{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_5717/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_5717","id":"gutenberg_5717","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/5717","summary":null,"tags":["Bergson, Henri, 1859-1941","Category: Biographies","Category: French Literature","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Philosophy"],"text":"Produced by Juliet Sutherland, Charles Franks and the\nOnline Distributed Proofreading Team\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nBERGSON AND HIS PHILOSOPHY\n\nBy J. Alexander Gunn, M. A.,\n\nFellow of The University Of Liverpool\n\nWith An Introduction By Alexander Mair, M. A.,\n\nProfessor of Philosophy in The University Of Liverpool\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n      PREFACE\n\n      INTRODUCTION\n\n   I. LIFE OF BERGSON\n\n  II. THE REALITY OF CHANGE\n\n III. PERCEPTION\n\n  IV. MEMORY\n\n   V. THE RELATION OF SOUL AND BODY\n\n  VI. TIME-TRUE AND FALSE\n\n VII. FREEDOM OF THE WILL\n\nVIII. EVOLUTION\n\n  IX. THE GOSPEL OF INTUITION\n\n   X. ETHICAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS\n\n  XI. RELATION TO RELIGION AND THEOLOGY\n\n XII. REFLECTIONS\n\n      APPENDIX: BIBLIOGRAPHY\n\n      INDEX\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\nThe aim of this little work is practical, and it is put forth in the\nhope that it may be useful to the general reader and to the student\nof philosophy as an introduction and guide to the study of Bergson's\nthought. The war has led many to an interest in philosophy and to\na study of its problems. Few modern thinkers will be found more\nfascinating, more suggestive and stimulating than Bergson, and it is\nhoped that perusal of the following pages will lead to a study of the\nwritings of the philosopher himself. This is a work whose primary aim is\nthe clear exposition of Bergson's ideas, and the arrangement of chapters\nhas been worked out strictly with that end in view. An account of his\nlife is prefixed. An up-to-date bibliography is given, mainly to meet\nthe needs of English readers; all the works of Bergson which have\nappeared in England or America are given, and the comprehensive list\nof articles is confined to English and American publications. The\nconcluding chapters endeavour to estimate the value of Bergson's thought\nin relation to Politics (especially Syndicalism), Ethics, Religion, and\nthe development of thought generally.\n\nMy thanks are due to Professor Mair, Professor of Philosophy in the\nUniversity of Liverpool, for having read the MS. while in course of\npreparation, for contributing an introduction, for giving some\nhelpful criticism and suggestions, and, what is more, for stimulus and\nencouragement given over several years of student life.\n\nProfessor Bergson has himself expressed his approval of the general form\nof treatment, and I am indebted to him for information on a number\nof points. To Dr. Gillespie, Professor of Philosophy at Leeds, I am\nindebted for a discussion of most of the MS. following the reading of\nit. My thanks are also due to Miss Margaret Linn, whose energetic and\ncareful assistance in preparing the MS. for the press was invaluable.\nI wish also to acknowledge kindness shown in supplying information\non certain points in connexion with the bibliography by Mr. F. C.\nNicholson, Librarian of the University of Edinburgh, by Mr. R. Rye,\nLibrarian to the University of London, and by the University of London\nPress. I am grateful to Professor Bergson and to the Delegates of the\nOxford University Press for permission to quote from La Perception du\nChangement, the lectures given at Oxford. Further I must acknowledge\npermission accorded to me by the English publishers of Bergson's works\nto quote passages directly from these authorized translations--To\nMessrs. Geo. Allen & Unwin, Ltd. (Time and Free Will and Matter and\nMemory), to Messrs. Macmillan & Co., Ltd. (Creative Evolution, Laughter,\nIntroduction to Metaphysics), and to T. Fisher Unwin, Ltd. (Dreams).\nThrough the kindness of M. Louis Michaud, the Paris publisher, I have\nbeen enabled to reproduce (from his volume of selections, Henri\nBergson: Choix de textes et etude de systeme philosophique, Gillouin) a\nphotograph of Bergson hitherto unpublished in this country.\n\nJ.A.G.\n\nTHE UNIVERSITY, LIVERPOOL March, 1920\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\nThe stir caused in the civilized world by the writings of Bergson,\nparticularly during the past decade, is evidenced by the volume of the\nstream of exposition and comment which has flowed and is still flowing.\nIf the French were to be tempted to set up, after the German manner, a\nBergson-Archiv they would be in no embarrassment for material, as the\nAppendix to this book--limited though it wisely is--will show. Mr.\nGunn, undaunted by all this, makes a further, useful contribution in his\nunassuming but workmanlike and well-documented account of the ideas\nof the distinguished French thinker. It is designed to serve as an\nintroduction to Bergson's philosophy for those who are making their\nfirst approach to it, and as such it can be commended.\n\nThe eager interest which has been manifested in the writings of\nM. Bergson is one more indication, added to the many which history\nprovides, of the inextinguishable vitality of Philosophy. When the\nman with some important thought which bears upon its problems is\nforthcoming, the world is ready, indeed is anxious, to listen. Perhaps\nthere is no period in recorded time in which the thinker, with something\nrelevant to say on the fundamental questions, has had so large and so\nprepared an audience as in our own day. The zest and expectancy with\nwhich men welcome and listen to him is almost touching; it has its\ndangerous as well as its admirable aspects. The fine enthusiasm for the\nphysical and biological sciences, which is so noble an attribute of the\nmodern mind, has far from exhausted itself, but the almost boundless\nhope which for a time accompanied it has notably abated. The study of\nthe immediate problems centring round the concepts of matter, life, and\nenergy goes on with undiminished, nay, with intensified, zeal, but in\na more judicious perspective. It begins to be noticed that, far from\nleading us to solutions which will bring us to the core of reality and\nfurnish us with a synthesis which can be taken as the key to experience,\nit is carrying the scientific enquirer into places in which he feels the\npressing need of Philosophy rather than the old confidence that he is\non the verge of abolishing it as a superfluity. The former hearty and\nself-assured empiricism of science is giving way before the outcome of\nits own logic and a new and more promising spirit of reflection on its\nown \"categories\" is abroad. Things are turning out to be very far from\nwhat they seemed. The physicists have come to a point where, it may be\nto their astonishment, they often find themselves talking in a way which\nis suspiciously like that of the subjective idealist. They have made the\nuseful discovery that if you sink your shaft deep enough in your search\nfor reality you come upon Mind. Here they are in a somewhat unfamiliar\nregion, in which they may possibly find that other instruments and other\nmethods than those to which they have been accustomed are required. At\nany rate, they and the large public which hangs upon their words show a\ngrowing inclination to be respectful to the philosopher and an anxiety\n(sometimes an uncritical anxiety) to hear what he has to say.\n\nNo one needs to be reminded of the ferment which is moving in the world\nof social affairs, of the obscure but powerful tendencies which are\nforcing society out of its grooves and leaving it, aspiring but dubious,\nin new and uncharted regions. This may affect different minds in\ndifferent ways. Some regret it, others rejoice in it; but all are aware\nof it. Time-honoured political and economic formulae are become \"old\nclothes\" for an awakened and ardent generation, and before the new\ngarments are quite ready; the blessed word \"reconstruction\" is often\nmentioned. Men are not satisfied that society has really developed so\nsuccessfully as it might have done; many believe that it finds itself in\na cul-de-sac. But what is to be done? The experienced can see that many\nof the offered reforms are but the repetition of old mistakes which will\ninvolve us in the unhappy cycle of disillusion and failure. It is not to\nbe wondered at, therefore, if men everywhere are seeking for a sign, a\nglimpse of a scheme of life, a view of reality, a hint of human destiny\nand the true outcome of human effort, to be an inspiration and a guide\nto them in their pathetic struggle out of the morass in which they, too\nobviously, are plunged. If Philosophy has anything to say which is to\nthe point, then let Philosophy by all means say it. They are ready to\nattend. They may indeed expect too much from it, as those who best grasp\nthe measure of Philosophy's task would be the first to urge.\n\nThis is the opportunity of the charlatan. Puzzled and half-desperate, we\nstrongly feel the influence of the need to believe, are prone to\nlisten to any gospel. The greater its air of finality and assurance the\nstronger is its appeal. But it is the opportunity also of the serious\nand competent thinker, and it is fortunate for the world that one of\nM. Bergson's quality is forthcoming. He is too wise a man, he knows the\nhistory of human thought too well, he realizes too clearly the extent of\nthe problem to pretend that his is the last word or that he has in his\npocket the final solution of the puzzle of the universe and the one and\nonly panacea for human distresses. But he has one of the most subtle and\npenetrating intellects acting in and upon the world at this moment,\nand is more worthy of attention than all the charlatans. That he has\nobtained for himself so great an audience is one of the most striking\nand hopeful signs of the present time.\n\nIt is the more impressive inasmuch as Bergson cannot be said to be an\neasy author. The originality and sweep of his conceptions, the fine and\ndelicate psychological analysis in which he is so adept and which is\nnecessary for the development of his ideas--e.g., in his exposition\nof duree--make exacting demands upon those readers who wish to closely\nfollow his thought. An interesting fact is that this is realized most\nof all by those who come to Bergson with a long process of philosophical\ndiscipline behind them. It is not surprising when we remember what he\nis trying to do, namely, to induce philosophical thought to run in\nnew channels. The general reader has here an advantage over the other,\ninasmuch as he has less to unlearn. In the old words, unless we become\nas little children we cannot enter into this kingdom; though it is true\nthat we do not remain as little children once entry is made. This is a\nserious difficulty for the hard-bitten philosopher who at considerable\npains has formed conceptions, acquired a technique, and taken an\norientation towards life and the universe which he cannot dismiss in\na moment. It says much for the charitable spirit of Bergson's\nfellow-philosophers that they have given so friendly and hospitable a\nreception to his disturbing ideas, and so essentially humane a man as\nhe must have been touched by this. The Bahnbrecher has his troubles,\nno doubt, but so also have those upon whose minds he is endeavouring to\noperate. Reinhold, one of Kant's earliest disciples, ruefully stated,\naccording to Schopenhauer's story, that it was only after having gone\nthrough the Critique of Pure Reason five times with the closest and\nmost scrupulous attention that he was able to get a grasp of Kant's real\nmeaning. Now, after the lapse of a century and a half, Kant to many is\nchild's play compared with Bergson, who differs more fundamentally from\nKant than the Scoto-German thinker did from Leibniz and Hume. But this\nneed not alarm the general reader who, innocent of any very articulate\nphilosophical preconceptions, may indeed find in the very \"novelty\" of\nBergson's teaching a powerful attraction, inasmuch as it gives effective\nexpression to thoughts and tendencies moving dimly and half-formed in\nthe consciousness of our own epoch, felt rather than thought. In this\nsense Bergson may be said to have produced a \"philosophy for the times.\"\nIn one respect Bergson has a marked advantage over Kant, and indeed over\nmost other philosophers, namely, in his recognized masterly control over\nthe instrument of language. There is a minimum of jargon, nothing\nturgid or crabbed. He reminds us most, in the skill and charm of his\nexpression, of Plato and Berkeley among the philosophers. He does not\nwork with so fine and biting a point as his distinguished countryman and\nfellow-philosopher, Anatole France, but he has, nevertheless, a burin\nat command of remarkable quality. He is a master of the succinct and\nmemorable phrase in which an idea is etched out for us in a few strokes.\nAlready, in his lifetime, a number of terms stamped with the impress\nof Bergson's thought have passed into international currency. In this\nconnexion, has it been remarked that while an Englishman gave to the\nFrench the term \"struggle for life,\" a Frenchman has given to us the\nterm elan vital? It is worthy of passing notice and gives rise to\nreflections on the respective national temperaments, fanciful perhaps,\nbut interesting. It is not, however, under the figure of the etcher's\nart or of the process of the mint that we can fully represent Bergson's\nresources of style. These suggest staccato effects, hard outlines, and\nthat does not at all represent the prose of this writer. It is a fine,\ndelicately interwoven, tissue-like fabric, pliant and supple. If\none were in the secret of M. Bergson's private thoughts, it might be\ndiscovered that he does not admire his style so much as others do, for\nhis whole manner of thought must, one suspects, have led him often to\nattempt to express the inexpressible. The ocean of life, that fluide\nbienfaisant in which we are immersed, has no doubt often proved too\nfluid even for him. \"Only the understanding has a language,\" he almost\nruefully declares in L'Evolution creatrice; and the understanding is,\nfor him, compared with intuition peu de chose. Yet we can say that in\nwhat he has achieved his success is remarkable. The web of language\nwhich he weaves seems to fit and follow the movements of his thought as\nthe skin ripples over the moving muscles of the thoroughbred. And this\nis not an accidental or trivial fact. M. Bergson may possibly agree with\nSeneca that \"too much attention to style does not become a philosopher,\"\nbut the quality of his thought and temperament does not allow him to\nexpress himself otherwise than lucidly. Take this, almost at random, as\na characteristic example. It must be given, of course, in the original:\n\n\"L'intelligence humaine, telle que nous la representons, n'est point du\ntout celle que nous montrait Platon dans l'allegorie de la caverne. Elle\nn'a pas plus pour fonction de regarder passer des ombres vaines que de\ncontempler, en se retournant derriere elle, l'astre eblouissant. Elle\na autre chose a faire. Atteles comme des boeufs de labour, a une lourde\ntache, nous sentons le jeu de nos muscles et de nos articulations, le\npoids de la charrue et la resistance du sol: agir et se savoir agir,\nentrer en contact avec la realite et meme la vivre, mais dans la measure\nseulement ou elle interesse l'oeuvre qui s'accomplit et le sillon qui se\ncreuse, voila la fonction de l'intelligence humaine.\"\n\nThat is sufficiently clear; we may legitimately doubt whether it is\nan adequate account of the function of the human intelligence, but we\ncannot be in any doubt as to what the view is; and more than that, once\nwe have become acquainted with it, we are not likely to forget it.\n\nFor the student as yet unpractised in philosophical reflection,\nBergson's skill and clarity of statement, his fertility in illustration,\nhis frequent and picturesque use of analogy may be a pitfall. It all\nsounds so convincing and right, as Bergson puts it, that the critical\nfaculty is put to sleep. There is peril in this, particularly here,\nwhere we have to deal with so bold and even revolutionary a doctrine. If\nwe are able to retain our independence of judgment we are bound sooner\nor later, in spite of Bergson's persuasiveness, to have our misgivings.\nAfter all, we may begin to reflect, he has been too successful, he\nhas proved too much. In attempting to use, as he was bound to do, the\nintelligence to discredit the intelligence he has been attempting the\nimpossible. He has only succeeded in demonstrating the authority, the\nmagisterial power, of the intelligence. No step in Philosophy can\nbe taken without it. What are Life, Consciousness, Evolution, even\nMovement, as these terms are employed by Bergson, but the symbolization\nof concepts which on his own showing are the peculiar products of the\nhuman understanding or intelligence? It seems, indeed, on reflection,\nthe oddest thing that Philosophy should be employed in the service of\nan anti-intellectual, or as it would be truer to call it a\nsupra-intellectual, attitude. Philosophy is a thinking view of things.\nIt represents the most persistent effort of the human intelligence to\nsatisfy its own needs, to attempt to solve the problems which it has\ncreated: in the familiar phrase, to heal the wounds which it has itself\nmade. The intellect, therefore, telling itself that it is incompetent\nfor this purpose, is a strange, and not truly impressive, spectacle.\n\nWe are not enabled to recover from the sense of impotency thus created\nby being referred to \"intuition.\" Bergson is not the first to try this\nway out. It would be misleading, no doubt, to identify him with the\nmembers of the Scottish School of a hundred years ago or with Jacobi;\nhe reaches his conclusion in another way, and that conclusion is\ndifferently framed; nevertheless, in essence there is a similarity, and\nHegel's comments [Footnote: Smaller Logic, Wallace's translation, c.\nv.] on Bergson's forerunners will often be found to have point with\nreference to Bergson himself.\n\nIt is hardly conceivable that any careful observer of human experience\nwould deny the presence and power of intuition in that experience. The\nfact is too patent. Many who would not give the place to intuition which\nis assigned to it by Bergson would be ready to say that there may be\nmore in the thrilling and passionate intuitive moments than Philosophy,\nafter an age-long and painful effort, has been able to express. All\nknowledge, indeed, may be said to be rooted in intuition. Many a thinker\nhas been supported and inspired through weary years of inquiry and\nreflection by a mother-idea which has come to him, if not unsought yet\nuncompelled, in a flash of insight. But that is the beginning, not the\nend, of his task. It is but the raw material of knowledge, knowledge in\npotentia. To invert the order is to destroy Philosophy not to serve\nit, is, indeed, a mere counsel of desperation. An intuitive Philosophy\nso-called finds itself sooner or later, generally sooner, in a blind\nalley. Practically, it gives rise to all kinds of crude and wasteful\neffort. It is not an accident that Georges Sorel in his Reflexions sur\nla Violence takes his \"philosophy\" from Bergson or, at least, leans on\nhim. There are intuitions and intuitions, as every wise man knows, as\nWilliam James once ruefully admitted after his adventures with nitrous\noxide, or as the eaters of hashish will confess. To follow all our\nintuitions would lead us into the wildest dervish dance of thought and\naction and leave us spent and disheartened at the end. \"Agnosticism\"\nwould be too mild a term for the result. Our intuitions have to be tried\nand tested; there is a thorny and difficult path of criticism to be\ntraversed before we can philosophically endorse them and find peace of\nmind. What Hoffding says is in a sense quite true: \"When we pass into\nintuition we pass into a state without problems.\" But that is, as\nHoffding intends us to understand, not because all problems are thereby\nsolved, but because they have not yet emerged. If we consent to remain\nat that point, we refuse to make the acquaintance of Philosophy; if we\nrecognize the problems that are really latent there, we soon realize\nthat the business of Philosophy is yet to be transacted.\n\nThe fact is that in this part of his doctrine--and it is an important\npart--the brilliant French writer, in his endeavours to make\nphilosophizing more concrete and practical, makes it too abstract.\nIntuition is not a process over against and quite distinct from\nconceptual thought. Both are moments in the total process of man's\nattempt to come to terms with the universe, and too great emphasis on\neither distorts and falsifies the situation in which we find ourselves\non this planet. The insistence on intuition is doubtless due, at bottom,\nto Bergson's admiration for the activity in the creative artist. The\nborder-line between Art and Philosophy becomes almost an imaginary line\nwith him. In the one case as in the other we have, according to him,\nto get inside the object by a sort of sympathy. True, there is this\ndifference, he says, that aesthetic intuition achieves only the\nindividual--which is doubtful--whereas the philosophic intuition is\nto be conceived as a \"recherche orientee dans la meme sens que l'art,\nindeed, but qui prendrait pour objet la vie en general.\" He fails\nto note, it may be observed, that the expression of the aesthetic\nintuition, that is to say, Art, is always fixed and static. This in\nview of other aspects of his doctrine is remarkable. But apart from\nthis attempt to practically identify Art and Philosophy--a hopeless\nattempt--there is, of course, available as a means of explanation the\nwell-known and not entirely deplorable tendency of the protestant and\ninnovator to overstate his case, to bring out by strong emphasis the\naspect with which he is chiefly concerned and which he thinks has been\nunduly neglected. This, as hinted, has its merits, and not only or\nchiefly for Philosophy, but also, and perhaps primarily, for the conduct\nof life. If he convinces men, should they need convincing, that they\ncannot be saved by the discursive reason alone, he will have done a good\nservice to his generation, and to the philosophers among them who may\n(though they ought not to) be tempted to ignore the intuitive element in\nexperience.\n\nThe same tendency to over-emphasis can be observed elsewhere. It is\nnoticeable, for instance, in his discussions of Change, which are so\nmarked and important a feature in his writings. His Philosophy has been\ncalled, with his approval apparently, the Philosophy of Change, though\nit might have been called, still more truly and suggestively, the\nPhilosophy of Creation. It is this latter phase of it which has so\nenormously interested and stimulated the world. As to his treatment of\nChange, it reveals Bergson in one of his happiest moods. It is difficult\nto restrain one's praise in speaking of the subtle and resourceful\nway in which he handles this tantalizing and elusive question. It is a\nstroke of genius. The student of Philosophy, of course, at once thinks\nof Heraclitus; but Bergson is not merely another Heraclitus any more\nthan he is just an echo of Jacobi. He places Change in a new light,\nenables us to grasp its character with a success which, if he had no\nother claim to remembrance, would ensure for him an honourable place\nin the History of Philosophy. In the process he makes but a mouthful\nof Zeno and his eternal puzzles. But, as Mr. Gunn also points\nout,[Footnote: See p. 142.] Change cannot be the last word in our\ncharacterization of Reality. Pure Change is not only unthinkable--that\nperhaps Bergson would allow--but it is something which cannot be\nexperienced. There must be points of reference--a starting point and an\nending point at least. Pure Change, as is the way with \"pure\" anything,\nturns into its contradictory. Paradoxical though it may seem, it ends\nas static. It becomes the One and Indivisible. This, at least, was\nrecognized by Heraclitus and is expressed by him in his figure of the\nGreat Year.\n\nIt is not my purpose, however, to usurp the function of the author of\nthis useful handbook to Bergson. The extent of my introductory remarks\nis an almost involuntary tribute to the material and provocative nature\nof Bergson's discussions, just as the frequent use by the author of this\nbook of the actual words of Bergson are a tribute to the excellence\nand essential rightness of his style. The Frenchman, himself a free and\ncandid spirit, would be the last to require unquestioning docility in\nothers. He knows that thereby is the philosophic breath choked out of\nus. If we read him in the spirit in which he would wish to be read, we\nshall find, however much we may diverge from him on particular issues,\nthat our labour has been far from wasted. He undoubtedly calls for\nconsiderable effort from the student who takes him, as he ought to be\ntaken, seriously; but it is effort well worth while. He, perhaps, shines\neven more as a psychologist than as a philosopher--at least in the\ntime-honoured sense. He has an almost uncanny introspective insight\nand, as has been said, a power of rendering its result in language which\ncreates in the reader a sense of excitement and adventure not to be\nexcelled by the ablest romancer. Fadaises, which are to be met with in\nphilosophical works as elsewhere, are not to be frequently encountered\nin his writings. There is always the fresh breeze of original thought\nblowing here. He is by nature as well as by doctrine the sworn foe of\nconventionality. Though he may not give us all we would wish, in our\nhaste to be all-wise, let us yet be grateful to him for this, that he\nhas the purpose and also the power to shake us out of complacency, to\ncompel us to recast our philosophical account. In this he is supremely\nserviceable to his generation, and is deserving of the gratitude of all\nwho care for Philosophy. For, while Philosophy cannot die, it may be\nallowed to fall into a comatose condition; and this is the unpardonable\nsin.\n\nALEXANDER MAIR\n\nLIVERPOOL UNIVERSITY\n\n\n\nThis huge vision of time and motion, of a mighty world which is always\nbecoming, always changing, growing, striving, and wherein the word of\npower is not law, but life, has captured the modern imagination no less\nthan the modern intellect. It lights with its splendour the patient\ndiscoveries of science. It casts a new radiance on theology, ethics and\nart. It gives meaning to some of our deepest instincts, our strangest\nand least explicable tendencies. But above and beyond all this, it lifts\nthe awful weight which determinism had laid upon our spirits and fills\nthe future with hope; for beyond the struggle and suffering inseparable\nfrom life's flux, as we know it, it reports to us, though we may not\nhear them, \"the thunder of new wings.\"\n\nEvelyn Underhill\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nLIFE OF BERGSON\n\n\nBirth and education--Teaches at Clermont-Ferrand--Les donnees immediates\nde la conscience--Matiere et Memoire--Chair of Greek Philosophy,\nthen of Modern Philosophy, College de France--L'Evolution\ncreatrice--Relations with William James--Visits England and\nAmerica--Popularity--Neo-Catholics and Syndicalists--Election to\nAcademie francaise--War-work--\n\nL'Energie spirituelle.\n\n\nBergson's life has been the quiet and uneventful one of a French\nprofessor, the chief landmarks in it being the publication of his three\nprincipal works, first, in 1889, the Essai sur les donnees immediates\nde la conscience, then Matiere et Memoire in 1896, and L'Evolution\ncreatrice in 1907. On October 18th, 1859, Henri Louis Bergson was born\nin Paris in the Rue Lamartine, not far from the Opera House.[Footnote:\nHe was not born in England as Albert Steenbergen erroneously states in\nhis work, Henri Bergsons Intuitive Philosophie, Jena, 1909, p. 2, nor\nin 1852, the date given by Miss Stebbing in her Pragmatism and French\nVoluntarism.] He is descended from a prominent Jewish family of Poland,\nwith a blend of Irish blood from his mother's side. His family lived\nin London for a few years after his birth, and he obtained an early\nfamiliarity with the English language from his mother. Before he was\nnine years old his parents crossed the Channel and settled in France,\nHenri becoming a naturalized citizen of the Republic.\n\nIn Paris from 1868 to 1878 he attended the Lycee Fontaine, now known as\nthe Lycee Condorcet. While there he obtained a prize for his scientific\nwork and also won a prize when he was eighteen for the solution of a\nmathematical problem. This was in 1877, and his solution was published\nthe following year in Annales de Mathematiques. It is of interest as\nbeing his first published work. After some hesitation over his career,\nas to whether it should lie in the sphere of the sciences or that of\n\"the humanities,\" he decided in favour of the latter, and when nineteen\nyears of age, he entered the famous Ecole Normale Superieure. While\nthere he obtained the degree of Licencie-es-Lettres, and this was\nfollowed by that of Agrege de philosophie in 1881.\n\nThe same year he received a teaching appointment at the Lycee in Angers,\nthe ancient capital of Anjou. Two years later he settled at the Lycee\nBlaise-Pascal in Clermont-Ferrand, chief town of the Puy de Dome\ndepartment, whose name is more known to motorists than to philosophers.\nThe year after his arrival at Clermont-Ferrand he displayed his ability\nin \"the humanities\" by the publication of an excellent edition of\nextracts from Lucretius, with a critical study of the text and the\nphilosophy of the poet (1884), a work whose repeated editions are\nsufficient evidence of its useful place in the promotion of classical\nstudy among the youth of France. While teaching and lecturing in this\nbeautiful part of his country (the Auvergne region), Bergson found time\nfor private study and original work. He was engaged on his Essai sur les\ndonnees immediates de la conscience. This essay, which, in its English\ntranslation, bears the more definite and descriptive title, Time and\nFree Will, was submitted, along with a short Latin Thesis on Aristotle,\nfor the degree of Docteur-es-Lettres, to which he was admitted by the\nUniversity of Paris in 1889. The work was published in the same year\nby Felix Alcan, the Paris publisher, in his series La Bibliotheque de\nphilosophie contemporaine.\n\nIt is interesting to note that Bergson dedicated this volume to Jules\nLachelier, then ministre de l'instruction publique, who was an ardent\ndisciple of Ravaisson and the author of a rather important philosophical\nwork Du fondement de l'Induction (1871), who in his view of things\nendeavoured \"to substitute everywhere force for inertia, life for\ndeath, and liberty for fatalism.\" [Footnote: Lachelier was born in 1832,\nRavaisson in 1813. Bergson owed much to both of these teachers of the\nEcole Normale Superieure. Cf. his memorial address on Ravaisson, who\ndied in 1900. (See Bibliography under 1904.)]\n\nBergson now settled again in Paris, and after teaching for some months\nat the Municipal College, known as the College Rollin, he received\nan appointment at the Lycee Henri-Quatre, where he remained for eight\nyears. In 1896 he published his second large work, entitled Matiere et\nMemoire. This rather difficult, but brilliant, work investigates the\nfunction of the brain, undertakes an analysis of perception and memory,\nleading up to a careful consideration of the problems of the relation\nof body and mind. Bergson, we know, has spent years of research in\npreparation for each of his three large works. This is especially\nobvious in Matiere et Memoire, where he shows a very thorough\nacquaintance with the extensive amount of pathological investigation\nwhich has been carried out in recent years, and for which France is\njustly entitled to very honourable mention.\n\nIn 1898 Bergson became Maitre de conferences at his Alma Mater, L'Ecole\nNormale Superieure, and was later promoted to a Professorship. The year\n1900 saw him installed as Professor at the College de France, where\nhe accepted the Chair of Greek Philosophy in succession to Charles\nL'Eveque. The College de France, founded in 1530, by Francois I, is\nless ancient, and until recent years has been less prominent in general\nrepute than the Sorbonne, which traces back its history to the middle\nof the thirteenth century. Nevertheless, it is one of the intellectual\nheadquarters of France, indeed of the whole world. While the Sorbonne is\nnow the seat of the University of Paris, the College is an independent\ninstitution under the control of the Ministre de l'Instruction\npublique. The lectures given by the very eminent professors who fill\nits forty-three chairs are free and open to the general public, and are\nattended mainly by a large number of women students and by the senior\nstudents from the University. The largest lecture room in the College\nwas given to Bergson, but this became quite inadequate to accommodate\nhis hearers.\n\nAt the First International Congress of Philosophy, which was held in\nParis, during the first five days of August, 1900, Bergson read a short,\nbut important, paper, Sur les origines psychologiques de notre croyance\na la loi de causalite. In 1901 Felix Alcan published in book form a work\nwhich had just previously appeared in the Revue de Paris entitled Le\nRire, one of the most important of his minor productions. This essay on\nthe meaning of the Comic was based on a lecture which he had given\nin his early days in the Auvergne. The study of it is essential to an\nunderstanding of Bergson's views of life, and its passages dealing with\nthe place of the artistic in life are valuable. In 1901 he was elected\nto the Academie des Sciences morales et politiques, and became a member\nof the Institute. In 1903 he contributed to the Revue de metaphysique\net de morale a very important essay entitled Introduction a la\nmetaphysique, which is useful as a preface to the study of his three\nlarge books.\n\nOn the death of Gabriel Tarde, the eminent sociologist, in 1904, Bergson\nsucceeded him in the Chair of Modern Philosophy. From the 4th to the\n8th of September of that year he was at Geneva attending the Second\nInternational Congress of Philosophy, when he lectured on Le Paralogisme\npsycho-physiologique, or, to quote its new title, Le Cerveau et la\nPensee: une illusion philosophique. An illness prevented his visiting\nGermany to attend the Third Congress held at Heidelberg.\n\nHis third large work--his greatest book--L'Evolution creatrice, appeared\nin 1907, and is undoubtedly, of all his works, the one which is most\nwidely known and most discussed. It constitutes one of the most profound\nand original contributions to the philosophical consideration of the\ntheory of Evolution. Un livre comme L'Evolution creatrice, remarks\nImbart de la Tour, n'est pas seulment une oeuvre, mais une date, celle\nd'une direction nouvelle imprimee a la pensee. By 1918, Alcan, the\npublisher, had issued twenty-one editions, making an average of two\neditions per annum for ten years. Since the appearance of this book,\nBergson's popularity has increased enormously, not only in academic\ncircles, but among the general reading public.\n\nHe came to London in 1908 and visited William James, the American\nphilosopher of Harvard, who was Bergson's senior by seventeen years,\nand who was instrumental in calling the attention of the Anglo-American\npublic to the work of the French professor. This was an interesting\nmeeting and we find James' impression of Bergson given in his Letters\nunder date of October 4, 1908. \"So modest and unpretending a man but\nsuch a genius intellectually! I have the strongest suspicions that the\ntendency which he has brought to a focus, will end by prevailing, and\nthat the present epoch will be a sort of turning point in the history of\nphilosophy.\"\n\nAs in some quarters erroneous ideas prevail regarding both the\nhistorical and intellectual relation between James and Bergson, it may\nbe useful to call attention to some of the facts here. As early as 1880\nJames contributed an article in French to the periodical La Critique\nphilosophique, of Renouvier and Pillon, entitled Le Sentiment de\nl'Effort.[Footnote: Cf. his Principles of Psychology, Vol. II., chap\nxxvi.] Four years later a couple of articles by him appeared in Mind:\nWhat is an Emotion?[Footnote: Mind, 1884, pp. 188-205.] and On some\nOmissions of Introspective Psychology.[Footnote: Mind, 1884, pp. 1-26.]\nOf these articles the first two were quoted by Bergson in his work of\n1889, Les donnees immediates de la conscience. In the following\nyears 1890-91 appeared the two volumes of James' monumental work,\nThe Principles of Psychology, in which he refers to a pathological\nphenomenon observed by Bergson. Some writers taking merely these dates\ninto consideration, and overlooking the fact that James' investigations\nhad been proceeding since 1870, registered from time to time by various\narticles which culminated in The Principles, have mistakenly assigned\nto Bergson's ideas priority in time.[Footnote: For example A. Chaumeix:\nWilliam James (Revue des Deux Mondes, Oct, 1910), and J. Bourdeau:\nNouvelles modes en philosophie, Journal de Debats, Feb., 1907. Cf.\nFlournoy: La philosophie de William James. (Eng. Trans. Holt and James,\npp. 198-206).] On the other hand insinuations have been made to the\neffect that Bergson owes the germ-ideas of his first book to the 1884\narticle by James On Some Omissions of Introspective Psychology, which\nhe neither refers to nor quotes. This particular article deals with\nthe conception of thought as a stream of consciousness, which intellect\ndistorts by framing into concepts. We must not be misled by parallels.\nBergson has replied to this insinuation by denying that he had any\nknowledge of the article by James when he wrote Les donnees immediates\nde la conscience.[Footnote: Relation a William James et a James Ward.\nArt. in Revue philosophique, Aug., 1905, lx., p. 229.] The two thinkers\nappear to have developed independently until almost the close of the\ncentury. In truth they are much further apart in their intellectual\nposition than is frequently supposed.[Footnote: The reader who desires\nto follow the various views of the relation of Bergson and James will\nfind the following works useful. Kallen (a pupil of James): William\nJames and Henri Bergson: a study in contrasting theories of life.\nStebbing: Pragmatism and French Voluntarism. Caldwell: Pragmatism and\nIdealism (last chap). Perry: Present Philosophical Tendencies. Boutroux:\nWilliam James (Eng. Tr.). Flournoy: La philosophie de James (Eng. Tr.).\nAnd J. E. Turner: An Examination of William James' Philosophy.] Both\nhave succeeded in appealing to audiences far beyond the purely academic\nsphere, but only in their mutual rejection of \"intellectualism\" as final\nis there real harmony or unanimity between them. It will not do to press\ntoo closely analogies between the Radical Empiricism of the American\nand the Doctrine of Intuition of the Frenchman. Although James obtains a\ncertain priority in point of time in the development and enunciation\nof his ideas, we must remember that he confessed that he was baffled by\nmany of Bergson's notions. James certainly neglected many of the deeper\nmetaphysical aspects of Bergson's thought, which did not harmonize\nwith his own, and are even in direct contradiction. In addition to this\nBergson is no pragmatist, for him \"utility,\" so far from being a test of\ntruth, is rather the reverse, a synonym for error.\n\nNevertheless, William James hailed Bergson as an ally very\nenthusiastically. Early in the century (1903) we find him remarking in\nhis correspondence: \"I have been re-reading Bergson's books, and nothing\nthat I have read since years has so excited and stimulated my thoughts.\nI am sure that that philosophy has a great future, it breaks through old\ncadres and brings things into a solution from which new crystals can\nbe got.\" The most noteworthy tributes paid by him to Bergson were those\nmade in the Hibbert Lectures (A Pluralistic Universe), which James\ngave at Manchester College, Oxford, shortly after he and Bergson met in\nLondon. He there remarked upon the encouragement he had received from\nBergson's thought, and referred to the confidence he had in being \"able\nto lean on Bergson's authority.\" [Footnote: A Pluralistic Universe, pp.\n214-15. Cf. the whole of Lecture V. The Compounding of Consciousness,\npp. 181-221, and Lecture VI. Bergson and His Critique of\nIntellectualism, pp. 225-273.] \"Open Bergson, and new horizons loom on\nevery page you read. It is like the breath of the morning and the song\nof birds. It tells of reality itself, instead of merely reiterating\nwhat dusty-minded professors have written about what other previous\nprofessors have thought. Nothing in Bergson is shop-worn or at\nsecond-hand.\" [Footnote: Lecture VI., p. 265.] The influence of Bergson\nhad led him \"to renounce the intellectualist method and the current\nnotion that logic is an adequate measure of what can or cannot be.\"\n[Footnote: A Pluralistic Universe, p. 212.] It had induced him, he\ncontinued, \"TO GIVE UP THE LOGIC, squarely and irrevocably\" as a method,\nfor he found that \"reality, life, experience, concreteness, immediacy,\nuse what word you will, exceeds our logic, overflows, and surrounds it.\"\n[Footnote: A Pluralistic Universe, p. 212.]\n\nNaturally, these remarks, which appeared in book form in 1909, directed\nmany English and American readers to an investigation of Bergson's\nphilosophy for themselves. A certain handicap existed in that his\ngreatest work had not then been translated into English. James, however,\nencouraged and assisted Dr. Arthur Mitchell in his preparation of the\nEnglish translation of L'Evolution creatrice. In August of 1910 James\ndied. It was his intention, had he lived to see the completion of\nthe translation, to introduce it to the English reading public by a\nprefatory note of appreciation. In the following year the translation\nwas completed and still greater interest in Bergson and his work was the\nresult. By a coincidence, in that same year (1911), Bergson penned\nfor the French translation of James' book, Pragmatism,[Footnote: Le\nPragmatisme: Translated by Le Brun. Paris, Flammarion.] a preface\nof sixteen pages, entitled Verite et Realite. In it he expressed\nsympathetic appreciation of James' work, coupled with certain important\nreservations.\n\nIn April (5th to 11th) Bergson attended the Fourth International\nCongress of Philosophy held at Bologna, in Italy, where he gave\na brilliant address on L'Intuition philosophique. In response to\ninvitations received he came again to England in May of that year, and\nhas paid us several subsequent visits. These visits have always been\nnoteworthy events and have been marked by important deliverances. Many\nof these contain important contributions to thought and shed new light\non many passages in his three large works, Time and Free Will,\nMatter and Memory, and Creative Evolution. Although necessarily brief\nstatements, they are of more recent date than his books, and thus show\nhow this acute thinker can develop and enrich his thought and take\nadvantage of such an opportunity to make clear to an English audience\nthe fundamental principles of his philosophy.\n\nHe visited Oxford and delivered at the University, on the 26th and 27th\nof May, two lectures entitled La Perception du Changement, which were\npublished in French in the same year by the Clarendon Press. As Bergson\nhas a delightful gift of lucid and brief exposition, when the occasion\ndemands such treatment, these lectures on Change form a most valuable\nsynopsis or brief survey of the fundamental principles of his\nthought, and serve the student or general reader alike as an excellent\nintroduction to the study of the larger volumes. Oxford honoured its\ndistinguished visitor by conferring upon him the degree of Doctor of\nScience. Two days later he delivered the Huxley Lecture at Birmingham\nUniversity, taking for his subject Life and Consciousness. This\nsubsequently appeared in The Hibbert Journal (Oct., 1911), and since\nrevised, forms the first essay in the collected volume L'Energie\nspirituelle or Mind-Energy. In October he was again in England, where\nhe had an enthusiastic reception, and delivered at London University\n(University College) four lectures on La Nature de l'Ame. In 1913 he\nvisited the United States of America, at the invitation of Columbia\nUniversity, New York, and lectured in several American cities, where\nhe was welcomed by very large audiences. In February, at Columbia\nUniversity, he lectured both in French and English, taking as his\nsubjects: Spiritualite et Liberte and The Method of Philosophy. Being\nagain in England in May of the same year, he accepted the Presidency of\nthe British Society for Psychical Research, and delivered to the Society\nan impressive address: Fantomes des Vivants et Recherche psychique.\n\nMeanwhile, his popularity increased, and translations of his works began\nto appear in a number of languages, English, German, Italian, Danish,\nSwedish, Magyar, Polish and Russian. In 1914 he was honoured by\nhis fellow-countrymen in being elected as a member of the Academie\nfrancaise. He was also made President of the Academie des Sciences\nmorales et politiques, and in addition he became Officier de la Legion\nd'Honneur, and Officier de l'Instruction publique. He found disciples\nof many varied types, and in France movements such as Neo-Catholicism or\nModernism on the one hand and Syndicalism on the other, endeavoured to\nabsorb and to appropriate for their own immediate use and propaganda\nsome of the central ideas of his teaching. That important continental\norgan of socialist and syndicalist theory, Le Mouvement socialiste,\nsuggested that the realism of Karl Marx and Prudhon is hostile to all\nforms of intellectualism, and that, therefore, supporters of Marxian\nsocialism should welcome a philosophy such as that of Bergson. Other\nwriters, in their eagerness, asserted the collaboration of the Chair of\nPhilosophy at the College de France with the aims of the Confederation\nGenerale du Travail and the Industrial Workers of the World. It\nwas claimed that there is harmony between the flute of personal\nphilosophical meditation and the trumpet of social revolution. These\nstatements are considered in the chapter dealing with the political\nimplications of Bergson's thought.\n\nWhile social revolutionaries were endeavouring to make the most out\nof Bergson, many leaders of religious thought, particularly the more\nliberal-minded theologians of all creeds, e.g., the Modernists and\nNeo-Catholic Party in his own country, showed a keen interest in\nhis writings, and many of them endeavoured to find encouragement and\nstimulus in his work. The Roman Catholic Church, however, which still\nbelieves that finality was reached in philosophy with the work of\nThomas Aquinas, in the thirteenth century, and consequently makes that\nmediaeval philosophy her official, orthodox, and dogmatic view, took\nthe step of banning Bergson's three books by placing them upon the Index\n(Decree of June 1, 1914).\n\nIt was arranged by the Scottish Universities that Bergson should deliver\nin 1914 the famous Gifford Lectures, and one course was planned for\nthe spring and another for the autumn. The first course, consisting\nof eleven lectures, under the title of The Problem of Personality, was\ndelivered at Edinburgh University in the Spring of that year.\n\nThen came the War. The course of lectures planned for the autumn months\nhad to be abandoned. Bergson has not, however, been silent during\nthe conflict, and he has given some inspiring addresses. As early as\nNovember 4th, 1914, he wrote an article entitled La force qui s'use et\ncelle qui ne s'use pas, which appeared in that unique and interesting\nperiodical of the poilus, Le Bulletin des Armees de la Republique\nFrancaise. A presidential address delivered in December, 1914, to\nthe Academie des sciences morales et politiques, had for its title La\nSignificance de la Guerre. This, together with the preceding article,\nhas been translated and published in England as The Meaning of the\nWar. Bergson contributed also to the publication arranged by The Daily\nTelegraph in honour of the King of the Belgians, King Albert's Book\n(Christmas, 1914). In 1915 he was succeeded in the office of President\nof the Academie des Sciences morales et politiques by M. Alexandre\nRibot, and then delivered a discourse on The Evolution of German\nImperialism. Meanwhile he found time to issue at the request of the\nMinister of Public Instruction a delightful little summary of French\nPhilosophy. Bergson did a large amount of travelling and lecturing in\nAmerica during the war. He was there when the French Mission under M.\nViviani paid a visit in April and May of 1917, following upon America's\nentry into the conflict. M. Viviani's book La Mission francaise en\nAmerique, 1917, contains a preface by Bergson.\n\nEarly in 1918 he was officially received by the Academie francaise,\ntaking his seat among \"The Select Forty\" as successor to M. Emile\nOllivier, the author of the large and notable historical work L'Empire\nliberal. A session was held in January in his honour at which he\ndelivered an address on Ollivier.\n\nIn the War, Bergson saw the conflict of Mind and Matter, or rather of\nLife and Mechanism; and thus he shows us in action the central idea of\nhis own philosophy. To no other philosopher has it fallen, during\nhis lifetime, to have his philosophical principles so vividly and so\nterribly tested. We are too close to the smoking crucible of war to be\naware of all that has been involved in it. Even those who have helped in\nthe making of history are too near to it to regard it historically, much\nless philosophically. Yet one cannot help feeling that the defeat of\nGerman militarism has been the proof in action of the validity of much\nof Bergson's thought.\n\nAs many of Bergson's contributions to French periodicals are not readily\naccessible, he agreed to the request of his friends that these should\nbe collected and published in two volumes. The first of these was being\nplanned when war broke out. The conclusion of strife has been marked\nby the appearance of this delayed volume in 1919. It bears the title\nL'Energie spirituelle: Essais et Conferences. The noted expounder\nof Bergson's philosophy in England, Dr. Wildon Carr, has prepared an\nEnglish Translation under the title Mind-Energy. The volume opens\nwith the Huxley Memorial Lecture of 1911, Life and Consciousness, in a\nrevised and developed form under the title Consciousness and Life. Signs\nof Bergson's growing interest in social ethics and in the idea of a\nfuture life of personal survival are manifested. The lecture before the\nSociety for Psychical Research is included, as is also the one given\nin France, L'Ame et le Corps, which contains the substance of the four\nLondon lectures on the Soul. The seventh and last article is a reprint\nof Bergson's famous lecture to the Congress of Philosophy at Geneva\nin 1904, Le paralogisme psycho-physiologique, which now appears as Le\nCerveau et la Pensee: une illusion philosophique. Other articles are on\nthe False Recognition, on Dreams, and Intellectual Effort. The volume is\na most welcome production and serves to bring together what Bergson has\nwritten on the concept of mental force, and on his view of \"tension\" and\n\"detension\" as applied to the relation of matter and mind.\n\nIt is Bergson's intention to follow up this collection shortly by\nanother on the Method of Philosophy, dealing with the problems of\nIntuition. For this he is preparing an important introduction, dealing\nwith recent developments in philosophy. This second volume will\ninclude the Lectures on The Perception of Change given at Oxford, The\nIntroduction to Metaphysics, and the brilliant paper Philosophical\nIntuition. In June, 1920, Cambridge honoured him with the degree of\nDoctor of Letters. In order that he may be able to devote his full\ntime to the great new work he is preparing on ethics, religion, and\nsociology, Bergson has been relieved of the duties attached to the\nChair of Modern Philosophy at the College de France. He still holds this\nchair, but no longer delivers lectures, his place being taken by his\nbrilliant pupil Edouard Le Roy. Living with his wife and daughter in\na modest house in a quiet street near the Porte d'Auteuil in Paris,\nBergson is now working as keenly and vigorously as ever.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nTHE REALITY OF CHANGE\n\n\nFundamental in Bergson's philosophy. We are surrounded by changes--we\nourselves change--Belief in change--Simplicity of change--Immobility\nis composite and relative--All movement is indivisible. The fallacy of\n\"states\"--Intellect loves the static--Life is dynamic--Change, the very\nstuff of life, constitutes reality.\n\n\nThroughout the history of thought we find that the prevailing\nphilosophies have always reflected some of the characteristics of their\ntime. For instance, in those periods when, as historians tell us, the\ntendency towards unity, conformity, system, order, and authority was\nstrong, we find philosophy reflecting these conditions by emphasizing\nthe unity of the universe; while in those periods in which established\norder, system, and authority were disturbed, the philosophy of the\ntime emphasizes the idea of multiplicity as opposed to the unity of\nthe universe, laying stress on freedom, creative action, spontaneity of\neffort, and the reality of change. There can be little doubt that this\nis the chief reason why Bergson's philosophy has found such an amount of\nacceptance in a comparatively short period. The response to his thought\nmay be explained very largely by this, that already his fundamental\nideas existed, although implicit, unexpressed, in the minds of a great\nmultitude of thoughtful people, to whom the static conceptions of the\nuniverse were inadequate and false.\n\nWe must not, on the other hand, overlook the fact that Bergson's\nstatements have in their turn given an emphasis to all aspects of\nthought which take account of the reality of change and which realize\nits importance in all spheres. A writer on world politics very aptly\nreminds us that \"life is change, and a League of Peace that aimed at\npreserving peace by forbidding change would be a tyranny as oppressive\nas any Napoleonic dictatorship. These problems called for periodic\nchange. The peril of our future is that, while the need for change\nis instinctively grasped by some peoples as the fundamental fact of\nworld-politics, to perceive it costs others a difficult effort of\nthought.\" [Footnote: H. N. Brailsford on Peace and Change, Chap. 3 of\nhis Book A League of Nations.] However difficult it may be for some\nindividuals and for some nations to grasp it, the great fact is\nthere--the reality of change is undeniable.\n\nBergson himself would give to his philosophy the title, The Philosophy\nof Change, and this for a very good reason, for the principle of\nChange and an insistence on its reality lies at the root of his\nthought.[Footnote: He suggested this as a sub-title to Dr. H. Wildon\nCarr for his little work Henri Bergson (People's Books). Dr. Wildon\nCarr's later and larger work bears this as its full title.] \"We know\nthat everything changes,\" we find him saying in his London lectures,\n\"but it is mere words. From the earliest times recorded in the history\nof philosophy, philosophers have never stopped saying that everything\nchanges; but, when the moment came for the practical application of this\nproposition, they acted as if they believed that at the bottom of things\nthere is immobility and invariability. The greatest difficulties of\nphilosophy are due to not taking account of the fact that Change and\nMovement are universal. It is not enough to say that everything changes\nand moves--we must believe it.\" [Footnote: Second of the four lectures on\nLa Nature de l'Ame delivered at London University, Oct. 21, 1911. From\nreport in The Times for Oct. 23, 1911, p. 4.] In order to think Change\nand to see it, a whole mass of prejudices must be swept aside--some\nartificial, the products of speculative philosophy, and others the\nnatural product of common-sense. We tend to regard immobility as a\nmore simple affair than movement. But what we call immobility is really\ncomposite and is merely relative, being a relation between movements.\nIf, for example, there are two trains running in the same direction on\nparallel lines at exactly the same speed, opposite one another, then the\npassengers in each train, when observing the other train, will regard\nthe trains as motionless. So, generally, immobility is only apparent,\nChange is real. We tend to be misled by language; we speak, for\ninstance, of 'the state of things'; but what we call a state is the\nappearance which a change assumes in the eyes of a being who, himself,\nchanges according to an identical or analogous rhythm. \"Take, for\nexample,\" says Bergson, \"a summer day. We are stretched on the grass, we\nlook around us--everything is at rest--there is absolute immobility--no\nchange. But the grass is growing, the leaves of the trees are developing\nor decaying--we ourselves are growing older all the time. That which\nseems rest, simplicity itself, is but a composite of our ageing with the\nchanges which takes place in the grass, in the leaves, in all that is\naround us. Change, then, is simple, while 'the state of things' as\nwe call it, is composite. Every stable state is the result of the\nco-existence between that change and the change of the person who\nperceives it.\" [Footnote: La Nature de l'Ame, lecture 2.]\n\nIt is an axiom in the philosophy of Bergson that all change or\nmovement is indivisible. He asserts this expressly in Matter and\nMemory,[Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 246 ff. (Fr. p. 207 ff).] and\nagain in the second lecture on The Perception of Change he deals with\nthe indivisibility of movement somewhat fully, submitting it to a\ncareful analysis, from which the following quotation is an extract--\"My\nhand is at the point A. I move it to the point B, traversing the\ninterval AB. I say that this movement from A to B is a simple\nthing--each of us has the sensation of this, direct and immediate.\nDoubtless, while we carry our hand over from A to B, we say to ourselves\nthat we could stop it at an intermediate point, but then that would no\nlonger be the same movement. There would then be two movements, with an\ninterval of rest. Neither from within, by the muscular sense, nor from\nwithout, by sight, should we have the same perception. If we leave our\nmovement from A to B such as it is, we feel it undivided, and we must\ndeclare it indivisible. It is true that when I look at my hand, going\nfrom A to B, traversing the interval AB, I say to myself 'the interval\nAB can be divided into as many parts as I wish, therefore the movement\nfrom A to B can be divided into as many parts as I like, since this\nmovement covers this interval,' or, again, 'At each moment of its\npassing, the moving object passes over a certain point, therefore we\ncan distinguish in the movement as many stopping-places as we\nwish--therefore the movement is infinitely divisible.' But let us\nreflect on this for a minute. How can the movement possibly coincide\nwith the space which it traverses? How can the moving coincide with the\nmotionless? How can the object which moves be said to 'be' at any point\nin its path? It passes over, or, in other words, it could 'be' there. It\nwould 'be' there if it stopped there, but, if it stopped there, it is no\nlonger the same movement with which we are dealing. It is always at one\nbound that a trajectory is traversed when, on its course, there is no\nstoppage. The bound may last a few seconds, or it may last for weeks,\nmonths, or years, but it is unique and cannot be decomposed. Only, when\nonce the passage has been made, as the path is in space, and space is\ninfinitely divisible, we picture to ourselves the movement itself as\ninfinitely divisible. We like to imagine it thus, because, in a movement\nit is not the change of position which interests us, it is the positions\nthemselves which the moving object has left, which it will take up,\nwhich it might assume if it were to stop in its course. We have need\nof immobility, and the more we succeed in presenting to ourselves the\nmovement as coinciding with the space which it traverses, the better we\nthink we understand it. Really, there is no true immobility, if we\nimply by that, an absence of movement.\" [Footnote: Translated from La\nPerception du Changement, pp. 19-20.] This immobility of which we have\nneed for the purposes of action and of practical life, we erect into an\nabsolute reality. It is of course convenient to our sense of sight to\nlay hold of objects in this way; as pioneer of the sense of touch,\nit prepares our action on the external world. But, although for all\npractical purposes we require the notion of immobility as part of our\nmental equipment, it does not at all help us to grasp reality. Then we\nhabitually regard movement as something superadded to the motionless.\nThis is quite legitimate in the world of affairs; but when we bring this\nhabit into the world of speculation, we misconceive reality, we create\nlightheartedly insoluble problems, and close our eyes to what is most\nalive in the real world. For us movement is one position, then another\nposition, and so on indefinitely. It is true that we say there must\nbe something else, viz., the actual passing across the interval which\nseparates those positions. But such a conception of Change is quite\nfalse. All true change or movement is indivisible. We, by constructing\nfictitious states and trying to compose movement out of them, endeavour\nto make a process coincide with a thing--a movement with an immobility.\nThis is the way to arrive at dilemmas, antinomies, and blind-alleys of\nthought. The puzzles of Zeno about \"Achilles and the Tortoise\" and \"The\nMoving Arrow\" are classical examples of the error involved in treating\nmovement as divisible.[Footnote: Bergson in Matter and Memory examines\nZeno's four puzzles: \"The Dichotomy,\" \"Achilles and the Tortoise,\" \"The\nArrow\" and \"The Stadium.\"] If movement is not everything, it is nothing,\nand if we postulate, to begin with, that the motionless is real, then\nwe shall be incapable of grasping reality. The philosophies of Plato, of\nAristotle, and of Plotinus were developed from the thesis that there\nis more in the immutable than in the moving, and that it is by way of\ndiminution that we pass from the stable to the unstable.\n\nThe main reason why it is such a difficult matter for us to grasp\nthe reality of continuous change is owing to the limitations of our\nintellectual nature. \"We are made in order to act, as much as and more\nthan in order to think--or, rather, when we follow the bent of our\nnature, it is in order to act that we think.\" [Footnote: Creative\nEvolution, p. 313 (Fr. p. 321).] Intellect is always trying to carve out\nfor itself stable forms because it is primarily fitted for action, and\n\"is characterized by a natural inability to comprehend life\" and\ngrasp Change.[Footnote: Creative Evolution, p. 174 (Fr. p. 179).]\nOur intellect loves the solid and the static, but life itself is not\nstatic--it is dynamic. We might say that the intellect takes views\nacross the ever-moving scene, snapshots of reality. It acts like the\ncamera of the cinematograph operator, which is capable only of producing\nphotographs, successive and static, in a series upon a ribbon. To grasp\nreality, we have to do what the cinematograph does with the film--that\nis, introduce or rather, re-introduce movement.[Footnote: Creative\nEvolution, pp. 320-324 (Fr. pp. 328-332).] The stiff photograph is an\nabstraction bereft of movement, so, too, our intellectual views of the\nworld and of our own nature are static instead of being dynamic. Human\nlife is not made up of childhood, adolescence, manhood, and old age as\n\"states,\" although we tend to speak of it in this way. Life is not a\nthing, nor the state of a thing--it is a continuous movement or change.\nThe soul itself is a movement, not an entity. In the physical world,\nlight, when examined, proves itself to be a movement. Even physical\nscience, bound, as it would seem, to assert the fixity and rigidity of\nmatter, is now of the opinion that matter is not the solid thing we are\napt to think it. The experiments of Kelvin and Lodge and the\ndiscovery of radium, have brought forward a new theory of matter; the\nold-fashioned base, the atom, is now regarded as being essentially\nmovement; matter is as wonderful and mysterious in its character\nas spirit. Further we must note that the researches of Einstein,\nculminating in the formulation of his general Theory of Relativity and\nhis special Theory of Gravitation, which are arousing such interest at\nthe present time, threaten very seriously the older static views of\nthe universe and seem to frustrate any efforts to find and denote any\nstability therein.[Footnote: Consult on this Dr. Einstein's own work of\nwhich the translation by R. W. Lawson is just published: Relativity: The\nSpecial and the General Theory. Methuen, 1920.] In the light of\nthese discoveries, Bergson's views on the reality of Change seem less\nparadoxical than they might formerly have appeared. The reality of\nChange is, for Bergson, absolute, and on this, as a fundamental point,\nhe constructs his thought. In conjunction with his study of Memory, it\nleads up to his discussions of Real Time (la duree), of Freedom, and\nof Creative Evolution. We must then, at the outset of any study of\nBergson's philosophy, obtain a grasp of this universal 'becoming'--a\nvision of the reality of Change. Then we shall realize that Change is\nsubstantial, that it constitutes the very stuff of life. \"There are\nchanges, but there are not things that change; change does not need a\nsupport. There are movements, but there are not, necessarily, constant\nobjects which are moved; movement does not imply something that is\nmovable.\" [Footnote: Translated from La Perception du Changement, Lecture\n2, p. 24.]\n\nTo emphasize and to illustrate this point, so fundamental in his\nthought, Bergson turns to music. \"Let us listen,\" he says, \"to a melody,\nletting ourselves be swayed by it; do we not have the clear perception\nof a movement which is not attached to any mobility--of a change devoid\nof anything which changes? The change is self-sufficient, it is the\nthing itself. It avails nothing to say that it takes time, for it is\nindivisible; if the melody were to stop sooner, it would not be any\nlonger the same volume of sound, but another, equally indivisible.\nDoubtless we have a tendency to divide it and to represent it to\nourselves as a linking together of distinct notes instead of the\nuninterrupted continuity of the melody. But why? Simply because our\nauditive perception has assumed the habit of saturating itself with\nvisual images. We hear the melody across the vision which the conductor\nof the orchestra can have of it in looking at his score. We represent\nto ourselves notes linked on to notes on an imaginary sheet of paper.\nWe think of a keyboard on which one plays, of the bow of a violin which\ncomes and goes, of the musicians, each one of whom plays his part in\nconjunction with the others. Let us abstract these spatial images; there\nremains pure change, self-sufficing, in no way attached to a 'thing'\nwhich changes.\" [Footnote: Translated from La Perception du Changement,\npp. 24-25.]\n\nWe must conceive reality as a continual flux, then immobility will\nseem a superficial abstraction hypostatized into states, concepts, and\nsubstances, and the old difficulties raised by the ancients, in regard\nto the problem of Change, will vanish, along with the problems attached\nto the notion of \"substance\" in modern thought, because there is nothing\nsubstantial but Change. Apart from Change there is no reality. We shall\nsee that all is movement, that we ourselves are movement--part of an\nelan, a poussee formidable, which carries with it all things and all\ncreatures, and that in this eternity--not of immutability but of\nlife and Change--\"we live and move and have our being.\" [Footnote: La\nPerception du Changement, concluding paragraph, p. 37.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nPERCEPTION\n\n\nImages as data--Nerves, afferent and efferent, cannot beget images, nor\ncan the brain give rise to representations--All our perception relative\nto action. Denial of this involves the fallacies of Idealism or\nof Realism--Perception and knowledge--Physiological data--Zone of\nindetermination--\"Pure\" perception--Memory and Perception.\n\n\nFrom the study of Change we are led on to a consideration of the\nproblems connected with our perception of the external world, which\nhas its roots in change. These problems have given rise to some very\nopposing views--the classic warfare between Realism and Idealism.\nBergson is of neither school, but holds that they each rest on\nmisconceptions, a wrong emphasis on certain facts. He invites us to\nfollow him closely while he investigates the problems of Perception in\nhis own way.\n\n\"We will assume for the moment that we know nothing of theories of\nmatter and theories of spirit, nothing of the discussions as to the\nreality or ideality of the external world. Here I am in the presence\nof images, in the vaguest sense of the word, images perceived when my\nsenses are opened to them, unperceived when they are closed. ... Now of\nthese images there is ONE which is distinct from all the others, in that\nI do not know it only from without by perceptions, but from within by\naffections; it is my body.\" [Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 1 (Fr.\np. 1).] Further examination shows me that these affections \"always\ninterpose themselves between the excitations from without and the\nmovement which I am about to execute.\" [Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 1\n(Fr. p. 1).] Indeed all seems to take place as if, in this aggregate of\nimages which I call the universe, nothing really new could happen except\nthrough the medium of certain particular images, the type of which is\nfurnished me by my body.\" [Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 3 (Fr. p. 2).]\nReference to physiology shows in the structure of human bodies afferent\nnerves which transmit a disturbance to nerve centres, and also efferent\nnerves which conduct from other centres movement to the periphery, thus\nsetting in motion the body in whole or in part. When we make enquiries\nfrom the physiologist or the psychologist with regard to the origin of\nthese images and representations, we are sometimes told that, as the\ncentrifugal movements of the nervous system can evoke movement of the\nbody, so the centripetal movements--at least some of them--give rise to\nthe representation, mental picture, or perception of the external world.\nYet we must remember that the brain, the nerves, and the disturbance of\nthe nerves are, after all, only images among others. So it is absurd to\nstate that one image, say the brain, begets the others, for \"the brain\nis part of the material world, but the material world is not part of the\nbrain.\" Eliminate the image which bears the name 'material world,' and\nyou destroy, at the same time, the brain and the cerebral disturbances\nwhich are parts of it. Suppose, on the contrary, that these two images,\nthe brain and the cerebral disturbance, vanish; ex hypothesi you efface\nonly these, that is to say, very little--an insignificant detail from an\nimmense picture--the picture in its totality, that is to say, the whole\nuniverse remains. To make of the brain the condition on which the\nwhole image depends is a contradiction in terms, since the brain is,\nby hypothesis, a part of this image.\" [Footnote: Matter and Memory, p.\n4 (Fr. pp. 3-4).] The data of perception are external images, then my\nbody, and changes brought about by my body in the surrounding images.\nThe external images transmit movement to my body, it gives back movement\nto them. My body or part of my body, i.e., my brain, could not beget a\nwhole or part of my representation of the external world. \"You may\nsay that my body is matter or that it is an image--the word is of no\nimportance. If it is matter, it is a part of the material world, and the\nmaterial world consequently exists around it and without it. If it is an\nimage--that image can give but what has been put into it, and since\nit is, by hypothesis, the image of my body only, it would be absurd to\nexpect to get from it that of the whole universe. My body, an object\ndestined to move other objects, is then a centre of action; it cannot\ngive birth to a representation.\" [Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 5 (Fr.\np. 4).] The body, however, is privileged, since it appears to choose\nwithin certain limits certain reactions from possible ones. It exercises\na real influence on other images, deciding which step to take among\nseveral which may be possible. It judges which course is advantageous\nor dangerous to itself, by the nature of the images which reach it. The\nobjects which surround my body reflect its possible action upon\nthem. All our perception has reference, primarily, to action, not to\nspeculation.[Footnote: Cf. Creative Evolution, p. 313 (Fr. p. 321).]\nThe brain centres are concerned with motor reaction rather than with\nconscious perception, \"the brain is an instrument of action and not\nof representation.\" [Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 83 (Fr. p.\n69).] Therefore, in the study of the problems of perception, the\nstarting-point should be action and not sensation. All the confusions,\ninconsistencies and absurdities of statement, made in regard to\nour knowledge of the external world, have here their origin. Many\nphilosophers and psychologists \"show us a brain, analogous in its\nessence to the rest of the material universe, consequently an image, if\nthe universe is an image. Then, since they want the internal movements\nof this brain to create or determine the representation of the whole\nmaterial world--an image infinitely greater than that of the cerebral\nvibrations--they maintain that these molecular movements, and movement\nin general, are not images like others, but something which is either\nmore or less than an image--in any case is of another nature than an\nimage--and from which representation will issue as by a miracle. Thus\nmatter is made into something radically different from representation,\nsomething of which, consequently, we have no image; over against it they\nplace a consciousness empty of images, of which we are unable to form\nany idea. Lastly, to fill consciousness, they invent an incomprehensible\naction of this formless matter upon this matterless thought.\" [Footnote:\nMatter and Memory, p. 9 (Fr. pp. 7-8).]\n\nThe problem at issue between Realists and Idealists turns on the fact\nthat there are two systems of images in existence. \"Here is a system of\nimages which I term 'my perception of the universe,' and which may be\nentirely altered by a very slight change in the privileged image--my\nbody. This image occupies the centre. By it all the others are\nconditioned; at each of its movements everything changes as though by\na turn of a kaleidoscope. Here, on the other hand, are the same images,\nbut referred each one to itself, influencing each other no doubt, but in\nsuch a manner that the effect is always in proportion to the cause; this\nis what I term the 'universe.'\" [Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 12 (Fr.\np. 10).] The question is, \"How is it that the same images can belong\nat the same time to two different systems--the one in which each image\nvaries for itself and in the well-defined measure that it is patient of\nthe real action of surrounding images--the other in which all change for\na single image and in the varying measure that they reflect the eventual\naction of this privileged image?\" [Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 13\n(Fr. p. 11).] We may style one the system of science, the other the\nsystem of consciousness. Now, Realism and Idealism are both incapable\nof explaining why there are two such systems at all. Subjective\nIdealism derives the system of science from that of consciousness, while\nmaterialistic Realism derives the system of consciousness from that of\nscience. They have, however, this common meeting-place, that they both\nregard Perception as speculative in character--for each of them \"to\nperceive\" is to \"know.\" Now this is just the postulate which Bergson\ndisputes. The office of perception, according to him, is to give us,\nnot knowledge, but the conditions necessary for action.[Footnote: Notre\ncroyance a la loi de causalite (Revue de metaphysique et de morale,\n1900), p. 658.] A little examination shows us that distance stands for\nthe degree in which other bodies are protected, as it were, against the\naction of my body against them, and equally too for the degree in which\nmy body is protected from them.[Footnote: Le Souvenir du present et\nla fausse reconnaissance in L'Energie spirituelle, pp. 117-161\n(Mind-Energy), or Revue philosophique, 1908, pp. 561-593.] Perception\nis utilitarian in character and has reference to bodily action, and\nwe detach from all the images coming to us those which interest us\npractically.\n\nBergson then examines the physiological aspects of the perceptual\nprocess. Beginning with reflex actions and the development of the\nnervous system, he goes on to discuss the functions of the spinal cord\nand the brain. He finds in regard to these last two that \"there is only\na difference of degree--there can be no difference in kind--between what\nis called the perceptive faculty of the brain and the reflex functions\nof the spinal cord. The cord transforms into movements the stimulation\nreceived, the brain prolongs into reactions which are merely nascent,\nbut in the one case as in the other, the function of the nerve substance\nis to conduct, to co-ordinate, or to inhibit movements.[Footnote: Matter\nand Memory, pp. 10-11 (Fr. p. 9).] As we rise in the organic series\nwe find a division of physiological labour. Nerve cells appear, are\ndiversified and tend to group themselves into a system; at the same time\nthe animal reacts by more varied movements to external stimulation.\nBut even when the stimulation received is not at once prolonged\ninto movement, it appears merely to await its occasion; and the same\nimpression which makes the organism aware of changes in the environment,\ndetermines it or prepares it to adapt itself to them. No doubt there is\nin the higher vertebrates a radical distinction between pure automatism,\nof which the seat is mainly in the spinal cord, and voluntary activity\nwhich requires the intervention of the brain. It might be imagined\nthat the impression received, instead of expanding into more movements\nspiritualizes itself into consciousness. But as soon as we compare the\nstructure of the spinal cord with that of the brain, we are bound to\ninfer that there is merely a difference of complication, and not a\ndifference in kind, between the functions of the brain and the reflex\nactivity of the medullary system.\" [Footnote: Matter and Memory,\npp. 17-18 (Fr. p. 15).] The brain is no more than a kind of central\ntelephone exchange, its office is to allow communication or to delay\nit. It adds nothing to what it receives, it is simply a centre where\nperceptions get into touch with motor mechanisms. Sometimes the function\nof the brain is to conduct the movement received to a chosen organ of\nreaction, while at other times it opens to the movement the totality\nof the motor tracks. The brain appears as an instrument of analysis in\nregard to movements received by it, but an instrument of selection in\nregard to the movements executed. In either case, its office is limited\nto the transmission and division of movements. In the lower organisms,\nstimulation takes the form of immediate contact. For example, a\njelly-fish feels a danger when anything touches it, and reacts\nimmediately. The more immediate the reaction has to be, the more it\nresembles simple contact. Higher up the scale, sight and hearing enable\nthe individual to enter into relation with a greater number of objects\nand with objects at a distance. This gives rise to an amount of\nuncertainty, \"a zone of indetermination,\" where hesitation and choice\ncome into play. Hence, says Bergson: \"Perception is master of space in\nthe exact measure in which action is master of time.\" [Footnote: Matter\nand Memory, p. 23 (Fr. p. 19).]\n\nIn the paper read before the First International Congress of Philosophy\nat Paris in 1900, on Our Belief in the Law of Causality,[Footnote: Notre\ncroyance a la loi de causalite (Revue de metaphysique et de morale,\nSept., 1900, pp. 655-660).] Bergson showed that it has its root in the\nco-ordination of our tactile impressions with our visual impressions.\nThis co-ordination becomes a continuity which generates motor habits or\ntendencies to action.\n\nThere now comes up for consideration the question as to why this\nrelation of the organism, to more or less distinct objects, takes\nthe particular form of conscious perception, and further, why does\neverything happen as if this consciousness were born of the internal\nmovements of the cerebral substance? To answer this question, we must\nturn to perceptual processes, as these occur in our everyday life. We\nfind at once that \"there is no perception which is not full of memories.\nWith the immediate and present data of our senses, we mingle a thousand\ndetails out of our past experience.\" [Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 24\n(Fr. p. 20).] To such an extent is this true that the immediate data of\nperception serve as a sign to bring much more to the mind. Psychological\nexperiments have conclusively proved that we never actually perceive all\nthat we imagine to be there. Hence arise illusions, examples of which\nmay be easily thought of--incorrect proof-reading is one, while another\ncommon one is the mistake of taking one person for another because of\nsome similarity of dress. What is actually perceived is but a fraction\nof what we are looking at and acts normally as a suggestion for the\nwhole. Now, although it is true that, in practice, Perception and Memory\nare never found absolutely separate in their purity, yet it is necessary\nto distinguish them from one another absolutely in any investigation\nof a psychological nature. If, instead of a perception impregnated\nwith memory-images, nothing survived from the past, then we should have\n\"pure\" perception, not coloured by anything in the individual's past\nhistory, and so a kind of impersonal perception. However unreal it may\nseem, such a perception is at the root of our knowledge of things and\nindividual accidents are merely grafted on to this impersonal or \"pure\"\nperception. Just because philosophers have overlooked it, and because\nthey have failed to distinguish it from that which memory contributes to\nit, they have regarded Perception as a kind of interior and subjective\nvision, differing from Memory only by its greater intensity and not\ndiffering in nature. In reality, however, Perception and Memory differ\nfundamentally.\n\nOur conscious perception is just our power of choice, reflected from\nthings as though by a mirror, so that representation arises from the\nomission of that in the totality of matter which has no bearing on our\nneeds and consequently no interest for us. \"There is for images merely\na difference of degree and not of kind between 'being' and 'being\nconsciously perceived.'\" [Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 30 (Fr. p.\n25).] Consciousness--in regard to external perception--is explained by\nthis indeterminateness and this choice. \"But there is in this necessary\npoverty of conscious perception, something that is positive, that\nforetells spirit; it is, in the etymological sense of the word,\ndiscernment.'\" [Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 31 (Fr. p. 26).] The\nchief difficulty in dealing with the problems of Perception, is to\nexplain \"not how Perception arises, but how it is limited, since it\nshould be the image of the whole and is in fact reduced to the image of\nthat which interests you.\" [Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 34 (Fr. p.\n29).] We only make an insuperable difficulty if we imagine Perception\nto be a kind of photographic view of things, taken from a fixed point\nby that special apparatus which is called an organ of perception--a\nphotograph which would then be developed in the brain-matter by some\nunknown chemical and psychical process. \"Everything happens as though\nyour perception were a result of the internal motions of the brain and\nissued in some sort from the cortical centres. It could not actually\ncome from them since the brain is an image like others, enveloped in the\nmass of other images, and it would be absurd that the container should\nissue from the content. But since the structure of the brain is like\nthe detailed plan of the movements among which you have the choice,\nand since that part of the external images which appears to return upon\nitself, in order to constitute perception, includes precisely all the\npoints of the universe which these movements could affect, conscious\nperception and cerebral movement are in strict correspondence. The\nreciprocal dependence of these two terms is therefore simply due to the\nfact that both are functions of a third, which is the indetermination of\nthe Will.\" [Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 35 (Fr. p. 29).]\n\nMoreover, we must recognize that the image is formed and perceived in\nthe object, not in the brain, even although it would seem that rays\nof light coming from a point P are perceived along the path of the\nsensori-motor processes in the brain and are afterwards projected into\nP. There is not, however, an unextended image which forms itself in\nconsciousness and then projects itself into the position P. Really,\nthe point P, and the rays which it emits, together with the retina\nand nervous elements affected in the process of perception, all form a\nsingle whole. The point P is an indispensable factor in this whole and\nit is really in P and not anywhere else that the image of P is formed\nand perceived.[Footnote: Cf. Matter and Memory, p. 37 (Fr p. 31), also\npaper entitled Notre croyance a la loi de causalite in the Revue de\nmetaphysique et de morale, 1900, p. 658.]\n\nIn the field of \"pure\" perception, that is to say, perception\nunadulterated by the addition of memory-images, there can arise no image\nwithout an object. \"Sensation is essentially due to what is actually\npresent.\" [Footnote: Le Souvenir du present et la fausse reconnaissance,\np. 579 of Revue philosophique, Dec., 1908; also L'Energie spirituelle,\np. 141 (Mind-Energy).] Exactly how external stimuli, such as rays of\na certain speed and length, come to give us a certain image, e.g., the\nsensation \"red\" or the sound of \"middle C,\" we shall never understand.\n\"No trace of the movements themselves can be actually perceived in the\nsensation which translates them.\" [Footnote: Time and Free Will, pp.\n34-35 (Fr. p. 26).] We only make trouble by regarding sensations in an\nisolated manner and attempting to construct Perception from them. \"Our\nsensations are to our perceptions, that which the real action of our\nbody is to its possible or virtual action.\" [Footnote: Matter and Memory,\np. 58 (Fr. p. 48).] Thus, everything happens as if the external images\nwere reflected by our body into surrounding space. This is why the\nsurface of the body, which forms the common limit of the external and\ninternal, is the only portion of space which is both perceived and\nfelt. Just as external objects are perceived by me where they are, in\nthemselves and not in me, so my affective states (e.g. pains--which are\nlocal, unavailing efforts) are experienced where they occur, in my body.\nConsider the system of images which we term the \"external world.\" My\nbody is one of them and around it is grouped the representation, i.e.,\nits eventual influence on others. Within it occurs affection, i.e., its\nactual effort upon itself. It is because of this distinction between\nimages and sensations that we affirm that the totality of perceived\nimages subsists, even if our body disappears, whereas we cannot\nannihilate our body without destroying our sensations. In practice,\nour \"pure\" perception is adulterated with affection, as well as with\nmemories. To understand Perception, however, we must--as previously\ninsisted upon--study it with reference to action. It is false to suppose\n\"that perception and sensation exist for their own sake; the philosopher\nascribes to them an entirely speculative function,\" [Footnote: Matter\nand Memory, p. 311 (Fr p. 261).] a proceeding which gives rise to the\nfallacies of Realism and Idealism.\n\nIt has been said that the choice of perceptions from among images in\ngeneral is the effect of a \"discernment\" which foreshadows spirit. But\nto touch the reality of spirit, we must place ourselves at the point\nwhere an individual consciousness continues and retains the past in\na present, enriched by it.[Footnote: See Chapter VI on la duree.\nTime--True and False.] Perception we never meet in its pure state; it\nis always mingled with memories. The rose has a different scent for you\nfrom that which it has for me, just because the scent of the rose bears\nwith it all the memories of all the roses we have ever experienced, each\nof us individually.[Footnote: Time and Free Will, pp. 161-162 (Fr.\np. 124).] Memory, however mingled with Perception, is nevertheless\nfundamentally different in character.[Footnote: Le Souvenir du present\net la fausse reconnaissance, Revue philosophique, Dec., 1908, p. 580;\nalso L'Effort intellectuel, Revue philosophique, Jan., 1902, p. 23;\nL'Energie spirituelle, pp. 141 and 197 (Mind-Energy).] \"When we pass\nfrom 'pure' Perception to Memory, we definitely abandon matter for\nspirit.\" [Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 313 (Fr. p. 263).]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nMEMORY\n\n\nDefinition--Two forms--memorizing power related to habit; recalling\npower or \"pure\" memory. Is memory a function of the brain?--Pathological\nPhenomena. Memory something other than merely a function of the brain.\nThe \"Box\" theory--Memory records everything--Dreams--The well-balanced\nmind--Memory a manifestation of spirit.\n\n\nThe importance of Memory is recognized by all persons--whether\npsychologists or not. At the present time there is a growing interest\nin systems of memory-training offered to the public, which aim at mental\nefficiency as a means to success in life. Indeed, from the tone of some\nadvertisements seen in the press, one might be prompted to think that\nMemory itself was the sole factor determining success in either a\nprofessional or a business career. Yet, although we are likely to regard\nthis as a somewhat exaggerated statement, nevertheless we cannot deny\nthe very great importance of the power of Memory. How often, in everyday\nlife, we hear people excuse themselves by remarking \"My memory failed\nme\" or \"played me false\" or, more bluntly, \"I forgot all about that.\"\nWithout doubt, Memory is a most vital factor, though not the only one\nin mental efficiency.[Footnote: The true ideal of mental efficiency must\ninclude power of Will as well as of Memory.] It is an element in mental\nlife which puzzles both the specialist in psychology and the layman.\n\"What is this wonderfully subtle power of mind?\" \"How do we remember?\"\nEven the mind, untrained in psychological investigation, cannot help\nasking such questions in moments of reflection; but for the psychologist\nthey are questions of very vital significance in his science. For\nBergson, as psychologist, Memory is naturally, a subject of great\nimportance. We must note, however, that for Bergson, as metaphysician,\nit plays an even more important role, since his study of Memory and\nconclusions as to its nature lead him on to a discussion of the relation\nof soul and body, spirit and matter. His second large work, which\nappeared in 1896, bears the title Matiere et Memoire. For him, Memory\nis a pivot on which turns a whole scheme of relationships--material\nand spiritual. He wrote in 1910 a new introduction for the English\nTranslation of this work. He there says that \"among all the facts\ncapable of throwing light on the psycho-physiological relation, those\nwhich concern Memory, whether in the normal or the pathological state,\nhold a privileged position.\" [Footnote: Introduction to Matter and\nMemory, p. xii.] Let us then, prior to passing on to the consideration\nof the problem of the relation of soul and body, examine what Bergson\nhas to say on the subject of Memory.\n\nAt the outset, we may define Memory as the return to consciousness of\nsome experience, accompanied by the awareness that it has been present\nearlier at a definite time and place.[Footnote: The above is to be taken\nas a definition of the normal memory. In a subtle psychological analysis\nin the paper entitled Le Souvenir du present et la fausse reconnaissance\nin L'Energie spirituelle, pp. 117-161 (Mind-Energy), Bergson considers\ncases of an abnormal or fictitious memory, coinciding with perception in\nrather a strange manner. This does not, however, affect the validity\nof the above definition.] Bergson first of all draws attention to a\ndistinction between two different forms of Memory, the nature of which\nwill be best brought out by considering two examples. We are fond of\ngiving to children or young persons at school selections from the plays\nof Shakespeare, \"to be learned by heart,\" as we say. We praise the boy\nor girl who can repeat a long passage perfectly, and we regard that\nscholar as gifted with a good memory. To illustrate the second type of\ncase, suppose a question to be put to that boy asking him what he saw on\nthe last half-holiday when he took a ramble in the country. He may, or\nmay not, be able to tell us much of his adventures on that occasion,\nfor whatever he can recall is due to a mental operation of a different\ncharacter from that which enabled him to learn his lesson. There is\nhere no question of learning by rote, of memorizing, but of capacity to\nrecall to mind a past experience. The boy who is clever at memorizing a\npassage from Shakespeare may not have a good memory at all for recalling\npast events. To understand why this is so we must examine these two\nforms of Memory more closely and refer to Bergson's own words: \"I study\na lesson, and in order to learn it by heart I read it a first time,\naccentuating every line; I then repeat it a certain number of times. At\neach repetition there is progress; the words are more and more linked\ntogether, and at last make a continuous whole. When that moment comes,\nit is said that I know my lesson by heart, that it is imprinted on my\nmemory. I consider now how the lesson has been learnt and picture to\nmyself the successive phases of the process. Each several reading then\nrecurs to me with its own individuality. It is distinguished from those\nwhich preceded or followed it, by the place which it occupied in time;\nin short, each reading stands out before my mind as a definite event in\nmy history. Again it will be said that these images are recollections,\nthat they are imprinted on my Memory. The same words then are used in\nboth cases. Do they mean the same thing? The memory of the lesson which\nis remembered, in the sense of learned by heart, has ALL the marks of\na habit. Like a habit, it is acquired by the repetition of the same\neffort. Like every habitual bodily exercise, it is stored up in a\nmechanism which is set in motion as a whole by an initial impulse, in\na closed system of automatic movements, which succeed each other in the\nsame order and together take the same length of time. The memory of each\nseveral reading, on the contrary, has NONE of the marks of a habit, it\nis like an event in my life; it is a case of spontaneous recollection as\ndistinct from mere learnt recollection. Now a learnt recollection passes\nout of time in the measure that the lesson is better known; it\nbecomes more and more impersonal, more and more foreign to our past\nlife.\" [Footnote: Matter and Memory, pp. 89-90 (Fr. pp. 75-76).] This\nquotation makes clear that of these two forms of Memory, it is the\npower of spontaneous recollection which is Memory par excellence and\nconstitutes \"real\" Memory. The other, to which psychologists usually\nhave devoted most of their attention in discussing the problem of\nMemory, is habit interpreted as Memory, rather than Memory itself.\nHaving thus made clear this valuable and fundamental distinction--\"one\nof the best things in Bergson\" [Footnote: Bertrand Russell's remark in\nhis Philosophy of Bergson, p. 7.]--and having shown that in practical\nlife the automatic memory necessarily plays an important part, often\ninhibiting \"pure\" Memory, Bergson proceeds to examine and criticize\ncertain views of Memory itself, and endeavours finally to demonstrate to\nus what he himself considers it to be.\n\nHe takes up the cudgels to attack the view which aims at blending Memory\nwith Perception, as being of like kind. Memory, he argues, must be\ndistinguished from Perception, however much we admit (and rightly)\nthat memories enter into and colour all our perceptions. They are quite\ndifferent in their nature. A remembrance is the representation of an\nabsent object. We distinguish between hearing a faint tap at the door,\nand the faint memory of a loud one. We cannot admit the validity of\nthe statement that there is only a difference of intensity between\nPerception and Recollection. \"As our perception of a present object\nis something of that object itself, our representation of the absent\nobject, as in Memory, must be a phenomenon of quite other order than\nPerception, since between presence and absence there are no degrees, no\nintermediate stages.\" [Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 315 (Fr. p. 264).]\nIf we maintain that recollection is merely a weakened form of Perception\nwe must note the consequences of such a thesis. \"If recollection is only\na weakened Perception, inversely, Perception must be something like an\nintenser Memory. Now, the germ of English Idealism is to be found here.\nThis Idealism consists in finding only a difference of degree and not of\nkind, between the reality of the object perceived, and the ideality\nof the object conceived.\" [Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 318 (Fr.\np. 267).] The maintenance of such a doctrine involves the further\nremarkable contention that \"we construct matter from our own interior\nstates and that perception is only a true hallucination.\" [Footnote:\nMatter and Memory, p 318 (Fr. p. 267).] Such a theory will not\nharmonize with the experienced difference between Perceptions and\nMemories.[Footnote: Le Souvenir du present et la fausse reconnaissance,\nRevue philosophique, Dec., 1908, p. 568; also L'Energie spirituelle\n(Mind-Energy).] We do not mistake the perception of a slight sound for\nthe recollection of a loud noise, as has already been remarked. The\nconsciousness of a recollection \"never occurs as a weak state which we\ntry to relegate to the past so soon as we become aware of its weakness.\nHow indeed, unless we already possess the representation of a past,\npreviously lived, could we relegate to it the less intense psychical\nstates, when it would be so simple to set them alongside of strong\nstates as a present experience more confused, beside a present\nexperience more distinct?\" [Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 319 (Fr. p.\n268).] The truth is that Memory does not consist in a regression from\nthe present into the past, but on the contrary, in a progress from the\npast to the present. Memory is radically distinct from Perception, in\nits character.\n\nBergson then passes on to discuss other views of Memory, and in\nparticular, those which deal with the nature of Memory and its relation\nto the brain. It is stated dogmatically by some that Memory is a\nfunction of the brain. Others claim, in opposition to this, that Memory\nis something other than a function of the brain. Between two such\nstatements as these, compromise or reconciliation is obviously\nimpossible. It is then for experience to decide between these two\nconflicting views. This empirical appeal Bergson does not shirk. He has\nmade a most comprehensive and intensive study of pathological phenomena\nrelating to the mental malady known as aphasia. This particular type of\ndisorder belongs to a whole class of mental diseases known as amnesia.\nNow amnesia (in Greek, \"forgetfulness\") is literally any loss or defect\nof the Memory. Aphasia (in Greek \"absence of speech\") is a total or\npartial loss of the power of speech, either in its spoken or written\nform. The term covers the loss of the power of expression by spoken\nwords, but is often extended to include both word-deafness, i.e., the\nmisunderstanding of what is said, and word-blindness--the inability to\nread words. An inability to execute the movements necessary to express\noneself, either by gesture, writing, or speech, is styled \"motor\naphasia,\" to distinguish it from the inability to understand\nfamiliar gestures and written or spoken words, which is known as\n\"sensory-aphasia.\" The commonest causes of this disease are lesions,\naffecting the special nerve centres, due to haemorrhage or the\ndevelopment of tumours, being in the one case rapid, in the other a\ngradual development. Of course any severe excitement, fright or illness,\ninvolving a disturbance of the normal circulation in the cerebral\ncentres, may produce asphasia. During the war, it has been one of the\nafflictions of a large number of the victims of \"shell-shock.\" But,\nwhatever be the cause, the patient is reduced mentally to an elementary\nstate, resembling that of a child, and needs re-educating in the\nelements of language.\n\nNow, from his careful study of the pathological phenomena, manifested in\nthese cases, Bergson draws some very important conclusions in regard\nto the nature of Memory and its relation to the brain. In 1896, when he\nbrought out his work Matiere et Memoire, in Paris, the general view\nwas against his conclusions and his opinions were ridiculed. By 1910, a\nmarked change had come about and he was able to refer to this in the\nnew introduction.[Footnote: See Bibliography, p. 158.] His view was\nno longer considered paradoxical. The conception of aphasia, once\nclassical, universally admitted, believed to be unshakeable, had been\nconsiderably shaken in that period of fourteen years. Localization,\nand reference to centres would not, it was found, explain things\nsufficiently.[Footnote: The work of Pierre Janet was largely influential\nalso in bringing about this change of view.] This involved a too rigid\nand mechanical conception of the brain as a mere \"box,\" and Bergson\nattacks it very forcibly under the name of \"the box theory.\" \"All the\narguments,\" he says, \"from fact which may be invoked in favour of a\nprobable accumulation of memories in the cortical substance, are\ndrawn from local disorders of memory. But if recollections were really\ndeposited in the brain, to definite gaps in memory characteristic\nlesions of the brain would correspond. Now in those forms of amnesia in\nwhich a whole period of our past existence, for example, is abruptly and\nentirely obliterated from memory, we do not observe any precise cerebral\nlesion; and on the contrary, in those disorders of memory where cerebral\nlocalization is distinct and certain, that is to say, in the different\ntypes of aphasia, and in the diseases of visual or auditory recognition,\nwe do not find that certain definite recollections are, as it were, torn\nfrom their seat, but that it is the whole faculty of remembering that is\nmore or less diminished in vitality, as if the subject had more or less\ndifficulty in bringing his recollections into contact with the present\nsituation.\" [Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 315 (Fr. pp. 264-265).] But\nas it is a fact that the past survives under two distinct forms, viz.,\n\"motor mechanisms\" and \"independent recollections,\" we find that this\nexplains why \"in all cases where a lesion of the brain attacks a certain\ncategory of recollections, the affected recollections do not resemble\neach other by all belonging to the same period, or by any logical\nrelationship to one another, but simply in that they are all auditive or\nall visual or all motor. That which is damaged appears to be the various\nsensorial or motor areas, or more often still, those appendages which\npermit of their being set going from within the cortex rather than the\nrecollections themselves.\" [Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 317 (Fr. p.\n266).] Going even further than this, by the study of the recognition of\nwords, and of sensory-aphasia, Bergson shows that \"recognition is in no\nway affected by a mechanical awakening of memories that are asleep in\nthe brain. It implies, on the contrary, a more or less high degree of\ntension in consciousness, which goes to fetch pure recollections in pure\nmemory, in order to materialize them progressively, by contact with the\npresent perception.\" [Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 317 (Fr. p. 266).]\n\nIn the face of all this mass of evidence and thoroughness of argument\nwhich Bergson brings forward, we are led to conclude that Memory is\nindeed something other than a function of the brain. Criticizing\nWundt's view,[Footnote: As expressed in his Grundzuge der physiologische\npsychologie, vol. I., pp. 320-327. See Matter and Memory, p. 164 (Fr.\np. 137).]Bergson contends that no trace of an image can remain in the\nsubstance of the brain and no centre of apperception can exist. \"There\nis not in the brain a region in which memories congeal and accumulate.\nThe alleged destruction of memories by an injury to the brain is but\na break in the continuous progress by which they actualize\nthemselves.\" [Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 160 (Fr. p. 134).] It is\nthen futile to ask in what spot past memories are stored. To look for\nthem in any place would be as meaningless as asking to see traces of the\ntelephonic message upon the telephone wire.\n\n\"Memory,\" it has been said, \"is a faculty which loses nothing and\nrecords everything.\" [Footnote: Ball, quoted by Rouillard, Les Amnesies,\nParis, 1885, p. 25; Matter and Memory, p. 201 (Fr. p. 168).] This is\nonly too true, although normally we do not recognize it. But we can\nnever be sure that we have absolutely forgotten anything. Illness,\nproducing delirium, may provoke us to speak of things we had thought\nwere gone beyond recall and which perhaps we even wish were beyond\nrecall. A somnambulistic state or even a dream may show us memory\nextending far further back than we could ordinarily imagine. The facing\nof death in battle, we know, recalls to many, with extreme vividness,\nscenes of early childhood which they had deemed long since forgotten.\n\"There is nothing,\" says Bergson, \"more instructive in this regard than\nwhat happens in cases of sudden suffocation--in men drowned or hanged.\nThe man, when brought to life again, states that he saw in a very short\ntime all the forgotten events of his life, passing before him with great\nrapidity, with their smallest circumstances, and in the very order in\nwhich they occurred.\" [Footnote: La Perception du Changement, pp.\n30-31, and Matter and Memory, p 200 (Fr p 168).] Hence we can never be\nabsolutely sure that we have forgotten anything although at any given\ntime we may be unable to recall it to mind. There is an unconscious\nmemory.[Footnote: Cf. Samuel Butler's Unconscious Memory.] Speaking\nof the profound and yet undeniable reality of the unconscious, Bergson\nsays,[Footnote: Matter and Memory, pp 181-182 (Fr. pp. 152-153).\nSee also Le Souvenir du present et la fausse reconnaissance, Revue\nphilosophique, Dec., 1908, p. 592, and L'Energie spirituelle, pp.\n159-161 (Mind-Energy).] \"Our unwillingness to conceive unconscious\npsychical states, is due, above all, to the fact that we hold\nconsciousness to be the essential property of psychical states, so\nthat a psychical state cannot, it seems, cease to be conscious without\nceasing to exist. But if consciousness is but the characteristic note\nof the present, that is to say, of the actually lived, in short, of\nthe active, then that which does not act may cease to belong to\nconsciousness without therefore ceasing to exist in some manner. In\nother words, in the psychological domain, consciousness may not be the\nsynonym of existence, but only of real action or of immediate efficacy;\nlimiting thus the meaning of the term, we shall have less difficulty in\nrepresenting to ourselves a psychical state which is unconscious, that\nis to say, ineffective. Whatever idea we may frame of consciousness in\nitself, such as it would be if it could work untrammelled, we cannot\ndeny that in a being which has bodily functions, the chief office\nof consciousness is to preside over action and to enlighten choice.\nTherefore it throws light on the immediate antecedents of the decision\nand on those past recollections which can usefully combine with it; all\nelse remains in shadow.\" But we have no more right to say that the\npast effaces itself as soon as perceived than to suppose that material\nobjects cease to exist when we cease to perceive them. Memory, to use\na geometrical illustration which Bergson himself employs, comes into\naction like the point of a cone pressing against a plane. The plane\ndenotes the present need, particularly in relation to bodily action,\nwhile the cone stands for all our total past. Much of this past, indeed\nmost of it, only endures as unconscious Memory, but it is always capable\nof coming to the apex of the cone, i.e., coming into consciousness. So\nwe may say that there are different planes of Memory, conic sections, if\nwe keep up the original metaphor, and the largest of these contains all\nour past. This may be well described as \"the plane of dream.\" [Footnote:\nSee Matter and Memory, p. 222 (Fr. p. 186) and the paper L'Effort\nintellectuel, Revue philosophique, Jan., 1902, pp. 2 and 25, L'Energie\nspirituelle, pp. 165 and 199 (Mind-Energy).]\n\nThis connexion of Memory with dreams is more fully brought out by\nBergson in his lecture before the Institut psychologique international,\nfive years after the publication of Matiere et Memoire, entitled Le\nReve. [Footnote: Delivered March 26, 1901. See Bibliography, p. 153.]\nThe following is a brief summary of the view there set forth. Memories,\nand only memories, weave the web of our dreams. They are \"such stuff as\ndreams are made on.\" Often we do not recognize them. They may be very\nold memories, forgotten during waking hours, drawn from the most\nobscure depths of our past, or memories of objects we have perceived\ndistractedly, almost unconsciously, while awake. They may be fragments\nof broken memories, composing an incoherent and unrecognizable whole.\nIn a waking state our memories are closely connected with our present\nsituation (unless we be given to day-dreams!). In an animal memory\nserves to recall to him the advantageous or injurious consequences\nwhich have formerly arisen in a like situation, and so aids his present\naction. In man, memory forms a solid whole, a pyramid whose point is\ninserted precisely into our present action. But behind the memories\nwhich are involved in our occupations, there are others, thousands of\nothers, stored below the scene illuminated by consciousness. \"Yes,\nI believe indeed,\" says Bergson, \"that all our past life is there,\npreserved even to the most infinitesimal details, and that we forget\nnothing and that all that we have ever felt, perceived, thought, willed,\nfrom the first awakening of our consciousness, survives indestructibly.\"\n[Footnote: Dreams, p. 37. For this discussion in full, see pages 34-39,\nor see L'Energie spirituelle, pp. 100-103 (Mind-Energy).] Of course, in\naction I have something else to do than occupy myself with these.\nBut suppose I become disinterested in present action--that I fall\nasleep--then the obstacle (my attention to action) removed, these\nmemories try to raise the trap-door--they all want to get through. From\nthe multitude which are called, which will be chosen? When I was awake,\nonly those were admitted which bore on the present situation. Now, in\nsleep, more vague images occupy my vision, more indecisive sounds\nreach my ear, more indistinct touches come to my body, and more vague\nsensations come from my internal organs. Hence those memories which\ncan assimilate themselves to some element in this vague mass of\nvery indistinct sensations manage to get through. When such union is\neffected, between memory and sensation, we have a dream.\n\nIn order that a recollection should be brought to mind, it is necessary\nthat it should descend from the height of pure memory to the precise\npoint where action is taking place. Such a power is the mark of the\nwell-balanced mind, pursuing a via media between impulsiveness on the\none hand, and dreaminess on the other. \"The characteristic of the man of\naction,\" says Bergson in this connexion, \"is the promptitude with which\nhe summons to the help of a given situation all the memories which have\nreference to it. To live only in the present, to respond to a stimulus\nby the immediate reaction which prolongs it, is the mark of the lower\nanimals; the man who proceeds in this way is a man of impulse. But he\nwho lives in the past, for the mere pleasure of living there, and in\nwhom recollections emerge into the light of consciousness, without any\nadvantage for the present situation, is hardly better fitted for\naction; here we have no man of impulse, but a dreamer. Between these two\nextremes lies the happy disposition of a memory docile enough to follow\nwith precision all the outlines of the present situation, but energetic\nenough to resist all other appeal. Good sense or practical sense, is\nprobably nothing but this.\" [Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 198 (Fr. pp.\n166-167).]\n\nIn the paper L'Effort intellectuel, contributed in 1902 to the Revue\nphilosophique, and now reprinted in L'Energie spirituelle,[Footnote:\nPp. 163-202. See also Mind-Energy.]Bergson gives an analysis of what is\ninvolved in intellectual effort. There is at first, he shows, something\nconceived quite generally, an idea vague and abstract, a schema which\nhas to be completed by distinct images. In thought there is a movement\nof the mind from the plane of the schema to the plane of the concrete\nimage. Various images endeavour to fit themselves into the schema, or\nthe schema may adapt itself to the reception of the images. These\ndouble efforts to secure adaptation and cooperation may both encounter\nresistance from the other, a situation which is known to us as\nhesitation, accompanied by the awareness of obstacles, thus involving\nintellectual effort.\n\nMemory then, Bergson wishes us to realize, in response to his treatment\nof it, is no mere function of the brain; it is something infinitely more\nsubtle, infinitely more elusive, and more wondrous. Our memories are not\nstored in the brain like letters in a filing cabinet, and all our\npast survives indestructibly as Memory, even though in the form of\nunconscious memory. We must recognize Memory to be a spiritual fact\nand so regard it as a pivot on which turn many discussions of vital\nimportance when we come to investigate the problem of the relation of\nsoul and body. For \"Memory must be, in principle, a power absolutely\nindependent of matter. If then, spirit is a reality, it is here, in\nthe phenomenon of Memory that we may come into touch with it\nexperimentally.\" [Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 81 (Fr. p. 68).]\n\"Memory,\" he would remind us finally, \"is just the intersection of mind\nand matter.\" [Footnote: Matter and Memory, Introduction, p. xii.] \"A\nremembrance cannot be the result of a state of the brain. The state of\nthe brain continues the remembrance; it gives it a hold on the present\nby the materiality which it confers upon it, but pure memory is a\nspiritual manifestation. With Memory, we are, in very truth, in the\ndomain of spirit.\" [Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 320 (Fr. p. 268).]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nTHE RELATION OF SOUL AND BODY\n\n\nThe hypothesis of Psycho-physical Parallelism--Not to be accepted\nuncritically--Bergson opposes it, and shows the hypothesis to rest on a\nconfusion of terms. Bergson against Epiphenomenalism--Soul-life unique\nand wider than the brain--Telepathy, subconscious action and psychical\nresearch--Souls and survival.\n\n\nFor philosophy in general, and for psychology in particular, the problem\nof the relation of soul and body has prime significance, and moreover,\nit is a problem with which each of us is acquainted intimately\nand practically, even if we know little or nothing of the academic\ndiscussions, or of the technical terms representing various views. It is\nvery frequently the terminology which turns the plain man away from the\nconsideration of philosophical problems; but he has some conception,\nhowever crude it may be, of his soul or his mind and of his body.\nThese terms are familiar to him, but the sight of a phrase like\n\"psycho-physical parallelism\" rather daunts him. Really, it stands for\nquite a simple thing, and is just the official label used to designate\nthe theory commonly held by scientific men of all kinds, to describe the\nrelation of soul and body. Put more precisely, it is just the assertion\nthat brain and consciousness work on parallel lines.\n\nBergson does not accept the hypothesis of psycho-physical parallelism.\nIn the first of his four lectures on La Nature de l'Ame, given at\nLondon University in 1911, we find him criticizing the notion that\nconsciousness has no independence of its own, that it merely expresses\ncertain states of the brain, that the content of a fact of consciousness\nis to be found wholly in the corresponding cerebral state. It is true\nthat we should not find many physiologists or philosophers who would\ntell us now that \"the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes\nbile.\" [Footnote: Cabanis (1757-1808). Rapports du physique et du morale\nde l'homme, 1802. See quotation by William James in Human Immortality.\nNote (4) in his Appendix.] But there was an idea that, if we could see\nthrough the skull and observe what takes place in the brain, if we had\nan enormously powerful microscope which would permit us to follow the\nmovements of the molecules, atoms, electrons, of the brain, and if we\nhad the key to the correspondence between these phenomena and the mind,\nwe should know all the thoughts and wishes of the person to whom\nthe brain belonged--we should see what took place in his soul, as a\ntelegraph operator could read by the oscillation of his needles the\nmeaning of a message which was sent through his instrument. The notion\nof an equality or parallelism between conscious activity and cerebral\nactivity, was commonly adopted by modern physiology, and it was\nadopted without discussion as a scientific notion by the majority of\nphilosophers. Yet the experimental basis of this theory is extremely\nslight, indeed altogether insufficient, and in reality the theory is\na metaphysical conception, resulting from the views of the seventeenth\ncentury thinkers who had hopes of \"a universal mathematic.\" The idea had\nbeen accepted that all was capable of determination in the psychical as\nwell as the physical world, inasmuch as the psychical was only a reflex\nof the physical. Parallelism was adopted by science because of its\nconvenience.[Footnote: See The Times of Oct. 21, 1911.] Bergson,\nhowever, pointed out that philosophy ought not to accept it without\ncriticism, and maintained, moreover, that it could not stand the\ncriticism that might be brought against it. Relation of soul and body\nwas undeniable, but that it was a parallel or equivalent relation he\ndenied most emphatically. That criticism he had launched himself\nwith great vigour in 1901 at a Meeting of the Societe francaise\nde philosophie,[Footnote: See Bibliography, p. 153.] and on a more\nmemorable occasion, at the International Congress of Philosophy\nat Geneva in 1904.[Footnote: See Bibliography, p. 154.] Before the\nPhilosophical Society he lectured on Le Parallelisme psycho-physique et\nla Metaphysique positive, and propounded the following propositions:\n\n1. If psycho-physical parallelism is neither rigorous nor complete,\nif to every determined thought there does not correspond an absolutely\ndetermined state (si a toute pensee determinee ne correspond pas un etat\ncerebral determine absolument), it will be the business of experience\nto mark with increasing accuracy the precise points at which parallelism\nbegins and ends.\n\n2. If this empirical inquiry is possible, it will measure more and more\nexactly the separation between the thought and the physical conditions\nin which this thought is exercised. In other words, it will give us a\nprogressive knowledge of the relation of man as a thinking being to man\nas a living being, and therefore of what may be termed \"the meaning of\nLife.\"\n\n3. If this meaning of Life can be empirically determined more and more\nexactly, and completely, a positive metaphysic is possible: that is to\nsay, a metaphysic which cannot be contested and which will admit of\na direct and indefinite progress; such a metaphysic would escape the\nobjections urged against a transcendental metaphysic, and would be\nstrictly scientific in form.\n\nAfter having propounded these propositions, he defended them by\nrecalling much of the data considered in his work Matiere et Memoire\nwhich he had published five years previously and which has been examined\nin the previous chapter. The onus of proof lay, said Bergson, with\nthe upholders of parallelism. It is a purely metaphysical hypothesis\nunwarrantable in his opinion as a dogma. He distinguishes between\ncorrespondence--which he of course admits--and parallelism, to which\nhe is opposed. We never think without a certain substratum of cerebral\nactivity, but what the relation is precisely, between brain and\nconsciousness, is one for long and patient research: it cannot be\ndetermined a priori and asserted dogmatically. Until such investigation\nhas been carried out, it behoves us to be undogmatic and not to allege\nmore than the facts absolutely warrant, that is to say, a relation of\ncorrespondence. Parallelism is far too simple an explanation to be a\ntrue one. Before the International Congress, Bergson launched another\nattack on parallelism which caused quite a little sensation among those\npresent. Says M. E. Chartier, in his report: La lecture de ce memoire,\nlecture qui commandait l'attention a provoque chez presque tous les\nauditeurs un mouvement de surprise et d'inquietude. [Footnote: The paper\nLe Paralogisme psycho-physiologique is given in Revue de metaphysique\net de morale, Nov., 1904, pp. 895-908. The Discussion in the Congress is\ngiven on pp. 1027-1037. This was reissued under the title Le Cerveau et\nla Pensee: une illusion philosophique in the collected volume of essays\nand lectures, published in 1919, L'Energie spirituelle, pp. 203-223\n(Mind-Energy).] He there set out to show that Parallelism cannot be\nconsistently stated from any point of view, for it rests on a fallacious\nargument--on a fundamental contradiction. To grasp Bergson's points in\nthis argument, the reading of this paper in the original, as a whole,\nis necessary. It is difficult to condense it and keep its clearness\nof thought. Briefly, it amounts to this, that the formulation of the\ndoctrine of Parallelism rests on an ambiguity in the terms employed in\nits statement, that it contains a subtle dialectical artifice by which\nwe pass surreptitiously from one system of notation to another ignoring\nthe substitution: logically, we ought to keep to one system of notation\nthroughout. The two systems are: Idealism and Realism. Bergson attempts\nto show that neither of these separately can admit Parallelism, and that\nParallelism cannot be formulated except by a confusion of the two--by\na process of mental see-sawing as it were, which of course we are\nnot entitled to perform, Idealism and Realism being two opposed and\ncontradictory views of reality. For the Idealist, things external to the\nmind are images, and of these the brain is one. Yet the images are in\nthe brain. This amounts to saying that the whole is contained in the\npart. We tend, however, to avoid this by passing to a pseudo-realistic\nposition by saying that the brain is a thing and not an image. This is\npassing over to the other system of notation. For the Realist it is\nthe essence of reality to suppose that there are things behind\nrepresentations. Some Realists maintain that the brain actually creates\nthe representation, which is the doctrine of Epiphenomenalism: while\nothers hold the view of the Occasionalists, and others posit one reality\nunderlying both. All however agree in upholding Parallelism. In the\nhands of the Realist, the theory is equivalent to asserting that a\nrelation between two terms is equal to one of them. This involves\ncontradiction and Realism then crosses over to the other system of\nnotation. It cannot do without Idealism: science itself oscillates from\nthe one system to the other. We cannot admit Parallelism as a dogma--as\na metaphysical truth--however useful it may be as a working hypothesis.\n\nBergson then proceeds to state and to criticize some of the mischievous\nideas which arise from Parallelism. There is the idea of a brain-soul,\nof a spot where the soul lives or where the brain thinks--which we have\nnot quite abandoned since Descartes named the pineal gland as the\nseat of the soul. Then there is the false idea that all causality is\nmechanistic and that there is nothing in the universe which is not\nmathematically calculable. There is the confusion of representations\nand of things. There is the false notion that we may argue that if two\nwholes are bound together there must be an equivalent relation of the\nparts. Bergson points out in this connexion that the absence or the\npresence of a screw can stop a machine or keep it going, but the parts\nof the screw do not correspond to the parts of the machine. In his new\nintroduction to Matiere et Memoire, he said, \"There is a close connexion\nbetween a state of consciousness and the brain: this we do not dispute.\nBut there is also a close connexion between a coat and the nail on which\nit hangs, for if the nail is pulled out the coat falls to the ground.\nShall we say then that the shape of the nail gives us the shape of\nthe coat or in any way corresponds to it? No more are we entitled to\nconclude because the psychical fact is hung on to a cerebral state\nthat there is any parallelism between the two series psychical and\nphysiological.\" [Footnote: There must be an awkward misprint \"physical\"\nfor \"psychical\" in the English translation, p. xi.] Our observation and\nexperience, and science itself, strictly speaking, do not allow us to\nassert more than that there exists a certain CORRESPONDENCE\nbetween brain and consciousness. The psychical and the physical are\ninter-dependent but not parallel.\n\nBergson however has more to assert than merely the inadequacy and\nfalsity of Parallelism or Epiphenomenalism. This last theory merely\nadds consciousness to physical facts as a kind of phosphorescent\ngleam, resembling, in Bergson's words, a \"streak of light following the\nmovement of a match rubbed along a wall in the dark.\" [Footnote: L'Ame\net le Corps, pp. 12-13, in Le Materialisme actuel, or pp. 35-36 of\nL'Energie spirituelle (Mind-Energy).] He maintains, as against all\nthis, the irreducibility of the mental, our utter inability to interpret\nconsciousness in terms of anything else, the life of the soul being\nunique. He further claims that this psychical life is wider and richer\nthan we commonly suppose. The brain is the organ of attention to life.\nWhat was said in regard to memory and the brain is applicable to all\nour mental life. The mind or soul is wider than the brain in every\ndirection, and the brain's activity corresponds to no more than an\ninfinitesimal part of the activity of the mind. [Footnote: L'Ame et le\nCorps, Le Materialisme actuel, p. 45, L'Energie spirituelle, p. 61.]\nThis is expressed more clearly in his Presidential Address to the\nBritish Society for Psychical Research at the Aeolian Hall, London,\n1913, where he remarked, \"The cerebral life is to the mental life\nwhat the movements of the baton of a conductor are to the symphony.\"\n[Footnote: The Times, May 29, 1913.] Such a remark contains fruitful\nsuggestions to all engaged in Psychical Research, and to all persons\ninterested in the fascinating study of telepathy. Bergson is of the\nopinion that we are far less definitely cut off from each other, soul\nfrom soul, than we are body from body. \"It is space,\" he says, \"which\ncreates multiplicity and distinction. It is by their bodies that the\ndifferent human personalities are radically distinct. But if it is\ndemonstrated that human consciousness is partially independent of the\nhuman brain, since the cerebral life represents only a small part of the\nmental life, it is very possible that the separation between the various\nhuman consciousnesses or souls, may not be so radical as it seems to\nbe.\" [Footnote: The Times, May 29, 1913.] There may be, he suggests,\nin the psychical world, a process analogous to what is known in the\nphysical world as \"endosmosis.\" Pleading for an impartial and frank\ninvestigation of telepathy, he pointed out that it was probable, or\nat least possible, that it was taking place constantly as a subtle and\nsub-conscious influence of soul on soul, but too feebly to be noticed\nby active consciousness, or it was neutralized by certain obstacles.\nWe have no right to deny its possibility on the plea of its being\nsupernatural, or against natural law, for our ignorance does not entitle\nus to say what may be natural or not. If telepathy does not square at\nall well with our preconceived notions, it may be more true that our\npreconceived notions are false than that telepathy is fictitious;\nespecially will this be so if our notion of the relation of soul and\nbody be based on Parallelism. We must overcome this prejudice and seek\nto make others set it aside. Telepathy and the sub-conscious mental life\ncombine to make us realize the wonder of the soul. It is not spatial,\nit is spiritual. Bergson insists strongly on the unity of our conscious\nlife. Merely associationist theories are vicious in this respect: they\ntry to resolve the whole into parts, and then neglect the whole in their\nconcentration on the parts. All psychological investigation incurs this\nrisk of dealing with abstractions. \"Psychology, in fact, proceeds like\nall the other sciences by analysis. It resolves the self which has been\ngiven to it at first in a simple intuition, into sensations, feelings,\nideas, etc., which it studies separately. It substitutes then for the\nself a series of elements which form the facts of psychology. But are\nthese elements really parts? That is the whole question, and it is\nbecause it has been evaded that the problem of human personality has\nso often been stated in insoluble terms.\" [Footnote: Introduction to\nMetaphysics, p. 21.] \"Personality cannot be composed of psychical states\neven if there be added to them a kind of thread for the purpose of\njoining the states together.\" [Footnote: Introduction to Metaphysics,\np. 25.] We shall never make the soul fit into a category or succeed in\napplying concepts to our inner life. The life of the soul is wider than\nthe brain and wider than all intellectual constructions or moulds we may\nattempt to form. It is a creative force capable of producing novelty in\nthe world: it creates actions and can, in addition, create itself.\n\nPhilosophy shows us \"the life of the body just where it really is, on\nthe road that leads to the life of the spirit\"; our powers of sense\nimpression and of intelligence are both instruments in the service of\nthe will. With a little will one can do much if one places the will in\nthe right direction. For this force of will which is the essence of\nthe soul or personality has these exceptional characteristics, that its\nintensity depends on its direction, and that its quality may become the\ncreator of quantity. [Footnote: See the lectures La Nature de l'Ame.]\nThe brain and the body in general are instruments of the soul. The brain\norients the mind toward action, it is the point of attachment between\nthe spirit and its material environment. It is like the point of a knife\nto the blade--it enables it to penetrate into the realm of action or,\nto give another of Bergson's metaphors, it is like the prow of the ship,\nenabling the soul to penetrate the billows of reality. Yet, for all\nthat, it limits and confines the life of the spirit; it narrows vision\nas do the blinkers which we put on horses. We must, however, abandon the\nnotion of any rigid and determined parallelism between soul and body and\naccustom ourselves to the fact that the life of the mind is wider\nthan the limits of cerebral activity. And further, there is this to\nconsider--\"The more we become accustomed to this idea of a consciousness\nwhich overflows the organ we call the brain, then the more natural and\nprobable we find the hypothesis that the soul survives the body. For\nwere the mental exactly modelled on the cerebral, we might have to admit\nthat consciousness must share the fate of the body and die with\nit.\" [Footnote: New York Times, Sept. 27, 1914.] \"But the destiny of\nconsciousness is not bound up with the destiny of cerebral matter.\"\n[Footnote: Creative Evolution, p. 285 (Fr. p. 293).] \"Although the\ndata is not yet sufficient to warrant more than an affirmation of high\nprobability,\" [Footnote: Louis Levine's interview with Bergson, New York\nTimes, Feb. 22, 1914. Quoted by Miller, Bergson and Religion, p. 268.]\nyet it leaves the way open for a belief in a future life and creates a\npresumption in favour of a faith in immortality. \"Humanity,\" as Bergson\nremarks, \"may, in its evolution, overcome the most formidable of its\nobstacles, perhaps even death.\" [Footnote: Creative Evolution, p. 286\n(Fr. p. 294). In Life and Consciousness he says we may admit that in man\nat any rate \"Consciousness pursues its path beyond this earthly life\"\nCf. also conclusion to La Conscience el la Vie in L'Energie spirituelle,\np. 29, and to L'Ame et le Corps, in the same vol., p. 63.]\n\nThe great error of the spiritual philosophers has been the idea that\nby isolating the spiritual life from all the rest, by suspending it in\nspace, as high as possible above the earth, they were placing it beyond\nattack; as if they were not, thereby, simply exposing it to be taken as\nan effect of mirage! Certainly they are right to believe in the absolute\nreality of the person and in his independence of matter: but science is\nthere which shows the inter-dependence of conscious life and cerebral\nactivity. When a strong instinct assures the probability of personal\nsurvival, they are right not to close their ears to its voice; but if\nthere exist \"souls\" capable of an independent life, whence do they come?\nWhen, how, and why do they enter into this body which we see arise quite\nnaturally from a mixed cell derived from the bodies of its two parents?\n[Footnote: Creative Evolution, p. 283 (Fr. p. 291).] At the close of\nthe Lectures on La Nature de l'Ame, Bergson suggests, by referring to\nan allegory of Plotinus, in regard to the origin of souls, that in\nthe beginning there was a general interpenetration of souls which was\nequivalent to the very principle of life, and that the history of the\nevolution of life on this planet shows this principle striving until\nman's consciousness has been developed, and thus personalities have\nbeen able to constitute themselves. \"Souls are being created which, in\na sense, pre-existed. They are nothing else but the little rills into\nwhich the great river of life divides itself, flowing through the great\nbody of humanity.\" [Footnote: Creative Evolution, p. 284 (Fr. p. 292).]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\nTIME--TRUE AND FALSE\n\n\nOur ordinary conception of Time false because it is spatial and\nhomogeneous--Real Time (la duree) not spatial or homogeneous--Flow of\nconsciousness a qualitative multiplicity--The real self and the external\nself. La duree and the life of the self--No repetition--Personality and\nthe accumulation of experience-Change and la duree as vital elements in\nthe universe.\n\n\nFor any proper understanding of Bergson's thought, it is necessary to\ngrasp his views regarding Time, for they are fundamental factors in his\nphilosophy and serve to distinguish it specially from that of previous\nthinkers. It is interesting to note however, in passing, that Dr. Ward,\nin his Realm of Ends, claims to have anticipated Bergson's view of\nConcrete Time. In discussing the relation of such Time to the conception\nof God, he says, \"I think I may fairly claim to have anticipated him\n(Bergson) to some extent. In 1886 I had written a long paragraph on this\ntopic.\" [Footnote: See The Realm of Ends' foot-note on pp. 306-7. Ward\nis referring to his famous article in the Encyclopaedia Britannica,\neleventh edition, Psychology, p. 577 (now revised and issued in book\nform as Psychological Principles).] Be this as it may, no philosopher\nhas made so much of this view of Time as Bergson. One might say it is\nthe corner-stone of his philosophy, for practically the whole of it is\nbuilt upon his conception of Time. His first large work, Essai sur les\ndonnees immediates de la conscience, or, to give it its better title, in\nEnglish, Time and Free Will, appeared in 1889.\n\nOur ordinary conception of Time, that which comes to us from the\nphysical sciences, is, Bergson maintains, a false one. It is false\nbecause so far from being temporal in character, it is spatial. We look\nupon space as a homogeneous medium without boundaries; yet we look on\nTime too, as just such another medium, homogeneous and unlimited. Now\nhere is an obvious difficulty, for since homogeneity consists in being\nwithout qualities, it is difficult to see how one homogeneity can be\ndistinguished from another. This difficulty is usually avoided by the\nassertion that homogeneity takes two forms, one in which its contents\nco-exist, and another in which they follow one another. Space, then,\nwe say, is that homogeneous medium in which we are aware of\nside-by-sideness, Time--that homogeneous medium in which we are aware\nof an element of succession. But this surely we are not entitled to\nmaintain, for we are then distinguishing two supposed homogeneities\nby asserting a difference of quality in them. To do so is to take away\nhomogeneity. We must think again and seek a way out of this difficulty.\nLet us admit space to be a homogeneous medium without bounds. Then every\nhomogeneous medium without bounds must be space. What, then, becomes of\nTime?--for on this showing, Time becomes space. Yes, says Bergson, that\nis so, for our common view of Time is a false one, being really a hybrid\nconception, a spurious concept due to the illicit introduction of the\nidea of space, and to our application of the notion of space, which is\napplicable to physical objects, to states of consciousness, to which\nit is really inapplicable. Objects occupying space are marked out as\nexternal to one another, but this cannot be said of conscious states.\nYet, in our ordinary speech and conventional view of things, we think\nof conscious states as separated from one another and as spread out like\n\"things,\" in a fictitious, homogeneous medium to which we give the name\nTime. Bergson says, \"At any rate, we cannot finally admit two forms of\nthe homogeneous, Time and Space, without first seeking whether one\nof them cannot be reduced to the other. Now, externality is the\ndistinguishing mark of things which occupy space, while states of\nconsciousness are not essentially external to one another and become so\nonly by being spread out in Time regarded as a homogeneous medium. If,\nthen, one of these two supposed forms of the homogeneous, viz., Time and\nSpace, is derived from the other, we can surmise a priori that the idea\nof space is the fundamental datum. Time, conceived under the form of\nan unbounded and homogeneous medium, is nothing but the ghost of space,\nhaunting the reflective consciousness.\" [Footnote: Time and Free Will,\np. 98 (Fr. p. 75).] Bergson remarks that Kant's great mistake was to\ntake Time as a homogeneous medium. [Footnote: Time and Free Will, p. 232\n(Fr. p. 178).]\n\nHaving asserted the falsity of the view of Time ordinarily held,\nBergson proceeds to make clear to us his view of what Real Time is--an\nundertaking by no means easy for him, endeavouring to lay before us the\nsubtleties of this problem, nor for us who endeavour to interpret his\nlanguage and grasp his meaning. We are indeed here face to face with\nwhat is one of the most difficult sections of his philosophy. An initial\ndifficulty meets us in giving a definite name to the Time which Bergson\nregards as so real, as opposed to the spatial falsity, masquerading as\nTime, whose true colours he has revealed. In the original French text\nBergson employs the term duree to convey his meaning. But for the\ntranslation of this into English there is no term which will suffice and\nwhich will adequately convey to the reader, without further exposition,\nthe wealth of meaning intended to be conveyed. \"Duration\" is usually\nemployed by translators as the nearest approach possible in English. The\ninadequacy of language is never more keenly felt than in dealing\nwith fundamental problems of thought. Its chief mischief is its\nall-too-frequent ambiguity. In the following remarks the original French\nterm la duree will be used in preference to the English word \"Duration.\"\n\nThe distinction between the false Time and true Time may be regarded\nas a distinction between mathematical Time and living Time, or between\nabstract and concrete Time. This living, concrete Time is that true Time\nof which Bergson endeavours to give us a conception as la duree. He has\ncriticized the abstract mathematical Time, his attack having been made\nto open up the way for a treatment of what he really considers Time to\nbe. Now, from the arguments previously mentioned, it follows that\nTime, Real Time, which is radically different from space, cannot be any\nhomogeneous medium. It is heterogeneous in character. We are aware of it\nin relation to ourselves, for it has reference not to the existence of\na multiplicity of material objects in space, but to a multiplicity of\na quite different nature, entirely non-spatial, viz., that of conscious\nstates. Being non-spatial, such a multiplicity cannot be composed of\nelements which are external to one another as are the objects existing\nin space. States of consciousness are not in any way external to one\nanother. Indeed, they interpenetrate to such a degree that even the use\nof the word \"state\" is apt to be misleading. As we saw in the chapter on\nThe Reality of Change, there can be strictly no states of consciousness,\nfor consciousness is not static but dynamic. Language and conventional\nfigures of speech, of which the word \"state\" itself is a good example,\nserve to cut up consciousness artificially, but, in reality, it is,\nas William James termed it, \"a stream\" and herein lies the essence of\nBergson's duree--the Real as opposed to the False Time. \"Pure Duration\"\n(la duree pure), he says, \"is the form which the succession of our\nconscious states assumes when our Ego lets itself live, when it refrains\nfrom separating its present state from its former states. For this\npurpose, it need not be entirely absorbed in the passing sensation or\nidea, for then, on the contrary, it would no longer 'endure.' Nor\nneed it forget its former states; it is enough that in recalling these\nstates, it does not set them alongside its actual state as one point\nalongside another, but forms both the past and the present states\ninto an organic whole, as happens when we recall the notes of a tune,\nmelting, so to speak, into one another. Might it not be said that\neven if these notes succeed one another, yet, we perceive them in one\nanother, and that their totality may be compared to a living being whose\nparts, although distinct, permeate one another just because they are so\nclosely connected?\" [Footnote: Time and Free Will, p. 100 (Fr. p. 76).]\nSuch a duration is Real Time. Unfortunately, we, obsessed by the idea of\nspace, introduce it unwittingly and set our states of consciousness side\nby side in such a way as to perceive them alongside one another; in\na word, we project them into space and we express duree in terms of\nextensity and succession thus takes the form of a continuous line or a\nchain--the parts of which touch without interpenetrating one another.\n[Footnote: Time and Free Will, p. 100 (Fr. p. 76).] Thus is brought to\nbirth that mongrel form, that hybrid conception of False Time criticized\nabove. Real Time, la duree, is not, however, susceptible like False\nTime to measurement, for it is, strictly speaking, not quantitative in\ncharacter, but is rather a qualitative multiplicity. \"Real Duration (la\nduree reele) is just what has always been called Time, but it is Time\nperceived as indivisible.\" [Footnote: La Perception du Changement, p.\n26. Cf. the whole of the Second Lecture.] Certainly pure consciousness\ndoes not perceive Time as a sum of units of duration, for, left to\nitself, it has no means and even no reason to measure Time, but a\nfeeling which lasted only half the number of days, for example, would\nno longer be the same feeling for it. It is true that when we give this\nfeeling a certain name, when we treat it as a thing, we believe that\nwe can diminish its duration by half, for example, and also halve the\nduration of all the rest of our history. It seems that it would still\nbe the same life only on a reduced scale. But we forget that states\nof consciousness are processes and not things; that they are alive\nand therefore constantly changing, and that, in consequence, it is\nimpossible to cut off a moment from them without making them poorer by\nthe loss of some impression and thus altering their quality. [Footnote:\nTime and Free Will, p. 196 (Fr. p. 150).] La duree appears as a \"wholly\nqualitative multiplicity, an absolute heterogeneity of elements which\npass over into one another.\" [Footnote: Time and Free Will, p. 229 (Fr.\np. 176).] Such a time cannot be measured by clocks or dials but only\nby conscious beings, for \"it is the very stuff of which life and\nconsciousness are made.\" Intellect does not grasp Real Time--we can\nonly have an intuition of it. \"We do not think Real Time--but we live it\nbecause life transcends intellect.\"\n\nIn order to bring out the distinctly qualitative character of such a\nconception of Time, Bergson says, \"When we hear a series of blows of a\nhammer, the sounds form an indivisible melody in so far as they are pure\nsensations, and here again give rise to a dynamic progress; but, knowing\nthat the same objective cause is at work, we cut up this progress into\nphases which we then regard as identical; and this multiplicity\nof elements no longer being conceivable except by being set out in\nspace--since they have now become identical--we are, necessarily, led\nto the idea of a homogeneous Time, the symbolical image of la duree.\"\n[Footnote: Time and Free Will, p. 125 (Fr. pp. 94-95).] \"Whilst I am\nwriting these lines,\" he continues, \"the hour strikes on a neighbouring\nclock, but my inattentive ear does not perceive it until several strokes\nhave made themselves heard. Hence, I have not counted them and yet I\nonly have to turn my attention backwards, to count up the four strokes\nwhich have already sounded, and add them to those which I hear. If,\nthen, I question myself carefully on what has just taken place, I\nperceive that the first four sounds had struck my ear and even affected\nmy consciousness, but that the sensations produced by each one of them,\ninstead of being set side by side, had melted into one another in such\na way as to give the whole a peculiar quality, to make a kind of musical\nphrase out of it. In order, then, to estimate retrospectively, the\nnumber of strokes sounded, I tried to reconstruct this phrase in\nthought; my imagination made one stroke, then two, then three, and\nas long as it did not reach the exact number, four, my feeling, when\nconsulted, was qualitatively different. It had thus ascertained, in its\nown way, the succession of four strokes, but quite otherwise than by a\nprocess of addition and without bringing in the image of a juxtaposition\nof distinct terms. In a word, the number of strokes was perceived as a\nquality and not as a quantity; it is thus that la duree is presented to\nimmediate consciousness and it retains this form so long as it does\nnot give place to a symbolical representation, derived from extensity.\"\n[Footnote: Time and Free Will, pp. 127-8 (Fr. pp. 96-97).] In these\nwords Bergson endeavours to drive home his contention that la duree is\nessentially qualitative. He is well aware of the results of \"the breach\nbetween quality and quantity,\" between true duration and pure extensity.\nHe sees its implications in regard to vital problems of the self,\nof causality and of freedom. Its specific bearing on the problems of\nfreedom and causality we shall discuss in the following chapter. As\nregards the self, Bergson recognizes that we have much to gain by\nkeeping up the illusion through which we make our conscious states share\nin the reciprocal externality of outer things, because this distinctness\nand solidification enables us to give them fixed names in spite of their\ninstability, and distinct names in spite of their interpenetration.\nAbove all it enables us to objectify them, to throw them out into the\ncurrent of social life. But just for this very reason we are in danger\nof living our lives superficially and of covering up our real self.\nWe are generally content with what is but a shadow of the real self,\nprojected into space. Consciousness, goaded on by an insatiable desire\nto separate, substitutes the symbol for the reality or perceives the\nreality only through the symbol. As the self thus refracted and thereby\nbroken in pieces, is much better adapted to the requirements of social\nlife in general, and of language in particular, consciousness prefers it\nand gradually loses sight of the fundamental self which is a qualitative\nmultiplicity of conscious states flowing, interpenetrating, melting\ninto one another, and forming an organic whole, a living unity or\npersonality. It is through a consideration of la duree and what it\nimplies that Bergson is led on to the distinction of two selves in each\nof us.\n\nTowards the close of his essay on Time and Free Will, he points out that\nthere are finally two different selves, a fundamental self and a social\nself. We reach the former by deep introspection which leads us to grasp\nour inner states as living things, constantly becoming, never amenable\nto measure, which permeate one another and of which the succession in\nla duree has nothing in common with side-by-sideness. But the moments at\nwhich we thus grasp ourselves are rare; the greater part of our time we\nlive outside ourselves, hardly perceiving anything of ourselves but our\nown ghost--a colourless shadow which is but the social representation\nof the real and largely concealed Ego. Hence our life unfolds in space\nrather than in time. We live for the external world rather than for\nourselves, we speak rather than think, we are \"acted\" rather than \"act\"\nourselves. To act freely, however, is to recover possession of one's\nreal self and to get back into la duree reele. [Footnote: Time and Free\nWill, p. 232 (Fr. p. 178).]\n\nReal Time, then, is a living reality, not discrete, not spatial in\ncharacter--an utter contrast to that fictitious Time with which so many\nthinkers have busied themselves, setting up \"as concrete reality the\ndistinct moments of a Time which they have reduced to powder, while the\nunity which enables us to call the grains 'powder' they hold to be much\nmore artificial. Others place themselves in the eternal. But as their\neternity remains, notwithstanding, abstract since it is empty, being\nthe eternity of a concept which by hypothesis excludes from itself the\nopposing concept, one does not see how this eternity would permit of an\nindefinite number of moments co-existing in it, an eternity of death,\nsince it is nothing else than the movement emptied of the mobility which\nmade its life.\" [Footnote: An Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 51-54.]\nThe true view of Time, as la duree, would make us see it as a duration\nwhich expands, contracts, and intensifies itself more and more; at the\nlimit would be eternity, no longer conceptual eternity, which is an\neternity of death, but an eternity of life and change--a living, and\ntherefore still moving, eternity in which our own particular duree\nwould be included as the vibrations are in light, [Footnote: Speaking in\nMatter and Memory on the Tension of la duree, Bergson calls attention\nto the \"trillions of vibrations\" which give rise to our sensation of\nred light, p. 272 (Fr. p. 229) Cf. La Conscience et la Vie in L'Energie\nspirituelle, p. 16.] an eternity which would be the concentration of\nall duree. Altering the old classical phrase sub specie aeternitatis,\nto suit his special view of Time, Bergson urges us to strive to\nperceive all things sub specie durationis. [Footnote: La Perception du\nChangement, p. 36.]\n\nFinally, Bergson reminds us that if our existence were composed of\nseparate states, with an impassive Ego to unite them, for us there would\nbe no duration, for an Ego which does not change, does not endure. La\nduree, however, is the foundation of our being and is, as we feel, the\nvery substance of the world in which we live. Associating his view of\nReal Time with the reality of change, he points out that nothing is more\nresistant or more substantial than la duree, for our duree is not merely\none instant replacing another--if it were there would never be anything\nbut the present, no prolonging of the past into the actual, no growth\nof personality, and no evolution of the universe. La duree is the\ncontinuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future and which\nswells as it advances, leaving on all things its bite, or the mark of\nits tooth. This being so, consciousness cannot go through the same state\ntwice; history does never really repeat itself. Our personality is being\nbuilt up each instant with its accumulated experience; it shoots, grows,\nand ripens without ceasing. We are reminded of George Eliot's lines:\n\n     \"Our past still travels with us from afar\n      And what we have been makes us what we are.\"\n\nFor our consciousness this is what we mean by the term \"exist.\" \"For a\nconscious being, to exist is to change, to change is to mature, and to\ngo on creating oneself endlessly.\" [Footnote: Creative Evolution, p.\n8 (Fr. p. 8).] Real Time has, then, a very vital meaning for us as\nconscious beings, indeed for all that lives, for the organism which\nlives is a thing that \"endures.\" \"Wherever anything lives,\" says\nBergson, \"there is a register in which Time is being inscribed. This, it\nwill be said, is only a metaphor. It is of the very essence of mechanism\nin fact, to consider as metaphorical every expression which attributes\nto Time an effective action and a reality of its own. In vain does\nimmediate experience show us that the very basis of our conscious\nexistence is Memory--that is to say, the prolongation of the past into\nthe present, or in a word, duree, acting and irreversible.\" [Footnote:\nCreative Evolution, p. 17 (Fr. pp. 17-18).] Time is falsely assumed to\nhave just as much reality for a living being as for an hour-glass. But\nif Time does nothing, it is nothing. It is, however, in Bergson's view,\nvital to the whole of the universe. He expressly denies that la duree is\nmerely subjective; the universe \"endures\" as a whole. In Time and Free\nWill it did not seem to matter whether we regarded our inner life as\nhaving duree or as actually being duree. In the first instance, if we\nhave duree it is then only an aspect of reality, but if our personality\nitself is duree, then Time is reality itself. He develops this last\npoint of view more explicitly in his later works, and la duree is\nidentified not only with the reality of change, but with memory and with\nspirit. [Footnote: La Perception du Changement, Lecture 2.] In it he\nfinds the substance of a universe whose reality is change. \"God,\" said\nPlato, \"being unable to make the world eternal, gave it Time--a moving\nimage of reality.\" Bergson himself quotes this remark of Plato, and\nseems to have a vision like that of Rosetti's \"Blessed Damozel,\" who        ...... \"saw\n      Time like a pulse shake fierce\n      Through all the worlds.\"\n\nThe more we study Time, the more we may grasp this vision ourselves, and\nthen we shall comprehend that la duree implies invention, the creation\nof new forms, the continual elaboration of the absolutely new--in short,\nan evolution which is creative.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\nFREEDOM OF THE WILL\n\n\nSpirit of man revolts from physical and psychological\ndeterminism--Former examined and rejected--The latter more subtle--Vice\nof \"associationism\"--Psychology without a self. Condemnation\nof psychological determinism--Room for freedom--The self in\naction--Astronomical forecasts--Foreseeableness of any human action\nimpossible--Human wills centres of indetermination--Not all our acts\nfree--True freedom, self-determination.\n\n\nBefore passing on to an examination of Bergson's treatment of Evolution,\nwe must consider his discussion of the problem of Freedom of the Will.\nFew problems which have occupied the attention of philosophers have\nbeen more discussed or have given rise to more controversy than that of\nFreedom. This is, of course, natural as the question at issue is one of\nvery great importance, not merely as speculative, but also in the realm\nof action. We ask ourselves: \"Are we really free?\" Can we will either\nof two or more possibilities which are put before us, or, on the other\nhand, is everything fixed, predestined in such a way that an all-knowing\nconsciousness could foretell from our past what course our future action\nwould take?\n\nThe study of the physical sciences has led to a general acceptance of a\nprinciple of causality which is of such a kind that there seems no\nplace in the universe for human freedom. Further, there is a type of\npsychology which gives rise to the belief that even mental occurrences\nare as determined as those of the physical world, thus leaving no room\nfor autonomy of the Will. But even when presented with the arguments\nwhich make up the case for physical or psychological determinism,\nthe spirit of man revolts from it, refuses to accept it as final,\nand believes that, in some way or other, the case for Freedom may be\nmaintained. It is at this point that Bergson offers us some help in the\nsolution of the problem, by his Essai sur les donnees immediates de la\nconscience, better described by its English title Time and Free Will.\n\nThe arguments for physical determinism are based on the view that\nFreedom is incompatible with the fundamental properties of matter, and\nin particular, with the principle of the conservation of energy. This\nprinciple \"has been assumed to admit of no exception; there is not an\natom either in the nervous system or in the whole of the universe whose\nposition is not determined by the sum of the mechanical actions which\nthe other atoms exert upon it. And the mathematician who knew the\nposition of the molecules or atoms of a human organism at a given\nmoment, as well as the position and motion of all the atoms in the\nuniverse, capable of influencing it, could calculate with unfailing\ncertainty the past, present, and future actions of the person to\nwhom this organism belonged, just as one predicts an astronomical\nphenomenon.\" [Footnote: Time and Free Will, p. 144 (Fr. p. 110).] Now,\nit follows that if we admit the universal applicability of such a theory\nas that of the conservation of energy, we are maintaining that the whole\nuniverse is capable of explanation on purely mechanical principles,\ninherent in the units of which the universe is composed. Hence, the\nrelative position of all units at a given moment, whatever be their\nnature, strictly determines what their position will be in the\nsucceeding moments, and this mechanistic succession goes on like a\nJuggernaut car with crushing unrelentlessness, giving rise to a rigid\nfatalism:\n\n     \"The moving finger writes; and having writ\n      Moves on: nor all thy Piety nor Wit\n      Shall lure it back to cancel half a line,\n      Nor all thy tears wash out a Word of it.\"\n\nIs there no way out of this cramping circle? We feel vaguely,\nintuitively, that there is. Bergson points out to us a way. Even if we\nadmit, he says, that the direction and the velocity of every atom of\nmatter in the universe (including cerebral matter, i.e., the brain,\nwhich is a material thing) are strictly determined, it would not at\nall follow from the acceptance of this theorem that our mental life is\nsubject to the same necessity. For that to be the case, we should\nhave to show absolutely that a strictly determined psychical state\ncorresponds to a definite cerebral state. This, as we have seen, has not\nbeen proved. It is admitted that to some psychical states of a limited\nkind certain cerebral states do correspond, but we have no warrant\nwhatever for concluding that, because the physiological and the\npsychological series exhibit some corresponding terms, the two series\nare absolutely parallel. \"To extend this parallelism to the series\nthemselves, in their totality, is to settle a priori the problem of\nfreedom.\" [Footnote: Time and Free Will, p. 147 (Fr. pp. 112-113).]\nHow far the two series do run parallel is a question--as we saw in the\nchapter on the relation of Soul and Body--for experience, observation,\nand experiment to decide. The cases which are parallel are limited, and\ninvolve facts which are independent of the power of the Will.\n\nBergson then proceeds to an examination of the more subtle and plausible\ncase for psychological determinism. A very large number of our actions\nare due to some motive. There you have it, says the psychological\ndeterminist. Your so-called Freedom of the Will is a fiction; in reality\nit is merely the strongest motive which prevails and you imagine that\nyou \"freely willed it.\" But then we must ask him to define \"strongest,\"\nand here is the fallacy of his argument, for there is no other test\nof which is the strongest motive, than that it has prevailed. Such\nstatements do not help to solve the difficulty at all, for they avoid it\nand attempt to conceal it; they are due to a conception of mind which is\nboth false and mischievous, viz., Associationism. This view regards\nthe self as a collection of psychical states. The existing state of\nconsciousness is regarded as necessitated by the preceding states. As,\nhowever, even the associationist is aware that these states differ from\none another in quality, he cannot attempt to deduce any one of them a\npriori from its predecessors. He therefore endeavours to find a link\nconnecting the two states. That there is such a link as the simple\n\"association of ideas\" Bergson would not think of denying. What he does\ndeny however, very emphatically, is the associationist statement that\nthis relation which explains the transition is the cause of it. Even\nwhen admitting a certain truth in the associationist view, it is\ndifficult to maintain that an act is absolutely determined by its\nmotive, and our conscious states by one another. The real mischief of\nthis view lies, however, in the fact, that it misrepresents the self\nby making it merely a collection of psychical states. John Stuart Mill\nsays, in his Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy: \"I could\nhave abstained from murder if my aversion to the crime and my dread of\nits consequences had been weaker than the temptation which impelled me\nto commit it.\" [Footnote: Quoted by Bergson, Time and Free Will, p. 159\n(Fr. p. 122).] Here desire, aversion, fear, and temptation are regarded\nas clear cut phenomena, external to the self which experiences them,\nand this leads to a curious balancing of pain and pleasure on purely\nutilitarian lines, turning the mind into a calculating machine such as\none might find in a shop or counting-house, and taking no account of the\ncharacter of the self that \"wills.\" There is, really, in such a system\nof psychology, no room for self-expression, indeed, no meaning left\nfor the term \"self.\" It is only an inaccurate psychology, misled by\nlanguage, which tries to show us the soul determined by sympathy,\naversion, or hate, as though by so many forces pressing upon it from\nwithout. These feelings, provided that they go deep enough, make up the\nwhole soul; in them the character of the individual expresses itself,\nsince the whole content of the personality or soul is reflected in each\nof them. Then my character is \"me.\" \"To say that the soul is determined\nunder the influence of any one of these feelings, is thus to recognize\nthat it is self-determined. The associationist reduces the self to an\naggregate of conscious states, sensations, feelings, and ideas. But if\nhe sees in these various states no more than is expressed in their name,\nif he retains only their impersonal aspect, he may set them side by side\nfor ever without getting anything but a phantom self, the shadow of the\nEgo, projecting itself into space. If, on the contrary, he takes these\npsychical states with the particular colouring which they assume in the\ncase of a definite person, and which comes to each of them by reflection\nfrom all the others, then there is no need to associate a number\nof conscious states in order to rebuild the person, for the whole\npersonality is in a single one of them, provided that we know how to\nchoose it. And the outward manifestation of this inner state will be\njust what is called a free act, since the self alone will have been\nthe author of it and since it will express the whole of the self.\"\n[Footnote: Time and Free Will, pp. 165-166 (Fr. pp. 126-127).] There is\nthen room in the universe for a Freedom of the human Will, a definite\ncreative activity, delivering us from the bonds of grim necessity and\nfate in which the physical sciences and the associationist psychology\nalike would bind us. Freedom, then, is a fact, and among the facts which\nwe observe, asserts Bergson, there is none clearer. [Footnote: Time and\nFree Will, p. 221 (Fr. p. 169).] There are, however, one or two things\nwhich bear vitally upon the question of Freedom and which tend to\nobscure the issue. Of these, the foremost is that once we have acted\nin a particular manner we look back upon our actions and try to explain\nthem with particular reference to their immediate antecedents. Here is\nwhere the mischief which gives rise to the whole controversy has its\norigin. We make static what is essentially dynamic in character. We call\na process a thing. There is no such \"thing\" as Freedom; it is a relation\nbetween the self and its action. Indeed, it is only characteristic of a\nself IN ACTION, and so is really indefinable. Viewed after the action,\nit presents a different aspect; it has then become historical, an event\nin the past, and so we try to explain it as being caused by former\nevents or conditions. This casting of it on to a fixed, rigid plan,\ngives action the appearance of having characteristics related to space\nrather than to time, in the real sense. As already shown in the previous\nchapter, this is due entirely to our intellectual habit of thinking in\nterms of space, by mathematical time, rather than in terms of living\ntime or la duree.\n\nAnother point which causes serious confusion in the controversy is the\nnotion that because, when an act has been performed, its antecedents\nmay be reckoned up and their value and relative importance or influence\nassigned, this is equivalent to saying the actor could not have acted in\nany other way than he did, and, further, that his final act could have\nbeen foretold from the events which led up to it. It is a fact that in\nthe realm of physical science we can foretell the future with accuracy.\nThe astronomer predicts the precise moment and place in which Halley's\ncomet will become visible from our earth. It is also a fact that we say\nof men and women who are our intimate friends: \"I knew he (or she) would\ndo such and such a thing\" or \"It's just like him.\" We base our judgment\non our intimate acquaintance with the character of our friend, but this,\nas Bergson points out, \"is not so much to predict the future conduct of\nour friend as to pass a judgment on his present character--that is to\nsay, on his past.\" [Footnote: Time and Free Will, p. 184 (Fr. p. 140).]\nFor, although our feelings and our ideas are constantly changing, yet\nwe feel warranted in regarding our friend's character as stable, as\nreliable. But, as Mill remarked in his Logic: \"There can be no science\nof human nature,\" because, although we trust in the reliability of our\nfriend, although we have faith in his future actions, we do not, and can\nnot, know them. \"Tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner.\" To say that, if\nwe knew all the conditions, motives, fears, and temptations which led up\nto the actions of another, we could foretell what he would do, amounts\nto saying that, to do so, we should have actually to become that other\nperson, and so arrive at the point where we act as he did because we are\nhim. For Paul to foretell Peter's act, Paul would simply have to become\nPeter. [Footnote: Time and Free Will, p. 187 (Fr. p. 144).] The very\nreasons which render it possible to foretell an astronomical phenomenon\nare the very ones which prevent us from determining in advance an act\nwhich springs from our free activity. For the future of the material\nuniverse, although contemporaneous with the future of a conscious being,\nhas no analogy to it. The astronomer regards time from the point of\nview of mathematics. He is concerned with points placed in a homogeneous\ntime, points which mark the beginning or end of certain intervals. He\ndoes not concern himself with the interval in its actual duration. This\nis proved by the fact that, could all velocities in the universe be\ndoubled, the astronomical formulae would remain unaffected, for the\ncoincidences with which that science deals would still take place, but\nat intervals half as long. To the astronomer as such, this would make no\ndifference, but we, in ourselves, would find that our day did not\ngive us the full experience. Situations which arose as a result of the\nintroduction of \"summer time\" serve to make this point clear. As then\nwe find that time means two different things for the astronomer and the\npsychologist, the one being concerned with the points at the extremities\nof intervals, and the other with the enduring reality of the intervals\nthemselves, we can see why astronomical phenomena are capable of\nprediction and see too that, for the same reason, events in the realm\nof human action cannot be so predicted and therefore the future is not\npredetermined but is being made.\n\nUpon exactly parallel lines lie the references to causality in the\ncontroversy. In the physical realm events may recur, but in the mental\nrealm the same thing can never happen again because we are living in\nreal, flowing time, or la duree, and our conscious states are\nchanging. Admitting that there is that in experience which warrants the\napplication of the principle of causality, taking that principle as the\nstatement that physical phenomena once perceived can recur, and that a\ngiven phenomenon, happening only after certain conditions, will recur\nwhen those precise conditions are repeated, [Footnote: See the brief\npaper Notre croyance a la loi de causalite, Revue de metaphysique et\nde morale, 1900.] still it remains open whether such a regularity of\nsuccession is ever possible in the human consciousness, and so the\nassertion of the principle of causality proves nothing against Freedom.\nWe may admit that the principle is based on experience--but what kind of\nexperience? Consideration of this question leads us to assert that the\nprinciple of causality only tends to accentuate the difference between\nobjects in a realm wherein regular succession may be observed and\npredicted and a realm where it may not be observed or predicted, the\nrealm of the self. Just because I endure and change I do not necessarily\nact to-day as I acted yesterday, when under like conditions. We do\nexpect, however, that this will not be the case in the physical realm;\nfor example, we expect that a flame applied to dry paper will always\nset it alight. Indeed, the more we realize the causal relation as one of\nnecessary determination, we come to see that things do not exist as\nwe do ourselves, and distinction between physical and psychical events\nbecomes clear. We perceive that we, in ourselves, are centres of\nindetermination enjoying Freedom, and capable of creative activity.\n\nWe must, however, be careful to observe that such Freedom as we have is\nnot absolute at all and that it admits of degrees. All our acts are by\nno means free. Indeed, Free Will is exceptional, and many live and die\nwithout having known true Freedom. Our everyday life consists in the\nperformance of actions which are largely habitual or, indeed, automatic,\nbeing determined not by Free Will, but by custom and convention. Our\nFreedom is the exception and not the rule. Through sluggishness or\nindolence, we jog on in the even tenor of a way towards which habit has\ndirected us. Even at times when our whole personality ought to vibrate,\nfinding itself at the cross-roads, it fails to rise to the occasion.\nBut, says Bergson, \"it is at the great and solemn crises, decisive of\nour reputation with others, and yet more with ourselves, that we choose\nin defiance of what is conventionally called a motive, and this absence\nof any tangible reason, is the more striking the deeper our Freedom\ngoes.\" [Footnote: Time and Free Will, p. 170 (Fr. p. 130).] At such\ntimes the self feels itself free and says so, for it feels itself to be\ncreative. \"All determinism will thus be refuted by experience, but every\nattempt to define Freedom will open the way to determinism.\" [Footnote:\nTime and Free Will, p. 330 (Fr. p. 177).]\n\nIt has been urged that, although Bergson is a stanch upholder of\nFreedom, it is Freedom of such a kind that it must be distinguished from\nFree Will, that is, from the liberty of choice which indeterminists have\nasserted and which determinists have denied; and that the Freedom for\nwhich he holds the brief is not the feeling of liberty that we have when\nconfronted with alternative courses of action, or the feeling we have\nwhen we look back upon a choice made and an action accomplished, that we\nneed not have acted as we did, and that we could have acted differently.\nSuch Freedom it has been further maintained, is of little importance to\nus, for it is merely a free, creative activity which is the essence of\nlife, which we share with all that lives and so cannot be styled \"human\"\nFreedom. Now, although many of Bergson's expressions, in regard to\nfree, creative activity in general, lead to a connexion of this with\nthe problem of \"human\" Freedom, such an identification would seem to be\nunfair. This seems specially so when we read over carefully his remarks\nabout the coup d'etat of the fundamental self in times of grave crisis.\nWe cannot equate this with a purely biological freedom or vitality, or\nspontaneity. But in the light of the criticism which has been made, it\nwill be well to consider, in concluding this chapter, the statements\nmade by Bergson in his article on Liberty in the work in connexion with\nthe Vocabulaire philosophique for the Societe francaise de philosophie:\n[Footnote: Quoted by Le Roy in his Une nouvelle philosophie: Henri\nBergson, English Translation (Benson), Williams and Norgate, p. 192.]\n\"The word Liberty has for me a sense intermediate between those which\nwe assign, as a rule, to the two terms 'Liberty' and 'Free Will.' On\none hand I believe that 'Liberty' consists in being entirely oneself,\nin acting in conformity with oneself; it is then to a certain degree\nthe 'moral liberty' of philosophers, the independence of the person\nwith regard to everything other than itself. But that is not quite this\nLiberty, since the independence I am describing has not always a moral\ncharacter. Further, it does not consist in depending on oneself as an\neffect depends on the cause which, of necessity, determines it. In this,\nI should come back to the sense of 'Free Will.'\" And yet, he continues,\n\"I do not accept this sense either, since Free Will, in the usual\nmeaning of the term, implies the equal possibility of two contraries,\nand, on my theory, we cannot formulate or even conceive, in this case,\nthe thesis of the equal possibility of the two contraries, without\nfalling into grave error about the nature of Time. The object of my\nthesis has been precisely to find a position intermediate between 'moral\nLiberty' and 'Free Will.' Liberty, such as I understand it, is situated\nbetween these two terms, but not at equal distances from both; if I were\nobliged to blend it with one of the two, I should select 'Free-Will.'\"\nNor is Liberty to be reduced to spontaneity. \"At most, this would be\nthe case in the animal world where the psychological life is principally\nthat of the affections. But in the case of a man, a thinking being,\nthe free act can be called a synthesis of feelings and ideas, and the\nevolution which leads to it, a reasonable evolution.\" [Footnote: Matter\nand Memory, p. 243 (Fr. p. 205).] \"In a word, if it is agreed to call\nevery act free, which springs from the self, and from the self alone,\nthe act which bears the mark of our personality is truly free, for our\nself alone will lay claim to its paternity.\" [Footnote: Time and Free\nWill, p. 172 (Fr. p. 132). It is interesting to compare with this\nthe remark by Nietzsche in Also sprach Zarathustra, Thus Spake\nZarathustra,--\"Let your Ego be in relation to your acts that which the\nmother is in relation to the child.\"] The secret of the solution lies\nsurely here, and in the words given above: \"Liberty consists in being\nentirely oneself.\" If we act rightly we shall act freely, and yet be\ndetermined. Yet here there will be no contradiction, for we shall be\nself-determined. It is only the man who is self-determined that can\nin any sense be said to know the meaning of \"human\" Freedom. \"We call\nfree,\" said Spinoza, \"that which exists in virtue of the necessities of\nits own nature, and which is determined by itself alone.\" Liberty is not\nabsolute, for then we ourselves would be at the beck and call of every\nexternal excitation, desire, passion, or temptation. Our salvation\nconsists in self-determination, so we shall avoid licence but preserve\nFreedom. We can only repeat the Socratic maxim--\"Know thyself\"--and\nresolve to take to heart the appeal of our own Shakespeare:\n\n    \"To thine own self be true!\"\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\nEVOLUTION\n\n\nWork of Darwin and Spencer--Bergson's L'Evolution\ncreatrice--Life--L'elan vital--Evolution not progress in a straight\nline--Adaptation an insufficient explanation--Falsity of mechanistic\nview--Finalist conception of reality as fulfilling a plan false--Success\nalong certain lines only--Torpor, Instinct, and Intelligence--Genesis\nof matter--Humanity the crown of evolution--Contingency and Freedom--The\nFuture is being created.\n\n\nSince the publication of Darwin's famous work on The Origin of Species\nin 1859, the conception of Evolution has become familiar and has won\ngeneral acceptance in all thinking minds. Evolution is now a household\nword, but the actual study of evolutionary process has been the work of\ncomparatively few. Science nowadays has become such a highly specialized\naffair, that few men cover a large enough field of study to enable them\nto deal effectively with this tremendous subject. What is more, those\nwho shouted so loudly about Evolution as explaining all things have\ncome to see that, in a sense, Evolution explains nothing by itself. Mere\ndescription of facts undoubtedly does serve a very useful purpose and\nmay help to demolish some of the stanchly conservative theories still\nheld in some quarters by those who prefer to take Hebrew conceptions as\na basis of their cosmology however irreconcilable with fact these may\nprove to be. Mere description, however, is not ultimate, some philosophy\nof Evolution must be forthcoming. \"Nowadays,\" remarks Hoffding, \"every\nphilosopher has to take up a position with respect to the concept\nof Evolution. It has now achieved its place among the categories or\nessential forms of thought by the fact of its providing indications\nwhence new problems proceed. We must ask regarding every event, and\nevery phenomenon, by what stages it has passed into its actual state.\nIt is a special form of the general concept of cause. A philosophy\nis essentially characterized by the position which it accords to\nthis concept and by the way in which it applies it.\" [Footnote: The\nPhilosophy of Evolution--lecture IV, of Lectures on Bergson, in Modern\nPhilosophers, Translated by Mason (MacMillan), p. 270.]\n\nNo one has done more to make familiar to English minds the notion of\nEvolution than Herbert Spencer. His Synthetic Philosophy had a grand\naim, but it was manifestly unsatisfactory. The high hopes it had raised\nwere followed by mingled disappointment and distrust. The secret of the\nunsatisfactoriness of Spencer is to be found in his method, which is an\nelaborate and plausible attempt to explain the evolution of the universe\nby referring the complex to the simple, the more highly organized to\nthe less organized. His principle of Evolution never freed itself from\nbondage to mechanical conceptions.\n\nBergson's Creative Evolution, his largest and best known work, appeared\nin 1907. It has been regarded not only as a magnificent book, but as\na date in the history of thought. Two of the leading students of\nevolutionary process in England, Professors Geddes and Thomson, refer to\nthe book as \"one of the most profound and original contributions to the\nphilosophical consideration of the theory of Evolution.\" [Footnote: In\nthe Bibliography in their volume Evolution.]\n\nFor some time there had been growing a need for an expression of\nevolutionary theory in terms other than those of Spencer, or of\nHaeckel--the German monistic philosopher. The advance in the study of\nbiology and the rise of Neo-Vitalism, occasioned by an appreciation of\nthe inadequacy of any explanation of life in terms purely physical and\nchemical, made the demand for a new statement, in greater harmony with\nthese views, imperative. To satisfy this demand is the task to which\nBergson has applied himself. He sounds the note of departure from\nthe older conceptions right at the commencement by his very title,\n'Creative' Evolution. For this, his views on Change, on Time, and on\nFreedom, have in some degree prepared us. We have seen set forth\nthe fact of Freedom, the recognition of human beings as centres of\nindetermination, not mere units in a machine, \"a block universe\" where\nall is \"given,\" but creatures capable of creative activity. Then by\na consideration of Time, as la duree, we found that the history of an\nindividual can never repeat itself; \"For a conscious being, to exist\nis to change, to change is to mature, to mature is to go on creating\noneself endlessly. Should the same be said,\" Bergson asks, \"of existence\nin general?\" [Footnote: Creative Evolution, p. 8 (Fr. p. 8).]\n\nSo he proceeds to portray with a wealth of analogy and brilliance of\nstyle, more akin to the language of a poet than a philosopher, the\nstupendous drama of Evolution, the mystery of being, the wonders of\nlife. He makes the great fact of life his starting point. Is life\nsusceptible to definition? We feel that, by the very nature of the case,\nit is not. A definition is an intellectual operation, while life is\nwider, richer, more fundamental than intellect. Indeed Bergson shows us\nthat intellect is only one of the manifestations or adaptations of life\nin its progress. To define life, being strictly impossible, Bergson\nattempts to describe it. He would have us picture it as a great current\nemerging from some central point, radiating in all directions, but\ndiverted into eddies and backwaters. Life is an original impetus, une\npoussee formidable, not the mere heading affixed to a class of objects\nwhich live. We must not speak any longer of life in general as an\nabstraction or a category in which we may place all living beings. Life,\nor the vital impulse, consists in a demand for creation, we might almost\nsay \"a will to create.\" It appears to be a current passing from one germ\nto another through the medium of a developed organism, \"an internal\npush that has carried life by more and more complex forms, to higher\nand higher destinies.\" It is a dynamic continuity, a continuity of\nqualitative progress, a duration which leaves its bite on things.\n[Footnote: For these descriptions of life, see Creative Evolution,\npp. 27-29 and 93-94 (Fr. pp. 28-30 and 95-96).] We shall be absolutely\nwrong, however, if we attempt to view the evolutionary process as\nprogressive in a straight line. The facts contradict such a facile\nand shallow view. Some of the stock phrases of the earlier writers\non Evolution were: \"adaptation to environment,\" \"selection\" and\n\"variation,\" and a grave problem was presented by this last. How are\nwe to account for the variations of living beings, together with the\npersistence of their type? Herein lies the problem of the origin of\nspecies. Three different solutions have been put forward. There is\nthe \"Neo-Darwinian\" view which attributes variation to the differences\ninherent in the germ borne by the individual, and not to the experience\nor behaviour of the individual in the course of his existence. Then\nthere is the theory known as \"Orthogenesis\" which maintains that there\nis a continual changing in a definite direction from generation\nto generation. Thirdly, there is the \"Neo-Lamarckian\" theory which\nattributes the cause of variation to the conscious effort of the\nindividual, an effort passed on to descendants. [Footnote: Concerning\nLamarck (1744-1829) Bergson remarks in La Philosophie (1915) that\nwithout diminishing Darwin's merit Lamarck is to be regarded as the\nfounder of evolutionary biology.] Now each one of these theories\nexplains a certain group of facts, of a limited kind, but two\ndifficulties confront them. We find that on quite distinct and\nwidely separated lines of Evolution, exactly similar organs have been\ndeveloped. Bergson points out to us, in this connexion, the Pecten genus\nof molluscs, which have an eye identical in structure with that of\nthe eye of vertebrates. [Footnote: The common edible scallop (Pecten\nmaximus) has several eyes of brilliant blue and of very complex\nstructure.] It is obvious, however, that the eye of this mollusc and\nthe eye of the vertebrate must have developed quite independently, ages\nafter each had been separated from the parent stock. Again, we find that\nin all organic evolution, infinite complexity of structure accompanies\nthe utmost simplicity of function. The variation of an organ so highly\ncomplex as the eye must involve the simultaneous occurrence of an\ninfinite number of variations all co-ordinated to the simple end of\nvision. Such facts as these are incapable of explanation by reference to\nany or all of the three theories of adaptation and variation mentioned.\nIndeed they seem capable of explanation only by reference to a single\noriginal impetus retaining its direction in courses far removed from\nthe common origin. \"That adaptation to environment is the necessary\ncondition of Evolution we do not question for a moment. It is quite\nevident that a species would disappear, should it fail to bend to the\nconditions of existence which are imposed on it. But it is one thing\nto recognize that outer circumstances are forces Evolution must reckon\nwith, another to claim that they are the directing causes of Evolution.\"\n[Footnote: Creative Evolution, p. 107 (Fr. p. 111).]\n\n\"The truth is that adaptation explains the sinuosities of the movement\nof Evolution, but not the general directions of the movement, still\nless the movement itself. The road which leads to the town is obliged to\nfollow the ups and downs of the hills; it adapts itself to the accidents\nof the ground, but the accidents of the ground are not the cause of\nthe road nor have they given it its direction.\" [Footnote: Creative\nEvolution, p. 108 (Fr. p. 112).] The evolution of life cannot be\nexplained as merely a series of adaptations to accidental circumstances.\nMoreover, the mechanistic view, where all is \"given,\" is quite\ninadequate to explain the facts. The finalist or teleological conception\nis not any more tenable, for Evolution is not simply the realization\nof a plan. \"A plan is given in advance. It is represented or at least\nrepresentable, before its realization. The complete execution of it may\nbe put off to a distant future or even indefinitely, but the idea is\nnone the less formulable at the present time, in terms actually given.\nIf, on the contrary, Evolution is a creation unceasingly renewed, it\ncreates as it goes on, not only the forms of life but the ideas that\nenable the intellect to understand it. Its future overflows its present\nand cannot be sketched out therein, in an idea. There is the first error\nof finalism. It involves another yet more serious. If life realizes a\nplan it ought to manifest a greater harmony the further it advances,\njust as the house shows better and better the idea of the architect as\nstone is set upon stone.\" [Footnote: Creative Evolution, p. 108 (Fr. p.\n112).] Such finalism is really reversed mechanism. If, on the contrary,\nthe unity of life is to be found solely in the impetus (poussee\nformidable) that pushes it along the road of Time, the harmony is not in\nfront but behind. The unity is derived from a vis a tergo: it is given\nat the start as an impulsion, not placed at the end as an attraction, as\na kind of\n\n     \"... far-off divine event\n      To which the whole creation moves.\"\n\n\"In communicating itself the impetus splits up more and more. Life,\nin proportion to its progress, is scattered in manifestations\nwhich undoubtedly owe to their common origin the fact that they are\ncomplementary to each other in certain aspects, but which are none the\nless mutually incompatible and antagonistic. So that the discord between\nspecies will go on increasing.\" \"There are species which are arrested,\nthere are some that retrogress. Evolution is not only a movement\nforward; in many cases we observe a marking-time, and still more often\na deviation or turning back. Thence results an increasing disorder. No\ndoubt there is progress, if progress means a continual advance in the\ngeneral direction determined by a first impulsion; but this progress is\naccomplished only on the two or three great lines of Evolution on which\nforms ever more and more complex, ever more and more high, appear;\nbetween these lines run a crowd of minor paths in which deviations,\narrests, and set-backs are multiplied.\" [Footnote: Creative Evolution,\npp. 107-110 (Fr. pp. 111-114).] Evolution would be a very simple and\neasy process to understand if it followed one straight path. To describe\nit, Bergson uses, in one place, this metaphor: \"We are here dealing\nwith a shell which has immediately burst into fragments, which, being\nthemselves species of shells, have again burst into fragments, destined\nto burst again, and so on.\" [Footnote: Creative Evolution, p. 103 (Fr.\np. 107).]\n\nA study of the facts shows us three very marked tendencies which may\nbe denoted by the terms \"Torpor,\" \"Instinct,\" and \"Intelligence.\" These\nare, in a sense \"terminal points\" in the evolutionary process. Hence\narises the distinction of plant and animal, one showing a tendency to\nunconscious torpor, the other manifesting a tendency towards movement\nand consciousness. Then again arises another divergence which gives rise\nto two paths or tendencies, one along the line of the arthropods, at the\nend of which come the ants and the bees with their instincts, and the\nother along the line of the vertebrates, at the end of which is man with\nhis intelligence. These three, Torpor, Instinct, and Intelligence, must\nnot, however, be looked upon as three successive stages in the linear\ndevelopment of one tendency, but as three diverging directions of a\ncommon activity, which split up as it went on its way. Instinct and\nIntelligence are the two important terminal points in Evolution. They\nare not two stages of which one is higher than the other, they are\nat the end of two different roads. The wonders of Instinct are a\ncommonplace to students of animal and insect life. [Footnote: See the\ninteresting books by the French writer, Henri Fabre.] Men, with their\nintellect, make tools, while Instinct is tied to its tool. There is\na wondrous immediacy, however, about Instinct, in the way it achieves\nends, and its operations are often quite unconsciously performed. The\ninsect or animal could not possibly \"know\" all that was involved in its\naction. Instinct, then, is one form of adaptation, while Intellect is\nquite another. In man--the grown man--Intellect is seen at its best. Yet\nwe are not without Instincts; by them we are bound to the race and to\nthe whole animal creation. But in ants and bees and such like creatures,\nInstinct is the sole guide of life, and it is often a highly organized\nlife. The following example clearly shows the contrast between Instinct\nand Intelligence. A cat knows how to manage her new-born kittens, how to\nbring them up and teach them; a human mother does not know how to manage\nher baby unless she is trained either directly or by her own quick\nobservation of other mothers. A cat performs her simple duties by\nInstinct, a human mother has to make use of her Intelligence in order to\nfulfil her very complex duties. We must observe, however, the relative\nvalue of Instinct and Intelligence. Each is a psychical activity, but\nwhile Instinct is far more perfect, far more complete in its insight, it\nis confined within narrow limits. Intelligence, while far less perfect\nin accomplishing its work, less complete in insight, is not limited\nin such a way. But while Intellect is external, looking on reality as\ndifferent from life, Instinct is an inner sympathy with reality; it is\ndeeper than any intellectual bond which binds the conscious creature to\nreality, for it is a vital bond.\n\nBergson now turns to a consideration of Life and Matter in the\nevolutionary process, and their precise relation to one another. Life is\nfree, spontaneous, incalculable, not out of relation to Matter, but\nits direction is not entirely determined by Matter nor has its initial\nimpulse Matter as its source. Although Bergson denies that Will and\nConsciousness, as we know them, are mere functions of the material\norganism, yet they do depend upon it as a workman depends upon his tool.\nWe are fond of insinuating that a bad workman always blames his tools.\nA good workman, however, cannot be expected to do the best work with bad\ntools. The tool, although he uses it, at the same time limits him. So\nit is with the material organism at our disposal, our body, and so,\ntoo, with spirit and matter in general. Spirit and Matter are not to\nbe regarded as independent or as ranged against one another from all\neternity. Matter is a product of Spirit or Consciousness, the underlying\npsychic force. \"For want of a better word,\" says Bergson, \"we have\ncalled it Consciousness. But we do not mean the narrowed consciousness\nthat functions in each of us.\" [Footnote: Creative Evolution, p. 250\n(Fr. p. 258).] It is rather super-Consciousness than a consciousness\nlike ours. Matter is a flux rather than a thing, but its flow is in the\nopposite direction to that of Spirit. The flow of Spirit shows itself\nin the creativeness of the evolutionary process; Matter is the inverse\nmovement towards stability. Bergson adheres to the view of Spirit as\nfundamental, while Matter, he says, is due to a lessening of the tension\nof the spiritual force which is the initial elan. Now, of course, Matter\nand Spirit have come to be two opposing forces, for one is determined\nand the other free. Yet Bergson has to make out that there must have\nbeen some indetermination in Matter, however small, to give Spirit an\nopening to \"insinuate itself\" into Matter and thus use it for its own\nends. It always seems, however, as if Spirit were trying to free itself\nfrom material limitations. It evolved the Intellect to cope with Matter.\nThis is why Reason is at home, not in life and freedom, but in solid\nMatter, in mechanical and spatial distinctions. There is thus an eternal\nconflict in progress between Spirit and Matter. The latter is always\ntending to automatism, to the sacrifice of the Spirit with its creative\npower. In his little book on The Meaning of the War Bergson claims\nthat here we have an instance of Life and Matter in conflict--Germany\nrepresenting a mechanical and materialistic force. In quite another way\nhe illustrates the same truth, in his book on Laughter, where he shows\nus that \"rigidity, automatism, absent-mindedness, and unsociability, are\nall inextricably entwined, and all serve as ingredients to the making up\nof the comic in character,\" [Footnote: Laughter, p. 147 (Fr. p. 151).]\nfor \"the comic is that side of a person which reveals his likeness to\na thing, that aspect of human events which, through its peculiar\ninelasticity, conveys the impression of pure mechanism, of automatism,\nof movement without life.\" [Footnote: Laughter, p. 87 (Fr. p. 89).]\n\nFinally, in reviewing the evolutionary process as a whole, Bergson\nasserts that it manifests a radical contingency. The forms of life\ncreated, also the proportion of Intuition to Intelligence, in man, and\nthe physique and morality of man, are all of them contingent. Life\nmight have stored up energy in a different way through plants selecting\ndifferent chemical elements. The whole of organic chemistry would then\nhave been different. Then, too, it is probable that Life manifests\nitself in other planets, in other solar systems also, in forms of which\nwe have no idea. He points out that between the perfect humanity and\nours one may conceive many possible intermediaries, corresponding to all\nthe degrees imaginable of Intelligence and Intuition. Another solution\nmight have issued in a humanity either more intelligent or more\nintuitive. Man has warred like the other species, he has warred\nagainst the other species. If the evolution of life had been opposed by\ndifferent accidents en route, if the current of life had been divided\notherwise, we should have been, in physique and in morality, very\ndifferent from what we are. [Footnote: Creative Evolution, pp. 280-282\n(Fr. p. 288-290).] We cannot regard humanity as prefigured in the\nevolutionary process, nor look on man as the ultimate outcome of the\nwhole of Evolution. The rest of Nature does not exist simply for\nthe sake of man. Certainly man stands highest, for only in man has\nconsciousness succeeded, but man has, as it were, lost much in coming\nto this position. The whole process of Evolution \"IS AS IF A VAGUE AND\nFORMLESS BEING, WHOM WE MAY CALL, AS WE WILL, man OR super-man, HAD\nSOUGHT TO REALIZE HIMSELF AND HAD SUCCEEDED ONLY BY ABANDONING A PART OF\nHIMSELF ON THE WAY.\" [Footnote: Creative Evolution, p. 281 (Fr. p. 289).\n(Italics are Bergson's.)]\n\nIn the lectures on The Nature of the Soul, Bergson referred to the\n\"Pathway of the evolutionary process\" as being a \"Way to Personality.\"\nFor on the line which leads to man liberation has been accomplished and\nthus personalities have been able to constitute themselves. If we could\nview this line of evolution it would appear to resemble a telegraph\nwire on which has travelled a dispatch sent off as long ago as the first\nbeginnings of life, a message which was then confused, of which a part\nhas been lost on the way, but which has at last found in the human race\nthe appropriate instrument.\n\nHumanity is one; we are members one of another. Bergson insists on\nthis solidarity of man, and, indeed, of all living creatures. \"As the\nsmallest grain of dust is bound up with our entire solar system, drawn\nalong with it in that undivided movement of descent which is materiality\nitself, so all organized beings, from the humblest to the highest, from\nthe first origins of life to the time in which we are, and in all places\nas in all times, do but evidence a single impulsion, the inverse of\nthe movement of matter, and in itself indivisible. All the living hold\ntogether and all yield to the same tremendous push. The animal takes its\nstand on the plant, man bestrides animality, and the whole of humanity,\nin space and in time, is one immense army galloping beside and before\nand behind each of us, in an overwhelming charge, able to beat down\nevery resistance and clear the most formidable obstacles, perhaps even\ndeath.\" [Footnote: Creative Evolution, pp. 285-286 (Fr. pp. 293-294).]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\nTHE GOSPEL OF INTUITION\n\n\nIntelligence and Intuition not opposed--Intellectual sympathy--Synthesis\nand analysis. \"Understanding as one loves\"--Concepts--Intellect not\nfinal--Man's spirit and intuitions--Joy, creative power and art--Value\nof Intuitive Philosophy.\n\n\nWe now approach the grand climax of Bergson's philosophy, his doctrine\nof Intuition, which he preaches with all the vigour of an evangelist.\nOur study of his treatment of Change, of Perception, of la duree, and\nof Instinct, has prepared us for an investigation of what he means by\nIntuition, for in dealing with these subjects he has been laying the\nfoundations of his doctrine of Intuition. He pointed out to us that Life\nis Change, but that our intellect does not really grasp the reality of\nChange, for it is adapted to solids and to concepts, it resembles the\ncinematograph film. Then he has tried to show us that in Perception\nthere is really much more than we think, for our intellect carves out\nwhat is of practical interest, while the penumbra or vague fringes\nof perceptions which have no bearing on action are neglected. By his\nadvocacy of a real psychological Time, in opposition to the physical\nabstraction which bears the name, he again brought out the inadequacy of\nintellect to grasp Life in its flow and has put before us the soul's own\nappreciation of Time, which is a valuation rather than a magnitude,\nan intuition of our consciousness. Then, in examining the Evolution\nof Instinct and Intelligence, we found that Instinct, however blind\nintellectually, contained a wonderful and unique element of immediacy or\ndirect insight. These are just preparatory indications of the direction\nof Bergson's thought all the time.\n\nIt is admittedly difficult to determine with very great definiteness\nwhat Bergson's view of Intuition really is, for he has made many\nstatements regarding it which appear at first sight irreconcilable and,\nin his earlier writings, has not been sufficiently careful when speaking\nof the distinction between Intelligence and Intuition. Some of his early\nstatements are reactionary and crude and give the impression of a purely\nanti-intellectualist position involving the condemnation of Intellect\nand all its work. [Footnote: E.g., the statement \"To philosophize is to\ninvert the habitual direction of the work of thought\"--Introduction to\nMetaphysics p. 59.] In his later work, however, Bergson has made it more\nclear that he does not mean to throw Intellect overboard; it has its\nplace, but is not final, nor is it the supreme human faculty which most\nphilosophers have thought it to be. It must be lamented, however, that\nBergson's language was ever so ill defined as to encourage the many\nvaried and conflicting views which are held regarding his doctrine of\nIntuition. Around this the greatest controversy has raged. Little is to\nbe gained by heeding the shouts of either those who acclaim Bergson as\na revolutionary against all use of the Intellect, or of those who regard\nhim as no purely anti-intellectualist at all. We must turn to Bergson\nhimself and study carefully what he has said and written, reserving our\njudgment until we have examined his own statements.\n\nWhat is this \"Intuition\"? In what is now a locus classicus [Footnote:\nIntroduction to Metaphysics, p. 7.] he says, \"By Intuition is meant\nthe kind of INTELLECTUAL SYMPATHY by which one places oneself within an\nobject in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently\ninexpressible. Analysis is the operation which reduces the object to\nelements already known, that is, to elements common to it and other\nobjects. To analyse, therefore, is to express a thing as a function\nof something other than itself. All analysis is thus a translation, a\ndevelopment into symbols, a representation taken from successive points\nof view from which we note as many resemblances as possible between the\nnew object which we are studying and others which we believe we know\nalready. In its eternally unsatisfied desire to embrace the object\naround which it is compelled to turn, analysis multiplies without\nend the number of its points of view in order to complete its always\nincomplete representation, and ceaselessly varies its symbols that it\nmay perfect the always imperfect translation. It goes on therefore to\ninfinity. But Intuition, if Intuition be possible, is a simple act. It\nis an act directly opposed to analysis, for it is a viewing in totality,\nas an absolute; it is a synthesis, not an analysis, not an intellectual\nact, for it is an immediate, emotional synthesis.\"\n\nTwo illustrations, taken from the same essay, may serve to make this\npoint clearer. A visitor in Paris, of an artistic temperament, makes\nsome sketches of the city, writing underneath them, by way of memento,\nthe word \"Paris.\" As he has actually seen Paris he is able, with the\nhelp of the original Intuition he has had of that unique whole which is\nParis itself, to place his sketches therein, and synthesize them. But\nthere is no way of performing the inverse operation. It is impossible,\neven with thousands of sketches, to achieve the Intuition, to give\noneself the impression of what Paris is like, if one has never been\nthere. Or again, as a second illustration, \"Consider a character whose\nadventures are related to me in a novel. The author may multiply the\ntraits of his hero's character, may make him speak and act as much as\nhe pleases, but all this can never be equivalent to the simple and\nindivisible feeling which I should experience if I were able, for an\ninstant, to identify myself with the person of the hero himself. Out of\nthat indivisible feeling, as from a spring, all the words, gestures, and\nactions of the man would appear to me to flow naturally. They would no\nlonger be accidents which, added to the idea I had already formed of the\ncharacter, continually enriched that idea without ever completing it.\nThe character would be given to me all at once, in its entirety, and the\nthousand incidents which manifest it, instead of adding themselves to\nthe idea and so enriching it, would seem to me, on the contrary,\nto detach themselves from it, without, however, exhausting it or\nimpoverishing its essence. All the things I am told about the man\nprovide me with so many points of view from which I can observe him. All\nthe traits which describe him and which can make him known to me, only\nby so many comparisons with persons or things I know already, are signs\nby which he is expressed more or less symbolically. Symbols and points\nof view, therefore, place me outside him; they give me only what he has\nin common with others, and not what belongs to him, and to him alone.\nBut that which is properly 'himself,' that which constitutes his\nessence, cannot be perceived from without, being internal by definition,\nnor be expressed by symbols, being incommensurable with everything\nelse. Description, history, and analysis leave me here in the relative.\nCoincidence with the person himself would alone give me the absolute.\"\n[Footnote: An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 3.] This, as Gaston Rageot\nputs it, is \"to understand in the fashion in which one loves.\" This\nstatement is of suggestive interest in considering the practical problem\nof how we may be said to \"know\" other people, and has vital bearing on\nthe revelation of one personality to another, urging, as it does, the\nvalue and necessity of some degree of sympathy and indeed of love, for\nthe full understanding and knowledge of any personality.\n\nIn another place Bergson says: \"When a poet reads me his verses, I can\ninterest myself enough in him to enter into his thought, put myself\ninto his feelings, live over again the simple state he has broken into\nphrases and words. I sympathize then with his inspiration, I follow it\nwith a continuous movement which is, like the inspiration itself, an\nundivided act.\" If this sympathy could extend its object and so reflect\nupon itself, it would give us the key to vital operations in the same\nway as Intelligence, developed and corrected, introduces us into Matter.\nIntelligence, by the intermediary of science, which is its work, tells\nmore and more completely the secret of physical operations; of Life it\ngives and pretends only to give an expression in terms of inertia. We\nshould be led into the very interior of Life by Intuition, that is,\nby Instinct become disinterested, conscious of itself, capable of\nreflecting on its object and enlarging it indefinitely.\n\nIn proclaiming the gospel of Intuition, Bergson's main point is to show\nthat man is capable of an experience and a knowledge deeper than that\nwhich the Intellect can possibly give. \"At intervals a soul arises which\nseems to triumph... by dint of simplicity--the soul of an artist or\na poet, which, remaining near its source, reconciles, in a harmony\nappreciable by the heart, terms irreconcilable by the intelligence\"\n[Footnote: From the address on Ravaisson, delivered before the Academie\ndes Sciences morales et politiques 1904.] His point of view is here akin\nto that of an earlier French thinker, Pascal, who said: \"The heart hath\nreasons that the reason cannot know.\" The Intellect is, by its nature,\nthe fabricator of concepts, and concepts are, in Bergson's view,\nmischievous. They are static, they leave out the flux of things, they\nomit too much of experience, they are framed at an expensive cost, the\nexpense of vital contact with Life itself. Of course he admits a certain\nvalue in concepts, but he refuses to admit that they help us at all to\ngrasp reality in its flux. \"Metaphysics must transcend concepts in order\nto reach Intuition. Certainly concepts are necessary to it, for all the\nother sciences work, as a rule, with concepts, and Metaphysics cannot\ndispense with the other sciences. But it is only truly itself when it\ngoes beyond the concept, or at least when it frees itself from rigid and\nready-made concepts, in order to create a kind very different from\nthose which we habitually use; I mean supple, mobile, and almost fluid\nrepresentations, always ready to mould themselves on the fleeting forms\nof Intuition.\" [Footnote: An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 18.]\n\nThe true instrument of Metaphysics is intuition. We can only grasp\nourselves, Bergson points out, by a metaphysical Intuition, for the\nsoul eludes thought; we cannot place it among concepts or in a category.\nIntuition, however, reveals to us Real Time (la duree) and our real\nselves, changing and living as free personalities in a Time which, as it\nadvances, creates.\n\nIntuition is in no way mysterious, Bergson claims. Every one of us\nhas had opportunities to exercise it in some degree, and anyone, for\nexample, who has been engaged in literary work, knows perfectly well\nthat after long study has been given to the subject, when all documents\nhave been collected and necessary drafts worked out, one thing more is\nneedful--an effort, a travail of soul, a setting of oneself in the\nheart of the subject; in short, the getting of inspiration. Metaphysical\nIntuition seems to be of this nature, and its relation to the empirical\ndata contributed by the Intellect is parallel to the relation between\nthe literary man's inspiration and his collected material. Of course \"it\nis impossible to have an Intuition of reality, that is, an intellectual\nsympathy, with its innermost nature, unless its confidence has been won\nby a long comradeship with its external manifestation.\" In his study of\nLucretius [Footnote: Extraits de Lucrece avec etude sur la poesie,\nla philosophie, la physique le texte et la langue de Lucrece (1884).\nPreface, p. xx.] he remarks that the chief value of the Latin\npoet-philosopher lay in his power of vision, in his insight into the\nbeauty of nature, in his synthetic view, while at the same time he was\nable to exercise his keenly analytic intellect in discovering all he\ncould about the facts of nature in their scientific aspect. At the\nsame time, metaphysical Intuition, although only to be obtained through\nacquaintance with empirical data, is quite other than the mere summary\nof such knowledge. [Footnote: See protest: L'Intuition philosophique in\nRevue de metaphysique et de morale, 1911, p. 821.] It is distinct from\nthese data, as the motor impulse is distinct from the path traversed\nby the moving body, as the tension of the spring is distinct from the\nvisible movements of the pendulum. In this sense Metaphysics has nothing\nin common with a generalization of facts. It might, however, be defined\nas \"integral experience.\" Nevertheless Intuition, once attained, must\nfind a mode of expression in well-defined concepts, for in itself it is\nincommunicable. Dialectic is necessary to put Intuition to the proof,\nnecessary also in order that Intuition should break itself up into\nconcepts and so be propagated to others. But when we use language and\nconcepts to communicate it, we tend to make these in themselves mean\nsomething, whereas they are but counters or symbols used to express what\nis their inspiration--Intuition. Hence we often forget the metaphysical\nIntuitions from which science itself has sprung. What is relative in\nscience is the symbolic knowledge, reached by pre-existing concepts\nwhich proceed from the fixed to the moving. A truly intuitive philosophy\nwould bring science and metaphysics together. Modern science dates from\nthe day when mobility was set up as an independent reality and studied\nas such by Galileo. But men of science have mainly fixed their attention\non the concepts, the residual products of Intuition, the symbols which\nhave lent a symbolic character to every kind of science. Metaphysicians,\ntoo, have done the same thing. Hence it was easy for Kant to show that\nour science is wholly relative and our metaphysics entirely artificial.\nFor Kant, science was a universal mathematic and metaphysics a\npractically unaltered Platonism. The synthetic Intuition was hidden\nby the analysis to which it had given rise. For Kant, Intuition was\ninfra-intellectual, but for Bergson it is supra-intellectual. Kant's\ngreat error was in concluding that it is necessary for us, in order\nto attain Intuition, to leave the domain of the senses and of\nconsciousness. This was because of his views of Time and Change. If Time\nand Change really were what he took them to be, then Metaphysics and\nIntuition alike are impossible. For Bergson, however, Time and Change\nlead up to Intuition; indeed it is by Intuition that we come to see all\nthings, as he expresses it, sub specie durationis. This is the primary\nvision which an intuitive philosophy supplies. Such a philosophy will\nnot be merely a unification of the sciences.\n\nIn an article contributed to the Revue de metaphysique et de morale\nin January of 1908, under the title L'Evolution de l'intelligence\ngeometrique, we find Bergson remarking: \"Nowhere have I claimed that we\nshould replace intelligence by something else, or prefer instinct to it.\nI have tried to show merely that when we leave the region of physical\nand mathematical objects for the realm of life and consciousness, we\nhave to depend on a certain sense of living, which has its origin in\nthe same vital impulse that is the basis of instinct, although instinct,\nstrictly speaking, is something quite different.\"\n\nIntellect and Intuition, Bergson says very emphatically, at the close\nof his Huxley Lecture on Life and Consciousness, are not opposed to one\nanother. \"How could there be a disharmony between our Intuitions and\nour Science, how, especially, could our Science make us renounce our\nIntuition, if these Intuitions are something like Instinct--an Instinct\nconscious, refined, spiritualized--and if Instinct is still nearer Life\nthan Intellect and Science? Intuition and Intellect do not oppose each\nother, save where Intuition refuses to become more precise by coming\ninto touch with facts, scientifically studied, and where Intellect,\ninstead of confining itself to Science proper (that is, to what can\nbe inferred from facts, or proved by reasoning), combines with this\nan unconscious and inconsistent metaphysic which in vain lays claim to\nscientific pretensions. The future seems to belong to a philosophy which\nwill take into account the whole of what is given.\" [Footnote: Life and\nConsciousness, as reported in The Hibbert Journal, Vol. X, Oct., 1911,\npp. 24-44.] Intuition, to be fruitful, must interact with Intellect.\nIt has the direct insight of Instinct, but its range is widened in\nproportion as it blends with Intellect. To imagine that the acceptance\nof the gospel of Intuition means the setting aside of all valuation in\nregard to the Intellect and its work would be preposterous. Bergson,\nhowever unguarded his language at times has been, does not mean this.\nHe does not mean that we must return to the standpoint of the animal\nor that we must assume that the animal view, which is instinctive, is\nhigher than the view which, through Intellect, gives it a meaning and\nvalue to the percipient. That would involve the rejection of all that\nour culture has accumulated, all our social heritage from the past, the\noverthrow of our civilization, the undoing of all that has developed\nin our world, since man's Intelligence came into it. We cannot obtain\nIntuition without intellectual labour, for it must have an intellectual\nor scientific basis. Yet, however valuable Intellect is, it is not\nfinal. \"It is reality itself, in the profoundest meaning of the word,\nthat we reach by the combined and progressive development of science\nand philosophy.\" [Footnote: Creative Evolution, p. 210 (Fr. p. 217).] We\nneed, therefore, if we are to get into touch with the deeper aspects\nof reality, something more than bare science. We cannot live on its dry\nbread alone; we need philosophy--an intuitional philosophy.\n\nIn his brilliant paper L'Intuition philosophique Bergson shows us, by\na splendid study of Berkeley and Spinoza, that the great Intuition\nunderlying the thought of a philosopher is of more worth to the world\nthan the logic and dialectic through the aid of which it is made\nmanifest, and elaborated. [Footnote: He makes this clear in a letter to\nDr. Mitchell in the latter's Studies in Bergson's Philosophy, p. 31.]\nThen in the Lectures La Perception du Changement and in his little work\non Laughter he sets forth the meaning of Intuition in relation to Art.\nFrom time to time Nature raises up souls more or less detached from\npractical life, seers of visions and dreamers of dreams, men of\nIntuition, with powers of great poetry, great music, or great painting.\nThe clearest evidence of Intuition comes to us from the works of these\ngreat artists. What is it that we call the \"genius\" of great painters,\ngreat musicians, and great poets? It is simply the power they have of\nseeing more than we see and of enabling us, by their expressions, to\npenetrate further into reality ourselves. What makes the picture is the\nartist's vision, his entry into the subject by sympathy or Intuition,\nand however imperfectly he expresses this, yet he reveals to us more\nthan we could otherwise have perceived.\n\nThe original form of consciousness, Bergson asserts, was nearer to\nIntuition than to Intelligence. But man has found Intellect the more\nvaluable faculty for practical use and so has used it for the solution\nof questions it was never intended to solve, by reason of its nature\nand origin. Yet \"Intuition is there, but vague and, above all,\ndiscontinuous. It is a lamp almost extinguished which only glimmers now\nand then for a few moments at most. But it glimmers whenever a vital\ninterest is at stake. On our personality, on our liberty, on the place\nwe occupy in the whole of Nature, on our origin, and perhaps also on our\ndestiny, it throws a light, feeble and vacillating, but which, none the\nless, pierces the darkness of the night in which the Intellect leaves\nus.\" [Footnote: Creative Evolution, p. 282 (Fr. p. 290).]\n\nScience promises us well-being, or, at the most, pleasure, but\nphilosophy, through the Intuition to which it leads us, is capable\nof bestowing upon us Joy. The future belongs to such an intuitive\nphilosophy, Bergson holds, for he considers that the whole progress of\nEvolution is towards the creation of a type of being whose Intuition\nwill be equal to his Intelligence. Finally, by Intuition we shall find\nourselves in--to invent a word--\"intunation\" with the elan vital,\nwith the Evolution of the whole universe, and this absolute feeling of\n\"at-one-ment\" with the universe will result in that emotional synthesis\nwhich is deep Joy, which Wordsworth describes as:\n\n                                   \"that blessed mood\n      In which the burthen of the mystery,\n      In which the heavy and the weary weight\n      Of all this unintelligible world,\n      Is lightened:--that serene and blessed mood,\n      In which the affections gently lead us on,--\n      Until, the breath of this corporeal frame\n      And even the motion of our human blood\n      Almost suspended, we are laid asleep\n      In body, and become a living soul:\n      While with an eye made quiet by the power\n      Of harmony and the deep power of joy\n      We see into the life of things.\"\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X\n\nETHICAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS\n\n\nAnti-intellectualism and the State--Syndicalism--Class war,\n\"direct action.\" Sorel advocates General Strike--Bergson cited in\nsupport--Unfair use of Bergson's view of reality--His ethic--Value\nof Will and Creativeness; not a supporter of impulse. Development of\npersonality. Intuitive mind of woman. Change and the moral life.\n\n\nBergson has not written explicitly upon Ethics. In some quarters,\nhowever, so much has been made of Bergson as a supporter of certain\nethical tendencies and certain social movements, that we must examine\nthis question of ethical and political implications and try to ascertain\nhow far this use of Bergson is justified.\n\nBoth ethical and political thought to-day are deriving fresh stimulation\nfrom the revision of many formulae, the modification of many conceptions\nwhich the War has inevitably caused. At the same time the keen interest\ntaken in studies like social psychology and political philosophy\ncombines with a growing interest in movements such as Guild Socialism\nand Syndicalism. The current which in philosophy sets against\nintellectualism, in the political realm sets against the State. This\npolitical anti-intellectualism shows a definite tendency to belittle\nthe State in comparison with economic or social groups. \"If social\npsychology tends to base the State as it is, on other than intellectual\ngrounds, Syndicalism is prone to expect that non-intellectual forces\nwill suffice to achieve the State as it should be.\" [Footnote: Ernest\nBarker in his Political Thought in England from Herbert Spencer to the\nPresent Day, p. 248.] Other tendencies of the same type are noticeable.\nFor example, Mr. Bertrand Russell's work on The Principles of Social\nReconstruction is based on the view that impulse is a larger factor in\nour social life than conscious purpose.\n\nThe Syndicalists have been citing the philosophy of Bergson in support\nof their views, and it is most interesting to see how skilfully at times\nsayings of Bergson are quoted by them as authoritative, as justification\nfor their actions, in a spirit akin to that of the devout man who quotes\nscripture texts as a guide to conduct.\n\nIn this country, Syndicalism has not been popular, and when it did show\nits head the government promptly prosecuted the editor and printers\nof its organ, The Syndicalist, and suppressed the paper owing to its\naggressive anti-militarism. [Footnote: Imprisonment of Mr. Tom Mann]\nEnglish Syndicalism has few supporters and it is a rather diluted form\nof French Syndicalism. To understand the movement, we must turn to its\nhistory in France or in America. Its history in Russia will be an\nobject of research in the future, when more material and more news are\navailable from that \"distressful country.\" In France local unions or\nsyndicats were legalized as early as 1884 but 1895 is the important\nlandmark, being the date of the foundation with which Syndicalism is\nassociated to-day, the Confederation Generale du Travail, popularly\nknown as the \"C.G.T.,\" the central trade-union organization in France.\nIn the main, Syndicalism is an urban product, and has not many adherents\namong the agricultural population. In America a \"Federation of Labour\"\nwas formed in 1886, but the Syndicalist organization there is the body\nknown as \"The Industrial Workers of the World.\" In its declaration\nof policy, it looks forward to a union which is to embrace the whole\nworking class and to adopt towards the capitalist class an unending\nwarfare, until the latter is expropriated. \"The working class and the\nemploying class,\" says the declaration, \"have nothing in common. Between\nthese two classes a struggle must go on until all the toilers come\ntogether on the industrial field and take and hold that which they\nproduce by their labour.\" Among the leaders of Syndicalist thought on\nthe Continent may be mentioned the names of three prominent Frenchmen,\nBerth, Lagardelle, and Sorel, together with that of the young Italian\nprofessor Labriola, who is leading the increasingly active party in his\nown country.\n\nIn France, Italy, and America alike, Syndicalism stands for the\nclass-war. Its central feature is the idea of a General Strike. It\nmanifests a hatred of the State, which makes it bitterly opposed to\nState Socialism, which it regards as centralized and tyrannical, or to a\nLabour-party of any kind in Parliament. [Footnote: Attempts at carrying\nout a General Strike, in France, Sweden, Italy, and Spain have failed.\nThe greatest Strikes have been: Railwaymen in Italy, in 1907; Postal\nWorkers in France, in 1909. Miners in New South Wales, in 1909, and\nin Sweden, 1909; Miners and Railwaymen in England; Textile Workers in\nMassachusetts, 1912; Railwaymen in England, 1919, in France, 1920.] It\nregards the State as fixed, rigid, and intellectual, and adopts all\nthe Bergsonian anathemas it can find which condemn intellectual\nconstructions, concepts, and thought in general. Its war-cry is not only\n\"Down with Capitalism\" but also, in a great number of cases, \"Down\nwith Intellectualism\"! Instinct and impulse alone are to be guides.\nSyndicalism, unlike Socialism, has no programme--it does not believe in\na prearranged plan. Reality, it says, quoting Bersgon, has no plan. It\nsays, \"Let us act, act instinctively and impulsively against what we\nfeel to be wrong, and the future will grow out of our acting.\" We find\nGeorges Sorel, the philosopher of Syndicalism, talking about what he\nterms the INTUITION of Socialism, and he talks emphatically about the\ntremendous moral value of strikes, apart from any material gain achieved\nby them. He believes religiously in a General Strike as the great ideal,\nbut considers it a myth capable of rousing enthusiasm in the workers,\nan ideal to which they must strive, a myth as inspiring as the belief\nof the early Christians in the Second Coming of Christ, which, although\nquite a false belief, contributed largely to the success of the early\nChurch. \"Strikes,\" says Sorel, \"have engendered in the proletariat the\nmost noble, the most profound, the most moving sentiments they possess.\nThe General Strike groups these in a composite picture, and by bringing\ntogether, gives to each its maximum intensity; appealing to the most\nacute memories of particular conflicts, it colours with an intense life\nall the details of the composition presented to the mind. We obtain thus\nan intuition of Socialism which language cannot clearly express and we\nobtain it in a symbol instantly perceived, such as is maintained in\nthe Bergsonian philosophy.\" [Footnote: Quoted by C. Bougle, in an\ninteresting article Syndicalistes et Bergsoniens, Revue du mois, April\n10, 1909. And by Rev. Rhondda Williams in Syndicalism in France and its\nRelation to the Philosophy of Bergson, Hibbert Journal, 1914. Also by\nJ. W. Scott in his book Syndicalism and Philosophical Realism, 1919, pp.\n39-40, and by Harley in Syndicalism.] In England, although the idea\nof the General Strike has not been so prominent, yet in recent years\nStrikes have assumed an aspect different from those of former years.\nWorkers who had \"struck\" before for definite objects, for wages or\nhours, or reformed workshop conditions, now seem to be seeking after\nsomething vaster--a fundamental alteration in industrial conditions or\nthe total abolition of the present system. The spirit of unrest is on\nthe increase; no doubt War conditions have, in many cases, intensified\nit, but there is in the whole industrial world an instinctive impulse\nshowing itself, which is issuing in Syndicalist and Bolshevist\n[Footnote: \"Bolshevik\"--simply the Russian word for majority party as\ndistinct from Mensheviks or minority.] activities of various kinds.\nSyndicalism is undoubtedly revolutionary. There are Les Syndicats\nrouges and Les Syndicats jaunes, of which the \"Reds\" are by far the\nmost revolutionary. [Footnote: See article Des Ouvriers syndiques et le\nSyndicalisme jaune, Revue de metaphysique et morale, 1912] The C.G.T.\nand the Industrial Workers of the World are out for what they call\n\"direct action.\" Their anarchy is really an organization directed\nagainst organization, at least against that organization we know as the\nmodern State. They have no hope of salvation for themselves coming about\nthrough the State in any way. It has become somewhat natural for us\nto think of the social reformer as a Member of Parliament and of the\nrevolutionary socialist as a \"strike-agitator.\" The cries of \"Don't\nvote!\" \"Don't enlist!\" are heard, and care is taken to keep the workman\nfrom ceasing to quarrel with his employer. Any discussion of the\nrights or wrongs of any Strike is condemned at once. [Footnote: Ramsay\nMacDonald was condemned by the Syndicalists for claiming that a strike\nMIGHT be wrong.] All Strikes are regarded as right and as an approach\nto the ideal of the General Strike. Sorel cites Bergson as calling us\nto turn from traditional thought, to seek reality in the dynamic, rather\nthan the static. He claims that the Professor of Philosophy at the\nCollege de France really co-operates with the C.G.T. An unexpected\nharmony arises \"between the flute of personal meditation, and the\ntrumpet of social revolution, and the workman is inspired by being made\nto feel that the elan ouvrier est frere de l'elan vital.\" [Footnote:\nQuoted by C. Bougie in the article previously mentioned.] As Bergson\nspeaks of all movement as unique and indivisible, so the triumphant\nmovement of the General Strike is to be regarded as a whole, no analysis\nis to be made of its parts. As the portals of the future stand wide\nopen, as the future is being made, so Bergson tells us, that is deemed\nan excuse by the Syndicalists for having no prearranged plan of the\nconduct of the General Strike, and no conception of what is to be done\nafterwards. It is unforeseen and unforeseeable. All industries, however,\nare to be in the hands of those who work them, the present industrial\nsystem is to be swept away. The new order which is to follow will have\nentirely new moral codes. Sorel justifies violence to be used against\nthe existing order, but says he wishes to avoid unnecessary blood-shed\nor brutality. [Footnote: Reflections on Violence. It is interesting to\nnote that Bergson refers briefly to Sorel as an original thinker whom it\nis impossible to place in any category or class, in La Philosophie, p.\n13.] He remarks however, in this connexion, that ancient society, with\nall its brutality, compares favourably with modern society which has\nreplaced ferocity by cunning. The ancient peoples had less hypocrisy\nthan we have; this, in his opinion, justifies violence in the overthrow\nof the modern system and the creation of a nobler ethic than that on\nwhich the modern State is based. For this reason, he disagrees with most\nof his Syndicalist colleagues, and condemns sabotage and also the ca\ncanny policy, both of which are a kind of revenge upon the employer,\nbased on the principle of \"bad work for bad pay.\" He would have the\nworkers produce well now, and urges that moral progress is to be aimed\nat no less than material progress.\n\nIt certainly seems, however, that the Syndicalists are making an unfair\nuse of Bergson. They have got hold of three or four points rather out of\nrelation to their context, and are making the most of them. These points\nare, chiefly, his remarks against the Intellect, his appreciation\nof Instinct and Intuition, his insistence on Freedom and on the\nIndeterminateness of the Future. In the hands of the Syndicalists these\nbecome in effect: \"Never mind what you think, rouse up your feeling\nintensely; act as you feel and then see what you think.\" Briefly\nthis amounts to saying: \"Act on impulse, behave instinctively and not\nrationally.\" In too many cases, as we know, this is equivalent to a\nmerely selfish \"Down tools if you feel like it.\" Now so far from Bergson\nreally giving any countenance to capricious behaviour, or mere impulse,\nhe expressly condemns such action. Although the future is being made, he\ndoes not admit that it will be merely CAPRICIOUSLY made, and he condemns\nthe man of mere impulse along with the dreamer, in a fine passage\nwhere he speaks of the value of an intelligent memory in practical\nlife.[Footnote: See p. 48 of the present work.] When the Syndicalists\nassert that elan, instinct, impulse, or intuition are a better guide\nthan intelligence and reasoned principles, and cite Bergson as their\nauthority, they omit an important qualification which upsets their\ntheory entirely, for Bergson's anti-intellectualism is not at all of the\ntype which they advocate. He does not intend to rule Intellect out of\npractical affairs. Indeed it is just the opposite that he asserts, for,\nin his view, the Intellect is pre-eminently fitted for practical life,\nfor action, and it is for this very reason that he maintains it does not\ngive us insight into reality itself, which Intuition alone can do. He\ndoes not wish, however, to decrease the small element of rationality\nmanifested in ethical and political life, least of all to make men\nless rational, in the sense that they are to become mere creatures of\nImpulse.\n\nNevertheless, Bergson's great emphasis on Will and Creativeness condemns\nany laissez-faire type of political theory. It would be wrong for us to\naccept the social order which is felt to be imperfect and unjust in so\nmany ways, simply because we find ourselves in it and fear we cannot\nwork a way out. WE HAVE GREAT POWER OF CREATION, AND IN LARGE MEASURE WE\nCAN CREATE WHAT WE WILL IN THE WORLD OF POLITICS AND SOCIAL LIFE, and it\nis good that men generally should be made to see this. But it is of very\nvital importance that we should will the right thing. This we are not\nlikely to do impulsively and without reflection. Even if we admit\nMr. Russell's contention that \"impulse has more effect than conscious\npurpose in moulding men's lives\" [Footnote: Principles of Social\nReconstruction, Preface, p. 5.] and agree that \"it is not the weakening\nof impulse that is to be desired, but the direction of impulse toward\nlife and growth,\" [Footnote: p. 18. Cf. the whole of the first chapter\non The Principle of Growth.] yet, we none the less assert that instinct\nis an insufficient guide in the determination of social behaviour, and\nask how the direction of impulse, of which Mr. Russell himself speaks,\nis to be arrived at? Surely our only hope lies in striving to make\nmen not less, but more rational in order that they may grasp--however\ndimly--something of what is implied in ethical and political ideals,\nthat they may recognize in society some embodiment of will and purpose\nand come to look upon Thought and Reason as the unifying and organizing\nprinciples of human society.\n\nWe cannot help wishing that Bergson had given us some contribution\nto the study of Ethics. In one of his letters to Father de Tonquedec\nregarding the relation of his philosophy to Theology, we find him\nremarking that \"Before these conclusions [theological statements] can be\nset out with greater precision, or considered at greater length, certain\nproblems of quite another kind would have to be attacked--the problems\nof Ethics. I am not sure that I shall ever publish anything on this\nsubject. I shall do so only if I attain the results that appear to me\nas demonstrable or as clearly to be shown as those of my other books.\"\n[Footnote: In Etudes (Revue des Peres de Jesus), Vol. CXXX, pp. 514,\n515, 1912.] Prior to the War, however, we know that Bergson was taking\nup the problem of working out the implications of his philosophy in the\nsphere of social ethics, with particular reference to the meaning\nof \"Duty\" and the significance of \"Personality.\" Although his\ninvestigations of these supremely important problems have not yet been\ncompleted or made public, nevertheless certain ethical implications\nwhich have an important bearing on personal and social life seem to be\ncontained in what he has already written.\n\nIn its application to social life, Bergson's philosophy would involve\nthe laying of greater stress upon the need for all members of society\nhaving larger opportunities of being more fully themselves, of being\nself-creative and having fuller powers of self-expression as free\ncreative agents. It would lay emphasis upon the value of the personality\nof the worker and would combat the systematic converting of him into\na mere \"hand.\" Thus would be set in clearer light the claims of human\npersonality to create and to enjoy a good life in the widest sense, to\nenter into fuller sympathy and fellowship with other personalities, and\nso develop a fuller and richer form of existence than is possible under\npresent social and industrial conditions. It would mean a transvaluation\nof all social values, an esteeming of personality before property, a\nrecognition of material goods as means to a good life, when employed in\nthe social service of the spirit of man. It would involve a denunciation\nof the enslavement of man's spirit to the production of material wealth.\nEach man would be a member of a community of personalities, each of\nunique value, treating each other, not as means to their own particular\nselfish ends, but as ends in themselves. At the same time it would\ninvolve the putting of the personality of the citizen in the foremost\nplace in our social and political life, instead of a development of a\npurely class consciousness with its mischievous distinctions.\n\nArticles have been written dealing with Bergson's message to Feminism.\nThis point is not without its importance in our modern life. It must\nbe admitted that the present system of civilization with its scientific\ncampaign of conquest of the material environment has been the work of\nman's intellect. In the ruder stages of existence women's subordination\nto men may have been necessary and justifiable. But in the development\nof society it has become increasingly less necessary, and humanity\nis now at a stage where the contributions of women to society are\nabsolutely vital to its welfare and progress. Woman is proverbially and\nrightly regarded as more intuitive than man. This need not be taken to\nmean that, given the opportunity of intellectual development (until now\npractically denied to her), woman would not show as great ability in\nthis direction as man. But it is an undeniable fact that woman has kept\nmore closely to the forces of the great life-principle, both by the fact\nthat in her rests the creative power for the continuation of the human\nfamily and also by the fact that the development of the personalities of\nchildren has been her function. The subjection in which women have been\nlargely kept until now has not only hindered them from taking part in\nthe work of society as a whole and from expressing their point of view,\nbut has meant that many of them have little or no knowledge of their\ncapacities and abilities in wider directions. However, with their\nincreasing realization of their own powers, with the granting of\nincreased opportunities to them, and an adequate recognition of their\npersonality side by side with that of men, achievements of supreme value\nfor humanity as a whole may be expected from them. In certain spheres\nthey may be found much better adapted than are men to achieve a vision\nwhich will raise human life to a higher plane and give it greater worth.\nMore especially in the realms of ethical development, of social science,\nproblems of sex, of war and peace, of child welfare, health, and\neducation, of religion and philosophy we may hope to have valuable\ncontributions from the more intuitive mind of woman. \"It is not in the\nfighting male of the race: it is in Woman that we have the future centre\nof Power in civilization.\" [Footnote: Benjamin Kidd in The Science\nof Power, p. 195. This is more fully shown in his chapters, Woman the\nPsychic Centre of Power in the Social Integration, and The Mind of\nWoman, pp. 192-257.] The wandering Dante required for his guidance\nnot only the intellectual faculties of a Vergil but in addition the\nintuitive woman-soul of a Beatrice to lead him upward and on.\n\nIn La Conscience et la Vie [Footnote: L'Energie spirituelle, p.\n27 (Mind-Energy).] Bergson indicates slightly his views on SOCIAL\nevolution--c'est a la vie sociale que l'evolution aboutit, comme si le\nbesoin s'en etait fait sentir des le debut, ou plutot comme si quelque\naspiration originelle et essentielle de la vie ne pouvait trouver que\ndans la societe sa pleine satisfaction. He seems inclined to turn his\nattention to the unity of life, not simply as due to an identity of\noriginal impulse but to a common aspiration. There is involved a process\nof subordination and initiative on the part of the individual. The\nexistence of society necessitates a certain subordination, while\nits progress depends on the free initiative of the individual. It is\nextremely dangerous for any society, whether it be an International\nLeague, a State, either Communistic or Capitalistic, a Trade Union, or\na Church, to suppress individual liberty in the interests of greater\nsocial efficiency or of increased production or rigid uniformity of\ndoctrine. With the sacrifice of individual initiative will go the loss\nof all \"soul,\" and the result will be degeneration to a mechanical type\nof existence, a merely stagnant institution expressing nothing of man's\nspirit. This personal power of initiative Bergson appeals to each one\nto maintain. In an important passage of his little work on Laughter he\nmakes a personal moral appeal.\n\n\"What life and society require of each of us is a constantly alert\nattention, that discerns the outlines of the present situation, together\nwith a certain elasticity of mind and body to enable us to adapt\nourselves in consequence.\" [Footnote: Laughter, p. 18 (Fr. p. 18).] The\nlack of tension and elasticity gives rise to mental deficiency and to\ngrave inadaptability which produces misery and crime. Society demands\nnot only that we live but that we live well. This means that we must be\ntruly alive; for Bergson, the moral ideal is to keep spiritually alert.\nWe must be our real, living selves, and not hide behind the social self\nof hypocrisy and habit. We must avoid being the victims of mechanism or\nautomatism. We must avoid at all costs \"getting into a rut\" morally or\nspiritually. Change and vision are both necessary to our welfare. Where\nthere is no vision, no undying fire of idealism, the people perish.\n\nResistance to change is the sin against the Holy Spirit. Bergson is\nopposed to the conventional view of morality as equivalent to rigidity,\nand grasps the important truth that if morality is to be of worth at all\nit must lie not in a fixed set of rules, habits, or conventions, but in\na spirit of living. This is of very great ethical importance indeed,\nas it means that we must revise many of our standards of character. For\nexample, how often do we hear of one who, holding an obviously false\nview long and obstinately, is praised as consistent, whereas a mind\nwhich moves and develops with the times, attempting always to\nadjust itself to changing conditions in its intellectual or material\nenvironment, is contemptuously dubbed as \"changeable\" by the moralists\nof rigidity. We must, however, learn that consistency of character\ndoes not mean lack of change. Stanchness of character is too often\nmere obstinate resistance to change. We must therefore be on our guard\nagainst those who would run ethics into rigid moulds, and so raise up\nstatic concepts and infallible dogmas for beliefs or action. Change\nmust be accepted as a principle which it is both futile and immoral to\nignore, even in the moral life. This does not mean setting up caprice\nor impulsiveness, for in so far as our change of character expresses\nthe development of the single movement of our own inner life it will be\nquite other than capricious, but it will be change, and a change which\nis quite consistent, a creative evolution of our personality.\n\nNo merely materialistic ethic can breathe in the atmosphere of Bergson's\nthought, which sets human consciousness in a high place and insists upon\nthe fact of Freedom. He maintains a point of view far removed from the\nold naturalistic ethic; he does take some account of \"values,\" freedom,\ncreativeness, and joy (as distinct from pleasure). He points out that\nMatter, although to a degree the tool of Spirit, is nevertheless the\nenemy who threatens us with a lapse into mere automatism which is only\nthe parody of true life. The eternal conflict of Matter and Spirit\nin Evolution demands that we place ourselves on the side of spiritual\nrather than merely material values. We must not be like \"the man with\nthe muck rake.\" Our conceptions of goodness must be not merely static\nbut dynamic, for the moral life is essentially an evolution--\"a growth\nin grace.\" It means a constant \"putting on of the new man,\" never\n\"counting oneself to have attained,\" for spirituality is a progress to\never new creations, the spiritual life is an unending adventure, and is,\nmoreover, one which is hampered and crushed by all refusals to recognize\nthat Change is the fundamental feature of the universe. Nothing can\nbe more mischievous, more detrimental to moral progress--which is\nultimately the only progress of value and significance to humanity--than\nthe deification of the status quo either in the individual or in society\nas a whole.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI\n\nRELATION TO RELIGION AND THEOLOGY\n\n\nAvoidance of theological terms--Intuition and faith--God and\nChange--Deity not omnipotent but creative and immanent--God as \"Creator\nof creators\"--Problem of teleology--Stimulus to theology--The need for\nrestatements of the nature of God--Men as products and instruments of\ndivine activity--Immortality.\n\n\nWe have seen that Bergson holds no special brief for science, for,\nas has been shown, he opposes many of the hypotheses to which science\nclings. Consequently, some persons possessing only a superficial\nacquaintance with Bergson, and having minds which still think in the\nexclusive and opposing terms of the conflict of science and religion of\na generation past, have enthusiastically hailed him as an ally of their\nreligion. We must examine carefully how far this is justifiable. It is\nperfectly natural and just that many people, unable to devote time or\nenergy to the study of his works, want to know, in regard to Bergson, as\nabout every other great thinker, what is the bearing of his thought on\ntheir practical theory of life, upon their ideals of existence, upon\nthe courage, faith, and hope which enable them to work and live, feeling\nthat life is worth while. We must, however, guard against misuse of\nBergson, particularly such misuse of him as that made in another sphere,\nby the Syndicalists. We find that in France he has been welcomed by the\nModernists of the Roman Catholic Church as an ally, and by not a few\nliberal and progressive Christian theologians in this country.\n\nAt the outset, we must note that Bergson avoids theological forms\nof expression, because he is well aware that these--especially in a\nphilosophical treatise--may give rise to misconceptions. He does not,\nlike Kant, attack any specific or traditional argument for Theism; he\ndoes not enter into theological controversy. He has not formulated, with\nany strictness, his conception of God; for he has recognized that an\nexamination of Theism would be of little or no value, which was not\nprefaced by a refutation of mechanism and materialism, and by the\nassertion of some spiritual value in the universe. It is to such a\nlabour that Bergson has applied himself; it is only incidentally that\nwe find him making remarks on religious or theological conceptions.\nHis whole philosophy, however, involves some very important religious\nconceptions and theological standpoints. In France, Bergson has had a\nconsiderable amount of discussion on the theological implications of his\nphilosophy with the Jesuit Fathers, notably Father de Tonquedec. These\narise particularly from his views concerning Change, Time, Freedom,\nEvolution and Intuition.\n\nBergson has been cited as a \"Mystic\" because he preaches a doctrine\nof Intuition. But his metaphysical Intuition bears no relation to the\nmysticism of the saint or of the fervid religious mind. He expressly\nsays, \"The doctrine I hold is a protest against mysticism since\nit professes to reconstruct the bridge (broken since Kant) between\nmetaphysics and science.\" Yet, if by mysticism one means a certain\nappeal to the inner and profound life, then his philosophy is\nmystical--but so is all philosophy. We must beware of any attempts to\nrun Bergson's thought into moulds for which it was never intended,\nand guard against its being strained and falsely interpreted in the\ninterests of some special form of religious belief. Intuition is not\nwhat the religious mind means by Faith, in the accepted sense of belief\nin a doctrine or a deity, which is to be neither criticized nor reasoned\nabout. Religion demands \"what passeth knowledge.\" Furthermore, it seeks\na reality that abides above the world of Change, \"The same yesterday,\nto-day, and for ever,\" to which it appeals. The religious consciousness\nfinds itself most reluctant to admit the reality of Change, and this, we\nmust remember, is the fundamental principle of Bergson's thought. Faber,\none of the noblest hymn writers, well expresses this attitude:\n\n     \"O, Lord, my heart is sick,\n         Sick of this everlasting change,\n      And Life runs tediously quick\n         Through its unresting race and varied range.\n      Change finds no likeness of itself in Thee,\n      And makes no echo in Thy mute eternity.\"\n\nFor Bergson, God reveals Himself in the world of Time, in the very\nprinciple of Change. He is not \"a Father of lights in Whom is no\nvariableness nor shadow of turning.\"\n\nIt has been said that the Idea of God is one of the objects of\nphilosophy, and this is true, if, by God, we agree to mean the principle\nof the universe, or the Absolute. Unity is essential to the Idea of\nGod. For the religious consciousness, of course, God's existence is\na necessary one, not merely contingent. It views Him as eternal and\nunchangeable. But if we accept the Bergsonian philosophy, God cannot be\nregarded as \"timeless,\" or as \"perfect\" in the sense of being \"eternal\"\nand \"complete.\" He is, so to speak, realizing Himself in the universe,\nand is not merely a unity which sums up the multiplicity of time\nexistence. Further, He must be a God who acts freely and creatively\nand who is in time. Trouble has arisen in the past over the relation of\n\"temporal\" and \"eternal\"--the former being regarded as appearance. For\nBergson, this difficulty does not arise; there is, for him, no such\ndualism. His God is not exempt from Change, He is not to be conceived as\nexisting apart from and independent of the world. Indeed, for him,\nGod would seem to be merely a focus imaginarius of Life and Spirit,\na \"hypostatization\" of la duree. He cannot be regarded as the loving\nFather of the human race whom He has begotten or created in order that\nintelligent beings \"may glorify Him and enjoy Him for ever.\" Bergson\ndoes not offer us a God, personal, loving, and redemptive, as the\nChristian religious consciousness demands or imagines. He does not, and\ncan not, affirm Christian Theism, for he considers that the facts do not\nwarrant the positing of a self-conscious and personal Individual in the\nonly sense in which we, from our experience, can understand these words.\nGod is pure, creative activity, a flowing rather than a fountain head;\na continuity of emanation, not a centre from which things emanate.\nFor Bergson, God is anthropomorphic--as He must necessarily be for us\nall--but Bergson's is anthropomorphism of a subtle kind. His God is the\nduree of our own conscious life, raised to a higher power. Dieu se fait\nin the evolutionary process. He is absolutely unfinished, not complete\nor perfect. He is incessant life, action, freedom, and creativeness,\nand in so far as we ourselves manifest these (seen, above all, in the\ncreative joy of the inventor, poet, artist, and mother) each of us has\nthe \"divine\" at work within. For Bergson, God is a Being immanent in\nthe universe, but He is ignorant of the direction in which Evolution\nis progressing. This is not the God of the ordinary religious\nconsciousness, nor is it a conception of God which satisfies the limited\nnotion which our own imagination both creates and craves to find real.\nGod, it would seem, must be greater than His works, and He must know\nwhat He is doing. It has been objected that a force, even if a divine\nforce (one can hardly call it \"God\" in the ordinary meaning of that\nvague word) which urges on Matter without knowing in what direction or\nto what end, is no God at all, for it is merely personified chance.\nThis is due to what Hegel calls \"the error of viewing God as free.\"\n[Footnote: Logic, Wallace's translation, first edition, p. 213.]\n\nIn reply to certain criticisms of his book L'Evolution creatrice made\nby Father de Tonquedec, Bergson wrote in 1912: \"I speak of God as the\nsource whence issue successively, by an effort of his freedom, the\ncurrents or impulses each of which will make a world; he therefore\nremains distinct from them, and it is not of him that we can say that\n'most often it turns aside' or is 'at the mercy of the materiality that\nit has been bound to adopt.' Finally, the reasoning whereby I establish\nthe impossibility of 'nothing' is in no way directed against the\nexistence of a transcendent cause of the world; I have, on the contrary,\nexplained that this reasoning has in view the Spinozist conception of\nBeing. It issues in what is merely a demonstration that 'something' has\nalways existed. As to the nature of this 'something' it is true that\nnothing in the way of a positive conclusion is conveyed. But neither\nis it stated in any fashion that what has always existed is the world\nitself, and the rest of the book explicitly affirms the contrary.\"\n[Footnote: Tonquedec: Dieu dans l'Evolution creatrice (Beauchesne), and\nAnnales de philosophie chretienne, 1912.] \"Now the considerations set\nforth in my Essai sur les donnees immediates result in bringing to light\nthe fact of freedom, those of Matiere et Memoire point directly, I\nhope, to the reality of Spirit, those of L'Evolution creatrice exhibit\ncreation as a fact. From all this emerges clearly the idea of a God,\ncreator and free, the generator of both Matter and Life, whose work of\ncreation is continued on the side of Life by the evolution of species\nand the building up of human personalities. From all this emerges a\nrefutation of monism and of pantheism.\" [Footnote: Tonquedec: Dieu dans\nl'Evolution creatrice (Beauchesne), and also Etudes des Peres de Jesus,\nVol. CXXX, 1912.] To this it was replied that, for Catholic theology,\nGod is not merely the source from which the river springs, God does\nnot develop Himself to a world but He causes it to appear by a kind of\ncreation quite different from that of Bergson. Bergson's God is not the\nGod of pantheism, because, for him, the Deity is immanent in nature,\nnot identifiable with it. A true account of the Absolute would, for him,\ntake the form of history. Human history has a vital meaning for him.\nGod is not omnipotent; He is a fighter who takes sides. He is not a\n\"potter-God\" with a clay world. The world involves a limiting of God,\nand theology has always found this its most difficult problem, for the\nevils or defects against which the Creator is waging war are evils\nand defects in a world of His own creating. Speaking in 1914, at the\nEdinburgh Philosophical Society, Bergson remarked that God might be\nlooked upon as \"a Creator of creators.\" Such a view, more explicitly\nworked out, might bring him into line with the religious attempt to\nreconcile the divine action with our own work and freedom. Our wills are\nours, but in some mystic way religion believes they may become His also,\nand that we may be \"fellow-labourers together with God.\" The religious\nview of the perfection of the Divine, its omniscience and omnipotence,\nhas always been hard to reconcile with free will. Christian theology,\nwhen based on the perfection of the Divine nature, has always tended\nto be determinist. Indeed, free will has been advocated rather as an\nexplanation of the presence of evil (our waywardness as in opposition\nto the will of God) than as the privilege and necessary endowment of\na spiritual being, and so the really orthodox religious mind has been\nforced to seek salvation in self-surrender and has found consolation\nin reliance on the \"grace\" or \"active good will\" of God. Thus many\ntheologians in an attempt to reconcile this with human freedom speak\nmystically, nevertheless confidently, of \"the interaction of Grace and\nFree-Will.\"\n\nThe acceptance of Creative Evolution involves the acceptance of a\nGod who expresses Himself in creative action called forth by changing\nsituations. It cannot regard Evolution as merely the unrolling in time\nof the eternally complete, as in the view of monistic idealism. We find\nin Bergson, however, two hints which suggest that some vague idealistic\nconception has been present to his mind. For instance, in speaking\nof Time in relation to God, we find him suggesting that \"the whole of\nhistory might be contained in a very short time for a consciousness at\na higher degree of tension than our own, which should watch the\ndevelopment of humanity while contracting it, so to speak, into the\ngreat phases of its evolution.\" [Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 275\n(Fr. p. 231).] This remark seems an echo of the words of the old Hebrew\npoet:\n\n     \"For a thousand years in Thy sight\n      Are but as yesterday when it is past,\n      And as a watch in the night.\"\n\nAgain, in L'Evolution creatrice we find him suggesting that in maternity\nand love may lie the secret of the universe.\n\nThe important point however, in considering Bergson in relation to\nReligion and Theology, is his marked objection to teleology. It is this\nwhich has led many to style his philosophy pessimistic. Religion does\nnot live readily in a pessimistic atmosphere. Then religion regards\nLife and the Universe as valuable, not because they yield to some single\nimpulsion, but because, at every step, they manifest a meaning and\nsignificance interpreted by our conceptions of value. Bergson's view\nonly favours religion as ordinarily comprehended, in so far as it breaks\naway from a materialistic mechanism, and asserts freedom and gives\nSpirit some superiority over Matter. At first sight, the term \"creative\"\nseemed very promising, but can we stop where Bergson has left us? Why\nshould he banish teleology? His super-consciousness is so indeterminate\nthat it is not allowed to hamper itself with any purpose more definite\nthan that of self-augmentation. The course and goal of Evolution are to\nit unknown and unknowable. Creation, freedom, and will are great things,\nas Mr. Balfour remarks, but we cannot lastingly admire them unless we\nknow their drift. It is too haphazard a universe which Bergson displays.\nJoy does not seem to fit in with what is so aimless. It would be better\nto invoke God with a purpose than a supra-consciousness with none.\n[Footnote: Creative Evolution and Philosophic Doubt, Hibbert Journal,\nOct., 1911, pp. 1-23.]\n\nIn response to an international inquiry, conducted by Frederic Charpin,\nfor the Mercure de France, formulated in the question, Assistons-nous a\nune dissolution ou a une evolution de l'idee religieuse et du sentiment\nreligieux? Bergson wrote: \"I feel quite unable to foretell what the\nexternal manifestation of the religious sense may be in time to come.\nI can only say that it does not seem to me likely to be disintegrated.\nOnly that which is made up of parts can be disintegrated. Now, I am\nwilling to admit that the religious sense has been gradually enriched\nand complicated by very diverse elements; none the less it is in essence\na simple thing, sui generis; and resembles no other emotion of the soul.\nIt may, perhaps be urged that a simple element, although it cannot\nbe decomposed, may yet disappear, and that the religious sense will\ninevitably vanish when it has no object to which it can attach itself.\nBut this would be to forget that the object of the religious sense is,\nin part at least, prior to that sense itself; that this object is felt\neven more than it is thought and that the idea is, in this case, the\neffect of the feeling quite as much as its cause. The progressive\ndeepening of the idea may therefore make the religious sense clearer and\never clearer; it cannot modify that which is essential in it, still less\neffect its disappearance.\" [Footnote: Charpin: La Question religieuse,\n1908, Paris.]\n\nWe find Bergson reported as believing that the individual cannot be\nguided solely by considerations of a purely moral character. Morality,\neven social ethics, is not enough in view of the longing for religious\nexperience, the yearning for at least a feeling of definite relationship\nbetween the individual human personality and the great spiritual source\nof life. This is a feeling which he believes will grow. [Footnote: New\nYork Times, Feb. 22, 1914.]\n\nBergson's philosophy has aroused a new interest in many theological\nquestions. The dogmas of theology, philosophy holds itself free to\ncriticize; they are for it problems. The teleological arguments of the\nolder theologians have had to be left behind. \"We are fearfully and\nwonderfully made,\" no doubt, but not perfectly, and the arguments in\nfavour of an intelligent contriver (cf. The Bridgewater Treatises) which\nshowed the greatest plausibility, were made meaningless by Darwin's\nwork. Further, Evoluton knows no break. We cannot believe in the\ndoctrines of the \"fall\" or in \"original sin,\" for Evolution means a\nprogress from lower to higher forms. Thus we see that many of the older\nforms of theological statement call for revision. Bergson has done much\nto stimulate a keener and fresher theological spirit which will express\nGod in a less static and less isolated form, so that we shall not have\nthe question asked, either by children or older folks, \"What does God\ndo?\"\n\nIt should be noted before closing this section that the religious\nconsciousness is tempted to take Bergson's views on Soul and Body to\nimply more than they really do. The belief in Immortality which Western\nreligion upholds is not a mere swooning into the being of God, but a\nperfect realization of our own personalities. It is only this that is\nan immortality worthy of the name. To regard souls as Bergson does, as\nmerely \"rivulets\" into which the great stream of Life has divided, does\nnot do sufficient justice to human individuality. A \"Nirvana,\" after\ndeath, is not immortality in the sense of personal survival and in the\nsense demanded by the religious consciousness.\n\nThe influence of Bergson's thought upon religion and theology may be put\nfinally as follows: We must reject the notion of a God for whom all is\nalready made, to whom all is given, and uphold the conception of a\nGod who acts freely in an open universe. The acceptance of Bergson's\nphilosophy involves the recognition of a God who is the enduring\ncreative impulse of all Life, more akin perhaps to a Mother-Deity than\na Father-Deity. This divine vital impetus manifests itself in continual\nnew creation. We are each part of this great Divine Life, and are both\nthe products and the instruments of its activity. We may thus come to\nview the Divine Life as self-given to humanity, emptying itself into\nmankind as a veritable incarnation, not, however, restricted to one time\nand place, but manifest throughout the whole progress of humanity. Our\nconception will be that of a Deity, not external and far-off, but one\nwhose own future is bound up in humanity, rejoicing in its joy, but\nsuffering, by a kind of perpetual crucifixion, through man's errors and\nhis failures to be loyal to the higher things of the spirit. Thus we\nshall see that, in a sense, men's noble actions promote God's fuller\nbeing. A Norwegian novelist has recently emphasized this point by his\nstory of the man who went out and sowed corn in his late enemy's field\nTHAT GOD MIGHT EXIST! [Footnote: The Great Hunger, by Johan Bojer.]\nBut it is important to remember that in so far as we allow ourselves to\nbecome victims of habit, living only a materialistic and static type of\nexistence, we retard the divine operations. On the other hand, in so far\nas our spirit finds joy in creative activity and in the furtherance of\nspiritual values, to this extent we may be regarded as fellow-labourers\ntogether with God. We cannot, by intellectual searching find out\nGod, yet we may realize and express quite consistently with Bergson's\nphilosophy the truth that \"in Him we live, and move, and have our\nbeing.\"\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII\n\nREFLECTIONS\n\n\nBergson not systematic--His style--Difficult to classify--Empirical\nand spiritual--Value of his ideas on Change, the nature of Mind, of\nFreedom--Difficulties in his evolutionary theory--Ethical lack--Need\nfor supplement-Emphasis on Will, Creativeness, Human Progress and\nPossibilities.\n\n\nIn concluding this study of Bergson's philosophy, it remains to sum up\nand to review its general merits and deficiencies. We must remember, in\nfairness to Bergson, that he does not profess to offer us A SYSTEM of\nphilosophy. In fact, if he were to do so, he would involve himself in a\ngrave inconsistency, for his thought is not of the systematic type. He\nis opposed to the work of those individual thinkers who have offered\n\"systems\" to the world, rounded and professedly complete constructions,\nlabelled, one might almost say, \"the last word in Philosophy.\" Bergson\ndoes not claim that his thought is final. His ideal, of which he speaks\nin his lectures on La Perception du Changement--that excellent summary\nof his thought--is a progressive philosophy to which each thinker shall\ncontribute. If we feel disappointed that Bergson has not gone further or\ndone more by attempting a solution of some of the fundamental problems\nof our human experience, upon which he has not touched, then we must\nrecollect his own view of the philosophy he is seeking to expound. All\nthinking minds must contribute their quota. A philosophy such as he\nwishes to promote by establishing a method by his own works will not\nbe made in a day. \"Unlike the philosophical systems properly so called,\neach of which was the individual work of a man of genius, and sprang\nup as a whole to be taken or left, it will only be built up by the\ncollective and progressive effort of many thinkers, of many observers\nalso, completing, correcting, and improving one another.\" [Footnote:\nIntroduction to Creative Evolution, p. xiv. (Fr. p. vii).] Both science\nand the older kind of metaphysics have kept aloof from the vital\nproblems of our lives. In one of his curious but brilliant metaphors\nBergson likens Life to a river over which the scientists have\nconstructed an elaborate bridge, while the laborious metaphysicians\nhave toiled to build a tunnel underneath. Neither group of workers has\nattempted to plunge into the flowing tide itself. In the most brilliant\nof his short papers: L'Intuition philosophique, he makes an energetic\nappeal that philosophy should approach more closely to practical life.\nHis thought aims at setting forth, not any system of knowledge, but\nrather a method of philosophizing; in a phrase, this method amounts to\nthe assertion that Life is more than Logic, or, as Byron put it, \"The\ntree of Knowledge is not the tree of Life.\"\n\nIt is because Bergson has much to say that is novel and opposed to older\nconceptions that a certain lack of proportion occasionally mars his\nthought; for he--naturally enough--frequently lays little emphasis on\nimportant points which he considers are sufficiently familiar, in order\nto give prominent place and emphasis to some more novel point. Herein\nlies, it would now appear, the explanation of the seeming disharmony\nbetween Intuition and Intellect which was gravely distressing to many in\nhis earlier writing on the subject. Later works, however, make a point\nof restoring this harmony, but, as William James has remarked: \"We\nare so subject to the philosophical tradition which treats logos, or\ndiscursive thought generally, as the sole avenue to truth, that to fall\nback on raw, unverbalized life, as more of a revealer, and to think of\nconcepts as the merely practical things which Bergson calls them, comes\nvery hard. It is putting off our proud maturity of mind and becoming\nagain as foolish little children in the eyes of reason. But, difficult\nas such a revolution is, there is no other way, I believe, to\nthe possession of reality.\" [Footnote: Lecture on Bergson and his\nanti-intellectualism, in A Pluralistic Universe. It may be remarked\nhere that, although James hailed Bergson as an ally, Bergson cannot\nbe classed as a pragmatist. His great assertion is that just because\nintellect is pragmatic it does not help us to get a vision of reality.\nCf. the interesting work on William James and Henri Bergson, by W. H.\nKallen.]\n\nBergson's style of writing merits high praise. He is no \"dry\"\nphilosopher; he is highly imaginative and picturesque; many of his\npassages might be styled, like those of Macaulay, \"purple,\" for at times\nhe rises to a high pitch of feeling and oratory. Yet this has been urged\nagainst him by some critics. The ironic remark has been repeated, in\nregard to Bergson, which was originally made of William James, by Dr.\nSchiller, that his work was \"so lacking in the familiar philosophic\ncatch-words, that it may be doubted whether any professor has\nquite understood it.\" There is in his works a beauty of style and a\ncomparative absence of technical terms which have contributed much to\nhis popularity. The criticism directed against his poetic style, accuses\nhim of hypnotizing us by his fine language, of employing metaphors where\nwe expect facts, and of substituting illustrations for proof. Sir Ray\nLankester says: \"He has exceeded the limits of fantastic speculation\nwhich it is customary to tolerate on the stage of metaphysics, and has\ncarried his methods into the arena of sober science.\" [Footnote: In the\npreface to Elliot's volume, Modern Science and the Illusions of Bergson,\np. xvii.] Another critic remarks that \"as far as Creative Evolution is\nconcerned, his writing is neither philosophy nor science.\" [Footnote:\nMcCabe: Principles of Evolution, p. 254.] Certainly his language\nis charming; it called forth from William James the remark that it\nresembled fine silk underwear, clinging to the shape of the body, so\nwell did it fit his thought. But it does not seem a fair criticism\nto allege that he substitutes metaphor for proof, for we find, on\nexamination of his numerous and striking metaphors, that they are\nemployed in order to give relief from continuous abstract statements. He\ndoes not submit analogies as proof, but in illustration of his points.\nFor example, when he likens the elan vital to a stream, he does not\nsuggest that because the stream manifests certain characteristics,\ntherefore the life force does so too. Certainly that would be a highly\nillegitimate proceeding. But he simply puts forward this to help us to\ngrasp by our imaginative faculty what he is striving to make clear. Some\ncritics are apt to forget the tense striving which must be involved in\nany highly philosophical mind dealing with deep problems, to achieve\nexpression, to obtain a suitable vehicle for the thought--what wrestling\nof soul may be involved in attempting to make intuitions communicable.\nMetaphor is undoubtedly a help and those of Bergson are always striking\nand unconventional. Had Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason, given more\nillustrations, many of his readers would have been more enlightened.\n\nBergson's thought, although in many respects it is strikingly original\nand novel, is, nevertheless, the continuation, if not the culmination,\nof a movement in French philosophy which we can trace back through\nBoutroux, Guyau, Lachelier and Ravaisson to Maine de Biran, who died in\n1824. Qui sait, wrote this last thinker, [Footnote: In his Pensees, p.\n213.] tout ce que peut la reflection concentree et s'il n'y a pas un\nnouveau monde interieur qui pourra etre decouvert un jour par quelque\nColomb metaphysicien.\n\nMany of the ideas contained in Bergson's work find parallels in the\nphilosophy of Schopenhauer, as given in his work The World as Will and\nIdea (Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung), particularly his Voluntarism\nand his Intuitionism. The German thinker regarded all great scientific\ndiscoveries as an immediate intuition, a flash of insight, not simply\nthe result of a process of abstract reasoning. Schelling also maintained\na doctrine of intuition as supra-rational.\n\nRavaisson, [Footnote: Ravaisson (1813-1900) wrote De l'habitude, 1832;\nLa metaphysique d'Aristote, 1837; and his Rapport sur la philosophie en\nFrance au xix siecle, 1867. See Bergson's Memoir, 1904.] to whom Bergson\nis indebted for much inspiration, attended the lectures of Schelling\nat Munich in 1835. This French thinker, Ravaisson, has had an important\ninfluence on the general development of thought in France during the\nlatter half of the last century, and much of his work foreshadows\nBergson's thought. He upheld a spiritual activity, manifesting itself\nmost clearly in love and art, while he allowed to matter, to mathematics\nand logic only an imperfect reality. He extolled synthetic views of\nreality rather than analytic ones. We are prevented, he said, from\nrealizing our true selves because of our slavery to habit. To the\nultimate reality, or God, we can attain because of our kinship with that\nreality, and by an effort of loving sympathy enter into union with it\nby an intuition which lies beyond and above the power of intellectual\nsearching. As Maine de Biran foretold the coming of a metaphysical\nColumbus, so Ravaisson, in his famous Rapport sur la philosophic en\nFrance au xix siecle, published in 1867, prophesied as follows: \"Many\nsigns permit us to foresee in the near future a philosophical epoch\nof which the general character will be the predominance of what may\nbe called spiritualistic realism or positivism, having as generating\nprinciple the consciousness which the mind has of itself of an existence\nrecognized as being the source and support of every other existence,\nbeing none other than its action.\"\n\nLachelier, a disciple of Ravaisson, brought out--as has been already\nremarked [Footnote: Page 3.]--the significance of the operations of\nvital forces and of liberty. Guyau, whose brief life ended in 1888\nand whose posthumous work La Genese de I'Idee de Temps was reviewed by\nBergson two years after the publication of his own Time and Free\nWill, laid great stress on the intensification and expansion of life.\nBoutroux, in his work, has insisted upon the fact of contingency.\n\nThese forecasts of Bergson's thought made by men to whom he owes much\nand for whom he personally has the greatest admiration are interesting,\nbut we are not yet able to look upon his work through the medium of\nhistorical perspective. We can however see it as the culmination of\nvarious tendencies in modern French philosophy; first, the effort to\nbring philosophy into the open air of human nature, into immediate\ncontact with life and with problems vital to humanity; secondly, the\nupholding of contingency in all things, thus ensuring human freedom;\nthirdly, a disparagement of purely intellectual constructions as\ntrue interpretations of human life and all existence, coupled with an\ninsistence on an insight that transcends logical formulation.\n\nAs a thinker, Bergson is very difficult to classify. \"All classification\nof philosophies is effected, as a rule, either by their methods or\nby their results, 'empirical' and 'a priori' is a classification by\nmethods; 'realist' and 'idealist' is a classification by results. An\nattempt to classify Bergson's philosophy, in either of these ways, is\nhardly likely to be successful, since it cuts across all the recognized\ndivisions.\" [Footnote: Mr. Bertrand Russell's remark at the opening of\nhis Lecture on The Philosophy of Bergson, before The Heretics, Trinity\nCollege, Cambridge, March 11, 1912.] We find that Bergson cannot be\nput in any of the old classes or schools, or identified with any of the\ninnumerable isms. He brings together, without being eclectic, action and\nreflection, free will and determinism, motion and rest, intellect and\nintuition, subjectivity and externality, idealism and realism, in a\nmost unconventional way. His whole philosophy is destructive of a large\namount of the \"vested interests\" of philosophy. \"We are watching the\nrise of a new agnosticism,\" remarked Dr. Bosanquet. A similar remark\ncame from one of Bergson's own countrymen, Alfred Fouillee, who, in his\nwork Le Mouvement idealist et la reaction contre la science positive,\nexpressed the opinion that Bergson's philosophy could but issue in le\nscepticisme et le nihilisme (p. 206). Bergson runs counter to so many\nestablished views that his thought has raised very wide and animated\ndiscussions. The list of English and American articles in the\nBibliography appended to the present work shows this at a glance. In his\npreface to the volume on Gabriel Tarde, his predecessor in the chair\nof Modern Philosophy at the College de France, written in 1909, we find\nBergson remarking: On mesure la portee d'une doctrine philosophique a la\nvariete des idees ou elle s'epanouit et a la symplicite du principe ou\nelle se ramasse. This remark may serve us as a criterion in surveying\nhis own work. The preceding exposition of his thought is a sufficient\nindication of the wealth of ideas expressed. Bergson is most suggestive.\nMoreover, no philosopher has been so steeped in the knowledge of both\nMind and Matter, no thinker has been at once so \"empirical\" and so\n\"spiritual.\" His thought ranges from subtle psychological analyses and\nminute biological facts to the work of artists and poets, all-embracing\nin its attempt to portray Life and make manifest to us the reality of\nTime and of Change. His insistence on Change is directed to showing that\nit is the supreme reality, and on Time to demonstrating that it is\nthe stuff of which things are made. He is right in attacking the false\nconception of Time, and putting before us la duree as more real; right,\ntoo, in attacking the notion of empty eternity. But although Change and\nDevelopment may be the fundamental feature of reality, Bergson does not\nconvincingly show that it is literally THE Reality, nor do we think\nthat this can be shown. He does not admit that there is any THING that\nchanges or endures; he is the modern Heraclitus; all teaching which\nsavours of the Parmenidean \"one\" he opposes. Yet it would seem that\nthese two old conceptions may be capable of a reconciliation and that\nif all reality is change, there is a complementary principle that Change\nimplies something permanent.\n\nThen, again, we feel Bergson is right in exposing the errors which the\n\"idea of the line,\" the trespassing of space, causes; but he comes very\nnear to denying, in his statements regarding duree pure, any knowledge\nof the past as past; he overlooks the decisive difference between the\n\"no more\" and the \"not yet\" feeling of the child's consciousness, which\nis the germ of our clear knowledge of the past as past, and distinct\nfrom the future.\n\nTo take another of his \"pure\" distinctions, we cannot see any necessity\nfor his formulation of what he terms \"Pure Perception.\" Not only does\nit obscure the relation of Sensation to Perception, but it seems to be\nquite unknown and unknowable and unnecessary as an hypothesis. As to his\n\"Pure\" Memory, there is more to be said. It stands on a different plane\nand seems to be the statement of a very profound truth which sheds light\non many difficult problems attaching to personality and consciousness,\nfor it is the conservation of memories which is the central point in\nindividuality. His distinction between the habit of repeating and the\n\"pure\" memory is a very good and very necessary one. In his study of\nthe relation of Soul and Body, we find some of his most meritorious\nwork--his insistence on the uniqueness of Mind and the futility of\nattempts to reduce it to material terms. His treatment of this question\nis parallel to that of William James in the first part of his Ingersoll\nLecture at Harvard in 1898, when he called attention to \"permissive\"\nor \"transmissive\" function of the brain. Bergson's criticisms of\nParallelism are very valuable.\n\nNo less so are his refutations of both physical and psychological\nDeterminism. Men were growing impatient of a science claiming so\nmuch and yet admittedly unable to explain the really vital factors of\nexistence, of which the free action of men is one of the most important.\nThe value placed on human freedom, on the creative power of human beings\nto mould the future, links Bergson again with James, and it is this\nhumanism which is the supremely valuable factor in the philosophies of\nboth thinkers. This has been pointed out in the consideration of\nthe ethical and political implications of Bergson's Philosophy.\nNevertheless, although his insistence on Freedom and Creative Evolution\nimplies that we are to realize that by our choices and our free acts we\nmay make or mar the issue, and that through us and by us that issue may\nbe turned to good, the good of ourselves and of our fellows, there is\nan ethical lack in Bergson's philosophy which is disappointing. Then,\nas has been remarked in the chapter on Religion, there is the lack of\nteleology in his conception of the Universe; his denial of ANY purpose\nhardly seems to be in harmony with his use of the phrase \"the meaning of\nlife.\"\n\nMuch in Bergson would point to the need for the addition of a philosophy\nof Values. This, however, he does not give us. He shirks the deeper\nproblems of the moral and spiritual life of man. He undervalues,\nindeed ignores, the influence of transcendent ideas or ideals on the\nlife-history of mankind. The study of these might have led him to admit\na teleology of some kind; for \"in the thinking consciousness the order\nof growth is largely determined by choice; and choice is guided by\nvaluation. We are, in general, only partially aware of the ends that we\npursue. But we are more and more seeking to attain what is good, true\nand beautiful, and the order of human life becomes more and more guided\nby the consciousness of these ends.\" [Footnote: Professor Mackenzie:\nElements of Constructive Philosophy, p. 111.] Bergson, however, will not\nultimately be able to evade the work of attempting some reconciliation\nof moral ideas and ideals with their crude and animal origins and\nenvironment, to which they are so opposed and to which they are actually\noffering a very strong opposition. That he himself has seen this is\nproved by the attention he is now giving to the problems of social\nEthics.\n\nThere are four problems which confront every evolutionary theory. These\nconcern the origin of: Matter, Life, Consciousness, and Conscience.\nBergson finds it very difficult to account for the origin of Matter, and\nit is not clear from what he says why the original consciousness should\nhave made Matter and then be obliged to fight against it in order to\nbe free. Then, in speaking of the law of Thermodynamics, he says: \"Any\nmaterial system which should store energy by arresting its degradation\nto some lower level, and produce effects by its sudden liberation, would\nexhibit something in the nature of Life.\" This, however, is not\nvery precise, for this would hold true of thunder-clouds and of many\nmachines. In regard to Instinct, it has been pointed out by several\nexperts that Instinct is not so infallible as Bergson makes out. Of the\nmistakes of Instinct he says little. Dr. McDougall in his great work\nBody and Mind says, when speaking of Bergson's doctrine of Evolution:\n\"Its recognition of the continuity of all Life is the great merit of\nProfessor Bergson's theory of Creative Evolution; its failure to give\nany intelligible account of individuality is its greatest defect.\nI venture to think,\" he continues, \"that the most urgent problem\nconfronting the philosophic biologist is the construction of a theory of\nlife which will harmonize the facts of individuality with the appearance\nof the continuity of all life, with the theory of progressive evolution,\nand with the facts of heredity and biparental reproduction.\" [Footnote:\nMcDougall, Body and Mind, Footnote to p. 377.]\n\nIn the light of such criticism it is important to note that Bergson is\nnow giving attention to the problem of personality which he made the\nsubject of his Gifford Lectures. It is a highly important problem for\nhumanity, and concentration on it seems the demand of the times upon\nthose who feel the urgent need of reflection and who have the ability\nto philosophize. Can philosophy offer any adequate explanation of human\npersonality, its place and purpose in the cosmos? Why should individual\nsystems of energy, little worlds within the world, appear inside the\nunity of the whole, depending on their environment, physical and mental,\nfor much, but yet capable of freedom and unforeseen actions, and\nof creative and progressive development? Further, why should ideals\nconcentrate themselves as it were round such unique centres of\nindeterminateness as these are? On these problems of our origin and\ndestiny, in short, on an investigation of human personality, thinkers\nmust concentrate. Humanity will not be satisfied with systems which\nleave no room for the human soul. Human personality and its experience\nmust have ample place and recognition in any philosophy put forward in\nthese days.\n\nBergson's work is a magnificent attempt to show us how, in the words\nof George Meredith: \"Men have come out of brutishness.\" His theory\nof evolution is separated from Naturalism by his insistence on human\nfreedom and on the supra-consciousness which is the origin of things;\non the other hand, he is separated from the Idealists by his insistence\nupon the reality of la duree. He contrasts profoundly with Absolute\nIdealism. While in Hegel, Mind is the only truth of Nature, in Bergson,\nLife is the only truth of Matter, or we may express it--whereas for\nHegel the truth of Reality is its ideality, for Bergson the truth of\nReality is its vitality.\n\nThe need for philosophical thought, as Bergson himself points out,\n[Footnote: See the closing remarks in his little work on French\nphilosophy, La Philosophie.] is world-wide. Philosophy aims at bringing\nall discussion, even that of business affairs, on to the plane of ideas\nand principles. By looking at things from a truly \"general\" standpoint\nwe are frequently helped to approach them in a really \"generous\" frame\nof mind, for there is an intimate connexion between the large mind and\nthe large heart.\n\nBergson has rendered valuable service in calling attention to the need\nfor man to examine carefully his own inner nature, and the deepest worth\nand significance of his own experiences. For the practical purposes of\nlife, man is obliged to deal with objects in space, and to learn their\nrelations to one another. But this does not exhaust the possibilities\nof his nature. He has himself the reality of his own self-consciousness,\nhis own spiritual existence to consider. Consequently, he can never rest\nsatisfied with any purely naturalistic interpretation of himself. The\nstep of realizing the importance of mental constructions to interpret\nthe impressions of the external world, and the applying them to\npractical needs, was a great advance. Much greater progress, however, is\nthere in man's realization of qualities within himself which transcend\nthe ordinary dead level of experience, the recognition of the spiritual\nvalue of his own nature, of himself as a personality, capable even amid\nthe fluctuations of the world about him, and the illusions of sense\nimpressions, of obtaining a foretaste of eternity by a life that has the\ninfinite and the eternal as its inheritance; \"He hath set eternity\nin the heart of man.\" Man craves other values in life than the purely\nscientific. \"There are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt\nof\" in the philosophies of the materialist or the naturalist. Bergson\nassures us that the future belongs to a philosophy which will take into\naccount THE WHOLE of what is given. Transcending Body and Intellect is\nthe life of the Spirit, with needs beyond either bodily satisfaction\nor intellectual needs craving its development, satisfaction and fuller\nrealization. The man who seeks merely bodily satisfaction lives the life\nof the animal; even the man who poses as an intellectual finds himself\nentangled ultimately in relativity, missing the uniqueness of all\nthings--his own life included. An intuitive philosophy introduces us\nto the spiritual life and makes us conscious, individually and\ncollectively, of our capacities for development. Humanity may say: \"It\ndoth not yet appear what we shall be,\" for man has yet \"something to\ncast off and something to become.\"\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX\n\nBIBLIOGRAPHY\n\nNote on Bibliographies.\n\nPART ONE.\n\nBergson's own writings chronologically arranged.\n\nPART TWO.\n\nSection 1. Books directly on Bergson:\n     (a) French.\n     (b) English and American.\n     (c) Others.\n\nSection 2. Books indirectly on Bergson:\n     (a) French.\n     (b) English and American.\n\nSection 3. Articles: English and American.\n     (a) Signed, under author.\n     (b) Unsigned, under date.\n\nSection 4. English Translations of Bergson.\n\n\n\n\nBIBLIOGRAPHY\n\nA NOTE ON BIBLIOGRAPHIES\n\nThe books and articles which have appeared,\ndealing with Bergson's thought, are truly\nlegion. Three bibliographies have already\nbeen compiled, one in each of the countries: England,\nAmerica and Germany, which are of value and merit\nattention.\n\nIn 1910, Mr. F. L. Pogson, M.A., prefixed to Time\nand Free Will (the English translation of the Essai sur\nles donnees immediates de la conscience) a comprehensive\nbibliography, giving a list of Bergson's own\npublished works, and numerous articles contributed\nto various periodicals, and in addition, lists of articles\nin English, American, French, German and other\nforeign reviews upon Bergson's philosophy. This\nbibliography was partly reprinted in France two years\nlater as an appendix to the little work on Bergson by\nM. Joseph Desaymard, La Pensee de Henri Bergson\n(Paris, Mercure de France, pp. 82, 1912).\n\nThen in 1913, when Bergson paid his visit to America,\nMr. W. Dawson Johnston, the Librarian of the\nColumbia University, New York, presented him with\na copy of a little work of fifty-six pages entitled A\nContribution to a Bibliography of Henri Bergson. This\nexhaustive work was prepared under the direction of\nMiss Isadore G. Mudge, the Reference Librarian, and\nincludes all books published and all periodical literature\nof value by or on Bergson, complete up to 1913.\n\"The bibliography includes\" (to quote the Preface)\n\"90 books and articles by Professor Bergson (including\ntranslations of his works), and 417 books and articles\nabout him. These 417 items represent 11 different\nlanguages divided as follows: French, 170; English,\n159; German, 40; Italian, 19; Polish, 5; Dutch, 3;\nSpanish, 3; Roumanian, 2; Swedish, 2; Russian, 2;\nHungarian, 1.\" For this work Professor John Dewey\nwrote an introduction. It was published by the\nColumbia University Press in 1913, and is the best\nevidence of the world-wide popularity of Bergson and\nthe international interest aroused by his writings.\n\nA more recent compilation, however, which contains\nlater books and articles, is a German one,\nwhich appeared during the war. It is the work of\nWalter Meckauer and forms a valuable part of his book\nDer Intuitionismus und seine Elemente bei Henri Bergson,\npublished in Leipsig in 1917 (Verlag Felix Meiner).\n\nThe bibliography which follows gives more up-to-date\nlists of works than those mentioned, bringing the\nlist of Bergson's writings up to 1919, and it includes\nbooks and articles on Bergson which have appeared\nin the current year (1920). All the important books in\nFrench, English, or German on Bergson are given.\nAs the present work is designed mainly to meet the\nneeds of English readers, lists of foreign articles are\nnot given, but in order to show the wide interest\naroused by Bergson's thought in the English speaking\nworld, and for purposes of reference, a comprehensive\nlist of articles which have appeared in English and\nAmerican periodicals is appended. Finally, a list of\nthe English Translations of Bergson's works is given\nin full under their publishers' names.\n\n\n\nPART ONE\n\nBERGSON'S OWN WRITINGS CHRONOLOGICALLY\nARRANGED\n\n1878 SOLUTION OF A MATHEMATICAL PROBLEM.\n   This, his first published work, appeared when he was\n     nineteen years of age in Annales de Mathematiques.\n     (Brisse et Gerono.) It is of interest, as it shows us an\n     early ability in the study of this science.\n\n1882 LA SPECIALITE.\n   Discours au Lycee d'Angers--a publication of sixteen\n     pages; address given at the prize-giving in August\n     of that year. Angers: Imprimerie Lacheze et Dolbeau.\n\n1884 EXTRAITS DE LUCRECE avec un commentaire, des\n     notes et une \u00e9tude sur la po\u00e9sie, la philosophie, la\n     physique, le texte et la langue de Lucr\u00e8ce.\n     Published Delagrave, Paris, 1884. By 1914 ten editions\n     had appeared. This work is of interest in showing\n     his ability in classical scholarship. Pp. xlvii l59.\n\n1885 LA POLITESSE.\n   Another address. This one was given at Clermont-\n     Ferrand, and was published on August 5, 1885, in the\n     local paper Moniteur du Puy de Dome. It is of interest\n     because in it is to be found his original view of \"Grace\"\n     which he developed later in the Essai sur les donnees\n     immidiates de la conscience (1889).\n\n1886 LA SIMULATION INCONSCIENTE DANS L'ETAT D'HYPNOTISME.\n   His first contribution to the Revue philosophique (Vol.\n     XXII, pp. 525-31). It is interesting to note that correspondence\n     following the appearance of this article led\n     to the inclusion in Myers' Human Personality and its\n     Survival of Bodily Death of a case cited by Bergson\n     (see Vol. I, p. 447), 1901.\n\n1889 QUID ARISTOTELES DE LOCO SENSERIT.\n   A Latin thesis, presented along with the following French\n     thesis, for the degree of Docteur-es-Lettres. Published\n     Alcan, Paris, pp. 82.\n\n1889 ESSAI SUR LES DONNEES IMMEDIATES DE LA CONSCIENCE.\n   French thesis, presented along with the above Latin\n     thesis, for the degree of Docteur-es-Lettres. Published\n     by Alcan, Paris, same year, in La Bibliotheque de philosophie\n     contemporaine (pp viii-185) Eighteen editions\n     called for by 1920.\n\n   English Translation: Time and Free Will, by F. L. Pogson,\n     M.A. Published in 1910 by Swan & Sonnenschein\n     (now George Allen & Unwin) in Library of Philosophy.\n\n1891 LA GENESE DE L'IDEE DE TEMPS.\n   A review, published in the Revue philosophique (Vol. for\n     1891, pp 185-190), of the book by Jean Mane Guyau,\n     La Genese de l'Idee de Temps, with an introduction by\n     Alfred Fouillee which appeared posthumously in 1890,\n     two years after Guyau's death.\n\n1895 LE BON SENS ET LES ETUDES CLASSIQUES.\n   Discours au concours general des lycees et colleges, 1895--\n     another prize-giving address. Published in Revue\n     scientifique, 4th Ser., No. 15, pp. 705-713, June, 1901,\n     and by Delalain, Paris, 1895.\n\n1896 MATIERE ET MEMOIRE.\n     Essai sur la relation du corps avec l'esprit.\n   Bergson's second notable work Published by Alcan,\n     Paris, in Bibliotheque de philosophie contemporaine,\n     pp iii-280. Thirteen editions by 1919.\n   English Translation: Matter and Memory, by Nancy\n     Margaret Paul and W. S. Palmer. Published 1911,\n     Swan & Sonnenschein (now George Allen & Unwin), in\n     the Library of Philosophy.\n\n1897 PRINCIPES DE METAPHYSIQUE ET DE PSYCHOLOGIE\n     D'APRES MONSIEUR PAUL JANET.\n   A critical review in Revue philosophique (Vol. XLIV,\n     Nov., 1897, pp. 525-551).\n\n1900 LE RIRE.\n   Essai sur la signification du comique.\n   First published as two articles in Revue de Paris, 1900\n     (Vol. I, pp. 512-545 and pp. 759-791). Book form,\n     Paris (Alcan), 1901, Bibliotheque de philosophie contemporaine,\n     pp. vii-205. By 1919, seventeen editions.\n   English Translation: Laughter--An Essay on the Meaning\n     of the Comic, by Brereton and Rothwell. Published\n     1911, Macmillan.\n   This essay is based on a lecture given by Bergson while\n     at Clermont-Ferrand, on Feb 18, 1884, a report of which\n     appeared in the local paper Moniteur du Puy de Dome,\n     Feb. 21, 1884.\n\n1900 NOTES SUR LES ORIGINES PSYCHOLOGIES DE\n     NOTRE CROYANCE A LA LOI DE CAUSALITE.\n   Short paper of fifteen pages, read at the First International\n     Congress of Philosophy, held in Paris, August 1 to 5,\n     1900 Published in Bibhotheque du Congres International\n     de Philosophie, being special numbers of the\n     Revue de metaphysique et de morale. Paris (Armand\n     Colin). Discussion reported in the Revue, Sept, 1900,\n     Vol VIII, pp 655-660.\n\n1901 LE REVE.\n   Conf\u00e9rence a l'Institut psychologique international.\n     March 26, 1901 Published, Pans, Bulletin de l'Institut,\n     May, 1901; Revue scientifique, June 8, 1901, and\n     abridged, Revue de philosophie, 1901. As Book, Alcan,\n     1901.\n   Reprinted in the volume of collected papers L'Energie\n     spiriuelle, 1919, pp 91-116.\n   English Translation: Dreams, by Dr Edwin E Slosson.\n     Published first as articles in the Independent of Oct 23\n     and 30, 1913 Book form 1914 Fisher Unwin.\n   Reissued in 1920 in Mind-Energy, English Translation of\n     L'Energie spirituelle.\n\n1901 LE PARALLELISME PSYCHO-PHYSIQUE ET LA METAPHYSIQUE\n     POSITIVE.\n   Bergson's first contribution to the Bulletin de la Societe\n     fran\u00e7aise de philosophie, June, 1901. The important\n     lecture in which he defended the propositions set forth\n     on pages 53-54 of this present work.\n\n1901 L'INCONSCIENT DANS LA VIE MENTALE.\n   Article in the Bulletin de la Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 fran\u00e7aise de philosophie.\n\n1901 LE VOCABULAIRE TECHNIQUE ET CRITIQUE DE\n     LA PHILOSOPHIE.\n   Article in the Bulletin de la Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 fran\u00e7aise de philosophie.\n\n1902 L'EFFORT INTELLECTUEL.\n   Article in the Revue philosophique, Jan, 1902, Vol XLIII,\n     pp 1-27. This article supplements parts of the larger\n     work Mati\u00e8re et M\u00e9moire.\n   Reprinted in 1919 in the volume of collected essays,\n     L'Energie spintuelle, pp 163-202 English Translation\n     in 1920 in volume Mind-Energy (Macmillan).\n\n1902 L'INTELLECT ET LA VOLONTE\n   Discours au Lyc\u00e9e Voltaire, July, 1902 Published\n     Imprimerie Quelquejeu\n\n1902 LE VOCABULAIRE PHILOSOPHIQUE.\n   Collaboration Bulletin de la Societ\u00e9 fran\u00e7aise de philosophie,\n     July, 1902.\n\n1903 RAPPORT SUR LA FONDATION \"CARNOT\" (1902).\n   Published in Jan, 1903, in Seances et travaux de l'Academie\n     des sciences morales et pohtiques. Also Memoires de\n     l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques, 1904.\n\n1903 INTRODUCTION A LA METAPHYSIQUE.\n   Article in Revue de m\u00e9taphysique et de morale. Paris,\n     Jan, 1903.\n   English Translation: An Introduction to Metaphysics, by\n     T. E. Hulme Published in 1913, Macmillan.\n   Valuable as an independent statement of his doctrine of\n     Intuition. Not to be regarded as a mere epitome of the\n     larger works, although it makes a good preface to them.\n   To be included in forthcoming volume of collected essays\n     and lectures.\n\n1903 LA PLACE ET LE CARACTERE DE LA PHILOSOPHIE\n     DANS L'ENSEIGNEMENT SECONDAIRE.\n   Article in the Bulletin de la Societ\u00e9 fran\u00e7aise de philosophie,\n     Feb., 1903, p. 44. An address delivered before the\n     Societ\u00e9 in Dec., 1902.\n\n1903 LA NOTION DE LA LIBERTE MORALE.\n   Article in the Bulletin de la Societ\u00e9 fran\u00e7aise de philosophie,\n     April, 1903, p. 101.\n\n1903 RAPPORT SUR LE PRIX \"HALPHEN.\"\n   Seances de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques,\n     July, 1903. Also Memoir es de l'Academie des sciences\n     morales et politiques, 1904.\n\n1903 LA PHILOSOPHIE SOCIALE DE COURNOT.\n   Article in the Bulletin de la Societ\u00e9 fran\u00e7aise de philosophie,\n     Aug, 1903, p. 229.\n\n1904 RAPPORT SUR UN OUVRAGE DE RUSKIN \"LA\n     BIBLE D'AMIENS.\"\n   Traduction francaise de M. Proust, Seances de l'Acadimie\n     des sciences morales et politiques, 1904.\n\n1904 NOTICE SUR LA VIE ET SUR LES OEUVRES DE\n     FELIX RAVAISSON-MOLLIEN, Lue dans les seances\n     du 20 et 27 fevrier, 1904, de l'Academie des sciences\n     morales et politiques.\n\n   Published in Seances et travaux de l'Academie des sciences\n     morales et politiques, Paris, 1904, and in Memoires de\n     l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques, in 1907.\n\n1904 LE PARALOGISME PSYCHO-PHYSIOLOGIQUE.\n   Lecture given at the Second International Congress of\n     Philosophy held at Geneva from Sept. 4 to 8, 1904.\n     Published in Revue de metaphysique et de morale,\n     numero exceptionel (Nov, 1904).\n   Reprinted in 1919 in the volume of collected essays\n     L'Energie spirituelle, pp. 203-223, under new title\n     Le Cerveau et la pensee: une illusion philosophique.\n     English Translation, 1920 in volume: Mind-Energy.\n\n1904 LES COURBES RESPIRATOIRES PENDANT L'HYPNOSE\n   Article contributed to the Bulletin de l'Institut general\n     psychologique.\n\n1904 PREFACE de la Psychologie Rationelle, d'Emile Lubac.\n   Published at Paris, Alcan. Four pages on Intuition.\n\n1904 RAPPORT SUR UN OUVRAGE DE M. MORTET\n   \"Notes sur le texte des 'Institutiones' de Cassiodore.\"\n   Seances de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques.\n\n1904 VISION DE LUEURS DANS L'OBSCURITE PAR LES\n     SENSITIFS.\n   Bulletin de l'Institut general psychologique, Jan., 1904.\n\n1904 LES RADIATIONS \"N.\"\n   Bulletin de l'Institut general psychologiques, Jan., 1904.\n\n1905 ESPRIT ET MATIERE.\n   Article in the Bulletin de la Societe francaise de philosophie.\n\n1905 THEORIE DE LA PERCEPTION.\n   Article in the Bulletin de la Societe francaise de philosophie,\n     March, 1905, pp. 94-95. An address given in Dec.,\n     1904.\n\n1905 REPONSE A MONSIEUR RAGEOT.\n   Article in Revue philosophique, Vol LX, p 229. Criticism\n     by Monsieur Rageot appears on p. 84. See Ward on\n     this point. Realm of Ends, p. 307.\n\n1905 RAPPORT SUR UN OUVRAGE DE M. OSSIP LOURIE\n     (now Professeur a l'Universite nouvelle de Bruxelles).\n   Le Bonheur et l'intelligence, published by Alcan in 1904.\n     Seances de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques.\n\n1905 RELATION A WILLIAM JAMES ET A JAMES WARD.\n   A Letter on la duree in the Revue philosophique, Aug.,\n     1905. Vol. LX, pp. 229-230\n\n1906 RAPPORT SUR LE CONCOURS POUR LE PRIX\n     \"BORDIN\" (1905).\n   Ayant pour sujet \"Maine de Biran.\" Seances de l'Academie\n     des sciences morales et politiques, 1906: also Memoires\n     de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques, 1907.\n\n1906 RAPPORT SUR UN OUVRAGE DE M. BARDOUX.\n   Essai d'une psychology de l'Angleterre contemporaine\n     (premiere partie).\n   Seances de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques.\n\n1906 RAPPORT SUR UN OUVRAGE DE M LUQUET,\n     entitule:--\n   Idees generales de psychologie.\n   Seances de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques.\n\n1906 RAPPORT SUR UN OUVRAGE DE M. GAULTIER,\n     entitule:--\n   Le Sens de l'art, avec une preface de M. Emile Boutroux.\n   S\u00e9ances de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques.\n\n1907 L'EVOLUTION CREATRICE.\n   Published by Alcan, Paris, in La Biblioth\u00e8que de philosophie\n     contemporaine, 1907 (pp viii   4O3). By 1918 the work\n     was in its twenty-first edition.\n   English Translation: Creative Evolution, by Arthur\n     Mitchell, Ph.D. Published in 1911, Macmillan.\n   This is Bergson's third large work, and his most important,\n     being one of the most profound and original contributions\n     to the philosophieal consideration of the theory\n     of Evolution.\n     \"Un livre comme L'Evolution cr\u00e9atrice n'est pas seulement\n     une oeuvre mais une date celle d'une direction\n     nouvelle imprim\u00e9e a la pens\u00e9e.\" Pierre Imbart de la\n     Tour--in Le Pangermanisme et la philosophie de l'histoire.\n\n1907 ARTICLE SUR \"L'EVOLUTION CREATRICE.\"\n   Revue du Mois, Sept., 1907, pp. 351-354. Bergson's reply\n     to a critic, M. Le Dantec.\n\n1907 VOCABULAIRE PHILOSOPHIQUE.\n   Collaboration. Bulletin de la Societ\u00e9 fran\u00e7aise de philosophie,\n     Aug., 1907.\n\n1907 RAPPORT SUR LE CONCOURS POUR LE PRIX\n     \"LE DISSEZ DE PENANRUN.\"\n   Seances de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques,\n     1907. PP. 91-102. Also in Memoires de l'Academie des\n     sciences morales et politiques, 1909.\n\n1907 RAPPORT SUR UN OUVRAGE DE M. BARDOUX.\n   Psychologie de l'Angleterre contemporaine (Deuxieme\n     partie).\n   Seances de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques.\n\n1908 REPONSE A UNE ENQUETE INTERNATIONALE\n     SUR LA QUESTION RELIGIEUSE.\n   Arranged by the Mercure de France, and published in Paris\n     in the book La Question Religieuse, by Frederic Charpin.\n     Bergson's answer is less than a page.\n\n1908 L'INFLUENCE DE SA PHILOSOPHIE SUR LES\n     ELEVES DES LYCEES.\n   Article in the Bulletin de la Societe francaise de philosophie,\n     Jan., 1908 Address delivered before the Societ\u00e9 in\n     the previous Nov.\n\n1908 LETTRE SUR L'INFLUENCE DE SA PHILOSOPHIE\n     SUR LES ELEVES DES LYCEES\n   Appended to Binet's L'Evolution de l'ensignement philosophique,\n     in L'Ann\u00e9e psychologique, 1908, pp. 230-231.\n\n1908 LE SOUVENIR DU PRESENT ET LA FAUSSE RECONAISSANCE.\n   Article in the Revue philosophique, Dec, 1908, pp 561-\n     593.\n   Reprited in 1919 in the volume of collected essays\n     L'Energie spirituelle, pp 117-161 English Translation\n     in volume: Mind-Energy. Macmillan, 1920.\n\n1908 L'EVOLUTION DE L'INTELLIGENCE GEOMETRIQUE.\n   Article in the Revue de metaphysique et de morale, Jan,\n     1908, pp. 28-33. Another reply to a critic, Monsieur\n     Borel.\n\n1908 VOCABULAIRE PHILOSOPHIQUE.\n   Collaboration. Bulletin de la Societe francaise de philosophie,\n     Aug, 1908. On the words \"immediat\" and\n     \"inconnaissable\"\n\n1908 RAPPORT SUR UN OUVRAGE DE M. MERLANT,\n     ayant pour sujet \"Senancour\"\n   Seances de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques.\n\n1908 RAPPORT SUR UN OUVRAGE DE M. BAZAILLAS,\n     entitule:--\n   Musique et inconscience.\n   Seances de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques.\n\n1908 RAPPORT SUR UN OUVRAGE DE M. BOIRAC,\n     entitule:--\n   La psychologie inconnue.\n   Seances de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques.\n\n1908 RAPPORT SUR UN OUVRAGE DE M. NAYRAC.\n   La Fontaine.\n   Seances de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques.\n\n1909 PREFACE A \"GABRIEL TARDE\"\n   A volume of the collection Les Grands Philosophes, published\n     by Louis Michaud, Paris.\n   This book was written by Tarde's sons. It is interesting\n     to note that Tarde was Bergson's predecessor in the\n     Chair of Modern Philosophy at the College de France.\n   The Preface (pp. 5 and 6) treats of Causality\n   A volume of this same series devoted to Bergson himself\n     appeared in 1910, by Rene Gillouin.\n\n1909 RAPPORT SUR UN OUVRAGE DE M. MEYERSON,\n     entitule:--\n   Identiti et realite.\n   Seances de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques.\n\n1909 RAPPORT SUR UN OUVRAGE DE M. HENRI\n     DELACROIX.\n   Etudes d'histoire et de psychologie du mysticisme.\n   Seances de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques.\n\n1909 L'ORGANISATION DES CONGRES DE PHILOSOPHIE.\n   Article in the Bulletin de la Societe francaise de philosophie,\n     Jan., 1909.\n\n1909 VOCABULAIRE PHILOSOPHIQUE.\n   Collaboration Bulletin de la Societe francaise de philosophie,\n     Aug., 1909.\n\n1910 RAPPORT SUR UN OUVRAGE DE M. WENDELL.\n   La France d'aujourd hui.\n   Seances de l'Academie des sciences morales et politques.\n\n1910 RAPPORT SUR LE CONCOURS POUR LES PRIX\n     \"CHARLES L'EVEQUE.\"\n   Seances de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques.\n\n1910 JAMES ET BERGSON.\n   Remarques a propos d'un article de Mr. W. B. Pitkin,\n     intitule James and Bergson, or, Who is against Intellect?\n   Mr. Pitkin's article appeared in the Journal of Philosophy,\n     Psychology, and Scientific Methods on April 28, 1910.\n     Bergson's reply appeared in the same journal on July\n     7th of the same year.\n\n1910 NEW INTRODUCTION WRITTEN IN ENGLISH FOR\n     THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF MATIERE\n     ET MEMOIRE.\n   This new introduction was subsequently translated\n     into French and prefaced to the next French edition of\n     Matiere et Memoire which appeared. This was the\n     seventh edition. The English translation by Nancy\n     Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer was published in\n     1911 (see note under date 1896).\n   The new introduction called attention mainly to the\n     change in orthodox opinion regarding aphasia which\n     had come about since the original publication of the\n     work in French in 1896--a change of view which only\n     served to make Bergson's opinions appear less novel and\n     more probable.\n\n1910 RAPPORT SUR UN OUVRAGE DE M. DAURIAC.\n   Le musicien-poete Wagner: etude de psychologie musicale.\n   Seances de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques.\n\n1910 RAPPORT SUR UN OUVRAGE DE M. JOUSSAIN.\n     entitule:--\n   Le Fondement psychologique de la morale.\n   Seances de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques.\n\n1910 L'INCONSCIENT DANS LA VIE MENTALE\n   Remarques a propos d'une these soutenue par M.\n     Dwelshauvers (Now Belgian Professor.) An address\n     delivered to the Societe in the previous November.\n     Published in the Bulletin de la Societe francaise de\n     philosophie, Feb., 1910. Here Bergson has another encounter\n     with a critic. As far back as 1901 Bergson contributed to\n     this same periodical an article bearing this title. M.\n     Georges Dwelshauvers criticized Bergson's views in his articles--\n\n   \"Raison et Intuition,\" \u00e9tude sur la philosophie de M. Bergson,\n     in La Belgique artistique et litteraire, Nov.-Dec., 1905,\n     and April, 1906.\n\n   \"Bergson et la methode intuitive,\" in the Revue des Mois,\n     Sept., 1907.\n\n   \"De l'intuition dans l'acte de l'esprit,\" in the Revue de\n     m\u00e9taphysique et de morale, Jan., 1908.\n\n\n1911 L'INTUITION PHILOSOPHIQUE.\n   Paper read at the Fourth International Congress of Philosophy,\n     held at Bologna, April 5 to 11, 1911. Published in Nov. in\n     Revue de m\u00e9taphysique et de morale (Numero exceptionel),\n     pp. 809-827. To reappear in forthcoming second volume of\n     collected papers.\n\n\n1911 LA PERCEPTION DU CHANGEMENT.\n   Deux conf\u00e9rences faites a l'Universit\u00e9 d'Oxford, les 26 et\n     27 Mai, 1911.\n     Published in original French by the Clarendon Press,\n     Oxford, in 1911. (Out of print now.) To reappear in\n     forthcoming second volume of collected essays and lectures.\n\n1911 LIFE AND CONSCIOUSNESS.\n   The Huxley Lecture delivered at University of Birmingham,\n     May 29, 1911. Published in The Hibbert Journal\n     for Oct., 1911, Vol X, pp. 24-44, and also in the volume\n     Huxley Memorial Lectures in 1914.\n   In a revised and somewhat developed form this appeared\n     in 1919 in the volume of collected essays and lectures\n     L'Energie spirituelle, pp. 1-29 (Mind-Energy, 1920).\n\n\n1911 VERITE ET REALITE\n   Introduction of sixteen pages written for the French\n     Translation of William James' Pragmatism. Translated\n     by Le Brun. Published Flammarion, Paris.\n\n1911 LES REALITES QUE LA SCIENCE N'ATTEINT PAS.\n   Article in Foi et Vie (French Protestant Review).\n\n1911 LA NATURE DE L'AME.\n   Four lectures delivered at the University of London, Oct.,\n     1911. Up to the time of writing, these lectures have\n     not been published Reports are to be found, however,\n     in The Times, Oct 21, 23, 28 and 30, 1911 (For definite\n     information regarding these lectures, I am indebted\n     to Mr. Reginald Rye, Librarian of the University of\n     London, to the University of London Press, and to\n     Professor Bergson himself.)\n\n1912 L'AME ET LE CORPS.\n   Conf\u00e9rence faite pour la Societ\u00e9 Foi et Vie. Published\n     in Le Mat\u00e9rialisme actuel, Paris, 1913, Flammarion.\n   During the year 1912, the Paris Review Foi et Vie arranged\n     a series of lectures on Materialism. These were given\n     in Paris, alternating with a series on Pascal, likewise\n     arranged by Foi et Vie, under the direction of in Paul\n     Doumergue, chief editor This was the sixth year in\n     which such courses of lectures had been arranged by\n     this Review. The most of these lectures were subsequently\n     published in the Review itself, but the 1912\n     lectures on Materialism were issued separately in a\n     volume entitled Le Materialisme actuel, published in\n     the Bibliotheque de philosophie scientifique, with a preface\n     by in Paul Doumergue. Two illustrious names headed\n     the list of lecturers--those of Henri Bergson and the\n     late Henri Poincare. Bergson's lecture bears the title\n     L'Ame et le Corps, pp. 7-48. (I am told by Prof.\n     Bergson that it is a Summary of the four unpublished\n     London lectures.)\n   This was reprinted in 1919 in L'Energie spirituelle, pp.\n     31-63 (Mind-Energy, 1920).\n\n1912 PREFACE written for the French Translation of Eucken's\n     Der Sinn und der Wert des Lebens\n   Le sens et la valeur de la vie--translated by M. A.\n     Hullet and A. Leicht. Published, Paris, Alcan.\n\n1912 LETTER ON HIS PHILOSOPHY IN RELATION TO THEOLOGY.\n   Written to Father de Tonquedec, S J, in the Jesuit periodical\n     Les Etudes of Feb 20, 1912,Vol CXXX, pp 514-515.\n     Father de Tonquedec had criticized Bergson's philosophy\n     from the point of view of Roman Catholic Theology.\n     The following are amongst his criticisms:\n   La Notion de la veritt dans la philosophie nouvelle, Paris,\n     1908.\n   Comment interpreter l'ordre du monde a-propos du dernier\n     ouvrage de in Bergson, Paris, Beauchesne, 1908.\n   Bergson est-il moniste? Article in Les Annales de\n     philosophie chretienne, March, 1912.\n   Dieu dans l'Evolution cr\u00e9atrice, Beauchesne, 1912, which\n     gives two letters from Bergson\n\n1913 FANTOMES DE VIVANTS ET RECHERCHE PSYCHIQUE\n   Presidential address to the British Society for Psychical\n     Research. Delivered at the Aeolian Hall, London,\n     May 28, 1913. Published report in the Times, May 29,\n     1913; and of the New York Times, Sept 27,1914,\n     Proceedings of the Society, Vol 1914-15, pp 157-175.\n     This address was reprinted in 1919 in L'Energie\n     spirituelle, pp 65-89. English Translation: Mind-\n     Energy, 1920.\n\n1914 LETTER TO \"LE FIGARO.\"\n   Letter on his Philosophy generally, March 7, 1914.\n\n1914 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY.\n   The Gifford Lectures at Edinburgh University One\n     course of eleven lectures, given in the Spring. The\n     Autumn course was abandoned owing to the War.\n     These lectures have not yet been published. (For information\n     regarding them I am indebted to Mr. F. C.\n     Nicholbon, Librarian of the University of Edinburgh,\n     and to Prof. Bergson himself.)\n\n1914 LA FORCE QUI S'USE ET CELLE QUI NE S'USE PAS.\n   Article written for the famous organ of the poilus. Bulletin\n     des Armees de la Republique francaise, Nov. 4, 1914.\n\n1914 HOMMAGE AU ROI ALBERT ET AU PEUPLE BELGE.\n   Contribution to King Albert's Book, issued by the\n     Daily Telegraph.\n\n1915 LA SIGNIFICATION DE LA GUERRE\n   Collection of War speeches and writings in the series\n     Pages actuelles, 1914-15. Published by Bloud et Gay,\n     Paris, 1915. Small volume of 47 pages Contains:\n   1. Discours prononce a l'Academie des Sciences morales\n     et politiques le 12 dec, 1914, pp 7-29. This was a\n     Presidential address La Signification de la Guerre.\n   2. Allocution prononcee a l'Academie le 16 Jan, 1915,\n     a l'occasion de l'installation de M. Alexandre Ribot\n     au fauteuil de la presidence (in succession to Bergson).\n     Reported only in part, pp 33-35.\n   3. La force qui s'use et celle qui ne s'use pas, pp 39-42.\n     Reprinted from the pages of the Bulletin des Armees\n     de la, Republique francaise, Nov. 4, 1914.\n   4. Hommage au Roi Albert et au Peuple Belge, pp 45-46.\n     Reprinted from King Albert's Book, War publication of\n     Daily Telegraph.\n   Items Nos 1 and 3 have been translated into English\n     as The Meaning of the War, with preface by Dr. H.\n     Wildon Carr. Published 1915, Fisher Unwin. No. 1\n     appeared in The Hibbert Journal in English, as \"Life\n     and Matter at War,\" April, 1915, pp. 465-475; and in the\n     American paper The Living Age on July 31, 1915, pp. 259-264\n\n1915 AUTOUR DE LA GUERRE\n   A discourse on the Evolution of German Imperialism,\n     delivered before the Academie des Sciences morales et\n     politiques. Published in La Revue, Feb.-March, 1915,\n     pp. 369-377.\n\n1915 LA PHILOSOPHIE.\n   Ouvrage publi\u00e9 sous les auspices du ministre de\n     l'Instruction publique. A delightful little work of 27 pages.\n     Reprinted from La Scienc\u00e9 fran\u00e7aise, Tome I.\n   Published in the series of that name by Larousse, Pans,\n     and costing fifty centimes. It is a review of French\n     Philosophy, and contains a bibliography, and portraits\n     of the philosophers, Descartes, Malebranche, Pascal,\n     and Renouvier.\n\n1916 LETTRE A PROF. HOFFDING.\n   Published in the original French in the French edition\n     of the Danish Professor's Lectures on Bergson; La\n     Philosophie de Bergson expose et critique par H.\n     Hoffding, Professeur a l'Universit\u00e9 de Copenhague.\n     Traduit d'apr\u00e8s l'\u00e9dition danoise avec un avant-\n     propos par Jacques de Coussange et suivi d'une lettre\n     de M. Bergson \u00e0 l'auteur. Alcan, Paris. The letter, pp.\n     l57-165.\n\n1917 PREFACE A \"LA MISSION FRANCAISE EN\n   AMERIQUE 24 AVRIL-13 MAI, 1917.\"\n   Compiled by M. R. Viviani, published, Flammarion,\n     Paris, 1917, pp 264. Bergson's Preface is seven pages.\n\n1918 DISCOURS DE RECEPTION.\n   Bergson's address on being received by the Academy.\n     On M. Ollivier. Published by Perrin, Paris. Seance de\n     l'Academie francaise, Jan. 24, 1918, pp. 44. (The work\n     also contains the reply to Bergson by the Director of\n     the Academy, M. Rene Doumic, pp. 45-75.)\n\n1919 L'ENERGIE SPIRITUELLE (Essais et Conferences).\n   Felix Alcan's Bibliotheque de philosophie contemporaire,\n     pp. 227.\n   This is a volume of collected essays and lectures of which\n     three editions appeared in 1919. It deals with the\n     concept of mental force, with problems of the interaction\n     of mind and body, and with Bergson's view of \"tension\"\n     and \"detension\" in relation to matter and mind.\n   With a brief foreword, explaining that this is the first of a\n     couple of volumes of collected essays, there are seven\n     papers:\n       1. \"La Conscience et la Vie,\" pp. 1-29. A revised and\n         developed version of \"Life and Consciousness,\" the\n         Huxley Lecture of 1911.\n       2. \"L'Ame et le Corps,\" pp. 31-63. Reprinted from\n         Le Materialisme actuel. Lecture given in 1912.\n       3. \"Fantomes de Vivants et Recherche Psychique,\"\n         pp. 65-89. Presidential address of 1913.\n       4. \"Le Reve,\" pp. 91-116. The lecture of 1901.\n       5. \"Le Souvenir du present et la fausse reconnaissance,\"\n         pp. 117-161. Reprint from Revue philosophique of\n         article of 1908.\n       6. \"L'Effort intellectuel,\" pp. 163-202. Reprint from\n         Revue philosophique of article of 1902.\n       7. \"Le Cerveau et la Pensee: une illusion philosophique,\"\n         pp. 203-223. The Lecture given at the International\n         Congress at Geneva, formerly printed in the Revue de\n         metaphysique et de morale as \"Le Paralogisme psycho-\n         physiologique.\"\n       English Translation: MIND-ENERGY, by Dr. Wildon Carr.\n         Macmillan, 1920.\n\n   The forthcoming second volume of collected essays on The\n     Method of Intuitional Philosophy will contain inter alia:\n     Introduction on \"Method.\"\n   Reprint of \"L'Intuition philosophique.\" Introduction a la\n     metaphysique, \"La Perception du Changement.\"\n\nThree articles, bearing the titles \"Memoire et reconaissance,\"\n\"Perception et matiere\" and \"L'Idee de neant,\" which appeared\nrespectively in Revue philosophique (1896), Revue de metaphysique\net de morale (1896) and Revue philosophique (1906) have been\nomitted from their places in the above list because they were\nsubsequently incorporated into the larger works Matiere et\nMemoire and L'Evolution creatrice.\n\n\n\nBIBLIOGRAPHY\n\nPART TWO\n\nBOOKS AND ARTICLES ON BERGSON\n\nSection I. Books directly on Bergson\n\n(a) French Publications.\n\nBENDA, Julien.\n Le Bergsonisme ou une Philosophie de la Mobilit\u00e9. Paris, Mercure\n   de France. 1912.\n\n Une Philosophie path\u00e9tique. Cahiers de la Quinzaine. Paris,\n   1913, Ser. 15, Cah 2.\n\n Sur le succes du Bergsonisme. 1914. Incorporates Une\n   Philosophie path\u00e9tique.\n\nBERTHELOT, R.\n Un Romantisme Utilitaire. Paris, 1911. Vol. 2, Le Pragramatisme\n   chez Bergson.\n\n Le pragmatisme de Bergson. Paris, Alcan, 1913.\n\nCOIGNET, Clarisse.\n De Kant a Bergson. Reconciliation de la religion et de la science\n   dans un spiritualisme nouveau. Paris, 1911 (Alcan).\n   Concluding 60 pages deal with Bergson.\n\nDESAYMARD, Joseph.\n La Pensee d'Henri Bergson. In series Les Hommes et les Idees.\n   Paris, 1912. Mercure de France. Pp. 82. With portrait\n   and bibliography (reprint of Mr. Pogson's list).\n\nDWELSHAUVERS, Georges.\n Raison et intuition. Etudes sur la philosophie de Bergson, 1906.\n\nFARGES.\n Theorie fondamentale de l'Acte et de la Puissance avec la critique\n   de la philosophie nouvelle de MM. Bergson et Le Roy. Paris,\n   1909. (Etudes philosophiques, No. 1.)\n\n La philosophie de M. Bergson. Expose et critique. Paris, 1912.\n\nFOUILLEE, Alfred.\n La Pensee et les nouvelles ecoles anti-intellectuelles. Paris, 1910.\n\nGAGNEBIN, S.\n La philosophie de l'intuition. 1912. Saint Blaise, 'Foyer\n   Solidariste. Pp. 240. Mainly on Le Roy, Bergson's disciple, but a\n   third of the book deals with the master.\n\nGILLOUIN, Rene.\n Bergson: Choix de textes, etudes sur l'OEuvre, notices biographiques\n   et bibliographiques. Paris, 1910, Michaud. Series Les\n   Grands Philosophes. Illustrated. Pp. 220.\n\n Essay of 30 pages on Bergson's philosophy. Extracts from\n   Bergson's works. Pp. 39-220.\n\n La Philosophie de M. Bergson. Paris, 1911, Grasset. Pp. 187.\n\nGRANDJEAN, F.\n Une revolution dans la philosophie, La Doctrine de Bergson.\n   Atar, Geneva, 2nd ed., 1916.\n\nLE ROY, Edouard.\n Une Philosophie nouvelle: Henri Bergson. Paris, 1912.\n   English Translation: A New Philosophy: Henri Bergson, by\n   Vincent Benson. 1913. Williams and Norgate. Pp. 235.\n   The author of this work is Bergson's famous pupil, who now\n   lectures in his place at the College de France.\n\nMARITAIN, J.\n La philosophie bergsonienne. Paris, Riviere, 1914. Pp. 477.\n\nMEUNIER, D.\n Lecon de Bergson. 1914.\n\nPEGUY, Charles.\n Note Sur M. Bergson et la philosophie bergsonienne. Paris.\n   (Bourgeois). Cahiers de la Quinzaine. Pp. 101.\n\nPENIDO, Dr. M. T. L.\n La methode intuitive de Bergson. Essai critique. Atar, Geneva,\n   and Alcan, Paris, 1918, pp. 220.\n\nSEGOND, J.\n L'Intuition bergsonienne. Alcan, Paris, 1912 and 1913. Pp. 157.\n\n\n(b) English and American Publications\n\nBALSILLIE, David.\n An Examination of Professor Bergson's Philosophy. 1912. Williams\n   and Norgate. Pp. 228.\n\nCARR, Dr. H. Wildon.\n Henri Bergson: The Philosophy of Change, 1912. Jack,\n   \"The People's Books.\" Pp. 91. Good brief sketch. 1919.\n   Jack and Nelson. Second revised edition. Pp. 126.\n\n The Philosophy of Change: A study of the Fundamental Principle\n   of the Philosophy of Bergson. 1914. Macmillan. Pp. 216.\n\n Time and History in Contemporary Philosophy, with special\n   reference to Bergson and Croce. Proceedings of British\n   Academy, 1918. Pp. 20. Separately, Oxford University Press.\n\nCUNNINGHAM, Gustave W., Dr.\n Study in the Philosophy of Bergson. 1916. Longman. New\n   York. Pp. 212.\n\nDODSON, G. R., Dr.\n Bergson and the Modern Spirit. An Essay in Constructive\n   Thought. 1914. Lindsey Press. Pp. 295.\n\nELLIOT, Hugh S. R.\n Modern Science and the Illusions of Professor Bergson. 1912.\n   Preface by Sir Ray Lankester. Longman, New York, and\n   1913, Longman, London. Pp. 257. Very hostile to Bergson,\n   indeed contemptuously or bitterly so.\n\nGERRARD, Father Thomas.\n Bergson: an Exposition and Criticism from the point of view of\n   Saint Thomas Aquinas. 1913. Sands & Co. Pp. 208.\n\nHERMANN, Mrs. E.\n Bergson and Eucken. Their significance for Christian Thought.\n   1912. James Clark & Co. Pp. 224.\n\nHOFFDING, Prof Harald.\n Six Lectures on Bergson. Delivered 1913. Published in the\n   volume Modern Philosophers, Macmillan, 1915. Pp. 227-302.\n   Translated by Alfred C. Mason.\n\nHOUGH, Dr. Lynn H.\n The Quest of Wonder. Studies in Bergson and Theology.\n\nJOHNSTON, W. (with MISS I. MUDGE).\n A Contribution to a Bibliography of Henri Bergson. 1913.\n   Columbia University Press, New York. Pp. 56. For this\n   pamphlet, Professor John Dewey has written an introduction.\n\nKALLEN, H. M.\n William James and Henri Bergson: A Study of Contrasting\n   Theories of Life. 1914. Chicago University Press. Pp. 248.\n\nKITCHIN, Darcy B.\n Bergson for Beginners: A Summary of his Philosophy. 1913.\n   Geo. Allen and Unwin. Pp. 309.\n\nLE ROY, Edouard.\n A New Philosophy: Henri Bergson. 1913. Williams and Norgate.\n   English Translation by V. Benson of Une Nouvelle\n   philosophie. Pp. 235.\n\nLIBBY, M. F.\n The Continuity of Bergson's Thought. 1912. University of\n   Colorado Studies, Vol. 9, No. 4. Pp. 147-202.\n\nLINDSAY, A. D.\n The Philosophy of Bergson. 1911. Dent. Pp. 247.\n\nLOVEJOY.\n Bergson and Romantic Evolutionism. 1914. University of\n   California Press, Berkeley. Pp. 61.\n\nMILLER, Lucius Hopkins.\n Bergson and Religion. 1916. Holt & Co., New York. (Out of\n   print.)\n\nMITCHELL, Dr. Arthur.\n Studies in Bergson's Philosophy. 1914. Kansas University\n   Humanistic Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2. Pp. 115.\n\nPECKHAM, G. W.\n The Logic of Bergson's Philosophy. (Time and Free Will\n   compared with Matter and Memory.) 1917. Archives of Philosophy,\n   Columbia University Press, New York, No. 8. Pp. 68.\n\nRUHE AND PAUL.\n Henri Bergson: An Account of his Life and Philosophy. 1914.\n   Macmillan. Pp. 245 (With portrait.)\n\nRUSSELL, Hon. Bertrand.\n The Philosophy of Bergson. 1914. London, Macmillan for Bowes,\n   Cambridge. Pp. 36. Lecture to The Heretics, Cambridge,\n   March 11, 1912. Contains reply by Dr. Wildon Carr, and\n   rejoinder by Mr. Russell.\n\nSAIT, Bernard Una.\n The Ethical Implications of Bergson's Philosophy. 1914. Columbia\n   University Contributions to Philosophy and Psychology. New\n   York Science Press. Pp. 183.\n\nSEWELL, Frank, Dr.\n Is the Universe Self-Centred or God-Centred? 1913. Examination\n   of the systems of Eucken and Bergson.\n   Presidential Address to Swedenborg Scientific Association,\n   Philadelphia, USA. Published by the Association. Pp. 13.\n\nSHASTRI, Prabhu Datta.\n The Conception of Freedom in Hegel, Bergson, and Indian\n   Philosophy. 1914. Address before the Calcutta Philosophical\n   Society, March 14, 1913. Published Albion Press, Calcutta.\n   Pp. 26.\n\nSOLOMON, Joseph.\n Bergson. 1911. Constable, in Series Philosophies Ancient and\n   Modern. Pp. 128.\n\nSTEWART, Dr. J. M'Kellar.\n A Critical Exposition of Bergson's Philosophy. 1911. Macmillan\n   Pp. 295.\n\nWILM, Emil C.\n Henri Bergson: A Study in Radical Evolution. (1914.) Sturgis\n\n\n\n\nHOOGVILD, J.E.H.J.\n De Niewe Wysbegeerte: Een studie over H. Bergson. 1911.\n\nJACOBSON, Malte.\n Henri Bergson's Intuitionsfilosofi.\n\nLEVI, A.\n La filosofia della contingenza. Firenze, Seeber, 1905. In\n   L'indeterminismo nella filosofita francese contemporanea.\n\nLARSSON, Prof. Hans.\n Intuitionsprobleme.\n\nOLGIATI, F.\n La Filosofia di Enrico Bergson, 1914.\n\nPAPINI, Giovanni.\n Stroncature. Firenze, 1918. Libreria della voce. Section on\n   Bergson and Croce (in French), written in 1914. Pp. 51-56.\n\nRUHE, Algot.\n Henri Bergson: Tankesattet. 1914. Swedish volume (similar to\n   his English work in conjunction with Miss Paul). Stockholm.\n\n\nSection II. Books dealing Indirectly with Bergson\n\n(a) French Publications\n\nCHAUMEIX, A.\n Pragmatisme et Modernisme. Paris, Alcan, 1909\n\nDWELSHAUVERS, Georges.\n La Synth\u00e8se mentale. Alcan, Paris, 1908.\n\nFOUILLEE, Alfred.\n Le Mouvement id\u00e9aliste et la R\u00e9action centre la Science positive,\n   1896. Paris, Alcan.\n\nIMBART DE LA TOUR, Pierre.\n Le Pangermanisme et la Philosophie de L'Histoire. Letter to\n   Bergson, published in book form, 1916. Reprinted from Pour\n   la verite, 1914-15. Perrin. Pp. 75. This letter was occasioned\n   by Bergson's writings on the War.\n\nLANESSAN, J. de.\n Transformation et Cr\u00e9ationisme. 1914. Paris, Alcan.\n\nPIAT, Clodius.\n Insuffisance des Philosophies de L'Intuition. 1908. Paris,\n   Plon-Nourrit. Pp. 319.\n\nSOREL, Georges.\n Reflexions sur la Violence. This has been translated into English\n   by T.E. Hulme, and published by Geo. Allen and Unwin,\n   Reflections on Violence.\n   Les Illusions du Progres.\n   Le Mouvement socialists. Collected volumes of the periodical.\n\nWILBOIS.\n Devoir et Dur\u00e9e. 1912. Paris, Alcan. Pp. 408.\n\n(b) English and American Publications\n\nALIOTTA.\n The Idealistic Reaction against Science 1914. Macmillan.\n   English translation from Italian by W. Agnes McCaskill.\n\nBENNETT, W.\n The Ethical Aspects of Evolution Regarded as the Parallel Growth\n   of Opposite Tendencies. 1908. Clarendon Press, Oxford.\n\nBJORKMAN, Edwin.\n Voices of Tomorrow. Critical studies of the New Spirit in\n   Literature. London, Grant Richards. See Section The New\n   Mysticism, Part 3, Its Philosopher, Henri Bergson, pp. 205-223.\n\nBOSANQUET, B.\n The Principle of Individuality and Value. 1912. Macmillan.\n   The Gifford Lectures for 1911. The Value and Destiny of\n   the Individual. Gifford Lectures, 1912.\n\nBURNS, Delisle.\n Political Ideals. Clarendon Press, Oxford Discusses in\n   concluding pages the rational element in politics.\n\nCALDWELL, Dr. Wm.\n Pragmatism and Idealism 1913. Macmillan, New York, and\n   A. and C. Black, London. Chap. (9) is entitled \"Pragmatism\n   and Idealism in the Philosophy of Bergson,\" pp. 234-261.\n\nCARR, H. Wildon.\n The Problem of Truth. Jack. \"People's Books.\"\n\nDREVER, Dr James.\n Instinct in Man. 1917. Cambridge University Press.\n\nFREUD.\n Wit and its Relation to the Unconscious. Fisher Unwin.\n   Remarks on Bergson's Le Rire, pp. 301 and 360.\n\nGRUBB.\n The Religion of Experience. Chapter IV. Bergson and Intuition.\n\nHARLEY, J. H.\n Syndicalism. \"People's Books.\"\n\nHARPER, Dr. J. Wilson.\n Christian Ethics and Social Progress. 1912. Contains chapter\n   on Bergson.\n\nHOCKING.\n Meaning of God in Human Experience. Yale University Press. 1912.\n\nHUGEL, Baron Frednch von.\n Eternal Life: its Implications and Applications. T. and T.\n   Clark. 1912. Deals with Bergson's view of duree and of\n   Liberty, pp. 288-302.\n\nHUNT, Harriet E.\n The Psychology of Auto-Education. Based on the interpretation\n   of Intellect, given by Bergson in his Creative Evolution\n   Illustrated in the work of Maria Montessori. 1912. Bardeen,\n   Syracuse, New York.\n\nINGE, Very Rev Dr W.R.\n The Philosophy of Plotmus. Gifford Lectures, published 1919.\n   These lectures on the great Neo-platonist to whom Bergson\n   owes not a little, contain important discussions of Bergson's\n   views on Time, Consciousness and Change.\n\nJACKS, L.P.\n Alchemy of Thought. Holt & Co, New York. 1911.\n\nJAMES, William\n A Pluralistic Universe (Hibbert Lectures) 1909. Lectures 5\n   and 6, pp 181-273.\n\nJEVONS, Dr F.B.\n Personality. Methuen, 1913. Especially Chap. 3 on Bergson,\n   pp 78-124.\n\nJOHNSON, F.H.\n God in Evolution. A Pragmatic Study of Theology.. Longman. 1911.\n\nJOHNSTONE, Dr James\n The Philosophy of Biology. 1914. Cambridge University Press.\n\nJONES, Prof. Tudor.\n The Spiritual Ascent of Man. 1916. University of London Press,\n   Chapter (4) Intellect and Intuition.\n\nLAIRD, John\n Problems of the Self. Shaw Lectures at Edinburgh for 1914.\n   1917. Macmillan.\n\nLODGE, Sir Oliver.\n Modern Problems. Methuen, 1912. Balfour and Bergson, pp.\n   189-210 (Chap. 18). Reprint of Article in Hibbert Journal\n   (1912).\n\nMACKENZIE, Prof.\n Elements of Constructive Philosophy. 1918. Geo Allen & Unwin.\n\nMARSHALL\n Consciousness. On Revival and Memory. P. 436.\n\nMELLOR, Dr Stanley A.\n Religion as Affected by Modern Science and Philosophy. 1914.\n   Lindsey Press. Devotes a section to the consideration of\n   Bergson and Religion, pp 147-166.\n\nMcCABE, Joseph.\n Principles of Evolution. Collins--Nation's Library. Very\n   hostile to Bergson, pp 247-253.\n\nMcDOUGALL, William.\n Body and Mind 1911. Methuen & Co.\n\nMORGAN, C. Lloyd.\n Instinct and Experience. Methuen. 1912.\n\nPERRY, R.B.\n Present Philosophical Tendencies. 1912. Longmans. U.S.A.\n\nPRINGLE-PATTISON, A.S.\n The Idea of God. Gifford Lectures, 1912-13. Lecture (19) on\n   Bergson, pp. 366-385.\n\nRUSSELL, Bertrand\n Our Knowledge of the External World. 1914. Open Court Publishing\n   Co. Chapter (8) on Cause and Free Will, criticizes Bergson,\n   pp. 229-242.\n The Principles of Social Reconstruction. Geo. Allen & Co. 1917.\n   Shows Impulse to be greater than conscious purpose in\n   our social life.\n Mysticism and Logic. 1918. Longman.\n Roads to Freedom. On Socialism, Anarchism and Syndicalism.\n   Geo. Allen & Co. 1918.\n\nSANTAYANA, Prof. George.\n Winds of Doctrine.. Scribner, U.S.A.\n\nSAROLEA, Prof. Charles.\n The French Renascence. 1916. Allen and Unwin. Chapter on\n    Bergson, pp. 271-284, with portrait.\n\nSCOTT. J.W.\n Syndicalism and Philosophical Realism. 1919. A.& C. Black.\n   For Bergson, pp. 70-160.\n\nSLOSSON, Dr. E.\n Major Prophets of To-day. 1914. Little, Boston, U.S.A.\n   Pp. 44-103. (Portrait.)\n\nSMITH, Norman Kemp, D. Phil.\n Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. 1918. Macmillan.\n\nSORLEY, Dr. W.R.\n Moral Values and the Idea of God. Cambridge University\n   Press, 1918. Gifford Lectures, 1914-15. Discusses Intuition\n   and Vital Impulse.\n\nSTEBBING, L. Susan, M.A.\n Pragmatism and French Voluntarism with Special Reference to\n   the Notion of Truth in the Development of Philosophy from Maine\n   de Biran to Bergson. M.A. (London.) Thesis, 1912. Cambridge\n   University Press, 1914. Girton College Studies, No 6.\n\nUNDERHILL, Evelyn.\n Mysticism. A Study in the Nature and development of man's\n   spiritual consciousness. Dutton, U.S.A. 1912.\n\nWALLAS, Graham.\n The Great Society. Error on p. 236, where he has 1912 for 1911,\n   as date of Bergson's Lectures at London University.\n\nWARD, Prof. James.\n The Realm of Ends. (Pluralism and Theism.) Cambridge\n   University Press. Cf. pp. 306-7.\n\nWARDELL, R.J.\n Contemporary Philosophy. Contains careless blunders. The\n   date of the publication of L'Evolution creatrice in Paris is\n   given as 1901 instead of 1907. This is on page 74. Then on\n   page 95, Lectures given at London University are referred\n   to as having been given at Oxford. The whole section of 28\n   pages, devoted to Bergson, tends to be somewhat misleading.\n\nWEBB, C.C.J.\n God and Personality. Gifford Lectures, 1918-19. Geo. Allen\n   and Unwin.\n\nWOODBRIDGE, F.J.E.\n The Purpose of History. Reflections on Bergson, Dewey and\n   Santayana. 1916. Columbia University Press.\n\n\nSection III. English and American Articles\n\n(a) Signed Articles\n\nABBOTT.\n\"Philosophy of Progress.\" Outlook, Feb, 1913.\n\nAKELY.\n\"Bergson and Science.\" Philosophical Review, May, 1915.\n\nALEXANDER, H.B.\n\"Socratic Bergson.\" Mid-West Quarterly, Oct., 1913.\n\nALEXANDER, S.\n\"Mati\u00e8re et M\u00e9moire.\" Mind, Oct, 1897.\n\nARMSTRONG.\n\"Bergson, Berkeley and Intuition.\" Philosophical Review, 1914.\n\nBABBITT.\n\"Bergson and Rousseau.\" Nation, Nov., 1912.\n\nBALDWIN.\n\"Intuition.\" American Year Book, 1911.\n\nBALFOUR.\n\"Creative Evolution and Philosophic Doubt.\" Hibbert Journal,\nOct, 1911; and Living Age, Dec. 2, 1911.\n\nBALSILLIE.\n\"Bergson on Time and Free Will.\" Mind, 1911.\n\nBARR.\n\"The Dualism of Bergson.\" Philosophical Review, 1914.\n\nBEYER.\n\"Creative Evolution and the Woman's Question.\" Educational\nReview, Jan, 1914.\n\nBJORKMAN.\n\"The Philosopher of Actuality.\" Forum, Sept, 1911.\n\"Is there Anything New?\" Forum.\n\"Bergson: Philosopher or Prophet?\" Review of Reviews,\nAug, 1911.\n\nBLACKLOCK.\n\"Bergson's Creative Evolution.\" Westminster Review, Mar., 1912.\n\nBODE\n\"L'Evolution creatrice.\" Philosophical Review, 1908.\n\"Creative Evolution.\" American Journal of Psychology, April, 1912.\n\nBOSANQUET.\nPrediction of Human Conduct.\" International Journal of\nEthics, Oct, 1910.\n\nBOYD.\n\"L'Evolution cr\u00e9atrice.\" Review of Theology and Philosophy, Oct, 1907.\n\nBROWN.\n\"Philosophy of Bergson.\" Church Quarterly Revtew, April, 1912.\n\nBURNS.\n\"Criticism of Bergson's Philosophy.\" North American Review, March, 1913.\n\nBURROUGHS.\n\"The Prophet of the Soul.\" Atlantic Monthly, Jan., 1914.\n\nBUSH.\n\"Bergson's Lectures.\" Columbia University Quarterly, 1913.\n\nCALKINS.\n\"Bergson: Personalist.\" Philosophieal Review, 1912-13. No. (6).\n\nCARR\n\"Philosophy of Bergson\" Hibbert Journal, July, 1910.\n\"Creative Evolution\" Proc. Aristotelian Soc, Vol. 9 and 10.\n\"Bergson's Theory of Instinct\" Proc. Aristotelian Soc, Vol 10.\n\"Bergson's Theory of Knowledge.\" Proc. Aristotelian Soc, Vol 9\n\"Psycho-physical Parallelism as a working hypothesis in Psychology.\"\n  Proc. Aristotelian Soc, Vol. 1910-11.\n\"The Philosophy of Bergson.\" Mind, Oct, 1911.\n\"Science and Bergson\" Mind, Oct, 1912.\n\"On Mr Russell's Reasons for supposing that Bergson's Philosophy\n  is not true\" Cambridge Magazine, April, 1913.\n\"The Concept of Mind-Energy.\" Mind, Jan., 1920.\n\nCARUS.\n\"The Anti-intellectual movement of to-day.\" Monist, July, 1912.\n\nCOCKERELL.\n\"The New Voice in Philosophy.\" Dial, Oct., 1911.\n\nCOOKE.\n\"Ethics and New Intuitionists.\" Mind, 1913.\n\nCORRANCE.\n\"Bergson and the Idea of God.\" Hibbert Journal, Feb, 1914.\n\nCORY.\n\"Bergson's Intellect and Matter.\" Philosophical Review, May, 1914.\n\"Answer to Mr. Bertrand Russell's Philosophy of Bergson.\"\n  Monist, Jan, 1914.\n\nCOSTELLOE (Mrs. ADRIAN STEPHEN).\n\"What Bergson means by Inter-penetration\" Proc. Aristotelian\n  Soc, Vol. 1913-14.\n\"Complexity and Synthesis: Data and Methods of Russell and\n  Bergson. Proc. Aristotelian Soc., 1914-15.\n\nCOX.\n\"Bergson's Message to Feminism.\" Forum, May, 1913.\n\nCUNNINGHAM.\n\"Bergson's Conception of Duration.\" Philosophical Review, 1914-15.\n\"Bergson's Conception of Finality.\" Philosophical Review, 1914-15.\n\nDIMNET.\n\"Meaning of Bergson's Success.\" Saturday Review, 1914.\n\nDOLSON.\n\"Philosophy of Bergson.\" I. Philosophical Review, Nov., 1910.\n\"Philosophy of Bergson.\" II. Philosophical Review, Jan., 1911.\n\nDOUGLAS.\n\"Christ and Bergson.\" North American Review, April, 1913.\n\nDUBRAY.\n\"Philosophy of Bergson.\" Bulletin of Catholic University of\n  Washington, April, 1914.\n\nDURBAN.\n\"Philosophy of Bergson. Homiletic Review, Jan., 1912.\n\nEWALD.\n\"Philosophy in Germany in 1911.\" Trans. from German by\n  Hammond. Philosophieal Review, Sept., 1912.\n\nFAWCETT.\n\"Matter and Memory.\" Mind, April, 1912.\n\nFERRAR.\n\"L'Evolution cr\u00e9atrice.\" Commonwealth, Dec., 1909.\n\nFOSTER.\n\"Henri Bergson.\" Overland, April, 1918.\n\nGARDINER.\n\"Memoire et Reconnaissance.\" Psychological Review, 1896.\n\nGERRARD.\n\"Bergson's Philosophy of Change.\" Catholic World, Jan, 1913.\n\"Bergson, Newman and Aquinas.\" Catholic World, Mar., 1913.\n\"Bergson and Freedom.\" Catholic World, May, 1913.\n\"Bergson and Finahsm.\" Catholic World, June, 1913.\n\"Bergson and Divine Fecundity.\" Catholic World, Aug., 1913.\n\nGIBSON.\n\"The Intuitiomsm of Bergson.\" The Quest, Jan., 1911,\n\nGOETZ.\n\"Bergson,\" A poem. Open Court, Sept., 1912.\n\nGOULD.\n\"Balfour and Bergson.\" Literary Guide and Rationalist Review,\n  Nov., 1911.\n\nGUNTHER.\n\"Bergson, Pragmatism and Schopenhauer.\" Monist, Vol. 22.\n\nHICKS.\n\"Recent Bergson Literature.\" Hibbert Journal, Jan., 1911.\n   \"      \"         \"           \"        \"     \"    1912.\n\nHOCKING.\n\"Significance of Bergson\" Yale Review, 1914.\n\nHOOKHAM.\n\"Bergson as Critic of Darwin.\" National Review, Mar, 1912.\n\"Further Notes on Bergson.\" National Review, April, 1912.\n\nHULME.\n\"The New Philosophy.\" New Age, July, 1909.\n\nHUNEKER.\n\"The Playboy of Western Philosophy.\" Forum, March,\n\nHUSBAND.\n\"L'Evolution creatrice.\" International Journal of Ethics, July, 1912.\n\nJAMES.\n\"Philosophy of Bergson.\" Hibbert Journal, April, 1909.\n\"Bradley or Bergson?\" Journal of Philosophy, Psychology,\n  and Scientific Methods, Jan, 1910.\n\"A Great French Philosopher at Harvard.\" Nation (U. S), March, 1910.\n\nJOHNSTON.\n\"Where Bergson Stands.\" Harper's Weekly, March, 1913.\n\nJOHNSTONE.\n\"Bergson's Philosophy of the Organism.\" Proc. of Liverpool\n  Biological Society, 1913.\n\nJORDAN.\n\"Kant and Bergson.\" Monist, 1913.\n\nJOURDAIN.\n\"Logic, Bergson and H. G. Wells.\" Hibbert Journal, Vol. 10.\n\nKALLEN.\n\"James, Bergson and Mr Pitkin.\" Journal of Philosophy,\n  Psychology and Scientific Methods, June, 1910.\n\"James, Bergson and Traditional Metaphysics\" Mind, 1914.\n\"Laughter\" Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific\n  Methods, May, 1912.\n\nKEEFFE.\n\"Bergson's Critical Philosophy.\" Irish Theological Studies, April, 1913.\n\nKHOROSHKO.\n\"Bergson's Philosophy from a Physician's Point of View.\"\n  Russkaya Misl., Feb, 1915.\n\nLALANDE.\n\"Philosophy in France in 1905.\" Philosophieal Rev., May, 1906.\n\"Philosophy in France in 1907.\" Philosophieal Rev., May, 1908.\n\"Philosophy in France in 1912.\" Philosophieal Rev., April, 1914.\n\nLEIGHTON\n\"On Continuity and Discreteness.\" Journal of Philosophy,\n  Psychology and Scientific Methods, April, 1910.\n\nLEWIS.\n\"Bergson and Contemporary Thought.\" University of California\n  Chronicle, 1914.\n\nLICORISH\n\"Bergson's Creative Evolution and the Nervous System\n  in Organic Evolution\" Lancet, Vol. 182.\n\nLIPPMANN\n\"The most Dangerous Man in the World.\" Everybody's Magazine,\n  July, 1912.\n\"Bergson's Philosophy\" New York Times Book Review, Nov, 1912.\n\nLODGE\n\"Bergson's Intuitional Philosophy Justified.\" Current Literature,\n  April, 1912.\n\"Balfour and Bergson\" Hibbert Journal, Jan., 1912.\n\nLOVEDAY.\n\"L'Evolution creatrice\" Mind, 1908.\n\nLOVEJOY.\n\"The Metaphysician of the Life Force\" Nation, Sept, 1909\n\"The Problem of Time in Recent French Philosophy, (III).\n  Bergson s Temporalism and Anti-intellectualism\" Philosophical\n  Review, May, 1912\n\"Practical Tendencies of Bergsonism\" International Journal of\n  Ethics, 1913\n\"Some Antecedents of Bergson's Philosophy\" Mind, 1913.\n\"Bergson and Romantic Evolutionism.\" University of California\n  Chronicle, 1914.\n\nLOW.\n\"Mr Balfour in the Study.\" Edinburgh Review, Oct, 1912.\n\nMARTIN.\n\"Bergson's Creative Evolution\" Pnnceton Theological Review, Jan., 1912.\n\nMASON.\n\"Bergson's Principle\" Nation, July, 1911.\n\"Bergson's Method Confirmed\" North American Review, Jan, 1913.\n\nMcCABE.\n\"The Anti rationalism of Bergson.\" Literary Guide and\n  Rationalist Review, Oct 4-1911.\n\nMACASKILL.\n\"Intellect and Intuition\" Footnote to \"Bergson and Bradley.\"\n  Contemporary Review, July, 1915.\n\nMACDONALD\n\"L'Effort itellectuel\" Philosophical Review, July, 1902.\n\nMcGILVARY.\n\"Philosophy of Bergson\" Philosophical Review, Sept, 1912.\n\nMACKINTOSH.\n\"Bergson and Religion\" Biblical World, Jan, 1913\n\nMEREDITH.\n\"Critical Side of Bergson's Philosophy.\" Westminster Review,\n  Feb, 1912.\n\nMILLER.\n\"Bergson and Religion.\" Biblical World, Nov., 1915.\n\nMITCHELL.\n\"L'Evolution creatrice\" Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and\n  Scientific Methods, Oct, 1908.\n\"Studies on Bergson.\" Bulletin of University of Kansas, 1915.\n\nMOORE. A. W.\n\"Bergson and Pragmatism.\" Philosophical Review, 1912.\n\nMOORE, C. L\n\"Return of the Gods.\" The Dial, Nov, 1912.\n\nMORIES.\n\"Bergson and Mysticism\" Westminster Review, June, 1912.\n\nMORRISON.\n\"The Treatment of History by Philosophers.\"\n  Proc Aristotelian Soc, Vol. 1913-14.\n\nMUIRHEAD.\n\"Creative Evolution\" Hibbert Journal, 1911.\n\"Matter and Memory\" Hibbert Journal, 1911.\n\"Time and Free Will.\" Hibbert Journal, 1911.\n\nMULFORD.\n\"What is Intuition ?\" Monist, Vol. 26, 1916.\n\nOVERSTREET.\n\"Mind and Body.\" Psychological Bulletin, Jan., 1912.\n\nPALMER.\n\"Thought and Instinct\" Nation, June, 1909\n\"Life and the Brain\" Contemporary Review, Oct, 1909.\n\"Presence and Omni-presence.\" Contemporary Review, June, 1908\n\nPAULHAN.\n\"Contemporary Philosophy in France.\" Philosophical Review, Jan, 1900.\n\nPERRY.\n\"Philosophy of Bergson.\" Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and\n  Scientific Methods, 1911.\n\nPITKIN\n\"James and Bergson, or, Who is against Intellect ?\" Journal\n  of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, April, 1910\n\nPOULTON.\n\"Darwin and Bergson on Evolution.\" Bedrock, April, 1912.\n\nQUICK\n\"Creative Evolution and the Individual.\" Mind, 1913.\n\nRADHAKRISHNAN.\n\"Bergson's Idea of God\" Quest, Oct, 1916.\n\"Bergson and Absolute Idealism 1.\" Mind, Jan, 1919.\n\"Bergson and Absolute Idealism 2.\" Mind, July, 1919.\n\nROBINSON\n\"The Philosophy of Bergson.\" Churchman, March, 1912.\n\nROSS\n\"A New Theory of Laughter\" Nation, Nov, 1908.\n\"The Philosophy of Vitalism\" Nation, March, 1909.\n\nROOSEVELT.\n\"The Search for Truth in a Reverent Spirit.\" Outlook, Dec, 1911.\n\nROYCE.\n\"The Reality of the Temporal\" International Journal of Ethics,\n  April, 1910.\n\nRUSSELL, B.\n\"Philosophy of Bergson.\" Monist, July, 1912.\n\"Mr Carr's Defence of Bergson.\" Cambridge Magazine, April, 1913.\n\nRUSSELL, J. E.\n\"Bergson's Anti-Intellectualism.\" Journal of Philosophy,\n  Psychology and Scientific Methods, 1912.\n\nSANBORN.\n\"Bergson: His Personality, Philosophy and Influence.\"\n  Century Review, Dec, 1912.\n\"Bergson; Creator of a New Philosophy.\" Outlook, Feb, 1913.\n\nSAUVAGE.\n\"The New Philosophy in France\" Catholic University Bulletin,\n  Washington, April, 1906, and March, 1908.\n\nSCOTT\n\"Pessimism of Bergson\" Hibbert Journal, Oct, 1912;\n  International Journal of Ethics, Jan, 1914; Mind, July, 1913.\n\nSHEPHERD.\n\"Le Souvenir du present et la fausse reconnaissance.\"\n  Psychological Bulletin, Sept., 1910.\n\nSHIMER.\n\"Bergson's View of Organic Evolution.\" Popular Science\n  Monthly Feb., 1913.\n\nSHOTWELL\n\"Bergson's Philosophy.\" Political Science Quarterly, March, 1913.\n\nSLATER.\n\"Vision of Bergson.\" Forum, Dec., 1914.\n\nSLOSSON.\n\"Major Prophets of To-day\" Independent, June, 1911.\n\"Recent Developments of Bergson's Philosophy.\" Independent, June, 1913.\n\nSMITH\n\"Subjectivism and Realism in Modern Philosophy.\"\n  Philosophical Review, April, 1908.\n\nSOLOMON.\n\"Bergson's Philosophy.\" Mind, Jan, 1911, also Fortnightly\n  Review, Dec, 1911\n\"Creative Evolution.\" Mind, July, 1911.\n\nSTEBBING.\n\"Notion of Truth in Bergson's Theory of Knowledge.\" Proc.\n  Aristotelian Soc, Vol 1912-13.\n\nSTORK.\n\"Bergson and his Philosophy.\" Lutheran Quarterly, 1913.\n\nSTOUT.\n\"Free Will and Determinism.\" Speaker, May, 1890.\n\nSTRANGE.\n\"Bergson's Theory of Intuition.\" Monist, 1915.\n\nSYMONS\n\"Bergson's Theory of Intellect and Reality.\" Scientific\n  American Supplement, Dec, 1916.\n\nTAYLOR.\n\"Henri Bergson.\" Quest, 1912.\n\nTAYLOR, A.E.\n\"Matter and Memory.\" International Journal of Ethics, Oct., 1911.\n\"Creative Evolution.\" International Journal of Ethics, July, 1912.\n\nTHOMSON\n\"Biological Philosophy of Bergson.\" Nature, Oct., 1911.\n\nTITCHENER.\n\"Laughter.\" American Journal of Psychology, Jan., 1912.\n\nTOWNSEND.\n\"Bergson and Religion.\" Monist, July, 1912.\n\nTUFTS.\n\"Humor.\" Psychological Review, 1901.\n\nTUTTLE\n\"Bergson on Life and Consciousness.\" Philosophical Review, Jan., 1912.\n\nTYRRELL, G.\n\"Creative Evolution.\" Hibbert Journal, Jan., 1908.\n\nTYRRELL, H.\n\"Bergson.\" A Poem. Art World, Sept., 1917.\n\nUNDERHILL\n\"Bergson and the Mystics.\" Living Age, March, 1912, and\n  English Review, Feb., 1912.\n\nWATERLOW.\n\"Philosophy of Bergson.\" Quarterly Review, Jan., 1912.\n\nWHITE.\n\"Bergson and Education.\" Educational Review, May, 1914.\n\nWHITTAKER, A.L.\n\"Bergson: First Aid to Common-sense.\" Forum, March, 1914.\n\nWHITTAKER, T.\n\"Les donnees immediates de la conscience.\" Mind, April, 1890.\n\nWILLCOX.\n\"Impressions of M. Bergson.\" Harper's Weekly, March, 1913.\n\"Implications of Bergson's Philosophy.\" North American\n  Review, March, 1914.\n\nWILLIAMS.\n\"Syndicalism in France and Its Relation to the Philosophy of\n  Bergson.\" Hibbert Journal, Feb., 1914.\n\nWILM\n\"Bergson and Philosophy of Religion\" Biblical World, Nov., 1913.\n\nWOLF.\n\"Natural Realism and Present Tendencies in Philosophy\"\n  Proc Aristotelian Soc, Vol, 1908-9.\n\"Philosophy of Bergson.\" Jewish Review, Sept, 1911.\n\nWOLFF.\n\"Balfour on Teleology and Bergson's Creative Evolution.\"\n  Hibbert Journal, Jan, 1912.\n\nWYANT\n\"Bergson and His Philosophy.\" Bookman, March, 1915.\n\n\n(b) Unsigned Articles\n\n1909 Sept. \"Creative Evolution.\" Nation.\n1909 Dec.  \"Creative Evolution.\" Current Literature.\n1909 Dec.  \"Bergson's New Idea\" Current Literature.\n\n1910 Sept. \"Bergson on Free Will\" Spectator.\n1910 Oct.  \"Time and Free Will.\" Athenaeum.\n1910 Oct.  \"Time and Free Will.\" Saturday Review.\n1910 Nov.  \"Time and Free Will.\" Nation (USA)\n\n1911 April \"Creative Evolution\" Athenaeum\n1911 May   \"Bergson's Wonder-working Philosophy.\" Current Literature.\n           \"Bergson and Others\" Spectator.\n1911 June  \"Creative Evolution\" Saturday Review.\n1911 June  \"Bergson in English\" Nation.\n1911 Aug.  \"Latest of Philosophers\" New York Times.\n1911 Aug.  \"New Conception of God as Creative Evolution.\"\n            Current Literature\n1911 Oct.  \"Creative Evolution\" Bookman.\n1911 Oct.  \"Creative Evolution\" Dial.\n1911 Oct.  \"Creative Evolution\" Nature.\n1911 Oct.  \"Matter and Memory.\" International Journal of Ethics.\n1911 Dec.  \"Balfour's Objections to Bergson's Philosophy.\"\n            Current Literature.\n\n1912 Jan.  \"Bergson and Balfour discuss Philosophy.\" Review\n            of Reviews.\n1912 Jan.  \"The Soul\" Educational Review\n1912 Feb.  \"Is the Philosophy of Bergson that of a Charlatan?\"\n            Current Literature\n1912 Feb.  \"Bergson on Comedy\" Living Age\n1912 Apr\u00edl \"Bergson's Intuitional Philosophy justified by Sir\n            Oliver Lodge.\" Current Literature.\n1912 Apr\u00edl \"Laughter\" Edinburgh Review\n1912 Apr\u00edl \"Bergson Criticized.\" London Quarterly Review\n1912 June  \"Laughter.\" North American Review.\n           \"Modern Science and Bergson.\" Contemporary Review.\n     July  \"Creative Evolution.\" International Journal of Ethics.\n           \"Pressing Forward into Space.\" Nation.\n           \"Balfour and Bergson.\" Westminster Review.\n     Sept. \"Prof. Henri Bergson.\" Open Court.\n           \"Laughter.\" Dublin Review.\n\n1913 Feb.  \"Eucken and Bergson.\" Independent.\n           \"Bergson's Lectures.\" Outlook.\n     March \"Bergson's New Idea of Evolution.\" Literary Digest.\n           \"Bergson's Reception in America.\" Current Opinion.\n           \"Visiting the French Philosopher.\" Literary Digest.\n           \"The Jewishness of Bergson.\" Literary Digest.\n           \"Bergson at the City College.\" Outlook.\n1913 March \"The Spiritual Philosopher.\" Review of Reviews.\n     April \"Introduction to Metaphysics.\" Contemporary Review.\n           \"Bergson and Eucken under Fire.\" Current Opinion.\n     Oct.  \"Such Stuff as Dreams are Made On.\" Independent.\n           \"The Birth of a Dream.\" Independent.\n           \"Bergson on Psychical Research.\" Educational Review.\n\n1914 March \"Portrait of Bergson.\" American Magazine.\n     May   \"Threatened Collapse of Bergson boom in France.\"\n            Current Opinion.\n     July  \"The Banning of Bergson.\" Independent.\n     Dec.  \"Bergson Looking Backward.\" Literary Digest.\n           \"Bergson on Germany's Moral Force.\" Literary Digest.\n\n1915 Jan.  \"Mr. Kallen on Bergson.\" North American Review.\n     April     \"  \"  \"                  Nation.\n           \"Mr. Wildon Carr and Philosophy of Change.\" Quest.\n1917 May   \"Bergson and the Art World.\" Art World.\n     Sept. \"Are Americans Money Worshippers? Bergson's Opinion.\"\n            Outlook.\n     Dec.  \"Bergson thanks America.\" New Republic.\n\n1919 Dec.  \"French Ideals in Education and the American Student.\"\n            Living Age.\n\n\n\nSection IV. The English Translations of Bergson's Works\n\nAs, in the foregoing lists, the English Translations of Bergson's\nWorks are given separately under the heading of the date and title\nof the original work, they are here set forth together under the title\nof the publishers with translators' names and the published prices\nfor convenience of reference for English readers or students.\n\nGEORGE ALLEN AND UNWIN, LTD.\n  Time and Free Will. Translator--F. L. Pogson, M.A. Pp.\n    xxiii+252 (12/6).\n\n  Matter and Memory. Translators--Nancy Margaret Paul and\n    W. Scott Palmer. Pp. xx+339 (12/6).\n\n  Both of these are in \"The Library of Philosophy.\"\n\nMACMILLAN AND CO., LTD.\n  Creative Evolution. Translator--Arthur Mitchell, Ph.D. Pp.\n    xv+407 (12/6).\n\n  Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic, Translators--\n    Cloudesley Brereton L.-es-L., M.A., and Fred Rothwell, B.A.\n    Pp. vi+200 (4/6).\n\n  An Introduction to Metaphysics. Translator--T. E. Hulme.\n    Pp. vi+79 (3/e).\n\n  Mind-Energy. Translator. Dr. Wildon Carr. (Announced.)\n\nT. FISHER UNWIN, LTD.\n  Dreams. Translator--Dr. Slosson. Pp. 62 (2/6).\n\n  The Meaning of the War. Editor, Dr. Carr. Pp. 47 (1/6).\n\nThe above are all the English Translations which have appeared\nup to now. The Oxford University Press published in the original\nFrench the lectures given at Oxford, La Perception du Changement.\nThese are now out of print, but will be included in the\nforthcoming volume of Essays.","title":"Bergson and His Philosophy","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":57781}