof man, is sufficient for Himself, and, while he prescribes duties\nto others, is himself raised above them, and is not subject to any\ntemptation to transgress the moral law. All this, however, they\ncould not have done if they had conceived this law in all its purity\nand strictness, as the precept of the Gospel does. When I give the\nname idea to a perfection to which nothing adequate can be given in\nexperience, it does not follow that the moral ideas are thing\ntranscendent, that is something of which we could not even determine\nthe concept adequately, or of which it is uncertain whether there is\nany object corresponding to it at all, as is the case with the ideas\nof speculative reason; on the contrary, being types of practical\nperfection, they serve as the indispensable rule of conduct and\nlikewise as the standard of comparison. Now if I consider Christian\nmorals on their philosophical side, then compared with the ideas of\nthe Greek schools, they would appear as follows: the ideas of the\nCynics, the Epicureans, the Stoics, and the Christians are: simplicity\nof nature, prudence, wisdom, and holiness. In respect of the way of\nattaining them, the Greek schools were distinguished from one\nanother thus that the Cynics only required common sense, the others\nthe path of science, but both found the mere use of natural powers\nsufficient for the purpose. Christian morality, because its precept is\nframed (as a moral precept must be) so pure and unyielding, takes from\nman all confidence that he can be fully adequate to it, at least in\nthis life, but again sets it up by enabling us to hope that if we\nact as well as it is in our power to do, then what is not in our power\nwill come in to our aid from another source, whether we know how\nthis may be or not. Aristotle and Plato differed only as to the origin\nof our moral conceptions.\n\n\n\n                                          {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 50}\n\nIn this manner, the moral laws lead through the conception of the\nsummum bonum as the object and final end of pure practical reason to\nreligion, that is, to the recognition of all duties as divine\ncommands, not as sanctions, that is to say, arbitrary ordinances of\na foreign and contingent in themselves, but as essential laws of every\nfree will in itself, which, nevertheless, must be regarded as commands\nof the Supreme Being, because it is only from a morally perfect\n(holy and good) and at the same time all-powerful will, and\nconsequently only through harmony with this will, that we can hope\nto attain the summum bonum which the moral law makes it our duty to\ntake as the object of our endeavours. Here again, then, all remains\ndisinterested and founded merely on duty; neither fear nor hope\nbeing made the fundamental springs, which if taken as principles would\ndestroy the whole moral worth of actions. The moral law commands me to\nmake the highest possible good in a world the ultimate object of all\nmy conduct. But I cannot hope to effect this otherwise than by the\nharmony of my will with that of a holy and good Author of the world;\nand although the conception of the summum bonum as a whole, in which\nthe greatest happiness is conceived as combined in the most exact\nproportion with the highest degree of moral perfection (possible in\ncreatures), includes my own happiness, yet it is not this that is\nthe determining principle of the will which is enjoined to promote the\nsummum bonum, but the moral law, which, on the contrary, limits by\nstrict conditions my unbounded desire of happiness.\n\nHence also morality is not properly the doctrine how we should\nmake ourselves happy, but how we should become worthy of happiness. It\nis only when religion is added that there also comes in the hope of\nparticipating some day in happiness in proportion as we have\nendeavoured to be not unworthy of it.\n\nA man is worthy to possess a thing or a state when his possession of\nit is in harmony with the summum bonum. We can now easily see that all\nworthiness depends on moral conduct, since in the conception of the\nsummum bonum this constitutes the condition of the rest (which belongs\nto one's state), namely, the participation of happiness. Now it\nfollows from this that morality should never be treated as a\ndoctrine of happiness, that is, an instruction how to become happy;\nfor it has to do simply with the rational condition (conditio sine qua\nnon) of happiness, not with the means of attaining it. But when\nmorality has been completely expounded (which merely imposes duties\ninstead of providing rules for selfish desires), then first, after the\nmoral desire to promote the summum bonum (to bring the kingdom of\nGod to us) has been awakened, a desire founded on a law, and which\ncould not previously arise in any selfish mind, and when for the\nbehoof of this desire the step to religion has been taken, then this\nethical doctrine may be also called a doctrine of happiness because\nthe hope of happiness first begins with religion only.\n\nWe can also see from this that, when we ask what is God's ultimate\nend in creating the world, we must not name the happiness of the\nrational beings in it, but the summum bonum, which adds a further\ncondition to that wish of such beings, namely, the condition of\nbeing worthy of happiness, that is, the morality of these same\nrational beings, a condition which alone contains the rule by which\nonly they can hope to share in the former at the hand of a wise\nAuthor. For as wisdom, theoretically considered, signifies the\nknowledge of the summum bonum and, practically, the accordance of\nthe will with the summum bonum, we cannot attribute to a supreme\nindependent wisdom an end based merely on goodness. For we cannot\nconceive the action of this goodness (in respect of the happiness of\nrational beings) as suitable to the highest original good, except\nunder the restrictive conditions of harmony with the holiness * of\nhis will. Therefore, those who placed the end of creation in the glory\nof God (provided that this is not conceived anthropomorphically as a\ndesire to be praised) have perhaps hit upon the best expression. For\nnothing glorifies God more than that which is the most estimable thing\nin the world, respect for his command, the observance of the holy duty\nthat his law imposes on us, when there is added thereto his glorious\nplan of crowning such a beautiful order of things with corresponding\nhappiness. If the latter (to speak humanly) makes Him worthy of\nlove, by the former He is an object of adoration. Even men can never\nacquire respect by benevolence alone, though they may gain love, so\nthat the greatest beneficence only procures them honour when it is\nregulated by worthiness.\n\n\n\n                                          {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 55}\n\n* In order to make these characteristics of these conceptions\nclear, I add the remark that whilst we ascribe to God various\nattributes, the quality of which we also find applicable to creatures,\nonly that in Him they are raised to the highest degree, e.g., power,\nknowledge, presence, goodness, etc., under the designations of\nomnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, etc., there are three that are\nascribed to God exclusively, and yet without the addition of\ngreatness, and which are all moral He is the only holy, the only\nblessed, the only wise, because these conceptions already imply the\nabsence of limitation. In the order of these attributes He is also the\nholy lawgiver (and creator), the good governor (and preserver) and the\njust judge, three attributes which include everything by which God\nis the object of religion, and in conformity with which the\nmetaphysical perfections are added of themselves in the reason.\n\n\n\nThat in the order of ends, man (and with him every rational being)\nis an end in himself, that is, that he can never be used merely as a\nmeans by any (not even by God) without being at the same time an end\nalso himself, that therefore humanity in our person must be holy to\nourselves, this follows now of itself because he is the subject of the\nmoral law, in other words, of that which is holy in itself, and on\naccount of which and in agreement with which alone can anything be\ntermed holy. For this moral law is founded on the autonomy of his\nwill, as a free will which by its universal laws must necessarily be\nable to agree with that to which it is to submit itself.\n\n\n\n  VI. Of the Postulates of Pure Practical Reason Generally.\n\n                                          {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 60}\n\n\n\nThey all proceed from the principle of morality, which is not a\npostulate but a law, by which reason determines the will directly,\nwhich will, because it is so determined as a pure will, requires these\nnecessary conditions of obedience to its precept. These postulates are\nnot theoretical dogmas but, suppositions practically necessary;\nwhile then they do [not] extend our speculative knowledge, they give\nobjective reality to the ideas of speculative reason in general (by\nmeans of their reference to what is practical), and give it a right to\nconcepts, the possibility even of which it could not otherwise venture\nto affirm.\n\nThese postulates are those of immortality, freedom positively\nconsidered (as the causality of a being so far as he belongs to the\nintelligible world), and the existence of God. The first results\nfrom the practically necessary condition of a duration adequate to the\ncomplete fulfilment of the moral law; the second from the necessary\nsupposition of independence of the sensible world, and of the\nfaculty of determining one's will according to the law of an\nintelligible world, that is, of freedom; the third from the\nnecessary condition of the existence of the summum bonum in such an\nintelligible world, by the supposition of the supreme independent\ngood, that is, the existence of God.\n\nThus the fact that respect for the moral law necessarily makes the\nsummum bonum an object of our endeavours, and the supposition thence\nresulting of its objective reality, lead through the postulates of\npractical reason to conceptions which speculative reason might\nindeed present as problems, but could never solve. Thus it leads: 1.\nTo that one in the solution of which the latter could do nothing but\ncommit paralogisms (namely, that of immortality), because it could not\nlay hold of the character of permanence, by which to complete the\npsychological conception of an ultimate subject necessarily ascribed\nto the soul in self-consciousness, so as to make it the real\nconception of a substance, a character which practical reason\nfurnishes by the postulate of a duration required for accordance\nwith the moral law in the summum bonum, which is the whole end of\npractical reason. 2. It leads to that of which speculative reason\ncontained nothing but antinomy, the solution of which it could only\nfound on a notion problematically conceivable indeed, but whose\nobjective reality it could not prove or determine, namely, the\ncosmological idea of an intelligible world and the consciousness of\nour existence in it, by means of the postulate of freedom (the reality\nof which it lays down by virtue of the moral law), and with it\nlikewise the law of an intelligible world, to which speculative reason\ncould only point, but could not define its conception. 3. What\nspeculative reason was able to think, but was obliged to leave\nundetermined as a mere transcendental ideal, viz., the theological\nconception of the first Being, to this it gives significance (in a\npractical view, that is, as a condition of the possibility of the\nobject of a will determined by that law), namely, as the supreme\nprinciple of the summum bonum in an intelligible world, by means of\nmoral legislation in it invested with sovereign power.\n\nIs our knowledge, however, actually extended in this way by pure\npractical reason, and is that immanent in practical reason which for\nthe speculative was only transcendent? Certainly, but only in a\npractical point of view. For we do not thereby take knowledge of the\nnature of our souls, nor of the intelligible world, nor of the Supreme\nBeing, with respect to what they are in themselves, but we have merely\ncombined the conceptions of them in the practical concept of the\nsummum bonum as the object of our will, and this altogether a\npriori, but only by means of the moral law, and merely in reference to\nit, in respect of the object which it commands. But how freedom is\npossible, and how we are to conceive this kind of causality\ntheoretically and positively, is not thereby discovered; but only that\nthere is such a causality is postulated by the moral law and in its\nbehoof. It is the same with the remaining ideas, the possibility of\nwhich no human intelligence will ever fathom, but the truth of\nwhich, on the other hand, no sophistry will ever wrest from the\nconviction even of the commonest man.\n\n                                          {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 65}\n\n\n\nVII. How is it possible to conceive an Extension of Pure\n\n     Reason in a Practical point of view, without its\n\n        Knowledge as Speculative being enlarged at\n\n                    the same time?\n\n                                          {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 70}\n\n\n\nIn order not to be too abstract, we will answer this question at\nonce in its application to the present case. In order to extend a pure\ncognition practically, there must be an a priori purpose given, that\nis, an end as object (of the will), which independently of all\ntheological principle is presented as practically necessary by an\nimperative which determines the will directly (a categorical\nimperative), and in this case that is the summum bonum. This, however,\nis not possible without presupposing three theoretical conceptions\n(for which, because they are mere conceptions of pure reason, no\ncorresponding intuition can be found, nor consequently by the path\nof theory any objective reality); namely, freedom, immortality, and\nGod. Thus by the practical law which commands the existence of the\nhighest good possible in a world, the possibility of those objects\nof pure speculative reason is postulated, and the objective reality\nwhich the latter could not assure them. By this the theoretical\nknowledge of pure reason does indeed obtain an accession; but it\nconsists only in this, that those concepts which otherwise it had to\nlook upon as problematical (merely thinkable) concepts, are now\nshown assertorially to be such as actually have objects; because\npractical reason indispensably requires their existence for the\npossibility of its object, the summum bonum, which practically is\nabsolutely necessary, and this justifies theoretical reason in\nassuming them. But this extension of theoretical reason is no\nextension of speculative, that is, we cannot make any positive use\nof it in a theoretical point of view. For as nothing is accomplished\nin this by practical reason, further than that these concepts are real\nand actually have their (possible) objects, and nothing in the way\nof intuition of them is given thereby (which indeed could not be\ndemanded), hence the admission of this reality does not render any\nsynthetical proposition possible. Consequently, this discovery does\nnot in the least help us to extend this knowledge of ours in a\nspeculative point of view, although it does in respect of the\npractical employment of pure reason. The above three ideas of\nspeculative reason are still in themselves not cognitions; they are\nhowever (transcendent) thoughts, in which there is nothing impossible.\nNow, by help of an apodeictic practical law, being necessary\nconditions of that which it commands to be made an object, they\nacquire objective reality; that is, we learn from it that they have\nobjects, without being able to point out how the conception of them is\nrelated to an object, and this, too, is still not a cognition of these\nobjects; for we cannot thereby form any synthetical judgement about\nthem, nor determine their application theoretically; consequently,\nwe can make no theoretical rational use of them at all, in which use\nall speculative knowledge of reason consists. Nevertheless, the\ntheoretical knowledge, not indeed of these objects, but of reason\ngenerally, is so far enlarged by this, that by the practical\npostulates objects were given to those ideas, a merely problematical\nthought having by this means first acquired objective reality. There\nis therefore no extension of the knowledge of given supersensible\nobjects, but an extension of theoretical reason and of its knowledge\nin respect of the supersensible generally; inasmuch as it is compelled\nto admit that there are such objects, although it is not able to\ndefine them more closely, so as itself to extend this knowledge of the\nobjects (which have now been given it on practical grounds, and only\nfor practical use). For this accession, then, pure theoretical reason,\nfor which all those ideas are transcendent and without object, has\nsimply to thank its practical faculty. In this they become immanent\nand constitutive, being the source of the possibility of realizing the\nnecessary object of pure practical reason (the summum bonum);\nwhereas apart from this they are transcendent, and merely regulative\nprinciples of speculative reason, which do not require it to assume\na new object beyond experience, but only to bring its use in\nexperience nearer to completeness. But when once reason is in\npossession of this accession, it will go to work with these ideas as\nspeculative reason (properly only to assure the certainty of its\npractical use) in a negative manner: that is, not extending but\nclearing up its knowledge so as on one side to keep off\nanthropomorphism, as the source of superstition, or seeming\nextension of these conceptions by supposed experience; and on the\nother side fanaticism, which promises the same by means of\nsupersensible intuition or feelings of the like kind. All these are\nhindrances to the practical use of pure reason, so that the removal of\nthem may certainly be considered an extension of our knowledge in a\npractical point of view, without contradicting the admission that\nfor speculative purposes reason has not in the least gained by this.\n\nEvery employment of reason in respect of an object requires pure\nconcepts of the understanding (categories), without which no object\ncan be conceived. These can be applied to the theoretical employment\nof reason, i.e., to that kind of knowledge, only in case an\nintuition (which is always sensible) is taken as a basis, and\ntherefore merely in order to conceive by means of- them an object of\npossible experience. Now here what have to be thought by means of\nthe categories in order to be known are ideas of reason, which\ncannot be given in any experience. Only we are not here concerned with\nthe theoretical knowledge of the objects of these ideas, but only with\nthis, whether they have objects at all. This reality is supplied by\npure practical reason, and theoretical reason has nothing further to\ndo in this but to think those objects by means of categories. This, as\nwe have elsewhere clearly shown, can be done well enough without\nneeding any intuition (either sensible or supersensible) because the\ncategories have their seat and origin in the pure understanding,\nsimply as the faculty of thought, before and independently of any\nintuition, and they always only signify an object in general, no\nmatter in what way it may be given to us. Now when the categories\nare to be applied to these ideas, it is not possible to give them\nany object in intuition; but that such an object actually exists,\nand consequently that the category as a mere form of thought is here\nnot empty but has significance, this is sufficiently assured them by\nan object which practical reason presents beyond doubt in the\nconcept of the summum bonum, the reality of the conceptions which\nare required for the possibility of the summum bonum; without,\nhowever, effecting by this accession the least extension of our\nknowledge on theoretical principles.\n\n\n\nWhen these ideas of God, of an intelligible world (the kingdom of\nGod), and of immortality are further determined by predicates taken\nfrom our own nature, we must not regard this determination as a\nsensualizing of those pure rational ideas (anthropomorphism), nor as a\ntranscendent knowledge of supersensible objects; for these\npredicates are no others than understanding and will, considered too\nin the relation to each other in which they must be conceived in the\nmoral law, and therefore, only so far as a pure practical use is\nmade of them. As to all the rest that belongs to these conceptions\npsychologically, that is, so far as we observe these faculties of ours\nempirically in their exercise (e.g., that the understanding of man\nis discursive, and its notions therefore not intuitions but\nthoughts, that these follow one another in time, that his will has its\nsatisfaction always dependent on the existence of its object, etc.,\nwhich cannot be the case in the Supreme Being), from all this we\nabstract in that case, and then there remains of the notions by\nwhich we conceive a pure intelligence nothing more than just what is\nrequired for the possibility of conceiving a moral law. There is\nthen a knowledge of God indeed, but only for practical purposes,\nand, if we attempt to extend it to a theoretical knowledge, we find an\nunderstanding that has intuitions, not thoughts, a will that is\ndirected to objects on the existence of which its satisfaction does\nnot in the least depend (not to mention the transcendental predicates,\nas, for example, a magnitude of existence, that is duration, which,\nhowever, is not in time, the only possible means we have of conceiving\nexistence as magnitude). Now these are all attributes of which we\ncan form no conception that would help to the knowledge of the object,\nand we learn from this that they can never be used for a theory of\nsupersensible beings, so that on this side they are quite incapable of\nbeing the foundation of a speculative knowledge, and their use is\nlimited simply to the practice of the moral law.\n\n                                          {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 75}\n\nThis last is so obvious, and can be proved so clearly by fact,\nthat we may confidently challenge all pretended natural theologians (a\nsingular name) * to specify (over and above the merely ontological\npredicates) one single attribute, whether of the understanding or of\nthe will, determining this object of theirs, of which we could not\nshow incontrovertibly that, if we abstract from it everything\nanthropomorphic, nothing would remain to us but the mere word, without\nour being able to connect with it the smallest notion by which we\ncould hope for an extension of theoretical knowledge. But as to the\npractical, there still remains to us of the attributes of\nunderstanding and will the conception of a relation to which objective\nreality is given by the practical law (which determines a priori\nprecisely this relation of the understanding to the will). When once\nthis is done, then reality is given to the conception of the object of\na will morally determined (the conception of the summum bonum), and\nwith it to the conditions of its possibility, the ideas of God,\nfreedom, and immortality, but always only relatively to the practice\nof the moral law (and not for any speculative purpose).\n\n\n\n* Learning is properly only the whole content of the historical\nsciences. Consequently it is only the teacher of revealed theology\nthat can be called a learned theologian. If, however, we choose to\ncall a man learned who is in possession of the rational sciences\n(mathematics and philosophy), although even this would be contrary\nto the signification of the word (which always counts as learning only\nthat which one must be \"learned\" and which, therefore, he cannot\ndiscover of himself by reason), even in that case the philosopher\nwould make too poor a figure with his knowledge of God as a positive\nscience to let himself be called on that account a learned man.\n\n\n\nAccording to these remarks it is now easy to find the answer to\nthe weighty question whether the notion of God is one belonging to\nphysics (and therefore also to metaphysics, which contains the pure\na priori principles of the former in their universal import) or to\nmorals. If we have recourse to God as the Author of all things, in\norder to explain the arrangements of nature or its changes, this is at\nleast not a physical explanation, and is a complete confession that\nour philosophy has come to an end, since we are obliged to assume\nsomething of which in itself we have otherwise no conception, in order\nto be able to frame a conception of the possibility of what we see\nbefore our eyes. Metaphysics, however, cannot enable us to attain by\ncertain inference from the knowledge of this world to the conception\nof God and to the proof of His existence, for this reason, that in\norder to say that this world could be produced only by a God\n(according to the conception implied by this word) we should know this\nworld as the most perfect whole possible; and for this purpose\nshould also know all possible worlds (in order to be able to compare\nthem with this); in other words, we should be omniscient. It is\nabsolutely impossible, however, to know the existence of this Being\nfrom mere concepts, because every existential proposition, that is,\nevery proposition that affirms the existence of a being of which I\nframe a concept, is a synthetic proposition, that is, one by which I\ngo beyond that conception and affirm of it more than was thought in\nthe conception itself; namely, that this concept in the\nunderstanding has an object corresponding to it outside the\nunderstanding, and this it is obviously impossible to elicit by any\nreasoning. There remains, therefore, only one single process\npossible for reason to attain this knowledge, namely, to start from\nthe supreme principle of its pure practical use (which in every case\nis directed simply to the existence of something as a consequence of\nreason) and thus determine its object. Then its inevitable problem,\nnamely, the necessary direction of the will to the summum bonum,\ndiscovers to us not only the necessity of assuming such a First\nBeing in reference to the possibility of this good in the world,\nbut, what is most remarkable, something which reason in its progress\non the path of physical nature altogether failed to find, namely, an\naccurately defined conception of this First Being. As we can know only\na small part of this world, and can still less compare it with all\npossible worlds, we may indeed from its order, design, and\ngreatness, infer a wise, good, powerful, etc., Author of it, but not\nthat He is all-wise, all-good, all-powerful, etc. It may indeed very\nwell be granted that we should be justified in supplying this\ninevitable defect by a legitimate and reasonable hypothesis; namely,\nthat when wisdom, goodness, etc, are displayed in all the parts that\noffer themselves to our nearer knowledge, it is just the same in all\nthe rest, and that it would therefore be reasonable to ascribe all\npossible perfections to the Author of the world, but these are not\nstrict logical inferences in which we can pride ourselves on our\ninsight, but only permitted conclusions in which we may be indulged\nand which require further recommendation before we can make use of\nthem. On the path of empirical inquiry then (physics), the\nconception of God remains always a conception of the perfection of the\nFirst Being not accurately enough determined to be held adequate to\nthe conception of Deity. (With metaphysic in its transcendental part\nnothing whatever can be accomplished.)\n\n                                          {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 80}\n\nWhen I now try to test this conception by reference to the object of\npractical reason, I find that the moral principle admits as possible\nonly the conception of an Author of the world possessed of the highest\nperfection. He must be omniscient, in order to know my conduct up to\nthe inmost root of my mental state in all possible cases and into\nall future time; omnipotent, in order to allot to it its fitting\nconsequences; similarly He must be omnipresent, eternal, etc. Thus the\nmoral law, by means of the conception of the summum bonum as the\nobject of a pure practical reason, determines the concept of the First\nBeing as the Supreme Being; a thing which the physical (and in its\nhigher development the metaphysical), in other words, the whole\nspeculative course of reason, was unable to effect. The conception\nof God, then, is one that belongs originally not to physics, i.e.,\nto speculative reason, but to morals. The same may be said of the\nother conceptions of reason of which we have treated above as\npostulates of it in its practical use.\n\nIn the history of Grecian philosophy we find no distinct traces of a\npure rational theology earlier than Anaxagoras; but this is not\nbecause the older philosophers had not intelligence or penetration\nenough to raise themselves to it by the path of speculation, at\nleast with the aid of a thoroughly reasonable hypothesis. What could\nhave been easier, what more natural, than the thought which of\nitself occurs to everyone, to assume instead of several causes of\nthe world, instead of an indeterminate degree of perfection, a\nsingle rational cause having all perfection? But the evils in the\nworld seemed to them to be much too serious objections to allow them\nto feel themselves justified in such a hypothesis. They showed\nintelligence and penetration then in this very point, that they did\nnot allow themselves to adopt it, but on the contrary looked about\namongst natural causes to see if they could not find in them the\nqualities and power required for a First Being. But when this acute\npeople had advanced so far in their investigations of nature as to\ntreat even moral questions philosophically, on which other nations had\nnever done anything but talk, then first they found a new and\npractical want, which did not fail to give definiteness to their\nconception of the First Being: and in this the speculative reason\nplayed the part of spectator, or at best had the merit of embellishing\na conception that had not grown on its own ground, and of applying a\nseries of confirmations from the study of nature now brought forward\nfor the first time, not indeed to strengthen the authority of this\nconception (which was already established), but rather to make a\nshow with a supposed discovery of theoretical reason.\n\n\n\nFrom these remarks, the reader of the Critique of Pure Speculative\nReason will be thoroughly convinced how highly necessary that\nlaborious deduction of the categories was, and how fruitful for\ntheology and morals. For if, on the one hand, we place them in pure\nunderstanding, it is by this deduction alone that we can be\nprevented from regarding them, with Plato, as innate, and founding\non them extravagant pretensions to theories of the supersensible, to\nwhich we can see no end, and by which we should make theology a\nmagic lantern of chimeras; on the other hand, if we regard them as\nacquired, this deduction saves us from restricting, with Epicurus, all\nand every use of them, even for practical purposes, to the objects and\nmotives of the senses. But now that the Critique has shown by that\ndeduction, first, that they are not of empirical origin, but have\ntheir seat and source a priori in the pure understanding; secondly,\nthat as they refer to objects in general independently of the\nintuition of them, hence, although they cannot effect theoretical\nknowledge, except in application to empirical objects, yet when\napplied to an object given by pure practical reason they enable us\nto conceive the supersensible definitely, only so far, however, as\nit is defined by such predicates as are necessarily connected with the\npure practical purpose given a priori and with its possibility. The\nspeculative restriction of pure reason and its practical extension\nbring it into that relation of equality in which reason in general can\nbe employed suitably to its end, and this example proves better than\nany other that the path to wisdom, if it is to be made sure and not to\nbe impassable or misleading, must with us men inevitably pass\nthrough science; but it is not till this is complete that we can be\nconvinced that it leads to this goal.\n\n\n\n                                          {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 85}\n\n    VIII. Of Belief from a Requirement of Pure Reason.\n\n\n\nA want or requirement of pure reason in its speculative use leads\nonly to a hypothesis; that of pure practical reason to a postulate;\nfor in the former case I ascend from the result as high as I please in\nthe series of causes, not in order to give objective reality to the\nresult (e.g., the causal connection of things and changes in the\nworld), but in order thoroughly to satisfy my inquiring reason in\nrespect of it. Thus I see before me order and design in nature, and\nneed not resort to speculation to assure myself of their reality,\nbut to explain them I have to presuppose a Deity as their cause; and\nthen since the inference from an effect to a definite cause is\nalways uncertain and doubtful, especially to a cause so precise and so\nperfectly defined as we have to conceive in God, hence the highest\ndegree of certainty to which this pre-supposition can be brought is\nthat it is the most rational opinion for us men. * On the other hand,\na requirement of pure practical reason is based on a duty, that of\nmaking something (the summum bonum) the object of my will so as to\npromote it with all my powers; in which case I must suppose its\npossibility and, consequently, also the conditions necessary\nthereto, namely, God, freedom, and immortality; since I cannot prove\nthese by my speculative reason, although neither can I refute them.\nThis duty is founded on something that is indeed quite independent\nof these suppositions and is of itself apodeictically certain, namely,\nthe moral law; and so far it needs no further support by theoretical\nviews as to the inner constitution of things, the secret final aim\nof the order of the world, or a presiding ruler thereof, in order to\nbind me in the most perfect manner to act in unconditional\nconformity to the law. But the subjective effect of this law,\nnamely, the mental disposition conformed to it and made necessary by\nit, to promote the practically possible summum bonum, this\npre-supposes at least that the latter is possible, for it would be\npractically impossible to strive after the object of a conception\nwhich at bottom was empty and had no object. Now the above-mentioned\npostulates concern only the physical or metaphysical conditions of the\npossibility of the summum bonum; in a word, those which lie in the\nnature of things; not, however, for the sake of an arbitrary\nspeculative purpose, but of a practically necessary end of a pure\nrational will, which in this case does not choose, but obeys an\ninexorable command of reason, the foundation of which is objective, in\nthe constitution of things as they must be universally judged by\npure reason, and is not based on inclination; for we are in nowise\njustified in assuming, on account of what we wish on merely subjective\ngrounds, that the means thereto are possible or that its object is\nreal. This, then, is an absolutely necessary requirement, and what\nit pre-supposes is not merely justified as an allowable hypothesis,\nbut as a postulate in a practical point of view; and admitting that\nthe pure moral law inexorably binds every man as a command (not as a\nrule of prudence), the righteous man may say: \"I will that there be\na God, that my existence in this world be also an existence outside\nthe chain of physical causes and in a pure world of the understanding,\nand lastly, that my duration be endless; I firmly abide by this, and\nwill not let this faith be taken from me; for in this instance alone\nmy interest, because I must not relax anything of it, inevitably\ndetermines my judgement, without regarding sophistries, however unable\nI may be to answer them or to oppose them with others more\nplausible. *(2)\n\n\n\n* But even here we should not be able to allege a requirement of\nreason, if we had not before our eyes a problematical, but yet\ninevitable, conception of reason, namely, that of an absolutely\nnecessary being. This conception now seeks to be defined, and this, in\naddition to the tendency to extend itself, is the objective ground\nof a requirement of speculative reason, namely, to have a more precise\ndefinition of the conception of a necessary being which is to serve as\nthe first cause of other beings, so as to make these latter knowable\nby some means. Without such antecedent necessary problems there are no\nrequirements- at least not of pure reason- the rest are requirements\nof inclination.\n\n                                          {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 90}\n\n*(2) In the Deutsches Museum, February, 1787, there is a\ndissertation by a very subtle and clear-headed man, the late\nWizenmann, whose early death is to be lamented, in which he disputes\nthe right to argue from a want to the objective reality of its object,\nand illustrates the point by the example of a man in love, who\nhaving fooled himself into an idea of beauty, which is merely a\nchimera of his own brain, would fain conclude that such an object\nreally exists somewhere. I quite agree with him in this, in all\ncases where the want is founded on inclination, which cannot\nnecessarily postulate the existence of its object even for the man\nthat is affected by it, much less can it contain a demand valid for\neveryone, and therefore it is merely a subjective ground of the\nwish. But in the present case we have a want of reason springing\nfrom an objective determining principle of the will, namely, the moral\nlaw, which necessarily binds every rational being, and therefore\njustifies him in assuming a priori in nature the conditions proper for\nit, and makes the latter inseparable from the complete practical use\nof reason. It is a duty to realize the summum bonum to the utmost of\nour power, therefore it must be possible, consequently it is\nunavoidable for every rational being in the world to assume what is\nnecessary for its objective possibility. The assumption is as\nnecessary as the moral law, in connection with which alone it is\nvalid.\n\n\n\nIn order to prevent misconception in the use of a notion as yet so\nunusual as that of a faith of pure practical reason, let me be\npermitted to add one more remark. It might almost seem as if this\nrational faith were here announced as itself a command, namely, that\nwe should assume the summum bonum as possible. But a faith that is\ncommanded is nonsense. Let the preceding analysis, however, be\nremembered of what is required to be supposed in the conception of the\nsummum bonum, and it will be seen that it cannot be commanded to\nassume this possibility, and no practical disposition of mind is\nrequired to admit it; but that speculative reason must concede it\nwithout being asked, for no one can affirm that it is impossible in\nitself that rational beings in the world should at the same time be\nworthy of happiness in conformity with the moral law and also\npossess this happiness proportionately. Now in respect of the first\nelement of the summum bonum, namely, that which concerns morality, the\nmoral law gives merely a command, and to doubt the possibility of that\nelement would be the same as to call in question the moral law itself.\nBut as regards the second element of that object, namely, happiness\nperfectly proportioned to that worthiness, it is true that there is no\nneed of a command to admit its possibility in general, for theoretical\nreason has nothing to say against it; but the manner in which we\nhave to conceive this harmony of the laws of nature with those of\nfreedom has in it something in respect of which we have a choice,\nbecause theoretical reason decides nothing with apodeictic certainty\nabout it, and in respect of this there may be a moral interest which\nturns the scale.\n\nI had said above that in a mere course of nature in the world an\naccurate correspondence between happiness and moral worth is not to be\nexpected and must be regarded as impossible, and that therefore the\npossibility of the summum bonum cannot be admitted from this side\nexcept on the supposition of a moral Author of the world. I\npurposely reserved the restriction of this judgement to the subjective\nconditions of our reason, in order not to make use of it until the\nmanner of this belief should be defined more precisely. The fact is\nthat the impossibility referred to is merely subjective, that is,\nour reason finds it impossible for it to render conceivable in the way\nof a mere course of nature a connection so exactly proportioned and so\nthoroughly adapted to an end, between two sets of events happening\naccording to such distinct laws; although, as with everything else\nin nature that is adapted to an end, it cannot prove, that is, show by\nsufficient objective reason, that it is not possible by universal laws\nof nature.\n\nNow, however, a deciding principle of a different kind comes into\nplay to turn the scale in this uncertainty of speculative reason.\nThe command to promote the summum bonum is established on an objective\nbasis (in practical reason); the possibility of the same in general is\nlikewise established on an objective basis (in theoretical reason,\nwhich has nothing to say against it). But reason cannot decide\nobjectively in what way we are to conceive this possibility; whether\nby universal laws of nature without a wise Author presiding over\nnature, or only on supposition of such an Author. Now here there comes\nin a subjective condition of reason, the only way theoretically\npossible for it, of conceiving the exact harmony of the kingdom of\nnature with the kingdom of morals, which is the condition of the\npossibility of the summum bonum; and at the same time the only one\nconducive to morality (which depends on an objective law of reason).\nNow since the promotion of this summum bonum, and therefore the\nsupposition of its possibility, are objectively necessary (though only\nas a result of practical reason), while at the same time the manner in\nwhich we would conceive it rests with our own choice, and in this\nchoice a free interest of pure practical reason decides for the\nassumption of a wise Author of the world; it is clear that the\nprinciple that herein determines our judgement, though as a want it is\nsubjective, yet at the same time being the means of promoting what\nis objectively (practically) necessary, is the foundation of a maxim\nof belief in a moral point of view, that is, a faith of pure practical\nreason. This, then, is not commanded, but being a voluntary\ndetermination of our judgement, conducive to the moral (commanded)\npurpose, and moreover harmonizing with the theoretical requirement\nof reason, to assume that existence and to make it the foundation of\nour further employment of reason, it has itself sprung from the\nmoral disposition of mind; it may therefore at times waver even in the\nwell-disposed, but can never be reduced to unbelief.\n\n                                          {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 95}\n\n\n\n  IX. Of the Wise Adaptation of Man's Cognitive Faculties\n\n             to his Practical Destination.\n\n\n\nIf human nature is destined to endeavour after the summum bonum,\nwe must suppose also that the measure of its cognitive faculties,\nand particularly their relation to one another, is suitable to this\nend. Now the Critique of Pure Speculative Reason proves that this is\nincapable of solving satisfactorily the most weighty problems that are\nproposed to it, although it does not ignore the natural and\nimportant hints received from the same reason, nor the great steps\nthat it can make to approach to this great goal that is set before it,\nwhich, however, it can never reach of itself, even with the help of\nthe greatest knowledge of nature. Nature then seems here to have\nprovided us only in a step-motherly fashion with the faculty required\nfor our end.\n\n                                         {BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 100}\n\nSuppose, now, that in this matter nature had conformed to our wish\nand had given us that capacity of discernment or that enlightenment\nwhich we would gladly possess, or which some imagine they actually\npossess, what would in all probability be the consequence? Unless\nour whole nature were at the same time changed, our inclinations,\nwhich always have the first word, would first of all demand their\nown satisfaction, and, joined with rational reflection, the greatest\npossible and most lasting satisfaction, under the name of happiness;\nthe moral law would afterwards speak, in order to keep them within\ntheir proper bounds, and even to subject them all to a higher end,\nwhich has no regard to inclination. But instead of the conflict that\nthe moral disposition has now to carry on with the inclinations, in\nwhich, though after some defeats, moral strength of mind may be\ngradually acquired, God and eternity with their awful majesty would\nstand unceasingly before our eyes (for what we can prove perfectly\nis to us as certain as that of which we are assured by the sight of\nour eyes). Transgression of the law, would, no doubt, be avoided; what\nis commanded would be done; but the mental disposition, from which\nactions ought to proceed, cannot be infused by any command, and in\nthis case the spur of action is ever active and external, so that\nreason has no need to exert itself in order to gather strength to\nresist the inclinations by a lively representation of the dignity of\nthe law: hence most of the actions that conformed to the law would\nbe done from fear, a few only from hope, and none at all from duty,\nand the moral worth of actions, on which alone in the eyes of\nsupreme wisdom the worth of the person and even that of the world\ndepends, would cease to exist. As long as the nature of man remains\nwhat it is, his conduct would thus be changed into mere mechanism,\nin which, as in a puppet-show, everything would gesticulate well,\nbut there would be no life in the figures. Now, when it is quite\notherwise with us, when with all the effort of our reason we have only\na very obscure and doubtful view into the future, when the Governor of\nthe world allows us only to conjecture his existence and his\nmajesty, not to behold them or prove them clearly; and on the other\nhand, the moral law within us, without promising or threatening\nanything with certainty, demands of us disinterested respect; and only\nwhen this respect has become active and dominant, does it allow us\nby means of it a prospect into the world of the supersensible, and\nthen only with weak glances: all this being so, there is room for true\nmoral disposition, immediately devoted to the law, and a rational\ncreature can become worthy of sharing in the summum bonum that\ncorresponds to the worth of his person and not merely to his\nactions. Thus what the study of nature and of man teaches us\nsufficiently elsewhere may well be true here also; that the\nunsearchable wisdom by which we exist is not less worthy of admiration\nin what it has denied than in what it has granted.\n\nPART_2|METHODOLOGY\n\n                    SECOND PART.\n\n\n\n        Methodology of Pure Practical Reason.\n\n\n\nBy the methodology of pure practical reason we are not to understand\nthe mode of proceeding with pure practical principles (whether in\nstudy or in exposition), with a view to a scientific knowledge of\nthem, which alone is what is properly called method elsewhere in\ntheoretical philosophy (for popular knowledge requires a manner,\nscience a method, i.e., a process according to principles of reason by\nwhich alone the manifold of any branch of knowledge can become a\nsystem). On the contrary, by this methodology is understood the mode\nin which we can give the laws of pure practical reason access to the\nhuman mind and influence on its maxims, that is, by which we can\nmake the objectively practical reason subjectively practical also.\n\nNow it is clear enough that those determining principles of the will\nwhich alone make maxims properly moral and give them a moral worth,\nnamely, the direct conception of the law and the objective necessity\nof obeying it as our duty, must be regarded as the proper springs of\nactions, since otherwise legality of actions might be produced, but\nnot morality of character. But it is not so clear; on the contrary, it\nmust at first sight seem to every one very improbable that even\nsubjectively that exhibition of pure virtue can have more power over\nthe human mind, and supply a far stronger spring even for effecting\nthat legality of actions, and can produce more powerful resolutions to\nprefer the law, from pure respect for it, to every other\nconsideration, than all the deceptive allurements of pleasure or of\nall that may be reckoned as happiness, or even than all threatenings\nof pain and misfortune. Nevertheless, this is actually the case, and\nif human nature were not so constituted, no mode of presenting the law\nby roundabout ways and indirect recommendations would ever produce\nmorality of character. All would be simple hypocrisy; the law would be\nhated, or at least despised, while it was followed for the sake of\none's own advantage. The letter of the law (legality) would be found\nin our actions, but not the spirit of it in our minds (morality);\nand as with all our efforts we could not quite free ourselves from\nreason in our judgement, we must inevitably appear in our own eyes\nworthless, depraved men, even though we should seek to compensate\nourselves for this mortification before the inner tribunal, by\nenjoying the pleasure that a supposed natural or divine law might be\nimagined to have connected with it a sort of police machinery,\nregulating its operations by what was done without troubling itself\nabout the motives for doing it.\n\nIt cannot indeed be denied that in order to bring an uncultivated or\ndegraded mind into the track of moral goodness some preparatory\nguidance is necessary, to attract it by a view of its own advantage,\nor to alarm it by fear of loss; but as soon as this mechanical work,\nthese leading-strings have produced some effect, then we must bring\nbefore the mind the pure moral motive, which, not only because it is\nthe only one that can be the foundation of a character (a\npractically consistent habit of mind with unchangeable maxims), but\nalso because it teaches a man to feel his own dignity, gives the\nmind a power unexpected even by himself, to tear himself from all\nsensible attachments so far as they would fain have the rule, and to\nfind a rich compensation for the sacrifice he offers, in the\nindependence of his rational nature and the greatness of soul to which\nhe sees that he is destined. We will therefore show, by such\nobservations as every one can make, that this property of our minds,\nthis receptivity for a pure moral interest, and consequently the\nmoving force of the pure conception of virtue, when it is properly\napplied to the human heart, is the most powerful spring and, when a\ncontinued and punctual observance of moral maxims is in question,\nthe only spring of good conduct. It must, however, be remembered\nthat if these observations only prove the reality of such a feeling,\nbut do not show any moral improvement brought about by it, this is\nno argument against the only method that exists of making the\nobjectively practical laws of pure reason subjectively practical,\nthrough the mere force of the conception of duty; nor does it prove\nthat this method is a vain delusion. For as it has never yet come into\nvogue, experience can say nothing of its results; one can only ask for\nproofs of the receptivity for such springs, and these I will now\nbriefly present, and then sketch the method of founding and\ncultivating genuine moral dispositions.\n\n                                         {PART_2|METHODOLOGY ^paragraph 5}\n\nWhen we attend to the course of conversation in mixed companies,\nconsisting not merely of learned persons and subtle reasoners, but\nalso of men of business or of women, we observe that, besides\nstory-telling and jesting, another kind of entertainment finds a place\nin them, namely, argument; for stories, if they are to have novelty\nand interest, are soon exhausted, and jesting is likely to become\ninsipid. Now of all argument there is none in which persons are more\nready to join who find any other subtle discussion tedious, none\nthat brings more liveliness into the company, than that which concerns\nthe moral worth of this or that action by which the character of\nsome person is to be made out. Persons, to whom in other cases\nanything subtle and speculative in theoretical questions is dry and\nirksome, presently join in when the question is to make out the\nmoral import of a good or bad action that has been related, and they\ndisplay an exactness, a refinement, a subtlety, in excogitating\neverything that can lessen the purity of purpose, and consequently the\ndegree of virtue in it, which we do not expect from them in any\nother kind of speculation. In these criticisms, persons who are\npassing judgement on others often reveal their own character: some, in\nexercising their judicial office, especially upon the dead, seem\ninclined chiefly to defend the goodness that is related of this or\nthat deed against all injurious charges of insincerity, and ultimately\nto defend the whole moral worth of the person against the reproach\nof dissimulation and secret wickedness; others, on the contrary,\nturn their thoughts more upon attacking this worth by accusation and\nfault finding. We cannot always, however, attribute to these latter\nthe intention of arguing away virtue altogether out of all human\nexamples in order to make it an empty name; often, on the contrary, it\nis only well-meant strictness in determining the true moral import\nof actions according to an uncompromising law. Comparison with such\na law, instead of with examples, lowers self-conceit in moral\nmatters very much, and not merely teaches humility, but makes every\none feel it when he examines himself closely. Nevertheless, we can for\nthe most part observe, in those who defend the purity of purpose in\ngiving examples that where there is the presumption of uprightness\nthey are anxious to remove even the least spot, lest, if all\nexamples had their truthfulness disputed, and if the purity of all\nhuman virtue were denied, it might in the end be regarded as a mere\nphantom, and so all effort to attain it be made light of as vain\naffectation and delusive conceit.\n\nI do not know why the educators of youth have not long since made\nuse of this propensity of reason to enter with pleasure upon the\nmost subtle examination of the practical questions that are thrown up;\nand why they have not, after first laying the foundation of a purely\nmoral catechism, searched through the biographies of ancient and\nmodern times with the view of having at hand instances of the duties\nlaid down, in which, especially by comparison of similar actions under\ndifferent circumstances, they might exercise the critical judgement of\ntheir scholars in remarking their greater or less moral\nsignificance. This is a thing in which they would find that even early\nyouth, which is still unripe for speculation of other kinds, would\nsoon Become very acute and not a little interested, because it feels\nthe progress of its faculty of judgement; and, what is most important,\nthey could hope with confidence that the frequent practice of\nknowing and approving good conduct in all its purity, and on the other\nhand of remarking with regret or contempt the least deviation from it,\nalthough it may be pursued only as a sport in which children may\ncompete with one another, yet will leave a lasting impression of\nesteem on the one hand and disgust on the other; and so, by the mere\nhabit of looking on such actions as deserving approval or blame, a\ngood foundation would be laid for uprightness in the future course\nof life. Only I wish they would spare them the example of so-called\nnoble (super-meritorious) actions, in which our sentimental books so\nmuch abound, and would refer all to duty merely, and to the worth that\na man can and must give himself in his own eyes by the consciousness\nof not having transgressed it, since whatever runs up into empty\nwishes and longings after inaccessible perfection produces mere heroes\nof romance, who, while they pique themselves on their feeling for\ntranscendent greatness, release themselves in return from the\nobservance of common and every-day obligations, which then seem to\nthem petty and insignificant. *\n\n\n\n* It is quite proper to extol actions that display a great,\nunselfish, sympathizing mind or humanity. But, in this case, we must\nfix attention not so much on the elevation of soul, which is very\nfleeting and transitory, as on the subjection of the heart to duty,\nfrom which a more enduring impression may be expected, because this\nimplies principle (whereas the former only implies ebullitions). One\nneed only reflect a little and he will always find a debt that he\nhas by some means incurred towards the human race (even if it were\nonly this, by the inequality of men in the civil constitution,\nenjoys advantages on account of which others must be the more in\nwant), which will prevent the thought of duty from being repressed\nby the self-complacent imagination of merit.\n\n\n\n                                        {PART_2|METHODOLOGY ^paragraph 10}\n\nBut if it is asked: \"What, then, is really pure morality, by which\nas a touchstone we must test the moral significance of every\naction,\" then I must admit that it is only philosophers that can\nmake the decision of this question doubtful, for to common sense it\nhas been decided long ago, not indeed by abstract general formulae,\nbut by habitual use, like the distinction between the right and left\nhand. We will then point out the criterion of pure virtue in an\nexample first, and, imagining that it is set before a boy, of say\nten years old, for his judgement, we will see whether he would\nnecessarily judge so of himself without being guided by his teacher.\nTell him the history of an honest man whom men want to persuade to\njoin the calumniators of an innocent and powerless person (say Anne\nBoleyn, accused by Henry VIII of England). He is offered advantages,\ngreat gifts, or high rank; he rejects them. This will excite mere\napprobation and applause in the mind of the hearer. Now begins the\nthreatening of loss. Amongst these traducers are his best friends, who\nnow renounce his friendship; near kinsfolk, who threaten to disinherit\nhim (he being without fortune); powerful persons, who can persecute\nand harass him in all places and circumstances; a prince, who\nthreatens him with loss of freedom, yea, loss of life. Then to fill\nthe measure of suffering, and that he may feel the pain that only\nthe morally good heart can feel very deeply, let us conceive his\nfamily threatened with extreme distress and want, entreating him to\nyield; conceive himself, though upright, yet with feelings not hard or\ninsensible either to compassion or to his own distress; conceive\nhim, I say, at the moment when he wishes that he had never lived to\nsee the day that exposed him to such unutterable anguish, yet\nremaining true to his uprightness of purpose, without wavering or even\ndoubting; then will my youthful hearer be raised gradually from mere\napproval to admiration, from that to amazement, and finally to the\ngreatest veneration, and a lively wish that he himself could be such a\nman (though certainly not in such circumstances). Yet virtue is here\nworth so much only because it costs so much, not because it brings any\nprofit. All the admiration, and even the endeavour to resemble this\ncharacter, rest wholly on the purity of the moral principle, which can\nonly be strikingly shown by removing from the springs of action\neverything that men may regard as part of happiness. Morality, then,\nmust have the more power over the human heart the more purely it is\nexhibited. Whence it follows that, if the law of morality and the\nimage of holiness and virtue are to exercise any influence at all on\nour souls, they can do so only so far as they are laid to heart in\ntheir purity as motives, unmixed with any view to prosperity, for it\nis in suffering that they display themselves most nobly. Now that\nwhose removal strengthens the effect of a moving force must have\nbeen a hindrance, consequently every admixture of motives taken from\nour own happiness is a hindrance to the influence of the moral law\non the heart. I affirm further that even in that admired action, if\nthe motive from which it was done was a high regard for duty, then\nit is just this respect for the law that has the greatest influence on\nthe mind of the spectator, not any pretension to a supposed inward\ngreatness of mind or noble meritorious sentiments; consequently\nduty, not merit, must have not only the most definite, but, when it is\nrepresented in the true light of its inviolability, the most\npenetrating, influence on the mind.\n\nIt is more necessary than ever to direct attention to this method in\nour times, when men hope to produce more effect on the mind with soft,\ntender feelings, or high-flown, puffing-up pretensions, which rather\nwither the heart than strengthen it, than by a plain and earnest\nrepresentation of duty, which is more suited to human imperfection and\nto progress in goodness. To set before children, as a pattern, actions\nthat are called noble, magnanimous, meritorious, with the notion of\ncaptivating them by infusing enthusiasm for such actions, is to defeat\nour end. For as they are still so backward in the observance of the\ncommonest duty, and even in the correct estimation of it, this means\nsimply to make them fantastical romancers betimes. But, even with\nthe instructed and experienced part of mankind, this supposed spring\nhas, if not an injurious, at least no genuine, moral effect on the\nheart, which, however, is what it was desired to produce.\n\nAll feelings, especially those that are to produce unwonted\nexertions, must accomplish their effect at the moment they are at\ntheir height and before the calm down; otherwise they effect\nnothing; for as there was nothing to strengthen the heart, but only to\nexcite it, it naturally returns to its normal moderate tone and, thus,\nfalls back into its previous languor. Principles must be built on\nconceptions; on any other basis there can only be paroxysms, which can\ngive the person no moral worth, nay, not even confidence in himself,\nwithout which the highest good in man, consciousness of the morality\nof his mind and character, cannot exist. Now if these conceptions\nare to become subjectively practical, we must not rest satisfied\nwith admiring the objective law of morality, and esteeming it highly\nin reference to humanity, but we must consider the conception of it in\nrelation to man as an individual, and then this law appears in a\nform indeed that is highly deserving of respect, but not so pleasant\nas if it belonged to the element to which he is naturally\naccustomed; but on the contrary as often compelling him to quit this\nelement, not without self-denial, and to betake himself to a higher,\nin which he can only maintain himself with trouble and with\nunceasing apprehension of a relapse. In a word, the moral law\ndemands obedience, from duty not from predilection, which cannot and\nought not to be presupposed at all.\n\nLet us now see, in an example, whether the conception of an\naction, as a noble and magnanimous one, has more subjective moving\npower than if the action is conceived merely as duty in relation to\nthe solemn law of morality. The action by which a man endeavours at\nthe greatest peril of life to rescue people from shipwreck, at last\nlosing his life in the attempt, is reckoned on one side as duty, but\non the other and for the most part as a meritorious action, but our\nesteem for it is much weakened by the notion of duty to himself\nwhich seems in this case to be somewhat infringed. More decisive is\nthe magnanimous sacrifice of life for the safety of one's country; and\nyet there still remains some scruple whether it is a perfect duty to\ndevote one's self to this purpose spontaneously and unbidden, and\nthe action has not in itself the full force of a pattern and impulse\nto imitation. But if an indispensable duty be in question, the\ntransgression of which violates the moral law itself, and without\nregard to the welfare of mankind, and as it were tramples on its\nholiness (such as are usually called duties to God, because in Him\nwe conceive the ideal of holiness in substance), then we give our most\nperfect esteem to the pursuit of it at the sacrifice of all that can\nhave any value for the dearest inclinations, and we find our soul\nstrengthened and elevated by such an example, when we convince\nourselves by contemplation of it that human nature is capable of so\ngreat an elevation above every motive that nature can oppose to it.\nJuvenal describes such an example in a climax which makes the reader\nfeel vividly the force of the spring that is contained in the pure law\nof duty, as duty:\n\n\n\n                                        {PART_2|METHODOLOGY ^paragraph 15}\n\n  Esto bonus miles, tutor bonus, arbiter idem\n\n  Integer; ambiguae si quando citabere testis\n\n  Incertaeque rei, Phalaris licet imperet ut sis\n\n  Falsus, et admoto dictet periuria tauro,\n\n  Summum crede nefas animam praeferre pudori,\n\n                                        {PART_2|METHODOLOGY ^paragraph 20}\n\n  Et propter vitam vivendi perdere causas. *\n\n\n\n* [Juvenal, Satirae, \"Be you a good soldier, a faithful tutor, an\nuncorrupted umpire also; if you are summoned as a witness in a\ndoubtful and uncertain thing, though Phalaris should command that\nyou should be false, and should dictate perjuries with the bull\nbrought to you, believe it the highest impiety to prefer life to\nreputation, and for the sake of life, to lose the causes of living.\"]\n\n\n\nWhen we can bring any flattering thought of merit into our action,\nthen the motive is already somewhat alloyed with self-love and has\ntherefore some assistance from the side of the sensibility. But to\npostpone everything to the holiness of duty alone, and to be conscious\nthat we can because our own reason recognises this as its command\nand says that we ought to do it, this is, as it were, to raise\nourselves altogether above the world of sense, and there is\ninseparably involved in the same a consciousness of the law, as a\nspring of a faculty that controls the sensibility; and although this\nis not always attended with effect, yet frequent engagement with\nthis spring, and the at first minor attempts at using it, give hope\nthat this effect may be wrought, and that by degrees the greatest, and\nthat a purely moral interest in it may be produced in us.\n\n                                        {PART_2|METHODOLOGY ^paragraph 25}\n\nThe method then takes the following course. At first we are only\nconcerned to make the judging of actions by moral laws a natural\nemployment accompanying all our own free actions, as well as the\nobservation of those of others, and to make it as it were a habit, and\nto sharpen this judgement, asking first whether the action conforms\nobjectively to the moral law, and to what law; and we distinguish\nthe law that merely furnishes a principle of obligation from that\nwhich is really obligatory (leges obligandi a legibus obligantibus);\nas, for instance, the law of what men's wants require from me, as\ncontrasted with that which their rights demand, the latter of which\nprescribes essential, the former only non-essential duties; and thus\nwe teach how to distinguish different kinds of duties which meet in\nthe same action. The other point to which attention must be directed\nis the question whether the action was also (subjectively) done for\nthe sake of the moral law, so that it not only is morally correct as a\ndeed, but also, by the maxim from which it is done, has moral worth as\na disposition. Now there is no doubt that this practice, and the\nresulting culture of our reason in judging merely of the practical,\nmust gradually produce a certain interest even in the law of reason,\nand consequently in morally good actions. For we ultimately take a\nliking for a thing, the contemplation of which makes us feel that\nthe use of our cognitive faculties is extended; and this extension\nis especially furthered by that in which we find moral correctness,\nsince it is only in such an order of things that reason, with its\nfaculty of determining a priori on principle what ought to be done,\ncan find satisfaction. An observer of nature takes liking at last to\nobjects that at first offended his senses, when he discovers in them\nthe great adaptation of their organization to design, so that his\nreason finds food in its contemplation. So Leibnitz spared an insect\nthat he had carefully examined with the microscope, and replaced it on\nits leaf, because he had found himself instructed by the view of it\nand had, as it were, received a benefit from it.\n\nBut this employment of the faculty of judgement, which makes us feel\nour own cognitive powers, is not yet the interest in actions and in\ntheir morality itself. It merely causes us to take pleasure in\nengaging in such criticism, and it gives to virtue or the\ndisposition that conforms to moral laws a form of beauty, which is\nadmired, but not on that account sought after (laudatur et alget);\nas everything the contemplation of which produces a consciousness of\nthe harmony of our powers of conception, and in which we feel the\nwhole of our faculty of knowledge (understanding and imagination)\nstrengthened, produces a satisfaction, which may also be\ncommunicated to others, while nevertheless the existence of the object\nremains indifferent to us, being only regarded as the occasion of\nour becoming aware of the capacities in us which are elevated above\nmere animal nature. Now, however, the second exercise comes in, the\nliving exhibition of morality of character by examples, in which\nattention is directed to purity of will, first only as a negative\nperfection, in so far as in an action done from duty no motives of\ninclination have any influence in determining it. By this the\npupil's attention is fixed upon the consciousness of his freedom,\nand although this renunciation at first excites a feeling of pain,\nnevertheless, by its withdrawing the pupil from the constraint of even\nreal wants, there is proclaimed to him at the same time a\ndeliverance from the manifold dissatisfaction in which all these wants\nentangle him, and the mind is made capable of receiving the\nsensation of satisfaction from other sources. The heart is freed and\nlightened of a burden that always secretly presses on it, when\ninstances of pure moral resolutions reveal to the man an inner faculty\nof which otherwise he has no right knowledge, the inward freedom to\nrelease himself from the boisterous importunity of inclinations, to\nsuch a degree that none of them, not even the dearest, shall have\nany influence on a resolution, for which we are now to employ our\nreason. Suppose a case where I alone know that the wrong is on my\nside, and although a free confession of it and the offer of\nsatisfaction are so strongly opposed by vanity, selfishness, and\neven an otherwise not illegitimate antipathy to the man whose rights\nare impaired by me, I am nevertheless able to discard all these\nconsiderations; in this there is implied a consciousness of\nindependence on inclinations and circumstances, and of the possibility\nof being sufficient for myself, which is salutary to me in general for\nother purposes also. And now the law of duty, in consequence of the\npositive worth which obedience to it makes us feel, finds easier\naccess through the respect for ourselves in the consciousness of our\nfreedom. When this is well established, when a man dreads nothing more\nthan to find himself, on self-examination, worthless and\ncontemptible in his own eyes, then every good moral disposition can be\ngrafted on it, because this is the best, nay, the only guard that\ncan keep off from the mind the pressure of ignoble and corrupting\nmotives.\n\nI have only intended to point out the most general maxims of the\nmethodology of moral cultivation and exercise. As the manifold variety\nof duties requires special rules for each kind, and this would be a\nprolix affair, I shall be readily excused if in a work like this,\nwhich is only preliminary, I content myself with these outlines.\n\nPART_2|CONCLUSION\n\n                     CONCLUSION.\n\n\n\nTwo things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and\nawe, the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them: the\nstarry heavens above and the moral law within. I have not to search\nfor them and conjecture them as though they were veiled in darkness or\nwere in the transcendent region beyond my horizon; I see them before\nme and connect them directly with the consciousness of my existence.\nThe former begins from the place I occupy in the external world of\nsense, and enlarges my connection therein to an unbounded extent\nwith worlds upon worlds and systems of systems, and moreover into\nlimitless times of their periodic motion, its beginning and\ncontinuance. The second begins from my invisible self, my personality,\nand exhibits me in a world which has true infinity, but which is\ntraceable only by the understanding, and with which I discern that I\nam not in a merely contingent but in a universal and necessary\nconnection, as I am also thereby with all those visible worlds. The\nformer view of a countless multitude of worlds annihilates as it\nwere my importance as an animal creature, which after it has been\nfor a short time provided with vital power, one knows not how, must\nagain give back the matter of which it was formed to the planet it\ninhabits (a mere speck in the universe). The second, on the\ncontrary, infinitely elevates my worth as an intelligence by my\npersonality, in which the moral law reveals to me a life independent\nof animality and even of the whole sensible world, at least so far\nas may be inferred from the destination assigned to my existence by\nthis law, a destination not restricted to conditions and limits of\nthis life, but reaching into the infinite.\n\nBut though admiration and respect may excite to inquiry, they cannot\nsupply the want of it. What, then, is to be done in order to enter\non this in a useful manner and one adapted to the loftiness of the\nsubject? Examples may serve in this as a warning and also for\nimitation. The contemplation of the world began from the noblest\nspectacle that the human senses present to us, and that our\nunderstanding can bear to follow in their vast reach; and it ended- in\nastrology. Morality began with the noblest attribute of human\nnature, the development and cultivation of which give a prospect of\ninfinite utility; and ended- in fanaticism or superstition. So it is\nwith all crude attempts where the principal part of the business\ndepends on the use of reason, a use which does not come of itself,\nlike the use of the feet, by frequent exercise, especially when\nattributes are in question which cannot be directly exhibited in\ncommon experience. But after the maxim had come into vogue, though\nlate, to examine carefully beforehand all the steps that reason\npurposes to take, and not to let it proceed otherwise than in the\ntrack of a previously well considered method, then the study of the\nstructure of the universe took quite a different direction, and\nthereby attained an incomparably happier result. The fall of a\nstone, the motion of a sling, resolved into their elements and the\nforces that are manifested in them, and treated mathematically,\nproduced at last that clear and henceforward unchangeable insight into\nthe system of the world which, as observation is continued, may hope\nalways to extend itself, but need never fear to be compelled to\nretreat.\n\nThis example may suggest to us to enter on the same path in treating\nof the moral capacities of our nature, and may give us hope of a\nlike good result. We have at hand the instances of the moral judgement\nof reason. By analysing these into their elementary conceptions, and\nin default of mathematics adopting a process similar to that of\nchemistry, the separation of the empirical from the rational\nelements that may be found in them, by repeated experiments on\ncommon sense, we may exhibit both pure, and learn with certainty\nwhat each part can accomplish of itself, so as to prevent on the one\nhand the errors of a still crude untrained judgement, and on the other\nhand (what is far more necessary) the extravagances of genius, by\nwhich, as by the adepts of the philosopher's stone, without any\nmethodical study or knowledge of nature, visionary treasures are\npromised and the true are thrown away. In one word, science\n(critically undertaken and methodically directed) is the narrow gate\nthat leads to the true doctrine of practical wisdom, if we\nunderstand by this not merely what one ought to do, but what ought\nto serve teachers as a guide to construct well and clearly the road to\nwisdom which everyone should travel, and to secure others from going\nastray. Philosophy must always continue to be the guardian of this\nscience; and although the public does not take any interest in its\nsubtle investigations, it must take an interest in the resulting\ndoctrines, which such an examination first puts in a clear light.\n\n\n                             THE END","title":"The Critique of Practical Reason","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":62826}