{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_57573/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_57573","id":"gutenberg_57573","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/57573","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Psychiatry/Psychology","Category: Science - Biology","Emotions"],"text":"Produced by KD Weeks, MFR and the Online Distributed\nProofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was\nproduced from images generously made available by The\nInternet Archive)\n\n\n\n\n\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n Transcriber\u2019s Note:\n\nThis version of the text cannot represent certain typographical effects.\nItalics are delimited with the \u2018_\u2019 character as _italic_.\n\nFootnotes have been moved to directly follow the paragraphs in which\nthey are referenced.\n\nMinor errors, attributable to the printer, have been corrected. Please\nsee the transcriber\u2019s note at the end of this text for details regarding\nthe handling of any textual issues encountered during its preparation.\n\n\n\n\n STUDIES\n IN THE\n EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY OF FEELING\n\n\n\n\n STUDIES IN THE\n EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY\n OF FEELING\n\n\n\n\n BY\n HIRAM M. STANLEY\n\n _Member of the American Psychological Association_\n\n[Illustration: colophon]\n\n =London=\n SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO\n NEW YORK: MACMILLAN & CO\n 1895\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n BUTLER & TANNER,\n THE SELWOOD PRINTING WORKS,\n FROME, AND LONDON.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n PREFACE\n\n[Illustration]\n\n\nThis work does not profess to be a treatise on the subject of feeling,\nbut merely a series of studies, and rather tentative ones at that. I\nhave attempted to deduce from the standpoint of biologic evolution the\norigin and development of feeling, and then to consider how far\nintrospection confirms these results. I am well aware that I traverse\nmoot points\u2014what points in psychology are not moot?\u2014and I trust that the\nposition taken will receive thorough criticism. I should be very glad to\nhave new facts adduced, whatever way they may bear. I have no theory to\ndefend, but the results offered are simply the best interpretation I\nhave as yet been able to attain.\n\nSome of the material of this book has appeared during the last ten years\nin the pages of _Mind_, _Monist_, _Science_, _Philosophical Review_ and\n_Psychological Review_, but my contributions to these periodicals have\nin many cases been largely re-written.\n\n HIRAM M. STANLEY.\n\nLAKE FOREST, ILLINOIS, U S.A.\n\n\n\n\n TABLE OF CONTENTS\n\n[Illustration]\n\n\n CHAPTER I\n PAGE\n\n ON THE INTROSPECTIVE STUDY OF FEELING 1\n\n\n CHAPTER II\n\n ON PRIMITIVE CONSCIOUSNESS 12\n\n\n CHAPTER III\n\n THEORIES OF PLEASURE-PAIN 35\n\n\n CHAPTER IV\n\n THE RELATION OF FEELING TO PLEASURE-PAIN 48\n\n\n CHAPTER V\n\n EARLY DIFFERENTIATION 61\n\n\n CHAPTER VI\n\n REPRESENTATION AND EMOTION 78\n\n\n CHAPTER VII\n\n FEAR AS PRIMITIVE EMOTION 93\n\n\n CHAPTER VIII\n\n THE DIFFERENTIATION OF FEAR 108\n\n\n CHAPTER IX\n\n DESPAIR 121\n\n\n CHAPTER X\n\n ANGER 127\n\n\n CHAPTER XI\n\n SURPRISE, DISAPPOINTMENT, EMOTION OF NOVELTY 163\n\n\n CHAPTER XII\n\n RETROSPECTIVE EMOTION 176\n\n\n CHAPTER XIII\n\n DESIRE 192\n\n\n CHAPTER XIV\n\n SOME REMARKS ON ATTENTION 225\n\n\n CHAPTER XV\n\n SELF FEELING 251\n\n\n CHAPTER XVI\n\n INDUCTION AND EMOTION 282\n\n\n CHAPTER XVII\n\n THE \u00c6STHETIC PSYCHOSIS 295\n\n\n CHAPTER XVIII\n\n THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LITERARY STYLE 310\n\n\n CHAPTER XIX\n\n ETHICAL EMOTION 332\n\n\n CHAPTER XX\n\n THE EXPRESSION OF FEELING 345\n\n\n CHAPTER XXI\n\n CONCLUSION 371\n\n INDEX 391\n\n\n\n\n EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY\n\n[Illustration]\n\n CHAPTER I\n _ON THE INTROSPECTIVE STUDY OF FEELING_\n\n\nOf all the sciences psychology is, perhaps, the most imperfect. If a\nscience is a body of knowledge obtained by special research and accepted\nby the general _consensus_ of specialists, then psychology is so\ndefective as to scarcely merit the name of science. This want of\n_consensus_ is everywhere apparent, and must especially impress any one\nwho compares the lack of harmony in manuals of psychology with the\npractical unanimity in manuals of botany, geology, physics, and other\nsciences. Even in the most fundamental points there is no agreement, as\nwill be evident in a most summary statement.\n\nIt is now something more than a century since the general division of\npsychic phenomena into intellect, feeling and will, first came into\nrepute, but still some psychologists of note do not agree to this\nfundamental classification, but would unite feeling and will in a single\norder. As to the subdivisions of feeling and will we are confessedly\nwholly at sea. In intellect it is only on the lower side, sensation and\nperception, that anything of great scientific value has been\naccomplished; and even now it cannot be said that the classes of\nsensation have been marked off with perfect certainty. In the higher\nrange of intellect psychology can do scarcely more than accept some\nready-made divisions from common observation and logic. And if so little\nhas been settled in the comparatively simple work of a descriptive\nclassification of the facts of mind, we may be assured that still less\nhas been accomplished toward a scientific _consensus_ for the laws of\nmind. Weber\u2019s law alone seems to stand on any secure basis of\nexperiment, but its range and meaning are still far from being\ndetermined. Even the laws of the association of ideas are still the\nsubjects of endless controversy. Also in method there is manifestly the\ngreatest disagreement. The physiological and introspective schools each\nmagnify their own methods, sometimes so far as to discredit all others.\nPhysiological method has won for itself a certain standing, indeed, but\njust what are its limitations is still far from being settled.\n\nBut the grievous lack of generally accepted results is most apparent in\nthe domain of feeling. The discussion of feeling in most manuals is very\nmeagre and unsatisfactory. Professor James\u2019s recent treatise, for\ninstance, gives some 900 pages to the Intellect, and about 100 pages\neach to Feeling and Will. There is little thorough analysis and no\nperfected inductive classification. We often, indeed, find essays of\nliterary value which appeal to the authority of literature. But to refer\nto Shakspeare or Goethe as psychological authorities, or in illustration\nor proof of psychological laws, is generally a doubtful procedure. The\nliterary and artistic treatment of human nature is quite distinct from\nthe scientific, and literature and art cannot be said to be of much more\nvalue for psychology than for physics, chemistry, or biology. To appeal\nto the Bible or Shakspeare in matters psychological, is usually as\nmisleading as to consult them for light on geology or botany. Even the\nfuller treatises on the subject of feeling rarely reach beyond literary\nmethod and common observation, being for the most part a collection and\narrangement of the results of common sense, accepting common\ndefinitions, terms, and classifications. Now, science is always more\nthan common sense and common perception, it is uncommon sense; it is an\ninsight and a prolonged special investigation which penetrates beneath\nthe surface of things and shows them in those inner and deeper relations\nwhich are entirely hid from general observation. Common views in\npsychology are likely to be as untrustworthy as in physics or astronomy,\nor any other department. Science must, indeed, start with common sense,\nbut it does not deserve the name of science till it gets beyond it.\n\nAgain, the subject of pleasure, pain, and emotion, is usually discussed\nwith considerable ethical or philosophical bias. The whole subject of\nfeeling has been so naturally associated with ethics and philosophy from\nthe earliest period of Greek thought that a purely colourless scientific\ntreatment is quite difficult. Furthermore, feeling has been too often\ndiscussed from an _a priori_ point of view, as in the rigid following\nout of the Herbartian theory of feeling as connected with hindrance or\nfurtherance of representation. Still further, the physical side of\nemotion has been so emphasized by the physiological school as to\ndistract attention from purely psychological investigation.\n\nIt is obvious, then, on the most cursory review, that very little has\nbeen accomplished in the pure psychology of feeling. Here is a region\nalmost unexplored, and which, by reason of the elusiveness and obscurity\nof the phenomena, has seemed to some quite unexplorable. Dr. Nahlowsky\ntruly remarks, that feeling is a \u201cstrange mysterious world, and the\nentrance to it is dark as to Hades of old.\u201d Is there any way out of this\ndarkness and confusion? If the study of feeling is to become scientific,\nwe must, I think, assume that all feeling is a biological function\ngoverned by the general laws of life and subject in origin and\ndevelopment to the law of struggle for existence. Assuming this strictly\nscientific point of view, we have to point out some difficulties in the\nway of the introspective psychology of feeling as compared with other\ndepartments of biological science.\n\nWe trace directly and with comparative ease any physiological organ and\nfunction from its simplest to its most complex form; for example, in the\ncirculation of the blood there is clearly observable a connected series\nfrom the most elementary to the most specialized heart as developed\nthrough the principle of serviceability. In some cases, as in the\norohippus, a form in the evolution of the horse, we are able to predict\nan intermediate organism. Psychology is still far from this deductive\nstage; we have no analogous series of psychic forms, much less are able\nto supply, _a priori_, the gaps in a series. The reason for this is\nmainly the inevitable automorphism of psychological method. In biology\nwe are not driven to understand life solely through analogy with our own\nlife, but in psychology mind in general must be interpreted through the\nself-observation of the human mind. In biology we see without effort\nfacts and forms of life most diverse from our own; the most strange and\nprimitive types are as readily discernible as the most familiar and\nadvanced, the most simple as the most complex. We study a fish just as\nreadily as a human body, but the fish\u2019s mind\u2014if it has any\u2014seems beyond\nour ken, at least is not susceptible of direct study, but a matter for\ndoubtful inference and speculation. Whether a given action does or does\nnot indicate consciousness, and what kind of consciousness, this is most\ndifficult to determine. Thus we have the most various interpretations,\nsome, as Clifford, even going so far as to make psychic phenomena\nuniversal in matter, others, on the other hand, as Descartes, limiting\nthem to man alone.\n\nThe difficulty of this subjective method, this reflex investigation, is\nalmost insurmountable. Consciousness must act as both revealer and\nrevealed, must be a light which enlightens itself. A fact of\nconsciousness to be known must not simply exist like a physical fact or\nobject, as a piece of stone, but it must be such that the observing\nconsciousness realizes or re-enacts it. To know the fact we must have\nthe fact, we must _be_ what we _know_. Mind is pure activity; we do not\nsee an organ and ask what it is for, what does it do; but we are\nimmediately conscious of consciousness as activity, and not as an\nobjective organ. We must here, then, reverse the general order and know\nthe activity before we can identify the organ as a physical basis.\n\nBy the purely objective vision of the lower sciences we can easily\ndetermine a genetic series of forms most remote from our own life, but\nin psychology, mind can be for us only what mind is in us. The primitive\ntypes of psychosis are, no doubt, as remote and foreign from our own as\nis the primitive type of heart or nervous system from that of man\u2019s. In\nthe case of heart and nerve we can objectively trace with certainty the\nsuccessive steps, but in endeavouring to realize by subjective method\nthe evolution of mind we are involved in great doubt and perplexity. How\ncan we understand an insect\u2019s feelings? How can we appreciate minds\nwhich are without apprehension of object, though there is reason to\nbelieve such minds exist? Only to a very limited extent can a trained\nand sympathetic mind project itself back into some of its immediately\nantecedent stages. Consciousness, because of its self-directive and\nself-reflective power, is the most elastic of functions, yet it can\nnever attain the power of realizing all its previous stages. Sometimes,\nhowever, the mind in perfect quiescence tends to relapse into primitive\nmodes, which may afterward be noted by reflection, but such occasions\nare comparatively rare. The subjective method means a commonalty of\nexperience which is often impossible to attain. Thus a man may believe\nthere are feelings of maternity; he has observed the expression of\nnursing mothers, and knows in a general way that here is a peculiar\npsychosis into which he can never enter, and which is, therefore, beyond\nhis scientific analysis. The psychic life of the child is more akin to\nhis than that of the mother; yet it is only by an incessant cultivation\nof receptivity and repression of adult propensities that one can ever\nattain any true inkling of infant experience. There is then, I think, a\nvast range of psychic life which must for ever lie wholly hidden from\nus, either as infinitely below or infinitely above us; there is also an\nimmense realm where we can only doubtfully infer the presence of some\nform of consciousness without being able to discriminate its quality, or\nin exceptional cases to know it very partially; and there is but a\nrelatively small sphere where scientific results of any large value may\nbe expected. By reason of its objective method the realm of physical\nscience is practically illimitable, but psychic science is, by reason of\nits subjective method, kept for ever within narrow boundaries.\n\nWe must then take into account the inherent difficulties of the\nsubjective method as applied to the study of feeling and mind in\ngeneral, and yet we must recognise its necessity. No amount of objective\nphysiological research can tell us anything about the real nature of a\nfeeling, or can discover new feelings. Granting that neural processes\nare at the basis of all feelings as of all mental activities, we can\ninfer nothing from the physiological activity as to the nature of the\npsychic process. It is only such feelings and elements as we have\nalready discovered and analyzed by introspection that can be correlated\nwith a physical process. Nor can we gain much light even if we\nsuppose\u2014which is granting a good deal in our present state of\nknowledge\u2014that there exists a general analogy between nerve growth and\nactivity, and mental operations. If relating, _i.e._, cognition, is\nestablished on basis of inter-relation in brain tissue, if every mental\nconnecting means a connecting of brain fibres, we might, indeed,\ndetermine the number of thoughts, but we could not tell what the\nthoughts were. So if mental disturbance always means bodily disturbance,\nwe can still tell nothing more about the nature of each emotion than we\nknew before. We must first know fear, anger, etc., as experiences in\nconsciousness before we can correlate them with corporeal acts.\n\nIs now this necessarily subjective method peculiarly limited as to\nfeeling? Can we know feeling directly as psychic act or only indirectly\nthrough accompaniments? Mr. James Ward (_vide_ article on Psychology in\nthe _Encyclop\u00e6dia Britannica_, p. 49, cf. p. 71) remarks that feelings\ncannot be known as objects of direct reflection, we can only know _of_\nthem by their effects on the chain of presentation. The reason for this\nis, that feeling is not presentation, and \u201cwhat is not presented cannot\nbe re-presented.\u201d \u201cHow can that which was not originally a cognition\nbecome such by being reproduced?\u201d\n\nIt cannot. But do we need to identify the known with knowing, in order\nthat it may be known? Must feeling be made into a cognition to be\ncognized? It is obvious enough that no feeling can be revived into a\nrepresentation of itself, but no more can any cognition or any mental\nactivity. Revival or recurrence of consciousness can never constitute\nconsciousness of consciousness which is an order apart. If cognition is\nonly presentation and re-presentation of objects, we can never attain\nany apprehension of consciousness, any cognition of a cognition or of a\nfeeling or of a volition, for they are all equally in this sense\nsubjective acts. Re-presentation at any degree is never by itself sense\nof re-presentation or knowledge of the presentation.\n\nOf course, the doctrine of relativity applies to introspection as to all\ncognition, and subject _qua_ subject is as unknowable as object _qua_\nobject. We do not know feeling in itself, nor anything else in itself,\nthe subjective like the objective _ding an sich_ is beyond our ken. Yet\nkinds of consciousness are as directly apprehended and discriminated as\nkinds of things, but the knowing is, as such, distinct from the known\neven when knowing is known. Here the act knowing is not the act known\nand is different in value. The object known is not, at least from the\npurely psychological point of view, ever to be confounded with the\nknowing, to be incorporated into cognition by virtue of being cognized.\nFeeling, then, seems to be as directly known by introspection and\nreflection as any other process. It is not a hypothetical cause brought\nin by the intellect to explain certain mental phenomena, but it is as\ndistinctly and directly apprehended as cognition or volition.\n\nThe distinction between having a feeling and knowing a feeling is a very\nreal one, though common phraseology confuses them. We say of a brave\nman, he never knew fear; by which we mean he never feared, never\nexperienced fear, and not that he was ignorant of fear. Again, in like\nmanner, we say sometimes of a very healthy person, he never knew what\npain was, meaning he never felt pain. These expressions convey a truth\nin that they emphasize that necessity of experience in the exercise of\nthe subjective method upon which we have already commented, but still\nthey obscure a distinction which must be apparent to scientific\nanalysis. We cannot know feeling except through realization, yet the\nknowing is not the realization. Being aware of the pain and the feeling\npain are distinct acts of consciousness. All feeling, pain and pleasure,\nis direct consciousness, but knowledge of it is reflex, is consciousness\nof consciousness. The cognition of the pain as an object, a fact of\nconsciousness, is surely a distinct act from the pain in consciousness,\nfrom the fact itself. The pain disturbance is one thing and the\nintrospective act by which it is cognized quite another.\n\nThese two acts are not always associated, though they are commonly\nregarded as inseparable. It is a common postulate that if you have a\npain you will know it, or notice it. If we feel pained, we always know\nit. This seemingly true statement comes of a confounding of terms. If I\nhave a pain, I must, indeed, be aware of it, know it, in the sense that\nit must be in consciousness; but this makes, aware of pain, and knowing\npain, such very general phrases as to equal experience of pain or having\npain. But there is no knowledge in pain itself, nor pain in the knowing\nact _per se_. The knowing the pain must be different from the pain\nitself, and is not always a necessary sequent. We may experience pain\nwithout cognizing it as such. When drowsy in bed I may feel pain of my\nfoot being \u201casleep,\u201d but not know it as a mental fact. We may believe,\nindeed, that pain often rises and subsides in consciousness without our\nbeing cognizant of it, but, of course, in the nature of the case there\nis no direct proof, for proof implies cognizance of fact. Pain as mental\nfact, an object for consciousness, not an experience in consciousness,\nis what is properly meant by knowing pain. Consciousness-of-pain as\nknowledge of it is not always involved by pain-in-consciousness as\nexperience of it. Consciousness of pain by its double meaning as\ncognizance of pain and experience of pain leads easily to obscurity of\nthought upon this subject. But experience does not, if we may trust the\ngeneral law of evolution from simple to complex, at the first contain\nconsciousness of experience. This latter element is but gradually built\nup into experience, though in the end they are so permanently united in\ndeveloped ego life that it is difficult to perceive their distinctness\nand independence. That pain and pleasure are cognized as facts of\nconsciousness seems to us clear, but this does not deny that for us, at\nleast, they may be cognizable only in fusion with other elements, as\nwith sensation or volition. But whether known only with other elements\nor not, pleasure-pain is equally known only by direct introspection. I\nknow directly and immediately pain and pleasure when I experience them,\nthough they always occur bound up with some sensation. It may be that I\nnever experience mere pain but some kind of pain, as a pricking pain,\nburning pain, etc., and that I always recall pain by its sensation tone,\nthat I cannot isolate it by any act of attention. (E. B. Titchener,\n_Philosophical Review_, vol. iii., p. 431.) However I know that I have\npain as well as I know that I have a pricking or burning sensation. \u201cDid\nyou feel the prick?\u201d \u201cYes.\u201d \u201cWas it painful or pleasurable?\u201d\n\u201cPleasurable\u201d; such a common colloquy implies as direct consciousness of\nthe pleasure-pain as of the sensation. That I can at once discriminate a\nsensation as either pleasurable or painful certainly shows a direct\nawareness of pleasure-pain.\n\nIf pure pleasure-pain is primitive consciousness (see chap. ii.), it\nmust be most rare phenomenon in such an advanced consciousness as that\nof the human adult: and it is not surprising that one should search for\nit in vain. But in any case it could not yield to attention. Attention\nas cognition views its object in relation, in a _milieu_; it can\nreproduce only by fastening upon something to reproduce by, but pure\npleasure-pain has nothing connected with it. Again, attention as\nvolition cannot reproduce mere pleasure-pain which is not volitional in\nits origin and growth like sensing, perceiving, or ideating. We merely\n\u201csuffer\u201d pain. Both pleasure and pain in themselves are purely passive;\nwilling cannot directly affect them, and they are not, like cognitions,\nmodes of volition, or effortful activities. For man to have a primitive\nconsciousness by exercise of will would be quite as difficult as to turn\nhimself into a protozo\u00f6n.\n\nFurther, would not attention as introspective alertness to discover such\na fact of consciousness as pure pleasure-pain denote that consciousness\nis thereby raised far above the level at which such a phenomenon can\noccur? In general also constant introspective attention tends to defeat\nitself. A continual intentness and watching for a given psychic\nphenomenon is a state which, the more intense and persistent it is,\ntends to bar out the particular state watched for, and, indeed, all\nother states than itself. If attention as act engrosses, it defeats\nitself.\n\nIf, however, undifferentiated pleasure-pain should at any time occur in\nhuman consciousness, might we become immediately and spontaneously aware\nof it? By its very nature it may escape conscious attentive\ninvestigation, but may there not be a direct and simple awareness or\napperception of it? We might suppose that one man tells another, \u201cI was\nvery sick, and in state of coma I had pain, merely pain, not any kind of\npain or pain anywhere, but just pain, that was all the consciousness I\nhad.\u201d Such an expression is intelligible, and may be a fact. However, it\nis in the phenomena of lapse and rise of consciousness that we see\nevidences that undifferentiated feeling probably occurs, and that\nsometimes in high psychisms. In the following chapter we discuss then\nthis point as a matter of judgment of tendencies, rather than on basis\nof direct evidence of introspection, though this is not barred out.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER II\n _ON PRIMITIVE CONSCIOUSNESS_\n\n\nScience views the world as an assemblage of objects having mutual\nrelations. In this cosmos of interacting elements certain objects become\nendowed with mental powers by which they accomplish self-conservation.\nJust what these objects are and how they attain mental quality is beyond\nour direct investigation. However, assuming consciousness as a purely\nbiological function, as a mode for securing favourable reactions, we can\ndiscuss the probable course of its evolution under the law of\nself-conservation. Mind, like all other vital function, must originate\nin some very simple and elementary form as demanded at some critical\nmoment for the preservation of the organism. It is tolerably obvious\nthat this could not be any objective consciousness, any cognitive act,\nlike pure sensation, for this has no immediate value for life. It was\nnot as awareness of object or in any discriminating activity that mind\noriginated, for mere apprehension would not serve the being more than\nthe property of reflection the mirror. The demand of the organism is for\nthat which will accomplish immediate movement to the place of safety.\nThe stone pressed upon by a heavy weight does not react at once to\nsecure itself, but is crushed out of its identity; but the organism\nreacts at once through pain. It is certainly more consonant with the\ngeneral law of evolution that mind start thus in pure subjective act\nrather than in mere objective acts, like bits of presentation or a\nmanifold of sense. We shall now endeavour to elucidate this conception\nof pure pain as primitive mind, first from the general point of view of\nthe law of self-conservation, and secondly from particular inductive\nconsiderations.\n\nIt is very difficult to conceive what this bare undifferentiated pain as\noriginal conscious act was, it being so foreign to our own mental acts.\nOur psychoses have a certain connection one with the other, and a\nconnection which is cognized as such, so that the whole of mental life\nis pervaded by an ego-sense. But primitive consciousness must have been\nby intermittent and isolated flashes. The primitive pain, moreover, was\nnot a pain in any particular kind, but wholly undifferentiated or bare\npain. There was no sense of the painful, but only pure pain. Nor was\nthere any consciousness of the pain, any knowledge or apperception of\nit. The pain stands alone and entirely by itself, and constituting by\nitself a genus.\n\nNow to assert that this general pain exists, is not, of course, realism.\nThe pain is a particular act, though it is wholly without particular\nquality. It is not a pain as one of a kind distinct from other kinds,\nbut it is comparable to a formless, unorganized mass of protoplasm which\nhas in it potency of future development. Pain may exist as such, but not\na consciousness or a feeling. It is meaningless to say that the first\npsychosis may have been a consciousness in general form which was\nneither a feeling, a will, or a cognition, but the undifferentiated\nbasis of these, nor can a feeling _per se_ exist. The expressions,\npainful consciousness, and painful feeling are deceptive; there is no\nconsciousness which pains, but consciousness is the pain, and the\nfeeling is not pleasurable or painful, but is the pleasure or pain.\n\u201cFeeling,\u201d as I have said (_Mind_, vol. xiii., p. 244), \u201chas no\nindependent being apart from the attributes which in common usage are\nattached to it, nor is there any general act of consciousness with which\nthese properties are to be connected.\u201d\n\nFurther, the law of conservation requires us to associate with this\nprimitive act of blind, formless pain the will act of struggle and\neffort which is as simple and undifferentiated as the feeling. And these\ntwo we must mark as the original elements of all mental life.\nStrenuousness through and by pain is primal and is simplest force which\ncan conduce to self-preservation. It is thus that active beings with a\nvalue in and for themselves are constituted. The earliest conscious\nresponse to outward things is purely central and has no cognitive value.\nThe first consciousness was a flash of pain, of small intensity, yet\nsufficient to awaken struggle and preserve life.\n\nPleasure, then, we have excluded from playing any _r\u00f4le_ in absolutely\nprimitive consciousness. Pleasure and pain could not both be primitive\nfunctions, and of the two pain is fundamental in that the earliest\nfunction of consciousness must be purely monitory. Pain alone fulfils\nprimitive demands, and secures struggle which ends in the abatement of\npain through change of environment or otherwise. Pain lessens, but\npleasure does not come, but unconsciousness instead, for no continuous\norganic psychic life is yet evolved. As long as pain continues there is\neffort and self-conserving action; when pain ceases, consciousness\nceases, because the need for it is gone. Each fit of pain subsides into\nunconsciousness as struggle succeeds, and there is no room for even the\npleasure of relief, which, indeed, must be accounted a tolerably late\nfeeling. As far as the lowest organisms have a conscious life it is a\npain life, but they have a Nirvana in a real unconsciousness. The\nevolution of pleasure must be accounted a distinct problem.\n\nThe law of evolution is, that origin of function and all progressive\nmodification arise at critical stages. Thus it is in painful\ncircumstances that the origin of mind is to be traced, and the important\nsteps in its development have been achieved in severest struggle and\nacutest pain at critical periods. Pleasure is not then the original\nstimulant of will, but is a secondary form. Pleasure has an obvious\nutility which is far from the absolutely primitive. The pleasure-mode\nearly enters, however, to sharpen by contrast the pain-mode, and it is\nonly by their interaction that any high grade of psychic life could be\nbuilt up. The development of pleasure cannot be from pain, but as a\npolar opposite to it. We cannot bring the development of mind into a\nperfectly continuous evolution from a single germ, as is the case in\nbiological evolution. In a sense we may say that pleasure and pain are\ncomplementary, like positive and negative electricity, but the\ncomparison cannot be pressed. We cannot, indeed, carry it so far as to\nbelieve either absolutely essential to the other. We mention, then, the\nevolution of pleasure as a problem which is yet to be dealt with in\nfull. However, that it is not original element in mind is easily seen\nfrom this. As we ascend the grades of psychic life the pleasure-pain\ngamut lengthens, and as we descend, it shortens, with pleasure always as\nthe intermediate factor. Thus, if we can represent it by a line,\n\n PAIN PLEASURE PAIN\n \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u253c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u253c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n\nany single element which can affect psychic life, as temperature, moves\nthrough a highest pain intensity, an intermediate region, then to pain\nagain as effects in a range from a very high temperature to very low, or\n_vice vers\u00e2_. Now, this gamut in a human being, from the intensest agony\nfrom heat to the greatest suffering from cold, consists of very many\nnotes, but the step to unconsciousness is always at one end of the\nscale. In lower psychic life it shortens, but always at the intermediate\npoints where pain merges into pleasure and pleasure into pain, and thus\nin the lowest form the original element of consciousness as feeling is\nseen when only the two extremes remain, namely, primitive consciousness\nas pain reaction. As the step from feeling\u2014consciousness to\nunconsciousness is through a pain, this certainly points to pain as the\noriginal feeling, and the first element of consciousness. We must\nsuppose then that the first organism which attained consciousness felt\npain, that if this came from temperature, for example, that intense heat\nand intense cold would both produce a pain one and the same in nature,\nbare pain, not sensation of heat or cold. And this pain-consciousness\nresponse came at first only at the application of these critical\ntemperatures, all other degrees not bringing any response. If\nconsciousness like other functions originated as an infinitesimal germ\nat some crisis in life, it must have been with pain. The pleasure\nfunction, unlike the pain, does not originate in life and death crises.\n\nThat pleasure is secondary is also suggested by this, that pleasure is\nmainly connected with such late formations as the special senses,\nwhereas pain is prominent with earlier functions. Thus we have pleasures\nof taste, but visceral pleasure is scarcely noticeable, though visceral\npain, as colic, may be very acute. Wild animals, which feed often under\nfear of interruption or in extreme hunger, bolt their food without\ntasting, and so miss taste pleasure, and this seems to be the type of\nprimitive feeding.\n\nThe origin of pleasure is then, I think, to be traced as an intermediary\nfeeling between pain as produced by excess, and pain from lack as\ndifferentiated form. Pain as original and undifferentiated is the same\nwhether resulting from excess or lack, but it is only after it has\ndifferentiated so far as to be in two modes that pleasure can enter as a\nmediate form of feeling and become a directing force to advantageous\naction. The primitive pleasure-pain gamut was this:\n\n LACK PAIN PURE PLEASURE EXCESS PAIN\n \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u253c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u253c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n\nA general survey from the point of view of self-conservation leads us\nthen to regard the original psychic state as a pain-effort form. There\nis first a purely undifferentiated sense of pain and closely consequent\na purely undifferentiated _nisus_. There is neither sense of objectivity\nin general, nor in any special mode, nor is there feeling of pleasure.\nAnd the study of what seem to be the earliest forms of mental life in\nthe child and in the lower animals points toward this conclusion.\nPreyer, in his studies on the mind of the child, expresses his\nconviction that the feelings \u201care the first of all psychical events to\nappear with definiteness,\u201d and that at first in no manifold forms. He\nadds, \u201cThe first period of human life belongs to the least agreeable,\ninasmuch as not only the number of enjoyments is small, but the capacity\nfor enjoyment is small likewise, and the unpleasant feelings predominate\nuntil sleep interrupts them\u201d (_Mind of the Child_, Part I., New York,\n1888, p. 143, _cf._ p. 185). Since in the embryology of the mind as in\nthat of the body the individual repeats in condensed manner the\nevolution of life, we judge that these observations point toward the\ngenesis of consciousness in a single feeling state, pure\nundifferentiated pain. The earliest consciousness we can discover seems\nto approach this type. The close observer of very young infants must\nfeel that the meagre psychic life they may have consists mainly of\nintermittent pains interrupted by comparatively long periods of\nunconsciousness in sleep. Of course, the earliest psychic life of the\ninfant is not absolutely primitive both on account of heredity and on\naccount of pre-natal experience; but in its general form it, no doubt,\nreverts toward the original _status_ of mind. This original state, to\nwhich that of a very young infant is akin, was merely pain, which knew\nnot itself nor its relation to other states, nor its relation to the\nexternal world, but was a wholly central subjective fact, and so was\nexpressed only in wild and blind general movements. The very lowest\ntypes of psychic life which we can interpret seems to feel and nothing\nmore. They do not feel _at_ anything, and do not feel because they know,\nnor do they have definite kinds of feeling.\n\nPure feeling as bare pain and as undifferentiated pleasure is certainly\nfar removed from our ordinary conscious experience, yet it may sometimes\nappear in a survival form, especially in sluggish states, in waking from\nsleep, and in recovering from an\u00e6sthetics. We are sometimes awakened by\na dull pain which was evidently in its inception mere bare pain without\ndifferentiation. But in all such cases the pure pain or pure pleasure is\nbut momentary, and is quickly swallowed up in a flood of manifold\nsensations. Many objects by many modes of sense at once invade and\npossess consciousness, and the early indefinite mode vanishes so quickly\nthat we very rarely have time to note it by reflective consciousness.\n\nBut it is not merely in exceptional states of developed consciousness\nthat we may trace the elementary form of feeling, but we may believe it\nto be fundamental to consciousness in general. It is natural for us who\nare so pervaded and dominated by sense of objectivity to see in it the\ncausal element in mentality; feeling and will seem consequent to it, and\nwe apprehend and feel accordingly. But the order of evolution was not\nfrom knowledge in any form to feeling, but the reverse, and we may\nsuspect that in the completest analysis consciousness will still be\nfound to obey its original law. If the rise of knowledge was at the\ninstance of feeling, it is certainly unlikely that a fundamental order\nshould be more than apparently reversed.\n\nThe order of consciousness is really the reverse of the order conceived\nby the objectifying consciousness, and this is a point where cognition\nby its very nature as objective may be said to obscure itself. To\napprehend is to bring into relation, and the relation is very easily\nattributed to what is purely unrelated, to pure subjectivity. Thus here\nin the interpretation of merely subjective facts knowledge tends to\nstand in its own way. It is only objectively that the objectifying can\nappear causative of feeling; subjectively sense of object must always be\ntaken as subsequent to a pleasure-pain psychosis. The object\ncommunicates or causes the feeling, but the subjective order is as such\nof necessity the opposite; the object does not come in view; there is no\nrelating, until feeling has incited to it, and gradually the mind\nreaches out to an objective order from the purely central fact. In every\npsychical reaction there must be the purely central disturbance before\nthe rebound to the actuality occasioning the disturbance. I must feel\nbefore I can discriminate or have any sense of the communication of the\nfeeling. This means that when external objects are brought into relation\nwith a wholly unanticipating consciousness, the first element in\npsychosis is always pure pleasure or pure pain. Thus, on a cold, dark\nday a sudden rush of sunlight on a blindfold man causes pleasure, then\nfeeling warm, and then sense of warming object. The glow of pleasure and\nthe pang of pain merely as such is in all cases precedent to any\nobjective reference. Pure centrality of response, I thus take to be the\ninitial element of all psychosis, primitive or developed. The first\ntendency in every consciousness is pure pain-pleasure, complete\nsubjectivity which, however, in higher consciousness is so quickly lost\nthrough practically consentaneous differentiation that all traces of it\nseem wholly extinguished. Pure subjectivity must be pronounced the most\nevanescent of all characters in developed minds and yet the most\nconstant. It is the inevitable precedent in every sensation and in every\nperception. We always experience pleasure or pain before the pleasurable\nor painful. A bright colour gives pleasure before we see it, and this\npleasure incites to the seeing it. But so fully has the objective order\nbeen wrought into consciousness as a mode of interpretation that the\ngreat majority on reading the preceding sentence will mentally at first\nattribute sense of objectivity from the expression \u201cbright colour gives\npleasure,\u201d as if there were pleasure at colour, a colour-pleasure,\nwhereas is meant pleasure and nothing more,\u2014bare, undifferentiated\npleasure.\n\nThe objective statement, however true, is no measure of subjective fact,\nbut this twisting of subjective fact to correspond with objective order\nis so embedded in language and common thought that it will perhaps\nalways remain the form of ordinary thinking, like common-sense realism\nand geocentric appearance. The expressions, it pleased me, it pained me,\nand the common modes of speech in general, are fundamentally misleading.\nPleasure and pain bring their objects, not objects pleasures and pains.\nPleasure _per se_ does not come for and in consciousness from the\nobject,\u2014though this is objective order\u2014but the object for and in\nconsciousness comes from the pleasure. Pleasure and pain always precede\nany cognizance of the thing, and it is only the combination of the two\nelements that constitutes pleasure or pain of or at a thing. The\nprimitive element, the original feeling movement, also excludes subject\nas real object; both the \u201cit\u201d and \u201cme\u201d are not yet apparent; there is\nnot yet identification of experience with subject or object, and in fact\nno sense of experience at all. The psychologist must retain common\nexpressions, however, but, like the astronomer who retains such phrases\nas the sun rises, the sun sets, he must reverse common interpretation\nand correct natural error.\n\nGuided by this principle we note an obvious error in the interpretation\nof child consciousness. If a bright-coloured object is passed before the\neyes of a young infant we may conclude from its expression that a\npleasure-consciousness is awakened, but we are probably quite at fault\nif we conceive it to have a consciousness of bright, and that this\nconsciousness preceded and gave rise to pleasure and gave it a _quale_\nas pleasure-brightness. Sense of pleasure-object is manifested by\nappropriative activities, but in the very young, where these activities\nare lacking, the response to object is best regarded not as in any wise\nsense of object, nor even any kind of sensation, but as a pure\nsubjectivity of pleasure. Of course the same remarks apply to the pain\nside of the child\u2019s experience.\n\nThe purely subjective experience, while it becomes more and more\nevanescent factor as mind develops, yet always maintains its place as\nthe initial point and vanishing-point of every psychosis. Every\npsychosis beyond the most primitive must be accounted a\nfeeling-will-knowing group. These psychic forces exist in a correlated\nunion generally comparable with the correlated activity of physical\nforces like electricity and heat. Each psychosis repeats in itself, in\ntendency form at least, the essential stages in the evolution of\nconsciousness. Every psychosis rises from the pure pleasure-pain as the\nlowest level of mentality like a wave, and like a wave falls back into\nit again. Every wave of consciousness, whether it rises slowly or\nrapidly, whether it subsides gradually or violently, rises from pure\nsubjectivity and comes back to it again. This absolutely simple feeling\nphase is accomplished so rapidly in ordinary human consciousness as to\nbe rarely perceptible, but in lower consciousness it often exists as\nmood, as more or less permanent psychosis. The Brahmans attain\nartificially a subjectivity akin to this through their expertness in\nmental control and manipulation. They succeed in reducing and keeping\nconsciousness in some very simple type, and their Nirvana may be\nconsidered as a state of pure subjectivity on the pleasure side. They,\nof course, cannot really attain this state or, at least, keep it, for\npleasure is at bottom relative, yet they come to something approaching\nit. Pain at its height just before unconsciousness is reached, is always\nof the pure subjective type. In slow torture pain increases to a maximum\nintensity in pure pain, beyond which there is a gradual loss of\nintensity and consciousness in general, till ultimate failure of all\nconsciousness. From the maximum intensity on to the end, consciousness\nis entirely subjective. Pleasure at its maximum attains only comparative\nsubjectivity. Such facts tend toward a theory of mind which makes its\noriginal and fundamental act purely central; mind starts as in a germ\nwhich pushes outward till it penetrates space and time, but not in any\nreverse motion a pushing inward of a series of presentation forms.\n\nWe shall now notice certain of Mr. James Ward\u2019s statements on primordial\nmind\u2014in the article Psychology, _Encyclop\u00e6dia Britannica_\u2014in which he\ncontroverts feeling as original and simplest unit in mentality. Mr. Ward\nregards \u201c_the simplest form of psychical life_\u201d as involving\n\u201c_qualitatively distinguishable presentations which are the occasions of\nthe feeling_.\u201d Presentation is primitive and initial in all\nconsciousness, and cognition\u2014feeling\u2014will is the order for all mind. We\nalways act as we are pleased or pained with the \u201cchanges in our\nsensations, thoughts, or circumstances\u201d of which we are aware. Some\npresentation form is, throughout all our experience, the precursor and\ncause of feeling, and feeling can never be said to exist in a pure state\nas bare pleasure and pain totally without cognitive value.\n\nOn the contrary, I conclude from general considerations and from special\nindications in our own minds that pure pain is the original element, and\nthat pure pleasure and pain are fundamental in all mind. Pure feeling\narises from objects, indeed, but is still wholly unknowing of object and\nwithout qualitative aspect. Pure feeling is the constant incentive to\nall knowing and will activity. To say that I am pleased with a thing is\nto transform objective order into subjective fact. Pleasures and pains\ncertainly come from things but this does not invariably rouse cognition\nof them as so coming, or of object as causative agent. The governing and\nessential fact of mind is always pure feeling, which, by reason of its\nperfect centrality, necessarily and naturally tends to elude\nobservation. Every act of consciousness begins and ends with pure\nfeeling, but mind, as far as it minds itself, is most apt to see only\nculminating phases rather than the obscure and inner forces which\nconstituted long outgrown stages. The prominent facts of late\nconsciousness are always very complex. Cognition as revealer unites with\nthe known and inevitably, but strongly tends to regard itself as the\ndetermining and causative agent, whereas by its essence and function it\nis secondary. Cognition does not create its object, except in the view\nof a transcendental philosophy.\n\nMr. Ward asserts that phenomena of pleasure and pain involve change in\nconsciousness with consciousness of change whereby we are pleased or\npained. A changing presentation _continuum_ is impressed upon mind, and\nit is by awareness of these changes that feelings are caused. This is\ncertainly a complex mode to be assigned to all consciousness. This\nasserts that primarily consciousness merely happens in presentation form\nas determined from without, but I take it that the evolution of faculty\nis always acquirement, not mind determined, but mind determining,\nachieving its own growth in blind struggle. Mind is wholly an inward\ngrowth, not a series of givens; and presentations are accomplished not\nmerely in it but by it. The fundamental principle is that while objects\ndo determine conscious functions, it is only through self-conservative\ninterest, through pleasure and pain reacting to them. All sensations,\nintuitions, presentations, are at bottom achievements as forced by law\nof struggle for existence. They do, indeed, seem to come of necessity\nand spontaneously to adult human consciousness, but developed faculty by\nvirtue of being such does not have to attain beginnings.\n\nBut we note also this, that while all consciousness is change in the\nsense of being dynamic, of being an activity, this does not include\nconsciousness of change. Consciousness as a changing factor is very\ndistinct from consciousness of that change, and does not necessarily\ninclude or imply it. That the forms of activity which we group under the\ngeneral term consciousness have their existence wholly in movement and\nchange is true, but this does not necessitate that the changing elements\nshould be aware of the change as such. Different things may be felt and\nknown, but this does not always result in being known _as different_.\nThis brings in comparison, consciousness of relation, which is certainly\nbeyond primitive consciousness. In early mind we conceive that new\nelements are continually taking the place of the old, that change is\nincessant, yet without sense of the change. So far as the earliest\nconsciousness is spasmodic and intermittent, appearing in isolated\nflashes, we cannot speak even of change in consciousness, much less of\nconsciousness of change, for there is no continuous thread, no\nintegration, consequently change is not in consciousness from a\nconsciousness to a consciousness, but the only change is from a\nconsciousness to unconsciousness. In the whole life of some organisms we\nmay believe that only three or four pains or pleasures occur, entirely\nsubjective and undifferentiated, and this collection of consciousnesses\nwhere state does not follow and influence state, where there is no\ncomplexity, is scarcely to be termed a consciousness which changes, much\nless that is aware of change. It is not improbable that even with\ncivilized and educated men mind may sometimes lapse so far that changes\noccur with no awareness of change. In such sluggish conditions as when\nhalf asleep we may experience succession of consciousnesses without\nnoting succession, each phase standing alone in itself and by itself.\nWhile consciousness is maintained as consciousness\u2014that is, a\ncontinuance of conscious states\u2014by the change, it is obviously not\nnecessary to this that there should be awareness of change. Here as\nelsewhere we must keep clear of the mistake of making consciousness more\nthan a general term for a group of phenomena. Consciousness as such has\nno reality or existence, but merely denominates a sum of\nconsciousnesses. The phrase, change of consciousness, and similar\nexpressions easily convey the impression that consciousness is a\nchanging something. But we know that consciousness does not exist as a\ngeneral indefinite something which changes or has other properties, but\nis merely a name for certain activities and functions.\n\nThe formula of Mr. Ward\u2019s hardly applies to developed consciousness,\nmuch less to undeveloped. Consciousness even in man cannot be regarded\nas a something which changes in sensation and presentation forms as pure\ngivens, determined with immediate completeness from without, and these\nchanges perceived, and pleasure and pain result. On the contrary the\nimmediateness and spontaneity of presentation forms in our ordinary\nadult human consciousness are in appearance only; they stand first\nbefore us because they have reached a dominance through heredity and\neducation, but still the latent and inward order is always from feeling\nto knowledge and not _vice vers\u00e2_. The accomplishment of presentation is\nusually so marvellously rapid in perceptive beings, and acts upon such\nslight incentive that it is only under very rare conditions of\nregression, or when developing a new sense or new form of sense that we\nsee that the moving element in mentality is pure feeling. Thus, for\nexample, in being awakened from sound sleep by a bright light suddenly\nbrought into the room, the order of consciousness is, pure feeling of\npain, sensation of light, perception of lighted object, and not the\nreverse; whenever we can catch consciousness gradually awakening we can\nalways identify this order. The lighted lamp, objectively speaking,\ncertainly caused the feeling of discomfort with which consciousness\nbegan, and this feeling roused the mind to both sensation of light and\nperception of lamp. I, of course, have a feeling as to the visible\nobject only after seeing it, but this is altogether distinct from the\nfeeling which incites to the seeing. A vague, undifferentiated pain or\npleasure is always initiative, but pure pleasure-pain is often so low in\nintensity that it does not start any cognitive act.\n\nIn a general way the influence of feeling and emotion upon cognitive act\nin higher psychical life is acknowledged by common observation. The wish\nis father to the thought\u2014we see what we want to see. What we observe\ndepends upon prepossession, interest, and the whole pleasure-pain tone.\nThe mind must be determined to cognitive act by interest of some kind,\nand even for advanced consciousness with all its strength of inherited\naptitude total loss of interest ultimately leads to loss of perceptive\npower. The _impetus_ of all previous cognitive effort will carry on\ncognition, of any high order, at least, but a comparatively short time.\nBlot feeling out of life and all nature would soon become a dumb show\nand quickly fade into nothingness. Absolute passionless receptivity is\nimpossible under the conditions of reality, and pure presentation forms\nnever _come_ as antecedent and causative to feeling. We have constantly\nto bear in mind that in the nature of the case the simplest elements and\nfundamental laws are hidden and certainly far from conspicuous in highly\ndeveloped mind, which is an intricate _nexus_ of feeling, will, and\ncognition constantly acting and reacting on each other.\n\nAs a general statement, then, impliedly as to mind in general, and\nimplicitly as to the developed human mind, the proposition that\nconsciousness is fundamentally aware of changes in itself as the basis\nand cause of all feeling is an assertion which may well be questioned.\nCertain it is that being \u201cpleased or pained with the change\u201d is not\nfeeling in general, but a particular kind of feeling, namely, feeling of\nvariety and novelty. Further, to be pleased with a thing for itself\nalone is not to be referred to pleasure or pain \u201cwith the change.\u201d There\nis intrinsic pleasurableness and painfulness which does not come under\nthe head of pleasure or pain of change. From both an _a priori_ point of\nview of the law of self-conservation, and also from a brief survey of\ncertain forms in comparative and human psychology, we incline towards\naccepting pure pain as the original consciousness which is very soon\ndifferentiated into excess and lack pain with evolution of pure\npleasure. Will exists throughout as incited by feeling. Much, indeed, is\nto be done before this theory of the nature of mind is either fully\nelucidated or proved; but I believe that the assumption of mind as life\nfunction leads toward such a theory. Sensationalism and intuitionalism\nare both mistaken as to the origin and essence of mentality.\nConsciousness is not at bottom any mode of cognition, either as more or\nless freely accomplished by a \u201cmind,\u201d or as more or less mechanical\nimpression from \u201cthings,\u201d but it is primitively and fundamentally pain\nand pleasure as serving the organism in the struggle for existence. It\nis strange that evolutionary psychologists have so generally missed this\npoint of view, and maintain sensationalism.\n\nComte, indeed, acutely remarks (_Positive Philosophy_, vol. 1, p. 463)\nthat \u201cdaily experience shows that the affections, the propensities, the\npassions, are the great springs of human life; and that, so far from\nresulting from intelligence, their spontaneous and independent impulse\nis indispensable to the first awakening and continuous development of\nthe various intellectual faculties.\u201d He here assumes the introspection\nwhich he elsewhere denies as psychological method, and enunciates an\nimportant principle which he never carried out. Horwicz has made a\nsurvey of feeling as fundamental aspect of mind, but his discussion is\nphysiological.\n\nOur conclusions have been founded on general considerations and on the\nphenomena of growth of mind in general and particular. Another line of\nevidence would be decadent mind. Mental powers should decline and vanish\nin the reverse of the general order in which they arose; the order of\ndisappearance should be the reverse of appearance, and if pain-pleasure\nbe primitive, we should expect to find it both the first conscious\nelement in infancy and the last in old age. The last stage of senility\nseems sensitive only to organic pleasures and pains. Further, old age\ndoes not so much seek pleasure as guard against pains, and this fact is\nin line with our treatment of pain as prior to pleasure and more\nfundamental than it. We may consider it likely that conscious life in\nthe individual begins with a pain and ends with a pain. Senile\npsychology on this and other points is worthy of far more attention than\nit has received, for it is on the whole more accessible and trustworthy\nthan infant psychology.\n\nWith regard to Mr. H. R. Marshall\u2019s remarks (_Philosophical Review_,\nvol. 1, p. 632), it is sufficient to say that I lay no great emphasis on\neither pain or pleasure being the first fact of consciousness; but my\nmain contention is that the primitive facts of consciousness are of the\npain-pleasure type. While I have noticed some considerations as implying\npain to be the first consciousness phenomenon, yet I am satisfied that\npain and pleasure are correlative and complementary, each implying the\nother. Further, I do not regard pain as \u201cprimal sense,\u201d but as primal\nfact. Pain is not in any wise a sense, and sense of pain can only mean\ncapacity for pain, or actual pain experience.\n\nAgain, I do not, as Mr. Marshall implies, regard pain as the\ndifferentiating basis of subsequent evolution, but rather as mere\n_prius_ and impetus, and hence I do not look for pain-pleasure to\ndisappear with mental evolution, nor yet to mark divisions in\n\u201csensational phenomena\u201d; but it will ever remain in representative\nforms, at least, as increasingly complex stimulant of all mental life.\n\nThe objection urged by H\u00f6ffding and others to the primitive nature of\npure feeling is that we sense before we feel pain or pleasure; thus we\nhave the sensation of touch before we feel the pain from contact with a\nhot stove; we feel the pin, then the pricking sensation, then the pain.\nThis precedence has been measured by Beau and others.\n\nBut what is the significance of these well-recognised facts? Do they\nshow that pain-pleasure originates always in sensation? What is the\norigin of tactile power? How and why was the first tactile effort made,\nif not at impulse of some pain-pleasure? When conscious life was at\npre-tactile stage\u2014before it had learned to touch\u2014it had no pain from\ntouch, but it had pain. We can scarcely deny that a pre-tactile stage\nexists, that all sensation was originally a sensing\u2014an exertive act,\nthat it did not _come_, but was _attained_; for all the growth of\nsensitive power in the race proceeds thus at present, and the law of\npresent psychic development in this regard seems general. But it is\npain-pleasure which forces all action; here is the impulse which brings\nexertion whether as sensing or otherwise. A doctrine of spontaneity is\nagainst the general law of development by struggle. It is certainly true\nthat, standing with my back to the stove and inadvertently coming in\ncontact, I, without any previous pain-pleasure impulse and without\nexertion, have sense of touch, then pain. But this spontaneity is not\noriginal factor; it is the result of inherited powers. When tactility\nhas become a well-developed power and is handed down to descendants,\nthen contact with things is immediately and spontaneously realized in\nthe form of touch, which contact would originally have been unnoticed.\nThat is, the severest condition\u2014a red hot stove\u2014would impress the lowest\npsychism only in terms of mere pain, and so result in general reactions\nof _minimum_ service. The early psychism which is just in process of\nachieving sense of touch would have pain, and then with effort touch the\nobject and thus attain some more special reaction of more particular\nservice. But the tactile, like all sensing activity is anticipatory, it\nis a finder, an interpreter. Suppose I bring a very fine needle toward\nyour eye, you may see it and avoid it; but suppose your eyes are shut\nthe eye comes in contact with the needle, and you have sensation of\ntouch; but you are sound asleep, then pricking sensation may wake you as\nneedle proceeds deeper, but in profoundest sleep undefined pain may be\nthe first consciousness to result. Now the needle might be so small as\nto be seen with great difficulty by the waking man, or invisible, or to\nbe touched with great difficulty; but this stage of exertive action for\nthe sense is only relative, and in the history of mind the very grossest\nforms were at one time only dimly seen by intensest effort, and lower\nstill, touched only by intensest effort. Seeing originated in looking,\nand passive touch in active touch, as moved by interest or direct\npleasure-pain. Now pain is not in the mere sight or touch, but is\nsuggested by them. The whole order\u2014seeing, touching, feeling prick,\nfeeling pain\u2014is the reverse of evolution order. The rational mode, then,\nof interpreting the origin of any sense, whether tactile, visual or\nother, is not by receptivity, but through struggle at critical stage\nwhen great pain is actual or imminent. Thus, if the conditions of life\nrequired the development of a special sense of magnetism, it would\nsurely arise by strongest effort, as, indeed, all progress in special\nsensitiveness is now being accomplished. Thus, the anticipatory and\npremonitory function of sense does not make it original, rather the\ncontrary; it is guide and significant of pain-pleasure.\n\nIt is obvious that the cognitive tendency once established becomes an\ninstinct of objectivity and governs the whole mentality. This is\nobviously the case with man. He does not exist in that sluggishness and\nsemi-consciousness where pain-pleasure must arise as primitive impulse,\nbut by habit and instinct he is passively and actively cognitive. The\neye is continually seeing things spontaneously, the hand touching, but\nas to some very small object we have to exert effort to see or touch,\nand this was undoubtedly the mode by which all seeing and touching\narose. It is because generations of ancestors actively sensed, that we\nautomatically sense; the tendency has become ingrained in mind. So it is\nthat man is predominantly sensing, is continually and naturally awake to\nobjective conditions, is constantly anticipatory, and so normally senses\nbefore he feels pain-pleasure. However, a man in a \u201cbrown study,\u201d\ninadvertently touching a hot stove, has pain, then warmth, then touch\nsensation, and actively realizes these. So in deep slumber mentality\noften begins with pain-pleasure. At bottom the reason we have pain from\na sensing is because we had originally pain-impulse to that sensing, and\nthe pain therewith. Thus tactility, arising as effortful sensing, was\nproduced by pain from thing to be touched, to be sensed in its\nexperimental value. By innumerable painful experiences with hot things,\nthe hot thing is tactilily appreciated; and as touching is actively\npursued by organism on the alert, the associated pain is more and more\nquickly realized from given object. In origin pain was felt from the hot\nthing in contact, before either sense of warmth or contact was sensed;\nit was this pain that forced to sensing and development of cognition,\nwhich, however, ultimately became habit, and things were constantly\nappreciated and anticipated. Thus the touch-warmth-pain order is\nestablished. Sense is significant of pain-pleasure, but the\npain-pleasure came not at first from the sensing, but the contrary;\nsensing was determined by it, and became correlated with it, and became\nsign of it. The progress is from initial subjectivity to an instinctive\nconstant objectivity. This objectivity is reflected in all objective\nexpression as language; \u201cthe heat was painful,\u201d \u201cit hurt\u201d; the \u201cit\u201d\nbeing tactual thing, etc., etc. However, if we look for primitive\nconsciousness, we must find it only in primitive organisms in their\nprimitive stage, and in man most rarely only as tendency in profound\nrelapse. We must mark this, that cognition is not to be evolved out of\nfeeling, but at instance of feeling as impelling the knowing effort or\nvolition.\n\nWe may suppose that primitive consciousness still exists in the lowest\ntypes of life, but it may also be the sub-consciousness in the higher\ntypes. Viewed biologically, what is sub-consciousness?\n\nThe earliest living aggregations attain but a very slight degree of\ncommon life, and very slowly do the cells, under the pressure of\nserviceability in the struggle for existence, give up their independency\nand become interdependent, each thereby giving up some functioning to be\ndone for it by others, and in turn functioning for others. Thus it is\nbut slowly that a stomach is specialised, the cells in general in the\norganism long retaining and exercising some digestive function, which is\nproperly termed sub-digestion. In this way a soup bath gives\nnourishment. If psychic function specializes gradually like other\nfunctions, we shall have in the same way a sub-form here, a\nsub-consciousness which stands for lower centres, and not for the whole\norganism as such. The wider, higher, and more specialized psychic centre\ndoes not at once extinguish the lower.\n\nNow what is a _high_ organism but an involved series of combinations of\ncombinations? With every new integration a higher plane is achieved, and\nthe vital process has a wider functioning: but the physical or psychical\nactivity so far as it does not pass over into the service of the new and\nhigher whole remains as sub-function. With every new stage in evolution\nthe integrating psychic factors only partially lose themselves in\neffecting a common psychism for the new whole, a sub-consciousness and a\nsub-sub-consciousness, etc., are still carried on in survival. In man,\nphysiologically speaking, it is the brain consciousness which is\ngeneral. But we need not suppose this to extinguish all the lower\nganglionic consciousness from which and by which it arose. If psychic\nfunction be correlative with other function, we must expect in man a\nvast amount of survival sub-mentality which, while not the mind of the\nman, is yet mind in the man. The individual knows necessarily only the\ngeneral consciousness, for this only is _his_ consciousness and\nconstitutes his individuality, yet the doctrine of evolution would call\nfor a vast deal of undiscoverable simple consciousness which never rises\nto the level of the whole organism\u2019s consciousness. A cell or a group of\ncells may be in pain and yet there be no pain in the individual\u2019s\nconsciousness, and so unknown to this general consciousness.\n\nWe have intimated that primitive consciousness may occur in a\nsub-conscious way in the highest organisms. But can this\nsub-consciousness ever be more than mere survival in its nature? or may\nit play essential part as basis of higher manifestations? If the\nintegration of mentality is like other integration,\u2014_e.g._ material\nwhich is based on molecular and atomic activity\u2014it will be bound up in\nthe activity of psychic units, which can be none other than\nsub-consciousness. That is, any common or general consciousness when\nlooked at from below, and analytically is the dynamic organic whole of\nelements; it is a product of activities which are on another plane from\nitself. Roughly illustrated, I may say that my finger feels pain before\nI do. We conceive that at a certain intensity a sub-consciousness tends\nto rouse a general consciousness, and for a time maintain it; and losing\nintensity, the general consciousness disappears leaving only the\nsub-consciousness, which may long outlast the general form.\n\nSub-consciousness, whether as survival or basal, is put beyond our\ndirect observation, but it remains a necessary biological and\npsychological hypothesis. Here is exemplified for psychosis that law of\nthe aggregation of units in hierarchical order, that wheel within wheel\nstructure of the universe, upon which I have touched in _Mind_, ix. pp.\n272-3.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER III\n _THEORIES OF PLEASURE-PAIN_\n\n\nThe bearing of our studies on a theory of the conditions of\npleasure-pain is obvious. If we consider pure feeling as the primary,\nfundamental, and conditioning mentality, it stands before all other\nmentality, and cannot be interpreted as conditioned. Pain as _primum\nmobile_ is not intrinsically dependent on any other psychosis. Hence we\nrun counter to the Herbartian School, which maintains that psychism\nexists from the first for itself as intellectual ideational activity,\nand that pleasure-pain is but reflex of the efficiency and ease, or the\ninefficiency and difficulty of this activity. The checking of the\ncurrent of ideas may give a pain, but our exposition has been that pain\narose before ideas or presentations of any kind, and long before any\ninterference could be felt as pain.\n\nAgain, if we say \u201call pain comes from tension\u201d (_Mind_, xii. p. 6), we\nhave to ask, Tension of what? If we say tension of sensation or\nideation, this is Herbartianism merely. How also can tension be felt as\npainful, except through sensation of tension, which is a feeling of\nintense sensation\u2014obviously a late psychosis? And certainly pain is more\nthan a general consciousness fatigue. And further stress and strain\nresult in pain, because we imply these as painful activities by the very\nnotion of the words. A stress or strain is assumedly painful activity,\nbut this is not explanation. But apart from this, if the organism felt\npain merely as direct result of struggling and straining, it would cease\nactivity; activity and evolution would stop. It may be that by tension\nis not meant a mode of consciousness, but of nervous or muscular\nactivity; but as we are now considering psychosis only as conditioning\npure feeling, we leave this aspect for discussion till a little later.\nBut on the psychical side, that all pain is a by-product of over-intense\nconsciousness, intellectual or volitional, that the origin and\ndevelopment of pain is in a mental intensity which has gone beyond a\ncertain point, this seems, on general evolutionary grounds, unlikely.\nHere, indeed, is merely a very particular and rather late mode of pain.\nAnd may not pains themselves attain an intensity which is itself\npainful? It must be acknowledged, however, that the whole doctrine as to\nconsciousness intensity, its nature, reactions, laws, and measurements\nis very obscure.\n\nAgain, as to the theory that pleasure-pain is reflex of quantity of\nconsciousness, that pleasure results from mental expansion, pain from\nmental contraction, this must, like the intensity theory, be considered\nas putting a late and special form as covering all forms. Mentality here\nexists for itself, and conscious self-development\u2014a very late mode\u2014is\npresupposed. The promotion of large complete free consciousness, the\nsense of progress and of unimpeded mental activity, certainly conveys\nhigh joys to certain choice natures, but they do not touch the vast\nmajority of even human minds, much less animal. With the stolid an\nexpanding consciousness is painful. Consciousness only as conscious of\nitself, and as self-developing, reaches a pleasure or pain as a felt\nfurtherance or hindrance of its own expansion.\n\nAll reflex theories take us above the realm of simple consciousness\nacting directly for life, and this is the very form which seems\ncommonest, and which appears to be full of passing pleasures and pains.\nThat consciousness does react on itself in late phases is plain, but if\nconsciousness, like other functions, has developed from the extremely\nsimple to the extremely complex, this self-reaction cannot be regarded\nas primitive. Not till consciousness becomes integrated as a manifold\norganism do pleasure and pain become prominent as reflexes. We are not\nnow looking for the functional value of pleasure and pain in mind itself\nas an independent whole; but regarding its functional quality and that\nof all mentality in life values, and here the functional meaning of such\nreflexes is secondary. In mind, as organic continuous whole,\npleasure-pain is both resultant and excitant; it stands related to an\nantecedent state and it is stimulant to following states. Its function\nis excitant and it is the starting point of all other mentality, both\noriginally and in the later manifestation. The having pleasure-pain is\nwhat starts both motor and cognitive volition.\n\nIt has, indeed, been maintained that while pleasure-pain is not a\nproduct or concomitant of some psychosis, as sensation, it is itself a\nsensation, a definite mode of sensibility. I have a pain sense just as I\nhave a temperature sense, I feel pain in the same way as I feel warm,\nand by the analogous sensory nerves. With reference to this theory we\nmust ask, since sensation is correspondent to modes of objects, to what\nmode is pain correspondent? Sense responds to modes of object, as light,\nand sonorous vibrations; but pain is not based on any such mode of\nobjects. If pain were, there would have been long since a department of\nphysics, which would have treated that basis just as it treats light,\nheat, sound, etc. But we all know that an object is not painful or\npleasing in the same way that it is warm or cold, heavy or light. I do\nnot say the stone feels heavy and painful, but I do say the stone feels\npainfully heavy, that is feeling pain is not a state of awareness.\nFurther, having pain or pleasure is not by any sensing effort. I do not\ntry to feel pain as I try to see the light of a star or feel the warm\nspot in a bar of iron. To be sure, the doctor asks his patient, \u201cdo you\nfeel any pain?\u201d and after a moment\u2019s delay the answer may be, \u201cyes,\u201d but\nthis is not in the nature of a sensing effort, but merely an\nattentiveness to bodily conditions as affecting mental state, not an\nobjective attention but an analytical self-attention. Still further, a\nneural basis for pleasure-pain is altogether likely, but even if these\nnerves were found to be generally distributed over the body, this would\nnot prove sensation, but merely that pleasure-pain is functional\nthroughout the organism, diffusive organic consciousness. If\npleasure-pain is primitive, and neurality and mentality correlate, the\nearliest nerve structure\u2014ganglion\u2014was a pleasure-pain organ. However,\nthe sensory motor predominance is so early and complete that the current\ntheory, as the more objective, is the natural physiologic\ninterpretation.\n\nAgain, it has been maintained that pleasure-pain is not a definite state\nof consciousness, but a quality like intensity, a _modus_ which must\nbelong to all states. But if we assign pleasure-pain to such a category\nas intensity we must define just what we mean by this category. Is\nintensity a mere objective quality which we as observers assign to all\npsychosis, just as we do to electrical or luminous phenomena? or is it\ninherent element, an actual constituent, of every psychosis? If a man is\nangry and becomes more angry, intensity is increased; but we may\nconceive that he simply is more angry without being aware of this change\nof intensity, that is without every change of intensity being noted by\nconsciousness. As introspection avers, it often happens that a man is\nboth unconscious of his anger and unconscious of its increase. As I have\nfrequently had occasion to note, simple natures are wholly unconscious\nof their emotions and of their intensity variations. That is, as matter\nof fact, intensity of feeling is not feeling of intensity. If you feel\nwarm you feel differently than when you feel warmer, but this is no more\nthan saying that when the iron is hot it is in a different state than\nwhen it is hotter. Intensity means the same in both cases.\nConsciousness, primitively, at least, is not self-awareness of its own\nchanges in intensity. The feeling warm and the feeling warmer occur\nsimply as facts which are subjectively unrelated and unmeasured by the\nconsciousness which has the varying intensities. I strike a cow\nhard\u2014result, intense pain; harder, more intense pain; this is\ncorrelative with, I strike iron, intense tremor; harder, more intense\ntremor. The cow experiences more intense pain, but does not consciously\nmeasure it off as such. I can say, \u201cI feel hotter than I did,\u201d but the\ncow does not appreciate and express its own sense of its experience. The\nlanguage fallacy leads us astray. By our very use of terms, warm and\nwarmer, and by our discussion of the matter, we imply a consciousness of\nintensity which is far from being primitive or general. It would\nprobably be an overestimate to say that the intensity of one in a\nthousand psychoses makes itself felt as such in consciousness.\n\nThat consciousness is not always conscious of its own intensity is then\nshown by direct introspection. And in general we must observe that every\npsychosis has its own intensity, which intensity may or may not be noted\nby a consciousness of intensity. If there come a consciousness of\nintensity, this consciousness has its own intensity, which may be noted\nby a new consciousness, whose intensity may in like manner be noted by a\nnew consciousness, etc., _ad infinitum_. That is, a consciousness is\nnever its own intensity, and intensity is never a consciousness, such as\npain or pleasure, but is mere comparative objective quality.\n\nAgain, consciousness has almost from the first different degrees of\nactivity, but it would be most unlikely that so complex an act as\nconsciousness conscious of its own intensity should be primitive and\nearly. Also, if consciousness develops as life factor it must be\nimmediate utility which determines its early forms. Hence on this\ngeneral principle of biologic evolution it is most unlikely that\nprimitive organisms will both have consciousnesses and consciousness of\ntheir intensity, for of what direct and vital value is this\nintensity-consciousness as psychic mode? On the other hand it is\nobviously desirable that psychoses should early differentiate intensity\nas objective quality, _i.e._, without self-awareness of it, should have\ndifferent degrees of a psychosis to meet different degrees of\nrequirement; thus to fear strongly or weakly according to necessity of\nthe case. To have fear set at one pitch for all cases is perhaps\nabsolutely primitive, but differentiation is early. But to fear more or\nless, _i.e._, at different intensities, is not to have intensity as\nsubjective element, an actual psychosis constituent appreciated as such,\nwhich is very late evolution since the demand for it is late. In thus\ndefining the category of intensity we have plainly isolated it from the\npleasure-pain category. We know pleasure or pain as act of consciousness\njust as we know volition or sensation. Pain and pleasure are definite\nfacts like seeing or touching or willing, and are so recognised by\ncommon consciousness. One or the other may be involved in all\nexperience, but this does not make them general qualities like\nintensity. Pain is a consciousness, intensity is not a consciousness.\nThis is the immediate value of the terms, the very names convey\ndistinctness of category. I have a pain, I do not have an intensity; I\nam in pain, I am not in intensity. My pain is intense, but I cannot say\nmy intensity is painful. We experience pain and pleasure, but we never\nexperience intensity.\n\nThis _quale_ hypothesis as presented by Marshall in _Pain, Pleasure and\nAesthetics_, is set upon the dangerous foundation of ignorance, viz., of\nthe neural basis of pleasure-pain, and of causes of its variability. It\nis as yet disputed whether a nerve organ for pleasure-pain has been\nfound; but if one is generally acknowledged, the theory would be\noverthrown. Greater intensity in any psychosis, as sensation of warmth,\nmeans simply greater nervous activity in the particular nerves\nsubserving the psychosis, in this case the temperature nerves. So also\npleasure-pain as general concomitant like intensity must mean merely\nsome general mode of nervous activity as yet unknown, if we allow it any\nnervous basis at all. Again, the variability of pleasure-pain for a\ngiven content, the fact that the taste of olives is at one time\npleasant, at another, unpleasant, suggests that pleasure-pain is like\nintensity merely a general quality, which must in one form or another\nattach to all psychoses. But this does not explain anything. What we\nwant to know is why in any given case we have pleasure and not pain; we\ndo not wish to be put off with a general statement that the nature of\npleasure-pain is such that we may have either, which is akin to the old\nmetaphysical method of abstract explanation; making the _rationale_ of\nthe lion leoninity is not unlike the hypothesis that explains\npleasure-pain in all its variations by variability as its nature. We\nhave a scientific faith that variability is not a general unexplainable\nquality, but that there is for every case of pleasure-pain a definite\n_rationale_ based in the facts of life demand and life history. That\nolives now give pleasure, and now give pain, is based upon definite\nconditions of physical state which are very complex, but which can be\nrevealed by patient research alone.\n\nAny theory of pleasure-pain then from the point of view of pure\npsychology, as explaining it by reference to other modes of\nconsciousness, is, we think, unsatisfactory. But perhaps the\nphysiological point of view will be more satisfactory. It is generally\nconsidered that the function and origin of pain is in what is\nunfavourable to physiological function, of pleasure, in what is\nfavourable. I cut my finger, and the pain says, stop the injurious\naction. However, there are exceptions. I taste sugar of lead; it is\npleasant, and I keep on tasting, and am poisoned. Lotze explains that\nthis sweetness is immediately soothing and advantageous. \u201cWe must not\nregard pleasure,\u201d says Grant Allen, as \u201cprophetic.\u201d But what has been\nthe evolution of taste as sensing act except to be \u201cprophetic,\u201d to give\nat the opening of the alimentary canal a monitor to the stomach and\nother digestive organs? That it tastes sweet, that this taste is\npleasant, and so the substance is swallowed, or that it tastes bitter\nand unpleasant, and the substance is rejected; this surely is\nanticipatory and \u201cprophetic.\u201d The taste for sweetness is not evolved for\nitself; but for its life value; and hence Lotze\u2019s explanation fails from\nthe point of view of evolutionary psychology. The organic sweet is the\nnutritious and beneficial, and the sensing this quality in connection\nwith these favourable and pleasant effects on the stomach and organism\nas a whole has led to a taste and liking for sweetness. \u201cSweet and\nwholesome\u201d is the common and just conception. But if mineral sweets\ninjurious to life, like sugar of lead, had been a common environment,\nand the only sweet known, this sweetness would have been as unpleasant\nas the sour or acid now is. We see even now that sweets that have\nseveral times caused nausea, though at first highly agreeable, come to\nbe distasteful and disgustful. We now find that sour and bitter\nsubstances are disliked by animals in general as painful, for the sour\nand bitter is general sign of the unwholesome; but those animals which\nlive almost exclusively on bitter herbs undoubtedly appreciate this\nquality as we do a _bon bon_. Men lost in a desert by pertinaciously\ntasting bitter herbs and becoming dependent upon them for support would\nsoon realize their bitterness as pleasant, and a race might originate to\nwhom sweetness would be unpleasant. Hence the value of a sensation does\nnot\u2014in natural evolution\u2014lie in itself, it is merely a guide and index;\nand the sensation quality will be pleasant or unpleasant according to\nits relation to the demands of life. A sensation is inherently either\npleasurable or painful, but not essentially one and not the other, hence\nthe proverb, _de gustibus non disputandum_. The sensing act in itself is\nindifferent, _i.e._, sweetness and bitterness, purely as tastes, as\nsensing acts, are indifferent; but as matter of fact having grown up\nwith and for pleasure-pain tones as indicative of life values, they are\neither one or the other according to their relation to life. Where sense\nserves not life but itself, as with the epicure, a new order of\npleasures and pains is determined which is not within our present scope\nof discussion.\n\nThis variability of pleasure-pain tone of sensations even under natural\nevolution shows that the main force at least of their pleasurability or\nthe contrary does not lie in the affection of the sense organ itself. If\na given sensation, for example, bitterness, were painful in all degrees\nonly because of its harmfulness to the sense organ, how could this\nvariability be explained? We consider that the tasting bitterness, for\nexample, arose through painful stomachic and bowel experience with herbs\nwhich had this quality, and which by sensing efforts were so cognized at\nlength, and pain connected by its very origin with sense of bitterness,\nwhich becomes in all degrees painful. The identifying the nutritiously\nharmful weed by tasting its bitterness has the pain quality of its\neffects, since the tasting has grown up in connection with its effects.\nIt is out of actual injurious and painful experiences that the organism\nis led to put out sensing effort and to reach such a sensation as that\nof a bitter taste whose pain value is mainly, at least, due to the\nactual results of the substance lower down in the alimentary canal. A\nsense of bitterness becomes disagreeable in all degrees, for in its\ninception, when first sensed, it has its connection with the pain\neffects which stimulate this sensing. To discriminate the unnutritious\nor poisonous by tasting is a grand achievement, securing the rejection\nat the very opening, the mouth of the alimentary canal, in place of\nrejection by nausea from the stomach itself. The organism which could\nonly know that a certain substance was bad for it by very painful\nnausea, now knows its badness by the comparatively painless tasting bad.\nWhatever tastes bad, is bad.\n\nThe chief difficulty of the theory of bodily advantage and disadvantage\nas conditioning pleasure and pain comes not from any such instance as\nthe sugar of lead phenomenon; but it lies in the fact that life\nprogressiveness, enlargement, specialization, that which is to the\nhighest profit of life, is uniformly reached only by painful struggle.\nIt is only by intense struggle, by supremest, painfullest effort, that\nthose new psychic forms are initiated and developed which are of the\nutmost service to the organism. The act of adjustment to a new\ncircumstance is so extremely difficult and painful that it is attempted\nby few and achieved by very few of any set of organisms. By an act of\nmost painful struggle the fittest survive; and the rest, the vast\nmajority, who could not key themselves to that pitch, perish. Adjustment\nto the ordinary conditions is simply a free using of intelligence and\nenergy integrated and stored by ancestors when these conditions were new\nto them. The adjustments which are so spontaneously made by new-born\nanimals as response to environment were once new, and secured and\nintegrated for inheritance by the most painful and persistent effort.\nSuch is the inertia and conservatism of life that while it moves\nspontaneously in grooves already made, it does not rejoice in the toil\nof real progress. The struggle by which the greatest life advances have\nbeen accomplished has always been intensely painful in itself, whatever\nthe aftermath of pleasure may be, the pleasure of achievement and\ncreation, the satisfaction at successful effort, which is plainly a very\nlate psychosis.\n\nThe origin and place of pleasure is indicated by these considerations.\nThough function is generated and developed by severest painfullest\nstruggle, yet the reward is pleasurability of the free functional\nactivity; and the more manifold the functioning built up, the more\nmanifold the pleasure. Thus it is that a highly complex organism like\nman, which represents many psychic ages of painful function building,\nhas a very high pleasure capacity. Every new adaptation when integrated\nmeans a new pleasure. It is pleasurable to inhale fresh, cool air, but\nthe lung functioning itself has been built up by painful exertion in the\nstruggle for existence. Pleasure as reflex of functioning is merely then\nconserving power. The immediately and intrinsically pleasure-giving acts\nare not progressive, but merely hold life at the given and already\nacquired status. But the most and largest pleasure is in the mere\nexpenditure of stored energy. The easiest way, the way of inclination\nand obvious direct pleasure is regressive. It is living upon the past,\nliving upon accumulated capital bequeathed, and perhaps in some measure\nacquired. The use of a stimulant, as alcohol, enables the capital to be\nused up faster. As the systemic craving becomes greater with the\ndrunkard, the pleasure increases, and on the brink of dissolution he may\nreach the extremest pleasure. In alcoholism the more injurious the\ndrink, the more violent the pleasure. The most rapid and destructive\nusing up of vital force in lust, revenge and other excitements gives the\nkeenest pleasure. The orgy, the chase, the prize ring, give the\nexpensive \u201cthrill,\u201d which is ecstatic pleasure. Debauchery and\nalcoholism are quick ways of using the pleasure capacity which has been\nbuilt up by painful effort of thousands of generations. A taste\nsensation, which was achieved as the highest effort of genius by some\nvery remote ancestor at a critical moment and attained by painful\nsensing exertion, is finally after generations of severe volition\nintegrated, and becomes spontaneous activity, and reactive as free\npleasurable functioning. That is, in the early stages of tasting the\npleasure taken in it was by discriminating effort, a pleasure realized\nby exertion as pleasures of artistic \u201ctaste\u201d are now enjoyed by many\npeople; which pleasure may at length be so inwrought into psychism that\nit occurs spontaneously. At least, we have no other clue to the origin\nof pleasures except by judging from the present development of definite\npleasures in the case of man, which pleasures come only by effortful\ncultivation, for instance, the highest pleasures of art. The whole range\nof sense pleasures have been built up and capacity therefore has been\ninherited, and may be used up with great intensity.\n\nThe largest and keenest sort of pleasures is from expenditure. Yet\nstorage in certain modes yields a moderate pleasure, as the pleasure of\nrest, dozing after exercise. Here is a general spontaneous accumulation\nof physical pleasure capacity, it is a case where functional repair has\nbecome automatic, and thus far is analogous to the spontaneity of\npleasures of expenditure. But these storage pleasures are mainly\nnegative, relief only; and they are not the great positive corporeal\npleasures which are so largely sought. The drunkard gradually recovering\nfrom a spree experiences feelings of relief, but he does not indulge in\nhis cups to feel the gradual recovery from the painful after effects.\n\nNo biologic or psychologic theory of pleasure and pain can yet be\nenunciated which is fully explanatory. In fact, if pleasure-pain is the\nprimitive and fundamental fact, if it constitutes the worth of life and\nis life, then it must explain other factors, but remain itself\nunexplained. The theory of advantage and disadvantage fails signally,\nfor the most pleasurable act is frequently the most disadvantageous to\nthe interests of the organism, and the most advantageous\u2014progressive\neffortful volition\u2014is invariably most painful. As to why the way of\nconservation and upbuilding should be painful, why pleasure should not\nbe inherent in the progressive struggle rather than pain, is, at least\nfor the present, a philosophical problem; but the fact remains. We have\nconsidered that struggle is pain-impelled and painful, and that pleasure\nis resultant of functioning thereby established, and that all pleasure\ncapacity is painfully acquired. With the grand exception of this\nsingular and important fact, however, we can say that in natural\nevolution\u2014that is, before mind has become independent and artificial and\nsubjected itself to pathologic tendencies\u2014the general law that pleasure\ndenotes favouring organic conditions, pain, unfavourable, may be\nassumed. However, if the body is mere dependency and expression of mind,\nthe form of statement must be reversed; that is, a given pain or\npleasure is an acquirement by mind in its function building. I have\npainful taste sensation of bitter, pleasant sensation of sweet, not as\noriginally reflex of bodily conditions, but the sensing power and the\norgan, like all bodily specialization, is outcome of mind as struggle. A\ntypical consciousness\u2014series of a low type which places pleasure in its\nplace is: pain (as from hunger)\u2014struggle-sensing (as touching for\nfood)\u2014desire (when food is recognised through sensing)\u2014absorptive and\ndigestive effort and action\u2014pleasure\u2014struggle to continue and increase\npleasure\u2014slight satiety pain\u2014unconsciousness of sleep. So we do not\nconnect pleasure-pain as outcome of organic function in general or\nparticular, but function is outcome of pleasure-pain. It determines\nfunction, and not function it. The feelings which prompted and developed\na functioning, and the correlate total\u2014organism\u2014necessarily involve a\nvery high complex, at least for any late psychism, and make a general\nlaw of pleasure-pain impossible to determine under present conditions.\nThe _rationale_ of particular pleasures and pains can only be reached\nthrough a thorough investigation of life history, an investigation which\nin present circumstances seems in most cases beyond our powers. A great\nmass of psychological _data_, and not any general theory, is the\n_desideratum_.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER IV\n _THE RELATION OF FEELING TO PLEASURE-PAIN_\n\n\nShould the term Feeling be made to include certain states of\nconsciousness which are neither pleasurable nor painful? Or should all\nsuch neutral states be designated by some other term? We are concerned\nhere with an important matter of definition which implies an extensive\nanalysis of consciousness with reference to pleasure and pain. It will\nnot be difficult to find many so-called feelings which are neutral, or\nseem to be so; but it is the duty of the psychologist to carefully\nanalyse all such states, and point out the proper use of the term\nFeeling.\n\nCommon observation neglects minute analysis, and is unreliable when it\nspeaks of certain indifferent states as feelings. When a man speaks of\nfeeling queer, or strange, or bewildered, or surprised, and says that\nthe state of mind seemed neither agreeable nor disagreeable, we may\nsuspect that by a perfectly natural tendency he is extending the name\nFeeling to closely-connected states of cognition or will. In\nidentification and definition common observation is for all sciences\nnotoriously untrustworthy, and especially in psychology; so on this\nquestion the evidence of language and popular testimony counts for\nlittle one way or the other. This is strikingly evident when people\nspeak of feeling indifferent as to some matter, meaning that they have\nno feeling on the matter. The term Feeling is used in such a broad and\nvague way that \u2018I feel indifferent\u2019 means \u2018I am indifferent,\u2019 \u2018I have no\nfeeling.\u2019 The mistake here is in using the word Feeling as an equivalent\nto Ego, or any quality of Ego. A feeling of indifference is no feeling\nat all. Popular evidence then, I believe, can be no guide in this\nmatter. In passing, I may also say that the very abundant use of analogy\nby some writers on this subject seems to me ill-advised. Analogy does\nvery well to bring up the rear, but it is often very useless and\nconfusing as an advance-guard.\n\nProf. Bain (_Mind_, No. 53) insists that ideas tend to actualise\nthemselves by neutral intensity or excitement, which is feeling; or\nrather, he says, a \u201cfacing-both-ways condition.\u201d This last expression is\ncertainly not very helpful or satisfactory. Prof. Bain admits that\ntypical will is incited by pleasure and pain, but he maintains that\nsometimes, as notably in imitation, will is stimulated by purely neutral\nexcitement or feeling. In the discussion of this subject much has been\nsaid about excitement, and, as Mr. Sully has suggested, this requires\ncareful definition.\n\nReflection assures us that every mental activity has a certain\nintensity, and the word Excitement may, in the most general sense,\ndenote this intensity. The intensity may be so slight as to be unnoticed\nby the subject, and remain wholly unindicated to the keenest observer;\nor it may be so strong as to be perfectly evident to both; or it may be\nevident to the subject and not to the observer, or _vice vers\u00e2_. Thus\nthe obvious division of Excitement from this point of view is into\nsubjective, where it is immediately recognised and felt in the\nconsciousness of the subject, and objective, where it is unnoticed, or\nnoticed only by observer. Classifying by another principle, we may\ndistinguish Cognition-intensity, Feeling-intensity and Will-intensity,\nand the natural subdivisions under these according to the accepted\nsubdivisions of mental activities. Excitement is not, however, generally\nused in the large sense we have just mentioned, but as denoting\nintensity of a high degree so as to be very noticeable to the subject,\nor observer, or both.\n\nIt is plain that Excitement, as subjective intensity, is the only kind\nwhich bears on the question under discussion. It is with excitement as a\nfeeling, _viz._, the feeling of intensity, and not with excitement as\nquality of feeling, that is, intensity, that we have to deal, and it is\nnecessary that this distinction be clearly borne in mind. One may be\nexcited but not feel excited, may have intensity of feeling but not\nfeeling of intensity. Using the term, then, as equivalent to feeling of\nintensity, it is to be noted that it is a reflex or secondary mental\nstate. It is the feeling resulting from consciousness of intensity of\nconsciousness. The intensity of any consciousness may increase to such a\npoint that it pushes itself into consciousness, first as mere\nrecognition of intensity, but immediately and most manifestly as feeling\nof intensity. In rapid alternations of contrasted states, as of hope and\nfear, intensity soon rises to such a degree that it forces its way into\nconsciousness as feeling of intensity. This feeling of intensity may be\nitself either weak or intense. In very reflective natures, the cognition\nand feeling of intensity may be reflex at any power: there may be\ncognition of the intensity of cognition-of-intensity, etc., in\nindefinite regression. Most persons stop with the single step in the\nregression.\n\nIt is evident that as far as excitement is regarded merely as intensity,\nas a fundamental element in all feeling and mental action, it is a\nconfusion of terms to apply quality to it, to speak of it as either\npleasurable, or painful, or neutral. Intensity of mental action has\ndegrees but not quality, just as pitch in sound has degree, but not\ntimbre or quality. Regarding excitement as feeling-of-intensity, it has\nthe general characteristics of all feelings, and is not more likely to\nbe neutral than any other feeling.\n\nTaking the case of surprise, which is so frequently instanced as a\nneutral feeling, let us analyse it with special reference to the\nexcitement as feeling of intensity of cognition. A typical case would be\nthe surprise from hearing thunder in January. The presentation is\nquickly compared with a representation of observed order of facts, and\nthe disagreement of the two marked. This is so far purely cognitive\nactivity; but immediately connected with the perception of disagreement\nis the forcible recognition of the breaking up of a more or less rigid\norder. There is a disturbance in cognitive activity and the tension\nbreaks into consciousness as excitement, the feeling of intensity. The\nconflict of a settled conviction with recent presentation intensifies\nconsciousness, and this intensity with the abrupt change in quantity and\nquality of mental activity breaks into consciousness as intellectual\nsense of shock accompanied and closely followed by feeling of\nunpleasantness and pain. It is to be noted that when we come upon the\nfeeling-element in surprise we find pain. Surprise in the strict sense\nis then the reflex act of consciousness in which the mind becomes aware\nof and feels the sudden disturbance and tension set up in itself by the\nsudden weakening of an established belief. The painful shock has some\nrelation to the force of the disturbing factor, but is more closely\nconnected with the strength of the belief assailed. The feeling of the\ndisagreement as pain is due to the fact that this disagreement impinges\non subjectivity, personal opinion and conviction, and the disturbance\nwill be more or less disagreeable according to the degree of personal\ninterest. Note that by exact statement the feeling is not painful, but\nis the pain concomitant or resultant upon the mental perception. The\nsurprise for a person of rather weak habit of mind and of little\ngeneralising power will be almost wholly intellectual. Disagreement will\nbe noted, but not felt. For one of strong intellectual interest, the\nsurprise will mean definite and acute pain. For a meteorologist who has\nwritten a book stating that in this latitude thunder does not occur in\nJanuary the surprise might be very grievous. The intellectual element in\nsurprise is emphasized in the statement \u201cI am surprised,\u201d the\nfeeling-element in \u201cI feel surprised.\u201d If antecedent states of\nrepresentation, comparison and inner perception are placed under the\nterm feeling-of-surprise, we may expect consequent states to be likewise\neasily confused. When one speaks of being agreeably or disagreeably\nsurprised, the pleasure or pain is not really, however, a part of the\nsurprise. The sense and feeling of intellectual destruction, which\nconstitutes surprise, is so quickly and thoroughly swallowed up in\npleasure in having hope realized, or in pain in having fear realized, as\nthe event may prove, that the term is naturally applied to what\nengrosses attention. Thus, \u201cIt was a very pleasant surprise\u201d means \u201cThe\nsurprise was followed by very pleasant consequences.\u201d When I am\nsurprised by the arrival of an intimate friend whom I supposed a\nthousand miles away, the mental disagreement, and the pain from conflict\nof conception and perception, are quickly eliminated by the event\naccording with desire, and by the mind anticipating joys. We see, then,\nhow easily the antecedents and consequents of surprise are confounded\nwith surprise itself, which is the reflex act of consciousness\nrecognising and feeling sudden disturbance in intensity, quality and\nquantity in cognitive activity. I conclude that surprise, as feeling, is\npain coloured by cognition of shock and by volition to avoid disturbing\nelement.\n\nAbsorption in thought may be attended by what seems to be neutral\nexcitement, but is not really so. The intensity of thought may press\ninto consciousness as a knowledge and feeling of intensity, but so far\nas it is a feeling it is indubitably pleasure or pain. This pleasure or\npain may remain as continuous undertone with frequently repeated\nintrusion into full consciousness. Careful analysis in this case shows\nthat apparent neutrality results from a strong attendant recognition, or\nfrom the natural volitions being quickly overruled by feelings\nconsequent upon other considerations. Intellectual men are not apt to be\nguided by excitement. Professor Bain says that imitation is a test-case,\nthat this is a volition which is obviously stimulated by neutral\nfeeling. In some cases imitation seems clearly a mechanical, ideo-motor\naffair, an instinctive action without either conscious feeling or\nwilling. In all other cases of imitation analysis will show excitant\npleasure or pain. As Preyer and others have shown in the case of young\nchildren, mimicry arises mainly from pleasure in activity as such, and\nnot from its peculiar quality as imitation. For children, and often for\nadults, imitation is simply a method of joyous and novel activity. The\nstimulant in higher grades of imitation is pleasure in attainment. As\nfar as excitement is stimulant, it is, on the general principle before\nstated, either pleasure or pain. The pleasant feeling of intensity will\ntend toward continuance of imitative action, the unpleasant toward\ndiscontinuance. The pleasurable sense of activity, as inciting and\ncontinuing will in imitation, is a good example of excitement as feeling\nof volition-intensity.\n\nIf volitional excitement as instanced in imitation, and cognitive\nexcitement, as exemplified in surprise and absorption of thought, cannot\nbe termed neutral, it is quite unlikely that we shall find any neutral\nfeeling-excitement. A person at a horse-race may at first have so small\na degree of pleasurable hope and painful fear aroused that the intensity\ndoes not force itself into consciousness. The increasingly rapid\npendulum-swing of consciousness from hope to fear and back again becomes\nsoon so intense that this objective intensity of feeling forces its way\ninto conscious life as feeling of intensity. This excitement may be\nmainly regarded as accompaniment, or it may be valued in itself as\nexcitement for excitement\u2019s sake. This absorption in the feeling of\nintensity is eagerly sought for by the _ennuy\u00e9_. The devoted\ntheatre-goer often induces both pleasures and pains simply for this\nresultant feeling of tension which he regards as enjoyable for its own\nsake. Feeling-excitement in the simpler and earlier form and in this\nlater artificial form is plainly pleasure or pain coloured by slight\nelement of cognition as recognition of intensity, and by volition in\ncontinuing or in stopping the causative activity.\n\nBearing in mind the analysis of excitement just made, the true\ninterpretation of several matters which have been suggested is obvious\nand clear. Mr. Johnson (_Mind_, xiii. 82) remarks that very intense\nmental pleasure and pain tends to run into a state of neutral\nexcitement. This I interpret as the mental law that intensity of any\nmental activity, of any pleasure or pain, tends to displace this\nactivity by feeling of intensity. This feeling of intensity is indeed\nneutral as regards previous states\u2014that is, it is not, of course, the\nfeeling whose intensity it feels; but, as I have sought to show, it is\nnevertheless always pleasure or pain. Again, as to the question whether\nstates of mind equally pleasurable or painful may have different degrees\nof excitement. If excitement means here subjective excitement, then I\nanswer that they do not have any degree of excitement, for feeling of\nintensity can never be a quality of the feeling whose intensity is felt.\nIf excitement is the objective form, and refers to the intensity in\ngeneral, then, as has been before said, it is a confusion in terms to\napply the terms pleasure and pain to it. The anticipation suggested by\nMr. Johnson as a case of neutral excitement is precisely analogous to\nthe case of excitement at a horse-race, which has been analysed. Mr.\nJohnson concludes that feeling is not only more or less pleasure or\npain, but also more or less excitement. The proper way of stating this\nis: all feelings, including the feeling of excitement, consist of\npleasure or pain and have degrees of intensity.\n\nAgain, let me note the relation of intensity, and consequently feeling\nof intensity, to quantity of consciousness\u2014a subject suggested by Mr.\nSully (_Mind_, xiii. 252). The fundamental properties of\nconsciousness\u2014quality, quantity, intensity\u2014and also their\ninter-relations, would be a fruitful theme for extended discussion. I\nthink that the clearing-up of many problems would result from thorough\ninvestigation and careful definition in these points; but at present I\ncan only offer a remark or two upon the subject. It is plain that\nintensity varies with different qualities, that certain kinds of mental\naction are more generally characterised by high degrees of intensity\nthan others. Presentations tend to higher intensities than\nrepresentations, and pains than pleasures. It is noticeable that our\npsychological nomenclature, both popular and scientific, is mostly\nconcerned with qualities, which shows that quantities and intensities\nhave not received the attention they deserve, and have not been\ncarefully discriminated. A representation of the same house comes up in\nthe minds of two persons, one of whom has lived in it, the other merely\nseen it several times. Each psychosis is as representative as the other:\nthey have the same quality, but in quantity and intensity they vary\ngreatly. In a single multiplex act of consciousness, the former embraces\na wide reach of detail and association and a high degree of intensity\nwhich is lacking in the meagre and faint image of the latter.\nPhysiologically, quantity is as the mass of co-ordinate coincident\nactivities of brain in highest centres, and intensity is as the arterial\nand nervous tension in the highest centres. Intensities may be equal,\nand quantities very unequal; as compare one greatly interested in a game\nof cards with a person watching a near relative at a critical moment of\nillness. Intensity of pleasurable hope alternating with painful fear may\nbe equal in both cases, but in quantity the latter would tend to exceed.\nVery quiet natures are often characterised by largeness of quantity of\nconsciousness. Other things being equal, intensity tends to reduce\nquantity and obscure quality of consciousness. Quantity, like intensity,\nmay cause a reflex act of consciousness when it becomes so great as to\npush into consciousness as recognition and feeling of quantity; and as a\nfeeling of largeness, elevation and mental power it is clearly\ndistinguishable from excitement as feeling of intensity. Intensity is\ndependent on the force or strength by which a mental state tends to\npersist against other states which may be crowding in, and it is also\nclosely connected with rapidity of mental movement; but it is primarily\ntension, consciousness at its highest stretch, specially as touching\nupon interest, an element more or less involved in all consciousness.\n\nIt would seem highly desirable, in order to keep clear the distinction\nbetween intensity and feeling-of-intensity, to restrict the term\nExcitement to the latter meaning, and substitute the general term\nIntensity for all objective excitement so-called. It is also greatly to\nbe desired that the reflex states which arise from sudden or great\nchanges in quality, quantity and intensity of consciousness, and which\nare commonly termed feelings, should receive more general attention from\npsychologists than heretofore. I have in this paper essayed something in\nthis direction, but it is a very large field, and comparatively\nunexplored.\n\nHowever, so far as the problem of feeling as indifference is concerned,\nenough has been said on Excitement and Intensity, and I shall now\nconsider Neutralisation as giving neutral feeling, a method suggested by\nMr. Johnson (_Mind_, xiii. 82), and developed by Miss Mason (xiii. 253).\nDoes a feeling, neutral as regards pleasure and pain, result from the\nunion in one consciousness of a pleasure and pain of equal intensities?\nIs there a composition of equal pleasure-pain forces so that resultant\nequals zero? Such a question implies a clear apprehension of what is\nmeant by being in consciousness, and as to the possibility of perfect\ncoincidence and equality in mental activities. It is plain that so far\nas consciousness is linear, neutralisation cannot occur. Where there is\nbut one track, and but one train at a time, collision is impossible.\nMental states often appear coexistent while they are really consecutive.\nIt is doubtful whether pain from toothache and pleasure from music ever\nappear in absolute synchronism in consciousness, but they may alternate\nso rapidly sometimes as to appear synchronous to uncritical analysis. To\na man drowning, a lifetime of conscious experience seems condensed into\na few seconds. This means a consciousness made very sensitive and very\nrapid in its movement, and which acts like a camera taking pictures with\na lightning-shutter. Even if a pleasure and pain did coincide, it is\nprobable that in no case would they be exactly equal. In mental life as\nin organic life every product has an individuality: as every leaf\ndiffers from every other leaf, so every mental state is on completest\nobservation _sui generis_. This is evidently a most delicate\ninvestigation, but I doubt whether it can ever be shown that two equal\npleasures and pains ever appear in the same sense in consciousness at\nthe same time. Practically equal pleasures and pains in consecutive\nconsciousness lead to vacillation, and the secondary pain of alternation\nand excitement drives intelligent agents to new activity, or in stupid\nagents the alternation may be carried to exhaustion.\n\nIt is undoubtedly true that consciousness, in all the higher forms at\nleast, is a complex; yet full and complete consciousness is probably of\none element only, and the remaining portion of the nexus grades off into\nsubconsciousness and unconsciousness. There is a network of coexistent\nstates of consciousness in different degrees in mutual reaction, each\nstriving for dominance but only one at a time reaching it. Some portions\nof the nexus, as Ego-tone, are quite permanent elements. The light of a\nlarge and brilliant consciousness may illumine a considerable area, but\nbrightness most certainly diminishes in rapid ratio as the distance\nincreases from attention, the single point of greatest illumination. A\nhighly developed brain may sustain a highly complex consciousness, but\nit is only at the point of highest functional activity that we find the\nphysiological basis of a full consciousness. While high grades of mental\nlife are so complex, we do not find anywhere a mental compound. Two\ndiverse or opposite elements never combine into a compound which is\ntotally unlike either. Close analysis will fail to reveal any process of\nneutralisation or combination whereby we experience neutral states of\nfeeling.\n\nI have endeavoured to set forth the real nature of certain so-called\nneutral feelings; but at the bottom the question is, as was at first\nintimated, a matter of definition. Is it best to restrict the term\nFeeling to pleasurable and painful states of consciousness, or is it\nadvisable for clearness and definiteness to widen the use of the\nterm so as to include certain neutral states? From such analysis as\nhas been made, I doubt the advisability. Appeal in such matters must\nalways be made to analysis, and the advantage must be shown for a\nconcrete example. The _a priori_ idea or general impression that\npleasure and pain is too small a basis for all feeling has no real\nweight. Moreover, it must always be borne in mind that psychology,\nlike all other sciences, deals only with phenomena and not with\nessences, not with mind but with mental manifestations, not with\nfeeling as mental entity having properties, being pleasurable,\npainful, etc., but with these qualities in and for themselves. Thus\nthe metaphysical fallacy hidden in such common expressions as\n\u201cpleasurable and painful feelings\u201d is to be constantly guarded\nagainst. The feeling is not pleasurable or painful, but is the\npleasure or the pain. The feeling has no independent being apart\nfrom the attributes which in common usage are attached to it, nor is\nthere any general act of consciousness with which these properties\nare to be connected. As indicated at the beginning of this paper,\nthis common tendency has its psychological basis in the bringing\nunder the term Feeling some of the more permanent elements of\nconsciousness\u2014especially the Ego-sense\u2014which stand for metaphysics\nas beings and entities having properties. Knowledge, Feeling, Will,\nare for nominalistic science simply general terms denoting the three\ngroups of mental phenomena which seem to stand off most clearly and\nfundamentally from each other, and Pleasure and Pain are most\nclearly and fundamentally set over against Knowing and Willing. It\ndoes not seem that Professor Bain and others have made plain to us\nany better differentia.\n\nIf this definition of Feeling seems the best that descriptive\nclassification can give us, it is certainly enforced by genetic\nconsiderations. The key to a really scientific classification lies in\nthe history of mind in the individual and race. The greatest progress in\npsychology is not to be attained by the psychologist continually\nreverting to his own highly developed consciousness, but, as in all\nsciences, the study of the simple must be made to throw light upon the\ncomplex. Mentality like life is a body of phenomena whose forms cannot\nbe separated by hard and fast lines into orders, genera, species; but\nthere is a continuous development of radical factors. In the earliest\nforms of mind we find the most radical distinctions most clearly and\nsimply set forth, and what Feeling is at first, it is by continuity of\ndevelopment the same for ever after. The earliest indications of\nconscious life show merest trace of apprehension of object, some organic\npleasure and pain, considerable striving and effort. Mental evolution,\nlike all evolution, is not by the elimination but by the expansion of\nits primal factors; and by the continuous amplification and\nintensification of these the highest development is reached. Pleasure\nand pain remain then for all consciousness as constant factors; and if\nthe term Feeling is to indicate one element in tripartite mind, it must\nbe held to this meaning of pleasure and pain. Pleasure and pain in their\nmost complicated colourings from developed knowledge and will, and in\ntheir most subtle interactions, remain true to the primal type; and when\nwe find a state of consciousness in which neither is a dominant factor,\nwe had best denote it by some other term than Feeling. This evolutionary\nreason seems to me the strongest one for making the term Feeling signify\nstates of pleasure or pain, and, as I have suggested (_Mind_, xi. 74-5),\na genetic classification of the feelings must proceed upon this basis.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER V\n _EARLY DIFFERENTIATION_\n\n\nA blind psychic life of pure feeling cannot long avail in the sharp\nstruggle of existence, for to all stimulations it secures only two crude\nreactions, a spasmodic, defensive activity from pain, and an\nappropriative motion from pleasure. This perfectly subjective\nconsciousness can serve only the earliest and crudest demands of life;\nbut as the struggle for existence becomes fiercer, the more delicate and\ndefinite reactions, which can only come through cognition, are required.\nAll that we can say as to the origin of knowledge in general is that it\narose, or rather was achieved, like other conscious and extra-conscious\nfunctions, in answer to the pressing demands of the organism; and so far\nas we can see, it does not seem to be evolved from any pre-existing\nconsciousness or any common basis of mind. It is a distinct type of\nconsciousness, and so utterly diverse that we cannot trace any psychical\ncontinuity. However, we can remark this,\u2014that perfect objectifying is\nnot at once achieved, but cognition must be regarded as beginning in a\nvery minute and obscure germ in some intense feeling state. Yet this\ngerm does not seem to have a direct psychical connection with the pure\nfeeling by which it is excited into existence, but it is a reaction to\nan opposite mode more diverse from pleasure and pain than these are from\neach other. Moreover, according to the law of evolution by struggle,\nthis first cognition does not _come_ to mind, but is _achieved_ only in\nmost intense will act, comparable for relative intensity to the\nknowledge originated by severest effort of a man in danger of his life\nlistening to a barely audible sound, or watching a barely visible object\non a distant horizon. The evolution point for all life is in stress and\nstrain, and this is the law of the development of sensation at all times\nin psychic history.[A]\n\n-----\n\nFootnote A:\n\n Cf. my remarks in _Psychological Review_, vol. ii. pp. 53 ff.\n\n-----\n\nCognition undoubtedly began as a very crude sensation, as the barest\nmovement towards objectifying sense, as a pure sensation without any\nimage form, any direct perception of an object. In the order of\ndisappearance of elements from consciousness, we note that sensation\nmaintains itself through a long series, and is the last stage before\npure feeling sets in. As heat stimulus is increased, sense of heat\nbegins at a certain point, and increases up to a certain intensity of\nthe stimulus and to a certain intensity of its own, when it rapidly\nvanishes, and in the agony on the verge of unconsciousness is lost in\npure pain. We note also that the cognition of object, of thing,\ndisappears before the sensation of heat does. A person burning to death\nis for a time conscious of the fire, which consciousness at length is\nlost in intense painful sensations of heat; and this in turn, at the\nacme of consciousness entirely disappears, leaving only pure pain.\nFurther, the rise to full consciousness, as well as the fall to\nunconsciousness, also suggests bare sensation as the original cognition.\nIf a hot iron be applied to one in deep sleep, the order of waking\nconsciousness\u2014apart from any dream order\u2014is pure pain, then sensation of\nheat, then awareness of hot object, and also of part heated and paining.\nIn our ordinary consciousness it is certainly very hard to even\npartially isolate the various elements. Sometimes, however, a person\nwill say, \u201cI have such a queer pain; I do not know what it is.\u201d The\npsychosis thus indicated is evidently pain with a movement towards a\nsensation which yet is not realized. Sensation does not come though it\nis looked for; there is pain only, and unqualified save by the\npeculiarity of being unidentified. The sense of lack of sensation\nbewilders, because sensation is so constant for our psychic life; but in\nprimitive mind there is no such feeling of queerness when sensation does\nnot _come_, or it is not able to _attain_ it. This inwrought tendency to\nsense all our pains and pleasures, and to feel the lack if we do not, is\nevidently the result of a long evolution. Sensation is thus seen to be\nan activity which we exercise to give definition to our pure feelings;\nthere is something unfulfilled for us if sensation does not _come_, and\nwe may thus go out for it and interpret the pain in sense form by a\nwill-effort. Primitive mind, however, does not achieve its sensations as\nincited by this indefinite sense of lack-queerness or strangeness, but\nthrough pain at some critical moment to obtain a suitable reaction. All\nsensation is at first, as we even now can faintly realize, by a severe\neffort, and is not a spontaneous, incoming impression. Paradoxical as is\nthe expression, \u201cwe learn to know,\u201d yet it contains a truth in that\ncognition is an attainment incited by the necessities of the organism.\nNecessity is the mother of invention, and knowledge is at first an\ninvention which the organism hits upon to help it in the exigencies of\nexperience. In early and even in later consciousness it is probable that\nthe majority of pleasures and pains are so dull in intensity that they\ndo not rouse sensation, and comparatively few incite as far as to\nperception. A close analysis of our own consciousness even will show\nmany pleasures and pains, many vague states of uneasiness and\ndiscomfort, and many of organic pleasure and comfort, which lead to\nnothing and come to nothing for either sensation or perception. These\nstates stand alone by themselves, and vanish with little effect on\neither mind or body. They constitute the outer fringe of consciousness\nwhere all mentality starts, and under sufficient pressure of\nlife-interest develops into great fulness and complexity, or, when of\ncomparatively little value to the organism, they disappear suddenly and\ncompletely. I am inclined also to think that close scrutiny will\nsometimes reveal for psychical life, as for the physical, certain\nentirely useless survivals, undifferentiated feelings of some types, and\nprobably also some pure sensations.\n\nI conceive then that the fundamental order of consciousness is not, as\nusually set forth, pure sensation with accompanying pleasure and pain,\nbut the reverse\u2014pure pleasure and pain with accompanying sensation; and\nonly by a very gradual evolution indeed did pure feeling bring in\nsensation, which is thus always sequent and not accompaniment. We\ncommonly inquire as to a sensation, Was it pleasurable or painful? but\nthe true form of inquiry is, Was the pain or pleasure senseful? Did it\nattain to bringing in the qualifying element of a sensation, and in what\nform?\n\nThe qualifying of pure feeling to attain actions suitably differentiated\nfor distinct forces must have proceeded very slowly, and have had the\ndimmest beginning. We cannot suppose that consciousness attained at once\nand easily to a manifold of sense, much less have had this brought to\nit, involuntarily received. The earliest forms of sensations were no\ndoubt of those affections of the body produced by heat, pressure, and\nother elements which determine most vitally the existence of the\norganism. The first sensation indeed was undoubtedly not in any\nparticular mode, but was a bare and undifferentiated form. It was some\nsuch indefinite and general sensation as we may sometimes detect near\nthe vanishing-point of consciousness just before pure pain state occurs.\nFor example, the sense of heat as such is lost at a given temperature\nfor a given case, and there exists for a moment a vague general\nsensation, sensation _per se_, before mere pain absorbs all\nconsciousness. Sensation at its very origin was not sense of any kind,\nsense of heat, pressure, etc., but a mere undifferentiated sense of\nbodily affection. The body is not, of course, apprehended as object, but\nthere is a vague attributing and qualifying which marks the state as\nmore than purely central, as being a real objectifying. Toothache, for\ninstance, implies ache before the toothache, and this general aching is\nthe type of early unorganized sensation. Pain is the essence of the\nstate, and is throughout dominant, the cognition in mere aching being a\nvery minor element. \u201cI was awakened in the night by a toothache,\u201d is the\nobjective description of a triple movement in consciousness, pain, ache,\ntoothache. The earliest cognitive experiences were all of this very\ngeneral type of sensation, which becomes gradually more definitely\nlocalized and qualified as distinct modes of sensation; pain-hunger,\npain-heat, pain-pressure, and corresponding pleasure-sensations are\ndifferentiated. Subtract the mere pain from hunger state and from\npainful sensation of heat, and we have certain _quales_ which are\ndifficult to analyse, but which are cognitive in nature. Diverse bodily\naffections are _sensed_ diversely instead of being _felt_ in one mode,\npure feeling.\n\nWe have far outgrown the sensation-cognition psychic stage, and speaking\nof psychic history in biologic terms, it belongs to the early pal\u00e6ozoic.\nWe have yet to formulate the succession of psychic ages, in each of\nwhich some distinct psychic power attains dominancy, and produces minds\nas diverse from ours as the organisms of past ages are different from\nour own bodies. As already pointed out, it is an extremely difficult\nproblem to realize by subjective method these ancient types. A mere\ngeneral sensation is a very rare phenomenon in our ordinary\nconsciousness, and even special sensations rarely occur in pure form. To\nrealize what sensation of heat is for a simple consciousness, we must\nstrip our minds bare of most of their furnishings, for all our\nsensations of heat are interpreted with reference to visual and tactual\nobjects which must be non-existent for early consciousness. Sensation\nfor us is a complex of sensations _plus_ perceptions and other cognitive\nand emotional elements which lie beyond early mind, but which by an\ninevitable automorphism we interpret into early forms. This automorphism\nwith the child is complete, and is never perfectly effaced even in the\nmost accomplished psychologist. A life of simple feeling, or of this\n_plus_ simple sensation is most difficult of realization; still we may\nhave reason to believe that the psychic life of a low type consists\nwholly in repeated pains and pleasures occasionally rising so high that\nconsciousness reaches to a vague general sensation, or rarely to a\nthrill of heat, or sense of hunger or pressure. Of course, in all cases\nwe assume will-activity.\n\nAnd we have to emphasize this again, that all sensation, like all pain,\nwhile always from objects is never of objects. The objective description\nhere, as usual, does not give the inner state. Our automorphic tendency\nleads us inevitably to regard the order in which we perceive the\norganism to be effected by external objects to be its received order.\nBut a little reflection always convinces us that this is in the nature\nof the case an erroneous procedure, that what happens within\nconsciousness is not primarily any cognition of a world of objects, nor\nan apprehension of them in any form. Sensation, while objective by\nvirtue of being cognition, is not in any way a realization of object,\nbut is objective only toward the dynamic within the individual organism,\nand is not apprehension of static wholes of any kind. It is an\nobjectifying to force, not to things, and this in the modes of\nphysiological affection. It is not appreciation of a something, but of a\nsomehow.\n\nIn the earliest stage of mind, as has been before noticed, all manner of\nmaterial causes rouse nought more than a pure feeling mode; heat,\npressure, electricity, sound, light, nutriment or its absence, if they\nattain to waken the function of consciousness, accomplish no more than\npure feeling as bare pain and pleasure. It is, of course, natural to\nconceive that from the first consciousness, responds objectively in\nsensation in as many modes as organism is moved by external and internal\nforces; but a multiform sense origin of consciousness is not borne out\nby the general tendency and law of evolution, nor yet by such special\nindications in consciousness as we are able to observe. When a very\nyoung infant seems to reach pleasurably to warmth, if we are correct in\npositing consciousness at all, it is still very unlikely that there is\nsense of warmth, but the state is probably pure pleasure; and if there\nis sense of warmth, it did not give the pleasure, but the reverse. We\nbelieve likewise that it is probable that a consciousness response to\nnutriment is, at first, mere pleasure, and only, secondarily, organic\nsensation. Thus, warmth and nutriment effect, but only, at first, in the\none mode of pure feeling, and secondly, pure sensation as general\norganic satisfaction. Lastly arises a differencing in consciousness for\nthe different bodily changes. And the multiformity of stimulus and\npaucity of consciousness in modes while so very apparent in early mind\nis yet always found in all grades of psychic life. The responsiveness of\nconsciousness is never perfected, and mind has a practically infinite\nfield for the acquirement of sensation, for appreciating what has never\naffected consciousness, or which mind has felt or known only by some\ngeneral mode. The infant, no doubt, has many pains for which it has no\nsensation values. These pains, perfectly pure and undifferentiated the\none from the other, have had their occasion in a variety of physical\nchanges. A native of the tropics, who on first touching ice says it\nburns, has at first but a single sensation for very diverse physical\naffections; but he soon attains an icy sensation, that ice feels not\nburning, but stinging cold. Men, civilized and educated, often are\nconsciously affected by bodily changes of which they are wholly\nincognizant, the psychosis being not specialized according to the mode\nof change. In degraded states of consciousness, which come to all, there\noften appears obscure feeling and sensation, which is a practically\nsingle mode of answer to a very wide variety of physical excitation. In\nrealizing the variety of external objects and changes the mind proceeds\nbut slowly, each new form always at first in pure feeling. It is only as\nsomething affects feeling and interest that we ever come to know it or\nits manifestations in physiological change.\n\nSensations are, then, by no means such original and simple elements of\nmind as often conceived; but they are developed forms of some general\nundifferentiated cognitive state, sensation as bare apprehension of\nbodily disturbance, and this itself cannot be accounted absolutely\noriginal. The evolution into particular modes of sensation, as sense of\nheat, hunger, light, pressure, etc., is in the struggle for existence\ngradually achieved, and also therewith the evolution of special\nsense-organs. And we must always bear in mind that it is not the\nsense-organ that develops the sensation, but on the contrary the effort\nat sensing that produces, maintains, and improves the sense-organ. The\neagle\u2019s eye has been developed by unceasing straining as incited by the\nnecessities of existence felt in pain and pleasure. It is natural for us\nat our stage of development to suppose that the organs of sense _give_\nsensations and to explain the sensation by the physiological organ; but\nwhen we reflect that sensations _come_ to us from the organ only up to\nthe measure of the momentum from heredity, we see the insufficiency of\npurely physiological interpretation. Evolution to-day is on the same\nbasis as evolution at any period, and as it always has been, it always\nwill be, dependent upon a ceaseless _nisus_. It is only by painstaking\neffort\u2014labour\u2014that man progresses in sensibility, and this effort has\nalways an incentive in some form of interest that is pleasure-pain\nbasis. Thus it is that the astronomer\u2019s eye, the microscopist\u2019s eye, the\nartist\u2019s eye, is formed. The multiform sensibility of the tea-taster is\nattained by assiduous tasting, and the development in organ only follows\n_pari passu_. What is seemingly simple and original in sensation for us\nwas, no doubt, like the very special forms of sensibility acquired by\nour specialist, achieved by the lower forms painfully and toilfully, and\npassed on to us. Our highest feats of sensation and insight may likewise\nfor our remote descendants be intuitions, whose apparently simple nature\nmay be asserted as the basis of philosophic systems. A genius is one who\nantedates the general stage of progress of his period by having as\nintuitions, as seemingly direct and simple knowledges and sensations,\nwhat is beyond or barely within the intensest effort of his\ncontemporaries, though it may become common and easy for all men of\nlater ages.\n\nThe moving factors, the active agents in the evolution of consciousness,\nare not, I think, sense-impressions of any kind; these are the results,\nrather than the incentives, of mental evolutions. Mind acquires its\nwhole sense outfit, and receives no cognition whatever ready-made. It is\nhard, indeed, for us to put ourselves at the point of view of\nacquirement of what seem to us simple impressions of sense; but the\ndifficulty is only of the same general nature as to understand how what\nseem to be direct perceptions of things in space are really indirect.\nThe progress of psychology will, in my opinion, tend to show more and\nmore that _givens_ of all kinds are such in appearance only, and that\nmind in its essence is purely a feeling-effort.\n\nThe differentiation of action secured through sensation and its\ndifferentiations is evidently of the utmost importance to life, but\nstill the objectivity secured is small. In the pure feeling stage,\nreaction is a very hit-and-miss affair, and in pure sensation stage it\nis but little better. Guided only by present sensations, the organism in\nthe struggle for existence is blind to all objects, and, knowing not\nitself nor other objects, anticipatory action is entirely beyond its\npower. The growth of mind is to secure delicacy and precision of\nadjustment with largest time and space extension, and the achievement of\nobjectification was a _tour de force_ of the highest value. The\nexigencies of life-struggle lead comparatively early from cognition of\nmode of affection to the cognition of thing affecting. Perception arises\nto supplement sensation, and full objectification opens the way for\nintelligent activities. Thing or object is first, no doubt, apprehended\ntactually; but the sense of touch is, of course, acquired before\ncognition of thing touched. We, indeed, find it difficult to appreciate\nthis, since in touch we constantly apprehend things as in contact with\nus; still, if in some very sluggish state, as deep sleep, when the\nvaried and correlated life of sensation with perception is practically\n_nil_, a rough object be made to bear upon the body as a lump in the\nmattress, it is evident that consciousness begins as bare pain, then\ngeneral uneasiness as bare general sensation, then sense of touch, and\nfinally cognition of object by means of and through the touch sensation.\nThe sense of thing touched follows on sense of touch. This general order\nmay be illustrated from a squib in a comic paper of the day. A swell\nfinding a friend sitting by an open window on a cold day asks him if he\ndoes not feel cold. He answers, \u201cYa-as; I guess I do. I knew theah was\nsomething the mattah with me; I suppose it must be cold.\u201d The threefold\nmovement in this noodle\u2019s mind as evidenced by his words, is, first,\nfeeling pain; second, a something the matter, _i.e._, general sensing\nand objectifying thereupon; third, particularizing to feeling cold. He\nhas simply gone back to primitive process. Touch or other sensation is\nin itself no more than an objectification of physiological change, and\ncalls up no object whatever. In pure sensation there is no image of\nanything, but it is merely a peculiar modifying of pleasure-pain\naccording to mode of physiological stimulus. A heat thrill does not\ninclude objectification to any existences, not even to the physical body\nof the organism sensing.\n\nIt is only by and through sense of physiological disturbance that\nawareness of object is achieved. Intense sensation stimulates to full\ncognition, to complete act of objectifying. This tendency of sensation\nis illustrated by the common saying, \u201chunger sharpens wit\u201d; and certain\nit is that presentation of food objects is arrived at only by this\nstimulus. The earliest objectifying, no doubt, arose from a\npain-sensation of some kind; but this primitive cognition of object was\npurely general, just as primitive sensation was purely general. A world\nof objects is not at first and at once attained, but only object barely\nas such, dim awareness of a mere mass. In the earliest stage every\npresentation is of a bare objectivity, so that one cognition differs\nfrom another in no wise as regards content. This mere thing, which is\nfirst full cognition content, is next to no-thing. When we try to\nconceive this thing we inevitably foist in some special sensation and\nperception, most generally sense of light and seeing; and the\nexplication just made in the previous sentence was undoubtedly\nunderstood by the reader in visual terms. Our apprehension of object is\ncorrelation of several modes, and it is most difficult to intimate in\nany wording what bare undifferentiated apprehension of object may be. If\nthe embryology of mind were more thoroughly studied, we should\nunderstand in some measure, for this stage most probably occurs in the\nvery earliest activities of every human and animal mind. A _totum\nobjectivum_, which is thing and nothing more, is, perhaps, occasionally\nobservable in our own consciousness when at very low ebb\u2014at such times\nwhen pure feeling and pure sensation become possible phases.\n\nThis general, undifferentiated cognition of object and all the special\nforms therefrom developed must always be accounted as coming about in no\nspontaneous way, but as attained and supported through will activity of\nan intense form. Perception of object is not in any true sense impressed\nfrom without, nor yet in any true sense is it a native faculty or power.\nIt is not more or less freely constructed out of more or less given\ndata. It is the necessities of life that bring mind to achieve full\ncognition; and this alone is the first cause of cognition, which is\nalways in its inception cognitive effort toward objective realities,\ntowards a world of things. These objects, among which and in close\nrelation to which some single object, organism, must live\u2014this is the\ncommon postulate of all biologic science, psychology included\u2014constitute\na world. The living object is such by virtue of the simplest\nconsciousness, a feeling-will, as absolutely essential to any\nadvantageous action. It is by this root-form, feeling-will, that\ncognition is ultimately accomplished, and not by virtue of any\nimprinting of objects upon mind as in some measure a _tabula rasa_, nor\nyet in any purely subjective construction of object. Object is revealed\nneither from without nor from within; it is achieved solely as a guide\nto advantageous action in the struggle for existence. Of course, the\nmind does not knowingly reach knowledge, does not foreknow it and its\nadvantage in order to attain it; this is a contradiction in terms, and\nprofects backward a highly refined teleology. All we do at present is to\nsimply assume it as law that serviceable consciousnesses, cognition and\nothers, are inevitably attained in the stress of existence. For the\nscience of psychology, metaphysics apart, this is the best standpoint,\nand all we can now say. The confirmation of an organism\u2019s activity,\ncognitive and otherwise, as serviceable, is in feeling pain and\npleasure, which is the original mode in which objects excite\nconsciousness or consciousness reacts to them. It is in feeling as the\nstarting point that cognition is determined and maintained. We cannot\nscientifically speak of any mental process as native, that is, mind\nitself is not native. By the very term original we exclude inborn. The\nfirst consciousness occurred, it was merely event, useful event; and if\nwe further say it was acquired, we probably say what agrees best with\nbiology as a whole. It is impossible at present to discuss whether or\nnot mind may be a primitive vital function, for where life begins or\nends is itself a most obscure problem; but whether it be primary or\nsecondary, mind in no form is properly native, that is a pure given, but\nwe simply say the function is displayed, as we speak of nutrition or\nreproduction. In the organism we see something which has nutritive,\nreproductive, motor processes, perhaps also consciousness processes; and\nso far as there is any problem as to the nature of consciousness as\nnative function it belongs to a general biologic problem. As to the\nquestion as to whether cognition or what cognitions are original and\nsimple in all mind, we have already excluded the whole field of\ncognition from this position.\n\nDoes the general objectification, the first stage in cognition of\nobject, have any special function for the developed presentation forms\nof later consciousness? Mr. Ward, in his suggestive article in the\n_Encyclop\u00e6dia Britannica_, seems to intimate that it has. He says (p.\n50), \"Actual presentation consists in this _continuum_ being\ndifferentiated and every differentiation constitutes a new\npresentation.\u201c Mr. Ward in this connection sets forth that\npresentation-continuity in consciousness is determined by a\npresentation-continuum which is \u201d_totum objectivum_.\" Presentation\nactivity is fundamentally a differentiating of this constant element. We\nmight compare this _continuum_ to an ocean from whose surface rise\nwaves, particular presentations, which subside again into the parent\nsea, which ever remains as the constant basis of all wave movements.\n\nNow the question of _continua_ is a very broad one. Do the early stages\nof consciousness, pure feeling, pure sensation, pure objectivity, remain\nas constituting the basic bulk of all higher consciousness, and is all\nhigher consciousness but differentiation of these as well as from these,\nthat is, is it no more than differentiating activity kept up on a vast\nseries of levels and sub-levels? Or are we to regard them as regressive\nstages to which developed consciousness rarely returns? May we consider\nthat there is a certain histology of mind, that certain primitive forms,\nlike tissues in the body, constitute the inner and constant structure of\nmind?\n\nThe theory of _continua_, be it observed, in its fulness requires a\nnumberless series of levels and sub-levels supporting one another, for a\nhigh form of consciousness pre-supposes an indefinite series of\nantecedent stages. While any highly differentiated consciousness is\ngoing on it must be an actual differentiating of the preceding stage,\nwhich is therefore coincident and pre-existent to it, and this latter in\nturn must have its supporting continuum, and so on down _ad infinitum_.\nThe theory makes mind a wheel within wheel of bewildering intricacy. Yet\nmind in this point of view has a certain analogy with the physiological\nstatus of the higher organisms, for example, the human body is colonial,\nis constituted of a multitude of cells, a simple type of organisms, by\nwhose consentaneous activity the whole body is animate.\n\nOne objection to this theory is that it confounds functioning with\ndifferentiating. Not every act of consciousness is by its very nature a\ndifferentiating, a movement toward specialization. Consciousness is on\nthe whole more often regressive than progressive, and very often\npractically neither, as for example, in all instinctive, habitual, and\nspontaneous activities.\n\nBut again, while differentiating act certainly pre-supposes the\nundifferentiated, does it require coincidence? For instance, vision as\nordinary form, receiving impressions, certainly contains no _totum\nobjectivum_ activity, but also as differentiating act, as intense visual\neffort reaching to higher development, it generally, at least, seems\nfree from any lower stage, and is engrossed in itself. Since we make the\nprime cause of all mental development and differentiation in will, we do\nnot need any undifferentiated general ground remaining in consciousness\nas basic element, nor does analysis of consciousness show this constant\nelement. Successive phases of presentation development are attained\nthrough effort, but one does not gradually grow and branch out of the\nother by a purely inward _impetus_ of its own. I believe, indeed, that\nthe inner life of mind consists in its original forms, and that they\nremain in late mind not merely as useless survivals but having a\ndistinct functional value; but I do not see how any or all of the\ngeneral stages of mentality constitute _continua_ for consciousness of\nhigher types. Instead of being constant basal elements they occur and\nare blotted out with such rapidity that reflection can very rarely\nidentify them (_vide_ p. 63). They are lost and swallowed up in complex\nconsciousness so quickly as to leave no trace upon memory, and they do\nnot subsist or continue throughout the complex forms. They are then the\nvery opposite of _continua_, being, in fact, the most evanescent of\nmental phenomena. Consciousness in all higher forms, as the human mind,\nmust and does mount the main steps of its very early growth with\nmarvellous rapidity and leaves them entirely behind. The more primitive\nthe stage the more quickly it vanishes, till often it seems to appear in\ntendency form only, or be thrown into a subconsciousness. Primitive\ntypes exercise a most important but fleeting influence in advanced\nconsciousness which rises through them most rapidly and easily, but in\nthe less advanced the contrary is the case. The Australian savages, as\nobserved by Lumholtz, came to their senses and reached a full awakening\nin the morning very slowly as compared with civilized men. With dull\nchildren likewise we observe how slowly they awaken. All regressive\nforms reach but slowly to their full consciousness and dwell long in\nintermediate stages. But in all cases when higher forms enter the lower\ndisappears, when varied perception enters in awakening, then the\npreceding dim general objectivity is wholly obliterated.\n\nIt will be remarked that admitting, as we do, the constant existence in\nmental life of feeling as pleasure and pain, we thereby make this a real\n_continuum_. But we may say that consciousness is never without a\npleasure-pain constituent and yet not assert a _continuum_.\nConsciousness continually possesses some pleasure-pain element, but this\nis not a feeling as continuous state, as an underlying differentiating\nbasis pleasures and pains as diverse independent states are essential\nincentives in all consciousness, but they do not constitute a single\ncontinuum.\n\nOf course, every consciousness, as long as it continues, is in this very\ngeneral sense a _continuum_, but no form of consciousness, primitive or\nadvanced, can, with one exception, be called a _continuum_, as a single\nmode running through and unifying a long stretch of varied\nconsciousnesses. This exception is the complex element of ego-tone.\nEarly mind is no more than a kaleidoscopic jumble, with no one\norganizing and unifying element. Even when consciousness from happening\nin purely disconnected flashes attains first a certain limited\ncontinuity, this is not by means of some conscious element persisting\nthrough a series, but merely signifies that as fast as one consciousness\ndies out, another takes its place, _i.e._, the continuity is purely\nformal and temporal. It is through self-consciousness alone that any\nreal _continuum_ is achieved in and for consciousness, and this ego-tone\nis far from being primitive.\n\nThe sensation and objectifying as discussed in this chapter in\nconnection with feeling, both pain and pleasure, constitutes complex\nstates of consciousness which may be termed a feeling when the pain or\npleasure is dominant, or a cognition when the sensing and objectifying\nis dominant. Thus by a feeling I understand a state of consciousness\nwhich is either entirely or dominantly pain or pleasure, the former\nbeing pure feeling, the latter mixed feeling. This latter class\nconstitutes the feelings properly so-called, as varied pains and\npleasures, the variation element being the cognition in some form.\nFeeling as being in different kinds is made such by the differentiation\nof cognition. Thus hunger is neither a pure sensation\u2014that is by pure\nsensation meaning not absolutely pure, for pleasure or pain is\ninvariable incentive concomitant, but sensation pure from any distinct\nmode of apprehension, as merely general and undifferentiated\u2014nor yet is\nhunger pure pain, but it is the combination of a certain definite\nsensing, beyond the pure stage, with pain. Hunger is a feeling when the\npain aspect is dominant, is cognition when sensation aspect is dominant.\nThe confusion in the use of the terms sensation and feeling comes from\nthe difficulty in determining dominancy in given cases. Certainly the\nexact line where feeling of hunger passes into sensation of hunger can\nbe settled only by the most careful discrimination, but at any great\nremove from this line the character of the state is very manifest. By no\neffort can we separate the sensing from the pain so as to have nothing\nbut sensation, though the attributing to bodily affection does in the\nincipient stages of hunger become dominant, but as hunger increases,\npain becomes dominant, and ultimately the end as the beginning is pure\npain. We say, \u201cI _feel_ hungry,\u201d for all stages when any sensing is\npresent, and this indiscriminate popular use of the word \u201cfeel,\u201d has\ntended to obscure the real nature of the whole mentality. The same line\nof remark applies to feeling thirsty, feeling hot, etc.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER VI\n _REPRESENTATION AND EMOTION_\n\n\n\u201cI feel cold,\u201d and \u201cI feel afraid of cold,\u201d are expressions which denote\ntwo tolerably distinct feelings. The main characteristic which\ndistinguishes the second feeling as an emotion is obviously\nrepresentation. In the first case, I have pain with presentation of the\ncold, in the second, pain with the mere representation of the cold. If I\nfeel cold, I have direct and immediate experience; if I fear the cold, I\nhave an experience in view of experience, pain at pain. When one says,\n\u201cI have a violent pain in my head,\u201d and a friend answers, \u201cI am deeply\npained to hear it,\u201d we recognise at once the fundamental distinction\nbetween sensation and emotion. We have in this chapter to discuss some\npoints as to the rise and nature of emotion in its relation to\nrepresentation.\n\nThe theory which we have been elaborating is that pure pleasure and pain\nare the original and causative elements in the whole realm of mind. Pure\nfeeling is the most direct and necessary, and so the first response in\nconscious form, to all stimuli, and it is the incitement to all\ncognitive activity in its inception and growth. The harm and good to\norganism, are at once, and most quickly realized in terms of pure\nfeeling, and the painful necessities in the struggle for existence, lead\nto a continuous development from this point. Dominant pleasure and pain,\nwith the different presentation forms, constitute different feelings, as\nof warmth, hunger, cold, etc., to which some fuller objectification may\nbe added. Adjustment is thereby made manifold, but only with present\nstimulus. There is no appreciation of the experienceable. All that is\nattained is immediate present apprehension which in no wise suggests or\ninterprets, but which is strictly self-contained.\n\nWe must, indeed, acknowledge that no consciousness, save, of course, the\nvery first, can exist in perfect isolation totally unaffected by any\nother. The second conscious activity was not a perfect facsimile of the\nfirst, and its variation is due at least in the main to the precedent\nmentality. What is, is determined by what has been, and this universal\nlaw is in mind the inductive nature of all experience. The solidarity of\nall mentality and of all materiality is a scientific postulate, a\nprinciple which we must assume, or deny all scientific investigation.\nThe movement of a molecule in the sun, millions of years since,\ninfluences the condition of my body to-day, and the flush of pain in\nsome protozoan millions of years since, has had an infinitesimal share\nin determining my present state of mind. Yet this fact that every\npsychosis is what it is by reason of the whole line of previous\npsychoses, does not lead us to suppose that experience cognizes itself\nfrom the beginning, and consciously builds itself up. There is for a\nlong time no consciousness of process of mental integration. The whole\nuniverse of mind is the necessary _prius_ of each individual\nmanifestation, yet the particular phenomenon in consciousness does not\ninclude a sense of, or reaching out to, these conditioning agencies. No\nsense of dependence is generated. But we ask, How can one conscious\nstate unconsciously effect or determine another? How can consciousness\nbe affected without consciousness of affection? Yet, difficult as it may\nappear to set clearly before us the nature of this relation of a\nconsciousness to all the preconsciousness, it is still obvious that the\nintricate _nexus_ of cause and effect in mind does not need to be known\nof mind or realized in the individual consciousness, and is not, and\ncannot be. Every consciousness is the derivative resultant of\ninnumerable pre-consciousnesses, and it goes to the determining and\nqualifying of innumerable post-consciousnesses, yet it is neither\nconsciousness of the future or the past, though it involves both.\n\nThe early phase of mind where consciousnesses are wholly un-unified from\nwithin by any central or continuous consciousness, and whose solidarity\nis wholly in an unconscious integration is so foreign to us who have\nminds where experience of experience is continually in process, that it\nis with the utmost difficulty we can in any wise conceive it. It is\nevident that a very low organism may have consciousnesses, but no mind,\nthat is, no self-unifying whole of consciousnesses. It does not possess\na mind, but during its whole life it attains psychoses which are merely\n_disjecta_ reached to help an immediate necessity of existence, and then\nfading completely away. Each psychosis is achieved more easily than the\nformer by reason of the former, though there is no consciousness of\nconnection with it. The increment and qualifying of a given experience\nby past experience is not reached by it. Some differentiation is\nattained under pressure of struggle for existence, and experience is\nconstituted, but is wholly unknowing of itself and in no wise\nself-formative.\n\nWe have now, however, to consider the problem, how experience came to\nitself, and how and why representation and emotion should arise in the\nstruggle of existence.\n\nAt the first, as we have seen, organisms responded in conscious form\nonly in pleasure and pain, and this only when the actual damage or\nbenefit to the individual was very considerable. When the hurt was\ncritical, then only was pain accomplished as a function to secure\nself-preservative action, but gradually through survival of the fittest\nthe greater susceptibility was attained, so that minor lesions are felt\nin pain terms, and some general sensing and objectifying lead to some\ndifferentiation in adjustment. The external parts of the body become\nspecially sensitive, and ciliate extensions are formed. Injury to these\nresults in pain and consequent reactions, and in this wise by injury to\na small part great harm to the organism as a whole is prevented. The low\nforms of life are thus enabled to avoid the hurtful before they meet it\nin full annihilatory force. These practically anticipatory\nreactions\u2014though there is no real anticipation in consciousness, no real\nexperience of experience\u2014I term the method of incipiency. Pain reactions\nare thus reached with less and less actual harm until the very slightest\ninjury to a minute tentacle will suffice to awaken pain.\n\nThis tentacular experience, however, is obviously very limited, and has\nincidental disadvantages. Further, that pain should be attained when\nthere is little actual harm, is good, but to attain pain, and\nself-conservative action before any injury is done, but only about to be\ndone is better. Reaction to potential harm is a most important\nadvantageous step. In the earlier form of mentality, the animal must\nactually be in the process of being devoured by an enemy before a pain\nreaction is achieved, but in the later representative form of reaction\nthere is complete anticipation, and the animal can come off with an\nabsolutely whole skin. Ideal pains, as fear, anger, and other emotions,\nare gradually substituted for pains which are real in the sense that\nthey arise in a positive hurt to the life of the organism. The saving\nwhich is effected through emotion is most important, and this economy is\nreason for the rise of emotion in the struggle of existence. Those\nanimals who are able, not merely to react on slight injuries to\nthemselves, but also through fear, etc., to avoid all actual injury,\nhave a very manifest advantage.\n\nIf now the _rationale_ of the rise of emotion is apparent, let us next\nproceed to some analysis of emotional process in general. The mental\nmechanism by which anticipatory function is secured is certainly\ncomplex, and a complete analysis presents many difficulties.\n\nIn the incipiency stage, which we have just discussed, the organism was\nenabled to avoid the full force of the injurious by meeting it half-way\nwith extensions from its own body, but we cannot suppose that this was\npurposely accomplished, or that the lesser pain conveyed in any form\nsense of the greater pain. There was no fear, no anger, not any\nexperience at experience in consciousness. There is simply pain on less\nand less injury, but no anticipation of pain.\n\nIn early consciousness there is, of course, frequent return of a given\nobject which becomes the occasion of a large number of objectifyings\nwhich are identical in nature yet do not contain sense of identity.\nThere is repeated reaction to the same objective stimulus, yet with no\nsense of sameness, there is frequent cognition of the same thing yet no\nrecognition. With primitive consciousness, no matter how often a thing\nis experienced, it is equally new; revival of the past is not\nstimulated, nor sense of identity attained. Mere return of a state is\nnot sense of return, and no amount of re-occurrence or combinations\nthereof will make sense of re-occurrence. Re-occurrence of a psychosis\nis nothing more subjectively than occurrence unless there arise sense of\nre-occurrence or revival. The pure feeling states in primitive\nconsciousness are perfectly identical in nature, and they arise on\noccasions which are the same, yet there is of course no sense of\nidentity. A young child may see a thing a hundred times without\nrecognising it; there are a hundred re-occurrences of state yet no sense\nof re-occurrence. The hundredth perception does not differ materially\nfrom the first, does not include any true representative element. The\nimmediate image does not stand for the past, the mind does not revive\nprevious presentation on the strength of it.\n\nMind is regarded by many as consisting fundamentally of vivid sense\npresentations and their faint reproductions, of sense impressions and\ntheir representations. That which has been repeatedly experienced has a\ntendency to re-occur without the particular objective stimulus, but\nmerely indirectly by some connected stimulus, through an association of\nstates. But this revival, however attained, does not constitute real\nrepresentation, it does not really differ from the presentation simply\nbecause it re-occurs without the original particular objective stimulus.\nRepresentation in true sense of term is representation with sense of\nre-presentation. A representation is a repetition of a presentation with\nno consciousness of repetition or any added nature. Repetition is a fact\nin consciousness before it is a fact for consciousness. All\npresentations and re-presentations have mere immediate validity and\nvalue, they point to nothing, and mean nothing, there is no going beyond\nwhat is immediately given, no prescience of a possible experience.\n\nRevival often occurs in mind without sense of revival, and so is not\ntrue representation. In disordered states of the nerves we frequently\nsee objects which have no real existence, the states are revival states\nas objectively interpreted, yet there being no sense of revival they\nstand in consciousness for real presentations. When I see a person\nsitting in a chair but afterwards find that no one was there, I\ncharacterize the state very naturally as a mere imagination, a\nrepresentation; yet in fact it was in subjective quality a presentation.\nWe are not to psychologically classify, as is too often done, psychical\nstates according to presence or absence of object, but as to sense of\npresence or absence of object. It is only as consciousness takes note\nwith reference to object that there is differentiation in consciousness\nto make presentation and representation.\n\nWe must consider it probable that the earliest revivals by consciousness\nwere solely of the unconscious sort, or, objectively speaking, were\nhallucinatory. A sense order is formed, which attends to a series of\nobjective realities; let now, on some occasion, one of these objects\ndrop out, yet there will be attaining of some sense of it as though it\nwere present, and the proper reaction will be carried out. The mind gets\nits early revivals without sense of revival. They have presentative\nforce, and are sensings of objective reality though there is no\nobjective reality there at the time to sense.\n\nThese early simple revivals, which are all hallucinatory, perform an\nimportant function. They are practically anticipatory, in that the\nreaction is secured before the actual presence of the reality. Thus they\nsave an actual bodily experience, though the mental is quite real, yet\nfainter than actual object would give. Thus with an enemy an animal will\nrevive, upon slight indirect sensation, previous experiences, and it\nwill have in ideal form, _i.e._, without the objective reality, a very\nreal experience with what is to it real enemy, thus escaping before full\nadvent of enemy. When a shadow alarms a low organism\u2014and even very low\norganisms seem to react to shadows\u2014there is no actual harm done to its\nmembers as would happen with a concrete body, and hence there is no\ndirect pain. The shadow is yet taken for real body, and revival pains\nand revival sensations are attained with this, and there is consequent\nactivity. Shadow does not appear as sign of enemy, but in itself a\ndangerous reality, so that anticipatory reaction is gained without\nactual representation. In most cases in low organisms what we take for\nfear or other emotion is probably no more than revival of the type of\nwhich this shadow experience is an example. What is actually unreal,\nbeing only revival, is taken for the real, and is acted on accordingly,\nand in most cases this action is of service as anticipatory. When the\norganism discovers the shadow to be but shadow, a something, not the\nobject, yet connected with it, when it becomes a sign of further\nexperience, this is representation as the basis of emotions such as fear\nand anger.\n\nThe pain intensity in the simple revivals, re-presentations, is\ndoubtless less than in experience with objective realities, so there is\na saving on this score in pseudo-direct experience. While reactions are\nsecured upon this method without injury being actually inflicted, still\nthere is loss of economy in this, that the activity is excessive under\nthe circumstances. Priority of action to real injury is secured, but at\nan excessive expense of energy, almost equal to that in actual\nexperience with the real thing.\n\nThis acting to a false reality, while it has a value for experience, is,\nas said, uneconomical, and it must sometimes not have the anticipatory\nforce. The cheat and illusion is ultimately at some critical moment\ncognized by consciousness, revival comes to be estimated at its real\nworth, and sense of reality and unreality is formed. The revived\npresentation does not stand in and by itself alone, but it acquires a\nsignificance, and it loses the force of complete reality value. That\nwhich is brought into consciousness again is not only revival, but is\nfelt to be such.\n\nTo constitute representation, then, there must be not merely revival,\nbut sense of revival with some sense of unreality of revival form. But\nthis would avail nothing save it brought in sense of its value for\nexperience. The revival must not only be appreciated as such, but the\nrelation to the experienceable must be cognized. The calling up of the\npast must be applied to experience. The sight of a fire not only calls\nup revivals, but there is the sense of the experienceable therewith, and\nan emotion which incites me to walk to the fire and receive warmth. Mere\nreturn and sense of return must be supplemented by sense of value for\nfuture experience. Representation is experience doubling on itself. All\nrepresentation is more than representation of thing, revival; it is\nrepresentation of experience as such, hence an experience of experience.\nWe must always emphasize as the essence of representation not the\nrevival, but the sense of the experienceable or experienced thereby\nconveyed.\n\nThe process to representation we see exemplified in measure in awaking\nfrom a dream. The dream itself, speaking from the objective point of\nview of observing psychologist who detects no real things in interaction\nwith the body, is representative in nature; but, for the experiencing\nconsciousness, there is no sense of revival, and all is presentative\nactivity. Things are known as such, and not as dreamt or represented.\nAwaking is a gradual pouring in of sense of revival and of sense of\nobjective unreality of the experience; we become conscious that the\nactivity is no direct consciousness, but a recalling or reproduction.\nThe dream image, which was so real to me while in the dream, I now hold\nas representative only, as having no immediate answering form and\nsubstance. When, as with the superstitious, the dream is felt to have\nsignificance, to have a meaning for life in pleasure-pain terms, then\nemotion becomes possible, and fear, hope and kindred feelings are\nexcited.\n\nWe observe that representation is then a new order of consciousness.\nRepresentation cannot be attained by any combination of experiences,\nrevival or direct, but it is a unique and reflex act. It is not a\ndevelopment of presentation, as an echo and re-echo of it; and the mere\nfact of absence of external cause or object does not constitute a\ncognition as representation. The objectifying is not self-contained, but\nit conveys a meaning for experience. Representation is an experience\nwhich includes some cognizance of or sense of experience, and it is thus\nthe germ of self-consciousness and consciousness of consciousness.\nExperience comes to be more than a series of detached and isolated\nactivities with no cognitive power beyond a direct and immediate\napprehension, but by rising to some appreciation of itself it becomes\nforewarned and forearmed, able to consciously appreciate and attend to\nits own welfare.\n\nWe have also to emphasize this, that while representation involves a\nconscious re-objectifying, it must also include some re-feeling\nconsciously accomplished of pain and pleasure. Revivals of pain and\npleasure are felt and are appreciated as revivals, as having their basis\nnot in present object, but in previous experience. It is by\nunderstanding feeling as experienced and experienceable, it is in view\nof pleasure-pain experience, that emotion arises. It is not sense of\nimminence of object, but of imminence of pain and pleasure, that awakens\nresponsive emotion and so self-conservative action. Emotion always\nimplies a pleasure or a pain in ideal sense of the experienceability of\neither. Representation as cognitive revival and sense thereof is\nsubsidiary to representation as feeling revival with sense thereof. For\ninstance, the representation of a tooth and of pain of toothache are\ncorrelative representations. Mere representation of cognition has no\nvalue in itself, is a mere idle panorama, save as it brings on\nrepresentation of pleasure-pain. Unless representation of object implies\nrepresentation of pain, there is no deterrent effect on the mind, and no\nproper bodily reaction.\n\nWe may believe that the order and basis of the representative side of\nmind is practically the same as indirect and simple activity, that the\nactual motive forces and originating impulses are pleasures and pains.\nWe should suspect that the first revival attained was a pure feeling\nrevival, and that the first representation was of pain and pleasure, and\nnot of object, a consciously re-feeling rather than a consciously\nre-objectifying. The immediate value of the feeling side necessitates\nthat all differentiation be initiated there.\n\nRepresentation is only of experience of things or of pleasure-pain\nexperience. It is always experience of experience, hence the expression,\nrepresentation of an object, is, in strictness, inaccurate. Experience\nof things, as cognitive act, is always presentation. Yet early\nrepresentation must be considered as very much adulterated by\npresentative elements. It was only slowly that representation was\ndifferentiated as a distinct power such as we find it in human\nconsciousness; at the first it must have resembled the confused state\nthat we sometimes experience between sleeping and waking when a given\nimage often shifts from presentation value to representation value, and\nthen back again.\n\nRepresentation at the first is also purely concrete and particular. Bare\nappreciation of the experienceable does not include idea of experience.\nBut representation in itself is merely a calling up and application of\ndefinite experiences as such. Experience as general term is not known,\nbut only the particular facts as experiences.\n\nThe earliest emotions arise, of course, with reference to the bodily\nfunctions which have the most direct vital significance, as nutritive,\nreproductive, and motor activity. Very simple organisms seem to\napprehend that a certain object is food before actually consuming, to\nhave sense of the experience, and some emotive disturbance. The pleasure\nof feeding and incorporating into the bodily tissue is sensational, but\nany feeling previous or subsequent to this and with reference to this is\nemotional. A very young child feeds, and does not know food. Gradually\nit associates the visual sensation of whiteness of the milk with the\nimmediate taste sensation and pleasure feeling. But the sense of\nwhiteness at first arises only with and after the actual taste and\npleasure experiences; it only gradually notices what gives it\nsatisfaction or pain, thus repeating the evolution of mind, which is\nfrom feeling to sense, and not _vice vers\u00e2_. Only slowly does it attain\npower of appreciating whiteness previous to actual experience and as\n_indicative of such_, that is, a power of representation. Then emotions,\nas expectancy, and desire, become possible, and will can be stirred to\nactive appropriation of food, a fact of the greatest importance in the\nstruggle for existence. Once attaining the sense of the representative\nvalue of its cognitions, the child is enabled to consciously accomplish\nanticipatory actions.\n\nAn element which complicates emotion at a late stage is representation\nof representation in indefinite _regressus_. In advanced human\nconsciousness, where mind is very reflective and introspective, this\nphase is prominent. The _nuances_ of modern emotion are largely due to\nthis mode of complication. Montaigne remarks that what he most fears is\nfear. As fear implies representation, fear of fear implies\nrepresentation of representation, which in its turn may be feared, and\nso on _ad infinitum_. Spencer terms love of property a re-representative\nfeeling; but this psychosis does not imply representation of\nrepresentation, but merely representation of desirable realities. Desire\nof possession is an emotion, but not emotion at emotion. It is not an\nexperience in view of representative experience, but with reference to a\ndirect experience, that of ownership. Since we make representation the\nbasis of emotion, it would be natural to make classes of emotion\nrepresentative, re-representative, etc.; but this is quite too subtle a\ndistinction to be fruitful or practical.\n\nAs there are stages of representation, so there are varying degrees of\nstrength in the sense of representativeness. A colour may be recalled to\nconsciousness several times as neither more nor less red, and precisely\nof the same quantity, yet the sense of its representation quality may\ndiffer greatly at each time. There are all degrees of intensity in this\nsense, from dimmest feeling, when the representation hovers on the\nconfines of the presentation field, to the point of perfect conviction\nof representative nature. When consciousness is not exactly sure whether\nan object is directly seen or only recalled, is a presentation or only a\nrevival, sense of representation is obviously at its lowest degree of\nintensity.\n\nWe have also to remark that in presentation and representation the\nobject is not to be divorced from activity. It is a natural analogy that\ncognition as subjective-objective is a picturing, the picture and the\nobject pictured seeming to be diverse but co-existent constituents of\nconsciousness. Cognition seems to consist in both the thing as realized\nand the realizing act. It is an attitude of mind which is a holding on\nto a something which it has in its grasp. But there is no distinction in\nconsciousness itself of the presented and the presenting, the\nrepresented and the representing, of product and process, of content and\nactivity; there is only the presenting, the activity, which is itself\nthe object. Sense of colour conveys, indeed, by the common vice of\nlanguage that the colour exists for consciousness, and is perceived by\nconsciousness. But, subjectively and psychologically speaking, the\nobject is always no more than the objectifying, the thing no more than\nthe activity. Thus the analysis into content and activity is\nfundamentally false; it assumes a world of objects which are merely at\nbottom object-sensings.\n\nEmotion is an arousing and energizing. It is perturbation, disturbance,\nagitation, excitement. It is a throwing open the throttle and putting on\na full head of steam. The whole organism quivers with the sudden inflow\nof force and life, is quickened to its highest pressure. In all higher\npsychic life it is a driving force of the utmost importance. However,\nthe trend of evolution is in the direction of economy, and with the\nhighest forms of consciousness emotion accomplishes its work even before\narriving at agitation intensity. Feeling of the emotion type, that is,\nrepresentative, is always at first a rather intense perturbation. Fear,\nfor example, is with the lower minds always fright; with higher minds it\noften appears as dread. I stand on the railway track when a train is\napproaching, and a slight fear enables me to take the self-conservative\naction of stepping from the track; but with my dog, in similar\ncircumstances, I judge by his hasty jump and general expression that his\nfear is always more intense and more generally disturbing. Emotion being\na force which quickly tends to exhaustion, it is obvious that those\nanimals will, _ceteris paribus_, have the advantage which react with the\nleast expenditure. Thus the tendency of evolution is away from intense\nemotionalism.\n\nIn this emotion conforms to a general law. The earliest occurrences of\nany given form of psychosis are with strenuousness and with exaltation\nand excitement of the organism. We speak of fits of anger and gusts of\npassion, but for early consciousness we might also justly speak of fits\nof seeing and hearing. Common vision of external objects is for lower\nconsciousness as rarely attained, and requires as much of force as\nbeatific vision of seer and poet in the human mind. The new psychosis is\nbut momentary, and implies high tension and great friction, but progress\nis toward continuity and ease of working. Emotion is in human life a\ntolerably constant element, like perception with whose representative\nside it is correlated, and within certain ranges it rises because of the\nforce of heredity with apparent spontaneity.\n\nWe remark that the social significance of emotion is embodied in the\nword _treat_, as _treat_ kindly, badly, etc. Our _treatment_ of each\nother always means activities inspired by some emotion.\n\nWe must acknowledge that representation is very complex and difficult\nof analysis. For our present purpose, however, representation is a\nrevival with sense of revival and unreality, and yet indicative of\nreality experienceable in pleasure-pain terms, and thus the occasion\nof emotion as stimulus of self-conservative action. The young child\nperceives no danger; its pleasures and pains are not related to\nthings, and have not led to the evolution of a world of objects. Pain\nand pleasure lead it slowly to correlate its senses, so that the burnt\nchild learns to dread the fire; the emotion of fear is aroused with\ncognition of the experienceable. Objectively, we must divide psychoses\ninto those which directly result from actual engagement of the\norganism with objects, or the reverberations therefrom; subjectively,\ninto simple self-contained states, and into reflex states which view\nexperience, and so being representations involving emotion. Just how\nfrom re-experience sense of re-experience and of its value for\nexperience\u2014sense of pre-experience\u2014arises, is something we have not\nparticularly inquired into, but it is something that appears a\nmysterious and difficult problem. That the perception of object should\never carry with it sense of possibility or certainty of further\nexperience, painful or pleasurable, is, when candidly considered, a\nremarkable and singular operation. The problems of origin of\nconsciousness of self, of consciousness of consciousness, and of sense\nof reality seem unsolved, but I believe that a thorough study of\nrepresentation would throw much light on these points; but this is not\nthe place to pursue this investigation. When we take up\nrepresentation\u2014emotion life in detail, we may be able to make\nsuggestions on some moot points.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER VII\n _FEAR AS PRIMITIVE EMOTION_[B]\n\n\nIt may be considered as plausible that if the first feeling was pain,\nthe first emotion was also of the pain character. The first\nrepresentation of an object as painful induced that reaction of mind\nwhich we term an emotion, and the painful emotion we call fear. That the\nfirst emotion to appear was fear, as fright, seems likely when we\nconsider that the general alertness and defensiveness imperatively\nrequired in the struggle for existence is thereby most immediately and\nsimply attained. The acquirement of the power to become frightened is\nplainly a most important requisite for self-preservation, and thus is\nindicated as a very early factor in conscious life. An animal being\ndevoured by another may merely suffer pain without any perception of the\nobject as pain-giving and to give pain; but if it attains this\nperception, there may be added to the stimulus of simple pain that of\nfright. The direct actual pain may be but small, and so inducing but\nfeeble reaction, as when some less sensitive portion is being injured;\nbut if there occurs a vivid representation of potential pain, fright\nhappens and stimulates most strenuous endeavours, and so rids the animal\nboth of the immediately and the prospectively painful. Thus emotion acts\nas a complement to simple feeling, and also secures practically\nanticipatory reaction. Animals which must receive actual injury before\nexperiencing pain are clearly inferior to those which experience\nemotion-pain before the injury is actually received. Other things being\nequal, the most easily frightened have, in the midst of many destructive\nagents, the best chance of survival and of perpetuating their kind.\n\n-----\n\nFootnote B:\n\n Originally appeared in part in _Philosophical Review_, i. pp. 241-256.\n\n-----\n\nIt is unnecessary to dwell at length on child life and savage life as\nillustrating the primitive quality and function of fear. The earliest\nexperiences of the child with things are lessons of fear. The burnt\nchild dreads the fire, and thus is enabled to preserve himself from\nthreatened injury. Fear is a primary and most important motive to action\nin a very wide range of the lower mental life. Those who have observed\nanimals and man in a state of nature are always greatly impressed with\nthe constant and large part which this emotion plays in their\nconsciousness. With the timid and weaker species, like the rabbit and\nsquirrel, it is likely that a majority of their cognitions prompt to\nfear or are prompted by fear, and with some persecuted races of savages\nthe same may be said.\n\nThe necessity and value of anticipatory reaction being acknowledged in\nthe struggle of existence, we plainly see a primitive motive thereto in\nfear, and the earliest emotional life which we can clearly interpret\nlikewise seems to be fear.\n\nIt is sufficiently easy to see the general function of fear and its\nprimitive character, but we find it very hard to make a satisfactory\nanalysis, and to show the exact steps of its evolution. It is obvious,\nhowever, in the first place, that fear, like other emotions, is purely\nindirect and secondary experience; it pre-supposes previous painful\nexperience of the feared object. Pain experienced in connection with\ncognition of object is the basis of all fear. Animals that have not felt\npain from man do not fear him. But fear while thus based on previous\ndirect experience is always hindered by simultaneous direct experience,\nas, for example, sensation. Thus when we, whip in hand, say to a child\ncrying from fear, \u201cI will give you something to cry for,\u201d we imply the\nlaw that direct pain and sensation tend to supplant indirect feeling as\nemotion. This common expression emphasizes the essential\nrepresentativeness of emotion, its imaginary nature, as also the\nsupplanting power of direct real experience. The sight of the whip\ninspires fear in the child who has been whipped, but this fear is in the\ncourse of a punishment wholly eliminated by the direct pain endured. The\ndirect experience is thus the basis of every fear, but only as it is\ncognized, and not felt.\n\nThe great difficulty in analysing fear is in clearly apprehending the\nmode in which previous experience is utilized. If we could study in\nourselves the genesis of a simple emotion, we should doubtless be\nenabled to see the steps by which experience reacts upon itself so as to\ngive a reflex form like the emotion of fear, but this is hardly\npossible. However, cognition is evolved at the instance of pain, and all\nobjects are viewed, not for themselves, but in their feeling\nsignificance. Cognition is embedded in feeling, and at first is a mere\ntone of feeling. Things are not at first known for themselves but solely\nas sources of present pleasure and pain. Things are perceived in and\nthrough the feeling which has stimulated the perception. The immediate\nfeeling value of the object is given by the very origin and process of\ncognition. When an animal is pained by contact with a sharp rock, and\nthis pain stimulates cognition of the rock, this is solely on the pain\naccount. Repeated experiences enable the percept to arise at stimulus of\nless and less pain, and so the proper reaction is accomplished more and\nmore economically.\n\nWe may say that the order of evolution is this: first, a pain; second, a\ncognition of pain-giver\u2014\u201cit hurts\u201d\u2014third, emotion about pain-giver, as\nfear thereof\u2014\u201cI am afraid of it.\u201d Primitive and normal cognition always\nimplies emotion as impelling self-preservative action. Knowledge which\ndoes not spring into emotion and action is abortive. At first the known\nis always startling.\n\nThe original pain-impelled cognition brings in the painful emotion,\nprimitive fear. And as knowledge has brought in fear, so fear reacts on\nknowledge, and fearfulness incites to knowing even when the pain from\nobject ceases. Thus before any actual experience of an object it may be\nknown and felt about. Thus that habit of objectivity is formed, of\nalertness, of a fearful sensing and perceiving, which is noticeable in\nmany animals. A cognitive-emotive, emotive-cognitive life is formed and\ndeveloped. It is a tremendous stride onward to be able through fearful\ncognition to wholly pre-perceive and anticipate the injurious, instead\nof having to suffer it in part before being enabled to get away.\n\nNow primitive fear and all primitive emotion plainly utilizes the past\nexperience as interpreting the future; emotion is about a known potency.\nYet it is often stated that emotion is but a summation of revivals of\npast experience. Having often been burnt by fires that I have\ncoincidently been looking at, it sometimes happens that I see a fire\nwhich has not yet harmed me, but still the mere sight affects me with\nwhat I call the emotion of fear, which, in closest analysis, means\nmerely the revival of the burning pains associated with this seeing in\nthe past. \u201cI am afraid\u201d equals \u201cI re-experience the pains of burning\u201d by\nsuggestion. Pains faintly re-occurring constitute the painful fear.\nThere is in this mass of re-awakenings no real cognition of experience\nand no feeling about it as such, no psychosis _at_ the experienceable.\nAnd it is certainly true that when a fixed sequence of experiences tend\nto recur together, there will follow upon the cognition, revival waves\nof pain before any actual increase of pain is really inflicted in the\ngiven case. These waves stand for, and are the echoes of, the former\nreal pain sequences of cognition. Thus the perception of a great mass of\nice will often cause a shivery feeling, a painful sensation is revived\nas correlated with former cognition experiences. Even the image or\nrepresentation, the purely and consciously ideal cognition, may bring in\npainful feeling, as when I say, \u201cIt makes me shiver to think of it.\u201d\nHere the painful sensation-bringing idea is cognized as such, but the\nrepresentation here is the occasion of a direct painful sensation, and\nevidently does not imply fear or other emotion.\n\nWhile not arising from actual injuries, revivals strengthen both\ncognition and volition. They have recurred before further hurtful\nexperiences with the fire which originally incited them. These revival\npains of previous sequences to the cognition, which are carried along\nwith the present cognition, are real enough in themselves, yet they are\nobjectively anticipatory of actual injury. The whole order of previous\nexperience is by the nature of mind and nervous system re-enacted before\nthe actual injuries are inflicted. It is always a race between mind and\nnature, but it is a prime function of mind to anticipate practically the\nmovements of nature. Mind by its revival forms accomplishes this, but if\nit lags in its work the real injuries are mercilessly inflicted by slow\nbut sure nature. When the sequence of revival is quicker than the\nobjective sequence, the reactions anticipate objective order, and thus a\nmanifest economy is achieved. But pain revivals of this kind are not\nfear, nor is there a real pre-perception. Since the revival forms are,\nto the observer\u2019s point of view, incentive to anticipatory reaction,\npsychologists must often, especially with low organisms, mistake them\nfor fear; the animal is often, doubtless, merely suffering revival pains\nwhen it appears to be fearing pain. Thus we may suspect that organisms\nwhich seem to fear shadows or real objects are often merely suffering\nrevival pains brought up in conjunction with the cognition, and not\nreally fearing as result of perceiving feeling quality inherent in the\nobject. Manifestation of pain must often be mistaken for manifestations\nof emotion, and there is as yet no accurate objective determination for\nfear or other emotions.\n\nRevival pains are not representations of pains as in some way coming\nfrom object. Emotion requires representation, and cannot occur in any\npresentation or re-presentation chain. True pre-perception is not merely\nperceiving the thing before its effects in feeling are experienced, but\nit is a _representing_ the feeling quality of the object before, in any\ngiven case, this quality is directly experienced. This obviously rests\non past experience, but the connecting of object with pleasure-pain\nexperience is at all times, as before intimated, equally a problem.\nEmotion and representation are built not of revivals, but upon them\nperceived as such. At some critical moment, in some rather early period\nin mental development, a consciousness which was pain _plus_ sense of\nobject, realized, under the pressure of struggle for existence, the\nfeeling quality of the object, and there arose with the knowledge of\nobject as pain-giver the painful emotion. And as soon as object is not\nmerely cognized, but cognized as pain-giver, it may be feared. The\nmoment that object was known as a pain agent, then fear of the object\ncame, and thus true anticipatory action arose. We are said, indeed, to\nfear objects, to fear men, animals, etc., but, in truth, the fear is\nnever of the object as such, but only in view of its pain agency. The\ncognizing the experienced and experienceable as such seems then a\npeculiar and distinct process in fear and in all emotion, a _genus_\napart which cannot be constituted by interaction of simple elements. The\ngrowth of mind is largely in multiplying and enlarging the signs of\nexperience.\n\nThe connecting once achieved of object with pain, it becomes\nincreasingly easy to cognize the feeling value of objects, and before\nfull and extreme pain experience therefrom to pre-react through emotion.\nThus emotion saves both direct pain and injury. As it becomes a\npermanent tendency, and an impulse of consciousness to proceed from all\npure feelings to cognition of object, so also to cognition of object in\nits feeling quality, and thus by inherent tendency it ultimately comes\nabout that there is attaching of pain to various objects cognized, even\nwhen there is no immediate experience of pain to be connected therewith.\nFinally the precedent inciting pains to cognition become such minor\nfactors, and knowledge arises with such apparent spontaneity, that\nemotion as involving pain significance becomes dominant rather than the\nimmediate pain. An order of consciousness becomes established in which\nthe notable event is emotional cognition of experience values as\nbringing in permanent emotion rather than an order of pleasure-pain\ninciting cognition with evanescent emotion. But at the first it is\nevident that fear was but a slight event in a consciousness which was\nmainly absorbed in immediate pain experience and some sense of object.\nIt is so habitual and instinctive for us to perceive all things as\nhaving feeling value, that it is most difficult to appreciate the\nstandpoint of a consciousness which is just attaining emotion life.\n\nThe preliminary elements to simple primitive fear, as expressed by any\nsuch phrase as, \u201cit hurts,\u201d are at least four: pain, cognition of\nobject, cognition of the pain, cognition of the pain agency of object.\nThese operations, as being at first successive, do not necessarily\nimply, however, sense of time. The consciousness of a pain is certainly,\nat first, consciousness of pain really past, yet not consciousness of it\nas past. The pain stands as immediately antecedent act to the\nconsciousness which is cognition of it, but sense of experience is not\nthereby sense of experience in time. The sense of time-relations of\nexperiences is wholly subsequent to the simple sense of experience. All\nexperience is, of course, in time, but far from being of time.\n\nAn organism, which has suffered knowingly from an object, and so feared,\nattains at length the power of fearing antecedent to any real injury.\nThis seems to be brought about somewhat in the following manner: If I in\nany way, as by a pin pricking, rouse a sleeping animal to a cognition of\nan object which has often injured it, and which it has often feared,\nimmediately there would re-occur the original concomitants of the\ncognition in the previous cases; there would be pain, cognition of pain,\nascription to object, and fear, all merely revivals, and happening most\nprobably before any actual injury, etc., received in the present case.\nNow these revivals, as before insisted, do not and cannot in themselves\nalone form a new fear. This is only constituted when the revival pains\nare known as such, when they are not merely presented in consciousness,\nbut represented as belonging to past experience of thing, and so to be\nexperienced. The thing is thereby truly _interpreted_ for its feeling\nvalue. Not merely pain, as being experienced, is connected with thing,\nbut as having been experienced, and to be experienced. Thus only arises\nthat sense of the experienceable, that real _apprehension_ for the\nfuture, which is so valuable an acquisition in the struggle for\nexistence. Feeling quality comes thus to be assigned as real and\npermanent property of things, and every cognition comes to imply\nrepresentation of feeling value, and so to be a basis for emotion. But\nall sense of experienceability is founded on sense of experience; the\nsense of things as possibilities of sensation and feeling is based on\nactual relatings of feelings to objects in simple direct experiences.\n\nFear is in itself pre-eminently a painful state, and we have to inquire\nas to the origin and nature of this pain. The statement of the problem\nin general form is, how does that which does not yet please or pain, but\nis only cognized as about to do so, give immediate pleasure or pain?\n\nWe have already expressed the opinion that fear is based on more than\nmere pain revivals; there must be true representation, the revival must\nbe appreciated as representation of past experience, and indicative of\nfuture. The painful agitation consequent on prospect of pain seems,\nindeed, to include as pain element more than revival pain, but it is\nonly seeming. Where does the pain come from which a person feels at the\nmere prospect of pain unless from the past? The pain is, of course, not\nthe identical pain feared. Again, one cannot see how a cognition in\nitself, entirely empty of feeling, can cause a pain, except as acting as\na link in a chain of association whereby conjoined past pains are\nrevived. So far as fear is pain, it is, we may be told, revival, for\nrepresentation of pain is not pain, and cannot cause pain. The pain\nwhich arises from cognition of pain to be experienced appears in a\nstrict analysis to be wholly re-occurrence stimulated thereby, and not\nany new and peculiar mode of pain at pain. That this is the case is\napparent from the fact that we can only have the pain of fear so far as\nwe have experienced pain. Poignant pains experienced are the basis of\npoignant pain in fear. The knowledge that you are soon to re-experience\nan intense pain leads to an intense dread, in which the intense pain is\nrevived from former experience. There are, to be sure, in the phenomena\nof fear in highly developed consciousness, complex pains which cannot be\nascribed to revivals, reflexes upon consciousness of the great tension\nand agitation thereof, pain of loss of self-possession and self-power,\nand other modes which proceed from consciousness of consciousness, but\nthis does not bear upon the question how mere cognition of pain, as to\nbe experienced, can in itself give pain; how there arises from mere\napprehension a pain which is more than and distinct from the revival\npains.\n\nBut, however we may be puzzled to see how mere cognition of\nexperienceable pain develops a peculiar pain which is the essence of\nfear, yet we must acknowledge its production to be a fact. We may say,\nindeed, that the bare thought of pain even when conveyed by the printed\nword\u2014the abstract sign of an arbitrary vocal name\u2014is not without a tinge\nof a peculiar fear-pain which does not wholly consist of revivals. When\npreparing to go out into the storm on a very cold day I have pain in\nanticipation of the pain I am to receive from the bitterly cold wind.\nNow I may have preliminary shiverings, and there may be recurrent\npainful sensations as I look intently at the raging elements, pains\nwhich return from actual experiences which I have before undergone and\nat the time knowingly connected with wind and snow. But all these\nrevivals, while the basis of my fear, do not give the distinct pain\nquality of the fear. The pain which I do experience when I actually step\ninto the biting blast I know at once to be entirely distinct in quality\nfrom that which I before felt at the anticipation, the real pain, of\nfear. Again, when I say, \u201cI was deeply pained to hear of it,\u201d and when I\nsay, \u201cThe noise pained me greatly,\u201d I indicate that difference between\npurely mental distress and sensuous pain, between pain at representation\nand pain referred to presentation, which is to be emphasized in all our\nstudy of emotion. With a man in the hands of hostile Indians the\ntortures of fear are quite distinct in quality from the tortures\nactually endured. The agony of fear is a _genus_ apart from the agony of\nphysical pain.\n\nAgain, if the pain in fear were derived from revivals, then the nature\nof the pain in different states of fear would be as different as the\nsensations feared. But as a matter of fact the pain in fear of cold,\nfear of heat, of famine, of punishment, etc., is substantially of the\nsame quality. I may fear one more than another, but the real mental\nagitation and pain which constitute the fear are in all cases\nessentially the same. If the pain in fear were sensation revivals, then\nfear of cold and fear of heat would be quite diverse and contrary in\nquality of pain value, but we all know that the dread of a cold day and\nof a hot day are in themselves essentially the same in nature. As far as\nthe states are pure fear and have a pain quality, the conscious activity\nin both is entirely similar.\n\nFurther, if the pain in fear were wholly of revival nature, not only\nshould we expect fear of different sensations to be correspondingly\ndistinct, but we should also expect the pain in fear to never exceed in\namount and intensity the pain feared as indicated by measure of past\nexperience. But we know that our fears are often much more painful than\npain feared and than our experience of past pain. The pang of fear, of\nsudden fright, is often more acute and intense than any direct pain we\nhave ever experienced. The terrible convulsions of fear which we see in\nthe insane give evidence of pain which could not have been reflection\nfrom direct experience. That excessive and sudden fear which turns men\u2019s\nhair gray in a few hours and transforms their whole physical system is\nplainly not any revival from the individual\u2019s past experience. As\nrevealed by its effects it is often, perhaps, greater than the whole\namount of pain they have ever suffered. Where, in the direct-experience\nform, pain is greater in the fear than the real pain suffered, we\nexpress the fact by the common phrase, \u201cmore scared than hurt.\u201d In all\nsuch cases the pain in fear is not the revival of past experiences of\nthe object feared.\n\nFear is, in the main, the peculiar pain coming from consciousness of\nexperienceable pain, but in general in all complex consciousness it is\nmarked by dissolution and weakening of mental force. There is a\nshrinking of will, and a clouding of cognition, a general unsettling of\nall mental elements, a commotion or agitation which destroys the organic\n_consensus_ of consciousness. But any excessive functioning of some\nelement in consciousness, of emotion life, as fear, or of any other\nform, is unbalancing and detracts from normal activity of the whole.\nFear, however, in its normal measure and form arose and was developed as\na desirable stimulant; where it becomes paralyzing in its force, it is\npathological in quality. Also where fear is pathologically intense it\ntends to disappear in sensation feared. Cognition becomes so weakened\nthat sense of representativeness is lost, the thing feared is no longer\nbrought before the mind in its potential quality, but is immediately\napprehended as present in its influence\u2014though really objectively\nabsent\u2014hallucination is produced, and fear naturally reverts to its\nearliest and direct form in immediate experience. As cognition is still\nfurther weakened the sense of object as giving pain is lost and fear in\nany form entirely disappears. The pain is not felt which before was\nfeared to be felt. Fear thus in the general order of its disappearance\nrepeats the order of its appearance and growth.\n\nFear always includes some sense of object. The apprehension of something\nevil to happen is the basis of all fear, but the thing, or, subjectively\nspeaking, the objectifying, may be extremely vague. We may fear that\nsome harm is to befall us, but what and how, we know not. We must\nsuppose that in early stages this bare objectifying of approaching pain\nwas a regular incipient form, that an indefinite fear preceded every\ncase of defined fear. We, as a rule, attain a full objectifying with\nsuch ease and rapidity that this form does not often appear.\n\nA complete fear movement, then with reference to cognition includes four\nstages: first, a very general sense of object as about to give pain;\nsecond, an increasing definition of object up to the maximum of\nclearness, thus marking the highest efficiency of the fear function;\nthird, a decreasing definition of object till, fourth, a purely\nindefinite objectifying is again reached. Every fear, if it attains a\nnormal life, will rise, culminate, and decline in this way. Even in man,\nwhere the full development of single simple psychoses rarely proceed\nundisturbed, there is yet observed a general tendency toward these\nstages. I awaken in the night at a sudden noise with slight and vague\nfear; suspicious sounds increase my fear and I listen and look more\nintently till I see clearly and quite fully crouching near the bed a\ndark body which I make out to be an armed burglar; as he approaches with\nhis pointed weapon fear will most likely become so intense that I see\nless and less clearly, and a shot might terrify me into vague but very\nintense fear. If the object is discerned to be not a burglar but a\nchair, the fear quickly lapses. At a certain point of maximum clearness\neither a weakening or an intensifying of fear weakens cognition. Too\nmuch or too little pain is equally injurious to the knowing activity.\nLow psychisms examine and clearly define only that from which they have\nsomething to fear or hope.\n\nThe qualitative relation of the pain of fear to the pain feared varies\ngreatly with the evolution of mind. Fear-pain could not have originated\nas a substitutionary function for the real pain except by being at the\nfirst somewhat less in quality than the pain to be endured, otherwise\nthere would be no economy in the function. The progress of this function\nis to secure at less and less expense of fear-pain the suitable\nreaction. The function of fear being to escape a greater direct pain by\na less indirect one, the progress of the function is in diminishing the\namount of fear-pain for required effectiveness. The small original gain\nin the ratio is increased by small increments till in the highest minds\nproportion of fear-pain to pain feared might be represented by\n1\u2044\u221e. The pain in the usual fear which commonly induces me to step from\nthe track before an approaching train, or which enables me after\nreading some advice on the subject to take precautions against the\ncholera, is evidently in infinitesimal relation to the pain feared.\nWhen fear is unsuccessful, as in anticipating a visit to the dentist,\nwe, of course, suffer a double pain, both the fear-pain and the\npain feared.\n\nOften we must observe that the pain of fear is equal to or greater than\nthe experience feared, and we have to ask how this disadvantageous\nexcess could have been evolved. Often the pain of anticipation turns out\nto be far greater than the pain anticipated. However, a little\nreflection assures us that the excess of fear in many cases is only in\nappearance. We do not fear too much upon the judgment we have formed as\nto the coming pain, but we have by error of judgment assigned too much\nvalue to the pain. When a person being initiated into a secret society\ntrembles with fear at being told to jump from a precipice, when he\nreally is to jump but a few feet downward, his fear was perfectly just\naccording to his judgment. If his belief is perfectly assured, the\nmortal fear will make him offer the most strenuous resistance and most\nlikely secure his release from the ordeal. In all such cases the feeling\nis right enough, but the estimate of future experience is inaccurate.\nWhen an animal is terrified at its own shadow the fear is justly\nproportioned to the estimate of danger, which, however, happens to be\nerroneous. In the evolution of mind in the struggle for existence, more\nand more accurate calculations of possible injury are attained, and fear\nbecomes more and more rational. Educated men fear only what is worthy of\nfear; they fear many things that lower minds do not, and do not fear\nmany things they do. The true excess of fear is where we fear against\njudgment, as when, knowing the safety of travel by rail, I am yet\nconstantly in fear while aboard a railway train. When I still continue\nto fear, though I know the fear to be groundless, this is a true\nhypertrophy of fear. We constantly observe those who are fearful and\ntimid against their own reason. When dangers known are compared with\ndangers obscure or unknown\u2014and perceived to be unknowable\u2014the fear of\nthe unknown often prevails against the fear of the known, and we prefer\nwith Hamlet to fear the ills we have than fly to others we know not of.\n\nI must in conclusion express my conviction that while the physiological\nand objective study of fear and other emotions is of very considerable\nvalue, yet it is only introspective analysis which can reveal the true\nnature and genesis of fear and all emotion. What fear is and what is the\nprocess of its development can only be determined by the direct study of\nconsciousness as a life factor in the struggle for existence. This I\nattempt in the present chapter, with the main result that fear, as\nindeed every emotion, does not consist of pain or cognition-revivals in\nany form, but is a feeling reaction from the representation of the\nfeeling potency of the object.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER VIII\n _THE DIFFERENTIATION OF FEAR_\n\n\nFear, according to the analysis we have made, includes representation of\nobject in its feeling value, predominant tone of mental pain, and will\nrecoil. Fear in its primitive form, as we have seen, was a sudden and\ntransitory phenomenon in consciousness, a simple thrill of feeling\nawaking will to spasmodic violent effort in the struggle for existence.\nAll states of fear in early psychical history were practically alike in\nquantity, quality and intensity. Every fear is like every other fear in\nits pain tone and will effort. Every object and event considered as\npainful is equally feared; there is no distinction of more or less fear,\nnor any qualitative differentiation. Very young children manifest equal\nfear disturbance and seemingly identical in nature on all fearful\noccasions. Prospect of vaccination, of a scratch, of the pulling of a\ntooth, of a whipping, of an amputation, produce equally paroxysms of\nfear, waves of painful emotion, which discharge themselves in muscular\ncontortions. The lowest animals likewise appear in all cases frightened\nto the same degree and in the same way. It must be said, however, that\nthis period of simple undifferentiated fear is undoubtedly very brief,\nand embraces in the individual and the race but a comparatively small\nnumber of phenomena; but a careful study, even by the method of\napproximation will, I believe, show it to be a definite initial phase.\n\nWhile this primitive undifferentiated fear, which acts with the same\nforce and quality in all instances, confers upon the organism which\npossesses it a great superiority over those which do not possess it, in\nthe race for life, and thus marks a great advance in psychical progress,\nyet it is manifestly uneconomical in its action in that there should be\nprecisely the same amount and quality of reaction in all cases. So when\na considerable number of organisms had attained the power to fear,\ncompetition would inevitably lead to some differentiation, and this\ndoubtless first in the direction of greater economy. The animal which\ncould fear much or little, according to the degree of actual injury\nthreatened, would have a great advantage in the struggle for existence\nover his fellows. The amount of pain in prospect is definitely gauged,\nand the fear pain becomes proportioned thereto, and so the will effort\nand muscular exertions. Fear in its earliest form sets the whole motor\napparatus going at the highest rate, the whole organism is at the\nhighest pitch of activity, and life and death struggle happens at every\napprehension of pain, no matter how small the reality. Later, through\ndiscrimination, animals become capable of either a slight scare or a\ngreat fear, according to circumstances. The fear force is gradually\nrationalized and made less spasmodic and so more adaptive. The fear pain\nbecomes proportioned to the real amount of pain and so to injury\nactually imminent.\n\nThis mode of evolution by decrease rather than increase of intensity\nmay seem peculiar. Fear, however, certainly originates as a simple\noutburst of considerable strength relative to the individual organism,\nand the first step in fear growth is a development in the\nrepresentation-of-object element in fear which tends to reduce the\nessence of fear as pain-emotion. Spasmodic primitive fear in becoming\nintelligent loses intensity in the essential feeling aspect. Other\nthings being equal, the intensity of fear is inversely as the\ndefinition of its object. The dimly and uncertainly known is always\nthereby more fearful than the well known and familiar. However, as\nregards primitive psychism, we must remark that all phenomena are very\nlarge in relative quantity to individual capacity, but very small in\nabsolute psychological quantity. A fear which convulses a very small\nmind would make but a very small disturbance in a mind of very great\ncapacity. An amount of fear which would absorb completely one\nconsciousness capacity, would require comparatively little force in a\nmind of greater calibre. The lowest minds are possessed by their\nfears, higher minds possess them, do not \u201close their heads,\u201d _i.e._,\nboth cognition and will co-exist as stable controlling elements.\nPrimitive consciousness is constantly at saturation point, phenomena\noccur only in linear consecutive order, and every phenomenon is a\nfeeling-willing which absorbs the low conscious capacity. It may then,\nperhaps, be regarded that the evolution of fear is not through\nabsolute decrease in intensity, but an increase of conscious capacity,\nwhereby greater definition of object becomes possible and coincident\nwith fear-pain of original quantity. The complete determination of\nthis question must then await a fuller analysis, but the relation to\nindividual capacity in the evolution of fear remains apparent.\nWhatever may be the absolute quantity and intensity of the fear\nphenomenon, its relative quantity and intensity changes very greatly.\n\nThe number of adaptive degrees of fear which are ultimately evolved and\nof which any very high mind is susceptible, is quite beyond our present\nmeans of psychological analysis. We have no phobometer to register all\nthe gradations, other than the popular usage of language, but between \u201cI\nwas scared just the least bit,\u201d and \u201cI was scared stiff,\u201d or \u201cscared to\ndeath,\u201d there is certainly a vast number of intermediaries. Terror is an\nintensive term denoting strong fear, and a terrible fright is a\nredundancy for extreme fear. By the use of adjectives and various\nqualifying phases we roughly denote a number of fear degrees, but\nscientific precision is wholly lacking. Such expressions as \u201cI have very\nlittle fear of him,\u201d \u201cI fear him a little,\u201d \u201cI fear him greatly,\u201d \u201cI\nfear him very much,\u201d convey a meaning indeed, but no exact measurement\nis indicated.\n\nTerror is often used as a term not merely for fear in general, but for\nfear which paralyzes by its force. The individual is often \u201crooted to\nthe spot\u201d by terror, he loses all power of motion and becomes as an\ninert mass. With animals even of the lower grades this is doubtless\noften a pathological manifestation. We find that predatory animals are\noften furnished with apparatus to inspire benumbing fear in their\nvictims. Various means, as inflation of size, strident noises, etc., are\nemployed with great effect. On the other hand, we find that predacious\nanimals seek to reduce the stimulus of fear in their victims by quieting\nand alluring methods. Both hypertrophy and atrophy of fear are\ndisadvantageous, and we should see then in paralyzing terror an instance\nof over-development of useful function which produces the direct\nopposite of the normal fear. Fear, the great means of salvation to all\nweaker organisms, is also in its highest intensities taken advantage of\nby enemies. Hence the due graduation and restraint of fear becomes one\nof the most important lines of mental evolution for the organism preyed\nupon, but the over stimulation or undue weakening of the fear function\nin its prey becomes a most important object and advantage for the\npredacious animal. This evolution is often by the individual\ndisadvantageous variation when this is advantage to some other organism;\nand, as living beings are soon divided into the two classes, those who\nflee and those who pursue, the destroying and preserving of the chief\npsychological defence becomes a leading form of psychic growth of a\npathologic character. Fear in its origin was certainly a stimulant to\naction and not sedative. However, so far as fear effects an unconscious\nmimicry of death it often reaches thereby negatively to conservative\naction, and paralyzing fear is thus explained by the general law of\nadvantage in the struggle for existence. We can then trace a double\nevolution of fear, on the one hand as leading to action, on the other to\ninaction, but the former will, I think, be found to be the primitive\nform. The primary and main function of fear in all life is in a duly\nmodulated energizing in view of approaching injury, and the depressing\nmode is secondary and exceptional.\n\nAgain, we must remark upon the sense of personal weakness, or,\nobjectively stated, the sense of overwhelming power, as entering into\nfear. I cannot agree with Mr. Mercier that this is a mark of all fear.\nIn its origin and early gradations fear, as we have noticed it in the\nimmediately preceding paragraphs, requires no other cognition than that\nof pain to come. Self-measurement of power in relation to that of pain\ngiving object is certainly too complex to be primitive, nor do the\nsimplest forms of fear as we observe them in ourselves and judge of them\nin lower organisms pre-suppose any such process. Primitively every\nperception of painful event fills consciousness with the impetuous\nself-conserving fear revulsion. There is neither time nor capacity for\nestimating one\u2019s own strength or weakness in relation to opposing power.\nBy the very low intelligence only the immediately imminent is\napprehended, and action is always immediate, short, and decisive. In\nfact, it is now probable that originally painful events are really\nactualized by the mind, and the fear is thus at the event as actual,\nrather than as ideal, as represented as to be. Certain it is that mind,\nin its hurry to get ahead of natural harmful agencies in their action,\nmust in its earliest pre-apprehensions have no room or time for dynamic\ninterpretations.\n\nOf course the whole value of sense of one\u2019s own superior power is in\nfear, thereby securing the contingency of the painful event, but sense\nof contingency upon one\u2019s own efforts no doubt first occurs at a\nconsiderably advanced stage, much beyond that of simple fear.\nPrimitively mind regards events as being, or about to be, with no sense\neither of their certainty or uncertainty. Early mind cannot appreciate\ncertainty, for it knows not uncertainty, it has not yet accomplished the\nprevision to which certainty and uncertainty may attach; it cannot say,\n\u201cI fear this will happen,\u201d or \u201cI fear that will not happen,\u201d but only \u201cI\nfear or do not fear the thing happening, the event coming.\u201d The world of\nthe earliest psychical life is simply factual, and the fears are simple\nand wholly undifferentiated. Fear certainly antedates the perception of\ncontingency and of one\u2019s own agency in producing contingency. Even in\nthe ordinary fears in human consciousness sense of personal power in\nrelation to pain-giver is actually subsequent to the fear phenomenon and\nreacts upon it, but is not constitutive of it in its first impulse.\n\nFear is first graduated by the increasing discrimination as to the\namount of pain and injury to be inflicted, and later it is graduated by\nthe sense of the painful event as more or less contingent, either in the\nnatural course of things, or as determined by the individual\u2019s strength\nin warding off impending evil. Taking chances and risks is learned, and\nbecomes often very advantageous. Fear is also greatly diminished and\nmodified by acquiring a sense of one\u2019s individual power in overcoming or\nresisting pain given. The rabbit, often chased by a clumsy dog,\nevidently fears him less and less. Man, both by his increasing knowledge\nof natural contingencies and by his increasing power over elemental and\nanimal pain-giving forces, fears less and less. The inevitable evil,\nsure to come, and sure to overcome, is that which strikes intensest\nfear, as we often see in criminals led to execution.\n\nThe discrimination between the animate and the inanimate also\ndifferentiates fear. When this distinction is fully achieved, the\nattitude of mind toward each in fear is plainly distinct. The thing,\nperceived as having psychic powers, and capable of purposive evil and\nself-directive of its movements, awakens thereby a complex of feelings\nwhich rapidly develops beyond our present powers of analysis to follow\nthem. For the present sketch of the early natural history of fear it is\nsufficient merely to remark this differentiation as one of prime value\nin the struggle for existence.\n\nHowever, as we have before suggested (p. 106), the nature of fear,\npurely in itself considered, does not depend on the nature of the object\nfeared; thus fear of cold and fear of heat are perfectly alike as\npsychic facts, though having regard to very diverse physical facts.\nAnimistic mind, indeed, reacts to all objects differently from\nnaturalistic mind, yet in its essential quality fear is identical in\nboth. In fear of a storm, both as a purely physical manifestation and as\nthe expression of the psychical nature of a deity, the fear act is by\nitself quite the same; the fear pain and the willing are quite the same,\nbut on the more external, the representation side, they do greatly\ndiffer, the complication being greater in the latter instance, and\nintroducing a complex of feelings. Fear in the narrowest sense does not\nreach to the object to consider its nature, to regard its objective\nquality, for this is the base of very different feelings; but fear\nproper is engrossed in object purely for its immediate pain\nsignificance; it is given up to viewing personal pain infliction. I am\ninclined to think, then, that we shall find that mind is primarily\nneither animistic nor naturalistic. The only interpretation of object\nwhich is first made is as pain or pleasure given, and a personalizing\nand impersonalizing stage is decidedly later. We must remember that mind\nat first goes only so far as it is positively obliged to by the struggle\nfor existence; and hence, though it is quite impossible for us to fully\nrealize such a simple state, yet originally objects were discriminated\nmerely as pleasure and pain sources. Object at first was of the more\nvague sort, merely an indefinite _locus_ for pleasure-pain; something\npainful or pleasurable is the discrimination, but attribution of\nsentiency or insentiency is not yet reached, for no interpretation of\nthe sort is yet imperatively demanded. It is so ingrained in us to\nperceive beings as either living or non-living, that it is quite\nimpossible to thoroughly conceive a state so primitive as to be unable\nto rise to this attribution or distinction. However, like the bare\nstatement of a fourth dimension in space, the statement that\npre-animistic mind exists or has existed, a way of looking at objects\nentirely without reference to their personal or impersonal quality\u2014this\nis intelligible, and hypothetically required by a complete theory of the\nevolution of mind. In a _dolce far niente_ of perfect sensuousness, even\nthe adult man sometimes approximates this stage, and the actions of very\nyoung infants are best interpreted as expressions of a similar state.\nThings for them seem entirely uninterpreted and unperceived, except as\nimparters of crass sensual pains and pleasures, as mere pleasure-pain\npotencies.\n\nA very important differentiation of fear is brought about by the\nextension of the time sense. Fear begins with a _minimum_ of time sense;\nonly the immediately impending, the absolutely imminent danger, suffices\nto awaken fear. But in the struggle for existence the advantage of being\ninfluenced for action by the more and more remote, in time, determines a\nrapid extension in time to feared events. With man actions are thus\ninfluenced by fears, which reach even beyond the present life. The\ncautious and prudent are those whose fears are far-sighted, and who,\nconducting themselves accordingly, maintain supremacy over the\nshort-sighted and improvident. _Carpe diem_ is, from the point of view\nof evolutionary psychology, the cry of the retrogressive fool.\n\nThe time differentiation of fear is recognised in popular language in\nthe term\u2014dread. I am frightened in the night by a sudden noise; I am\nalarmed for the safety of a child awaking near a precipice; but I dread\nnext week\u2019s task. Of course dread, like other popular psychological\nterms, is plastic, and often denotes fear in general, and is often used\nintensively, or to denote vague fear, still it is the most correct and\ndistinctive term for fear of a more or less remote event. It would be\nmost interesting to investigate the relation of distance in time of\nfeared event to intensity of the fear, but we have as yet no standards\nfor estimating in mathematical ratios either time or intensity\npsychologically considered. It is not, of course, physical determination\nof time as minutes, hours, etc., with which we are concerned, but only\nwith variations in sense of nearness or remoteness of event. Our sense\nof time is most variable, and fluctuates from many causes, so that hours\nsometimes seem minutes, and minutes at other times seem hours. However,\nthere is, doubtless, other things being equal, some fixed relation\nbetween our sense of the nearness and remoteness of a fearful event and\nthe intensity of the fear, but we may well doubt whether it can ever be\nreduced to any law of inverse squares like that of physical intensities.\nA criminal sentenced to die at the expiration of thirty days certainly\nhas a marked increase in fear as time approaches, or rather, as he has\nsense of the time approaching, but a quantitative analysis is beyond our\npresent powers.\n\nA most important but tolerably late differentiation is the altruistic\nform of fear\u2014fear, not of others, but for others. Psychic life is at\nfirst wholly self-centred, there is no perception of things or interest\nin them otherwise than as bearing on the experience of the self. Other\nselves are wholly unrecognised, and pain-giving effects to them are then\nunperceivable. In very young infants we see a close approximation to\nprimitive selfish life. The exact point in the history of life when\naltruism is developed by the struggle of existence is not at present\ndeterminable, but we may well believe that it arose with the evolution\nof the sexes in separate individuals. Fear for mate and offspring is\nobviously an essential advantage in the progress and perpetuation of the\nkind. Pure altruism is not at first attained, and there is only the\nfaintest gleam of appreciation of pain-states in others, and genuine\nfeeling therefor. The sexual appetite is, like other appetites, purely\nselfish at first, and the animal fears the loss of what will satisfy in\nan individualistic way, quite as he fears that food may be taken away or\ndestroyed. Even in higher psychisms much that we readily interpret as\naltruistic is often mainly personal; it is not a true regard and emotion\nat pain and injury imminent to others, a manifestation of feeling at\ntheir experience as such, but mostly a feeling for their experience only\nso far as it involves our pleasure-pain. When sociality and\ninterdependence of organisms is attained as a great advantage in the\nstruggle of life, when personal experience is perceived as dependent\nupon experiences of others, then a feeling value attaches to the\nexperienceable for others, yet selfishly at first. Even parental\noversight and care must originally have been selfish\u2014the satisfaction of\na personal craving, rather than the promotion of the well-being of\nanother, considered for its own sake. Real and pure altruism must,\nindeed, be accounted, even in human society, as a rare phenomenon,\nperfect self-forgetfulness being almost impossible even for the most\ndeveloped consciousness, owing to the strength and persistence of an\nindefinite heredity of selfishness. Fear for others is, then, in truth,\nmerely an indirect fear for ourselves; and particularly so is this true\nin all lower consciousness. But we must acknowledge that elements of\nreal altruism do enter and do grow in value and strength in the\nevolution of consciousness, and we must, if we adhere strictly to the\nprinciple of personal advantage as determining evolution, find a reason\nhere for a singular and seemingly incompatible manifestation. Regard for\nthe good of others is not always indirectly regard for personal good,\nand self-sacrifice is certainly an element in psychic life, even in\nlower consciousness, where we often seem to see a distinct struggle\nbetween egoistic fear and altruistic fear, as in animals protecting\ntheir young. But we see the same in an animal defending food from being\nacquired by its enemies.\n\nAdvantage for the race is certainly gained, but this wholly\nunconsciously; and it plays no part in the actual psychism of the\nindividual. In a highly social, which is also in the most effective and\nadvantageous mode of life, it is certain that the purely self-seeking\nwill be at a disadvantage in general, whereas those who give themselves\nup to help others are by others so helped, that the final _status_ of\nthe individual is higher and better than if he had been wholly a\nself-seeker. However, he who, perceiving this law, sets out to be\naltruistic for his own ends, invariably suffers defeat in the long run,\nfor entire disinterestedness can alone avail. But the problem of\naltruism, from an evolutionary point of view, cannot here be further\nremarked on; a fuller discussion would lead us too far afield. However,\nwe are convinced that altruism springs up and grows like the other\nelements of psychic life, as functional in the largest way to the\ndemands of life in the struggle for existence.\n\nHorror is a distinctive term for altruistic fear. When on a train, I am\n_terrified_ if I perceive a collision imminent and inevitable, but as a\nmere spectator walking near the tracks, I am _horrified_ by the prospect\nof a collision. One may be \u201cin mortal terror,\u201d but not in mortal horror.\n\nOur sense of the feelings of others towards us, whether they be egoistic\nor altruistic, determines a large class of reflex emotions which are\noften very subtle. If we perceive that some one is fearing us or fearing\nfor us there is immediate reaction on our part. Feeling response to\nfeeling acts and reacts in a multitude of complex ways, as we cannot but\nobserve when in the company of very \u201csensitive\u201d people. The \u201csensitive\u201d\none is he whose emotional life is governed by his perception of the\nfeelings of others toward himself, and he becomes wonderfully responsive\nto the least expressions of emotion toward himself. The delicate\nresponsiveness of women, their intuitions, are merely quick\nperceptiveness of emotion expression. The fears of such are largely\nconcerned with this dependence on the emotional attitudes of others\ntoward themselves; they fear to incur displeasure, they fear loss of\nlove, etc. Thus psychical phenomena become more and more determined by\npsychical phenomena as interpreted and considered with reference to the\nself. Panic is contagious fear, and has originated and been developed as\nsecuring mutual safety in societies of animals. However, there is less\nreal fear on occasions of panic than is often supposed, for much of the\nexpression which we read as fear inspired is really merely imitative,\nand does not signify any real basis of emotion. Moreover, we must note\nthat there is no direct contagion, but the perception of fear in others\nmerely leads us to dimly body forth some fearful events as impending,\nwhich representation involves the full phenomenon of fear. There is also\na discrimination as to those who shall impart fear; the fear of a child\non shipboard will not start a panic, while the fear of a captain would.\nConvinced that there is something worth fearing, we fear, and make\nfrantic efforts to escape.\n\nWe have before mentioned (p. 89) the peculiar fear of fear. The latest\nand culminating differentiation of fear is awe, and the highest, most\nrefined development of awe is in the feeling for the sublime. The sense\nof magnitude and mighty potency of injurious agents or agencies in\nthemselves considered, and not as immediately affecting the individual\nor any individual, is the essential element in awe as a species of fear.\nThis fear is then neither egoistic nor altruistic, but impersonal. We\nfear neither for ourselves nor others in standing awestruck at the foot\nof Niagara, but a sense of overwhelming greatness and might stirs a\nthrill of emotion which is at bottom a sublimation of fear. The view\nwhich to a peasant or an animal would give terror, or produce no\nemotional effect whatever, with very rational and sensitive minds\nproduces awe. Awe does not, as early emotions and fear generally, lead\ndirectly to will, it is not a stimulant to action, and thus has not been\nevolved by the principle of usefulness for action which governs the\ngeneral course of physiological and psychical evolution. It is evident\nthat with awe and the sense of the sublime emotion has a value and end\nin itself. In the higher evolution of man we see that the psychic\nelements evolve no longer in a strict dependency for their value in\nsecuring advantage and success in the struggle for existence, but\ncomfortable existence being practically assured, psychic development is\npushed on in lines ethical, emotional and intellectual, for no practical\nend, but for their own intrinsic value. Thus the feeling for the sublime\nis a purely independent development, which, indeed, is based upon man\u2019s\ncapacity to fear egoistically and altruistically, but is really\nexercised solely for its own sake. A consciousness which has had no\ncommon fear stage, could never arrive at awe. We stand in awe of persons\nwho are totally beyond us in their superiority, who exist in a sphere of\npower and glory, which transcends even our understanding, and thus awe\nhas a religious as well as \u00e6sthetic side.\n\nThe chief differentiations then of fear we note as intensive dread, as\naltruistic horror, as impersonal awe. The chronological order of\nevolution may be denoted in this order\u2014fright, alarm, terror, dread,\nhorror.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER IX\n _ON DESPAIR_\n\n\nDespair is a phase of painful emotion which is certainly related to\nfear, yet is very distant from it. Despair has always a fear basis; we\ncan only despair where fear is implied, and what does not excite fear\nwill give no hold for despair. I must first fear a pain before I can\ndespair of escaping it. The prisoner condemned to death must fear death\nbefore he will be in despair at the prospect of it. Yet while despair\nalways implies fear, fear may often exist and that in very strong form\nwithout despair. The prisoner often displays great fear, but no despair.\n\nThere is, in fact, a strong contrast between fear and despair. Fear\nnormally stimulates effort, despair depresses it. Fear is active,\ndespair passive. Deep dejection and lassitude mark despair, while fear\nis intense agitation and activity. Fear in its original and normal\nfunction is stimulant of defensive action, fear as paralytic being\nsecondary or abnormal, but in normal despair there is absolute\ninertness. Fear, again, in contrast with despair, is direct and\ntransitive. I fear the pain or injury, but my despair is only in\nrelation to it, despair _of_, _in_ despair, etc. Fear is at the evil\nitself, it is a direct attitude of mind toward it, through an ideal\npre-experiencing, the very representation of any pain as experienceable\ncarrying with it a thrill of fear. But despair concerns itself, not with\nthe pain _per se_ as experienceable, but with the inevitability of the\npainful. Fear rests upon idea of pain, despair, upon idea of its\ninevitability. \u201cI despair of escape,\u201d means a recoil of painful emotion\nat inevitability of painful experience. Sense of complete and permanent\ninability to attain an end, whether release from pain, or positively, a\nsecuring a pleasure, generates commonly this distressful emotion.\nDespair is not then simple pain at pain, but at the unavertibility of\nthe pain. Despair is then the mind bent down and crushed by the sense of\nthe inevitable and irremediable nature of the pain, positive or\nnegative, it experiences or is to experience. Despair is, indeed,\nhopelessness, though all hopelessness is not despair. There is no hope\nin stolidity or in stoicism, psychic modes quite distinct from despair,\nbut which take the place with some natures.\n\nAgain, we must note that while fear has its degrees, and may be but\npartial, despair is always complete collapse. I may fear a little but\nnot despair a little, I may be frightened \u201cjust the least bit,\u201d but not\ndespair a little bit. The hostess who is \u201cin despair\u201d because the ice\ncream has not come, speaks truly, however, for the affair is for her so\nimportant and momentous as to be the basis of real despair. That which\nis the occasion of despair must always be or seem of capital value.\n\nAn adjacent and often precedent state to despair is desperation, which\nis a feeling of the almost inevitable. In the face of heavy odds there\nis often awakened a painful emotion which we term desperation, and which\nleads to strong and furious will action, to an intense and general\nstruggle which is often advantageous. An enemy fears to drive his\nadversary to desperation. In desperation we take one chance in a\nthousand or in a million; for example, the leader of a forlorn hope. It\nwould be difficult to say whether despair or desperation contains more\nof pain, but they are obviously quite opposite in their character. To\ncombative temperaments and with pugnacious animals the sense of the\nseeming inevitable is often stimulative of desperation rather than\ndespair. Such are \u201cgame\u201d to the last. A criminal of this type will run\namuck rather than submit to his fate in despair. The desperado is\ndefiant to the end. With some whose natures are balanced between\nreflection and action there are in the face of the inevitable or almost\ninevitable rapid fluctuations of despair and desperation.\n\nDismay is another form closely akin to despair. Dismay is the immediate\nresult for feeling of a sudden cognition of great difficulties and pains\nas imminent. As the transition stage of rapid movement in feeling toward\ndespair, as the sudden falling in temperature from hope, it is really\nincipient despair. Dismay is essentially temporary, and settles quickly\ninto despair or rises into renewed hope. Though but such a passing mode,\nit yet has for the moment that sense of self-efficiency annihilated\nwhich is so characteristic of despair. Consternation is very intense\ndismay.\n\nBut what now is the real quality and inner nature of despair? what\nessentially is this strange drooping before inevitable loss, injury and\npain? and what is its significance for life? Despair is certainly a very\nadvanced and complex emotion, and we can do no more at present than\nmerely remark on some of its most striking features.\n\nA most noticeable and remarkable quality of despair is its introactive\ntendency. When the whole strength and vital motive, of a full-grown\nteleologic psychic life\u2014the _dilettante_ is not capable of despair\u2014is\nsuddenly and completely withdrawn, there results, not indifference nor\n_ennui_ but a deep disturbance which is active on the _minus_ side of\nmental life. The complete breaking up of great and absorbing hopes and\nof the free objective activity flowing from them brings will tension\ndown, not simply to _nil_, but gives it a spring back into the negative\nregion beyond the line of mere quiescence and indifferentism. Despair is\na revulsive process by which the whole mind is broken up, just as a\npropeller wheel running at high speed out of water or an engine working\nat high pressure when disconnected from its shafting, tend to wrench and\nshatter themselves. Desire is not really extinct, but latent; though\nsmothered it burns inward. This is that peculiar cankering, corroding\nquality, which is always so marked in despair. Will, not self-shattered,\nbut forcibly pent by external circumstances, gives a sullen restlessness\nto the mental life now turned in upon itself. Hence the capacity for\ndespair will be directly as the co-ordinate capacity for action and\nreflection in any individual, and as such co-ordination marks the\nhighest level of conscious life, despair is certainly a phenomenon of\nexceptionally complex and advanced consciousness.\n\nAgain, we note that despair is intensely and oppressively a pain state,\nbut the dull despair pain is distinct from racking fear pain. What now\nis the nature of despair pain, and what the reason for its peculiar\nquality? Here is not as in fear a feeling pain at pain, but at the idea\nof its inevitability and completely destructive power. The actual pain\nforeseen may seem bearable and excite little feeling, but it is the\ntotal loss of personal success, the complete thwarting of\nself-realization, that moves the mind to despair, that causes that\nsickening, dull, emotional pain which we term despair. Thus despair is\neminently a disease of self-hood, an egoistic distemper, the strong and\nlarge individuality being peculiarly subject to it. However, the general\nproblem of despair pain is practically the same as of the origin and\nnature of fear pain, which has already been discussed. Whether any mere\nrepresentation induces pain, and how it does so, is certainly one of the\nmost difficult problems of emotional psychology. We have in a previous\nchapter sought to indicate in a general way that purely subjective or\nmental pain which is not in any wise revival of sensation or objective\ndoes really exist. Also since pain _per se_ is always simple and\nidentical, the differentiation of pains as seemingly quite different in\nkind, as fear pain, despair pain, etc., is really due to sensation,\nwill, and other elements which closely adhere to pain and give it a\ncertain local colouring. The whole emotion is a complex of various\nfactors which are closely knit into a single state which to common\nobservation seems simple, but which is really constituted in its\n_ensemble_ by the total specific forces of many elements. In psychics,\nas in physics, we know that common sense analysis of phenomena must be\nat fault, and that one who says \u201cI certainly have an entirely different\npain when I fear and when I despair,\u201d is as much in the wrong as he who\nmaintains essential diversities in material substance, or radical\ndistinctions of species in the organic world. So we must believe that\nthe peculiar quality of the pain in despair exists, not in the pain\nitself, but is really the colouring result from various coincident\nsensations and ideas. The lowering of the mental tone far below the zero\npoint is greatly accentuated by refluent waves of organic sensation set\nup from the physical basis of the psychic disturbance.\n\nHow, we may now ask, did despair ever evolve and become a well-defined\npsychic form? in what way in the course of natural selection could such\nan apparently disadvantageous variation have arisen and been developed?\nThe serviceability of fear is plain to every one, but of what possible\nvalue could despair be in the struggle of life? The one who gives up in\ndespair is but very rarely doing the best thing. If we cannot look to\nthe general principle of evolution, serviceability, how can we account\nfor the appearance and growth of such a phase as despair, except as\nabnormal variation, a disease, profitable to the enemies of the\nindividual, and so developed by and for external organisms. As there is\nan abnormal pathological variation of fear, which we have previously\nnoticed, and which is forced in its development by enemies who profit by\nit, so despair is a psychic disease, entirely hurtful to the individual,\nand, so far, only advantageous for its enemies. Despair is, without\ndoubt, one of those altruistic variations which serve, not the\nindividual, but some antagonist in the struggle of existence. To bring\none to despair is to make him entirely helpless and wholly at our mercy\nfor our own ends. The possibility that active-reflective natures may\nprey upon themselves is thus stimulated into an actual phenomenon whose\ngrowth is continually fostered by those whose advantage it is to reduce\nthe individual to a helpless condition. Despair is hardly an hypertrophy\nor atrophy of any normal tendency, it is rather a pathological _genus_\nby itself. The capacity for despair being inherent in the general\nformation of mind as subject to collapse, it arose solely in response to\nthe needs of organisms warring upon the organism afflicted. The whole\nfield of physical and psychical altruistic variation under the general\nlaw of natural selection, decadent and self-injurious characteristics\nbeing stimulated and maintained in a kind of artificial selection, is an\ninteresting but unexplored field, attention so far having been turned to\nthe individually advantageous as determining element in evolution.\n\nDespair is a disease of advanced and mature psychic life. Children are,\nin general, incapable of despair. It implies a well-developed sense of\nself and a general experience of the world. High and strong emotional\nnatures, but rather weak-willed and narrow of intelligence, are\npredisposed to it. Occasions which would lead to despair will with lower\nnatures be unnoticed or lead merely to stolidity; while with the highest\nnatures, there comes heroic endeavour and wide searching for means and\nmethods.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER X\n _ANGER_\n\n\nIn studying any state of consciousness we first inquire what constitutes\nits dominant factor; if this is sense of object, we call it a cognition;\nif effortful action, it is a volition; if the marked feature is\npleasure-pain, we term it a feeling. Finding that the consciousness is a\nfeeling, we would next inquire whether the pleasure-pain is mainly\ndetermined in its colouring by direct presentation, and so is a\nsensation, or whether this dominant colouring comes indirectly through\nrepresentation, and is thus what we term an emotion. For example, the\ndistinction between \u201cI feel a pain in my shoulder,\u201d and \u201cI feel pained\nat your conduct\u201d illustrates the most radical division of feeling. If\nemotion is founded on an appreciation of the experienceable, which has\ndeveloped under natural selection, we must look upon the emotional power\nin general and upon the various emotions in particular as merely\nadvantageous psychoses which are as clearly determined by general\nevolutionary laws as the merely physical organs like heart, lungs,\nwings, horns, etc. It is clearly desirable that the organism should look\nbefore, should anticipate experience and so direct its way; but bare\nanticipation has no value in itself unless it powerfully stimulates will\nthrough emotion. All conscious life above the most primitive is\neminently and increasingly anticipatory, and so becomes more and more\ninfused with emotional powers. Among the earliest developed of these in\nthe struggle for existence are fear and anger. The fear group, embracing\nlarge numbers of allied forms, simple and complex, has been discussed in\na general way in the preceding pages, and we now come to some\nconsideration of the correlative anger group.\n\nThe _rationale_ of the evolution of anger is not far to seek. We have\nseen that fear is the spring of defensive action, and it is obvious that\nanger is the stimulant to offensive action. Fear is regressive, anger\naggressive. Fear is contractile, anger expansive. Fear is the emotion of\nthe pursued, of the prey; anger the emotion of the pursuer, of the\npredacious. Emotion in the service of life evidently has two great\npsychic ramifications from this point, and the whole world of\nemotion-beings, which compose the greater mass of organisms, is hence\ndivided in two great divisions, a fear class and an anger class.\nLikewise in relation to opposing natural forces as to neighbouring\ncompeting and destroying organisms, the same distinction is to be made\naccording as the animal either combats or flees. Shyness or fierceness,\ntimidity or irascibility, these are characters which divide the animate\nworld into two grand antagonistic groups. Zoology has recognised this\npsychic differentiation as a marked and essential feature in its\nnomenclature, thus _lepus timidus_. In fact, the most important part of\nevolution is the psychical; in this, indeed, lies the whole significance\nand value of the organism. The attainment of more and more advantageous\npsychic qualities is the main trend of evolution, for psychic power as\ndistinct from main force, like that of the elements, is far and away of\nthe most value in the struggle for existence, and ultimately, as in man,\nit achieves the subduing all lower powers, natural, vegetable and brute,\nto its own ends. It is psychical quality, moreover, which determines\nphysical, and not _vice vers\u00e2_. Thus it is not the possession of claws,\nfangs, etc., that makes an animal fierce, but it is fierceness which\ndevelops and maintains these weapons of offence. Thus it is, though thus\nfar practically overlooked by scientists, that psychic development,\nespecially on the emotional side, is of the utmost importance as the\nprime factor and motive in organic processes. The central core of life\nis emotional capacity, and this in its evolution determines the whole\nexternal morphological trend of evolution of organisms which is so\nclosely followed by the science of to-day. But the science of the future\nis comparative psychology, which, when once placed on a secure basis of\ninterpretation, will determine the real and inner law of evolution as a\npsychic movement incarnating itself in a succession of animate forms.\nBut a sure method of knowing a psychic fact as such when it occurs, and\nwhat, how, and why it is, is yet to be discovered and applied, and\nextra-human and even extra-ego consciousness is a field, so far, for\nlittle else than hypothesis. If this remark be turned against us, we say\nthat our work is mainly a deductive interpretation of the course of\npsychic evolution from the general standpoint of natural selection,\nreinforced and illustrated by introspective investigation, and merely\nusing the most obvious facts of comparative psychology in a very general\nand provisional way. We do not profess to show where, how, and when mind\noriginated, or what particular powers any certain organisms possess, but\nwe do endeavour to show how the principle of utility may be made a key\nto the study of a very perplexing region of mental life\u2014the emotions. We\nproffer then merely a very general sketch of the history of emotion as a\nlife factor, hoping that it may, at least in its general scope, be of\nservice to future explorers. In taking up this subject of anger we do\nthen thus reiterate the position we occupy and the method we follow.\n\nAnger like fear certainly originated at some critical point in some\nindividuals life as an advantageous variation of essential value. A\nvital issue at some early point in the history of life determined the\ngenesis of this new psychic mode and function as a stimulant of\naggressive will action. Very likely it was in competition of organisms\nfor food that some favoured individual first attained the power of\ngetting mad and violently attacking its fellows, and so obtaining\nsustenance. However this may be, certain it is that a direct attack is\noften more self-conservative than attempts at escape when injury\nthreatens; it is a greater advantage to destroy pain-giver than to shun\nit. Fear enables organisms to avoid loss, but it does not accomplish\npositive gain, as anger does through overcoming hindrance. Anger is\noften also more economical for the forces of the organism, and thus, in\ngeneral, predacious animals are longer-lived than even those of their\nprey who may attain a full length of life. Even in the face of great\nodds a direct attack is often more serviceable than attempt at escape.\nAnger is certainly the primitive motive force of all offensive action,\nthough of course we cannot say that the animal got mad because it saw\nthe serviceability. Psychic evolution, at least as far as new powers are\nconcerned, never comes by teleologic foresight, and, indeed, cannot by\nthe nature of the case. The animal did not definitely set out to get\nangry because it foresaw the value, yet in the earliest angers there\nmust have been effort, a certain _nisus_ which marked the new form as a\nreal attainment, a marked achievement. That the provoking occasion gives\nrise now to anger inevitably and naturally, that anger comes upon us and\novercomes us is true enough, but in its earliest phases anger must have\nbeen, like other just evolving factors, supported only by powerful will\neffort. The oftener the early psychism got mad, the easier it got mad.\nFacility came only by practice, and a large variety of occasions,\nbesides the simple critical and original one, were gradually utilized by\nthe anger faculty. But in its original form and occasion anger was, no\ndoubt, akin to that we see when an extremely timid animal at the last\nextremity will turn in anger and fiercely fight for its life. Such an\nattempt, sometimes successful, marks an origin of a new mode of\nconscious emotion which may never return to the individual again during\nall its future life for lack of occasion. If often returning and often\nimproved, a definite new habit of emotion is established, and from being\na fearful animal it may at length become dominantly irascible, and so\nbelong to a totally distinct psychic genus.\n\nBy the evolution of anger then, as in contradistinction to fear, two\ngrand divisions of animate existence were set apart, two great psychical\norders as fundamentally distinct and important for evolutionary\npsychics, as invertebrate and vertebrate for biology. The rise of the\nback-boned animal is not more important for physiological morphology\nthan the evolution of anger for psychical morphology, and, indeed, as we\nhave before remarked, the psychical growth is ever the broadest and\ndeepest fact in evolution. By the acquirement and predominance of the\nanger stimulus certain animals became differentiated as a distinct class\nfrom their fearful neighbours, and they then by this new impulse\ngradually attained instruments of offence, and also by increase of size\nbecame physically distinct forms. Henceforth the animate world becomes\ndivided in a more and more marked way into pursuers and pursued. By\nmutual interaction fear is increased on one side as anger increases on\nthe other, and the division into timid and fierce, predacious and prey,\nbecomes more and more established and marked.\n\nWe take it then that it was a most momentous day in the progress of mind\nwhen anger was first achieved, and some individual actually got mad. If\nthe exact date and the particular individual were ascertainable a\nmemorial day set apart for all time would not be too great an honour. In\nthe struggle of existence, other things being equal, the most irascible\nis the most successful, faring the best, securing the best mate, and\nhaving the best and most numerous progeny. Susceptibility to anger\nbecomes a necessity to a large class of organisms, and those who will\nnot get angry and fight for their interests are surely trampled on or\npushed aside to become starveling or outcast.\n\nIs now this primitive anger an absolutely new power, a _de novo_\nevolution, or is it possible to study its rise as a gradual\ndifferentiation from some other factor? Must we not view psychical\nevolution like all evolution as coming under the law of continuity? How\nthen explain the sudden rise of apparently new and distinct forms like\nanger or fear? Anger as a response to the demands of life seems from the\nvery first to be as distinctly and peculiarly anger as at any time in\nits development. The peculiar quality which makes anger anger, does not\nseem to appear as a gradual differentiation from other elements as\nslowly emerging from previous modes, but we can only judge that it\nbursts suddenly upon the field as a new and unique creation, which does\nnot find its explanation in pre-existent forms and cannot be traced as a\ngradual evolution from them. On the other hand, while it does not at\nfirst sight seem possible to regard anger as being from the first other\nthan a radically new power and activity determined, indeed, by the\nstruggle for existence, but wholly unexplained in its essence and\nformation as a consciousness related to and differentiated from other\nconsciousnesses, yet we must acknowledge our profound ignorance of the\nreal morphology of mind and what is the real nature of mental\ndifferentiation. Here the problem is altogether more difficult than in\nbiology, where the appearance of new forms like wings can be readily\ntraced as slow modifications of previous members, the physical\npossibility and _rationale_ of which is easily seen to be inherent in\nthe physical constitution of the body and its circumambient matter, the\nair. However, in the present state of our psychical knowledge it is\nquite impossible to attain any similarly clear conception as to the\nformation of new psychical forms. We may see why they should be called\ninto being by the necessities of animate life, we can perceive their\nfunctional importance from the first, but to trace their morphological\ndevelopment as gradually assuming their peculiar qualities as\nmodifications of already existing activities, and as inherently possible\nin the psychical constitution of things, this is clearly beyond us at\npresent. We can conceive that the earliest anger was weak and rather\nineffective as compared with the fully developed anger of later life,\nbut we cannot see that it was any the less anger, any the less purely\nand wholly _sui generis_ than the very latest and strongest form. Has it\never in its earlier stages that hybrid and mixed character which marks\nit as a modification of existent factors? It is certainly not a modified\nfear, to which it is, indeed, a polar opposite.\n\nBut we may perhaps regard anger, and fear as well, as modified from\nprevious general emotion. We may, indeed, consider it likely that some\ngeneral emotional phase preceded the special emotions, just as a general\nindefinite pain and pleasure preceded definite pains and pleasures. It\nmay be considered as probable that emotion first appeared as a purely\nundifferentiated disturbance sequent on sense of the experienceable\npain, this general emotion being neither fear nor anger, but the basis\nfrom which both develop. The psychic agitation we term emotional very\nlikely began in a purely general form, yet it is hard to understand how\npeculiar forms develop therefrom. We are too far from such inchoate\nexperience to readily come to any appreciation of its method or mode. We\nmay be disturbed as to something imminent and know not whether to fear\nor be angry, but this in general means only a rapid alternation of fear\nand anger according as the mind runs back and forth between fear and\nanger-provoking elements. It is unlikely that we can trace in any such a\npurely undifferentiated emotion.\n\nAt the best we but throw the difficulty farther back, for emotion _per\nse_ is then the _de novo_ form to which the principle of continuity does\nnot seem to apply. If anger is a traceable modification of some more\ngeneral emotion as combined with definite representation and volition\nmodes, yet how the peculiar anger quality is achieved is still\nunexplained. On the whole it seems simplest and truest to assume the\nfirst impulse of anger as a perfectly new and diverse wave of emotion\nsuddenly generated in answer to some extreme urgency in the struggle of\nexistence.\n\nThe analogy of organic and psychic evolution may be pressed to a certain\nextent. It is plainly possible to set in order an evolutionary series of\nlight\u2014sensing organs, eyes\u2014from most elementary to most complex, and it\nis quite as possible, though yet to be done, to set forth in similar\ngenetic order a series of psychic states as offence-sense, _i.e._,\nangers, in their increasing differentiation. But previous to any eye, to\nlocal visualization, there is a period of common sensation when an\nabsolutely simple organism is in every part equally responsive to light;\nin a crude way the whole organism reacts to light, from which stage by\ntraceable specialization the eye as a light-sensing organ is gradually\ndeveloped. Here analogy would seem to fail, unless we consider it to be\nthe stage when any psychosis, _e.g._, anger, requires the whole\nconsciousness capacity, mind being merely a capacity for the recurrent\nbut isolated single-activities. Mind certainly but slowly grows into\nthat sum of organic coincident interdependent yet distinct\nconsciousnesses which we commonly think of under the term, mind. Anger\nin its very earliest and lowest form is no doubt an absorbing na\u00efve\nisolated wave, as common to mind as a whole, that is, as making up the\nwhole of mind for the time being, is perhaps in its measure an analogy\nto common sensation. Anger may then be but a common emotion, answering\nin a certain aspect to light-sense, sound-sense, etc., as purely common\nsensations. But we must remark that general sensation is not to be\nconfounded with common sensation, or general emotion with common\nemotion. Common sensations are, indeed, usually very general in form,\nand a sensation _per se_, a purely general sensation, is probably very\nrarely anything else, yet when we close the eyes and direct them toward\nthe sun, the general sensation of light we receive\u2014very like the\noriginal primitive common sensation\u2014is general, yet by a special organ.\nThe word common refers, not to the special nature of the function\nitself, but the fact that the function, whether special or general, is\nperformed indifferently, or practically so, by the common whole. A\nsensation of coloured light is more special than a mere sensation of\nlight, and this than mere general sensation of force, but all may be\naccomplished either by common sensation or special sensation. General\nemotion may similarly be either common or in organic co-activity. There\nwas certainly a time when consciousness existed which was not and could\nnot be anger or fear or even an emotion _per se_. Pre-emotional and\npre-representative consciousness was so absolutely primitive, general,\nand common, that psychology as a necessarily automorphic science will be\nvery long in coming to any understanding of this field, but yet we must\nset it off as something which must always receive some consideration.\nAnger is not a property of all consciousness by the nature of\nconsciousness itself, but is merely a possible mode dependent on\ncircumstances for its development at a certain psychic stage.\n\nWhat now is the inner nature and what the constituent elements of the\nanger state? Comparatively few reflect upon their emotions save from an\nethical standpoint, and very few indeed attempt any analysis of them. To\ndetermine the process and exact psychical constituents of getting mad\nand being mad, may seem to many a quite useless and foolish\nintrospective endeavour. If a person is angry, he is angry, and that is\nall there is of it, will be the general verdict of common sense. You can\ndissect flowers into their parts, you can analyse rocks and soils, but\nany emotion such as anger is wholly unanalyzable. No one can know what\nit is to be mad until he has once been mad, and, thereafter, he can only\nreflect upon it as a peculiar excitement, a powerful agitation, whose\noccasions and results may be fully traced, but which in itself is _sui\ngeneris_ and irresolvable. The form of consciousness we know as being\nangry, is really a simple wave of emotion which stands by itself as an\nelementary and ultimate form.\n\nSuppose we acknowledge these remarks as true, we may yet maintain that\nanger, like all emotions, is a highly complex state of manifold factors\nwhose sum total, whose grand resultant, is a seemingly simple and\npeculiar _status_. Why should one arrangement of atoms produce a\npeculiar perfume, another a peculiar stench? Anger may likewise be\nmerely an unexplainable _ensemble_ of early ascertainable elements.\n\nCertain it is, in the first place, that sense of object is necessary to\nanger. One cannot be mad without being mad _at_ something. The attitude\nof mind is objective, and even rage in its blindest moment preserves\nthis attitude. Blind with rage, means no more than that various definite\nqualities of the object are lost in the intense emotional reaction at\npain-giver. At its height, anger preserves, indeed, only the barest\napprehension of object; but this is intense and overpowering in\nconnection with the sense of it as infringing and injuring. In the\ntransports of rage and fury, the movements are wild and reckless enough,\nbut always antagonistic, implying outward destructive activity. Anger is\nthe fixation of the mind upon some object in its quality of personal\nhurtfulness, and is revulsion, not _from_ it, as fear, but _against_ it.\nWith early psychisms, all perceptions of objects end in either anger or\nfear, and a large part of early education consists in learning what\nobjects to be fearful of, and what to be angry at. The alertness of wild\nanimals is determined mainly by either nascent fear or anger. When a dog\nis suddenly wakened from sleep he generally shows either fear or anger.\nThis is merely an illustration of how the dimmest sense of object\nimmediately connects itself with emotion as primitive and fundamental\ntendency. The organism perceives the object, and representing its\nimminent hurtfulness, feels fear and dashes away from it, or feels anger\nand dashes against it. These are the two simplest possible reactions\nwith sense of the experienceable injurious. In fear there is elimination\nof oneself from the injury, and in anger the elimination of the injury\nfrom oneself. With later anger and fear these processes of elimination\nthemselves become matters of representation, and make a large part in\nhighly-developed forms.\n\nA knowledge which very generally enters into anger is the comparative\nestimate of power. A cat scratches us, we are angry; a lion threatens\nus, we are afraid. The progress of the lower psychic life is largely in\nlearning what is best to fear and what should excite anger. That which\nat first angers will often, when better understood, produce fear, and\n_vice vers\u00e2_. Wild animals at first often show merely anger when\nmolested by man, but soon manifest fear as they learn to appreciate his\nsuperior power. The African elephant learns to distinguish between the\nsavage with his spear, and the white hunter with his rifle, and is\nmerely irritated or angry with the one, while he manifests genuine fear\nof the other. The young of animals and of man continually show\nirrelevant fear and anger. They are generally either over fearful or\nover irritable. Our own feelings are powerfully modified by varying\nestimates of opposing force and injury. If, in passing through a dark\nstreet, I am tripped by what I take to be a child\u2019s snare, I am angered,\nbut upon noticing that it is a fuse to a dynamite bomb, I am thrown into\nintense fear. In general, any sensation, as of sound or light, in its\nlower grades of intensity produces anger, in higher occasions fear. As a\nrule when reactions induced by either fear or anger are uniformly\nunsuccessful, natural selection favours the development of the other.\n\nWhile the comparative estimate of opposing force with one\u2019s own is\ngeneral ingredient in anger, anger being fear-limited, it is not, as\nMercier would indicate (_Mind_, ix., p. 346), a constant element in\nanger. We often see cases of anger, and have perhaps, ourselves,\nexperienced anger which is totally unrelated to a sense of power. Some\nanimals seem at times utterly fearless and utterly unaware of the\ntremendous crushing force they angrily oppose. It is, moreover,\naltogether probable that anger and fear originated and received a\ncertain measure of development before any capacity of measuring\ncomparative force of antagonist arose in mind. However, the\ndiscrimination between overwhelming and slight force is certainly\ntolerably early, and is obviously a very necessary factor in\nself-conservative action. Yet it is very unlikely that this was an\nelement in primitive fear or anger, which must have been no more than a\nsimple emotional reaction to perceived injury without any reference to\nwhether pain-giver is more or less strong than pain-receiver. The\nearliest fears and angers of infants seem to be quite devoid of any\nguidance from sense of powerlessness or power, but merely direct,\nunthinking reactions.\n\nA marked and constant element in anger is hostility. This is the\naggressive fighting attitude of will which is exercised toward and\nagainst the perceived pain-giving object. Anger can never subsist\nwithout this volition element, and it always appears as direct simple\nreaction to anger-provoking object. Anger always exhibits itself as\nhostility, openly and freely in lower life, and in higher life, which is\noften disingenuous, the hostility as real psychic act remains, though\nsomewhat concealed in physical manifestation as long as angry mood\nexists. The will tendency is always toward the violent removing and\ndestroying of the offending object. However, na\u00efve primitive anger does\nnot include in its hostility giving pain for pain received, making the\nobject suffer in turn, which is, indeed, far removed from the capacity\nof primitive mind to conceive. Anger in its earliest form does, of\ncourse, inflict pain where its object is pain-susceptible; but this, it\nmay confidently be said, cannot lie in the intent of the pain-inflicter.\nThe simple original ebullitions of anger do not include intent in any\nform. Volition is powerfully and directly incited by the emotion without\nthe intervention of any idea. The only representation in the simplest\nanger is the representation of pain experience impending which occasions\nthe excitement, which then directly and violently starts will-activity;\nbut the representations of destructiveness and pain-infliction as ends\nbecome guiding ideas only in the slow evolution of anger toward more\nintelligent forms.\n\nPain is certainly a prominent element in anger. This pain is the\nemotional pain, the pain at pain, whose nature and origin we have\ncommented on in the chapter on fear. The mere representation of pain to\nbe starts a violent pain quite distinct from the fear-pain, yet like it,\npre-eminently central and subjective. Precedent, however, to both fear\nand anger-pain, is the simple pain which immediately arises on\nrepresentation of pain, the prospect of pain being immediately and\npeculiarly painful in itself. This commonly continues throughout, and\ngives a dominant pain tone. But there immediately succeeds a rush of\neither fear or anger emotion, each intensely painful in opposite ways.\nThe pain which results from the anger, which is by the anger occasioned\nin me, is again distinct from the pain in and of the anger. Anger is\nitself a state of pain. In its earliest forms, as rarely and with\ndifficulty attained, there is still another pain connected with anger,\nthe pain of exertion and stress. But all the pain factors, as more or\nless continuous, make anger, as emotion in general, a complex pain\nstate. Thus, when angered by a man shaking his fist in my face, we trace\nfirst a purely subjective pain at prospect of pain, then a rush of\naggressive emotion which embodies in it a pain of its own, then a pain\nwhich reacts from the peculiar tension of the anger state. Of course, in\nour stage of evolution, anger has become such an inwrought factor that\nit arises spontaneously, it overtakes and overcomes us, not we reaching\nit; and so the stress or labour pain is absent. It is never or very\nrarely an effort for us to get angry, but it must have been for our very\nremote psychical ancestors.\n\nWhile it may be said with truth that some people are never so happy as\nwhen mad, yet we must remember this does not alter the fact that anger\nis radically a pain state. There may be a pleasure from anger\nexcitement, and from successful anger; there may be a pleasure in the\nmere exercise of aggressive power; but the happiness meant is mostly the\nexcitement pleasure _plus_ the delight which always comes from freely\nfollowing out one\u2019s nature. Especially when the outflow of natural force\nin an irascible man has been pent up and restrained for some time, a fit\nof anger is altogether a delightful experience, the pleasure of relief\nin a habitual function. Thus an occasional fight is necessary to the\npugnacious amongst both animals and men; it is an inbred function and\ntendency which must work itself out, or render the being as miserable as\na rodent kept from gnawing. But all this does not interfere with the\nanalysis of anger as fundamentally painful. Happiness is a very late\nevolution, and, as the reaction from freely working out one\u2019s strongest\ntendency, it is unfelt by early minds, which only gradually attain\ninwrought tendencies and so the capacity for being happy or unhappy. To\nwitness a fight is likewise to a large class of minds a supreme\nfelicity. This is largely the pleasure which comes at second hand from\nrepresentation of participancy. And so, to have a fight described, or to\nread about it even, is a source of considerable representative pleasure\nto many, a spurious and reflected anger, and an ideal fighting in the\nfray. However, all this leads far away from primitive emotion, which is\nnow our main concern.\n\nWe may grant then that sense of the object giving pain, sense of\ncomparative power, hostility, and pains of various kinds, are usual\nelements in anger; yet it is evident that anger is explained by no one\nor all of them. It is not a mere aggregation and mixture of states, it\nis essentially a compound which has in some unexplained way a peculiar\nquality which is not in any of its constituent elements. When I am\nangry, there occurs a phenomenon which, while based on and inclusive of\nthese factors, is yet peculiar in itself. The flush of anger, the wave\nof emotion, the tempest of passion, bases itself on and includes\ncognition, hostility, and pain; but it is more\u2014it is a deep psychic\ndisturbance of a peculiar and undefinable kind which we recognise when\nwe have it, but which we cannot analyse. We express the nature of anger\nmetaphorically, indeed, when we speak of an angry man being \u201chot,\u201d\n\u201cboiling with rage,\u201d etc., as opposed to being chilled and frozen stiff\nby fear. The being angry is obviously a kind of being pained at pain\nquite opposite to that of fear. It is also true that I may see\nthreatening injury, I may be pained, I may combat, but not be angry.\nThere are other and higher motives which may bring about the violent\nwill offensive activity so often required in the struggle of life; but\nwe may take it that anger is the most primitive, and throughout the\nwhole range of psychism the most common offensive motive, and so of the\nutmost importance as a life factor.\n\nWhich shall we regard as the more primitive, anger or fear? Were animals\nat first universally timid, and subsequently acquired anger as an\nadvantageous variation, or was anger the first, and fear the\ncomplementary and later evolution, or may we suppose that they developed\nin strict correlation? The earliest manifestations of emotion with some\nanimals, and with some human infants, seem to be anger. Everything\nperceived to be painful irritates and makes them mad, and they are quite\nfearless in the presence of overwhelming danger. These but slowly learn\nto fear; by hard experience they learn the hurtfulness and inutility of\ncombatting in many cases, and occasions which would once make them mad\nnow cause them to fear. On the other hand, we observe many of the very\nyoung who seem to be universally fearful, and but slowly acquire \u201cspunk\u201d\nand spirit. Mental embryology thus, at least with our present very\nimperfect knowledge, is quite indecisive on the question. If fear and\nanger were wholly determined by relation of predacious and prey, then we\nmight suppose correlated simultaneous origin; but we know that obstacles\nand injuries, not from competitors, but from elements, forces, and\nobjects of nature, were the first environment and the first field for\nstruggle. Organism began as a weak thing planted amongst manifold\nopposing forces, where fear was quite the most salutary emotion and\nanger useless. If, as we must deem probable, mental function in general\nand emotion in particular reaches back toward primitive organism, it is\nlikely, on merely general grounds, that fear is the more ancient and\noriginal emotion, though anger was closely subsequent. The general\nconditions of life at the first would demand the development of fear\nmore imperatively than anger. Certainly, however, both emotions are\nsufficiently primitive, as is shown by their being so ingrained and\ndominant forces in the whole range of lower psychic life.\n\nAll higher animals, moreover, are peculiarly sensitive to and observant\nof signs of anger and fear. Rarey, a most excellent judge, made it an\naxiom of his method that horses are extremely acute in detecting either\nfear or anger in those who deal with them, and this is also noticeably\ntrue of animals in general. These are also the emotional attitudes which\nare earliest interpreted by children. Now what is soonest, easiest and\nsurest interpreted by psychisms above the lowest may be taken to be\nfundamentally primitive and such are fear and anger. To discover with\nreadiness and certainty the emotional states of organisms about them,\nbecause these states are the motives of very important activities, is\nclearly an advantage early gained in the struggle of existence. It means\npreparedness, and there is a nascent anger to break forth against the\nfearful, or fear or counter-anger prepared against the fear discerned or\nsuspected. The inter-related activity of these two emotions is the\nchiefest and most interesting spectacle we see in all lower psychic\nphases.\n\nBut we must notice now a form which seems on the whole to belong to the\nanger group, and that is hate. Hate often precedes and succeeds anger,\nand the object of anger is peculiarly apt to be the object of hate. The\nman whom we hate very easily angers us, and he who provokes us is one\nwhom we are apt to hate. Yet a person may be very provoking, even\nexasperating, and not be hateful, and _vice vers\u00e2_ for hate. It is\nobvious then that while the object of anger and hate is apt to be the\nsame, yet it is viewed from very different standpoints, and the emotion\nreactions are somehow very different. \u201cI hate him,\u201d and \u201cI am angry at\nhim,\u201d\u2014these expressions denote very distinct emotions. While anger and\nhate are both aggressive emotion reactions against the pain-giver, yet\nin their nature they are essentially diverse. In general we hate him who\ndeliberately and constantly provokes us, who establishes himself as a\ndeliberate enemy. It is harmful, opposed intent that particularly\nstimulates hate. But anger is most generally a sudden flash of feeling\nleading to violent repulsive effort against pain-giver, but without any\ninsight into intent. The immediacy of reaction is accomplished through\nanger; but hate, having more of insight and foresight, is more slowly\ngenerated, and is not so directly and promptly active. I may be angry at\none who casually pinches me in sport, but I will hate him who\ncontinually pinches me in spite. I may be angry at the child who in its\nchildish play often interrupts my studies, but I do not hate it; this I\nreserve for the malicious boys who continually put tick-tacks on my\nwindows. And so also inanimate things often arouse anger; but we hate\nonly the animate, and then mainly when we discern deliberate, purposed\noffence. To be sure we often hear some such expression as, \u201cI hate the\nvery sight of that house\u201d; but here the term hate denotes loathing, and\nis only a little less flagrant misuse than when I say \u201cI hate ham, but\nlove beefsteak.\u201d\n\nHate, then, marks in a very noticeable way the growth of psychic\nresponsiveness. A prevision of psychic attitude of others, especially\nthe emotional and volitional, is of the utmost service as helping to and\npreparing for an appropriate response. Thus we may believe that quite\nearly in mental evolution there came an appreciation and interpretation\nof the psychic modes of others as affecting the interests of the\nindividual. We may judge that this is probable by the very apparent\ndifference of reaction of even certain of the lower animals in the\npresence of threatening dangers from common material things, and from\nanimate beings capable of being not merely crushed or pushed away, but\nintimidated and frightened away. Young children learn quickly to\ndistinguish between mere physical events and psychic expressions, and to\nfeel and to act toward the psychic in the peculiar manner which will\nbest serve them. Thus it becomes of very definite value to excite fear\nin enemies, but even a low animal learns speedily that it cannot terrify\na large stone which prevents access to food. Now fear and anger\nobviously do not specially belong to the rather advanced class of\nemotions which are always psychically responsive, for, in earliest\nphases at least, both fear and anger may be taken to have no reference\nto the psychic quality of the object, but only to the physical quality\nas painful and injurious. However, later fear and anger become cognizant\nof the psychic attitude and responsive thereto; but it may be said that\nhate from the first is a psychic responsive, it is an answer to the\npsychic attitude of others as interpreted by the individual as turned\ntowards itself. Hate is always against evil intent; anger and fear may\nbe. Hate and anger are both intensified by hate and anger in the\nobject\u2014though this may often occasion fear\u2014but fear, on the contrary, is\ngreatly weakened, and sometimes turned into hate or anger, by perceiving\nits object as fearing it. I naturally hate those and am angered with\nthose whom I perceive as having the same passions against me; but he\nwhom I see fearing me does not thereby inspire my fear for him, but\ntends in quite the contrary direction. Yet mutual fear in equally\nmatched opponents is consistent with mutual anger and hate. Fear, with\nthose who are capable of inflicting about equal losses on each other,\nacts as a check upon anger and hate, and gives caution and wariness to\npassion itself.\n\nThe object of hate then differs from that of anger and fear, as being\ninvariably a psychic quality in another as injurious to one\u2019s own\ninterests. Injuriousness _per se_ does not excite hate as it may anger\nand fear. Animals, indeed, often seem to hate that which has no psychic\nattitude toward them, and may be wholly incapable of it; but this is\nerror of judgment, just as we ourselves often find ourselves wrong in\nhating where we supposed there was evil feeling toward us, but where we\nnow see there is none. Hate disappears the moment we discover our\nmistake of interpretation.\n\nWhile hate often views its object very largely from the retrospective\nside, as opposed to fear and anger, which are generally prospective, yet\nhate originally must have applied to the present or latent potency of\nthe object for harm, for only in this wise does it reach\nself-conservative value. In early psychic life there is no time or place\nfor purely retrospective emotion like revenge and resentment. Hate is\nnot essentially a paying back for the past offence, but a will-inciting\nemotion of immediate, or imminently prospective value. In fact, though\nwe say, \u201che has done me injury and I hate him for it,\u201d yet we do not\nhate the dead injurer or the one so crippled as to be entirely powerless\nagainst us. Certainly there is no value for our interests in injuring\nthe one who is past injuring us, and from the self-conservative point of\nview to exercise ourselves in hate or anger in such a case is to waste\nenergy. Feeling for what has been done against us, purely as such, is\nplainly sheer waste of force. The past is irretrievable, and emotion\nabout it is valuable for life only so far as the past implies the\nfuture. Thus it is that hate, arising because of self-conservative\nvalue, and developing under natural selection, never becomes wholly\nretrospective.\n\nHate then is at first much the same in its elements as anger. It is\nalways objective. Hate is always of something, though extreme passion\ndulls perception, yet at its normal tension hate, like other emotions,\nis incentive to beneficial cognition. We are closely observant of those\nwe hate. Beside sense of object, there is the will-stirring, the\nhostility, which is prominent in anger, though here more controlled and\nnot so impetuous and na\u00efve. Hate thus often allies itself with fear, but\nanger is very rarely coincident with it, though there may be rapid\nalternations. There is also a hate pain which is a parallel complex to\nthe anger pain already analysed. We might term hate a distilled anger,\nand yet this signifies little, for the innermost emotion seems very\ndistinct. Like fear and anger, hate seems a _genus_ by itself, and in\nits essential feature as emotion-reaction, quite beyond scientific\nanalysis, which can point out its conditions, but not account for their\ntotal value or for the peculiar quality of hate disturbance by which\nhate is hate. Hate can be appreciated only by realization, but no matter\nhow long we reflect upon and try to catch its exact nature in some\ndefinite formula, the essence of hate always eludes, and presents itself\nas only a bare simple psychosis wholly indefinable and inexplicable in\nits essential nature.\n\nBut if we turn now to the origin and development of hate, shall we\narrive at anything more satisfactory? Is hate a modified anger, or is it\nfrom the first a wholly distinct emotion and not slowly differentiated\nfrom any preceding psychosis? Hate evidently belongs with anger as\naggressive emotional reaction, but it is very hard to see how it could\noriginate by any slow growth, and it seems easier and simpler to regard\nit as being a unique response to some very pressing demand in the\nstruggle of existence.\n\nThe whole subject of mental differentiation needs clarifying. Are we to\nconsider mind merely as a sum of many distinct modes each of which has,\nin the course of evolution, appeared suddenly in answer to the demands\nof life at a critical period, and is faint, indeed, yet from the first\nhaving a distinct and peculiar quality by which it suitably stimulates\nwill, and that the sole growth of these diverse forms has been in\nintensity and by various associations with other states? or are we to\nconsider that mind was originally a very general vague state, which, by\na continuous and traceable differentiation, has slowly developed into\nmany different modes? Certainly the latter seems the more rational. To\nconceive that there are no essential and radical subdivisions in mind,\nthat not even knowing, feeling, and willing, are fundamentally\nprimitive, but each, and each form of each, but modifications of\nprecedent modes, this is a theory which is enticing in its simplicity\nand in its analogy to physical evolution from a single underlying\nmaterial element. But when we come to particular investigations, as this\nof the origin and development of hate, we cannot well discover any modes\nintermediate between it and say, anger, which are the links in a\ncontinuous evolution, but for aught we can see or conceive, hate is as\nmuch hate the first time it appears as at any subsequent time. The links\nin the evolution of mind from phase to phase are all missing, and how\nare we to supply them? Of necessity as subjective facts they must first\nbe realized, before they can be known, but how can this be done by a\nconsciousness which has long outgrown them? We cannot discover these\nfossil and extinct forms objectively, as the paleontologist discovers\nextinct species, but in some way we must re-enact and re-experience them\nin our own consciousness before we can know anything about them. If\nevery mind embryologically passes through the several stages of its\ngeneral evolution in the race, still the strange intermediate forms\nwhich might then have existed are beyond the recall of the reflective\nstage, when we first demand to know the history of mind. And when we\nappeal to comparative psychology we are equally in the dark, for we must\njudge animals by ourselves, we can interpret their consciousness only by\nour own, and they may have very rude and peculiar forms which are\nunknown and unknowable by us. Thus the limitations and difficulties of\nsubjective research are especially brought up to us in evolutionary\nstudy which thus seems wholly confined to _a priori_ speculation. While\nwe can conceive it likely that hate was suddenly brought into full being\nby the demands of life, yet it is hardly a rational view of emotion to\nregard it as a _per saltum_ series of distinct psychical species called\nsuccessively into being by the exigencies of existence, which indeed, is\na view almost as ultra-scientific as that which regards all mental modes\nas direct endowments from Deity.\n\nBut though on general scientific analogy we are led to believe in fossil\nmental forms, in missing psychic links now extinct as regards our own\nconsciousness, but which were the germs of our present distinct\nemotions, perceptions, etc., how are we to discover and investigate\nthem? Can we work our own consciousness back through the multitudinous\nstages of its past evolution, through myriads of human and pre-human\nforms to the confused, primal, undifferentiated psychoses?\n\nCertainly the forms which lead up to such an emotion as hate and from\nwhich it is gradually evolved must be realized, must be actually felt in\nsome measure before they can be understood and analyzed. Here then seems\na great barrier to introspective evolutionary psychology, perhaps\ninsuperable, for how can mind retrace itself, involute itself, in the\ninterests of science? Mind is fundamentally action, motive-feeling,\nwhich, in connection with cognitive forms gradually achieved, becomes\nfrom mere pure pleasure-pain a very complex manifold. We feel many of\nthese forms in our own experience, and we can say of some that they are\nthe higher, of others that they are the lower and more primitive. Thus\nfear, anger, and hate are generally regarded as low action-motives as\ncompared with love of truth or justice. But while we distinguish in our\nown consciousness and by analogy in the consciousness of others a\nconsiderable variety of psychic forms, they are, so far as we are able\nto see\u2014and we have given some special attention to this in discussing\nfear and other emotions\u2014invariably distinct, and each has its own\npeculiar quality, and we do not find, and we should not expect to find,\nthe intermediate forms any more than the anatomist would expect to find\nin man a radial starfish structure. The hazy, indefinite phases which\nmark evolving consciousness into new forms have been long done away with\nfor such emotions as hate, and it would seem an impossible task to ever\nbring them back. When we let consciousness lapse of its own regressive\ntendency\u2014and undirected consciousness tends always to revert to _wild_\nstates\u2014we fall down through a series, but it is by steps, and no gradual\ndescent, that is, defined mental forms succeed each other, with no\ntransitional phases which are both as differentiating into either. We\nhave mixed states, indeed, but these have no evolutionary value in this\nline, being merely coincident distinct psychoses, and not an\nintermediate differentiating mode. The psychoses which we call lower and\nwhich we naturally _fall into_, were really a higher level once for some\nremote ancestors, and it was only by occasional great efforts that fear,\nanger, hate, etc., were reached, by just such efforts as now are\nrequired by many a worldling who would be religious and would attain a\nfeeling for holiness, or that of a Philistine, ambitious of reaching\n\u00e6sthetic feeling, who endeavours to appreciate the refined, elaborate\npower in a poem by Rossetti, or the simple human grandeur in a painting\nby Millet. In some forms we know what it is to try to feel, to have dim\nand vague stirring of \u00e6sthetic emotion, and to reach new levels in\nemotion generally, and we know the stages of differentiation and the\nsevere _nisus_ of the earlier realizations. On the _nisus_ side of our\npsychic life there is abundant opportunity for every one to observe the\nprocess of mental differentiation, and how slowly evolving a new emotion\nis, for instance, before it reaches a definite form, but there is the\ngreat range of purely natural, spontaneous life, deriving its whole\n_impetus_ from ancestral minds, where, as in hate and anger, it is\nimpossible to study the slowly modifying forms precursory to the\ndistinct mode. How can we find or produce in ourselves a state which is\nnot yet hate, but merely hate in becoming, a half-differentiated,\nhalf-evolved hate? If we could put ourselves on the _nisus_ side, and\nlook up to hate as something to be reached, instead of something we may\nfall into, we might attain some idea of its process of formation. But\nsince hate, anger, and so forth, invariably come upon us and overcome\nus, how can we appreciate their evolutionary stages? If we could trace\nthese old intermediate disused forms which merely lead up to others, we\nshould find them very strange, and should need an entirely new\nnomenclature for them. But to reach back and realize long outgrown and\nfossil psychoses, will, if ever possible, require more exertion and\nability than even the intense struggle of the actual psychical advances\nwhich adds, by the efforts of exceptional individuals\u2014\u201cgeniuses\u201d\u2014new\nmodes of cognition and feeling to the mind of a race. To regress beyond\na certain point is harder than to progress.\n\nHow then hate developed from non-hate, from anger, or from any other\nemotion, is obviously a very difficult problem. It would seem to us in\nour present stage of mentality that the first hate phenomenon was\ndefinitely and inexplicably such. We cannot perceive or conceive how the\norigin of hate is other than a sudden apparition of a new and elementary\nemotion in response to an extraordinary call upon some extraordinary\norganism in its life career. Yet we may easily believe that the direct\noccasion of its rise and progress was as complement to anger. Anger is\ncertainly in general a very advantageous self-conservative factor, but\nby reason of its violence it requires a vast amount of vital energy to\naccomplish its end, and it thus also tends to disturb the cognitive\npower in its clear and cool actions. A burst of passion, though it may\nsucceed in destroying the injurious, is both uneconomical and\nunintelligent. It is also a very transient phase. Anger will be defeated\nand supplanted in the evolution of life by some factor which has not\nthese incidental disadvantages. Hate is such a superior psychosis, and\nis surer, steadier, and more economical than anger, and defeats it in\nthe long run.\n\nHate then may be taken to exemplify the principle of antithetic\nevolution. We are careful not to raise the anger of some men and of some\nanimals, and thus anger, or the capacity for anger, serves them as\nadvantage and defence. We fear to make them mad. However, the\nantagonists of many individuals, knowing the weakening effect of such a\nstrong emotion as anger, and knowing also how apt the angry one is to\n\u201close his head,\u201d purposely stimulate anger to their own advantage, and\nthe disadvantage of the angered. Thus, cunning and wary animals,\nimpelled by hate, often tease and torment their stronger and larger\nadversaries and competitors into a furious rage, which is so rash and\nunintelligent that they are completely at the mercy of the weaker. Where\nin such a way as this an advantageous variation is turned into\ndisadvantageous by an opposing form, as anger by hate, we have what may\nbe called an antithetic evolution. New psychic variations are then\ncontinually stimulated by the earlier, and it is only for a short time\nthat any variation maintains itself as purely beneficial, but an\nanswering one soon takes advantage of its weak points and turns it from\nself-conservative into self-destructive. Under the constant success of\nopposing factors, there is gradual loss of value and soon disuse, with\nthe inception of some new form to combat more effectively the opponent.\nThis opposing form meanwhile attains dominancy, culminates, and is\ngradually ousted by some variation which has been attained in order to\nmeet the new weapons on the other side. Thus, in the battle of life,\noffence and defence, attack _versus_ retreat and counter-attack,\nmutually stimulate to a series of new and higher antithetic psychic\nvariations.\n\nThe so-called problem of evil is, then, tolerably easy to a\nthorough-going evolutionist. All developments, all perversions which are\nself-destructive rather than self-conservative to the individual, have\nreceived their original stimulus from other antagonistic individuals to\nwhose interest it is to promote these evils to the utmost. What is an\nevil to me is first so much of a good to him whose interest lies in\ndefeating and destroying me, and he will take advantage of all my\nweaknesses to his own profit. Competition and struggle involve the\nexistence of evils to individuals who are conquered and maltreated in\nthe battle of life. Disease and death itself is necessary to evolution\non a finite sphere. As long as the good and desirable is limited as\ncompared with the number of those who want, competition must exist, and\nthis competition must be by both cultivating advantageous variations in\nourselves, and also by cultivating the disadvantageous variations latent\nin our enemies. Thus, evil sown in others that our own good may be\nadvanced is the general law of all life. To injure as much as possible\nall those who oppose, and to get as many as possible well affected\ntowards us, and to be subservient to our ends, this is the meaning of\npsychical evolution in all its earlier, and most of its later, course.\nOn any scheme of evolution by struggle, evil to particular individuals\nis a necessary fact. We throw, then, the problem back to how and why\nlife arose and developed through this competition mode; and all science\nat present can say is that it is the \u201cnature of things,\u201d an expression\nwhich covers ignorance and is really metaphysical.\n\nIn all its later stages anger, and likewise hate as well, and all the\nallied emotions, attach only to what is distinctly known as animate. The\nfutility and self-destructiveness of anger against the inanimate and\ninsentient comes to be fully recognised. But early anger is quite\nundiscriminating. The hunter, who, pursued by an enraged bear, scatters\nhis clothes and accoutrements behind him for the bear to tear in pieces,\ntakes advantage of the unintelligent anger of the bear for his own ends.\nSince animals do not wear clothes they have no conception of what they\nare as independent insentient things distinct from the wearer. To the\nbear the weapons and clothes dropped by the hunter appear not as\ninanimate beings, but as living, vitally-connected parts of the creature\npursued. The error arose, not from senselessness, but from lack of range\nof experience, and it is akin to the error of the ancient Mexicans who,\nhaving never seen a horse by itself, regarded a man on horseback as a\nsingle creature. A dog, the first time he sees his master unclothed, is\ngreatly puzzled, and but slowly learns that clothes are something the\nmaster has and not what he is. When weapons, clothes, etc., are at\nlength distinguished as property, there is yet a natural and right\nimpulse to destroy them as injuring the owner; but the animal which\nstops to do this commits an error of judgment, as it is usually of more\nimportance to despatch the hunter than to destroy his implements. It is\nthe tendency of anger to destroy all which is in any wise connected with\nits object. This is true, not only of the animal world, but also of the\nlower human development. A savage in a fit of fury will slay, not only\nan offending fellow, but also his family and relations, and also destroy\nall his property. The uselessness, not to say the injustice, of such an\nindulgence of anger is only recognised at a comparatively late stage of\nevolution. Anger in its later form concerns itself only with purposive\noffence in its object, and vents itself solely on the individual\noffending. A clear distinction is drawn between animate and inanimate.\nThus, my dog, playing with another, hurt itself by running into a tree,\nand gave an angry growl; but noticing the real nature of the paingiver\nas, not the other dog, but an inoffensive tree, his attitude immediately\nchanged, and he seemed to take the injury as a matter of course. A puppy\nwould in like case senselessly continue its demonstrations of anger to\nno good and perhaps to its own injury.\n\nAs to the function of anger and hate, this has already been intimated in\nthe remarks we have just made on its origin and development. For\nfunction it is which gives rise to organ and activity; in some unknown,\nmysterious way the pressing life-struggle for useful mental activity\ndetermines ultimately its appearance. We know that extremely hard\nconditions, which would threaten the continued existence of animate life\nas a whole, or of any large subdivision, would give rise to new\nperceptions and emotions by which a saving remnant would escape; and on\nthis principle we must expect the most signal psychic advance of the\nfuture at that seemingly remote period when mankind will be threatened\nwith extinction by the slow refrigeration of the earth. A long-continued\nuniformity of easy conditions of life, as in the tropics, is distinctly\nunfavourable to psychic progress; but let a glacial period invade that\nzone, and the changed conditions would awaken such a struggle for\nexistence in all organisms, man included, that new organic and mental\ntypes would be developed. The necessities of existence and the\nself-interest of the individual in an unceasingly sharp competition\ndevelop slowly in the few those mental modes which, from their\nfunctional importance, become the heritage of a race and _genus_; and\nthese \u201csports\u201d thereby secure to themselves a certain temporary\ndominancy. This is the history of life in general, and of man in\nparticular. How demand determines supply, how necessity is the mother of\ninvention, is obvious enough in man, who, clearly conceiving the\nfunction, sets about by his knowledge of means to accomplish the needed\nimprovement; but in the lower life, which is incapable of such\nteleological foresight, we can only say that through pain of lack in the\naltered conditions of existence there is stimulated a blind, intense\nstruggle, which, moving out in all lines, somewhere, at sometime, by\nmere chance hitting on the right variation, sticks to it and\naccomplishes its own salvation, and leaves descendants who tend in the\nsame direction. New psychic qualities, as well as new physical organs,\nare in some way gradually determined through struggle which is\npractically blind. That mental variation, that bodily variation, which\nwas incessantly demanded in the struggle of existence does somehow\nultimately appear, is, indeed, a fact which, for the present at least,\nwe can only state in this indefinite, unsatisfactory manner. Blind,\npain-impelled will, fiercely striking out in every direction, does at\nlength, achieve those new psychical and physical forms which are most\nneeded by life. The chance serviceable variation is fixed and continued\nby reason of its serviceability; but when its utility wanes by reason of\nnew life factors appearing or new conditions of existence, it is lost by\ndisuse, or survives in rudimentary forms.\n\nThe function of hate is, like anger, to injure and eliminate the\ninjurious; but what anger accomplishes by a sudden volcanic outburst,\nhate accomplishes in a slower, but surer and more subtle way. Hate is,\nas previously pointed out, a manifest improvement over anger as a method\nof offensive warfare. Other things being equal, the best hater is the\nmost successful individual. Dr. Johnson had reason on his side when he\nsaid that he loved a good hater. A strong hater, who pertinaciously\nassails and injures his enemies, strengthens his own position and makes\nthe largest place for himself in life. Hate, as a permanent,\neconomically aggressive motion, marks certainly a great advance, and is\nof the highest import for life. If now hate has its own function as\ndirect stimulus to offensive action toward those who will be injurious,\ntoward those who are capable and likely to pain and harm us, how shall\nwe explain the hate\u2014and we might say anger as well\u2014which arises at mere\nremembrance of injury, and which seems to have no immediate value for\nlife?\n\nIn the first place we may well doubt whether any purely retrospective\nemotion exists, at least in early psychic life. The past, of course, has\nno value in and by itself; it is irretrievable, and emotional force\nspent upon it as such wasted\u2014\u201cno use crying for spilled milk.\u201d It may\nwell be that for simple psychisms the past never exists as such; at\nleast, it is never a stopping point, but a mere _datum_ for interpreting\nthe inexperienceable. The sense of experience, especially in its\ntemporal aspect, is very difficult of analysis; yet we may say with some\nconfidence that at first it does not imply a sense of either the past or\nfuture as such. The mind is immediately impressed by the injuriousness\nof the injurious, which, though coming, of course, in terms of the\nexperienced, is not relegated thereby to a past time, nor is it at all\ndwelt upon as such for emotion reaction. Primitive emotion is not\nbackward looking; for this is in itself entirely futile, and primitive\nlife depends for its existence and progress upon utility. The value of\nemotion is in stimulating preparedness for defence and offence. The\nrepresentation of injury inflicted comes up to early mind as some injury\nbeing inflicted, or imminently so, or is applied at once in\ninterpretation of the experienceable, with no thought or emotion for it\nas merely past fact. Advanced psychic life may stop at the first step,\nmay indulge in retrospection for its own sake, and not for its immediate\nvalue in understanding the experienceable, but primitive emotion is ever\nan alertness and anticipatory readiness.\n\nIf, now, we turn to some classification of the anger group in itself and\nin its general relation to emotion, we obtain something like the\nfollowing:\u2014\n\n \u250c Reaction to \u250c Regressive\u2014fear.\n Emotion. \u2502 injurious. \u2514 Aggressive\u2014anger.\n \u2502 Reaction to \u250c Receptive.\n \u2514 beneficial. \u2514 Appropriative.\n\n \u250c Simple anger or wrath.\n \u2502 Intensive\u2014Rage or fury.\n \u2502 Incipient\u2014Displeasure.\n \u2502 Mild\u2014Irritation.\n \u2502 Response to purposive injury\u2014Hate.\n Anger \u2502 Altruistic\u2014Indignation.\n \u2502 Sentiment\u2014Indignation and Hate.\n \u2502 Retrospective\u2014Resentment.\n \u2502 Revenge.\n \u2502 Sub-hate\u2014Detestation.\n \u2502 Despite.\n \u2514 Scorn.\n\nBut few remarks need to be added to elucidate the outline. Exasperation\nis plainly a late form of anger. It belongs to the period when anger has\nbeen subjected to will restraint, and when something passes all bounds\nof forbearance\u2014is \u201cperfectly maddening\u201d\u2014we are exasperated. Anger of a\nhigh and peculiar intensity produced by special and repeated provocation\nis known as exasperation. For intensive hate there seems no special\nword, at least, in English, though we denote it by adjective as bitter,\nmalignant, virulent. Detest sometimes means strong hatred. Malice is not\nan emotion; it is a state of mind which is implied in hate, namely,\ndeliberate intent to injure. We do not say we feel malicious; but if we\nhate, we are malicious. Malice is merely an objective term for a will\nelement in hate, and denotes character of act.\n\nThe sight of injury done to others produces indignation. When law or\nprinciple injured and violated excites indignation or hate, we have that\nfeeling for the abstract\u2014rarely pure\u2014which is termed sentiment. He who\nis indignant at injustice and he who hates sin have risen to the highest\nevolution of the anger group. For an account of resentment and revenge\nsee chapter on Retrospective Emotion. In the earlier stages both anger\nand hate are rather undiscriminating as to rank or _status_ of opposing\nobject, but in later evolution there must be a sense of equality. When\nwe consider the offending ones as entirely below us, as unworthy of our\nanger or hate, we detest or despise. Our relations with them may compel\nus to notice them and to have some feeling toward them, but we would not\nlower ourselves to fight them. To detest is to feel a strong revulsion,\nbut it also in measure has a direct objective movement. Still, although\ndetestation, despising, scorn, contempt, are by no means so actively\naggressive as the other members of the group, they have evidently a\ndirect affiliation with hate and anger. In all these there is direct\nrepulse of all relation with what is below us, a position holding off\nand looking down upon the offending object as too small and mean for us\nto seriously oppose.\n\nWe cannot at present elaborate more fully an analysis, a genetic\ninvestigation, nor a classification, of what must appear to every\nattentive student of mind as a most important and extraordinary group of\npsychic phenomena. In all the lower psychic life with every perception\ncomes an emotion reaction, very generally either of a fear or anger\ncharacter. Everything perceived has a definite life meaning, nothing is\nindifferent, and, in fact, primitive perception cannot exist except as\nprompting and being prompted by emotion or feeling. For the low psychism\nthere is no such vast collection of practically indifferent objects, a\nworld of things, as maintains a constant and large place in advanced\npsychism. Lower mental life is piecemeal, inconsequent and broken, and\nwholly directed by feeling phases. Every object has its place only in\nrelation to self-interest, as favouring or injuring. This is impressed\nupon those who have made any study of lower human types, and of wild\nanimals, where your very presence, no matter how accidental and really\nmeaningless, is construed as suggesting detriment, and suspicion is\naroused, a preparatory stage to some fear or anger exhibition, one of\nthose being often nascent, though sometimes not very active owing to the\nlack of full certainty as to your injuriousness. For the savage, who is\nincapable of disinterestedness, and wholly given up to self-seeking, the\nmissionary and scientist must have some hidden personal motive, some\nintent to take advantage of them, and profit by them. From the first\nthey are regarded with fear, anger, or hate. The strange and peculiar is\nhated merely for being unlike the self, and all non-conformity means\npersonal slight and insult. With primitive psychism all objects are\ncoloured by a strong emotion light, and this remains a tendency till the\nlatest stages of evolution.\n\nAnger and hate have by no means spent their force, even for human\nevolution in some of its more advanced forms. We all recognise the\nnecessity of \u201cspirit\u201d to success. The one who is incapable of anger and\nof venting it powerfully is a weakling, and will be trodden under foot\nin the battle of life. The high sense of personal honour and advantage,\nwhich will brook no insult with impunity, or allow no injury to go\nunpunished and unresented, is still the _sine qua non_ of worldly\nsuccess. Show anger, hate, and defiance to all those who invade your\nrights; stand up and fight the battle of life against every oncomer, and\nsecure and hold the position against all competitors. In the natural\ncourse of events\u2014the struggle for self-conservation and\nself-aggrandizement\u2014the meek do not inherit the earth, but rather those\nwho are irascibly aggressive.\n\nThe most notable revolution in human history against the general course\nof evolution which we have been considering has come from Christianity.\nThe world says, \u201cIf any one smite you on the cheek, hit him between the\neyes\u201d; the Nazarene says, \u201cOffer him the other cheek also\u201d; the world\nsays, \u201cIf any one takes away your cloak, fall upon him and despoil him\nof his all\u201d; the Nazarene says, \u201cGive him your coat also\u201d; the world\nsays, \u201cHate your enemies\u201d; the Nazarene says, \u201cLove your enemies, bless\nthem which curse you, and do good to them that despitefully use you.\u201d\nThe law of natural evolution by fear, anger, hate, strife, is replaced\nby a new law of a spiritual evolution through forbearance, humility,\nlove, loyalty to truth, to beauty, to goodness, and to holiness in a\nkingdom not of this \u201cworld.\u201d Life consists, not in making friends and\nfighting enemies, but in a fight with one\u2019s self to realize unselfish\nideals, to exemplify the highest principles and laws, and to achieve the\nlargest and best work, without regard to self-conservation or\nself-aggrandizement. In this radically new evolution the mind is for\nitself, and is not, as in the lower evolution, merely a utilitarian\nfactor, subservient to the general demands of life. Life, on the\ncontrary, here becomes subservient to the development of mentality\npurely for its own sake. Thus pure science, art for art\u2019s sake, an\nindependent morality and religion, become possible. The greatest minds\nof the race are those who have lived most completely this highest life;\nbut this new form scarcely touches the great bulk of humanity, and is\nvery partially developed even in the so-called highest classes.\n\nBut it is not our present purpose to survey the higher evolution, or to\npoint out its _rationale_. For the lower evolution, however, it is\ntolerably evident that fear, anger and hate, give the dominant tone to\npsychic life. These strong, direct emotions act as fundamental life\nfactors; without them the individual would be quickly overwhelmed in the\nstruggle for existence. The conditions of early life absolutely require\nthese simple, na\u00efve emotions to stimulate advantageous reactions.\nEmotional indifferentism is possible only as an artificial and\nby-product, a sort of disease or abnormal symptom even in the very\nlatest phases of human evolution. The comparative psychology of the\nfuture will show more and more clearly and fully the nature and function\nof both the fear and anger groups as factors in biologic evolution.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER XI\n _SURPRISE AND DISAPPOINTMENT, EMOTION OF_\n _NOVELTY_\n\n\nTo anticipate what is to occur is plainly one of the most useful\nachievements of mind, for all providence implies apprehension and\nemotion therewith. But to look before and after is certainly not the\nprerogative of man alone, but anticipatory power is found throughout the\nrealm of mind, and constitutes the larger portion of all cognition. To\nknow a thing means, in general, to appreciate its potentiality; and all\nscience is really prescience. Knowledge is not the immediate sensation,\nbut the meaning of it for life; it is the ideal translation from one\nsense to another in feeling tendency. Thus, to scent is by itself a\nuseless acquirement, but the connecting it with desired food is of the\nutmost service. The psychism gradually attains the power to interpret by\nvarious _media_ the nature, that is, the experienceability, of the\nenvironment.\n\nTo foresee is then one of the commonest events in mind, and according to\nthe painfulness or pleasurability foreseen is felt anger or fear, hope\nor desire, or allied emotions. But the foreseen does not always come to\npass, and hence there results a new order of intellectual and emotional\nreaction. That what we had in mind would happen comes not, or is other\nthan foreseen; this has a disturbing effect on cognition and emotion.\nPrescience defeated becomes not merely nescience, but there is the\npositive definite shock of surprise, and the emotion of disappointment\nor some correlated form. Surprise as the sense of contrast of real and\nideal, involving personal sense of limitation and error, is, as we have\nnoted (pp. 50 ff.), a painful experience. But where there is no\npreconceived notion, no expectation, there is no surprise, as Lumholtz\nremarks of the Australian savages, that they are not surprised at the\nrailway and other wonders of civilization; they do not know enough to be\nsurprised. The full apprehension and understanding of the gap between\nideal and real is but very slowly attained. At first the thwarting is\nnaturally and easily attributed to an enemy, and there is anger and\npertinacious violence, but ultimately, by sad and repeated experience,\nmind is led to notice its own insufficiency, to feel that the conflict\nbetween the actual and the expected is due to subjective error rather\nthan objective interference. Genuine surprise, as distinct from mere\nnervous shock, is then, I think, a later phenomenon than is generally\nsupposed. What is often taken for surprise with animals and children is\nreally eager attention. Again, certain modes of fright are often taken\nfor surprise. But experience must have made a considerable advance in\napprehension of experienceability before a real surprise can be\nmanifested, which is always the correlative of a sudden contrariness of\nexperience to what was preconceived. Surprise involves a certain measure\nof a theory of experience; in short, a more or less definite body of\nknowledge. One who has framed no ideas of what experience should be can\nnever be really surprised at whatever may happen. However, to be able to\nfeel surprise is obviously very advantageous, to have a painful and\nsharp sense of the incongruity of real and ideal often conducts to that\ninvestigation which results in being prepared against being surprised in\nthe same way again. The imperfectness of adaptation is thus consciously\nand intelligently remedied. The man of large resources, cautious nature,\nand keen insight and foresight, is little liable to be surprised, for in\nall circumstances he accurately forecasts a very wide range of\npossibilities.\n\nWhen the good expected comes in less measure than was foreseen, or not\nat all, or some real evil instead, there is not merely surprise, but\ndisappointment as well. When what is confidently expected does not\nhappen, the emotional reaction is surprise; when what is eagerly hoped\nfor does not occur, disappointment is the result. I am disappointed in\nnot receiving a certain remittance I had hoped for. Here the ought to\nbe, the expected, is ranged over against the actual not, as in surprise,\nas a sudden and painful change in cognition, but solely for the personal\nadvantage missed. Disappointment is bound up with the sense of personal\nloss and detriment from the happening contrary to expectation. Feeling\nof disappointment is thus emotional reaction from cognizance of evil\nresult where good is looked for. The more it was hoped for, the more\nbitter the disappointment. This disappointment has its function as an\nemphatic protest against impracticality; the lessons of experience are\nthus brought home and made memorable. Disappointment turns life from\nfalse dreams to stern realities; it prompts to an investigation of\ncauses, and rouses cognition to a full understanding of the situation.\nHope thereby becomes more and more rational and realizable.\n\nIn all disappointment we note that the feeling is not about the past as\nsuch, but is with reference to the immediately actual in its unexpected\nbearing on life. Thus it is not strictly retrospective emotion. Though\noften initial to regret and grief, it should not be confounded with\nthese.\n\nA curiously illogical remark, and one not uncommonly heard, is, \u201cI hope\nyou will succeed, but do not be disappointed if you don\u2019t.\u201d This is\nreally a psychological Hibernicism. Hope is the foundation of\ndisappointment, and one cannot say, \u201chope, but do not be disappointed,\u201d\nin the same breath with definite meaning. We cannot escape the painful\nimplications of unfulfilled desire: we cannot both have our cake and eat\nit too. Some measure of expectation of success is implied in all\nfuturitive effort, hence a like measure of disappointment. The real\nsense of any such admonition can only be for moderating desire, and so\ntempering possible reaction. The expression in question amounts to\nlittle else than a phrase of well-wishing, but with little confidence in\nthe actual result.\n\nFrom the feeling of surprise and its congener, disappointment, it is\nnatural to turn to the feeling for novelty. Surprise and novelty both\nrelate, but in different ways, to the character of the experience in\nrelation to other experiences. The strangeness, however, in what is\nsurprising, and which makes it surprising, is not intrinsic, but wholly\nrelative to a preconception. Thunder is familiar to me, but it may\nsurprise me if it occur in January, and also totally out of my\npreconceived order; but a friend who has neither heard, nor heard of,\nthunder, will not be surprised by the sound in January, though he may be\nstartled, and may feel the novelty of the phenomenon. The novel, purely\nas such, cannot surprise, for there is no field for the expectation\nwhich is the foundation of surprise. The surprising is always contrary\nto expectation, but the novel is simply unexpected, not in the range of\nthought and conception in any manner. A novel experience is one which\nhas previously been unexperienced, and the feeling of novelty is the\nfeeling of it as such, while a surprising experience goes quite against\nall we look for, and is often familiar and common enough, though\nsometimes it is novel, as when the absolutely new experience and not\nsome familiar experience comes in place of the expected experience. If\nthe man to whom thunder is novel is awaiting merely the pattering of\nrain, the crash of thunder will excite both feelings of surprise and\nnovelty. In this case he is surprised before he feels the novelty of the\nsurprising event.\n\nA feeling for the novelty of an experience implies sense of experience\nand experienceable, and is thus debarred from primitive consciousness,\nwhich is merely a series of disconnected flashes, occurring a few times\nat the critical moments in an organism\u2019s life. It is probable that in\nthe origin of mind the first consciousness was the last, an entirely\nunique and isolated phenomenon in the animal\u2019s life, hence supremely\nnovel. However, at first, and undoubtedly also in later mind,\nconsciousness but slowly rises to the sense of novelty of consciousness\nas such. After a long period of unconsciousness from any cause we do not\nappreciate returning consciousness as _per se_ a comparatively novel\nphenomenon. In early mind every experience is practically a new\nexperience, and so novel, but as there is no cognizance of experience in\nany light, and least of all in this light which is rather remote from\nimmediate practicality, the feeling for novelty does not occur. Sense of\nnovelty implies a comparison of experience purely for its own sake,\ncertainly a very late acquirement. Thus in primitive mind, though all\nexperiences are uniformly fresh, yet they are not appreciated as such.\nThe feeling for novelty must always rest upon a considerable body of\nexperience unified by ego-sense and apprehended as such, that is,\nconsciousness of novelty implies both consciousness of consciousness and\nself-consciousness. The consciousness of novelty is thus far from being\nequivalent to novel consciousness. Whenever, even in advanced mind, a\nnovel consciousness occurs, we should be over hasty if we at once\nconcluded that feeling of novelty was also experienced.\n\nThe first step in life is to get an experience, to struggle into a\nconsciousness which may be immediately valuable, and which is at once\nemotional and motor in its action; the second step is to compare and\nidentify the experience gained so as to ascertain its meaning for life\nwith greater certainty. Recognition thus comes early into play, but\nwhile the sphere of the sense of the novel lies in that of the\nunrecognised, it does not in any wise occupy the whole, for much that is\nunrecognised still is far from conveying feeling of novelty, because\nthis feeling is, as we have said, far from being experienced on every\npresentation of the novel. The novel is equivalent rather to the\nunrecognisable. A dog may lose in a few months the power of recognising\nits master, yet the master after such a lapse of time cannot be said to\nawaken sense of novel. Though not recognised for master he is recognised\nas one of many familiar objects, he is known to be a man, and that is as\nfar as the identification goes. The experience then is in reality not a\nfresh one. Here is a new man but there is nothing novel in the\nexperience, much less is there a feeling of novelty. I doubt much if a\ndog or any lower animal notices and appreciates pleasurably or painfully\nthe novel as such. The unrecognisable and unclassifiable presented to\nthem may agitate them in various ways, as contrast a horse and a\ncourageous dog on first seeing a locomotive, but there is no evidence of\nreal feeling of the novelty of the experience as such. The enjoyment of\nthe novel for its own sake is probably wholly confined to late human\npsychism.\n\nIt must, indeed, be granted that change from monotonous or confining\ncircumstances is appreciated and appreciated pleasurably by lower\nanimals, though they may not know enough to seek change for its own\nsake. Animals certainly suffer from _ennui_, and enjoy variety within\ncertain limits, but change is not newness, and absolute change or\nnovelty in strict sense hardly appeals to them, that is, they do not\nappreciate the novelty of a situation. The really novel disturbs them,\nthey do not desire it nor are pleased with it. It is only in fact in the\nhigher ranges of human mind that experience of any kind, novel or\nvarious, comes to be sought for its own sake. To say, \u201cthis is a novel\nsensation,\u201d or \u201chow novel and delightful,\u201d and all similar expressions,\ndenotes a frame of mind which is artificial, that is, lies away from and\nbeyond the common course of psychism under natural selection. The\nchangefulness of experience and the novelty of an experience are in\nreality two distinct elements. One who has been ill in bed for weeks\nenjoys the change in sitting up in his arm chair, but there is no real\nnovelty or sense of novelty. Everything, we say, is novel and\ninteresting to the child, tiresome and a bore to the blas\u00e9 man of the\nworld. The world is, in truth, fresh and new to the child, but the sense\nof the novel _per se_ is very slowly developed, and the rarer the novel\nbecomes, the more keen our appreciation of it. Where all is novel, there\ncan be no sense of novelty, for this is purely a contrast type of\npsychosis. The zest and eagerness of the child proceeds from radically\nother sentiments than the feeling for novelty; it is absorbed in things\nfor themselves and what they directly give, and does not stop to reflect\nand feel about the relations of experiences, and so feel the novel as\nsuch. Further we note that pleasing novelties are far from being equally\npleasing as such. It may be as novel to carry a potato in my pocket as a\ndouble eagle, but not equally pleasing. The real value of novelty for\nemotion must always be carefully determined by subtracting accessory\nfeelings.\n\nWith regard to the relation of novelty to pleasure and pain, the novel\nand the sense of the novel is always in its inception under evolution by\nnatural selection unpleasant and painful. A novel experience is one\nwhich can only originate in painful struggle, and the new is always _per\nse_ distasteful to early mind, which is ever conservative in its\ninstincts and tendencies. A perfect life, biologically speaking, is one\nwhich is perfectly adapted to its environment, and so goes through its\nevolution with mechanically exact adjustment to circumstances; and the\nnovel would break in upon the unconscious rhythm which is here\nperfected. Habituation becomes so iron fast that the novel, even when\ndistinctly pleasurable in itself, is resented, much less is the novel\nsought for its own sake. However, so far as a novel experience may come\nrather by way of regressiveness than progressiveness, it may delight us\nby its novelty whenever the mind becomes capable of appreciating\nnovelty. Thus purely hereditary tendencies, which we do not accomplish\nbut which are accomplished in us during youth, as, for instance, the\nsexual evolution, may charm, not only in themselves, but for their\nnovelty as well. But this experience which is not merely novel to the\nindividual as springing up spontaneously by _impetus_ from the past, but\nwhich is novel for the race, and requires effort to assimilate, and so\nis in the distinct line of higher evolution, as, the achieving a high\nspiritual sentimentality in love; this, the real novel, is inevitably\nand naturally painful. The first time the emotion of humility\u2014a\ncomparatively recent evolution\u2014was experienced by a human being was a\ntruly novel experience, though it is quite uncertain whether there was\nwith it either sense or sentiment of novelty.\n\nIf the novel and the novel experience\u2014and these terms are practically\nidentical\u2014are essentially painful, whence and how arises the peculiar\npleasure which we undeniably may experience in connection with the novel\nappreciated as such? Must all such pleasure be placed to the account of\nregressiveness? But pleasure of this kind is intrinsic in the act itself\nand not for its novelty _per se_. There is a wide variety of experience\nintrinsically either pleasurable or painful, which may be pleasurable to\nus solely by reason of its novelty. I may enjoy the novel experience of\ntasting a pomegranate, be the actual experience agreeable or\ndisagreeable, merely enjoying the novelty as such. What is this novelty,\nwhy is it noticed, and why does it give occasion to pleasure or pain in\nemotional form?\n\nAs we have already pointed out, the sense of the novel and emotion about\nit cannot be said to arise with novel experiences in general. The novel\nin the objective sense is the first occurrence of any given definite\nkind of psychosis, as humility or pity, in the history of mind, and this\nnovelty is probably not at first appreciated.\n\nBain says that novelty is not an emotion, but \u201cmerely expresses the\nsuperior force of all stimulants on being first applied.\u201d But from the\npoint of view of psychic history the initial force of stimulants is\nalways very inferior and slight. For example, to taste and to\nqualitatively distinguish tastes is an extremely slow growth in the\nrace, and by no means suddenly completed even in the offspring of the\nmost advanced individuals. Place a drop of wormwood extract on an\ninfant\u2019s tongue and it may have a novel sensation and a disagreeable\none, as evidenced by the reaction, yet the real force of the sensation\nis certainly quite inferior to that of a ten year old child in the given\ncase. The absolutely new impression is always slight, for mind is, in\nthe natural course of evolution, always slow at fully experiencing\nthings, it is by effort and by effort alone that it attains the several\norders of sensation and perception, and it is only by effort that they\nare realized with greater and greater force and clearness. By the very\nnature of psychic evolution as a progressive process toward helping\nadjustability the novel exercises at the first but a slight reaction.\nHowever, in the exigencies of existence the most wide awake, those most\nsusceptible to perceiving novelties and new circumstances and to being\nsuitably affected by them, have the advantage. Hence the apprehension,\ninterpretation, and application, of novelties is the path of progress\nwhich finally culminates in the achievements of human invention. An\nopenness to the novel is thus of prime importance in a practical way,\nthough this is quite distinct from the pleasing sense of novelty.\nHowever, the novel is not primarily attractive and interesting in and\nfor itself, but this must be accounted a late evolution in an artificial\nperiod. The novel is at the first anything but charming. The absolutely\nnovel is never pleasant for its own sake.\n\nIt is only in a relative way that the objectively novel pleases, that\nis, in the way of variety and change. Where overflowing mental energy by\nreason of habituation finds no full and easy diverse activity the mind\nis hampered and constrained. Thus youth in particular finds delight and\nrelief in new sights and sounds, in fresh experiences of all kinds.\nQuickly wearied and exhausted in one channel and yet full of active\npower, the mind springs rapidly from object to object along those lines\nwhich ancestral experience has rendered the lines of least resistance,\nthus especially in the plays and sports of childhood.\n\nWhile the novel in this way as change pleases, yet there is no pleasing\nsense of novelty. Sensations, sights, sounds, tastes, etc., please by\ntheir novelty, there is a pleasure in the sensations not merely\nintrinsic but relative to previous experiences, but the mind is not yet\ncapable of the emotion of novelty which belongs to reflective\nconsciousness. The child may be pleased by the novel, but is not\nconsciously charmed by the novelty. The sense of experience as novel,\nand as such pleasing, belongs to a higher grade of consciousness than\nthe na\u00efve direct consciousness of the child. Novelty consciously known,\nappreciated, and sought for its own sake is a decidedly late evolution.\nThere is an emotion and emotion of pleasure which we may feel in view of\nthe novel _per se_. Not merely the new object becomes the stimulant of a\nnew and refreshing experience, but this experience being known as novel\nby the reflecting consciousness, and contrasted with other experiences,\nthere comes therewith a peculiar ripple of pleasurable emotion, the\nemotion of the novel. The first emotion of novelty is itself thereby a\nnovel consciousness which might be, to a very reflective self-conscious\nmind, an object for another emotion of novelty. In touching upon the\nemotion of novelty we have thus risen beyond the common course of\nnatural selection, to the point where experience values itself for its\nown sake.\n\nIn contrast to the emotion of novelty is the emotion of familiarity.\nThis might be discussed in a strictly parallel way to our discussion of\nthe emotion of novelty. It is founded upon likeness, being the sentiment\nof likeness. An absolute novelty, the perfectly new, is of course\nimperceptible as such, and by the law of continuity cannot occur in\nnature. Some correlation with past experience is required to make the\nthing cognizable at all, as is also some measure of unlikeness to make\nit distinguishable and so familiar. The emotion of familiarity is much\nneglected by psychologists, yet it forms a more important and a larger\nelement in the pleasures of advanced mind than the emotion of novelty.\nMany of the delights of home and domestic life are tinged by it. The\npleasing sense of familiarity is, of course, most felt in contrast after\nsome long experience of novelties, as when the traveller returns home\nfrom a prolonged journey. Delight in the familiar for its own sake often\nlargely prompts to the revisiting old scenes and renewing old habits.\nThe emotions of novelty and familiarity have a constant contrasting play\nin many men. The familiar which is painful in itself may yet, like the\nnovel painful in itself, be pleasurable. We often welcome the familiar\nand novel purely for their own sake whatever be their actual\nhedonalgic[C] content.\n\n[Footnote C: This adjective, which I used before seeing Mr. Marshall\u2019s\n\u201calgedonic,\u201d more exactly expresses pleasure\u2014pain quality.]\n\nNoticed familiarity like novelty may be painful. The disgusting emotion\nby which we may meet the unwelcome novelty, has its correlate in the\nwearing sense of monotony from the regular return of the familiar even\nthough it be intrinsically pleasurable.\n\nIn the reflective emotions we have touched upon but a single group, the\nnovelty-familiarity, which is certainly a complex but interesting kind\nof psychoses. In all this field we have rightly to separate mere\nsensitiveness to likeness and unlikeness\u2014a tolerably early\nphenomenon\u2014from sense of relatedness and unrelatedness of experiences in\nand for themselves. Consciousness of experience as such is the mark of a\nradically new type of consciousness, quite set off from the na\u00efve\nunreflecting consciousness under the primitive conditions of natural\nselection and the struggle for existence. The significance of this, by\nwhich experience rests purely upon itself and is for itself, leads into\na wide region. It is enough that we have instanced one of these later\nemotions in contrast to the directly serviceable emotions which have\nmost concerned us in our present discussions, without inquiring closely\ninto its function. It is evident that in the ordinary course of\nevolution the character of the situation as affecting life determines\nthe serviceable emotion, thus different kinds of harmful situations\ndetermine fear, anger, hate, etc. If a situation is really interesting\nfor life, it ultimately will be both known and felt in the progress of\nthe struggle for existence just as surely as light, colour, sound, etc.,\nare gradually appreciated. Hence we might predict that the novel\nsituation and the incongruous situation would receive some advantageous\ncognitive and feeling response, and that even emotions of novelty,\nfamiliarity, congruity, and incongruity, would arise, as well as the\nfeelings for these things, if this were useful; that is, experience may\nultimately consciously react upon itself in these ways as well as\ndirectly sense mere objects. Now the pleasure in novelty for its own\nsake, while not consciously in the region of natural selection, yet\nindirectly may be favoured by it as prop\u00e6deutic to progressiveness. It\nwould, indeed, from one standpoint seem possible to deduce according to\nthe law of serviceability the whole course of experience past, present\nand future, and we might as assuredly predict particular feelings as we\nmay predict the evolution of the wing or the hoof or the four-ventricled\nheart in the course of a physical biologic evolution. The psychic\nbiologic evolution is to a certain point as strictly interpretable by\nthe principle of advantageous natural selection as the physical, for the\ntwo are really co-ordinated. In the near future of psychology every\npsychosis in its origin and development will be as clearly traceable as\nany purely physiological organ, though this can never be accomplished in\nthe purely objective manner, but will require a subjective manipulation\nwhich is now quite beyond us.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER XII\n _RETROSPECTIVE EMOTION_\n\n\nBrown divided emotions into retrospective and prospective, but such a\nclassification has no basis in a general biological view nor yet in a\nspecial analysis of the particular phenomena. It is evident that the two\ngreat classes of emotion from the point of view of struggle for\nexistence will be response to injurer and to benefactor. These are the\ntwo prime qualities in things for which emotional notice is most needed\nas a service to life, and hence the broad and fundamental division of\nemotion must always be into that which is response to the harmful and\nthat which is response to the beneficial. Here only is the great and\nconstant distinction in the nature of emotions. Prospect and retrospect\nare equally meaningless in themselves considered. From a merely _a\npriori_ biologic point of view we must, then, pronounce it quite\nunlikely that the time-sense should fundamentally differentiate emotion,\nbut we should expect that the prime division would be with respect to\ncognised injury or benefit.\n\nThat time-sense is not a grand principle of division we also see plainly\nwhen we examine particular emotions. Thus, in the case of anger, while\nwe can say at once that this is, in all its forms, repulse to injury,\ncan we claim it is either prospective or retrospective emotion? The\ntruth is, the thought of injury done, doing, or to be done, equally\nwakens anger in choleric individuals. The man who harmed me yesterday\nexcites my anger, and so does the man whom I perceive to be now injuring\nme or about to injure me. The quality of the emotion is identically the\nsame whether the object be considered as in past, present, or future.\nEven what seems to be a purely temporal emotion, like hope, which is\nusually regarded as wholly prospective, may yet have other temporal\naspects. Thus, we sometimes say, \u201cI hope it was not so,\u201d where hope is\nobviously retrospective, or more strictly prospective-retrospective,\nhaving reference to expectation with desire that the event will turn out\nnot to have happened.\n\nBut it may be said that, as emotion rests upon representation, the\nproper classification of the emotions will depend upon the divisions of\nrepresentation which are essentially determined by the time-sense as\nrepresentation of past or future. Representation with sense of\nrepresentation implies a cognition of the thing as represented merely,\nand so as non-existent to present actual sensing, as something having\nbeen, or to be, sensed. The emotion arises thus on cognition of the\nexperienceable, and includes always some dim impression of potency of\nobject for harm or benefit at some time. However, though this may be the\ncase, it is plain that it makes no radical distinction in emotion. If a\nman threatens me with some injury, this fires my rage, which is greatly\nincreased if I catch him in the act of committing the injury threatened,\nor find that he has committed the evil deed. Change in time-sense may\nthus bring change in intensity of some emotions, but it does not\ndetermine quality of emotion. The prime factor as to kind of emotion is\nalways, not any sense of time, but the personal value of the event,\nwhich may or may not receive a definite time determination. Indeed, a\nform of representation, before any sense of experience as merely\nsubjective phenomenon is attained, is a prominent feature in the direct\nna\u00efve experience which constitutes by far the greater bulk in the total\nexistent consciousness. Before experience is aware of itself and of the\nexperienceable there is a certain purely subjective mirroring of that\nwhich is not present to sense, but has been, _i.e._, there is a\nre-occurrence in consciousness which has the subjective force of\nreality; though the objective actuality is lacking, such re-occurrence\nby association without the actual presence of the object stands,\nhowever, for reality to the mind experiencing\u2014it is a direct intuition;\nthe object, though unreal, is perfectly real to consciousness, and\nconveys no meaning, and so is not a basis for emotion. Yet in the higher\nrepresentation with a sense of experience as integral element, the\nrepresentation is sometimes practically timeless, though surcharged with\nemotion tendency. The highest objects which the mind represents have\nlittle time quality, and all the nobler sentiments, as love of truth,\njustice, etc., exist with little or no reference to time. So also in the\nvery earliest representation, the object is seen in its feeling\nvalue\u2014emotion basis\u2014as soon as it is perceived as object; but this is as\nan immediate subjective realizing in which time-sense plays very little\npart. The conscious interpretation of past and future as a conscious\nconnecting of the two is certainly not a primitive function. The time\nform is, then, on the whole, merely incidental in emotion, and is by no\nmeans a fundamental principle determining classification.\n\nYet, though we must reject time as a cardinal principle of division in\nemotion, still we must acknowledge that the term retrospective emotion\ndenotes a real group of mental phenomena, including revenge, regret,\nremorse, and kindred forms, which are marked as feeling for the past\nmerely as past. However, pure retrospection is rare and late. The past\ndoes not for primitive mind stand by itself as something to be dwelt\nupon, to be thought about, to be moved by, and stirred to action. The\nimmediate present absorbs the mind, and the past interests and excites\nonly so far as bearing directly on the present. And so it is that the\nchild lives in the present, the youth and man in the future, the old man\nin the past; and this denotes the relatively late appearance of pure\nretrospection and of emotion founded thereon. Emotion is first merely\nspectant, then prospective, then retrospective. However, when we say an\nemotion is concerned solely with the present in the very young, we mean,\nof course, the immediately prospective\u2014that which has relation to but\none sense and by association rouses emotion, as an apple, seen or\nhandled by a child, awakens emotion, desire to taste. Where sense\nconsciousness is not multiform, but single and uniform, as, doubtless,\nin very low organisms, there is no opportunity for any emotion, for\nthere is no interpretation power. But the intensification of some one\nsense connection already attained may be a basis for emotion which we\nmay loosely call emotion spectant, as when the greedy child eagerly\neating an apple desires a larger bite, sweeter portion, etc.\nHowever,\u2014though it has little classification value,\u2014emotion can be only\nprospective or retrospective; and this is, of course, implied in its\nbasis\u2014representation. Emotion by its very nature must be a looking\nforward, or a looking backward, or both. As a feeling about, and not a\ndirect feeling, this is obviously its unvariable cognitive content. The\nimmediate and actual realization may be direct feeling or sensation, but\nit is never in itself emotion. Emotion is always over something, an\nexperience of experience, and cannot thus be simple content. It is thus\na consciously idealizing mode as distinguished from direct realization\nwhich is wholly self-contained.\n\nOne of the most important and interesting retrospective emotions is\nrevenge. The cardinal idea in revenge is returning evil for evil. Not\nonly must there be a paying back for past injury, but there must be an\nequivalence, eye for an eye, and tooth for a tooth; and the revengeful\nemotion is the meting out such purely retributive action. Exact return\nbecomes the basis of a general usage in animal and human societies.\nJustice, law, and punishment rest upon the idea of inflicting duplicate\nor equivalent injury for injury received. Administrative justice is the\nspecialization of revenge in the hands of a few members of a community,\na social differentiation by which individuals in general secure their\nrevenges at great economy by proxy. Further, the revengeful emotion is a\nsmouldering hate which vents itself only some time after the immediate\noccasion. This is not the flush of anger which prompts to vigorous\noffensive action upon the injurer at the very moment of harm perceived,\nand it does not appear as stimulant to immediate self-conservative\nactivities, but is simply the spirit of getting even for relatively long\npast injury.\n\nWhat, now, is the function of revenge as a life factor? It surely does\nnot mend my injury that I do another harm solely because he has some\ntime harmed me, and the whole impulse might seem a pure waste of energy.\nBut under natural selection revenge must arise in serviceability of some\nsort; and it is obvious that while revenge is of no use in mending the\npast, it yet has a large value with reference to future possible injury.\nYet revenge is undeniably without conscious meaning for present or\nfuture; it is merely the spirit and determination to get even, and so\nits deterrent function is unconsciously attained. A dwelling in thought\non the past _per se_, a feeling about it and acting on it, while it\ncannot help life directly, has a large value in its ultimate effect upon\nenemies. He who never forgets injury, and for whom by-gones are never\nby-gones, who never fails to return injury for injury, is feared and is\nless likely to be injured. Junker, the African traveller, remarks of the\npygmies, \u201cThey are much feared for their revengeful spirit.\u201d Thus, other\nthings being equal, the most revengeful are the most successful in the\nstruggle for self-conservation and self-furtherance. Though by itself\nconsidered irrational and foolish to inflict return injuries upon an\ninjurer long after the immediate occasion, yet its deterrent effect is\nvery great with reference to other assailants. Thus, pure retrospection\nmay have unconsciously prospective value, or sometimes revenge may be\nreally retrospective-prospective, as when one says, \u201cI will fix him so\nhe will not do that again.\u201d Here function is consciously known, but in\ninstinctive revenge there is no such foresight, and, in general, utility\nis no consideration with the revenger, whose mind is bent rather on\ndoing great harm for its own sake to his enemy rather than benefiting\nhimself. It is always the conscious or unconscious significance for the\nfuture that justifies revenge in the natural course of events; while it\nis no remedy for my hurt, if some one has put out my eye, to put out his\nin return, yet this revenge act, and so the feeling which prompts it, is\nof highest prospective value with reference to future possible enemies.\nEvery one will know that I cannot be harmed with impunity. Despoil or\ninjure the revengeful in any way and you inevitably suffer for it sooner\nor later, and so revenge acts as a protective psychical variation of\nhigh value. On the whole the revengeful is less likely than others to be\nmolested and injured, and thus has a manifest advantage in the struggle\nfor existence. Revenge has, then, also rightfully its own subjective\nsanction, a pleasure reaction, for revenge is, indeed, \u201csweet.\u201d\n\nRevenge is apparently found in a considerable range in the animal\nkingdom, and seems universal in the _genus homo_. However, we cannot\ninfallibly conclude from certain actions that revengeful emotion is\npresent, and especially is this so in the case of animals. Thus, in the\nwell-known instance of the elephant, who, observing a man passing by who\nhad greatly annoyed him years before, suddenly drenched him with dirty\nwater, we are not necessarily to suppose that this elephant was prompted\nby the emotion of revenge; although this may have been the case, we are\nnot perfectly sure how far the elephant did the act merely as recompense\nfor what the man had done, or how far the sight of the injurer, and so\none likely to injure, roused to simple anger and defence against the\nthreatening harmful. Many acts which seem like revenge are quite likely\nto be common defence or offence, are done with reference to what the\nobject is and will be as injurious, based upon knowledge of the past,\nand not as merely retrospective retributive acts. Memory for injuries\nreceived is strong in many animals; that which has harmed is often\nrecognised after many years as the harmful, and appropriate simple\nemotion, not revenge, is manifested. Rage, rather than revenge, is the\nusual emotion among lower animals in special instances where revenge\nmight seem called for; and thus it is more likely that the elephant\nshould rage and hate rather than have pure revenge as in the case\nconsidered.\n\nHowever, somewhere rather late in sub-human psychism revengeful emotion\ncertainly arose as an advantageous variation, and it grew in strength\nand prominence for many ages of psychic progress. At length it\nculminated, and began its decline with the marked increase of\nco-operative sociality, with which it must greatly interfere. Reprisal\nand counter-reprisal, vendetta, feud, is opposed to that social union\nwhich is strength; and so we see that tribes and nations in which the\nspirit of personal revenge has been a dominant trait have been left\nbehind in the march of progress. Revengefulness, at least in the form of\nretributive personal violence for injuries done, is, in a highly\ncivilized community, entirely superseded by the machinery of law.\nInstead of slaying a brother\u2019s murderer I call upon the law to execute\njustice and retribution, and I bring certain designated ones among my\nfellows to secure my revenge. Where a man takes the law in his own\nhands, and kills or injures the violator of his home or the slayer of\nhis nearest kin, he recedes to the lower unsocial plane from which\ncivilization has arisen. Thus revengefulness, in certain forms at least,\nhas become in the highest human communities a disadvantageous variation,\nand is gradually being eliminated. This negative elimination of revenge\nis also greatly hastened by the progress of certain ethical and\nChristian conceptions by which a new and opposite law of conduct is\nenforced, namely, the returning good for evil.\n\nOne of the most interesting and most retrospective of emotions is\nsorrow. Sorrow, grief and regret are wholly regardful of the past, are\npains at the past. They are purely subjective or \u201cmental\u201d pains at the\npast, and in no wise pains from the past; they are not pains recurrent\nfrom past pains, but purely a painful emotion at the representation of\npast pain. Thus, a man says, \u201cI did it to my own harm and hurt, and I\nhave always been sorry I did it.\u201d Here the sorrow-pain is evidently\nquite distinct from the direct pain of the injury; pain for the harm\ndone is one thing, and pain from the harm done is another. I hurt\nmyself, and I not only have this pain, but, being sorry that I did it, I\nhave this new emotional pain added. Sorrow as painful emotion for the\npast is thus plainly unique and peculiar. To feel sorry over what has\nhappened is a mode of feeling altogether different from feeling proud of\nit, angry at it, etc., and we may reasonably regard sorrow as a distinct\n_genus_ of retrospective emotion. What, now, is the nature and function\nof this special emotion reaction?\n\nWe have to consider here only that simple primitive sorrow which is a\npainful emotion at regarding personal loss or failure. Such simple\nsorrow we see in the child who cries over spilled milk, in the man who\nexpresses deep regret at the careless misstep by which he broke his leg.\nIn this emotional reaction at the injurious the harmful is neither\nescaped nor repelled, as through fear and anger; the feeling disturbance\nis comparatively passive and purely reflective, and is not a spur to\nsome immediate advantageous defensive or offensive activity. In sorrow\nwe are pained emotionally at the trouble which has come upon us through\nour own agency or otherwise, but we do not struggle from it or against\nit, but there is purely helpless retrospection. Harm and loss which\nmight provoke in one nature to fear or anger, in another lead only to\ninactive sorrow.\n\nThe cognition form in sorrow means always sense of _personal_ loss. I\nmay fear a thing, or I may be angry at a thing, but I can be sorry only\nfor a person. I do not feel sorry for a broken chair, though I may feel\nsorry for having broken it. This view of one\u2019s own personal agency in\ncausing harm to one\u2019s self and harm to others is very prominent in a\nlarge range of sorrow. In viewing any action which determined some evil,\nI say, \u201cI am sorry I did it.\u201d This is, however, a later mode of the\nemotion, which at the first cannot take account of any agency, but is\nsimply an acute feeling of distress at the injury received. Thus the one\nwho grieves over the spilled milk regards, not his own agency, but only\nhis loss; he is sorry, not that he spilled the milk, but that his milk\nwas spilled. Yet the sense of personal agency certainly forms a great\npart in much sorrow, and tends to intensify it. I may grieve over any\nharm that has come upon me, but my grief is intensified as I remember my\nown agency in bringing it about. I may feel sorry over the loss of my\ngoods by fire, but if I lose them by my own careless act, my sorrow is\nredoubled. Strictly speaking, perhaps, the sorrows are distinct, I feel\nsorry for having done it and I am sorry at it done; yet they may be said\nto constitute a single psychic state. Sense of our own agency, however,\nin having produced harm to self is as likely to produce anger at self or\neven fear of self. Hence our intensest and purest sorrows are apt to be\nthose occasioned by considering injuries occasioned by elemental forces.\nThat harm which we did not help because we could not, the inevitable\ninjury, this excites a keen regret and deep mourning.\n\nThe pain in sorrow is as peculiar, searching, unanalyzable and\nundescribable as other simple emotion pains, and only conceivable\nthrough realization. This sinking, helpless pain over what has happened\nis clearly distinct from the sensation order of pains, and is in no wise\na reflection from them. The pain I have at remembrance of some great\nloss which has befallen me is certainly very distinct from that which\ncame from the loss itself.\n\nWhat part now does sorrow play as a psychic life-function, and how\nexplain it on the general principle of natural selection? At first\nsight, sorrow or grief over the past seems utterly valueless, seems to\nbe mental energy thrown away. The past is irretrievable, of what use\nthen is any grief? Is not all regret vain? To deplore its loss does not\ntend to restore a lost arm, and it is of no use crying over spilled\nmilk. Indeed, he who bewails spilled milk has not only the actual loss\nbut the ideal pain about the loss. He who grieves suffers doubly. But\nwhile it is true that sorrow for what has happened cannot alter the\noccurrence, yet it has a permanent salutary effect on the one who\nsorrows to give more caution for the future. The child will carry the\npitcher of milk the more carefully next time by the more he has grieved\nover the past occurrence. By increasing sensitiveness and capacity for\nsorrow experience is strengthened, deepened, and completely adjusted to\nenvironment. Shallow and volatile natures, who take all loss and harm\neasily, and even gaily, have little strength, and attain no great and\npermanent growth. But with most, when the object of strong desire is\nsuddenly lost, not only will there be a disappearance of the positive\nfeeling about it, but an actual _minus_ or negative state will be\ngenerated, a reaction mode we term grief. By this grief the chief\nlessons of all higher experience are made possible. Grief is not a\npathological phenomenon in mind, but in its place thoroughly normal and\nuseful. Indeed, if under certain circumstances grief did not appear,\nmind would be proved very crude, obtuse, or diseased. He who never feels\nsad about what has happened, is not of a progressive or highly advanced\ntype. If one does not feel sorry for his past errors and hurtful\nactions, he plainly has so much the less motive force to higher action\nfor the future. If sorrow had never entered the world of mind, if the\nwhole corrective for injurious actions or want of action lay wholly in\nthe immediate pain resulting or in the direct simple emotions like fear\nand anger, a most potent factor in psychic progress would be lacking.\nThe possibility of going wrong, _i.e._, literally aside, and\ncontrariwise to one\u2019s own interests, is implied in the struggle for\nexistence. The next best thing to the impossible _status_ of being\nunable to do wrong, is to have the capacity of feeling for the wrong,\nthat is, of experiencing grief. Sorrow is thus a corrective of the\nhighest importance in the history of experience. The slips, willed and\nunwilled, from the narrow path of upward evolution are of necessity\nmany; but a man is, on the whole, best doing the largest part in the\nevolution scheme in which he finds himself, who both knows the wrong as\nsuch, and is sorry for it, whether in the primitive selfish mode, or\nbetter still, on the higher ethical and religious grounds. The greatest\nand most efficient minds are those who have felt most keenly for their\nerrors, faults, and sins.\n\nAs to the origin of grief, we may say with confidence that it is\ntolerably late, and certainly subsequent to anger and hate and like\nreactions. Under certain circumstances sorrow must be accounted a more\nfavourable reaction than these. Rage is certainly impotent and useless\non many occasions of recalled injury, and rage is besides a very intense\nemotion and expensive of energy. The general law in the development of\nemotion is toward milder, more economical, and more permanent forms, and\nthen it is that sorrow must at some time have originated under the\ndemands of life, and been preserved and developed under natural\nselection. Sorrow most probably originated as supplanting rage at the\nview or remembrance of injury done. In young children we often see rage\nmingled with the first manifestation of grief, and but slowly is the\nrage eliminated and pure grief attained. Sorrow exercises its function\nwhere rage is useless. The child cries over spilled milk partly from\nrage, partly from grief, but such mishaps will tend more and more to be\nattended by grief only, as the better and more economical reaction.\nFurther, in a certain range of cases, sorrow in its manifestations\nserves to appease revenger, and sincere regret, unmistakably expressed,\noften saves the wrong-doer an equivalent harm. This form of sorrow\nfunction is distinctly cultivated in the education of children where\nthey are taught to feel sorry for faults if they would be forgiven and\nescape punishment.\n\nGrief in its origin and its earlier occurrence is not the spontaneous\nand almost irresistible impulse of our adult human experience, but, like\nall emotion and all progressive psychism, is by effort of will. That is,\nwe must suppose that grief has its origin in some such _nisus_ as a\nchild exhibits when he is taught to be sorry for something he has done.\nHence it is only gradually and with the lapse of many generations after\nits origin that sorrow becomes hereditary and spontaneous. At first\nsorrow was a distinct attainment, rarely and but occasionally reached by\nany individual, and it is comparatively late in psychic history that it\nbecomes a permanent and innate power. Sorrow also very gradually widens\nits sphere. At first purely selfish, a retrospective reaction at one\u2019s\nown hurt, it becomes at length, through sociality and its concurrent\nadvantages, altruistic; sorrow is felt for others and the springs of\nsympathy and pity are developed. That this altruism is very late\ndevelopment is obvious, in that it has still to be taught even among the\nmost advanced of the human race to their children. The child is taught\nto feel sorry for the cat he has hurt, for the blind man, for the\ncripple. And we must conclude that at one time in psychic history\negoistic sorrow was likewise at the stage of development at which we now\nsee altruistic, and we may suppose that in the far future the altruistic\nmay come to the present _status_ of the egoistic sorrow. However, for\nboth there is an indefinite field for expansion, for refinement of\nsensibility, and for readiness and appropriateness of manifestation.\nSorrow also will develop more and more on ethical and religious grounds.\nRemorse arises and develops; and also the \u201cgodly sorrow for sin.\u201d We\nlearn to feel, not merely sorry over the past as affecting our\ndisadvantage, but to feel sorry conscientiously as our deeds or those of\nothers conflict with the law of right or with the law of God. Those who\nhave no God-consciousness, and so no feeling about their action in the\nsight of God, no sense of sinfulness, have yet often acute moral sense\nand feelings. However, the origin and function of the moral and\nreligious sense in the light of natural selection is a wide subject\nwhich can only be alluded to here; suffice it to say that sorrow is\nthereby lifted to a peculiar and new plane of self-contained\nspirituality. That is, the bearing of it is often without relation to\nphysical life-function, and even adverse thereto, and throughout has its\nvalue and sanction in itself alone.\n\nOne of the deepest and most significant of late forms of sorrow is that\nfor the dead, and its importance is obvious from the fact that a word is\nespecially coined to denote its expression, namely, mourning. Nothing\ncan be more useless than mourning for the dead as far as the individual\nobject is concerned; the most poignant sorrow cannot in anywise tend to\nreanimate the corpse. However, it plainly serves as an index to the\nvalue put upon life, and so in general has a most powerful effect on\nconservation and upbuilding of life. Other things being equal,\nsensitiveness to this form of sorrow measures accurately possibly\nself-conservative effort or effort for others\u2019 conservation, which in a\nstate of sociality, is equivalent in value to one\u2019s self. The lives for\nwhich there is the most mourning and real sorrow when death comes are\nthe most valuable to the community, and for the conserving of which the\nutmost combined effort would be extended. Where life has little value\nattached to it, sorrow is slight and mourning short. As compared with\nthe savage state, loss and injury to life is infinitely more respected\nin the great centres of modern civilization\u2014the _nuclei_ of progress. It\nis because we feel strongly for the safety of friends and relatives that\nwe employ the best devices to insure their protection from injury and\ndeath. One who has sorrowed most deeply over the death of a friend\ncaused by his own careless handling of a gun, will for the future be\nmuch more careful for himself and others. To be sure we sorrow deeply\nbecause we place a high estimate upon the life rather than place high\nestimate because we sorrow greatly; but if there were no sorrow\nreaction, there would be no emotion basis for the future caution and\ncare, and it affects our general estimate of life. Thus there is ever a\ncumulative emotional development.\n\nPerhaps the latest developed form of sorrow is the feeling of sadness\nwhich comes over one in reflecting upon pain as a universal fact of\nexistence. The pessimistic mood, with its converse, the optimistic, as\nbased on philosophic generalization, is certainly extremely late. Pain\nat pain in general, pleasure at pleasure as a purely general fact, are\nequally remote from primitive modes, and mark culminating phases. While,\nperhaps, there is a certain justification and value in being saddened by\nthe spectacle of universal pain, yet a gravity rather than a despondency\nis its proper measure. Pain, punitive and premonitory, plays, as we have\nalready noted more than once in our discussions, a most beneficent and\nessential part in the struggle for existence and in all the higher\nstruggle. It is a necessary and salutary phenomenon, involved in the\nvery nature of evolution by struggle; hence he who impugns pain and is\noffended at it, really impugns the psychic nature of things and desires\nwith Schopenhauer the annihilation of will. As a matter of fact the\nextreme pessimistic spirit is more destructive to progress than even the\nmost buoyant optimism, in that it nips all earnest and forceful activity\nin the bud. A foolishly happy-go-lucky activity is better than a\nparalysis of effort through conviction of its inherent painfulness and\nultimate inutility. The scientific evidence, so far as we can now read\nit, points decisively to the belief that pain-will activity, an intense\nstruggle, is the earliest mind, and the condition of its birth has been\nthe law of its development, and for aught that we can see, ever will be.\nInto this we are born, and it is as foolish to run counter to it as to\nthe law of gravitation. A philosophy which runs counter to reality must\neither build a new reality or subside; but it is most certainly to be\ndoubted whether the philosophic spirit ever has or ever will determine a\ngeneral innovation in psychic evolution. But we cannot do more than\nmerely advert to these large questions here.\n\nWith reference to the development of sorrow it is an obvious remark that\nmuch which causes grief in the earlier stages of mental growth ceases to\nhave that effect with maturer experience. Thus the man may not notice,\nor may laugh at, or may feel irritation at occasions which in his early\nlife would have wakened grief. On the contrary, much that seems grievous\nto the old is not so regarded by the young. In general, grief tends to\nbecome less frequent and paroxysmal, but more profound and lasting with\nthe growth of mind.\n\nAs to the kinds of retrospective emotion the largest division is, of\ncourse, into the painful and pleasurable. We have touched only on some\nof the painful, but each painful emotion has its analogous pleasurable\nemotion. We have used the terms sorrow and grief as synonyms. If we\nshould make a distinction, it would be to put sadness or sorrow in\nantithesis to happiness, and grief to joy; that is, sorrow proceeds from\noutward circumstances, grief from subjective conditions. However,\npopular usage is not firm on this point. Regret is a mild sorrow.\nRemorse is the ethical side of sorrow. Resignation is a very late phase\nof emotion related to sorrow. A person says, My child was crushed in the\naccident, yet I do not grieve, but am quite resigned. Here certainly is\na new mode of feeling about past harm, and it is a mode as far above\nsorrow proper as sorrow is above anger in the evolutionary scale. We do\nnot lament or weep over the past, but there is self-conscious,\nself-constrained sinking of the will, and a composure which is not\napathy, but a gentle emotion wave. Nor is there a callousness; one is\nnot hardened, but softened, and made the more sensitive. The emotion of\nresignation is thus cultivated and to be cultivated, and is yet in the\nvolition stage which marks the early form of all emotions. Even in the\nhighest human types resignation does not come, it must be brought; the\ninstinctive impulse upon contemplating past personal evil is toward\nsorrow or anger and revenge, which must be checked, and resignation\ndirectly willed and assumed as the proper emotion. Resignation, then, as\na growing point in psychic evolution, a distinct attainment as frame of\nmind, is generally and rightly accounted a virtue. At present, then, it\nseems the culmination of retrospective emotion with regard to past\npersonal injuries, and it exercises and will more and more exercise a\nmost important function in human psychic development.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER XIII\n _DESIRE_\n\n\nThe lowest organisms come in contact with things, have objective\nrelations of contact, but it is quite unlikely that the earliest psychic\nlife feels contacts, really touches things. From the objective commerce\nwith things pleasures and pains are realized, but object is unsensed and\nunknown. The simplest marine forms are incessantly feeding at hazard at\nthe prompting of a subjective lack-pain. That the lowest life is born\ninto a nutritive medium and that at birth many later organisms are\nincased or in direct connection with nutritive material, shows that at\nthe very beginning psychic life is not needed as discriminatory, but as\nsimple subjective pain and pleasure moving to undirected activities.\nHowever, such perfect environment being rare and temporary, in its blind\nand senseless activity the organism is often trying to assimilate the\nunassimilable, or the harmful, and is often appropriating when there is\nno substance present. It would obviously be of great advantage if it\ncould touch its food, have sensation as guide to activity. Thus\nrealization of a very limited world of things arises in touch achieved\nduring the feeding act. That which satisfies and gives pleasure is by\ntouch discriminated from that which does not give these results.\nDiscrimination of soft and hard is probably the earliest touch\nimpression. The soft thing is manipulated in the feeding act as edible.\nBut a great step is made when psychical effect of the edible is not only\ncomprehended through touch in direct connection with the assimilatory\nact, but antecedently thereto. The animal establishes a connection\nbetween the feeling the soft thing and pleasure experience in its\nstruggling activities. It touches more and more readily what it is\nassimilating, and thence rejects more easily and promptly the injurious.\nIn appropriative effort with pleasure experience it feels the thing,\ncognizes in most general way its physical quality. As sensitiveness\nincreases through struggle and natural selection the assimilatory\nattempt will be more and more quickly met by the touch sensation, until\ntouch ultimately becomes precedent and actually directive to food.\nRecognition, in a far more emphatic way than before, becomes added to\ncognition; the thing is not merely known in its bare objectivity, but is\nrecognised, identified, and has a meaning. Touch must give, not only the\nthing, but the thing as potent for some quality not now being\nappreciated, though formerly appreciated _pari passu_ with the touching.\nThe interpretative act comes through the association gradually\nestablished in past experiences, so that the edible is no longer\nfortuitously hit upon, but touch precedes active effort at\nappropriation, and suggests by itself edibility or non-edibility. Thus\nis action greatly economized and made certain. Definite feelers,\nextending from the body, and sometimes quite long, are evolved, and the\nfirst period in the history of knowledge, the age of touch, is\ninaugurated.\n\nIt is here when touch involves representation and becomes a sign of\nsomething, _e.g._, edible thing, that desire and other simple emotions\noriginate. A possibility of pleasurable experience being recognised, it\nis necessary, if useful action would follow, that emotion springs up as\nincentive, and this emotion we term desire. Hunger drives, but desire\ndraws, and as reinforcement and guide to the blind hunger impulse desire\nhas a large function. A mere indifferent recognition, the pleasurable\nforeseen but not felt about, would be entirely unserviceable. If we do\nnot desire the pleasurable and beneficial, we do not act for it. And\noriginally, at least, perception of the good always stirred desire; and\ndesire was awakened in no other way; for in the course of natural\nevolution, knowledge and emotions have alike to be interpreted in their\norigin and meaning with reference to advantageous action, this alone\nbeing the arena of natural selection. A meaningless knowledge and a\nself-contained emotion or feeling, are entirely contrary to the trend of\nevolution on the basis we have assumed. Moreover, through ages of\nactivity the tendency to desire the good and the good only becomes so\ningrained that I think it hardly fails, even in the highest and latest\nminds. The most hyper-conscious man, once convinced that something will\ngive him pleasant experience, _so long_ and _so far_ as this feeling is\n_dominant_ in mind will have incipient desire.\n\nOn this long disputed question of the relation of desire to the good or\npleasurable, evolutionary psychology, which views mind as serving life,\nas interpreting things with reference to their serviceability and so\nimplied pleasurability, always bases desire in its origin and growth on\npleasure. But is this general point of view borne out by the facts of\nmind? A typical example of common desire is this: At a fair I observe a\ntoboggan chute and say to my companion, \u201cThat must be sport, how would\nyou like to try it?\u201d The appeal to \u201csport\u201d awakens desire in my comrade\nand he says, \u201cLet\u2019s try it.\u201d We test its pleasurability, and, enjoying\nit, desire to go again. It is evident that desire arises not on the mere\nimage of actualization as such, the idea of sliding, but on conception\nof its pleasure quality. Whenever by our own experience or by the\ntestimony of others we are assured of a good thing to be experienced we\nstraightway desire it.\n\nThis, it may be said, is all very true for a certain class of desires,\nbut the principle does not apply in the higher desires like the desire\nfor knowledge. But knowledge originates only as serviceable, and\nprimarily only serviceable knowledges are desired. We desire knowledge\nonly so far as it is worth having, and it may be that I esteem all\nknowledge as worth something and so desirable. However, some knowledges\nare worth nothing and are never desired. Who wants to know the exact\nmeasurements of the pebbles on the road, or how many hairs are on the\nmane of his neighbour\u2019s pony, or the names of all the inhabitants of\nPekin? But if one thinks it would be any satisfaction to know such\nfacts, he may desire to know them. The insatiable curiosity of children\nwhich seeks to know all such irrelevant facts hardly comes under the\ncategory of desire, but is rather instinctive hereditary impulse. It has\nno clear idea of a thing to be known and a desire to know it, but is\nonly a spontaneous outburst of knowing activity which is inbred and\ncomes from ancestral integration. There is a sensing and perceiving\nactivity which is very intense at the questioning age, but which hardly\nimplies the desire to know. The incessant \u201cWhat\u2019s this?\u201d \u201cWhat\u2019s that?\u201d\nis merely outcome of an instinctive impulsion to interpret environment;\nit is not significant of full-formed desire, there is no idea of thing\nto be known, of an actualization to be accomplished.\n\nIf a man desires knowledge, not for his own sake, but for its own sake,\ndesire as such really ceases, it merges into love and devotion, which\nare disinterested and clearly distinct as mental modes from desire.\nDesire is not a sentiment; and it does not properly include all impulse\nto actualization. For instance, the feeling for actualization merely as\nsuch, for achievement of ideal _per se_, is beyond the biologic stage of\nconsciousness wherein desire has its chief function. The attainment of\nend merely for the sake of the end must be distinguished from\nactualizing an image for the pleasure of actualization, which thus has\ndesire element. We know that the image of realization may act as end by\ncompulsion, as in feeling of duty, which is thus marked off from desire\nas impulsion. Thus desire is but one mode of teleological emotion. But\ndesire is emotion at unrealized good and not at unrealization in\ngeneral.\n\nSpinoza\u2019s _dictum_, followed by Volkmann, that we do not desire a thing\nbecause we deem it good, but we deem it good because we desire it, is\nnot borne out by the commonest facts. A peddler shows me an apple, but I\ndo not desire it and then deem it good, but I examine it, and if it\nseems good I may desire and buy it, but if bad, I have aversion, and\nreturn it. My desire thus depends altogether upon whether or not I deem\nthe apple good, and not my deeming it good upon my desire. If I see any\none desiring anything I at once judge that he first thought it good or\nhe would not have desired it. All the excitation of desire is by\nrepresentation of the good. The merchant tempts you by exhibiting his\n_goods_, the child with candy offers it to you crying, \u201cgood! good!\u201d the\nmoralist proclaims, \u201cdo this and thou shalt live.\u201d The cause of desire,\nwhich for weal or woe plays such a large part in almost all psychism, is\nalways by imaging the good. The bait and the reward as excitants of\ndesire are most common; a mere suggestion of a representation without\nimplication of its goodliness in realization does not excite desire.\nThus some one, speaking of a totally unknown town, asks, \u201cHow would you\nlike to live in Perry?\u201d and we answer, \u201cIs it a pleasant town?\u201d A mere\nsuggestion of change of abode starts desire only when there is already\ndispleasure with present residence, and so desire for release as a good;\nbut image of actualization considered solely by itself is desireless.\nAnd if to excite desire we offer the good or pleasurable, to extinguish\ndesire we offer the bad and painful. I desire a fair looking apple, but\ncutting it and finding it wormy and rotten, desire flees. I extinguish\nthe desire of a child for eating some noxious substance by assuring it\nof the bad taste and nauseating effect. Both positively and negatively\nthen, common sense finds the basis, not of the good in desire, but of\ndesire in the good. The facts in both exciting and extinguishing desire\npoint to this conclusion.\n\nSpinoza (_Ethics_ iii., Prop ix.) defines desire as \u201cappetite with\nconsciousness thereof.\u201d But to be aware of being hungry is but the first\nstep toward desire. In the midst of my daily occupations I become aware\nof pain, then of uneasiness, then of hunger, whereupon I may desire\nfood, which desire includes as distinct elements: (1) idea of eating as\nact or movement; (2) idea of the thing eaten as _food_, a something\nsatisfying; affording relief, and so a good; (3) thereupon the emotion\nwave of longing, the essential point in desire. This is, of course,\nfollowed by volition, I act to realize, I go to a restaurant. When\nH\u00f6ffding (_Psychology_, p. 323) says that the impulse in hunger \u201chas\nreference primarily to the food, not to the feeling of pleasure in its\nconsumption,\u201d he forgets that \u201cfood\u201d is a something satisfying, and only\nthus is desired. Object is not desired as object, but for its value in\nexperience.\n\nWe must also touch upon a certain class of experiences which have been\nadduced as showing a desire not based upon the idea of the pleasure.\nTake the example of a man in _ennui_ who takes to playing tennis as a\nrelief, but with no desire of being victorious. Engaging in the game he\nfinds that \u201cthis desire which does not exist at first is stimulated to\nconsiderable intensity by the competition itself; and in proportion as\nit is thus stimulated both the mere contest becomes more pleasurable,\nand the victory, which was originally indifferent, comes to afford a\nkeen enjoyment.\u201d (Sidgwick, _Methods of Ethics_, p. 46.) But does the\ndesire really come from some idea of pleasure? The player volleys a ball\nsuccessfully against his opponent, and thereby receiving a thrill of\npleasure desire awakes to beat. \u201cWouldn\u2019t I like to beat him? I would\nenjoy nothing better.\u201d This desire foresees the pleasure of triumph. If\nhe gets no pleasure from returning the ball successfully he does not\ndesire success; but if unanticipated pleasure comes up in beating his\nopponent, as soon as he recognises this pleasure he desires to continue\nand complete it. This pleasure in succeeding in competitive activity,\nextremely old and integrated from all the struggle of existence, springs\nup spontaneously. There may also be added pleasure from activity and\npleasure from skill which will make the game very interesting, _i.e._,\nfull of desire and other emotions.\n\nProfessor Sidgwick allows that pleasure may be the cause of desire, but\nnot its object. But surely if I cognize pleasure coming from an act, I\nattach this pleasure to it in representation; if I take pleasure from\nreturning a tennis ball and then represent a coming opportunity to\nreturn the ball I also represent its pleasurability. Pleasure or pain\nconnected with acts is connected by association with representation of\nthe acts, the pleasure-pain tone penetrates the representation, and only\nthus does actualization of an image become object of desire. If it is\npossible to conceive an activity indifferent\u2014which may be doubted\u2014we\nshould have no emotion about it. But we have already sufficiently\nemphasized how the perceived experience quality of things determines\ndesire and all emotion.\n\nProfessor Sidgwick\u2019s remark that the pleasurableness of the contest is\n\u201cin proportion\u201d (_Ibid_., p. 46) to the desire, _i.e._, that the\npleasure results from the desire rather than desire from the pleasure,\nalso shows defective analysis. If I desire intensely to beat, and am on\nthe losing side, I am greatly pained, for desire is always in itself\npainful. In any case desire is pleasurable only so far as it is being\nsatisfied, which, of course, means only so far as desire is being\nextinguished. It is not the increasing desire intensity, but the\ndecreasing, that gives pleasure, _i.e._, desire is negatively related to\npleasure. Intense desire may act as excitement-pleasure, but this does\nnot bear on the nature of desire.\n\nAnother objection that has been brought up against pleasure as desire\nbasis is that \u201cpleasures are diminished by repetition, whilst habits are\nstrengthened by it; if the intensity of desire therefore were\nproportioned to the \u2018pleasure value\u2019 of its gratification, the desire\nfor renewed gratification should diminish as this pleasure grows less,\nbut if the present pain of restraint from action determines the\nintensity of desire, this should increase as the action becomes\nhabitual.\u201d (James Ward in _Encyclop\u00e6dia Britannica_, vol. xx., p. 79.)\n\nBut pleasure and so also desire often increases with repetition. One who\ntastes champagne for the first time may receive slight pleasure. The\nnext time he dines out he will, with image of his previous experience,\nhave slight desire for champagne. As experience is repeated his pleasure\nand desire may increase to ecstasy and passion. But habits not obviously\npleasure-yielding, as the morning chore to the country lad, will be\ndesired after intermittance; the country boy homesick in the city longs\nin the morning for the familiar scene and familiar task which was a\nsource of aversion at home. We painfully miss the customary, even the\npainful customary, for thereby the conservative tendency of nature and\norganic activity is broken up. Desire arises for relief from this pain,\nand the habitual is so far regarded as pleasurable. Thus desire is in\nproportion to the \u201crestraint\u201d only so far as the restraint is painful,\nand thus relief appears pleasurable. Thus the desire for the habitual\nhas, like other desire, its basis in prospective pleasure.\n\nThat the analysis of desire as regards representation of pleasure is\nstill an open question certainly marks the psychology of feeling as very\nbackward; that here is a most common and prominent psychosis, whose\nsimplest analysis is not yet agreed upon, shows how far we yet are from\na standard of subjective verification. I have expressed my own opinion\nthat both the evolutionary standpoint and special analysis indicate a\ndistinct emotion at prospective good which is best denominated by the\nterm desire. This is a purely psychological result, and has absolutely\nno reference to ethics. \u201cPleasure\u201d has such an inevitable ethical tinge\nthat a purely scientific denotation would be useful. The \u201cgood\u201d is a\nbetter, but also objectionable term. That then the organism should\nforesee and image the good and should have a feeling about it which\nshould stimulate will to its appropriation and realization is a\npsychosis of utmost value, and one which is in all psychism above the\nlowest an extremely common phenomenon. This does not assert that desire\nin all its lower range is a seeking for pleasure, an extremely late\nconception and endeavour; but it means that as perception is of things\nin their experience values, so representation also, as giving the basis\nof desire; but a conscious hedonism is still afar off.\n\nThe general function which desire subserves in stimulating advantageous\naction is obvious. As anger and fear are primarily useful emotions in\nview of potential pain and harm, so desire in view of potential pleasure\nand benefit.\n\nThe function of desire in stimulating advantageous action is obvious.\nDesire answers to potential pleasure and benefit just as anger does to\npotential pain and harm. It is a correlative and supplement of fear, and\nin general the more one fears a thing the more one desires the opposite.\nWhen sailing I desire fair weather in proportion as I fear a squall.\nDesire is the very spring of life and progress, and when desire is\nextinguished the will to live ceases, and psychic life declines and\ndies. Fulness of desire is fulness of life, and the largest mental life\nis that in which desire, constant, multiplex, and far-reaching, is\nstrong and dominant. Desire seems thus to be a permanent factor, and,\nthough there is a pre-desire period, no post-desire age seems to be\nindicated in psychic history so far.\n\nSomewhat as to the analysis of desire has already been intimated in\ntouching upon its origin and function, but we are now to study its\nelements more in detail. The very young infant certainly experiences\nhunger pains in almost its initial consciousness; but it is only\ngradually that the need felt leads up to presentation and representation\nof the needed thing, and so to desire. Hunger with it, as with all\norganisms, sharpens the wits, and leads to knowing things, interpreting\nthem, and acting definitely toward them. Through touch it first comes to\nappreciate object, and object as food, a representative\u2013inductive act.\nThe earliest meaning attached to object is edibility, and this, indeed,\nindiscriminately to all objects, as we see that infants mouth\neverything. Gradually from this, or by dint of a good deal of unpleasant\nexperience, objects are divided into edible and non-edible, the\nprimitive classification of things.\n\nFrom the consideration of any such simple example as the desire for food\nwe determine that the first element toward and in desire is a lack-pain\ngenerating felt want, and so\u2014and such common use of words is\nsignificant\u2014we want, _i.e._, desire what we are in want of. A feeling of\nneed or lack is fundamental. Now sense of lack is more than pain from\nrestriction or intermission, for it implies a measure of in-ground\nintegrated experience with objects, a constant connecting of object with\npurely subjective experience. For instance, hunger and feeling the need\nof food, the craving for food, are not the same, for it is evident that\nto feel lack of anything with such a central pain as hunger-pain means\nthat this something has often been conjoined with the pain experience.\nHunger is primarily an organic uneasiness and gnawing pain which does\nnot include any sense of object as of a food or reference thereto. Our\nsubjective and objective experience have been so completely integrated,\nand feeling of lack and that for a very definite thing has become so\ningrained in mind with pains, we feel so spontaneously and immediately\nneed of _thing_ in connection with organic pains that it is very\ndifficult for us to realize a state where this connection has not been\nformed or is forming. But it would seem that the first hunger pains of\nthe infant are of this primitive quality, and that need is not felt in\nconnection therewith. It is only after some crude cognitions of bodies\nhave been generated in connection with the feeding act and as guides\nthereto that on occasion of hunger pains there can occur the sense of\nlack of food object, a painful feeling of unrealization, at first very\ndimly representative, and so a craving, an incipient emotion. Desire\nrests then upon capacity to feel the lack of accustomed satisfying thing\nin connection with some form of perception or representation of the\nthing. When a satisfying object is missing, it must be _missed_\npsychically before desire can awake. The reaction when a customarily\nconjoined experience does not occur is a peculiar feeling in mind, a\ndisturbance, uneasiness, a unique sense of loss and lack which is the\nimmediate stimulus of desire. Hunger at first leads blindly to\nactivities tending to satisfy hunger, but the satisfying\nthing\u2014food\u2014therewith becomes gradually known, hence thereafter when\nhunger comes there is struggle both to know and to act thereby. This\nstruggle has impulsation from feelings of lack.\n\nLack pains then prompt to cognitive activities to find the thing lacked\nand desired. The first knowledge is that some things satisfy, and an\nappropriative activity is excited. The lowest organisms under impulse of\nhunger pains reach out after things, feel for them, and as soon as they\nsense the edible, appropriate it. It is quite evident that they exercise\ncognition only as driven to it, and then it is effort even for the\nsimplest knowing. But what the first psychic facts are is hard for us to\ninterpret, because we have progressed so far beyond them. However, we\nmay well believe that the general form of primitive consciousness is\nakin to what we have when dozing or half awake. The realization of\nthings is dim indefinite, and it is only as pains of considerable\nseverity are felt and as the psychism gains in capacity for pain that\nparticular knowledges and particular needs and desires are accomplished.\nAfter having repeatedly sensed something\u2014as a soft vegetable form\u2014in\nconnection with bodily pain as hunger and with the feeding activity as\nallaying hunger, a renewal of the pain from organic conditions will\ngive, not merely purely subjective pains, but also, as the\npre-associated cognition of thing and the allaying of hunger is not\nexperienced, there arises as reaction a vague sense of lack which may\nlead to equally vague desire. A vague uneasiness and restlessness which\nknows object and misses object only in the most general way is the\nlowest basis. A study of some case of waking from a doze by reason of\nhunger would give the original formation of desire as involving lack\nsense. Here a purely subjective pain gradually intensifies till it\nwakens a very general objectifying, and we feel need of undefined\nsomething, which soon becomes specialized, when fully wakened, to need\nof something to eat, and finally as need of some particular usual food,\nas bread, meat, or milk, which is then desired.\n\nPain from restriction or intermission of some organic activity, as the\ndigestive and assimilatory, may then lead to sense of lack and desire\nfor object which is unrealized. However, craving-desire as implying\nsense of loss, of something pleasurable missed, is not organic, but is\nmere reflex of organization. It is not progressive, but conservative; it\ndoes not initiate, it merely keeps the organism to its accustomed level.\nThis is the limited range of appetite. Craving rests on past evolution.\nHowever, we have to explain the origin of those activities which, when\nintermitted, produce such distressful results. We must first acquire the\nliking before we miss what we like, and tastes uniformly originate\nthrough effort, and all pleasurable activity is built up by painful\nvolition as urged by direct pains or by desires. Desire then is more\nthan craving. Craving as based on organic lack is satiable, desire is\ninsatiable. We desire what we have never missed and modes of experience\nwe have never attained. We, who have never had a gold watch, desire one,\nand having received one, we lose it, miss it, and so desire is\nreinforced. All the progressive activity of the human world originates\nin desire, as ambition, or as desire of truth, virtue, etc. Here we do\nnot miss what we are accustomed to, but we are forming habits, which\nwill be the basis for cravings with descendants. For instance, one who\nnow does not miss beauty of art, but is ambitiously striving to\nappreciate art, may come finally\u2014or at least his descendants\u2014to miss\nart, and so to crave it. But for the time he has no art craving, only an\nart desire. Of course all desire in the craving form, or in the higher\ndesire form, involves a missing actualization. All desire is\nextinguished in realization. But this obviously does not destroy the\ndistinction of desire as based on craving, a spontaneous resultant from\nintegration, an intermittence of habit, and desire as itself integrating\nhabit-forming emotion.\n\nHowever, with the lowest psychisms, we may perhaps suppose it unlikely\nthat representation does ever become definite enough for desire, except\nwhen in direct sensing of a thing, as, for example, in a touch\nperception. The psychism is impelled to touch activity by its subjective\npains and simple, undifferentiated lack pains. It does not desire a food\nthrough the representation of it brought up by hunger, for such\nrepresentation of things in their potentiality is probably not\noriginally stimulated directly by subjective feelings, though with man,\nfor instance, we know that hunger and other simple feelings will provoke\nrepresentations of foods, which foods will be desired; and particularly\nin famine the most lively representations of feasts occur, and thus\nthere is a strengthening and defining of desire. Thus in famine there\ncomes a greater and greater urgency to action as its necessity becomes\ngreater. The vivid representations of foods become through desire\u2014though\nthere may be no sense connection with food\u2014a mighty force for\nself-preservative action.\n\nYet primitively desire probably awoke only after some sensing was\naccomplished, not the mere subjective pain, but the touch perception\nawoke the representation, for it would seem the original _status_ that\nrepresentation occurs at first only with correlated presentation. Thus\nit is that the simplest psychisms are driven by their pains to achieve a\ntouch or some sensing of a thing before they interpret it as food, and\nso desire it; that is, things must have a food meaning attached to them\nthrough actual sense appreciation of them as such, before they can be\ndirectly instanced in pure representation as foods. Hunger leads us\nimmediately to think of food, but this ability to directly represent\nfood is based upon having thoroughly learned certain things as food by\nrepeated direct experiences. A savage who has never seen or known of\nbonbons is presented with a box of them, and he may receive them with\nindifference, but a bonbon is placed in his mouth, whereupon he says,\n\u201cit tasted so good, I want another.\u201d Such is the genesis of desire when\npleasure quality is attached to thing, is learned by experience. The\nvisual and tactual experience is actively conjoined with pleasure\nexperience, so that seeing another bonbon, he represents its\npleasurability and so desires it.\n\nFurther, the relative presentations and feelings must be mentally\ncorrelative, the connection must be more than phenomenal series of\nseveral forms; there must be an active connecting psychic process as\nbasis. You are told to open your mouth and shut your eyes, and a bonbon\nis dropped in; the taste will at once give rise to a revival visual\npresentation, and if a person holds up before your eyes a fine bonbon,\nsaying, \u201clook at this,\u201d there may occur revival taste experiences. But\nthe immediate basis of desire is not here, for if psychic process\nstopped here, there would be no higher elements; these can only be\naccomplished by a definite bringing up and attribution of subjective\nquality to the thing. You represent its possible pleasurableness on the\nbasis of past experience, by the action of the inductive instinct, a\ncomplex process. Here revival is not an active correlating, but is\nself-contained, lying isolated by itself, and unfruitful till its\nrevival character is recognised, and it is actively wrought into\nexperience. That is, integrating act is presupposed in all desire.\n\nThe way in which revival becomes the basis representation is hard to\ntrace, but in many cases it seems to be connected with certain\nphysiological activities. A revival form implies correlated physical\nfunctions, as when the sight of a peach causes the taste pre-experienced\ntherewith to be revived, and the mouth waters, as if in actual\ndeglutition. As the reacting and assimilating process is carried on\nwithout any real thing to be acted upon, there comes a physiological\nreaction, which in turn gives rise to peculiar psychic affections, and\nspecially the uneasy feeling of lack. The unreality and mere revival\ncharacter of the revival experience is ultimately recognised, and\nrepresentation becomes possible, and idea of pleasure as both\nexperienced and experienceable is evolved. Thus an unsubstantial\nrevival, where the thing is sensed in one form only, but thereby\nre-awakening other associated experiences, as in the case of merely\nseeing a peach, leads finally to know the thing as a potency; I taste,\nbut after all I taste nothing; hence I am led to perceive the thing as a\nsign, as unrealized in its pleasure significance, but realizable. How we\nattain sense of reality and unreality we discuss in chapter on\nInduction, but with special reference to desire we add here an\nillustration. When engaged in reading on a hot day, I have feeling of\ndiscomfort, and then spontaneously arises image of a wonted bathing\nplace, I have the image of moving in the clear, cool water, but at once\nrecognising the unreality of the image, I long for realization. I, when\nheated, have so often seen the water, and plunged in it, that the\npresentation of mode of relief has become firmly associated with the\ndiscomfort, so when it organically returns, presentation revives, and\nits unreality known, desire rises. One not accustomed to bathe, but to\ntaking lemonade when heated, will have visions of lemonade and desire\ntherefor. One who is just forming some habit of relief will not have\nspontaneous images, but must call them up. Desire also will be purely\ngeneral, \u201cOh! to get rid of this heat.\u201d Specific desire, as founded upon\na definite image of realization, is primarily the result of active\nassociation of definite object and mode with a given pleasure-pain\nstate. The realizing the image as unreality, as suggesting an\nactualization to be wished for, is learned from rude experience with\npresent sensations and perceptions quite at variance with the image.\nThus, that the vision of water is unreality I know by seeing the room\nbefore me, touching the chair, sense of painful heat unrelieved, etc. An\nimage of actualization barely of itself does not include desire. I may\nconceive that I can image myself moving in water without any emotion\ntherewith connected, but as matter of fact, this never occurs; all our\nimages of actualization carry some desire value. Even bare phantasy, as\nimagining myself living on the moon, is not without a tinge of desire or\naversion, for the origin and growth of imaging has been so bound up with\ndesire, and is for desire as life function that some desire tendency is\nretained even in the purest flights of imagination. It becomes\nincreasingly evident that such a simple and understandable expression\nas, \u201cI want that peach,\u201d implies a great complexity of psychic process\nwhich is hidden from us by the summarizing facility of language. Emotion\nis evidently far too complex for full analysis. Its complexity is such\nthat we may well hesitate to attribute it, as is so often and easily\ndone, to the lowest psychisms. Since desire includes a measure of\nself-consciousness, and also of consciousness of pleasure, it seems\nimprobable at first sight that such elements should exist in certain low\nconsciousnesses where primitive organisms seem impelled by desire.\nHowever, though this _a priori_ view has weight, it must not be allowed\nto be of supreme value. Yet when we fairly interpret a very simple case,\nas when a dog scenting and seeing meat on a shelf, is said to desire it,\nand so to spring for it, we certainly imply a complexity of mental\nactivity, which might by many be thought quite beyond the power of even\na very intelligent dog. We have at least the following factors:\u2014\n\n1. Simple scent or vision of the thing; bare presentation or\nrepresentation of object.\n\n2. Either a definite bringing up, or a mechanical re-occurrence of past\npleasurable associated feelings and sensations, or both.\n\n3. Sense of unreality.\n\n4 Feeling of lack.\n\n5. Pain of lack.\n\n6. Sense of pleasure potentiality of the thing, which implies\u2014\n\n (_a_) Idea of pleasure.\n\n (_b_) Idea of personal experience thereof, _i.e._, some egoistic\nsense.\n\n (_c_) Sense of experience as in time past, as experienced.\n\n (_d_) Sense of time as future as implied in sense of the\nexperienceable.\n\n7. The longing, yearning, peculiar desire quality as feeling mode.\n\n8. Desire pain.\n\nIn the first place then, the object of desire, the _desideratum_, is not\nthe object as such. We do not desire things merely as such, but only as\nfar as they are significant of experience. Presentation does not, at\nleast normally and originally, ever end in itself, but it is always\nconnected, and connects with pleasure-pain experiences. Desire begins by\nbeing vague as to its object; under slight pressures of pain we want\nsomething, but we know not what; we have dim, undefined longing, but the\nindefinite object is always a possibility of experience, a centre of\npleasure-pain potency. At the first stirring of hunger pains, we have a\nvague uneasiness and sense of lack, with a most general idea of object\nand longing toward it, and suffer the pain from hunger. We may be\nphysiologically hungry without feeling hungry, and so may have a desire\nof thing in general to remove pain before the pain is felt and\nrecognised in its particularity as hunger pain. When hunger comes, or,\nprimitively, is achieved, then we want something to eat; and as this\nfeeling intensifies, the craving becomes more and more definite as to\nobject; bread, etc., is wanted, and in famine hunger there is the most\nparticular representation, as of certain dishes formerly eaten with\ngreat relish. Lumholtz, wandering famished on a Christmas in the wilds\nof Australia, thinks of the puddings in his native Norway. The\nevolutionary significance of this increasing definition of object in\ndesire is obvious in that greater definiteness and accuracy of\nself-preservative action is thereby assured.\n\nAs far as the nature of the emotion desire goes, it seems quite\nindifferent whether there is presentation or representation of object. I\ndesire equally, whether I actually see the bonbon on the table or when I\nmerely represent it\u2014see it in my mind\u2019s eye.\n\nPrimarily then, and always, even in the latest evolution, as tendency at\nleast, the desire is for the pleasure in the object, and desire is\nexcited by every representation of the pleasurable. If one says, \u201cI can\nlook upon pleasure without desire,\u201d we may well question whether there\nis really personal pleasure represented. Dancing, card-playing,\nwine-drinking, may be pleasures which do not attract me because I do not\ncare for them; and by such a statement we indicate the practical\nparallelism of pleasure and desire which is forced upon common\nintrospection. If you care for it, it is a pleasure to you; if you do\nnot care for it, it is not a pleasure to you; such is the result of\ncommon observation, and a very just conclusion so far as I can see. To\nexcite desire, we naturally suggest the pleasurable. One person\npersuading another to go to a party says: \u201cI know you would have a good\ntime.\u201d When one answers, \u201cI know that I would have a good time, but I\ndread the trouble of getting ready\u201d; here is a conflict of desires in\nwhich desire of present ease and comfort may overcome desire of future\npleasure. We may, indeed, assert that one cannot honestly say, \u201cI know\nit would be a great pleasure to me, but I have no desire for it.\u201d When\nsuch a phrase is used, it can only mean that the pleasure is interpreted\nas belonging to the generic class of pleasures, yet not a pleasure to\nthe individual in his present conception, or else its contingency,\nimplied by \u201cwould,\u201d is so great that desire is practically _nil_.\n\nAnd if the pleasurable is always the desirable, the desirable also may\nbe said to be only the pleasurable. The martyr in his most eager desire\nfor a painful death, fixes his mind, not upon the pain as pain, but upon\nthe enduring it successfully, and the triumphant pleasure, also the\nsatisfaction of the reward of martyrdom, and the pleasure of suffering\nfor right and the approval of conscience; these and many other factors\ninfluence him.\n\nDesire is _at_ pleasure, not _in_ pleasure, and thus contains pain,\nespecially as implied in the preparative factors, sense of unreality and\nsense of lack. A bonbon may be so cunningly imitated, that placed in the\nmouth it feels like a bonbon, yet not tasting so, the painful sense of\nunreality and loss occurs. There is a painful waking up to the fact of\nnon-realization, much the same in quality as that which we suppose to\nhave happened in the original genesis of desire. The pleasant\nhallucination is broken in upon by actuality not fulfilling the psychic\nco-ordination pre-established under more favourable circumstances; and\nthis occurs in early psychisms on a wider variety of occasions than in\nlater development. That I am not tasting the bonbon I see on the table,\nthis fact _per se_ does not pain me. I take it as a matter of course in\nan order of nature already well learned and completely acquiesced in.\nBut with infantile and lower stages of evolution generally, the lack of\nimmediate correlation seems highly painful. Seeing has directly\ndeveloped in immediate connection with a tasting, and the seeing without\ntasting seems by its very nature as disquieting as the feeling in the\nmouth the artificial bonbon without being able to taste is for later\nexperience. It is through the negations of customary coincident\nimpressions that anticipation and desire become forced by the exigencies\nof life. The early psychism is limited in its adjustments to a very few\nsimple coincidences, but in the struggle of life in complex nature there\ncomes disruption of these primitive co-ordinations, and sequences become\napprehended, and meaning is discerned in things. This disruption\nprimitively occurred most easily when there was direct opposition to the\nusual course of sensations. Just as when mouthing the imitation bonbon,\nwe apprehend most quickly and easily non-realization when it tastes sour\nrather than sweet. By realities continually breaking in upon the common\ncourse of psychic association, the significance of things is gradually\napprehended, and to see a thing is understood not merely as coincident\nwith other sensations and perceptions, touching, tasting, and\npleasure-feeling, but the thing is cognized as centre of pleasure\npotency, and so can become object of desire. Experience loses its\nself-contained simplicity, and is forced in the struggle of experience\nin a complex environment into some definite understanding of things, and\ninto a feeling for them or at them, and not merely a feeling from them.\nAnd so a world of desirables and aversibles is formed.\n\nIf no pain was felt in the experience of unreality and lack, if there\nwas mere passivity, desire would not be generated. This pain of loss\nspurs the mind to achieve desire, and desire enables the organism to\nattain the advantageous. At length a conventionalized world of\ndesirables so formed, and certain significances, become so inground into\nexperience that they seem often to be instinctively and immediately\nrecognised by the individual, anterior to any personal learning by\nexperience, as in cases of instinctive fear of, and desire for, certain\nobjects.\n\nWhile desire is attained at the incitement of pain, it is in itself a\npainful mental act. The emotional going out toward the _desideratum_ is\nin itself a painful mode of consciousness. The feeling I have for the\nbonbon which I see and desire is, so far as desire, painful, yet\nnegatively and comparatively, it may be pleasurable in that this\npsychosis may supplant one more painful still. It may be said that\ndesire is painful, and also lack of desire, or _ennui_. But mere\ndesirelessness is not _ennui_. _Ennui_ is a feeling of lack and loss,\nand so a feeling of desire, but a peculiar kind of desire. It is desire\nfor activity, when by a morbid _status_ there is no desire moving to\nactivity. Lack of desire and interest in things may be painfully\nrevealed to some active natures, but to the great majority of psychisms\nit is a pleasure state. As far as we can judge, the undesire of the cow\nleisurely chewing her cud in a warm corner of the barn yard is supreme\nfelicity. A state of desirelessness, complete yet blissful, occasionally\nvisits even the consciousness of the nineteenth century busy-body. But\nthe normality of desire for human adult consciousness in general is\napparent to all. One who loses all interest or desire loses hold on\nlife. Thus desire is life, and even when it is sought to extinguish it\neither as dictated by a philosophical maxim or by religious and moral\nscruples, on account of the innate selfishness of desire\u2014Madame Guyon,\nfor instance\u2014yet desire is sure to intrude, and must as a desire to\ndestroy desire. So whether we _would_ fly, or _would_ reach desire, we\nthereby desire. We may uproot or cultivate certain kinds of desire which\nthereby become objects of aversion or desire, but the effort to\nextinguish desire as general fact of psychic life involves either a\npsychological indefinite _regressus_ which is never desireless, or else\nit means the extinction of consciousness itself in any grade above the\nlowest.\n\nA further element which appears in all desire is some measure of\nself-consciousness. The representation of the experienceable implies\nsome representation of experiences. In constituting the world as the sum\ntotal of the experienceable, we imply an ego-consciousness, and that\nobjectifying as psychic act is correlated with subjectifying. Desire,\nlike all other emotion, implies a subjective reference. We see clearly\nthat the psychic act expressed by \u201cthis is the food,\u201d and as such the\nprecursor of and ingredient of desire, means an identification with past\npersonal experience. A similar act is performed, no doubt, by animals\nvery commonly, though not expressible in speech, yet in measure\nexpressible, as in the cluckings of a hen to attract the brood to some\nseeds. In various ways the _desideratum_ is suggested to the mind, and\nin view of it, both in the identifying as having experiences, and the\nlonging to experience, some consciousness of personality is implied.\nThis in early forms of psychosis is, no doubt, meagre and indefinite\nenough, but not more so than its correlate sense of object. When a\nstrange object is presented, as when a famished traveller finds a new\nhouse, identifying effort is instinctive; he at once seeks to understand\nit, and gropes through his past experience to determine what has been\nits life significance for him or other persons, and so what will be.\nWhat is thus done in the full light of reflective consciousness by man,\nis done in a summary and imperfect manner, generally by psychisms, as\npreparative to making the object a _desideratum_ or _anti-desideratum_.\nThe assimilating and integrating, the knowing, never exists without some\nappreciation of subject, because integration is not only of\nsomething\u2014objectifying act\u2014but also to something\u2014subjectifying act.\nThings are from the first apprehended only in their immediate egoistic\nsignificance, and also very early as centres of possible sensations\nwhich become a matter of fear and hope, desire and aversion.\n\nDesire is certainly a very extensive psychic _genus_ including many\nvarieties which are noted by common introspection, and which are even\ndenoted by special words. A wish is a momentary act of desire, longing\nis intense form; ambition and aspiration are desires for higher order of\nobjects, as contrasted with desire for food or dress. The kinds as\ndistinguished by object are numberless since any object may be\ndesirable, and the realm of the desirable is coincident with the realm\nof the knowable. In the course of evolution we become aware of things\nand of states of consciousness, so that by feeling about them\u2014having\nemotions\u2014there may result the advantageous action with reference to\nthem. This order, not consciously apprehended of course, is the natural\norder of psychic events, and one which, in tendency at least, always\nappears, even in latest evolutions. The desire to know what is the full\nexperience value of things, curiosity, is an early acquirement, since\ncomplete cognition of object is obviously of the greatest advantage,\nespecially to the weaker animals, as deer, who act wholly on the\ndefensive. The very strong can afford to be largely indifferent to their\nenvironment.\n\nWith reference to intensity, we can place forms from a positive to a\nnegative pole. Thus with a famished man desire for food is first intense\ncraving, becoming with continued eating moderate desire, then feeling of\nsatisfaction, then of repletion, then negative, as aversion in passive\nform or satiety, then becoming active as disgust, and intense as\nloathing. Content, or desire satisfied, is not desire extinguished,\nrather it is an equilibrium wherein desire and its function are in\ncontinual equalizing action. When desire granted means all desire\nextinguished, with beings of any high tendency to activity _ennui_ is\nthe result. Here, as Schopenhauer notes, wish for a wish develops. Even\nin complete pleasurable quiescence, there is desire for its continuance,\nwhich is only saying that there can be no complete quiescence short of\ncoma, or else of a state where reality has never broken in, and\nexperience is wholly unformed where the being cannot anticipate or note\nchange. Pure and absolute content never occurs, and as a matter of fact\nnever will, the point of transition in the desire gamut, in passing from\npositive to negative, being like a mathematical form, unreal and\ntheoretical. When positive desire ends, negative desire springs up\nimmediately, just as in the pleasure-pain gamut, where the indifference\npoint of transition has no existence in reality.\n\nDesire in any of its forms may take on an altruistic, disinterested\nphase, though much that is taken for altruistic is only apparently or\npartially so, being really due to self-extension. If you take an\ninterest in anything, it becomes interesting to _you_, it is a matter of\npersonal concern, and becomes identified with the self. Thus in _our_\nfamily, _our_ town, _our_ nation, _our_ race, desire plants itself; it\nis in this personal extension of view that most of the pity, sympathy,\nand benevolence is exercised. A well-wishing and consequent exertion for\nhumanity in general is very late, and still later is desire for animals\nas sentient beings having a worth of being in themselves.\n\nThe remarks we have made concerning desire proper, apply equally to\naversion. We must bear constantly in mind that desire proper and\naversion are really in psychic analysis, merely phases positive and\nnegative of a certain definite mode of psychosis, hence we often use\ndesire in this large and generic sense, which instances will be apparent\nfrom the context. Desire, like other emotions, is polar, and desire\ngeneric has its antipodal feeling in some form of active desirelessness.\n\nAs desire is naturally and originally connected with all perception of\nobject, we find it closely allied with other emotions. While we must\nsuppose that early desire is upon idea of pleasure, upon the idea of its\nrealization to be attained, without any estimate of likelihood or\nunlikelihood of realization, which factor is slow in evolution, yet when\nthrough experience, sense of certainty or uncertainty is attained as to\nthe experienceable, this psychosis\u2014belief\u2014has a marked effect upon\ndesire, and is closely associated with it. Bare sense of the\nexperienceable was sufficient to generate desire, but when the measure\nof probability of the experienceable actually happening is measured, we\nhave belief, expectation, hope, and kindred psychoses, bound up with\ndesire. The expression, \u201cI hope it will be a good day to-morrow,\u201d\nindicates a wish that it would, _plus_ some confidence that it will be a\ngood day; \u201cI wish it would be a good day, but I fear it will not,\u201d shows\nsome lack of confidence in the realization of the event. Hope then\nequals wish, _plus_ the intellectual element expectation, a desire for a\nrealization _plus_ some belief in it as actually to happen. A large\nshare of learning by experience consists in the reaction of this\nexpectation on the wish, in learning not to set our hearts on what we\nbelieve to be unrealizable or extremely improbable to happen. Wish also\nacts on belief, as is plainly expressed in the common phrase, \u201cthe wish\nis father to the thought.\u201d If belief tends to restrict or magnify\ndesire, desire also tends to determine belief. Hope, as very commonly\nused, as when we say, \u201cI hope it will turn out so,\u201d is a passive\nemotion, and does not appeal to the individual as self-determining the\nevent. As the primary end of emotion is to incite the organism to\ndetermine its own experience, hope as passive seems a rather late\nevolution, as having only an indirect and general value by maintaining\ngeneral pleasurable tone. The one who hopes it will be a good day\nto-morrow is in a better and more advantageous frame of mind than he who\nfears it will be a bad day, in so far as the events are equally beyond\nself-determination, and it is of no direct use to either hope or fear.\n\nAs to the range of desire we must then disagree with Aristotle and later\npsychologists, who suppose that desire is limited by the belief in the\npossibility of realization. Desire existed before this belief was\ngenerated; and while, after its generation, it may often affect desire,\nyet often it does not. I may wish for the moon as readily as the child\nto whom the notion of possibility or impossibility of realization is\nbeyond experience. The unrepresentable only cannot be wished, and desire\nis bounded only by the power of conception and perception. Hope is a\nspecies of desire which has to do with belief in the possibility of the\nevent or act: it is a joyful emotion connected with belief of\nrealization of the pleasurable. This distinction between hope and desire\nin general is implied in the phrases, \u201cI wish he _would_ do it,\u201d and \u201cI\nhope he _will_.\u201d The hope includes the desire, but the desire may exist\nwithout the hope, as we say, \u201cI wish he would, but know he won\u2019t.\u201d\nDesire may be hopeless, but hope cannot be desireless.\n\nDesire is vitally connected with ideation and volition, but properly it\nis the intermediate emotional moment between these, and not idea of\npleasure\u2014as James Mill\u2014nor yet to be placed under will\u2014Bain, James. It\nis neither phase of ideation or volition. Desire is neither idea of, nor\nstriving after realization; it is not the idea of goal nor the effort to\nreach goal. I may have idea of a goal without desire to reach it\u2014at\nleast, analysis discriminates thus as separate mental stages\u2014and I may\ndesire to reach it without trying to reach it,\u2014impotent desire,\nsometimes called wish. The striving is the consequent, and the idea the\nantecedent of the desire which is the emotion wave we emphasize by the\nword, longing. Desire is neither phase of volition nor ideation.\nVolition is properly effort at realization, and is stimulated by the\nemotion toward the realization ideally apprehended.\n\nThe relation of desire to will has been a fertile subject of discussion\nfrom Aristotle down, but we have to take up but a single aspect, namely,\nwhether will and desire may with reference to the same object be\ncontrary or distinct. Take the example of contrariety mentioned by\nStewart. I wish a certain man not to do a certain act, but yet I\npersuade him to do it at the request of a friend. If I say I will\npersuade him, though I wish him not to be persuaded, this merely implies\nthat the wish to oblige my friend overcomes the aversion to persuading\nthe man. And, in general, apparent cases of conflict of will and desire\nmay be resolved into conflict of desires. Hence the phrase, \u201cI will do\nit, though I do not want to do it,\u201d is inaccurate or rather an\nincomplete analysis. We should always add, \u201cbecause I have some\nextraneous and stronger desire.\u201d A box of bonbons is hung in a room at a\nheight to be had by whomsoever will jump and reach it. In any party of\npersons there may be some to whom the wish for ease, the disinclination\nto jump, overcomes the inclination for the bonbons, so that this\nvolition does not occur, others who jump even against this\ndisinclination, the desire for the bonbons being the stronger desire,\nand others, very active, who jump without feeling any disinclination to\nthe act. Conflict of desires is a common and almost constant state with\nmany minds, and the evolution of man has been mainly through conflict of\ndesire in sacrificing an immediate to a future good. In lower minds with\nso little self-consciousness and consciousness of a consciousness that\nthey do not grasp conduct as a whole, there is a simple alternation of\nvolitions flowing from the desires of rival goods, till one by its\nintrinsic force dominates with some permanence. These are the creatures\nof impulse, unreflecting and unself-directing by principle and reason.\nHigher minds realize _their_ situation and consciously bring in higher\ndesire or motive; they form rules and principles of conduct: they become\nethical beings, having self-control and self-direction.\n\nDesire is based by Mr. Bain on hindrance and opposition to activity, on\n\u201ca bar in the way of activity.\u201d This is true if we understand it to\nrefer to sense of unreality and of lack as connected with an\napprehension of thing where the thing is really absent from the usual\ncorrelation, and hence physiological activities are checked. We have in\nthe previous pages discussed this, but this is not Mr. Bain\u2019s point of\nview. The three elements he emphasizes are: deficiency, idea of\npleasure, and the hindrance. Thus, he contrasts the prisoner who looks\nout on a bright day and longs to take a walk, with a perfectly free man\nwho looks out on a fine day and freely follows his inclination to walk.\nHowever, it appears to me that both have desire, and that in the same\nsense both are moved by the motive, though only one is free to attain\nthe action. So if I get thirsty in a waterless desert or in my room with\na jug of water on the table, the bodily sensations will equally lead to\ndesire. The conflict in desire is between state actual and state\nconceived, and not between will and restraint. Mr. Bain remarks, \u201cIf all\nmotive impulses could be at once followed up, desire would have no\nplace.\u201d (_Emotions and Will_, p. 423.) But desire is itself an original\nimpulse, and is more or less an ingredient in all emotion impulse; and\nit is plain that emotion impulses as implying representation are the\nonly ones which can be \u201cfollowed up.\u201d Where every wish is gratified as\nsoon as formed, as with a petted child of rich parents, desire still\nremains in all its characteristic quality. Such an one, however, by\nhaving only the momentary pleasure of completed realization, misses the\njoys of realizing, and loses all that happiness which has been defined\nas sense of progress. If every wish were gratified as soon as formed, if\nevery representation of pleasure was immediately followed by\nrealization, desire would still exist in all its peculiar force. The\nmoment of gratification is always second to the moment of desire, and a\nFortunatus with his wishing-cap cannot possess in absolute coincidence\nwith the wish.\n\nIt may be objected that Tantalus\u2019 desire is certainly a form where\nhindrance is the main stimulant. When one is continually hindered just\non the point of realization, desire is intensified, but this\nintensifying is very largely due to the increased definiteness of\npresentation or representation, and to the increase of confidence in the\nevent. To tantalize is to bring before one an object of strong desire\ninto the clearest prominence and seemingly certain attainment, yet to\nconstantly withhold it.\n\nWe have spoken of desire as an impulse, and we would include all emotion\nas impulse, for to impel is its function and action. Impulse is the will\nside of emotion as interest is its intellectual side. If I fear a man,\nthis is my interest in him and impulse from him. True, we speak of being\ndriven by \u201cblind impulse\u201d; but emotion cannot be blind, it can only be\nkindled by object imaged. Anything which actuates the will may very\nbroadly but wrongly be called impulse, for impulse strictly connotes an\nemotion wave undirected and issuing at once in action. Where unforeseen\nends are served, as when a hen driven by sensation of heat sits on eggs,\nwe commonly but wrongly denominate it impulse. Without some\nrepresentation there is no emotion and no impulse. So when standing over\na precipice I say I have the impulse to throw myself down, this means\nthat the depth wakens in me image of falling and an awful desire to\nrealize the image, which impels the act. If I am merely giddy I will\nfall, but if I have the emotion-impulse I will throw myself down; I am\nnot impelled by dizziness or any sensation, but the term denotes emotion\nas desire or fear.\n\nFor the ordinary human mind desire seems in general a spontaneous and\ninstinctive act. We do not make an effort in desiring, though desire\nlike other mental functions undoubtedly arose in struggle. Originally\nthis psychosis was a stress and strain activity; it was a rarely\nachieved emotion, just as the emotion of pleasurable appreciation of\nBeethoven\u2019s music or Michael Angelo\u2019s sculpture is for most minds a rare\nuplift of psychic force. Knowing as compound of presentation and\nrepresentation and as involving emotion and volition, is, with us,\nwithin certain limits, an habitual spontaneous act of mind. I feel the\npain from cold, without sensation of cold, as bare pain, as\nundifferentiated feeling of discomfort, I then feel cold, I feel cold\nobject, I desire warmth, I will to draw near the stove; here is a\nprogressive series of correlated psychoses which are constantly\noccurring in a spontaneous way in ordinary experience. But this psychic\nstructure which operates so easily is really the outgrowth of ages of\npsychic evolution wherein the separate steps have been achieved and the\ncorrelation established only by the severest _nisus_.\n\nAssociations are first achieved in experience established by numberless\nreiterations before there is spontaneous tendency to re-occurrence, this\nis the law of psychic evolution to-day, and is the only clue we have to\nthe past. The evolution of mind is not and never has been a mechanical\nprocess, but its basis is in pure feeling as stimulating volition.\nParadoxical as the expression sounds, yet in a sense it is true that the\norganism has _learned_ to know and to feel thereupon. It may even be\nthat in the course of psychic ages with certain species of animals some\nemotions may become innate, and such advantageous psychoses as fear or\ndesire may occur without any integration through individual experience.\nThe new-born chick, when it hears the note of a hawk, is said to show\nsigns of fear, though what actual psychosis occurs, if any, seems almost\nbeyond our power to know. The whole process may be reflex nervous\naction, a mere closed neural circuit being affected. It is no doubt true\nthat all long-continued, often recurring psychoses tend to so embody\nthemselves in a neural combination that the given activities are carried\non in a sub-conscious and finally in an unconscious way. It is very\nprobable that much that we take for emotion with lower animals is reflex\nor semi-reflex action; yet it is likewise true that there is, as a\nmatter of advantage in struggle for existence, an inherited instinctive\ntendency to certain emotions, to certain kinds of fear and desire, and\nthere may be a distinct awareness of the potency in things, which has\nnever been individually realized. In its every transaction with things\nthe young organism may act by reflex action or by inherited emotional\ntendency. How far either or both enter into the first individual\nexperiences is a matter for the psychology of the future.\n\nThe general function of desire in life is obvious; it is the most potent\nfactor in conserving and extending life. Far back in a paleozoic psychic\nperiod life was below desire; but once originating under the pressure of\nthe struggle for existence it has since developed into the most manifold\nand complex forms. Human life is the outcome of desire, and the human\nbeing is _par excellence_ the desiring psychism. As the moving factor of\nhumanity history is its record, and present human organization, faculty,\nand achievement is its product. Desire, as the force to realize, to\nconvert seen potency into actuality, the idea into reality, is now in\nthe very highest examples of psychic development an ever increasing\npower, and no prospect of a psychic stage to be reached beyond desire is\nintimated in the present course of normal development. The tendency\ntoward extinction of desire, when it does occur, appears always as\npathologic or retrogressive symptom. It may be the dream of a\nphilosopher or of a cult, but with Schopenhauer himself desire was a\nmost forceful factor, and the devotee of desirelessness by very reason\nof being a _devotee_ to an object, desires it, namely, the state of\ndesirelessness. We may desire to extinguish certain desires, and succeed\nin accomplishing this, but to desire not to desire, as general act, is a\npsychological contradiction in terms. A very low vegetative psychic\nstatus without any desire is possible, but all teleologic activity\nimplies desire, hence extinction of desire can never be attained as an\nend.\n\nDesire moves the world and is the core of psychic being. Deprived of\ndefinite desire, we long for it, and if every wish were immediately\nrealized, we should desire delay in gratification. The amount and value\nof life is measured by the quantity, quality, and effectiveness of\ndesire. Orton characterizes the Indians of the Amazon as \u201cwithout\ncuriosity or emotion,\u201d which must, however, be taken only as relatively\ntrue, but yet marking them as extremely low in the psychic scale.\n\nEducation then, is a process of stimulating desire, of leading to\nambitions and aspirations. As what is imposed on consciousness without\ndesire is a hurtful burden, the true pedagogic method is always to\nawaken the wish for knowledge and power before it is granted. Desire as\ninterest is assimilating power, and without it there is no mental\ngrowth. The art of education is the art of stimulating intellectual,\n\u00e6sthetic, moral and religious desires, and of providing for their\nprogressive gratification with the best arranged and most suggestive\nmaterial.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER XIV\n _SOME REMARKS ON ATTENTION_\n\n\nThe term attention is, like feeling, a word of extremely doubtful and\nvariable import. Like feeling, attention may be used as denominating any\nstage of consciousness, or it may be restricted to some more or less\nspecific form. As affections of the organism all psychoses are termed\nfeelings; viewed as subjective-objective acts, a content being attained,\nconsciousness as such is termed attention. We are said to be attending\nwhen we have any activity of mind, when we have anything in the mind or\nbefore the mind. When consciousness has something in it, consciousness\nis attending, whence attention means consciousness acting. But what is\nconsciousness inactive? Nothing. Hence consciousness attending, used for\nconsciousness acting, is a pleonasm. Consciousness, by virtue of always\nbeing conscious of something, does not need the word attention to\nqualify it.\n\nThe attention of consciousness is called, attracted, or engaged, when\nany mental act occurs, whether a pain, pleasure, perception, or whatever\nform it may be. When the mind is occupied with anything, _i.e._, is\nactive, it is thereby attending to the thing. If I am conscious, I am,\nof course, conscious of something, hence attending to that something.\nBut all these expressions are incompatible with a purely psychological\npoint of view. In psychics, as opposed to physics, the thing exists only\nas perceived and in perceiving, _esse_ is _percipi_; the object or\ncontent of consciousness exists neither beyond consciousness nor in it;\nit is consciousness and consciousness is it, it is nothing more than\nobjectifying fact. Consciousness does not, like a pail, have contents,\nbut it is merely a name for the sum of activities we term conscious.\nSuch a phrase, then, as, attending to something, may be radically\nmisleading. We do not have both consciousness and a field of\nconsciousness, a presentation field. A tolerably constant part of human\nconsciousness is an activity which is a constituting a world of external\nand internal objects. This objectifying activity, which may or may not\nbe object for higher activity\u2014apperception or attention in one\nsense\u2014does not, however, persist and subsist as a more or less\nmechanical _continuum_, as Mr. James Ward and that school maintain.\nStill the word attention may in a vague and general way denote both the\nrealizing force and will effort therein of every act of consciousness.\nBut yet as thus a general term for certain aspects or general qualities,\nit is liable to misconstruction, and we do not propose to employ it\neither as denoting any act of consciousness as such, or any aspect\nthereof.\n\nAttention may also denote dominancy in consciousness. When any one\nfactor is pre-eminent, we say the mind is therewith attentive. When any\nelement has a marked ascendency, so that all others are much feebler and\nsubservient, thereby is constituted a state of attention; as when sight\nperception monopolizes consciousness in an eagle watching for prey, or\nhearing commands all the mental powers of a deer listening to a strange\nsound. However, practically all states are in reality complexes in which\nsome one factor is and must be dominant, and this universal phenomenon\nof dominancy scarcely deserves the specific name, attention.\nConsciousness is always more or less concentrated in some single\nchannel; the factors in any state of consciousness are never perfectly\nequal in intensity, and so are never in perfect balance. But attention\nis not this fact of dominancy, but rather that of consciously sustained\ndominancy, as we shall note later.\n\nIf attention is not a proper term to denote simple dominancy, may it not\ndenote that complete form, engrossment, or absorption, where one element\npredominates to the exclusion of all others, and so occupies all of\nconsciousness\u2014that is, more exactly, is all the consciousness\u2014and also\ntests the capacity for consciousness to the full? The fixed idea is an\ninstance in point, and in a certain way also preoccupation or\nabsent-mindedness. Still, in this last there are manifold elements and\noften great complexity\u2014_e.g._, train of thought\u2014hence dominances of\ndifferent forms, but yet a persistence of a certain mode with\nconsciousness running at its full capacity, and the result being that\nthe general trend is not easily altered. In cases of fixed idea and\nbrown study we say, \u201chis attention is fully occupied,\u201d which means\nnothing more than his mind or consciousness capacity is fully taken. I\ndo not see that we gain anything by using attention in the same sense as\nthese two general terms, mind and consciousness, which are surely\nsufficient. Further, when one \u201closes himself in a subject,\u201d the power of\nself-activity, and hence power of real attention, is lost. Mental\nactivity which has slipped beyond the control of will is not in any true\nand high sense an attending, nor is attention good term for\nconsciousness at saturation point.\n\nAgain, attention is often used to denote consciousness in its change\naspect. When a new consciousness comes in and supplants a former state,\nwe say, in popular but misleading phrase, \u201cit takes or attracts his\nattention,\u201d as if attention were entity rather than activity. But when\nwe say that change of consciousness is change of attention, we really\nadd nothing; it is an identical proposition. Attention does not qualify\nconsciousness, but is merely synonym for it.\n\nStill again, may attention designate intensity, or some certain degree\nof intensity? We may say of one, \u201che was looking inattentively,\u201d or of a\nfixed, intense gaze, \u201che was looking very attentively.\u201d A strong vision\nis thus opposed to weak as an attention. As all psychoses have some\ndegree of intensity, they are thereby acts of attention, if we reckon\nfrom a zero point, or a more or less large number of consciousnesses if\nwe reckon from some fixed degree of intensity. But to call a psychosis,\nbecause of its intensity, or because it has reached a certain degree\nthereof, an attention, seems an unnecessary procedure. Nothing is gained\nby describing an intense psychosis as an attention, and certainly\nintense pains and pleasures hardly come under the term. Nor yet are\nintense cognitions, merely by reason of the intensity, properly states\nof attention. Fixed ideas are commonly intense, yet there is no true\nattention, as we have before intimated. Cognitions which come as intense\nmust be marked off from those which are intense by reason of a\nself-determined self-consciousness intensifying. The essence of\nattention is intensifying act self-regulated. To be sure, intense\npresentations are given as such only by an heredity _momentum_, from\npast ancestral intensifyings; their _impetus_ is on the basis of past\ncognitive exertions. Presentation intensity, and, indeed, all mental\nintensity, is originally and fundamentally volitional; the act had its\nforce solely in will power; but in late phases psychoses which\noriginally required intense exertion rise spontaneously and have a\nstrength and persistence apart from volition, and so the word attention\ndoes not rightly apply to them. Thus also we can solve the problem that\nMr. Ward states when he says, \u201cHow the intensity that presentations have\napart from volition is related to that which they have by means of\nit\u2014how the objective component is related to the subjective\u2014is a hard\nproblem; still there is no gain in a spurious simplicity that ignores\nthe difference\u201d (_Mind_, xii. p. 65). But \u201cobjective component\u201d and\n\u201csubjective\u201d do not enter into the question; cognition does not arise as\na given, as forced and determined from without, but it is rather at\nbottom a mode of volition. Still attention is not then cognition\nintensity in general.\n\nIf attention is not any form or quality of mental activity in general or\nof cognition in particular, we must find its essence in volition\u2014as,\nindeed, has been intimated in the immediately preceding pages. Attention\nis properly the will side of cognition; it is cognitive effort.\nConsidering attentively, looking attentively, listening attentively,\nmean cognitive efforts in thinking, seeing and hearing. Here is a\ncognitive experience which does not simply happen, but is definitely\nbrought about and held to. There is intensifying act by which the given\ncognition is held and kept in dominancy. The word attention must, as a\npsychological term, be extended to denote, not merely modes of cognitive\neffort prominent in man, but all cognitive exertion of whatever grade.\nIt will include all will-tension in all the senses\u2014olfactory, gustatory,\nmuscular, etc.\u2014as well as visual and auditory.[D] A dog scenting game\nmay be as truly attentive as a waiter listening to your order. So far as\nthe smelling by the dog is merely instinctive, that is, heredity\nsurvival, there is no real attention; the mental activities are not\nefforts of will-attentions\u2014so far as they occur spontaneously and\ninevitably. But when, as we often see, a dog is somewhat baffled in\nscenting, it plainly puts forth cognitive effort, it exerts its\ncognitive powers to the utmost, there is that strain and stretch which\nthe word attention literally and naturally suggests. As soon, in fact,\nas the labour point is reached in any mode of cognition, here is\nattention. All toil and work is attention, as a definite exertion of\nwill including some cognitive element. The labour of life is attention,\nis minding or attending to business. Attention is thus will effort in\nmaintaining and intensifying a mode of cognition.\n\n-----\n\nFootnote D:\n\n See also my remarks in _Psychological Review_, ii. p. 53.\n\n-----\n\nConcentration of attention is then, we may now remark, a redundancy, as\nwe make attention equal to concentration. To say his attention was\nconcentrated upon a certain subject, is equivalent to saying his mind\nwas concentrated. Sometimes, indeed, concentrated attention may mean\nintense attention or concentration, but some concentration being always\ninvolved in attention, it is a confusing and inaccurate phrase.\n\nIn a more restricted sense, attention is not merely any will tension in\ncognition, but only so far as self-consciousness is involved in all the\nexertion. We must sharply distinguish between this attention as willed\nactivity and as simple act of will. Willed cognitive activity denotes\ncognition determined upon and consciously accomplished. The willing in\nthe knowing act may not be will to know. Willed cognitive activity, when\nnot against the will, when including choice and acquiescence, is in the\ntrue sense voluntary attention\u2014attention voluntarily, freely, willingly\nperformed. The term voluntary is not the proper correlative of\nspontaneous, but rather volitional, while non-voluntary must be set over\nagainst voluntary. In self-conscious attention of any kind there must be\nconsciousness of the tension, and consciously exercised effort in\ndelineating and maintaining cognition. In this narrow sense attention is\nconscious furtherance or hindrance of cognition. Effort is consciously\nput forth in some particular cognitive form; there is a self-limitation\nby the mind in cognitive process. In short, attention here equals\ncognition consciously constrained.\n\nAs to the relation of attention to subject, we remark that psychology as\nthe science of mental phenomena, rather than science of the soul, is not\ncalled upon to imply a subject as in any wise attending. Yet we use, and\nuse inevitably, substantive forms and personal pronouns, but while it is\nimpossible for science to desubstantialize language, yet it must be ever\non its guard against the delusions of language. It is a common impulse\nto explain activities by referring them to agents, to describe attention\nand all mental acts as being what they are by reason of the actor, the\nself, or _ego_; but science in this, as in so many things, inverts the\ncommon order; the agent is made by and of activities, and not the\nreverse. Agent or subject is no more than a congeries of manifold\ninterdependent activities. There is, and can be, no fixing of the mind\nby the mind: the word, mind, being used in the same sense in both cases.\nWhen I say, \u201cI fix the mind upon something,\u201d this means for analytical\npsychology, that in the complex of consciousnesses which are unified by\nan _ego_-sense, there occurs a will effort accomplishing a perception.\nThis purely dynamic interpretation is the method of all science which\ncannot accept inexplicable essences and agents as explaining anything.\nAttention is not to be explained by an attender, but it is a mode of\nactivity in that collection of activities which we term organic life\nwith conscious process. So even attention, as self-conscious exertion,\nis not to be interpreted as an agent which is conscious of itself in\nexerting; but we consider it as volitional activity with consciousness\nof self as manifold complex of objects vitally connected with will\neffort. Self-consciousness does not necessarily mean a self conscious of\nitself.\n\nIt is obvious from our discussion thus far that we do not accept the\ncommon division of attention into spontaneous and voluntary, which means\nfor us no more than spontaneous and voluntary\u2014more properly\nvolitional\u2014cognition. So-called spontaneous attention is the displacing\nof one consciousness element by another without any will effort; there\nis no displacing or placing as will activity, but cognitions appear,\npersist and disappear by an inherent force. When in deep study the noise\nof a whistle may spontaneously \u201cattract my attention,\u201d as the phrase is,\nbut this denotes no more than forcible change of state. There is nought\nin the new act but the sensing the noise of whistle; there is no real\nattending activity, no will effort at either promotion or inhibition.\nHowever, we must grant that most cognition contains a volition element.\nAbsolute zero or negative value as to volition is but a momentary and\ncomparatively rare phenomenon in normal consciousness, where\nself-possession and self-direction in some measure is almost constant.\nIn the case of noise of steam-whistle suddenly breaking in upon a\nstudent, there is quickly attention\u2014either positively, as listening to\nquality, or to detect direction of sound; or negatively\u2014true\n_in_attention\u2014as inhibiting and disturbing element. When one is made\n\u201cwild,\u201d or distracted, by noise, then his mind is occupied unwillingly,\nindeed, yet there being no real promotion or inhibition, we must term\nthe state _unattention_. Another form is where we give up in despair,\nand passively suffer the annoying noise. In both cases we neither\nstimulate nor repress, and so both are emotional unattentions. On\naccount of the pain-pleasure nature of all experience, there is even\nhere, however, some will attitude and tendency, some favouring or\nretarding act, though it be wholly impotent in effect.\n\nJust when a cognition rises to attention point, just when volition with\neffort becomes prominent factor, this is a difficult and delicate\nproblem. However, according to the relative prominence or obscurity of\nvolition element, we must divide cognitions into attentions and\nimpressions. In the variety of human cognitive activity there is a\nconstant flow of cognitions which are one moment being strengthened to\nattentions, and another, weakened to impressions. With volatile persons\ncognitive life is a kaleidoscopic congeries of rapidly experienced\nimpressions and attentions. Will darts in and out with marvellous\nvelocity, now vivifying some, now others, in the stream of cognitive\nactivities determined by pleasure and pain interest. With all of us\nthere is a manifold complex _continuum_ of cognition, a general\nnon-attention knowing of external world and _ego_, which we continually\ncarry with us. Into this field of exertionless cognitive life\nwill-effort penetrates now to one point, now to another, seizing upon\nand enlarging the most interesting and significant facts. As I am\nsitting in my chair, I am dimly aware, without will tension, of a large\nfield of varied objects, any one of which I may emphasize, attend to,\nwhen incited by sufficient interest. Practically exertionless awareness\nis a constant _substratum_ for developed consciousness; here, in the\nworld of habit, it is always at home, and moves with great ease and\nsmallest friction; but the process of learning, the work of adding to\nmental possessions and enlarging the _totum objectivum_ and _totum\nsubjectivum_, this is attention for complex consciousness.\n\nWe must note this, that attention is any general alertness toward\ncognizing, though no actual cognition be attained. Cognitive straining\nwithout result is truly a form of attention. A man listening for a sound\nis equally attentive with a man listening to a sound. It is not\nnecessary for an attention to have something to attend to. Attention is\neffort at cognizing as well as in cognizing. The stupid boy is often the\nmost attentive, the most strenuous in cognitive effort, yet there may be\nlittle apprehension. In fact, we must recognise that in cognitive, as in\nmuscular activity, effort may be excessive, and defeat its own end. When\nsuddenly awaking in the night we often strain sense to the utmost, but\nwith no result; nothing is heard or seen. In this, as in some other\ncases, we must notice that attention is not necessarily delineation.\nWhile generally a particularizing effort of cognition, attention may\nsometimes occur as mere general cognition stress.\n\nIf attention consists in cognitive effort, whether successful or not,\nwhat is the nature of the effort to attend? A student says, I try to\nattend, but I cannot; I cannot hold my mind down to anything. Professor\nJames remarks, \u201cIn fact, it is only to the _effort to attend_, not to\nthe mere _attending_, that we are seriously tempted to ascribe\nspontaneous power\u201d (_Psychology_, p. 451). But it is obvious in such\nphrases attention means simply cognition, and may be substituted for it,\nwhereas we have just pointed out that attention is both the effort\ntoward and in cognizing act. Literally interpreted, then, the problem is\nwhether we can make an effort to make an effort at cognizing. In great\nlassitude or exhaustion we lose control of ourselves, we are unable to\nexercise volition either as attention or otherwise. We recognise and\nlament the fact to ourselves, we feel our powerlessness, but I hardly\nthink we do ever really make an effort at effort. At the very first\nstage of recovery from such state of utter non-volition, the will act is\nalways toward definite sense adjustments, or in holding to and promoting\ncertain thoughts and representations, and we thus have real attention.\nThe utter rout of psychoses, which once possessed us, we now conquer and\ncontrol for our ends and interests.\n\nAttention to attention is obviously distinctively different from this\nphase. We can and do attend to attention as psychic fact. An act of\nattention cannot, indeed, attend to itself, but the volition act in\nconsciousness of consciousness, as consciousness of some attention act,\nis very properly an attention to attention. If I am looking attentively\nat a man, I cannot, by the very nature of attention, be simultaneously\nvolitionally introspective of, _i.e._, attentive to the looking\nattentively. When actively sensing light, I cannot at the same moment\nattend to this attention, because attention is always concentrative of\nwill. To be volitionally conscious of light is one moment, and to be\nvolitionally conscious of this light consciousness is another moment.\nThe attention attended to is not in process at the same moment as the\nattention. This does not deny that we have simultaneous spontaneous\nintrospection of attentions. Introspection, like sensation, perception,\nideation, is attention only so far as it is effortful.\n\nIn his recent treatise on psychology Professor James discusses in an\ninteresting and suggestive way the relation of ideation to attention,\nmaintaining that \u201cideational preparation ... is concerned in all\nattentive acts.\u201d Attention is \u201canticipatory imagination\u201d or\n\u201cpreperception\u201d which prepares the mind for what it is to experience.\nThus the schoolboy, listening for the clock to strike twelve,\nanticipates in imagination and is prepared to hear perfectly the very\nfirst sound of the striking.\n\nIt is undoubtedly true that in the form of attention we term expectant,\nwhere we are awaiting _some given impression_, there is a representing,\nantedating experience, which may be a preparatory preperception. But\nwith a wrong imaging of what is to be experienced there is hindrance, as\nwhen in a dark, quiet room we are led to expect sensation of light but\nactually receive sensation of sound. Very often, indeed, our\nanticipations make us unprepared for experience. Further, the\nexperiments adduced by Professor James from Wundt and Helmholtz are in\nthe single form of expectant attention, and we must remark that in these\nexperiments the reagent is also experimenter, and this introduces a new\nattention, consciousness of consciousness, and that of a peculiar kind,\nwhich complicates an already complex consciousness. In general we may\nsay that experimentally incited consciousness is artificial, at least as\nfar as it feels itself as such, and for certain points like simple\nattention this tends to vitiate results. Self-experimentation or\nexperiment on those conscious of it as such may mislead in certain\ncases, and must, so far as this element of consciousness of experiment\nis not allowed for. In physical science things always act naturally,\nwhether with observation or experiment, but in psychology observation,\nother things being equal, is more trustworthy than experiment.\n\nIn all cases of expectant or experimentally expectant attention, the\nattention does not, however, lie in the expectancy or in the imaging as\nsuch, but it is merely the will effort concerned in these operations.\nYet as we may expect without effort, and preconceive without volition,\nattention is necessarily involved in neither. A perception or a\npreperception is an attention only as accomplished by will with effort,\nbut only an unattention when purely involuntary. Professor James\u2019s use\nof attention as preperception brings us back to the common idea of\nattention, as any consciousness which cognizes something. This is so\ninbred in thought and language that it is most difficult to avoid using\nthe term in this sense. Many psychologists, like Mr. James and Mr.\nSully, frequently mention attention as a will phenomenon, but they do\nnot treat it under will, and they constantly return to the cognition\nmeaning. H\u00f6ffding, however, treats attention under psychology of will.\nAttention as the exercise of will in building up and maintaining\ncognitive activity, is naturally treated under cognition; but it is on\nthe whole safer and better to discuss attention under will so as to keep\nit sharply distinguished from the presentation form which it vitalizes.\nI have endeavoured to hold the term strictly to this sense, yet it is\nnot unlikely I may sometimes unwittingly countenance the common\nconfusion, but trust the instances will be few.\n\nWhen we have, then, a case of expectant attention, we must distinguish\nthe attention in the imaging from the attention in the actual cognizing.\nIt is, indeed, true for us almost invariably that cognitive strain\nwithout immediate realization is incentive to ideating. In listening in\nthe night in vain for a sound we hear in imagination many sounds, and we\nform preparatory ideas of what we are to hear. Sense-adjustments call up\na train of sensations in ideal form. But it is obvious that low\nintelligences which have no power of expectancy or ideation do yet\nreally attend. The very first cognitions and all early cognitions by\ntheir very newness and difficulty were attentions long before ideation\nwas evolved. With low organisms, as cognitive power extends only to the\npresent in time and space, immediacy of reaction is imperatively\ndemanded, and every tension of cognitive apparatus is immediately\ndirective of motor apparatus, so that suitable motion is at once\naccomplished. The cognition, though dim and evanescent factor, is yet\npowerfully energized, and so a true attention. Always with lowest\nsentiencies, and often with higher, pain is suddenly realized without\nanticipation, followed quickly by attention as strong effort to cognize\nthe nature and quality of the pain-giver and so to effectually get rid\nof pain-giver and pain.\n\nPreliminary idea, then, cannot occur in early attentions and in late\nattentions, it is by no means necessary. It is said that we see only\nwhat we look for, but it must be answered that seeing commonly happens\nwithout any looking for. The kindergarten child, Professor James to the\ncontrary notwithstanding, is not confined in his seeing to merely those\nthings which he has been told to see and whose names have been given\nhim. A child continually asks, What is that? and is quick to discern the\nnew and strange. He accomplishes a wide variety of attentions without\nideas and gives himself almost entirely to immediate presentations.\n\nTo be sure, every one sees only what he is prepared to see, only what is\nmade possible for him by his mental constitution as determined by his\nown pre-experience and the experience of his ancestors, but this does\nnot signify ideation. Every cognizing is conditioned by the past, but\nthis does not call for a reawakening and projecting in ideal form at\nevery instance of cognitive effort before any real cognition is reached.\n\nIn fact many, if not the most of our attentions, are merely\nintensifyings of some present cognition, of some cognitive psychosis\nwhich has simply come or happened. Take the instance of attention to\nmarginal and retinal images; this certainly does not always imply\npre-perception, the forming of an idea of what we are to see, though in\nthe cases mentioned by Professor James it may. For example, I was\nwriting the above seated with my profile to the window when I became\nsuddenly aware, through the physiological agency of a marginal image, of\na moving object to my right. This perception of bare, undefined object\nwas spontaneous, a pure given; I exercised no will in attaining it, and\nso the state of cognition was not an attention. However, by attending,\nby intensifying the cognition by will effort, I perceive that the\nindefinite object is a man walking on the sidewalk, who is of a certain\nheight, clothed in a certain way, etc. I do not trace the least ideation\nin the whole process; the slight attending as act of will did not imply\nany anterior or posterior idea or representation. The reason for the\nwill act was the intrinsic interest of movement, and this intrinsic\ninterest arises in the fact that moving objects have had for all life a\nspecial pleasure-pain significance; the moving object is the most\ndangerous, and so motion perceived has become ingrained in mind as a\nspecial stimulant of attention. This habit of attentiveness to things in\nmotion survives and continues for cases where it is of no use and even\nof harm; thus, in the present instance, it diverts me from my work. It\nis obvious that attention often occurs in the same way for other senses\nwithout preliminary idea.\n\nIs there such a state as negative attention or active inattention? Is\nwill activity in cognition always positive merely, and never existing as\ndirect repression or weakening of acts? To some psychologists negative\nattention means only that certain elements in a consciousness are\novershadowed by the dominancy of some single factor; that, owing to the\nlimited capacity of mind, many elements can exist only in enfeebled form\nbeside their stronger neighbours. If the life blood of mind, will, is\nlargely absorbed by some particular form or mode, all other forms must\nsuffer in consequence.\n\nIt is, of course, obvious that the amount of will force which is put\ninto some given cognition is potentially or actually withdrawn from\nother factors which then, however, are more justly termed unattentions\nthan inattentions. But is the withdrawal of energy attained only by\ntransference? May it not be attained by direct repression and\nsuppression? When we wish to weaken some particular cognition, is it to\nbe done only by specially energizing some other cognition? It would seem\non general principles rather strange that we can, under stimulus of\ninterest, increase our energizing of any given cognition but cannot\nreduce it except indirectly by transference. This would mean that the\nsum total of actual will force remains constant as far as subject to\nvoluntary control, and it is only by subdivision into many channels that\nany actual diversion is secured. Will force may be withdrawn and\ntransferred, but not an atom of it can be directly suppressed. But can I\nnot directly repress a troublesome thought or a painful sight? If by a\ngreat effort of will I keep my eyes closed to some horrible but\nfascinating sight, this is a true active inattention, the exactly\nopposite exertion to holding my eyes open and fixed upon my book for\nreading when very sleepy, which process is always termed attention. When\nour energy is going in some comparatively undesirable way we often do\nsimply switch on to another track, but often also we shut off steam and\nreverse. Instead of direct promotion or indirect inhibition there is\ndirect inhibition or often both forms of inhibition combined. We may,\nunder pressure of interest, directly weaken any cognition, untensify,\ncheck and reduce the will effort involved by immediate relaxation. In\nputting ourselves to sleep we relax with effort, we reduce and stop all\nattentions. In awaking we often go through a reverse process. The\nattitude of any cognition is either by and through will, or with\ncomparative indifference and no intervention of will or with will\ndirectly against it, which three states we term attention, unattention,\ninattention.\n\nNegative attention is then, I think, a real activity, a will force which\ndirectly hinders and crushes out the unwelcome in consciousness, while\npositive attention is will force vitalizing and strengthening the\npleasant. In conflict of interests these forms are complementary, and\nattention is here a double will-effort, both the effort at withdrawing\nenergy from one point, and the effort at applying it in a new point. In\nmost cases attention is both resistance and insistance. Even in simple\nforms the natural tendency to inertia constitutes a constant counter\ninterest to any particular activity-interest. Attention then is always\nresistance to this natural inertia _plus_ the direct energy in effecting\nthe particular activity. But in advanced consciousness there is always a\nmultitude of difficulties in the way of specializing cognition, a great\nvariety of distractions to be resisted, all which, added to the definite\nexertion required in the special work, makes the ordinary attention in\nhuman consciousness a very complex affair. A student engaged on a\nmathematical problem is incessantly driving out distracting thoughts and\npositively fixing his mind upon the problem. Resistance is manifold,\naccording to the speciality of the task\u2014the more special, the more\ndistractions\u2014and the direct concentration is also a real and direct\nactivity.\n\nWe may then, I think, see the importance of both positive and negative\nacts in attention. As counter to the theory that positive attention is\nthe only real form, we might plausibly argue the opposite, that it is\nonly the reverse side of negative attention. If we shut out all but one\nelement from consciousness, do we not thereby bring that one into bolder\nrelief and so indirectly strengthen it? May not all intensification of\ncognition be thus but an indirect result of negative attention? No, for\neven when all distractions are kept away, there is the inherent\ndifficulty of the act _plus_ the inertia, the general disinclination to\neffort. Positive attention may rarely appear as practically pure, and\nrarely also negative attention. Consciousness may sometimes consist of\nmerely pure will tension as keeping off all defined activities; and\npersons of great will power sometimes achieve this in putting themselves\nto sleep. Consciousness is a blank field, tensely kept, but perfectly so\nonly for a very brief time.\n\nAs to the origin of attention, it must arise with cognition itself. The\npast act of cognition was, as we have seen (p. 61), a powerful will act,\nan achievement through struggle, and therefore an attention. The history\nof cognition and of its ultimate development into the highest forms is a\nstory of incessant and fierce competition in the struggle of life. Man\u2019s\npower of sense, perception and thought is an inheritance from an immense\ndeal of will effort by untold millions of ancestors. The necessities of\nexistence compelled an alertness, a general cognitive strain, which\neffected progress and discovery, the attainment and integration of new\nand most valuable forms of experience which have been handed down to\nlater generations. The earliest cognitive life is then almost entirely\nattentive; cognition does not _come_, it must be _attained_. Gradually,\nhowever, some low form like general sensation is so integrated, and\nrequires less and less attention, till it _comes_, is _given_, with\ncomparatively no effort, and a state of unattention thus appears in\nconsciousness. The child repeats quickly, easily, without attention, the\nevolution of the past, and this spontaneous re-enactment continues up to\nthe full point of hereditary integration. Without effort the child is\ncarried on at the incitement of instinctive inherent interest up to a\ncertain comparatively high grade of experience. But heredity _momentum_\ngradually ceases, and if there is to be individual progress, attention\nmust come in. Thus, intellectual education is fundamentally a developing\nof attention. Conscious control of cognition, both positively and\nnegatively, becomes more and more efficient, and the progress of the\nrace is dependent on exceptional attention in exceptional\nindividuals\u2014geniuses. Attention becomes more and more limited and\nspecialized, and a minute subdivision of labour results.\n\nNow, primitive attention is not as Mr. Ward, for example, would make it,\na primordial fact of mind, but as a cognitive form of will or will form\nof cognition\u2014it is essentially secondary. However, Mr. Ward, in his\narticle in the _Encyclop\u00e6dia Britannica_, makes a peculiarly advanced\nform of attention the initial fact of consciousness, namely, by the\nnon-voluntary act of mind being conscious of changes in itself. But mind\nis not at first a something which is inevitably cognizant of its own\nexperience, but it merely is a state, does not have states, and is not\nconsciously aware of them as such. There is, for instance, pain, but no\nconsciousness of the pain as fact of experience. Mind is not primitively\na something acted on, reacting, and cognizant of these self-movements,\nbut merely effortful will activity attaining snatches of cognition at\nthe pressure of pain and pleasure. It seems, indeed, tolerably plain\nthat apperception is not necessary to consciousness as such, and the\ngeneral law of evolution from simple to complex leads us to suppose that\nconsciousness was not at first with any apperceptive process. Changes,\nwhether as occurring or as being brought about, did not imply an\napperception taking cognizance of them. But however this may be, certain\nit is that apperception, as consciousness of self-change or as\nconsciousness of consciousness, must as a form of cognition arise in\nwill effort like any other forms, must be a real attention, not a\nso-called non-voluntary attention. We do not see any reason why this\nform of cognition should be an exception to the general law that every\nstep of consciousness is an acquirement and achievement determined by\nthe struggle for existence.\n\nThe relation of attention to feeling has already been touched upon,\nespecially as related to interest. Attention, like other volitions, is\naroused by feeling, primarily as direct pleasures and pains, secondarily\nby the ideal forms of these, that is, interest. Low organisms are\nincited to attentions as simple sensation-cognitions only by present or\nimmediately impending pain or pleasure. Direct pain does not interest or\ninclude interest in itself. There must be, not merely pain, but\ncognition of it as element in experience, before there is interest,\nwhich is always _in_ something. Interest implies representation, the\nsense of the value for experience of any given thing. What pleases or\npains interests only so far as perceived as pleasurable-painful; the\nthing perceived as source of feeling, or as in any wise related to it,\narouses interest. \u201cI am pleased or pained,\u201d does not equal, \u201cI am\ninterested\u201d; but only so far as I have cognizance of the object,\npleasing or paining, am I interested in it. The interesting is what\ntouches my interests, what affects my experience, what potentially\nreaches or touches me. It is obviously to the great advantage of the\norganism that pleasure-pain object merely perceived should move, excite,\nor interest, which brings in attention to the thing, and so fuller\nknowledge and preparedness for action. Interest, then, is practically\nequivalent to emotion. \u201cIt interests me,\u201d is equal to, \u201cIt arouses my\nemotion.\u201d The interesting picture, book, man, animal, etc., is that\nwhich awakens emotion, and thus incites attention. What affects me or\nmoves me, interests me. Interest is generally used to denote favourable\nemotion of rather low intensity, as when I say, \u201cHe interests me\u201d; but\nas a psychological term it may well be used in the broad sense to denote\nany emotion so far as it stimulates attention. The function of interest\nlies wholly in its effect upon attention, it is always a feeling\nstimulant to the will act of cognition. I do not exert my cognitive\npowers unless I have some interest at stake.\n\nThere are, of course, many degrees of interest. Often interest is so\nslight as not to rouse attention, being too weak to overcome natural\ninertia to will effort or unable to deflect will as bent by some\nconflicting interest. A lesson is to be learned, but the interest,\noften extrinsic, does not rise to attention point till possibly a\nfew minutes before recitation. The interest, fear of failure, may\nthen be sufficiently strong to induce very vigorous attention, and\nwithin a certain range the stronger the interest, the stronger the\nattention. Yet at a certain point of intensity emotion begins to\nderange will activity and to hinder and even destroy attention. Fear\nwhich has become fright extinguishes attention. Self-controlling\npower of attention is lost in a flood of emotion. Yet ungovernably\nintense emotion is no longer properly termed interest, which always\nimplies cognitive power. Interest is properly comparatively mild\nemotion state, which includes definite cognitive element. But\ninterest may be not only at or below attention point, but it may be\nof such an intensity and kind as to do away with need of attention,\nsecuring a spontaneous, or practically spontaneous, cognition. Thus,\nmy interest in a book may at first be insufficient, _i.e._,\npractically _nil_, to constrain attention in any degree; it may\nbecome so strong that I make constant cognitive effort, and finally,\nas it becomes profound and absorbing, I cognize without any\nattention. When anything becomes sufficiently interesting, interest\nacts of itself directly upon cognition, which is then performed\nwithout attention. Interest frequently increases to the spontaneous\ncognition point, carries cognition in it; but we must remember,\nnevertheless, that all cognition had its origin in attention.\nInterest acquired and become habitual demands less and less force of\nattention, so that our customary interests finally awake cognition\nwithout any attention act. If given cognitions always required the\noriginal will effort,\u2014attention,\u2014intellect could not progress,\ndelicate and far-reaching reactions could not be initiated, for they\ncould have no basis. The force of inherent hereditary interests\nmakes itself felt throughout all advanced psychic life. A survey of\nthe cognitions of any single day would show us that by far the\ngreater number are by this type and degree of interest. The common\ncognitions and adjustments of every-day life in walking, sitting\ndown, and in matters of routine, are mostly of this type.\n\nIt is tolerably plain that the relation of feeling to cognition cannot\nbe expressed by any single formula, and it is certainly far from true\nthat sensation or other cognition is inversely as the intensity of\nfeeling. If feeling, either as simple pleasure-pain or as interest, is\nthe incentive of attention, which is the primary measure of cognition;\nthen intensity of cognition is directly as intensity of feeling for a\ncertain range, and this is also true where attention has lapsed. The law\nof inverse ratio applies only when feeling has risen beyond the point of\nhighest efficiency, when there is over pressure, and mind runs wild\nbeyond self-control and attention. Then we should, of course, find at a\ncertain point, if we could make exact measurement, geometrical decrease\nin cognition for arithmetical increase in feeling, but ratio would\nconstantly change. The centre and spring of any high psychic life is\ninterest, and as interest increases intellection and volition increases\n_pari passu_. In cases of decline, where interest or capacity for\nemotion is lost, psychic life as a whole dissolves and disappears. On\nthe contrary, the progress of mind is in the strengthening and extension\nof interest.\n\nInterest leads to attention in the forms mentioned, but it seems also a\nmode of attention when, at the bidding of interest, we not only promote\nor inhibit some cognition, but some particular feeling. In a fit of\nanger we may be prompted by prudence or conscience to forcibly and\ndirectly restrain and abate it. I may similarly maintain an amiable\nframe of mind as opposed to crossness. To repel a fit of anger of course\nimplies repelling the representations which enter into the angry\nemotion, and so it is that the repressing or stimulating all emotions,\nby reason of their representative nature, necessitates a will effort\nwith reference to the cognitive element, and thus an attention.\n\nIt is commonly believed that attention to a feeling intensifies it\u2014that\nthe more we attend to our feelings the stronger they are, and the less\nattention we pay to them the weaker they are. A soldier wounded on the\nfield of battle heeds not the pain in the excitement of the conflict.\nBut the truth is in this case that he has no pain so long as he feels\nnone, and that he does not attend to the pain signifies simply that pain\ndoes not become a psychic fact, but is wholly physiological, and so not\na subject for psychological discussion. This is a case of the confusing\nuse of attention for consciousness in general which we have before\ncriticised. Very often, indeed, such an expression as, \u201cThe more he\nattends to his pain the more he has,\u201d means simply, the more pain he has\nthe more he feels, an identical proposition. But we must also\ndiscriminate between attention in a feeling and attention to a feeling.\nI work myself up into a passion by strenuously dwelling on\nrepresentations involved in anger\u2014this is an attention in a feeling; but\nattention to anger would be self-observational effort. The former does\nnot involve consciousness of the feeling, the latter is nothing more\nthan strenuous consciousness of the feeling. Men are often angry without\nbeing conscious of it or but dimly so, and attention to the feeling\nwould consist in intensifying by will effort this consciousness. When a\nperson says, \u201cI was mad and I knew it,\u201d he asserts the distinctness of\nthe acts and that the first does not always imply the second. This\ncognition originally, like all cognition, required volition, and it is\nstill subject to volitional control and emphasis, that is attention,\neven in advanced consciousness. Attention to a feeling is cognitive\neffort in attaining or strengthening consciousness of feeling, hence is\nbut a mode of apperceptive or introspective effort.\n\nWe must distinguish sharply then between the observing act and the\nobserved feeling, between a cognition of consciousness of pain and a\npain consciousness, and we must note that attention may be either,\nneither, or both. Apperception has become such a habit with higher human\nconsciousness that it is commonly exercised without attention, and so\nhas seemed to some as a necessary fact of all consciousness, an\nanthropomorphism, which seems to us erroneous. When we are conscious we\nare generally conscious that we are conscious; when a man has toothache\nthere is not only pain, ache, toothache, but consciousness of this as\nfact of experience; but this does not establish apperception as fact of\nall consciousness.\n\nIs it true now that the more we are conscious of a consciousness the\nless we have of the latter? Certainly the more conscious we are of it\ndoes not imply having the more of it, though we may say with truth that\nwithin a limited range the greater and intenser the consciousness, the\ngreater the facility for consciousness of consciousness. A mental fact\nmust have a certain definiteness and prominence before it is clearly and\neasily cognizable. However, speaking of the effect of apperception upon\nthe consciousness apperceived, it must be evident that it is always a\nminifying and not a magnifying. Consciousness is self-divided when there\nis both experience and consciousness of experience, hence a loss of\nforce for the consciousness cognized. A feeling self-consciously felt is\nweakened thereby. The feelings we are most conscious of are of\ncomparatively low intensities. In very intense feelings we lose or\nforget ourselves: we do not know what we are doing or feeling.\n\nIf now we make the consciousness of consciousness effortful, it is plain\nthat we diminish the consciousness cognized in still greater measure. A\nconsciousness of consciousness cannot be forwarded except at expense of\ngeneral mental capacity, and so as diverting force from the act\nobserved, whatever this be. Attention to a feeling must then on general\nprinciples diminish the feeling, and that in a marked measure. The\npsychologist who is always twigging his own consciousness to find out\nwhat is going on there must often be surprised to find nothing there. It\nis astonishing how fast feeling disappears when we begin to examine and\nanalyse it. The emotion fades the moment we turn attention to it. We\nfind that in psychological matters as elsewhere that we cannot have our\ncake and eat it too. We murder to dissect. Apperceptive effort is never\nintensification in the consciousness cognized, but cognition and\npleasure-pain feeling as a consciousness cognized lose in force, just as\nin the body, an undue exaltation of one function is always a depressing\nof others by withdrawal of force. The more conscious I am of my fear the\nless I fear. While this law of withdrawal of force is obviously the case\nwhen consciousness is at its fullest capacity, yet it may be said that\napperception in other phases acts as stimulant to waken latent forces,\njust as in the body stimulus of one function is often stimulus of all,\nthough we doubt that apperception is original and permanent function in\nconsciousness. But still in such cases it is a new consciousness which\nis stimulated and strengthened and not the consciousness which is being\ncognized, and still more then is there decrease in the latter. A given\nfeeling is never increased by attentive consciousness of it. When a\nfeeling is said to be intensified by attention to it, we may suspect\neither inaccurate analysis or misuse of terms. This, of course, does not\ndeny that within a certain range _immanent_ attention increases\npleasure, etc., for example, the more actively we taste an orange the\nmore taste pleasure we get.\n\nWe note in passing the very interesting psychological paradox that the\nmore we view ourselves the less we have to view, the principle of which\nhas been set forth above. We know well that the very reflective and\nself-conscious have little personal force and individual quality.\nMoreover the self-conscious stage in youth is precisely the period when\nthere is the least real self to be conscious of. A strong multiplex mind\nis rarely very self-observant.\n\nFinally we have to remark upon the way in which attention may be\ndivisive of cognition. Boswell makes Dr. Johnson to say, \u201cIf we read\nwithout inclination, half the mind is employed in fixing the attention;\nso that there is but one half to be employed on what we read.\u201d But\nadmitting the necessity of intrinsic interest, this does not do away\nwith attention. Attention hinders rather than helps cognition only when\nit becomes wearing strain, as in reading when much fatigued. But\nattention as fulness of vigorous normal will activity gives a force and\nvalue to cognition which it would not otherwise have, and often makes\nits very existence possible. The greatest, most significant cognitions\nin the mental life of any individual are those which are achieved at the\ntop of endeavour. Real knowledge as advancement and acquirement is\nalways the fruit of long training and attention.\n\nThe act of attention is painful and therefore is not exercised by lower\norganisms, at least, only under absolute necessity. Often the pain from\nattention is so great that the individual prefers to suffer than to\nexert himself cognitively and so help to remove pain-giver. It is only\nunder the greatest pressure that new knowledge and new ideas are\nacquired, and the history of mind shows a series of _tours de force_\nachieved only in moments of direst need. The strengthening and the\nholding of cognitive powers to a given point by effort of will is\npeculiarly distasteful and painful activity. All minds tend toward\ninaction or toward the regions of effortless action where overwhelming\ninterest carries them freely along. Attention, while the most\nadvantageous of actions, is yet most irksome and painful. It would seem\nto us at first blush that if pleasure and not pain had attached to the\nattentive act from the beginning, the evolution of mind would have been\naccomplished in the merest fraction of the time actually required. It\nwould have been the difference between going down a steep incline rather\nthan up. Why progress should only be realized through painful effort and\nstruggle is a problem which has vexed the thought of man throughout\nhistory but upon which psychology has little light to throw. Our present\nconcern is to simply emphasize the fact that cognitive act as attention\nis always painful, and if the act of cognition is performed without pain\nwe may promptly deny this to be an attention. This is, of course, far\nfrom asserting that all cognizings with pain are attentions.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER XV\n _SELF-FEELING_\n\n\nPopular and scientific observation agree that a very interesting and\nimportant phenomenon in consciousness is the sense of self as involving\nsuch feelings as pride, shame, self-satisfaction, and self-disgust. And\nthe evolutionary psychologist is bound to consider self-consciousness in\nits rise and development as a life factor. What is its significance for\nlife? How and when did it arise as answering a demand in the struggle\nfor existence? Further, the psychologist is bound to clearly define and\nanalyse the self-sense as psychic fact, to understand just what it is,\nas well as what it seems. The nature of the self-sense must be carefully\nstudied by introspection, and its elements and quality determined.\nHowever, the psychist has nothing, of course, to do with the self which\nis sensed, an inquiry which belongs alone to the metaphysician.\n\nSelf-consciousness has been throughout all our discussion assumed and\nimplied as factor in emotion life. Object is not merely perceived, for\nthis in itself has no life value, but is at once interpreted in\nexperience terms, is self-related, and emotion arises and stimulates\nsuitable will-response in bodily activities. Thus all response to\nenvironment through cognition of environment means with sense of the\nenvironment as its own. Thus, and thus only, is sense of environment\nrendered efficacious, for bare objectivity, which signifies nothing, has\nno value for life. Under the conditions of existence in the struggle of\nlife object cognition could not originate because it has no function.\nThe theory of natural selection then requires that object and subject\ncognition be regarded as complementary psychic factors, coincident in\ntheir origin, and developing in strict correlation.\n\nThis corollary from the theory of natural selection, implying a\nself-relating act in all cognition under the condition of struggle for\nexistence, is seen to be a likely hypothesis so far as we can judge from\nthe action of low psychisms. Any one who closely observes animals must\nrecognise that self-interest determines their cognitive activities and\nin turn is roused by it. The alert listening and looking of a squirrel\nis obviously impelled by fear and awakens fear. The object perceived is\nconstantly interpreted for its experience value, that is, there is\nconstant self-reference. This is the type of all cognition under natural\nselection, _i.e._, where use dominates.\n\nAssuming then psychism as mode of adaptive reaction, we see the\nnecessity for the correlation of the sense of self with the sense of\nthings. An experiencer blind to self, who has no awareness of self, but\nmerely blindly strives, has little advantage, for it possesses no\nself-directivity and no power of intelligent action. Its adaptation is\npurely general; to be specific adaptation it must appreciate differences\nin environment in their differential action upon itself, an appreciation\nof the objective in subjective terms. It is probable then that the first\nknowledge was the apprehension of thing as painer and then of the thing\nas pleasurer. A discrimination of the two is attained, probably tactile,\nas hard and soft. The subjective import of the thing is at once realized\nfrom these signs.\n\nIt is obvious that the origin of self-consciousness must be placed very\nearly in psychic life. With organisms which have but a few flashes of\nconsciousness during their whole individual existence, whose whole\nexperience is a mere sum of separate pleasure-pain thrills and blind\nefforts, there is neither sense of objectivity nor subjectivity. These\nvery lowest psychisms have experience, but no sense of experience;\npleasures and pains possess them, but they do not possess these. But if\nmentality arises and progresses solely by virtue of its function in\nsaving and profiting the individual living organism, if the end of\npsychosis is this self-conservation of the bodily whole in its vitality,\nthere is an imperative demand for self-cognizance in order to self-care.\nUnder the law of struggle and survival of the fittest, the organism\nwhich does not look out _for itself_ must go to the wall or be in the\nlowest grade. Self-conservation is closely linked with self-sense. Hence\nthe individual very early acquires some sense of itself in its\nenvironment, and so acts and conducts itself. Thus under adverse forces\nit learns to know itself, to realize its own place and power, and to\nfeel fear, anger, and so to appropriately respond to any environment.\nThus is secured manifold and special response to multiform conditions,\nwhereas in the organism which has only pure subjectivity of pain the\nresponse would be uniform.\n\nThe condition of an _ego_ being sensed or known is, of course, that\nthere is an ego to be sensed. All experience is an individual\u2019s\nexperience, is personal, but this does not constitute egoism as an\nexperience. The experiencer must have experience before he can know\nhimself as experience centre, that is, there must be experience before\nthere can be experience of experience. But the amount of consciousness\nand integration thereof which is required for self-cognizance is\nprobably very small. The dynamic organic whole of psychic life, which we\ndenominate _ego_, has almost from the start self-consciousness, and\ngrows by self-integration. By the conjoint interaction of subject and\nobject cognition with feeling and will elements egohood or personality\nis gradually developed to the largeness which we see in the human mind.\nExperience which does not self-integrate is scarce worthy the name, and\nit is noticeable that we usually associate self-consciousness with the\nterm. \u201cHaving an experience\u201d signifies a self-related psychic fact.\nGiven the first germ and experience constantly returns upon itself and\nself-develops. It anticipates itself, experiences the experienceable,\nand so serves life. A psychic individual without sense of his own\nindividuality is practically undiscoverable and impossible. It is\nperhaps not too much to say that psychically egohood really begins when\nexperience cognizes and organizes itself; the self is made by the sense\nof self. At first only an occasional achievement upon a very meagre\nbasis of psychosis, the self-sense rose only through intense pain and\neffort, but has now become so built into experience that, with human\nminds at least, it seems constant and spontaneous factor. Just what this\nmeans we have to note when we come to analyze the self-sense.\n\nWhile the ego-sense is to be regarded as a reflection of experience upon\nitself, this reflection is far from being abstract, or general, or\nspontaneous. The self-sense is wrought out in the direct commerce with\nobjects demanded by the exigencies of existence, a particular and\nconcrete apprehension is produced. That is, mind is no purely internal\ndevelopment nor yet a mechanical impression. Development is forced upon\nit in a world of competition and danger, but yet this development is\nalways active response. The self-sense then by which the individual\nbecomes aware of its own activities and feelings as its own, originates,\nlike all other new modes, by stress and strain as a most valuable\npsychosis in the struggle of existence.\n\nThe primitive self-consciousness is evidently na\u00efve, that is, there is\nno consciousness of the self-consciousness. The low psychism is\nconscious of itself, knows what is to its own advantage, and is\nabsorbingly selfish, but it is wholly unconscious of its self regard; so\nalso with very young children we see an egoism which is perfectly\nunconscious and na\u00efve, often humorously so to the observant adult who\nperceives the utter simplicity of its selfishness. The embarrassing\nself-consciousness of the boy and girl in their teens, a conscious\nself-consciousness, is not yet achieved. The immediate consciousness of\nself cannot by itself embarrass, it must be complicated with reflection\nand with cognizance of other _ego_'s; but later forms we do not need to\ndiscuss here.\n\nIn the simplest form of self-consciousness what are the necessary\nelements? and what is the essential nature of self-consciousness as\npsychic fact?\n\nIn the first place, then, what is the nature of self-consciousness as\ncognition? If cognition be awareness of object, what is self or subject\ncognition? Is subject merely a kind of object? Is self-consciousness a\npeculiar conscious mode, or is it merely of the same type as the general\ncognition of object? Of course we wish to consider such questions here\nsimply in the light of psychic fact.\n\nIt is often considered that self-cognitions are really in no way unique,\nthat the subject sensed is merely the individual\u2019s body or his mental\npowers. And it is undoubtedly true that subject is always some object,\nthe subject cognition is apprehension of some object either corporeal or\nmental; yet self-cognition is never merely an object seen as object. The\npsychic act of self-cognition is a peculiar qualifying of the object\ncognition; the individual who merely knows body or mind has not\nself-sense, he must be aware of body and mind as his own. The essence of\nself-sense is not in the object as so perceived, but in the\nsubjectifying reference. While the _ego_ then is always constituted as\nobject, _ego_ sense as psychic fact is more than mere object cognition.\nThe psychic self as object, as some mode or modes of consciousness, has\nnaturally been emphasized. Thus the self may be defined as that which is\nsubject to will. Yet the least reflection shows us that for self-sense\nthis must imply _my_ will, and so assume what it would explain. A\nconsciousness of will act as effective psychic fact is not _ego_ sense.\nA cognition of effort or _nisus_ is not the sense of self save so far as\nthe effort is known or felt as _mine_. And so in any other objectivist\ndefinition of self as psychic object, the self in its real nature as\npsychic act vanishes. Thus the consciousness of pleasure-pain capacity,\nwhile closely related to self-sense, does not make it, for we have to\nadd that the capacity must be known as one\u2019s own. In every endeavour\nthen to define or analyze the self as psychic fact we must either\neliminate it or presuppose it, and this must be taken as very\nsignificant. It means at least that this _stating_ it\u2014being merely\nobjectifying act\u2014destroys the subjectifying which is its essence. The\nradical distinction and polar opposition of subjectifying and\nobjectifying is therein suggested, and the difficulty of all fruitful\ndiscussion and scientific investigation, which is objectifying, is made\napparent.\n\nThe objective cognition of a self can only mean cognition of an object\ncapable of experience. Objects are thus discriminated into two\nclasses\u2014experiencers and non-experiencers, subject-objects and bare\nobjects; but this is not self-sense whereby the experiencer directly\nknows _his own_ experience as such, but merely sense of a self as any\nindividual object experiencing. This objective definition of a self is\nsimple enough. It merely asserts that any object which at any moment of\nits persistence or existence has a consciousness or experience of any\nkind is thereby a self. But this is obviously not a definition of the\nself and self-sense as psychic act, nor does it explain it. The\nscientific statement that individual objects exist as experiencers, and\nso are personalities, or _ego_'s, does not clear up the self-sense\nwhereby the individual is aware of his own individuality as such.\nEgohood as selfishness in this objective sense, and ego-hood as\nself-experience, as a feeling and knowing myself, are quite distinct. To\nthe question, What makes an object\u2014this particular object, body with\nlimbs and various organs capable of feeling pain-pleasure\u2014what makes\nthis _myself_? the only answer is relation not, be it noted, to\nexperience, but to _my_ experience felt as such. And what makes an\nexperience mine is that I consciously experience it; not merely that I\nexperience\u2014that experience occurs to me, or in me, as objective fact\u2014but\nthat I consciously experience, subjectively realize the experience as\n_mine_; not merely as realizing experience as experience, but as _mine\nown_. This ceaseless circle into which we fall in trying to define _ego_\nis hinted at in various common expressions. A child even will often\nremark, \u201cI did not do it, my hand did it\u201d; \u201cyou did not touch _me_, you\ntouched my _foot_,\u201d etc. That is, even the most cursory observation\nasserts that object in itself is not subject, that the me is not mine.\n\nWhile, then, we must regard self-cognition as a _genus_ by itself and as\nunanalyzable simple psychic fact, arising early upon a very slight basis\nof experience, and continually developing as most important psychosis\nfor life, we may yet distinguish what is involved with it, what modes of\nconsciousness it presupposes, and from which it yet is distinct.\n\nWe might speak of ego-sense as an experience knowing itself. But since\ncognition implies always a knowing and the known, an experience cannot,\nand does not, know itself. The consciousness knowing is never the\nconsciousness known; and to speak of a consciousness as aware of itself\nis misleading and inaccurate. To speak of the cognizance of a pain as\npain self-cognizant is an erroneous expression, for the pain does not\nknow itself; but it is known by a cognition which is not it. To be aware\nof pain as such is awareness of consciousness, but is, interpreted\nstrictly, in no wise self-consciousness. I may even speak of a\nself-conscious self-consciousness. This does not really mean what it\ndirectly implies, but can only mean a self-consciousness _plus_ a\nconsciousness of it as one\u2019s own; that is, the self-consciousness is not\nactually conscious of itself. Even if a consciousness could both be and\nknow its being as an absolute, simple act, yet this would not be\nself-sense, an individual realizing its own individuality, but merely a\nsingle psychic act existing, and at the same time conscious of its\nexistence. Self-consciousness is more and other than any consciousness\nwhich is self-conscious, if that were possible.\n\nConsciousness of consciousness is not, then, self-consciousness. It is,\nindeed, conceivable that an _ego_, in objective sense, might know his\nown consciousness not as _his own_\u2014the act of self-consciousness\u2014but\nmerely as consciousness, and he would thus exist as an individual, yet\nwithout subjective individuality. Yet, as matter of fact, consciousness\nof consciousness always carries self-consciousness with it. If I become\nconscious of a consciousness which is my own, I know it, not merely as a\nconsciousness, but as my own consciousness; if I am conscious of anger,\nI am conscious of being angry.\n\nHume, in his chapter on Personal Identity, observes, \u201cFor my part, when\nI enter most intimately into what I call _myself_, I always stumble on\nsome particular perception or other of heat or cold, light or shade,\nlove or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch _myself_ at any time\nwithout a perception, and never can observe anything but the\nperception.\u201d This is a good illustration of a futile and mistaken\nattempt to absorb self-consciousness in consciousness of consciousness.\nOf course Hume was not the hypothetical _ego_ which we have instanced as\npurely objective observer of his own consciousness; when he was\nconscious of any consciousness, as a heat or light sensation, a pleasure\nor a pain, he was assuredly, like other mortals, conscious of it as his\nown. The sense of mine-ness as psychic fact he should not have ignored,\nwhatever might be his conclusions as to the _myself_ But metaphysical\npsychology is always apt to swerve from fact.\n\nThe close connection of self-consciousness with consciousness of\nconsciousness leads often to their confusion. Thus under the head\n\u201cIllusions of Self-consciousness,\u201d J. M. Baldwin, in his treatise on the\nSenses and Intellect, says, \u201cOf these subjective illusions we may\nmention _emotional illusions_, wrong estimates of our emotional states,\nas when an angry man declares that he was never more cool in his life.\u201d\nThis instance is plainly an illusion of introspection, not of\nself-inspection; there is a mistake in the consciousness of\nconsciousness. Wundt, in defining self-sense as perception of the unity\nof experience, falls into the same confusion.\n\nIt points to the fundamental value and place of these cognition factors,\nthat when we say any one is conscious we imply them all. Thus I say of\nsome one rendered unconscious by an accident, \u201cHe slowly recovered\nconsciousness,\u201d by which I mean, became aware of himself and his\nsurroundings with awareness of his own mental activities. He is\nconsciously conscious, objectively conscious, and self-conscious. All\nthis makes up for us being conscious, and is for cognitive mind such a\nsimple organic basal movement as circulatory-nervous-motor function is\nfor body.\n\nAn organism must, of course, have had some psychosis before it can\nbecome conscious of it, and of it as its own, and this primitive\npsychosis we regard as pure pleasure-pain series. But in the struggle\nfor existence the organism is driven out of this subjectivity to\ncognize its environment as related to itself, to apprehend and\ncomprehend and so to feel about itself\u2014emotion\u2014and so led to\nintelligent will activity as real self-activity. At the very first the\norganism has pleasures and pains, without knowing them as determined\nin itself by objects, but this primitive pre-cognitive stage is short,\nand most psychisms are certainly beyond it; they sense and notice\nthings, bodily and beyond the body, as of experience value in pleasure\nand pain terms. At some most critical moment cognition first arose as\ntriple movement, object\u2014subject\u2014consciousness knowledge. Just what may\nhave been its original form it is most difficult to determine, but we\nmay suppose it to have been a very weak activity, possibly\nexpressible, as, \u201cit hurts,\u201d object being simply pain centre. \u201cIt\nhurts,\u201d means object self-related, with consciousness of the\nconsciousness, and this is our language expression for what seems to\nbe an extremely common psychosis among many organisms. As simple pains\nwere probably the first conscious phenomena, consciousness of pain was\nprobably the first consciousness of consciousness, involving also\nsubject and object consciousness. Not only to have a pain, but to be\nconscious of it as definitely objectively determined is decidedly\nuseful attainment, which is finally inground in experience, so that it\noccurs spontaneously in highest psychisms. But it is only with a few\nof the highest human psychisms that consciousness object and subject\nare apprehended as general facts. Even by philosophers and scientists,\nsubject, subjectivity, and object are not easily apprehended in their\ndistinctness as purely general modes; it requires will strain to\nproperly know them.\n\nWe have throughout sought the origin and place of modes of consciousness\nin function, and from this point of view we must view object-knowledge,\nsubject-knowledge, and consciousness-knowledge as early coincident and\ncorrelative. Cognition springs up as a threefold mode, for in no single\nfactor by itself has it life value. Pain, we say, forced the organism to\nwork out to object as painer, cognition arising at once as triple\nactivity. However, this does not imply that there is a constant knowing\nwith, an apperception, that every consciousness is accompanied with a\nconsciousness of it. Pains, pleasures, perceptions, etc., constantly\nengross the consciousness field without our apprehending them. Simple,\ncommon folk and children are rarely apperceptive, but yet they are\neminently self-conscious, and consciousness conscious in all their life\nof na\u00efve selfishness. They are constantly perceiving the significance of\nthings for their own experience, and acting upon this felt meaning.\nAlthough not immediately aware of what is passing in their own\nconsciousness, as is common to certain high types of human psychism, yet\nin their self-interest they certainly know themselves as experiencers.\nThus immediate awareness of one\u2019s own psychic attitude as\nsuch\u2014apperception\u2014is a kind of consciousness of consciousness in measure\ndivorced from consciousness of the object, and so belonging to such a\nhigh scope of psychism that it hardly falls within the range of our\ndiscussion, which is confined to simple direct emotion\u2014value of things\nas implying both self and consciousness knowledge. Apperception as a\nconstant reflection and introspection is certainly not original. In its\noriginal form consciousness of consciousness is merely implied element\nin the study of things. The study of conscious self self-possession,\nself-poise, conscious psychic self-development, is all very late.\n\nLeaving now the general consideration and analysis of self-consciousness\nin the light of the general doctrine of evolution, let us note how it\noccurs in consciousness to-day. Let us come to some direct inductive\nstudy.\n\nThe simplest method and the most direct of studying the rise and nature\nof self-consciousness is in those experiences in coming to\nself-consciousness from deep sleep or from coma after severe accident. I\nsay, \u201cI regained consciousness,\u201d \u201cI came to consciousness,\u201d meaning, not\nbare consciousness as in mere sensations or perceptions, but a\nself-consciousness involved therein. In becoming conscious I came to\nself-consciousness; in becoming aware of the objective, I at once\nrealize my subjectivity, myself as experiencer. In coming out from under\nthe influence of chloroform, there is, I have distinctly observed in my\nown case, a struggling to realize, which is both objective and\nsubjective cognition. It is true a person having awakened under very\nstrange circumstances, as in a bed in a hospital after an accident, may\ndeclare, \u201cI did not know myself,\u201d but this does not mean that he had no\nself-consciousness, but merely that for the moment he did not identify\nthis self, himself, as John Smith, of Jonesville, etc. Sometimes it\nhappens that self-identification is not reached at all, but the self, as\nbodily whole experiencing, is speedily aware of self, a new personality\nand sense of personality quickly grows up. Again, a lunatic mistaking\n_himself_ for Herod or C\u00e6sar is thus always self-conscious. He has\nconsciously established himself as the self playing a part in the world,\nbut according to the opinion of his sane fellows he is much in error as\nto what that part is. Strictly speaking, there is no illusion of\nself-consciousness, except under the impossible supposition that a being\nnot a real self or psychic individual should have self-sense; but the\nvery act of self-cognizance implies reality of self-hood. It is plain\nthat even the insane man who regards _himself_ as tree or stone, has,\nhowever, the act of self-regard, is really self-conscious. Strictly\nspeaking, we cannot identify or recognise self, for sense of self is\nnecessary in any recognition to make it such, a self-consciousness is a\nfundamental _prius_. You recognise a tree, a house, but you do not\nrecognise yourself except as yourself is mere object related to you, to\nyour experience. Self-identification means only objective act, and is\nnot, then, the same as self-consciousness, though based upon it.\n\nI have endeavoured to make observations of myself in moments of awaking\nfrom sleep or going to sleep, to find whether subjective reference and\nobjective apprehension are mingled co-ordinately in consciousness from\nthe beginning, whether the self-sense reaches through both the\nperceptive life and the sensation life. Drowsing in bed I sometimes have\na feeling of bare pleasure as the first stage in a pleasant awakening.\nThere is here no sensing, no localizing, no awareness of body or of\nanything, no self-consciousness. This mere undifferentiated pleasure,\ninterrupted by \u201ccat-naps,\u201d may often recur. Lolling half-awake every one\nhas frequently experienced these feelings of pure pleasure, unsensed and\nunlocalized, and wholly unobjectivised, the barest and simplest\nconsciousness, the very first stage in awaking. In this very lowest\n_status_ in which I can ever catch my consciousness I have the pleasure\nfrom the warmth and softness of the bed without having to feel warm or\nsensing the soft. It is a distinct step to even feeling warm; moreover,\nin extreme drowsiness it is an effortful step, an active sensing, an\nobjectifying self-activity, and hence a real self-consciousness, implied\nin the sensing act. To _feel_ warm, to sense in this mode, is primarily\nobject cognition which implies a measure of subject and consciousness\ncognition in feeling the warmth as source of the pleasure. Any one who\nwill closely examine his mental state at the very first stage of slow\nawaking from deep sleep\u2014a state of primitive consciousness\u2014will notice a\nvanishing moment of mere pleasure or pain, and in cases of great\ndrowsiness, when a sensation supervenes upon this stage, it does not\nmerely _come_, as in our ordinary consciousness, but it is _brought_;\nthere is objectifying effort. So in basking in the sun like an animal,\nthe very first and lowest stage of consciousness I drop to is pure\npleasure without having even to feel warm; and the feeling warm is\ndistinctly a new and higher step in consciousness which is often\nattained by some slight effort. Thus it is distinctly possible for a man\nat times to be too lazy to feel warm; and this fundamental laziness must\nbe accounted not uncommon with lower psychisms. Similarly for cold\nawakening one. There is a moment of pain from cold before one feels\ncold, a general pain and uneasiness discomfort before one realizes what\nis the matter, feels cold and the part cold\u2014foot it may be\u2014and so\nreaches some self-consciousness; in language expression, I am cold or\nfeel cold. Here is a self-conscious personal experience, though the\nfirst touch of mere pain was experienced by the individual unconscious\nof himself.\n\nWe infer, then, that self-consciousness is first reached and maintained\nin the sensing act as definite cognitive volition. To sense warmth and\ncold is simply a little earlier objectification than to attain sense of\na light or a sound. To _feel_ is as active as to look or to listen. We\nknow that there are modes of force an appreciation of which does not now\nenter into known psychosis, but which might be sensed through long and\nsevere effort and evolve a new sense-organ. Thus, if the conditions of\nlife had demanded it, there would have arisen in the struggle of\nexistence a magnetic sense, though now a man may place his head between\nthe poles of the strongest magnet and be unable to reach any sensation.\nA magnetic sense once organized and inbred into experience would act\nwith the same apparent spontaneity, as a \u201c_given_,\u201d as does such a\nsensation as that of heat; and a person feeling magnetic would have\nself-feeling implied the same as in feeling warm. That feeling warm with\nus denotes something which possesses consciousness rather than\nconsciousness by struggle possessing it, is simply the result of the\ninheritance of the accumulated mental force by which past generations\nhave reached this sense, and thereby consolidated self-consciousness\nwith it, for self-consciousness is built up as reflex cognition from the\ncognitive effort and willing of the individual. Sensation always begins\nin a sensing, a volition of the individual to realize externality in its\nexperience value, that is, mode of affection of its own body, as in\nfeeling warm pleasurably or painfully. When the objective is not merely\nsensed but perceived, when object and objects are definitely cognized,\nself-consciousness is greatly furthered, as each object and objectifying\ncognizance means self-reference or interpretation in terms of\nself-experience.\n\nThat self-consciousness is early and fundamental psychosis, is apparent,\nnot only from the gradual losing consciousness on going to sleep or in\ngaining consciousness in waking, but also from the fact of its being\nuniversal in dream life. Those factors which remain throughout all\nstages and kinds of dream life, are justly regarded as organic and\nbasal. The higher and later elements, those which are still nascent and\nin the volitional stage, as conscience and reason, rarely or never occur\nin dreams. In the slightest dreams there is personal quality; I am\nconsciously experiencing, I am walking, riding, looking, hearing, etc.\nAn awareness of self pervades all dream life, even in its lowest form.\nWe are constantly in a world of objects which we are conscious of in\ntheir experience value as affecting us or to affect us. A person\nrelating a dream always narrates it as personal experience and so\nfelt\u2014\u201cI dreamed I was in a cave and I heard water running and I felt it\ncold,\u201d etc., etc. As far then as we can survey dream life, it is a\nsignificant fact that self-consciousness pervades it.\n\nAs far then as we can discover in dream consciousness, or in ordinary\nconsciousness, self-consciousness is persistent and pervasive element.\nIn the whole range of consciousness, with the exception of the very\nevanescent and absolutely primitive pure pleasure-pain series,\nself-cognition appears. We say, indeed, that a man forgets himself in a\nrage, but mean merely that the rage object as self-related quite\nengrosses consciousness to the exclusion of other forms of\nself-consciousness, as himself related to other selves. Blind with fury\nto all other objects than the rage object, he does not notice things as\nrelated to himself, and he will rush into a stone wall. In the utmost\nconcentration and intensification of emotion, self-consciousness does\nnot disappear, but is itself concentrated and intensified. Even in the\ndelirium of passion, so long as any cognition remains self-consciousness\nremains. The intensification order in consciousness, that is, where\nmultiple consciousness loses elements through intensifying of some\nothers, bears evidence then to the fundamental nature of\nself-consciousness. A person roused from sleep by cold, which becomes\nmore and more intense till he loses all consciousness through suffering,\nis throughout the long series self-conscious with the exception of the\ninitial and the final pang of pain. From the moment when cold made him\nattain consciousness till the moment when he thereby lost\nconsciousness\u2014that is, practically the time he was conscious\u2014he was\nself-conscious; this is the verdict of common introspection. Any one who\nlooks back upon his experiences of this intensification nature, finds\nhimself to have been self-conscious throughout.\n\nSo far then as I have been able to examine them, the modes of coming to\nconsciousness in dream life and in awaking process, and also the order\nof disappearing consciousness by intensification, confirm the general\nresult which at the opening of this chapter we deduced from a general\nconsideration of psychism under the conditions of existence, namely,\nthat self-consciousness is necessary and important factor in all\ncognitive process, the self-relating act giving vital value to all\nconsciousness of external and internal object, whether in sensing or\nperceiving.\n\nWe have already touched on the general function of self-consciousness,\nthe gain which accrues to the individual organism from knowing its own\nexperiences as such by giving self-directivity and special response. The\nindividual is thereby enabled to look after its own interests, to\nconsciously care for itself, and to make the most of itself. The core of\npsychic life is _interest_, and the core of _interest_ is\nself-consciousness. That the psychism has interest, that it feels for\nitself, is essential to the progress of life. Indeed, the genesis and\ngrowth of biological forms and organs lie in their attainment and\nperfecting as servants to the self in the struggle of existence. We know\nthis to be the case for the sense-organs. The organism evidently came to\nappreciate light by a definite _nisus_ with self-consciousness, just the\nsame in kind as that by which organ is advanced to-day when straining\nthe eyes to perceive a seventh Pleiad. In short, we do not see because\nwe have eyes, but we have eyes because we see. The seeing activity and\neffort as a self-activity generates the eye and perfects it. So also it\nis by locomotive effort that motor organs originate and develop. The\nyoung child learning to walk, self-consciously and with effort moving\nupon its legs, is an intimation of the way in which the limbs themselves\narose in active response to environment. The rabbits imported into\nAustralia have, it is reported, learned to climb trees, with a\nconsequent modification of foot structure. Now the real genesis of the\nmorphological change is obviously psychic, the climbing effort as a\nvaluable function to life under the conditions of existence, viz., the\nscarcity of herbage.\n\nBut not only the motor and sensory organs are to be traced in origin and\ngrowth to psychic basis in self-consciousness and struggle, but other\norgans now quite disassociated from will may originally have been\ndeveloped by will. Thus the stomach may have originated in digestive\neffort and the heart in circulatory effort. That self-attention to the\nheart stimulates the action of the heart is well-known, and also that in\nrare cases the heart\u2019s action is directly controlled by will. This may\nbe survival. Function is built up also as indirect result of will, as\nwhen motor effort in running develops heart action. Psychism may thus be\ninterpreted as the basis of all organic development. The body is the\noffspring of will. Certainly as man surveys progressive adaptation in\nhimself and other evolving organisms, the psychic basis is apparent in\nfeeling and in effort self-conscious; and if in any wise it has\napparently become mechanical and spontaneous, as in heart-beat, as in\ndigestion, as in winking the eye, this is to be ascribed to impulse from\nthe past. Self-consciousness quickens reaction, for reaction time is\nshortened when there is anticipation, and anticipation implies\nself-consciousness as awareness of experienceability. Self-consciousness\nalso enormously strengthens reaction. Thus the more thoroughly one\nrealizes his own danger, the more powerful the effort to escape. This is\ntrue under normal and simple conditions, the only form in which we are\nconsidering self-consciousness. Self-consciousness may become abnormal\nand debilitating in the hypochondriac, but this is a stage beyond our\npresent studies. Primarily in the struggle of life self-relating to\none\u2019s own experience is always advantageous function. The most important\nthing in life is the realization, by the aid of self-consciousness, of\nthe self-experience value of things; to appreciate and understand\nenvironment, and so adapt oneself to it and adapt it to oneself, to\nconserve and extend self, this is the substance of psychism, and its\nwhole history is thence pervaded by self-consciousness.\n\nBut we must now turn from these general considerations to specific\nemotions as related to self-consciousness. In the natural course of\nthings, an organism can never sense or view the self with indifference.\nIn all early psychic stages a dispassionate view of self is uncalled for\nand does not exist; and, in fact, even if the most educated and\nthoughtful human adult had a self-sense which is active as evolutionary\ncause, it may rightly be regarded as ever active. Life forms from the\nlowest protista to the highest vertebrate are in their development due\nto active response, and thus morphological development may be looked at\nas a functional embodiment of psychism. Instead, then, of regarding\npsychism merely as life factor, we may go farther, and define life as\npsychism. This is what the doctrine of active response and development\nthereby, with natural selection, leads to. The phenomena of life, so far\nas we can interpret them, seem to favour the view that organism is\nobjectification of the will, and, except at the very first stage, will\nas cognitive, and triply so in object-subject-consciousness cognition.\nSuch evidence as we have points rather to organic body as reflex of mind\nthan mind as reflex of body. That the initiatory, progressive, and\ncreative force in evolution is psychic, we judge from such instances as\nwe can observe of progressive adaptation in ourselves and in lower\nanimals. Where new circumstances affect a species, as the rabbit\ntransferred to Australia, the favouring modification of the foot to\nclimb trees is evidently only attained by severest struggle for\nself-conservation. If a new mode of force were introduced to this\nplanet, which should powerfully affect life, it would reach it at first\nonly through pleasure-pain, and the growth to a special sense-organ for\nthis new force would very gradually be attained through the struggle for\nexistence.\n\nThe prime value of self-consciousness in evolution is in securing an\nintelligent correlation with environment. All specific reaction and\nadaptation arose probably through an emotion volitional self-relating of\nobject. It is a biologic psychic law that all emotion is bound up with\nself-consciousness, and all self-consciousness with emotion, for thus\nonly is there efficiency as intelligent will stimulation. But while\nsense of self is inherent in all emotion as such, may it not in some\ncases have a peculiar place, so that we may justly term them\nself-feelings or emotions of personality?\n\nA child fears the dog and is proud of its new dress. Here are two\nemotions which both imply self-consciousness, the object is in both\nrelated to the self, but they differ in egoistic quality in that in the\nfear there is sense of the thing as acting on the self, in the pride\nthere is sense of the self as acting on the thing. In the pride it is\nthe object as identified with the self that is the source of emotion.\nThe pride proceeds from within outward, while fear, _vice vers\u00e2_. In\nfear it is the experience value of the dog, that it will hurt, that\ngives the emotion quality; but in the pride the essence of the emotion\nlies, not in the influence of the dress on the self, but that the self\nis connected with the dress by way of ownership. \u201cSee my pretty dress\u201d;\n\u201cOh mama! the cross dog\u201d; the emotions thus expressed appear to belong\nto different orders; the fear being of the thing in its effect on the\nself, the pride being of the self in the thing. Pride is a glorified\nself-consciousness, self-consciousness is its substance and immediate\nspirit, whereas in fear self-consciousness is but an instrument in\ninterpretation of experience value. We observe an interesting example of\nemotion of personality in a young girl who fears a cow and is yet\nashamed of her fear. Here, while self-consciousness is certainly\ninvolved in the fear, yet it is peculiarly involved in the emotion at\nher emotion as such; the shame is at or of herself, the fear is for\nherself. This peculiar personal feature of pride is signified by the\ncommon usage of language; the child is proud of the thing, does not\npride the thing, but prides himself on the thing, whereas in fear he\nfears the thing for himself. I say, indeed, the child is afraid of the\ndog and proud of his dress, but the force of the preposition is quite\ngeneral.\n\nIt may be said that pride is not peculiarly an emotion of personality\nsimply as being directed toward self; one can hate himself, fear\nhimself, be angry at himself, etc. But the drunkard fearing himself\nmeans merely that he fears the results of his own tendencies, _delirium\ntremens_, for instance, a perfectly objective fear. And it is evident\nthat one cannot, holding to the term, self, in the same meaning, fear at\nonce himself for himself. The self which is endangered is not the self\nwhich endangers. In all such cases as so-called fearing self the action\nis from without inward, which is the reverse of the mode in\npersonality\u2014emotion where oneself is seen, not as affected by the thing,\nbut as himself in the thing.\n\nThe typical and earliest of the emotions of personality is undoubtedly\npride. Like all emotions pride includes cognition of object; pride is\nalways proud of something but in the peculiar way before emphasized, in\nthe light which our own personality casts upon it. Pride generally and\ncertainly originally implies sense of something done or possessed by\nself and that in a manner superior to competitors. It is a self\nassertion over rivals, an impressing spectators, a being proud of\nsomething to some one. If the world contained but one solitary conscious\nindividual, he could never attain to pride, though he might be\nself-satisfied. Sense of comparative self-magnification is essential to\npride. Pride as social in its nature suffers great diminishing when the\nindividual is long kept in solitude, and in some cases men may\nultimately lose all standard of comparison and so pride entirely\nvanishes. If a man were from his earliest remembrance an inhabitant of a\ndesert isle pride would have no opportunity to develop. His achievements\nmight satisfy himself, but they could not make him proud, for he would\nknow nothing of others and their works. Again, this need of sociality is\nseen in this, that we are not proud of our planet as such. We\ndistinguish it, indeed, as our own, but we have no sense of pride in its\nfinest features as such. I do not feel proud of Amazonian forest or\nHimalayan mountain merely as earth characters. However, if in the future\nwe secure interplanetary communication, and planets rival each other as\ncities and countries do now, there will be a stimulus to pride on an\nastronomical scale. If we could say to the inhabitants of some neighbour\nsphere that our planet made better time round the sun than theirs, this\nwould be the basis of an intense pride.\n\nThe extent of pride is thus equal to the extent of the self-sense, but\nin its wide ranges pride is relatively weak. I am proud of my country,\nbut, other things being equal, more proud of my state and still more\nproud of my city. I am proud of the achievements of the Anglo-American\nrace, and I always survey a locomotive with pride, but it is when\nownership and achievement comes closer to the _ego_, as in one\u2019s\nrelatives and family, that pride notably intensifies, and it reaches its\n_maximum_ in view of one\u2019s own attainments. That which we do without any\nassistance and which seems to us far beyond the ordinary gives the best\nand highest incitement to pride.\n\nPride, in the later stages at least, is more and more discriminating,\nand is connected finally only with those objects which are the actual\nwill products of the individual, and so identified with the veritable\nself. Thus is erected by society a pride test, and men say, \u201cHe has a\nright to be proud,\u201d or, \u201cHe ought not to be proud.\u201d Yet standards will\ndiffer, and what one will be proud of another will be ashamed of, and\n_vice vers\u00e2_. The general standard is largely regulated by the\ncomparative amount of will force and so of strength required in the\nparticular act; thus, while I am not proud of crushing an ant, I might\nbe at felling an ox.\n\nThe general expression of pride is holding up one\u2019s head and expanding\noneself generally, though this self-enlargement is not, as in anger, to\ninspire fear in beholders, but rather admiration. Proud sense of\nsuperiority naturally asserts itself primarily in physical\nimpressiveness, and, as such, pride plays an especially large part in\nsexual selection. The lower expression of pride is swagger and strut,\nthe higher in a dignity and stateliness of demeanour.\n\nThe function of pride, the use which originally determined its\ndevelopment, and which is still apparent, is a pleasure-sanction to\ncompetitive successful effort. The proud consciousness of triumph is one\nof the greatest pleasures of existence, and if there were no such\nemotion following the winning effort, life would lose much of its\nincentive. Pride prevents parasitism. Without pride to stimulate and\nreward, striving mind would have lost one of the most potent factors of\nprogress. Even in human education it becomes of value to appeal to a\njust and proper pride. In the lower life it is all important. It gives\ntone to life, gives power and confidence, assertiveness and\naggressiveness, and conduces in a large measure to permanent and\nprogressive self-aggrandisement. And not only for effect upon self but\nupon others, pride is an important psychic factor. Thus pride in always\nshowing a bold, commanding front to rivals, makes a direct impression\nupon antagonists. Pride always puts the best foot first, hides weakness\nand exaggerates strength, so that the proud one always shows for all and\neven more than he is, and thus gains much in the struggle of existence\nwhere even mere appearance of power is apt to discourage opponents. The\none who is strong and proud of it is doubly strong. Pride is the reflex\nof gain and victory, as shame is of loss and defeat. It is thus the root\nof ambition, the desire of rank and place for superiority\u2019s sake which\nhas been, and now is, especially in advanced human psychism, a most\npowerful agent in the evolution of life and mind.\n\nBut while it is undoubtedly true that pride is in its origin solely an\nadvantageous psychosis, and indeed, could have been developed in no\nother way, yet there is a disadvantageous side. Only up to a certain\npoint is it true that the prouder one is, the better off he is. When\npride, over-stimulated, betrays into over-confidence and heedlessness,\nthen, indeed, \u201cpride goeth before a fall.\u201d But at the first, however, we\nmust suppose that the organism was proud of only that of which it was to\nits advantage to be proud; but by perversion and hypertrophy, indeed, in\npride as in the case of other emotions, caused largely by rivals, it\nbecame a source of great disadvantage and positively destructive of high\nself-advancement. Conceit, an over-weening abnormal pride which is\ntotally irrelevant to the real standing of the individual, cannot but be\nhighly injurious. However, harmful pride must be accounted rather late.\nIn early psychisms attainment over and beyond others, when perceived\nnaturally and normally, gave rise to pride as a wholly useful emotion\nreaction, and those who had the capacity of being proud had a distinct\nadvantage over those who had no sense of their own consequence or no\npride about it. Even in human society we must remark that in general\nthose who are incapable of becoming proud on proper occasion, are less\nand less liable to reach the occasion.\n\nPride, as emotion of sense of superiority, manifests itself in many\nforms, of which we need not now expect to make a detailed or complete\ninvestigation, since the object of our present studies is merely to\nemphasize the main forms of the early emotions from the point of view of\nnatural selection. Simple pride, which is unconscious of itself, but\nacts directly and without reflection, as we see in a child proud of a\nnew dress, is a phase which does not often appear in the experience of\nthe educated human adult, where pride becomes highly complicated with\nemotional and intellectual movements of many kinds, and where it is\nextended to a wide diversity of objects with the extension of\nself-interest. Thus men are proud of rank, blood, money, muscular\nstrength, possessions, intellectual attainments, moral character, and,\nin fact, whatever the idea of _mine_ can be applied to. However, the\ndifferent kinds of pride are not to be distinguished by the object\nmerely, as pride of rank, blood, etc., for difference in object does not\nby itself constitute distinct quality in psychic act. Pride is the same,\nwhether it is of a horse, a bank account, or a wife. Still the object\nfrequently calls up subsidiary emotions which may complicate pride, and\nthe perceived nature of the object certainly influences our feeling\ntoward it.\n\nWhen an object is to be competed for, but we consider it beneath us to\nenter the lists, or we think our rivals unworthy of our attention, we\nhave the peculiar phase of feeling termed arrogance. Arrogance brooks no\nrivalry and stands apart on a peak of self-contained superiority. Walter\nSavage Landor, the proudest of men, displays this feeling in perfection\nwhen he says in one of his cameos in verse:\n\n \u201cI strove with none,\n For none were worth my strife.\u201d\n\nThis is a perfect expression of complete arrogance. We may say that he\nwas too proud to be proud. No one was worthy of his mettle, and so he\nheld himself aloof with the feeling of immeasurable superiority.\nStrictly speaking then, arrogance is a variety of very intense pride\nwhere the sense of superiority is perfectly exclusive and absolute, and\ndisdains comparison. It is entirely inconsiderate of others\u2019 rivalry and\nabove caring for the approval or disapproval or admiration of others.\nThus this phase, unlike pride in general, seeks concealment rather than\ndisplay; its excellence is so far beyond the common as to be\nunappreciable by contemporaries, and appreciated by self alone.\n\nConceit is a term objectively applied, but hardly indicates a kind of\npride, a real subjective distinction. He who thinks more highly of\nhimself than he ought to think, esteems himself beyond his due, and so\nis considered by the community over proud, is termed conceited. The\npride which is entirely just, as viewed from the objective standpoint,\nis quite the same subjectively as the most preposterous conceit.\nSimilarly also dignity is no real feeling. \u201cThat man is dignified\u201d; this\nis an objective characterization of his manner of conduct, but this does\nnot imply that he feels dignified. Pride may give a dignified demeanour,\nbut a feeling dignified can only refer to the reactive effect upon\nconsciousness, of this mode of behaviour. \u201cI feel proud,\u201d may likewise\nsometimes be used, not for designating the subjective feeling or being\nproud, but as equal to, \u201cI felt that I was proud,\u201d that is, \u201cI was proud\nand I knew it,\u201d \u201cI had the sense of being proud.\u201d So also in general we\nmay remark that while feeling may denote a simple state of being, yet\nsuch phrases as \u201cI felt proud,\u201d \u201cfelt angry,\u201d etc., are ambiguous, and\nmay mean either the bare feeling of pride, anger, etc., as experienced,\nor the feeling of being proud, angry, etc., or both, that is,\nconsciousness of the particular consciousness may or may not complicate\nself-consciousness. The word, feel, is often used in this merely\nreflexive way to denote a sense of state as, \u201cI was proud and I felt so\nat the time.\u201d Thus common phrase verifies the analysis that\nself-consciousness and consciousness of consciousness are bound up with\nemotion, the full analysis of the phrase showing that the feeling proud\nwas an object consciousness _plus_ a subject consciousness.\n\nAs previously intimated, we have to sharply distinguish between pride\nand such emotions as self-satisfaction and self-complacency. These\nlatter emotions of personality deal solely with the self in its own\nsight, while pride is always not over self to self, but over self to\nothers. The self-satisfied often are proud, but this is not necessarily\nimplied. The comparative element enters in self-satisfaction, as in all\ntrue pride, but the comparison is primarily with oneself, not with\nothers. If we succeed in our own eyes, we may think little about others.\nA pure self-satisfaction, like a purely altruistic pride, is a rare and\nlate phenomenon. Pride about others, pride to oneself, are both very apt\nto be tinged with the original pride over others. One says of a friend,\n\u201cI feel proud of him\u201d; but while this has a certain reality and psychic\nvalue of altruistic mode, yet the innate and fundamental selfishness of\npride tends to make a place in what appears to be the most disinterested\nform. Personal interest and aggrandisement is so inbred a motive from\nthe earliest stages of evolution that it is never superseded.\n\nA feeling of embarrassment is an emotion of personality which is closely\nconnected with pride. Those who are most susceptible to pride are most\napt to feel embarrassed. The one who has no tendency toward pride, who\ndoes not in the least care how he may appear before others or in\nrelation to others, and so does not value his place among his fellows,\ncannot be embarrassed. He may be disturbed by the difficulties of some\ntask, but only in the same way in which he would be agitated by any\ndifficult work undertaken by and for himself alone. The emotion of\nembarrassment, like pride, conceives the self in its social relations.\nWhen one says that he felt greatly embarrassed in being called on\nunexpectedly to speak at a dinner, we perceive that he means emotion,\nnot merely in view of the inherent difficulty of the task, but in view\nof what he himself may or may not do under the inspection of the\ncritical. In this emotion there is a wonderful quickening of the\nself-sense, a painfully intense self-consciousness being suddenly\ngenerated as the peculiar relation of self to others is impressed upon\nhim. This self-sense is powerfully reinforced by the self-sense of the\nbodily expression of self-consciousness. The whole bodily self seems\nconspicuously magnified, and we become painfully aware of hands, feet,\nand other members. This bodily self-sensitiveness, as often contributing\nstrongly to this emotion-total, is very marked in cases of blushing. A\ngirl, feeling embarrassed, blushes, and immediately becoming conscious\nof the blushing as itself an embarrassing circumstance, blushes again\nstill more violently, and becoming conscious of this, becomes still more\nconfused, and so on, a constant cumulation of psychic effect from\nreaction of expression. Sense of the expression of embarrassment is\nitself embarrassing, hence every embarrassment may become in itself a\nnew source of embarrassment. However, that this peculiar\nself-consciousness cannot be forced in itself or in its expression, we\nsee in the fact that the efforts of the maiden who exclaims in mock\nmodesty, \u201cI _know_ I am blushing,\u201d are entirely futile. This assumption\nof embarrassment may become embarrassing, and so a genuine expression be\nstimulated, which, however, is of quite another order from the one\ndesired.\n\nHow such an emotion as that of embarrassment, which is disadvantageous\nfrom the first, could have originated under natural selection, can never\nbe solved by the evolutionist who views all variation as originally\nspringing from personal advantage. Here is a psychosis, always the\nreverse of serviceable, an emotion anticipatory of disgraceful defeat,\nand so is really premonitory, but yet one which ever unnerves, rather\nthan nerves to successful action. He who never feels embarrassed, under\nany circumstances always has the best chance. Hence this psychosis must\nbe strictly a negative evolution, an unfavourable variation determined\nby a persistent exciting by antagonists as serviceable to them. An\nadversary will always put his opponent in an embarrassing situation, and\nendeavour that he shall both be embarrassed and feel embarrassment. This\nemotion has thus been stimulated and fostered during ages of psychic\nevolution, and in advanced human evolution the stimulating it is one of\nthe subtlest methods of offence.\n\nA feeling of embarrassment is incipient shame, or perhaps the way for\nshame. But the feeling of embarrassment is generally anticipatory as to\nthe potential, while shame is as to the actual; it is a feeling of\npresent public degradation and loss. Both equally imply a capacity for\npride; one who cannot be proud cannot be ashamed. But shame, unlike the\nfeeling of embarrassment, acts as serviceable variation to the\nindividual, and is one of the weightiest negative guards to advantageous\nactions. It cannot promote very high and noble action, but it keeps\nabove a certain low and base level. The member of society who has lost\nall pride and all sense of shame has ceased to feel the most powerful\nand useful of social incentives.[E]\n\n-----\n\nFootnote E:\n\n As to the origin of bodily shame, we may suppose that this arose with\n reference to _excreta_ as something rejected from the body, and\n therefore base and unworthy. With the refined even spitting and\n perspiring are shameful. It may be that sexual shame can be traced to\n the same root, but social convention and morality also have very large\n influence here.\n\n-----\n\nThere is a certain curious psychosis which may be called shame for want\nof a better term. I allude to the feeling which prompts one to shun\noneself. One may not only be ashamed to look others in the eye, but even\nhimself. He will not look at himself in a mirror because he feels a\ngreat loss of self-respect. This is not the opposite of vanity, a shame\nat viewing oneself because of unseemliness of feature, which is liable\nto general observation, but it is rather the reverse, the polar opposite\nof pure self-feeling, of self-respect and self-satisfaction. A feeling\nof shame with regard to oneself alone is still, of course, comparative;\nthough it does not touch upon others, it implies a self-erected\nstandard. This emotion, like the others just mentioned, is obviously\nvery late.\n\nHowever, perhaps the latest in the series, and the psychic culmination\nof all is humility. Humility, like meekness, marks a new order of\nevolution. In the highest human development pride is eliminated and\nsupplanted by humility. A true self-estimate of personal achievement\nupon a very wide and impartial impersonal basis, either that of a\nscientific view of man\u2019s place in the universe, or as influenced by high\nreligious and moral ideals, leads to a feeling of humility. Egoism and\nself-assertiveness give place to altruistic modesty and refined reserve.\nThe humble man always gives place rather than takes place. He does not\nlift himself above his fellows, but takes the lowest seat, and is\nservant of all. The humble man does not strive with others, not because\ntoo proud to do so, as Landor, but because he feels called to the\nhighest and best work for its own sake. He says with Laotze, \u201cDo, not\nstrive.\u201d Unthinking of getting ahead or falling behind others, he aims\nconsistently and constantly at an ideal of perfect fruitage, so high an\nideal that he always feels his own unworthiness in his own sight and in\nthat of others, though aware of his desert by the ordinary standards of\nhis community, country, or generation. Worldly successes produce no\nelation in the lowly of heart; they view themselves, not with\nself-depreciation, but with the justness of the largest view, as Newton,\nwho, when complimented upon his attainments, replied that he had but\npicked up a few pebbles by the ocean of truth. Spiritual and ethical\nprinciples sway these, and not personal ambition. And it must be noted\nthat humility is not simply lack of pride under circumstances which\nnaturally allow of it, an insensitiveness to pride, a wholly negative\nstate, which is nothing in itself, but it is a positive feeling and\nemotion in view of oneself in relation to others. Thus the humble man is\nhe of high pride capacity, and who consciously refrains from pride when\nusual standards would allow it. \u201cThat is something to be proud of,\u201d \u201cHe\nhas a right to be proud,\u201d and similar expressions mark the lower\nstandards of which he never avails himself. The best and noblest\nspecimens of mankind renounce the \u201cworld,\u201d \u201cthe lust of the eye and\npride of life,\u201d and live by their self-erected ideals. And if we ask how\nthe spirit of humility and disinterestedness can arise and progress in a\nnatural evolution, we must answer that it holds its place and wins its\nway by reason of its greater inherent value and fruitfulness. He who has\nhimself in view has lost sight of his work. By this psychic mode alone\nis the largest, most perfect, most permanent work accomplished, and\nultimately, often posthumously, it is appreciated at its real worth.\nThose originating and master minds in human history who have opened new\navenues of spiritual progress, have usually been of this modest,\nunassuming, humble type. Thus in a wholly natural manner the higher law\nof an ideal life prevails over the lower law of life which works only by\ncompetition in the struggle for existence.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER XVI\n _INDUCTION AND EMOTION_\n\n\nWe have implied throughout that we have feeling about a thing only so\nfar as we attach on basis of past experience an experience value to the\nthing, as we say, \u201cthe burnt child dreads the fire.\u201d Induction, as this\ninterpretation is termed, is so important an element that we will devote\na little space to considering its _rationale_, development, and place in\nintellectual emotion.\n\nWhat is the _rationale_ of the inductive act? Why should iteration lead\nto expectancy of reiteration? I observe that a body unsupported falls in\na hundred instances, but is it not arbitrary for me then to suppose that\nit will fall the hundred and first instance? In fact would it not be\nmore rational to suppose that this particular combination should be\nexhausted, that it was time for nature to stop? But this very reason\nrests on the uniformity of nature\u2014the very law we are questioning\u2014as\nexperienced in the past and applied to the future; only it is a negative\nlaw of omissions, literally law of reiteration of unreiterations. Thus\nif reason takes the law of uniformity of nature to task it can only do\nso by assuming it. J. S. Mill in his treatment of this matter (_Logic_,\nbk. iii. chap. 3, sec. 2), falls into an error. It is, indeed, true, as\nhe says, that some occurrences repeated suggest cessation and not\nrecurrence, as when we have several consecutive cloudy days, we expect a\nbright one, or having had several rainy seasons we expect a dry one; but\nit is plainly wrong to regard this, as he does, as a contradiction of\nthe principle of uniformity of nature. On the contrary, this is a very\ngood example of it. Experience of intermittent character of bad weather\nin the past leads to expectancy of its re-intermittency for the future,\nand the oftener the experience the stronger the belief as to the nature\nof the still unexperienced. A negative uniformity is as much a\nuniformity as a positive.\n\nIt is plain that we can assign no reason for our belief in the\nuniformity of nature. It is simply a fact, an arbitrary fact if you\nwill, that the more often experiences are conjoined, the more strongly\nwe expect the conjuncture. I may imagine a body unsupported remaining\nstationary in the air as readily as to imagine it falling; however, I\n_believe_ it will fall, and I duck my head for fear of getting hurt. Not\nany speculative reason then, but a very practical reason, is at the\nbottom of this inductive tendency, that is, the conservation and\nprogress of the organism is secured by induction as anticipatory\nfunction. The origin of induction is not then in its abstract\nrationality, but in its immediate utility as a life function. Experience\nis self-adjustment through felt stimulus. Once begun it grows by\ncontinual self-reference, and hence practically all experience is\ninductive. Experience is thus a _continuum_, an integrating cumulating\nwhole; and inductive experience, like all experience, arises and\nprogresses by reason of its serviceability.\n\nIt has been implied that the inductive act arises very early in the\nhistory of experience. Every psychosis is what it is by reason of all\nthe previous psychoses in the individual and the race. Psychism, while\nit has its points of development in individuals, must yet be estimated\nas a unit, as a single whole. But we have to ask whether this\nmodification of one psychosis by another is conscious or unconscious. If\nsome low organism have in its lifetime but two consciousnesses, must we\nregard the second as influenced in quality by the first, and if so,\nconsciously influenced, that is, a conscious relating, an active\ninduction as opposed to mechanical integration? Is mind always\nself-building, or does psychosis act and react on psychosis\nautomatically? We have maintained that all the growth of mind has been\nin the past, as in the present, by struggle, by severest endeavour, and\nhence if experience modify experience it is by conscious act. Experience\nthus constantly connects with itself and builds upon itself, it is\nself-integrating, that is, inductive, in all its evolution. Mind, as\nprimarily pleasure-pain and struggle, by endeavour reaches back to\nitself, realizes itself, and rises upon itself.\n\nTake a comparatively simple case. A child tastes an orange, and finds it\nsweet, _i.e._, it relates the sweetness to the object, which relating is\na true thinking, an active conjoining or associating. Upon the\npresentation of another orange to the child at a later date, he\nidentifies it as the sweet thing; he associates sweetness as to be\nexperienced from it on basis of past associating, that is, he makes an\ninduction. In this second orange-experience, as far as there is active\nconjoining of mental products, a definite adding to present percept of\nsweet taste as experienceable by conscious reference to former percept\n(taste-experience), we must recognise a genuine thought-process. The\nthinking consists in the joining of sensation of taste to an object, not\nas a present, but as a future experience, on the basis of some past\nexperience. Here is a true mediation or reasoning of inductive type, and\nalso a true concept-process, that is, a taking together, a conscious\nuniting, although the product is still particular. The nearest approach\nto expressing this psychological process in language is to say, \u201cThis\nround yellow is this sweet, because this round yellow was this sweet\nbefore.\u201d The correlating process rests upon the relating process\naccomplished at first experience of orange-tasting, whereby the taste\nwas related to the thing tasted. This relating may be thrust upon the\nmind, or the mind may consciously and actively assimilate. Thought in\nthe wide sense of the term may be made to include all mediate or\nimmediate conscious conjoining of experiences, whether the product be\ngeneral or particular.\n\nMediacy is certainly, however, accomplished before commonness is noted,\nwhich in ordinary usage is concept-making. The grouping of the\nparticular taste with the particular sight and touch on basis of past\nexperience does not give a general result. The mediate term of past\nexperience of taste which the child brings up on sight of orange and\napplies to the present case does not suggest commonness, but constancy\nof experience, for at first it knows things only as identical, and not\nas separate, or as like or unlike. The method of this early intelligence\nis that of identifying, \u201cThe orange was sweet and is sweet\u201d; and not\nthat of common characterizing, \u201cOranges are sweet, and this is an\norange.\u201d The child does not discriminate or understand that the object\nof its first experience is, by reason of this experience, no longer to\nbe experienced; it has not attained notion of disappearance. It does not\ncognize the orange as one of a group or class, having as common\ncharacters roundness, sweetness, and yellowness, and from presence of\nround-yellow in any instance infer sweet; but it knows orange only as\nthis particular object of past, present, and future experience. Many of\nthe early thought-experiences of children are to be interpreted rather\nupon this identity-method than upon the usual interpretation of true\nconcepts. Thus the child who calls every person of certain age, dress,\netc., \u201cPapa,\u201d is not thinking of a papa, or class of papas, but of the\npapa. This is mistaken identity: the common and like is the same, and\nthe child requires considerable discrimination before it attains to\nnotion of papa in general. Same and not-same are discriminated before\nlike and unlike, and hence young children use common names as proper.\nNow the mental product achieved by the child, which, as expressed in\nwords, we term the papa, may be styled a particular concept, a gathering\ntogether of sight-sensations, and associating sound- and\ntouch-sensations with these so that any generally like group of\nsight-sensations enables the child to call up on basis of past\nexperience the associated sound and touch, to expect the gentle word and\ncaress. The child in identifying the orange, \u201cThis round yellow thing is\nthe sweet thing,\u201d is bringing together with a certain general force, not\nof common characterization, indeed, but of temporal significance as\npermanent grouping. Animals and young children think mostly on the\nidentifying plan; they join to and expect for a present experience what\nhas been conjoined with it in past experience, but the object is the\nsame, not a like one.\n\nHow then does the child come to knowledge of things as like, to form a\nclass of oranges after regarding all oranges as the orange? Pass oranges\nbefore a young child one after the other so that one only is in sight,\nand the child will probably know only one orange as the same continually\nre-appearing. The image formed will, however, be more or less composite,\nthe mental product will be a concept-image, as being a re-inforcement\nand exaggeration of common characters and a suppression of individual;\nbut for practical purposes it is still a particular concept, that is,\nthe child applies it to the one and not the many, and does not recognise\nits representative nature. A general image as a group of common\nqualities may be thus attained before consciousness of this generality\nis reached.\n\nIf now two or three oranges are presented to the child at the same time,\nit will learn to discriminate them as separate co-existences, having\ncharacters in common, roundness, yellowness, etc.; the objects will be\nrecognised as individuals belonging to class round-yellow things. Here a\ngeneral image having a general import is achieved. The particular\ncharacters, round, yellow, sweet, which always centred in and made up\nthe individual orange, are recognised to have general scope in applying\nto many objects. Groups of characters had been achieved before by\nparticular thinking, but now by general thought groups of characters as\ncommon are formed. From the practically coincident impressions it gains\nthe notion orange, so that it recognises new individuals as individuals,\nand not as the individual or single object, as in the earlier and cruder\nidentity method of thinking. The mind now\u2014instead of saying \u201cSame\nimpressions, same object\u201d\u2014says \u201cSame impressions, like objects.\u201d Instead\nof making an object as a group of qualities, it makes a class of objects\nhaving the group of qualities in common. Concept-forming is thus often\nbut an extension from what I have termed the particular concept; the\ngroup of qualities formed as characterizing the thing is through\nexperience with co-existences predicated of things. Notion or idea of\nthe orange precedes notion or idea of orange; but both are truly notions\nor concepts, a taking together of impressions, one of particular, the\nother of general import. The general significance of the particular\ngroup is first forced upon the mind by experience, but soon the mind\ngeneralizes as well as notices generalizations brought to it. Gradually\nthe mind obtains power to generalize, not only from co-existences, but\nfrom successions, and later still to generalize by abstraction, to\ncompare and pick out common features amidst the unlike, to search for\nunity in diversity.\n\nThe rise of generalizing power is through the struggle for existence; it\noriginates, like all other mental processes, in practical needs. Law is\nthereby not simply acted upon or merely recognised, as in the\nassociative stage: it is definitely sought for and applied. Art arises,\nand also science. The ability, given by generalizing power, of dealing\nwith things in the lump, becomes of signal service, and specially\ndistinguishes man. But the primary value of the concept in all its\nstages is not as a summation of experience, but as a guide for the\nfuture. Through reiterated grouping the concept-group is recognised as\npermanent factor, so that one element of a group being given, other\nelements are expected through a conscious assimilation with the past\nexperience. The concept answering to the word orange, for example, is\nthe mental product recognising a constant co-existence of certain\nqualities of shape, colour, size, taste, etc., so that from occurrence\nof one or more we infer other or others. Concepts are the inner\ngroupings, the mental synthesizings, which interpret the outer groupings\nthat we term laws of nature. In all this we see the inductive element in\nits conscious form, experience developing itself by anticipating future\nin terms of past.\n\nWe have now to consider briefly the psychological nature of judgment and\nreasoning with special reference to the inductive feature. Logically\njudgment is any connecting, _plus_ affirming of reality, as effected\nthrough the copula. The copula is made, not only to denote relation, but\nreality of relation, to express, not only the act of connecting, but\nalso its validity for the case in hand. Psychologically, judging may be\nregarded as any thinking, as any relating without reference to the\nthings related, whether it be a joining of the concept \u201creality\u201d to some\nother concept as a concept-forming process, or any joining of other\nelements. I have already discussed the nature of relating _per se_, but\non the topic of judgment a word is to be said about the\nproposition-form. In all thinking there are the two things\njoined\u2014subject and predicate in language-expression\u2014and the act of\njoining, or copula in language-expression; thus all thought is capable\nof the proposition-form. Indeed, the word-form cannot express a thinking\nbut only a thought as a consolidated and single product, and as a sign\nof process. The word is a summary of process and relations, but it\ncannot express process as concept-forming or judging. The word orange\nsignifies for the mind by symbolic and shorthand method, \u201cThing is sweet\n_plus_ thing is yellow,\u201d etc; but as far as process happens, and not\nsimultaneous composite representation, the process is capable of\nproposition-form. All relatings or joinings, even of particulars to\nparticulars, are of the proposition-type, and I must dissent from the\ncommon view that two percepts cannot stand in subject-predicate\nrelations. As I have before discussed, the relating of particular to\nparticular is thinking, and to say \u201cThis sweet belongs to this yellow\u201d\nis awkward indeed, but still psychologically proper. Every proposition,\non the other hand, is susceptible of analysis as expressive of\nconcept-forming relating. The proposition \u201cMan is mortal\u201d is expression\nof a mental process of joining; the concept mortal is either attached to\nor detached from the concept man, according as we consider the process\nas synthetic or analytic. If it be a grouping or concept-forming in full\nsense, it means that in forming the concept man, we add to the already\ngathered qualities the quality \u201cmortal\u201d on basis of experience. The\nchild first notices deaths in cases of John, Peter, etc., whom it knows\nto belong to the class \u201cmen,\u201d forms the concept \u201cmortal\u201d and adds it by\ngeneralisation to the whole class and enlarges concept \u201cman\u201d by one\nquality. This proposition, as denoting inductive concept-forming,\nexpresses the act of incorporating on basis of experience the quality\nmortal into the quality-group man. As analytic, as a detaching of what\nhas been grouped, the proposition still expresses joining, and until the\nstatement becomes purely formal and practically meaningless the\nrejoining is always a strengthening of the concept, and formative in its\nvalue.\n\nAll uniting or relating is, however, more than a bare connecting; it is\na definite mode of relating, it has a form; and the first and\nfundamental form is that of time and space, by which all relating has\nthe inductive quality of relying upon the past for the interpretation of\nthe future. But thought as self-active mentality is specially stimulated\nand controlled by the form of reality. All relatings are not, however,\ninfluenced by sense of reality, and hence belief is not coincident with\njudgment in the large sense. Affirmation or denial of actuality or\nreality is a kind of joining, but is not joining _per se_. The infant\njoins taste of sweetness with percept round-yellow for the first time\nand for many following times with no reference to reality or unreality.\n\u201cThis round-yellow is this sweet\u201d expresses a mere connecting, a bare\nrelating, but as neither real nor unreal. There is no emphasis laid on\nthe copula by which it expresses more than a mere joining. But let the\nperfect tranquility of the child\u2019s experience be broken in upon by\ndiscord of appearance and reality, let the child once have a bitter\nexperience with a round lemon, then its future conjoinings of\nround-yellow and sweet will be more or less tinged by sense of\npossibility of error, and emphasis will be laid on the copula, \u201cThat\n_is_ sweet.\u201d Through other such experiences with other of its\nthought-groups, the child generalises to the universal significance of\nreality and unreality for all its thinking; hence, all conjoinings with\ntheir copula-expressions attain a new force and quality from this\ninduction. In the light of fallibility as making up a part of the\nconcept \u201cexperience,\u201d all thought-experience modifies itself by this\nself-relation. Reality becomes so constant and universal for all\nthought-life that mature thought can never escape it. Hegel tried to\nrise superior to the notion of existence, but psychologically, at least,\nhe failed. The conception or induction of reality becomes a necessary\nform of thought by being united with all unitings. Judgment in the\nnarrow sense may be defined as all those relatings in which the reality\nof the relation is affirmed or denied.\n\nLastly a word on the nature of reasoning. Reasoning is mediatorial; the\njoining is accomplished through one or more mediates. Most if not all\nthinking is by mediating; joining proceeds only upon ground or basis,\nwhether recognised or not as such. \u201cKings are mortal\u201d is the\nlanguage-expression of a conjoining effected either through the\nparticular mediate term, John, or terms, John, Peter, etc., or through\nthe general mediate term men. In both cases the conjoining is effected\nthrough subjoining of the mediate term to both the elements to be\nconjoined. In the first case the process is: \u201cJohn is mortal, John is\nking, therefore kings are mortal.\u201d This relating of king and mortal is\nstrengthened by subjoining for other particular mediates, Peter, James,\netc. In the second case the process is: \u201cMen are mortal, kings are men,\ntherefore kings are mortal.\u201d In both cases the appeal is to constancy of\ncoherence of a quality to a quality-group, in the first, mortality\ncoherent with king John, hence coherent with kings; in the second, kings\nhave mortality because mortality is coherent with the group man = kings\n+ others. In both cases the generalising tendency, that is, the\ninductive quality, is the main point and not the method of mediation. In\nboth processes the concept king is filled out by the additional quality\nmortality, and there is real gain in generalising and concept-forming,\nwhether the mind accomplishes it by the more special or more general\nreference. Induction in the large sense is thus inclusive of both\ninduction and deduction in the restricted sense as determined by the\nmode of mediation. Inductive thinking, as we have treated it, is the\njoining which generalises, whatever be the means used to this end.\nInduction as generalising tendency is imbedded in experience, and is the\nlargest factor in all its development. All cognition as interpretation\nis induction.\n\nThat induction, as giving the experience value of things on basis of\nprevious experience, is fundamental to all emotions about the things,\nhas been implied throughout our discussion. But the inductive act may\nitself be emotively considered and intellectual emotion may arise. How\nand why induction came to be a pleasurable act and carried on for its\nown sake is, perhaps, not explainable by biologic evolution. It is\ncertain that the inductive act, like other functions, arises as painful\neffort and as a mere means of serving life. Identifying and recognising\nis accomplished only under pressure of the struggle for existence.\nAnimals in general, and, indeed, most human beings exercise their\nintelligence, make inductions, only as compelled by the demands of life.\nThe Australian savages who guided Lumholtz in his search for new\nmarsupials knew about the animals solely in a practical way, and were\ntotally unable to comprehend Lumholtz\u2019s motive. So geologists examining\nstones are entirely misapprehended by savages and the semi-civilized,\nthough these people are sufficiently acquainted with stones so far as\nthey are a source of mineral wealth, are useful for building, etc. And\nfrom the point of view of natural selection pure science, the pursuit of\nknowledge solely for its own sake, without the least reference to its\nappreciation, is unexplainable.\n\nNevertheless, it is a fact that at a certain point in psychism the\nintellectual life develops for its own sake; the inductive act is\npleasurable, and the desire arises to continue it as such, that is, here\nis true intellectual emotion, an emotion arising about an intellectual\nact represented as such. This feeling about induction may rise to an\nabsorbing passion, as with Charles Darwin. He liked nothing better than\nmaking inductions, until he finally came to like little else. If the\nreason is asked for induction becoming pleasurable, and an end in itself\npsychology at present has no answer.\n\nIt is plain that when intellectual activity is desired, not as a means,\nbut as an end in itself, it excludes much intellectual emotion which is\ncommonly associated therewith. Surprise and wonder, for instance, are\nintellectual emotions at contemplating a conjuncture very contrary to\nexpectation, entirely opposite to some pre-formed induction, but they do\nnot imply devotion to intellectual activity as such. The visitor to a\nbiological laboratory who, on first seeing blood corpuscles, cries\n\u201cWonderful! Who would have thought it! One\u2019s blood all full of such\nthings! Let me look again!\u201d is hardly actuated by the scientific motive.\nAll phenomena are equally wonderful or wonderless\u2014which amounts to the\nsame thing\u2014to the scientist; for him everything is simply natural, he\nforms no expectations not founded on facts. The \u201cwonders of science\u201d are\nwonders only to the outsider: the scientist takes them as matter of\nfact. It is no more wonderful to him that the blood should be full of\ncorpuscles than that it should fall in drops. The tyro does not wonder\nat a drop of blood; he wonders to see the drop filled with myriads of\nanimated corpuscles; the scientist wonders at neither. He who, on being\ntold of blood corpuscles, exclaims, \u201cI want to know,\u201d plainly desires\nknowledge, but is not impelled by a pure thirst for knowledge. The\nscientific items appearing in the newspapers generally appeal merely to\nseekers for marvels and lovers of intellectual sensation. Surprise and\nwonder are then extraneous impulses to knowledge, the impulse to\nknowledge for its own sake being quite distinct. As based on\nintellectual shock they imply a considerable intellectual integration,\nand hence are by no means primitive in mental life, yet far from being\nas late as emotion for knowledge _per se_. Wonder gives birth to the\nArabian Nights and to Jules Verne\u2019s romances, but it always hinders true\nscience.\n\nAgain, the pleasure and desire of achieving and achievement often plays\na large part in intellectual pursuits, as in a wide variety of activity.\nReaching an end merely for the sake of accomplishment, an emotion about\nany end, as, for instance, a wide generalisation to be attained, merely\nas end, intellectual action has in common with all other teleological\naction, but the teleologic emotion is not distinctly intellectual. The\ndesire to achieve for achievement\u2019s sake, to reach the satisfaction of\naccomplishment, is extremely multiplex in its application. The man who\ndoes a thing just to see if he can do it, who does feats of any kind is\nobviously impelled by a different emotion from the one who performs the\nsame activity for the pleasure of the activity itself. He who plays a\ngame to succeed, and he who plays for the pleasurable activity involved,\nare in very different frames of mind. And emotion for achievement is\ngenerally complicated by desire to be thereby superior to one\u2019s fellows.\nThe intense competitive struggle is plain in all departments even among\nscientists. The emotion of competition, the earnest desire to surpass\nothers in interpreting nature and life is a tremendous force among all\nscientific workers, and not even Darwin himself, exceptional though he\nwas, could keep out every vestige of _amour propre_.\n\nWe note also that love of any intellectual activity for its own sake, as\ninduction, must be distinguished from the love of truth. Here induction\nis exercised, not for itself, but as a means to an end, truth; inducing\nis not merely a pleasing exercise, but a means to accomplishment of a\ndefinite result. Darwin, of course, a trained and habitual inductionist,\nworked both from the pleasurability of the activity and from his\ndevotion to truth, to which this induction was the true method. Though\nboth these motives, love of an activity and love of some definite end\nthereby attained, as truth, reputation, etc., are closely connected,\nthey are perfectly distinct modes of emotion, as the least reflection\nconvinces. Truth is some very wide permanent and significant conjuncture\nof experience discovered and set forth, such as the origin of species in\nprogressive modification, or the intensity of light in inverse\nproportion to the square of the distance, and this is the kind of\ninduction or conjoining demanded by the love of truth.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER XVII\n _THE \u00c6STHETIC PSYCHOSIS_\n\n\nThe problem of the origin and nature of \u00e6sthetic feeling is a definite\npsychological problem to be solved only by introspection careful and\nprolonged. We must take simple cases and closely scrutinize them to\ndiscover the distinctive quality, we must seek the cognitive, feeling,\nwill elements, we must note its kinship to other psychoses, we must\nendeavour to analyse and determine whether it be simple or complex.\nAnalysis, indeed, as chemical analysis, _e.g._, is a reducing the\nmanifold to a comparatively few elements, from which by composition an\nindefinite number of substances are formed. But in psychological study\nwe must proceed without any bias from physical investigation. We cannot\nreduce mind to the mechanical development of a few simples as we survey\nthe development of matter chemically. If mind be essentially\nself-activity, will effort, then conjunction of psychoses is due to a\nconjoining activity, and is not mere aggregation. So in case of fear we\nfound a great complexity of conditions, yet fear in itself seems an\nunanalyzable emotion wave. In taking up \u00e6sthetic psychosis we attempt an\nunbiassed introspective study.\n\nThe \u00e6sthetic psychosis has been by many evolutionists connected with\nsexual appetite and emotion. The evidence for this is that among animals\nthe brilliant-hued, and, as we term them, beautiful mates are chosen in\npairing time. Also graceful movements and melodious tones are then\nemployed. In mankind the \u00e6sthetic feeling, as every one may recall in\nhis own case, arose, and became prominent when near or in the teens. The\nrude boy and the hoyden girl then dress and adorn themselves, and a\nglamour of beauty is thrown about one who was once an entirely\nindifferent object. All the surroundings, artificial and natural, of the\nbeloved object are looked upon and thought about in a new way of\nfeeling, an air of attractiveness and beauty envelops all. The period of\nlife of strongest sexuality, from twenty to forty, is also the period of\nstrongest \u00e6sthetic emotion. Further, sexuality is notedly strong among\nthose who professionally cultivate the \u00e6sthetic psychosis, as artists,\nmusicians, and poets: indeed, many of the very greatest of these have\nbeen so carried away by the tender passion as to transgress the\nconventions and laws on sexual matters. In cases of precocious sexuality\na feeling for the beautiful makes itself apparent; while with those who\nslowly mature, the \u00e6sthetic feeling is similarly delayed. But does not\nthe infant who holds out a rose to you and cries \u201cpretty,\u201d have a\nfeeling for beauty? And it is surely unaffected by sexuality. What may\nbe in the mind of a child speaking thus is hard to make out, but the\nactivity is probably largely mimetic merely, and the term \u201cpretty\u201d is\nprobably used substantively rather than qualitatively; it is the name of\nthing rather than quality. We certainly cannot assert of a child that\nbecause it uses certain words it attaches to those words the proper\nmeanings. This is evident from the fact that a child taught to say\n\u201cpretty\u201d will bring you any and every object and use the word, or if it\nlearns to take merely a class of objects, as rose, it does this at\ndictation. The child is, however, obviously attracted by some objects\nrather than others, but it would be hasty to say that it perceives their\nbeauty, when it is quite sufficient to regard them as conspicuous only,\nand striking. But we have to touch on sensing later; and we only add to\nthe evidence of connection of feeling for beauty with sexual feeling,\nthat with the old and with eunuchs the \u00e6sthetic sense is but slight or\ntends to vanish. Thus positively and negatively there seems to be\nevidence that feeling for beauty originates in connection with sexual\npassion, either that the object of the passion is always regarded as\nbeautiful, or that a feeling for beauty excites the passion. A girl\nadorns herself to attract lovers, knowing that to admire beauty is the\nfirst step to love. This close connection is recognised in common\nconsciousness in that \u201clovely\u201d is synonymous with beautiful, thus a\n\u201clovely\u201d landscape or picture is a beautiful one.\n\nThat there is a close association of sexual with \u00e6sthetic psychosis is\nthen obvious in the case of the human being, but yet it would be quite\nhasty to conclude that a sweet note or a pure colour may not be\n\u00e6sthetically appreciated by children before they have the first stirring\ntoward sexuality, but still it is very easy\u2014as I have before noted in\nthe case of the child who cries \u201cpretty!\u201d\u2014to mistake the quality of\ntheir interest.\n\nBut when we come to interpret the psychoses of the lower animals in\nconnection with sexuality we may still more easily slip into a doubtful\nautomorphism. Thus to say with Darwin, \u201cWhen we behold a male bird\nelaborately displaying ... before the female, ... it is impossible to\ndoubt that she admires the beauty of her male partner\u201d (_Descent of\nMan_, p. 92), or more strongly still with Grant Allen, \u201cEvery crow must\nthink its own mate _beautiful_\u201d (_Mind_, v. 448), we too easily take for\ngranted that these birds would feel like ourselves in corresponding\ncircumstances. We can find a more simple explanation. That crows often\nmaltreat those who are off colour, _e.g._, white, plainly does not\nrequire us to suppose that they regard white as ugly, black as\nbeautiful, any more than we should judge that students in some Society\nwho wear a black badge would be \u00e6sthetically moved when they look with\ndisfavour upon students who may wear a white badge. Animals are\nclannish, and as a rule, suffer none but those who have the customary\nmarks to associate with them, and especially to propagate. Hence when\nthe peacock displays himself to his mate he simply shows to her that he\nhas most conspicuously the proper marks, and she sees that he is the\nproper mate. These are signs of a tempting mate, just as here is\ntempting food, a very red ripe berry, but the coloration no more in the\none case than the other awakens feeling for beauty. The hen bird\nprobably appreciates a red feather as a red berry merely as being signs\nof the completely satisfying. Sexual selection, like nutriment\nselection, is a discrimination according to certain characters as\nprompted by appetite. The expanded and vari-coloured tail of a peacock\nis then a mere sexual characteristic which does not imply feeling for\nbeauty in its appreciation as significant of sex. A small foot, long\nhair, and other sexual characters in woman, which are attractive to men,\nin like manner arouse emotion which is far from \u00e6sthetic. We may take a\nperfectly unsexual \u00e6sthetic pleasure in long raven tresses just as we do\nin an ebony table, but this is obviously rather late achievement.\n\nIn fact are not \u00e6sthetic and sexual feelings mutually exclusive? So far\nas nude art is \u201csuggestive,\u201d so far is the feeling of its beauty lost,\nhence sculpture is not tinted. And so in the presence of the nude model\nthe artist can have merely \u00e6sthetic emotion, whereas his visitor is apt\nto have emotions of another sort. We do, indeed, say that the lover\ndwells upon his mistress\u2019 \u201cbeauties,\u201d but beauties here mean\nattractions, and to the devoted lover all parts are attractive, even\nmoles and freckles which to the \u00e6sthetic eye are ugly.\n\nFrom the evidence in hand we judge then that it is certainly not\nnecessary to call in the feeling of the beautiful as the motive in the\norigin and development of sexual characters in animals and plants. Just\nas there is a cry of fear or a tone of anger there is a vocal expression\nof sexual feeling and emotion which has its use and is recognised as\nsuch, but whose \u00e6sthetic quality is no more a matter of immediate\napprehension than in other utilities. At least the safest interpretation\nthat we can now make for all the lower grades of sexuality is that sex\ncharacters are not primarily determined by the feeling for beauty, but\nare simply immediate signs of sex to awaken the sexual response and\nsecure the best mate. How is it that sexuality is so prominent in\nexpression among some species and so little among others?\u2014compare\npeacocks and blue jays\u2014is a question on which we have no light. We are\nalso in ignorance how the particular sexual character was evolved and\nnot some other, for example, why is not the peacock\u2019s tail red? Grant\nAllen\u2019s suggestion that food selection has influenced sex selection may\nbe true, but it would require a very wide and thorough investigation. Do\nbrilliant-hued birds prefer brilliant-hued foods? How is the coloration\nof the scarlet tanager related to the coloration of its food? However,\nif the colouring of foods and mates were the same, it would in some\ncases lead to disadvantageous confusion, and on general principles we\nshould expect such distinct elements as nutrition and sex to develop on\nvery different lines. The cue for colour may be learned first with\nreference to food, but it may be carried on as sexually significant on\nvery distinct lines. Still to distinguish a food or a mate by colour is\nequally non-\u00e6sthetic in itself. At least we think it improbable that\n\u00e6sthetic psychosis arises as incentive to or reflex of sexuality in any\nof the lower psychic stages.\n\nA theory of the origin of \u00e6sthetic psychosis which has been pressed by\nsome, as by Herbert Spencer, is that it arises as reflex from\nspontaneous outflow of energy, or more particularly in connection with\nplay impulse. A horse turned loose in pasture may gambol, running,\nsniffing, looking around, all which denoting a free outflow of energy\nthrough lines of least resistance, the customary channels of activity.\nBut we cannot seriously think that in this sensing and muscular activity\nthere is implied any real \u00e6sthetic psychosis, and indeed it seems quite\nemotionless. The emotion of fear or similar feelings aroused the\noriginal activities, but this present galloping, etc., is automatic, and\nsuch immediate pleasure as may result from this free activity is\nscarcely of the \u00e6sthetic order. The whole is of a distinctly lower order\nthan the original activity and much below \u00e6sthetic quality. If we recall\nour own state of mind in youthful \u201cletting off steam\u201d and in plays, we\ndo not find \u00e6sthetic pleasure. There is, however, a pleasure of relief\nand also positively a pleasure from such spontaneous outflow; but the\noutburst of pent-up energy automatically spent along lines of race\naction is a mere echo, dies out at once, and as degenerate form is not a\nstarting point for origin of any new psychosis. Play as simulation of\nfeeling and action is also removed from \u00e6sthetic activity, as in a dog\nplaying at fear and running, or at anger and chasing. He gets a more or\nless modified fear or anger, but there does not seem to be any tendency\nto \u00e6sthetic psychosis. Mere imitation is more or less exact and skilful,\nbut emotion therein and thereat is plainly not the glow of \u00e6sthetic\nemotion, but is reflex of sense of power and intelligence as qualities.\nMimicry as mere outlet of energy as with monkeys is plainly not\naesthetic; here is merely an automatic outflow of force into suggested\nactivity. When a savage as mimetic achievement carves the figure of man\nas handle to a knife, he accomplishes art, but not fine art. He has no\nmore \u00e6sthetic feeling than a boy or man whittling out a ship, it being\nmerely an exact and skilful counterfeit of a real thing. Imitation for\nthe sake of imitation or to deceive is a teleologic pleasure distinct\nfrom \u00e6sthetic. Successful imitation is often said, indeed, to be\n\u201cbeautifully done,\u201d but this means no more than well done. Even a\nwell-baked cake is popularly spoken of as beautifully done.\n\nWe observe that superfluous energy rushes out along customary or\nhabitual lines of activity, and so with perfect ease and economy.\nActivity which is easy and free is in itself pleasant, and this\npleasantness in sensing and derived psychosis is \u00e6sthetic feeling. Where\nsensing is mere escape valve of force, though facility is absolute,\nthere is, as just pointed out, no \u00e6sthetic quality, the whole tending to\nthe merely mechanical. Owing to the fact that in nature curved lines\npredominate and so ocular adjustment is to them, my eye follows a curved\nline easier than a straight one, hence when spontaneous energy outflows\nin sensing activity of least resistance it will be toward curves. But\nspontaneous activity of this kind is, as we have explained, not\n\u00e6sthetic. The law of economy in a vent is, greatest force, least effect,\nthe contrary of the usual formula for economy which is, least force,\ngreatest effect. Where energy is expensive the latter rule is to be\napplied. Thus in directed and effortful sensing activity economy means\nthe ratio of efficiency, the ratio of the amount of painful effort to\ndesired result. But this is merely a saving of pain and not a real\npleasure psychosis. When I, in using a microscope see clearly with less\nand less effort the objects of my study, I may take pleasure in the\neconomical and facile accomplishment, but this pleasure is one of\nsatisfaction in power and skill, and so not at all \u00e6sthetic. Again, a\ndyer has great skill and easy appreciation with respect to colour, but\nthe \u00e6sthetic side of colour is not thereby specially felt by him. Mere\nhabitual and easy colour sensitiveness is not then thereby \u00e6sthetic. We\nmust, indeed, sense a colour before we can feel its beauty, but the\nfeeling of beauty is not directly involved in any stage of the sensing\nevolution from the earliest and most painful effort with bare\nappreciation to the spontaneous and effortless sensing at the moment of\ngreat surplus of sensing energy.\n\nAnother way of accounting for \u00e6sthetic psychosis is by association.\nPleasant sights, for instance, are those with which we associate\npleasure, and \u201cpleasant\u201d means to many, beautiful. But a traveller,\nthirsty in a desert land, declares that he saw no more pleasant sight\nthan a mud hole, but this pleasure, as he himself would aver, was far\nfrom \u00e6sthetic. Whatever we have associated pleasure with, we regard with\npleasure, but only as we have associated \u00e6sthetic pleasure with it do we\nregard it with \u00e6sthetic pleasure. Thus mere association or revival no\nmore gives us the derivation of \u00e6sthetic than any other emotion. Any\npleasure or pain may be associated with any sensation or perception, and\nthereby re-occur with these, but the mere revival obviously does not\nalter the nature of the psychosis or give any new psychosis. It is not\nwhat is recalled, but how we _feel about_ it that constitutes \u00e6sthetic\nemotion. So also when the beautiful is defined by H. R. Marshall as \u201cthe\npermanently pleasurable in revival,\u201d we get no insight into the origin,\nnature, and development of the \u00e6sthetic psychosis; this purely objective\ndescription gives no psychological analysis. But we may question the\naccuracy of the description. A thing of beauty is not a joy for ever\nwhen we mean thereby the object which excites the \u00e6sthetic psychosis,\nfor much that has seemed beautiful to one people and age does not remain\nso for all peoples and times, and even with the individual, taste\nvaries. We must also note that the permanently pleasurable in revival\nmay not be \u00e6sthetic, as the lover\u2019s remembrance of a trysting place. On\nthe whole, I do not find that \u00e6sthetic pleasure is in any case to be\nascribed to association, though it comes under the general laws of\nassociation like any other feeling. A lily excites various modes of\n\u00e6sthetic impression by its form, colour, odour, poetical character,\netc., all which may re-awaken together upon any presentation or\nsuggestion of the lily. However, for the aboriginal lotus-eater the lily\nwas also a pleasant sight\u2014but not \u00e6sthetic\u2014from the associated pleasures\nof its pleasant taste and as satisfying hunger.\n\nWe have implied throughout\u2014and common introspection approves this\u2014that\n\u00e6sthetic pleasure and emotion is a distinct psychosis which somehow\narises with reference to objects. It is not some previous psychosis as\nmodified by association, habit, economy, play-impulse, or sexuality; but\nit is a _sui generis_ mode which develops on the basis of a past\nevolution. The simplest and earliest \u00e6sthetic mode is plainly the\nsensuous. Very commonly when looking on the delicate solid-tinted glow\nof early dawn I have \u00e6sthetic pleasure, my eye dwells on it with\npleasure and drinks in the pleasant light. It is obvious here that the\nsensing activity is carried on, not to discriminate food or mate nor yet\nas mere vent to energy; but the sensing here acts for the pleasure in\nthe activity itself. How and why mere cognitive act, which originates as\nguide to life, acquires a direct pleasure value and so is carried on\napart from the ends of life, and initiates an \u00e6sthetic world of its own,\ncannot on the face of it be explained by natural selection; it is\nentirely apart from this order of things. But we know that sensing often\ncarries pleasure with it as significant of life value, thus the thing\ntasting good was originally the good thing to eat, digest and\nassimilate; so also for smell, etc. But under natural selection this\npleasure sanction and index was never cultivated for its own sake.\n\nNow is there any real difference in the pleasure in, for instance,\nsmelling, for the pure pleasure of smelling, as a perfume of fresh\napples, and the pleasure from smelling the apples as detecting them when\nyou are hungry? \u201cHow pleasant those apples smell! I do not care to eat\nthem, but I just enjoy smelling them\u201d; is the pleasure thus indicated\nthe same in quality with that of the man who says, \u201cThose apples smell\nso nice I would like to try one\u201d? Again, if hungry, we say, \u201cThe bread\ntastes so _good_,\u201d but we notice this pleasantness rapidly decreases as\nappetite is satisfied. However, if there be fresh grass butter, you may\ncontinue to eat long after appetite is satisfied, for the pure pleasure\nof the taste. Obviously, the latter pleasure is not a mere continuance\nof the former. Relish and taste pleasure seem distinct. Again, a red\napple is a pleasant sight to a hungry man and to an artist in different\nways. If our pleasure in looking at a picture of an apple is such that\nthe mouth waters, we know at once that the pleasure is un\u00e6sthetic. He\nwho is very fond of apples, and to whom they are always a pleasant\nsight, is so far barred from \u00e6sthetic pleasure in them; while he who has\nno appreciation of their edibility is thereby prepared for \u00e6sthetically\nsensing them. So also sour grapes are as pretty as sweet. The colour\nsense began as discriminative of foods, and hence red became pleasurably\nknown, but \u00e6sthetic appreciation is certainly much later and quite\ndiverse. If it be asked how and when did red, already noticeable, become\ndwelt upon \u00e6sthetically, all we can hazard in reply is that at some\nleisure moment when unmoved by appetite a surplus of energy set up an\nhabitual sensing activity, as noticing reds, and at a certain stage when\nsome directing is exercised, there comes a unique pleasure from the mere\nsensing, and the red is therefore _dwelt_ upon. \u00c6sthetic colour-pleasure\nin the simplest case arises then in every one\u2019s experience.\n\nSense-pleasure is thus distinctly of two kinds, first, as arising in\ndirect connection with general organic demands and satisfactions\u2014the\npart as serving the whole; second, as arising immediately from the\nsense-activity\u2014the whole as serving the part. A monkey may find an apple\na pleasant sight, but loses all interest when the apple is seen to be an\nimitation: the monkey has the first pleasure, but not the second. The\nsensuous \u00e6sthetic problem is merely to introspect the quality of the\nsensing-for-itself-pleasure as distinct from pleasantness coming from\nthe service of life. A sense which develops its own pleasurableness is\non a new line, which we term the \u00e6sthetic. \u00c6sthetic activity is distinct\nfrom mere vent activity of superfluous energy by reason of being carried\non self-directed by the felt pleasure of activity; it implies a measure\nof self-direction and self-consciousness. \u00c6sthetic activity may then be\ngenerally described as primarily a sensing carried on, not as means, but\nfor its own sake in pleasure immediately resulting. And we find that in\nthis very general meaning all senses have their \u00e6sthetic activity. The\ntemperature sense is carried on, as in basking, for the pure pleasure of\nwarmth. A cat behind a stove is a connoisseur in \u00e6sthetic warmth\nsensations, and enjoys warmth for its own sake, so far as often to\ninjure the organism as a whole. To lie in the sun and experience the\nthrills of pleasurable warmth and to keep up this sensing merely for the\nsensation pleasure is a frequent experience even with man. Again, the\nmuscular and pressure senses often have a sphere of \u00e6sthetic activity\nwith athletes and lovers of exercise. When in prime condition, a man\nwill toss weights about solely for the pleasure involved in the sense of\npressure and of muscular activity. Touch also is plainly \u00e6sthetic when\none handles silk for the pleasure involved in its smoothness. Smell is\nobviously an \u00e6sthetic activity in smelling perfumes for the pleasure of\nthe smell. It is probable that the \u00e6sthetic activity of this sense is\nfar wider in some of the lower animals where the sense is much more\nacute, as the dog. The dog is plainly having a very different psychosis\nwhen he is smelling with pleasure a piece of meat which he is about to\neat, and when he sniffs carrion and perfumes himself therewith. He gets\nthus a certain pleasant but gross stimulation quite akin to the pleasure\nsome men take in musk, an enjoyment of which is distinctly an animal\ntrait. Again, the epicure who sips his rare wine is tasting for the pure\npleasure of the taste, and exercises this sense \u00e6sthetically. The\n\u00e6sthetic of all these senses may be called the lower \u00e6sthetic, in\ncontradistinction to the higher \u00e6sthetic of sight and hearing; but\n\u00e6sthetic activity is throughout its whole range practically identical in\nnature and in the quality of its pleasure. When I lie in the sun and get\nwarmth, not because I am cold, but for the mere pleasure of the warmth\nthrills, and when I keep looking at a delicate tint in the evening sky\nfor the mere pleasure of the sensation, I have, as far as my\nintrospection assures me, activities whose method and pleasure tone is\nidentical.\n\nSimple sensuous \u00e6sthetic is no doubt the beginning of \u00e6sthetic activity,\nbut there speedily enters much complication. It often happens that\nsingle elements which separately do not excite us \u00e6sthetically will\nproduce a marked effect in conjunction, as complementary colours, for\ninstance. Indeed, relation plays so large a place in our \u00e6sthetic\nexperience that such principles as variety and contrast, or, on the\nother hand, unity, order, proportion, and harmony, have been made\nfundamental to the \u00e6sthetic feeling. \u00c6sthetic effect certainly here\nbecomes a complex of two or more reinforcing sensations or perceptions.\nWhere the sensuous elements of a perception are in themselves pleasing\nwe may expect the unison in perception to be doubly pleasing. However,\nwe may also conceive that \u00e6sthetic pleasure arises as a reflex of\nperceptive activity in and for itself as a co-ordinating of impressions.\n\nFechner has made some experiments on what combinations are pleasing; but\nexperiment in this direction is extremely difficult because so few\npeople are willing to speak frankly of their \u00e6sthetic feelings, being\nvery sensitive about compromising themselves on matters of taste. There\nis also the great difficulty of isolation, of making sure that\nassociation does not creep in and add unforeseen elements. If Fechner\nexpected to get any judgments of value on such a matter as the golden\nsection rectangle, he should have consulted only trained artists who are\nused to taking up the \u00e6sthetic activity with reference to any material\nand expressing themselves with freedom. If this rectangle has the\n\u00e6sthetic quality Fechner\u2019s experiments suggest, it seems strange it was\nnot adopted by the symmetry-loving Greeks in their temples, like the\nParthenon.\n\nTo the spheres of simple and relational sense beauty we have to add a\nthird\u2014representative beauty. A colour, or two or more in combination\nwhich give \u00e6sthetic satisfaction, will also please in hallucinatory\nvision and in representation proper where the revival is recognised in\nits unreality and representative nature, and also in recollection where\nthe memory is willed. The mere imaging these colours without any\ndefinite time relation also gives \u00e6sthetic pleasure. It is, indeed, a\npleonasm to say that \u00e6sthetic revivals are \u00e6sthetic. However,\nimagination is productive as well as reproductive, hence the ideal\nachieves a fuller beauty than the real. Where the mind, prompted by\n\u00e6sthetic desire, determines its own object, this object can more fully\nsatisfy it than reality, which is always imperfect. Thus art surpasses\nnature, or more strictly is a higher nature. Idealism then is a mode of\nrealism, and realism is but the ideal of actuality. But the imaging\nactivity may, like the perceptive, be considered as in itself a source\nof \u00e6sthetic pleasure. Imaging is primarily used in the service of life,\nas when walking in a forest I hear a peculiar cry, imagine a wolf, and\nflee. When imaging has been largely developed thus, it may often act as\na mere vent to energy; but this kind of activity has here, no more than\nelsewhere, real \u00e6sthetic quality. At the animistic stage children\nimagine in this way long before they \u00e6sthetically image. When we\nconsciously and with some self-direction enjoy imaging for its own sake,\nwe attain the \u00e6sthetic sphere. The \u00e6sthetic pleasures which are\nsuggested by such a phrase as\u2014\n\n \u201cFair ship, that from the Italian shore\n Sails the placid ocean plains\u201d\u2014\n\nare not merely the sum of the original sense pleasures, but perceptive\nand imaginative pleasure _per se_ is added, the image is more beautiful\nthan the real vision, and this perception than some sense element, as\nthe light sensation implied in \u201cplacid.\u201d\n\n\u00c6sthetic pleasure, even in sense, and much more in perceiving and\nimagining, is a _delight_, that is, \u00e6sthetic quality is an emotion\nquality, it is not a mere feeling from an object, but a feeling about\nit. Now emotion may be enacted for emotion\u2019s sake and so an \u00e6sthetic\npleasure wave be generated. This is the pleasure we take in the\npathetic\u2014pity, the sublime, fear as awe, the tragic-horror. These\nemotions are realized for themselves as a mode of pleasurable activity.\n\u00c6sthetic emotion is also very largely emotion at emotion, as a feeling\nfor the expressive, still here the emotion is for its own sake.\n\n\u00c6sthetic activity may then be described as an independent self-activity\nof some sense, or of perception, or imagination, or emotion as impelled\nby a pleasure, this pleasure being a distinct and new form we term\n\u00e6sthetic. It is probable this pleasure first arose in connection with\nthe exercise of the sense as a vent for spontaneous energy, and pleasure\nonce somehow being taken in a mere activity _per se_, it is thenceforth\nconducted therefor. This is the plainest path of conjecture thus far. If\nthe first \u00e6sthetic pleasure were taken in some quiet moment of venting\nenergy in sensing red, then red will continue to be sensed, impelled by\nthe pleasure involved in the act. Granted such an origin, the\ndevelopment of \u00e6sthetic psychosis can be traced in the way we have\nnoted.\n\n\u00c6sthetic psychosis is commonly regarded as passive, and it is indeed\ntrue that the first moment of the pleasure _comes_ as result of an\nactivity impelled by other motives. New psychoses are not consciously\nformed but are rather hit upon in natural development; but once a new\npleasure is felt its conditions will be attained and kept to by\nconscious effort, and the pleasure itself will receive its development\nonly through effortful activity. It is by supreme effort the great\nartist attains the vision of beauty, it is by supreme effort he\nexpresses this vision, it is by supreme effort the critic appreciates\nthis expression. He who has no appreciation of sculpture may by\npatiently and earnestly observing statuary reach at length some \u00e6sthetic\npleasure. Thus the \u00e6sthetic, like all mental modes, so far as\nprogressive, is effortful; and it seems certain that the \u00e6sthetic\npleasures that come to us so easily are race acquirements, a heritage of\nculture. From its first germ onwards \u00e6sthetic, like intellectual, like\nmoral, like all mental activity, is the achievement of intense struggle.\n\nWith the rise of beauty we have a new utility. Here is a new pleasure\nwhich once experienced is sought and sought again, is developed, and\nwith some natures becomes absorbing passion, the life. Objects fitted to\ngive this pleasure are desired, are bought and sold. The beautiful is\nused to effect all kinds of ends. The lover adorns himself to make\nhimself attractive, the advertiser distributes his bills in artistic\nshape, the real estate dealer ornaments his houses and grounds. Whatever\nwill afford \u00e6sthetic pleasure we are willing to pay for and pay high. In\nfact, in the person of a Patti the \u00e6sthetic thrill becomes the most\nexpensive taste which humanity can indulge. Art then is a utility\u2014a\nsomething which satisfies desire\u2014and as such it is not free or\nshareable. But one at a time can observe a picture from the best point\nof view. Rich men buy the most sightly spots in nature, the places of\nmagnificent vistas and open to beautiful sunsets. Beautiful things are\nthen desirables just like edible things or warm things, and as such they\nare not shareable. The feeling for beauty, just because it is\nself-contained, is far from being disinterested. It is essentially\nselfish.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER XVIII\n _THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LITERARY STYLE_\n\n\nMr. Herbert Spencer\u2019s famous essay, entitled, \u201cThe Philosophy of\nStyle\u201d\u2014by which is meant the Psychology of Style\u2014propounds what we may\nterm the economic theory of literary effect. The secret, he tells us, of\nthe pleasing effect of diction, rhythm, figurative language, sentence\nstructure, lies in this, that these are labour-saving devices to\neconomize mental effort, that by their use we get with the least\nattention the greatest apprehension; and hence we receive pleasure as\nreflex of the facile and full cognition functioning. Literary pleasure\nis thus brought under the law of pleasure in general. Take the quotation\nfrom Shelley cited by Mr. Spencer:\u2014\n\n \u201cMethought among the lawns together\n We wandered, underneath the young grey dawn,\n And multitudes of dense white fleecy clouds\n Were wandering in thick flocks along the mountains,\n Shepherded by the slow unwilling wind.\u201d\n\nYou have read this with pleasure, and is not the source of this pleasure\nthe ease and celerity with which the mind reaches the \u201cdesired\nconception\u201d? Vividly and forcibly the mind is led by cunning use of\nphrase and rhythm and figure to realize the picture, and there is a glow\nof pleasure in the reaction from the facility. Language is a medium for\nthe transfer of ideas, and when it accomplishes this office most\neffectively, as in the present case, and acts upon the mind so clearly\nand forcibly that _nolens volens_ the reader at once apprehends and\ncomprehends, he feels a thrill of pleasure therewith, just as there is\npleasure connected with the rapid and easy assimilation of well cooked\nfood. Before developing and criticising this theory I may remark in\npassing that Blair, the rhetorician, in treating of the structure of\nsentences foreshadows in a way the economic theory when he writes that\n\u201cto have the relation of every word and member of a sentence marked in\nthe most proper and distinct manner, gives, not clearness only, but\ngrace and beauty to a sentence, making the mind pass smoothly and\nagreeably along the parts of it.\u201d This surely implies that \u00e6sthetical\npleasure of style may be based in a psychological economy and facility.\nIt is indeed a commonplace remark, \u201cThe book is so well written that you\ncannot mistake or miss its meaning\u201d; wherein the identification of style\nwith intelligibility becomes a truism. Certainly Mr. Spencer has not in\nthe economic theory propounded anything radically new.\n\nWe note at the outset that while this pleasure of style may result from\neconomy it is not the pleasure of the conscious economizer. The reader\nwho is enjoying a very readable book has a distinct pleasure from him\nwho views with satisfaction his finishing a book at a great and\nunexpected saving of mental energy. We have here the direct pleasure\nfrom economical exercise of the faculties contrasted with the indirect\nintrospective-retrospective pleasure at economy effected. Many persons\ntake as much pleasure in making mental energy go as far as possible, but\nthis pleasure in economy is obviously not the pleasure of style, which\nis not reflective, but na\u00efve and direct impression.\n\nLanguage, either spoken or written, by its more or less effective modes\nof accomplishing its office does then awaken a simple and direct\npleasure, according to the general law that pleasure accompanies\nefficient acts as a sanction and stimulus. It is obvious that style for\nspoken language, oratorical style, is precedent in its formation to\nstyle for written language or literary style, and that it has greatly\naffected literary style throughout its whole history. Yet the\ndistinctness of the two modes is affirmed by the common observation that\na speech, impressively pleasing to listen to, often does not read well.\nWhile it may be true that in its origin literary style borrowed certain\ndevices from oratorical, yet in its latest evolution the written page is\nfar from being the speaking page. The book is not a substitute speaker\naddressing us, and modes of expression which are most fitting for\nconversation and oration, though sometimes used by writers, are alien to\npure literary art. However, I cannot pursue this interesting subject,\nnor yet can I here treat of the origin of style more than to merely\nobserve that it is considerably later than the origin of language\nitself. Neither the original uncouth speech, whether interjectional or\nonomatopoetic, nor the earliest rude inscriptions can be said to have\nstyle, oratorical or literary. Style is the offspring of specialization;\nit first appeared when men recognised some one as particularly gifted\nfor fitting expression, and chose him as spokesman because of this\nability to communicate what was desired to be said with special force\nand clearness. Thus arises the orator who achieves and invents\noratorical style. Likewise the writer is one who is selected for his\nspecial abilities in expression by word of pen, and the scribe, clerk,\nand public letter writer arise and evolve literary style as a skilful\nway of effectively conveying ideas and impressions by written language.\nThe reader is also evolved, and in the reciprocal relation of demand and\nsupply and the competitive struggle to secure readers, the writer seeks\never more and more to please and interest by introducing and perfecting\nvarious inventions to make the reading of his work very easy and\nenjoyable. Thus it comes that readableness is the natural test for\nreading matter.\n\nThe economic theory of style in fine art plainly implies at bottom\nphysiological economy, for all psychological economy can only be\neffected on this basis. The psychology of style must rest on a\nphysiology of style. We know that the pleasures of form and colour in\nsculpture and painting are the reflex of physiological functions as\neasily and completely performed. The curve of beauty is such because the\neye follows it more easily than other lines; the pleasing colour is such\nbecause the physiological stimulus is accomplished in a normal and\nfacile way. And as visibility is the test for the arts which appeal to\nthe eye, so audibility is for the fine art which appeals to the ear.\nPleasure from music is the reflex of aural functioning accomplishing the\nmost with least strain. Now the pleasure which comes from literary style\nmust similarly be sought in some physiological mode. While plain print\nand good paper are incidental pleasures in reading, they are not\nprimarily due to the stylist, who does, however, appeal to the eye by\nthe due proportioning of long and short words, sentences and paragraphs.\nThough there is no conscious intent by the stylist, yet it may be\nbelieved that the use of certain letters and certain successions of\nletters as more or less easy for the eye is a matter of some importance.\nSome letters and some combinations are ocularly more pleasing than\nothers, and this is clearly founded on economic physiological\nconditions. It is greatly to be desired that physiologists would invent\nnew alphabetical forms which should be most adapted to the eye. It is\nscarcely to be supposed that our present A B C's are the simplest and\neasiest line-combinations for the eye. When the visual side of reading\nis made as easy as possible, the general reflex sense of facility and\npleasure therewith is certainly increased. The artificial languages now\nbeing exploited, as Volapuk, ought and would effect a great\nphysiological saving, as would also be accomplished by a phonetic\nspelling.\n\nBut the direct visible function of style is certainly far inferior to\nthe indirect. The power of style is very largely in stimulating pleasing\nvisual images. The main element in literature we are told is vision and\nimagination, which is but a restimulation and recombination of ocular\nexperiences. Sensation is the source and strong basis for all those\nfaint revivals which are so aptly and pleasantly called up by the\nliterary artist, and hence when the poet speaks of \u201cthe light which\nnever was on sea or land,\u201d this is really meaningless, since all our\nlight impressions are terrestrial in their nature. To the blind man the\nwhole visual effect, direct and indirect, of style is lost; his imaging\npower must be in some other sense.\n\nLiterature is then, like sculpture and painting, largely a visual art,\nand its pleasure-giving quality is the reflex of visibility. Mere form\nand colour may in a sense constitute a picture; though in general we\ndemand that it mean something, suggest something. A picture is such as\ndepicting something, and so being more than a study in form or colour.\nThe mere direct pleasure of ocular sensation plays a large part in\ngraphic and glyptic art, yet it is commonly conceived that some measure\nof imagination, that is, some indirect visible function, is necessary\neven here. Sculpture and painting depend like literature on both direct\nand indirect vision as physiological and psychological basis of \u00e6sthetic\npleasure.\n\nBut in a secondary way literary style depends for its effect upon\nauditory sensations both direct and revival. We mentally, and often\norally, pronounce as we read, and so appreciate sonorous quality and\nonomatopoetic force. Alliteration, rhyme, euphony, and rhythm play\ncertainly a considerable part in the charm of style, and literature on\nthis side approaches and passes gradually into music. Euphony answers to\nmelody, and rhyme and rhythm to harmony. Literature may become for us\nmerely a succession of pleasing sounds, as when we hum over some\nfavourite lines of poetry, or when, ignorant of the Italian language, we\nlisten to an opera. Some of Milton\u2019s lists of names in such lines as\nthese,\u2014\n\n \u201cOf Cambalu, seat of Cathayan Can,\n And Samarchand by Oxus, Temer\u2019s throne\u201d\u2014\n\ncharm merely by the flow and fulness of sound. But the stylist aims, not\nmerely at formal sensuous beauty in tone and cadence of language, he\naims to suggest pleasing sounds, and to awaken the auditory imagination,\nand to harmonize sense with sound as is done so successfully by poets\nlike Tennyson and prosaists like Sir Thomas Browne. All this auditory\nside of literary style is lost on the deaf, as the visual is lost on the\nblind. Literature as an art is neither blind like music nor deaf like\npainting, but it is a compound art, visual-auditory, and thus, by virtue\nof its range, is the greatest of the arts. It is true that indirectly\nand in a very limited way painting can suggest sounds, and music sights,\nbut literature, both directly and indirectly, can freely and fully give\nboth. Word-music and word-painting are both methods of literary style.\nIn short, the explanation of the pleasure of style is pleasing sight or\nsound directly or indirectly given, and the explanation of the pleasing\ncharacter of the sight or sound is as the reflex of easy economical\nphysiological functioning as basis of easy economical psychic function.\n\nBut we have now to ask whether economy of attention is the sole\npsychological secret of style, and whether, indeed, it is always\nnecessary to style. Is style, like grammar or orthography, merely a more\nor less conventionalized device to make intelligibility certain and\neasy? Is our reading always the more pleasurable as it is the more\neffortless? The pleasure of facility certainly bears a large part in\nmuch of our literary enjoyment, but there is another and opposite law of\npleasure which, I think, often determines pleasure in style. To\naccomplish much with no exertion, to slide down a long hill, gives\npleasure, but there is also a pleasure in exertion, in climbing hills as\nwell as sliding down. The pleasures of strenuous activity of attention\nform a certain element in literary effect. The writer may do too much\nfor the reader, may make everything so simple and easy that the reader\nhas nothing to do, but is carried along without volition and curiosity,\nlosing all joy of attainment and grasp. For my own part, I often find\nauthors too fluent and facile, especially among the French, and\nsometimes among the English, as, for instance, in some of John Stuart\nMill\u2019s writings. These do not leave enough for me to do, and led\nskilfully along so smooth a road that I am not conscious of moving, I\nlose the pleasure of achievement, of the sense of enlargement of\nconscious powers. Easy got, easy goes, is the law here as elsewhere. The\npleasure of acquirement is directly as the amount of attention\nexercised.\n\nMr. Spencer in discussing this matter remarks that, as \u201clanguage is the\nvehicle of thought, we may say that in all cases the friction and\ninertia of the vehicle deduct from its efficiency, and that in\ncomposition the chief thing to be done is, to reduce the friction and\ninertia to the smallest amounts.\u201d But it must be remembered that motion\nis not only against friction but by friction. The rail may be too smooth\nas well as too rough. Every locomotive, for a given piece of track with\na given gradient, has a certain co-efficient of friction for its most\neffective working, above and below which there is alike decrease of\nefficiency; and in engineering it is equally a problem to keep friction\nup as to reduce it. So I say of style, that it may be too smooth and\nfacile, and may reduce mental friction to so low a point that there is\nno grasp and no real progress. A sentence of Hooker or Milton,\nmagnificent stylists though they are, can, as an affair of economy of\nattention, be greatly improved by breaking it up into a number of simple\nplain sentences after the primer fashion, The cat mews, The dog barks,\netc.; but this process certainly is not an improvement of their style.\nBut if economy of attention were the sole secret of style, certainly the\nmore economy we introduce the greater and better should be the style.\nProfessor Sherman, of the University of Nebraska, in a recent article\nshows that heaviness\u2014that which requires \u201cconstant effort in reading\u201d\u2014is\ndue to the number of words _per_ sentence, which has been reduced in the\ncourse of the history of English prose from an average of fifty words a\nsentence in Chaucer and Spenser to five in the columns of a modern,\nlow-grade, popular story-paper; but it obviously cannot be maintained\nthat the style of the story-paper is ten times better than that of\nSpenser\u2019s _State of Ireland_.\n\nWe might then set up with plausibility an exactly opposite theory to the\neconomic, and maintain that the secret of style is in exciting us to the\ngreatest attentive effort, and that the best style is that which rouses\nus to the severest mental exertion. However, I believe that these two\nopposite methods of style are complementary. The great stylist is he who\nstrikes the exact mean between over facility and over difficulty, and\ntouches the exact co-efficient of mental friction in the reader, at\nwhich his whole power of mind comes into highest and most harmonious and\neffective exercise. The accomplished stylist most cleverly throws in\nquestions, suggests doubts, and defers answers. To read his book is not\na toboggan slide, but an obstacle race. What is plot interest but a\nskilful putting of obstacles in the reader\u2019s way, deferring and\nthwarting his expectations, putting him on the _qui vive_ of attention?\nBy the development of plot the novelist and dramatist plays hide and\nseek with the reader. No cunning artist reveals at once his whole\nthought in a blaze of light, but he mystifies and draws in half-tones,\nthus to stir you to reach out and grasp his meaning.\n\nBut we are as yet far from exhausting the psychological significance of\npleasure in style when we trace it to a reflex from either decrease or\nincrease of attentive effort. The pleasure we have so far considered is\nna\u00efve and direct; it is from literary art rather than in or at literary\nart as such. The child and the most ordinary reader derive from books a\nsimple and natural pleasure which they do not reflect upon, and do not\nin any wise conceive the ways and means by which the effect is produced.\nIndeed, in the presence of the most lucid and perfect art these readers,\nlike Partridge at the play, take everything as a matter of course, as\njust the way they would themselves express it. The _dilettante_ alone\ntastes the pleasure in style as such; as an art, an adaptation of means\nto ends, he alone appreciates the delicate adjustment of expression to\nthought, the choice diction, the deft management of word and phrase. The\nquality of this technical pleasure in style is exemplified in its\nhighest form in this note of a great artist-critic, Shelley, appended to\nhis fine translation of the opening chorus in \u201cFaust\u201d:\u2014\n\n\"Such is a literal translation of this astonishing chorus; it is\nimpossible to represent in another language the melody of the\nversification; even the volatile strength and delicacy of the ideas\nescape in the crucible of translation, and its reader is surprised to\nfind a _caput mortuum_.\"\n\nThe psychological nature of this pleasure in style is obviously quite\ndistinct from the direct pleasures from reading which have been\npreviously discussed. Here is pleasure in literary art, not for what it\nbrings, but for its own sake. The distinction between the pleasure the\naverage tourist takes in travelling swiftly and smoothly in a _de luxe_\ntrain, and that taken by the professional engineer inspecting the\nhigh-speed locomotive, is analogous in quantity and quality to the\ndistinctive pleasures of critical and uncritical appreciation of fine\nart. But we have as yet only cleared the ground toward ascertaining the\npsychological _rationale_ of literary style. We have marked only general\ncauses of literary pleasure, we have noticed in this pleasure only those\nelements which flow from the psychological and physiological basis of\nall pleasure as reflex of functioning. That we admire and take pleasure\nin nice adjustment of means to ends is also a general law of pleasure\nwith all who act teleologically, and are capable of appreciating actions\nof this kind. But is there not a specific quality in the \u00e6sthetic\npleasure from or in literary art which has not yet been accounted for?\nCertainly the common expression, \u201cmore forcible than elegant,\u201d as\napplied to spoken or written language, denotes that for the popular\nconsciousness style is somewhat more than and different from mere force\nand consequent ease and largeness of apprehension. We hear a very loud\nsound with greater ease than smaller sounds, there is economy of\nattention, yet this does not bestow \u00e6sthetic quality on the great sound.\nAt the renderings of the finest music we are often called on to strain\nthe ear, and the mental receptiveness as a whole to the utmost, in order\nto hear, note, and appreciate the delicate effects. So in literary art\nit is not that which speaks most loudly and strongly to the mind that\nthereby becomes the best style. In fact, the most forcible method of\nexpression is often, as is generally acknowledged, slang, which is\ndebarred from style. Literary style seems, then, more than a mental\nlabour-saving machine. As a utilitarian device it certainly does save\nmental exertion, and gives rapidity, accuracy, and facility to psychic\nfunction. Like grammar, a mechanic rhetoric is useful, and we receive a\npleasure from its use as from any other mechanism of man\u2019s industry; and\nfurther, we may take a certain pride and pleasure in its consciously\nrecognised effectiveness. However, we have not yet reached style in the\nhigher sense, which may be clear and forcible, but must be dignified,\ngraceful, and beautiful. For purposes of business, for conventional\ncommunication, for science, for philosophy, language fulfils its end in\nstating accurately, clearly, and forcibly; but style as literary art is\nmore than instrument to intelligibility, it has an independent office of\nits own. Language in the lower service as a medium of communication is a\nlens which cannot be too transparent; but in the higher service to fine\nart, language is rather a mosaic window of stained glass which both\nabsorbs and transmits light, which both conceals and reveals, which we\nlook at as well as through. In literary art or style, language has a\nvalue of beauty for itself alone, as well as a value of use as a means\nof communication.\n\nBut the root of style is in emotion; it is as expression of emotion, and\nin the main of one kind of emotion, that language rises to style. All\nemotions influence language expression, and any one may, under certain\nconditions, lead towards literary art; there is an eloquence of wrath\nand of fear, of hate and of love, and these emotions may induce artistic\ncreativeness in written language; but the main impulse to art is in the\nfeeling for beauty _per se_. This is a certain mode of emotional delight\nwhich every one who has felt it knows at once in its quality as quite\ndistinct as a psychic mode. How literary style rises and falls with\n\u00e6sthetic emotion might be exemplified by a wide range of quotations, but\nan example or two must suffice. This, from one of Shelley\u2019s letters,\nwill, I trust, illustrate the point:\u2014\n\n \u201cMY DEAR P\u2014\u2014, I wrote to you the day before our departure from Naples.\n We came by slow journeys, with our own horses, to Rome, resting one\n day at Mola di Gaeta, at the inn called Villa di Cicerone\u2014from being\n built on the ruins of his villa, whose immense substructions overhang\n the sea, and are scattered among the orange groves. Nothing can be\n lovelier than the scene from the terraces of the inn. On one side\n precipitous mountains whose bases slope into an inclined plane of\n olive and orange copses, the latter forming, as it were, an emerald\n sky of leaves, starred with innumerable globes of their ripening\n fruit, whose rich splendour contrasted with the deep green foliage; on\n the other the sea, bounded on one side by the antique town of Gaeta,\n and the other by what appears to be an island, the promontory of\n Circe. From Gaeta to Terracina the whole scenery is of the most\n sublime character. At Terracina precipitous conical crags of immense\n height shoot into the sky and overhang the sea. At Albano we arrived\n again in sight of Rome. Arches after arches in unending lines\n stretching across the uninhabited wilderness, the blue defined line of\n the mountains seen between them, masses of nameless ruin standing like\n rocks out of the plain, and the plain itself, with its billowy and\n unequal surface, announced the neighbourhood of Rome. And what shall I\n say to you of Rome? If I speak of the inanimate ruins, the rude stones\n piled upon stones which are the sepulchres of the fame of those who\n once arrayed them with the beauty which has faded, will you believe me\n insensible to the vital, the almost breathing creations of genius yet\n subsisting in their perfection?\u201d\n\nThis letter opens with language as method of conventional commonplace\ncommunication. The second and third sentences are barely tinged by\n\u00e6sthetic emotion, as in \u201cimmense substructions\u201d and \u201clovelier\u201d; but it\nis not till the fourth sentence that style fairly begins. Then it\nrapidly falls away in the fifth, sixth, and seventh sentences, to arise\nagain with a new wave of \u00e6sthetic emotion, which progresses through the\nremainder of the quotation. The culminating points of the \u00e6sthetic\nemotion are precisely the culminating points of style, namely, in the\nphrases, \u201can emerald sky of leaves, starred with innumerable globes of\ntheir ripening fruit,\u201d and in \u201csepulchres of the fame of those who once\narrayed them with the beauty which has faded.\u201d What constitutes the\npeculiar attractiveness of these expressions is this, that they are rich\nin \u00e6sthetic feeling, and communicate it to us. We are by the power of\nstyle sharers in high delights. In the first case we are awakened to a\nvisualizing, to a sensuous beauty, though compounded with other\nelements, through metaphor; and in the second case the emotion is a\ncomplex of sensuous and spiritual elements.\n\nTake also the verses from Shelley already quoted. Mr. Spencer, in\ncommenting on these lines, has correctly pitched upon the word\n\u201cshepherded\u201d as the culminating point; but when he intimates that the\nbeauty and pleasing effect is due to the \u201cdistinctness with which it\ncalls up the feature of the scene, bringing the mind by a bound to the\ndesired conception,\u201d we must dissent. This purely utilitarian\nexplanation fails to recognise that poetic metaphor is confusing\u2014here\ntwo classes of objects, clouds and sheep\u2014and misleading, except to the\npoetic mind. A writer who was aiming purely at clearness and correctness\nof imaging, as a popular scientific writer, might mention the clouds as\nlike patches of white wool; but he would not bring in the extraneous\nideas of sheep and shepherd. If Mr. Spencer were trying to give us a\nvivid idea of clouds, he would surely not speak in this purely poetic\nfashion. It is a mode of fancy and emotion which the poet is indulging\nwhen he writes these lines, and not an intellectual impulse to clarify\nand illustrate. If Mr. Spencer receives them in this latter spirit, he\nmisses their psychic content and explanation. Poetry is only\nintelligible to the poetic, and the German pedant who emended \u201cCelia,\ndrink to me only with thine eyes,\u201d to \u201cCelia, wink to me only with thine\neyes,\u201d was certainly economizing attention and rendering conception\neasy, but at the expense of poetic beauty. The source of the pleasure we\ntake in poetic style\u2014the highest and purest form of literary art\u2014is\nevidently not for its intelligibility, at least primarily, but its\n\u00e6sthetic quality, an expression of a peculiar emotional attitude toward\nobjects.\n\nTo illustrate this psychological distinction between the sense of beauty\nas inherent in style, and style as mere force and clearness, I instance\nfurther only this sentence from Mr. W. D. Howell\u2019s Italian sketches,\ndescribing a side wheel steamer in motion: \u201cThe wheel of the steamer was\nas usual chewing the sea, and finding it unpalatable, and making vain\nefforts at expectoration.\u201d This is the _ne plus ultra_ of a _pseudo_\nliterary style, of affected and strained literary art. An ugly metaphor,\nforcible and clear enough, is relentlessly pursued to its ugliest\nconclusion. Here is style in pin feathers, and we are glad to remember\nthat it was writ in callow youth. It brings \u201cthe mind by a bound to the\ndesired conception,\u201d but this does not sanction it as fine art, for it\nis utterly without taste and beauty.\n\nI believe then from considering the previous examples\u2014and they might be\nindefinitely extended\u2014that the main function of literary art is not\nintelligibility, and that pleasure in style in its specific quality does\nnot arise out of economy of attention, but it is a direct communication\nof pleasant \u00e6sthetic emotion artistically conveyed. Intelligibility is a\nregulative by-law of art, but it is neither standard nor goal. Literary\nart is then a compromise between intellectual and emotional motives,\nbetween sense and sensibility. The natural choice and order of words for\neasiest apprehension is rarely the artistic order, as every\n_litt\u00e9rateur_ knows full well. It is, for example, simplest and clearest\nto repeat the best and exact word, yet the literary artist avoids, and\nrightly, the repetition of words in the same sentence or paragraph. Thus\nalso, while, as Mr. Spencer suggests, rhythm and euphony may often help\nsense, yet I believe they as often distract from it. We often tend to\nturn over in a very senseless way words and verses which please the ear.\nAs language is both an organ for meaning and for beauty, literary art,\nlike architectural, is always a compromise between utility and beauty,\nthat is, neither literature nor architecture are pure and perfectly\nindependent arts. However, it is possible that poetic license may, as\nhas already been done to some extent in English, ultimately develop a\npure poetic language, entirely distinct from the utilitarian product,\nand bound by none of its practical rules; then and then only will\nliterature become a pure art.\n\nFurther, that literary art does not always imply clearness and\nconsequent economy of attention is evident when we reflect that the\nnature of emotion is to disturb the mind, and hence also the language\nexpression. Incoherence, dimness, darkness, as qualities of \u00e6sthetic\nemotion, render literary art correspondingly broken and obscure. The\nweird, fantastic, and mysterious issues in style which is far from being\neasily intelligible. In the dreamy poetry of the Orient all is hazy and\nevanescent, and the mind strives in vain for clear impressions, yet here\nis the peculiar charm of style. Among Occidentals William Blake, with\nhis childish incoherence, and Robert Browning, with his harsh\nabruptness, have a certain obscurity, but both are great stylists and\ngreat poets.\n\nStyle then is at bottom something quite distinct from either ease or\ndifficulty of apprehension. It is founded, not on apprehension at all,\nbut on emotional receptiveness. Hence very active and intellectual\nnatures seem ever debarred from really entering the realms of art,\nbecause they ever fail to appreciate that the function of art is not\npractical, or ethical, or scientific, or philosophic, but emotional. The\nman of business, of politics, of science, of thought, cannot give\nhimself up without questioning to be thrilled and suffused by the\nunanalyzable charm of mere beauty. Such natures seem incapable of\nreceiving, they must get and acquire, and so they miss all that art to\nwhich the only open sesame is a quiet inattention and a wise\npassiveness. The kingdom of art is not taken by violence, and the\nviolent do not take it by mere intellectual force.\n\nAs to the origin and nature of the feeling for beauty in style as for\nbeauty in general, the reason may be sought in survivals of primitive\npleasures. Thus the expression, before quoted, \u201cstarred with innumerable\nglobes of their ripening fruit,\u201d aside from the pleasure in sonorous\nquality and artistic construction, pleases mainly as awakening the\nfeeling for natural beauty. But what is the psychological explanation\nfor this \u00e6sthetic emotion in presence of tree, fruit, flower, sky, and\nall landscape features. It may largely be a revival of feelings felt\nlong since by our arboreal and forest-haunting ancestors, \u201ccombinations\nof states which were organized in the race, during barbarous times, when\nits pleasurable activities were chiefly among the woods and waters\u201d\n(Spencer, _Psychology_, Sect. 214). In the woods and by the streams\nthere tends to revive the long outgrown physical emotion; the old savage\nfeelings of delight and excitement in the chase come back to the\ncivilized man, and in stealthy approach of game and skilful slaying the\nmodern man re-experiences far distant ancestral joys. Now literary art\nby skilfully setting forth scenes of savage life may renew, the old\nsurvival feelings to a certain degree of illusive life. This is done to\na large extent by pastoral poetry, mythic story, legend and fairy tale,\nwhereby we drop back into a very old and simple mode of enjoyable mental\nlife. The basis of primitive psychosis is in the particular concrete and\nanimate, and literary art, especially in its highest manifestation,\npoetry, as becoming simple, sensuous, and impassioned, has a foundation\nin survival tendencies. Through literature mankind renews its youth.\nSimilarly we may suppose that if in the future psychic evolution of the\nrace the present mode of thinking in general and abstract terms should\nbe succeeded by some new and higher phase, then the artificial\nstimulating the revival of this outgrown abstract phase would constitute\na source of pleasure and might be achieved through a style. As a means\ntoward revivals literary style is a backward moving spirit in sharp\ncontrast to science, which, as generalizing and depersonifying, is the\nforward moving process.\n\nHowever, we have sharply to distinguish between what is given in a\nsurvival state and that which accompanies it. Primitive realization is\nalways single and na\u00efve, but when it comes up in a survival it is\ngenerally consciously contrasted with accustomed modes by consciousness,\nand there arises a reflective pleasure of contrast which is not\ncontained in the survival itself, but of which the survival is merely a\ncondition. Further, our realization of the outgrown psychic elements is\nvery generally dramatic. We take self-conscious pleasure in\ninvestigating, assuming, and re-enacting past psychic phases. Even when\na survival state arises spontaneously and naturally, it holds\nconsciousness at best in its original _status_ for a moment only, for\nself-consciousness quickly occurs and brings in a variety of secondary\nemotions. However attained, the obsolescent type of consciousness does\nnot stand in its simple original force, but most often there is more or\nless make-believe, some sense of its artificial and unreal nature: we do\nnot become children by playing at being children. Children and savages\nare in the animistic psychic stage, but the poetic interpretation of\nnature by adult man is plainly far more than mere revival of this stage,\nit is dramatic self-conscious realization. Original animism is often\npainful; the savage fears his gods and the child dreads ghosts; but\nmyths and ghost stories are sources of amusement to us, and the twinge\nof fear which comes up as survival loses its real force and is\ndramatically realized and enjoyed. Literary art is a dramatic induction\ninto the past rather than incentive to mere revival; and it makes us to\npleasurably renew alike the outgrown pains and pleasures. We certainly\nshould go far astray if we should consider style as effectual mainly by\nits exciting to revival of ancestral experiences. What is recurrent is\nbut a small element compared to what is concurrent.\n\nWe must note the particular case of landscape beauty. Shelley\u2019s\ndescription of the orange tree laden with fruit excites in us the\nfeeling of pleasure in the beauty of nature, a feeling which is declared\nby some to be merely the reminiscent revived feelings which our distant\nprogenitors felt in the presence of natural forms and forces. But what\nwas the emotion our remote progenitor felt at sight of a well-fruited\norange tree? Did he feel moved as Shelley was and as we through Shelley\nare? and is our emotion but a faint survival of that which welled up in\nhim at viewing the mass of green and gold, or has it any relation\nthereto? The civilized traveller in wild regions is often charmed by the\nbeauty of the scenery which the savage natives do not in the least\nappreciate. But the revival feelings which come over him must be\nidentical with the feelings of his un\u00e6sthetic companions who are totally\ninsensible to natural beauty. The reversal tendency can give to the\ntraveller only an animal pleasure in viewing an orange tree as\nsatisfying to the taste and stomach; a fine, bright day can only suggest\nthe pleasure of a sluggish basking. Goethe rejoiced that, though the\nincidental pains of \u00e6sthetic sensitivity were great, yet he could see in\na tree shedding its leaves more than the approach of winter. Bare\nrevival then cannot in itself constitute \u00e6sthetic pleasure or explain\nit. A savage race transferred to a civilized land for a few generations\nand then returned to their native haunts have acute pleasures of\nrevival, but these are not of the \u00e6sthetic quality. An outcropping\nsurvival tendency may serve as itself an object for emotion and \u00e6sthetic\nemotion to the mind experiencing it, but thereby the survival is like\nany other object, physical or psychical, which excites \u00e6sthetic\nsensibility, and it no more explains the emotion for beauty than any\nother object.\n\nIt is evident thus far that the psychological basis of stylistic effect\nis very complex, and in this essay we certainly lay no claim to making\nan exhaustive enumeration of its factors. However, we have still to\nconsider one more element, and perhaps, at least for cultivated minds,\nthe most important psychic element of literary art. Read now the\nfollowing extract, and analyze the impression it makes:\u2014\n\n \u201cThe natural thirst that ne\u2019er is satisfied\n Excepting with the water for whose grace\n The woman of Samaria besought,\n Put me in travail, and haste goaded me\n Along the encumbered path behind my Leader,\n And I was pitying that righteous vengeance;\n And lo! in the same manner as Luke writeth\n That Christ appeared to two upon the way\n From the sepulchral cave already risen,\n A shade appeared to us, and came behind us,\n Down gazing on the prostrate multitude,\n Nor were we 'ware of it, until it spake,\n Saying, 'My brothers, may God give you peace.'\u201d\n\nHere, surely, is neither facility, nor beauty of expression, nor deft\nand subtle art to please the mind, yet it attracts and interests. The\nmain secret of the effect of Dante\u2019s style is as revelation of\npersonality. Art with Dante is the child of life, the product of long\nand deep-felt experience; and because he is an original reality he\nachieves in his writings that distinctiveness and distinction which is\nthe truest and highest mark of style. Again, it is not the lucidity of\nSam Weller\u2019s remarks that pleases us, but rather their characteristic\nflavour. We delight to come in contact with originals, and we relish the\ncharacteristic for its own sake, even when ugly or when most unlike\nourselves in tendency, and so the modernest of the moderns enjoys Dante,\nthe typical medi\u00e6valist. Style is the man. This is the best definition\nof style and the best explanation of its peculiar effect. Style is\nexpression of subjective quality. While scientist and philosopher aim to\nbe objective, to justly reflect and interpret outward reality the\nliterary artist aims merely to give a perfect exposition of himself.\nStyle is the literary expression of self-realization. Hence the greatest\nstylists write to please themselves, and are their own severest critics.\nStyle is _timbre_, and the best style is that in which this peculiar\ntone of the individual mind is most perfectly revealed. A great style\nis, then, the expression of a great man, and the consummation of style\noccurs when the genius has grown to the highest point of his\nindividuality\u2014and individuality is genius\u2014with corresponding power of\nexpression. Among Tennyson\u2019s poems the most Tennysonian has the greatest\nstyle. When we quote from Wordsworth such lines as,\u2014\n\n \u201cThe world is too much with us: late and soon,\n Getting and spending, we lay waste our powers\u201d\u2014\n\nand say of them that they are eminently Wordsworthian, that no one else\ncould have written them, we have said the highest word for the style.\n\nIn the very largest sense style is the evolution of the characteristic;\ndevelopment physical and psychical is but a movement toward style. The\nprogress from homogeneity to heterogeneity in matter; the morphological\ndevelopment of animate things from indefinite formless beings to\ndefinite, complex types; biological integration and specialization\u2014all\nthis is progress of style. Thus the most lion-like lion and the most\nelephantine elephant respectively achieve the highest style of animal in\ntheir kind. The development in the human race is mainly psychic, and\nincludes psychic classes, orders, genera and species, not as yet so\nclearly tabulated as in general natural history. A genius is the\ninauguration of a new _genus_, style, or type of man; he is a psychic\n\u201csport,\u201d to borrow a botanical term. A new mode of personality is\nachieved and may manifest itself in various ways of action, thought and\nemotion. If the expression is through literature a great style is\ngenerated, and this style grows with the growing individuality\u2014the\nproductions of youth have little style\u2014and culminates with its\nculmination.\n\nTo discover style is almost as rare a gift as to achieve it. The\ncritical sense is about as uncommon as the creative power; hence the\ngreatest masters of style have had often to wait long for recognition,\nwhich would hardly be the case if the main value of style was in\neconomising attention. According to this theory, we should expect the\nstylist to be welcomed with instant and universal appreciation, a\nphenomenon which rarely or never occurs. With very many writers, as with\nWordsworth, recognition is very tardy, and with some only posthumous.\nMany readers fail even with the utmost attention to appreciate the\ngreatest artists, and can make nothing out of them; a few rise at length\nto some understanding; but only rare and select spirits find themselves\nat once _en rapport_. The true _connoisseur_ and critic must introduce\nand interpret to us the characteristic quality or style of the\n_litt\u00e9rateur_, else we may never know and feel it. Recognition and\nappreciation of style as the characteristic is, then, for the vast\nmajority an acquired taste; it is slowly and painfully learned, and so\nthe emotion for style as specific mode of expression must be pronounced\na very late psychic development.\n\nThe taste and emotion for the characteristic as such, whenever and\nhowever acquired, is certainly a peculiar and definite mode of emotion.\nIt is far from being the feeling of discipleship, and is often excited\nby that which is most remote and opposite to ourselves. We say of a\ncertain person, \u201cHe is a _character_,\u201d and he interests and pleases us\nas such, though entirely foreign to us in either sympathy or antipathy.\nAs an entirely disinterested emotion, the \u00e6sthetic is beyond the range\nof common na\u00efve consciousness. The enjoyment of the characteristic _per\nse_ is specially for the analytically super-conscious cosmopolite and\nfor the cultured critic. The pleasure comes partly from the novelty and\nthe contrast reflectively understood, partly from admiration for the\nforcefulness of creative personality, its plastic power in forming its\nmaterial of expression, and largely a teleologic pleasure in perceiving\nfulness and purity of type. The emotion for style as characteristic\nexpression is plainly one of those which is not due to the utility in\nthe struggle for existence, but has arisen when experience comes to be\ncultivated for its own sake.\n\nWhen, as in eras like our own, personality weakens, and the inner\nplastic and creative force of conviction and emotion decreases, the\nwriter is driven to technical treatment. The _litt\u00e9rateur_, as he has\nlittle or nothing to say, contents himself with playing tricks on\nlanguage, and elaborating rhythms and cadences. Style becomes finicky; a\nrace of prinking poetasters and priggish prosaists arise, punctiliously\nformal, and superlatively dainty, who attain the art of saying nothing\nvery elegantly, elaborately, and brilliantly. An over-conscious,\nover-subtle technique destroys the grand style as transmitter of\ncharacteristic quality.\n\n * * * * *\n\nI trust I have, in this brief study, made it clear that the psychology\nof literary style is far from simple, and that a number of factors are\ninvolved, which are slighted by Herbert Spencer and others of that\nschool. I believe that any one at all conversant with literature who\nwill reflect upon the pleasures he receives from reading, will perceive\nthat the pleasure of smoothness and facility, of moving along rapidly\nand easily, is but one, and that generally a minor factor in literary\nenjoyment. Beside this, he often has the pleasure of difficulties\novercome, of ideas grasped, and delicate emotional touches appreciated\nby triumphant attentive effort. Again, he receives pleasure in\nperceiving literary skill, the adaptation of artistic means to the\nartistic end. But, as I have maintained, the chief mode of pleasure is\nthrough style as transmitter of \u00e6sthetic emotion and as expression of\nthe characteristic, achieving its acme when both these functions are\nsimultaneously performed most fully and perfectly.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER XIX\n _ETHICAL EMOTION_\n\n\nThe need of a closer psychological definition and interpretation of\nethical emotion must be apparent to any reader of the current\npsychology, where we find the utmost confusion and looseness of usage.\nOne of the most glaring instances which I have come across is this from\nPerez (_First Three Years of Childhood_, p. 286): \u201cAs soon as the child\nbegins to obey, from fear or from habit, he enters on the possession of\nthe moral sense; as soon as he obeys in order to be rewarded or praised\nor to give pleasure, he has advanced further in this possession.\u201d A boy\nat table reaches out for the last piece of cake, but withdraws his hand\nout of love for his mother\u2019s approbation, and fear of her\ndisapprobation. Does this imply moral sense and emotion? We say, indeed,\nthat these were very proper and moral emotions for the child to have;\nobjectively moral, but we do not describe the psychical state of the\nchild correctly by saying that it has the moral sense and emotion. In\nfact, just so far as he acts out of love or fear, just so far he is not\nacting out of ethical emotion; that is, simply because he feels he\nought.\n\nOnly the slightest introspection, then, is needed to recognise the\ndistinction of objective and subjective morality, of a moral emotion and\nthe emotion of morality. So we must disallow even dread of \u201cmoral\ndiscomfort\u201d as psychically moral, Spencer notwithstanding (_Essays_ I.,\np. 348). The fear of remorse may restrain from objectively immoral acts,\nbut the ethical emotion is not a fear constraint, as every one knows\nwhen doing a thing simply because he feels he ought to. Because I judge\nmy feeling or act a right one, does not constitute this the feeling of\nrightness as psychic fact. In short, we must always distinguish between\nthe socially right action, the morally right action, and the\npsychologically moral action. He who erects a model tenement, even\nthough he do it to advertise himself, is doing the right thing by\nsociety, though his action is neither prompted by a moral emotion nor\nthe moral emotion. If philanthropy incites him, both the act and feeling\nobjectively are moral, but psychically he is immoral, and only becomes\npsychically moral when he acts out of the ethical emotion as feeling of\nduty. One who acts out of sympathy, pity, mercy, affection, feeling of\nhonour, love of approbation, and similar emotions, often confounded with\nthe moral emotion, is objectively moral. We pronounce these to be right\nemotions, yet they are not the emotion of right, and so not psychically\nmoral; and it is evident, also, that they may not be socially right, for\noften actions from these motives result in social wrongs. However, in\nlater phases of psychic evolution, when emotions themselves are\nreflected upon as psychic acts, the emotion of the moral \u201cought\u201d may be\nfelt as stimulus to them, and so we may at once feel that we ought to\nsympathise, and so sympathise, and so act, and may thus at the same time\nbe psychically, morally and socially right.\n\nBut while the nature and rise of ethical emotion is often untruly\nconnected with some one kind of act, as obedience, or with some one kind\nof motive, as love of reward, a far more likely field of investigation\nis opened by those who connect feeling of duty with conflict of motives.\nYet it is obvious at first sight that mere opposition of any two psychic\nfactors is not a distinct feeling. I have seen my dog run away from me\nto follow some canine friend, and then back to follow, and so on, till\none affection became dominant force; but such simple interference of\nemotions does not constitute any third and new or higher emotion.\nConflicts of this sort in higher natures have sometimes a reflex\npsychosis in painful feeling of distraction and bewilderment, but this\nis the end of the natural course of feeling conflicts.\n\nThere are, however, higher phases of conflict of motives which may bring\nus nearer to ethical emotion. A burglar, the evening he is to crack a\nsafe, is inclined to indulge in several glasses of wine, but his\ncompanion remarks that he ought not to drink if he expects to do the\njob. Here is something to be done, a duty, and under the compulsive\nforce of the feeling of this duty the burglar lays down his glass\nuntouched. Is not the psychic phenomenon really a case of the ethical\nemotion as involved in the thwarting of present inclination for the\nright carrying out of the thing to be done? A feeling for that which is\nlaid upon us to be done, whether we lay it upon ourselves, or it is laid\nupon us by others, has certainly the compulsory quality which we\ncommonly attribute to the ethical emotion. When we have set out to do\nsomething, this pre-determination exercises a peculiar pressure when\nsome diverse inclination enters, but it is the force of firmly-formed\npurpose and of tenacious will. Its compulsiveness is not ethical, but\nvolitional. A very little reflection convinces me that something to be\ndone, and something which ought to be done, incite distinct emotions. I\nfeel differently when I go to church, because I have planned to go, or\nhave been told to go, and when I go simply because I feel I ought. There\nis also superadded, the purely impulsive force of the emotion for the\nlarger good; and this may, indeed, play the whole part in the contest\nwith present inclination, which contest then becomes of the simple\nalternating order. Thus the burglar has avaricious visions of gold, and\nrelaxes his cup; he looks at the tempting wine, and grasps it again, and\nso on.\n\nIt is true, however, that the feeling for the larger and future good\nagainst a present inclination may be a feeling of oughtness, a feeling\nof duty, a constraining to do a set something. Providence and prudential\naction are enforced not merely by, \u201cI wish to get the larger good,\u201d but,\n\u201cI ought to reach it.\u201d The most permanent, the greatest and completest\npleasure and benefit not only incites us, but constrains us.\nConstraining emotion, a feeling of oughtness, may then arise both from a\npreview of bare accomplishment of plan or purpose set by ourselves or\nothers, and also from sense of larger over lesser advantage. Here is the\nregion of utilitarian duty, of the Ethics of calculation of personal\npleasure and happiness. Psychically here is a true feeling of ought, and\nhere is the ethical emotion, if we make the term denominate all feeling\nof oughtness. But if this is the region of Ethics, it may be said to be\nthe region of the lower Ethics, and we may indeed deny the term ethical\nto all this kind of emotion of oughtness. The emotion arises about\npersonal and particular ends, and not about principles. The ambitious\nman feels an ought as well as the conscientious, but they are diverse in\nnature. Alike merely in the general quality of compulsive force, they\nmay differ in tone and special qualities. The constraining emotion which\ncomes with viewing a universal law of right may be claimed as distinct\nfrom the constraint exercised by personal ends. But it is not our\npurpose to discuss this matter here.\n\nThe psychic conflict which is specially connected with moral emotion is\nthe conflict of the egoistic and altruistic impulses. When in such a\nstruggle sympathy prevails, we approve as objectively moral and right,\nbut the existence of ethical emotion in determining the dominance of the\naltruism is not assured. Pity originally overcame hatred without the\ncompulsion of duty. Altruistic impulses contest with egoistic in na\u00efve\nand simple natures without any appearance of feeling for duty. The\norigin and nature of morality does not thus seem bound up with the\nearliest forms of egoistic-altruistic contests, though in later\nevolution it may come in as reinforcement of the altruistic. We may feel\nthen, not merely like helping a man in distress at the expense of our\nown comfort, but we feel we ought to help him; the force of a general\nprinciple of conduct is felt in the form we term the ethical emotion,\nyet it is obvious that such a recognition of a general and universal law\nand such a feeling therefor is far later than the rise of altruism\nitself. Darwin alludes to the baulking of the social instinct as having\nspecial ethical significance. With the social instinct baulked, as with\nany other, there certainly results distress, but it is by no means made\nclear that this necessarily involves moral quality. When a savage in a\nfit of anger slays his pet child, the misery of baulked parental\ninstinct may soon be felt, and he may bitterly regret the deed, but this\ndoes not involve moral feeling, a feeling of repentance for the\nessential wrongfulness of the act. He would regret in the same spirit\nthe destroying his dinner by his own hand. If we say that he is stricken\nwith remorse, we assert conscience violated. Remorse cannot explain\nconscience, but must be explained by it. Still, morality is not bound up\nnecessarily with sociality. Sociality certainly arises and progresses to\na considerable evolution before moral compulsion and the emotion of bare\nrightness arises to sanction and to stimulate social activities. And if\nmoral emotion is not implied positively in altruism as an outgoing\ntowards others, neither is it implied in the incoming of others upon the\nindividual, either in respect of approbation or disapprobation, or in\nthe more direct and essential way of rewards and penalties. Penalty is\nat bottom but a species of disadvantage brought to bear on the\nindividual through fear of consequences. The desire to get even\u2014an eye\nfor an eye and a tooth for a tooth\u2014and all exacting justice as an\nequivalence, whether as exacted by the individual or by persons\ndelegated, the officers of justice, is plainly not in its origin and\nbasis the ethical emotion. A system of mutual dues and rights may or may\nnot have the sanction of morality, but they arise in advantage; and the\nmotives which originate penalties and act with reference thereto, are\nfar from being the pure moral emotion, a direct feeling for rightness as\nrightness. The merchant in general pays his import _duty_, not as a\nmoral duty, but as something required by legality rather than morality.\nLaw and public sentiment exercise through emotion, and that of a\ncompulsory type, certain effects on conduct, but it is clear that the\ngeneral feeling of oughtness as self-imposed law of rightness is not\npresupposed.\n\n * * * * *\n\nIf the ethical emotion be not specially bound up with obedience or with\nconflict of motives, may it not be particularly connected with science?\nAt the outset we note that a very natural confusion of science and\nEthics is favoured by the fact that we can apply the term Ethics both to\nthe science and the matter treated, and so speak of the science Ethics\nas the science of Ethics, of ethical perception, emotion and action. But\nyet we know that the science is by no means to be identified with its\nsubject matter, and also that the science of a matter and the Ethics of\nit are two very diverse psychic tendencies and points of view. Science\nis always an objectifying impulse whose end is merely to know, but\nEthics is subjective, whose end is merely to be. This is emphasized by\nthe fact that science in its ceaseless objectifying may constitute a\nscience of science, and science of the science of science, and so on,\nbut Ethics is self-contained, and there can be no Ethics of Ethics.\nWhile we so sharply distinguish scientific and ethical activity, yet so\nfar as the science is prompted by ethical emotion it is ethical\nactivity. If I learn and know out of the feeling of duty, the act is\npsychically moral, yet is always distinct in quality from the feeling\nwhich prompts it. Thus there is an Ethics of science, or rather, to or\ntoward science, though most scientific activity is carried on at the\nstimulus of other impulses, as love of truth, ambition, etc.\nPsychologically speaking, then, science is in no wise Ethics nor Ethics\nscience.\n\nBut it will be said, \u201cIs not ethical discrimination a cognitive\nactivity? Must not one know the right, know that he ought, before he can\nfeel ethically and act ethically?\u201d But it will be found that at bottom\nthe rightness of an action is the appreciated accord of the action with\nan end which is already felt to be right. I am asked whether I think it\nwas right for a certain poor man to purloin a loaf from a baker for his\nstarving family. In passing ethical judgment I simply fall back on some\nethical postulate. The right of the family to life, I may say, ought to\ntake precedence of the right of property. I therein fall back upon the\nsimple feeling of right as ethical emotion. The knowing activity is\nconcerned merely in the apprehending the situation, and ratiocination in\ntracing back to moral principles, but the ethical discrimination is\nneither, but an affair of direct emotion. If it be felt to be right to\nsave life in any wise that seems necessary, I will approve it as right.\nA reason can only make an act right by being a right reason. Thus it is\nthat moral discrimination is at bottom no more than a peculiar feeling\nabout acts, towards or against the doing them, which, like all emotion,\ninvolves the knowing its object, but is not involved or explained in its\npsychic quality by the knowing act. The setting out what ought to be\ndone, the establishing duties and moral rules of conduct, the\ndevelopment of a system of Ethics, is not then fundamentally cognitive\nprocess, but emotive. Hence it is, psychically speaking, a misnomer to\ndenote any system of Ethics a science.\n\nIt is true we may denote by Ethics\u2014always capitalizing the term\u2014that\nbranch of psychology and sociology which investigates the nature and\nlaws of ethical phenomena. This Ethics merely gives an objective account\nof ethical emotion and conduct. It is often defined as the science of\nconduct, a definition quite too wide, for conduct is action consciously\nself-directed to an end, be the impulse anger, fear, love, ethical\nemotion, or any other emotion; but psychological Ethics studies only\nconduct as moved by ethical emotion. Conduct is, indeed, the sphere for\nethical feeling, and any specimen of conduct, whatever its psychic\nstimulus, may excite moral approval or disapproval and stir ethical\nemotion, but this ethical survey of conduct is not properly a science,\nas has just been shown. All conduct is then objectively interpretable as\nmoral, though it be inherently and psychologically immoral, that is,\nhaving no element of moral feeling. The spheres of objective and\nsubjective morality are far from being coincident.\n\nFurther, science is not peculiarly related above common knowledge to\nethical emotion. Common sense and ordinary fear lead me to jump off the\ntrack before an approaching train, while physiological knowledge and\nordinary fear may incite me to put on rubbers on a wet day. Scientific\nknowledge opens the way for the common emotions; it shows the\nconsequences of acts with fulness and accuracy, and so opens a wide\nrange for the ordinary emotions which awake at sight of the experienced\nand experienceable. If I feel I ought to put on rubbers, this feeling\narises, not directly at the consequences which science reveals, but at\nthe rightness of the consequences. I feel I ought not to injure my\nhealth, a feeling which science does not generate, but it merely\nestablishes the fact that such and such actions will injure my health,\nand so gives the opportunity of applying the moral postulate, I ought\nnot to injure my health. I judge the rightness of an act, not by its\nconsequences, but by the rightness of its consequences.\n\nAgain, science reveals most clearly the necessary means to ends; it says\nthat to make nitro-glycerine you must use such and such ingredients. In\nviewing these means in their necessity there may arise a certain emotion\nof compulsion to their use; but this compulsive quality is not, I ought\nto do so and so, but I must, if I would attain the end. It is plainly an\nunethical use of terms to say, If you wish to succeed or be happy you\nought to do so and so, or that is the right way to succeed or be happy.\nMorality is not a recipe toward any end but itself. So the feeling as to\nthe \u201cConditions by fulfilment of which happiness is achieved\u201d\u2014emphasized\nby Spencer in the principles of Ethics as the main element in moral\nemotion\u2014is not real ethical emotion. I may feel the constraint and\nnecessity to using certain means, difficult and unpleasant in\nthemselves, in order to reach a desired end, but a moment\u2019s\nintrospection shows that this compulsive emotion is not thereby moral,\nthat this feeling is not a feeling of duty but of necessity to employ\nthe means. If I feel that I ought to become happy, then alone will I\nfeel I ought to use the means to happiness. So also a man may desire to\nwin in athletic competition, but the requisite means, a hard course of\ntraining, may deter him from entering; that is, his love of ease\nconflicts and overcomes his desire of athletic success as far as action\nis concerned. If he undertakes the training and struggles through, he\nfeels the compulsion of the means in direct proportion to his love of\nease and pleasure. He refuses a cigar under this emotion at the\nnecessity of the means, but this is plainly not a case of ethical\nemotion; he refuses, not because he ought, but because he must, and the\ntrainer who says to him, \u201cYou ought not to take that cigar,\u201d does not\nprimarily appeal to moral principle, but to the constraint of the means\nto desired end. This does not deny that a man may feel training as a\nmatter of duty, but it is still obvious that he who refuses a cigar as a\nmere matter of training, is as psychic fact actuated by an emotion of\ndistinct quality from that which the man feels who refuses to smoke as a\nmatter of conscience; the feeling, \u201cI must not,\u201d is diverse from the\nfeeling implied in, \u201cI ought not.\u201d The athlete may be conscientiously an\nathlete, but in general he refuses to smoke merely because that is the\nright stand, _i.e._, suitable to gaining the particular desired end,\nwhereas the conscientious man refuses as determined by a feeling for\nsome end whose rightness is assumed, as the preservation of health, or\nthe being inoffensive to others. The athlete is moved by what is right\nor useful to some end, while the psychically moral man is actuated by\nthe emotion for the end of rightness; and while constraint appears as\ncharacteristic of both emotions, still in breadth, depth, and particular\ntone, the ethical is plainly differentiated from the necessitarian\nemotion. At bottom also it is plain that the feeling of compulsion to\nmeans is a case of conflict of motives\u2014as with the athlete is love of\npleasure of smoking _versus_ desire of athletic success\u2014and conflict of\nmotives has been previously discussed.\n\nNeither scientific nor common knowledge then can as method of means give\nby itself the moral emotion. But it may be said that science does\nprovide ends for action and that the emotion about the end is an ethical\nemotion. Thus the end of truth, of adherence to reality, is naturally\nemphasized by science; yet here is not duty, but the essential guiding\nemotion is the emotion for achievement and the achievement of the\ndesired accordance with nicety and completeness. The enthusiasm for\ntruth and truth in action is an emotion which may be sanctioned by moral\nfeeling, but it is not moral feeling. Adaptation to environment or\nconformity to reality as a general end of action may have its impetus in\nmoral emotion, I may feel that I ought to accord with the nature of\nthings as scientifically revealed, but this motive is by no means\nnecessarily implied in the end. And conduct is rarely actuated by pure\nsentiment for this end; rather the general form is, \u201cDo this and thou\nshalt live\u201d; that is, the emotion is desire for personal ends to which\naccordance with nature is the means.\n\nAgain, take a suggestion of end for conduct from some special science.\nFor instance, Biology marks as the general result of the struggle for\nexistence and of natural selection, the perfection\u2014practical and\nrelative\u2014of the kind. Thus the result, that is, end unconsciously\nachieved, of the life of deer is power of locomotion and keenness of\nscent, while with man the tendency of evolution is toward brain power.\nMan obviously is able to consciously make an evolution tendency an end,\nto conduct himself with reference to it, and thus man\u2019s life may be a\nconscious and strenuous carrying out of tendency. A constraint arises\nfrom this end as from others, but it is not moral constraint, till the\nend has been adjudged right; thus this end does not explain rightness.\nThe aspiration toward self-culture and self-fulfilment is not\npsychically moral, nor yet the determination to achieve this perfection.\nPerfection, be it remarked, is not an end, but the measure of attainment\nof any end; a perfect man is one who is complete in certain respects.\nMorality is not the carrying out any end, perfectly or imperfectly, be\nit pleasing, satisfactory, true, good, etc., but it pursues and is\npursued by the right end, which is rightness as universal,\nauthoritative, compulsive, self-approved, impersonal law. The emotion of\noughtness in its purely ethical form is responsive to this alone. Purely\nmoral emotion as psychic fact, is not any feeling for any _summum bonum_\nor any perfection of attainment of any kind, but is an emotion for the\nright for its own sake. It is neglectful of all consequences, and cries,\n\u201cLet justice be done, though the heavens fall.\u201d We all know the distinct\ndifference in quality of feeling when acting merely to do my duty and\nwhen acting to achieve an end for the achievement\u2019s sake or for the good\nimplied. Ethical emotion may arise about any extrinsic end, but does not\narise out of it.\n\nWe conclude then that as psychical fact there is a variety of compulsory\nemotions, an ought of law as behest of others, an ought of means, an\nought of end, an ought of advantage, an ought of bare moral rightness,\nand that this latter emotion, as every one knows by introspection, has\nits own peculiar quality and force. He who feels constraint from\nauthority, from use of means, from end purposed, is plainly feeling\ndifferent from him who feels the constraining emotion at moral right.\nAnd the law which says, \u201cDo this and thou shalt live,\u201d does not bring\nmoral pressure, for the moral law says, \u201cDo this whether thou livest or\nnot\u201d; that is, moral emotion and activity is not consciously to itself a\nlife factor. As a matter of psychic fact a world of moral activity\nexists solely for and in itself, and the emotion in this sphere of\nabsolute morality, in which many conscientious people live habitually,\nis ethical emotion in the narrow and strict sense of the term. The\nimmediate feeling of absolute rightness\u2014so-called intuitive\nmorality\u2014however and whenever it has arisen, seems to present itself as\nmental factor radically diverse from all emotions of means, ends, and\nlaw.\n\nHere we may criticise a so-called rule of moral conduct to which appeal\nis often made, namely, the rule that we ought to do as we would be done\nby. We know, indeed, that the principle of equivalence is strong in\nsociety, and that if we wish to be well treated we should treat others\nwell. However, to do as we would be done by, in order that we may be\ndone by as we would, transforms moral precept into prudential maxim.\nHere is a method of advantage: in order to attain the given end we ought\nto do so and so, but the purely ethical emotion is not aroused. But\nfurther, interpret the rule as simple universal moral law that we ought\nto do as we would be done by. This involves putting ourselves in\nanother\u2019s place and considering how we would like to be treated under\nthe circumstances, and so treating him. This is hedonistic altruism, and\nits measure is crude and unreliable, for what might please me in a given\ncase might not please another. This automorphic interpretation is,\nhowever, extremely common, especially in lower psychism. The child and\nthe savage judge inevitably and naturally that they are giving you the\ngreatest pleasure when they share their dainties with you. But slowly is\nindividuality of taste recognised, and still more slowly recognised as\nproper and right. Still a hedonistic altruism, whether by mistaken mode\nof putting yourself in his place, or by true measure of realizing what\nhe is in his own place and acting accordingly, on either method is of\nvery doubtful morality if judged by any high standard. Indeed,\nhedonistic altruism, whatever its motive, has wrought both incalculable\ninjury and unrighteousness, whether as a weak sentimentalism as seen,\nfor instance, in promiscuous charity, or in more special forms, like\nparental indulgence. Ethical emotion which seeks to be directed in its\naction by an extraneous measure adulterates itself. We ought not to do\nto others as we would like them to do by us, nor yet as they would like,\nnor yet merely as we feel they ought to be treated, but the real golden\nrule is, we ought to do by others as we feel that they in their own\nnature and position ought to be done by. This is no more than to say\nthat we ought to do by others as we ought, a moral identical\nproposition; and the reducing to this shows that moral emotion rests\nonly on itself. The end of pure ethical conduct is always and ever\nmerely to fulfil righteousness everywhere or to secure its fulfilment\neverywhere, to help and forward all doing right. The so-called golden\nrule may have its place, as undoubtedly it was meant, as prop\u00e6deutic to\na kingdom of righteousness, but it has not pure ethical quality in\nitself.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER XX\n _THE EXPRESSION OF FEELING_\n\n\nThe primary function of mentality, as we have throughout assumed, is as\nstimulant to activities advantageous to the individual under the\nconditions of its existence; hence all these activities are in a broad\nsense expressions of mental state, they are the outflow of psychoses and\nare indicative of them. In particular, feeling is specially and directly\nrelated to motor values, which thus become to the self-observant or to\nothers observant an index or expression of the feeling. Thus, I see a\ndeer fleeing from a wolf, and I infer that this is an expression of\nfear. Hence we may rightly say that in a large sense all action is\nexpression, for all such action rises in feeling; in other words, from\none point of view expression equals action. Not only may exterior bodily\nphenomena betray the feeling which is their inciting cause, but to a\nvivisectionist, for example, interior phenomena, cerebral and other, may\nbe noted as indicating a feeling origin. Excluding, of course, so-called\nreflex action, which is really reflex motion, action and expression are\nbut different points of view of the same thing: what we term an action\nwhen we dwell upon the motor side, we term an expression when we dwell\non the mental _prius_ and stimulus which is revealed.\n\nNow as the evolution of mind progresses actions no longer serviceable\nmay survive in connection with given feelings, remain indicative of\nthem; thus the strong beating of the heart in fear and the scowl in\nanger. Such survival actions which occur in connection with all kinds of\nfeelings, and especially with those which are pre-human in their origin,\nare with particular emphasis styled expressions. The scowl in anger is\nconsidered as expression rather than the actual blow struck, which is\nequally the result and indication of anger.[F]\n\n-----\n\nFootnote F:\n\n Wundt says that when in emotion we look \u201csour\u201d we think we are\n actually tasting the sour, and so make the repulsing action, \u201csour\u201d\n look. (_Lectures on Psychology_, p. 283.) I think it more probable\n that the \u201csour\u201d look is the survival expression of such an emotion as\n disappointment. It is likely that the genesis of disappointment was in\n tasting the sour for the supposedly sweet, _e.g._, lemon for orange,\n and the \u201csour\u201d look has remained as expression of disappointment long\n since its utility ceased. The genesis and early growth of most\n emotions is in connection with certain sense experiences and their\n related actions, and these actions tend to remain as \u201cexpressions\u201d\n long after their real quality as actions has disappeared. Hence it is\n by survival, and not because he thinks himself tasting something sour,\n that a man looks \u201csoured\u201d by disappointment when I fail to give him\n money as promised. So also black is gloomy because we are diurnal, and\n our ancestors were diurnal. If nocturnal, black would seem joyous,\n white gloomy. (Cf. Wundt, _ibid._, p. 375.)\n\n-----\n\nExpression is then primarily all action connected with all\nconsciousness, secondarily, it is useless action continued by force of\nhabit and transmitted to descendants. But still many expressions are\nmore than mere actions or their survivals. To be sure, Darwin and many\nDarwinists maintain that the expressions do not arise or exist for their\nown value as such, but they are entirely incidental. Expression is not\nthe function of the so-called expressions, but they are entirely\nfunctional survivals. While, however, we must admit that many\nexpressions have arisen and been preserved in this manner, yet I think\nit is altogether hasty to deny the function and value of expression _per\nse_. Expression has existed as a function from very early phases of\nlife, and it underlies all bisexuality and sociality which have been\nsuch important elements in evolution. Organic sound-producing\nstructures, whose sole utility from the very first is for attracting\nattention, early appear, and further voice seems to have its origin in\nthe demand for love-call and call to young. Gregariousness is made\npossible in almost all its forms by purposive expression. There comes\nearly, then, a will, not merely in performing some definite act at\nprompting of a feeling, but also a use in simply expressing it to\nothers, communicating the fact of having pain or pleasure states to\nothers. The cry of pain in young animals is a cry for help, and as such\nhas been favoured in the struggle for existence. The usefulness of this\naction is solely as expression, and as expression it has arisen and been\ndeveloped. Expression here is not an incidental view of a physiological\naction, but exists for its own value to the individual. Such expressions\nhave their use in their significance, and as the true language of\nfeeling are to be interpreted by the principle of serviceability. An\nexpression which is and continues, by reason of its utility, as a\nsign-language, visual, auditory, or otherwise, as gesture love-calls,\netc., may be termed pure expression as distinguished from incidental\nexpression, like blushing, pallor, etc., which exist, not for their\nsignificance, though they are significant. Incidental expression\nincludes also the sphere of degraded action. Yet what seems mere\ndegraded action may be true expression, as beckoning, which is an\nabridgement of the action of pulling one to oneself and of movement\ntowards oneself; but this motion of the hands exists, not for this end,\nnor as survival, but merely as significant of a desire on the part of\nthe gesturer. In the higher ranges of life we well know the large place\nplayed by pure expression as distinguished from incidental expression.\nIt is not necessary to suppose that pure expression consists merely in\n\u201cvoluntary and consciously\u201d employing \u201cmeans of communication\u201d (Darwin,\n_Expression of the Emotions_, p. 256); thus, the scream of an infant is\nequally pure expression, whether the infant employs it knowingly or not\nas such, for screaming of the young has doubtless arisen and been\npreserved in natural selection because of its utility as significant.\nThere is then, I think, a group of activities which are not merely\nincidentally expressive, but originate and exist for expression as a\nuseful thing in the battle of life.\n\nBut we have not exhausted the principles of expression when we refer to\npresent or past serviceability as an action in general or to service as\nexpression. It is plain that in any activity prompted by any feeling\nthere comes at a certain high intensity a more or less pathologic\nover-functioning of the organs concerned, with under-functioning of\nothers. Emotion as action stimulator in any high degree always enhances\nsome physiologic function to the depression of others. The blood, for\ninstance, is forcibly withdrawn from various parts to certain specially\nactive parts, and this withdrawal gives rise to an appearance which may\nbe termed a negative expression, as the pallor in fear. Certain other\nphenomena connected with fear, as change of colour in the hair, cold\nsweat, and trembling of the muscles, which are mentioned by Darwin as\nunexplained, are probably due to this negative principle (_Expression of\nthe Emotions in Man and Animals_, New York, 1886, p. 350; but compare\npp. 81 and 308, where these disturbances are ascribed to direct action\nof the nervous system. Darwin does not, however, distinctly state or\ntreat the principle we here mention as a distinct law). As the body is\nan inter-related system of organs, stimulation to one organ means an\neffect upon all, excitation of some, depression of others; thus to an\nacute observer the whole body is symptomatic of every feeling, and,\nindeed, of every consciousness. In the natural and normal course\nemotion, to do its work most effectively, implies little or no marked\nnegative expression, but the nervous energy generated flows freely and\ndirectly to the organs which are to do service, without greatly\nimpairing general function. Fear thus acts at first simply and\nadvantageously; but in its later history fear becomes greatly\ncomplicated, and instead of freely issuing in serviceable action with\nnot excessive heightening or depressing of any function, its outlet\nseems as it were choked, and the nervous energy spends itself within the\nbody in violent disturbances of vital organs. Fear becomes then decadent\nand loses its place as evolutionary factor, becoming impediment rather\nthan aid to progress. Negative expression must then be considered as\nespecially notable in the later exhibitions of an emotion when\nconcentration becomes morbid and ineffective, losing its\nadvantageousness, and the emotion is being supplanted by other psychic\nfactors. Great injury and death itself may result from the abnormal\naction of fear and other primarily useful psychoses.\n\nBesides the particular organs to serviceable activity with the\nsubsidiary physiological functioning, and the indirect depression, we\nmust still note other principles which may control expression. Nervous\nenergy under the incitement of emotion is often in excess of the demand\nfor the required action, and it will then overflow into correlated\nactivities along the line of least resistance. Also when the suitable\naction is checked for any reason, its motive force backs up and\noverflows in new channels. Indefinite and purposeless movements of\nvarious kinds thus result which may be expressive of the emotion of\nwhich they are incidentally the result. Any one who has watched an Irish\nsetter tracing game must have remarked the wavings of the tail becoming\nmore rapid when the scent becomes stronger. When the dog is running very\nfast, the tail-waggings are less noticeable than when moving slowly,\nalthough the interest may seemingly be the same in both cases. It is\nobvious that a fast run uses to a large extent the superfluous energy\nwhich was discharging in tail movements, and when the useful running is\nchecked the tail motion recommences with greater force, serving as a\nsafety-valve. The frisking of young animals and children is also largely\ndue to diffusion of so-called superfluous nerve-force, and is expressive\nof general sensations of pleasure. All feeling is motor in its natural\nvalue and tendency, and unless the resulting energy is fully used in\nsome special serviceable action, it will discharge itself along the\neasiest and most habitual lines laid down by inheritance. Thus the\npeculiar ancestral experience of animals is always expressed by their\nspontaneous diffusive activities. It will be remarked that the principle\nof diffusion is the reverse of negative expression, being an overflow of\nforce as opposed to withdrawal. Excessive generation of energy is\ncertainly uneconomical, and we must consider that at first emotion\ntended rather to less than the required amount, than more.\n\nThe phenomena of diffusive expression, in the strict sense, are thus\nrather late in appearance. The very lowest forms of life have no infancy\nor play period, and from the first are directly active in the struggle\nfor existence. Yet the play period was certainly evolved through natural\nselection as a fully educative and preparatory stage, wherein the\nactions most demanded in actual life are unconsciously practised and a\ngeneral basis of reserve force is accumulated. Play activity is a living\non inherited energy and in the inherited modes: the kitten pouncing, the\nhorse prancing, etc. Play is then rather a mode of activity than a mode\nof expression; it is expressive only in the way that all action is\nexpressive. Expression proper is only in those modes of action which are\ncarried on, whether consciously or unconsciously, by virtue of their\nsignificance value. If everything which is expressive is called an\nexpression, we must include all the bodily actions and phenomena which\ncan in any wise be connected with consciousness. I use the term\ndiffusion in the narrow sense of spontaneous overflow of energy in\nexcess of that absolutely required for the advantageous action. I do not\nrefer to the general diffusion of emotional effect throughout the whole\norganism, which always occurs by the very nature of organism. Thus the\npain from a pin-prick certainly modifies to some extent every cell in\nthe body; there is a direct wave of influence from the psychic\nexperience, and this is propagated throughout the whole organism by\nreason of its essential interdependency of parts; it echoes and\nre-echoes throughout the whole. The physiological result is then in\nsimplest cases extremely complicated. However, this mere general fact of\ndiffusion is a biological truism, and does not explain any expression,\nbut simply asserts that every feeling, by virtue of its physical basis,\naffects the organism as a whole. Emotion issues specially in motor\nactivities because its origin was as stimulant to necessary action, but\nthis action involved internal organs, especially the circulatory and\nrespiratory, and indirectly the whole body in every part. The\nexplanation of an expression must always be in tracing back to the\noriginal serviceable actions with their demands on special subsidiary\norgans, and their depression of certain related organs, and not in\nreference to the general law of diffusion, which is but another term for\nthe essential continuity of the organism. A useful principle of\nexpression must not merely say that there is by the nature of organism a\ngeneral bodily result from every emotion, but it must explain the\nparticular expressions.\n\nWe make them so far four principles or forms of expression, which we\ninstance in saying that the blow of an angry man is general activity\nexpression, shaking the fist at one, purposive expression, scowling as\nremnant of watching foe intently in the open air is survival expression,\nand twitching and trembling of certain muscles is diffusive expression.\nEvery emotion commonly issues in all four forms, in direct activity with\nassociated survival tendencies and purposive expression, and a surplus\nof energy runs over into certain natural and easy motions, or a\ndeficiency of energy in certain organs manifests itself, the negative\nside of diffusive expression.[G]\n\n-----\n\nFootnote G:\n\n Since emotion comes in waves, expression is reduplicated. This may\n throw some light on such an expression as laughter. Landor says the\n Ainu do not in the proper sense laugh, but they roar with delight. It\n may be that laughter is reiterated roar as resulting from reiterated\n psychic impulses and feelings. As in the growth of an emotion, waves\n are multiplied, the expression becomes more reduplicate, and thus\n laughter tends to become more rippling and articulate. The\n cachinnation and explosiveness has thus a plausible explanation, which\n I merely suggest. At least Prof. Dewey\u2019s explanation (_Psychological\n Review_, I., 559) that \u201cboth crying and laughing fall under the same\n principle of action\u2014the termination of a period of effort\u201d\u2014is quite\n too general. Tension ceasing, effort stopped, we \u201cbreathe freely,\u201d\n take deep inspirations. Laughter is far from being the usual outcome\n of such a _status_.\n\n-----\n\nDarwin makes antithesis a principle of expression. Thus the expression\nof affection in the dog or cat toward its master cannot, says Darwin, be\ntraced in any wise to serviceability, and we must seek its explanation\nmerely as unconsciously and instinctively assumed as directly contrary\nto the serviceable hostile expressions. A dog\u2019s expression of anger is,\nor has been, directly serviceable action, but the expressions of\naffectionate pleasure seem never to have had such an origin, but to have\narisen merely as antithetic to the former, and so establishing the\nutmost distinctness of impression. To convey most clearly a motion of\nits friendliness the dog naturally assumes those attitudes which are\nmost diverse from its expression of hostility. Their serviceability as\nexpressions is best attained by being completely antithetical, and the\nmore antithetical the better under natural selection. However, if this\nbe the case, antithesis scarcely deserves, it seems to me, the name of a\nprinciple of expression, but it merely denominates the fact that\nopposite emotions in the struggle for existence tend to exhibit\nthemselves in opposite ways as similar emotions in similar ways; but we\nneed neither antithesis nor similarity as a principle. I believe that\nserviceability past or present either as direct action or as expression\nis the prime _impetus_ of what we term the expression of the emotions,\nand I confess I do not see much force in Darwin\u2019s Chapter on Antithesis.\nIf, however, opposition has a meaning for life, as Darwin seems to\nimply, then does not the expression come under the law of\nserviceability? If there is any opposition in expression, I should\nexplain this in general by utility rather than by antithesis _per se_.\nThus take the gestures instanced by Darwin (_ibid._, p. 65), of pushing\naway with the hand when telling one to go away, and of pulling toward\nwhen telling one to come; these gestures are, indeed, antithetic, but\ntheir explanation does not lie in the fact of the antithesis, but in the\nfact of the past serviceable habit, by which individuals disliked or\nliked were repelled or attracted. In the present instance the person\nmotioned to may be far beyond the reach of the arms, but still the\ngesture may be more than mere useless survival, for it acts as emphasis\nof the vocal expression, and has its influence there.\n\nDarwin for some reason constantly ignores the serviceability of\nexpression as such\u2014not so much as a fact, but as a principle\u2014and hence\nits relation to natural selection, whereby he involves himself in\nneedless difficulties. If an expression is of use, why should it not\narise through natural selection as well as a limb, a wing, or an eye?\nLike other functions, expression may be incidental or may adapt\nvariations attained originally for other ends, but in the case of the\nvoice, at least, we have an original organ of expression as instrument\nof intercommunication.\n\nNor can I think Darwin\u2019s treatment of the expressions of affection by\nthe dog as due to antithesis a very happy or satisfactory solution. In\nthe first place, the expression of friendliness by the dog is not the\ncomplete antithesis of that of hostility. The dog barks both out of\nfriendly joy and from anger, as Darwin himself states. Some dogs also,\nas I have often observed in my dog, show pleasurable affection by\nwrinkling up the lips and showing the teeth, an act which is often\nmistaken for a hostile demonstration. Dogs also, as is the habit with my\nown, will often express affection in the same way as the cat (_ibid._,\nfig. 10), by rubbing against one. This is but an instance of a general\nlaw of expression of affectionate emotion, _i.e._, closeness of contact\nwith the beloved object which is liked as promoting pleasure. This\ninstinctive expression of love or liking certainly had its origin in\nserviceability, the appropriate effort toward the pleasure-giving thing\nor animal, but specially in the relation of parent and offspring, and in\nthat of alliance in danger. Again, the tail of a hostile dog is, as\nfigured by Darwin, straight and erect, but the opposite of this is the\ntail tucked between the legs when fleeing from pursuers in fear, rather\nthan the position when showing friendliness to its master. My own\nopinion of the rise of the friendly expression of dog, cat, and other\nanimals toward man is that they are in the main, at least, transferred\nfrom the serviceable friendly expressions used among themselves in a\nwild or domesticated state. I have repeatedly seen small dogs, who\nattach themselves to some large dog as their master, fawn, posture, and\nlick this master precisely as this master does his human master. Dogs\nand cats also show their affection and care for their offspring in many\nexpressive acts which are transferred to their human owners. These\nexpressions were primarily either directly serviceable actions, as the\nlicking, or serviceable for expression as such, as various sounds made\nto give assurance of presence of food, or of safety. In general, it\nseems to me that when antithesis has occurred, it has arisen out of\nserviceability and not _vice vers\u00e2_.\n\nWith reference to the wagging of the tail in the dog, this is far from\nbeing an expression of affection alone. I have already mentioned the\ncase of the setter where the movement of the tail is largely due to\ndiffusion of superfluous energy, analogous to nervous habits like pacing\nthe floor or biting the nails in human beings. With some dogs at least,\nas I have noticed in my own St. Bernard, the tail is switched slowly\nback and forth when approaching another dog with hostile intent. We have\nnot as yet a sufficient number of facts at hand with reference to the\nhistory of the dog to pronounce the tail wagging as originating by\nvirtue of its use as expression. And what is the _rationale_ of the\norigin of the tail in the dog and cat, and for what reason has it been\nperpetuated? Is it a prehensile survival\u2014which has been taken advantage\nof in the breeding of the pug\u2014or is it a sexual characteristic, or did\nit originate to perform some directly advantageous action, as the tail\nof the cow and horse, or did it come into being as an organ of\nexpression? Is the tail-wagging recognised by animals themselves as an\nexpression as it is by man? These are questions on which we must have\nmore data than we now possess in order to make any sufficient answers.\n\nAgain, the rise of the barking by dogs under domestication is another\nproblem on which little can be said with certainty for lack of data.\nDarwin\u2019s remark that it may arise by imitation of the loquacity of man\nseems to me ludicrously inadequate, and there seems no element of\nimitation in the noise produced. Domesticated animals in general tend to\nuse the vocal organs for louder sounds than when in the wild state, for\nwith wild animals the value of a loud noise as expression in any way is\nlargely counterbalanced by its betraying presence to enemies. When\nnatural enemies of the dog are driven out by man there will be a\ntendency toward a larger use of the vocal organs, both with reference to\ncompanion dogs and also to man. The particular sound, the bark, is\ndetermined by the nature of the whole vocal apparatus. The bark was, no\ndoubt, originally to frighten aggressors, as I have often seen a large\ndog frighten a small dog from a piece of meat by a sudden resounding\nbark. Gradually attained as a mode of terrifying his competitive\nassociates and certain game which it follows under domestication, and so\npreserved and developed by natural selection, the tendency is also\npowerfully strengthened by artificial selection, the best barker, other\nthings being equal, being chosen for breeding by man. When the bark has\nbecome a common and habitual practice, it becomes a vent for superfluous\nenergy developed by joy and other emotions. Like snarling or grinning,\nit is also a play form, and thus becomes denotative of joy by\nassociation. To impress one\u2019s friendliness or hostility upon others, to\nappease or terrify, are the two main ends of expression with both man\nand animals, and this function is excited in various ways by different\nspecies, as determined by environment. The danger signal and the safety\nsignal, the beware or welcome, is amplified and varied according to\nparticular requirements which must be fully investigated before we can\ngive any complete _rationale_ of any expression. Conciliatory and\nmenacing expressions and gestures have been evolved and matured in\nstrict correlation under the same general law of natural selection, and\nneither one nor the other is due to antithesis. It is entirely unlikely\nthat of such expressions, one, the hostility side, was first developed\nby natural selection, the other owing its rise to a distinct principle,\nantithesis.\n\nHowever, I am not ready to deny antithesis all force as principle of\nexpression, but it seems to me it should be ranged with law of\nsimilarity or analogy as subsidiary, and largely influential only in the\nhigher types of expression, especially the teleologic human, as in\ngesture. Thus, if thumbs up means pity, thumbs down would naturally be\nused to denote pitilessness. To nod the head means assent or yes, to\nshake the head means dissent or no, though the exact antithesis would be\nto throw the head backward\u2014assent signal with some tribes. However,\nwhile it may be asserted that, as a general law, that like emotions\nexpress themselves in like ways, unlike in unlike, this can hardly be\nused to throw much light on expression. Given a particular emotion and\nits expression, we can by no means deduce immediately the expression of\nthe opposition emotion. Particular conditions and special organic\nlimitations will always make this impracticable, and it is the office of\nthe scientist to study expression in the course of evolution as of\nservice under a multitude of conflicting interests and distracting\ndifficulties.\n\nWe view expression then as mainly due to the principle of advantageous\nvariation in the struggle for existence. Expression is the action\nrequired in the battle for life, or accompaniments to assist this\naction, or the call for aid to bring it about. Natural selection is the\nfirst and fundamental law of expression, negative expression and\nsuperfluous energy both being secondary and often pathologic in\ntendency.\n\nThe struggle for existence is itself on the very face of it an\nexpression of mind, namely, activity significant of certain will and\nfeeling experience. Whatever shows mind is expression, and thus in a\nlarge sense every movement in the physical universe\u2014and what is the\nuniverse but motion\u2014and every organic activity may be construed as\nexpression. Whether all force, motion, action, is or must be expression\nis, however, a philosophic investigation which we need not now discuss,\nthough we may suspect that the height and depth of mind and so the range\nof expression is enormously beyond the science of to-day. However,\nrestricting ourselves to the domain of animal life, it is obviously very\ndifficult to determine just what activities of a given organism betray\nmind, and still more just what form of mentality is manifesting itself.\nMan, being the measure of all things, interprets himself in all, and\neven when he becomes aware of the dangers of anthropomorphism he cannot\nwholly disengage himself from the tendency. The subjective analogical\ninterpretation is a necessary evil. Still man is the keenest sighted of\nall beings for expression, and actions in a very wide range which had\nnot in fact the real function of expression become expressive to him.\nThe primary value of fear for the deer is to make it run from danger,\nand the running becomes expressive of the fear to observers, though the\nrunning is not for the expression. Thus vital activities of many kinds\nare expressive, though their primary value is not in the expression.\nActivities whose sole or main value is to give expression are\ncomparatively late, the value of expression in this narrow sense being\nin the mental impression thereby made upon other organisms. Thus actions\nwhich serve purely to frighten others, in making one\u2019s self formidable\nby loud noises, as roar of lion, bark of dog, by erecting the hair,\ndisplaying claws, teeth, and other such actions are pure expressions.\n\nThere is a constant growth in the value of expressiveness as we ascend\nthe scale of life, expression playing a larger and larger part till with\nman certain individuals become specialized as expressionists, artists,\npoets, and orators. Further, fine art is expression which has its value,\nnot in any exterior utility, but in itself alone, the subjective emotion\nseeking in a manner perfectly free from the common utilities of life to\nfind itself a complete and perfect embodiment. Art here does not serve\nlife, but life, art. The experience has in itself its own vindication\nfor being, in that it expresses. Expression is no longer bare action nor\nyet a function to serve life, but it becomes a life in itself. In this\nideal life of pure expression we recognise the necessity that the\nexpressionist be emancipated from the struggle for existence, be freed\nfrom the sordid cares of life, and given up wholly to expressing his\nindividuality with characteristic force; hence the State often pensions\nwriters and artists. But apart from this ideal life, in the evolution of\nintricate sociality and industry and complex culture, expression becomes\na more and more potent factor. Man in society must not only be, he must\nreveal himself, he must show what he is in order to achieve the most.\nMany fail, not for lack of faculty, but for lack of expressive ability.\nExpression, then, in general, is a function which, starting from the\nmost minute beginnings in the lower animals, culminates in man. In large\npart man is man by reason of his superior power of expression,\nespecially by speech, oral and written. Evolution in man is on the\nmental side in particular, but a large part of this mentality has been\ngiven to the improvement of expression in making it more facile, full\nand rapid. The complete natural history of expression is yet to be\nwritten, and all that I attempt is to indicate the point of view for\nsuch an investigation.\n\nThere are two points further with reference to expression which merit a\nfew remarks. The first is as to the reaction of expression on emotion.\nWe have treated to some extent the relation of emotion to its\nexpression, but we have also to consider the relation of an expression\nto its emotion and to emotion in general. We have all along assumed that\nthe emotion as a factor in the evolution of life is an internal stimulus\nto a serviceable activity, which may be viewed as its expression, or may\neven have its value as such. That emotion, as stimulus of action,\ndetermines expression is, I think, a primary law. However, Prof. James\nmaintains (_Mind_, xxxiv., 188) the reverse\u2014that expression determines\nthe emotion.[H] We do not strike because we are angry, but we are angry\nbecause we strike. Hence, in reality, the emotion is really the\nexpression, that is, the emotion is the consciousness result of the\nso-called expression\u2014it expresses the \u201cexpression\u201d in terms of\nconsciousness. We commonly speak of expressing our emotions, but we\nshould rather speak of emotions as expressions in consciousness of\ncertain bodily activities. But if we make emotion but a psychological\nincident and off-shoot of certain activities, I take it we run directly\ncounter to the general function of mind in evolution as internal\nstimulant to useful activity. Emotion is, I judge, fundamentally a\nmotive force and has its function, and so its rise and development as\nsuch. It is more than a by-product, but even if it were, how should we\naccount for it? After the serviceable activity has actually been brought\nabout, after a man has really struck down his adversary, what is the\nutility of emotion? We take it that the value of emotion lies in\nstarting and supporting the activity, and it is advantageous economy\nthat it cease immediately on the accomplishment of its end. While we\nmust always suppose that emotion has its physical support in central\nneutral changes, yet the expression is truly such; that is, it is from a\ndifferent impulse as determined by the emotional brain excitement. In\nthe light merely of a theory of natural selection, mind in general, and\nemotion in particular, is more than incidental concomitant of physical\nchanges, more than echo of corporeality: it has a vital and central\nfunction in the evolution of life. Prof. James points to the fact that\nexercising the expressions or imagining the feeling calls up the\nfeeling, as a proof of his theory. This, however, is merely a matter of\nassociation, and can prove neither a real precedent nor resultant. We\nmay call up ideation as well as emotion by producing associated\nactivities. In the interdependence of the conscious life, emotion,\nperception and willing call up each other without reference to causative\norder. Any one element of consciousness may be regarded either as\nresultant or stimulant, according as we look at preceding or following\nstate of consciousness. In the order of evolution, pain and pleasure\narise from certain actions in order to inhibit or stimulate repetition\nof actions. Feeling is then, both resultant and stimulant. The emotions\nmay arise from the expressions by association, but the original\ndependence is that of expression on emotion. The further test, that we\ncannot imagine an emotion without bringing in bodily presentation, is\nsimply a necessity of the imaging faculty as such, an image by its very\nnature being concrete.\n\n-----\n\nFootnote H:\n\n Professor James has of late largely modified his view (see\n _Psychological Review_, Sept., 1894).\n\n-----\n\nWhile, then, I believe that emotion is the spring of expression, I am\nfar from denying that the expression may not react upon the emotion.\nWhenever the will in any wise controls expression we mark modifications\nin the feeling. In the later evolution of life the directing of\nexpression is of great importance, and expression is gradually subjected\nto the will. Hence, especially with man, it becomes possible to feel in\ncertain ways and yet to repress the signs of feeling, to have strong\nemotions, and yet not betray them to those who might take advantage of\nthem. When a strong emotion is forcibly and completely checked in its\nexpression there is commonly rankling. At least it is not true, as\nDarwin states (_Ibid._, p. 360), that \u201crepression, as far as this is\npossible, of all outward signs softens our emotions.\u201d Very often, as we\nall know by personal experience and by observation, the checking the\nfree expression of emotion tends to intensify, rather than soften, the\nemotion. The school-girl, who, on hearing sad news, rushes away to have\na good cry, weeps away her grief, and experiences a deep sense of\nrelief; while the man who sternly represses the expression of grief\noften suffers acutely and long. Grief, of course, sometimes lies too\ndeep for tears, and we often long to be able to express the pent-up\nemotion which chokes us. This state is the opposite of the free, natural\nexpression of feeling such as we see in children. Children express\nthemselves without self-control, for this is beyond them; but here is\nthe power to will expression, but the effort is always futile.\n\nBy promoting or repressing expression we do certainly influence emotion;\nbut this volition is always for reason, and implies, then, a conflict of\nfeelings. Thus, a feeling for propriety leads the man to control his\ntears, and this feeling in itself must tend to diminish the strength of\nthe concomitant grief. However, though there is a measure of\ninterference, we would be wrong in supposing that complex mental life is\nalways comparatively weak in its component elements. The distraction of\ninterest due to new feelings checking expression is not always equal to\nthe relieving power of free or promoted expression. The direct checking\nof the expressional act certainly keeps back the current of energy from\nits natural channel, and the feeling has increased in duration, if not\nin quantity. The evanescent character of emotion with young children and\nwith demonstrative people is well known.\n\nBut besides the changes which may come to the feeling through direct\nwill-effected changes in the expression, we must also note that the mere\nconsciousness of expression has often a definite influence. Thus, when\ngreatly frightened, I may become conscious of the heart leaping into the\nthroat, the trembling, etc.; and this consciousness of the expression\nacts in general as a diversion in the feeling which is expressed.\nSometimes, indeed, it seems to add to the feeling, as when a girl\nblushes for her blushes. There is an intensification of\nself-consciousness which but heightens and renews the expression with\nrenewed sense of expression, and then another flood of embarrassing\nself-consciousness, and so on in a long series. Here, however, the sense\nof expression does not in strictness add to the intensity of the\noriginal feeling, but it develops a new feeling of the same kind; at\neach step there is new occasion and a renewed feeling, but a total\nquantity is constituted, so that we are right enough in saying that the\nconsciousness of her own blushing but added to her embarrassment. Yet it\nmay be stated as a general law that a consciousness of our expressive\nacts as such tends to decrease the original feeling from which the\nexpression arises, inasmuch as the field of consciousness is thereby\ndivided.\n\nWhen the will attains control over expression we may not merely repress\nthe impulse to expression when we feel strongly, but having no feeling\nof a given kind we may voluntarily adopt its expression, and this\nadoption of the expression very often leads by association to the real\nfeeling. Again, when experiencing a feeling we may simulate the\nexpression of another or even opposite feeling. It is often advantageous\nin the struggle for existence to throw others off their guard by\ndeceiving them as to the real emotional state; hence, craft and guile\nhave from a tolerably early stage in evolution played a part in the\nhistory of life. Animals and men alike soon appreciate the distinction\nbetween appearance and reality, that a kind and pleasant expression is\noften but the lure of malice and hostility, that injury is often meant\nwhere there is the show of benefit. Plants, as well as animals, often\nare quite other than they appear, both for offence and defence; and\nthere is the wide field of mimetic protection which cannot, however, at\npresent be brought under our subject.\n\nSimulation of expression probably arose as an economical makeshift; a\nmere show which costs the organism little often attains ends which would\notherwise require a vast deal of mental force. Thus we see children\nscared into desired behaviour by assumed anger, grief, etc.; and even\nanimals, as I have noticed with dogs, likewise frequently affect\nexpressions which have no support in real emotion. The unsophisticated,\nhowever, learn with great rapidity to distinguish between assumed and\nreal emotion. Any one who has made a pretence of crying before little\nchildren must have remarked this. Simulation of expression in order to\neasily reach desired ends is thus rather limited, but still has a real\nvalue and a considerable place under natural selection.\n\nHowever, expression may sometimes be simulated in order to attain the\nassociated emotion. If we act mad, we often get mad, and thus, as we see\nin the plays of animals and children, merely assumed expression may lead\nto the real emotion. This way of attaining emotion by purposely enacting\nits known expression, we may call impression as the reverse of the\nexpression order. Men may work themselves up into a fury, as well as\nvigorously express an anger directly occasioned. Actors and public\nspeakers often take advantage of this reaction of expression on emotion,\nand thereby not merely affect an emotion, but have a certain real\nemotion, which cannot ever be na\u00efve. Thus Macready as Shylock used to\nprepare himself and get up \u201cthe proper state of white heat\u201d by violently\nshaking a ladder. Poe in one of his tales makes a detective say, when\nwishing to know the thoughts of a wicked man, \u201cI fashion the expression\nof my face as accurately as possible in accordance with the expression\nof his, and then wait to see what thoughts or sentiments arise in my\nmind or heart, as if to match or correspond with the expression.\u201d This\nmethod of acting like another, that we may have and so know his thoughts\nand feelings, is a very difficult way of mind-reading.\n\nBut expression is often simulated on one or both sides with full\nunderstanding of it as such. This enters into play, and is the essence\nof the dramatic art. That the word _play_ denotes both the sportive\nimitative actions of animals and men, and also a dramatic representation\nis not fortuitous or arbitrary. It is noticeable that among the lower\nanimals the earliest and commonest play is playing at being angry or\nfrightened, which corroborates the view of these emotions as probably\nthe earliest and most fundamental in life. The correlated nature of fear\nand anger is shown by the way they are played at; thus you often see one\ndog with a show of anger chasing another who simulates fear, and then\nthe parts are exchanged.\n\nThe great relation of pursuer and pursued is constantly mimicked among\nanimals with interchanging of parts. So also among children the\ncommonest plays are those of fleeing and chasing, as tag, hare and\nhound, hide and seek, etc., the fundamental elements of life being\nre-enacted under the superfluous energy which tends to flow most easily\ninto the oldest and most habitual channels. Thus play has a high\nhistoric psychic importance. To attack and to run away are the most\nnecessary and essential of life activities, and play has a certain\npedagogic and preparative value, and has thereby been sanctioned by\nnatural selection, for we see that in the evolution of life the tendency\nhas constantly been to lengthen the play period. Among the lowest\nanimals the individual at birth is immediately thrown into the struggle\nfor existence and must battle for itself; there is no play time for it,\nbut at once it enters upon direct life struggle; but in higher life\nthere is a period of spontaneous free dramatic activity.\n\nBut not only is anger and fear shammed as a prominent and primitive\nplay, but it is most common to stimulate to real anger or fear, and then\nin glee to show the inadequacy of the occasion to the victim. Every one\nhas observed how frequently young animals play by teasing and scaring\neach other. The tricks of boys and practical jokes of men both point to\nthe deep inbred power of anger and fear in life, and are at the same\ntime symptomatic of their decline in power as dominant life factors. All\nchildren delight in scaring one another on pretence, in seeing the real\nexpression and feeling themselves the moving powers in bringing it\nabout. This satisfaction, which is aboriginal, which is the reflex of\nthe original pleasure sanction when power to scare others for one\u2019s own\nbenefit was being evolved in life, makes a large part of the enjoyment\nof such action. A large part of play-pleasure must, indeed, be set down\nto reflex of the earliest hard-earned pleasure experience; but a large\npart is also due to the thrill of excitement and the delight in activity\n_per se_. Later forms of plays are largely due to pure imitative\npropensity, though often helped by reversal tendencies.\n\nWe note also that this perceived groundlessness of the action becomes a\nlarge element in later forms of play, as wit and humour, but the\npleasure is plainly based on the power and the superiority of\nintelligence implied. It amuses the tyrant to throw his companions into\nmortal fear by the slightest suggestion, the smaller the occasion the\nmore amusing the fright. And in general the slighter the real cause in\nrelation to the effect produced, the more acute the pleasure, by reason\nof the supremacy thereby emphasized. It is always more amusing to scare\na child by a slight movement of a finger than by a vigorous act of the\nwhole body. It seems to me that it is by this association that\ndisproportion, incongruity, irrelevance, however induced, become in\nthemselves amusing, ludicrous, laughable. So the incongruous, in which I\nhave no part whatever, becomes a comic spectacle and the basis of all\ncomedy, yet also of the tragic and tragedy. In the tragic the\ndiscordance between what is and what ought to be, instead of pleasing,\npains. What is comic to a coarse mind may seem tragic to the refined. A\nbird, distressed by the death of its mate, offering it food, might amuse\na savage or a boy, but must be a pathetic sight to a civilized and\ncultured man, though both might be amused to see a child presenting food\nto its doll.\n\nNot only may the incongruous which is comparatively unrelated to me be\namusing as well as that which I myself bring about, but even when I am\nthe victim I may be highly delighted by the intrinsic disproportion of\nmy experience to the exciting cause. With some persons, perhaps rather\nfew in number, the next best thing to playing a joke is having one\nplayed on them. This amusement at oneself occurs even among savages.\nWhen Stanley was on the Congo, he was at one time greatly annoyed by the\nnumber of native visitors. In vain he tried to repel them, but one\nmorning when a crowd had assembled at the river side, at some little\ndistance, waiting an opportunity to board his vessel, some of his men\nput on lion skins which were at hand, and acted the part so well that\nthe intending visitors fled in abject terror. Having retired to a safe\ndistance they looked back to see the men walking the deck with the lion\nskins in their hands and laughing most heartily. Seeing then the\ngroundlessness of their alarm the whole crowd burst into roars of\nlaughter and shouted in merriment for a long time. Exhibitions of\nfright, we may remark, seem to be especially amusing to savages, as when\nan assembly of Africans of the lowest type went into ecstasies of\nuproarious delight on seeing a stereopticon picture of a frightened\nnegro hastily climbing a tree to get out of the way of the gaping jaws\nof a crocodile.\n\nPlay is then very largely either a mutual shamming of expression, or a\nstimulating real expression in one by pretended expression in the other.\nThe pleasure in deceiving others by simulating expression points to\nancestral experience, for deceit has been one of the greatest factors in\nlife evolution. That an individual seems to be an entirely different\nbeing from what he really is, has often been most advantageous in the\nstruggle for existence, and hence a large variety of simulated\nexpression has been employed. Children then, as repeating in play form\nthe race history, take great delight in masquerading and so deceiving\ntheir acquaintances as to their identity, making false pleas for\ncharity, etc. The drama has its roots in this form of play. To make\nothers take us for quite different than we are gives us a high pleasure\nof power, and early man was often moved, in the breathing spells of the\nstruggle for existence, to play at false personalities simply for the\npleasure in itself of being a successful actor. There is also the\ncounter pleasure of the spectators in piercing the simulated expression.\nIt is only in latest phases of dramatic art that simulation comes to be\nappreciated for its own sake, that there is on both sides full and\ncomplete feeling of the illusory nature of the whole transaction, and an\nenjoyment of the art _per se_. Simulating expression is the actor\u2019s art;\nbut when the simulation is forgotten by either actor or audience, nature\nappears and art disappears.\n\nWhile it is the province of the actor\u2019s art to simulate expression, it\nis in general the office of fine art to imitate and render the\nexpressive by image, picture, musical notes, etc. The artist is the\nexpresser and simulator _par excellence_, and complete and perfect\nexpressiveness is his constant aim, though not for utility or amusement,\nbut for the sake of awakening the \u00e6sthetic emotion. I cannot then agree\nwith Bosanquet, who, as I understand, makes \u00e6sthetic feeling the emotion\nof expression, expression for expression\u2019s sake. For expression by its\nvery nature is such only as _expressive_, that is, as going beyond\nitself, as being a means, and not an end in itself, hence expression for\nexpression\u2019s sake is meaningless phrase. Expression, so far as it\nattempts to stand merely for itself, is an empty mannerism and a barren\ntechnique. Expression is only such as it is backed by the emotion\nexpressed, as significant of some psychosis; and artistic expression or\nart is the expression of the artistic or \u00e6sthetic emotion, a peculiar\nfeeling about things, as apple blossoms, a sunset, a child playing. This\nemotion is often awakened by cognizance of an expression, as an\nexpression of joy or horror by a child, and may thus be an emotion of or\nat expression, as also in the case where it is roused by the skill in\npurposive expression of any kind, \u00e6sthetic or other, but expression is\nobviously not the only way of exciting the emotion, its object may be a\nmere patch of colour, a pure musical note, etc. \u00c6sthetic emotion tends\nto manifest or express itself just like all emotions, and in attaining\nperfect expression it strengthens itself. Likewise language, as an\ninstrument of thought, a logical expression, has strengthened thought,\nbut a purely formal logic is as barren and void as a purely formal\n\u00e6sthetic. Language as expressive of thought and as expressive of\n\u00e6sthetic emotion is equally dependent upon what it expresses, and\n\u00e6sthetics is thus not peculiar in its relation to expression.\n\nThe interpretation of expression in nature and art is often a hard\nmatter and has given rise to much variance. For instance, take the much\ndiscussed Laoko\u00f6n group; Winckelmann says the father sheds pity from his\neyes like mist upon his sons; Lessing finds grief and noble endurance\nexpressed; Goethe thinks the father shows pity for his youngest son,\napprehension for the older son, and terror for himself; L\u00fcbke finds only\nmere pain manifested. Coming to a single feature, the mouth, we find the\nmost diverse interpretation. Winckelmann says that here is an heroic\nsoul who disdains to shriek, and gives forth only \u201can anxious and\nsuppressed sigh.\u201d Lessing maintains also that here is a shriek softened\ninto a sigh, but not \u201cbecause a shriek would have betrayed an ignoble\nsoul, but because it would have produced a hideous contortion of the\ncountenance.\u201d Later critics have generally followed Lessing. It is\nobvious, I think, that the expression of the mouth is not shrieking, but\nis moaning, groaning, or sighing. On this quite a number of competent\nwitnesses, physicians and psychologists whom I consulted, are\npractically agreed. However, it has occurred to me that the sighing or\nmoaning of Laoko\u00f6n may not be a softened form at all, but the actual\nexpression designed by the artists. It is generally supposed that the\nartist here desired to show mortal agony, and it is assumed that\nshrieking is the expression of mortal agony. This assumption seems to me\ncorrect when extreme pain is suddenly inflicted; but when, as in the\ncase of Laoko\u00f6n, the mortal wound is received only after the most\nexhausting struggle, the natural expression is moaning. The realistic\nsculptor would surely not give any softened form, but, shrinking from\nnothing, has expressed Laoko\u00f6n in this death grasp in the very act of\ngiving up the ghost. Though the muscles of the limbs and trunk are still\ntense, yet the closing eyes, the head falling back, and the arm thrown\ntoward the base of the brain indicate that the struggle is over, and the\ndeath moment has come, expressed vocally only by a moan. We do not need\nto find here then any conflict between realism and the artistic sense,\nbut the simplest and most obvious interpretation is what the expression\ngives, sighing and moaning, which is the true one under the\ncircumstances, and is so meant by the artist.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER XXI\n _CONCLUSION_\n\n\nIn the present haste to construct psychology as a natural science\ncognate to chemistry, physics, and biology, we note much that is\npremature and confusing, owing to insufficient reflection upon the\nquality of the phenomena. A consciousness is a natural phenomenon, but\nwe cannot discover and investigate it as we do phenomena of light and\nelectricity. Anger is a phenomenon occurring millions of times every\nday, but it is a fact which must be discerned and studied by an\naltogether different method from facts of crystallization, erosion, or\nplant growth. Psychology is not a science of inspection, but of\nintrospection. If I know I am angry, I know it by a direct\nself-awareness; if I see a man strike another, and regard this as\nexpressive of a psychosis, and that of a certain kind, anger, this\nsupposed knowledge is analogical realization. One who never was or could\nbe angry could no more investigate anger than a blind man light, and,\nother things being equal, the more irascible a man is, the better\nobserver of anger he would be. We are not, however, conscious of all our\nmental processes, and we may be often blinded to the real nature of such\nwe think we have; and as to the psychoses of other beings, especially of\nthe more unlike and remote, we need to be extremely cautious in forming\nconclusions. It is likely that the mental constitution of organisms\ndiffer as widely as the physical, that the mentality of a fish is as\ndiverse from our own as its physical structure is unlike our own. The\nfish may have peculiar psychoses of which we may never gain the least\ninkling, because we cannot examine its consciousness objectively as we\ndo its fins, its air bladder, and its gills. The psychologist must then\nbe myriad-minded; his fitness is the ductility and range of his psychic\ncapacity. The richness and receptivity of his own mental life must be\ninfinite if he is to come to full knowledge of the whole course of\npsychism. Thus psychology is marked off from all other science as\ndistinct in subject and method. Its being so individual and subjective\nis the greatest hindrance to its progress, for science is verifiable\nknowledge, but how shall we have a method of consciousness verification?\nA man tells me he has a scar on his left knee, and this I can verify by\npersonal examination if I like, but if he says he is angry, I have no\nsuch means of verification, I can only guess by expression. A biologist\nannounces the discovery of a pineal eye in a certain embryo, and\nstraightway the fact may be verified by a host of observers; but if a\npsychologist announces that he has discovered a new mode of\nconsciousness, the verification is by no means so easy. May not the\nconsciousness be entirely peculiar to him? The psychologist who attempts\nto verify cannot disclaim the fact simply because he cannot find this\nact of mind in himself. But an introspective _consensus_, though\nextremely difficult as compared with the objective _consensus_ required\nby objective science, is not impossible, but it requires exceptional\ngifts and training in introspection. Before psychology can reach any\nstanding a method of subjective verification must be formulated and\nadhered to as rigidly as corresponding verification is required by\nobjective science. The backwardness of psychology is in this most\nsignificant, that while a half-dozen recognised biologists may announce\na certain fact, and it is immediately accepted as scientific knowledge,\nno such action can occur in psychology. The uncertainty of subjective\nverification is the trouble, and the most important step that can be\nmade to-day is a clearly defined basis for an exact verification. That\none party should claim there is a feeling of relation, and another that\nthere is no such feeling, marks a crudeness in the most general matters,\nand points to psychology being about where physiology was when the\ncirculation of the blood was in debate.\n\nBut, say the experimental psychologists, subjective verification is\nimpossible; psychology, if it is to become a science, must, like the\nother sciences, resort to the laboratory, and by definite and exact\nexperiments produce the facts to order, study them by the most approved\ninstruments, and obtain with certainty a knowledge of their laws. Now it\nis sufficiently easy to experiment on light, sound, and on plant growth\nin a laboratory, but how can we make consciousness to order with the\nsame certainty? how can we know when we have got a consciousness, what\nkind it is, etc., except by subjective verification? You certainly\ncannot see the consciousness or touch it; but you must wholly rely on\nthe subjective report of the individual experimented on as verified by\nyour own consciousness. We have no impassive agent entirely under our\ncontrol, except in hypnosis, and we cannot secure conditions with the\nsame exactness in testing the intensity of some form of consciousness,\nas anger, as in testing the tensile strength of iron.\n\nIn the physical laboratory we produce certain conditions and we get\ninvariably certain observable and measurable results, but in a\npsychological laboratory how shall I get with certainty a definite\nconsciousness in a large number of cases and formulate its law? How\nshall I know at a given moment that the mental act of the agent is what\nmy experiment requires? Moreover, does not experimental psychology by\nbeginning with human consciousness enter rashly upon a very complex\nfield? If it would get results, let it start with the simpler mental\nlife, just as biology has founded itself in a study of simplest\nelements. But how shall psychology get at the consciousness of a clam\nwith the same exactness as biology investigates the circulation of blood\nin the clam? It is plain, in short, that if we are to have a fruitful\nexperimental psychology, some very important questions of method must\nfirst be settled. A method of getting psychoses to order, to obtain the\nexact reaction required, and knowing and realizing what it is when got,\nthis is a _desideratum_ not yet attained. Further, we must remark that\nexperimentation is itself a psychic act, and sense of experimentation is\na disturbing factor in results; that is, a consciousness which is\nconscious of being experimented on is thereby complicated over mere\nobservation method. This is markedly the case in self-experimentation.\nConsciousness is not, like an electric current or a sound wave, an\nobjective fact, readily reproducible in the laboratory. And again ethics\nmay interfere with psychical experiment. How far have we a right to\nincite psychosis for experiment\u2019s sake? How far may psychical\nvivisection be carried in the name of science? A scientist who should\nfor his own study make an animal or person angry, would be reprobated as\nwould the artist who should incite anger in his model in order to catch\nartistic effect. However, that there is a vast scope for experimental\npsychology cannot be denied, and we may expect an indefinite\nmultiplication of artificial psychoses and combinations comparable to\nthe artificial syntheses and new compounds of the chemical laboratory.\nMind may develop and act merely on the scientific motive, and accomplish\nby _tour de force_ a complex field of artificial consciousness quite\ndistinct in origin and nature from natural consciousness. But for the\npresent, at least, we regard not experiment but observation as the main\nmethod. Not laboratory, but field work, is most needed. The psychical\nscientist must go psychologizing, as the botanist goes botanizing. But\nthere is no simple objective method as in botany. In order to have\ninsight and interpretative power, there must be constant\nself-observation. He can know the real nature, conditions, and laws of\nother minds only so far as he realizes them in himself. If he has never\nfeared, he will never know fear, and if he has never analyzed his own\nfear, he will not know its factors as occurring in others. All external\nconsciousness is but a projection from the observer\u2019s own consciousness.\n\nBut it may be said that mind is but a kind of neural function, and that\nphysiological psychology will give us the true key to consciousness. But\nif one has never known any psychosis, as fear, directly in himself and\nindirectly in others, how will he find it in any nerve activities?\nNervous activities are significant of psychosis only so far as psychosis\nis already known. In fact, the sciences of neurosis and psychosis are\nradically distinct. I stick a pin in my finger, the facts of pain,\nvolition, anger, etc., are of one order knowable only by introspection,\nthe nerve excitation, current and reaction are of another order,\nconstitute a complete circle, and are known only by inspection.\nNeurology in its own field can afford to ignore psychosis, for it does\nnot find it: it finds only neural changes, and psychology likewise can\nafford to ignore physiology. These sciences stand self-sufficient, and\nmay develop indefinitely each in its own way without meeting. Divide and\nconquer. The present mingling of the two is greatly to be deplored. Thus\nin current books we often find such sentences as this: \u201cThe prevalent\nview hitherto has probably been that the same nervous apparatus which on\nmoderate excitement produces sensations of pressure or temperature,\nproduces feelings of pain when irritated with increased intensity.\u201d\n(Ladd, _Outlines Physiological Psychology_, p. 387.)\n\nThis confusing of objective and subjective terms, sensation and\nirritation, is but too frequent in recent treatises. There is no way yet\nfound of discovering psychic facts in neural, or neural in psychic,\nwhatever may be their connection and interdependence. If we must have a\ncross-interpretation, the psychologist has the vantage-ground on the\nbasis of evolution by struggle. _Nisus_ has developed all sense and\nmotor organs and all nervous organs. It is the effort at seeing that has\nproduced the optic nerve and the physiological function of sight. The\nvision and visual organ of the eagle came by incessant looking for prey\nduring thousands of years. Hence mind is not reflex or concomitant of\nnerve, but nerve is outgrowth of mind in the struggle of existence, and\na psychological physiology is better than a physiological psychology.\n\nThe psychological field is then first, self; second, other selves or\nindividuals. In this latter phase of human psychology we have the\npsychology of adults, then adolescent, senile, infantile, sexual, and\nracial psychology. In sub-human or comparative psychology we include\nanimals, wild and tame, also all discussion on plant psychism, mind\nstuff (_e.g._ Clifford\u2019s), etc. In superhuman psychology we include all\ndoctrine of cosmic intelligence, teleology (_vide_ _Mind_, x. 420).\n\nWe have limited ourselves to evolutionary psychology and that of the\nfeelings, and our data are mostly from adult human consciousness.\nEvolutionary psychology bases itself on the idea that mental development\noriginates and is continued through struggle or will effort. Such\nevidence as we can gather points to feeling, impelled exertion as the\nessence of psychic evolution, and it proves fruitful when assumed as a\nguiding principle. And the principle of struggle is final. We cannot\nadmit with Bain a principle of spontaneity. The activities of a new-born\nlamb are seemingly spontaneous only because they are the results of\nenergies stored in ages of psychic effort. This doctrine of struggle\ndoes away with all impressionism and all passivity theories. Mind is not\na receptivity, an association of impressions, a reflex or concomitant of\nphysiological activities, but it is dynamic determining vital fact, an\nactive response to the conditions of self-existence. This impetus of\nstruggle and striving seems to feed all life and make life, and has its\nplace, perhaps the highest in the dynamic whole we term the universe.\nWhile the significance of struggle is a question for philosophy, yet, as\nmatter of fact, it is the only method of realization we know; and the\noffice of humanity is the providing a wider and higher scope for\nstruggle, the making new and independent life regions. Science and art,\nethics and religion, which are at bottom only phases of emotionalism,\nare with utmost toil developed for themselves, and new emotions now\narising and yet to arise will be cherished for their own sakes. Mind\nbegins and continues long as the servant of the body, it ends by making\nthe body its servant, the instrument of the spiritual life, the temple\nof the Holy Ghost; but all its evolution is through supreme effort. In\nthe spiritual evolution he who loveth his life shall lose it, he whose\nstruggle is in the primitive stage, namely, for material existence,\nloses thereby the real life, the life of the spirit.\n\nIt is possible, indeed, that we may over-estimate this salient fact of\nstruggle, and certainly, in the present state of psychology, modesty is\nmost commendable. We would be far from assuming that the horizon of our\nmind is the limit of the universe. However, assuming mind as a\nbiological function continually evolving in the service of\nself-conservation and self-furtherance, our endeavour has been to point\nout the general trend of the evolution of feeling, and to analyze some\nof its more important features. The little exploration we have made\nsuggests the greatness of the unexplored field of mind, the vast number\nof psychoses unknown, and perhaps unknowable. The difficulties of the\nsubjective method make it seem almost impossible to trace a complete\nhistory of mind. For mind to return over and realize its whole growth in\nall its ramifications seems quite as hard as to develop new forms, or a\nwhole region of artificial psychosis. In the filling up of missing\nlinks, psychology presents vastly greater difficulties than biology\nbecause of its subjectivity of method and the evanescent nature of the\nfacts. Further, the more I analyze consciousness, the more I am\nconvinced of the great and often unexpected complexity of apparently\nsimple forms, and I am satisfied then the simplicity and completeness of\nthe system-making psychologists, physiological or idealistic, is\nfactitious and delusive. An inductive science of mind is yet in its\ninfancy. My conclusion that mind was at first, and is always as\nprogressive, feeling-impelled will, and that sensing arose as secondary,\nas useful cognitive effort, is simply the best reading I can make from\npresent data when assuming the current doctrine of evolution.\n\nA very important point, which needs to be worked out more fully than we\nhave been able to do, is as to the nature of revival as involving\nemotion. Sense of re-experience and of the experienceable is one of the\nmost important acquisitions of mind. The self-consolidation and\norganization of experience certainly does not come in the first place by\nany mechanical association, but we must assume that all mental progress\nis the result of the most intense, though often blind and fortuitous\nstriving. But just how the return of an experience is cognized as\n_return_ and as _experience_, and so becoming basis for emotion, this is\na most difficult inquiry on which we have made but a few remarks in the\nchapter on the nature of emotion. Just when and how sense of experience\nis generated, and what is a full analysis of its nature, must be\npostponed to some future study, but I am convinced that a very fruitful\nfield for investigation lies in this direction. Experience certainly\ndoes at a very early stage become compound, become self-appreciative in\nsome form, as sense of the potentiality of things, but the elucidation\nof progress in this line is confronted by many difficulties. The history\nof ideation or representation as a power for self-conservation has yet\nto be traced with definiteness and completeness.\n\nAnother point, which needs a far fuller discussion than we can now give,\nis as to the nature of organic interaction in consciousness, as to the\nreal quality of psychic cause and effect. We have all along assumed\nfeeling as stimulant of will, both the will to know and the will to act,\nbut just how does feeling develop will as struggling effort? What is the\nexact mode of connection? We conceive readily of physical impact as\ndetermining effects in the material world, and we conceive a\ntransference and transmutation of energy, but in the psychic realm we\nhave no entities as permanent existences susceptible of entering into\nrelation with other entities. How then does a pain incite a will\nactivity? A peculiar form of consciousness we term will activity does\ndirectly follow upon feeling pain, and, within limits, the greater the\npain, the greater the willing, but we have no theory to express the mode\nof connection of these consciousnesses. All that we can say is that one\ndoes follow upon the other as somehow caused by it. Yet it is certain\nthat the limitation of conscious capacity must in every individual\ndetermine a definite range of interaction, and, beyond some particular\npoint, the more I feel, the less I will, and _vice vers\u00e2_. But the\nphenomenon of interference is likewise as obscure as that of excitation.\nThe development of distinct organic forms of consciousness is slowly\ncarried forward, and they exercise a definite dynamic relation to each\nother, though the mode is as yet wholly obscure. Thus the largest\nsubdivisions of consciousness, knowing, feeling, and willing, become\ndetermined as distinct organically related modes, like the nervous,\nnutritive-circulatory and motor systems forming one organic whole body.\nThese psychic modes attain gradually an intricate and definite\ndevelopment, whose constant interdependent connection with an individual\nbody we term a \u201cmind.\u201d And we must remark that this vital relation of\none consciousness and one form of consciousness to another is in no wise\neffected through apperception, through a third distinct consciousness, a\ncognitive one, which unites them in idea. A feeling excited a will act\nlong before there was consciousness of either, or of their relation. In\ngeneral we must say that consciousness does not consciously forge for\nitself its own relations, but that in by far the larger part of psychic\ndevelopment new modes of consciousness and their inter-relations come in\na totally unforeseen way, by a blind striving in the struggle for\nexistence. It may be doubted, indeed, if even the most advanced human\nmind can really invent a new consciousness or a new relation in\nconsciousness, but by intense effort it attains them. One of the\nobscurest points in biology is as to the nature and cause of\nmorphological variation, and the subject of mental variation is for\npsychological science far more obscure. We presuppose that mental\nvariations somehow arise in response to sudden and great emergencies,\nand in connection with the severest effort. Mental progress is, in all\nthe earlier life at least, only achieved under pressure of intense pain\nactually experienced or ideally so,\u2014emotion\u2014and in some way an\nappropriate and saving psychosis as response of organism to environment\noriginates. This new form may be indistinct, and proceed as a gradual\ndifferentiation from previous types, still the method of action of the\nmotive force seems mysterious. We can see, indeed, the advantage which\naccrues, for example, to the animal which is first able to detect danger\nor nutriment by scent, but just the method of the rise and progress of\nscenting as a conscious process seems difficult to trace. We cannot say\nthat power of smell arose because organs of smell were developed; this\nputs the cart before the horse. It is the struggle to sense that is the\nprime motive force in developing the sense organs and not _vice vers\u00e2_.\nWe do not smell because we have noses, but we have noses because we\nsmell. That the sense of smell is a differentiated general sensation is\nlikely enough, but we are unable to follow the steps. We know that the\nhigher development of our present senses is attained only through great\nexertion, which determines a physical basis and organic progress\u2014as in\nmicroscopy, telescopy, and so-called mind-reading\u2014and if humanity is to\ndevelop in the future an electric sense or a telepathic sense, it must\nbe reached by the intense struggle of a very few. We must believe that\nevery mode of mind is at bottom but some modification of pre-existing\nforms, and it may be that as all modes of the material are interpretable\nin motion, so the manifold mental may be equally resolvable into some\none type. Yet so far as we can now see, feeling, will, and cognition\nseem radically and primitively distinct. The missing links in mental\nevolution are most difficult to determine, for, as we have often\nremarked, while we can with comparative ease both determine fossil\norganic forms _a priori_ and discover as realities, the intermediate\nmental forms can only be known through a subjective realization.\n\nIt does not help us to ascribe the advantageous variation to chance, a\nword, indeed, which does not belong to the dictionary of science, for it\nis but a cover to ignorance. Chance means that the determinate line of\ncauses is hidden from the observer, who only knows that one of several\nresults will take place. Chance is thus wholly relative; the gambling of\nsavages is often calculable to the European, and so every affair of\nchance, as dice throwing, might be calculable to a superior intelligence\nwho could compute or watch every turn of the dice. Chance, then, does\nnot reside in the outward thing, is not a property of phenomena, but is\nwholly a subjective limitation of the investigating mind, hence to\nascribe variation, physical or psychical, to chance is simply to\nobjectivise our own imperfect cognition. The pre-supposition of all\nscience is that every event or change has its definite determining\nantecedents, and that these are cognizable; hence the doctrine of chance\nhas no place in any complete and real science of phenomena. That\norganism is, indeed, fortunate, which first achieves some notable and\nvaluable psychic mode, but this good fortune does not in any wise come\nby chance, or by the passive enjoyment of concurrent favourable\ncircumstances, but it is a well-earned superiority attained only by the\nseverest and most patient responsive struggle, and there in every case a\ndeterminate series of steps in mental process which may ultimately be\ntraceable.\n\nMental forms also arise through perversion, competitors perverting\noriginally advantageous variations, as has been already pointed out for\nparalysing-fear, sense-destroying anger, etc. Atavistic tendency gives\npseudo-variations. Certain mental forms may be negative in origin, that\nis, merely reactionary from previous states. Given a high degree of any\njoyous emotion, say hope, and suddenly remove its conditions, and the\nswing is back beyond the zero point of emotion to actual negative\nemotion, as despair. Still the whole gamut from positive to negative, as\nfrom highest hope to deepest despair, is but a single generic emotion\nform of polar correlate elements, which have equally developed through\nstruggle.\n\nThe subject of psychic intensity in general, and feeling intensity in\nparticular, is likewise obscure and difficult. Physical intensity is\ncomparatively easy to investigate in its nature and laws. For instance,\nin the case of light we clearly conceive its nature in terms of\nmolecular motion, we measure it exactly by photometers, and we know it\nto proceed by the law of inverse squares. We have no similar certainty\nand clearness with regard to mental intensity. We speak of suffering\nvery slight or very intense pains, but there is no scientific theory or\nvaluation of psychic intensity. Mere physical intensity does not explain\npsychic, and we know that variations in rapidity of ether waves, for\nexample, give, not quantitative, but qualitative psychic variations. 640\nbillion vibrations are felt subjectively as the comparatively feeble\ncolour blue, while 450 billion gives the striking and intense colour,\nred. It is only within a certain range and with certain forms of forces\nthat Weber\u2019s law of geometric and arithmetic increase applies.\n\nStrictly speaking, we cannot apply quantitative conceptions to\nconsciousness, inasmuch as mind has no spatiality which is the basis of\nidea of quantity and size. Hence the use of quantitative terms, like\ngreat, large, small, little, etc., is an indirect reference to\nintensity. I was in very great pain equals I was in very intense pain.\nNo consciousness is literally either larger or smaller than another,\nbecause consciousnesses cannot, by reason of their non-spatial nature,\nenter into quantitative relations. So-called massive pains are really\nmanifold. (See on this and kindred points my remarks in _Nature_, vol.\n40, p. 642.)\n\nA popular test of mental intensity, and one which has a relative value,\nis by the power needed to displace a given psychosis. Thus, if a man in\na brown study walks into a pond of cold water without noticing it, we\nrightly conclude that he is thinking very intensely. This, of course\nestablishes a scale relative to the individual, beginning with a\npsychosis which resists all displacing agencies, and ending with those\nof such very slight intensity that they give way to any and all\ndiversions. A consciousness which supplants another must _per se_ be\nmore intense than the other. All that which rouses and diverts patients\nsuffering from monomania and fixed ideas is practically equal in\nintensity. While we may thus pronounce one state as being equal in\nintensity to another or as being more or less intense than it, we yet\nhave no ground for any numerical estimate. When a person says, \u201cI feel\ntwice as bad as I did yesterday, or I feel a hundred times as happy now\nas I was a year ago,\u201d it is plainly a general and indefinite expression.\nEmotions have not yet been brought within the range of mathematical\ncomparisons.\n\nThe intensity of feelings, as also of sensations, sustains undoubtedly\ncertain mathematical relations to intensity of objective stimulus, but\nowing to their complex nature, emotions, at least, must always be very\ndifficult of interpretation by any such law as Weber\u2019s, though simple\npain may be brought more easily under some law. A pain, _other things\nbeing equal_, increases in some ratio to increment of physical stimulus.\nBut we must believe that the reason for the diversity between proportion\nof actual increments of stimulus and actual increments of sensation and\nfeeling is largely physiological. It certainly is not a true\npsycho-physical law, a law of relation of mind and matter, as is often\nclaimed; for we cannot obtain an absolutely objective standard to test\nsubjectivity. Hence any such law is merely a law of relation of\ndifferent kinds of sensations, of different methods of interpreting the\nobjective. Intensity of stimulus itself is always determinable only\nthrough some sensation, which is itself subject to Weber\u2019s law. There is\nno objective standard for sense stimuli; the measure of increasing\nstimulus to increasing sensation must be by some sense which has its own\nlaw with reference to physical increment as interpreted by another sense\nequally under law, and so on. Take pressure, for instance; we note by\nsense of _sight_ the arm of a balance reacting regularly and constantly\nto definite small additions to load, while upon our own arm we do not\nnotice the same additions in any such series of feeling of pressure\nincrements. The arm and balance as disparate weighers must, of course,\nbe in certain ratios related, and for a certain range we must have a\ngeometrical series, but other ratios at other points.\n\nThat the degree of sensitivity is proportioned to the intensity of\nsensation already present, that the knock at the door must be the louder\nthe more noise is going on within, is a defect in organic measurement,\nbut it is not entirely absent in mechanical; scales which weigh by the\nton do not respond easily or at all to minute weights. But, abstractly\nspeaking, mechanic methods are in general far superior to organic; a\nfine balance weighs better than any arm, and a good camera pictures\nbetter than the best eye; that is, their ratio of discriminating\nsensibility is far greater than natural organs, and it may be as\ngeometric series to arithmetic series. Practically, however, organic\nweighing and seeing are well adjusted to the demands of life. An\nappreciation of gravity, so far as it is of use to the organism, is\nsecured, and if a finer sensibility were demanded it would be attained.\nThat is, I am inclined to believe that the Weber-Fechner law of definite\nmathematical proportions is purely empirical, and does not mark a real\nlimit or a fundamental psycho-physical law. If a man\u2019s life and living\ndepended on it, he could become a good weighing machine, and in time a\nrace of organic weighers might be raised up which should vie in accuracy\nand range with the best scales now constructed. The quotient of\nsensitiveness is really indefinitely variable. It is probable, indeed,\nthat deep sea organisms have a discriminative sensibility for both\ngravity and light far more delicate than the acutest human sense.\n\nThe whole subject of measurement of mental intensities must evidently be\napproached with the greatest care, and the diversities of researches in\nresults and in their interpretation, is evidence that we have not\ncompletely isolated the facts we are in search of. Conscious\nexperimentation must be allowed as tending to disturb sense. When\nattention is strained to marking sense increments it may very easily be\ndeluded, and wrongly suppose as to feeling or not feeling. Consciousness\nis by no means infallible as to its own acts, and especially when\nartificial. Feelings may, and often do, originate subjectively by\nsuggestion, and hence may have no direct reference to the external cause\nwhich is under experimental manipulation.\n\nAnd not only have we thus to guard against a strong tendency to\nintrospective and apperceptive error as to what we actually experience,\nor how we experience, but we have also to constantly bear in mind that\nevery experience, every sensing, as of pressure, light, etc., is not an\nisolated phenomenon, but as resting upon and involving the past, it can\nnever be a simple direct measure of the objective present, as a given\nweight or light. Every conscious experience, like all other vital\norganic phenomena, has thus an individuality and differs from every\nother as every leaf differs from every other, and so the laws of\nexperience are capable only of general expression. Since all\nconsciousness is self-integrating and brings up the past into itself, it\nis always more than any occasional reflection of a present phenomenon;\nin the finest analysis every consciousness must have an equation of its\nown.\n\nHowever, there is a quotient of relation of physical stimulus,\nmechanically measured, with increase and decrease of both sense and of\npleasure-pain. The pack-carrier feels in a certain proportion to his\npresent load pressure of weight-increments, and pressure pains also\naugment, though probably not in strict corresponding ratio. It is a\npopular saying that the last straw breaks the camel\u2019s back, and it is\ncertain that pains rapidly culminate. It is probable that increments\nwhich may not be sensed may yet be felt as pain. In fact, it is but very\ngradually that sense of pressure is evolved as practically free of pain;\nas a mere cognitive process it is always secondary to pleasure-pain\nstates which are felt directly from weights or but slightly objectified.\nPleasure-pain which proceeds from weights gradually is driven to sensing\nthem\u2014the evolution of the pressure sense\u2014and to noting variations, sense\nincrements, and if, like marine organisms, we ranged through pressure\nzones, the significance of discriminative sensibility might be very\ngreat.\n\nHowever, it is obvious that in its rise and in its whole evolution,\npleasure-pain is bound up with the pressure sense, but not with the arm\nof the balance as a record. Hence it is possible that Weber\u2019s law, so\nfar as applicable, is in some measure a result of feeling interference.\nThe simplicity of direct reaction is being destroyed by the hedonalgic\nlaw disturbing the direct ratio; we may thus feel an increasing pain\nfrom increasing weights, and have decreasing pressure sense. Beyond a\ncertain point the law of increments, with reference to external standard\nfor sensing and for pleasure and pain are in inverse ratio. On a very\nhot day we notice more and more strongly each additional degree of heat\nby the temperature sense, but beyond a certain degree, peculiar to the\nindividual at the time, sense of heat will rapidly diminish as heat\nincreases, and with increase of pain.\n\nAs to the number of feelings, of qualitatively distinct states, we must\non a general doctrine of evolution pronounce this to be innumerable and\nindefinite. The present forms of feeling in human consciousness of\ncourse represent but a small fraction of the total number which have\narisen in the course of psychic evolution. Every distinct form implies a\nlong evolution of intermediate types which are now for the most part\nbeyond our realization and so beyond cognition. The process of naming\naffords some slight clue to the importance and multiformity of feeling,\nthough this denotes only a few of the most obvious points which have\nimpressed themselves on the popular mind. Certainly the most striking\nfact to ordinary introspection, human and sub-human, is feeling, and the\nmanifold variety of simple pleasure-pains and of emotions has always,\nand will always, attract most strongly the general attention. It would\nbe a most interesting and profitable study to follow the course of\nlanguage in its denotation of feeling. Varied expression for varied\nfeelings is gradually achieved in vocal forms, which expressions become\na language sense to denote the feeling expressed. Thus the hoarse bellow\nof rage will both express and denote rage. The vocal expression form as\nimitated is the earliest language form, and only very gradually does\nlanguage assume the mechanical and arbitrary forms of its highest\ndevelopment. It is by imitating being mad vocally and otherwise, and\npointing to the angered one, that the savage conveys the idea of anger.\nGradually all but the vocal expression is dropped, and this\nconventionalized, becomes the origin of the word to denote the emotion\nin question. Feeling and emotion names are doubtless in their origin\ndebased vocal expression forms, though in the later evolution of\nlanguage this is generally not detectable, and various other more\nindirect associations control language. Only states of consciousness\nwhich have attained a considerable force and prominence receive notice\nin the vocabulary of common speech. For many variances of feeling there\nis no word denotation, but it may be given by intonation. The number of\nnames of feeling is thus in any language, or in all languages, but a\nvery rough index to the actual number of kinds of feeling, and we may\nexpect that a thorough scientific analysis will develop as extended\nscientific nomenclature of feeling, as chemistry has of kinds of matter.\nAt the present crude stage of psychology we must affirm that the number\nof cognizable, but unnamed feelings, far exceeds the number of the\nnamed, and that the number of the undiscriminated or the undiscovered\nfeelings far exceeds the number of both forms.\n\nOn the whole, it has been the object of our present studies to point out\nwith some definiteness the extent and mode of the early differentiation\nof feeling. Owing to the peculiar difficulties which beset this form of\nstudy and to which we have often adverted, our conclusions may seem\nrather meagre and uncertain, but it is sufficient if they emphasize a\nregion of introspective study, which, though of the utmost practical\nimportance, is yet the most neglected of all in psychic science; and we\nhope to have set forth the most probable general order of mental\nevolution with some distinctness as based on the struggle of existence.\nMind, beginning in pure pain, and culminating on the feeling side in the\nhigher emotions, contains an intermediate, continuous, indefinite number\nof forms, determined by the demands of life and preserved by natural\nselection, many of which are so entirely outgrown that they may be for\never beyond human conception, and many occurring only occasionally in\nhuman consciousness as survivals, and a large, yet comparatively small\nnumber constituting the present evolution phase of feeling in human\nconsciousness. We have dwelt specially on the lower developments, the\nrise of objectification and its nature, the rise and value of emotion,\nwith some characterization of the simpler and earlier emotions. Emotion\nis superior to and supplants sensation, though based thereon. The poison\nI fear, I abstain from without tasting; but with lower psychisms there\nmust be a direct sensing of the thing before its experience quality is\napprehended.\n\nMust we not suppose that feeling and emotion is destined to be an\nevanescent form in the evolution of mind? Is not the emotional type\ngradually disappearing, and will not the men of the future be pure\nindifferentists? Or are we rather to judge that emotion will always\ncontinue to strengthen and deepen? In an intellectual and introspective\nage like our own the na\u00efve mental life, which is primitive and merely\nnatural, vanishes, and we find that men everywhere, like Kenyon, in\nHowell\u2019s novel, _The Undiscovered Country_ are constantly destroying\ntheir feelings by pulling them up by the roots to see what they are and\nwhy they are. Such are only occasionally surprised into a genuine\nemotion, but they greet it with joy, and forthwith pull it to pieces in\na morbid self-analysis. An indifferentism, born of intellectual\ncuriosity, of scepticism or of pessimism, is, in fact, a pathological\nstate, a certain mono-emotionalism, for humanity cannot escape\nemotionalism if it _would_. This _blas\u00e9_ way of looking at things and\n_feeling_ about them, is a decadent symptom in an artificial age. The\nstruggle of life in a natural state always demands a varied, prompt, and\nfrank emotionalism. If mind lose its love of things and men, it may yet\nbe moved to highest attainment by sentiments like the love of science\nand truth. An intense intellectual life must be driven to its\nstrugglings and achievements by some strong motive power, some powerful\nemotion, though this may be purely impersonal, like the conviction of\nduty, or the love of truth. Feeling as the fundamental element in mind,\nas the very core of mentality, as the force which actuates both will and\ncognition, can never be destroyed, and for the future progress of mind,\nas for the past, we are assured that feeling and emotion will not cease\nto become ever stronger, deeper, and nobler.\n\n ERRATA.\n\n In the following index, for pages\n 100-332, subtract four; pages 332-390,\n subtract five.\n\n\n\n\n INDEX\n\n\nNOTE.\u2014The letter _m_ affixed to a page number signifies the middle third\nof the page; the letter _b_ signifies the bottom third of the page; no\nletter being affixed, the top third of the page is referred to.\n\n \u00c6sthetic psychosis, 299, 329, 373_m_.\n\n ALLEN, GRANT, 42, 301_b_, 303_m_.\n\n Altruism, 119_b_, 340_b_, 348_m_.\n\n Anger, 131, 369_b_.\n\n Apperception, 246_m_, 251.\n\n Arrogance, 279.\n\n Attention, 229.\n\n Awe, 123.\n\n BAIN, 49, 175, 223_b_, 381_b_.\n\n BALDWIN, J. M., 263.\n\n Belief, 220_m_.\n\n BLAIR, 315.\n\n BOSANQUET, 373_m_.\n\n Cause and effect in consciousness, 384.\n\n Chance, 386_m_.\n\n Change and consciousness, 23.\n\n Characteristic, emotion for, 334_b_.\n\n Christianity, 164_b_, 187.\n\n Comic, the, 371.\n\n COMTE, 28.\n\n Conceit, 278, 279_b_.\n\n Consciousness, function of, 167.\n\n _Continua_, 73.\n\n Craving, 207_b_.\n\n Curiosity, 218_b_.\n\n DARWIN, 301_b_, 341, 352_b_, 353_m_, 357, 366_m_.\n\n Desire, 196.\n\n Despair, 125.\n\n Desperation, 126_b_.\n\n DEWEY, J., 357, note.\n\n Differentiation of consciousness, 151_m_.\n\n Dignity, 280.\n\n Disappointment, 169.\n\n Dismay, 127.\n\n Drama, 372_m_\n\n Dread, 119.\n\n Dream life and self consciousness, 269.\n\n Education and desire, 228.\n\n _Ego_, 234_b_.\n\n Embarrassment, 281_m_.\n\n Emotion, 78.\n _rationale_ of, 81.\n analysis of, 82.\n retrospective, 180, 383_m_.\n classification of, 180.\n future of, 394_m_.\n\n _Ennui_, 216_b_.\n\n Ethical emotion, 337.\n\n Evil, problem of, 157.\n\n Evolution, antithetic mental, 271, 385.\n\n Exasperation, 162_m_.\n\n Excitement, 49.\n\n Expression, 303, 350.\n\n Familiarity, emotion of, 177.\n\n Fear, 91, 354, 369_b_.\n of fear, 89.\n\n FECHNER, 310_b_.\n\n Feeling, psychology of imperfect, 2.\n and subjective method, 7.\n and pleasure-pain, 48.\n definition of, 58, 76_b_.\n number of feelings, 392_m_.\n\n Fine Art, 363_m_, 373.\n\n Hate, 147_m_.\n\n Hedonalgic, 177, note.\n\n Hedonism, 41_b_, 204_b_.\n\n H\u00d6FFDING, 29, 201_m_.\n\n Hope, 220_m_, 169_b_.\n\n Horror, 121_b_.\n\n HOWELLS, W. D., quoted, 327.\n\n HUME, 262_b_.\n\n Humility, 283_b_.\n\n Imagination, 311.\n\n Imitation, 53, 368_m_.\n\n Impulse, 224_b_.\n\n Indignation, 162_b_.\n\n Induction, 210, 211, 286.\n\n Inhibition, 242_b_.\n\n Integration of consciousness, 79.\n\n Intellectual emotion, 295_b_.\n\n Intensity, 38_m_, 49, 231_b_, 387_b_.\n\n Interest, 224_b_, 247, 270_b_.\n\n JAMES, W., 237_b_, 239, 364_b_.\n\n JOHNSON, W. E., 54.\n\n Knowledge, origin of, 61, 95_m_, 263_b_, 267.\n\n LANDOR, W. S., quoted, 279_m_.\n\n Laoko\u00f6n group, 374.\n\n Lotze, 42.\n\n Malice, 162b.\n\n MARSHALL, H. R., 28, 40_b_, 306_m_.\n\n MASON, F. A., 56.\n\n MERCIER, 142.\n\n Method of psychology, 4, 133, 152, 362_b_, 376.\n\n MILL, J. S., 286_b_.\n\n Moral sense, 337.\n\n Novelty, feeling of, 170.\n\n Optimism, 193_b_.\n\n Pain, knowledge of, 8.\n primitive mind, 13.\n and tension, 35.\n and sensation, 37.\n\n Panic, 122_m_.\n\n Perception, origin of, 70.\n\n PEREZ, 337.\n\n Pessimism, 193_b_.\n\n Play, 303_b_, 355_m_, 369_m_.\n\n Pleasure, evolution of, 14.\n function of, 44_b_.\n as bad term, 204.\n\n Pleasure-Pain and sensation, 62, 196.\n as quality, 38.\n physiological theory, 41_b_.\n\n PREYER, 17_b_.\n\n Pride, 273_b_.\n\n Psychology, imperfectness of, 1, 133, 152, 203_b_.\n and evolution, 59, 381_b_.\n experimental, 378.\n physiological, 380.\n\n Quantity in consciousness, 388.\n\n Recognition, 171_b_.\n\n Regret, 195.\n\n Remorse, 195.\n\n Representation, 278.\n\n Resignation, 195.\n\n Retrospective emotion, 180.\n\n Revenge, 183_b_.\n\n Self-feeling, 255.\n consciousness, 255.\n and dream life, 269.\n satisfaction, 280_b_.\n\n Senile psychology, 28.\n\n Sexual emotion, 299_b_.\n\n Shame, 282_b_.\n\n Shelley quoted, 320, 324.\n\n SIDGWICK, H., 201_b_.\n\n Sorrow, 187.\n\n SPENCER, HERBERT, 303_b_, 314, 320_m_, 326, 329_m_, 337_b_, 345.\n\n SPINOZA, 200, 201.\n\n Spontaneity, 381_b_.\n\n STEWART, D., 222_b_.\n\n Style, 314.\n\n Sub-consciousness, 32_b_.\n\n Surprise, 296_b_, 50, 167_b_.\n\n Teleologic emotion, 297_b_.\n\n Tentacular experience, 81.\n\n TITCHENER, E. B., 10.\n\n Variation, mental, 385.\n\n VOLKMANN, 200.\n\n WARD, JAMES, 7, 22_b_, 73, 203, 232_b_, 246.\n\n Weber\u2019s law, 389.\n\n Wonder, 296_b_.\n\n Wundt, 351, note.\n\n --------------\n\n Butler & Tanner, The Selwood Printing Works, Frome, and London.\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n Transcriber\u2019s Note\n\nHyphenation is mostly consistent. The word \u2018representation\u2019 is\nfrequently given as \u2018re-presentation\u2019, as a technical term. Where the\nhyphen occurs at a line break, it is retained or removed based on other\ninstances of the word in the text.\n\nErrors deemed most likely to be the printer\u2019s have been corrected, and\nare noted here. The references are to the page and line in the original.\n\n 3.29 that feeling is a \u201cstrange[\u201d] mysterious world Removed.\n\n 4.19 through the [s]elf-observation of the human Restored.\n mind\n\n 9.5 that it must[ ]be in consciousness Inserted.\n\n 40.34 viz[.], of the neural basis Added.\n\n 225.19 whether a pain[,] pleasure, perception Inserted.\n\n 349.25 (_Expression of the Emotions in Man and Removed.\n Animals_, New York, 1886, p. 350[)];\n\n 369.8 The interp[r]etation of expression Inserted.","title":"Studies in the Evolutionary Psychology of Feeling","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":126529}