{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_5775/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_5775","id":"gutenberg_5775","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/5775","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Ethics"],"text":"Produced by Charles Aldarondo, Charles Franks\nand the Online Distributed Proofreading Team\n\n\n\n\nPROBLEMS OF CONDUCT\n\nAN INTRODUCTORY SURVEY OF ETHICS\n\nBY\n\nDURANT DRAKE\n\nA.M. (Harvard) Ph.D. (Columbia)\n\nAssociate Professor of Ethics and Philosophy of Religion at Wesleyan\nUniversity\n\nBOSTON NEW YORK CHICAGO\n\n1914\n\n\n\n\nTO THE DEAR TWO WHOSE INTEREST IN PROBLEMS OF CONDUCT FIRST AWAKENED\nMINE AND WHOSE EAGERNESS TO KNOW AND DO REMAINS UNDIMMED BY THE\nYEARS MY FATHER AND MY MOTHER\n\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\nThis book represents in substance a course of lectures and discussions\ngiven first at the University of Illinois and later at Wesleyan\nUniversity. It was written to meet the needs both of the college\nstudent who has the added guidance of an instructor, and of the\ngeneralreader who has no such assistance. The attempt has been\nmade to keep the presentation simple and clear enough to need no\ninterpreter, and by the list of readings appended to each chapter,\nto make a self directed further study of any point easy and alluring.\nThese references are for the most part to books in English, easily\naccessible, and both intelligible and interesting to the ordinary\nuntrained reader or undergraduate. Some articles from the popular\nreviews have been included, which, if not always authoritative,\nare interesting and suggestive.\n\nThe function of the instructor who should use this as a textbook would\nconsist, first, in making sure that the text was thoroughly read and\nunderstood; secondly, in raising doubts, suggesting opposing views,\nconducting a discussion with the object of making the student think\nfor himself; and, thirdly, in adding new material and illustration\nand directing the outside readings which should supplement this\npurposely brief and summary treatment. The books to which reference\nis made in the lists of readings, and other books approved by the\ninstructor, should be kept upon reserved shelves for the constant\nuse of the class in the further study of questions suggested by\nthe text or raised in the classroom.\n\nIt will be noticed that the disputes and the technical language of\ntheorists have been throughout so far as possible avoided. The\ndiscussion of historical theories and isms' is unnecessarily\nbewildering to the beginner; and the aim has been rather to keep as\nclose as possible to the actual experience of the student and the\nlanguage of everyday life. Far more attention is given than in most\nbooks on ethics to concrete contemporary problems. After all, an\ninsight into the fallacies of the reasoning of the various ethical\nschools, an ability to know what they are talking about and glibly\nrefute them, is of less importance than an acquaintance with, and a\nfirm, intelligent attitude toward, the vital moral problems and\nmovements of the day. I have prayed to be saved from academic\nabstractness and remoteness, and to go as straight as I could to the\nreal perplexities from which men suffer in deciding upon their conduct.\nThe purpose of a study of ethics is, primarily, to get light for the\nguidance of life. And so, while referring to authors who differ from\nthe views here expressed, I have sought to impart a definite conception\nof relative values, to offer a thread for guidance through the\nlabyrinth of moral problems, and to effect a heightened realization\nof the importance and the possibilities of right living.\n\nIt is necessary, indeed, in order to justify and clarify our concrete\nmoral judgments, that we should reach clear and firmly grounded\nconclusions upon the underlying abstract questions. And the habit of\nlaying aside upon occasion one's instinctive or habitual moral\npreferences and discussing with open mind their justification and\nrationality is of great value to the individual and to society. Hence\nthe first two Parts of this volume take up, as simply as is consonant\nwith the really intricate questions involved, the history of the\ndevelopment of human morality and the psychological foundation of moral\nobligations and ideals. The exposition of the meaning of right and\nwrong there unfolded serves as a basis for the sound solution of the\nconfused concrete issues, private and then public, which are discussed\nin the remainder of the volume.\n\nAn introductory outline of any subject must inevitably be superficial.\nTo explain all the discriminations that are important to the\nspecialist, to justify thoroughly all the positions taken, to do\nadequate justice to opposing views, would require ten volumes instead\nof one. And though there is a crying need of scholarly and elaborate\ndiscussion of the endless problems of morality, there is a prior need\nfor the student of surveying the field, seeing what the problems are,\nhow they are related, and what is approximately certain. The impression\nleft by many ethical treatises, that everything is matter for dispute\nand no moral judgments are reliable, seems to me unfortunate; I have\npreferred to incur the charge of dogmatism rather than to fall into\nthat error to offer a clear cut set of standards, to which exception\nwill be taken by this critic or that, rather than to hold out to the\nstudent a chaos of confused possibilities.\n\nNo originality of viewpoint is claimed for this book. Its raison d'etre\nis simply to provide a clearer, more concrete, and more concisely\ncomprehensive view of the nature of morality and its summons to men\nthan has seemed to me available. I have drawn freely upon the thoughts\nof ethical teachers, classic and contemporary. These ideas are, or\nought to be, common property; and it has been impracticable to trace\nthem to their sources and offer detailed acknowledgment. Nothing has\nbeen presented here that has not first passed through the crucible\nof my own thinking and experience; and where the sparks came from that\nkindled each particular thought I am sure I do not know.\n\nPortions of chapters xxi and xxix have appeared in the Forum and North\nAmerican Review respectively; to the editors of these periodicals my\nthanks are due for permission to reprint.\n\nDURANT DRAKE.\n\nMlDDLETOWN, CONN, August 3, 1914.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTORY.\nWhat is the field of ethics? Why should we study ethics?\n\nPART I. THE EVOLUTION OF MORALITY\n\nCHAPTER I. THE ORIGIN OF PERSONAL MORALITY...\nHow early in the evolutionary process did personal morality\nof some sort emerge?\nWhat were the main causes that produced personal morality? How far\nhas the moralizing process been blind and how far conscious?\n\nCHAPTER II. THE ORIGIN OF SOCIAL MORALITY...\nHow early was social morality developed?\nBy what means was social morality produced?\nHow has morality been fostered by the tribe?\n\nCHAPTER III. OUTWARD DEVELOPMENT-MORALS...\nWhat is the difference between morals and non-moral customs?\nWhat, in general, has been the direction of moral progress?\nWhat definition of morality emerges from this?\nIs moral progress certain?\n\nCHAPTER IV. INWARD DEVELOPMENT-CONSCIENCE...\nWhat are the stages in the history of moral guidance?\nOut of what has conscience developed?\nWhat is conscience now?\nWhat is the value of conscience?\n\nCHAPTER V. THE INDIVIDUALIZING OF CONSCIENCE...\nWhy did not the individualizing of conscience occur earlier?\nWhat forces made against custom-morality?\nConservatism vs. radicalism. What are the dangers of conventional\nmorality?\n\nCHAPTER VI. CAN WE BASE MORALITY UPON CONSCIENCE...\nWhat is the meaning of \"moral intuitionism\"?\nDo the deliverances of different people's consciences agree?\nIf conscience everywhere agreed in its dictates, could we base\nmorality upon it?\nWhat is the plausibility of moral intuitionism?\n\nPART II. THE THEORY OF MORALITY\n\nCHAPTER VII. THE BASIS OF RIGHT AND WRONG...\nWhat is the nature of that intrinsic goodness upon which ultimately\nall valuations rest?\nWhat is extrinsic goodness?\nWhat sort of conduct, then, is good?\nAnd how shall we define virtue?\n\nCHAPTER VIII. THE MEANING OF DUTY...\nWhy are there conflicts between duty and inclination?\nMust we deny that duty is the servant of happiness?\nDoes the end justify the means?\nWhat is the justification of justice and chivalry?\n\nCHAPTER IX. THE JUDGMENT OF CHARACTER...\n Wherein consists goodness of character?\nCan we say, with Kant, that the only good is the Good Will?\nWhat evils may go with conscientiousness?\nWhat is the justification of praise and blame?\nWhat is responsibility?\n\nCHAPTER X. THE SOLUTION OF PERSONAL PROBLEMS...\nWhat are the inadequacies of instinct and impulse that necessitate\nmorality?\nWhat factors are to be considered in estimating the worth\nof personal moral ideals?\nEpicureanism vs. Puritanism.\nWhat are the evils in undue self-indulgence?\nWhat are the evils in undue self-repression?\n\nCHAPTER XI. THE SOLUTION OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS...\nWhy should we be altruistic?\nWhat is the exact meaning of selfishness and unselfishness?\nAre altruistic impulses always right?\nWhat mental and moral obstacles hinder altruistic action?\nHow can we reconcile egoism and altruism?\n\nCHAPTER XII. OBJECTIONS AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS...\nDo men always act for pleasure or to avoid pain?\nAre pleasures and pains incommensurable?\nAre some pleasures worthier than others?\nIs morality merely subjective and relative?\n\nCHAPTER XIII. ALTEBNATIVE THEORIES...\nIs morality \"categorical,\" beyond need of justification?\nShould we live \"according to nature,\" and adjust ourselves\nto the evolutionary process?\nIs self-development, or self-realization, the ultimate end?\nIs the source of duty the will of God?\n\nCHAPTER XIV. THE WORTH OF MORALITY...\nMorality as the organization of human interests.\nDo moral acts always bring happiness somewhere?\nIs there anything better than morality?\n\nPART III. PERSONAL MORALITY\n\nCHAPTER XV. HEALTH AND EFFICIENCY...\nWhat is the moral importance of health?\nCan we attain to greater health and efficiency?\nIs continued idleness ever justifiable?\nAre competitive athletics desirable? Is it wrong to smoke?\n\nCHAPTER XVI. THE ALCOHOL PROBLEM...\nWhat are the causes of the use of alcoholic drinks?\nWhat are the evils that result from alcoholic liquors?\nWhat should be the attitude of the individual toward\nalcoholic liquors? What should be our attitude toward the use of\nalcoholic liquors by others?\n\nCHAPTER XVII. CHASTITY AND MARRIAGE...\nWhat are the reasons for chastity before and fidelity after\nmarriage? What safeguards against unchastity are necessary?\nWhat are the factors in an ideal marriage? 1Is divorce morally\njustifiable?\n\nCHAPTER XVIII. FELLOWSHIP, LOYALTY, AND LUXURY...\nwhat social relationships impose claims upon us?\nWhat general duties do we owe our fellows?\nAre the rich justified in living in luxury?\nIs it wrong to gamble, bet, or speculate?\n\nCHAPTER XIX. TRUTHFULNESS AND ITS PROBLEMS...\nWhat are the reasons for the obligation of truthfulness?\nWhat exceptions are allowable to the duty of truthfulness?\nIn what directions are our standards of truthfulness low?\nThe ethics of journalism.\n\nCHAPTER XX. CULTURE AND ART...\nWhat is the value of culture and art?\nWhat is most important in cultural education?\nWhat dangers are there in culture and art for life?\nShould art be censored in the interests of morality?\n\nCHAPTER XXI. THE MECHANISM OF SELF-CONTROL...\nWhat are our potentialities of greater self-control?\nA practicable mechanism of self-control.\nVarious accessories and safeguards.\n\nCHAPTER XXII. THE ATTAINABILITY OF HAPPINESS...\nThe threefold key to happiness:\nI. Hearty allegiance to duty.\nII. Hearty acquiescence in our lot.\nIII. Hearty appreciation of the wonder and beauty in life.\nCan we maintain a steady under glow of happiness?\n\nPART IV. PUBLIC MORALITY\n\nCHAPTER XXIII. PATRIOTISM AND WORLD-PEACE...\nWhat is the meaning and value of patriotism? How should patriotism\nbe directed and qualified? What have been the benefits of war? What\nare the evils of war? What can we do to hasten world-peace?\n\nCHAPTER XXIV. POLITICAL PURITY AND EFFICIENCY...\nWhat are the forces making for corruption in politics?\nWhat are the evil results of political corruption?\nWhat is the political duty of the citizen?\nWhat legislative checks to corruption are possible?\n\nCHAPTER XXV. SOCIAL ALLEVIATION...\nWhat is the duty of the State in regard to:\nI. Sickness and preventable death?\nII. Poverty and inadequate living conditions?\nIII. Commercialized vice?\nIV. Crime?\n\nCHAPTER XXVI. INDUSTRIAL WRONGS...\nIn our present organization of industry, what are the duties of\nbusinessmen:\nI. To the public?\nII. To investors?\nIII. To competitors?\nIV. To employees?\nWhat general remedies for industrial wrongs are feasible?\n\nCHAPTER XXVII. INDUSTRIAL RECONSTRUCTION...\nOught the trusts to be broken up, or regulated?\nWhat are the ethics of the following schemes:\nI. Trade-unions and strikes?\nII. Profit-sharing, cooperation, consumers' leagues?\nIII. Government regulation of prices, profits, and wages?\nIV. Socialism?\n\nCHAPTER XXVIII. LIBERTY AND LAW...\nWhat are the essential aspects of the ideal of liberty?\nThe ideal of individualism. The ideal of legal control.\nShould existing laws always be obeyed?\n\nCHAPTER XXIX. EQUALITY AND PRIVILEGE...\nWhat flagrant forms of inequality exist in our society?\nWhat methods of equalizing opportunity are possible?\nWhat are the ethics of:\nI. The single tax?\nII. Free trade and protection?\nIII. The control of immigration?\nIV. The woman's movement?\n\nCHAPTER XXX. THE FUTURE OF THE RACE...\nIn what ways should the State seek to better human environment?\nWhat should be done in the way of public education?\nhat can be done by eugenics?\nWhat are the gravest moral dangers of our times?\n\n\n\n\nPROBLEMS OF CONDUCT\n\n\nINTRODUCTORY\n\nWhat is the field of ethics?\n\nTo know what exists, in its stark reality, is the concern of natural\nscience and natural philosophy; to know what matters, is the field\nof moral philosophy, or ethics. The one group of studies deals with\nfacts simply as facts, the other with their values. Human life is\ncheckered with the sunshine and shadow of good and evil, joy and pain;\nit is these qualitative differences that make it something more than\na meaningless eddy in the cosmic whirl. Natural philosophy (including\nthe physical and psychological sciences), drawing its impartial map\nof existence, is interesting and important; it informs us about our\nenvironment and ourselves, shows us our resources and our powers, what\nwe can do and how to do it. Moral philosophy asks the deeper and more\nsignificant question, What SHALL we do? For the momentous fact about\nlife is that it has differences in value, and, more than that, that\nwe can MAKE differences in value. Caught as we are by the irresistible\nflux of existence, we find ourselves able so to steer our lives as\nto change the proportion of light and shade, to give greater value\nto a life that might have had less. This possibility makes our moral\nproblem. What shall we choose and from what refrain? To what aims shall\nwe give our allegiance? What shall we fight for and what against?\n\nFor the savage practically all of his activity is determined by his\nimperative needs, so that there is little opportunity for choice or\nreflection upon the aims of his life. He must find food, and\nshelter, and clothing to keep himself warm and dry; he must protect\nhimself from the enemies that menace him, and rest when he is tired.\nNor are most of us today far removed from that primitive condition;\nthe moments when we consciously choose and steer our course are few\nand fleeting. Yet with the development of civilization the elemental\nburdens are to some extent lifted; men come to have superfluous\nstrength, leisure hours, freedom to do something more than merely\nearn their living. And further, with the development of\nintelligence, new ways of fulfilling the necessary tasks suggest\nthemselves, moral problems arise where none were felt before. Men\nlearn that they have not made the most of their opportunities or\nlived the best possible lives; they have veered this way and that\naccording to the moment's impulse, they have been misled by\ningrained habits and paralyzed by inertia, they have wandered at\nrandom for lack of a clear vision of their goal. The task of the\nmoralist is to attain such a clear vision; to understand, first, the\nbasis of all preference, and then, in detail, the reasons for\npreferring this concrete act to that. Here are a thousand impulses\nand instincts drawing us, with infinite further possibilities\nsuggesting themselves to reflection; the more developed our natures\nthe more frequently do our desires conflict. Why is any one better\nthan another? How can we decide between them? Or shall we perhaps\ndisown them all for some other and better way.\n\nMan's effort to solve these problems is revealed outwardly in a\nmultitude of precepts and laws, in customs and conventions; and\ninwardly in the sense of duty and shame, in aspiration, in the\ninstinctive reactions of praise, blame, contentment, and remorse. The\nleadings of these forces are, however, often divergent, sometimes\nradically so. We must seek a completer insight. There must be some\nbest way of solving the problem of life, some happiest, most useful\nway of living; its pursuit constitutes the field of ethics. Nothing\ncould be more practical, more vital, more universally human.\n\nWhy should we study ethics?\n\n(1) The most obvious reason for the study of ethics is that we may\nget more light for our daily problems. We are constantly having to\nchoose how we shall act and being perplexed by opposing advantages.\nDecide one way or the other we must. On what grounds shall we decide?\nHow shall we feel assured that we are following a real duty, pursuing\nan actual good, and not being led astray by a mere prejudice or\nconvention? The alternative is, to decide on impulse, at haphazard,\nafter some superficial and one-sided reflection; or to think the matter\nthrough, to get some definite criteria for judgments, and to face the\nrecurrent question, what shall we do? In the steady light of those\nprinciples. [Footnote: Cf. Matthew Arnold, Essays in Criticism, vol.\ni: \"Marcus Aurelius,\" opening paragraph: \"The object of systems of\nmorality is to take possession of human life, to save it from being\nabandoned to passion or allowed to drift at hazard, to give it happiness\nby establishing it in the practice of virtue; and this object they\nseek to attain by presenting to human life fixed principles of action,\nfixed rules of conduct. In its uninspired as well as in its inspired\nmoments, in its days of languor or gloom as well as in its days of\nsunshine and energy, human life has thus always a clue to follow, and\nmay always be making way towards its goal.\"]\n\n(2) In addition to the fact that we all have unavoidable problems which\nwe must solve one way or another, a little familiarity with life, an\nacquaintance with the biographies of great and good men, should lead\nus to suspect that beyond the horizon of these immediate needs lie\nwhole ranges of beautiful and happy living to which comparatively few\never attain. There are better ways of doing things than most of us\nhave dreamed. The study of ethics should reveal these vistas and\nstimulate us to a noble discontent with our inferior morals. [Footnote:\nCf. Emerson, in a letter to Fraulein Gisela von Arnim: \"In reading\nyour letter, I felt, as when I read rarely a good novel, rebuked that\nI do not use in my life these delicious relations; or that I accept\nanything inferior or ugly.\"] Such a forward look and development of\nideals not only adds greatly to the worth of life but prepares a man\nto meet perplexities and temptations which may some day arise. It pays\nto educate one's self for future emergencies by meditating not only\nupon present problems but upon the further potentialities of conduct,\nright and wrong, that may lie ahead, and building up a code for one's\nself that will make life not only richer but steadier and more secure.\n\n(3) Another advantage of a systematic study of ethics is that it can\nmake clearer to us WHY one act is better than another; why duty is\njustified in thwarting our inclinations and conscience is to be obeyed.\nNot only is this an intellectual gain, but it is an immense\nfortification to the will. There comes a time in the experience of\nevery thinking man when a command not reinforced by a reason breeds\ndistrust, and when until he can intelligently defend an ideal he will\nhesitate to give it his allegiance. Morality, to be depended upon,\nmust be not a mere matter of breeding and convention, or of impulse\nand emotion, but the result of rational insight and conscious resolve.\nTo many people morality seems nothing but convention, or an arbitrary\ntyranny, or a mysterious and awful necessity, something extraneous\nto their own desires, from which they would like to escape. To be able\nto refute these skeptics, expose the sophisms and specious arguments\nby which they support their wrongdoing, and show that they have chosen\nthe lesser good, is a valuable help to the community and to one's own\nintegrity of conduct. Too often the people perish for lack of vision;\nan understanding of the naturalness and enormous desirability of\nmorality, together with an appreciation of its main injunctions, would\nenlist upon its side many restless spirits who now chafe under a sense\nof needless restraint and seek some delusory freedom which leads to\npain and death. Morality is simply the best way of living; and the\nmore fully men realize that, the more readily will they submit themselves\nto the sacrifices it requires.\n\n(4) Finally, a study of ethics should help us to see what are the\nprevalent sins and moral dangers of our day, and thus arouse us to\nput the weight of our blame and praise where they are needed. Widespread\npublic opinion is a force of incalculable power, which is largely\nunused. Politics and business, and to a far greater extent than now\nprivate life, will become clean and honest and kind just so soon as\na sufficient number of people wake up and demand it. We have the power\nto make sins which are now generally tolerated and respectable, so\nodious, so infamous, that they will practically disappear. There are\ncertain of the older forms of sin which the race in its long struggle\nupward has so effectually blacklisted that only a few perverts now\nlapse into them; we have execrated out of existence whole classes of\ncruelty and vice. But with the changing and ever more complex relations\nof society new forms of sin continually creep in; these we have not\nyet come to brand with the odium they deserve. Leaders of society and\npillars of the church are often, and usually without disturbance of\nconscience, guilty of wrongdoing as grave in its effects, or graver,\nthan many of the faults we relentlessly chastise. On the other hand,\nmany really useful reforms are blocked because they awaken old prejudices\nor cross silly and meaningless conventions. The air is full of proposals,\ninvectives, causes, movements; how shall we know which to espouse and\nwhich to reject, or where best to lend a hand? We need a consistent\nand well-founded point of view from which to judge. To get such a sane\nand far-sighted moral perspective; to see the acts of our fellow men\nwith a proper valuation; to be able to point out the insidious dangers\nof conduct which is not yet as generally rebuked as it ought to be;\nand at the same time to emancipate ourselves and others from the mistaken\nand merely arbitrary precepts that are intermingled with our genuine\nmorality, and so attain the largest possible freedom of action, such\nshould be the outcome of a thorough study of ethical principles and\nideals.\n\n\n\n\nPART I\n\n\nTHE EVOLUTION OF MORALITY\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\n\nTHE ORIGIN OP PERSONAL MORALITY\n\nIn almost any field it is wise to precede definition by an impartial\nsurvey of the subject matter. So if we are to form an unbiased\nconception of what morality is, it will be safest to consider first\nwhat the morals of men actually have been, how they came into being,\nand what function they have served in human life. Thus we shall be\nsure that our theory is in touch with reality, and be saved from mere\ncloset-philosophies and irrelevant speculations. Our task in this First\nPart will be not to criticize by reference to any ethical standards,\nbut to observe and describe, as a mere bit of preliminary sociology,\nwhat it is in their lives to which men have given the name \"morality,\"\nof what use it has been, and through the action of what forces it has\ntended to develop. With these data in mind, we shall be the better\nable, in the Second Part, to formulate our criteria for judging the\ndifferent codes of morality; we shall find that we are but making\nexplicit and conscious the considerations that, unexpressed and\nunrealized, have been the persistent and underlying factors in their\ndevelopment. How early in the evolutionary process did personal\nmorality of some sort emerge? Of course the words (in any language)\nand the explicit conceptions \"morality,\" \"duty,\" \"right,\" \"wrong,\" etc,\nare very late in appearance, presupposing as they do a power of\nreflection and abstraction which develops only in man and with a\nconsiderable civilization. Even in the Homeric poems, which reflect\na degree of mental cultivation in some respects equal to our own, these\nconcepts hardly appear. But ages earlier, far back in the course of\nanimal evolution, there emerged phenomena which we may consider\nrudimentary forms of morality; and all early human history was replete\nwrith unanalyzed and unformulated moral struggles. Concretely, we mean\nby personal morality courage, industriousness, self-control, prudence,\ntemperance, and other similar phenomena, which have this in common,\nthat they involve a crossing of earlier-developed impulses and\nredirection of the individual's conduct, with the result, normally,\nthat his welfare is enhanced. Exceptions to this result will be\nconsidered later; but the point to be noted at the outset is that\npersonal morality is not at first the outcome of reflection, or a\npurely human affair. If we were to take the term \"morality\" in a\nnarrower sense, as meaning conscious obedience to a sense of duty or\nto the moral law, it would obviously be a late product. But morality\nin this sense is only an ultimate development of what in its less\nconscious and reflective forms dates far back in pre-human history.\n\nTake courage, for example, which may be briefly defined as action in\nspite of the instinct of fear and contrary to its leading. Nearly all\nof the higher animals exhibit courage in greater or less degree, and\nthere are many touching instances of it recorded to the credit of those\nwe best know. Industriousness, again, is proverbial in the case of\nbees and ants \"Go to the ant, thou sluggard!\"--and noteworthy in the\ncase of many birds, of beavers, and a long list of other animals.\nPrudence may be illustrated by the case of the camel who fills himself\nwith water enough to last for many desert days, or that of the bird\nwho builds her nest with remarkable ingenuity and pains out of the\nreach of invaders. Whether or not we shall attribute self-control to\nthe lower animals is a mere matter of definition; in the looser sense\nwe may credit with it the hungry fox who does not touch the bait whose\ndangerous nature he vaguely suspects. Temperance is probably one of\nthe latest of the virtues, and is rather conspicuously absent in much\nof human history and biography; but perhaps students of animal psychology\ncan guarantee instances to which the name might fairly be given.\n\nIn lesser degree, then, but unmistakably present, we find the same\nsort of conduct appearing in the animals to which we give in man the\nnames courage, prudence, etc. Purely instinctive these acts usually\nare though we may see even in the animals the beginnings of mental\nconflicts, of reasoning, of reflection. But morality (if we keep to\nthe wider sense of the term) is none the less morality when it is\ninstinctive and natural. Morality is a general name for certain KINDS\nof conduct, certain redirections of impulse. These redirections\nappeared in animal life long before the emergence of what we may call\nman from his ape-like ancestry; and all of our self-conscious moral\nidealism is but a continuation and development of the process then\nbegun. Any theory of right and wrong must take account of the fact\nthat morality, unlike art, science, and religion, is not an exclusively\nhuman affair. In contrast with these late and purely human innovations,\nit is hoary with antiquity and the possession, in some rudimentary\nform or other, of nearly the whole realm of organic life.\n\nWhat were the main causes that produced personal morality?\n\nHow did these germinal forms of courage, prudence, industriousness,\netc, first come into existence? The answer to this question will also\nshow what are the main underlying causes that promote these virtues\ntoday.\n\n(1) They are in part due to certain organic needs and cravings which\nexist independently of the individual's environment. Hunger and thirst\nimperiously check the tendency to laziness, or heedlessness, and\nstimulate to industriousness and prudence. To this day the mere need\nof food and clothing and shelter is the main bulwark of these virtues.\nThe acquisitive impulse, which is also rather early in appearance,\nhas an increasing share in this sort of moralization. The craving for\naction, which is the natural result of abundant nervous and muscular\nenergy, the combative instinct, the joy of conquest and achievement,\nand the sexual impulse, go far in counteracting cowardice and inertia.\nThe artistic impulse, when it emerges in man, long before the dawn\nof history, makes against caprice for orderliness, self-control, and\npatience. Ambition is a potent force in human affairs. The desire for\nthe approval of others, which is prehuman, makes for all the virtues.\n\n(2) But in addition to these inward springs of morality there is the\nconstant pressure of a hostile environment. Cold, storms, rivers that\nblock journeys, forests that must be felled, treacherous seas that\nlure with promise and exact toll for carelessness, arouse men out of\ntheir torpor and aid the development of the virtues we have been\nconsidering. The necessity of rearing some sort of shelter makes against\nlaziness for industry and perseverance. The dangers of wind or flood\ncheck heedlessness in the choice of location for the home and foster\nprudence and foresight. In the harsher climates man is more goaded\nby nature; hence more moral progress has, probably, been effected in\nthe temperate than in the tropical zones.\n\n(3) A third and very important source lies in the mutual hostility\nof the animal species and of men. Slothfulness and recklessness mean\nfor the great majority of animals the imminent risk of becoming the\nprey of some stronger animal. Among tribes of men the ceaseless struggles\nfor supremacy have pricked cowardice into courage, demanded self-control\ninstead of temper, supplanted gluttony and drunkenness by temperance.\nCruel as has been the suffering caused by war, and deplorable as most\nof its effects, it did a great deal in the early stages of man's\nhistory to promote the personal virtues, alertness, moderation,\ncaution, courage, and efficiency.\n\nIn the latest stages of man's development, conscious regard for law\nand custom, the fear of gods, the explicit recognition of duty and\nconscience, and the direct pursuit of ideals-all the reflective\nconsiderations that we may lump together under the word\n\"conscientiousness\"-play their ever increasing part and complicate\nthe psychological situation. But even in modern civilized man the\nunderlying animal forces count for far more. And without them the later\nself-conscious forces would not have come into play at all. There is\na small class of people who are dominated throughout their activities\nby consciously present ideals or obedience to religious injunctions.\nBut the average man still acts mainly under the pressure of the more\nprimitive forces which we have enumerated.\n\nHow far has the moralizing process been blind and how far conscious?\n\n(1) To a very large extent the moralizing process has been a merely\nmechanical one. Through slight differences in nerve-structure\nindividuals have varied a little in their response to the pressure\nof inward cravings and outward perils. The braver, the more prudent,\nthe more industrious have had a better chance of survival. So by the\nprocess which we have come to call natural selection there has been\na continual weeding-out of the relatively lazy, cowardly, reckless,\nand imprudent. Much of our morality is the result of tendencies thus\nlong cultivated by the ruthless methods of nature; we inherit a complex\nnervous organization, the outcome of ages of molding and selection,\nwhich now instinctively and easily responds to stimuli with a certain\ndegree of inbred morality. This is the case much more than is apparent\nupon the surface. The child seems very unmoral, the mere prey of\npassing impulses; but latent in his brain are many aptitudes and\ntendencies which will at the proper time ripen and manifest themselves.\nThe period of adolescence is that during which the changes in mental\nstructure which were effected during the later stages of evolution\nare being made in the mind of this new individual; he reenacts, as\nit were, in a few years, the history of the race, and emerges without\nany conscious effort, the possessor of the fruits of that long struggle\nof which he was always the heir.\n\n(2) In all the later stages of animal evolution, however, moral\ndevelopment is largely conscious, or semi-conscious. Besides our inner\ninheritance of altered brain-paths there is a social inheritance of\nhabits which each generation adopts by imitation of its predecessors.\nWithout any deliberate intention, the young of every species imitate\ntheir parents, and then the older members of the flock or herd.\n\"Suggestion\" is said by some to be the chief means of moralization;\nwe are brave or industrious because we see others practicing these\nvirtues and naturally do as they do. At any rate, whichever are more\nimportant, the inherited tendencies or those acquired by contagion,\nboth of these factors play a large part in the development of the\nindividual's morals.\n\n(3) The third method of moral development is that which we call\n\"learning by experience.\" The pain or dissatisfaction which a wrong\nimpulse brings in its train, the satisfaction which follows a moral\nact, are remembered, and recur with the recurrence of a similar\nsituation, becoming perhaps the decisive factors in steering the animal\nor man toward his true welfare. Many animals quite low in the organic\nscale learn by experience; and though of course the degree of\nconsciousness that accompanies these readjustments varies enormously,\nthis method of moralization may be said to be always, like the\npreceding, a more or less conscious process. Learning by experience\nis subject, of course, to many mistaken judgments; the fallacy of post\nhoc propter hoc leads many learners to avoid perfectly innocent acts\nas supposedly involving some evil result with which they were once\nby chance connected; and the true causes of the evils are often\noverlooked. Even when dimly conscious readjustments become highly\nconscious deliberation, the results of that deliberation may be less\nforwarding morally than the unconscious and merciless grinding of\nnatural selection.\n\nMore and more, of course, as men grew in power of reflection, did they\nconsciously shape their morals; and this intelligent selection, which\nhas as yet played a comparatively small role, is bound, as men become\nmore and more rational, to supersede in importance the other factors\nin moral evolution. But in the later phases of evolution all three\nof these processes blend together; and it would be impossible for the\nkeenest analyst to tell how much of his conduct was determined in each\nof these ways.\n\nH. Spencer, Data of Ethics (also published as the first part of his\nPrinciples of Ethics), chap. I and chap. II, through sec. 4; or J.\nFiske, Cosmic Philosophy, part II, chap, XXII, first half, to \"We are\nnow prepared to deal.\" L. T. Hobhouse, Morals in Evolution, part\nI, chap. I, secs. 1-4. I. King, Development of Religion, pp. 48-59\nA great mass of concrete material will be found in E. Westermarck's\nOrigin and Development of Moral Ideas, H. O. Taylor's Ancient Ideals,\nW. E. H. Leeky's History of European Morals.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\n\nTHE ORIGIN OF SOCIAL MORALITY\n\nHow early was social morality developed?\n\nBy social morality we mean, concretely, such virtues as tender and\nfostering love, sympathy, obedience, subordination of selfish instincts\nto group-demands, the service of other individuals or of the group.\nThese habits are later in development than some of the personal\nvirtues, but long antedate the differentiation of man from the other\nanimals. Instances of self-sacrificing devotion of parent to offspring\namong birds and beasts are too common to need mention. Devotion to\nthe mate, though less developed, is early present in many species.\nThe strict subordination of ants and bees to the common welfare is\na well-known marvel, the latter enthusiastically and poetically\ndescribed by Maeterlinck in his delightful Life of the Bees. The stern\nrequirements of obedience to the unwritten laws of the herd, which\nmake powerful so many species of animals individually weak, are\ngraphically, though of course with exaggeration, set forth by Kipling\nin his Jungle Book. Many sorts of animals, such as deer and antelopes,\nmight long ago have been exterminated but for their mutual cooperation\nand service. Affection and sympathy in high degree are evident in some\nsub-human species. When we come to man, we find his earliest recorded\nlife based upon a social morality which, if crude, was in some respects\nstricter than that of today. It is a mistake to think of the savage\nas Rousseau imagined him, a freehearted, happy-go-lucky individualist,\nonly by a cramping civilization bowed under the yoke of laws and\nconventions. Savage life is essentially group-life; the individual\nis nothing, the tribe everything. The gods are tribal gods, warfare\nis tribal warfare, hunting, sowing, harvesting, are carried on by the\ncommunity as a whole. There are few personal possessions, there is\nlittle personal will; obedience to the tribal customs, and mutual\ncooperation, are universal. [Footnote: As an example of the solidarity\nof barbarous tribes, note how Abimelech, seeking election as king,\nsays to \"all the men of Shechem\": \"Remember that I am your bone and\nyour flesh.\" (Judges IX, 2.) Later, \"all the tribes of Israel\" say\nto David, \"Behold, we are thy bone and thy flesh.\" (2 Sam. V, 1.) Of\nsavage life as observed in modern times we have many reports like this:\n\"Many strange customs and laws obtain in Zululand, but there is no\nmoral code in all the world more rigidly observed than that of the\nZulus.\" (R. H. Millward, quoted by Myers, History as Past Ethics, p.\n11.) Compare this: \"A Kafir feels that the 'frame that binds him in'\nextends to the clan. The sense of solidarity of the family in Europe\nis thin and feeble compared to the full-blooded sense of corporate\nunion of the Kafir clan. The claims of the clan entirely swamp the\nrights of the individual.\" (Kidd, Savage Childhood, p. 74.) An elaborate\nand stern social morality, then, long preceded verbally formulated\nlaws; it was a matter of instinct and emotion long before it was a\nmatter of calculation or conscience. The most primitive men acknowledge\na duty to their neighbors; and the subsequent advance of social morality\nhas consisted simply in more and more comprehensive answers to the\nquestions, What is my duty? and Who is my neighbor? At first, the\nneighbor was the fellow tribesman only, all outsiders being deemed\nfair prey. Every member of the clan instinctively arose to avenge an\ninjury to any other member, and rejoiced in triumphs over their common\nfoes. We still have survivals of this primitive code in the Corsican\nvendettas and Kentucky feuds. With the growth of nations, the cooperative\nspirit came to embrace wider and wider circles; but even as yet there\nis little of it in international relations. The old double standard\nof morality persists in spite of the command to which we give theoretic\nallegiance-\"Ye have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love\nthy neighbor, and hate thine enemy. But I say unto you, Love your\nenemies!\" From the same lips came the final answer to the question,\n\"Who is my neighbour?\" It can be found in the tenth chapter of the\nGospel according to Luke. By what means was social morality produced?\n\n(1) The earliest source of social morality lies in the maternal\ninstinct; the first animal that took care of its young stood at the\nbeginning of this wonderful advance. The originating causes of the\nfirst slight care of eggs or offspring lay, no doubt, in some obscure\nphysiological readjustments, due to forces irrelevant to morality.\nBut the young that had even such slight care had a survival advantage\nover their rivals, and would transmit the rudimentary instinct to their\noffspring. Thus, given a start in that direction, natural selection,\nsteadily favoring the more maternally disposed, produced species with\na highly developed and long continuing maternal love. In similar manner\nbut in lesser degree a paternal instinct was developed. The existence\nof these instincts implied the power of sympathy and altruistic action\nthat is, action by one individual for another's welfare. From sympathy\nfor offspring to sympathy for mate and other members of the group was\nbut a step; and all sympathetic action may have its ultimate source\nin mother love.\n\n(2) Not only was natural selection early at work in the rivalry for\nexistence between individuals, protecting those stocks that had the\nstronger maternal and paternal instincts, but it played an important\npart in the struggle between groups. Those species that developed the\nability to keep together for mutual protection or for advantage. And\nwithin a species those particular herds or flocks or tribes that\ncooperated best outlived the others. With the strongest animals, such\nas lions and tigers, and with the weakest, such as rabbits and mice,\nthe instinct to stand by one another is of no value and so was never\nfostered by natural selection. But in many species of animals of\nintermediate strength, that by cooperation might be able to resist\nattack or overcome enemies that they would singly be impotent against,\nthe cooperative instinct became strongly developed. Notably in such\ncase was man; and we find group consciousness, tribal loyalty,\ncontinually enhanced by the killing off of the tribes in which it was\nfeebler. The dominant races in man's internecine struggles have been\nthose of passionate patriotism and capacity for working together.\nNature has socialized man by a repeated application of the method\nhinted at in the adage \"United we stand, divided we fall.\" Successful\nwar demands loyalty and obedience, self-forgetfulness and mutual\nservice. It demands also the cessation of internal squabbling, the\nrestraint of individual greed, lust, and caprice. At first instinctive,\nthese virtues came with clearing consciousness to be deliberately\ncultivated by the tribe, in ways which we shall in a moment indicate.\n\n(3) As in the development of personal morality, the hostility of\ninanimate nature, coupled with the urgency of inner needs, has also\nplayed its part in the socialization of man. The satisfying of hunger,\nprotection against storm, flood, and other physical calamities, is\ngreatly forwarded by cooperation. The rearing of a shelter, for\nexample, that shall be at all comfortable and secure, demands the labor\nof several. With the development of civilization, mutual assistance\nand the division of labor become more and more imperative. As man\ndeveloped more and more into a reflective animal, the comprehension\nof these advantages became clearer and clearer to him. Resentment against\nmere individualism grew keener; and any member whose laziness or passions\nled him to pull apart from the common good had to incur the anger of\nhis fellows. Under these three heads--the selection of the maternal\ninstinct, with its potentialities of universal sympathy, through the\nstruggle between individuals; the selection of the various powers of\nloyalty and cooperation through the struggle between groups; and the\nproduction of cooperative habits through the struggle with inanimate\nnature-we may group the causes of social morality in man. How has\nmorality been fostered by the tribe? Social morality, like personal\nmorality, is passed on from generation to generation by heredity and\nby imitation. Both, in historic man, are also deliberately cultivated\nby the tribe. We have discriminated between the two aspects of morality\nfor theoretic reasons which will later become apparent; but no\ndiscrimination is possible or needful for the savage. Courage and\nprudence and industriousness and temperance in its members are assets\nof the tribe, and are included among its requirements. We shall now\nconsider in what ways the group brings pressure to bear upon the\nindividual and influences his moral development.\n\n(1) It needs no great powers of observation to convince the members\nof a tribe severally that immorality of any sort-laziness, cowardice,\nunrestrained lust, recklessness, quarrelsomeness, insubordination,\netc. in another member is detrimental to him personally. His own security\nand the satisfaction of his needs are thereby in some degree decreased.\nContentment at the morality of the other members of the group, and\nanger at their immorality, are therefore among the earliest\npsychological reactions. No men, however savage, are insensitive to\nthese attitudes of their fellows; and the emotional response of others\nto their acts is from the beginning a powerful force for morality.\nWhen contentment becomes explicitly expressed, becomes praise,\ncommendation, honor; when anger becomes openly uttered blame, contempt,\nridicule, rebuke, their power is well nigh irresistible. A civilized\nman, with his manifold resources, may defy public opinion; the savage,\nwho cannot with safety live alone and has few personal interests to\nfill his mind, is unavoidably subject to its sting. His impulses and\npassions lead him often to immoral conduct, but he is pretty sure to\nsuffer from the condemnation of his fellows. The memory of that penalty\nin his own case, or the sight of it in the case of others, may be a\nconsiderable deterrent; while, on the other hand, the craving for\napplause and esteem may be a powerful incentive.\n\n(2) Even among some of the animals, the resentment against the\nmisconduct of a member of the herd finds expression in outward\npunishment maltreatment or death. Among men, punishments for the\nimmoral and outward honors for the virtuous antedate history.\nDecorations, tattoos, songs, for the conspicuously brave and efficient,\ndeath or some lesser penalty for the cowardly, the traitorous, the\ninsubordinate, figure largely in primitive life. These honors are\ncapricious, uncertain, and transitory; but they are undoubtedly more\nstimulating to the savage, who lives in the moment, than they are in\nthe more complex existence of the modern man. And while in general\nthe savage is more callous to punishments, he has to fear much severer\npenalties than our humane conscience allows. They are inflicted, of\ncourse, with greatest frequency for those sins which instinctively\narouse the hottest anger; that in turn varies with different types\nof men and various accidental circumstances that have determined the\ntribal points of view. But in general it is the virtues that most\nobviously benefit the tribe that are rewarded, and those that most\nobviously harm it that are punished.\n\n(3) Another important means of securing morality in the tribe is the\neducation of the young. This includes not only deliberate instruction,\nencouragement, and warning, but various symbolic rites and customs,\nwhose value in impressing the plastic minds of the boys and girls of\nthe tribe is only half realized. Initiation into manhood is accompanied\nin many races of men by solemn ceremonies, which instill into the youth\nthe necessity and glory of courage, endurance, self-control, and other\nvirtues. The maidens are taught by equally solemn rites the\nobligatoriness of chastity. The lowest races studied by anthropologists\nwhich, however, represent, of course, the result of ages of evolution\nhave commonly an elaborate provision for the guidance of the young\ninto the paths of the tribal morals.\n\n(4) Further, all occasions upon which the tribe gets together for\ncommon work or play strengthen the group loyalty and make the group\nwelfare appeal to the member as his own good. Hunting expeditions and\nwars, the sowing and reaping of the communal harvest, births,\nmarriages, and deaths, in which usually the group as a whole takes\na keen interest, feasts and dances, bard recitals, in common\nundertakings, dangers, calamities, triumphs, and celebrations, merge\nthe individuality of the separate members into a unity. In many\nprimitive races these influences are so strong that the individual\nhas scarcely any separate life, but lives from childhood till death\nfor the tribe and its welfare.\n\n(5) Religion is, until late in civilization, almost wholly a group\naffair. The gods are tribal gods, their commands are chiefly the more\nobvious duties to the tribe. The fear of their displeasure and the\nhope of their assistance are among the most powerful of the sanctions\nof early morality. Where a special set of men are set aside as priests,\nto foster the religious consciousness and insure obedience to the divine\nbehests, he is rash who dares openly to transgress. The idea of \"taboo\"\nof certain acts which must not be done, certain objects which must\nnot be touched, etc. i extraordinarily prominent among many early\npeoples. The taboo may not be clearly connected with a divine\nprohibition; but, whether vague and mysterious or explicit, it brings\nthe awe of the supernatural to bear upon daily conduct. The worship\nof the gods is one of the most important of the common activities,\ncovered by the preceding paragraph, which make for the unifying of\na tribe; and the sense of their presence and jealous interest in its\nwelfare one of the strongest motives that restrain the individual from\ncowardice or lust or any anti-social conduct.\n\n(6) With the development of language, the moral experience of a people\nbecomes crystallized into maxims, proverbs, and injunctions, which\nthe elders pass on to the boys and girls together with their comments\nand personal instruction. Oral precepts thus condense the gist of\nrecurrent experience for the benefit of each new generation. Such saws\nas \"Honesty is the best policy,\" \"Lies are short lived,\" \"Ill gotten\ngains do not prosper,\" date, no doubt, well back toward the origin\nof articulate language. The gathering antiquity of this inherited counsel\nadds prestige to the personal authority of the old men who love to\nrepeat it; and the customs once instinctive and unconsciously imitated,\nor adopted from fear and the hope of praise, are now consciously\ncultivated as intrinsically desirable. There is, of course, very little\nrealization of WHY some acts are commended and others prohibited; the\nmere fact that such and such are the tribal customs, that thus and\nso things have been done, is enough. Primitive peoples are highly\ninnovation. So that the moral habits which were established before\nthe age of reflection and articulate speech remain for the most part\nafter they have become crystallized into precepts and commands, and\nby this articulating process become much more firmly entrenched. Then\nfrom the existence of miscellaneous maxims and prohibitions, taught\nby the elders and linked with whatever impulsive and haphazard\npunishments are customary, to the formulation of legal codes, with\ndefinite penalties attached to specific infringements, is an easy\ntransition. With the invention of written language these laws could\nbecome still better fixed and more clearly known. The appointment of\ncertain men of authority as judges, to investigate alleged cases of\ntransgression and award the proper penalties, completes the evolution\nof a civilized legal system, the most powerful of all deterrents from\nflagrantly anti- social acts. Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, chaps. II, III.\nH. Spencer, Data of Ethics, chap. II, secs. 5, 6. J. Fiske, Cosmic\nPhilosophy, part II, chap. XXII, second half. A. Sutherland, Origin\nand Growth of the Moral Instinct, vol. I. C. S. Wake, Evolution of\nMorality, vol. I, chaps. V, VI, VII. P. V. N. Myers, History as Past\nEthics, chap. I. P. Kropotkin, Mutual Aid, chaps. I-IV. L. T. Hobhouse,\nMorals in Evolution, part I, chaps. I-III. Westermarck, op. cit, chap.\nXXXIV. J. Fiske, Through Nature to God, part II, \"The Cosmic Roots\nof Love and Self-Sacrifice.\" C. Read, Natural and Social Morals, chap.\nIII.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\n\nOUTWARD DEVELOPMENT--MORALS\n\nWhat is the difference between morals and non-moral customs?\n\nMORALITY, before it is a matter of legal prescription or of reflective\ninsight, is a matter of instinctive and unconsciously imitated habit.\nThat this is so is shown by the fact that many ethical terms are by their\netymology connected with the idea of custom. \"Morals\" and \"morality\"\nare from the Latin mores, usually translated \"customs,\" \"ethics,\" from\na Greek root of similar sense. The German Sitten has the same fused\nmeanings. Most of our present-day morality is a matter of custom or\nconvention; and there are those who make a complete identification\nof the two concepts, morality being simply to them conventional habits\nof conduct. But a little thought will show that there is a distinction\nin our common usage; the two categories overlap, but are not identical.\nOn the one hand, our highest moral ideals have never become customary;\nwe long, in our best moments, to make them habitual, but seldom actually\nattain them. The morals of Jesus, of Buddha, of Marcus Aurelius, have\nnever become habits with any but the saints, yet we recognize them\nas the high-water mark of human morality. On the other hand, many of\nour customs have no moral aspect. I may have a fixed habit of going\nfrom my home to my office by a certain one out of a number of equally\nadvantageous routes. All of the members of my set may habitually\npronounce a given word in a certain way rather equally correct.\nBut about such habits there is nothing moral or immoral. In a word,\nMORALS ARE CUSTOMS THAT MATTER, OR ARE SUPPOSED\nTO MATTER; standards to which each member of a group is\nexpected by the other members to conform, and for the neglect\nof which he is punished, frowned upon, scorned, or blamed.\nToward these standards he feels, therefore, a vague or definite\npressure, the reflection in him of he feelings of his fellows.\n\nThe line between mere habits or manners and morals is differently\ndrawn in different times and places, according to the differing ideas\nas to what matters. The same actions which are moral to one community\n( i.e, arouse feelings or judgments of commendation) may be immoral to\nanother community ( i.e., arouse reprobation or scorn) and non-moral to\na third ( i.e., arouse no such response at all). For example, in one tribe\ntattooing may be a mere matter of personal liking, of no importance\nand with no group-judgment upon it; yet certain habits with\nregard to it may become widespread. In another tribe certain tattoos\nmay be thought to be enjoined by the god, and their neglect deemed\na matter of serious importance to the tribe as a whole; tattooing may\nhere be said to be a part of the tribal morals. To us moderns it is\nprobably a morally indifferent affair; but if we should learn it to\nbe seriously deleterious to the body, it would again become a moral\nmatter. In short, morals are customs that affect, or are supposed to\naffect, a man's life or that of his tribe for weal or woe. Obviously,\nthis discrimination is not consciously made by savages; indeed, to\nthis day, such distinctions are enveloped in a haze for the average\nman. Men do not realize the raison d'etre of morals. They follow them\nbecause their fathers did or their fellows do; because they inherit\ninstincts that drive them in their direction or inevitably imitate\nthose who have formed the habits before; because they feel a pressure\ntoward them and are uncomfortable if they hold out against it. When\npressed for a justification of their conduct, they are usually surprised\nat the inquiry; such action seems obviously the thing to do, and that\nis the end of it. Or they will hit upon some of the secondary sanctions\nthat have grown up about these habits the penalties of the law,\nthe commandment of the gods, or what not. But with our resources\nof analysis and reflection, it is not difficult to discern that the\nvarious forces at work have been such as to preserve, in general,\nhabits which made for the welfare of individual or tribe and discard\nthe harmful ones. It is, then, not merely habits, but habits that\nmatter, moral habits, with whose growth and alteration we are here\nconcerned. What, in general, has been the direction of moral progress?\nWe have noted the main causes at work in the production of morality;\nwe now ask in what general direction these forces push. We have in\nmind the concrete virtues which have been developed; but what common\nfunction have these habits of conduct, so produced, had in human life?\nWhat has been the net result of the process? At first sight a\ngeneralized answer seems impossible. All sorts of chance causes bring\nabout local alterations in morals. The momentary dominance of an\nimpulse ordinarily weak, the whim of a ruler, the self-interest of\nclasses, superstitious interpretation of omens, the attribution of\nsome success to a prior act which may have had nothing to do with it\nsuch accidental and irrational sources of morals, and the resulting\ncodes, are numberless. But as in the process of organic evolution the\nvarious obscure physiological alterations which produce variations\nof type are all overruled and guided in a few directions of value to\nthe species by the law of natural selection, so in the evolution of\nin all directions are subject to the law of the survival of the fittest.\nIt is really of comparatively little importance to discover how a given\nmoral habit first arose; it may have arisen in a hundred different\nways in a hundred different places; indeed, the precise origin of most\nof the cardinal virtues lies too far back in the mists of the past\nto be traced with assurance. But the important truth to observe is\nnot the particular details of their haphazard origin but the causes\nof their survival. Overlaying the countless originating causes of moral\nideals are two main preservation--causes, two constant factors which\nretain certain of the innumerable impulses for one reason or other\nmomentarily dominant. These are of extreme significance for a\ncomprehension of the function of morality in life.\n\n (1) In the first place, a certain number of these blind, hit-or-miss\nexperiments in conduct were, as we have seen, of use to individuals\nor the tribe in increasing their chances of survival in the ceaseless\nrivalry for life. The inclemency's of nature and the enmity of the\nbeasts and other men kill more often the less moral than the more\nmoral. So that in general and in the long run those that developed\nthe higher moral habits outlived the others and transmitted their morals\nto the future. Even within historic times this same weeding-out process\nhas been observable. On the whole, the races and the individuals with\nthe more advanced moral standards survive, while those of lower\nstandards perish. This law accounts, for instance, in some measure\nprobably for the relatively greater increase of whites than of Negroes\nin the United States, in spite of the higher birth rate of the latter.\nOther causes are, to be sure, also at work in this competition for\nlife; for one thing, the long period of intercommunication between\nEuropean races has largely weeded out the stocks most liable to certain\ndiseases, while the antecedent isolation of savage tribes, with no\nsuch elimination at work, allows them to fall victims in greater numbers\nto European diseases when mutual contact is established. But the degree\nof the moralization of a people has been certainly one of the criteria\nof survival; and thus by a purely mechanical elimination mankind has\ngrown more and more moral. It hardly needs to be added that the conscious\nselection of codes that tend to preserve life is a factor of growing\nimportance in insuring movement in this same direction. Altogether,\nmoral progress consists primarily in an increasing adaptation of codes\nto the preservation of life.\n\n(2) Morality, however, makes not only for life, thus insuring its own\nperpetuation; it makes also for happiness. Arbitrary and tyrannous\nrules, cruel or needlessly prohibitive customs, engender restlessness,\nand are not stable. Such barbarous morals may long persist, propped\nby the power of the rulers, the superstitions of the people, and all\nthe forces of conservatism; but sooner or later they breed rebellion\nand are cast aside. On the other hand, more rational codes promote\npeace and security, banish fear and hatred, and make for all the benefits\nof civilization. Such codes are in relatively more stable equilibrium\nand gradually tend to replace the others. All morality is, of course,\nin one aspect, a restraint upon desire, a check upon impulse;\nrebelliousness against its decrees will be perpetually recurrent until\nhuman nature itself is completely refashioned and men have no\ninordinate and dangerous desires. But while all codes of conduct are\nrepressive at the moment of passion, they vary widely in the degree\nin which they satisfy or thwart man's deeper needs. Such institutions\nas the gladiatorial games of Rome, human sacrifice, or slavery, were\nfruitful of so much pain that they were bound in time to perish. In\ncontrast with these cruel customs, the prohibitions of the Jewish law,\nthe Ten Commandments, for example, were so humane, so productive of\nsecurity and concord and a deep-rooted and lasting satisfaction, that\nthey persisted and became the parent of much of our present day\nmorality. An increasing part in this progress has been played by the\nconscious recognition of the advantages of code over code; but long\nbefore such explicit perception of advantage, the blind instincts and\nemotions of men were making for the gradual humanizing of morals, the\nselection of ideals and laws that make for human happiness. As\ncivilization advances, the consideration of mere preservation counts\nfor less, and that of happiness for more; the margin, the breathing\nspace, for liberal interests, grows. Men become interested in causes\nfor which they willingly risk their lives. But, except as these causes\nare fanatical, off the real track of moral progress, they make for\nhuman happiness. And the center of interest can never shift too far.\nFor not only is premature death, an evil in itself, it precludes the\ncultivation of the humane pursuits that life might have allowed.\n\nMen have to learn to find their happiness not in what saps health or\ninvites death, but in what makes for health and life. What definition\nof morality emerges from this? The foregoing summary permits us to\nformulate a definition of morality. Historically, there has been a\ngradual, though not continuous, progress toward CODES OF CONDUCT WHICH\nMAKE FOR THE PRESERVATION OF LIFE AND FOR HAPPINESS. These codes have\nreceived an imaginative consecration, and all sorts of secondary\nsanctions; but it is their underlying utility that is of ultimate\nimportance. Very simple and obvious causes have continually tended\nto destroy customs which made in the contrary direction and to select\nthose which, however originating, made for either or both of these\ntwo ends. It is these customs, important for the welfare of the\nindividual or tribe, which we call morality. If the original instincts\nof mankind had been delicately enough adjusted to their needs, there\nwould have been no need of these secondary and overruling impulses,\nand the differentiation of impulse and duty, of the natural and the\nspiritual man, would never have arisen. But actually, mankind inherited\nfrom its brute ancestry instincts which, unguided, wrought great harm.\nWithout the development of some system of checks men would forever\nhave been the prey of overindulgence, sexual wantonness, civil strife,\nand apathy. They would have remained beasts and never won their dominance\non the earth. Even rudimentary moral codes came as an amelioration\nof this dangerous and unhappy situation; they enabled men, by abstention\nfrom dangerous passions and from idleness, to make their lives\nefficient, interesting, and comparatively free from pain; by\ncooperation and mutual service to resist their enemies and develop\na civilization. Morality thus has been the greatest instrument of\nprogress, the most fundamental of man's achievements, the most\nimportant part of the wisdom of the race.\n\nIs moral progress certain?\n\nA measure of hopefulness is to be won from the observation that, quite\napart from the conscious effort of men, natural laws have been making\nfor moral progress. And unquestionably there has been a great advance\nin morality within historic times. We are forever past the age of\ncannibalism, of human torture, of slavery, of widespread infanticide.\nWar is on the wane and may vanish within a few generations. Never\nbefore was there so much sympathy, so much conscious dedication to\nhuman service, in the world. We are apt to idealize the past; we sigh\nfor a \"return to nature,\" or to the golden age of Greece. And there\nis some justification in our regrets. Simplicity of living, hospitality,\ncourage, patriotism one virtue or another has been more conspicuous\nin some particular age than ever before or since. Moral progress\nwavers, and not all that is won is retained. But on the whole there\ncan be no doubt that we stand on a higher level morally than the Greeks\nwho had vices and sins that we scarcely hear of today and incomparably\nhigher than savage races. Even within a lifetime one can see the wave\nof moral advance push forward. Yet this observable progress is not\nso certain of continuance that we can lapse into inertia and trust\nit to go on of itself. With the softening of the struggle for existence\namong men, with the disappearance of danger from wild animals, and\nthe increasing conquest over nature, the chief means of moral progress\nhitherto are being removed. More and more we must rely on man's\nconscious efforts on personal consecration and self-mastery, on\nimproved and extended legislation, on the growth of a moralized public\nopinion, on organizations and institutions that shall work for specific\ncauses. Moreover, with the changing situations in which man finds\nhimself, and especially with the growing complexification of society,\nnew opportunities for sin and new temptations continually arise. No\nsooner is one immoral habit stamped out than another begins\ninsidiously, and perhaps unnoticed, to form. The battle-line moves\non, but new foes constantly appear; it will not be an easy road to\nthe millennium. On the whole, our material and intellectual advance\nhas outrun our moral progress; at present our chief need is to catch\nup morally. [Footnote: Cf. Alfred Russel Wallace, in his last book,\nSocial Environment and Moral Progress (p. 50): \"This rapid growth of\nwealth and increase of our power over Nature put too great a strain\nupon our crude civilization and our superficial Christianity; and it\nwas accompanied by various forms of social immorality, almost as amazing\nand unprecedented.\"] We may note several reasons for this eddy in the\nmoralizing process, this counter-movement toward the development of\nnew sins and the renascence of old ones.\n\n(1) With the growth of large cities and the development of individual\ninterests we come to live less and less in one another's eyes. In\nprimitive life it is almost impossible for a man to indulge in any\nvice or sin without its being immediately known to his fellows; but\ntoday millions live such isolated lives in the midst of crowded\ncommunities that all sorts of immorality may flourish without detection.\nUnder early conditions foodstuffs or other goods were consumed if not\nby the producer, at least by his neighbors; and any adulteration or\nsham was a dangerous matter. Today we seldom know who slaughtered the\nmeat or canned the fruit we eat, who made the clothing or utensils\nwe use; shoddy articles and unwholesome food can be sold in quantity\nwith little fear of the consumer's anger. All sorts of intangible and\nhardly traceable injuries can be wrought today by malicious or careless\nmen injuries to reputation, to credit, to success. In a city the criminal\ncan hide and escape far more easily, can associate with his own kind,\nhave a certain code of his own (cf. \"honor among thieves\"), and more\ncompletely escape the pangs of conscience, than under the surveillance\nof village life. In a hundred ways there are increased opportunities\nfor doing evil with impunity. [Footnote: Cf. E. A. Ross, Sin and\nSociety, pp. 32: \"The popular symbol for the criminal is a ravening\nwolf; but alas, few latter day crimes can be dramatized with a wolf\nand a lamb as the cast! Your up-to-date criminal presses the button\nof a social mechanism, and at the other end of the land or the year\ninnocent lives are snuffed out. As society grows complex, it can be\nharmed in more ways. Each advance to higher organization runs us into\na fresh zone of danger, so there is more than ever need to be quick\nto detect and foil the new public enemies that present themselves.\nThe public needs a victim to harrow up its feelings. The injury that\nis problematic, or general, or that falls in undefined ways upon unknown\npersons, is resented feebly, or not at all. The fiend who should rack\nhis victim with torments such as typhoid inflicts would be torn to\npieces. The villain who should taint his enemy's cup with fever germs\nwould stretch] [Footnote continued from previous page: hemp. But think\nof it!-the corrupt boss who, in order to extort fat contracts for\nhis firm, holds up for a year the building of a filtration plant designed\nto deliver his city from the typhoid scourge, and thereby dooms twelve\nhundred of his townspeople to sink to the tomb through the flaming\nabyss of fever, comes off scatheless.\"]\n\n(2) With the gentler conditions of civilized life there is a general\ntendency toward the relaxing of social restraints. The harsh penalties\nof early days would shock us by their cruelty; and early codes are\nfull of prohibitions and injunctions on matters which are now left\nto the individual conscience. Needlessly cramping and cruel as these\nprimitive laws often were, they were powerful deterrents, and their\nlapse has often been followed by greater moral laxity. The passionate\npursuit of liberty, which has been so prominent in modern times, though\non the whole of great advantage to man, has not been without its ill\neffects.\n\n(3) The monotonously specialized and unnatural work, which\nconfines a large proportion of our men, women, and youths today, promotes\nrestlessness and the craving for excitement. The normal all-round\noccupations of primitive men tended to work off their energies and\nsatisfy their natural impulses. But the dulled and tired worker\nreleased from eight or ten hours' drudgery in a factory is apt to be\nin a psychological state that demands variety, excitement, pleasure\nat any cost. It does not pay to repress human nature too much, or to\ntry to make out of a red-blooded young man or woman a mere machine.\nGambling, drunkenness, prostitution, and all sorts of pathological\nvices flourish largely as a reaction from the dullness and monotony\nof the day's work. We are paying this heavy penalty for our increase\nof material efficiency at the expense of normal human living.\n\n(4) With the increased possibilities of undetected sin, above\nmentioned, and the opportunity which criminals now have of forming\nwithin a city a little community of their own which permits them\nfellowship without rebuke for their sins, there have arisen whole\nclasses of vice-caterers. These men and women make their living by\ntempting others to sin; the allurements which they set before the young\nconstitute a great check to moral advance, and even threaten\ncontinually a serious moral degeneration. The keepers of gambling\nhouses, saloons, and houses of prostitution, the venders of vile\npictures and exciting reading matter, the proprietors of indecent\ndance-halls and theaters, of the \"shows\" of all sorts that flourish\nchiefly through their offering of sexual stimulation these are the\nworst sinners of our times, for they cause thousands of others to sin,\nand deliberately undermine the moral structure so laboriously reared,\nand at such heavy cost. Conspicuous in commercialized vice-catering\nis the Casino of Monte Carlo, where thousands of lives have been ruined.\nThe business of seducing and kidnapping girls-the \"white slave trade\"\nflourishes secretly in our great cities. Associations of liquor\nproducers and sellers are very powerful social and political forces.\nOne of the greatest problems before the race is how to exterminate\nthese human beasts of prey that live at the expense of the moral\ndeterioration and often utter ruin of their victims.\n\n(5) While the older racial and national barriers between peoples are\nbreaking down, so that the possibilities of human brotherhood and\ncooperation are laterally increasing, and the wretched fratricidal\nwars between peoples coming toward an end, [Footnote: As I read the\nproof sheets of this book (August, 1914), news comes of the outbreak\nof what may prove the costliest and one of the least excusable wars\nof history. Nevertheless, the end of international wars draws near.]\nOther barriers, between upper and lower classes, are thickening, new\nantagonisms and antipathies that threaten yet much friction and\nunhappiness and a retardation of moral progress. Rich are becoming\nfarther and farther consciousness is on the increase, class-wars in\nthe form of strikes, riots, and sabotage, are ominous symptoms. Masses\nof the laboring class believe that a great class-war is not only\ninevitable but desirable. Such conflicts, however, besides their\nmaterial losses, engender hatred, cruelty, lust, greed, and all sorts\nof other forms of immorality. No one can predict how far such struggles\nmay go in the future toward undoing the socializing process which at\nbest has so many obstacles to meet and moves so slowly. Many forces\nare at work, however, for moral uplift. The spread of education, teaching\nmen to think, to discern evils, and to comprehend the reasons for right\nconduct, the increasing influence of public opinion through newspapers\nand magazines, the growing number of organizations working to eradicate\nevils, the gradual increase of wise legislation, the reviving moral\npressure of the Christian Church such signs of the times should give\nus courage as well as show us where we can take hold to help.\nMorality is not static, a cut-and-dried system to be obeyed or neglected,\nbut a set of experiments, being gradually worked out by mankind, a\ndynamic, progressive instrument which we can help ourselves to forge.\nThere is room yet for moral genius; we are yet in the early and formative\nstage of human morality. We should not be content with past achievement,\nwith the contemporary standards of our fellows. If we give our keenest\nthought and our earnest effort, there is no knowing what noble heights\nof morality we may be helping the future to attain.\n\nDewey and Tufts, Ethics, chap. IV. Hobhouse, op. cit, part II,\nchaps. II, VIII. Westermarck, op. cit, chap. VII. Sutherland, op.\ncit, vol. II, chaps. XIX-XXI. W. G. Sumner, Folkways, chaps. I,\nII, XI. Sir H. Maine, Village Communities. C. Darwin, Descent of\nMan, part  I, chap. v. J. G. Schurman, Ethical Import of Darwinism.\nW. I. Thomas, Source Book for Social Origins, part  VII. C. Read,\nNatural and Social Morals, chap. VI. I. King, Development of Religion,\nchap. XI. On the question of moral progress: Dewey and Tufts, Ethics,\npp. 187-92. W. Bagehot, Physics and Politics, chap. VI. H. G. Wells,\nNew Worlds for Old, chap.I, secs. 2-4. J. Bryce, in the Atlantic Monthly,\nvol. 100, p. 145. E. Root, The Citizen's Part in Government, pp. 96-123.\nJ. S. Mackenzie, Manual of Ethics (2d ed.), chap. XV. A. R. Wallace,\nSocial Environment and Moral Progress.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\n\nINWARD DEVELOPMENT--CONSCIENCE\n\nWhat are the stages in the history of moral guidance?\n\nTHERE may be said to be five stages in the history of moral guidance:\nguidance by instinct, by custom, by law and precept, by conscience,\nand by insight. No one of these guides is discarded with the development\nof the others; we rely today upon all of them in varying degree. Their\nevolution overlaps; the alteration of instinct still goes on, changing\nlaws and customs still bring their pressure to bear from without upon\nthe individual; while our conscience and our insight have their roots\nfar back in the past. Yet the prominence of each of these factors in\nturn marks a successive stage in the evolution of moral control.\nInherited instinct, and then custom, unconsciously passed on by\nimitation and to some extent taught with a dimly conscious purpose,\nshape the crude morality of the animals though the other means of\nguidance are not wholly absent even in them. Among savages legal codes,\nunwritten and perhaps not even clearly formulated, yet exacting and\nstrictly enforced by penalties, come to form an important supplement\nto instinct, custom, and proverbial wisdom. But quite as important\nis the gradual development of an inward guide--those very various\nsecondary impulses and inhibitions which we hump together because of\ntheir common function and call the moral sense or conscience. We shall\nnow consider briefly the origin of this internal steering-apparatus.\nThe latest and most mature guide of all, reflective insight, arises\nin marked degree only when abstraction and analysis. There is no problem\nconnected with its origin except the general problems of the development\nof human reason. How moral insight may be trained and brought to bear\nupon conduct will, it is hoped, be clear to the student who patiently\nstudies this volume.\n\nOut of what has conscience developed?\n\nThe \"conscience\" of our moralizing and religious literature figures\nas a sharply defined and easily recognizable \"faculty,\" like \"will\"\nor \"reason.\" But this classification, though useful, is misleading\nby its simplicity. If we observe by introspection what goes on in our\nminds when we \"will\" or \"reason\" or \"listen to conscience,\" we shall\nfind all sorts of emotions, ideas, impulses, surging back and forth,\naltering from moment to moment, never twice the same. At another period\nof our lives, or in another man's mind, the psychological stuff\npigeonholed under these names may be almost entirely different. A great\nmany diverse mental elements have at one time or other taken the role\nof, or formed an ingredient in, the function we label \"conscience.\"\nWe will enumerate the more important:\n\n(1) Experience quickly teaches her pupils that certain acts to which\nthey feel a strong impulse will lead to an aftermath of pain or\nweariness, or will stand in the way of other goods which they more\nlastingly desire or more deeply need. The memory of these consequences\nof acts remains as a guide for future conduct, not so often in the\nform of a clearly recognized memory as in a dim realization that the\ndangerous act must be avoided, a vague pressure against the pull of\nmomentary inclination, or an uncomprehended feeling of impulsion toward\nthe less inviting path. This residuum of the moral experience of the\nindividual is one ingredient in what we call his conscience.\n\n(2) But there is much more than this. The individual is a member of\na group. The customs and expectations of this group not only bear upon\nhim from without but find a reflection in his own motor mechanism.\nHe hears the voice of the community in his heart, an echo of the general\ncondemnation and approval. This acquired response, the reverberation\nof the group judgment, may easily supplant his personal inclinations.\nPrimitive man is sensitive to the judgments and emotional reactions\nof his fellows; the tribal point of view is unquestioned and\nauthoritative over him. So important is this pressure in his mental\nlife, though not understood or recognized for what it is, that conscience\nis denned by many moralists as the pressure of the judgment of the\ntribe in the mental life of its members, or in similar terms. Paulsen\ncalls it \"the existence of custom in the consciousness of the\nindividual.\" This is to neglect unjustly the other sources of the sense\nof duty; but certainly the pulls and pushes arising from these two\nsources, which we may call the inner aspect of individual moral\nexperience and of loyalty to the community-morals, reinforcing one\nanother as they generally do, produce a very powerful form of conscience.\n\n(3) A number of primitive emotions join forces with them. Sympathy\nis generally on their side, and the instinctive glow of patriotism\nor pride in the tribe's success. The shrinking from disapproval, the\ncraving for esteem, the very early emotions of shame and vanity, help\nto pull away from the self-indulgent or selfish impulse. The\nspontaneous admiration of others for their virtues and anger at them\nfor their sins is applied involuntarily by a man to himself; contempt\nfor his own weakness and joy in his superiority according to the\ngenerally accepted code are powerful deterrents. The consciousness\nof the resentment that others will feel if he does evil, the instinctive\napplication to himself of a trace of the resentment he would feel\ntoward him or toward these fellow tribesmen of is-such complex states\nof mind complicate his mental processes and help check his primary\ninstincts.\n\n(4) To these ingredients we must early add the more or less conscious\nfear of the penalties of the tribal law, of the vengeance of chiefs\nor powerful members of the tribe, of the tribal gods and their jealous\npriests. These fears may be but dimly felt and not clearly\ndiscriminated; but however subconscious they may be in a given case\nof moral conflict, they play a large part. The peace of mind that\naccompanies a sense of conformity to the will of rulers or of gods,\ncontrasted with the anxiety that follows infraction, gives a greatly\nincreased weight to that growing pressure of counter instincts which\ncomes so largely to override a man's animal nature. Most of the sources\nof conscience thus date far back beyond the dawn of history. But they\ncan be pretty safely inferred from the earliest records, from a study\nof existing savage races, and from the study of childhood. The definite\nconception of \"conscience\" is very late, scarcely appearing until very\nmodern times. And the fact that conscience itself, even in its\nrudimentary forms, was much later in growth than the underlying animal\ninstincts which it developed to control and guide, is shown by its\nlate development in the child-not, normally, until the beginning\nof the third year. The early life of the individual parallels the\nevolution of the race; and the later-developed faculties in the child\nare those which arose in the later stages of human progress. But the\nexistence of our well-defined moral sense, with its significant role\nin modern life, needs no supernatural explanation. It has grown up\nand come to be what it is as naturally as have our language, our customs,\nand our physical organs.\n\nWhat is conscience now? It is a valuable exercise in introspection\nto observe a case of \"conscience\" in one's own life and note of what\nmental stuff it is made. When a number write down their findings\nwithout mutual suggestion, the results are usually widely divergent.\nAny of the original ingredients hitherto mentioned may be discovered,\nor other personal factors. There may be present to consciousness only\na vague uneasiness or restlessness, or there may be a sophisticated\nrecurrence of the concepts of \"conscience,\" \"duty,\" etc. The one\nuniversal fact is that there is a conflict between some primitive\nimpulse or passion and some maturer mental checks. Any sort of mental\nstuff that serves the purpose of controlling desire will do; we must\ndefine conscience in terms not of content but of function. There is\nno such unity in the material as the single name seems to imply; and\nwhether or not that name shall be given to a given psychological state\nis a matter of usage in which there is considerable variation.\n\nIn general, we reserve the name \"conscience\" for the vaguer and more\nelusive restraints and leadings, the sense of reluctant necessity whose\npurpose we do not clearly see although we feel its pressure, the\naccumulated residuum of long inner experience and many influences from\nwithout. Our minds retain many creases whose origin we have forgotten;\nwe veer away from many a pleasant inclination without knowing why.\nThese unanalyzed and residual inhibitions that grip us and will not\nlet us go, form a contrasting background to our more explicit motives\nand often count for more in our conduct. The very lack of comprehension\nserves in less rational minds to enhance their prestige with an\natmosphere of awe and mystery. These strange checks and promptings\nthat well up in a man's heart are which he must not dare to disobey.\nThe voice of God in our hearts we may, indeed, well conceive them to\nbe. The attempt to analyze into its psychological elements and trace\nthe natural genesis of conscience, as of morality in general must not\nbe taken as an attempt to discredit it or to read God out of the world.\nFor God works usually, if not universally, through natural laws; and\nthe historical viewpoint, that sees everything in our developed life\nas the outcome of ages of natural evolution, is not only rich in fruitful\ninsight, but entirely consistent with a deep religious feeling. For\nhortatory or inspirational purposes we do not need to make this\nanalysis; it has, indeed, its practical dangers. It tends to rob the\nglory from anything to analyze it into its parts and study the natural\ncauses that produced it. The loveliest painting is but a mess of\npigments to the microscope, the loveliest face but a mess of cells\nand hairs and blood vessels. There is something gruesome and\ninhuman about embryology and all other studies of origins.\n\nWhile we are analyzing an object, or tracing its genesis, we are not\nresponding to it as a whole or feeling its beauty and power. The mystery,\nthe spell, vanishes; we cease to thrill when we dissect. But knowledge\nproceeds by analysis, and gains by a study of origins and causes.\nAnd the temporary emotional loss should be more than balanced\nby the value of the insight won. We need not linger too long at\nour dissecting. The discovery that conscience is an explicable\nand natural development does not preclude a realization of the\nawfulness of obligation, the sacredness of duty, any more than\na geologist must cease to thrill at the grandeur and beauty of\nthe Grand Canyon because he has studied the composition of\nthe rocks and understands the causes that have slowly, through\nthe ages, wrought this miracle. So we need feel no sense of duty\nis not something imposed upon human nature from without; it is of\nits very substance, it has developed step by step with our other\nfaculties, slowly crystallizing through millenniums of human and\npre-human experience. In the abstract, then, we may say that\nconscience is a name for ANY SECONDARY IMPULSES OR\nINHIBITIONS WHICH CHECK AND REDIRECT MAN'S PRIMARY\nIMPULSES, FOR A GREATER GOOD; any later developed\naversions or inclinations, judgments of value or feelings of constraint,\nwhich guide a man in the teeth of his animal nature toward a better\nway of life PROVIDED THAT THESE SUPERIMPOSED IMPULSES\nARE NOT EXPLICIT ENOUGH TO BE CLASSIFIED UNDER SOME\nOTHER HEAD. For example, we may be pulled up sharply from a\ncourse of self-indulgence by a conscious realization of the harm we\nare doing to others thereby; this bridling state of mind, whether chiefly\nemotional or more intellectual, we may call sympathy, or an altruistic\ninstinct, or love. But when we feel the pressure from these same\nmental states incipiently aroused, when our motor-mechanism half\nautomatically steers us away from the selfish act, without our\nconsciously formulating a specific name for the new impulse or\nrecognizing any articulate motive, we are apt to give this mental\npush the more general name of conscience. So if we consciously\nreckon up, balance advantages, and decide on the less inviting\nact in recognition of its really greater worth to us, we say we act\nfrom prudence or insight, we are reasonable about it; while if\nthe grumbling of the prudential motives remain subterranean,\nsubconscious, they play the role of conscience. Conscience is,\non such occasions, but inarticulate common sense. Usually,\nhowever, prudential and altruistic motives would both be\ndiscovered if the dumb driving of conscience were to be\nmade articulate. The reverberation of parental teachings,\nof sermons heard and books read, of the opinions and\nemotions of our fellows, might be found, all bent and\nfused into a combined \"suggestion,\" a mental push,\na \"must\" or \"ought,\" from whose influence we find it\ndifficult to escape.\n\nThe detailed psychological analysis of cases of conscience and the\nstudy of its genesis are of no essential ethical interest, except as\nthey show us that the sense of duty is not an ultimate, irreducible\nelement in our consciousness, or make clearer to us its function and\nvalue. Conscience is the general name for coercion upon conduct from\nwithin the mind. The important thing to note is the useful purpose,\nwhich, in its so widely varying forms, it serves. Whatever its sources\nor its exact nature in contemporary man, it is one of the most valuable\nof our assets. To a more explicit statement of its value we must now\nturn. What is the value of conscience?\n\nIt would seem, at first glance, as if the development of reason should\nmake conscience unnecessary. When we are able to discern the\nconsequences of our acts, formulate and weigh our motives and aims,\nwhat need of these vague pre-rational promptings and inhibitions? Why\nnot train men to supplant a blind sense of duty by a conscious insight,\na rational valuation of ends and means? Is not reason, as it has been\nrecently called, \"the ultimate conscience\"? [Footnote: G. Santayana,\nReason in Science, p. 232; where also the following: \"So soon as\nconscience summons its own dicta for revision in the light of\nexperience and of universal sympathy, it is no longer called\nconscience, but reason.\"]\n\n(1) Conscience is valuable on account of our ignorance. Individually\nwe have not had experience enough to guide us in our crises;\nconscience is the representative in us of the wisdom of the race.\nIn many cases we should never reason out the right solution of\na problem; we lack the data. But we can lean upon the racial\nexperience. Many past experiences, now forgotten, have gone\nto the molding of this faculty. The need of action is often imminent,\nthere is no time for the long study of the situation which alone could\nform a sure insight into the conduct it demands. We need readymade\nmorals. Moreover, we are subject to bias, to individual one sidedness,\nand to the distortion of passion; in the stress of temptation we are not\nin a mood to reason judicially, even if we have the necessary data.\nAltogether, insight, though in the long run the critic of conscience,\nis not a practical substitute. What conscience tells us is more apt\nto be true than what at the moment seems a rational judgment.\n\n(2) Conscience is also valuable in view of our rebelliousness.\nConventional morality is external, and would continually arouse\nrevolt, were it not reinforced by an inward prompting. If external\nmotives and penalties alone bore upon us we should chafe under\nthem, and under the stress of passion or longing throw them aside.\nEven if these external sanctions were reinforced by insight into the\nrationality of morality, that insight might still leave us rebellious and\nunpersuaded. Knowledge alone is feeble, marginal in our lives. We\noften sin in the full knowledge of the penalties awaiting us. We need\nsomething more dynamic, pressure as well as information. Conscience\nis such a driver. Its commands weigh upon us, and will not be stilled.\nReason plays but a weak part in the best of us; and to counteract our\nincurable waywardness, our recurrent longings for what cannot be had\nwithout too great a cost, we need not only the presence of law and\nconvention, not only the weak voice of knowledge, but the stern\nsummons of this powerful psychological response. Nature was wise\nwhen she evolved this function as a bulwark against our weakness,\na bit between our because of our forgetfulness. Over and over again\nwe say, \"I didn't stop to think.\" If our conscience had been properly\nacute, it would have made us stop. Insight, however comprehensive\nand clear, is apt to remain somewhere in a locked drawer in our minds\nwhen the hot blooded impulse appears. If we were but to pause and\nreflect, we should be sensible and kind. But our intellect is dulled by\nour emotions, it does not get working. We need a more instinctive,\na deeper-rooted mechanism, an imperious \"Halt!\" at the brief moment\nbetween the thought of sin and the act. Conscience is not only a\nteacher and a driver, it is a sentinel. Its red flag stops us at the brink\nof many a disaster, and we have it to thank for many an otherwise\nforgotten duty performed.\n\nTo sum up: Instinct and desire are lacking in proper adjustment to\nthe needs of life. Society seeks to control them by the pressure of\nlaw and custom. These powerful forces, however, are external, and,\nsavoring more or less of tyranny, tend at times to awaken a rebellious\nspirit in the hotheaded. So a perpetual antinomy would exist between\ninternal impulse and external constraint, were it not that that external\nconstraint is reflected within the individual mind by a secondary and\noverlying set of inhibitions and promptings which we call variously\nthe \"moral sense,\" the \"sense of duty,\" or \"conscience.\" We often do\nnot know or remember consciously at the moment of decision what the\nlaw ordains or the wisdom of the race teaches. But we have an inward\nmonitor. We often hang back from a recognized duty. But we feel an\ninward push. When the wrong impulse is pungent and enticing, and\nthe right one insipid and tame, when we would forget if we could the\nperils of sin, conscience surges up in us and saves us from ourselves.\nIt is a mechanism of extreme value, which nature has evolved in us\nfor imposing on our weak and vacillating wills action that makes for\na truer good than we should otherwise choose. No wonder, then, if\nwe reverence this saving power within us, and crown it with a halo\nas the divine spark in the midst of our grosser nature. The more we\nrevere it, the brighter the glamour it has for us, the stronger it grows\nand the more it helps us. The apotheosis of conscience has been\nof immense use in leading men to heed its voice and obey its leading.\nYet this blind allegiance has its dangers; conscience has often been\na cruel tyrant. It is by no means an always-safe guide, as we shall\npresently note. And as men grow more and more adjusted by instinct\nand training to their real needs, they will have less and less need of\nthis helmsman. After all, there is something wrong with a life that\nneeds conscience; it is a transition help for the long period of man's\nmaladjustment. Spencer looks forward, a little too hopefully, perhaps,\nto a time in the measurable future when we shall have outgrown the\nneed of it, when we shall wish to do right and need no compulsion,\nouter or inner. And Emerson, in a well known passage, writes: \"We\nlove characters in proportion as they are impulsive and spontaneous.\nWhen we see a soul whose acts are all regal, graceful, and pleasant\nas roses, we must thank God that such things can be and are, and\nnot turn sourly on the angel and say, 'Crump is a better man with his\ngrunting resistance to all his native devils.'\" A Chinese proverb says,\n\"He who finds pleasure in vice and pain in virtue is still a novice in\nboth.\" The saint is he who has learned really to love virtue, in its\nconcrete duties, better than all the allurements of sin; to him we\nmay say, as Virgil said to Dante, \"Take thine own pleasure for thy\nguide henceforth.\" But until we are saints it is wise for us to\ncultivate conscientiousness, the habit of obedience, even\nwhen it costs, to that inward urging which is, on the whole,\nfor most of us, our safest guide.\n\nF. Paulsen, System of Ethics, book II, chap. V, secs. 1, 2, 5. H.\nSpencer, DATA OF ETHICS, chap. VII, secs. 44-46. S. E. Mezes,\nETHICS, DESCRIPTIVE AND EXPLANATORY, chaps. V, VIII.\nSutherland, op. cit, chap. XV. F. Thilly, INTRODUCTION TO\nETHICS, chap. III. Westermarck, op. cit, chap. V. Darwin,\nDESCENT OF MAN, partt. I, chap. III. J. H. Hyslop, ELEMENTS\nOF ETHICS, chaps. VI, VII. J. S. Mill, UTILITARIANISM, chap.\nv. H. W. Wright, SELF-REALIZATION, part. I, chap. IV.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nTHE INDIVIDUALIZING OF CONSCIENCE\n\nConscience as we have seen, is the result of a fusion of elements\ncoming from personal experience and tribal judgment. In its early\nphases the latter elements predominate; conscience may be fairly called\nthe inner side of custom. Primitive men have little individuality and\ninvoluntarily reflect the general attitude. But with widening\nexperience and growing mental maturity, conscience, like man's other\nfaculties, tends to become more individual and divergent, until we\nfind, in civilized life, a man standing out for conscience' sake\nagainst the opinion of the world. The individualization of conscience,\nwith the consequent clash of ideals, gives the study of morality much\nof its interest and difficulty; it will be worthwhile to note some\nof its causes. Why did not the individualizing of conscience occur\nearlier?\n\n(1) In primitive man there is not much opportunity for the development\nof individuality. There are few personal possessions, there is little\nscope for the exercise of peculiar talents, there is little power of\nreflection, to develop strongly individual ideas. The self-assertive\ninstincts are to considerable extent still dormant for lack of stimulus\nto call them forth. The individual is content to take his place in\nthe group life, and it seldom occurs to him to question the group-\njudgment.\n\n(2) In primitive life there is a drastic repression of any incipient\nrebelliousness, through the enforcement of custom or explicit law in\nthe ways we have indicated; the fear of a heavy discouragement to any\ninnovator. If men dared to defy the community morals, they were very\nlikely to be put to death before the habit of free judgment had much\ntime to spread. There was thus a sort of artificial selection for\nsurvival of the conventional type, and weeding-out of the freethinker\nand moral genius. Even in historic times this process has continued\nand been an enormous clog on human progress. The man of revolutionary\nmoral insight has had to pay the penalty, if not of death as in\nthe case of Socrates or of Jesus-at least of ridicule and ostracism,\nof excommunication and isolation as, in our own day, with Tolstoy.\nMany and many a saint who might have been a beacon-light to mankind\nhas lived under the curses or sneers of his fellows and died in\nloneliness, to be soon forgotten. A few have, after years of opposition,\nobtained a following and accomplished great reforms, as did Buddha,\nMohammed, St. Francis, and Luther. But none can count the potential\nreformers, the men of new insight, of individual moral judgment, who\nhave been crushed by the weight of group-opposition. Man has been the\nworst enemy of his own progress.\n\n(3) There is another aspect to this selective process, noted before\nin another context- the struggle for existence between groups. So\nintense are these tribal struggles in early society that harmony within\na group is absolutely necessary. Individualization means\ndisorganization; and whatever communities developed free thought and\ndivergent ideas were at a disadvantage when it came to action. Many\nsuch groups, ahead of their rivals in individual moral development,\nwere wiped out by barbaric armies that gave unquestioning obedience\nto the tribal will and worked together like a machine. Up to a certain\nstage in human development individuality was an undesirable variation\nand was ruthlessly repressed, sometimes by the execution of the\nparticular offenders, sometimes by the destruction of the group to\nwhich they belonged and which they by their divergence weakened.\nWhat forces made against custom-morality? Against these repressive\nforces, however, other forces were from early times urging men on to\nreject the tyranny of custom. Those inward promptings that we call\nconscience were continually tending to become less the echo of the\ngroup conventions and more the expression of the individual's needs\nand deepest desires.\n\n(1) At bottom, of course, lay the natural restlessness and passions\nof men, the impatience of control, the longing for liberty, and the\ncraving for self-expression. The combative instinct, pride, obstinacy,\nand notably the sex-instinct, were from earliest times spurring men\non to a disregard of the conventional and the formation of individual\nstandards.\n\n(2) We may make special mention of the love of power over others, which\nhas been one of the deep roots of the perpetual internecine struggles\nof man. There is a need of leadership in every group; and this need\nis felt more and more keenly as the groups increase in size. At first\nthe authority of the elders suffices, or of strong men who push to\nthe fore at times of crisis, as in the case of the so called judges,\nthe military dictators, as we might better call them, of early Israel.\nBut as Israel, grown in numbers, and feeling the need of greater unity\nand readiness, clamored for a king, so generally, at a certain stage\nof culture, permanent chiefs of some sort become necessary. Now the\nchief, enjoying his sense of power, usually imposed his will upon the\npeople; his individuality, at least, had more or less free play. And\nthus, through the changing decrees of successive rulers, all sorts\nof varying standards became realized, and the rigidity of early custom\nwas steadily loosened.\n\n(3) In the hunting stage of primitive life, and even in the pastoral\nstage, there was little private property, and hence little opportunity\nfor the development of the acquisitive instinct. But with the\ntransition to an agricultural life, and still more with the growth\nof commerce and the arts, private accumulation became possible.\nIndividual initiative began to pay; the smarter and more ingenious\ncould outstrip their fellows by breaking through the crust of custom,\nwhile those who were hidebound by a conventional conscience were at\na disadvantage. To a large extent this lawlessness or innovation in\nconduct came into conflict with the individual's conscience. But the\nquestion \"Why not?\" would at once arise; if possible, a man would justify\nhis act to himself. And to some degree those new ways of acting would\nswing conscience over to their side.\n\n(4) In earliest times each tribe lived, very, much to itself and\ndeveloped its own morals, under the stress of similar forces, but\nwithout much influence from the experience of other groups. It was\nthus exceedingly difficult for it to conceive of any other ways of\ndoing things; the ancestral customs were accepted as inevitable, like\nthe sun and the rain. Inter-tribal conflicts first gave, perhaps, a\nvantage point for mutual criticism. A clan that by some custom had\nan obvious advantage over its neighbors would naturally be imitated\nas soon as men became quick-witted enough to understand its superiority.\nThe taking of prisoners, the exchange of hostages or envoys, friendly\nmissions and journeys, would give insight into one another's life.\nWith the development of commerce, this mutual criticism of morals would\nbe greatly accelerated. So the authority of local conventions and\nstandards would be discredited, custom would become more fluid, and\nindividual judgment find freer play. Especially would the more\nobservant, the more traveled, the more reflective, tend to vary from\nthe ideals of their neighbors.\n\n(5) In various other ways, apart from the mutual influence of divergent\ngroup-customs, the progress of civilization tends to produce variations\nin ideals. The increase of knowledge, the development of science and\nphilosophy, bring floods of new ideas to burst the old dams; deepening\ninsight reveals the irrationality of old ideas to the leaders of\nthought. The progress of the arts gives new interests and valuations.\nThe spiritual seers and prophets see visions of a better order and\nproclaim new gospels. The development of classes and castes allows\nto the aristocracy more leisure to think and criticize; the institution\nof slavery, in particular, produced a class of slave-owners with ample\ntime to dissect their inherited conceptions.\n\n(6) Finally, where, under favoring conditions, the danger of war in\nwhich man has for the most part lived became less acute, custom\ngenerally grew laxer. It is the imperious necessity of selfpreservation\nthat has been the greatest conservative force; warlike states have\ndemanded strict allegiance and looked with suspicion upon\ndeviations from the group ideals. But peoples that, whether from a\nfortunate geographical situation or because of their marked superiority\nin numbers and power over their neighbors have escaped this need of\nperpetual self-defense could afford to relax their vigilance for\nconformity. And the very notable increase in individual variations\nin conduct and ideal during the past century has been largely owing\nto the era of comparative peace. We seem to be reaching the age when\nthe advantage is to lie not with the nation that has the most rigid\ncustoms, but with the nation that shows the most individual initiative\nand progress.\n\nConservatism vs. radicalism\n\nWe have become forever emancipated from the tyranny of custom morality\nunder which the majority of men have lived. Legislation is, to be sure,\ncontinually on the increase, shutting men out from the ever-new ways\nthey discover to prey upon their fellows. But nevertheless, the freedom\nwith which men may now live their own lives according to their own\nideas is almost a new phenomenon upon the earth. When we compare the\nfree range that our individuality has with the tyranny of public\nopinion even so recently as the lifetime of our Puritan grandparents,\nwhen we see the new experiments in personal life and social legislation\nwhich are being tried on every hand, when we read a few of the\nthousands of books and magazines and newspapers that are pouring a\ncontinual flood of new ideas into the world, we must realize the\nimmense change from the stereotyped customs of nearly all past epochs.\nIn each of our forty eight States different codes are showing their\nrelative advantages; here woman's suffrage is on trial, there the\ninitiative and referendum, there the recall. Almost every sort of\npossible marriage law, it would seem, is being tried somewhere. It\nis a time of moral confusion, of the unsettling of old conceptions\nand a groping, stumbling progress toward the new.\n\nIn such a situation it is no wonder that we have two types of thought,\ntwo sets of forces, at work. On the one hand we have the conservatives,\nthe \"stand-patters,\" the maintainers of the existing order; on the\nother hand are the progressives, the radicals, the reformers of the\nexisting order. For the former the moral standards of their particular\nage and country tend to have an absolute and unconditional worth, which\nmust not be criticized or questioned. The necessity of allegiance to\nmorality has been so deeply stamped upon their minds that it has become\na loyalty to the particular brand of morality they have grown up in,\nhowever flagrantly inadequate or tyrannous it may be. For the latter\na commendable impatience with the imperfect is apt to foster a blindness\nto the value that almost always lies in ancient customs and a lack\nof regard for the need of stability and common agreement on some plane.\nThese iconoclasts, vociferous in condemnation, are often most empty\nhanded, giving us nothing wiser or more advantageous wherewith to\nreplace the conventions they discard. So it is difficult to say whether\nhumanity is more in danger from the red-handed radicalism which\ndestroys the precious fruit of long experience, or from the obstinate\nobstructionists who by the dead weight of their apathy or the positive\npull-back of their antagonism delay the remedying of existing evils.\nThe ideal lies in keeping morality plastic while giving its approved\nforms our hearty allegiance. Widely different ideals are theoretically\nconceivable; but we live in a specific time and place and must defer\nto the code of our fellows; it is along these lines, and by gradual\nsteps, that progress must be made. We must be on the alert for new\nsuggestions, but slow to tear down till we can build better. The\ngreatest of prophets, keenly as he saw the flaws in existing standards,\nproclaimed that he came not to destroy but to fulfill. It is evident\nenough to the impartial observer that our present chaos and mutual\nantagonism of conflicting view-points is not ideal; we need to work\nout of this disorder into some sane and stable order; when we can find\nthe best way of life we must discard these manifold variations, most\nof which are foolish and ill-advised. The undesirability of this\ncontemporary disagreement, which in some matters amounts to almost\na complete moral anarchy, is enough to explain the pull back of the\nconservatives. And it is precisely the purpose of such a volume as\nthis to help in the crystallizing of definite and universally accepted\nmoral principles for personal and social life. But, on the other hand,\nthis temporary chaos is more pregnant with promise than the older blind\nacquiescence in full light of criticism and experiment to bear upon\nthe laws and customs of the past.\n\n\"New occasions teach new duties, Time makes ancient good uncouth.\"\n\nWe should reverence the great seers and lawmakers of the past; but\ntheir true disciples are not those who slavishly accept their dicta,\nthey are rather those who think for themselves, as they did, and\ncontribute, as they did, toward the slow progress of man.\n\nWhat are the dangers of conventional morality?\n\nThe reasons why we cannot be content with our fathers' conservatism\nin morals, and our fathers' custom-bound conscience, may be summarized\nas follows:\n\n(1) Conventional morality is almost necessarily too general; it is\nnot elastic enough to fit the infinite variations in specific cases,\nnot detailed enough to fit all needs. It therefore often causes needless\nand cruel repression; the most sensitive and aspiring spirits have\noften revolted from the morality of their times because of its\nharshness. It is well for the marriage-tie to be binding; divorce has\ngenerally been deemed unchristian. But if this judgment is rigidly\nenforced, special cases arise, very piteous, very pathetic, crying\nout for a more discriminating rule. Our forebears, with their grave\nrealization of the dangers of frivolousness, forbade by law and a stern\npublic opinion many innocent and wholesome diversions. Such injustices\nare inevitable where custom has unchecked sway. The general aim and\nresult may be very salutary, but the application is too sweeping, and\nbrings suffering to many unfortunate individuals, or to the community\nas a whole, by its indiscrimination.\n\n(2) But even in its general result custom may be harmful. Morals have\ndeveloped blindly, as we have seen, through all sorts of irrational\ninfluences, swayed this way by class interest, by rulers or priests,\nveered that way by superstition, passion, and stupidity. Morality has\nnot understood itself; and the natural forces which have developed\nit into its enormous usefulness have not always weeded out the baneful\nelements. The persecution of heretics was sheer mistake, but it was\nacceded to by practically the entire Church in the Middle Ages, and\npracticed with utter conscientiousness. The hostility of the Puritans\nto music and art was pure folly, though it seemed to them their grim\nduty.\n\n(3) New situations are continually arising, new sins appearing.\nConventional morality, while sometimes over-severe against old and\nwell-recognized sins, lags far behind in its branding of the newer\nforms. The evils arising from the modern congestion of population,\nthe unscrupulousness of modern business, the selfishness of politicians,\nthe servility of newspapers to the \"interests\" and to advertisers,\nfor example, find too little reprobation in our established moral codes.\n\"Business is business\" has been said by respectable church-members.\nA successful American boss, when asked if he was not in politics for\nhis pocketbook, said, \"Of course! Aren't you?\" with no sense of shame.\nProbably he was very \"moral\" along the old lines, an excellent father,\na kind husband, an agreeable neighbor; but his conventional code,\nshared by most of his contemporaries, did not include the reprobation\nof the practice of politics for private gain. In the upper classes\nare many people who are \"good\" by the old standards, but who are\nunhelpful and trivial-minded, mere parasites devoted to sport or society,\nwith never a qualm of conscience for their selfishness. The old standards\nneed the constant infusion of new blood; our consciences need to be\nadjusted to our new relations and deeper insight. [Footnote: Cf. Rosa,\nSin and Society, p. 14: \"One might suppose that an exasperated public\nwould sternly castigate these modern sins. But the fact is, the very\nqualities that lull the conscience of the sinner blind the eyes of\nthe onlookers. People are sentimental; and bastinado wrongdoing not\naccording to its harmfulness, but according to the infamy that has\ncome to attach to it. Undiscerning, they chastise with scorpions the\nold authentic sins, but spare the new. They do not see that blackmail\nis piracy, that embezzlement is theft, that speculation is gambling\nthat deleterious adulteration is murder. The cloven hoof hides in patent\nleather; and today, as in Hosea's time, the people 'are destroyed\nfor lack of knowledge.'\"]\n\n(4) Custom-morality tends to literalism, a mere formal observance of\nlaw or custom without the true spirit of service, without any inward\nsweetness or power. Christ's condemnation of the Pharisees will occur\nto every one; the parable of the Pharisee and publican, and that of\nthe widow's mite, among others, are classic illustrations of a cut-and\ndried formalism in morality. Such a legalism Paul found could not save\nhim. And forever the prophets and spiritual leaders of men have had\nto burst the bonds of tradition to awaken a real love of and devotion\nto the good. The letter killeth, and a punctilious observance of rules\nmay choke out the aspirations of the soul.\n\n(5) Finally, conflicts between customs inevitably arise. Which shall\na man obey? The moral perplexity thus caused gives a great deal of\nits poignancy to the tragedy of life. When one accepted ideal pulls\nus one way, and another standard, to which we have given allegiance,\ncalls us the other, when we cry out with Desdemona, \"I do perceive\nhere a divided duty,\" the only solution lies in the development of\ninsight and a recognition of the transition-nature of much of our\naccepted code. If for no other reason, to avoid these conflicts of\nideals we must comprehend the ultimate aims of morality and take existing\nstandards with a sort of tentative allegiance. It should be clear,\nthen, that the individualizing of conscience, which has been going\non observably in recent times, is, in spite of its dangers, a necessary\nand desirable process. Dewey and Tufts, ETHICS, chaps, V. IX. W. Bagehot,\nPHYSICS AND POLITICS, chaps. II, VI. F. Paulsen, SYSTEM OF ETHICS,\npart II, chap. V, sec. 6. S. E. Mezes, ETHICS, chap, VII, pp. 164-83.\nJ. H. Coffin, THE SOCIALIZED CONSCIENCE, pp. 12-23.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\n\nCAN WE BASE MORALITY UPON CONSCIENCE?\n\nWhat is the meaning of \"moral intuitionism\"?\n\nWith the growth of individualism in morals, the relaxing of the\nconstraint of publicly accepted standards, there is, of course, a\ndangerous drift toward self-indulgence and moral nihilism. It becomes\nall the more necessary that conscience be strong and sensitive, that\ninner restraints take the place of outer. In the lack of a mature moral\ninsight, which is one of the latest of mental developments, and indeed,\nwhere it exists, to reinforce its pale affirmations with greater\nimpulsive power, a stern sense of duty is a veritable rock of\nsalvation. Many a people have perished, many a brilliant hope of\ncivilization been lost, because of its lack. So we cannot wonder when\nmoralists put it forward as the foundation- stone of all morality and\nseek to build their systems upon it. To a man who has been bred to\nobey the inner voice, it seems the very source and basis of the right;\nit is so inescapable, so authoritative, that it cannot be deemed derived,\nor evolved by a mechanical process of selection. It figures as something\nultimate and unanalyzable, if not frankly supernatural; that it is\na mere instrument in the attainment of an ulterior end, to be used\nor rejected according to its observed usefulness is an abhorrent thought.\n\nThere has thus arisen a school of philosophers who base their\njustification of morality entirely upon the deliverances of conscience.\nTheir theories vary in detail and have received sundry names; we will\ngroup them here for convenience under the general caption \"moral\nintuitionism.\" As a rule they steer clear of the historic point of\nview; they refuse to believe that conscience has a natural history.\nNor are they usually keen at psychological analysis; the numberless\nvariations in form which conscience assumes in different individuals\nare, for their purposes, better ignored. Instead of analyzing the moral\nsense into its components and describing the mental stuff of which\nit is composed, instead of tracing its genesis and studying the forces\nthat have produced it, they wax eloquent over its importance and\nuniversality. As preachers they are admirable. But the foundation they\nprovide for morality is slippery. It amounts to saying, \"We ought to\ndo right because we know we ought!\" When we ask how we can be sure,\nin view of the general fallibility of human conviction, that we are\nnot mistaken in our assurance, and following a false light, they can\nbut reiterate in altered phraseology that we know because we know.\n\nTo these intuitionists, and to the popular mind very often, the\napproval or disapproval of conscience is immediate, intuitive, and\nunerring. Its authority is absolute and not to be questioned. We have\nthis faculty within us that tells us as surely what is right and what\nwrong as our color-sense tells us what is red and what green. Some\npeople may, to be sure, be color-blind, or have defective consciences;\nbut the great mass of unsophisticated people possess this innate guide\nand commandment, a quite sufficient warrant for all our distinctions\nof good and evil. Honest men do not really differ in their moral\njudgments. They may misunderstand one another's concepts and engage\nin verbal disputes; but at bottom their moral sense approves and\ndisapproves the same acts. Our moral differences come mainly from the\ndeluding effects of passion and the sophisticated ingenuities of the\nintellect. We should \"return to nature,\" go by ourselves alone, and\nlisten to the inner voice. If we sincerely listen and obey we shall\nalways do right. [Footnote: \"But truth and right, founded in the\neternal and, is what every man can judge of, when laid before him.\n'T is necessarily one and the same to every man's understanding, just\nas light is the same, to every man's eyes.\" (S. Clarke, Discourse upon\nNatural Religion, 1706.)]\n\nWe cannot but recognize a certain amount of practical truth in this\npicture. But it is over-simplified, and it is fundamentally\nunsatisfactory to the intellect. We shall now pass in review its most\nobvious inadequacies.\n\nDo the deliverances of different people's consciences agree?\n\nNothing is more notorious to an unbiased observer than the\nconscientious differences between men. Even among members of a single\ncommunity, with closely similar inheritance and environment, we find\nmarked divergence in moral judgment. And when we compare widely\ndifferent times and places we are apt to wonder if there is any common\nground. It is only a very smug provincialism that can attribute the\nalien standards of other races and nations to a disregard of the light.\nMohammedans and Buddhists have believed as firmly in, and fought as\npassionately for, their moral convictions as Christians have for\ntheirs. When we survey the vast amount of material amassed by\nanthropologists, we find that, as has been often said, there is hardly\na vice that has not somewhere been deemed a virtue, and hardly a virtue\nbut has been branded as a vice. History is full of the pathos of havoc\nwrought by conscientious men, of foolish and ruinous acts which they\nhave braced themselves to do for conscience' sake. One has but to think\nof the earnest and prayerful inquisitors and persecutors in the\nmediaeval Church, of the Puritans destroying the stained-glass windows\nand paintings of the Madonna, of the caliph who destroyed the great\nAlexandrian library, bereaving the world at one blow of that priceless\nculture-inheritance. Written biography, fiction which truly represents\nlife, and individual memory are full of conscience have sundered those\nwho truly loved and wrought irremediable pain and loss. Lately the\nnewspapers told us of the heroic suicide of General Nogi and his wife,\nwho felt it their duty not to survive their emperor. To a Catholic\nChristian this imperious dictate of the Japanese conscience would be\na deadly sin. And so it goes. There is no need to multiply instances\nof what can be observed on every hand. Conscience reflects the traditions\nand influences amid which a man grows up.\n\nBut if the deliverances of different men's consciences conflict, how\nshall we know which to trust? If any particular command of the inner\nvoice may be morally wrong, how can we trust it at all? There are\nobviously morbid and perverted consciences; but if conscience itself\nis the ultimate authority, and is not to be justified and criticized\nby some deeper test, what right have we to call any of its manifestations\nmorbid or perverted? Is it not a species of egotism to hold one's own\nmoral discernment as superior to another's; and if so, do we not need\nsome criterion by which to judge between them? Surely the diversity\nof its judgments makes conscience an impossible foundation for morality;\nwe should have as many codes as consciences and fall into a hopeless\nconfusion. If conscience everywhere agreed in its dictates, could we\nbase morality upon it? Even, however, if conscience led us all in the\nsame direction, would that prove its authority? Perhaps we should all\nbe following a will o' the wisp, and foolishly sacrificing our desires\nto an idol of the tribe, a universal superstition. Must it not show\nits credentials before it can legitimately command our allegiance?\nIt is but one specific type of impulse among many; why should it be\ngiven the reins, the control over all? Do we say, because conscience\nmakes for our best welfare? The answer would, in general, be true;\nbut we should then be putting as our test and ultimate authority the\nattainment of our welfare, which would be to abandon the point of view\nwe are discussing. Conscience claims authority. But that might\nconceivably be mere impudence and tyranny. Moreover, there are those\nwho feel no call to follow conscience; how could we prove to them that\nthey ought? Is it not the height of irrationality to bow down before\nan unexplained and mysterious impulse and allow it to sway our conduct\nwithout knowing why? If the \"ought\" is really shot out of the blue\nat us, if there is no justification, no imperious demand for morality\nbut the existence of this inner push, why might we not raise our heads,\nrefuse to be dominated by it, and live the life of free men, following\nthe happy breezes of our desires? That is precisely what many have\ndone, men who have reached maturity enough of mind to see the emptiness\nof following an ingrained impulse simply because it exists, but not\na full enough maturity to see beyond to the real justification and\nsignificance of conscience.\n\nA further realization of the inadequacy of the intuitive theory comes\nwhen we observe that conscience is by no means always clear in its\ndictates. It often leaves us in the lurch. Developed in us as it has\nbeen by circumstance and suggestion, it helps us usually only in\ncertain recognized types of situation. When new cases arise, it is\nhopelessly at sea. As a practical working principle, conscientiousness\nis not only apt to be a perverted and provincial guide, it is\ninsufficient for the solving of fresh and difficult problems. The\nscience casnistry has been developed in great detail to supply this\nlack, to apply the well-recognized deliverances of a certain accepted\ntype of conscience to the various possibilities of situation. These\nsystems, however, reflect the idiosyncrasies of their makers, and have\nnever won wide approbation. Morality must remain largely experimental,\nindividual. Conscience will play a very useful role in spurring us\nto our recognized duty in the commoner situations, but for all the\nmore delicate decisions we need a more ultimate touchstone. We must\ngrasp the underlying principles of right conduct, and weigh the relative\ngoods attainable by each possible act. A well-balanced and normal\nconscience will save us the recurrent reasoning out of typical\nperplexities, but it must be supplemented by an insight into the ends\nto be aimed for and kept rather strictly in its place.\n\nWhat is the plausibility of moral intuitionism?\n\nIt is never wholly satisfactory merely to refute a theory; we must\nsee its plausibility and understand its appeal if we are to be sure\nof doing it justice. In the case of the intuition-theory it is easy\nto discern the reasons that have kept it alive? though it has never\nbeen at all widespread among thinking men? in spite of the obvious\nobjections that can be raised to it.\n\n(1) Perhaps the original source of the doctrine was a certain sort\nof religious faith; it follows easily as a corollary to the belief\nin God. If God commands us to do right, it is felt, He must have given\nus some way to know what is right. The inner voice of conscience may\nbe just such a God-given guide; therefore it is such a guide; therefore\nit is infallible. A natural piece of a priori reasoning, on a par with\nthe Christian Scientist's syllogism: God is good; a good God would\nnot permit evil to exist; therefore there is no evil. Unfortunately\na priori reasoning has to yield to actual experience. Since we see\nthat conscience is not infallible and evil does exist, there must be\nsome fallacy in the arguments.\n\n(2) Another source of the doctrine's strength lies in its simplicity.\nIt is a great mental relief to drop the tangle of confusing\nconsiderations, to stop trying to reason out one's course of action,\nand follow a supposedly reliable guide. The intuition-theory goes\nnaturally with a moral conservatism which dreads the chaos and\nuncertainty that follow upon the doubt of established moral habits.\nIt is so much more comfortable to feel that one has already the one\ndivine and ultimate code, that one has always done right because one\nhas steadily obeyed the inner light! It is reassuring to divide the\nworld into the sheep and the goats? if one can believe one's self a\nsheep. But what O dismay! what if one were after all a goat! A great\ndeal of mental anguish has been caused by the pseudo-simplicity of\nthis dichotomy. There is no such clean-cut and clearly visible line\nbetween right and wrong; there is instead a bewildering maze of goods.\nHardly any choice but involves a sacrifice, hardly any ideal but has\nits disadvantages. One learns with experience to be wary of these simple\ntheories, these closet theories which collapse when they are brought\nout into the light of day.\n\n(3) We must, however, be just. The fact of the reliability of\nconscience, and the wisdom of following its guidance, holds over a\nwide range of human experience and the experience which is most\napparent upon the surface. For all ordinary cases we of Christendom\nagree without hesitation that murder is wrong, and lying, and stealing.\nIt seems a waste of time to try to justify our instinctive verdict,\nand the attempt would only be bewildering to most men. It is only when\nbrought face to face with some alien code that we see the need of\ndigging below intuition. A missionary to the South Seas may be\nconfronted with men to whom the killing of other tribesmen and the\naccumulation of skulls is a glorious and honorable feat, or to whom\nskillful lying is an enviable and proud accomplishment. But most of\nus live among neighbors whose conscience is comfortably like our own,\nand only occasionally become seriously perplexed. In the great mass\nof everyday occasions we do know our duty intuitively, and we do agree\nwith one another. We recognize a duty at sight without realizing its\nteleology. It is not, indeed, an innate faculty; it was acquired during\nour formative years; it is not infallible. But the forces which have\ngone to the making of it are similar in all our lives, and the products\nare more alike than unlike.\n\n(4) Finally, it is true that to obey conscience is, in a sense, to\ndo right, to be moral, no matter how distorted conscience may be.\nConscientiousness is in itself a virtue. To this point we shall later\nreturn. We need only say here that conscientiousness is not enough.\nLife is not so simple a matter as that. We need judgment, sanity,\ninsight, as well as a strong sense of duty. We need to correct and\ntrain conscience, to adjust it to our real needs, to recognize that\nit is a means, not an end.\n\nOur discussion, though rapid, should show that we cannot start with\nthe \"ought\" of our conscience, or moral sense, and erect our moral\ntheory upon that. Conscience itself needs to be explained. Its commands\nneed to be justified by reference to some more ultimate criterion.\nIt needs to be pruned of its fanaticism, developed where it is weak,\nand kept in line with our growing insight into what is best in conduct.\nRuskin once summed the matter up by saying, \"Obey thy conscience! But\nfirst be sure it is not the conscience of an ass!\" Conscience may be\na very dangerous guide. And even where it is normal and useful it must\nnot be invested with any absolute and irrational authority.\n\nHistorical study, then, reveals the growth of personal and social\nmorality through the action of forces, which tend to drive men into\nconduct that makes for their welfare more surely than did their\nprimitive animal impulses. Conscience arises through these same forces.\nThough subject to perversion and infinitely variant in detail,\ncommunity-morals and individual conscience have been the chief\nmeans of making man's life safe and wisely directed. The criterion\nthat emerges from such a study is not, however, the bald existence\nof codes of morals, or of conscience, but the human welfare which\nthose codes and that conscience exist to serve. To an exposition\nof the ways in which morality serves and should increasingly serve\nhuman welfare, we now turn.\n\nClassic intuitional theories will be found developed in: Price, Review\nof the Chief Questions and Difficulties of Morals (1757), Shaftesbury,\nAn Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit (1699). F. Hutcheson, An Inquiry\nConcerning Moral Good and Evil (1725). Joseph Butler, Fifteen Sermons\nupon Human Nature, II, III (1726). J. Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory\n(1885).\n\nCriticisms of the intuitional theories will be found in: S. E. Mezes,\nEthics, chap. III; Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, chap. XVI, sec. 3; F.\nPaulsen, System of Ethics, part II, chap. V, sec. 4; H. Spencer, Data\nof Ethics, chap. II, sec. 14; chap. IV, sec. 20; Muirhead, Elements\nof Ethics, secs. 32-35. H. Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil, book\nI, chap. IV. W. Fite, Introductory Study of Ethics,\n\n\n\nPART II\n\n\nTHE THEORY OF MORALITY\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\n\nTHE BASIS OF RIGHT AND WRONG\n\nHISTORICAL knowledge without critical insight leads to moral nihilism,\nthe conviction of the pre-Socratic Sophists that, since every time\nand people has its own standards, there is no real objective right\nand wrong. Morality is seen to be not a fixed code sent readymade from\nheaven, but a set of habits and intuitions that have had a natural\norigin and development. Our particular moral code is perceived to be\nbut one out of many, our type of conscience psychologically on the\nsame level with the strange, and to us perverted, sense of duty of\nalien races. How can we judge impartially between our standards and\nthose of the Fiji Islanders? What warrant have we for saying that our\ncode is a better one than theirs? Or how do we know that the whole\nthing is not superstition?\n\nWhat is the nature of that intrinsic goodness upon which ultimately\nall valuations rest?\n\nAs a matter of fact, underneath the manifold disagreements as to good\nand bad, there is a deep stratum of absolute certainty. It is only\nin the more complex and delicate matters that doubt arises; all men\nshare in those elementary perceptions of good and bad that make up\nthe bulk of human valuation. To men everywhere it is an evil to be\nin severe physical pain or to be maimed in body, to be shut away from\nair, from food, from other people. It is a good to taste an appetizing\ndish, to exercise when well and rested, to hear harmonious music, to\nfeel the sweet emotion of love. The fact that men agree upon judgments\ndoes not prove them true; but these are not judgments, they are\nperceptions. [Footnote: Or affections. Let no one quarrel about the\npsychological terms used; the only important matter is to note the\nfact, however it be phrased, that \"good\" and \"bad\" in their basic usage\nare DESCRIPTIVE terms. A toothache is bad just as indisputably as the\nsky is blue. The word \"bad\" has a definite meaning, just as the word\n\"blue\" has; and the toothache is, among other things, precisely what\nwe mean by \"bad,\" just as the look of the cloudless sky by daylight\nis what we mean by \"blue.\"] To call love good is not to give an opinion,\nit is to describe a fact. It is a matter of direct first-hand feeling,\nwhose reality consists in its being felt. To say that these experiences\nare good or bad is equivalent to saying that they FEEL good or bad;\nthere can be no dispute about it. This is the bottom fact of ethics.\nDifferent experiences have different intrinsic worth as they pass.\nThere is a chiaroscuro of consciousness, a light and shade of immediate\ngoodness and badness over all our variegated moments. The good moments\nare their own excuse for being, a part of the brightness and worth\nof life. They need nothing ulterior to justify them. The bad moments\nfeel bad, and that is the end of it; they are bad-feeling moments,\nand no sophistication can deny it. Conscious life looked at from this\npoint of view, and abstracted from all its other aspects, is a flux\nof plus and minus values. Certain of its moments have a greater felt\nworth than others; some experiences are intrinsically undesirable,\nthe shadows of life; others, intrinsically sweet, a part of its sunshine.\nIn the last analysis, all differences in value, including all moral\ndistinctions, rest upon this disparity in the immediate worth of\nconscious states. [Footnote: Cf. G. Santayana, The Sense of Beauty,\np. 104: \"All worth leads us back to actual feeling somewhere, or else\nevaporates into nothing-into a word and a superstition.\" I cannot but\nfeel that contemporary definitions of value that omit reference to\nhedonic differences e.g. that of Professor Brown (Journal of Philosophy,\nPsychology, and Scientific Methods, vol. II, p. 32): \"Value is degree\nof adequacy of a potentiality to the realization of the effect by\nvirtue of which it is a potentiality\"-miss the real meaning of \"value.\"\nWe do, indeed, speak occasionally of x as having value as a means to\ny, when y is not good or a means to a good. But that seems to me a\nmisuse of the word.] We may say absolutely that if it were not for\nthis fundamental difference in feeling there would be no such thing\nas morality. There might conceivably be a world in which consciousness\nshould exist without any agreeable or disagreeable qualities; in such\na world nothing would matter; all acts would be equally indifferent.\nOr there might be a world in which all experiences were equally\npleasurable or painful; in such a case all acts would be equally good\nor equally sad; there would be no ground for choice. One might in any\nof these hypothetical worlds be driven by mechanical impulse or fitful\nwhim to do this or that, but there would be no rational basis for\npreference. Such, however, is not the case. Comparative valuation is\npossible; all secondary goods and evils arise, all morality, all art\nand religion and science have their wellspring in this brute fact,\nthis primordial parting of the ways between the more and the less\ndesirable phases of possible conscious life. Morality of an elementary\ntype would exist on this level even without the further complications\nof actual life. At least a very important art would arise; whether\nor not we should call it morality is a mere matter of definition. For\na choice between alternatives immediately felt goods would arise, and\nthe problem of how to get the better kinds of experience and avoid\nthe worse would demand solution. Every bit of plus value added to\nexperience would make the world so much the brighter, as would every\nbit of pain avoided. There are, to be sure, the mystical optimisms\nand pessimisms to be reckoned with, the sweeping assertions of certain\nschools and individuals that everything is equally good or equally\nbad. Such undiscriminating formulas are either the mere objectification\nof a mood, of some unusual period of ecstasy or sorrow, a blind outcry\nof thanksgiving or of bitterness, or they are the clumsy expression\nof some practical truth, as, the wisdom of acquiescence, and the futility\nof preoccupation with evil. But taken seriously and literally such\nstatements are simply untrue to the facts and blur our fundamental\nperceptions. If actually accredited, either would lead to quiescence;\nif everything were equally good or evil all striving would be\nmeaningless, one might as well jump from a housetop or walk into the\nfire. But as a matter of fact such mystical assertions are indulged\nin only in the inactive moments of life, and mean no more than a lyric\npoem or a burst of music. Every one in his practical moments\nacknowledges tacitly, at least, the difference between the intrinsic\ngoodness and badness of experiences. A life of even delight or even\nwretchedness, or of colorless indifference, is not inconceivable, but\nit is not the lot of any actual human beings.\n\nThe larger quarrel between optimists and pessimists need not, for our\npurposes, be settled. Life may be a very good thing, on the whole,\nor a very bad thing. The only point we need to note is that it is at\nany rate a varying thing. Some experiences are more worth having than\nothers. Moral theory needs no further admission to find its foothold.\nNor do we need to discuss the problem of evil. It may be that all pain\nhas its ultimate uses that nothing is \"really\" bad, if we take that\nto mean that all evil has a necessary existence as a means to a good\notherwise unattainable and worth the cost. But however useful as a\nmeans evil may be, it is nonetheless evil and regrettable. It is not\ngood qua pain. If the same amount of good could be obtained without\nthe preliminary evil, it were better to skip it. In short, the existence\nof different values in immediate experience is indisputable; we may\ncall them for convenience intrinsic goodness and badness.\n\nWhat is extrinsic goodness?\n\nBut there is a radically different sense of the words \"good\" and \"bad\";\nnamely, that in which we say that a thing is good FOR this or that.\nThis is the kind of goodness the THINGS about us have; they are good\nfor the production of intrinsic goodness (as we are using that phrase),\nwhich is always (so far as we know) something produced in living\norganisms. [Footnote: We also occasionally speak of things as being\n\"good for\" something else when that something else is not a good or\na means to a good (see preceding footnote); as, \"sunshine is good for\nweeds.\" But as applied to evils, the phrase \"good for\" more often means\n\"good to abolish\"; as, \"hellebore is good for weeds.\" These usages\nillustrate the ambiguity of all our common ethical terms. To consider\nthem here would be, however, needlessly confusing. The two senses of\nthe term \"good\" mentioned in the text are the only senses we need to\nbear in mind for the purposes of ethics.] To put the same truth in\nother terms, things are good or bad only with respect to their effect\nupon our conscious experience. [Footnote: I am fully aware of the\nwidespread current distaste for the word \"consciousness,\" with its\nidealistic associations. The term seems to me too useful to discard;\nbut I wish to point out that, as I use it, it involves no metaphysical\nviewpoint, but is equally consonant with idealism or realism of any\nsort.] Primitive man, indeed, imagines inanimate things as having\nintrinsic goodness or badness, i.e., as feeling happy or unhappy,\nbenevolent or malignant. We still speak of a serene sky, an angry\nstorm cloud, a caressing breeze, and in a hundred ways read our\naffective life into material objects. But we now recognize all these\nascriptions as cases of the pathetic fallacy, poetically significant but\nliterally untrue. Animism, which looms so large in primitive religion,\nconsists in thus objectifying into things the emotions they arouse\nin us. In reality all of these affective qualities exist in us, not in the\nouter objects; so far as our epithets have an objective truth they\ndescribe not the content of the objects, but their function in our lives.\nWhen we speak of delicious food, beautiful pictures, ugly colors, we\nmean strictly that these objects are such as to arouse in us certain\npeculiar pleasant or unpleasant feelings. So that apart from the\nexistence of consciousness there would be no goodness or badness\nat all. [Footnote: The neo-realists would prefer to say, perhaps, \"apart\nfrom the existence of organisms,\"] and this may be an exacter phrase;\nwe from previous page [Footnote: pleasures and pains that remain out\nof connection with that interrelated stream of experience to which\nwe usually limit the term \"consciousness.\" On the other hand, MAY it\nnot be that God, and angels, or other disembodied beings, have\nconsciousness, and intrinsic goodness, without having organisms?\nOf course, for all we know, the world about us may be chock full\nof pleasures and pains. But for practical purposes, and so far as\nour morality is concerned, either the statement in the text or the\nsuggested equivalent is true. The point is, that the foundation\nof morality is in US--whether you call US in the last analysis\nconsciousnesses or organisms]\n\nIt is the existence of felt goodness, intrinsic goodness, and its\nopposite, that allows us to attribute to objects another kind of\ngoodness or badness, according as they are calculated to produce in\nus the former kind. This kind of goodness and badness we may call\nextrinsic. It is only by thus attributing a sort of goodness and\nbadness to senseless objects that we can aim for and avoid the good\nand bad phases of conscious life. In themselves these conscious moments\nare largely unnamable and inexpressible. There are, as it is, dumb\nobjectless ecstasies that are of transcendent sweetness; but we do\nnot usually know how to reproduce them, and for the most part we have\nto overlook these goods in our ideals and aim only for those that we\ncan associate with recognized outer stimuli. For practical purposes\nwe think rather in terms of outer objects than of our states of\nexperience; nature has had need to make men but very slightly\nintrospective. And so it is that this derived use of our eulogistic\nand disparaging terms plays a larger part than its primary application.\nBut the essential point to note is that \"goodness\" and \"badness\" in\nthe first instance refer to the fundamental cleavage between the\naffective qualities of experience, and only secondarily and by metonymy\napply to objects in the physical world which affect our conscious states.\nThe next point to note is that our conscious experiences and activities\nthemselves have not only their intrinsic value, as they pass, but an\nextrinsic value, as means toward future intrinsic values. Each phase\nof experience has its own worth, while it lasts, and also has its results\nin determining future phases with their varying degrees of worth. Our\nreveries, our debauches, our sacrifices are good or bad in their\neffects as well as in themselves. Thus all experience has a double\nrating; acts are not only pleasant, agreeable, intrinsically desirable,\nbut also wise, prudent, useful, virtuous, i.e., extrinsically desirable.\nThese extrinsic values usually bulk much larger in the end\nthan the first transitory intrinsic value; but our natural tendency\nis to forget them and guide our action by immediate values. Hence the\nneed of a continual disparagement of the latter, and the many means\nmen have adopted of emphasizing the importance of the former. Yet,\nafter all, our concern for the extrinsic value of acts has to do only\nwith means to ends; and unless acts tend to produce intrinsic goodness\nsomewhere they are not extrinsically good. There is no sense in\nsacrificing an immediate good unless the alternative act will tend\nin its ultimate effects to produce a greater good, or unless the act\nsacrificed would have brought, after its present intrinsic good, some\ngreater intrinsic evil. The sacrifice of a good for no greater good\nis asceticism or fanaticism. From this there is no ultimate salvation\nbut by referring all acts to the final touchstone--asking which will\nproduce in the end the greatest amount of intrinsic good and the least\nintrinsic evil. What sort of conduct, then, is good? And how shall\nwe define virtue? We are brought thus to the conception of an art which\nshall not only teach us which of two immediate, intrinsic, goods is\nthe better, but shall consider all the near and remote consequences\nof acts, and direct us to that conduct which will produce most good\nin the end. [Footnote: The impossibility of finding any other ultimate\nbasis for our conception of moral \"good\" or \"bad\" is well expressed\nby Socrates in Plato's Protagoras (p. 354): \"Then you think that pain\nis an evil and pleasure is a good, and even pleasure you deem an evil,\nwhen it robs you of greater pleasure than it gives, or causes pain\ngreater than the pleasure. If, however, you call pleasure an evil in\nregard to some other end or standard, you will be able to show us that\nstandard. BUT YOU HAVE NONE TO SHOW... And have you not a similar way\nof speaking about pain? You call pain a good when it takes away greater\npains than those which it has, or gives pleasures greater than the\npains.\" He then goes on to explain the need of morality,-to guide us,\nin the face of the foreshortening effects of our particular situation,\nto what will make for the greatest happiness in the long run (p. 356):\n\"Do not the same magnitudes appear larger to your sight when near,\nand smaller when at a distance? Now suppose happiness to consist\nin doing or choosing the greater, and in not doing or avoiding the\nless, what would be the saving principle of human life? Would not the\nACT OF MEASURING be the saving principle?\"] is best which will in the\nlong run bring into being the greatest possible amount of intrinsic\ngoodness and the least intrinsic evil. For goodness of conduct we\ncommonly use the term \"virtue\"; and for intrinsic good the most widely\naccepted name-though one which is misleading to many is \"happiness.\"\nSo we may say, in sum, that virtue is that manner of life that tends\nto happiness. Objection is occasionally made that happiness is too\nvague a term, too elusive a concept, to be set forth as the ultimate\naim of conduct. \"Alas!\" says Bradley, \"the one question which no one\ncan answer is, what is happiness?\" But this is a palpable confusion\nof thought. If we mean by the question, \"Wherein is happiness to be\nfound, by doing what can we attain it?\" then the answer is, indeed,\nuncertain in its completeness; it is precisely to answer it that we\nstudy ethics. Or if we mean, \"What is the psychology of happiness?\"\nthe answer is as yet dubious; but it is irrelevant. Whatever its\npsychological conditions and the means to attain it, we know happiness\nwhen we have it. The puzzle is not to recognize it, but to get it.\nBy happiness we mean the steady presence of what we have called intrinsic\ngoodness and the absence of intrinsic badness; it is as indefinable\nas any ultimate element of experience, but as well known to us as\nblackness and whiteness or light and dark. Take, as a typical moral\nsituation, a case in which a thirsty man drinks polluted water. In\nthe diagram the arrow represents the direction of the flow of time,\nand each of the ribbons below represents the stream of consciousness\nof an individual concerned-the uppermost being that of the thirsty\nman himself, the others those of his wife, children, or friends. The\nplus sign early in the drinker's stream of experience stands for the\nplus value which drinking the water effects-the gratifying taste of\nthe water and the allaying of the discomfort of thirst-real values,\nwhose worth cannot be gainsaid. Following, in his own stream of\nexperience, are a row of minus signs, indicating the undesirable\npenalties in his own life which follow-disease, pain, deprivation of\nother goods. No good accrues to others, unless the slight pleasure\nof seeing his thirst allayed. But evils follow in their experience:\nworry, sympathetic pain at his suffering, expense of doctor's bills,\nperhaps (which means deprivation of other possible goods), etc. It\nis clear at a glance that the positive good attained is not worth the\nlingering and widespread evils; and the act of drinking the polluted\nwater, though to a very thirsty man a keen temptation, is immoral.\nMorality is thus an acting upon a right perspective of life. Personal\nmorality considers the goods and evils in the one stream of\nconsciousness, social morality the goods and evils in other conscious\nlives concerned. Between them they sum up the law and the prophets.\n\nThe best life for humanity is that which is, on the whole, felt best;\nnot necessarily that which is judged best by this man or that, for\nour judgments are narrow and misrepresent actual values,-but that which\nhas had from beginning to end the greatest total of happiness. No other\nultimate criterion for conduct can ever justify itself, and most\ntheoretical statements reduce to this. To be virtuous is to be a\nvirtuoso in life. All sorts of objections have been raised to this\nsimple, and apparently pagan, way of stating the case; they will be\nconsidered in due time. The reader is asked to refrain from parting\ncompany with the writer, if his prejudices are aroused, until the\nconsonance of this sketchy account of the basis of morality with\nChristianity and all idealism can be demonstrated.\n\nH. Spencer, Data of Ethics, chap. III. S. E. Mezes, Ethics, chap IX.\nLeslie Stephen, Science of Ethics, chaps. II, IX. F. Thilly,\nIntroduction to Ethics, chaps. IV, V. F. Paulsen, book II, chap. I.\nJ. S. Mill, Utilitarianism. B. P. Bowne, Principles of Ethics, chap.\nII. The classic accounts of a rational foundation of ethics are to\nbe found by the discerning reader in Plato's Protagoras, Gorgias, and\nRepublic (esp. books. I, II, IV), and Aristotle's Ethics (esp. books. I\nand II). For refinements in the definition of right and wrong, see\nG. E. Moore, Ethics, chaps. I-V; B. Russell, Philosophical Essays,\nI, secs. II, III. International Journal of Ethics, vol. 24, p. 293.\nDefinitions of value without reference to pleasure or pain will be\nfound in Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods,\nvol. II, pp. 29, 113, 141. An elaborate and careful discussion will\nbe found in G. H. Palmer's Nature of Goodness.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\n\nTHE MEANING OF DUTY\n\nWhy are there conflicts between duty and inclination?\n\nIF virtue is simply conduct that makes most truly for happiness, why\nare not all but fools virtuous? The answer is, in a word, because what\nwill bring about the greatest good in the long run, and to the most\npeople, is not always what the individual desires at the moment. The\ntwo great temptations are the lure of the selfish and the lure of the\nimmediate. To purchase one's own happiness at the expense of others,\nand to purchase present satisfaction by an act which will bring less\ngood in the end-these are the cardinal sins, and under these two\nheads every specific sin can be put. The root of the trouble is that,\nin spite of the superposition of conscience upon their primitive\nimpulses, human organisms have not yet motor-mechanisms fully adjusted\nto their individual or combined needs. Some instincts are over-strong,\nothers under-developed, none is delicately enough attuned to the\nchanging possibilities of the situation. Our desires tug toward all\nsorts of acts which would prove disastrous either to ourselves or\nothers. Many of our faults we commit \"without realizing it\"; we follow\nour impulses blindly, unconscious of their treachery. Other sins we\ncommit knowingly, because in spite of warning voices we cannot resist\nthe momentary desire. Readjustment of our impulses is always painful;\nit is easier and pleasanter to yield than to control.\n\nDuty is the name we give virtue when she is opposed to inclination.\nShe is the representative at the helm of our conduct of all absent\nor undeveloped impulses. The saints have no need of the concept; virtue\nto them is easy and agreeable; they have learned the beauty of holiness\nand have no unruly longings. Sometimes this happy adjustment of desire\nto need has been won by severe struggle; the dangerous impulses have\nbeen trained to come to heel through many a painful sacrifice. In other\ncases an approximation to this ideal state is the result of early\ntraining; by skillful guidance the growing boy or girl has had his\nsafe impulses fostered and his perilous desires atrophied with disuse.\nThe proverb, \"Bring up a child in the way he should go, and when he\nis old he will not depart there from,\" has much truth in it. But no\nparent and no man himself can ever breathe quite safe; we can never\ntell when some submerged animal instinct will rise up in us, stun all\nour laboriously acquired morality into inactivity, and bring on\nconsequences that in any cool headed moment we should have\nknown enough to avoid. Thus duty, although she is the truest friend\nand servant of happiness, figures as her foe. And some moralists,\nrealizing vividly the frequent need of opposing inclination, have\ngeneralized the situation by saying that happiness cannot be our\nend. \"Foolish Word-monger and Motive grinder,\" shouts Carlyle,\n\"who in thy Logic-mill hast an earthly mechanism for the Godlike itself,\nand wouldst fain grind me out Virtuefrom the husks of Pleasure,\nI tell thee, Nay! Is the heroic inspiration we name Virtue but\nsome Passion, some bubble of the blood, bubbling in the direction\nothers PROFIT by? I know not; only this I know, If what thou namest\nHappiness be our true aim, then are we all astray. 'Happy,' my brother?\nFirst of all, what difference is it whether thou art happy or not!\n'Happiness our being's end and aim,' all that very paltry speculation\nis at bottom, if we will count well, not yet two centuries old in the\nworld\" [Footnote: Sartor Resartus: \"The Everlasting No\" Past and\nPresent: \"Happy\" Leaving aside this last statement, which is an\nirrelevant untruth, we probably feel an instinctive sympathy with\nCarlyle, and a sort of shame that we should have thought of happiness\nas the goal of conduct. Carlyle goes so far in his tirades as to call our\nhappiness-morality a \"pig philosophy,\" which makes the universe out\nto be a huge \"swine's trough\" from which mankind is trying to get the\nmaximum \"pigs\" wash. Again he calls it a \"Mechanical Profit-and-Loss\ntheory\" In such picturesque language he embodies a point of view\nwhich in milder terms has been expressed by many.] But to say that we\nmust often oppose inclination in the name of duty is by no means to say\nthat we must do what in the end will make against happiness. The trouble\nwith inclination and passion is precisely that they are often ruiners of\nhappiness. The very real and frequent opposition of desire and duty is\nno support of the view that duty is irrelevant to happiness, but quite\nconsistent with the rational account of morality-that dates at least back\nto the ancient Greeks-which shows it to be the means to man's most\nlasting and widespread happiness.\n\nMust we deny that duty is the servant of happiness?\n\nWe may go on to point out various flaws in the doctrine, of which\nCarlyle is one of the extreme representatives, that the account of\nmorality as a means to happiness is immoral and leads to shocking\nresults.\n\n(1) The plausibility of the doctrine rests largely on its confusion\nwith the very different truth that we should not make happiness our\nconscious aim. It is one of the surest fruits of experience that\nhappiness is best won by forgetting it; he that loses his life shall\ntruly find it. To think much of happiness slides inevitably over into\nthinking too much of present happiness, and more of one's own than\nothers' happiness; it leads to what Spencer properly dubs \"the pursuit\nof happiness without regard to the conditions by fulfillment of which\nhappiness is to be achieved.\" Carlyle is practically on the right track\nin bidding us think rather of duty, of work, of accomplishment. But\nthat is far from denying that these aims have their ultimate\njustification in the happiness they forward. In order that remote ends\nmay be attained, it is often necessary to cease thinking of them and\nconcentrate the mind upon immediate means. To acquire unconsciousness\nof manner, the last thing to do is to aim directly for it; to acquire\nhappiness, the worst procedure is to make it one's conscious quest.\nYet in the former case the attainment of the ease of manner sought,\nand in the latter case the attainment of the happiest life for one's\nself and those whom one's action affects is the touchstone which at\nbottom determines the method to be adopted. The proper method, we\ncontend, is-morality. It is the method that Carlyle recommends. So\nthat in practice we agree with him, while parting with him in theory.\n\n(2) Carlyle evidently has in mind usually the thought that it is one's\nown happiness only that is put up as the end by the moralists he\nopposes. This was pure misunderstanding, however, or perversity. Other\nmen's happiness has intrinsic worth (or IS intrinsic worth, for the\nword and the phrase are synonymous) as truly as mine; and morality\nis concerned quite as much with guiding the individual toward the general\ngood as toward his own ultimate welfare. To this point we must return,\nmerely mentioning here the fact that no reputable moralist now preaches\nthe selfish theory.\n\n(3) A part of Carlyle's ammunition consists in the slurring\nconnotations which have grown up about the word \"pleasure,\" and even\nthe word \"happiness.\" Because of the practical need of opposing\nimmediate in the interests of remoter good, the various words that\ndesignate intrinsic and immediate value have come to have a less worthy\nsound in our ears than those words which indicate control for the sake\nof more widespread or lasting interests-such as \"prudence,\" \"duty,\"\nand \"virtue.\" Moreover, the word \"pleasures\" commonly connotes the\nminor goods of life in contrast with the great joys, such as the\naccomplishment of some worthy task or the service of those we love.\nAgain, it commonly connotes things passively enjoyed, rather than the\nactive joys of life, which are practically more important. So that\nto condemn \"pleasure\" as an end arouses our instinctive sympathy. A\n\"pleasure\" is any bit of immediate good, however involved with pain,\nhowever transitory, and dangerous in its effects. \"Happiness\" generally\nrefers to a more permanent state of satisfaction, including comparative\nfreedom from pain; a stable and assured state of intrinsic worth, good\nto reflection as well as to sense. Pleasures are easy enough to get,\nbut this safe state of happiness, full of rich positive worth, and\nimmune from pain both in action and in moments of retrospect, is far\nfrom easy. Hence it is better to use the word \"happiness\" for our goal\nthan the word \"pleasure.\" Carlyle, however, takes \"happiness\" in the\nlower sense and rejects it in favor of what he calls \"blessedness.\"\nThis gives him the advantage of seeming to have a new and superior\ntheory. But when we ask what \"blessedness\" is, it is apparent that\nit can be nothing but what we call \"happiness\" or the living of life\nin such a way as to lead to happiness.\n\n(4) There is another important practical insight underlying the\nprotests of Carlyle and those of his ilk, namely, that it pays to\ndisregard the minor ills and discomforts of life and keep our thoughts\nfixed on the big things. These minor ills do not matter much as they\npass; they are transient, and usually leave little pain for reflection.\nIt is the fear of them, the complaining about them, the shrinking from\nthem, the attending to them, that constitutes the greater part of their\nbadness. Carlyle has the same practical common sense that the Christian\nScientists show; but, as in their case, he lets his practical wisdom\nconfuse his theoretical insight.\n\nSympathize, then, as we all must with these anti-happiness preachers,\nwe may point out that their intuitions are quite compatible with a\nsane view of the ultimate meaning of morality. If morality does not\nexist for human welfare, what is it good for? And what else can welfare\nultimately be but happiness? Other proposed ends we shall presently\nconsider. But the happiness-account of morality leads to no dangerous\nlaxity. If any eudemonistic moralists have lived loosely, it was\nbecause they did not realize what really makes for happiness or had\nnot strength of will to cleave to it, not because they saw happiness\nas the criterion. An immature perception of this as the criterion without\na full recognition of its bearings may have misled some; it is possible\nto see a general truth clearly and yet evaluate wrongly in concrete\nsituations. But the converse of the truth that morality makes for\nhappiness is the truth that the way to attain happiness is morality.\nNo lesson could be more salutary. Correct concrete evaluations are\nmore important than correct abstract generalizations, and Carlyle is\nnearly always on the right side in the former. But his influence would\nhave been still more wholesome if he had added to his sound sermonizing\na sane and clearly analyzed theory.\n\nDoes the end justify the means?\n\nOur account of morality may be called the eudemonistic account, from\nthe Greek eudemonia, happiness, or the teleological account, from\ntelos, an end. It asserts, that is, that morality is to be judged by\nthe end it subserves; that end is happiness. We have seen the sort\nof protest that arises with respect to the word \"happiness.\" We may\nnow note a danger that arises from the use of the concept \"end\"; it\nfinds expression in the familiar proverb, \"The end justifies the means.\"\nConduct is to be judged by the end it subserves; therefore, if the\nend is good any means may be used to attain it. This has been the defense\nof much wrongdoing. The Jesuits who lied, slandered, cheated, and\nmurdered, to promote the interests of the Church, the McNamara\nbrothers, who dynamited buildings and bridges as a means toward the\nfinal end of attaining for laborers a just share of the fruits of their\nlabor, the suffragettes who have been burning private houses, sticking\nup mail-boxes, and breaking windows, have justified their crimes by\nreference to the great ends they expected thereby to attain. What shall\nwe say to this plea?\n\n(1) The motto means: Conduct in itself undesirable may be justified\nIF the end attained is important enough to warrant it. In every case,\nthen, the question must arise: Is the end to be attained worth the\ncost? To justify means that are intrinsically bad, it must be shown\nthat the end attained is so good as to overbalance this evil. WAS the\nadvancement of the Church worth the cost in human suffering,\nestrangement, and bitterness that the Jesuits exacted? IS the\nadvancement of labor interests worth the destruction of property and\nlife, the fostering of class-enmity and of moral anarchism that the\ncriminal wing of the I. W. W. stands for? ARE votes for women worth\nthe similar evils which British suffragettes are drifting into? Sometimes\na cause is so important that almost any act is justified in its\nadvancement. But such cases are rare, at least in modern life. Always\nthere must be a balancing of good and evil. And the trouble with the\nattitude of mind which we have illustrated is that the end sought is\nusually not so all-important as to warrant the grave evils which its\nseekers cause. When the Titanic was sinking, the boat's officers shot\nseveral men who tried to jump into the lifeboats ahead of the women\nand children. It was probably the only way to stop a mad panic stricken\nrush, which would have endangered the lives of all as well as broken\nthe chivalrous code which is worth so much sacrifice. The evil of\nshooting down unarmed and frightened men was great; but it was\nundoubtedly justified by the end attained. Whether any of the other\ninstances mentioned are cases where the evil done would be similarly\njustified by the end, if thereby attained, we shall not here discuss.\nBut the principle is evident. The end justifies evil means only if\nit is so supremely good as to overbalance that evil.\n\n(2) It is pertinent, however, to add two considerations. First, we\nmust feel sure that no less harmful means are available. And secondly,\nwe must feel sure that these evil means are really adapted to attain\nthe purpose. Is there no other way of securing votes for women than\nby the hysterical and criminal pranks our British sisters have been\nplaying? And will those irritating acts actually forward their cause,\nor tend to bring about a revulsion of feeling? Did the crimes of the\nJesuits make the Church triumphant? Not in the long run. Immediate\ngains may often be won by unpleasant methods, as in the case of the\nTitanic. But when the struggle is bound to be a long one, as in the\ncase of woman's suffrage and industrial justice, methods which (not\nto beg the question) would ordinarily be criminal are seldom in the\nend advantageous. The McNamara case hurt the I. W. W. sorely. Suffrage\nlegislation has possibly been retarded in Britain. And in both cases\nthere are probably more efficacious, as well as less harmful, ways\nof attaining the desired end.\n\n(3) It is strictly true that THE end, human welfare, justifies any\nmeans necessary to attain it. Whatever pain must be caused to bring\nabout the greatest possible human happiness is thereby exempt from\nreprobation. Whatever conduct is necessary for that supreme end BECOMES\nmorality, or virtue; for that is precisely what morality IS. For\nexample, it is undoubtedly necessary at times to murder, to steal,\nand to lie for the sake of human welfare; in such cases these acts\nare universally approved. Only, we give the acts in such cases new\nnames, that the words \"murder,\" etc, may retain their air of\nreprobation. We call murder of which we approve \"capital punishment\"\nor \"justifiable homicide\" or \"patriotic courage.\" If taking a man's\nproperty without his consent is stealing, then the State steals; but,\napproving the act, we call it \"eminent domain.\"\n\n(4) The motto has its chief danger, perhaps, in the tendency it\nencourages to ignore remoter consequences for the sake of immediate\ngain. This point we will consider under the following topic.\n\nWhat is the justification of justice and chivalry?\n\nIf the greatest total of human happiness is the supreme end of conduct,\nwas not Caiaphas right in deeming it expedient that one man should\ndie for the people, even though he were innocent of all sin? Were not\nthe French army officers sane in preferring to make Dreyfus their\nscapegoat rather than bring dishonor and shame upon their army? For\nthat matter, does not the aggregate of enjoyment of a score of cannibals\noutweigh the suffering of the one man whom they have sacrificed to\ntheir appetite, or the delirious excitement with which a brutal crowd\nwitnesses a lynching overbalance the pain of their solitary victim?\nYet our souls revolt against such things. We cry, ruat caelum, fiat\njustitia! Justice is prior to all expediency! Is this irrational, or\ncan it be shown to be teleologically justifiable?\n\nJustice is undoubtedly justifiable; and the only reason that we ever\nhesitate to acknowledge it in any concrete case is that we tend to\noverlook indirect and remote results and see only the immediate effect\nof action. The harm done by injustice consists not merely in the pain\ninflicted upon the victim. There is the sympathetic pain caused in\nall those who are at all tender hearted. There is the sense of insecurity\ncaused in each by the realization that he too might some day be a\nvictim; when justice is not enforced no man is safe. There is the\nstimulation given to human passions by one indulgence which will breed\na whole crop of pain. There is the danger that if injustice is allowed\nin one case where a great good seems to warrant it, it will be\npracticed in other cases where no such necessity exists. Men are not\nto be trusted to judge clearly of relative advantages where their\npassions are concerned; they must bind themselves by an inflexible\ncode. The cases cited are comparatively clear. No one would seriously\ncontend that cannibalism or lynching, the execution of Christ, or the\nbanishment of Dreyfus, made in the direction of the greatest happiness\nof mankind. But it has been seriously urged that the insane and the\nfeeble and the morally worthless should be killed off, as they were\nin some sterner ancient states. Why should we guarantee life and liberty\nto such as are a useless drag upon the community, spend upon them\nmillions which might be spent for bringing joy and recreation to the\nrest of us? Or again, if medical men need a living human victim to\nexperiment upon, in order to conquer some devastating disease, why\nnot pounce upon some good-for-nothing member of the community and force\nhim to undergo the pain? The considerations enumerated in the preceding\nparagraph, however, bid us halt. Imagine the anxiety and the anguish\nthat would be caused if some commission were free to determine who\nwere insane or feeble or worthless enough to be put out of the way!\nOr free to select a human victim for vivisection whenever experts deemed\nit wise! The widespread horror and uneasiness of such a regime, the\ncallousness to suffering it would engender, the private revenges and\ncrimes that might insidiously creep in under the guise of public good,\nare alone enough to render vicious such a procedure.\n\nIt is true that one person's suffering is less of an evil than the\nsuffering of many. The State, by universal consent, inflicts undeserved\nsuffering upon individuals when the social welfare seems to require\nit; as when it takes away a man's beloved acre to built a railroad\nor highway, or when it compels vaccination, or when it drafts soldiers\nfor the national defense and sends them to their death. When a man\nvolunteers to risk his life or to endure pain for his fellows we\nrightly applaud his act. In such a case the ill effects above-mentioned\ndo not follow, and the gain is clear; in addition, the stimulating\nvalue of the voluntary self-sacrifice is great. The American soldiers,\nwho risked their lives to rid Cuba and the world of yellow fever, by\noffering themselves for inoculation with the disease, stand among the\nworld's heroes.\n\nIt is also true that \"rights\" are not primitive and transcendent; their\nexistence rests upon purely utilitarian grounds. The right to liberty\nand life is limited by the community's welfare. So is the right to\nproperty. But in estimating advantage we must beware of a superficial\ncalculation. The concept of justice, and the enthusiasm for it, have\nbeen of enormous value to man's happiness. It is of extreme importance,\nfrom a eudaemonistic standpoint, to cherish that ideal. Even if in\nsome individual case a greater general happiness would result from\ninfringing upon it, we cannot afford to do so; we should find ourselves\nlapsing into less advantageous habits and incurring unforeseen\npenalties.\n\nChivalry is in like case with justice. It might have seemed better\nfor the world that the able and distinguished men should have been\nsaved from the Titanic-some of them were men of considerable importance\nin various lines of work-rather than less-needed women. But the effect\nof the noble example in strengthening the will to sacrifice self for\nothers, and in maintaining our beautiful devotion to woman, was worth\nthe cost. Fox was right when he said, \"Example avails ten times more\nthan precept.\" Even if the loss had been greater than it was, it would\nhave been better to incur it than to allow an exception to the code\nof chivalry. Such codes are formed with infinite pains and are very\neasily shattered; a little laxity here, a tolerated exception there,\nand the selfishness and passions of men rise to the surface and undo\nthe work of years. AT ALL COSTS WE MUST MAINTAIN THE CODE. In the end\nit pays. The greatest genius must run the risk of drowning in the\nendeavor to save the life of some unknown person who may be a worthless\nscamp. He may die and the scamp live, a great loss to the world. But\nonly so can the code of honor be maintained which in the long run adds\nso much positive joy to man and saves him from so much pain.\n\nIn most instances, though not in some of those cited, the reward of\njustice and chivalry is sufficient for the individual himself. As\nSocrates said to Theodoras, [Footnote: Plato, Theoetetus, 176.] \"The\npenalty of injustice cannot be escaped. They do not see, in their\ninfatuation, that they are growing like the one and unlike the other,\nby reason of their evil deeds; and the penalty is, that they lead a\nlife answering to the pattern which they resemble.\" \"On the other\nhand,\"-to supplement Plato with Emerson, [Footnote: Essays, First\nSeries: \"Spiritual Laws.\" Cf. George Eliot, in Romola: \"The\ncontaminating effect of deeds often lies less in the commission than\nthe hero the avowal of a just and brave act, it will go unwitnessed\nand unloved. One knows it himself and is pledged by it to sweetness\nof peace and to nobleness of aim, which will prove in the end a better\nproclamation of it than the relating of the incident.\" And, we may\nadd, a greater joy.]\n\nBut even in view of the cases where no apparent compensation comes\nto the individual, the ideals of justice and chivalry, like the more\ngeneral concept of duty, are among the most valuable possessions of\nman's fashioning. Cross our inclinations as they often do, cost dearly\nas they sometimes will, the habit of unquestioning allegiance to them\nis one of the greatest of all gains as means to the attainment by\nmankind of a stable and assured happiness.\n\nA brief discussion of the conflict of duty and inclination will be\nfound in Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, chap. XVII, first few pages.\nCarlyle's declamations against happiness are too scattered and\nunsystematic to make reference to specific chapters useful. The general\npoint of view may be found, more temperately stated, in F. H. Bradley's\nEthical Studies, the chapter entitled \"Why Should I be Moral?\"\nContemporary accounts of the nature of obligation will be found in\nthe International Journal of Ethics, vol. 22, p. 282; vol. 23, pp.\n143, 323.\n\nA discussion of the motto, \"The end justifies the means\" will be found\nin F. Paulsen's System of Ethics, book II, and chap. I, sec. 4. The\njustification of justice is treated in J. S. Mill's Utilitarianism,\nchap. V. [in the consequent adjustment of our desires, the enlistment\nof our self-interest on the side of falsity. The purifying influence\nof public confession springs from the fact that by it the hope in lies\nis forever swept away, and the soul recovers the noble attitude of\nsimplicity.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\n\nTHE JUDGMENT OF CHARACTER\n\nWherein consists goodness of character?\n\nCharacter is the sum of a man's tendencies to conduct. Our estimate\nof a man's character is a sort of weather forecast of what he will\ndo in various situations. Goodness of character consists, then, of\nsuch an organization of impulses as will lead to good acts-to acts\nproductive ultimately of a preponderance of intrinsic good, or happiness.\nThe blame and approval that attaches in our minds to certain acts becomes\nattached also to the disposition that is fruitful of such acts. A good\nman is he whose mind is so set and adjusted that it will turn away\nfrom evil deeds and espouse the right. We can say, then, with Dewey\nand Tufts, \"Goodness consists in active interest in those things which\nreally bring happiness.\" [Footnote: Ethics, p. 396.] Similarly, Paulsen\nwrites, \"Virtues may be defined as habits of the will and modes of\nconduct which tend to promote the welfare of individual and collective\nlife.\" [Footnote: System of Ethics, Eng. p. 475.] And Santayana\nputs it more tersely in the statement, \"Goodness is that disposition\nthat is fruitful in happiness.\" [Footnote: Reason in Common Sense,\np. 144.] It is easy, then, to understand the enthusiasm that men feel\nfor goodness; it is the resultant of the passionate longing to be\ndelivered from the domination of evil impulses, the instinctive joy\nin splendid and unselfish acts, the sense of relief and gratitude felt\ntoward those from whom one has nothing to fear. Contrariwise, the\nshrinking from a bad man springs primarily from the dread of what he\nmay do, from the disgust which the sight of his foolish and ruinous\nacts inspires and from various other reactions of the spectator which\nwe need not enumerate. If character were a sort of merely inward\npossession, unconnected with conduct, we should not Jeel thus toward\nit. Merely to FEEL virtuous is pleasant, but it is not important. Imputed\ngoodness must be judged by the kind of conduct it yields, and that\nconduct in turn by its consequences. \"By their fruits ye shall know\nthem.\" But this inward disposition, though important chiefly for its\neffects, is more important therefore than we are apt to realize. \"As\na man thinketh in his heart, so he is.\" The scientific study of\npsychology has emphasized the fact, which is open to everyday\nobservation, that even secret thoughts and moods influence\ninevitably a man's outward acts. What we do depends upon\nwhat we have been thinking and imagining and feeling. The\nGreat Teacher was right when he bade men refrain not merely\nfrom murder, but from angry thoughts; not merely from adultery,\nbut from lustful glances; not merely from perjury, but from the\ndesire to deceive. Epictetus puts it, \"What we ought not to do\nwe should not even think of doing.\" And Marcus Aurelius writes,\n\"We should accustom ourselves to think upon othing that we\nshould hesitate to reveal to others if they asked to know it.\"\nThis is sound advice. Without attempting to settle the problem\nof determinism or indeterminism, which falls properly within the\nsphere of natural rather than of moral philosophy, it is evident\nthat our conduct is largely the result of that set of potentialities\nwhich we call character, that our happiness is in great degree\nshaped by our inward mental states.\n\nHence the large role of \"motive\" and \"intent\" in ethical theory. High\nmotives and good intentions lead-sometimes to disastrous, acts we\nknow what place is paved therewith. We need the wisdom of the\nserpent as well as the innocence of the dove. But other things being\nequal, pure desires tend to right conduct. A man whose mind dwells\nupon the good side of his neighbors, who loves and sympathizes,\nand enjoys their friendship, will be far less likely to give vent to acts\nof cruelty or malice than one who indulges in spiteful feelings, fault\nfinding, and resentment. Our habitual thoughts and desires make\nus responsive to certain stimuli and indifferent to others. The words\nof our mouth and the meditations of our heart, as well as the trifling\nacts that we perform, in themselves however unimportant, have\ntheir subtle and accumulative influence in determining our momentous\nacts. The familiar case of the drinker who says, \"This glass doesn't\ncount\" can be paralleled in every field of life. It pays to keep in moral\ntraining, to cultivate kindly and disciplined thoughts, to forbid ill\nnatured and unworthy feelings, and self-indulgent dreams. Otherwise\nbefore we know it the barriers of resistance will crumble and we shall\ndo what we had never supposed we should do, some act that is the\nfruit of our unregulated inner life. [Footnote: Cf. George Eliot in Romola:\n\"Tito\" (who, having posed as a rich and noble gentleman, being\nunexpectedly confronted with his plebeian father, on the spur of the\nmoment disowned him with the merciless words, \"Some madman,\nsurely!\") \"Was experiencing that inexorable law of human souls, that\nwe prepare ourselves for sudden deeds by the reiterated choice of\ngood or evil that gradually determines character.\"] Can we say, with\nKant, that the only good is the Good Will? It is not uncommon for\ninstrumental goods to come to receive a homage greater than that\nwhich is paid to the ends they serve. It is notably and necessarily so\nwith the various aspects of the concept of morality; virtue, conscience,\ngoodness of character are actually more important for us to think about\nand aim for than the happiness to which they ultimately minister. But this\napotheosis denial of its fundamentally instrumental value. As with\nthe miser who rates his bank notes more highly than the goods he could\npurchase with them, an abstract moralist occasionally exalts the means\nat the expense of the end. We are told that only goodness counts; that\nits worth has nothing to do with its relation to happiness; that goodness\nwould command our allegiance even if it brought nothing but misery\nin its train.\n\nThe best-known exponent of this blind worship of goodness is Kant.\nHe writes, \"A Good Will is good, not because of what it performs or\neffects, not by its aptness for the attainment of some proposed end,\nbut simply by virtue of the volition; that is, it is good in itself\nIts fruitfulness or fruitlessness can neither add nor take away\nanything from this value ... Moral worth ... cannot lie anywhere but\nin the principle of the Will, without regard to the ends which can\nbe attained by the action.\" [Footnote: The Metaphysic of Morality.\nTo be found in Kant's Theory of Ethics, trans. by Abbott, pp. 10, 16.]\n\nSo far does Kant carry this worship of the idea of goodness that he\nseparates it from the several virtues that make up goodness in the\nconcrete and bows down before the resulting bare abstraction Good\nWill, the will to do good. This leads him to a curiously dehumanized\nposition. Prudential acts, he declares, are obviously good in their\nconsequences; they therefore deserve no praise; whatever one does\ncalculatingly, with view to future results, has no moral worth. And\non the other hand, whatever good acts one does instinctively, pushed\non by animal impulses, including love and sympathy, deserve no praise\nand have no moral worth. It is only what one does from the single\nmotive of desiring to do the right that awakens Kant's enthusiasm.\n\"The preservation of one's own life, for instance, is a duty; but, as\nevery one has a natural inclination to which most men usually devote\nto this object has no intrinsic value, nor the maxim from which they act\nany moral import.\" [Footnote: The Metaphysic of Morality, sec. I.] What\nshall we say to this?\n\n(1) Kant's statements are a mere crystallization of an unanalyzed\nfeeling; their plausibility rests upon our ingrained enthusiasm for\ngoodness. But if that enthusiasm be challenged, how shall we justify\nit? How do we know that good will is good, unless we can see WHY it\nis good? Many other things appeal to our instincts as good; may not\nthis particular judgment be mistaken, or may not all these other things\nbe equally good with good will? Kant's Hebraic training is clearly\nrevealed in his exaltation of good will; it reflects the practical\nLebensweisheit we have learned from the Bible. To the Greek it would\nhave been foolishness, fanaticism. We want not only good will, but\nwisdom, sympathy, skill, common sense. Also we want health, love, wives\nand children, friends, and congenial work. All of these things are\npart of the worth of life. What would it profit us if we lost all these\nand had only our good will! [Footnote: A reduction ad absurdum of the\nKantian view may be found in Cardinal Newman's statement of the\nCatholic Christian view. \"The Church holds that it were better for\nsun and moon to drop from heaven, for the earth to fall, and for all\nthe many millions who are upon it to die of starvation in extremist\nagony, so far as temporal affliction goes, than that one soul, I will\nnot say should be lost, but should commit one single venial sin, should\ntell one willful untruth, though it harmed no one, or steal one poor\nfarthing without excuse.\" (Anglican Difficulties, p. 190.)] The\nvaluation that ignores all natural goods but one is unreal, inhuman,\nfanatical; it leads when unchecked to the emasculated life of the\nanaemic mediaeval saint or anchorite. Kant's eloquent eulogy of good\nwill appeals to one of our noblest impulses; but that impulse is as\nmuch in need of justification to the reason as any other, and it is\nonly one of a number of equally healthy and justifiable natural\npreferences. Good will, the desire to do right, is perhaps, on the\nwhole, IN THE EMERGENCY, a safer guide to trust than warm-blooded\nimpulse or reasoned calculation. Moreover, it has a thin, precarious\nexistence in most of us at best, and needs all the encouragement it\ncan get. Practically, we need Kant's kind of sermonizing; we need to\nexalt abstract goodness and resist the appeal of immediate and sensuous\ngoods. So Kant has been popular with earnest men more interested in\nright living than in theory. But as a theorist he is hopelessly\ninadequate.\n\n(2) It is true that we admire good will without consideration of the\neffects it produces, and even when it leads to disaster. But if good\nwill USUALLY led to disaster we should never have come to admire it.\nChance enters into this world's happenings and often upsets the normal\ntendencies of acts. But we have to act in ways that may normally be\nexpected to produce good results. And we have to admire and cherish\nthat sort of action, in spite of the margin of loss. The admiration\nthat we have come to feel for goodness is partly the result of social\ntradition, buttressing the code that in the long run works out to best\nadvantage; and partly, of course, the spontaneous emotion that rises\nin us at the sight of courage, heroism, self-sacrifice, and the other\nspectacular virtues. But however naive or sophisticated a reaction\nit may be, its psychogenesis is perfectly intelligible, U and its\nexistence is no proof of the supernal nature of the goodness of \"good\nwill.\"\n\n(3) Kant argues as follows: \"Nothing can possibly be conceived, in\nthe world or out of it, which can be called good WITHOUT\nQUALIFICATION, except a good will.\" [Footnote: Op. cit, sec. I.]\nHe goes on to show that wit, courage, perseverance, etc, are all\nbad if the will that makes use of them is bad as in the case of a\ncriminal; while health, riches, honor, etc, may inspire pride or\npresumption, and so not be unmitigated thing that can in every\ncase be called good.\n\nBut is this so? May not a man have good will and yet do much mischief?\nIf courage, wit, etc, need to be employed by good will, so does good\nwill need to be joined with common sense, knowledge, tact, and many\nother helpers. Good will is good only if it is sanely and wisely\ndirected; else it may go with all sorts of fanaticism. If one says,\n\"It is still good qua good will,\" we may reply, \"Yes, but so are all\ngoods; courage is always good qua courage, knowledge qua knowledge,\"\netc. All harmless joys are good without qualification, and all goods\nwhatever are good except as they get in the way of some greater good\nor lead to trouble.\n\n(4) Kant's formula \"good will\" is ambiguous. OF COURSE a GOOD act of\nwill is good; that is a mere tautology, and gives us no guidance\nwhatever. Which acts of will ARE good is our problem. Kant, however,\nworked out his empty formula into a concrete maxim, \"Act as if the\nmaxim of thy action were to become by thy will a universal law of\nnature.\" But how should we WISH others to act in the given situation?\nIt would be quite possible for a lustful man to be willing that\nunrestrained lust should be the general rule; he would be much more\ncomfortable and freer if it were. There is nothing in the law of\nconsistency to direct him; men might be consistently bad as well as\nconsistently good. We have still no criterion, only an appeal to\ncoolness, to detachment from hot impulses and selfishness.\n\nPractically, what the Kantian viewpoint amounts to is an exaltation\nof conscience-a much more concrete (and variable) thing than this\nabstract formula. Do your duty, at any cost! Our hearts respond to\nsuch preaching, but our intellects remain perplexed, if the practical\napotheosis of goodness is not supplemented by an adequate theoretic\njustification thereof.\n\nWhat evils may go with conscientiousness?\n\nAt this point it may repay us to note more carefully the inadequacy\nof that mere blind conscientiousness which is the practical burden\nof the Kantian teaching. One would think that the only source of our\ntroubles lay in our lack of desire to do right! As a matter of fact,\nthere is a vast amount of good will in the world which effects no good,\nor does serious harm, for want of wise direction. Much of the tragedy\nof life consists of the clashes between wills equally consecrated and\npure. Conscientious cranks and blunderers are perhaps even more of\na nuisance than out-and-out villains; they hurt every good cause they\nespouse and bring noble ideals into ridicule; they provoke discouragement\nand cynicism. There is hardly a folly or a crime that has not been\ncommitted prayerfully and with a clear conscience; the saint and the\ncriminal are sometimes psychologically indistinguishable indeed,\nby which name we call a fanatic may depend upon which side we are on.\nWe may discriminate among the types of perverted conscience:\n\n(1) The fanatical conscience, the meddling conscience, that feels a\nmission to stir up trouble. Under this head come the parents who\ninterfere needlessly with their children's ways when different from\ntheir own, the breakers-up of love-affairs, the fault-finders, the\nmilitantly religious, all that great multitude of men who with prayer\nand tears have felt it their duty to override others' wills and impose\ntheir codes upon the world.\n\n(2) The obstructive conscience, that has become set and will not suffer\nchange. Here we can put all the earnest \"stand-patters,\" who resist\ninnovation of every sort. Slaves of the particular standards that they\nhappen to have grown up in, unable to conceive that their individual\nbrand of religion may not be the ultimate truth, horror-struck at the\nsuggestion that we should forsake the ways of our fathers, their\nconscientious conservatism stands like a rock in the way of progress.\n\n(3) The ascetic conscience, that overemphasizes the need of sacrifice,\nand deletes all the positive joy of life for the sake of freedom from\npossible pain. This particular misdirection of conscience is not\nprominent in contemporary life; but at certain periods, as among\nsome of the mediaeval saints, or the early Puritans, this hypertrophy\nof conscience has been a serious blight.\n\n(4) The anxious conscience, that magnifies trifles and gives us no\nrest with its incessant suggestions, lest we forget, lest we forget.\nThis type of over conscientiousness is a form of unhealthy self\nconsciousness, a bane to its possessor and a nuisance to every\none within range.\n\nThese familiar evils that may go with the utmost good will show us\nthat good will or conscientiousness is not enough. The conscientious\nman may not only leave undone important duties; his good will may lead\nhim to push in exactly the wrong direction and do great harm. There\nare thus two ways of judging a man. First, did he do the best he knew?\nDid he live up to his conscience? Secondly, did he do what was really\nbest? Was his conscience properly developed and directed? Our\napproval must often be divided; we may rate him high by the standard\nof conscientiousness, but low in his standard of morality. This is the\nfamiliar distinction between what is objectively right and what is\nsubjectively right. An objectively right action is \"one such that,\nif it be done, the total value of the universe will be at least as\ngreat as if any other possible alternative had been done by the agent\";\nwhereas \"it is subjectively right for the agent to do what he judges\nto be most probably objectively right on his information\"-whether he\njudges correctly or not. [Footnote: C. D. Broad in International\nJournal of Ethics, vol. 24, pp. 316, 320.] It may then be right (in\none sense) for a man to do an act which is wrong (in the other sense)\n[Footnote: Strictly speaking, there are four possible usages of the\nword \"right\": An act is right which (a) is actually going to have the\nbest consequences; which (b) might be expected, on our best human\nknowledge, to have the best consequences; which (c) the actor, on his\npartial information, and with his partial powers of judgment, expects\nto have the best consequences; or which (d) his conscience approves,\nwithout reference to consequences.] What is the justification of praise\nand blame? Kant was expressing a familiar thought when he wrote that\na man deserved no praise for either instinctive or calculating acts.\nWhy should we praise a man for doing what he wants to do, what is the\nmost natural and easy thing for him to do, or what he can foresee will\nbring about desirable consequences? Should we not praise only the man\nwho fights his inclinations, does right when he does not want to, and\nwithout foresight of ultimate gain?\n\nAs a matter of fact, however, we do praise and admire and love the\nsaints who do right easily and graciously. We do not refuse our\nadmiration to Christ because it was his meat and drink, his deepest\njoy, to do his Father's work; nor do we imagine him as having to\nwrestle with inner devils of spitefulness and ill-temper. The type\nof character we rate highest is that from which all these lower impulses\nhave been finally banished, the character that inevitably seeks the\npure and the good. And on the other hand, as we have just seen, we\noften blame the man who, with the noblest intentions, and at great\ncost to himself, does what we consider wrong.\n\nIt is thus true that our reactions of praise and blame are complicated\nand inconsistent. We often praise a man and blame him at the same time;\npraise him for following his conscience, and blame him for having a\nnarrow and distorted conscience to follow. Different people in a\ncommunity will praise or blame him according as they consider this\nor that aspect of his conduct. What, then, is the rationale of these\nemotion-reactions?\n\nObviously, the same natural forces which have produced morality have,\npari passu, produced these emotions; they are one of the great means\nby which men have been pushed into being moral. We praise people,\nultimately, because it is socially useful to praise them; the\napprobation of one's fellows is one of the greatest possible incentives\nto right conduct. We blame people that they and others may be thereby\ndeterred from wrongdoing. For ages these emotions have been arising\nin men's hearts, veering their fellows toward moral action. Neither\nblamer nor blamed has realized the purpose nature may be said to have\nhad in view; the emotional reaction has been instinctive, like sneezing.\nBut if it had not been for its eminent usefulness it would never have\ndeveloped and become so deep-rooted in us. If blame did no good, if\nit did not tend to correct evildoing, it would be an unhappy and\nundesirable state of mind, to be weeded out, like malice or\ndiscouragement. Praise might be kept for its intrinsic worth, its\nagreeableness, like sweet odors and pleasant colors. But actually we\nneed to conserve these reactions for their extrinsic value, as spurs\nand correctives.\n\nThe man who acts upon a calculated expectation of consequences\nis, indeed, to be praised, if the ends he has sought are good and his\ncalculation correct. Prudence, foresight, thoughtfulness are among\nthe most important virtues. On the other hand, the man who does right\ninstinctively is to be most admired; for to reach that goal is the aim of\nmuch of our inner struggle. The approbation we heap upon him, if not\nneeded to keep him up to his best, at least is beneficial to others, who\nthereby may be stimulated to imitate his goodness. Any sort of conduct\nthat is in line with human welfare is to be praised and loved and sung,\nand kept before the minds of the young and plastic.\n\nMore deeply rooted, perhaps, than the disparagement of praise, is\nthe compassionate revulsion from blame. \"He meant well\"; \"His\nconscience is clear\"; \"How could he help sinning with such a\nbringing-up!\" such pleas pull us up in the midst of our condemnation.\nAnd they must have their weight. Conscientiousness must be praised,\nwhile in the same breath we blame the folly or fanaticism it led to. And\nthe visibly degrading effects of environment should make us tender\ntoward the erring, even while, for their own sakes and the sake of\nothers, we continue to blame the sin. Society cannot afford to overlook\nsin because it sees provocation for it. There is always provocation,\nthere are always causes outside the sinner's heart. But there is also\nalways a cause within the heart, an openness to temptation, and\nacquiescence in the evil impulse, which we must try to reach and\ninfluence by our blame and condemnation. No doubt in like\ncircumstances we should do as badly, or worse. But to blame\ndoes not mean that we set ourselves up as of finer clay; it\nmeans only that we continue to use a weapon of great value\nfor the advancement of human welfare. A man always \"could\nhave helped it\" he could have if his inward aversion to the sin\nhad been strong enough; and it is precisely because blame tends\nto make that aversion stronger in the sinner and in all who are\naware of it, that we must employ it. Reward and punishment are\nthe materialization of praise and blame and have the same uses.\nWe reward and punish men not because in some unanalyzable\nsense they \"deserve\" it, but ultimately in order to foster noble and\nheroic acts and deter men from crime. The giving of rewards for\ngood conduct has never been systematized (except for Carnegie\nmedals, school prizes, and a few other cases), and the practical\ndifficulties in the way are probably insuperable. Indeed, the natural\noutward rewards of fame, position, increased salary, etc, would be\nspur enough, if they could be made less capricious and more certain.\nBut to restrain its members from injury to one another is so necessary\nto society, and so difficult, that elaborate systems of punishment have\nbeen used since prehistoric times. To a consideration of the\ncontemporary problems concerning punishment we shall return\nat a later stage in our study.\n\nWhat is responsibility?\n\nThere is one plea which exempts a person from blame- when we say\nhe was not responsible. Responsibility means accountability, liability\nto blame and punishment. We do not hold accountable those classes\nwhom it would do no good to blame or punish. Babies, the feeble\nminded, the insane, are not deterred by blame; hence we do not hold\nthem responsible. Beyond these obvious exemptions there are all sorts\nof degrees of responsibility, carefully worked out in that branch of the\nlaw known as \"torts.\" The principle upon which man has instinctively\ngone, and which the law now recognizes, in holding men accountable\nor, in other words, imputing responsibility-is the degree in which they\nmight have been expected to foresee the consequences of their acts.\nThe following set of cases will illustrate the principle:\n\n(1) We do not hold a man responsible at all for unforeseeable results\nof his action. If because of turning his cows into pasture a passing\ndog gets excited and tramples a neighbor's flower-bed, the owner of\nthe cows is not responsible for the damage; it would do no good to\nexact punishment for what was so indirectly and unexpectedly due to\nhis action.\n\n(2) But if his cows got over the wall and trampled the beds, he would\nbe held responsible, in different degrees, according to the\ncircumstances. If he had inspected the wall with eyes of experience\nand honestly thought it would keep the cows in, we deem him only slightly\nresponsible. He could have done nothing more; yet he must learn more\naccurately to distinguish safe walls from unsafe. It is fairer for\nhim to pay for the damage than for the owner of the flower- bed to\nsuffer the loss; such risks must be assumed as a part of the business\nof keeping cows.\n\n(3) If he was ignorant of the necessary height or strength of wall,\nwe blame him more. He has no business-keeping cows until he knows all\naspects of the business.\n\n(4) If there was a gap in the wall which he would have noticed if he\nhad taken ordinary care, we hold him still further to blame, and his\npunishment must be severer.\n\n(5) If he remembered the gap in the wall and did not take the trouble\nto repair it, thereby consenting to the damage his cows might do, his\ncase is still worse.\n\n(6) Finally, if he deliberately turned the cows into his field with\nthe hope that they would go through the gap and damage his neighbor's\nflower-beds, he is the most dangerous type of criminal, of \"malice\naforethought,\" and his punishment must be severest of all.\n\nIn such ways do we distinguish between traits of character more and\nmore dangerous to society, and adjust our blame and punishment to their\ndifferent degrees of danger, and the differing degrees of efficacy\nthat the blame and punishment may have. But throughout these are purely\nutilitarian, an unhappy necessity for the preservation of human\nwelfare.\n\nOn goodness of character: Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, chap. XII. F.\nPaulsen, System of Ethics, book II, chap, I, secs. 3, 5. Leslie\nStephen, Science of Ethics, chap. VII.\n\nThe Kantian theory: Kant's Metaphysic of Morality. A good edition in\nEnglish is Abbott's Kant's Theory of Ethics. There are many discussions\nof his theory. An interesting recent one is Felix Adler's, in Essays\nPhilosophical and Psychological in Honor of William James; see also\nthe chapter of Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, above mentioned; Paulsen, System\nof Ethics, book II, chap. V, secs. 3, 4; American Journal of Psychology,\nvol. 8, p. 528. On responsibility: Mezes, op. cit, pp. 29-35.\nSutherland, op. cit, vol. II, chap. XVIII. Alexander, Moral Order\nand Progress, book III, chap, III, sec.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X\n\n\nTHE SOLUTION OF PERSONAL PROBLEMS\n\nPERSONAL morality is the way to live the most desirable, the\nmost intrinsically valuable, life-in the long run, and in view of the\ninescapable needs and conditions of human welfare; the way to\navoid the snares and pitfalls of impulse and attain those sweetest\ngoods that come only through effort and sacrifice of lesser goods.\nThat is what morality is, with reference to the single individual alone,\nand that is ample justification for it. A recent writer phrases it as\nfollows: \"I would define goodness as doing what one would wish\none had done in twenty years-twenty years, twenty days, twenty\nminutes, twenty seconds, according to the time the action takes\nto get ripe Perhaps when we stop teasing people and take\ngoodness seriously. and calmly, and see that goodness is\nessentially imagination that it is brains, that it is thinking down\nthrough to what one really wants goodness will begin to be more\ncoveted. Except among people with almost no brains or imagination\nat all, it will be popular.\" [Footnote: Gerald Stanley Lee. Cf. also G.\nLowes Dickinson, The Meaning of Good, p. 141. Of morality he\nsays: \"Its specific quality consists in the refusal to seize some\nimmediate and inferior good with a view to the attainment of one\nthat is remoter but higher\".] The difference between the moral and\nthe immoral man is not that the latter allows himself to enjoy pleasant\nand exciting phases of experience which the former denies himself\nfor the sake of some good lying outside of experience, but that the\nlatter indulges himself in any agreeable sensation that he chances\nto desire, while the former conflict with greater, being content not\nwith any goods that may come to hand, but only with the attainable\nbest. [Footnote: Cf. G. Santayana, Reason in Science, pp. 252-53:\n\"Happiness is hidden from a free and casual will; it belongs rather\nto one chastened by a long education and unfolded in an\natmosphere of sacred and perfected institutions. It is discipline that\nrenders men rational and capable of happiness, by suppressing without\nhatred what needs to be suppressed to attain a beautiful naturalness.\"]\nWhat are the inadequacies of instinct and impulse that necessitate\nmorality? It would seem as if the best way to live should be obvious\nand irresistible in its appeal. But in truth we are commonly very blind\nand foolish about this business of living; we lack wisdom, and we\nlack motive-power at the right place. Instinct is altogether too clumsy\nand impulse too uncertain. We need a more delicate adjustment; for\nthis, intelligence and conscience have been developed. Morality is\nthe way of life that intelligence and conscience oppose to instinct\nand impulse. Not to be guided by their wisdom is to forfeit our\nbirthright, like Esau, for a mere mess of pottage. Some of the main\ntypes of difficulty that necessitate their overruling guidance we may\nnow note.\n\n(1) Our impulses are often deceptive. What promises keen\npleasure turns flat in the tasting; what threatens pain may prove our\ngreatest joy. Most men are led astray at one time or other by some\ndelusory good, some ignis fatuus-whoring, money-making, fame are\namong the commonest which has fascinated them, from the thought\nof which they cannot tear themselves away, but which brings no\nproportionate pleasure in realization, or an evanescent pleasure\nfollowed by lasting regret. \"Pleasures are like poppies spread,\nYou seize the flow'r, its bloom is shed\".\n\nAll sorts of insidious consequences follow secretly in the train of\ninnocent-seeming acts; the value of following a given impulse is\ncomplicated in many ways of which the impulse itself does not inform\nus. We are the frequent victims of a sort of inward mirage, and have\nto learn to discount our hopes and fears. Morality is the corrector\nof these false valuatiens; it discriminates for us between real and\ncounterfeit goods, teaches us to discount the pictures of our\nimagination and see the gnawed bones on the beach where the\nsirens sing.\n\n(2) Our impulses often clash. And since, as we have just said, the\nrelative worth to us of the acts is not always accurately represented\nby the impulses, we need to stand off and compare them impartially.\nNo single passion must be allowed to run amuck; the opposing voices,\nhowever feeble, must be heard. When desires are at loggerheads, when\na deadlock of interests arises-an almost daily occurrence when life'\nis kept at a white heat-there must be some moderator, some governing\npower. Morality is the principle of coordination, the harmonizer, the\narbitrator of conflicting claims.\n\n(3) We often lack impulses which would add much to the worth of our\nlives; we are blind to all sorts of opportunities for rich and joyous\nliving. We need to develop our latent needs, to expand our natures\nto their full potentiality, to learn to love many things we have not\ncared for. In general we ignore the joys that we have not ourselves\nexperienced or imagined, and those which belong to a different realm\nfrom that of our temporary enthusiasms. A lovesick swain, an opium\nfiend, are utterly unable to respond to the lure of outdoor sport or\nthe joy of the well-doing of work; these joys, though perhaps\nacknowledged as real possibilities for them, fail to attract their\nwills, touch no chord in them, have no influence on their choices.\nMorality is the great eye-opener and insistent reminder of ignored\ngoods.\n\n(4) We often have perverted impulses. We inherit disharmonies from\nother conditions of life, like the vermiform appendix and the many\nother vestigial organs which have come down to us only for harm. In\ngeneral we inherit bodies and brains fairly well organized for our\nwelfare; but there are still atavisms to be ruthlessly stamped out.\nThe craving for stimulants or drugs, sexual perversions, kleptomania,\npyromania, and the other manias, bad temper, jealousy- there is a good\ndeal of the old Adam in us which is just wholly bad and to be utterly\ndone away with; rebellious impulses that are hopelessly at war with\nour own good and must go the way of cannibalism and polygamy. Morality\nis the stern exterminator of all such enemies of human welfare.\n\nWhat factors are to be considered in estimating the worth of personal\nmoral ideals?\n\nThis summary consideration of the obstacles that block the path to\nhappiness through the heedless following of impulse, shows the\nnecessity of moral ideals; that is to say, of directive codes which\nshall steer the will through the tumultuous seas of haphazard desire\ninto the harbor of its true welfare. How, then, can we decide between\nconflicting ideals and estimate their relative value? It can only be\nby judging through experience the degree of happiness which they\nseverally effect in the situations to which they are to be applied.\nBut there are many factors which contribute to or detract from that\nhappiness in its totality; and a proper estimation of ideals must note\nthe degree in which they provide for each possible element of\nsatisfaction.\n\n(1) In the first place, the mere fact of yielding to\nan impulse, of whatever sort, brings a relief from craving, and a\nmomentary satisfaction. Just to do what we wish to do is, negatively\nat least, a good; and in so far every act desired is really desirable.\nAn ideal which crosses inclination must have this initial price debited\nagainst it. At times the restlessness of pent-up longing is so great\nthat it pays to gratify it even at some cost of pain or loss. But in\ngeneral, desire can be modified to fit need; and rational ideals rather\nthan silly wishes must guide us. It is dangerous to lay much stress\non the urgency of desire, and almost always possible with a little\nfirmness to hush the blind yearning and replace it with more ultimately\nsatisfying desires.\n\n(2) Normally, however, our desires represent real goods, which must\nbulk much larger in our calculation than the mere relief of yielding\nto the impulse. Not only is it ipso facto good to have what we want,\nbut what we want is usually something that can directly or indirectly\ngive us pleasure. The pleasure, then, to be attained through following\nthis or that impulse is to be estimated, both in its intensity and\nits duration. The certainty or uncertainty of its attainment may also\nlegitimately be considered. And this pleasure, though it is but one\nphase of the total situation, must be taken seriously into account\nin our appraisal of ideals which permit or forbid it.\n\n(3) A further question is as to the purity of this pleasure, i.e,\nits freedom from mixture with pain. Most selfish and sensual pleasures,\nhowever keen, are so interwoven with restlessness, shame, or\ndissatisfaction, or so inevitably accompanied by a revulsion of\nfeeling, disgust or loathing, that they must be sharply discounted\nin our calculus. Whereas intellectual, aesthetic, religious pleasures\nare generally free from such intermixture of pain, and so, though milder,\non the whole preferable even in their immediacy and apart from ultimate\nconsequences.\n\n(4) But the most imperious need of life lies in the tracing-out and\npaying heed to these extrinsic values, these after effects of conduct.\nThe drinking of alcoholic liquors, for example, not only stills a\ncraving that arises in a man's mind, not only brings pleasure of taste\nand comfort of oblivion, not only brings the quick revulsion of\nemotional staleness and headache, but has its gradual and inevitable\neffects in undermining the constitution, lessening the power of\nresistance to disease, and decreasing the vitality of offspring. Quite\ncommonly these ultimate consequences are the most important, and so\nthe determining, factors in deciding our ideals. Among them may be\nincluded the influence of single acts in increasing or decreasing the\npower to resist future temptations, and the gradual paralysis of the\nwill through unchecked self-indulgence.\n\n(5) Another important aspect of any moral situation lies in the\nrejection which every choice involves. Not only must we ask what a\ngiven impulse has to offer us, in immediate and remote satisfaction;\nwe must consider what alternative goods its adoption precludes. What\nmight we have been doing with our time and strength or money? Is this\nact not only a good one, is it the best one for that moment of our\nlives? An important function of ideals is to point us to realms of\nhappiness into which our preexisting impulses might never have led\nus, and whose existence we might scarcely have suspected.\n\n(6) Finally, we may ask of every proposed line of conduct, what will\nbe its worth to us in memory? Not only in our leisure hours, but in\na current of subconscious reflection that accompanies our active life,\nwe constantly live in the presence of our past. And the nature of memory\nis such that it cannot well retain the traces of certain of our keenest\npleasures, but can continually feed us upon other joys of our past.\nIt is imperative, then, for a happy life, so to live that the years\nare pleasant to look back upon. Vicious self-indulgence and selfishness\nare rarely satisfying in retrospection, whereas all courage and heroism\nand tenderness are a source of unending comfort. For better or worse,\nwe are, and cannot shirk being, judges of our own conduct. We may be\nprejudiced, and may properly try to correct our prejudices; we may\ndiscount our own disapprovals, and seek to escape from our own self-\ncondemnation. But after all, we must live with ourselves; and it pays\nto aim to please not only the evanescent impulses whose disapproval\nwill soon be forgotten, but that more deeply rooted and insistent\njudgment that cannot wholly be stilled. Regret and remorse are among\nthe greatest poisoners of happiness, and prospective ideals must bear\nthat truth in mind. \"No matter what other elements in any moment of\nconsciousness may tend to give it agreeable tone, if there is not the\nelement of approval, there is not yet any deep, wide, and lasting\npleasantness for consciousness. A flash of light here, a casual word\nthere, and it is gone. \"Just when we are safest, there's a sunset-\ntouch; A fancy from a flower-bell, some one's death, A chorus ending\nfrom Euripides, And that's enough\" to bring the shock of disapproval,\nand with it disagreeable feeling- tone continues till disapproval is\nremoved or approval is won. If there be won this approval, other\nelements of disagreeableness, however great, can be endured. The\nmassive movement of the complex unified consciousness of a Socrates\ndrinking hemlock, of a Jesus dying on the cross, whatever strong eddies\nof pain there be in it, is still toned agreeably, as it makes head\nconqueringly toward that end which each has ideally constructed as\nfit.\" [Footnote: H. G. Lord, in Essays Philosophical and Psychological\nin Honor of William James, p. 388-89.] No reference has been made,\nin this summary of the factors which determine our estimate of the\nworth of personal ideals, to the bearing of these ideals upon other\npeople's lives. Actually, of course, the social values of even primarily\npersonal ideals are impossible to overlook, and often bulk larger than\nthe merely personal values. This whole side of the matter will be left\nfor convenience, however, to the following chapter.\n\nEpicureanism vs. Puritanism.\n\nPersonal ideals have swung historically between two magnets, richness\nand purity, self-expression and self-repression, indulgence and\nasceticism. The crux of the individual's problem is the question how\nmuch repression is necessary; and man's answer has wavered somewhere\nbetween these extremes, which we may designate by the names of their\nbest-known exemplars, Epicureanism and Puritanism. Many differences\nin degree or detail there have been, of course, in the various historic\nembodiments of these ideals; but for the sake of making clear the\nfundamental contrast we may neglect these individual divergences and\ngroup together those on the one hand who have called men to a fuller,\ncompleter life and those who have summoned them to an austerer and\npurer life, free from taint of sin and regret. We shall then put in\nthe first group such well-known seers and poets as Epicurus, Lucretius,\nHorace, Goethe, Shelley, Byron, Walter Pater, Walt Whitman; we shall\nthink of the Greek gods, of the Renaissance artists, the English\ncavaliers. We shall think of the motto, \"Carpe diem,\" and \"Gather ye\nrosebuds while ye may\"; and perhaps of Stevenson's\n\n\"The world is so full of a number of things, I'm sure we should all\nbe as happy as kings.\" [Footnote: An excellent brief plea for this\nideal of the life that shall be rich in experience can be found in\nWalter Pater's Renaissance, the \"Conclusion.\"] In contrast to these\nfollowers are afraid of impulse, those who warn and rebuke and seek\nto save life from its pitfalls. We shall think of Buddha, the Stoics,\nthe Hebrew prophets, the mediaeval saints, Dante and Savonarola, the\nEnglish and American Puritans, or, in modern times, of Tolstoy. The\nideal of such men is expressed not by the wholesomely happy and carefree\nGreek gods, but by haloed saint, by the calm-eyed Buddha of Eastern\nlands, by the figure of Christ on the cross. The answer to the\nEpicurean's heedlessness is expressed in such lines as \"What is this\nworld's delight? Lightning that mocks the night, Brief even as bright.\"\n\nIt is condensed in the familiar \"Respice finem\"; the peace of its self-\ndenial shines out in Christ's \"Not my will but thine,\" and in Dante's\n\"In His will is our peace.\" Meager and cold and repellent as this ideal\nin its extreme expressions often seems, it appeals to us as the softer\nand irresponsible ideal of the Epicureans cannot. But obviously our\nway lies between the extremes. And after all that has now been said,\nour summary of the dangers inherent in each ideal may be very brief.\n\nWhat are the evils in undue self-indulgence?\n\nApart from the selfishness of self-indulgence, which is obvious upon\nthe surface, but with which we are not now concerned,\n\n(1) Self-indulgence, if unbridled, leads almost inevitably to pain,\ndisease, and premature death. For in the majority of men there are\ncertain instincts so strong and so dangerous -as, the sex-instinct,\nthe craving for stimulants and excitement-that where no repressive\nprinciple exists they tend to override the grumblings of prudence and\ndrag their possessor to disaster. It is impossible for most men, if\nthey give themselves over to the pursuit of personal pleasure, to keep\nto the quiet, refined, healthful pleasures which Epicurus advocated.\nTheir feet go down to death.\n\n(2) But even if the worst penalties are escaped, indulgence brings\nat least satiety, the \"heart high cloyed,\" a blunted capacity for\nenjoyment, ennui, restlessness, and depression of spirit. Keen as its\nzest may be at the outset, it is short-lived at best; and with the\nensuing emotional fatigue, pleasures pall, life seems empty, robbed\nof its meaning and glory.\n\n(3) Moreover, pleasure-seeking is cursed with the specter of\naimlessness; it entirely misses the deepest and most satisfying joys\nof life, the joy of healthy, unspent forces and desires, the joy of\npurpose and achievement, the joy of the pure, disciplined, loyal life.\nIt renders these joys unattainable; we cannot serve God and sense,\nideals and lusts of the flesh. The parting of the ways lies before\nevery man; and it is the perennial tragedy of life that so many, misled\nby impulse and blinded by desire, fail to see the beauty of holiness\nand choose the lesser good.\n\n(4) Especially as we grow older does it matter less and less what\nevanescent enjoyments we have had, and more and more what we have\naccomplished. Our happiness lies increasingly with the years in the\nmemory, subconscious most of the time but constantly potent in its\ninfluence, of our past. To have gratified the senses, to have tasted\nthe superficial delights of life, to have yielded to the tug of desire,\nleaves little in the way of satisfaction behind; but to have done\nsomething worthy, to have lived nobly, even to have fought and failed,\nis a lasting honor and joy.\n\nWhat are the evils in undue self-repression?\n\nAsceticism, like self-indulgence, is selfish. It asks, \"What shall\nI do to be saved?\" rather than \"What shall I do to serve?\" Endlessly\npreoccupied with the endeavor not to do wrong, the ascetics have failed\nto do the positive good they ought. The grime that comes through loving\nservice is better than the stainlessness of inactivity; as the poet\nSpenser puts it, \"Entire affection hateth nicer hands.\" And the\nemphasis upon freedom from taint of sin tends to produce a scorn of\nothers who do not thus deny themselves, a self-righteousness and\nPharisaism, a callousness to others, which distorts the judgment as\nwell as dries up the sympathies.\n\nBut apart from these dangers, and from a purely personal point of view,\nasceticism has its evil side.\n\n(1) An overemphasis upon self-denial sacrifices unnecessarily the\nsweetness and richness of life, stunts it, distorts it, robs it of\nits natural fruition. The denial of any satisfaction is cruel except\nas it is necessary. Purity, carried to a needless extreme, became\ncelibacy; the virtue of frugality became the vice of a starvation diet,\nproducing the emaciated and weakened saints; the unworldliness which\ncan be in the world but not of it was transformed into the morbidly\nlonely and futile isolation of the hermits. These are abnormal and\nundesirable perversions of human nature.\n\n(2) A reaction from needless repression is almost inevitable. The\nattempt radically to alter and repress human nature is nearly always\ndisastrous. Most of the ascetics had to pass their days in constant\nstruggles against their temptations, and many of them recurrently\nlapsed into wild orgies of sin, the result of pent-up impulses denied\ntheir natural channels. Morality should be rather directive than\nrepressive, using all of our energies for wise and noble ends, and\novercoming evil with good. A merely negative morality implies the\ncontinual dwelling of attention upon sin and the continual rebellion\nof desire. It keeps the soul in a state of unstable equilibrium, and\ndefeats its own ends.\n\nR. B. Perry, Moral Economy, chap, II, secs, II, III; chap, III, secs,\nII, III, IV. F. Paulsen, System of Ethics, book III, chap. II. S. E.\nMezes, Ethics, chap, X, XI, Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, chap, XVIII, secs.\n1, 2, 4; chap, XIX, sees. 1, 2, 4. Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy,\nchap. IV. H. C. King, Rational Living, pp. 93-102. W. dew. Hyde, The\nFive Great Philosophies of Life, chaps, I-IV. H. Bashdall, Theory of\nGood and Evil, book II, chap. III.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI\n\n\nTHE SOLUTION OP SOCIAL PROBLEMS\n\nDUTY, like charity, begins at home; and we need to take the motes out\nof our own eyes before we can see clearly how to help our fellows.\nTo keep physically well, pure, and prudent, following worthy purposes\nand smothering unruly desires, is our first business; and there would\nbe much less to do for one another if every one did his duty by himself.\n\nBut even with our best endeavors we need a helping hand now and then,\nand, indeed, are continuously dependent upon the work and kindness\nof others for all that makes life tolerable, or even possible. And\nthe other side to this truth is that we are never free from the\nobligation of doing our duty squarely by those whose welfare is in\nsome degree dependent upon us. No man can, if he would, live to himself\nalone; life is necessarily and essentially social. Personal and social\nduties are so inextricably interwoven that it is impossible except\nby an artificial abstraction to separate them. The cultivation of one's\nown health, for example, is a boon to the community; and to care for\nthe community's health is to safeguard one's own. Every advance in\npersonal purity, culture, or self-control increases the individual's\nvalue and diminishes his menace to his fellows; while every step in\nsocial amelioration makes life freer and more comfortable for him.\nSo close- knit is society today that an indifference to sanitation\nin Asia or a religious persecution in Russia may produce disastrous\nresults to some innocent and utterly indifferent individual in\nMassachusetts or California. On the other hand, there is no vice so\nsolitary and so can widespread social results. [Footnote: Cf. George\nEliot in Adam Bede: \"There is no sort of wrong deed of which a man\ncan bear the punishment alone. Men's lives are as thoroughly blended\nas the air they breathe; evil spreads as necessarily as disease.\"]\nSociety has a vital interest in the personal life of its members, and\nevery member, however self- contained he may be, has a vital interest\nin the general standards of morality. For purposes of analysis, however,\nit is convenient to make the distinction between the two aspects of\nmorality, the governance of intra-human and of inter-human relations;\nthe ordering of the single life and the ordering of the community life.\nOf the two the latter is even more imperative than the former, the\narbitration of clashes between individuals even more difficult than\nthe governing of the impulses within a single heart. We turn, therefore,\nto consider the problems involved in the general conception of social\nmorality, which we may define as the direction of the action of each\ntoward the greatest attainable welfare of all. Why should we be\naltruistic? That altruism (action directed toward others' welfare)\nis best for the community as a whole is obvious. In order to maintain\nhis life in the face of the many obstacles that thwart and dangers\nthat threaten him, man must present a solid front to the universe.\nAll clashes of interest, friction, and civil strife, all withholding\nof help, means a weakening of his united forces, an invitation to\ndisaster. And even where life becomes relatively secure and individualism\npossible, the greatest good for the greatest number is attainable only\nby continual cooperation and mutual sacrifice. So vital is it to each\nmember of the community that selfishness and cruelty in others be\nrepressed, that society cannot afford to leave at least the grosser\nforms of egoism unpunished. Men must enforce upon one another that\nmutual regard which individuals are constantly tempted to ignore, but\nwithout which no man's life can find its adequate fulfillment or\nsecurity. No man, then, can be called moral, can be said to have found\na comprehensive solution of life, however self-controlled and pure\nhe may be, if he is cruel, or even lacking in consideration for others.\nThis is the most glaring defect in both Epicureanism and asceticism;\nboth are fundamentally selfish. For the proper adjustment of life to\nits needs we must turn rather to Christianity, or to Buddhism, with\ntheir ideals of service; to the patriotic ideals of the noblest Greeks;\nto Kant, with his \"So act as to treat humanity, whether in their own\nperson or in that of any other, as an end, never as a means only\";\nor to the British utilitarians with their \"Every one to count for one,\nand only one.\" The question, however, persistently recurs, Why should\nthe INDIVIDUAL be altruistic? What does HE get out of it? To this we\nmay reply:\n\n(1) The life of service is, in normal cases, a happier life in itself\nthan the life that is preoccupied with self. It is richer, fuller in\npotentialities of joy; it is freer from regrets and the eventual\nemptiness of the self-centered life. [Footnote: Cf. Mill,\nUtilitarianism, chap. 2: \"When people who are tolerably fortunate in\ntheir outward lot do not find in life sufficient enjoyment to make\nit valuable to them, the cause generally is, caring for nobody but\nthemselves.\"] It is saner, less likely to be veered off on some tangent\nof morbid and ultimately disastrous indulgence\n\n(2) The altruistic life earns the gratitude and love of others, while\nthe selfish life remains isolated, unloved, without their stimulus\nand help. Ingratitude there is, of course, and the returning of evil\nfor good; on the other hand, the selfish man may hope for undeserved\nforgiveness and even love from his fellows. But in the long run it\npays to be good to others; bread cast upon the waters does return after\nmany days; normally unkindness provokes dislike, contempt, open\nhostility, retaliation, while kindness finds a natural and proper reward\nin return favors, esteem, and affection. No man can tell when he will\nbe in need of sympathy or of aid; it is folly so to live as to forfeit\nour fellows' good will. And finally, selfishness carried beyond a certain\npoint brings the penalty not only of the unfavorable opinion and\nprivate retaliations of others, but of the publicly enforced law. \"In\nnormal cases,\" we have said. And we must add that there are cases\nthough they are less common than we are apt to suppose in which the\ngood of the individual is hopelessly at variance with that of the\ncommunity. If our fellows could be counted on for a fair reciprocity\nof self-denial and service, we should not begrudge these necessary\nsacrifices. The sting lies not so much in the loss of personal\npleasures as in the lack of appreciation and return; to do our part\nwhen others are not doing theirs takes, indeed, a touch of saintliness.\nSocrates drinking the hemlock, Jesus dying in agony on the cross,\nRegulus returning to be tortured at Carthage, were deliberately\nsacrificing their personal welfare for the good of other men. And in\nnumberless ways a host of heroic men and women have practiced and are\ndaily practicing unrewarded self-denial in the name of love and\nservice, self-denial which by no means always brings a joy commensurate\nwith the pain. These are the abnormal cases; but the abnormal is, after\nall, not so very uncommon. And for these men and women we must grieve,\nwhile we honor and admire them and hold them up for imitation. Society\nmust insist on just such sacrifices when they are necessary for the\ngood of the whole, and must so train its youth that they will be\nwilling to make them when needful.\n\nWhat is the exact meaning of selfishness and unselfishness?\n\nSelfishness is the pursuance of one's own good at the expense of\nothers. A mistaken idea, which it is necessary to guard against, is\nthat selfishness must be conscious, deliberate. It is not uncommon\nfor a person accused of selfishness to say, or think, \"This is an unjust\naccusation; I have not had a selfish thought!\" But unconscious\nselfishness is by far the commoner sort; millions of essentially good-\nhearted people are guilty of selfish acts through thoughtlessness and\nstagnant sympathy. Conscious cruelty is rare compared with moral\ninsensibility. It cannot be too often repeated that selfishness is\nnot a way of feeling about people, it is a way of acting toward them.\nTo be wholly free from selfish conduct necessitates insight into the\nneeds and feelings of others as well as a vague good will toward them.\nThe girl who allows her mother to drudge that she may have immaculate\nclothes, the mother who keeps her son at home when he ought to be given\nthe opportunity of a wider life, is conscious only of love; but she\nis really putting her own happiness before that of the loved one. The\nowner of the vilest tenement houses is sometimes a generous and\nbenevolent-minded man, the luxuriously rich are often honest and glad\nto confer favors, the political boss is full of the milk of human\nkindness; but the superficial or adventitious altruism of such men\nshould not blind us to their fundamental, though often entirely\nunrealized, selfishness. A complementary fallacy is that which denies\nthe epithet \"unselfish\" to a man who enjoys helping others. Who has\nnot heard the cynical remark, \"There's nothing unselfish about\nSo-and-So's benevolence that is his enjoyment in life!\" Such a comment\nignores the fact that the goal of moral progress lies precisely at\nthe point where we shall all enjoy doing what it is our duty to do.\nAltruistic impulses are our own impulses, as well as egoistic ones;\nthe distinction between them lies not in the pleasure they may give\nto their possessor, or the sacrifice they may demand, but in the\nobjective results they tend to attain. Happy is the man whose DELIGHT\nis in the law of the Lord! Unselfish action is, in the broader sense,\nall action that is not selfish; in the narrower and positive sense,\nit is all action that tends to the welfare of others at the expense\nof the narrower interests of the individual.\n\nAre altruistic impulses always right?\n\nIt would be an easy solution for our problems if we could say, \"In\nevery case follow the altruistic impulse.\" But this simplification\nis impossible; the ideal of service is not such an Open Sesame to our\nduty. And this for several reasons:\n\n(1) There are frequently clashes between altruistic impulses. In fact,\nalmost all moral errors have some unselfish impulse on their side which\nhelps to justify them in the eyes of the sinner and his friends. The\npolitician who gets the best jobs for his supporters, the legislator\nwho puts through a special statute to favor his constituents, the jingo\nwho helps push his country into war for its \"honor\" or \"glory\"-these\nand a host of other wrongdoers are conscious of a genuine altruistic\nglow. They ignore the fact that they are doing, on the whole, more\nharm than good to others, because the smaller group that is apparently\nbenefited looms larger to the eye than the more widely distributed\nand less directly affected sufferers.\n\nAll of our most vexing moral problems are those in which benefit to\nsome must be weighed against benefit to others. Shall a man who is\nneeded by his family risk his life to save a ne'er-do-well? Shall we\ninsist that people unhappily married shall endure their wretchedness\nand forego the possibility of a happier union in order that\nheedlessness and license may not be encouraged in the lives of others?\nLife is full of such two- sided problems; it is not enough that an\nact may bring good to some, it must be the act that brings most good\nto most.\n\n(2) An apparently altruistic act, dictated by sympathy, and productive\nof happiness, may not be for the ultimate good of the very person made\nhappy. To give everything they want to children is inevitably to\n\"spoil\" them, as we rightly say; to spoil their own happiness in the\nlong run as well as their usefulness to others. To condone another's\nsin and save him the unpleasantness of rebuke or the inflicting of\na penalty is often the worst thing that could be done to him. To give\nalms to a beggar may mean to assist his moral degeneration and in the\nlong run increase his misery.\n\n(3) Even when an act superficially egoistic conflicts with one that\nseems altruistic, the greatest good of the community often dictates\nthe former. There is, as Trumbull used to put it, a \"duty of refusing\nto do good.\" A man who can best serve the common good by concentrating\nhis strength on that work where his particular ability or training\nmakes him most effective, may be justified in refusing other calls\nupon his energies, however intrinsically worthy. An Edison would be\ndoing wrong to spend his afternoons in social service, a Burbank has\nno right to diminish his resources by giving a public library. Emerson\ndeserves our commendation for refusing to be inveigled into the various\ncauses that would have drafted his time and strength. Even to the\nanti-slavery agitation he refused his services, saying, \"I have quite\nother slaves to free than those Negroes, to wit, imprisoned thoughts\nfar back in the brain of man, which have no watchman or lover or defender\nbut me.\" This brings us to the question how far a man may legitimately\nlive a self- contained life. Certainly there is a measure of truth\nin Goethe's saying, \"No man can he isolates himself\"; in Ibsen's \"The\nmost powerful man is he who is most alone\"; and in Matthew Arnold's\n\n\"Alone the sun rises, and alone Spring the great streams.\"\n\nA multiplicity of interests distracts the soul and often confuses our\nideals. By keeping free from social burdens some men, like Kant, have\naccomplished tasks of unusual magnitude.\n\nOn the other hand, we can match Goethe's assertion with another of\nhis own: \"A talent forms itself in solitude, a character in the stream\nof the world.\" Isolation tends almost inevitably to narrowness, to\nan abnormal and cramped outlook, to willfulness or Pharisaism, and\nusually to loneliness and depression. The only pervasively happy life\nfor man is the life of cooperation and loyalty. We may well \"withdraw\ninto the silence,\" take our daily communion with God in our closets,\nor our forty days in the wilderness, to win clearer vision and steadier\npurpose. But solitude should, in normal cases, be only an interlude\nof rest, or a quiet maturing for service. The ideal is perhaps expressed\nin Wordsworth's sonnet on Milton:\n\n\"Thy soul was like a star and dwelt apart. .... And yet thy heart The\nlowliest duties on herself did lay.\"\n\nThe organization of life implies a criticism of and control over\naltruistic as well as egoistic impulses. There is nothing inherent\nin the fact of a good being OTHERS' good to make it necessarily the\ngreatest good in a given situation. The ultimate criterion must always\nbe the greatest good of the greatest number; but an altruistic as well\nas an egoistic impulse may stand in the way of that end. Our altruistic\ninclinations are often perverted, non-representative, a matter of\ninstinctive and irrational sympathy or shortsighted impulse. And so,\nwhile one of the great tasks of moral education is to make men\nunselfish, that alone is not enough; unselfishness must be directed\nby reason and tact, rendered far-sighted and intelligent.\n\nWhat mental and moral obstacles hinder altruistic action?\n\nAlthough an altruistic impulse is not necessarily a right impulse to\nfollow, there are a great many altruistic duties which are clear and\nsummoning; and it is a never ending disappointment to the man of social\nconscience to behold the apathy wherewith obvious social duties are\nregarded. It will be worthwhile to pause and note the chief mental\nand moral obstacles that prevent a more general devotion to social\nbetterment.\n\n(1) The most formidable obstacle, perhaps, is the selfishness of those\nwho are themselves .well enough off. Our cities, and even, to some\nextent, our small towns, grow up in \"quarters\"; the rich living in\none district and the poor in another. This permits the suffering of\nthe latter to go unknown or only half-realized by the former. The\nwell-to- do have many interests and many pleasant uses for their money;\nthe call of the unfortunate-\"Come over and help us!\"- rings faint and\nfar away in their ears. Or they may excuse their callousness by the\nassertion that the poor are used to their evil living conditions, do\nnot mind them, and are as contented, on the whole, as the rich;\ncomplacently ignoring the fact that being used to conditions is not\nthe same as enjoying or profiting by them, and that contentment by\nno means implies a useful or desirable life. It is true that the needy\nare often but dimly conscious of their needs; in that very fact lies\na reason why the favored classes should rouse them out of their dullness,\nsave them from the physical and moral degeneration into which they\nso unconsciously and helplessly drift. The indifference of the fortunate\ncomes not so often from a deliberate hardening of the heart as from\na lack of contact with the needy or imagination to picture their\ndestitution. But blame must rest upon all comfortable citizens who\ndo not bestir themselves to help in social betterment because it is\ntoo much trouble or requires a sacrifice they are not willing to make.\n\n(2) Another serious obstacle lies in the distrust with which many\npeople regard any duty which they have not been accustomed to regard\nas a duty. This may take the form of an overdeveloped loyalty, that\nbows before the sacredness of existing institutions and labels any\nreform as \"unconstitutional,\" a departure from the ways that were good\nenough for our fathers. It may wear the guise of a lazy piety that\nwould leave everything with God, accepting social ills as manifestations\nof his will, and interference as a sort of arrogant presumption! It\nmay be a mere mental apathy, an inertia of habit, that sees no call\nfor a better water supply or bothersome laws about the purity of milk.\nOr it may defend itself by pointing out the uncertainties that attend\nuntried ways and warning against the danger of experimentation. To\nthese warnings we may reply that our altruistic zeal must, indeed,\nbe coupled with accurate thinking; unless we have based our proposals\non wide observation and cautious inference we may find unexpected and\nbaneful results in the place of our sanguine expectations. But we may\npoint out that it is \"nothing venture nothing have\"; we cannot work\nout our social salvation without experimenting; and, after all, ways\nthat do not work well can readily be discontinued. What is vital is\nto keep alive an intolerance of apathy and contentment, to realize\nthat we are hardly more than on the threshold of a rational civilization,\nto recognize evils, cherish ideals, and maintain our determination\nin some way to actualize them.\n\n(3) A further steady damper upon our altruistic zeal is the dread of\nraising the taxes. Humanitarian movements are well enough, but they\ncost so much! What is needful is to point out that poverty,\nunemployment, disease, and the other social ills are also costly;\nindeed, they cost the public in the long run far more than the\nexpenditure necessary for their abolition or alleviation. It pays in\ndollars and cents, within a generation or two at least, to make and\nkeep the social organism sound. A wise altruism is not merely a matter\nof philanthropy; it is also a matter of economy; a means of saving\nindividuals from suffering, but at the same time a means of\nsafeguarding the public treasury. If the community does not pay for\nthe curing of these evils it will have to pay for their results. \"It\nseems to me essentially fallacious to look upon such expenditures as\nindulgences to be allowed rather sparingly to such communities as are\nrich enough to afford them. They are literally a husbanding of\nresources, a safeguard against later unprofitable but compulsory\nexpenditure, a repair in the social organism which, like the repair\nof a leaky roof, may avert disaster.\" [Footnote: E. T. Devine, Misery\nand its Causes, p. 272.] The public must be educated to see the wisdom\nof investing heavily in long-neglected social repairs and reconstruction,\nwhich in the end will far more than pay for itself in the lowering\nof expenses for police, courts, prisons, hospitals, asylums, and\nalmshouses, in the lowered death-rate, immunity from costly disease,\nand increased working capacity of the people.\n\n(4) Finally, a hopelessness of accomplishing anything often paralyzes\nour zeal. This sometimes takes the form of a more or less honest\nconviction that poverty, unemployment, and other maladjustments are\nsimply the result of moral degeneration-of the laziness, extravagance,\ndrinking, or other wrongdoing of the poor; their suffering is their\nown fault, and they must be left to endure it. Of course such factors\noften-though by no means always-enter in. One may well say, \"Who are\nwe of the upper classes to throw the first stone?\" Under like conditions\nmost of us would have become as discouraged or demoralized, yielded\nto the consolation of some vice, or balked at the monotonous grind\nof factory labor. But however that may be, in so far as social evils\nare due to these faults, the faults must be attacked, not accepted\nas inevitable and incurable. The pressure that pushes men into them\nmust be eased, the ignorance and foolishness that foster them must\nbe dissipated by education and moral training. And for all the social\nmaladjustments that are NOT due to vice and sin, other remedies must\nbe found. The road to social salvation is long and beset with many\ndifficulties, but the goal is not hopeless of attainment; and every\nstep toward the goal is so much gain. Because we cannot now see how\nto remedy all evils must not be a pretext for refusing to lend a hand\nto movements that are of proved value.\n\nHow can we reconcile egoism and altruism?\n\nAlthough altruism is usually wise from the individual's own standpoint,\nit does not always seem so. The commonest moral clash is between the\nindividual's apparent good and that of others; the cases in which one\nman's position, wealth, success precludes another's are everyday\noccurrences. Must this conflict be eternal? Is there any way of\nreconciling these opposing interests except by an unhappy and\nregrettable sacrifice? Must life be a perpetual compromise, a \"social\ncontract,\" a treaty to make reciprocal concessions, with every one's\nreal interests at war with every one else's? Certainly the altruistic\nsummons cannot be ignored; we cannot all follow our egoistic impulses;\nin the common disaster we should be individually involved. And, indeed,\nthe altruistic impulses have become so deeply rooted in our natures\nthat, turn away from them as we might, they would yet persist in the\nform of an undercurrent of dissatisfaction and remorse. The only\npossible solution of the deadlock lies in the killing-off of the\nselfish impulses.\n\nThis is not a fantastic dream. We see in the ideal mother, father,\nhusband, wife, in the ardent patriot and religious devotee, this\nsloughing-off of the egoistic nature already accomplished. Love, and\njoy in service, are not alien to us; they are as instinctive as self-\nseeking; the hope of ultimate peace lies in the strengthening of these\nimpulses till they so dominate us that we no longer care for the\nselfish and narrow aims. We must cultivate the masculine aspect of\nunselfishness, the loyalty of the Greeks, the impulse to stand by and\nfight for others; and we must cultivate its more feminine side, the\ncaritas of I Corinthians XIII, the love that suffereth long and is\nkind, the sympathy and tenderness infused into a rough and rugged world\nby Christianity. In this highest developed life there will then be\nno dualism of motive; at the top of the ladder of moral progress\nindividual and social goods coincide. It is joy to the righteous to\ndo righteousness; it is the keenest delight in life for the lover of\nmen to serve.\n\nThe unselfish impulse has thus a double value; it blesseth him that\ngives and him that takes. It is more blessed to give than to receive,\nwhen the giver has reached the moral level where giving is his greatest\njoy. The development of sympathy and the spirit of service in modern\ntimes gives great hope that the time will come when men will\nuniversally find a rich and satisfying life in ways which bring no\nharm but only good to others.\n\nH. Spencer, Data of Ethics, chaps, XI-XIV. R. B. Perry, Moral Economy,\nchap, II, secs, IV, V.; chap, III, secs, V, VI. F. Paulsen, System\nof Ethics, book II, chap. I, sec. 6; chap, VI; book III, chap, X, sec.\n1. Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, chap, XVIII, sec. e. W. K. Clifford, Right\nand Wrong, On the Scientific Basis of Morals, in Lectures and Essays,\nvol. II. R. M. McConnell, Duty of Altruism. B. Russell, Philosophical\nEssays, chap. I, sec. V. J. Royce, Problem of Christianity, vol. I,\nchap. III.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII\n\n\nOBJECTIONS AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS\n\nHAVING now outlined the eudfemonistic account of morality, we may\nnote certain objections that are commonly raised to it, and certain is\nunderstandings that constantly recur.\n\nDo men always act for pleasure or to avoid pain?\n\nMany of the earlier theorists, not content with showing that the good\nconsists ultimately in a quality of conscious states, asserted that\nall of men's actions are actually DIRECTED TOWARD the attainment of\nagreeable states of experience or avoidance of disagreeable states.\nThere is no act but is aimed for pleasure of some sort or away from\npain; men differ, then, only in their wisdom in selecting the more\nimportant pleasures and their skill in attaining what they aim for.\nThis assertion, easily refuted, has seemed to some opponents of the\neudemonistic account of morality so bound up with it as to involve\nits downfall.\n\nThe classic statement of this erroneous psychology, which has been\nthe source of much satisfaction to anti-eudemonistic philosophers,\nis to be found in the fourth chapter of Mill's Utilitarianism. \"There\nis in reality nothing desired except happiness. Whatever is desired\notherwise than as a means to some end beyond itself, and ultimately\nto happiness, is desired as itself a part of happiness, and is not\ndesired for itself until it has become so. Human nature is so constituted\nas to desire nothing which is not either a part of happiness or a means\nto happiness\" A careful reading of Mill shows that he did not mean\nthese statements without qualification. But since they, and similar\nsweeping assertions, [Footnote: Cf. Leslie Stephen, Science of Ethics,\np. 44: \"The love of happiness must express the sole possible motive\nof Judas Iscariot and of his Master; it must explain the conduct of\nStylites on his pillar or Tiberius at Caprae or A Kempis in his cell\nor of Nelson in the cockpit of the Victory.\"] have been a stumbling-block\nto many, we must pause to note their inaccuracy, while insisting that\nthey are no part of a sound utilitarian, or eudemonistic, theory. Far\nfrom the desire for happiness being the universal motive, it is one\nof the less common springs of conduct. Habit, inertia, instinct, ideals\ndrive us this way and that; we do a thousand things daily without any\nthought of happiness, because our minds are so made that they naturally\nrun off into such action. We desire concrete THINGS, without reference\nto their bearing on our happiness. We even go directly and consciously\ncounter to our happiness at times, deliberately sacrifice it, perhaps\nfor some foolish fancy. The idealist in politics expects to get no\npleasure out of what his associates deem his pigheadedness; but he\nhas seen a vision and he keeps true to it. Regulus did not go back\nto Carthage to be tortured to death for the pleasure of it, or to avoid\nthe greater pain of an uneasy conscience; he went in spite of foreseen\npain and the allurement of possible pleasure. When a man endures\nprivations for the sake of posthumous fame, it is not that he expects\nto enjoy that fame when it comes, or expects others to enjoy it; he\nis simply so made that he cannot resist the sway of that ambition which\nwill bring him no good. The pursuit of pleasure is a sophisticated\nimpulse which appears in marked degree only in a few self-conscious\nand idle individuals. William James gave the deathblow to this\npleasure-seeking psychology. \"Important as is the influence of pleasures\nand pains upon our movements, they are far from being our only stimuli.\nWith the manifestations of instinct and emotional expression, for\nexample, they have absolutely nothing to do. Who smiles for the pleasure\nof smiling, or frowns for the pleasure of the frown? Who blushes to\nescape the discomfort of not blushing? Or who in anger, grief, or fear\nis actuated to the movements which he makes by the pleasures which\nthey yield? In all these cases the movements are discharged fatally\nby the vis a tergo which the stimulus exerts upon a nervous system\nframed to respond in just that way. The IMPULSIVE QUALITY of mental\nstates is an attribute behind which we cannot go.\" [Footnote: W. James,\nPsychology, vol. II, p. 550.] It is not true, then, that love of pleasure\nand fear of pain are the universal motives. It is not true that we\ninevitably act along the line of least hedonic resistance, that pain\nnecessarily veers us off and pleasure irresistibly attracts. By force\nof will, by \"suggestion\" or training, we can go directly counter to\nthe pull of pleasure. It is true that we should not have the instincts\nand habits and impulses that we do were they not in general useful\nfor our existence or happiness. But the evolutionary process has been\nclumsy; we are not properly adjusted; we become the victims of ideas\nfixes; ideas and activities obsess us quite without relation to their\nhedonic value. So pleasure and pain are not usually the impelling force\nor conscious motive behind conduct. What they are is-the touchstone,\nthe criterion, the justification.\n\nWe do not act in ways that bring the greatest happiness, but we ought\nto. We do not consciously seek happiness, and we ought not to. We ought\nto continue to care for THINGS and for IDEALS; but the things and\nideals we care and work for ought to be such that through them man's\nwelfare is advanced.\n\nAre pleasures and pains incommensurable?\n\nAn objection commonly raised is that pleasures and pains of various\nsorts are incommensurable; that therefore no calculation of relative\nadvantage is possible; and that the eudaemonistie criterion for action\nis thereby made impracticable and useless.\n\n(1) To this we may reply that the estimation of the relative worth\nof different kinds of experience is, indeed, often very difficult.\nBut on any theory the decision as to the right is equally complicated\nand puzzling. The fact that the criterion is difficult to use is no\nevidence that it is not the right criterion. Which set of consequences\nwill be of most intrinsic worth, it is sometimes impossible to know.\nBut one set is, nevertheless, of more intrinsic worth, and the act\nthat secures them is the best act, even though we do not recognize\nit as such. There will continue to be, many differences of judgment\nas to which of alternative possible experiences is the more desirable.\nBut that uncertainty does not alter the fundamental fact that some\nexperiences ARE intrinsically more desirable than others and more\ndeserving of pursuit.\n\n\"A debtor who cannot pay me offers to compound for his debt by making\nover one of sundry things he possesses- a diamond ornament, a silver\nvase, a picture, a carriage. Other questions being set aside, I assert\nit to be my pecuniary interest to choose the most valuable of these,\nbut I cannot say which is the most valuable. Does the proposition that\nit is my pecuniary interest to choose the most valuable, therefore,\nbecome doubtful? Must I not choose as well as I can, and if I choose\nwrongly, must I give up my ground of choice? Must I infer that in\nmatters of business I may not act on the principle that, other things\nequal, the more profitable transaction is to be preferred, because,\nin many cases, I cannot say which is the more profitable and have often\nchosen the less profitable? Because I believe that of many dangerous\ncourses I ought to take the least dangerous, do I make 'the fundamental\nassumption' that courses can be arranged according to a scale of\ndangerousness, and must I abandon my belief if I cannot so arrange\nthem?\" [Footnote: H. Spencer, Data of Ethics, chap. IX.]\n\n(2) If it is practically impossible to calculate the relative worth\nof consequences in many cases, it is yet easy enough to do so in the\ngreat majority of moral situations. In most cases the preponderance\nof value is clear. That selfishness and self-indulgence are not worth\nwhile; that abstinence from pleasure-giving drugs and intoxicating\nliquors is worth the sacrifice; that truth and honesty, the law-abiding\nspirit, the spirit of service, friendliness and courtesy, sanitary\nmeasures, incorruptible courts, and a thousand other things are worth\nthe effort and cost of acquiring them, is indisputable. It is only\nin some peculiarly balanced situations that we find practical difficulty\nin deciding. If morality were limited to the cases where we can be\nsure on which side the greater good or lesser evil lies, we should\nnot be shorn of much of our present code.\n\n(3) It would, of course, be impracticable to stop and calculate at\nthe moment when action is needed. But such continual recalculation\nis unnecessary. Our ancestors, after many experiments, have found\nsolutions for all the familiar types of situation; the results of their\nthought are crystallized for us in the ideals that press upon us from\nwithout and the voice of conscience that calls to us within. Forces\nbeyond the individual human mind have taken care of these things and\nslowly steered man, with all his passions and caprices, toward his\nown better welfare. It is only in moments when we long to understand\nand justify our ideals, or when some unusually baffling problem arises,\nthat we need to calculate and weigh relative advantage and\ndisadvantage. And that is what, in such situations, most people do.\n\nAre some pleasures worthier than others?\n\nUndiscriminating critics have often condemned the eudsemonistic\ncriterion on the ground that any sort of pleasure is rated equally\nhigh on its scale so long as it is pleasure. \"Pushpin as good as poetry!\"\nseems to some the height of sarcasm. Socrates says in the Philebus,\n\"Do we not say that the intemperate has pleasure, and that the temperate\nhas pleasure in his very temperance, and that the fool is pleased when\nhe is full of foolish fancies and hopes, and that the wise man has\npleasure in his wisdom? And may not he be justly deemed a fool who\nsays that these pairs of pleasures are respectively alike?\"\n\nWhy, however, do we rate the pleasures of temperance and wisdom above\nthose of intemperance and folly? Simply because of their respective\nEFFECTS. INTRINSICALLY they may be equally desirable, or the latter\nmay even be keener pleasures? that depends upon the individual\ncircumstances; but there is no question about their relative EXTRINSIC\nvalue. There is always \"the devil to pay\" for intemperance and folly;\nwhile temperance and wisdom lead to health, love, honor, achievement,\nand many another good. As to push- pin-or let us say baseball-VERSUS\npoetry, it is only prejudice that makes us say we rate the latter\nhigher. Outdoor games are not only productive of a keener delight to\nmost people, they are extrinsically good as well, conducing to health,\nquickness of wit, self-control, and other goods. They ARE, in their\ntime and place, as good as poetry. The reason for the greater reverence\nwe feel, or feel we ought to feel, for poetry lies in the fact that\nit takes much more mental cultivation to acquire the taste for it;\nthe love of poetry is a sort of patrician distinction. It is also true\nthat poetry opens up to its lover a much wider range of enjoyments;\nit opens his eyes to the beauty and significance and pathos in the\nworld; it is immensely educative, and inspiring to the spiritual life.\nThe love of broadening and inspiring things requires cultivation in\nmost of us; so that we praise and honor such things and urge people\ntoward them. Pushpin, or baseball, NEEDS no apotheosis. But if we ever\ndevelop into a race of anaemic bookworms, we shall have to glorify\nsport and learn to shrug our shoulders at the soft and easy enjoyments\nof poetry. Nothing is more obvious than the utilitarian nature of such\nhabitual judgments and attitudes.\n\nOne of the Platonic illustrations, often brought up, is that of the\nhappy oyster. [Footnote: Philebus, 22. \"Is such a life eligible?\" asks\nSocrates. Later (40), he agrees that \"a man must be admitted to have\nreal pleasure who is pleased with anything or anyhow,\" but asks if\nit is not true that some pleasures are \"false.\" Protarchus hits the\nnail on the head by replying, \"No one would call pleasures bad because\nthey are 'false,' but BY RASON OF SOME OTHER GREAT EVIL TO WHICH THEY\nARE LIABLE,\" i.e, because of their after-effects.] Who would wish,\nhowever miserable, to exchange places with it! Are there not other\nthings to be considered besides happiness? \"It is better to be a Socrates\ndissatisfied than a fool satisfied.\" And why? In the first place, we\nsuspect that the oyster's, or even the fool's, range of happiness is\nvery limited. We should hesitate to forego such joys as we do have,\neven if sorrow attends them, at so great a sacrifice. In the second\nplace, each of us has a deep-rooted love of his own personal memories\nand expectations; and except in cases of unusual depression of spirits\nfew of us would wish to lose our identity and become some other person\nor thing even if we knew that other being to be happier. In the third\nplace, a man knows HE could NOT be happier as an oyster; an oyster's\njoys (whatever they may be) would not satisfy him; he has other needs\nand desires. He must find happiness, if at all, in the satisfaction\nof his human cravings. The oyster's life, however satisfactory to the\noyster, would leave him restless and bored. If you are a Socrates,\nyou realize similarly that you could not FIND satisfaction in the fool's\nlife. You know that although you have sorrows the fool wots not of,\nyou also have a whole range of joys beyond his ken; and those joys\nare particularly precious to you. In the fourth place, the very words\n\"oyster\" and \"fool\" beg the question. \"Fool\" means by very definition\na sort of person one would NOT choose to be; and the very visualization\nof an oyster is repellent. Were one to offer as the alternative a happy\nlion or eagle; or a happy, free- hearted savage such as Chateaubriand\nand Rousseau painted, one suspects that not a few suffering men and\nwomen would jump at the chance.\n\nIt is not really important to decide, however, what any one would\nchoose. Our choices are biased and often foolish. The actual question\nis, Is the happiness of a fool, or of an oyster (if happiness it has)\nas worthy, as objectively desirable, as that of a wise man? And here\nagain we have to say, not EXTRINSICALLY so desirable. The wise man\nis he who finds his happiness in activities that conduce to his ultimate\nwelfare and that of others. The happiness of fool or oyster is\ntransitory, blind, and fraught with unseen dangers; it is of no value\nto the community in which they live. But INTRINSICALLY, just qua\nhappiness, it is-if it is-as good. What makes one form of happiness\nmore worthy than another is simply, in the first place, its greater\nkeenness or extent or freedom from pain, and in the second place its\npotentialities of future happiness or pain for self and others. When\nMill wrote, therefore, in his classic treatise, that \"some KINDS of\npleasure are more desirable and valuable than others,\" he showed a-for\nhim unusual-failure to analyze. Some kinds of PLEASURES are more\ndesirable, for the reasons summarized above. But PLEASURE, in the\nabstract, pleasantness, agreeableness, intrinsic worth, whatever you\nchoose to call it, is itself a quality; there can be more or less of\nit in a concrete experience, that is all. To speak of KINDS of pleasure\nis to mean KINDS OF EXPERIENCE which have the common attribute of\npleasantness. In themselves all kinds of experience that are equally\npleasant are equally worthy; there is no meaning to that adjective\nas applied to intrinsic immediate good. \"Worthy\" and \"unworthy\" apply\nto experience only when we begin to consider their consequences.\n\nIs morality merely subjective and relative?\n\nDifferent people find happiness in different ways; if morality is\nsimply the means to happiness, is it not relative to their varying\ndesires; is it not a purely subjective matter and without a fixed\nobjective nature?\n\nWe must discriminate. Morality is not relative to our inclinations\nand desires, because those often do not rightly represent our own true\nwelfare, still less the general welfare. Happiness is desirable whether\nour impulses are adjusted so as to aim for it or not. Nor is morality\nrelative to our opinions; an act may be wrong though the whole world\nproclaim it right. It is a matter not of opinion but of fact whether\nan act is going to bring the greatest attainable welfare or not. However\nbiased and shortsighted we may. be, the consequences of acts will be\nwhat they will be. In a very real sense, then, morality is objective;\nit is valid whether we recognize its validity and want it or not. It\nrepresents our needs more truly than our own wills, and thus has a\ngreater authority, just as the rules of dietetics are not a matter\nof appetite or whim, but have a rational authority over our caprices.\nMorality is not, like imagination, something we can shape at will;\nit is imposed upon us from without, like sensation. Its development\nis predetermined by the structure of human nature and its environment;\nwe do not invent it, we accept it. [Footnote: Cf. Cudworth (ca. 1688),\nTreatise, chap, n, sec. 3: \"It is so far from being true that all moral\ngood and evil, just and unjust, are mere arbitrary and factitious\nthings, that are created wholly by will, that (if we would speak\nproperly) we must needs say that nothing is morally good or evil, just\nor unjust, by mere will without nature, because everything is what\nit is by nature, and not by will.\" A good recent discussion bearing\nupon the question of the relativity of morality will be found in\nSantayana's Winds of Doctrine, pp. 138-154.] But although imposed upon\nour restive impulses, it is not imposed by any alien and arbitrary\nwill. It is imposed by the same cosmos that set our consciousness into\nrelation with a given kind of body in a given world. Submission to\nit is simply submission to the laws of our own natures. Lasting happiness\ncan be found only in certain ways; we must make the best of it, but\nit is for our own good that we obey. Morality is relative to our organic\nneeds and particular environment. It is a function of human nature,\nvarying with its variations. A different race of beings on another\nplanet might have to have a very radically different code. Ours is\na distinctively human code, bearing the earmarks of our humanity and\nstamped with the particular nature of our earth-life.\n\nTo say this is to admit that morality varies with different\ntemperaments and different needs. What is best for one person is not\nnecessarily best for another; what is right for an early stage of\ncivilization is not always right for a later. The patriarchal family\nwas a source of strength in primitive society; today it would be a\nneedless tyranny. Life in a tropical isle frees man from the necessity\nof many virtues which a more rigorous climate entails. The poet needs\nto live in a different way from the coal-heaver. Just so far as our\nindividual and racial needs vary-our real needs, not our supposed needs\nand pathological desires (and always bearing in mind the needs of\nothers)-just so far is what is right for one different from what is\nright for another. This is no condemnation of eudsemonistic morality.\nOn the contrary, a clear recognition of this truth would happily relax\nthe sometimes over-rigid conventions of society, its cut-and- dried-\nmade-on-one-pattern code, and make it more elastic and suitable to\nindividual needs.\n\nHowever, we are not so different from one another as we are apt to\nthink. The extenuation of sin on the plea that the \"artistic\ntemperament\" demands this, or a \"sensitive nature\" needs that, is much\noverdone. Differences in temperament are superficial compared with\nthe miles of underlying strata of plain human nature. \"A man's a man\nfor a' that,\" and must submit to the rules for human life. The man\nof \"artistic temperament\" does not know himself well enough. He feels\nsuperficial and transient cravings; he ignores his underlying needs,\nand the fundamental duties which, in common with all other men, he\nowes to his fellows.\n\nThe standard of morality is absolute and objective, then, for each\nindividual, and approximately the same for all human beings. He is\nwise who seeks not to mould his life according to his longings, but\nwho accepts the rules of the game and follows the paths blazed by the\nseers and doers before him. Only those individuals and those nations\nhave achieved success that have been willing to learn and follow the\nideals which life itself imposes, the eternal laws which religious\nmen call the will of God.\n\nFor criticisms of the account of morality here defended: F. Paulsen,\nSystem of Ethics, book II, chap. II. J. Martineau, Types of Ethical\nTheory, book II, chaps, I, II. T. H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics,\nbook in, chap. I, first half, book IV, chap. III. Dewey and Tufts,\nEthics, chap. XIV. J. S. Mackenzie, Manual of Ethics, 2d ed, chap.\nvi. H. Rashdall, Theory of Good and Evil, book I, chap, III; book II,\nchaps, I, II. W. Fite, Introductory Study of Ethics, part I. G. E.\nMoore, Ethics, chap. VII. In rebuttal of some of these arguments: J.\nS. Mill, Utilitarianism, chaps, II and IV. H. Spencer, Data of Ethics,\nchaps, IX, X. Leslie Stephen, Science of Ethics, chap. X.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII\n\n\nALTERNATIVE THEORIES\n\nAFTER this summary answer to the commoner objections to our account\nof morality, we should notice a few of the more persistently recurrent\nformulas that seem inconsistent with this explanation of its\nfundamental nature.\n\nIs morality \"categorical,\" beyond need of justification?\n\nTo Kant and his followers, as well as to many less philosophical minds,\nthe justification of morality by its utility has seemed unworthy.\nMorality is much more ultimate and imperious. The pursuit of happiness\nis not binding; morality is. The way to attain happiness is dubious\nand variable; the commandments of morality are clear-cut and certain.\nDifferent people find happiness in different activities; the laws of\nmorality are universal and changeless. Morality, therefore, is prior\nto the pursuit of happiness; its dictates are known by an independent\nfaculty. There is in us all an unanalyzable and unavoidable \"ought\";\nours not to reason why; ours but to do-and die, if need be. Morality\nis not a means to employ IF we wish happiness; in that case its precepts\nwould be but hypothetical, if you wish happiness, do so and so. No,\nits commands are categorical. The inescapable fact of \"oughtness\" is\nthe bottom fact upon which our ethics must be built. To the truth in\nthis manner of speech we must all respond. As we have seen, morality\nis not purely subjective and relative; it carries the authority not\nof opinion but of fact. The right, the best way, IS unconditionally\nbest, whether we are wise enough to desire it or no. The greatest good\nIS the greatest good, however narrow or short- sighted our impulses.\nKant expresses eloquently the absolute and inescapable nature of duty\nin its perennial opposition to our transitory and nickering desires.\n\n(1) But Kant is unfair in his picturesque contrast between the\nperplexities attending the pursuit of happiness and the certainty\nattachable to morality. As a matter of observation, moral codes have\nvaried quite as much as man's different ways of finding happiness.\nCases of moral perplexity are as common as cases of uncertainty with\nregard to the road to happiness; there is no such universality and\nchangelessness about morality as he assumes. If a certain code seems\nfixed and indubitable to us, it is in large degree because we have\nbecome accustomed to it and given it our allegiance; a wider\nacquaintance with other codes, contemporary or past, would shake our\nconfidence. Some fundamental rules are unquestionable-rules against\nmurder, rape, etc.; but just as unquestionable is the fact that these\nacts make against human happiness.\n\n(2) Only a man with an Hebraic training and rigoristic temper could\nthink of morality in this awestruck and unquestioning way. More\nBohemian people feel no such \"categorical ought\" in their breasts.\nAnd if a man feels no such \"categorical imperative,\" how can you prove\nto him it is there? Kant's theory is at bottom mere assertion; if because\nof your training and temperament you respond to it, and if you are\ncontent not to analyze and explain the existence of this imperious\npressure upon your will, you are tremendously impressed. Otherwise\nthe whole elaborate Kantian system probably seems to you an unreal\nbrain-spun structure.\n\nKant, though a man of extraordinary mental powers, had but a narrow\nrange of experience to base his theories upon, and lived too early\nto catch the genetic viewpoint. Hence there is a certain pedantic\nnaivete in his constructions. No man with any modern psychological\nor historical training ought to be content to leave this extraordinary\n\"categorical imperative\" unexplained. It is quite possible to trace\nits origin and understand its function; there is nothing unique or\nmysterious about it. Why should we bow down to a command shot\nat us out of the air, a command irrelevant to our actual interests?\nChildren have to do so, and the majority of the human race are\nstill children, who may properly acquiesce in the rules of morality\nwithout clearly realizing why. But the reflective man should not be\ncontent to yield himself to the yoke unless he can see its necessity\nand value. The \"ought,\" the knowledge of what is right, antedates\nthe individual's experience of what is best, and so seems mysterious\nand a priori to him; but it does not antedate the racial experience; it\nis rather its fruit. The teleology of conscience is very simple, and its\ngenesis and development purely natural.\n\n(3) The \"ought\" seems more objective than \"conscience,\" more\nimpersonal. Just so does \"beauty\" seem more impersonal and objective\nthan our pleasure in contemplating nature and art. It is a constant\ntendency of the mind to project its values out of itself; to create\n\"universes of discourse\" that seem more stable and real than its own\nfleeting states. All that exists psychologically is a sense of pleasure\nat looking at certain combinations of outer objects; but that pleasure\nis constantly evoked by that peculiar combination, both in our own\nmind and in others'. So we objectify that pleasure and call it the\n\"beauty\" of the object. Similarly, all that exists psychologically\nis a certain felt pressure, certain emotions and ideas and pushes whose\nteleology is not realized. But we objectify that constantly and pretty\nuniversally felt pressure and think of an impersonal, objective \"ought.\"\nAll the arts are expressible in \"oughts\"; and if there is a more\nauthoritative and categorical nature to moral laws than there is, for\nexample, to the aesthetic laws that art-study reveals, it is because\naesthetics deals with only one aspect of human good and ethics with\nits totality. Indeed, every impulse is, in its initial push, categorical,\noffering no reasons, simply pressing upon us with its requirements.\nHunger and thirst and sex-desire do not say to us, \"If you desire to\nbe happy, eat, drink, and gratify your passion\"; they call to us with\nan imperious and immediate demand. The demand of the moral law\nis more insistent and more authoritative simply because it represents\na far more widespread and lasting need.\n\n(4) Kant's \"categorical imperative\" is purely formal and empty. We\nOUGHT, we OUGHT-but what? It leads, if to anything, to a mere\nemotional reinforcement of our preexisting moral conceptions, to that\ncanonization of good will as the one and only good, which is Kant's\nown position, but which we have found inadequate and misleading.\nWhen we come to new situations it has no clue to offer. How do we\nactually decide in such cases? By imagining the consequences of acts\nand seeing their relative productiveness of happiness and pain. Or else\nby finding some already decided case under which we can put the new\ninstance. We are tempted to an act that promises profit, but something\nchecks us. Ought we to do this? Gradually it comes over us that this\nwould be stealing; and stealing we have already decided, or the race\nhas decided for us, is wrong.\n\nWe have to decide things in terms of our welfare, or of those already\nstereotyped decisions which represent the half-conscious strivings\nof past generations for human welfare. There is no other way; the\nconception of an imperious impersonal \"ought\" bearing ruthlessly down\nupon us gives no help whatsoever.\n\nA later and English expression of the feeling that morality needs no\njustification may be found in Bradley's ETHICAL STUDIES. [Footnote:\nPages 56-57.] \"To take virtue as a mere means to an ulterior end is\nin direct antagonism to the voice of moral consciousness. That\nconsciousness, when unwarped by selfishness and not blinded by\nsophistry, is convinced that to ask for the Why is simple immorality;\nto do good for its own sake is virtue, to do it for some ulterior end\nor object...is never virtue...Virtue not only does seem to be, but\nis, an end in itself. Against the base mechanical which meets us on\nall sides, with its 'What is the use' of goodness, or beauty, or truth,\nthere is but one fitting answer from the friends of science, or art,\nor religion and virtue, 'We do not know and we do not care.'\"\n\n(1) But morality would then be a mere arbitrary tyranny; if it were\nof no use, the sacrifices it demands would be sheer cruelty. A moral\nlaw irrelevant to human interests would have no possible authority\nover us; it would not be a moral, i.e,. a right, law for us.\n\n(2) And what criterion should we have to judge what is virtuous?\n\"Virtue for virtue's sake\" is equivalent to \"the best way because it\nis the best way.\" But what makes it the best way? And how shall we\ndecide what is the best way?\n\n(3) We must be blind not to see the use of morality, even if we feel\nthat usefulness degrades it. All moralists agree that virtue does\nactually lead to happiness. But is that connection a mere accident?\nIs it not likely that the usefulness of virtue has something to do\nwith its origin and existence?\n\n(4) A real practical value of the motto \"Virtue for virtue's sake\"\nlies in the implied rejection of virtue for INDIVIDUAL profit merely.\nThe moralist rightly feels that such proverbs as \"Honesty is the best\npolicy,\" \"Ill-gotten gains do not prosper,\" do not strike deep enough.\nEven if ill-gotten gain should prosper, it would be wrong. But it would\nbe wrong simply because of the damage to others' welfare, not for any\ntranscendental reason. The opponent of the eudaemonistic account of\nmorality nearly always identifies it with a selfish pursuit, by each\nindividual, of his own personal happiness. But that is, of course,\na very narrow and unjustifiable interpretation of it.\n\n(5) Another practical value of the motto lies in the implied contrast\nof virtue with expediency. Questions of expediency are questions of\nthe best means to a given end; questions of virtue ask which ends are\nto be sought. Expediency asks, \"How shall I do this?\" Virtue asks,\n\"Shall I do this or that?\" The counsels of expediency are thus always\nrelative to the value of the end, in itself unquestioned; \"this is the thing\nto do IF such and such an end is right to seek.\" The counsels of virtue\nare absolute-\"This is the best thing to do.\" It is rightly felt that in matters\nof right and wrong there is no \"if\" about it; you act not with relation to\nan end which may be chosen or rejected, on ulterior grounds. The only\nend to which virtue is the means is-the living of the best life. Virtue is\nthe ultimate expediency. But it is well contrasted with all those\nsecondary matters of debate for which we reserve the name\n\"expediency.\"\n\n(6) Finally, the motto is practically useful in advising us not to\nrely upon calculation in the concrete emergency, but to fall back upon\nan already adopted code, to love virtue as one does the flag, and follow\nit unquestioningly, as the soldier does his general. We must be willing\nto accept guidance and leadership. But every one knows that the flag\nis but a symbol; that the general's word is authoritative because it\nserves the best interests of the country. And our impulsive allegiance\nto virtue, and love of it, would be a mere silly daydream and empty\nsacrifice were it not for its loyal safeguarding of human interests.\n\nShould we live \"according to nature,\" and adjust ourselves to the\nevolutionary process?\n\nAccording to the Stoic philosophy, the criterion for conduct was to\nlive \"according to nature.\" \"What is meant by 'rationally'?\" asks\nEpictetus, and answers, \"Conformably to nature.\" \"Convince me that\nyou acted naturally, and I will convince you that everything which\ntakes place according to nature takes place rightly.\" [Footnote: Book\nIII, chap, I; book I, chap. XI.] And Marcus Aurelius writes, \"Do not\nthink any word or action beneath you which is in accordance with nature;\nand never be misled by the apprehension of censure or reproach. I will\nmarch on in the path of nature till my legs sink under me. Philosophy\nwill put you upon nothing but what your nature wishes and calls for.\"\n[Footnote: Book V.] Of this preaching Bishop Butler says that it is\n\"a manner of speaking, not loose and indeterminate, but clear and\ndistinct, strictly just and true.\" [Footnote: Preface to Sermons.]\nIn modern times this doctrine has taken the form of exhortation to\ntake our place in the evolutionary process. It is thought by some that\nto grasp the trend of existing natural forces is to know the direction\nof duty. We have only to keep in the current, to espouse heartily the\n\"struggle for existence\" and rejoice in the \"survival of the fittest,\"\nbecause it is nature's way. In a recent book by a Harvard professor\nwe read, \"Whatever the order of the universe is, that is the moral\norder...The laws of natural selection are merely God's regular methods\nof expressing his choice and approval. The naturally selected are the\nchosen of God...The whole life of [moral] people will consist in an\nintelligent effort to adjust themselves to the will thus expressed.\"\n[Footnote: T. N. Carver, The Religion Worth Having, pp. 84-89.] It\nis easy enough to point out, however, that nature man to follow. \"In\nsober truth, nearly all the things which men are hanged or imprisoned\nfor doing to one another, are nature's everyday performances. Nature\nimpales men, breaks them as if on the wheel, casts them to be devoured\nby wild beasts, crushes them with stones like the first Christian\nmartyr, starves them with hunger, freezes them with cold, poisons them\nby the quick or slow venom of her exhalations.\" [Footnote: J. S. Mill,\nThree Essays on Religion: \"Nature,\" p. 28.] The evolutionary process\nis cruel and merciless; multitudes perish for every one that survives,\nand the survivor is not the most deserving, but the strongest or swiftest\nor cleverest. Why should we imitate such ruthless ways? Nature is to\nbe not followed but improved upon. Not only morality, but most of man's\nactivity, consists in making nature over to suit his needs. \"If nature\nand man are both the works of a Being of perfect goodness, that Being\nintended nature as a scheme to be amended, not imitated, by man.\"\n[Footnote: Ibid, p. 41.]\n\n(2) Not only is there no reason WHY we should \"follow nature,\" but\nthe result of so doing would be any thing but what we agree is moral.\nHardly a sin is committed but was \"natural\" to the sinner. It is\n\"natural\" to lose our tempers; to be vain, selfish, greedy, lustful.\nNothing could be practically more pernicious than the idea that an\nimpulse is right because it is natural; that is, because it is common\nto most men. \"Following nature\" naturally means following our\ninclinations; nothing is more disastrous. Virtue necessitates self\ndenial, effort, living by ideals, which are late and artificial\nproducts. It is actually true, in its metaphorical way, that we need\nto be born again, to be turned about, converted, saved from ourselves.\nThe \"natural\" man is the \"carnal\" man; the \"spiritual\" man, while\npotential in us all, needs to be fostered and stimulated by every\npossible means if life is to be serene and full and beautiful. The\ndifference between the \"natural\" man and the moral man is the\ndifference between the untrained child, capricious, the victim of\na thousand whims and longings, and the man of formed character\nwhom we respect and trust. Morality is, of course, in a sense, natural\ntoo-everything that exists is natural; but in the sense in which the word\nhas a specific meaning, it is flatly opposed to that making-over, that\nreadjustment of our impulses, which is the very differentia of morality.\nThere is, indeed, a eulogistic sense of the word \"natural\"; to Rousseau\nthe \"return to nature\" meant the abandonment of needless artificiality\nand silly convention. But except in this sense, what is \"natural\" has\nno particular merit. The great achievements of man have consisted\nnot in following natural, primitive instincts, but in controlling and\ndisciplining those instincts.\n\nIf we were to imitate nature in making the survival of the fittest\nour aim, we should return to the barbaric ruthlessness of ancient Sparta\nor Rome, exposing infants, killing the feeble and insane, and becoming\njust such cold-blooded pursuers of efficiency as Nietzsche admires.\nThat such pitiless competition is moral, or desirable, no one but a\nfew cranks would on examination maintain. \"Let us understand once for\nall,\" says Huxley,\" that the ethical progress of society depends not\non imitating the cosmic process, still less in running away from it,\nbut in combating it.\" [Footnote: Evolution and Ethics, title essay.]\n\n(3) This cosmic defiance of Huxley's commands our approval; if\nmorality interferes with the evolutionary process, let it interfere;\nthe sooner an immoral process is stopped the better. But, after all,\nHuxley unnecessarily limits the meaning of the phrase \"the cosmic\nprocess,\" applying it only to that stage which antedates the\ndevelopment of morality. That development, however, is itself\nnatural selection, which in its earlier stages selects merely the\nstrong and swift and clever, in its later stages selects also the moral\nraces and individuals. So that to follow out the evolutionary process\nis, for man, after all, to follow morality as well as to cultivate\nspeed and strength and wit.\n\nThere is, indeed, a danger to the race from the development of the\ntenderer side of morality, in the care for the feeble and degenerate\nwhich permits them to live and produce offspring, instead of being\nruthlessly exterminated, as in ruder days. But this danger can, and\nwill, be met by measures which, while permitting life and, so far as\npossible, happiness, to these unfortunates, will prevent them from\nhaving children. Except for this removable danger, the development\nof sympathy and tenderness by no means involves a lessening of virility,\nbut is rather its necessary complement and check.\n\nIs self-development or self-realization the ultimate end?\n\nIt is no justification of morality to say that it is \"in harmony with\nnature.\" Is it an adequate justification to say that morality is what\nmakes for self-development or self-realization? A number of classic\nand contemporary moralists, fighting shy of the acknowledgment of\nhappiness as the ultimate end, have rested content with such expressions.\nDarwin wrote, \"The term 'general good' may be defined as the rearing\nof the greatest number of individuals in full vigor and health, with\nall their faculties perfect, under the conditions to which they are\nsubjected.\" [Footnote: Descent of Man, chap, iv.] Paulsen writes, \"The\nvalue of virtue consists in its favorable effects upon the development\nof life...The value of life consists in the normal performance of all\nfunctions, or in the exercise of capacities and virtues...A perfect\nhuman life is an end in itself. The standard is what has been called\nthe normal type, or the idea, of human life.\" [Footnote: System of\nEthics, book II, chap. II.]\n\n(1) Such a point of view gives opportunity for stimulating words. But\nit gives no guidance. Observation can teach us, slowly, what conduct\nmakes for happiness; but what conduct makes for \"self-development\"?\nThe fact is, the cultivation of any impulse will develop us in its\ndirection and preclude our development in other directions; along which\npath shall we let ourselves develop? Every choice involves rejection;\ninfinite possibilities diverge before us; which among the myriad\nimpulses that call upon us shall we follow? While still young and\nplastic, we may develop ourselves into poets or philosophers or lawyers\nor businessmen. In which of these ways shall we \"realize\" ourselves?\n[Footnote: Cf. William James, Psychology, vol. I, p. 309: \"I am often\nconfronted by the necessity of standing by one of my empirical selves\nand relinquishing the rest. Not that I would not, if I could, be both\nhandsome and fat and well dressed, and a great athlete, and make a\nmillion a year, be a wit, a bon-vivant, and a lady-killer, as well\nas a philosopher; a philanthropist, statesman, warrior, and African\nexplorer, as well as a 'tone-poet' and saint. But the thing is simply\nimpossible. The millionaire's work would run counter to the saint's;\nthe bon vivant and the philanthropist would trip each other up; the\nphilosopher and the lady-killer could not well keep house in the same\ntenement of clay. Such different characters may conceivably at the\noutset of life be alike possible to a man. But to make any one of them\nactual, the rest must more or less be suppressed.\"] It is evident that\nwe need some deeper ground of choice. May it not even be better\ndrastically to choke our natures, better to get a new nature than to\nrealize the old? Surely there are perverted natures, which ought not\nto be developed. In the name of happiness we can decide on\ndevelopment or non-development, as the need may be. But the\nideal of \"self development\" gives us no criterion. It is too sweeping,\ntoo indiscriminate.\n\n(2) Again, we may ask WHY we should develop ourselves. This ideal\nis in need of justification to the has a eulogistic connotation in our\nears; but to rely upon that is to beg the question. Strictly, it means\nonly the actualizing of potentiality, which may be potentiality for\nevil as well as for good. Concretely, if developing our natures led\nto pain and sorrow we should do well to resist such development.\nThe plausibility of the formula lies in the fact that the development of\none's self along any line is normally pleasant and normally conduces\nto ultimate happiness. The idea of it attracts us, and it is well that\nit should; it is intrinsically and extrinsically good. But it is the\nfact of possessing that intrinsic and extrinsic goodness that makes\nit a legitimate ideal. In sum, it is good to develop one's powers only\nbecause and in so far as such development makes for happiness or is\nitself an aspect of happiness. For happiness is the only sort of thing\nthat is in itself intrinsically and obviously desirable, without need\nof proof.\n\n(3) Practically, this ideal-tends to selfishness; it does not point\nto the fact that the best development of self lies in service. The\nideal is capable of this interpretation, but its emphasis is in the\nwrong direction. It is essentially a pagan conception, and practically\ninferior to the Christian ideal of service. Service cannot be the\nultimate ideal, any more than the Chinese in the story could support\nthemselves by taking in one another's washing; and it needs to be\njustified, like self-development, by the happiness it brings. But for\na working conception it is far better. Self-realization has never been\nthe aim of the saints and heroes. Imagine a patriot dying for his\ncountry's freedom, or a mother giving years of sacrificing toil for\nher child, on the ground of self-development! The patriot may feel\nthat through his sacrifice and that of his comrades his countrymen\nwill be freer or more united or rid of some curse i.e., ultimately,\nhappier. The mother thinks consciously of the happiness of the child\nshe serves. But except for the young man or properly be for the time\nself-centered, self-development makes but a sorry ideal. We may admire\na Goethe who cares primarily for the development and perfection of\nhis own powers-if he is handsome and clever and of a winning personality.\nBut the men we really love and reverence are those who forget themselves\nand prefer to go, if necessary, with their artistic sense undeveloped\nor their scientific sense untrained, so they may bring help and peace\nto their fellows. [Footnote: Cf. a recent story writer, Nalbro Hartley,\nin Ainslee's (a mountain-white is speaking): \"I reckon the best way\nto get on in this world is to learn just enough to make you all always\nwant to know more but to be so busy usin' what you-all has learned\nthat there ain't no time to learn the rest!\"] Goethe, with all his\ngenius, encyclopedic knowledge, and universality of experience,\nhis wit and energy and power of expression, stands on a lower moral\nlevel than Buddha, St. Francis, Christ.\n\n(4) Finally, the theory, if taken strictly, is immoral. To set up self-\nrealization as the criterion is to say that the self-realizing act\nis to be chosen EVEN IF IT SHOULD PRODUCE LESS THAN\nTHE GREATEST ATTAINABLE TOTAL GOOD. That such cases\ndo not occur, no one can prove; in fact, observation tends to the\nbelief that they do. This criterion is, then, not only practically but\ntheoretically selfish. Perfection of character should be our aim, yes.\nBut perfection of character is not to be found in a mere indiscriminate\ncultivation of whatever faculties we may have. It means the superposition\nof a severe discipline upon our faculties, a purification of the will,\ndirected by more ultimate considerations. Is the source of duty the\nwill of God? \"Obedience to the will of God\" describes the highest\nmorality, as does the phrase \"perfection of character.\" But is it, any\nmore than that, the ULTIMATE JUSTIFICATION of morality? Is the\nwill of God the SOURCE of morality? An adequate discussion of this\nquestion would involve a philosophy of religion, but a few considerations\nmay be useful, and it is hoped, not misleading.\n\n(1) How can we know what is the will of God except by considering what\nmakes for human welfare? Our Bible is but one of a number of holy books\nwhich are held to be a revelation of God's will. Even if we grant the\nsuperior authority of the Hebrew- Christian Bible, can we rely on its\nteachings implicitly? How do we know that it is a revelation of God\nexcept by our experience of the beneficence of its teachings? As a\nmatter of fact, there is wide disagreement, among those who accept\nthe Bible as authoritative, over its real teachings. A text is available\nfor every variety of belief. Christians usually emphasize those texts\nthat make for what they hold true, and slur over others. \"Look not\non the wine when it is red\" is preached in every Sunday School, while\n\"Take a little wine for thy stomach's sake\" is seldom quoted save by\nbrewers. The Bible, the work of a hundred hands during a span of a\nthousand years, represents a great variety of views. It is certainly\nan inspired book if there ever was one; so much inspiration could not\nhave come from it if none had gone into it. But to extract a satisfactory\nethical code from it is possible only by a process of judicious\nselection and ingenious inference. The Mosaic code is held by\nChristians to be now abrogated; the recorded teachings of Christ are\nfragmentary and touch only a few fundamental matters. How, for example,\nshall we ascertain from the Bible the will of God with respect to the\ntrust problem, or currency reform, or penal legislation? Times have\nchanged, our problems are no longer those of the ancient Jews; a\nhundred delicate questions arise to which no answers can be will of\nGod to be clearly and unquestionably known, why should we obey it?\nBecause he is stronger, and can reward or punish? If that is the reason,\nthe freehearted man would defy Him. Might does not make right. If God\nwere to command us to sin, it would not be right to obey Him. On the\ncontrary, we should sympathize with Mill in his outburst: \"Whatever\npower such a being may have over me, there is one thing which he shall\nnot do: he shall not compel me to worship him. I will call no being\ngood, who is not what I mean when I apply that epithet to my fellow\ncreatures; and if such a being can sentence me to hell for not so\ncalling him, to hell I will go.\" [Footnote: An Examination of Sir\nWilliam Hamilton's Philosophy, chap. VI.] It is clear that God is to\nbe obeyed only because He is good and his will right. Not the existence\nof a will, but its goodness makes it authoritative. But how do we know\nthat it is good unless we have some deeper criterion to judge it by?\nHow do we know that God is not an arbitrary tyrant? The answer must\nbe that we judge the Christian teachings to be a revelation of God\nbecause we know on other grounds what we mean by \"right\" and \"good,\"\nand see that these teachings fit that conception. If the teachings\nwere coarse and low, no prodigies or miracles would suffice to attest\nthem as God-given; it would be superstition to obey them. Experience\nalone can be judge; the experience of the beneficence of the Christian\nideal. The Way of Life that Christ taught verifies itself when tried;\nthat it is the supreme ideal for man is proved by the transfiguration\nof life it effects. Christ and the Bible deserve our allegiance because\nthey are worthy of it; from them we can learn the secrets of man's\ntrue welfare. Morality is, indeed, older than religion. It develops\nto a certain point, and in some cases very highly, without the concept\nof God. It has an and needs no supernatural prop. Religion is not the\nroot of morality, but its flower and consummation. The finest ideals,\nthe loftiest heights of morality, merge into religion; but even these\nspiritual ideals have their ultimate root in the common soil of human\nwelfare, and are rational ideals because they minister to human need.\n\nFor the \"categorical\" theory of morality, see Kant's Theory of Ethics,\ntrans. Abbott; F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies; F. Paulsen, System of\nEthics, book II, chap, V, secs. 3 and 4; Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, chap,\nXVI, sec. 2; H. Spencer, Data of Ethics, chap, III, sees. 12, 13. W.\nFite, Introductory Study of Ethics, chap. X. H. Rashdall, Theory of\nGood and Evil, book I, chap. V. For the \"according to nature\" theory,\nsee Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, passim; Rousseau, Discourse on\nScience and Art, etc.; J. S. Mill, \"Nature\" in Three Essays on\nReligion; T.H. Huxley, Evolution and Ethics. T. N. Carver, The Religion\nWorth Having. For the \"self-realization\" theory, see T. H. Green,\nProlegomena to Ethics; F. Paulsen, op. cit, esp. book II, chap, II,\nsecs. 5-8; H. W. Wright, Self-Realization; J. S. Mackenzie, Manual\nof Ethics, 2d ed, chaps, VI and VII. W. Fite, op. cit, chap. XI.\nFor theological ethics, see any of the older theological books. A brief\ncomment may be found in H. Spencer's Data of Ethics, chap, IV, sec.\n18.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV\n\n\nTHE WORTH OF MORALITY\n\nBEFORE proceeding to a more concrete unfolding of the difficulties\nand problems of morality, it will be well to formulate our theory in\nterms of modern biology, and then, finally, to answer those modern\ncritics who reject not merely the rational explanation of morality\nbut morality itself.\n\nMorality as the organization of human interests.\n\nThe worth of morality is most commonly defended today, in biological\nterms, by describing it as a synthesis of human interests; it is\nvaluable because it is what we really want and need. It does, indeed,\nforbid the carrying-out of any impulse which renders impossible greater\ngoods; it flatly opposes that unrestrained satisfying of a part of\nour natures which we call self-indulgence, or of one nature at the\nexpense of others which we call selfishness. But it stifles desire\nonly for a greater ultimate good; it rejects that needless repression\nof a part of the self which we call asceticism, and an undue\nsubordination of self to others. It is, then the organizing or\nharmonizing principle, subordinating the interests of each aspect of\nthe self, and of the many conflicting selves, to the total welfare\nof the individual and of the community. As Plato pointed out, [Footnote:\nRepublic, books. I-IV; e.g. (444): \"Is not the creation of righteousness\nthe creation of a natural order and government of one another in the\nparts of the soul, and the creation of unrighteousness the opposite?\"\nand (352): \"Is not unrighteousness equally suicidal when existing in\nan individual [as it is when it exists in the State], rendering him\nincapable of action because he is not at unity with himself, making\nhim an enemy to himself?\" and (443): \"The righteous man does not permit\nthe several elements within him to meddle with one another, or any\nof them to do the work of others; but he sets in order his own inner\nlife, and is his own master, and at peace with himself; and when ...\nhe is no longer many, but has become one entirely temperate and perfectly\nadjusted nature, then he will think and call right and good action\nthat which preserves and cooperates with this condition.\" (In quoting\nPlato I have used Jowett's translation, with an occasional substitution;\nas, above, in the use of \"righteousness\" and \"right\" instead of \"justice\"\nand \"just.\")] representative of all other interests, the consensus\nof interest. Such a definition, we must admit, happily describes\nmorality, showing us that if we would find its leading we must know\nourselves; we must examine our actual existing needs and consider how\nbest to attain them. The direction of morality is that of a carefully\npruned and weeded human nature. But there are certain dangers inherent\nin this form of definition which we must note:\n\n(1) We must not be satisfied with the synthesis of consciously felt\ndesires. Many of our deepest needs fail to come to the surface and\nembody themselves in impulses; we do not know or seek what is really\nbest for ourselves. There are possibilities of harmony and peace upon\nlow levels. We must be pricked into desire for new forms of life and\nnot allowed to stagnate in a condition which, however well organized\nand contented, is lacking in the richness and joy we might attain.\nWe must include in the \"interests\" to be organized all our dumb and\nunrealized needs, all potential and latent impulses, as well as our\narticulate desires.\n\n(2) On the other hand, there are perverse and pathological impulses\nwhich are deserving of no regard and must be simply cast aside in the\norganizing process, because they lead only to unhappiness. There is\na difference between the desirable and the desired; morality is not\nmerely an organizing but a corrective force, bringing sometimes not\npeace but a sword. A truer figure would be to represent it as a flowers\nand ruthlessly pruning or weeding out others, that the garden may be\nthe most beautiful place.\n\n(3) Moreover, this definition, while an excellent DESCRIPTIONTION of\nwhat morality in general is, is not a JUSTIFICATION of morality, does\nnot point to its ultimate raison d'etre. To all this organizing\nactivity we might say, Cui bono, for what good? WHY should we organize\nour interests; why not deny them like the ascetics? The mere existence\nof pushes, in this direction and that, affords no material for moral\njudgment; a harmonizing of them would make a mathematical resultant,\nbut it would be of no superior WORTH. If there were no pleasure and\npain in life, it would not MATTER in the least whether the various\nlife forces were organized or not. In such a colorless world a unison\nof human impulses would be as morally indifferent as the convergence\nof tributary rivers or the formation of an organized solar system.\nIt is only, as we long ago pointed out, [Footnote: Cf. ante, p. 74 ]\nwhen consciousness differentiates into its plus and minus values,\npleasure and pain, that a reason arises why any forces in the cosmos\nshould be thwarted or allowed free play. With the emergence of those\nvalues, however, everything that affects them becomes significant.\nIf the complete transformation of our interests would make human life\nbrighter, fuller of plus values, such a radical alteration, rather\nthan a harmonization, would be our ideal. As it is, desire points\nnormally toward the really desirable; the direction of human welfare\nlies, in general, along the line of our organic needs, of the avoidance\nof clashes, of the mutual subordination and cooperation of natural\nimpulses. The principle of reason, of intelligence, is necessary in\nmorality to find this way of cooperation, this ultimate drift of need;\nbut without the potentiality of happiness chaos would be as good as\norder, both within the individual soul and within the social group.\n[Footnote: Plato realized this, and in the Philebus points out that\nwe cannot completely describe morality either in terms of pleasure-pain\nor in terms of reason (or wisdom), the organizing principle. Both aspects\nof morality are important. Cf, along this line, H. G. Lord, The Abuse\nof Abstraction in Ethics, in the James memorial volume.] Do moral acts\nalways bring happiness somewhere? The ultimate justification of\nmorality the value of synthesizing our interests, lies in the happiness\nmen thereby attain. But there is one fundamental doubt that ever and\nanon recurs the doubt whether, after all, actions that we agree in\ncalling virtuous always BRING happiness. If not, either our definition\nof morality, or our universal judgment as to what is moral, would seem\nto be in error. Perhaps morality is, after all, off the track, and\nto be discarded.\n\n(1) We must first lay aside cases of perverted conscience, acts which\nare \"subjectively moral,\" or conscientious, but not objectively best.\nThese cases we have already glanced at; they need be no stumbling\nblock.\n\n(2) We must remember that the types of conduct which we have glorified\nby the concepts \"virtue,\" \"duty,\" etc, are those which TEND to produce\nhappiness. We have to frame our judgments and pigeonhole acts according\nto their normal results. But it happens not infrequently that accidents\nupset these natural tendencies. For these unforeseeable eventualities\nthe actor is not responsible; if his act was the best that could have\nbeen planned, in consideration of all known factors, it remains the\nideal for future cases, it still retains the halo of \"virtue\" which\nmust attract others to it. Good acts may lead, by unexpected chance,\nto evil consequences; bad acts may result, by some accident, in good.\nBut to the interfering factor belongs the credit or blame; the act\nthat would normally have led to good or to evil remains right or wrong.\nTo rescue a drowning man is right, for such action normally tends to\nhuman welfare; if the rescued man turns out a great criminal, or escapes\nthis death to suffer a worse, the act of rescuing the drowning remains\na desirable and therefore moral act. On the other hand, if one man\nslanders another, with the result that the latter, refuting the\nslander, thereby attains prominence and position, the act of slander,\nnormally harmful, remains an immoral act.\n\nIt is a failure to recognize this necessarily general character of\nour moral judgments that raises the problem of Job. The ancient\nIsraelites saw clearly that righteousness was the road to happiness;\n[Footnote: Cf. for example, \"Righteousness tendeth to life; he that\npursueth evil pursueth it to his own death.\" \"Blessed is every one\nthat feareth the Lord, that walketh in his ways. Happy shalt thou be,\nand it shall be well with thee.\"] and when a righteous man like Job\nfell into misfortune, they accused him of secret sin. Job is conscious\nof his innocence, of having done his part aright, and cannot understand\nhow he has come to such an evil pass. It would have brought him no\nmaterial alleviation, but it might have saved him some mental chafing,\nto recognize that morality is simply doing our part. When we have done\nour best we are still at the mercy of fortune. Happiness, as Aristotle\npointed out, is the result of two cooperating factors, morality and\ngood fortune. [Footnote: Nichomachean Ethics, book I, several places:\ne.g, in chap. VII, \"To constitute happiness there must be, as we have\nsaid, complete virtue and fit external conditions.\"] If either is\nlacking, evil will ensue. If all men were perfectly virtuous, we should\nstill be at the mercy of flood and lightning, poisonous snakes,\nicebergs and fog at sea, a thousand forms of accident and disease,\nold age and death. The millennium will not bring pure happiness to\nman; he is too feeble a creature in the presence of forces with which\nhe cannot cope. Morality is just-the best man can do; and it is not\nto be blamed for the twists of fate that make futile its efforts. (3)\nAre there not, however, cases where conduct which we agree is right\nis not even likely to bring the greatest happiness attainable; where\nnot only immediate but lasting happiness is to be deliberately sacrificed\nin the name of morality? Suppose, for example, a politician who becomes\nconvinced of the evils of the liquor trade ruins his career in a hopeless\nfight against the saloons. He loses his office, his income, his honor\nin the sight of his associates; he brings suffering upon his innocent\nwife and children; and all for no good, since his fight is futile and\nineffective. Surely any one could foresee that such action would make\nonly for unhappiness, or for no happiness commensurable with the\nsacrifice. Yet if we agree with his premise, that the liquor trade\nis a curse to humanity, we deem his conduct not only conscientious\nbut objectively noble and right. How can we justify that judgment?\n\nIn the first place, we cannot be sure, beforehand, that such a fight\nwill not be successful. Forlorn hopes sometimes win. We must encourage\nmen to venture, to take chances; only so can the great evils that ride\nmankind be banished. If there is a fighting chance of accomplishing\na great good it is contemptible not to try; society must maintain a\ncode that leads at times to quixotic acts.\n\nIn the second place, the fight, even if in itself hopeless, is sure\nto have valuable indirect results. It arouses others to the need; it\nstimulates in others the willingness to sacrifice self-interest and\nwork for the general good. Every such honorable defeat has its share\nin the final victory. The subtle benefits that result from such moral\ngallantry are not evident on the surface, but they are there. No push\nfor the right is wholly wasted. It pays mankind to let its heroes\nlavish their lives in apparently ineffective struggles; through their\nexample the apathetic masses are stirred and moved a little farther\ntoward their goal.\n\nIn general, we may say that the belief that virtue is not the right\nroad to happiness betrays inexperience and immaturity of judgment.\nA moderate degree of morality saves man from many pitfalls into which\nhis unrestrained impulses would lead him. The highest levels of morality\nbring a degree of happiness unknown to the \"natural man.\" Who are the\nhappiest people in the world? The saints; those who are inwardly at\npeace, who play their part with absolute loyalty. Even the irremediable\nmisfortunes of life do not affect them as they do the worldly man;\nthey have \"learned the luxury of doing good.\" Of morality a recent\nwriter says, \"Its distribution of felicity is ideally just. To him\nwho is most unselfish, who sinks most thoroughly his own interests\nin those of the race of which he is a unit, it awards the most complete\nbeatitude.\" [Footnote: J. H. Levy, of London, in a funeral oration.]\nTo him who complains that he is moral but not happy, the answer is,\nBe more moral! A high enough morality, a complete enough consecration,\nwill lead, in all but very abnormal cases, to happiness in the individual\nlife, as well as make its due contribution to the happiness of others.\n\nIs there anything better than morality?\n\nIt is this lack of vision, this immature skepticism as to the\nservice of morality to human welfare, that has fired a flame of\nrevolt in certain minds, a revolt not merely against incidental\ndefects and outworn conceptions of morality, but against morality\nuberhaupt. The declamations of these Promethean rebels make it\nclear, however, that their protest is but the old fault of\ncondemning a necessary institution altogether for its imperfections\nor its abuses. Morality has been blended with superstition and\ntyranny, has been often blind, perverted, narrow, checking noble\nimpulses and choking the rich and happy development of life. But it\nis one thing to arraign these accidents and corruptions of morality;\nit is quite another to discard the whole system of guidance of which\nthey are but the excrescences and mistakes. This usurping is, of\ncourse, also in large part a thirst for novelty, a love of paradox,\nof practicing ingenuity in making the better appear the worse; it is\nin part a volcanic eruption of suppressed longings and a protest\nagainst the inadequacy of our present code to provide opportunity\nand happiness for the masses. The motives vary with the individual\nrebels.\n\nIt must suffice, however, from among the many leaders of this\nrevolt, to quote that clever but unbalanced German iconoclast,\nNietzsche. Typical of his doctrine is the following: [Footnote:\nGenealogy of Morals (ed. Alex. Tille), Foreword, p. 9.] \"Never until\nnow was there the least doubt or hesitation to set down the 'good'\nman as of higher value than the 'evil' man-of higher value in the\nsense of furtherance, utility, prosperity, as regards MAN in general\n(the future of man included). What if the reverse were true? What if\nin, the 'good' one also a symptom of decline were contained, and a\ndanger, a seduction, a poison, a narcotic by which the present might\nlive AT THE EXPENSE OF THE FUTURE? Perhaps more comfortably, less\ndangerously, but also in humbler style- more meanly? So that just\nmorality were to blame, if a HIGHEST MIGHTINESS AND SPLENDOR of type\nof man-possible in itself were never attained? And that, therefore,\nmorality itself would be the danger of dangers?\"\n\nThe point of this tirade is that morality puts a wet blanket over\nhuman powers; it is a bourgeois ideal, saving men, indeed, from\npain, but also robbing life of its picturesqueness and glory. Many\npeople frankly prefer \"interesting\" to \"good\" people; Nietzsche\ngeneralizes this feeling. Morality is to him uninteresting, dull, a\ncode for slaves, for the clash of combat, the tang of cruelty and\nlust, the tingle of unrestrained power. Every man for himself then,\nand the Devil take the hindmost. Shocked as we are by this brutal\nplatform, there is something in it that appeals to the red blood and\nadventurous spirit in us; after all, we are not far removed from the\nsavage, and the thought of a psalm-singing, tea-drinking, tamely\ngood world is abhorrent to the marrow of us. Stevenson, with his\ndelightfully irresponsible audacity, sighs for an occasional\n\"furlough from the moral law\"; and there are times for most of us\nwhen it seems as if we should choke and smother under the\neverlasting \"Thou shalt not!\" But the daring rebel, the defiant\nTitan, comes creeping back to the shelter of morality with a\nheadache or something worse, and discovers that his Promethean\nboldness was but childish petulance; that it is futile and foolish\nto try to escape the inexorable laws of human life. There are, in\nfact, two adequate answers that can be made to the despiser of\nmorality:\n\n(1) Dull or not, repressive or not, morality is absolutely necessary.\nIt is better than the pain, the insecurity, the relapse into barbarism,\nthat immorality implies. Our whole civilization, everything that makes\nhuman life better than that of the beasts of prey, would collapse\nwithout its foundation of moral obedience. The regime of slashing\nindividualism would kill off many of the weaker who are precious to\nhumanity-a Homer (if he was blind), a Keats, a Stevenson; nay, if\ncarried to extreme, it would put an end to the race. For who are the\nweakest, the \"hindmost,\" but the babies! Sympathy and love and self\nsacrifice, at least in parents, are necessary if the race is to endure\na generation. But even for the individual, the penalties of immorality\nare too obvious to need recapitulation. If morality is repression,\nit is the minimal repression consistent with the maintenance of\nsuccessful and happy life. Its real aim is to bring life, and life\nmore abundantly.\n\n(2) But if we are looking for something great, for adventure and\nexcitement and battle against odds, we can find it much better than\nin brutally slashing at our fellows, or running amuck at the beck of\nour impulses, by putting our valor at the service of some really great\nhuman endeavor. If we want to get into the big game, the great\nadventure, we must pit ourselves, with the leaders of mankind, against\nthe hostile universe. The men and women who set our blood tingling\nand our hearts beating fastest are-Darwin, discoverer by patient labor\nof a great cosmic law; Pasteur, conqueror at last over a terrible human\ndisease; Peary, first to plant foot upon the axis of the world; Goethals,\nbuilder of a canal that links the oceans. The steady march of a\nmoralized civilization, presenting united front to the cosmos,\nis infinitely more glorious than the futile, aimless, and petty struggles\nof an anarchic immorality. Our half-disciplined life is already far richer\nand more romantic than the life of Nietzsche's \"supermen\" could\nbe; and we are only a little way along the road of moral progress.\nThe real superman will be a BETTER man, a man of tenderness\nand chivalry, of loyalty and self-control, a man of disciplined heart\nand purified will; to attain to such a supermanliness is, indeed, a heroic\nand splendid achievement, worthy of our utmost endeavor, and calling\ninto play all our noblest powers.\n\nSome there are, accustomed to the vision of tables of stone engraved\nby the hand of God and set up for man's obedience amid Sinaitic thunders,\nfor whom the discovery of the humble human and prehuman origin, and\nthe stumbling hit-or-miss evolution, of morality dulls its sanctity.\nBut any one who is tempted for this reason to deride morality may console\nhimself with the reflection that everything else of supreme importance\nin human life is of plebeian ancestry. Reason, art, government,\nreligion, had their crude and superstition-ridden beginnings. Man\nhimself was once hardly different from a monkey. Yet there is a spark\nof the divine in him and in all these arts and institutions which he\nwith the aid of the cosmic forces has evolved. Surely a juster judgment\nmay find a sublimity in this age-long march from the clod toward the\nmillennium that could never belong to the spectacular but very\nprovincial myths of the Semites. The emotions ever lag behind the\nintellect; and our hearts may still yearn for the neighborly and\npassionate battle-god of the Pentateuch. Moreover, we shall continue\nto recognize a vast fund of truth and insight in those early folk tales\nand primitive codes. But there comes a deeper breath to the man who\nrealizes that morality and religion long antedate the Jewish\nrevelation, and comes to see God in the tens and hundreds of thousands\nof years of slow but splendid human progress. Historical codes of\nmorals are, indeed, seamed with superstition and are progressively\ndisplaced; but morality persists. At no time has man wholly solved\nthe problem of life, but he must ever live by the best solution he\nhas found. The innumerable codes are so many experiments, their very\ndifferences bearing witness to the need of some set of guiding\nprinciples for conduct.\n\nIt is sometimes said that morality, being a merely human invention,\nmay be discarded when we choose. To this we may reply that morality\nbears, indeed, the indisputable marks of human instinct, will, and\nreason; but it is not an invention; it is a lesson, slowly learned.\nIn its humanness lies its value. It is not an alien code, irrelevant\nto human nature; it is a natural function; it is the greatest of human\ninstitutions unless that be religion, which is its flower and\nconsummation. Morality is made for man, for his use and guidance; what\ncould possibly have greater sanctity or authority for him? Rebel as\nhe may, and chafe under its restraints, he always comes back to morality;\nperhaps to a revised code, but to essentially the same control; for\nhe cannot do without it. Our morality has its defects, but it is on\nthe right track. A clearer insight into its teleological necessity,\nthe purpose it exists to serve, will direct us in our efforts to revise\nit, so to fashion it as to make it productive of still greater good\nin the time to come. But if we discard it altogether, we are \"like\nthe base Indian\" who \"threw a pearl away, Richer than all his tribe.\"\n\nWhat we need is not to abandon but to steadily improve our code; and\nwhereas any one can pick flaws, only the man of trained mind and\ncontrolled desire can discover feasible lines of advance. \"When all\nis said, there is nothing as yet to be changed in our old Aryan ideal\nof justice, conscientiousness, courage, kindness, and honor. We have\nonly to draw nearer to it, to clasp it more closely, to realize it\nmore effectively; and, before going beyond it, we have still a long\nand noble road to travel beneath the stars.\" [Footnote: Maeterlinck,\n\"Our Anxious Morality,\" in The Measure of the Hours.] The conception\nof morality as the organization of interests will be found in Plato's\nRepublic and Aristotle's Ethics, and in many recent ethical books and\npapers. Among them are R. B. Perry's Moral Economy, G. Santayana's\nReason in Science (chap. IX); William James, \"The Moral Philosopher\nand the Moral Life\" (in the Will to Believe and Other Essays).\n\nA discussion of whether morality really makes for happiness will be\nfound in Leslie Stephen, System of Ethics, chap. X; W. L. Sheldon,\nAn Ethical Movement, chap. VIII. For Nietzsche's theory, see his Beyond\nGood and Evil. There are many excellent replies; a brief but adequate\none will be found in Perry, op. cit, chap. I.\n\n\n\n\nPART III\n\n\nPERSONAL MORALITY\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XV\n\n\nHEALTH AND EFFICIENCY\n\nWith the general nature and justification of morality in our minds,\nwe may now seek to apply our criteria of conduct to the concrete\nproblems that confront us, first taking up those problems which,\nhowever important their social bearings, are primarily problems of\nprivate life, problems for the individual to settle, and then turning\nto those wider problems which the community as a whole must\ngrapple with and solve by public action.\n\nBodily health is the foundation of personal morality; to act at all\nthere must be physical energy available; and, other things equal,\nthe man with the greatest store of vitality will live the happiest and\nmost useful life. Christianity has too often forgotten this fundamental\ntruth, which needs emphasis at the very outset of our concrete studies\nin morality.\n\nWhat is the moral importance of health?\n\n(1) Health is in itself a great contribution to the intrinsic worth\nof life. To awake in the morning with red blood stirring in the veins,\nto come to the table with hearty appetite, to go about the day's work\nwith the springing step of abounding energy, and to reach the close\nof day with that healthy fatigue that quiets restless desire and betokens\nthe blessed boon of sound and dreamless sleep-this is to be a long\nway on the road to contentment. Health cannot in itself guarantee\nhappiness if other evils obtrude; but it removes many of the commonest\nimpediments thereto, and normally produces an increase in all other\nvalues. Heightened vitality means an increased sense of power, a keener\nzest in everything; troubles slide off the healthy man that would stick\nto the less vigorous. Bodily depression almost always involves mental\ndepression; our \"blues\" usually have an organic basis. It was not a\nsuperstition that evolved our word \"melancholy\" from the Greek \"black\n(i.e., disordered) liver\" nor is it a mere pun or paradox to say that\nwhether life is worth living depends upon the liver.\n\nMore than this, health is opportunity. The man of abundant energy can\ntaste more of the joys of life, can enlarge the bounds of his\nexperience, can use precious hours of our brief span which the weakling\nmust devote to rest, can learn more, can range farther, can venture\nall sorts of undertakings from which the other is precluded by his\nlack of strength. All these experiences, if they are guided by prudence\nand self-control, bring their meed of insight and skill and character.\nIt is only through living that we grow, and health means the potentiality\nof life.\n\n(2) Health means efficiency, more work done, greater usefulness to\nsociety. Sooner or later every man who is worth his salt finds some\ntask the doing of which arouses his ambition and becomes his particular\ncontribution to the world. How bitterly will he then regret the\nheritage denied him or foolishly squandered, the handicap of quivering\nnerves, muscular flabbiness, wandering mind, that impedes its\naccomplishment! Determination and persistence may, indeed, use a frail\nphysique for splendid service; such names as Darwin, Spencer, Prescott,\nremind us of the strength of human will that can override physical\nobstacles and by long effort produce a great achievement. But for one\nvictor in this struggle of will against body there are a hundred\nvanquished; and even these men of genius and grit could have\naccomplished far more if they had had normally serviceable bodies.\n\n(3) Health makes morality easier and likelier. The pernicious influence\nof bodily frailty and abnormality upon mind and morals has always been\nrecognized (cf. the mens sana in corpore sano of the ancients), but\nwas never so clearly seen as today. The lack of proper nutrition or\ncirculation, the state of depressed vitality resulting from want of\nfresh air, exercise, or sleep, are important factors in the production\nof insanity and crime. Over fatigue means a weakening of the power\nof attention, and hence of will, a paralyzing of the highest brain\ncenters, a lowered resistance to the more primitive instincts and\npassions. Chronic irritability, moroseness, pathological impulses of\nall sorts, generally betokens eyestrain, dyspepsia, constipation, or\nsome other bodily derangement. With the regaining of normal health\nthe unruly impulses usually become quieter, sympathy flows more freely,\nthe man becomes kinder, more tolerant, and morally sane. Professor\nChittenden of Yale is quoted as saying that \"lack of proper physical\ncondition is responsible for more moral ... ills than any other\nfactor.\" Certain temptations, at least, bear more hardly upon the man\nof weak and unstrung nerves; in Rousseau's well known words, \"The\nweaker the body, the more it commands.\" And in general, abnormal\norganic conditions involve a warping of the judgment, a twisted or\nunbalanced view of life (e.g. Wordsworth's \"Spontaneous reason breathed\nby health\"), which leads away from the path of virtue. All honor, then,\nto the men who have kept clean and true and cheerful through years\nof bodily depression; such conquest over evil conditions is one of\nthe finest things in life. But nobility of character is hard enough\nto attain without adding the obstacle of a reluctant body; and although\nsome virtues are easier to the invalid, and some temptations removed\nfrom his circumscribed field of activity, it remains true in general\nthat health is the great first aid to morality.\n\nCan we attain to greater health and efficiency? If health is, then,\nso important to the individual and society, its pursuit is not a selfish\nor a trivial matter; it is rather a serious and unavoidable duty. The\ngospel of health is sorely needed in our modern world. Young men and\nwomen use up their apparently limitless capital with heedless waste;\nthose who start with a lesser inheritance neglect the means at their\ncommand for increasing their stock of strength and winning the power\nand exuberance of life that might be theirs. There are, of course,\nmany cases of undeserved ill health; we ill understand as yet the causes\nand enemies of bodily vigor, and many a gallant fight for health has\ngone unrewarded. But in the great majority of cases a wise conduct\nof life would retain robust strength for the threescore or more years\nof our allotted course, increase it for those who start poorly equipped,\nand regain it for those who by mischance, blunder, or imprudence have\nlost their heritage. Yet half the world hardly knows what real health\nis. Our hospitals and sanitariums are crowded, our streets are full\nof half-sick people-hollow chests, sallow faces, dark-rimmed eyes,\nnervous, run-down, worn-out, brain-fagged, dragging on their existence,\nor dying before their time, robbed by stupidity and ignorance of their\nbirthright of full-breathed rosy-cheeked health, and robbing the\nsociety that has reared them of the full quota of their service. Health\nis not merely freedom from disease; we have a right to what Emerson\ncalled \"plus health.\" And among the men who rightly awaken our\nenthusiasm are those who out of a frail childhood have built up for\nthemselves by perseverance and will a manhood of physical power,\nendurance, and efficiency.\n\nThe principles of health for the normal man are few and simple, the\nreward great; what stands in the way is partly our apathy and\nindifference, partly our incontinent appetites, partly the unwholesome\nand deadening social influences in which we find ourselves enmeshed.\nFor those who care enough, almost unlimited vistas open up; as Spinoza\nhas it, \"No one has yet found the limits of what the body can do.\"\nWilliam James was convinced [Footnote: See his essay, \"The Energies\nof Man,\" in Memories and Studies.] that the potentialities of human\nenergy and efficiency are but half realized by the best of us. We must\nlearn better to run the human machine. Our prevalent disregard of the\nconditions of bodily vigor, our persistent carelessness in the\nelementary matters of hygiene and health, is nothing short of criminal.\n\n\"We would have health, and yet still use our bodies ill; Bafflers of\nour own prayers from youth to life's last scenes.\"\n\nHappiness that impairs health seldom pays. Where it is a question of\nuseful work done at the expense of our fatigue, there may be more\nquestion; normally such sacrifices are undesirable; but what seems\nover fatigue may not really be so, and the earnest man will err on\nthis side rather than run risk of pusillanimous shirking. Moreover,\nsome work practically requires an over effort for its accomplishment;\nand no man of mettle will begrudge his very life-blood when necessary.\nOverwork is \"the last infirmity of noble minds.\" Yet when not really\nnecessary, it must be ranked as a sin, and not too generously condoned.\nThe intense competition of modern industry, the complexity of our\neconomic machinery, the colossal accumulation of facts which must be\nmastered for success, bring heavy pressure to bear upon those who have\ntheir way to make in the world. The pace is fast, and many there are\nthat die or break from overstrain when at the height of their usefulness.\nSuch, overpressure does not pay; it means that less work will in the\nend get done. When we consider also the moral dangers it involves,\nthe glumness or irritability of taut nerves, the unhealthy tension\nthat demands strong excitements and does not know how to rest or enjoy\nquiet and restorative pleasures; when we consider the broken men and\nwomen that have to be taken care of, the widows and children of the\nworkers who have died before their time, the children perhaps weakened\nfor life because of the tired condition of their parents at birth;\nwhen we consider the number of defective children born to such overworked\nparents, we realize that it is not primarily a question of enjoying\nlife more or less, it is a matter of grave economic and moral import.\n[Footnote: Cf. M. G. Schlapp, in the Outlook, vol. 100, p. 782.]\nWhether we actually work harder, on the whole, than our forebears,\nand whether there is actually a decrease in the health and endurance\nof the younger generation today owing to the overstrain of their parents,\nis open to dispute. Certainly when one compares a portrait of Reynolds,\nGainsborough, or Stuart with one by Sargent, Thayer, or Alexander,\nthere is a noticeable difference of type, indicative of a different\nideal of life in the upper stratum of society, an ideal of effort and\nefficiency, which is far better than a patrician dilettantism, but\nhas in turn its dangers.We need to recall the line of AEschylus,\n\"All the gods' work is effortless and calm.\" Or Matthew Arnold's\nsonnet on Quiet Work:\n\n\"One lesson, Nature, let me learn of thee, A lesson that on every wind\nis borne, A lesson of two duties kept at one Though the loud world\nproclaim their enmity: Of toil unsevered from tranquility, Of labor\nthat in lasting fruit outgrows Far noisier schemes, accomplished in\nrepose, Too great for haste, too high for rivalry...\"\n\nMost of us would find our powers adequate to our duties if we learned\nto rest when we are not working, and spend no energy in worry and\nfretfulness. [Footnote: Cf. W. James's essay on \"The Gospel of\nRelaxation,\" in Talks to Teachers and Students, or Annie Payson Call's\nbooks, of which the best known is Power Through Repose.] This nervous\nleakage is a notoriously American ailment; we knit our brows, we work\nour fingers, we fidget, we rock in our chairs, we talk explosively,\nwe live in a quiver of excitement and hurry, in a chronic state of\ntension. We need to follow St. Paul's exhortation to \"Study to be\nquiet\"; to learn what Carlyle called \"the great art of sitting still.\"\nWe must not lower our American ideal of efficiency, of the \"strenuous\nlife\"; but it is precisely through that self-control that is willing\nto live within necessary limitations, and able to cut off the waste\nof fruitless activity of mind and body, that our national efficiency\ncan be maintained at its highest.\n\nIs continued idleness ever justifiable?\n\nWe do not need Stevenson's charming Apology for Idlers, to know that\nrest and recreation are as wholesome and necessary as work. But\nidleness is only profitable and really enjoyable when it comes as an\ninterlude in the midst of activity. There is much to be done, and no\none is free to shirk his share of the world's work; we may enjoy our\nvacations only as we have earned the right to them. Except for invalids\nand idiots, continued idleness never justifiable. Clothes we must have,\nand food, and shelter, and much else; if a man does not produce these\nthings for himself, or some equivalent which he can fairly exchange\nfor them, he is a parasite upon other men's labor. \"Six days shalt\nthou labor\" is the universal commandment, and \"In the sweat of thy\nbrow shalt thou eat bread.\" An old Chinese proverb runs, \"If there\nis one idle man, there is another who is starving.\" Certainly a state\nin which the masses will have their drudgery lightened for them and\nopportunity for a well rounded human life given, will be attained only\nin a society where there are no drones; and no man or woman worthy\nof the name will be content to live idly on the labor of others. \"Others\nhave labored, and we have entered into their labors\"; it is not fair\nto accept so much without giving what we can in return.\n\nFor most men and women there is, of course; no alterative; they must\nwork or live a wretched, comfortless life, with the actual risk of\nstarvation. A few may prefer the precarious existence of the tramp,\nor pauper; but they must pay the price in homelessness and hazard.\nExcept for abnormal social conditions, the vile housing of the poor,\nthe hopeless monotony and overlong hours of most forms of unskilled\nlabor, the lure of drink, and the deprivation of the natural joys of\nlife, there would be few of these voluntary idlers among the poor.\nThe aversion to work, when it is decently agreeable, in decent\nsurroundings, and not carried to the point of fatigue, is abnormal;\nand it is by the improvement of the conditions and remuneration of\nlabor that we must seek to cure that unwillingness to work, in the\npoor, which Tolstoy came to believe was their greatest curse.\n[Footnote: See his What Shall We Do Then? (or What to Do?)]\n\nMuch more difficult to cure is the curse of idleness among the rich.\nThe absence of the need of working, and the possibilities of pleasure\nseeking which money affords, are a constant temptation to them to\nlive a life of ease. The spectacle is not unfamiliar of rich young men\ntraveling about the world, living at their clubs, spending their\nenergies in gayeties and sports, with hardly a sense of the\nresponsibilities which their privileges entail. Fortunately, however,\nthere is, in America at least, a pretty widespread sense of shame among\nmen about such shirking, and the idler has to face a certain amount\nof mild contempt. Upon women the pressure of public opinion has not\nyet become nothing upper-class ladies who spend their time at cards,\nat teas, at the theater, who think of little but dress and gossip,\nor of the latest novels and music, who evade their natural duties of\nmotherhood or give over care of home and children to hired servants,\nthat they may be freer to live the butterfly life, are still too little\nrebuked by their hard-working sisters and by men. We must impress it\nupon all that the inheritance of money does not excuse laziness; if\nthe pressure to earn a living is removed, there are numberless ways\nin which the rich can serve, privileged ways, happy ways, which there\nis far less pretext for avoiding than the poor have for hating their\ngrim toil. In Carlyle's words, \"If the poor and humble toil that we\nhave food, must not the high and glorious toil for him in return, that\nhe may have light, have guidance, freedom, immortality?\" The rich\ncommonly point the finger of scorn at the poor who turn away from honest\nwork; we may well wonder if they would work themselves at such dirty\nand dangerous occupations. Many a charity visitor who preaches the\ngospel of toil is herself, except for some fitful and ineffective \"social\nwork,\" a useless ornament to society who hardly knows the meaning of\n\"toil.\" If idleness is a mote in the eyes of the poor, it is a beam\nin the eyes of the rich. Neither blood nor rank nor sex excuses from\nthe universal duty. \"We must all toil or steal (howsoever we name our\nstealing), which is worse.\" [Footnote: Carlyle's writings are full\nof such wholesome declarations. And cf. W. Dew. Hyde: \"An able-bodied\nman who does not contribute to the world at least as much as he takes\nout of it is a beggar and a thief; whether he shirks the duty of work\nunder the pretext of poverty or riches.\" Cf. also Tolstoy, in What\nto Do? For example (from chap. XXVI), \"How can a man who considers\nhimself to be, we will not say a Christian, or an educated and humane\nman, but simply a man not entirely devoid of reason and of conscience,\nhow can he, I say, live in such a way that, not taking part in the\nstruggle of all mankind for life, he only swallows up the labor of\nothers, struggling for existence, and by his own claims increases the\nlabor of those who struggle, and the number of those who perish in\nstruggle?\"] relieved from the necessity of earning a living\" (unless\none intends to use that freedom for unpaid service), an ideal dangerous\nto social welfare, and shortsighted for the individual. Work makes\nup a large part of the worth of life. Drudgery it may be at the time,\na weary round, with no compensation apparent; but it is of just such\nstuff that real life is made. What ennobles it, what gives it meaning,\nis the courageous attack, the putting of heart into work, the facing\nof monotony, the finding of the zest of accomplishment. There is no\nsuch thing as \"menial\" work; the washing of dishes and the carting\naway of garbage are just as necessary and important as the running\nof a railway or the making of laws. The real horror is the dead weight\nof ennui, the aimlessness and fruitlessness of a life that has done\nnothing and has nothing to do. If the thought of the day's work\ndepresses, it is probably because of ill health, over fatigue, unpleasant\nsurroundings or companions, because of worry, or because the particular\nwork is not congenial. The finding of the right work for the right\nman and woman is one of the great problems which we have hardly begun\nto solve. But all of these sources of the distaste for work can normally,\nor eventually, be reached and the evil remedied. In spite of the burden\nand the strain, if we could have our way with the order of things,\none of the most foolish things we could do would be to take away the\nnecessity of work. Here, as usual, personal and social needs coincide;\nin the working life alone can be found a lasting satisfaction for the\nsoul and the hope of salvation for society. Are competitive athletics\ndesirable? As samples of the concrete problems involved in the ideal\nof health and efficiency, we may briefly discuss two questions that\nconfront particularly the young man. And first, that concerning athletic\nsports are of marked value:\n\n(1) They are to any normal man or woman, and especially to the young\nwho have not yet become immersed in the more serious game of life,\none of the greatest and most tonic joys. The stretching and tension\nof healthy muscles, the deep draughts of out-of-door air, the excitement\nof rivalry, the comradeship of cooperative endeavor, the ABANDON of\neffort, the glow of achievement, contribute much in immediate and\nretrospective pleasure to the worth of living.\n\n(2) When not carried too far, the physical gain is clear. Regular\nexercise is necessary for abundant health; and of all forms of\nexercise the happiest is, other things equal, the best.\n\n(3) In many ways there are potentialities of moral gain in athletics\nwhich do not result from ordinary exercise. There is the stimulus to\nintense effort, the awakening of strenuousness which may carry over\ninto other fields of activity. Here, at least, indolence is impossible,\nalertness is demanded, and the willingness to strive against obstacles.\nTo put one's whole soul into anything is wholesome, even if it be but\na game; and the man who bucks the line hard on the gridiron has begun\na habit which may serve him well when he meets more dangerous\nobstacles and more doughty opponents on a larger field.\n\n(4) The lesson of cooperation taught by teamwork of any sort is a\nvaluable schooling. One of the prime needs of our day is the\ndevelopment of the spirit of loyalty, the willingness to subordinate\nindividual welfare to that of a group, and to look upon one's own work\nas part of a larger endeavor. The man who has learned to take pride\nin making sacrifice hits is ripe to respond to the growing sense of\nthe dishonorableness of making personal profit the aim of business\nor of politics.\n\n(5) Athletic games, where properly supervised, inculcate the spirit\nof sportsmanship. To keep to the rules of longing, to restrain temper\nand accept the decisions of the umpire without complaint, to take no\nunfair advantage and indulge in no foul play, to give a square deal\nto opponents and ask no more for one's own side, to endure defeat with\na smile and without discouragement- surely this is just the spirit\nwe need in everything. It is vitally important that unsportsmanlike\nconduct should be ruthlessly stamped out in all competitive sports,\nand that every team should prefer to lose honorably than to win unfairly.\n[Footnote: There has been a good deal of criticism of American\nintercollegiate athletics on the ground of their fostering\nunsportsmanlike conduct. A recent paper in the Atlantic Monthly (by\nC. A. Stewart, vol. 113, p. 153) concludes with this recommendation:\n\"A forceful presentation of the facts of the situation, with an appeal\nto the innate sense of honor of the undergraduates; such a revision\nof the rules as will retain only those based upon essential fairness;\nand a strict supervision by the faculty;-upon the success of these\nthree measures rests the hope that college athletics may be purged\nof trickery and the spirit of 'get away with it.' ... A few men expelled\nfor lying about eligibility, and a few teams disbanded because of\nunfair play, would arouse undergraduates with a wholesome jolt.\"]\n\n(6) Wherever they are taken seriously athletic contests require a\npreliminary period of \"training,\" which includes abstinence from sex\nincontinence, from alcohol, smoking, overeating, and late hours. The\ndiscipline which this involves is an object lesson in the requirements\nfor efficiency in any undertaking, and excellent practice in their\nfulfillment. How far athletes learn this lesson and apply it to wider\nspheres of activity, it would be interesting to discover. In any case,\nthey have proved in themselves the ability to repress inclination and\nfind satisfaction in what makes for health and efficiency; and all\nwho know the implications of \"training\" have received a subconscious\n\"suggestion\" in the right direction. The other side of the problem\nis this:\n\n(1) Competitive athletics, if taken seriously contests,inevitably\ntake more time and energy than their importance .warrants. A member\nof a college football or baseball team can do little else during the\nseason. Studies are neglected, intellectual interests are subordinated,\ncollege figures essentially as a group of men endeavoring to beat\nanother college on the field. If a man is bright he may \"keep up with\"\nhis studies, but his intellectual profit is meager; his energies are\nbeing absorbed elsewhere. This phenomenon has given rise to much\nsatire and to much perplexity on the part of college administrations. A\nfew have gone so far as to banish intercollegiate contests, asserting\nthatthe purpose of coming to college is primarily to learn to use the\nbrain, not the muscles.\n\n(2) The strain of intense rivalry is too severe on the body. It is\nnow known that the intercollegiate athlete is very probably sacrificing\nsome of his life when he throws his utmost effort into the game or\nthe race. The length of life of the big athletes averages considerably\nshorter than that of the more moderate exercisers. From the physical\npoint of view, interclass or interfraternity contests, not taken too\nearnestly, are. far better than the intercollegiate struggles. They\nalso have the advantage that far more can participate. The problem\nbefore our college authorities and leaders of student sentiment is\nhow to check the fierceness of the big contests-shortening them,\nperhaps, possibly forbidding entirely the more strenuous and how\nto provide sports for all members of the college; so that, instead of\na few overstrained athletes and a lot of fellows who under exercise,\nwe shall see every man out on the field daily, and no one overdoing.\nThis ideal necessitates far larger athletic grounds than most of our\ncolleges have reserved. It may necessitate the abolition of some of\nthe big contests that have been the excitement of many thousands. But\nit must not be forgotten prelude and preparation for life; they must\nnot be allowed to usurp the chief place in a man's thoughts or to unfit\nhim for his greatest after-usefulness. [Footnote: Cf. Atlantic Monthly,\nvol. 90, p. 534; Outlook, vol. 98, p. 597.] Is it wrong to smoke?\nStatistics taken with care at many American colleges show with apparent\nconclusiveness that the use of tobacco is physically and mentally\ndeleterious to young men. [Footnote: See, e.g., in the Popular Science\nMonthly for October, 1912, a summary by Dr. F. J. Pack of an\ninvestigation covering fourteen colleges. Similar investigations have\nbeen made by several others, with generally similar results.] It seems\nthat smokers lose in lung capacity, are stunted slightly in their\ngrowth, are lessened in their endurance, develop far more than their\nproportion of eye and nerve troubles, furnish far less than their\nproportion of the athletes who win positions on college teams, furnish\nfar less than their proportion of scholarship men, and far more than\ntheir proportion of conditions and failures. It is perhaps too early\nto be quite sure of these results; but in all probability further\nexperiment will confirm them, and make it certain that tobacco is\nphysically harmful as has long been recognized by trainers for athletic\ncontests. The harm to adults seems to be less marked; perhaps to some\nit is inappreciable. And if there is appreciable harm, whether it is\ngreat enough to counterbalance the satisfaction which a confirmed\nsmoker takes in his cigar or pipe, or any worse than the restlessness\nwhich the sacrifice of it might engender, is one of those delicate\npersonal problems that one can hardly solve for another. But certainly\nwhere the habit is not formed, the loss of tobacco involves no\nimportant deprivation; its use is chiefly a social custom which can\nbe discontinued without ill effects. Effort should be made to keep\nthe young from forming the habit; college \"smokers,\" where free\ncigarettes and cigars are furnished, should be superseded by \"rallies,\"\nwhere the same amount of money could provide some light and harmless\nrefreshment. This is not one of the important problems. But, after\nall, everything is important; and men must, and ultimately will, learn\nto find their happiness in things that forward, instead of thwarting,\ntheir great interests; what makes at all against health and\nefficiency-when it is so needless and artificial a habit as smoking,\nso mildly pleasant and so purely selfish-must be rooted out of desire.\nThe great amount of money wasted on tobacco could be far more\nwisely and fruitfully expended. We shall not brand smoking as a sin,\nhardly as a vice; but the man who wishes to make the most of his life\nwill avoid it himself, and the man who wishes to work for the general\nwelfare will put his influence and example against it.\n\nH. S. King, Rational Living, chap. VI, secs. I, II. J. Payot, The\nEducation of the Will, book III, sec. IV. J. MacCunn, The Making of\nCharacter, part II, chap. II. W. Hutchinson, Handbook of Health. L.\nH. Gulick, The Efficient Life. F. Paulsen, System of Ethics, book III,\nchap. III. T. Roosevelt, The Strenuous Life. P. G. Hamerton, The\nIntellectual Life, part I.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVI\n\n\nTHE ALCOHOL PROBLEM\n\nOF all the problems relating to health and efficiency there is none\ngraver than that of the narcotic-stimulants. With the exception of\ntobacco, which is probably, for adults, but mildly deleterious, their\nuse is fraught with danger, both physical and moral; beyond the\nnarrowest limits it is certainly baneful, while it is as yet an open\nquestion whether even a very slight use is not distinctly harmful.\nThe exact physiological effects of the several narcotic-stimulants\nare different, but they are alike in stimulating certain activities\nand depressing others; and their attraction for men is similar. Opium,\nmorphine, and cocaine are more powerful drugs, and more inherently\ndangerous; but alcohol is much the most widely used and so most\nproductive of evil. The hypodermically used narcotics need not be here\ndiscussed; for although they can give a far keener pleasure than\nalcohol, the penalty they inflict is more evident. Moreover, since\ntheir sale is not pushed by such powerful interests as continually\nstimulate the use of alcohol, they can, by the vigilant enforcement\nof existing laws, be readily removed from any general use. We turn,\nthen, to the consideration of the one which has got a universal hold\non the imagination and social habits of men, the only one that\nconstitutes at present a serious and complicated problem.\n\nWhat are the causes of the use of alcoholic drinks?\n\n(1) We may dismiss at once the suggestion that alcoholic liquors are\ndrunk for the pleasantness of their taste or for their food value.\nTo some slight extent these factors enter in; but neither is important.\nThe taste for them is for most men an acquired taste; and with so many\nother delicious drinks to be had, especially in recent years, drinks\nthat are far less expensive and without their poisonous effects, it\nis safe to say that the mere taste of them would not go far toward\nexplaining the lure they have for men. As to their food value, there\nare those who justify themselves on the score of the nutrition they\nare getting from their wine or beer. But careful experiments have shown\nthat the food value of alcohol is slight; and certainly, for nutrition\nreceived, these are among the most expensive foods, to be ranked with\ncaviar and pate de foie gras. Beer is the most nutritious of the\nalcoholic drinks; but the same amount of money spent on bread would\ngive about thirty times the nutrition, and a more all-round nutrition\nat that. Alcoholic liquors as food are, as has been said, like\ngunpowder as fuel very costly and very dangerous. [Footnote: See H.\nS. Williams, Alcohol, p. 133; H. S. Warner, Social Welfare and\nthe Liquor Problem, p. 80, and bibliography, p. 95.]\n\n(2) A much commoner plea for drinking rests upon its sociability. But\nthis is a matter of convention which can readily enough be altered.\nThere is nothing inherently more sociable in the drinking of wine than\nin the drinking of grape-juice, or coffee, or chocolate, or tea.\nIndeed, one may well ask why the chief social bond between men should\nconsist in drinking liquids side by side! Games and sports, in which\nwit is pitted against wit, or which bring men together in happy\ncooperation, together with the great resource of conversation, are\nmore socially binding than any drinks. There will, indeed, be a temporary\nsocial hardship for many abstainers until the custom is generally\nbroken up; one runs the risk of being thought by the heedless a prig\nand a Puritan. But that is a small price to pay for one's health and\none's influence on others.\n\n(3) More important than any of these causes is the craving for a\nstimulant. The monotony of work, the fatigue toward the end of the\nday, the severity of our Northern climate, the longing for intenser\nliving, lead men to seek to apply the whip to their flagging energies.\nThis stimulus to the body is, however, largely if not wholly, illusory.\nThe mental-emotional effects, noted in the following paragraph, give\nthe drinker the impression that he is physically fortified; but objective\ntests show that, after a very brief period, the dominant effect upon\nthe organism is depressant. The apparent increase in bodily warmth,\nso often experienced, is a subjective illusion; in reality alcohol\nlowers the temperature and diminishes resistance to cold. Arctic\nexplorers have to discard it entirely. The old idea of helping to cure\nsnake bite, hydrophobia, etc, by whiskey was sheer mistake; the patient\nhas actually much less of a chance if so drugged. Only for an immediate\nand transitory need, such as faintness or shock, is the quickly passing\nstimulating power of alcohol useful; and even for such purposes other\nstimulants are more valuable. Reputable physicians have almost wholly\nceased to use it. [Footnote: See H. S. Williams, op. cit, p. 4,\n124-127; H. S. Warner, op. cit, pp. 87]\n\n(4) The one real value of alcohol to man has been the boon of\nstimulating his emotional and impulsive life, bringing him an elevation\nof spirits, drowning his sorrows, helping him to forget, helping to\nfree his mind from the burden of care, anxiety, and regret. As William\nJames, with his unerring discernment, wrote twenty-five years ago:\n\"The reason for craving alcohol is that it is an unaesthetic, even\nin moderate quantities. It obliterates a part of the field of\nconsciousness and abolishes collateral trains of thought.\" [Footnote:\nTolstoy also hit the nail on the head in his little essay, Why do Men\nStupefy Themselves?] This use, in relieving brain-tension, in bringing\na transient cheer and comfort to poor, overworked, worried, remorseful\nmen, is not to be despised. Dull lives are vivified by it, a fleeting\nanesthesia of unhappy memories and longings is effected, and for the\nmoment life seems worth living.\n\nWithout considering yet the physical penalty that must be paid for\nthis evanescent freedom, we may make the obvious remark that it is\na morally dangerous freedom. As the Odyssey has it, \"Wine leads to\nfolly, making even the wise to love immoderately, to dance, and to\nutter what had better have been kept silent.\" Alcohol slackens the\nhigher, more complicated, mental functions-our conscience, our scruples,\nour reason- and leaves freer from inhibition our lower passions and\ninstincts. We cannot afford thus to submerge our better natures, and\nleave the field to our lower selves; it is a dangerous short cut to\nhappiness. A far safer and more permanently useful procedure for the\nindividual would be so to live by his reason and his conscience that\nhe would not need to stupefy them, to forget his life as he is shaping\nit from day today. And the lesson to the community is so to brighten\nthe lives of the poor with normal, wholesome pleasures and recreations,\nso to lift from them the burdens of poverty and social injustice, that\nthey will not so much need to plunge into the grateful oblivion of\nthe wine-cup.\n\n(5) The most tenacious hold of the alcohol trade lies,\nhowever, in two things not yet enumerated. The one is, that much use\nof alcohol creates a pathological craving for it; the man who is\naccustomed to his beer or whiskey is restless and depressed if he cannot\nget it, and will sacrifice much to still for the nonce that insatiable\nlonging. The other and even more important fact is, that the sale of\nliquor is immensely profitable to the manufacturers and sellers. The\nfighters for prohibition have to encounter the desperate opposition\nof those who have become slaves to the drug-many of whom may never\nget intoxicated, and would resent the term \"slaves,\" but who have formed\nthe abnormal habit and cannot without discomfort get rid of it. They\nhave to meet the still fiercer hostility of those who are making money\nfrom the sale of liquor and do not intend to let go their opportunity.\nWhat are the evils that result from alcoholic liquors?\n\nThe one real value of alcohol, we have said, lies in its temporary\nmental effects. It raises the hedonic tone of consciousness; it brings\nabout, when taken in proper amounts, the well-known happy-go-lucky,\nscruple-free, expansive state of mind. What now is the price that must\nbe paid for its use?\n\n(1) The physical harmfulness of even light drinking is considerable.\n\n(a) Alcohol, even in slight doses, as in a glass of wine or beer, has\npoisonous effects upon some of the bodily functions, which are clearly\nrevealed by scientific experiment. [Footnote: See, for one testimony\nout of very many in medical literature, an article by Dr. Herbert\nMcIntosh in the Journal of Advanced Therapeutics for April, 1912, p.\n167: \"Alcohol and ether are the two great enemies of the\nelectrochemical properties of the salts necessary to organic life.\"\nHe speaks of \"paralysis of the vaso-constrictor nerves,\" \"inhibition\nof the cortical centers,\" etc.] Hence the temporary cheer must be paid\nfor with usury by a much longer depression, resulting from the poisonous\neffects of alcohol upon the body. A jolly evening is followed by the\nfamiliar symptoms of the morning after. The extent of the physical\nand mental depression caused is not always realized, because it is\nspread out over a considerable period of time and may not be acute;\na healthy person can stand a good deal without being conscious of\nthe ill effects. But they are there. In bodily vigor, and so in mental\nbuoyancy, the abstainer is IN THE END better off than if he drank\neven a little, or seldom.\n\n(b) Careful and repeated experiments seem to show that even a very\nlittle drinking-a glass of beer or wine a day- decreases the capacity\nfor both muscular and mental work. This loss of ability is not usually\nperceptible to the drinker; he often feels an illusory glow of power;\nbut he cannot do as much. A bottle of beer a day means an\nappreciable loss in working efficiency. [Footnote: Accounts of\nthe experiments will be found in H. S. Williams, op. cit, pp. 5-23,\n128, 137; H. S. Warner, op. cit, p. 116. They had some\nrealization of this truth even in the days of the Iliad. Hector says,\n\"Bring me luscious wines, lest they unnerve my limbs and make\nme lose my wonted powers and strength.\"]\n\n(c) Even a moderate use of alcohol increases liability to disease and\nshortens the chances of life. In any case of exposure to or contraction\nof disease, the total abstainer has a proved advantage over even the\nlight drinker. The British life insurance companies reckon that at the\nage of twenty a total abstainer has an average prospect of life of\nforty-four years, a temperate regular drinker a prospect of thirty-one\nyears, and a heavy drinker of fifteen years. Many other factors enter\ninto the individual situation, of course; we know many cases where\ninveterate drinkers have lived to a ripe old age; it takes a great\ndeal to break the iron constitutions of some men. But averages\ntell the story. An authority on tuberculosis states that \"if for no\nother reason than the prevention of tuberculosis, state prohibition\nwould be justified\" The use of alcohol predisposes the body to\nmany kinds of disease; and according to conservative figures,\napproximately seventy thousand deaths yearly in the United\nStates are caused by alcoholism and diseases that owe their\ngrip to the use of alcohol. Besides this, a great deal of insanity\nand chronic invalidism, and a large proportion of deaths after\noperations, are due to this cause. [Footnote: See H. S. Williams,\nop. cit, pp. 25- 43, 149, 150; H. S. Warner, op. cit, chap. IV, and\nbibliography at end.]\n\n(d) The chances of losing children at chances of begetting\nfeeble-minded or degenerate children, are markedly greater\nfor even moderate drinkers than for abstainers. Children of\ntotal abstainers have a great advantage, on the average, in\nsize, stature, bodily vigor, intellectual power; they stand, on\nthe average, between a year and two years ahead in class\nof the children of moderate drinkers, they have less than half\nas many eye, ear, and other physical defects. This proved\ninfluence of even light drinking upon the vitality and normality\ntransmitted to children should be the most serious of indictments\nagainst self-indulgence. Truly the sins of the fathers are visited\nupon the second and third generation. [Footnote: See Journal\nof Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, vol. IX, p.\n234; H. S. Williams, op. cit, pp. 44-47.]\n\n(2) The economic waste is enormous:\n\n(a) Nearly, if not quite, two billion dollars a year are spent by the\npeople of the United States for intoxicating beverages. Between fifty\nand seventy-five million bushels of grain are consumed annually in\ntheir production, besides the grapes used for wines. Nor does the money\nspent for liquors go in any appreciable degree into the pockets of\nthe farmers who raise the grains; less than a thirtieth part finds\nits way to them, the brewers, distillers, and retailers getting about\ntwo thirds. The money invested in the beer industry alone was in 1909\nover $550,000,000. [Footnote: See Independent, vol. 67, p. 1326;\nYear-Books of the Anti-Saloon League. For this whole subject of the\ncost of the liquor trade, see chap. V, in H. S. Warner, op. cit, and\nthe bibliography appended.] The importance of the national liquor bill\ncan be realized by a simple computation; it would suffice to pay two\nmillion men three dollars a day, six days in the week, year in and\nyear out; it would suffice to build four or five Panama Canals (at\n$400,000,000) a year. When we reckon up the total liquor bill of the\nworld, a sum many times this, we can see what a frightful waste of\nman's resources is going on; for not only is there no a tremendous\nadditional drain of wealth caused indirectly thereby.\n\n(b) Among the factors in this additional drain of wealth, which must\nbe added to the figures given above in estimating the total financial\nloss to the community, are: the loss in efficiency of workers through\nthe- usually unrealized- toxic effects of alcohol; the loss of the\nlives of adult workers due to alcoholic poisoning-an annual loss greater\nthan that of the whole Civil War; the support by the State of paupers,\ntwo fifths of whom, it is estimated, owe their status to alcoholism;\n[Footnote: See H. S. Williams, op. cit, p. 85] the support by the\nState of the insane, from a quarter to a half of whom owe their\ninsanity directly or indirectly to alcohol; [Footnote: Ibid, p. 63]\nthe support of destitute and deserted children; [Footnote: Ibid,\np. 89 ] the maintenance of prisons, of courts, and police - the\nMassachusetts Bureau of Labor Statistics has shown that eighty-four\nper cent of all criminals under conviction in the correctional\ninstitutions of that State committed their crimes under the influence\nof alcohol. [Footnote: Ibid, p. 72] When we add to this the still\ngreater numbers of incapables supported by their families and friends,\nwe realize that the national drink bill is really very much greater\nthan the mere sums spent for liquor. Comparative statistics show\ngraphically how strikingly pauperism, crime, and destitution are\ndiminished by prohibition. It is variously estimated that a fourth\nor a third or more of all acute poverty is due directly or indirectly\nto alcohol. Our municipalities are always poor; all sorts of needed\nimprovements are blocked for lack of funds. If this leakage of the\nnational wealth can be stopped we shall be able with the money saved\nto create a radically different and higher civilization.\n\n(3) The moral harm of alcohol is comparable to its physical and\neconomic harm.\n\n(a) As we noted when considering the value of alcohol, the higher\nnature is stupefied, leaving the emotions less controlled. The\nsilliness, the irritability, the glumness, the violence, the lust of\nmen are given freer rein. The effect of alcohol is coarsening,\nbrutalizing; we are not our best selves under its influence. The\njudgment is dulled, the spirit of recklessness is stimulated-an\nimpatience of restraint and a craving for further excitement. Even\nafter the palpable effects of a potation have disappeared, a permanent\nalteration in the brain remains, which makes it likely that the drinker\nwill \"go farther\" next time or the time after. The accumulation of\nsuch effects leads finally to the complete demoralization of character,\nto the point where a man's higher nature can no longer keep control\nover his conduct. This is what is meant by saying that alcohol undermines\nthe will power. [Footnote: See H. S. Williams, op. cit, p. 56]\nIn particular, most sexual sins are committed after drinking; and the\ngravity of the sex problem is so great that this fact alone would\njustify the banishment of alcohol, the greatest of sexual stimulants.\n[Footnote: Cf. Jane Addams, A New Conscience and an Ancient Evil, p.\n189: \"Even a slight exhilaration from alcohol relaxes the moral sense\nand throws a sentimental or adventurous glamour over an aspect of life\nfrom which a decent young man would ordinarily recoil; and its\ncontinued use stimulates the senses at the very moment when the\nintellectual and moral inhibitions are lessened.\"]\n\n(b) A very large proportion of the crimes committed are committed under\nthe influence of alcohol. In Massachusetts, for example (in 1895),\nonly five per cent of convictions for crime were of abstainers. In\ngeneral, statistics show that from a half to three quarters of the\ntotal amount of crime has drinking for a direct contributing cause.\nWhen we add to this the crime-inducing influence of the poverty, ill\nhealth, and immoral social conditions caused by drink; we can form\nsome idea of the moral indictment against alcohol. [Footnote: H. S.\nWarner, op. cit, p. 261.]\n\n(c) The liquor trade is the most powerful of all \"interests\" in the\ncorruption of politics, one of the most demoralizing phases of our\nAmerican life. [Footnote: H. S. Warner, op. cit, chap. XI.] The saloon\npower is in politics with a grim determination to keep its business\nfrom extermination. It is able to throw the votes of a large body of\nmen as it wills. It maintains a powerful lobby at Washington and at\nthe state capitals. In many places it has had a strangle hold on\nlegislation. The trade naturally tends to ally itself with the other\nvicious interests that live by exploiting human weakness-the gamblers,\nthe fosterers of prostitution, the keepers of vile \"shows\"; it has\na vast revenue for the purchasing of votes, and, in the saloon, the\neasiest of channels for reaching the bribable voter. Corrupt political\nmachines have been glad to use its support, and have derived a large\nmeasure of their strength there from. Were the liquor trade destroyed,\nthe greatest obstacle in the way of political reform would be removed.\nIn sum, we can say that the evils caused by alcohol, instead of having\nbeen exaggerated, have never until very recently been sufficiently\nrealized. The half hath not been told.\n\nWhat should be the attitude of the individual toward alcoholic liquors?\n\nIn the light of our present knowledge, the attitude toward liquor\ndemanded by morality of the individual admits of no debate. He may\nlove dearly his wines or his beer, but his enjoyment is won at too\ndear a cost to himself and others; his support of the liquor trade\nis very selfish. He has no right to poison himself, to impair his health\nand efficiency, as even a little drinking will do. He has no right\nto run the risk of becoming the slave of alcohol, as so many of the\nmost promising men have become; the effect of the drug is insidious,\nand no man can be sure that he will be able to resist it. He has no\nright to spend in harmful self-indulgence money that might be spent\nfor useful ends. He has no right to incur the, however immeasurable,\nmoral and intellectual impairment which is effected by even rather\nmoderate drinking. He has no right to bequeath to his children a weakened\nheritage of vitality. He has no right, by his example, to encourage\nothers, who may be far more deeply harmed than he, in the use of the\ndrug; \"let no man put a stumbling-block or an occasion to fall in his\nbrother's way.\" The influence of every man who is amenable to\naltruistic motives is needed against liquor, to counteract its lure;\nwe must create a strong public sentiment and make it unfashionable\nand disreputable to drink. Happily the tide of liquor-drinking, which\nhas been rising rapidly in the last half- century, owing to the increase\nin prosperity, the great influx of immigrants from liquor-drinking\ncountries, and the stimulation of the trade by the highly organized\nliquor industry, has at last, by the earnest efforts of enlightened\nworkers, been turned. Men of influence are standing out publicly\nagainst it. Grape-juice has been substituted for wine in the White\nHouse; Kaiser Wilhelm has become an abstainer, with a declaration that\nin the present era of fierce competition the nations that triumph will\nbe those that have least to do with liquor. So conservative and\ncautious a thinker as ex-President Eliot of Harvard has recently become\nan abstainer, saying, \"The recent progress of science has satisfied\nme that the moderate use of alcohol is objectionable.\" The yearly per\ncapita consumption of alcoholic liquors, which rose from 8.79 gallons\nin 1880 to 17.76 in 1900 and 22.79 in 1911, fell in 1912 to 21.98.\nIt is to be devoutly hoped that the tide will ebb as rapidly as it\nrose. What should be our attitude toward the use of alcoholic liquors\nby others? The consideration of this question falls properly under\nthe head of \"Public Morality.\" But it will be more convenient to treat\nit here, following the presentation of the facts concerning alcohol.\nThe right of the community to interfere with the conduct of its members\nwill be discussed in chapter xxviii, and we must assume here the result\ntherein reached, that whatever is deemed necessary for the greatest\nwelfare of the community as a whole may legitimately be required of\nits individual members, however it may cross their desires or however\nthey may consider the matter their private concern. The argument against\nprohibition on the ground that it interferes with individual rights\nwould apply also to child-labor legislation, to legislation against\nstreet soliciting by prostitutes or the sale of indecent pictures,\nand, more obviously still, against anti-opium and anti-cocaine\nlegislation. As a matter of fact, the older individualistic point of\nview has been generally abandoned now, and we are free to discuss what\nis desirable for the general welfare. We may at once say that whatever\nmethod will most quickly and thoroughly root out the evil should be\nadopted. Different methods may be more or less efficacious in different\nplaces; it is a matter for legitimate opportunism. But the goal to\nbe kept in sight can only be absolute prohibition of the manufacture,\nsale, and importation of all alcoholic liquors for beverages. Education\non the matter, and exhortation to personal abstinence, must be continued.\nBut education and exhortation are not alone sufficient; self-restraint\ncannot be counted on, constraint must be employed.\n\n\"High License\" and \"Regulation\" have been thoroughly tried and have\nnot checked the evil; moreover, it has been a serious blunder to make\nthe State or municipality dependent upon the liquor trade for revenue,\nand therefore eager to retain it. The \"State Monopoly\" system has not\nproved a success in this country in lessening the evil; it made the\nliquor power a more sinister influence than ever in politics. If liquor\nmust be sold, the \"Company,\" or Scandinavian system, which eliminates\nthe factor of private profits, without fostering political corruption,\nis probably the least harmful method of selling. But no method of\nselling liquor can be more than a temporary expedient. We must work\ninch by inch to extend the boundaries of absolutely \"dry\" territory.\n\"Local Option\" has been of very great value in this movement, and may\nstill in some States be the best attainable status. Option by counties,\nwith a prohibition of the shipment of liquor from \"wet\" to \"dry\"\ncounties, is the preferable form. Statewide prohibition, for a while\nin disrepute because of open violation of the law, is again gaining\nground, ten of the forty-eight States being entirely \"dry\" at time\nof writing. The ultimate solution can only be the adoption of an\namendment to the National Constitution enforcing nation-wide\nprohibition; the agitation for such an amendment is already acute,\nand the promise of its passage within a generation bright. The arguments\nagainst prohibition are not strong. That the law is poorly enforced\nin localities where public sentiment is against it is natural; but\nno law is universally obeyed, and that a law is broken is a poor reason\nfor removing it from the statute books. No one would suggest repealing\nthe laws against burglary or seduction because they are daily disobeyed.\nThis pseudo-concern for the dignity of the law is simply a specious\nargument advanced by those who have an interest in the trade, and\naccepted by those who suppose liquor drinking to be wrong only in\nexcess and harmless in moderation. The reply is to show that alcohol,\npractice that is always harmful must be fought by the law as well as\nby moral suasion. Public sentiment must be educated up to the law;\nand the existence of the law is itself of educative value. Moreover,\nthe old observations of non-enforcement must now be modified; recent\nexperience shows that the prohibition States are on the whole\nincreasingly successful in enforcing their laws. The new national law\nprohibiting importations from \"wet\" to \"dry\" States helps immensely;\nand with the forbidding of importations from abroad and of the\nmanufacture of liquor anywhere in the country, the problem of enforcement\nwill settle itself. Except for the precarious existence of\n\"moon-shiners,\" and for what individuals may make for themselves, the\nstuff will not be obtainable. [Footnote: For the arguments for\nprohibition, see H. S. Warner, op. cit, chaps. IX, XII. Artman, The\nLegalized Outlaw. Fehlandt, A Century of Drink Reform. Wheeler,\nProhibition.] That prohibition involves the ruin of a great industry\nis true; these millions of workers will be free to give their strength\nto productive labor, these millions of dollars can be invested in some\nindustry useful to mankind. Confiscation will work hardship to the\nbrewers and distillers; so it does to the opium-growers, the makers\nof indecent pictures, and counterfeit money. A trade so inimical to\nthe general interest deserves no mercy. The States that have unwisely\nused the \"tainted money\" drawn from the industry by license will have\na far richer community to tax in other ways; for every dollar got in\nliquor-license fees, many dollars have been lost to the State. As\nGladstone said, \"Give me a sober population, not wasting their earnings\nin strong drink, and I shall know where to obtain the revenue.\" Pending\nthe enactment of legal prohibition, what is called industrial prohibition\nis proving widely efficacious. Growing numbers of manufacturers, railway\nmanagers, and storekeepers are refusing to employ men who drink at\nall. The United States Commissioner of Labor reports that ninety per\ncent of the railways, eighty-eight per cent of the trades, and\nseventy-nine per cent of the manufacturers of the country discriminate\nalready against drinkers. The only other point to be noted is that\nthe saloon-the \"public house,\" the \"poor man's salon\"-must be replaced\nby other social centers, that give opportunities for recreation, cheer,\nand social intercourse. The question of substitutes for the saloon\nwill be alluded to again, in chapter xxx. [Footnote: See Raymond Calkins,\nSubstitutes for the Saloon. H. S. Warner, op. cit, chap. VIII. Forum,\nvol. 21, p. 595.] The nation-wide campaign against alcohol is on, the\narea of its legalized sale is steadily diminishing. We who now discuss\nit may live to see it swept off the face of the earth; if not we, our\nchildren or children's children. And we must see to it that no other\ndrug opium, morphine, or the like gets a similar grip on humanity.\nOur descendants will look with as great horror upon the alcohol\nindulgence of our times as most of us now do upon opium smoking.\n\"O God, that men should put an enemy into their mouths to steal\naway their brains! that we should, with joy, pleasance, revel, and\napplause, transform ourselves into beasts!\"\n\nThe best book for practical use is H. S. Warner's Social Welfare\nand the Liquor Problem (revised edition, 1913), where extensive\nreferences to the authorities will be found. Two other excellent\npopular books are H. S. Williams, Alcohol (1909), and Horsley\nand Sturge, Alcohol and the Human Body (1911). See also\nRosanoff, in McClure's Magazine, vol. 32, p. 557; Rountree\nand Sherwell, The Temperance Problem and Social Reform;\nT. N. Kelynack, The Drink Problem: Scientific Conclusions\nconcerning the Alcohol Problem (Senate Document 48, 61st\nCongress, 1909); and the five volumes of conclusions of the\nCommittee of Fifty, published by Houghton, Mifflin Co, under\nthe general title, Aspects of the Liquor Problem; a summary of\nthese conclusions is published with the title The Liquor Problem,\ned. F. J. Peabody. Barker, The Saloon Problem and Social Reform.\nFanshawe, Liquor Legislation in the United States and Canada.\nC. B. Henderson, The Social Spirit in America, chap. XVI. The\nbest available data, to date, on the physiological questions\nunderlying the moral questions may be found in G. Rosenfeld,\nDer Einfluss des Alkohols auf den Organismus (1901) A.B.Cushney,\nThe Action of Alcohol (1907)-paper read before the British Association;\nMeyer and Gottlieb, Pharmacology (1914).\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVII\n\n\nCHASTITY AND MARRIAGE TEMPERANCE\n\nIn the indulgence of the appetites is a manifest necessity for health and\nefficiency-temperance in work and play, in eating and drinking, in\nnovel reading and theater going, in whatever activity desire may suggest.\nBut two appetites stand on a different footing from the others, and\ndemand more than temperance. The love of alcohol and the other narcotics,\nbeing, as we have seen, a pathological and highly dangerous appetite,\nproductive of scarcely any real good, must be completely rooted out\nof human nature, as it readily can be, to the great advantage of mankind.\nThe other great appetite, that of sex, cannot be treated so cavalierly;\nto eradicate it or deny its fulfillment would be to put a speedy end\nto the human race. The solution of the problems of sex is therefore\nnot so simple, the remedying of the evils of which sexual passion is\nthe source not so feasible. On the one hand, we have to recognize the\nsex instinct as normal and necessary, the source of the keenest, and,\nindirectly, of some of the most lasting, pleasures of life; the denial\nof its enticements to the extent which our Christian ideal demands\nprovokes perennial resentment and rebellion. On the other hand, we\nare confronted by the incalculable evils which unrestrained lust\nproduces, and forced to admit the imperious necessity of some strictly\nrepressive code. To many, the gravest dangers in life lie here; the\nsex instinct is the great rebel, promising a glorious liberty, a melting\nof the barriers between human bodies and souls, an ecstasy of mutual\nhappiness that nothing else can offer. Yet beyond these transient\nexcitements lie the saddest tragedies-disease and suffering, unwished\nchildbirth, heartbreak and death. Desire sings a siren music in our\nears; but the bones of those who have surrendered to the song lie\nbleaching on the rocks. These sweet anticipations presage sorrow and\nruin; there is no heavier sight than to see happy, heedless youth caught\nby the lure of this strange, mysterious thrill and drifting to their\ndestruction-\"As a bird hasteth to the snare, And know not that it is\nfor his life.\" So much is at stake here that we must be more than\nordinarily sure that we are not biased, that we are not binding ourselves\nby needless restrictions. But after whatever doubts and wanderings,\nthe man of mature experience comes back to the monogamous ideal with\nthe conviction that in it lies not only our salvation but our truest\nhappiness. A thousand pities that so many learn the lesson too late!\nNothing in the whole field of ethics is more important than for each\ngeneration, as it stands on the threshold of temptation and\nopportunity, to see clearly the basic reasons for our hard-won and\nbarely maintained code of chastity. A reverence for authority, a deep-\nimplanted sentiment, a recurrent emotional appeal, and a barrier of\nscruples and pledges may keep many within the lines of safety. But\nthe morality of sentiment and authority must always be based on a\nmorality of reason and experience. We must therefore begin by\nrecapitulating the fundamental reasons for our monogamous ideal.\n\nWhat are the reasons for chastity before and fidelity after marriage?\n\n(1) The most glaring danger for a man in unchastity is disease. The\nvenereal diseases are among the most terrible known to man; they are\nhighly contagious-one contact, and that not necessarily actual\nintercourse, sufficing for infection-and at present only very partially\ncurable. Practically all prostitutes become infected before long; the\nyoungest and prettiest are usually diseased; the chance of indulging\nin promiscuous intimacies without catching some form of infection is\nslight. The only sure way of escape from this imminent danger is by\nthe exclusive love of one man and one woman. Moreover, these diseases\nare, in their effects, transmissible from husband to wife and from\nwife to children. Many women's diseases, a large part of their sterility,\nof miscarriages and infant deaths, a large proportion of the paralysis,\ninsanity, and blindness in the world, are due to the sins of a husband\nor parent. Thus the penalty for a single misstep may be very grim;\nand the worst of it is that it must often be shared by the innocent.\n[Footnote: See Prince Morrow, Social Diseases and Marriage. W. L.\nHoward, Plain Facts on Sex Hygiene.]\n\n(2) For a girl the danger of disease is not all. There is the\nadditional danger of pregnancy, which means, and must mean, for her\nnot only pain and risk of life, but lasting shame and disgrace. Even\npaid prostitutes, who are willing to employ dangerous methods to prevent\nconception, and soon become nearly sterile through disease or\noverindulgence, often have to resort to illegal operations, at the\nrisk of their lives, and not infrequently come to childbirth. The virgin\nwho gives herself to her lover under the spell of his ardent wooing\nis very much more likely to conceive. It cannot be too bluntly stated\nthat the barest contact may suffice for conception; for a momentary\nintimacy two lives, or three, have often been ruined.\n\n(3) The reason why society cannot afford to be lenient with\nillegitimacy is that there is no proper provision for rearing children\nborn out of wedlock. The woman and the child usually need the financial\nsupport of the man; they always need his love and care. If the man\nmarries the girl he has wronged, there is not only the disgrace still\nattaching to her (and rightly to him, still more), but the fact of\na hasty and unintended and probably more or less unhappy marriage.\nCertainly in every such case the girl has a right to demand that the\nman shall marry her; whether or no she will wish him to, or will prefer\nto bear her burden and disgrace alone, is for her to determine. But\nthis is sure that any man who takes the chance of ruining a foolish\nand ignorant or oversusceptible girl \"and all for a bit of pleasure,\nas, if he had a man's heart in him, he 'd ha' cut his hand off sooner\nthan he'd ha' taken it\" [Footnote: George Eliot's Adam Bede, from which\nthese words are taken, ought to be read by every boy and girl.]- ought\nto be despised and socially ostracized by his fellows. Except for the\npenalty of disease, women have always borne the brunt of sexual\nfollies, though men have been the more to blame. It is high time that\nthis injustice were remedied to such extent as law and public opinion\ncan do it.\n\n(4) The employment of paid prostitutes for man's gratification keeps\nin existence the unhappiest and most degraded class in the world.\nBrutalized and worn by their abnormal life, treated with coarse\nindignities which they cannot resent, deprived of their birthright\nof genuine love, of wifehood and motherhood, stricken with disease\nand doomed to an early death, thousands of the prettiest,\nreddest-blooded, most promising young girls of our land, the girls\nwho ought to be bearing healthy children and rearing the future citizens\nof the State, now walk the streets painted and gaudily bedecked, seeking\ntheir miserable livelihood, and snaring the heedless and restless youth\nof the cities, the \"young men void of understanding,\" to their common\ndegradation. This human wastage is worse upon the race than war; and\nall the more pathetic because it consists of girls scarcely past the\nthreshold of their maidenhood. When we consider further the\nindescribably horrible cruelty of the \"white-slave trade,\" which the\ninsatiable lust of men has brought into being, we may begin to realize\nto what the absence of restraint upon this appetite has led.\n\nIt is quite conceivable that within the near future the venereal\ndiseases will be rendered entirely curable by the progress of medicine.\nIt is possible that some certain and harmless method of preventing\nconception will be found and become so universally known that the\ndanger of unintentional childbirth will become practically nonexistent.\nSuch a situation would remove the most obvious reasons for\nchastity, and would insure a rapid growth of free-love sentiment. It\nwould be pointed out that free love would do away with the shameful\nexistence of the paid prostitutes, and that thus all four of the basic\nreasons above given for chastity would no longer exist. To discuss\nsuch possibilities may seem premature. But as a matter of fact, even\nnow every one who indulges in \"free\" love hopes to escape disease and\nconception. And there is an increasing propaganda insisting on the\nremoval of the old conventions and the permission of promiscuous love.\nThe spirit of adventure is in the air; and with even a good chance\nof escaping the penalties, there are many who will seize their\nopportunities for enjoyment, preferring a present pleasure with its\nspice of risk to a dull negation of desire. We must then go on with\nthe argument and point out that even where these terrible results are\nescaped, the way of free love is not the happiest way.\n\n(5) Freedom from restraint in inter-sex relations inevitably leads,\nin the majority of men and women, to an overindulgence which seriously\nimpairs health and efficiency. The one salient motive for the\nopposition of ancient codes to sex license was the necessity of\npreserving the virility of the young men for war. Today athletes are\nenjoined to chastity. But, indeed, if a man would succeed in anything,\nhe must check this so easily overdeveloped impulse. Promiscuity means\na continually renewed stimulus; the passion, which quickly becomes\nnormal and intermittent when it spends itself upon one object, is apt\nto become an abnormal and almost continuous craving when it is solicited\nby a succession of novel and piquant attractions. The advocates of\nfree love assert that it is unnatural repression that creates an undue\nand morbid longing; that freedom to satisfy the instinct would tend\nto keep it in its properly subordinate place. But the contrary is,\nin reality, true. More usually, as Rabelais has it, \"the appetite comes\nduring the eating.\" The absence of temptation will leave an instinct\ndormant which free opportunity to indulge will develop into a dominant\nappetite. And nothing more quickly drafts strength or ambition than\nabsorption in sex pleasures; we need to put our energies into something\nthat instead of being inimical is forwarding to the rest of our\ninterests.\n\n(6) Sexual intemperance coarsens, blunts delight in the\nless violent and more delicate emotions. The pleasures of sex,\nthough of the keenest, are not lasting, like those of the intellect,\nof religion, art, and manly achievement. But if recklessly indulged\nin, they inevitably sap our interest in these other ideals. Except\nwhere they spring from and reinforce true affection, they are an\nopiate, taking us into a dream world that makes actual life stale\nand tasteless. \"Hold off from sensuality,\" says Cicero; \"for if you\ngive yourself up to it, you will be unable to think of anything else.\"\nThere is so much else that is worthwhile, life has so many possible\nvalues, that for our own final happiness, we cannot afford to let this\ninstinct usurp too great a place. The vision of God is worth many\nhours of transient and shallow excitement; and that vision comes\nonly to the pure in heart.\n\n(7) But even for the greatest pleasure in sex itself,\nincontinence is a blunder. The one telling argument for free love is\nthe sweetness of the delights that the chaste must miss; the bodily\nintimacy that soothes the lonely heart, the adventurous excitement\nof breaking down barriers, of dominance and surrender, with its\nquickened breathing and heightened sense of living. But the plea\ncomes usually from the inexperienced; it is the yearning of youth\ntoward the lure of the untried ways, of the untasted joys. Actually,\nwhere passion is unbridled, the halo and the vision quickly vanish;\nthe sated impulse becomes a restless craving for more violent\nstimulation, a thirst that no mere physical intimacy can ever assuage;\nor it leaves the heart cloyed and despondent and resourceless.\nThis is the natural history of undisciplined passion; it cheapens\nlove, it robs it quickly of its exquisiteness and charm. The faithful\nlover, on the other hand, by checking premature intimacies, and\nkeeping true to the one woman who calls or will some day call out\nall his love, knows a steady joy that bulks in the end far greater than\nthe flaring and fitful and quickly disillusioned passions of unearned\nlove. Where the veil of mystery is not too rudely drawn aside, the\nability to respond to the charm of girlhood and of ripe womanhood\nmay be long retained; the pleasures of sex that count for most in\nthe end are not the moments of passion, but the daily enjoyment\nof companionship with the opposite sex, the assurance and comfort\nof mutual fidelity, the love that feeds on daily caresses, endearing\nwords, and acts of tender service. And these lasting joys do not\naccrue to the man or woman who is not willing to wait, or who\nsquanders his potentialities of love in reckless and fundamentally\nunsatisfying debauchery. This is the paradox of love; whoso would\nfind its best gifts must be willing to deny himself its gaudiest. The old\nlove of twos, the loyalty of man and wife that bring to each other\npure hearts and bodies, is best.\n\n(8) There are, besides, certain practical consequences of which\nexperience warns. Free love would mean that the pretty and well-\ndeveloped girls, the handsomer and physically stronger men, would be\nbesieged with solicitations and almost inevitably debauched by excess\nof temptation, while the less attractive would starve for love. It would\nmean jealousies, deserted lovers, and broken hearts. Free love\nis especially hard on a woman; she readily becomes attached,\nand craves loyalty. Inconstancy, though it is so natural to man as\noften to need the pressure of law and convention for its repression,\nis not only the worst enemy of his own happiness, but the inevitable\nsource of friction and clash between men and between women. If\nfreedom to break the troth that love instinctively plights is allowed,\nthe chances are numerous that one or the other will some day\ndiscover another \"affinity\" that, at least for the time, seems closer\nand better suited to him; unless a stern loyalty prevents, one or two\nor three hearts may be broken. Our monogamous code-whose\niological value is clearly indicated by its adoption by most of the\nhigher animals (not counting the domesticated animals, whose\nmorals have been hopelessly ruined)-stands among the wisest\nof our ideals.\n\nWhat safeguards against unchastity are necessary?\n\nOverwhelming as is the argument for monogamy, it runs counter to such\nviolent impulses that it needs every prop and sanction that can be\ngiven it. It must shelter itself under the law, keep on its side the\nconscience of men, and be hallowed by alliance with religion. All this\nis partially attained by the social-religious institution of marriage.\nThe wedding ceremony itself, adding as it does dignity and symbolism,\nthe memory of a beautiful occasion, and the witness of friends to the\nplighting of mutual vows, is of appreciable value. We must now consider\nthe practical question how, in the face of almost inevitable\ntemptation, the young man and woman may keep chaste during the years\nprior to marriage. If pre-marital chastity is maintained, there is\ncomparatively little danger of infidelity when chosen love and loyalty\nto vows come to reinforce the earlier motives.\n\n(1) Certain abstinences, that might not seem in themselves important,\nare necessary. Little familiarities, kisses and caresses, must be\navoided; they are a playing with fire; and the youth never knows when\nthe electric thrill will vibrate through his being, awakened by a\ntouch, that will summon him to a new world wherein he must not yet\nenter. The finest men do not take these liberties, nor do well-bred\ngirls permit them or respect those who seek them. Vulgar jokes and\nstories must be despised, as well as all allusions to vice as a natural\nor amusing thing. Alcohol, gambling, and all unhealthy excitements\nmust be shunned. Above all, the imagination must be controlled; nothing\nis more dangerous than the indulgence in voluptuous dreams. Longings\nso fostered, so pent up without outlet, are too apt to break out, in\ndespite of scruples and resolves, if a favorable and alluring\nopportunity occurs. The battle against sin is won more in private than\nin the actual moments of temptation.\n\n(2) But in this matter, as always, we must not merely avoid evil, we\nmust overcome evil with good; we can best hope to escape the sirens\nnot as Ulysses did, by having himself bound to the mast, but as Orpheus\ndid, by playing a sweeter music still than they. The best antidote\nto impurity is a pure love, the next best the dedication to a love\nyet to be found. The passionate youth must speak in the vein of the\nKnight in Santayana's poem:\n\n\"As the gaudy shadows Stalked by me which men take for beauteous\nthings, I laughed to scorn each feeble counterfeit, And cried to the\nsweet image in my soul, How much more bright thou wast and beautiful.\"\n\nNormal friendships with pure girls are vitally necessary for a man,\nand comradeship with men important for women. Normal interests of all\nsorts are necessary; the man or woman who has a full, all-round life,\nwho cultivates wholesome intellectual, aesthetic, religious activities,\nis in far less danger of an unregulated passion. Human energy must\nfind some happy outlets, or it will tend to run amuck; what we become\ndepends largely on what we get interested in. In particular, the\nabundant physical activity of robust health makes it much easier to\nbanish immoderate desires.\n\n(3) There are certain safeguards that the community should erect.\n(a) Among these are the conventions that control intimacy between the\nsexes. On the one hand, the wholesome comradeship of boys and girls,\nabove desiderated, must be encouraged, not only for the removal of\nthat loneliness and morbid curiosity which are among the greatest of\nsex irritants, but in order that husband and wife may be wisely chosen.\nOn the other hand, the attractiveness of the other sex may easily draw\ntoo much attention from the studies and sports that ought to make up\nthe bulk of the activity of youth; and too great freedom of companionship\nleads to an unnecessary amount of temptation. The fearless, heart-\nfree friendship of chaste youths and maidens is a priceless boon. But\nclose lines must be drawn, and a certain amount of wise chaperonage\nis necessary. Too free a physical intimacy between the sexes leads\nalmost irresistibly on, with many, to actual intercourse; the instinct\nis too imperious to be withstood when opportunity is too easy, if there\nare not many barriers to be broken first.\n\n(b) Another duty of the community lies in the fight against the public\nsources of sensual appeal not merely the houses of prostitution\nand street solicitation, but the vile shows, indecent pictures and\nbooks, and other means by which the greed of money panders to the sex\ninstinct. The questions concerning the drama, the ballet, and the nude\nin art will recur when we come to discuss the general relations of\nart and morality. Closely parallel are the problems concerning the\ncostume of women; these are phases of the eternal conflict between\nbeauty and morality. What is pretty is tempting. How can we have\nenjoyment without being wrecked by it; how can we make life rich and\nyet keep it pure? Some line must be drawn; just where, we have not\nspace to discuss.\n\n(c) Education on matters of sex must probably be attended to in the\npublic schools. It were better done by parents, perhaps; but parents\ncannot be depended upon to do it. The dangers that await indulgence,\nthe cruelty and brutality of prostitution, should be universally but\ncautiously taught; too many boys and girls wreck their lives for l\nack of such knowledge. It is indeed a delicate task to instruct\nadolescents in these matters; there is, as Professor Munsterberg\nhas well pointed out, a grave danger of stimulating, by calling\nattention to it, the very impulse which it is desired to curb, of\ndissipating the fear of the unknown which may be greater than\nthat of clearly understood, and thereby, perhaps, avoidable\ndangers, and of breaking down barriers of shyness and reticence,\nwhich form one of the most effective of safeguards. Personal\nattention to the individual needs of boys and girls of widely\ndiffering temperaments and mental condition is imperative.\nBut in general, it is to be remembered that almost every boy\nand girl learns, somehow, long before marriage, the main facts\nconcerning sex-relations. And it is far better that that knowledge\nshould be imparted reverently, accurately, unemotionally, and with\ndue emphasis upon perils and penalties, than that it should be gained\n in coarse and exciting ways, or remain half understood and with a\nglamour of mystery about it.\n\nWhat are the factors in an ideal marriage?\n\nCelibacy is neither natural nor desirable; a happy marriage should\nbe the goal of every healthy man's and woman's thought. The economic\nsituation that prevents so many from marrying till nearly or quite\nthirty is thoroughly unwholesome and must in some way be remedied.\nMarriage in the early twenties is not only an important safeguard\nagainst unchastity; it is physiologically better for the woman and\nher offspring. The danger and pain in childbirth to a woman of twenty\nor twenty-five are less than in later life, and the children have a\nbetter chance of health. Moreover, young people are mentally and morally\nmore plastic; they have not yet become so \"set\" in their ways as they\nwill later become, and are more likely to grow together and make easily\nthose little compromises and adjustments which the fusing of two lives\nnecessitates. And it is always a pity that the two who are to be life\ncomrades should fail to have these years, in some ways the best of\ntheir lives, together.\n\nYet this sacred and exacting relationship must not be hastily entered,\nfor nothing more surely than marriage makes or mars character and\nhappiness. Too early marriage is apt to be impulsive and thoughtless.\nIt is true that many confirmed bachelors and maiden ladies lose through\nan excess of timidity the great experiences and joys which a little\nboldness, a little willingness to take a risk and put up with the\nimperfect would have brought them. No man or woman is perfect; no one\ncan expect to find a wholly ideal mate; it is foolish to be too\nexacting, and it is conceited, implying\nthat one is flawless one's self. Nevertheless, the counsel of caution\nis more commonly needed. Happily we have pretty generally got away\nfrom mariages de convenance, marriages for money, or title, or other\nextraneous advantages. And we have recognized the right of the\ntwo who are primarily concerned to make their own choice without\ninterference, other than friendly counsel and warning, from others.\nBut we still have many marriages from which the basic desiderata\nare in too great degree absent.\n\n(1) There should be genuine sex attraction; not necessarily a violent\npassion, or love at first sight, but some measure of that instinctive\norganic attraction, that unpredictable and irrational emotional\nsatisfaction in physical proximity, which differentiates sex love from\nthe love of men or women for one another. Not that \"platonic\" relations\nbetween husband and wife are not possible or permissible; but if a\nyoung couple are not linked by this sweetest of bonds, they not only\nmiss much of the charm and mutual drawing- together of marriage, but\nthey stand in gravest danger of an eventual arousing of the instinct\nby another-and that means either a bitter fight for loyalty or actual\ntragedy. It is never to be forgotten that husband and wife have to\nspend a great part of their life in the same house, in the same room.\nNo degree of similarity of interests can take the place of that mere\ninstinctive liking, that pervasive content at each other's presence,\nthat enjoyment in seeing each other about, and in the daily caresses\nand endearing words that rightly mated couples know.\n\n(2) But this underlying physical attraction, however keen at first\nis not of guaranteed permanence; it must be buttressed by common\ntastes and sympathies. To like the same people, to enjoy doing the\nsame things, to judge problems from the same angle, to cleave to\nsimilar moral, aesthetic, religious canons is of great importance. A\ncertain amount of contrast in ideas and ideals is, indeed, piquant\nand stimulating; and where marriage is early there is likelihood of\nan adequate convergence in Weltanschauung. But too radically\ndifferent an outlook upon life may lead to continual friction, to\nloneliness, and mutual antagonism. The two who are to be\ncomrades in the great experiment of life must be able to help\neach other, strengthen each other's weaknesses, and admire\neach other's aims and achievements. In particular, religious\nfanaticism is an intractable enemy of marital happiness. As\nStevenson puts it, \"There are differences which no habit\nnor affection can reconcile, and the Bohemian must not\nntermarry with the Pharisee. The best of men and the best of\nwomen may sometimes live together all their lives, and, for want\nof some consent on fundamental questions, hold each other lost\nspirits to the end.\"\n\n(3) It scarcely needs to be added that there must be on both sides\na high standard of morality. Truthfulness, sincerity, self-control,\nthe willingness to work, to sacrifice personal desires and pull together\nfor the common welfare of the house, are essential, as well as fidelity\nto marriage vows and abstinence from all intemperance and lawbreaking.\nCommon tastes can be formed after marriage; even the organic attraction\nis pretty sure to be awakened in some degree if the pair are not\nactually repulsive to each other; but low moral ideals at the age of\nmarriage are seldom radically transformed afterward and render any\nhappiness in home-making insecure.\n\n(4) Perhaps some day it may become incumbent upon the suitor to weigh\nthe matter of the heredity back of the lady of his choice, and consider\nwhether she is best adapted, by mating with him, to give birth to\nnormal and healthy children; or for the maiden sought to regard with\nequal care the antecedents of the suitor. But-fortunately for lovers'\nconsciences-we know too little at present about heredity and the\nbreeding of human beings to give much useful advice or make any demands\nof the prospective couple, except to insist that those who are tainted\nwith hereditary disease or feeble-mindedness shall refrain from\nmarriage. To this subject we shall recur in chapter XXX.\n\nIs divorce morally justifiable?\n\nIf marriage were always undertaken with adequate caution, there would\nseldom be need of annulling it. But since mistakes are bound to be\nmade and unhappy unions result; since, further, matters arising after\nmarriage often tend to push couples apart and engender a state of\nfriction or absolute antagonism, a necessary postscript to the\nquestions concerning marriage must be that concerning divorce. It is\nmatter of common knowledge that there is a marked tendency in recent\nyears toward a loosening of the marriage bond; the ease with which\ndivorces are granted in some States has become a national scandal.\nAmong the causes for this are the lessening of allegiance to religious\nauthority, the loss of the older fears and restraints, the growing\nspirit of adventure and iconoclasm. With the breaking-up of traditions,\nthe lure of freedom has been strong, especially upon the so-long-\ndominated and docile sex. Women are becoming better educated and\nasserting their rights everywhere; they are now able to earn their\nliving in many independent ways, and are in a position to break loose;\nthe era of the subjection of women is over, and it is natural that\nmany, particularly of the idle and frivolous, should turn this new-won\nliberty into license.\n\nBut, indeed, human nature being as it is, there would inevitably arise,\nand have always arisen, many cases of strain and friction in marriage\nrelations. As Chesterton says, a man and a woman are, in the nature\nof the case, incompatible; and that underlying incommensurability of\nviewpoint easily results in clash where a deep-rooted affection and\na habit of self-control are absent. Innumerable couples have suffered\nand hated each other and made the best of it; nowadays they are\ndeeming it better frankly to admit and end the discord. And the problem,\nWhich solutionis better? is by no means an easy one. We can but make\nhere a few general suggestions.\n\n(1) Divorce must certainly not be so easy as to encourage hasty and\nunconsidered marriage, or to turn this most sacred of relationships\ninto a mere experimental and provisional alliance. \"Trial marriage\"\nis a palpably reprehensible scheme, involving an unwarrantable stimulus\nto the sex appetite; many men would enjoy taking one woman after another,\nuntil their passion in each case had exhausted its force with the lapse\nof novelty; women, who are not so naturally promiscuous, would suffer\nmost. What would become of the children is a question whose very posing\ncondemns the proposal. But a lax divorce law provides practically for\ntrial marriage; one or the other party may enter into the contract\nand pronounce the solemn vows without any intention of keeping them\nwhen it shall cease to be for his or her pleasure. Not in this way\nis to be got the real worth of marriage; the conscious and earnest\neffort, at least, must be to keep to it for life. An easy short cut\nto freedom would tempt too many from the harder but nobler way of\ncompromise, conciliation, and self-subordination. If one is weak and\nerring, or petulant and unkind, the other must patiently and lovingly\nseek to help, to educate, to uplift; seventy times seven times is not\ntoo often for forgiveness; and many a marriage that seemed hopelessly\nwrecked has been saved by magnanimity and tactful affection. There\nis a fine disciplinary value in these forbearances, and much opportunity\nfor spiritual growth in the persevering endeavor toward harmony and\nmutual understanding. Many a man and woman who might have been lost\nif divorced, has been saved for a better life by the unwillingness\nof wife or husband to desert under grievous provocation. There comes\nan ebb to most conjugal disputes; men and women grow wiser, and often\ngentler, with age; while there is any hope for readjustment and revival\nof love it is wrong to break marital vows. Many a divorce has been\nas hasty and ill considered as the marriage it ended, and has left\nthe couple in the end less happy and useful members of the community.\nParticularly when there are children should the parents sacrifice much\nfor the sake of giving them a real home, with both mother- and\nfather-love.\n\n(2) Yet there are cases where love is hopelessly killed\nand harmony is impossible; cases where much suffering, and even moral\ndegeneration, would result from continuance of the married life. Where\na man transfers his love to another or indulges in infidelity to his\nvows; where he crazes himself with liquor or some other narcotic, and\nwill not give it up; where he treats his wife with cruelty or contempt,\nor through selfishness or laziness deserts or refuses to support her;\nwhere she refuses to perform her wifely duties, gives herself to other\nmen, makes home intolerable for him--in short, in any case where\nmutual loyalty and cooperation are hopeless of attainment, it is surely\nbest that there should be separation. It does not make for the welfare\nof the children, or for the sanctity of marriage, that such wretched\ntravesties of it should continue. Moreover, for eugenic reasons, we\nmust urge the freeing of wives from husbands who have transmissible\ndiseases, inheritable defects, or chronic alcoholism. Nor should the\nfact of one mistake preclude the injured party from another opportunity\nfor happiness and usefulness. Whether the guilty man or woman, the\none wholly or chiefly to blame for the failure, should be permitted\nto remarry is another matter; but probably, on the whole, it is better\nthan the alternative encouragement of immorality and illegitimacy.\n\n(3) The community should exert its influence toward the remedying of\nthe present anomalies and uncertainties by making both marriage laws\nand divorce laws more stringent, and uniform throughout the country.\nStatutes that will render impulsive marriage impossible, by requiring\nan interval to elapse after statement of intention to marry, and making\na clean bill of health necessary; divorce laws that shall refuse to\npander to caprice and willfulness, but shall make it easy, without\nscandal or needless publicity, to deliver a woman or a man from an\nintolerable and irremediable situation, and that shall not be\nappreciably more lenient in one State than in another, will go far\ntoward curing contemporary evils. It may yet be that the Constitution\nwill be so amended as to permit the National Government to control\nthese matters and thus replace our present chaos with order.\n\nDewey and Tufts, Ethics, chap. XXVI. Scharlieb and Silby, Youth and\nSex. C. Read, Natural and Social Morals, chap. VII. Anon, Life, Love,\nand Light (Macmillan), pp. 84-96. R. C. Cabot, What Men Live By, chaps.\nXXIV-XXIX. W. L. Sheldon, An Ethical Movement, chaps. XI, XII. C. F.\nDole, Ethics of Progress, part VII, chap. III. Felix Adler, Marriage\nand Divorce, The Spiritual Meaning of Marriage. N. Smyth, Christian\nEthics, pp. 405-15. B. P. Bowne, Principles of Ethics, part III, chaps.\nVIII, IX. W. E. H. Lecky, The Map of Life, chap. XIV. Stevenson,\nVirginibus Puerisque. G. E. C. Gray, Husband and Wife. J. Rus, The\nPeril and Preservation of the Home. Thompson and Geddes, Problems of\nSex. H. Munsterberg, \"Sex-Education\" (in Psychology and Social Sanity).\nH. G. Wells, \"Divorce\" (in Social Forces in England and America). C.\nJ. Hawkins, Will the Home Survive? Biblical World, vol. 43, p. 33.\nInternational Journal of Ethics, vol. 17, p. 181. For the data: United\nStates Department of Commerce and Labor, Reports on Marriage and\nDivorce. Publications of the National League for the Protection of\nthe Family (Secretary S. W. Dike, Auburndale, Massachusetts)\nand of the Society of Sanitary and Moral Prophylaxis (105 West 40th\nStreet, New York). Howard, MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS. Sutherland,\nORIGIN AND GROWTH OF THE MORAL INSTINCT of the Moral Instinct,\nchaps. vii, ix. Lestourneaux, EVOLUTION OF MARRIAGE.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVIII\n\n\nFELLOWSHIP, LOYALTY, AND LUXURY\n\nEVERY man has to solve the problem of how far he will live for his\nsmaller, personal self, and how far for that larger self that includes\nthe interests of others. The general principles involved we have\ndiscussed in chapter XI; we may now proceed to consider their\napplication to the concrete situations in which we find ourselves.\nWhat social relationships impose claims upon us?\n\n(1) The relations of husband and wife and of parenthood are most sacred\nand exacting, because they are voluntarily assumed, and because the\nneed and possibilities of help are here greatest. A man or woman may\nwithout odium remain free from these obligations; but once they have\nmade the vows that initiate the dual life, once they have brought a\nhelpless child into the world, neither may evade the consequent\nresponsibilities. If undertaken at all, these duties must be\nconscientiously fulfilled; and whatever sacrifices are necessary must,\nas a matter of course, and ungrudgingly, be made.\n\n(2) Next in inviolability to these claims are those of father and\nmother, brother and sister, and other near relatives. Involuntary as\nthese relations are, the natural piety that accepts the burdens they\nentail must not be allowed to grow dim. Those nearest of kin are the\nnatural supports and helpers of the weak and dependent; and though\npatience and resources be severely taxed, it is better to let blood\nties continue to involve obligation than to permit the selfish\nirresponsibility of a freer and more individualistic society. Much\nprovocation can be borne by remembering \"She is my mother\"; \"He is\nmy brother\"; after all, their interests are ours, and our lives are\nimpoverished, as well as theirs, if we ignore them.\n\n(3) The voluntary bonds of friendship entail somewhat vaguer\nobligations, since the closeness of the tie is not clearly fixed, as\nit is in the case of blood relationship. But \"once a friend always\na friend\" is the truehearted man's motto. \"Assure thee,\" says one of\nShakespeare's heroines, \"if I do vow a friendship, I'll perform it\nto the last article.\" No one who has won another's friendship, and,\nhowever tacitly, pledged his own, is thenceforth free to ignore the\nbond. Here are for most men the happiest opportunities for fellowship,\nfor inward growth, and for service; for if the love of wife surpasses\nthat of friends, it is not only on account of the fascination of sex,\nbut because marriage may be the supreme friendship. Emerson declared\nthat \"every man passes his life in the search after friendship\"; and\nthe greatest of Stevenson's three desiderata for happiness was - \"Ach,\nDu lieber Gott, friends!\" Human beings, even when brought up in a\nsimilar environment, are so infinitely divergent in temperament and\nideal, that the near of kin seldom meet a man's deepest needs, and\nhe must wait and watch to find one here and there with whom he can\nclasp hands in real mutual comprehension and accord. Want of this\nspontaneous comradeship sadly limits a life; nothing pays more in joy\nthan the circle of friends that a man can draw about him. Nothing,\nlikewise, is more morally stimulating. \"What a friend thinks me to\nbe, that must I be.\" This linking of our lives to others draws us out\nof ourselves, corrects our cramped and distorted vision, and reinforces\nour wavering aspirations. Hence those who are so critical and fastidious\nas to make few friends ill serve their own interests. A certain\nheartiness and fearlessness of trust is necessary; reproaches and\nsuspicions, accusations and demands for explanations, must not be\nindulged in, even if wrong is actually done. A presumption of good\nintentions must always be maintained, even if appearances are black.\nIt is more shameful, as La Rochefoucauld said, to distrust a friend\nthan to be deceived by him. Indeed, these deceptions and disillusions\nare oftenest the result of our own mistaken idealization; we must expect\nneither perfection nor those particular virtues in which we ourselves\nare especially punctilious, and undertake to love and cleave to a mortal,\nnot an angel. Friendship requires not only that we lend a hand when\nhelp is needed; it implies patience and tact and the endeavor to\nunderstand. Through common experiences, repeated interchange\nof thought and observation, mutual enjoyment of beauty and fun,\nparticularly in expressing common ideals and working together for\ncommon causes, there grows to maturity this wonderful relationship\n\"the slowest fruit in the whole garden of God, which many summers\nand many winters must ripen.\"\n\n(4) Beyond the boundaries of blood and friendship lie a whole hierarchy\nof lesser relationships-to neighbors, to employees, to fellow townsmen,\nto human beings the world over. Mere proximity constitutes a claim that\nis not commonly acknowledged when distance interposes;\nmost men would be mortally ashamed to let a next-door neighbor starve,\nalthough they may feel no call to lessen their luxuries when thousands,\nwhom they could as easily succor, are perishing in the antipodes. And\nthere is a measure of necessity in this; to burden our minds with the\nthought of the suffering in India, in Russia, in Japan, leads to a\nparalyzing sense of impotence. If we confine our thought to the\ndwellers on our street or in our town, it may not seem utterly hopeless\nto try to remedy their distress; to improve the situation of the\nlaborers in one's own shop or factory lies within the limits of\npracticability. But the Christian doctrine of the universal brotherhood\nof man is becoming a working principle at last; and millions of dollars\nand thousands of our ablest young men and women are crossing the\noceans to uplift and civilize the more backward nations, in deference\nto the admonition that we are our brothers' keepers. At home this\nrecognition of the basic human relationship of living together on this\nlittle sphere, that is plunging with us all through the great deeps of\nspace, should help to obliterate class lines and snobbishness and\nbring about a real democracy of fellowship.\n\n(5) Finally, we have a duty to those dumb brothers of ours, the animal\nspecies that share with us the earth. For they, too, feel pain and\npleasure, and are much at our mercy. We must learn \"Never to blend\nour pleasure or our pride With sorrow of the meanest thing that feels.\"\n\nAll needless hurting of sentient creatures is cruelty, whether of the\nboy who tortures frogs and flies, or of the grown man who takes his\npleasure in hunting to death a frightened deer. Beasts of prey must,\nindeed, be ruthlessly put to death, just as we execute murderers; among\nthem are to be counted flies, mosquitoes, rats, and the other pests\nso deadly to the human race and to other animals. But death should\nbe inflicted as painlessly as possible; no humane man will prolong\nthe suffering of the humblest creature for the sake of \"sport\" or take\npleasure in the killing. We must say with Cowper \"I would not enter\non my list of friends, (Though graced with polished manners and fine\nsense, Yet wanting sensibility) the man Who needlessly sets foot upon\na worm.\"\n\nThis does not necessarily imply that we may not rear and kill animals\nfor food. When properly slaughtered, they suffer inappreciably-no\nmore, and probably less, than they would otherwise suffer before death;\nthe fear of the hunted animal is not present, and there is no danger\nof leaving mate and offspring to suffer. Indeed, the animals that are\nbred for food would not have their chance to live at all but for serving\nthat end; and their existence is ordinarily, without doubt, of some\npositive balance of worth to them. Certainly the rearing of cattle\nand sheep and chickens adds appreciably to the picturesqueness and\nrichness of human life; and if dieticians are to be believed, their\nfood value could hardly be replaced by substitutes.\n\nThe question of vivisection is not a difficult one. Certainly\nexperimentation on living animals should be sharply controlled,\nanesthetics should be used whenever possible, and the needless\nrepetition of operations for illustrative purposes should be forbidden.\nBut it is far better for the general good that necessary\nexperimentation should be performed upon animals than upon human\nbeings; not at all as a partisan judgment, to shift suffering from\nourselves to others, which would be unjustifiable, but because animals\nare less sensitive to pain, and unable to foresee and fear it as human\nbeings would. The human lives saved have been of far greater worth\nnot only to themselves but objectively than the animal lives sacrificed.\nMoreover, except for a few glaring instances, vivisection has involved\nlittle cruelty; and the crusade against it, though actuated by a noble\nimpulse, has rested upon misrepresentation of facts and exaggeration\nof evils.\n\nWhat general duties do we owe our fellows?\n\n(1) The abstract duty to refrain from hurting our fellows, and to give\npositive help, to whomever we can, will find constant application in\nconnection with each specific problem we are to study. But a few\ngeneral remarks may be pertinently made here. In the first place, we\nneed to be reminded that to help requires insight and tact and\ningenuity; it is not enough to respond to obvious needs or actual\nrequests; we must learn to understand our fellows' wants, remember\ntheir tastes, seek out ways to add to their happiness or lighten their\nburdens. For another must realize the importance of manners, cultivate\nkindliness of voice and phrase, courtesy, cheerfulness, and good humor.\nSurliness and ill temper, glumness, touchiness, are inexcusable; nor\nmay we needlessly burden others with our troubles and disappointments\n- the motto, \"Burn your own smoke,\" voices an important duty. Again,\nwe must remember that people generally are lonely and in need of love;\nwe must be generous in our affection. It is sometimes said that love\ngiven as a duty is a mockery; and doubtless spontaneous and irresistible\nlove is best. But it is possible to cultivate love. If we think of\nothers not as rivals or enemies, but as fellows whose interests we\nourselves have at heart, if we try to put ourselves in their place,\nsee through their eyes, and enjoy their pleasures and successes, we\nshall find ourselves coming to want happiness for them and then feeling\nsome measure of affection. Men and women do not have to be perfect\nto be loved; all or nearly all are love worthy, if we have it in us\nto love.\n(2) The question how far we should tolerate what we believe\nto be wrong in others, and how far we should work to reform them, is\nof the most difficult. Certainly moral evil must be fought; the counsel\nto \"resist not evil\" cannot be taken too sweepingly. No one can sit\nstill while a big boy is bullying a smaller, while vice caterers are\nplying their trades, while cruelty and injustice of any sort are being\nperpetrated. In lesser matters, too, we must not be inactive, but use\nour influence and persuasion to call our fellows to better things.\nThey may well at some later day reproach us if we shirk our duty to\nhelp them see and correct their faults; still more may we be reproached\nby others who have been harmed by faults that we might have done\nsomething toward curing. Often a single gentle and tactful admonition\nhas turned the whole current of a man's life. The truest friendship\nis not too easy- going; it stimulates and checks as well as comforts.\nEmerson happily phrases this aspect of the matter: \"I hate, when I\nlooked for a manly furtherance, or at least a manly resistance, to\nfind a mush of concession. Better be a nettle in the side of your friend\nthan his echo.\"\n\nThis is, however, only half the truth. What Stevenson calls the\n\"passion of interference with others\" is one of the wretchedest\npoisoners of human happiness. People are, after all, hopelessly at\nvariance in ideals, and we must be content to let others live in their\nown way and according to their own inner light, as we live by ours.\nProbably neither is the light of perfect day. Parents are particularly\nat fault in this respect; rare is the father or mother who is willing\nthat son and daughter should leave the parental paths and follow their\nown ideals. Incalculable is the amount of needless suffering caused\nby the conscientious attempt to make others over into our own image.\nAs Carlyle wrote, \"The friendliest voice must speak from without; and\na man's ultimate monition comes only from within.\" We need not only\na shrugging \"tolerance,\" but a willingness to admit that those who\ndiffer from us may after all be in the right of it. It often happens\nthat as we live our standards change, and we come to see that those\nwhom we were anxious to reform were less in need of reformation than\nwe; and very likely while we were blaming others, they in their hearts\nwere blaming us. The older we grow the less we feel ourselves qualified\nfor the office of censor.\n\nCertain practical counsels may perhaps be not too impertinent: Be sure\nyou can take advice yourself without offense or irritation before you\nproffer it to others; there may be beams in your own eyes as well as\nmotes in your neighbors'. Be sure you see through the other's eyes,\nand get his point of view; only so can you feel reasonably confident\nthat you are right in your advice or reproof.[Footnote: Cf. W. E. H.\nLecky, The Map of Life, p. 68: \"Few men have enough imagination to\nrealize types of excellence altogether differing from their own. It\nis this, much more than vanity, that leads them to esteem the types\nof excellence to which they themselves approximate as the best, and\ntastes and habits that are altogether incongruous with their own as\nfutile and contemptible.\"] Be sure that you are saying what you are\nsaying for the other's good, and not to give vent to your own\nirritability or selfishness or sense of superiority; say what must\nbe said sweetly or gravely, never patronizingly or sharply, with\nresentfulness or petulance. Be sure you choose your occasion tactfully,\nand above all things do not nag; it is better to have it out once and\nfor all than to be forever hinting and complaining and reproving. Praise\nwhen you can, temper advice with compliments, make it apparent that\nyour spirit is friendly and your mood good-tempered. Talk and think\nas little as possible of others' faults; he who is above doing a low\nact is above talking about another's failings. The only right gossip\nis that which dwells upon the pleasant side of our neighbors' doings.\nAvoid all impatience, contempt, and anger; they poison no one so much\nas him who feels them. Cultivate kindliness and sympathy; love opens\nblind eyes, helps us to understand our neighbor, and to help him in\nthe best way. Are the rich justified in living in luxury? Of all the\nproblems that loyalty to our fellows involves, none is acuter, to the\nconscientious man, than that concerning the degree of luxury he may\nallow himself. It is strictly things in the world is limited; the more\nI have, the less others have. How can a good man be content to spend\nunnecessary sums upon himself and his own family, when within arm's\nreach men and women and children are being stunted mentally and morally,\nare living in dirt and squalor, are succumbing to disease, are actually\ndying, for lack of the comfort and opportunity that his superfluous\nwealth could give? \"Wherever we may live, if we draw a circle around\nus of a hundred thousand [sic], or a thousand, or even of ten miles'\ncircumference, and look at the lives of those men and women who are\ninside our circle, we shall find half- starved children, old people,\npregnant women, sick and weak persons, all working beyond their strength,\nwith neither food nor rest enough to support them, and so dying before\ntheir time.\"[Footnote: Tolstoy, What Shall We Do Then? chap. xxvi.]\nIt is only a lack of imagination and sympathy, or an actual ignorance\nof conditions, that can permit so many really kind-hearted people to\nspend so much money upon clothes, amusements, elaborate dinners, and\na lot of other superfluities, in a world so full of desperate need.\nIt would be well if every citizen could be compelled to do a little\ncharity-visiting, or something of the sort, that he might see with\nhis own eyes the cramping and demoralizing conditions under which,\nfor sheer lack of money, so many worthy poor, under the present crude\nsocial organization, must live. It is the segregation of the well to\ndo in their separate quarters that fosters their shameless callousness,\nand leads, in the rich, \"to that flagrant exhibition of great wealth\nwhich almost frightens those who know the destitution of the poor.\"\n\nThere is, however, a growing uneasiness among those who have, an\nincreasing sense of responsibility toward those who have not; there\nare hopeful signs of a return to the sane ideal of the Greeks, who\ndeemed it vulgar and barbaric to spend money lavishly on self. The\ncompunctions of the rich are indicated, on the one hand, by generous\ndonations made to all sorts of causes, and on the other hand, by the\narguments which are now thought necessary to justify the selfish use\nof money. These arguments we may cursorily discuss.\n\n(1) A clever writer in a recent magazine [Footnote: Katherine Fullerton\nGerould, in the Atlantic Monthly, vol. 109, p. 135.] speaks of\n\"factitious altruism\"; with this \"altruism of the Procrusteans\" who\nwould reduce every one to the simple life-she has \"little patience.\"\n\"Thousands of people seem to be infected with the idea that by doing\nmore themselves they bestow leisure on others; that by wearing shabby\nclothes they somehow make it possible for others to dress better-\nthough they thus admit tacitly that leisure and elegance are not evil\nthings. Or perhaps-though Heaven forbid they should be right!-they\nmerely think that by refusing nightingales' tongues they make every\none more content with porridge. Let us be gallant about the porridge\nthat we must eat; but let us never forget that there are better things\nto eat than porridge.\"\n\nThis philosophy, less gracefully expressed, is not uncommon. Luxury\nis, other things equal, better than simplicity. But other things are\nnot equal when our neighbors are cold and sick and hungry. What self-\nrespecting man can eat \"caviar on principle\" when another has not even\nbread? By wearing plainer clothes we can make it possible for others\nto dress better, by denying ourselves nightingales' tongues we can\nbuy porridge for the poor. It surely betokens a low moral stage of\ncivilization that so many, nevertheless, choose the Paquin gowns and\nthe six-course dinners. Luxury is better than simplicity if it can\nbe the luxury of all. If not, it means selfishness, callousness, and\nbroken bonds of brotherhood. Moreover, it has personal dangers;\nit tends to breed softness and laziness, an inability to endure\nhardship, what Agnes Repplier calls \"loss of nerve.\" It tends to choke\nthe soul, to crush it by the weight of worldly things, as Tarpeia was\ncrushed by the Sabine shields. \"Hardly can a rich man enter the kingdom\nof heaven.\" Simple living, with occasional luxuries, far more\nappreciated for their rarity, is healthier and safer, and in the end\nperhaps as happy. Certainly the luxury of the upper classes has usually\nportended the downfall of nations. \"It is luxury which upholds states?\"\nasks Laveleye; \"yes, just as the executioner upholds the hanged man.\"\n\"Ill fares the land, to hastening ills a prey, Where wealth accumulates\nand men decay.\"\n\n(2) There is a patrician illusion prevalent among the rich, to the\neffect that they are more sensitive than the poor, have higher natures\nwhich demand more to satisfy them; that the lower classes do not need\nand would not appreciate the luxuries which are necessary to their\nexistence. To this the reply is, \"Go and get acquainted with them;\nyou will find that they are just the same sort of people that you and\nyour friends are\"-not so educated, very likely, nor so refined of speech\nand manner, but with the same longings and capacities for enjoyment.\nOf course, they become used to discomfort and deprivation, seared by\nsuffering; so would you in their place. Human nature has a fortunate\nability to adjust itself to its environment. But even if the poor do\nnot realize what they are missing, that is scant excuse for not\nbringing to them, as we can, new comforts and opportunities.\n\n(3) The commonest fallacy lies in the argument that by lavish\nconsumption the rich provide employment for the poor. They provide\nemployment, yes, in serving them. They create needless work, where\nthere is so much work crying to be done. If that money is put into\nthe bank, instead, or into stocks and bonds, it will employ men and\nwomen in really useful tasks. If it is given to some of the worthy\n\"causes\" which are always handicapped for lack of funds, it will employ\nmen in caring for the sick, in educating the ignorant, in feeding the\nhungry, or in bringing recreation and relief to the worn. Every man\nor woman whose time and strength we buy for our personal service-valet,\nmaid, gardener, dressmaker, chef, or what not-is taken away from the\nother work of the world.\n\n(4) A certain hopelessness of effecting any good often paralyzes good\nwill. The help a little money can give seems like a drop in the bucket;\nits assistance is but for a day, and the need remains as great as ever.\nIt may even be worse than wasted; it may encourage shiftlessness, it\nmay pauperize. There is no doubt that indiscriminate and thoughtless\ncharity is dangerous; the crude largesse of a few rich Romans of the\nEmpire bred vast corruption and pauperism. But there is much that can\nsafely be done; there are many wise and cautious agencies at work for\naid and uplift; and every little, if given to one of them, is of real\nhelp.\n\n(5) It is sometimes said that if society discountenances luxury, the\nmotive for hard and efficient work will be too much reduced; we need\nthis extra spur to exertion. But the earning of what may permissibly\nbe spent on self is spur enough; there is no need of inordinate luxury\nto foster faithfulness and exertion. The praise of superiors and equals,\na moderate rise in scale of living, the shame of shirking, the\ninstinctive glory in achievement, and the joy of helping others, are\nstimuli enough.\n\n(6) Finally, the last argument of the selfish man is that \"he has\nearned his money; it is his; he has a right to do with it as he\npleases\" This we cannot admit. Legally he is as yet free so backward\nis our social order-to accumulate and spend upon himself vast sums.\nBut it is not best for society that he should, and so he is not morally\njustified therein. We must agree with Carnegie that \"whatever surplus\nwealth comes to him (beyond his needs and those of his family) is to\nbe regarded as a social trust, which he is bound to administer for\nthe good of his fellows\"; and with Professor Sager, that \"the general\ninterest requires acceptance of the maxim: the consumption of luxuries\nshould be deferred until all are provided with necessaries.\" This does\nnot mean that we need live like peasants, as Tolstoy advised, make\nour own shoes, and till our own plot of ground; nor that we must come\ndown to the level of the lowest. By doing that we should lose the great\nadvantages of our material progress, which rests upon the high\nspecialization of labor and reciprocal service. We should lose the\ncharm and picturesqueness of highly differentiated lives, and sink\ninto the dull, monotonous democracy which Matthew Arnold so dreaded.\nWe must work where we can best serve; we must try to make our lives\nand their surroundings beautiful, so far as beauty does not require\ntoo great cost. We must save up for a rainy day, for insurance against\nillness and old age, for wife and children. We may properly invest\nmoney, where it will be used to good ends - so that we beware of\nspendthrift or lazy heirs. We must keep up a reasonably comfortable\nand beautiful standard of living, such a standard as the majority could\nhope to attain to by hard work and abstinence and thrift. But all the\nmoney one can earn beyond this ought to be used for service. The\nextravagance and ostentation and waste of many even moderately well\nto do are a blot upon our civilization. The insane ideal of lavish\nadornment, of fashionable clothes and costly furnishings, of mere vain\ndisplay and wanton luxury, infects rich and poor alike, isolating the\nformer from the great universal current of life, and provoking in the\nlatter bitterness and anarchism. Let us ask in every case, Does this\nexpenditure bring use, health, joy commensurate with the labor it\nrepresents? A great deal of current expense in dressing, in\nentertaining, in eating, could be saved by a sensible economy, with\nno appreciable loss in enjoyment. We must not forget that everything\nwe consume has been produced by the labor and time of others. What\nfortune, or our own cleverness, has put into our hands that we do not\nneed for making fair and free our own lives, and the lives of those\ndependent upon us, we should pass on to those whose need is greater\nthan ours. Is it wrong to gamble, bet, or speculate? A corollary to\nour discussion of the duties appertaining to the use of money must\nbe a condemnation of gambling. Its most obvious evil is the danger\nof loss of needed money; most gamblers cannot rightly afford to throw\naway what ought to be used for their real needs and those of their\nfamilies. Notably is this the case with college students, supported\nby their parents, who heedlessly waste the money that others have worked\nhard to save. But even if a man be rich, he should steward his wealth\nfor purposes useful to society. And he must remember that if he can\nafford to lose, perhaps his opponent cannot. Moreover, if many cannot\nafford to lose, no one can afford to win. Insidiously this getting\nof unearned money promotes laziness, and the desire to acquire more\nmoney without work. It makes against loving relations with others,\nsince one always gains at another's expense. It quickly becomes a morbid\npassion, an unhealthy excitement, which absorbs too much energy and\nkills more natural enjoyments. The gambling mania, like any other\nreckless dissipation, easily leads to other dissipations, such as\ndrinking and sex indulgence. These disastrous consequences are, of\ncourse, by no means always incurred. But in order that the weaker may\nbe saved from them, it behooves the stronger to abstain. All betting,\nall playing games for money, all gambling in stocks is wrong in\nprinciple, liable to bring needless unhappiness. The honorable man\nwill hate to take money which has not been fairly earned; he will wish\nto help protect those who are prone to run useless risks against\nthemselves. The safest place to draw the line is on the near side of\nall gambling, however trivial.[Footnote: See H. Jeffs, Concerning\nConscience, Appendix. R. E. Speer, A Young Man's Questions, chap. xi\nB. S. Rowntree, Betting and Gambling. International Journal of Ethics,\nvol. 18, p. 76.] General relations to others: F. Paulsen, System of\nEthics, book III, chap. IX, sec. 6; chap. X, secs. 3, 4, 5. G. Santayana,\nReason in Society. J. S. Mackenzie, Manual of Ethics, 2d ed, chap.\nIX. Emerson, Society and Solitude title essay. P. G. Hamerton, The\nIntellectual Life, part IX. Friendship: Aristotle, Ethics, books. VIII,\nIX. Emerson, \"Friendship\" (in Essays, vol. I). H. C. Trumbull, Friendship\nthe Master Passion. Randolph Bourne, in Atlantic Monthly, vol. 110,\np. 795. Luxury: E. de Laveleye, Luxury. E. J. Urwick, Luxury and Waste\nof Life. Tolstoy, What Shall We Do Then? (or, What To Do?) Maeterlinck,\n\"Our Social Duty\" (in Measure of the Hours). F. Paulsen, System of\nEthics, book III, chap. IV, secs. 3, 4. T. W. Higginson, in Atlantic\nMonthly, vol. 107, p. 301. H. Sidgwick, Practical Ethics, chap. VII.\nHibbert Journal, vol. II, p. 39. H. R. Seager, Introduction to Economics,\nchap. IV, secs. 43-45.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIX\n\n\nTRUTHFULNESS AND ITS PROBLEMS\n\nSins of untruthfulness are not so seductive or, usually, so serious\nas those we have been considering; but for that reason they are perhaps\nmore pervasive - we are less on our guard against them. What are the\nreasons for the obligation of truthfulness? Truthfulness means\ntrustworthiness. The organization of society could not be maintained\nwithout mutual confidence. This general need and the specific harm\ndone to the individual lied to, if he is thereby misled, are sufficiently\nplain. [Footnote: I will content myself with quoting one sentence from\nMill (Utilitarianism, chap. II), warning the reader to take a deep\nbreath before he plunges in: \"Inasmuch as the cultivation in ourselves\nof a sensitive feeling on the subject of veracity is one of the most\nuseful, and the enfeeblement of that feeling one of the most hurtful,\nthings to which our conduct can be instrumental; and inasmuch as any,\neven unintentional, deviation from truth does that much towards\nweakening the trustworthiness of human assertion, which is not only\nthe principal support of all present social well-being, but the\ninsufficiency of which does more than any one [other] thing that can\nbe named to keep back civilization, virtue, everything on which human\nhappiness on the largest scale depends, - we feel that the violation,\nfor a present advantage, of a rule of such transcendent expediency,\nis not expedient, and that he who, for the sake of a convenience to\nhimself or to some other individual, does what depends on him to\ndeprive mankind of the good, and inflict upon them the evil, involved\nin the greater or less reliance which they can place in each others'\nwords, acts the part of one of their worst enemies.\"] The evil\nresulting to the man who lies is less generally recognized. We may\nsummarize it under three heads:\n\n(1) It is much simpler and less worrisome, usually, to tell the truth.\nA lie is apt to be scantly on our guard; and one lie is very likely\nto need propping by others. We are led easily into deep waters, and\ndiscover \"what a tangled web we weave When first we practice to\ndeceive.\" But when we tell the truth, we have no need to remember what\nwe said; there is a carefree heartiness about the life that is open\nand aboveboard that the liar, unless he has given up trying to maintain\na reputation, never knows.\n\n(2) Lying is usually a SYMPTOM - of selfishness, vanity, greed,\nslovenliness, or some other vicious tendency which a man cannot afford\nto tolerate. Refusing to give vent in speech to these undesirable\nstates of mind helps to atrophy them, while every expression of them\ninsures them a deeper hold. Untruthfulness is the great ally of all\nforms of dishonesty; and strict scruples against lying make it much\neasier to clear them from the soul. This is the best vantage point\nfrom which to attack the half-conscious egotism which seeks to create\na false impression of one's virtues or powers, the insidiously growing\navarice that instinctively overvalues goods for sale and disparages\nwhat is offered. It is a good vantage point from which to attack\ncarelessness, inaccuracy, and negligence; the man who has trained\nhimself to precision of speech, who is painstakingly honest in his\nstatements, who qualifies and discriminates, and hits the bull's eye\nin his descriptions of fact, can be pretty safely depended upon to\ndo things rightly as well. The selfish lie is never justifiable, because\nselfishness is never justifiable; the cowardly lie - \"lying out of\"\nunpleasant consequences - is wrong, because cowardice is wrong. To\nbanish the symptoms may not wholly banish the underlying causes, but\nit is one good way to go about it. At least, the lies are danger signals.\n\n(3) The habit of lying is very easily acquired; and the habitual liar\nis sure, sooner or later, to be caught and to be despised. He has\nforfeited the confidence of men and will find it almost impossible\nto regain it or to win a position of trust. If one must lie, then,\nit pays to lie boldly, as a definite and authorized exception to one's\ngeneral rule; in this way one may keep from sliding unawares into the\nhabit. All equivocations and dissimulations, all literal truths that\nare really deceptions, all attempts to salve one's own conscience by\nmaking one's statements true \"in a sense,\" and yet gain the advantage\nof an out-and- out lie, are miserable make-shifts and utterly\ndemoralizing. There is \"not much in a truthfulness which is only\nphrase-deep.\" Whether we deceive others or no, we cannot afford to\ndeceive ourselves; we should never deviate a hair's breadth from the\ntruth without acknowledging the deviation to ourselves as a necessary\nbut unfortunate evil. A man may say nothing but what is true, and yet\nintentionally give a wrong impression; \"truth in spirit, not truth\nto the letter, is the true veracity.\" \"A lie may be told by a truth,\nor a truth conveyed by a lie.\" \"A man may have sat in a room for hours\nand not opened his teeth, and yet come out of that room a disloyal\nfriend or a vile calumniator.\"[Footnote: Stevenson, Virginibus Puerisque,\nchap. IV.] If a man lies deliberately and regretfully, for an end that\nseems to him to require it, he may be making a mistake; but he is\nescaping the worst danger of lying. He is not corrupting his soul,\nblurring his vision of the line between sincerity and insincerity,\nand numbing his conscience so that presently he will lie as a matter\nof course - and be universally distrusted. All of this is very clear,\nand sufficiently explains our ideal of veracity. But it is not enough\nfor moralists to dwell upon the general necessity of truthfulness;\nthe problems connected therewith arise when one asks, Are there not\nlegitimate or even obligatory exceptions to the rule? Except for a\nfew theorists who are more attracted by unity and simplicity than by\nthe concrete complexities of life, practically all agree that there\nare occasions when lying is necessary, occasions when the confidence\nof men would not be destroyed by a lie because of the clearly exceptional\nnature of the case. Can we lay down any useful rules in the matter,\nindicating what types of cases require untruthfulness? What exceptions\nare allowable to the duty of truthfulness? Love undoubtedly sometimes\nrequires, and oftener still excuses, a lie.\n\n(1) There are the trite cases where by misinformation a prospective\nmurderer is misled and his potential victim saved;[Footnote: Cf. the\nsomewhat similar situation in Victor Hugo's Les Miserables (Fantine,\nlast chapter) where Soeur Simplice lies to Javert about Jean Valjean.\nHugo applauds the lie perhaps too extravagantly (\"O sainte fille! que\nce mensonge vous soit compte dans le paradis!\"); but few probably\nwould condemn it. Another interesting case is that of a French girl in\nthe days of the Commune. On her way to execution her fiance tried\nto interfere; but she, realizing that if he were known to be her lover\nhe would likewise be executed, looked coldly upon him and said, \"Sir,\nI never knew you!\"] where a sick man, who would have less chance of\nrecovery if he realized his dangerous condition, is cheered and carried\nover the critical point by loving deception; where a theater catches\nfire and a disastrous panic is averted by a statement to the audience\nthat one of the actors has fallen ill, and the performance must be\nended. In such cases it is foolish to talk of the possibility of\nevasion; it is direct misstatement that is necessary to prevent the\ngreat evil that knowledge, or even suspicion of the truth, might\nentail. Truthfulness under such circumstances, or even the taking\nof a chance by attempting to effect deception without literal untruth,\nwould be brutal and inexcusable. As Saleeby puts it, \"When the\nchoice is between being a liar or a brute, only brutal people can\ntell the truth or hesitate to lie - and that right roundly.[Footnote:\nEthics, p. 103.] In such cases the public, including the very\npeople deceived (except the murderer, who deserves no\nconsideration), applaud the lie; no lack of confidence is\nengendered. Other cases, less commonly discussed, are\nequally clear. A mother has just lost a son whom she has\nidealized and believed to be pure; his classmates know him\nto have been a rake. If she asks them about his character,\nwill not all feel called upon to deceive her, and leave her in\nher bereavement at least free from that worst sting? When\na timid woman or a sensitive child is alarmed, say, for example,\nat sea in a fog, will not a considerate companion reiterate\nassurance that there is little or no danger, even when he\nhimself believes the risk may be great? When a man is asked\nabout some matter which he has promised to keep secret, if\nthe attempt to evade the question in the nature of the case is\npractically a letting-out of the secret, there seems sometimes to\nbe hardly an alternative to lying. Mrs. Gerould puts it thus: \"A\nquestion put by some one who has no right to the information\ndemanded, deserves no truth. If a casual gossip should ask\nme whether my unmarried great-aunt lived beyond her means,\nI should feel justified in saying that she did not although it might\nbe the private family scandal that she did. There are inquiries\nwhich are a sort of moral burglary\" [Footnote: In the Atlantic\nessay referred to at the end of this chapter. The unassigned\nquotations following are from that paper, which I am particularly\nglad to commend after rather curtly criticizing that other essay of\nhers in the preceding chapter.]\n\n(2) In regard to the little lies which form a part of the conventions of\npolite society, there may be difference of opinion. Their aim is to\nobviate hurting people's feelings, to oil the wheels of social misled\nby them. When asked by one's hostess if one likes what is apparently\nthe only dish provided, or if one has had enough when one is really\nstill hungry, the average courteous man will murmur a gallant falsehood.\nWhat harm can be done thereby, and why cause her useless\nembarrassment? \"We simply have to be polite as our race and clime\nunderstand politeness, and no one except a naive is really going to take\nthis sort of thing seriously.\" To thank a stupid hostess for the pleasure\nshe has not given, is loving one's neighbor as one's self. \"I know only\none person whom I could count on not to indulge herself in these\nconventional falsehoods, and she has never been able, so far as I\nknow, to keep a friend. The habit of literal truth-telling, frankly, is\nself-indulgence of the worst.\" In some circles, at least, the phrase\n\"not at home\" is generally understood as a politer form of \"not\nseeing visitors.\" It must be admitted, however, that there is danger\nin these courteous untruths. If the visitor does not understand the\n\"not at home\" in the conventional sense, she may be deeply hurt\nand lose her trust in her friend, if she by chance discovers her to\nhave been in the house at the time. Nor is it always wise to truckle\nto sensibilities that may be foolish; blunt truthfulness, even if\nunpalatable, is often in the end the best service. There are cases\nwhere untruthfulness is shirking one's duty, just as there are cases\nwhere truthfulness is mean or brutal.\n\nTo tell what we honestly think of a person, or his work, may mean to\ndiscourage him and invite demoralization or failure; to attribute virtues\nor powers to him which he actually does not possess may be to foster\nthose virtues or powers in him. Or the reverse may be the case; his\nindividual need may be of frank criticism or rebuke. The concrete\ndecision can only be reached by following the guidance of the law of\nkindness, the Apostle's counsel of \"speaking truth in love.\"\n\n(3) In this connection it may be well to go further and emphasize the fact\nthat there are many cases, not necessitating a lie, where the truth\nis not to be thrust at people. \"Friend, though thy soul should burn\nthee, yet be still. Thoughts were not meant for strife, nor tongues\nfor swords, He that sees clear is gentlest of his words, And that's\nnot truth that hath the heart to kill.\" There are usually pleasant\nenough things that one CAN say - though one may be hard put to it;\nand if the truth must be told, it may often be sugarcoated. President\nHadley, when a young man, was receiving instructions for a delicate\nnegotiation. \"If the issue is forced upon us,\" he interrupted, \"there\nis, I think, nothing to do but to tell the truth.\" \"Even then,\" replied\nhis chief, \"not butt end foremost.\" Cases of religious disbelief will\noccur to every one. While all hypocrisy and truckling to the majority\nopinion is ignoble, the blunt announcement of disbelief may do much\nmore harm than good. Truth is not the only ideal; men live by their\nbeliefs, and one who cannot accept a doctrine which is precious and\ninspiring to others should think twice before helping to destroy it.\nNot only may he, after all, be in the wrong, or but half right; even\nif he is wholly right, it may not be wise to thrust his truth upon\nthose whom it may discourage or morally paralyze. [Footnote: On the\nethics of outspokenness in religious matters, see H. Sidgwick, Practical\nEthics, chap. VI; J. S. Mill, Inaugural Address at St. Andrews; Matthew\nArnold, Prefaces to Literature and Dogma and God and the Bible F.\nPaulsen, System of Ethics, book III, Chap. XI, sec. 10.] In what\ndirections are our standards of truthfulness low? Truthfulness in private\naffairs averages fairly high in our times. Many people will, indeed,\nlie about the age of a child for the sake of paying the half- fare\nrate, use the return half of a round-trip ticket sold only for the\noriginal purchaser's use, or look unconcernedly out of the window if\nthey think the conductor will pass them by without collecting fare.\nCertain forms of such oral or tacit lying are so common that people\nof looser standards adopt them with the excuse that \"every one does\nit,\" or that \"the company can afford to lose it.\" But in more public\nmatters the prevalence of untruthfulness is much more shocking. Standards\nare low or unformulated, and it is often extremely difficult for the\nhonorable man to know what to do; strict truthfulness would deprive\nhim of his position. We may barely hint at some of these situations.\n\n(1) In business, misstatement is generally expected of a salesman.\nAdvertisements of bargains, for example, have to be discounted by the\nwary shopper. \"$10 value, reduced to $3.98,\" may mean something worth\nreally $3. \"Finest quality\" may mean average quality; goods passed\noff as first-class may be shoddy or adulterated. Labels on foodstuffs\nand drugs are, happily, controlled to some degree by the national\ngovernment; there ought to be a similar control over all advertising.\nMuch is being done by the better magazines in investigating goods and\nrefusing untruthful advertising; and many houses have built up a deserved\nreputation for reliability. But still the economical householder has\nto spend much time in comparing prices and studying values, that he\nmay be sure he is not being cheated.\n\n(2) In politics, frank truth telling is almost rare. It is deemed\nnecessary to suppress what sounds unfavorable to a candidate's\nchances, to make unfair insinuations against opponents, to\njuggle statistics, emphasize half-truths, and work generally\nfor the party by fair means or foul. Too great candor in admitting\nthe truth in opponents' arguments or the worth of their candidates\nwould be sharply reprimanded by party leaders. Especially in\ninternational diplomacy is truthfulness far to seek. Secretary Hay,\nindeed, stated in the following words: \"The principles which have\nguided us have been of limpid simplicity. We have set no traps;\nwe have wasted no time in evading the imaginary traps of others.\nThere might be worse reputations for a country to acquire than\nthat of always speaking the truth, and always expecting it from\nothers. In bargaining we have tried not to get the worst of the\ndeal, alway remembering, however, that the best bargains are those\nthat satisfy both sides. Let us hope we may never be big enough to\noutgrow our conscience.\" Other American diplomats have followed\nthe same ideal. But American diplomacy has been labeled abroad\nas \"crude,\" and is perpetually in danger of lapsing from this moral level.\n\n (3) The profession of the lawyer presents peculiarly difficult problems.\nMay he so manipulate the facts in his plea as to convince a jury of\nwhat he is himself not convinced? May he by use of the argumentum\nad populum, by his eloquence and skill, win a case which he does not\nbelieve in at heart? In some ancient codes lawyers had to swear not to\ndefend causes which they believed unjust. But this is hardly fair to a\nclient, since, even though appearances are against him, he may be\ninnocent; whatever can be said for him should be discovered and\npresented to the tribunal. Dr. Johnson said: \"You are not to deceive\nyour client with false representations of your opinion, you are not to\ntell lies to the judge, but you need have no scruple about taking up\na case which you believe to be bad, or affecting a warmth which you\ndo not feel. You do not know your cause to be bad till the judge\ndetermines it. An argument which does not convince you may\nconvince the judge, and, if it does convince him, you are wrong\nand he is right.\" [Footnote: Quoted by W. E. H. Lecky,\nThe Map of Life, p. 110. The chapter which contains this quotation\ngives an interesting discussion of the ethics of the lawyer and some\nfurther references on the subject.] This dilemma of the lawyer could\nbe matched by equally doubtful situations that confront the physician,\n[Footnote: See, for a discussion of the ethics of the medical profession,\nG. Bernard Shaw, Preface to The Doctor's Dilemma, and B. J. Hendrick,\n\"The New Medical Ethics,\" in McClure's Magazine, vol. 42, p. 117.]\nand members of the other professions. There is need of acknowledged\nprofessional codes, drawn up by representative members, and enforced\nby public opinion within the profession and perhaps by the danger of\nexpulsion from membership in the professional associations. It is largely\nthe variation in practice between equally conscientious members that\ncauses the distrust and disorder of our present situation. Truthfulness\nmust be standardized for the professions. [Footnote: On professional\ncodes, see H. Jeffs, Concerning Conscience, chap. VIII.]\n\n(4) The author, whether of books or essays or reviews, has to face\nparticularly powerful temptations. It is so easy to overstate his case,\nto omit facts that make against his conclusions, to use colored words,\nto beg the question adroitly, to create prejudice by unfair epithets,\nto evade difficult questions, to take the popular side of a debated\nmatter at the cost of loyalty to truth. Controversy almost inevitably\nbreeds inaccuracy; there are few writers who fight fair. Quotations,\ntorn from their context, mislead; carefully chosen figures give a wrong\nimpression; the reviewer is tempted to pick out passages that support\nonly his contention, whether eulogistic or depreciatory. Leslie Stephen\nspeaks of \"the ease with which a man endowed with a gift of popular\nrhetoric, and a facility for catching at the current phrases, can set\nup as teacher, however palpable to the initiated may be his ignorance.\"\nA larger proportion of the great mass of books yearly published are\nmere trash, appealing to untrained readers, and only confirming them\nin unwarranted beliefs and opinions. Few there are who are really fit\nto teach the public; and of those there are fewer still who love truth\nmore than the triumph of their opinion, who are candid, scrupulous,\nand exact in their statements. There is doubtless little conscious\ndeception; but there is a great deal of misstatement which is\ninexcusable, and due either to slovenliness, lack of proper training,\nor partisanship.\n\nThis brings us to the similar and even graver evils in our modern\nnewspapers, which we must pause to study in somewhat greater detail.\nFor nowhere is untruthfulness so rampant and so shameless as in\ncontemporary journalism. The ethics of journalism.\n\n(1) The gravest evil, perhaps, in journalistic practice is the\nsuppression or distortion of news in the interest of political parties\nand \"big business.\" It is impossible to rely on the political\ninformation given in most of our newspapers; they are dominated by\na party, subservient to \"the interests,\" afraid to publish anything\nthat will offend them. They misrepresent facts, give prejudiced accounts\nof events, gloss over occurrences unfavorable to their ends, circulate\nunfounded rumors to create opinion, pounce upon every flaw in the\nrecords of opponents,- going often to the point of shameless libel,-\nwhile eulogizing indiscriminately the politicians of their own party.\nMany of them cannot be counted on to attack corruption or politically\nprotected vice. They are organs neither of an impartial truth seeking\nnor of public service. However conscientious the reporters and editors\nmight wish to be, they are bound, by the fear of dismissal, to follow\nthe policy of the owners.\n\n(2) No less reprehensible, though somewhat less important, is the\ntoadying of the newspapers to their advertisers. The average paper\ncould not exist were it not for this source of income, and it cannot\nafford to refuse the big advertisements even when they are pernicious\nto the morals or health of the community. So we are confronted daily\nby the premedicine fakirs, who injure the health and drain the\npocketbooks of the guileless. So we are exposed to the plausible\nsuggestions of the swindlers, feasted with glowing prospectuses of\nmines that will never yield a dividend, or eulogistic descriptions\nof house lots to be sacrificed at a price that is really double their\nworth. In a recent postal raid the financial frauds exposed had fleeced\nthe public of nearly eighty million dollars, about a third of which\nhad been spent in advertising.\n\nNot only do the newspapers accept such advertisements, and those of\nthe brewers, the cigarette-makers, and the proprietors of vile theaters,\nbut they do not dare in their columns to denounce these frauds or\nundesirable trades. They are muzzled because they cannot afford to\ntell the truth when it will offend those who supply their revenue.\n\n(3) Less harmful, but more superficially conspicuous, is the tendency\ntoward the fabrication of imaginary news, to attract attention and\nsell the paper. Huge headlines announce some exciting event, which\nbelow is inconspicuously acknowledged to be but a rumor. It will be\ndenied the next day in an obscure corner, while the front page is devoted\nto some new sensation. This \"yellow journalism\" is very irritating\nto one who cares more for facts than for thrills; and the more reputable\nnewspapers have stood out against this disgraceful habit of their less\nscrupulous rivals. Mr. Pulitzer, the son of the famous editor of the\nNew York \"World,\" in an address at the opening of the Columbia\nUniversity School of Journalism, spoke vehemently against this evil:\n\"The newspaper which sells the public deliberate fakes instead of facts\nis selling adulterated goods just as surely as does the rascal who\nputs salicylic acid in canned meats or arsenical coloring in preserves;\nand it ought to be subject to the same penalties for adulteration as\nare these other adulterators. The fakir is a liar if he is guilty of\na fake that injures people, he is not only a vicious liar but often\na moral assassin as well; but in either event he is a liar, and it\nis only by treating him uncompromisingly as such that he may be corrected\nif he is not yet a confirmed fakir, or rooted out if he is an inveterate\nfakir.\" There is surely enough, for those who have eyes to see, that\nis dramatic and exciting in actual life without depending upon fictitious\nnews. Chesterton berates the contemporary press for failing to give\nus the thrill of reality. It \"offends as being not sensational or violent\nenough; . . . does not merely fail to exaggerate life-it positively\nunderrates it. With the whole world full of big and dubious\ninstitutions, with the whole wickedness of civilization staring them\nin the face, their idea of being bold and bright is to attack the War\nOffice. . . . Something which is an old joke in fourth-rate comic\npapers.\" [Footnote: \"The Mildness of the Yellow Press,\" chap. VIII\nof Heretics.]\n\n(4) Another danger of our irresponsible journalism lies in pandering\nto prejudices and antipathies, in stirring up class hatred or national\njingoism. Evil motives are attributed to foreign powers; the German\nEmperor has designs upon South America; the Japanese are preparing\nto invade our Pacific Coast. Insignificant words of individuals are\nheadlined and treated as portentous; foreign peoples are caricatured;\nour national \"honor\" is held to be in danger daily. Or the capitalists\nare pictured as universally fat and greedy and unscrupulous; anarchism\nis encouraged-as in the case of the murderer of McKinley, who was\ndirectly incited to his deed by the violent diatribes of a contemporary\nnewspaper. Such demagoguery might flourish even with strict regard\nfor truthfulness; but it becomes far worse when, as usual, in its appeal\nto popular prejudices, it exaggerates and invents and suppresses facts.\n\n(5) The notorious emphasis upon crime and summary of journalistic\nevils. Every unpleasant fact that ought, from kindness to those\nconcerned and from regard to the morals of the readers, to be ignored\nor passed lightly over, is instead dragged out into the light. The\ndelight in besmirching supposedly respectable citizens, the brutal\nintrusion into private unhappiness, the detailed description of\ndomestic tragedy, is nothing short of outrageous. Pictures of\nadulterers and murderers, of the instruments and scenes of crimes,\nprecise instructions to the uninitiated for their commission,\nexplanations of the success of burglary or train-wreckers, help\nmarvelously to sell a paper, but do not help the morals of the younger\ngeneration. No one can estimate the amount of sexual stimulation, of\nsuggestion to sin and vice, for which our newspapers are responsible.\n\n(6) In conclusion, we may mention a trivial matter which, however,\nbrings our newspapers into deserved disrepute-their self-laudation\nad boasting. How many \"greatest American newspapers\" are there? There\nare even, in this country alone, more than one \"World's greatest\nnewspaper!\" From this principle of conceit there are all gradations\ndown to the humblest village paper that lies about its circulation\nand extols itself as the necessary adjunct of every home. These\noverstatements are pernicious in their influence upon public standards\nof accuracy and honesty.\n\nThe newspaper is potentially an instrument of incalculable good. No\nother influence upon the minds and morals of the people is so\ncontinuous and universal. Through the newspapers knowledge is\ndisseminated, judgment and outlook upon life are crystallized,\npolitical and social beliefs are shaped. They might be the means of\ngreat social and moral reforms. But so long as they are subject to\nthe struggle for existence which, necessitates their truckling to\nparties, to advertisers, and to public prejudices and passions, so\nlong their influence will be largely unwholesome. If public opinion\ncannot force them to a higher moral level in their present status as\nsources of private profit, they must be published by the State or by\ntrustees of an endowment fund. Municipally owned papers are liable\nto partisanship and corruption, in their way, and endowed papers to\nan undue regard for the interests of the class to which the majority\nof the trustees may belong. But the dangers would probably be far less\nthan are inherent in our present system, where morals have to defer\nto pocketbooks; and when municipal government in this country is finally\nordered in a sensible way, so that corruption is much more difficult\nand easily detected, the municipal newspaper, run after the \"city\nmanager\" plan, will probably become universal.\n\nF. Paulsen, System of Ethics, book III, chap. XI. L. Stephen, Science\nof Ethics, chap, V, sec. IV. C. F. Dole, Ethics of Progress, part VII,\nchaps, I, II. E. L. Cabot, Everyday Ethics, chaps. XIX, XX. T. K.\nAbbott, Kant's Theory of Ethics, Appendix I. Stevenson, Virginibus\nPuerisque, chap. IV. E. Westermarck, Origin and Development of Moral\nIdeas, chap. XXXI. K. F. Gerould, in Atlantic Monthly, vol. 112, p.\n454. Ethics of Journalism: H. Holt, Commercialism and Journalism. H.\nGeorge, Jr, The Menace of Privilege, book VII, chap. I. W. E. Weyl,\nThe New Democracy, chap. IX. Educational Review, vol. 36, p. 121.\nAtlantic Monthly, vol. 102, p. 441; vol. 105, p. 303; vol. 106, p.\n40; vol. 113, p. 289. Forum, vol. 51, p. 565. E. A. Ross, Changing\nAmerica, chap. VII. North American Review, vol. 190, p. 587.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XX\n\n\nCULTURE AND ART\n\nTHE function of the newspaper, which we have been discussing, is, to\na considerable extent, to widen our horizon, to give us new ideas and\nsympathies, to enrich and brighten our lives; in greater degree, that\nis the role of the fine arts, and of that wide conversance with beauty\nand truth that we call culture. Man is not a mere worker, and\nefficiency is not the only test of value; the pursuit of truth and\nbeauty for its own sake is a legitimate human ideal. But beauty, as\nwe have seen, brings temptations; and even the search for truth may\nlure a man away from his duty. We must consider, then, how far culture,\nand its outward expression in art, may rightly claim the time and\nenergies of man.\n\nWhat is the value of culture and art?\n\n(1) Culture, according to Matthew Arnold, [Footnote: Culture and\nAnarchy, Preface, and chap. I.] is \"the disinterested endeavor after\nman's perfection . . . . It is in endless additions to itself, in the\nendless expansion of its powers, in endless growth in wisdom and beauty\nthat the spirit of the human race finds its ideal.\" This wisdom, this\nbeauty that culture offers us, does not need extrinsic justification;\nit is, as Emerson so happily said, its own excuse for being; it is\na fragment of the ideal; and it means that life has in so far been\nsolved, its goal attained. It is in itself a great addition to the\nworth, the richness and joy, of life, and it is a pledge to the heart\nof the possibility of the ideal, a realization of that perfection for\nwhich we long and strive.\n\nIt means a multiplication of interests, a participation by proxy in\nthe throbbing life of mankind, which lifts us above the disappointments\nof our personal fortunes, helps us to identify ourselves with the larger\ncurrents of life, and to live as citizens of the world. A limitless\nresource against ennui, it refreshes, rests, and recreates, relieves\nthe tension of our working hours, makes for health and sanity. \"If\na man find himself with bread in both hands,\" said Mohammed, \"he should\nexchange one loaf for some flowers of the narcissus, since the loaf\nfeeds the body, indeed, but the flowers feed the soul.\"\n\nThere is in certain quarters a tendency to disparage culture as not\npractical-\" a spirit of cultivated inaction\" -unworthy of the attention\nof serious men. The word connotes, perhaps, to these critics certain\nsuperficial polite accomplishments, mere frills and decorations, which\nfritter away our time and dissipate our ambitions. But in its proper\nsense, culture is far more than that; it is the comprehension of the\nmeaning of life and the appreciation of its beauty. And grim as is\nthe age-long struggle with evil, insistent as is the duty to toil and\nsuffer and achieve, it were a harsh taskmaster who should refuse to\npoor driven men and women the right to snatch such innocent joys as\nthey can by the way, to try to understand the whirl of existence in\nwhich they are caught; in short, to really live, as well as to earn\na living. It would be a sorry outcome if when we reached the age of\ncomplete mechanical efficiency, with all the machinery of a complex\nindustrial life well oiled and perfected, we should find ourselves\nimaginatively sterile, hopelessly utilitarian, earthbound in our\nvision.\n\n(2) But the moralist need not rest with this apology for culture. By\nhelping us to understand the life about us, culture shows us the better\nhow to solve our own problems, and saves us from the tragedy of putting\nour energies into fiction, poetry, and the drama give us an insight\ninto the longings, the temptations, the ideals of others, and so\nindirectly into our own hearts. Thus a normal perspective of values\nis fostered; we come to learn what is base and what is excellent, and\nhave our eyes opened to the inferior nature of that with which we had\nbefore been content. There is a pathos in the ignorance of the\nuncultivated man as to what is good. Give him money to spend and he\nwill buy tawdry furniture and imitation jewelry, he will go to vulgar\nshows and read cheap and silly trash. He is unaware of what the best\nthings are, and unable to spend his money in such a way as really to\nimprove his mind, his health, or his happiness. Even in his vocation\nhe could be helped by a background of culture; the college graduate\noutstrips the uneducated man who has had several years the start of\nhim. And no one can tell how many an undeveloped genius there may be,\nnow working at some humble and routine task, who might have contributed\nmuch to the world if his mental horizon had been widened and his latent\npowers unfolded. Knowledge is power; we never know what bit of apparently\nuseless insight may find application in our own lives and help us to\nsolve our personal problems.\n\n(3) Moreover, culture is not only informative, it is inspirational.\nHistory and biography fire the youth with a noble spirit of emulation;\npoetry, fiction, and the drama, and to some extent music, painting,\nand sculpture, arouse the emotions and direct them-if the art is\ngood-into proper channels. Meunier's sculptured figures, Millet's Angelus\nor Man with the Hoe, the oratorio of the Messiah or a national song\nlike the Marseillaise, have a stirring and ennobling effect upon the\nsoul; while such a poem as Moody's Ode in Time of Hesitation, a story\nlike Dickens's Christmas Carol, or a play like The Servant in efficacious\nthan many a sermon. The study of any art has a refining influence,\nteaching exactness and restraint, proportion, measure, discipline.\nAnd in any case, if no more could be said, art and culture substitute\ninnocent joys and excitements for dangerous ones, satisfy the craving\nfor sense-enjoyment by providing natural outlets and developing normal\npowers, thus tending to check its crude and unwholesome manifestations.\nIn these ways they are valuable moral forces, whose usefulness we ought\nnot to neglect.\n\n(4) Culture socializes. It adds to our competitive life, to our\npersonal ambitions and self-seeking, an unselfish pleasure, a pleasure\nwhich we can share with all, and which needs to be shared to be best\nenjoyed. Nothing binds men together more joyously and with less\nlikelihood of friction than their common love of the beautiful. All\nclasses and all peoples, men of whatever trade or interests, may learn\nto love the same scarlet of dawn, the same stir and heave of the sea,\nthat Homer loved and fixed in winged words for all men of all time.\nFrom whatever land we come we may thrill to the words of English\nShakespeare or Florentine Dante, to the chords of German Wagner and\nItalian Verdi, to the colors of Raphael and Murillo, to the noble\nthoughts of Athenian Plato, Roman Marcus Aurelius, and Russian Tolstoy.\nOur opinions differ, our interests diverge, our aims often cross; but\nin the presence of high truth and beauty, fitly expressed, our\ndifferences are forgotten and we are conscious of our essential unity.\nPrejudices and provincialisms crumble, personal eccentricities fade,\nbarriers are broken, all sorts of fanaticisms and frictions are choked\noff, under the influence of a widespread cultural education. What is\nmost important in cultural education? Wisdom and beauty are vague\nwords; and to make our discussion practical we must indicate what in\nthe ideal curriculum. It is a matter of relative values, since nearly\nevery study is of some worth; and the detailed decision as to subjects\nand methods must be left to the expert on pedagogy. But to present\nthe general needs that education must meet falls within our province.\nIn addition, then, to the particular vocational education which is\nto fit each man for his specific task, in addition to that physical\ndevelopment which must always go hand in hand with intellectual growth,\nin addition to that moral-religious training and that preparation for\nparenthood, of which we shall later speak, we may mention three\nimportant ideals to be grouped under our general conception of culture.\n\n(1) First, we must have KNOWLEDGE of the world we live in -not so much\nmasses of facts as a comprehension of principles, insight into\nrelations and tendencies. A man should be at home upon the earth; he\nshould be able to call the stars by name, to realize something of the\nimmensities by which this spinning planet is surrounded, and to see\nin every landscape a portion of the wrinkled, water-eroded surface\nof the globe. He should see this apparently solid sphere as a whirl\nof atoms, and come face to face with the old puzzles of matter and\nmind. He should be able to trace in imagination the growth of stellar\nsystems; the history of our own earth; the evolution of plant and animal\nlife, from the first protoplasmic nuclei to the mammoth and mastodon;\nthe emergence of man from brute hood into self-consciousness, his triumph\nover nature and the other animals, and his achievement of civilization.\nHe should watch primitive man wrestling with problems as yet partly\nunsolved, see him gradually establishing law and order, inventing and\ndiscovering, mastering his fate. He should follow the floods and ebbs\nof progress, the rise and fall of nations, know the great names of\nhistory and have for friends humanity's saints and heroes. He should\nbe at home in ancient Israel, in classic Greece, in Rome of the Republic,\nin Italy of the Renaissance, especially in the early days of our own\nland, learning to comprehend and sympathize with the struggles and\nideals that have made our nation what it is. He should understand the\nclash of creeds and codes, follow the thoughts of Plato, of Bacon,\nof Emerson, and grasp the essence of the problems that now confront\nus. What dangers lie before us, what the great statesmen and reformers\nare aiming at, what are the meaning and use of our institutions, our\ngovernment, our laws, our morals, our religion - here is a hint of\nthe knowledge that every man who comes into the world should amass.\nTo know less than this is to be only half alive, and unable to fulfill\nproperly the duties of citizenship. Widespread ignorance of the larger\nsocial, moral, political, religious problems of the day, is ominous\nto the Republic; and it is impossible to understand aright without\na background of history and theory. The aim of the schools should be\nto give not only some detailed information but a structural sense of\nlife as a whole, a sane perspective; and to inspire an enthusiasm for\nintellectual things which shall outlast the early years of schooling.\nThe few facts imparted should suggest the vast fields beyond, and stir\nyouth to that passion for truth which shall lead to ever-new vistas\nand farther horizons.\n\n(2) But the most encyclopedic acquaintance with facts, or even with\nprinciples, is not enough; TRAINING TO THINK ACCURATELY, to reason\nlogically, so as to arrive at valid conclusions and be able to\ndiscriminate sound from unsound arguments in others, is vitally\nnecessary. With new and intricate problems continually confronting\nus, we need the temper that observes with exactness, and without\nprejudice or passion, that judges truly, that thinks clearly, and forms\nindependent convictions. There has been in our educational system an\noveremphasis on the acquirement of facts, a natural result of our\nmodern dependence upon books; too much is accepted on authority, too\nlittle thought out at first hand. We must \"banish the idolatry of\nknowledge,\" as Ruskin exhorted, and \"realize that calling out thought\nand strengthening the mind are an entirely different and higher process\nfrom the putting in of knowledge and the heaping up of facts.\" We have\nmany well-informed scholars to one clear and reliable thinker; the\nworld is full of books, widely read and applauded, in which the trained\nmind detects false premises, fallacious reasoning, unwarranted\nconclusions. When the public is really educated, these superficially\nplausible arguments will not be heeded, these appeals to the prejudices\nand emotions of the reader will not be tolerated; a stricter standard\nof logic will be demanded, and we shall be by so much the nearer a\nsolution of our perplexing problems.[Footnote: This mental training\ncan be given not merely by a specific course in logic, but by an\ninsistence on exactness and the critical spirit in every study. It\nis particularly easy to cultivate this temper in scientific study.\nSo Karl Pearson, for example, pleads for more science in our schools:\n\"It is the want of impersonal judgment, of scientific method, and of\naccurate insight into facts, a want largely due to a non-scientific\ntraining, which renders clear thinking so rare, and random and\nirresponsible judgments so common in the mass of our citizens today.\"\n(Grammar of Science, Introductory.) Cf. Emerson, \"Education,\" in Lectures\nand Biographies: \"It is better to teach the child arithmetic and Latin\ngrammar than rhetoric or moral philosophy, because they require\nexactitude of performance; it is made certain that the lesson is\nmastered, and that power of performance is worth more than the\nknowledge.\" There is in our modern get-knowledge-easy methods a grave\ndanger of letting the child absorb wisdom so comfortably, so almost\nunconsciously, that its wits shall not be sharpened to grapple with\nfallacies, to refute specious arguments, and to find their way through\na chaos of facts to a correct conclusion. By way of contrast with these\npleas for science, the student should read Arnold's argument for the\nsuperiority of literature, in the address on \"Literature and Science\"\nincluded in Discourses in America.] We may include under our ideal\nof clear thought, the ability to use clearly and efficiently the language\nby which the steps and conclusions of thought are formulated and\nexpressed. Thought proceeds, where it is precise and logical, by words;\nunless a man's vocabulary is wide, unless his understanding of the\nlanguage is exact, his thoughts must inevitably be vague and muddled.\nMoreover, he will be unable to transmit his thoughts clearly and\nreadily to others. The most important tool for the carrying on of life\nis- language; the slovenliness and inadequacy of the average man's\nspeech is a sad commentary on our boasted educational system.\n\n(3) Wide information and a trained mind must be supplemented by a SOUND\nTASTE. To love excellence everywhere, to appreciate the good and the\nbeautiful in every phase of life, should be the third, and possibly\nmost important, aim of cultural education. It is, at least, the prime\nfunction of art. Art informs us of life, its pursuit trains in\nprecision and judgment; but above all, it opens our eyes to beauty.\nThe man who is versed in the work of the masters can never after be\ncontent with the ugliness and squalor that our industrial civilization\ncontinually tends to increase. He has caught the vision of beauty,\nand must strive to shape his environment toward that high ideal. The\nartist sees what we had not learned to see; by isolating and perfecting\nthis bit of the ideal, he directs our attention to it and teaches us\nto love it. No one can feel the spell of a landscape by Corot or Innes\nwithout delighting more deeply in such scenes in the outdoor world;\nno one can live long in the atmosphere of Greek art without longing\nfor such a body and such a poise of spirit. We are not accustomed to\nlook at nature, or at man, with observing eyes, to see the richness\nof color in sun-kissed meadows or humming city streets, the infinite\nvariations of light and shade, the depth of distance, the charm of\nline and composition. The picturesque is everywhere about us, undiscerned\nand unloved. So us the marvelous varieties in human character and\ncircumstance, the humor and dignity and pathos of life. Literature\nand art, by revealing to us unsuspected possibilities of beauty, breed\na healthy discontent with ugliness and urge us on to its banishment.\nThe ultimate aim of art should be to make life beautiful in every nook\nand corner, to elevate the humdrum working days of common men by fair\nand sunny surroundings, to make manners gentle and gracious, speech\nmelodious and refined, homes, pleasant and restful.\n\nBut art has a further function. However beautiful and harmonious our\nlives, they are at best confined within narrow boundaries; and the\nlover of beauty will always rejoice in the glimpses which art affords\ninto an ideal realm beyond his daily horizon. He will gaze eagerly\nat the masterpieces of color and form that he cannot have forever about\nhim, he will enrich his imagination with the great scenes of drama,\nhe will solace his soul with the cadenced lines of poetry and the melody\nof music, he will live with the heroes of fiction for a day, and return\nto his work ennobled and sweetened by the contact with these forms\nof excellence which lie beyond the bounds of his own outward life.\nIn two ways the fine arts add to the preexisting beauty in a man's\nlife: by representing to him beautiful scenes and objects which he\ncannot enjoy in themselves, because he cannot go where they are, and\nby creating from the artist's imagination a new universe of emotions\nand satisfactions, congenial to the human spirit and full of a refined\nand pure joy.\n\nWhat dangers are there in culture and art for life?\n\nWe must now glance at the other side of the picture. Enormous as are\nthe potentialities for good in culture and art, they also have their\nperils.\n\n(1) Culture and art must not take time, energy, or money that is needed\nfor work. Achievement necessitates concentration and sacrifice; beauty\nmust not beguile men away from service. [Footnote: Cf. what Pater says\nof Winckelmann (The Renaissance, p. 195): \"The development of his force\nwas the single interest of Winckelmann, unembarrassed by anything else\nin him. Other interests, practical or intellectual, those slighter\nmotives and talents not supreme, which in most men are the waste part\nof nature, and drain away their vitality, he plucked out and cast from\nhim.\"] The boys and girls who squander health in their eagerness to\nexplore the new worlds opening before them, the older folk who give\na disproportionate share of their time and money to music or the theater,\nthe voracious readers who pore over every new novel and magazine\nwithout really assimilating and using what they read, are turning what\nought to be recreation or inspiration into dissipation, and thereby\nseriously impairing their efficiency. It is so much easier to read\nsomething new than to meditate fruitfully upon what one has read, to\npass from picture to picture in a gallery and win no genuine insight\nfrom any. A single great book thoroughly mastered-the Bible, Homer,\nShakespeare-were better for a man than the superficial skimming of\nmany, one beautiful picture well loved than a hundred idly glanced\nat and labeled with some trite comment. Too many of the upper class,\nfor whom limitless cultural opportunities are open, dabble in everything,\nknow names and schools, repeat glibly the current phrases of criticism,\nbut miss the lesson, the clarification of insight, the vision of the\nauthor or artist. Such superficial culture is a futile expenditure\nof time and money. [Footnote: For an arraignment of the money thrown\naway on modern decadent art, see Tolstoy's What is Art? chapter I.]\n\nIn this connection we must mention the waste of time over what Arnold\ncalled \"instrument knowledge.\" Years are spent by most upper-class\nboys and girls in half-learning several languages which they will never\nuse, in acquiring the technique of the piano, or of some other art\nwhich they will never learn to practice with proficiency. There is,\nto be sure, a certain mental training in all this, but no more than\ncan be found in more useful studies. A foreign language is essentially\na tool for carrying on conversation with its users, or for utilizing\nthe literature written therein; the technique of an art is a tool for\nproducing or copying beautiful forms of that art. And except as these\ntools are actually so utilized, the time spent on learning to handle\nthem might better be otherwise occupied.\n\n(2) More than this, cultural interests may fritter away in passive\nand useless thrills the emotions and energies that ought to stimulate\nmoral and practical activity. It is so easy, where there is money enough\nto live on, to let one's faculties become absorbed in the fascinations\nof study, without applying it to practice; to enjoy the relatively\ncomplete attainment possible in the fine arts, and keep out of the\ndust and chaos and ugliness of real life. Or, when the student or\nart-lover does return to realities, after his absorption in some\ndream-world, there is danger that he carry over into actual moral\nsituations his habit of passive contemplation, that he be content to\nremain a spectator instead of plunging in and taking sides. He has\nlearned to enjoy the spectacle-sin, suffering, and all-and lost the\nprimitive reaction of protest against evils, of practical response\nto needs, and the impulse to realize ideals in conduct. Thus culture\nand art may relax human energy or scatter it in trivial accomplishments;\nthe dilettante spends his days in dreaming rather than in doing.\n[Footnote: Cf. William James, Psychology, vol. I, pp. 125-26: \"Every\ntime a fine glow of feeling evaporates without bearing practical fruit\nis worse than a chance lost; it works so as positively to hinder future\nemotions from taking the normal path of discharge. There is no more\ncontemptible type of human] Footnote continued from Page 269 [character\nthan that of the nerveless sentimentalist and dreamer, who spends his\nlife in a weltering sea of sensibility and emotion, but who never does\na manly concrete deed. . . . The habit of excessive novel reading and\ntheater going will produce true monsters in this line. The weeping\nof a Russian lady over the fictitious personages in the play, while\nher coachman is freezing to death on his seat outside, is the sort\nof thing that everywhere happens on a less glaring scale. Even the\nhabit of excessive indulgence in music, for those who are neither\nperformers themselves nor musically gifted enough to take it in a purely\nintellectual way, has probably a relaxing effect upon the character.\nOne becomes filled with emotions which habitually pass without prompting\nto any deed, and so the inertly sentimental condition is kept up. The\nremedy would be, never to suffer one's self to have an emotion at a\nconcert, without expressing it afterward in some active way. Let the\nexpression be the least thing in the world-speaking genially to one's\naunt, or giving up one's seat in a horse-car, if nothing more heroic\noffers-but let it not fail to take place.\" Professor James also refers\nin this connection to an interesting paper by Vida Scudder in the Andover\nReview for January, 1887, on \"Musical Devotees and Morals.\"]\n\n(3) Graver still, however, is the risk of the overstimulation of\ncertain dangerous emotions. The \"artistic temperament\" is notoriously\nprone to reckless self- indulgence; the continual seeking of the\nimmediately satisfying tends to weaken the powers of restraint. Artists\nand poets, and those who immerse themselves constantly in the pleasures\nof sense, tend to chafe under the dull repressions of morality and\ncrave ever-new forms of excitement. Art is an emotional stimulant;\nand unless the emotions aroused are harnessed in the service of morality,\nthey are apt to run amuck. Artists and authors often take to drink,\nand almost always have to meet exceptional sexual temptations. The\nmost beautiful forms of art are those which have the element of sex\ninterest, and the general emotional susceptibility of the creator or\nlover of beauty makes the sex emotion particularly inflammable. Other\nemotions also may be unwisely stimulated by art. In times of\ninternational friction, war-songs, \"patriotic\" speeches, or martial\nprocessions may arouse an unreasoning jingo spirit. The love of\ndeviltry is fostered in boys by many of the penny novels, by\nsensational \"movies\" and newspaper \"stories\"; a famous detective has\nsaid that seventy per cent of the crimes committed by boys under twenty\nare traceable to \"suggestions\" received from these sources. Should\nart be censored in the interests of morality? Art, then, with its vast\npotentialities of both good and harm, needs supervision in the\ninterests of human welfare. The motto, \"Art for art's sake,\" should\nnot be taken to mean that what is detrimental to human life must be\ntolerated, just because it is art. There is, indeed, this truth in\nthe adage, that art does not need to have a moral or practical use\nto justify its existence. It may be merely pleasant, serving no end\nbeyond the enjoyment of the moment. But it must not be harmful. It\nis but one of the many interests in life, and must be judged, like\nany other interest, in the light of the greatest total good. We cannot\nsay, \"Work for work's sake,\" \"Education for education's sake\"; not\neven, \"Morality for morality's sake\"; it is work, education, morality,\nfor the sake of the ultimately happiest human life. The moralist must\nnot despise forms of art which have no ulterior, utilitarian value;\nbut he must insist that no enjoyment of art is really, in the long\nrun, good for man which influences his life in the unwholesome ways\nwe have indicated. Since morality is that way of life that gives it\nits greatest worth, indulgence in art at the expense of morality is\nseizing an immediate but lesser good at the expense of an ultimately\ngreater good. Practically, however, the censorship of art is the most\ndelicate of matters, because the influence of the same work of art\non one person may be widely different from its effect upon another.\nA play or a picture that pleases or even inspires one spectator may\nbe disastrous to his neighbor. And it is always difficult to decide\nbetween the claims of an immediate good and the warnings of dangers\nthat may lurk therein. But we universally acknowledge the duty of some\ncensorship, by prohibiting the most openly tempting pictures, plays,\nand literature. And there can be no doubt that this supervision should\nbe carried further than it now is.\n\nThe most pressing contemporary problem is that concerning the stage.\n[Footnote: See J. Addams, The Spirit of Youth and the City Streets,\nchap. IV. P. MacKaye, The Civic Theatre in Relation to the Redemption\nof Leisure. H. Munsterberg, Psychology and Social Sanity, pp. 27-43.\nJ. H. Coffin, The Socialized Conscience, pp. 130-41. Outlook, vol.\n92, p. 110; vol. 101, p. 492; vol. 107, p. 412. Atlantic Monthly, vol.\n89, p. 497; vol. 107, p. 350.] Any number of boys and girls owe their\nundoing to the influences of the theater. No other form of art now\ntolerated so frequently overstimulates the sex instinct. The scant\ncostumes permitted, with their conscious endeavor to reveal the feminine\nform as alluringly as possible, the voluptuous dances and ballets,\nthe jokes, stories, and suggestive gestures, and often the low moral\ntone of the play, making light of sacred matters and encouraging lax\nideas on sex relations, are powerful excitants. Many theaters frankly\npander to the desire for such stimulation; and they are crowded. For\nwhile human nature remains as it is, the young will flock whither they\ncan find sex excitement. Scarcely less dangerous are the magazines\nand books that by their pictures and their stories play up to this\neternal instinct. Even painters in oils often use this drawing card;\nthe Paris salons have always a considerable sprinkling of nudes, in\nall sorts of voluptuous attitudes, making a frank appeal to desire.\nFrench literature abounds in books, some of great literary merit, that\nexploit this aspect of human nature; but in every tongue there are\nthe Boccaccios and the Byrons.\n\nPlato found this problem in planning his ideal republic, and decreed\nthat all voluptuous and tempting art must be banished. We are rightly\nunwilling to sacrifice beauty and enjoyment to so great an extent;\nsuch Puritanism inevitably provokes reaction, besides sadly impoverishing\nlife. The feminine form, at its best, is exquisitely lovely; and a\nperfect nude is one of the most beautiful things in the world.\n[Footnote: On the moral problem of the nude in art, see Atlantic\nMonthly, vol. 88, pp. 286, 858.] How we shall retain this beauty to\nenrich our lives while avoiding the overstimulation of an already\ndangerously dominant instinct, is a problem whose gravity we can but\nindicate without presuming to offer a satisfactory solution.\n\nWhat can emphatically be said is that artists must subordinate\nthemselves to the welfare of life as a whole. And this is not so great\na loss, for only that art is of the deepest beauty which expresses\nnoble and wholesome feelings. The trouble with the artist is apt to\nbe that he becomes so absorbed in the solution of the practical\ndifficulties attendant upon his art that he cares primarily for\ntriumphs of technique, irrespective of the worth of the feelings which\nthat technique is to express. Indeed, there is actually a sort of scorn\nof beauty in certain studies and studios; the \"literary\" or \"artistic\"\npoint of view is taken to mean a regard only for skill of execution,\nrather than for that beauty of whose realization the skill should be\nbut the means. There is, indeed, a beauty of words and rhythms, of\nbrushwork, of modeling; but if the poet does not love beautiful\nthoughts and acts, no verbal power can make his product great; and\nif the artist paints trivial or vulgar subjects he wastes his genius.\nToo much poetry that is sensual, flippant, drearily pessimistic, morbid,\nor obscure, is included in anthologies because cleverly wrought, with\na sense for form and cadence. Too many stories, too many pictures,\nare applauded by critics, though in subject and tone they are\ncontemptible. As proofs of human skill these works may excite such\nadmiration as we give to a juggler's feats; as practice in handling\na stubborn medium they may be valuable. But the artist who does not\nhave a sane and high sense of what is really noble and beautiful in\nlife prostitutes the talents by which he ought to serve the world.\nOften one feels as Emerson felt when he wrote of another, \"I say to\nhim, if I could write as well as you, I would write a good deal better.\"\nThe bald truth is that artists are seldom competent to be final judges\nof art; they are too much behind the scenes, concerned too constantly\nwith problems of method. The final judgment as to beauty can come only\nfrom one who combines a delicate appreciation of technique with a wide\ninsight into life and a sane perspective of its values. For lack of\nsuch a criticism of art, the average man wanders distracted through\nour art-museums, with their hodge-podge of beautiful and ugly pictures,\nwades through the ingeniously clever stories and sensationally original\nbut often meaningless or trivial verses in the magazines, goes to a\nconcert and joins others in applauding some brilliant display of vocal\ngymnastics, some instrumental pyrotechnics, while his heart is thirsting\nfor high and noble feelings, for something to elevate and inspire his\nlife. The great poets, the great painters, the great dramatists and\nnovelists, have been high-souled men as well as artists, lovers of\nthe really beautiful in life as well as masters of their medium. Their\nart has no conflict with morality; it is rather its greatest stimulus\nand stay. To the lesser brood with the gift of melody, of rhythm, with\nan eye for color or form, but without a true perspective of human values,\nwe must repeat sadly, or even sternly, the poet's reproof:\n\"Can'st thou from heaven, O child Of light, but this to declare?\"\n\nOn culture: Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy; \"Literature and\nScience\" (in Discourses in America). F. Paulsen, System of Ethics,\nbook III, chap. V. H. Spencer, Education. H. Sidgwick, Practical Ethics,\nchap. VIII. Atlantic Monthly, vol. 90, p. 589; vol. 97, p. 433; vol.\n109, p. 111. International Journal of Ethics, vol. 23, p. 1. On the\nmoral censorship of art: Plato, Republic, books. I, III, X. Aristotle,\nPoetics. Ruskin, Lectures on Art. Tolstoy, What is Art? G. Santayana,\nReason in Art, chaps. IX, XI. R. B. Perry, Moral Economy, chap. V.\nH. R. Haweis, Music and Morals. Mackenzie, Manual of Ethics, chap.\nXVI. C. Read, Natural and Social Morals, chap. X. Forum, vol. 50, p.\n588. Outlook, vol. 107, p. 412.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXI\n\n\nTHE MECHANISM OF SELF-CONTROL\n\nTo discuss, as we have been doing, the various duties which are the\nunavoidable pre-conditions of a lasting and widespread welfare for\nmen, would be futile, if we had not the ability to fulfill them. The\npower of self-control is the sine qua non of a secure morality, and\ntherefore of a secure happiness. But this power seems often bafflingly\nabsent. Hard as it is to know what is right to do, it is harder yet\nfor many of us to make ourselves do what we know is right. Life for\nthe average conscientious man is a perpetual battle between two opposing\ntendencies, that which his better self endorses, and that which is\neasiest or most alluring at the moment of action. The latter course\ntoo often seduces his will; and for the earnest and aspiring this\ncontinual moral failure constitutes one of the most tragic aspects\nof life. [Footnote: Cf. Ovid's Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor.\nAnd St. Paul's \"To will is present with me, but how to perform that\nwhich is good I find not. For the good that I would I do not, but the\nevil which I would not, that I do.\" From pagan and Christian pen alike\nthere comes testimony to this universal and disheartening experience.]\nThere is no greater need for most men than that of some wiser and more\neffective method whereby those who have ideals beyond their practice\nmay regularly and consistently realize them.\n\nWhat are our potentialities of greater self-control?\n\nThe encouraging side of the matter is that there have been many, of\nvery various codes and creeds, who have attained to a nearly perfect\nself-control, who easily and almost inevitably govern their conduct\nby their ideals. Puritans with their personal Devil, Christian Scientists\nwho believe that there is no evil at all-Christians, Buddhists,\natheists-there have been saints in all the folds. The fact seems to\nbe that the particular form which our moral ideas take matters much\nless than the completeness with which they possess the mind. Almost\nany of the many motives to right conduct will reform a character if\nit be so stamped into the mind as to become the dominant idea. What\nis necessary is some vivid and dominating anti-sinning idea rammed\ndeep into the brain. The religions have been the chief means of effecting\nthis; and the Church, that draws men together, and into the presence\nof God, for the reinforcing of their better selves, is the most\nefficacious of instruments for the control of sin. But the existence\nof a vast, and by most men hardly tapped, reservoir of power for\nrighteousness (whether or not it is thought of as God) is recognized\ntoday by science as well as by religion; and we must here discuss the\nmatter in a purely secular way. We can control our conduct if we care\nenough to set about using the forces at our disposal. The various\nreligions have found and used them; modern psychology, analyzing their\nsuccess, shows us clearly and exactly how to succeed, even if we stand\naloof from religion altogether.\n\nPsychologically considered, this whole affair of saintliness or\nsinfulness is a matter of the preponderant idea. To have merely\nresolved is not enough; our moral forces must be drilled and made ready\nbefore the battle. This fortifying process we nowadays call\n\"suggestion.\" By it we can so \"set\" our minds, so deepen the channels\nthat flow toward the right actions, that when the time of conflict\ncomes our minds will work along those grooves. Habit, to be sure, means\na deep-cut channel in the mind; it may require much effort to dig a\ndeeper one to take its place. Unless the work is persistently carried\nthrough, the mental currents, diverted temporarily into the new course,\nwill soak through the barriers and find their old bed again. Moreover,\ndifferent minds differ greatly in their plasticity, their\nsusceptibility to suggestion. But the great fact remains that habits\ncan be made over, temptations rendered harmless, and character formed,\nby this simple means.\n\nIt may be worthwhile to remind ourselves of the remarkable power of\nsuggestion. It is most strikingly seen at work in the phenomena of\nhypnotism, because a person who is hypnotized is in a peculiarly\nsusceptible state; he is asleep to everything but the words of the\nhypnotist, which thus have full influence over him, except as checked\nand balanced by the preexisting bias of his mind. Hypnotism is simply\nthe perfect case of suggestion, isolated from disturbing factors. The\nhypnotizing process itself, the putting to sleep, is only preliminary\nto the suggestion; and to patients who are difficult to hypnotize,\n\"waking suggestion\" is given, with the patient in as relaxed and empty\na state of mind as possible. The popular notion that healing through\nhypnotism is uncanny and dangerous is, of course, entirely erroneous.\nTo be sure, every great power has its dangers from misuse, and\nhypnotism is not to be used except for proper ends; but there is\nnothing occult about it. It simply uses the psychological truth that\nthe mind acts on the predominating idea, by lulling to sleep all ideas\nbut the one wanted and impressing that upon the mind. Immediate and\nlasting moral changes are daily being effected through suggestion by\nprofessional hypnotists.\n\nBut though the power of suggestion is most obvious when employed by\nthe scientifically trained physician of today, it has been successfully,\nthough often unconsciously, used in all times. Prophets and saints\nof old, the touch of a king's hand, the sight of relics or images,\nhave wrought striking moral and physical cures through this same mental\nlaw. Christian Scientists and mental healers of various sorts are curing\npeople daily through them. Cases of religious conversion, where a man's\nwhole inner life is turned about through a powerful emotional appeal,\nshow best of all the possibilities of suggestion in the moral field.\nThese are the extreme cases. But, indeed, all our moral education is,\nin psychological language, but so much \"suggestion.\" The imperious\nnecessity for man of preaching, of ritual and liturgy, of prayer and\npraise, is to drive home the high and noble thoughts which in his\nsanest moments he recognizes to be what he needs. The aim of the\npreacher is to bring to his hearers ideals of right living and to make\nthem as appealing and vivid as possible. Yet even the best preaching\ncomes only on Sundays, and there are six days between of other sorts\nof suggestion, which are often counter- suggestions, so that it is\nno wonder we lag so far behind our Sabbath- day ideals. In subtle and\nunrealized ways all the factors of our environment are so many sources\nof suggestion, constantly working upon our minds. Could we always\ncommand powerful and inspiring moral influences, and keep out of range\nof evil ones, our morals would perhaps take care of themselves. But\nwhile seeking so far as possible these external props, and if necessary\nhaving recourse to the still more effective help of the professional\nhypnotists, there remains a vast deal that we must do for ourselves\nif we are to resist successfully the downward pull of evil influences,\nsolve our own individual problems, conquer our own peculiar\ntemptations, and attain our ideals. We must practice autosuggestion.\nIt is noteworthy that the loftiest spirits have always practiced it,\nin their habit of daily prayer. For whatever else prayer accomplishes,\nit certainly brings the mind back to its ideals, concentrates it\nearnestly engaged in, is the best possible form of suggestion. The\nlapse of this habit helps to explain why unbelievers so often degenerate\nmorally. Comte, that positive disbeliever in supernatural dogmas, clearly\nrecognized this danger, and enjoined upon his followers a consecration\nprayer three times a day. In recent years the writers who call their\ndoctrine by the name of The New Thought - and other kindred thinkers\nhave called attention to the possibilities of self- help, directing\nus to \"retire into the silence,\" there to concentrate our minds upon\nthose beliefs that are comforting and inspiring to us; and have helped\nmany thereby to attain peace and self-possession. But still the conscious\nuse of autosuggestion for the attainment of personal ideals has been\nvery little discussed, and in the employment of this great power we\nare astonishingly backward.\n\nA practicable mechanism of self-control.\n\nLet us, then, outline briefly the chief points necessary to note in\nusing this force for our own benefit. A necessary preliminary is to\nstudy our problems, analyze our difficulties, make sure exactly what\nwe want to do and wherein we fail; and thereby to pin our aspirations\ndown to definite resolves to act in certain ways rather than in certain\nother ways. Our ideals are apt to be vague and even conflicting, or\nelse so abstract and general as to fail to direct us with precision\nto any concrete act. We realize dumbly that we are not what we\nshould be, and we grope for better things; but just wherein the\ndifference consists, just where is the point where we go off the track,\nis uncertain in our minds. As in physical achievement, half the success\nlies in applying the effort at just the right place. The men who have\naccomplished much are those who have known exactly what they wanted\nto do and have concentrated their energies upon that. If we have so\nmuch self-reformation to accomplish as to dissipate our attention,\nit may be wise to decide which changes are most immediately important\nand to limit our endeavors at first to those.\n\nIncluded in this preliminary task is the fixation in our minds of the\nreasons for the lines of conduct we intend to follow, all the motives\nthat draw us toward them. This will show us whether we, i.e., our\nbetter selves, really wish to acquire these new habits, are really\nconvinced that they are right, or whether we are merely putting before\nourselves some one else's ideal which we vaguely feel we ought or are\nexpected to follow. One can often convince one's self quite thoroughly\nof ideas one did not really believe in by this method of suggestion;\nbut if we are to control our own morals we wish to control them not\nby some one else's ideals but by our own. If a thing is really right\nto do there must be definite and legitimate reasons for the doing which\ncan appeal to our intelligence and our emotions; these we should bring\ninto the foreground of our thought and express as clearly and forcibly\nas possible.\n\nWe have now the material for our work. We must so hammer these\nresolutions and the motives to them into our heads that they will be\nvividly conscious to us when they are needed. In this process there\nare three main points to be remembered - Concentration, Iteration,\nand Assertion.\n\n(1) Concentration. The more completely the mind can be concentrated\nupon the resolution and its motives the deeper will they penetrate\ninto it, to lie there ready for use at the moment of action. A definite\ntime should be set apart when the mind can be withdrawn from other\nthoughts and compelled to give all its attention to this matter. On\nfirst waking, or just before going to sleep. If one is not too tired-one\ncan usually best get away from the distracting details of life. The\nresolutions should be written down, with the most important words or\nphrases underlined, to serve as catchwords and mottoes. They should\nbe read aloud and repeated from memory, as well as thought over silently,\nthus adding visual and auditory images to the mental concepts. In\nmeditating upon them one's thoughts should not be allowed to wander\ntoo far, but must be constantly referred to the definite numbered\nresolutions. The use of symbols, of colors, etc, will readily occur\nto any one who goes into this matter with lively interest. Always repeat\nthe resolutions with the greatest possible emphasis and enthusiasm,\nso as to carry them away ringing in the mind. Remember that the\nastonishing results of hypnotism and mental healing are due simply\nto the complete possession of the mind by the new idea.\n\n(2) ITERATION. The oftener the mind is fixed upon the resolution and\nits motives, the more deeply will they become engraved in it. Sometimes\none determined concentration will carry the day; but if this quick\nassault does not win the victory a long-continued siege can do it.\nBy hammering away continually at the same spot the requisite impression\nwill finally be made. A momentary rehearsal of the resolutions may\nbe made a hundred times a day, in passing; and immediately before the\ntime for execution, if it can be foreseen, forces should be rallied,\neven if only by an instantaneous flash of determination. Above all,\none should not be discouraged and stop trying; for every renewed effort,\neven if showing no reward in success, produces its exact and unfailing\neffect. Keeping everlastingly at it is as necessary for success in\nmorals as in everything else.\n\n(3) ASSERTION. The more vigorously we assert our power to keep our\nresolutions the more likely we are to do so. It is largely lack of\nconfidence in ourselves that paralyzes us. The religions have realized\nthe need of inspiring hope and confidence in their converts by\npreaching the necessity of faith.\n\nThe faith we need is not necessarily faith in any supernatural help,\nbut only in the demonstrated fact of the possibility of controlling\nour own minds and morals by going at it in the right way. But we must\nnot passively wait for faith to possess us, we must grasp it, cleave\nto it, assert it. We must repeat our resolutions always with the\nconviction that we are really going to carry them out. We must picture\nourselves at the time of temptation, with the triumphant thought of\nhow splendidly we are going to worst the Devil, and never for a moment\nthink or talk of ourselves as likely to forget or yield. Such\npersistent assertion, even if there is a background of distrust that\nwe cannot wholly banish from our minds, will greatly help. Whatever\nwe may think about the ethics of belief as applied to supernatural\nthings, the \"will to believe\" in our own power is certainly legitimate\nand important. [Footnote: The important problem of the ethics of belief,\nas applied to religious matters, has not been discussed in this volume.\nThe present writer hopes to discuss it fully in a later volume, to\nbe called Problems of Religion.] Various accessoriesand safeguards.\nThe dogged and hearty practice of auto-suggestion,\nwhether in the secular form above outlined, or in the warmer and more\nsatisfying form of prayer, is sufficient to keep a man master of\nhimself and above the reach of whatever temptations he recognizes and\nchooses to resist. But there are various other furtherances to self-\ncontrol that may be briefly suggested.\n\n(1) The method of \"turning over a new leaf\" is of the utmost value\nto minds of a certain type. To declare a definite break with the old\nlife, a fresh beginning, unstained and full of hope, often gives just\nthe extra impetus that was needed. We are weighted by the memory of\nour failures, we live in the shadow of the past, and easily slide into\na hopelessness and sense of impotence which a mere dogged persistence\ncannot overcome. New Year's Day, a birthday, any change in place or\nmanner of life, may well be made the occasion for a bout of \"moral\nhouse-cleaning,\" which will give a new enthusiasm and vitality to our\nbetter natures. The essential thing in such cases is to look out for\nthe first tests, and not allow a single exception to the new\nresolutions. A slight lapse, that seems inconsequential, may serve\nto check the new momentum; as La Rochefoucauld says, \"It is far easier\nto extinguish a first desire than to satisfy all those that follow\nin its train.\"\n\nThere is, however, a real danger in this method, of a discouragement\nand demoralization resulting from the collapse of enthusiastic hopes.\nAnd there is the further danger that a man will excuse indulgence in\nsuch hours of discouragement, on the ground that he is going to turn\nover another new leaf to-morrow and might as well have a good fling\nto- day. It is well to remember the truth that Martineau expressed\nby his apt phrase, \"the tides of the spirit.\" \"But, alas,\" Stevenson\nputs it, \"by planting a stake at the top of the flood, you can neither\nprevent nor delay the inevitable ebb.\" After all, in most of our moral\nwarfare, \"it's dogged as does it.\" \"He that stumbles and picks himself\nup is as if he had never fallen.\"\n\n\"We cannot kindle when we will The fire which in the heart resides;\nThe spirit bloweth and is still, In mystery our soul abides. But tasks\nin hours of insight will'd Can be through hours of gloom fulfill'd.\"\n\nIf we do try the abrupt break, it is of the utmost importance to\nutilize every opportunity for the carrying out of the new program,\nto hunt up occasions while the will is strong and the courage high.\nOne actual fulfillment of a resolution is worth many mental rehearsals.\nAnd when the enemy is repulsed by this charge with the bayonet,\nvigilance must not be relaxed, lest he return to take us unawares.\n[Footnote: I cannot forbear including, in this connection, the admirable\nremarks of William James (Psychology, vol. I, pp. 123-24): \"The first\n[maxim] is that in the acquisition of a new habit, or the leaving off of\nan old one, we must take care to LAUNCH OURSELVES WITH AS\nSTRONG AND DECIDED AN INITIATIVE AS POSSIBLE. Accumulate\nall the possible circumstances which shall reinforce the right motives;\nput yourself assiduously in conditions that encourage the new way;\nmake engagements incompatible with the old; take a public pledge,\nif the case allows; in short, envelop your resolution with every aid you\nknow. This will give your new beginning such a momentum that the\ntemptation to break down will not occur as soon as it otherwise might;\nand every day during which a breakdown is postponed adds to the\nchances of its not occurring at all. \"The second maxim is: NEVER\nSUFFER AN EXCEPTION TO OCCUR TILL THE NEW HABIT IS\nSECURELY ROOTED IN YOUR LIFE. Each lapse is like the letting\nfall of a ball of string which one is carefully winding up; a single slip\nundoes more than a great many turns will wind again. The need of\nsecuring success at the OUTSET is imperative. Failure at first is apt\nto dampen the energy of all future attempts, whereas past experience\nof success nerves one to future vigor. It is surprising how soon a desire\nwill die of inanition if it be NEVER fed. \"A third maxim may be added to\nthe preceding pair: SEIZE THE VERY FIRST POSSIBLE\nOPPORTUNITY TO ACT ON EVERY RESOLUTION YOU MAKE,\nAND ON EVERY EMOTIONAL PROMPTING YOU MAY EXPERIENCE\nIN THE DIRECTION OF THE HABITS YOU ASPIRE TO GAIN. It is not\nin the moment of their forming, but in the moment of their producing\nMOTOR EFFECTS that resolves and aspirations communicate the\nnew 'set' to the brain.\"]\n\n(2) It is an excellent thing to do a little gratuitous spiritual\nexercise every day, just to keep in training, to get the habit of\nconquering impulse, of doing disagreeable things. Nothing is more\nuseful to a man than that power. We must not let our lives get too\neasy and our wills too soft. To jump out of bed when the whistle blows,\ninstead of dawdling just for a minute more in indolent comfort, to\nmake one's self take the cold bath that is abhorrent to the flesh,\nto deny one's self the cigar or the candy that may not be in itself\nparticularly harmful-by some means or other to keep one's self in\nthe saddle and riding one's desires, may enable one when some\ncrisis comes to thrust aside a man too fatally accustomed to doing\nthings in the easiest way.\n\n(3) Discretion is sometimes the better part of valor. Besides\nstrengthening our own wills, it is wise to seek in every way to remove\ntemptation from our path, and, if need be, to run away from it. We\nmust keep away from situations that experience warns are dangerous\nfor us, however innocent they may be to others. If a man find that\ndancing, or the theater, arouses his passionate nature, it may be better\nto avoid it entirely till his hypersensitive state is normalized. Always\nalcoholic liquors are to be avoided; they cloud the reason and the\nwill, and let impulse loose. Always overexcitement and overfatigue\nare to be avoided. \"The power to overcome temptation,\" Jane Addams\nwrites, \"reaches its limit almost automatically with that of physical\nresistance.\"\n\n(4) We must follow Bossuet's advice not to combat passions directly\nso much as to turn them aside by applying them to other objects. Our\nemotional nature is a gift of the gods; the sinner might have been\na saint if his emotions had only been enlisted under the right banner.\nSomething good to love, to work for, and think about, something that\ncan arouse our whole nature and relieve it from suppression, is the\nbest antidote to morbid desire. It is sometimes alleged that it is\nbetter to satisfy a passion than to keep it pent up within the\norganism. But satisfying a wrong passion not only brings its inevitable\nunhappy consequences, to one's self and to others, it makes it far\nharder to resist the passion again, when it recurs. The only safe\noutlet is one that leads into right conduct; under skilful guidance\nall passions can be transmuted into valuable driving forces and allies\nof morality.\n\n(5) Even if one seems to be playing a losing game, one can still keep\nup the fight. One can spoil one's enjoyment in self-indulgence or\nselfishness; one can refuse to give in all over. This minority\nrepresentation of the better impulse will suffice to keep it alive\nin us; and when the revulsion from sin comes we shall be in better\nshape to make the fight next time. A hundred failures need not\ndiscourage; some of the greatest men have gained the final ascendancy\nover their weaknesses only after a long and often losing struggle.\nThe case is hopeless only for the man who stops fighting.\n\nSelf-control is the measure of manhood. It is the most important thing\nin the personal life. And it is within the reach of any man who can\nbe brought to understand the mechanism where through it can be attained.\nIt remains true that it is best attained through religion, which\nutilizes the power of prayer, of faith, the enthusiasm of a great cause\nand motive, and the comradeship and help of others engaged in the same\neternal war with sin. But religion, to be efficacious, must be not\npassively accepted, but USED. Its help comes not to him who saith\n\"Lord, Lord!\" but to him who earnestly seeks to do the will of the\nFather. J. Payot, Education of the Will. H. C. King, Rational Living,\nchap. VI, sec. III; chap. X. W. James, Psychology, vol. I, pp. 122-27;\nvol. II, pp. 561-79. W. E. H. Lecky, Map of Life, chap. XII. A. Bain,\nThe Emotions and the Will, part II, chap. IX. L. H. Gulick, in World's\nWork, vol. 15, p. 9797. Bossuet, Connaissance de Dieu et de Soi meme,\nchap. III, sec. 19. St. Augustine, Confessions, book VIII, chap. V.\nJanet, Elements de Morale, chap. X, sec. 3. W. L. Sheldon, An Ethical\nMovement, chap. X. A. Bennett, The Human Machine, chaps. I-V. O. S.\nMarden, Every Man a King.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXII\n\n\nTHE ATTAINABILITY OF HAPPINESS\n\nWE have now discussed the more recurrent problems of the individual,\nand pointed out the salient duties that private life entails. But there\nremains something to be added before we shall have clearly pointed\nthe way to personal happiness. \"Mere morality,\" even when coupled with\ngood fortune, is not enough; a sinless man, scrupulous to fulfill the\nleast command of the law, may yet be anxious, restless, depressed,\nunsatisfied. We need more than morality, as the word is commonly used;\nwe need religion - or something of the sort. There is no doubt that\nfor the attainment of a pervasive and stable happiness there is nothing\nso good as the best sort of religion; but, as in discussing self-\ncontrol, we must here steer clear of religious controversy and phrase\nwhat we have to say in the colder terms of \"mere morality.\" And though\nthere will be a great loss in feeling, in persuasiveness and unction\nthereby, there will be gain in clearness. It is possible to express\nin the drab tones of morality the profound insights which have made\nreligion the great guide to happiness; and even the man who deems\nhimself irreligious may, if he takes to heart these more prosaic counsels,\nfind something of the peace that has been the boon of true believers.\n\nThe threefold key to happiness:\n\nI. HEARTY ALLEGIANCE TO DUTY.\n\nThe one thing above all others that makes\nlife worth living is the utter devotion of the heart and will to the\ncommands of morality. To throw one's self whole-heartedly into the\ngame, to play one's part for all it is worth, transforms what were\nelse a grim and unhappy necessity into a glorious opportunity. The\nhappy man is the loyal man, the man who has taken sides, who has\nenrolled himself definitely on the side of right and tastes the zest of\nbattle. He has something to live for, and something lasting. He has\nput his heart into a cause that the limitations and accidents of life\ncannot take from him, he has laid up his treasure in heaven, where\nmoth and rust doth not corrupt or thieves break through and steal.\n\nAny cause, any ambition, any great endeavor that can stir the blood,\nand give a life direction, purpose, and continuity of achievement,\nhas the power to rescue life from ennui, from emptiness, and give it\npositive worth. But most ambitions pall in time, and many a cause that\nhas taken a man's best energies has come to seem mistaken or futile\nwith the years. There is only one great campaign which is so eternal,\nso surely necessary, so clear in its summons to all men, that the heart\ncan rest in it as in something great enough to ennoble a whole life.\nThat is the age-long war against evil, the unending summons to duty,\nthe service of God. Once a man learns this deepest of joys, nothing\ncan take it from him; whatever his limitations, however narrow his\nsphere, there will not fail to be a right way, a brave way, a beautiful\nway to live. There is comradeship in it; in this common service of\nGod - or of good, if we must avoid religious terms - we stand shoulder\nto shoulder with the saints and heroes of all races and times, with\nall, of whatever land or tongue, who are striving to push forward the\nline, to make the right prevail and banish evil. Every effort, every\nsacrifice, has its inextinguishable effect; in his moral conquests\na man is no longer an individual, he is a part of the great tide that\nis resistlessly making toward the better world of the future, the Kingdom\nof God. The great Power in the world that makes for righteousness is\nback of him, and in him; in no loyal moment is he alone. . . .\nInevitably the tongue slips into religious language in dealing with\nthese high truths; but nonetheless are they scientific truths, matters\nof plain every day observation.\n\nThe essential point is, that it is not enough to obey the Law; we must\nESPOUSE the Law, clasp it to our bosoms, love it, and give ourselves\nto it utterly. We must - to use the pregnant words of James \"base our\nlives on doing and being, not on having\"; base our lives solidly upon\nit, so that everything else is secondary. The pleasures of life are\nwell enough in their time, but they must not usurp the chief place\nin a man's thought.[Footnote: Cf. J. S. Mill, Autobiography, p. 142:\n\"The enjoyments of life are sufficient to make it a pleasant thing,\nwhen they are taken en passant, without being made a principal object.\nThe only chance is to treat, not happiness, but some end external\nto it, as the purpose of life.\"] His first concern must be to keep\ntrue, to play the game; he must seek first the Kingdom of God and His\nrighteousness, if he would have these other things added unto him.\nHe must lose his life his worldly interests, his dependence upon\nease and luxury, and even love if he would truly find it. In a hundred\nsuch phrases from the Great Teacher's lips one finds the secret. More\nbaldly expressed, it comes to this, that only through putting the main\nemphasis upon doing the right, obeying the call of duty, only through\nthe courageous attack and the giving of our utmost allegiance, can\nwe keep a positive zest in living, exorcise the specter of aimlessness\nand depression, and lift ordinary commonplace life to the level of\nheroism. Blessed is the man whose DELIGHT is in the law of the Lord.\n\nII. HEARTY ACQUIESCENCE IN OUR LOT.\n\nThe fighter, for whatever cause, can bear the blows that come as\na part of the battle; if a man has put his heart into living by his ideal,\nhe is immune from the disappointments and irritations that beset man\nupon a lower level. But it is well to take thought also for this side of\nthe matter, to cultivate deliberately the spirit of acquiescence in the\ninevitable pain and losses of life. Many of the sweetest pleasures\nare by their nature uncertain or transient; these we must hold so\nloosely that, while not refusing to enjoy their sweetness, we are\n]ot dependent upon them and can let them go without losing sight\nof the steady gleam that we follow. However dear to us are the people\nwe love, and the material things we own, we must keep the underlying\nassurance that if they be taken from us life will still bring us in other\nways renewed opportunities for that loyalty to duty, that faithful living,\nwhich is after all the end for which we live. We must count whatever\ncomes to us, whether sweet or bitter, as the conditions under which\nwe serve, the material with which we have to work, the stuff which\nwe have to \"try the soul's strength on.\" For there is no way to be\narmor-proof against unhappiness but by seeing to it that our hearts\nare not set on anything but doing or being; nothing else is reliably\npermanent amid the fitful sunshine and shadow of human life. \"Make\nhy claim of wages a zero; then hast thou the world at thy feet.\"\n[Footnote: In Maeterlinck's Measure of the Hours, he speaks of a\nsundial found near Venice by Hazlitt with the inscription, Horas non\nnumero nisi serenas and quotes Hazlitt's remarks thereon: \"What a\nfine lesson is conveyed to the mind to take no note of time but by its\nbenefits, to watch only for the smiles and neglect the frowns of fate,\nto compose our lives of bright and gentle moments, turning always to\nthe sunny side of things and letting the rest slip from our imaginations,\nunheeded or forgotten.\"] This necessity of detaching the heart from\ndependence upon uncertainties found extreme expression in the\nvarious historic forms of asceticism and monasticism. Such a running\naway from the world does not satisfy our age, with its eagerness for\nlife and life more abundantly; if it escapes the poignant sorrows it\ncannot happiness, or make life better for others. But we may well\ntake to heart the half-truth taught by the hermits and monks of the\npast. We may be \"in the world,\" indeed, but not \"of it\"; we, too,\nmay make no claims upon life, while putting our hearts into playing\nour own part in it well. The writings of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius\nare full of passages that express the gist of the matter, such as the\nfollowing: \"It is thy duty to order thy life well in every single act; and\nif every act does its duty as far as is possible, be content; no one is\nable to hinder thee so that each act shall not do its duty. But something\nexternal will stand in the way? Nothing will stand in the way of thy\nacting justly and soberly and considerately. But perhaps some of thy\nactive powers will be hindered? Well, by acquiescing in the hindrance,\nand being content to transfer thy efforts to that which is allowed,\nanother opportunity of action is immediately put before thee in place\nof that which was hindered.\" What is this but saying in other words\nthat not in having lies our life, but in doing and being. Not even\nin succeeding, we must remember; and this is perhaps the hardest part\nof our lesson. It is one thing to bear with serenity those blows of\nfortune against which we are obviously defenseless; it is another thing,\nwhen there seems a chance for averting the disaster, when our whole\nheart and soul are thrown into that effort, to await the outcome with\ntranquility, to bear failure without complaint. The \"might have been's\"\nand the \"perhaps may yet be's\" are the greatest disturbers of our peace.\nTo use our keenest wits for attaining what seems best, to use our utmost\npersuasion for protecting ourselves from the selfishness and stupidity\nof others, and then if we fail, if the fair hope slips from our grasp,\nif the thoughtlessness or cruelty of men prevails against us, to smile\nand attack the next problem with undaunted cheerfulness, requires,\nindeed, to attain to that level may well be called \"the last infirmity\nof noble minds.\" For the very concentration of life upon doing and\nbeing carries with it the danger of staking happiness upon the success\nof the doing, the attainment of the ideals. We must count even the\nstupidity and impulsiveness of our own mental make-up as among the\nmaterials we have to work with, and not allow remorse for our own part\nin past failures to interfere with the joyful earnestness with which\nwe attack the problems of the eternal present. We may, indeed, often\nsucceed, and that may be a very great and pure joy to us; but we are\nnot to count upon success; or, to put it another way, we are to think\nof the real success as lying in the dauntless renewal of the effort\nrather than in the show of outward result. \"To have often resisted\nthe diabolic, and at the end to be still resisting it, is for the poor\nhuman soldier to have done right well. To ask to see some fruit of\nour endeavor is but a transcendental way of serving for reward.\" This\nis not pessimism, it is the first step toward a sound and invulnerable\noptimism. We must recognize once for all that this world is not the\nworld of our dreams, and cease to be so pathetically surprised and\nhurt when it falls short of them. Were we to be rebellious at life\nfor not being built after the pattern of our ideals there would be\nno limit to our faultfinding. We may, indeed, long in our idle hours\nwith Omar \"To grasp this sorry scheme of things entire, shatter it\nto bits-and then Remould it nearer to the heart's desire!\" But in our\ndaily life a braver and saner attitude befits us; for it is not in\nsuch an ideal world but in the actual world that we have to live. Evils\nthere are in it and will yet be-why we cannot tell and need not know;\nthe only alternative we have is to take them cheerfully or gloomily,\nto rebel or to accept the situation. Our duty then is clear. To face\nthe events of life as they come to us, without discouragement or dismay,\nto laugh at them a little and learn to carry on our lives through them\nwith steadfast heart and smiling face- surely that is the part of wisdom\nand of true manliness. The ugly things in life seem much less formidable\nwhen thus boldly faced than when we try to shut our eyes to them,\nwith the consequent disillusion at their continual reappearance.\nConfess frankly the faults of life and it becomes tolerable, is even\nin a fair way to become lovable. For after all, when its obvious\nimperfections do not blind us to its good points, it is a dear old\nworld we live in, and the healthy minded man loves it, as he\nloves his friends in spite of their faults loves it, and finds it a\nworld gloriously worth living in.\n\nIII.\nHEARTY APPRECIATION OF THE WONDER AND BEAUTY IN LIFE.\n\nFinally, when we have our great purpose in life, and have overcome\nthe fear of pain and loss, we must learn to see and appreciate the\nbeauty of the world we live in. The man who refuses to be downed by\ntrouble is in a condition to enjoy each bit of good fortune that comes\nto him, to welcome each as a pure gift or addition to life, and to\nknow that gifts of some sort or other will always come. Holding all\nthings with that looser grasp that is ready to let them go if go they\nmust, he can relish the good things of life the more freely for not\nhaving counted on them, as he can the more freely admire the virtues\nof his friends for not having expected them to be perfect. He can feel\nthe beauty of the world without being dependent upon it, not looking\nfor mortal things to be immortal or human things to be ideal, but\nwhole-heartedly enjoying today what he has today and tomorrow what\nhe shall have to-morrow. The things he cannot have at all, instead\nof spoiling his happiness in what he has, will rather add to it by\nforming another dimension of the actual, full of beautiful visions\nand glorious possibilities. And meantime the real world, of events\nthat actually occur, will not fail, in spite of its flaws and rebuffs,\nto bring him ever-fresh delights. Let no one minimize these delights.\nThere is more beauty, more interest here in this mundane existence\nof ours, more inspiration, more inexhaustible possibility of enjoyment\nthan the keenest of us has dreamed of. We need some sort of shaking\nup to rouse us to the beauty of common things- the freshness of the air\nwe breathe, the warmth of sunshine, the green of trees and fields and\nthe blue of the sky, the joy in exercise of brain and muscle, in reading\nand talking and sharing in the life of the world; and in such daily\nthings as eating at the family table when we are hungry, or a good\nnight's sleep when we are tired. We need some teacher like Whitman\nto open our eyes to the beauty not only of flowers but of leaves of\ngrass, to the picturesqueness and significance of so dull a thing as\na ferryboat; or like Wordsworth, with his picturing of homely country\nscenes and events, with his emotion at the sight of the sleeping city-\n\"a sight so touching in its majesty.\" This sense of the meaning of\ncommon things floods most of us at one time or another, and we see\nwhat in our blindness we have been overlooking. Go without your\ncomfortable bed for a while, your well-cooked food, your home, friends,\nneighbors, and you will discover how rich you have been. Your mother's\nface hinted by some stranger in a foreign land will some day overcome\nyou with the realization of the comfort of her love; and unless you\nare a crabbed egotist the life of your fellows can furnish you with\nendless pleasures. It is not necessary to own things to enjoy them;\nour interests and enjoyments may well overlap and include those of\nour friends and neighbors, and even those of strangers. The smile of\na happy child, a friend's good fortune a sunrise or moonlit cloud-strewn\nsky, should bring a pure gladness to any one who has eyes to see and\nheart to feel. We must \"Learn to love the morn, Love the lovely working\nlight, Love the miracle of sight, Love the thousand things to do.\"\n[Footnote: These lines are Richard Le Gallienne's. Cf. also Matthew\nArnold's lines: \"Is it so small a thing To have enjoyed the sun, To have\nlived light in the spring, To have loved, to have thought, to have done,\nTo have advanced true friends and beat down baffling foes? The sports\nof the country people, A flute note from the woods, Sunset over the sea;\nSeed-time and harvest, The reapers in the corn, The vinedresser\nin his vineyard, The village girl at her wheel. . .\"] The true lover of\nbeauty will not need to seek forever-new scenes and objects\nto admire. He will find that which can feed his heart in the clouds\nof morning, the blue of noon, or the stars of night. One graceful vase\nwith a flower-stalk bending over to display its drooping blossoms,\nwill fill him with a quiet happiness; the merry laughter of a child,\nthe tender smile of a lover, the rugged features of a weather beaten\nlaborer, will stir his soul to response; a few lines of poetry remembered\nin the midst of work, a simple song sung in the twilight, a print of\nsome old master hanging by his bedside, a bird-call heard at sunset\nor the scent of evening air after rain, may so speak to his spirit\nthat he will say, \"It is enough!\" It is not the number of beautiful\nthings that we have that matters, but the degree in which we are open\nto their influence, the atmosphere into which we let them lead us.\nOur hearts must be free from self-seeking, from regret, from anger,\nfrom restlessness. The vision comes not always to the connoisseur,\ncomes to him whose life is simple, earnest, open-eyed and openhearted.\nIn the pauses of his faithful work he will refresh his soul with some\nbit of beauty that tells of attainment, of peace, of perfection. That\nis a proof to him of the beauty in the midst of which he lives,\ninexhaustible, hardly discerned; it carries him beyond itself into\nthe ideal world of which it is a sample and illustration; unconsciously\nduring the duties of the day he lives in the light of that vision,\nand everything is sweetened and blessed thereby.\n\nCan we maintain a steady under glow of happiness?\n\nHappiness--happiness sufficient to make life well worth living is,\nfor most men at least, at most times, a real possibility. To be won\nit has but to be sought vigorously enough. It is to be sought,\nhowever, not primarily by changing one's environment but by\nchanging one's self; not by acquiring new things, but by acquiring\na new attitude toward things; not by getting what could make one\nhappy, but by learning to be happy with what one can get. THE\nKINGDOM OF HEAVEN IS WITHIN YOU! This is not merely a\nmoralist's theory, or an empirical observation; it is a scientific fact.\nWe may restate the matter in psychological language by saying\nthat happiness and unhappiness are responses of the organism\nto its environment, reactions upon a stimulus, our attitude of\nwelcome or dissatisfaction toward the various matters of our\nexperience. True, we often think of the quality of pleasantness\nas inhering in the things we enjoy, and speak of troubles and\nsorrows as objective. But this is only a shorthand way of describing\nexperience. In reality the pleasure we feel in eating when we are\nhungry or in seeing a friend we love is something added to and\ndifferent from the taste sensations, or the complex visual perceptions\nand memory images the friend arouses in us. So a cutting or burning\nsensation, the thought of a friend's death, or of our failure, on the one\nhand, and our unhappiness thereat on the other hand, are two distinct\nthings, closely bound together in our minds but separable.\n\nThe separation is, indeed, difficult to bring about, because the age\nlong struggle for existence has made unhappiness at physical pain\nand pleasure at the healthy exercise of our organs or satisfying of our\nappetite instinctive and immediate, that we may avoid what is harmful\nto life and pursue what is useful. All our cravings and longings and\nregrets have this biological value; they are the machinery by which\nnature spurs us on to better adjustment to the conditions of life.\nAnd in learning to do without the spur we must learn not to need it.\nDiscontent is better than laziness, remorse better than callous\nselfishness, suffering under extreme cold better than recklessly\nexposing the body till it is weakened. But as soon as we have reached\nthat stage of rationality where we can choose the better way and stick\nto it without the stinging goad of pain, the pain is no longer\nnecessary and we may safely learn to weed it out.\n\nA few blessed souls we know who have learned the secret, who go about\nwith perpetually radiant face and take smilingly the very mishaps that\nworry and sadden the rest of us. To some extent this may be merely\na matter of better nerves, of less sensitive temperament, of more\nabounding vitality; but there are many of the weakest and most\nsensitive among those who have learned that better way; they can turn\neverything into happiness as Midas turned everything into gold. It\nis surprising, looking through such a one's eyes, to see how full life\nis of delight. Yet in the same situations there may be room for endless\ncomplaint if \"every grief is entertained that's offered.\" It all\ndepends on the attitude taken. In trouble one man will fall to\nfretting, while another does what can be done and then turns his\nthoughts to something else; in discomfort one will lower the corners\nof his mouth and feel wretched, while the other finds it all vastly\namusing; one will have his day quite spoiled by some disappointment\nwhich the other takes as a mere incident; one will find the same\nenvironment dull and stupid which the other finds full of interest\nand opportunity; and so out of like conditions one will make an unhappy,\nthe other a happy life. [Footnote: Cf. \"In journeying often, in perils\nof waters, in perils of robbers, in perils by mine own countrymen,\nin perils by the heathen, in perils in the city, in perils in the\nwilderness, in perils in the sea, in perils among false brethren, in\nweariness and painfulness, in watching often, in hunger and thirst,\nin fasting often, in cold and nakedness . . . yet always rejoicing!\"\n\"Rejoicing in tribulation\" even, because to the brave man every\nobstacle and failure is so much further opportunity for courage and\ncontrivance, for matching himself against things. \"Human joy,\" writes\nthe author of the Simple Life, \"has celebrated its finest triumphs\nunder the greatest tests of endurance.\" The Apostle Paul is but one\nof many who have welcomed each rebuff, and proved that if rightly taken\nlife almost at its worst can be transmuted by courage into happiness.]\nThis, then, is the philosophy of happiness in a nutshell: PUT YOUR\nHEART INTO DOING YOUR DUTY; DEMAND NOTHING ELSE OF\nLIFE THAN THE OPPORTUNITY TO DO YOUR DUTY; ENJOY\nFREELY AND WITHOUT FEAR EVERYTHING GOOD AND\nBEAUTIFUL THAT COMES IN YOUR WAY.\n\nTo acquire and keep this attitude of mind requires of course resolution\nand persistence. We must rouse ourselves and take sides. We must\ndefinitely pledge ourselves once and for all to happiness; and if we]\ncannot at a leap attain to it, we must still remember that we have\ncommitted ourselves to that side. We must pretend to be happy,\nthrow aside all complaining and sighs and long faces; whatever\ncomes, we must remember that we are on trial to preserve our\nbuoyancy, our power not to be downcast. We shall not be able]\nto disuse our habit of unhappiness at once. But if we stick to\nour colors and refuse to add to whatever depression masters\nus by brooding upon it and giving it right of way; if we remember\nthe conditions of happiness stated above, and thrust resolutely\nfrom us all thoughts and words incompatible with living according\nto them, the unhappiness will be gone before we know it. It is a\nwell-known psychological law that if we choke the expression\nof an emotion, we shall presently find that we have smothered the\nemotion itself. It may seem like hollow pretense at first, but it will pay\nto pretend hard; when we have pretended long enough, we shall find\nwe no longer need to pretend. There will always be those, no doubt,\nwho will declare it impossible, and they will continue to be unhappy;\nthere will be many others who will concede the possibility of it, but will\nnot have the determination and persistence to effect it; but there will\nalways be some who will say, \"Happiness is possible!\" who will set\nout to get it, and who will get it, as they will deserve to. Some men\nare born happy, some seem to have happiness thrust upon them,\nbut some achieve happiness. It will not be the same kind of happiness\nthat we had as children, before the shocks of life awoke us. It will be\na happiness that meets and rises above pain. Life will always have its\ntragedies, sickness and separation, pain and sudden death. They are\nthe common inheritance of mankind. But it is not these things in\nthemselves that make life unendurable, it is the way we take them,\nour fear of them, our worry over them, our longings and rebelliousness,\nour magnifying and brooding over and shrinking from them; when we resolve\nto lift our heads and assert our power, we shall find life tragic,\nyes, but endurable, and full of a deep joy. The little worries and\ndisappointments will cease to trouble us. And the same attitude that\nenables us to rise above them will, when more staunchly held, lift\nus over the great sorrows also, and keep alive in us an under glow\nof joy. An under glow of joy-that is what can be found in life in any\nbut its highly abnormal phases, by conforming to its conditions and\ntaking it for what it is, stuff which, we have to shape into service\nto the ideal. It should be recognized as the final word of personal\nmorality that a man must train himself to a happiness that is independent\nof circumstances. We need no mystical painting out of the shadows,\nno blindness to facts, only a will to serve the right, a readiness\nto accept the imperfect, and eyes to see the beauty that surrounds\nus. \"If I have faltered more or less In my great task of happiness,\nIf I have moved among my race And shown no glorious morning face,\nIf beams from happy human eyes Have moved me not; if morning skies,\nBooks\" and my food, and summer rain, Knocked on my sullen heart in\nvain. If, in short, we have not disciplined ourselves to happiness,\nit may well be maintained that we have left undone our highest duty\nto our neighbor and ourselves. And he may with good reason declare\nthat he has solved the greatest problem of life who can proclaim with\nTolstoy, \"I rejoice in having taught myself not to be sad!\" or with\nthe Apostle Paul, \"I have learned in whatsoever state I am therein\nto be content.\" Much of the secret of happiness is to be found in\nEpictetus and Marcus Aurelius  and, of course, in the Gospels. Of\nmodern writers, among the most useful are Stevenson and Chesterton.\nSee, for example, Stevenson's Christmas Sermon, and J. F. Genung's\nStevenson's Attitude toward Life. Chesterton's counsels are too\nsattered to make reference practicable.\n\nSee also C. W. Eliot, The Happy Life. C. Hilty, Happiness. P. G.\nHamerton, The Quest of Happiness. P. Paulsen, System of Ethics,\nbook m, chap, n, sees. 3, 6; chap, iv, sees. 1, 2. H. C. King, Rational\nLiving, chap, x, sec. iv. J. Payot, Education of the Will, book iv, chap.\niv. A. Bennett, The Human Machine, chaps, VI; Mental Efficiency,\nchap. ix. In Royce's Philosophy of Loyalty, Roosevelt's Strenuous\nLife, and Gannett's Blessed be Drudgery, we get valuable notes;\nand Carlyle has many, especially ID the latter chapters of Sartor\nResartm.\n\n\n\n\nPART IV\n\n\nPUBLIC MORALITY\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIII\n\n\nPATRIOTISM AND WORLD-PEACE\n\nTHE goal of personal morality is reached with the adoption of that\nmode of life that leads to the stable and lasting happiness of the\nindividual. Such a happiness necessarily presupposes relations of\nkindness and cooperation with those other persons that form the\nimmediate environment. But it is quite compatible with a neglect of\nthose wider aspects of duty that we call public morality. The Stoics,\nthe anchorites, some communities of monks, and many a well-to-do\nrecluse today, are examples of those who have found a selfish happiness\nfor themselves without taking any hand in forwarding the general\nwelfare. Yet the greatest total good is not to be attained in any such\nway; if man is to win in his inexorable war with a hostile and grudging\nenvironment, men must march EN MASSE, must work for ends that lie\nfar beyond their personal satisfactions, for the welfare of the State and\nposterity. It is these larger, public duties that we must now consider.\nAnd it is here that our greatest stress must be laid; for these\nobligations are too easily overlooked, and toward them the contemporary\nconscience needs most sharply to be aroused. The first great public\nproblem, historically, is that of war. And theoretically it may well\ncome first, since the attainment of peace is the prerequisite of all\nother social advance. While a nation's energies are absorbed in war,\nnothing, or nearly nothing else can be done. So we turn to a\nconsideration of war; and first, of that emotion, patriotism, whose\ntraining and redirection must underlie the movement toward universal\npeace.\n\nWhat is the meaning and value of patriotism?\n\nMatthew Arnold began his famous American address on Numbers by\nquoting Dr. Johnson's saying, \"Patriotism is the last refuge of a\nscoundrel.\" We must admit that to certain forms of it the gibe is\npertinent. But in its essence, patriotism is that most useful of\nhuman possessions, an emotion that turns a duty into a joy. It is\nnecessary for men, however burdensome they may find the obligation,\nto be loyal to the interests of the State of which they are members.\nBut the patriot feels it noburden; he loves his country, and serves\nher willingly, as his privilege and glad desire. To be conscious of\nbelonging to a social group, whose interests are regarded as one's\nown, to mourn its disasters and rejoice in its successes, and give\none's hands and brains without reluctance, when needed, to its\nservice- that is patriotism. For the individual, its value is that\nit widens his sympathies, gives him new interests, stimulates his\nambition, warms his heart with a sense of brotherhood in common\nhopes and fears; the \"man without a country\" is, as Dr. Bale's story\ngraphically depicted, like a man without a home; the \"citizens of\nthe world,\" who voluntarily expatriate themselves, miss much of the\ntang of life that is tasted by him who keeps his local attachments\nand national loyalty. For the State, its value is that it welds men\ntogether, softens their civil strife, lifts them above petty\njealousies, rouses them to maintain the common weal against all\ndangers, external and internal. Especially in view of our hybrid\npopulation is it necessary to stimulate patriotism, by the\ncelebration of national anniversaries, the salutation of the flag in\nthe public schools, and whatever other means help to enlist the\nemotions on the side of civic consciousness. But while seeking to\nfoster patriotism, for its great potentialities of good, we must\nguard diligently against its lapse into forms that are really\nharmful to the community which it avowedly serves. Like every other\ngreat emotion, it needs to be controlled, developed along the lines\nof greatest usefulness, directed into proper channels. How should\npatriotism be directed and qualified?\n\n(1) Patriotism must be rationalized, so as to be an enthusiasm for\nthe really great and admirable phases of the national life. Instead\nof a pride in the prowess of army and navy, of yachts or athletes,\nit should become a pride in national efficiency and health, in the\nnational art, literature, statesmanship, and educational system, in\nthe beauty of public buildings and the standards of public manners\nand morals. It should think not so much of defending by force the\nnational \"honor,\" as of maintaining standards of honor that shall be\nworth defending. There may, indeed, still be occasions when we can\nlearn the truth of the old Roman verse, Dulce et decorum est pro patria\nmori; but the newer patriotism consists not so much in willingness\nto die as in willingness to live, for one's country-to take the trouble\nto study conditions, to vote, and to work for the improvement of\nconditions and the invigorating of the national life. The real\nanti-patriots are not the peace-men, but the selfish and unscrupulous\nmoney-makers, the idle rich, the dissolute, the ill-mannered, all those\nwho put private interest or passion above the public weal, help to\nweaken national strength and solidarity, and bring our country's name\ninto disrepute.\n\n(2) Patriotism must not merge into conceit and blind\nself-satisfaction. The superior, patronizing air of many Americans,\ntheir insufferable boasting and dogmatism, does more, perhaps, to\nprejudice foreigners against us than any other thing. We must teach\ninternational good manners, a becoming modesty, a generosity toward\nthe prejudices of others, and a recognition of our own shortcomings.\nThe blind patriotism that will not confess to any fault, that shouts,\n\"Our country, right or wrong,\" leads in the direction of arrogance,\nwrongdoing, and dishonor. We must be free to criticize our own\ngovernment; we must have no false notions about national \"honor\" such\nas were once held concerning personal \"honor\" in the days of dueling.\nWe shall doubtless be in the wrong sometimes; we must welcome\nenlightenment and try to learn the better way. Apologizing is sometimes\nnobler than bluster; and he is no true lover of his country who seeks\nto condone, and so perpetuate, her errors.\n\n(3) Patriotism must not imply a hatred of, or desire to hurt, other\ncountries. The sight of one great civilization seeking to injure\nanother is the shame of humanity. For in the end our interests are\nthe same; we should not profit by Germany's loss any more than\nConnecticut would gain by injury to Vermont. Jingoism, contempt of\nother peoples, and purely selfish diplomacy, are sinful outgrowths\nof patriotism. We must learn to be fair and good-tempered, to appreciate\nthe admirable in other nations, to thrill to their ideals, and banish\nall suspicious, sneering, or hypercritical attitudes toward them. It\nis a pity that the mass of our people get their conceptions of foreign\npeoples and rulers so largely through newspaper cartoons and caricatures,\nwhich emphasize and exaggerate their points of difference and inferiority\ninstead of revealing their power and excellence. It is a stupid\nprovinciality that conceives a distaste for foreigners because of their\nalien manners and to us uncouth language, their different dress and\nhabits. As a matter of fact, they feel as superior to us as we to them,\nand on the whole, perhaps, with as good a right. No one of the nations\nbut has some noble ideals and achievements to its credit; if we do\nnot appreciate them, we are thereby proved to be in need of what they\nhave to give. And underneath these usually superficial differences,\nwe are all just men and women, with the same loves and hatreds, the\nsame needs, the same weaknesses and repentances and aspirations. If\nwe realized our common humanity, we should try to treat them as we\nshould wish to be treated by them; the Golden Rule, the Christian spirit,\nthe method of reason and kindness, is as applicable to international\nas to inter-personal relations. We should not be too sensitive to the\ntrivial breaches of manners, the intemperate words and selfish acts\nof neighbor-nations, but make allowances and preserve our\ngood-fellowship, as we do in our personal life. We should beware of\nletting our own patriotism lead us into like misconduct. Above all,\nwe must refuse to let it lead us into the lust of conquest; we must\nrespect the rights and liberties of other peoples, keep strictly to\nour treaty obligations, honor less the patriots who have inflamed\nnational hatreds and led us to battle against other peoples than those\nwho have wrought for their country's righteousness and true honor,\nand let it be our pride to stand for international comity and good\nwill. A question that may properly be discussed here is whether it\nis permissible to shift patriotism from one country to another. Such\na change of loyalty is, in times of war, called treason, and naturally\nevokes the resentment of the deserted side. Even as impartial judges,\nwe are properly suspicious of such action, as denoting a vacillating\nnature, devoid of the true spirit of loyalty, or as indicative of a\nselfishness that follows its own personal advantage. And so far as\nthat suspicion is well founded, we must condemn the traitor. But\ncertainly, if a man experiences a sincere change of conviction, he\nshould not be required to continue to serve the side that he now feels\nto be in the wrong; every man must be free to follow his conscience,\neven if it leads him to disavow his own earlier allegiance. Suppose\nBenedict Arnold to have developed a sincere conviction that the American\nrevolutionists were in the wrong, and that the true welfare of both\nAmerica and Britain lay in their continued union. In such a case he\nmust, as a conscientious man, have transferred his allegiance to the\nTory side. So a man who has been a worker for the saloon interests,\nwho should become convinced of the anti-social influence of the liquor\ntrade, would do right to come over to the anti- saloon side and work\nagainst his former associates. The really difficult question lies\nrather here: may such a man use for the advantage of the cause he now\nserves the knowledge he gained, the secrets entrusted to him, the power\nhe won, as a worker for the opposite cause? If Benedict Arnold was\na sincere convert to the British cause, did he do right in trying to\ndeliver West Point into their hands? Or are we right in execrating\nhim for his attempted breach of trust? May the former saloon-worker\nuse his inside knowledge of the saloon men's plans, and his familiarity\nwith the business, to help the cause to which he has transferred his\nallegiance? The two cases may be closely parallel; but each will\nprobably be decided by most people according to the side upon which\nthey stand. An impartial judgment will, perhaps, condemn all breaches\nof faith, all use of delegated power for ends contrary to those for\nwhich the power was delegated, including secrets deliberately\nentrusted, but will not condemn the use for the new cause of knowledge\ngained by the individual's own observation, or influence won through\nthe power of his own personality.\n\nWhat have been the benefits of war?\n\nWar has not been an unmitigated evil. In fairness we must note the\nfollowing points:\n\n(1) In spite of its danger, and its pain, war has been a great\nexcitement and joy to men. Tennyson is doubtless true to life in making\nUlysses exclaim \"All times I have enjoyed Greatly, have suffered\ngreatly. . . And drunk delight of battle with my peers, Far on the\nringing plains of windy Troy. How dull it is to pause, to make an end,\nAs though to breathe were life!\"\n\nIn the Iliad, indeed, we read: \"With everything man is satiated, sleep,\nsweet singing, and the joyous dance; of all these man gets sooner tired\nthan of war.\" In primitive times, and even, though decreasingly, in\nmodern times, the cause of war has lain not merely in the ends to be\nattained thereby, but in the sheer love of war for its own sake-the\nquickened heartbeats, the sense of power and daring and achievement,\nthe joy in martial music and uniforms, in the rhythmic footsteps of\nmarching men, in the awakened thrill of patriotism, the love of effort\nand sacrifice for a cherished cause.\n\nTo some extent this primitive lure of war still persists. But,\nfortunately, the glory and excitement of hand-to-hand conflict, the\npicturesque valor and visible achievement of earlier battles, are now\ngone. The soldier is but a cog in a machine, usually at a considerable\ndistance from his enemy. He does not know whether his shot has hit\nor not; if he is wounded it is by an invisible hand. All the strain\nand fatigue and pain of war remain, but little of its glory and delight.\nMoreover, whatever normal satisfaction has been found in war can be\nhad, as we shall presently note, in other ways- in all sorts of\ngenerous rivalries and useful as well as exciting endeavors that are\nopen to the modern man.\n\n(2) War has necessitated discipline, organization, courage, self-\nsacrifice, and has thus been a great stimulus to virtues which to some\nextent have carried over into other fields. It has kept men from\nsinking into inertia or mere pleasure seeking, fostered energy and\nhardihood, quieted civil strife, taught the necessity of union and\njustice at home. The patriotism awakened by struggle against a common\nenemy has often persisted when the conflict was over, given birth to\nart and history, and many an act of devotion to the State.\nBut national solidarity and a regime of justice within the State are\nnow our stable possession, while the hardier and heroic virtues can\nbe awakened in other and less disastrous ways. War has ceased to have\nits former usefulness as a spur to personal and social morality.\n\n(3) Wars of self-defense have often been necessary, to preserve goods\nthat would have been lost by conquest; as when the Greeks at Marathon\nrepelled the barbaric hordes of Asia, or when Charles Martel and the\nFranks checked the advance of the Saracens at Tours. Offensive wars,\neven, may have been necessary to wipe out evils, such as slavery or\nthe oppression of neighboring peoples. But in modern times the moral\njustification of war on such grounds has usually been a flimsy pretext;\nand certainly the occasion for legitimate warfare is becoming steadily\nrarer. Nearly always the good aimed at could have been attained without\nthe evils of war. If the American colonies had had a little more\npatience, they could have won the liberty they craved without war and\nseparation from the mother country-as Canada and Australia have done.\nIf the United States had had a little more patience and tact and\ndiplomacy, it is probable that Cuba could have been saved from the\nintolerable oppression of Spain without war. Now that the moral\npressure of the world's opinion is becoming so strong, and the Hague\ntribunal stands ready to adjust difficulties, there is seldom excuse\nfor recourse to brute strength. The real cause of war lies far less\noften in the moral demand that prefers righteousness to peace than\nin the touchiness, selfishness, and resentments of nations, or their\ndesire for glory and conquest.\n\n(4) War has, directly or indirectly, been the means of spreading the\nblessings of civilization. Alexander's campaigns brought Greek culture\nto the Eastern world, the Roman conquests civilized the West, the\nfamous Corniche Road was built by Napoleon to get his troops into\nItaly, the trans-Siberian railway, the subsidized steamship lines of\nmodern nations, the Panama Canal, owe their existence primarily to\nthe fear of war. But today all lands are open to peaceful penetration;\nmissionaries and traders do more to civilize than armies. And if the\nbuilding of certain roads and railways and canals might have been\nsomewhat postponed in an era of stable peace, many more material\nimprovements, actually more imperative if less spectacular, would\ncertainly have been carried out with the vast sums of money saved from\nwar expenditures. Whatever good ends, then, war may have served in\nthe past, it is now superfluous, a mere survival of savagery, a relic\nof our barbaric past, a clear injury to man, in ways which we shall\nnext consider.\n\nWhat are the evils of war?\n\n(1) We need not dwell on the physical and mental suffering caused by\nwar; General Sherman's famous declaration, \"War is hell!\" sums the\nmatter up. Agonizing wounds, pitiless disease, the permanent crippling,\nenfeeblement, or death of vigorous men in the prime of life, the\nanguish of wives and sweethearts, the loneliness of widows, the lack\nof care for orphans-it is impossible for those who have not lived through\na great war to realize the horror of it, the cruel pain suffered by\nthose on the field, the torturing suspense of those left behind. It\nis, indeed, a sad commentary on man's wisdom that, with all the distress\nthat inevitably inheres in human life, he should have voluntarily\nbrought upon himself still greater suffering and premature death.\n\n(2) But the moral harm of war is no less conspicuous than the physical.\nIt fosters cruelty, callousness, contempt of life; it kills sympathy\nand the gentler virtues; it coarsens and leads almost inevitably to\nsensuality. After a war there is always a marked increase in crime\nand sexual vice; ex-soldiers are restless, and find it hard to settle\ndown to a normal life. There is a permanent coarsening of fiber. Even\nthe maintenance of armies in time of peace is a great moral danger.\nThe unnatural barrack-life, the requisite postponement of marriage,\nthe opportunity for physical and moral contagion, make military posts\ncommonly sources of moral contamination. Prostitution flourishes and\nillegitimacy increases where soldiers are quartered; the army is a\nbad school of morals.\n\nAdd to this indictment the stimulus to national hatreds caused by war,\nthe inflaming of resentments and checking of international good will.\nFrenchmen still nourish a bitter animosity against the Germans for\nthe possession of Alsace and the occupation of Paris. The instinctive\nracial antipathies of the Balkan peoples have been immeasurably\ndeepened by the recent wars on the peninsula. The eventual brotherhood\nof man is indefinitely postponed by every war and by every rumor of\nwar.\n\nThe interest in war also takes attention and effort away from the\nremedying of social and moral evils; it is useless to attempt any moral\ncampaign while a war is on. Jane Addams tells us, in Twenty Years at\nHull House, that when she visited England in 1896 she found it full\nof social enthusiasm, scientific research, scholarship, and public\nspirit; while on a second visit, in 1900, all enthusiasm and energy\nseemed to be absorbed by the Boer War, leaving little for humanitarian\nundertakings.\n\n(3) A less obvious, but even more lasting, evil is that caused by the\nloss of the best blood of a nation. In general, the strongest and best\nmen go to the field; the weaklings and cowards are left to produce\nthe next generation. The inevitable result is racial degeneration.\nThe decline of the Greek and Roman civilizations was doubtless in large\npart due to the continual killing off of the best stocks, until the\nearlier and nobler breed of men almost ceased to exist. The effect\nof modern war is the exact opposite of that of primitive war, where\nall the men had to fight, and the strongest or bravest or swiftest\nsurvived; strength and valor and speed avail nothing against modern\nprojectiles, and it is the stay-at-homes who are selected for survival,\nin general the weakest and least worthy. War is the greatest of\ndysgenic forces, and undoes the effect of a hundred eugenic laws.\n\n(4) The vast and increasing expense of war is a very serious matter\nfor the moralist, because it means a drain of the resources that might\notherwise be utilized for the advance of civilization. The cost of\na modern war goes at least into the hundreds of millions of dollars,\nand any great war would cost billions. Every shot from a modern sixteen\ninch gun costs approximately a thousand dollars! Add to this direct\ncost the indirect costs of war, not reckoned in the usual figures-the\nloss of the time and work of the hundreds of thousands of able-bodied\nmen, the economic loss of their illness and death, the destruction\nof buildings, bridges, railways, etc, the obstruction of commerce,\nthe paralysis of industry and agriculture, the ravages and looting\nof armies, the maintenance of hospitals and nurses, and then, finally,\nthe money given in pensions.[Footnote: The recent Balkan war is reckoned\nto have cost nearly half a million men killed or permanently disabled,\na billion and a half dollars of direct] Add further the cost of the\nexpenditure, besides many billions of indirect expense. The colossal\nEuropean war just beginning as these pages go to press bids fair to\ncost immeasurably more aintenance of armies upon a peace-footing-the\nfeeding and clothing of the men, the building and maintenance of barracks\nand forts, of battleships and torpedo boats, of guns and ammunition,\nautomobiles, aeroplanes, and the increasing list of expensive modern\nmilitary appurtenances. Europe spends nearly two billion dollars a year\nin times of peace on its armies and navies-money enough to build four\nor five Panama canals annually. The entire merchant marine of the world\nis worth but three billion dollars. More than this, over four million\nstrong young men are kept under arms in Europe, a million more workers\nare engaged in making ships, weapons, gunpowder, military stores. Over\na million horses are kept for army use. This money and these men, if\nused in the true interests of humanity, could quickly provide adequate\nand comfortable housing for every European, adequate schooling,\nclothing, and food for every one. Here is the great criminal waste\nof our times. In America our waste is less flagrant, but it is steadily\nincreasing. We throw away money enough in these fratricidal\npreparations to cover the country with excellent roads in short order,\nor give every child a high school education.\n\nIn a way, however, the rapidly growing cost of war and preparation\nfor war is to be welcomed. For it is this that is creating, more than\nall our moral propaganda, a rising sentiment against war, and will\npresently make it impossible. When the German militarists became\nexcited over the Morocco incident in 1911, a financial panic ensued,\ncredit was withdrawn, pockets were touched, and a great protest arose\nwhich did much to quench the jingo spirit. Japan was induced to sign\nher treaty of peace with Russia because her money was giving out.\nTurkey was unable, in the winter of 1913-14, to renew war with Greece\nfor the Aegean Islands, because she could not raise a loan till she\npromised peace. The growing international financial network, and the\nrevolt of the taxpayers against the incessant draining of their\npocketbooks, promise a change for the better in European militarism\nbefore very long.\n\nWhat can we do to hasten world-peace?\n\nThere are powerful forces, which without our conscious effort are\nmaking for the abolition of war: its growing cost; the extension of\nmutual knowledge, through the newspapers and magazines, through travel,\nthrough exchange professorships and Rhodes scholarships and all\ninternational associations; the growing sensitiveness to suffering;\nthe spread of eugenic ideals; and the increasing interest in worldwide\nsocial, moral, and material problems. But the epoch of final peace\nfor man can be greatly accelerated by means which we may now note.\n\n(1) We may stimulate counter-enthusiasms to take the place of the\npassion for war. After all, the great war of mankind is the war against\npain, disease, poverty, and sin; the real heroes are not those who\nsquander human strength and courage in fighting one another, but those\nwho fight for man against his eternal foes. The war of man against\nman is dissension in the ranks. We must make it seem more glorious\nto men to enlist in these humanitarian campaigns than in the miserable\ncivil wars that impede our common triumphs. [Footnote: Cf. Perry, Moral\nEconomy, p. 32; \"War between man and man is an obsolescent form of\nheroism. . . . The general battle of life, the first and last battle,\nis still on; and it has that in it of danger and resistance, of\ncomradeship and of triumph, that can stir the blood.\" And cf. President\nEliot's fine eulogy of Dr. Lazear, who died of yellow fever after\nvoluntarily undergoing inoculation by a mosquito, in the attempt to\nlearn how to stay the disease: \" With more than the courage and]\nFurther, we should awaken interest in innocent devotion of the soldier,\nhe risked and lost his life to show how a fearful pestilence is\ncommunicated and how its ravages may be prevented.\"] excitements and\nrivalries-in sports, in industrial competition, in missionary\nenterprise. A world's series in baseball, or an intercollegiate\nfootball season, can work off the restless energies of many thousands\nwho in earlier days would have lusted for war. The revival of the\nOlympic games was definitely planned as a substitute for war. And men\nmust have not only excitements and rivalries, but real difficulties\nand dangers-something to try their courage and endurance and train\nthem in hardihood. For this we have exploration and mountaineering,\nthe prosecution of difficult engineering undertakings, the attacking\nof corruption and the achievement of political and social reforms.\n[Footnote: Cf. W. James, \"The Moral Equivalent of War\" (in Memories\nand Studies), p. 287: \"We must make new energies and hardihood's continue\nthe manliness to which the military mind so faithfully clings. Martial\nvirtues must be the enduring cement, intrepidity, contempt of softness,\nsurrender of private interest, obedience to command, must still remain\nthe rock upon which states are built. The martial type of character\ncan be bred without war. The only thing needed henceforward is\nto inflame the civic temper as past history has inflamed the military\ntemper.\"]\n\n(2) We may spread popular knowledge of the evils of war. It is\nincredible that this barbarous method of deciding disputes could be\ncontinued if the people generally had a lively realization of its cost\nin pain, money, and degradation. Already many societies exist for the\ndiffusion of literature on the matter, [Footnote: And of course for\nother work in the direction of peace. The oldest such organization\nin this country is the American Peace Society. The Association for\nInternational Conciliation, founded in Paris by Baron d' Estournelles\nde Constant, in 1899, has branches now in all the important countries.\nLately we have Mr. Carnegie's endowments for international peace]\nconscientious editors of journals and newspapers use their columns\nfor peace propaganda, public schools teach children the evils of war,\nministers use their pulpits to denounce it. All this, effort must be\npushed in greater degree until a general public sentiment is aroused\nthat will insist on the peaceful settlement of all international\ndifficulties.\n\n(3) Indirectly, too, education and association can make war more and\nmore unlikely. We can create a greater knowledge of and sympathy with\nother nations. We can to considerable extent train out pugnacity, quick\ntemper, resentfulness, and train in sensitiveness to suffering,\nsympathy, breadth of view. All such moral progress helps in the war\nagainst war. We can encourage the interchange of professors and\nscientists between countries, increase the number of professional and\nindustrial international organizations. The International Socialist\nparty, with its threatened weapon of the general strike against war,\nmay actually prove to be- whether we like it or not the most efficient\nof all forces. The International Federation of Students (Corda ratres),\nfounded at Turin in 1898, with its branches in all civilized countries,\nmay be of great use. A censorship of the press to exclude all\njingoistic and inflammatory utterances may at times be necessary. It\nis even questionable whether uniforms and martial music ought not to\nbe banished for a while, until the habit of peaceful settlement becomes\nfixed.\n\n(4) Politically, we must make our public policies so high and unselfish\nthat other nations cannot justly take offense. Most wars are provoked\nby national greed or selfishness, lack of manners, or the breaking\nof treaty obligations. The United States, it must be confessed, has\nto some extent lost the respect and trust of other nations for its\nhigh- handed methods and disregard of treaties. Congress is allowed\nto modify or abrogate any treaty without consultation with the other\nnation involved; and we have what many critics deem acts of grave\ndishonor upon our record. [Footnote: For example, the recent abrogation\nof our long-standing treaty with Russia, without her consent, which\nhas forfeited her friendship; or what seemed to many the violation\nof our treaty-promise to England by Congress in its exemption, now\nrepealed, of American coastwise shipping from canal tolls. It would\nbe well to engrave over the entrance to the Capitol the Psalmist's\nwords: \"He that sweareth to his own hurt and changeth not.\"] ways we\nhave needlessly offended and insulted other nations. The voter must\nwatch the conduct of parties and work to elect men who, refraining\nfrom provoking other nations, will aim for peace.\n\n(5) Practical steps in the direction of peace may be mentioned. Most\nimportant are arbitration treaties. They must be made binding, and\nmade to apply to all matters; the loophole which permits a nation to\nrefuse to arbitrate a matter which it believes to involve its \"honor\"\npractically invalidates the treaty altogether, as every matter in\ndispute may be so construed. Alliances in which one country agrees\nto help another if the latter has agreed to arbitrate a matter and\nits enemy has refused, may be of great value. Treaties that guarantee\nexisting boundaries and bind a nation not to extend its territory are\nuseful, even if there is no adequate method as yet of enforcing such\nguaranties. The question whether we shall increase or decrease our\narmy and navy is hotly disputed. The United States might well lead\nthe way in disarmament, since the oceans that separate us from Europe\nand Asia are a better protection than forts or fleets, and no nation\nhas enough to gain by fighting us to make it worth the cost. With the\ngreat European nations the case is different, and disarmament will\nprobably have to come by mutual agreement. The only valid reason for\nan American army and navy lies in the power they give us to protect\nour citizens abroad, or to protect our weaker neighbors against foreign\naggression. Perhaps until there is formed an international army and\nnavy, it will be necessary for the most civilized and pacific nations\nto keep armed, since the less scrupulous nations would remain armed\nand acquire the balance of power. But the contention that a great\narmament is the best guaranty of peace is untrue, for two reasons:\nit is an inevitable provocation to other nations to match it with other\ngreat armaments; and the very existence of battleships and weapons\ncreates a temptation to use them. The professional soldier is always\neager to see active service, to prove his efficiency, have excitement,\nwin glory and advancement. As the Odyssey puts it, \"The steel blade\nitself often incites to deeds of violence.\"\n\n(6) The ultimate solution for international difficulties must, of\ncourse, be world organization. The beginnings of an international court\nwe have already, the outcome of the first two Hague Conferences, in\n1899 and 1907. It must be given greater powers, and backed up by an\ninternational executive, legislature, and police. Perhaps the police\nwill be the combined armies of the world put at the service of\ninternational justice. This \"parliament of nations, federation of the\nworld\" is not a Utopian dream; it is hardly a greater step than that\nby which savage tribes, or the thirteen States of North America, or\nthe South African and Australian States, became welded into nations.\nIt is to be remembered that the wager of battle was the original method\nof settling private disputes; and even when trial by jury was authorized,\nthe older form of settlement persisted long-being legally abolished\nin England only as late as 1819. Similarly, the peaceful settlement\nof international disputes will doubtless before many generations become\nso universal that it will be difficult for our grandchildren or great-\ngrandchildren to realize that as late as early in the twentieth century\nthe most civilized nations still had recourse to the old and barbarous\nwager of battle.\n\nH. Spencer, \"Patriotism,\", \" Rebarbarization\" (in Facts and Comments).\nG. K. Chesterton, \"Patriotism\" (in The Defendant). G. Santayana, Reason\nin Society, chap. VII. Outlook, vol. 92, p. 317; vol. 90, p. 534.\nInternational Journal of Ethics, vol. 16, p. 472. The American\nAssociation for International Conciliation (Sub-Station 84, New York\nCity) sends free literature on request. A bibliography of peace\nliterature will be found in their pamphlet No. 64. E. L. Godkin,\n\"Peace\" (in Reflections and Comments). W. James, \"Speech at the Peace\nBanquet,\" and \"The Moral Equivalent of War\" (in Memories and Studies').\nJane Addams, Newer Ideals of Peace, chaps. I, VII; The Arbiter in\nCouncil. J. Novicow, War and its Alleged Benefits. N. Angell, The Great\nIllusion. W. J. Tucker, The New Movement of Humanity. V. L. Kellogg,\nBeyond War, chap. I. D. S. Jordan, War and Waste. R. C. Morris,\nInternational Arbitration and Procedure. International Journal of\nEthics, vol. 22, p. 127. World's Work, vol. 20, p. 13318; vol. 21,\np. 14128. Independent, vol. 77, p. 396. Outlook, vol. 86, pp. 137,\n145; vol. 83, p. 376; vol. 84, p. 29; vol. 98, p. 59. Hibbert\nJournal, vol. 12, p. 105.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIV\n\n\nPOLITICAL PURITY\n\nAND EFFICIENCY THE attainment of a stable peace is the first public\nduty; the second is the achievement of an efficient government. Where\npolitics are corrupt and inefficient all social progress is obstructed;\nand all such ideals of a reshaped human society as the Socialists yearn\ntoward must be postponed until we have learned to run the machinery\nof government smoothly and effectively. The backward condition of peoples\nwhose government is unintelligent needs no examples. The Russo-Japanese\nWar brought into sharp contrast a nation of limitless resources and\nfine human stock handicapped and crippled by a selfish bureaucracy,\nand a much smaller nation, inexperienced and remote from the great\nworld currents, but strengthened and made efficient by an intelligent\nand patriotic administration. In Persia and Mesopotamia we find poverty,\nignorance, desert, where once flourished mighty empires: bad government\nis the cause. Greece and Italy and Egypt are struggling to recover\nfrom centuries of misgovernment. In this country government has been\nfar wiser and more responsive to the community's needs; and yet the\napathy of the intelligent public and the intrusion of private greed\nhave distorted and obstructed legislation until social reformers throw\nup their hands in despair. But there are hopeful signs. The causes\nof this political mismanagement are being more generally recognized\ntoday, and it is probable that the next few decades will witness great\nstrides toward improving the mechanism of American government and\nbanishing corruption.\n\nWhat are the forces making for corruption in politics?\n\n(1) By one means or other, unscrupulous rulers and officeholders have\nalways been able to replenish their private income by misuse of their\nofficial powers. Since popular government was first tried there has\nexisted a class of professional politicians with little regard for\nthe public welfare and ready to do anything to keep themselves in power\nand fatten their pocketbooks. We have in America the well-known phenomena\nof the \"machine,\" the \"ring,\" and the \"boss,\" whose motto is \"Politics\nis politics,\" and who are unashamed to put their interests above those\nof the people at large. Their control of the machinery of government\nenables them, unless ingenious provisions prevent, to wink at illegal\nvoting and fraudulent counting of votes, to get the dregs of the\npopulation out to the polls, and perhaps intimidate their opponents\nfrom voting. The police power has often been misused for such purposes;\nthe gerrymander is another clever method of manipulating the results\nof elections. Such means, together with the use as bribe money of funds\ndeflected from the public treasury, the blackmail of vice, and the\nacceptance of \"contributions\" from favored parties, create a vicious\ncircle which tends to keep in power corrupt officials who have once\ngot hold.\n\n(2) But the power of unscrupulous politicians is made far greater by\nthe support of those whose personal interests they make a business\nof furthering. Whole sections of the people are pleased and placated\nand bribed by special legislation in their favor, and as many individuals\nas possible are given positions. Behind every \"boss\" there are always\nhundreds of men who owe their \"jobs\" to him, and many others who\ncherish promises and hopes for personal favors. Jane Addams tells us\nthat upon one occasion when the reformers in Chicago tried to oust\na corrupt alderman they \"soon discovered that approximately one out\nof every five voters in the nineteenth ward at that time held a job\ndependent upon the good will of the alderman.\" [Footnote: Twenty Years\nat Hull House, p. 316.]\n\n(3) Of especial importance are the great \"interests\" that are always\nto be found behind a corrupt administration. These corporations are\nso dependent upon the good will of the Government for their prosperity,\nand even for their very existence, that from the primitive instinct\nof self-preservation as well as from the greed of exorbitant profits,\nthey stand ready to give liberal bribes, or at least to back with money\nand moral support the party machine that promises to favor them. They\ncontrol a large proportion of the newspapers and magazines, and are\nthus able to distort facts, protect themselves from attack, and even\nstir up a factitious distrust of would-be reformers. As every little\ncontractor naturally favors the \"ring\" that awards contracts to him,\nso the great corporations publicly or secretly support it. The liquor\ntrade and the vice caterers-the keepers of gambling dens, illegal\n\"shows,\" and disorderly houses-back by their money and votes the\n\"machine\" that they know will let them alone. But, indeed, the most\n\"respectable\" trusts and public-service corporations are often most\nculpable, and the greatest power behind the throne. Their interest\nin the personnel of the Government is far keener than that of the average\ncitizen; they can usually succeed, by cleverly specious presentations\nof the situation, in dividing the forces against them, and often, by\n\"deals,\" in effecting secret alliances of the \"rings\" in control of\nsupposedly opposing parties. The poor are right in supposing that these\npowerful \"interests\" are their greatest enemy; as that keen observer\nof our national life, Mr. Bryce, has put it, \"the power of money is\nfor popular governments the most constant source of danger.\"\n\n(4) But, after all, this combination of forces in defiance of the\ncommon weal would not be effective but for the comparative indifference\nof the people, which may thus be called a contributing factor. The\naverage voter feels no stimulus of self-interest in the matter; \"what\nis everybody's business is nobody's business,\" and the individual finds\nhis personal influence so slight that it seems hardly worth his pains\nto do anything about it. Occasionally popular passions become aroused\nand reform movements make a clean sweep; but the result is usually\ntemporary, and when the general attention is turned elsewhere the\nbosses creep back to power. Modern life has so many more personal\ninterests in it than the ancient republics had, that public affairs\nseldom become so big and absorbing an interest. And the more public\naffairs become the concern of a special group of men with dubious\nreputations, the more politics are shunned by the average citizen.\nHome life and business, social life and amusements, aesthetic,\nintellectual, and religious interests, are so much more attractive\nto him, that he gives little heed to political conditions, lets himself\nbe duped by newspaper talk, and votes blindly some party ticket, without\nrealizing his gullibility and his poor citizenship.\n\nWhat are the evil results of political corruption?\n\n(1) The obvious result of these conditions is inefficiency of\nadministration and waste of the public moneys. The real interests of\ncity or State are neglected. Streets become filthy, unsanitary\ntenements are built, firetrap factories and theaters allowed; every\neffort to improve public health is sidetracked, and the will of the\npeople is subordinated to the will of the gang. Officials are nominated\nor appointed not for their competence but for their subservience to\nthe organization; the boss himself, inexpert in administration,\nresponsible to no one, and usually bribable, dictates public policy.\nThe public funds disappear as in a quicksand; extravagant prices are\npaid for building lots and contracts, in return for political support\nor a share of the loot. Philadelphia before the reform movement of\n1911 borrowed fifty-one million dollars in four years, and at the end\nhad practically nothing to show for it, with the city dirty, buildings\nout of repair, and everything important neglected. One contractor in\nthe \"ring\" was paid $520,000 a year to remove the city garbage-a\nprivilege which is actually paid for in some cities, the value of the\ngarbage for fertilizer and the manufacture of other products making\nthe collection of it a profitable business.\n\n(2) Another evil result lies in the subordination of general to local\ninterests. The scattered and ineffective \"pork-barrel\" appropriations\nof Congress are dictated not by intelligent consideration for the\npublic weal, but by the desire to throw a sop to this and that section\nof the country, and thereby win votes. Costly buildings are authorized\nin many towns where they are not needed, river and harbor improvements\nproceed at a halting pace in a hundred places at once, unnecessary\nnavy yards and custom houses are maintained at heavy cost, the army\nis scattered at many small and expensive posts. Even the tariff is\nlargely a deal between various manufacturing interests, rather than\nan instrument of the public good. Most officials consider themselves\nbound to exert all their influence in favor of their particular\nconstituency's desires; if they cross those wishes they will probably\nnot be reelected, while if they sacrifice the interests of the people\nas a whole they will be immune from punishment. Most of the state\nuniversities, normal schools, asylums, and other institutions have\nbeen located where they are as the result of a deal between different\nsections rather than with a view to the most advantageous site.\n\n(3) To these grave evils we must add the moral harm of selfish and\ncorrupt politics. Standards of honor are blurred, the spirit of public\nservice is almost lost sight of, and the cheap materialism to which\nour prosperous age is too easily prone flourishes apace. The man who\nwould succeed in politics-unless he is a man of extraordinary personality\nand favored by good fortune-must be disingenuous and a time-server,\nmust truckle to bosses and do favors for the ring; he must appeal to\nprejudice and passion and put his personal advancement before his\nideals. No one can estimate the evil effect that corruption in politics\nhas had upon the national character. When we add the indirect effects-\nthe distortion of the public news-service, the protection of vice,\nthe insecurity of justice-the moral evils of political corruption are\nseen to be of gravest importance.\n\nWhat is the political duty of the citizen?\n\n(1) In the present chaotic state of our machinery of government, where\ncorruption is so easy and efficiency so difficult to obtain, the burden\nmust rest upon every conscientious voter to play his part with\nintelligence. He must study the situation, keep himself informed as\nto candidates and issues, watch the conduct of officials, vote at\nprimaries and elections, however irksome and fruitless this effort\nmay seem. Above all, he must use independence of judgment, and not\nlet himself be duped by disingenuous appeals to \"party loyalty\"; where\nblind party voting is prevalent there is little stimulus to party\nmanagers to nominate able and honorable men or to promote needed\nlegislation. Public opinion must be kept aroused, the sense of\nindividual responsibility awakened, and political matters kept in the\nglare of publicity. At election times whoever can spare the time\nshould, after learning the local situation, take some part in the\ncampaign, by public speaking, personal soliciting of is a shame that\nthe peaceable home-loving citizen should have to be dragged into this\nbusiness of politics, which ought to be\nleft to experts to manage; but at present there seems no help for it\nin most communities.\n\n(2) An important service lies in joining or forming local branches\nof the leagues which now exist for the pushing of specific political\nmeasures, for the investigation and publication of impartial records\nof candidates, or for the investigation of the expenditures and results\nof administrations. Under the first head we may classify, for example,\nthe National Short Ballot Organization; under the second head the Good\nGovernment Association, that makes it its business to send to each\nvoter in a community a printed statement of the past history of each\ncandidate for office, including the record of his vote on important\nmatters; under the third head there are the Bureaus of Municipal\nResearch. The New York Bureau, incorporated in 1907, conducts a yearly\nbudget exhibit that shows graphically what is being done with the money\nraised by taxation. Inefficiency and corruption are ferreted out, waste\nis demonstrated, suggestions are made for economy, for the improvement\nof administration in every detail, and the amelioration of evil social\nconditions. By its determined publicity it can do much to energize\nand modernize city government. [Footnote: Cf. World's Work, vol. 23,\np. 683. National Municipal Review, vol. 2. p. 48.]\n\n(3) The outlook for clean and public-spirited young men, with expert\nknowledge and ideals, who wish to enter a political career, is\ngradually becoming more encouraging. The reformer in politics must\nbe not merely an idealist, but a man who can do things. He must show\nhis constituents that reform government serves them better than the\nringsters. Reform tactics have too often been negative; stopped, but\nno positive measures for social welfare have been passed. To be\nsuccessful, a politician must show the people that he understands and\nis able to satisfy their needs. More effective than any moral house-\ncleaning in securing the tenure of an administration is its efficiency\nin promoting better living and working conditions, improving\nopportunities for recreation and education, or loosening the clutch\nof the predatory \"interests.\" Moreover, the politician must be a good\nmixer, willing to work with those who do not share his idealism, good-\nnatured and conciliatory, ready to postpone the accomplishment of much\nthat he has at heart in order to get something done. As organization\nis in most matters necessary for effectiveness, he must usually work\nwith a party, do a lot of distasteful detail work, and make compromises\nfor the sake of agreements. Happily, the Progressive party has made\nan out- and-out stand for the application of morals to politics; and\nthe growing movement in the cities toward seeking experts to manage\ntheir affairs gives hope that the way will soon be generally open for\nmen of scientific training and high ideals in political life.\n\nWhat legislative checks to corruption are possible?\n\nIt is, of course, an unnatural situation when the ordinary citizen\nhas to spend a lot of time and effort if he would guard against being\nmisgoverned. He ought to be able to tend to his own affairs and leave\nthe machinery of government to those who have been trained to it and\nwhose business it is. And while no political mechanism will ever wholly\nrun itself, without watchfulness on the part of the people, experience\nshows clearly that it is possible by a wise system to make corruption\nmuch more difficult and more easily checked. We Americans are beginning\nto awake from our complacent self-gratulation and realize that our\npolitical machinery is clumsy and antiquated and a standing invitation\nto inefficiency. The discussion of the relative advantages of\nlegislative schemes belongs to the science of government rather than\nto ethics; but their bearing upon public morality is so important that\ncertain typical movements must be explained. The stages by which the\nadvanced form of popular government which we have now attained has\nbeen reached need not, for our purposes, be considered-the extension\nof suffrage to the masses, government by representatives, registration\nlaws, the secret ballot, and the like. We need only discuss several\nreforms now being agitated and tried, whose aim is to make government\nmore responsive to the real wishes and needs of the people, and more\ndifficult of usurpation by selfish interests.\n\nI. We may first speak of several reforms whose aim is to improve our\nmechanism of election, in order that merit, rather than \"pull,\" shall\nlead to office, and that officials shall represent the people rather\nthan the political rings. It is not generally true that good and able\nmen are unwilling to accept public office; what they are unwilling\nto do is to truckle to bosses, to do all the questionable things that\nwill keep them in with the ring, or to spend large sums of money in\nadvertising their claims to the public. So thoroughly have political\nmachines entrenched themselves that it is often practically useless\nfor any one to oppose the machine candidate. Appointees receive their\npositions for \"political services\" rendered, or in return for a\n\"campaign contribution\" for which they may hope to recoup themselves\nwhen in office. To destroy utterly this political \"graft\" will be\nimpossible until human nature becomes more generally moralized; but\nto render it more difficult and less common is the purpose of a number\nof measures, of which we may mention the following:\n\n(1) CIVIL SERVICE LAWS. These require appointments to\noffice, made by officials, to be made on the basis of competitive\nexaminations which shall test the ability and knowledge of the\napplicants. By this means, within a generation, tens of thousands of\npositions have been put beyond the reach of spoilsmen, and men of worth\nhave replaced political henchmen. Instead of a great overturn with\nevery new political regime, the man who has now fairly won his position\nretains it for life, except in case of proved inefficiency. The quality\nof the public service has been immeasurably improved, the subservience\nof office-holders to political chiefs abolished. [Footnote: See\nAtlantic Monthly, vol. 113, p. 270. National Municipal Review, vol.\n1, p. 654; vol. 3, p. 316.] But there are still many thousands of offices\nthat have not been brought within the civil service, and there are\ncontinual attempts on the part of politicians to withdraw from it this\nor that class of appointments, that they may have \"plums\" to offer\ntheir constituents. To the most important positions the civil service\nmethod is, however, inapplicable; imagine a President having to appoint\nas his Secretary of State the man who passed the best examination in\ndiplomacy! So many other considerations affect the availability of\na man for such posts that the elected officials must be given a free\nhand in their choice and held responsible therefore to the people.\nThese important appointees will be enough in the public eye to make\nit usually expedient for the career of the appointers that they pick\nreasonably honest and able men-especially if the recall (of which we\nshall presently speak) is in operation.\n\n(2) The short ballot. As our government has grown more and more\ncomplex, the number of officials for whom the citizen must vote has\nincreased, with the result that he has to decide in many cases among\nrival candidates about none of whom he knows anything definitely. For\nfour or five offices he can be fairly expected the merits of the\ncandidates in the field; but to investigate or remember the relative\nmerits and demerits of a score or more is more than the average voter\nwill do. So he may \"scratch\" his party's candidate for governor or\nmayor, but usually votes the \"straight ticket\" for the minor officials.\nThis works too well into the hands of the political machines. The\nobvious remedy is to give him only a few officers to vote for and to\nrequire the remaining offices to be filled by appointment instead of\nelection.\n\nBy this method, not only is the voter saved from needless confusion\nand enabled to concentrate his attention upon the few big offices,\nbut the responsibility for misgovernment is far more clearly fixed,\nand the possibility of remedying it made much easier. If a dozen state\nofficials are elected, the average citizen is uncertain who is to blame\nfor inefficiency; each official shoves the responsibility on to the\nothers' shoulders, and it is not plain what can be done except to\ndepose them all, one by one. If a governor only is elected, and is\nrequired to appoint his subordinates, the entire blame rests upon his\nshoulders. If dishonesty or misadministration is discovered, he must\ntake the shame; he may be recalled from office if he is not quick\nenough in removing the guilty man and remedying the evil.\n\nFurther, the right to choose his own subordinates makes the work of\nthe chief much easier, brings a unity of purpose into an administration\nwhich is likely to be absent when a number of different men,\nsimultaneously elected, perhaps representing different parties, have\nto work together. The increased power and responsibility of the chief\noffices attract able men, men of ideals and training, who do not care\nfor an office whose power is limited by that of various machine\npoliticians who, they know, will hamper them on every side in their\nefforts for efficient administration. And, apart from this\nconsideration, a man able enough to win election as governor is a far\nbetter judge of the men best fitted for the various technical duties\nthat fall to his subordinates than is the general public. Experience\nshows that the men chosen by chiefs who are elected and held\nresponsible to the people are generally abler than those elected to\nthe same positions by popular vote.\n\nThe present movement toward a short ballot, with responsibility clearly\ndenned and concentrated, will doubtless do away ultimately with the\nclumsy systems by which both States and cities in this country are\nnow governed-the two-chambered legislatures, with their inevitable\nfriction betwixt themselves and with the executive. This method of\nchecks and counter-checks was thought necessary as a safeguard against\ntyranny, the bugbear of our forefathers, but is now the enemy of\nefficiency and the haunt of corruption. The much simpler commission\nform of government, which, originating in Galveston and Des Moines\na few years ago, has already, at date of writing, been adopted by over\nthree hundred cities, substitutes for the usual executive and legislative\nbranches a small group of elected officials - commonly five-who, with\nthe aid of appointed subordinates, carry on the whole business of the\ncity. Some such plan may eventually be adopted for states, and even\nfor the national government. [Footnote: R. S. Childs, Short Ballot\nPrinciples, Story of the Short Ballot Cities. C. A. Beard, Loose Leaf\nDigest of Short Ballot Charters. Free literature of the National Short\nBallot Organization (383 Fourth Avenue, New York City). C. R. Woodruff,\nCity Government by Commission. E. S. Bradford, Com- mission Government\nin American Cities. National Municipal Review, vol. 1, pp. 40, 170, 372,\n562; vol. 2, p. 661. The American City, vol. 9, p. 236. Outlook, vol. 92,\npp. 635, 829; vol. 99, p. 362. Forum, vol. 51, p. 354.]\n\n(3) Direct primaries. Experience has conclusively shown\nthat the caucus system of making nominations for office plays directly\ninto the hands of the machine; its practical result has been that the\nvoter is usually restricted in his nominees of the bosses and the\n\"interests.\" The direct primary gives the independent candidate his\nopportunity, and makes it more practicable for honest citizens to\ndetermine between what candidates the final choice shall lie. It\nimplies effort on the part of the candidate to make himself known to\nthe voters; but such effort there must always be, unless the candidate\nis already a conspicuous figure, in order that the citizen may have\ngrounds for his decision. It has in some places led to an exorbitant\nexpenditure for self-advertisement; but this expenditure can be pretty\nwell controlled by legislation. The argument that it does away with\nthe deliberation possible in a caucus wears the aspect of a joke, in\nview of the sort of deliberation the caucus has in practice encouraged;\nand discussion does, of course, take place in the public press, which\nis the modern forum. It is possible, however, that some modified form\nof the direct primary plan may be better still, such as the Hughes\nplan, which provided for the election at each primary of a party\ncommittee to present carefully discussed nominations for the following\nyear's primary to approve or reject.[Footnote: See Outlook, vol. 90,\np. 382; vol. 95, p: 507. North American Review, vol. 190, p. 1] Arena,\nvol. 35, p. 587; vol. 36, p. 52; vol. 41, p. 550. Forum, vol. 42, p.\n493. Atlantic Monthly, vol. 110, p. 41.\n\n(4) PREFERENTIAL VOTING. A more radical movement would abolish\nprimaries altogether and settle elections upon one day by preferential\nvoting. The voter indicates his second choices, and any further choices\nhe may care to indicate. If no candidate receives a majority of first\nchoices, the first and second choices are added together; if necessary,\nthe third choices. In this way the danger, so often realized, of a\nsplit vote and the election of a minority candidate, will be banished;\nit will no longer be possible for a machine candidate, actually the\nleast majority of the people, to win a plurality over the divided\nforces of opposition. The real wishes of the voter can be discovered\nand obeyed more readily than with our present troublesome and expensive\nsystem of double elections. [Footnote: National Municipal Review, vol.\n1, p. 386; vol. 3, pp. 49, 83.]\n\n(5) PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. By means of preferential voting it\nis possible to make representative bodies a mirror not of the majority\nparty, but of the real divisions of opinion in a community. One of\nthe great evils in our present system of majority rule is the suppression\nof the wishes of the minority-which may amount to nearly half the\ncommunity. [Footnote: Cf. Unpopular Review, vol. 1, p. 22.] Strong\nparties may go for many years without any representation, or with\nrepresentation quite disproportionate to their numbers. By the method\nof proportional representation, every man's vote counts, and every\nconsiderable body of opinion can send its representative to council.\nMen of marked personality, who have aroused too great hostility to\nmake them safe candidates as we vote today, because they would be\nunlikely to win a majority, can get a constituency sufficient to elect\nthem, while the harmless nobody, elected today only to avoid a feared\nrival, will have less chance. The evil gerrymander will be abolished,\nand representative bodies will be divided along party lines in the\nvery proportions in which the people are divided.\n\nMoreover, since on this plan every vote counts, the greatest source\nof political apathy will be removed-that sense of hopelessness which\nparalyzes the efforts of the members of a minority party. Corruption\nwill hardly pay; for whereas at present the boss has but to win the\ncomparatively few votes necessary to swing the balance toward a bare\nmajority, in order to have complete control, he will upon this plan\nsecure control only in actual proportion to the number of votes he\ncan secure.\n\nAnother advantage of the system lies in the stabler policy it will\nensure. Our present system results in frequent sharp overturns,\naccording as this party or that may get a temporary majority. But this\nbattledore and shuttlecock of legislation does not represent the far\nmore gradual changes in public opinion. A system whereby the number\nof representatives of each party is always directly proportioned to\nthe number of votes cast for that party would make it possible to evolve\na careful machinery of government, as is not possible with our periodic\nupheavals and reversals of personnel and policy.[Footnote: See\npublications of the American Proportional Representation League\n(Secretary C. G. Hoag, Haverford, Pennsylvania). National Municipal\nReview, vol. 3, p. 92. American City, vol. 10, p. 319. Thomas Hare,\nRepresentation. J. S. Mill, Representative Government, chap. VII.\nPolitical Science Quarterly, vol. 29, p. 111. Atlantic Monthly, vol.\n112, p. 610.]\n\n(6) THE SEPARATION OF NATIONAL, STATE, AND LOCAL ISSUES. The obtrusion\nof national party lines into state and municipal affairs has\ncontinually confused issues and blocked reforms in the narrower\nspheres. Masses of voters will support a candidate for governor or\nmayor simply because he is a Republican or Democrat, although the\nnational party issues in no way enter into the campaign. Bosses\nskillfully play on this blind party allegiance, and many a scoundrel\nor incompetent has ridden into office under the party banner. The\nseparation of local from national elections has proved itself a\nnecessity; in the most advanced communities they are now put in\ndifferent years, that the loyalties evoked by one campaign may not\ncarry over blindly into another. The direct election of United States\nSenators has this great advantage, among others, of separating issues;\nin former days the alternative was often forced upon the citizen of\nvoting for a state legislator who stood for measures of which he\ndisapproved, or of voting for a better legislator who would not vote\nfor the United States Senator he wished to see elected.\n\n(7) Space forbids the further discussion of reforms that aim at\nimproving the machinery of election. The value of anti-bribery laws\nis obvious, as of the laws that require publicity of campaign accounts,\nforbid campaign contributions by corporations, and limit the legal\nexpenditures of individuals. [Footnote: Cf. Outlook, vol. 81, p. 549.]\nThe publication at public expense and sending to every voter of a\npamphlet giving in his own words the arguments on the strength of which\neach candidate seeks election has recently been tried in the West.\nBut this is sure, that in one way or other the American people will\nevolve a mechanism which will make it easier for able and honest men\nto attain office than for the rogues and their incompetent henchmen.\n\nII. A second set of reforms bears rather upon the quality of\nlegislation than upon the selection of men for office. It is not enough\nthat the way be made easy for good men to attain office; they must,\nwhen elected, be freed from needless temptations and given every\ninducement to work for the interests of the community they represent.\nEvery possible pressure is valuable that can counteract the pull of\nsectional interests, party interests, or the interests of the great\ncorporations, away from the general welfare. For even the best\nintentioned officials may yield to the insistence of local or partisan\nwishes, to the arguments of \"big business,\" or to the lure of personal\nadvantage.\n\n(1) REPRESENTATION AT LARGE. The method of legislation by\nrepresentatives of local districts leads inevitably to laws that are\na compromise or bargain between the interests of the several districts,\nrather than the result of a desire to further the best interests of\nthe entire community. Congressmen are continually beset by their\nconstituents to secure special favors for them, aldermen are expected\nto push the interests of their respective wards. Each representative\nstands in danger of political suicide if he refuses to use his\ninfluence for these often improper ends; and legislation takes the\nform of a quid pro quo:-\"You vote for this bill which my section desires,\nand I'll vote for the bill yours demands.\" This evil is so great that\nit may be necessary eventually to do away entirely with district\nrepresentation.[Footnote: See Outlook, vol. 95, p. 759.]\n\n(2) DELEGATED GOVERNMENT. Another plan, which evades the\npressure of local interests while allowing district representation, also\navoids the friction and deadlocks which result from government by a\ngroup of representatives of sharply opposed parties or principles. By\nthis plan, a representative body is elected, by districts, or at large,\nby proportional representation; but this body, instead of itself deciding\nor executing the state or municipal policy, serves merely to select\nand watch experts, who carry on the various phases of government.\nThese experts remain responsible to the representatives, who in turn\nare responsible to the people. This method promises to combine\nconcentration of responsibility, efficiency, and business-like\ngovernment, with democracy, that is, responsiveness to popular control.\nThe national Congress may, for example, appoint a commission of experts\non the tariff, agreeing to consider no tariff legislation except such\nas they recommend; in this way they are freed from all requests to\npropose this or that alteration in the interests of their State or\none of its industries, while the commissioners, not being responsible\nto any localities, are under no pressure to yield to such requests.\nSimilarly, the right to recommend-or even to enact-legislation on\npensions, on river and harbor appropriations, or what not, may be\ndelegated to an appointed body responsible only to the Congress at\nlarge; and all the \"pork-barrel\" legislation, which the better class\nof legislators hate, but which is forced upon them by the threat of\npolitical ruin, may be obviated. [Footnote: Cf. the new (1914) Public\nHealth Council of six members, in New York State, to whom has been\ndelegated all power to make and enforce laws bearing upon the public\nhealth throughout the State (except in New York City). See World's\nWork, vol. 27, p. 495.] The plan of delegating power to appointed\nexperts has very recently been winning approval in municipal\ngovernment, where it is commonly called the \"City Manager \" plan.\nA small body of commissioners are elected and held responsible for\nthe city government; these men may remain in their private vocations,\nand draw a comparatively small salary from the city. Their duty is\nto select an expert city manager who will receive a high salary, and\nconduct personally and through his appointees the whole business of\nthe city. The commissioners may dismiss him if his work is not\nsatisfactory and engage another to take his place. Responsibility is\nconcentrated; mismanagement can be stopped at once, more readily even\nthan by the recall; unity and continuity of policy become possible;\nin short, the same successful methods that have made American business\nthe admiration of the world can be applied to politics. If this plan\nbecomes widely adopted, as it bids fair to be, politics can become\na trained profession, and we can be governed by experts instead of\nby politicians. [Footnote: See The City Manager Plan of Municipal\nGovernment (printed by the National Short Ballot Organization)\nNational Municipal Review, vol. 1, pp. 33, 549; vol. 2, pp. 76, 639;\nvol. 3, p. 44. Outlook, vol. 104, p. 887.]\n\n(3) THE RECALL. Many of the newer plans for government include a method\nby which an inefficient or dishonest official can be removed from\noffice by the people, without the cumbersome process of an impeachment.\nIt would not be wise to apply the recall to local representatives,\nwho would then be still more at the mercy of local wishes; but with\na short ballot and the concentration of responsibility upon executives\nor small commissions who represent the community as a whole, it is\nhighly desirable to have a method available for quickly remedying\nmistakes. The danger of being recalled from office is a salutary\ninfluence upon a weak or a self-willed man. And the possibility of\nit allows the election of officials for longer terms, which are desirable\nfrom several points of view: they bring a more stable government, freed\nfrom too frequent breaks or reversals of policy; they permit the\nacquiring of a longer political experience, and stimulate abler men\nto run for office; they save the public the bother and expense of too\nfrequent elections. [Footnote: See National Municipal Review, vol.\n1, p. 204. Forum, vol. 47, p. 157. North American Review, vol. 198,\np. 145.]\n\n(4) THE REFERENDUM. A less drastic instrument of popular control\nover legislation is the referendum, which refers individual measures\nback to the people for approval or rejection. An official may be\nefficient and free from corruption, yet opposed to the general wish\non some particular matter. In this, then, he may be overruled by the\nreferendum without being humiliated or required to resign his office.\nThus not only the improper influence of the machine or the interests\nmay be guarded against by the public, but the unconscious prejudices\nof generally efficient officials. Of course there is, in the case of\nboth recall and referendum, the possibility that the official may be\nright and the people wrong. But that danger is inherent in democratic\ngovernment. The best that can be done is to make government responsive\nto the sober judgment of the majority; if that is mistaken, nothing\nbut time and education can correct it. [Footnote: See W. B. Munro,\nThe Initiative, Referendum and Recall; The Government of American Cities,\np. 321. Political Science Quarterly, vol. 26, p. 415; vol. 28, p.\n207. National Municipal Review, vol. 1, p. 586. Nation, vol. 95, p.\n324.]\n\nThe air is full of suggestions, and experiments are being tried in\nevery direction. There is every hope that America may yet learn by\nher failures and evolve a system of government that shall be her pride\nrather than her shame. Our National Government has worked far better\nthan our state and local government, but even that can be further freed\nfrom the pull of improper motives, made much more efficient and\nresponsive to the general will. We are in a peculiar degree on trial\nto show what popular government can accomplish. The Old World looks\nto us with distrust, but with hope. And though the solution of our\npolitical problem involves many technical matters, it has deep underlying\nmoral bearings, and affects profoundly the success of every great moral\ncampaign.\n\nR. C. Brooks, Corruption in American Politics and Life. L. Steffens,\nThe Shame of the Cities. J. Bryce, The Hindrances to Good Government.\nW. E. Weyl, The New Democracy, chaps. VIII, IX. Jane Addams, Democracy\nand Social Ethics, chap. VII. A. T. Hadley, Standards of Public\nMorality, chaps. IV, V. T. Roosevelt, American Ideals. C. R. Henderson,\nThe Social Spirit in America, chap. XI. Edmond Kelly, Evolution and\nEffort, chap. IX. W. H. Taft, Four Aspects of Civic Duty. E. Root,\nThe Citizen's Part in Government. D. F. Wilcox, Government by All the\nPeople. L. S. Rowe, Problems of City Government. H. E. Deming, The\nGovernment of American Cities. Publications of the National Municipal\nLeague (703 North American Building, Philadelphia). Political Science\nQuarterly, vol. 18, p. 188; vol. 19, p. 673;\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXV\n\n\nSOCIAL ALLEVIATION\n\nWHEN the security of peace and an efficient government are attained,\nthe way lies open for the amelioration of social evils. Freedom from\nwar and from political corruption are but the pre-conditions of social\nadvance, which must consist in three things: the healing of existing\nills, the reorganization of society to prevent the recurrence of\nsimilar ills, and the bringing of new opportunities and joys to the\npeople. Our first step, then, is to consider social therapeutics-the\npalliation of present suffering, the redressing of existing wrongs;\nhowever we may seek, by radical readjustments, to strike at the roots\nof these evils, we must not fail to mitigate, as best we can, the lot\nof those who are the unfortunate victims of our still crude social\norganization. The detailed study of social ills and their remedies\nhas come to be a science by itself, and a science that calls for close\nattention; for there is more good will than insight a field, and\nnothing demands more wisdom and experience than the permanent curing\nof social sores. But it falls to ethics to note the general duties\nand opportunities, to point out the responsibility of the individual\ncitizen for wrongs which he is not helping to right, and to direct\nhim to the great moral causes in one or more of which an increasing\nnumber of our educated men and women are enrolling themselves. A\nquestionnaire recently sent out by the author of this book discloses\nthe fact that over half the college graduates of this country have\ngiven time and money to one or more of the campaigns which are being\nwaged for social betterment. [Footnote: Some of the results of this\nquestionnaire were published in the Independent for August 5, 1913,\nvol. 75, p. 348.] These evils which it is the duty of the State to\ntry to remedy we shall now consider.\n\nWhat is the duty of the State in regard to:\n\nI. SICKNESS AND PREVENTABLE DEATH? Physical ills are the unavoidable\nlot of the human race; but by no means to the extent to which they\nnow prevail. A very large percentage of existing sickness and infirmity\ncould have been prevented by a timely application of such knowledge\nas the intelligent already possess. It is the poverty, the crowded\nand unsanitary living conditions, the ignorance and helplessness of\nthe masses, that perpetuate all this unnecessary suffering, this economic\nwaste, this drag on human efficiency and happiness. Not only from\nhumanitarian motives, but also from regard for national prosperity\nand virility, it behooves the State to wage war against preventable\nillness and safeguard the general health.\n\nHow shocking conditions are, in view of the sanitary and medical\nknowledge we now possess, we are not apt to realize. It is estimated\nthat of the three million or so who are seriously ill in this country\non any average day, more than half might have been kept well by the\nenforcement of proper precautions; that of the 1,500,000 deaths that\noccur annually in the United States, nearly half could have been\npostponed. Tuberculosis, for example, is not a highly contagious or\nrapid disease; it is absolutely preventable by measures now understood,\nand almost always curable in its earliest stages. Yet half a million\npeople in our country are suffering from it, and about 130,000 die\nof it annually. Typhoid, which could readily be as nearly eradicated\nas smallpox has been, claims some 30,000 victims annually. It has been\nestimated by various statisticians that the nation could save a billion\ndollars a year through postponing deaths, and at least half as much\nagain by preventing illness that does not result fatally. Tuberculosis\nalone is said to cost the country half a billion annually, typhoid\nover three hundred million, and so on. The cost in suffering, broken\nlives, and broken hearts is beyond computation.\n\nThere are many different ways in which the campaign for public health\ncan be simultaneously waged:\n\n(1) The enforcement of quarantine laws, vaccination, and fumigation,\nshould be much stricter than it is in many parts of the nation. By\nsuch means the cholera, bubonic plague, and other terrible diseases\nhave been practically kept out of the country, and smallpox has become,\nfrom one of the most dreaded scourges, an almost negligible peril.\nExperience shows strikingly the advantage of isolating patients\nsuffering from contagious diseases; here at least the State, in the\ninterest of the community as a whole, must sternly limit individual\nliberty. And it looks as if we were at the threshold of an era of\n\"vaccination\" for other diseases besides smallpox; typhoid is now\nabsolutely preventable by that means, and the number of diseases\namenable to prevention or mitigation by similar methods is yearly\nincreasing. In some or all of these cases there is a slight risk to\nthe patient, in view of which compulsory \"vaccination\" is in some\nquarters strenuously opposed. Leaving the discussion of the principle\nhere involved to chapter XXVIII, we may confidently say, at least,\nthat voluntary inoculation against diseases is an increasingly valuable\nsafeguard not only for the individual in question but for the whole\ncommunity.\n\n(2) Apart from state action, voluntary organizations formed to attack\nspecific diseases, by spreading popular knowledge of preventive\nmeasures, and pushing legislation for their enforcement, offer much\npromise. The Anti-Tuberculosis League can already point to a ten per\ncent decline in the death rate from that plague in the decade from\n1900 to 1910. [Footnote: For methods and results consult the Secretary\nof the National Association for the Study and Prevention of Tuberculosis,\n105 East Twenty-second Street, New York City. Free literature is sent,\nand information furnished on request.] But while in New York City alone\nnearly thirty thousand fresh victims are seized by the disease every\nyear, a voluntary organization cannot hope to cope with the situation;\nthe power and resources of the State are needed. The congestion of\npopulation, and the lack of proper light and air, which are the\ngreatest factors, perhaps, in the spread of the scourge, must be\nattacked by legislation. So typhoid must be fought not only by\nvaccination, but by legislation insuring a pure water supply, proper\nsewage disposal, and the protection of food from contamination.\nMeasures necessary to eradicate that pest, the house fly, must be\nenforced, the mosquito must be as nearly as possible exterminated,\nstreets and yards must be kept clean, the smoke nuisance abated, the\nslaughtering of animals and canning of food sharply regulated, sanitary\nconditions enforced in homes and factories. One of the prerequisites\nto any marked improvement will be the \"taking out of politics\" of the\npublic health service and making it an expert profession.\n\n(3) Another service that the community must eventually, in its own\ninterests, provide, is free medical attendance, by really competent\nphysicians, wherever there is need. Without referring to the suffering\nand anxiety spared, the expense of this service will far more than\nbe saved the State in the prevention of illness and premature death.\nThe most careful medical inspection of school children, including\nattention by experts to eyes, ears, and teeth, is of utmost importance;\nall sorts of ills can thus be averted which the parents are too ignorant\nor careless to forestall. [Footnote: Consult the literature of the\nAmerican School Hygiene Association (Secretary T. A. Storey, College\nof the City of New York). L. D. Cruickshank, School Clinics at Home\nand Abroad. Outlook, vol. 84, p. 662.] It is earnestly to be hoped\nthat the present chaos of medical education and practice will be soon\nreduced to a better order; that practitioners who prefer manipulation\nor mental healing, for example, will, instead of forming separate and\nantagonistic schools, unite their insight and experience with the main\nstream of scientific therapeutic effort. The quacks who delude and\nmurder hordes of ignorant victims must be, so far as is practicable,\nseverely punished; and adequate physiological and medical education\nshould be required for all practicing healers, whatever methods they\nmay then choose to employ.\n\n(4) Besides free medical attendance, the State must pro- vide free\nhospitals for the sick, nurses for the poor, asylums for those who\nare incapacitated by infirmity from self-support. The care and treatment\nof the feeble-minded, the insane, the deaf, the blind, the crippled,\nshould always be in the hands of experts; and, so far as possible,\nwork that they can do must be provided. With the enforcement of the\nmeasures we have enumerated, the need of such institutions will become\nmuch less; but at present they are inadequate in number and equipment,\ntoo often managed by incompetent officials, and not always free from\nscandal. [Footnote: Cf. C. R, Henderson, Social Spirit in America,\nchap. XV.]\n\n(5) Most important of all, perhaps, is the work that must be done to\nsave the babies. Approximately a third of the babies born in this\ncountry die before they are four years old; half or two thirds of these\ncould be saved. Wonderful results in baby saving have followed strict\ncontrol of the milk supply and the banishing of the fly. Besides this,\nmothers must in some way be given instruction in the very difficult\nand complicated art of rearing infants; for many of the deaths are\ndue to simple ignorance.[Footnote: For methods and results in\nbaby-saving, consult the Secretary of the National Association for\nthe Study and Prevention of Infant Mortality, 1211 Cathedral Street,\nBaltimore, Maryland. Also Outlook, vol. 101, p. 190. J. S. Gibbon,\nInfant Welfare Centers.] Poverty, the necessity of self- support on\nthe part of mothers, also plays a large part; we shall consider in\nchapter xxx the possibility of state care of mothers during the infancy\nof their children. II. Poverty and inadequate living conditions? If\nhuman illness can be in large measure averted by state action, poverty\ncan be practically abolished. The poor we have always had with us,\nindeed; but we need not forever have them. There is no excuse for our\ntolerance of the suffering and degradation of the submerged classes;\nthe causes of this wretchedness are in the main removable. The initial\ncost will be great, but in the long run the saving to the community\nwill be enormous. Individual effort can only achieve a superficial\nand temporary relief; and even the two or three hundred charity\norganization societies in the country are impotent, for lack of funds\nand of power, to stem the forces that make for poverty. To dole out\ncharity to this family and to that is unhappily necessary in our\npresent crude social situation; but it is not a solution. It not only\nruns the continual risk of encouraging shiftlessness and dependence,\nbut it does not go to the root of the matter. There will always be\ninequalities in wealth and room for personal gifts from the more to\nthe less fortunate; but the State must not be content with such patching\nand palliating, but must strike at the roots of the evil. We will\nconsider the chief causes of poverty and their cure.\n\n(1) The cause that bulks largest is the inadequate wages of a\nconsiderable portion of the lowest class. It is obviously impossible\nto support the average family of five in decency, not to say in health,\nefficiency, or comfort, with an income of, say, less than a thousand\ndollars a year, as prices go at time of writing (1914). Yet great\nnumbers of families at present have to exist somehow upon less, even\nmuch less. Five million adult male workers in this country receive\nless than six hundred dollars a year for their work.[Footnote: Cf.\nProfessor Fairchild's comments in Forum, vol. 52, p. 49 (July, 1914).]\nEven when mothers work who ought to be at home tending the children,\neven when children work who ought to be in school, the total income\nis often miserably inadequate. Yet there is ample wealth in the country,\nif it were better distributed, to pay a living wage to every laborer.\nBy some one of the means which we shall presently discuss, the State\nmust see that all laborers are well enough paid to enable them, while\nthey work, to support in comfort a moderate family.\n\n(2) Involuntary unemployment is the next source of poverty. This is\ndue to many causes: the periodic depressions and failures of industries;\nthe introduction of new machinery, throwing out whole classes of\nlaborers; the enormous influx of immigrants and consequent congestion\nin the cities of unskilled labor; lack of education, or natural\nstupidity, which render some men too incompetent to retain positions.\nIgnorance can be overcome by proper compulsory education laws; all\nbut the actually feeble-minded (who must be cared for in institutions)\ncan, by skillful attention, be taught proficiency in some trade. And\nwith a more widespread education the work that requires no skill can\nbe left to the hopelessly stupid. The congestion of labor in the cities\n[Footnote: In February, 1914, there were reported to be 350,000 men\nout of work in New York City (Outlook, March 14, 1914).] can be largely\nremedied by free state employment bureaus which shall serve as\ndistributing agencies; there is almost always work enough and to spare\nin some parts of the country, and usually not far away. But more than\nthis is necessary; the State must see that work is offered every man\nwho is able to work. All sorts of public works need unskilled laborers\nin every city of the country; there is digging to be done, shoveling\nand sweeping and carting. There are roads to be built, rivers to be\ndredged, parks to be graded, buildings to be erected, a thousand things\nto be done. It will be quite feasible, when wages are generally\nadequate, for the cities, by general agreement, to offer work to all\napplicants at a wage so low as not to attract men away from other\nemployments, and yet to enable them to support their families decently.\nThe low wages given will save the city much money directly, as well\nas saving it the care of the indigent. But it will be a feasible plan\nonly when the city's jobs cease to be used as a means of vote-buying\nby politicians and are offered where they are needed. [Footnote: 1 See\nW.H. Beveridge, Unemployment. J.A. Hobson, The Problem of the\nUnemployed. Alden and Hayward, The Unemployable and the\nUnemployed. C. S. Loch, Methods of Social Advance, chap. IX.\nQuarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 8, pp. 168, 453, 499. Review\nof Reviews, vol. 9, pp. 29, 179. Charities Review, vol. 3, pp. 221,\n323. Independent, vol. 77, p.363. National Municipal Review,\nvol. 3, p.366. The unemployment which is the result of laziness\nmust be cured by compulsory work as in farmcolonies, which\nhave been successful in Europe. Cf. Edmond Kelly, The\nElimination of the Tramp.]\n\n(3) The third important cause of poverty is sickness and the death\nof wage earners. Here the way is clear. When the State has taken the\nmeasures we have enumerated for the public health, when it provides\ncompetent doctors and nurses, and bears the cost of illness, we shall\nhave only the loss of wages during the illness or after the death of\nwage earners to consider. And here some form of universal insurance\nwill probably be the solution; this is preferable to state care of\ndependents, as it carries no taint of charity. This solves every\nproblem but the delicate one, which must be entrusted to expert\ndiagnosticians, of determining to work is caused by physical\nweakness or mere laziness.\n\n(4) The fourth great cause of poverty, drink, can and must be abolished\nin the near future, by the means already considered.\n\n(5) There remain three personal causes which need be the only\npermanently troublesome factors- -laziness, self-indulgence, and the\nincontinence which results in over- large families. The laziness which\nprefers chronic inactivity to work is not normal to human nature, and\nwill be largely banished by education, the improvement of health, and\nthe improvement of the conditions and hours of labor. The obstinate\ncases of unwillingness to work must be cured by compulsory labor in\nfarm colonies or on public works; most such cases respond to\nintelligent treatment and cease to be troublesome when some physical\nor moral twist has been remedied. The waste of income in self-indulgence\nof one form or other is more difficult to deal with; but the law can\njustly forbid the wage-earner from squandering upon himself money\nneeded by wife and children, and direct that a due proportion of his\nwages be paid directly to the wife. If neither father nor mother will\nuse their money for the proper welfare of the children, the State must\ntake the children from them though that step should only be a last\nand desperate resort. Finally, there is the tendency, unfortunately\nmost prevalent among the lowest classes, to have more children than\ncan be decently cared for. To some extent this evil can be remedied\nby the dissemination of information concerning proper methods of\npreventing conception [Footnote: There is, however, a danger in the\ngeneral dissemination of such information- the danger of increasing\nprostitution by lessening one of the chief deterrents there from.];\nto some extent by moral training to self-control and a sense of\nresponsibility. Or the State may undertake the countenance large\nfamilies; if this is done (see chapter xxx), steps must of course be\ntaken to prevent the marrying of the unfit-or, at least, their\nbreeding. With our rapidly decreasing birth rate, and the spread of\neducation, which will do away with \"lower\" classes and fit every one\nin some decent degree to be a parent, this will probably be the ultimate\nsolution. With the disappearance of poverty, the miserable living\nconditions of so large a proportion of our population will\nautomatically improve. But much should be done directly by the State\nto prevent such housing conditions as make for physical or moral\ndegeneration. We are far behind Europe in housing-legislation, and\nconditions in most of our cities are going from bad to worse. There\nis, however, no need whatever of unsanitary housing; it is merely the\nselfishness of owners and the apathy of the public that permits its\nexistence. The crowding-which in New York City runs up to some\nthirteen hundred per acre-can be stopped by simple legislation. The\nlack of proper light or ventilation, of proper water supply, plumbing,\nor sewerage, of proper removal of ashes, garbage, or rubbish, is\ninexcusable. The results of living in the dark, foul-aired, unsanitary\ntenements of our slums are: a great increase in sickness and premature\ndeath; a stunting of growth, physical and mental, and an increase in\nnumbers of backward and delinquent children; the spread of vicious\nand criminal habits through the lack of privacy and contagion of close\ncontact with the vicious.\n\nWe are breeding in our slums a degenerate race,-boys who grow up\nused to vice, and girls that drift naturally into prostitution; we are\nallowing disease to spread from them, through the children that go\nto the public schools, the shop-girls we buy from in the stores, the\nservants that enter our houses, the men we rub elbows with on the\nstreet or in the street-cars. Very salutary are the laws that require\nthe name of the owner to be placed on all buildings; shame before the\npublic may wring improvements from many a landlord who now takes\nprofits from tenements unfit for habitation. But it ought not to be\nleft to the conscience of the individual owner; the State must exercise\nits primary right to forbid the crowding of tenants into houses which\ndo not afford sanitary quarters and permit a decent degree of privacy.\n\n\nIII. COMMERCIALIZED VICE?\n\nThe duty of the State in regard to the vice caterers is obvious; the\ncommercializing of vice must be strictly prohibited by law and enforced\nby whatever means experience proves most effective. We must learn\nto include in this class of enemies of society the manufacturers and\nsellers of alcoholic liquors, as well as of the less generally used\narcotics; but this matter has been already discussed in connection\n]with our study of the individual's duty in relation to alcohol. Of the\nproprietors of gambling dens, indecent \"shows,\" etc, we need not\nfurther speak, concentrating our attention instead upon the worst\nspecies of vice catering, the commercializing of prostitution. The\nextent to which the sale of woman's virtue prevails in our cities is\nscarcely believable. The recent commission of which Mr. Rockefeller\nwas chairman actually counted 14,926 professional prostitutes in\nManhattan alone, in 1912; while personal visitation established the\nexistence of over sixteen hundred houses where the gratification of\nlust could be bought. Not all, certainly, were counted; and this list is,\nof course, entirely exclusive of the great number of girls occasionally\nand secretly selling themselves to friends, acquaintances, and employers.\nMany hundreds of men and women, keepers of houses, procurers,\nand the like, live on the proceeds of this great underground industry;\nand to some extent-though to what extent it is, of course, impossible\nto ascertain the forcible retention of young girls is exist in most of the\nworld's cities. What is being done to abolish this ghastliest of evils?\nIn most great cities, scarcely anything, for two reasons: the one being\nthat so many men, perhaps the majority, secretly wish to retain an\nopportunity for purchasing sex gratification, the other that the police\ngenerally find the protection of illegal vice an easy source of revenue.\nIf the police are honest, they break up a disorderly house-and let the\ninmates carry the lure of their trade elsewhere. The magistrates fine\nthem, or give them sentences just long enough to bring them needed\nrest and nutrition, and send them back to their business. Or they drive\nthem out of town-to swell the numbers in the next town. Attempts at\nlegalization and localization are frank admissions of inability or\nlack of desire to fight the evil; their effect is to make the way of\ntemptation easier for the youth. Compulsory medical inspection gives\na promise of immunity from disease which is largely illusory, and entices\nmen who are now restrained by prudential motives. There are, however,\nmany promising lines of attack:\n\n(1) When women gain the vote, they can be counted on to fight the\nevil. The prostitutes themselves, being mostly minors, and, in any case,\nanxious to conceal their identity, seldom vote; and the remaining women\nare almost en masse bitterly opposed to the trade. With women voting,\nand an efficient political administration inaugurated in our cities, we\nshall hope to witness the end of the scandalous nonenforcement of\nexisting laws.\n\n(2) The abolishing of the liquor trade will take away the great\npolitical ally of the trade in girlhood; and without the demoralizing\ninfluence of alcohol fewer men will yield to their passions and\nfewer girls be pliant thereto.\n\n(3) The Rockefeller Commission disclosed majority of prostitutes are\nalmost wholly uneducated-about half of those questioned had not even\ngone through the primary school, and only seven per cent had finished\nthe grammar-school work. Compulsory education, vigilantly enforced,\nwill greatly lessen the number of girls who will be willing to take\nup the life of degradation, suffering, and premature death; especially\nwill this be the case if sex hygiene is properly taught. Approximately\na quarter of the girls studied were mentally defective; these should\nhave been detected in the schools and removed to the proper\ninstitutions before they fell prey to the clever schemes of the\nprocurer.[Footnote: Of 647 wayward girls recently at the Bedford\nReformatory, over 300 were accounted mentally deficient.] For a\nfalling-off in this alarming number of mental defectives we must await\nscientific eugenic laws to be discussed in chapter xxx.\n\n(4) It is a shameful fact that thousands of girls, dependent upon their\nown earnings for support, receive less than enough to enable them to\nlive in decent comfort, not to say with any enjoyment of life. Many,\nof course, waste their earnings on needlessly fine clothes, or at the\n\"shows\"; the American fashion of extravagant dress and the craving\nfor amusement are factors of importance in the ruin of young girls.\nBut five dollars, or even seven dollars, a week is not enough to live\non in the cities; and many girls are paid no more, even less. The\nState, in framing its minimum wage laws, or other legislation, must\ntake cognizance of this startling and intolerable situation.\n\n(5) Provision should be made for the care of girls who come alone to\nthe cities. Dormitories with clean and airy bedrooms at minimum cost,\nand attractive reading- and social-rooms, offering provision for normal\nsocial life and amusement, can do much to keep lonely and restless\ngirls out of the clutches of the vicious provision for young men who\nlive alone might avail to lessen to some extent their patronage of\nhouses of vice.\n\n(6) The model injunction acts of a few of our more advanced States\n\"vest the power in any citizen, whether he or she is personally damaged\nby such establishment, to institute legal proceedings against all\nconcerned; to secure the abatement of the nuisance, and perpetual\ninjunction against its reestablishment.\" It is too early yet to speak\nwith assurance of the practical working of this method; but it bids\nfair to make the brothel business more precarious. If, in addition,\nlaws against street soliciting are strictly enforced, the first steps\nof young men into vice will be made much less alluringly easy than\nat present.\n\n(7) The most radical and effective measure of all will be to arrest\nthe professional prostitutes, segregate them, and keep them segregated\nduring the dangerous years, except as genuine signs of intention to\nreform appear, in which case they may be released upon probation. The\nexpense will be, at the outset, considerable. But the girls will be\ntaught trades, and kept at work which will in most cases more than\npay for their support. Moreover, the community will, of course, save\nthe vast sums now passed over by its lustful men to these women. The\nsaving of health and life will be incalculable. The girls, although\nunder restraint, will be infinitely better off than they were, and\ncan in most cases, with patience and education, be made ultimately\nto realize their gain; as they grow older and forget their early years\nof shame, they can be set free again, with some skilled trade learned,\nand some accumulated earnings. Professional prostitution will, of course,\nstill flourish to a degree underground; but it will be a highly risky\nbusiness, attracting far fewer girls, and difficult for the uninitiated\nyoung man to discover. With this outlet for lust partially closed,\nthere would no doubt tend to be an increase in solitary and homosexual\nvice, and in the seduction of innocent girls. But the latter outlet\ncan be checked by raising the \"age of consent\" to twenty or twenty-one,\nand punishing the seduction of younger girls as rape. And the former\nevils, serious as they are, are far less of an evil than the creation\nof our present wretched class of professional prostitutes. As a matter\nof fact, there would, beyond all question, be a great diminution in\nsexual vice, the present amount of it being due by no means wholly\nto desire that is naturally imperious, but to the artificial fostering\nof that desire by those who hope to profit financially thereby.\n\nIV. Crime?\n\nThe gravest of all social ills is-crime. Its treatment\nmay be considered under the three heads of prevention, conviction,\nand the treatment of convicted criminals.\n\n(1) To some extent, not yet clearly determined, the causes of crime\nare temperamental, due to congenital defects or overexcitable impulses.\nThe inherited effects of insanity, alcoholism, and other pathological\nconditions, make self-control far more difficult for some unfortunates.\nSuch baneful inheritances will some day be minimized by eugenic laws;\nand individuals whose abnormal mental condition makes them dangerous\nto society will be kept under permanent restraint. The causes of crime\nare, however, to a far greater degree environmental. Undernutrition,\noverwork, worry, and various other sources of poor health, create a\ncondition of lowered resistance to impulse. The herding of the poor\ninto crowded tenements, the inability to find work, the lack of\nwholesome interests and excitements to provide a normal outlet for\nenergy of body and mind, the daily sight of the luxury of the rich\nand the bitterness of its contrast with their own need, awaken dangerous\npassions and reckless defiance of law. The lack of education, contact\nwith absorption of law-defying philosophies of life, tend to make crime\nappear natural and justified. All of these unhealthy conditions are\nbeing attacked under the spur of our new social conscience; and with\nevery step in social alleviation crime diminishes. Criminals are, in\ngeneral, just such men and women as we; in like situations we too\nshould be tempted to crime. We might all repeat with Bunyan: \"There,\nbut for the grace of God, go I!\" Give every man and woman a fair chance\nfor happiness in normal ways, and the lure of crime will largely\nvanish.[Footnote: Cf. An Open Letter to Society from Convict 1776 (F.\nH. Revell Co.).] Yet human nature in its most favorable circumstances\nand in its most favored individuals has its twists and its anti-social\nimpulses. For the potential criminal-and that means for every one of\nus-there must be elaborated also a system of moral or religious\ntraining which shall seek to develop the better nature that is in every\nman and enchain the brute. With such a discipline imposed upon each\ngeneration there would be a far greater hope for the repression of\nevil tendencies, whether due to temperamental perversion or provocative\nenvironment.\n\n(2) If there is much to be done in the prevention of crime, there is\nalso much to be done in insuring the prompt conviction of offenders.\nThe legal delays and obtrusion of the technicalities which now so often\nobstruct the administration of justice, hold out a means to the\ncriminal of escaping punishment, work hardship to the poor, who cannot\nafford to employ the sharpest lawyers, and needlessly retard the\nclearing of the reputation of the innocent. The overuse of the plea\nof insanity has become latterly a public scandal. In certain courts\nit has sometimes seemed impossible to convict a criminal who has plenty\nof money or strong political influence. In other cases such men have\nbeen set free on bail and proceeded to further may have to wait years\nfor compensation; if they are poor, they may hesitate to set out on\nthe long and dubious course of a lawsuit; or, if they embark upon it,\nit is only by an agreement wherein the speculator- lawyer takes the\nlion's share of the compensation. The result of all this friction in\nthe machinery of the courts is an increase in crime, and an increase\nin the illegal punishment of crime. Lynching, which are such a disgrace\nto this country, are due primarily to indignation at crime which bids\nfair to be inadequately punished; they will occur, in spite of their\ninjustice and brutality, until the penalties of the law are made\nuniversally prompt and sure and fair.[Footnote: See J. E. Cutler, Lynch\nLaw. Outlook, vol. 99, p. 706.] A wholesome disregard of\ntechnicalities, and an interpretation of the law in the line of equity,\na rigid exclusion of irrelevant evidence and argument, the provision\nof an adequate number of courts to prevent the piling up of cases,\nand of a public defender, of skill and training, to look after the\ninterests of the poor, the removal of judgeships from politics by the\ngeneral improvement of our political system, and the adjudgment of\ninsanity only by impartial, state-hired alienists-these are some of\nthe reforms that ethical considerations suggest.[Footnote: Cf. W. H.\nTaft, Four Aspects of Civic Duty, II. Outlook, vol. 92, p. 359; vol.\n98, p. 884.]\n\n(3) The ends to be borne in mind in the treatment of the\nconvicted Criminal are four: First, reparation to the injured party\nmust be demanded of him, so far as money will constitute reparation;\nif he has not the money, his future work must go for its accumulation,\nso far as that is compatible with the support of his infant children.\nSecondly, he must be punished severely enough to serve as a warning\nto other potential offenders and, so far as they are amenable to such\nfears, deter them from similar crimes. Capital punishment for the worst\ncrimes is shown deterrent than confinement; whether the danger of\nexecuting an innocent man is grave enough to offset this public gain\nis an open question.[Footnote: See A. J. Palm, The Death Penalty.]\nThirdly, he must be prevented from doing any more harm; this means\nconfinement just so long as expert criminologists deem him dangerous,\nwhether not at all (unless to deter others) or for life. The old system\nof giving a fixed sentence is wholly unjustifiable; some are thereby\nkept imprisoned when there is every reason to believe them capable\nof living honorably and serving the community as free men, others are\nlet loose, after a term, more dangerous to the community than ever.\nThe habitual criminal, who alternates between periods of crime and\nperiods of imprisonment, should be an unknown phenomenon. The judge\nshould be obliged to pronounce an indeterminate sentence, and leave\nit to the expert prison officials to decide if, or when, it is safe\nto release the prisoner on parole. Experience has already shown that\nfew mistakes are made (where prison management is kept out of machine\npolitics); and as the released prisoner is under surveillance, and\nmay be returned to the prison without trial for disorderliness,\ndrunkenness, or other anti-social conduct, he is not likely to do much\ndamage. A second offense would be likely to bring upon him imprisonment\nfor life, which would be within the discretion of the prison officials.\nThis method provides a spur to good behavior, and, when used in\nconjunction with the reforming influences we are about to consider,\nworks admirably in abolishing the criminal class; whatever criminal\nclass persists-those who cannot or will not reform are kept under\nrestraint for life, where they can do no harm. Fourthly, and most\nimportant of all, a painstaking attempt must be made to reform the\ncriminal, to make him a normal, socially useful man. At present our\nprisons are rather schools of corruption than of uplift; too often\nfirst offenders are thrown into association with hardened criminals,\nand come out after their term of years with their minds full of criminal\nsuggestions, and less able than before to live a normal life. The prison\nshould be a training school for the morally perverted. First of all,\nthe prisoner should be taught a trade, if he knows none, and made\ncompetent to earn an honest living. He should be kept at regular work,\nand his wages used partly to reimburse society for his keep, and partly\nto support his family, or, if he has none, to give him a new start\nwhen he leaves prison. Recent experience shows that the great majority\nof prisoners can be trusted to work outside the prison, at any ordinary\nlabor, without guards-returning to the prison each evening.[Footnote:\nSee Century, vol. 87, p. 746.] Regular hours, and wholesome living\nin every way, are, of course, enforced; sports are encouraged in leisure\nhours, and physical development ensured. Educational influences are\nbrought to bear, through class-instruction, books, sermons, private\ntalks. The individual's mind is studied and every effort made to supplant\nmorbid and anti-social by normal and moral ideas. Few criminals but\nare amenable to skillful guidance; most of them, could, if pains were\ntaken, be transformed into useful citizens. All this application of\nmodern penological ideas means a greatly increased expense per capita;\nbut this will be largely offset by the work required of all healthy\nprisoners, and in any case is the best sort of an investment. The\nprevention of crime is, in the long run, much less costly, even from\na purely financial standpoint, than crime itself. On pathological social\nconditions in general: Smith, Social Pathology. E. T. Devine, Misery\nand its Causes. M. Conyngton, How to Help. C. Aronovici, Knowing One's\nOwn Community. Jane Addams, Twenty Years at Hull House. S. Nearing,\nSocial Adjustment. Charles Booth, Life and Labor of the People of\nLondon. Hall, Social Solutions. C. R. Henderson, Social Duties. W.\nGladden, Social Salvation. Public health: H. Ellis, The Task of Social\nHygiene, The Nationalization of Health. Outlook, vol. 98, p. 63; vol.\n102, p. 764. Literature published by The Committee of One Hundred on\nNational Health (105 East Twenty-second Street, New York City). C.\nR. Henderson, The Social Spirit in America, chap. V. World's Work,\nvol. 17, p. 11321; vol. 21, p. 13881; vol. 23, p. 692. W. H. Allen,\nCivics and Health. Poverty and living conditions: R. Hunter, Poverty.\nB. S. Rowntree, Poverty, A Study of Town Life. Adams and Sumner, Labor\nProblems, chap. V. A. S. Warner, American Charities. E. T. Devine,\nPrinciples of Relief. S. Webb, Prevention of Destitution. Literature\nof the American Association of Societies for Organizing Charity, and\nof the Charity Organization Department of the Russell Sage Foundation\n(both at 105 East Twenty-second Street, New York City). L. Veiller,\nHousing Reform. Deforest and Veiller, The Tenement-House Problem. J.\nLee, Constructive and Preventive Philanthropy. Alden and Hayward,\nHousing. J. A. Riis, The Battle with the Slum. National Municipal\nReview, vol. 2, p. 210. Commercialized vice: Jane Addams, A New\nConscience and an Ancient Evil. Report of the Chicago Vice Commission:\nThe Social Evil in Chicago. G. J. Kneeland, Commercialized Prostitution\nin New York City. Outlook, vol. 94, p. 303; vol. 101, p. 245; vol.\n104, p. 101. Crime: F. H. Wines, Punishment and Reformation. E. A.\nRoss, Social Control, chap. XI. R. M. McConnell, Criminal Responsibility\nand Social Constraint. H. Ellis, The Criminal. A. H. Currier, The\nPresent- Day Problem of Crime. P. A. Parsons, Responsibility for Crime.\nE. Ferri, The Positive School of Criminology. W. Tallack, Penological\nand Preventive Principles. E. Carpenter, Prisons, Police, and Punishment.\nOutlook, vol. 94, p. 252; vol. 97, p. 403. World's Work, vol. 21, p.\n14254. North American Review, vol. 138, p. 254. International Journal\nof Ethics, vol. 20, p. 281.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXVI\n\n\nINDUSTRIAL WRONGS\n\nWE have been discussing the treatment of recognized crime. But beyond\nthe boundaries of conduct universally labeled as criminal, there is\na whole realm of anti-social action to which the public conscience\nis only beginning to be sensitive, although it is often far more harmful\nto the general welfare than that for which men are imprisoned.\nEspecially is this true of the wrongs connected with modern industry.\nAs Professor Ross puts it, [Footnote: Sin and Society, p. 97.] \"the\nmaster iniquities of our time are connected with money-making\"; and\nso our \"moral pace-setters,\" who are, for the most part, confining\ntheir attacks to the time-worn and familiar sins, \"do not get into\nthe big fight at all.\" The root of the trouble is that great power\nover the lives and happiness of others has been acquired by a small\nclass of irresponsible men, many of whom fail to recognize their\nprivileged position as a public trust and care only for enriching\nthemselves. As we noted in chapter in, the complexification of our\nindustrial life is making possible a whole new range of what must be\nbranded as crimes; endless opportunities have been opened up of\nmoney-making at the cost of others' suffering. Often that suffering,\nor loss, is so remote from the path of the greedy business man that\nhe does not see himself, and others fail to see him, as the predatory\nmoney-grabber that he is. The many who have been ruined by unscrupulous\ncompetitors are often embittered, the repressed capitalism; but the\npublic as a whole has not been aroused to rebuke this \"newer\nunrighteousness.\" We must proceed to note its commonest contemporary\nforms. In our present organization of industry, what are the duties\nof businessmen:\n\nI. To the public?\n\n(1) The first duty of businessmen is to supply honest goods, in honest\nmeasure. Underweight, undermeasure, double- bottomed berry-boxes,\nbottles so shaped as to appear to contain more than their actual\ncontents, are obviously cheating. Misbranding of goods is now\nregulated, so far as interstate trade goes, by the Federal Pure Food\nand Drugs Act; and most States have similar legislation.\nMisrepresentation in advertisement should be severely punished; the\nselling of cold storage for fresh products, of part-cotton for all-wool\nclothing, of less for more expensive woods, and the thousand other\nways of panning inferior goods upon an inexpert public for high-grade\narticles. At present there is little recourse but to carry distrust\ninto all purchasing, learn to be canny, and to recognize differences\nin quality in all articles needed. But the average man cannot become\nan expert purchaser; he buys furniture which breaks down prematurely;\nhe pays a high price for clothing which proves to have no wearing\nquality; he buys patent medicines which promise to cure his physical\nills, and is lucky if they do not leave him worse in health than before.\nJerry- building, and the doing of fake jobs by contractors, especially\nfor municipalities, is one of the scandals of our times. [Footnote:\nSee Encyclopedia Britannica, article, \"Adulteration.\" E. Kelly Twentieth\nCentury Socialism, book ii, chap. i. For a notorious case of tampering\nwith weights, see Outlook, vol. 92, p. 25; vol. 93, p. 811. For cases\nof adulteration, Good Housekeeping Magazine, vol. 54, p. 593. F. W.\nTaussig, Principles of Economics, chap. 45.]\n\n(2) Another duty, less generally recognized by even the more honorable\nbusinessmen, is to sell their goods at fair prices. The strangulation\nof competition by mutual agreements or the formation of trusts, aided\noften by an iniquitously high tariff, has put many a business for a\ntime on a par with those natural monopolies which, if unregulated,\ncan always exact exorbitant prices for what the public needs. Rich\nprofits have been made by the tucking of a few cents on to the price\nof gas, or coal, or steel, or oil, or telephone service. Enormous\nfortunes have been made, at the public expense, by the practical\ncornering of staple commodities. These hold-up prices should be clearly\nrecognized for what they are-a form of modern piracy. No business man\nor corporation is entitled in justice to more than a moderate reward\nfor the mental and physical labor expended; the excessive incomes of\nmonopoly are largely at the expense of the public, who, by one means\nor other, are being compelled to pay more than a fair price for the\narticle. [Footnote: For cases, see C. R. Van Hise, Concentration and\nControl, pp. 109,145, 149.]\n\n(3) Finally, all business must be looked upon as a form of public\nservice, and the convenience of customers scrupulously consulted. Where\nthere is competition this tends to regulate itself; but our public-\nservice monopolies have too often followed the \"public- be-damned\"\npolicy. The long-suffering community puts up with inadequate and\ncrowded streetcars, inconvenient train service, a bungled and high-\nhanded telephone system. Railway managements have sometimes been\ncriminally indifferent to public safety, finding it less expensive\nto lose occasional damage suits than to install safety appliances.\nEfficiency in serving the public has likewise been sacrificed to\ndividends; and courtesy, where it is not recognized to have a cash\nvalue, tends to disappear. Such indictments point to the widespread\nexistence of the idea that men and corporations are in business for\nthemselves only, and not as fulfilling a public need.[Footnote: For\nconcrete illustrations, see Outlook, vol. 91, p. 861; vol. 95, p. 515.\nWorld's Work, vol. 23, p. 579.]\n\n\nII. TO INVENTORS?\n\nIt has not been generally enough recognized that business men owe it\nto investors to do their best to see to it that they get fair returns\non their money invested -and only fair returns. There are a number\nof ways in which, on the one hand, the investing public is \"skinned,\"\nand, on the other hand, stock in a business, largely owned by the\nmanagement itself, has been rewarded with undeserved dividends at the\nexpense of the public.\n\n(1) There are, in the first place, the get-rich-quick swindles, the\nout-and-out impostures, which have deceived the credulous into\ninvestments that never could pay. Bonanza mines, impractical\ninventions, town lots laid out on the prairie, orange groves that\nexisted only on paper-such bogus hopes have enticed many an honest\nman and woman, who could ill afford to lose, into turning over their\nsmall earnings to the brazen exploiters.[Footnote: For cases, see World's\nWork, vol. 21, p. 14112.]\n\n(2) But such arrant deception is not the commonest form of wrong. A\nmore usual practice, and more dangerous- because it deceives even the\nintelligent-is to overcapitalize an honest business, to issue \"watered\"\nstock-that is, stock in excess of the actual value of plant, patents,\nand other assets. These stocks are issued merely to sell. If the\nbusiness is very successful, its profits may pay a fair return on all\nthis capital; if not, low dividends or none can be paid until the\nbusiness slowly catches up with its overcapitalization. In all\ninvestment-as our industrial organization at present goes-there is\nrisk; but to create a needless risk and deceive the public into taking\nit is plain dishonesty. The extra money thus sucked from the public\ngoes sometimes to pay excessive salaries to the officials of the\ncompany, sometimes to pay excessive prices for patents or plants\npurchased; there are many subtle ways, known to \"high finance,\" of\nmisappropriating stockholders' money and diverting it to the pockets\nof the promoters. Many great fortunes have been made in this way; such\nexploitation is so new to society that it has not yet awakened to its\nessentially criminal nature. Even if the business is able to pay good\ndividends on watered stock, the crime of overcapitalization is not\nlessened, though the harm done is now not to the investor but to the\npublic. Stocks should represent only the actual value of the property,\nso that dividends may be only a fair return for capital really invested\nin the business. Where there is sharp competition, the possibility\nof overcharging the public to make returns on watered stock is cut\nout, and the loss falls upon the investor. But in the case of monopolies,\nsuch as railways, or of combinations which practically stifle\ncompetition, the public may be charged enough to \"pay a fair dividend\nto investors,\" although the money upon which dividends are being made\nwent not into improving the service, but into fattening the promoters'\npurses. [Footnote: On stock watering, see Dewey and Tufts, Ethics,\npp. 561-64. Outlook, vol. 85, p. 562. Political Science Quarterly,\nvol. 26, p. 88. International Journal of Ethics, vol. 18, p. 151. C.\nR. Van Hise, Concentration and Control, pp. 115, 142, etc.]\n\n(3) A third method of \"fleecing\" investors lies in skillful\nmanipulation of the stock market. In ways which are known to the\ninitiated, it is often possible artificially to raise or lower the\nmarket value of stocks. Unwary investors are lured in; timid investors\nare frightened out; through all ticker fluctuations the brokers win\ntheir commissions; the skilled financiers and organizers of\ncombinations rake in unearned sums that are sometimes immense,\nwhile the losses fall mostly to the lot of the are honestly seeking to put\ntheir savings into solid investments. The ethics of the stock market has\nnot yet been clearly decided, and the subject is too big to discuss here.\nIt is mentioned only to point out one more form of social sinning, as yet\ninadequately punished or rebuked, whereby men of capital and brains\nhave been able to pocket money for which they have given no return\nto society. [Footnote: For cases, see C. Norman Fay, Big Business and\nGovernment. Outlook, vol. 91, pp. 591, 636.]\n\nIII. TO COMPETITORS?\n\n(1) The most conspicuous form of wrongdoing, perhaps, to be charged\nto modern business is the attempt to get monopoly by foul means. The\nstory of too many of our great trusts is a story of competitors ruined\nby ruthless and unscrupulous methods. The competitor may be hurt by\nthe circulation of falsehoods concerning his business, his right to\npatents, or the worth of his goods. He may be denied outlet to markets\nby control of the railway upon which he must depend. If the capital\nof the concern that is seeking monopoly permits, the price of the article\nmanufactured may be lowered until rivals with less financial backing\nare forced out of business-after which the price can be raised and\nlosses recouped. With skill and foresight worthy of a better cause,\nsome of the great industrial leaders of our day have eliminated one\nrival after another and attained that unification of a business which\nhas, indeed, its great economic advantages, but is not to be won at\nsuch a bitter cost. [Footnote: See, for example, I. Tarbell, History\nof the Standard Oil Company.]\n\n(2) Even where monopoly is not sought, there are many unfair methods\nof competition-unfair to competitors and to the public that both should\nserve. One method, much discussed in recent years, is that of railway\nrebates. By this is meant favoritism in freight rates between shippers\nand between localities. One manufacturer, who is in a position to ship\nhis goods by either of two railways, perhaps by a water route, is given\na low rate to get his freight; another manufacturer of similar goods,\nnot so favorably situated, is made to pay a higher rate. Rates from\nseaboard or river cities, where water competition exists, have often\nbeen considerably lower than rates from inland towns on the same line,\nwith a very much shorter haul. In such ways the railway squeezes those\nwhom it can squeeze and is content with a bare profit where it can\ndo no better. Where the railway is controlled by the same interests\nthat control some industrial combination, the favoritism may go even\nfarther, and the railway's profits be sacrificed entirely for the\ncheaper marketing of that particular trust's article. Against all such\ninequalities in the treatment of shippers the public conscience has\nlately protested; the railways are recognized as a public instrument\nof transportation, which should be open to use by all upon equal terms,\nat a price which will repay the cost of carriage plus a fair profit.\n[Footnote: On railway rebates, see H. R. Seager, Introduction to\nEconomics, chap. XXIV, secs 260-63. F. W. Taussig, Principles of\nEconomics, chap. 60, secs. 7, 8. Outlook, vol. 81, p. 803; vol. 85,\np. 161.] IV. TO EMPLOYEES?\n\n(1) The first duty of employers is to give to all employees a fair\nwage. If the business does not pay enough to allow this, it has no\nright to exist; if the owners are pocketing large salaries, or giving\ndividends to stockholders, this money should be used first for a proper\npayment of the workers. So many laborers are at the mercy of the\nemploying class, because of their ignorance, their lack of capital\nand necessity of work at any wage, and often their unfamiliarity with\nthe language and customs of the country, that it has become possible\nin many cases to treat them like animals and give them less than enough\nto sustain life in decency, not to say in comfort. Such a case as that\nof our benevolent Mr. Carnegie, who million dollars in one year's\nearnings of his steel trust, while many hundreds of his employees were\ngetting but a miserable pittance and living in vile surroundings, is\nexceptionally glaring; but in lesser degree the same injustice is being\nwrought in many industries. Wages have, indeed, been raised gradually,\nhere and there; but not usually by the free will of employers. The\ncallousness of some of the privileged classes toward the underpayment\nof the lower classes is almost on a par with the attitude of the\nnobility before the French Revolution.[Footnote: See, for example,\nOutlook, vol. 101, p. 345.] Fortunately, the public is coming to see\nnot only the wrong done to the helpless poor, but the cost to the\ncommunity in breeding underfed, ill- housed, criminally tempted\nclasses, and the danger that lies ahead if these classes realize their\npower before amelioration is effected from above. As a recent writer\nhas put it, Addition Division=Revolution. [Footnote: S. Hearing,\nWages in the United States; Social Adjustment, chap. IV. Ryan,\n A Living Wage.]\n\n(2) Another phase of modern industrial injustice is the overlong hours\nof work still required in many industries. The race for cheapness of\nproduct has blinded manufacturers and the public to the cost in terms\nof human happiness. An eight-hour day is quite long enough to produce\nall that is necessary, with the aid of modern machinery; every man\nshould be given a margin of leisure for education, recreation, and\nsocial life. And every man should be given the benefit of that one\nday's rest out of seven which is so precious a legacy to us from the\nJewish religion.[Footnote: A joint legislative committee in\nMassachusetts in 1907 estimated that 222,000 persons in that State\nwere working seven days in the week. Similar, or worse, conditions\nexist throughout the country.] Those industries that require continuous\nuse of machinery should employ three complete shifts of workmen; and\nthose that must be run every day in the week should have enough extra\nhelpers man. This humanizing of hours cannot be done by individual\naction, where competition is sharp; but by legislation that bears equally\nupon all, a generous standard-the eight-hour day and six-day week -can\nbe maintained, with hardship to none and a great increase in the health\nand happiness of the masses. Especially jealous should the law be for\nthe welfare of women workers. In cotton mills in the South women work\nten and twelve hours a day; in canneries in the North they work, during\nthe short season, fifteen and eighteen hours a day, eighty or even\nninety hours a week. Particularly should women be protected during\nthe weeks before and after childbirth; as it is, women workers are\noften ruined in health for life, the rate of infant mortality is\nshockingly high, and the children that survive are usually subnormal.\nGirls through overwork are weakened too seriously to bear strong\nchildren- which, in any case, they have had no time or opportunity\nto learn how to nurture and rear. No doubt women should work, as well\nas men; if not in the home, then outside the home. But the contemporary\neconomic pressure that bears so hard on so many girls and women must\nbe eased not only for their sakes but for that of coming generations.\n[Footnote: Dorothy Richardson, The Long Day. S. Nearing, Social\nAdjustment, chap. X. J. Rae, Eight Hours for Work.]\n\n(3) The most piteous form of industrial slavery is that of young\nchildren, who should be in school or out of doors, developing their\nminds and bodies into some measure of readiness for adult work and\nresponsibility, instead of prematurely losing the joy of life and\nstunting their mental and physical growth. In 1910 some two million\nchildren under sixteen were earning their living in this country. Even\nmany thousands of children of twelve years or less are set to work\nin our factories and canneries. These children get almost no development\nand wholesome recreation; in great numbers they die early, and if they\nlive it is commonly to fall into some form of vice or crime, and to\nbreed an inferior race. Nothing is more inhumane or more mad than for\nthe community to permit cheapness of goods at such a price. Indeed,\nchild labor means, in the end, economic waste; the ultimate loss in\nefficiency on the part of these undeveloped, uneducated children, far\nmore than overbalances the temporary industrial gain. The situation\nhas been incredibly shocking; the employers who seek such an advantage\nover their humaner rivals, and the legislators who have winked at their\ninhumanity, deserve no mild reprobation. But legislation alone is not\nadequate to meet the situation; the underlying cause is the\ninsufficient payment of adult workers, which practically necessitates\nsupplementation by what the children can add to the family income.\nThis is one illustration of the way in which all our social problems\nare tangled together so that it is impossible fully to solve any one\nwithout solving the others. When every adult receives wages enough\nto support a normal family-and when he is content to restrict his family\nto normal size; when the public schools are made efficient enough to\nshow their evident worth to parents and to attract the children\nthemselves, and a strict truant system takes care that the law is\nreally obeyed; when the sick and defective and aged among the poor\nare cared for at public expense as a matter of course, there will be\nno need for children to work to help support the family; and we must\nendeavor, by the arousal of public opinion and by nationwide\nlegislation, to keep children out of the factories, the shops, and\nthe mines, till they are full-grown and educated. [Footnote: S. Nearing,\nThe Solution of the Child-Labor Problem. J. Spargo, The Bitter Cry\nof the Children. E. N. Clopper, Child Labor in City Streets. Reports\nof Annual Meetings of the National Child Labor Committee. (Free\nliterature. 105 East Twenty-second Street, New York City.)]\n\n(4) A less appalling, but still sufficiently serious; aspect of\nindustrial unrighteousness is the dirty, crowded, ugly, unsanitary,\nand sometimes indecent conditions under which many workers in our\nprosperous age have to carry on their work. Lack of proper lighting,\nspace, and ventilation, unnecessary noises, and general untidiness,\nundermine the health and morals of laborers; while insufficient fire-\nprotection causes intermittently one tragedy after another. Much has\nbeen done in many quarters to improve such conditions; not a few up-to-\ndate factories are models of cleanliness and sanitation, spacious,\nreasonably quiet, and altogether pleasant places in which to spend\nthe working day. They point the way which all must in time follow.\nIn addition, the provision of reading-rooms, baths, rest- and recreation-\nrooms, lunch-rooms, athletic fields, and the like, give augury of that\nhappy future when work shall be divorced from ugliness and free from\nunnecessary physical strain.[Footnote: Sir T. Oliver, Diseases of\nOccupation. W. H. Tolman, Social Engineering, chaps. III, X, XI.\nWorld's Work, vol. 15, p. 9534; vol. 23, p. 294. Outlook, vol. 97,\np. 817; vol. 100, p. 353.]\n\n(5) Finally, the callousness to injuries incurred by employees must\nbe sharply checked. Well over a hundred thousand men, women, and children\nare killed or injured every year in the various industries of this\ncountry. Our proportion of accidents is far greater than in Europe;\nthe great majority are preventable by the adoption of known safeguards.\nWhat stands in the way is, partly, ignorance and heedlessness on the\npart of employers, and, still more, the initial cost of installing\nsafety appliances. It is often cheaper to lose an occasional damage\nsuit than to forestall accidents. In coal mines alone we have let\nthirty thousand men be killed and seventy-five thousand be more or\nless seriously maimed, in a decade; proportionately about twice as\nmany as in European mines-which are far from ideally safeguarded. There\nare two ways to check this waste and crippling of human life; one is\nto keep our legislation up to date, and require the installation of\nevery effective safety device, no matter if the cost to the public\nhas to be increased. The other is to make accidents so expensive to\nemployers that they will have a greater interest in taking measures\nto prevent them.\n\nCertainly all deaths or injuries in any industry where proper\nprecautions have been neglected must be a criminal matter for the\nemployer. [Footnote: Outlook, vol. 92, p. 171; vol. 93, p. 196; vol.\n99, p. 202. World's Work, vol. 22, p. 13602; vol. 23, p. 713.] We must\ndo entirely away with the system whereby accidents to workingmen bear\nso heavily upon their families. Though it is true that they are\ncommonly due, in some measure, to the carelessness of the worker, his\npunishment, in the loss of life or limb, is great enough; and if he\ndies or is incapacitated from supporting wife and children, the burden\nshould fall upon the community, which is able to bear it. It should\nnot be necessary to bring a damage suit against the employer; that\nmethod is slow, dubious, and expensive; the corporation, with its expert\nlawyers, has too great an advantage over the helpless and sorrow-struck\npoor. In some form, automatic compensation for injuries is destined\nto become universal; the cost will fall upon the industry, where it\nbelongs, bad feeling between employer and employee will cease, the\ncourts will be freed from a good deal of work, and relief will follow\ninjury with promptness and certainty. [Footnote: H. R. Seager, Social\nInsurance. Outlook, vol. 85, p. 508; vol. 92, p. 319; vol. 98, p. 49.\nS. Nearing, Social Adjustment, chap. XII.] What general remedies for\nindustrial wrongs are feasible?\n\n(1) The first step toward an amelioration of our crude and unjust\nindustrial code is to awaken the public conscience to protest against\nthe evils we have enumerated. Publicity, pitiless publicity, alone\ncan lead to redress. These large- scale, impersonal sins must not be\nso nonchalantly tolerated; instead of applauding and envying the shrewd\nfinancier who rakes in unearned profits by clever manipulation, by\nunscrupulous use of inside information, and disregard of the welfare\nof workers, competitors, and public, we must brand him as a selfish\nscoundrel, turn him out of the church, ostracize him in society. Such\na man must not be looked upon as a successful businessman any more\nthan a pirate is a successful trader; success must clearly imply\nobedience to the rules of the game. Taking all that one can grab without\npunishment is a reversion to barbarism; the unscrupulous magnate is\nmorally no better than a pickpocket. And these men are, in general,\nresponsive to public opinion; it has effected rapid improvement in\nsome points in the past few years. Just so soon as the community\nconscience is aroused to the point of a general condemnation of\nindustrial robbery, it will cease to flaunt itself so boldly, and lurk\nonly underground with the other furtive sins.\n\n(2) We cannot rely wholly upon the force of public opinion, however;\nthe law must be ready to check those who are insensitive to moral\nrestraints. One by one, the paths of evildoing must be blocked.\nEspecially must the law learn how to punish corporations, which have\nbeen the greatest offenders. At present the stockholders throw\nresponsibility upon the directors, the directors upon their managers,\nand they upon the subordinates who have personally carried through\nthe evil practices. But to punish these subordinates is ineffective,\nbecause they have, in general, little money wherewith to pay fines,\nand will be ready to run the risk of imprisonment for the sake of\npleasing their superiors and earning promotion. If they are imprisoned,\nothers can readily be found to step into their places and higher up.\nIt is these superiors who must be held responsible for acts done by\ntheir subordinates. If they realize the risk of punishment falling\nupon their own heads, they will see to it that illegal practices are\ndiscontinued. It will probably be necessary to hold directors responsible\nfor the conduct of their managers, and stockholders for the character\nof their directors. It will then become the business of owners and\ndirectors to watch out for lawbreaking and to put men in control who\nwill keep to fair dealing. This will put an end to the easy assumption\nof the directorship of several corporations at once by men whose names\nare wanted; directorship will be made to imply actual attention to\nthe affairs of the business. And the stockholders will take pains to\nelect such directors as will not incur fines for the corporation that\nwill lessen their dividends. [Footnote: For comment on this matter,\nsee Outlook, vol. 88, p. 862.]\n\n(3) Through these two means, public opinion and the law, we must work\ntoward the ultimate solution, the establishment of codes of honor in\nthe professions and industries. Canons of professional ethics have\nbeen adopted by lawyers and doctors; any member of these professions\nwho is guilty of breaking these canons suffers loss of prestige and,\nalmost inevitably, financial loss. So must it be in every industry;\neach must be organized and must formulate for itself its code; so that\npressure from within will supplement pressure from without. There is\nplenty of capacity for loyalty, self-denial, and discipline in men,\neven in captains of industry; it needs only to be aroused, crystallized,\ndirected. \"We may prevent certain specific practices by statutes which\nmake them misdemeanors; but in so doing we have simply cut off one\nway of reaching an end. Men will get the same result by another route.\nobtaining money or office in certain specified ways. We must so shape\ntheir ambitions that they do not wish to obtain money or office by\nmeans that injure the community. We must get them to consider public\nselfishness as dishonorable a thing as we now consider private\nselfishness\". If a man today crowds himself out of a theater, leaving\nbehind him a trail of bruised women and children, the very newsboy\nin the street will hiss him when he gets to the door. Such a man will\nbe despised by the public, and in his heart he will despise himself,\nfor taking advantage of his strength to crush others. But if a man\ngets money or office by analogous processes, the world is inclined\nto admire the result and forgive the means; and the man, instead of\ndespising himself for his selfishness, applauds himself for his\nsuccess.[Footnote: A. T. Hadley, Standards of Public Morality,\np. 8.] Certainly, unless in these peaceful ways we can transform our\npresent system of grab-as-grab-can into a fair and rational industrial\norder, changes will come by violence and revolution. There are volcanic\npassions slumbering beneath the prosperity of our trade and\nmanufacture; there is but a brief respite before society wherein to\nevolve a measure of social justice. The lower classes are awakening\nto their power; unless society and government grant them their fair\nshare of the fruits of industry, they will take them through the wreck\nof society and government. There is no moral problem more pressing\nthan the finding of peaceful remedies for industrial wrongs.\n\nE. A. Ross, Sin and Society. H. R. Seager, Introduction to Economics,\nchap. XXII. C. R. Van Hise, Concentration and Control, chap. II. A.\nT. Hadley, Standards of Public Morality. H. C. Potter, The Citizen\nin his Relation to the Industrial Situation. W. Gladden, The New\nIdolatry. R. C. Brooks, Corruption in American Politics and Life. H.\nJeffs, Concerning Conscience, chaps. XXII, XXIII. C. R. Henderson,\nThe Social Spirit in America, chaps. VII, IX. J. S. Brooks, The Social\nUnrest. Jane Addams, Democracy and Social Ethics, chap. V. Buskin,\nUnto this Last. International Journal of Ethics, vol. 23, p. 455. [For\nspecific references, see footnotes.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXVII\n\n\nINDUSTRIAL RECONSTRUCTION\n\nOUR modern industrial evils are so grave and so deep-rooted that it\nis highly questionable whether the pressure of public opinion, piecemeal\nlegislation, and the development of codes of honor can strike deep\nenough to eradicate them. Is not, perhaps, the whole system morally\nwrong? Instead of these endless attempts to cure the natural results\nof the system, is there not need of a radical reconstruction? Various\nattempts have been made, divers proposals are offered, in the hope\nof curing the causes of present maladies and devising a juster system.\nMany of these are doubtless impracticable, or tend to work more\nhardship than amelioration. But each proposal, of any plausibility,\nhas a right to a hearing if it offers to end the great wrongs of\ncontemporary industry; we must be very confident that it will not work\nbefore we reject it. For some way must be found to right these wrongs,\nor our whole industrial order will go to smash. We must not condemn\ntoo hastily a method which has not had a thorough trial, or whose defects\ntime and experience might remedy. For mistaken experiments can be\ndiscontinued; and great as is the danger in incautious radicalism,\nthe danger in \"standing pat\" is greater.\n\nOught the trusts to be broken up or regulated?\n\nThe greatest sinners are, certainly, to speak generally, the great\ncorporations that we call trusts-though the word \"distrust\" would\nbetter express contemporary feeling! So great has popular hostility\nto them become that the Democratic party platform of July, 1912, declared\nthat \"a private monopoly is indefensible and intolerable,\" and demanded\n\"the enactment of such additional legislation as may be necessary\nto make it impossible for a private monopoly to exist in the United\nStates,\"  i.e., \"the control by any one corporation of so large a\nproportion of any industry as to make it a menace to competitive\nconditions.\" But is it necessary to destroy this splendidly\nefficient concentration of industry in order to avoid its evils? The\nproposal to revert to the older competitive plan is reminiscent of\nthe outcry against machine production a century earlier, and the earnest\npleas then made to return to the hand-tool method. \"Big business\"\nconstitutes one of the greatest advances in human industry, and\ntherefore has surely come to stay. From the era of individual workers\nowning their tools, mankind advanced to the age of competition between\nsmall concerns using machines; no less marked an advance is that to\nthe age of large-scale production and unified industry. Its advantages\nmay be briefly summarized:\n\n(1) The competitive system involves needless duplications of plant,\nmachinery, and workers; clerks stand idly in rival stores, waiting\nfor trade, drummers spend their time in getting trade away from one\nanother, great sums have to be spent on advertising. Monopoly means\na saving of all this wasted time, labor, and money.\n\n(2) The competitive system means great fluctuations in industry,\nconstant anxiety, forced cut prices, and frequent failures, with their\nfinancial ruin and heartbreak to employers and loss of work to\nemployees. Monopoly means stability, comparative freedom from anxiety,\nand a saving of the economic confusion and loss of bankruptcies.\n\n(3) The great scale of monopolistic production tends to still further\neconomies. Raw ported in larger quantities, and so at lower cost; less\nneed be kept on hand at a given time. The utilization of by-products,\nmade feasible by large-scale production, has proved, in many cases,\na striking addition to human wealth.\n\n(4) Monopolistic production means that more money can be put into\nimproved processes, into plant and machinery, into making factories\nsanitary, and working conditions pleasant. The conspicuousness of the\nplant makes it more open to public criticism and more likely to awaken\na sense of pride in the owners. Conditions are seldom tolerated in\nthe big concerns that go unheeded in the little shops.\n\nSurely our attempt, then, must be to retain \"big business,\" and cure\nits evils, rather than to turn the hands of the clock backward by\nreverting to the wasteful competitive system. If this proves possible,\nwe should work for the organizing of the as yet unorganized industries.\nHalf of human effort is still wasted, through lack of such\norganization. If the innumerable butcher shops, grocery stores,\napothecary shops, dry goods stores, etc, throughout the country, were\nconsolidated locally, and then for some considerable section of the\ncountry, we could have greatly reduced prices and greatly improved\nshops. Mr. Woolworth's chain of five- and ten-cent stores offers a\nfamiliar contemporary example of the efficiency and saving to the\nconsumer of such consolidation.\n\nWhat are the ethics of the following schemes:\n\nI. TRADE UNIONS AND STRIKES? We must, then, consider what methods of\nregulating, without destroying, monopoly are efficient and morally\ndefensible; and, first, the method into which the working classes have\nput most of their effort and enthusiasm. The labor-unions have, as\na matter of fact, actually effected certain results, which we may rapidly\nreview:-\n\n(1) Their chief accomplishment, and indeed effort, has been the raising\nof wages and shortening of hours for labor. Their success, however,\nhas fallen far short of their hopes; and it is impossible to say how\nmuch more they have accomplished in this direction than would have\nbeen effected by other causes without their efforts. As a whole, the\nemploying class disbelieves in the unions and is strenuously\ndisinclined to yield to their desires. And at present the employers\nare usually stronger than their employees, unless public opinion or\nlegislation forces them to surrender their position.\n\n(2) To some slight extent, but only to a slight extent, they have\neffected amelioration in other matters have freed labor from the\ntyranny of company stores, decreased child labor, secured the\ninstallation of safety appliances, sanitary conditions, and other\nneeded improvements.\n\n(3) Their social effect has been greatest. They have amalgamated our\nstream of heterogeneous immigrants and fired them with common\nunderstanding and purpose; they have taught the ignorant to cooperate,\nmade them think, frowned to some degree upon vice, insured their\nmembers to. some extent against illness and death, and promoted general\nfriendliness among the laboring classes.\n\nOn the other hand, their methods have been productive of much harm:\n\n(1) The economic loss due to strikes has been enormous; the employers\nhave suffered heavily, the public has suffered heavily; the laborers\nhave suffered most of all. Social amelioration certainly ought not\nto have to come about through such wasteful methods and such bitter\nprivation.\n\n(2) The inconvenience caused the public by strikes has often been very\ngreat, especially where the coalmines or railways have been affected.\nOnly a few years ago a veritable tragedy was barely averted, when\nPresident Roosevelt succeeded, after the most strenuous efforts, in\nending the general coal strike in the winter season. A strike of\nlocomotive engineers means obviously a great peril to the traveling\npublic.\n\n(3) The antagonisms and class hatreds engendered by this sort of\nindustrial warfare do infinite moral harm, and retard heavily the\npeaceful solution of the problems. The class organs always denounce\nin bitterest terms the opposing class, and lawlessness always lurks\nin the background.\n\n(4) Apart from their conduct of strikes, the labor unions must answer\nto many serious indictments. They have endeavored to restrict output,\nin order to raise prices. They have sought to restrict the number of\napprentices in a trade, and have opposed trade schools, in order to\nkeep down the competition for positions. They have insisted on a\nuniform wage without regard to efficiency. They have opposed scientific\nmanagement and the increase of efficiency in various industries, in\norder to retain more workers therein. They have insisted upon the\nretention of incompetent employees, thereby directly causing railway\naccidents and other evils. They have often antagonized such other\nameliorative methods as profit sharing and government regulation, and\nhave rejected overtures from employers, because these-to quote from\na union pamphlet-\"remove the scope and field of trade-unionism.\" They\nhave at times been run in the interests of selfish leaders and seemed\nchiefly a moneymaking scheme of a few grafters.\n\nThere can be no question, on a dispassionate consideration, that the\nmilitant methods of the trade unions are an unfortunate and temporary\nexpedient. The grievances which they have sought to remedy are very\nreal and very bitter; and perhaps, on the whole, the unions have done\nmore good than harm, and accomplished results that would not so soon\nhave been effected in any other way. But they have been rather\nstrikingly unsuccessful. After fifty years of propaganda, seventy per\ncent of all industrial workers remain non-unionized; and there has\nbeen a relative loss in their numbers during the past decade. They\nhave never succeeded in cornering the labor market, and there seems\nto be no prospect of their succeeding. In all events, for a permanent\nand thoroughgoing solution of labor troubles we must turn to some other\nmethod.\n\n\nII. PROFIT SHARING, COOPERATION, AND CONSUMERS' LEAGUES?\n\n(1) The usual method of profit-sharing is for the employer to set aside\nvoluntarily a certain proportion of the profits of successful years,\nto be distributed among the employees in addition to their regular\nwages, the distribution being made proportionate to the amount of each\nman's wages. It is thus properly called a dividend to wages, and is\nequivalent to a small ownership of the stock of the business by each\nworker. The advantage lies not only in the fairer distribution of the\nprofits of a business, but in the interest, contentment, and increased\nefficiency of the employees. The self-interest of the laborers is\nenlisted to prevent strikes, and a feeling of good will tends to\nprevail. Not a few employers are giving a degree of profit sharing\nas a mere business proposition; and the results have been generally\nsuccessful. But the method is only a sop. It touches only one of the\nevils above mentioned, that of underpayment of workers. And, for that\nmatter, it is oftenest introduced where the workers are already well\npaid. It is possible only in successful and firmly established\nindustries; and even in them, bad years may necessitate a temporary\ncessation of dividends to wages, and generate resentment in the minds\nof the laborers, who do not know the precise status of the business.\nMoreover, since the workers cannot be expected to reverse the procedure\nin lean years and contribute to the maintenance of the business, it\nis necessary, in most industries, to reserve a considerable sum from\nthe profits of fat years to tide over possible periods of lean years.\nIt might be possible to enforce by law the accumulation of such a reserve\nfund, and then the distribution of a fixed percentage of the net\nprofits of the business to labor-instead of permitting all the profits\nto go into the pockets of owners or stockholders. But such a plan will\nprobably be superseded by or incorporated into some more comprehensive\nsolution for industrial evils, a scheme that can remedy other wrongs\nbesides that of inadequate wages.\n\n(2) Cooperation in production involves democratic management of a\nbusiness as well as a more radical sharing of its profits. The workers\nthemselves contribute the capital, elect the managers, and divide the\nprofits. By their votes they can determine hours of work, and arrange\nconditions to suit themselves, so far as their capital allows.\nCooperation-when fully carried out-is socialism on a small scale\nintroduced into the midst of a capitalistic regime. Its defects are,\nfirst, that it is difficult while that regime lasts to find capital\nenough-since those who have capital to invest usually prefer to manage\nthe business themselves or to entrust their money to a business\nconducted on ordinary lines; secondly, that failure means the loss\nof the hard-earned savings of workingmen; thirdly, that it is difficult\nto retain skillful managers, since such men usually prefer the\nopportunities which individualistic business offers of making a larger\nincome; and fourthly, that it is difficult for a democratically managed\nconcern to compete successfully with autocratic business. Political\ndemocracies are at a disadvantage in a struggle with tyrannies, if\nthe latter are governed by able men. A one- man policy is more stable,\npermits of quicker action and a more consistent policy than is possible\nto a democracy. Exactly so in business, our dictatorial captains of\nindustry have an advantage over their usually less skilled and always\nless powerful heads, and their smaller capital. The millionaire can\ncut prices and stand losses which would ruin a cooperative body of\nworkingmen. So that cooperative production has not generally proved\nsuccessful. In any case, there seems to be no probability of societies\nof producers being able to supplant the capitalistic concerns; we must\nturn elsewhere for the solution of our problems.\n\n(3) Consumers' cooperation has been more widely successful. On this\nplan a number of people contribute the capital of a business in equal\nsmall amounts and share the profits in proportion to their purchases.\nThe possibility of excessive profits to a single owner or a small group\nof owners is thus abolished. But the other evils of autocratic industry\nremain; laborers are hired for current wages, as by the capitalists,\nand the temptations to unfair treatment of employees and of competitors\nremain.\n\n(4) \"Consumers' Leagues,\" so called, have made a business of\nascertaining the conditions under which goods are produced, and\nexhorting their members to purchase only those which have involved\nfair treatment to the workers. The undertaking is praiseworthy, and\nhas accomplished some good. But its effects are limited by obvious\ncauses. It is extremely difficult in many cases for the consumer to\ndiscover the conditions of production of what he wishes to buy. It\nis a nuisance to have to burden himself with such perplexing\nconsiderations. And it is impossible to maintain public allegiance\nto a white list in face of the temptation of bargain sales. Evils must\nbe attacked at their source; they cannot be effectively controlled\nfrom the consumer's end. III. Government regulation of prices, profits,\nand wages? There are two proposals that promise thoroughgoing cure\nfor industrial evils government regulation of business, leaving it\nupon its present capitalistic basis, and socialism, the complete\ndemocratizing of industry. It seems that one or the other alternative\nmust ultimately be accepted. According to the former, and less radical,\nplan, publicity of accounts would be required in every industry; and\nstate or national commissions would have full power to supervise the\nconditions of production, to set a minimum standard below which wages\nmust not fall, to fix maximum prices above which the products must\nnot be sold, to prevent stock- watering, to enforce standards of honesty\nand good workmanship in goods, to see to it that all competition is\ncarried on fairly, and to forbid excessive salaries to managers. Equal\nstandards would be exacted throughout an industry, and any increased\ncost of production would result in the raising of prices (except where\nprofits had previously been exorbitant); thus there would be no real\nhardship upon employers. The minimum wage should not, of course, be\nset above the actual productive power of labor; and the inefficient\nlaborers who would be thrown out of employment as not worth the standard\nwage must be looked after by the provision of free vocational education\nand state employment. Apprentices, cripples, defectives, and persons\ngiving only part time, would be permitted to receive partial wages;\nand above the minimum wage, differences in stipend would still exist,\nas now, to stimulate industry and skill. With such provision for safe-\nguarding the rights of labor, of competitors, and of the public, profits\nwould not be directly regulated; if they became excessive, they would\nbe clipped by the requirement of a lower price for the product, or\nof more sanitary or safer conditions of production. But the initiative\nand energy of the owners would be retained by permitting a sliding\nscale of profits; the higher the wages paid, or the lower the price\nset upon products, the greater the profits they could be allowed. Thus\na premium would still be set upon efficiency. Under this plan monopoly\ncould be carried to any extent; strikes could be absolutely forbidden,\nand all dissatisfaction settled by the arbitration of the impartial\ngovernment commission. Monopoly might even be legally maintained by\na refusal of charters to would-be competitors, thus insuring to the\npublic the advantages of a completely organized business without\nleaving the public at its mercy. The natural monopolies, such as\nrailways, telephones, lighting-service, from which private fortunes\nhave often been made at public expense, can easily be regulated by\ncarefully considered and short-term franchises.\n\nUp to date, the partial and tentative trials of this plan have been\nencouragingly successful. But there are obvious defects in it, which\nwe must notice:\n\n(1) The danger of failures in business would still exist. Some factors\nwould tend to lessen this danger as, the prevention of stock-\nwatering, misappropriation of funds, excessive salaries, and the unfair\ncompetition of rivals. But failures could no longer be averted by\nsqueezing wages, neglecting conditions of production, or lowering the\nquality of goods. The employers may well ask, in bitterness, what right\nthe Government has to close their chances of high profits when it\nleaves the chance of total loss. Private ownership of business, still\nretained on the plan we are considering, must involve risk of\nbankruptcy, with its economic waste and its suffering.\n\n(2) The plant, capital, and management of a business would still be\nentirely at the disposal of the owner, and handed down in his family\nor to partners voluntarily taken in. The son of a capitalist, who\ninherits the business, may be by no means the most deserving or efficient\nperson to carry it on. Industry is not democratic under this plan;\njustice is attained as a compromise between the interests of capitalists\nand laborers. Class antagonisms are still fostered; distrust of the\nimpartiality of the government commission would continually be present,\nand might at any time lead to actual rebellion and violence.\n\n(3) The temptations to corruption would be enormous. The capitalists,\nwith their reserve funds, would be in a position to bribe or unfairly\ninfluence any susceptible members of the commissions; and with the\ndanger of bankruptcy on the one hand, and the great prizes to be won\non the other, there would inevitably result in the present state\nof the average human conscience-a great deal of foul play.\nCommissioners would have an unlimited opportunity of blackmailing\nemployers. Labor members would pull in one direction, and upper-class\nmembers in another. The strain upon public morality would be severe.\n\nIV. SOCIALISM? Socialism promises, according to its adherents, to\naccomplish all the good results of government regulation, while\nobviating its defects. It behooves us, then, to give it careful and\nunbiased attention. The movement toward it is, at least, one of the\nmost significant and widespread movements of our times, evoking on\nthe one hand extraordinary enthusiasm and loyalty, so that to millions\nof men it is almost a religion, and on the other hand deep distrust,\nimpatient contempt, or bitter hostility. Moreover, the movement is\nsteadily growing; we must recognize that it is not a fad, but a deep\ncurrent, an international brotherhood that numbers in its ranks many\nable and intellectual men. We may here disregard the inadequate\neconomic theories that have hampered its earlier years, and the Utopian\ndreams that have been published under its name, and consider it only\nas a practical program for remedying our acknowledged and serious\nindustrial evils.\n\nThe gist of the socialist proposal is that all industry shall be made\ndemocratic, as government is now becoming democratic all over the\nearth. All plants and all capital are to be owned by the State, and\nall business run as the Post-Office is run, or as the Panama Canal\nwas built. The managers of each industry are to be chosen from the\nranks, according to their fitness, for proved efficiency and knowledge\nof the business. Everybody will be upon a salary, and the opportunity\nof increasing personal profits by lowering wages, cheating the public,\nneglecting evil conditions of production, or damaging rivals, will\nbe absent. Thus, instead of trying by an elaborate system of checks\nto keep within due bounds the greed of man, the possibility of satisfying\nthat greed is definitely removed, and all earnings made proportionate\nto industriousness and skill. We proceed to summarize the advantages\nthat, it is urged, would follow the inauguration of this industrial\ndemocracy:\n\n(1) All industries could be organized and centralized. A vast amount\nof human effort could be saved, and waste eliminated. Business would\nno longer, as so often now, be hampered for lack of funds to carry\nout plans. A special staff could be retained to invent and apply new\nideas. In short, just as the trusts now are much more efficient and\neconomical than the small concerns they have superseded, so the\ncompletely organized industries of a socialistic regime would be, we\nare told, in a position to double human efficiency. If the postal\nbusiness were open to competition, there can be no doubt that we should\nbe paying higher rates today for a much less efficient service. If\nit were a private monopoly, some one would probably be getting enormous\nprofits out of it profits which now go back into extending the service.\nThe labor saved by industrial unification would be available for a\nthousand other undertakings that cry to be carried out.\n\n(2) All the industrial wrongs enumerated in the preceding chapter\ncould, it is asserted, be remedied, and all problems adjusted, with\ncomparatively little friction, because it would be to no one's\nparticular advantage to retard such betterment. Those in control of\nevery business, being upon a fixed salary, and having nothing to gain\nby squeezing laborers or public, would be amenable to a sense of pride\nin the honesty, cleanliness, and efficiency of their business, and\nthe contentment of their employees. If they were too lazy or stupid\nto respond to such motives, they could quickly be superseded in office\nby men who were more ambitious for the fair showing of their branch\nof the public service.\n\n(3) Opportunity to rise to the control of a business would be open\nto every laborer in it. The sons of rich men could no longer step easily\ninto the soft berths, whether they were deserving or not. Proved\nefficiency, plus popularity, would be the road to success. With the\nhigher wages paid to labor (made possible partly by the economic saving\nthrough organization, and partly by cutting out the private fortunes\nnow made out of industry), every boy would be able to get a thorough\nvocational education, and be in a position to strive, if he is\nambitious, for leadership. Industrial power would be conferred,\ndirectly or indirectly, by popular vote; business would be recognized\nas a public affair, and nepotism and hereditary advantage banished\nfrom it as they have been from politics.\n\n(4) The risk of bankruptcies, with all their attendant evils, would\nbe done away with entirely. Business would have a stability unknown\nto our present individualistic industry, and businessmen would be freed\nfrom that anxiety that drives so many today to a premature grave.\n\n(5) All speculation in stocks would be likewise eliminated. The\nnecessary capital for any new undertaking would be provided by the\nindustrial State, and the undeserved gains and losses of our present\nsystem of private investment would come to an end.\n\n(6) Morally, there would be a probable gain in several ways. The\nelimination of private profit from business would give freer room for\nthe development of a social spirit which is now choked out by the\ntemptation that each owner of a business is under to grab all that\nhe can for himself. There would be no motive, and no fortunes available,\nfor, at least, the most striking forms of that corruption of the press\nwhich is such a grave problem today. Municipal theaters would be under\nno temptation to produce nasty plays. All this exploitation of human\nweakness and passion is done because it PAYS; if the men at the top\nwere on a salary there would be no such inducement to cater to vicious\ninstincts. The economic pressure that now pushes so many girls in the\ndirection of prostitution would be relieved. The people generally would\nbe dignified and educated by their participation in industrial, as\nnow in political decisions. If some of the tougher strains of character,\ngrit, push, endurance, etc. would be less fostered, the gentler and\nmore social aspects of character would find better soil.\n\nWhether all these advantages would actually accrue, in the degree hoped\nfor, it is, of course, impossible to know. There are, however, at least\ntwo grave dangers in socialism which must be squarely faced:\n\n(1) A certain degree of slackness and consequent inefficiency would\nalmost inevitably result from the relaxing of the pressure of\ncompetition and the removal of the opportunity for unlimited personal\nprofit. Employees and managers of state and municipal undertakings\nare apt to take things easily; and there have been usually waste and\ninertia and extravagance in such enterprises. The probable loss in\ngrit, push, and endurance, mentioned above, might prove serious.\nWe must admit that, on the whole, private business has been managed\nmuch better than public business, both in this country and abroad. To a\nconsiderable extent, however, the inefficiency of municipal and state\nundertakings has been due to the clumsiness and corruption of political\nsystems, and can be cured by political reform. That public affairs\ncan be managed as successfully as private business has been\ndemonstrated on many occasions. The parcel post offers a much\nmore economical service than the express companies ever gave.\nThe most efficient and successful engineering undertaking ever\naccomplished by man the construction of the Panama Canal was\na thoroughgoing socialistic achievement. Moreover, in our criticism\nof public undertakings, we are apt to forget how slack and inefficient\nthe great bulk of private business has been; our attention is caught\nby the few concerns that have made a striking success, and we\noverlook the vast numbers that have failed or barely kept alive.\nLooking at the matter psychologically, observation does not\naltogether confirm the statement that men need an unlimited\npossibility of financial reward to work hard. The vast majority of\nworkers today are on salary; and on the whole they probably work\nas faithfully as the few at the top (continually becoming fewer) who\nhave the spur of private profit.[Footnote: 1 Cf. this testimony in regard\nto former owners of stores in Minnesota and Wisconsin who have been\nbought out and retained as managers by cooperative societies: \"they\nwork for moderate salaries, and in almost all cases are working\nas ardently for success as they ever did for their own gain.\" N. O.\nNelson, in Outlook, vol. 89, p. 527.] Not all capitalists are hard\nworkers; much of the real work is done for them by salaried managers.\nIt is very questionable if doctors and lawyers, who work for profits,\ngive any more loyal service to the community than teachers, ministers,\nor nurses, who work on salary. There would still be the need of earning\none's living, and the incentive of rising to positions of higher salary,\ngreater authority, and wider interest. And, after all, most of the really\ngood work of the world is done on honor, from the normal human\npleasure in doing things well, and pride in being known to do\nthings well. When freed from the private greed and antisocial class\nfeelings which now inhibit it, this zest in efficient work and loyal\nservice might receive a new impetus. A socialistic regime would surely\nmake a business of inculcating in its public schools the conception\nof all work as public service; and the pressure of public opinion would\nbear more heavily upon workers-as there is today much freer criticism\nof public than of private undertakings. But even if there should be\na considerable increase in slackness and a decrease in PER\nCAPITA production, that economic loss might be more than\nmade up by the saving of labor through organization. And if\nnot, it is true that efficiency is not the only good. Considerations\nof humanity should weigh with us as well as considerations of\nmoneymaking; if socialism can cure the intolerable evils in our\npresent selfish and chaotic system, a certain decrease in\nproduction might not be too great a price to pay.\n\n(2) The running of the complicated socialistic machine would involve\na great deal of friction, with consequent dissatisfaction and dissension.\nProblems would arise on all hands: On what basis should the wage-rate\nin this industry and in that be determined? How much of the public\nmoneys should be put into this and how much into that undertaking?\nWas this department head fair in discharging this man and promoting\nthat man? Suspicion of bribery and graft would continually recur. Bad\nseasons would be encountered, blunders would be made, overproduction\nwould occur, men would be thrown out of employment in the work they\nhad chosen, floods, fires, plagues, and other disasters would sweep\naway profits; the adjustment of these losses would be an enormously\ndelicate matter. At present, the poor are apt to feel that prosperity\nfor them is hopeless; under a socialistic regime they would expect\nit, and be loath to see their incomes diminished when things went\nwrong. Socialism would require a great deal of good temper and\nwillingness to submit to decisions which seemed unwise or unfair.\nIt is highly doubtful if human nature is yet good enough to fit the\nsystem.\n\n(3) A third objection to socialism, that corruption would be increased,\nis a much-debated point. There would be, as now, opportunity for\nfalsification of accounts and embezzlement. Individual promotions\nwould too often hinge upon personal friendship or favors received.\nThe enormous administrative machinery would open up all sorts of new\navenues to personal gain at the expense of others, which unprincipled\nmen would be quick to take advantage of. But, on the other hand, no\ngreat private fortunes or wealthy corporations would exist to bribe,\nand no such money-prizes would exist to be won by bribery as are\ncommon in our present system. There would be no temptation to adulterate\ngoods, and less of a temptation to award contracts or franchises to\nfriends -since there would be no private profit in it. What supports\nour political rings today is, above all, the existence of the\n\"interests\" wealthy corporations that are making profits enough to\nspare large sums for \"influencing\" legislation; these \"interests\" would\nno longer exist. On the whole, then, the amount and direction of\ncorruption under socialism is unpredictable; but its possibility should\ngive us pause. The other general objections to socialism are probably\nless serious; some of them complete misapprehensions. It is certainly\nnot anti-Christian; on the contrary, there are those who believe that\nit is the necessary the Christian spirit.[Footnote: Cf, for example,\nW. Rauschenbusch, Christianity and the Social Crisis.] It is not\n\"materialistic\" any more than any industrial system must necessarily\nbe. It would not necessarily destroy private property or lessen human\nfreedom, except in the one matter that it would prevent private\nownership of the instruments of industrial production and destroy the\nfreedom to conduct business to private advantage. But it is clear that\nit would involve us in all sorts of complicated and delicate problems\nof detail which would require generations for satisfactory solution\nand which might never be satisfactorily solved. And it might, of course,\nlead to other difficulties now unforeseen, graver and more difficult\nto meet than we now realize. Surely, then, it is not to be lightly\nundertaken, and not to be undertaken as a mere revolt of the lower\nclasses against their industrial masters. It must be worked out in\ngreat detail, and contrasted with every possible alternative, before\ncautious statesmen will consent to its adoption. For it would mean\na revolutionary change of enormous proportions; and it would not be\neasy to revert to the earlier order. Our political machinery, under\nwhich the vast industrial system would come, must first be reconstructed\nand made efficient. Religion and public education must be strengthened\nto meet the new demands upon character and intelligence. It is earnestly\nto be hoped that if socialism comes, it will come not by revolution,\nas the result of a class struggle, but by evolution and a general\nconsent, the result of long and careful public discussion. In the\nwriter's opinion, present steps must be along the line of government\nregulation, with socialism as the possible, but as yet by no means\ncertain, eventual outcome. In any case, there is no simple and sweeping\npanacea for our industrial ills; the patient thought and experimentation\nand effort of generations will be required before a satisfactory and\nstable equilibrium is attained.\n\nCompetition VS. concentration: C. R. Van Hise, CONCENTRATION AND\nCONTROL, chap. I. J. W. Jenks, THE TRUST PROBLEM. E. von Halle,\nTRUSTS AND INDUSTRIAL COMBINATIONS. F. C. McVey, MODERN\nINDUSTRIALISM. S. C. T. Dodd, COMBINATIONS, THEIR USE AND\nABUSE. R. T. Ely, MONOPOLIES AND TRUSTS. C. N. Fay, BIG\nBUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT. Edmond Kelly, TWENTIETH CENTURY\nSOCIALISM, book II, chap, II; book III, chap. I. A. J. Eddy, THE NEW\nCOMPETITION. Atlantic Monthly, vol. 79, p. 377. FORUM, vol. 8, p. 61.\nJOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, vol. 20, p. 358. Labor unions and\nstrikes: J. R. Commons, TRADE-UNIONISM AND LABOR PROBLEMS.\nCarlton, HISTORY AND PROBLEMS OF ORGANIZED LABOR. S. and\nB. Webb, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY; HISTORY OF TRADE\nUNIONISM. J. Mitchell, ORGANIZED LABOR. C. R. Henderson, SOCIAL\nSPIRIT IN AMERICA, chap. ix. Jane Addams, NEWER IDEALS OF\nPEACE, chap. v. ATLANTIC MONTHLY, vol. 109, p. 758. H. R. Seager, I\nNTRODUCTION TO ECONOMICS, chap. xxi. F. W. Taussig, PRINCIPLES\nOF ECONOMICS, chap. 55. Profit sharing: W. H. Tolman, SOCIAL\nENGINEERING, chap. vii. Seager, OP. CIT, chap, xxvi, sec. 281. Adams\nand Sumner, LABOR PROBLEMS, chap. X. N. P. Gilman, PROFIT\nSHARING; A DIVIDEND TO LABOR. Outlook, vol. 106, p. 627.\nQUARTERLY REVIEW, vol. 219, p. 509. Cooperation: G. J. Holyoake,\nHISTORY OF COOPERATION. C. R. Fay, COOPERATION AT HOME\nAND ABROAD. Adams and Sumner, LABOR PROBLEMS, chap. x.\nARENA, vol. 36, p. 200; vol. 40, p. 632. H. R. Seager, OP. CIT, sec.\n282. F. W. Taussig, OP. CIT, chap. 59. Consumers' leagues: Publications\nof the National Consumers' League (106 East Nineteenth Street, New\nYork City). Government regulation: J. W. Jenks, OP. CIT, Appendices.\nC. R. Van Hise, OP. CIT, chaps, iii-v. F. W. Taussig, OP. CIT, chaps.\n62,63. H. R. Seager, OP. CIT, chap. xxv. C. L. King, REGULATION\nOF MUNICIPAL UTILITIES. J. B. and J. M. Clark, CONTROL OF THE\nTRUSTS. E. M. Phelps, FEDERAL CONTROL OF INTERSTATE\nCORPORATIONS. ATLANTIC MONTHLY, vol. iii, p. 433. OUTLOOK,\nvol. 99, p. 649; vol. 100, pp. 574, 690; vol. 101, p. 353; vol. 103,\np. 476. NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, vol. 197, pp. 62, 222, 350.\nINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, vol. 23, p. 158. JOURNAL\n OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, vol. 20, pp. 309, 574. Socialism:\nEdmond Kelly, TWENTIETH CENTURY SOCIALISM. H. G. Wells,\nNEW WORLDS FOR OLD. J. Spargo, SOCIALISM. M. Hillquit,\nSOCIALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE. A. Schaffle, THE\nQUINTESSENCE OF SOCIALISM. F. W. Taussig, OP. CIT, chaps.\n64, 65. J. Rae, the roman numerals are both upper and lower case\ndid not standardize PORARY SOCIALISM. R. T. Ely, SOCIALISM.\nW. G. Towler, SOCIALISM IN LOCAL GOIVERNEMNT. H. R. SEAGER,\nOP. CIT, sec. 282. N. P. Gilman, SOCIALISM AND THE AMERICAN\nSPIRIT. R. Hunter, SOCIALISTS AT WORK. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL\nECONOMY, vol. 14, p. 257. OUTLOOK, vol. 91, pp. 618, 662; vol. 95,\npp. 831, 876.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXVIII\n\n\nLIBERTY AND LAW\n\nWE have spoken of the practical defects and dangers inherent in the\nvarious proposals that look to the rectification of industrial wrongs.\nBut there is one source of opposition to these proposals that requires\nmore extended consideration-the fear that they-and especially\nsocialism-unduly threaten that ideal of personal liberty which our\nfathers so passionately served and we have come to look upon as the\ncornerstone of our prosperity. What is this ideal of liberty, and how\nshould it affect our efforts at industrial regeneration? What are the\nessential aspects of the ideal of liberty? Throughout a long stretch\nof human history one of the most vexing obstacles to general happiness\nand progress has been the irresponsible power of sovereigns and\noligarchies. To generations it has seemed that if freedom from selfish\ntyranny could but be won, the millennium would be at hand. Our heroes\nhave been those who fought against despots for the rights of the\npeople; we measure progress by such milestones as the Magna Charta,\nthe French Revolution, the American Declaration of Independence. To\nthis day we engrave the word \"liberty\" on our coins; and the converging\nmultitudes from Europe look up eagerly to the great statue that\nwelcomes them in New York Harbor and symbolizes for them the freedom\nthat they have often suffered so much to gain. In Mrs. Hemans's hymn,\nin Patrick Henry's famous speech, in Mary Antin's wonderful\nautobiography, The Promised Land, we catch glimpses of that devotion\nto liberty which, it is now said, we are jeopardizing by our increasing\nmass of legislative restraints and propose to banish for good and all\nby an indefinite increase in the powers of the State. More than a\ngeneration ago Mill wrote: \"There is in the world at large an\nincreasing inclination to stretch unduly the powers of society over\nthe individual, both by the force of opinion and even by that of\nlegislation; and as the tendency of all the changes taking place in\nthe world is to strengthen society, and diminish the power of the\nindividual, this encroachment is not one of the evils which tend\nspontaneously to disappear, but, on the contrary, to grow more and\nmore formidable.\"[Footnote: Essay on Liberty, Introductory.] Not a\nfew observers today are reiterating this note of alarm with increasing\nemphasis. Are their fears well founded? We may at once agree in\napplauding the liberty worship of our fathers and of our contemporaries\nin the more backward countries. No secure steps in civilization can\nbe taken until liberty of body, of movement, and of possession are\nguaranteed; there must be no fear of arbitrary execution, arrest, or\nconfiscation. To this must be added liberty of conscience, of speech,\nand of worship; the right of free assembly, a free press, and that\n\"freedom to worship God\" that the Pilgrims sought. Wherever these\nrights, so fundamental to human happiness, are impugned, \"Liberty!\"\nis still the fitting rallying-cry.[Footnote: The exact limits within\nwhich freedom of speech must be allowed are debatable, (a) Speech which\nincites to crime, to lawbreaking, to sexual and other vice, must be\nprevented; and (b) slander, the public utterance of grossly disparaging\nstatements concerning any person, without reasonable evidence of their\ntruth. May we attempt to stifle the utterance of (c) such other\nuntruths as are inexcusable in the light of our common knowledge? There\nare certainly many matters where there is no longer room for legitimate\ndifference of opinion; and the general diffusion of correct knowledge\nis greatly retarded by the silly utterances of uninformed people. Yet\nto draw the line here is so difficult that we must probably tolerate\nthis evil forever rather than run the risk of stifling some generally\nunsuspected truth.] rights are safely won; the danger now is rather\nof abusing them. We must not forget that liberty is only a means, not\nan end in itself, to be restricted in so far as may be necessary for\nthe greatest happiness. From our discussion in Part II it should be\nclear that there are no \"natural rights\" which the community is bound\nto respect; liberty must be granted the individual so far, and only\nso far, as it does not impede the general welfare. We do not hesitate\nto end the liberty, or even to take the life, of those we deem dangerous\nto society. We do not hesitate to confiscate the land which we deem\nnecessary for a highway or railroad or public building. Indeed, we\nhedge personal liberty about with a thousand restrictions by general\nconsent, in the realization that public interests must come before\nprivate. We have no need to discuss the doctrine of anarchism\n[Footnote: For an eloquent defense of anarchism see Tolstoy's writings;\nhere is a sample statement: \"For a Christian to promise to subject\nhimself to any government whatsoever-a subjection which may be\nconsidered the foundation of state life-is a direct negation of\nChristianity.\" (Kingdom of God, chap. IX.) Cf. this utterance of one\nof the Chicago anarchists of 1886. \"Whoever prescribes a rule of action\nfor another to obey is a tyrant: usurper, and an enemy of liberty.\"]-\nunrestricted liberty since the general chaos that would result there\nfrom, in the present stage of human nature, is sufficiently apparent.\nLiberty can never be absolute. Indeed, there has been a curious\nreversal of situation. The older cry of liberty that stirs us was a\ncry of the oppressed masses against their masters; now it is a slogan\nof the privileged upper classes against that increasing popular\nlegislation which restricts their powers. Kings are now but\nfigureheads, if they linger at all, in our modern democracies;\ngovernments are not irresponsible masters of the people, they are\ninstruments for carrying out the popular will. The real tyrants now,\nthose whose irresponsible authority is dangerous to the masses, are\nthe kings of industry; if the cry of \"liberty\" is to be raised again,\nit should be raised, according to all historical precedent, in behalf\nof the slaves of modern industry rather than in behalf of the fortunate\nfew who give up so grudgingly the practical powers they have usurped.\nThere were those, indeed, who fought passionately for the divine right\nof kings, those who died to maintain the right of a white man to hold\nNegroes as slaves; there are those today who with a truly religious\nfervor uphold the right of the capitalistic class to manage the\nindustries of the country at their own sweet will, unhampered by such\nlegislative restrictions as the majority may deem expedient for the\ngeneral welfare. But it is a travesty on the sacred word \"liberty\"\nthat it should be thus invoked to uphold the prerogatives of the favored\nfew. Liberty, in the sense in which it is properly an ideal for man,\nconnotes the right to all such forms of activity as are consonant with\nthe greatest general happiness, and to no others. It implies the right\nnot to be oppressed, not the right to oppress. Mere freedom of contract\nis not real freedom, if the alternative be to starve; such formal\nfreedom may be practical slavery. The real freedom is freedom to live\nas befits a man; and it is precisely because such freedom is beyond\nthe grasp of multitudes today that our system of \"free contract\" is\ndiscredited; it offers the name of liberty without the reality. But\napart from this questionable appeal to the ideal of liberty, there\nare not a few who sincerely believe, on grounds of practical expediency,\nthat legislation ought not to interfere any more than proves absolutely\nnecessary with the conduct of industry. This scheme of individualism\nwe will now consider.\n\nThe ideal of individualism. The individualistic, or laissez-faire,\nideal dates perhaps from Rousseau and the French doctrinaires; its\nbest-known representatives in English speech are Mill and Spencer.\nDewey and Tufts have pithily expressed it as follows: \"The moral end\nof political institutions and measures is the maximum possible freedom\nof the individual consistent with his not interfering with like freedom\non the part of other individuals.\"[Footnote: Ethics, p. 483.] Its leading\narguments may be presented and answered, summarily, as follows:\n\n(1) Legislation has so often been mischievous that it is well to have\nas little of it as possible. The masses are uneducated, the prey of\nimpulse and passion; politics are corrupt; to submit the genius of\nfree ENTREPRENEURS to the clumsy and ill-fitted yoke of a popularly\nwrought legal control is to stifle their enterprise and interfere with\ntheir chances of success. After all, every one knows his own needs\nbest; and if we leave people alone, they will secure their own welfare\nbetter than if we try to dictate to them how they shall seek it. \"Out\nof the fourteen thousand odd acts which, in our own country, have been\nrepealed, from the date of the Statute of Merton down to 1872 . . .\nhow many have been repealed because they were mischievous? . . . Suppose\nthat only three thousand of these acts were abolished after proved\ninjuries had been caused, which is a low estimate. What shall we say\nof these three thousand acts which have been hindering human happiness\nand increasing human misery; now for years, now for generations, now\nfor centuries?\"[Footnote: H. Spencer, Principles of Ethics, part IV,\nsec. 131.] But to admit that much legislation has been blundering is\nnot to admit that the principle of social control is wrong. Our political\nsystem must, indeed, be made must be placed in the way of overhasty\nand ill-considered lawmaking. But it is not always true that the\nindividual is the best judge of his own ultimate interests; and it\nis demonstrably untrue that the pursuit by each of what he deems best\nfor himself will bring the greatest happiness for all. The stronger\nand more favorably situated will take advantage of their position and\nresources; the weaker, though theoretically free, will in reality be\nunder the handicap of poverty, ignorance, hunger. Such a system is\ninevitably vicious in its moral effects. To say that in a popular\ngovernment legislation cannot properly standardize practice, cannot\nformulate a higher code of public morality than men can be depended\nupon to attain if unrestrained, is unwarrantably to discredit democracy.\nIf the laws are bad, improve them. If the public is uneducated, educate\nit. If our system gives us poor lawmakers, change the system. But to\ngive up the attempt at legal control, to leave things as they are or\nrather, to leave them to go from bad to worse, is unthinkable.\n\n(2) Too much legislation stifles individuality, drags genius down to\nthe dead level of average ideas, tends to produce an unprogressive\nuniformity of practice. It imposes the conceptions of the past upon\nthe future. \"If the measures have any effect at all, the effect must\nin part be that of causing some likeness among the individuals; to\ndeny this is to deny that the process of molding is operative. But\nin so far as uniformity results advance is retarded. Every one who\nhas studied the order of nature knows that without variety there can\nbe no progress.\"[Footnote: H. Spencer, op. cit, sec. 138.] \"Persons\nof genius, it is true, are, and are always likely to be, a small\nminority; but in order to have them it is necessary to preserve the\nsoil in which they grow. Genius can only breathe freely in an atmosphere\nof freedom. ... It is important to give the freest scope possible to\nuncustomary things, in order that it may in time appear which of these\nare fit to be converted into customs.\" [Footnote: J. S. Mill, On Liberty,\nchap. III.] But the intention of social legislation is to check only\nsuch individual action as is demonstrably detrimental; the uniformity\nproduced will be only a uniform absence of flagrant wrongs and adoption\nof such positive precautions as will make the detection and checking\nof these harmful acts easy. Beyond this minimum uniformity (which,\nhowever, must include an enormous number of details, so manifold have\nthe possibilities of wrongdoing become) there will on any system be\nample range for the development of new methods and processes. Whatever\ndanger there once was in choking individual initiative by needlessly\nparalyzing restrictions, will be, in the long run, negligible in an\nage of omnivorous reading and free discussion, and in a land whose\nconscious ideal is improvement, new invention, progress. As a matter\nof fact, it is chiefly through legislation that new methods of social\npractice become diffused. Each of our forty-eight States is\nexperimenting in social guidance, trying to thwart this or that sin,\nto remedy this or that wrong, to work out a plan by which men can happily\ncooperate in our complex public life. The process of evolving an\nefficient and frictionless social machine, instead of being retarded\nby this activity of lawmaking, is actually accelerated thereby. Private\nbusiness tends to fall into ruts; and one man's ideals are blocked\nby lack of cooperation from others. Legislation tends not only to\npreserve the best of past experiments; but, goaded by the zeal of\nreformers, and pushed by political parties, to drag complacent and\ninert individuals along new and untried paths. The greatest field for\ngenius lies today in devising successful constructive legislation;\nand the greatest hope for progress in this era of mutual dependence\nlies in the winning of a majority for some social scheme that must\nbe generally adopted if at all.\n\n(3) Laws, however beneficent, which rise above the general conscience\nof the people are undesirable; character should precede legislation.\n\"To conform to custom, merely as custom, does not educate or develop\nin [a man] any of the qualities which are the distinctive endowment\nof a human being. . . . He who does anything because it is the custom\nmakes no choice. He gains no practice either in discerning or in desiring\nwhat is best. The mental and moral, like the muscular powers, are\nimproved only by being used. . . . It is possible that he might be\nguided in some good path, and kept out of harm's way, without [using\nhis own judgment, powers of decision, self control, etc.] But what\nwill be his comparative worth as a human being? It really is of\nimportance, not only what men do, but also what manner of men they\nare that do it.\" [Footnote: J. S. Mill, op. cit, chap. III.] A little\ncommon sense will show us, however, that there are, and always will\nbe, plenty of occasions for exercising our moral muscle, however closely\nwe hedge in the field of legitimate activity. Prone to temptation as\nmen are, and beset by a thousand wrong impulses, we may well seek to\nblock this and that path of possible wrongdoing without fear of turning\nthem mechanically into saints. On the contrary, we should hasten to\nuse the experience of the past to avert needless temptations from the\nmen of the future.\n\nOur experience has been costly enough; and if it has revealed its\nlessons too late to save contemporary social life, at least it should\nserve as warning for our sons. To sacrifice right conduct to moral\ngymnastics is to set up the means as more important than the end; every\ngood act that can be lifted from the plane of moral struggle and put\nsecurely on the plane of habit is a step in human progress, and leaves\nmen freer to grapple with the remaining temptations. If you wish to\neducate men up to a law, put it upon the statute books if you can,\ncompel attention to it and discussion of the reasons pro and con,\nshow its practical workings; it is far easier to educate conscience\nup to an existing law than beyond it. Moreover, it must be said that\nthose who prefer to see men left to think things out anew for\nthemselves, without the restraint and guidance of the law,\nshow a singular callousness toward those whom their action,\nif they choose wrongly, will hurt. If we could trust men to\nchoose aright-but we cannot; and men must be protected\nagainst their own stupidity and weakness, and that of others,\nby the collective wisdom and will.\n\n(4) Individualism makes for prosperity. Offering a fair chance to all,\nit brings the best to the top; the fittest survive, and win the\npositions of power; the community as a whole is, then, in the end\nadvantaged. \"Free competition in profits coordinates industrial\nefficiency and industrial reward.This is equality of opportunity,\nthrough which every man is rewarded according to his worth\nto the consumer.\" [Footnote: F. Y. Gladney, in the Outlook, vol. 101,\np. 261.] Unfortunately, however, it is those who are fittest to serve\nnot the community but their own interests that have the best chance\nto survive-the clever, the privileged, the unscrupulous. Nor is there\nequality of opportunity where some will not play fair and others have\na long start. The individualistic struggle makes for the selection\nof a type of greedy, self-centered man, with little sense of social\nresponsibility. Even granted that the men who reach the top are the\nmen best fitted to manage the industries of the country, this method\nof selection of leaders is too wasteful of strength, too hard on the\nunsuccessful, to be generally profitable. The prosperity of modern\nindustry is due not primarily to its chaotic plan of individual effort\nand cross-purposes, but to the measure of cooperation we have\nnevertheless attained, with its consequent division and specialization\nof labor and large-scale production, aided by the extraordinary\ndevelopment of invention and machinery. The ideal of legal control.\nThe epoch of ultra individualism, of what Huxley called \"administrative\nnihilism,\" is rapidly passing. Jane Addams speaks of \"the inadequacy\nof those eighteenth-century ideals the breakdown of the machinery\nwhich they provided,\" pointing out that \"that worldly wisdom which\ncounsels us to know life as it is\" discounts the assumption \"that if\nonly the people had freedom they would walk continuously in the paths\nof justice and righteousness.\" [Footnote: Newer Ideals of Peace, pp.\n31-32.] H. G. Wells remarks, \"We do but emerge now from a period of\ndeliberate happy- go-lucky and the influence of Herbert Spencer, who\ncame near raising public shiftlessness to the dignity of a natural\nphilosophy. Everything would adjust itself-if only it was left alone.\"\n[Footnote: Social Forces in England and America, p. 80.] It is becoming\nclear that we cannot trust to education and the conscience of\nindividuals to right matters, not only because as yet we provide no\nmoral education of any consequence for our youth, but because, if we\ndid, the temptations in a world where every man is free to grab for\nhimself would still be almost irresistible. But there are two positive\narguments for the extension of legal control that clinch the matter:\n\n(1) Without the support of the law it is often impossible for the\nconscientious man to act in a purely social spirit. The competition\nof those who are less answerable to moral motives forces him to lower\nhis own ideals if he would not see his business ruined. The employer\nof child labor in one factory cannot afford to hire adults, at their\nhigher wage, until all the other factories give up the cheaper labor\nalso. Where sweatshop labor produces cheap clothing for some\nmanufacturers, the more scrupulous are undersold. One employer cannot,\nunless he is unusually prosperous, raise the wages of his employees\nor shorten their hours until his competitors do likewise. Improvement\nof conditions must take place all along the line or not at all. And\nsince unanimous voluntary consent is practically impossible to obtain,\nand of precarious duration if obtained, the legal enforcement of common\nstandards is necessitated.\n\n(2) Men generally are willing to bind themselves by law to higher codes\nthan they will live up to if not bound. In their reflective moments,\nwhen they are deciding how to vote, temptations are less insistent\nand ideals stronger than when they are confronting concrete situations.\nTo vote for a law which will restrain others, and incidentally one's\nself, comes easier than to make a purely personal sacrifice that leaves\ngeneral practice unaltered. To realize that this is true, we need but\nlook at the remarkable ethical gains made now year by year through\nlaws voted for by many of the very men whose practice had hitherto\nbeen upon a lower moral level. Very many evils that once seemed fastened\nupon society have been thus legislated out of existence.[Footnote:\nFor a vivid picture of earlier industrial conditions which would not\nnow be tolerated, see Charles Reade's Put Yourself in His Place.] And\nif the industrial situation still seems wretched, it is because, in\nour swift advance, new evils are arising about as fast as older evils\nare eradicated. The law necessarily lags behind the spread of abuses,\nso that \"there will probably always be a running duel between anti-social\naction and legislation designed to check it. Novel methods of\ncorruption will constantly require novel methods of correction . .\nBut this constant development of the law should make corrupt\npractices increasingly difficult for the less gifted rascals who must\nalways constitute the great majority of would-be offenders.\" [Footnote:\nR. C. Brooks, Corruption in American Politics and Life, p. 99.] The\nlaw can never, of course, cover the whole field of human conduct; it\nrepresents, in Stevenson's phrase,\" that modicum of morality which\ncan be squeezed out of the rock of mankind.\" Unnecessary extension\nof the law is cumbersome, expensive, and provocative of impatience\nand rebellion. Moreover, there is always some minimum of danger of\ninjustice in attempting legal constraint; the law itself, as approved\nby the majority, may be unfair, or its application to the concrete\ncase may be unfair. The individualists are right in feeling that men\nmust be left alone, wherever the possible results are not too dangerous.\nBut no hard-and-fast line can be drawn between activities that must\nbe left free and those which must be regulated. Such apparently personal\nmatters as the use of opium or alcohol must be checked because the\ngeneral happiness is, in the end, greatly and obviously enhanced by\nsuch restraint. But there will always be, beyond the law, a wide field\nfor the satisfaction of personal tastes and the practice of generosity.\nThere is no double standard; if an act is legally right and morally\nwrong, that simply means that it lies beyond the boundaries of the\nlimited field which the law covers. The extension of that field is\na matter of practical expediency in each type of situation; beyond\nthat field, but working to the same ends, the forces of education and\npublic opinion are alone available. [Footnote: For a discussion of\nthis point, see F. Paulsen, System of Ethics, book III, chap. IX, sec.\n9. International Journal of Ethics, vol. 18, p. 18.] Should existing\nlaws always be obeyed? Year by year we are extending our network of\nlaws over human conduct; more and more pertinent becomes the them?\nand the further question, Are there times when the law may be rightly\ndisobeyed? We shall discuss the second question first. It is obvious\nthat our whole social structure rests upon the willingness of the\npeople to obey the law. The watchword of republics should be, not\n\"liberty,\" but \"obedience\"; their gravest danger now is not tyranny,\nbut anarchy. We must individually submit with patience and good temper\nto the decisions of the majority, even if we disapprove those\ndecisions. We must abide by the rules of the game until we can get\nthe rules changed. And all changes must be effected according to the\nrules agreed upon for effecting changes. This law-abiding spirit is\nthe great triumph of democracy; only so long as it exists can popular\ngovernment stand. Though it be slower and exacting of greater effort\nand skill, evolution, not revolution, is the method of permanent\nprogress. We must, then, band together against any groups that, in\ntheir impatience of reform or opposition to the common will, cast aside\nthe restraints of law. However dearly we may long for woman's suffrage,\nwe must sternly repress those excited suffragettes who would gain this\nend by defiance of law and destruction of property; even if they further\ntheir particular cause by their violence-which is highly doubtful-they\ndo it at the expense of something still more precious, the preservation\nof the law-abiding spirit. Other organizations will not be slow to\nprofit by the lesson of their success; and we shall have Heaven knows\nhow many causes seeking to attain their ends by destructiveness and\nresistance. Similarly, the more serious and menacing rebellion of labor\nagainst law must be firmly controlled; much as we may sympathize with\ntheir grievances, we cannot countenance the attempt to remedy them\nby violence. The Industrial Workers of the World, with action, [Footnote:\nCf, in a pamphlet issued by them: \"The I.W.W. will get the results\nsought with the least expenditure of time and energy. The tactics used\nare determined solely by the power of the organization to make good\nin their use\". The question of 'right' and 'wrong' does not concern\nus. In short, the I.W.W. advocates the use of militant 'direct action'\ntactics to the full extent of our power to make them.\" (Quoted in\nAtlantic Monthly, vol. 109, p. 703.)] have made themselves enemies\nof society. The advocates of \"sabotage,\" the \"reds\" in the socialist\ncamp, the preachers of practical anarchism, must be treated as among\nthe most dangerous of criminals. On the other hand, the spread of the\nspirit of lawlessness among the lower classes should serve to warn\nthe upper classes that present social conditions will not much longer\nbe endured.[Footnote: Cf. Ettor (quoted in Outlook, vol. 101, p. 340):\n\"They tell us to get what we want by the ballot. They want us to play\nthe game according to the established rules. But the rules were made\nby the capitalists. THEY have laid down the laws of the game. THEY\nhold the pick of the cards. We never can win by political methods.\nThe right of suffrage is the greatest hoax of history. Direct action\nis the only way.\"] There is a great deal of idealism among the advocates\nof violence;[Footnote: Cf, for example, Giovannitti's poem, The Cage,\nin the Atlantic Monthly, June, 1913.] there is a great deal of sympathy\non the part of the public with lawless strikers, with the I.W.W. gangs\nthat have recently invaded city churches, with all those under-dogs\nwho are now determining to have a share in the good things of life.\nUnless the employing and governing classes meet their demands halfway,\ngunpowder and dynamite pretty surely lie ahead. Will the spirit of\nlawlessness spread? Ought we to slacken our process of lawmaking lest\nwe make the yoke too hard to bear? As a matter of fact, it is through\nmore laws, better laws, and a better mechanism for punishing infraction\nof laws, that we can hope to check lawlessness. Lynching-as we noted\nin chapter XXV-have been the product of inadequate legislation and\njudicial procedure; as our laws against the worst crimes become\nsharper, our police forces more efficient, and our court trials quicker\nand less hampered by technicalities, they decrease in number. As\neducation on the liquor question spreads, violations of prohibition\nlaws become fewer. The kind of lawlessness that is on the increase\nis that which exists as a protest against and a means of remedying\nevils that the laws have not yet properly dealt with. Give us by law\nan industrial code that will minimize the exploitation of the weak\nby the strong, bringing a good measure of security and comfort to all,\nand such outrages as those of the McNamara brothers will cease, or\nat worst will be merely sporadic and generally condemned. Allow present\nconditions to drift on without sharp legal guidance, and such outrages\nwill certainly become more and more numerous. The alternative that\nconfronts the modern world is plainly evolution by law or revolution\nby violence. Individualism: J. S. Mill, On Liberty. H. Spencer,\nPrinciples of Ethics, part iv, chaps, XXV-XXIX; Social Statics; and\nmany other writings. J. H. Levy, The Outcome of Individualism. Various\npublications of the British Personal Rights Association. W.\nDonisthorpe, Individualism. W. Fite, Individualism, lect. IV. Legal\ncontrol: Florence Kelley, Some Ethical Gains through Legislation. Jane\nAddams, Newer Ideals of Peace. E. A. Ross, Social Control, chap. XXXI.\nD. S. Ritchie, Principles of State Interference. J. W. Jenks,\nGovernment Action for Social Welfare. A. V. Dicey, Law and Opinion.\nJ. Seth, Study of Ethical Principles, pp. 297-331. H. C. Potter, Relation\nof the Individual to the Industrial Situation, chap. VI. W. J. Brown,\nUnderlying Principles of Modern Legislation. Journal of Philosophy,\nPsychology, and Scientific Methods, vol. 10, p. 113. A. T. Hadley,\nFreedom and Responsibility. J. W. Garner, Introduction to Political\nScience, chaps, IX, X. Edmond Kelly, Evolution and Effort. Lawlessness:\nAtlantic Monthly, vol. 109, p. 441. Outlook, vol. 98, p. 12; vol. 99,\np. 901; vol. 100, p. 359. J. G. Brooks, American Syndicalism.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIX\n\n\nEQUALITY AND PRIVILEGE\n\nAll men, our Declaration of Independence tells us, are created free\nand equal-that is, with a right to freedom and equality. They are\nnot actually equal in natural gifts, but they ought, so far as possible,\nto be made equal in opportunity; equality is not a fact, but an ideal.\nAnd as an ideal it comes sometimes into conflict with its twin ideal\nof liberty; the freedom of the stronger must be curtailed when it robs\nthe weaker of their fair share of happiness; but, on the other hand,\na dead level of equality must not be sought at the sacrifice of the\npotentialities for the general good that lie in the free play of\nindividuality. The various projects for securing a greater equality\namong men must be scrutinized with an eye to their total effects\nupon human happiness.\n\nWhat flagrant forms of inequality exist in our society?\n\nEquality is a modern ideal; in former times it was generally assumed\nthat men inevitably belong to classes or castes; that some must have\nluxury and others poverty, some must rule and others obey. Plato, in\nconstructing his ideal state, retains the walls between the small\ngoverning class, the warriors, and the mass of artisans, who are of\nno particular account but to get the work done. Castiglione, in his\nBook of the Courtier, declares that \"there are many men who,\nalthough they are rational creatures, have only such share of\nreason as to recognize it, but not to possess or profit by it. These,\ntherefore, are naturally slaves, and it is better and more profitable\nfor them to obey than to command.\"\n\nBut the invention of the printing press brought ideas to the masses,\nthe invention of gunpowder brought them power; the colonization of\nnew continents leveled old distinctions of rank; the development of\nmanufacture and commerce brought fortune and power to men of\nhumble origin. The forces thus set in motion have resulted in our\nday in the general acceptance of political democracy witness in\ncontemporary affairs the inception of the Portuguese Republic,\nthe Chinese Republic, the abolition of the veto-power of the British\nHouse of Lords-and are creating a widespread belief in industrial\ndemocracy. So complete is our American acquiescence in the\nprinciple of equality in the abstract that it is difficult for us to\nrealize the burning passions that underlay such familiar words\nas Don Quixote's, \"Know, Sancho, that one man is no more\nthan another unless he does more than another\"; or Burns's\n\"A man's a man for a' that\"; or Tennyson's \" 'Tis only noble\nto be good.\"\n\nYet, for all our abstract belief in equality, we have not become equal\nin opportunity, and in some ways are actually becoming less so. Land,\nfor example, which was once to be had for the taking, is steadily\nrising in price, and is now, in most parts of the country, getting\nbeyond the reach of the poor. Foreign observers agree that there is\nno other existing nation so plutocratic as our own; and wealth here\nis probably though the matter is in doubt becoming more and more\nconcentrated. [Footnote: For a recent and cautious discussion of this\npoint see F. W. Taussig, Principles of Economics, chap. 54, sec. 3.\nThere is really no accurate information available to settle the\nquestion whether wealth is becoming more or less concentrated.\nCertainly the number of the rich has rapidly increased, and very many\nof the poor have risen into the class of the well to do. Wages and\nthe scale of living of the poor have risen, but not in proportion to\nthe total increase in wealth. The rich seem to be not only getting\nricher, but getting a larger SHARE of the national wealth.] It is\nestimated that one per cent of the inhabitants of our country now own\nmore property than the remaining ninety-nine per cent.\n\nThe natural resources of the country have been to a considerable extent\nsuch natural monopolies as railways, telegraph and telephone service,\ngas and electric lighting, are controlled by, and largely in the\ninterests of, a small owning class. The Astors have become enormously\nrich because one of their progenitors bought for an inconsiderable\nsum farm land on Manhattan Island which is now worth so many dollars\na square foot. Others have made gigantic fortunes out of the country's\nforests, its coal deposits, its copper, its waterpower, its oil. A\ncertain upper stratum of society is freed from the necessity of work,\ncan exercise vast power over the lives of the poor, and use its great\naccumulations for personal luxury or at its caprice, in defiance of\nthe general welfare. Such congestion of wealth involves poverty on\nthe part of masses of the less fortunate. With no capital, the poor\nman cannot compete in the industrial game; he has no money to invest,\nno reserve to fall back upon; he must accept employers' terms or starve.\nHe cannot pause to educate himself, to get the skill and knowledge\nthat might enable him to work up the ladder. His power in politics\nis overshadowed by that of the great corporations with their funds\nand their control of legal skill. He cannot afford expert medical care,\nor proper hygienic conditions of life; he is lucky if he can get a\nmeasure of justice in the courts. To call such a situation one of\nequality is irony. It is certain that, far as we are yet from final\nsolution of the problems of production, we are still farther from a\nsolution of the problems of the distribution of wealth. \"A new and\nfair division of the goods and rights of this world should be,\" De\nTocqueville long ago declared, \"the main object of all who conduct\nhuman affairs.\" What methods of equalizing opportunity are possible?\n\nThree plans for a fairer distribution of wealth have been proposed.\nAccording to one, the profits from industry would be divided among\nthe population on a basis of their NEEDS. This is, however, clearly\nimpracticable; every one, would discover unlimited needs, and no one\nwould be fit to make the apportionment. The second scheme is that all\nmen should be paid alike for equal hours of work, or, rather, in\nproportion to the disagreeableness of the work, the amount of\nSACRIFICE made. This scheme is that usually advocated by Socialists.\nThe objection to it is that equal pay for every man would take away the\nchief stimulus to initiative, skill, energy, efficiency; it would take\nthe zest and excitement out of the game of life, make living too\nmonotonous; there must be rewards for the ambitious youth, prizes to\nbe won. The third plan proportions reward to efficiency. And on the\nwhole, as men are constituted, it seems desirable to reward men\nfinancially according to their efficiency, so far as that can be\nmeasured.[Footnote: F. W. Taussig, Principles of Economics, chap. 64,\nsec. 3.] This does not mean to leave things as they are. For at present\nthe shrewd, if also fortunate, are rewarded out of all proportion to\ntheir efficiency; and many who are not efficient at all, who even do\nno work at all that is socially useful, are among the wealthiest.\nMoreover, efficiency itself is only partly due to the individual's\nwill and effort; it is due to the physique and gifts and fortune he\nhas inherited, the education and environment that have molded him,\nthe social situation in which he finds himself, the willingness of\nothers to cooperate with him, and his good luck in early ventures.\nIt seems unfair that to him that hath so much, so much more should\nbe given. Or at least it seems fair that he that hath less should be\ngiven more favorable opportunity. It is not enough, as Professor Giddings\nsays, to reward every man according to his performance; we must find\na way to enable every man to achieve his potential performance. The\nplan of proportioning rewards to efficiency must be modified by mercy\nfor the weak-minded and weak-bodied. It must be supplemented by earnest\nefforts to provide health, education, and favorable environment for\nall, and, by the limitation of the right of inheritance, that all may\nhave, so far as possible, approximately equal opportunity. It must\nbeware of judging efficiency by immediate and obvious results, must\nencourage inventions that ripen slowly, genius that stumbles and blunders\nbefore succeeding, work that contributes to others' results and makes\nno showing for itself. It must involve a restriction of the right to\nunearned incomes. To put these necessary corollaries to the efficiency-\\\nreward plan into concrete form:\n\n(1) The handicap of ignorance must be removed by providing free\neducation for all, to the point of enabling every one to develop\nefficiency in some vocation. Scholarships for the needy, the\nprohibition of child labor, and a high enough wage scale for adults\nto permit the youth of all classes to complete their education, are\nindispensable.\n\n(2) The handicap of ill-health must be, so far as possible, removed\nby state support of mothers-so that children need not inherit a weakened\nconstitution from overtired mothers, or suffer from want of care in\ninfancy; by free medical aid to all; by strict legislation for sanitary\nhousing, pure food, etc; by the provision of public parks and\nplaygrounds.\n\n(3) The possibility of exorbitant profits from industry (profits out\nof proportion to the actual contribution of the individual in skillful\nwork, mental or manual) must be abolished, by one of the plans\ndiscussed in chapter XXVII.\n\n(4) There must be abolition or sharp limitation of unearned incomes\ni.e., incomes for which a return to society in service has not been\nmade by the getter. This is the step that is clearest of all\ntheoretically, but the worst sticking point in practice. If we could\npersuade men that they should not reap where they have not sown,\nthe gravest inequities of our present order would disappear. The\nsources of unearned incomes are, first, the \"unearned increment\"\nin land values; secondly, the \"unearned increment\" in the value of\nnatural resources; thirdly, all interest on investment; fourthly, all\nwealth inherited or obtained by legacy or gift.\n\n(a) Land in the heart of New York or London sells at fifteen million\ndollars or so an acre. The land value of Manhattan Island alone,\nthe central part of New York City, is in the neighborhood of\n$3,500,000,000, and rapidly increasing. A few generations ago it was\nall bought from the Indians for $24. It is estimated that the \"unearned\nincrement\" of land values in Berlin during fifty years has been between\n$500,000,000 and $750,000,000. What is true so strikingly in the case\nof these great cities is true, in lesser degree, of all cities and\ntowns and villages that have grown in population. The total increase\nin land values in America since the days of the pioneers equals, of\ncourse, the present value of its land, since it was acquired by our\nforefathers without payment, or with only a nominal fee to the Indians.\nAlmost all of this enormous increase in wealth has gone into the\npockets of the fortunate individuals who got possession; very little\ninto the public treasury. Our cities have remained terribly poor,\nalways in debt, obliged to pass by many needed improvements and to\nimpose heavy taxes on their citizens. Yet all this wealth (not counting\nimprovements made by the possessor upon his land) has been socially\ncreated. Others have moved into the neighborhood, factories have been\nbuilt near by, roads and railways and sewers and water systems and\nlighting-systems and police protection, and a hundred other things,\nhave made the individual's land more and more salable. If our fathers\nhad been wise enough to divert a large percentage of this increase\nin value into the public coffers, no one would have been wronged, but\nmany private fortunes would today be smaller, and the entire population\ncould have been free from taxation from the beginning, with plenty\nof money for all needed public works, including many that we can now\nonly dream about.\n\nIt is easy to see what could have been done; to determine what should\nnow be done is far more difficult. To try to regain for the public\nthe unearned increments of past years would be an injustice to those\nwho have purchased lands recently, at the increased prices, and even,\nperhaps, to those who have benefited by the increasing values, since\nthey have regarded the increase as theirs and adjusted their\nexpenditures to this added income. The best that could be done would\nbe to take an inventory of all land values now, and provide for a\nrecurrent reappraisal; then to take all, or a large percentage, of\nthe increased value from now on. It would, indeed, be dangerous to\nattempt to take it all, on account of the extreme difficulty of drawing\nthe line between earned and unearned increments; even the most\npainstaking and impartial decisions would be sometimes unjust. But\nto take half or two thirds of what should be deemed \"unearned\" would\nbe practicable. Several modern States now take from ten to fifty per\ncent; and the percentage taken will doubtless increase. The objections\nto such a course are twofold. In the first place, it is pointed out\nthat if the unearned increment of value is appropriated by the State,\nthe State should recoup landowners for all undeserved decrements of\nvalue; it is not fair to take away the possibility of gain and leave\nthe possibility of loss. So long, however, as our population grows,\nthe State could afford to make good the comparatively few cases of\ndecreased value and yet get a big income. The other objection is that\nthe hope of winning the increased land values has been a great and\nneeded incentive to the development of the country, and a legitimate\ncompensation for the hardships of pioneering. But while this is true\nof the earlier days, it applies less and less to present conditions,\nand is hardly at all applicable to the profits made in city lands.\nOn the whole, there seems little objection to the appropriation by\nthe State henceforth of the unearned increments of land value. But\nthe days of enormous increments are passing, and land will presently\nreach a comparatively stable value. So that this method of preventing\ninflated fortunes must be counted, on the whole except for new and\nrapidly growing communities a lost opportunity. [Footnote: H. J.\nDavenport, State and Local Taxation, pp. 294-303. F. C. Howe, European\nCities at Work, pp. 189-207. Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 22,\np. 83; vol. 25, p. 682; vol. 27, p. 539. Political Science Quarterly,\nvol. 27, p. 586. National Municipal Review, vol. 3, p. 354. F. W.\nTaussig, Principles of Economics, chap. 44, sec. 5.]\n\n(b) What is true of land is true of the natural resources of the\ncountry-coal, minerals, oil, gas, waterpower, forests. These were\nseized, with a small payment or none, by the early comers, and sold\nlater at a great advance, or worked for an increasing profit by the\nowner. Here, again, if the nation had maintained an inventory of these\nvalues and appropriated to itself all or a percentage of the increase\nin value (which results from the increasing public need of the\nresources and the limited supply, together with the increase in\nfacilities for transportation, etc, rather than from the owner's labor\nor skill), many of our present gross inequalities in wealth would have\nbeen forestalled, and the community would be far richer in its common\nwealth. Add to the realization of this fact the sight of the reckless\nwaste by private owners of such resources as can be wasted, and the\npresent conservation movement is fully explained. The best that can\nnow be done is to retain under government ownership such natural\nresources as have not yet passed into private hands, and to appropriate\nfurther increases in value of those that are privately owned. [Footnote:\nC. R. Van Hise, Concentration and Control, pp. 154-66. Outlook, vol.\n85, p. 426; vol. 86, p. 716; vol. 93, p. 770; vol. 95, p. 21.]\n\n(c) Practically all of the upper classes add to the incomes they earn by\nlabor of hands or brain an \"unearned\" income derived from investment;\ni.e., from the willingness of others to pay for the use of their\naccumulated wealth or lands. A considerable class is thus enabled,\nif it chooses, to live without working. A great proportion of this\nwealth that draws interest was never itself earned by the possessors,\nin the stricter sense of the word \"earned\"; it has come to them by\ninheritance, by the increase of value of land or natural resources,\nor squeezed out of labor and the public by the unregulated profits\nof some autocratically managed industry or franchise. Is it expedient\nto allow this accumulated wealth to bring an income to its possessors?\nThere are two possibilities: one goes with government control of private\nindustry, the other with industrial socialism.\n\nAccording to the first plan, income might still be derived from money\nin savings banks, from stocks and bonds, and from the rent of land\nand buildings. But it would cease to be a serious source of inequality.\nFor if the unearned increment of land values and natural resources\nwere deflected to the State, if none but moderate profits were allowed\nfrom industry; and if, in addition, the right of inheritance and gift\nwere sharply curtailed, there would be, after a generation, no large\nfortunes left or thereafter possible. A man might receive by legacy\na moderate amount of money, a little land or property; by working\nefficiently and living simply he might add continually to his\ninvestments and so come to have an income measurably beyond his\nearnings. But he could not get wealth enough for investment to be freed\nin perpetuity from the necessity of earning his living; and\ninequalities of wealth could not become very great; no greater,\nperhaps, than would be consistent with the greatest happiness.\n\nAccording to the socialistic plan, since all industry would be run\nby the State, on state provided capital, there would be no demand\nfor a man's savings except for purely personal uses, no stocks and\nno bonds, no savings banks, except for the safe deposit of money\nand valuables. All interest might then be forbidden; and a man would\nsave merely for future use, or to pass on to others, not for the sake of\ndrawing a further income from his savings. All rent must then in fairness\nbe forbidden also, except such payments as would be a fair return for\nimprovements made, buildings constructed, with the cost of repairs,\ninsurance, etc. This would result in all land being owned by the users,\nand do away with landlordism. The unearned increment would be so\nwidely distributed that it would be needless, for purposes of equalizing\ndistribution, to bother with it, though it might still be appropriated\nby the State as a means of increasing its revenue. This scheme would\nmake it impossible for any one to live without earning his livelihood,\nexcept during such periods as his accumulated earnings would tide\nhim over. It would, indeed, lessen the incentive to saving; but if it were\nbuttressed by the provision of fair salaries for all and by universal\ninsurance against illness, accident, old age, and death, there would\nno longer be much need of saving. This social order would be eminently\njust, leaving only such inequalities in wealth as would result from\nthe differences in productive efficiency of different men, coupled\nwith a moderate right of inheritance. Its practicability, however,\nhinges upon the general practicability of socialism, which must remain\nfor the present an open question. [Footnote: F. W. Taussig, Principles\nof Economics, chap. 46; chap. 66, sec. 5; chap. 64, radical change\nas this lies beyond the range of immediate possibilities]\n\n(d) The right of inheritance and gift, which we have had to mention\nas aggravating other sources of inequality, needs, as matters are at\npresent, drastic curtailment. The tax must not, indeed, be heavy enough\nto encourage spendthrift living and lessen thrift, or to cut too deeply\ninto the capital necessary for carrying on business. But a carefully\ndevised tax can escape these dangers; and it is plainly not best for\nsociety, or for the heirs themselves in most cases, that they should\nhave irresponsible use of large sums of money which they have not\nearned in a world where millions are starving, physically, mentally,\nand spiritually, for lack of what money can provide. If, however, the\nplan last outlined is ever carried into effect, there will be no need\nof restricting the right of inheritance; even the alternative plan\nwould require little attention to inheritance after present\ninequalities had been approximately leveled, as there would then be\nlittle opportunity for large accumulations. A sharply graded\ninheritance tax may therefore be looked upon as a now necessary but\ntemporary expedient.[Footnote: F. W. Taussig, Principles of Economics,\nchap. 54, sec. 5; chap. 67. secs. 5, 6.] We may conclude with the\nconsideration of four special problems that are related, in some\naspect, to the conceptions of equality and privilege.\n\nWhat are the ethics of:\n\nI. The single tax? The single-tax idea is that all the public revenue\nshould be raised by a land tax. The push behind the movement comes\nfrom the sight of the unearned fortunes that have been made out of\nland. The term is used loosely by some to mean merely the taking or\ntaxing by the State, as we have already suggested, of all future unearned\nincrements of land value, so far as they can be computed. But, this\nwould not now provide enough revenue for most communities, and so would\nnot really make possible a single tax. The real single tax would involve\ntaking in taxation not only future INCREASES in values, but ALL the\nrental value of land. Even this would not always produce revenue enough,\nas the needs of public revenue bear no relation to the land values\nin a given area. But it would in most places produce considerably more\nthan enough revenue. Land taxes in New York City, for example, if\ntrebled, would supply all the revenue; they would have to be quintupled\nto absorb the entire rental value of the land the city stands on. The\nsimplicity of the scheme appeals to many-especially to those who own\nno land. But it amounts to a confiscation of land values by the State,\nwhich would be unjust to land-owners, however advantageous to the\nrest of the community. It means charging everybody rent for the land\nhe now owns. Present tenants would be no worse off, but present owners\nof the land they use, as well as landlords, would be hard hit. Let\nus consider each in turn.\n\nA considerable proportion of the land is owned by the users, the\nmajority of whom are members of the middle class and but moderately\nwell to do. Upon them the burden of supporting our increasing public\nundertakings would largely fall. But why? THEY are not getting any\nunearned income. THEY have, in most cases, paid pretty nearly full\nvalue for their land, even though that land was originally acquired\nfor little or nothing. They have put their earnings into land in good\nfaith, when they might have put it into industry or enjoyed its use.\nThe single tax would work grave injustice to them. It would also be\npractically inexpedient, in drawing the public revenue largely from\na class that can less afford it, while leaving hardly touched most\nof the bigger fortunes, which consist seldom chiefly of land oldings.\nBut even as to that part of the land that is bringing unearned income\nto landlords is it fair to stop that income unless we stop all other\nforms of income on investment? One man has put his fortune into stocks\nor bonds; he draws his five per cent in security with no further trouble\nthan clipping coupons; another, having put an equal fortune into land,\nfinds his five per cent income entirely confiscated. Not by such class\nlegislation can justice be served or equality produced. The landlord\nclass deserves no worse than the stockholder class or the investor\nin a savings bank. It is fair, as we suggested above, to put an end\nto ALL incomes from investment, and make every man live on his earnings;\nit is not fair to pick out landlords for exploitation.\n\nII. Free trade and protection?\n\nFree trade is undoubtedly the ultimate industrial ideal; not as a natural\nright, but as a matter of mutual advantage, that everything may be\nmanufactured in the most economical place and way. The geographical\ndivision of labor is as generally advantageous as the assignment of\nhighly specialized tasks within a community. Import duties result in\ndiverting labor into less economical channels, and hence entail a loss\nto the community as a whole. The prosperity of the United States has\nbeen in considerable measure the result of its complete internal free\ntrade. On this general truth the best economists are pretty universally\nagreed. The argument that a tariff wall is necessary to maintain our\ngenerally higher standard of wages and living is pure fallacy, as,\nindeed, can be seen in the fact that wages in free-trade England are\nhigher than in protectionist Germany. The only legitimate economic\nquestion is whether special advantages may accrue from protecting certain\nindustries under certain peculiar conditions. For example, a new\nindustry, in the conduct of which skill has not yet been acquired,\nmay need nursing while it is growing strong enough to produce as cheaply\nas foreign competitors. Again, when foreign nations impose a tax upon\nour products, it may be politically expedient to impose a counter-tariff,\nas a means toward reciprocity and eventual free trade. But the\ndiscussion of such situations involves no ethical principles, and may\nbe left to the economists and statesmen.\n\nThe considerations that concern the moralist are rather such as these:\nIs it advisable to keep our own people self-sufficing, producing all\nthey need to consume? Is it permissible to protect (by a subsidy, which\nis equivalent to an import duty in other matters) our foreign merchant\nmarine, so as to have the satisfaction of seeing our flag flying in\nforeign ports and the assurance of plenty of transports, colliers,\netc, in case of war? Or is it better for humanity that the nations\nshould become mutually interdependent, requiring one another's products\nand somewhat at one another's mercy in case of war? There can be no\ndoubt that the narrower, \"patriotic\" view retards the deepest interests\nof humanity, and that free trade is to be sought not only as a means\ntoward economic prosperity, but as an avenue toward universal peace.\n\nThe other dominant ethical aspect of the situation lies in the fact\nthat the tariff plays into the hands of certain monopolies, enables\nthem to maintain high prices and make excessive profits, which\ninternational competition would reduce. As actually used, the American\ntariff is largely an instrument for favoring special classes of\nmanufacturers at the general expense, and so is to be condemned.\n\nOn the other hand, where manufacturers are enabled by the tariff merely\nto make fair profits, and economic considerations would dictate a\nremoval of the duty and the shifting of labor to industries where it\ncould be more regard for vested interests should make us pause. To\nruin an industry in which capitalists have invested their fortunes\nand laborers have acquired skill, although it would be in the end for\nthe general good, would work unjust hardship to them; in such cases,\nthen, a tariff should be lowered only with great caution, or some\ncompensation should be made to the individuals who suffer loss thereby.\n\nIII. The control of immigration? Another contemporary question is\nwhether discrimination may rightfully be exercised in the admission\nof aliens to residence in our country. Abstract considerations would\nsuggest the desirability of equal treatment to all comers. But certain\npractical effects must be considered.\n\n(1) The admission of hordes of ill-educated and ill-disciplined\nimmigrants from countries lower in the scale of progress than our own\nis a serious menace to the ideals and standards of living that we have\nat great cost evolved. Our own morals and manners are not firmly enough\nfixed to be sure of withstanding the downward pull of more primitive\nconceptions and habits. Their willingness to work for small wages\nlowers the remuneration of Americans; their contentment with wretched\nliving conditions blocks our attempts to raise the general standard\nof life. Many of them are unappreciative of American ideals, easily\nmisled by corrupt politicians, and thus a deadweight against political\nand social advance. We may, perhaps, disregard the poverty of the\nimmigrant, if he is in good health and able to work; we may even\ndisregard his lack of education, if he is mentally sound and reasonably\nintelligent. But if some practicable method could be devised to lessen\nradically the incoming stream of those who are low in their standards\nof living, we should be spared the social indigestion from which we\nnow suffer. One feasible suggestion is to limit the number of immigrants\nannually admitted from each country to a certain small percentage of\nthe number of natives of that country already resident here. In that\nway the total number could be restricted without offense to any nation,\nand those peoples most easily assimilated would be admitted in greatest\nproportions. In addition, naturalization should be permitted only after\na number of years, during which the immigrant would be in danger of\ndeportation for proved criminality, vicious indulgence, intemperance,\nshiftlessness, troublesome agitation, and other undesirable traits.\n\n(2) The admission of peoples of very alien race to residence side by\nside with our own inevitably gives rise to friction and unpleasantness.\nHowever irrational it may be, there are instinctive antipathies and\ndistrusts between the different racial stocks. The importation of the\nNegroes brought us a terrible racial problem, one for which there seems\nno satisfactory solution. White men as a class dislike living side\nby side with them, and fiercely resent intermarriage, which might\nultimately merge the races, as it seems to be doing in South America.\nA general feeling of brotherhood and social democracy is greatly retarded\nby this racial chasm.[Footnote: Cf. J. M. Mecklin, Democracy and Race\nFriction.] It is earnestly to be hoped that Chinese, Japanese, Hindus,\nand other non-European races may not be admitted to residence here\nin any great degree; similar antipathies and resentments would be added\nto our existing discords. It is not that these races are inferior to\nour own, they are simply different; and however superficial the\ndifferences, they are just the sort of differences that cause social\nfriction. Precisely the same argument would apply to the exodus of\nAmericans and Europeans to Asiatic countries. A certain amount of\nintermingling of students, travelers, missionaries, traders, is highly\nbeneficial, in the exchange of ideas and manners it stimulates; that\nthe main racial stocks should remain apart, on their several\ncontinents, in that mutual respect and brotherhood that the superficial\nrepugnancies of too close contact tend to destroy. The plan suggested\nat the close of the preceding paragraph would sufficiently avert these\nundesirable racial migrations.\n\nIV. The woman-movement? The demand of women for a larger life and a\nrecognition from men of their full equality has found expression\nrecently, not only in the hysterical and criminal acts of British\nsuffragettes, but in many soberer revolts against the traditional\nassignment of duties and privileges. We may agree at once in deploring\nthe exclusion of women from any rights and opportunities which are\nnot inconsistent with a wise division of labor, and that patronizing\nair of superiority shown toward them by so many men-a condescension\nnot incompatible with tenderness and chivalry. Theirs has been the\nrepressed and petted sex. Yet there are no adequate grounds for\nsupposing that men are, on an average, really abler or saner or more\nreasonable naturally than women; that they are, indeed, in any\nessential sense different, except for the results of their different\neducation and life, and such divergences as the differentiation of\nsex itself involves including an average greater physical\nstrength.[Footnote: But cf. Munsterberg, Psychology and Social Sanity,\np. 195] Men and women are naturally equals; with equally good\ntraining they can contribute almost equally to the world's work; they\nhave an equal right to education, a useful vocation, and the free\npursuit of happiness. But equal rights do not necessarily imply\nidentical duties; there is a certain division of labor laid down by\nnature. Women alone can bear children, mothers alone can properly rear\nthem; no incubators and institutions can supply this fundamental need.\nIf women, in their eagerness to compete with men in other occupations,\nneglect in any great numbers this most difficult and honorable of all\nvocations, there will be a dangerous decline in the numbers and the\nnurture of coming generations. Moreover, if homes are not to be\nsupplanted by boarding houses and hotels, the great majority of women\nmust stay at home and do the work which makes a home possible. Home\nmaking and child rearing are the duties that always have been and\nalways will be the lot of most women; and they are duties too exacting\nto permit of being conjoined with any other vocation.\n\nOn the other hand, the woman who has servants and rears no children\nshould be pushed by public opinion into some outside occupation; women\nhave no more right to idle than men. All unmarried women, when past\nthe years that may properly be devoted to education, should certainly\nenter upon some useful vocation; and there is no reason why (with a\nfew obvious exceptions) any occupation save the more physically arduous\nshould be closed to such. Every girl should be prepared for some\nremunerative work, in case she does not marry or her husband dies\nleaving her childless. Such economic independence would, further, have\nthe inestimable value that she would be under no pressure to marry\nin order to be supported and have an honorable place in the world;\nif she is trained to earn her living she will be free to marry only\nfor love. If she does marry, and gives up her prior vocation to be\nhousekeeper and child-rearer, she should be legally entitled to half\nher husband's earnings. The grave difficulty is that a woman needs\nto prepare herself both for her probable duties as housekeeper and\nmother, and also for her possible need of earning a living otherwise.\nEducation in the former duties, that must fall to the great majority\nof women, cannot safely be neglected, as it is so largely today; the\nonly general solution will be for unmarried women to adopt, as a class,\nthe vocations for which less careful preparation is necessary.\n\nThe question of the ballot is not practically of great importance,\nfirst, because equal suffrage is coming very fast, whatever we may\nsay, and, secondly, because it will make no great difference when it\ncomes. There is no natural right in the matter; the decision in political\naffairs might well be left to half the population-when that half cuts\nso completely through all classes and sections-if the saving in\nexpense or trouble seemed to make it expedient. The interests of\nwomen are identical with those of men. Women are, in most parts\nof this country, as well off before the law as men; they do not need\nthe ballot to remedy any unjust discriminations. Moreover, the ballot\nwill mean the necessity of sharing the burden of political responsibility.\nThe women who look upon the right to vote as a plum to be grasped\nfor, a something which they want because men have it, with no\nconception of the training necessary to exercise that right responsibly,\nare not fit to be trusted with it. It often seems that it were better to\nrestrict our present trustful and generous right of suffrage to those\nwho can show evidence of intelligence and responsibility, rather\nthan to double the number of shallow and untrained voters.\n\nBut, on the other hand, there is reason to suppose that women,\nthrough their greater interest in certain goods, will materially accelerate\nsome reforms-as, the sanitation of cities, the improvement of\neducation, child-welfare legislation, the warfare against alcohol and\nprostitution. The actual results already attained where women vote\nare, on the whole, important enough to warrant the extension of the\nright, as a matter of social expediency. Moreover, the very increase\nin the number of voters makes the securing of power through bribery\nmore difficult; and the entrance of women into politics will probably\nhasten their purification in many places. At any rate, the necessity\nof voting will tend to develop a larger interest among women in public\naffairs, to fit them better for the education of their children, and\nto do away with the lingering sense of the inferiority of women. Certain\nit is, finally, that an increasing number of women want the vote, and\nwill not rest till they get it.\n\nGeneral: F. W. Taussig, Principles of Economics, chap. 54. W. E. Weyl,\nThe New Democracy, book I. Adams and Sumner, Labor Problems, chap.\nXIII. C. B. Spahr, The Present Distribution of Wealth in the United\nStates. Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, chap. XXV, secs. 6, 7. Atlantic\nMonthly, vol. 112, pp. 480, 679. The single tax: Henry George, Progress\nand Poverty; Social Problems. R. C. Fillebrown, The A.B.C. of Taxation.\nOutlook, vol. 94, p. 311. Shearman, Natural Taxation. Atlantic Monthly,\nvol. 112, p. 737; vol. 113, pp. 27, 545. H. R. Seager, Introduction\nto Economics, chap, XXVI, secs. 283-88. F. W. Taussig, op. cit, chap.\n42, sec. 7. Arena, vol. 34, p. 500; vol. 35, p. 366. New World, vol.\n7, p. 87. Free trade: North American Review, vol. 189, p. 194. Quarterly\nReview, vol. 202, p. 250. H. Fawcett, Free Trade and Protection. W.\nJ. Ashley, The Tariff Problem. H. R. Seager, op. cit, chap. XX, secs.\n211-17. F. W. Taussig, op. cit, chaps. 36, 37. Immigration: Jenks\nand Lauck, The Immigration Problem. H. P. Fairchild, Immigration. Adams\nand Sumner, Labor Problems, chap. III. F. J. Warne, The Immigrant\nInvasion. A. Shaw, Political Problems, pp. 62-86. North American Review,\nvol. 199, p. 866. Nineteenth Century, vol. 57, p. 294. Educational\nReview, vol. 29, p. 245. Forum, vol. 42, p. 552. Charities, vol. 12,\np. 129. Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 16, pp. 1, 141. The\nwoman question: J. S. Mill, The Subjection of Women. C. P. Gilman,\nWomen and Economics. O. Schreiner, Woman and Labor. K. Schirmacher,\nThe Modern Woman's Rights Movement. Jane Addams, Newer Ideals of Peace,\nchap. VII. F. Kelley, Some Ethical Gains through Legislation, chap.\nV. Outlook, vol. 82, p. 167; vol. 91, pp. 780, 784, 836; vol. 95, p.\n117; vol. 101, pp. 754, 767. Atlantic Monthly, vol. 112, pp. 48, 191,\n721. Century, vol. 87, pp. 1, 663. National Municipal Review, vol.\n1, p. 620.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXX\n\n\nTHE FUTURE OF THE RACE\n\nIn proportion as fair means are found and utilized for remedying the\ngross inequalities in the present distribution of wealth, and big\nfortunes disappear, it will become necessary for the State to undertake\nmore and more generally the functions that have, during the last few\ngenerations, been largely dependent upon private philanthropy. This\nwill be an advantage not merely in putting this welfare work upon a\nsecurer basis, but in enlisting the loyalty of the masses to the\nGovernment. Much of the energy and devotion which are now given to\nthe labor-unions, because in them alone the workers see hope of help,\nmight be given to the State if it should take upon itself more adequately\nto minister to the people's needs. The rich can get health and beauty\nfor themselves; but the poor are largely dependent upon public provision\nfor a wholesome and cheerful existence. Laissez-faire individualism\nhas provided them with saloons; in the new age the State must provide\nthem with something better than saloons. \"Flowers and sunshine for\nall,\" in Richard Jefferies' wistful phrase-the State should make\na determined and thoroughgoing effort, not merely to repress, to punish,\nto palliate conditions, but in every positive way that expert thought\ncan devise and the people will vote to support, to add to the worth\nof human life. We may consider these paternal functions of government\nunder three heads: the improvement of human environment, to make it\nmore beautiful and convenient; the development, through educational\nagencies, of the mental and moral life of the people; and the\nimprovement, by various means, of the human stock itself.\n\nIn what ways should the State seek to better human environment?\n\n(1) Municipal governments should supervise town and village planning.\nThe riotous individualism of our American people has resulted in the\nhaphazard growth of countless dreary towns and an architectural anarchy\nthat resembles nothing more than an orchestra playing with every\ninstrument tuned to a different key. The stamp of public control is\nto be seen, if at all, in an inconvenient and monotonous chessboard\nplan for streets. Congestion of traffic at the busy points; wide\nstretches of empty pavement on streets little used; houses of every\nstyle and no style, imbued with all the colors of the spectrum;\nweed-grown vacant lots, unkempt yards, some fenced, some unfenced;\nposter-bedecked billboards-verily, the average American town is not\na thing of beauty. Matthew Arnold's judgment is corroborated by every\ntraveler. \"Evidently,\" he wrote, \"this is that civilization's weak\nside. There is little to nourish and delight the sense of beauty there.\"\nA certain crudeness is inevitable in a new country, and will be outgrown;\nage is a great artist. Man usually mars with his first strokes; and\nit is only when he has met his practical needs that he will dally with\naesthetic considerations. Many of our older cities and villages have\npartly outgrown the awkward age, become dignified in the shade of\nspreading trees, and fallen somehow into a kind of unity; a few of\nthem, especially near the Atlantic seaboard, where the stupid\nrectangularity of the towns farther west was never imposed, are among\nthe loveliest in the world. But in general, in spite of many costly,\nand some really beautiful, buildings, and acknowledging the individual\ncharm of many of the wide piazzaed shingled houses of the well-to-do,\nand the general effect of spaciousness, our towns and villages are\nshockingly, depressingly ugly. Money enough has been spent to create\na beautiful effect; the failure lies in that unrestrained individualism\nthat permits each owner to build any sort of a structure, and to color\nit any hue, that appeals to his fancy, without regard to its effect\nupon neighboring buildings or upon the eyes of passers-by. All sorts\nof architectural atrocities are committed-curious false fronts, fancy\nshingles, scroll-work balustrades, and the like;-in the town where\nthese words are written, a builder of a number of houses has satisfied\na whim to give eyebrows to his windows, in the shape of flat arches\nof alternate red and white bricks, with an extraordinarily grotesque\nand discomforting effect. But even where the buildings are good\nseparately, the general effect is, unless by coincidence, a sad chaos.\n\nIn the more progressive countries of Europe matters are not left thus\nto the caprice of individuals; in some German towns, and the so-called\ngarden cities of England, we have excellent examples of scientific\ntown planning, conducing to homogeneity, convenience, and beauty. The\nawakening social sense in this country will surely lead soon to a\ngeneral conviction of the duty of an oversight of street planning and\nbuilding in the interests of the community as a whole. There is no\nreason why our towns should not be sensibly laid out, according to\na prearranged and rational plan; they might have individuality,\npicturesqueness, charm; be full of interesting separate notes, yet\nharmonious in design, making a single composition, like a great mosaic.\nSuch an environment would have its subconscious effects upon the morals\nof the people, would awaken a new sense of community loyalty, and drive\nhome the lesson of the necessity and beauty of the cooperative spirit.\n\nAmong the features of this town planning are these:\n\nStreets must be laid out in conformity with the topography of the\nneighborhood and the direction of traffic. Gentle curves, or frequent\ncircles, as in Washington, must break the monotony of straight lines;\nthe natural features of the landscape, hills, bluffs, a river, must\nbe utilized to give character to the town. The height of buildings\nmust be regulated in relation to the width of the streets, and the\npercentage of ground space that may be built upon determined.\nAll designs for buildings must be approved by the community architects\nwith consideration of their harmony with neighboring buildings. A public\nlandscape architect should have supervision over and give expert advice\nfor the planting of trees and shrubbery and the beautifying of yards\nback as well as front. Factories and shops should be confined to\ncertain designated portions of a town (and the smoke nuisance strictly\ncontrolled); disfiguring billboards and overhead wires done away with;\nparks laid out and kept intact from intrusion of streets or buildings.\nFortunately, the majority of our American houses, built of wood, are\ntemporary in character; and most city buildings at present have a life\nof but a generation or two. In this evanescence of our contemporary\narchitecture lies the hope for an eventual regeneration of American\ntowns. In the city and village of the future, life will be so bosomed\nin beauty that there will be less need of artificial beauty-seeking\nand gaslight pleasures. A healthy local pride will be fostered and\ncommunity life come into its own again.\n\n(2) Municipalities should provide facilities for wholesome recreation\nout of doors. Children, in particular, ought not to be obliged, for\nlack of other space, to play upon city streets, where they impede\ntraffic and run serious risks. [Footnote: On New York City streets\ntwo hundred and thirty-one children were killed in twenty-one months,\naccording to recent figures.] Schoolyards should be larger than they\ngenerally are, and bedtime; in the big cities the roofs should be\nutilized also. Every neighborhood should have its ample playgrounds.\nFor want of such provision children of the poor grow up pale and\npinched, without the normalizing and educative influence of healthy\nplay, and with no proper outlet for their energies, so that crime and\nvice flourish prematurely. With proper foresight open spaces can be\nretained as a city grows, without great expense; the economic gain,\nin a reduced death-rate, reduced cost for doctors and nurses, police,\ncourts, and prisons, and increased efficiency of the next generation\nof workers, will easily balance the outlay, without weighing the gain\nin happiness and morality.[Footnote: See on this point, the literature\nof the Division of Recreation of the Russell Sage Foundation, and of\nthe Playground and Recreation Association of America (1 Madison Avenue,\nNew York City). Jane Addams, The Spirit of Youth and the City Streets.\nC. Zueblin, American Municipal Progress, chap IX. J. Lee, Constructive\nand Preventive Philanthropy, chaps. VIII-XII. Outlook, vol. 87, p.\n775; vol. 95, p. 511; vol. 96, p. 443.] But, indeed, adults stand also\nin need of outdoor life. Grounds for ball games, bowls, and all sorts\nof sports should be generously provided if human life is not to lose\none of its pleasantest and most useful aspects. For evenings there\nshould be attractive social meeting-places, neighborhood clubs,\nsupervised dance halls, and the like, such as the social settlements\nnow to a slight extent provide, with notably beneficial results. As\nthe poorer classes come more and more into their inheritance of the\nfruits of industry, these desiderata may perhaps be again left to private\ninitiative; but at present there is a large class too pressed by\npoverty to get for itself these necessities of a normal life; and the\nneed of the people makes the duty of the State.[Footnote: Cf. C. R.\nHenderson, The Social Spirit in America, chap. XIV.]\n\n(3) The States and the Nation must be careful to conserve the natural\nresources of the country from waste, and advantage of the people. The\nforests, still so recklessly felled, must be guarded, not only for\nthe sake of the future timber supply, but to prevent floods, ensure\na proper supply of water in times of drought, and preserve the soil\nfrom being washed away. The scientific practice of forestry, the\nmaintenance of an efficient fire patrol, and the reforestation of denuded\nareas that can best be utilized for the growth of timber, must be\nundertaken or supervised by government experts. The very limited supplies\nof coal, oil, and natural gas must be protected from waste. Arid lands\nmust be brought into use where irrigation is possible, swamp lands\ndrained, waterways and harbors improved to their full\nusefulness.[Footnote: On national conservation, see C. R. Van Hise,\nThe Conservation of Natural Resources. Outlook, vol. 93, p. 770. Atlantic\nMonthly, vol. 101, p. 694. Review of Reviews, vol. 37, p. 585.\nChautauquan, vol. 55, pp. 21, 33, 112.] National and state highways\nmust be built as object-lessons to the towns and counties that still\nleave their roads a stretch of mud or sand.[Footnote: It is estimated\nthat ninety per cent of the public roads in the United States are still\nunimproved; that the average cost of hauling produce is twenty-five\ncents a mile-ton, as against twelve cents in France; that $300,000,000\na year would be saved in hauling expenses if our roads were as good\nas those of western Europe.] All of these material improvements have\ntheir civilizing influence, their moral significance; as Edmond Kelly\nput it, \"By constructing our environment with intelligence we can\ndetermine the direction of our own development.\" So it is of no small\nconsequence what sort of homes and cities we live in. During the next\ngeneration or so, while the State is slowly bestirring itself to\nundertake these duties, there will be great need of civic and village\nimprovement associations, women's clubs, merchants' associations, etc,\nto arouse public interest, demonstrate possibilities, and stir up\nmunicipal holidays, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Arbor Day,\nThanksgiving Day, etc, should be used to stimulate civic pride in\nthese matters; pulpit and press should be brought into line. It will\nbe a slow and discouraging, but necessary, task to awaken the people\nto a realization of the potentialities for a better civilization that\nlie in the utilization of government powers. What should be done in\nthe way of public education? The principle of state support of education\nhas, happily, been pretty fully accepted  in this country, although\nin the East the universities still have to depend upon private\nbenefactions. The public-school system  is excellent in plant and\nprinciple; the next step is to work out a rational curriculum. The\naverage high-school graduate today has learned little of what he most\nneeds to know how to earn his living, how to spend his money wisely,\nhow to live. The average girl knows little of housekeeping, less of\nthe duties of motherhood.[Footnote: Cf. H. Spencer, Education, chap.\nI: \"Is it not an astonishing fact that though on the treatment of\noffspring depend their lives or deaths, and their moral value or ruin,\nyet not one word of instruction on the treatment of offspring is ever\ngiven to those who will hereafter be parents? Is it not monstrous that\nthe fate of a new generation should be left to the chances of unreasoning\ncustom, impulse, fancy . . . ?\" The whole chapter is worth reading;\nthe neglect of which Spencer complained still persists.] The dangers\nof sex indulgence-the greatest of all perils to youth, the poisonous\neffects of alcohol, the necessities of bodily hygiene, are seldom\neffectively taught. Moral and religious education is, owing to our\nsectarianism, almost absolutely neglected. The evils of political\ncorruption and unscrupulousness in business, the social problems that\nso insistently beset us, are little discussed in school. Yet here is\nan enormous opportunity for the awakening of moral idealism and the\nsocial spirit. Boys and girls in their teens can be brought to an eager\ninterest in moral and social problems; class after class could be sent\nout fired with enthusiasm to remedy wrongs and push for a higher\ncivilization. The failure to awaken more of this dormant good will\nand energy, and to direct it for the elevation of community standards\nand the solution of community problems, is a grave indictment against\nour complacent \"stand-pat\" educational system. Religious instruction\nwill be a delicate matter for the indefinite future; but inspirational\ntalks on non-controversial themes should find place, and perhaps a\npresentation of different religious views in rotation by representatives\nof different communions. In some way, at least, recognition should\nbe made of the important role played by religion in life. Besides the\nschool system, other means of public education must be extended. The\nlibraries and art museums must reach a wider public. The docent-work\nin the museums is a recent undertaking of considerable importance.\nFree public lectures, free mothers' schools, city kindergartens,\nmunicipal concerts, university extension courses-such enterprises will\ndoubtless become universal. The work of the National Government in\nspreading knowledge of scientific methods of agriculture and of\npracticable methods of improving country life- information about the\ninstallation of plumbing systems, water supply, sewage systems, electric\nlights, etc.- is of wide educational value. In 1911 the average schooling\nof Americans was five years apiece. Such inadequate preparation for\nlife is a disgrace to our prosperous age. Education should be universally\ncompulsory until the late teens at least; it should be regarded not\nas a luxury, like kid gloves and caviar, but as the normal development\nof a human being and the common heritage. It ought not to be the\nexclusive privilege of \"gentlemen\"- of certain select, upper- class\nindividuals; as economic conditions are straightened out, universal\neducation will become practically feasible. It is not only as a matter\nof justice, but in the interests of public welfare, that education\nshould be given to all. It will actually pay in dollars and cents,\nin increased efficiency, more intelligent voting, decreased crime,\ndecreased commercial prostitution, and crazy propaganda of all sorts.\nThe city of Boston was right in inscribing on its public library the\nmotto: \"The commonwealth requires the education of the people as the\nsafeguard of order and liberty.\" What can be done by eugenics?\nEnvironment and education are of enormous importance in determining\nwhat the mature individual shall be. But the result is strictly limited\nby the material they have to work upon; the individual who is handicapped\nby heredity cannot expect to catch up with him who starts the race\nof life better equipped, if both have equally favorable influences\nand opportunities. These influences can effect little permanent\nimprovement in the human stock; that can only be radically bettered\nby seeing to it that individuals of superior stock have children and\nthose of inferior stock do not. We have \"harnessed heredity\" to produce\nbetter types of wheat and roses and cattle and horses and dogs; why\nnot produce better types of men? The study of these possibilities\nconstitutes the new science of eugenics, which its founder, Francis\nGalton, defined as the study of \"those agencies which humanity through\nsocial control may use for the improvement or the impairment of the\nracial qualities of future generations.\" Dr. Kellogg defines it as\n\"taking advantage of the facts of heredity to make the human race\nbetter.\" \"Good breeding of the human species.\" We may first ask what\nduties the disclosures of this new science lay upon the individual.\n\n(1) The constitutional health of children is partly deter parents at\nthe time of conception and birth. Most deaths of newborn infants are\ndue to prenatal influences. Overstrain, malnutrition, alcoholism, and\nall physical excesses tend to cause physical degeneracy in the\noffspring. It is obviously the duty of prospective parents- and that\nmeans practically all healthy young people-to keep themselves well\nand strong, so as to give a good endowment of health to their children.\n\n(2) Feeble-mindedness, epilepsy, some forms of insanity, and some\nvenereal diseases are inheritable defects; those who suffer from them\nmust refrain from having children. Studies of the \"Jukes\" family and\nthe \"Kallikak\" family, and others, show convincingly the spread of\nthese defects where defectives marry. To bring children into the world\nto bear such burdens-and to cost the State, as they are almost sure\nto, for their support [Footnote: The descendants of the original\ndegenerate couple of \"Jukes\" cost New York State in seventy-five years\n$1,300,000. See R. L. Dugdale, The Jukes. H. H. Goddard, The Kallikak\nFamily]-ought to be regarded as a grave sin.\n\n(3) Little positive advice can yet be given as to those who are BEST\nfitted to have children, except in the matter of health and freedom\nfrom inheritable defects. According to Professor Boaz,[Footnote: F.\nBoaz, The Mind of Primitive Man.] one racial stock is about as good\nas another; so whatever selection is to be made may be between individual\nstrains. But to breed the human stock for beauty, energy, mental\nability, immunity to disease, sanity, or what not, is a task far beyond\nour present knowledge. Personal value and reproductive value are not\nclosely correlative; and the factors that determine a good inheritance\nare highly complex. So that the choice of wife and husband may be left\nto those instinctive affinities and preferences which will in any case\ncontinue to be the deciding causes for the strong and educated and\nwell-to-do to beget and rear children; the tendency to \"race-suicide\"\namong the upper classes is a matter for serious alarm. That portion\nof the population that is least able to give proper nurture to children,\nand to train them up to American ideals, is producing them in\noverwhelmingly greatest numbers. The older stocks in this country are\ndying out and being replaced by the large families of the east and\nsouth European immigrants. In England also, we are told, one sixth\nof the population, and this the least desirable sixth, is producing\nhalf of the coming generation. In 1790 the American family averaged\n5.8 persons; in 1900 the average was 4.6. Among native Americans\nthe average is lower still. College graduates are failing to reproduce\ntheir own numbers. Everywhere the Western peoples are breeding more\nand more slowly, while the Orientals, Negroes, and, in general, the\nless civilized peoples, are multiplying rapidly. Unless the upper classes\nin western Europe and America cease their selfish refusal to rear\ncitizens, the earth will be inherited by the more backward peoples.\nThis means, plainly, a perpetual clog upon progress. We may now ask\nwhat the State should demand in the interests of race- improvement.\n\n(1) Health certificates may be required from both parties at marriage\ni.e., marriage may be prohibited without a guarantee from a licensed\nphysician of freedom from communicable or inheritable disease, or\ninheritable defects. This seems the minimum of protection due the\ncontracting parties themselves, as well as due the next generation.\n\n(2) Marriage restrictions are easily evaded, however; unscrupulous\nphysicians can usually be found to sign certificates. And where\nmarriage is prohibited, illegitimacy is sure to flourish. Hence the\nsegregation (with proper care) of those obviously unfit to become\nparents seems necessary. Great as would be the initial expense, the\nrapid reduction in the number of idiots, epileptics, etc, would in\na generation or two counterbalance it and greatly diminish the problem.\nIt is estimated that there are some three hundred thousand feeble-\nminded persons in the United States, only twenty thousand of whom are\nsegregated in institutions, the rest being free to propagate-which\nthey do with notorious rapidity. Most of them can be made\nself-supporting; and real as the hardship to some of them may be in\nconfining them from sex relations, the sacrifice seems demanded by\nthe welfare of coming generations.\n\n(3) An alternative to segregation (for inheritable, but not for\ncommunicable, diseases) is sterilization. The operation when performed\non adults seems to have no effects upon character or the enjoyment\nof life, not even interfering with ordinary sex gratification. It is\nnot painful, and perfectly harmless, to man; for women there is a risk,\nwhich is said, however, to be slight.[Footnote: Cf. Dr. E. C. Jones,\nin Woman's Medical Journal, December, 1912.] Sterilization permits\nthe unfit to be entirely at liberty, to marry, if they can find mates,\nand to have all the pleasures of life except that of parenthood. A\nnumber of the American States have passed laws permitting the compulsory\nsterilization of certain very restricted classes of people undesirable\nas parents, at the discretion of the proper authorities; and this\nseems, on the whole, at least in the case of men, the best solution.\n\n(4) Of an entirely different nature is the movement to secure state\nsupport for mothers; a movement, however, which is also eugenic in\nits intent. At present those parents who are zealous to maintain a\nhigh standard of living, those with talents which they are ambitious\nto develop, and those who realize keenly the care and expense that\nchildren need, are deterred from having many, or any; while the\nshiftless and happy-go-lucky propagate without scruple. There is, for\nall except the rich, a premium on childlessness, which the natural\ndesire for parenthood cannot wholly discount. But this ought not to\nbe so. Childbearing and rearing is a very necessary and arduous vocation,\nin which all the best women should be enlisted. In a socialistic regime\nthe State would as a matter of course pay for this work as well as\nfor all other productive work. But state endowment of motherhood, the\npayment of \"maternity benefits,\" may be practiced apart from industrial\nsocialism. It may be objected that the removal of economic pressure\nwould bring an undue increase in population and the evils that Malthus\nfeared. But the tendency of advancing civilization seems to be so\nstrikingly toward a declining birth-rate-a phenomenon unrecognized\nin this country because of the tide of immigration, but apparent in\nwestern Europe-that the net outcome may be attained of a stationary\npopulation. Moreover, the scheme in question would not only tend to\nincrease the number of children born to the prudent among the middle\nclasses, it would enable mothers and prospective mothers to save\nthemselves from that overwork which enfeebles so many children today;\nit would insure them the means to care properly for the children. State\ninspectors would visit homes and examine the children of state\nsupported mothers; the amount granted might vary in proportion to the\ncare apparently given to the children, their cleanliness, health,\nprogress in education, the clothing, food, air, and space provided\nfor them; if the nurture of a child was judged too inadequate, it might,\nafter warning, be removed to an institution and the parents\npunished.[Footnote: See, besides the books referred to later, H. G.\nWells, \"The Endowment of Motherhood\" (in Social Forces in England\nand America); or, New Worlds for Old, chap. III. F. W. Taussig, Principles\nof Economics, chap. 65, sec. 1. Survey, vols. 29 and 30, many\narticles.] recruiting of coming generations from the diseased and\nfeeble-minded, to prevent the handicapping of poor children through\nthe overwork and poverty of their parents, and gradually to raise the\nlevel of inherited human nature. When coupled with improved environment\nand with universal and rational education, it will surely mean the\nexistence of a happier race of men-which should be the ultimate goal\nof all human endeavor. What are the gravest moral dangers of our times?\nIn conclusion, we may venture a judgment as to which, out of the many\nevils we have noted in contemporary life, are most serious, and where\nour moral energies should most earnestly be directed.\n\nThe most prominent of prevalent vices are certainly sex incontinence\nand the use of alcohol; the lure of wine and the lure of women have\nfrom time immemorial been man's undoing. Alcohol is being vigorously\nfought, and is probably doomed to general prohibition, together with\nopium and morphine and the other narcotics. The sex dangers are not\nto be so easily overcome, and we are probably in for an increase of\nlicense and its inevitable evils. There will be need for every\nfarsighted and earnest man and woman to stand firm, in spite of\nenticing promises of liberty, for the great ideal of faithful marriage\nthat makes in the end for man's deepest happiness.\n\nThe most prominent sins of today are, selfish moneymaking, selfish\nmoney spending, selfish idleness; the chief sinners we may label\npirates, prodigals, parasites. By pirates are meant the dishonest\ndealers, the grafters, the vice caterers, the unscrupulous competitors,\nthe pilers-up of exorbitant profits at the expense of employees and\npublic; by prodigals, the spendthrift rich, the wasters of wealth,\nthose who lavish in luxury or ostentation money that is sorely needed\nby others; by parasites, the idle rich, the lazy poor, the tramps,\nall who take, but do not give a return of honest work. There are also\nthe jingoes, the preachers of lawlessness, the demagogues, and many\nless common types of sinners. But the particularly flagrant wrongs\nof our day have to do with the getting and spending of money; and the\nperil of the near future which looms now most menacingly on the horizon\nis the irritation of the wronged classes to the point of civil warfare\nand revolution. Such a calamity might, of course, be ultimately a means\nof great social advance; but it is a highly dangerous and uncertain\nmethod, involving great moral damage as well as great individual\nsuffering, and to be averted by every possible means. The hope for\naverting it lies not only in the growth of public condemnation of\nlawlessness, but in the substitution of an ideal of service for the\nideal of personal gain, and in the growing willingness of the community\nto check by progressive legislative measures the various means which\nresourceful men have discovered for advantaging themselves at the\nexpense of society. Necessary initial steps are the securing of\ninternational peace and the construction of an efficient political\nsystem. When these ends have been attained and a just industrial order\nevolved, the citizens of the future will take pride in using the powers\nof the State to bring the greatest possible health and happiness to\nall.\n\nOur forefathers had great wrongs to right-political tyranny to\noverthrow, human slavery to eradicate, civil and religious liberty\nto win, a system of popular education to inaugurate, and with it all\nthe wilderness to tame and a new land to develop. For these ends\nthey sacrificed much. It is for us to attack with equal courage the\nevils of the present. Life has outwardly become easy for many of us;\nour spiritual muscle easily becomes flabby. But there are new tasks\nequally importunate, equally worthy of our loyalty and sacrifice,\nhard enough to stir our blood. The times call for new idealism, new\ncourage, new effort; the purpose of this book will not be attained\nunless the reader carries away from its perusal some new realization\nof the moral dangers that confront our civilization, and some new\ndetermination to have a hand in meeting them.\n\nEnvironment: J. Nolen, Replanning Small Cities. T. C. Horsfelt, The\nImprovement of the Dwellings and Surroundings of the People. E.\nHoward, Garden Cities of To-Morrow. The City Beautiful (magazine).\nLiterature of the National League of Improvement Associations, the\nAmerican Civic Association (914 Union Trust Building, Washington,\nD.C.), the City Club of New York, Metropolitan Improvement League of\nBoston, etc. The Civic Federation of Chicago, What it has\nAccomplished (Hollister, Chicago, 1899). Atlantic Monthly, vol. 113,\np. 823. World's Work, vol. 15, p. 10022. Outlook, vol. 92, p. 373;\nvol. 97, p. 393; vol. 103, p. 203. National Municipal Review, vol.\n1, p. 236.\n\nEducation: H. Home, Idealism in Education. G. Spiller, Moral\nEducation in Eighteen Countries. International Journal of Ethics,\nvol. 20, p. 454; vol. 22, pp. 146, 335. I. King, Social Aspects of\nEducation. E. Boutroux, Education and Ethics. Proceedings of the\nNational Education Association, Religious Education Association,\nInternational Moral Education Congresses. C. R. Henderson, The\nSocial Spirit in America, chap, xn, xm. S. Nearing, Social\nAdjustment, chaps, in, xv. World's Work, vol. 15, p. 10105. Outlook,\nvol. 85, pp. 664, 943; vol. 89, p. 789; vol. 94, p. 701.\n\nEugenics: C. B. Davenport, Eugenics; Heredity in Relation to\nEugenics. W. D. McKim, Heredity and Human Progress. E. Schuster,\nEugenics. C. W. Saleeby, Parenthood and Race Culture. H. G. Wells,\nMankind in the Making, chap. in. New Tracts for the Times (various\nauthors, Moffat, Yard Co.). Reports of International Eugenic\nCongresses. Atlantic Monthly, vol. 110, p. 801. Forum, vol. 51, p.\n542. Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 26, p. 1.","title":"Problems of Conduct: An Introductory Survey of Ethics","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":139819}