{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_57970/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_57970","id":"gutenberg_57970","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/57970","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - American","Category: History - British","Category: History - Modern (1750+)","Category: History - Warfare","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Politics","Finance, Public -- France -- History -- To 1789","Finance, Public -- Great Britain -- History -- 1688-1815","United States -- History -- Revolution, 1775-1783 -- Causes","United States -- Politics and government -- 1775-1783"],"text":"Produced by The Online Distributed Proofreading Team at\nhttp://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images\ngenerously made available by The Internet Archive)\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTWO TRACTS ON CIVIL LIBERTY\n\n\n\n\n_Published by the same Author_,\n\nAnd printed for T. CADELL, in the Strand.\n\n\nI. OBSERVATIONS on REVERSIONARY PAYMENTS; on Schemes for providing\nAnnuities for Widows, and Persons in Old Age; on the Method of\ncalculating the Values of Assurances on Lives; and on the National Debt.\nTo which are added, Four Essays on different Subjects in the Doctrine of\nLife-Annuities and Political Arithmetic. Also, an Appendix, containing\na complete Set of Tables; particularly four New Tables, shewing the\nProbabilities of Life in LONDON, NORWICH, and NORTHAMPTON, and the Values\nof two joint Lives.\n\nThe 3d Edition, with a Supplement, containing (besides several New\nTables) additional Observations on the Probabilities of Human Life in\ndifferent Situations; on the LONDON Societies for the Benefit of Widows\nand of Old Age; and on the present State of Population in this Kingdom.\nPrice 6s.\n\nII. A Review of the principal Questions and Difficulties in MORALS.\nParticularly, those relating to the Original of our Ideas of Virtue, its\nNature, Foundation, Reference to the Deity, Obligation, Subject-matter,\nand Sanctions. The Second Edition corrected. Price 6s.\n\nIII. FOUR DISSERTATIONS.\u2014I. On Providence.\u2014II. On Prayer.\u2014III. On the\nReasons for expecting that virtuous Men shall meet after Death in a\nState of Happiness. IV. On the Importance of Christianity, the Nature\nof Historical Evidence, and Miracles. The 4th Edition. Price 6s.\n\nIV. An APPEAL to the PUBLIC, on the Subject of the NATIONAL DEBT. The\n2d Edition; with an Appendix, containing Explanatory Observations and\nTables; and an Account of the present State of Population in Norfolk.\nPrice 2s.\n\n\n\n\n TWO TRACTS\n ON\n CIVIL LIBERTY,\n THE\n WAR WITH AMERICA,\n AND\n THE DEBTS AND FINANCES OF\n THE KINGDOM:\n WITH\n A GENERAL INTRODUCTION and\n SUPPLEMENT.\n\n By RICHARD PRICE, D.D. F.R.S.\n\n LONDON,\n Printed for T. CADELL, in the STRAND.\n MDCCLXXVIII.\n\n\n\n\nGENERAL INTRODUCTION.\n\n\nThe first of the following tracts was published in the beginning of the\nyear 1776; and the second in the beginning of last year. They are now\noffered to the public in one volume, with corrections and additions.\nAll the calculations, in the _Appendix_ to the first tract, have been\ntransferred to the _second_ and _fourth_ sections, in the third part of\nthe second tract.\n\nThe section on PUBLIC LOANS, in the second tract, has been revised with\ncare; and a _supplement_ to it, containing additional proposals and some\nnecessary explanations, has been given at the end of the whole.\u2014This is\na subject to which I have applied (perhaps too unprofitably) much or my\nattention. I have now done with it; and the whole is referred to the\ncandid examination of those who may be better informed, hoping for their\nindulgence should they find that, in any instance, I have been mistaken.\nI have not meant, in any thing I have said on this subject, to censure\nany persons. That accumulation of artificial debt which I have pointed\nout, and by which the dagger of the kingdom from its growing burdens\nhas been so needlessly increased, has, I doubt not, been the effect\nof inattention in our ministers; and the scheme, by which the loan of\nlast year has been procured, gives reason to hope that better plans of\nborrowing will be adopted for the future.\n\nThe principal design of the first part of the second tract was (as I\nhave observed in the introduction to it) to remove the misapprehensions\nof my sentiments on CIVIL LIBERTY AND GOVERNMENT into which some had\nfallen. It gives me concern to find that it has not answered that end\nin the degree I wished. I am still charged with maintaining opinions\nwhich tend to subvert all civil authority. I paid little regard to this\ncharge, while it was confined to the advocates for the principles which\nhave produced the present war; but as it seems lately to have been given\nthe public from the authority of a writer of the first character,[1] it\nis impossible I should not be impressed by it; and I find myself under a\nnecessity of taking farther notice of it.\n\nThere are two accounts, directly opposite to one another, which have been\ngiven of the origin of civil government. One of them is, that \u201ccivil\ngovernment is an expedient contrived by human prudence for gaining\nsecurity against oppression; and that, consequently, the power of civil\ngovernors is a delegation or trust from the people for accomplishing this\nend.\u201d\n\nThe other account is, that \u201ccivil government is an ordinance of the\nDeity, by which the body of mankind are given up to the will of a few;\nand, consequently, that it is a trust from the Deity, in the exercise of\nwhich civil governors are accountable only to him.\u201d\n\nThe question \u201cwhich of these accounts we ought to receive,\u201d is important\nin the highest degree. There is no question which more deeply affects the\nhappiness and dignity of man as a citizen of this world.\u2014If the former\naccount is right, the people (that is, the body of independent agents)\nin every community are their own legislators. All civil authority is\nproperly _their_ authority. Civil governors are only public _servants_;\nand their power, being _delegated_, is by its nature _limited_.\u2014On the\ncontrary. If the latter account is right, the people have nothing to\ndo with their own government. They are placed by their maker in the\nsituation of cattle on an estate, which the owner has a right to dispose\nof as he pleases. Civil Governors are a body of _masters_; and their\npower is a commission from Heaven held by divine right, and unbounded in\nits extent.\n\nI have espoused, with some zeal, the first of these accounts; and in the\nfollowing tracts, endeavoured to explain and defend it. And this is _all_\nI have done to give countenance to the charge I have mentioned.\u2014Even the\nmasterly writer who, after a croud of writers infinitely his inferiors,\nseems to have taken up this accusation against me, often expresses\nhimself as if he had adopted the same idea of government[2]. Such indeed\nis my opinion of his good sense, and such has been the zeal which he\nhas discovered for the rights of mankind, that I think it scarcely\npossible his ideas and mine on this subject should be very different.\nHis language, however, sometimes puzzles me; and, particularly, when\nhe intimates that government is an institution of divine authority;[3]\nwhen he scouts all discussions of the nature of civil liberty, the\nfoundation of civil rights, and the principles of free government;\nand when he asserts the _competence_ of our legislature to revive the\n_High-Commission Court_ and _Star-Chamber_, and its BOUNDLESS AUTHORITY\nnot only over the people of _Britain_, but over distant communities who\nhave no voice in it.\n\nBut whatever may be Mr. BURKE\u2019S sentiments on this subject, he cannot\npossibly think of the former account of government that \u201cit is a\nspeculation which destroys all authority.\u201d\u2014Both accounts establish an\nauthority. The difference is, that one derives it from the _people_, and\nmakes it a _limited_ authority; and the other derives it from _Heaven_;\nand makes it _unlimited_.\u2014I have repeatedly declared my admiration\nof such a constitution of government as our own would be, were the\nHouse of Commons a fair representation of the kingdom, and under no\nundue influence.\u2014The sum of all I have meant to maintain is, \u201cthat\nLEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT, as opposed to OPPRESSION and TYRANNY, consists\nin the dominion of equal laws made with common consent, or of men over\n_themselves_; and not in the dominion of communities over communities, or\nof any men over other men.\u201d Introduction to the second Tract, p. 9.\u2014How\nthen can it be pretended, that I have aimed at destroying all authority?\nDoes our own constitution destroy all authority? Is the authority of\nequal laws made with common consent no authority? Must there be no\ngovernment in a state that governs itself? Or, must an institution,\ncontrived by the united counsels of the members of a community, for\nrestraining licentiousness and gaining security against injury and\nviolence, _encourage_ licentiousness, and give to every one a power to\ncommit what outrages he pleases?\n\nThe Archbishop of York, (in a sermon preached before the society for\npropagating the gospel in foreign parts, Feb. 21, 1777,) has taken notice\nof some loose opinions, as he calls them, which have been lately current\non civil liberty; some who mean delinquency having given accounts of it\n\u201cby which every man\u2019s humour is made to be the rule of his obedience,\nall the bad passions are let loose, and those dear interests abandoned\nto outrage for the protection of which we trust in law,\u201d 4to edit. p. 15\nand 16. It is not difficult to guess at one of the delinquents intended\nin these words. In opposition to the horrid sentiments of liberty\nwhich they describe, but which in reality no man in his senses ever\nentertained, the Archbishop defines it to be simply, the supremacy of\nlaw, or GOVERNMENT by LAW, without adding to _law_, as I had done, the\nwords _equal_ and _made with common consent_;[4] and without opposing a\nGOVERNMENT by LAW to a GOVERNMENT BY MEN, as others had done.\u2014According\nto him, therefore, the supremacy of law must be liberty, whatever the\nlaw is, or whoever makes it.\u2014In despotic countries government by law\nis the same with government by the will of one man, which HOOKER has\ncalled _the misery of all men_; but, according to this definition, it is\nliberty.\u2014In ENGLAND _formerly_, the law consigned to the flames all who\ndenyed certain established points of faith. Even _now_, it subjects to\nfines, imprisonment and banishment all teachers of religion who have not\nsubscribed the doctrinal articles of the church of England; and the good\nArchbishop, not thinking the law in this case sufficiently rigorous, has\nproposed putting Protestant Dissenters under the same restraints with the\nPapists.[5] And should this be done, if done by _law_, it will be the\nestablishment of _liberty_.\n\nThe truth is, that a government by law is or is not liberty, just as\nthe laws are just or unjust; and as the body of the people do or do not\nparticipate in the power of making them. The learned Prelate seems to\nhave thought otherwise, and therefore has given a definition of liberty,\nwhich might as well have been given of slavery.\n\nAt the conclusion of his sermon, the Archbishop adds words which\nhe calls comfortable, addressed to those who had been _patient in\ntribulation_,[6] and intimating that they might _rejoice in hope_, \u201ca ray\nof brightness then appearing after a prospect which had been long dark.\u201d\nAnd in an account which follows the sermon, from one of the missionaries\nin the province of New-York, it is said, that \u201cthe rebellion would\nundoubtedly be crushed, and that THEN will be the time for taking steps\nfor the increase of the church in America, by granting it an episcopate.\u201d\nIn conformity to the sentiments of this missionary, the Archbishop also\nexpresses his hope, that the opportunity which such an event will give,\nfor establishing episcopacy among the colonists, will not be lost; and\nadvises, that measures should be thought of for that purpose, and for\nthereby rescuing the church from the persecution it has long suffered in\n_America_.\n\nThis is a subject so important, and it has been so much misrepresented,\nthat I cannot help going out of my way to give a brief account of it.\n\n * * * * *\n\nIt does not appear that the lay members themselves of the church in\n_America_ have ever wished for Bishops. On the contrary, the assembly of\n_Virginia_ (the first episcopal colony) some years ago returned thanks\nto two clergymen in that colony, who had protested against a resolution\nof the other clergy to petition for Bishops. The church _here_ cannot\nhave a right to _impose_ Bishops on the church in another country; and\ntherefore, while churchmen in _America_ are averse to Bishops, it must be\npersecution to send Bishops among them. The _Presbyterians_, and other\nreligious sects there, are willing, from a sense of the reasonableness\nof toleration, to admit Bishops whenever the body of episcopalian\nlaity shall desire them, provided security is given that they shall be\nofficers merely spiritual, possessed of no other powers than those which\nare necessary to the full exercise of that mode of religious worship.\nIt is not Bishops, as _spiritual_ officers, they have opposed; but\nBishops on a state-establishment; Bishops with _civil_ powers; Bishops\nat the head of ecclesiastical courts, maintained by taxing other sects,\nand possessed of a PRE-EMINENCE which would be incompatible with the\nequality which has long subsisted among all religious sects in _America_.\nIn this last respect, the colonies have hitherto enjoyed a happiness\nwhich is unparalleled, but which the introduction of such Bishops as\nwould be sent from hence would destroy. In _Pensilvania_ (one of the\nhappiest countries under heaven before we carried into it desolation and\ncarnage) all sects of christians have been always perfectly on a level,\nthe legislature taking no part with any one sect against others, but\nprotecting all equally as far as they are peaceable. The state of the\ncolonies north of _Pensilvania_ is much the same; and, in the province\nof _Massachusett\u2019s-Bay_ in particular, civil authority interposes no\nfarther in religion than by imposing a tax for supporting public worship,\nleaving to all the power of applying the tax to the support of that mode\nof public worship which they like best. This tax the episcopalians were,\nat one time, obliged to pay in common with others; but so far did the\nprovince carry its indulgence to them, that an act was passed on purpose\nto excuse them.\u2014With this let the state of Protestant Dissenters in\nthis country be compared. Not only are they obliged to pay tithes for\nthe support of the established church, but their worship is not even\ntolerated, unless their ministers will subscribe the articles of the\nchurch. In consequence of having long scrupled this subscription, they\nhave lost all legal right to protection, and are exposed to the cruellest\npenalties. Uneasy in such a situation, they not long ago applied twice to\nparliament for the repeal of the penal laws against them. Bills for that\npurpose were brought into the _House of Commons_, and passed that House.\nBut, in the House of Lords, they were rejected in consequence of the\nopposition of the Bishops.\u2014There are few I reverence so much as some on\nthe sacred bench; but such conduct (and may I not add the alacrity with\nwhich most of them support the present measures?) must leave an indelible\nstain upon them, and will probably exclude them for ever from _America_.\n\nOn this occasion, I cannot help thinking with concern of the learned\nPrelate\u2019s feelings. After a prospect long dark, he had discovered a ray\nof brightness shewing him _America_ reduced, and the church triumphant:\nBut lately, that ray of brightness has vanished, and defeat has taken\nplace of victory and conquest.\u2014And what do we _now_ see?\u2014What a different\nprospect, mortifying to the learned Prelate, presents itself?\u2014A great\npeople likely to be formed, in spite of all our efforts, into free\ncommunities, under governments which have[7] no religious tests and\nestablishments!\u2014A new \u00e6ra in future annals, and a new opening in human\naffairs beginning, among the descendants of _Englishmen_, in a new\nworld;\u2014A rising empire, extended over an immense continent, without\nBISHOPS,\u2014without NOBLES,\u2014and without KINGS.\n\n_O the depth of the riches of the wisdom of God! How unsearchable are his\njudgments!_\n\nBut to proceed to another subject.\n\n * * * * *\n\nIn the second of the following tracts, page 48, I have observed, that in\nformer times it was the custom of parliament to pass bills for appointing\ncommissioners to take, state, and examine the public accounts. I have\nlately had it in my power to inform myself more particularly on this\nsubject; and I shall here beg leave to give a brief recital of some of\nthe principal facts relating to it.\n\nThe first bill for the purpose I have mentioned was passed in the times\nof the commonwealth, and in the year 1653. It was called an \u201cact for\naccounts, and for clearing of public debts, and discovering frauds and\nconcealments.\u201d Seven commissioners were named in it, and the necessary\npowers given them. In 1667, another act was passed for the same purpose;\nafter which I find no account of any such acts till the beginning of\nthe reign of King William. At this time complaints of mismanagement\nand embezzlements in the disposition of public money were become so\nprevalent, that the _House of Commons_ thought it necessary to enter\ninto measures for effectually preventing them, by obliging all revenue\nofficers to make up their accounts, and bringing defaulters to justice.\n\nWith these views, six of the acts I have mentioned were passed between\nthe years 1690 and 1701. Another was passed in the first of Queen _Anne_;\nand _three_ more in her four last years. In King _William_\u2019s reign they\nwere always passed by the _House of Commons_ without a division. In\n_Queen Anne\u2019s reign_, not _one_ passed without a division. In 1717, a\nmotion for such an act was _rejected_ without a division; and since 1717,\nonly one motion[8] has been made for such a bill, and it was rejected by\na majority of 136 to 66.\n\nThe preamble to these acts declares the reason of them to be, that \u201cthe\nkingdom may be satisfied and truly informed, whether all the monies\ngranted by parliament have been faithfully issued and applied to the\nend for which they had been given; and that all loyal subjects may be\nthereby encouraged more chearfully to bear the burthens laid upon them.\u201d\nThe number of commissioners named in them was generally nine or seven,\nall members of the _House of Commons_. It was particularly ordered,\nthat they should take an account of all the revenues brought into the\nreceipt of the Exchequer, and all arrears thereof; of all monies in the\nhands of the receivers general of the land-tax, customs and excise; of\nall the public stores, provisions, &c. as well for land as sea service;\nof all ships of war, and the sums of money provided or paid for the use\nof the forces by sea and land, and the number of them respectively;\nand of any briberies or corruptions in any persons concerned in the\nreceiving or disposing of the national treasure. And, for these purposes,\nthey were impowered to call before them, and to examine upon oath the\nofficers of the exchequer, the secretary at war, paymaster of the forces,\ncommissioners of the navy and ordnance, and all persons whatever employed\nas commissioners, or otherwise, in or about the _Treasury_.\n\nThe reports, which the commissioners thus appointed delivered from time\nto time to parliament, contain accounts of a waste of public money,\narising from the rapacity of contractors, and many scandalous abuses\nand frauds in every part of the public service, which must shock every\nperson not grown callous to all the feelings of honesty and honour.\nIn consequence of these reports, the _House of Commons_ addressed the\nthrone, and remonstrated; several great men were accused, and brought\nto shame; some were dismissed from their places, and ordered to be\nprosecuted; some expelled, and some committed to the Tower. Thus did our\nrepresentatives in those times discharge their duty as guardians of the\npublic property; and it is, in my opinion, only by such means that they\nare capable of doing this properly and effectually. It must, however, be\nacknowledged, that these commissions of enquiry did not produce all the\ngood effects which might have been expected from them. The influence of\nthe crown, and the interest in parliament of many great men entrusted\nwith the disposition of public money, rendered the proper execution\nof them extremely difficult. This led some even of the _Tories_, at\nthe time of the great change of ministry in 1710, to propose, that the\nreceiving and issuing of the public money should be taken from the crown;\nand, in defence of this proposal, it was urged, that the issuing of\npublic money, being in some of the most despotic countries left in the\nhands of the people, it was by no means a necessary part of the royal\nprerogative. This would indeed have provided a complete remedy; and it\nmight have perpetuated the constitution. But, even in these times, it was\na reformation too great and too impracticable to engage much attention.\n\nEver since those times the public accounts have been growing more\ncomplicated; and the temptations to profusion and embezzlement have been\nincreasing with increasing luxury and dissipation. How astonishing then\nis it that every idea of such _commissions_ should be now lost; and that,\nat a time when the nation is labouring under expences almost too heavy\nto be borne, the passing of accounts by the _House of Commons_ is become\nlittle more than a matter of form; our representatives scarcely thinking\nit worth their while to attend on such occasions, and MILLIONS of the\npublic treasure being sometimes given away, in a few hours, just as\nproposed by the _Treasury_, without debate or enquiry.\n\nI must not forget to mention particularly on this subject, that the\ncommissioners named in the acts I have described, were always declared\nincapable of holding any place or office of profit under the crown;\nand directed to take an account \u201cof all pensions, salaries, and sums\nof money paid or payable to members of parliament out of the revenue\nor otherwise.\u201d\u2014Not long before this time, the _House of Commons_ would\nnot suffer even the _Attorney-general_[9] to sit and vote in the\nhouse because he was the king\u2019s servant; and in 1678, a member, as Mr.\n_Trenchard_ says, was committed to the Tower, for only saying in the\nhouse that the king might keep guards for his defence, if he could pay\nthem.\u2014Such _once_ was the House of Commons.\u2014So jealous of the power\nof the crown, and so chaste.\u2014Since the reign of Queen _Ann_ and the\npassing of the _Septennial Act_, a great change has taken place.[10]\nA change which is little less than the total ruin of the constitution,\nand which may end in a tyranny the most oppressive and insupportable. It\nis, therefore, the greatest evil, which could have happened to us; and\nthe men, by whose abominable policy it has been accomplished, ought to\nbe followed with the everlasting execrations of every friend to public\nvirtue and liberty.\n\n * * * * *\n\nI now withdraw to the situation of an anxious spectator of public events;\nbut before I do this, I must leave with the public, at this threatening\nperiod, the following sentiments.\n\nNot long ago, the colonies might have been kept, without bloodshed or\ntrouble, by repealing the _acts_ which have made us the aggressors in\nthe present war; but _now_ it would be great folly to expect this.\u2014At\nthe same time I think it certain, that they may be rendered more useful\nto us by a pacification on liberal terms, which shall bind them to us as\nFRIENDS, than by any victories or slaughters (were they possible) which\ncan force them to submit to us as SUBJECTS.\u2014I think it also certain,\nthat should the offer of such terms be delayed till they have formed an\nalliance with _France_, this country is UNDONE.\u2014Such an alliance, we may\nhope, is not yet settled.\u2014Our rulers, therefore, may _possibly_ have\nstill a moment for pausing and retreating; and every dictate of prudence\nand feeling of humanity requires them to be speedy and earnest in\nimproving it.\u2014But what am I saying? I know this must not be expected. Too\nfull of ideas of our own dignity, too proud to retract; and too tenacious\nof dominion, we seem determined to persist: And the consequence must be,\nthat the colonies will become the allies of _France_; that a general war\nwill be kindled; and, perhaps, this once happy country be made, in just\nretribution, the seat of that desolation and misery which it has produced\nin other countries.\n\n January 19, 1778.\n\n * * * * *\n\nSince the publication of the preceding Introduction, the event referred\nto at the end of it has been announced to the public. A memorial from\nthe _French_ court has been delivered to our court, declaring, that\nthe former has concluded a treaty of commerce and friendship with the\ncolonies as INDEPENDENT STATES; and acquainting us that, IN CONCERT\nWITH THEM, the King of France is determined and prepared to defend his\ncommerce against any interruption we may give it.\u2014A new turn, therefore,\nis now given to our affairs of a nature the most critical and alarming.\nWould to God there were any concessions by which we could extricate\nourselves. But the opportunities for this have been shamefully lost,\nand cannot be now recovered.\u2014With a judicial blindness in our councils\nwhich has hitherto carried us uniformly from _bad_ to _worse_\u2014With near\nhalf our strength torn from us, and our vaunted dignity in the dust\u2014With\nour resources failing; our credit tottering; and a debt threatening\nto overwhelm us of more than a HUNDRED AND FIFTY MILLIONS\u2014In these\ncircumstances, we seem to be entering on a war with the united powers of\n_France_, _Spain_, and _America_.\u2014This, should it happen, will complete\nthe measure of our troubles, and soon bring on that _catastrophe_ which\nthere has been all along reason to expect and dread.\n\n April 24, 1778.\n\n\nACCOUNT OF THE CUSTOMS FOR THE LAST SIX YEARS.\n\nIn the following tracts I have reckoned, among the destructive\nconsequences of the war with _America_, the loss of a considerable part\nof our trade. In consequence of several accidental causes, particularly\nthe demand created by the war, this effect has not yet been so much felt\nas was generally expected. The truth, however, is, that the war has\noperated in this way to a degree that is alarming, as will appear from\nthe following account of the CUSTOMS for the last six years.\n\n Gross Receipt. Debentures. Net Receipt. Payments into\n the Exchequer.\n 1772 5.134,503 2.214,508 2.441,038 2.525,515\n 1773 5.159,800 2.463,767 2.221,460 2.431,071\n 1774 5.068,000 2.132,600 2.455,500 2.547,717\n 1775 5.146,900 1.904,900 2.709,340 2.476,302\n 1776 3.726,970 1.544,300 1.633,380 2.460,402\n 1777 3.293,200 932,860 1.846,390 2.199,105\n\nIt should be observed, that though, in 1776, there had been no\nimportation of _tobacco_, yet the duties on _tobacco_ brought into the\n_Exchequer_ as much as ever, these duties having been paid for old\nstock taken out of the warehouses for _home consumption_, instead of\n_exportation_. This is one of the causes which kept up the payments into\nthe _Exchequer_ in 1776, notwithstanding a sudden fall of near a MILLION\nAND A HALF in the gross receipt, and a MILLION in the net receipt.\u2014In\nthe last year, or 1777, the duties on tobacco fell very short; and this\ncontributed to diminish the payments into the _Exchequer_ near a _quarter\nof a million_. But what seems of more importance is, that the debentures\n(or duties returned at exportation) which had fallen in 1775 and 1776\nabove a _fourth_, continued to fall in 1777; and did not then amount to\nmore than _two-fifths_ of the usual sum.\n\nI have examined the customs from the Revolution to the present time; but\ncannot find that any thing like such a fall in them has ever happened\nbefore.\n\n\nFIRST ADVERTISEMENT.\n\nThe present state of the public funds makes it necessary for me to\nacquaint the reader, that when the _Supplement_ to the following Tracts\nwas written, the 3 _per cent._ annuities were at the price which the\ncalculations in it suppose, or nearly at 78. They have since fallen to\n72, and once even below 69, which is a lower price than they were ever at\nduring the whole last war, except just at the pinch of the loan of twelve\nmillions in 1762.\u2014The difference of price also between them and the new\n_4 per cents._ is fallen, (for no reason that I can discover) from 14\nto about 10\u00bd.\u2014I find, likewise, that in consequence of a distressing\nscarcity of money, the subscribers to the last loan of _five millions_\nhave not yet been able to complete their payments.\u2014These facts afford\na dark prospect; and make it doubtful whether, if things don\u2019t mend,\nit will be possible, by any schemes, to procure the money necessary\nto bear the expence of another campaign.\u2014Should it happen, for these\nreasons, that what I have written on loans can be of no use; or, though\ncapable of being of use, should it be neglected; I shall still reflect\nwith satisfaction, that I have now given what I wished to offer on this\nsubject with more correctness; and proved, beyond a doubt, that a great\npart of the National Debt is an _artificial_ debt, for which no money has\nbeen received, and which might have been easily avoided.\n\n Jan. 19, 1778.\n\n\nSECOND ADVERTISEMENT.\n\nSince the foregoing Advertisement in January last, the price of the 3\n_per cent._ annuities has fallen from 72 to 60\u00bd. But the difference of\nprice between them and the 4 _per cent._ annuities created in 1777, has\nrisen to near 18l. agreeably to the true comparative value of these\nannuities, as computed in page 14 of the Supplement.\u2014It is necessary I\nshould farther mention, that there has been a new loan of six millions\nfor the service of the present year; but that, contrary to my hopes, the\nmanagers of our finances have returned to the old modes of borrowing\u2014The\nconsolidated 3 _per cent._ annuities being, when the loan was settled on\nthe 6th of February, at 66\u00bd; one hundred 3 _per cent. stock_ estimated\nat this price, was given for every 100l. in _money_, with FOUR-FIFTHS of\nthe profits of a lottery ticket reckoned at 2\u00bdl. and an ANNUITY of 2\u00bdl.\nfor 30 years, reckoned worth 14 years purchase (or 135l.) but really\nworth above 15 years purchase. This made a profit of 4l. on every 100l.\nadvanced. But the 3 _per cent._ annuities falling immediately to 64, and\nin a few days to 60\u00bd; and the short annuity also happening to sell for no\nmore than 13 years purchase, this loan has been constantly at a discount,\nwhich has fluctuated between 2 and 4\u00bd _per cent._\n\nThe scheme of this loan is the first of the old schemes described in\nthe following Supplement, page 2d; and it is apparent that by including\nthe value of the _douceurs_ in the capital, it brings on the public\nan artificial debt, for which nothing will be received, of above two\nmillions.\u2014The sum to be lent, should it be ever paid, might have been as\nwell obtained, without making any material addition to the annual charge,\nby selling separately the two _douceurs_ worth 2.244,000l. and offering\nfor the remaining sum necessary to make up six millions, an interest of\nfive _per cent._ subject to the regulations proposed in the Second Tract,\npage 98, or in the Supplement, page 24.\n\n April 24, 1778.\n\n\nThe following accounts have been laid before the House of Commons since\nJanuary last.\n\n\n_Account of the Gold Coin brought into the Mint from Great Britain and\nIreland by the Proclamations in 1773, 1774, and 1776._\n\n \u00a3. _s._ _d._\n\n First Proclamation brought in 3.806,435 7 2 deficient more than\n 6 grains in a guinea.\n\n 2d Proclamation brought in 4.876,171 18 3 deficient between\n 3 and 6 grains.\n\n 3d Proclamation brought in 6.880,986 5 3 deficient between\n 1 and 3 grains.\n ------------------\n Total 15.563,593 10 8\n\nCompare Second Tract from page 56 to 64.\n\n\n_Account of the Expence of calling in and recoining all the Gold Coin\ndeficient more than a grain in a guinea._\n\n \u00a3. _s._ _d._\n\n Expence to the Bank for melting 16,786 14 6\n\n Deficiency in melting 317,314 6 11\n\n Interest of money advanced to the\n holders of gold coin 231,982 17 7\n\n To master of the Mint for the charge\n of recoining and other charges 115,459 12 9\n\n To several persons who were appointed\n in the several counties to take in\n and exchange the gold coin, and for\n other charges and expences 72,476 8 0\n ----------------\n Total 754,019 19 9\n\nTowards defraying this expence there have been applied the following sums:\n\n \u00a3. _s._ _d._\n\n Out of the supplies in 1774 250,000 0 0\n in 1775 69,671 8 3\n in 1776 92,421 14 11\u00bc\n\n Out of the million\n vote of credit in 1776 30,000 0 0\n\n Out of the million\n vote of credit in 1777 206,699 8 3\u00be\n\n Provided for in 1778 105,227 8 3\n -----------------\n 754,019 19 9\n\nThese accounts shew, that in the note, p. 63 of the Second Tract, the\nwords _16 millions and a half_ should have been _15 millions and a half_;\nand that in p. 69, 2d line, 650,000l. should have been 754,019l. 19s. 9d.\n\n * * * * *\n\n_N. B._ The loss attending the deficiency in the coin brought in by the\nfirst proclamation amounted nearly to 300,000l. but having been thrown on\nthe holders of the coin, it could not be brought to account.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n[1] See Mr. _Burke\u2019s_ Letter to the Sheriffs of _Bristol_, pages 53, 54.\n\n[2] \u201cTo follow, not to force the public inclination; to give a direction,\na form, a technical dress and a specific, sanction to the general sense\nof the community, is the true end of legislature. When it goes beyond\nthis, its authority will be precarious, let its rights be what they\nwill.\u201d Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol, p. 49.\n\n[3] Ibid. p. 55. Thoughts on the causes of the present discontents, p.\n67. \u201cGovernment certainly, is an institution of divine authority; though\nits _forms_ and the _persons_ who administer it, all originate from the\npeople.\u201d It is probable that Mr. _Burke_ means only that government is\na divine institution, in the same sense in which any other expedient of\nhuman prudence for gaining protection against injury, may be called a\nDivine institution. All that we owe _immediately_ to our own foresight\nand industry, must _ultimately_ be ascribed to God the giver of all our\npowers, and the cause of all causes. It is in this sense that St. Paul in\nRom. xiii. 1, 2. calls civil magistracy the _ordinance of God_, and says\nthat _there is no power but of God_. If any one wants to be convinced of\nthis, he should read the excellent bishop HOADLY\u2019s Sermon entitled _The\nMeasures of Submission to the civil Magistrate_, and the defences of it.\n\nIt is further probable, that when Mr. _Burke_ asserts the _omnipotence_\nof Parliaments, or their _competence_ to establish any oppressions\n(Letter, p. 46, 49) he means mere _power_ abstracted from _right_, or\nthe same sort of _power_ and _competence_ that trustees have to betray\ntheir trust, or that armed ruffians have to rob and murder. Nor should\nI doubt whether this is his meaning, were it not for the passage I have\nquoted from him in the last page, the latter part of which seems to\nimply, that a legislature may contradict its _end_, and yet retain its\n_rights_.\u2014Some of the justest remarks on this subject may be found in the\nEarl of ABINGDON\u2019s thoughts on Mr. _Burke_\u2019s letter, a pamphlet which (on\naccount of the excellent public principles it maintains, and the spirit\nof liberty it breathes, as well as the rank of the writer) must give to\nevery friend to the true interests of this country particular pleasure.\n\nIn p. 46, Mr. _Burke_ says, that \u201cif there is one man in the world more\nzealous than another for the supremacy of parliament and the rights of\nthis imperial crown, it is himself; though many may be more knowing in\nthe extent and the foundation of these rights.\u201d He adds, that \u201che has\nconstantly declined such disquisitions, not being qualified for the chair\nof a professor in metaphysics, and not chusing to put the solid interests\nof the kingdom on speculative grounds.\u201d\u2014_The less knowledge, the more\nzeal_, is a maxim which experience has dreadfully verified in _religion_.\nBut he that, in the present case, should apply this maxim to Mr. _Burke_,\nwould, whatever he may say of himself, greatly injure him. Though he\nchuses to decry enquiries into the nature of liberty, there are, I am\npersuaded, few in the world whose zeal for it is more united to extensive\nknowledge and an exalted understanding.\u2014He calls it, p. 55. \u201cthe vital\nspring and energy of a state, and a blessing of the first order.\u201d He\ncannot, therefore, think that too much pains may be taken to UNDERSTAND\nit. He must know, that nothing but usurpation and error can suffer by\nenquiry and discussion.\n\nMr. WILKES, in an excellent speech which he lately made in moving\nfor the repeal of the declaratory law, observed, that this law was a\n_compromise_ to which the great men, under whose administration it was\npassed, were forced in order to obtain the repeal of the _Stamp-act_.\nI think so highly of that administration and of the service it did the\npublic, that I have little doubt of the truth of this observation. But,\nat the same time, I cannot help wishing Mr. _Burke_ had given no reason\nfor doubt by defending the _principle_ of that act; a _principle_ which,\nunquestionably, he and his friends would never have acted upon; but which\nothers have since acted upon, with a violence which has brought us to the\nbrink of ruin.\n\n[4] In p. 19. he calls liberty \u201ca freedom from all restraints except\nsuch as established law imposes for THE GOOD OF THE COMMUNITY.\u201d But this\naddition can make no difference of any consequence, as long as it is not\nspecified _where_ the power is lodged of judging what laws are for the\ngood of the community. In countries where the _laws_ are the _edicts_ of\nabsolute princes, the end professed is always the good of the Community.\n\n[5] \u201cThe laws against Papists have been extremely severe. New dangers may\narise; and if at any time ANOTHER DENOMINATION of men should be equally\ndangerous to our civil interests, it would be justifiable to lay them\nunder similar restraints.\u201d Page 17.\u2014In another part of this sermon the\ngreat men in opposition (some of the first in the kingdom in respect\nof rank, ability, and virtue) are described as a body of men void of\nprinciple, who, without regarding the relation in which they stand to\nthe community, have entered into a league for advancing their private\ninterest, and \u201cwho are held together by the same bond that keeps together\nthe lowest and wickedest combinations.\u201d\u2014Was there ever such a censure\ndelivered from a pulpit? What wonder is it that the Dissenters should\ncome in for a share in his Grace\u2019s abuse?\u2014Their political principles, he\nsays, are growing dangerous.\u2014On what does he ground this insinuation?\nHe is mistaken if he imagines that they are all such delinquents as the\nauthor of the following tracts, or that they think universally as he does\nof the war with America. On this subject they are, like other bodies of\nmen in the kingdom, of different opinions.\u2014But I will tell him in what\nthey agree.\u2014They agree in detesting the doctrines of passive obedience\nand non-resistance. They are all WHIGS, enemies to arbitrary power, and\nfirmly attached to those principles of civil and religious liberty which\nproduced the GLORIOUS REVOLUTION and the HANOVERIAN SUCCESSION.\u2014Such\nprinciples are the nation\u2019s best defence; and Protestant Dissenters have\nhitherto reckoned it their glory to be distinguished by zeal for them,\nand an adherence to them. ONCE these principles were _approved_ by men in\npower. No good can be expected, if they are now reckoned dangerous.\n\n[6] That is, the missionaries of the society in America.\u2014The charter of\nthe society declares the end of its incorporation to be \u201cpropagating the\ngospel in foreign parts, and making provision for the worship of God\nin those plantations which wanted the administration of God\u2019s word and\nsacraments, and were abandoned to atheism and infidelity.\u201d The chief\nbusiness, on the contrary, of the society has been to provide for the\nsupport of _episcopalianism_ in the northern colonies, and particularly\nNEW-ENGLAND, where the sacraments are more regularly administered, and\nthe people less abandoned to infidelity, than perhaps in any country\nunder heaven. The missionaries employed and paid by the society for this\npurpose, have generally been clergymen of the highest principles in\nchurch and state. _America_, having been for some time very hostile to\nmen of such principles, most of them have been obliged to take refuge in\nthis country; and here they have, I am afraid, been too successful in\npropagating their own resentments, in misleading our rulers, and widening\nthe breach which has produced the present war.\n\n[7] I am sorry to mention one exception to the fact here intimated. The\nnew constitution for _Pensilvania_ (in other respects wise and liberal)\nis dishonoured by a religious test. It requires an acknowledgment of the\ndivine inspiration of the Old and New Testament, as a condition of being\nadmitted to a seat in the House of Representatives; directing however, at\nthe same time, that no other religious test shall _for ever_ hereafter be\nrequired of any civil officer.\u2014This has been, probably, an accommodation\nto the prejudices of some of the narrower sects in the province, to which\nthe more liberal part have for the present thought fit to yield; and,\ntherefore, it may be expected that it will not be of long continuance.\n\nReligious tests and subscriptions in general, and all establishments\nof particular systems of faith, with civil emoluments annexed, do\ninconceivable mischief, by turning religion into a trade, by engendering\nstrife and persecution, by forming hypocrites, by obstructing the\nprogress of truth, and fettering and perverting the human mind; nor\nwill the world ever grow much _wiser_, or _better_, or _happier_, till,\nby the abolition of them, truth can gain fair play, and reason free\nscope for exertion. The Archbishop, page 11, speaks of christianity as\n\u201cinsufficient to rely on its own energies; and of the assistances which\nit is the business of civil authority to provide for gospel truths.\u201d\u2014A\nworse slander was never thrown on gospel truths. Christianity disdains\nsuch assistances as the corrupted governments of this world are capable\nof giving it. Politicians and statesmen know little of it. Their _enmity_\nhas sometimes done it good; but their _friendship_, by supporting\ncorruptions carrying its name, has been almost fatal to it.\n\n[8] In 1742, after the resignation of Sir _Robert Walpole_.\n\n[9] Sir FRANCIS BACON was the _second_ ATTORNEY-GENERAL who sat in the\n_House of Commons_; but, to prevent its being drawn into a precedent,\nthe House would not admit him, till they had made an order, that no\nAttorney-General should for the future be allowed to sit and vote in that\nHouse.\u2014In conformity to this order, whenever afterwards a member was\nappointed Attorney-General, his place was vacated, and a new writ issued.\nThis continued to be the practice till the year 1670, when Sir HENEAGE\nFINCH (afterwards EARL OF NOTTINGHAM) being appointed Attorney-General,\nhe was allowed by connivance to preserve his seat, which connivance has\nbeen continued ever since.\u2014I give these facts not from any enquiry or\nknowledge of my own, but from the authority of a friend, who is perhaps\nbetter informed than any person in the kingdom on every subject of this\nkind.\n\n[10] The following facts will shew, in some degree, how this change\nhas been brought about.\u2014For ten years ending Aug. 1, 1717 (a period\ncomprehending in it a general war abroad; and the demise of the crown,\nthe establishment of a new family, and an open rebellion at home) the\nmoney expended in secret services amounted only to 279,444l.\u2014For TEN\nYEARS ending Feb. 11, 1742, it amounted to no less a sum than 1.384,600;\nof which 50,077l. was paid to printers of News-papers and writers for\ngovernment; and a greater sum expended, in the last _six weeks_ of these\nten years, than had been spent in _three years_ before Aug. 1710.\u2014See\nthe Report of the COMMITTEE appointed March 23, 1742, to enquire into\nthe conduct of _Robert Earl of Orford_, printed in the Journals of\nthe House of Commons, vol. 24, p. 295, 296, 300.\u2014One passage, in this\nreport, contains remarks, so much to my present purpose and so important,\nthat I cannot help copying it.\u2014\u201cThere are no laws particularly adapted\nto the case of a minister who clandestinely employs the money of the\npublic, and the whole power and profitable employments that attend\nthe collecting and disposing of it, _against_ the people: And, by\nthis profusion and criminal distribution of offices, in some measure\njustifies the expence that particular persons are obliged to be at, by\nmaking it necessary to the preservation of all that is valuable to a\nfree nation. For in that case, the contest is plain and visible. It is,\nwhether the Commons shall retain the _third_ state in their own hands;\nwhile this whole dispute is carried on at the expence of the people,\nand, on the side of the minister, out of the money granted to support\nand secure the constitutional independence of the three branches of\nthe legislature.\u2014This method of corruption is as sure, and, therefore,\nas criminal a way of subverting the constitution as by an armed force.\nIt is a crime, productive of a total destruction of the very being of\nthis government; and is so _high_ and _unnatural_, that nothing but\nthe powers of parliament can reach it; and, as it never can meet with\nparliamentary animadversion but when it is unsuccessful, it must seek for\nits _security_ in the extent and efficacy of the mischief it produces.\u201d\nP. 395. The obstructions which this committee met with in their enquiry\nproved that the crime they here describe in such emphatical language, had\n_even then_ obtained that very security, in the extent of the mischief it\nproduced, which, they observe, it was under a necessity of seeking.\n\n\n\n\n OBSERVATIONS\n ON THE NATURE OF\n CIVIL LIBERTY,\n THE PRINCIPLES OF\n GOVERNMENT,\n AND THE\n JUSTICE AND POLICY\n OF THE\n WAR WITH AMERICA.\n\n _Quis furor iste novus? quo nunc, quo tenditis\u2e3a_\n _Heu! miseri cives? non Hostem, inimicaque castra,_\n _\u2e3a Vestras Spes uritis._\n\n VIRG.\n\n By RICHARD PRICE, D. D. F. R. S.\n\n THE EIGHTH EDITION,\n With CORRECTIONS and ADDITIONS.\n\n LONDON:\n Printed for T. CADELL, in the STRAND.\n M.DCC.LXXVIII.\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.\n\n\n_In the following Observations, I have taken that liberty of examining\npublic measures, which, happily for this kingdom, every person in it\nenjoys. They contain the sentiments of a private and unconnected man; for\nwhich, should there be any thing wrong in them, he alone is answerable._\n\n_After all that has been written on the dispute with America, no reader\ncan expect to be informed, in this publication, of much that he has not\nbefore known. Perhaps, however, he may find in it some new matter; and if\nhe should, it will be chiefly in the Observations on the Nature of Civil\nLiberty, and the Policy of the War with America._\n\n February 8th, 1776.\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE TO THE FIFTH EDITION.\n\n\nThe favourable reception which the following Tract has met with, makes\nme abundant amends for the abuse it has brought upon me. I should be\nill employed were I to take much notice of this abuse: But there is one\ncircumstance attending it, which I cannot help just mentioning.\u2014The\nprinciples on which I have argued form the foundation of every state as\nfar as it is free; and are the same with those taught by Mr. Locke, and\nall the writers on Civil Liberty who have been hitherto most admired\nin this country. But I find with concern, that our Governors chuse to\ndecline trying by them their present measures: For, in a Pamphlet which\nhas been circulated by government with great industry, these principles\nare pronounced to be \u201cunnatural and wild, incompatible with practice, and\nthe offspring of the distempered imagination of a man who is biassed by\nparty, and who writes to deceive.\u201d\n\nI must take this opportunity to add, that I love quiet too well to think\nof entering into a controversy with any writers; particularly, NAMELESS\nones. Conscious of good intentions, and unconnected with any party, I\nhave endeavoured to plead the cause of general liberty and justice: And\nhappy in knowing this, I shall, in silence, commit myself to that candour\nof the public of which I have had so much experience.\n\n March 12th, 1776.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n\n _Page_\n\n PART I.\n\n SECT. I. _Of the Nature of Liberty in general._ 2\n\n SECT. II. _Of Civil Liberty and the Principles of Government._ 6\n\n SECT. III. _Of the Authority of one Country over another._ 19\n\n PART II.\n\n SECT. I. _Of the Justice of the War with America._ 34\n\n SECT. II. _Whether the War with America is justified by\n the Principles of the Constitution._ 48\n\n SECT. III. _Of the Policy of the War with America._ 50\n\n SECT. IV. _Of the Honour of the Nation as affected by\n the War with America._ 87\n\n SECT. V. _Of the Probability of succeeding in the War\n with America._ 94\n\n\n\n\nOBSERVATIONS, &c.\n\n\nOur Colonies in NORTH AMERICA appear to be now determined to risk\nand suffer every thing, under the persuasion, that GREAT BRITAIN is\nattempting to rob them of that Liberty to which every member of society,\nand all civil communities, have a natural and unalienable title. The\nquestion, therefore, whether this is a right persuasion, is highly\ninteresting, and deserves the careful attention of every _Englishman_\nwho values Liberty, and wishes to avoid staining himself with the\nguilt of invading it. But it is impossible to judge properly of this\nquestion without just ideas of Liberty _in general_; and of the nature,\nlimits, and principles of Civil Liberty _in particular_.\u2014The following\nobservations on this subject appear to me of some importance; and I\ncannot make myself easy without offering them to the public at the\npresent period, big with events of the last consequence to this kingdom.\nI do this, with reluctance and pain, urged by strong feelings, but at\nthe same time checked by the consciousness that I am likely to deliver\nsentiments not favourable to the present measures of that government,\nunder which I live, and to which I am a constant and zealous well-wisher.\nSuch, however, are my present sentiments and views, that this is a\nconsideration of inferior moment with me; and, as I hope never to go\nbeyond the bounds of decent discussion and expostulation, I flatter\nmyself, that I shall be able to avoid giving any person reason for\noffence.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe observations with which I shall begin, are of a more general\nand abstracted nature; but being necessary to introduce what I have\nprincipally in view, I hope they will be patiently read and considered.\n\n\nSECT. I.\n\n_Of the Nature of Liberty in General._\n\nIn order to obtain a more distinct view of the nature of Liberty as\nsuch, it will be useful to consider it under the four following general\ndivisions.\n\nFirst, _Physical_ Liberty.\u2014Secondly, _Moral_ Liberty.\u2014Thirdly,\n_Religious_ Liberty.\u2014And Fourthly, _Civil_ Liberty.\u2014These heads\ncomprehend all the different kinds of Liberty. And I have placed _Civil_\nLiberty last, because I mean to apply to it all I shall say of the other\nkinds of Liberty.\n\nBy PHYSICAL LIBERTY I mean that principle of _Spontaneity_, or\n_Self-determination_, which constitutes us _Agents_; or which gives us\na command over our actions, rendering them properly _ours_, and not\neffects of the operation of any foreign cause.\u2014MORAL LIBERTY is the power\nof following, in all circumstances, our sense of right and wrong; or of\nacting in conformity to our reflecting and moral principles, without\nbeing controuled by any contrary principles.\u2014RELIGIOUS LIBERTY signifies\nthe power of exercising, without molestation, that mode of religion\nwhich we think best; or of making the decisions of our own consciences\nrespecting religious truth, the rule of our conduct, and not any of the\ndecisions of our fellow-men.\u2014In like manner; CIVIL LIBERTY is the power\nof a _Civil Society_ or _State_ to govern itself by its own discretion,\nor by laws of its own making, without being subject to the impositions of\n_any_ power, in appointing and directing which the collective body of the\npeople have no concern, and over which they have no controul.\n\nIt should be observed, that, according to these definitions of the\ndifferent kinds of liberty, there is one general idea, that runs through\nthem all; I mean, the idea of _Self-direction_, or _Self-government_.\u2014Did\nour volitions originate not with _ourselves_, but with some cause over\nwhich we have no power; or were we under a necessity of always following\nsome will different from our own, we should want PHYSICAL LIBERTY.\n\nIn like manner; he whose perceptions of moral obligation are controuled\nby his passions has lost his _Moral Liberty_; and the most common\nlanguage applied to him is, that he wants _Self-government_.\n\nHe likewise who, in religion, cannot govern himself by his convictions of\nreligious duty, but is obliged to receive formularies of faith, and to\npractise modes of worship imposed upon him by others, wants _Religious\nLiberty_.\u2014And the Community also that is governed, not by itself, but by\nsome will independent of it, wants _Civil Liberty_.\n\nIn all these cases there is a force which stands opposed to the agent\u2019s\n_own_ will; and which, as far as it operates, produces _Servitude_.\u2014In\nthe _first_ case, this force is incompatible with the very idea of\nvoluntary motion; and the subject of it is a mere passive instrument\nwhich never _acts_, but is always _acted upon_.\u2014In the _second_ case;\nthis force is the influence of passion getting the better of reason; or\nthe _brute_ overpowering and conquering the will of the _man_.\u2014In the\n_third_ case; it is _Human Authority_ in religion requiring conformity\nto particular modes of faith and worship, and superseding _private\njudgment_.\u2014And in the last case, it is any will distinct from that of\nthe Majority of a Community, which claims a power of making laws for it,\nand disposing of its property.\n\nThis it is, I think, that marks the limit between _Liberty_ and\n_Slavery_. As far as, in any instance, the operation of any cause\ncomes in to restrain the power of Self-government, so far Slavery is\nintroduced: Nor do I think that a preciser idea than this of Liberty and\nSlavery can be formed.\n\n * * * * *\n\nI cannot help wishing I could here fix my reader\u2019s attention, and engage\nhim to consider carefully the dignity of that blessing to which we give\nthe name of LIBERTY, according to the representation now made of it.\nThere is not a word in the whole compass of language which expresses so\nmuch of what is important and excellent. It is, in every view of it, a\nblessing truly sacred and invaluable.\u2014Without _Physical Liberty_, man\nwould be a machine acted upon by mechanical springs, having no principle\nof motion in himself, or command over events; and, therefore, incapable\nof all merit and demerit.\u2014Without _Moral Liberty_, he is a wicked and\ndetestable being, subject to the tyranny of base lusts, and the sport of\nevery vile appetite.\u2014And without _Religious_ and _Civil Liberty_ he is\na poor and abject animal, without rights, without property, and without\na conscience, bending his neck to the yoke, and crouching to the will\nof every silly creature who has the insolence to pretend to authority\nover him.\u2014Nothing, therefore, can be of so much consequence to us as\n_Liberty_. It is the foundation of all honour, and the chief privilege\nand glory of our natures.\n\nIn fixing our ideas on the subject of Liberty, it is of particular use to\ntake such an enlarged view of it as I have now given. But the immediate\nobject of the present enquiry being _Civil Liberty_, I will confine to it\nall the subsequent observations.\n\n\nSECT. II.\n\n_Of Civil Liberty and the Principles of Government._\n\nFrom what has been said it is obvious, that all civil government, as\nfar as it can be denominated _free_, is the creature of the people. It\noriginates with them. It is conducted under their direction; and has in\nview nothing but their happiness. All its different forms are no more\nthan so many different modes in which they chuse to direct their affairs,\nand to secure the quiet enjoyment of their rights.\u2014In every free state\nevery man is his own Legislator.[11]\u2014All _taxes_ are free-gifts for\npublic services.\u2014All _laws_ are particular provisions or regulations\nestablished by COMMON CONSENT for gaining protection and safety.\u2014And all\n_Magistrates_ are Trustees or Deputies for carrying these regulations\ninto execution.\n\nLiberty, therefore, is too imperfectly defined when it is said to be \u201ca\nGovernment by LAWS, and not by MEN.\u201d If the laws are made by one man,\nor a junto of men in a state, and not by COMMON CONSENT, a government\nby them does not differ from Slavery. In this case it would be a\ncontradiction in terms to say that the state governs itself.\n\nFrom hence it is obvious that _Civil Liberty_, in its most perfect\ndegree, can be enjoyed only in small states, where every independent\nagent is capable of giving his suffrage in person, and of being chosen\ninto public offices. When a state becomes so numerous, or when the\ndifferent parts of it are removed to such distances from one another,\nas to render this impracticable, a diminution of Liberty necessarily\narises. There are, however, in these circumstances, methods by which such\nnear approaches may be made to perfect Liberty as shall answer all the\npurposes of government, and at the same time secure every right of human\nnature.\n\nTho\u2019 all the members of a state should not be capable of giving their\nsuffrages on public measures, _individually_ and _personally_, they may\ndo this by the appointment of _Substitutes_ or _Representatives_. They\nmay entrust the powers of legislation, subject to such restrictions as\nthey shall think necessary, with any number of _Delegates_; and whatever\ncan be done by such delegates within the limits of their trust, may be\nconsidered as done by the united voice and counsel of the Community.\u2014In\nthis method a free government may be established in the largest state;\nand it is conceivable that by regulations of this kind, any number of\nstates might be subjected to a scheme of government, that would exclude\nthe desolations of war, and produce universal peace and order.\n\nLet us think here of what may be practicable in this way with respect\nto _Europe_ in particular.\u2014While it continues divided, as it is at\npresent, into a great number of independent kingdoms whose interests\nare continually clashing, it is impossible but that disputes will often\narise which must end in war and carnage. It would be no remedy to this\nevil to make one of these states supreme over the rest; and to give it an\nabsolute plenitude of power to superintend and controul them. This would\nbe to subject all the states to the arbitrary discretion of one, and to\nestablish an ignominious slavery not possible to be long endured. It\nwould, therefore, be a remedy worse than the disease; nor is it possible\nit should be approved by any mind that has not lost every idea of Civil\nLiberty. On the contrary.\u2014Let every state, with respect to all its\ninternal concerns, be continued independent of all the rest; and let a\ngeneral confederacy be formed by the appointment of a SENATE consisting\nof Representatives from all the different states. Let this SENATE\npossess the power of managing all the _common_ concerns of the united\nstates, and of judging and deciding between them, as a common _Arbiter_\nor _Umpire_, in all disputes; having, at the same time, under its\ndirection, the common force of the states to support its decisions.\u2014In\nthese circumstances, each separate state would be secure against the\ninterference of foreign power in its private concerns, and, therefore,\nwould possess _Liberty_; and at the same time it would be secure against\nall oppression and insult from every neighbouring state.\u2014Thus might the\nscattered force and abilities of a whole continent be gathered into one\npoint; all litigations settled as they rose; universal peace preserved;\nand nation prevented _from any more lifting up a sword against nation_.\n\n * * * * *\n\nI have observed, that tho\u2019, in a great state, all the individuals that\ncompose it cannot be admitted to an immediate participation in the powers\nof legislation and government, yet they may participate in these powers\nby a delegation of them to a body of representatives.\u2014In this case it\nis evident that the state will be still _free_ or _self-governed_; and\nthat it will be more or less so in proportion as it is more or less\nfairly and adequately represented. If the persons to whom the trust of\ngovernment is committed hold their places for short terms; if they are\nchosen by the unbiassed voices of a majority of the state, and subject\nto their instructions; Liberty will be enjoyed in its highest degree.\nBut if they are chosen for long terms by a part only of the state;\nand if during that term they are subject to no controul from their\nconstituents; the very idea of Liberty will be lost, and the power of\nchusing representatives becomes nothing but a power, lodged in a _few_,\nto chuse at certain periods, a body of _Masters_ for themselves and for\nthe rest of the Community. And if a state is so sunk that the majority\nof its representatives are elected by a handful of the meanest[12]\npersons in it, whose votes are always paid for; and if also, there is a\nhigher will on which even these mock representatives themselves depend,\nand that directs their voices: In these circumstances, it will be an\nabuse of language to say that the state possesses Liberty. Private men,\nindeed, might be allowed the exercise of Liberty; as they might also\nunder the most despotic government, but it would be an _indulgence_ or\n_connivance_ derived from the spirit of the times, or from an accidental\nmildness in the administration. And, rather than be governed in such a\nmanner, it would perhaps be better to be governed by the will of one man\nwithout any representation: For a representation so degenerated could\nanswer no other end than to mislead and deceive, by disguising slavery,\nand keeping up a _form_ of Liberty when the _reality_ was lost.\n\n * * * * *\n\nWithin the limits now mentioned, Liberty may be enjoyed in every possible\ndegree; from that which is complete and perfect, to that which is\nmerely nominal; according as the people have more or less of a share in\ngovernment, and of a controuling power over the persons by whom it is\nadministered.\n\nIn general, to be _free_ is to be guided by one\u2019s own will; and to be\nguided by the will of another is the characteristic of _Servitude_. This\nis particularly applicable to Political Liberty. That state, I have\nobserved, is _free_, which is guided by its own will; or, (which comes\nto the same) by the will of an assembly of representatives appointed\nby itself and accountable to itself. And every state that is not so\ngoverned; or in which a body of men representing the people make not an\nessential part of the Legislature, is in _slavery_.\u2014In order to form the\nmost perfect constitution of government, there may be the best reasons\nfor joining to such a body of representatives, an _Hereditary Council_\nconsisting of men of the first rank in the state, with a _Supreme\nexecutive Magistrate_ at the head of all. This will form useful checks\nin a legislature; and contribute to give it vigour, union, and dispatch,\nwithout infringing liberty: for, as long as that part of a government\nwhich represents the people is a _fair representation_; and also has\na negative on all public measures, together with the sole power of\nimposing taxes and originating supplies; the essentials of liberty will\nbe preserved.\u2014We make it our boast in this country, that this is our own\nconstitution. I will not say with how much reason.\n\n * * * * *\n\nOf such Liberty as I have now described, it is impossible there should\nbe an excess. Government is an institution for the benefit of the people\ngoverned, which they have power to model as they please; and to say,\nthat they can have too much of this power, is to say, that there ought\nto be a power in the state superior to that which gives it being, and\nfrom which all jurisdiction in it is derived.\u2014Licentiousness, which\nhas been commonly mentioned, as an extreme of liberty, is indeed its\nopposite. It is government by the will of rapacious individuals, in\nopposition to the will of the community, made known and declared in\nthe laws. A free state, at the same time that it is free itself, makes\nall its members free, by excluding licentiousness, and guarding their\npersons and property and good name against insult. It is the end of all\njust government, at the same time that it secures the liberty of the\npublic against _foreign_ injury, to secure the liberty of the individual\nagainst _private_ injury. I do not, therefore, think it strictly just to\nsay, that it belongs to the nature of government to entrench on private\nliberty. It ought never to do this, except as far as the exercise of\nprivate liberty encroaches on the liberties of others. That is; it is\nlicentiousness it restrains, and liberty itself only when used to destroy\nliberty.\n\nIt appears from hence, that licentiousness and despotism are more nearly\nallied than is commonly imagined. They are both alike inconsistent\nwith liberty, and the true end of government; nor is there any other\ndifference between them, than that the one is the licentiousness of\n_great_ men, and the other the licentiousness of _little_ men; or that,\nby the one, the persons and property of a people are subject to outrage\nand invasion from a King, or a lawless body of _Grandees_; and that, by\nthe other, they are subject to the like outrage from a _lawless mob_.\u2014In\navoiding one of these evils, mankind have often run into the other. But\nall well constituted governments guard equally against both. Indeed of\nthe two, the last is, on several accounts, the least to be dreaded, and\nhas done the least mischief. It may be truly said, that if licentiousness\nhas destroyed its thousands, despotism has destroyed its millions. The\nformer, having little power, and no system to support it, necessarily\nfinds its own remedy; and a people soon get out of the tumult and\nanarchy attending it. But a despotism, wearing the form of government,\nand being armed with its force, is an evil not to be conquered without\ndreadful struggles. It goes on from age to age, debasing the human\nfaculties, levelling all distinctions, and preying on the rights and\nblessings of society.\u2014It deserves to be added, that in a state disturbed\nby licentiousness, there is an animation which is favourable to the\nhuman mind, and which puts it upon exerting its powers. But in a state\nhabituated to a despotism, all is still and torpid. A dark and savage\ntyranny stifles every effort of genius; and the mind loses all its spirit\nand dignity.\n\n * * * * *\n\nBefore I proceed to what I have farther in view, I will observe, that\nthe account now given of the principles of public Liberty, and the\nnature of an equal and free government, shews what judgment we should\nform of that OMNIPOTENCE, which, it has been said, must belong to every\ngovernment as such. Great stress has been laid on this, but most\nunreasonably.\u2014Government, as has been before observed, is, in the very\nnature of it, a TRUST; and all its powers a DELEGATION for gaining\nparticular ends. This _trust_ may be misapplied and abused. It may be\nemployed to defeat the very ends for which it was instituted; and to\nsubvert the very rights which it ought to protect.\u2014A PARLIAMENT, for\ninstance, consisting of a body of representatives, chosen for a limited\nperiod, to make laws, and to grant money for public services, would\nforfeit its authority by making itself perpetual, or even prolonging its\nown duration; by nominating its own members; by accepting bribes; or\nsubjecting itself to any kind of foreign influence. This would convert a\n_Parliament_ into a _conclave_ or _junto_ of self-created tools; and a\nstate that has lost its regard to its own rights, so far as to submit to\nsuch a breach of trust in its rulers, is enslaved.\u2014Nothing, therefore,\ncan be more absurd than the doctrine which some have taught, with respect\nto the omnipotence of parliaments. They possess no power beyond the\nlimits of the trust for the execution of which they were formed. If they\ncontradict this trust, they betray their constituents, and dissolve\nthemselves. All delegated power must be subordinate and limited.\u2014If\nomnipotence can, with any sense, be ascribed to a legislature, it must\nbe lodged where all legislative authority originates; that is, in the\nPEOPLE. For _their_ sakes government is instituted; and their\u2019s is the\nonly real omnipotence.\n\n * * * * *\n\nI am sensible, that all I have been saying would be very absurd, were\nthe opinions just which some have maintained concerning the origin\nof government. According to these opinions, government is not the\ncreature of the people, or the result of a convention between them and\ntheir rulers: But there are certain men who possess in themselves,\nindependently of the will of the people, a right of governing them, which\nthey derive from the Deity. This doctrine has been abundantly refuted\nby many[13] excellent writers. It is a doctrine which avowedly subverts\nCivil Liberty; and which represents mankind as a body of vassals, formed\nto descend like cattle from one set of owners to another, who have an\nabsolute dominion over them. It is a wonder, that those who view their\nspecies in a light so humiliating, should ever be able to think of\nthemselves without regret and shame. The intention of these observations\nis not to oppose such sentiments; but, taking for granted the\nreasonableness of Civil Liberty, to shew wherein it consists, and what\ndistinguishes it from its contrary.\u2014And, in considering this subject, as\nit has been now treated, it is unavoidable to reflect on the excellency\nof a free government, and its tendency to exalt the nature of man.\u2014Every\nmember of a free state, having his property secure, and knowing himself\nhis own governor, possesses a consciousness of dignity in himself, and\nfeels incitements to emulation and improvement, to which the miserable\nslaves of arbitrary power must be utter strangers. In such a state all\nthe springs of action have room to operate, and the mind is stimulated\nto the noblest exertions[14].\u2014But to be obliged, from our birth, to look\nup to a creature no better than ourselves as the master of our fortunes;\nand to receive his will as our law\u2014What can be more humiliating? What\nelevated ideas can enter a mind in such a situation?\u2014Agreeably to\nthis remark; the subjects of free states have, in all ages, been most\ndistinguished for genius and knowledge. Liberty is the soil where the\narts and sciences have flourished; and the more free a state has been,\nthe more have the powers of the human mind been drawn forth into action,\nand the greater number of brave men has it produced. With what lustre do\nthe antient free states of _Greece_ shine in the annals of the world? How\ndifferent is that country now, under the Great _Turk_? The difference\nbetween a country inhabited by men and by brutes is not greater.\n\nThese are reflexions which should be constantly present to every mind\nin this country.\u2014As _Moral_ Liberty is the prime blessing of man in his\n_private_ capacity, so is _Civil_ liberty in his _public_ capacity.\nThere is nothing that requires more to be _watched_ than power. There is\nnothing that ought to be opposed with a more determined resolution than\nits encroachments. Sleep in a state, as _Montesquieu_ says, is always\nfollowed by slavery.\n\nThe people of this kingdom were once warmed by such sentiments as these.\nMany a sycophant of power have they sacrificed. Often have they fought\nand bled in the cause of Liberty. But that time seems to be going. The\nfair inheritance of Liberty left us by our ancestors many of us are\nwilling to resign. An abandoned venality, the inseparable companion of\ndissipation and extravagance, has poisoned the springs of public virtue\namong us: And should any events ever arise that should render the same\nopposition necessary that took place in the times of King _Charles_ the\nFirst, and _James_ the Second, I am afraid all that is valuable to us\nwould be lost. The terror of the standing army, the danger of the public\nfunds, and the all-corrupting influence of the treasury, would deaden all\nzeal, and produce general acquiescence and servility.\n\n\nSECT. III.\n\n_Of the Authority of one Country over another._\n\nFrom the nature and principles of Civil Liberty, as they have been\nnow explained, it is an immediate and necessary inference that no one\ncommunity can have any power over the property or legislation of another\ncommunity, which is not incorporated with it by a just and adequate\nrepresentation.\u2014Then only, it has been shewn, is a state _free_, when\nit is governed by its own will. But a country that is subject to the\nlegislature of another country, in which it has no voice, and over which\nit has no controul, cannot be said to be governed by its own will. Such\na country, therefore, is in a state of slavery. And it deserves to\nbe particularly considered, that such a slavery is worse, on several\naccounts, than any slavery of private men to one another, or of kingdoms\nto despots within themselves.\u2014Between one state and another, there is\nnone of that fellow-feeling that takes place between persons in private\nlife. Being detached bodies that never see one another, and residing\nperhaps in different quarters of the globe, the state that governs\ncannot be a witness to the sufferings occasioned by its oppressions; or\na competent judge of the circumstances and abilities of the people who\nare governed. They must also have in a great degree separate interests;\nand the more the one is loaded, the more the other may be eased. The\ninfamy likewise of oppression, being in such circumstances shared among\na multitude, is not likely to be much felt or regarded.\u2014On all these\naccounts there is, in the case of one country subjugated to another,\nlittle or nothing to check rapacity; and the most flagrant injustice and\ncruelty may be practised without remorse or pity.\u2014I will add, that it\nis particularly difficult to shake off a tyranny of this kind. A single\ndespot, if a people are unanimous and resolute, may be soon subdued. But\na despotic state is not easily subdued; and a people subject to it cannot\nemancipate themselves without entering into a dreadful, and, perhaps,\nvery unequal contest.\n\nI cannot help observing farther, that the slavery of a people to internal\ndespots may be qualified and limited; but I don\u2019t see what can limit\nthe authority of one state over another. The exercise of power in this\ncase can have no other measure than discretion; and, therefore, must be\nindefinite and absolute.\n\n * * * * *\n\nOnce more. It should be considered that the government of one country by\nanother, can only be supported by a military force; and, without such a\nsupport, must be destitute of all weight and efficiency.\n\nThis will be best explained by putting the following case.\u2014There is,\nlet us suppose, in a province subject to the sovereignty of a distant\nstate, a subordinate legislature consisting of an Assembly chosen by the\npeople; a Council chosen by that Assembly; and a Governor _appointed_\nby the Sovereign state, and paid by the Province. There are, likewise,\njudges and other officers, appointed and paid in the same manner, for\nadministering _justice_ agreeably to the laws, by the verdicts of juries\nfairly chosen.\u2014This forms a constitution seemingly free, by giving the\npeople a share in their own government, and some check on their rulers.\nBut, while there is a higher legislative power, to the controul of which\nsuch a constitution is subject, it does not itself possess Liberty,\nand therefore cannot be of any use as a security to Liberty; nor is\nit possible that it should be of long duration. Laws offensive to the\nProvince will be enacted by the Sovereign State. The legislature of the\nProvince will remonstrate against them. The magistrates will not execute\nthem. Juries will not convict upon them; and consequently, like the\nPope\u2019s Bulls which once governed _Europe_, they will become nothing but\nforms and empty sounds, to which no regard will be shewn.\u2014In order to\nremedy this evil, and to give efficiency to its government, the supreme\nstate will naturally be led to withdraw the _Governor_, the _Council_,\nand the _Judges_[15] from the controul of the Province, by making\nthem entirely dependant on itself for their _pay_ and _continuance in\noffice_, as well as for their appointment. It will also alter the mode\nof chusing Juries on purpose to bring them more under its influence: And\nin some cases, under the pretence of the impossibility of gaining an\nimpartial trial where government is resisted, it will perhaps ordain,\nthat offenders shall be removed from the Province to be tried within its\nown territories: And it may even go so far in this kind of policy, as\nto endeavour to prevent the effects of discontents, by forbidding all\nmeetings and associations of the people, except at such times, and for\nsuch particular purposes, as shall be permitted them.\n\nThus will such a Province be exactly in the same state that _Britain_\nwould be in, were our first executive magistrate, our House of Lords,\nand our Judges, nothing but the instruments of a foreign democratical\npower; were our Juries nominated by that power; or were we liable to\nbe transported to a distant country to be tried for offences committed\nhere, and restrained from calling any meetings, consulting about any\ngrievances, or associating for any purposes, except when leave should be\ngiven us by a _Lord Lieutenant_ or _Viceroy_.\n\nIt is certain that this is a state of oppression which no country could\nendure, and to which it would be vain to expect, that any people should\nsubmit an hour without an armed force to compel them.\n\nThe late transactions in _Massachuset\u2019s Bay_ are a perfect\nexemplification of what I have now said. The government of _Great\nBritain_ in that Province has gone on exactly in the train I have\ndescribed; till at last it became necessary to station troops there, not\namenable to the civil power; and all terminated in a government by the\nSWORD. And such, if a people are not sunk below the character of men,\nwill be the issue of all government in similar circumstances.\n\n * * * * *\n\nIt may be asked\u2014\u201cAre there not causes by which one state may acquire a\n_rightful_ authority over another, though not consolidated by an adequate\nRepresentation?\u201d\u2014I answer, that there are no such causes.\u2014All the causes\nto which such an effect _can_ be ascribed are CONQUEST, COMPACT, or\nOBLIGATIONS CONFERRED.\n\nMuch has been said of the right of _conquest_; and history contains\nlittle more than accounts of kingdoms reduced by it under the dominion\nof other kingdoms, and of the havock it has made among mankind. But\nthe authority derived from hence, being founded on violence, is never\n_rightful_. The _Roman Republic_ was nothing but a faction against the\ngeneral liberties of the world; and had no more right to give law to the\nProvinces subject to it, than thieves have to the property they seize,\nor to the houses into which they break.\u2014Even in the case of a just war\nundertaken by one people to defend itself against the oppressions of\nanother people, conquest gives only a right to an indemnification for the\ninjury which occasioned the war, and a reasonable security against future\ninjury.\n\nNeither can any state acquire such an authority over other states in\nvirtue of any _compacts_ or _cessions_. This is a case in which compacts\nare not binding. _Civil_ Liberty is, in this respect, on the same footing\nwith _Religious_ Liberty. As no people can lawfully surrender their\n_Religious_ Liberty, by giving up their right of judging for themselves\nin religion, or by allowing any human beings to prescribe to them what\nfaith they shall embrace, or what mode of worship they shall practise;\nso neither can any civil societies lawfully surrender their _Civil_\nLiberty, by giving up to any extraneous jurisdiction their power of\nlegislating for themselves and disposing their property. Such a cession,\nbeing inconsistent with the unalienable rights of human nature, would\neither not bind at all; or bind only the individuals who made it. This\nis a blessing which no one generation of men can give up for another;\nand which, when lost, a people have always a right to resume.\u2014Had our\nancestors in this country been so mad as to have subjected themselves to\nany foreign Community, we could not have been under any obligation to\ncontinue in such a state. And all the nations now in the world who, in\nconsequence of the tameness and folly of their predecessors, are subject\nto arbitrary power, have a right to emancipate themselves as soon as they\ncan.\n\nIf neither _conquest_ nor _compact_ can give such an authority, much less\ncan any favours received, or any services performed by one state for\nanother.\u2014Let the favour received be what it will, Liberty is too dear a\nprice for it. A state that has been _obliged_ is not, therefore, bound to\nbe _enslaved_. It ought, if possible, to make an adequate return for the\nservices done to it; but to suppose that it ought to give up the power of\ngoverning itself, and the disposal of its property, would be to suppose,\nthat, in order to shew its gratitude, it ought to part with the power\nof ever afterwards exercising gratitude.\u2014How much has been done by this\nkingdom for _Hanover_? But no one will say that on this account, we have\na right to make the laws of _Hanover_; or even to draw a single penny\nfrom it without its own consent.\n\n * * * * *\n\nAfter what has been said it will, I am afraid, be trifling to apply\nthe preceding arguments to the case of different communities, which\nare considered as different parts of the same _Empire_. But there are\nreasons which render it necessary for me to be explicit in making this\napplication.\n\nWhat I mean here is just to point out the difference of situation between\ncommunities forming an _Empire_; and particular bodies or classes of men\nforming different parts of a _Kingdom_. Different communities forming\nan _Empire_ have no connexions, which produce a necessary reciprocation\nof interests between them. They inhabit different districts, and are\ngoverned by different legislatures.\u2014On the contrary. The different\nclasses of men _within a kingdom_ are all placed on the same ground.\nTheir concerns and interests are the same; and what is done to one\npart must affect all.\u2014These are situations totally different; and a\nconstitution of government that may be consistent with Liberty in one of\nthem, may be entirely inconsistent with it in the other. It is, however,\ncertain that, even in the last of these situations, no one part ought to\ngovern the rest. In order to a fair and equal government, there ought to\nbe a fair and equal representation of all that are governed; and as far\nas this is wanting in any government, it deviates from the principles\nof Liberty, and becomes unjust and oppressive.\u2014But in the circumstances\nof different communities, all this holds with unspeakably more force.\nThe government of a part in this case becomes complete tyranny; and\nsubjection to it becomes complete slavery.\n\n * * * * *\n\nBut ought there not, it is asked, to exist somewhere in an _Empire_ a\nsupreme legislative authority over the whole; or a power to controul and\nbind all the different states of which it consists?\u2014This enquiry has been\nalready answered. The truth is, that such a supreme controuling power\nought to exist no-where except in such a SENATE or body of delegates as\nthat described in page 8; and that the authority or supremacy of even\nthis senate ought to be limited to the common concerns of the _Empire_.\u2014I\nthink I have proved that the fundamental principles of Liberty\nnecessarily require this.\n\nIn a word. An _Empire_ is a collection of states or communities united\nby some common bond or tye. If these states have each of them free\nconstitutions of government, and, with respect to taxation and internal\nlegislation, are independent of the other states, but united by compacts,\nor alliances, or subjection to a Great _Council_, representing the\nwhole, or to one monarch entrusted with the supreme executive power: In\nthese circumstances, the Empire will be an Empire of Freemen.\u2014If, on the\ncontrary, like the different provinces subject to the _Grand Seignior_,\nnone of the states possess any independent legislative authority; but\nare all subject to an absolute monarch, whose will is their law; then\nis the Empire an Empire of Slaves.\u2014If one of the states is free, but\ngoverns by its will all the other states; then is the Empire, like that\nof the Romans in the times of the republic, an Empire consisting of one\nstate free, and the rest in slavery: Nor does it make any more difference\nin this case, that the governing state is itself free, than it does, in\nthe case of a kingdom subject to a _despot_, that this despot is himself\nfree. I have before observed, that this only makes the slavery worse.\nThere is, in the one case, a chance, that, in the quick succession of\ndespots, a good one will sometimes arise. But bodies of men continue the\nsame; and have generally proved the most unrelenting of all tyrants.\n\nA great writer before[16] quoted, observes of the _Roman Empire_, that\nwhile Liberty was at the center, tyranny prevailed in the distant\nprovinces; that such as were free under it were extremely so, while those\nwho were slaves groaned under the extremity of slavery; and that the same\nevents that _destroyed_ the liberty of the former, _gave_ liberty to the\nlatter.\n\nThe Liberty of the _Romans_, therefore, was only an additional calamity\nto the provinces governed by them; and though it might have been said\nof the _citizens_ of _Rome_, that they were the \u201cfreest members of any\ncivil society in the known world;\u201d yet of the _subjects_ of _Rome_, it\nmust have been said, that they were the completest slaves in the known\nworld.\u2014How remarkable is it, that this very people, once the freest of\nmankind, but at the same time the most proud and tyrannical, should\nbecome at last the most contemptible and abject slaves that ever existed?\n\n\n\n\nPART II.\n\n\nIn the foregoing disquisitions, I have, from one leading principle,\ndeduced a number of consequences, that seem to me incapable of being\ndisputed. I have meant that they should be applied to the great question\nbetween this kingdom and the Colonies which has occasioned the present\nwar with them.\n\nIt is impossible, but my readers must have been all along making this\napplication; and if they still think, that the claims of this kingdom\nare reconcileable to the principles of true liberty and legitimate\ngovernment, I am afraid, that nothing I shall farther say will have any\neffect on their judgments. I wish, however, they would have the patience\nand candour to go with me, and grant me a hearing some time longer.\n\nThough clearly decided in my own judgment on this subject, I am inclined\nto make great allowances for the different judgments of others. We have\nbeen so used to speak of the Colonies as _our_ Colonies, and to think of\nthem as in a state of subordination to us, and as holding their existence\nin _America_ only for our use, that it is no wonder the prejudices of\nmany are alarmed, when they find a different doctrine maintained. The\nmeanest person among us is disposed to look upon himself as having a body\nof subjects in _America_; and to be offended at the denial of his right\nto make laws for them, though perhaps he does not know what colour they\nare of, or what language they talk.\u2014Such are the natural prejudices of\nthis country.\u2014But the time is coming, I hope, when the unreasonableness\nof them will be seen; and more just sentiments prevail.\n\n * * * * *\n\nBefore I proceed, I beg it may be attended to, that I have chosen to try\nthis question by the general principles of Civil Liberty; and not by the\npractice of former times; or by the _Charters_ granted the colonies.\u2014The\narguments _for_ them, drawn from these last topics, appear to me\ngreatly to outweigh the arguments _against_ them. But I wish to have\nthis question brought to a higher test, and surer issue. The question\nwith all liberal enquirers ought to be, not what jurisdiction over them\n_Precedents_, _Statutes_, and _Charters_ give, but what reason and\nequity, and the rights of humanity give.\u2014This is, in truth, a question\nwhich no kingdom has ever before had occasion to agitate. The case of\na free country branching itself out in the manner _Britain_ has done,\nand sending to a distant world colonies which have there, from small\nbeginnings, and under free legislatures of their own, increased, and\nformed a body of powerful states, likely soon to become superior the\nparent state.\u2014This is a case which is new in the history of mankind; and\nit is extremely improper to judge of it by the rules of any narrow and\npartial policy; or to consider it on any other ground than the general\none of reason and justice.\u2014Those who will be candid enough to judge on\nthis ground, and who can divest themselves of national prejudices, will\nnot, I fancy, remain long unsatisfied.\u2014But alas! Matters are gone too\nfar. The dispute probably must be settled another way; and the sword\nalone, I am afraid, is now to determine what the rights of _Britain_ and\n_America_ are.\u2014Shocking situation!\u2014Detested be the measures which have\nbrought us into it: And, if we are endeavouring to enforce injustice,\ncursed will be the war.\u2014A retreat, however, is not yet impracticable. The\nduty we owe our gracious sovereign obliges us to rely on his disposition\nto stay the sword, and to promote the happiness of all the different\nparts of the Empire at the head of which he is placed. With some hopes,\ntherefore, that it may not be too late to reason on this subject, I will,\nin the following Sections, enquire what the war with _America_ is in the\nfollowing respects.\n\n1. In respect of Justice.\n\n2. The Principles of the Constitution.\n\n3. In respect of Policy and Humanity.\n\n4. The Honour of the Kingdom.\n\nAnd lastly, The Probability of succeeding in it.\n\n\nSECT. I.\n\n_Of the Justice of the War with America._\n\nThe enquiry, whether the war with the Colonies is a _just_ war, will be\nbest determined by stating the power over them, which it is the end of\nthe war to maintain: And this cannot be better done, than in the words\nof an act of parliament, made on purpose to define it. That act, it is\nwell known, declares, \u201cThat this kingdom has power, and of right ought to\nhave power to make laws and statutes to bind the Colonies, and people of\n_America_, in all cases whatever.\u201d\u2014Dreadful power indeed! I defy any one\nto express slavery in stronger language. It is the same with declaring\n\u201cthat we have a right to do with them what we please.\u201d\u2014I will not waste\nmy time by applying to such a claim any of the preceding arguments. If\nmy reader does not feel more in this case, than words can express, all\nreasoning must be vain.\n\nBut, probably, most persons will be for using milder language; and for\nsaying no more than, that the united legislatures of _England_ and\n_Scotland_ have of right power to tax the Colonies, and a _supremacy_ of\nlegislation over _America_.\u2014But this comes to the same. If it means any\nthing, it means, that the property and the legislations of the Colonies,\nare subject to the absolute discretion of _Great Britain_, and ought of\nright to be so. The nature of the thing admits of no limitation. The\nColonies can never be admitted to be judges, how far the authority over\nthem in these cases shall extend. This would be to destroy it entirely\u2014If\n_any_ part of their property is subject to our discretion, the _whole_\nmust be so. If we have a right to interfere at all in their internal\nlegislations, we have a right to interfere as far as we think proper.\u2014It\nis self-evident, that this leaves them nothing they can call _their\nown_.\u2014And what is it that can give to any people such a supremacy over\nanother people?\u2014I have already examined the principal answers which have\nbeen given to this enquiry. But it will not be amiss in this place to go\nover some of them again.\n\n * * * * *\n\nIt has been urged, that such a right must be lodged somewhere, \u201cin order\nto preserve the UNITY of the British Empire.\u201d\n\nPleas of this sort have, in all ages, been used to justify tyranny.\u2014They\nhave in RELIGION given rise to numberless oppressive claims, and slavish\nHierarchies. And in the _Romish Communion_ particularly, it is well\nknown, that the POPE claims the title and powers of the supreme head\non earth of the Christian church, in order to preserve its UNITY.\u2014With\nrespect to the _British Empire_, nothing can be more preposterous than to\nendeavour to maintain its unity, by setting up such a claim. This is a\nmethod of establishing unity, which, like the similar method in religion,\ncan produce nothing but discord and mischief.\u2014The truth is, that a common\nrelation to one supreme executive head; an exchange of kind offices; tyes\nof interest and affection, and _compacts_, are sufficient to give the\nBritish Empire all the unity that is necessary. But if not\u2014If, in order\nto preserve its _Unity_, one half of it must be enslaved to the other\nhalf, let it, in the name of God, want Unity.\n\nMuch has been said of \u201cthe _Superiority_ of the British State.\u201d But what\ngives us our superiority?\u2014Is it our _Wealth_?\u2014This never confers real\ndignity. On the contrary: Its effect is always to debase, intoxicate,\nand corrupt.\u2014Is it the _number of our people_? The colonies will soon\nbe equal to us in number.\u2014Is it our _Knowledge_ and _Virtue_? They\nare probably _equally_ knowing, and _more_ virtuous. There are names\namong them that will not stoop to any names among the philosophers and\npoliticians of this island.\n\n\u201cBut we are the PARENT STATE.\u201d\u2014These are the magic words which have\nfascinated and misled us.\u2014The English came from _Germany_. Does that give\nthe _German_ states a right to tax us?\u2014Children, having no property, and\nbeing incapable of guiding themselves, the author of nature has committed\nthe care of them to their parents, and subjected them to their absolute\nauthority. But there is a period when, having acquired property, and a\ncapacity of judging for themselves, they become independent agents; and\nwhen, for this reason, the authority of their parents ceases, and becomes\nnothing but the respect and influence due to benefactors. Supposing,\ntherefore, that the order of nature in establishing the relation between\nparents and children, ought to have been the rule of our conduct to the\nColonies, we should have been gradually relaxing our authority as they\ngrew up. But, like mad parents, we have done the contrary; and, at the\nvery time when our authority should have been most relaxed, we have\ncarried it to the greatest extent, and exercised it with the greatest\nrigour. No wonder then, that they have turned upon us; and obliged us to\nremember, that they are not Children.\n\n\u201cBut we have, it is said, protected them, and run deeply in debt on their\naccount.\u201d\u2014The full answer to this has been already given, (page 26.) Will\nany one say, that all we have done for them has not been more on our\n_own_ account,[17] than on _theirs_?\u2014But suppose the contrary. Have they\ndone nothing for us? Have they made no compensation for the protection\nthey have received? Have they not helped us to pay our _taxes_, to\nsupport our poor, and to bear the burthen of our debts, by taking from\nus, at our own price, all the commodities with which we can supply\nthem?\u2014Have they not, for our advantage, submitted to many restraints\nin acquiring property? Must they likewise resign to us the disposal of\nthat property?\u2014Has not their exclusive trade with us been for many years\none of the chief sources of our wealth and power?\u2014In all our wars have\nthey not fought by our side, and contributed much to our success? In\nthe last war, particularly, it is well known, that they ran themselves\ndeeply in debt; and that the parliament thought it necessary to grant\nthem considerable sums annually as compensations for going beyond their\nabilities in assisting us. And in this course would they have continued\nfor many future years; perhaps, for ever.\u2014In short; were an accurate\naccount stated, it is by no means certain which side would appear to\nbe most indebted. When asked as _freemen_, they have hitherto seldom\ndiscovered any reluctance in giving. But, in obedience to a demand, and\nwith the bayonet at their breasts, they will give us nothing but blood.\n\nIt is farther said, \u201cthat the land on which they settled was ours.\u201d\u2014But\nhow came it to be ours? If sailing along a coast can give a right to\na country, then might the people of _Japan_ become, as soon as they\nplease, the proprietors of _Britain_. Nothing can be more chimerical than\nproperty founded on such a reason. If the land on which the Colonies\nfirst settled had any proprietors, they were the natives. The greatest\npart of it they bought of the natives. They have since cleared and\ncultivated it; and, without any help from us, converted a wilderness into\nfruitful and pleasant fields. It is, therefore, now on a double account\ntheir property; and no power on earth can have any right to disturb them\nin the possession of it, or to take from them, without their consent, any\npart of its produce.\n\nBut let it be granted, that the land was ours. Did they not settle upon\nit under the faith of charters, which promised them the enjoyment of\nall the rights of _Englishmen_; and allowed them to tax themselves, and\nto be governed by legislatures of their own, similar to ours? These\ncharters were given them by an authority, which at the time was thought\ncompetent; and they have been rendered sacred by an acquiescence on our\npart for near a century. Can it then be wondered at, that the Colonies\nshould revolt, when they found their charters violated; and an attempt\nmade to force INNOVATIONS upon them by famine and the sword;\u2014But I lay\nno stress on charters. They derive their rights from a higher source. It\nis inconsistent with common sense to imagine, that any people would ever\nthink of settling in a distant country, on any such condition, as that\nthe people from whom they withdrew, should for ever be masters of their\nproperty, and have power to subject them to any modes of government they\npleased. And had there been express stipulations to this purpose in all\nthe charters of the colonies, they would, in my opinion, be no more bound\nby them, than if it had been stipulated with them, that they should go\nnaked, or expose themselves to the incursions of wolves and tigers.\n\nThe defective state of the representation of this kingdom has been\nfarther pleaded to prove our right to tax _America_. We submit to a\nparliament that does not represent us, and therefore they ought.\u2014How\nstrange an argument is this? It is saying we want liberty; and therefore,\nthey ought to want it.\u2014Suppose it true, that they are indeed contending\nfor a better constitution of government, and more liberty than we enjoy:\nOught this to make us angry?\u2014Who is there that does not see the danger to\nwhich this country is exposed?\u2014Is it generous, because we are in a sink,\nto endeavour to draw them into it? Ought we not rather to wish earnestly,\nthat there may at least be ONE FREE COUNTRY left upon earth, to which\nwe may fly, when venality, luxury, and vice have completed the ruin of\nliberty here?\n\nIt is, however, by no means true, that _America_ has no more right to\nbe exempted from taxation by the _British_ parliament, than _Britain_\nitself.\u2014_Here_, all freeholders, and burgesses in boroughs, are\nrepresented. _There_, not one _Freeholder_, or any other person, is\nrepresented.\u2014_Here_, the _aids_ granted by the represented part of\nthe kingdom must be proportionably _paid_ by themselves; and the laws\nthey make for _others_, they at the same time make for _themselves_.\n_There_, the aids they would grant would not be _paid_, but _received_,\nby themselves; and the laws they made would be made for _others\nonly_.\u2014In short. The relation of one country to another country, whose\nrepresentatives have the power of taxing it (and of appropriating the\nmoney raised by the taxes) is much the same with the relation of a\ncountry to a single despot, or a body of despots, within itself, invested\nwith the like power. In both cases, the people taxed and those who tax\nhave separate interests; nor can there be any thing to check oppression,\nbesides either the abilities of the people taxed, or the humanity of the\n_taxers_.\u2014But indeed I can never hope to convince that person of any\nthing, who does not see an essential difference[18] between the two cases\nnow mentioned; or between the circumstances of individuals, and classes\nof men, making parts of a community imperfectly represented in the\nlegislature that governs it; and the circumstances of a whole community,\nin a distant world, not at all represented.\n\nBut enough has been said by others on this point; nor is it possible for\nme to throw any new light upon it. To finish, therefore, what I meant to\noffer under this head, I must beg that the following considerations may\nbe particularly attended to.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe question now between us and the Colonies is, Whether, in respect of\ntaxation and internal legislation, they are bound to be subject to the\njurisdiction of this kingdom: Or, in other words, Whether the _British_\nparliament has or has not of right, a power to dispose of their property,\nand to model as it pleases their governments?\u2014To this supremacy over\nthem, we say, we are entitled; and in order to maintain it, we have begun\nthe present war.\u2014Let me here enquire,\n\n_1st._ Whether, if we have now this supremacy, we shall not be equally\nentitled to it in any future time?\u2014They are now but little short of half\nour number. To this number they have grown, from a small body of original\nsettlers, by a very rapid increase. The probability is, that they will\ngo on to increase; and that, in 50 or 60 years, they will be _double_ our\nnumber;[19] and form a mighty Empire, consisting of a variety of states,\nall equal or superior to ourselves in all the arts and accomplishments,\nwhich give dignity and happiness to human life. In that period, will\nthey be still bound to acknowledge that supremacy over them which we now\nclaim? Can there be any person who will assert this; or whose mind does\nnot revolt at the idea of a vast continent, holding all that is valuable\nto it, at the discretion of a handful of people on the other side the\n_Atlantic_?\u2014But if, at _that_ period, this would be unreasonable; what\nmakes it otherwise _now_?\u2014Draw the line, if you can.\u2014But there is a still\ngreater difficulty.\n\n * * * * *\n\n_Britain_ is now, I will suppose, the seat of Liberty and Virtue;\nand its legislature consists of a body of able and independent men,\nwho govern with wisdom and justice. The time may come when all will\nbe reversed: When its excellent constitution of government will be\nsubverted: When, pressed by debts and taxes, it will be greedy to draw\nto itself an increase of revenue from every distant Province, in order\nto ease its own burdens: When the influence of the crown, strengthened\nby luxury and an universal profligacy of manners, will have tainted\nevery heart, broken down every fence of Liberty, and rendered us a\nnation of tame and contented vassals: When a General _Election_ will be\nnothing but a general _Auction_ of _Boroughs_: And when the PARLIAMENT,\nthe Grand Council of the nation, and once the faithful guardian of the\nstate, and a terror to evil ministers, will be degenerated into a body\nof _Sycophants_, dependent and venal, always ready to confirm _any_\nmeasures; and little more than a public court for registering royal\nedicts.\u2014Such, it is possible, may, some time or other, be the state of\n_Great Britain_.\u2014What will, at that period, be the duty of the Colonies?\nWill they be still bound to unconditional submission? Must they always\ncontinue an appendage to our government; and follow it implicitly through\nevery change that can happen to it?\u2014Wretched condition, indeed, of\nmillions of freemen as good as ourselves.\u2014Will you say that we now govern\nequitably; and that there is no danger of any such revolution?\u2014Would\nto God this were true.\u2014But will you not always say the same? Who shall\njudge whether we govern equitably or not? Can you give the Colonies any\n_security_ that such a period will never come? Once more.\n\n * * * * *\n\nIf we have indeed that power which we claim over the legislations, and\ninternal rights of the Colonies, may we not, whenever we please, subject\nthem to the arbitrary power of the crown?\u2014I do not mean, that this would\nbe a disadvantageous change: For I have before observed, that if a\npeople are to be subject to an external power over which they have no\ncommand, it is better that power should be lodged in the hands of one man\nthan of a multitude. But many persons think otherwise; and such ought\nto consider that, if this would be a calamity, the condition of the\nColonies must be deplorable.\u2014\u201cA government by King, Lords, and Commons,\n(it has been said) is the perfection of government;\u201d and so it is, when\nthe Commons are a just representation of the people; and when also, it is\nnot extended to any distant people, or communities, not represented. But\nif this is the _best_, a government by a king only must be the _worst_;\nand every claim implying a right to establish such a government among any\npeople must be unjust and cruel.\u2014It is self-evident, that by claiming\na right to alter the constitutions of the Colonies, according to our\ndiscretion, we claim this power: And it is a power that we have thought\nfit to exercise in _one_ of our Colonies; and that we have attempted\nto exercise in _another_.\u2014_Canada_, according to the late extension of\nits limits, is a country almost as large as half _Europe_; and it may\npossibly come in time to be filled with British subjects. The _Quebec_\nact makes the king of _Great Britain_ a despot over all that country.\u2014In\nthe Province of _Massachuset\u2019s Bay_ the same thing has been attempted and\nbegun.\n\nThe act for BETTER _regulating their government_, passed at the same\ntime with the _Quebec_ act, gives the king the right of appointing, and\nremoving at his pleasure, the members of one part of the legislature;\nalters the mode of chusing juries, on purpose to bring it more under the\ninfluence of the king; and takes away from the province the power of\ncalling any meetings of the people without the king\u2019s consent.[20]\u2014The\njudges, likewise, have been made dependent on the king, for their\nnomination and pay, and continuance in office.\u2014If all this is no more\nthan we have a right to do; may we not go on to abolish the house of\nrepresentatives, to destroy all trials by juries, and to give up the\nprovince absolutely and totally to the will of the king?\u2014May we not even\nestablish popery in the province, as has been lately done in _Canada_,\nleaving the support of protestantism to the king\u2019s discretion?\u2014Can\nthere be any Englishman who, were it his own case, would not sooner\nlose his heart\u2019s blood than yield to claims so pregnant with evils,\nand destructive to every thing that can distinguish a _Freeman_ from a\n_Slave_?\n\nI will take this opportunity to add, that what I have now said, suggests\na consideration that demonstrates, on how different a footing the\nColonies are with respect to our government, from particular bodies of\nmen _within_ the kingdom, who happen not to be represented. Here, it is\nimpossible that the represented part should subject the unrepresented\npart to arbitrary power, without including themselves. But in the\nColonies it is _not_ impossible. We know that it _has_ been done.\n\n\nSECT. II.\n\n_Whether the War with ~America~ is justified by the Principles of the\nConstitution._\n\nI have proposed, in the next place, to examine the war with the Colonies\nby the principles of the constitution.\u2014I know, that it is common to say\nthat we are now maintaining the constitution in _America_. If this means\nthat we are endeavouring to establish our own constitution of government\nthere; it is by no means true; nor, were it true, would it be right. They\nhave chartered governments of their own, with which they are pleased;\nand which, if any power on earth may change without their consent, that\npower may likewise, if it thinks proper, deliver them over to the _Grand\nSeignior_.\u2014Suppose the Colonies of _France_ had, by compacts, enjoyed\nfor many years, free governments open to all the world, under which they\nhad grown and flourished; what should we think of that kingdom, were it\nto attempt to destroy their governments, and to force upon them its own\nmode of government? Should we not applaud any zeal they discovered in\nrepelling such an injury?\u2014But the truth is, in the present instance, that\nwe are not maintaining but violating our own constitution in _America_.\nThe essence of our constitution consists in its independency. There is\nin this case no difference between _subjection_ and _annihilation_. Did,\ntherefore, the Colonies possess governments perfectly the same with ours,\nthe attempt to subject them to ours would be an attempt to ruin them. A\nfree government loses its nature from the moment it becomes liable to be\ncommanded or altered by any superior power.\n\nBut I intended here principally to make the following observation.\n\nThe fundamental principle of our government is, \u201cThe right of a people to\ngive and grant their own money.\u201d\u2014It is of no consequence, in this case,\nwhether we enjoy this right in a proper manner or not. Most certainly\nwe do not. It is, however, the _principle_ on which our government, as\na _free_ government, is founded. The _spirit_ of the constitution gives\nit us; and, however imperfectly enjoyed, we glory in it as our first and\ngreatest blessing. It was an attempt to encroach upon this right, in a\ntrifling instance, that produced the civil war in the reign of _Charles_\nthe First.\u2014Ought not our brethren in _America_ to enjoy this right as\nwell as ourselves? Do the principles of the constitution give it _us_,\nbut deny it to _them_? Or can we, with any decency, pretend that when\nwe give to the king _their_ money, we give him _our own_?[21]\u2014What\ndifference does it make, that in the time of _Charles the First_ the\nattempt to take away this right was made by _one man_: but that, in the\ncase of _America_, it is made by a body of men?\n\nIn a word. This is a war undertaken not only against the principles\nof our own constitution; but on purpose to destroy other similar\nconstitutions in _America_; and to substitute in their room a military\nforce. See page 23, 24.\u2014It is, therefore, a gross and flagrant violation\nof the constitution.\n\n\nSECT. III.\n\n_Of the Policy if the War with ~America~._\n\nIn writing the present Section, I enter upon a subject of the last\nimportance, on which much has been said by other writers with great\nforce, and in the ablest manner[22]. But I am not willing to omit any\ntopic which I think of great consequence, merely because it has already\nbeen discussed: And, with respect to this in particular, it will, I\nbelieve, be found that some of the observations on which I shall insist,\nhave not been sufficiently attended to.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe object of this war has been often enough declared to be \u201cmaintaining\nthe supremacy of this country over the colonies.\u201d I have already enquired\nhow far reason and justice, the principles of Liberty, and the rights of\nhumanity, entitle us to this supremacy. Setting aside, therefore, now all\nconsiderations of this kind, I would observe, that this supremacy is to\nbe maintained, either merely _for its own sake_, or for the sake of some\npublic interest connected with it and dependent upon it.\u2014If _for its own\nsake_; the only object of the war is the extension of dominion; and its\nonly motive is the lust of power.\u2014All government, even _within_ a state,\nbecomes tyrannical, as far as it is a needless and wanton exercise of\npower; or is carried farther than is absolutely necessary to preserve the\npeace and to secure the safety of the state. This is what an excellent\nwriter calls GOVERNING TOO MUCH; and its effect must always be, weakening\ngovernment by rendering it contemptible and odious.\u2014Nothing can be of\nmore importance, in governing distant provinces and adjusting the\nclashing interests of different societies, than attention to this remark.\nIn these circumstances it is _particularly_ necessary to make a sparing\nuse of power, in order to preserve power.\u2014Happy would it have been for\n_Great Britain_, had this been remembered by those who have lately\nconducted its affairs. But our policy has been of another kind. At the\nperiod when our authority should have been most concealed, it has been\nbrought most in view; and by a progression of violent measures, every\none of which has increased distress, we have given the world reason to\nconclude, that we are acquainted with no other method of governing than\n_by force_.\u2014What a shocking mistake!\u2014If our object is power, we should\nhave known better how to use it; and our rulers should have considered,\nthat freemen will always revolt at the sight of a naked sword; and that\nthe complicated affairs of a great kingdom, holding in subordination\nto it a multitude of distant communities, all jealous of their rights,\nand warmed with spirits as high as our own, require not only the most\nskilful, but the most cautious and tender management. The consequences of\na different management we are now feeling. We see ourselves driven among\nrocks, and in danger of being lost.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe following reasons make it too probable, that the present contest\nwith _America_ is a contest for power only[23], abstracted from all the\nadvantages connected with it.\n\n_1st._ There is a love of power inherent in human nature; and it cannot\nbe uncharitable to suppose that the nation in general, and the cabinet\nin particular, are too likely to be influenced by it. What can be\nmore flattering than to look across the _Atlantic_, and to see in the\nboundless continent of _America_, increasing MILLIONS whom we have a\nright to order as we please, who hold their property at our disposal,\nand who have no other law than our will. With what complacency have we\nbeen used to talk of them as OUR subjects?\u2014Is it not the interruption\nthey now give to this pleasure; is it not the opposition they make to\nour pride; and not any injury they have done us, that is the secret\nspring of our present animosity against them?\u2014I wish all in this kingdom\nwould examine themselves carefully on this point. Perhaps, they might\nfind, that they have not known what spirit they are of.\u2014Perhaps, they\nwould become sensible, that it was a spirit of domination, more than a\nregard to the true interest of this country, that lately led so many of\nthem, with such savage folly, to address the throne for the slaughter\nof their brethren in _America_, if they will not submit to them; and to\nmake offers of their lives and fortunes for that purpose.\u2014Indeed, I am\npersuaded, that, were pride and the lust of dominion exterminated from\nevery heart among us, and the humility of Christians infused in their\nroom, this quarrel would be soon ended.\n\n * * * * *\n\n_2dly._ Another reason for believing that this is a contest for power\nonly is, that our ministers have frequently declared, that their object\nis not to draw a revenue from _America_; and that many of those who are\nwarmest for continuing it, represent the _American trade_ as of no great\nconsequence.\n\nBut what deserves particular consideration here is, that this is a\ncontest from which no advantages can possibly be derived.\u2014Not a revenue:\nFor the provinces of America, when desolated, will afford no revenue;\nor if they should, the expence of subduing them and keeping them in\nsubjection will much exceed that revenue.\u2014Not any of the advantages\nof trade: For it is a folly, next to insanity, to think trade can be\npromoted by impoverishing our customers, and fixing in their minds\nan everlasting abhorrence of us.\u2014It remains, therefore, that this\nwar can have no other object than the extension of power.\u2014Miserable\nreflection!\u2014To sheath our swords in the bowels of our brethren, and\nspread misery and ruin among a happy people, for no other end than to\noblige them to acknowledge our supremacy. How horrid!\u2014This is the cursed\nambition that led a _C\u00e6sar_ and an _Alexander_, and many other mad\nconquerors, to attack peaceful communities, and to lay waste the earth.\n\nBut a worse principle than even this, influences some among us. Pride and\nthe love of dominion are principles hateful enough; but blind resentment\nand the desire of revenge are infernal principles: And these, I am\nafraid, have no small share at present in guiding our public conduct.\u2014One\ncannot help indeed being astonished at the virulence, with which some\nspeak on the present occasion against the Colonies.\u2014For, what have they\ndone?\u2014Have they crossed the ocean and invaded us? Have they attempted\nto take from us the fruits of our labour, and to overturn that form\nof government which we hold so sacred?\u2014This cannot be pretended.\u2014On\nthe contrary. This is what we have done to them.\u2014We have transported\nourselves to their peaceful retreats, and employed our fleets and\narmies to stop up their ports, to destroy their commerce, to seize\ntheir effects, and to burn their towns. Would we but let them alone,\nand suffer them to enjoy in security their property and governments,\ninstead of disturbing us, they would thank and bless us. And yet it is\nWE who imagine ourselves ill-used.\u2014The truth is, we expected to find\nthem a cowardly rabble who would lie quietly at our feet; and they have\ndisappointed us. They have risen in their own defence, and repelled force\nby force. They deny the plenitude of our power over them; and insist upon\nbeing treated as free communities.\u2014It is THIS that has provoked us; and\nkindled our governors into rage.\n\nI hope I shall not here be understood to intimate, that _all_ who\npromote this war are actuated by these principles. Some, I doubt not,\nare influenced by no other principle, than a regard to what they think\nthe just authority of this country over its colonies, and to the unity\nand indivisibility of the British Empire. I wish such could be engaged\nto enter thoroughly into the enquiry, which has been the subject of the\nfirst part of this pamphlet; and to consider, particularly, how different\na thing maintaining the authority of government _within_ a state is from\nmaintaining the authority of one people over another, already happy in\nthe enjoyment of a government of their own. I wish farther they would\nconsider, that the desire of maintaining authority is warrantable, only\nas far as it is the means of promoting some end, and doing some good;\nand that, before we resolve to spread famine and fire through a country\nin order to make it acknowledge our authority, we ought to be assured\nthat great advantages will arise not only to ourselves, but to the\ncountry we wish to conquer.\u2014That from the present contest no advantage\nto _ourselves_ can arise, has been already shewn, and will presently be\nshewn more at large.\u2014That no advantage to the Colonies can arise from\nit, need not, I hope, be shewn. It has however been asserted, that even\n_their_ good is intended by this war. Many of us are persuaded, that they\nwill be much happier under our government, than under any government of\ntheir own; and that their liberties will be safer when held for them by\nus, than when trusted in their own hands.\u2014How kind is it thus to take\nupon us the trouble of judging for them what is most for their happiness?\nNothing can be kinder except the resolution we have formed to exterminate\nthem, if they will not submit to our judgment.\u2014What strange language have\nI sometimes heard? By an armed force we are now endeavouring to destroy\nthe laws and governments of America; and yet I have heard it said, that\nwe are endeavouring to support law and government there. We are insisting\nupon our right to levy contributions upon them; and to maintain this\nright, we are bringing upon them all the miseries a people can endure;\nand yet it is asserted, that we mean nothing but their security and\nhappiness.\n\nBut I have wandered a little from the point I attended principally to\ninsist upon in this section, which is, \u201cthe folly, in respect of policy,\nof the measures which have brought on this contest; and its pernicious\nand fatal tendency.\u201d\n\nThe following observations will, I believe, abundantly prove this.\n\n_1st._ There are points which are likely always to suffer by discussion.\nOf this kind are most points of authority and prerogative; and the best\npolicy is to avoid, as much as possible, giving any occasion for calling\nthem into question.\n\nThe colonies were at the beginning of this reign in the habit of\nacknowledging our authority, and of allowing us as much power over\nthem as our interest required; and more, in some instances, than we\ncould reasonably claim. This habit they would have retained: and had\nwe, instead of imposing new burdens upon them, and increasing their\nrestraints, studied to promote their commerce, and to grant them\nnew indulgences, they would have been always growing more attached\nto us. Luxury, and, together with it, their dependence upon us, and\nour influence[24] in their assemblies, would have increased, till in\ntime perhaps they would have become as corrupt as ourselves; and we\nmight have succeeded to our wishes in establishing our authority over\nthem.\u2014But, happily for _them_, we have chosen a different course. By\nexertions of authority which have alarmed them, they have been put\nupon examining into the grounds of all our claims, and forced to give\nup their luxuries, and to seek all their resources within themselves:\nAnd the issue is likely to prove the loss of _all_ our authority over\nthem, and of all the advantages connected with it. So little do men in\npower sometimes know how to preserve power; and so remarkably does the\ndesire of extending dominion sometimes destroy it.\u2014Mankind are naturally\ndisposed to continue in subjection to that mode of government, be it what\nit will, under which they have been born and educated. Nothing rouses\nthem into resistance but gross abuses, or some particular oppressions out\nof the road to which they have been used. And he who will examine the\nhistory of the world will find, there has generally been more reason for\ncomplaining that they have been too patient, than that they have been\nturbulent and rebellious.\n\nOur governors, ever since I can remember, have been jealous that the\nColonies, some time or other, would throw off their dependence. This\njealously was not founded on any of their acts or declarations. They have\nalways, while at _peace_ with us, disclaimed any such design; and they\nhave continued to disclaim it since they have been at _war_ with us.\nI have reason, indeed, to believe, that independency is, even at this\nmoment,[25] generally dreaded among them as a calamity to which they are\nin danger of being driven, in order to avoid a greater.\u2014The jealousy I\nhave mentioned, was, however, natural; and betrayed a secret opinion,\nthat the subjection in which they were held was more than we could expect\nthem always to endure. In such circumstances, all possible care should\nhave been taken to give them no reason for discontent, and to preserve\nthem in subjection, by keeping in that line of conduct to which custom\nhad reconciled them, or at least never deviating from it, except with\ngreat caution; and particularly, by avoiding all direct attacks on their\nproperty and legislations. Had we done this, the different interests\nof so many states scattered over a vast continent, joined to our own\nprudence and moderation, would have enabled us to maintain them in\ndependence for ages to come.\u2014But instead of this, how have we acted?\u2014It\nis in truth too evident, that our whole conduct, instead of being\ndirected by that sound policy and foresight which in such circumstances\nwere absolutely necessary, has been nothing (to say the best of it) but\na series of the blindest rigour followed by retractation; of violence\nfollowed by concession; of mistake, weakness and inconsistency.\u2014A recital\nof a few facts, within every body\u2019s recollection, will fully prove this.\n\nIn the 6th of _George the Second_, an act was passed for imposing\ncertain duties on all foreign spirits, molasses and sugars imported\ninto the plantations. In this act, the duties imposed are said to be\nGIVEN and GRANTED by the Parliament to the King; and this is the first\n_American_ act in which these words have been used. But notwithstanding\nthis, as the act had the appearance of being only a regulation of trade,\nthe colonies submitted to it; and a small direct revenue was drawn by\nit from them.\u2014In the 4th of the present reign, many alterations were\nmade in this act, with the declared purpose of making provision for\nraising a revenue in America. This alarmed the Colonies; and produced\ndiscontents and remonstrances, which might have convinced our rulers this\nwas tender ground, on which it became them to tread very gently.\u2014There\nis, however, no reason to doubt but in time they would have sunk into\na quiet submission to this revenue act, as being at worst only the\nexercise of a power which then they seem not to have thought much of\ncontesting; I mean, the power of taxing them EXTERNALLY.\u2014But before they\nhad time to cool, a worse provocation was given them; and the STAMP-ACT\nwas passed. This being an attempt to tax them INTERNALLY; and a direct\nattack on their property, by a power which would not suffer itself to\nbe questioned; which eased _itself_ by loading _them_; and to which it\nwas impossible to fix any bounds; they were thrown at once, from one end\nof the continent to the other, into resistance and rage.\u2014Government,\ndreading the consequences, gave way; and the Parliament (upon a change\nof ministry) repealed the _Stamp-Act_, without requiring from them\nany recognition of its authority, or doing any more to preserve its\ndignity, than asserting, by the declaratory law, that it was possessed\nof full power and authority to make laws to bind them in all cases\nwhatever.\u2014Upon this, peace was restored; and, had no farther attempts\nof the same kind been made, they would undoubtedly have suffered us (as\nthe people of _Ireland_ have done) to enjoy quietly our declaratory\nlaw. They would have recovered their former habits of subjection; and\nour connexion with them might have continued an increasing source of\nour wealth and glory.\u2014But the spirit of despotism and avarice, always\nblind and restless, soon broke forth again. The scheme for drawing a\nrevenue from _America_, by parliamentary taxation, was resumed; and in\na little more than a year after the repeal of the _Stamp-Act_, when all\nwas peace, a third act was passed, imposing duties payable in _America_\non tea, paper, glass, painters colours, &c.\u2014 This, as might have been\nexpected, revived all the former heats; and the Empire was a second time\nthreatened with the most dangerous commotions.\u2014Government receded again;\nand the Parliament (under another change of ministry) repealed all the\nobnoxious duties, EXCEPT that upon tea. This exception was made in order\nto maintain a shew of dignity. But it was, in reality, sacrificing safety\nto pride; and leaving a splinter in the wound to produce a gangrene.\u2014For\nsome time, however, this relaxation answered its intended purposes. Our\ncommercial intercourse with the Colonies was again recovered; and they\navoided nothing but that tea which we had excepted in our repeal. In this\nstate would things have remained, and even tea would perhaps in time have\nbeen gradually admitted, had not the evil genius of _Britain_ stepped\nforth once more to embroil the Empire.\n\nThe _East India_ company having fallen under difficulties, partly in\nconsequence of the loss of the _American_ market for tea, a scheme was\nformed for assisting them by an attempt to recover that market. With this\nview an act was passed to enable them to export their tea to _America_\nfree of all duties here, and subject only to 3d. per pound duty, payable\nin _America_. It was to be offered at a low price; and it was expected\nthe consequence would prove that the Colonies would be tempted to buy\nit; a precedent gained for taxing them; and at the same time the company\nrelieved. Ships were, therefore, fitted out; and large cargoes sent. The\nsnare was too gross to escape the notice of the Colonies. They saw it,\nand spurned at it. They refused to admit the tea; and at BOSTON some\npersons in disguise threw it into the sea.\u2014Had our governors in this case\nsatisfied themselves with requiring a compensation from the province for\nthe damage done, there is no doubt but it would have been granted. Or had\nthey proceeded no farther in the infliction of punishment, than stopping\nup the port and destroying the trade of Boston, till compensation was\nmade, the province might possibly have submitted, and a sufficient\nsaving would have been gained for the honour of the nation. But having\nhitherto proceeded without wisdom, they observed now no bounds in their\nresentment. To the Boston port bill was added a bill which destroyed the\nchartered government of the province; a bill which withdrew from the\njurisdiction of the province, persons who in particular cases should\ncommit murder; and the _Quebec_ bill. At the same time a strong body of\ntroops was stationed at _Boston_ to enforce obedience to these bills.\n\n * * * * *\n\nAll who knew any thing of the temper of the Colonies saw that the\neffect of this sudden accumulation of vengeance, would probably be not\nintimidating but exasperating them, and driving them into a general\nrevolt. But our minister had different apprehensions. They believed that\nthe malecontents in the Colony of _Massachusett\u2019s_ were a small party,\nheaded by a few factious men; that the majority of the people would take\nthe side of government, as soon as they saw a force among them capable\nof supporting them; that, at worst, the Colonies in general would never\nmake a common cause with this province; and that, the issue would prove,\nin a few months, order, tranquility and submission.\u2014Every one of these\napprehensions was falsified by the events that followed.\n\nWhen the bills I have mentioned came to be carried into execution,\nthe whole province was thrown into confusion. The courts of justice\nwere shut up, and all government was dissolved. The commander in chief\nfound it necessary to fortify himself in Boston; and the other Colonies\nimmediately resolved to make a common cause with this Colony.\n\nDisappointed by these consequences, our ministers took fright. Once\nmore they made an effort to retreat; but indeed the most ungracious one\nthat can well be imagined. A proposal was sent to the Colonies, called\nConciliatory; and the substance of which was, that if any of them would\nraise such sums as should be demanded of them by taxing themselves, the\nParliament would forbear to tax them.\u2014It will be scarcely believed,\nhereafter, that such a proposal could be thought conciliatory. It was\nonly telling them; \u201cIf you will tax yourselves BY OUR ORDER, we will save\nourselves the trouble of taxing you.\u201d\u2014They received the proposal as an\ninsult; and rejected it with disdain.\n\nAt the time this concession was transmitted to _America_, open\nhostilities were not begun. In the sword our ministers thought they\nhad still a resource which would immediately settle all disputes. They\nconsidered the people of _New-England_ as nothing but a mob, who would\nbe soon routed and forced into obedience. It was even believed, that a\nfew thousands of our army might march through all _America_, and make\nall quiet where-ever they went. Under this conviction our ministers did\nnot dread urging the Province of _Massachusett\u2019s Bay_ into rebellion, by\nordering the army to seize their stores, and to take up some of their\nleading men.\u2014The attempt was made.\u2014The people fled immediately to arms,\nand repelled the attack.\u2014A considerable part of the flower of the British\narmy has been destroyed.\u2014Some of our best Generals, and the bravest\nof our troops, are now[26] disgracefully and miserably imprisoned at\n_Boston_.\u2014A horrid civil war is commenced;\u2014And the Empire is distracted\nand convulsed.\n\nCan it be possible to think with patience of the policy that has brought\nus into these circumstances? Did ever Heaven punish the vices of a\npeople more severely by darkening their counsels? How great would be our\nhappiness could we now recall former times, and return to the policy of\nthe last reigns?\u2014But those times are gone.\u2014I will, however, beg leave for\na few moments to look back to them; and to compare the ground we have\nleft with that on which we find ourselves. This must be done with deep\nregret; but it forms a necessary part of my present design.\n\n * * * * *\n\nIn those times our Colonies, foregoing every advantage which they might\nderive from trading with foreign nations, consented to send only to us\nwhatever it was for our interest to receive from them; and to receive\nonly from us whatever it was for our interest to send to them. They gave\nup the power of making sumptuary laws, and exposed themselves to all the\nevils of an increasing and wasteful luxury, because we were benefited by\nvending among them the materials of it. The iron with which providence\nhad blessed their country, they were required by laws, in which they\nacquiesced, to transport hither, that our people might be maintained\nby working it for them into nails, ploughs, axes, &c. And, in several\ninstances, even one Colony was not allowed to supply any neighbouring\nColonies with commodities, which could be conveyed to them from\nhence.\u2014But they yielded much farther. They consented that we should have\nthe appointment of one branch of their legislature. By recognizing as\ntheir King, a King resident among us and under our influence, they gave\nus a negative on all their laws. By allowing an appeal to us in their\ncivil disputes, they gave us likewise the ultimate determination of all\ncivil causes among them.\u2014In short. They allowed us every power we could\ndesire, except that of taxing them, and interfering in their internal\nlegislations: And they had admitted precedents which, even in these\ninstances, gave us no inconsiderable authority over them. By purchasing\nour goods they paid our taxes; and, by allowing us to regulate their\ntrade in any manner we thought most for our advantage, they enriched our\nmerchants, and helped us to bear our growing burdens. They fought our\nbattles with us. They gloried in their relation to us. All their gains\ncentered among us; and they always spoke of this country and looked to it\nas their home.\n\nSuch WAS the state of things.\u2014What is it now?\n\nNot contented with a degree of power, sufficient to satisfy any\nreasonable ambition, we have attempted to extend it.\u2014Not contented with\ndrawing from them a large revenue _indirectly_, we have endeavoured to\nprocure one _directly_ by an authoritative seizure; and, in order to\ngain a pepper-corn in this way, have chosen to hazard millions, acquired\nby the peaceable intercourse of trade.\u2014Vile policy! What a scourge is\ngovernment so conducted?\u2014Had we never deserted our old ground: Had we\nnourished and favoured _America_, with a view to commerce, instead of\nconsidering it as a country to be governed: Had we, like a liberal and\nwise people, rejoiced to see a multitude of free states branched forth\nfrom ourselves, all enjoying independent legislatures similar to our own:\nHad we aimed at binding them to us only by the tyes of affection and\ninterest; and contented ourselves with a moderate power rendered durable\nby being lenient and friendly, an umpire in their differences, an aid to\nthem in improving their own free governments, and their common bulwark\nagainst the assaults of foreign enemies: Had this, I say, been our\npolicy and temper; there is nothing so great or happy that we might not\nhave expected. With their increase our strength would have increased. A\ngrowing surplus in the revenue might have been gained, which, invariably\napplied to the gradual discharge of the national debt, would have\ndelivered us from the ruin with which it threatens us. The Liberty of\n_America_ might have preserved our Liberty; and, under the direction of\na patriot king or wise minister, proved the means of restoring to us\nour almost lost constitution. Perhaps, in time, we might also have been\nbrought to see the necessity of carefully watching and restricting our\npaper-credit: And thus we might have regained safety; and, in union with\nour Colonies, have been more than a match for every enemy, and risen to a\nsituation of honour and dignity never before known amongst mankind.\u2014But I\nam forgetting myself.\u2014Our Colonies are likely to be lost for ever. Their\nlove is turned into hatred; and their respect for our government into\nresentment and abhorrence.\u2014We shall see more distinctly what a calamity\nthis is, and the observations I have now made will be confirmed, by\nattending to the following facts.\n\n * * * * *\n\nOur American Colonies, particularly the Northern ones, have been for\nsome time in the happiest state of society; or, in that middle state of\ncivilization, between its first rude and its last refined and corrupt\nstate. Old countries consist, generally, of three classes of people;\na GENTRY; a YEOMANRY; and a PEASANTRY. The Colonies consist only of a\nbody of YEOMANRY[27] supported by agriculture, and all independent,\nand nearly upon a level; in consequence of which, joined to a boundless\nextent of country, the means of subsistence are procured without\ndifficulty, and the temptations to wickedness are so inconsiderable,\nthat executions[28] are seldom known among them. From hence arises an\nencouragement to population so great, that in some of the Colonies\nthey double their own number in fifteen years; in others, in eighteen\nyears; and in all, taken one with another, in twenty-five years.\u2014Such an\nincrease was, I believe, never before known. It demonstrates that they\nmust live at their ease; and be free from those cares, oppressions, and\ndiseases which depopulate and ravage luxurious states.\n\n * * * * *\n\nWith the population of the Colonies has increased their trade; but much\nfaster, on account of the gradual introduction of luxury among them.\u2014In\n1723 the exports to _Pensylvania_ were 16,000l.\u2014In 1742 they were\n75,295l.\u2014In 1757 they were increased to 268,426l. and in 1773 to half a\nmillion.\n\nThe exports to all the Colonies in 1744 were 640,114l.\u2014In 1758, they\nwere increased to 1.832,948l. and in 1773, to three millions.[29] And\nthe probability is, that, had it not been for the discontents among the\nColonies since the year 1764, our trade with them would have been this\nyear double to what it was in 1773; and that in a few years more, it\nwould not have been possible for the whole kingdom, though consisting\nonly of manufacturers, to supply the American demand.\n\nThis trade, it should be considered, was not only thus an increasing\ntrade; but it was a trade in which we had no rivals; a trade certain,\nconstant, and uninterrupted; and which, by the shipping employed in it,\nand the naval stores supplied by it, contributed greatly to the support\nof that navy which is our chief national strength.\u2014Viewed in these lights\nit was an object unspeakably important. But it will appear still more\nso if we view it in its connexions and dependencies. It is well known,\nthat our trade with _Africa_ and the _West-Indies_ cannot easily subsist\nwithout it. And, upon the whole, it is undeniable, that it has been one\nof the main springs of our opulence and splendour; and that we have, in\na great measure, been indebted to it for our ability to bear a debt so\nmuch heavier, than that which, fifty years ago, the wisest men thought\nwould necessarily sink us.\n\nThis inestimable prize, and all the advantages connected with _America_,\nwe are now throwing away. Experience alone can shew what calamities must\nfollow. It will indeed be astonishing if this kingdom can bear such a\nloss without dreadful consequences.\u2014These consequences have been amply\nrepresented by others; and it is needless to enter into any account\nof them\u2014At the time we shall be feeling them\u2014The Empire dismembered;\nthe blood of thousands shed in an unrighteous quarrel; our strength\nexhausted; our merchants breaking; our manufacturers starving; our\ndebts increasing; the revenue sinking; the funds tottering; and all the\nmiseries of a public bankruptcy impending\u2014At such a _crisis_ should\nour natural enemies, eager for our ruin, seize the opportunity\u2014The\napprehension is too distressing.\u2014Let us view this subject in another\nlight.\n\n * * * * *\n\nOn this occasion, particular attention should be given to the present\nSINGULAR situation of this kingdom. This is a circumstance of the utmost\nimportance; and as I am afraid it is not much considered, I will beg\nleave to give a distinct account of it.\n\nAt the REVOLUTION, the _specie_ of the kingdom amounted, according to[30]\n_Davenant\u2019_s account, to eighteen millions and a half.\u2014From the ACCESSION\nto the year 1772, there were coined at the mint, near 29 millions of\ngold; and in ten years only of this time, or from January 1759 to January\n1769, there were coined eight millions and a half.[31] But it has\nappeared lately, that the gold specie now left in the kingdom is no more\nthan about twelve millions and a half.[32]\u2014Not so much as half a million\nof _Silver specie_ has been coined these sixty years; and it cannot be\nsupposed, that the quantity of it now in circulation exceeds two or three\nmillions. The whole specie of the kingdom, therefore, is probably at this\ntime about fifteen millions. Of this some millions must be hoarded at the\n_Bank_.\u2014Our circulating _specie_, therefore, appears to be decreased.\nBut our wealth, or the quantity of money in the kingdom, is greatly\nincreased. This is paper to a vast amount, issued in almost every corner\nof the kingdom; and, particularly, by the BANK OF ENGLAND. While this\npaper maintains its credit it answers all the purposes of specie, and is\nin all respects the same with money.\n\nSpecie represents some real value in goods or commodities. On the\ncontrary; paper represents immediately nothing but specie. It is a\npromise or obligation which the emitter brings himself under to pay a\ngiven sum in coin; and it owes its currency to the credit of the emitter;\nor to an opinion that he is able to make good his engagement; and that\nthe sum specified may be received upon being demanded.\u2014Paper, therefore,\nrepresents coin; and coin represents real value. That is, the one is a\n_sign_ of wealth. The other is the _sign_ of that _sign_.\u2014But farther.\nCoin is an _universal_ sign of wealth, and will procure it every where.\nIt will bear any alarm, and stand any shock.\u2014On the contrary. Paper,\nowing its currency to opinion, has only a local and imaginary value. It\ncan stand no shock. It is destroyed by the approach of danger; or even\nthe _suspicion_ of danger.\n\nIn short. Coin is the basis of our paper-credit; and were it either all\ndestroyed, or were only the quantity of it reduced beyond a certain\nlimit, the paper circulation of the kingdom would sink at once. But, were\nour paper destroyed, the coin would not only remain, but rise in value,\nin proportion to the quantity of paper destroyed.\n\nFrom this account it follows, that as far as, in any circumstances,\nspecie is not to be procured in exchange for paper, it represents\n_nothing_, and is, worth _nothing_.\u2014The specie of this kingdom is\ninconsiderable, compared with the amount of the paper circulating in it.\nThis is generally believed; and, therefore, it is natural to enquire how\nits currency is supported.\u2014The answer is easy. It is supported in the\nsame manner with all other bubbles. Were all to demand specie in exchange\nfor their notes, payment could not be made; but, at the same time that\nthis is known, every one trusts, that no alarm producing such a demand\nwill happen, while he holds the paper he is possessed of; and that if\nit should happen, he will stand a chance for being first paid; and this\nmakes him easy. And it also makes all with whom he traffics easy.\u2014But\nlet any events happen which threaten danger; and every one will become\ndiffident. A run will take place; and a bankruptcy follow.\n\nThis is an account of what has often happened in _private_ credit. And\nit is also an account of what _will_ (if no change of measures takes\nplace) happen some time or other in _public_ credit. The description I\nhave given of our paper-circulation implies, that nothing can be more\ndelicate or hazardous. It is an immense fabrick, with its head in the\nclouds, that is continually trembling with every adverse blast and every\nfluctuation of trade; and which, like the baseless fabrick of a vision,\nmay in a moment vanish, and leave no wreck behind.\u2014The destruction\nof a few books at the _Bank_; an improvement in the art of forgery;\nthe landing of a body of _French_ troops on our coasts; insurrections\nthreatening a revolution in government; or any events that should produce\na general panic, however groundless, would at once annihilate it, and\nleave us without any other medium of traffic, than a quantity of _specie_\nnot much more than the money now drawn from the public by the taxes. It\nwould, therefore, become impossible to pay the taxes. The revenue would\nfail. Near a hundred and forty millions of property would be destroyed.\nThe whole frame of government would fall to pieces; and a state of nature\nwould take place.\u2014What a dreadful situation! It has never had a parallel\namong mankind; except at one time in _France_ after the establishment\nthere of the Royal _Mississipi_ Bank. In 1720 this bank broke;[33] and,\nafter involving for some time the whole kingdom in a golden dream, spread\nthrough it in one day, desolation and ruin.\u2014The distress attending such\nan event, in this free country, would be greater than it was in _France_.\nHappily for that kingdom, they have shot this gulph. Paper-credit has\nnever since recovered itself there; and their circulating cash consists\nnow all of solid coin, amounting, according to the lowest account, to no\nless a sum than 1500 millions of _Livres_;[34] or near 67 millions of\npounds sterling. This gives them unspeakable advantages; and, joined to\nthat quick reduction of their debts which is inseparable[35] from their\nnature, places them on a ground of safety which we have reason to admire\nand envy.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThese are subjects on which I should have chosen to be silent, did I\nnot think it necessary, that this country should be apprized and warned\nof the danger which threatens it. This danger is created chiefly by the\nnational debt. High taxes are necessary to support a great public debt;\nand a large supply of cash is necessary to support high taxes. This\ncash we owe to our paper; and, in proportion to our paper, must be the\nproductiveness of our taxes.\u2014King William\u2019s wars drained the kingdom of\nits specie. This sunk the revenue, and distressed government. In 1694\nthe BANK was established; and the kingdom was provided with a substitute\nfor specie. The taxes became again productive. The revenue rose; and\ngovernment was relieved.\u2014Ever since that period our paper and taxes have\nbeen increasing together, and supporting one another; and one reason,\nundoubtedly, of the late increase in the productiveness of our taxes has\nbeen the increase of our paper.\n\nWas there no public debt, there would be no occasion for half the present\ntaxes. Our paper-circulation might be reduced. The balance of trade\nwould turn in our favour. Specie would flow in upon us. The quantity\nof property destroyed by a failure of paper-credit (should it in such\ncircumstances happen) would be 140 millions less; and, therefore, the\nshock attending it would be _tolerable_. But, in the present state of\nthings, whenever any calamity or panic shall produce such a failure, the\nshock attending it will be _intolerable_.\u2014May heaven soon raise up for us\nsome great statesman who shall see these things; and enter into effectual\nmeasures, if not now too late, for extricating and preserving us.\n\nPublic banks are, undoubtedly, attended with great conveniences. But\nthey also do great harm; and, if their emissions are not restrained, and\nconducted with great wisdom, they may prove the most pernicious of all\ninstitutions; not only, by substituting _fictitious_ for _real_ wealth;\nby increasing luxury; by raising the prices of provisions; by concealing\nan unfavourable balance of trade; and by rendering a kingdom incapable of\nbearing any _internal_ tumults or _external_ attacks, without the danger\nof a dreadful convulsion: But, particularly, by becoming instruments in\nthe hands of ministers of state to increase their influence, to lessen\ntheir dependence on the people, and to keep up a delusive shew of public\nprosperity, when perhaps ruin may be near. There is, in truth, nothing\nthat a government may not do with such a mine at its command as a public\nBank, while it can maintain its credit; nor, therefore, is there any\nthing more likely to be IMPROPERLY and DANGEROUSLY used.\u2014But to return to\nwhat may be more applicable to our own state at present.\n\n * * * * *\n\nAmong the causes that may produce a failure of paper-credit, there are\ntwo which the present quarrel with _America_ calls upon us particularly\nto consider.\u2014The first is, \u201cAn unfavourable balance of trade.\u201d This, in\nproportion to the degree in which it takes place, must turn the course\nof foreign exchange against us; raise the price of bullion; and carry\noff our specie. The danger to which this would expose us is obvious; and\nit has been much increased by the new coinage of the gold specie which\nbegun in 1773. Before this coinage, the greatest part of our gold coin\nbeing light, but the same in currency as if it had been heavy, always\nremained in the kingdom. But, being now nearly of full weight, whenever a\nwrong balance of foreign trade alters the course of exchange, and gold in\n_coin_ becomes of less value than in _bullion_, there is reason to fear,\nthat it will be melted down in such great quantities, and exported so\nfast, as in a little time to leave none behind;[36] the consequence which\nmust prove, that the whole superstructure of paper-credit, now supported\nby it, will break down.\u2014The only remedy, in such circumstances, is an\nincrease of coinage at the mint. But this will operate too slowly; and,\nby raising the price of bullion, will only increase the evil.\u2014It is the\n_Bank_ that at such a time must be the immediate sufferer: For it is from\nthence that those who want coin for any purpose will always draw it.\n\nFor many years before 1773, the price of gold in _bullion_ had been, from\n2 to 3 or 4 _per cent_. higher than in _coin_. This was a temptation\nto melt down and export the coin, which could not be resisted. Hence\narose a demand for it on the BANK; and, consequently, the necessity of\npurchasing bullion at a loss for a new coinage. But the more coin the\nBank procured in this way, the lower its price became in comparison with\nthat of bullion, and the faster it vanished; and, consequently, the more\nnecessary it became to coin again, and the greater loss fell upon the\nBank.\u2014Had things continued much longer in this train, the consequences\nmight have proved very serious. I am by no means sufficiently informed to\nbe able to assign the causes which have produced the change that happened\nin 1772. But, without doubt, the state of things which took place before\nthat year must be expected to return. The fluctuations of trade, in its\nbest state, render this unavoidable. But the contest with our Colonies\nhas a tendency to bring it on soon; and to increase unspeakably the\ndistress attending it. All know that the balance of trade with them is\ngreatly in our favour;[37] and that this balance is paid partly by direct\nremittances of bullion; and partly by circuitous remittances through\n_Spain_, _Portugal_, _Italy_, &c. which diminish the balance against\nus with these countries.\u2014During the last year they have been employed\nin paying their debts, without adding to them; and their exportations\nand remittances for that purpose have contributed to render the general\nbalance of trade more favourable to us, and, also, (in conjunction with\nthe late operations of the Bank) to keep up our funds. These remittances\nare now ceased; and a few years will determine, if this contest goes on,\nhow far we can sustain such a loss without suffering the consequences I\nhave described.\n\nThe second event, ruinous to our paper circulation, which may arise from\nour rupture with _America_, is a deficiency in the revenue. As a failure\nof our paper would destroy the revenue, so a failure of the revenue, or\nany considerable diminution of it, would destroy our paper. The BANK is\nthe support of our paper; and the support of the BANK is the credit of\ngovernment. Its principal securities, are a capital of eleven millions\nlent to government; and money continually advanced to a vast amount on\nthe Land-tax and Malt-tax, Sinking Fund, Exchequer Bills, Navy Bills, &c.\nShould, therefore, deficiencies in the revenue bring government under\nany difficulties, all these securities would lose their value, and the\n_Bank_ and Government, and all private and public credit, would fall\ntogether.\u2014Let any one here imagine, what would probably follow, were it\nbut suspected by the public in general, that the taxes were so fallen, as\nnot to produce enough to pay the interest of the public debts, besides\nbearing the _ordinary_ expences of the nation; and that, in order to\nsupply the deficiency and to hide the calamity, it had been necessary\nin any one year to anticipate the taxes, and to borrow of the Bank.\u2014In\nsuch circumstances I can scarcely doubt, but an alarm would spread of the\nmost dangerous tendency.\u2014The next foreign war, should it prove _half_\nas expensive as the last, will probably occasion such a deficiency;\nand bring our affairs to that crisis towards which they have been long\ntending.\u2014But the war with _America_ has a greater tendency to do this;\nand the reason is, that it affects our resources more; and is attended\nmore with the danger of internal disturbances.\n\nSome have made the proportion of our trade depending on _North America_\nto be near ONE HALF. A moderate computation makes it a THIRD.[38] Let it,\nhowever, be supposed to be only a FOURTH. I will venture to say, this is\na proportion of our foreign trade, the loss of which, when it comes to be\nfelt, will be found insupportable.\u2014In the article of _Tobacco_ alone it\nwill cause a deduction from the _Customs_ of at least 300,000_l._ _per\nann._[39] including the duties paid on foreign commodities purchased by\nthe exportation of tobacco. Let the whole deduction from the revenue be\nsupposed to be only half a million. This alone is more than the kingdom\ncan at present bear, without having recourse to lotteries, and the\nland-tax at 4s. in order to defray the common and necessary expences\nof peace. But to this must be added a deduction from the produce of\nthe _Excises_, in consequence of the increase of the poor, of the\ndifficulties of our merchants and manufacturers, of less national wealth,\nand a retrenchment of luxury. There is no possibility of knowing to what\nthese deductions may amount. When the evils producing them begin, they\nwill proceed rapidly; and they may end in a general wreck before we are\naware of any danger.\n\nIn order to give a clearer view of this subject, I will in an\nAppendix[40], state particularly the national expenditure and income\nfor eleven years, from 1764 to 1774. From that account it will appear,\nthat the money drawn every year from the public by the taxes, does not\nfall greatly short of a sum equal to the whole _specie_ of the kingdom;\nand that, notwithstanding the late increase in the productiveness of\nthe taxes, the whole surplus of the national income has not exceeded\n338,759l. _per ann._ See the Second Tract, p. 160. This is a surplus\nso inconsiderable as to be scarcely sufficient to guard against the\ndeficiencies arising from the common fluctuations of foreign trade, and\nof home consumption. It is NOTHING when considered as the only fund we\nhave for paying off a debt of near 140 millions.\u2014Had we continued in a\nstate of profound peace, it could not have admitted of any diminution.\nWhat then must follow, when one of the most profitable branches of our\ntrade is destroyed; when a THIRD of the Empire is lost; when an addition\nof many millions is made to the public debt; and when, at the same time,\nperhaps some millions are taken away from the revenue?\u2014I shudder at this\nprospect.\u2014A KINGDOM ON AN EDGE SO PERILOUS, SHOULD THINK OF NOTHING BUT A\nRETREAT.\n\n\nSECT. IV.\n\n_Of the Honour of the Nation as affected by the War with ~America~._\n\nOne of the pleas for continuing the contest with _America_ is, \u201cThat\nour honour is engaged; and that we cannot now recede without the most\nhumiliating concessions.\u201d\n\nWith respect to this, it is proper to observe, that a distinction should\nbe made between the nation, and its rulers. It is melancholy that there\nshould be ever any reason for making such a distinction. A government\nis, or ought to be, nothing but an institution for collecting and for\ncarrying into execution the will of the people. But so far is this from\nbeing in general the fact, that the measures of government, and the\nsense of the people, are sometimes in direct opposition to one another;\nnor does it _often_ happen that any certain conclusion can be drawn from\nthe one to the other.\u2014I will not pretend to determine, whether, in the\npresent instance, the dishonour attending a retreat would belong to the\nnation at large, or only to the persons in power who guide its affairs.\nBe this as it will, no good argument can be drawn from it against\nreceding. The disgrace which may be implied in making concessions, is\nnothing to that of being the aggressors in an unrighteous quarrel;\nand dignity, in such circumstances, consists in retracting freely and\nspeedily.\u2014For, (to adopt on this occasion, words which I have heard\napplied to this very purpose, in a great assembly, by a peer to whom\nthis kingdom has often looked as its deliverer, and whose ill state of\nhealth at this awful moment of public danger every friend to _Britain_\nmust deplore) to adopt, I say, the words of this great man\u2014\u201cRECTITUDE IS\nDIGNITY. OPPRESSION ONLY IS MEANNESS; AND JUSTICE, HONOUR.\u201d\n\nI will add, that PRUDENCE, no less than true HONOUR, requires us to\nretract. For the time may come when, if it is not done voluntarily,\nwe may be _obliged_ to do it; and find ourselves under a necessity\nof granting that to our distresses, which we now deny to equity and\nhumanity, and the prayers of _America_. The possibility of this appears\nplainly from the preceding pages; and should it happen, it will bring\nupon us disgrace indeed, disgrace greater than the worst rancour can\nwish to see accumulated on a kingdom already too much dishonoured.\u2014Let\nthe reader think here what we are doing.\u2014A nation, once the protector of\nLiberty in distant countries, and the scourge of tyranny, changed into\nan enemy to Liberty, and engaged in endeavouring to reduce to servitude\nits own brethren.\u2014A great and enlightened nation, not content with a\ncontrouling power over millions of people which gave it every reasonable\nadvantage, insisting upon such a supremacy over them as would leave them\nnothing they could call their own, and carrying desolation and death\namong them for disputing it.\u2014What can be more ignominious?\u2014How have we\nfelt for the brave _Corsicans_, in their struggle with the _Genoese_, and\nafterwards with the _French_ government? Did GENOA or FRANCE want more\nthan an absolute command over their property and legislations; or the\npower of binding them in all cases whatsoever?\u2014The _Genoese_, finding it\ndifficult to keep them in subjection, CEDED them to the _French_.\u2014All\nsuch cessions of one people by another are disgraceful to human nature.\nBut if our claims are just, may not we also, if we please, CEDE the\nColonies to _France_?\u2014There is, in truth, no other difference between\nthese two cases than that the _Corsicans_ were not descended from the\npeople who governed them, but that the _Americans_ are.\n\nThere are some who seem to be sensible, that the authority of one country\nover another, cannot be distinguished from the servitude of one country\nto another; and that unless different communities, as well as different\nparts of the same community, are united by an equal representation, all\nsuch authority is inconsistent with the principles of Civil Liberty.\u2014But\nthey except the case of the Colonies and _Great Britain_; because the\nColonies are communities which have branched forth from, and which,\ntherefore, as they think, belong to _Britain_. Had the colonies been\ncommunities of _foreigners_, over whom we wanted to acquire dominion, or\neven to extend a dominion before acquired, they are ready to admit that\ntheir resistance would have been just.\u2014In my opinion, this is the same\nwith saying, that the Colonies ought to be worse off than the rest of\nmankind, because they are our own _Brethren_.\n\nAgain. The United Provinces of _Holland_ were once subject to the\n_Spanish_ monarchy; but, provoked by the violation of their charters;\nby levies of money, without their consent; by the introduction of\nSpanish troops among them; by innovations in their antient modes of\ngovernment; and the rejection of their petitions; they were driven to\nthat resistance which we and all the world have ever since admired; and\nwhich has given birth to one of the greatest and happiest Republics\nthat ever existed.\u2014Let any one read also, the history of the war which\nthe _Athenians_, from a thirst of Empire, made on the _Syracusans_ in\n_Sicily_, a people derived from the same origin with them; and let him,\nif he can, avoid rejoicing in the defeat of the _Athenians_.\n\nLet him, likewise, read the account of the social war among the Romans.\nThe allied states of _Italy_ had fought the battles of _Rome_, and\ncontributed by their valour and treasure to its conquests and grandeur.\nThey claimed, therefore, the rights of Roman citizens, and a share\nwith them in legislation. The Romans, disdaining to make those their\n_fellow-citizens_, whom they had always looked upon as their _subjects_,\nwould not comply; and a war followed, the most horrible in the annals of\nmankind, which ended in the ruin of the Roman Republic. The feelings of\nevery _Briton_ in this case must force him to approve the conduct of the\nAllies, and to condemn the proud and ungrateful Romans.\n\nBut not only is the present contest with _America_ thus disgraceful to\nus, because inconsistent with our own feelings in similar cases; but\nalso because condemned by our own practice in former times. The Colonies\nare persuaded that they are fighting for Liberty. We see them sacrificing\nto this persuasion every private advantage. If mistaken, and though\nguilty of irregularities, they should be pardoned by a people whose\nancestors have given them so many examples of similar conduct. ENGLAND\nshould venerate the attachment to Liberty amidst all its excesses;\nand, instead of indignation or scorn, it would be most becoming them,\nin the present instance, to declare their applause, and to say to the\nColonies\u2014\u201cWe excuse your mistakes. We admire your spirit. It is the\nspirit that has more than once saved _ourselves_. We aspire to no\ndominion over you. We understand the rights of men too well to think of\ntaking from you the inestimable privilege of governing yourselves; and,\ninstead of employing our power for any such purpose, we offer it to you\nas a friendly and guardian power, to be a mediator in your quarrels; a\nprotection against your enemies; and an aid to you in establishing a plan\nof Liberty that shall make you great and happy. In return, we ask nothing\nbut your gratitude and your commerce.\u201d\n\nThis would be a language worthy of a brave and enlightened nation.\nBut alas! it often happens in the _Political World_ as it does in\n_Religion_, that the people who cry out most vehemently for Liberty to\nthemselves are the most unwilling to grant it to others.\n\nBut farther. This war is disgraceful on account of the persuasion which\nled to it, and under which it has been undertaken. The general cry was\nlast winter, that the people of NEW-ENGLAND were a body of cowards, who\nwould at once be reduced to submission by a hostile look from our troops.\nIn this light were they held up to public derision in both Houses of\nParliament; and it was this persuasion that, probably, induced a Nobleman\nof the first weight in the state to recommend, at the passing of the\n_Boston Port Bill_, coercive measures; hinting at the same time, that\nthe _appearance_ of hostilities would be sufficient, and that all would\nbe soon over, SINE CLADE.\u2014Indeed no one can doubt, but that had it been\nbelieved some time ago, that the people of _America_ were brave, more\ncare would have been taken not to provoke them.\n\nAgain. The manner in which this war has been hitherto conducted, renders\nit still more disgraceful.\u2014English valour being thought insufficient to\nsubdue the Colonies, the laws and religion of _France_ were established\nin _Canada_, on purpose to obtain the power of bringing upon them from\nthence an army of _French Papists_. The wild _Indians_ and their own\nSlaves have been instigated to attack them; and attempts have been\nmade to gain the assistance of a large body of _Russians_.\u2014With like\nviews, _German_ troops have been hired; and the defence of our Forts and\nGarrisons trusted in their hands.\n\nThese are measures which need no comment. The last of them, in\nparticular, having been carried into execution without the consent of\nparliament, threatens us with imminent danger; and shews that we are in\nthe way to lose even the _Forms_ of the constitution.\u2014If, indeed, our\nministers can at any time, without leave, not only send away the national\ntroops, but introduce _foreign_ troops in their room, we lie entirely at\nmercy; and we have every thing to dread.\n\n\nSECT. V.\n\n_Of the Probability of Succeeding in the War with ~America~._\n\nLet us next consider how far there is a possibility of succeeding in the\npresent war.\n\nOur own people, being unwilling to enlist, and the attempts to procure\narmies of _Russians_, _Indians_, and _Canadians_ having miscarried; the\nutmost force we can employ, including foreigners, does not exceed, if\nI am rightly informed, 40,000 effective men. This is the force that is\nto conquer half a million _at least_[41] of determined men fighting on\ntheir own ground, within sight of their houses and families, and for that\nsacred blessing of Liberty, without which man is a beast, and government\na curse. All history proves, that in such a situation, a handful is a\nmatch for millions.\n\nIn the _Netherlands_, a few states thus circumstanced, withstood, for a\nlong course of years, the whole force of the Spanish monarchy, when at\nits zenith; and at last humbled its pride, and emancipated themselves\nfrom its tyranny.\u2014The citizens of SYRACUSE also, thus circumstanced,\nwithstood the whole power of the _Athenians_, and almost ruined\nthem.\u2014The same happened in the contest between the house of _Austria_,\nand the cantons[42] of _Switzerland_.\u2014There is in this case an infinite\ndifference between attacking and being attacked; between fighting to\n_destroy_, and fighting to _preserve_ or _acquire_ Liberty.\u2014Were we,\ntherefore, capable of employing a _land_ force against _America_ equal\nto its own, there would be little probability of success. But to think\nof conquering that whole continent with 30,000 or 40,000 men to be\ntransported across the _Atlantic_, and fed from hence, and incapable of\nbeing recruited after any defeat\u2014This is indeed a folly so great, that\nlanguage does not afford a name for it.\n\nWith respect to our naval force, could it sail at land as it does at\nsea, much might be done with it; but as that is impossible, _little_\nor _nothing_ can be done with it, which will not hurt _ourselves_ more\nthan the _Colonists_.\u2014Such of their maritime towns as they cannot guard\nagainst our fleets, and have not been already destroyed, they are\ndetermined either to give up to our resentment, or destroy themselves:\nThe consequence of which will be, that these towns will be rebuilt in\nsafer situations; and that we shall lose some of the principal pledges\nby which we have hitherto held them in subjection.\u2014As to their trade;\nhaving all the necessaries and the chief conveniencies of life within\nthemselves, they have no dependence upon it; and the loss of it will do\nthem unspeakable good, by preserving them from the evils of luxury and\nthe temptations of wealth; and keeping them in that state of virtuous\nsimplicity which is the greatest happiness. I know that I am now speaking\nthe sense of some of the wisest men in America. It has been long their\nwish that _Britain_ would shut up all their ports. They will rejoice,\nparticularly, in the last restraining act. It might have happened, that\nthe people would have grown weary of their agreements not to export\nor import. But this act will oblige them to keep these agreements; and\nconfirm their unanimity and zeal. It will also furnish them with a reason\nfor confiscating the estates of all the friends of our government among\nthem, and for employing their sailors, who would have been otherwise\nidle, in making reprisals on British property. Their ships, before\nuseless, and consisting of many hundreds, will be turned into ships of\nwar; and that attention, which they have hitherto confined to trade, will\nbe employed in fitting out a naval force for their own defence; and thus\nthe way will be prepared for their becoming, much sooner than they would\notherwise have been, a great maritime power. This act of parliament,\ntherefore, crowns the folly of all our late measures.[43]\u2014None who know\nme, can believe me to be disposed to superstition. Perhaps, however, I\nam not in the present instance, free from this weakness.\u2014I fancy I see\nin these measures something that cannot be accounted for merely by human\nignorance. I am inclined to think, that the hand of Providence is in\nthem working to bring about some great ends.\u2014But this leads me to one\nconsideration more, which I cannot help offering to the public, and\nwhich appears to me in the highest degree important.\n\nIn this hour of tremendous danger, it would become us to turn our\nthoughts to Heaven. This is what our brethren in the Colonies are doing.\nFrom one end of _North America_ to the other, they are FASTING and\nPRAYING. But what are we doing?\u2014We are ridiculing them as _Fanatics_, and\nscoffing at religion.\u2014We are running wild after pleasure, and forgetting\nevery thing serious and decent at _Masquerades_.\u2014We are trafficking for\nBoroughs; perjuring ourselves at Elections; and selling ourselves for\nplaces.\u2014Which side then is Providence likely to favour?\n\nIn _America_ we see a number of rising states in the vigour of youth,\ninspired by the noblest of all passions, the passion for being free;\nand animated by piety.\u2014_Here_ we see an old state, great indeed, but\ninflated and irreligious; enervated by luxury; encumbred with debts; and\nhanging by a thread.\u2014Can any one look without pain to the issue? May we\nnot expect calamities that shall recover to _reflection_ (perhaps to\n_devotion_) our _Libertines_ and _Atheists_?\n\nIs our cause such as gives us reason to ask God to bless it?\u2014Can we in\nthe face of Heaven declare, \u201cthat we are not the aggressors in this war;\nand that we mean by it, not to acquire or even preserve dominion for its\nown sake; not conquest, or Empire, or the gratification of resentment;\nbut solely to deliver ourselves from oppression; to gain reparation for\ninjury; and to defend ourselves against men who would plunder or kill\nus?\u201d\u2014Remember, reader, whoever thou art, that there are no other just\ncauses of war; and that blood spilled, with any ether views, must some\ntime or other be accounted for.\u2014But not to expose myself by saying more\nin this way, I will now beg leave to recapitulate some of the arguments\nI have used; and to deliver the feelings of my heart in a brief, but\nearnest address to my countrymen.\n\n * * * * *\n\nI am hearing it continually urged\u2014\u201cAre they not our subjects?\u201d\u2014The\nplain answer is, they are not your subjects. The people of _America_\nare no more the subjects of the people of _Britain_, than the people of\n_Yorkshire_ are the subjects of the people of _Middlesex_. They are your\n_fellow-subjects_.\n\n\u201cBut _we_ are taxed; and why should not _they_ be taxed?\u201d\u2014_You_ are taxed\nby yourselves. _They_ insist on the same privilege.\u2014They are taxed to\nsupport their own governments; and they help also to pay your taxes by\npurchasing your manufactures, and giving you a monopoly of their trade.\nMust they maintain _two_ governments? Must they submit to be _triple_\ntaxed?\u2014Has your moderation in taxing yourselves been such as encourages\nthem to trust you with the power of taxing them?\n\n\u201cBut they will not obey the _Parliament_ and the _Laws_.\u201d\u2014Say rather,\nthey will not obey _your_ parliament and _your_ laws. Their reason is:\nThey have no voice in your parliament. They have no share in making[44]\nyour laws.\u2014\u201cNeither have _most_ of us.\u201d\u2014Then you so far want Liberty;\nand your language is, \u201c_We_ are not free, Why will _they_ be free?\u201d\u2014But\n_many_ of you have a voice in parliament: _None_ of them have. _All_\nyour freehold land is represented: But not a foot of _their_ land is\nrepresented. At worst, therefore, you are only enslaved _partially_.\u2014Were\nthey to submit, they would be enslaved _totally_.\u2014They are governed\nby parliaments chosen by themselves, and by legislatures similar to\nyours. Why will you disturb them in the enjoyment of a blessing so\nvaluable? Is it reasonable to insist, that your discretion alone shall\nbe their law; that they shall have no constitutions of government,\nexcept such as you shall be pleased to give them; and no property except\nsuch as your parliament shall be pleased to leave them?\u2014What is your\nparliament?\u2014Is there not a growing intercourse between it and the court?\nDoes it awe ministers of state as it once did?\u2014Instead of contending\nfor a controuling power over the governments of _America,_ should you\nnot think more of watching and reforming your own?\u2014Suppose the worst.\nSuppose, in opposition to all their own declarations, that the Colonists\nare now aiming at independence.[45]\u2014\u201cIf they can subsist without you;\u201d\nis it to be wondered at? Did there ever exist a _community_, or even\nan _individual_, that would not do the same?\u2014\u201cIf they _cannot_ subsist\nwithout you;\u201d let them alone. They will soon come back.\u2014\u201cIf you cannot\nsubsist without them,\u201d reclaim them by[46] kindness; engage them by\nmoderation and equity. It is madness to resolve to butcher them. This\nwill make them detest and avoid you for ever. Freemen are not to be\ngoverned by force; or dragooned into compliance. If capable of bearing to\nbe so treated, it is a disgrace to be connected with them.\n\n\u201cIf _they_ can subsist without _you_; and also _you_ without _them_,\u201d the\nattempt to subjugate them by confiscating their effects, burning their\ntowns, and ravaging their territories, is a wanton exertion of cruel\nambition, which, however common it has been among mankind, deserves to\nbe called by harder names than I chuse to apply to it.\u2014Suppose such an\nattempt was to be succeeded: Would it not be a fatal preparation for\nsubduing yourselves? Would not the disposal of _American_ places, and the\ndistribution of an _American_ revenue, render that influence of the crown\nirresistible, which has already stabbed your liberties?\n\nTurn your eyes to _India_: There more has been done than is now attempted\nin _America_. There ENGLISHMEN, actuated by the love of plunder and the\nspirit of conquest, have depopulated whole kingdoms, and ruined millions\nof innocent people by the most infamous oppression and rapacity.\u2014The\njustice of the nation has slept over these enormities. Will the justice\nof heaven sleep?\u2014Are we not now execrated on both sides of the globe?\n\n * * * * *\n\nWith respect to the Colonists; it would be folly to pretend they are\nfaultless. They were running fast into our vices. But this quarrel gives\nthem a salutary check: And it may be permitted on purpose to favour them,\nand in _them_ the rest of mankind; by making way for establishing, in an\nextensive country possessed of every advantage, a plan of government,\nand a growing power that will astonish the world, and under which every\nsubject of human enquiry shall be open to free discussion, and the\nfriends of Liberty, in every quarter of the globe, find a safe retreat\nfrom civil and spiritual tyranny.\u2014I hope, therefore, our brethren in\n_America_ will forgive their oppressors. It is certain _they know not\nwhat they are doing_.\n\n\nCONCLUSION.\n\nHaving said so much of the war with America, and particularly of the\ndanger with which it threatens us, it may be expected that I should\npropose some method of escaping from this danger, and of restoring\nthis once happy Empire to a state of peace and security.\u2014Various plans\nof pacification have been proposed; and some of them, by persons so\ndistinguished by their rank and merit, as to be above my applause. But\ntill there is more of a disposition to attend to such plans; they cannot,\nI am afraid, be of any great service. And there is too much reason to\napprehend, that nothing but calamity will bring us to repentance and\nwisdom.\u2014In order, however, to complete my design in these observations,\nI will take the liberty to lay before the public the following sketch of\none of the plans just referred to, as it was opened before the holidays\nto the house of Lords by the _Earl of Shelburne_; who, while he held\nthe seals of the Southern Department, with the business of the Colonies\nannexed, possessed their confidence, without ever compromising the\nauthority of this country; a confidence which discovered itself by peace\namong themselves, and duty and submission to the Mother-country. I hope\nI shall not take an unwarrantable liberty, if, on this occasion, I use\nhis Lordship\u2019s own words, as nearly as I have been able to collect them.\n\n\u201cMeet the Colonies on their own ground, in the last petition from the\nCongress to the king. The surest, as well as the most dignified mode\nof proceeding for this country.\u2014Suspend all hostilities\u2014Repeal the\nacts which immediately distress America, namely, the last restraining\nact,\u2014the charter act,\u2014the act for the more impartial administration of\njustice;\u2014and the Quebec act.\u2014All the other acts (the custom house act,\nthe post office act, &c.) leave to a temperate revisal.\u2014There will be\nfound much matter which both countries may wish repealed. _Some_ which\ncan never be given up, the principle being that regulation of trade for\nthe common good of the Empire, which forms our _Palladium_. _Other_\nmatter which is fair subject of mutual accommodation.\u2014Prescribe the most\nexplicit acknowledgment of your right of regulating commerce in its most\nextensive sense; if the petition and other public acts of the Colonies\nhave not already, by their declarations and acknowledgments, left it\nupon a sufficiently secure foundation.\u2014Besides the power of regulating\nthe general commerce of the Empire, something further might be expected;\nprovided a due and tender regard were had to the means and abilities\nof the several provinces, as well as to those fundamental, unalienable\nrights of _Englishmen_, which no father can surrender on the part of his\nson, no representative on the part of his elector, no generation on the\npart of the succeeding one; the right of judging not only of the _mode_\nof raising, but the _quantum_, and the appropriation of such aids as\nthey shall grant.\u2014To be more explicit; the debt of _England_, without\nentering into invidious distinctions how it came to be contracted, might\nbe acknowledged the debt of every individual part of the whole Empire,\nAsia, as well as America, included.\u2014Provided, that full security were\nheld forth to them, that such free aids, together with the Sinking Fund\n(Great Britain contributing her superior share) should not be left as\nthe privy purse of the minister, but be unalienably appropriated to the\noriginal intention of that fund, the discharge of the debt;\u2014and that by\nan honest application of the _whole_ fund, the taxes might in time be\nlessened, and the price of our manufactures consequently reduced, so that\nevery contributory part might feel the returning benefit\u2014always supposing\nthe laws of trade duly observed and enforced.\n\n\u201cThe time _was_, I am confident\u2014and perhaps _is_, when these points\nmight be obtained upon the easy, the constitutional, and, therefore, the\nindispensible terms of an exemption from parliamentary taxation, and an\nadmission of the sacredness of their charters; instead of sacrificing\ntheir good humour, their affection, their effectual aids, and the act\nof NAVIGATION itself, (which you are now in the direct road to do) for\na commercial quit-rent,[47] or a barren metaphysical chim\u00e6ra.\u2014How long\nthese ends may continue attainable, no man can tell.\u2014But if no words are\nto be relied on except such as make against the Colonies\u2014If nothing is\nacceptable, except what is attainable by force; it only remains to apply,\nwhat has been so often remarked of unhappy periods,\u2014_Quos deus vult, &c._\u201d\n\nThese are sentiments and proposals of the last importance; and I am very\nhappy in being able to give them to the public from so respectable an\nauthority as that of the distinguished Peer I have mentioned; to whom, I\nknow, this kingdom, as well as America, is much indebted for his zeal to\npromote those grand public points on which the preservation of Liberty\namong us depends; and for the firm opposition which, jointly with many\nothers (Noblemen and Commoners of the first character and abilities,) he\nhas made to the present measures.\n\nHad such a plan as that now proposed been adopted a few months ago, I\nhave little doubt but that a pacification would have taken place, on\nterms highly advantageous to this kingdom.\u2014In particular. It is probable,\nthat the Colonies would have consented to grant an annual supply, which,\nincreased by a saving of the money now spent in maintaining troops among\nthem, and by contributions which might have been gained from other\nparts of the Empire, would have formed a fund considerable enough, if\nunalienably applied, to redeem the public debt; in consequence of which,\nagreeably to Lord Shelburne\u2019s ideas, some of our worst taxes might be\ntaken off, and the Colonies would receive our manufactures cheaper; our\npaper-currency might be restrained; our whole force would be free to meet\nat any time foreign danger; the influence of the Crown would be reduced;\nour Parliament would become less dependent; and the kingdom might,\nperhaps, be restored to a situation of permanent safety and prosperity.\n\nTo conclude.\u2014An important revolution in the affairs of this kingdom\nseems to be approaching. If ruin is not to be our lot, all that has been\nlately done must be undone, and new measures adopted. At that period, an\nopportunity (never perhaps to be recovered, if lost) will offer itself\nfor serving essentially _this country_, as well as _America_; by putting\nthe national debt into a _fixed_ course of payment; by subjecting to new\nregulations, the administration of the finances; and by establishing\nmeasures for exterminating corruption and restoring the constitution.\u2014For\nmy own part; if this is not to be the consequence of any future changes\nin the ministry, and the system of corruption, lately so much improved,\nis to go on; I think it totally indifferent to the kingdom who are _in_,\nor who are _out_ of power.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe following fact is of so much importance, that I cannot satisfy myself\nwithout laying it before the public.\u2014In a Committee of the American\nCONGRESS in _June_ 1775, a declaration was drawn up containing an offer\nto GREAT BRITAIN, \u201cthat the Colonies would not only continue to grant\nextraordinary aids in time of war, but also, if allowed a free commerce,\npay into the SINKING-FUND such a sum annually for ONE HUNDRED YEARS, as\nshould be _more_ than sufficient in that time, if faithfully applied, to\nextinguish all the present debts of BRITAIN. Or, provided this was not\naccepted, that, to remove the groundless jealousy of _Britain_ that the\nColonies aimed at Independence and an abolition of the Navigation Act,\nwhich in truth, they had never intended; and also, to avoid all future\ndisputes about the right of making that and other Acts for regulating\ntheir commerce for the general benefit, they would enter into a covenant\nwith _Britain_, that she should fully possess and exercise that right for\n_one hundred years_ to come.\u201d\n\n * * * * *\n\nAt the end of the preceding Tract I have had the honor of laying before\nthe public the Earl of _Shelburne_\u2019s plan of Pacification with the\nColonies. In that plan, it is particularly proposed, that the Colonies\nshould grant an annual supply to be carried to the Sinking Fund, and\nunalienably appropriated to the discharge of the public debt.\u2014It must\ngive this excellent Peer great pleasure to learn, from this resolution,\nthat even this part of his plan, as well as all the other parts,\nwould, most probably, have been accepted by the Colonies. For though\nthe resolution only offers the alternative of either a _free_ trade,\nwith extraordinary aids and an annual supply, or an _exclusive_ trade\nconfirmed and extended; yet there can be little reason to doubt, but that\nto avoid the calamities of the present contest, BOTH would have been\nconsented to; particularly, if, on our part, such a revisal of the laws\nof trade had been offered as was proposed in Lord Shelburne\u2019s plan.\n\nThe preceding resolution was, I have said, drawn up in a Committee of\nthe Congress. But it was not entered in their minutes; a severe Act of\nParliament happening to arrive at that time, which determined them not to\ngive the sum proposed in it.\n\nFINIS.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n[11] See a particular explanation of this assertion in the Second Tract,\nPage 9.\n\n[12] In _Great Britain_, consisting of near six _millions_ of\ninhabitants, 5723 persons, most of them the lowest of the people, elect\none half of the _House of Commons_; and 364 votes chuse a ninth part.\nThis may be seen distinctly made out in the _Political Disquisitions_,\nVol. 1. Book 2. C. 4. a work full of important and useful instruction.\n\n[13] See among others Mr. Locke on Government, and Dr. Priestley\u2019s Essay\non the first Principles of Government.\n\n[14] See Dr. Priestly on Government, page 68, 69, &c.\n\n[15] The independency of the Judges we esteem in this country one of our\ngreatest privileges.\u2014Before the revolution they generally, I believe,\nheld their places _during pleasure_. King William gave them their places\n_during good behaviour_. At the accession of the present Royal Family\ntheir places were given them _during good behaviour_, in consequence of\nthe Act of Settlement, 12 and 13 W. III. C. 2. But an opinion having\nbeen entertained by some, that though their commissions were made under\nthe Act of Settlement to continue, during good behaviour, yet that they\ndetermined on the demise of the Crown; it was enacted by a statute made\nin the first year of his present Majesty, Chap. 23. \u201cThat the commissions\nof Judges for the time being shall be, continue, and remain in full\nforce, during their good behaviour, notwithstanding the demise of his\nMajesty, or of any of his Heirs and Successors;\u201d with a proviso, \u201cthat\nit may be lawful for his Majesty, his Heirs and Successors, to remove\nany Judge upon the address of both Houses of Parliament.\u201d And by the\nsame Statute their salaries are secured to them during the continuance\nof their commissions: His Majesty, according to the preamble of the\nStatute, having been pleased to declare from the Throne to both Houses\nof Parliament, \u201cThat he looked upon the independency and uprightness of\nJudges as essential to the impartial administration of Justice, as one of\nthe best securities to the Rights and Liberties of his loving Subjects,\nand as most conducive to the honour of his Crown.\u201d\n\nA worthy friend and able Lawyer has supplied me with this note. It\naffords, when contrasted with that _dependence_ of the Judges which has\nbeen thought reasonable in _America_, a sad specimen of the different\nmanner in which a kingdom may think proper to govern itself, and the\nprovinces subject to it.\n\n[16] Montesquieu\u2019s Spirit of Laws, Vol. I. Book 11. C. xix.\n\n[17] This is particularly true of the _bounties_ granted on some\nAmerican commodities (as pitch, tar, indigo, &c.) when imported into\n_Britain_; for it is well known, that the end of granting them was,\nto get those commodities cheaper from the Colonies, and in return for\nour manufactures, which we used to get from _Russia_ and other foreign\ncountries. And this is expressed in the preambles of the laws which\ngrant these bounties. See the Appeal to the Justice, &c. page 21, third\nedition. It is, therefore, strange that Doctor TUCKER and others, should\nhave insisted so much upon these bounties as favours and indulgencies to\nthe Colonies.\u2014But it is still more strange, that the same representation\nshould have been made of the compensations granted them for doing more\nduring the last war in assisting us than could have been reasonably\nexpected; and also of the sums we have spent in maintaining troops among\nthem _without_ their consent; and in opposition to their wishes.\u2014See a\npamphlet, entitled \u201cThe rights of Great Britain asserted against the\nclaims of America.\u201d\n\n[18] It is remarkable that even the author of the _Remarks on the\nPrincipal Acts of the 13th Parliament of Great Britain_, &c. finds\nhimself obliged to acknowledge this difference.\u2014There cannot be more\ndetestable principles of government, than those which are maintained by\nthis writer. According to him, the _properties_ and _rights_ of a people\nare only a kind of _alms_ given them by their civil governors. Taxes,\ntherefore, he asserts, are not the _gifts_ of the people. See page 58,\nand 191.\n\n[19] See Observations on Reversionary Payments, page 207, &c.\n\n[20] See page 22.\n\n[21] The author of _Taxation no Tyranny_ will undoubtedly assert this\nwithout hesitation, for in page 69 he compares our present situation with\nrespect to the Colonies to that of the antient _Scythians_, who, upon\nreturning from a war, _found themselves shut out of their_ OWN HOUSES by\ntheir SLAVES.\n\n[22] See particularly, a speech intended to have been spoken on the\nbill for altering the Charter of the Colony of Massachuset\u2019s Bay; the\n_Considerations on the Measures carrying on with respect to the British\nColonies_; the _Two Appeals to the Justice and Interests of the People_;\nand the _further Examination_, just published, _of our present American\nMeasures_, by the Author of the Considerations, &c.\n\n[23] I have heard it said by a person in one of the first departments\nof the state, that the present contest is for DOMINION on the side of\nthe Colonies, as well as on ours: And so it is indeed; but with this\nessential difference. _We_ are struggling for dominion over OTHERS.\n_They_ are struggling for SELF-dominion: The noblest of all blessings.\n\n[24] This has been our policy with respect to the people of _Ireland_;\nand the consequence is, that we now see their parliament as obedient as\nwe can wish.\n\n[25] It should be remembered, that this was written some time before the\nDeclaration of Independence in July 1776. See page 85 of the next Tract.\n\n[26] In February 1776.\u2014In a few weeks after this, they were driven from\n_Boston_; and took refuge at _Hallifax_ in _Nova Scotia_; from whence,\nafter a strong reinforcement, they invaded the Province of _New-York_.\n\n[27] Except the _Negroes_ in the Southern Colonies, who probably will now\neither soon become extinct, or have their condition changed into that\nof _Freemen_.\u2014It is not the fault of the Colonies that they have among\nthem so many of these unhappy people. They have made laws to prohibit the\nimportation of them; but these laws have always had a negative put upon\nthem here, because of their tendency to hurt our Negro trade.\n\n[28] In the county of Suffolk, where Boston is, there has not been, I am\ninformed, more than one execution these 18 years.\n\n[29] Mr. Burke (in his excellent and admirable Speech on moving his\nresolutions for conciliation with the Colonies, P. 9. &c.) has shewn,\nthat our trade to the Colonies, including that to _Africa_ and the\n_West-Indies_, was in 1772 nearly equal to the trade which we carried on\nwith the whole world at the beginning of this Century.\n\n[30] See Dr. Davenant\u2019s works, collected and revised by Sir Charles\nWhitworth, Vol. I. Page 363, &c. 443, &c.\n\n[31] See Considerations on Money, Bullion, &c. Page 2 and 11.\n\n[32] The coin deficient between one grain and three grains was not called\nin at the time this was written. This call was made in the Summer of\n1776; and it brought in above three millions more than was expected. The\nquantity of gold coin should therefore have been stated at about SIXTEEN\nMILLIONS, and the whole coin of the kingdom at 18 or 19 millions.\u2014The\nevidence from which I have drawn this estimate may be found in the first\nSection of the Second Part of the next Tract.\n\n[33] See Sir James Steuart\u2019s Enquiry into the Principles of political\n\u0152conomy, Vol. II. Book 4, Chap. 32.\n\n[34] See the Second Tract, P. 65.\n\n[35] Their debts consist chiefly of money raised by annuities on lives,\nshort annuities, anticipations of taxes for short terms, &c. During the\nwhole last war they added to their _perpetual_ annuities only 12 millions\nsterling, according to Sir James Steuart\u2019s account; whereas we added\nto these annuities near 60 millions. In consequence therefore of the\nnature of their debts, as well as of the management they are now using\nfor hastening the reduction of them, they must in a few years, if peace\ncontinues, be freed from most of their incumbrances; while we probably\n(if no event comes soon that will unburthen us at once) shall continue\nwith them all upon us.\n\n[36] Mr. _Lowndes_ in the dispute between him and Mr. _Locke_, contended\nfor a reduction of the standard of silver. One of his reasons was, that\nit would render the silver-coin more commensurate to the wants of the\nnation; and CHECK HAZARDOUS PAPER-CREDIT.\u2014Mr. CONDUIT, Sir ISAAC NEWTON\u2019S\nsuccessor in the mint, has proposed, in direct contradiction to the laws\nnow in being, that all the bullion imported into the kingdom should be\ncarried into the mint to be coined; and only coin allowed to be exported.\n\u201cThe height, he says, of paper-credit is the strongest argument for\ntrying this and _every other_ method that is likely to increase the\ncoinage. For whilst paper-credit does in a great measure the business of\nmoney at home, Merchants and Bankers are not under a necessity, as they\nwere formerly, of coining a quantity of specie for their home trade;\nand as Paper-credit brings money to the Merchants to be exported, the\nmoney may go away insensibly, and NOT BE MISSED TILL IT BE TOO LATE: And\nwhere Paper-credit is large and increasing, if the money be exported\nand the coinage decrease, THAT CREDIT MAY SINK AT ONCE, for want of a\nproportionable quantity of _Specie_, which alone can support it in a time\nof distress.\u201d\u2014See Mr. _Conduit\u2019_s Observations on the state of our Gold\nand Silver Coins in 1730, Page 36, to 46.\n\n[37] According to the accounts of the exports to, and imports from the\nNorth-American Colonies, laid before Parliament, the balance in our\nfavour appears to have been, for 11 years before 1774, near a _million\nand a half_ annually.\n\n[38] See the substance of the evidence on the petition presented by the\n_West-India_ Planters and Merchants to the House of Commons as it was\nintroduced at the BAR, and summed up by Mr. GLOVER.\n\n[39] The annual average of the payments into the Exchequer, on account of\nthe duties on tobacco, was for five years, from 1770 to 1774, 219,117l.\nexclusive of the payments from _Scotland_.\u2014Near one half of the _tobacco_\ntrade is carried on from _Scotland_; and above _four fifths_ of the\ntobacco imported is afterwards exported to _France_, _Germany_ and other\ncountries. From _France_ alone it brings annually into the Kingdom, I am\ninformed, about 150,000l. in money.\n\nIn 1775, being, alas! the _parting_ year, the duties on tobacco in\nENGLAND brought into the _Exchequer_ no less a sum than 298,202l.\n\n[40] All the accounts and calculations in the _Appendix_ here referred\nto, have been transferred to the 2d and 4th Sections of the 3d Part of\nthe Second Tract.\n\n[41] A quarter of the inhabitants of every country are fighting men.\u2014If,\ntherefore, the Colonies consist only of two millions of inhabitants, the\nnumber of fighting men in them will be half a million.\n\n[42] See the Appendix to Dr. Zubly\u2019s Sermon, preached at the opening of\nthe Provincial Congress of _Georgia_.\n\n[43] The apprehensions here expressed have been verified by the events\nwhich have happened since this was written. American privateers have\nspread themselves over the Atlantick. They have frightened us even on our\nown coasts, and seized millions of British property.\n\n[44] \u201cI have no other notion of slavery, but being bound by a law to\nwhich I do not consent.\u201d See the case of _Ireland_\u2019s being bound by acts\nof Parliament in _England_, stated by William Molyneux, Esq; Dublin.\u2014In\narguing against the authority of Communities, and all people not\nincorporated, over one another; I have confined my views to taxation and\ninternal legislation. Mr. Molyneux carried his views much farther; and\ndenied the right of _England_ to make any laws even to regulate the trade\nof _Ireland_. He was the intimate friend of Mr. Locke; and writ his book\nin 1698, soon after the publication of Mr. Locke\u2019s Treatise on Government.\n\n[45] See on this subject the second Section of the second Part of the\nnext Tract, Page 77.\n\n[46] Some persons, convinced of the _folly_ as well as _barbarity_ of\nattempting to keep the Colonies by slaughtering them, have very humanely\nproposed giving them up. But the highest authority has informed us, with\ngreat reason, \u201cThat they are too important to be given up.\u201d\u2014Dr. TUCKER\nhas insisted on the depopulation, produced by migrations from this\ncountry to the Colonies, as a reason for this measure. But, unless the\nkingdom is made a prison to its inhabitants, these migrations cannot be\nprevented; nor do I think that they have any great tendency to produce\ndepopulation. When a number of people quit a country, there is more\nemployment and greater plenty of the means of subsistence left for those\nwho remain; and the vacancy is soon filled up. The grand causes of\ndepopulation are, not migrations, or even famines and plagues, or any\nother _temporary_ evils; but the permanent and slowly working evils of\ndebauchery, luxury, high taxes, and oppression.\n\n[47] See the Resolutions on the _Nova-Scotia_ petition reported to the\nHouse of Commons, November 29, 1775, by Lord North, Lord George Germaine,\n&c. and a bill ordered to be brought in upon the said Resolutions.\u2014There\nis indeed, as Lord Shelburne has hinted, something very astonishing in\nthese Resolutions. They offer a relaxation of the authority of this\ncountry, in points to which the Colonies have always consented, and by\nwhich we are great gainers; at the same time, that, with a rigour which\nhazards the Empire, we are maintaining its authority in points to which\nthey will never consent; and by which nothing can be gained.\n\n\n\n\n ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS\n On the NATURE and VALUE of\n CIVIL LIBERTY,\n AND THE\n WAR WITH AMERICA:\n\n ALSO\n\n OBSERVATIONS on Schemes for raising Money\n by PUBLIC LOANS;\n\n An Historical Deduction and Analysis of the\n NATIONAL DEBT;\n\n And a brief Account of the DEBTS and RESOURCES\n of FRANCE.\n\n Should the morals of the English be perverted by luxury;\u2014should\n they lose their Colonies by restraining them, &c.\u2014they will be\n enslaved; they will become insignificant and contemptible; and\n _Europe_ will not be able to shew the world one nation in which\n she can pride herself.\n\n ABBE RAYNAL.\n\n\n\n\n TO\n THE RIGHT HONOURABLE\n THE LORD MAYOR,\n THE ALDERMEN, AND THE COMMONS\n OF THE\n CITY OF LONDON,\n\n THIS TRACT,\n Containing ADDITIONS to those OBSERVATIONS\n on CIVIL LIBERTY,\n which they have honoured with their Approbation,\n\n Is, with the greatest Respect and Gratitude,\n INSCRIBED,\n BY\n Their most obedient\n and humble Servant,\n RICHARD PRICE.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n\n Page\n\n INTRODUCTION vii\n\n PART I.\n\n SECT. I. _Of the NATURE of ~Civil~ Liberty, and the Essentials\n of a Free Government._ 1\n\n SECT. II. _Of the VALUE of Liberty, and the EXCELLENCE of a\n Free Government._ 15\n\n CONCLUSION. 41\n\n PART II.\n\n SECT. I. _Supplemental Observations on the Surplus of the\n Revenue; the Quantity of Coin in the Kingdom; and Paper\n Credit._ 53\n\n SECT. II. _Of the State of the Nation; and the War with America._ 69\n\n SECT. III. _Of Schemes for raising Money by public Loans._ 89\n\n PART III.\n\n SECT. I. _Abstract of the EXPORTS from, and IMPORTS to GREAT\n BRITAIN from 1697 to 1773, with Remarks._ 113\n\n SECT. II. _Historical Deduction and Analysis of the Public\n Debts._ 119\n\n SECT. III. _Of the DEBTS and RESOURCES of FRANCE._ 148\n\n SECT. IV. _Remarks on the Earl of STAIR\u2019S Account of the Public\n Income and Expenditure._ 156\n\n _Resolution of a Committee of the ~American~ Congress in\n June 1775._ 175\n\n\n\n\n_Published by the same Author_,\n\nAnd printed for T. CADELL, in the Strand.\n\n\n1. OBSERVATIONS on REVERSIONARY PAYMENTS; on Schemes for providing\nAnnuities for Widows, and Persons in Old Age; on the Method of\ncalculating the Values of Assurances on Lives; and on the National Debt.\nTo which are added, Four Essays on different Subjects in the Doctrine of\nLife-Annuities and Political Arithmetic. Also, an Appendix, containing\na complete Set of Tables; particularly four New Tables, shewing the\nProbabilities of Life in LONDON, NORWICH, and NORTHAMPTON, and the Values\nof two joint Lives.\n\nThe 3d Edition, with a Supplement, containing (besides several New\nTables) additional Observations on the Probabilities of Human Life in\ndifferent Situations; on the LONDON Societies for the Benefit of Widows\nand of Old Age; and on the present State of Population in this Kingdom.\nPrice 6s.\n\nII. A Review of the principal Questions and Difficulties in MORALS.\nParticularly, those relating to the Original of our Ideas of Virtue, its\nNature, Foundation, Reference to the Deity, Obligation, Subject-matter,\nand Sanctions. The Second Edition corrected. Price 6s.\n\nIII. FOUR DISSERTATIONS.\u2014I. On Providence.\u2014II. On Prayer.\u2014III. On the\nReasons for expecting that virtuous Men shall meet after Death in a\nState of Happiness.\u2014IV. On the Importance of Christianity, the Nature of\nHistorical Evidence, and Miracles. The 4th Edition. Price 6s.\n\nIV. An APPEAL to the PUBLIC, on the Subject of the NATIONAL DEBT. The\n2d Edition; with an Appendix, containing Explanatory Observations and\nTables; and an Account of the present State of Population in Norfolk,\nPrice 2s.\n\nV. OBSERVATIONS on the Nature of CIVIL LIBERTY, the Principles of\nGOVERNMENT, and the Justice and Policy of the WAR with AMERICA. To\nwhich is added an Appendix, containing a State of the National Debt, an\nEstimate of the Money drawn from the Public by the Taxes, and an Account\nof the National Income and Expenditure since the last War. The 7th\nEdition. Price 2s.\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION.\n\n\nBefore the reader enters on the following tract, I shall beg leave to\ndetain him while I give a general account of the contents of it, and make\na few introductory observations.\n\nIn the first part of the _Observations on Civil Liberty_, published last\nwinter, I gave a brief account of the nature of Liberty in general, and\nof _Civil Liberty_ in particular. That account appears to me, after\ncarefully reconsidering it, to be just; nor do I think it in my power\nto improve it. In order, however, to be as explicit as possible on this\nsubject, and to remove those misapprehensions of my sentiments into which\nsome have fallen, I have thought proper to add the _supplemental_ and\n_explanatory_ observations, which will be found in the FIRST part of this\npamphlet.\u2014In writing with this view, I have been led to refer often to\nmy former pamphlet, and to repeat some of the observations in it. But as\nthis could not have been avoided, it will, I hope, be excused.\n\nThe remarks in the SECOND part, I offer to the public with all the\ndeference due to the high station and abilities of the noble Lord, whose\nspeech at opening the Budget in _April_ last, has occasioned them.\u2014These\nremarks, having been promised long ago, should have been published\nsooner. The reasons which have produced this delay are of little\nconsequence to the public; and, therefore, need not be mentioned.\n\nIn the first section of this _second_ part, it will, I think, appear,\nthat I went upon as good grounds as the nature of the case admitted, when\nI stated the gold coin[48] of the kingdom at ABOUT TWELVE MILLIONS AND\nA HALF. It appears now, indeed, to be some millions more. But this is a\ndiscovery made by the call of last summer; which, I find, has brought in\nnear double the sum that the best judges expected. Nothing, however, very\nencouraging can be inferred from hence. It only shews that a great deal\nof gold has been hoarded; and will, probably, be again hoarded. This is\nthe natural consequence of public diffidence; and it is a circumstance\nwhich may, hereafter, greatly increase distress. Before the REVOLUTION,\naccording to Dr. _Davenant_, near half the coin was hoarded; and the\nsame, undoubtedly, will be done again, whenever the nation comes to be\nthoroughly alarmed.\n\nIn the next section of this part, I have made some further observations\non the contest with _America_.\u2014I cannot expect any other than a tragical\nand deplorable issue to this contest. But let events turn out as they\nwill, I shall always reflect with satisfaction, that I have, though a\nprivate person of little consequence, bore my testimony, from deep-felt\nconviction, against a war which must shock the feelings and the reason\nof every considerate person; a war in which rivers of blood must be\nshed, not to repel the attacks of enemies, or to maintain the authority\nof government _within_ the realm, but to maintain sovereignty and\ndominion in another world[49].\u2014I wish the advocates for the measures\nagainst _America_ would attend to the distinction now intimated.\u2014The\nsupport of just government _within_ the realm is always necessary, and\ntherefore right. But to maintain, by fire and sword, dominion over the\npersons and the property of a people _out_ of the realm, who have no\nshare in its legislature, contradicts every principle of liberty and\nhumanity.\u2014Legitimate government, let it be remembered, as opposed to\noppression and tyranny, consists \u201conly in the dominion of EQUAL LAWS made\nwith COMMON CONSENT, or of men over THEMSELVES; and not in the dominion\nof communities over communities, or of ANY MEN OVER OTHER MEN.\u201d\u2014This is\nthe great truth I have endeavoured to explain and defend; and happy\nwould the world be, were a due conviction of it impressed on every human\nheart.\n\nThe representation I have given in this section and elsewhere, of the\nstate of this kingdom, is, without doubt, gloomy. But it is not the\neffect, as some have intimated, of either a natural disposition to\ngloominess, or of sinister views. Few, who know me, will entertain such\na suspicion. Valuing _most_ what politicians and statesmen generally\nvalue _least_, I feel myself perfectly easy with respect to my interest\nas a citizen of this world; nor is there any change of situation that can\nmake me happier, except a return to privacy and obscurity. The opinion\nI have entertained of the present danger of the kingdom is, therefore,\nthe effect of evidence which appears to me irresistible. This evidence I\nhave stated to the public; and every one may judge of it as he pleases. I\nam sensible of my own liableness to error. The measures which I condemn\nas the worst that ever disgraced and hazarded a great kingdom, others,\nwhose integrity I cannot question, approve; and that very situation of\nour affairs which I think alarming, others think prosperous. Time will\ndetermine which of these opinions is right. But supposing the latter to\nbe so, no harm can arise from any representations which have a tendency\nto put us on our guard.\n\nI have bestowed particular attention on the observations in the third\nsection of this second part; and I think the subject of this section\nso important, that it is probable, I should not have resolved on the\npresent publication, had it not been for the opportunity it gives me to\nlay the observations it contains before the public.\u2014An intimation of\nthem was given in the Introduction to the third edition of the Treatise\non _Reversionary Payments_. The nation being now once more got into a\ncourse of borrowing; and our first step having been a return to a mode\nof borrowing, which had appeared to me absurd and detrimental, I was\ninduced to resume the subject, and to examine it with more care. And\nthe result of an examination of only a _part_ of the public loans, will\nbe found to be, \u201cthat a capital of more than TWENTY MILLIONS has been a\nneedless addition to the public debt, for which no money, or any sort of\nequivalent has been received; and which might have been avoided, together\nwith a great expence of interest, by only forming differently the schemes\nof the public loans.\u201d\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe intention of the first section of the THIRD PART is to give, in as\nshort a compass as possible, a view of the progress of our _foreign\ntrade_, and its effect on the nation, from the beginning of this century;\nand, particularly, to point out an unfavourable change which seems to\nhave taken place since 1764.\n\nIn the second section of this part, an explanation and analysis are given\nof all the different articles of the national debt, which will probably\ninform every person of most that he can wish to know concerning them.\u2014I\nhave added a general account of the debts and resources of FRANCE. This\nis a subject at present particularly interesting to this country; and,\nhaving been informed of some important facts relating to it, I have\nthought proper to lay them before the public, with such reflexions as\nhave offered themselves in mentioning them.\n\nThe last section contains such of the calculations in the APPENDIX to the\n_Observations on Civil Liberty_ as were necessary to be reprinted, in\norder to introduce the remarks I have added on some particulars in the\nstate of the _public income and expenditure_, published not long ago by\nthe _Earl of Stair_. I have also meant to accommodate the purchasers of\nthe different editions of the _Observations on Civil Liberty_, who will\nbe enabled, by this section, to possess themselves of all the material\nalterations and improvements which were made in that pamphlet after its\nfirst publication.\u2014The accounts, in the latter part of this tract, are\nso various and extensive, that it is scarcely possible there should not\nbe some incorrectnesses in them. But the pains I have taken, and the\nmeans of information which I have possessed have been such, that I cannot\nsuspect that I have fallen into any mistakes of consequence. Should,\nhowever, any such have escaped me, it will be kind in any person to\npoint them out with candour; and to assist in making those accounts so\ncorrect and perfect, as that they may serve for a basis to all future\naccounts of the same kind.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe following note in Mr. _Hume_\u2019s History of _England_ was written\nby him a little before his death, and left with other additions to be\ninserted in the new edition of that history just published. It contains,\ntherefore, a kind of dying warning from Mr. _Hume_ to this kingdom; and I\nhave thought proper to transcribe it, and to insert it in this place, as\na confirmation of similar sentiments frequently expressed in these tracts.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u201cThe supplies granted Queen _Elizabeth_, during a reign of FORTY-FIVE\nYEARS, amounted to three millions. The minister, in the war which begun\nin 1754, was, in some periods, allowed to lavish a sum equal to this in\nTWO MONTHS. The extreme frivolous object of the late war, and the great\nimportance of hers, set this matter in still a stronger light. Money\ntoo was in most particulars of the same value in both periods: she paid\neight-pence a day to every foot soldier;\u2014but our LATE DELUSIONS have\nmuch exceeded any thing known in history, not even excepting those of\nthe Crusades. For, I suppose, there is no mathematical, still less an\narithmetical demonstration, that the road to the holy land was not the\nroad to Paradise; as there is, that the endless increase of national\ndebt is the direct road to national ruin. But having now completely\nreached that goal, it is needless at present to reflect on the past. It\nwill be found in the present year (1776) that all the revenues of this\nisland, north of the _Trent_, and west of _Reading_, are mortgaged or\nanticipated for ever. Could the small remainder be in a worse condition,\nwere these provinces seized by _Austria_ and _Prussia_? There is only\nthis difference, that some event might happen in _Europe_, which would\noblige those great monarchs to disgorge their acquisitions. But no\nimagination can figure a situation which will induce our creditors to\nrelinquish their claims, or the public to seize their revenues.\u2014So\negregious, indeed, has been our folly, that we have even lost all title\nto compassion, under the numberless calamities that are waiting us.\u201d\u2014Mr.\n_Hume_\u2019s History, vol. 5th, page 475.\n\n\n\n\nPART I.\n\nSUPPLEMENTAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE and VALUE of CIVIL LIBERTY and\nFREE GOVERNMENT.\n\n\nSECT. I.\n\n_Of the Nature of Civil Liberty, and the Essentials of a Free Government._\n\nWith respect to Liberty in general there are two questions to be\nconsidered:\n\nFirst, What it is?\u2014And Secondly, How far it is of value?\n\nThere is no difficulty in answering the first of these questions.\u2014To be\nFREE, is \u201cto be able to act or to forbear acting, as we think best;\u201d or\n\u201cto be masters of our own resolutions and conduct.\u201d\u2014It may be pretended,\nthat it is not desirable to be thus free; but, without doubt, this it is\nto be _free_; and this is what all mean when they say of themselves or\nothers that they are _free_.\n\nI have observed, that all the different kinds of Liberty run up\ninto the general idea of self-government[50].\u2014The Liberty of men as\n_agents_ is that power of self-determination which all agents, as\nsuch, possess.\u2014Their Liberty as _moral_ agents is their power of\nself-government in their _moral_ conduct.\u2014Their Liberty as _religious_\nagents is their power of self-government in _religion_.\u2014And their\nLiberty, as members of communities associated for the purposes of\ncivil government, is their power of self-government in all their civil\nconcerns. It is Liberty, in the last of these views of it, that is the\nsubject of my present enquiry; and it may, in other words, be defined to\nbe \u201cthe power of a state to govern itself by its own will.\u201d\u2014In order,\ntherefore, to determine whether a state is free, no more is necessary\nthan to determine whether there is any will, different from its own, to\nwhich it is subject.\n\nWhen we speak of a state, we mean the _whole_ state, and not any\n_part_ of it; and the will of the state, therefore, is the will of the\nwhole.\u2014There are two ways in which this will may be expressed. First,\nby the suffrages of all the members given in person. Or secondly, by\nthe suffrages of a body of Representatives, in appointing whom all\nthe members have voices.\u2014A state governed by its own will in the first\nof these ways enjoys the most complete and perfect Liberty; but such\na government being impracticable, except in very small states, it is\nnecessary that civil communities in general should satisfy themselves\nwith that degree of Liberty which can be obtained in the last of these\nways; and Liberty so obtained may be sufficiently ample, and at the same\ntime is capable of being extended to the largest states[51].\n\n * * * * *\n\nBut here, before I proceed, I must desire, that an observation may\nbe attended to, which appears to me of considerable consequence.\u2014A\ndistinction should be made between the _Liberty_ of a state, and\nits not suffering oppression; or between a free government, and a\ngovernment under which freedom is enjoyed. Under the most despotic\ngovernment liberty may happen to be enjoyed. But being derived from a\nwill over which the state has no controul, and not from its own will;\nor from an accidental mildness in the _administration_, and not from\na _constitution_ of government; it is nothing but an indulgence of a\nprecarious nature, and of little importance.\u2014Individuals in private\nlife, while held under the power of masters, cannot be denominated free,\nhowever equitably and kindly they may be treated. This is strictly true\nof _communities_ as well as of _individuals_.\u2014Civil Liberty (it should be\nremembered) must be enjoyed as a right derived from the Author of nature\nonly, or it cannot be the blessing which merits this name. If there is\nany human power which is considered as _giving_ it, on which it depends,\nand which can invade or recall it at pleasure, it changes its nature, and\nbecomes a species of slavery.\n\n * * * * *\n\nBut to return\u2014The force superseding self-government in a state, or the\npower destroying its Liberty, is of two kinds. It may be either a power\n_without_ itself, or a power _within_ itself. The former constitutes\nwhat may be properly called _external_, and the latter _internal_\nslavery.\u2014Were there any distant state which had acquired a sovereignty\nover this country, and exercised the power of making its laws and\ndisposing its property, we should be in the first kind of slavery; and,\nif not totally depraved by a habit of subjection to such a power, we\nshould think ourselves in a miserable condition; and an advocate for\nsuch a power would be considered as insulting us, who should attempt to\nreconcile us to it by telling us, that we were _one_ community with that\ndistant state, though destitute of a single voice in its legislature;\nand, on this ground, should maintain, that all resistance to it was no\nless criminal than any resistance _within_ a state to the authority of\nthat state.\u2014In short, every state, not incorporated with another by an\nequal representation, and yet subject to its dominion, is enslaved in\nthis sense.\u2014Such was the slavery of the provinces subject to antient\n_Rome_; and such is the slavery of every community, as far as any other\ncommunity is master of it; or as far as, in respect of taxation and\ninternal legislation, it is not independent of every other community. Nor\ndoes it make any difference to such a community, that it enjoys within\nitself a free constitution of government, if that constitution is itself\nliable to be altered, suspended or over-ruled at the discretion of the\nstate which possesses the sovereignty over it.\n\nBut the slavery most prevalent in the world has been internal slavery.\u2014In\norder better to explain this, it is proper to observe, that all civil\ngovernment being either the government of a _whole_ by _itself_, or of\na _whole_ by a _power extraneous_ to it, or of a _whole_ by a _part_;\nthe first _alone_ is LIBERTY, and the two last are TYRANNY, producing\nthe two sorts of slavery which I have mentioned. Internal slavery,\ntherefore, takes place wherever a whole community is governed by a\n_part_; and this, perhaps, is the most concise and comprehensive\naccount that can be given of it.\u2014The part that governs may be either a\n_single_ man, as in _absolute Monarchies_; or, a body of grandees, as\nin _Aristocracies_. In both these cases the powers of government are\ncommonly held for life without delegation, and descend from father to\nson; and the people governed are in the same situation with cattle upon\nan estate, which descends by inheritance from one owner to another.\u2014But\nfarther. A community may be governed by a body of delegates, and yet be\nenslaved.\u2014Though government by representation alone is free, unless when\ncarried on by the personal suffrages of all the members of a state, yet\n_all_ such government is by no means free. In order to render it so, the\nfollowing requisites are necessary.\n\nFirst, The representation must be _complete_. No state, a _part_ of\nwhich only is represented in the Legislature that governs it, is\n_self_-governed. Had _Scotland_ no representatives in the Parliament of\n_Britain_, it would not be free; nor would it be proper to call _Britain_\nfree, though _England_, its other part, were adequately represented. The\nlike is true, in general, of every country subject to a Legislature in\nwhich _some_ of its parts, or some classes of men in it, are represented,\nand others not.\n\nSecondly, The representatives of a free state must be _freely_ chosen.\nIf this is not the case, they are not at all representatives; and\ngovernment by them degenerates into government by a junto of men in\nthe community, who happen to have power or wealth enough to command or\npurchase their offices.\n\nThirdly, After being _freely_ chosen, they must be themselves _free_. If\nthere is any higher will which directs their resolutions, and on which\nthey are dependent, they become the instruments of that will; and it is\nthat will alone that in reality governs the state.\n\nFourthly, They must be chosen for short terms; and, in all their acts,\nbe accountable to their constituents. Without this a people will have no\ncontroul over their representatives; and, in chusing them, they will give\nup entirely their Liberty; and only enjoy the poor privilege of naming,\nat certain intervals, a set of men whom they are to _serve_, and who are\nto dispose, at their discretion, of their property and lives.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe causes of internal slavery now mentioned prevail, some of them more\nand others less, in different communities. With respect, in particular,\nto a government by representation; it is evident, that it deviates more\nor less from Liberty, in proportion as the representation is more or\nless imperfect. And, if imperfect in every one of the instances I have\nrecited; that is, if inadequate and partial; subject to no controul from\nthe people; corruptly chosen for long terms; and, after being chosen,\nvenal and dependent;\u2014in these circumstances, a representation becomes an\nimposition and a nusance; and government by it is as inconsistent with\ntrue Liberty as the most arbitrary and despotic government.\n\n * * * * *\n\nI have been so much misunderstood[52] on this subject, that it is\nnecessary I should particularly observe here, that my intention in\nthis account has been merely to shew what is requisite to constitute a\nstate or a government free, and not at all to define the best form of\ngovernment. These are two very different points. The first is attended\nwith few difficulties. A free state is a state self-governed in the\nmanner I have described. But it may be free, and yet not enjoy the best\nconstitution of government. Liberty, though the most essential requisite\nin government, is not the only one. Wisdom, union, dispatch, secresy, and\nvigour are likewise requisite; and that is the best form of government\nwhich best unites all these qualities; or which, to an equal and perfect\nLiberty, adds the greatest wisdom in deliberating and resolving, and the\ngreatest union, force and expedition in executing[53].\n\nIn short, my whole meaning is, that the will of the Community alone\nought to govern; but that there are different methods of obtaining and\nexecuting this will; of which those are the best which collect into it\nmost of the knowledge and experience of the community, and at the same\ntime carry it into execution with most dispatch and vigour.\n\nIt has been the employment of the wisest men in all ages to contrive\nplans for this purpose; and the happiness of society depends so much on\ncivil government, that it is not possible the human understanding should\nbe better employed.\n\n * * * * *\n\nI have said in the Observations on Civil Liberty, that \u201cin a free state\nevery man is his own legislator.\u201d\u2014I have been happy in since finding\nthe[54] same assertion in _Montesquieu_, and also in Mr. Justice\n_Blackstone_\u2019s Commentaries. It expresses the fundamental principle\nof our constitution; and the meaning of it is plainly, that every\nindependent agent in a free state ought to have a share in the government\nof it, either by himself _personally_, or by a body of representatives,\nin chusing whom he has a free vote, and therefore all the concern\nand weight which are possible, and consistent with the equal rights\nof every other member of the state.\u2014But though the meaning of this\nassertion is so obvious, and the truth of it undeniable, it has been\nmuch exclaimed against, and occasioned no small part of the opposition\nwhich has been made to the principles advanced in the _Observations on\nCivil Liberty_.\u2014One even of the most candid, as well as the ablest of\nmy opponents, (whose difference of opinion from me I sincerely lament)\nhas intimated, that it implies, that, in a free state,[55] _thieves and\npick-pockets have a right to make laws for themselves_.\u2014The public will\nnot, I hope, wonder that I chuse to take little notice of such objections.\n\n * * * * *\n\nIt has been said, that the liberty for which I have pleaded, is\n\u201ca right or power in every one to act as he likes without any\nrestraint.\u201d\u2014However unfairly this representation has been given of my\naccount of liberty, I am ready to adopt it, provided it is understood\nwith a few limitations.\u2014MORAL LIBERTY, in particular, cannot be better\ndefined than by calling it \u201ca power in every one to do as he likes.\u201d\nMy opponents in general seem to be greatly puzzled with this; and I am\nafraid it will signify little to attempt explaining it to them by saying,\nthat every man\u2019s will, if perfectly free from restraint, would carry him\ninvariably to rectitude and virtue; and that no one who acts wickedly\nacts as he _likes_, but is conscious of a tyranny within him overpowering\nhis judgment, and carrying him into a conduct, for which he condemns\nand hates himself. _The things that he would he does not_;[56] _and the\nthings that he would not, those he does_. He is, therefore, a slave in\nthe properest sense.\n\nRELIGIOUS LIBERTY, likewise, is a power of acting as we _like_ in\nreligion; or of professing and practising that mode of religious worship\nwhich we think most acceptable to the Deity.\u2014But here the limitation to\nwhich I have referred must be attended to. ALL have the same unalienable\nright to this Liberty; and consequently, no one has a right to such a use\nof it as shall take it from others. Within this limit, or as far as he\ndoes not encroach on the equal liberty of others, every one has a right\nto do as he pleases in religion.\u2014That the right to religious Liberty goes\nas far as this every one must allow, who is not a friend to persecution;\nand that it cannot go farther, is self-evident; for if it did, there\nwould be a contradiction in the natures of things; and it would be\ntrue, that every one had a right to enjoy what every one had a right to\ndestroy.\u2014If, therefore, the religious faith of any person leads him to\nhurt another because he professes a different faith; or if it carries\nhim, in any instances, to intolerance, Liberty itself requires he should\nbe restrained, and that, in such instances, he should lose his liberty.\n\nAll this is equally applicable to the Liberty of man in his _civil_\ncapacity; and it is a maxim true universally, \u201cthat as far as any one\ndoes not molest _others_, others ought not to molest _him_.\u201d\u2014All have\na right to the free and undisturbed possession of their good names,\nproperties and lives; and it is the right all have to this that gives\nthe right to establish civil government, which is or ought to be nothing\nbut an institution (by laws and provisions made with _common_ consent)\nfor guarding this right against invasion; for giving to every one, in\n_temporals_ and _spirituals_, the power of commanding his own conduct;\nor, of acting as he pleases, and going where he will, provided he does\nnot run foul of others.\u2014Just government, therefore, does not _infringe_\nliberty, but _establish_ it.\u2014It does not _take away_ the rights of\nmankind, but _protect_ and _confirm_ them.\u2014I will add, that it does not\neven create any new subordinations of particular men to one another,\nbut only gives security in those several stations, whether of authority\nand pre-eminence, or of subordination and dependence, which nature has\nestablished, and which must have arisen among mankind whether civil\ngovernment had been instituted or not. But this goes beyond my purpose in\nthis place, and more will be said of it presently.\n\n * * * * *\n\nTo sum up the whole\u2014Our ideas of Civil Liberty will be rendered more\ndistinct by considering it under the three following views:\u2014The Liberty\nof the _citizen_\u2014The liberty of the _government_\u2014And the liberty of\nthe _community_.\u2014A _citizen_ is free when the power of commanding his\nown conduct and the quiet possession of his life, person, property and\ngood name are _secured_ to him by being his own legislator in the sense\nexplained in page 10[57].\u2014A _government_ is free when constituted in\nsuch a manner as to give this _security_.\u2014And the freedom of a community\nor nation is the same among nations, that the freedom of a citizen is\namong his fellow-citizens.\u2014It is not, therefore, as observed in page 3,\nthe mere possession of Liberty that denominates a citizen or a community\nfree; but that _security_ for the possession of it which arises from\nsuch a free government as I have described; and which takes place, when\nthere exists no power that can take it away.\u2014It is in the same sense\nthat the mere performance of virtuous actions is not what denominates\nan agent virtuous; but the temper and habits from whence they spring;\nor that _inward constitution_, and right balance of the affections,\nwhich _secure_ the practice of virtue, produce stability of conduct, and\nconstitute a _character_.\n\nI cannot imagine how it can be disputed whether this is a just account\nof the nature of Liberty. It has been already given more briefly in the\nObservations on Civil Liberty; and it is with reluctance I have repeated\nso much of what has been there said. But the wrong apprehensions which\nhave been entertained of my sentiments have rendered this necessary. And,\nfor the same reason, I am obliged to go on to the subject of the next\nsection.\n\n\nSECT. II.\n\n_Of the VALUE of Liberty, and the EXCELLENCE of a Free Government._\n\nHaving shewn in the preceding section \u201cwhat Liberty is;\u201d the next\nquestion to be considered is, \u201chow far it is valuable.\u201d\n\nNothing need be said to shew the value of the three kinds of liberty\nwhich I have distinguished under the names of _Physical_, _Moral_, and\n_Religious_ Liberty. They are, without doubt, the foundation of all the\nhappiness and dignity of men, as reasonable and moral agents, and the\nsubjects of the Deity.\u2014It is, in like manner, true of _Civil_ Liberty,\nthat it is the foundation of the whole happiness and dignity of men as\nmembers of civil society, and the subjects of civil government.\n\nFirst. It is Civil Liberty, or such free government as I have described,\nthat alone can give just security against oppression. One government is\nbetter than another in proportion as it gives more of this security.\nIt is, on this account, that the supreme government of the Deity is\nperfect. There is not a possibility of being oppressed or aggrieved by\nit. Subjection to it is the same with complete freedom.\n\nWere there any men on whose superior wisdom and goodness we might\nabsolutely depend, they could not possess too much power; and the love of\nliberty itself would engage us to fly to them, and to put ourselves under\ntheir direction. But such are the principles that govern human nature;\nsuch the weakness and folly of men; such their love of domination,\nselfishness, and depravity; that none of them can be raised to an\nelevation above others without the utmost danger. The constant experience\nof the world has verified this; and proved, that nothing intoxicates the\nhuman mind so much as power, and that men, when they have got possession\nof it, have seldom failed to employ it in grinding their fellow-men, and\ngratifying the vilest passions.\u2014In the establishment, therefore, of civil\ngovernment, it would be preposterous to rely on the discretion of any\nmen. If a people would obtain security against oppression, they must seek\nit in _themselves_, and never part with the powers of government out _of\ntheir own_ hands. It is there only they can be safe.\u2014A people will never\noppress themselves, or invade their own rights. But if they trust the\narbitrary will of any body or succession of men, they trust ENEMIES, and\nit may be depended on that the worst evils will follow.\n\n * * * * *\n\nIt follows from hence, that a free government is the only government\nwhich is consistent with the ends of government.\u2014Men combine into\ncommunities and institute government to obtain the peaceable enjoyment of\ntheir rights, and to defend themselves against injustice and violence:\nAnd when they endeavour to secure these ends by such a free government as\nI have described, improved by such arrangements as may have a tendency to\npreserve it from confusion, and to concentrate in it as much as possible\nof the wisdom and force of the community; In this case, it is a most\nrational and important institution.\u2014But when the contrary is done; and\nthe benefits of government are sought by establishing a government of\n_men_, and not of _laws_ made with common consent; it becomes a most\nabsurd institution.\u2014It is seeking a remedy for oppression in _one_\nquarter, by establishing it in _another_; and avoiding the outrages of\n_little_ plunderers, by constituting a set of _great_ plunderers.\u2014It\nis, in short, the folly of _giving up_ liberty in order to _maintain_\nLiberty; and, in the very act of endeavouring to secure the most valuable\nrights, to arm a body of enemies with power to destroy them.\n\nI can easily believe, that mankind, in the first and rude state of\nsociety, might act thus irrationally. Absolute governments, being the\nsimplest forms of government, might be the first that were established. A\npeople having experienced the happy effects of the wisdom or the valour\nof particular men, might be led to trust them with unlimited power\nas their rulers and legislators. But they would soon find reason to\nrepent: And the time, I hope, may come, when mankind in general, taught\nby long and dear experience, and _weary_ of the abuses of power under\n_slavish_ governments, will learn to detest them, and never to give up\nthat SELF-GOVERNMENT, which, whether we consider men in their private or\ncollective capacities, is the first of all the blessings they can possess.\n\n * * * * *\n\nAgain. Free governments are the only governments which give scope\nto the exertion of the powers of men, and are favourable to their\nimprovement.\u2014The members of free states, knowing their rights to be\nsecure, and that they shall enjoy without molestation the fruits of every\nacquisition they can make, are encouraged and incited to industry. Being\nat liberty to push their researches as far as they can into all subjects,\nand to guide themselves by their own judgments in all their religious\nand civil concerns, while they allow others to do the same; error and\nsuperstition must lose ground. Conscious of being their own governors,\nbound to obey no laws except such as they have given their consent to,\nand subject to no controul from the arbitrary will of any of their\nfellow-citizens; they possess an elevation and force of mind which must\nmake them great and happy.\u2014How different is the situation of the vassals\nof despotic power?\u2014Like cattle inured to the yoke, they are driven on in\none track, afraid of speaking or even thinking on the most interesting\npoints; looking up continually to a poor creature who is their master;\ntheir powers fettered; and some of the noblest springs of action in\nhuman nature rendered useless within them. There is nothing indeed more\nhumiliating than that debasement of mankind which takes place in such\nsituations.\n\nIt has been observed of free governments, that they are often torn by\nviolent contests, which render them dreadful scenes of distress and\nanarchy. But it ought to be considered, that this has not been owing to\nthe _nature_ of such governments; but to their having been ill-modelled,\nand wanted those arrangements and supplemental checks which are necessary\nto constitute a wise form of government.\u2014There is no reason to doubt, but\nthat free governments may be so contrived, as to exclude the greatest\npart of the struggles and tumults which have arisen in free states; and,\nas far as they cannot be excluded, they will do more good than harm. They\nwill occasion the display of powers, and produce exertions which can\nnever be seen in the _still_ scenes of life. They are the active efforts\nof health and vigour; and always tend to preserve and purify. Whereas,\non the contrary, the _quiet_ which prevails under slavish governments,\nand which may seem to be a recommendation of them, proceeds from an\nignominious tameness, and stagnation of the human faculties. It is the\nsame with the _stillness_ of midnight, or the _silence_ and torpor of\ndeath.\n\n * * * * *\n\nFurther. Free governments are the only governments which are consistent\nwith the natural equality of mankind. This is a principle which, in my\nopinion, has been assumed, with the greatest reason, by some of the\nbest writers on government. But the meaning of it is not, that all the\nsubordinations in human life owe their existence to the institution\nof civil government. The superiorities and distinctions arising from\nthe relation of parents to their children; from the differences in the\npersonal qualities and abilities of men; and from servitudes founded on\nvoluntary compacts, must have existed in a state of nature, and would now\ntake place were all men so virtuous as to leave no occasion for civil\ngovernment.\u2014The maxim, therefore, \u201cthat all men are naturally equal,\u201d\nrefers to their state when grown up to maturity, and become independent\nagents, capable of acquiring property, and of directing their own\nconduct. And the sense of it is, that no one of them is constituted by\nthe author of nature the vassal or subject of another, or has any right\nto give law to him, or, without his consent, to take away any part of\nhis property, or to abridge him of his liberty.\u2014In a state of nature,\none man may have received benefits from another; and this would lay the\nperson obliged under an obligation of gratitude, but it would not make\nhis _benefactor_ his _master_; or give him a right to judge for him what\ngrateful returns he ought to make, and to extort these from him.\u2014In\na state of nature, also, one man may possess more strength, or more\nknowledge, or more property than another; and this would give him weight\nand influence; but it would not give him any degree of authority. There\nwould not be one human being who would be bound to _obey_ him.\u2014A person\nlikewise, in a state of nature, might let out his labour, or give up to\nanother, on certain stipulated terms, the direction of his conduct; and\nthis would so far bring him into the station of a _servant_; but being\ndone by himself, and on such terms only as he chuses to consent to, it is\nan _instance_ of his liberty; and he will always have it in his power to\nquit the service he has chosen, or to enter into another.\n\nThis equality or independence of men is one of their essential\nrights.[58] It is the same with that equality or independence which now\nactually takes place among the different states or kingdoms of the world\nwith respect to one another. Mankind came with this right from the hands\nof their Maker.\u2014But all governments, which are not free, are totally\ninconsistent with it. They imply, that there are some of mankind who\nare born with an inherent right of dominion; and that the rest are born\nunder an obligation to subjection; and that civil government, instead of\nbeing founded on any compact, is nothing but the exercise of this right.\nSome such sentiments seem to be now reviving in this country, and even\nto be growing fashionable. Most of the writers against the _Observations\non Civil Liberty_ argue on the supposition of a right in the _few_ to\ngovern the _many_[59], independently of their own choice. Some of these\nwriters have gone so far as to assert, in plain language, that civil\ngovernors derive their power immediately from the Deity; and are _his_\nagents or representatives, accountable to him only. And one courtly\nwriter, in particular, has honoured them with the appellation of OUR\nPOLITICAL GODS.\u2014Probably, this is the idea of civil governors entertained\nby the author of the _Remarks on the Acts of the Thirteenth Parliament\nof Great Britain_: for it is not easy to imagine on what other ground he\ncan assert, that _property_ and _civil rights_ are derived from civil\ngovernors, and their _gifts_ to mankind[60].\n\nIf these sentiments are just, civil governors are indeed an awful order\nof beings; and it becomes us to enquire with anxiety who they are, and\nhow we may distinguish them from the rest of mankind.\u2014Shall we take for\nsuch all, whether _men_ or _women_, whom we find in actual possession of\ncivil power, whatever may be their characters; or however they may have\nacquired their power?\u2014This is too extravagant to be asserted. It would\nlegalize the _American_ Congress.\u2014There must then be some _pretenders_\namong civil governors; and it is necessary we should know how to discover\nthem. It is incredible, that the Deity should not have made this easy to\nus, by some particular marks and distinctions, which point out to our\nnotice his _real_ vicegerents; just as he has pointed out man, by his\nfigure and superior powers, to be the governor of the lower creatures.\u2014In\nparticular; these persons must be possessed of wisdom and goodness\nsuperior to those of the rest of mankind[61]; for, without this, a grant\nof the powers they are supposed to possess would be nothing but a grant\nof power to injure and oppress, without remedy and without bounds. But\nthis is a test by which they cannot be tryed. It would leave but few of\nthem in possession of the places they hold and the rights they claim.\nIt is not in the high ranks of life, or among the great and mighty,\nthat we are to seek wisdom and goodness. These love the shade, and fly\nfrom observation. They are to be found chiefly in the middle ranks of\nlife, and among the contemplative and philosophical, who decline public\nemployments, and look down with pity on the scramble for power among\nmankind, and the restlessness and misery of ambition.\u2014It is proper to\nadd, that it has never been hitherto understood that any superiority in\nintellectual and moral qualifications lays the foundation of a claim to\n_dominion_.\n\nIt is not then, by their superior endowments, that the Deity intended to\npoint out to us the _few_ whom he has destined to command the _many_.\u2014But\nin what other manner could they be distinguished?\u2014Must we embrace _Sir\nRobert Filmer_\u2019s _Patriarchal_ scheme? One would have thought, that Mr.\n_Locke_ has said more than enough to expose this stupid scheme. One of\nmy opponents, however, has adopted it; and the necessary inference from\nit is that, as there is but now one lineal descendent from Adam\u2019s eldest\nson, there can be but one rightful monarch of the world.\u2014But I will not\nabuse my reader\u2019s patience by saying more on this subject. I am sorry\nthat in this country there should be any occasion for taking notice of\nprinciples so absurd, and at the same time so pernicious[62]. I say,\nPERNICIOUS; for they imply, that King _James_ the Second was deposed at\nthe Revolution unlawfully and impiously; that the present King is an\nusurper; and that the present government, being derived from rebellion\nand treason, has no right to our allegiance.\n\nWithout all doubt, it is the choice of the people that makes civil\ngovernors.\u2014The people are the spring of all civil power, and they have a\nright to modify it as they please.\n\nMankind being naturally equal according to the foregoing explanation,\ncivil government, _in its genuine intention_, is an institution for\nmaintaining that equality, by defending it against the encroachments\nof violence and tyranny. All the subordinations and distinctions in\nsociety previous to its establishment, it leaves as it found them, only\nconfirming and protecting them. It makes no man _master_ of another. It\nelevates no person above his fellow citizens. On the contrary, it levels\nall by fixing all in a state of subjection to one common authority.\u2014The\nauthority of the laws.\u2014The will of the community.\u2014TAXES are _given_;\nnot _imposed_. LAWS are regulations of common choice; not injunctions\nof superior power.\u2014The authority of magistrates is the authority of the\nState; and their salaries are wages paid by the State for executing its\nwill and doing its business. _They_ do not govern the _State_. It is the\n_State_ governs _them_; and had they just ideas of their own stations,\nthey would consider themselves as no less properly _servants_ of the\nPublic, than the labourers who work upon its roads, or the soldiers who\nfight its battles.\u2014A KING, in particular, is only the first executive\nofficer; the creature of the law; and as much accountable and subject to\nthe law as the meanest peasant[63]. And were Kings properly attentive to\ntheir duty, and as anxious as they should be about performing it, they\ncould not easily avoid sinking under the weight of their charge.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe account now given is, I am fully persuaded, in every particular,\na true account of what civil government _ought_ to be; and it teaches\nus plainly the great importance and excellence of FREE Government.\u2014It\nis this only that answers the description I have given of government;\nthat secures against oppression; that gives room for that elevation of\nspirit and that exertion of the human powers which is necessary to human\nimprovement; or that is consistent with the ends of government, with the\nrights of mankind, and their natural equality and independence. _Free_\nGovernment, therefore, only, is _just_ and _legitimate_ government.\n\nIt follows farther from the preceding account, that no people can\nlawfully surrender or cede their Liberty. This must appear to any one\nwho will consider, that when a people make such a cession, and the\nextensive powers of government are trusted to the discretion of any\nman or body of men, they part with the powers of life and death, and\ngive themselves up a prey to oppression; that they make themselves the\ninstrument of any injustice in which their rulers may chuse to employ\nthem, by arming them against neighbouring states; and also, that they\ndo this not only for _themselves_, but for their _posterity_.\u2014I will\nadd, that if such a cession has been made; or if through any causes, a\npeople have lost their Liberty, they must have a right to emancipate\nthemselves as soon as they can[64]. In attempting this, indeed, they\nought to consider the sufferings which may attend the struggle, and the\nevils which may arise from a defeat. But at the same time, it will be\nproper to consider, that the sufferings attending such a struggle must\nbe temporary, whereas the evils to be avoided are permanent; and that\nLiberty is a blessing so inestimable, \u201cthat whenever there appears any\nprobability of recovering it, a people should be willing to run many\nhazards, and even not to repine at the greatest expence of blood or\ntreasure.\u201d[65]\n\n * * * * *\n\nI am very sensible, that civil government, as it actually exists in the\nworld, by no means answers to the account I have given of it.\u2014Instead\nof being an institution for guarding the weak against the strong, we\nfind it an institution which makes the strong yet stronger, and gives\nthem a systematical power of oppressing. Instead of promoting virtue and\nrestraining vice, encouraging free enquiry, establishing Liberty, and\nprotecting alike all peaceable persons in the enjoyment of their civil\nand religious rights; we see a savage despotism, under its name, laying\nwaste the earth, unreasonably elevating some and depressing others,\ndiscouraging improvement, and trampling upon every human right. That\nforce of states, which ought to be applied only to their own defence,\nwe see continually applied to the purpose of attack, and used to extend\ndominion by conquering neighbouring communities.\u2014Civil governors consider\nnot themselves _servants_ but as _masters_. Their stations they think\nthey hold in their own right. The people they reckon their property; and\ntheir possessions, a common _stock_ from which they have a right to take\nwhat[66] they will, and of which no more belongs to any individual than\nthey are pleased to _leave_ him.\n\nWhat a miserable perversion is this of a most important institution? What\na grievance is government so degenerated?\u2014But this perversion furnishes\nno just argument against the truth of the account I have given. Similar\ndegeneracies have prevailed in other instances of no less importance.\n\nReason in man, like the will of the community in the political world,\nwas intended to give law to his whole conduct, and to be the supreme\ncontrouling power within him. The passions are subordinate powers, or\nan _executive force_ under the direction of reason, kindly given to be,\nas it were, wind and tide to the vessel of life in its course through\nthis world to future honour and felicity.\u2014How different from this is\nthe _actual_ state of man?\u2014Those powers which were destined to _govern_\nare made to _serve_; and those powers which were destined to _serve_,\nare allowed to _govern_. Passion guides human life; and most men make\nno other use of their reason than to justify whatever their interest or\ntheir inclinations determine them to do.\n\nRELIGION likewise (the perfection of REASON) is, in its true nature,\nthe inspirer of humanity and joy, and the spring of all that can be\ngreat and worthy in a character; and were we to see its genuine effects\namong mankind, we should see nothing but peace and hope and justice and\nkindness, founded on that regard to God and to his will, which is the\nnoblest principle of action.\u2014But how different an aspect does religion\nactually wear? What is it, too generally, in the practice of mankind, but\na gloomy and cruel superstition, rendering them severe and sour; teaching\nthem to compound for wickedness by punctuality in religious forms; and\nprompting them to harrass, persecute and exterminate one another?\n\nThe same perversion has taken place still more remarkably in\nCHRISTIANITY; the perfection of RELIGION.\u2014JESUS CHRIST has established\namong Christians absolute equality. He has declared, that they have\nbut _one_ master, even himself; and that they are all _brethren_; and,\ntherefore, has commanded them not to be called _masters_; and, instead of\nassuming authority over one another, to be ready to _wash one another\u2019s\nfeet_[67]. The princes of the Gentiles, he says, exercise lordship over\nthem, and are flattered with[68] high titles; but he has ordained, that\nit shall not be so amongst his followers; and that if any one of them\nwould be _chief_, he must be the _servant_ of all.\u2014The clergy in his\nchurch are, by his appointment, no more than a body of men, chosen by\nthe different societies of Christians, to conduct their worship, and to\npromote their spiritual improvement, without any other powers than those\nof persuasion and instruction. It is expressly directed, that they shall\nnot make themselves Lords of _God\u2019s heritage_, or exercise dominion over\nthe faith of Christians, but be _helpers of their joy_[69].\u2014Who can,\nwithout astonishment, compare these appointments of Christianity, with\nthe events which have happened in the Christian church?\u2014That religion\nwhich thus inculcates humility and forbids all domination, and the end of\nwhich was to produce _peace an earth, and good-will among men_, has been\nturned into an occasion of animosities the most dreadful, and of ambition\nthe most destructive. Notwithstanding its mildness and benignity, and the\ntendency it has to extinguish in the human breast pride and malevolence;\nit has been the means of arming the spirits of men with unrelenting fury\nagainst one another. Instead of _peace_, it has brought a _sword_; and\nits professors, instead of washing one another\u2019s feet, have endeavoured\nto tread on one another\u2019s necks.\u2014The ministers, in particular, of\nChristianity, became, soon after its establishment, an independent body\nof spiritual rulers, nominating one another in perpetual succession;\nclaiming, by divine right, the highest powers; and forming a HIERARCHY,\nwhich by degrees produced a despotism more extravagant than any that ever\nbefore existed on this earth.\n\nA considerate person must find difficulties in enquiring into the causes\nand reasons of that depravity of human nature which has produced these\nevils, and rendered the best institutions liable to be so corrupted. This\nenquiry is much the same with the enquiry into the origin of moral evil,\nwhich has in all ages puzzled human wisdom. I have at present nothing\nto do with it. It is enough for my purpose in these observations, that\nthe facts I have mentioned prove undeniably, that the state of civil\ngovernment in the world affords no reason for concluding, that I have not\ngiven a just account of its true nature and origin.\n\n * * * * *\n\nI have shewn at the beginning of this section, that it is free government\nalone that can preserve from oppression, give security to the rights of\na people, and answer the ends of government. It is necessary I should\nhere observe, that I would not be understood to mean, that there can\nbe no _kind_ or _degree_ of security for the rights of a people, under\nany government which cannot be denominated free. Even under an absolute\nMonarchy or an Aristocracy, there may be laws and customs which, having\ngained sacredness by time, may restrain oppression, and afford some\nimportant securities.\u2014Under governments by representation, there must\nbe still greater checks on oppression, provided the representation,\nthough partial, is uncorrupt, and also frequently changed. In these\ncircumstances, there may be so much of a common interest between the\nbody of representatives and the people, and they may stand so much on\none ground, that there will be no temptations to oppression.\u2014The taxes\nwhich the representative body impose, they will be obliged themselves to\npay; and the laws they make, they will make with the prospect of soon\nreturning to the situation of those for whom they make them, and of being\nthemselves governed by them.\n\nIt seems particularly worth notice here, that as far as there are any\nsuch checks under any government, they are the consequence of its\npartaking so far of Liberty, and that the security attending them is\nmore or less in proportion as a government partakes more or less of\nLiberty. If, under an absolute government, fundamental laws and long\nestablished institutions give security in any instances, it is because\nthey are held so sacred that a despot is afraid to violate them; or,\nin other words, because a people, not being completely subdued, have\nstill some controul over the government.\u2014The like is more evidently true\nunder mixed governments of which a house of representatives, fairly\nchosen and freely deliberating and resolving, forms a part; and it is\none of the highest recommendations of such governments that, even when\nthe representation is most imperfect, they have a tendency to give more\nsecurity than any other governments.\u2014Under other governments, it is the\nfear of exciting insurrections by contradicting established maxims, that\nrestrains oppression. But, as, in general, a people will bear much, and\nare seldom driven to resistance till grievances become intolerable,\ntheir rulers can venture far without danger; and therefore, under such\ngovernments, are very imperfectly restrained. On the contrary; If there\nis an honest representation, vested with powers like to those of our\n_House of Commons_, the redress of grievances, as soon as they appear,\nwill be always easily attainable, and the rulers of a state will be under\na necessity of regarding the first beginnings of discontent.\u2014Such, and\ngreater than can be easily described, are the advantages of even an\n_imperfect representation_ in a government. How great then must be the\nblessing of a COMPLETE REPRESENTATION?\u2014[70] It is this only gives full\nsecurity; and that can properly denominate a people free.\n\n * * * * *\n\nIt deserves to be added here, that as there can be no private character\nso abandoned as to want _all_ virtue; so there can be no government\nso slavish, as to exclude _every_ restraint upon oppression.\u2014The most\nslavish and, therefore, the worst governments are those under which\nthere is nothing to set bounds to oppression, besides the _discretion_\nand _humanity_ of those who govern.\u2014Of this kind are the following\ngovernments.\n\nFirst, All governments _purely_ despotic. These may be either\nmonarchical, aristocratical. The latter are the worst, agreeably to a\ncommon observation, that it is better to have _one_ master than _many_.\nThe appetites of a single despot may be easily satiated; but this may be\nimpossible where there is a multitude.\n\nSecondly, All provincial governments.\u2014The history of mankind proves these\nto be the worst of all governments; and that no oppression is equal\nto that which one people are capable of practising towards another. I\nhave mentioned some of the reasons of this in the _Observations on Civil\nLiberty_, Part I. sect. 3. Bodies of men do not feel for one another as\nindividuals do. The _odium_ of a cruel action, when shared among many,\nis not regarded. The master of slaves working on a plantation, though he\nmay keep them down to prevent their becoming strong enough to emancipate\nthemselves, yet is led by _interest_, as well as _humanity_, to govern\nthem with such moderation, as to preserve their use: But these causes\nwill produce more of this good effect, when the slaves are under the eye\nof their proprietor, and form a part of his family, than when they are\nsettled on a distant plantation, where he can know little of them, and is\nobliged to trust them to the management of rapacious servants.\n\nIt is particularly observable here, that _free_ governments, though\nhappier in themselves, are more oppressive to their provinces than\ndespotic governments. Or, in other words, that the _subjects_ of free[71]\nstates are worse slaves than the subjects of states not free. This is\none of the observations which Mr. HUME represents as an universal axiom\nin politicks[72].\u2014\u201cThough, says he, free governments have been commonly\nthe most happy for those who partake of their freedom, yet are they the\nmost oppressive and ruinous to their provinces; and this observation may\nbe fixed as an universal axiom in politics. What cruel tyrants were the\nRomans over the world during the time of their commonwealth?\u2014After the\ndissolution of the commonwealth the Roman yoke became easier upon the\nprovinces, as _Tacitus_ informs us; and it may be observed, that many\nof the worst Emperors (_Domitian_, for instance) were very careful to\nprevent all oppression of the provinces.\u2014The oppression and tyranny of\nthe _Carthaginians_ over their subject states in _Africa_ went so far,\nas we learn from _Polybius_ (Lib. i. cap. 72.) that not content with\nexacting the _half_ of all the produce of the ground, which of itself\nwas a very high rent, they also loaded them with many other taxes.\u2014If we\npass from antient to modern times we shall always find the observation to\nhold. The provinces of absolute monarchies are always better treated than\nthose of free states.\u201d\n\nThirdly, Among the worst sorts of governments I reckon all governments\nby a corrupt representation.\u2014There is no instance in which the trite\nobservation is more true than in this, \u201cthat the best things when\ncorrupted become the worst.\u201d A corrupt representation is so far from\nbeing any _defence_ against oppression, that it is a _support_ to it.\nLong established customs, in this case, afford no security, because,\nunder the sanction of such a representation, they may be easily\nundermined or counteracted; nor is there any injury to a people which,\nwith the help of such an instrument, may not be committed with safety.\nIt is not, however, every degree of corruption, that will destroy the\nuse of a representation, and turn it into an evil so dreadful. In order\nto this, corruption must pass a certain limit. But _every degree_ of it\n_tends_ to this, saps the foundation of Liberty, and poisons the fountain\nof Legislation. And when it gets to its last stage, and has proceeded\nits utmost length: When, in particular, the means by which candidates\nget themselves chosen are such as admit the _worst_, but exclude the\n_best_ men; a House of Representatives becomes little better than a\nsink into which is collected all that is most worthless and vile in a\nkingdom.\u2014There cannot be a greater calamity than such a government.\u2014It\nis impossible there should be a condition more wretched than that of a\nnation, once free, so degenerated.\n\n\nCONCLUSION.\n\nIt is time to dismiss this subject. But I cannot take a final leave\nof it, (and probably of all subjects of this kind) without adding the\nfollowing reflections on our own state in this kingdom.\n\n * * * * *\n\nIt is well known, that MONTESQUIEU has paid the highest compliment to\nthis country, by describing its constitution of government, in giving\nan account of a perfect government; and by drawing the character of\nits inhabitants, in giving an account of the manners and characters\nof a free people.\u2014\u201cAll (he says) having, in free states, a share in\ngovernment, and the laws not being made for some more than others, they\nconsider themselves as _monarchs_, and are more properly _confederates\nthan fellow-subjects_.\u2014No one citizen being subject to another, each\nsets a greater value on his Liberty than on the glory of any of his\nfellow-citizens.\u2014Being independent, they are proud; for the pride of\nkings is founded on their independence.\u2014They are in a constant ferment,\nand believe themselves in danger, even in those moments when they are\nmost safe.\u2014They reason; but it is indifferent whether they reason well or\nill. It is sufficient that they _do_ reason. Hence springs that Liberty\nwhich is their security.\u2014This state, however, will lose its Liberty. It\nwill perish, when the _Legislative_ power shall become more corrupt than\nthe _executive_.\u201d[73]\n\nSuch is the account which this great writer gave, many years ago, of the\n_British_ constitution and people. We may learn from it, that we have\nnothing to fear from that disposition to examine every public measure, to\ncensure ministers of state, and to be restless and clamorous, which has\nhitherto characterized us.\u2014On the contrary; we shall have every thing to\nfear, when this disposition is lost. As soon as a people grow secure, and\ncease to be quick in taking alarms, they are undone. A free constitution\nof government cannot be preserved without an earnest and unremitting\njealousy. OUR Constitution, in particular, is so excellent, that it is\nthe properest object of such a jealousy. For my own part, I admire so\nmuch the general frame and principles of it, that I could be almost\nsatisfied with that representation of the kingdom, which forms the most\nimportant part of it, had I no other objection to this representation\nthan its _inadequateness_. Did it consist of a body of men, fairly\nelected for a short term, by a number of independent persons, of all\norders in every part of the kingdom, equal to the number of the present\nvoters; and were it, after being elected, under no undue influence; it\nwould be a security of such importance, that I should be less disposed\nto complain of the injustice done, by its inadequateness, to the\ngreatest part of the kingdom by depriving them of one their natural and\nunalienable rights. To such a body of representatives we might commit,\nwith confidence, the guardianship of our rights, knowing, that having\none interest with the rest of the state, they could not violate them; or\nthat if they ever did, a little time would bring the power of gaining\nredress without tumult or violence.\u2014Happy the people so blessed.\u2014If wise,\nthey will endeavour, by every possible method, to preserve the purity of\ntheir representation; and, should it have degenerated, they will lose\nno time in effecting a reformation of it.\u2014But if, unhappily, infection\nshould have pervaded the whole mass of the state, and there should be no\nroom to hope for any reformation, it will be still some consolation to\nreflect, that slavery, in all its rigour, will not immediately follow.\nBetween the time in which the securities of Liberty are undermined, and\nits final subversion, there is commonly a flattering interval during\nwhich the _enjoyment_ of Liberty may be continued, in consequence of\nfundamental laws and rooted habits which cannot be at once exterminated.\nAnd this interval is longer or shorter, according as the progress of\ncorruption is more or less rapid; and men in power more or less attentive\nto improve favourable opportunities.\u2014The government of this country, in\nparticular, is so well balanced, and the institutions of our common law\nare so admirable, and have taken such deep root, that we can bear much\ndecay before our liberties fall.\u2014Fall, however, they must, if our public\naffairs do not soon take a new turn. That very evil, which, according to\nthe great writer I have quoted, is to produce our ruin, we see working\nevery where and increasing every day.\u2014The following facts, among many\nothers, shew too plainly whither we are tending and how far we are\nadvanced.\n\nFirst. It seems to me, that a general indifference is gaining ground\nfast among us.\u2014This is the necessary effect of increasing luxury and\ndissipation; but there is another cause of it, which I think of with\nparticular regret.\u2014In consequence of having been often duped by false\npatriots; and found, that the leaders of opposition, when they get into\nplaces, forget all their former declarations; the nation has been led\nto a conviction, that all patriotism is imposture, and all opposition\nto the measures of government nothing but a struggle for power and its\nemoluments. The honest and independent part of the nation entertain at\npresent most of this conviction; and, therefore, having few public men\nto whom they can look with confidence, they give up all zeal, and sink\ninto inactivity and despondence.\n\nSecondly. At the Revolution, the House of Commons acquired its just\nweight in the constitution; and, for some years afterwards, it was often\ngiving much trouble to men in power. Of late, it is well known, that\nmeans have been tryed and a system adopted for quieting it.\u2014I will not\nsay with what success\u2014But I must say, that the men whose policy this has\nbeen, have struck at the very _heart_ of public liberty, and are the\nworst traitors this kingdom ever saw.\u2014\u201cIf ever, (says Judge _Blackstone_)\nit should happen, that the independency of any one of the three branches\nof our legislature should be lost; or that it should become subservient\nto the views of either of the other two, there would soon be an end of\nour constitution. The legislature would be changed from that which was\noriginally set up by the general consent and fundamental act of the\nsociety; and such a change, however effected, is according to Mr. _Locke_\n(who perhaps carries his theory too far) at once an entire dissolution of\nthe bands of government, and the people are thereby reduced to a state\nof anarchy, with liberty to constitute to themselves a new legislative\npower.\u201d[74]\n\nThirdly. Soon after the REVOLUTION, bills for triennial parliaments\npassed both Houses, in opposition to the court[75]. At the ACCESSION,\nseptennial parliaments were established. Since this last period, many\nattempts have been made, by the friends of the constitution, to restore\ntriennial parliaments; and, formerly, it was not without difficulty that\nthe ministry were able to defeat these attempts. The division in the\nHouse of Commons in 1735, on a bill for this purpose, was 247 to 184.\u2014I\nneed not say, that _now_ all such attempts drop of themselves. So much\nare the sentiments of our representatives changed in this instance, that\nthe motion for such a bill, annually made by a worthy member of the House\nof Commons, can scarcely produce a serious debate, or gain the least\nattention.\u2014For several years, at the beginning of the last reign, the\nHOUSE OF COMMONS constantly passed _pension_ and _place_ bills, which\nwere as constantly rejected by the HOUSE OF LORDS. At present, no one is\nso romantic as ever to think of introducing any such bills into the House\nof Commons.\n\nFourthly. Standing armies have in all ages been destructive\nto the Liberties of the states into which they have been\nadmitted.\u2014MONTESQUIEU[76] observes, that the preservation of Liberty\nin ENGLAND requires, that it should have no land forces.\u2014Dr. FERGUSON\ncalls the establishment of standing armies \u201cA FATAL REFINEMENT in the\npresent state of civil government.\u201d[77]\u2014Mr. _Hume_ pronounces \u201cour\nstanding army a mortal distemper in the British constitution, of which\nit must _inevitably_ perish.\u201d[78]\u2014Formerly, the nation was apprehensive\nof this danger; and the _standing army_ was a constant subject of warm\ndebate in both Houses of Parliament. The principal reason then assigned\nfor continuing it was, the security of the House of HANOVER against the\nfriends of the _Pretender_. This is a reason which now exists no more;\nthe House of _Hanover_ being so well established as not to want any such\nsecurity.\u2014The standing army also is now more numerous and formidable than\never; and yet all opposition to it is lost, and it is become in a manner\na part of the constitution.\n\nFifthly. For many years after the accession the national debt was thought\nan evil so alarming, that the reduction of it was recommended every year\nfrom the throne to the attention of Parliament as an object of the last\nimportance. The FUND appropriated to this purpose was called the ONLY\nHOPE of the kingdom; and when the practice of alienating it begun, it\nwas reckoned a kind of sacrilege, and zealously opposed in the House of\n_Commons_, and protested against in the House of _Lords_. But now, though\nthe debt is almost _tripled_, we sit under it with perfect indifference;\nand the sacred fund, which repeated laws had ordered to be applied _to no\nother purpose_ than the redemption of it, is always alienated of course,\nand become a constant part of the current supplies, and much more an\nencouragement to dissipation than a preservative from bankruptcy.\n\nSixthly. Nothing is more the duty of the representatives of a nation than\nto keep a strict eye over the expenditure of the money granted for public\nservices.\u2014In the reign of King William, the House of Commons passed\nalmost every year bills for appointing commissioners for taking, stating\nand examining the public accounts; and, particularly, the army and navy\ndebts and contracts. In the reign of Queen Ann such bills became less\nfrequent. But since the accession, only two motions have been made for\nsuch bills; one in 1715, and the other in 1741; and both were rejected.\n\nSeventhly. I hope I may add, that there was a time when the kingdom\ncould not have been brought to acquiesce in what was done in the case\nof the _Middlesex_ election. This is a precedent which, by giving the\nHouse of Commons the power of excluding its members at discretion, and of\nintroducing others in their room on a minority of votes, has a tendency\nto make it a self-created House, and to destroy entirely the right of\nrepresentation: And a few more such precedents would completely overthrow\nthe constitution.\n\nLastly. I cannot help mentioning here the addition which has been\nlately made to the power of the Crown, by throwing into its hands the\n_East-India Company_. Nothing more unfavourable to the security of public\nLiberty has been done since the REVOLUTION: And should our statesmen,\nthus strengthened by the patronage of the EAST, be farther strengthened\nby the conquest and patronage of the WEST, they will indeed have no small\nreason for triumph; and there will be little left to protect us against\nthe encroachments and usurpations of power. ROME sunk into slavery, in\nconsequence of enlarging its territories, and becoming the center of the\nwealth of conquered provinces, and the seat of universal empire. It seems\nthe appointment of Providence, that free states, when, not contented with\n_self_-government, and prompted by the love of domination, they make\nthemselves masters of other states, shall lose Liberty at the same time\nthat they take it away; and, by subduing, be themselves subdued. Distant\nand dependent provinces can be governed only by a military force. And\na military force which governs abroad, will soon govern at home. The\n_Romans_ were so sensible of this, that they made it treason for any of\ntheir generals to march their armies over the _Rubicon_ into _Italy_.\nC\u00c6SAR, therefore, when he came to this river, hesitated; but he passed\nit, and enslaved his country.\n\n\u201cAmong the circumstances (says Dr. FERGUSON) which in the event of\nnational prosperity and in the result of commercial arts, lead to the\nestablishment of despotism, there is none perhaps that arrives at\nthis termination with so sure an aim as the perpetual enlargement of\nterritory. In every state the freedom of its members depends on the\nbalance and adjustment of its interior parts; and the existence of\nany such freedom among mankind depends on the balance of nations. In\nthe progress of conquest those who are subdued are said to have lost\ntheir liberties. But, from the history of mankind, to conquer or to be\nconquered has appeared in effect the same.\u201d[79]\n\nMany more facts of this kind might easily be enumerated; but these are\nsufficient.\u2014They shew, with sad evidence, how fast we have, for some\ntime, been advancing towards the greatest of all public calamities.\n\nWe may, also, infer from the preceding observations, that there is only\none way in which our deliverance is possible; and that is, by RESTORING\nOUR GRAND NATIONAL SECURITY. This is the object which our great men in\nopposition ought to hold forth to the kingdom, and to bind themselves by\nsome decisive tests to do all they can to obtain. That patriotism must be\nspurious which does not carry its views principally to this. Without it,\nnothing is of great importance to the kingdom; and even an accommodation\nwith _America_ would only preserve a limb, and save from present danger,\nwhile a gangrene was left to consume the vitals.\n\nBut, probably, we are gone too far; and corruption has struck its roots\ntoo deep to leave us much room for hope.\u2014Mr. HUME has observed,[80] that\nas the affairs of this country are not likely to take a turn favourable\nto the establishment of a perfect plan of Liberty, \u201can absolute\nmonarchy is the easiest death, the true EUTHANASIA of the British\nconstitution.\u201d\u2014If this observation is just, our constitution (should no\ngreat calamity intervene) is likely, in some future period, to receive\na very quiet dissolution.\u2014At present, however, it must be acknowledged,\nthat we enjoy a degree of Liberty, civil and religious, which has seldom\nbeen paralleled among mankind. We ought to rejoice in this happiness; and\nto be graceful to that benevolent disposer of all events who blesses us\nwith it. But, at the same time, our hearts must bleed when we reflect,\nthat, the supports of it having given way, it is little more than a\n_sufferance_ which we owe to the temper of the times; the lenity of our\ngovernors; and some awe, in which the friends of despotism are still\nheld, by the voice and spirit of the uncorrupted part of the kingdom.\u2014May\nthese causes, if no better securities can be hoped for, long delay our\nfate.\n\n * * * * *\n\nIt must not be forgotten, that all I have now said is meant on the\nsupposition, that our affairs will proceed smoothly till, by a common and\nnatural progress, we have gone the round of other nations once free, and\nare brought to their end.\u2014But it is possible this may not happen.\u2014Our\ncircumstances are singular; and give us reason to fear, that we have\nbefore us a death which will not be easy or common.\n\n\n\n\nPART II.\n\nCONTAINING REMARKS on some Particulars in a SPEECH at opening the BUDGET\nin _April 1776_.\n\n\nSECT. I.\n\n_Supplemental Observations on the Surplus of the Revenue; the Quantity of\nCoin in the Kingdom; and Paper-Credit._\n\nIt is well known, that the great minister who presides over our finances,\ntook occasion, at opening the Budget in April last, to enter into a\nparticular account of the state of the nation. In this account, he\nrepresented us as in a condition the most sound and happy; our trade and\nrevenue flourishing; our common people well provided for; our debts and\ntaxes light; our current specie sufficiently ample; our paper-circulation\nsafe; and the BANK, in particular, as little less firm and durable than\nthe world.\n\nThis account, so encouraging and flattering, was generally understood\nto be given in designed opposition to another account very different,\nwhich had been given in the _Observations on Civil Liberty_.\u2014It cannot,\ntherefore, I hope, be thought too presuming in me to offer the following\nremarks in my own defence.\n\n * * * * *\n\nI have grounded my opinion of the hazardous state of the kingdom, partly\non the smallness of the surplus in the revenue, and the nature and\ncircumstances of our paper-circulation, compared with the quantity of\n_specie_ in the kingdom, and the weight of our debts and taxes.\n\nThe surplus of the revenue I have made out in two different methods;\nand by a deduction so minute, that it is, I think, scarcely possible\nit should be materially wrong. One of these methods brings it out\n338,759_l._ _per ann._[81]: and the other, 300,000_l._ _per ann._\nsupposing the expence of calling in the gold coin, and the profits of\nlotteries excluded; the land-tax at three shillings in the pound; and\nthe peace establishment the same that it has been at a medium for eleven\nyears, from 1764 to 1775.\n\nNothing more was said in opposition to this, than a general intimation,\nthat had it not been for the war with _America_, the peace-establishment\nfor the navy would have been reduced, and a sufficient surplus gained\n(including lotteries) to enable parliament to pay off a million every\nyear of the public debt.\n\n * * * * *\n\nI am very sensible that reductions of the public expences and\nimprovements in the revenue are practicable, which would give such a\nsurplus. But I am afraid, they will never take place. Nor can I think\nit proper, in determining what permanent surplus we possess, to include\nthose pernicious profits of lotteries, by which infinitely more is upon\nthe whole lost than gained; or, to form our judgment of the expence of\n_future_ years, by any other rule than the medium expence of _past_\nyears.\u2014It would, however, give little consolation, were there a certainty\nthat, had peace continued, a MILLION annually of the public debt would\nhave been discharged. This would have made a very slow progress in\ndischarging our debts. A million every year discharged in peace, and\neight or ten millions every year added in war, would leave us under the\nnecessity of breaking at last. But hitherto we have not proceeded in a\ncourse so favourable. The great person to whom I refer, must know, that\nin 1772, he announced in the _House of Commons_, his intention to pay off\na _million and a half_ every year, and SEVENTEEN MILLIONS in ten years;\nthat yet only 2.800,000_l._ was paid off in the three subsequent years;\nand that, on account of the increase of the _navy_ and _civil-list_\ndebts, there has not been in fact the ability (without the help of\nlotteries) to pay half that sum.\n\n * * * * *\n\nIn page 74th of the _Observations on Civil Liberty_, I have said, \u201cthat\nit has appeared lately, that the gold specie of the kingdom, is no more\nthan about TWELVE MILLIONS AND A HALF.\u201d\u2014This assertion has been much\ncontroverted; and it is therefore necessary I should give a distinct\naccount of the reasons on which it was grounded.\n\nI had learnt from unquestionable authority, that the quantity of gold\ncoin brought into the mint, by the Acts of Parliament and Proclamations\nin 1773 and 1774, was about NINE MILLIONS[82]; or as much as, when\nrecoined, amounted nearly to that sum.\u2014I find also, that it was expected\nby the best judges, that the proclamation lately issued would bring in\nabout _three_ millions. These two sums make up _twelve_ millions; and\nthey include the gold coin of _Ireland_. Let this be estimated at a[83]\nmillion; and the whole gold coin of _Britain_, to be brought in by all\nthe calls, will be ELEVEN millions; and none will remain, except that\npart which was deficient less than a grain in a guinea, and remained\nin the kingdom, at the time the coin Act took effect in June 1773. We\nare here left entirely to conjecture. But it should be remembered, that\nfor many years before 1773, the heavy coin was catched up as soon as\nissued, and either clipped, or melted down and exported; and that from\nhence arose such a scarcity of heavy coin, that, in some counties, heavy\nguineas might be disposed of at a premium.\u2014In such circumstances, an\nallowance of about a million and a half, for the coin deficient less than\na grain in a guinea before the coin Act in 1773, seems to be sufficient;\nand therefore, it might, I think, with reason be said, that it appeared\nthat the gold coin of the kingdom was about TWELVE MILLIONS AND A HALF.\n\n * * * * *\n\nBut there is another reason, by which I have been convinced, that this is\na moderate estimate.\n\nThe quantity of gold coin, deficient between three and six grains in a\nguinea, was 4.800,000_l._ and this, when recoined, made 4.600,000_l._\u2014The\ncoin deficient less than three grains could not have been so much, for\nthe following reasons. First, new coin being rougher, wears faster than\nold coin; and therefore, does not remain so long in any given degree of\ndeficiency.\u2014Secondly, coin, deficient less than three grains, is subject\nto several peculiar causes of diminution and destruction.\u2014Clipping and\nsweating remove part of it to greater degrees of deficiency; and part is\ndestroyed by being melted down and exported; whereas, lighter coin is\ndiminished only by being worn[84].\n\nThese reasons seem to prove, that if the gold coin, deficient in June\n1773 less than three grains, is estimated at _five millions_, (that is,\nat a little more than the coin deficient between three and six grains) it\nwill be rated rather too high; and the conclusion will be, that the whole\nof our gold coin (exclusive of the _Irish_) might possibly be _less_, but\ncould not have been _much more_, than the sum at which I have reckoned it.\n\n * * * * *\n\nSuch have been the facts and arguments by which my judgment has been\ndetermined in this instance.\u2014But it must not be overlooked, that it helps\nonly to ascertain the quantity of _circulating_ specie in the kingdom,\nas distinguished from that which is _hoarded_. When the _Observations on\nCivil Liberty_ were published, I did not apprehend, that this part of the\ncoin could be considerable enough to deserve regard. But the contrary has\nlately appeared. The Proclamation issued last summer, and which it was\nexpected would bring in about three millions, has, I am informed, brought\nin about _six millions and a half_. This exceeds the sum at which I have\nbeen led to state the _whole_ gold coin deficient less than three grains;\nand proves, that several millions must have been hoarded[85]. Nor, I\nthink, will this appear incredible, when it is recollected, that only\ngold coin under three grains of deficiency is likely to be hoarded; and\nalso, that distrust of the _Funds_ and of Paper-money has a particular\ntendency to increase the practice of hoarding.\n\nAssisted, therefore, by this new light, I would now state the\n_circulating_ gold coin of the kingdom before 1773, nearly as I did\nbefore; and call it TWELVE or THIRTEEN MILLIONS. But the whole gold coin\n(including the hoarded part) I would reckon at SIXTEEN or SEVENTEEN\nMILLIONS[86].\n\n * * * * *\n\nAn account very different from this was given at opening the Budget; the\nsubstance of which I will state as faithfully as my memory will enable\nme; and just as I understood it.\n\n\u201cFrom the beginning of the year 1772, to the 23d of April last,\n13.200,000_l_. had been coined at the Tower; and on that day there was\n600,000_l_. more ready to be coined.\u2014All this, (it was intimated) is\nnow left in the kingdom. The last Proclamation, it was expected, would\nbring in three millions more; which, added to the coin deficient less\nthan a grain resting in the kingdom at the time of the Coin Act in\n1773, and issued before 1772, will make the whole, EIGHTEEN OR NINETEEN\nMILLIONS[87].\u201d\n\n * * * * *\n\nOn this account I would observe,\n\nFirst. That if just, it proves that, in 1773, a _third_ at least of the\n_circulating_ coin was in the best state possible. For the late calls\nhaving shewn, that there was then, in _Britain_ and _Ireland_, no more\nthan about twelve _millions_ deficient _more_ than a grain; six millions\n(that is, a third of eighteen millions) or seven millions (that is, more\nthan a third of nineteen millions) must have been deficient _less_ than\na grain.[88]\u2014It will also follow, (since the quantity brought in by\nthe first call is known to have been 4.900,000l.) that but little more\nthan a _fourth_ could have been deficient so much as six grains, or a\nshilling in a guinea.\u2014No person can think this credible who recollects\nthe distress of traffic, and the complaints of the kingdom before 1773.\n\nSecondly. The truth of the account I have stated depends, in a great\nmeasure, on the supposition, that all the gold coined since the beginning\nof 1772 is now in the kingdom. I cannot conceive on what grounds this\nwas taken for granted.\u2014From the beginning of 1772 to June 1773, the\npractice of clipping was more prevalent than it had ever been. During\nthe greatest part of 1772, the price of gold was so much above mint\nprice, that a profit, from 2 to 4 _per cent_. might be got by melting\nheavy guineas[89]. And, in February in that year, the price of gold was\nat 4l. 1s. 6d. per ounce; and 4\u00bd _per cent._ might be got by melting\nheavy guineas. Instead, therefore, of believing, that all the gold coined\nsince the beginning of 1772 remains with us; I think it almost certain,\nthat the greatest part of all coined during the first year and a half of\nthis period, has been either clipped or melted into bullion. That part\nwhich was clipped has been recoined; and that part which was melted has\nbeen either recoined or exported; and, therefore, neither has made any\naddition to the coin of the kingdom.\n\nThese observations demonstrate, that the amount of the gold coin at the\ntime of the Coin Act in 1773, must have been near the sum at which I\nhave reckoned it. There may, for ought I know, have been an increase\nsince; but I shall not believe there has, till I know, whether the coin\nbrought in by the last proclamation has been all recoined and issued. But\nthis cannot be expected; for should it be done, FOUR MILLIONS[90] more\nwill have been coined and issued, than has been brought in.\u2014The truth,\ntherefore, may be, that the coinage, since June 1773, has been carried\non only to provide a supply of new coin to be exchanged for old; in which\ncase, the quantity of coin in the kingdom, even according to this method\nof computing it, will come out nearly the same with that which I have\ngiven.\n\n * * * * *\n\nAfter all, let the _specie_ of the kingdom, including the silver, be\nallowed to be as considerable as some have asserted; or about four\nmillions more than I have reckoned it; the difference arising from\nhence will not be of particular consequence; and it will be still true,\nthat notwithstanding all our increase of trade and apparent opulence,\nthe _specie_ of the kingdom[91] is not much more than it was at the\n_Revolution_.\u2014What then is all the rest of our circulating cash? What\nis it keeps up rents; feeds our luxury; pays our taxes; supplies the\nrevenue, and supports government?\u2014Paper, chiefly, emitted, not only at\nthe Bank, but by tradesmen, merchants, and bankers in every corner of\nthe kingdom.\u2014And is this a solid and permanent support?[92] Is there,\nin the annals of the world, another instance of a great kingdom so\nsupported?\u2014The causes are numberless which may suddenly destroy it; and\nwere this to happen, we should fall at once, with a debt of 140 millions\nupon us, to the state we were in before the REVOLUTION.\u2014Imagination\ncannot paint to itself the shock this would give.\u2014I must repeat here\nwhat I have said in the _Observations on Civil Liberty_, page 73, &c.\nthat we should think of nothing but guarding ourselves against the danger\nof such a situation, by restricting our paper currency, and gradually\ndischarging our public debts.\u2014In giving this admonition, I look upon\nmyself as doing my country one of the best offices in my power; and\nacting in the character of one who calls to another to awake who is\nsleeping over a precipice.\u2014But I know I call in vain.\u2014The great minister\nwho directs our finances has assured us all is well; and, under this\npersuasion, we are advancing, with unsuspicious and careless speed, to\nthe catastrophe I have pointed out; and pursuing measures which must\nincrease the difficulty of avoiding it, and the distress attending it.\n\nAmong these measures I have mentioned the present new coinage.\u2014Before\nthis coinage, I have observed, the light money always remained, because\nnothing could be got by melting and exporting it. But now, as soon as\ngold rises to the price it bore for many years before 1773, the melters\nand exporters of coin will be saved the trouble of selection; and\nevery piece on which they can lay their hands will be proper for their\npurpose.\u2014It seems, therefore, obvious, that, in consequence of this\nmeasure, all our coin may be carried away, and the whole superstructure\nof paper supported by it, break down, before we are aware of any danger.\n\nI will take this opportunity to add, that this measure will at the\nsame time increase our paper. This has been the consequence of the two\nformer calls; but it will probably be more the consequence of the last\ncall. For, as no coin is now to be current which is more than a grain\ndeficient; and as also a great deal of it is already at or near that\nlimit; the vexation attending it will be so intolerable, that it will\nbe generally cried down, and paper substituted in its room.\u2014Certain it\nis, that nothing can prevent this evil, but another evil; I mean, the\ndeficient coin forcing itself again into circulation, and furnishing\nclippers with more employment than ever; and, consequently, a return,\nwith increased violence, of the confusion and distress which took place\nbefore the Coin Act in 1773.\u2014This, indeed, will be much the least of the\ntwo evils; nor, in my opinion, are there any methods of preventing the\ndiminution of the coin, which will not produce greater evils, except such\nalterations in its form[93] as shall render clipping less practicable,\njoined to the execution of severe laws against clippers, and a strict\nvigilance in detecting them.\n\nUpon the whole, it seems to me, that enough had been done by the\nfirst coin act to restore the gold coin; and that all which has been\ndone since, at the expence of about 650,000l. has been nothing but a\npreparation of the coin for melters and exporters, to the dreadful hazard\nof the kingdom.\u2014These are my present views of this subject. But I must\nsay, that I suspect my own judgment in this instance. The noble Lord,\nwho is furnished with infinitely more of the means of information than I\nam, intimated, if I remember rightly, that there is no such danger: And\nthough I did not understand the reason he assigned for this assertion,\nI must believe, that, in a matter so particularly interesting to the\nkingdom, he has gone upon the best evidence.\n\n\nSECT. II.\n\n_Of the State of the Nation; and the War with America._\n\nAt the beginning of the preceding section, I have taken notice of the\nflattering account which was given, at opening the Budget in April last,\nof the state of the kingdom with respect to its commerce, revenue, and\nopulence. On that account I shall beg leave to offer the following\nreflections.\n\n * * * * *\n\nFirst. The observations in the last section prove, I think, that it\nis not so well supported by facts, as there is reason to wish. I am\nsensible, indeed, that we never made a more gay and splendid appearance.\nBut no considerate person will draw much encouragement from hence. That\npride and security; that luxury, venality and dissipation which give us\nthis appearance, are melancholy symptoms; and have hitherto been the\nforerunners of distress and calamity.\n\nSecondly. When this account was given there was a particular end to\nbe answered by it. Additional taxes were to be imposed; and it was\nnecessary to reconcile the public to the prospect of a great increase\nof its burthens, in order to carry on the war with _America_.\u2014On other\noccasions, different accounts had been given. In order to prove the\njustice of taxing the _Americans_, the weight of our own taxes had been\noften insisted upon; and the difficulty of raising a sufficient force\namong ourselves to reduce them, had been urged as a reason for seeking\nand employing, at a great expence, the assistance of foreign powers.\nOn such occasions, I have heard our unhappy and embarrassed situation\nmentioned; and, at the end of the last session of Parliament, one of our\ngreatest men, whose opinion in favour of coercion, had contributed to\nbring us into our present situation, acknowledged the distress attending\nit, and represented the vessel of the state as having never before rode\nin so dangerous a storm.\u2014This is, without doubt, the truth. But, if the\naccount on which I am remarking was just, we were then safe and happy;\nnor was the vessel of the state ever wafted by more gentle and prosperous\ngales.\n\nBut the reflection which, on this occasion, has given me most pain is the\nfollowing.\n\nIf, without _America_, we can be in a state so flourishing, a war to\nreduce _America_ must be totally inexcuseable. I wish I could engage\nattention to this. War is a dreadful evil; and those who involve a people\nin it _needlessly_, will find they have much to answer for. Nothing can\never justify it, but the necessity of it to secure some _essential_\ninterest against unjust attacks. But, it seems, there is no interest\nto be secured by the present war. The revenue has never flourished so\nmuch, as since _America_ has been rendered hostile to us; and it is now\nreckoned by many a decided point, that little depends on the _American_\ntrade. It follows then, that if the end of the present war is to \u201cobtain\na revenue,\u201d it is a revenue we do not want; if \u201cto maintain authority,\u201d\nit is an authority of no use to us.\u2014Must not humanity shudder at such a\nwar?\u2014Why not let _America_ alone, if we can subsist without it?\u2014Why carry\nfire and sword into a happy country to do ourselves no good?\n\nSome of the very persons who depreciate the value of the colonies, as a\nsupport to our revenue and finances, yet say, that we are now under a\nnecessity of reducing them, or perishing. I wish such persons would give\nan account of the causes which, according to their ideas, create this\ndreadful necessity. Is it the same that led _Haman_ of old to reckon\nall his honours and treasures nothing to him, while _Mordecai_ the Jew\nwould not bow to him?\u2014Or, are we become so luxurious, that luxury even\nin the revenue is become necessary to us; and so depraved, that, like\nmany individuals in private life, having lost _self_-dominion, we cannot\nsubsist without dominion over _others_?\n\nIt must not be forgotten, that I speak here on the supposition, that\nit is possible for this country to be as safe and prosperous without\n_America_ as some have asserted, and as was implied in what was said at\nopening the last Budget.\u2014This is far from being my own opinion.\u2014Some time\nor other we shall, in all probability, feel severely, in our commerce and\nfinances, the loss of the colonies. As a source of revenue they are, I\nthink, of great importance to us; but they are still more important as\nsupports to our navy, and an aid to us in our wars. It appears now, that\nthere is a force among them so formidable and so growing, that, with its\nassistance, any of the great _European_ powers may soon make themselves\nmasters of all the _West-Indies_ and _North-America_; and nothing ought\nto be more alarming to us than that our natural enemies see this, and\nare influenced by it.\u2014With the colonies united to us, we might be the\ngreatest and happiest nation that ever existed. But with the colonies\nseparated from us, and in alliance with _France_ and _Spain_, we are no\nmore a people.\u2014They appear, therefore, to be indeed worth any price.\u2014Our\nexistence depends on keeping them.\u2014But HOW are they to be kept?\u2014Most\ncertainly, not by forcing them to unconditional submission at the expence\nof many millions of money and rivers of blood. The resolution to attempt\nthis, is a melancholy instance of that infatuation, which sometimes\ninfluences the councils of kingdoms. It is attempting to keep them by a\nmethod, which, if it succeeds, will destroy their use, and make them not\nworth the having; and which, if it does _not_ succeed, will throw them\ninto the scale of rival powers, kindle a general war, and undo the empire.\n\nThe extension of our territories in _America_, during the last war,\nincreased the expence of our _peace_-establishment, from 2.400,000l. _per\nann._ to four millions _per ann._\u2014Almost all the provinces in _America_,\nwhich used to be ours, are now to be conquered. Let the expence of this\nbe stated at 25 or 30 millions; or, at a capital bearing a million\n_per annum_ interest.\u2014_America_ recovered by the sword must be kept by\nthe sword, and forts and garrisons must be maintained in every province\nto awe the wretched inhabitants, and to hold them in subjection. This\nwill create another addition of expence; and both together cannot, I\nsuppose, be stated at less than two millions _per annum_.\u2014But how is\nsuch an increase of revenue to be procured?\u2014The colonies, desolated and\nimpoverished, will yield no revenue.\u2014The surplusses of the sinking fund\nhave, for many years, formed a necessary part of the current and ordinary\nsupplies.\u2014It must, therefore, be drawn from _new_ taxes.\u2014But can the\nkingdom bear such an increase of taxes? Or, if it can, where shall we\nfind a surplus for discharging an enormous debt of above 160 millions?\nAnd what will be our condition, when the next foreign war shall add two\nmillions _per annum_ more to our expences?\u2014Indeed this is a frightful\nprospect. But it will be rendered infinitely more frightful by carrying\nour views to that increase of the power of the Crown which will arise\nfrom the increase of the army, from the disposal of new places without\nnumber, and the patronage of the whole continent of _North-America_.\n\nThese consequences have been stated moderately on the supposition, that\nwe shall succeed in subduing _America_; and that, while we are doing\nit, our natural enemies will neglect the opportunity offered them, and\ncontinue to satisfy themselves with assisting _America indirectly_.\u2014But\nshould the contrary happen.\u2014I need not say what will follow.\n\nSome time ago this horrid danger might have been avoided, and\nthe colonies kept by the easiest means.\u2014By a prudent lenity and\nmoderation.\u2014By receiving their petitions.\u2014By giving up the right we\nclaim to dispose of their property, and to alter their governments.\u2014By\nguarantying to them, in these respects, a legislative independence;[94]\nand establishing them in the possession of equal liberty with\nourselves.\u2014This a great and magnanimous nation should have done. This,\nsince the commencement of hostilities, would have brought them back to\ntheir former habits of respect and subordination; and might have bound\nthem to us for ever.\n\nMONTESQUIEU has observed, that ENGLAND, in planting colonies, should\nhave _commerce_, not _dominion_, in view; the increase of dominion being\nincompatible with the security of public liberty.\u2014Every advantage that\ncould arise from commerce they have offered us without reserve; and\ntheir language to us has been\u2014\u201cRestrict us, as much as you please, in\n_acquiring_ property by regulating our trade for your advantage; but\nclaim not the disposal of that property after it has been acquired.\u2014Be\nsatisfied with the authority you exercised over us before the present\nreign.\u2014PLACE US WHERE WE WERE IN 1763.\u201d\u2014On these terms they have\nrepeatedly sued for a reconciliation. In return, we have denounced them\n_Rebels_; and with our fleets in their ports, and our bayonets at their\nbreasts, have left them no other alternative than to acknowledge our\nsupremacy, and give up rights they think most sacred; or stand on the\ndefensive, and appeal to heaven.\u2014They have chosen the latter.\n\nIn this situation, if our feelings for _others_ do not make us tremble,\nour feelings for _ourselves_ soon may.\u2014Should we suffer the consequences\nI have intimated, our pride will be humbled.\u2014We shall admire the plans of\nmoderation and equity which, without bloodshed or danger, would have kept\n_America_.\u2014We shall wish for the happiness of former times; and remember,\nwith anguish, the measures which many of us lately offered their lives\nand fortunes to support.\n\n * * * * *\n\nI must not conclude these observations, without taking particular notice\nof a charge against the colonies, which has been much insisted on.\u2014\u201cThey\nhave, it is said, always had independency in view; and it is this,\nchiefly, that has produced their present resistance.\u201d\u2014It is scarcely\npossible there should be a more unreasonable charge. Without all doubt,\nour connexion with them might have been preserved for ages to come,\n(perhaps _for ever_) by wise and liberal treatment. Let any one read\na pamphlet published in 1761, by Dr. _Franklin_, and entitled, _The\ninterest of Great Britain with respect to her Colonies_; and let him deny\nthis if he can.\u2014Before the present quarrel, there prevailed among them\nthe purest affection for this country, and the warmest attachment to the\nHouse of HANOVER. And since the present quarrel begun, and not longer ago\nthan the beginning of last winter, independency was generally dreaded\namong them. There is the fullest evidence for this; and all who are\nbest acquainted with _America_, must know it to be true. As a specimen\nof this evidence, and of the temper of _America_ till the period I have\nmentioned, I will just recite the following facts.\n\nIn the resolutions of the _Assembly_, which met at _Philadelphia_,\nJuly 15, 1774, after making the strongest professions of affection to\n_Britain_, and duty to their sovereign, they declare their abhorrence of\nevery idea of an unconstitutional independence on the parent state.\u2014An\nassembly of delegates from all the towns of the county of _Suffolk_\n(of which _Boston_ is the capital) delivered in September 1774, to\nGeneral Gage, a remonstrance against fortifying _Boston-neck_. In this\nremonstrance, they totally disclaim every wish of independence.\u2014The same\nis done in the instructions given by the several colonies to the first\ndeputies chosen for a general Congress.\u2014In the petition of the first\nCongress to the King, they declare they shall always, carefully and\nzealously, endeavour to support and maintain their connexion with _Great\nBritain_. In the memorial of the same Congress to the people of this\ncountry, they repeat this assurance.\u2014In the order of the _Congress_,\nwhich met in May 1775, for a general fast, they call upon all _America_\nto unite in beseeching the Almighty to avert the judgments with which\nthey were threatened, and _to bless their rightful Sovereign_, that so\n_a reconciliation might be brought about with the parent state_.\u2014And in\ntheir declaration setting forth the causes of their taking arms, they\nwarn us, \u201cthat, should they find it necessary, foreign assistance was\nundoubtedly attainable;\u201d but at the same time declare, \u201cthat they did not\nmean to dissolve the union which had so long and so happily subsisted\nbetween them and this country; that necessity had not yet driven them\nto that desperate measure, or induced them to excite any other nation\nto war against us; and that they had not raised armies with ambitious\ndesigns of forming independent states, but solely for the protection of\ntheir property against violence, and the defence of that freedom which\nwas their birth-right.\u201d\u2014In the instructions, delivered Nov. 9, 1775, by\na committee of the representatives of the province of _Pensylvania_, to\ntheir delegates in the third general congress; they enjoin them, in\nbehalf of the province, \u201cutterly to reject any propositions, should such\nbe made, that might lead to a separation from the mother country.\u201d\n\nWhat reason can there be for thinking the colonies not sincere in\nall these declarations?\u2014In truth; it was not possible they should be\notherwise than sincere; for so little did they think of war, at the\ntime when most of these declarations were made, that they were totally\nunprepared for it: And, even when hostilities were begun at LEXINGTON\nin April 1775, they were so destitute of every instrument of defence,\nparticularly ammunition, that _half_ the force which is now invading\nthem, would have been sufficient to conquer them at once.\n\nI will beg leave to add on this occasion, the following extracts from\nletters, written by some leading persons at NEW-YORK, the genuineness of\nwhich may be depended on.\n\n_New-York, August_ 3d. 1775.\u2014\u201cI am sensible of the many artifices and\nfalshoods which have been used to biass the minds of your countrymen,\nwho believe evil reports of us; and, particularly, that we are aiming at\nindependence.\u2014Of this be assured, that even HANCOCK and ADAMS are averse\nto independence. There was a lye current last week, that the congress had\nfinally agreed upon independence to take place the 10th of March next,\nshould not our grievances be redressed before that time. I wrote to one\nof our delegates, to enquire whether this report was true. In his answer\nhe declares, upon his honour, that he believed there was not one man in\nthe Congress who would dare to make a motion tending to independence; or,\nthat if any one did, two could not be found to support the motion.\u2014None\nbut those who are on the spot can conceive what a spirit is gone forth\namong all ranks and degrees of men.\u2014We deserve to be free. It is a heavy\nsacrifice we are making. Trade is at an end. We expect our city to be\nknocked about our ears. But I declare solemnly, I will submit to all,\nand die in a log-house in the wilds of America, and be free; rather than\nflourish in servitude.\u201d\u2014In a subsequent letter, dated NEW-YORK, Jan.\n3d. 1776, the same person writes as follows:\u2014\u201cIt is in the power of the\nministry to annihilate all our disputes, by restoring us to the situation\nwe were in at the conclusion of the last war. If this is done, we shall\nimmediately return to our allegiance. But if not, be assured, that an\nawful scene will be opened in the spring. Let me repeat a caution to you;\nbelieve not the insinuations of our enemies, who would make you all\nbelieve that _independence_ is what _America_ aims at. It is an insidious\nfalshood. Madmen will be found in all large societies. It would be\nsingular, were there none such to be found in a body of three millions of\npeople and upwards. But they are like a grain of sand on the sea shore.\u201d\n\nAnother person writes thus.\u2014NEW-YORK, Nov. 2d. 1775. \u201cWe love and\nhonour our King. He has no subjects in all his dominions more attached\nto his person, family and government, notwithstanding the epithet of\nrebels bestowed upon us. No charge is more unjust than the charge that\nwe desire an independence on _Great Britain_. Ninety-nine in a hundred\nof the inhabitants of this country deprecate this as the heaviest of\nevils. But if administration will persist in their present measures,\nthis will and must inevitably be the event; for submit to the present\nclaims of the British parliament, while unrepresented in it, you may\nbe assured they never will. And what deserves notice is, that all the\nviolence of _Britain_ only unites the _Americans_ still more firmly\ntogether, and renders them more determined to be free or die. This\nspirit is unconquerable by violence; but they may be easily won by\nkindness.\u2014Serious people of all denominations among us, episcopal and\nnon-episcopal, are much employed in prayer to God for the success of the\npresent struggles of _America_. They consider their cause as the cause of\nGod; and as such, they humbly commit it to him, confident of success in\nthe end, whatever blood or treasure it may cost them.\u201d\n\nSince these letters were written, the sentiments of _America_, with\nrespect to _independence_, have been much altered. But it should be\nremembered, that this alteration has been owing entirely to OURSELVES; I\nmean, to the measures of the last winter and summer, and particularly the\nfollowing.\n\nFirst. The rejection of the petition from the Congress brought over by\nGovernor PENN. In this petition they professed, in strong language, that\nthey still retained their loyalty to the King and attachment to this\ncountry; and only prayed, \u201cthat they might be directed to some mode by\nwhich the united applications of the Colonies might be improved into a\nhappy reconciliation; and that, in the mean time, some measures might be\ntaken for preventing their farther destruction, and for repealing such\nstatutes as more immediately distressed them.\u201d\u2014The Colonies had often\npetitioned before without being heard. They had, therefore, little hope\nfrom this application; and meant that, if rejected, it should be their\nlast.\n\nSecondly. The last prohibitory bill, by which our protection of them was\nwithdrawn; their ships and effects confiscated; and open war declared\nagainst them.\n\nThirdly. Employing _foreign_ troops to subdue them. This produced\na greater effect in _America_ than is commonly imagined. And it is\nremarkable, that even the writers in _America_ who answered the pamphlet\nentitled COMMON SENSE, acknowledge, that should the _British_ ministry\nhave recourse to foreign aid, it might become[95] proper to follow their\nexample, and to embrace the necessity of resolving upon _independence_.\n\nI have, further, reason to believe, that the answer to the last petition\nof the City of London, presented in March 1776,[96] had no small share in\nproducing the same effect.\n\nBy these measures, and others of the same kind, those Colonists who had\nall along most dreaded and abhorred independence, were at last reconciled\nto it.\u2014I can, however, say from particular information, that even so\nlately as the month of June last, an accommodation might have been\nobtained with the Colonies, on a reasonable and moderate plan; without\ngiving up any one of the rights claimed by this country, except that\nof altering their charters and disposing of their property.\u2014And, as it\nwould have restored peace and prevented the desolating calamities into\nwhich _America_ and _Britain_ are now plunged, no friend to humanity\ncan avoid regretting that such a plan, when offered, was not adopted.\nBut our rulers preferred coercion and conquest: And the consequence has\nbeen, that the Colonies, after being goaded and irritated to the utmost,\nresolved to disengage themselves, and directed the CONGRESS to declare\nthem Independent States; which was accordingly done, as is well-known, on\nthe 4th of July last. Since that time, they have, probably, been making\napplications to foreign powers; and it is to be feared, that _now_ we\nmay in vain offer them the very terms for which they once sued.\u2014All this\nis the necessary consequence of the principles by which human nature\nis governed.\u2014There was a time when, perhaps, we should ourselves have\nacted with more violence; and, instead of remonstrating and praying,\nas _America_ has done, have refused the most advantageous terms when\noffered with defiance, and under an awe from a military force. Had King\nWILLIAM, instead of coming over by invitation to deliver us, invaded us;\nand, at the head of an army, offered us the BILL OF RIGHTS; we should,\nperhaps, have spurned at it; and considered LIBERTY itself as no better\nthan SLAVERY, when enjoyed as a boon from an insolent conqueror.\u2014But we\nhave all along acted as if we thought the people of _America_ did not\npossess the feelings and passions of _men_, much less of _Englishmen_.\u2014It\nis indeed strange our ministers did not long ago see, that they had\nmistaken the proper method of treating the Colonies; and that though they\nmight be gradually _influenced_ to any thing, they could be dragooned to\nnothing.\u2014Had King _James the Second_ avoided violence; and been a little\nmore patient and secret in pursuing his views, he might have gained\nall he wished for. But an eager haste and an open avowal of the odious\nclaims of prerogative ruined him.\u2014This has been since considered; and\na plan both here and in _Ireland_,[97] less _expeditious_ indeed, but\nmore _sure_, has been pursued. And had the same plan been pursued in\n_America_, the whole empire might in time have been brought, without a\nstruggle, to rest itself quietly in the lap of corruption and slavery.\nIt may, therefore, in the issue prove happy to the Colonies, that they\nhave not been thought worthy of any such cautious treatment. Our coercive\nmeasures have done all for them that their warmest patriots could have\ndesired. They have united them among themselves, and bound them together\nunder one government. They have checked them in the career of vicious\nluxury; guarded them against any farther infection from hence; taught\nthem to seek all their resources within themselves; instructed them in\nthe use of arms; and led them to form a naval and military power which\nmay, perhaps, in time, become superior to any force that can attack\nthem, and prove the means of preserving from invasion and violence, a\ngovernment of justice and virtue, to which the oppressed in every quarter\nof the globe may fly, and find peace, protection, and liberty.\u2014In short.\nThese measures have, in all probability, hastened that disruption of the\n_new_ from the _old_ world, which will begin a new _\u00e6ra_ in the annals\nof mankind;[98] and produce a revolution more important, perhaps, than\nany that has happened in human affairs.\u2014As a friend, therefore, to the\ngeneral interest of mankind, I ought, probably, to rejoice in these\nmeasures; and to bless that all-governing Providence, which, often, out\nof the evil intended by wretched mortals, brings the greatest good.\u2014But\nwhen I consider the _present_ sufferings which these measures must\noccasion, and the _catastrophe_ with which they threaten GREAT-BRITAIN;\nI am shocked; and feel myself incapable of looking forward, without\ndistress, to the fate of an empire, once united and happy, but now torn\nto pieces, and falling a sacrifice to despotic violence and blindness.\nUnder the impressions of these sentiments, and dreading the awful\n_crisis_ before us, I cannot help, however impotent my voice, crying out\nto this country\u2014\u201cMake no longer war against _yourselves_. Withdraw your\narmies from your Colonies. Offer your power to them as a _protecting_,\nnot a _destroying_ power. Grant the security they desire to their\nproperty and charters; and renounce those notions of dignity, which lead\nyou to prefer the exactions of force to the offerings of gratitude, and\nto hazard _every thing_ to gain _nothing_.\u2014By such wisdom and equity\n_America_ may, perhaps, be still preserved; and that dreadful breach\nhealed, which your enemies are viewing with triumph, and all _Europe_\nwith astonishment.\u201d\n\nBut what am I doing?\u2014At the moment I am writing this, the possibility of\na reconciliation may be lost.\u2014_America_ may have formed an alliance with\nFRANCE\u2014And the die may be cast.\n\n\nSECT. III.\n\n_Of Schemes for raising Money by Public Loans._\n\nThe following observations were occasioned by the scheme for the public\nloan of last year, proposed to the _House of Commons_ at opening the\n_Budget_, and afterwards agreed to. I have thought proper, therefore,\nto introduce these observations here; and, as they appear to me of some\nimportance, I shall endeavour to explain them with as much care and\nperspicuity as possible.\n\n * * * * *\n\nIn order to raise _two millions_, the Legislature created last year a\nnew capital in the 3 _per cent._ consolidated annuities, of 2.150,000l.\nEvery share of 77l. 10s. in this new capital was valued at 65l.\n17s. 6d. or every 100l. _stock_ at 85l. For the whole new capital,\ntherefore, Government has received in money, 1.827,500l.\u2014The remaining\nsum, necessary to make up _two millions_, was a compensation advanced\nto Government for relinquishing the profits of a Lottery, consisting\nof 60,000 tickets, each of the same value with 10l. _three per cent.\nstock_; and might have been obtained, without annexing the Lottery to the\nannuities.\u2014This new capital the public may be obliged to redeem at _par_;\nin which case, 322,500l. (being the difference between 1.827,500 and\n2.150,000l.) that is 17\u00bd _per cent._ will be paid by the public more than\nit has received.\u2014In this transaction, therefore, Government has acted as\na private person would act, who, in order to raise 850l. on a mortgage,\nshould promise for it 30l. _per ann._ (or 3\u00bd _per cent._ interest) and\n150l. (that is 17\u00bd _per cent_. nearly) over and above the principal,\nwhen the mortgage came to be discharged.\u2014Such a _premium_ (should the\nmortgage be discharged soon) would be very extravagant; but, if _never_\nto be discharged, would be insignificant: Nor would it be possible to\naccount for such a bargain, except by supposing, that the borrower,\ninstead of meaning to repay the sum he borrowed, chose to continue\n_always_ paying interest for it, or returning 30l. annually for 850l.\nonce advanced; and to subject his estate, for that purpose, to an eternal\nincumbrance.\n\nThe public, I have said, may be obliged to discharge the new capital,\nlately created, at _par_; and, consequently, to suffer a loss by this\nyear\u2019s loan of 322,500l. This will, undoubtedly, happen, should the\nnation prosper, and the public debts be put into a regular and fixed\ncourse of redemption; for the 3 _per cents._ would then soon rise to\n_par_.\n\nThe extravagance I have pointed out is the more to be regretted, because\nit was entirely needless; for the same sum might as well have been\nborrowed by schemes, which would not have subjected the public to the\nnecessity of paying, when the loan came to be discharged, more money than\nhad been received.\u2014For instance. The sum advanced for the new capital of\n2.150,000l. _three per cent._ annuities, might have been procured by\noffering 3\u00bd _per cent._ on a capital equal to the sum advanced; or on\n1.827,500l. And the remainder, necessary to make up _two millions_, might\nhave been obtained by the profits of a Lottery, consisting of 60,000\ntickets each worth 10l. in MONEY. This scheme would have differed but\nlittle in value from the other; and the interest, or the annuity payable\nby the public, would have been 63,962l. at 3\u00bd _per cent._ on a capital\nof 1.827,500l.;[99] instead of 64,500l. at 3 _per cent._ on a capital of\n2.150,000l.\n\nWhen a 100l. _stock_ in the 3 _per cent._ annuities is sold at 85\u00be,\npurchasers get 3\u00bd _per cent._ interest for their money. When, therefore,\nthe 3 _per cents_ are at this price, 3\u00bd _per cents_ would be at _par_;\nand a capital of 1.827,500l. might be redeemed by the public, (without\nlosing any advantage arising from its debts being at a discount,) by\npaying this sum; or by returning the money borrowed[100]. But in the same\ncircumstances, a capital of 2.150,000l. in the 3 _per cent._ annuities,\nfor which 85l. _per cent._ or, in the whole, 1.827,500l. had been\nreceived, could not be redeemed without offering 86 or 87 _per cent._\nfor it; nor, therefore, without paying _more_ than the original sum\nborrowed.\u2014When the 3 _per cents_ are near _par_, there would be a loss of\n322,500l. in redeeming the same capital; whereas, the former annuities,\nfor which the same sum had been advanced, might be always discharged\nby either paying the very sum[101] advanced, or a _less sum_.\u2014In all\npossible circumstances, therefore, these annuities would have the\nadvantage.\u2014But we never, when contracting debts, carry our views to the\ndischarge of the principal; and the consequences must prove fatal.\n\n * * * * *\n\nIt is necessary I should observe, in justice to our present ministers,\nthat in adapting the scheme on which I have made these remarks, they have\nonly followed the example of former ministers; and that, however needless\na waste it occasions of public money, there is reason to fear it will be\nfollowed by future ministers; for the increase of difficulty and expence\nin redeeming the public debts, which such schemes create, being to be\nfelt _hereafter_, it makes no impression, and is little regarded.\n\n * * * * *\n\nIn 1759, the fifth year of the last war, the lenders of 6.600,000l. were\ngranted a capital in the 3 _per cents_ of 7.590,000l. together with the\nprofits of the Lottery. Subtract from the sum advanced, 150,000l. for\nthe profits of the Lottery; and it will appear, that, in this instance,\n1.140,000l. was _needlessly_ added to the capital; there being no reason\nto doubt, but that lenders would then have readily advanced 6.600,000l.\nfor a capital of 6.450,000l. bearing 3\u00bd _per cent._[102] interest,\nprovided the profits of a Lottery were annexed; instead of advancing the\nsame sum for a nominal capital near 18 _per cent._ greater, but bearing 3\n_per cent._ interest.\n\n * * * * *\n\nAgain. In 1762, in order to raise 12 millions, every contributor of 80l.\nwas entitled to a capital of 100l. to bear 4 _per cent._ interest for\n19 years; and afterwards to become redeemable, and to bear interest at\n3 _per cent._ And for the remaining 20l. necessary to make up a 100l.\ncontributors were entitled to an annuity of 1l. for 98 years.\u2014This was\nthe same with promising, for every 60l. advanced, a 100l. capital in\nthe 3 _per cent._ annuities, not redeemable for 19 years; and, for the\nremaining 40l. necessary to make up 100l. an annuity of 2l. for 19 years;\nand, after that, of 1l. for 79 years.\n\nBy this scheme no less a sum than 4.800,000l. was needlessly added to\nthe capital of the public debts. For, had 5 _per cent._ been offered for\nevery 60l. advanced;[103] and, for the remaining 40l. an annuity of 2l.\nduring 19 years, and afterwards of 1l. for 79 years; equal encouragement\nwould have been given to contributors; the annuity payable by the public\nwould have been the same; and the new capital would have been 7.200,000l.\nbearing 5 _per cent._ interest; which might, at any time, have been\nredeemed with a saving of a million _per ann._ (the first payment to be\nmade immediately) in _five_ years and a _quarter_: Whereas now, this debt\nwill not become redeemable till 1781; and then, it will form a capital\nof 12 millions, not capable of being redeemed with the same saving, in\nless than _nine_ years and a half. Five millions and a quarter,[104]\ntherefore, will be wasted.\n\nThe capital of 12 millions four _per cent._ annuities created this year,\nwere made irredeemable for 19 years, to guard against the effects of an\napprehension then unavoidable, that an interest of 4 _per cent._ would,\nif the capitals were redeemable, be reduced, whenever peace came, to 3\n_per cent._ as had been done in the preceding peace.\u2014But this end would\nhave been answered, with equal effect and more advantage to the public,\nby pledging the faith of Parliament, that whatever interest was promised\non any capital, should not be _reduced_ for 19 years; or (which comes to\nthe same) that the capital should not be _redeemed_, during that term,\nby borrowing money, and creating a new capital bearing _lower_ interest.\nThis would have placed capitals bearing any interest on the same footing\n_nearly_ with the 3 _per cent._ annuities; and an assurance, that no part\nof them should be discharged, without at the same time discharging an\nequal capital in the 3 _per cents_, would have placed them _entirely_ on\nthe same footing.\u2014Had it, however, been necessary, on account of the fear\nof a reduction of interest, to make the capital here proposed bearing 5\n_per cent_, and the capitals to be mentioned presently bearing 4 _per\ncent._ irredeemable, (and therefore the interest irreducible) for any\nterm (suppose till 1781); had, I say, even this been necessary (and more\ncould not have been necessary) no advantage of great consequence would\nhave been lost. These capitals would, during that term, have been exactly\nthe same burden on the public with the capitals which were actually\ncreated; and after that term, they would have been a much less burden, as\nwill be shewn at the end of this section.\n\nAgain. In January 1760, eight millions were borrowed by offering for\nthis sum a capital of eight millions to carry 4 _per cent._ interest\nfor 21 years, and afterwards 3 _per cent_, together with a _premium_ of\n240,000l. stock carrying the same interest, and divided into 80,000l.\nlottery tickets, each 3l. stock.\u2014This was the same with offering, for\n80l. of every 100l. advanced, a capital of 100l. in the 3 _per cent._\nannuities,[105] not redeemable for 21 years; and for the remainder\nbesides a lottery ticket an annuity of 1l. for 21 years.\u2014The same sum\nmight have been raised by offering 4 _per cent_, irreducible during 21\nyears, or 3l. _per ann._ for 75l. of every 100l. advanced, and for the\nremaining 25l. an annuity of 1l. for 21 years, together with a lottery\nticket.\u2014In this case, the new capital, instead of 8.240,000l. bearing 3\n_per cent._ not subject to redemption, and having an annuity of 82,400l.\nannexed to it, for 21 years; would have been 6.000,000l. bearing 4 _per\ncent._ with the same annuity annexed, but redeemable at _any_ time; and\n240,000_l._[106] bearing 4 _per cent._ for 21 years, and afterwards 3\n_per cent._\n\nBy the scheme likewise in 1761, for borrowing 11.400,000_l._ a capital\nof 100_l._ bearing 3 _per cent. interest_, was given for part of every\n100_l._ advanced; and for the other part, an annuity of 1_l._ 2_s._ 6_d._\nfor 99 years. Had, in this case, 75_l._ FOUR _per cent._ STOCK, been\noffered for 75_l._ in _money_; and, for the remaining 25_l._ necessary to\nmake up 100_l._ the said annuity of 1_l._ 2_s._ 6_d._ for 99 years;[107]\nthe whole annual charge would have been the same; subscribers could not\nhave been sensible of any difference in the encouragement offered them;\nand the public, in paying its debts, would have saved 2.850,000_l._\n\nThere was also this year 600,000_l._ received by government for\n600,000_l._ stock, carrying 3 _per cent._ interest, and divided into\n60,000 lottery tickets, each worth 10_l._ in stock.\u2014As 150,000_l._ of\nthis sum was paid for the profits of the lottery; and as 4 _per cent._\ncould not at this time be made of money laid out in the funds, it is out\nof doubt, that the same sum (or 600,000_l._) would have been given for\n450,000_l._ stock, carrying 4 _per cent._ and divided into 60,000 lottery\ntickets, each of the same value with 7_l._ 10_s._ four _per cent._ stock;\nand thus 150,000_l._ more would have been saved.\n\nIn like manner; it will appear, that _three millions_, raised in\n1757, by creating a capital of _three millions_ bearing 3 _per cent._\ninterest,[108] with a life annuity annexed of 1_l._ 2_s._ 6_d._ for every\n100_l._ advanced; and also, _four millions and a half_ raised in 1758, by\ncreating a capital of _four millions and a half_, bearing 3 _per cent._\nwith an annuity of a _half per cent._ annexed for 24 years; might have\nbeen raised by creating, in the former case, a capital of two millions\nand a half, and, in the latter, a capital of four millions, bearing 3\u00bd\n_per cent._ interest, with the same annuities annexed.\n\nIn 1758, the additional sum of half a million was borrowed at 3 _per\ncent._ by a lottery, consisting of 50,000 tickets, each of the same\nreal value with 10l. _stock_, but sold to the subscribers for 10l. in\n_money_[109]. As the 3 _per cents._ were now at 94, 3\u00bc _per cent._ could\nnot be made of money laid out in the funds. Therefore, 350,000_l._ of\nthis half million might have been raised at 3\u00bd _per cent._ interest,\nand the remaining 150,000_l._ might have been procured for the profits\nof the lottery. Or (which is the same) 10_l._ each would have been given\nfor 50,000 tickets, of the same value taken all together, with 350,000l.\ncarrying 3\u00bd _per cent._ interest; and a capital of 150,000_l._ would have\nbeen saved.\n\nThe same is true of the lottery, by which half a million was borrowed\nin 1756.\u2014A million and a half also borrowed in this year, by creating a\ncapital of a million and a half, bearing 3\u00bd _per cent._ for 15 years, and\nafterwards 3 _per cent._ might have been procured, by creating a capital\nof only 1.400,000_l._ bearing 3\u00bc _per cent._ interest. But I will not\nexamine any more of these loans. Let us next consider how detrimental\nthey have been to the public.\n\n * * * * *\n\nAll the savings and surplus monies of the kingdom from 1763 to 1775, have\namounted (deducting 400,000_l._ gained by debts discharged at a discount)\nto 10.739,793_l._ and with this sum 11.139,793_l._ of the national debt\nhas been paid off. (See the _Postscript_ at the end of this work.)\u2014The\nneedless addition which was made to the capital of the national debt, by\ninjudicious schemes for raising money during the last war, exceeded this\nsum; and it follows, therefore, that the whole surplus of the revenue for\ntwelve years, has not been sufficient to discharge the capital, to which\nin the last war a right was given, without receiving any money for it, or\nobtaining the least advantage by it.\n\nThe attentive reader must have observed, as I have gone along, that the\nextravagance on which I have insisted, has been the consequence of not\nseparating, in the schemes for raising money, the premiums (consisting\nof short and long and life-annuities) from the perpetual annuities, and\nrequiring them to be distinctly paid for; and also, of not attending to\nthe difference between selling an _annuity_, and selling the _stock_ for\nwhich that annuity is paid. When a 100_l._ _stock_ in the 3 _per cents._\nis at any given price, there is no one who would not be glad to purchase\nfrom government a perpetual annuity of 3_l._ at any _lower_ price[110].\nBut when government sells the _stock_, instead of the _annuity_, at that\nprice, the public is injured in the manner I have represented.\n\nWould any one, in selling any part of his property, offer to make the\npurchase-money an outstanding principal which he shall be bound to\nreturn?[111] This is what government has uniformly done in its proposals\nfor raising money.\u2014Were I to desire any sum to be lent me _without_\ninterest, offering as a _compensation_ or _premium_ an annuity for a\ngiven term, or an advantageous contract; the proposal would not be\naccepted, unless the annuity or the contract was worth the sum to be\nlent; and I should make myself a debtor to the purchaser for the very\nthing which I sold to him.\u2014The absurdity would be the same, if instead of\nborrowing _without_ interest, I should in the same way borrow at a _low_\ninterest. In every such bargain, I should bring upon myself a needless\ndebt, equal to the value of the _premium_.\n\nI am afraid I have tired my reader\u2019s attention on this subject. But as\nmuch depends upon a right understanding of it, I am anxious about shewing\nit in every possible light. In hopes, therefore, of being attended to\na little longer, I shall endeavour to give a yet fuller view of this\nsubject, and to prove its importance, by recapitulating some of the\nforegoing remarks, and comparing the _present_ state of our public debts,\nwith that which would have been their state, had the errors I have\npointed out, in the schemes of the public loans during the last war, been\navoided.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe sum of 12 millions, borrowed in 1762, would have left, at the end\nof the war, a redeemable capital of 7.200,000l. carrying 5 _per cent._\ninterest, with an annuity added of 120,000l. for 18 years from January\n1763, instead of an _ir_-redeemable capital of 12 millions carrying 4\n_per cent._ for 18 years, and afterwards 3 _per cent._ See page 95, &c.\n\nThe sum of 12 millions, borrowed in 1761, would have left a redeemable\ncapital of 9 millions bearing 4 _per cent._ interest, with a long annuity\nannexed; instead of 12 millions with the same annuity annexed. Page 100.\n\nThe sum of 8 millions, borrowed in 1760, would have left a redeemable\ncapital of 6.180,000l. carrying 4 _per cent._ with an annuity of 82,400l.\nfor 18 years from January 1763; instead of 8.240,000l. _ir_-redeemable,\nand carrying 4 _per cent._ for 18 years, and afterwards 3 _per cent._\nPage 99.\n\nThe sum of 6.600,000l. borrowed in 1759, would have left a capital of\n6.450,000l. carrying 3\u00bd _per cent_; instead of a capital of 7.590,000l.\ncarrying 3 _per cent._ Page 95.\n\nThe sum of five millions, borrowed in 1758, would have left a redeemable\ncapital of 4.350,000l. bearing 3\u00bd _per cent._ interest, with an annuity\nadded of 22,500l. for 19 years from Midsummer 1763; instead of a capital\nof five millions irredeemable, and carrying 3\u00bd _per cent._ for 19 years,\nand afterwards 3 _per cent._ Page 101, 102, &c.\n\nThe sum of three millions, borrowed in 1757, would have left a capital of\ntwo millions and a half bearing 3\u00bd _per cent._ interest, instead of three\nmillions bearing 3 _per cent._ interest.\u2014And two millions, borrowed\nin 1756, instead of leaving a capital of two millions, would have left a\ncapital of only 1.750,000l. Page 104.\n\nThe result, therefore, is, that the whole capital of the public debts\nwould have been, at the end of the last war, near TWELVE MILLIONS AND\nA HALF less than it was; and at the same time, the annual charge not\ngreater.\u2014In 1775, the difference would have been much more considerable.\nFor,\n\nSupposing all the same sums applied since the last war to the discharge\nof the public debts that we know have been so applied, not only the\n_capital_ but the _annual charge_ would have been considerably less.\u2014This\nwill be demonstrated by the following account.\n\nIt may be learnt from the _Postscript_ at the end of this Tract, that\n11.139,793l. of the public debts has been discharged with 10.739,793l. of\nthe public money, derived from various savings and surplusses. All this\nmoney _might_ have been employed, and without doubt _would_ have been\nemployed, in redeeming first the capital I have mentioned in Page 107,\nof 7.200,000l. bearing 5 _per cent._ interest; and afterwards, the two\nother capitals there mentioned of 9 millions, and of 6.180,000l. bearing\n4 _per cent._ interest. It would have been sufficient to redeem the whole\nof the former capital, and also 3.539,793l. of the two last capitals;\nwhich would have set free for the public an annual charge of 501,591l.\u2014To\nthis sum must be added an annual charge of 256,000l. saved in 1765, 1766,\n1767 and 1768, by redeeming, with 6.400,000l. borrowed in those years, so\nmuch of a debt unfunded at the end of the war, but afterwards funded, and\ncarrying 4 _per cent._ interest. And also 12,537l. _per ann._ gained by\nchanging 1.253,700l. from an interest of 4 to 3 _per cent._ and 7,500l.\n_per ann._ gained in 1771, by the ceasing of an annuity of a \u00bd _per\ncent._ annexed for 15 years to 1.500,000l. borrowed in 1756.\u2014The total\ndecrease, therefore, of the annual charge would have been 777,628l.\u2014But\nat the same time there would have been the following additions to\nit.\u2014First. There would have been the addition of 199,500l. _per ann._\nbeing the interest of 6.650,000l. borrowed since 1763.\u2014Secondly. Of\n69,187l. _per ann._ being the interest of 2.306,240l. applied, in 1764\nand 1765, to the discharge of German and army debts derived from the\nwar, and which might have been converted into a funded capital bearing\n3 _per cent._ interest, by borrowing money to pay them off, in order to\navoid diverting money employed in redeeming capitals bearing 5 _per cent._\n\nThese two sums make 268,687l. which deducted from 777,628l. leaves\n508,941l. And this is the clear annual charge which would have been\nsaved to the public, exclusive of the savings which have arisen from the\nfalling in of life-annuities.\n\nBut the annual charge that has in fact been saved is only\n382,129[112].\u2014The difference is 126,812l.\u2014With this additional saving,\nas it fell in and increased from time to time during the course of 12\nyears, a million more of the public debts bearing 4 _per cent._ might\nhave been redeemed; and this would have made a farther saving of 40,000l.\n_per ann._ It appears, therefore, upon the whole, that had the mistakes I\nhave pointed out, in the loans of the last war, been avoided, (all other\npublic measures remaining the same) the nation would _now_ have had 13\nmillions and a half less to pay, in order to redeem its debts; and also\nan annual charge upon it 166,812l. less.\n\nAll this supposes that the capitals of the 5 _per cent._ and 4 _per\ncent._ annuities in the improved schemes were redeemable.\u2014But had they\nbeen made irredeemable till 1781, as mentioned in page 98, the public\nwould not have been much less benefited: For, soon after 1781, these 5\nand 4 _per cents._ (the former 7.200,000l. and the latter 15.180,000l.)\nmight have been easily reduced to 3\u00bd _per cent._ and this would have\noccasioned an annual saving of 183,900l. over and above the savings,\nwhich would have arisen in that year, from the extinction of the short\nannuities.\n\nI will add, that had these annuities been made not only _irredeemable_\ntill 1781; but _irreducible_ for some time beyond that year, in the\nmanner intimated in page 98, the public would still have been greatly\nbenefited. For, the annual charge upon it would not at any time have been\ngreater; but its debts would have been 12 millions and a half less; and,\nat the same time, they would have been capable of being discharged with\nmore expedition, and at a less expence, than a smaller quantity of its\npresent debts. See the note, page 94.\n\n * * * * *\n\nI cannot doubt but that all who will attentively examine these\nobservations will find them to be just.\u2014I have confined my enquiries\nto the loans of the last war. Had I extended them to all our loans, it\nwould have appeared, that a greater sum than most persons can think\ncredible,[113] has been such a needless addition to our debts as I have\nexplained; or, \u201ca pure and uncompensated loss, which might have been\navoided by only framing differently the schemes of the public loans.\u201d\n\n\n\n\nPART III.\n\n\nSECT. I.\n\nABSTRACT of the EXPORTS from and IMPORTS to GREAT-BRITAIN from 1697 to\n1773, with REMARKS.\n\n IMPORTS. EXPORTS. EXCESS of EXPORTS.\n \u00a3. \u00a3. \u00a3.\n ANNUAL MEDIUM\n for FOUR YEARS\n ended at 1700 4.956,975 6.034,724 1.077,749 or 10/56 of\n the exports.\n\n For FIVE YEARS\n ended at 1710 5.321,717 6.713,246 1.391,529 or 10/48 of\n the exports.\n at 1715 5.304,343 7.401,946 2.097,603 or 10/35 of\n the exports.\n at 1725 6.628,279 9.663,527 3.035,248 or 10/32 of\n the exports.\n at 1735 7.470,454 11.855,226 4.384,772 or 10/27 of\n the exports.\n at 1745 7.363,079 11.922,982 4.559,903 or 10/26 of\n the exports.\n at 1750 7.429,739 12.877,129 5.447,390 or 10/24 of\n the exports.\n at 1755 8.264,834 13.406,530 5.141,696 or 10/26 of\n the exports.\n at 1760 8.877,144 14.253,377 5.376,233 or 10/26 of\n the exports.\n For FOUR YEARS\n ended at 1764 10.110,870 15.793,158 5.682,228 or 10/28 of\n the exports.\n\n For NINE YEARS\n ended at 1773 11.996,769 14.814,074 2.817,305 or 10/53 of\n the exports.\n\nThis ABSTRACT has been formed from the accounts delivered annually to the\nHOUSE OF COMMONS, and lately published by Sir CHARLES WHITWORTH.\n\nIn order to draw just inferences from it, the following particulars\nshould be remembered.\u2014First. The EXPORTS in the _Custom-House_ entries\nare, for reasons well-known, too high. This excess has, by some of\nthe best judges, been reckoned at a million _per ann._\u2014Secondly. The\nIMPORTS are too low, no smuggled commodities being included in them.\nThis deficiency has been estimated at another million _per ann._ But, in\norder to be sure of keeping within bounds, I will take both at a _million\nand a half per ann._\u2014Thirdly. The interest of the national debt paid to\nforeigners; the money spent in foreign countries by _English_ travellers;\nthe bullion consumed in manufactures; and the wear of the current coin,\ncannot, perhaps, amount to much less than two millions _per ann._ I will,\nhowever, take them at no more than the annual sum which has been commonly\nsupposed to be due to foreigners from our funds; or, a _million and a\nhalf_.\u2014In order, therefore, to find the GRAND BALANCE OF PAYMENT between\n_Britain_ and the rest of the world _since_ the last war, all these\nsums (making up THREE MILLIONS) must be deducted from the excess of the\nexports.\u2014But, in order to find the same balance _before_ the end of the\nlast war, less must be deducted, in proportion as the national debt and\nthe foreign trade were _then_ less than they are _now_.\n\nIf the foregoing Abstract is examined with a due regard to this rule, it\nwill be found that, from[114] 1710 to 1764, the BALANCE OF PAYMENT must\nhave been in favour of _Britain_; and that consequently, there must have\nbeen, during that period, an influx of money into the kingdom.\u2014It was\nthis, together with the increase of our paper, that produced the rapid\nfall of interest which began a few years before the _Accession_. And it\nwas this also that enabled us to bear the great expence of the two last\nwars, and the loss of those enormous sums which were sent out of the\nkingdom to pay foreign subsidies, and to support armies on the continent.\n\nBefore 1710 it appears to be doubtful, whether the excess of the\nexports was such as brought any money into the kingdom; but it seems\ncertain, that it could not have been such as in any degree compensated\nthat drain of the public cash, which was occasioned by the continental\nwars of King _William_ and Queen _Ann_. In consequence of this, the\nquantity of _specie_ in the kingdom must have been greatly diminished;\nand Dr. _Davenant_ computes that in 1711 it was nine millions less than\nat the _Revolution_. Hence proceeded the high rate of interest; the\nunproductiveness of the taxes; and the difficulties which government\nmet with in raising money during those two wars: And there is reason to\nbelieve, these difficulties would have been insurmountable, had not a\nsubstitute for _specie_ been provided by the establishment of the _Bank_.\n\nIn the interval of peace between the two last wars, or from 1748 to\n1755, the balance in favour of _Britain_ was at the highest; and this\ncontributed to raise the stocks[115] to such a price, as enabled\ngovernment to reduce the interest of the public debts from 4 to 3 _per\ncent._\n\nBut the observation I here intended principally to make is, that the\n_balance_, since the year 1764, appears, from the preceding abstract, to\nhave been _against_ BRITAIN; and that this accounts for the high price of\nbullion, the scarcity of specie, and the distress of the _Bank_ from that\nyear to 1773.\n\nIt deserves farther to be observed that, while the exports were\ndecreasing from 1764 to 1773, the IMPORTS appear to have increased\nfaster than ever: And the fact is, that since 1760, a greater addition\nhas been made to them, than had been made during the whole time from the\n_Accession_ to that year.\u2014This is a striking proof that luxury has been\nfor some years increasing with rapidity among us; and it is worth adding,\nthat the productiveness of the taxes has kept pace, as might have been\nexpected, with this increase of luxury, both the CUSTOMS and EXCISES\nhaving brought in lately, near 250,000l. _per ann._ each, more than they\ndid twelve years ago.\u2014It should be attended to, that this improvement\nof the revenue must be the effect solely of an increased consumption\noccasioned by luxury; the taxes, ever since the end of the last war,\nhaving been nearly the same.\n\nThe _exports_ from 1710 to 1764 went on increasing constantly. I have\nobserved, that from 1764 to 1773 they have decreased. One reason of this\nhas been, the decline of the PORTUGAL trade; the exports to that country\nhaving fallen, since 1760, from 1.200,000l. _per ann._ to 600,000l. _per\nann._\u2014Another reason has been the check which a wretched policy has been\ngiving, ever since 1763, to our trade with the Colonies. This trade had\nfor many years contributed more than any other trade towards raising our\n_exports_; and even in the period between 1763 and 1774, notwithstanding\nthe checks it received, it went on increasing, and produced a balance\nin our favour of a million and a half _per ann._ But since 1774 it has\nbeen entirely lost. _Before_ this loss, the balance of payment between\nus and the rest of the world was, according to the account I have given,\n_against_ us. Undoubtedly then, it was a loss we could by no means have\nsustained, had it not been for the seasonable interposition of some very\nparticular causes. Time will shew whether these causes are of a permanent\nnature, or temporary and accidental.\n\n\nSECT. II.\n\n_HISTORICAL DEDUCTION and ANALYSIS of the PUBLIC DEBTS._\n\n\n_STATE and AMOUNT of the NATIONAL DEBT, at Midsummer, 1775, with the\nCharges of Management._\n\n CAPITALS and ANNUITIES transferable at the BANK OF ENGLAND.\n\n Principal. Interest.\n \u00a3. \u00a3.\n\n CAPITAL of their original Fund\u2014See Note (1) p. 125 3.200,000 96,000\n\n EXCHEQUER bills, by 3d of _Geo._ I. c. 8th, bearing\n originally 5 _per cent._ interest, but reduced\n to 4 _per cent._ in 1727, and to 3 _per cent._ by\n 23d _George_ II. 1749. See Note (2) p. 126 500,000 15,000\n\n Purchased of the SOUTH SEA COMPANY in 1722,\u2014reduced\n from 6 to 5 _per cent._ interest in 1717; from 5\n to 4. _per cent._ in 1727; and to 3 _per cent._\n by 23d of _George_ II. 1749.\u2014See Note (3) 4.000,000 120,000\n\n Lent to government at 4 _per cent._ in 1728,\n charged on the surplus of the fund for the\n lottery in 1714, and reduced to 3 _per cent._\n by 23d _George_ II. 1749 1.250,000 37,500\n\n Lent at 4 _per cent._ in 1727; charged on the\n duties on coals; and reduced to 3 _per cent._\n by 23d of _George_ II. 1749 1.750,000 52,500\n\n Lent at 4 _per cent._ in 1746; charged on licences\n for retailing spirituous liquors; and reduced to\n 3 _per cent._ by 23d _Geo._ II. 1749 986,800 29,604\n\n ---------------------\n Amount of Bank capital 11.686,800 350,604\n See Note (4) p. 126.\n\n Charge of management 5,898_l._ _per ann._\n\n BANK ANNUITIES.\n\n Consolidated 4 _per cent._ annuities due\n _April_ 5, and _October_ 10\u2014See Note (5) 18.986,300 759,452\n\n These annuities fall to 3 _per cent._ in\n _January_, 1781. Charge of management\n 10,680_l._ _per ann._\n\n Annuities at 3\u00bd _per cent._ 1758, due _Jan._ 5, and\n _July_ 5.\u2014These annuities fall to 3 _per cent._\n in 1782 4.500,000 157,500\n\n See an account of them in p. 101.\n\n Charge of management 2,805_l._ _per ann._\n including management on half a million raised\n at the same time by a lottery, and made a part\n of the consolidated 3 _per cents_.\n\n CONSOLIDATED 3 _per cent._ annuities due _Jan._ 5,\n and _July_ 5. See Note(6) 38.251,696 1.147,551\n\n Management 21,087_l._ _per ann._\n\n REDUCED 3 _per cent._ annuities, due _April_ 5,\n and _Oct._ 10. See Note (7) 18.353,774 550,613\n\n Charge of management 10,324_l._ _per ann._\n\n Three _per cent._ 1726, due _Jan._ 5, and _July_ 5,\n charged on the deduction of 6_d._ _per_ pound on\n all pensions from the civil list; and on all\n payments from the crown, except to the navy and\n army\u2014See Note (8) p. 128 1.000,000 30,000\n\n Management 360_l._ _per ann._\n\n Long annuity due _Jan._ 5, and _July_ 5 6.702,750 248,250\n\n The remaining term from _Jan._ 1776, is 84\n years\u2014See Note (9) p. 128.\n\n Management 3,491_l._ _per ann._\n\n CAPITALS and ANNUITIES transferable at the SOUTH SEA HOUSE.\n\n SOUTH SEA STOCK 3.662,784 109,884\n\n The dividend on this stock, at 3\u00bd _per cent._\n is 128,197_l._ 9_s._\u2014Due _Jan._ 5, and _July_ 5.\n\n SOUTH SEA 3 _per cent._ OLD Annuities due\n _April_ 5, and _Oct._ 10 11.907,470 357,224\n\n Three _per cent._ NEW Annuities due _Jan._ 5,\n and _July_ 5 8.494,830 254,845\n\n Three _per cent._ 1751, due _Jan._ 5, and\n _July_ 5 1.919,600 57,588\n\n Charge of management on _South Sea_ Stock and\n Annuities 15,100_l._ _per ann._\u2014See Note (10).\n\n CAPITAL and ANNUITIES transferable at the INDIA HOUSE.\n\n EAST INDIA STOCK 3.200,000 96,000\n\n Interest 3 _per cent._\n\n _Dividend_ 7 _per cent._ 224,000_l._ due _Jan._\n 5, and _July_ 5.\u2014See Note (11).\n\n Charge of management 1.285_l._ 14_s._ 4_d._\n\n EAST INDIA Annuity due _April_ 5, and _Oct._ 10,\n charged on the surplus of a tax on spirituous\n liquors. See Note (12) 1.000,000 30,000\n\n Management 401_l._ 15_s._ 8_d._ _per ann._\n\n ANNUITIES payable at the EXCHEQUER.\n\n ANNUITIES for 96 and 99 years, from various\n dates, in the time of King _William_\n and Queen _Anne_\u2014See Note (13) 1.836,276 131,203\n\n Salaries to Exchequer officers, and\n management\u20145,250_l._ _per ann._\n\n Annuities for lives, with benefit of survivorship,\n granted by the 4th of _William_ and _Mary_,\n 1693.\u2014These annuities are not yet extinct,\n and they are valued at three years purchase 22,781 7,567\n\n Annuities for lives, with benefit of survivorship,\n by an Act of the 5th of _Geo._ III. 1765\u2014See\n Note (14) 18,000 540\n\n Annuities for two or three lives, granted in\n 1694.\u2014Also, Annuities on single lives 1745, 1746,\n and 1757.\u2014See Note (15)\u2014Their original amount,\n taken all together, was very nearly 124,000_l._\n but they are now reduced by deaths to near\n 80,000_l._ and their value is here taken at\n 10 years purchase 800,000 80,000\n\n UNFUNDED DEBT, consisting of Exchequer bills,\n (1.250,000_l._) Navy debt, (1.850,000_l._)\n and Civil list debt, supposed 500,000_l._\u2014The\n interest is reckoned at 2 _per cent._\u2014See\n Note (16) 3.600,000 72,000\n\n Salaries to Exchequer bill officers 650_l._\n _per ann._\n ---------------------\n Total of the principal and interest of the\n National Debt at _Midsummer_ 1775. \u00a3. 135.943,051 4.440,821\n\n\n_NOTES containing an EXPLANATION and HISTORY of the different Articles in\nthe foregoing Account._\n\nNOTE (1)\u2014BANK OLD CAPITAL. See Page 119.\u2014The BANK was established in\n1694. Their original capital was 1.200,000_l._ bearing 8 _per cent._\ninterest, charged on 5/7ths. of 9_d._ _per_ barrel excise, with 4000_l._\n_per ann._ for management.\u2014In 1709, they lent to government 400,000_l._\nwithout interest, which increased their old capital to 1.600,000_l._\nbearing 6 _per cent._ interest. In 1742, they again lent to government\n1.600,000l. without interest; and thereby increased this capital to its\npresent amount, or to 3.200,000_l._ bearing 3 _per cent._ with the same\nannual sum for management.\u2014It is of particular importance to observe with\nrespect to the sums of 400,000_l._ and of 1.600,000_l._ just mentioned,\nthat they were properly a compensation from the _Bank_ to the public for\ncontinuing their exclusive privileges; and would have been advanced,\nor at least the greatest part of them, though government had not bound\nitself to return the purchase money, by making it a part of the principal\ndue to the _Bank_, provided the same interest had been continued for\nsome time on their former principal, and the same liberty granted to\nincrease their _stock_.\u2014The like is true of 1.200,000_l._ advanced by the\n_India_ Company without interest in 1708.\u2014In these instances, therefore,\na needless addition was made to the public debt of 3.200,000_l._ which,\nhad it been avoided, the public would have had not only a principal so\nmuch less to pay; but it would have saved in interest at least 96000_l._\n_per ann._ for the old capital of the _Bank_ and the capital of the _East\nIndia_ Company would have formed, in this case, between them, a debt of\nonly 3.200,000_l._ (instead of 6.400,000_l._) the interest of which might\nlong ago have been reduced at least one half; or from 8 _per cent._ the\noriginal interest, to 4 _per cent._\n\n * * * * *\n\nNOTE (2)\u2014_Half a million_, part of the BANK CAPITAL. See Page 119.\u2014This\npart of the Bank capital consisted originally of two millions in\n_Exchequer_ bills, cancelled for government by an act of the 3d of _Geo._\nI. But half a million was discharged in 1729; and a million in 1738.\n\n * * * * *\n\nNOTE (3)\u2014FOUR MILLIONS purchased of the SOUTH-SEA COMPANY; part of the\nBANK Capital. See Page 119.\u2014In order to procure this money, the _Bank_\nsold new stock at 18 _per cent._ premium. This produced a saving of\n610,169_l._ the sale of 3.389,831_l._ _stock_ having produced four\nmillions in _money_. And, consequently, though by this transaction the\ncapital for which they received interest was increased four millions,\nyet the _stock_ on which they made their dividends was increased only\n3.389,831_l._\n\n * * * * *\n\nNOTE (4)\u2014BANK STOCK and DIVIDEND.\u2014The _stock_ on which the _Bank_ divides\nis only 10,780,000_l._ This dividend varies as their profits vary; but\nfor several years it has been 5\u00bd _per cent._ payable half-yearly at\n_Lady-day_ and _Michaelmas_. Their whole annual dividend is, therefore,\n592,900_l._ which subtracted from 350,604_l._ the interest paid by\ngovernment, makes their clear annual profit 242,296_l._\u2014Besides interest,\nthey receive for management of their capital 4000_l._ _per ann._ on\naccount of their old capital, and 1,898_l._ _per ann._ on account of\nfour millions purchased of the South Sea Company; in all, 5,898_l._ _per\nann._\u2014The _Bank_ receives farther the sums specified in the foregoing\naccount, towards bearing the expences of managing the annuities commonly\ncalled _Bank Annuities_. All these expences, including the sums granted\nfor managing their capital, amount to 54,645_l._ _per ann._\n\n * * * * *\n\nNOTE (5)\u2014CONSOLIDATED 4 _per cent._ BANK ANNUITIES. See Page 120.\u2014The\ncapital of these Annuities consists of two loans, one in 1760, and\nthe other in 1762, consolidated into one stock, and charged on the\nadditional duty of 3_d._ per bushel on malt, the surplus of the duties\non spirituous liquors, and the additional duties on windows; all which\nduties were ordered by 2d Geo. III. to be carried to the Sinking Fund,\nand the interest with which they were charged to be paid out of that\nfund.\u2014I have made some remarks on these loans in page 96, and page 99.\nThey amounted to 20.240,000_l._ But 1.253,700_l._ of this capital was\nchanged in 1770, from an interest of 4 to 3 _per cent._ and the capital\nreduced to the present sum.\u2014A more full account of these annuities may be\nfound in Mr. _Ashmore_\u2019s Analysis of the several Bank Annuities, p. 17.\n\n * * * * *\n\nNOTE (6)\u2014CONSOLIDATED 3 _per cent._ BANK ANNUITIES. See page 121.\u2014The\ncapital of these annuities is made a distinct stock from that of the\nannuities called _Reduced_, because it never bore a higher interest than\n3 _per cent._\u2014It consisted originally of the following loans\u201437,821_l._\nremaining in 1727, of 3 _per cent._ annuities, granted in lieu of\nSt. _Christopher_\u2019s and _Nevis_ debentures\u2014800,000_l._ borrowed in\n1731\u2014600,000_l._ borrowed in 1736\u2014300,000_l_. in 1738\u20146.400,000_l_.\nin 1742, 1743, 1744 and 1745, and charged on additional duties on\nspirituous liquors, wines, vinegar, &c.\u20141.000,000_l._ borrowed in\n1750\u201424.490,000_l._ borrowed in the course of the last war, and funded on\nthe additional duties on beer, houses, stamps, &c.\u20144.900,000_l._ borrowed\nin 1766, 1767 and 1768\u2014And 1.253,700_l._ of the 4 _per cent._ annuities,\nsubscribed into the 3 _per cent._ annuities in 1770.\n\nAll these loans were by 25 Geo. II. 1751, and several subsequent Acts\nof Parliament, consolidated into one joint stock; and carried, with the\nduties for paying the interest, to the _Sinking Fund_. And in 1770, they\nformed a capital of 39.781,521_l._ which has been since reduced, by the\npayments mentioned in the _Postscript_ at the end of this tract, to the\nsum specified in the account to which this note refers.\u2014See a more full\naccount in Mr. Ashmore\u2019s Analysis, &c. from page 5 to page 11.\n\n * * * * *\n\nNOTE (7)\u2014REDUCED 3 _per cent._ BANK ANNUITIES. See page 121.\u2014The capital\nof these annuities consisted, in 1749, of loans in 1746, 1747, and 1748,\nand navy, ordnance and transport debts funded in 1749, amounting to\n18.402,472_l._ and all bearing 4 _per cent._ interest.\u2014By the 23d of\nGeo. II. 1749, these loans were reduced to an interest of 3 _per cent._\nand by the great consolidating Act in 1751, they were converted into one\nstock, and carried into the Sinking Fund with the duties on carriages,\nand the additional duties on glass, spirituous liquors, houses, windows,\nstamps, merchandize imported, &c. which had been granted for paying the\ninterest.\u2014In 1751, certain exchequer tallies and orders, amounting to\n129,750_l._ were subscribed into this stock; and in 1765, navy bills to\nthe amount of 1,482,000_l._ were subscribed into it, which made its whole\noriginal amount 20.014.222_l._\u2014In 1751, there was paid off 830,898_l._\nbeing stock which had not been subscribed agreeably to the Act in 1749\nfor reducing interest; and in 1772, 1774, and 1775, so much more of this\nstock was paid off as reduced it to its present amount.\u2014See Mr. Ashmore\u2019s\nAnalysis, p. 12-16.\n\n * * * * *\n\nNOTE (8)\u2014CIVIL LIST MILLION. See page 121.\u2014The income settled upon King\nGeorge I. for his civil list, was 700,000_l._\u2014In 1720, there had been\ngranted him besides, from the _Royal Exchange_ and _London_ Assurance\ncompanies, 300,000_l._ And in 1726, this million was farther granted\ntowards paying off his debts.\n\n * * * * *\n\nNOTE (9)\u2014BANK LONG ANNUITY. See page 122.\u2014This annuity consists of\n128,250_l._ _per ann._ for 99 years, given in 1761, as a _premium_ to the\nsubscribers of 11.400,000_l._ at 3 _per cent_; and of 120,000_l._ _per\nann._ for 98 years, given in 1762, as a premium to the lenders of twelve\nmillions at 4 _per cent._ See page 95 and 100. It is charged, together\nwith the loans to which it was annexed, on the _Sinking Fund_.\u2014Its value\nin the Alley is about 25 years purchase; but the remaining term is really\nworth 27 years purchase, reckoning interest at 3\u00bd, (or the 3 _per cents._\nbeing at 85\u00be.) But when interest is at 4 _per cent._ or the 3 _per\ncents._ are at 75, it is worth only 24 years purchase.\u2014When this annuity\nis called a _premium_, it must not be imagined, that no compensation was\ngiven for it. Government received the value of it; but, at the same time,\nmade itself a debtor for that value. And, what is very surprizing, this\nhas been uniformly practised with respect to all the premiums or douceurs\ngranted by government; and the consequence has been, that great and\nneedless increase of the public debt explained in the 3d section of the\n2d Part.\n\n * * * * *\n\nNOTE (10).\u2014SOUTH-SEA STOCK AND ANNUITIES. See page 122.\u2014These four\ncapitals amounting to 25.984,684_l._ 13_s._ consist almost entirely\nof the remainder of debts contracted in the reigns of _King William_\nand Queen _Anne_. The following account will probably give sufficient\ninformation concerning them.\n\nIn 1711, Lord Oxford being minister, the proprietors of certain navy,\narmy, ordnance and transport debts, to the amount of 9.177,968_l._\nincluding arrears of interest, and half a million for the current\nsupplies, were incorporated into a company for trading to the\n_South-seas_. They were allowed 6 _per cent._ interest for this debt,\nwith 8000_l._ _per ann._ for management; and the duties on wine, tobacco,\n_East-India_ goods, candles, &c. were made perpetual, and granted as a\n_Fund_ (ever since called the _South-sea Company\u2019s Fund_) for paying the\ninterest. This kept up public credit at the time, and has been called\nthe _Earl of Oxford_\u2019s master-piece.\u2014By the 1st of Geo. I. 822,032_l._\nconsisting chiefly of interest payable on the Company\u2019s capital, was\nadded to the capital, in consequence of which it was increased to TEN\nMILLIONS, (ever since called their _original capital_) bearing 6 _per\ncent._ interest.\u2014In 1717, they agreed to take 5 _per cent_; and this was\nthe first great reduction of interest, which in conjunction with the same\nreduction of the other redeemable debts almost all carrying 6 _per cent._\nlaid the foundation of the SINKING FUND established in this year. But\nit is remarkable, that so fast did interest fall at this time, that the\nprice of _South-sea stock_, notwithstanding this reduction, rose from 101\nto 111.\u2014In 1719, the _South-sea_ capital was increased to 11.746,844_l._\nbearing 5 _per cent._ interest (with an addition of 1,397_l._ 9_s._\nto their former allowance for management) by advancing to government\n544,142_l._ and by the proprietors of 94,329_l._ 12_s._ lottery annuities\nfor 32 years granted in 1710, accepting in lieu of them 1.202,702_l._\n_South Sea stock_.\u2014In 1720, the agreement was made by government with\nthe South Sea Company, which produced the great SOUTH SEA BUBBLE.\u2014There\nexisted at that time _long_ annuities to the amount of 666,821_l._\n8_s._ and _short_ annuities, for 32 years from 1710, to the amount of\n127,260_l._ 6_s._ The proprietors of these annuities were allowed to\nsubscribe them into the _South Sea_ trading stock; and the Company, for\nevery 100_l._ of the _long_ annuity which should be subscribed, were\nto receive from government an addition to their capital of 2000_l._\nbearing 5 _per cent._ interest till 1727, and afterwards 4 _per cent._\ntill redeemed: and for every 100_l._ of the _short_ annuities, they\nwere to receive an addition to their capital of 1400_l._ bearing the\nsame interest.\u2014They were besides to take in the redeemable debts to the\namount of 16.546,482_l_. and to receive an addition to their capital of\n100_l._ for every 100_l._ subscribed.\u2014By the subscription of the _long_\nand _short_ annuities which followed this agreement, a capital due from\ngovernment to the Company was created, which was greater by 3.034,769_l._\nthan the original sum advanced for the annuities subscribed. And as\nmuch of these annuities and of the redeemable debts were subscribed, as\nincreased the _South Sea_ trading capital to 37.802,203_l._\u2014In 1722,\nfour millions of this capital was purchased by the BANK, (See Note 3.)\nwhich reduced it to 33.802,203_l._\u2014By 9 Geo. I. 1723, this remaining\ncapital was divided into two equal parts, one of which alone (or\n16.901,101_l._) was ordered to be the trading capital of the Company,\nand the other part was directed to be called _South Sea Annuities_.\u2014In\n1733, the _South Sea_ trading capital had been reduced by payments at\ndifferent times to 14.651,137_l._ 12_s._ By an Act of Parliament in\nthat year, this remaining stock received a farther division; and only\na fourth part, or 3.662,784_l._ was allowed to be the Company\u2019s stock;\nand the other three parts, or 10.988,353_l._ were directed to be called\nNEW South Sea Annuities, in order to distinguish them from the former\nannuities, which have ever since gone under the name of OLD South Sea\nannuities.\u2014From 1733, to the present time, SOUTH SEA STOCK has continued\nthe same; but the capital of the OLD South Sea annuities has been\nreduced, by redemptions, to 11,907,470_l._ and of the NEW South Sea\nannuities, to 8.494,830_l._ And of the whole _South Sea_ debt, which in\n1722 was 33.802,203_l._ there has, since that year, been paid off in all\n9.737,119_l._ This should have reduced it to 24.065,081_l._ but it is in\nreality 25.984,685_l._ The reason of this is, that the diminution just\nmentioned of the _South Sea_ debt was made in part with money borrowed in\n1751, to pay off such proprietors of South Sea annuities as had refused\nto consent to the reduction of interest proposed to them in 1749. The sum\nborrowed for this purpose was 2.100,000_l._ bearing 3 _per cent._ with\n1181_l._ 5_s._ for management. This debt is now reduced by redemptions to\nthe sum specified in the preceding account; or to 1.919,600_l._\n\n * * * * *\n\nNOTE (11).\u2014EAST-INDIA STOCK. See page 123.\u2014In 1698, a company of\nmerchants, in consideration of two millions lent to government at 8 _per\ncent._ were incorporated, and entitled to the sole privilege of trading\nto the _East-Indies_.\u2014These two millions formed the first capital of the\npresent _East-India_ Company.\u2014In 1702, an old company of traders to the\n_East-Indies_ was united to this company; and in 1708, these united\ncompanies lent to government 1.200,000_l._ without additional interest,\nwhich made their capital 3.200,000_l._ bearing 5 _per cent._\u2014In 1730,\nthis interest was reduced to 4 _per cent._ and by the 23d Geo. II. 1749,\nto 3 _per cent._\u2014The salt duties, and some additional stamp duties, were\nat first charged with the annuity due on this capital; but at present the\nduties constituting the aggregate fund are charged with it.\n\n * * * * *\n\nNOTE (12).\u2014EAST-INDIA ANNUITY. See page 123.\u2014The capital of this\nannuity was advanced to government in 1744, at 3 _per cent._ and, in\nconsideration of this loan, the exclusive charter of the Company was\ncontinued to Lady-day 1783, at which time it is to cease, provided three\nyears notice has been given, and the debt due from government discharged.\n\nAn observation here forces itself upon me, which I have often had\noccasion to make.\u2014Part of this loan was a compensation from the\n_East-India_ Company for prolonging the term of its charter; and,\ntherefore, ought not to have been included in the loan. The Company would\nhave lent 750,000_l._ on the interest common at the time, or 4 _per\ncent._ and the remainder would have been advanced as a gratuity.\u2014It is a\npity those who managed these contracts for the public, did not attend to\nthe absurdity and extravagance of making a _debt_ of purchase money, and\n_borrowing_ in the very act of _selling_.\n\n * * * * *\n\nNOTE (13).\u2014EXCHEQUER LONG ANNUITIES. See page 123.\u2014These are the _long_\nannuities which, in 1720, remained unsubscribed to the South Sea Company.\nSee Note 10.\u2014They consist first of annuities to the amount of 54,900_l._\n14_s._ 6_d._ purchased by the 4th, 5th, and 6th of _William_ and _Mary_,\nfor 96 years, from January 1695, with the addition of 1350_l._ _per ann._\nfor salaries to exchequer officers. These annuities were originally 14\n_per cent._ life-annuities. By the 6th and 7th of _William_ and _Mary_,\nin order to raise more money, these annuitants, or any other persons\nfor them, were offered a reversionary interest in the annuities after\nthe failure of the lives, till the end of 96 years from January 1695,\non paying 4\u00bd years purchase, (that is 63_l._) for every annuity of\n14_l._\u2014The predecessors of the present company of the MILLION BANK (so\ncalled from the MILLION lottery 1694, in which they were some of the\nprincipal adventurers) purchased 30,669_l._ 4_s._ of these reversionary\nannuities. The life annuitants being now reduced to a very small number,\nalmost the whole of this annuity is lapsed to the _company_; and though\nthey have divided for several years 5 _per cent._ on a capital of half a\nmillion, yet their growing savings, from the falling in of lives, have\nbeen such, that, when their annuity ceases in 1791, they will, I am\ninformed, have accumulated a fund considerably larger, than the capital\non which they have made their dividends. But to return.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThese EXCHEQUER Annuities consist farther of\n\n \u00a3. _s._ _d._\n 30,400 6 8 purchased for 99 years from _Christmas_\n 1705, by 2d and 3d of _Anne_, with\n 1450_l._ for management.\n 23,234 16 6 purchased for 99 years from _Lady-day_,\n 1706, by 4 _Anne_, with 1470_l._\n _per ann._ for management.\n 7,776 10 0 purchased for 99 years from _Lady-day_,\n 1707, by 5 _Anne_, with 375_l._ 12_s._\n _per ann._ for management.\n 4,710 0 0 purchased for 99 years from _Lady-day_,\n 1708, by 6th of _Anne_, with 208_l._\n 2_s._ _per ann._ for management.\n 10,181 0 0 purchased for 99 years from _Lady-day_,\n 1707, by a 2d Act of 5th of _Anne_,\n with 416_l._ _per ann._ for management.\n Add 54,900 14 6\n -----------------\n 131,203 7 8 Total.\n\nThe original sum contributed for these annuities was 1.836,276_l._ They\nare even now worth more than this sum. The public has already paid above\nTEN MILLIONS; and by the time they are all extinct, it will have paid\nabove THIRTEEN MILLIONS, on their account. This is great extravagance;\nbut it is nothing to the extravagance constantly practised of borrowing\non perpetual annuities, without putting them into a fixed course of\nredemption.\n\n * * * * *\n\nNOTE (14).\u2014TONTINE by an act of 6 Geo. III. See page 124.\u2014The intention\nof this Act was to raise 300,000_l._ towards paying off navy bills, by\noffering to subscribers for every 100_l._ advanced, an annuity of 3_l._\nfor their lives, with benefit of survivorship. But the scheme did not\nsucceed, and only 18000_l._ was subscribed.\n\n * * * * *\n\nNOTE (15).\u2014LIFE ANNUITIES. See page 124.\u2014The annuities on _two_ lives in\n1694, were sold at 12_l._ _per ann._ during _two_ lives, of any ages, and\nthe annuities on _three_ lives, at 10_l._ _per ann._ during three lives,\nfor every 100_l._ advanced.\u2014This was very extravagant; for, supposing the\nannuitants in general, about the age of 20 or 30, it was the same, in\nthe case of _two_ lives, with giving above 10 _per cent._ for money, and\nin the case of _three_ lives, 9 _per cent._\u2014It is, likewise, extremely\nabsurd in these cases to pay no regard to difference of ages. A _single_\nlife at the age of 60, supposing money improved at 4 _per cent._ is\nintitled to 11 _per cent._ but at the age of 10, scarcely to 6 _per\ncent._ _Two_ lives at 60, are entitled, on the same supposition, to 8\u00bd\n_per cent._ but at 10, not to 5 _per cent._\u2014The original amount of these\nannuities was 22,700_l._ nearly. In 1762, that is, in 68 years, they were\nreduced by deaths no lower than 9,215_l._\n\nThe other life-annuities mentioned in the preceding account were\n_douceurs_ granted for loans in 1745, 1746, and 1757. An account of the\nannuities granted in the last of these years may be seen in page 101.\n\nThe life-annuities in 1745, amounted to 22,500_l._ and were granted,\ntogether with the profits of a lottery, for a loan of two millions at 4\n_per cent._\n\nThe life-annuities in 1746, amounted to 45,000_l._ and were granted,\nwith the profits of another lottery, for a loan of three millions, at\nthe same interest.\u2014The remarks made in the 3d section of the last part,\nand particularly in the note, p. 101, are applicable to these two loans.\nThe value of the life-annuities, and the profits of the lotteries, were\nmade a part of the public debt. And, supposing the life-annuities worth,\none with another, only 14 years purchase, and the profits of the two\nlotteries worth 300,000_l._ it will follow, that the capital created\nby these loans, instead of being 5.000,000_l._ should have been only\n3.755,000_l._\n\nBut there is another remark, which it is proper to mention here. The\nlife-annuities granted in 1757, amounting to 33,750_l._ were, in January\n1775, that is in 18 years, reduced by deaths to 28,732_l._ or but a\nlittle more than a seventh part. But, supposing the annuitants all in\nthe firmest stage of life, or between the age of 10 and 30, they ought,\naccording to some of the best tables of observations, to have been\nreduced a _quarter_. These life-annuities have, therefore, fallen in much\nmore slowly than could have been expected; and I have found the same to\nbe true of all the other life-annuities.\u2014The reason, undoubtedly, is,\nthat the tables exhibit the rate of mortality among all sorts and orders\nof men taken together; whereas, the lives on which annuities are bought,\nare a selection of the better sort of lives from the general mass, and\ntherefore must be of greater value.\u2014Indeed I am not acquainted with any\ntable of observations which gives the probabilities of the duration\nof life high enough to be a guide in this case; except that which was\nformed by Mr. _De Parcieux_, from the French _Tontines_.\u2014A calculation,\ntherefore, of the values of lives, agreeably to this table, would be of\nconsiderable use.\n\n * * * * *\n\nNOTE (16).\u2014UNFUNDED DEBT. See page 124.\u2014I have given the navy debt, as it\nwas in January, 1775.\u2014The civil list debt in 1775, was probably more than\nthe sum at which I have reckoned it. Lord STAIR, in his account of the\nnational debt, income, and expenditure, reckons it at 800,000_l._\n\nMuch the greatest part of the foregoing debts, with the taxes for\npaying the interest, including the duties composing the _Aggregate_,\n_South-Sea_, and _General_ Funds, have, by the 25th of _George_ the\nSecond, 1751, and several subsequent acts of Parliament, been thrown\ninto one general account; and the _surplus_ of the whole, after\ndeducting the interest, 800,000l. _per ann._ to the civil list, and a\nfew other payments, forms the SINKING FUND.\u2014The debts not brought to\nthis account are about seven millions and a half in the _South-Sea_\nHouse; 11.186,800l. of the _Bank_ capital; the Civil List million; four\nmillions and a half borrowed at 3\u00bd _per cent._ in 1758; the capital of\nthe East-India annuity; and the Exchequer long and life annuities, except\nthose granted in 1758. But the _surplusses_ of the duties which pay\nthe interest of these debts are either carried _immediately_ into the\n_Sinking Fund_ account; or brought _first_ to the _Aggregate_ Fund, and\nfrom thence carried into that account.\u2014On the contrary. Deficiencies in\nthese duties when they happen, are made good out of the Sinking Fund; and\nafterwards replaced from the supplies.\n\nFor example. Three old nine-penny excises on beer, with an additional\nthree-pence per barrel, producing above half a million annually; also,\n3,700l. _per_ week out of the hereditary excise on beer, together with\nsome duties on paper, coals, &c. and \u2153 additional subsidy of tonnage and\npoundage, are appropriated to the payment of the Banker\u2019s Annuity; the\nLife Annuities granted in 1693 and 1694; the Exchequer Long Annuities;\nand annuities on various sums subscribed to the South-Sea Company in\n1720. The surplusses make a part of the _Aggregate Fund_; and after\ncontributing to satisfy the charge on that fund, are carried into the\n_Sinking Fund_.\u2014Again. Certain additional duties on soap, parchment,\ncoals, &c. are appropriated to pay the interest of 1.250,000l. and\nof 1.750,000l. parts of the Bank capital.\u2014The surplusses are carried\n_directly_ to the _Sinking Fund_.\u2014In like manner. The duties on houses\nand windows imposed by an act of the 20th of _George_ the Second,\n1747,[116] after deducting from them 91,485l. _per ann._ to satisfy\ncertain charges on old house-duties in the _Aggregate Fund_; and, also,\nother duties on houses and windows imposed by the 2d and 6th of _George_\nthe Third, amounting in all to about 205,000l. _per ann._ are carried\ninto the Sinking Fund, together with the capitals, the interest of which\nhas been charged upon them. But the addition to these duties (with a\ntax on pensions) granted in 1758, and charged with the interest (at 3\u00bd\n_per cent._) of the loan in that year, having not been carried into the\n_Sinking Fund_, and proving deficient; the deficiency is constantly made\ngood out of this fund, and afterwards replaced from the supplies.\n\n\n_State and Amount of the NATIONAL DEBT at Christmas 1753; with the\nCharges of Management._\n\n BANK OF ENGLAND.\n\n Principal. Interest.\n \u00a3. \u00a3.\n\n BANK capital 11.686,800 393,038\n\n Of this capital 3.200,000l. bore at this time 3\n _per cent._ interest; and the remainder bore 3\u00bd\n _per cent._ till 1757, by 23d Geo. II. 1749.\u2014See\n note (1) p. 125.\n\n Management 5,898l. _per ann._\n\n Three _per cent._ BANK Annuities consolidated by\n 25 Geo. II. 1751.\u2014See note (6) p. 127. 9.137,821 274,135\n\n Management 4,450l. _per ann._\n\n BANK Annuities consolidated by 25 Geo. II.\n 2.713,618l. carrying 3\u00bd _per cent._ interest\n till 1755; and 14.857,956l. carrying the same\n interest till 1757. See note (7) p. 128. 17.740,132 619,546\n\n Management 9,884l. _per ann._\n\n Civil List million, 1726 1.000,000 30,000\n\n Management 360l. _per ann._\n\n Whole charge of Management at the Bank in\n 1753\u201420,592l. _per ann._\n\n SOUTH-SEA COMPANY.\n\n SOUTH-SEA STOCK carrying 4 _per cent._ till 1757 3.662,784 146,511\n\n Old and New SOUTH-SEA Annuities carrying 3\u00bd\n _per cent._ till 1757 21.362,525 747,688\n\n Three _per cent._ 1751\u2014See note (10) p. 131. 2.100,000 63,000\n\n Whole charge of management at the _South-Sea-House_\n on stock and annuities, 15,748l. _per ann._\n\n EAST-INDIA HOUSE.\n\n EAST-INDIA STOCK, reduced to 3\u00bd till 1757 3.200,000 112,000\n\n EAST-INDIA annuity 1744 1.000,000 30,000\n\n Management 1,687l. 10s. _per ann._\n ---------------------\n Total[117] \u00a3. 70,851,254 2.415,918\n\n EXCHEQUER.\n\n ANNUITIES for 96 and 99 years from various dates\n in King _William_\u2019s and Queen _Anne_\u2019s times\n being the original sum contributed. See note\n (13) page 132. 1.836,276 131,203\n\n Management 5,230l. _per ann._ inclusive of\n management for the two next articles.\n\n ANNUITIES for lives with benefit of survivorship,\n being the original sum contributed 108,100 7,567\n\n ANNUITIES for two and three lives, being the\n remainder after deducting the annuities fallen\n in by deaths, and reckoned worth 10 years\n purchase 106,650 10,665\n\n ANNUITIES for single lives 1745, being the\n remainder after deducting the annuities fallen\n in by deaths; and reckoned worth 14 years\n purchase 296,142 21,153\n\n ANNUITIES for single lives 1746, being the\n remainder after the lives fallen in 582,274 41,591\n\n Navy debt in 1754\u2014Interest reckoned at 2\n _per cent._ 1.296,568 25,931\n ---------------------\n Total of the principal and interest of the\n public debts in 1753 \u00a3. 75.077,264 2.654,028\n\n\n_STATE and AMOUNT of the NATIONAL DEBT in 1739._\n\n BANK OF ENGLAND.\n\n Principal. Interest.\n \u00a3. \u00a3.\n\n BANK CAPITAL, consisting of 1.600,000l. old capital\n carrying 6 _per cent_; and 7.500,000l. carrying 4\n _per cent._ See note 1, p. 123. 9.100,000 396,000\n\n BANK ANNUITIES at 3 _per cent._ for the lottery in\n 1731. 800,000 24,000\n\n SOUTH-SEA COMPANY.\n\n Stock and annuities bearing 4 _per cent._ 27.302,203 1.092,088\n\n EAST-INDIA COMPANY.\n\n EAST-INDIA stock carrying 4 _per cent._ 3.200,000 128,000\n\n EXCHEQUER ANNUITIES.\n\n Annuities at 3\u00bd by 4 Geo. II. paid off in 1752 400,000 14,000\n\n ANNUITIES at 4 _per cent._ charged on the duty on\n wrought plate by 6 Geo. I. 1720 312,000 12,480\n\n 182,250l. of this capital was paid off in 1750.\n The remainder is now included in the capital\n of the reduced 3 _per cent._ annuities.\n\n ANNUITIES at 3 _per cent._ charged on the Sinking\n Fund by 9 and 10 Geo. II. Now included in the\n consolidated 3 _per cent._ annuities 900,000 27,000\n\n ANNUITIES on _Nevis_ and St. _Christopher_ Debentures\n at 3 _per cent._ Now included in the consolidated\n 3 _per cents._ 37,821 1,135\n\n EXCHEQUER BILLS charged on a duty upon victuallers\n by 12 Geo. I. 1726\u2014Carrying 3 _per cent._ 480,000 14,400\n\n EXCHEQUER BILLS charged on a duty on sweets by 10 of\n Geo. II. 1737\u2014Carrying 3 _per cent._ and paid off\n in 1754\u2014See the note p. 140. 499,600 14,988\n\n ANNUITIES for long terms from various dates 1.836,276 131,203\n\n ANNUITIES for lives with _benefit_ of _Survivorship_\n granted in 1693 108,100 7,567\n\n ANNUITIES for two and three lives, 1694 106,650 15,000\n\n _Navy_ debt[118] 1.300,000 26,000\n ---------------------\n Total of the _Principal_ and _Interest_ of the\n National Debt in 1739[119] \u00a3. 46.382,650 1.903,861\n\nFrom the account in the POSTSCRIPT, at the end of this tract, it will\nappear, that 10.639,793l. of the public debt was discharged between\nthe years 1763 and 1775; and also that the _funded_ debt was, in\n1775, 1.400,000l. greater than it was at the end of the last war.\nFrom hence, and from the amount of the public debt in 1775, as stated\nin page 124, it follows, that the funded debt at the end of the war\nwas 130.943,051l. and the whole debt 146.582,844l. and, consequently,\nthat the war left upon the nation an _unfunded debt_ amounting to[120]\n15.639,793l. This unfunded debt consisted of the following particulars\u2014Of\n3.500,000l. borrowed after the peace in 1763, and applied towards\nbearing such expences of the war as could not immediately cease with its\noperations.\u2014Of near _eight millions_ in navy, victualling, ordnance, and\ntransport debts.\u2014Of 1.800,000l. _Exchequer bills_; and the remainder,\nof subsidies to foreign princes, extraordinaries of the army, and German\ndemands.\n\nIn the interval of peace between 1748 and 1755 the following debts were\npaid off.\n\n \u00a3.\n\n _Bank Annuities_ bearing 4 _per cent._ 1.013,148\n\n SOUTH-SEA Annuities bearing 4 _per cent._ 176,893\n\n _Annuities_ bearing 3\u00bd _per cent._ charged by 4 Geo. II. on\n additional Stamp-duties 400,000\n\n EXCHEQUER Bills bearing 3 _per cent._ charged by 10 Geo. II.\n 1737 on the duties on sweets 499,600\n\n Borrowed in 1745 at 3\u00bd _per cent._ on the credit of the Salt\n duties 1.000,000\n\n See note, page 140.\n -----------\n [121]Total \u00a3. 3.089,641\n\nFrom the whole, the following account of the progress of the National\nDebt, from 1739 to 1775, may be deduced.\n\n Principal. Interest.\n \u00a3. \u00a3.\n\n _Amount_ of the _principal_ and _interest_\n of the national debt before the war\n which begun in 1740 46.382,650 1.903,861\n\n Amount in 1749 immediately after the war 78.166,906 2.765,608\n\n Increased by the war 31.784,256 861,747\n\n Diminished by the Peace from 1748 to 1755 3.089,641 111,590\n\n Amount at the commencement of the last war 75.077,264 2.654,018\n\n Amount at the end of the war in 1763 146.582,844 4.840,821\n\n Increased by the last war 71.505,580 2.186,803\n\n Diminished by the Peace, in twelve years from\n 1763 to 1775 10.639,793 [122]400,000\n\n Amount at _Midsummer_, 1775 135.943,051 4.440,821\n\nWe are now involved in another war, and the public debts are increasing\nagain fast. _Exchequer_ Bills have been increased from 1.250,000l. to\n1.500,000l. A new capital of 2.150,000l. has been added to the 3 _per\ncent._ Consolidated Annuities. And a vote of credit was given in the\nlast session of Parliament for a million. The last year, therefore, has\nadded 3.400,000l. to our debts, besides a vast sum not yet provided for,\nconsisting of navy, ordnance, victualling, transport and army debts.\u2014The\npresent year (1777) must make another great addition to them; and what\nthey will be at the end of these troubles, no one can tell.\u2014The union of\na _foreign_ war to the present _civil_ war might perhaps raise them to\nTWO HUNDRED MILLIONS; but, more probably, it would sink them to\u2014NOTHING.\n\n\nSECT. III.\n\n_Of the DEBTS and RESOURCES of France._\n\nMinisters have of late sought to remove the public apprehensions by\ngeneral accounts of the weakness of powers, which, from the circumstances\nof former wars as well as national prejudices, have been felt by the\npeople as jealous rivals or formidable enemies.\u2014I wish it was possible\nfor me to confirm these accounts; and by contrasting the preceding state\nof our own debts with a similar one of those of FRANCE, to shew, that\nfrom this power in particular we have nothing to fear. The following\nparticulars, on the correctness of which I can rely, may give some\nassistance in judging of this subject.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe whole expence of the last war to FRANCE was 1.118.307,047 livres;\nthat is, 49.702,000l. sterling: of which 23.152,000l. (520.926,000\nlivres) consisted of money procured by the sale of taxes, by free-gifts,\nand extra-impositions during the war, which left behind them no debts:\nAnd 26.550,000l. (597.380,100 livres) consisted of LOANS, or money raised\non perpetual annuities, life-annuities, and lotteries.\u2014At the beginning\nof 1769 the whole amount of the debts of _France_, including all arrears\nand capitals advanced on annuities and lotteries, was 128.622,000l.\nsterling, or 2.894.053,616 livres. The annual charge derived from this\ndebt was 6.707,500l. sterling (150.919,284 livres)\u2014All the appropriations\namounted to 8.218,500l. sterling (184.919,284 livres).\u2014The expences of\nthe army, navy, king\u2019s houshold, prince\u2019s houshold, foreign affairs, &c.\namounted to 8.947,000l. or 201.307,312 livres. So that the whole annual\nexpence was 17.165,000l. (386.226,596 livres).\u2014The whole revenue had\namounted, before 1769, to 13.484,500l. sterling (303.401,696 livres).\u2014The\npublic expence, therefore, had exceeded the revenue 3.681,000l.\n(82.800,000 livres.) _per ann._\n\nFrom the year 1769 to the present King\u2019s Accession, by forced reductions\nof interest, and by new taxes, the public revenue was carried to\n16.289,000l. sterling (366.508,000 livres) and the public expence was\nreduced so as not to exceed the revenue above 766,800l. _per annum_\n(17.253,000 livres).\u2014The anticipations also of the revenue, which\nbefore 1769 had extended to _seventeen_ months, were reduced to _five_\nmonths.\u2014Such was the progress of reformation; namely, an increase of\nrevenue amounting to little less than THREE MILLIONS sterling _per ann._\nin a few years, under an unpopular minister, in the latter days of a\nreign never characterized by an attention to oeconomy, or a regard to the\npublic interest; and at this time particularly stamped by unprecedented\nprofusion and a general relaxation.\n\nA new reign produced a new minister of finance whose name will be\nrespected by posterity for a set of measures as new to the _political_\nworld, as any late discoveries in the system of nature have been to the\n_philosophical_ world.\u2014Doubtful in their operation, as all unproved\nmeasures must be, but distinguished by their tendency to lay a solid\nfoundation for endless peace, industry, and a general enjoyment of\nthe gifts of nature, arts, and commerce.\u2014The edicts issued during his\nadministration exhibit indeed a ph\u00e6nomenon of the most extraordinary\nkind. An absolute king rendering a voluntary account to his subjects,\nand inciting his people to _think_; a right which it has been the\nbusiness of all absolute princes and their ministers to extinguish in\nthe minds of men.\u2014In these edicts the king declared in the most distinct\nterms against a bankruptcy, an augmentation of taxes, and new loans;\nwhile the minister applied himself to increase every public resource by\nprinciples more liberal than _France_, or any part of _Europe_, ever had\nin serious contemplation.\u2014It is much to be regretted, that the opposition\nhe met with, and the intrigues of a court, should have deprived the world\nof those lights which must have resulted from the example of such an\nadministration.\n\nAfter a short interval, a nomination, in some respects still more\nextraordinary, has taken place in the court of FRANCE. A court which a\nfew years since was distinguished by its bigotry and intolerance, has\nraised a _Protestant_, the subject of a small but virtuous republic, to\na decisive lead in the regulation of its finances. It is to be presumed,\nthat so singular a preference will produce an equally singular exertion\nof integrity and talents. Though differing from Monsieur TURGOT in\nseveral principles, which regard the larger lines of government, he\nappears by his first steps, and, particularly, the preamble to a late\nedict for raising 24 millions of livres by a lottery, to put his foot\non the same great basis of general justice, and a strict conservation\nof the faith o\u00a3 the king; and points more particularly at the surest\nof all resources in any modern states, a simplification of taxes and\na reformation in the collection of them. This administration, making\nimprovements in the Revenue its immediate object, is more capable of\npresent exertion; and, as such, is more formidable.\n\nFrom these facts and observations it is impossible not to conclude,\nthat if we trust our safety to the difficulties of FRANCE, we may\nfind ourselves fatally deceived. I will add, that though (like the\n3s. land-tax and lotteries among ourselves) some of the extraordinary\nimpositions of the last war have been continued in _France_, there\nare some which ceased with the war, and which they can renew. It is,\nparticularly, an advantage of unspeakable importance to them, that they\ncan carry on a war, as they did the last, at _half_ our expence; and\nthat, having no dependence on the flattering delusion of paper, they\ncan, as they did in 1759, bear even a bankruptcy in the middle of a\nwar, and yet carry it on vigorously.\u2014Their debts time itself is sinking\nfast. Of 3.111,000l. (seventy millions of livres) in annuities on the\n_Hotel de Ville_ at _Paris_, 1.777,000l. (forty millions of livres)\nconsisted in 1774 of Life Annuities, which were falling by deaths at\nthe rate of 71,000l. (1.600,000 livres) every year.\u2014Even their loss of\ncredit, whatever present embarrassment attends it, favours them upon\nthe whole. To this they owe the advantages just mentioned. The facility\nwith which our high credit has enabled us to run in debt ensnares us;\nand, if a change of measures does not take place,[123] must _ruin_ us.\nExperience has given them a just horror at borrowing on permanent funds;\nand were they inclined to do it, they are not able to do it to any great\namount; and, consequently, they cannot go on mortgaging one resource\nafter another till none is left.\u2014While we lose sight of the capital in\nthe interest, they carry their views chiefly to the reimbursement of\nthe capital; and after receiving high interest, for some years, can be\nsatisfied with receiving back a part of their capital.\u2014Their debts, being\nconfined in a great measure to the _Farmers General_ and others at PARIS,\nare not circulated and diffused among the body of the people in the\nmanner ours are: And it is well known, that they can make use of methods\nto discharge them which our government must never think of. The acts of\narbitrary power and unjust expedients to which, on many occasions, they\nhave had recourse for this purpose without producing any tumults, are\nsuch as appear to us almost incredible; and should the time ever come,\nwhen it will be necessary in this country to make use of any violence of\nthe same kind, all government will probably be at an end.\n\nIn point of territory and number of inhabitants, the two countries will\nbear no comparison[124]. We have hitherto opposed _France_ by our free\nspirit, and our colonies; and to them chiefly we owe our prosperity and\nvictories. Our colonies once separated from us, the islands will soon\nfollow. But should they remain ours, our comparative advantages will best\nappear from the following authentic account of the imports into _France_\nfrom their islands.\n\n In 1774.\n\n Weight in Pounds.\n\n Sugar imported into _France_ 147.986,959\n Indigo 1.734,206\n Rocou 210,187\n Coffee 58.247,133\n -----------\n 208.178,485\n\n In 1775.\n\n Weight in Pounds.\n\n Sugar imported into _France_ 171.932,972\n Indigo 2.134,247\n Rocou 169,831\n Coffee 58.545,000\n -----------\n [125]232.782,050\n\nValue of the above commodities re-exported from _France_, taken upon the\naverage price.\n\n _Livres._ _Sterling._\n\n In 1774 75.901,373 3.373,000\n In 1775 74.961,318 3.331,000\n\nThe whole importation from the _West Indies_ into _Britain_ is about\nthree millions _per ann._\n\nBut I have gone much beyond the views with which I begun this section.\nThe facts which have been stated, and the reflections which they have\noccasioned, are intended principally to shew that we ought not to suffer\nourselves to be drawn into security by any assurances of the weakness\nof _France_.\u2014May she, however, find herself the weakest of kingdoms\nwhenever, from motives of interest or ambition, she shall attempt to\ninjure any of her neighbours.\u2014May _Britain_, hitherto the most favoured\nspot under heaven, always preserve her distinguished happiness, and\nescape the danger which now threatens her. And may the time soon come,\nwhen all mankind, sensible of the value of the blessings of peace and\nequal liberty, shall suffer one another to enjoy them, and learn war no\nmore.\n\n\nSECT. IV.\n\n_Containing an Account of the National Income and Expenditure; the\nSurplus of the Revenue; and the Money drawn from the Public by the Taxes;\nwith Remarks on Lord STAIR\u2019S Account._\n\n _APPROPRIATED REVENUE at Midsummer, 1775._\n\n \u00a3.\n\n Interest of the national debt 4.440,821\n\n Civil list revenue. See the note in page 163 800,000\n\n Expences of management attending the national debt; of which\n 71,432 l. is the expence of management at the Bank, South-Sea\n House, and _India_ House; and 5.900 l. salaries to _Exchequer\n Officers_. See Page 119, &c. 77,332\n\n Annuities payable out of the Aggregate Fund to the DUKE OF\n GLOUCESTER, 8000 l.\u2014DUKE OF CUMBERLAND, 8000 l.\u2014the\n Representatives of ARTHUR ONSLOW, Esq; 3000 l.\u2014And the\n Sheriffs of ENGLAND and WALES, 4000 l.\u2014In all 23,000\n\n Clerk of the Hanaper in Chancery\u2014Coinage[126] expence\u2014Tenths\n and first-fruits of the Clergy appropriated to the\n augmentation of small livings\u2014Extra revenues of the\n crown, consisting of _American_ quit-rents; duty of 4\u00bd\n _per cent._ in the Leeward Islands; revenues of Gibraltar\n and dutchy of _Cornwall_, &c.\u2014Fees for warrants and orders,\n for auditing and engrossing accounts of dividend warrants,\n and other charges at the EXCHEQUER and TREASURY[127] 100,000\n ---------\n Total of the Appropriated Revenue \u00a3. 5.441,153\n\n\n_State of the SURPLUS of the REVENUE for 11 years ended at 1775._\n\n UNAPPROPRIATED REVENUE.\n\n NEAT PRODUCE of the Sinking Fund, for five years, including\n casual surplusses, reckoning to _Christmas_ in every year;\n being the annual medium, after deducting from it about\n 45,000l. always carried to it from the supplies, in order\n to replace so much taken from it every year to make good\n a deficiency in a Fund established in 1758. \u00a3. 2.610,759\n\n Neat annual produce of Land Tax at 3s. militia deducted;\n and of the Malt Tax[128] 1.800,000\n\n (N. B. These two taxes in 1773, brought in only 1.665,475l.)\n\n There are some casual Receipts, not included in the Sinking\n Fund, such as Savings in Pay-Office, duties on Gum Senega,\n American Revenue, &c. But they are so uncertain and\n inconsiderable, that it is scarcely proper to give them as\n a part of the permanent Revenue. Add however on this account 50,000\n ---------\n Total of unappropriated Revenue \u00a3. 4.460,759\n\n\n_Produce of the SINKING FUND, reckoned to Christmas in every Year._\n\n 1770 \u00a3. 2.486,836\n 1771 2.553,505\n 1772 2.683,831\n 1773 2.823,150\n 1774 2.731,476\n\nThe average of these five years is 2.655,759l. or, deducting 45,000l. (as\ndirected in the last page), 2.610,759l.\n\nIn 1775, the Sinking Fund was taken for 2.900,000l. including an\nextraordinary charge of 100,000l. on the _Aggregate_ Fund; but it\nproduced 2.917,869l. The average of six years, including 1775, was\n2.654,443l. The average of five years before 1770, was 2.234,780l.\n\n\nANNUAL EXPENDITURE.\n\n \u00a3.\n\n Peace Establishment, for the Navy and Army, including\n all miscellaneous and incidental expences 3.700,000\n\n Annual increase of the Navy and Civil List debts 350,000\n\n Interest at 2 _per cent._ of 3.600,000l. unfunded debt,\n which must be paid out of the unappropriated Revenue 72,000\n\n ---------\n Total 4.122,000\n ANNUAL SURPLUS of the Revenue 338,759\n ---------\n Annual income \u00a3. 4.460,759\n\nThe estimate for the peace establishment, including miscellaneous\nexpences, amounted, in 1775, to 3.703,476l.\u2014But the extraordinary\nexpences, occasioned by the war with America, made it fall very\nshort.\u2014In 1774 it amounted to 3.784,452l. exclusive of 250,000l. raised\nby Exchequer Bills, towards defraying the expence of calling in the\ngold coin. And the medium for eleven years, from 1765, has been nearly\n3.700,000l.\u2014According to the accounts which I have collected, the expence\nof the peace establishment (including miscellaneous expences) was in\n1765, 1766, and 1767, 3.540,000l. _per ann._\u2014In 1768, 1769, and 1770,\nit was 3.354,000l. _per ann._\u2014In 1771, 1772, 1773, 1774, and 1775, the\naverage has been nearly four millions _per ann._ exclusive of the expence\nof calling in the coin.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe parliament votes for the sea service 4l. _per_ month _per_ man,\nincluding wages, wear and tear, victuals and ordnance. This allowance\nis insufficient, and falls short every year more or less, in proportion\nto the number of men voted. From hence, in a great measure, arises that\nannual increase of the navy debt, mentioned in the second article of the\n_National Expenditure_. This increase in 1772 and 1773 was 669,996l. or\n335,000l. _per ann._ The number of men voted in those two years, was\n20,000. I have supposed them reduced to 16,000, and the annual increase\nof the Navy Debt to be only 250,000l.\u2014Add 100,000l. for the annual\nincrease of the Civil List Debt, and the total will be 350,000l.\n\n * * * * *\n\nSoon after the publication of the preceding account in _February_ last\nyear, the EARL OF STAIR obliged the public with another account of\nthe same kind, which brings out a conclusion much more unfavourable.\nAccording to this account, were lotteries abolished, and the land-tax\nat 3s. in the pound only, there would be a _deficiency_ in the revenue,\ninstead of such a _surplus_ as I have stated. The following remarks will\nshew the reason of this difference.\n\nThe EARL OF STAIR has taken the annual produce of the _Sinking_ Fund\nat 2.506,400l. being the average produce of EIGHT years ended at _Lady\nday_ 1775.\u2014I have taken it at 2.610,759l. being the average of FIVE\nyears ended at _Christmas_ 1775.\u2014The neat produce of the land and malt\ntaxes has been also taken near 50,000l. higher in my account; and I have\nbesides admitted 50,000l. _per ann._ for casual supplies, which his\nLordship has not charged.\n\nThe annual increase of the Navy Debt, LORD STAIR states at 300,000l. and\nof the Civil List at 200,000l. I have stated the former at 250,000l. and\nthe latter at 100,000l.\u2014In order also to avoid, as much as possible, all\nexaggeration, I have thrown out the expence of the new coinage. Lord\nStair has admitted it, and given an yearly expence derived from hence of\n100,000l.\u2014He has also taken the Peace Establishment for 1774, as a fair\nmedium for common years of peace, because it was lower in that year than\nin the three years preceding 1775. I have taken the average of _eleven_\nyears of peace, which is 75,000l. less.\n\nIn consequence of these differences, the national PEACE expenditure in\n_Lord Stair_\u2019s account comes out 325,000l. _per ann. higher_ than in\nmine; and the national income comes out 204,359l. _lower_; from whence it\nfollows, that without lotteries, and the land being at 3s. in the pound,\nthe kingdom must, according to his Lordship\u2019s calculation, run out at the\nrate of about 200,000l. every year.\n\nIn some of the particulars I have mentioned, this account is probably\nnearest to the truth; but, I hope, it will be considered, that I have\nstudied to give moderate accounts, and aimed at erring always rather on\nthe favourable than the unfavourable side.\n\n\n_Second Method of deducing the SURPLUS of the REVENUE._\n\nFrom the year 1763 to the year 1775, or during a period of 12 years,\n10.639,793l. of the public[129] debt was paid off.\u2014The money employed\nfor this purpose must have been derived from the surplus of the\n_ordinary_ revenue, added to the _extraordinary_ receipts. These receipts\nhave consisted of the following articles.\u20141st. The land-tax at 4s. in the\npound in 1764, 1765, 1766, and 1771; or 1s. in the pound extraordinary\nfor four years, making 1.750,000l.\u20142. The profits of ten lotteries[130]\nmaking (at 150,000l. each lottery) 1.500,000l.\u20143. A contribution of\n400,000l. _per ann._ for five years from the EAST INDIA Company, making\n2.000,000l.\u20144. Savings by debts discharged at a discount,[131] making\nat least 400,000l.\u20145. Paid by the Bank in 1764 for the renewal of their\ncharter, 110,000l.\u20146. Savings on high grants during the war; produce of\n_French_ prizes taken before the declaration of war; sale of lands in the\nceded islands; and composition for maintaining _French_ prisoners,[132]\nmaking 2.520,000l.\u2014All these sums amount to 8.280,000l. There remains to\nmake up 10.639,793l. (the whole debt discharged) 2.359,793l. and this,\ntherefore, is the amount of the whole surplus of the _ordinary_ revenue\nfor twelve years; or 196,000l. _per ann._[133]\n\nThe Earl of STAIR has also, in this method, calculated the _surplus_ of\nthe Revenue; and makes the total, for eleven years, to be no more than\n2.557,378l. even with the assistance of lotteries, and the land-tax at\n4s. in the pound for five years; from whence it follows, that _without_\nthese assistances, there would have been a deficiency of near 60,000l.\n_per ann._\u2014The reason is, that his Lordship has taken the whole debt paid\nsince 1763, at no more than 7.053,855l. or three millions and a half\nless than I have made it; and he has taken it so much less, chiefly in\nconsequence of including in the amount of the public debt in 1775, the\nexcess of the expences of that year above the common peace expences.\nThis excess is to be charged to the present war; and, in determining the\nordinary peace _surplus_, which is my object, it was proper to exclude\nit, and to terminate the account at the commencement of the war.\u2014I will\nonly add, that Lord STAIR has also included more in the extraordinary\nreceipts than I have; and, particularly, 700,000l. which he supposes the\npublic gained by the TEA INDEMNITY.\u2014But this was only a compensation made\nby the _East-India_ Company for the loss which the public sustained by\ntaking off, in 1766, a part (or 1s. _per_ pound) of the duty on tea. In\n1772 it was restored; and the excise upon tea has since, if I am rightly\ninformed, produced as much as ever. _Before_ 1766, it produced annually\n474,091l. Immediately[134] after 1766, it produced 341,284l.\u2014But in 1775,\nit produced near half a million.\n\n\n_Sketch of an Account of the Money drawn from the Public by the Taxes,\nbefore the Year 1776._\n\n \u00a3.\n\n CUSTOMS in ENGLAND, being the medium of the payments\n into the Exchequer, for 3 years ending in 1773[135] 2.528,275\n\n Amount of the EXCISES in ENGLAND, including the malt tax,\n being the medium of 3 years ending in 1773 4.649,892\n\n Land Tax at 3s. 1.300,000\n\n Land Tax at 1s. in the pound 450,000\n\n SALT DUTIES, being the medium of the years 1765 and 1766 218,739\n\n Duties on Stamps, Cards, Dice, Advertisements, Bonds, Leases,\n Indentures, News-papers, Almanacks, &c. 280,788\n\n Duties on houses and windows, being the medium of 3 years\n ending in 1771 385,369\n\n Post Office, Seizures, Wine Licences, Hackney Coaches, Tenths\n of the Clergy, &c. 250,000\n\n EXCISES in SCOTLAND, being the medium of 3 years ending in 1773 95,229\n\n CUSTOMS in SCOTLAND, being the medium of 3 years ending in 1773 68,369\n\n Annual profit from Lotteries 150,000\n\n Inland taxes in SCOTLAND, coinage duties, casual revenues, such\n as the duties on Gum-Senega, American revenue, &c. 150,000\n\n EXPENCE of collecting the EXCISES in ENGLAND, being the average\n of the years 1767 and 1768, when their produce was 4.531,075l.\n _per ann._\u20146 _per cent._ of the gross produce 297,887\n\n EXPENCE of collecting the Excises in SCOTLAND, being the medium\n of the years 1772 and 1773, and the difference between the\n gross and nett produce\u201431 _per cent._ of the gross produce 43,254\n\n EXPENCE of collecting the CUSTOMS in ENGLAND, being the average\n of 1771 and 1772, bounties included, and 15 _per cent._ of\n the gross produce, exclusive of drawbacks and over-entries 468,703\n\n N. B. The bounties for 1771 were 202,840l.\u2014for 1772, 172,468l.\n\n The charges of management for 1771, were 276,434l.\n\n For 1772, 285,764l. or 10 _per cent._ nearly.\n\n Interest of loans on the land tax at 4s. expences of collection,\n militia, &c. 250,000\n\n PERQUISITES, &c. to Custom-house officers, &c. supposed 250,000\n\n EXPENCE of collecting the Salt-duties in ENGLAND, 10\u00bd _per cent._ 27,000\n\n Bounties on fish exported 18,000\n\n EXPENCE of collecting the duties on Stamps, Cards, Advertisements,\n &c. 5\u00bc _per cent._ 18,000\n ----------\n Total \u00a3. 11.900,505\n ----------\n\nIt must be seen, that this account is imperfect and defective. It is,\nhowever, sufficient to prove, that the whole money raised DIRECTLY by the\ntaxes, (exclusive of tithes, county rates, and the taxes which support\nthe poor,) cannot be much less than TWELVE MILLIONS. The _Earl of Stair_\nhas in his papers made it to be above 400,000l. more, by including in\nhis estimate several articles which I have omitted; particularly, the\ninterest and management on the equivalent to _Scotland_, the Scotch crown\nRevenues, Dutchy of _Cornwall_ and _Lancaster_ Fines, &c. He has also\ngiven an estimate of the fees and perquisites of office of every kind,\nand reckoned them at half a million; whereas, I have only reckoned the\nperquisites of office at the _Custom-house_.\n\nI should be inexcusable were I to quit this subject, without taking\nnotice of the particular gratitude due from the public to _Lord Stair_,\nfor publishing his papers; and for stepping forth at this time to draw\nattention, by the weight of his name and character, to calculations,\nwhich, as he justly says, \u201cit becomes every man of property among us to\nunderstand; to awaken the nation from the lethargy into which the mockery\nof paper wealth has plunged it; and to bear his testimony against the\npresent unnatural war.\u201d\n\n\n\n\nPOSTSCRIPT.\n\n\nThe following POSTSCRIPT has been published only in a few of the last\nEditions of the _Observations on Civil Liberty._ It has been often\nreferred to in the preceding work; and, therefore, it is necessary to\ngive it a place here.\n\n\n_ACCOUNT of Public Debts discharged, Money borrowed, and Annual Interest\nsaved from 1763 to 1775._\n\n Debts paid off since 1763. Annuity decreased.\n \u00a3. \u00a3. _s._\n 1765 870,888 funded, bearing interest at\n 4 _per cent._ 34,835 10\n 1.500,000 unfunded, 4 _per cent._ 60,000 00\n 1766 0.870,888 funded, 4 _per cent._ 34,835 10\n 1.200,000 unfunded, 4 \u2014 48,000 00\n 1767 2.616,777 funded, 4 \u2014 104,671 0\n 1768 2.625,000 funded, 4 \u2014 105,000 0\n 1771 1.500,000 funded, 3 _per cent._ 45,000 0\n 1772 1.500,000 funded, 3 _per cent._ 45,000 0\n 1773 800,000 unfunded, 3 \u2014 24,000 0\n 1774 1.000,000 funded, 3 \u2014 30,000 0\n 1775 1.000,000 funded, 3 \u2014 30,000 0\n ---------- ----------\n Total 15.483,553 Total 561,342 0\n\nIn 1764, there was paid off 650,000_l._ navy-debt; but this I have not\ncharged, because scarcely equal to that annual increase of the navy-debt\nfor 1764, 1765, and 1766, which forms a part of the ordinary peace\nestablishment. The same is true of 300,000_l._ navy-debt, paid in 1767;\nof 400,000_l._ paid in 1769; of 100,200_l._ paid in 1770; 200,000_l._ in\n1771; 215,883_l._ in 1772; and 200,000_l._ in 1774.\n\n\n_Account of money borrowed and debts contracted since 1763._\n\n\n Annual interest\n \u00a3 increased.\n Borrowed and funded,\n at 3 _per cent._ in 1765 1.500,000 45,000\n in 1766 1.500,000 45,000\n in 1767 1.500,000 45,000\n in 1768 1.900,000 57,000\n Unfunded in 1774 250,000 7,500\n Civil list debt in 1775 500,000[136]\n --------- -------\n Total 7.150,000 199,500\n\nFrom 15.483,553_l._ the total of debts discharged, subtract 7.150,000_l._\nthe total of debts contracted; and the remainder, or 8.333,553_l._ will\nbe the diminution of the public debts since 1763. Also, from 561,342_l._\nthe total of the decrease of the annual interest, subtract 199,500_l._\n(the total of its increase), and the remainder, or 361,842_l._ will\nbe the interest or annuity saved since 1763.\u2014To this must be added\n12,537_l._ _per ann._ saved by changing a capital of 1.253,700_l._ (part\nof 20.240,000_l._) from an interest of 4 to 3 _per cent._ pursuant to\nan act of the 10th of George III.; also the life-annuities that have\nfallen in; and 7,500_l._ _per ann._ gained by the falling (in 1771) of\n1.500,000_l._ from an interest of 3\u00bd to 3 _per cent._; which will make a\nsaving in the whole of near 400,000_l._ _per annum_: And it is to this\nsaving, together with the increase of luxury, that the increase of the\n_Sinking-Fund_ for the last ten years has been owing.\n\nTo the debts discharged the following additions must be made.\n\nIn 1764 there was paid towards discharging the extraordinary expences of\nthe army, 987,434_l._: In 1765, these expences amounted to 404,496_l._:\nIn 1766, to 479,088_l._\u2014Total 1.871,018_l._\u2014This sum is at least a\nmillion higher than the extraordinary expences of the army for three\nyears in a time of peace. This excess, being derived from the preceding\nwar, must be reckoned a debt left by the war. And the same is true\nof 1.106,000_l._ applied, in 1764, 1765, and 1766, towards satisfying\n_German_ demands.\u2014There are likewise some smaller sums of the same kind;\nsuch as subsidies to _Hesse-Cassel_, _Brunswick_, &c. And they may be\ntaken at 200,000_l._\u2014The total of all these sums is 2.306,240_l._; which,\nadded to 8.333,553_l._ makes the whole diminution of the public debt\nsince 1763, to be 10.639,793_l._\n\nSoon after the peace in 1763, an unfunded debt, amounting to\n6.983,553_l._ was funded on the _Sinking Fund_, and on new duties on wine\nand cyder, at 4 _per cent._ There has been since borrowed and funded\non coals exported, window-lights, &c. 6.400,000_l._ The funded debt,\ntherefore, has increased since the war 13.383,553_l._ It has decreased\n(as appears from page 171) 11.983,553_l._; and, consequently, there has\nbeen on the whole an addition to it of 1.400,000_l._\u2014During seven years,\nfrom 1767 to 1774, 1.415,883_l._ navy-debt was paid off. See page 172.\nBut, as this is a debt arising from constant deficiencies in the peace\nestimates for the navy, it is a part of the current peace expences.\u2014In\n1768 this debt was[137] 1.226,915_l._\u2014In 1774 it was 1.850,000_l._; and\nconsequently, though 1.415,883_l._ was paid off, an addition was made to\nit, in seven years, of 623,085_l._ It increased, therefore, at the rate\nof 291,000_l._ _per ann._\n\nThe paper from which I have taken the following account, came into my\nhands after almost the whole of this work had been printed off. It\ncontains a fact of so much importance, that I cannot satisfy myself\nwithout laying it before the public.\u2014In a Committee of CONGRESS in _June_\n1775, a declaration was drawn up containing an offer to GREAT BRITAIN,\n\u201cthat the Colonies would not only continue to grant extraordinary aids in\ntime of war, but also, if allowed a free commerce, pay into the SINKING\nFUND such a sum annually for ONE HUNDRED YEARS, as should be _more_ than\nsufficient in that time, if faithfully applied, to extinguish all the\npresent debts of BRITAIN. Or, provided this was not accepted, that, to\nremove the groundless jealousy of _Britain_ that the Colonies aimed at\nIndependence and an abolition of the Navigation Act, which, in truth,\nthey had never intended; and also, to avoid all future disputes about the\nright of making that and other Acts for regulating their commerce for the\ngeneral benefit, they would enter into a covenant with _Britain_, that\nshe should fully possess and exercise that right for _one hundred years_\nto come.\u201d\n\nAt the end of the _Observations on Civil Liberty_, I had the honor of\nlaying before the public the Earl of _Shelburne\u2019s_ plan of Pacification\nwith the Colonies. In that plan, it is particularly proposed, that the\nColonies should grant an annual supply to be carried to the Sinking Fund,\nand unalienably appropriated to the discharge of the public debt.\u2014It must\ngive this excellent Peer great pleasure to learn, from this resolution,\nthat even this part of his plan, as well as all the other parts,\nwould, most probably, have been accepted by the Colonies. For though\nthe resolution only offers the alternative of either a _free_ trade,\nwith extraordinary aids and an annual supply, or an _exclusive_ trade\nconfirmed and extended; yet there can be little reason to doubt, but that\nto avoid the calamities of the present contest, both would have been\nconsented to; particularly, if, on our part, such a revisal of the laws\nof trade had been offered as was proposed in Lord Shelburne\u2019s plan.\n\nThe preceding resolution was, I have said, drawn up in a Committee of\nthe Congress. But it was not entered in their minutes; a severe Act of\nParliament happening to arrive at that time, which determined them not to\ngive the sum proposed in it.\n\nFINIS.\n\n\n\n\nPOSTSCRIPT.\n\n\nThe following POSTSCRIPT was published only in a few of the last Editions\nof the _Observations on Civil Liberty_. It has been often referred to in\nthe preceding work; and therefore, it is necessary to give it a place\nhere.\n\n\n_ACCOUNT of Public Debts discharged, Money borrowed, and Annual Interest\nsaved from 1763 to 1775._\n\n Debts paid off since 1763. Annuity decreased.\n \u00a3. \u00a3. _s._\n 1765 876,888 funded, bearing interest at\n 4 _per cent._ 34,835 10\n 1.500,000 unfunded, 4 _per cent._ 60,000 00\n 1766 0.870,888 funded, 4 _per cent._ 34,835 10\n 1.200,000 unfunded, 4 \u2014 48,000 00\n 1767 2.616,777 funded, 4 \u2014 104,671 0\n 1768 2.625,000 funded, 4 \u2014 105,000 0\n 1771 1.500,000 funded, 3\u00bd _per cent._ 52,500 0\n 1772 1.500,000 funded, 3 _per cent._ 45,000 0\n 1773 800,000 unfunded, 3 \u2014 24,000 0\n 1774 1.000,000 funded, 3 \u2014 30,000 0\n 1775 1.000,000 funded, 3 \u2014 30,000 0\n ---------- -----------\n Total 15.483,553 Total 568,842 0\n\nIn 1764, there was paid off 650,000l. navy-debt; but this I have not\ncharged, because scarcely equal to that annual increase of the navy-debt\nfor 1764, 1765, and 1766, which forms a part of the ordinary peace\nestablishment. The same is true of 300,000l. navy-debt, paid in 1767; of\n400,000l. paid in 1769; of 100,200l. paid in 1770; 200,000l. in 1771;\n215,883l. in 1772; and 200,000l. in 1774.\n\n\n_Account of money borrowed and debts contracted since 1763._\n\n Annual interest\n \u00a3 increased.\n Borrowed and funded,\n at 3 _per cent._ in 1765 1.500,000 45,000\n in 1766 1.500,000 45,000\n in 1767 1.500,000 45,000\n in 1768 1.900,000 57,000\n Unfunded in 1774 250,000 7,500\n Civil list debt in 1775 500,000[138]\n --------- -------\n Total 7.150,000 199,500\n\nFrom 15.483,553l. the total of debts discharged, subtract 7.150,000l.\nthe total of debts contracted; and the remainder, or 8.333,553l. will\nbe the diminution of the public debts since 1763. Also, from 568,842l.\nthe total of the decrease of the annual interest, subtract 199,500l.\n(the total of its increase), and the remainder, or 369,342l. will be the\ninterest or annuity saved since 1763.\u2014To this must be added 12,537l _per\nann._ saved by changing a capital of 1.253,700l. (part of 20.240,000l.)\nfrom an interest of 4 to 3 _per cent._ pursuant to an act of the 10th of\nGeorge III.; also the life-annuities that have fallen in; which will make\na saving in the whole of near 400,000l. _per annum_: And it is to this\nsaving, together with the increase of luxury, that the increase of the\n_Sinking Fund_ for the last ten years has been owing.\n\nTo the debts discharged the following additions must be made.\n\nIn 1764 there was paid towards discharging the extraordinary expences\nof the army, 987,434l. In 1765, these expences amounted to 404,496l.\nIn 1766, to 479,088l.\u2014Total 1.871,018l.\u2014This sum is 1.100,000l. higher\nthan the extraordinary expences of the army for three years in a time\nof peace. This excess, being derived from the preceding war, must be\nreckoned a debt left by the war. And the same is true of 1.106,000l.\napplied, in 1764, 1765, and 1766, towards satisfying _German_\ndemands.\u2014There are likewise some smaller sums of the same kind; such as\nsubsidies to _Hesse-Cassel_, _Brunswick_, &c. And they may be taken at\n200,000l.\u2014The total of all these sums is 2.406,240l. which, added to\n8.333,553l. makes the whole diminution of the public debts, or the whole\nsaving of the kingdom, since 1763, to be 10.739,793l.\n\nSoon after the peace in 1763, an unfunded debt, amounting to 6.983,553l.\nwas funded on the _Sinking Fund_, and on new duties on wine and cyder, at\n4 _per cent._ There has been since borrowed and funded on coals exported,\nwindow-lights, &c. 6.400,000l. The funded debt, therefore, has increased\nsince the war 13.383,553l. It has decreased (as may appear from page 177)\n11.983,553l. and, consequently, there has been on the whole an addition\nto it of 1.400,000l.\u2014During seven years, from 1768 to 1774, 1.115,883l.\nnavy-debt was paid off. See page 178. But, as this is a debt arising from\nconstant deficiencies in the peace estimates for the navy, it is a part\nof the current peace expences.\u2014On the 31st of December, 1767, this debt\nwas 1.213,072l.\u2014On the 31st of December, 1774, it was 1.850,000l. and\nconsequently, though 1.115,883l. was paid off, an addition was made to\nit, in seven years, of 673,028l. It increased, therefore, at the rate of\n255,558l. _per ann._\n\n\nSUPPLEMENT TO SECTION III PART II.\n\n_Containing additional Observations on Schemes for raising Money by\nPublic Loans._\n\nIt is impossible, that any attentive person can reflect without concern,\non that monstrous accumulation of artificial debt for which no value\nhas been received, which has been pointed out in different parts of the\npreceding Tract; and, particularly in the third Section of the second\nPart. This being a subject which, in the present state of our finances,\nis highly interesting; I have been induced to return to it in this place;\nand to offer some further observations and proposals which have occurred\nto me in reconsidering it, and which I think necessary to explain and\nconfirm those which have been already offered.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThere are two methods in which money is capable of being borrowed for\npublic services. The first is, by offering such _high_ interest as may\nof itself be sufficient to induce lenders to advance the sums that\nare wanted: And the second is, by offering a _low_ interest, with a\n_gratuity_ or _douceur_ to produce the acceptance of it.\u2014The last has\nbeen the method in which our government has most commonly borrowed money;\nand the gratuity offered has been either a right to a greater capital\nthan the sum advanced, or a _long_ or _short_ or _life_ annuity, or the\nprofits of a lottery, or some advantages of trade.\u2014The first without\ndoubt, is the most rational method of borrowing; and the latter is\nso absurd and extravagant as to be incapable of being adopted in the\ncommon transactions of life.\u2014In order to give a just and full idea of\nthis, I shall instance in the last loan; specifying the manner in which\nit _would_ have been made if the usual method of borrowing had been\nfollowed; and comparing this with the manner in which it _was_ made; and\nthe manner in which, I think, it _might_ have been made to the greatest\nadvantage.\n\nFIVE MILLIONS, it is well known, were borrowed last year; and, had the\nold plan of borrowing been adopted, this sum would have been borrowed by\nsome such scheme as one of the _two_ following.\n\nFirst. Interest in the public funds being then near 4 _per cent. per\nann._ an interest of only 3 _per cent._ would have been offered; or, in\nother words, for every 100l. in _money_, 100l. _stock_ carrying 3 _per\ncent._ (worth then 78l.) would have been given; but at the same time,\nas a _premium_ or _compensation_ for accepting such low interest, a\nlife-annuity, or a short annuity would have been offered worth somewhat\nmore than the difference between 100l. and 78l. or about 24l. The whole\npremium, therefore, in raising _five millions_, would have been equal\nin value to about 1.200,000l. and, supposing it to have been either a\nlife-annuity, or a short annuity for 17 years of 2l. worth 12 years\npurchase, annexed to every 100l. stock, the whole annual charge incurred\nby the loan would have been 250,000l. for a term of years, and 150,000l.\nfor ever till the capital is redeemed.\n\nIt is manifest that the capital including in it according to this account\nalmost the whole _premium_, the public makes itself, by this mode of\nborrowing, a _debtor_ for the very thing it _gives_; and, besides paying\nthe annuity, obliges itself to advance at redemption the whole value\nof it.\u2014It is proper to add, that this is done _unnecessarily_, because\n1.200,000 might have been procured by selling the annuity, and the\nremaining 3.800,000l. necessary to make up five millions, might have been\nprocured, as will be shewn presently, without any _douceur_ by giving\nhigher interest.\n\nBut there is another method of borrowing which has been practised by\ngovernment on former occasions, and which might have been adopted in the\nlast loan.\n\nFor every 100l. advanced a new capital in the 3 _per cent._ funds worth\nthat sum would have been sold, including a funded 10l. lottery ticket.\nThis new capital would have been nearly 127l. three _per cent. stock_\nfor every 100l. in _money_, or 6.343,954l. stock for FIVE MILLIONS in\nmoney; of which stock 5.718,954l. would have been sold, to encourage\nsubscriptions, at 2 _per cent._ below the market price, that is, at 76l.\n\u00bd; and the remaining stock, having a lottery annexed, would have been\nsold at _par_. A fictitious or artificial capital, therefore, would\nhave been created, or a debt incurred more than the value received, of\n1.343,954l. besides relinquishing about 150,000l. which might have been\nobtained by the profits of the lottery.\n\nI have been seldom more surprized than at the preference of this scheme,\nwhich, at the time of settling the last loan, was expressed by some very\nrespectable members of the House of Commons; nor can this preference be\neasily accounted for on any other supposition than that they consider\nthe public debts as incumbrances, never to be removed, and, therefore,\nthink it of no consequence with what difficulties the redemption of\nthem is loaded by an increase of capitals bearing low interest. It must\nbe acknowledged indeed that this method of borrowing would have been\nattended with a small present advantage; for the interest of 6.343,954l.\nat 3 _per cent._ is 190,318l. and this, together with the interest of\n150,000l. or 6000l. _per ann._ lost by giving up the profits of a\nlottery, would have been the whole present annual charge it would have\nbrought on the public. But if this be a sufficient reason for preferring\nsuch a scheme, it would perhaps be best to create capitals bearing 2\n_per cent._ or even 1 _per cent._ interest; for probably such capitals\nwould bear a better price, in proportion to the rates of interest, than\nany 3 _per cent._ capitals, and consequently, a greater present saving\nmight be made by selling them. No other objection can be made to this\nthan that by lowering interest, and laying the public under an obligation\nto return _double_ or _triple_ every sum it receives; the redemption of\nthe public debts might be rendered so expensive and difficult as to be\nentirely impracticable. But this would be of no consequence if indeed\ntheir redemption is already become impracticable; and if, therefore,\nevery new charge they bring on the public is to be considered as laid on\nfor eternity.\n\n * * * * *\n\nWith these schemes let us now compare the scheme actually adopted for the\nlast loan.\n\nInstead of a 3 _per cent._ capital, a new capital bearing 4 _per cent._\ninterest, irredeemable for ten years, was offered at 95l. for every 100l.\n_stock_, with two _douceurs_ to raise the value of the stock above 100l.\nin money; namely, a short annuity of a HALF _per cent._ for ten years,\n(reckoned worth 4l. 2s.) and the profit (reckoned at 3l.) of one ticket\nin a money lottery consisting of 50,000 tickets.\n\nThe chief difference between this scheme and the first I have described\nis, that the new stock created is a FOUR _per cent._ instead of a THREE\n_per cent._ stock. But this is a difference of particular importance,\nand brings it near to such plans of borrowing as appear to me the\nbest.\u2014In the _first_ scheme, the artificial capital is 1.200,000l. In the\n_second_, 1.343,954l. In this _third_ scheme it is only 250,000l. This\nscheme, therefore, has evidently great merit; and perhaps, in the present\nstate of the public debts, it does not admit of any great improvement.\nThere is, however, an easy alteration which, I think, would have been an\nimprovement, and which I shall take the liberty to mention.\n\nAccording to a preceding observation, the two _douceurs_ being included\nin the capital, are granted, and must be paid twice over. This is so\nabsurd and extravagant that it ought to be avoided as far as possible;\nand it might have been avoided, in a great measure, by offering for\nevery 100l. advanced 95l. stock, carrying 4 _and a quarter_ interest\nirredeemable for ten years, with the same short annuity and a lottery\nticket annexed.[139] In this case, the new capital would have been\n4.750,000_l_. carrying (at 4\u00bc _per cent._) 201,875_l_. _per ann._\ninterest. There would, therefore, have been a saving of 250,000l. in the\ncapital; and the annual charge would have been nearly the same.\n\nIt must be observed that this scheme supposes that a stock bearing\n4\u00bc _per cent._ interest would have been valued nearly at _par_; and,\naccording to the principles on which the scheme was calculated, it could\nnot have been valued at much less; or, supposing it valued at 1 or 2\n_per cent._ less, the difference might have been made up by only adding\ntwo or three years to the duration of the short annuity and the term\nof irredeemableness.\u2014Had a _stock_ been offered bearing 4\u00bc _per cent._\ninterest irredeemable for ten years, one _half_ at least of the short\nannuity might have been saved. The annual charge for ten years would have\nbeen somewhat less;[140] and the excess afterwards would have been much\nmore than compensated by the advantages at redemption attending a higher\ninterest and a smaller capital.\n\nBut, perhaps, such a scheme as the following would have been preferable\nto any of those now proposed.\n\nFor every 100l. in _money_ 75l. stock irredeemable for 10 years and\ncarrying 4\u00bc _per cent._ interest, might have been offered, together with\nan annuity for 27 years of 1\u00bd _per cent._ (valued cheap at 16 years\npurchase, or 24l.) and the advantage of a lottery ticket. This scheme\nwould have been as likely to be attended with a profit as that which\nwas adopted. The new capital would have been only 3.750,000l. bearing\n159,375l. interest. The short annuity would have been 75,000l. and the\nwhole annual charge (supposing no redemptions of the capital to take\nplace after ten years) 234,375l. for 27 years, and afterwards 159,375l.\nIt appears, therefore, that 1.250,000l. or a _quarter_ of the capital\nthat was actually created, would have been saved; and also a rent charge\non the public after 27 years of 40,750l. _per ann._ for ever.\u2014The\nadditional expence to balance these advantages would have been 9.650l.\n_per ann._ for ten years, and 34,375l. _per ann._ for 17 years. In other\nwords; the public would have absolutely secured the redemption of a\n_quarter_ of the loan, (or of 1.250,000l.) besides an easier redemption\nof the remainder, at the expence of 680,875l. in the whole,[141] to be\npaid annually in small sums during the course of 27 years.\n\n * * * * *\n\nAll that has been now said has gone on the supposition that, agreeably\nto the calculations on which the last loan was formed, 100l. _stock_\nirredeemable for ten years and bearing 4 _per cent._ interest, would sell\nat 17l. more than 100l. stock bearing 3 _per cent._ interest; (or at 95l.\nwhen the latter stock is at 78l.) and also, that a short annuity for ten\nyears would sell at 8\u215f\u2081\u2080 years purchase.\u2014But events have shewn that these\nvaluations were too high. The new subscription (including 100l. four\n_per cent._ stock, a half _per cent._ short annuity, and the profit of a\nlottery ticket) should have sold, according to these valuations, at about\n102\u00bd. But it never bore so high a price; and in a little time it fell to\n_par_, and at last to 3 _per cent._ discount.\u2014Various reasons have been\nassigned for this; but the true reasons were the following.\n\nFirst. A general fall of near 2 _per cent._ which took place in the\nstocks soon after the loan was settled.\n\nSecondly. A lower valuation of the new 4 _per cent._ stock and the short\nannuity which took place in the ALLEY.\u2014This was the principal reason; and\nit will be proper particularly to explain it. In doing this, it will be\nnecessary to look back a little to the history of the public funds.\n\n * * * * *\n\nIn 1717 the public debts were reduced from an interest of 6 _per cent._\nto 5 _per cent._ and in 1727, from 5 _per cent._ to 4 _per cent._ In\n1737 a bill was brought into the HOUSE OF COMMONS by Sir _John Barnard_,\nfor a farther reduction from 4 to 3 _per cent._ At this time the 3 _per\ncents._ were above _par_; and even, during the three first years of the\nwar which began in 1740, they continued so high that government was\nable to raise the necessary supplies by borrowing at 3 _per cent._\u2014In\nsuch circumstances, it was impossible the public creditors should avoid\nexpecting a _third_ reduction; and this expectation would necessarily\nlink the value of the FOUR PER CENTS. by leading the public to consider\nthem as no more than a THREE _per cent._ stock having a short annuity of\nONE _per cent._ annexed. Accordingly; _before_ the war the difference of\nprice between the THREE and the FOUR _per cent._ stocks was about 10 or\n11 _per cent._ After the commencement of the war, a reduction becoming\nmore doubtful and more distant, this difference became greater, and\ngenerally kept between 14 and 17 _per cent._ At the approach of the\nPEACE in 1748, it sunk to 11 _per cent._ and soon _after_ the PEACE,\nthe 3 _per cents._ having risen considerably above _par_,[142] and an\nuniversal expectation of a speedy reduction taking place, it sunk to 6\n_per cent._\u2014It is evident, therefore, that the price of the FOUR _per\ncents._ has been governed by the expectation of their reduction,[143] and\nthat, had there been no such expectation, their price, compared with the\n3 _per cents._ would have been much higher. It will appear presently to\nbe most probable, that had it not been for this expectation, the prices\nof these stocks would not have differed much from the proportion of the\nrates of interest.\n\nIn taking this account, I have only compared the THREE _per cents._\nwith the SOUTH-SEA FOUR _per cent._ capitals before their reduction in\n1749, at which time they amounted to above 27 millions, and were (as\nthe consolidated three _per cent._ annuities are now) the grand staple\nstock of the kingdom. In 1746 and 1747, two new FOUR _per cent._ capitals\nwere created redeemable at any time, and transferable at the BANK. The\nprice of these new capitals kept for some time after their creation,\nconsiderably below the price of the old SOUTH-SEA four _per cents._ the\nreasons of which were, I suppose, the general reasons which make new\nfunds bear a lower price than old ones; and, particularly, their having\nless traffic in them, and being small and detached parcels likely to be\nfirst selected for the operations of finance.\n\n * * * * *\n\nWere the cause now assigned, or the expectation of a reduction of\ninterest, the only cause that governed the comparative prices of 3 _per\ncent._ and 4 _per cent._ capitals, the excess of one above the other\nwould never be more than the supposed value of a short annuity of 1l.\ntill _reduction_.\u2014But there is another cause which may operate in this\ninstance, and which ought not to be overlooked; I mean, the expectation\nof a greater payment at _redemption_. The effect of the former is to\n_diminish_, and of the latter to _increase_ the value of FOUR _per\ncent._ capitals.\u2014In order to understand this it must be remembered, that\nwhen the 3 _per cents._ are at any considerable discount, it becomes\npracticable to redeem them under _par_, while debts bearing 4 _per cent._\ninterest must be redeemed at _par_. This will make a difference in favour\nof the latter, which will be greater or less in proportion to the greater\nor less discount at which the _three per cents._ are sold, the greater or\nless quantity of stock bearing 4 _per cent._ interest, and the greater\nor less probability that the whole or a considerable part of it will be\nsoon redeemed[144]\u2014Let us suppose, for instance, that all the public\ndebts bearing 4 _per cent._ interest, consist of a single capital of\nFIVE MILLIONS redeemable at any time; and that all the rest of the public\ndebts are THREE _per cent._ capitals sold at a discount of 12 _per cent._\nor at 88l. for every 100l. stock. In these circumstances, there would be\na certainty that the small stock bearing 4 _per cent._ interest would be\nselected for redemption as soon as possible; and, as a stock carrying\nsuch high interest could not be expected, when the 3 _per cents._ are\nat 88, to be redeemed under _par_, its real value would on this account\nexceed that of the THREE _per cents._ more or less in proportion as its\nredemption was more or less distant. And its _whole_ excess of value in\nthese circumstances is to be computed in the following manner.\u2014It would\nconsist of a 3 _per cent._ capital, for every 100l. of which 100l. in\nmoney is to be received; and of an additional annuity of 1 _per cent._\ntill redemption. Its excess of value, therefore, if the whole capital was\nto be redeemed immediately, would be the same with the discount of the\n3 _per cents._ or 12 _per cent._ If the capital was not to be redeemed\ntill the end of 7 years, its excess of value would consist of 12 _per\ncent._ payable seven years hence, and the present worth of an annuity of\n1 _per cent._ for the intermediate term of seven years. 12l. payable at\nthe end of 7 years is worth in present money (allowing compound interest\nat 4 _per cent._) 9l. 2s. 6d. An annuity of 1l. for seven years is worth\n(reckoning the same interest) 6l. The whole excess of value, therefore,\nwill be 15l. 2s. 6d. for every 100l. stock. If the redemption of the\ncapital is to be delayed 15 years, the excess of value computed in the\nsame manner will be 17l. 15s. 6d.\u2014if 20 years, 19l. 1s.\u2014if 30 years, 21l.\n\nIf the 3 _per cents._ had been supposed at a greater discount, it is\nevident that these several values would have been likewise greater;\nand had the quantity of 4 _per cent._ stock been supposed _double_ or\n_triple_, the effect would have been the same with a delay of redemption;\nand had it been supposed thirty or forty millions, the effect (in\nconsequence of our slow progress in redeeming our debts) would not have\nfallen very short of an eternal delay of redemption.\n\nBefore 1749, the amount of the public debts carrying 4 _per cent._\ninterest was near 58 millions. The expectation, therefore, of the\nadvantage now explained could not _then_ have any effect; and the only\ncause which could have influenced, in any considerable degree, the\ncomparative prices of these stocks must have been the first I have\nassigned, or the expectation of their _reduction_; that is, in other\nwords, the expectation of a _sudden redemption_ of them, as soon as the\n3 _per cents._ got above _par_, by borrowing money at that interest. Had\nnot this been foreseen, or had there been an act of parliament rendering\nit impracticable, there is no reason to doubt but the price of the FOUR\n_per cents._ compared with the THREE _per cents._ would have approached\nnearly to the proportion of the rates of interest, agreeably to what is\nsaid in (page 191).\n\nThe state of the public funds has been much changed since the two last\nwars; but it is an alteration that has increased the comparative value of\n4 _per cent._ capitals.\n\nI have already observed, that during the last war there was reason to\nexpect, that, as soon as peace came, the THREE _per cents._ would rise\nabove _par_. No one can now entertain any such expectation. On the\ncontrary; it is most probable, that they will never again rise to that\nwhich has been their average price during the last peace from 1763 to\n1775, and which, I think, may be stated at 87 or 88.\u2014My reason for this\nassertion is,\n\nFirst, that after the present war, should we be so happy as to escape\nthe ruin with which it threatens us, our taxes and expences will be so\nmuch increased, and at the same time our resources so much diminished, as\nnecessarily to leave the credit and value of our public securities lower\nthan ever.\n\nSecondly. Though our credit and resources should continue undiminished,\nyet the great addition which the present war will make to the public\ndebt, is alone likely to sink their value, because every increase of a\nsaleable commodity has always a tendency to lower its price.\u2014It follows\nfrom hence, that the purchasers of FOUR _per cent._ capitals have now a\nprospect of an advantage of 12 or 14 _per cent._ at redemption, which\nthey could not have had before the last peace.\n\nIn connexion with this it must be considered, that it is now highly\nprobable, that it will never be again practicable to reduce the\ninterest of any 4 _per cent._ capitals. In order to such a reduction,\ngovernment must be able to offer to the proprietors of these capitals\ntheir _principal_, should they not chuse to take lower interest, and\nconsequently to borrow at an interest of 3\u00bd or 3\u00be _per cent._ But no\nsums will be lent on such lower interest, unless it can be depended Upon\nthat capitals bearing that interest, when brought to market, will bear\na premium of 1 or 2 _per cent._; and this, when the _three per cents._\nare not higher than 87 or 88, would require the excess of value of such\ncapitals to be estimated at 14 or 15 _per cent._ whereas it has been\nlately found, that even FOUR _per cent._ capitals irredeemable for ten\nyears, will not bear such an excess of value.\u2014A _reduction_, therefore,\nof the interest of FOUR _per cent._ capitals, or a _redemption_ of them\nby borrowed money, cannot now be reckoned upon; and the only cause that\ncan REASONABLY sink their value compared with the THREE _per cents._\nbelow the ratio of the rates of interest, is the probability of a\nredemption of them by the surplus of the national revenue. I need not say\nhow little is to be expected from hence. Supposing, however, that much\nmay be expected, I have shewn what effect it ought to have; and from the\nobservations I have made, and particularly the computation in (page 194),\n&c. it appears, I think, that the price of the capital of five millions\nfour _per cent._ annuities lately created ought to have been near 18 _per\ncent._ more than the price of the THREE _per cents._ This appears to be\ntrue on the supposition that this capital will be redeemed in fifteen\nyears; (that is, in five years after the expiration of the term for\nwhich it is made irredeemable) that the 3 _per cents._ will rise to as\nhigh a price as they bore during the last peace; and that purchasers are\nallowed to make FOUR _per cent._ compound interest of their money.\u2014Were\nwe to suppose this capital discharged even in two years after it becomes\nredeemable, the value, made out in the same way, would be nearly 17l.\n\nHe who will consider all this, and also recollect the general price of\nthe 4 _per cents._ before their reduction in 1749, (see page 190) must\nbe convinced that the TREASURY, at the time the last loan was settled,\nhad good reason for taking the price of the new _four per cent._ capitals\n17 _per cent._ higher than the price of the three _per cents._\u2014It has,\nhowever, been found that this was too high a valuation. Instead of being\nsold at 17l. more for every 100l. stock than the 3 _per cents._ they\nhave been sold at only 13l. or 14l. more; and this has been the chief\nreason of the discount to which the last subscription fell.\u2014It is hard\nto say, by what principles the money\u2019d men who traffic in the funds have\ngoverned themselves in this instance; but certain it is, that they have\nnot been guided by any of the rules of just calculation: And the same\nmust be said of the value at which they have reckoned the short annuity\nof a half _per cent._ for ten years annexed to the new 4 _per cents._\nIn forming the scheme for the last loan this annuity was, I have said,\nestimated at 8\u215f\u2081\u2080 years purchase, agreeably to its real value, supposing\nthe payments yearly, the first payment to be made at the distance of a\nyear, and money improved at 4 _per cent._ compound interest. But it has\nin general been sold at about 7\u00bd years purchase; which is _less_ than its\nvalue, supposing money improved at 5\u00bd _per cent._ compound interest.[145]\n\nFrom this account it appears, that could the caprice of the public have\nbeen foreseen, the price of the new four _per cents._ should not have\nbeen reckoned at more than 91l.; (the 3 _per cents._ being at 78l.) and\nthat, consequently, to make up a value which would have produced 102l.\nfor every 100l. advanced, either the term of irredeemableness and of the\nshort annuity should have been lengthened; or, supposing this term the\nsame, the short annuity should have been more than doubled. An artificial\ncapital, indeed, of near half a million would in this case have been\ncreated. But this disadvantage might have been avoided, without bringing\nany additional expence on the public, by such alterations as I have\nbefore proposed; and by increasing in the corrected schemes, (page 186),\n&c. either the term of irredeemableness, or the short annuity, or the\nrate of interest, or all of them together.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe preceding account will, I fancy, help to shew what is practicable,\n_taking things as they are_, in borrowing money for public uses. It\nproves, that the nation loses greatly by the low price of all capitals\nbearing a higher interest than 3 _per cent._ and that could their value\nbe raised, it would be greatly benefited.\u2014For example. Could the new FOUR\n_per cents._ have been taken at 99l. for every 100l. stock, instead of\n95l. the whole expence of the short annuity in the scheme of the last\nloan, and of a _quarter per cent._ perpetual interest, in the corrected\nschemes, (page 186), &c. might have been saved. But had the value of\nthe 4 _per cents._ been raised in proportion to the rate of interest,\nor _nearly_ in that proportion, a farther saving might have been made,\nin all the schemes, of the profits of the lottery, and, consequently,\nof 6000l. _per annum_ in the annual charge.\u2014My next enquiry, therefore,\nshall be, in what manner and by what regulations this may be done. I have\nwritten in the section on loans, on the supposition that such regulations\nare practicable; and I have proposed one of them; but I will here be more\nexplicit.\n\n * * * * *\n\nIt has been shewn, that before 1749 the cause which depressed the value\nof the 4 _per cents._ was the expectation of their being reduced; and\nthat _now_ this cause is the expectation of their being soon _redeemed_.\nRemove, therefore, these causes in any degree, and their value must\nrise in the same degree.\u2014With respect to the first, it is in my opinion\ncertain that it would be doing great service to the public to exclude\nit entirely. Our reductions of interest have proceeded from a policy\ntoo narrow; and the nation is likely to suffer by them much more\nthan it has gained.[146] The savings they produce, being expended on\ncurrent services, tempt to extravagance; give a fallacious appearance of\nopulence; and, by making our debts sit lighter, render us less anxious\nabout redeeming them, and less apprehensive of danger from the increase\nof them. At the same time they render their redemption a work of more\ndifficulty, and oblige government, when under a necessity of contracting\nnew debts, either to give extravagant interest, or to offer extravagant\npremiums. That accumulation of artificial debts which I have pointed\nout has been owing principally to this cause; and had it not been, in\nparticular, for the reduction in 1749, the public debts would now have\nbeen near 14 millions less; and a debt of above a hundred millions,\ninstead of consisting of capitals bearing interest at 3 _per cent._ would\nhave consisted of capitals bearing some of them 3\u00bd, some 4, and some 4\u00bd\nand 5 _per cent._ interest, which (supposing them all at a medium to bear\n4 _per cent._) a million _per ann._ would have redeemed in six years\nless time, and at twenty-one millions less expence.\u2014In short; reducing\nof interest is one of those unhappy TEMPORARY EXPEDIENTS to which\nstatesmen are apt to betake themselves; and by which _present_ relief\nis gained at the expence of _future_ safety, and distress postponed by\nrendering it in the end more unavoidable and dreadful.\u2014There cannot,\ntherefore, be any sufficient reason against making the interest of the\nnew capitals which may be created by any future loans, IRREDUCIBLE.[147]\nShould this raise the price of capitals bearing high interest in\nproportion to the increase of interest, government would be enabled to\nborrow to equal advantage whatever interest it offered; the new loans\nwould not bring any greater annual charge on the nation than would have\nbeen necessary had the same sums been obtained by selling 3 _per cent._\ncapitals; and, at the same time, all the immense expence of _douceurs_\nand _fictitious capitals_ would be saved, and all the advantages in\nredeeming the public debts obtained, arising from smaller capitals\nbearing higher interest.\n\nSuch a regulation as that now proposed would be alone sufficient for\nthese purposes, when the amount of the debts bearing high interest\nand declared irreducible, is considerable, as appears from what is\nsaid in (page 195). But when a debt happens to bear a higher interest\nthan any other, and is at the same time small, the probability of a\n_quick redemption_ will operate in the same manner on its price with\nthe expectation of a _reduction_; and in this case, therefore, it will\nbecome necessary, in order to avoid the inconveniences I have described,\nto POSTPONE REDEMPTION; and one of the best methods of doing this will\nbe, by ordering, that such a debt shall be redeemed _after_ some other\ngiven part of the funded public debts.\u2014So slow has been our progress\nin redeeming debts, that this (supposing the part to be first redeemed\nconsiderable) would be reckoned, in the present circumstances of the\nfunds, the same with making the debt to be last redeemed, irredeemable\nfor ever. And should such an apprehension prove right, the public would\nlose nothing, because the debt whose redemption was postponed, would\nbring no greater annual charge on the public, than if the same sum had\nbeen obtained by selling a capital bearing any lower interest. But\nshould it prove false, or should our debts be ever put into a fixed\ncourse of redemption, the public would gain greatly by being able, after\ndischarging one part of its debts, to discharge the remainder more\nexpeditiously and easily.\n\nI shall beg leave to illustrate what has been now said by having recourse\nagain to the last loan of FIVE MILLIONS.\u2014During the last 60 years, or\nfrom the first establishment of the sinking fund to the year 1777, no\nmore than about FIFTEEN MILLIONS of the public funded debts have been\npaid. An order, therefore, that the capital of five millions bearing 4\n_per cent._ created by the last loan, should not be discharged unless\na capital of twenty-five or thirty millions in the three _per cents._\nshall have been _first_ discharged, would have carried its redemption\nto so distant a period, as might probably have raised it to the same\ncomparative value with any 3 _per cent._ capitals.\n\nLet it, however, be supposed to advance its price only to 102l. when\nthe 3 _per cents._ are at 78; that is, when the ratio of the rates\nof interest required the price to be at 104. In these circumstances,\n4.850,000l. of the five millions would have been advanced for an equal\ncapital carrying 194,000l. interest at 4 _per cent._; and the remaining\n150,000l. would have been advanced for the lottery: And thus the whole\nexpence of the short annuity, and 150,000l. capital, would have been\nsaved.\u2014And had the same sum been obtained by selling a 3 _per cent._\ncapital, the amount of interest, though the least possible, would not\nhave been much less;[148] but, at redemption, there would have been a\nnecessity of paying above a MILLION AND A QUARTER for which no value had\nbeen received.\u2014When such advantages, uncompensated by any loss, can be\nobtained by so easy and simple a regulation as only changing the ORDER of\npaying the public debts,[149] what possible reason can there be against\nadopting it?\n\nThere is another method by which the value of any stocks bearing high\ninterest might be raised, which would probably be no less effectual; I\nmean, by ordering that no part of such stocks shall be redeemed, without\nat the same time redeeming an _equal_, or any _larger_ sum, in other\ncapitals. This is the regulation proposed in the section on public loans,\n(page 98); and it will not be amiss here to give an illustration of\nit, by supposing, that EIGHT MILLIONS will be wanted for the necessary\nsupplies of this year; and that this sum will be procured by selling, as\nwas done in the last loan, a capital equal to the sum advanced, bearing 4\n_per cent._ interest. Were the interest in this case made irreducible,\nand the capital incapable of being redeemed without at the same time\nredeeming four times as much of the 3 _per ct._ or some other stocks,\nan increase of value would be communicated to it which would render all\nDOUCEURS unnecessary. For it would be a capital, the redemption of which\ncould not be completed without discharging in all FORTY[150] MILLIONS\nof the public debts.\u2014I cannot doubt but that, in these circumstances\n(supposing the price of the 3 _per cents._ to continue near 78) a\n100l. in money would be given for 100l. in such a stock, and the whole\nextravagant expence of short annuities, lotteries, and artificial\ncapitals would be saved.\n\nIn short. With the aid of such regulations as those now proposed, EIGHT\nMILLIONS might this year be borrowed (supposing the 3 _per cents._\nnot lower than 78 or 77) _probably_ at an interest of 4 _per cent._,\nbut _certainly_ at an interest an EIGHTH or a QUARTER higher, without\noffering any _premiums_. Whereas, if no such regulations are established,\neither an artificial debt of near[151] _two millions and a half_ must\nbe created; or 5 _per cent._ for 15 or 20 years certain, together with\nthe profits of a lottery, must be given; and a new tax laid which will\nproduce 400,000l. _per ann._\n\nIt may deserve to be added, that an unprosperous state of public affairs,\nand apprehensions of public danger, would have a tendency, by placing the\nredemption of our debts at a greater distance, to promote, rather than\nobstruct the success of schemes attended with such regulations.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThere remains one proposal more on this subject which I wish may be\nattended to.\n\nI have observed, that our reductions of interest have been the effect\nof too narrow a policy. It seems to me, that one of the best measures\nthat could now be adopted, would be to undo what we have done in this\ninstance, by restoring the 3 _per cent._ capitals to a higher interest,\nand making this restoration, one of the means of raising the necessary\nsupplies. That this is practicable, and that it would be advantageous,\nwill appear from the following scheme, and observations.\n\nFor 20l. in money, let 110l. stock bearing 3\u00bd _per cent._ interest,\nbe offered, in exchange for every 100l. of the 3 _per cent._ stocks;\nand let the new 3\u00bd _per cent._ flock be capable of being redeemed at\nany time, but never under _par_, unless when the price of the 3 _per\ncents._ happens to be below 85l.\u2014By this scheme the public would procure\n20l. from the conversion of every 100l. 3 _per cent._ stock into 110l.\nstock carrying 3\u00bd _per cent._; or FIVE MILLIONS from the conversion of\nTWENTY-FIVE MILLIONS. The new _additional_ capital would be only TWO\nMILLIONS AND A HALF, (or 10 _per cent._ of the old capital); and the\n_additional_ interest would be 17s. (that is, a half _per cent._ added to\n7s. the interest of 10l. at 3\u00bd _per cent._) for every 20l. advanced; or\n4\u00bc _per cent._ for the whole loan.\n\nThat such a scheme would afford ample encouragement to subscriptions,\nsupposing the 3 _per cents._ at or near 78, will appear from\nconsidering, that the interest offered is above a _quarter per cent._\nmore than could be made by purchasing any perpetual annuities, and at the\nsame time, in consequence of forming a part of the interest of a THREE\nAND A HALF _per cent._ capital, is incapable of reduction, and therefore\nnearly on an equal footing with the interest of any 3 _per cent._\ncapital.\u2014But to be a little more explicit.\n\nThe new capital of 110l. bearing 3\u00bd _per cent._ interest would be\nbetter than the 100l. THREE _per cent._ capitals for which it would be\nsubstituted, in the following respects.\u20141st. It would carry 17s. _per\nann._ more interest; and such an interest, when the price of an annuity\nof 3l. is 78l., ought to be worth 22l. 2s. The additional interest,\ntherefore, would be disposed of at 2l. 2s. for every sum of 22l. 2s. (or\nat 9\u00bd _per cent._) less than its true value, compared with the price of\nthe 3 _per cent._ annuities.\n\nSecondly. The 3 _per cents._ when _peace_ comes, will probably be capable\nof being redeemed at 88l.[152] But this stock, in the same circumstances,\nmust be redeemed at _par_. It will, therefore, produce 12l. more in\nevery 100l. at redemption. Add the 10l. additional stock; and the whole\nadditional sum to be received at redemption will be 22l.\u2014There will,\ntherefore, be a profit at redemption of 10l. _per cent._ of the money\nadvanced; and this profit deserves the more notice, because the stock to\nwhich it is annexed, being redeemable at any time, and bearing a higher\ninterest than the 3 _per cents._ will be selected for redemption before\nthem; and therefore its price will be so much the more likely always to\nkeep near _par_.\u2014Setting aside, however, this advantage, and supposing\nonly the 20l. advanced likely to be received at redemption, it may be\nfound by calculating in the manner explained in (p. 194), &c. that the\nsubstitution of 110l. flock carrying THREE AND A HALF _per cent._ for\n100l. carrying THREE _per cent._, or, in other words, that 20l. to\nbe received some time hereafter, besides an annuity of 17s. for the\nintermediate time, is worth in present money more than 20l., reckoning\ncompound interest at 4 _per cent._\n\nSuch a scheme, therefore, in whatever way its value was rightly\ncalculated, would appear to offer an advantageous bargain. Should there,\nhowever, be reason to fear that the public might judge otherwise; or\nshould the 3 _per cents._ be at 74 or 75, the value might be easily\nincreased near nine _per cent._ by making the substituted stock 112l.\ninstead of 110l. in which case, the interest for the 20l. advanced would\nbecome 18s. 5d. _per ann._, or a little more than four and a half _per\ncent._ instead of _four and a quarter_.\n\nThe advantages to the public which would arise from such a scheme\nare\u20141st. That it would be one of the best preparations for measures that\nmust some time or other be entered into for putting the public debts into\na _fixed_ course of redemption.[153]\u2014In consequence of being raised to\na higher interest, a considerable part of them would be made capable of\nbeing redeemed with more ease and expedition; and for this reason, it is\ncertain that, if there remains a possibility of our escaping a public\nbankruptcy, the time must come when we shall wish all our debts bore a\nhigh interest.[154]\n\nSecondly. A capital of TWO MILLIONS AND A HALF would be saved in raising\nFIVE MILLIONS. That is; the nation in procuring _five millions_ would\nincur a debt of only _half_ that sum; and instead of having a QUARTER or\na THIRD _more_ to pay at redemption than had been received, it would have\nONE HALF _less_ to pay.\n\nThirdly. Such a scheme would keep up public credit; and, by its\nnecessary operation, contribute to carry _itself_ into execution. For\nthe advantages attending it being grounded entirely upon the old 3\n_per cent._ stocks, few at such a time would chuse to sell them, but\nmany would be induced to buy, and, consequently, their price would be\nadvanced, contrary to the common effect of public loans.\u2014These seem to me\nadvantages so unspeakably important, that I cannot but think it would\nbe right to go to some extraordinary expence, in making at least one\nexperiment of this kind. If, in consequence of offering high terms in\n_one_ trial for a small sum, such an experiment should succeed, it might\nbe renewed on lower terms; and the way might be discovered of managing,\nin the best manner, larger loans on the same plan.\u2014I cannot help thinking\nindeed, that it would be found that in this way great sums might be\nraised without creating _any_ new capitals, or making any addition to the\npublic debts. I fancy, for instance, that few, when the 3 _per cents._\nare about 78, would scruple to pay 25l. for the conversion of 100l. THREE\n_per cent._ stock into a 100l. FOUR _per cent._ stock, provided this last\nstock was not to become redeemable till THIRTY or FORTY MILLIONS of our\npresent debts have been discharged: And supposing this true, money for\npublic services would be raised at 4 _per cent._ or at an interest nearly\nas low as possible; and, at the same time, a sum equal to the whole\nmoney advanced would be saved. But were it necessary to take for such a\nsubstitution 24l. or even 23l. (that is, to pay about 4\u00bc _per cent._ for\nmoney) the gain, if our debts are ever to be redeemed, would abundantly\noverbalance the increased expence of interest.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n[48] See Observations on Civil Liberty, page 74.\n\n[49] Of all the writers against this war, the learned Dr. TUCKER is the\nseverest. For if, as he maintains, contrary to repeated declarations from\nthe throne, a separation from the Colonies would be an advantage to us,\nthe attempt to keep them, by invasion and bloodshed, deserves a harsher\ncensure than words can convey.\n\n[50] See Observations on Civil Liberty, Part I. sect. 1.\n\n[51] See Observations, Part I. sect. 2.\n\n[52] The greatest part of Mr. _Goodricke_\u2019s remarks are founded on\nthis misunderstanding. He is so candid that I know he did not mean to\nmisrepresent me; and yet I cannot help thinking it hard, after repeated\ndeclarations of my preference of such a constitution as our own, to be\nconsidered as an advocate for a pure Democracy. See _Observations on Dr.\nPrice\u2019s Theory and Principles of Civil Liberty and Government_, by Mr.\nGOODRICKE.\n\n[53] One of the best plans of this kind has been with much ability,\ndescribed by Mr. DE LOLME, in his account of the Constitution of England.\n\n[54] \u201cAs in a free state, every man who is supposed a free agent, ought\nto be his own governor; so the legislative power should reside in the\nwhole body of the people.\u201d _Spirit of Laws_, Book XI. chap. vi. See\nlikewise Justice Blackstone\u2019s Commentaries on the Laws of England,\npage 158. 1st Vol. oct. edition.\u2014_Demosthenes_ speaking in his first\nPhilippic, sect. 3d. of certain free states, calls them _their own\nlegislators_, \u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03b7\u03bd\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03c5\u03b8\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1.\n\n[55] See _Remarks_, printed for Mr. Cadell, _on a pamphlet published by\nDr. Price. In a letter from a gentleman in the country to a member of\nparliament_, page 10.\n\n[56] Rom. vii.\n\n[57] Dr. PRIESTLY, in his Essay on the _first principles of Government_,\nmakes a distinction between _civil_ Liberty and _political_ Liberty;\nthe former of which he defines to be \u201cthe power which the members of a\nstate ought to enjoy over their actions;\u201d and the latter, \u201ctheir power\nof arriving at public offices, or, at least, of having votes in the\nnomination of those who fill them.\u201d\u2014This distinction forms a very proper\nsubdivision of _the liberty of the citizen_ here mentioned; and it may be\naccommodated to all I have said on this subject, by only giving some less\ngeneral name to that which Dr. Priestly calls _civil_ Liberty.\n\n[58] See on this Subject an excellent Sermon entitled, _The Principles of\nthe REVOLUTION vindicated_. By Dr. Watson, Regius Professor of Divinity,\nat Cambridge.\n\n[59] Some who maintain this doctrine concerning government, overthrow\ntheir own system by acknowledging the right of resistance in certain\ncases. For, if there is such a right, the people must be judges _when_\nit ought to be exercised; a right to resist only when civil governors\n_think_ there is reason, being a gross absurdity and nullity.\u2014The right\nof resistance, therefore, cannot mean less than a right in the people,\nwhenever they think it necessary, to change their governors, and to limit\ntheir power. And from the moment this is done, government becomes the\nwork of the people, and governors become their trustees or agents.\n\n[60] It has been commonly reckoned, that it is the end of civil\ngovernment and civil laws to protect the _property_ and _rights_ of men;\nbut, according to this writer, civil government and civil laws create\n_property_ and _rights_. It follows therefore, that, antecedently to\ncivil laws, men could have no _property_ or _rights_; and that civil\ngovernors, being the makers of civil laws, it is a contradiction to\nsuppose, that mankind can have any property or rights which are valid\nagainst the claims of their governors. See Three Letters to Dr. _Price_,\np. 21, &c. And Remarks on the principal Acts of the 13th Parliament of\nGreat-Britain, p. 58, &c. and p. 191.\n\n[61] This has been done in a lower instance. Parents have been furnished\nwith a particular affection for their children, in order to prevent any\nabuse of their power over them.\n\n[62] \u201cIn ages of darkness, and too often also in those of greater\nknowledge, by the perfidious arts of designing princes, and by the\nbase servility of too many ecclesiastics, who managed the superstition\nof the populace, by the violent restraints put upon divulging any\njuster sentiments about the rights of mankind, the natural notions of\npolity were erased out of the minds of men; and they were filled with\nsome confused imaginations of something adorable in monarchs, some\nrepresentation of the Divinity; and that even in the worst of them; and\nof some certain Divine claims in certain families.\u2014No wonder this! that\nmillions thus look upon themselves as a piece of property to one of their\nfellows as silly and worthless as the meanest of them; when the like arts\nof superstition have made millions, nay the very artificers themselves,\nfall down before the block or stone they had set up; or adore monkies,\ncats, and crocodiles, as the sovereign disposers of their fortunes.\u201d See\nDr. HUTCHESON\u2019S System of Moral Philosophy. Vol. ii. p. 280.\n\n[63] \u201cLet not, therefore, these _pretended masters_ of the people\nbe allowed even to do good against the general consent.\u2014Let it be\nconsidered, that the condition of rulers is exactly the same as that\nof the Cacique, who being asked whether he had any slaves, answered;\n_Slaves? I know but one slave in all my district, and that is myself._\u201d\nSee the Philosophical and Political History of the Settlements and Trade\nof the _Europeans_ in the EAST AND WEST INDIES. Translated from the\nFrench of the Abbe _Raynal_, by Mr. _Justamond_. Vol. v. page 414.\n\n[64] See Obs. p. 25. \u201cThe rights of mankind are so sacred that no\nprescription of tyranny or arbitrary power can have authority enough to\nabolish them.\u201d Mr. _Hume_\u2019s Essays, vol. iii. Essay on the Coalition of\nParties.\n\n[65] \u201cMankind have been generally a great deal too tractable; and hence\nso many wretched forms of power have always enslaved nine tenths of the\nnations of the world, where they have the fullest right to make all\nefforts for a change.\u201d Dr. _Hutcheson_\u2019s Moral Philosophy. Vol. ii. p.\n280.\n\n[66] See Remarks on the Acts of the Thirteenth Parliament of _Great\nBritain_. P. 34, &c.\u2014\u201cIs not the same reasoning applicable to taxes paid\nfor the support of civil government? Are not these too the property of\nthe civil magistrate?\u201d Ibid. p. 56.\u2014If I understand this writer, his\nmeaning is, not only that the taxes which the civil magistrate _has_\nimposed are his property; but also, _any_ which he shall please to impose.\n\n[67] Matth. xxiii. 8-12.\u2014John xiii. 14.\n\n[68] Luke xxii. 25, &c.\n\n[69] 1 Pet. v. 3.\u20142 Cor. i. 24.\n\n[70] He who wants to be convinced of the _practicability_, even in this\ncountry, of a complete representation, should read a pamphlet lately\npublished, the title of which is, TAKE YOUR CHOICE.\n\n[71] \u201cA _free_ subject of a free state\u201d is a contradiction in terms. See\nthe Proclamation for a Fast.\n\n[72] Mr. Hume\u2019s Essays. Vol. i. Essay iv. p. 31.\n\n[73] Spirit of Laws. Book xix. ch. 27.\n\n[74] Introduction to the Commentaries on the Laws of England, p. 48. See\nalso Book i. ch. 8.\n\n[75] In 1692 King William rejected a bill for triennial Parliaments,\nafter it had passed both Houses. But in a following year he thought\nproper to give his assent to it.\n\n[76] Spirit of Laws. Book xix. ch. 27.\n\n[77] History of Civil Society. Part vi. sect. 5.\n\n[78] _Political_ Discourses. Essay xii. p. 301.\n\n[79] History of Civil Society. Part iv. sect. 5.\n\n[80] See Mr. Hume\u2019s Essays. Vol. i. p. 91.\n\n[81] See the conclusion of the Third Part.\n\n[82] This was confirmed by the account of the noble Lord at opening the\nlast Budget.\n\n[83] I have mentioned this sum at random. It is not of great consequence\nwhether it is half a million too little or half a million too much.\n\n[84] The quantity of coin within all equal degrees of deficiency would be\nequal, were equal quantities issued every year, and were there also no\ncause which diminished or destroyed it, except the _uniform_ operation\nof time in wearing it. Any cause, therefore, which destroys it more, or\ndiminishes it faster at first than at last, must render the quantity less\nin the first degrees of deficiency. And the same must be the consequence\nof a greater proportion issued formerly, in any given time, than of\nlate.\u2014The causes of diminution never probably operated so much on the\ngold coin as they did for about twelve years before 1773; and this will\nbalance the greater proportion coined during that time. The very reason\nof the increase of coinage in those years was, a necessity created by\nthe loss of the new coin, and never before felt in an equal degree. The\ncoinage, however, in those years, was not so much more than usual as some\nmay imagine. In ten years before 1770, eight millions and a half were\ncoined; and in twelve years after the _Accession_, the same quantity was\ncoined; and in twenty-seven years after the _Accession_, more was coined\nthan in twenty-seven years before 1770. See _Considerations on Money,\nBullion_, &c. p. 2.\u2014The whole quantity of gold coined from the Accession\nto 1770, was near 29 millions; more than one half of which must have been\nmelted and exported; and, the greatest part of the remainder must have\nbeen precipitated in its progress towards deficiency by being clipped and\nsweated.\n\n[85] When the silver _specie_ was recoined in King William\u2019s time, it\nappeared, that a great treasure had been hoarded before the _Revolution_,\nin consequence of the danger of public liberty at that time. See\nDavenant\u2019s Works, Vol. I. p. 439, &c.\n\nIn _Russia_ it is reckoned, that as much money lies buried under ground,\nas exists above ground.\n\n[86] In these sums is included all the coin which the late Proclamations\nhave brought in from HOLLAND and other foreign countries; and which, I\nthink, ought not to be deemed a part of the resting stock of the kingdom.\n\n[87] Or deducting a million for the _Irish_ coin, seventeen or eighteen\nmillions.\n\n[88] This is said on the supposition, that the last call would bring in\nno more than was expected, or about three millions. Its having brought in\nabove double this sum makes little difference. For it proves, that the\nwhole quantity of gold coin must have been (according to Lord NORTH\u2019s\nmethod of computing) 21 or 22 millions; and the quantity deficient more\nthan a grain about 15 millions; and, consequently, six or seven millions\n(that is, near a _third_) will still remain to be the quantity deficient\nless than a grain.\n\n[89] It has been thought very strange, that a piece of metal should\nbear a higher price, merely because it wants the stamp of the mint. But\nthe reason is, that bullion alone being exportable in any considerable\nquantity, the price of it must vary as the demand for it varies; or,\nin other words, as the _balance of payment_ between us and the rest of\nthe world is favourable or unfavourable.\u2014This will be explained at the\nbeginning of the Third Part, where it will appear that, in consequence\nof the increase of luxury and the national debt, this balance has been\ngenerally against us ever since the end of the last war.\n\n[90] The coin brought in last Summer, added to near 14 millions coined\nfrom the beginning of 1772 to the time of the last call, amounts to about\n20 millions and a half; but only 16 millions and a half have been brought\nin, including the coin from _Ireland_ and foreign countries.\n\n[91] Or EIGHTEEN MILLIONS AND A HALF. See Dr. DAVENANT\u2019s Works, Vol. i.\np. 363, &c. 443, &c. A great part of this specie was carried out of the\nnation in King WILLIAM\u2019s wars; and the consequence was, that the taxes\nbecame unproductive; and that Government fell under great difficulties,\nfrom which it was afterwards relieved by the establishment of the _Bank_\nand the increase of trade. See the beginning of the Third Part.\n\n[92] The paper currency of the Colonies is one of the greatest\ndisadvantages under which they labour; but it is of a more safe and\npermanent nature than ours. Were it not so, it could not have been of the\nleast use to them for the last year and a half. He who doubts this, need\nonly consider what our paper would be worth were we now invaded as they\nare.\n\nThis difference depends chiefly, on the following circumstances.\u2014Their\npaper is not payable on demand.\u2014It is a legal tender.\u2014It represents fixed\nproperty which is mortgaged for it.\u2014It does not support such a monstrous\ndebt as ours.\u2014And when public emergencies require any extraordinary\nemissions, they are generally sunk by taxes in four or five years.\u2014It\nis the first of these circumstances that gives our paper its currency;\nand it is also this circumstance that creates the danger attending it,\nby rendering it incapable of sustaining any great shock or panic.\u2014The\npossession of securities equal in nominal value to the amount of the\npaper emitted, or the debts contracted, is of little consequence when\nthe value of these securities depends on the paper, and is created by\nit; that is, in other words, when the debts themselves are the very cash\nwhich must pay the debts.\u2014Nothing can be more unnatural than such a state\nof things; and it may hereafter be a curious object of enquiry, how it\ncould be ever possible that it should subsist any long time.\n\nIn page 78 of the _Observations on Civil Liberty_, I have said, \u201cthat\nthe kingdom of FRANCE has no such dependence as we have on paper-credit;\nand that its specie amounts to 67 millions sterling.\u201d In mentioning this\nsum I took the lowest of different accounts which I had then received\nfrom different authorities. I have since received accounts which make\nit 87 millions and a half; or 2000 millions of _livres_. This, in\nparticular, is the account of an author whom all know to be likely to\nbe well informed on this subject; I mean the author of the Treatise on\nthe _Legislation_ and _Commerce of Corn_, Part I. chap. v.\u2014In the same\ntreatise it is said, (Part I. chap. viii,) that it appears, from the\nreturns made by the intendants of the different Provinces, that the\nnumber of _annual_ deaths in the whole kingdom of France, for three\nyears ended in 1772, was 780,040. I have been informed by the ingenious\nauthor, that this account may be depended on; and if so, _France_ must\ncontain 26 millions of inhabitants; for the best observations prove, that\nno more than a thirty-third part of a whole kingdom dies annually. See\nObservations on Reversionary Payments, page 200.\u2014In _Sweden_, though a\nnineteenth part die in the capital every year, only a thirty-fifth part\ndie in the whole kingdom. See Philosophical Transactions, Vol. lxv. for\n1775, p. 426. The particulars now mentioned, added to the nature of the\ndebts of FRANCE as mentioned in page 78 of the _Observations on Civil\nLiberty_, form a striking contrast between the state of that kingdom and\nours. Nothing gives us our superiority but the advantages we derive from\nour RELIGION and our LIBERTY. Even in these respects, however, they seem\nto be improving, while we are declining. _Montesquieu_, _Abbe Raynal_,\nand others of their most admired writers, inculcate principles of\ngovernment, and breathe a spirit of Liberty, which, to the shame of this\ncountry, are become offensive in it.\n\n[93] See the proposals and observations in a pamphlet lately published by\nLord Viscount MAHON on this subject.\n\n[94] \u201cThere is something (says a great writer) so unnatural in supposing\na large society, sufficient for all the good purposes of an independent\npolitical union, remaining subject to the direction and government of\na distant body of men who know not sufficiently the circumstances and\nexigencies of this society; or in supposing this society obliged to be\ngoverned solely for the benefit of a distant country; that it is not easy\nto imagine there can be any foundation for it in justice or equity. The\ninsisting on _old claims_ and _tacit conventions_, to extend civil power\nover distant nations, and form grand unwieldy empires, without regard\nto the obvious maxims of humanity, has been one great source of human\nmisery.\u201d _System of Moral Philosophy_, by Dr. HUTCHESON, vol. ii. p.\n309. In the section from whence this quotation is taken, Dr. HUTCHESON\ndiscusses the question, \u201cWhen colonies have a right to be released from\nthe dominion of the parent state?\u201d And his general sentiment seems to\nbe, that they acquire such a right, \u201cWhenever they are so increased in\nnumbers and strength, as to be sufficient by themselves for all the\ngood ends of a political union.\u201d\u2014Such a decision given by a wise man,\nlong before we had any disputes with the colonies, deserves, I think,\nparticular notice.\n\n[95] See COMMON SENSE, and PLAIN TRUTH, p. 44. Published for Mr. _Almon_.\n\n[96] The Colonies, I am assured, were not perfectly unanimous till they\nsaw this answer.\n\n[97] I am sorry to differ from those respectable persons who have\nproposed placing _America_ on the same ground with _Ireland_. If the same\nground of LAW is meant, it is already done; for our laws give us the same\npower over _Ireland_, that we claim over _America_. If the same ground of\nPRACTICE is meant; it has been most unfortunate for _Ireland_, and would\nbe equally so for _America_.\n\n[98] See the Abbe RAYNAL\u2019s Reflections on this subject at the end of\nthe 18th book of his History of the _European Settlements_ in the East\nand West-Indies.\u2014\u201cIs it not likely, says this writer, that the distrust\nand hatred which have of late taken place of that regard and attachment\nwhich the _English_ Colonies felt for the parent country, may hasten\ntheir separation from one another? Every thing conspires to produce\nthis great disruption; the \u00e6ra of which it is impossible to know.\u2014Every\nthing tends to this point: The progress of good in the new hemisphere,\nand the progress of evil in the old.\u2014In proportion as our people are\nweakened, and resign themselves to each other\u2019s dominion, population\nand agriculture will flourish in _America_; and the arts make a rapid\nprogress: And that country rising out nothing, will be fired with the\nambition of appearing with glory in its turn on the face of the globe\u2014O\nposterity! ye, peradventure, will be more happy than your unfortunate and\ncontemptible ancestors.\u201d\u2014Mr. _Justamond_\u2019s Translation.\n\n[99] Had this interest been insufficient, it might have been increased\na 16th or even an 8th _per cent._ without any material difference; or,\n(which would have been better) 3\u00bd _per cent._ might have been offered for\n_four fifths_ of the sum borrowed, and 4 _per cent._ for the remainder;\nin which case, the annuity payable by the public would have been 65,790l.\n\n[100] It should be remembered here, that tho\u2019 Government, when its debts\nare at a discount, may be able, with the consent of the creditors, to\nredeem a given capital by paying a less sum than that capital; yet it can\nnever be obliged to pay _more_.\u2014In other words; a 100l. capital in the 3\n_per cents_; 3\u00bd _per cents_; or 4, or 5 _per cents_, Government is always\nat liberty to redeem by paying 100l. whatever the market price of it may\nbe, and whether the creditors will consent or not.\n\n[101] There is another very great advantage which would attend these\nannuities.\u2014One and the same _surplus_ would discharge a given capital\nin less time. For example. A surplus of a million _per ann._ invariably\napplied, and the first payment to be made immediately, would discharge\na capital of a _hundred millions_ bearing 3 _per cent._ interest in 46\nyears. But if the same capital bore 3\u00bd _per cent._ interest, it would\nbe discharged in 43\u00bd years; if 4 _per cent._ in 40 years; if 5 _per\ncent._ in 37\u00bc years.\u2014A capital _less_ than a 100 millions, in the same\nproportion that the interest is _more_ than 3 _per cent._ and for which,\ntherefore, the same annuity is paid, (as in the present case) the same\nsurplus would discharge in 39 years, if the interest is 3\u00bd; in 34\u00bc years,\nif the interest is 4 _per cent._ in 27\u00bc years if the interest is 5 _per\ncent._\u2014Supposing, therefore, 75 millions borrowed in the manner of our\nGovernment, by creating a capital of a 100 millions bearing 3 _per cent._\n(that is, by selling 3 _per cent._ stock for 75l. in money) which might\nhave been borrowed by creating a capital of only 75 millions bearing 4\n_per cent._ (that is by selling 4 _per cent._ stock at 100) there will\nnot only be a loss of 25 millions by a needless increase of the capital;\nbut also a loss of 14 millions, by an increase of the time in which one\nand the same saving will discharge the two capitals.\u2014This may be proved\nin the following manner.\u2014A million, _per ann._ will, in 34 years and a\nquarter, very nearly discharge a debt of 75 millions bearing interest\nat 4 _per cent._; but the same saving will, in the same time, discharge\nonly a capital of 61 millions, if it bears interest at 3 _per cent._\nWhen, therefore, such a saving has compleated the redemption of the _one_\ncapital, there will remain unpaid of the other, 39 millions.\u2014What has\nbeen now applied to a large sum holds true in proportion of any smaller\nsums.\n\nIt appears from hence to be a very wrong observation which some have\nmade; \u201cthat provided the annual charge is the same, it signifies little\nwhat the _principal_ of the public debt is.\u201d\u2014As there is no way of\nremoving the annual charge but by paying the _principal_, it is of\njust as much consequence what it is, as whether it is practicable or\nimpracticable, to remove a burden which weakens and cripples, and must\nin time sink the public. An annuity of SIX MILLIONS, if the principal is\nHUNDRED MILLIONS borrowed at 6 _per cent._ might be redeemed in 33 years\nwith a million _per ann._ surplus. But if the principal is TWO HUNDRED\nMILLIONS bearing 3 _per cent._ the same surplus would, in the same time,\npay off only 56 millions; and but little more than a _quarter_ of the\nannuity would be redeemed. If, therefore, the same sum might as well have\nbeen obtained by creating a principal of a hundred millions bearing 6\n_per cent._ as by creating a capital of two hundred millions bearing 3\n_per cent._ there will be a needless expence, in discharging the debt, of\n144 millions.\n\n[102] The price of the 3 _per cents_ at the time of this loan (in the\nbeginning of Feb. 1759) was 88\u00bd and 89.\n\n[103] The 3 _per cents_ just before this loan were at 69l. and,\nconsequently, 5 _per cent._ interest, (or 3l. _per ann._ for 60l.) would\nhave afforded subscribers a profit of 9l. for every 60l. advanced. The\nlong annuity was worth, as the stocks then stood, 21 years purchase, and\nthe short annuity, 13 years purchase. Upon the whole loan, therefore, the\nprofit would have been 3 _per cent._\n\n[104] That is, the difference between 12 millions, and the sum bearing\ninterest at 3 _per cent._ which a million _per ann._ would pay off, in\nfive years and a quarter.\n\n[105] The 3 _per cents_ being at this time at 80l. an annuity of 3l.\npurchased for 75l. would have produced a profit of 5l. Therefore these\nschemes are of exactly the same value. But they are too narrow; and the\nsubscription this year fell immediately to one _per cent._ discount. But\nin the scheme I have proposed this might have been prevented by only\noffering 4 _per cent._ for 77l. or 78l. (instead of 75l.) of every 100l.\n\n[106] It is plain, that this capital, as well as the former, might have\nbeen a quarter (or 60,000_l._) less, which would have made the whole\nsaving of capital 2.060,000_l._\n\n[107] At the time of this loan, the 3 _per cents._ were above 75; and,\ntherefore, a perpetual annuity of 3_l._ could not be purchased for 75_l._\nand an annuity of 1_l._ 2_s._ 6_d._ for 99 years, was worth at least\n27_l._ This, therefore, would have been a scheme very profitable to\nsubscribers.\n\n[108] The life-annuity granted in this case could not have been worth\nso little as 16_l._ or 14 years purchase; and, therefore, a capital\nof 100_l._ in the 3 _per cents_ was sold for 84_l_; or a capital of\nthree millions, for 2.520,000_l._\u2014A premium, therefore, was granted of\n480,000_l_; and this was done without the least reason. For the 3 _per\ncents_ being at that time at 87 and 88, 2.520,000_l._ would undoubtedly\nhave been lent at 3\u00bd _per cent._ interest; and the remaining 480,000_l._\nnecessary to make up three millions, would have been given for the life\nannuities; in which case, the annual charge occasioned by the new capital\nwould have been somewhat less; and 480,000_l._ would have been saved,\ntogether with the additional expence occasioned by the longer time which\na given surplus would require to discharge a debt bearing 3 _per cent._\ninterest, as explained in the note, p. 94.\n\n[109] It is a general and certain maxim \u201cthat whenever money is borrowed\nby a lottery which gives a right to _stock_ equal to the sum advanced,\nthere is a loss equal to the sum which might have been received for the\nprofits of the lottery.\u201d\u2014When the 3 _per cents._ are at 76 or 77, half\na million might be borrowed by a lottery, consisting of 50,000 tickets,\neach of the same value with 10l. three _per cent._ stock: and hitherto\nsuch a method of borrowing has been reckoned advantageous. But it only\ngives a fallacious appearance of borrowing at 3 _per cent._ It is the\nsame with selling the profits of a lottery, and at the same time absurdly\nconverting the purchase-money into a debt due to the purchaser.\u2014Since the\nlast war we have had seven of these lotteries, including two in 1763; and\nabove a million has been lost by them.\n\nIn Queen _Anne_\u2019s time, there were several lotteries, consisting of all\n_prizes_ and no _blanks_. This is so curious, and most persons may be so\nmuch at a loss to conceive of the possibility of it, that I cannot help\nexplaining it.\n\nA capital, equal to the whole money advanced, was distributed _equally_\namong all the tickets in the lottery; and, in order to make them prizes\nof different values, there was farther distributed among them different\nshares of an additional capital, to which a right was given, though\nno money had been paid for it.\u2014For example\u2014In 1711, two millions were\nraised by a lottery of this kind, called a class lottery. The whole sum\nadvanced was divided into 20,000 tickets, each 100_l._ stock bearing 6\n_per cent._ interest. This capital was increased by a gratuitous capital\nof 602,200_l._ bearing the same interest, and divided into shares which\nwere added to the tickets, in order to form prizes.\u2014This was the same\nwith giving near 8 _per cent._ for money, besides a _premium_ of 30\n_per cent._\u2014As the interest of money was at this time 6 _per cent._ the\nsum borrowed would most certainly have been advanced at 8 _per cent._\nwithout any _premium_; but it was, I suppose, reckoned necessary that\ngovernment should not _seem_ to give such high interest.\u2014In the same\nyear, 1.500,000_l._ was borrowed by another such lottery, and creating\na capital of 1.928,570_l._ And in 1712, 3.600,000_l._ was borrowed by\ntwo more such lotteries, and creating a capital of 4.683,080_l._\u2014The\ngreatest part of the debts contracted by these lotteries (amounting to\n9.213,850_l._ though only 7.100,000_l._ was advanced) remains at this\nhour an incumbrance on the public; and the duties constituting the\n_general fund_ are charged with the interest of it.\n\nIn 1714, the national interest was reduced to 5 _per cent._ But in that\nvery year 1.400,000_l._ was borrowed by a lottery, which gave a right to\na capital of 1.876,000_l._ bearing 4 _per cent._ that is, by giving near\n5\u00bd _per cent._ interest, besides a _premium_ of 34 _per cent._\u2014Thus have\nour debts been increased. But even worse has been done. The taxes charged\nwith the interest of the public debts proving often deficient, the\nshortest way of discharging the arrears has been often taken, by adding\nthem to the principal, and paying _compound_ interest for money.\u2014Is it a\nwonder, that a nation which has been so careless in contracting debts,\nshould have done so little towards discharging them?\n\n[110] That is, in other words; there is no one who would not be glad to\nlend to government on any higher interest than that which he can make in\nthe funds. There is no one, for instance, who would not be glad to lend\n75_l._ at 4 _per cent._ when the 3 _per cents._ are at 76, and when,\ntherefore, he cannot make 4 _per cent._ by purchasing them.\n\n[111] The expectation of receiving back some time or other the\npurchase-money would probably, in private loans, influence a purchaser.\nBut in the cases to which I allude, this certainly was not considered,\nand did not at all influence. And if it had influenced, the observations\nI have made as I have gone along, demonstrate that the same loans would\nhave been made without any such expectation.\n\n[112] See the Postscript.\n\n[113] SIXTEEN MILLIONS have been specified. It will come in my way to\nmention above FOUR MILLIONS more in the second section of the next part.\nNotes 1, 12, 14.\u2014No notice has been here taken of the loans of the war\nbefore the last; but losses of the same kind to a great amount were\nincurred by them.\n\n[114] In the exports, as delivered to the _House of Commons_, is included\nbullion exported. If this, as well as the other sums I have mentioned,\nis deducted, there will be still a balance left in favour of _Britain_\nduring this period. Since 1764, it does not appear, from the accounts\nlaid before the _House of Commons_, as published by Sir _Charles\nWhitworth_, that any bullion has been entered for exportation.\n\n[115] The 3 _per cent._ annuities were then at 105; and, during the first\nfive years of the war which began in 1755, they were higher than they\nhave generally been _since_ the war.\n\n[116] These duties were appropriated to the payment of the interest at 4\n_per cent._ of a capital of 4.400,000l. created in 1747, for which four\nmillions only had been advanced. It is now a part of the capital of the\nreduced 3 _per cent._ annuities.\n\n[117] The whole of this sum, (except 16.437,821l. consisting of the old\nBank capital, the consolidated 3 _per cents_, the South-Sea 3 _per cent._\nannuities 1751, the Civil List million, and the East-India annuity)\nthat is, 54.413,433l. was reduced by 23 Geo. II. 1749. from an interest\nof 4 _per cent._ to 3\u00bd till 1757, and afterwards to 3 _per cent._\u2014The\nproprietors of a capital of 3.290,042l. refused to consent to this\nreduction, which, therefore, was paid off; 1.190,042l. with _Exchequer_\nBills (afterwards cancelled); and 2.100,000l. with money borrowed at\n3 _per cent._ and added to the capital of the _South-Sea_ annuities.\nThe whole sum, therefore, reduced and paid off, was 57.703,475l. which\nproduced a saving to the public, and an addition to the Sinking Fund\nafter 1757, of 612,735l. _per ann._\n\nThe SALT DUTIES in 1753 had been for some time mortgaged to pay the\nprincipal and interest of a million borrowed in 1745. In 1757, after\nclearing the mortgage, they became free, and were carried into the\nSinking Fund, of which they have ever since formed a part. This produced\na farther addition to the _Sinking Fund_, after 1757, of about 220,000l.\n_per ann._\n\nI have not included the million now mentioned in the account given\nabove of the public debts in 1753, because it was in a fixed course of\nredemption; nor have I included 499,600l. in Exchequer Bills charged on\nthe duty on sweets, because these Exchequer Bills were paid off in 1754.\n\n[118] Having met with no account of the Navy Debt at this time, I have\nchosen, rather than omit it, to suppose it nearly the same that it was at\nthe commencement of the last war; which, probably, is reckoning it too\nhigh.\n\n[119] In this account I have omitted a million borrowed in 1734, because\nthe redemption of it was near being completed by the Salt Duties. I have\nalso omitted _Short Annuities_ amounting to 24,334l. being the remainder\nof 9 _per cent._ annuities for 32 years created in 1710, because the term\nfor which they were created was near expiring.\n\n[120] The author of the _Considerations on the Trade and Finances of\nthis Kingdom_ makes this debt 1.318,000l. more than the sum at which I\nhave here stated it. See page 22; and _State of the Nation_ by the same\nauthor, page 15, quarto editions.\u2014The reason of this difference is,\nthat this writer has included in the unfunded debt left by the war the\ndeficiencies of grants and funds in 1763 and 1764, and the _whole_ army\ndebt not provided for in those years; whereas I have excluded the former\nentirely; and admitted only as much of the latter as exceeded the army\ndebts common in subsequent years. See the Postscript.\n\n[121] In 1751 there was applied to the payment of Navy debts 200,000l.\nand in 1752, the sum of 900,000l. But I have not reckoned these sums,\nbecause they did little more than make up the constant deficiency in the\n_Peace Establishment_ for the Navy.\n\n[122] See the Postscript.\n\n[123] \u201cEither the nation (Mr. Hume says) must destroy public credit, or\npublic credit will destroy the nation.\u201d Political Essays, page 135.\n\n[124] The number of inhabitants in _France_ is 26 millions. In _Britain_\nit cannot exceed six or seven millions. See p. 66. And _Observations on\nReversionary Payments_, page 185, third edition.\n\n[125] Near one half of all this importation is made into _Bourdeaux_\nonly; and the rest into _Rochelle_, _Marseilles_, _Nantz_, _Havre_, and\n_Honfleur_.\n\n[126] In order to defray the expence of coinage, a duty of 10s. _per_ ton\nhas been laid on wines imported; and, as far as this duty happens to fall\nshort of 15,000 l. the deficiency is made good out of the supplies.\n\n[127] I am not able to give the exact amount of this part of the\nappropriated revenue. I have, therefore, reckoned it at such a round sum,\nas, I think, cannot much exceed or fall short of it.\n\n[128] The Land-tax at 3s. is given by Parliament for 1.500,000l.; and the\nMalt-tax for 750,000l. but they are always greatly deficient.\u2014Both these\ntaxes (and also sometimes the income of the Sinking Fund) are borrowed\nof the _Bank_, and spent long before they come into the Exchequer; and\ntherefore, are debts constantly due to the Bank, for which interest is\npaid.\n\n[129] The account given by Lord North at opening the Budget in 1775,\nwas, that the public debt had been diminished since 1763, near nine\nmillions and a half. The grounds on which I have stated this diminution\nat 10.639,793l. may be seen in the POSTSCRIPT, (p. 171).\n\n[130] Four of these lotteries have been annexed to annuities; but it\nwould be a great mistake to think that they have not been equally\nprofitable with the other lotteries. For instance; in 1767, a million and\na half was borrowed on an annuity of 45,000l. with a lottery of 60,000\ntickets annexed. In the same year, 2.616,777l. was paid off; but, had it\nnot been for the lottery, only 1.350,000l. could have been raised on the\nannuity; and 150,000l. less must have been paid off.\n\n[131] The discounts on a million and a half paid off in 1772, and two\nmillions paid off in 1774 and 1775, amounted nearly to this sum.\n\n[132] The particular sums may be found in a pamphlet, entitled, _The\nPresent State of the Nation_, p. 28, quarto edition. But I have not\nincluded all the sums there enumerated; nor have I admitted the Army\nsavings in 1772, and some other smaller sums.\n\n[133] This surplus, being the medium for the whole 12 years of peace, is\nless than that in p. 160, which is the medium at the end of this period,\nwhen the Sinking-Fund produced above a quarter more than it did at the\nbeginning of it.\n\n[134] I have here taken the average of two years before and after 1766.\n\n[135] The annual medium of the payments into the Exchequer from the\nCUSTOMS in ENGLAND, for the last five years, has been 2.521,769l.\u2014In\n1774 the payment into the Exchequer was 2.547,717l.\u2014In 1775, it was\n2.476,302l.\u2014The produce of the CUSTOMS, therefore, has been given rather\ntoo high.\n\nThe produce of the EXCISES in England has been higher, in 1772 and\n1775, than in any two years before 1776; but the average of any three\nsuccessive years, or of all the five years since 1770, will not differ\nmuch from the sum I have given.\u2014In 1754, or the year before the last\nwar, the CUSTOMS produced only 1.558,254l.\u2014The Excises, exclusive of\nthe Malt-tax, produced 2.819,702l,\u2014And the whole revenue, exclusive\nof the Malt-tax and Land-tax at 2s. was 5.097,617l.\u2014In 1753 the whole\nrevenue was 5.189,745l. And the appropriation or annual charge upon it,\n(consisting of the Civil List, 834,443l. interest of the national debt,\nexclusive of navy debt, 2.628,087l. expences of management, 43,691l. 4\u00bd\n_per cent._ from the Leeward Islands 27,378l. annuity to the late Duke of\nCumberland 25,000l. first-fruits and tenths of the Clergy 13,597l. &c.\n&c.) was 3.733,713l. The Sinking-Fund, therefore, produced 1.456,000l.;\nwhich, added to 1.500,000l. (the neat produce, at that time, of Land at\n2s. and Malt-tax) made the unappropriated revenue 2.956,032l.\u2014The expence\nof the peace establishment, consisting of 10,000 seamen, and 18,857\nlandmen, was, in 1753 and 1754, (including an allowance for the increase\nof the Navy-debt) 2.400,000l. nearly; which left an annual surplus in the\nnational income of 556,000l. _without_ lotteries, and land at 2s. This\nsurplus (with land at 3s.) has of late scarcely exceeded 300,000l.; and,\ntherefore, has not been a THIRD of what it was in the last peace, and\nbefore the reduction of interest to 3 _per cent._ was compleated.\n\n[136] This article was omitted in the former editions of this\n_Postscript_; and its insertion here makes the diminution of the public\ndebts, since 1763, half a million less than the sum at which it is taken\nin p. 104 and 108.\u2014It might have been proper also to add, the excess of\nNavy debts _contracted_ above the Navy debts _discharged_, from 1763 to\n1775; and had this been done, the surplus in p. 165, would have been\nreduced to 150,000l.\n\n[137] See _The Present State of the Nation_, page 26.\n\n[138] This article was omitted in the first editions of this\n_Postscript_.\u2014It might have been proper to add, the excess of Navy debts\n_contracted_ above the Navy debts _discharged_, from 1763 to 1775; and\nhad this been done, the surplus in p. 166, would have been reduced to\n150,000l. _per ann._\n\n[139] Or, for every 105l. contributed, 100l. STOCK irredeemable for 10\nyears might have been given, carrying 4\u00bc _per cent._ interest, with the\nsame short annuity and a lottery ticket annexed; and then the new capital\nwould have been 4.762,000l. carrying (at 4\u00bc _per cent._) 202,385l. _per\nann._ interest. The amount of the short annuity would have been 23,810l.\nand the number of lottery tickets 47,620.\n\n[140] 211,375l. the interest at 4\u00bd of 4.750,000l. and 12,500l. a short\nannuity of a QUARTER _per cent._ annexed to every 100l. contributed, make\n223,875l. This last sum, therefore, would have been the annual charge\nfor 10 years; and the first sum the annual charge after ten years till\nredemption.\n\n[141] Ten payments of 9,650l. and seventeen payments of 34,375l. make\n680,875l.\n\n[142] It may be worth observing, that during this whole war they never\nfell below 82, except for a few months during the rebellion in 1745; that\nafter the PEACE in 1748 they rose to 105, and in the succeeding war never\nfell so low as they are now, except in the two last years; that after\nthe PEACE in 1763 it was expected they would again rise above _par_; but\nthat, instead of this, they have in general during the whole peace kept\n12 or 13 _per cent._ below _par_, and 15 or 16 _per cent._ below the\nprice they bore before the two last wars.\u2014One of the reasons of the great\nalteration which has taken place since the last war is, I think, pointed\nout in the 3d Section of the 3d Part of this Tract.\n\n[143] Since the reduction in 1749 there has been no FOUR _per cent._\ncapital created except that of the last year.\n\n[144] What is here said has been verified, in the particular instance\nof a _million and a half_ borrowed in 1756, which was to carry 3\u00bd _per\ncent._ interest till 1771, and then to become redeemable.\u2014During the last\nwar, and for about three years after the commencement of peace, there\nwas a general expectation that the THREE _per cents._ would rise above\n_par_ as they had done in the former peace; and while this expectation\ncontinued, this stock reckoned no better than a THREE _per cent._ stock\nwith a short annuity of a _half per cent._ annexed; and for this reason\nit bore, during that period, a lower price than another stock of 4\nmillions and a half which was to bear the same interest till 1782, and\nthen to become redeemable, and to sink to an interest of 3 _per cent._\u2014In\nthe latter end of 1767 and beginning of 1768 the price of the former\nstock rose above that of the latter, and continued not far from _par_\nfrom that time to the time of its redemption in 1771. The reason must\nhave been, that being a small stock bearing a higher interest than the\nother stocks, it was expected, that it would be paid off at _par_, and\ntherefore with a considerable profit, as soon as it became redeemable;\nwhich accordingly happened. See Postscript, (page 177).\n\n[145] Nothing has been more undervalued in the ALLEY than _Annuities on\nlives_. They have been always granted, very unreasonably, without any\nlimitation of age; and their value has been taken at no more than 12 or\n13 years purchase; tho\u2019 really worth one with another 16 or 17 years\npurchase. This is a strong reason for preferring short annuities to them\nin all schemes for raising money. Short annuities for 21 years will be\ntaken for as much as life-annuities; and yet experience has proved that\nin this time not a _quarter_ of the life-annuities will drop; and the\nwhole expence brought by them on the public will not be removed in less\nthan 70 or 80 years. See Note 15, (Page 134).\n\n[146] I would except here the first reduction in 1717. This was then\nnecessary to gain a fund for sinking the public debts; and had the fund\nthus gained been applied, as the laws required, invariably to this\npurpose, and all farther reductions been avoided, we should now have been\nburthened with no debts.\n\n[147] That is; never capable of being redeemed by substituting one\ndebt for another; or of being saved from redemption by accepting lower\ninterest.\n\n[148] Supposing the 3 _per cents._ sold at 76\u00bd, the capital necessary to\nproduce 4.850,000l. in money would be 6.339,869l. the interest of which\nat 3 _per cent._ is 190,195l.\n\n[149] When the amount of interest, payable for a sum obtained by selling\na 4 _per cent._ capital, is the same with the amount of interest, payable\nfor an equal sum obtained by selling a 3 _per cent._ capital, which is\nnearly the present case, postponing, in the manner I have proposed,\nthe redemption of the former, becomes as indifferent as it would be to\npostpone in the same manner the redemption of any 3 _per cents._\n\n[150] In this case only a FIFTH of the _surplus_ to be at any time\nemployed in redeeming debts could be applied to the redemption of this\n_particular_ loan. The rest after nine years might be employed in\nredeeming the 4 _per cent._ stock created last year; or jointly with it,\nsuch parts of future loans bearing high interest, as, in borrowing on the\nsame plan, might be left redeemable. And thus no obligation would arise\nfrom this mode of borrowing to prefer the redemption of 3 _per cents._ to\nthe redemption of capitals bearing higher interest. In particular; had\nthis been the plan of borrowing through the last war, all surplus monies\nmight have been ever since employed intirely in paying off 4, 4\u00bd and 5\n_per cent._ capitals preferably to any others; and at the same time, no\n_douceurs_ would have been granted in order to procure the loans, no\nartificial debt contracted, or extraordinary charge incurred.\n\n[151] Should this be disregarded, and a long annuity offered, as a\n_douceur_, of 1\u00bd _per cent._ for 90 or 100 years, _eight millions_ might\nperhaps be borrowed at an interest, including the long annuity, of 4\u00bd\n_per cent._ even though the 3 _per cents._ should fall as low as 73.\u2014And\nthis, probably, would be the very scheme a minister would prefer, who,\nminding chiefly present ease, did not care how much he burdened the\nnation hereafter.\n\n[152] In 1774, a million of the 3 _per cents._ was redeemed at this\nprice; and in 1772, a million and a half at 90.\n\n[153] I mean such a course of redemption as should not be liable to\ninterruption by a WAR; or, as would be the effect of the establishment of\nsuch an unalienable _sinking_ fund as has been described in the _Appeal\nto the Public on the Subject of the National Debt_, and the _Observations\non reversionary Payments_.\u2014Nothing can save us from bankruptcy but such\na fund; and were it established, the 3 _per cents._, when they came to\nbe redeemed, would soon rise to _par_; and, consequently, the obligation\nimplied in this scheme to pay a part of them at _par_ would occasion no\nadditional expence. It is, however, so little to be expected, that such\na fund will be ever established, that it would have been folly to have\nmade the calculation given above, on any supposition less favourable,\nthan that the 3 _per cents._ will bear the same price after the present\nwar, that they bore after the last; and that we shall go on as we have\nhitherto done, paying off a _million_, or a _million and a half_, now and\nthen in a time of peace.\n\n[154] The conversion of a 3 _per cent._ stock into a 3\u00bd _per cent._ stock\ngives the same advantage in redeeming it, that the power of redeeming it\nat 85\u00be for every 100l. would give.\u2014A million _per ann._ surplus would\nredeem 114 millions and a quarter of the latter stock in the same time,\nand therefore at the same expence, that it would redeem 100 millions\nof the former. I suppose here the 3 _per cents._ paid at _par_; and\nthis I have before observed will be found to be necessary should a time\n(scarcely the object of hope) ever come when government will set itself\nin earnest and with any effect to pay the public debts.\n\n\n\n\nCORRECTIONS and ADDITIONS.\n\nTranscriber\u2019s Note: Whilst minor typesetting errors have been corrected in\nthe course of producing this e-text, the author\u2019s list of corrections and\nadditions below has not been addressed.\n\n\nIn THE SECOND TRACT, (page 120), after the words _Lent at 4 per cent. in\n1746, charged on licences for retailing spirituous liquors, and reduced\nto 3 per cent. by 23d of George II. 1749_, add, _and consisting of old\nExchequer Bills then cancelled and converted into a debt from Government\nto the Bank, for which the Bank was allowed to add to its capital an\nequal sum by 19th George II. Ch. 6_.\n\nIn (page 128), instead of the words, _In 1751, certain Exchequer tallies\nand orders, amounting to 129,750l._ read, _In 1751, the remainder of\ncertain Exchequer tallies and orders charged on the duties on wrought\nplate, and amounting to 129,750l._\n\n(Page 136), line 17, instead of 1758 read 1757.\n\n(Page 137), line 2d from the bottom, for 205,000l. read 215,000l.\n\n(Page 139), for 17.7401,32l. read 17.701,324l.\n\n(Page 144), after _Exchequer Bills charged on a duty upon victuallers by\n12th Geo. I. 1726_, add, _and afterwards by 16th Geo. II. 1743, charged\non the duties on licences for retailing spirituous liquors. Now included\nin the Bank Capital by 19th Geo. II. Ch. 6_.\n\n(Page 144), Note (b) after the words, _In this account I have omitted\na million borrowed in 1734_, add, _and half a million borrowed in 1736;\nbecause these debts had for some time been in a fixed course of\nredemption by the salt-duties_.\n\nIn (page 145), line 2d, for 10.639,793l. read 10.739,793l.\u2014Ibid,\nline 10th, for 146.582,844l. read 146.682,844l.\u2014Ib. line 12th, for\n15.639,793l. read 15.739,793l\u2014Ibid. note, line 2d, for 1.118,000l. read\n1.218,000l.\n\n(P. 147). For 146.582,844l. read 146.682,844l.\u2014For 71.505,580l. read\n71.605,580l.\u2014And for 10.639,793l. read 10.739,793.\n\nFINIS.\n\n\nA SUMMARY VIEW and COMPARISON of the different Schemes of Public Loans\ndescribed in the SUPPLEMENT.\n\n_N.B._ The Sum borrowed is always supposed FIVE MILLIONS; and the Price\nof the 3 _per cents._ 78l. But all the Schemes may be accommodated to\nany other Price of the 3 _per cents._ and to Schemes for borrowing any\ngreater or smaller Sums.\n\n +---------------------------------+-------------+\n | | |\n | OLD SCHEMES. | |\n | | |\n | I. II. |Scheme of the|\n +----------------+----------------+loan in 1777.|\n |Scheme described|Scheme described| Page 185. |\n | Page 182. | Page 183. | |\n | | | |\n | | | III. |\n | | | |\n | \u00a3. | \u00a3. | \u00a3. |\n SUM ADVANCED | 5.000,000 | 5.000,000 | 5.000,000 |\n ------------------------+----------------+----------------+-------------+\n NEW CAPITAL, or sum | | | |\n payable at redemption | 5.000,000 | 6.343,954 | 5.000,000, |\n ------------------------+----------------+----------------+-------------+\n Interest offered | 3 _per cent._ | 3 _per cent._ |4 _per cent._|\n ------------------------+----------------+----------------+-------------+\n ARTIFICIAL CAPITAL, | | | |\n or sum payable at | 1.200,000 | 1.343,954 | 250,000 |\n redemption more than | | | |\n the value received | | | |\n ------------------------+----------------+----------------+-------------+\n DOUCEURS consisting of | | | |\n additional capitals | --0-- | 1.343,954 | --0-- |\n Short Annuity worth | 1.200,000 | --0-- | 200,000 |\n Lottery worth | --0-- | 150,000 | 150,000 |\n ------------------------+----------------+----------------+-------------+\n ANNUAL CHARGE. | | | |\n Perpetual | 150,000 | 100,318 | 200,000 |\n Temporary | 100,000 | --0-- | 25,000 |\n | For lives or | |for 10 years.|\n | 17 yrs. | | |\n ------------------------+----------------+----------------+-------------+\n Total of Annual Charge | 250,000 | 190,318 | 225,000 |\n ------------------------+----------------+----------------+-------------+\n\n +-------------------------------+---------------+\n | Scheme of 1777, altered |Scheme of 1777;|\n | to avoid douceurs and |supposing 100l.|\n | an artificial capital. |four _per ct._ |\n +---------------+---------------+ stock worth |\n | See Page 186. | See Page 188. | 91l. when the |\n | | | 3 _per cts._ |\n | | | are at 78l. |\n | | | Page 200. |\n | IV. | V. | VI. |\n | | | |\n | \u00a3. | \u00a3. | \u00a3. |\n SUM ADVANCED | 5.000,000 | 5.000,000 | 5.000,000 |\n ------------------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+\n NEW CAPITAL, or sum | | | |\n payable at redemption | 4.750,000 | 3.750,000 | 5.000,000 |\n ------------------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+\n Interest offered | 4\u00bc _per cent._| 4\u00bc _per cent._| 4 _per cent._|\n ------------------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+\n ARTIFICIAL CAPITAL, | | | |\n or sum payable at | --0-- | --0-- |[155]450,000 |\n redemption more than | | | |\n the value received | | | |\n ------------------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+\n DOUCEURS consisting of | | | |\n additional capitals | --0-- | --0-- | --0-- |\n Short Annuity worth | --0-- | --0-- | 450,000 |\n Lottery worth | 150,000 | 150,000 | 150,000 |\n ------------------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+\n ANNUAL CHARGE. | | | |\n Perpetual | 201,875 | 159,375 | 200,000 |\n Temporary | 25,000 | 75,000 | 56,250 |\n | For 10 years. | for 27 years. | for 10 years.|\n ------------------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+\n Total of Annual Charge | 226,875 | 234,375 | 256,250 |\n ------------------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+\n\n +---------------+-------------------------------+\n | | Schemes of loans by changing |\n | Scheme | the 3 _per cent._ stocks to |\n | founded | stocks bearing higher |\n | on the | interest. |\n | regulations +--------------+----------------+\n | proposed | See Page 209.| See Page 214. |\n | Page 205, &c. | | |\n | | | |\n | VII. | VIII. | IX. |\n | | | |\n | \u00a3. | \u00a3. | \u00a3. |\n SUM ADVANCED | 5.000,000 | 5.000,000 | 5.000,000 |\n ------------------------+---------------+--------------+----------------+\n NEW CAPITAL, or sum | | | |\n payable at redemption | 4.850,000 | 2.500,000 | --0-- |\n ------------------------+---------------+--------------+----------------+\n Interest offered | _4 per cent._ |4\u00bc _per cent._| 4 _per cent._ |\n ------------------------+---------------+--------------+----------------+\n ARTIFICIAL CAPITAL, | | | |\n or sum payable at | --0-- | --0-- | --0-- |\n redemption more than | | | |\n the value received | | | |\n ------------------------+---------------+--------------+----------------+\n DOUCEURS consisting of | | | |\n additional capitals | --0-- | --0-- | --0-- |\n Short Annuity worth | --0-- | --0-- | --0-- |\n Lottery worth | --0-- | --0-- | --0-- |\n ------------------------+---------------+--------------+----------------+\n ANNUAL CHARGE. | | | |\n Perpetual | 194,000 | 212,500 | 200,000 |\n Temporary | --0-- | --0-- | --0-- |\n | | | |\n ------------------------+---------------+--------------+----------------+\n Total of Annual Charge | 194,000 | 212,500 | 200,000 |\n ------------------------+---------------+--------------+----------------+\n\n[To be placed last of all, facing Page 216.]\n\n[155] This Scheme may be altered to avoid the artificial Capital and\n450,000l. Douceur (preserving nearly the same annual Charge) in the\nManner directed in the 4th or 5th Scheme.","title":"Two Tracts on Civil Liberty, the War with America, and the Debts and Finances of the Kingdom: With a General Introduction and Supplement","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":86792}