{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_57037/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_57037","id":"gutenberg_57037","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/57037","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Early Modern (c. 1450-1750)","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Politics","Political ethics -- Early works to 1800","Political science -- Philosophy -- Early works to 1800","State, The -- Early works to 1800"],"text":"THE PRINCE\n\nBY\n\nNICCOL\u00d2 MACHIAVELLI\n\nTRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH BY\n\nLUIGI RICCI\n\nHUMPHREY MILFORD\n\nOXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS\n\nLONDON EDINBURGH GLASGOW\n\nNEW YORK TORONTO MELBOURNE CAPETOWN\n\nBOMBAY CALCUTTA AND MADRAS\n\n1909\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nOf all Machiavelli's works _The Prince_ is undoubtedly the greatest;\nand a new English edition of it is likely to be welcome to all those\nwho have not the advantage of reading it in the classical Italian\noriginal.\n\nFor a true appreciation of Machiavelli, impossible in a brief Preface,\nI must refer the English reader to Macaulay's Essay on the Italian\nhistorian and statesman.[1] In it he will see how our Author's ideas and\nwork were wrongfully and wilfully misinterpreted by the very men who,\nwhile profiting by his wisdom, have with great ingratitude criticised\nthe statesman and defamed his name, as that of the inventor of the\nworst political system ever imagined. Yet, as his whole life was an\nindefatigable and unremitting endeavour to secure for his native\nFlorence a good and popular government, and as he lost his great office\nof Secretary to the Florentine Republic on account of his avowed\nliberal opinions, it is not only unjust but ridiculous to accuse him of\nhelping tyrants to enslave the people. What he did was to show in the\nmost deliberate and in the plainest way the arts by which free peoples\nwere made slaves; and, had his words of advice been always heeded, no\ntyrant in Italy or elsewhere could have been successful in his policy.\nThat he was not listened to, and his advice scorned and spurned, was\nnot Machiavelli's fault.\n\nThose who still share the opinion of his interested detractors should\nread his private correspondence with the leaders of liberal ideas\nin Italy--many of his letters being still left unpublished in the\nMS. Collection of Giuliano Ricci in the National Library, in the\nRiccardiana Library (No. 2467), in the Government Archives (Strozzi,\nNos. 133 and 1028) of Florence, in the Barberini Library, and in the\nCollezione Gonnelli of the Palatine Library in Rome.\n\nLUIGI RICCI.\n\n22 ALBEMARLE STREET, LONDON, W.\n\n\n[1] \"Machiavelli\" by Thomas Babington Macaulay is available at Project\nGutenberg in Critical, Historical, and Miscellaneous Essays; Vol. 1,\nebook 55901.\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\nNICCOL\u00d2 MACHIAVELLI TO LORENZO THE MAGNIFICENT\n\n1. The various kinds of Government and the ways by which they are\nestablished.\n\n2. Of Hereditary Monarchies.\n\n3. Of Mixed Monarchies.\n\n4. Why the Kingdom of Darius, occupied by Alexander, did not rebel\nagainst the successors of the latter after his death.\n\n5. The way to govern Cities or Dominions that, previous to being\noccupied, lived under their own Laws.\n\n6. Of New Dominions which have been acquired by one's own Arms and\nPowers.\n\n7. Of New Dominions acquired by the Power of others or by Fortune.\n\n8. Of those who have attained the position of Prince by villainy.\n\n9. Of the Civic Principality.\n\n10. How the strength of all States should be measured.\n\n11. Of Ecclesiastical Principalities.\n\n12. The different kinds of Militia and Mercenary Soldiers.\n\n13. Of Auxiliary, Mixed, and Native Troops\n\n14. What the duties of a Prince are with regard to the Militia.\n\n16. Of the things for which Men, and especially Princes, are praised or\nblamed.\n\n16. Of Liberality and Niggardliness.\n\n17. Of Cruelty and Clemency, and whether it is better to be loved or\nfeared.\n\n18. In what way Princes must keep faith.\n\n19. That we must avoid being despised and hated.\n\n20. Whether Fortresses and other things which Princes often make are\nuseful or injurious.\n\n21. How a Prince must act in order to gain reputation.\n\n22. Of the Secretaries of Princes.\n\n23. How Flatterers must be shunned.\n\n24. Why the Princes of Italy have lost their States.\n\n25. How much Fortune can do in human affairs, and how it may be opposed.\n\n26. Exhortation to liberate Italy from the Barbarians.\n\n\n\n\nNICCOL\u00d2 MACHIAVELLI\n\nTO\n\nLORENZO THE MAGNIFICENT\n\nSON OF PIERO DI MEDICI\n\n\nIt is customary for those who wish to gain the favour of a prince to\nendeavour to do so by offering him gifts of those things which they\nhold most precious, or in which they know him to take especial delight.\nIn this way princes are often presented with horses, arms, cloth of\ngold, gems, and such-like ornaments worthy of their grandeur. In my\ndesire, however, to offer to Your Highness some humble testimony of\nmy devotion, I have been unable to find among my possessions anything\nwhich I hold so dear or esteem so highly as that knowledge of the deeds\nof great men which I have acquired through a long experience of modern\nevents and a constant study of the past.\n\nThe results of my long observations and reflections are recorded in the\nlittle volume which I now offer to Your Highness: and although I deem\nthis work unworthy of Your Highness's notice, yet my confidence in your\nhumanity assures me that you will accept it, knowing that it is not\nin my power to offer you a greater gift than that of enabling you to\nunderstand in the shortest possible time all those things which I have\nlearnt through danger and suffering in the course of many years. I have\nnot sought to adorn my work with long phrases or high-sounding words or\nany of those allurements and ornaments with which many writers seek to\nembellish their books, as I desire no honour for my work but such as\nits truth and the gravity of its subject may justly deserve. Nor will\nit, I trust, be deemed presumptuous on the part of a man of humble and\nobscure condition to attempt to discuss and criticise the government of\nprinces; for in the same way that landscape painters station themselves\nin the valleys in order to draw mountains or elevated ground, and\nascend an eminence in order to get a good view of the plains, so it\nis necessary to be a prince to be able to know thoroughly the nature\nof a people, and to know the nature of princes one must be one of the\npopulace.\n\nMay I trust, therefore, that Your Highness will accept this little gift\nin the spirit in which it is offered; and if Your Highness will deign\nto peruse it, you will recognise in it my ardent desire that you may\nattain to that grandeur which fortune and your own merits presage for\nyou.\n\nAnd should Your Highness gaze down from the summit of that eminence\ntowards this humble spot, you will recognise the great and unmerited\nsufferings inflicted on me by a cruel fate.\n\n\n\n\nTHE PRINCE\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\n\nTHE VARIOUS KINDS OF GOVERNMENT AND THE WAYS BY WHICH THEY ARE\nESTABLISHED\n\n\nAll states and dominions which hold or have held sway over mankind are\neither republics or monarchies. Monarchies are either hereditary ones,\nin which the rulers have been for many years of the same family, or\nelse they are those of recent foundation. The newly founded ones are\neither entirely new, as was Milan to Francesco Sforza, or else they\nare, as it were, new members grafted on to the hereditary possessions\nof the prince that annexes them, as is the kingdom of Naples to the\nKing of Spain. The dominions thus acquired have either been previously\naccustomed to the rule of another prince, or else have been free\nstates, and they are annexed either by force of arms of the prince, or\nof others, or else fall to him by good fortune or merit.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\n\nOF HEREDITARY MONARCHIES\n\n\nI will not here speak of republics, having already treated of them\nfully in another place. I will deal only with monarchies, and will show\nhow the various kinds described above can be governed and maintained.\nIn the first place, in hereditary states accustomed to the reigning\nfamily the difficulty of maintaining them is far less than in new\nmonarchies; for it is sufficient not to exceed the ancestral usages,\nand to accommodate one's self to accidental circumstances; in this way\nsuch a prince, if of ordinary ability, will always be able to maintain\nhis position, unless some very exceptional and excessive force deprives\nhim of it; and even if he be thus deprived of it, on the slightest\nmisfortune happening to the new occupier, he will be able to regain it.\n\nWe have in Italy the example of the Duke of Ferrara, who was able\nto withstand the assaults of the Venetians in the year '84, and of\nPope Julius in the year '10, for no other reason than because of the\nantiquity of his family in that dominion. In as much as the legitimate\nprince has less cause and less necessity to give offence, it is only\nnatural that he should be more loved; and, if no extraordinary vices\nmake him hated, it is only reasonable for his subjects to be naturally\nattached to him, the memories and causes of innovations being forgotten\nin the long period over which his rule has existed; whereas one change\nalways leaves the way prepared for the introduction of another.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\n\nOF MIXED MONARCHIES\n\n\nBut it is in the new monarchy that difficulties really exist. Firstly,\nif it is not entirely new, but a member as it were of a mixed state,\nits disorders spring at first from a natural difficulty which exists\nin all new dominions, because men change masters willingly, hoping to\nbetter themselves; and this belief makes them take arms against their\nrulers, in which they are deceived, as experience shows them that they\nhave gone from bad to worse. This is the result of another very natural\ncause, which is the necessary harm inflicted on those over whom the\nprince obtains dominion, both by his soldiers and by an infinite number\nof other injuries unavoidably caused by his occupation.\n\nThus you find enemies in all those whom you have injured by occupying\nthat dominion, and you cannot maintain the friendship of those who have\nhelped you to obtain this possession, as you will not be able to fulfil\ntheir expectations, nor can you use strong measures with them, being\nunder an obligation to them; for which reason, however strong your\narmies may be, you will always need the favour of the inhabitants to\ntake possession of a province. It was from these causes that Louis XII.\nof France, though able to occupy Milan without trouble, immediately\nlost it, and the forces of Ludovico alone were sufficient to take it\nfrom him the first time, for the inhabitants who had willingly opened\ntheir gates to him, finding themselves deluded in the hopes they had\ncherished and not obtaining those benefits that they had anticipated,\ncould not bear the vexatious rule of their new prince.\n\nIt is indeed true that, after reconquering the rebel territories they\nare not so easily lost again, for the ruler is now, by the fact of the\nrebellion, less averse to secure his position by punishing offenders,\ninvestigating any suspicious circumstances, and strengthening himself\nin weak places. So that although the mere appearance of such a person\nas Duke Ludovico on the frontier was sufficient to cause France to lose\nMilan the first time, to make her lose her grip of it the second time\nwas only possible when all the world was against her, and after her\nenemies had been defeated and driven out of Italy; which was the result\nof the causes above mentioned. Nevertheless it was taken from her both\nthe first and the second time. The general causes of the first loss\nhave been already discussed; it remains now to be seen what were the\ncauses of the second loss and by what means France could have avoided\nit, or what measures might have been taken by another ruler in that\nposition which were not taken by the King of France. Be it observed,\ntherefore, that those states which on annexation are united to a\npreviously existing state may or may not be of the same nationality\nand language. If they are, it is very easy to hold them, especially if\nthey are not accustomed to freedom; and to possess them securely it\nsuffices that the family of the princes which formerly governed them\nbe extinct. For the rest, their old condition not being disturbed, and\nthere being no dissimilarity of customs, the people settle down quietly\nunder their new rulers, as is seen in the case of Burgundy, Brittany,\nGascony, and Normandy, which have been so long united to France; and\nalthough there may be some slight differences of language, the customs\nof the people are nevertheless similar, and they can get along well\ntogether, and whoever obtains possession of them and wishes to retain\nthem must bear in mind two things: the one, that the blood of their old\nrulers is extinct; the other, to make no alteration either in their\nlaws or in their taxes; in this way they will in a very short space of\ntime become united with their old possessions and form one state. But\nwhen dominions are acquired in a province differing in language, laws,\nand customs, the difficulties to be overcome are great, and it requires\ngood fortune as well as great industry to retain them; one of the best\nand most certain means of doing so would be for the new ruler to take\nup his residence in them. This would render their possession more\nsecure and durable, it is what the Turk has done in Greece; in spite of\nall the other measures taken by him to hold that state, it would not\nhave been possible to retain it had he not gone to live there. Being\non the spot, disorders can be seen as they arise and can quickly be\nremedied, but living at a distance, they are only heard of when they\nget beyond remedy. Besides which, the province is not despoiled by\nyour officials, the subjects are pleased with the easy accessibility\nof their prince; and wishing to be loyal they have more reason to love\nhim, and should they be otherwise they will have greater cause to fear\nhim.\n\nAny external Power who wishes to assail that state will be less\ndisposed to do so; so that as long as he resides there he will be very\nhard to dispossess. The other and better remedy is to plant colonies\nin one or two of those places which form as it were the keys of the\nland, for it is necessary either to do this or to maintain a large\nforce of armed men. The colonies will cost the prince little; with\nlittle or no expense on his part, he can send and maintain them; he\nonly injures those whose lands and houses are taken to give to the new\ninhabitants, and these form but a small proportion of the state, and\nthose who are injured, remaining poor and scattered, can never do any\nharm to him, and all the others are, on the one hand, not injured and\ntherefore easily pacified; and, on the other, are fearful of offending\nlest they should be treated like those who have been dispossessed of\ntheir property. To conclude, these colonies cost nothing, are more\nfaithful, and give less offence; and the injured parties being poor\nand scattered are unable to do mischief, as I have shown. For it must\nbe noted, that men must either be caressed or else annihilated; they\nwill revenge themselves for small injuries, but cannot do so for great\nones; the injury therefore that we do to a man must be such that we\nneed not fear his vengeance. But by maintaining a garrison instead of\ncolonists, one will spend much more, and consume in guarding it all\nthe revenues of that state, so that the acquisition will result in\na loss, besides giving much greater offence, since it injures every\none in that state with the quartering of the army on it; which being\nan inconvenience felt, by all, every one becomes an enemy, and these\nare enemies which can do mischief, as, though beaten, they remain in\ntheir own homes. In every way, therefore, a garrison is as useless\nas colonies are useful. Further, the ruler of a foreign province as\ndescribed, should make himself the leader and defender of his less\npowerful neighbours, and endeavour to weaken the stronger ones, and\ntake care that his possessions are not entered by some foreigner not\nless powerful than himself, who will always intervene at the request\nof those who are discontented either through ambition or fear, as was\nseen when the \u00c6toli invited the Romans into Greece; and in whatever\nprovince they entered, it was always at the request of the inhabitants.\nAnd the rule is that when a powerful foreigner enters a province, all\nthe less powerful inhabitants become his adherents, moved by the envy\nthey bear to those ruling over them; so much so that with regard to\nthese minor potentates he has no trouble whatever in winning them over,\nfor they willingly join forces with the state that he has acquired.\nHe has merely to be careful that they do not assume too much power\nand authority, and he can easily with his own forces and their favour\nput down those that are powerful and remain in everything the arbiter\nof that province. And he who does not govern well in this way will\nsoon lose what he has acquired, and while he holds it will meet with\ninfinite difficulty and trouble.\n\nThe Romans in the provinces they took, always followed this policy;\nthey established colonies, flattered the less powerful without\nincreasing their strength, put down the most powerful and did not allow\nforeign rulers to obtain influence in them. I will let the single\nprovince of Greece suffice as an example. They made friends with the\nAch\u00e6i and the \u00c6toli, the kingdom of Macedonia was cast down, and\nAntiochus driven out, nor did they allow the merits of the Ach\u00e6i or the\n\u00c6toli to gain them any increase of territory, nor did the persuasions\nof Philip induce them to befriend him without lowering him, nor could\nthe power of Antiochus make them consent to allow him to hold any state\nin that province.\n\nFor the Romans did in this case what all wise princes should do, who\nlook not only at present dangers but also at future ones and diligently\nguard against them; for being foreseen they can easily be remedied,\nbut if one waits till they are at hand, the medicine is no longer in\ntime as the malady has become incurable; it happening with this as with\nthose hectic fevers spoken of by doctors, which at their beginning\nare easy to cure but difficult to recognise, but in course of time\nwhen they have not at first been recognised and treated, become easy\nto recognise and difficult to cure. Thus it happens in matters of\nstate; for knowing afar off (which it is only given to a prudent man\nto do) the evils that are brewing, they are easily cured. But when,\nfor want of such knowledge, they are allowed to grow so that every\none can recognise them, there is no longer any remedy to be found.\nHowever, the Romans, observing these disorders while yet remote, were\nalways able to find a remedy, and never allowed them to proceed in\norder to avoid a war; for they knew that war was not to be avoided,\nand could be deferred only to the advantage of the other side; they\ntherefore declared war against Philip and Antiochus in Greece, so as\nnot to have to fight them in Italy, though they might at the time\nhave avoided either; this they did not choose to do, never caring to\ndo that which is now every day to be heard in the mouths of our wise\nmen, to enjoy the benefits of time, but preferring those of their\nown virtue and prudence, for time brings with it all things, and may\nproduce indifferently either good or evil. But let us return to France\nand examine whether she did any of these things; and I will speak not\nof Charles, but of Louis as the one whose proceedings can be better\nseen, as he held possession in Italy for a longer time; you will then\nsee that he did the opposite of all those things which must be done to\nkeep possession of a foreign state. King Louis was called into Italy by\nthe ambition of the Venetians, who wished by his coming to gain half\nof Lombardy. I will not blame the king for coming nor for the part\nhe took, because wishing to plant his foot in Italy, and not having\nfriends in the country, on the contrary the conduct of King Charles\nhaving caused all doors to be closed to him, he was forced to accept\nwhat friendships he could find, and his schemes would have quickly\nbeen successful if he had made no mistakes in his other proceedings.\n\nThe king then having acquired Lombardy regained immediately the\nreputation lost by Charles. Genoa yielded, the Florentines became his\nfriends, the Marquis of Mantua, the Dukes of Ferrara and Bentivogli,\nthe Lady of Furl\u00ec, the Lords of Faenza, Pesaro, Rimini, Camerino,\nand Piombino, the inhabitants of Lucca, of Pisa, and of Sienna, all\napproached him with offers of friendship. The Venetians might then\nhave seen the effects of their temerity, how to gain a few lands\nin Lombardy they had made the king ruler over two-thirds of Italy.\nConsider how little difficulty the king would have had in maintaining\nhis reputation in Italy if he had observed the rules above given, and\nkept a firm and sure hold over all those friends of his, who being\nmany in number, and weak, and fearful one of the Church, another of\nthe Venetians, were always obliged to hold fast to him, and by whose\naid he could easily make sure of any who were still great. But he was\nhardly in Milan before he did exactly the opposite, by giving aid to\nPope Alexander to occupy the Romagna. Nor did he perceive that, in\ntaking this course, he weakened himself, by casting off his friends\nand those who had placed themselves at his disposal, and strengthened\nthe Church by adding to the spiritual power, which gives it such\nauthority, further temporal powers. And having made the first mistake,\nhe was obliged to follow it up, whilst, to put a stop to the ambition\nof Alexander and prevent him becoming ruler of Tuscany, he was forced\nto come to Italy. And not content with having increased the power\nof the Church and lost his friends, he now desiring the kingdom of\nNaples, divided it with the king of Spain; and where he alone was the\narbiter of Italy, he now brought in a companion, so that the ambitious\nof that province who were dissatisfied with him might have some one\nelse to appeal to; and where he might have left in that kingdom a king\ntributary to him, he dispossessed him in order to bring in another who\nwas capable of driving him out. The desire to acquire possessions is\na very natural and ordinary thing, and when those men do it who can\ndo so successfully, they are always praised and not blamed, but when\nthey cannot and yet want to do so at all costs, they make a mistake\ndeserving of great blame. If France, therefore, with her own forces\ncould have taken Naples, she ought to have done so; if she could not\nshe ought not to have divided it. And if the partition of Lombardy with\nthe Venetians is to be excused, as having been the means of allowing\nthe French king to set foot in Italy, this other partition deserves\nblame, not having the excuse of necessity. Louis had thus made these\nfive mistakes: he had crushed the smaller Powers, increased the power\nin Italy of one ruler, brought into the land a very powerful foreigner,\nand he had not come to live there himself, nor had he established\nany colonies. Still these mistakes might, if he had lived, not have\ninjured him, had he not made the sixth, that of taking the state from\nthe Venetians; for, if he had not strengthened the Church and brought\nthe Spaniards into Italy, it would have been right and necessary to\nhumble them; having once taken those measures, he ought never to have\nconsented to their ruin; because, had the Venetians been strong, it\nwould have kept the others from making attempts on Lombardy, partly\nbecause the Venetians would not have consented to any measures by which\nthey did not get it for themselves, and partly because the others would\nnot have wanted to take it from France to give it to Venice, and would\nnot have had the courage to attack both.\n\nIf any one urges that King Louis yielded the Romagna to Alexander\nand the kingdom to Spain in order to avoid war, I reply, with the\nreasons already given, that one ought never to allow a disorder to take\nplace in order to avoid war, for war is not thereby avoided, but only\ndeferred to your disadvantage. And if others allege the promise given\nby the king to the pope to undertake that enterprise for him, in return\nfor the dissolution of his marriage and for the cardinalship of Rohan,\nI reply with what I shall say later on about the faith of princes and\nhow it is to be observed. Thus King Louis lost Lombardy through not\nobserving any of those conditions which have been observed by others\nwho have taken provinces and wished to retain them. Nor is this any\nmiracle, but very reasonable and natural. I spoke of this matter with\nCardinal Rohan at Nantes when Valentine, as Cesare Borgia, son of Pope\nAlexander, was commonly called, was occupying the Romagna, for on\nCardinal Rohan saying to me that the Italians did not understand war,\nI replied that the French did not understand politics, for if they did\nthey would never allow the Church to become so great. And experience\nshows us that the greatness in Italy of the Church and also of Spain\nhave been caused by France, and her ruin has proceeded from them. From\nwhich may be drawn a general rule, which never or very rarely fails,\nthat whoever is the cause of another becoming powerful, is ruined\nhimself; for that power is produced by him either through craft or\nforce; and both of these are suspected by the one that has become\npowerful.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\n\nWHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, OCCUPIED BY ALEXANDER, DID NOT REBEL AGAINST\nTHE SUCCESSORS OF THE LATTER AFTER HIS DEATH.\n\n\nConsidering the difficulties there are in holding a newly acquired\nstate, some may wonder how it came to pass that Alexander the Great\nbecame master of Asia in a few years, and had hardly occupied it\nwhen he died, from which it might be supposed that the whole state\nwould have rebelled. However, his successors maintained themselves in\npossession, and had no further difficulty in doing so than those which\narose among themselves from their own ambitions.\n\nI reply that the kingdoms known to history have been governed in two\nways: either by a prince and his servants, who, as ministers by his\ngrace and permission, assist in governing the realm; or by a prince\nand by barons, who hold their positions not by favour of the ruler but\nby antiquity of blood. Such barons have states and subjects of their\nown, who recognise them as their lords, and are naturally attached to\nthem. In those states which are governed by a prince and his servants,\nthe prince possesses more authority, because there is no one in the\nstate regarded as a superior besides himself, and if others are obeyed\nit is merely as ministers and officials of the prince, and no one\nregards them with any special affection. Examples of these two kinds\nof government in our own time are the Turk and the King of France.\nAll the Turkish monarchy is governed by one ruler, the others are his\nservants, and dividing his kingdom into \"sangiacates,\" he sends to them\nvarious administrators, and changes or recalls them at his pleasure.\nBut the King of France is surrounded by a large number of ancient\nnobles, recognised as such by their subjects, and loved by them; they\nhave their prerogatives, which the king cannot deprive them of without\ndanger to himself. Whoever now considers these two states will see that\nit would be difficult to acquire the state of the Turk; but having\nconquered it, it would be very easy to hold it.\n\nThe causes of the difficulty of occupying the Turkish kingdom are, that\nthe invader could not be invited by princes of that kingdom, nor hope\nto facilitate his enterprise by the rebellion of those around him, as\nwill be evident from reasons given above. Because, being all slaves,\nand bound, it will be more difficult to corrupt them, and even if\nthey were corrupted, little effect could be hoped for, as they would\nnot be able to carry the people with them for the reasons mentioned.\nTherefore, whoever assaults the Turk must be prepared to meet his\nunited forces, and must rely more on his own strength than on the\ndisorders of others; but having once conquered him, and beaten him in\nbattle so that he can no longer raise armies, nothing else is to be\nfeared except the family of the prince, and if this is extinguished,\nthere is no longer any one to be feared, the others having no credit\nwith the people; and as the victor before the victory could place no\nhope in them, so he need not fear them afterwards. The contrary is\nthe case in kingdoms governed like that of France, because it is easy\nto enter them by winning over some baron of the kingdom, there being\nalways some malcontents, and those desiring innovations. These can,\nfor the reasons stated, open the way to you and facilitate victory;\nbut afterwards, if you wish to keep possession, infinite difficulties\narise, both from those who have aided you and from those you have\noppressed. Nor is it sufficient to extinguish the family of the prince,\nfor there remain those nobles who will make themselves the head of new\nchanges, and being neither able to content them nor exterminate them,\nyou will lose the state whenever an occasion arises. Now if you will\nconsider what was the nature of the government of Darius you will find\nit similar to the kingdom of the Turk, and therefore Alexander had\nfirst to completely overthrow it and seize the country, after which\nvictory, Darius being dead, the state remained secure to Alexander,\nfor the reasons discussed above. And his successors, had they remained\nunited, might have enjoyed it in peace, nor did any tumults arise in\nthe kingdom except those fomented by themselves. But it is impossible\nto possess with such ease countries constituted like France.\n\nHence arose the frequent rebellions of Spain, France, and Greece\nagainst the Romans, owing to the numerous principalities which existed\nin those states; for, as long as the memory of these lasted, the Romans\nwere always uncertain of their possessions; but when the memory of\nthese principalities had been extinguished they became, with the power\nand duration of the empire, secure possessions.\n\nAnd afterwards the latter could, when fighting among themselves, draw\neach one with him a portion of these provinces, according to the\nauthority he had established there, and these provinces, when the\nfamily of their ancient princes was extinct, recognised no other rulers\nbut the Romans. Considering these things, therefore, let no one be\nsurprised at the facility with which Alexander could hold Asia, and at\nthe difficulties that others have had in holding acquired possessions,\nlike Pyrrhus and many others; as this was not caused by the greater or\nsmaller ability of the conqueror, but depended on the dissimilarity of\nthe conditions.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\n\nTHE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR DOMINIONS THAT, PREVIOUS TO BEING OCCUPIED,\nLIVED UNDER THEIR OWN LAWS.\n\n\nWhen those states which have been acquired are accustomed to live at\nliberty under their own laws, there are three ways of holding them. The\nfirst is to ruin them; the second is to go and live there in person;\nthe third is to allow them to live under their own laws, taking tribute\nof them, and creating there within the country a state composed of a\nfew who will keep it friendly to you. Because this state, being created\nby the prince, knows that it cannot exist without his friendship and\nprotection, and will do all it can to keep them, and a city used to\nliberty can be more easily held by means of its citizens than in\nany other way, if you wish to preserve it. There is the example of\nthe Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans held Athens and Thebes by\ncreating within them a state of a few people; nevertheless they lost\nthem. The Romans, in order to hold Capua, Carthage, and Numantia,\ndestroyed them, but did not lose them. They wanted to hold Greece in\nalmost the same way as the Spartans held it, leaving it free and under\nits own laws, but they did not succeed; so that they were compelled\nto destroy many cities in that province in order to keep it, because\nin truth there is no sure method of holding them except by ruining\nthem. And whoever becomes the ruler of a free city and does not destroy\nit, can expect to be destroyed by it, for it can always find a motive\nfor rebellion in the name of liberty and of its ancient usages, which\nare forgotten neither by lapse of time nor by benefits received, and\nwhatever one does or provides, so long as the inhabitants are not\nseparated or dispersed, they do not forget that name and those usages,\nbut appeal to them at once in every emergency, as did Pisa after being\nso many years held in servitude by the Florentines. But when cities or\nprovinces have been accustomed to live under a prince, and the family\nof that prince is extinguished, being on the one hand used to obey, and\non the other not having their old prince, they cannot unite in choosing\none from among themselves, and they do not know how to live in freedom,\nso that they are slower to take arms, and a prince can win them over\nwith greater facility and establish himself securely. But in republics\nthere is greater life, greater hatred, and more desire for vengeance;\nthey do not and cannot cast aside the memory of their ancient liberty,\nso that the surest way is either to destroy them or reside in them.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\n\nOF NEW DOMINIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN ACQUIRED BY ONE'S OWN ARMS AND POWERS\n\n\nLet no one marvel if in speaking of new dominions both as to prince\nand state, I bring forward very exalted instances, for as men walk\nalmost always in the paths trodden by others, proceeding in their\nactions by imitation, and not being always able to follow others\nexactly, nor attain to the excellence of those they imitate, a prudent\nman should always follow in the path trodden by great men and imitate\nthose who are most excellent, so that if he does not attain to their\ngreatness, at any rate he will get some tinge of it. He will do like\nprudent archers, who when the place they wish to hit is too far off,\nknowing how far their bow will carry, aim at a spot much higher than\nthe one they wish to hit, not in order to reach this height with\ntheir arrow, but by help of this high aim to hit the spot they wish\nto. I say then that in new dominions, where there is a new prince,\nit is more or less easy to hold them according to the greater or\nlesser ability of him who acquires them. And as the fact of a private\nindividual becoming a prince presupposes either great ability or good\nfortune, it would appear that either of these things would mitigate\nin part many difficulties. Nevertheless those who have been wanting\nas regards good fortune have maintained themselves best. The matter\nis also facilitated by the prince being obliged to reside personally\nin his territory, having no others. But to come to those who have\nbecome princes through their own merits and not by fortune, I regard\nas the greatest, Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, and such like. And\nalthough one should not speak of Moses, he having merely carried out\nwhat was ordered him by God, still he deserves admiration, if only\nfor that grace which made him worthy to speak with God. But regarding\nCyrus and others who have acquired or founded kingdoms, they will all\nbe found worthy of admiration; and if their particular actions and\nmethods are examined they will not appear very different from those of\nMoses, although he had so great a Master. And in examining their life\nand deeds it will be seen that they owed nothing to fortune but the\nopportunity which gave them matter to be shaped into the form that they\nthought fit; and without that opportunity their powers would have been\nwasted, and without their powers the opportunity would have come in\nvain. It was thus necessary that Moses should find the people of Israel\nslaves in Egypt and oppressed by the Egyptians, so that they were\ndisposed to follow him in order to escape from their servitude. It was\nnecessary that Romulus should be unable to remain in Alba, and should\nhave been exposed at his birth, in order that he might become King of\nRome and founder of that nation. It was necessary that Cyrus should\nfind the Persians discontented with the empire of the Medes, and the\nMedes weak and effeminate through long peace. Theseus could not have\nshowed his abilities if he had not found the Athenians dispersed.\n\nThese opportunities, therefore, gave these men their chance, and their\nown great qualities enabled them to profit by them, so as to ennoble\ntheir country and augment its fortunes. Those who by heroic means such\nas these become princes, obtain their dominions with difficulty but\nretain them easily, and the difficulties which they have in acquiring\ntheir dominions arise in part from the new rules and regulations that\nthey have to introduce in order to establish their position securely.\nIt must be considered that there is nothing more difficult to carry\nout, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than\nto initiate a new order of things. For the reformer has enemies in all\nthose who profit by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all\nthose who would profit by the new order, this lukewarmness arising\npartly from fear of their adversaries, who have the laws in their\nfavour; and partly from the incredulity of mankind, who do not truly\nbelieve in anything new until they have had actual experience of it.\nThus it arises that on every opportunity for attacking the reformer,\nhis opponents do so with the zeal of partisans, the others only defend\nhim half-heartedly, so that between them he runs great danger. It is\nnecessary, however, in order to investigate thoroughly this question,\nto examine whether these innovators are independent, or whether they\ndepend upon others, that is to say, whether in order to carry out\ntheir designs they have to entreat or are able to force. In the first\ncase they invariably succeed ill, and accomplish nothing; but when\nthey can depend on their own strength and are able to use force, they\nrarely fail. Thus it comes about that all armed prophets have conquered\nand unarmed ones failed; for besides what has been already said, the\ncharacter of people varies, and it is easy to persuade them of a thing,\nbut difficult to keep them in that persuasion. And so it is necessary\nto order things so that when they no longer believe, they can be made\nto believe by force. Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus would not have\nbeen able to make their institutions observed for so long had they\nbeen disarmed, as happened in our own time to Fra Girolamo Savonarola,\nwho failed entirely in his new rules when the multitude began to\ndisbelieve in him, and he had no means of holding fast those who had\nbelieved nor of compelling the unbelievers to believe. Therefore\nsuch men as these have great difficulty in making their way, and all\ntheir dangers are met on the road and must be overcome by their own\nabilities; but when once they have overcome them and have begun to be\nheld in veneration, and have suppressed those who envied them, they\nremain powerful and secure, honoured and happy. To the high examples\ngiven I will add a lesser one, which, however, is to be compared in\nsome measure with them and will serve as an instance of all such cases,\nthat of Jerone of Syracuse, who from a private individual became Prince\nof Siracusa, without other aid from fortune beyond the opportunity;\nfor the Siracusans being oppressed elected him as their captain, from\nwhich by merit he was made prince; while still in private life his\nvirtues were such that it was written of him, that he lacked nothing\nto reign but the kingdom. He abolished the old militia, raised a new\none, abandoned his old friendships and formed new ones; and as he had\nthus friends and soldiers of his own, he was able on this foundation\nto build securely, so that while he had great trouble in acquiring his\nposition he had little in maintaining it.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\n\nOF NEW DOMINIONS ACQUIRED BY THE POWER OF OTHERS OR BY FORTUNE\n\n\nThose who rise from private citizens to be princes merely by fortune\nhave little trouble in rising but very much in maintaining their\nposition. They meet with no difficulties on the way as they fly over\nthem, but all their difficulties arise when they are established. Such\nare they who are granted a state either for money, or by favour of him\nwho grants it, as happened to many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia\nand of the Hellespont, who were created princes by Darius in order to\nhold these places for his security and glory; such were also those\nemperors who from private citizens became emperors by bribing the\narmy. Such as these depend absolutely on the good will and fortune of\nthose who have raised them, both of which are extremely inconstant and\nunstable. They neither know how to, nor are in a position to maintain\ntheir rank, for unless he be a man of great genius it is not likely\nthat one who has always lived in a private position should know how to\ncommand, and they are unable to command because they possess no forces\nwhich will be friendly and faithful to them. Moreover, states quickly\nfounded, like all other things which are born and grow rapidly, cannot\nhave deep roots, so that the first storm destroys them, unless, as\nalready said, the man who thus becomes a prince is of such great genius\nas to be able to take immediate steps for maintaining what fortune\nhas thrown into his lap, and lay afterwards those foundations which\nothers make before becoming princes. With regard to these two methods\nof becoming a prince,--by ability or by good fortune, I will here\nadduce two examples which have taken place within our memory, those of\nFrancesco Sforza and Cesare Borgia.\n\nFrancesco, by appropriate means and through great abilities, from\ncitizen became Duke of Milan, and what he had attained after a thousand\ndifficulties he maintained with little trouble. On the other hand,\nCesare Borgia, commonly called Duke Valentine, acquired the state\nthrough the fortune of his father and by the same means lost it, and\nthat although every measure was adopted by him and everything done\nthat a prudent and capable man could do to establish himself firmly\nin that state that the arms and the favours of others had given him.\nFor, as we have said, he who does not lay his foundations beforehand\nmay by great abilities do so afterwards, although with great trouble\nto the architect and danger to the building. If, then, one considers\nthe progress made by the duke, it will be seen how firm were the\nfoundations he had laid to his future power, which I do not think it\nsuperfluous to examine, as I know of no better precepts for a new\nprince to follow than the example of his actions; and if his measures\nwere not successful, it was through no fault of his own but only by\nthe most extraordinary malignity of fortune. In wishing to aggrandise\nthe duke his son, Alexander VI. had to meet very great difficulties\nboth present and future. In the first place, he saw no way of making\nhim ruler of any state that was not a possession of the Church. And in\nattempting to take that of the Church, he knew that the Duke of Milan\nand the Venetians would not consent, because Faenza and Rimini were\nalready under the protection of the Venetians. He saw, moreover, that\nthe arms of Italy, especially of those who might have served him, were\nin the hands of those who would fear the greatness of the pope, and\ntherefore he could not depend upon them, being all under the Orsinis\nand Colonnas and their adherents. It was, therefore, necessary to\ndisturb the existing condition and bring about disorders in the states\nof Italy in order to obtain secure mastery over a part of them; this\nwas easy, for he found the Venetians, who, actuated by other motives,\nhad invited the French into Italy, which he not only did not oppose,\nbut facilitated by dissolving the marriage of King Louis. The king\ncame thus into Italy with the aid of the Venetians and the consent of\nAlexander, and had hardly arrived at Milan before the pope obtained\ntroops from him for his enterprise in the Romagna, which he carried out\nby means of the reputation of the king. The duke having thus obtained\nthe Romagna and defeated the Colonnas, was hindered in maintaining it\nand proceeding further by two things: the one, his forces, of which he\ndoubted the fidelity; the other the will of France, that is to say,\nhe feared lest the arms of the Orsini of which he had availed himself\nshould fail him, and not only hinder him in obtaining more but take\nfrom him what he had already conquered, and he also feared that the\nking might do the same. He had evidence of this as regards the Orsini\nwhen, after taking Faenza, he assaulted Bologna and observed their\nbackwardness in the assault. And as regards the king, he perceived his\ndesigns when, after taking the dukedom of Urbino, he attacked Tuscany,\nand the king made him desist from that enterprise; whereupon the\nduke decided to depend no longer on the fortunes and arms of others.\nThe first thing he did was to weaken the parties of the Orsinis and\nColonnas in Rome by gaining all their adherents who were gentlemen and\nmaking them followers of himself, by granting them large pensions,\nand appointing them to commands and offices according to their rank,\nso that their attachment to their parties was extinguished in a few\nmonths, and entirely concentrated on the duke. After this he awaited an\nopportunity for crushing the Orsinis, having dispersed the adherents of\nthe Colonna family, and when the opportunity arrived he made good use\nof it, for the Orsini seeing at length that the greatness of the duke\nand of the Church meant their own ruin, convoked a diet at Magione in\nthe Perugino. Hence sprang the rebellion of Urbino and the tumults in\nRomagna and infinite dangers to the duke, who overcame them all with\nthe help of the French; and having regained his reputation, neither\ntrusting France nor other foreign forces in order not to have to oppose\nthem, he had recourse to stratagem. He dissembled his aims so well that\nthe Orsini, through the mediation of Signor Pavolo, made their peace\nwith him, which the duke spared no efforts to make secure, presenting\nthem with robes, money, and horses, so that in their simplicity they\nwere induced to come to Sinigaglia and fell into his hands. Having\nthus suppressed these leaders and made their partisans his friends,\nthe duke had laid a very good foundation to his power, having all the\nRomagna with the duchy of Urbino, and having gained the favour of\nthe inhabitants, who began to feel the benefit of his rule. And as\nthis part is worthy of note and of imitation by others, I will not\nomit mention of it. When he took the Romagna, it had previously been\ngoverned by weak rulers, who had rather despoiled their subjects than\ngoverned them, and given them more cause for disunion than for union,\nso that the province was a prey to robbery, assaults, and every kind\nof disorder. He, therefore, judged it necessary to give them a good\ngovernment in order to make them peaceful and obedient to his rule.\nFor this purpose he appointed Messer Remiro d' Orco, a cruel and able\nman, to whom he gave the fullest authority. This man, in a short time,\nwas highly successful in rendering the country orderly and united,\nwhereupon the duke, not deeming such excessive authority expedient,\nlest it should become hateful, appointed a civil court of justice in\nthe middle of the province under an excellent president, to which each\ncity appointed its own advocate. And as he knew that the harshness of\nthe past had engendered some amount of hatred, in order to purge the\nminds of the people and to win them over completely, he resolved to\nshow that if any cruelty had taken place it was not by his orders, but\nthrough the harsh disposition of his minister. And taking him on some\npretext, he had him placed one morning in the public square at Cesena,\ncut in half, with a piece of wood and blood-stained knife by his side.\nThe ferocity of this spectacle caused the people both satisfaction and\namazement. But to return to where we left off.\n\nThe duke being now powerful and partly secured against present perils,\nbeing armed himself, and having in a great measure put down those\nneighbouring forces which might injure him, had now to get the respect\nof France, if he wished to proceed with his acquisitions, for he\nknew that the king, who had lately discovered his error, would not\ngive him any help. He began therefore to seek fresh alliances and to\nvacillate with France in the expedition that the French made towards\nthe kingdom of Naples against the Spaniards, who were besieging Gaeta.\nHis intention was to assure himself of them, which he would soon have\nsucceeded in doing if Alexander had lived. These were the measures\ntaken by him with regard to the present. As to the future, he feared\nthat a new successor to the Church might not be friendly to him and\nmight seek to deprive him of what Alexander had given him, and he\nsought to provide against this in four ways. Firstly, by destroying all\nwho were of the blood of those ruling families which he had despoiled,\nin order to deprive the pope of any opportunity. Secondly, by gaining\nthe friendship of the Roman nobles, so that he might through them hold\nas it were the pope in check. Thirdly, by obtaining as great a hold on\nthe College as he could. Fourthly, by acquiring such power before the\npope died as to be able to resist alone the first onslaught. Of these\nfour things he had at the death of Alexander accomplished three, and\nthe fourth he had almost accomplished.\n\nFor of the dispossessed rulers he killed as many as he could lay hands\non, and very few escaped; he had gained to his party the Roman nobles;\nand he had a great share in the College. As to new possessions, he\ndesigned to become lord of Tuscany, and already possessed Perugia and\nPiombino, and had assumed the protectorate over Pisa; and as he had\nno longer to fear the French (for the French had been deprived of the\nkingdom of Naples by the Spaniards in such a way that both parties\nwere obliged to buy his friendship) he seized Pisa. After this, Lucca\nand Siena at once yielded, partly through envy of the Florentines and\npartly through fear; the Florentines had no resources, so that, had he\nsucceeded as he had done before, in the very year that Alexander died\nhe would have gained such strength and renown as to be able to maintain\nhimself without depending on the fortunes or strength of others, but\nsolely by his own power and ability. But Alexander died five years\nafter he had first drawn his sword. He left him with the state of\nRomagna only firmly established, and all the other schemes in mid-air,\nbetween two very powerful and hostile armies, and suffering from a\nfatal illness. But the valour and ability of the duke were such, and\nhe knew so well how to win over men or vanquish them, and so strong\nwere the foundations that he had laid in this short time, that if he\nhad not had those two armies upon him, or else had been in good health,\nhe would have survived every difficulty. And that his foundations were\ngood is seen from the fact that the Romagna waited for him more than a\nmonth; in Rome, although half dead, he remained secure, and although\nthe Baglioni, Vitelli, and Orsini entered Rome they found no followers\nagainst him. He was able, if not to make pope whom he wished, at any\nrate to prevent a pope being created whom he did not wish. But if at\nthe death of Alexander he had been well everything would have been\neasy. And he told me on the day that Pope Julius II. was created,\nthat he had thought of everything which might happen on the death of\nhis father, and provided against everything, except that he had never\nthought that at his father's death he would be dying himself. Reviewing\nthus all the actions of the duke, I find nothing to blame, on the\ncontrary, I feel bound, as I have done, to hold him up as an example\nto be imitated by all who by fortune and with the arms of others have\nrisen to power. For with his great courage and high ambition he could\nnot have acted otherwise, and his designs were only frustrated by the\nshort life of Alexander and his own illness.\n\nWhoever, therefore, deems it necessary in his new principality to\nsecure himself against enemies, to gain friends, to conquer by force\nor fraud, to make himself beloved and feared by the people, followed\nand reverenced by the soldiers, to destroy those who can and may injure\nhim, introduce innovations into old customs, to be severe and kind,\nmagnanimous and liberal, suppress the old militia, create a new one,\nmaintain the friendship of kings and princes in such a way that they\nare glad to benefit him and fear to injure him, such a one can find no\nbetter example than the actions of this man. The only thing he can be\naccused of is that in the creation of Julius II. he made a bad choice;\nfor, as has been said, not being able to choose his own pope, he could\nstill prevent any one being made pope, and he ought never to have\npermitted any of those cardinals to be raised to the papacy whom he had\ninjured, or who when pope would stand in fear of him. For men commit\ninjuries either through fear or through hate.\n\nThose whom he had injured were, among others, San Pietro ad Vincula,\nColonna, San Giorgio, and Ascanio. All the others, if assumed to the\npontificate, would have had to fear him except Rohan and the Spaniards;\nthe latter through their relationship and obligations to him, the\nformer from his great power, being related to the King of France.\nFor these reasons the duke ought above all things to have created a\nSpaniard pope; and if unable to, then he should have consented to Rohan\nbeing appointed and not San Pietro ad Vincula. And whoever thinks that\nin high personages new benefits cause old offences to be forgotten,\nmakes a great mistake. The duke, therefore, erred in this choice, and\nit was the cause of his ultimate ruin.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\n\nOF THOSE WHO HAVE ATTAINED THE POSITION OF PRINCE BY VILLAINY\n\n\nBut as there are still two ways of becoming prince which cannot be\nattributed entirely either to fortune or to ability, they must not be\npassed over, although one of them could be more fully discussed if we\nwere treating of republics. These are when one becomes prince by some\nnefarious or villainous means, or when a private citizen becomes the\nprince of his country through the favour of his fellow-citizens. And in\nspeaking of the former means, I will give two examples, one ancient,\nthe other modern, without entering further into the merits of this\nmethod, as I judge them to be sufficient for any one obliged to imitate\nthem. Agathocles the Sicilian rose not only from private life but from\nthe lowest and most abject position to be King of Syracuse. The son\nof a potter, he led a life of the utmost wickedness through all the\nstages of his fortune. Nevertheless, his wickedness was accompanied\nby such vigour of mind and body that, having joined the militia, he\nrose through all its grades to be pr\u00e6tor of Syracuse. Having been\nappointed to this position, and having decided to become prince, and\nto hold with violence and without the support of others that which\nhad been granted him; and having imparted his design to Hamilcar the\nCarthaginian, who with his armies was fighting in Sicily, he called\ntogether one morning the people and senate of Syracuse, as if he had\nto deliberate on matters of importance to the republic, and at a given\nsignal had all the senators and the richest men of the people killed by\nhis soldiers; after their death he occupied and held rule over the city\nwithout any civil disorders. And although he was twice beaten by the\nCarthaginians and ultimately besieged, he was able not only to defend\nthe city, but leaving a portion of his forces for its defence, with the\nremainder he invaded Africa, and in a short time liberated Syracuse\nfrom the siege and brought the Carthaginians to great extremities, so\nthat they were obliged to come to terms with him, and remain contented\nwith the possession of Africa, leaving Sicily to Agathocles. Whoever\nconsiders, therefore, the actions and qualities of this man, will see\nfew if any things which can be attributed to fortune; for, as above\nstated, it was not by the favour of any person, but through the grades\nof the militia, which he had gained with a thousand hardships and\nperils, that he arrived at the position of prince, which he afterwards\nmaintained by so many courageous and perilous expedients. It cannot be\ncalled a virtue to kill one's fellow-citizens, betray one's friends,\nbe without faith, without pity, and without religion, by which methods\none may indeed gain an empire, but not glory. For if the virtues of\nAgathocles in braving and overcoming perils, and his greatness of soul\nin supporting and surmounting obstacles be considered, one sees no\nreason for holding him inferior to any of the most renowned captains.\nNevertheless his barbarous cruelty and inhumanity, together with his\ncountless atrocities, do not permit of his being named among the\nmost famous men. We cannot attribute to fortune or merit that which\nhe achieved without either. In our own times, during the reign of\nAlexander VI., Oliverotto du Fermo had been left a young boy under the\ncare of his maternal uncle, Giovanni Fogliani, who brought him up, and\nsent him in early youth to fight under Paolo Vitelli, in order that he\nmight, under that discipline, obtain a good military position. On the\ndeath of Paolo he fought under his brother Vitellozzo, and in a very\nshort time, being of great intelligence, and active in mind and body,\nhe became one of the leaders of his troops. But deeming it servile to\nbe under others, he resolved, with the help of some citizens of Fermo,\nwho preferred servitude to the liberty of their country, and with the\nfavour of the Vitellis, to occupy Fermo; he therefore wrote to Giovanni\nFogliani, how, having been for many years away from home, he wished\nto come to see him and his city, and in some measure to revisit his\nestates. And as he had only laboured to gain honour, in order that\nhis fellow-citizens might see that he had not spent his time in vain,\nhe wished to come honourably accompanied by one hundred horsemen, his\nfriends and followers, and prayed him that he would be pleased to\norder that he should be received with honour by the citizens of Fermo,\nby which he would honour not only him, Oliverotto, but also himself,\nas he had been his pupil. Giovanni did not fail in any duty towards\nhis nephew; he caused him to be honourably received by the people of\nFermo, and lodged him in his own houses. After waiting some days to\narrange all that was necessary to his villainous projects, Oliverotto\ninvited Giovanni Fogliani and all the principal men of Fermo to a\ngrand banquet. After the dinner and the entertainments usual at such\nfeasts, Oliverotto artfully introduced certain important matters of\ndiscussion, speaking of the greatness of Pope Alexander, and of his\nson Cesare, and of their enterprises. To which discourses Giovanni\nand others having replied, he all at once rose, saying that these\nmatters should be spoken of in a more secret place, and withdrew into\na room where Giovanni and the other citizens followed him. They were\nno sooner seated than soldiers rushed out of hiding-places and killed\nGiovanni and all the others. After which massacre Oliverotto mounted\nhis horse, rode through the town and besieged the chief magistrate in\nhis palace, so that through fear they were obliged to obey him and form\na government, of which he made himself prince. And all those being\ndead who, if discontented, could injure him, he fortified himself\nwith new orders, civil and military, in such a way that within the\nyear that he held the principality he was not only safe himself in\nthe city of Fermo, but had become formidable to all his neighbours.\nAnd his overthrow would have been difficult, like that of Agathocles,\nif he had not allowed himself to be deceived by Cesare Borgia, when\nhe besieged the Orsinis and Vitellis at Sinigaglia, as already\nrelated, where he also was taken, one year after the parricide he had\ncommitted, and strangled, together with Vitellozzo, who had been his\nteacher in ability and atrocity. Some may wonder how it came about\nthat Agathocles, and others like him, could, after infinite treachery\nand cruelty, live secure for many years in their country and defend\nthemselves from external enemies without being conspired against by\ntheir subjects; although many others have, through their cruelty, been\nunable to maintain their position in times of peace, not to speak of\nthe uncertain times of war.\n\nI believe this arises from the cruelties being used well or badly.\nWell used may be called those (if it is permissible to use the word\nwell of evil) which are committed once for the need of securing one's\nself, and which afterwards are not persisted in, but are exchanged for\nmeasures as useful to the subjects as possible. Cruelties ill used\nare those which, although at first few, increase rather than diminish\nwith time. Those who follow the former method may remedy in some\nmeasure their condition, both with God and man; as did Agathocles.\nAs to the others, it is impossible for them to maintain themselves.\nWhence it is to be noted, that in taking a state the conqueror must\narrange to commit all his cruelties at once, so as not to have to recur\nto them every day, and so as to be able, by not making fresh changes,\nto reassure people and win them over by benefiting them. Whoever acts\notherwise, either through timidity or bad counsels, is always obliged\nto stand with knife in hand, and can never depend on his subjects,\nbecause they, through continually fresh injuries, are unable to depend\nupon him. For injuries should be done all together, so that being less\ntasted, they will give less offence. Benefits should be granted little\nby little, so that they may be better enjoyed. And above all, a prince\nmust live with his subjects in such a way that no accident should make\nhim change it, for good or evil; for necessity arising in adverse\ntimes, you are not in time with severity, and the good that you do does\nnot profit you, as it is judged to be forced, and you will derive no\nbenefit whatever from it.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\n\nOF THE CIVIC PRINCIPALITY\n\n\nBut we now come to the case where a citizen becomes prince not\nthrough crime or intolerable violence, but by the favour of his\nfellow-citizens, which may be called a civic principality. To arrive\nat this position depends not entirely on worth or entirely on fortune,\nbut rather on cunning assisted by fortune. One attains it by help of\npopular favour or by the favour of the aristocracy. For in every city\nthese two opposite parties are to be found, arising from the desire\nof the populace to avoid the oppression of the great, and the desire\nof the great to command and oppress the people. And from these two\nopposing interests arises in the city one of three effects: either\nabsolute government, liberty, or license. The former is created either\nby the populace or the nobility depending on the relative opportunities\nof the two parties; for when the nobility see that they are unable to\nresist the people they unite in creating one of their number prince,\nso as to be able to carry out their own designs under the shadow of\nhis authority. The populace, on the other hand, when unable to resist\nthe nobility, endeavour to create a prince in order to be protected\nby his authority. He who becomes prince by help of the nobility has\ngreater difficulty in maintaining his power than he who is raised by\nthe populace, for he is surrounded by those who think themselves his\nequals, and is thus unable to direct or command as he pleases. But one\nwho is raised to the leadership by popular favour finds himself alone,\nand has no one or very few who are not ready to obey him. Besides\nwhich, it is impossible to satisfy the nobility by fair dealing and\nwithout inflicting injury on others, whereas it is very easy to satisfy\nthe mass of the people in this way. For the aim of the people is more\nhonest than that of the nobility, the latter desiring to oppress, and\nthe former merely to avoid oppression. It must also be added that the\nprince can never insure himself against a hostile populace on account\nof their number, but he can against the hostility of the great, as\nthey are but few. The worst that a prince has to expect from a hostile\npeople is to be abandoned, but from hostile nobles he has to fear not\nonly abandonment but their active opposition, and as they are more\nfarseeing and more cunning, they are always in time to save themselves\nand take sides with the one who they expect will conquer. The prince\nis, moreover, obliged to live always with the same people, but he can\neasily do without the same nobility, being able to make and unmake them\nat any time, and increase their position or deprive them of it as he\npleases. And to throw further light on this part, I would say, that the\nnobles are to be considered in two different manners; that is, they are\neither to be ruled so as to make them entirely depend on your fortunes,\nor else not. Those that are thus bound to you and are not rapacious,\nmust be honoured and loved; those who are not bound must be considered\nin two ways, they either do this through pusillanimity and natural\nwant of courage, and in this case you ought to make use of them, and\nespecially such as are of good counsel, so that they may honour you in\nprosperity and in adversity you have not to fear them. But when they\nare not bound to you of set purpose and for ambitious ends, it is a\nsign that they think more of themselves than of you; and from such men\nthe prince must guard himself and look upon them as secret enemies,\nwho will help to ruin him when in adversity. One, however, who becomes\nprince by favour of the populace, must maintain its friendship, which\nhe will find easy, the people asking nothing but not to be oppressed.\nBut one who against the people's wishes becomes prince by favour of\nthe nobles, should above all endeavour to gain the favour of the\npeople; this will be easy to him if he protects them. And as men, who\nreceive good from those they expected evil from, feel under a greater\nobligation to their benefactor, so the subject populace will become\neven better disposed towards him than if he had become prince through\ntheir favour. The prince can win their favour in many ways, which vary\naccording to circumstances, for which no certain rule can be given, and\nwill therefore be passed over.\n\nI will only say, in conclusion, that it is necessary for a prince to\npossess the friendship of the people; otherwise he has no resource in\ntimes of adversity. Nabis, prince of the Spartans, sustained a siege by\nthe whole of Greece and a victorious Roman army, and defended against\nthem his country and maintained his own position. It sufficed when the\ndanger arose for him to make sure of a few, which would not have been\nenough if the populace had been hostile to him. And let no one oppose\nmy opinion in this by quoting the trite proverb, \"He who builds on the\npeople, builds on mud\"; because that is true when a private citizen\nrelies upon the people and persuades himself that they will liberate\nhim if he is oppressed by enemies or by the magistrates; in this case\nhe might often find himself deceived, as happened in Rome to the\nGracchi and in Florence to Messer Georgio Scali.\n\nBut when it is a prince who founds himself on this basis, one who\ncan command and is a man of courage, and does not get frightened in\nadversity, and does not neglect other preparations, and one who by his\nown courage and measures animates the mass of the people, he will not\nfind himself deceived by them, and he will find that he has laid his\nfoundations well. Usually these principalities are in danger when the\nprince from the position of a civil ruler changes to an absolute one,\nfor these princes either command themselves or by means of magistrates.\nIn the latter case their position is weaker and more dangerous, for\nthey are at the mercy of those citizens who are appointed magistrates,\nwho can, especially in times of adversity, with great facility deprive\nthem of their position, either by acting against them or by not obeying\nthem. The prince is not in time, in such dangers, to assume absolute\nauthority, for the citizens and subjects who are accustomed to take\ntheir orders from the magistrates are not ready in these emergencies\nto obey his, and he will always in doubtful times lack men whom he can\nrely on. Such a prince cannot base himself on what he sees in quiet\ntimes, when the citizens have need of the state; for then every one is\nfull of promises and each one is ready to die for him when death is\nfar off; but in adversity, when the state has need of citizens, then\nhe will find but few. And this experience is the more dangerous, in\nthat it can only be had once. Therefore a wise prince will seek means\nby which his subjects will always and in every possible condition\nof things have need of his government, and then they will always be\nfaithful to him.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X\n\n\nHOW THE STRENGTH OF ALL STATES SHOULD BE MEASURED\n\n\nIn examining the character of these principalities it is necessary to\nconsider another point, namely, whether the prince has such a position\nas to be able in case of need to maintain himself alone, or whether he\nhas always need of the protection of others. The better to explain this\nI would say, that I consider those capable of maintaining themselves\nalone who can, through abundance of men or money, put together a\nsufficient army, and hold the field against any one who assails them;\nand I consider to have need of others, those who cannot take the\nfield against their enemies, but are obliged to take refuge within\ntheir walls and stand on the defensive. We have already discussed the\nformer case and will speak in future of it as occasion arises. In\nthe second case there is nothing to be said except to encourage such\na prince to provision and fortify his own town, and not to trouble\nabout the country. And whoever has strongly fortified his town and,\nas regards the government of his subjects, has proceeded as we have\nalready described and will further relate, will be attacked with great\nreluctance, for men are always averse to enterprises in which they\nforesee difficulties, and it can never appear easy to attack one who\nhas his town well guarded and is not hated by the people. The cities\nof Germany are extremely liberal, have little surrounding country, and\nobey the emperor when they choose, and they do not fear him or any\nother potentate that they have about them. They are fortified in such\na manner that every one thinks that to reduce them would be tedious\nand difficult, for they all have the necessary moats and bastions,\nsufficient artillery, and always keep in the public storehouses food\nand drink and fuel for one year. Beyond which, to keep the lower\nclasses satisfied, and without loss to the public, they have always\nenough means to give them work for one year in these employments which\nform the nerve and life of the town, and in the industries by which the\nlower classes live; military exercises are still held in reputation,\nand many regulations are in force for maintaining them. A prince,\ntherefore, who possesses a strong city and does not make himself hated,\ncannot be assaulted; and if he were to be so, the assailant would\nbe obliged to retire shamefully; for so many things change, that it\nis almost impossible for any one to hold the field for a year with\nhis armies idle. And to those who urge that the people, having their\npossessions outside and seeing them burnt, will not have patience, and\nthe long siege and self-interest will make them forget their prince,\nI reply that a powerful and courageous prince will always overcome\nthose difficulties by now raising the hopes of his subjects that the\nevils will not last long, now impressing them with fear of the enemy's\ncruelty, now by dextrously assuring himself of those who appear too\nbold. Besides which, the enemy would naturally burn and ruin the\ncountry on first arriving and in the time when men's minds are still\nhot and eager to defend themselves, and therefore the prince has still\nless to fear, for after some days, when people have cooled down, the\ndamage is done, the evil has been suffered, and there is no remedy, so\nthat they are the more ready to unite with their prince, as it appears\nthat he is under an obligation to them, their houses having been burnt\nand their possessions ruined in his defence.\n\nIt is the nature of men to be as much bound by the benefits that they\nconfer as by those they receive. From which it follows that, everything\nconsidered, a prudent prince will not find it difficult to uphold the\ncourage of his subjects both at the commencement and during a state of\nsiege, if he possesses provisions and means to defend himself.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI\n\n\nOF ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES\n\n\nIt now remains to us only to speak of ecclesiastical principalities,\nwith regard to which the difficulties lie wholly before they are\npossessed. They are acquired either by ability or by fortune; but\nare maintained without either, for they are sustained by the ancient\nreligious customs, which are so powerful and of such quality, that they\nkeep their princes in power in whatever manner they proceed and live.\nThese alone have a state without defending it, have subjects without\ngoverning them, and the states, not being defended, are not taken from\nthem; the subjects not being governed do not disturb themselves, and\nneither think of nor are capable of alienating themselves from them.\nOnly these principalities, therefore, are secure and happy. But as they\nare upheld by higher causes, which the human mind cannot attain to, I\nwill abstain from speaking of them; for being exalted and maintained by\nGod, it would be the work of a presumptuous and foolish man to discuss\nthem.\n\nHowever, I might be asked how it has come about that the Church has\nreached such great temporal power, when, previous to Alexander VI.,\nthe Italian potentates,--and not merely the really powerful ones, but\nevery lord or baron, however insignificant, held it in slight esteem\nas regards temporal power; whereas now it is dreaded by a king of\nFrance, whom it has been able to drive out of Italy, and has also been\nable to ruin the Venetians. Therefore, although this is well known, I\ndo not think it superfluous to call it to mind. Before Charles, King\nof France, came into Italy, this country was under the rule of the\npope, the Venetians, the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and the\nFlorentines. These potentates had to have two chief cares: one, that no\nforeigner should enter Italy by force of arms, the other that none of\nthe existing governments should extend its dominions. Those chiefly to\nbe watched were the pope and the Venetians. To keep back the Venetians\nrequired the ruin of all the others, as in the defence of Ferrara,\nand to keep down the pope they made use of the Roman barons. These\nwere divided into two factions, the Orsinis and the Colonnas, and as\nthere was constant quarrelling between them, and they were constantly\nunder arms, before the eyes of the pope, they kept the papacy weak and\ninfirm. And although there arose now and then a resolute pope like\nSextus, yet his fortune or ability was never able to liberate him from\nthese evils. The shortness of their life was the reason of this, for\nin the course of ten years which, as a general rule, a pope lived, he\nhad great difficulty in suppressing even one of the factions, and if,\nfor example, a pope had almost put down the Colonnas, a new pope would\nsucceed who was hostile to the Orsinis, which caused the Colonnas to\nspring up again, and he was not in time to suppress them. This caused\nthe temporal power of the pope to be of little esteem in Italy.\n\nThen arose Alexander VI. who of all the pontiffs who have ever\nreigned, best showed how a pope might prevail both by money and by\nforce. With Duke Valentine as his instrument, and on the occasion of\nthe French invasion, he did all that I have previously described\nin speaking of the actions of the duke. And although his object was\nto aggrandise not the Church but the duke, what he did resulted in\nthe aggrandisement of the Church, which after the death of the duke\nbecame the heir of his labours. Then came Pope Julius, who found\nthe Church powerful, possessing all Romagna, all the Roman barons\nsuppressed, and the factions destroyed by the severity of Alexander.\nHe also found the way open for accumulating wealth in ways never used\nbefore the time of Alexander. These measures were not only followed\nby Julius, but increased; he resolved to gain Bologna, put down the\nVenetians and drive the French from Italy, in all which enterprises\nhe was successful. He merits the greater praise, as he did everything\nto increase the power of the Church and not of any private person. He\nalso kept the Orsini and Colonna parties in the conditions in which he\nfound them, and although there were some leaders among them who might\nhave made changes, there were two things that kept them steady: one,\nthe greatness of the Church, which they dreaded; the other, the fact\nthat they had no cardinals, who are the origin of the tumults among\nthem. For these parties are never at rest when they have cardinals,\nfor these stir up the parties both within Rome and outside, and the\nbarons are forced to defend them. Thus from the ambitions of prelates\narise the discords and tumults among the barons. His holiness, Pope Leo\nX., therefore, has found the pontificate in a very powerful condition,\nfrom which it is hoped, that as those popes made it great by force of\narmies, so he through his goodness and infinite other virtues will make\nit both great and venerated.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII\n\n\nTHE DIFFERENT KINDS OF MILITIA AND MERCENARY SOLDIERS\n\n\nHaving now discussed fully the qualities of these principalities of\nwhich I proposed to treat, and partially considered the causes of their\nprosperity or failure, and having also showed the methods by which\nmany have sought to obtain such states, it now remains for me to treat\ngenerally of the methods of attack and defence that can be used in\neach of them. We have said already how necessary it is for a prince\nto have his foundations good, otherwise he is certain to be ruined.\nThe chief foundations of all states, whether new, old, or mixed, are\ngood laws and good arms. And as there cannot be good laws where there\nare not good arms, and where there are good arms there should be good\nlaws, I will not now discuss the laws, but will speak of the arms. I\nsay, therefore, that the arms by which a prince defends his possessions\nare either his own, or else mercenaries, or auxiliaries, or mixed. The\nmercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous, and if any one\nkeeps his state based on the arms of mercenaries, he will never stand\nfirm or sure, as they are disunited, ambitious, without discipline,\nfaithless, bold amongst friends, cowardly amongst enemies, they have no\nfear of God, and keep no faith with men. Ruin is only deferred as long\nas the assault is postponed; in peace you are despoiled by them, and in\nwar by the enemy. The cause of this is that they have no love or other\nmotive to keep them in the field beyond a trifling wage, which is not\nenough to make them ready to die for you. They are quite willing to be\nyour soldiers so long as you do not make war, but when war comes, it is\neither fly or be off. I ought to have little trouble in proving this,\nsince the ruin of Italy is now caused by nothing else but through her\nhaving relied for many years on mercenary arms. These were somewhat\nimproved in a few cases, and appeared courageous among themselves, but\nwhen the foreigner came they showed their worthlessness. Thus it came\nabout that King Charles of France was allowed to take Italy without the\nslightest trouble, and those who said that it was owing to our sins,\nspoke the truth, but it was not the sins that they believed but those\nthat I have related. And as it was the sins of princes, they too have\nsuffered the punishment. I will explain more fully the defects of these\narms. Mercenary captains are either very capable men or not; if they\nare, you cannot rely upon them, for they will always aspire to their\nown greatness, either by oppressing you, their master, or by oppressing\nothers against your intentions; but if the captain is not an able man,\nhe will generally ruin you. And if it is replied to this, that whoever\nhas armed forces will do the same, whether these are mercenary or not,\nI would reply that as armies are to be used either by a prince or by a\nrepublic, the prince must go in person to take the position of captain,\nand the republic must send its own citizens. If the one sent turns\nout incompetent, it must change him; and if capable, keep him by law\nfrom going beyond the proper limits. And it is seen by experience that\nonly princes and armed republics make very great progress, whereas\nmercenary forces do nothing but damage, and also an armed republic\nsubmits less easily to the rule of one of its citizens than a republic\narmed by foreign forces. Rome and Sparta were for many centuries well\narmed and free. The Swiss are well armed and enjoy great freedom. As an\nexample of mercenary armies in antiquity there are the Carthaginians,\nwho were oppressed by their mercenary soldiers, after the termination\nof the first war with the Romans, even while they still had their own\ncitizens as captains. Philip of Macedon was made captain of their\nforces by the Thebans after the death of Epaminondas, and after gaining\nthe victory he deprived them of liberty. The Milanese, on the death\nof Duke Philip, hired Francesco Sforza against the Venetians, who\nhaving overcome the enemy at Caravaggio, allied himself with them to\noppress the Milanese his employers. The father of this Sforza, being\na soldier in the service of the Queen Giovanna of Naples, left her\nsuddenly unarmed, by which she was compelled, in order not to lose the\nkingdom, to throw herself into the arms of the King of Aragon. And\nif the Venetians and Florentines have in times past increased their\ndominions by means of such forces, and their captains have not made\nthemselves princes but have defended them, I reply that the Florentines\nin this case have been favoured by chance, for of the capable leaders\nwhom they might have feared, some did not conquer, some met with\nopposition, and others directed their ambition elsewhere. The one who\ndid not conquer was Sir John Hawkwood, whose fidelity could not be\nknown as he was not victorious, but every one will admit that, had he\nconquered, the Florentines would have been at his mercy. Sforza had\nalways the Bracceschi against him, they being constantly at enmity.\nFrancesco directed his ambition towards Lombardy; Braccio against the\nChurch and the kingdom of Naples. But let us look at what followed a\nshort time ago. The Florentines appointed Paolo Vitelli their captain,\na man of great prudence, who had risen from a private station to the\nhighest reputation. If he had taken Pisa no one can deny that it was\nhighly important for the Florentines to retain his friendship, because\nhad he become the soldier of their enemies they would have had no\nmeans of opposing him; and in order to retain him they would have been\nobliged to obey him. As to the Venetians, if one considers the progress\nthey made, it will be seen that they acted surely and gloriously so\nlong as they made war with their own forces; that it was before they\ncommenced their enterprises on land that they fought courageously with\ntheir own gentlemen and armed populace, but when they began to fight\non land they abandoned this virtue, and began to follow the Italian\ncustom. And at the commencement of their land conquests they had not\nmuch to fear from their captains, their land possessions not being\nvery large, and their reputation being great, but as their possessions\nincreased, as they did under Carmagnola, they had an example of their\nmistake. For seeing that he was very powerful, after he had defeated\nthe Duke of Milan, and knowing, on the other hand, that he was not\nenterprising in warfare, they considered that they would not make any\nmore conquests with him, and they neither would nor could dismiss him,\nfor fear of losing what they had already gained. They were therefore\nobliged, in order to make sure of him, to have him killed. They then\nhad for captains Bartolommeo da Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino, Count\ndi Pitigliano, and such like, from whom they had to fear loss instead\nof gain, as happened subsequently at Vail\u00e0, where in one day they lost\nwhat they had laboriously gained in eight hundred years; for with these\nforces, only slow and trifling acquisitions are made, but sudden and\nmiraculous losses. And as I have cited these examples from Italy,\nwhich has now for many years been governed by mercenary forces, I will\nnow deal more largely with them, so that having seen their origin and\nprogress, they can be better remedied. You must understand that in\nthese latter times, as soon as the empire began to be repudiated in\nItaly and the pope to gain greater reputation in temporal matters,\nItaly was divided into many states; many of the principal cities took\nup arms against their nobles, who, favoured by the emperor, had held\nthem in subjection, and the Church encouraged this in order to increase\nits temporal power. In many other cities one of the inhabitants became\nprince. Thus Italy having fallen almost entirely into the hands of\nthe Church and a few republics, and the priests and other citizens\nnot being accustomed to bear arms, they began to hire foreigners as\nsoldiers. The first to bring reputation for this kind of militia was\nAlberigo da Como, a native of Romagna. The discipline of this man\nproduced, among others, Braccio and Sforza, who were in their day the\narbiters of Italy. After these came all those others who up to the\npresent day have commanded the armies of Italy, and the result of their\nprowess has been that Italy has been overrun by Charles, preyed on by\nLouis, tyrannised over by Ferrando, and insulted by the Swiss. The\nsystem adopted by them was, in the first place, to increase their own\nreputation by discrediting the infantry. They did this because, as they\nhad no country and lived on their earnings, a few foot soldiers did not\naugment their reputation, and they could not maintain a large number\nand therefore they restricted themselves almost entirely to cavalry,\nby which with a smaller number they were well paid and honoured. They\nreduced things to such a state that in an army of 20,000 soldiers there\nwere not 2000 foot. They had also used every means to spare themselves\nand the soldiers any hardship or fear by not killing each other in\ntheir encounters, but taking prisoners without a blow. They made no\nattacks on fortifications by night; and those in the fortifications did\nnot attack the tents at night, they made no stockades on ditches round\ntheir camps, and did not take the field in winter. All these things\nwere permitted by their military rules, and adopted, as we have said,\nto avoid trouble and danger, so that they have reduced Italy to slavery\nand degradation.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII\n\n\nOF AUXILIARY, MIXED, AND NATIVE TROOPS\n\n\nAuxiliary forces, which are the other kind of useless forces, are\nwhen one calls on a potentate to come and aid one with his troops, as\nwas done in recent times by Julius, who seeing the wretched failure\nof his mercenary forces, in his Ferrara enterprise, had recourse to\nauxiliaries, and arranged with Ferrando, King of Spain, that he should\nhelp him with his armies. These forces may be good in themselves, but\nthey are always dangerous for those who borrow them, for if they lose\nyou are defeated, and if they conquer you remain their prisoner. And\nalthough ancient history is full of examples of this, I will not depart\nfrom the example of Pope Julius II., which is still fresh. Nothing\ncould be less prudent than the course he adopted; for, wishing to take\nFerrara, he put himself entirely into the power of a foreigner. But\nby good fortune there arose a third cause which prevented him reaping\nthe effects of his bad choice; for when his auxiliaries were beaten\nat Ravenna, the Swiss rose up and drove back the victors, against all\nexpectation of himself or others, so that he was not taken prisoner by\nthe enemy which had fled, nor by his own auxiliaries, having conquered\nby other arms than theirs. The Florentines, being totally disarmed,\nhired 10,000 Frenchmen to attack Pisa, by which measure they ran\ngreater risk than at any period of their struggles. The emperor of\nConstantinople, to oppose his neighbours, put 10,000 Turks into Greece,\nwho after the war would not go away again, which was the beginning of\nthe servitude of Greece to the infidels. Any one, therefore, who wishes\nnot to conquer, would do well to use these forces, which are much more\ndangerous than mercenaries, as with them ruin is complete, for they\nare all united, and owe obedience to others, whereas with mercenaries,\nwhen they have conquered, it requires more time and a good opportunity\nfor them to injure you, as they do not form a single body and have been\nengaged and paid by you, therefore a third party that you have made\nleader cannot at once acquire enough authority to be able to injure\nyou. In a word, the greatest dangers with mercenaries lies in their\ncowardice and reluctance to fight, but with auxiliaries the danger\nlies in their courage. A wise prince, therefore, always avoids these\nforces and has recourse to his own, and would prefer rather to lose\nwith his own men than conquer with the forces of others, not deeming\nit a true victory which is gained by foreign arms. I never hesitate to\ncite the example of Cesare Borgia and his actions. This duke entered\nRomagna with auxiliary troops, leading forces composed entirely of\nFrench soldiers, and with these he took Imola and Forli; but as they\nseemed unsafe, he had recourse to mercenaries, and hired the Orsini and\nVitelli; afterwards finding these uncertain to handle, unfaithful and\ndangerous, he suppressed them, and relied upon his own men. And the\ndifference between these forces can be easily seen if one considers\nthe difference between the reputation of the duke when he had only the\nFrench, when he had the Orsini and Vitelli, and when he had to rely\non himself and his own soldiers. His reputation will be found to have\nconstantly increased, and he was never so highly esteemed as when\nevery one saw that he was the sole master of his forces.\n\nI do not wish to go away from recent Italian instances, but I cannot\nomit Hiero of Syracuse, whom I have already mentioned. This man being,\nas I said, made head of the army by the Syracusans, immediately\nrecognised the uselessness of that mercenary militia which was composed\nlike our Italian mercenary troops, and as he thought it unsafe\neither to retain them or dismiss them, he had them cut in pieces and\nthenceforward made war with his own arms and not those of others. I\nwould also call to mind a figure out of the Old Testament which well\nillustrates this point. When David offered to Saul to go and fight with\nthe Philistine champion Goliath, Saul, to encourage him, armed him\nwith his own arms, which when David had tried on he refused saying,\nthat with them he could not fight so well; he preferred, therefore,\nto face the enemy with his own sling and knife. In short, the arms of\nothers either fall away from you, or overburden you, or else impede\nyou. Charles VIII., father of King Louis XL, having through good\nfortune and bravery liberated France from the English, recognised this\nnecessity of being armed with his own forces, and established in his\nkingdom a system of men-at-arms and infantry. Afterwards King Louis\nhis son abolished the infantry and began to hire Swiss, which mistake\nbeing followed by others is, as may now be seen, a cause of danger to\nthat kingdom. For by giving such reputation to the Swiss, France has\ndisheartened all her own troops, the infantry having been abolished and\nthe men-at-arms being obliged to foreigners for assistance; for being\naccustomed to fight with Swiss troops, they think they cannot conquer\nwithout them. Whence it comes that the French are insufficiently strong\nto oppose the Swiss, and without the aid of the Swiss they will not\nventure against others. The armies of the French are thus of a mixed\nkind, partly mercenary and partly her own; taken together they are much\nbetter than troops entirely composed of mercenaries or auxiliaries, but\nmuch inferior to national forces.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV\n\n\nWHAT THE DUTIES OF A PRINCE ARE WITH REGARD TO THE MILITIA\n\n\nA Prince should therefore have no other aim or thought, nor take up\nany other thing for his study, but war and its order and discipline,\nfor that is the only art that is necessary to one who commands, and\nit is of such virtue that it not only maintains those who are born\nprinces, but often enables men of private fortune to attain to that\nrank. And one sees, on the other hand, that when princes think more of\nluxury than of arms, they lose their state. The chief cause which makes\nany one lose it, is the contempt of this art, and the way to acquire\nit is to be well versed in the same. Francesco Sforza, through being\nwell armed, became, from a private position, Duke of Milan; his sons,\nthrough wishing to avoid the fatigue and hardship of war, from dukes\nbecame private persons. For among other evils caused by being disarmed,\nit renders you contemptible; which is one of those disgraceful things\nwhich a prince must guard against, as will be explained later. Because\nthere is no comparison whatever between an armed man and a disarmed\none; it is not reasonable to suppose that one who is armed will obey\nwillingly one who is unarmed; or that any unarmed man will remain\nsafe among armed servants. For one being disdainful and the other\nsuspicious, it is not possible for them to act well together. And\nyet a prince who is ignorant of military matters, besides the other\nmisfortunes already mentioned, cannot be esteemed by his soldiers, nor\nhave confidence in them. He ought, therefore, never to let his thoughts\nstray from the exercise of war; and in peace he ought to practise it\nmore than in war, which he can do in two ways: both by action and by\nstudy. As to action, he must, besides keeping his men well disciplined\nand exercised, engage continually in hunting, and thus accustom his\nbody to hardships; and on the other hand learn the nature of the\nland, how the mountains rise, how the valleys are disposed, where the\nplains lie, and understand the nature of the rivers and swamps, and\nto this he should devote great attention. This knowledge is useful in\ntwo ways. In the first place, one learns to know one's country, and\ncan the better see how to defend it. Then by means of the knowledge\nand experience gained in one locality, one can easily understand\nany other that it may be necessary to venture on, for the hills and\nvalleys, plains and rivers of Tuscany, for instance, have a certain\nresemblance to those of other provinces, so that from a knowledge of\nthe country in one province one can easily arrive at a knowledge of\nothers. And that prince who is lacking in this skill is wanting in the\nfirst essentials of a leader; for it is this which teaches how to find\nthe enemy, take up quarters, lead armies, arrange marches and occupy\npositions with advantage. Philop\u0153men, prince of the Ach\u00e6i, among other\npraises bestowed on him by writers, is lauded because in times of peace\nhe thought of nothing but the methods of warfare, and when he was in\nthe country with his friends, he often stopped and asked them: If the\nenemy were on that hill and we found ourselves here with our army,\nwhich of us would have the advantage? How could we safely approach\nhim maintaining our order? If we wished to retire, what ought we to\ndo? If they retired, how should we follow them? And he put before them\nas they went along all the cases that might happen to an army, heard\ntheir opinion, gave his own, fortifying it by argument; so that through\nthese continued cogitations there could never happen any incident when\nleading his armies for which he was not prepared. But as to exercise\nfor the mind, the prince ought to read history and study the actions\nof eminent men, see how they acted in warfare, examine the causes of\ntheir victories and losses in order to imitate the former and avoid the\nlatter, and above all, do as some eminent men have done in the past,\nwho have imitated some one, who has been much praised and glorified,\nand have always kept their deeds and actions before them, as they say\nAlexander the Great imitated Achilles, C\u00e6sar Alexander, and Scipio\nCyrus. And whoever reads the life of Cyrus written by Xenophon, will\nperceive in the life of Scipio how gloriously he imitated him, and how,\nin chastity, affability, humanity, and liberality Scipio conformed to\nthose qualities of Cyrus described by Xenophon.\n\nA wise prince should follow similar methods and never remain idle in\npeaceful times, but by industry make such good use of the time as may\nserve him in adversity, so that when fortune changes she may find him\nprepared to resist her blows.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XV\n\n\nOF THE THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY PRINCES, ARE PRAISED OR\nBLAMED\n\n\nIt remains now to be seen what are the methods and rules for a\nprince as regards his subjects and friends. And as I know that many\nhave written of this, I fear that my writing about it may be deemed\npresumptuous, differing as I do, especially in this matter, from the\nopinions of others. But my intention being to write something of use to\nthose who understand it, it appears to me more proper to go to the real\ntruth of the matter than to its imagination; and many have imagined\nrepublics and principalities which have never been seen or known to\nexist in reality; for how we live is so far removed from how we ought\nto live, that he who abandons what is done for what ought to be done,\nwill rather learn to bring about his own ruin than his preservation.\nA man who wishes to make a profession of goodness in everything must\nnecessarily come to grief among so many who are not good. Therefore it\nis necessary for a prince, who wishes to maintain himself, to learn how\nnot to be good, and to use it and not use it according to the necessity\nof the case. Leaving on one side then those things which concern only\nan imaginary prince, and speaking of those that are real, I state that\nall men, when spoken of, and especially princes, who are placed at\na greater height, are noted for some of those qualities which bring\nthem either praise or blame. Thus one is considered liberal, another\nmiserly; one a free giver, another rapacious; one cruel, another\nmerciful; one a breaker of his word, another faithful; one effeminate\nand pusillanimous, another fierce and high-spirited; one humane,\nanother proud; one lascivious, another chaste; one frank, another\nastute; one hard, another easy; one serious, another frivolous; one\nreligious, another incredulous, and so on. I know that every one will\nadmit that it would be highly praiseworthy in a prince to possess all\nthe above-named qualities that are reputed good, but as they cannot all\nbe possessed or observed, human conditions not permitting of it, it is\nnecessary that he should be prudent enough to avoid the disgrace of\nthose vices which would lose him the state, and guard himself against\nthose which will not lose it him, if possible, but if not able to, he\ncan indulge them with less scruple. And yet he must not mind incurring\nthe disgrace of those vices, without which it would be difficult to\nsave the state, for if one considers well, it will be found that some\nthings which seem virtues would, if followed, lead to one's ruin, and\nsome others which appear vices result, if followed, in one's greater\nsecurity and well being.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVI\n\n\nOF LIBERALITY AND NIGGARDLINESS\n\n\nBeginning now with the first qualities above named, I say that it\nwould be well to be considered liberal; nevertheless liberality used\nin such a way that you are not feared will injure you, because if\nused virtuously and in the proper way, it will not be known, and you\nwill not incur the disgrace of the contrary vice. But one who wishes\nto obtain the reputation of liberality among men, must not omit every\nkind of sumptuous display, and to such an extent that a prince of this\ncharacter will consume by such means all his resources, and will be\nat last compelled, if he wishes to maintain his name for liberality,\nto impose heavy charges on his people, become an extortioner, and do\neverything possible to obtain money. This will make his subjects begin\nto hate him and he will be little esteemed being poor, so that having\nby this liberality injured many and benefited but few, he will feel\nthe first little disturbance and be endangered by every accident. If\nhe recognises this and wishes to change his system, he incurs at once\nthe charge of niggardliness; a prince, therefore, not being able to\nexercise this virtue of liberality without risk if it is known, must\nnot, if he is prudent, object to be called miserly. In course of time\nhe will be thought more liberal, when it is seen that by his parsimony\nhis revenue is sufficient, that he can defend himself against those\nwho make war on him, and undertake enterprises without burdening his\npeople, so that he is really liberal to all those from whom he does not\ntake, who are infinite in number, and niggardly to all to whom he does\nnot give, who are few.\n\nIn our times we have seen nothing great done except by those who have\nbeen esteemed niggardly; the others have all been ruined. Pope Julius\nII., although he had made use of a reputation for liberality in order\nto attain the papacy, did not seek to retain it afterwards, so that\nhe might be able to make war on the King of France, and he earned on\nso many wars without imposing an extraordinary tax, because his extra\nexpenses were covered by the parsimony he had so long practised. The\npresent King of Spain, if he had been thought liberal, would not have\nengaged in and won so many enterprises. For these reasons a prince must\ncare little for the reputation of being a miser, if he wishes to avoid\nrobbing his subjects, if he wishes to be able to defend himself, to not\nbecome poor and contemptible, and not to be forced to become rapacious;\nthis vice of niggardliness is one of those vices which enable him to\nreign. If it is said that C\u00e6sar attained the empire through liberality,\nand that many others have reached the highest positions through being\nliberal or being thought so, I would reply that you are either a prince\nalready or else on the way to become one. In the first case, this\nliberality is harmful; in the second, it is certainly necessary to be\nconsidered liberal, and C\u00e6sar was one of those who wished to attain the\nmastery over Rome, but if after attaining it he had lived and had not\nmoderated his expenses, he would have destroyed that empire. And should\nany one reply that there have been many princes, who have done great\nthings with their armies, who have been thought extremely liberal, I\nwould answer by saying that the prince may either spend his own wealth\nand that of his subjects or the wealth of others. In the first case\nhe must be sparing, but in the second he must not neglect to be very\nliberal. This liberality is very necessary to a prince who marches with\nhis armies, and lives by plunder, sacking and extorting, and is dealing\nwith the wealth of others, for without it he would not be followed\nby his soldiers. And you may be very generous indeed with what is\nnot the property of yourself or your subjects, as were Cyrus, C\u00e6sar,\nand Alexander; for spending the wealth of others will not diminish\nyour reputation, but increase it, only spending your own resources\nwill injure you. There is nothing which destroys itself so much as\nliberality, for by using it you lose the power of using it, and become\neither poor and despicable, or, to escape poverty, rapacious and hated.\nAnd of all things that a prince must guard against, the most important\nare being despicable or hated, and liberality will lead you to one or\nother of these conditions. It is, therefore, wiser to have the name\nof a miser, which produces disgrace without hatred, than to incur of\nnecessity the name of being rapacious, which produces both disgrace and\nhatred.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVII\n\n\nOF CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED OR FEARED\n\n\nProceeding to the other qualities before named, I say that every prince\nmust desire to be considered merciful and not cruel. He must, however,\ntake care not to misuse this mercifulness. Cesare Borgia was considered\ncruel, but his cruelty had settled the Romagna, united it, and brought\nit peace and confidence. If this is considered a benefit, it will be\nseen that he was really much more merciful than the Florentine people,\nwho, to avoid the name of cruelty, allowed Pistoia to be destroyed. A\nprince, therefore, must not mind incurring the charge of cruelty for\nthe purpose of keeping his subjects united and confident; for, with a\nvery few examples, he will be more merciful than those who, from excess\nof tenderness, allow disorders to arise, from whence spring murders\nand rapine; for these as a rule injure the whole community, while the\nexecutions carried out by the prince injure only one individual. And of\nall princes, it is impossible for a new prince to escape the name of\ncruel, new states being always full of dangers. Wherefore Virgil makes\nDido excuse the inhumanity of her rule by its being new, where she says:\n\n    Res dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt\n    Moliri, et late fines custode tueri.\n\nNevertheless, he must be cautious in believing and acting, and must\nnot inspire fear of his own accord, and must proceed in a temperate\nmanner with prudence and humanity, so that too much confidence does\nnot render him incautious, and too much diffidence does not render him\nintolerant.\n\nFrom this arises the question whether it is better to be loved more\nthan feared, or feared more than loved. The reply is, that one ought to\nbe both feared and loved, but as it is difficult for the two to go\ntogether, it is much safer to be feared than loved, if one of the two\nhas to be wanting. For it may be said of men in general that they are\nungrateful, voluble, dissemblers, anxious to avoid danger, and covetous\nof gain; as long as you benefit them, they are entirely yours; they\noffer you their blood, their goods, their life, and their children, as\nI have before said, when the necessity is remote; but when it\napproaches, they revolt. And the prince who has relied solely on their\nwords, without making other preparations, is ruined, for the friendship\nwhich is gained by purchase and not through grandeur and nobility of\nspirit is merited but is not secured, and at times is not to be had.\nAnd men have less scruple in offending one who makes himself loved than\none who makes himself feared; for love is held by a chain of obligation\nwhich, men being selfish, is broken whenever it serves their purpose;\nbut fear is maintained by a dread of punishment which never fails.\nStill, a prince should make himself feared in such a way that if he\ndoes not gain love, he at any rate avoids hatred; for fear, and the\nabsence of hatred may well go together, and will be always attained by\none who abstains from interfering with the property of his citizens and\nsubjects or with their women. And when he is obliged to take the life\nof any one, to do so when there is a proper justification and manifest\nreason for it; but above all he must abstain from taking the property\nof others, for men forget more easily the death of their father than\nthe loss of their patrimony. Then also pretexts for seizing property\nare never wanting, and one who begins to live by rapine will always\nfind some reason for taking the goods of others, whereas causes for\ntaking life are rarer and more quickly destroyed. But when the prince\nis with his army and has a large number of soldiers under his control,\nthen it is extremely necessary that he should not mind being thought\ncruel; for without this reputation he could not keep an army united,\nor disposed to any duty.\n\nAmong the noteworthy actions of Hannibal is numbered this, that\nalthough he had an enormous army, composed of men of all nations\nand fighting in foreign countries, there never arose any dissension\neither among them or against the prince, either in good fortune or in\nbad. This could not be due to anything but his inhuman cruelty, which\ntogether with his infinite other virtues, made him always venerated\nand terrible in the sight of his soldiers, and without it his other\nvirtues would not have sufficed to produce that effect. Thoughtless\nwriters admire on the one hand his actions, and on the other blame the\nprincipal cause of them. And that it is true that his other virtues\nwould not have sufficed may be seen from the case of Scipio (very rare\nnot only in his own times, but in all times of which memory remains),\nwhose armies rebelled against him in Spain, which arose from nothing\nbut his excessive kindness, which allowed more license to the soldiers\nthan was consonant with military discipline. He was reproached with\nthis in the senate by Fabius Maximus, who called him a corrupter of the\nRoman militia.\n\nThe Locri having been destroyed by one of Scipio's officers were not\nrevenged by him, nor was the insolence of that officer punished,\nsimply by reason of his easy nature; so much so, that some one wishing\nto excuse him in the senate, said that there were many men who knew\nrather how not to err, than how to correct the errors of others. This\ndisposition would in time have tarnished the fame and glory of Scipio\nhad he persevered in it under the empire, but living under the rule of\nthe senate this harmful quality was not only concealed but became a\nglory to him. I conclude, therefore, with regard to being feared and\nloved, that men love at their own free will, but fear at the will of\nthe prince, and that a wise prince must rely on what is in his power\nand not on what is in the power of others, and he must only trouble\nhimself to avoid incurring hatred, as has been explained.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVIII\n\n\nIN WHAT WAY PRINCES MUST KEEP FAITH\n\n\nHow laudable it is for a prince to keep good faith and live with\nintegrity, and not with astuteness, every one knows. Still the\nexperience of our times shows those princes to have done great things\nwho have had little regard for good faith, and have been able by\nastuteness to confuse men's brains, and who have ultimately overcome\nthose who have made loyalty their foundation. You must know, then,\nthat there are two methods of fighting, the one by law, the other by\nforce: the first method is that of men, the second of beasts; but as\nthe first method is often insufficient, one must have recourse to the\nsecond. It is therefore necessary to know well how to use both the\nbeast and the man. This was covertly taught to princes by ancient\nwriters, who relate how Achilles and many others of those princes were\ngiven to Chiron the centaur to be brought up, who kept them under his\ndiscipline; this system of having for teacher one who was half beast\nand half man is meant to indicate that a prince must know how to use\nboth natures, and that the one without the other is not durable. A\nprince being thus obliged to know well how to act as a beast must\nimitate the fox and the lion, for the lion cannot protect himself\nfrom snares, and the fox cannot defend himself from wolves. One must\ntherefore be a fox to recognise snares, and a lion to frighten wolves.\nThose that wish to be only lions do not understand this. Therefore,\na prudent ruler ought not to keep faith when by so doing it would be\nagainst his interest, and when the reasons which made him bind himself\nno longer exist. If men were all good, this precept would not be a\ngood one; but as they are bad, and would not observe their faith with\nyou, so you are not bound to keep faith with them. Nor are legitimate\ngrounds ever wanting to a prince to give colour to the non-fulfilment\nof his promise. Of this one could furnish an infinite number of modern\nexamples, and show how many times peace has been broken, and how many\npromises rendered worthless, by the faithlessness of princes, and those\nthat have been best able to imitate the fox have succeeded best. But\nit is necessary to be able to disguise this character well, and to be\na great feigner and dissembler; and men are so simple and so ready to\nobey present necessities, that one who deceives will always find those\nwho allow themselves to be deceived. I will only mention one modern\ninstance. Alexander VI. did nothing else but deceive men, he thought\nof nothing else, and found the way to do it; no man was ever more able\nto give assurances, or affirmed things with stronger oaths, and no man\nobserved them less; however, he always succeeded in his deceptions, as\nhe knew well this side of the world. It is not, therefore, necessary\nfor a prince to have all the above-named qualities, but it is very\nnecessary to seem to have them. I would even be bold to say that to\npossess them and to always observe them is dangerous, but to appear\nto possess them is useful. Thus it is well to seem pious, faithful,\nhumane, religious, sincere, and also to be so; but you must have the\nmind so watchful that when it is needful to be otherwise you may be\nable to change to the opposite qualities. And it must be understood\nthat a prince, and especially a new prince, cannot observe all those\nthings which are considered good in men, being often obliged, in order\nto maintain the state, to act against faith, against charity, against\nhumanity, and against religion. And, therefore, he must have a mind\ndisposed to adapt itself according to the wind, and as the variations\nof fortune dictate, and, as I said before, not deviate from what is\ngood, if possible, but be able to do evil if necessitated. A prince\nmust take great care that nothing goes out of his mouth which is not\nfull of the above-named five qualities, and, to see and hear him, he\nshould seem to be all faith, all integrity, all humanity, and all\nreligion. And nothing is more necessary than to seem to have this last\nquality, for men in general judge more by the eyes than by the hands,\nfor every one can see, but very few have to feel. Everybody sees what\nyou appear to be, few feel what you are, and those few will not dare\nto oppose themselves to the many, who have the majesty of the state to\ndefend them; and in the actions of men, and especially of princes, from\nwhich there is no appeal, the end is everything.\n\nLet a prince therefore aim at living and maintaining state the state,\nthe means will always be judged honourable and praised by every one,\nfor the vulgar is always taken by appearances and the result of things;\nand the world consists only of the vulgar, and the few find a place\nwhen the many have nothing to rest upon. A certain prince of the\npresent time, whom it is well not to name, never does anything but\npreach peace and good faith, but he is really a great enemy to both,\nand either of them, had he observed them, would have lost him both\nstate and reputation on many occasions.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIX\n\n\nTHAT WE MUST AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED\n\n\nBut as I have now spoken of the most important of the qualities\nin question, I will now deal briefly with the rest on the general\nprinciple, that the prince must, as already stated, avoid those things\nwhich will make him hated or despised; and whenever he succeeds in\nthis, he will have done his part, and will find no danger in other\nvices.\n\nHe will chiefly become hated, as I said, by being rapacious, and\nusurping the property and women of his subjects, which he must abstain\nfrom doing, and whenever one does not attack the property or honour\nof the generality of men, they will live contented; and one will only\nhave to combat the ambition of a few, who can be easily held in check\nin many ways. He is rendered despicable by being thought changeable,\nfrivolous, effeminate, timid, and irresolute; which a prince must\nguard against as a rock of danger, and manage so that his actions\nshow grandeur, high courage, seriousness, and strength; and as to the\ngovernment of his subjects, let his sentence be irrevocable, and let\nhim adhere to his decisions so that no one may think of deceiving him\nor making him change. The prince who creates such an opinion of himself\ngets a great reputation, and it is very difficult to conspire against\none who has a great reputation, and he will not easily be attacked, so\nlong as it is known that he is esteemed and reverenced by his subjects.\nFor a prince must have two kinds of fear: one internal as regards his\nsubjects, one external as regards foreign powers. From the latter he\ncan defend himself with good arms and good friends, and he will always\nhave good friends if he has good arms; and internal matters will always\nremain quiet, if they are not perturbed by conspiracy; and even if\nexternal powers sought to foment one, if he has ruled and lived as I\nhave described, he will always if he stands firm be able to sustain\nevery shock, as I have shown that Nabis the Spartan did. But with\nregard to the subjects, if not acted on from outside, it is still to be\nfeared lest they conspire in secret, from which the prince may guard\nhimself well by avoiding hatred and contempt, and keeping the people\nsatisfied with him, which it is necessary to accomplish, as has been\nrelated at length. And one of the most potent remedies that a prince\nhas against conspiracies, is that of not being hated or despised by\nthe mass of the people; for whoever conspires always believes that\nhe will satisfy the people by the death of their prince; but if he\nthought to offend them by doing this, he would fear to engage in such\nan undertaking, for the difficulties that conspirators have to meet are\ninfinite. Experience shows that there have been very many conspiracies,\nbut few have turned out well, for whoever conspires cannot act alone,\nand cannot find companions except among those who are discontented;\nand as soon as you have disclosed your intention to a malcontent, you\ngive him the means of satisfying himself, for by revealing it he can\nhope to secure everything he wants; to such an extent that seeing\na certain gain by doing this, and seeing on the other hand only a\ndoubtful one and full of danger, he must either be a rare friend to\nyou or else a very bitter enemy to the prince if he keeps faith with\nyou. And to reduce the matter to narrow limits, I say, that on the side\nof the conspirator there is nothing but fear, jealousy, suspicion,\nand dread of punishment which frightens him; and on the side of the\nprince there is the majesty of government, the laws, the protection\nof friends and of the state which guard him. When to these things are\nadded the goodwill of the people, it is impossible that any one should\nhave the temerity to conspire. For whereas generally a conspirator\nhas to fear before the execution of his plot, in this case he must\nalso fear afterwards, having the people for an enemy, when his crime\nis accomplished, and thus not being able to hope for any refuge.\nNumberless instances might be given of this, but I will content myself\nwith one which took place within the memory of our fathers. Messer\nAnnibale Bentivogli, Prince of Bologna, ancestor of the present Messer\nAnnibale, was killed by the Canneschi, who conspired against him. He\nleft no relations but Messer Giovanni, who was then an infant, but\nafter the murder the people rose up and killed all the Canneschi. This\narose from the popular goodwill that the house of Bentivogli enjoyed at\nthat time in Bologna, which was so great that, as there was nobody left\nafter the death of Annibale who could govern the state, the Bolognese\nhearing that there was one of the Bentivogli family in Florence, who\nhad till then been thought the son of a blacksmith, came to fetch him\nand gave him the government of the city, and it was governed by him\nuntil Messer Giovanni was old enough to assume the government.\n\nI conclude, therefore, that a prince need trouble little about\nconspiracies when the people are well disposed, but when they\nare hostile and hold him in hatred, then he must fear everything\nand everybody. Well-ordered states and wise princes have studied\ndiligently not to drive the nobles to desperation, and to satisfy the\npopulace and keep it contented, for this is one of the most important\nmatters that a prince has to deal with. Among the kingdoms that are\nwell ordered and governed in our time is France, and there we find\nnumberless good institutions on which depend the liberty and security\nof the king; of these the chief is the parliament and its authority,\nbecause he who established that kingdom, knowing the ambition and\ninsolence of the great nobles, and deeming it necessary to have a bit\nin their mouths to check them; and knowing on the other hand the hatred\nof the mass of the people to the great, based on fear, and wishing to\nsecure them, did not wish to make this the special care of the king,\nto relieve him of the dissatisfaction that he might incur among the\nnobles by favouring the people, and among the people by favouring the\nnobles. He therefore established a third judge that, without direct\ncharge of the king, kept in check the great and favoured the lesser\npeople. Nor could any better or more prudent measure have been adopted,\nnor better precaution for the safety of the king and the kingdom. From\nwhich another notable rule can be drawn, that princes should let the\ncarrying out of unpopular duties devolve on others, and bestow favours\nthemselves. I conclude again by saying that a prince must esteem his\nnobles, but not make himself hated by the populace. It may perhaps seem\nto some, that considering the life and death of many Roman emperors\nthat they are instances contrary to my opinion, finding that some who\nlived always nobly and showed great strength of character, nevertheless\nlost the empire, or were killed by their subjects who conspired against\nthem. Wishing to answer these objections, I will discuss the qualities\nof some emperors, showing the cause of their ruin not to be at variance\nwith what I have stated, and I will also partly consider the things to\nbe noted by whoever reads the deeds of these times. I will content\nmyself with taking all those emperors who succeeded to the empire from\nMarcus the philosopher to Maximinus; these were Marcus, Commodus his\nson, Pertinax, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus. And the first\nthing to note is, that whereas other princes have only to contend\nagainst the ambition of the great and the insolence of the people, the\nRoman emperors had a third difficulty, that of having to support the\ncruelty and avarice of the soldiers, which was such a difficulty that\nit was the cause of the ruin of many, it being difficult to satisfy\nboth the soldiers and the people. For the people love tranquillity,\nand therefore like princes who are pacific, but the soldiers prefer\na prince of military spirit, who is insolent, cruel, and rapacious.\nThey wish him to exercise these qualities on the people so that they\nmay get double pay and give vent to their avarice and cruelty. Thus it\ncame about that those emperors who, by nature or art, had not such a\nreputation as could keep both parties in check, invariably were ruined,\nand the greater number of them who were raised to the empire being\nnew men, knowing the difficulties of these two opposite dispositions,\nconfined themselves to satisfying the soldiers, and thought little of\ninjuring the people. This choice was necessary, princes not being able\nto avoid being hated by some one. They must first try not to be hated\nby the mass of the people; if they cannot accomplish this they must\nuse every means to escape the hatred of the most powerful parties. And\ntherefore these emperors, who being new men had need of extraordinary\nfavours, adhered to the soldiers more willingly than to the people;\nwhether this, however, was of use to them or not, depended on whether\nthe prince knew how to maintain his reputation with them.\n\nFrom these causes it resulted that Marcus, Pertinax, and Alexander,\nbeing all of modest life, lovers of justice, enemies of cruelty,\nhumane and benign, had all a sad ending except Marcus. Marcus alone\nlived and died in honour, because he succeeded to the empire by\nhereditary right and did not owe it either to the soldiers or to the\npeople; besides which, possessing many virtues which made him revered,\nhe kept both parties in their place as long as he lived and was never\neither hated or despised. But Pertinax was created emperor against the\nwill of the soldiers, who being accustomed to live licentiously under\nCommodus, could not put up with the honest life to which Pertinax\nwished to limit them, so that having made himself hated, and to this\ncontempt being added because he was old, he was ruined at the very\nbeginning of his administration. Whence it may be seen that hatred\nis gained as much by good works as by evil, and therefore, as I said\nbefore, a prince who wishes to maintain the state is often forced to\ndo evil, for when that party, whether populace, soldiery, or nobles,\nwhichever it be that you consider necessary to you for keeping your\nposition, is corrupt, you must follow its humour and satisfy it, and\nin that case good works will be inimical to you. But let us come to\nAlexander, who was of such goodness, that among other things for which\nhe is praised, it is said that in the fourteen years that he reigned\nno one was put to death by him without a fair trial. Nevertheless,\nbeing considered effeminate, and a man who allowed himself to be\nruled by his mother, and having thus fallen into contempt, the army\nconspired against him and killed him. Looking, on the other hand,\nat the qualities of Commodus, Severus, Antoninus, extremely cruel\nand rapacious; to satisfy the soldiers there was no injury which\nthey would not inflict on the people, and all except Severus ended\nbadly. Severus, however, had such abilities that by maintaining the\nsoldiers friendly to him, he was able to reign happily, although he\noppressed the people, for his virtues made him so admirable in the\nsight both of the soldiers and the people that the latter were, as it\nwere, astonished and stupefied, while the former were respectful and\ncontented. As the deeds of this ruler were great for a new prince, I\nwill briefly show how well he could use the qualities of the fox and\nthe lion, whose natures, as I said before, it is necessary for a prince\nto imitate. Knowing the sloth of the Emperor Julian, Severus, who was\nleader of the army in Slavonia, persuaded the troops that it would be\nwell to go to Rome to avenge the death of Pertinax, who had been slain\nby the Imperial guard, and under this pretext, without revealing his\naspirations to the throne, marched with his army to Rome and was in\nItaly before his design was known. On his arrival in Rome the senate\nelected him emperor through fear, and Julian died. There remained\nafter this beginning two difficulties to be faced by Severus before\nhe could obtain the whole control of the empire: one in Asia, where\nNigrinus, head of the Asiatic armies, had declared himself emperor; the\nother in the west from Albinus, who also aspired to the empire. And\nas he judged it dangerous to show himself hostile to both, he decided\nto attack Nigrinus and deceive Albinus, to whom he wrote that having\nbeen elected emperor by the senate he wished to share that dignity\nwith him; he sent him the title of C\u00e6sar and, by deliberation of the\nsenate, he was declared his colleague; all of which was accepted as\ntrue by Albinus. But when Severus had defeated and killed Nigrinus,\nand pacified things in the East, he returned to Rome and charged\nAlbinus in the senate with having, unmindful of the benefits received\nfrom him, traitorously sought to assassinate him, and stated that he\nwas therefore obliged to go and punish his ingratitude. He then went\nto France to meet him, and there deprived him of both his position\nand his life. Whoever examines in detail the actions of Severus, will\nfind him to have been a very ferocious lion and an extremely astute\nfox, and will see him to have been feared and respected by all and not\nhated by the army; and will not be surprised that he, a new man, should\nhave been able to hold the empire so well, since his great reputation\ndefended him always from that hatred that his rapacity might have\nproduced in the people. But Antoninus his son was also a man of great\nability, and possessed qualities that rendered him admirable in the\nsight of the people and also made him popular with the soldiers, for\nhe was a military man, capable of enduring the most extreme hardships,\ndisdainful of delicate food, and every other luxury, which made him\nloved by all the armies. However, his ferocity and cruelty were so\ngreat and unheard of, through his having, after executing many private\nindividuals, caused a large part of the population of Rome and all that\nof Alexandria to be killed, that he became hated by all the world and\nbegan to be feared by those about him to such an extent that he was\nfinally killed by a centurion in the midst of his army. Whence it is to\nbe noted that this kind of death, which proceeds from the deliberate\naction of a determined man, cannot be avoided by princes, since any one\nwho does not fear death himself can inflict it, but a prince need not\nfear much on this account, as such actions are extremely rare. He must\nonly guard against committing any grave injury to any one he makes use\nof, or has about him for his service, like Antoninus had done, having\ncaused the death with contumely of the brother of that centurion, and\nalso threatened him every day, although he still retained him in his\nbodyguard, which was a foolish and dangerous thing to do, as the fact\nproved. But let us come to Commodus, who might easily have kept the\nempire, having succeeded to it by heredity, being the son of Marcus,\nand it would have sufficed for him to follow in the steps of his father\nto have satisfied both the people and the soldiers. But being of a\ncruel and bestial disposition, in order to be able to exercise his\nrapacity on the people, he sought to amuse the soldiers and render\nthem licentious; on the other hand, by not maintaining his dignity,\nby often descending into the theatre to fight with gladiators and\ncommitting other contemptible actions, little worthy of the imperial\ndignity, he became despicable in the eyes of the soldiers, and being\nhated on the one hand and despised on the other, he was conspired\nagainst and killed. There remains to be described the character of\nMaximinus. He was an extremely warlike man, and as the armies were\nannoyed with the effeminacy of Alexander, which we have already spoken\nof, he was after the death of the latter elected emperor. He did not\nenjoy it for long, as two things made him hated and despised: the\none his base origin, as he had been a shepherd in Thrace, which was\ngenerally known and caused great disdain on all sides; the other,\nbecause he had at the commencement of his rule deferred going to Rome\nto take possession of the Imperial seat, and had obtained a reputation\nfor great cruelty, having through his prefects in Rome and other parts\nof the empire committed many acts of cruelty. The whole world being\nthus moved by indignation for the baseness of his blood, and also by\nthe hatred caused by fear of his ferocity, he was conspired against\nfirst by Africa and afterwards by the senate and all the people of Rome\nand Italy. His own army also joined them, for besieging Aquileia and\nfinding it difficult to take, they became enraged at his cruelty, and\nseeing that he had so many enemies, they feared him less and put him to\ndeath. I will not speak of Heliogabalus, of Macrinus, or Julian, who\nbeing entirely contemptible were immediately suppressed, but I will\ncome to the conclusion of this discourse by saying that the princes of\nour time have less difficulty than these of being obliged to satisfy in\nan extraordinary degree their soldiers in their states; for although\nthey must have a certain consideration for them, yet it is soon\nsettled, for none of these princes have armies that are inextricably\nbound up with the administration of the government and the rule of\ntheir provinces as were the armies of the Roman empire; and therefore\nif it was then necessary to satisfy the soldiers rather than the\npeople, it was because the soldiers could do more than the people; now,\nit is more necessary to all princes, except the Turk and the Soldan,\nto satisfy the people than the soldiers, for the people can do more\nthan the soldiers. I except the Turk, because he always keeps about\nhim twelve thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry, on which\ndepend the security and strength of his kingdom; and it is necessary\nfor him to postpone every other consideration of the people to keep\nthem friendly. It is the same with the kingdom of the Soldan, which\nbeing entirely in the hands of the soldiers, he is bound to keep their\nfriendship regardless of the people. And it is to be noted that this\nstate of the Soldan is different from that of all other princes, being\nsimilar to the Christian pontificate, which cannot be called either\na hereditary kingdom or a new one, for the sons of the dead prince\nare not his heirs, but he who is elected to that position by those\nwho have authority. And as this order is ancient it cannot be called\na new kingdom, there being none of these difficulties which exist in\nnew ones; as although the prince is new, the rules of that state are\nold and arranged to receive him as if he were their hereditary lord.\nBut returning to our matter, I say that whoever studies the preceding\nargument will see that either hatred or contempt were the causes of\nthe ruin of the emperors named, and will also observe how it came about\nthat, some of them acting in one way and some in another, in both ways\nthere were some who had a fortunate and others an unfortunate ending.\nAs Pertinax and Alexander were both new rulers, it was useless and\ninjurious for them to try and imitate Marcus, who was a hereditary\nprince; and similarly with Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus it was\npernicious for them to imitate Severus, as they had not sufficient\nability to follow in his footsteps. Thus a new prince cannot imitate\nthe actions of Marcus, in his dominions, nor is it necessary for him to\nimitate those of Severus; but he must take from Severus those portions\nthat are necessary to found his state, and from Marcus those that are\nuseful and glorious for conserving a state that is already established\nand secure.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XX\n\n\nWHETHER FORTRESSES AND OTHER THINGS WHICH PRINCES OFTEN MAKE ARE USEFUL\nOR INJURIOUS\n\n\nSome princes, in order to securely hold their possessions, have\ndisarmed their subjects, some others have kept their subject lands\ndivided into parts, others have fomented enmities against themselves,\nothers have endeavoured to win over those whom they suspected at the\ncommencement of their rule: some have constructed fortresses, others\nhave ruined and destroyed them. And although one cannot pronounce a\ndefinite judgment as to these things without going into the particulars\nof the state to which such a deliberation is to be applied, still I\nwill speak in such a broad way as the matter will permit of.\n\nA new prince has never been known to disarm his subjects, on the\ncontrary, when he has found them disarmed he has always armed them, for\nby arming them these arms become your own, those that you suspected\nbecome faithful and those that were faithful remain so, and from being\nmerely subjects become your partisans. And since all the subjects\ncannot be armed, when you benefit those that you arm, you can deal more\nsafely with the others; and this different treatment that they notice\nrenders your men more obliged to you, the others will excuse you,\njudging that those have necessarily greater merit who have greater\ndanger and heavier duties. But when you disarm them, you commence to\noffend them and show that you distrust them either through cowardice or\nlack of confidence, and both of these opinions generate hatred against\nyou. And as you cannot remain unarmed, you are obliged to resort to a\nmercenary militia, of which we have already stated the value; and even\nif it were good it cannot be sufficient in number to defend you against\npowerful enemies and suspected subjects. But, as I have said, a new\nprince in a new dominion always has his subjects armed. History is full\nof such examples. But when a prince acquires a new state as an addition\nto his old one, then it is necessary to disarm that state, except those\nwho in acquiring it have sided with you; and even these one must, when\ntime and opportunity serve, render weak and effeminate, and arrange\nthings so that all the arms of the new state are in the hands of your\nown soldiers who in your old state live near you.\n\nOur forefathers and those who were esteemed wise used to say that\nit was necessary to hold Pistoia by means of factious and Pisa with\nfortresses, and for this purpose they fomented differences among their\nsubjects in some town in order to possess it more easily. This, in\nthose days when Italy was fairly divided, was doubtless well done, but\ndoes not seem to me to be a good precept for the present time, for I do\nnot believe that the divisions thus created ever do any good; on the\ncontrary it is certain that when the enemy approaches, the cities thus\ndivided will be at once lost, for the weaker faction will always side\nwith the enemy and the other will not be able to stand. The Venetians,\nactuated, I believe, by the aforesaid motives, cherished the Guelf\nand Ghibelline factions in the cities subject to them, and although\nthey never allowed them to come to bloodshed, they yet encouraged\nthese differences among them, so that the citizens, being occupied in\ntheir own quarrels, might not act against them. This, however, did\nnot avail them anything, as was seen when, after the defeat of Vaila,\na part of those subjects immediately took courage and took from them\nthe whole state. Such methods, besides, argue weakness in a prince,\nfor in a strong government such dissensions will never be permitted.\nThey are profitable only in time of peace, as by means of them it is\neasy to manage one's subjects, but when it comes to war, the fallacy\nof such a policy is at once shown. Without doubt, princes become great\nwhen they overcome difficulties and opposition, and therefore fortune,\nespecially when it wants to render a new prince great, who has greater\nneed of gaining a great reputation than a hereditary prince, raises up\nenemies and compels him to undertake wars against them, so that he may\nhave cause to overcome them, and thus raise himself higher by means\nof that ladder which his enemies have brought him. There are many who\nthink therefore that a wise prince ought, when he has the chance, to\nfoment astutely some enmity, so that by suppressing it he will augment\nhis greatness. Princes, and especially new ones, have found more faith\nand more usefulness in those men, whom at the beginning of their power\nthey regarded with suspicion, than in those they at first confided\nin. Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, governed his state more by\nthose whom he suspected than by others. But of this we cannot speak at\nlarge, as it varies according to the subject; I will merely say that\nthese men who at the beginning of a new government were enemies, if\nthey are of a kind to need support to maintain their position, can be\nvery easily gained by the prince, and they are the more compelled to\nserve him faithfully as they know they must by their deeds cancel the\nbad opinion previously held of them, and thus the prince will always\nderive greater help from them than from those who, serving him with\ngreater security, neglect his interest. And as the matter requires it,\nI will not omit to remind a prince who has newly taken a state with the\nsecret help of its inhabitants, that he must consider well the motives\nthat have induced those who have favoured him to do so, and if it is\nnot natural affection for him, but only because they were not contented\nwith the state as it was, he will have great trouble and difficulty in\nmaintaining their friendship, because it will be impossible for him to\ncontent them. And on well examining the cause of this in the examples\ndrawn from ancient and modern times it will be seen that it is much\neasier to gain the friendship, of those men who were contented with\nthe previous condition and were therefore at first enemies, than that\nof those who not being contented, became his friends and helped him to\noccupy it. It has been the custom of princes in order to be able to\nhold securely their state, to erect fortresses, as a bridle and bit\nto those who have designs against them, and in order to have a secure\nrefuge against a sudden assault. I approve this method, because it was\nanciently used. Nevertheless, Messer Niccolo Vitelli has been seen in\nour own time to destroy two fortresses in Citt\u00e0 di Castello in order\nto keep that state. Guid' Ubaldo, Duke of Urbino, on returning to his\ndominions from which he had been driven by Cesare Borgia, razed to\ntheir foundations all the fortresses of that province, and considered\nthat without them it would be more difficult for him to lose again the\nstate. The Bentivogli, in returning to Bologna, used similar measures.\nTherefore fortresses may or may not be useful according to the times;\nif they do good in one way, they do harm in another.\n\nThe question may be discussed thus: a prince who fears his own people\nmore than foreigners ought to build fortresses, but he who has greater\nfear of foreigners than of his own people ought to do without them. The\ncastle of Milan built by Francesco Sforza has given and will give more\ntrouble to the house of Sforza than any other disorder in that state.\nTherefore the best fortress is to be found in the love of the people,\nfor although you may have fortresses they will not save you if you are\nhated by the people. When once the people have taken arms against you,\nthere will never be lacking foreigners to assist them. In our times\nwe do not see that they have profited any ruler, except the Countess\nof Forli on the death of her consort Count Girolamo, for she was thus\nenabled to escape the popular rising and await help from Milan and\nrecover the state; the circumstances being then such that no foreigner\ncould assist the people. But afterwards they were of little use to her\nwhen Cesare Borgia attacked her and the people being hostile to her\nallied themselves with the foreigner. So that then and before it would\nhave been safer for her not to be hated by the people than to have the\nfortresses. Having considered these things I would therefore praise the\none who erects fortresses and the one who does not, and would blame any\none who, trusting in them, thinks little of being hated by his people.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXI\n\n\nHOW A PRINCE MUST ACT IN ORDER TO GAIN REPUTATION\n\n\nNothing causes a prince to be so much esteemed as great enterprises\nand setting a rare example. We have in our own day Ferdinand, King of\nAragon, at present King of Spain. He may almost be termed a new prince,\nbecause from a weak king he has become for fame and glory the first\nking in Christendom, and if you regard his actions you will find them\nall very great and some of them extraordinary. At the beginning of\nhis reign he assailed Granada, and that enterprise was the foundation\nof his state. At first he did it leisurely and without fear of being\ninterfered with; he kept the minds of the barons of Castile occupied in\nthis enterprise, so that thinking only of that war they did not think\nof making innovations, and he thus acquired reputation and power over\nthem without their being aware of it. He was able with the money of\nthe Church and the people to maintain his armies, and by that long war\nlay the foundations of his military power, which afterwards has made\nhim famous. Besides this, to be able to undertake greater enterprises,\nand always under the pretext of religion, he had recourse to a pious\ncruelty, driving out the Moors from his kingdom and despoiling them.\nNo more admirable or rare example can be found. He also attacked\nunder the same pretext Africa, undertook his Italian enterprise, and\nhas lately attacked France; so that he has continually contrived great\nthings, which have kept his subjects' minds uncertain and astonished,\nand occupied in watching their result.\n\nAnd these actions have arisen one out of the other, so that they have\nleft no time for men to settle down and act against him. It is also\nvery profitable for a prince to give some rare examples of himself in\nthe internal administration, like those related of Messer Bernab\u00f2 of\nMilan, when it happens that some one does something extraordinary,\neither good or evil, in civil life, and to take a means of rewarding\nor punishing him which will be much talked about. And above all a\nprince must endeavour in every action to obtain fame for being great\nand excellent. A prince is further esteemed when he is a true friend\nor a true enemy, when, that is, he declares himself without reserve in\nfavour of some one against another.\n\nThis policy is always more useful than remaining neutral. For if two\nneighbouring powers come to blows, they are either such that if one\nwins, you will have to fear the victor, or else not. In either of these\ntwo cases it will be better for you to declare yourself openly and make\nwar, because in the first case if you do not declare yourself, you will\nfall a prey to the victor, to the pleasure and satisfaction of the one\nwho has been defeated, and you will have no reason nor anything to\ndefend you and nobody to receive you. For, whoever wins will not desire\nfriends whom he suspects and who do not help him when in trouble, and\nwhoever loses will not receive you as you did not take up arms to\nassist his cause. Antiochus went to Greece, being sent by the \u00c6toli\nto expel the Romans. He sent orators to the Ach\u00e6i who were friends of\nthe Romans to encourage them to remain neutral, on the other hand the\nRomans persuaded them to take up arms on their side. The matter was\nbrought before the council of the Ach\u00e6i for deliberation, where the\nambassador of Antiochus sought to persuade them to remain neutral, to\nwhich the Roman ambassador replied: \"As to what is said that it is best\nand most useful for your state not to meddle in our war, nothing is\nfurther from the truth; for if you do not meddle in it you will become,\nwithout any favour or any reputation, the prize of the victor.\" And it\nwill always happen that the one who is not your friend will want you\nto remain neutral, and the one who is your friend will require you to\ndeclare yourself by taking arms. Irresolute princes, to avoid present\ndangers, usually follow the way of neutrality and are mostly ruined\nby it. But when the prince declares himself frankly in favour of one\nside, if the one to whom you adhere conquers, even if he is powerful\nand you remain at his discretion, he is under an obligation to you and\nfriendship has been established, and men are never so dishonest as to\noppress you with such ingratitude.\n\nMoreover, victories are never so prosperous that the victor does not\nneed to have some scruples, especially as to justice. But if he to whom\nyou adhere loses, you are sheltered by him, and so long as he can, he\nwill assist you; you become the companion of a fortune which may rise\nagain. In the second case, when those who fight are such that you have\nnothing to fear from the victor, it is still more prudent on your part\nto adhere to one; for you go to the ruin of one with the help of him\nwho ought to save him if he were wise, and if he conquers he rests\nat your discretion, and it is impossible that he should not conquer\nwith your help. And here it should be noted that a prince ought never\nto make common cause with one more powerful than himself to injure\nanother, unless necessity forces him to it, as before said; for if he\nwins you rest at his discretion, and princes must avoid as much as\npossible being at the discretion of others. The Venetians united with\nFrance against the Duke of Milan, although they could have avoided that\nunion, and from it resulted their own ruin. But when one cannot avoid\nit, as happened to the Florentines when the pope and Spain went with\ntheir armies to attack Lombardy, then the prince ought to join for the\nabove reasons. Let no state believe that it can follow a secure policy,\nrather let it think that all are doubtful. This is found in the nature\nof things, that one never tries to avoid one difficulty without running\ninto another, but prudence consists in being able to know the nature of\nthe difficulties, and taking the least harmful as good. A prince must\nalso show himself a lover of merit, and honour those who excel in every\nart. Moreover he must encourage his citizens to follow their callings\nquietly, whether in commerce, or agriculture, or any other trade that\nmen follow, so that this one shall not refrain from improving his\npossessions through fear that they may be taken from him, and that one\nfrom starting a trade for fear of taxes; but he should offer rewards to\nwhoever does these things, and to whoever seeks in any way to improve\nhis city or state. Besides this, he ought, at convenient seasons of the\nyear, to keep the people occupied with festivals and spectacles; and\nas every city is divided either into trades or into classes, he ought\nto pay attention to all these things, mingle with them from time to\ntime, and give them an example of his humanity and magnificence, always\nholding firm, however, the majesty of his dignity, which must never be\nallowed to fan in anything whatever.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXII\n\n\nOF THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES\n\n\nThe choice of a prince's ministers is a matter of no little importance;\nthey are either good or not according to the prudence of the prince.\nThe first impression that one gets of a ruler and of his brains is\nfrom seeing the men that he has about him. When they are competent\nand faithful one can always consider him wise, as he has been able to\nrecognise their ability and keep them faithful. But when they are the\nreverse, one can always form an unfavourable opinion of him, because\nthe first mistake that he makes is in making this choice. There was\nnobody who knew Messer Antonio da Venafro as the minister of Pandolfo\nPetrucci, Prince of Siena, who did not consider Pandolfo to be a very\nprudent man, having him for his minister. There are three different\nkinds of brains, the one understands things unassisted, the other\nunderstands things when shown by others, the third understands neither\nalone nor with the explanations of others. The first kind is most\nexcellent, the second also excellent, but the third useless. It is\ntherefore evident that if Pandolfo was not of the first kind, he was\nat any rate of the second. For every time that one has the judgment to\nknow the good and evil that any one does or says, even if he has no\ninvention, yet he recognises the bad and good works of his minister\nand corrects the one and supports the other; and the minister cannot\nhope to deceive him and therefore remains good. For a prince to be\nable to know a minister there is this method which never fails. When\nyou see the minister think more of himself than of you, and in all his\nactions seek his own profit, such a man will never be a good minister,\nand you can never rely on him; for whoever has in hand the state of\nanother must never think of himself but of the prince, and not call\nto mind anything but what relates to him. And, on the other hand, the\nprince, in order to retain his fidelity ought to think of his minister,\nhonouring and enriching him, doing him kindnesses, and conferring on\nhim honours and giving him responsible tasks, so that the great honours\nand riches bestowed on him cause him not to desire other honours and\nriches, and the tasks he has to fulfil make him fearful of changes,\nknowing that he could not execute them without the prince. When princes\nand their ministers stand in this relation to each other, they can\nrely the one upon the other; when it is otherwise, the end is always\ninjurious either for one or the other of them.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIII\n\n\nHOW FLATTERERS MUST BE SHUNNED\n\n\nI must not omit an important subject, and a mistake which princes\ncan with difficulty avoid, if they are not very prudent, or if they\ndo not make a good choice. And this is with regard to flatterers, of\nwhich courts are full, because men take such pleasure in their own\nthings and deceive themselves about them that they can with difficulty\nguard against this plague; and by wishing to guard against it they run\nthe risk of becoming contemptible. Because there is no other way of\nguarding one's self against flattery than by letting men understand\nthat they will not offend you by speaking the truth; but when every one\ncan tell you the truth, you lose their respect. A prudent prince must\ntherefore take a third course, by choosing in his state wise men, and\ngiving these alone full liberty to speak the truth to him, but only of\nthose things that he asks and of nothing else; but he must ask them\nabout everything and hear their opinion, and afterwards deliberate by\nhimself in his own way, and in these councils and with each of these\nmen comport himself so that every one may see that the more freely he\nspeaks, the more he will be acceptable. Outside these he should listen\nto no one, go about the matter deliberately, and be determined in his\ndecisions. Whoever acts otherwise either acts precipitately through\nflattery or else changes often through the variety of opinions, from\nwhich it happens that he is little esteemed. I will give a modern\ninstance of this. Pre' Luca, a follower of Maximilian, the present\nemperor, speaking of his majesty said that he never took counsel with\nanybody, and yet that he never did anything as he wished; this arose\nfrom his following the contrary method to the aforesaid. As the emperor\nis a secret man he does not communicate his designs to any one or\ntake any one's advice, but as on putting them into effect they begin\nto be known and discovered, they begin to be opposed by those he has\nabout him, and he is easily diverted from his purpose. Hence it comes\nto pass that what he does one day he undoes the next, no one ever\nunderstands what he wishes or intends to do, and no reliance is to be\nplaced on his deliberations. A prince, therefore, ought always to take\ncounsel, but only when he wishes, not when others wish; on the contrary\nhe ought to discourage absolutely attempts to advise him unless he\nasks it, but he ought to be a great asker, and a patient hearer of\nthe truth about those things which he has inquired of; indeed, if he\nfinds that any one has scruples in telling him the truth he should be\nangry. And since some think that a prince who gains the reputation\nof being prudent is so considered, not by his nature but by the good\ncouncillors he has about him, they are undoubtedly deceived. It is an\ninfallible rule that a prince who is not wise himself cannot be well\nadvised, unless by chance he left himself entirely in the hands of one\nman who ruled him in everything, and happened to be a very prudent\nman. In this case he may doubtless be well governed, but it would not\nlast long, for that governor would in a short time deprive him of the\nstate; but by taking counsel with many, a prince who is not wise will\nnever have united councils and will not be able to unite them for\nhimself. The councillors will all think of their own interests, and he\nwill be unable either to correct or to understand them. And it cannot\nbe otherwise, for men will always be false to you unless they are\ncompelled by necessity to be true.\n\nTherefore it must be concluded that wise counsels, from whoever they\ncome, must necessarily be due to the prudence of the prince, and not\nthe prudence of the prince to the good counsels received.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIV\n\n\nWHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES\n\n\nThe before-mentioned things, if prudently observed, make a new prince\nseem ancient, and render him at once more secure and firmer in the\nstate than if he had been established there of old. For a new prince is\nmuch more observed in his actions than a hereditary one, and when these\nare recognised as virtuous, he gains men more and they are more bound\nto him than if he were of the ancient blood. For men are much more\ntaken by present than by past things, and when they find themselves\nwell off in the present, they enjoy it and seek nothing more; on the\ncontrary, they will do all they can to defend him, so long as the\nprince is not in other things wanting to himself. And thus he will\nhave the double glory of having founded a new realm and adorned it and\nfortified it with good laws, good arms, good friends and good examples;\nas he will have double shame who is born a prince and through want of\nprudence has lost it.\n\nAnd if one considers those rulers who have lost their position in\nItaly in our days, such as the King of Naples, the Duk\u00e8 of Milan and\nothers, one will find in them first a common defect as to their arms,\nfor the reasons discussed at length, then we observe that some of\nthem either had the people hostile to them, or that if the people were\nfriendly they were not able to make sure of the nobility, for without\nthese defects, states are not lost that have enough strength to be able\nto keep an army in the field. Philip of Macedon, not the father of\nAlexander the Great, but the one who was conquered by Titus Quinteus,\ndid not possess a great state compared to the greatness of Rome and\nGreece which assailed him, but being a military man and one who knew\nhow to divert the people and make sure of the great, he was able to\nsustain the war against them for many years; and if at length he lost\nhis power over several cities, he was still able to keep his kingdom.\nTherefore, those of our princes who had held their possessions for many\nyears must not accuse fortune for having lost them, but rather their\nown negligence; for having never in quiet times considered that things\nmight change (as it is a common fault of men not to reckon on storms,\nin fair weather) when adverse times came, they only thought of fleeing\nfrom them, instead of defending themselves; and hoped that the people,\nenraged by the insolence of the conquerors, would recall them. This\nmeasure, when others are wanting, is good; but it is very bad to have\nneglected the other remedies for that one, for nobody would desire to\nfall because he believed that he would then find some one to pick him\nup. This may or may not take place, and if it does, it is not with\nsafety to you, as that defence is known to be cowardly and not to be\ndepended on; and only those defences are good, certain and durable,\nwhich depend only on yourself and your own ability.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXV\n\n\nHOW MUCH FORTUNE CAN DO IN HUMAN AFFAIRS AND HOW IT MAY BE OPPOSED\n\n\nIt is not unknown to me how many have been and are of opinion that\nworldly events are so governed by fortune and by God, that men cannot\nby their prudence change them, and that on the contrary there is no\nremedy whatever, and for this they may judge it to be useless to toil\nmuch about them, but let things be ruled by chance. This opinion has\nbeen more believed in in our day, from the great changes that have been\nseen, and are daily seen, beyond every human conjecture.\n\nWhen I think about them at times, I am partly inclined to share\nthis opinion. Nevertheless, that our freewill may not be altogether\nextinguished, I think it may be true that fortune is the ruler of half\nour actions, but that she allows the other half or a little less to be\ngoverned by us. I would compare her to an impetuous river that, when\nturbulent, inundates the plains, ruins trees and buildings, removes\nearth from this side and places it on the other; every one flies before\nit, and everything yields to its fury without being able to oppose it;\nand yet though it is of such a kind, still when it is quiet, men can\nmake provision against it by dams and banks, so that when it rises\nit will either go into a canal or its rush will not be so wild and\ndangerous. It happens similarly with fortune, which shows her power\nwhere no measures have been taken to resist her, and turns her fury\nwhere she knows that no dams or barriers have been made to hold her.\nAnd if you regard Italy, which has been the seat of these changes, and\nwho has given the impulse to them, you will see her to be a country\nwithout dams or barriers of any kind. If she had been protected by\nproper measures, like Germany, Spain, and France, this inundation\nwould not have caused the great changes that it has, or would not have\nhappened at all. This must suffice as regards opposition to fortune\nin general. But limiting myself more to particular cases, I would\npoint out how one sees a certain prince to-day fortunate and to-morrow\nruined, without seeing that he has changed in character or otherwise.\nI believe this arises in the first place from the causes that we have\nalready discussed at length; that is to say, because the prince who\nbases himself entirely on fortune is ruined when fortune varies. I\nalso believe that he is happy whose mode of proceeding accords with\nthe needs of the times, and similarly he is unfortunate whose mode of\nproceeding is opposed to the times. For one sees that men in those\nthings which lead them to the aim that each one has in view, namely,\nglory and riches, proceed in various ways; one with circumspection,\nanother with impetuosity, one by violence, another by cunning, one with\npatience, another with the reverse; and each by these diverse ways\nmay arrive at his aim. One sees also two cautious men, one of whom\nsucceeds in his designs, and the other not, and in the same way two men\nsucceed equally by different methods, one being cautious, the other\nimpetuous, which arises only from the nature of the times, which does\nor does not conform to their method of proceeding. From this results,\nas I have said, that two men, acting differently, attain the same\neffect, and of two others acting in the same way, one arrives at his\ngood and not the other. From this depend also the changes in fortune,\nfor if it happens that time and circumstances are favourable to one\nwho acts with caution and prudence he will be successful, but if time\nand circumstances change he will be ruined, because he does not change\nhis mode of proceeding. No man is found able to adapt himself to this,\neither because he cannot deviate from that to which his nature disposes\nhim, or else because having always prospered by walking in one path,\nhe cannot persuade himself that it is well to leave it; and therefore\nthe cautious man, when it is time to act suddenly, does not know how\nto do so and is consequently ruined; for if one could change one's\nnature with time and circumstances, fortune would never change. Pope\nJulius II. acted impetuously in everything he did and found the times\nand conditions so in conformity with that mode of proceeding, that he\nalways obtained a good result. Consider the first war that he made\nagainst Bologna while Messer Giovanni Bentivogli was still living. The\nVenetians were not pleased with it, the King of Spain and likewise\nFrance had objections to this enterprise, notwithstanding which with\nhis fierce and impetuous disposition he engaged personally in the\nexpedition. This move caused both Spain and the Venetians to halt and\nhesitate, the latter through fear, the former through the desire to\nregain the entire kingdom of Naples. On the other hand, he engaged\nwith him the King of France, because seeing him make this move and\ndesiring his friendship in order to put down the Venetians, that king\njudged that he could not refuse him his troops without manifest injury.\nThus Julius by his impetuous move achieved what no other pontiff with\nthe utmost human prudence would have succeeded in doing, because, if\nhe had waited till all arrangements had been made and everything\nsettled before leaving Rome, as any other pontiff would have done, it\nwould never have taken place. For the king of France would have found\na thousand excuses, and the others would have inspired him with a\nthousand fears. I will omit his other actions, which were all of this\nkind and which all succeeded well, and the shortness of his life did\nnot suffer him to experience the contrary, for had times succeeded\nin which it was necessary to act with caution, his ruin would have\nresulted, for he would never have deviated from these methods to which\nhis nature disposed him. I conclude then that fortune varying and men\nremaining fixed in their ways, they are successful so long as these\nways conform to each other, but when they are opposed to each other\nthen they are unsuccessful. I certainly think that it is better to be\nimpetuous than cautious, for fortune is a woman, and it is necessary,\nif you wish to master her, to conquer her by force; and it can be seen\nthat she lets herself be overcome by these rather than by those who\nproceed coldly. And therefore, like a woman, she is a friend to the\nyoung, because they are less cautious, fiercer, and master her with\ngreater audacity.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXVI\n\n\nEXHORTATION TO LIBERATE ITALY FROM THE BARBARIANS\n\n\nHaving now considered all the things we have spoken of, and thought\nwithin myself whether at present the time was not propitious in Italy\nfor a new prince, and if there was not a state of things which offered\nan opportunity to a prudent and capable man to introduce a new system\nthat would do honour to himself and good to the mass of the people, it\nseems to me that so many things concur to favour a new ruler that I do\nnot know of any time more fitting for such an enterprise. And if, as\nI said, it was necessary in order that the power of Moses should be\ndisplayed that the people of Israel should be slaves in Egypt, and to\ngive scope for the greatness and courage of Cyrus that the Persians\nshould be oppressed by the Medes, and to illustrate the pre-eminence of\nTheseus that the Athenians should be dispersed, so at the present time,\nin order that the might of an Italian genius might be recognised, it\nwas necessary that Italy should be reduced to her present condition,\nand that she should be more enslaved than the Hebrews, more oppressed\nthan the Persians, and more scattered than the Athenians; without a\nhead, without order, beaten, despoiled, lacerated, and overrun, and\nthat she should have suffered ruin of every kind. And although before\nnow a spirit has been shown by some which gave hope that he might be\nappointed by God for her redemption, yet at the highest summit of his\ncareer he was thrown aside by fortune, so that now, almost lifeless,\nshe awaits one who may heal her wounds and put a stop to the rapine and\npillaging of Lombardy, to the rapacity and extortion in the kingdom\nand in Tuscany, and cure her of those sores which have long been\nfestering. Behold how she prays God to send some one to redeem her from\nthis barbarous cruelty and insolence. Behold her ready and willing to\nfollow any standard if only there be some one to raise it. There is\nnothing now she can hope for but that your illustrious house may place\nitself at the head of this redemption, being by its power and fortune\nso exalted, and being favoured by God and the Church, whose leadership\nit now occupies. Nor will this be very difficult to you, if you call to\nmind the actions and lives of the men I have named. And although those\nmen were rare and marvellous, they were none the less men, and had each\nof them less occasion than the present, for their enterprise was not\njuster than this, nor easier, nor was God more their friend than He is\nyours. Here is a just cause; for that war is just which is necessary;\nand those arms are merciful where no hope exists save in them. Here\nis the greatest willingness, nor can there be great difficulty where\nthere is great willingness, provided that the measures are adopted of\nthose whom I have set before you as examples. Besides this, unexampled\nwonders have been seen here performed by God, the sea has been opened,\na cloud has shown you the road, the rock has given forth water, manna\nhas rained, and everything has contributed to your greatness, the\nremainder must be done by you. God will not do everything, in order\nnot to deprive us of freewill and the portion of the glory that falls\nto our lot. It is no marvel that none of the before-mentioned Italians\nhave done that which it is to be hoped your illustrious house may do;\nand if in so many revolutions in Italy and so many warlike operations,\nit always seems as if the military capacity were extinct, this is\nbecause the ancient methods were not good, and no one has arisen\nwho knew how to discover new ones. Nothing does so much honour to a\nnewly-risen man than the new laws and measures which he introduces.\nThese things, when they are well based and have greatness in them,\nrender him revered and admired, and there is not lacking scope in Italy\nfor the introduction of every kind. Here there is great virtue in the\nmembers, if it were not wanting in the heads. Look how in duels and in\ncouncils of a few the Italians are superior in strength, dexterity,\nand intelligence. But when it comes to armies they make a poor show;\nwhich proceeds entirely from the weakness of the leaders, for those\nthat know are not obedient, and every one thinks that he knows, there\nbeing hitherto nobody who has raised himself so high both by valour and\nfortune as to make the others yield. Hence it comes about that in all\nthis time, in all the wars waged during the last twenty years, whenever\nthere has been an army entirely Italian it has always been a failure,\nas witness first Taro, then Alexandria, Capua, Genoa, Vaila, Bologna,\nand Mestri. If your illustrious house, therefore, wishes to follow\nthose great men who redeemed their countries, it is before all things\nnecessary, as the true foundation of every undertaking, to provide\nyourself with your own forces, for you cannot have more faithful, or\ntruer and better soldiers. And although each one of them may be good,\nthey will together become better when they see themselves commanded\nby their prince, and honoured and supported by him. It is therefore\nnecessary to prepare such forces in order to be able with Italian\nprowess to defend the country from foreigners. And although both the\nSwiss and Spanish infantry are deemed terrible, none the less they\neach have their defects, so that a third order might not only oppose\nthem, but be confident of overcoming them. For the Spaniards cannot\nsustain the attack of cavalry, and the Swiss have to fear infantry\nwhich meets them with resolution equal to their own. From which it has\nresulted, as will be seen by experience, that the Spaniards cannot\nsustain the attack of French cavalry, and the Swiss are overthrown\nby Spanish infantry. And although a complete example of the latter\nhas not been seen, yet an instance was furnished in the battle of\nRavenna, where the Spanish infantry attacked the German battalions,\nwhich observe the same order as the Swiss. The Spaniards, through their\nbodily agility and aided by their bucklers, had entered between and\nunder their pikes and were in a position to attack them safely without\nthe Germans being able to defend themselves; and if the cavalry had not\ncharged them they would have utterly destroyed them. Knowing therefore\nthe defects of both these kinds of infantry, a third kind can be\ncreated which can resist cavalry and need not fear infantry, and this\nwill be done not by the creation of armies but by a change of system.\nAnd these are the things which, when newly introduced, give reputation\nand grandeur to a new prince. This opportunity must not, therefore,\nbe allowed to pass, for letting Italy at length see her liberator. I\ncannot express the love with which he would be received in all those\nprovinces which have suffered under these foreign invasions, with what\nthirst for vengeance, with what steadfast faith, with what love, with\nwhat grateful tears. What doors would be closed against him? What\npeople would refuse him obedience? What envy could oppose him? What\nItalian would rebel against him? This barbarous domination stinks in\nthe nostrils of every one. May your illustrious house therefore assume\nthis task with that courage and those hopes which are inspired by a\njust cause, so that under its banner our fatherland may be raised up,\nand under its auspices be verified that saying of Petrarch:\n\n\n    Valour against fell wrath\n    Will take up arms; and be the combat quickly sped!\n    For, sure, the ancient worth,\n    That in Italians stirs the heart, is not yet dead.\n\n\nTHE END","title":"The Prince","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":30969}