{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_58136/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_58136","id":"gutenberg_58136","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/58136","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Conscience","Ethics","Fanaticism"],"text":"E-text prepared by Turgut Dincer, Martin Pettit, and the Online\nDistributed Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net) from page images\ngenerously made available by Internet Archive (https://archive.org)\n\n\n\nNote: Images of the original pages are available through\n      Internet Archive. See\n      https://archive.org/details/consciencefanati00pittuoft\n\n\n\n\n\nCONSCIENCE & FANATICISM\n\nAn Essay on Moral Values\n\nby\n\nGEORGE PITT-RIVERS\n\n\n\"_Aequam memento servare mentem_\"\n\n\n\n\n\n\n[Illustration: 1919]\n\nLondon: William Heinemann\n\nLondon: William Heinemann, 1919\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nIn presenting this little volume to the public I am fully conscious of\nmy presumption in introducing my personal views in a region where many\nhundreds of better qualified writers have devoted their best efforts.\nSince, however, no apology can justify a profitless task, if such it be,\nor add to its utility, if indeed it possesses any, I will not attempt to\nmake one.\n\nIf I have contributed in ever so slight a degree towards an\nunderstanding of the mental state or attitude we call fanaticism, for\nthe purpose of guarding against the catastrophes it begets, I shall have\nachieved my purpose. It is unfortunately inevitable that a discussion\nwhich involves current opinions and beliefs must necessarily encounter\nstrong prejudices and opposition, but it is less on this account that\nthis little work is likely to fail than for the reason to which Hume\nattributed the failure which attended the publication of his \"Treatise\nof Human Nature,\" which he described as his guilt \"of a very usual\nindiscretion, in going to the press too early.\" A circumstance which\nprevented that \"unfortunate literary attempt from reaching such\ndistinction as even to excite a murmur among the zealots.\"[1]\n\nNeedless to say, I have relied for my interpretation of human notions\nand ideas, and the conduct which results from them, very largely upon\nthe works of past and contemporary writers; and my indebtedness to those\nwith whom I differ no less than those with whom I agree is but very\ninadequately acknowledged in my references to the works of some of them.\n\nThe earlier portions of the essay are devoted chiefly to an examination\nof moral ideas, the latter portions more exclusively to the facts of\nnature and of mind from which they derive their meaning. Throughout I\nhave attempted to keep the argument as free as possible from the thin\nair of philosophical and scholastic dialectic, and as far as possible in\nterms of common usage and thought. With this end in view, and for the\nsake of brevity, the authors to whose works I have referred most\nfrequently have been selected either because they are better known or\nbecause their opinions are more widely held than in the case of others.\nBut in any case no claim to exhaustive or even adequate treatment can be\nmade for so slight a review of so vast a subject.\n\nThe first problem which I have attempted to deal with is one which\nconfronts all moralists. It consists in the difficulty of deriving\nethical notions from notions which are not ethical, or of deducing the\nmoral law from the facts of experience and of nature. The attempt to\nescape from this difficulty often takes the form of adopting a theory\nby which the whole world is divided into two unrelated worlds, a world\nof values and a physical world of mechanical sequences. In order to\nbring these two independent and self-consistent systems within the same\nreality and to weld them together, God is postulated. God is necessary,\nit is argued, to prove the objectivity of morality. That is to say, that\nsince moral values are eternally valid, independently of man's capacity\nto be conscious of them, they can only have existence in the one eternal\nmind.[2]\n\nThe purpose of this essay is to offer a different solution. As this\nquestion of the status of moral values is of great importance to the\nmoral argument, a preliminary examination of the ground may be helpful.\n\nThe predication of value to an object which elicits moral approbation is\nnot, as most Theistic writers stubbornly maintain, an implicit\nacknowledgment of the objectivity of the goodness predicated, it is\nmerely the act of appreciating the subject or valuer's attitude in\nrelation to the object (the relationship may be purely hypothetical),\nbut it may, and usually does, invite a similar attitude on the part of\nany number of subjects.[3] The relation of subject to object--this also\napplies to all relations--may belong to objective reality, but not the\nmoral worth we ascribe to the object as a result of that relationship.\nThis distinction is important and involves, necessarily, a\ndiscrimination (not always made) between the treatment of knowledge and\nof value. Hume, by denying the objective character of the relations and\nconnexions of nature equally with moral judgment, in his interpretation\nof individual experience, treated moral judgment and knowledge of\nnatural science in an identical manner. In the following discussion\ntruth, to which I have denied relativity, is accorded a position\naltogether distinct from value. Appreciation of truth and interest in\nknowing is treated as a value, but not truth itself to which\nsubjectivity is denied. The method I have adopted of treating this\nfundamental point may perhaps be made clearer by a simple illustration.\nLet us take any particular moral judgment, for example, \"A [a conscious\nindividual] is good.\" The assertion implies that A is the habitual doer\nof desirable actions, or is benevolently disposed towards the valuer,\nSociety at large, or God, according to the valuer's idea of goodness. In\nany case A's conduct or his attitude must have evoked approbation by\nreason of its effect (emotional or material) upon the valuer or those\nwith whom he is in sympathy. The valuer might attempt to refute this\ndefinition by maintaining that A's habitual conduct does him the\ngreatest injury, but that his predication of good in respect of A is\nthe assertion of an objective fact. In spite of such an objection, I\nwould reply that the moral judgment may indeed be intended to imply\ncertain definite objective qualities or properties _because_ the valuer\nconsiders these desirable, and chooses arbitrarily to define \"good\" as\ncontaining those definite properties, or because in the community to\nwhich he addresses himself they are customarily so defined. The\nveracity, however, of the moral judgment, considered as a statement of\nfact, can only be tested after an agreement has been reached as to the\ncontent of the symbol \"good.\" It has then been given a meaning which\nalone it does not possess. The validity of moral judgment, when it is\nnot merely the expression of individual attitude, will therefore always\ndepend upon the criterion of conduct previously adopted. In this way it\nis held that a moral judgment differs from a statement of fact, which is\nvalid irrespective of the existence of any mind capable of apprehending\nthat fact.\n\nIn the last two chapters, where an examination of psychological\nprocesses has been necessary, I have experienced no slight difficulty in\nfinding appropriate terms by which to distinguish certain conceptions\nwhich are in some respects new. An inapt terminology and the misuse of\nterms is so grave a fault, and so habitually results in errors,\nobscurity, and confusion, that it may not be superfluous to call\nattention to the terms that are more liable to misinterpretation and in\nmany ways least satisfactory. For this purpose it will be necessary to\ngive the briefest possible account of the use to which they are put,\nwhile their more precise definition will be left to the chapters in\nwhich they occur.\n\nThe psychic life and the mental activity of human beings is conditioned\nby three factors. The first, heredity, denotes the accumulation of\nexperiences and consequent structural modifications acquired by the race\nduring the process of its adjustment to its environment; the\nmanifestation of the result of this experience in behaviour is called\ninstinct. The second is the result of the habits and acquirements of the\nindividual from the moment of conception to the end of his existence:\nthis, together with the first, produces what we call character. The\nthird, those external influences operating upon the individual, we refer\nto as environment.\n\nIf we would reflect upon the mental life of humanity we must consider\nthe individual mind in relation to the world of mankind. In considering\nthe individual mind I have adopted the terms _objective mind_ and\n_subjective mind_ to denote two aspects of mind. The words \"objective\"\nand \"subjective\" in conjunction with mind are used in a special sense\nwhich has to be defined. The world of men has been considered as the\npsychic environment of the individual mind, and I have introduced a term\nto denote the power of aggregations of human thoughts and impulses. It\nhas been viewed as an aspect of the universal process underlying the\nconative disposition and will-to-power of all living beings, and on\naccount of the mode of its operation it has been termed \"cosmic\nsuggestion.\" The term is not intended to imply that the psychic forces\nof the human mind can be \"given off\" and have separate existence, like\nthe \"odylic fluid\" of the early Mesmerists. The power is that of\ncollective minds; suggestion an effect of its activity, not a derived\nessence. It must be understood that these three terms are provisional,\nand will be discarded if, in the course of time, better ones suggest\nthemselves.\n\nFinally, I would crave the indulgence of my readers to say a few words\nabout the philosophy of egoism. There is a view of egoism--the principle\nof self-interest--as distinguished from altruism, which is seen in\nopposition to asceticism and mysticism, a view which prompted Lecky when\nhe wrote: \"Taking human nature with all its defects, the influence of an\nenlightened self-interest first of all upon the actions and afterwards\nupon the character of mankind, is shown to be sufficient to construct\nthe whole edifice of civilization; and if that principle were withdrawn,\nall would crumble in the dust.... When, therefore, the ascetic,\nproclaiming the utter depravity of mankind, seeks to extirpate his most\nnatural passions, to crush the expansion of his faculties, to destroy\nthe versatility of his tastes, and to arrest the flow and impulse of his\nnature, he is striking at the very force and energy of civilization.\"\nHow infinitely preferable is the spirit of enlightened egoism to the\nblind altruism of the fanatic! The egoism that enhances rather than dims\nthe love of others. It is only through the realization of community of\ninterests and aims that like thought will result in like conduct. It is\na recognition of this principle of systematic integration of interests\nand their concomitant obligations, starting from egoism, in the sense of\na realization of the relation of self to environment, and then through\nsuccessive stages of widening appreciation of the full contents of\nenvironment to the identification of the self with the community, which\nalone leads to State or National morality, and will lead, ultimately it\nmay be hoped, to the morality of a community of all nations--that is, a\nworld morality. It is for this reason that we say that the end and aim\nof a true ethical system is to find the interests of mankind in the\ninterests of the individual.\n\nAnd now, as we stand on the threshold of a new era--a new world in\nsearch of its soul--what better precept can we have than the simple\nwords of the great thinker who, three hundred years ago, also stood on\nthe threshold of a new world of thought?\n\n\n\"Il suffit de bien juger pour bien faire, et de juger le mieux qu'on\npuisse, pour faire aussi tout son mieux, c'est-a-dire, pour acquerir\ntoutes les vertus, et ensemble tous les autres biens, qu'on puisse\nacquerir; et lorsqu'on est certain que cela est, on ne saurait manquer\nd'etre content.\"--Descartes, \"Discours de la Methode.\"\n\n\nG. P. R.\n\nHINTON ST. MARY, DORSET\n_January 1, 1919_\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[1] Hume's \"Autobiography.\"\n\n[2] This is the position of the Idealistic schools and is adopted in\nProfessor Sorley's recently published Gifford Lectures, \"Moral Values\nand the Idea of God.\"\n\n[3] This relationship may be expressed in psychological terms. Dr.\nMcDougall expresses it thus: \"Objects have value for us in proportion as\nthey excite our conative tendencies; our consciousness of their value,\npositive or negative, is our consciousness of the strength of the\nconation they awake in us.\"--\"Body and Mind,\" p. 329.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\nCHAP.                                                    PAGE\n  I. INTRODUCTION                                           1\n\n     The importance ascribed to the word \"conscience\"\n     by public opinion: by the State: by the Church:\n     need for examination of its credentials\n\n II. THE VALIDITY OF MORAL JUDGMENTS                        7\n\n     Theism and Determinism: the Intuitive schools:\n     the Rationalistic schools: recognition of Good:\n     the facts stated: the Utilitarian standard demanded\n\nIII. THE MEANING OF MORAL OBLIGATION                       20\n\n     The argument against Utilitarianism: Mill's defence\n     of Utilitarianism: a variation of Mill's position:\n     the principle of proximity: the meaning of Truth:\n     duty: an illustration from history: Robert E. Lee\n\n IV. RELIGION AND MORALITY                                 32\n\n     Probing the essentials: the need for a moral code:\n     its artificial character: the deeper morality:\n     Morality and Religion: religious and political\n     fanaticism: moral values and psychic force:\n     Monism and Duality: a reconciliation of systems:\n     conservation of the soul: education and the formation\n     of opinion.\n\n  V. THE LAWS OF SUGGESTION AND \"SUBJECTIVE MIND\"          44\n\n     The power of ideas: origin of the World War:\n     psychodynamics and the law of suggestion: Haeckel\n     on emotion: Dr. Samuel Johnson on the progress of\n     an agitator: consciousness: Hudson's hypothesis:\n     the two aspects of mind: Theology on the origin\n     of Good and Evil: self-knowledge: Socrates and\n     Joan of Arc: the phenomena of madness: men of\n     genius: evolution and organic memory: telepathy:\n     the power of suggestion: psychotherapeutics:\n     faith-healers: Christian Science: memory:\n     Coleridge's case: William James: Bernard Shaw\n     on Art.\n\n VI. VALUER AND VALUATION                                  73\n\n     Factors determining valuation and arrangement of\n     the discussion.\n\n     (1) INSTINCT AND HEREDITY                             73\n\n     Prof. Ward on heredity: Haeckel on instincts:\n     McDougall on instincts: imitation and morality:\n     demagogues and fanatics: geniuses and politicians:\n     maternal impressions: heredity versus environment:\n     conscience as an emotional and instinctive\n     organ, and conscience as a thinking and intellectual\n     organ: the force of cosmic suggestion on morality:\n     remorse.\n\n     (2) THE FACTOR OF EMOTION                             86\n\n     Emotion defined: its manifestations: its control:\n     Ward on emotion: James on emotion: the aesthetic\n     emotions: Racine and the element of mystery in\n     Art: William Hazlitt on the worship of names:\n     emotional sensibility: aesthetic appreciation.\n\n     (3) JUDGMENT OF ENDS                                  96\n\n     The intellectual and critical processes: realization\n     of ends: recognition of Good: the norm of valuation.\n\n     (4) COSMIC SUGGESTION                                 99\n\n     Public opinion: emotional suggestions: individual\n     suggestibility: gregarious attraction: ecstatic\n     oratory: Rasputin: Mark Antony: propaganda:\n     the Press: Mr. Hilaire Belloc's views: the influence\n     of literature: the worship of symbols: Bergson's\n     definition of metaphysics: the necessary task of\n     religion: progress or decline: the highest form of\n     morality.\n\n\n\n\nCONSCIENCE AND FANATICISM\n\n\n\n\nI\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\nIn all ages conscience has been the theme of priest, politician,\nphilanthropist and obstructionist. So often used and so seldom analysed,\nbeyond a bare assertion of its function, it is curious to reflect on the\nstrange medley of uses to which this word is put.\n\nConscience is at once the standard and the refuge of orthodox and\nfanatic, patriot and anarchist--according as they are described by\nadmirer or detractor--but, let us believe with Lecky,[4] least often of\nthe genuine hypocrite.\n\nNever was a nation so beset with \"conscientious\" men and women as\nEngland is to-day; some helping, some hindering, some having little\neffect on the national welfare. Some flaunt the badge obtrusively, they\nlabel themselves \"conscientious objectors to military service,\"\n\"conscientious objectors to vaccination,\" \"conscientious teetotallers\";\nin some cases anti-vivisectionists,[5] social reformers and (formerly)\nsuffragettes proclaim their exertions endured for \"conscience' sake\";\nso, for the most part, do missionaries and religious functionaries,\nand, in fact, all and any who engage in propaganda or obstruction,\n\"because,\" they say, \"something higher than reason prompts our\nmotives--'conscience'.\"[6] Others refer to conscience shyly as of\nsomething too sacred to be spoken of publicly, and again others only in\nmoments of intense earnestness--or alcoholic remorse.\n\nA conscience, in fact, is an invaluable asset; where it does not gain\napprobation, it at least gains some measure of respect.\n\nMost people, then, admit the existence and the reality of what we\npopularly call \"conscience,\" and although fewer people are agreed as to\nits origin and nature, it is, nevertheless, accorded a high place of\nimportance and almost universal recognition as an arbiter in the affairs\nof men.\n\nSo undisputed is this claim to inviolability of conscience in\ntwentieth-century England that the State, in framing her laws, modifies\ntheir application by the interspersion of _caveats_ in the form of\n\"conscience clauses.\"\n\nThe principle on which the conscience proviso is allowed to negative the\nuniversal applicability of the State's demand for service or compliance\nwith her rules appears, however, to be somewhat arbitrary and uncertain,\nand can hardly be said to be devised solely in deference to any possible\nreligious sanction, since, although a man's conscience is allowed to\nexempt him from vaccinating his children, the plea of religious\nsanction, in the case of a man professing the polygamous doctrine of\nBrigham Young,[7] would not exempt him from amenability to the law\nconcerning bigamy; or, again, the conscience of a Quaker or of a\nChristadelphian[8] is recognized as a stronger qualification for\nexemption from combatant service than the equally recalcitrant\nconsciences of, e.g. an Atheist or a Member of the Church of England.\nYet the standardization of \"privileged\" denominational consciences is\nstrongly disavowed! In spite, however, of a certain illogical\ninconsistency in practice, it is virtually conceded as a right that a\nman should justify any conduct by the plea of \"conscience,\" even, in\nmany cases, when it militates directly against the good of the State.\n\nEven more than the State and public opinion does the Protestant Church\ninsist upon the authority and inviolability of \"conscience.\" Driven,\nstep by step, from the time of the Reformation, by the encroachments of\nscience and the progress of Rationalism, from her defence of the\ninfallibility of Doctrine and Scripture, the Protestant Church has\nsought to render her position impregnable by increased insistence upon\nthe inviolability and sanctity of revelation and conscience. Lecky,\nspeaking of the trend of \"Protestant Rationalism,\" says: \"Its central\nconception is the elevation of conscience into a position of supreme\nauthority as the religious organ, a verifying faculty discriminating\nbetween truth and error.\"[9]\n\nThe most recent stalwarts of the Church of England are equally insistent\nupon this point, thus the Rev. G. L. Richardson writes: \"We shall appeal\nto and invigorate the conscience in proportion as we rely upon the Holy\nSpirit as the one source of spiritual power.... 'The fellowship of the\nHoly Ghost' and His grace through the Church is the master word of the\ntwentieth century.\"[10] This passage well illustrates the supreme\nimportance, with regard to her position, which the Church attaches to\nthe appeal to conscience at the present day. In another passage the same\nauthor says, \"the authority of conscience is ... paramount for the\nindividual.\" Dr. J. N. Figgis in his \"Churches in the Modern State\" says\nthat any doctrine which would \"destroy the springs of spiritual life in\nthe individual conscience would be disastrous to civic as well as to\nreligious life.\"\n\nHaving raised the individual conscience to a pinnacle of ethical\nomniscience, the ecclesiastic next proceeds to bring it into line with,\nor rather into synchronous subordination to, the aggregate \"Church\nConscience.\" \"The Church is a Divine society, her members will feel an\nobligation to be loyal to her discipline.... The conscience of her\nmembers will respond with approval or shame when they keep, or neglect\nto keep, her standards.\" From this the resulting \"code and sentiment\" is\nthe \"Church Conscience.\"[11]\n\nMr. G. K. Chesterton throws further light on this interrelationship.\n\"The 'Church Conscience' is rather to be conceived as a fortress to\nwhich the individual may return for shelter and strength when the\nattacks of temptation threaten to overwhelm him. At such times it is\nwell to feel that we are not dependent on the 'inner light' of\nconscience alone, but that we can throw ourselves on a social force\nmightier than our own, and behold with astonishment and enthusiasm a\nDivine company and a Divine Captain.\"[12]\n\nWhilst Church and State are in agreement regarding its importance and\nsanctity, the same unanimity is not exhibited in dealing with the origin\nand character of conscience. Equally divided in this respect are the\nphilosophers and psychologists.\n\nPriests are fond of telling us that conscience is \"the voice of God\nwithin us.\" To some men it appears strange that the voice of the same\nGod should frequently induce men to oppose each other with such\nparticular bitterness. This objection is sometimes met by the\nexplanation that although it is the voice of God speaking through the\nmedium of our souls, we fail to recognize or interpret rightly its\nsignificance. This explanation, again, is not altogether satisfactory,\nsince, if that were the case, the voice of God must be so uncertain a\nguide it were better not to rely on it.\n\nWhen we look back through the pages of History and consider the actions\nof men and the motives to which they ascribe them, and see what an orgy\nof blood, of persecutions, of burnings, of torturings, of blind passions\nand religious frenzy, of diabolical imaginings and monstrous eschatology\nhas been conceived at the instigation of conscience and religion, and\nprescribed in the name of God, we are inclined to inquire more deeply\ninto the meaning and credentials of this watchword of all ages.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[4] \"Hypocrites, who from interested motives profess opinions which they\ndo not really believe, are probably rarer than is usually\nsupposed.\"--\"Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe.\"\n\n[5] A few years ago the Animal Defence and Anti-Vivisection Society\ndistributed pamphlets from their headquarters in Piccadilly, beginning\n\"Do not ask of your doctor his opinion on this matter, ask your\n_conscience_,\" etc.\n\n[6] This distinction is commonly made between conscience and the\nintellectual faculty of reason; thus, when a man says, \"My conscience\ntells me,\" he usually means, \"No _reason_ will deter me.\"\n\n[7] Mormon leader and preacher, died in 1877, leaving seventeen wives.\n\n[8] The establishment of _bona fide_ membership of either of the\nabove-mentioned religious societies (_inter alia_) by a \"conscientious\nobjector\" was recognized by Military Service Tribunals (acting under\nofficial instructions) as sufficient cause for a verdict of exemption.\n\n[9] \"Rationalism in Europe,\" 1913 edition, p. 167.\n\n[10] \"Conscience, its Origin and Authority\" (1915).\n\n[11] \"Conscience, its Origin and Authority,\" p. 150.\n\n[12] \"Orthodoxy,\" p. 137, quoted by G. L. Richardson.\n\n\n\n\nII\n\nTHE VALIDITY OF MORAL JUDGMENTS\n\n\nAny investigation of the phenomenon of moral conduct, and of its\ninterpretation, brings us face to face with two sets of conflicting\ntheories. These may, for convenience, be roughly divided into the two\nprincipal schools of thought which have been termed respectively the\n\"Moral Sense\" or \"Intuitive\" schools and the \"Rationalistic schools of\nethics.\" Certain writers in their search for the springs of moral\nconduct have attempted to place the issue between Naturalism or\nDeterminism (by no means synonymous or necessarily connected) on the one\nside, and Theism on the other[13]; and, in their eagerness to discredit\nthe former to the advantage of the latter, imagine they demolish\nDeterminism (at any rate in the ethical sphere) by \"pushing it to its\nlogical conclusion\" and by showing that it \"has connected completely and\nindissolubly, as far as observation can carry us, mind with matter; it\nhas established a functional relation to exist between every fact of\nthinking, willing or feeling, on the one side, and some molecular\nchange in the body on the other side, and man, with all his ways and\nworks, is simply a part of nature, and can, by no device of thought, be\ndetached from or set above it.\"[14]\n\nWhat, after all, is involved in the acceptance of such a conclusion?\nWhat is there to fear? To concede this, it is thought, would mean to\nrelegate man to the position of a mere \"automaton,\" freed from\n\"accountability to God, responsibility to man, and the fears of\nconscience.\"\n\nSo far from ridding man of responsibility, the clear recognition by him\nof the true nature of his environment and antecedents, the laws by which\nthey influence him, and his inherent capacity of resistance--in other\nwords, the two processes observable in the world, action contrary to,\nand action along, the line of least resistance[15]--does, on the\ncontrary, greatly increase his responsibility of action and his power to\nknow himself.\n\nIs not mind and matter subject to the same law? Do they not react to the\nsame God? What matter, then, if we adopt the formula of Pampsychism and\nassert that \"all individual things are animated albeit in divers\ndegrees\"? or endorse the conclusion of Professor James Ward, who \"finds\nno ground for separating organic life from psychical life\"? and\ncontinues: \"All life is experience. We cannot therefore assume that\nexperience has no part in the building up of the organism, and only\nbegins when viable organism is already there.\"[16]\n\nThe belief that there can be no life without mind does not necessarily\nimply that there can be no mind without body. As John Stuart Mill\npointed out, Determinism does not imply Materialism, a man may be a\nspiritual being but yet subject to the law of causation. Neither does it\ndeny the dynamic character of will, but allows that not only our conduct\nbut our character is in part amenable to our will. The causality\ninvolved in human actions would, however, enable any one who knew\nperfectly our character and our circumstances to predict our actions.\n\nSuch considerations, however, although contributory, do not, of\nthemselves, decide the question with which we are here concerned,\nnamely, What is the real meaning and what the authority of \"conscience,\"\nor of that mental act which takes place in our minds when we call\ncertain conduct \"right\" and certain conduct \"wrong\"?\n\nApart from the question of the ultimate sanction of moral conduct, there\nhave always been two explanations of the mental act variously known as\n\"ethical judgment,\" \"moral faculty,\" \"moral sense\" or conscience. On the\none side there have been those who considered that moral judgment was an\nemotion, an intuition, or instinctive recognition of right or wrong,\nwhich implied no rational or intellectual process beyond that which is\ninvolved in registering or perceiving the fact. And on the other side\nthere have been those who treat moral approbation as essentially an act\nof judgment--the result of the reasoning and intellectual function of\nthe mind.\n\nThe earliest exponents of a morality that in no way depended upon the\nwork of Reason were the ancient Epicureans and Cyrenaics; since for them\ngood was pleasure and evil was pain, the sources and tests of all\nethical truth were necessarily, in consequence, the feelings and\nemotions.\n\nIn the eighteenth century there arose a school, associated with the\nnames of the third Lord Shaftesbury and Francis Hutcheson, the Scotch\nphilosopher, which became known as the \"moral sense\" school, widely\ndifferent from the old hedonistic philosophers, since they were the\nfirst to assert the existence of a distinctively ethical, as opposed to\na merely pleasurable, feeling.\n\nThe philosophers of the \"moral sense\" school attempted to prove that\nthere existed a distinct moral \"faculty\" which differed from all other\nperceptions or ideas, in that it was a separate medium by which men\ncould recognize ethical truth, which was rather a matter of the heart\nthan of the head.\n\nAs a result of the attacks of the various rationalist schools this idea\nof a \"moral faculty\" has been for the most part abandoned by those who\napproach ethics from the Religious or Theistic standpoint, for they are\nfar more concerned to establish the \"Divine authority\" and sacrosanct\ncharacter of conscience than influenced by psychological or metaphysical\ndistinctions. For the most part such writers are content to assume that\n\"conscience\" is the knowledge of one's own soul with regard to questions\nof right and wrong, but insist on that element of Divine Guidance which\nalone, they think, can give it the necessary authority and sanctity.\n\nThe Rev. G. H. Richardson[17] defines conscience as \"the whole\npersonality acting ethically; or, more precisely, conscience is the\nreaction, pleasurable or painful, of the whole personality in response\nto a human or Divine standard.\"\n\nIt is neither wholly emotional nor wholly rational, but \"is sensitive to\nmotives of which the pure reason would take no account; it is more akin\nto instinct than intelligence.\" Yet \"without reason, conscience would be\nblind impulse, though it might feel the consciousness of\nobligation.\"[18]\n\nClearly, then, conscience can derive little validity from intelligence;\nthe concession to the Rationalists does not amount to much; it might\nalmost get on without reason altogether. It is the Divine authority of\nconscience which, for the Theistic writer, is the factor of prime\nimportance.\n\n\"As we are bound to trust reason in the intellectual sphere, so we are\nbound to trust conscience in the moral sphere. To deny the authority of\nthe one or the other is to distrust the Power in whom physical and\nmoral law have their source. The authority of conscience is thus\nparamount for the individual; it will be better for me to do what is\nobjectively wrong, but what I conscientiously believe to be right, than\ndo what is in fact right, but what my conscience disapproves.\"[19]\n\nHere the writer appears to abandon his Rationalistic friends altogether;\nthe fanatic is given free rein, his ravings are sacred.\n\nDr. H. Rashdall, who by many is considered representative of\nrationalistic ethics, insists on the \"objectivity of moral judgment.\nFeelings or emotions possess no objectivity; and 'without objectivity,'\nin the words of Eduard von Hartmann, 'ethic has no meaning'.\"[20]\n\nThe all-important task for the Theistic writer is to establish the\nfactor of Divine impulse. \"Therefore we say that conscience is a\nfundamental form of man's personal consciousness of eternity; that\nineffaceable certainty that the relation of Duty, with Responsibility\nand Judgment, is not a relation which stands and falls with our\nrelations to the world and to men, but in its essence is a relation to\nthe holy and Almighty God.... Additional force seems to be given to this\nway of regarding the Authority of conscience if we consider that its\nactivity is set in motion by an impulse from the Divine\nPersonality.\"[21]\n\nBishop Butler refers to conscience as the \"voice of God,\" and as\n\"supreme among human faculties\"; and this is endorsed by Richardson, who\nfinds that Theism is essential to any doctrine of conscience, because\nthe alternative is \"destructive of its authority.\"\n\nLet us now summarize the Theistic conscience, variously described in\ndifferent passages, in the author's own words: \"Its activity is set in\nmotion by an impulse from the Divine Personality, and does not originate\nin the individual nor the world,\" yet it \"reacts to public opinion,\" is\n\"often unreasonable and inconsistent,\" is \"subject to evolutionary\ngrowth\" and is \"not infallible,\" is \"capable of _infinite_ variety of\ninterpretation\" and \"reacts to a human standard,\" which, however,\n\"trails some clouds of glory from its Divine original\"; and in\nconclusion, \"If we regard conscience not as a phosphorescent gleam\nplaying upon the surface of consciousness, but as a vital impulse,\npartly rational, partly instinctive, welling up from the depths of\nPersonality, we shall not run the risk of denying its authority.\"[22] It\nwould be well, however, not to underestimate the risk, although it\nundoubtedly caters for a great variety of tastes.\n\nAllied to the Emotional school for the purpose of proving conscience are\nthose Rationalists, of whom we have taken Dr. Rashdall as an example,\nwho have for an object the establishment of the \"objective\" validity of\nmoral judgment. The real contention becomes clearer; the chief point at\nissue is the question of authority.\n\nWe see, then, that there are two points to be decided: (1) the ultimate\nvalidity, with which is connected the question of the Divine Authority,\nof moral judgments; and (2) the mode of recognition, with which is\nconnected the cause or propellent which induces moral action.\n\nRashdall summarily dismisses the dual character of the problem in a\nphrase. \"The question at issue between Rationalists and Emotionalists is\nnot what impels me to do a virtuous act, but how I know it to be\nvirtuous.\"[23] The connexion between motive and judgment is too closely\nrelated to be thus calmly ignored. It is agreed that the motive does not\naffect the intrinsic character or \"rightness\" of an action, but at the\nsame time it most certainly does affect a man's _estimation_ of his\naction; and this, in order to arrive at the value of moral judgments, is\nmost obviously relevant.\n\nFor Dr. Rashdall the distinction between how I know my action to be\nright or virtuous, and how it is virtuous, does not exist. Both imply\nrecognition or statement of indisputable fact; for him there can be no\nultimate doubt as to the character of moral \"good,\" which can in no way\nbe a matter of opinion, for good is _sui generis_: it is good and\nnothing else; happiness may be good, honesty may be good, but good is\ngood for no other reason than because such an abstraction is supposed\nto exist as a transcendental fact. \"Therefore good can be recognized\njust as any axiomatic truth can be recognized; as, for instance, the\nfact that 2 + 2 = 4, or two straight lines cannot enclose a space.\" How\nis it then that people even of the highest intelligence do not\ninvariably agree about what _is_ good or morally right?\n\nThere are no two opinions about whether 2 + 2 does, or does not, equal\n4, yet there is no such general agreement about what is right. If asked\nwhy a thing is right or good most people would reply either by giving a\nreason to show that it is _desirable_ or else by quoting the authority\nof some one else's _ipse dixit_ (in which case it is inferred that the\nauthority quoted had some reason for supposing it desirable). The reason\nthat 2 + 2 = 4 is, on the other hand, that there can be _no_ possible\nalternative. Yet is it true to say that there can be no possible\nalternative to what the consensus of opinion in any one country\nconsiders morally right? Some things that are considered immoral in\nEngland are considered moral in Japan, and _vice versa_.\n\nDr. Rashdall, however, conceives of but two alternatives in estimating\nmoral values, the first of which he dismisses, because on this view \"our\nmoral judgments could possess no objective validity.\" He says: \"... I\nexamined the question whether our moral judgments are in ultimate\nanalysis merely statements asserting the existence of a particular kind\nof feeling in particular minds, or whether they are intellectual\njudgments of universal validity--judgments, of course, of a very\npeculiar and distinctive kind, but just as much intellectual and\nuniversal judgments about the nature of Reality as the judgments 2 + 2 =\n4, or 'this is a good inference and that is a bad one'.\"[24]\n\nIt is difficult to know whether this arbitrary elimination of the\nsubjective element from ethical judgments, and the attempt to translate\nmoral values into terms of mathematical formulae, is intended to denote\nthe infusion of a mystic factor into the \"exact sciences,\" or an attempt\nto reduce metaphysics and morality to rule of thumb! The following\nthesis, however, which will be elaborated in the course of this\ndiscussion, is based on a synchronous realization of rational principles\nand psychological processes.\n\nThus, what an individual conceives to be morally right and good, when he\nis conscious of having acted so according to his own standard, may be\neither:\n\n(1) Wholly irrational, illogical, anti-social and undesirable (from\nevery point of view except his own), even though arrived at solely by an\nintellectual and reasoning process; or\n\n(2) An entirely instinctive, blindly impulsive or emotional action,\nafterwards endorsed by the intellect (i.e. subsequently rationalized);\nor\n\n(3) The result of thoughtful deliberation, carefully and logically\ndesigned to bring about certain preconceived \"moral\" ends such as\nsocial happiness, justice, fulfilment of duty; all of which are\nartificial and conventional standards, and good _only_ because they are\n_desirable_, not because they are universally valid--irrespective of\ntime, locality and circumstances; or\n\n(4) Any combination of these three.\n\nThe foregoing applies as much to the aggregate moral consciousness of a\ncommunity in different stages of civilization, or in varying states of\nemotional abnormality, as to the individual conscience.\n\nIt can also be shown that the \"communal conscience\" reacts upon the\n\"individual conscience\" in inverse ratio to the latter's emotional or\nintellectual capacity for resistance; and that the \"communal conscience\"\n(identified at a later stage of this inquiry with \"Cosmic Suggestion\")\nis the integral product of the numerical and dynamic strength of the\nconvictions of the members of the community, and operates upon the\n\"individual conscience,\" either consciously or subconsciously, in the\nsame way that \"Suggestion,\" according to the law discovered by Liebeault\nand employed by the Nancy School, operates in hypnotic phenomena.\n\nIt will then (if this view can be established) be shown that the factors\nof conscience are: (1) emotional, (2) intellectual, (3) internal\n(including hereditary and organic elements), and (4) external\n(environment--material and psychic); and that its validity, in ultimate\nanalysis, can but rest on codes, which may be not only Conventional and\nArtificial, but also Rational or Intellectual, Social and Utilitarian;\nand in any case variable, in the same way that the soundest and most\nlogical policies must, to a certain extent, be variable, or capable of\nadjustment as circumstances change; the only elements which should be\nconstant and invariable in any policy (which is not a misnomer) being\nlogic and truth. So it is with rules of conduct.\n\nAs regards the purely internal sanction of our actions and thoughts,\nthat is to say, our relationship with Ultimate Reality, which is God or\nthe Law of Existence, there is only one conception of the latter which\nseems to comprehend the infinite with the finite, and that is Force,\nbecause it is the continuity of Existence, or after the manner of\nLeibnitz: \"Substance, the ultimate reality, can only be conceived as\nforce.\" Any moral law which may be said to be fundamental in itself and\nindependent of circumstances will be in relation to force. But such\n\"laws\" will also be independent of the moral imperatives and written\ncodes, for they are independent of volition--of the will to obey them.\nCan a man be possessed of love, greatness, nobility, courage, honour, at\na word of command? Therefore if it can be truly said that \"love is the\ngreatest thing in the world,\" it is because it is the most powerful\nforce. Hate is disruptive, disintegrating and annihilating; love is\nintegrating and strengthening.\n\nBut there is yet one \"good,\" one fundamental imperative which needs no\nproof, and that is Truth--ultimate truth, because it is the statement of\nwhat Is; without which logic, or, indeed, intelligible language, would\nbe impossible. But truth is not opinion, or assertion, or hope, or\nfaith, or in the words of Huxley \"those idols built up of books and\ntraditions and fine-spun ecclesiastical cobwebs.\" Truth and all its\nderivatives--honesty, integrity, truthfulness and sincerity--have an\nintrinsic value of their own, for their negation implies the negation of\nthe principles of Existence.\n\nBut men require more than this, they require a \"moral code\" or standard\nto give coherence to their relationships; this code, then, is that which\nis desired, or imposed, and this want is most efficiently supplied by\nthe principle of \"Utility.\"\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[13] See \"Conscience, its Origin and Authority,\" p. 25.\n\n[14] W. H. Mallock, quoted by Richardson.\n\n[15] Professor James Ward uses the terms \"anabolic\" and \"catabolic\"\nprocesses in this connexion, also in a sense analogous to the\ndistinction between doing and suffering.\n\n[16] J. Ward, \"Heredity and Memory,\" 1913.\n\n[17] \"Conscience, its Origin and Authority,\" p. 69.\n\n[18] _Ibid._, pp. 67 and 68.\n\n[19] \"Conscience, its Origin and Authority,\" p. 96.\n\n[20] Hastings Rashdall: \"Is Conscience an Emotion?\"\n\n[21] \"Conscience, its Origin and Authority,\" p. 99.\n\n[22] \"Conscience, its Origin and Authority,\" pp. 99, 95, 96, 70, 72 and\n73.\n\n[23] \"Is Conscience an Emotion?\" p. 113.\n\n[24] \"Is Conscience an Emotion?\" p. 52.\n\n\n\n\nIII\n\nTHE MEANING OF MORAL OBLIGATION\n\n\nThe author of \"Conscience, its Origin and Authority,\" attempts, after\nthe manner of priests, to demolish the Utilitarian principle of morality\nby stating that the Utilitarian must, to be logical, justify any means\nif the end is desirable. As though the Utilitarian and not the Theist\nwas for ever trying to show that the intrinsic character or value of an\naction depended upon the motive (which must be distinguished from the\n_intention_; a man who saved another from drowning in order to put him\nto death afterwards would be influenced by an intention to murder, but\nthe motives were: first, desire to rescue, and, for the subsequent\naction, desire to kill). Mr. Richardson writes: \"The Good and the Right\npossess their authority to the Utilitarian because they tend to the\ngreatest possible happiness of the greatest number of sentient beings.\"\nNow suppose a case which I do not think actually happened, but which may\neasily be conceived as happening. Suppose that Cecil Rhodes deliberately\ncaused the South African War, as many people believed at the time. This\nwould be characterized (and was, in fact, characterized) as an immoral\nact of unscrupulous aggression. But he might defend his action thus:\n\"Granted that so many thousands of soldiers and citizens will be slain,\nand the land cleared of its inhabitants. In a few years the land so\ncleared will produce increased harvests of gold and grain. More food\nwill mean an increase of human productiveness and an increase of\npopulation; thriving townships and farmsteads will support a people more\nnumerous and richer in the comforts which make life desirable than could\nhave existed without my action. Therefore on the Utilitarian hypothesis\nmy action was right and good, and deserved, not reprobation, but\napproval.\"\n\nNot only is this position not admitted by Utilitarians, but John Stuart\nMill long ago pointed out that such a hypothesis \"is to mistake the very\nmeaning of a standard of morals, and to confound the rule of action with\nthe _motive_ of it. It is the business of Ethics to tell us what are our\nduties, or by what test we may know them; but no system of ethics\nrequires that the sole motive of all we do shall be a feeling of\nduty.... The great majority of good actions are intended, not for the\nbenefit of the world, but for that of individuals, of which the good of\nthe world is made up; and the thoughts of the most virtuous man need not\non these occasions travel beyond the particular persons concerned,\nexcept so far as is necessary to assure himself that in benefiting them\nhe is not violating the rights--that is, the legitimate and authorized\nexpectations--of any one else.\"[25]\n\nThis is sufficient refutation of such objections to Utilitarianism as\nthe one brought forward by Richardson, and clearly founded on a\nmisconception.\n\nMill, in what is still the best defence of this system, continues:\n\"Utilitarians ... are ... of opinion that in the long run the best proof\nof a good character is good actions; and resolutely refuse to consider\nany mental disposition as good, of which the predominant tendency is to\nproduce bad conduct.\"[26]\n\n\"The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the\nGreatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion\nas they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the\nreverse of happiness.\"[27]\n\nThe Theistic writer says \"the essence of morality is sacrifice.\"[28]\n\nThe utilitarian morality does recognize in human beings the power of\nsacrificing their own greatest good for the good of others. It only\nrefuses to admit that sacrifice is itself a good. A sacrifice that does\nnot increase, or tend to increase, the sum total of happiness, it\nconsiders as wasted.\n\nAs regards \"conscience\": the Utilitarian, when he attempts an analysis,\nrealizes that \"in that complex phenomenon as it actually exists, the\nsimple fact is in general all encrusted over with collateral\nassociations derived from sympathy, from love, and still more from fear;\nfrom all forms of religious feeling; from recollections of childhood and\nof all our past life; from self-esteem, desire of the esteem of others,\nand occasionally even self-abasement.\"[29]\n\nFor the priest \"ethics cannot be built securely upon anything less than\nreligious sanctions, and it is for the sake of conscience that ethics\nhave a practical value.\"[30]\n\nCan an honest and unbiased thinker doubt that the first is the truer\nstatement?\n\nLet us now return to a further statement of the position of\nUtilitarianism as dealt with by J. S. Mill. From Professor Sidgwick and\nthose Utilitarians who attempt to claim for the atheistic moralist a\nconscience of mathematical accuracy we are unlikely to derive much\nassistance.\n\n\"According to the Greatest Happiness Principle, the ultimate end, with\nreference to, and for the sake of which, all other things are desirable\n(whether we are considering our own good or that of other people), is an\nexistence exempt as far as possible from pain and as rich as possible in\nenjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality; the test of quality,\nand the rule for measuring it against quantity, being the preference\nfelt by those who, in their opportunities of experience, to which must\nbe added their habits of self-consciousness and self-observation, are\nbest furnished with the means of comparison.\"[31]\n\nThis, according to Utilitarians, is also the standard of morality.\n\nIn conformance with this principle of moral obligation, we choose the\ngreater before the lesser good. Between General Morality and the\nobligation of Duty, with which he associates justice, Mill draws what\nappears to be a somewhat unnecessarily hard line of distinction,\ninsomuch as the difference may be seen to consist more of degree than of\nkind. Other ethical writers make the same distinction when they divide\nmoral duties into the two classes of perfect and imperfect obligation,\n\"the latter being those in which, though the act is obligatory, the\nparticular occasions of performing it are left to our choice, as in the\ncase of charity or beneficence.\"\n\nIf, in assessing the \"amount\" of good, we take into consideration,\nbesides the categories of quantity and quality, a third category of\n\"proximity,\" it would, I think, prove a useful qualification by enabling\nthe Utilitarian Good to embrace all moral obligation, including legal\nDuty, which is considered by Mill apart from general morality. By\n\"proximity\" it is intended to imply that the nearer good is more binding\nthan the further good, which may in some measure counteract the value of\n\"quantity and quality\" where these are involved, and when a decision\nbetween conflicting moral obligations has to be made.\n\nThough this additional category of Good may not altogether abolish the\ndistinction which Mill makes between general morality and justice or\nduty which may be obligatory by law, it appears to amplify and extend\nthe scope of the principle of Utility.\n\n\"Duty,\" in the words of J. S. Mill, \"is a thing which may be exacted\nfrom a person as one exacts a debt. Unless we think that it might be\nexacted from him we do not call it his duty.\"\n\nFrom this it might be assumed that there could never be any doubt about\nwhat is a person's duty, since when any one owes another or the\ncommunity a debt, he is clearly conscious of it, even to the amount. In\nthe case of right conduct which implies Duty, this, however, is not\nalways so clearly recognized, especially when Duty implies Allegiance or\nResponsibility.\n\nIn this connexion we may say that the good we do for our own country is\na nearer good than the good we do for an alien country, therefore if\ndoing the good involves a choice we should choose our own country; for\nthe debt we owe to our own country is greater than the debt we owe to\nhumanity at large. Equally the good we owe to our own family is nearer\nthan, and therefore comes before, the good we owe to society. To this\nmost people will accede, and, in fact, the realization of this is at the\nbase of all sense of Responsibility; thus every man, in whatsoever\ncapacity he is acting, whether as statesman, county councillor, soldier\nor head of a family, should put the considerations of the body he\nrepresents or belongs to before all others; and finally he owes it to\nhimself--or God[32]--to be true to himself, even before he can be true\nto another, in the sense that keeping faith with a friend will not\nexcuse a man acting dishonestly or untruthfully towards himself. And\nthis for the reason that Truth is independent of Utilitarian valuation,\nsince Truth alone is an _a priori_ and self-evident \"good\"; by its very\nmeaning it is a statement of \"what is,\" temporally as well as\nultimately; as such it must be a statement of indisputable fact, not\nopinion or faith which rests on assertion. Since more things are capable\nof being proved untrue than ultimately true, it follows that as a\ncriterion of conduct its value is chiefly negative. It can thus be shown\nthat lying, deception, breach of contract are wrong _per se_, for truth\nis the basic principle upon which all others depend, and the necessary\npostulate of the idea of God, whilst the value of our positive acts must\nfor the most part depend upon some such standard as the Greatest\nHappiness or Utility principle.\n\nAs an illustration of the \"nearer is the greater good\" principle may be\ncited the line taken up by Disraeli when the controversy over the opium\ntrade between India and China first came to the fore. Disraeli firmly\nrefused to ruin our export trade in opium for any quixotic\nconsiderations involving the moral effect upon the Chinaman, whilst it\nin no way implied a breach of faith with him.\n\nLess clear is the question of precedence when two primary obligations\nare conflicting; primary obligations are here intended to mean those\nobligatory duties which may rightly be exacted from a person by reason\nof his indebtedness to the corporate body to which he belongs, or which\nhe represents, and which is entitled to a preference in the good he\ndoes.\n\nFor instance, it may sometimes be said that a man's duty to his country\nas a soldier conflicts with his duty to his family as its sole support;\nboth are primary obligations; as long, then, as allegiance to one does\nnot involve a betrayal of the other, which could only be if their\ninterests were fundamentally opposed and directed against each other,\nboth obligations must be equally acknowledged, and a _via media_\ndiscovered to satisfy the claims of both to an equal extent.\n\nShould, however, this confliction of interests be so direct and\nantagonistic as necessarily to involve an overt repudiation of the\nclaims of one or the other, as in the hypothetical case of a soldier\nbeing ordered to execute the members of his own family, his conduct,\nsupposing him to be actuated by a desire to act solely in conformance\nwith ethical considerations, would be determined by his judgment as to\nwhich course would promote the greater good or Utility, having regard to\nthe categories: quantity, quality and proximity; the \"nearer\" in this\ncase undoubtedly being his family, though this fact alone would not\nnecessarily outweigh the other values of quantity and quality. In\ncertain Eastern countries it would possibly appeal to a man's sense of\nappropriateness to be the agent by which the crime or dishonour of his\nrelative would be expiated.\n\nA man is often heard to claim that his moral duty towards himself, in\nother words \"his conscience,\" absolves him from the fulfilment of\nanother primary duty or obligation. As I have attempted to show, the\nonly real or _a priori_ duty which a man can prove he owes to himself,\nand therefore has a right to place before any other clear duty derived\nfrom the fact of his membership of any community or corporate body, is\nhis obligation not to violate Truth, which is a statement of reality,\n_not of opinion_. Thus no other duty can rightly oblige a man to perjure\nhimself.\n\nIf this maxim is accepted, it will be seen that a deadlock of this sort\nbetween a man's duty to his country as a citizen and his duty to himself\nor his \"conscience,\" could rarely occur in a civilized or rational\ncommunity. Against this a man might argue that he had solemnly vowed not\nto shed human blood, either as a soldier or otherwise, and that he is\nright to resist any attempt to conscript him for the army, since he\nwould thereby be required to perjure himself. The answer is simple, for\nthe man clearly violated his duty to his country in the first place by\nvowing he would deprive his country of his services should they be\nrequired, a right which no country has ever forsworn and which is\nconsidered the natural return due for free citizenship and state\nprotection; these conditions are presumed to be accepted with the\nbenefits of citizenship and protection of person and property; his first\nviolation of duty towards his country will therefore not absolve him of\na second.\n\nNeither can it be shown according to this principle that a man is\nentitled to take an oath of this nature, regardless of potential\nconflicting obligations, on the score that such an oath is merely in\nconformance with the postulates of Truth, since the question of the\nRightness or Wrongness of shedding blood under all circumstances is not\nsusceptible of ultimate proof, but must remain finally on the authority\nof an _ipse dixit_, or of Utility.\n\nThus far we have examined to some extent the purely ethical basis on\nwhich the idea of priority of duty, as evinced by conscience or reason,\nrests: the sanction of conscience which rests on religious authority is\ndealt with elsewhere.\n\nTo further illustrate the \"nearer good\" principle with which we have\nbeen dealing, it may be profitable to refer to a passage from an account\nof the life of General Robert E. Lee, Commander-in-Chief of the\nConfederate troops during the American Civil War, a devoutly religious\nman, and a lifelong member of the Protestant Episcopal Church.[33]\n\n\"Colonel Lee was in command of the department of Texas in 1860, but was\nrecalled to Washington early in 1861, when the 'irrepressible conflict'\nbetween the free and the slave states seemed imminent. When Lee reached\nthe capital in March 1861, seven states had passed ordinances of\nsecession from the Union, and had formed the Southern Confederacy.\nVirginia seceded from the Union on April 17, and Colonel Lee, believing\nthat his supreme political allegiance was due to his state rather than\nto the Union, felt compelled to send his resignation to General Scott,\nwhich he did on April 20. The bitter struggle between his personal\npreferences and his high sense of duty is shown in the words of his wife\nwritten to a friend at the time: 'My husband has wept tears of blood\nover this terrible war; but he must as a man and a Virginian share the\ndestiny of his state, which has solemnly pronounced for independence.'\"\n\nLee's action in choosing the \"nearer\" duty to his own state in\npreference to the duty he owed to the Union as a soldier and a citizen,\neven against his personal preferences and, as far as one can discern\nthem, his religious opinions, affords a striking example of the\nprinciple I have been attempting to illustrate.\n\nWhether his decision was arrived at spontaneously and impulsively, or as\nthe result of deliberation, is immaterial as affecting the \"rightness\"\nof his action. Equally immaterial is the possibility that he might have\narrived at an opposite conclusion whilst still employing the same\nprinciples, by judging that the categories of \"quantity\" and \"quality\"\noutweighed that of \"proximity.\" Whenever clear duties are mutually\nannihilating, which fortunately is very rarely the case, the problem\nwill always have to be solved, if it is solved with scrupulous honesty,\nby a careful balance of values, whilst the result at best cannot be\ninfallible.\n\nWhat stands out, however, in this case, is the triumph of clearly\nrecognized duty founded on \"nearer\" indebtedness, and so of\nresponsibility, over lesser indebtedness, even though the latter was\nreinforced by personal predilection and religious sentiment.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[25] \"Utilitarianism,\" 15th edition, p. 27.\n\n[26] _Ibid._, p. 30.\n\n[27] _Ibid._, p. 9.\n\n[28] Richardson's \"Conscience,\" p. 151.\n\n[29] \"Utilitarianism,\" p. 42.\n\n[30] Richardson's \"Conscience,\" p. 211.\n\n[31] J. S. Mill, \"Utilitarianism.\"\n\n[32] The idea of God personified is often used as standing for a symbol\nor norm of ideal conduct, bearing an affinity to the ideal self or ego.\nThe theory of conduct maintained here is therefore equally applicable to\nTheist or Atheist.\n\n[33] N. B. Webster in \"Chambers's Encyclopaedia.\"\n\n\n\n\nIV\n\nRELIGION AND MORALITY\n\n\nAs long as morality is regarded as a Divinely implanted principle,\nsubject to no laws beyond the caprice and changing mood of a personal\nDeity, the essentials which underlie our conduct are lost sight of.\nMorality, that is to say those moral codes which are observed and\nrecognized, consists of the imposition of values; but the meaning and\nthe virtue of those values lie in the policy which will produce desired\nresults. Moral values are subject to constant revision as world\ninfluences affect our outlook. Our endeavour should always be to probe\nthe essentials. As long as morality is thought to depend on \"Revelation\"\nand religious superstition, the essentials are lost sight of. The\nconnexion between Religion and Morality is arbitrary, and since\nReligions owe their power to the fear of the Unknown, and the virtue of\nMorality depends upon the necessity of conforming to that mode of\nconduct which will produce known results, Religions tend to mask the\nessentials in Morality and make it unreal.\n\nMorality is held to include two distinct principles; moral obligation,\nor conduct towards others, and conduct towards, or the debt we owe,\nourselves. We are here concerned chiefly with the first; the\nsecond--those rules of conduct which concern only ourselves, are bound\nup with the purpose of existence, with the ultimate end. Moral\nobligation has arisen out of the necessity for co-ordination and system\nin our mutual relationships. Without a moral code, social life would\nbecome chaotic and impossible, comparable only to the state of Russia\nunder mob rule in the year of grace 1918--a state immeasurably more\ndegraded than that of Britain in the era B.C.; the early Briton like the\nmodern Kafir, at any rate, gave vent to his predatory and murderous\ninstincts, for the most part, outside his own little tribe. The\nimposition of some recognized rules of conduct, safeguarding the\nsecurity of life and property, is as necessary to the community as the\nexistence of a coinage for the negotiation of commercial bargains; in\nfact it is more so. The two are analogous: the moral code must give\neffect to that first and universal principle of ethics expressed thus,\n\"Do unto others as you would they should do unto you,\" which is only\nanother way of saying, \"You may expect others to treat you as you intend\nto treat them in similar circumstances.\" Hence the standardization of\nrules of conduct becomes a principle of Utility. Altruism has nothing\nwhatsoever to do with it. Even indignation at the spectacle of acute\nsuffering needlessly inflicted on animals, where considerations of\nreciprocal treatment on the part of the animal do not apply, is\ncorrectly based on the offence such a \"discordance\" causes to the\naesthetic sensibility of the cultivated, or the induced sympathetic\ndiscomfort of the many. In many natures the pain-suggesting spectacle,\nor even the mere thought of it, spontaneously evokes anger, which seeks\nsatisfaction in the punishment of the author of its occurrence. The only\nrational or intellectual process involved in the resulting \"moral\njudgment\" is, as a rule, confined to a realization of the\npain-suggesting idea, and the direction of vengeful impulses against the\noffender, while the consequences or ends of conduct in no way determine\nthe judgment. The particular idiocy of the anti-vivisection agitation is\nobvious. We are here, of course, purposely considering, _not_ actual and\narbitrary morality, but the essentials upon which all moralities are\nbased. We shall deal more fully as we proceed with those psychic and\nemotional factors which do, in fact, colour and distort all moral\nvalues. To return to our analogy--we may say then, that a conventional\nmoral rule stands for the credit of national morality, much as a\nfive-pound note stands for the credit of national wealth.\n\nHowever wise a code of morality may be, it is necessarily artificial. It\nhas grown up to suit the peculiar circumstances and demands of race,\nclimate and time. The basic reason for its existence is too often\nencrusted and disguised by fears, superstitions and illusions,\nperpetual creatures of the human mind; the essentials are often lost\nsight of or forgotten, and Truth is parodied as the principle that gave\nbirth to the ecclesiastical chimera which forms the edifice of modern\ncults. Is it surprising, then, that morality is garbed in the changing\ncoat of a chameleon? That what is held moral to-day is immoral\nto-morrow, and that what is held immoral here is moral elsewhere?\n\nThe second and deeper morality concerns ourselves only. It demands an\nanswer to the eternal question: What is the Ultimate Good? One great\nimperative stands out pre-eminent: we must be true to ourselves. He who\nwould seek the truth must himself be true. Without truth there is no\ncreation, no progress. But before we can be true to ourselves, we must\nknow ourselves; that is the problem we are considering--knowledge of the\nego.\n\nSome men are content to supply synonyms for the Ideal--for Perfection,\nthe goal of endeavour--imagining they are thereby showing the way.\nOthers realize the first task must be to cleanse the way of the\ninadequacies and perversions which masquerade as the whole Truth, as the\n\"word of God.\"\n\nThe Ultimate Good cannot be translated into the petty codes of human\nconvenience, neither can it be deduced from the wanton phantoms of man's\nwild fancy, called religion, which, by attempting to expound everything,\nexplains nothing.\n\nWhat is religion? Is it the search for truth? Is it not an attempt to\nclothe our conception of the Infinite in terms finite?--the result being\ngrotesque, bearing no relation to existence, a lawless chimera, born of\nman's dread of the unknown, an amorphous fantasy fashioned out of the\ndistorted visions of man's hopes and fears, modelled, amended and shaped\nin course of time in accordance with the postulate of man's nature--man\nthe religious animal!\n\nScience cannot give us the whole truth and admits it! \"Absolute\nbeginnings or origins are beyond the pale of science.\"[34] But religion\nprofesses to know and is disproved at every step. It is when Religion\nrefuses to learn that she is harmful; because her values are false and\nher thought retrospective that she is inadequate. It is not because the\nreligions of the past and their legacies to-day cannot prove the\nTranscendent that they should be discarded, but because they attempt to\nprove it and turn the world into chaos in so doing. It is not only\nbecause, in the words of Huxley, \"everywhere priests have broken the\nspirit of wisdom and tried to stop human progress by quotations from\ntheir Bibles or books of their Saints,\" that the old religion is\noutgrown, but because it is daily growing more and more impotent.\n\nWhether for good or evil the influence of religion on the conduct of men\ndaily grows less. Religious fanaticism is gradually giving place to\nsecular and political fanaticism, whose votaries shriek in the name of\nDemocracy, Socialism or other watchword of Utopia, ever attempting to\nimpose new moral values bearing as little correspondence to reality as\nthe old values. Neither can recent attempts to express the old religion\nin terms of modern thought revive that which is perishing of inanition.\nHuxley wrote thus of the attempt: \"If the religion of the present\ndiffers from that of the past, it is because the theology of the present\nhas become more scientific than that of the past, not because it has\nrenounced idols of wood and idols of stone, but begins to see the\nnecessity of breaking in pieces the idols built up of _books_ and\ntraditions, and fine-spun ecclesiastical cobwebs, and of cherishing the\nnoblest and most human of man's emotions by worship, 'for the most part\nof the Silent Sort,' at the altar of the _unknown and unknowable_....\"\n\nWe have no desire to follow in the wake of an unprovoked attack on the\nchurches, our concern is the defence of a rational, against the\nimposition of an irrational, code of morality.\n\nBut ethical systems are still built upon the fantastical dogmas of\nreligious or political visionaries. \"Ethics,\" say the former, \"cannot be\nbuilt securely upon anything less than the Religious Sanctions.\" The\nrules which govern the practical conduct of life must conform to \"divine\nlaws\" which in their interpretation have passed through a metamorphosis\nas varied and dissimilar as the habits and customs which distinguish\nthe twentieth century from the second! Was it a sign of the security and\ninfallibility of ethics founded on religious beliefs that Christian\nEngland as late as the beginning of the Eighteenth Century[35]\nsanctioned the execution and torture of harmless old women for the\nimaginary crime of witchcraft? It must be remembered that the moral code\nof the period, enforced by the laws of the land, reflected contemporary\nreligious thought. Lecky, referring to the causes upon which witchcraft\ndepended, says:[36] \"It resulted, not from accidental circumstances,\nindividual eccentricities, or even scientific ignorance, but from a\ngeneral predisposition to see Satanic agency in life. It grew from, and\nit reflected, the prevailing modes of religious thought; and it declined\nonly when those modes were weakened or destroyed.\" 5.\n\nThe fact is, as most impartial students of psychology admit, that both\nreligious and political ethics owe far more of their character to the\n\"emotional cravings\" combined with the interested propaganda current in\nthe age, than to any real value they may possess from a utilitarian or,\nassuming the Divinity to be rational, from a Divine point of view. Ibsen\nhas truly said that moral values are dependent on power-conditions;\nmorals, politics and law are to a great extent shaped and propelled by\nmight-conditions, by the fancied needs and interests of dominant\nclasses; but the greatest factor in power-condition is psychic; the\ngreatest world-propellant, the _ultima vires_, is more mind than muscle;\nit is this great world force which I have spoken of as Cosmic\nSuggestion.[37] Too little may yet be known of this force to trace its\nmeans of transmission, but the reality of its existence can no longer be\ndoubted. It has been described in the following way: there exists an\neffluence or force generated by, or resulting from, the molecular\nactivity of each individual brain. These forces are constantly\ninfluencing the souls of men, encountering, overcoming, and repelling\nopposition, and reacting upon the conscious intelligence of the authors\nof their generation; or they may unite themselves into groups and\noperate collectively, forming a psychic stream of power.[38]\n\nThe fact of this power must be received into the monistic system as part\nof the one great law. A purely materialistic monism cannot contain it.\nThough we postulate a single law with a dual aspect or duality within\nunity, whatever hypothesis we assume will be of less importance than the\ndiscovery and co-ordination of the invariable laws of its operation. We\naccept the principle of \"monism\" not, I fancy, because we are compelled\nto do so by the logic of Haeckel, the great exponent of modern monism,\nor of his fellow-scientists, but because we are driven to do so without\ntheir help. The principle of oneness and unity, alone, is capable of\nsatisfying our intellect, our sense of order and logic. There cannot be\nconflicting truths; there cannot exist true systems which disprove each\nother; all knowledge is complementary; there cannot be true objective\nfacts and equally true subjective ideals which contradict them;\notherwise the world is chaos and there is no reality. But if we know\nanything we know that matter is real and thought is real, and the law of\ntheir inter-relationship is within the same reality. No commonplace of\nscience is more widely known or more firmly established than the law of\nthe conservation of energy or of the persistence of force and of matter,\nwhich Haeckel calls the law of substance. Can we be content to believe\nthat no force exists that is not susceptible to physical analysis? Or\ndoes the first step towards the elucidation of the ultimate and unsolved\nriddle of existence, that is, the real character of substance or the\ncosmos, lie (as we believe) in the direction of reconciling the\nmetaphysical with the monistic system?\n\nWe seek no escape from the underlying principle of one universal law\nwhich determines all matter, life and energy; but our monism must\ncomprise the psychic factor. For us this cannot be stated in\nphysiological terms. Force cannot be regarded as a pure attribute of\nmatter. Recent advances in psychological research appear to endorse this\nview. It is, in any case, less important to insist upon one particular\nhypothesis, when much, at the present stage of knowledge, is insoluble,\nthan to appreciate by observation and introspection the laws that appear\nto evolve from it.\n\nHaeckel cannot conceive mind apart from matter or, conversely,\nprotoplasm without mind (for him they develop concurrently); yet why\nshould the fact that both are subject to the same cosmic law invalidate\nthe idea of the persistency of an immaterial force, which may even under\ncertain conditions, or metamorphoses, break the partnership with matter;\nprovided that the unit of psychic force is in itself immaterial?[39]\nThis psychic unit Haeckel terms _psychoplasm_, that is, the\nmaterialistic basis of mind in protoplasm. The laws of psychic\nphenomena, however, only appear intelligible when we concede that the\n_psychoplasm_ possesses an immaterial aspect which, at a certain stage\nof development, may persist as \"force,\" even after the disintegration of\nmatter into its chemical components. On the other hand, it may, below a\ncertain stage of development or intensity, lose cohesion and dissipate;\norganic matter, however, is never without it. The wonderful discoveries\nof recent psychological research, especially in the department of\nhypnotism, in the facts of memory and above all in the evidence lately\nforthcoming of the existence of telepathy, should encourage us to adopt\na hypothesis which, to the materialistic philosopher, appears\nchimerical.[40] A final decision of the ultimate problem remains at\npresent unattainable, its discussion is therefore of necessity\nspeculative in character. But the need for recognizing the existence of\na psychic factor, whose phenomena cannot be reconciled on a\nmaterialistic basis, makes its inclusion in the cosmic system\nimperative. This need is the greater in view of the tendency amongst an\never-increasing class to relegate all psychic phenomena to the chaotic\nrealms of emotional thought, resulting in the propagation of the wildest\nfanaticism under such titles as Spiritualism, Christian Science or\nTheosophism.\n\nThere are two modes of thought and they lead in opposite directions:\nemotional assumption and analytical investigation; the two systems are\nillustrated by the world phenomenon of religious beliefs arising from a\ncommon source, and in their development splitting up, breaking away and\nvariating, whilst all scientific knowledge unifies and becomes\nreconciled during its progress, all laws eventually resolving themselves\ninto one. It is often said, and it is well to remember, that no system\nof human belief is without some fact to sustain it. But when the great\nvariety of antagonistic beliefs that have sprung from different\nconceptions of the same facts are taken into account, one must realize,\nas too few educationalists do, that the value of human opinions and\nbeliefs depends far more on habits of mind and methods of assimilation\nthan on the ultimate facts on which they are based, or the conviction\nwith which they are held.\n\nThere are many people so ignorant of human nature and psychological fact\nthat they imagine the truth of a statement may be demonstrated by the\ncredulity with which it has been received, forgetting that faith fills\nthe void of ignorance where scepticism is reserved for new ideas.\n\nSo long as education comprises the inculcation of beliefs founded on\nemotional assumption (it should be clear to any one who thinks on the\nsubject that few beliefs outside the analytical and exact sciences are\nlogically reasoned out from fundamental principles) and the facile\nrepetition of archaisms is appraised as intellectual thought; in short,\nso long as our methods are retrospective rather than critical, emotion\nand fanaticism will triumph over reason.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[34] Professor J. Ward.\n\n[35] The last execution for witchcraft is believed to have taken place\nin Scotland in 1722. See Lecky's \"Rationalism,\" 15th edition, p. 13\n\n[36] _Op. cit._, p. 82.\n\n[37] See definition in Preface.\n\n[38] This description with a slight variation is taken from \"Ibsen's\nQuintessence.\"\n\n[39] It may be objected that the idea of the conservation of the psyche\nis only intelligible on the assumption of a pre-somatic, as well as a\npost-somatic existence, or that it necessarily involves some form of\ntransmigration. In place of any theory of the soul's preformation, I\nwould prefer to view the origin of the soul as bearing relation to the\nepigenesis of the organic germ, bearing in mind that the organism is but\nthe medium of the soul's activity and avoiding all dogmatism on the\nquestion of its ultimate destination. We should, however, remember, as\nProfessor Ward points out, before we apply the formulae of physical\nscience to the realm of spiritual ends, of this fundamental difference:\n\"Individuality is inseparable from mind and altogether foreign to\nmatter, which loses nothing by disintegration and gains nothing by\nintegration.\" (\"Realm of Ends,\" p. 279.)\n\n[40] See McDougall's \"Body and Mind,\" 2nd edition, p. 349.\n\n\n\n\nV\n\nTHE LAWS OF SUGGESTION AND \"SUBJECTIVE MIND\"\n\n\nIt has long been recognized that ideas rule the world, and that Power is\nthe translation of ideas into material force, but the real nature of\nworld forces and the elementary laws of their operation have been\nobscured by superstition and prejudice, and little attempt has been made\nto recognize their true significance.\n\nThe great world war has indeed emphasized the immense power of ideas. We\nhear much of propaganda and ideals. In medicine we hear more of\n\"psychotherapy,\" or the treatment of disease by persuasive and hypnotic\nmethods. We are aware, too, that our merchants have long known the\npractical and tangible value of advertisement, that is, the insistent\nrepetition of a coloured statement until it is believed to be true, and\nthat our priests, teachers and politicians have for centuries relied on\nthis method alone. But for the most part these people have little real\nknowledge or understanding of the power they are using, and of which\nthey are themselves the mere puppets. A supreme illustration is the real\nimpotence of the various belligerent governments to direct or cope with\nthe immeasurable psychic forces now pursuing their cataclysmic course,\nand their inability to foretell the direction in which they are leading\na bewildered world. Nowhere is this more graphically apparent than in\nRussia, whose kaleidoscopic upheavals have baffled all prophets.\n\nI do not suggest that the causal origin of the European War is purely\npsychic in character, it may with greater certainty be found years\nbefore its disastrous developments, in the steadily increasing pressure\nof population, assisted by the gradual elimination of the natural\nchecks[41] among the indigent and unfit[42] and the proportionate\nincrease in the burdens of the fit, due chiefly to the growth of\ndemocratic ideas and trend of religious influences; this pressure found\nexpression in policies of expansion among the more prolific nations, and\nin the case of Germany, where relief could not adequately be found in\ncolonization, as a natural consequence engendered assiduous military and\nbellicose propaganda, which was bound eventually to culminate in a world\nwar.\n\nIn order to facilitate a brief analysis of mob-psychology and public\nopinion, and to examine their rightful place in the science of\npsychodynamics and their relation to the hypnotic \"law of suggestion,\"\nI have introduced the term Cosmic Suggestion. There are few thinkers who\nwould attempt to deny that the same factors, processes and influences\nare observable in the formation of all classes of opinion, whether they\nare called religious, moral, political or artistic. It is,\nunfortunately, equally evident that reason, except in the case of\nscientific opinion, usually plays the smaller and emotion and desire the\ngreater part in their formation. We say that this is unfortunate because\nemotion never brings us nearer the truth. Poets and ecstatic visionaries\nhave sung the praises of emotion because to them emotion alone was real\nand the normal medium of truth. On the other hand the investigator is\nbound to arrive at a different conclusion. \"Emotion\" has nothing\nwhatever to do with the attainment of truth. That which we prize under\nthe name of \"emotion\" is an elaborate activity of the brain, which\nconsists of feelings of like and dislike, motions of assent and dissent,\nimpulses of desire and aversion. It may be influenced by the most\ndiverse activities of the organism, by the cravings of the senses and\nthe muscles, the stomach, the sexual organs, etc. The interests of truth\nare far from promoted by these conditions and vacillations of emotion;\non the contrary, such circumstances often disturb that reason which\nalone is adapted to the pursuit of truth, and frequently mar its\nperceptive power. \"No cosmic problem is solved, or even advanced, by\nthe cerebral function we call emotion.\"[43]\n\nFrom the earliest times shrewd observers have commented on the ease with\nwhich the passions of men are inflamed and united, often by the least\nworthy of objects. Dr. Samuel Johnson, describing the progress of an\nagitator bidding for adherence, tersely remarks, \"ale and clamour unite\ntheir powers, the crowd, condensed and heated, begins to ferment with\nthe leaven of sedition.\"[44]\n\nBefore proceeding further, it may be well to make a brief examination of\nthe hypothesis most in accord with the results of recent psychological\nresearch and ascertainable fact.\n\nIt has gradually come to be recognized in scientific circles that recent\nadvances in psychology have made it impossible to pursue that science\nany longer entirely on a physiological, anatomical and histological\nbasis. It is now also hardly likely to be disputed that not only is\nconsciousness not the sum total of man's psychic activities but that the\ngreater part of them are subconscious or unconscious. Thus, according to\nProfessor James Ward, \"our threshold of consciousness must be compared\nto the surface of a lake, and subconsciousness to the depths beneath it,\nand all the current terminology of presentations rising and sinking\nimplies this or some similar figure.\"\n\nAnother writer in a recent publication makes use of an analogous\nillustration by describing human personality as an iceberg, the great\nbulk of which is always invisible and submerged.[45]\n\nThe matter is further complicated by the fact that within the domain of\nthe subconscious there exists a vitality which cannot be traced to a\ncerebral or somatic source. Stated in broad terms it may be said that\nmind, or the sum total of Personality, must be viewed in two\ninteractionary aspects: the primary consciousness and secondary\nconsciousness, or the conscious and the subconscious or subliminal or\n(in a special sense) subjective, according to the various terms used by\ndifferent writers to express the same thing.\n\nFor the purpose of greater lucidity, it has usually been found that this\ndual aspect of mind can be best expressed by treating the whole mental\norganization as consisting of two minds, each endowed with separate and\ndistinct attributes and powers; each capable, under certain conditions,\nof independent action. It may be that a truer idea would be conveyed if\nthe mind-whole was described as possessing certain attributes and powers\nunder some conditions, and certain other attributes and powers under\nother conditions. As my object, here, is to enter no further into\npsychological questions than is necessary for the elucidation of those\nethical considerations which are dependent upon them, I shall give a\nshort account of those theories which, in the light of present\nknowledge, appear best founded and afford most assistance in connexion\nwith the subject of morality.\n\nThomas J. Hudson, whose hypothesis I shall make use of to illustrate my\nmeaning, assumed for practical purposes that man has two minds. In\nmaking use to some extent of Hudson's theory, I do so not because it is\nnecessarily correct, for his hypothesis was, admittedly, to a certain\nextent provisional; but because it was the first practical working\nhypothesis on which all psychic and hypnotic phenomena could be based,\nand because it has largely been used as a basis for subsequent\nelaborations.\n\nIn 1892, Hudson, in his \"Law of Psychic Phenomena,\" said: \"In more\nrecent years the doctrine of duality of mind is beginning to be more\nclearly defined, and it may now be said to constitute a cardinal\nprinciple in the philosophy of many of the ablest exponents of the new\npsychology.\" To-day when psychotherapeutics have claimed the attention\nof students of pathology, and when at last the medical profession has\nalmost throughout enlisted the co-operation and help of hypnotism, there\nare far fewer people who would deny the existence of that substratum of\nconsciousness, distinct from the manifestation of the normal waking\nmind, which is so profitably studied in the phenomena of somnambulism,\nhypnotism and lunacy.\n\nThe briefest statement of the salient features of Hudson's hypothesis\nwill suffice to enable me to suggest the irresistible conclusion that\nthe prime factor in the formation of all opinion, collective and\nindividual, the chief determinant of conduct, and the greatest motive\nforce in the world, is analogous and co-relative to hypnotic suggestion.\n\nHudson was the first to attempt a clear definition of the role and\nnature of the two elements which constitute the dual mind. For the sake\nof greater clearness he speaks of these two aspects of mind as though\nthey were two minds, possessing distinctive characteristics and a line\nof demarcation between the two, clearly defined. To continue in his own\nwords: \"Their functions are essentially unlike; each is endowed with\nseparate and distinct attributes and powers; and each is capable, under\ncertain conditions and limitations, of independent action.\" The author\nthen distinguishes the two by designating the one _objective_ and the\nother _subjective_. It is unfortunate that he makes use of a\nnomenclature in which these terms are slightly perverted from their\nlegitimate meaning, or perhaps, as he expresses it, modified and\nextended, but since he prefers to use them rather than attempt to coin\nnew ones, it will be necessary to employ them with reference to his law;\nin every case in which these designations are employed in conjunction\nwith the word mind, or printed in italics, they will be used in this\nsense.\n\nThey are defined thus: \"The objective mind takes cognizance of the\nobjective world. Its media of observation are the five physical senses.\nIt is the outgrowth of man's physical necessities.... Its highest\nfunction is that of reasoning.\"[46] In other words, the objective mind\nfunctionates from the brain and is susceptible of anatomical\nlocalization, whilst \"the subjective mind takes cognizance of its\nenvironment by means independent of the physical senses. It perceives by\nintuition.... It performs its highest functions when the _objective_\nsenses are in obeyance. In a word, it is that intelligence which makes\nitself manifest in a hypnotic subject when he is in a state of\nsomnambulism.\"[47]\n\nWhether we call it soul or subjective mind matters not; what matters is\nthe fact that in all psychic phenomena there is sufficient evidence to\nshow that the two aspects of mind interact according to certain\nobservable principles. The main principle affecting man's mental\norganization on which Hudson builds his hypothesis is the Law of\nSuggestion, first discovered by Liebeault, the founder of the Nancy\nSchool of hypnotism, during his researches in 1866. It is this: that\nhypnotic subjects are constantly amenable to the power of suggestion.\nThis proposition may be said to have been demonstrated as true beyond\nall possibility of doubt.\n\nStarting with this discovery, Hudson, after defining the dual character\nof mind, introduces two propositions, namely: that the subjective mind\nis constantly amenable to control by suggestion, and that the subjective\nmind is incapable of inductive reasoning. Man in hypnotic state has\ninvariably given sufficient evidence to show that the subjective mind\naccepts, without hesitation or doubt, every statement that is made to\nit.\n\nWith regard to this Law of Suggestion it is well to remember that, while\nthe subjective mind is invariably and constantly swayed by suggestion,\nand is capable of offering no resistance except that which has been\ncommunicated to it by the objective mind, or which is inherent in its\nnature, the objective mind, on the other hand, is perpetually assailed\nby extrinsic suggestion, its capacity for resistance being in proportion\nto the dominant quality and development of the mind-whole.\n\nThe objective mind, it will therefore be seen, is potentially selective,\nthat is to say, the measure of its quality is its capacity to select at\nwill intellectual nourishment from the whole range of humanity and\nnature, free from the oppression of its psychic environment. The rare\ncombination of this intellectual fastidiousness with a super-sensibility\nis the mark of true genius.\n\nEvery one is conscious that at times we become aware of impulses,\ninclinations and concepts which seem to form no part of our thinking or\nwaking minds; they seem to come from the depths of our souls in\nresponse to some vital need of our existence. When the tendency appears\nto be hereditary we call these promptings instincts[48] and consider it\nright to suppress them or hold them in check. We do not resign ourselves\nwholesale to unbridled licentiousness or anger because the reproductive\ninstinct and pugnacity are inherent in our nature; on the contrary, we\nrealize that our best interests lie in self-control. If, on the other\nhand, the impulse is less easily accounted for, if, maybe, the message\nof our souls runs counter to our normal instincts, our interests or\nreason, we are apt to assume that the impulse emanates from outside our\nnature and must have, many of us think, a supernatural or Divine origin.\n\nIt may be said then that most people distinguish \"good\" and \"bad\"\nimpulses, or impulses which must be inhibited and impulses which should\nbe followed at all costs.\n\nTheology, as taught in the Sunday School, treats the subject somewhat\nafter this fashion: \"All mortals are assailed by the powers of Good and\nEvil; the vehicle of the Divine Will is 'Conscience,' the voice of\nconscience is the voice of God within us. Beware of the World, the Flesh\nand the Devil; the Devil calls to his victims in the guise of the\nflesh.\" This idea is exploited for all it is worth in conjunction with\nthe doctrine of original sin: the stock device of priestcraft to enhance\nthe value of its own ministrations and sacraments. The spiritual teacher\nwill usually \"bring the lesson home\" by a vivid description of the\nhabits and idiosyncrasies of a Mephistophelian Devil with a particular\nliability to appropriate the \"laws of our lower nature\" for the sole\npurpose of baulking his equally anthropomorphic antagonist, the God of\nJews and Christians, whose voice may be recognized in the pangs of\nremorse and self-debasement. A child subjected to this form of\ninstruction during the most impressionable period of its existence is\nusually left for the remainder of its life with a vague distrust of\nnature, a proportionate reverence for the _super_-natural, and an\nimpression that asceticism is the highest attainable virtue, together\nwith a totally false appreciation of mental phenomena and the real value\nof self-control.\n\nEvery man should learn to know himself and seek the origin of his\nimpulses. History is full of examples of men and women who believed\nthemselves attended by guardian angels or familiar spirits who prompted\ntheir actions and gave them advice; Socrates was constantly attended by\nhis _daimones_, and Joan of Arc used to hear \"spirit voices.\" These and\nsimilar cases were evidence of the predominance of the subjective over\nthe objective mind. In a normally balanced mind the _objective_ is in\ncontrol; in the reverse process the objective mind is dormant and the\nsubjective dominates the throne of reason. This is the case in dreams,\ntrance, hypnosis and cerebral diseases. It is also the case, in greater\nor lesser degree, whenever the brain is stunned or is said to be\n\"unbalanced\" as the result of great emotional excitement or shock. It is\nthen that impulse and instinct take the place of, or inhibit, rational\nthought. Impulses emanate from the subjective mind, and may result from\nthe inherent nature and real character of the individual; or they may\nreflect the autosuggestions of the individual, or his bodily desires\n(this may be termed reflex-suggestion), or the suggestions of others;\nor, again, the latter, acting upon the subjective mind, may awaken\nrelated tendencies or inclinations and result in new complex impulses.\nExtreme cases of subjective control result in madness; the false\npremises conveyed by the disordered cerebral organs must result in\ndeductions by the subjective mind of equal abnormality. Control by the\nsubjective mind nearly always produces in the subject either a feeling\nof dual personality, in which two egos are realized, each distinct from\nthe other--the old _me_ and the new _me_--or else the subjective mind is\nidentified with a totally distinct, extrinsic and usually superior\nindividual; delusions of dual personality or demoniacal control are\namong the first recognized symptoms of Cerebral disease. The greatest\nand maddest fanatics in history have usually attributed their powers to\nspirit control. Poets and artists have sometimes confessed that their\nmost brilliant work was produced under conditions akin to trance; in\nsome cases--Coleridge and Edgar Allan Poe are well-known examples--the\nstate was artificially induced. Many have felt as though they were\npossessed by a mightier spirit than their own, which dictated while they\nmerely obeyed.\n\nProfessor William James, after describing delusions of dual, alternating\nand superimposed personality, which are common symptoms of insanity,\ncontinues: \"The literature of insanity is filled with narratives of such\nillusions as these.... One patient has another self that repeats all his\nthoughts for him. Others, among whom are some of the first characters in\nhistory, have familiar demons who speak with them, and are replied to.\nIn another, some one 'makes' his thoughts for him. Another has two\nbodies, lying in different beds. Or the cries of the patient himself are\nassigned to another person with whom the patient expresses\nsympathy.\"[49]\n\nIf Macaulay is right in the following passage, \"subjective control\"\nwould appear to be the essential condition for the production of poetry:\n\"Perhaps no man can be a poet, or can even enjoy poetry, without a\ncertain unsoundness of mind--if anything which gives so much pleasure\nought to be called unsoundness.... Truth, indeed, is essential to\npoetry, but it is the truth of madness. The reasonings are just, but\nthe premises are false.\"[50]\n\nAnother often quoted passage, from Caesar Lombroso's \"Man of Genius,\"\nbears out the same thing: \"Many men of genius who have studied\nthemselves, and who have spoken of their inspiration, have described it\nas a sweet and seductive fever, during which their thought had become\nrapidly and involuntarily fruitful, and has burst forth like the flame\nof a lighted torch.\" \"Kuh's most beautiful poems,\" wrote Bauer, \"were\ndictated in a state between sanity and reason; at the moment when his\nsublime thoughts came to him he was incapable of simple reasoning.\"\n\nNot the least remarkable of the powers of the subjective mind is its\napparently absolute memory; not only are those experiences of which we\nhave _objective_ cognizance indelibly recorded, but innumerable\noccurrences in our environment, which pass unnoticed or of which we are\neven consciously unaware, seem to be registered by the subjective mind.\nAlthough it cannot be included in the term memory, implying conscious\nmemory, we have good reason for believing that in common with all living\norganisms the subjective mind of men records not only the result of its\nown experience, but also is impregnated by those experiences of its\nancestors which have been transformed into habits and have become\ninnate, and that by this means only progress and evolution are capable\nof explanation. This unconscious register of ancestral experience, about\nwhich we shall have more to say in another chapter, is here adduced as\nbeing an additional factor which must have considerable bearing on the\nnature of _subjective_ impulses. The theories of unconscious and of\n\"organic\" memories[51] throw a great deal of light on the transmission\nof hereditary characters and of instincts. The very fact of the\nappearance of hereditary characteristics in, for example, young ducks\nhatched out by a hen, who persist in showing their ancestry by making\nfor the first pond they see in spite of the astonished remonstrances of\ntheir foster-mother, points to race memory as the only solution.\n\nTelepathy is again another factor in connexion with the subjective mind\nwhich must be taken into account. It has been described as the normal\nmeans of communication between subjective minds _en rapport_; the\npossibilities of its influence cannot be ignored. Is it surprising, when\nwe realize the range, scope and complexity of the subconscious\nintelligence within ourselves, that its emanations are sometimes\nmistaken for messages from another world?\n\nThis brief reference to some of the more noticeable influences which\naffect the inherent character of the subjective mind may help to\nindicate the importance of the Law of Suggestion with regard to the\ntheory of conscience (literally self-knowledge--but in practice more\noften lack of self-knowledge). This law can be most profitably studied\nin the phenomena of hypnotism, for the reason that \"the objective mind,\nor let us say man in his normal condition, is not controllable, against\nreason, positive knowledge, or the evidence of his senses, by the\nsuggestions of another.\" (We have discussed his _potential_ capacity for\nresistance.) \"The subjective mind, or man in the hypnotic state,\" on the\nother hand, \"is unqualifiedly and constantly amenable to the power of\nsuggestion.\"[52] In this condition the subjective mind accepts\nunhesitatingly every statement that is made to it, no matter how absurd\nor incongruous or contrary to the objective experience of the\nindividual. If the subject is told that he is a dog, he will instantly\naccept the suggestion, and to the limit of physical possibility act the\npart suggested. If he is told he is Napoleon, he will again act the part\nwith wonderful fidelity to life. The suggestion of pursuing devils will\nsend him into a lively terror. He will become intoxicated by drinking a\nglass of water under the impression that it is brandy. If told he is\nsuffering from a high fever, his pulse will become rapid, his face\nflushed and his temperature will rise. \"In short, he can be made to\nsee, smell, hear, or feel anything in obedience to suggestion.\" These\nare fundamental facts known not only to students of hypnotism but also\nvery extensively to the general public.\n\nEqual and complementary to the Law of Suggestion is the Law of\nAutosuggestion. Having accepted for purposes of clarity Hudson's view of\nthe independent powers and functions of the two aspects of mind, it\nnaturally follows that the subjective mind of an individual is as\namenable to the control of his own objective mind as to the objective\nmind of another; in fact we have sufficient reason to know that it is\nmore so. For instance, it is well known that a normal person cannot be\nhypnotized against his will, for the contrary autosuggestion of the\nsubject negatives the suggestion of the operator. Even after a subject\nhas consented to be hypnotized the settled habits of his life are\nsufficiently strong autosuggestions to defend him against the violation\nof his most tenacious principles. If, for instance, a hypnotic subject\nis conscientiously opposed to the use of alcohol, he cannot be persuaded\nto drink water under the impression that it is whisky. This fact is of\nthe greatest importance in relation to criminology.\n\nIn this connexion the following passage from Moll's \"Hypnotism\" is of\ninterest: \"The more an action is repulsive to the disposition [of an\nindividual], the stronger is his resistance. Habit and education play a\nlarge part here; it is generally very difficult to suggest anything\nopposed to the confirmed habits of the subject.\n\n\"For instance, suggestions are made with success to a devout Catholic,\nbut directly the suggestion conflicts with his creed it will not be\naccepted. The surroundings play a part also. A subject will frequently\ndecline a suggestion that will make him appear ridiculous. A woman whom\nI easily put into cateleptic postures, and who made suggested movements,\ncould not be persuaded to put out her tongue at the spectators.\n\n\"It is interesting to observe the way in which resistance is expressed,\nboth in hypnotic and post-hypnotic suggestion. I, myself, have observed\nthe interesting phenomenon that subjects have asked to be awakened when\na suggestion displeased them.\"[53]\n\nIt is a fundamental law of hypnotism that it cannot be used as an agent\nfor the commission of a crime, that is, unless the subject is criminally\ndisposed. It is obvious that the same rule applies to sexual crimes;\nHudson lays it down as an unassailable fact that no virtuous woman ever\nwas, or ever can be, successfully assaulted while in a hypnotic\ncondition.\n\nIt will now be realized that autosuggestion embraces not only the\nassertions of the objective mind of an individual, addressed to his own\nsubjective mind, but also his habits of thought and the settled\nprinciples and convictions of his whole life. The more intense these\nprinciples and convictions are, the stronger the autosuggestion will\nbe, and relatively harder to be overcome by the contrary suggestions of\nanother. It is a law of universal applicability that the strongest\nsuggestion must prevail.\n\nSo far we have alluded only to suggestion applied during hypnosis; it\nshould be remembered, however, that it is now a settled principle of\npsychotherapeutics that suggestion also operates, and from a therapeutic\npoint of view is sometimes more efficacious, in the normal waking or\nsleeping condition; though in the latter case, without complete\namenability, the results are seldom so striking. The condition in normal\nwaking life which produces phenomena most closely resembling those of\nhypnosis is that of strong emotional excitement. We find, also, that in\nnormal life suggestions of the greatest potency and having the most\nfar-reaching effects are conveyed by means of emotional states. Although\na close resemblance exists between the result of suggestion in hypnosis\nand the result of suggestion in normal and emotion states, similarity of\nresult does not, as Dr. Bramwell points out in this connexion,\nnecessarily imply identity of cause. In fact there are some important\ndifferences between the two conditions which produce the phenomena, as\nwell as some distinctions between the phenomena themselves: whereas\nfear, hope, faith, religious excitement and kindred emotions are almost\ninvariably present in cases which are cited as analogous to hypnotic\nones, some of these, such as fear and other violent emotions,\neffectually preclude the production of hypnosis, and further, subjects\nwho are most amenable to emotional suggestions are often those whom it\nis most difficult to hypnotize.[54]\n\nThe principle of psychotherapeutics depends, as is well known, upon the\nclose dependence of the organs and normal bodily functions upon the\nbehests of the mind. Hudson expresses this in the form of a proposition,\nnamely: \"The subjective mind has absolute control of the functions,\nconditions and sensations of the body.\" Although this statement contains\na very important principle we should not allow it to obscure the fact of\nthe reverse process. As James, Bain and others have shown, antecedent\nbodily conditions often react directly upon the mind. The general truth,\nhowever, of the proposition may be readily perceived when we remember\nthat perfect anaesthesia can be produced at the will of the operator by\nsuggestion. The effect of mental stimuli upon functional conditions is\nalso commonly observed under normal conditions in such phenomena as\nblushing, turning pale, the quickening of the pulse, fainting, etc., all\nof which should be sufficient to convince any one who gives the subject\na moment's consideration of the very direct and instant way the mind\naffects the body.\n\nSeveral typical examples of the influence of autosuggestion, or\nimagination, over intestinal action during sleep are quoted by Bernheim\nfrom the \"Bibliotheque choisie de Medecine.\" They consist for the most\npart of recorded cases where, for instance, the subjects, having\nregistered an intention to use a purgative the following day, have\ndreamt during the night with particular vividness that the dose had\nalready been taken, with the result that, influenced by the imaginary\naperient, they had awakened to yield to nature's demands, with the same\nresult as if the dose had already been taken.\n\nIt may not be out of place to refer to another example from my personal\nexperience of the potency of suggestion in affecting functional\ndisturbances during sleep. During my first week at a public school, the\ndampness of the new climate brought on a bad attack of bronchial asthma,\nwhich I had not been troubled with for some time previously. The first\nbad attack occurred at night, when some noise had caused me to wake up.\nWhen I had recovered sufficiently to look at the time, I noticed it was\n2 a.m. and at the same time heard the school clock faintly striking that\nhour. Fearing and half expecting another attack the next night; I asked\nthat asthma powder and the usual remedies might be made available in\ncase they were needed. That night, as I had feared, and for the next ten\nnights in succession, I woke struggling for breath, precisely on the\nfirst stroke of the school clock striking two, and experienced the worst\nattacks I ever had. They were undoubtedly induced at that exact time by\nthe autosuggestion which connected the symptom with the hour and by the\nconviction or fear, after the first experience, that the attack would\nrecur at the same hour.\n\nAs we have already shown, one of the chief factors in autosuggestion is\nfaith. This is, in fact, a fundamental principle recognized by all\nFaith-healers from Jesus of Nazareth onwards.\n\nThe cases during the present war where nervous aphonia and paralysis,\npopularly diagnosed with co-related cases of neurasthenia under the\ncomprehensive title \"Shell Shock,\" have completely yielded to simple\nsuggestion by affirmation on the part of the physician and confidence on\nthe part of the patient, must number hundreds of recorded cases.\nExcellent results are often obtained in cases of aphonia and paralysis\nby the suggestive influence of electricity applied to the vocal cords\nand the nerve centres. Bernheim[55] records several cures of this\ndescription. Smith and Pear[56] quote a striking but somewhat erratic\ncase in which suggestion was conveyed purely by the faradic current. The\ncase is recorded by Blaesig[57] of a sailor on the German battle cruiser\n_Derfflinger_. \"A seaman from the _Derfflinger_ was brought into a naval\nhospital with loss of voice on December 22, 1914, and could only speak\nin a whisper. He stated that his voice had always been clear and well\nunder control. At the beginning of December he had a slight cold, which\nhe attributed to sentry duty on deck in very stormy and wet weather.\nWhile in the ammunition chamber of the big guns, he was greatly upset\nduring the firing and suddenly lost his voice. After fourteen days he\nrecovered his speech. On February 12, 1915, he returned to hospital with\ncomplete loss of voice, immediately after the naval engagement in the\nNorth Sea. On February 15 he was treated with electricity, directly\napplied to the vocal cords, and on March 20 he was discharged with\ncomplete recovery of his speech. But on returning to duty, as soon as he\nwent on board his ship, his voice was suddenly lost for the third time\nand he remained aphonic.\"\n\nMore spectacular, but not more wonderful than the cures of the\nprofessional psychiatrist, are some of the so-called miracles that fill\nthe pages of religious history; and they are less easy to explain,\naccording to the invariable laws of suggestion, only in proportion to\ntheir lack of authenticity. There is no reason for doubting that\nthousands of remarkable and absolutely authenticated cures have taken\nplace at the healing waters of Lourdes, or that many of the recorded\ncases of the cure of epileptics, blind, deaf and dumb and sick at the\nhands of Saints and others are substantially true. Many of these stories\nare, of course, embellished and exaggerated, while others are wholly\nfictitious, but the majority are based upon more than a foundation of\nfact. The one essential in all these cases is faith in healer and\npatient. The truth of the hypothesis upon which that faith is founded\nhas not the slightest effect on the efficacy of the cure. Hudson quotes\nthe following passage from Bernheim: \"Among all the moral causes which,\nappealing to the imagination, set the cerebral mechanism of possible\ncauses at work, none is so efficacious as religious faith. Numbers of\nauthentic cures have certainly been due to it.\" On this fact are based\nthe numerous theories propounded by the different sects and schools of\nfaith- and prayer-healers that exist to-day.\n\nThe conclusion is irresistible and obvious to any one not blinded by\nreligious prejudice that whether the object of faith is real or false\nthe result attained will be the same in either case. Faith will produce\n\"miracles\" irrespective of the premises on which it is founded. This\naccounts for the quite considerable success (apart from financial\nconsiderations) attained by \"Christian Scientists\" in spite of the\nself-evident absurdity of their tenets, and the fact that they are\nwithout the remotest conception of the real principles which underlie\ntheir so-called \"science.\"\n\nOne of the most important and striking facts discovered by students of\nhypnotism is the complete recollection by the subject in the hypnotic\ncondition of all he may have learned or forgotten in the normal state,\nand, in fact, of all he may consciously or unconsciously have\nexperienced, and this recollection can be induced at the will of the\noperator. The subjective mind is said to have a perfect memory, that is\nto say, it is capable of registering with unfailing accuracy every\nexperience of the individual; for this reason hypnotic subjects have a\nrange and wealth of knowledge quite beyond their waking abilities. It is\nself-evident that any forgotten fact that is recalled by an effort or at\nrandom, when an associationist explanation would be wholly inadequate,\nmust have lain stored all the while below the level of consciousness.\n\nAs the factors of memory and heredity together have an important bearing\non the growth of moral ideas, we may deal with the subject a little more\nfully. According to James, \"The Stream of Thought flows on: but most of\nits segments fall into the bottomless abyss of oblivion.\"[58] \"Retention\nmeans _liability_ [the italics are the author's] to recall, and it means\nnothing more than such liability. The only proof of there being\nretention is that recall actually takes place.\"[59] His position is\nslightly modified some pages later, where he says, after recording a few\ncases of hypnotic memory: \"All these pathological facts are showing us\nthat the sphere of possible recollection may be wider than we think, and\nthat in certain matters apparently oblivion is no proof against possible\nrecall under other conditions.\" But adds: \"They give no countenance,\nhowever, to the extravagant opinion that nothing we experience can be\nabsolutely forgotten.\"[60] The only reason he gives, however, for\ndiscountenancing this possibility is that he cannot find sufficient\nexplanation for it. On the other hand, we believe that there is now\nample evidence to show that all experience is retained in some portion\nof the psychic whole, and that although it may not have been consciously\nrealized at all, it will still have been subconsciously registered. One\nof the cases most often quoted in illustration of this appears in\nColeridge's \"Biographia Literaria\"[61] and is here repeated since it is\ngiven by James and also at greater length by Hudson.[62] According to\nthe author it occurred a year or two before his arrival at Goettingen.\n\n\"In a Roman Catholic town in Germany, a young woman, who could neither\nread nor write, was seized with a fever, and was said by the priests to\nbe possessed of a devil, because she was heard talking Latin, Greek and\nHebrew. Whole sheets of her ravings were written out and found to\nconsist of sentences intelligible in themselves but having slight\nconnexion with each other. Of her Hebrew sayings, only a few could be\ntraced to the Bible and most seemed to be in the Rabbinical dialect.\nMany eminent physiologists and psychologists visited the town and\ncross-examined the case on the spot. All trick was out of the question;\nthe woman was a simple creature: there was no doubt as to the fever. It\nwas long before any explanation, save that of demoniacal possession,\ncould be obtained. At last the mystery was unveiled by a physician, who\ndetermined to trace back the girl's history, and who, after much\ntrouble, discovered that at the age of nine she had been charitably\ntaken by an old Protestant pastor, a great Hebrew scholar, in whose\nhouse she lived till his death. On further inquiry, it appeared to have\nbeen the old man's custom for years to walk up and down a passage of his\nhouse into which the kitchen opened, and to read to himself with a loud\nvoice out of his books. The books were ransacked, and among them were\nfound several Greek and Latin Fathers, together with a collection of\nRabbinical writings. In these works so many of the passages taken down\nat the young woman's bedside were identical that there could be no\nreasonable doubt as to their source.\"\n\nJames, who considered that phenomenal memories were accounted for by the\nexceptional persistence or permanence of the \"paths\" of thought, a\npurely physiological property of the brain-tissue of the individual,\nquotes a case within his own experience which, if we accept Hudson's\ntheory, affords a typical illustration of the facility possessed by some\nmen of drawing upon the knowledge of their own subjective minds.\n\n\"What these cases show is that the mere organic retentiveness of a man\nneed bear no definite relation to his other mental powers. Men of the\nhighest general powers will often forget nothing, however insignificant.\nOne of the most generally accomplished men I know has a memory of this\nsort. He never keeps written note of anything, yet is never at a loss\nfor a fact which he has once heard. As an instance of his desultory\nmemory, he was introduced to a certain colonel at a club. The\nconversation fell upon the signs of age in man. The colonel challenged\nhim to estimate his age. He looked at him, and gave the exact day of his\nbirth, to the wonder of all. But the secret of this accuracy was that,\nhaving picked up some days previously an army register, he had idly\nturned over its list of names with the dates of birth, graduation,\npromotion, etc., attached, and when the colonel's name was mentioned to\nhim at the club, these figures, on which he had not bestowed a moment's\nthought, involuntarily surged up in his mind.\"\n\nIt is hoped that the foregoing has made it clear that a distinction\nexists between the normal or _objective_ memory, or recollection, which\nis capable of cerebral localization, and the _subjective_ memory, which\nappears to be absolute and without anatomical basis. The very fact that\nthe normal memory is most efficient when the brain is healthy, and the\nremarkable powers of the _subjective_ memory are seen to the best\nadvantage when the brain is diseased or dormant, serves to emphasize the\ndistinction. This, too, explains the otherwise unaccountable fact that\nquite abnormal memories are sometimes possessed by imbeciles equally\nwith men of genius, especially that type of ecstatic mind often mistaken\nfor genius by the world. Mr. Bernard Shaw, laying great emphasis on the\ndistinction, proclaims the domination of will, not reason, as the mark\nof genius in art.[63] But the distinction is superfluous and misleading:\nit is just that type of \"genius\" (?), fruitful when the _will_ is\nanaesthetized and the range and wealth of the subjective mind given free\nplay, whose works degenerate into decadent mysticism; it is when\n_reason_ ceases to direct the course of genius that the _subjective_\nstratum dominates the throne; and the mind, fed and nourished by the\ndeep-seated lusts of the body, grows mad with the exuberance of its own\ndescriptive powers.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[41] The principal checks to population enumerated by Malthus were\nnormally: vice, misery and celibacy or moral restraint, and such\noccasional resorts of nature to repress a too redundant population (an\nevil aggravated considerably in countries where population is forced to\nthe limits of its means of subsistence by poor-laws and grants in aid of\nfamilies), as wars and famine.\n\n[42] The \"unfit\" denotes the diseased, criminals, paupers and lunatics.\nSee \"The Fertility of the Unfit,\" by W. A. Chapple, for an able\nexposition of the economic causes underlying the alarming increase in\nthe unfit population.\n\n[43] E. Haeckel, \"Riddle of the Universe.\"\n\n[44] \"The False Alarm,\" a pamphlet on the Middlesex election of 1770.\n\n[45] \"The Purpose of Education\" (1915), by St. George Lane Fox-Pitt.\n\n[46] \"Psychic Phenomena,\" by I. J. Hudson, p. 29.\n\n[47] _Ibid._\n\n[48] Instinct in its more technical use denotes any inherited tendency\nto perform a specific action in a specific way when the appropriate\nsituation occurs. In this use instinct should be discriminated from\nimpulse, which may be (1) the sensation or feeling which prompts an\ninstinctive action, (2) a similar prompting to an action which is not\ninstinctive in the narrower sense, or which is characteristic of an\nindividual only and not of a group.--Webster's Dictionary.\n\n[49] \"Principles of Psychology,\" vol. i, p. 377.\n\n[50] _Ex_ \"Essay on Milton.\"\n\n[51] The theory was developed by Professor R. Semon of Munich, in 1908,\nwho used the word \"engrams\" for \"organic memories\"; quoted by Professor\nJ. Ward in a lecture on the _mnemic theory_, entitled \"Heredity and\nMemory,\" delivered at Cambridge in 1912 and subsequently published.\nProfessor Ward considers that greater emphasis should be laid upon the\npsychic than upon the physical impressions recorded by the \"mind-stuff.\"\n\n[52] Hudson's \"Psychic Phenomena,\" p. 30.\n\n[53] _Op. cit._, p. 129.\n\n[54] _Vide_ Bramwell's \"Hypnotism,\" 3rd edition, p. 334.\n\n[55] \"Suggestive Therapeutics.\"\n\n[56] _Op. cit._, p. 44.\n\n[57] _Muenchener Medizinische Wochenschrift_, June 15, 1915.\n\n[58] \"Principles of Psychology,\" p. 643.\n\n[59] _Ibid._, vol. i, p. 654.\n\n[60] \"Principles of Psychology,\" vol. i, p. 682.\n\n[61] Ed. 1847, vol. i, p. 117; also quoted in Carpenter's \"Mental\nPhysiology,\" chap, x, in illustration of his theory of \"unconscious\ncerebrations.\"\n\n[62] Hudson's \"Psychic Phenomena,\" p. 44, and James's \"Principles of\nPsychology,\" vol. i, p. 681.\n\n[63] \"The Sanity of Art,\" by George Bernard Shaw.\n\n\n\n\nVI\n\nVALUER AND VALUATION\n\n\nValue implies a valuer; however universal or established a value may be,\nthe term is meaningless unless it bears relation to people who value. No\ndefinition of value is possible, or at any rate satisfactory, that does\nnot imply the judgment, choice, or assertion of a valuer in the act of\nvaluing. The universality of a value does not make it objective or\nindependent of valuers, but merely widens the applicability of that\nvalue with regard to any imaginable valuer. If this can be admitted, it\nfollows that value cannot be made independent of the factors that\ndetermine or have determined the mental attitude of the valuer. For this\nreason I will attempt to give an account of some of the factors which\nbear directly upon man, the valuer, and less directly upon values in\ngeneral and moral values in particular. The discussion will be under\nfour headings: (1) Instinct and Heredity; (2) Emotion; (3) Judgment of\nEnds; (4) Environment and Cosmic Suggestion.\n\n\n(1) INSTINCT AND HEREDITY\n\nWe have already alluded to the part played by instinct in determining\nthe initial character of the ego. Instincts are here distinguished from\nthe emotions to which they give rise. Without unduly stretching the\nmeaning of the word \"suggestion,\" in the sense of a prompting to action\nnot specifically in hypnotism, instinct may perhaps be looked upon as\nthe innate suggestion of heredity. The two primary factors held to be\nfundamental in shaping and influencing the character of the individual\nare environment and heredity. The question of the predominance of the\none influence or the other is the subject of keen controversy, and\ncoincides with the contingent problem of the relative importance of\ninherent and acquired characters.\n\nIt is now becoming increasingly evident that the problem of heredity is\nnearer a solution if viewed rather from the psychical than from the\npurely biological or material aspect. So we seek the solution of the\nsecret in psychology. The vital factor in organism is psychic from\nprotozoan to man, whether we identify it with \"psychoplasm,\" soul, ego,\nor \"subjective mind.\"\n\nThose who put forward memory as the basis of heredity show that\nevolution implies the retention by organisms of their experiences in\naccommodating themselves to their gradually changing environment.\nConstant and reiterated striving in certain directions in this process\nof accommodation, until actions become automatic--free of\neffort--produces habit. In the words of Professor Ward: \"This law of\nhabit we may reasonably regard as exemplified in the life of every\nindividual in the long line of genealogical ascent that connects us\nwith our humblest ancestors, in so far as every permanent advance in the\nscale of life implies a basis of habit embodied in a structure which has\nbeen perfected by practice.\"[64] Laborious observations have been\nrecorded of minute unicellular creatures to show that they \"succeed as\nwe do, only by way of trial and error.\" Thus we are led to the\nconclusion that the acquisition of habits by the individual during his\nefforts to adapt himself to his environment, and transmitted down a long\nline of genealogical descent, is the method of heredity; and further,\nthat man, in common with other animals, inherits all these racial and\nindividual acquirements from his parents. Instinct, we have said, may be\ntermed the \"Suggestion of Heredity,\" which again is \"race memory,\" or\nthe evolutionary product of habits acquired during the process of man's\nadaptability to his environment. This, then, is the primary and\nfundamental determinant of the character and quality of personality. It\nis the quality which is inherent in a man from the moment he begins his\nindividual existence, that is, from the moment the sexual cells of both\nparents coalesce in the process of conception and form a new stem-cell.\nHaeckel divides the instincts into two chief classes: the primary, which\ncan be traced to the commencement of organic life--the common lower\nimpulses inherent in the psychoplasm. The chief are impulses to\nself-preservation (by defence and maintenance) and the preservation of\nthe species (by generation and the care of the young). These two, hunger\nand reproduction, are universally recognized as fundamental. The\nsecondary were due to intelligent adaption; translated into habit, they\ngradually become automatic and \"innate\" in subsequent generations. The\nearlier these habits are acquired and ingrained in the life history of\nthe race, the more invariable and immutable will be their transmission;\nthe habits of a few generations are easily modified or effaced by\nconflicting tendencies or conditions. The life history of every new\nindividual, in its initial stages, is a (more or less complete[65])\nrecapitulation of the life history of the race. The _earlier_ ancestral\nacquisitions have been transformed into habit and have become\nsecondarily automatic, the less are they liable to variation, and the\nmore inexorable and unfailing will be their transmission. Thus Darwin\nshowed the greater immutability of generic characters over later\nacquired specific characters. This applies to psychic as well as to\nphysical characters. In the same way the earlier, during the course of\nhis life, a man assimilates a strong suggestion, the greater will be its\neffect and the longer its influence will last.\n\nLet us now consider instinct in relation to moral conceptions. Dr.\nMcDougall gives prominence in his \"Social Psychology\" to the following\ninstincts, which, together with the emotional excitements which\naccompany them, play the foremost part in the evolution of moral ideas:\n(1) The reproductive, parental and erotic instincts, responsible for the\nearliest form of social feeling; (2) the instinct of pugnacity, with\nwhich are connected the emotions of resentment and revenge, which give\nrise, when complicated with other instincts, to indignation at\nanti-social conduct; (3) the gregarious instinct, which inclines animals\nto gather together in aggregations of their own species--this impulse\nhas an important bearing upon the sympathetic emotions and is at the\nroot of tribal loyalty; (4) the instincts of acquisition and\nconstruction, which have been developed with the idea of property, and\nthe moral judgments connected therewith; (5) the instincts of\nself-abasement (or subjection) and of self-assertion (or self-display),\nwith which are connected the emotions of \"depression\" and \"elation\"--the\nformer instinct gives rise to feelings of respect towards superiors,\ndivine or human, and the latter is the basis of self-respect.[66]\n\nOther writers lay greater emphasis on a distinct instinct of Imitation.\nIt is undoubted that imitation, both when it is spontaneous and when it\nis deliberate--the distinction between the two forms should be carefully\nobserved--plays a great part in the formation of moral judgments.\nTheological and ethical writers are fond of saying that the sense of\nmoral obligation arises from the consciousness of approval, and\nconsequent imitation, of an ideal or a standard which is submitted to\nour judgment; this implies deliberate imitation. The imitative tendency\n(purely spontaneous) is strongly marked in every child in its first\nefforts at vocalization, which are pure \"Echolalia,\" i.e. incessant\nrepetition of the sounds it hears; in fact, imitation marks every step\nof a child's growing consciousness. Practically all phenomena, however,\nattributed to the imitative instinct is in reality a manifestation of\nresponse to extrinsic suggestion. James speaks of \"the imitative\ntendency which shows itself in large masses of men, and produces panics,\nand orgies and frenzies of violence, and which only the rarest\nindividuals can actively withstand.... Certain mesmerized subjects must\nautomatically imitate whatever motion their operator makes before their\neyes.\"[67]\n\nTo ascribe this tendency to a special instinct would be to disclose a\nfaulty appreciation of mob psychology and the Laws of Suggestion. These\npanics, orgies and frenzies of violence, and similar vindictive or\nenthusiastic mob tendencies, are simply the natural response to mass or\ncosmic suggestion, as we shall see later.\n\nThe final and precipitate cause of these outbreaks is frequently the\npersonal magnetism, or more correctly the suggestion, of one man. The\nqualities necessary for the exercise of this power--the secret of\nsuccessful demagogy--are not, as might be supposed, the possession of a\ndominant will and a constructive, purposive or tenacious intellect. It\nmay be, indeed, that a great man of action, a Napoleon or Caesar, arises,\nand by these sterling qualities dominates the masses and their attendant\nsycophants and demagogues; but more usually the essentials are a gift\nfor facile and frenzied oratory and the power of evoking emotional\npresentations, qualities possessed, _par excellence_, by madmen and\nfanatics, the Kerenskys, Lenins and visionaries of all times. Their\npowers are the more irresistible, it is true, if combined with a shrewd\nknowledge of correct methods of propaganda and lavish adulation, for the\nobvious reason that, as we have seen, the strongest suggestion is the\none that is most acceptable to the subject and most in accord with his\npredilections. Nothing would be truer than to say that only the rarest\nindividuals can actively withstand the onslaught of cosmic suggestion.\nIt is significant that the greatest human type, the true genius, who\nappears most often in the great philosopher, less often in the great\nartist, and who possesses a superabundance of dominant will-power and\nconstructiveness, is far less powerful than the great conqueror or\npolitician; for he commands intellect rather than emotion, and the world\nis governed by emotion.\n\nIt is not sufficiently realized that many so-called geniuses,\nimaginative, histrionic and poetical, can never deserve the highest\nplace, for they are the sounding-boards of the world; their superlative\nquality is receptivity; they are instruments, not players; they voice\nthe great masses, and they share with publicists and politicians a\ndesire to be incriminated in the movement of their surroundings.\nWieninger, in his \"Sex and Character,\" emphasizes the dependence of\npublicists and tribunes of the people upon the masses they would lead.\nThe politician, like the prostitute, has to court the populace; she is a\nwoman of the streets--he is a man of the streets. For this reason he\ndenies to the great politician and the man of action the quality of true\ngreatness. \"The man of action shares with the epileptic the desire to be\nin criminal relation to everything around him, to make them appanages of\nhis petty self. The great man feels himself defined and separate from\nthe world, a nomad amongst nomads, and as a true microcosm he feels the\nworld already within him.\"\n\nThe really great men, the Kants, the Descartes, Leibnizs or Spencers,\nand the greatest artists are wholly creative, purposive, dynamic; they\nowe no allegiance to the masses, for they are greater than the masses;\nthey realize all without reflecting all; they seek nourishment where\nthey will, and they spew out what they will; this perfect freedom is\nnecessary for the attainment of truth. Truthfulness is a necessary\nattribute of genius, but not of statecraft or government, or of\npoetical effusions of the imagination.\n\nWhile we are dealing with the subject of instincts it may not seem out\nof place to refer to the widely held belief that maternal impressions\nduring pregnancy have a direct influence on the temperament of the\nchild, and are often responsible for inducing definite tendencies of\naversion and attraction and even physical resemblances. Although such\nacquired tendencies, admitting their existence, cannot strictly be\nclassed with the instincts or tendencies inherited from former\ngenerations, since they are acquired after the inception of, and by, the\nnew individual; yet they have a resemblance in that they are both\npre-natal acquirements, and are manifested in the same way. Writers on\nheredity and biology are apt to dismiss the subject as unworthy of\nserious consideration, and to account for any instances of the sort\nattributed to this cause as based on pure coincidence. It is, however,\nsignificant that the great majority of mothers who have given the matter\nany thought are, as a rule, firmly convinced of the reality of pre-natal\ninfluences. When the principles of suggestion are applied to the case,\nit will be seen that the conditions of pre-natal existence are\nfavourable for the reception by an unborn child of strong telepathic\nsuggestions from its mother. The embryo mind is entirely receptive; any\nviolent psychic disturbance in the mother must react upon the child.\nMost people know of some instance which points to the \"impression\"\ntheory, and which it would be impossible to account for in any other\nway.\n\nThere appear to be no reasonable grounds for denying that maternal\nimpressions may sometimes be held accountable for temperamental\ntendencies, not easily attributable to heredity, although it would, of\ncourse, be absurd to attempt to account for all abnormalities in the\nsame way. The naturally greater receptivity and suggestibility of women,\nshown by their quick response to emotional suggestion, their\ncredulousness, and the fact that women are the best mediums,[68] becomes\nvery much more marked during pregnancy. At such times some women,\nnormally distinguished by their vigour and initiative, become\nconspicuously impressionable; they become, in fact, ready \"conductors\"\nof suggestion. It follows that the influences that bear strongest upon\nthem also bear upon the child.\n\nGreater importance should not be attached to the psychic environment of\na child than to its inherent hereditary qualities, which irrevocably\ndetermine its native tendencies and the limits of its ultimate\npossibilities. Environment may modify or enhance a child's inherent\ncharacteristics in an infinite variety of ways, but cannot nullify them\nor transcend by one iota the limit of its potential development.\n\nIn a previous chapter we discussed the view of those who regard moral\njudgment as an emotion or intuition of the \"good\" and the \"right,\" and\nwho find justification for our rules of conduct by referring them to the\nDivine Will, which is supposed to inspire them by means of the \"moral\norgan\" or conscience. We believe that a correct appreciation of\npsychology makes it abundantly clear that although there are many\nimpulsive, instinctive and emotional factors totally unconnected with\nany rational or intellectual process which do, indeed, affect our moral\njudgments and give rise to ethical conventions, these factors can give\nno _validity_ to moral codes; and that, stripped of the sentiments and\nemotions with which they are obscured, moral systems must be judged by\nprinciples of utility, while they are enforceable according to the\nuniversality with which they are desired. It is, moreover, equally\nabsurd to look upon moral values as ultimate and irreducible categories\nof good and evil, irrevocably codified by an omniscient Deity for the\nconduct of humanity for all time, and supposedly accessible to the\nintelligence of all who consult their conscience. This latter position,\nwhich is maintained by Theistic \"Rationalists,\" leads to precisely the\nsame \"conclusion\" as the arguments of the \"Intuitionalists,\" the only\ndifference between them being that the conscience of the \"Rationalists\"\nis a thinking and intellectual organ, while the conscience of the\nIntuitionalists is an emotional and instinctive organ. But this amicable\nconvergence is not accidental but a _sine qua non_, since in either case\nthe object aimed at is identically the same, that object being the\nestablishment of conscience, dependent on morality, on a pinnacle of\nethical omniscience and infallibility, where its authority shall be\nunquestionable and absolute. They may well be left to their quarrel,\nwhich in reality amounts to little more than verbal quibbling.\n\nInstinct, as we have seen, must inevitably play a very large part in the\nevolution of public morality and the moral impulse of every individual.\nCareful statistics have shown that criminal tendencies make their\nappearance with unfailing persistency in selected degenerate families.\nThe genealogical record of one family may show a murderer in every\ngeneration; pauperism, prostitution and drunkenness are characteristics\nof another, and so on. Heredity will primarily determine a man's\ninherent characteristics--his instincts, temperament, disposition and,\n_eo facto_, his \"conscience.\" Other factors, above all his immediate\npsychic environment, may, indeed, modify these tendencies for better or\nworse, but under the most favourable conditions Cosmic Suggestion, in\nits aspect of \"public conscience,\" can never altogether supplant strong\ninherent tendencies. Those who believe in the conscience myth sometimes\nobject that the voice of conscience always calls in the right direction,\nbut that a man may, throughout a long life of crime, stifle and inhibit\nthat \"still small voice,\" yet in the end (perhaps when faced with the\nextreme penalty of the law) the wretched sinner will exhibit the\nsymptoms of the most genuine and heartfelt remorse and express the\ngreatest horror of his evil deeds. This type of explanation shows a\ntotal failure to interpret psychological processes. It may, indeed, be a\ncommon occurrence for a condemned criminal, brought suddenly face to\nface with the prospect of plenary punishment, to experience real sorrow\nand shame at his conduct. The emotion will probably be perfectly\ngenuine. The prisoner, with little hope of enjoying the fruits of his\nfelony and removed from the direct counter-influence of a criminal\nenvironment, will be in the best possible frame of mind to respond to\nthe right cosmic suggestion--universal horror and detestation\nof his deed. Such a suggestion, reacting upon the instinct of\nself-preservation, will readily kindle emotions of remorse, self-horror\nand sorrow. Penitence need have nothing to do with any true ethical\nappreciation of the action of which it is supposed to be the object.\nMany cases have been recorded of miserable old women accused of\nwitchcraft, who, learning for the first time at their trial of the\ncrimes they were supposed to have committed, have become convinced of\ntheir guilt, and suffering the keenest pangs of remorse have died with\npenitence and resignation.\n\nFear is the chief element of remorse: fear of our fellow-men, vague\nfears for the future, or in the most literal sense the fear of Divine\nretribution or God. Racine dramatizes this emotion in the famous\nconfession of Athalie: filled with dread at the words of warning uttered\nby the ghost of her mother Jezebel, she recalls her vision:\n\n\n       Tremble, m'a-t-elle dit,\n     fille digne de moi;\n       Le cruel Dieu des Juifs\n     l'emporte aussi sur toi.\n       Je te plains de tomber\n     dans ses mains redoutables,\n       Ma fille.\n\n\n(2) THE FACTOR OF EMOTION\n\nUnfortunately for the attainment of truth, nothing has a greater\ninfluence on the formation of human opinion and character, and is\ntherefore more inextricably bound up with all questions of politics,\nreligion, morality and art, than the complex mental state we call\nemotion. Nothing affects the well-being, health and happiness of mankind\nmore directly.\n\nEmotion may perhaps be defined as a continuity of complex presentations\nmanifested in organic sensation. In a sense, emotion is feeling, which\nis the wider term; it is an effect, which therefore cannot exist\nwithout its cause, though the same cause under different circumstances\nmay produce many varied emotions, both in quality and degree.\n\nThe visible manifestation of emotional disturbance need bear no relation\nto its intensity. People of the greatest nervous sensibility, in whom\nemotional excitements are most deeply and acutely felt, often keep their\nemotions best under control. They are not, of course, able to inhibit\nthe involuntary or visceral processes which are affected by emotion:\nheart, pulse, salivary glands and respiratory system may indeed tell the\ntale; but the will may prevent the contagion spreading further: the\nintellect may remain calm, thought and action slow and deliberate,\ndemeanour outwardly cool and collected.[69] The lower the level of\nwill-power and intellectual development, the more closely dependent will\nall cerebral processes be upon emotional states and reactions; at the\nsame time, the emotions become cruder, less complex and subtle and even\nless deeply felt. Children and savages are almost entirely emotional, in\nthe sense that they think emotionally and have no power of intellectual\ndetachment.\n\nProfessor Ward describes the effect of emotion on thought very clearly\nas follows: \"Emotional excitement--and at the outset the natural man\ndoes not think much in cold blood--quickens the flow of ideas....\nFamiliar associations hurry attention away from the proper topic, and\nthought becomes not only discursive but wandering; in place of concepts\nof fixed and crystalline completeness, such as logic describes, we may\nfind a congeries of ideas but imperfectly compacted into one generic\nidea, subject to continual transformation, and implicating much that is\nirrelevant and confusing.\"[70]\n\nThere are few people indeed whose views on religion, politics, art, and\nthe rights and relations of the sexes are not chiefly emotional values.\nWe may think that our convictions are based on logical reasonings, but\nthe force of childish impressions and associations, and the unresisted\nbias of passions and interests, are the processes by which they have\nbeen cultivated, and rational thought has been devoted to the task of\nfinding reasons for the convictions that are ready made.\n\nEmotion, as we have said, is a continuity of complex presentations whose\nelements are manifold; it is a state of feeling subject to constant\nmodification and expansion while experience develops. First among the\ncausal factors which influence emotion are the instincts, others may be\nintellectual concepts, many more come from the substrata of\nconsciousness, and of these many are strictly physiological in\ncharacter; for instance, there may be disturbances of the genital,\nvasomotor or digestive systems, cerebellar disturbances or latent\nmolecular or biochemical nervous conditions, during which the mind\nresponds to stimuli ignored under other or healthier circumstances; but\nover all it is the inherent disposition of the immaterial psychic or\nsubjective mind which gives the whole its tone and tendency. We must,\nindeed, admit with James that \"a disembodied human emotion is a sheer\nnonentity.\"\n\nWith the psycho-physical problem as to whether sensory excitation is\nantecedent to emotional expression, or emotion gives rise to bodily\nexpression, we are not here directly concerned. Since emotion is a\ncontinuous condition of experience, it may reasonably be supposed that\norganic disturbance is both a contributory cause and the reactionary\nresult of emotion.[71] Most people admit that \"each emotion is a\nresultant of a sum of elements,\" and that some of those elements are\nfunctional and organic, without admitting the contention of Professor\nJames and those who insist with him that emotion is but a sum of\norganic sensations.[72]\n\nEmotional disturbances lead directly to the overthrow of the mental\nbalance, which divides the normal man from the madman and the\nneurasthenic. Modern psychiatrists lay stress on the emotional character\nof the latter affection. The underlying features of \"functional\nneurosis\" reveal themselves in symptoms denoting the clash of emotional\nelements within, together with a corresponding lack of adaptability to\nouter environment, and are characterized by instability and exaggeration\nof emotion rather than impaired intellect.[73]\n\nThe cultivation of the aesthetic, pleasurable and benevolent emotions on\nthe one hand, and the elimination of violent emotional excitements or\ndiscordant and morbid emotions on the other, are conditions as essential\nfor the physical health as for the happiness of the individual.\nEmotional sensibility is a condition necessary for the full appreciation\nand enjoyment of art, and of all that is pleasurable and beautiful, but\nwhen emotion is allowed to colour reason, the mind is closed to truth,\nknowledge and logic.\n\nArt gratifies the emotions as truth should gratify the intellect. It is\nnot always fully realized how large a part emotional elements, which may\nembrace every form of sensory and erotic excitation, as well as the\nwhole tone of the subjective mind, play in the most intellectual\ncriticism of an artistic achievement. Of these elements some may be\nirrelevant as well as irrational, and by no means realized by the critic\nat the time of writing his appreciation. Elliot Smith and Pear\nillustrate this point in a way few people would want to dispute. \"Let us\nsuppose that a musical critic, after hearing a new symphony by an\nunconventional composer, immediately writes a lengthy appreciation of\nthe performance. It is clear that nobody would expect him to be able to\ngive off-hand an account of his reasons for every sentence of the\ncriticism. But it is obvious that a single phrase in this account may be\nbut the apex of a whole pyramid of memories emanating from the critic's\ntechnical training, his attitude towards the new departure, experiences\nhighly coloured with emotion which a few notes of music may have evoked,\nand his mental condition at the time he heard the performance. Nobody\ndenies that these may have shaped or even determined his criticism. But\nwho believes either that they were all conscious at the time of writing\nthe article, or that he could resuscitate them without much time and\ntrouble and perhaps the help of a cross-examiner?\"\n\nIn addition to the causal, largely emotional, elements might be added a\nprime determinant in artistic appreciation, namely, cosmic suggestion.\nIn the case of a leading critic, overwhelmingly self-confident and\nsecure of his position, the mere knowledge of the consensus of informed\nand uninformed opinion being favourable or otherwise might conceivably\narouse an equally illogical desire to be esoteric and different at all\ncosts. An antagonistic autosuggestion of this sort unconsciously\nunderlying a critic's attitude would more than negative any body of\nopinion in one direction.[74] But if such artificial and diverse\ninfluences can affect the most highly trained and most honest critic,\nhow much more will they affect the credulous and untrained? Far greater\nwill be the power of authoritative opinion in influencing those whose\nemotional sensibility is blunt and untrained, who gape in unresponsive\nperplexity at some artist's canvas, waiting to have the emotions they do\nnot feel suggested to them, and who, when given the lead, infuse by the\npower of association into the meaningless daub or the subtlest motif\nalike the same spirit of satisfaction they derive from the garish\ncrudities which alone, unaided, find a responsive echo in their breasts.\nIt is well known that the less tutored the intellect the more real, as a\nrule, are the creatures of the imagination. Children and savages have a\nwonderful faculty for believing in the reality of their illusions. Does\nnot this account for the fact that the less clearly a thing is\nunderstood the greater is the power of the imagination in supplying a\nmeaning. A certain dimness and mystery or quality of incomprehensibility\ninvariably adds to the respect and awe paid to works of art and their\ncreators, officially labelled as \"great.\" Sometimes mere age or distance\nproduces the requisite dimness. Racine considered this atmosphere of\ndistance a necessary device of stagecraft for the proper presentation of\na hero. \"On peut dire que le respect que l'on a pour les heros augmente\na mesure qu'ils s'eloignent de nous.\"[75] In the same way the intensity\nof horror bestowed upon the arch-villain of the piece is increased in\nproportion to the distance away from which he is regarded; in other\nwords, the less you know about him. But this does not hold good for the\nheroes of the histrionic stage more truly than for the heroes and\narch-villains of the wider stage of the world. The principle can be\napplied equally to the heroes of art, religion, politics or war. It is\nnot, of course, the dimness or distance _per se_ which magnifies the\nobject of appreciation; unaided that would merely have the opposite\neffect. The factor of dimness, by placing the object further from the\ngrasp of _reason_, enables the playwright, politician, or critic, as the\ncase may be, to play with greater ease and certainty upon the emotions\nof his audience, and by force of suggestion to endue his puppet more\ncompletely with the symbolic quality he wishes to present. In spite of\nMedici prints, oleographic processes and the extension of culture which\nrenders any one liable to receive choice samples of the Italian Masters\nfree with a packet of cigarettes, what William Hazlitt said with\nreference to Michael Angelo is still literally true. \"We know,\" he\nwrites, \"nothing of him but his name. It is an abstraction of fame and\ngreatness. Our admiration of him supports itself, and our idea of his\nsuperiority seems self-evident, because it is attached to his name\nonly.\"\n\nConvention is a very real and wellnigh irresistible power. Not a few of\nour most cherished valuations--artistic, religious, political and\nsocial--are conventional fetishes which have been slowly evolved in the\ncourse of a great number of years as the result of determining factors,\nfor the most part accidental and forgotten, and probably called into\nexistence for totally different and unconnected reasons. Yet the\nappropriate emotional reaction, evoked by the association of an object\nwith such a conventional valuation or sentiment, may be just as keenly\nand genuinely felt as though it resulted from the awakening of some\ninstinctive or innate law of our nature. Impressionability is not a\nquality to be despised, but on the contrary to be carefully guarded from\ncontamination. It is by means of emotion that all pleasure and pain, all\naversion and attraction, and all sense of the aesthetic is recorded by\nthe senses. Emotional sensibility may be compared to an instrument that\nmay be so finely made that it is capable of registering the most\ndelicate and exact vibrations so that any harsh sound will injure it,\nwhile, on the other hand, it may be made of a texture so coarse that it\nwill respond instantly and indiscriminately to any loud and crude noise.\nThis instrument has an inherent quality of excellence with a\npotentiality of exactness that may be developed in a great variety of\ndirections.\n\nThe many factors which play a part in aesthetic appreciation have been\nabundantly explored by psychological writers.[76] They have traced the\ngreat variety of ways in which art can be the means of evoking\nsympathetic emotions by connecting its subject with the inexhaustible\ninterest in personality. They have cited the part played in inducing\npleasurable sensations in music by the association of range, depth of\ntone and pitch with the expression of human passions; and in pictorial\nart, the appeal to muscular sensibility by suggested associations with\nmovement and form, or the effect of straight lines and rounded forms in\ninducing sensations of vigour and repose. More obvious are the appeals\nto the sexual instincts. There are also associations that give beauty to\ncolours, pleasurableness to those tints that suggest youth, health,\nvigour and feminine charm.\n\nIt is easy to understand the agreeableness of symbols of strength and\nsolidity; the restfulness of economy in presentation, the pleasing\neffect of contrast and symmetry, variety and unity, of balance and the\nlaws of proportion and musical ratios, or of harmony and regularity. The\nlaws of relativity or comparison and of familiarity and strangeness are\nfactors which play a part in all appreciation. Finally, there is a more\nexclusively intellectual pleasure in the process of analytical valuation\nof artistic production.\n\nWe cannot acquire truth by means of the emotions, which can but be the\nmeans of informing us of our personal relation towards our environment.\nThey may reveal us to ourselves, or may register the reflection of our\nenvironment within us; but the consequences of emotion cannot be\nregarded as ephemeral, for all emotional excitation must have a\npermanent residual effect upon the tone of the subjective mind.\n\n\n(3) JUDGMENT OF ENDS\n\nWithout attempting to catalogue or enumerate the various intellectual\nand mental processes, consigning them to interminable classes and\nsubdivisions of volitional, cognitive, affective and cogitative states\nor acts, labelled like so many distinct specimens in a collector's\nmuseum, it may yet be possible to detach certain features involved in\nthe process of moral judgment which are distinguishable from the\nessentially instinctive, emotional and suggested elements we have been\nconsidering. The danger involved in reducing psychological processes to\ntheir constituent elements and treating of each element as though it\nwere static and dissociated, is that it is apt to obscure a true\nappreciation of the actual manifestations of personality which result\nfrom complex and interactionary elements in continuous motion, forming\none integral whole in constant process of influencing and being\ninfluenced by its environment. The whole is always more and something\ndifferent from the sum of its parts. The factors here specially referred\nto which may determine in greater or lesser degree the nature and\ndirection of moral valuation are deliberative, critical and analytic.\nThese are essentially the intellectual and _objective_[77] processes\nexercised to the best advantage when freed to the greatest possible\nextent from instinctive and emotional complications. Judgments formed\nunder such conditions involve the realization of the ends and effects of\nconduct, and an assignment of \"desirableness\" to those ends. It is clear\nthat an intellectual judgment of this nature, assigning value to the\nends of conduct, must take into account those inherent characteristics\nand instincts which underlie all motives and interests. Thus, we\nrecognize the fact of the instinct of self-preservation, and are right\nin assigning the qualification \"good\" to life as denoting its\ndesirableness; similarly the instinct of acquisition is general and\nfundamental in the human species,[78] we accordingly assign the\nqualification \"good\" to property and wealth, and to its destruction,\n\"evil\"; the abstract value of the end of this instinct is intensified\nand held in greater respect the more it is realized to have been the\nmeans by which the surplus energy of mankind has been utilized to\naccumulate the capital essential to the development of civilization. The\ndesirableness of both life and wealth is also considerably increased or\nmodified by collateral associations, by the pleasures they enable us to\nexperience.\n\nThere is in all judgment of the morality of an action a perception of\nthe end or consequence of that action. The clearness or dimness of the\nperception will depend upon the habits of thought and the organization\nof motives--or lack of it--which result from the native tendencies and\ndevelopment of the subjective mind. The norm of valuation which we apply\nto moral conduct is conditioned by many conscious and unconscious\nfactors which determine our idea of \"desirableness,\" and the standard\nwill approximate to the conventional and common standard of the\ncommunity in so far as we are influenced by our environment--or in\nproportion to our amenability to cosmic suggestion. It is on account of\nthe obvious desire for pleasure and for avoidance of pain that\nUtilitarians are justified in making use of that general fact as a\nstandard of utility. This in no way implies that the motives of all\nconduct are efforts to obtain pleasurable sensation or to avoid pain.\nThe mistake of this discredited doctrine of psychological hedonism lay\nin confusing the motive or impulse to action with the valuation of\nconduct. It is an unfortunate but undeniable fact that conduct is least\noften determined by valuation. Realization or anticipation of the end of\naction is not the necessary stimulus of action, neither does it conform\nto volition or striving; but realization of consequences frequently\ninhibits the fulfilment of volition. Both conduct and volition are\ndetermined by the relation of subject to object, and by the constitution\nof the ego, conditioned, as it is, by the innumerable factors of\nheredity and environment.\n\n\n(4) COSMIC SUGGESTION\n\nPublic opinion is often spoken of as something mysterious and powerful,\nto be recognized and submitted to, but not to be explained. Napoleon is\ncredited with having said: \"Public opinion is a power invisible,\nmysterious, and irresistible.\" Some writers, failing to appreciate the\ntrue significance and nature of this dynamic factor in the formation of\npublic sentiment, are content to fall back on the convenient subterfuge\nof Divine agency as full and sufficient explanation. Thus they speak of\na \"common consciousness\" which is the arbiter of the morals and faiths\nof men, a consciousness which is subject to evolutionary progress, and\nyet owes its existence to Divine revelation.\n\nHowever inadequately, the attempt has nevertheless been made in these\npages to present a wider and, at the same time, a more precise\ndefinition of those psychic and vital forces, included in the term\nenvironment, which play so great a part in the formation and growth of\nhuman beliefs, opinions and sentiments, in binding together nations,\ncommunities and groups, and no less a part in setting them against one\nanother. For lack of a better, the designation \"cosmic suggestion\" has\nbeen used as a generic term to describe the force resulting from the\naccumulative suggestions or impulsions of aggregations of individual\nagents, between whom and the subjects or recipients a state of _rapport_\nis more or less established. It is an aspect, or perhaps more accurately\na product, of the vital energy of the cosmos. In a community or a mass\nof men moved by common emotions and ideas, each individual plays the\ndouble role of operator and affected object or recipient.\n\nThe communication of a proposition by suggestion is distinguished from,\nthough often accompanied by, other means by which ideas are communicated\nthrough the senses, involving rational processes which produce\nconviction. Emotional suggestions are either rejected or accepted\nunquestioningly in the absence of any logical reason. The supreme\nimportance and general applicability in normal waking life of this wider\naspect of hypnotic suggestion is seldom adequately appreciated by\nstudents of social development. That the faiths and convictions of men\ndo not depend upon their appeal to \"man's reasoning faculties\" is,\nhowever, usually admitted. Lecky frequently dwells on this fact, as in\nthe following passage: \"In most men the love of truth is so languid, and\ntheir reluctance to encounter mental prejudices is so great, that they\nyield their judgments without an effort to the current, withdraw their\nminds from all opinions or arguments opposed to their own, and thus\nspeedily convince themselves of the truth of what they wish to believe.\"\n\nDr. McDougall recognizes, as do most modern psychologists, the great\nsocial importance of this \"current\" of which Lecky speaks; he terms it\nmass-suggestion. \"Children,\" he says, \"largely in virtue of their\nsuggestibility, rapidly absorb the knowledge, beliefs, and especially\nthe sentiments of their social environment. But most adults also remain\nsuggestible, especially towards mass-suggestion, and towards the\npropositions which they know to be supported by the whole weight of\nsociety, or by long tradition.\"[79] This also he calls prestige\nsuggestion. Individual suggestibility, he considers, is conditioned by\nnative disposition and character, and dependent upon the relative\nstrengths of the two instincts of self-assertion and subjection. He does\nnot, however, appear to assign to this factor of suggestion any\nconspicuous part in the excitation of such emotions as, for instance,\nanger, moral indignation, shame and remorse. But the simultaneous\nexcitation of the same emotion in crowds is attributed to the action of\nthe gregarious instinct which is accountable for the sympathetic\ninduction of emotion. The explanation given of the fact that the\ninstinctive behaviour of one animal directly excites similar behaviour\non the part of his fellows, consists in the assumption that among\ngregarious animals each of the principal instincts has a special\nperceptual inlet that is adapted to receive the sense-impressions made\nby the expressions of the same instinct in other animals of the same\nspecies: thus, for example, the fear instinct, _inter alia_, has a\nspecial perceptual inlet that renders it excitable by the sound of the\ncry of fear; the instinct of pugnacity is similarly excited through a\nperceptual inlet by the sound of the roar of anger, and so on. Whatever\nthe value of this assumption it is clear that the emotional excitement\nof an aggregation of individuals reacts with cumulative intensity upon\neach member of it. It is sufficient, however, to say that there exists\nin the human species a fundamental impulse of gregarious attraction,\nanalogous in the physical world to the law of gravitation, which tends\nto produce aggregations of men and to intensify their suggestibility in\nrelation to sheer weight of numbers and proximity. If we accept the view\nthat the subjective mind is liable to be directly influenced by other\nsubjective minds with which it is _en rapport_, the hypothesis of\nspecial perceptual inlets, designed for each instinct to receive only\nthe corresponding sense-impressions derived from the efferent action of\nthe same instinct in other individuals, becomes of secondary importance.\nAny cause which simultaneously provokes emotional excitement in a large\nbody of people tends to bring them into _rapport_, thence onwards a\ncommunity of feeling has been established, like elements coalesce,\nforeign elements are dissipated or repulsed, the mass will think, feel\nand act as a collective whole, the impulse or emotion of one will\nre-echo in all, as when a certain note is struck all the chords in the\ninstrument which are attuned to it are set vibrating. A skilful orator\nwho can once succeed in evoking strong emotional response in his\naudience is in the most favourable position for transmitting any\nproposition by suggestion; any assertion is then likely to be received\nunquestioningly and with the strength of conviction, any suggestion to\nbe resolved into action.\n\nAn orator of the ecstatic and fanatical type will endeavour, by working\nhimself into a frenzy of excitement, to throw himself into the\n_subjective_ state, for thus he is in closest _rapport_ with his\nenvironment. This is the secret of the power of demagogues and of other\nworthless and otherwise insignificant individuals. It is said to have\nbeen the method of one of the most extraordinary characters of modern\ntimes--Rasputin, or Grigori Yefimovitsch, a gross, illiterate, debauched\nand fanatical Siberian monk, who, up to the time of his murder in\nDecember 1916, had the reputation of being the most powerful man in\nRussia. According to the few reliable accounts of him that are\nobtainable, the influence of this man's personality and the\nreligio-erotic frenzies which characterized his ministrations were such\nthat women of the highest culture and refinement would prostitute\nthemselves, body and soul, in obedience to his suggestion, ministers and\nhigh state officials habitually sought his favours, and among the masses\nhe was a constant object of idolatry.\n\nDoes any one suppose that if Mark Antony could have circulated his\nfamous speech on the death of Caesar in pamphlet form, or could have\npublished his appeal in a leading daily, he would have chosen that\nmethod? Or if he had done so that he would have attained as striking a\nresult as by the fire of his oratory? This brings us to a consideration\nof the difference between written propaganda and that which is spoken or\nacted and accompanied by emotional suggestion.\n\nThe mere written or printed proposition is assimilated by\nautosuggestion; its aim is to awaken what is already in the reader's\nmind, whether of fear or courage, love or hate, admiration or contempt,\nto make articulate what before was vague and undefined, to associate\nthese qualities in the reader to certain objects or symbols, in this way\ngradually building up sentiments and ideals. But cosmic suggestion or\npsychic environment is a vital influence, capable of overcoming\nresistance and of kindling human passions and emotions. It is often\nasserted that the Press accurately voices public opinion; this, however,\nas all pressmen know, is not true. The Press to a certain extent\napproximates certain sections of public opinion, or more accurately\nadapts itself to it, but all it can truthfully be said to represent is\nthe newspaper proprietors, and in a lesser degree the host of hired\nscribblers whom they employ. At the same time it would be foolish to\nminimize the enormous and ever-increasing power it wields--a power that\nincreases _pari passu_ with the growing power of the masses and\ncorresponding decrease in responsibility and intelligence of their\nchosen rulers. The Press, no longer confining itself to its legitimate\nrole of conveying news, tends more and more to present the appearance of\norganized concerns for the dissemination of lies and counter-lies, and\nthe propagation of hate, envy and humbug, each organ shouting its\nparticular claptrap and catchwords with the frenzied persistence of\nbucket-shop touts. Mr. Hilaire Belloc draws a subtle distinction between\nwhat he calls the \"Capitalist Press,\" or those organs run for mere\nprofit, and a \"Free Press,\" or organs produced for the sole motive of\ninfluencing public opinion, i.e. for propaganda.[80] The former is\nvicious and untruthful, the latter is virtuous and bears witness to the\ntruth. Having once consigned all the existing press organs to their\nrespective categories as \"Capitalist\" or \"Free\" by this simple test of\nmotive, the vice of the one and the virtue of the other are at once\napparent: anything meriting the label \"Capitalist\" is naturally bad and\ndepraved, while sufficient guarantee of the integrity and virtue of the\n\"Free\" Press may be found in the fact that Mr. Belloc himself writes for\nthe \"Free\" Press, and testifies to the fact that it does not pay. While\nso arbitrary a distinction must necessarily appear captious and\nfanciful, and absurd when applied as a test of veracity, we may yet\nperhaps roughly distinguish between those organs which are designed\nprimarily to sell at a maximum profit and those which are sold primarily\nto propagate a \"cause,\" even at a loss. At the risk of appearing\ncynical, we might say that the chief difference between the two lies in\nthe fact that the former is designed to pander to the foibles of its\nreaders, and the latter is the expression of the fanaticism of its\nwriters. As a matter of fact, such a hard and fast distinction can\nseldom be made between the two, since both motives are usually operative\nin the same enterprise, though in varying proportions. But surely it is\nabsurd to claim for either an inherent predisposition to speak the\ntruth. The failure of the \"Free Press\"--the carping rags that imagine\nthemselves independent--would appear to lie in the very fact of their\neagerness to convert. The natural resentment of the man who discerns an\nattempt to convert him was well expressed in a witty speech in the House\nof Commons during a debate on the relations between Press and\nGovernment. What had always attracted him most about Lord Northcliffe,\nsaid the Hon. Member for Stockport, was that he had never pretended to\nbe a philanthropist. He was not one of those pestilent people who\npretended to run newspapers in order that they might leave the world a\nlittle better than they found it.[81]\n\nTradition and the building up of sentiments and ideals, together with\nthe symbols by which they are known and familiarized, are very largely,\nif not exclusively, the work of the written word. But Literature and the\nPress are themselves governed by their past history, and by traditions\nand conventions that have been gradually built up from a few fundamental\nideas, however diversified they may eventually have become; and these\nideas, in their turn, owe their origin to the passions and sentiments of\nthe race as a whole. Even the work of genius has its roots in the ideas\nof the past. \"Are we sure,\" asks a French author, \"that the ideas which\nflow from great men of genius are exclusively their own work? No doubt\nthey always spring from the wealth of individual souls, but the myriads\nof grains of dust which form the alluvion where those ideas have\ngenerated are surely formed by the soul of the nation?\"[82]\n\nWe have seen that it is a fundamental principle that the strongest\nsuggestion must prevail; mass tells against single individuals,\noverwhelming quantity against quality, when the strength of either is\nmeasured against the resistance to be overcome. Cosmic suggestion is\nconditioned by various circumstances which affect its influence. It is a\ncommonplace to say that like attracts like; this fact is but another\nattribute of gregarious attraction and tends towards establishing the\nhomogeneity of aggregations, and slightly modifies the attraction of\nmere numbers. It results in a diversity of centres of attraction; but\nthese centres of attraction are apt to converge and coalesce if for any\nreason they are simultaneously affected by related or identical\nsentiments. Frequency and persistency, as is well known, also modify the\nforce of mere numbers. The loudest and most frequently repeated\naffirmations carry the most weight. In this way small bands of fanatics,\nby dint of reiteration, have had their catchwords and shibboleths\naccepted unquestioningly.\n\nSo far from weakening the respect and awe with which mere symbols are\nregarded, their very obscurity and lack of meaning will ensure their\nposition and inviolability. The vogue for mysticism in poetry, art, and\nreligion reflects this love of symbolism. Men, from the very indolence\nof their minds, love to set up symbols and to worship them, without\nverifying the truths they are supposed to represent, for symbols are\neasily acquired and easily perceived, and dispense with the arduous\nnecessity of probing reality and the mental discipline without which\ntruth cannot be reached.\n\nThe power of words and symbols is entirely independent of their real\nmeaning. As we have already shown, the most meaningless and the most\nobscure phrases are, as a rule, for that very reason the most potent.\nSuch terms as liberty, equality, democracy, socialism, etc., whose\nmeanings are so vague that whole libraries do not exhaust their possible\ninterpretations, are solemnly uttered as though they were magic spells,\nat the very sound of which all problems disappear. Symbolism and\nmysticism form the fanatic's charter of licence. They revel in the dim\nobscurity which intensifies the false brightness of their symbols. They\nwelcome the emotional domination of their minds that they may abandon\nthemselves to passions and feelings, and by developing their\n_subjective_[83] powers, infect the masses with their madness. A true\nmetaphysics, it is well to remember, is the very antithesis of\nmysticism, for it aims at the elimination of symbols; its method is to\nco-ordinate and synthesize, and by means of the systematization of\nmateria to penetrate through and beyond, towards a realization of\ndirection and of value; it tests the highest powers of the intellect.\n\nBergson defines metaphysics as the science which claims to dispense with\nsymbols. A symbol, at best, can only stand for an aspect of the truth, a\nmere sign-post pointing somewhere in its direction. Symbols have no part\nin intuition, yet linguistic symbols are necessary for conveying\nthoughts and ideals to others. The generality of men, however, can only\nthink in symbols, and can only be influenced by them; lies and illusions\nare propagated and perpetrated in the form of images, yet images perform\nnecessary service in establishing goals of endeavour for securing\nco-ordination and moral direction. Symbololatry is a common trait of\nhumanity, and few men analyse the symbols they worship; for this reason\nit is necessary that the ideals and symbols of \"the good\" should be\nforged by the few and the wise, not by the force of the greatest number,\nthat is, they must come from above, not from below. Thus we see that in\npast history religion has performed a necessary function, and that in\nspite of the gross unreality of its symbols it constituted the only\ninstrument of consolidation at the disposal of primitive man. Without\nthis force, born of man's fear of the unknown, his ignorance and false\nappreciation of causality, together with a vague realization of his\ndependence on his fellows, the imposition of rough and arbitrary values,\nwhich first constituted moral conduct, would have been impossible. For\nthis reason any advancement and progress in the direction of\ncivilization would have been impossible without religion. The\nconservative spirit of religion is seen to have been the means of\nsecuring the consolidation and stability of society which was necessary\nfor the well-being and strength of every community; without this it\ncould not have survived. As long as men are dazzled by symbols and\ngoverned by emotions, and there is at present no sign of change in this\nrespect, a strong hierarchy capable of evoking respect for its values\nalone can save a state from disintegration, anarchy and social decay;\nbut only if that hierarchy is composed of the highest, noblest and most\nenlightened in the race can those values be the best possible, and can\nthey continue to improve _pari passu_ with advancing civilization. The\nalternative, the increasing despotism of the many, articulating through\nthe voice of demagogues, resulting in the gradual extermination of the\nfew and the highest, and in the imposition of values growing ever more\nfalse, points the way to decadence and barbarism. Evolution implies\ndecline no less than advancement, and the \"survival of the fittest\" in\nthe former case means the survival of the lowest and the most degraded.\n\nA child's moral conduct, like primitive man's, is at first absolutely\ndependent upon his environment, but with the development of\nself-consciousness and with the growth of an ideal of self, his values\nand his conduct become progressively freer from his present environment,\nand in a greater degree determined by the direction of past habits and\nthe force of early impressions.[84] \"There is hardly anything,\" said\nMill, \"so absurd or so mischievous that it may not by the use of\nexternal sanctions and the force of early impressions be made to act on\nthe human mind with all the authority of conscience.\"\n\nThe attainment of character through the development of an ideal of self\nand the systematization of habits and motives is a slow and gradual\nprocess, and only rarely is complete independence of judgment attained,\nwhich alone renders the highest form of moral conduct possible, when all\nconduct is determined by will with regard to the realization of ends.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[64] \"Heredity and Memory,\" p. 15.\n\n[65] Processes known technically as palingenesis and cenogenesis, the\nformer term denoting the more complete epitomized development.\n\n[66] Dean Rashdall, who thus summarizes his position, is candid enough\nto admit the strength of McDougall's psychological analysis, which,\nhowever, he fails to see undermines his own position.\n\n[67] \"Principles of Psychology,\" vol. ii, p. 408.\n\n[68] Many authorities deny that women are more easily hypnotized than\nmen. It should, however, be remembered that emotional suggestibility\ndoes not correspond with susceptibility to hypnotic influence. The\nneurotic, weak-brained and hysterical, who are usually most susceptible\nto emotional suggestions in normal life, are invariably the most\ndifficult to hypnotize, and on the other hand, as Dr. Bramwell points\nout, \"Subjects who readily respond to suggestions when hypnotized are\nfrequently the very ones who have for years resisted suggestion in the\nwaking condition, even when this has been associated with emotional\nstates.\" It is not, therefore, in hypnotic phenomena that evidence of\nthe greater suggestibility of women is found.\n\n[69] Cf. the following passage by Elliot Smith and Pear: \"It must be\nunderstood that this suppression of the external manifestations of an\nemotion such as fear is but a partial dominance of the bodily\nconcomitants of that emotion. The only changes which can usually be\ncontrolled by the will are those of the voluntary or skeletal muscular\nsystem, not those of the involuntary or visceral mechanism.... Men may\nfeel intense emotions, obviously not of fear alone, for a long time\nwithout displaying any signs of them. But suppression of emotion is a\nvery exhausting process. As Bacon says: 'We know diseases of stoppings\nand suffocations are the most dangerous in the body: and it is not\notherwise in the mind.'\"\n\n[70] Article on Psychology, _Encyclopaedia Britannica_, 10th edition.\n\n[71] For example, ereutophobia (fear of blushing) and tremophobia (fear\nof tremor) are abnormal psychoneurotic conditions which illustrate the\nreaction and interaction between psychical state and physical\nmanifestation. Blushing and spontaneous tremor are reflex manifestations\nof the emotional condition, which in these cases increase in proportion\nto the fear of blushing or of tremor respectively. The physical\nphenomenon produces the obsession which, in its turn, increases the\nsomatic reaction; the exaggeration of the latter again reacts on the\nmental disorder. Such psycho-physical reactions operate in varying\ndegree in all states of emotional excitement. (Roussy and Lhermitte.)\n\n[72] \"Principles of Psychology,\" vol. ii, chap. xxv.\n\n[73] \"Conflict\" and \"repression\" are the terms in current usage by\npsychiatrists of the Freudian school to explain the mechanism of\npsychoneurotic disturbance.\n\n[74] It should be noted that this is an inverted form of cosmic\nsuggestion which exerts a considerable influence over certain\ndispositions; very often this bias is confined to one or two subjects\nonly in which an individual is particularly interested, and in connexion\nwith which a permanently repellent autosuggestion is developed. Some\nwriters have spoken of this as _contra-suggestion_. On these subjects\nany suggestion conveyed by word or sign provokes an immediate and\nunthinking contradiction or an unreasoning hostile attitude or tendency.\n\n[75] Preface a \"Bajazet.\"\n\n[76] The aesthetic emotions are dealt with at length by Dr. Bain in \"The\nEmotions and the Will,\" chap. xiv.\n\n[77] I.e. processes of the conscious or objective mind.\n\n[78] There are a few notable exceptions where this instinct appears to\nbe deficient among primitive and nomadic tribes. McDougall instances the\nPunaris of Borneo.\n\n[79] \"Social Psychology,\" p. 100.\n\n[80] \"The Free Press,\" 1918.\n\n[81] Mr. Hughes, March 11, 1918.\n\n[82] Gustave Le Bon.\n\n[83] I.e. powers of the subjective mind.\n\n[84] Thus Mr. Jevons says: \"The consciousness of the child reproduces\nthe consciousness of the community to which he belongs.\"--\"The Idea of\nGod in Early Religions.\"\n\n\nPRINTED AT THE COMPLETE PRESS\nWEST NORWOOD\nLONDON, S.E.","title":"Conscience & Fanaticism: An Essay on Moral Values","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":28847}