{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_58169/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_58169","id":"gutenberg_58169","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/58169","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Medieval/Middle Ages","Category: History - Modern (1750+)","Category: History - Religious","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Philosophy -- History"],"text":"Produced by Fritz Ohrenschall and the Online Distributed\nProofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net, with thanks to\nGiovanni Fini\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n HEGEL\u2019S LECTURES ON THE\n HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY\n\n VOLUME THREE\n\n Hegel\u2019s Lectures on\n\n THE HISTORY OF\n\n PHILOSOPHY\n\n _Translated from the German by_\n\n E. S. HALDANE\n _and_\n FRANCES H. SIMSON, M.A.\n\n _In three volumes_\n\n VOLUME THREE\n\n [Illustration]\n\n ROUTLEDGE & KEGAN PAUL LTD\n Broadway House, 68-74 Carter Lane\n London, E.C.4\n\n\n\n\n _First published in England 1896\n by Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd\n Reprinted 1955\n by Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd\n Broadway House, 68-74 Carter Lane\n London, E.C.4_\n\n _Reprinted by lithography in Great Britain by\n Jarrold and Sons Limited, Norwich_\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n PART TWO\n\n PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE AGES\n\n PAGE\n\n INTRODUCTION 1\n\n 1. The Idea of Christianity 1\n\n 2. The Fathers and Heterodoxies 10\n\n 3. Church and State 23\n\n\n SECTION ONE\n\n ARABIAN PHILOSOPHY 26\n\n A. The Philosophy of the Medabberim 30\n\n B. Commentators of Aristotle 34\n\n C. Jewish Philosophers: Moses Maimonides 35\n\n\n SECTION TWO\n\n THE SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY 37\n\n A. Relationship of the Scholastic Philosophy to Christianity 45\n\n B. General Historical Points of View 60\n\n 1. The Building up of Dogmas on Metaphysical Grounds 61\n _a._ Anselm 61\n _b._ Abelard 67\n\n 2. Methodical Representation of the Doctrinal System of the\n Church 68\n _a._ Peter Lombard 69\n _b._ Thomas Aquinas 71\n _c._ John Duns Scotus 72\n\n 3. Acquaintanceship with Aristotelian Writings 73\n _a._ Alexander of Hales 73\n _b._ Albertus Magnus 75\n\n 4. Opposition between Realism and Nominalism 77\n _a._ Roscelinus 78\n _b._ Walter of Mortagne 80\n _c._ William Occam 82\n _d._ Buridan 85\n\n 5. Formal Dialectic 86\n _a._ Julian, Archbishop of Toledo 87\n _b._ Paschasius Radbertus 88\n\n 6. Mystics 91\n _a._ John Charlier 91\n _b._ Raymundus of Sabunde 91\n _c._ Roger Bacon 92\n _d._ Raymundus Lullus 92\n\n C. General Standpoint of the Scholastics 94\n\n\n SECTION THREE\n\n REVIVAL OF THE SCIENCES 108\n\n A. Study of the Ancients 109\n\n 1. Pomponatius 111\n\n 2. Bessarion, Ficinus, Picus 112\n\n 3. Gassendi, Lipsius, Reuchlin, Helmont 112\n\n 4. Ciceronian Popular Philosophy 113\n\n B. Certain Attempts in Philosophy 115\n\n 1. Cardanus 116\n\n 2. Campanella 119\n\n 3. Bruno 119\n\n 4. Vanini 137\n\n 5. Petrus Ramus 143\n\n C. The Reformation 146\n\n\n PART THREE\n\n MODERN PHILOSOPHY\n\n INTRODUCTION 157\n\n\n SECTION ONE\n\n MODERN PHILOSOPHY IN ITS FIRST STATEMENT 170\n\n A. Bacon 170\n\n B. Jacob Boehme 188\n\n\n SECTION TWO\n\n PERIOD OF THE THINKING UNDERSTANDING 217\n\n CHAPTER I.\u2014THE METAPHYSICS OF THE UNDERSTANDING 220\n\n A. First Division 220\n\n 1. Descartes 220\n\n 2. Spinoza 252\n\n 3. Malebranche 290\n\n B. Second Division 295\n\n 1. Locke 295\n\n 2. Hugo Grotius 313\n\n 3. Thomas Hobbes 315\n\n 4. Cudworth, Clarke, Wollaston 319\n\n 5. Puffendorf 321\n\n 6. Newton 322\n\n C. Third Division 325\n\n 1. Leibnitz 325\n\n 2. Wolff 348\n\n 3. German Popular Philosophy 356\n\n CHAPTER II.\u2014TRANSITION PERIOD 360\n\n A. Idealism and Scepticism 363\n\n 1. Berkeley 364\n\n 2. Hume 369\n\n B. Scottish Philosophy 375\n\n 1. Thomas Reid 376\n\n 2. James Beattie 377\n\n 3. James Oswald 377\n\n 4. Dugald Stewart 378\n\n C. French Philosophy 379\n\n 1. The Negative Aspect 388\n\n 2. The Positive Aspect 392\n _a._ Materialism 393\n _b._ Robinet 394\n\n 3. Idea of a Concrete Universal Unity 397\n _a._ Opposition between Sensation and Thought 398\n _b._ Montesquieu 399\n _c._ Helvetius 400\n _d._ Rousseau 400\n\n D. The German Illumination 403\n\n\n SECTION THREE\n\n RECENT GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 409\n\n A. Jacobi 410\n\n B. Kant 423\n\n C. Fichte 479\n\n 1. The First Principles of Fichte\u2019s Philosophy 481\n\n 2. Fichte\u2019s System in a Re-constituted Form 505\n\n 3. The More Important of the Followers of Fichte 506\n _a._ Friedrich von Schlegel 507\n _b._ Schleiermacher 508\n _c._ Novalis 510\n _d._ Fries, Bouterweck, Krug 510\n\n D. Schelling 512\n\n E. Final Result 545\n\n INDEX 555\n\n CORRIGENDA IN VOLS. I. AND II. 570\n\n\n\n\nPART TWO\n\nPHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE AGES\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\nThe first period embraces a space of one thousand years\u2014from Thales, 550\nB.C., to Proclus, who died 485 A.D., and until the disappearance of pagan\nphilosophy as an outward institution, 529 A.D. The second period extends\nto the sixteenth century, and thus again embraces a thousand years, to\npass over which we must provide ourselves with seven-leagued boots. While\nPhilosophy has hitherto found its place in the religion of the heathen,\nfrom this time on it has its sphere within the Christian world; for\nArabians and Jews have only to be noticed in an external and historic way.\n\n1. Through the Neo-Platonic philosophy we have come into quite familiar\nacquaintance with the Idea of Christianity, as the new religion which\nhas entered into the world. For the Neo-Platonic philosophy has as its\nessential principle the fact that the Absolute is determined as spirit in\na concrete way, that God is not a mere conception. Although the Absolute\nis Thought, it must, in order to be true, be concrete in itself and not\nabstract; in what we have just seen we have, then, the first appearance\nof the absolutely existent spirit. But in spite of their profound and\ntrue speculation, the Neo-Platonists still had not proved their doctrine\nthat the Trinity is the truth, for there is lacking to it the form of\ninward necessity. The Neo-Platonists begin from the One that determines\nitself, that sets a limit to itself from which the determinate proceeds;\nthis, however, is itself an immediate method of presentation, and it is\nthis that makes such philosophers as Plotinus and Proclus so tiresome.\nUndoubtedly dialectic considerations enter in, in which the opposites\nwhich are conceived as absolute are shown to be null; but this dialectic\nis not methodical, but occurs only disconnectedly. The principle of\nretroversion and comprehension found with the Neo-Platonists is that\nof substantiality generally, but because subjectivity is lacking, this\nidea of Spirit is deficient in one moment, the moment of actuality, of\nthe point which draws all moments into one, and which thereby becomes\nimmediate unity, universality, and Being. To them spirit is thus not\nindividual spirit; and this deficiency is made good through Christianity,\nin which spirit is found as actual, present spirit, immediately existent\nin the world here and now, and the absolute spirit is known in the\nimmediate present as man.\n\nIn order to grasp and apply the Idea of Christianity, the philosophic\nIdea of which we have already spoken in connection with the\nNeo-Platonists must have been comprehended for itself; but within\nChristianity the basis of Philosophy is that in man has sprung up the\nconsciousness of the truth, or of spirit in and for itself, and then\nthat man requires to participate in this truth. Man must be qualified\nto have this truth present to him; he must further be convinced of this\npossibility. This is the absolute demand and necessity; the consciousness\nmust be arrived at that this alone is true. The first point of interest\nin the Christian religion thus is that the content of the Idea should\nbe revealed to man; more particularly that the unity of the divine\nand human nature should come to the consciousness of man, and that,\nindeed, on the one hand as an implicitly existent unity, and, on the\nother, in actuality as worship. The Christian life signifies that the\nculminating point of subjectivity is made familiar with this conception,\nthe individual himself is laid claim to, is made worthy of attaining on\nhis own account to this unity, which is to make himself worthy of the\nSpirit of God\u2014Grace, as it is called\u2014dwelling in him. Hence the doctrine\nof reconciliation is that God is known as reconciling Himself with the\nworld, _i.e._ as we have seen in the Neo-Platonic philosophy, that He\nparticularizes Himself and does not remain abstract. Not external nature\nalone, but the whole world pertains to the particular; above all must\nhuman individuality know itself in God. The interest of the subject\nis itself involved, and here it plays an essential r\u00f4le in order that\nGod may be realized and may realize Himself in the consciousness of\nindividuals who are spirit and implicitly free. Thus through the process\nthese accomplish that reconciliation in themselves, actualize their\nfreedom; that is to say, they attain to the consciousness of heaven upon\nearth, the elevation of man to God. Thus the true intellectual world\nis not a beyond, but the so-called finite is an element in it, and no\ndivision exists between this side and that. The real concrete in regard\nto the absolute Idea is the knowing of the mundane, the \u2018other\u2019 in God,\nas implicitly divine, as universal, as the world of intellect, as having\nits root in God, but only the root. In God man is accepted only in his\ntruth, and not in his immediacy, and thus this doctrine is not what we\ncall Pantheism, for that leaves the immediate just as it is. Man then\nhas himself to accomplish the process of reconciliation in himself in\norder to attain to his truth. We have thus seen that man possesses the\ndetermination and attributes of God as the first begotten son, Adam\nKadmon, the first man; we may call this unity the concrete Idea, which,\nhowever, is still only implicit.\n\nBut the fact that because man is capable of the divine, the identity of\nthe divine and human nature must likewise be present for him, has in an\nimmediate way become known to him in Christ, as one in whom the divine\nand human nature are implicitly one. In the world what has come to pass\nis that the Absolute has been revealed as the concrete, and, further, not\nonly in thought in a general way as intelligible world, but because it\nhas in itself proceeded to its ultimate point of intensity. Thus it is\nan actual self, an \u201cI,\u201d the absolute universal, the concrete universal,\nthat is God; and also the absolute opposite of this determination, the\nclearly finite as it exists in space and time, but this finite determined\nin unity with the eternal as self. The Absolute comprehended as concrete,\nthe unity of these two absolutely different determinations, is the\ntrue God; each of them is abstract, and either of them taken by itself\nis thus not the true God. The fact that the concrete is thus known to\nmen in this perfection as God, brings about the whole revolution that\nhas taken place in the world\u2019s history. The Trinity is thereby not\nonly present in conception, which would not yet constitute the perfect\nconcrete, but actuality is perfectly united to it. In the consciousness\nof the world it has consequently broken in upon men that the Absolute has\nattained to this \u201cculminating point\u201d of immediate actuality, as Proclus\nsays; and that is the manifestation of Christianity. The Greeks were\nanthropomorphic, their gods were humanly constituted; but the deficiency\nin them is that they were not anthropomorphic enough. Or rather the Greek\nreligion is on the one hand too much, and, on the other hand, too little\nanthropomorphic\u2014too much, because immediate qualities, forms, actions,\nare taken up into the divine; too little, because man is not divine as\nman, but only as a far-away form and not as \u2018this,\u2019 and subjective man.\n\nThus man reaches this truth, because for him it becomes a sure intuition\nthat in Christ the \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 has become Flesh. We thus first have man\nthrough this process attaining to spirituality, and in the second place\nwe have man as Christ, in whom this original identity of both natures\nis known. Now since man really is this process of being the negation of\nthe immediate, and from this negation attaining to himself\u2014to a unity\nwith God\u2014he must consequently renounce his natural will, knowledge,\nand existence. This giving up of his natural existence is witnessed in\nChrist\u2019s sufferings and death, and in His resurrection and elevation to\nthe right hand of the Father. Christ became a perfect man, endured the\nlot of all men, death; as man He suffered, sacrificed Himself, gave up\nHis natural existence, and thereby elevated Himself above it. In Him\nthis process, this conversion of His other-being into spirit, and the\nnecessity of pain in the renunciation of the natural man is witnessed;\nbut this pain, the pain of feeling that God Himself is dead, is the\nstarting point of holiness and of elevation to God. Thus what must come\nto pass in the subject\u2014this process, this conversion of the finite\u2014is\nknown as implicitly accomplished in Christ. This constitutes the great\nleading Idea of Christianity.\n\nFrom what has been said it follows, in the second place, that the world\nmust not be left in its immediate naturalness. The original, implicitly\nexistent, is found only in the strictest conception of mind, or as its\ndetermination: immediately, man is only a living being, who has indeed\nthe capacity to become actual spirit\u2014but spirit does not pertain to\nnature. Man is thus not by nature this particular in which the spirit\nof God lives and dwells: man is not by nature what he ought to be. The\nanimal is by nature what it ought to be. But what has to be noticed in\nthis respect is that natural things merely remain in their implicit\nNotion, or their truth does not enter into their sensuous life, for this\ntheir natural individuality is only a fleeting fact that cannot look back\non itself. The misfortune in natural things is that they get no further,\nthat their essential nature is not for itself and independent; from this\nit follows that they do not attain to infinitude, to liberation from\ntheir immediate individuality, _i.e._ they do not attain to freedom, but\nonly remain in the necessity which is the connection of the \u201cone\u201d with an\n\u201cother,\u201d so that when this other unites itself to natural things, these\nlast perish because they cannot bear the contradiction. But because the\ntruth exists for man as consciousness, and in it he has the qualities\nnecessary for freedom, he is capable of perceiving the Absolute, of\nplacing himself in a relation to the same, and having knowledge as an\nend; and the liberation of mind depends on the fact that consciousness\ndoes not remain in its natural condition, but becomes spiritual, _i.e._\nthat for it the eternal, that is the reconciliation of the finite as this\nsubject with the infinite, exists. Thus consciousness does not signify\nremaining in the sphere of nature, but the existence of the process\nwhereby the universal becomes object or end to man. Man makes himself\ndivine, but in a spiritual, that is to say not in an immediate way. In\nthe ancient religions the divine is also united to the natural or human;\nbut this unity is no reconciliation, but an immediate, undeveloped, and\nthus unspiritual unity, just because it is merely natural. But because\nmind is not natural but only that into which it makes itself, the\nspiritual is first met with in this very process of producing unity. To\nthis spiritual unity pertains the negation of nature, of the flesh, as\nthat in which man must not rest; for nature is from the beginning evil.\nMan is likewise naturally evil, for all the wickedness that man does\nproceeds from a natural desire. Now because man is in himself the image\nof God, but in existence is only natural, that which is implicit must be\nevolved, while the first natural condition must be abrogated. So much the\nmore is it true that man first becomes spiritual, and attains to truth\nthrough rising above the natural, inasmuch as God Himself is a spirit\nonly in that He transformed the hidden unity into the other of Himself,\nin order from this other to turn back again into Himself.\n\nNow the fact that this is given as, or asserted to be the fundamental\nIdea of Christianity, implies on the one hand an historic question;\nat different times this idea has been grasped in different ways, and\nnow, for example, men again have their particular conceptions of it. In\norder to bring about the conclusion that this is the historic idea of\nChristianity, we should have to enter upon an historic disquisition;\nbut because we cannot deal with this here, we must accept it as an\nhistoric axiom. On the other hand, in so far as this question falls\nwithin the history of Philosophy, the assertion that this is the idea\nof Christianity has another ground to stand on than that of history,\nand this constitutes the third point of interest. In connection with\nthe preceding forms it has been shown that this Idea of Christianity\nmust have now come forth, and indeed become the universal consciousness\nof the nations. The fact that it has come forth as the world-religion,\nis the content of history; it is this necessity in the Idea which has\nto be expounded more clearly in the philosophy of history. To this end\nthe conception of mind must be made fundamental, and it must now be\nshown that history is the process of mind itself, the revelation of\nitself from its first superficial, enshrouded consciousness, and the\nattainment of this standpoint of its free self-consciousness, in order\nthat the absolute command of mind, \u201cKnow thyself,\u201d may be fulfilled. The\nrecognition of this necessity has been called the _\u00e0 priori_ construction\nof history; there is no good in decrying it as inadmissible, and indeed\nas arrogant. The development of history may be represented as contingent.\nOr, if the providence and government of God are seriously accepted,\nthese are represented as though Christianity were so to speak ready made\nin the mind of God; then, when thrust into the world, it appears to be\ncontingent. But the rationality and likewise the necessity of this decree\nof God\u2019s has now to be considered, and this may be called a theodicy,\na justification of God, _i.e._ a vindication of our Idea. It is a\ndemonstration that, as I have just said, things have happened rationally\nin the world, and it implies the fact that the world-history represents\nthe process of mind partially as the history of mind, which has to be\nreflected into itself in order to come to a consciousness of what it is.\nIt is this which is shown forth in temporal history, and as history,\nindeed, just because mind is the living movement, proceeding from its\nimmediate existence to beget revolutions in the world, as well as in\nindividuals.\n\nSince it is hereby presupposed that this Idea must necessarily become\nuniversal religion, there is, in the fourth place, present in it the\nsource of a method of knowledge proper to the particular consciousness.\nThat is to say, the new religion has made the intelligible world of\nPhilosophy the world of common consciousness. Tertullian hence says:\n\u201cEven children in our day have a knowledge of God, which the wisest\nmen of antiquity alone attained to.\u201d But in order that all may know\nthe truth, this Idea must come to them as an object, not for the\nthinking, philosophic and cultured consciousness, but for the sensuous\nconsciousness which still adheres to uncultured methods of regarding\nthings. If this Idea were not to receive and to retain this form of\noutward consciousness, it would be a philosophy of the Christian\nreligion; for the standpoint of Philosophy is the Idea in the form of\nthe merely universal thought, and not the Idea as it is for the subject\nand directed to the subject. That through which this Idea appears\nas religion, belongs, however, to the history of religion, and this\ndevelopment of its form must here be passed over. Through these forms we\nmust however not mistake the content, much less reject it altogether, for\nwe must rather recognize its presence more completely; the forms must\nlikewise not be held to be absolute, and we must not try to maintain the\ndoctrines in this form alone, as was at one time done by an orthodoxy \u201cof\nstraw.\u201d\n\nOnly one example will here be given. The so-called doctrine of original\nsin implies that our first parents have sinned, that this sin has thus\ndescended to all mankind as an hereditary disorder, and has come upon\nposterity in an external way as something inherent in their nature, which\ndoes not pertain to freedom of the mind, nor has its ground therein.\nThrough this original sin, it is further signified, man has drawn upon\nhimself the wrath of God. Now if these forms be adhered to, we have in\nthe first place there the first parents in time, and not in thought; but\nthe thought of these first parents is none other than man as he is in\nand for himself. What is said of him as such, what every member of the\nhuman race really is in himself, is represented here in the form of the\nfirst man, Adam; and in this first man sin manifests itself as something\ncontingent, or, more particularly, in his allowing himself to be enticed\ninto eating of the apple. But it is again not merely represented that\nhe simply partook of the fruit, but that he ate of the tree of the\nknowledge of good and evil; it is as man that he must partake of it, and\nnot as beast. The fundamental characteristic, however, through which he\ndistinguishes himself from the animal, is the very fact that he knows\nwhat good and evil are. For God likewise says, \u201cBehold, Adam has become\nas one of us, to know good and evil.\u201d But it is only through man\u2019s having\nthe power of thinking that he can make this distinction between good and\nevil; in thought alone is there thus the source of good and evil, but the\nhealing of the evil which is brought about through thought is also there.\nThe second point is that man is by nature evil and transmits the evil.\nOn the other hand, it is said: \u201cWhy should the sinner suffer punishment\nseeing that there is no responsibility for what is inborn in him?\u201d As a\nmatter of fact the statement that man is implicitly or by nature evil\nwould seem to be a hard saying. But if we set aside this hard saying,\nand do not speak of a divine punishment, but make use of milder general\nexpressions, in this idea of original sin the fact remains for us that\nman as he is by nature is not what he ought to be before God, but has\nthe power of becoming explicitly what he only is implicitly; and the fact\nthat this rests in the determination of man as such is represented as\ninheritance. The abrogation of mere naturalness is known to us simply as\neducation, and arises of itself; through education subjection is brought\nabout, and with that a capacity for becoming good is developed. Now if\nthis appears to come to pass very easily, we must recollect that it is of\ninfinite importance that the reconciliation of the world with itself, the\nmaking good, is brought about through the simple method of education.\n\n2. What concerns us now is to make the Principle of Christianity, which\nhas been explained at considerable length, into the principle of the\nworld; the task set before the world is to bring this absolute Idea\nwithin itself, to actualize it in itself, and thereby to reconcile itself\nto God. This task once more falls into three separate divisions.\n\nIn the first place we have the dissemination of the Christian religion\nand the bringing of it within the hearts of men; this, however, lies\noutside the limits of our consideration. The heart signifies the\nsubjective man as \u2018this,\u2019 and through this principle the latter has a\ndifferent position from before; it is essential that this subject should\nbe present. The individual subject is the object of divine grace; each\nsubject, or man as man, has on his own account an infinite value, is\ndestined to partake of this spirit which must, as God, be born within the\nheart of every man. Man is determined for freedom, he is here recognized\nas implicitly free; this freedom is, however, at first only formal,\nbecause it remains within the principle of subjectivity.\n\nThe second point is that the principle of the Christian religion should\nbe worked out for thought, and be taken up into thinking knowledge, and\nrealized in this; and thus that it should attain to reconciliation,\nhaving the divine Idea within itself, and that the riches of thought\nand culture belonging to the philosophic Idea should become united to\nthe Christian principle. For the philosophic Idea is the Idea of God,\nand thought has the absolute right of reconciliation, or the right to\nclaim that the Christian principle should correspond with thought. The\nFathers have rendered the service of thus elaborating the Christian\nreligion in thinking knowledge; but neither have we to consider further\nthis development of the Christian principle, since it belongs to the\nhistory of the Church. We have only here to give the point of view\nadopted regarding the relation of the Fathers to Philosophy. They for\nthe most part lived within the ancient Roman world and in Latin culture,\nthough the Byzantines likewise are included with them. We know that the\nFathers were men of great philosophic culture, and that they introduced\nPhilosophy, and more especially Neo-Platonic philosophy, into the Church;\nin this way they worked out a Christian system by which the first mode\nin which Christianity was manifested in the world was supplemented, for\nsystem was not present in this first manifestation. The Fathers have\ndealt with all questions respecting the nature of God, the freedom of\nman, the relationship to God\u2014who is the objective\u2014the origin of evil,\nand so on; and whatever thought decided regarding these questions was\nby them brought into and incorporated with the Christian system. The\nnature of spirit, the way of salvation, _i.e._ the various stages in the\nspiritualizing of the subject, his growth, the process of spirit, whereby\nit is spirit, the changes it has undergone, they have likewise treated in\nits freedom, and recognized its moments in the depths to which it reaches.\n\nWe may thus describe the attitude of the Christian Fathers, and likewise\nremark that this first philosophic development of the Christian principle\nhas been looked on as a crime on their part, and it has been said that\nthey have thus corrupted the purity of Christianity as originally\nmanifested. We must speak of the nature of this corruption. It is well\nknown that Luther in his Reformation made his aim the bringing of the\nChurch back to the purity of its first estate in the early centuries,\nbut this first condition already shows the fabric of an extensive and\nclosely interwoven system, an elaborate tissue of doctrines regarding\nwhat God is and what is man\u2019s relation to Him. Hence at the time of the\nReformation no particular system was built up, but what was originally\nthere was purified from later additions; it is a complicated erection,\nin which the most intricate pieces of workmanship are to be found. In\nmodern times this elaborately woven system has been entirely pulled to\npieces, because men have wished to bring Christianity back to the simple\nlines of the Word of God as found in the writings of the New Testament.\nMen have likewise given up the propagation of the system, the doctrine\nof Christianity as determined through the Idea and by the Idea, and have\nreturned to the manner of its first appearance (and that, indeed, in\neclectic fashion, and having regard to what will fit in with their own\nnotions), so that now only the original Gospel narrative is regarded as\nforming the basis of Christianity. As regards the title of Philosophy and\nthe Fathers to bring Philosophy into Christianity we have the following\nremarks to make.\n\nModern Theology on the one hand derives its formulas from the words of\nthe Bible, which are made to form their basis, so that the whole business\nof the individual, as regards his thoughts and his conceptions, is merely\nexegetical; religion must be retained in its positive form, and thus it\nis from something received and given, something most evidently externally\nposited and revealed, that a beginning must be made. These words and\nthis text are, however, of a nature such that they allow full latitude\nto the will of the interpreter; hence the other side is also present, or\nthe application of the Bible saying: \u201cThe letter killeth, but the spirit\ngiveth life.\u201d This must be assented to, and the spirit means none else\nthan the power which dwells within those who apply themselves to the\nletter in order that they may spiritually apprehend and animate it. This\nsignifies that it is the conceptions which we bring along with us which\nhave in the letter to give efficacy to themselves. Now these reflections\nbrought along with us may be grasped by the most ordinary human\nunderstanding, which is what is indicated in modern times when we say\nthat dogmas must be popular. In that way the right to act upon the letter\nwith the spirit is assumed, _i.e._ the right to approach it with our\nindividual judgment; but to the Fathers this is forbidden. They did act\nupon it with the Spirit; and it is expressly said that the Spirit dwells\nwithin the Church, directs, teaches, and illuminates it. The Fathers\nhave hence a similar right to relate themselves with the Spirit to the\npositive, to what is given by the senses. Only it will depend absolutely\nupon what the nature of the Spirit is, for spirits are very different.\n\nThe assertion that the spirit must give life to the mere letter is\ncertainly more definitely stated as that spirit has only to expound what\nis given, _i.e._ it must leave the actual sense of what is immediately\ncontained in the words. We must, however, be far behind in culture if we\ndo not see the fallacy in the attitude here adopted. To expound without\nthe individual spirit, as though the sense were one entirely given, is\nimpossible. To elucidate signifies to make clear, and it must be made\nclear to me; this can be done by nothing excepting what was already\npresent in me. It must be in conformity with my subjective judgment,\nthe necessities of my knowledge, of my apprehension, of my heart, &c.;\nthus only is it for me. We find what we look for, and just because I\nmake it clear to myself, I make my conception, my thought, a factor in\nit; otherwise it is a dead and external thing, which is not present for\nme at all. It is hence very difficult to make clear to ourselves those\nforeign religions which lie far below our spiritual needs; but yet they\ntouch a side of my spiritual necessities and standpoints, although it\nis but a dim and sensuous side. Thus when we talk of \u201cmaking clear,\u201d\nwe conceal the real matter in a word; but if this word itself is made\nclear we find nothing in it but the fact that the spirit which is in man\ndesires therein to recognize itself, and that it cannot know anything\nwhich does not rest in him. Thus have men made of the Bible what may be\ncalled a nose of wax. This man finds this thing, the other man that; what\nwas secure now shows itself as insecure, because it is considered by the\nsubjective spirit.\n\nIn this regard the nature of the text describing the method in which the\nfirst manifestation of Christianity took place, must be remarked upon;\nit cannot as yet expressly contain that which rests in the principle of\nChristianity, but only somewhat of an anticipation of what spirit is and\nwill know as true. This also is expressly said in the text itself. Christ\nsays: \u201cIf I depart, I will send the Comforter, the Holy Ghost.... He will\nguide you into all truth,\u201d He\u2014and not Christ\u2019s earthly presence nor His\nspoken words. It was only to be after Him, and after His teaching through\nthe text, that the Spirit was to come into the Apostles, and that they\nwere to become full of the Spirit. It might almost be said that when\nChristianity is carried back to its first appearing, it is brought down\nto the level of unspirituality, for Christ Himself says that the Spirit\nwill not come until He Himself has departed. In the text of the first\nmanifestation of Christianity we, on the other hand, see Christ only as\nthe Messiah, or under the more explicit designation of a mere teacher;\nfor His friends and apostles He is a present man whom they can perceive\nby the senses, and who does not yet hold to them the relationship of\nthe Holy Ghost. His friends have seen Him, heard His doctrine, seen His\nmiracles, and have thereby been brought to believe in Him. But Christ\nHimself sternly rebukes those who demand miracles of Him; if He thus be\nmade as God to man, God in the heart of man, He cannot have a sensuous\nand immediate presence. The Dalai-lama, in the form of a sensuous man, is\nGod to the inhabitants of Thibet, but in the Christian principle, where\nGod dwells in the hearts of men, He cannot be present to them in sensuous\nform.\n\nThe second point then is that the sensuous and present form must\ndisappear, so that it may be taken into the Mnemosyne, into the realm\nof popular conception; then for the first time can the spiritual\nconsciousness, the spiritual relation, enter in. To the question of\nwhither Christ has gone, the answer is given, \u201cHe sits on the right hand\nof God,\u201d which signifies that it is only now that God can be known as\nthis concrete One, as the One who has the other moment, His Son (\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2,\n\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1), in Himself. Thus to know what is the principle of Christianity as\ntruth, the truth of the Idea of spirit must be known as concrete spirit,\nand this is the form peculiar to the Fathers of the Church. With this\nthe idea that the abstractly divine breaks up and has broken up within\nitself, first began to appear. This other moment in the divine must\nnot, however, be grasped in the mode of an intelligible world, or, as\nwe certainly have it in the ordinary conception, of a kingdom of heaven\nwith many angels, who are also finite, limited, thus approaching closer\nto humanity. But it is not sufficient that the concrete moment should be\nknown in God, for the further knowledge is requisite that Christ is an\nactual present man. This moment of Christ\u2019s actual present humanity is of\nimmense importance to Christianity, because it is the union of the most\ntremendous opposites. This higher conception could not have been present\nin the text, in the first manifestation; the greatness of the Idea could\nonly come in later on, after the Spirit had perfected the Idea.\n\nThat the revelation of Christ has this significance is the belief of\nChristians, while the profane, immediate and direct significance of\nthis history is that Christ was a mere prophet and met the fate of\nall the prophets in being misunderstood. But the fact that it has the\nsignificance given by us is known through the Spirit, for the Spirit is\nrevealed in this history. This history is the Notion, the Idea of Spirit\nitself, and the world-history has in it found its end, which is in this\nimmediate way to know the truth. It is therefore the Spirit which so\ncomprehends that history, and at the time of Pentecost this is shown in\nan immediate and evident manner. For before this time the Apostles did\nnot know the infinite significance of Christ; they did not yet know that\nthis is the infinite history of God; they had believed in Him, but not\nyet as seeing in Him this infinite truth.\n\nThis is the truth which the Fathers developed; the general relation of\nthe first Christian Church to Philosophy is hereby given. On the one\nhand, the philosophic Idea has been transplanted into this religion; on\nthe other, this moment in the Idea\u2014according to which the latter breaks\nup within itself into wisdom, the active Logos, the Son of God, &c., but\nyet in so doing remains in universality\u2014has been brought to a culmination\nin subjectivity, and further in the sensuous immediate individuality and\npresent existence of a human individual appearing in time and space.\nThese two elements are essentially intermingled in this Christian system,\nthe Idea itself, and secondly the form as it presents itself through its\nconnection with a single individuality present in time and space. To the\nFathers this history had thus the Idea as its principle; the true Idea\nof the Spirit was consequently to them likewise in the determinate form\nof history. But the Idea was not yet, as such, separated from history;\nbecause the Church thus held to this Idea in historic form, it determined\nthe doctrines. This, then, is the general character of the time.\n\nFrom this Idea as comprehended through the Spirit, many so-called\nheresies arose in the first centuries after Christ. Among such heretics\nmust be included those of the Gnostics who take the Christian literature\nas their basis, but give a spiritual significance to everything therein\npresent. For they did not remain at this historical form of the Idea\nof Spirit, since they interpreted the history and deprived it of its\nhistorical value. The reflections which they introduced are, as we\nhave seen (Vol. II., pp. 396-399), to a greater or less extent such as\nare to be found in the philosophy of the Alexandrians or of Philo. In\nconformity with their principles they adopted a speculative attitude, but\nthey proceeded into extravagances both of the imagination and morality,\nalthough in this dim fantastic region the elements which we found in\nhistory may always be recognized. But the form of immediate existence,\nan essential moment in Christ, is by them etherealized into a universal\nthought, so that the determination of the individual as a \u2018this\u2019\ndisappears. The Docet\u00e6, for example, said that Christ had only a phantom\nbody, a phantom life; yet in such assertions thought still constituted\nthe background. The Gnostics were thus antagonistic to the Western\nChurch, and, like Plotinus and the Neo-Platonists, this last strove hard\nagainst Gnosticism, because it remained in what is general, grasped\nthe conception in the form of imagination, and because this conception\nwas opposed to that of Christ in the Flesh (\u03a7\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c3\u03b1\u03c1\u03ba\u03af).[1] The\nChurch, on the contrary, held to the definite form of personality as the\nprinciple of concrete actuality.\n\nFrom the East other forms of opposition in the principles than those\nwe mentioned in connection with the Gnostics have been introduced,\nnamely, Light and Darkness, Good and Evil. But more particularly has\nthis Parsee opposition emerged in Manich\u00e6ism, in which God, as the\nLight opposes the evil, non-existent (\u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f44\u03bd), the \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7, the material,\nself-annihilating. Evil is that which contains contradiction in itself:\nthe powers of evil (\u1f55\u03bb\u03b7), given over to themselves and raging in blind\nenmity against one another, were met by a gleam from the Kingdom of\nLight and thereby attracted, and this light pacified the powers of\nevil, so as to cause them to cease from strife and unite together in\norder to penetrate into the Kingdom of Light. As an inducement to make\nthem so act, in order to weaken and mitigate their blind fury through a\npower operating irresistibly, and in order to bring about their final\noverthrow, and the universal supremacy of light, of life, of the soul,\nthe Father of Light delivered over one of the powers of good. That is\nthe world-soul (\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74 \u1f01\u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd); it was swallowed up by the material,\nand this intermixture is the basis of the whole creation. Hence the\nsoul is everywhere disseminated, and in the dead husk it is everywhere\nworking and striving in man, the microcosm, as in the universe, the\nmacrocosm, but with unequal power; for where beauty reveals itself,\nthe Light-principle, the soul, obtains the mastery over matter, but in\nthe ugly, the hateful, it is subordinate, and matter is the conqueror.\nThis captive soul Mani likewise called the Son of Man\u2014that is, of the\nprimitive man, the heavenly man, of Adam Kadmon. But only a part of\nthe Light-principle which was destined to strive with the Kingdom of\nEvil is in this manner delivered over; being too weak, it incurred the\ndanger of being vanquished, and had to deliver over to matter a part\nof its armour, this soul. The part of the soul which had not suffered\nthrough such intermingling with matter, but had raised itself freely to\nheaven, works from above for the purification of the imprisoned souls,\nits kindred portions of light; and that is Jesus, the Son of Man, in so\nfar as he has not suffered (\u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u03ae\u03c2), as distinguished from the suffering\nSon of Man, the soul confined within the universe. But that delivering\nsoul remains in the second and visible light which is still distinguished\nfrom the first and unapproachable, having its seat there, and by means\nof sun and moon exercising influence in the purification of nature. To\nMani the whole course of the physical as of the spiritual world appears\nas a process of purification by means of this soul. The captive principle\nof Light required to be raised from the cycle of metempsychosis to an\nimmediate re-union with the Kingdom of Light. Hence the pure heavenly\nsoul came down to earth and appeared in the semblance of human form\nin order to reach to the suffering soul (to the \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2 of\nAristotle?) a helping hand. The Manich\u00e6ans also express themselves to\nthe effect that God, the Good, goes forth, illumines, and thus produces\nan intelligible world. What comes third is Spirit as turning round,\nestablishing the unity of the second and first, and experiencing feeling,\nand this feeling is Love. This heresy fully recognizes the Idea, but\ndoes away with the form of individual existence in which the Idea is\npresented in the Christian religion. The crucifixion of Christ is\nconsequently taken as merely a semblance, as allegorical only, simply an\nimage. That merely phantom crucifixion of the non-suffering Jesus, the\nfellow-suffering, only imaginary certainly, of the soul unmingled with\nmatter, shows forth the actual suffering of the captive soul. Thus as\nthe forces of Darkness could exercise no power over Christ, they must\nalso show themselves powerless over the soul allied thereto. With the\nManich\u00e6ans originates the conception of a Jesus who is crucified in all\nthe world and in the soul; the crucifixion of Christ thus mystically\nsignifies only the wounds of our suffering souls. Through vegetation the\nparticles of light were held fast, and thus held fast they were brought\nforth as plants. The earth becoming fruitful brings forth the suffering\n(_patibilis_) Jesus, who is the life and salvation of men and is\ncrucified on every tree. The \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 which appeared in Jesus signifies all\nthings.[2] The Church has likewise made a principal point of asserting\nthe unity of the divine and human nature. But because this unity in the\nChristian religion attained to conceiving consciousness, human nature was\nin its actuality taken as \u2018this,\u2019 and not merely in an allegorical or\nphilosophic sense.\n\nNow if, on the one hand, the essential matter with the orthodox Fathers\nwho opposed themselves to these Gnostic speculations, is the fact that\nthey held firmly to the definite form of an objectively conceived Christ,\non the other hand they attacked the Arians and all that pertain to them;\nfor these recognize the individual as manifested, but do not place the\nPerson of Christ in connection with the separation, with the breaking\nup of the divine Idea. They took Christ to be a man, accorded to Him\nindeed a higher nature, not, however, making Him a moment of God, of\nSpirit itself. The Arians did not indeed go so far as the Socinians,\nwho accepted Christ merely as a man of noble nature, a teacher, and\nso on; this sect hence did not form part of the Church at all, being\nsimply heathen. But still the Arians, since they did not recognize God\nin Christ, did away with the idea of the Trinity, and consequently with\nthe principle of all speculative philosophy. The according to Him of a\nhigher nature is likewise a hollow mockery which cannot satisfy us; as\nagainst this the Fathers accordingly asserted the unity of the divine\nand human nature, which has come to consciousness in the individual\nmembers of the Church, and this is a point of fundamental importance.\nThe Pelagians again, denied original sin, and maintained that man has by\nnature sufficient virtue and religion. But man should not be what he is\nby nature; he should be spiritual. And thus this doctrine is likewise\nexcluded as heretical. Therefore the Church was ruled by Spirit, to\nenable it to hold to the determinations of the Idea, though always in\nthe historic form. This is the philosophy of the Fathers; they produced\nthe Church, as the developed Spirit required a developed doctrine, and\nnothing is so out of place as the endeavour or desire of some men of the\npresent day to lead the Church back to her original form.\n\nWhat follows thirdly is that the Idea permeates reality, is immanent\ntherein, that not only is there a multitude of believing hearts, but that\nfrom the heart, just as the natural law rules over a sensuous world, a\nhigher life of the world, a kingdom, is constituted\u2014the reconciliation\nof God with Himself is accomplished in the world, and not as a heavenly\nkingdom that is beyond. This community is the kingdom of God upon earth\nin the Church; \u201cWhere two or three are gathered together in my name,\u201d\nsays Christ, \u201cthere am I in the midst of them.\u201d The Idea is only for\nspirit, for subjective consciousness, in so far as it realizes itself\nin actuality, and thus it not only has to bring itself to perfection\nin the heart, but has to perfect itself also into a kingdom of actual\nconsciousness. The Idea which man, self-consciousness, should recognize,\nmust become altogether objective to him, so that he may truly apprehend\nhimself as spirit and the Spirit, and then that he may be spiritual in\na spiritual, and not in an emotional way. The first objectification\nis found in the first immediate consciousness of the Idea, where it\nappeared as an individual object, as the individual existence of a man.\nThe second objectivity is the spiritual worship and communion extended\nto the Church. We might imagine a universal community of Love, a world\nof piety and holiness, a world of brotherly kindness, of innocent little\nlambs and pretty triflings with things spiritual, a divine republic, a\nheaven upon earth. But this is not supposed to come to pass on earth;\nthat imagination is relegated to heaven, _i.e._ to some other place,\nthat is to say, it is put off until death. Each living actuality directs\nhis feelings, actions, and affairs in a very different way from this.\nOn the appearance of Christianity it is first of all said: \u201cMy kingdom\nis not of this world;\u201d but the realization has and ought to be in the\npresent world. In other words the laws, customs, constitutions, and\nall that belongs to the actuality of spiritual consciousness should be\nrational. The kingdom of rational actuality is quite a different one, and\nmust be organized and developed thinkingly and with understanding; the\nmoment of the self-conscious freedom of the individual must maintain its\nrights against objective truth and objective command. This, then, is the\ntrue and actual objectivity of mind in the form of an actual temporal\nexistence as state, just as Philosophy is the objectivity of thought\nwhich comes to us in the form of universality. Such objectivity cannot be\nin the beginning, but must come forth after being worked upon by mind and\nthought.\n\nIn Christianity these absolute claims of the intellectual world and of\nspirit had become the universal consciousness. Christianity proceeded\nfrom Judaism, from self-conscious abjectness and depression. This feeling\nof nothingness has from the beginning characterized the Jews; a sense of\ndesolation, an abjectness where no reason was, has possession of their\nlife and consciousness. This single point has later on, and in its proper\ntime, become a matter of universal history, and into this element of the\nnullity of actuality the whole world has raised itself, passing out of\nthis principle indeed, but also into the kingdom of Thought, because that\nnothingness has transformed itself into what is positively reconciled.\nThis is a second creation which came to pass after the first; in it Mind\nbecame aware of itself as I = I, that is, as self-consciousness. This\nsecond creation has first of all appeared in self-consciousness equally\ndirectly in the form of a sensuous world, in the form of a sensuous\nconsciousness. As much of the Notion as has entered in was adopted by the\nFathers from the philosophers already mentioned; their Trinity, in so far\nas a rational thought, and not a mere ordinary conception, comes from\nthese, and certain other ideas also. But what mainly distinguishes them\nis the fact that for the Christian this intelligible world had likewise\nthis immediate sensuous truth of an ordinary course of events\u2014a form\nwhich it must have and retain for the majority of men.\n\n3. This new world has therefore, however, to be adopted by a new race of\nmen, by Barbarians; for it is characteristic of barbarians to apprehend\nthe spiritual in a sensuous way. And it must be by northern barbarians,\nfor it is the northern self-containedness alone that is the immediate\nprinciple of this new world-consciousness. With this self-consciousness\nof the intelligible world as a world immediately actual, mind, having\nregard to what it has in itself become, is higher than before, but, on\nthe other side, in respect of its consciousness it is thrown quite back\nto the beginning of culture, and this consciousness had to commence\nfrom the beginning again. What it had to overcome was on the one hand\nthis sensuous immediacy of its intelligible world, and secondly the\nopposed sensuous immediacy of actuality, by its consciousness held as\nnull. It excludes the sun, replaces it with tapers, is furnished with\nimages merely; it is in itself alone, and inward, not reconciled for\nconsciousness\u2014to self-consciousness a sinful, wicked world is present.\nFor the intelligible world of Philosophy had not yet completed in\nitself the task of making itself the actual world\u2014of recognizing the\nintelligible in the actual, as well as the actual in the intelligible.\nIt is one thing to have the Idea of Philosophy, to recognize absolute\nessence as absolute essence, and quite another thing to recognize\nit as the system of the universe, of nature, and of individual\nself-consciousness, as the whole development of its reality. The\nNeo-Platonists had found that principle of realization\u2014namely, this\nreal substance which again places itself in quite opposed, though in\nthemselves real determinations\u2014but having got so far they did not find\nthe form, the principle of self-consciousness.\n\nOn the Teutonic nations the world-spirit imposed the task of developing\nan embryo into the form of the thinking man. What comes first is the\nmind as apprehended, and to that is opposed the subjectivity of will\nwhich has not been taken up into mind; the kingdom of truth and that of\nthe world are bound together and at the same time evidently divided. An\nintelligible world has thus in the conception of men established itself\nin the mode of this same actuality, like a far-away land that is just as\nreally conceived of by us, peopled and inhabited, as the world we see,\nbut which is hidden from us as though by a mountain. It is not the Greek\nor any other world of gods and of mythology\u2014a simple, undivided faith;\nfor there is likewise present in it the highest negativity, that is, the\ncontradiction between actuality and that other world. This intellectual\nworld expresses the nature of real absolute existence. It is on it that\nPhilosophy tries its powers, and on it that thought also moils and\ntoils. We have in general outline to deal with these not very pleasing\nmanifestations.\n\nOur first view of Philosophy, as revealed in Christianity (pp. 10-21)\nis that of a dim groping which is carried on within the depths of the\nIdea\u2014as being the forms assumed by the same, which constitute its\nmoments; we see a hard struggle made by reason, which cannot force\nits way out of the imagination and popular conceptions to the Notion.\nThere is no venture too rash for the imagination to undertake, because,\nimpelled by reason, it cannot satisfy itself with beautiful images, but\nhas to pass beyond them. There is likewise no extravagance of reason\ninto which it does not fall, because it cannot obtain the mastery of\nthe image, but within this element is merely in the act of warfare\nwith it. Later on than this Western self-immersion, there arose in the\nEast expansion, negation of all that is concrete, abstraction from\nall determinations; this pure contemplation or pure thought present\nin Mohammedanism corresponds to the Christian descent into self.\nWithin Christianity itself, however, the intellectual world is set in\nopposition to that first Cabalistic principle; in it pure conceptions\nrule which constitute the ideas present in thought, and with this we\nenter upon the Scholastic philosophy. Philosophy, like the arts and\nsciences, when, through the rule of the Barbarians of Germany, they\nbecame dumb and lifeless, took refuge with the Arabians, and there\nattained a wonderful development; they were the first sources from\nwhich the West obtained assistance. Through the presupposition of the\nimmediately present and accepted truth, thought had lost its freedom and\nthe truth its presence in conceiving consciousness; and philosophy sank\ninto a metaphysics of the understanding and into a formal dialectic.\nWe have thus in this period first of all to consider philosophy in the\nEast, and secondly in the West; that is, the philosophy of the Arabians\nfirst, and subsequently the philosophy of the Schools. The Schoolmen are\nthe principal figures in this period; they represent European philosophy\nin the European Middle Ages. The third stage is the dissolution of what\nis upheld in the scholastic philosophy; new meteor-like apparitions are\nnow seen, which precede the third period, the genuine revival of free\nPhilosophy.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION ONE\n\nARABIAN PHILOSOPHY\n\n\nIn the West the Germanic tribes had obtained possession of what had\nhitherto formed a section of the Roman Empire, and their conquests\nwere attaining to shape and solidity, when another religion dawned in\nthe East, namely the Mohammedan. The East purified itself of all that\nwas individual and definite, while the West descended into the depths\nand actual presence of spirit. As quickly as the Arabians with their\nfanaticism spread themselves over the Eastern and the Western world,\nso quickly were the various stages of culture passed through by them,\nand very shortly they advanced in culture much farther than the West.\nFor in Mohammedanism, which quickly reached its culminating point, both\nas regards external power and dominion and also spiritual development,\nPhilosophy, along with all the other arts and sciences, flourished to an\nextraordinary degree, in spite of its here not displaying any specially\ncharacteristic features. Philosophy was fostered and cherished among the\nArabians; the philosophy of the Arabians must therefore be mentioned in\nthe history of Philosophy. What we have to say, however, chiefly concerns\nthe external preservation and propagation of Philosophy. The Arabians\nbecame acquainted with Greek philosophy mainly through the medium of the\nSyrians in Western Asia, who had imbibed Greek culture, and who were\nunder the Arabian sway. In Syria, which formed a Greek kingdom, at\nAntioch, especially in Berytus and Edessa, there were great institutes of\nlearning; and thus the Syrians constituted the connecting link between\nGreek philosophy and the Arabians. Syrian was the language of the people\neven in Bagdad.[3]\n\nMoses Maimonides, a learned Jew, gives further historical particulars\nin his _Doctor Perplexorum_ of this transition of Philosophy to the\nArabians. He says: \u201cAll that the Ishmaelites have written of the unity\nof God and other philosophic dogmas\u201d\u2014especially the sect of the Muatzali\n(\u200e\u200f\u05de\u05e2\u05ea\u05d5\u05d6\u05dc\u05d4\u200f\u200e, _i.e._ the Separated), who were the first to take an\ninterest in the abstract intellectual knowledge of such subjects, while\nthe sect Assaria (\u200e\u200f\u05d4\u05d0\u05e9\u05e2\u05e8\u05d9\u05d9\u05d4\u200f\u200e) arose later\u2014\u201cis based upon arguments\nand propositions which have been taken from the books of the Greeks and\nAram\u00e6ans\u201d (Syrians), \u201cwho strove to refute and deny the teachings of the\nphilosophers.\u201d The cause of this is as follows: The Christian community\ncame to include within it these nations also, and the Christians defended\nmany dogmas which were contradictory of philosophic tenets; among these\nnations, however, the teachings of philosophers were very widely and\ngenerally diffused (for with them Philosophy had its origin), and kings\narose who adopted the Christian religion. The Christian Greeks and\nlearned Aram\u00e6ans, therefore, when they perceived that their doctrines\nwere so clearly and plainly refuted by the philosophers, thought out\na wisdom of their own, the \u201cWisdom of the Words\u201d (Devarim), and they\nthemselves received on that account the name of the Speakers (Medabberim,\n\u200e\u200f\u05de\u05b4\u05d3\u05b7\u05d1\u05b0\u05e8\u05b4\u05d9\u05dd\u200f\u200e). They set up principles which served the purpose both\nof confirming their faith and of refuting the opposite teaching of the\nphilosophers. When the Ishmaelites followed and attained supremacy, and\nthe books of the philosophers themselves fell into their hands, and along\nwith them the answers which \u201cChristian Greeks and Aram\u00e6ans had written\nagainst the philosophic books, as for instance the writings of Johannes\nGrammaticus, Aben Adi, and others, they eagerly laid hold of these and\nadopted them bodily.\u201d[4] Christians and Ishmaelites felt the same need\nof philosophy; the Ishmaelites, moreover, strove all the more eagerly\nafter knowledge of this kind, because their first desire was to defend\nMohammedanism against Christianity, which was the religion of a large\nproportion of the nations they had conquered.\n\nThe external sequence of events is this. Syriac versions of Greek\nworks were to be had, and these were now translated into Arabic by the\nArabians; or translations were made from the Greek directly into Arabic.\nIn the reign of Harun al-Raschid several Syrians are named who lived in\nBagdad, and who had been called upon by the Caliphs to translate these\nworks into Arabic. They were the first scientific teachers among the\nArabians, and were chiefly physicians; hence the works they translated\nwere on medicine. Among these translators was Johannes Mesue of Damascus,\nwho lived in the reigns of Al-Raschid (_d._ A.D. 786), Al-Mamun (_d._\nA.D. 833) and Al-Motawakkil (_d._ A.D. 847), rather earlier than the rise\nof the Turks to supremacy (A.D. 862); he was a hospital superintendent\nin Bagdad. Al-Raschid appointed him to make translations from Syriac\ninto Arabic; he opened a public school for the study of medicine and all\nthe sciences then known. Honain was a Christian, as was also his master\nJohannes, and belonged to the Arab tribe Ebadi; he applied himself to the\nstudy of Greek, and made a number of translations into Arabic, and also\ninto Syriac, for example, Nicolaus _De summa philosophi\u00e6 Aristotelic\u00e6_,\nPtolemy, Hippocrate and Galen. Another is Ebn Adda, an eminent\ndialectician, who is quoted by Abulfaraj.[5] Among the works of the Greek\nphilosophers it was almost exclusively the writings of Aristotle which\nwere translated by these Syrians, and the later commentaries on the same.\nIt was thus not the Arabians themselves who translated the above works.\n\nIn the Arabic philosophy, which shows a free, brilliant and profound\npower of imagination, Philosophy and the sciences took the same bent\nthat they had taken earlier among the Greeks. Plato with his Ideas or\nuniversals laid the foundation of the independent world of intellect,\nand established absolute existence as an existence which is manifestly\npresent in the mode of thought; Aristotle developed, completed and\npeopled the realm of thought; the Neo-Platonic philosophy reached the\nfurther conception of the intelligible world as Idea of the existence\nwhich is independent in itself, of spirit; and then this first Idea,\nwhich we have already met with in connection with Proclus, passed over\ninto a similar Aristotelian development and completion. Consequently\nit is the Alexandrian or Neo-Platonic Idea which forms the essential\nprinciple or basis of the Arabian as well as the Scholastic philosophy,\nand all that Christian philosophy offers; it is on it that the\ndeterminations of the Notion expend their strength, and around this that\nthey career. A particular description of Arabian philosophy has in some\nparts but little interest; in other parts it will be found that the\nmain dogmas of this philosophy have much in common with those of the\nScholastics.\n\nWe may say of the Arabians that their philosophy constitutes no\ncharacteristic stage in the development of philosophy. The principal\npoints in this, as in the later philosophy, were the question whether the\nworld is eternal, and the task of proving the unity of God and similar\ndogmas. One great consideration in all this, however, was to defend the\ndoctrines of Mohammedanism, and owing to this all philosophizing had\nto be carried on within the limits of these doctrines. The Arabians,\nlike the Christians of the West, were restricted by the dogmas of their\nChurch (if one may call it so), few though these dogmas were; yet this\nlast circumstance of the small number of the dogmas certainly gave\nthem greater liberty. But according to all that we know of them, they\nestablished no principle of self-conscious reason that was truly higher,\nand thus they brought Philosophy no further. They have no other principle\nthan that of revelation, therefore only a principle that is external.\n\n\nA. PHILOSOPHY OF THE MEDABBERIM.\n\nThe Medabberim are specially mentioned by Moses Maimonides as a widely\nextended philosophic school or sect of considerable eminence. He\nspeaks (More Nevochim, P. I. c. 71, pp. 134, 135) of the peculiarity\nof their method of philosophy somewhat as follows: \u201cThe Ishmaelites,\nhowever, have extended their discourses still further, and have aspired\nto other wonderful doctrines, of which none of the Greek Medabberim\nknew anything, because they were still on some points in agreement\nwith the philosophers. The main point to be remarked is that all the\nMedabberim, whether among the Greeks who had become Christians, or among\nthe Ishmaelites, in the building up of their principles did not follow\nthe nature of the matter itself, or draw their arguments from it, but\nonly had in view how the subject must be regarded in order to support\ntheir assertion, or at least not to refute it altogether: afterwards\nthey boldly asserted that these were the circumstances of the case, and\nadduced further arguments and maxims in support of their object. They\ninsisted on that, and that alone, which concurred with their opinions,\neven though it were in the most remote degree, through a hundred links\nof reasoning. The earliest of their learned men adopted this practice,\nthough professing that they reached these reflections through speculation\nalone, without reference to any preconceived opinion. Their successors\ndid not follow their example,\u201d &c.\n\nIn the pure philosophy of the so-called \u201cSpeakers\u201d was expressed the\nprinciple, peculiar to the Oriental mind, of the dissolution of definite\nthought in all its consequences as the dissolution of all connection\nand relation. Maimonides says (P. I. c. 71, p. 135; c. 73, p. 149):\n\u201cThe ground-principle of the Medabberim is that men can have no certain\nknowledge of the nature of things, because in the understanding the\ncontrary may ever exist and be thought. Besides this they in the majority\nof instances confound imagination with understanding, and give to the\nformer the name of the latter. They adopted as a principle, atoms and\nempty space,\u201d where all connection appears as something contingent.\n\u201cProduction is nothing but a connection of atoms, and decay nothing but\na separation of the same; and time consists of many \u2018nows.\u2019\u201d In this way\nnothing but the atom really exists. They have thus in the more advanced\ncultivation of thought brought to consciousness the main standpoint,\nthen as now the standpoint of the Orientals\u2014that of substance, the one\nsubstance. This pantheism, or Spinozism, if you like to call it so, is\nthus the universal view of Oriental poets, historians and philosophers.\n\nThe Medabberim go on to say: \u201cSubstances, _i.e._ individuals, which,\u201d\nfor the rest, \u201care created by God, have many accidental qualities, as in\nsnow every particle is white. But no quality can endure for two moments;\nas it comes, it goes again, and God creates another and yet another in\nits place.\u201d All determinations are thus fleeting or perishable; the\nindividual alone is permanent. \u201cIf it pleases God to create another\nquality in a substance, it continues; but if He ceases to create, the\nsubstance perishes.\u201d Thereby all necessary connection is done away with,\nso that Nature has no meaning. \u201cThey therefore deny that anything exists\nby nature, likewise that the nature of this or that body necessitates\nthat it should have certain qualities rather than others. But they say\nthat God creates all qualities instantaneously, without natural means\nand without the help of anything else.\u201d General permanence is substance,\nand the particular is altered every moment, and so exists through the\nsubstance. \u201cAccording to this principle they say, for instance, that when\nwe think we have dyed a garment red with red dye we have not dyed it red\nat all; for God created the red colour in the garment at the very moment\nat which we thought we had brought about the result with the red dye. God\nobserves the invariable custom of not permitting that the colour black\nshould be produced except when the garment is dyed with that hue; and the\nfirst colour which comes to pass on the occasion of the connection is\nnot permanent, but disappears on the instant, and every moment another\nappears which is created in its turn. In the same way knowledge also\nis an accident, which is created by God at every moment that I know\nanything; to-day we no longer possess the knowledge which we yesterday\npossessed. A man,\u201d when writing, \u201cdoes not move the pen when he thinks\nhe moves it, but the motion is an accident of the pen, created by God at\nthe moment.\u201d In this way God alone is in truth the operative cause; but\nHe might have made everything differently. \u201cTheir eighth proposition is\nto the effect that nothing but substance or accident exists, and natural\nforms are themselves accidents; substances alone are individuals. The\nninth proposition is that accidents have nothing to do with one another;\nthey have no causal connection or other relation; in every substance all\naccidents may exist. The tenth proposition is transition (\u200e\u200f\u05d0\u05b4\u05e4\u05b4\u05e9\u05b8\u05c1\u05e8\u05d5\u05ea\u200f\u200e,\n_transitus_, _possibilitas_):\u201d \u201cAll that we can fancy may also pass over\ninto the understanding, _i.e._ be possible. But in this way everything is\npossible,\u201d since there are no laws of the understanding; this transition\nof thought is thus perfectly accidental. \u201cA man as large as a mountain,\na flea as large as an elephant, are possible. Everything may just as\nwell be something else as what it is, and there is no reason at all why\nanything should be one way rather than another. They term it a mere habit\nthat the earth revolves round a centre-point, that fire moves upward and\nthat it is hot; it is just as possible, they say, that fire should be\ncold.\u201d[6]\n\nWe thus see an utter inconstancy of everything; and this whirl of all\nthings is essentially Oriental. But at the same time this is certainly\nalso a complete dissolution of all that pertains to reasonableness, in\nharmony of course with Eastern exaltation of spirit, which allows of\nnothing definite. God is in Himself the perfectly undefined, His activity\nis altogether abstract, and hence the particulars produced thereby are\nperfectly contingent; if we speak of the necessity of things, the term\nis meaningless and incomprehensible, and no attempt should be made to\ncomprehend it. The activity of God is thus represented as perfectly\ndevoid of reason. This abstract negativity, combined with the permanent\nunity, is thus a fundamental conception in the Oriental way of looking at\nthings. Oriental poets are in a marked degree pantheists; the pantheistic\nis their ordinary point of view. Thus the Arabians developed the sciences\nand philosophy, without further defining the concrete Idea; their work\nis rather the dissolution of all that is definite in this substance,\nwith which is associated mere changeableness as the abstract moment of\nnegativity.\n\n\nB. COMMENTATORS OF ARISTOTLE.\n\nThe Arabians, moreover, made a point for the most part of studying the\nwritings of Aristotle very diligently, and of availing themselves more\nespecially both of his metaphysical and logical writings, and also of\nhis _Physics_; they occupied themselves particularly with multiplying\ncommentaries on Aristotle, and developing still further the abstract\nlogical element there present. Many of these commentaries are still\nextant. Works of this kind are known in the West, and have been even\ntranslated into Latin and printed; but much good is not to be got from\nthem. The Arabians developed the metaphysics of the understanding and a\nformal logic. Some of the famous Arabians lived as early as the eighth\nand ninth centuries; their progress was therefore very rapid, for the\nWest had as yet made very little advance in culture.\n\nAlkendi, who wrote a commentary on the _Logic_, flourished in and about\nA.D. 800, under Almamun.[7] Alfarabi died in 966; he wrote commentaries\non Aristotle\u2019s _Organon_, which were made diligent use of by the\nScholastics, and was also author of a work \u201cOn the Origin and Division\nof the Sciences.\u201d It is related of him that he read through Aristotle\u2019s\ntreatise _On Hearing_ forty times, and his _Rhetoric_ two hundred times,\nwithout getting at all tired of them;[8] he must have had a good stomach.\nThe very physicians made a study of philosophy, and formulated theories;\namong them was Avicenna (_b._ A.D. 984, _d._ A.D. 1064), who belonged\nto Bokhara, to the east of the Caspian Sea; he wrote a commentary on\nAristotle.[9] Algazel (_d._ A.D. 1127 at Bagdad) wrote compendiums\nof logic and metaphysics; he was a sceptic of great ability, with a\npowerful mind of the Oriental cast; he held the words of the Prophet to\nbe pure truth, and wrote _Destructio Philosophorum_.[10] Tofail died in\nSeville in A.D. 1193.[11] Averro\u00ebs, who died A.D. 1217, was specially\ndistinguished as the commentator of Aristotle.[12]\n\nThe acquaintance of the Arabians with Aristotle has this interest in\nhistory that it was thus that Aristotle first became known also in the\nWest. The commentaries on Aristotle and the collections of passages from\nhis writings become thus for the Western world a fountain of philosophy.\nWestern nations long knew nothing of Aristotle, excepting through such\nretranslations of his works and translations of Arabian commentaries on\nthem. For such translations were made from Arabic into Latin by Spanish\nArabs, and especially by Jews in the south of Spain and Portugal and in\nAfrica; there was often even a Hebrew translation between.\n\n\nC. JEWISH PHILOSOPHERS.\n\nWith the Arabians are closely connected the Jewish philosophers, among\nwhom the above-mentioned Moses Maimonides held a distinguished place. He\nwas born at Cordova, in Spain, A.D. 1131 (Anno Mundi 4891, or, according\nto others, 4895), and lived in Egypt.[13] Besides _More Nevochim_, which\nhas been translated into Latin, he composed other works; of him and\nother Jews much more of a literary character might be said. In their\nphilosophy a strong Cabalistic element, on the one hand, makes itself\nfelt throughout, in astrology, geomancy, &c.; on the other hand, we\nfind in Moses Maimonides, as in the Fathers, that the foundation is\nlaid in history. He deals with this in a strictly abstract system of\nmetaphysics, which is connected, in Philo\u2019s fashion, with the Mosaic\nbooks and their interpretation. We find in these Jewish philosophers\nproofs brought forward that God is One, that the world was created, and\nthat matter is not eternal; Maimonides also speaks of the nature of God.\nThe unity of God is dealt with as it was among the ancient Eleatics\nand the Neo-Platonists; to prove, namely, that not the Many, but the\nself-begetting and self-abrogating One is the truth.[14]\n\n\n\n\nSECTION TWO\n\nTHE SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY\n\n\nAll the Philosophy which we first encounter in the Middle Ages, when\nindependent states begin to rise, consists of bare remnants of the\nRoman world, which on its Fall had sunk in all respects so low that the\nculture of the world seemed to have come entirely to an end. Thus in\nthe West hardly anything was known beyond the Isagoge of Porphyry, the\nLatin Commentaries of Boethius on the Logical works of Aristotle, and\nextracts from the same by Cassiodorus\u2014most barren compilations; there\nis also what is just as barren, the dissertations ascribed to Augustine\n_De dialectica_ and _De categoriis_, which last is a paraphrase of\nthe Aristotelian work upon the categories.[15] These were the first\nmake-shifts or expedients for carrying on Philosophy; in them the most\nexternal and most formal reasoning is applied.\n\nThe whole effect of the scholastic philosophy is a monotonous one. In\nvain have men hitherto endeavoured to show in this theology, which\nreigned from the eighth or even sixth century almost to the sixteenth,\nparticular distinctions and stages in development. In this case as in\nthat of the Arabian philosophy, time does not allow\u2014and if it did the\nnature of things would not allow\u2014us to separate the scholastic philosophy\ninto its individual systems or manifestations, but only to give a general\nsketch of the main elements present therein which it has actually taken\nup into thought. It is not interesting by reason of its matter, for we\ncannot remain at the consideration of this; it is not a philosophy. The\nname, however, properly speaking indicates a general manner rather than\na system\u2014if we may speak of a philosophic system. Scholasticism is not\na fixed doctrine like Platonism or Scepticism, but a very indefinite\nname which comprehends the philosophic endeavours of Christendom for the\ngreater part of a thousand years. However, this history which occupies\nnearly a thousand years is, as a matter of fact, comprised within one\nNotion which we propose to consider more closely; it has ever occupied\nthe same standpoint, and been grounded on the same principle; for it is\nthe faith of the Church that we catch sight of, and a formalism which is\nmerely an eternal analysis and constant re-iteration within itself. The\nmore general acceptance of the Aristotelian writings has merely brought\nforth a difference of degree and caused no real scientific progress.\nHere there is indeed a history of men, but speaking properly none of\nscientific knowledge; the men are noble, pious, and in all respects most\ndistinguished.\n\nThe study of the scholastic philosophy is a difficult one, even if its\nlanguage only be considered. The Scholastics certainly make use of a\nbarbaric Latin, but this is not the fault of the Scholastics but of their\nLatin culture. Latin forms a quite unsuitable instrument for applying to\nphilosophic categories such as these, because the terms which the new\nculture adopts could not possibly be expressed by this language without\nunduly straining it; the beautiful Latin of Cicero is not adapted for\nuse in profound speculations. It cannot be expected of anyone to know at\nfirst hand this philosophy of the Middle Ages, for it is as comprehensive\nand voluminous as it is barren and ill-expressed.\n\nOf the great schoolmen we still have many works left to us which are\nvery lengthy, so that it is no easy task to study them: the later\nthey are, the more formal do they become. The Schoolmen did not only\nwrite compendiums\u2014for the writings of Duns Scotus amount to twelve,\nand those of Thomas Aquinas to eighteen folios. Abstracts of them are\nto be found in various works. The principal sources from which we\nobtain our knowledge are: 1, Lambertus Dan\u00e6us in the Prolegomena to his\n_Commentarius in librum primum sententiarum Petri Lombardi, Genev\u00e6_,\n1580. (This is the best authority we have in abridged form); 2, Launoi:\n_De varia Aristotelis in Academia Parisiensi fortuna_; 3, Cramer:\nContinuation of Bossuet\u2019s History of the World, in the last two volumes;\n4, the _Summa_ of Thomas Aquinas. In Tiedemann\u2019s History of Philosophy\nextracts from the Scholastics are also to be found, as likewise in\nTennemann; Rixner also makes judicious extracts.\n\nWe shall limit ourselves to general points of view. The name finds its\norigin in this way. From the time of Charles the Great it was only in\ntwo places\u2014in the great schools attached to the great cathedral churches\nand monasteries\u2014that a cleric, that is a canon who had the oversight of\nthe instructors (_informatores_), was called _scholasticus_; he likewise\ngave lectures on the most important branch of science, theology. In\nthe monasteries he who was the most advanced instructed the monks.\nWe have not, properly speaking, to deal with these; but although\nscholastic philosophy was something altogether different, the name of\nScholastics attached itself to those alone who propounded their theology\nscientifically and in a system. In place of the _patres ecclesi\u00e6_ there\nthus arose later on the _doctores_.\n\nThe scholastic philosophy is thus really theology, and this theology is\nnothing but philosophy. The further content of theology is merely that\nwhich is present in the ordinary conceptions of religion; theology,\nhowever, is the science of the system as it must necessarily be present\nwithin every Christian, every peasant, &c. The science of theology\nis often placed in an external historical content, in exegesis, in\nthe enumeration of the various manuscripts of the New Testament, in\nconsidering whether these are written on parchment, cotton fabrics or\npaper, whether in uncial letters or otherwise, and which century they\nbelong to; further matters for consideration are the Jewish conceptions\nof time, the history of the Popes, Bishops and Fathers, and what took\nplace at the councils of the Church. All these matters, however,\ndo not pertain to the nature of God and its relation to mankind.\nThe one essential object of theology as the doctrine of God, is the\nnature of God, and this content is in its nature really speculative;\nthose theologians who consider this are therefore nothing less than\nphilosophers. The science of God is nothing but Philosophy. Philosophy\nand theology have hence here also been counted one, and it is their\nseparation that constitutes the transition into modern times, seeing that\nmen have thought that for thinking reason something could be true which\nis not true for theology. Down to the Middle Ages, on the contrary, it\nwas held as fundamental that there should be but one truth. Thus the\ntheology of the scholastics is not to be represented as though, as with\nus, it merely contained doctrines about God, &c., in historic guise, for\nin fact it also has within it the profoundest speculations of Aristotle\nand of the Neo-Platonists. Their philosophy, and much in them that is\nexcellent, is found in Aristotle, only in a simpler and purer form; and\nto them too the whole lay beyond actuality and mingled with Christian\nactuality as it is represented to us.\n\nFrom Christianity, within whose bounds we now have our place, Philosophy\nhas to re-establish its position. In heathendom the root of knowledge\nwas external nature as thought devoid of self, and subjective nature\nas the inward self. Both Nature and the natural self of mankind, and\nlikewise thought, there possessed affirmative significance; hence all\nthis was good. In Christianity the root of truth has, however, quite\nanother meaning; it was not only the truth as against the heathen gods,\nbut as against Philosophy also, against nature, against the immediate\nconsciousness of man. Nature is there no longer good, but merely a\nnegative; self-consciousness, the thought of man, his pure self, all this\nreceives a negative position in Christianity. Nature has no validity,\nand affords no interest; its universal laws, as the reality under which\nthe individual existences of nature are collected, have likewise no\nauthority: the heavens, the sun, the whole of nature is a corpse. Nature\nis given over to the spiritual, and indeed to spiritual subjectivity;\nthus the course of nature is everywhere broken in upon by miracles. With\nthis surrender of natural necessity we have the fact associated that all\nfurther content, all that truth which constitutes the universal of that\nnature, is given and revealed. The one starting-point, the contemplation\nof nature, is thus for knowledge undoubtedly not present. Then this fact\nis likewise set aside that I am present as a self. The self as this\nimmediate certainty has to be abrogated; it must also merge itself in\nanother self, but in one beyond, and only there does it have its value.\nThis other self, in which the proper self is made to have its freedom,\nis first of all likewise a particular self, that has not the form of\nuniversality: it is determined and limited in time and space, and at\nthe same time has the significance of an absolute in and for itself. A\nreal sense of self is thus abandoned, but what self-consciousness on the\nother hand gains is not a universal, a thought. In thought I have real\naffirmative significance, not as an individual, but as universal \u2018I\u2019; the\ncontent of truth is now, however, plainly individualized, and thus the\nthought of the \u2018I\u2019 falls away. Thereby, however, the highest concrete\ncontent of the absolute Idea is set forth, in which the opposites that\nare plainly infinite are united; it is the power which unites in itself\nwhat appears to consciousness infinitely removed from one another\u2014the\nmortal and the absolute. This absolute is itself \u2018this\u2019 first of all as\nthis concrete, not as abstraction, but as the unity of universal and\nindividual; this concrete consciousness is for the first time truth. The\nreason of the former content being also true, comes to me as something\nnot pertaining to myself, but as a thing received outside of self.\nThe testimony of spirit, indeed, pertains thereto, and my inmost self\nis present there; but the testimony of spirit is a thing concealed,\nwhich does not further reveal itself, does not beget the content from\nitself, but receives it. The Spirit which bears witness is further\nitself distinguished from me as an individual; my testifying spirit is\nanother, and there only remains to me the empty shell of passivity.\nConditioned by this inflexible standpoint, Philosophy had to go forth\nonce more. The first working up of this content, the inward operation of\nuniversal thought in the same, is the task scholastic philosophy has to\nundertake. The opposition between faith and reason forms the end arrived\nat; reason, on the one hand, feels the necessity of setting to work on\nnature in order to obtain immediate certainty, and on the other hand of\nfinding in genuine thought, in specific production out of self, this same\nsatisfaction.\n\nWe must now speak of the methods and manners of the scholastics. In this\nscholastic activity thought pursues its work quite apart from all regard\nto experience; we no longer hear anything of taking up actuality and\ndetermining it through thought. Although the Notion came into recognition\nearlier than this, in Aristotle, in the first place, the Notion was not\napprehended as the necessity of carrying the content further; for this\nwas received in its successive manifestations, and there was present\nmerely an intermingling of actuality accepted as truth and of thought.\nStill less, in the second place, was the greater part of the content\npermeated by Notions, for this content was taken up superficially into\nthe form of thought\u2014more especially with the Stoics and Epicureans.\nThe scholastic philosophy altogether dissociates itself from any such\nendeavours; it leaves actuality to exist alongside itself as if it were\ndespised and had no interest. For reason found its true existence, its\nactualization, in another world and not in this; the whole progress of\nthe cultivated world goes, however, to the re-instalment of a faith in\nthe present world. Nevertheless, at first all knowledge and action, and\nwhatever relates to an interest in this world, were entirely banished.\nBranches of knowledge that pertain to such ordinary matters as sight and\nhearing, restful contemplation and occupation with ordinary actuality\nhere found no place; nor did such sciences as recognize a definite\nsphere of actuality after their own particular fashion, and constitute\nthe material for genuine philosophy, nor arts which give to the Idea a\nsensuous existence. Likewise law and right, the recognition of the actual\nman, were not esteemed as pertaining to the social relationships of life,\nbut to some other sphere. In this absence of rationality in the actual,\nor of rationality which has its actuality in ordinary existence, is found\nthe utter barbarism of thought, in that it keeps to another world, and\ndoes not have the Notion of reason\u2014the Notion that the certainty of self\nis all truth.\n\nNow thought as sundered has a content, the intelligible world, as an\nactuality existent for itself, to which thought applies itself. Its\nconduct is here to be compared with that which takes place when the\nunderstanding applies itself to the sensuous and perceptible world, makes\nit as substance its basis, having a fixed object in it, and reasoning\nrespecting it; it is then not the independent movement of Philosophy\nproper which penetrates existence and expresses it, for all it does is\nto find predicates regarding it. The scholastic philosophy has thus the\nintelligible world of the Christian religion, God and all His attributes\nand works therewith connected, as an independent object; and thought is\ndirected to God\u2019s unchangeableness, to such questions as whether matter\nis eternal, whether man is free, &c.\u2014just as the understanding passes to\nand fro over the phenomenal and perceived. Now the scholastic philosophy\nwas here given over to the infinite movement of determinate Notions;\nthe categories of possibility and actuality, freedom and necessity,\nconstitution and substance, &c., are of this nature, they are not\nfixed, but pure movements. Anything whatever, determined as potential,\ntransforms itself equally into the opposite, and must necessarily be\nsurrendered; and determination can only save itself by a new distinction,\nbecause it must, on the one hand, be given up, and on the other retained.\nThe scholastics are thus decried on account of the endless distinctions\nwhich they draw. For the sake of these determinations through the\nabstract Notion the Aristotelian philosophy was predominant, though not\nin its whole extent. It was the Aristotelian _Organon_ that was held in\nsuch favour, and that indeed just as much for its laws of thought as\nfor its metaphysical conceptions\u2014the categories. These abstract Notions\nconstituted in their determinateness the understanding of the scholastic\nphilosophy, which could not pass beyond itself and attain to freedom, nor\nseize upon the freedom given by reason.\n\nWith this finite form a finite content is likewise directly associated.\nFrom one determination we pass on to another, and such determinations,\nas particular, are finite; the determination there relates itself\nexternally and not as self-comprehensive and self-embracing. The result\nof this determination is that thought will really act as if it brought\nabout conclusions, for to draw conclusions is the mode of formal logical\nprogression. Philosophy thus consists of a methodical and syllogistic\nreasoning. Just as the Sophists of Greece wandered about amongst abstract\nconceptions on behalf of actuality, so did the scholastics on behalf of\ntheir intellectual world. To the former Being had validity; it they had\nrescued and delivered as against the negativity of the Notion, while\nalong with that they had justified it through the same. The principal\nendeavour of the scholastics was in the same way to vindicate the\nChristian intellectual world as against the confusion of the Notion,\nand through the latter to demonstrate its conformity with the same. The\nuniversal form of the scholastic philosophy thus consisted in this\u2014that\na proposition was laid down, the objections to it brought forward,\nand these contradicted through counter-propositions and distinctions.\nPhilosophy was hence not separated from theology, as it is not in itself,\nfor Philosophy is the knowledge of absolute existence, that is to say,\ntheology. But to that theology the Christian absolute world was a system\nwhich was held to be an actuality, as was ordinary actuality for the\nGreek sophists. Of Philosophy proper there thus remained only the laws of\nthought and abstractions.\n\n\nA. RELATIONSHIP OF THE SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY TO CHRISTIANITY.\n\nPhilosophy with the scholastics had consequently the same quality of\nwant of independence as it had before this with the Christian Fathers\nand the Arabians. The Church as already constituted established itself\namongst the Teutonic nations, and through its constitution it conditioned\nphilosophy. The Christian Church had indeed spread itself abroad\nthroughout the Roman world, but, more especially in the beginning, it\nmerely formed a community of its own, by whom the world was renounced,\nand which made no special claims to recognition\u2014or if such claims were\nmade they were merely negative, because the individuals in the world\nwere simply martyrs, thus renouncing the world. But the Church in time\nbecame dominant, and the Roman emperors, both of the East and of the\nWest, embraced Christianity. Thus the Church attained to a position\nopenly recognized and undisturbed, from which it exercised much influence\nupon the world. The political world, however, fell into the hands of\nthe Teutonic nations, and thereby a new form arose, and to this the\nscholastic philosophy pertains. We know the revolution by the name of the\nMigration of the Nations (_supra_, pp. 23, 24). Fresh races inundated\nthe ancient Roman world and established themselves therein; they thus\nerected their new world on the ruins of the old\u2014a picture which Rome in\nits present aspect still presents. There the splendour of the Christian\ntemples is due in part to the remnants of the ancient, and new palaces\nare built on ruins and have ruins all around.\n\n1. The principal feature in the Middle Ages is found in this disunion,\nthe two sides here present; there are revealed in it two nations, two\nmanners of speech. We see people who have hitherto ruled, a previous\nworld having its own language, arts, and sciences, and on this to them\nforeign element the new nations grafted themselves, and these thus\nstarted upon their course internally dissevered. In this history we\nhave thus before us not the development of a nation from itself, but\none proceeding from its opposite, and one which is and remains burdened\nby this opposite, and which takes it up into itself and has to overcome\nit. Hence these people have in this way represented in themselves the\nnature of the spiritual process. Spirit is the making for itself a\npresupposition, the giving to itself the natural as a counterpoise, the\nseparating itself therefrom, thus the making it an object, and then for\nthe first time the working upon this hypothesis, formulating it, and from\nitself bringing it forth, begetting it, internally reconstructing it.\nHence in the Roman as in the Byzantine world, Christianity has triumphed\nas a Church; but neither of these worlds was capable of effectuating\nthe new religion in itself and of bringing forth a new world from this\nprinciple. For in both there was a character already present\u2014customs,\nlaws, a juridical system, a constitution (if it can be called\nconstitution), a political condition, capacities, art, science, spiritual\nculture\u2014in short, everything was there. The nature of spirit, on the\ncontrary, requires that the world thus constituted should be begotten\nfrom it, and that this process of begetting should take place through\nthe agency of reaction, through the assimilation of something which has\ngone before. These conquerors have thus established themselves in a\nforeign sphere, and have become the rulers over it; but at the same time\nthey have come under the dominion of a new spirit which has been imposed\nupon them. Although on the one hand predominant, on the other they have\ncome under the dominion of the spiritual element, because they conducted\nthemselves passively in regard to it.\n\nThe spiritual Idea or spirituality has become imposed upon the dulness,\nboth in mind and spirit, of these rough barbarians; their hearts were\nthereby pricked. The rough nature has in this way become immanent in the\nIdea as an eternal opposition, or there is kindled in them infinite pain,\nthe most terrible suffering\u2014such that it may even be represented as a\ncrucified Christ. They had to sustain this conflict within themselves,\nand one side of it is found in the philosophy which later on made its\nappearance amongst them, and was first of all received as something\ngiven. They are still uncultured people, but for all their barbaric\ndulness they are deep in heart and mind; on them, then, has the principle\nof mind been bestowed, and along with it this pain, this war between\nspiritual and natural, has necessarily been instituted. Culture here\nbegins from the most terrible contradiction, and this has to be by it\nresolved. It is a kingdom of pain, but of purgatory, for that which is\nin the pain is spirit and not animal, and spirit does not die, but goes\nforth from its grave. The two sides of this contradiction are really thus\nrelated to one another in such a way that it is the spiritual which has\nto reign over the barbarians.\n\nThe true dominion of spirit cannot, however, be a dominion in the sense\nthat its opposite is in subjection to it; spirit in and for itself\ncannot have the subjective spirit to which it relates confronting it\nas an externally obedient slave, for this last is itself also spirit.\nThe dominion that exists must take up this position, that spirit is in\nsubjective spirit in harmony with itself. The universal is thus that\nopposition in which the one can only have supremacy by the subjection\nof the other, but which already contains the principle of resolution in\nitself because mind must necessarily bear rule. And hence the consequent\ndevelopment is only this, that mind as reconciliation attains the\nmastery. To this it pertains that not the subjective consciousness, mind\nand heart alone, but also the worldly rule, laws, institutions, the\nhuman life, in so far as these rest in mind, must become rational. In\nthe Republic of Plato we have met with the idea that the philosophers\nare those who ought to reign. Now is the time in which it is said that\nthe spiritual are to govern, but this talk about the spiritual has been\nmade to bear the significance that ecclesiasticism and the ecclesiastics\nought to govern. The spiritual is thus made a particular form, an\nindividual, but the real meaning that it bears is that the spiritual as\nsuch ought to be the determining factor; and this has passed current\nuntil the present day. Thus in the French Revolution we see that abstract\nthought is made to rule; in accordance with it constitution and laws are\ndetermined, it forms the bond between man and man; and men come to have\nthe consciousness that what is esteemed amongst them is abstract thought,\nand that liberty and equality are what ought to be regarded; in this the\nsubject also has his real value, even in relation to actuality.\n\nOne form of this reconciliation is likewise this, that the subject is\nsatisfied with himself and in himself as he stands and moves, with\nhis thoughts, his desires, with his spirituality; and thus that his\nknowledge, his thought, his conviction, has come to be the highest, and\nhas the determination of the divine, of what holds good as absolute.\nThe divine and spiritual is thus implanted in my subjective spirit,\nis identical with me; I myself am the universal, and it has efficacy\nfor me only as I directly know it. This form of reconciliation is the\nnewest, but the most one-sided. For the spiritual is not there determined\nas objective, but is only comprehended as it is in my subjectivity,\nin my consciousness: my conviction as such is taken as ultimate, and\nthat is the formal reconciliation of subjectivity with itself. If the\nreconciliation has this form, the point of view of which we spoke before\nhas no longer any interest; it is past and a mere matter of history. If\nthe conviction as it immediately reveals itself within every subject\nis the true, the absolute, this process of mediation between God, as\nthe true and absolute, and mankind, is no longer in us a necessity.\nThe doctrines of the Christian religion have likewise the position of\nsomething foreign, pertaining to a particular time, that with which\ncertain men have occupied themselves. The conception that the Idea is\nabsolutely concrete, and is as spirit in a relation of opposition to the\nsubject, has disappeared, and only shows itself as having passed away.\nIn so far that which I have said about the principle of the Christian\nsystem, and shall still say of the scholastics, has interest only from\nthe standpoint which I have given, when the interest is in the Idea in\nits concrete determination, and not from the standpoint of the immediate\nreconciliation of the subject with himself.\n\n2. We have now to consider further the character of the opposition to\nany agreement with Philosophy; and to do this we must shortly call to\nmind the historical aspect of the case, although we need only treat of\nthe main points therein. The first matter to consider is the opposition\nthat exists in the world. This form of opposition as it appears in\nhistory is as follows. Spirituality as such should be the spirituality\nof the heart; spirit, however, is one, and thus the communion of those\nwho have this spirituality is asserted. Hence a community arises,\nwhich then becomes an external order, and thus, as we have seen (pp.\n21, 22), expands into a church. In as far as spirit is its principle,\nit is, as spiritual, immediately universal, for isolation in feeling,\nopinion, &c., is unspiritual. The Church organizes itself, but yet it\ngoes forth into worldly existence, attains to riches, possesses goods,\nand even becomes worldly and imbued with all the brute passions; for\nthe spiritual is merely the original principle. The heart that is\nset on ordinary existence, on the world, and the whole of such human\nrelationships as are hereby involved, is guided by these inclinations,\ndesires and passions, by all this grossness and vulgarity. Thus the\nChurch merely has the spiritual principle within itself without its\nbeing truly real, and in such a way that its further relationships are\nnot yet rational; for such is their character before the development\nof the spiritual principle in the world. The worldly element without\nbeing conformable to the spiritual, is present as existence, and is the\nimmediately natural worldly element; in this way the Church comes to have\nin itself the immediately natural principle. All the passions it has\nwithin itself\u2014arrogance, avarice, violence, deceit, rapacity, murder,\nenvy, hatred\u2014all these sins of barbarism are present in it, and indeed\nthey belong to its scheme of government. This government is thus already\na rule of passion, although it professes to be a spiritual rule, and thus\nthe Church is for the most part wrong in its worldly principles, though\nright in its spiritual aspect.\n\nHence the new religion separated our whole conception of the world into\ntwo different worlds, the intellectual but not subjectively conceived\nworld, and the temporal world. Therefore life as a whole fell into two\nparts, two kingdoms. Directly opposite the spiritual worldly kingdom\nthere stands the independent worldly kingdom, emperor against pope,\npapacy and Church\u2014not a state, but a worldly government; there the world\nbeyond, here the world beside us. Two absolutely essential principles\nconflict with one another; the rude ways of the world, the ruggedness of\nthe individual will, beget an opposition most terrible and severe. The\nculture which now begins to show itself is confronted by this incomplete\nreality, as an actual world in opposition to its world of thought; and\nit does not recognize the one as present in the other. It possesses two\nestablishments, two standards of measure and of weight, and these it does\nnot bring together but leaves mutually estranged.\n\nThe spiritual kingdom likewise has as Church an immediate present of\nordinary actuality, but the worldly kingdom, both as external nature and\nas the real self of consciousness, has no truth or value in itself; for\ntruth, as lying beyond it\u2014the measure of truth that shines in it\u2014is given\nto it from without as something inconceivable and in itself complete. The\nworldly kingdom must thus be subject to the spiritual become worldly;\nthe emperor is hence defender and protector of the Church (_advocatus\necclesi\u00e6_). The worldly element, in a certain sense, takes up a position\nof independence, no doubt, but it is still in unity with the other\nin such a way that it recognizes the spiritual as dominant. In this\nopposition a war must arise both on account of the worldly element which\nis present in the Church itself, and likewise on account of the directly\nworldly element of violence and of barbarism in worldly rule as it exists\n_per se_. The war must at first, however, prove disastrous to the worldly\nside, for just as its own position is asserted, the other is likewise\nrecognized by it, and it is forced humbly to submit to this last, to\nthe spiritual and its passions. The bravest, noblest emperors have been\nexcommunicated by popes, cardinals, legates, and even by archbishops and\nbishops; and they could do nothing in self-defence, nor put their trust\nin outward power, for it was internally broken; and thus they were ever\nvanquished and finally forced to surrender.\n\nIn the second place, as regards morality in the individual, we see on\nthe one hand religion in its truly noble and attractive form in a few\nisolated individuals alone. I refer to those solitary spirits who are\ndead to the world and far removed therefrom, who find in their emotions\nwhat satisfies them, and, living in a little circle, can limit themselves\nto the sphere of religion. This is the case with women in the Middle\nAges, or with the monks or other solitaries who were able to preserve\nthemselves in a restricted and contracted state of fervour such as this,\nin which the spiritual side makes itself infinitely felt, although it\nlacks actuality. The one truth stood isolated and alone in man, the whole\nactuality of mind was not yet penetrated by it. On the other hand it\nis, however, essential that mind as will, impulse and passion, should\ndemand quite another position, another mode of venting and realizing\nitself, than any such solitary and contracted sphere affords, that the\nworld should require a more extended sphere of existence, an actual\nassociation of individuals, reason and thought coming together in\nactual relations and actions. This circle in which mind is realized\u2014the\nhuman life\u2014is, however, at first separated from the spiritual region of\ntruth. Subjective virtue partakes more of the character of suffering and\nprivation on its own account, morality is just this renunciation and\nself-surrender, and virtue as regards others merely has the character\nof benevolence, a fleeting, accidental character destitute of relation.\nAll that pertains to actuality is hence not perfected by the truth,\nwhich remains a heavenly truth alone, a Beyond. Actuality, the earthly\nelement, is consequently God-forsaken and hence arbitrary; a few isolated\nindividuals are holy, and the others are not holy. In these others we\nfirst see the holiness of a moment in the quarter of an hour of worship,\nand then for weeks a life of rudest selfishness and violence and the most\nruthless passion. Individuals fall from one extreme into another, from\nthe extreme of rude excess, lawlessness, barbarism, and self-will, into\nthe renunciation of all things without exception, the conquest of all\ndesires.\n\nThe great army of the Crusaders gives us the best example of this. They\nmarch forth on a holy errand, but on the way they give free vent to all\nthe passions, and in this the leaders show the example; the individuals\nallow themselves to fall into violence and heinous sin. Their march\naccomplished, though with an utter lack of judgment and forethought,\nand with the loss of thousands on the way, Jerusalem is reached: it is\nbeautiful when Jerusalem comes in view to see them all doing penance in\ncontrition of heart, falling on their faces and reverently adoring. But\nthis is only a moment which follows upon months of frenzy, foolishness\nand grossness, which everywhere displayed itself on their march. Animated\nby the loftiest bravery, they go on to storm and conquer the sacred\ncitadel, and then they bathe themselves in blood, revel in endless\ncruelties, and rage with a brutal ferocity. From this they again pass on\nto contrition and penance; then they get up from their knees reconciled\nand sanctified, and once more they give themselves up to all the\nlittleness of miserable passions, of selfishness and envy, of avarice and\ncupidity: their energies are directed to the satisfaction of their lusts,\nand they bring to nought the fair possession that their bravery had won.\nThis comes to pass because the principle is only present in them in its\nimplicitude as an abstract principle, and the actuality of man is not as\nyet spiritually formed and fashioned. This is the manner in which the\nopposition in actuality manifests itself.\n\nIn the third place, we reach the opposition existing in the content of\nreligion, in the religious consciousness; this has many forms, though\nwe have here only to call to mind those that are most inward. On the\none hand, we have the Idea of God\u2014that He is known as the Trinity; on\nthe other, we have worship, _i.e._ the process of individuals making\nthemselves conformable to spirit, to God, and reaching the certainty of\nentering the kingdom of God. A present and actual church is an actuality\nof the kingdom of God upon earth, in such a way that this last is present\nfor every man\u2014every individual lives and must live in the kingdom of\nGod. In this disposition we have the reconciliation of every individual;\nthereby each becomes a citizen of this kingdom, and participates in the\nenjoyment of this certainty. But this reconciliation is allied to the\nfact that in Christ the unity of the divine and human nature is shown\nforth, that is to say, the way in which the spirit of God must be present\nin man. This Christ thus cannot be one who is past and gone, and the life\nof reconciliation cannot be a mere recollection of that past. For as the\njust behold Christ in heaven, so must Christ be an object on earth which\nmay likewise be beheld. In that case this process must be present\u2014the\nindividual must be united to this to him objective form, and it becomes\nidentical with him; the history of Christ, that God reveals Himself as\nman, sacrifices Himself, and through this sacrifice raises Himself to\nthe right hand of God, is in the individual always being accomplished\nin the culminating point which is called the sacrifice of the mass. The\nmediating element to which the individual relates himself in worship, is\never present in the mass as the objective of which the individual must be\nmade to partake, as the Host and the act of partaking of the same. This\nHost, on the one hand, as objective, is held to be divine, and, on the\nother, it is in form an unspiritual and external thing. But that is the\nlowest depth of externality reached in the Church; for in this perfect\nexternality it is before the thing that the knee must be bowed, and not\nin as far as it is an object that may be partaken of. Luther changed\nthis way of regarding matters; in what is called the Supper, he has\nretained the mystical fact that the subject receives the divine element\ninto himself; but he maintains that it is only divine in so far as it is\npartaken of in this subjective spirituality of faith, and ceases to be\nan external thing. But in the Church of the Middle Ages, in the Catholic\nChurch generally, the Host is honoured even as an external thing; thus\nif a mouse eats of the Host, both it and its excrements are reverenced;\nthere the divine element has altogether the form of externality. This\nis the central point of intense opposition which is on the one hand\ndissolved, and on the other remains in perfect contradiction, so that the\nHost, still held to be a merely external thing, must nevertheless be thus\nhigh and absolute.\n\nWith this externality the other side is connected\u2014the consciousness\nof this relation\u2014and here we then have the consciousness of what is\nspiritual, of what is the truth, in the possession of a priesthood.\nThus as thing it is naturally also in the possession of another, from\nwhom, since it is something distinguished by itself, it has to receive\nits distinction\u2014or it must be consecrated\u2014and this last is likewise an\nexternal action only, performed by individuals. The power to give this\ndistinction to the thing is in the possession of the Church; from the\nChurch the laity receive it.\n\nBut besides all this, the relationship of the subject in himself, the\nfact that he belongs to the Church and is a true member of the same,\nmust be considered. After the admission of individuals into the Church\ntheir participation therein must likewise be brought about\u2014that is,\ntheir purification from sin. To this it is, however, essential, in the\nfirst place, that it should be known what evil is, and secondly, that\nthe individual should desire the good and that pertaining to religion;\nand thirdly, that sin should be committed from an innate and natural\nsinfulness. Now since what is inward, or conscience, must be of a right\nnature, the sins that are committed must be removed, and made as though\nthey had not happened; man must ever be purified, baptized anew, so to\nspeak, and received back again: the negation that shuts him out must\never be removed. Against this sinfulness positive commands and laws are\nnow given, so that from the nature of spirit men cannot know what is\ngood and evil. Thus the divine law is an external, which must hence\nbe in someone\u2019s possession; and priests are separated from others, so\nthat they are exclusively acquainted both with the particular details of\ndoctrine and the means of grace, _i.e._ the mode whereby the individual\nis religious in his worship and comes to know that he participates in\nthe divine. In the same way that the administration of the means of\ngrace belongs as an outward possession to the Church in relation to\nworship, so is the Church also in possession of a moral estimate for\njudging of the actions of individuals; it is in the possession of the\nconscience, as of knowledge as a whole, so that man\u2019s inmost essence, his\naccountability, passes into other hands and to another person, and the\nsubject is devoid of individuality even in his inmost self. The Church\nalso knows what the individual ought to do; his faults must be known,\nand another, the Church, knows them; the sins must be taken away, and\nthis also is effected in an external way, through purchase, fasting and\nstripes, through journeyings, pilgrimages, &c. Now this is a relation of\nself-suppression, unspirituality and deadness both of knowledge and will,\nin the highest things as well as in the most trivial actions.\n\nThese are the main facts as regards externality in religion itself, on\nwhich all further determinations depend.\n\n3. We have now obtained a better idea of the elements present in this\nphilosophy; but in barbaric nations Christianity could have this form\nof externality alone, and this pertains to history. For the dulness\nand frightful barbarism of such nations must be met by servitude, and\nthrough this service must their education be accomplished. Man serves\nunder this yoke; this fearful discipline had to be gone through if the\nTeutonic nations were to be raised into spiritual life. But this severe\nand wearisome service has an end, an object; infinite spring and infinite\nelasticity, the freedom of spirit, is the prize. The Indians are in equal\nservitude, but they are irrevocably lost\u2014identified and identical with\nnature, yet in themselves opposed to nature. Knowledge is thus limited\nto the Church, but in this very knowledge a positive authority is firmly\nrooted, and it is a prominent feature of this philosophy, whose first\nquality is consequently that of lack of freedom. Thought thus does not\nappear as though it proceeded from itself and was grounded in itself, but\nas being really independent of self and depending on a given content, the\ndoctrine of the Church\u2014which, although speculative itself, also contains\nthe mode of the immediate existence of external objects.\n\nIn theological form it may be said that, in general, the Middle Ages\nsignify the dominion of the Son and not of Spirit; for this last is still\nin the possession of the priesthood. The Son has differentiated Himself\nfrom the Father, and is regarded as remaining in this differentiation,\nso that the Father in Him is only implicit; but in the unity of both we\nfirst reach Spirit, the Son as Love. If we remain a moment too long in\nthe difference without likewise asserting the identity, the Son is the\nOther; and in this we find the Middle Ages defined and characterized. The\ncharacter of Philosophy in the Middle Ages is thus in the second place\nan attempt to think, to conceive, to philosophize under the burden of\nabsolute hypotheses; for it is not the thinking Idea in its freedom, but\nset forth in the form of an externality. We thus find here in Philosophy\nthe same character as is present in the general condition of things,\nand for this reason I before called to mind the concrete character that\nprevails; for on every period of time one special characteristic is\nalways imprinted. The philosophy of the Middle Ages thus contains the\nChristian principle, which is the highest incentive to thought, because\nthe Ideas therein present are thoroughly speculative. Of this one side is\nthat the Idea is grasped by the heart, if we call the individual man the\nheart. The identity of the immediate individuality with the Idea rests\nin this, that the Son, the mediator, is known as _this_ man; this is the\nidentity of spirit with God for the heart as such. But the connection\nitself, since it is likewise a connection with God in God, is hence\nimmediately mystical and speculative; thus here there is the call to\nthought which was first of all responded to by the Fathers, and then by\nthe scholastics.\n\nBut since, in the third place, there exists the opposition between\nthe doctrine of the Church and the worldly man\u2014who has indeed through\nthought worked his way out of this same barbarism, but who in his\nhealthy human understanding has not yet penetrated to reason\u2014the mode\nin which Philosophy was treated at this time for the setting forth of\nformal thought, has still no concrete content. We may appeal to the\nhuman concrete mind; in it we have a living present as thinking and\nfeeling; a concrete content such as this has its root in the thought of\nman, and constitutes the material for his independent consciousness.\nFormal thought directs its course by this; the wanderings of abstract\nreflection have in such consciousness an aim, which sets a limit upon\nthem, and leads them back to a human concrete. But the reflections of the\nscholastics on such a content depend unsupported on the determinations\nof formal thought, on formal conclusions; and all the determinations\nregarding natural relationships, laws of nature, &c., that may issue,\nreceive as yet no sustenance from experience; they are not yet\ndetermined by the healthy human understanding. In this respect the\ncontent likewise is unspiritual, and these unspiritual relationships are\ninverted and carried into the spiritual in so far as advance is made to\ndeterminateness of a higher kind. These three points constitute the main\ncharacteristics of this philosophy.\n\nMore particularly we would shortly deal with the chief representatives\nof this philosophy. Scholastic philosophy is considered to begin with\nJohn Scotus Erigena who flourished about the year 860, and who must\nnot be confused with the Duns Scotus of a later date. We do not quite\nknow whether he belonged to Ireland or to Scotland, for Scotus points\nto Scotland, and Erigena to Ireland. With him true philosophy first\nbegins, and his philosophy in the main coincides with the idealism of the\nNeo-Platonists. Here and there stray works of Aristotle were likewise\nknown, even to John Scotus, but the knowledge of Greek was very limited\nand rare. He shows some knowledge of the Greek and Hebrew tongues, and\neven of Arabic as well; but we do not know how he attained to this. He\nalso translated from Greek to Latin writings of Dionysius the Areopagite,\na later Greek philosopher of the Alexandrian school, who more especially\nfollowed Proclus: namely, _De c\u0153lesti hierarchia_, and others which\nBrucker calls (Hist. crit. phil. T. III. p. 521), _nug\u00e6 et deliria\nPlatonica_. Michael Balbus, Emperor of Constantinople, had in the year\n824 made a present of these works to the Emperor Louis the Pious; Charles\nthe Bald caused them to be translated by Scotus, who long resided at his\ncourt. In this way something of the Alexandrian philosophy became known\nin the West. The Pope quarrelled with Charles, and complained to him of\nthe translator, against whom he made the reproach that \u201che should have\nfirst sent the book to him in conformity with the general usage, and\nasked his approval.\u201d John Scotus afterwards lived in England as head of a\nschool at Oxford, which had been founded by King Alfred.[16]\n\nScotus was also the author of some original works, which are not without\ndepth and penetration, upon nature and its various orders (_De natur\u00e6\ndivisione_), &c. Dr. Hjort, of Copenhagen, published an epitome of\nthe writings of Scotus Erigena, in 1823. Scotus Erigena sets to work\nphilosophically, expressing himself in the manner of the Neo-Platonists,\nand not freely, and as from himself. Thus in the method of expression\nadopted by Plato, and also by Aristotle, we are rejoiced to find a new\nconception, and on bringing it to the test of philosophy, to find it\nboth correct and profound; but here everything is ready to hand, cut and\ndry. Yet, with Scotus, theology is not yet built on exegesis, and on the\nauthority of the Church; the Church in many cases rejected his writings.\nThus Scotus is reproached by a Lyons church council in these words:\n\u201cThere have come to us the writings of a boastful, chattering man, who\ndisputes about divine providence and predestination, in human fashion,\nor, as he himself boasts, with philosophic arguments, and without\nrelying on the holy scriptures and bringing forward the authority of the\nFathers. And he dares to defend this on its own merit, and to establish\nit on its own laws, without submitting himself to the holy scriptures\nand the authority of the Fathers.\u201d[17] Scotus Erigena hence even said:\n\u201cThe true Philosophy is the true Religion, and the true Religion is the\ntrue Philosophy.\u201d[18] The separation came later on. Scotus then made a\nbeginning, but properly he does not belong to the scholastics.\n\n\nB. GENERAL HISTORICAL POINTS OF VIEW.\n\nAll further scholastic philosophy attaches itself more to the doctrines\nof the Christian Church; the ecclesiastical system which it thereby made\nits necessary basis, became early established through church councils,\nwhile the faith of the Evangelical Church already prevailed before\nthe time of these councils from which the Catholic Church derives its\nsupport. The most important and most interesting thoughts which pertain\nto the scholastics, are, on the one hand, the strife between nominalism\nand realism; and, on the other, the proof of the existence of God\u2014quite a\nnew manifestation.\n\n\n1. THE BUILDING UP OF DOGMAS ON METAPHYSICAL GROUNDS.\n\nThe efforts of the scholastics were further directed, firstly, to the\nbuilding up of the dogmas of the Christian Church on metaphysical bases.\nAfter this, the collected doctrines of the Church were systematically\ntreated. Then the scholastics had branches or modifications of these\ndogmas, which were not determined by the doctrinal system. Those grounds\nthemselves, and then these further and special points of view, were\nobjects handed over for free discussion. Neo-Platonic philosophy was what\nlay before the theologians first of all; the manner of this school is\nrecognized in the older and purer scholastics. Anselm and Abelard are the\nmore distinguished of those who follow later.\n\n\na. ANSELM.\n\nAmongst those who wished to give additional proof of the doctrines of\nthe Church through thought, is Anselm, a man of great distinction and\nhigh repute. He was born at Aosta, in Piedmont, about 1034; in 1060 he\nbecame a monk at Bec, and in 1093 was raised to the rank of Archbishop\nof Canterbury; in 1109 he died.[19] He sought to consider and prove\nphilosophically the doctrines of the Church, and it has even been said of\nhim that he laid the basis for scholastic philosophy.\n\nHe speaks as follows of the relation of faith to thought: \u201cOur faith\nmust be defended by reason against the godless, and not against those\nwho glory in the name of Christian; for of these we may rightly demand\nthat they should hold firm to the obligations which they came under in\nbaptism. Those others must be shown through reason how irrationally\nthey strive against us. The Christian must go on through faith to\nreason, and not come from reason to faith; but if he cannot attain to\ncomprehension, he must still less depart from faith. For if he is able to\npress on to knowledge, he rejoices therein; when he is unable so to do,\nhe humbly adores.\u201d[20] He makes a noteworthy remark, which contains his\nwhole philosophy, in his work _Cur Deus homo_ (I. 2), which is rich in\nspeculative thought: \u201cIt appears to me great negligence if we are firm\nin the faith, and do not seek also to comprehend what we believe.\u201d Now\nthis is declared to be arrogance; immediate knowledge, faith, is held to\nbe higher than knowledge. But Anselm and the scholastics maintained the\nopposite view.\n\nAnselm may be regarded from this point of view as quite specially the\nfounder of scholastic theology. For the thought of proving through\na simple chain of reasoning what was believed\u2014that God exists\u2014left\nhim no rest day and night, and tortured him for long. At first he\nbelieved his desire to prove the divine truths through reason to be a\ntemptation of the devil, and he was in great anxiety and distress on\nthat account; finally, however, success came to him by the grace of God\nin his _Proslogium_.[21] This is the so-called ontological proof of\nthe existence of God which he set forth, and which made him specially\nfamous. This proof was included among the various proofs up to the time\nof Kant, and\u2014by some who have not yet reached the Kantian standpoint\u2014it\nis so included even to the present day. It is different from what we\nfind and read of amongst the ancients. For it was said that God is\nabsolute thought as objective; for because things in the world are\ncontingent, they are not the truth in and for itself\u2014but this is found\nin the infinite. The scholastics also knew well from the Aristotelian\nphilosophy the metaphysical proposition that potentiality is nothing by\nitself, but is clearly one with actuality. Later, on the other hand, the\nopposition between thought itself and Being began to appear with Anselm.\nIt is noteworthy that only now for the first time through the Middle\nAges and in Christianity, the universal Notion and Being, as it is to\nordinary conception, became established in this pure abstraction as these\ninfinite extremes; and thus the highest law has come to consciousness.\nBut we reach our profoundest depths in bringing the highest opposition\ninto consciousness. Only no advance was made beyond the division as\nsuch, although Anselm also tried to find the connection between the\nsides. But while hitherto God appeared as the absolute existent, and the\nuniversal was attributed to Him as predicate, an opposite order begins\nwith Anselm\u2014Being becomes predicate, and the absolute Idea is first of\nall established as the subject, but the subject of thought. Thus if\nthe existence of God is once abandoned as the first hypothesis, and\nestablished as a result of thought, self-consciousness is on the way to\nturn back within itself. Then we have the question coming in, Does God\nexist? while on the other side the question of most importance was, What\nis God?\n\nThe ontological proof, which is the first properly metaphysical proof\nof the existence of God, consequently came to mean that God as the Idea\nof existence which unites all reality in itself, also has the reality\nof existence within Himself; this proof thus follows from the Notion of\nGod, that He is the universal essence of all essence. The drift of this\nreasoning is, according to Anselm (Proslogium, c. 2), as follows: \u201cIt is\none thing to say that a thing is in the understanding, and quite another\nto perceive that it exists. Even an ignorant person (_insipiens_) will\nthus be quite convinced that in thought there is something beyond which\nnothing greater can be thought; for when he hears this he understands\nit, and everything that is understood is in the understanding. But that\nbeyond which nothing greater can be thought cannot certainly be in the\nunderstanding alone. For if it is accepted as in thought alone, we may go\non farther to accept it as existent; that, however, is something greater\u201d\nthan what is merely thought. \u201cThus were that beyond which nothing greater\ncan be thought merely in the understanding, that beyond which nothing\ngreater can be thought would be something beyond which something greater\ncan be thought. But that is truly impossible; there thus without doubt\nexists both in the understanding and in reality something beyond which\nnothing greater can be thought.\u201d The highest conception cannot be in\nthe understanding alone; it is essential that it should exist. Thus it\nis made clear that Being is in a superficial way subsumed under the\nuniversal of reality, that to this extent Being does not enter into\nopposition with the Notion. That is quite right; only the transition is\nnot demonstrated\u2014that the subjective understanding abrogates itself.\nThis, however, is just the question which gives the whole interest to the\nmatter. When reality or completion is expressed in such a way that it is\nnot yet posited as existent, it is something thought, and rather opposed\nto Being than that this is subsumed under it.\n\nThis mode of arguing held good until the time of Kant; and we see in it\nthe endeavour to apprehend the doctrine of the Church through reason.\nThis opposition between Being and thought is the starting point in\nphilosophy, the absolute that contains the two opposites within itself\u2014a\nconception, according to Spinoza, which involves its existence likewise.\nOf Anselm it is however to be remarked that the formal logical mode of\nthe understanding, the process of scholastic reasoning is to be found\nin him, the content indeed is right, but the form faulty. For in the\nfirst place the expression \u201cthe thought of a Highest\u201d is assumed as\nthe _prius_. Secondly, there are two sorts of objects of thought\u2014one\nthat is and another that is not; the object that is only thought and\ndoes not exist, is as imperfect as that which only is without being\nthought. The third point is that what is highest must likewise exist.\nBut what is highest, the standard to which all else must conform, must\nbe no mere hypothesis, as we find it represented in the conception of a\nhighest acme of perfection, as a content which is thought and likewise\n_is_. This very content, the unity of Being and thought, is thus indeed\nthe true content; but because Anselm has it before him only in the form\nof the understanding, the opposites are identical and conformable to\nunity in a third determination only\u2014the Highest\u2014which, in as far as\nit is regulative, is outside of them. In this it is involved that we\nshould first of all have subjective thought, and then distinguished from\nthat, Being. We allow that if we think a content (and it is apparently\nindifferent whether this is God or any other), it may be the case that\nthis content does not exist. The assertion \u201cSomething that is thought\ndoes not exist\u201d is now subsumed under the above standard and is not\nconformable to it. We grant that the truth is that which is not merely\nthought but which likewise is. But of this opposition nothing here is\nsaid. Undoubtedly God would be imperfect, if He were merely thought and\ndid not also have the determination of Being. But in relation to God\nwe must not take thought as merely subjective; thought here signifies\nthe absolute, pure thought, and thus we must ascribe to Him the quality\nof Being. On the other hand if God were merely Being, if He were not\nconscious of Himself as self-consciousness, He would not be Spirit, a\nthought that thinks itself.\n\nKant, on the other hand, attacked and rejected Anselm\u2019s proof\u2014which\nrejection the whole world afterwards followed up\u2014on the ground of its\nbeing an assumption that the unity of Being and thought is the highest\nperfection. What Kant thus demonstrates in the present day\u2014that Being\nis different from thought and that Being is not by any means posited\nwith thought\u2014was a criticism offered even in that time by a monk named\nGaunilo. He combated this proof of Anselm\u2019s in a _Liber pro insipiente_\nto which Anselm himself directed a reply in his _Liber apologeticus\nadversus insipientem_.[22] Thus Kant says (Kritik der reinen Vernunft,\np. 464 of the sixth edition): If we think a hundred dollars, this\nconception does not involve existence. That is certainly true: what is\nonly a conception does not exist, but it is likewise not a true content,\nfor what does not exist, is merely an untrue conception. Of such we do\nnot however here speak, but of pure thought; it is nothing new to say\nthey are different\u2014Anselm knew this just as well as we do. God is the\ninfinite, just as body and soul, Being and thought are eternally united;\nthis is the speculative, true definition of God. To the proof which Kant\ncriticizes in a manner which it is the fashion to follow now-a-days,\nthere is thus lacking only the perception of the unity of thought and of\nexistence in the infinite; and this alone must form the commencement.\n\nOther proofs such, for example, as the cosmological, which argues from\nthe contingency of the world to an absolute existence, have thereby\nnot reached the idea of absolute essence as spirit, and are without\nconsciousness of the fact that it is an object of thought. The old\nphysico-theological proof, which even Socrates possessed, from beauty,\norder, organic ends, indeed implies an understanding, a richer thought\nof absolute existence, and not alone an indeterminate Being, but in this\nproof it likewise remains unknown that God is the Idea. And then what\nsort of an understanding is God? A different and immediate one; then\nthis spirit is independent. Further, disorder likewise exists, and thus\nthere must be something else conceived of than this apparent order of\nnature only. But from asking about the existence of God, from making his\nobjective mode a predicate and thus knowing that God is Idea, to pass to\nmaking the absolute existence I = I, thinking self-consciousness, not as\npredicate but in such a way that each thinking I is the moment of this\nself-consciousness\u2014is still a long stride. Here, where we see this form\nfirst emerge, absolute existence is clearly to be taken as the Beyond of\nfinite consciousness; this is to itself the null and void, and it has\nnot yet grasped its sense of self. Its thoughts regarding things are\nmanifold, and the mere fact of being a thing is to it likewise just such\na predicate as the rest; but it is thereby not yet turned back within\nitself, it knows of existence, but not of itself.\n\nIn this, says Tennemann (Vol. VIII. Sec. I. p. 121), \u201cAnselm has laid\nthe first formal ground of scholastic theology;\u201d but even before this\nthe same was present, only to a more limited extent, and merely for\nindividual dogmas\u2014as is also the case with Anselm. His writings bear\nwitness of great penetration and mental ability; and he gave rise to\nthe philosophy of the scholastics, inasmuch as he united theology to\nphilosophy. The theology of the Middle Ages thus stands much higher than\nthat of modern times; never have Catholics been such barbarians as to\nsay that there should not be knowledge of the eternal truth, and that it\nshould not be philosophically comprehended. This is one point which has\nto be specially noted in Anselm, the other is that he apprehended in its\nunity that highest opposition between thought and Being spoken of above.\n\n\nb. ABELARD.\n\nWith Anselm Peter Abelard is associated, both being mainly concerned\nin the introduction of philosophy into theology. Abelard lived about\n1100\u2014from 1079 to 1142\u2014and is famed for his learning, but still more\nfamed in the world of sentiment and passion for his love to Heloise and\nhis after fate.[23] After the days of Anselm he attained to great repute,\nand he followed him in his treatment of the doctrines of the Church, more\nespecially seeking to give a philosophic proof of the Trinity. He taught\nat Paris. Paris about this time was to the theologians what Bologna was\nto the jurists, the central point of the sciences; it was at that time\nthe seat of philosophizing theology. Abelard often delivered his lectures\nthere before a thousand listeners. Theological science and philosophizing\nregarding it, was in France (as was jurisprudence in Italy) a matter\nof great importance, which, as most significant in the development of\nFrance, has hitherto been too much neglected. The conception prevailed\nthat philosophy and religion were one and the same; which they absolutely\nspeaking are. But the distinction was soon reached, \u201cthat much may be\ntrue in philosophy and false in theology:\u201d this the Church denied.\nTennemann (Vol. VIII. Sec. II. pp. 460, 461) quotes as follows from a\nrescript of the Bishop Stephen: \u201cThey say that this is true according to\nphilosophy, and not according to the Catholic faith, just as if there\nwere two contradictory truths, and as if in the doctrines of the accursed\nheathen a truth contradictory to the truth of the holy scriptures could\nbe present.\u201d While then undoubtedly, through the separation of the four\nfaculties in the University of Paris which came about in 1270, philosophy\nbecame separated from theology, it was yet forbidden to it to subject\ntheological beliefs and dogmas to disputation.[24]\n\n\n2. METHODICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE DOCTRINAL SYSTEM OF THE CHURCH.\n\nWe now go on to the more definite form which the scholastic theology\nreached; for in a second development of scholastic philosophy the main\nendeavour became to make the teaching of the Christian Church methodical,\nwhile still keeping its connection with all previous metaphysical\narguments. These and their counter-arguments were placed side by side in\nstating every dogma, so that theology became represented in a scientific\nsystem, while before this the ecclesiastical teaching in the general\neducation of the clergy was limited to the propounding of successive\ndogmas, and the writing down of passages from Augustine and other Fathers\nbearing on each proposition.\n\n\na. PETER LOMBARD.\n\nPeter of Novara in Lombardy was the first of those who brought this\nto pass; he dates from the middle of the twelfth century, and was the\noriginator of this method. He died in the year 1164. Petrus Lombardus set\nforth a whole system of scholastic theology which remained for several\ncenturies the basis of the doctrine of the Church. He composed to that\nend his _Quatuor libros sententiarum_, and hence he likewise received\nthe name _Magister sententiarum_. For in those times every learned\nschoolman had some predicate such as _Doctor acutus_, _invincibilis_,\n_sententiosus_, _angelicus_, &c. Others also availed themselves of the\nsame title for their works; thus Robert Pulleyn wrote _Sententiarum\nlibros octo_.[25]\n\nLombard collected the principal points in church doctrines from councils\nand Fathers, and then added subtle questions respecting particular items;\nwith these the schools occupied themselves, and they became a subject\nof disputation. He himself, indeed, answered these questions, but he\ncaused counter-arguments to follow, and his answer often left the whole\nmatter problematical, so that the questions were not properly decided.\nThe arguments are thus enumerated on either side; even the Fathers\ncontradicted themselves, and numerous passages from them were quoted by\nboth the opposed sides in support of their respective views. In this way\n_theses_ arose, then _qu\u00e6stiones_, in reply to these _argumenta_, then\nagain _positiones_, and finally _dubia_; according as men chose to take\nthe words in this sense or that, and followed this or that authority. Yet\na certain degree of method began to enter in.\n\nSpeaking generally, this middle of the twelfth century forms the epoch\nin which scholasticism became more universal as a learned theology.\nThe book of Lombard was all through the Middle Ages commentated by the\n_doctores theologic\u00e6 dogmatic\u00e6_, who were now held to be the recognized\nguardians of ecclesiastical doctrine, while the clergy had charge of the\nsoul. Those doctors had great authority, they held synods, criticized and\ncondemned this or that doctrine and book as heretical, &c., in synods or\nas the Sorbonne, a society of such doctors in the University of Paris.\nThey took the place of assemblages of the Church, and were something like\nthe Fathers in reference to the Christian doctrine. In particular they\nrejected the writings of the mystics like Amalrich and his disciple David\nof Dinant, who, resembling Proclus in their point of view, went back to\nunity. Amalrich, who was attacked as a heretic in 1204, for instance\nsaid, \u201cGod is all, God and the Creature are not different, in God all\nthings are, God is the one universal substance.\u201d David asserted, \u201cGod\nis the first matter and everything is one in matter, and God is just\nthis unity.\u201d He divided everything into three classes, bodies, souls,\neternal immaterial substances or spirits. \u201cThe indivisible principle of\nsouls is the \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2, and that of spirits is God. These three principles\nare identical and hence all things in essence are one.\u201d His books were\nburned.[26]\n\n\nb. THOMAS AQUINAS.\n\nThe other individual who was equally famous with Peter Lombard, was\nThomas Aquinas, born in 1224 of the noble race Aquino, in his paternal\ncastle Roccasicca, in the province of Naples. He entered the Order\nof Dominicans, and died in 1274 on a journey to a church council at\nLyons. He possessed a very extensive knowledge of theology, and also of\nAristotle; he was likewise called _Doctor angelicus_ and _communis_, a\nsecond Augustine. Thomas Aquinas was a disciple of Albertus Magnus, he\nwrote commentaries on Aristotle and on Petrus Lombardus; and he also\nhimself composed a _summa theologi\u00e6_ (that is, a system) which with his\nother writings obtained for him the greatest honour, and which became\none of the principal text-books in scholastic theology.[27] In this book\nthere are found, indeed, logical formalities\u2014not, however, dialectical\nsubtleties, but fundamental metaphysical thoughts regarding the whole\nrange of theology and philosophy.\n\nThomas Aquinas likewise added questions, answers and doubts, and he gave\nthe point on which the solution depended. The main business of scholastic\ntheology consisted in working out the _summa_ of Thomas. The principal\npoint was to make theology philosophic and more widely systematic; Peter\nLombard and Thomas Aquinas are best known in respect of this endeavour,\nand for long their works formed the basis of all further learned\nelaborations of doctrine. With Thomas, Aristotelian forms constitute\nthe basis\u2014that of substance (_forma substantialis_) is, for instance,\nanalogous to the entelechy (\u1f10\u03bd\u03ad\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1) of Aristotle. He said of the\ndoctrine of knowledge, that material things consist of form and matter;\nthe soul has the substantial form of the stone in itself.[28]\n\n\nc. JOHN DUNS SCOTUS.\n\nIn respect of the formal development of philosophic theology a third\nindividual is famous, namely, Duns Scotus, _Doctor subtilis_, a\nFranciscan, who was born at Dunston in the county of Northumberland,\nand who little by little obtained thirty thousand disciples. In the\nyear 1304 he came to Paris, and in 1308 to Cologne, as a doctor in the\nuniversity newly instituted there. He was received with great rejoicings,\nbut he died there of apoplexy soon after his arrival, and is said to\nhave been buried alive. He is supposed to have been only 34, according\nto others 43, and according to others again 63 years old, for the year\nof his birth is not known.[29] He wrote commentaries on the _Magister\nsententiarum_, which procured for him the fame of a very keen thinker,\nfollowing the order of beginning with the proof of the necessity of a\nsupernatural revelation as against the mere light of reason.[30] On\naccount of his power of penetration he has been likewise called the _Deus\ninter philosophos_. He was accorded the most excessive praise. It was\nsaid of him: \u201cHe developed philosophy to such an extent that he himself\nmight have been its discoverer if it had not already been discovered; he\n_knew_ the mysteries of the faith so well that he can scarcely be said to\nhave _believed_ them; he knew the secrets of providence as though he had\npenetrated them, and the qualities of angels as though he were himself an\nangel; he wrote so much in a few years that scarcely one man could read\nit all, and hardly any were able to understand it.\u201d[31]\n\nAccording to all testimony it appears that Scotus helped the scholastic\nmethod of disputation to reach its height, finding the material for\nthe same in arguments and counter-arguments arranged in syllogisms;\nhis manner was to add to each _sententia_ a long succession of\n_distinctiones_, _qu\u00e6stiones_, _problemata_, _solutiones_, _argumenta pro\net contra_. Because he also refuted his arguments in a similar series,\neverything fell once more asunder; hence he was held to be the originator\nof the quodlibetan method. The _Quodlibeta_ signified collections of\nmiscellaneous dissertations on individual objects in the every-day manner\nof disputation, which speaks of everything, but without systematic order\nand without any consistent whole being worked out and set forth; others,\non the other hand, wrote _summas_. The Latin of Scotus is exceedingly\nbarbarous, but well suited for exact philosophic expression; he invented\nan endless number of new propositions, terms and syntheses.\n\n\n3. ACQUAINTANCESHIP WITH ARISTOTELIAN WRITINGS.\n\nWe must further remark a third development, which proceeded from the\nexternal historical circumstance that in the end of the twelfth and in\nthe thirteenth century the Western theologians became more generally\nacquainted with the Aristotelian writings and their Greek and Arabian\ncommentators, in Latin translations from the Arabic. These now became\nmuch used by them, and were made the subject of further commentaries\nand discussions. The veneration, admiration and respect which Aristotle\nreceived, now reached its height.\n\n\na. ALEXANDER OF HALES.\n\nThe familiar acquaintance with Aristotle and the Arabians became first\nevident in Alexander of Hales (died 1245), the _Doctor irrefragabilis_.\nThe earlier stages by which this familiarity came about has been shown\nabove (p. 35). Hitherto the acquaintance with Aristotle was very slight,\nand through many centuries it was limited, as we saw above (p. 37), more\nespecially to his Logic, which had survived from the earliest times and\nwas transmitted in the works of Boethius, Augustine and Cassiodorus. It\nwas only when we came to Scotus Erigena that we found (p. 59) a knowledge\nof Greek, although it was quite unusual in his day. In Spain, under the\nArabians, the sciences flourished greatly. In particular the university\nof Cordova in Andalusia was a centre-point of learning; many from the\nlands of the West journeyed thither, just as even the Pope Sylvester\nII., so well known in his earlier days as Gerbert, escaped as a monk to\nSpain for the purpose of studying with the Arabs.[32] The sciences of\nmedicine and alchemy were diligently pursued. Christian doctors there\nstudied medicine under the Jewish-Arabian teachers. It was principally\nthe Aristotelian metaphysics and physics which were then known, and from\nthese abstracts (_summ\u00e6_) were constructed. The logic and metaphysics of\nAristotle were spun out with extreme fineness into endless distinctions,\nand brought into genuine syllogistic forms of the understanding, which\nconstituted for the most part the principle for the treatment of the\nsubject dealt with. In this way dialectic subtlety was much increased,\nwhile the properly speculative side in Aristotle remained for the spirit\nof externality, and consequently also of irrationality, in the background.\n\nThe Hohenstaufen emperor Frederick II. then sent for Aristotelian books\nfrom Constantinople and had them translated into Latin. At first,\nindeed, on the first appearance of the Aristotelian writings, the Church\nmade difficulties; the reading of his metaphysics and physics and the\nabstracts prepared therefrom, as also the exposition of the same, was\nforbidden by a church synod held at Paris 1209. Likewise in 1215 the\ncardinal Robert Corceo came to Paris and there held a visitation of the\nuniversity, on which occasion he ordained that regular lectures on the\ndialectical writings of Aristotle should be held while he forbade the\nreading of and lecturing on the metaphysics and natural philosophy of\nAristotle, and the abstracts prepared from them; he also condemned the\ndoctrines of the heretics David of Dinant and Amalrich and likewise the\nSpaniard Mauritius. Pope Gregory, in a bull issued to the University\nof Paris in 1231, without mentioning metaphysics, forbade the books of\nthe Physics to be read until they had been examined and purified from\nall suspicion of error. But later on, in 1366, it was on the other hand\nordained by two cardinals that no one could be made a _magister_ unless\nhe had studied the prescribed books of Aristotle\u2014amongst which were\nthe Metaphysics and some of the Physics\u2014and had proved himself capable\nof explaining them.[33] It was only much later on, however, when Greek\nliterature in general had again become widely diffused, that men became\nbetter acquainted with the Greek text of the Aristotelian writings.\n\n\nb. ALBERTUS MAGNUS.\n\nAmongst those who distinguished themselves through their commentaries\non Aristotle\u2019s writings, we must specially mention Albertus Magnus, the\nmost celebrated German schoolman, of the noble race of Bollstadt. Magnus\neither was his family name, or it was given him on account of his fame.\nHe was born in 1193 or 1205 at Lauingen on the Danube in Swabia, and\nbegan by studying at Padua, where his study is still shown to travellers.\nIn the year 1221 he became a Dominican friar, and afterwards lived at\nCologne as Provincial of his Order in Germany: in 1280 he died. It is\nsaid of him that in his youth he showed himself very dull and stupid,\nuntil, according to a legend, the Virgin Mary appeared to him in company\nwith three other beautiful women, incited him to the study of Philosophy,\nliberated him from his dulness of understanding, and promised him that\nhe should enlighten the Church, and, in spite of his science, should\nstill die in the faith. What happened was in accordance with this\nprophecy, for five years before his death he forgot all his philosophy\nas quickly as he learned it, and then actually died in the dulness and\northodoxy of his earlier years. Hence there is current regarding him an\nold saying: \u201cAlbert changed quickly from an ass into a philosopher, and\nfrom a philosopher into an ass.\u201d His learning was generally understood\nto consist largely of magic. For although natural objects have nothing\nto do with scholasticism proper, which was really perfectly blind to\nnature, he occupied himself much therewith; and amongst other devices\nhe manufactured a talking machine which alarmed his pupil Thomas of\nAquino, who even aimed a blow at it, thinking he saw therein a work of\nthe devil. Likewise the fact that he received and entertained William\nof Holland[34] in the middle of winter in a garden full of blossom, is\ncounted as magic.[35] While as for us\u2014we find the winter-garden in Faust\nquite natural.\n\nAlbert wrote a great deal, and twenty-one folios remain to us of his\nwritings. He wrote on Dionysius the Areopagite, commentated the _Magister\nsententiarum_, was specially conversant with the Arabians and the\nRabbis, as he was also well acquainted with the works of Aristotle,\nalthough he himself understood neither Greek nor Arabic. He likewise\nwrote on the Physics of Aristotle. There is found in him a remarkable\ninstance of deficient knowledge of the history of Philosophy. He derived\nthe name Epicurean (Opera, T.V. pp. 530, 531) from the fact that they\nidled away their time [auf der faulen Haut lagen] (\u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 _cutem_) or else\nfrom _cura_ because they concerned themselves with many useless things\n(_supercurantes_). He represents the Stoics as being something like our\nchoir-boys; he says that they were people who made songs (_facientes\ncantilenas_), and roamed about in porticoes. For, as he here remarks\nin a very learned way, the first philosophers clothed their philosophy\nin verses, and then sang them in halls and porches, and hence they\nare called standers in the porch (_Stoici_). Gassendi relates (_Vita\nEpicuri_, I. c. 11, p. 51) that Albertus Magnus mentioned as the first\nEpicureans, Hesiodus, Athalius or Achalius (of whom we know nothing),\nC\u00e6cina, or, as others call him, Tetinnus, a friend of Cicero, and\nIsaacus, the Jewish philosopher. How that is arrived at we do not know\nat all. Of the Stoics Albertus, on the contrary, mentions Speusippus,\nPlato, Socrates and Pythagoras. These anecdotes give us a picture of the\ncondition of culture in these times.\n\n\n4. OPPOSITION BETWEEN REALISM AND NOMINALISM.\n\nIn the fourth place we must mention an important matter, to which\nmuch attention was devoted in the Middle Ages, namely that particular\nphilosophic question which formed the subject of controversy between the\nRealists and the Nominalists, and the discussion of which was continued\nthrough very nearly the whole of the Scholastic period. Speaking\ngenerally, this controversy is concerned with the metaphysical opposition\nbetween the universal and the individual; it occupies the attention of\nScholastic philosophy for several centuries, and reflects great credit\nupon it. A distinction is drawn between the earlier and later Nominalists\nand Realists, but otherwise their history is very obscure; and we know\nmore of the theological aspect of the subject than of this.\n\n\na. ROSCELINUS.\n\nThe beginning of the controversy dates back to the eleventh century,\nRoscelinus being the earliest Nominalist. The famous Abelard, although\nhe professes to be an opponent of Roscelinus, is himself nothing more or\nless than a Nominalist. Roscelinus wrote also against the doctrine of the\nTrinity, and was pronounced guilty of heresy in 1092 at an ecclesiastical\ncouncil which met at Soissons. His influence was, however, but small.[36]\n\nThe matter in question is the universal as such (_universale_), or the\ngenus, the essence of things, what in Plato was called the Idea\u2014for\ninstance, Being, humanity, the animal. The followers of Plato asserted\nthat these universals exist; their existence was individualized, and\nthus \u2018tableness\u2019 was said to be also a real existence (_supra_, Vol. II.\np. 29). We make representations of a thing to ourselves, and say \u201cit is\nblue;\u201d this is a universal. The question now is whether such universals\nare something real in and for themselves, apart from the thinking\nsubject, and independent of the individual existing thing, so that they\nexist in the individual things independently of the individuality of\nthe thing and of each other; or whether the universal is only nominal,\nonly in the subjective representation, a thing of thought. Those who\nmaintained that the universals had a real existence apart from the\nthinking subject and distinct from the individual thing, and that the\nIdea alone constitutes the essence of things, were termed Realists\u2014a\nuse of the term in quite an opposite sense to that which passes current\nnow. I mean that this expression has for us the signification that\nthings as they are in their immediacy have an actual existence; and\nto this idealism is opposed, that being a name which was given later\nto the philosophy which ascribes reality to ideas alone, and asserts\nthat things as they appear in their individuality have no truth. The\nrealism of the Scholastics in the same way maintained that the Universal\nhas an independent, absolute existence, for Ideas are not liable to\ndestruction, like natural things, therefore they are immutable and the\nonly true existence. In opposition to this, the others, the Nominalists\nor Formalists, asserted that if generals or universals are formed,\nthese are only names, matters of form, representations which we make to\nourselves, a subjective generalization, a product of the thinking mind;\nthe individual alone is the real.\n\nThis is then the matter in question; it is of great interest, and is\nfounded upon a much higher opposition than any the ancients knew of.\nRoscelinus made universal conceptions arise only from the necessities\nof language. He maintained that ideas or universals, like Being, life,\nreason, are in themselves nothing but mere abstract notions or generic\nnames, which, as such, have in and for themselves no universal reality\nof their own: that which has Being and life is found in the individual\nalone. Against these assertions arguments are brought forward by which\none can see that the manner in which the Christian world was taken as\nbasis, often became in the highest degree ridiculous. For instance,\nAbelard reproaches Roscelinus for having asserted that no thing has\nparts, that only the words which denote the things are divisible.\nAbelard proved that according to Roscelinus, Christ did not eat a real\npart of the broiled fish, but only a part\u2014I do not know which\u2014of the\nword \u201cbroiled fish,\u201d since according to him there were no parts\u2014which\ninterpretation would be preposterous and highly blasphemous.[37] Our way\nof reasoning from \u201chealthy human understanding,\u201d is not much better.\n\n\nb. WALTER OF MORTAGNE.\n\nWalter of Mortagne (d. 1174) aimed at the union of the particular and the\nuniversal, saying that the universal must be individual, that universals\nmust be united with individuals in accordance with their essence.[38]\nIn later times the two rival factions were known to fame as Thomists,\nfrom the Dominican Thomas Aquinas, and Scotists, from the Franciscan\nJohannes Duns Scotus. Nevertheless, the original question as to whether\nuniversal notions have reality, and, if so, to what extent they have\nit, underwent a great variety of modifications and gradations, just as\nthe opposing parties received very various names. Nominalism, in its\ncrude form, declared universal notions to be mere names, which have\nreality only in speech, and it ascribed reality to individuals alone;\nRealism followed the exactly opposite course of attributing reality only\nto universals, while it considered that what distinguished individual\nthings was an accident only or a pure difference. Neither of these two\ntheories was correct in the manner of passing from the universal to the\nparticular. There were some, however, among the Schoolmen who grasped\nthe true conception that individuation, the limitation of the universal,\nand indeed of what is most universal, Being and entity, is a negation.\nOthers said that the limit is itself something positive, but that it is\nnot one with the universal by union with it, for it rather stands in a\nmetaphysical connection with it, that is, in a connection such as that\nwhich binds thought with thought. This implies that the individual is\nonly a clearer expression of what is already contained in the general\nconception; so that these conceptions, in spite of their being divided\ninto parts and differentiated, still remain simple; Being or entity,\nmoreover, really is a Notion.[39]\n\nThomas, who was a Realist, declared the universal Idea to be\nindeterminate, and placed individuation in determinate matter (_materia\nsignata_), _i.e._ matter in its dimensions or determinations. According\nto him, the original principle is the universal Idea; the form, as _actus\npurus_, may, as with Aristotle, exist on its own account; the identity of\nmatter and form, the forms of matter, as such, are further removed from\nthe original principle,\u2014while thinking substances are mere forms.[40] But\nfor Scotus the universal is rather the individual One, the one he thinks\nmay appear also in the other; he maintained therefore the principle of\nindividuation, and the formal character of the universal. In his view\nindeterminate matter becomes individual through an inward positive\naddition; the substantial forms of things are their real essence. Occam\nthus represents the views of Scotus: \u201cIn the thing that exists outside of\nthe soul the same Nature exists _realiter_ with the difference limiting\n(_contrahente_) it to a determinate individual, being only formally\ndistinguished, and in itself neither universal nor individual, but\nincompletely universal in the thing, and completely universal in the\nunderstanding.\u201d[41] Scotus racked his brains much over this subject. To\nuniversals the Formalists allowed only an ideal reality in the divine and\nhuman intellect beholding them.[42] We thus see how closely connected\nwith this is the thought which we first meet with in the Scholastics,\nnamely the seeking and giving of so-called proofs of God\u2019s existence\n(_supra_, pp. 62-67).\n\n\nc. WILLIAM OCCAM.\n\nThe opposition between Idealists and Realists appeared at an early stage,\nit is true, but it was not until later, after the time of Abelard, that\nit became the order of the day, and was invested with general interest.\nThis was brought about chiefly by the Franciscan William Occam, of the\nvillage of Occam in the county of Surrey in England, who was surnamed\n_Doctor invincibilis_, and flourished in the beginning of the fourteenth\ncentury: the year of his birth is unknown. He is greatly celebrated for\nhis skill in handling the weapons of logic; he is keen in discrimination\nand fertile in devising arguments and counter-arguments. Occam was a\nleading champion of Nominalism, which up to this time had found only\nhere and there a defender, like Roscelinus and Abelard; his numerous\nfollowers received the name of Occamists and were Franciscans, while\nthe Dominicans retained the name of Thomists. The conflict between\nNominalists and Realists raged with a burning vehemence, and was carried\nto the greatest extremes; a pulpit is still shown which was separated by\na wooden partition from the platform of the opponent, in order that the\ndisputants might not come to blows. Henceforth theology was taught under\ntwo forms (_theologia scholastica secundum utramque partem_). Owing to\nthe civil wars in France, politics also began gradually to affect the\nrelationship between the orders, and this lent increased importance to\nthe conflict into which jealousy had plunged the rival factions. In 1322,\nat a convention of his order, and also on other occasions, Occam and his\norder defended to the utmost of their power the claims of the different\nprinces, such as the King of France and the Emperor of Germany, Louis\nof Bavaria, against the pretensions of the Pope. Among the words of\nWilliam to the Emperor were these, \u201cDo thou defend me with the sword,\nand I will defend thee with the pen.\u201d Interdicts of the Paris University\nand Papal bulls were issued against Occam. The Paris University forbade\nhis doctrines to be taught or his works quoted. A special prohibition\nwas issued in 1340: \u201cNo teacher shall venture to assert plainly, or in\nso many words, that some familiar maxim of the author on whom he is\nlecturing is false, but shall either assent to it, or distinguish the\ntrue and the false significance; otherwise the dangerous result is to\nbe apprehended that the truths of the Bible might be in like manner\nrejected. No teacher shall assert that a maxim cannot be thus explained\nor further defined.\u201d Occam was excommunicated in 1328, and died at Munich\nin 1343.[43]\n\nOccam asks in one of his writings (_in libr. I. Sentent. Dist. II.\nQu\u00e6st. 4_), \u201cWhether what is immediately and proximately denoted by the\nuniversal and by the generic name is a real thing outside of the soul,\nsomething intrinsic and essential in the things to which it is common\nand which are called by its name, and yet in reality distinguished from\nthem.\u201d This definition of the Realists is given more in detail by Occam\nas follows: \u201cAs to this question, one opinion is that each generic\ndesignation or universal is a thing really existing outside of the soul\nin each and every individual, and that the Being (_essentia_) of each\nindividual is really distinguished from each individual\u201d (_i.e._ from\nits individuality), \u201cand from each universal. Thus man, the universal,\nis a true thing outside of the soul, which exists in reality in each\nhuman being, but is distinguished from each human being, from Universal\nliving nature, and from the universal substance, and in this way from\nall species and genera, those that are subordinate as well as those that\nare not subordinate.\u201d The universal, the common designation of all the\nindividuals, is therefore, according to this, not identical with the\nSelf, the ultimate point of subjectivity. \u201cAs many universal predicables\nas there are of any individual thing\u201d\u2014_e.g._ humanity, reason, Being,\nlife, quality, &c.\u2014\u201cso many really different things there are in nature,\neach of which is really distinct from the other and from that individual,\nand all these things are in no wise multiplied in themselves, however\nmuch the separate predicables are multiplied, which are in every\nindividual of the same kind.\u201d That is the most uncompromising way of\nstating the independence and isolation of every universal quality in a\nthing. Occam refutes this, saying: \u201cNothing which is one in number can,\nwithout being changed or multiplied, be present in several subjects\nor individuals. Science invariably restricts itself to propositions\nregarding the known; it is, therefore, a matter of no moment whether the\nterms of the propositions are known things outside of the soul, or only\nin the soul; and therefore it is not necessary for the sake of science to\nassume universal things, really distinct from individual things.\u201d\n\nOccam proceeds to state other opinions opposed to that first given; he\ndoes not exactly give his own decision, yet in this same passage (Qu\u00e6st.\n8) he, in the main, argues in favour of the opinion \u201cthat the universal\nis not something real that has explicit subjectivity (_esse subjectivum_)\nneither in the soul nor in the thing. It is something conceived, which,\nhowever, has objective reality (_esse objectivum_) in the soul, while\nthe external thing has this objective reality as an explicitly existent\nsubject (_in esse subjectivo_). This comes to pass in the following\nmanner. The understanding, which perceives a thing outside the soul,\nforms the mental image of a similar thing, so that, if it had productive\npower, it would, like an artist, exhibit it in an absolutely existing\nsubject, as numerically an individual distinct from any preceding. Should\nanyone be displeased by this manner of speaking of the mental image as\nbeing _formed_, it may be said that the mental image and every universal\nconception is a quality existing subjectively in the mind, which by its\nnature is the sign of a thing outside of the soul, just as the spoken\nword is a sign of the thing, arbitrarily instituted for marking out that\nthing.\u201d Tennemann says (Vol. VIII. Section II. p. 864): \u201cOne result of\nthis theory was that the principle of individuation, which had occupied\nto such an extent the attention of the Scholastics, was cast aside\nas utterly unnecessary.\u201d Thus the main question with the Scholastics\nconcerns the definition of the universal, and this was in itself highly\nimportant and significant for the culture of more modern times. The\nuniversal is the One, but not abstract; it is conceived or thought of as\ncomprehending all things in itself. With Aristotle the universal was, in\na judgment, the predicate of the subject in question; in a syllogism it\nwas the _terminus major_. With Plotinus, and especially with Proclus, the\nOne is still incommunicable, and is known only by its subordinate forms.\nBut because the Christian religion is a revelation, God is no longer\ntherein the unapproachable, incommunicable, a hidden mystery: for the\nvarious stages of the progression from Him are verily His manifestation,\nand the Trinity is thus the revealed. In this way the triads and the\nOne are not distinguished, but these three Persons in the Godhead are\nthemselves God and One, _i.e._ One as it is for another, as in itself\nrelative. The Father, the God of Israel, is this One; the moment of the\nSon and of the Spirit is the Most High in spiritual and bodily presence,\nthe former in the Church, the latter in Nature. With the Neo-Platonists\nthe universal is, on the contrary, only the first condition of things\nwhich then merely opens out and develops; with Plato and Aristotle it is\nrather the Whole, the All, the All in One.\n\n\nd. BURIDAN.\n\nBuridan, a Nominalist, inclines to the view of the Determinists that the\nwill is determined by circumstances. Against him is cited the case of\nthe ass which, being placed between two equal bundles of hay, perforce\nperished from hunger.\n\nLouis XI., in 1473, confiscated the books of the Nominalists and\ninterdicted the teaching of their doctrines, but in the year 1481 this\ninterdict was removed. In the theological and philosophical faculty\nAristotle is said to have been interpreted and studied, as were also his\ncommentators, Averro\u00ebs, Albertus Magnus, and Thomas Aquinas.[44]\n\n\n5. FORMAL DIALECTIC.\n\nThe study of dialectics was carried to a very great height, but it\nwas quite formal in character; this constitutes the fifth point for\nconsideration. With this is closely connected the interminable finding\nout of _termini technici_. This formal dialectic was very ingenious in\ndevising objects, problems and questions, destitute of all religious and\nphilosophic interest, on which to practise its method of procedure. The\nlast remark that we have, however, in this connection to make regarding\nthe Scholastics is this, that it was not only into the ecclesiastical\nsystem that they introduced all possible formal relations of the\nunderstanding, but that also objects intelligible in themselves\u2014the\nintellectual conceptions and religious ideas\u2014they represented as\nimmediately and sensuously real, as brought down into the externality\nof altogether sensuous relations, and in these relations subjected\nto systematic investigation. Originally, it is true, the basis was\nspiritual, but the externality in which it was at once comprehended,\nmade of the spiritual something perfectly unspiritual. It may therefore\nbe said that, on the one hand, the Scholastics showed great profundity\nin their treatment of Church dogma; and, on the other hand, that they\nsecularized it by placing it in quite inappropriate external relations;\nthus here we have the worst kind of secularity. For the dogma of the\nChurch explicitly contains, in the historical form of the Christian\nreligion, a number of ordinary conceptions determined in an external\nway, which are connected with the spiritual, it is true, but trench\nupon sensuous relationships. If a network of such relationships is then\ncontrived, there arises a host of oppositions, contrasts, contradictions,\nwhich have not the very slightest interest for us. It is this aspect of\nthe matter that the Scholastics have taken up and handled with finite\ndialectic; and it is on this account that the Scholastics in later times\nwere so much ridiculed. Of this I have some examples to give.\n\n\na. JULIAN, ARCHBISHOP OF TOLEDO.\n\nJulian, Archbishop of Toledo, sought, with as great earnestness as if\nthe salvation of the human race depended on it, to answer questions\nwhich contain an absurd assumption. In doing so he no less gives himself\nup to petty triflings than do the philologists when they institute\ninvestigations regarding Greek accents, metres, and verse-divisions.\nFor instance, there arises a question of this kind as to the dead. It\nis a dogma of the Church, that man will rise again; now if to this it\nbe added that he will be clothed with the body, we thereby enter the\nsensuous sphere. The following were inquiries which arose in connection\nwith this question: \u201cWhat will be the age of the dead when they rise?\nWill they rise as children, youths, grown men, or aged? In what form\nwill they rise? What will be the constitution of their bodies? Will the\nfat be again fat, and the lean again lean? Will the distinction of sex\ncontinue in that future life? Will those who rise again recover all\nthat they lost here in the way of nails and hair?\u201d[45] Thus a special\ndistinction was drawn between the actual dogma, which was indisputable,\nand the various aspects of the supersensuous world which are connected\nwith that dogma. These were regarded, though often only for the time\nbeing, as detached from the doctrinal system of the Church. For the\nsystem was not so definitely formulated but that anything in it might\nhave to be proved from the Fathers, until a council or a special synod\ndecided the point. Disputes were also possible regarding the proofs which\nwere given of the content of this system; and besides there was quite a\nlarge amount of matter which was open to discussion, and respecting which\nthe Scholastics\u2014with the exception, of course, of the noble men, renowned\nas _Doctores_ and writers,\u2014expressed themselves in finite syllogisms\nand forms, which degenerated into an utterly empty and formal craze for\ndisputation. The Scholastic Philosophy is thus the direct opposite of the\nempirical science of the understanding, with which curiosity is largely\nmingled, and which, careless of the Notion, follows after facts alone.\n\n\nb. PASCHASIUS RADBERTUS.\n\nAbout 840 another subject of discussion was raised, namely, the birth of\nChrist, whether it was natural or supernatural. This led to a protracted\ncontroversy. Paschasius Radbertus wrote two volumes, _De partu beat\u00e6\nvirginis_; and many others wrote and argued on the same topic.[46] They\nwent so far as even to speak of an accoucheur, and to discuss this\nsubject; and many questions were raised, to which our sense of what is\nfitting forbids us even to turn our thoughts.\n\nGod\u2019s wisdom, omnipotence, foresight, and predetermination led in the\nsame way to a host of contradictions in abstract, meaningless, local\nand trivial particulars, which concern not God. In the works of Petrus\nLombardus, where the Trinity, the Creation, and the Fall are dealt with,\nas also angels and their orders and ranks, questions are found such as\nwhether God\u2019s providence and predetermination would have been possible,\nhad nothing been created; and where God was before the Creation. Thomas\nof Strasburg answered: _Tunc ubi nunc, in se, quoniam sibi sufficit\nipse_.[47]\n\nLombardus goes on to ask \u201cIf God can know more than He knows?\u201d as if\npotentiality and actuality still remained distinguished; \u201cIf God retains\nat all times all power that He has once possessed? Where the angels were\nafter their creation? If the angels have always existed?\u201d A multitude\nof other questions of this kind are raised regarding the angels. Then\nhe asks: \u201cAt what age was Adam created? Why was Eve made from the rib,\nand not from some other part of the man? Why during sleep, and not when\nthe man was awake? Why did the first human pair not have intercourse in\nParadise? How the human race would have been propagated, if man had not\nsinned? If in Paradise children would have been born with limbs fully\ngrown, and the complete use of their senses? Why it was the Son, and not\nthe Father or the Holy Ghost, who became man?\u201d To do this rests in the\nvery Notion of the Son. \u201cIf God could not have also become incarnate in\nfemale form?\u201d[48]\n\nAdditional examples of _qu\u00e6stiones_ of this kind are given by those\nwho ridiculed such dialectic, for instance by Erasmus in his _Encomium\nmori\u00e6_: \u201cCould there be several sonships (_filiationes_) in Christ? Is\nthe proposition possible that God the Father hates the Son? Might God\nnot have also taken the form of a woman, or have passed into the devil?\nMight He not also have appeared in the form of an ass or of a pumpkin? In\nwhat manner would the pumpkin have preached and wrought miracles, and how\nwould it have been crucified?\u201d[49] Thus were intellectual determinations\ncombined and distinguished in a manner altogether without sense or\nthought. The main point is that the Scholastics were like barbarians\nin their way of handling divine things and bringing them into sensuous\ndeterminations and relations. They thus introduced a completely sensuous\nrigidity and these altogether external and senseless forms into the\npurely spiritual, thus bringing it to a lower and unspiritual level;\nHans Sachs similarly made a N\u00fcrnberg version of sacred history [die\ng\u00f6ttliche Geschichte vern\u00fcrnbergert]. In such representations as are\ngiven in the Bible of the wrath of God, or of the history of God\u2019s work\nof creation, it is said that God did this or that, naming some human and\nhomely action. God is certainly not to be looked on as something alien\nand unapproachable; on the contrary, we are to come to Him with courage\nand with all our heart. But to bring Him into the province of thought,\nand strive in earnest after a knowledge of Him, is a very different\nmatter. The reverse of this is to bring forward arguments _pro_ and\n_contra_, for they decide nothing, and are of no use; they are no more\nthan the assumptions which are only sensuous and finite determinations,\nand therefore infinite differences and distinctions. This barbarous use\nof the understanding is utterly irrational; it is like putting a golden\nnecklace on a sow. The One is the Idea of the Christian religion, and it\nis also the philosophy of the great and noble Aristotle; neither of the\ntwo could have been more bedraggled and besmirched, to so low a pass had\nthe Christians brought their spiritual Idea.\n\n\n6. MYSTICS.\n\nIn the above sketch we have mentioned the principal heads which come\nunder our consideration in studying Scholastic philosophy. With regard\nto this intrusion of distinctions of the understanding and sensuous\nrelations into that which in and for itself and by virtue of its very\nnature is spiritual, absolute and infinite, it is to be remarked that\nto this craze for reducing everything to the finite, some noble spirits\nhere and there opposed themselves. As such we must here, in the sixth\nplace, make honourable mention of the many great Scholastics who have\nbeen named Mystics, for although they are to be distinguished from the\nreal ecclesiastical Scholastics, they followed upon identical lines, and\nare closely connected with them. They took but little interest in these\ndiscussions and arguments, and maintained their purity in regard to\nChurch doctrines and philosophic speculation. Some of them were pious and\nspiritual men, who carried on their philosophic studies upon the lines of\nthe Neo-Platonic philosophy, as Scotus Erigena had done in earlier times.\nAmong them genuine philosophy is to be found\u2014termed also Mysticism; it\ntends to inwardness and bears a great resemblance to Spinozism. They also\nderived morality and the religious sentiment from actual feelings, and\nthe meditations and maxims we have from them embody these views.\n\n\na. JOHN CHARLIER.\n\nJohn Charlier, more generally known as Von Jerson or Gerson, was born in\n1363; he wrote a _theologia mystica_.[50]\n\n\nb. RAYMUNDUS OF SABUNDE.\n\nVery similar were the views expressed by Raymundus of Sabunde or Sabeyde,\na Spaniard of the fifteenth century, and professor at Toulouse about\nthe year 1437. In his _theologia naturalis_, which he handled in a\nspeculative spirit, he dealt with the Nature of things, and with the\nrevelation of God in Nature and in the history of the God-man. He sought\nto prove to unbelievers the Being, the trinity, the incarnation, the\nlife, and the revelation of God in Nature, and in the history of the\nGod-man, basing his arguments on Reason. From the contemplation of Nature\nhe rises to God; and in the same way he reaches morality from observation\nof man\u2019s inner nature.[51] This purer and simpler style must be set off\nagainst the other, if we are to do justice to the Scholastic theologians\nin their turn.\n\n\nc. ROGER BACON.\n\nRoger Bacon treated more especially of physics, but remained without\ninfluence. He invented gunpowder, mirrors, telescopes, and died in\n1294.[52]\n\n\nd. RAYMUNDUS LULLUS.\n\nRaymundus Lullus, the _Doctor illuminatus_, made himself famous chiefly\nby the art of thinking which he invented, which was called the _ars\nmagna_. He was born at Majorca in 1234, and was one of those eccentric,\nunsettled natures whose activity finds vent in all directions. He had a\nstrong inclination towards alchemy and great enthusiasm for the sciences\nin general, as well as a fiery, restless power of imagination. In his\nyouth he led a reckless life, throwing himself headlong into a round of\npleasures; then he retreated to a desert, and had there many visions\nof Jesus. At this time the impulse shaped itself in his ardent nature\nto dedicate his life to spreading the blessings of Christianity among\nthe Mohammedans in Asia and Africa. In order to carry on this work of\nconversion he learned Arabic, travelled through Europe and Asia, sought\nfor assistance from the Pope and all the crowned heads of Europe,\nwithout giving up, for all that, his interest in his \u2018Art.\u2019 He suffered\npersecution and passed through many hardships and strange adventures,\nperils of death, imprisonments, cruelties. He lived long in Paris at the\nbeginning of the fourteenth century, and was the author of well-nigh\nfour hundred works. After a life of the utmost restlessness, he died in\n1315, revered as a saint and martyr, his death being the result of cruel\ntreatment which he had suffered in Africa.[53]\n\nThe chief object aimed at in this man\u2019s \u2018Art\u2019 was an enumeration and\narrangement of the various concepts under which all objects fall, or\nof the pure categories according to which they can be determined, so\nthat it may be possible in regard to every object to indicate with\nease the conceptions applicable to it. Lullus is so systematic that he\nbecomes at times mechanical. He constructed a diagram in circles, on\nwhich were marked triangles through which the circles pass. In these\ncircles he arranged the various concepts, and strove to give a complete\ncatalogue of them. Some of the circles were fixed, others movable, and\nthey were six in number, two of them indicating the subjects, three the\npredicates, while the outermost circle represented possible questions.\nFor each class he had nine qualities, to indicate which he chose nine\nletters, B C D E F G H I K. Thus in the first place he wrote round the\ndiagram nine absolute predicates, goodness, greatness, duration, power,\nwisdom, volition, virtue, truth, splendour; then he wrote nine relative\npredicates, diversity, unanimity, opposition, beginning, middle, end,\nthe qualities of being greater, equal, or less; in the third place\nhe set down the questions Whether? What? Whence? Why? How great?\nOf what nature? When? Where? How and wherewith? the ninth of which\ncontains two determinations; in the fourth place he put nine substances\n(_esse_), viz. God (_divinum_), angel (_angelicum_), heaven (_c\u00e6leste_),\nman (_humanum_), _imaginativum_, _sensitivum_, _vegetativum_,\n_elementativum_, _instrumentativum_; in the fifth place were nine\naccidents, _i.e._ natural relations, viz. quantity, quality, relation,\nactivity, passivity, possession, position, time, place; and sixthly\nnine moral relations, the virtues, viz. justice, prudence, courage,\ntemperance, faith, hope, love, patience, piety; and the vices, viz. envy,\nwrath, inconstancy, covetousness, falsehood, gluttony, riotousness,\npride, sluggishness (_acedia_). These circles had to be placed in a\ncertain way, in order to give proper combinations. By turning them round\naccording to certain rules, by which all substances received the absolute\nand relative predicates which fitted them, it was supposed that there\nwould be obtained in every possible combination universal science, truth,\nand the knowledge of concrete objects in general.[54]\n\n\nC. GENERAL STANDPOINT OF THE SCHOLASTICS.\n\nAfter thus dealing with the subject in detail, we must pronounce judgment\non the Scholastics, and give an estimate of them. Though the subjects\nwhich they investigated were lofty, and though there were noble, earnest\nand learned individuals in their ranks, yet this Scholasticism on the\nwhole is a barbarous philosophy of the finite understanding, without\nreal content, which awakens no true interest in us, and to which we\ncannot return. For although religion is its subject matter, thought\nhere reached such an excessive point of subtlety that, as a form of\nthe mere empty understanding, it does nothing but wander amongst\nbaseless combinations of categories. Scholastic philosophy is this utter\nconfusion of the barren understanding in the rugged North German nature.\nWe see here two different worlds, a kingdom of life and a kingdom of\ndeath. The intellectual kingdom, which is outside and above, while in\nthe popular conception, is thereby brought within the sphere of the\nmere understanding and the senses, even though by nature it is purely\npeculative; and this does not take place as in art, but, on the contrary,\nafter the fashion of ordinary reality. As the relationship of Father\nand Son, to begin with, appealed to the senses, so the divine world was\nfurnished for the imaginative faculty and for purposes of devotion (in a\nway unknown to the disciples of Plato) with angels, saints and martyrs,\ninstead of with thoughts;\u2014or the thoughts are nothing but a rubbishy\nmetaphysic of the understanding. In the supersensuous world there was no\nreality of the thinking, universal, rational self-consciousness to be met\nwith: in the immediate world of sensuous nature, on the other hand, there\nwas no divinity, because nature was but the grave of God, in the same\nway that God was outside of nature. The existence of the Church, as the\ngovernment of Christ upon earth, is higher, it is true, than the external\nexistence which stands in contrast to it; for religion must rule our\ntemporal affairs, and through the subjection of worldly power the Church\nbecame a theocracy. But the divine kingdom, the dwelling-place of the\ndead, was to be reached only through the gate of death; yet the natural\nworld was dead to an equal degree\u2014all that lived in it was the vision\nof that other world, and hope\u2014it had no present. It was of no avail to\nintroduce mediators as a connecting link, the Virgin Mary, or the dead\nin a world beyond. The reconciliation was formal, not absolute; for it\nwas nothing but the longing of man for a satisfaction to be found only\nin another world. What purpose does all this serve? It lies behind us as\na thing of the past, and must continue useless to us on its own merits.\nThere is no good, however, in calling the Middle Ages a barbarous period.\nIt is a singular kind of barbarism, and is not simple and rude; for the\nabsolute Idea and the highest culture have sunk into barbarism, and that\nthrough the agency of thought. Thus we have here, on the one hand, the\nmost hideous form of barbarism and perversion, but, on the other hand,\nthe never-failing source of a higher reconciliation.\n\nIf we seek an immediate contrast to scholastic philosophy and\ntheology and their methods, we may say that it is to be found in the\n\u201chealthy human understanding,\u201d in outward and inward experience, in\nthe contemplation of nature, and in humanity. The character of Greek\nhumanity, for instance, was that everything concrete, everything that\npossessed interest for mind, had its place in the human breast, and its\nroot in the feelings and thoughts of man. Intelligent consciousness,\ncultured science, has in such content its real material\u2014that in which it\nis and remains at home with itself; knowledge busies itself on all sides\nwith that which concerns it, and remains true to itself, while both on\nits serious and its playful side it finds in this material, in Nature and\nits uniform laws, a standard and a guide by which to direct its course\naright. Even should we go astray on ground like this, our errors keep in\nview the fixed centre-point of the self-consciousness of the human mind,\nand as errors even they have a root therein, which as such forms the\njustification for them. It is only a one-sided withdrawal from the unity\nof this root with the altogether concrete ground-work and original, that\nis really faulty. What we see here, in contrast with the above, is the\ninfinite truth, expressed as spirit, committed to a nation of barbarians\nwho have not the self-consciousness of their spiritual humanity\u2014they\nhave a human breast, it is true, but not yet a human spirit. The absolute\ntruth does not yet make itself real and present in actual consciousness,\nbut men are torn out of themselves. They still find this content of\nspirit within themselves, introduced as into a strange vessel full of the\nmost intense impulses and desires of physical and intellectual life, but\nit is like a ponderous stone, whose enormous pressure they only feel,\nbut which they neither digest nor assimilate with their own impulses or\ndesires. Thus they can only find rest and reconciliation when they come\nabsolutely out of themselves, and they have become fierce and savage in\nthe very circumstances and by the very means which ought to have rendered\ntheir spirit peaceable and mild.\n\nJust as truth was not yet the foundation of reality, so science was\nlikewise destitute of firm basis. The understanding, when it comes to\nthink, applies itself, it is true, in the first place to the mysteries\nof religion, which, as an altogether speculative content, exist for the\nrational Notion only. But as Spirit, the rational element in question,\nhas not yet taken its place in thought, thought is still God-forsaken, it\nis still only abstract, finite understanding, a manner of thinking which\nis in itself quite formal and devoid of content, which is a stranger\nto subjects of such profundity as this, even when it is ostensibly\noccupying itself with the same. This understanding therefore draws its\ncontent entirely from things to which it remains altogether alien,\nand which remain altogether alien to it; yet it is not thereby at all\ncircumscribed, for it observes no bounds in its determinations and\ndistinctions. It is just as if one were to arbitrarily form and connect\npropositions, words and tones\u2014without making the presupposition that they\nshould by themselves express a concrete sense\u2014which need be only capable\nof being uttered, without having any restriction except possibility, that\nis, that they must not contradict each other.\n\nIn the second place, in so far as the understanding keeps to the given\nreligious content, it can prove this content; one can demonstrate that\nit must be so, just as if it were a geometrical proposition. But there\nstill remains something to be desired, in order that the satisfaction may\nbe complete; the content is proved, but I nevertheless do not understand\nit. Thus Anselm\u2019s excellent proposition (_supra_, pp. 63, 64) in which\nwe may perceive the general character of the scholastic understanding,\nis a proof, it may be admitted, of the existence of God, but it shows no\ncomprehension of it. Though I see the truth of the proposition, I have\nnot attained to the final point, the object of my desire; for there is\nlacking the I, the inner bond, as inwardness of thought. This lies only\nin the Notion, in the unity of the particular and the universal, of Being\nand thought. For the comprehension of this unity, without which there\ncould be no true proof, it was implied that further progress should not\ntake place after the manner of the understanding. It was necessary that\nfrom the nature of thought itself it should become evident how, taken on\nits own account, it negates itself, and how the determination of Being\nitself rests therein, or that the manner in which thought determines\nitself into Being should be shown forth. On the other hand it must in\nlike manner be demonstrated in the case of Being that it is its peculiar\ndialectic to abrogate itself, and from itself to make itself a universal\nNotion. The determination of itself into Being is certainly an object of\nthought, whose content is thought itself. This is inwardness, not a mere\nconclusion drawn from presuppositions. Here in scholastic philosophy,\nhowever, the object is not the nature of thought and Being, for what they\nare is a mere matter of assumption.\n\nThe understanding may take its start from experience, a given concrete\ncontent, a determinate contemplation of nature, the human heart, right,\nduty, which are just exactly what inwardness means. It may find its\ndeterminations, so to speak, on behalf of this content, and starting\nfrom this point it may come to abstractions, such as matter and force\nin physics. In this case, although a general form such as this does not\nsatisfy the content, it has at any rate therein a fixed point, by which\nit can regulate itself, and a boundary line for speculation, which would\notherwise have no limit set to its roaming. Or when we have the concrete\nperception of state and family, reasoning has in this content a fixed\npoint which gives it guidance\u2014a conception, which is the main thing; the\ndeficiency in its form becomes concealed and forgotten, and emphasis is\nnot laid on it. But in scholastic philosophy, in the third place, a basis\nwas not sought in such objects as direct the course of reflection; with\nthis understanding of the Scholastics it was rather the case that they\nreceived in the categories the external culture of the understanding as\ntradition, and enlarged upon it. Because there was no standard set up\nfor this scholastic understanding, either by concrete intuition or by\nthe pure Notion, it remained unregulated in its externality. In later\ntimes this spirit-forsaken understanding came across the philosophy\nof Aristotle, in an external way; but that philosophy is a two-edged\nsword, a highly determinate, clear understanding, which is at the same\ntime speculative Notion; in it the abstract determinations of the\nunderstanding, taken by themselves, and powerless thus to stand, pass\naway by means of dialectic, and have truth only when taken in their\nconnexion. The speculation that we find in Aristotle has this condition,\nthat such thought never abandons itself to free reflection, but keeps\never before it the concrete nature of the object; this nature is the\nNotion of the thing, and this speculative essence of the thing is the\nruling spirit, which does not leave the determinations of reflection\nfree on their own account. But the Scholastics laid down hard and fast\nthe abstract determinations of the understanding, which are always\ninadequate to their absolute subject, and in like manner they took\nevery example from life as subject, and since the concrete contradicts\nthem, they could hold fast by these determinations of the understanding\nonly by defining and limiting. In so doing, however, they involved\nthemselves in an endless web of distinctions, which could themselves\nbe held in the concrete, and maintained thereby alone. There is thus\nno \u201chealthy human understanding\u201d in such procedure of the Scholastics;\nthe former cannot oppose itself to speculation, but it can very well\ntake up a position hostile to ungrounded reflection, seeing that it\ncontains a basis and a rule of guidance for abstract determinations of\nthe understanding. The Aristotelian philosophy is quite opposed to this\nScholastic procedure, but it became therein alienated from itself. The\nfixed conception of the supersensuous world with its angels and so on\nwas a subject which the Scholastics elaborated without any regulating\nstandard, in barbaric fashion, and they enriched and embellished it with\nthe finite understanding and with the finite relationships of the same.\nThere is present no immanent principle in the thinking itself, but the\nunderstanding of the Scholastics got into its possession a ready-made\nmetaphysic, without the need of making it relate to the concrete; this\nmetaphysic was killed, and its parts in their lifelessness were separated\nand parcelled out. It might be said of the Scholastics that they\nphilosophized without conception, that is, without a concrete; for _esse\nreale, esse formale, esse objectivum, quidditas_ (\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03af \u1f26\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9) they\nmade their subjects of discussion.\n\nThis crude understanding, in the fourth place, made everything equal,\nreduced it all to the same level, and that in virtue of its abstract\nuniversality, which was held to be valid. In politics also the\nunderstanding aims at making all alike equal. This crude understanding\ndid not make away with itself and its finitude, but in its dealings\nwith them simply reduced to finite relations Heaven, the Idea, the\nintellectual, mystic, speculative world; for it makes no difference (and\ncan make none) whether its finite determinations are valid here or not.\nHence arose these senseless questions, and the endeavours to decide them;\nfor it is senseless, I may even say it is distasteful and revolting,\nalthough it may be logically correct, to carry over determinations into\na field where they are utterly out of place, as soon as it comes to be\na matter of comprehending a concrete content in its universality. This\nunderstanding in its operations furnishes no bridge from the universal\nto the particular, and the conclusions which it draws it leaves up in\nthe clouds as conceptions of its fancy. If, for instance, law is divided\ninto canonical law, criminal law, and so on, the ground of division is\nnot taken from the universal itself; and it is thus left vague which\nparticular determination is in accordance with the universal object. If\nthis object is God,\u2014for instance, such a determination as that He became\nman\u2014the relation between God and man is not derived from their nature.\nBecause God only manifests Himself, He can do so in any way whatever;\nthen, because nothing is impossible with God, the pumpkin idea is easily\nintroduced (p. 90), since it is a matter of indifference in which\ndetermination the Universal is supposed to be. Regarding the apple in\nParadise the understanding asks to what species of apple it belonged.\n\nWe must go on to indicate the principles which have been adopted and\nstand opposed to one other, and the development of the same, in order to\ncomprehend the transition into modern history and the present standpoint\nof philosophy. For this reason we must speak of the further progress of\nuniversal spirit. For thought was distorted by reason of its being bound\nto an externality, and spirit was in it no longer acting for spirit.\nBecause then in this and similar ways the Idea of spirit had, as it\nwere, its heart pierced through, the parts remained without spirit and\nlife, and were worked upon by the understanding. Amongst the learned\nignorance of the rational was displayed, a complete and unnatural lack of\nspirituality; and in the same way there was the most utter and terrible\nignorance amongst the others, the monks. This destruction of knowledge\nbrought about the transition to a different state of affairs; while\nheaven and the divine were thus degraded, the lofty aspirations and high\nspiritual claims of the clerical element rose above the secular. For we\nsaw that the supersensuous world of truth, as the world of religious\nconceptions, was ruined by the understanding making all things equal. We\nsaw, on the one hand, a handling of dogma in philosophic fashion, but\nwe saw also a development of formal logical thought, the secularization\nof the absolutely existent content. In the same way the existing\nChurch, this presence of heaven upon earth, brought itself down to the\nlevel of the secular, by entering upon the possession of riches and\nlands. In this way the distinction between the world and the Church is\nblotted out, not in a rational manner as regards the Church, but in a\nway that is altogether revolting, and which amounts to destruction: it\nis a reality, I grant, but one most terrible and barbarous. For state,\ngovernment, right, property, civil order, all these enter into religion\nas rational differences, that is, laws on their own account fixed. The\nacknowledgment of ranks, classes, divisions, their different occupations,\nthe stages and degrees of evil, as well as of good, are an entering into\nthe form of finitude, actuality, existence of the subjective will, while\nwhat is religious has only the form of infinity. But the Church in its\noutward existence is inviolable, it can throw over all the laws of the\ngood; every offence against it is a violation of sanctity. Evil and its\npenalties are made eternal, divergences of opinion are punished even with\ndeath: so are heresy and also heterodoxy in respect of the most abstract\nand empty determinations of an endless system of dogmas. Abominable\npractices and evil passions, utter wantonness, voluptuousness, bribery,\ndissoluteness, avarice, crimes of all kinds found their way into\nthe Church, because it was unrestrained by laws; and it founded and\nmaintained the system of government. The secular ought to be only\nsecular; but this whole secular government of the Church claims at the\nsame time the dignity and authority of the divine. This mingling of the\nsacred, divine, inviolable, with temporal interests, begets, on the one\nhand, fanaticism, as among the Turks, and on the other hand, the humility\nand _obedientia passiva_ of the laity against this dread power. It was\nthis ruin of the supersensuous world, as represented in knowledge and as\nthe actual Church, that inevitably forced man out of a temple such as\nthis, the Holy of Holies degraded into finitude.\n\nAgainst this disunion, on the other hand, the secular element has\nspiritualized itself in itself; or it has established itself firmly in\nitself, and that in a manner which the Spirit justifies. To religion was\nlacking the presence of its culminating point, the present reality of\nits head; to the present secularity there is lacking the presence in it\nof thought, reason, spirit. In the tenth century there was manifested\nin Christendom a general impulse to build churches, although it was not\npossible to regard God Himself as present therein. It was thus that\nChristianity rose up, in her longing to take to herself the principle\nof reality as absolutely her own. But neither these buildings, nor\nexternal wealth, nor the power and dominion of the Church, nor monks,\nnor clergy, nor Pope, are the principle of real actual presence in\nher; they were insufficient for the spiritual. The Pope or the Emperor\nis not Dalai-lama, the Pope is only the Vicar of Christ; Christ, as\na past existence, is in memory and hope alone. Impatient at the lack\nof reality and at the want of holiness, Christendom goes to seek this\ntrue Head; and this is the ruling motive of the Crusades. Christendom\nsought Christ\u2019s outward presence in the land of Canaan, the traces of\nHim, the mount where He suffered, His grave; they took possession of\nthe Holy Sepulchre. What they represent to themselves as real they also\ntake possession of in fact as real; but a grave is a grave\u2014all that they\nfind is a grave, and even that is torn from them. \u201cBecause Thou wilt not\nleave my soul in hell, neither wilt Thou suffer Thine Holy One to see\ncorruption.\u201d Christians made the mistake of thinking that they would find\nsatisfaction in this; this was the true object of their search; but they\ndid not understand themselves. These holy spots, the Mount of Olives,\nthe Jordan, Nazareth, as external sensuous presence of place without\npresence of time, are things of the past, a mere memory, no perception\nof the immediate present; the Christians found only their loss, their\ngrave, in this present. Barbarians all the time, they did not seek the\nuniversal, the world-controlling position of Syria and Egypt, this\ncentral point of the earth, the free connection of commerce; Bonaparte\ndid this when mankind became rational. The Crusaders were by the\nSaracens and by their own violence and repulsiveness, as also by their\nown misery (p. 53), brought to confess that they had in this deceived\nthemselves. This experience taught them that they must hold to the actual\nreality which they despised, and seek in this the realization of their\nintelligible world. What they sought for they were to find in themselves,\nin the present of the understanding; thought, personal knowledge and\nwill constitute this present. Because their acts, their aims and their\ninterests are upright, and thus are constituted the Universal, the\npresent is rational. What pertains to the world has thus become fixed in\nitself, that is, it has received into itself thought, justice, reason.\n\nWith reference to the general aspect of the period, from an historical\npoint of view, it may be remarked that as on the one side we see the\nselflessness of spirit, the fact that spirit is not at home with itself,\nthe torn and rent condition of man, on the other side we see the\npolitical condition becoming more consolidated, in the establishment\nof an independence which is no longer merely selfish. In the first\nindependence there is contained the moment of barbarism, which has need\nof fear in order to be held within bounds. Now, however, we see justice\nand order enter in; it is true that the ruling order is the feudal\nsystem with its servitude, but everything therein has certainly a firm\nbasis in justice. Justice, however, has its root in freedom, and thus\nthe individual therein brings himself into existence, and is recognized;\nnevertheless relationships which properly belong to the state are here\nstill made the concern of private individuals. Feudal monarchy, which now\nemerges in opposition to the self-abnegation of the Church, determines\nessential rights, it is true, according to birth; ranks are not, however,\nlike the system of caste among the Indians, for in the ecclesiastical\nhierarchy, for instance, anyone might from the lowest class rise to the\nvery highest position. Even under the feudal system, moreover, justice,\ncivil order, legal freedom gradually emerged. In Italy and Germany\ncities obtained their rights as citizen republics, and caused these to\nbe recognized by the temporal and ecclesiastical power; wealth displayed\nitself in the Netherlands, Florence and the free cities on the Rhine. In\nthis way men gradually began to emerge from the feudal system; an example\nof this is seen in the case of the Capitani. The fact that the _lingua\nvolgare_ became the language used may also be looked on as a springing up\nof self-abnegation of spirit: as in Dante\u2019s _Divina Commedia_.\n\nThe spirit of the times took this new direction; it forsook the\nintellectual world, and looked upon its present world, this hither side.\nThe finite heaven, the content which had lost its religious character,\ndrove it to the finite present. With this revolution the scholastic\nphilosophy sinks and is lost, as its thoughts are outside of reality.\nWhile the Church heretofore believed itself to be in possession of\ndivine truth, so now the temporal government, as it received into itself\norder and right, and worked its way out through the hard discipline\nof service, felt itself to be a divine institution, and consequently\nconsidered that it had the divine element here present in it, and that\nit was justified in having an independent existence in opposition to\nthe divine element in the Church, which takes up an exclusive position\nas regards the laity. Since in this way the temporal power, the worldly\nlife, self-consciousness, has taken into itself the higher and more\ndivine ecclesiastical principle, the harsh contrast has disappeared. The\npower of the Church appeared as the violence of the Church, not aiming\nat operating in accordance with reality and in reality, but at being\nmighty in the spirit. There at once came into the secular element the\nconsciousness that abstract Notions were filled with the reality of the\npresent, so that this was no longer a nullity, but had truth also in\nitself.\n\nWith this commerce and the arts are associated. It is implied in the\narts that man brings what is divine out of himself; as artists were\nat one time so pious that as individuals they had self-abnegation as\ntheir principle, it was they from whose subjective abilities these\nrepresentations were produced. With this is connected the circumstance\nthat the secular knew that it had in itself the right to hold to such\ndeterminations as are founded on subjective freedom. In his handicraft\nthe individual is taken in reference to his work, and is himself the\nproducer. Thus men came to the point of knowing that they were free,\nand insisting on the recognition of that freedom, and having the power\nof exercising their activity for their own objects and interests. Thus\nspirit came again to itself; it drew itself together again, and looked\ninto its reason, as if looking into its own hands. This new birth is\npointed out as the revival of the arts and sciences which were concerned\nwith present matter, the epoch when the spirit gains confidence in\nitself and in its existence, and finds its interest in its present. It is\nin reality reconciled with the world, not implicitly, far away in mere\nthought, at the last day, at the world\u2019s transfiguration, _i.e._ when\nthe world is reality no more, but it has to do with the world as not by\nany means annihilated. The man who was moved to seek what was moral and\nright, could no longer find it on such soil, but looked round about him\nto seek it elsewhere. The place which was pointed out to him is himself,\nhis inner life, and external Nature; in the contemplation of Nature the\nspirit begins to have a sense of being present therein.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION THREE\n\nREVIVAL OF THE SCIENCES\n\n\nThe deeper interest of the subject had been lost sight of, as we have\nseen, in the dryness and dulness of the content of thought, and in\nspeculations which went wandering off into endless details. But now\nspirit gathered itself together, and rose to claim the right to find\nand know itself as actual self-consciousness, both in the supersensuous\nworld and in immediate nature. This awakening of the self-hood of\nspirit brought with it the revival of the arts and sciences of the\nancient world. This looked like a falling back into childhood, but it\nwas really a spontaneous ascent into the Idea, a movement originating\nwith self\u2014while up to this time the intellectual world had been rather\nsomething given from without. From this proceeded all efforts and all\ninventions, the discovery of America and of the way to the East Indies.\nThus in a very special way the love for the old, so-called heathen\nsciences once more awoke, for men turned to the works of the ancients,\nwhich had now become objects of study, as _studia humaniora_, where man\nis recognized in what concerns himself and in what he effects. These\nsciences, though at first they were placed in opposition to the divine,\nare rather themselves the divine, as living, however, in the reality of\nspirit. Men, because they are men, find it interesting to study men as\nmen. With this a further consideration is intimately connected, namely,\nthat when the formal culture of the mind, found among the Scholastics,\nbecame transformed into the Universal, the result necessarily was that\nthought knew and found itself in itself; from this the antithesis between\nthe finite understanding and ecclesiastical dogma or faith consequently\narose. The idea became prevalent that the understanding can recognize\nsomething to be false which the Church affirms to be true; and it was of\nimportance that the understanding did so apprehend itself, although it\nwas in opposition to the positive in general.\n\n\nA. STUDY OF THE ANCIENTS.\n\nThe first way in which the desire to find the human element in reference\nto what pertains to science manifested itself, was that an interest in\nsuch matters sprang up in the West, a receptive power where the ancients\nin their definiteness and beauty are concerned. But the revival of the\narts and sciences, and especially of the study of ancient literature\nbearing on Philosophy, was at first in some measure a simple revival of\nthe old philosophy in its earlier and original form, without anything new\nbeing added; this working up of old philosophies, to which a great number\nof writings were devoted, was thus the restoration of something forgotten\nonly. The study of the Greeks was more especially revived; the knowledge\nof the Greek originals which the West acquired is connected with external\npolitical events. The West kept up constant intercourse with the Greeks\nthrough the Crusades, and Italy did so by means of commerce; yet there\nwere no special diplomatic relations. Even the Roman laws were brought\nback from the East, until a code of the _corpus juris_ was by chance\ndiscovered. But the West was again, and more effectually, brought into\ntouch with the Greek East when, on the disastrous fall of the Byzantine\nEmpire, the noblest and most distinguished of the Greeks fled to Italy.\nEarlier than this even, when the Greek Empire was being harassed by the\nTurks, ambassadors had been sent to the West in order to solicit help.\nThese ambassadors were men of learning, and by their means\u2014for as a rule\nthey settled in the West\u2014there was transplanted thither that love for\nantiquity to which we have referred. Petrarch in this way learned Greek\nfrom Barlaam, a monk in Calabria, where dwelt many belonging to the order\nof St. Basil; this order had monasteries in the south of Italy, and used\nGreek ritual. In Constantinople Barlaam had made the acquaintance of\nGreeks, particularly of Chrysoloras, who from 1395 chose Italy as his\npermanent dwelling-place. These Greeks made the West familiar with the\nworks of the ancients, especially of Plato.[55] Too much honour is done\nto the monks when it is asserted that they preserved for us the writings\nof the ancients; these works, at least such as were in Greek, came rather\nfrom Constantinople, while the Latin portion of them, it is true, were\npreserved in the West. Acquaintance was now also for the first time\nmade with Aristotle\u2019s own writings (_supra_, p. 75), and thereby the\nold philosophies were again revived, although mingled with intellectual\nvagaries of the utmost wildness.\n\nThus it was partly the old Platonic philosophy that was sought out,\nand partly the Neo-Platonic, as also the Aristotelian and Stoic, the\nEpicurean as far as it regarded physics, and the popular philosophy of\nCicero in its first form; these were brought forward as authorities\nagainst Scholasticism, being in direct contradiction to it. Such\nendeavours are, however, connected rather with the history of literature\nand culture, and with the advancement of the same; we do not find\noriginality in this philosophic work, nor can we recognize therein\nany forward step. We have still writings of that period, by which we\nfind that each school of the Greeks found its adherents, and that\nAristotelians, Platonists, and so on appeared on the scenes, though\nthey were of a very different stamp from those of olden times. For true\ninstruction in philosophy we must, however, go to the original sources,\nthe ancients.\n\n\n1. POMPONATIUS.\n\nPomponatius was one of the most remarkable of these Aristotelians; among\nother subjects he wrote in 1534 on the immortality of the soul, and in\nso doing he showed\u2014following a practice which was specially in vogue\nat that time\u2014that this dogma, which he believed as a Christian, was\naccording to Aristotle and reason incapable of proof.[56] The disciples\nof Averro\u00ebs alleged that the universal \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2, which is present in thought,\nis immaterial and immortal, while the soul as numerically one is mortal;\nand Alexander Aphrodisiensis also maintained its mortality. Both of\nthese opinions were condemned in 1513 at the Council of Benevento, under\nLeo X.[57] The vegetative and sensitive soul Pomponatius asserted to be\nmortal (c. VIII. p. 36; c. IX. pp. 51, 62-65): and he maintained that\nit is only through thought and reason that man partakes of immortality.\nPomponatius was summoned before the Inquisition; but as cardinals\nprotected him, no further notice was taken of the matter.[58] There were\nmany other pure Aristotelians; especially among the Protestants at a\nlater time were they general. The Scholastics were erroneously termed\nAristotelians; therefore the Reformation was opposed to Aristotle only in\nappearance, but to the Scholastics it was opposed in fact.\n\n\n2. BESSARION, FICINUS, PICUS.\n\nMen now began to form acquaintance more especially with Plato, when\nmanuscripts of his works were brought from Greece; Greeks, refugees from\nConstantinople, gave lectures on Plato\u2019s philosophy. Cardinal Bessarion\nof Trapezunt, at one time Patriarch of Constantinople, was specially\nactive in making Plato known in the West.[59]\n\nFicinus, who was born in Florence in 1433, and died in 1499, the\naccomplished translator of Plato, was a man of note; it was mainly due\nto him that the study of Neo-Platonism, as presented by Proclus and\nPlotinus, was again revived. Ficinus wrote also a Platonic Theology. One\nof the Medici in Florence, Cosmo II., went so far as to found a Platonic\nAcademy even in the fifteenth century. These Medici, the elder Cosmo,\nLorenzo, Leo X., Clement VII., were patrons of all the arts and sciences,\nand made their court the resort of classical Greek scholars.[60]\n\nTwo counts of the name of Pico della Mirandola\u2014Giovanni, and Giovanni\nFrancesco, his nephew\u2014were influential rather by virtue of their marked\npersonality and their originality; the elder propounded nine hundred\ntheses, fifty-five of which were taken from Proclus, and invited\nphilosophers one and all to a solemn discussion of the same; he also in\nprincely fashion undertook to pay the travelling expenses of those at a\ndistance.[61]\n\n\n3. GASSENDI, LIPSIUS, REUCHLIN, HELMONT.\n\nSomewhat later, and specially by Gassendi, the opponent of Descartes, the\natom theory of Epicurus was again revived. As a development therefrom\nthe theory of molecules maintained its place thenceforth in physical\nscience.\n\nThe revival of Stoic philosophy due to Lipsius was not so clearly\nevidenced.\n\nIn Reuchlin (Kapnio), who was born at Pforzheim in Swabia in 1455, and\nwho was himself the translator of several comedies of Aristophanes,\nthe Cabalistic philosophy found a defender. He endeavoured also to\nreconstruct the Pythagorean philosophy proper; but he mingled with it\nmuch that is vague and mysterious. There was in hand a project to destroy\nall Hebrew books in Germany by an imperial decree, as had been done in\nSpain; Reuchlin deserves great credit for having prevented this.[62]\nOn account of the entire lack of dictionaries, the study of the Greek\nlanguage was rendered so difficult that Reuchlin travelled to Vienna for\nthe purpose of learning Greek from a Greek.\n\nLater on we find many profound thoughts in Helmont, an Englishman, who\nwas born in 1618, and died in 1699.[63]\n\nAll these philosophies were carried on side by side with belief in\nChurch dogmas, and without prejudice thereto; not in the sense in\nwhich the ancients conceived them. A mass of literature exists on this\nsubject, containing the names of a multitude of philosophers, but it is\na literature of the past, without the vitality characteristic of higher\nprinciples; it is in fact not a true philosophy at all, and I shall\ntherefore not dwell any longer upon it.\n\n\n4. CICERONIAN POPULAR PHILOSOPHY.\n\nCicero\u2019s mode of philosophizing, a very general mode, was revived in an\nespecial degree. It is a popular style of philosophizing, which has no\nreal speculative value, but in regard to general culture it has this\nimportance, that in it man derives more from himself as a whole, from his\nouter and inner experience, and speaks altogether from the standpoint of\nthe present. He is a man of understanding who says,\u2014\n\n\u201cWhat helps a man in life, is what life itself has taught him.\u201d\n\nThe feelings, &c., of man obtained due recognition, we must observe,\nas against the principle of self-abnegation. A very large number of\nwritings of this kind were issued, some of them simply on their own\naccount, others aimed against the Scholastics. Although all that great\nmass of philosophical writings\u2014much, for instance, that Erasmus wrote\non similar subjects\u2014has been forgotten, and though it possesses little\nintrinsic value, it was still of very great service, as succeeding\nthe barrenness of the Scholastics and their groundless maunderings in\nabstractions:\u2014groundless I say, for they had not even self-consciousness\nas their basis. Petrarch was one of those who wrote from himself, from\nhis heart, as a thinking man.\n\nThis new departure in Philosophy applies in this regard to the reform of\nthe Church by Protestantism also. Its principle is simply this, that it\nled man back to himself, and removed what was alien to him, in language\nespecially. To have translated for German Christians the book on which\ntheir faith is grounded, into their mother-tongue, is one of the greatest\nrevolutions which could have happened. Italy in the same way obtained\ngrand poetic works when the vernacular came to be employed by such\nwriters as Dante, Boccaccio and Petrarch; Petrarch\u2019s political works were\nhowever written in Latin. It is not until a thing is expressed in my\nmother tongue that it becomes my own possession. Luther and Melancthon\ncast the Scholastic element quite aside, and drew their conclusions from\nthe Bible, from faith, from the human heart. Melancthon presents to us\na calm popular philosophy, in which the human element makes itself felt,\nand which therefore forms the most striking contrast to the lifeless and\njejune Scholasticism. This attack against the Scholastic method was made\nin the most different directions and in the most various forms. But all\nthis belongs rather to the history of Religion than to that of Philosophy.\n\n\nB. CERTAIN ATTEMPTS IN PHILOSOPHY.\n\nA second series of writers who now appeared have mainly to do with\nparticular attempts made in Philosophy which remained attempts merely,\nand are only found while this terrible time of upheaval lasted. Many\nindividuals of that period saw themselves forsaken by what had hitherto\nbeen accepted by them as content, by the object which up to this time had\nformed the stay and support of their consciousness\u2014by faith. Side by side\nwith the peaceful reappearance of the ancient philosophy there displayed\nitself, on the other hand, a multitude of individuals in whom a burning\ndesire after the conscious knowledge of what is deepest and most concrete\nwas violently manifested. It was spoilt, however, by endless fancies,\nextravagances of the imagination and a craze for secret, astrological,\ngeomantic and other knowledge. These men felt themselves dominated, as\nthey really were, by the impulse to create existence and to derive truth\nfrom their very selves. They were men of vehement nature, of wild and\nrestless character, of enthusiastic temperament, who could not attain\nto the calm of knowledge. Though it cannot be denied that there was\nin them a wonderful insight into what was true and great, there is no\ndoubt on the other hand that they revelled in all manner of corruption\nin thought and heart as well as in their outer life. There is thus to\nbe found in them great originality and subjective energy of spirit;\nat the same time the content is heterogeneous and unequal, and their\nconfusion of mind is great. Their fate, their lives, their writings\u2014which\noften fill many volumes\u2014manifest only this restlessness of their being,\nthis tearing asunder, the revolt of their inner being against present\nexistence and the longing to get out of it and reach certainty. These\nremarkable individuals really resemble the upheavals, tremblings and\neruptions of a volcano which has become worked up in its depths and has\nbrought forth new developments, which as yet are wild and uncontrolled.\nThe most outstanding men of this nature are Cardanus, Bruno, Vanini,\nCampanella, and lastly Ramus. They are representative of the character of\nthe time in this interval of transition, and fall within the period of\nthe Reformation.\n\n\n1. CARDANUS.\n\nHieronymus Cardanus is of their number; he was remarkable as an\nindividual of world-wide reputation, in whom the upheaval and\nfermentation of his time manifested itself in its utmost violence. His\nwritings fill ten folio volumes. Cardanus was born in 1501 at Pavia, and\ndied at Rome in 1575. He recounted his own history and described his\ncharacter in his book _De vita propria_, where he makes an extraordinary\nconfession of his sins, passing the severest possible judgment upon them.\nThe following may serve to give a picture of these contradictions. His\nlife was a series of the most varied misfortunes, external and domestic.\nHe speaks first of his pre-natal history. He relates that his mother,\nwhen pregnant with him, drank potions in order to produce abortion. When\nhe was still at the breast, there was an outbreak of the plague; the\nnurse who suckled him died of the pestilence, he survived. His father\nwas very severe in his treatment of him. He lived sometimes in the most\ncrushing poverty and the utmost want, sometimes in the greatest luxury.\nAfterwards he applied himself to science, became a Doctor of Medicine,\nand travelled much. He was celebrated far and wide; summons came to him\nfrom every quarter, several times he was called to Scotland. He writes\nthat he cannot tell the sums of money that were offered to him. He was\nprofessor at Milan, first of mathematics and then of medicine; after that\nhe lay for two years in Bologna in the strictest imprisonment, and had to\nundergo the most frightful tortures. He was a profound astrologer, and\npredicted the future for many princes, who on that account held him in\nthe greatest awe and reverence.[64] He is a name of note in mathematics;\nwe have from him still the _regula Cardani_ for the solution of equations\nof the third degree, the only rule we have had up to this time.\n\nHe lived his whole life in perpetual inward and outward storms. He says\nthat he suffered the greatest torments in his soul. In this inward agony\nhe found the greatest delight in inflicting torture both on himself and\nothers. He scourged himself, bit his lips, pinched himself violently,\ndistorted his fingers, in order to free himself from the tortures of\nhis spiritual disquietude and induce weeping, which brought him relief.\nThe same contradictions were to be seen in his outward demeanour, which\nwas sometimes quiet and decorous, while at other times he behaved as if\nhe were crazy and demented, and that without any external provocation\nwhatever, and in matters the most indifferent. Sometimes he put on decent\nclothes and made himself neat and trim, at other times he went in rags.\nHe would be reserved, diligent, persevering in his work, and then would\nbreak out into excesses, wasting and squandering all that he had, his\nhousehold goods and his wife\u2019s jewels. Sometimes he would walk quietly\nalong, like other men; at other times he would rush on as if he were mad.\nThe upbringing of his children, as was quite to be expected under the\ncircumstances, was very bad. He had the unhappiness of seeing his sons\nturn out ill; one of them poisoned his own wife and was executed with the\nsword; he had his second son\u2019s ears cut off, to chastise him for being\ndissipated.[65]\n\nHe himself was of the wildest temperament, brooding deeply within\nhimself, and yet breaking out into violence in the most contradictory\nmanner; within him there also raged a consuming restlessness. I have\nepitomized the description which he gives of his own character, and now\nquote it: \u201cI have by nature a mind of philosophic and scientific cast; I\nam witty, elegant, well-bred, fond of luxury, cheerful, pious, faithful,\na lover of wisdom, reflective, enterprising, studious, obliging, emulous,\ninventive, self-taught. I have a longing to perform prodigies, I am\ncrafty, cunning, bitter, versed in secrets, sober, diligent, careless,\ntalkative, contemptuous of religion, vindictive, envious, melancholy,\nmalicious, treacherous, a sorcerer, a magician, unhappy; I am surly to my\nfamily, ascetic, difficult to deal with, harsh, a soothsayer, jealous, a\nribald talker, a slanderer, compliant, inconstant; such contradictoriness\nof nature and manners is to be found in me.\u201d[66]\n\nHis writings are in parts just as utterly unequal as his character.\nIn them he gave vent to the wild vehemence of his nature; they are\ndisconnected and contradictory, and were often written in the direst\npoverty. They contain a medley of all kinds of astrological and\nchiromantic superstition, yet lit up here and there with profound and\nbrilliant flashes; there are Alexandrine and Cabalistic mysteries side\nby side with perfectly lucid psychological observations of his own. He\ntreated astrologically the life and deeds of Christ. His positive merit\nconsists, however, rather in the stimulus which he gave to original\nproduction, and in this direction he exercised an important influence\non his times. He boasted of the originality and novelty of his ideas,\nand the craze to be original drove him to the strangest devices. This\nrepresents the first form taken by the newly awakened and energizing\nreason in its spontaneous activity; to be new and different from others\nwas regarded as tantamount to possessing a private claim to science.\n\n\n2. CAMPANELLA.\n\nTommaso Campanella, a student of Aristotle, represents just such another\nmedley of all possible dispositions. He was born at Stilo, in Calabria,\nin 1568, and died at Paris in 1639. Many of his writings still remain\nto us. For seven-and-twenty years of his life he was kept in strict\nimprisonment at Naples.[67] Such men as he aroused enormous interest and\ngave great offence, but on their own account they were productive of very\nlittle result. We have still to make special mention of Giordano Bruno\nand Vanini as belonging to this period.\n\n\n3. BRUNO.\n\nGiordano Bruno was of an equally restless and effervescent temperament,\nand we see in him a bold rejection of all Catholic beliefs resting\non mere authority. In modern times he has again been brought into\nremembrance by Jacobi (Werke, Vol. IV. Section II. pp. 5-46), who\nappended to his letters on Spinoza an abstract of one of Bruno\u2019s\nworks.[68] Jacobi caused great attention to be paid to Bruno, more\nespecially by his assertion that the sum of Bruno\u2019s teaching was the One\nand All of Spinoza, or really Pantheism; on account of the drawing of\nthis parallel Bruno obtained a reputation which passes his deserts. He\nwas less restless than Cardanus; but he had no fixed habitation on the\nearth. He was born at Nola in the province of Naples, and lived in the\nsixteenth century; the year of his birth is not known with certainty. He\nroamed about in most of the European states, in Italy, France, England,\nGermany, as a teacher of philosophy: he forsook Italy, where at one time\nhe had been a Dominican friar, and where he had made bitter reflections\nboth upon various Catholic dogmas\u2014for instance, on transubstantiation and\nthe immaculate conception of the Virgin\u2014and upon the gross ignorance and\nscandalous lives of the monks. He then lived in Geneva in 1582, but there\nhe fell out in the same way with Calvin and Beza, and could not live with\nthem: he made some stay in several other French cities, such as Lyons;\nand after a time he came to Paris, where in 1585 he formally challenged\nthe adherents of Aristotle, by following a practice greatly in favour\nin those days (_supra_, p. 112), and proposing for public disputation\na series of philosophic theses, which were specially directed against\nAristotle. They appeared under the title _Jord. Bruni Nol. Rationes\narticulorum physicorum adversus Peripateticos Parisiis propositorum,\nViteberg\u00e6 apud Zachariam Cratonem, 1588_; he was not successful in them,\nhowever, as the position of the Aristotelians was still too well assured.\nBruno was also in London; he visited Wittenberg in the year 1586; he\nlikewise stayed in Prague and other universities and towns. In Helmstedt\nhe was high in the favour of the Dukes of Brunswick-L\u00fcneburg in 1589;\nafter that he went to Frankfort-on-Main, where he had several of his\nworks printed. He was a wandering professor and author. Finally he came\nback to Italy in 1592, and lived in Padua for some time undisturbed, but\nat last he was seized in Venice by the Inquisition, cast into prison,\nsent on to Rome, and there in the year 1600, refusing to recant, he\nwas burned at the stake as a heretic. Eye-witnesses, and amongst them\nScioppius, recount that he met death with the most unflinching courage.\nHe had become a Protestant when in Germany, and had broken the vows of\nhis order.[69]\n\nAmong both Catholics and Protestants his writings were held to be\nheretical and atheistic, and therefore they were burned and destroyed, or\nkept in concealment. His complete works are hence very seldom met with;\nthe greatest number of them are to be found in the University Library at\nGottingen; the fullest account of them is given in Buhle\u2019s History of\nPhilosophy (_supra_, Vol. I. p. 113). His works are for the most part\nrare, and in many cases interdicted; in Dresden they are still included\namong prohibited writings, and are therefore not to be seen there.\nLately[70] an edition of them in the Italian language was prepared,[71]\nwhich possibly has never yet been issued. Bruno also wrote a great deal\nin Latin. Wherever he took up his abode for a time, he gave public\nlectures, wrote and published works; and this increases the difficulty\nof making complete acquaintance with his books. Many of his writings are\nfor the above reason very similar in their matter, the form only being\ndifferent, and in the evolution of his thoughts he never consequently\nadvanced very much nor attained to any results. But the leading\ncharacteristic of his various writings is really to some extent the grand\nenthusiasm of a noble soul, which has a sense of indwelling spirit, and\nknows the unity of its own Being and all Being to be the whole life of\nthought. There is something bacchantic in his way of apprehending this\ndeep consciousness; it overflows in becoming thus an object of thought,\nand in the expression of its riches. But it is only in knowledge that\nspirit can bring itself forth as a whole; when it has not yet attained\nto this point of scientific culture, it reaches out after all forms,\nwithout bringing them first into due order. Bruno displays just such an\nunregulated and multiform profusion; and on that account his expositions\nhave frequently a dreamy, confused, allegorical appearance of mystical\nenthusiasm. Many of his writings are in verse, and much that is fantastic\nfinds a place in them, as for instance when he says in one of his works,\nentitled _La Bestia Trionfante_, that something else must be put in\nplace of the stars.[72] He sacrificed his personal welfare to the great\nenthusiasm which filled him, and which left him no peace. It is easy to\nsay that he was \u201ca restless being, who could get on with nobody.\u201d But\nwhence did this restlessness come to him? What he could not get on with\nwas the finite, the evil, the ignoble. Thence arose his restlessness.\nHe rose to the one universal substantiality by putting an end to this\nseparation of self-consciousness and nature, whereby both alike are\ndegraded. God was in self-consciousness, it was admitted, but externally,\nand as remaining something different from self-consciousness, another\nreality; while Nature was made by God, being His creature, not an image\nof Him. The goodness of God displayed itself only in final causes, finite\nends, as when it is said: \u201cBees make honey for man\u2019s food; the cork tree\ngrows to provide stoppers for bottles.\u201d[73]\n\nAs to his reflections, Jacobi has by his recent[74] exposition of them\nmade it seem as if it were a theory specially characteristic of Bruno\nthat one living Being, one World-Soul, should penetrate all existence,\nand should be the life of all. Bruno asserted, in the first place, the\nunity of life and the universality of the World-Soul, and, in the second\nplace, the indwelling presence of reason; but Bruno in so saying is far\nfrom being original, and in fact this doctrine is a mere echo of the\nAlexandrian. But in his writings there are two specially marked features.\nThe first is the nature of his system, based as it is on his leading\nthoughts, or his philosophic principles generally, namely the Idea as\nsubstantial unity. The second, which is closely connected with the first,\nis his use of the _Art_ of Lullius; this is specially emphasized and\nhighly esteemed by him, the art of finding differences in the Idea: it he\nwished to bring into special recognition.\n\na. His philosophic thoughts, to express which he sometimes made use of\nAristotle\u2019s concepts, give evidence of a peculiar, highly strung and\nvery original mind. The substance of his general reflections is found\nin the greatest enthusiasm for the above-mentioned vitality of Nature,\ndivinity, the presence of reason in nature. His philosophy is thus on\nthe whole certainly Spinozism, Pantheism. The separation of man from God\nor the world, all such relations of externality, have been superadded\nto his living idea of the absolute, universal unity of all things, for\nthe expression of which idea Bruno has been so greatly admired. In his\nconception of things the main points are that, on the one hand, he gives\nthe universal determination of matter, and, on the other hand, that of\nform.\n\n\u03b1. The unity of life he thus determines as the universal, active\nunderstanding (\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2), which manifests itself as the universal form of\nall the world, and comprehends all forms in itself; it bears the same\nrelation to the production of natural objects as does the understanding\nof man, and moulds and systematizes them, as the human understanding\nmoulds the multitude of its concepts. It is the artist within, who shapes\nand forms the material without. From within the root or the seed-grain\nit makes the shoot come forth; from this again it brings the branches,\nand from them the twigs, and from out of the twigs it calls forth the\nbuds, and leaves, and flowers. All is planned, prepared and perfected\nwithin. In the same way this universal reason within calls back their\nsaps from the fruits and blossoms to the twigs, and so on. The universe\nis thus an infinite animal, in which all things live and move and have\ntheir being in modes the most diverse. The formal understanding is\nthus in no wise different from the Final Cause (the Notion of end, the\nentelechy, the unmoved principle, which we meet with in Aristotle); but\nthese are just as truly also active understanding, the efficient cause\n(_causa efficiens_), this same producing force. Nature and Spirit are not\nseparated; their unity is the formal understanding, in which is contained\nthe pure Notion, not as in consciousness, but as free and independent,\nremaining within itself, and at the same time exercising activity and\npassing beyond itself. The understanding working towards one particular\nend is the inward form of the thing itself, an inward principle of the\nunderstanding. What is continually produced is in accordance with this\nform, and contained within it; what appears is determined as the form is\nin itself determined.[75] With Proclus in the same way the understanding,\nas substantial, is that which includes all things in its unity: life\nis the outgoing, the producing force: and the understanding as such\nsimilarly includes the returning force, which brings all things back into\nunity. In dealing with Kant\u2019s philosophy we shall have again to mention\nthis determination of final purpose. That which has organic life, whose\nprinciple is formative, which has its efficacy in itself, and in the same\nonly remains at home with itself and maintains itself, is nothing but the\nend, the activity determined in itself, which in its relation to what is\ndifferent does not comport itself as mere cause, but returns upon itself.\n\n\u03b2. Bruno, who asserts the final cause to be immediately operative, and\nthe life immanent in the universe, asserts it also to be existent,\nas substance; he is therefore opposed to the conception of a merely\nextra-mundane understanding. To a certain extent Bruno distinguishes\nform and matter in substance, which itself, as the aforesaid activity\nof the Idea, is the unity of form and matter; thus matter has life in\nitself. The permanent element in the endless changes of existence is,\nhe says, the first and absolute matter; although without form, it is\nnevertheless the mother of all forms, and receptive of all forms. Because\nmatter is not without the first universal form, it is itself principle\nor in itself final cause. Form is immanent in matter; the one simply\ncannot exist without the other; thus matter itself brings about these\nchanges of form, and the same matter runs through them all. What was at\nfirst seed becomes blade, then ear, then bread, chyle, blood, seed of\nanimal, an embryo, a human being, a corpse, then once more earth, stone,\nor other substance; from sand and water frogs are produced. Here then\nwe can perceive something which, although it transforms itself into all\nthese things in turn, yet still in itself remains one and the same. This\nmatter cannot be a body, for bodies have form; nor can it belong to the\nclass which we term properties, attributes, or qualities, for these are\nliable to change. Thus nothing seems to be eternal and worthy of the name\nof a principle, except matter. Many have for this reason held matter to\nbe the only reality, and all forms to be accidental. This error arises\nfrom the fact of their recognizing only a form of the second kind, and\nnot that necessary first and eternal form, which is the form and source\nof all forms. In the same way the aforesaid matter, on account of its\nidentity with the understanding which causes form beforehand, is itself\nintelligible, as the universal presupposition of all corporeality.\nBecause it is everything in general, it is nothing in particular, neither\nair nor water, nor anything else, abstract or otherwise; it has no\ndimensions, in order to have all dimensions. The forms of matter are the\ninward power of matter itself; it is, as intelligible, the very totality\nof form.[76] This system of Bruno\u2019s is thus objective Spinozism, and\nnothing else; one can see how deeply he penetrated.\n\nBruno here asks the question: \u201cBut this first universal form and that\nfirst universal matter, how are they united, inseparable? Different\u2014and\nyet one Being?\u201d He answers by making use of the Aristotelian forms of\n\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2 and \u1f10\u03bd\u03ad\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1: Matter is to be regarded as potentiality; in this\nway all possible forms of existence in a certain sense are included\nin the Notion of it. The passivity of matter must be regarded as pure\nand absolute. Now it is impossible to attribute existence to a thing\nwhich lacks the power to exist. Existence has, however, such an express\nreference to the active mode, that it is at once clear that the one\ncannot exist without the other, but that each of them presupposes the\nother. If therefore at all times a capacity of working, producing,\ncreating, was there, so must there also have been at all times a capacity\nof being worked upon, produced, created. The perfect potentiality of\nthe existence of things (matter) cannot precede their actual existence,\nand just as little can it remain after that is past. The first and\nmost perfect principle includes all existence in itself, can be all\nthings, and is all things. Active power and potentiality, possibility\nand actuality are therefore in it one undivided and indivisible\nprinciple.[77] This simultaneousness of acting and being acted upon is a\nvery important determination; matter is nothing without activity, form\nis therefore the power and inward life of matter. If matter were nothing\nbut indeterminate potentiality, how would the determinate be arrived at?\nThis simplicity of matter is itself only one moment of form: in wishing\ntherefore to tear asunder matter and form, matter is at once established\nin one determination of form, but in so doing there is immediately\nestablished also the existence of the Other.\n\nThus the Absolute is determined for Bruno: it is not so with other\nthings, which may exist and also may not exist, and which may be\ndetermined in one way or in another way. In regard to finite things and\nin finite determinations of the understanding the distinction between\nform and matter is thus present. The individual man is at every moment\nwhat he may be at that moment, but not everything which he may be in\ngeneral and with reference to substance. The things which appear to be\ndifferent are only modifications of one single thing which includes in\nits existence all other existence. The universe, unbegotten Nature, is,\nhowever, everything which it can be in reality and at one time, because\nit includes in itself the whole of matter, as well as the eternal,\nunchangeable form of its changing forms. But in its developments from\nmoment to moment, its particular parts, qualities, individual existences,\nin its externality as a whole, it is no more what it is and may be;\nbut a part such as this is only a shadow of the image of the first\nprinciple.[78] Thus Bruno wrote also a book, _De umbris idearum_.\n\n\u03b3. This is Bruno\u2019s fundamental idea. He says: \u201cTo recognize this unity\nof form and matter in all things, is what reason is striving to attain\nto. But in order to penetrate to this unity, in order to investigate all\nthe secrets of Nature, we must search into the opposed and contradictory\nextremes of things, the maximum and the minimum.\u201d It is in these very\nextremes that they are intelligible, and become united in the Notion; and\nthis union of them is infinite Nature. \u201cTo find the point of union is\nnot the greatest matter; but to develop from the same its very opposite,\nthis is the real and the deepest secret of the art.\u201d[79] It is saying\nmuch if we speak of knowing the development of the Idea as a necessity\nof determinations; we shall see later how Bruno proceeded to do this.\nHe represents the original principle, which is elsewhere known as the\nform, under the Notion of the minimum, which is at the same time the\nmaximum\u2014One, which at the same time is All; the universe is this One in\nAll. In the universe, he says, the body is not distinguished from the\npoint, nor the centre from the circumference, nor the finite from the\ninfinite, nor the maximum from the minimum. There is nothing but centre\npoint; or the centre point is everywhere and in everything. The ancients\nexpressed the same by saying of the Father of the gods, that he really\nhad his dwelling-place in every point of the universe. It is the universe\nthat first gives to things true reality; it is the substance of all\nthings, the monad, the atom, the spirit poured out on all things, the\ninnermost essence, the pure form.[80]\n\nb. The second object to which Bruno devoted himself was the so-called\nLullian Art, which received its name from its first inventor, the\nScholastic Raymundus Lullus (_supra_, pp. 92-94). Bruno adopted this\nand carried it to completion; he termed it also his _ars combinatoria_.\nThis art is in some respects like what we met with in Aristotle under\nthe name of the Topics (Vol. II. pp. 217, 218), seeing that both give an\nimmense number of \u201cplaces\u201d and determinations which were fixed in the\nconception like a table with its divisions, in order that these headings\nmight be applied to all that came to hand. But the Topics of Aristotle\ndid this in order to apprehend and determine an object in its various\naspects, while Bruno rather worked for the sake of lightening the task\nof memory. He thus really connected the Lullian Art with the art of\nmnemonics as practised by the ancients, which has come into notice again\nin recent times, and which will be found described in greater detail in\nthe _Auctor ad Herennium_ (Libr. III. c. 17, _sqq._). To give an example:\none establishes for oneself a certain number of different departments in\nthe imagination, which are to be chosen at pleasure; there may be perhaps\ntwelve of these, arranged in sets of three, and indicated by certain\nwords, such as Aaron, Abimelech, Achilles, Berg, Baum, Baruch, etc., into\nwhich divisions one inserts, as it were, what has to be learnt by heart,\nand forms it into a succession of pictures. In this way when we repeat\nit, we have not to say it from memory or out of our head, as we are\naccustomed to do, but we have only to read it off as if from a table.\nThe only difficulty lies in making some ingenious connection between the\ncontent in question and the picture; that gives rise to the most unholy\ncombinations, and the art is therefore not one to be commended. Bruno\nalso soon abandoned it, since what had been a matter of memory became a\nmatter of imagination; which was, of course, a descent. But since with\nBruno the diagram is not only a picture of external images, but a system\nof universal determinations of thought, he certainly gave to this art a\ndeeper inward meaning.[81]\n\n\u03b1. Bruno passes over to this art from universal ideas which are given.\nSince namely one life, one understanding is in all things, Bruno had the\ndim hope of apprehending this universal understanding in the totality\nof its determinations, and of subsuming all things under it\u2014of setting\nup a logical philosophy by its means, and making it applicable in all\ndirections.[82] He says: The object of consideration therein is the\nuniverse, in so far as it enters into the relation of the true, the\nknowable and the rational. Like Spinoza he distinguishes between the\nintelligible thing of reason and the actual thing: As metaphysics has for\nobject the universal thing, which is divided into substance and accident,\nso the chief matter is that there is a single and more universal art\nwhich knits together and compasses round the thing of reason and the\nactual thing, and recognizes them both as harmonizing with one another,\nso that the many, be they of what kind they may, are led back to simple\nunity.[83]\n\n\u03b2. For Bruno the principle in all this is the understanding generally:\nNone other than the understanding whose activity extends beyond itself,\nwhich brings into existence the sensuous world. It is related to the\nillumination of the spirit as the sun is related to the eye: it relates\ntherefore to a phenomenal manifold, illuminating this, not itself. The\nOther is the active understanding in itself, which is related to the\nobjects of thought in their various classes, as the eye is to things\nvisible.[84] The infinite form, the active understanding which dwells\nin reason, is the first, the principle, which develops; the process in\nsome respects resembles what was met with in the Neo-Platonists. Bruno\u2019s\ngreat endeavour is really now to apprehend and demonstrate the modes of\norganizing this active understanding.\n\n\u03b3. This is presented more in detail as follows: To the pure truth itself,\nthe absolute light, man approaches only; his Being is not absolute Being\nitself, which alone is the One and First. He rests only under the shadow\nof the Idea, whose purity is the light, but which at the same time\npartakes of the darkness. The light of substance emanates from this pure\nFirst Light, the light of accident emanates from the light of substance.\nThis we met with also in Proclus (_supra_, Vol. II. p. 446) as the third\nmoment in the first triad. This absolute principle in its unity is for\nBruno the first matter, and the first act of this principle he names the\noriginal light (_actus primus lucis_). But substances and accidents,\nwhich are many, cannot receive the full light, they are therefore only\nincluded in the shadow of the light; in like manner the ideas also are\nonly shadows thereof.[85] The development of Nature goes on from moment\nto moment; created things are only a shadow of the first principle, not\nthe first principle itself.\n\n\u03b4. Bruno continues: From this super-essential (_super-essentiale_)\u2014an\nexpression which is also met with in Proclus (_supra_, Vol. II. p.\n441)\u2014advance is made to the essences, from the essences to that which\nis, from that which is to their traces, images and shadows, and that in\na double direction: both towards matter, in order to be produced within\nher (these shadows are then present in natural fashion), and also towards\nsensation and reason, in order to be known by means of these. Things\nwithdraw themselves from the First Light towards the darkness. But since\nall things in the universe are in close connection, the lower with the\nmiddle, and those with the upper, the compound with the simple, the\nsimple with those which are more simple, the material with the spiritual,\nin order that there may be one universe, one order and government of the\nsame, one principle and aim, one first and last; so, following the sound\nof the lyre of the universal Apollo (an expression which we saw used by\nHeraclitus, Vol. I. pp. 284, 285), the lower can be led back step by\nstep to the higher, as fire was condensed and transformed into air, air\ninto water, water into earth. Thus One Being is in all. That process is\nthe same as this return, and they form a circle. Nature within her limits\ncan produce all from all, and so the understanding can also know all from\nall.[86]\n\n\u03b5. The unity of opposites is explained more in detail as follows: The\ndiversity of shadows is no real opposition. In the same conception the\nopposites are known, the beautiful and the ugly, the appropriate and the\ninappropriate, the perfect and the imperfect, the good and the evil.\nImperfection, evil, ugliness, do not rest upon special ideas of their\nown; they become known in another conception, not in one peculiar to\nthemselves, which is nothing. For this that is peculiarly theirs is\nthe non-existent in the existent, the defect in the effect. The first\nunderstanding is the original light; it streams its light out of the\ninnermost to the outermost, and draws it again from the outermost to\nitself. Every Being can, according to its capacity, appropriate somewhat\nof this light.[87]\n\n\u03b6. The real element in things is just that which is intelligible, not\nthat which is perceived or felt, or what is peculiar to the individual;\nwhatever else is termed real, the sensuous, is non-Being. All that\ncomes to pass beneath the sun, all that dwells in the region of matter,\nfalls under the notion of vanity (finitude). Seek to take from Ideas\na firm basis for thy conceptions, if thou art wise. The pure light of\nthings is nothing but this knowableness, which proceeds from the first\nunderstanding and is directed towards it; the non-existent is not known.\nWhat is here contrast and diversity, is in the first understanding\nharmony and unity. Try therefore if thou canst identify the images thou\nhast received, if thou canst harmonize and unite them; thus thou wilt not\nrender thy mind weary, thy thoughts obscure, and thy memory confused.\nThrough the idea which is in the understanding a better conception of\nanything will be formed than by means of the form of the natural thing\nin itself, because this last is more material: but that conception is\nreached in a supreme degree through the idea of the object as it exists\nin the divine understanding.[88] The differences which are here given,\nare therefore no differences at all; but all is harmony. To develop this\nwas therefore Bruno\u2019s endeavour; and the determinations, as natural in\nthat divine understanding, correspond with those which appear in the\nsubjective understanding. Bruno\u2019s art consists only in determining the\nuniversal scheme of form, which includes all things within itself, and in\nshowing how its moments express themselves in the different spheres of\nexistence.\n\n\u03b7. The main endeavour of Bruno was thus to represent the All and\nOne, after the method of Lullus, as a system of classes of regular\ndeterminations. Hence in the manner of Proclus he specifies the three\nspheres: First, the original form (\u1f51\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03af\u03b1) as the originator of all\nforms; secondly, the physical world, which impresses the traces of the\nIdeas on the surface of matter, and multiplies the original picture in\ncountless mirrors set face to face; thirdly, the form of the rational\nworld, which individualizes numerically for the senses the shadows of the\nIdeas, brings them into one, and raises them to general conceptions for\nthe understanding. The moments of the original form itself are termed\nBeing, goodness (nature or life), and unity. (Something similar to this\nwe also met with in Proclus, Vol. II. p. 445) In the metaphysical world\nthe original form is thing, good, principle of plurality (_ante multa_);\nin the physical world it manifests itself in things, goods, individuals;\nin the rational world of knowledge it is derived from things, goods and\nindividuals.[89] Unity is the agent that brings them back once more; and\nBruno, while distinguishing the natural and metaphysical world, seeks to\nset up the system of the above determinations, in order to show at once\nhow the same thing is in one way a natural appearance, and in another way\nan object existing for thought.\n\nSince Bruno sought to apprehend this connection more closely, he\nconsiders thinking as a subjective art and activity of the soul,\nrepresenting inwardly and in accordance with the ordinary conception, as\nit were through an inward writing, what Nature represents externally, as\nit were, through an outward writing. Thinking, he says, is the capability\nboth of receiving into one\u2019s self this external writing of nature and\nof imagining and substantiating the inward writing in the outward. This\nart of thinking inwardly and organizing outwardly in accordance with the\nsame, and the capacity to reverse the process\u2014an art possessed by the\nsoul of man\u2014Bruno places in the closest connection with the art of the\nnature of the universe, with the energy of the absolute World-principle,\nby means of which all is formed and fashioned. It is one form which\ndevelops; it is the same world-principle which causes form in metals,\nplants and animals, and which in man thinks and organizes outside\nhimself, only that it expresses itself in its operations in an endlessly\nvaried manner throughout the entire world. Inwardly and outwardly there\nis consequently one and the same development of one and the same\nprinciple.[90]\n\nIn his _Ars Lulliana_ Bruno made the attempt to determine and systematize\nthese various writings of the soul, by means of which also the organizing\nworld-principle reveals itself. He assumes therein twelve principal\nkinds of writing, or classes of natural forms, to form a starting-point:\n\u201c_Species, Form\u00e6, Simulacra, Imagines, Spectra, Exemplaria, Indicia,\nSigna, Not\u00e6, Characteres et Sigilli_. Some kinds of writing are connected\nwith the external sense, like external forms, pictures and ideals\n(_extrinseca forma, imago, exemplar_); these painting and other plastic\narts represent, by imitating Mother Nature. Some are connected with\nthe inner sense, where\u2014with regard to mass, duration, number\u2014they are\nmagnified, extended in time and multiplied; such are the products of\nfancy. Some are connected with a common point of similarity in several\nthings; some are so divergent from the objective nature of things that\nthey are quite imaginary. Finally, some appear to be peculiar to art, as\n_signa, not\u00e6, characteres et sigilli_; by means of these the powers of\nart are so great that it seems to be able to act independently of Nature,\nbeyond Nature, and, when the matter in question involves it, even against\nNature.\u201d[91]\n\nSo far all, on the whole, goes well; it is the carrying out of the same\nscheme in all directions. All respect is due to this attempt to represent\nthe logical system of the inward artist, the producing thought, in such\na way that the forms of external Nature correspond thereto. But while\nthe system of Bruno is otherwise a grand one, in it the determinations\nof thought nevertheless at once become superficial, or mere dead types,\nas in later times was the case with the classification of natural\nphilosophy; for Bruno merely enumerates the moments and contrasts of\nthe system, just as the natural philosophers developed the three-fold\ncharacter in every sphere, regarded as absolute. Further or more\ndeterminate moments Bruno has done nothing more than collect together;\nwhen he tries to represent them by figures and classifications, the\nresult is confusion. The twelve forms laid down as basis neither have\ntheir derivation traced nor are they united in one entire system, nor\nis the further multiplication deduced. To this part of his subject he\ndevoted several of his writings (_De sigillis_), and in different works\nit is presented in different ways; the appearances of things are as\nletters, or symbols, which correspond with thoughts. The idea is on the\nwhole praiseworthy compared with the fragmentariness of Aristotle and the\nScholastics, according to whom every determination is fixed once for all.\nBut the carrying out of the idea is in part allied with the Pythagorean\nnumbers, and consequently unmethodical and arbitrary; and in part we find\nmetaphorical, allegorical combinations and couplings, where we cannot\nfollow Bruno; in this attempt to introduce order, all things are mingled\ntogether in the wildest disorder.\n\nIt is a great beginning, to have the thought of unity; and the other\npoint is this attempt to grasp the universe in its development, in the\nsystem of its determinations, and to show how the outward appearance is a\nsymbol of ideas. These are the two aspects of Bruno\u2019s teaching which had\nto be taken into consideration.\n\n\n4. VANINI.\n\nJulius C\u00e6sar Vanini has also to be mentioned as belonging to this\nperiod; his first name was really Lucilius. He has many points of\nsimilarity with Bruno, and, like him, he suffered as a martyr on account\nof philosophy; for he shared Bruno\u2019s fate, which was to be burned at\nthe stake. He was born in 1586 at Taurozano in the province of Naples.\nHe wandered from country to country; we find him in Geneva, and then\nin Lyons, whence he fled to England in order to save himself from\nthe Inquisition. After two years he returned to Italy. In Genoa he\ntaught Natural Philosophy on the system of Averro\u00ebs, but did not bring\nhimself into favour. In his travels he met with all manner of strange\nadventures, and engaged in many and various disputations on philosophy\nand theology. He became more and more an object of suspicion, and fled\nfrom Paris; he was summoned before the tribunal on a charge of impiety,\nnot of heresy. Franconus, his accuser, stated on oath that Vanini had\nuttered blasphemies. Vanini protested that he had remained faithful to\nthe Catholic Church, and to his belief in the Trinity; and in answer to\nthe charge of atheism he took up a straw from the ground in the presence\nof his judges, and said that even this straw would convince him of\nthe existence of God. But it was of no avail; in 1619 at Toulouse in\nFrance he was condemned to the stake, and before the carrying out of\nthis sentence his tongue was torn out by the executioner. How the case\nwas proved against him is not, however, clear; the proceedings seem to\nhave been in great part due to personal enmity, and to the zeal for\npersecution which filled the clergy in Toulouse.[92]\n\nVanini derived his chief stimulus from the originality of Cardanus. In\nhim we see reason and philosophy taking a direction hostile to theology,\nwhile Scholastic philosophy went hand in hand with theology, and theology\nwas supposed to be confirmed thereby. Art developed in the Catholic\nChurch, but free thought broke off from, and remained alien to it. In\nBruno and Vanini the Church took her revenge for this; she renounced\nscience, and took up a position of hostility to it.\n\nVanini\u2019s philosophy does not go very far; he admires the living energy\nof Nature; his reasonings were not deep, but were more of the nature of\nfanciful ideas. He always chose the dialogue form; and it is not evident\nwhich of the opinions stated are his own. He wrote commentaries on\nAristotle\u2019s works on Physics. We have two other works by Vanini, which\nare very rare. The one is styled: _Amphitheatrum \u00e6tern\u00e6 providenti\u00e6\ndivino-magicum, christiano-physicum, nec non astrologo-catholicum,\nadversus veteres philosophos, Atheos, Epicureos, Peripateticos et\nStoicos. Auctore Julio C\u00e6sare Vanino, Lugd. 1615_; in this he gives a\nvery eloquent account of all these philosophies and their principles, but\nthe manner in which he refutes them is rather feeble. The second work is\nentitled \u201cOn the Wonderful Secrets of Nature, the Queen and Goddess of\nMortals\u201d (_De admirandis Natur\u00e6, regin\u00e6 De\u00e6que mortalium, arcanis libr.\nIV., Luteti\u00e6 1616_); it was printed \u201cwith the approval of the Sorbonne,\u201d\nwhich at first found in it nothing \u201cwhich contradicted and was hostile\nto the Catholic Apostolic and Roman religion.\u201d It contains scientific\ninvestigations into various matters belonging to physics and natural\nhistory, and is also in dialogue form, without definite indication being\ngiven as to which of the characters is made the mouthpiece of Vanini\u2019s\nown opinions. What one finds is assurances from him that he would believe\nthis or that doctrine if he had not received Christian teaching. Vanini\u2019s\ntendency, however, was towards naturalism; he showed that it is Nature\nthat is the Deity, that all things had a mechanical genesis. He therefore\nexplained the whole universe in its connection by efficient causes alone,\nnot by final causes; but the statement of this is made in such a way\nthat the writer does not give it as his own conclusion.[93]\n\nThus Vanini placed reason in opposition to faith and church dogma, as\nhad already been done by Pomponatius (_supra_, p. 111) and others.\nYet all the time that they were proving by reason this or that dogma\nwhich is in direct contradiction to the Christian belief, they were\ndeclaring that they submitted their conviction to the Church\u2014a course\nwhich was always adopted by Bayle afterwards in the reformed church.\nAnother practice of these philosophers was to bring forward all sorts of\narguments and theories contradictory of theological dogmas, as so many\ninsoluble difficulties and contradictions brought about by reason, which\nwere, however, by them submitted to faith. Thus, for instance, Bayle\nsays in the article \u201cManich\u00e6ans\u201d found in his critical _Dictionnaire_\u2014in\nwhich he touches on many philosophic conceptions\u2014that the assertion of\nthe existence of two principles cannot be disproved, but that we must\nsubmit herein to the Church. In this fashion all possible arguments\nwere advanced against the Church. Vanini thus states objections against\nthe Atonement, and brings forward arguments to prove that Nature is\nGod. Now men were convinced that reason could not be contradictory of\nthe Christian dogmas, and no faith was placed in the sincerity of a\nsubmission which consisted in giving up what one was convinced of by\nreason; therefore Galileo, because he defended the system of Copernicus,\nhad to recant on his knees, and Vanini was burned at the stake. Both of\nthem had in vain chosen the dialogue form for their writings.\n\nVanini certainly made one of the speakers in the Dialogues prove (_De\nnatur\u00e6 arcanis_, p. 420) even \u201cout of the text of the Bible, that the\ndevil is mightier than God,\u201d and that therefore God does not rule the\nworld. Among his arguments are the following: It was against the will\nof God that Adam and Eve sinned, and thus brought the whole human race\nto ruin (_ad interitum_): Christ also was crucified by the powers of\ndarkness. Moreover it is the will of God that all men should be saved.\nBut of Catholics there are very few in comparison with the rest of the\nworld, and the Jews often fell away from their faith; the Catholic\nreligion extends only over Spain, France, Italy, Poland and a part of\nGermany. If there were to be deducted also the atheists, blasphemers,\nheretics, whoremongers, adulterers, and so on, there would be still fewer\nleft. Consequently the devil is mightier than God. These are arguments\nof reason; they are not to be refuted; but he submitted himself to the\nfaith. It is remarkable that no one believed this of him; the reason\nthereof being that it was impossible for him to be in earnest with the\nrefutation of what he asserted to be rational. That the refutation was\nbut weak and subjective does not justify anyone in doubting Vanini\u2019s\nsincerity; for poor reasons may be convincing for the subject, just as\nthe subject holds to his own rights in respect of objective matters. What\nlies at the bottom of the proceedings against Vanini is this, that when a\nman by means of his reason has come to perceive something which seems to\nhim incontrovertible, he cannot but adhere to these definite perceptions,\nhe cannot believe what is opposed to them. It is impossible to believe\nthat faith is stronger in him than this power of perception.\n\nThe Church in this way fell into the strange contradiction of condemning\nVanini, because he did not find her doctrines in accordance with reason,\nand yet submitted himself to them; she thus appeared to demand\u2014a demand\nwhich she emphasized with the burning pile\u2014not that her doctrines should\nbe considered above reason, but in accordance with it, and that reason\nshould have merely the formal function of explaining the content of\ntheology, without adding anything of her own. This susceptibility of the\nChurch is inconsistent, and entangled her in contradictions. For in\nearlier times she certainly admitted that reason could not grasp what\nwas revealed, and that it was consequently a matter of little importance\nto refute and solve by reason the objections which reason itself brought\nforward. But as she now would not permit the contradiction of faith\nand reason to be taken seriously, but burned Vanini at the stake as an\natheist for professing so to do, it was implied that the doctrine of the\nChurch cannot contradict reason, while man has yet to submit reason to\nthe Church.\n\nThere is kindled here the strife between so-called revelation and reason,\nin which the latter emerges independently, and the former is separated\nfrom it. Up to this time both were one, or the light of man was the\nlight of God; man had not a light of his own, but his light was held to\nbe the divine. The Scholastics had no knowledge having a content of its\nown beyond the content of religion; philosophy remained entirely formal.\nBut now it came to have a content of its own, which was opposed to the\ncontent of religion; or reason felt at least that it had its own content,\nor was opposing the form of reasonableness to the immediate content of\nthe other.\n\nThis opposition had a different meaning in former times from what it\nbears now-a-days; the earlier meaning is this, that faith is the doctrine\nof Christianity, which is given as truth, and by which as truth man has\nto remain. We have here faith in this content, and opposed to this stands\nconviction by means of reason. But now this faith is transferred into the\nthinking consciousness itself; it is a relation of self-consciousness\nitself to the facts which it finds within itself, not to the objective\ncontent of the doctrine. In respect to the earlier opposition a\ndistinction must be drawn in the objective creed; the one part of it is\nthe teaching of the Church as dogma, the teaching as to the nature of\nGod, that He is Three in One; to this pertains the appearing of God in\nthe world, in the flesh, the relation of man to this divine nature, His\nholiness and divinity. That is the part which has to do with the eternal\nverities, the part which is of absolute interest for men; this part is\nin its content essentially speculative, and can be object only for the\nspeculative Notion. The other part, belief in which is also required, has\nreference to other external conceptions, which are connected with that\ncontent; to this pertains the whole extent of what belongs to history,\nin the Old and New Testament as well as in the Church. A belief in all\nthis finite element may be demanded also. If a man, for instance, did\nnot believe in ghosts, he would be taken for a free-thinker, an atheist:\nit would be just the same if a man did not believe that Adam in Paradise\nate of the forbidden fruit. Both parts are placed upon the one level; but\nit tends to the destruction of Church and faith, when belief is demanded\nfor these parts alike. It is to the external conceptions that attention\nhas been chiefly directed by those who have been decried as opponents of\nChristianity and as atheists, down to the time of Voltaire. When external\nconceptions such as these are held to firmly, it is inevitable that\ncontradictions should be pointed out.\n\n\n5. PETRUS RAMUS.\n\nPierre de la Ram\u00e9e was born in 1515 in Vermandois, where his father\nworked as a day-labourer. He early betook himself to Paris, in order\nto satisfy his desire for learning: he was, however, obliged on two\noccasions to leave it on account of the difficulty he experienced in\nprocuring a subsistence, before he obtained employment as a servant at\nthe _Coll\u00e9ge de Navarre_. Here he found an opportunity of extending his\nknowledge; he occupied himself with the Aristotelian philosophy and with\nmathematics, and he distinguished himself in disputation by extraordinary\noratorical and dialectical readiness. In a disputation for obtaining the\ndegree of _magister_, he came publicly forward with a thesis that caused\na great sensation: \u201cAll that Aristotle taught is not true;\u201d and the\nhonour fell to him. Having became _magister_, he attacked so bitterly and\nviolently the Aristotelian logic and dialectic, that the government took\nnotice of it. He was now accused of undermining by his anti-Aristotelian\nopinions the foundations of religion and science; this accusation was\nbrought before the parliament of Paris by the enemies of Ramus, as a\ncriminal case. But because the parliament appeared disposed to act in a\njudicial way, and seemed favourably inclined to Ramus, the complaint was\nwithdrawn, and brought before the council of the king. The latter decided\nthat Ramus should hold a disputation with his opponent Goveanus before a\nspecial commission of five judges, two of whom Goveanus was to choose,\nand two Ramus, while the king was to appoint the president; these judges\nwere to lay their opinion of the result before the king. The interest\nof the public was intense, but the contest was conducted in the most\npedantic way. On the first day Ramus maintained that the Aristotelian\nlogic and dialectic were imperfect and faulty, because the _Organon_ did\nnot begin with a definition. The commission decided that a disputation or\na dissertation requires indeed a definition, but in dialectic it is not\nnecessary. On the second day Ramus criticized the Aristotelian logic for\nits want of arrangement; this, he asserted, is essential. The majority\nof the judges, consisting of the commissioner of the king and the two\nnominees of the opponent Goveanus, now wished to annul the investigation\nas far as it had gone, and to set to work in another way, since the\nassertions of Ramus put them in a difficulty. He appealed to the king,\nwho, however, refused to hear him, and decided that the decision of\nthe judges should be considered final. Ramus was hence condemned, but\nthe other two took no share in the matter, and, indeed, resigned. The\ndecision was publicly placarded in all the streets of Paris, and sent\nto all the academies of learning throughout Europe. Plays aimed against\nRamus were performed in the theatres, greatly to the delight of the\nAristotelians. The public generally took a very lively interest in such\ndisputes, and a number of contests of this kind had already taken place\non similar questions of the schools. For example, the professors in a\nroyal _Coll\u00e9ge_ disputed with the theologians of the Sorbonne whether\n_quidam_, _quisquis_, _quoniam_ should be said or _kidem_, _kiskis_,\n_koniam_, and from this dispute a case before parliament arose, because\nthe doctors took away his benefice from a theologian who said _quisquis_.\nAnother hot and bitter controversy came before the magistrates as to\nwhether _ego amat_ was as correct as _ego amo_, and this dispute had\nto be suppressed by them. Finally Ramus obtained a public educational\nappointment, a professorship in Paris; but because he had become a\nHuguenot he had to vacate this office several times in the internal\ndisquietude that prevailed; on one occasion he even went to travel in\nGermany. On St. Bartholomew\u2019s Eve in 1572, Ramus finally fell, murdered\nthrough the instrumentality of his enemies; one of his colleagues who was\namong his bitterest enemies, Charpentier, had engaged assassins for the\npurpose, by whom Ramus was frightfully maltreated, and then thrown down\nfrom an upper window.[94]\n\nRamus aroused great interest, more especially by his attacks on the\nAristotelian dialectic as it had hitherto existed, and he contributed\nvery greatly to the simplification of the formal nature of the rules\nof dialectic. He is specially famed for his extreme hostility to the\nscholastic logic, and for having set up in opposition to it a logic of\nRamus\u2014an opposition which has spread so far that even in the history\nof literature in Germany we find various factions of Ramists and\nanti-Ramists and semi-Ramists mentioned.\n\nThere are many other remarkable men who come within this period and who\nare usually mentioned in the history of Philosophy, such as Michael\nof Montaigne, Charron, Macchiavelli, etc. The popular writings of\nthe first two contain pleasing, refined and spiritual thoughts on\nhuman life, social relationships, the right and good. The efforts\nof such men are counted as philosophy in as far as they have drawn\nfrom their consciousness, from the sphere of human experience, from\nobservation, from what takes place in the world and in the heart. It\nis in a philosophy of life that they have comprehended and imparted\nsuch experiences; they are thus both entertaining and instructive. In\naccordance with the principle on which they worked, they entirely forsook\nthe sources from which Scholastic knowledge had up to this time been\nderived, and also the methods hitherto prevalent of acquiring it. But\nbecause they do not make the question of highest interest to Philosophy\nthe object of their investigation, and do not reason from thought, they\ndo not properly belong to the history of Philosophy, but to general\nculture and to the healthy human understanding. They have contributed\nto man\u2019s taking a greater interest in his own affairs, to his obtaining\nconfidence in himself; and this is their main service. Man has looked\nwithin his heart again and given to it its proper value; then he has\nrestored to his own heart and understanding, to his faith, the essence of\nthe relationship of the individual to absolute existence. Although still\na divided heart, this division, this yearning, has become a disunion\nwithin itself; and man feels this disunion within himself, and along with\nthat his rest in himself. But here we must notice a transition, with\nwhich we are concerned, on account of the universal principle which in it\nis known in a higher way and in its true authority.\n\n\nC. THE REFORMATION.\n\nIt was in the Lutheran Reformation that the great revolution appeared,\nas, after the eternal conflicts and the terrible discipline which the\nstiff-necked Germanic character had undergone and which it had to\nundergo, mind came to the consciousness of reconciliation with itself,\na reconciliation whose form required that it should be brought about\nwithin the mind. From the Beyond man was thus called into the presence\nof spirit, as earth and her bodily objects, human virtues and morality,\nthe individual heart and conscience, began to have some value to him. In\nthe church, if marriage was not held to be immoral, self-restraint and\ncelibacy were considered higher, but now marriage came to be looked on as\na divine institution. Then poverty was esteemed better than possession,\nand to live on alms was considered higher than to support oneself\nhonestly by the work of one\u2019s hands; now, however, it becomes known that\npoverty is not the most moral life, for this last consists in living by\none\u2019s work and taking pleasure in the fruits thereof. The blind obedience\nby which human freedom was suppressed, was the third vow taken by the\nmonks, as against which freedom, like marriage and property, was now also\nrecognized as divine. Similarly on the side of knowledge man turned back\ninto himself from the Beyond of authority; and reason was recognized\nas the absolutely universal, and hence as divine. Now it was perceived\nthat it is in the mind of man that religion must have its place, and\nthe whole process of salvation be gone through\u2014that man\u2019s salvation is\nhis own affair, and that by it he enters into relationship with his\nconscience and into immediate connection with God, requiring no mediation\nof priests having the so-called means of grace within their hands. There\nis indeed a mediation present still by means of doctrine, perception, the\nobservation of self and of one\u2019s actions; but that is a mediation without\na separating wall, while formerly a brazen wall of division was present\nseparating the laity from the church. It is thus the spirit of God that\nmust dwell within the heart of man, and this indwelling spirit must\noperate in him.\n\nAlthough Wycliffe, Huss, and Arnold of Brescia had started from\nscholastic philosophy with similar ends in view, they did not possess\nthe character requisite to enable them modestly, and without any learned\nscholastic convictions, to set aside everything but mind and spirit.\nIt was with Luther first of all that freedom of spirit began to exist\nin embryo, and its form indicated that it would remain in embryo. This\nbeginning of the reconciliation of man with himself, whereby divinity\nis brought into man\u2019s actuality, is thus, at first principle alone. The\nunfolding of this freedom and the self-reflecting grasp of the same was a\nsubsequent step, in the same way as was the working out of the Christian\ndoctrine in the Church in its time. The subjective thought and knowledge\nof man, which enables him, being satisfied in his activity, to have joy\nin his work and to consider his work as something both permissible and\njustifiable\u2014this value accorded to subjectivity now required a higher\nconfirmation, and the highest confirmation, in order to be made perfectly\nlegitimate, and even to become absolute duty; and to be able to receive\nthis confirmation it had to be taken in its purest form. The mere\nsubjectivity of man, the fact that he has a will, and with it directs\nhis actions this way or that, does not constitute any justification: for\nelse the barbarous will, which fulfils itself in subjective ends alone,\nsuch as cannot subsist before reason, would be justified. If, further,\nself-will obtains the form of universality, if its ends are conformable\nto reason, and it is apprehended as the freedom of mankind, as legal\nright which likewise belongs to others, there is therein only indeed\nthe element of permission, but still there is much in the end being\nrecognized as permitted, and not as absolutely sinful. Art and industry\nreceive through this principle new activity, since now their activity is\njustified. But we always find the principle of personal spirituality and\nindependence at first limited to particular spheres of objects merely,\nin accordance with its content. Not until this principle is known and\nrecognized in relation to the absolutely existent object, _i.e._ in\nrelation to God, and is likewise grasped in its perfect purity, free from\ndesires and finite ends, does it receive its highest confirmation, and\nthat is its sanctification through religion.\n\nThis, then, is the Lutheran faith, in accordance with which man stands\nin a relation to God which involves his personal existence: that is, his\npiety and the hope of his salvation and the like all demand that his\nheart, his subjectivity, should be present in them. His feelings, his\nfaith, the inmost certainty of himself, in short, all that belongs to\nhim is laid claim to, and this alone can truly come under consideration:\nman must himself repent from his heart and experience contrition; his\nown heart must be filled with the Holy Ghost. Thus here the principle\nof subjectivity, of pure relation to me personally, _i.e._ freedom,\nis recognized, and not merely so, but it is clearly demanded that\nin religious worship this alone should be considered. The highest\nconfirmation of the principle is that it alone has value in the eyes of\nGod, that faith and the subjection of the individual heart are alone\nessential: in this way this principle of Christian freedom is first\npresented and brought to a true consciousness. Thereby a place has been\nset apart in the depths of man\u2019s inmost nature, in which alone he is\nat home with himself and at home with God; and with God alone is he\nreally himself, in the conscience he can be said to be at home with\nhimself. This sense of being at home should not be capable of being\ndestroyed through others; no one should presume to have a place therein.\nAll externality in relation to me is thereby banished, just as is the\nexternality of the Host; it is only in communion and faith that I stand\nin relation to God. The distinction between the laity and the priests\nis by it removed; there are no longer any laymen, for in religion each\nby himself is enjoined to know personally what it is. Responsibility is\nnot to be avoided; good works without spiritual reality in them are no\nlonger of avail; there must be the heart which relates itself directly to\nGod without mediation, without the Virgin, and without the Saints.\n\nThis is the great principle\u2014that all externality disappears in the\npoint of the absolute relation to God; along with this externality,\nthis estrangement of self, all servitude has also disappeared. With\nit is connected our ceasing to tolerate prayer in foreign tongues, or\nto study the sciences in such. In speech man is productive; it is the\nfirst externality that he gives himself, the simplest form of existence\nwhich he reaches in consciousness. What man represents to himself, he\ninwardly places before himself as spoken. This first form is broken\nup and rendered foreign if man is in an alien tongue to express or\nconceive to himself what concerns his highest interest. This breach with\nthe first entrance into consciousness is accordingly removed; to have\none\u2019s own right to speak and think in one\u2019s own language really belongs\nto liberty. This is of infinite importance, and without this form of\nbeing-at-home-with-self subjective freedom could not have existed; Luther\ncould not have accomplished his Reformation without translating the\nBible into German. Now the principle of subjectivity has thus become a\nmoment in religion itself, and in this way it has received its absolute\nrecognition, and has been grasped as a whole in the form in which it can\nonly be a moment in religion. The injunction to worship God in spirit\nis now fulfilled. Spirit, however, is merely conditioned by the free\nspirituality of the subject. For it is this alone which can be related\nto spirit; a subject who is not free does not stand in an attitude\nof spirituality, does not worship God in spirit. This is the general\nsignification of the principle.\n\nNow this principle was at first grasped in relation to religious objects\nonly, and thereby it has indeed received its absolute justification,\nbut still it has not been extended to the further development of the\nsubjective principle itself. Yet in so far as man has come to the\nconsciousness of being reconciled to himself, and of only being able to\nreconcile himself in his personal existence, he has in his actuality\nlikewise attained another form. The otherwise hearty and vigorous man may\nalso, in as far as he enjoys, do so with a good conscience; the enjoyment\nof life for its own sake is no longer regarded as something which is to\nbe given up, for monkish renunciation is renounced. But to any other\ncontent the principle did not at first extend. Yet further, the religious\ncontent has more specially been apprehended as concrete, as it is for\nthe recollection, and into this spiritual freedom the beginning and the\npossibility of an unspiritual mode of regarding things has thus entered.\nThe content of the _Credo_, speculative as it is in itself, has, that is\nto say, an historical side. Within this barren form the old faith of the\nchurch has been admitted and allowed to exist, so that in this form it\nhas to be regarded by the subject as the highest truth. The result then\nfollows that all development of the dogmatic content in a speculative\nmanner is quite set aside. What was required is man\u2019s inward assurance of\nhis deliverance, of his salvation\u2014the relation of the subjective spirit\nto the absolute, the form of subjectivity as aspiration, repentance,\nconversion. This new principle has been laid down as paramount, so\nthat the content of truth is clearly of importance; but the teaching\nrespecting the nature and the process of God is grasped in the form in\nwhich it at first appears for the ordinary conception. Not only have all\nthis finality, externality, unspirituality, this formalism of scholastic\nphilosophy, been on the one hand discarded, and with justice, but, on\nthe other, the philosophic development of the doctrines of the church\nhas been also set aside, and this is done in connection with the very\nfact that the subject is immersed in his own heart. This immersion, his\npenitence, contrition, conversion, this occupation of the subject with\nhimself, has become the moment of first importance; but the subject has\nnot immersed himself in the content, and the earlier immersion of spirit\ntherein has also been rejected. Even to this present day we shall find\nin the Catholic Church and in her dogmas the echoes, and so to speak\nthe heritage of the philosophy of the Alexandrian school; in it there\nis much more that is philosophic and speculative than in the dogmatism\nof Protestantism, even if there is still in this an objective element,\nand if it has not been made perfectly barren, as though the content were\nreally retained only in the form of history. The connection of Philosophy\nwith the theology of the Middle Ages has thus in the Catholic Church\nbeen retained in its essentials; in Protestantism, on the contrary, the\nsubjective religious principle has been separated from Philosophy, and\nit is only in Philosophy that it has arisen in its true form again. In\nthis principle the religious content of the Christian Church is thus\nretained, and it obtains its confirmation through the testimony of spirit\nthat this content shall only hold good for me in as far as it makes\nits influence felt in my conscience and heart. This is the meaning of\nthe words: \u201cIf any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine\nwhether it be of God.\u201d The criterion of truth is how it is confirmed in\nmy heart; the fact that I judge and know rightly\u2014or that what I hold\nto be true is the truth\u2014must be revealed to my heart. Truth is what it\nis in _my_ mind; and, on the other hand, my spirit is only then in its\nproper attitude to truth when truth is within it, when the spirit and\nits content are related thus. One cannot be isolated from the other.\nThe content has not thus the confirmation in itself which was given to\nit by philosophical theology in the fact that the speculative Idea made\nitself therein effectual; neither has it the historic confirmation which\nis given to a content in so far as it has an outward and historic side\nin which historic witnesses are heard in evidence, and in which its\ncorrectness is determined by their testimony. The doctrine has to prove\nitself by the condition of my heart, by penitence, conversion and joy\nin God. In doctrine we begin with the external content, and thus it is\nexternal only; but taken thus, independently of the state of my mind,\nit properly speaking has no significance. Now this beginning is, as\nChristian baptism and education, a working upon the nature in addition to\nan acquaintance with externals. The truth of the gospel and of Christian\ndoctrines only, however, exists in true relation to the same; it is\nreally so to speak a use of the content to make it educative. And this is\njust what has been said, that the nature is reconstructed and sanctified\nin itself, and it is this sanctification for which the content is a true\none. No further use can be made of the content than to build up and\nedify the mind, and awaken it to assurance, joy, penitence, conversion.\nAnother and wrong relation to the content is to take it in an external\nway, _e.g._ according to the great new principle of exegesis, and to\ntreat the writings of the New Testament like those of a Greek, Latin or\nother author, critically, philologically, historically. Spirit is alone\nin true relation to spirit; and it is a wrong beginning of a wooden and\nunyielding exegesis to prove in such an external and philological way\nthe truth of the Christian religion. This has been done by orthodoxy,\nwhich thereby renders the content devoid of spirituality. This, then, is\nthe first relation of spirit to this content; here the content is indeed\nessential, but it is as essential that the holy and sanctifying spirit\nshould bear a relation to it.\n\nThis spirit is, however, in the second place really thinking spirit\nlikewise. Thought as such must also develop itself therein, and that\nreally as this form of inmost unity of spirit with itself; thought\nmust come to the distinction and contemplation of this content, and\npass over into this form of the purest unity of spirit with itself. At\nfirst thought, however, reveals itself as abstract thought alone, and\nit possesses as such a relation to theology and religion. The content\nwhich is here in question, even in so far as it is historic merely and\nexternally accepted, must yet be religious; the unfolding of the nature\nof God must be present therein. In this we have the further demand\nthat the thought for which the inward nature of God is, should also\nset itself in relation to this content. But inasmuch as thought is at\nfirst understanding and the metaphysic of the understanding, it will\nremove from the content the rational Idea and make it so empty that only\nexternal history remains, which is devoid of interest.\n\nThe third position arrived at is that of concrete speculative thought.\nAccording to the standpoint which has just been given, and as religious\nfeeling and its form are here determined, all speculative content as\nsuch, as well as its developments, are at first rejected. And as for the\nenrichment of the Christian conceptions through the treasures of the\nphilosophy of the ancient world, and through the profound ideas of all\nearlier oriental religions, and the like,\u2014all this is set aside. The\ncontent had objectivity; but this merely signified that the objective\ncontent, without subsisting for itself, was to constitute the beginning\nonly, on which the mind had spiritually to build up and sanctify itself.\nAll the enrichment of the content whereby it became philosophic, is thus\nabandoned, and what follows later simply is that the mind, as thinking,\nagain immerses itself in itself, in order to be concrete and rational.\nWhat forms the basis of the Reformation is the abstract moment of a mind\nbeing within self, of freedom, of coming to self; freedom signifies the\nlife of the spirit in being turned back within itself in the particular\ncontent which appears as another; while spirit is not free if it allows\nthis other-being, either unassimilated or dead, to exist in it as\nsomething foreign. In as far as spirit now goes on to knowledge, to\nspiritual determinations, and as it looks around and comes forth as a\ncontent, so far will it conduct itself therein as in its own domain,\nas in its concrete world, so to speak\u2014and it will there really assert\nand possess its own. This concrete form of knowledge which, however, in\nthe beginning remains but dim, we have now to consider, and it forms\nthe third period of our treatise, into which we properly step with the\nReformation, although Bruno, Vanini and Ramus, who lived later, still\nbelong to the Middle Ages.\n\n\n\n\nPART THREE\n\nMODERN PHILOSOPHY\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\nIf we cast a glance back over the period just traversed, we find that\nin it a turning-point had been reached, that the Christian religion\nhad placed its absolute content in the mind and will of man, and that\nit was thus, as a divine and supersensuous content, separated from the\nworld and shut up within itself in the centre-point of the individual.\nOver against the religious life an external world stood as a natural\nworld\u2014a world of heart or feeling, of desire, of human nature\u2014which\nhad value only in as far as it was overcome. This mutual independence\nof the two worlds had much attention bestowed on it throughout the\nMiddle Ages; the opposition was attacked on all quarters and in the end\novercome. But since the relation of mankind to the divine life exists\nupon earth, this conquest at first presented the appearance of bringing\nwith it the destruction of the church and of the eternal through the\nsensuous desires of man. The eternal truth was likewise grafted upon the\ndry, formal understanding, so that we might say that the separation of\nself-consciousness has in itself disappeared, and thereby a possibility\nhas been given of obtaining reconciliation. But because this implicit\nunion of the Beyond and the Here was of so unsatisfactory a nature that\nthe better feelings were aroused and forced to turn against it, the\nReformation made its appearance, partly, no doubt, as a separation from\nthe Catholic Church, but partly as a reformation from within. There\nis a mistaken idea that the Reformation only effected a separation\nfrom the Catholic Church; Luther just as truly reformed the Catholic\nChurch, the corruption of which one learns from his writings, and from\nthe reports of the emperors and of the empire to the Pope; if further\nevidence be required, we need only read the accounts given even by the\nCatholic bishops, the Fathers of the councils at Constance, Basle, &c.,\nof the condition of the Catholic priesthood and of the Roman Court. The\nprinciple of the inward reconciliation of spirit, which was in itself the\nvery Idea of Christianity, was thus again estranged, and appeared as a\ncondition of external, unreconciled alienation and discord; this gives\nus an example of the slow operation of the world-spirit in overcoming\nthis externality. It eats away the inward substance, but the appearance,\nthe outward form, still remains; at the end, however, it is an empty\nshell, the new form breaks forth. In such times this spirit appears as\nif it\u2014having so far proceeded in its development at a snail\u2019s pace, and\nhaving even retrograded and become estranged from itself\u2014had suddenly\nadopted seven-leagued boots.\n\nSince thus the reconciliation of self-consciousness with the present is\nimplicitly accomplished, man has attained to confidence in himself and\nin his thought, in sensuous nature outside of and within him; he has\ndiscovered an interest and pleasure in making discoveries both in nature\nand the arts. In the affairs of this world the understanding developed;\nman became conscious of his will and his achievements, took pleasure\nin the earth and its soil, as also in his occupations, because right\nand understanding were there present. With the discovery of gunpowder\nthe individual passion of battle was lost. The romantic impulse towards\na casual kind of bravery passed into other adventures, not of hate or\nrevenge, or the so-called deliverance from what men considered the\nwrongs of innocence, but more harmless adventures, the exploration of the\nearth, or the discovery of the passage to the East Indies. America was\ndiscovered, its treasures and people\u2014nature, man himself; navigation was\nthe higher romance of commerce. The present world was again present to\nman as worthy of the interests of mind; thinking mind was again capable\nof action. Now the Reformation of Luther had inevitably to come\u2014the\nappeal to the _sensus communis_ which does not recognize the authority of\nthe Fathers or of Aristotle, but only the inward personal spirit which\nquickens and animates, in contradistinction to works. In this way the\nChurch lost her power against it, for her principle was within it and no\nlonger lacking to it. To the finite and present due honour is accorded;\nfrom this honour the work of science proceeds. We thus see that the\nfinite, the inward and outward present, becomes a matter of experience,\nand through the understanding is elevated into universality; men desire\nto understand laws and forces, _i.e._ to transform the individual of\nperceptions into the form of universality. Worldly matters demand to be\njudged of in a worldly way; the judge is thinking understanding. The\nother side is that the eternal, which is in and for itself true, is also\nknown and comprehended through the pure heart itself; the individual mind\nappropriates to itself the eternal. This is the Lutheran faith without\nany other accessories\u2014works, as they were called. Everything had value\nonly as it was grasped by the heart, and not as a mere thing. The content\nceases to be an objective thing; God is thus in spirit alone, He is not a\nbeyond but the truest reality of the individual.\n\nPure thought is likewise one form of inwardness; it also approaches\nabsolute existence and finds itself justified in apprehending the same.\nThe philosophy of modern times proceeds from the principle which ancient\nphilosophy had reached, the standpoint of actual self-consciousness\u2014it\nhas as principle the spirit that is present to itself; it brings the\nstandpoint of the Middle Ages, the diversity between what is thought\nand the existent universe, into opposition, and it has to do with the\ndissolution of this same opposition. The main interest hence is, not so\nmuch the thinking of the objects in their truth, as the thinking and\nunderstanding of the objects, the thinking this unity itself, which is\nreally the being conscious of a presupposed object. The getting rid of\nthe formal culture of the logical understanding and the monstrosities\nof which it was composed, was more essential than the extension of it:\ninvestigation in such a case becomes dissipated and diffused, and passes\ninto the false infinite. The general points of view which in modern\nphilosophy we reach are hence somewhat as follows:\u2014\n\n1. The concrete form of thought which we have here to consider on its own\naccount, really appears as subjective with the reflection of implicitude,\nso that this has an antithesis in existence; and the interest is then\naltogether found in grasping the reconciliation of this opposition in its\nhighest existence, _i.e._ in the most abstract extremes. This highest\nseverance is the opposition between thought and Being, the comprehending\nof whose unity from this time forward constitutes the interest of all\nphilosophies. Here thought is more independent, and thus we now abandon\nits unity with theology; it separates itself therefrom, just as with the\nGreeks it separated itself from mythology, the popular religion, and did\nnot until the time of the Alexandrians seek out these forms again and\nfill the mythological conceptions with the form of thought. The bond\nremains, but for this reason it is clearly implicit: theology throughout\nis merely what philosophy is, for this last is simply thought respecting\nit. It does not help theology to strive against philosophy, or to say\nthat it wishes to know nothing about it, and that philosophic maxims\nare thus to be set aside. It has always to do with the thought that it\nbrings along with it, and these its subjective conceptions, its home and\nprivate metaphysics, are thus frequently a quite uncultured, uncritical\nthought\u2014the thought of the street. These general conceptions are, indeed,\nconnected with particular subjective conviction, and this last is said to\nprove the Christian content to be true in a sense all its own; but these\nthoughts which constitute the criterion are merely the reflections and\nopinions which float about the surface of the time. Thus, when thought\ncomes forth on its own account, we thereby separate ourselves from\ntheology; we shall, however, consider one other in whom both are still\nin unity. This individual is Jacob Boehme, for since mind now moves in\nits own domains, it is found partly in the natural and finite world, and\npartly in the inward, and this at first is the Christian.\n\nWhile earlier than this, moreover, the spirit, distracted by outward\nthings, had to make its influence felt in religion and in the secular\nlife, and came to be known in the popular philosophy so-called, it\nwas only in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that the genuine\nPhilosophy re-appeared, which seeks to grasp the truth as truth because\nman in thought is infinitely free to comprehend himself and nature, and\nalong with that seeks to understand the present of rationality, reality,\nuniversal law itself. For this is ours, since it is subjectivity. The\nprinciple of modern philosophy is hence not a free and natural thought,\nbecause it has the opposition of thought and nature before it as a\nfact of which it is conscious. Spirit and nature, thought and Being,\nare the two infinite sides of the Idea, which can for the first time\ntruly make its appearance when its sides are grasped for themselves in\ntheir abstraction and totality. Plato comprehended it as the bond, as\nlimiting and as infinite, as one and many, simple and diverse, but not as\nthought and Being; when we first thinkingly overcome this opposition it\nsignifies comprehending the unity. This is the standpoint of philosophic\nconsciousness generally; but the way in which this unity must be\nthinkingly developed is a double one. Philosophy hence falls into the two\nmain forms in which the opposition is resolved, into a realistic and an\nidealistic system of philosophy, _i.e._ into one which makes objectivity\nand the content of thought to arise from the perceptions, and one which\nproceeds to truth from the independence of thought.\n\na. Experience constitutes the first of these methods, viz. Realism.\nPhilosophy now signified, or had as its main attribute, self-thought and\nthe acceptance of the present as that in which truth lay, and which was\nthereby knowable. All that is speculative is pared and smoothed down in\norder to bring it under experience. This present is the existent external\nnature, and spiritual activity as the political world and as subjective\nactivity. The way to truth was to begin from this hypothesis, but not to\nremain with it in its external self-isolating actuality, but to lead it\nto the universal.\n\n\u03b1. The activities of that first method operate, to begin with, on\nphysical nature, from the observation of which men derive universal\nlaws, and on this basis their knowledge is founded; the science of\nnature, however, only reaches to the stage of reflection. This kind of\nexperimental physics was once called, and is still called philosophy,\nas Newton\u2019s _Principia philosophi\u00e6 naturalis_ (Vol. I. p. 59) show.\nThis work is one in which the methods of the finite sciences through\nobservation and deduction are alone present\u2014those sciences which the\nFrench still call the _sciences exactes_. To this, the understanding\nof the individual, piety was opposed, and hence in this respect\nphilosophy was termed worldly wisdom (Vol. I. p. 60). Here the Idea in\nits infinitude is not itself the object of knowledge; but a determinate\ncontent is raised into the universal, or this last in its determinateness\nfor the understanding is derived from observation, just as is, for\ninstance, done in Keppler\u2019s Laws. In Scholastic philosophy, on the\nother hand, man\u2019s power of observation was set aside, and disputations\nrespecting nature at that time proceeded from abstruse hypotheses.\n\n\u03b2. In the second place, the spiritual was observed as in its realization\nit constitutes the spiritual world of states, in order thus to\ninvestigate from experience the rights of individuals as regards one\nanother, and as regards rulers, and the rights of states against states.\nBefore this popes anointed kings, just as was done in Old Testament\ntimes to those appointed by God; it was in the Old Testament that the\ntithe was commanded; the forbidden degrees of relationship in marriage\nwere also adopted from the Mosaic laws. What was right and permissible\nfor kings was demonstrated from Saul\u2019s and David\u2019s histories, the rights\nof priesthood from Samuel\u2014in short, the Old Testament was the source of\nall the principles of public law, and it is in this way even now that\nall papal bulls have their deliverances confirmed. It may easily be\nconceived how much nonsense was in this manner concocted. Now, however,\nright was sought for in man himself, and in history, and what had been\naccounted right both in peace and in war was explained. In this way books\nwere composed which even now are constantly quoted in the Parliament of\nEngland. Men further observed the desires which could be satisfied in\nthe state and the manner in which satisfaction could be given to them,\nin order thus from man himself, from man of the past as well as of the\npresent, to learn what is right.\n\nb. The second method, that of Idealism, proceeds from what is inward;\naccording to it everything is in thought, mind itself is all content.\nHere the Idea itself is made the object; that signifies the thinking\nit and from it proceeding to the determinate. What Realism draws from\nexperience is now derived from thought _\u00e0 priori_; or the determinate is\nalso comprehended but not led back to the universal merely, but to the\nIdea.\n\nThe two methods overlap one another, however, because experience on its\nside desires to derive universal laws from observations, while, on the\nother side, thought proceeding from abstract universality must still give\nitself a determinate content; thus _a priori_ and _a posteriori_ methods\nare mingled. In France abstract universality was the more predominant;\nfrom England experience took its rise, and even now it is there held in\nthe greatest respect; Germany proceeded from the concrete Idea, from the\ninwardness of mind and spirit.\n\n2. The questions of present philosophy, the opposites, the content which\noccupies the attention of these modern times, are as follows:\u2014\n\na. The first form of the opposition which we have already touched upon in\nthe Middle Ages is the Idea of God and His Being, and the task imposed is\nto deduce the existence of God, as pure spirit, from thought. Both sides\nmust be comprehended through thought as absolute unity; the extremest\nopposition is apprehended as gathered into one unity. Other subjects\nwhich engage our attention are connected with the same general aim,\nnamely, the bringing about of the inward reconciliation in the opposition\nwhich exists between knowledge and its object.\n\nb. The second form of opposition is that of Good and Evil\u2014the opposition\nof the assertion of independent will to the positive and universal; the\norigin of evil must be known. Evil is plainly the \u201cother,\u201d the negation\nof God as Holiness; because He is, because He is wise, good, and at the\nsame time almighty, evil is contradictory to Him; an endeavour is made to\nreconcile this contradiction.\n\nc. The third form of opposition is that of the freedom of man and\nnecessity.\n\n\u03b1. The individual is clearly not determined in any other way than from\nhimself, he is the absolute beginning of determination; in the \u2018I,\u2019\nin the self, a power of decision is clearly to be found. This freedom\nis in opposition to the theory that God alone is really absolutely\ndetermining. Further, when that which happens is in futurity, the\ndetermining of it through God is regarded as Providence and the\nfore-knowledge of God. In this, however, a new contradiction is involved,\ninasmuch as because God\u2019s knowledge is not merely subjective, that which\nGod knows likewise is.\n\n\u03b2. Further still, human freedom is in opposition to necessity as the\ndeterminateness of nature; man is dependent on nature, and the external\nas well as the inward nature of man is his necessity as against his\nfreedom.\n\n\u03b3. Considered objectively, this opposition is that between final causes\nand efficient causes, _i.e._ between the acts of freedom and the acts of\nnecessity.\n\n\u03b4. This opposition between the freedom of man and natural necessity has\nfinally likewise the further form of community of soul and body, of\n_commercium animi cum corpore_, as it has been called, wherein the soul\nappears as the simple, ideal, and free, and the body as the manifold,\nmaterial and necessary.\n\nThese matters occupy the attention of science, and they are of a\ncompletely different nature from the interests of ancient philosophy.\nThe difference is this, that here there is a consciousness of an\nopposition, which is certainly likewise contained in the subjects with\nwhich the learning of the ancients was occupied, but which had not come\nto consciousness. This consciousness of the opposition, this \u2018Fall,\u2019 is\nthe main point of interest in the conception of the Christian religion.\nThe bringing about in thought of the reconciliation which is accepted in\nbelief, now constitutes the whole interest of knowledge. Implicitly it\nhas come to pass; for knowledge considers itself qualified to bring about\nin itself this recognition of the reconciliation. The philosophic systems\nare therefore no more than modes of this absolute unity, and only the\nconcrete unity of those opposites is the truth.\n\n3. As regards the stages which were reached in the progress of this\nknowledge we have to mention three of the principal.\n\na. First of all we find the union of those opposites stated; and to prove\nit genuine attempts are made, though not yet determined in purity.\n\nb. The second stage is the metaphysical union; and here, with Descartes,\nthe philosophy of modern times as abstract thought properly speaking\nbegins.\n\n\u03b1. Thinking understanding seeks to bring to pass the union, inasmuch as\nit investigates with its pure thought-determinations; this is in the\nfirst place the standpoint of metaphysics as such.\n\n\u03b2. In the second place, we have to consider negation, the destruction of\nthis metaphysics\u2014the attempt to consider knowledge on its own account,\nand the determinations which proceed from it.\n\nc. The third stage is that this union itself which is to be brought\nabout, and which is the only subject of interest, comes to consciousness\nand becomes an object. As principle the union has the form of the\nrelationship of knowledge to the content, and thus this question has been\nput: \u2018How is, and how can thought be identical with the objective?\u2019 With\nthis the inward element which lies at the basis of this metaphysic is\nraised into explicitude and made an object; and this includes all modern\nphilosophy in its range.\n\n4. In respect to the external history and the lives of the philosophers,\nit will strike us that from this time on, these appear to be very\ndifferent from those of the philosophers of ancient times, whom we\nregarded as self-sufficing individualities. It is required that a\nphilosopher should live as he teaches, that he should despise the\nworld and not enter into connection with it; this the ancients have\naccomplished, and they are such plastic individualities just because the\ninward spiritual aim of philosophy has likewise frequently determined\ntheir external relations and conditions. The object of their knowledge\nwas to take a thoughtful view of the universe; they kept the external\nconnection with the world all the further removed from themselves\nbecause they did not greatly approve of much therein present; or, at\nleast, it ever proceeds on its way, according to its own particular\nlaws, on which the individual is dependent. The individual likewise\nparticipates in the present interests of external life, in order to\nsatisfy his personal ends, and through them to attain to honour, wealth,\nrespect, and distinction; the ancient philosophers, however, because\nthey remained in the Idea, did not concern themselves with things that\nwere not the objects of their thought. Hence with the Greeks and Romans\nthe philosophers lived in an independent fashion peculiar to themselves,\nand in an external mode of life which appeared suitable to and worthy of\nthe science they professed; they conducted themselves independently as\nprivate persons, unfettered by outside trammels, and they may be compared\nto the monks who renounced all temporal goods.\n\nIn the Middle Ages it was chiefly the clergy, doctors of theology,\nwho occupied themselves with philosophy. In the transition period the\nphilosophers showed themselves to be in an inward warfare with themselves\nand in an external warfare with their surroundings, and their lives were\nspent in a wild, unsettled fashion.\n\nIn modern times things are very different; now we no longer see\nphilosophic individuals who constitute a class by themselves. With the\npresent day all difference has disappeared; philosophers are not monks,\nfor we find them generally in connection with the world, participating\nwith others in some common work or calling. They live, not independently,\nbut in the relation of citizens, or they occupy public offices and take\npart in the life of the state. Certainly they may be private persons,\nbut if so, their position as such does not in any way isolate them from\ntheir other relationships. They are involved in present conditions, in\nthe world and its work and progress. Thus their philosophy is only by\nthe way, a sort of luxury and superfluity. This difference is really\nto be found in the manner in which outward conditions have taken shape\nafter the building up of the inward world of religion. In modern times,\nnamely, on account of the reconciliation of the worldly principle with\nitself, the external world is at rest, is brought into order\u2014worldly\nrelationships, conditions, modes of life, have become constituted and\norganized in a manner which is conformable to nature and rational. We\nsee a universal, comprehensible connection, and with that individuality\nlikewise attains another character and nature, for it is no longer the\nplastic individuality of the ancients. This connection is of such power\nthat every individuality is under its dominion, and yet at the same time\ncan construct for itself an inward world. The external has thus been\nreconciled with itself in such a way that both inward and outward may be\nself-sufficing and remain independent of one another; and the individual\nis in the condition of being able to leave his external side to external\norder, while in the case of those plastic forms the external could only\nbe determined entirely from within. Now, on the contrary, with the\nhigher degree of strength attained by the inward side of the individual,\nhe may hand the external over to chance; just as he leaves clothing to\nthe contingencies of fashion, not considering it worth while to exert\nhis understanding upon it. The external he leaves to be determined by\nthe order which is present in the particular sphere in which his lot is\ncast. The circumstances of life are, in the true sense, private affairs,\ndetermined by outward conditions, and do not contain anything worthy of\nour notice. Life becomes scholarly, uniform, commonplace, it connects\nitself with outwardly given relationships and cannot represent or set\nitself forth as a form pertaining only to itself. Man must not take up\nthe character of showing himself an independent form, and giving himself\na position in the world created by himself. Because the objective power\nof external relationships is infinitely great, and for that reason\nthe way in which I perforce am placed in them has become a matter of\nindifference to me, personality and the individual life generally\nare equally indifferent. A philosopher, it is said, should live as a\nphilosopher, _i.e._, should be independent of the external relationships\nof the world, and should give up occupying himself with and troubling\nhimself concerning them. But thus circumscribed in respect of all\nnecessities, more especially of culture, no one can suffice for himself;\nhe must seek to act in connection with others. The modern world is this\nessential power of connection, and it implies the fact that it is clearly\nnecessary for the individual to enter into these relations of external\nexistence; only a common mode of existence is possible in any calling\nor condition, and to this Spinoza forms the solitary exception. Thus in\nearlier times bravery was individual; while modern bravery consists in\neach not acting after his own fashion, but relying on his connection with\nothers\u2014and this constitutes his whole merit. The calling of philosopher\nis not, like that of the monks, an organized condition. Members of\nacademies of learning are no doubt organized in part, but even a special\ncalling like theirs sinks into the ordinary commonplace of state or class\nrelationships, because admission thereinto is outwardly determined. The\nreal matter is to remain faithful to one\u2019s aims.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION ONE\n\nMODERN PHILOSOPHY IN ITS FIRST STATEMENT\n\n\nThe first two philosophers whom we have to consider are Bacon and\nBoehme; there is as complete a disparity between these individuals as\nbetween their systems of philosophy. None the less both agree that mind\noperates in the content of its knowledge as in its own domain, and\nthis consequently appears as concrete Being. This domain in Bacon is\nthe finite, natural world; in Boehme it is the inward, mystical, godly\nChristian life and existence; for the former starts from experience and\ninduction, the latter from God and the pantheism of the Trinity.\n\n\nA. BACON.\n\nThere was already being accomplished the abandonment of the content\nwhich lies beyond us, and which through its form has lost the merit\nit possessed of being true, and is become of no significance to\nself-consciousness or the certainty of self and of its actuality; this\nwe see for the first time consciously expressed, though not as yet in a\nvery perfect form, by Francis Bacon, Baron Verulam, Viscount St. Albans.\nHe is therefore instanced as in the fore-front of all this empirical\nphilosophy, and even now our countrymen like to adorn their works with\nsententious sayings culled from him. Baconian philosophy thus usually\nmeans a philosophy which is founded on the observation of the external\nor spiritual nature of man in his inclinations, desires, rational\nand judicial qualities. From these conclusions are drawn, and general\nconceptions, laws pertaining to this domain, are thus discovered. Bacon\nhas entirely set aside and rejected the scholastic method of reasoning\nfrom remote abstractions and being blind to what lies before one\u2019s eyes.\nHe takes as his standpoint the sensuous manifestation as it appears to\nthe cultured man, as the latter reflects upon it; and this is conformable\nto the principle of accepting the finite and worldly as such.\n\nBacon was born in London in 1561. His progenitors and relatives held\nhigh office in the state, and his father was Keeper of the Great Seal\nto Queen Elizabeth. He in his turn, having been educated to follow the\nsame vocation, at once devoted himself to the business of the state, and\nentered upon an important career. He early displayed great talent, and\nat the age of nineteen he produced a work on the condition of Europe\n(_De statu Europ\u00e6_). Bacon in his youth attached himself to the Earl of\nEssex, the favourite of Elizabeth, through whose support he, who as a\nyounger son had to see his paternal estate pass to his elder brother,\nsoon attained to better circumstances, and was elevated to a higher\nposition. Bacon, however, sullied his fame by the utmost ingratitude\nand faithlessness towards his protector; for he is accused of having\nbeen prevailed upon by the enemies of the Earl after his fall to charge\nhim publicly with High Treason. Under James I., the father of Charles\nI. who was beheaded, a weak man, to whom he recommended himself by his\nwork _De augmentis scientiarum_, he received the most honourable offices\nof state by attaching himself to Buckingham: he was made Keeper of the\nGreat Seal, Lord Chancellor of England, Baron Verulam. He likewise made a\nrich marriage, though he soon squandered all his means, and high though\nhis position was, he stooped to intrigues and was guilty of accepting\nbribes in the most barefaced manner. Thereby he brought upon himself the\nill-will both of people and of nobles, so that he was prosecuted, and\nhis case was tried before Parliament. He was fined 40,000_l._, thrown\ninto the Tower, and his name was struck out of the list of peers; during\nthe trial and while he was in prison he showed the greatest weakness of\ncharacter. He was, however, liberated from prison, and his trial was\nannulled, owing to the even greater hatred of the king and his minister\nBuckingham, under whose administration Bacon had filled these offices,\nand whose victim he appeared to have been; for he fell earlier than his\ncomrade Buckingham, and was deserted and condemned by him. It was not\nso much his innocence as the fact that those who ruined him had made\nthemselves hated to an equal degree through their rule, that caused the\nhatred and indignation against Bacon to be somewhat mitigated. But he\nneither recovered his own sense of self-respect nor the personal esteem\nof others, which he had lost through his former conduct. He retired into\nprivate life, lived in poverty, had to beg sustenance from the king,\noccupied himself during the remainder of his life with science only, and\ndied in 1626.[95]\n\nSince Bacon has ever been esteemed as the man who directed knowledge\nto its true source, to experience, he is, in fact, the special leader\nand representative of what is in England called Philosophy, and beyond\nwhich the English have not yet advanced. For they appear to constitute\nthat people in Europe which, limited to the understanding of actuality,\nis destined, like the class of shopkeepers and workmen in the State, to\nlive always immersed in matter, and to have actuality but not reason as\nobject. Bacon won great praise by showing how attention is to be paid\nto the outward and inward manifestations of Nature, and the esteem in\nwhich his name is thus held is greater than can be ascribed directly\nto his merit. It has become the universal tendency of the time and of\nthe English mode of reasoning, to proceed from facts, and to judge in\naccordance with them. Because Bacon gave expression to the tendency,\nand men require to have a leader and originator for any particular\nmanner of thinking, he is credited with having given to knowledge this\nimpulse towards experimental philosophy generally. But many cultured men\nhave spoken and thought regarding what concerns and interests mankind,\nregarding state affairs, mind, heart, external nature, &c., in accordance\nwith experience and in accordance with a cultured knowledge of the world.\nBacon was just such a cultured man of the world, who had seen life in\nits great relations, had engaged in state affairs, had dealt practically\nwith actual life, had observed men, their circumstances and relations,\nand had worked with them as cultured, reflecting, and, we may even say,\nphilosophical men of the world. He thus did not escape the corruption\nof those who stood at the helm of the state. With all the depravity of\nhis character he was a man of mind and clear perception; he did not,\nhowever, possess the power of reasoning through thoughts and notions\nthat are universal. We do not find in him a methodical or scientific\nmanner of regarding things, but only the external reasoning of a man of\nthe world. Knowledge of the world he possessed in the highest degree:\n\u201crich imagination, powerful wit, and the penetrating wisdom which he\ndisplays upon that most interesting of all subjects, commonly called\nthe world. This last appears to us to have been the characteristical\nquality of Bacon\u2019s genius.... It was men rather than things that he\nhad studied, the mistakes of philosophers rather than the errors of\nphilosophy. In fact he was no lover of abstract reasoning,\u201d and although\nit pertains to philosophy, we find as little as possible of it in him.\n\u201cHis writings are indeed full of refined and most acute observations, but\nit seldom requires any effort on our part to apprehend their wisdom.\u201d\nHence mottoes are often derived from him. \u201cHis judgments,\u201d however,\n\u201care commonly given _ex cathedra_, or, if he endeavours to elucidate\nthem, it is by similes and illustrations and pointed animadversions\nmore than by direct and appropriate arguments. General reasoning is\nabsolutely essential in philosophy; the want of it is marked in Bacon\u2019s\nwritings.\u201d[96] His practical writings are specially interesting; but we\ndo not find the bright flashes of genius that we expected. As during\nhis career in the state he acted in accordance with practical utility,\nhe now, at its conclusion, likewise applied himself in a practical\nway to scientific endeavours, and considered and treated the sciences\nin accordance with concrete experience and investigation. His is a\nconsideration of the present, he makes the most of, and ascribes value to\nit as it appears; the existent is thus regarded with open eyes, respect\nis paid to it as to what reigns pre-eminent, and this sensuous perception\nis reverenced and recognized. Here a confidence on the part of reason\nin itself and in nature is awakened; it thinkingly applies itself to\nnature, certain of finding the truth in it, since both are in themselves\nharmonious.\n\nBacon likewise treated the sciences methodically; he did not merely\nbring forward opinions and sentiments, he did not merely express himself\nregarding the sciences dogmatically, as a fine gentleman might, but he\nwent into the matter closely, and established a method in respect of\nscientific knowledge. It is only through this method of investigation\nintroduced by him that he is noteworthy\u2014it is in that way alone that\nhe can be considered to belong to the history of the sciences and of\nphilosophy. And through this principle of methodical knowledge he has\nlikewise produced a great effect upon his times, by drawing attention\nto what was lacking in the sciences, both in their methods and in\ntheir content. He set forth the general principles of procedure in\nan empirical philosophy. The spirit of the philosophy of Bacon is to\ntake experience as the true and only source of knowledge, and then to\nregulate the thought concerning it. Knowledge from experience stands\nin opposition to knowledge arising from the speculative Notion, and\nthe opposition is apprehended in so acute a manner that the knowledge\nproceeding from the Notion is ashamed of the knowledge from experience,\njust as this again takes up a position of antagonism to the knowledge\nthrough the Notion. What Cicero says of Socrates may be said of Bacon,\nthat he brought Philosophy down to the world, to the homes and every-day\nlives of men (Vol. I. p. 389). To a certain extent knowledge from the\nabsolute Notion may assume an air of superiority over this knowledge; but\nit is essential, as far as the Idea is concerned, that the particularity\nof the content should be developed. The Notion is an essential matter,\nbut as such its finite side is just as essential. Mind gives presence,\nexternal existence, to itself; to come to understand this extension, the\nworld as it is, the sensuous universe, to understand itself as this,\n_i.e._ with its manifest, sensuous extension, is one side of things.\nThe other side is the relation to the Idea. Abstraction in and for\nitself must determine and particularize itself. The Idea is concrete,\nself-determining, it has the principle of development; and perfect\nknowledge is always developed. A conditional knowledge in respect of the\nIdea merely signifies that the working out of the development has not\nyet advanced very far. But we have to deal with this development; and\nfor this development and determination of the particular from the Idea,\nso that the knowledge of the universe, of nature, may be cultivated\u2014for\nthis, the knowledge of the particular is necessary. This particularity\nmust be worked out on its own account; we must become acquainted with\nempirical nature, both with the physical and with the human. The merit\nof modern times is to have accomplished or furthered these ends; it was\nin the highest degree unsatisfactory when the ancients attempted the\nwork. Empiricism is not merely an observing, hearing, feeling, etc., a\nperception of the individual; for it really sets to work to find the\nspecies, the universal, to discover laws. Now because it does this, it\ncomes within the territory of the Notion\u2014it begets what pertains to the\nregion of the Idea; it thus prepares the empirical material for the\nNotion, so that the latter can then receive it ready for its use. If\nthe science is perfected the Idea must certainly issue forth of itself;\nscience as such no longer commences from the empiric. But in order that\nthis science may come into existence, we must have the progression from\nthe individual and particular to the universal\u2014an activity which is a\nreaction on the given material of empiricism in order to bring about its\nreconstruction. The demand of _a priori_ knowledge, which seems to imply\nthat the Idea should construct from itself, is thus a reconstruction\nonly, or what is in religion accomplished through sentiment and feeling.\nWithout the working out of the empirical sciences on their own account,\nPhilosophy could not have reached further than with the ancients. The\nwhole of the Idea in itself is science as perfected and complete; but\nthe other side is the beginning, the process of its origination. This\nprocess of the origination of science is different from its process in\nitself when it is complete, just as is the process of the history of\nPhilosophy and that of Philosophy itself. In every science principles are\ncommenced with; at the first these are the results of the particular,\nbut if the science is completed they are made the beginning. The case\nis similar with Philosophy; the working out of the empirical side has\nreally become the conditioning of the Idea, so that this last may reach\nits full development and determination. For instance, in order that the\nhistory of the Philosophy of modern times may exist, we must have a\nhistory of Philosophy in general, the process of Philosophy during so\nmany thousand years; mind must have followed this long road in order\nthat the Philosophy may be produced. In consciousness it then adopts the\nattitude of having cut away the bridge from behind it; it appears to be\nfree to launch forth in its ether only, and to develop without resistance\nin this medium; but it is another matter to attain to this ether and\nto development in it. We must not overlook the fact that Philosophy\nwould not have come into existence without this process, for mind is\nessentially a working upon something different.\n\n1. Bacon\u2019s fame rests on two works. In the first place, he has the\nmerit of having in his work _De augmentis scientiarum_ presented to\nus a systematic encyclopedia of the sciences, an outline which must\nundoubtedly have caused a sensation amongst his contemporaries. It is\nimportant to set before men\u2019s eyes a well arranged picture such as\nthis of the whole, when that whole has not been grasped in thought.\nThis encyclopedia gives a general classification of the sciences; the\nprinciples of the classification are regulated in accordance with the\ndifferences in the intellectual capacities. Bacon thus divides human\nlearning according to the faculties of memory, imagination, and reason,\nfor he distinguishes what pertains (1) to memory; (2) to imagination; (3)\nto reason. Under memory he considered history; under imagination, poetry,\nand art; and finally, under reason, philosophy.[97] According to his\nfavourite method of division these again are further divided, since he\nbrings all else under these same heads; this is, however, unsatisfactory.\nTo history belong the works of God\u2014sacred, prophetic, ecclesiastical\nhistory; the works of men\u2014civil and literary history; and likewise the\nworks of nature, and so on.[98] He goes through these topics after the\nmanner of his time, a main characteristic of which is that anything can\nbe made plausible through examples, _e.g._ from the Bible. Thus, in\ntreating of _Cosmetica_, he says in regard to paint that \u201cHe is surprised\nthat this depraved custom of painting has been by the penal laws both\necclesiastical and civil so long overlooked. In the Bible we read indeed\nof Jezebel that she painted her face; but nothing of the kind is said\nof Esther or Judith.\u201d[99] If kings, popes, etc., are being discussed,\nsuch examples as those of Ahab and Solomon must be brought forward. As\nformerly in civil laws\u2014those respecting marriage, for instance\u2014the Jewish\nforms held good, in Philosophy, too, the same are still to be found. In\nthis work theology likewise appears, as also magic; there is contained in\nit a comprehensive system of knowledge and of the sciences.\n\nThe arrangement of the sciences is the least significant part of the work\n_De augmentis scientiarum_. It was by its criticism that its value was\nestablished and its effect produced, as also by the number of instructive\nremarks contained in it; all this was at that time lacking in the\nparticular varieties of learning and modes of discipline, especially in\nas far as the methods hitherto adopted were faulty, and unsuitable to the\nends in view: in them the Aristotelian conceptions of the schools were\nspun out by the understanding as though they were realities. As it was\nwith the Schoolmen and with the ancients, this classification is still\nthe mode adopted in the sciences, in which the nature of knowledge is\nunknown. In them the idea of the science is advanced beforehand, and to\nthis idea a principle foreign to it is added, as a basis of division,\njust as here is added the distinction between memory, imagination and\nreason. The true method of division is found in the self-division of the\nNotion, its separating itself from itself. In knowledge the moment of\nself-consciousness is undoubtedly found, and the real self-consciousness\nhas in it the moments of memory, imagination and reason. But this\ndivision is certainly not taken from the Notion of self-consciousness,\nbut from experience, in which self-consciousness finds itself possessed\nof these capacities.\n\n2. The other remarkable feature in Bacon is that in his second work,\nhis _Organon_, he sought at great length to establish a new method in\nlearning; in this regard his name is still held greatly in honour by\nmany. What chiefly distinguishes his system is his polemical attitude\ntowards scholastic methods as they had hitherto existed, towards\nsyllogistic forms. He calls these methods _anticipationes natur\u00e6_; in\nthem men begin with presuppositions, definitions, accepted ideas, with a\nscholastic abstraction, and reason further from these without regarding\nthat which is present in actuality. Thus regarding God and His methods\nof operating in nature, regarding devils, &c., they make use of passages\nfrom the Bible, such as \u201cSun, stand thou still,\u201d in order to deduce\ntherefrom certain metaphysical propositions from which they go further\nstill. It was against this _a priori_ method that Bacon directed his\npolemic; as against these anticipations of nature he called attention\nto the explanation, the interpretation of nature.[100] \u201cThe same action\nof mind,\u201d he says, \u201cwhich discovers a thing in question, judges it;\nand the operation is not performed by the help of any middle term, but\ndirectly, almost in the same manner as by the sense. For the sense in\nits primary objects at once apprehends the appearance of the object, and\nconsents to the truth thereof.\u201d[101] The syllogism is altogether rejected\nby Bacon. As a matter of fact, this Aristotelian deduction is not a\nknowledge through itself in accordance with its content: it requires a\nforeign universal as its basis, and for that reason its movement is in\nits form contingent. The content is not in unity with the form, and this\nform is hence in itself contingent, because it, considered on its own\naccount, is the movement onwards in a foreign content. The major premise\nis the content existent for itself, the minor is likewise the content\nnot through itself, for it goes back into the infinite, _i.e._ it has\nnot the form in itself; the form is not the content. The opposite may\nalways be made out equally well through the syllogism, for it is a matter\nof indifference to this form what content is made its basis. \u201cDialectic\ndoes not assist in the discovery of the arts; many arts were found out by\nchance.\u201d[102]\n\nIt was not against this syllogism generally, _i.e._ not against the\nNotion of it (for Bacon did not possess this), but against deduction as\nit was put into operation, as it was to the scholastics\u2014the deduction\nwhich took an assumed content as its basis\u2014that Bacon declaimed, urging\nthat the content of experience should be made the basis, and the method\nof induction pursued. He demanded that observations on nature and\nexperiments should be made fundamental, and pointed out the objects\nwhose investigation was of special importance in the interests of human\nsociety, and so on. From this there then resulted the establishment of\nconclusions through induction and analogy.[103] In fact it was only to\nan alteration in the content that, without being aware of it, Bacon\nwas impelled. For though he rejected the syllogism and only permitted\nconclusions to be reached through induction, he unconsciously himself\ndrew deductions; likewise all these champions of empiricism, who followed\nafter him, and who put into practice what he demanded, and thought they\ncould by observations, experiments and experiences, keep the matter\nin question pure, could neither so do without drawing deductions, nor\nwithout introducing conceptions; and they drew their deductions and\nformed their notions and conceptions all the more freely because they\nthought that they had nothing to do with conceptions at all; nor did\nthey go forth from deduction to immanent, true knowledge. Thus when\nBacon set up induction in opposition to the syllogism, this opposition\nis formal; each induction is also a deduction, which fact was known even\nto Aristotle. For if a universal is deduced from a number of things, the\nfirst proposition reads, \u201cThese bodies have these qualities;\u201d the second,\n\u201cAll these bodies belong to one class;\u201d and thus, in the third place,\nthis class has these qualities. That is a perfect syllogism. Induction\nalways signifies that observations are instituted, experiments made,\nexperience regarded, and from this the universal determination is derived.\n\nWe have already called to mind how important it is to lead on to the\ncontent as the content of actuality, of the present; for the rational\nmust have objective truth. The reconciliation of spirit with the world,\nthe glorification of nature and of all actuality, must not be a Beyond,\na Futurity, but must be accomplished now and here. It is this moment of\nthe now and here which thereby comes into self-consciousness. But those\nwho make experiments and observations, do not realize what they are\nreally doing, for the sole interest taken by them in things, is owing\nto the inward and unconscious certainty which reason has of finding\nitself in actuality; and observations and experiments, if entered upon\nin a right way, result in showing that the Notion is the only objective\nexistence. The sensuous individual eludes the experiments even while it\nis being operated upon, and becomes a universal; the best known example\nof this is to be found in positive and negative electricity in so far\nas it is positive and negative. There is another shortcoming of a formal\nnature, and one of which all empiricists partake,\u2014that is that they\nbelieve themselves to be keeping to experience alone; it is to them an\nunknown fact that in receiving these perceptions they are indulging in\nmetaphysics. Man does not stop short at the individual, nor can he do\nso. He seeks the universal, but thoughts, even if not Notions likewise,\nare what constitute the same. The most remarkable thought-form is that\nof force; we thus speak of the force of electricity, of magnetism,\nof gravity. Force, however, is a universal and not a perceptible;\nquite uncritically and unconsciously the empiricists thus permit of\ndeterminations such as these.\n\n3. Bacon finally gives the objects with which Philosophy mainly has\nto deal. These objects contrast much with that which we derive from\nperception and experience. \u201cIn the summary which Bacon gives of what\nhe conceives ought to be the objects of philosophical inquiry, are the\nfollowing; and we select those which he principally dwells upon in his\nworks: \u2018The prolongation of life; the restitution of youth in some\ndegree; the retardation of old age, and the altering of statures; the\naltering of features; versions of bodies into other bodies; making of new\nspecies; impression of the air and raising tempests; greater pleasures of\nthe senses, &c.\u2019\u201d He likewise deals with objects such as these, and he\nseeks to direct attention upon whether in their regard the means could\nnot be found to carry out their ends; in such powers we should be able\nto make some progress. \u201cHe complains that such investigations have been\nneglected by those whom he designates _ignavi regionum exploratores_.\nIn his Natural History he gives formal receipts for making gold, and\nperforming many wonders.\u201d[104] Bacon thus does not by any means take\nthe intelligent standpoint of an investigation of nature, being still\ninvolved in the grossest superstition, false magic, &c. This we find\nto be on the whole propounded in an intelligent way, and Bacon thus\nremains within the conceptions of his time. \u201cThe conversion of silver,\nquicksilver, or any other metal into gold is a thing difficult to\nbelieve, yet it is far more probable that a man who knows clearly\nthe natures of weight, of the colour of yellow, of malleability and\nextension, of volatility and fixedness, and who has also made diligent\nsearch into the first seeds and menstruums of minerals, may at last\nby much and sagacious endeavour produce gold, than that a few grains\nof an elixir may so do.... So again a man who knows well the nature\nof rarefaction, of assimilation, and of alimentation, shall by diets,\nbathings, and the like prolong life, or in some degree renew the vigour\nof youth.\u201d[105] These assertions are thus not as crude as they at first\nappear. In dealing with Medicine Bacon speaks amongst other things of\nmaceration (_Malacissatio per exterius_)[106] and so forth.\n\nBacon emphasizes what has reference to the formal aspect of\ninvestigation. For he says, \u201cNatural philosophy is divided into two\nparts, the first consists in the investigation of causes; the second\nin the production of effects; the causes to be investigated are either\nfinal or formal causes, or else material or efficient causes. The former\nconstitutes metaphysics; the latter physics. This last Bacon looks\nupon as a branch of philosophy very inferior in point of dignity and\nimportance to the other and accordingly to ascertain the most probable\nmeans of improving our knowledge of metaphysics is the great object of\nhis _Organon_.\u201d[107] He himself says: \u201cIt is a correct position that\n\u2018true knowledge is knowledge by causes. And causes, again, are not\nimproperly distributed into four kinds: the material, the formal, the\nefficient, and the final.\u2019\u201d[108] (Vol. I. p. 174, Vol. II. p. 138.)\n\nBut in this connection an important point is that Bacon has turned\nagainst the teleological investigation of nature, against the\ninvestigation into final causes. \u201cThe investigation of final causes is\nuseless; they corrupt rather than advance the sciences except such as\nhave to do with human action.\u201d[109] To Bacon the important matter is to\ninvestigate by the study of _caus\u00e6 efficientes_. To the consideration\nof final causes such assertions as these belong: \u201cThat the hairs of the\neyelids are for a protection to the eyes; that the thick skins and hides\nof living creatures are to defend them from heat and cold; that the trees\nhave leaves so that the fruit may not suffer from sun and wind\u201d[110]:\nthe hair is on the head on account of warmth; thunder and lightning are\nthe punishment of God, or else they make fruitful the earth; marmots\nsleep during the winter because they can find nothing to eat; snails\nhave a shell in order that they may be secure against attacks; the bee\nis provided with a sting. According to Bacon this has been worked out in\ninnumerable different ways. The negative and external side of utility is\nturned round, and the lack of this adaptation to end is likewise drawn\nwithin the same embrace. It may, for example, be said that if sun or\nmoon were to shine at all times, the police might save much money, and\nthis would provide men with food and drink for whole months together.\nIt was right that Bacon should set himself to oppose this investigation\ninto final causes, because it relates to external expediency, just\nas Kant was right in distinguishing the inward teleology from the\noutward. As against the external end, there is, in fact, the inward end,\n_i.e._ the inward Notion of the thing itself, as we found it earlier\nin Aristotle (Vol. II. pp. 156-163). Because the organism possesses an\ninward adaptation to its ends, its members are indeed likewise externally\nadapted as regards one another; but the ends, as external ends, are\nheterogeneous to the individual, are unconnected with the object which\nis investigated. Speaking generally, the Notion of nature is not in\nnature itself, which would mean that the end was in nature itself; but as\nteleological, the Notion is something foreign to it. It does not have the\nend in itself in such a way that we have to accord respect to it\u2014as the\nindividual man has his end in himself and hence has to be respected. But\neven the individual man as individual has only a right to respect from\nthe individual as such, and not from the universal. He who acts in the\nname of the universal, of the state, as a general does for instance, does\nnot require to respect the individual at all; for the latter, although an\nend in himself, does not cease to be relative. He is this end in himself,\nnot as excluding himself and setting himself in opposition, but only in\nso far as his true reality is the universal Notion. The end of the animal\nin itself as an individual is its own self-preservation; but its true end\nin itself is the species. Its self-preservation is not involved in this;\nfor the self-preservation of its individuality is disadvantageous to the\nspecies, while the abrogation of itself is favourable thereto.\n\nNow Bacon separates the universal principle and the efficient cause,\nand for that reason he removes investigation into ends from physics to\nmetaphysics. Or he recognizes the Notion, not as universal in nature, but\nonly as necessity, _i.e._ as a universal which presents itself in the\nopposition of its moments, not one which has bound them into a unity\u2014in\nother words he only acknowledges a comprehension of one determinate\nfrom another determinate going on into infinity, and not of both from\ntheir Notion. Bacon has thus made investigation into the efficient cause\nmore general, and he asserts that this investigation alone belongs to\nphysics, although he allows that both kinds of investigation may exist\nside by side.[111] Through that view he effected a great deal, and in\nso far as it has counteracted the senseless superstition which in the\nGermanic nations far exceeded in its horrors and absurdity that of the\nancient world, it has the very merit which we met with in the Epicurean\nphilosophy. That philosophy opposed itself to the superstitious Stoics\nand to superstition generally\u2014which last makes any existence that we\nset before ourselves into a cause (a Beyond which is made to exist in a\nsensuous way and to operate as a cause), or makes two sensuous things\nwhich have no relation operate on one another. This polemic of Bacon\u2019s\nagainst spectres, astrology, magic, &c.,[112] can certainly not be\nregarded exactly as Philosophy like his other reflections, but it is at\nleast of service to culture.\n\nHe also advises that attention should be directed to formal causes, the\nforms of things, and that they should be recognized.[113] \u201cBut to give\nan exact definition of the meaning which Bacon attaches to the phrase\nformal causes is rather difficult; because his language upon this subject\nis uncertain in a very remarkable degree.\u201d[114] It may be thought that\nhe understood by this the immanent determinations of things, the laws\nof nature; as a matter of fact the forms are none else than universal\ndeterminations, species, &c.[115] He says: \u201cThe discovery of the formal\nis despaired of. The efficient and the material (as they are investigated\nand received, that is as remote causes, without reference to the latent\nprocess leading to the forms) are but slight and superficial, and\ncontribute little, if anything, to true and active science. For though\nin nature nothing really exists beside individual bodies, performing\npure individual acts according to a fixed law, yet in philosophy this\nvery law, and the investigation, discovery and explanation of it, is the\nfoundation as well of knowledge as of operation. And it is this law, with\nits clauses, that I mean when I speak of Forms.... Let the investigation\nof Forms which are eternal and immutable constitute metaphysics.\nWhosoever is acquainted with Forms embraces the unity of nature in\nsubstances the most unlike.\u201d[116] He goes through this in detail, and\nquotes many examples to illustrate it, such as that of Heat. \u201cMind must\nraise itself from differences to species. The warmth of the sun and\nthat of the fire are diverse. We see that grapes ripen by the warmth of\nthe sun. But to see whether the warmth of the sun is specific, we also\nobserve other warmth, and we find that grapes likewise ripen in a warm\nroom; this proves that the warmth of the sun is not specific.\u201d[117]\n\n\u201cPhysic,\u201d he says, \u201cdirects us through narrow rugged paths in imitation\nof the crooked ways of nature. But he that understands a form knows the\nultimate possibility of superinducing that nature upon all kinds of\nmatter; that is to say, as he himself interprets this last expression,\nis able to superinduce the nature of gold upon silver,\u201d that is to say\nto make gold from silver, \u201cand to perform all those other marvels to\nwhich the alchymists pretended. The error of these last consisted alone\nin hoping to arrive at these ends by fabulous and fantastical methods;\u201d\nthe true method is to recognize these forms. \u201cOne leading object of\nthe _Instauratio Magna_ and of the _Novum Organon_ is to point out the\nnecessity of ascertaining the formal causes and logical rules.\u201d[118] They\nare good rules, but not adapted to attain that end.\n\nThis is all that we have to say of Bacon. In dealing with Locke we shall\nhave more to say of these empirical methods which were adopted by the\nEnglish.\n\n\nB. JACOB BOEHME.\n\nWe now pass on from this English Lord Chancellor, the leader of the\nexternal, sensuous method in Philosophy, to the _philosophus teutonicus_,\nas he is called\u2014to the German cobbler of Lusatia, of whom we have no\nreason to be ashamed. It was, in fact, through him that Philosophy first\nappeared in Germany with a character peculiar to itself: Boehme stands in\nexact antithesis to Bacon. He was also called _theosophus teutonicus_,\njust as even before this _philosophia teutonica_ was the name given to\nmysticism.[119] This Jacob Boehme was for long forgotten and decried as\nbeing simply a pious visionary; the so-called period of enlightenment,\nmore particularly, helped to render his public extremely limited.\nLeibnitz thought very highly of him, but it is in modern times that his\nprofundity has for the first time been recognized, and that he has been\nonce more restored to honour. It is certain, on the one hand, that he\ndid not merit the disdain accorded him; on the other, however, he did\nnot deserve the high honour into which he was elevated. To call him an\nenthusiast signifies nothing at all. For if we will, all philosophers may\nbe so termed, even the Epicureans and Bacon; for they all have held that\nman finds his truth in something else than eating and drinking, or in\nthe common-sense every-day life of wood-cutting, tailoring, trading, or\nother business, private or official. But Boehme has to attribute the high\nhonour to which he was raised mainly to the garb of sensuous feeling and\nperception which he adopted; for ordinary sensuous perception and inward\nfeeling, praying and yearning, and the pictorial element in thought,\nallegories and such like, are in some measure held to be essential in\nPhilosophy. But it is only in the Notion, in thought, that Philosophy\ncan find its truth, and that the Absolute can be expressed and likewise\nis as it is in itself. Looked at from this point of view, Boehme is a\ncomplete barbarian, and yet he is a man who, along with his rude method\nof presentation, possesses a deep, concrete heart. But because no method\nor order is to be found in him, it is difficult to give an account of his\nphilosophy.\n\nJacob Boehme was born in 1575 of poor parents, at Altseidenburg, near\nG\u00f6rlitz, in Upper Lusatia. In his youth he was a peasant boy who tended\nthe cattle. He was brought up as a Lutheran, and always remained such.\nThe account of his life which is given with his works was drawn up by\na clergyman who knew him personally, from information given by Boehme\nhimself. Much is there related as to how he attained to more profound\nknowledge and wisdom by means of certain experiences through which he\npassed. Even when a herd tending the cattle, as he tells of himself, he\nhad these wonderful manifestations. The first marvellous awakening that\noccurred to him took place in a thicket in which he saw a cavern and a\nvessel of gold. Startled by the splendour of this sight he was inwardly\nawakened from a dull stupor, but afterwards he found it was impossible\nfor him to discover the objects of his vision. Subsequently he was\nbound apprentice to a shoemaker. More especially \u201cwas he spiritually\nawakened by the words: \u2018Your heavenly Father will give the Holy Spirit\nto them that ask Him\u2019 (Luke xi. 13), so that, desiring to come to a\nknowledge of the truth, and yet retaining the simplicity of his mind, he\nprayed and sought, and knocked, fervently and earnestly, until, while\ntravelling about with his master, he was, through the influence of the\nFather in the Son, spiritually transported into the glorious peace and\nthe Sabbath of the soul, and thus his request was granted. According to\nhis own account, he was then surrounded with divine light, and for seven\ndays he remained in the supremest divine contemplation and joy.\u201d His\nmaster for this dismissed him, saying he could not keep in his service\n\u201chouse-prophets such as he was.\u201d After that he lived at G\u00f6rlitz. In 1594\nhe rose in his trade to be master, and married. Later on, \u201cin the year\n1600, and in the twenty-fifth year of his age, once more\u201d the light broke\nupon him in a second vision of the same kind. He tells that he saw a\nbrightly scoured pewter dish in the room, and \u201cby the sudden sight of\nthis shining metal with its brilliant radiance\u201d he was brought (into a\nmeditation and a breaking free of his astral mind) \u201cinto the central\npoint of secret nature,\u201d and into the light of divine essence. \u201cHe went\nout into the open air in order that he might rid his brain of this\nhallucination, and none the less did he continue all the more clearly\nas time went on to experience the vision in this way received. Thus by\nmeans of the signatures or figures, lineaments, and colours which were\ndepicted, he could, so to speak, look into the heart and inmost nature\nof all creatures (in his book _De signatura rerum_ this reason which\nwas impressed upon him is found and fully explained); and for this he\nwas overwhelmed with joy, thanked God, and went peacefully about his\naffairs.\u201d Later on he wrote several works. He continued to pursue his\nhandicraft at G\u00f6rlitz, and died at the same place in 1624, being then a\nmaster shoemaker.[120]\n\nHis works are especially popular with the Dutch, and for that reason\nmost of the editions are issued from Amsterdam, though they were also\nsurreptitiously printed in Hamburg. His first writing is the \u201cAurora\u201d or\n\u201cMorgenr\u00f6the im Aufgange,\u201d and this was followed by others; the work \u201cVon\nden drei Principien,\u201d and another \u201cVom dreifachen Leben des Menschen,\u201d\nare, along with several others, the most noteworthy. Boehme constantly\nread the Bible, but what other works he read is not known. A number\nof passages in his works, however, prove that he read much\u2014evidently\nmystical, theosophic, and alchemistic writings for the most part, and he\nmust certainly have included in his reading the works of Theophrastus\nBombastus von Hohenheim, known as Paracelsus, a philosopher of a somewhat\nsimilar calibre, but much more confused, and without Boehme\u2019s profundity\nof mind. He met with much persecution at the hands of the clergy, but he\naroused less attention in Germany than in Holland and England, where his\nwritings have been often printed.[121] In reading his works we are struck\nwith wonder, and one must be familiar with his ideas in order to discover\nthe truth in this most confused method of expression.\n\nThe matter of Jacob Boehme\u2019s philosophy is genuinely German; for what\nmarks him out and makes him noteworthy is the Protestant principle\nalready mentioned of placing the intellectual world within one\u2019s own\nmind and heart, and of experiencing and knowing and feeling in one\u2019s own\nself-consciousness all that formerly was conceived as a Beyond. Boehme\u2019s\ngeneral conceptions thus on the one hand reveal themselves as both deep\nand sound, but on the other, with all his need for and struggle after\ndetermination and distinction in the development of his divine intuitions\nof the universe, he does not attain either to clearness or order.\nThere is no systematic connection but the greatest confusion in his\ndivisions\u2014and this exists even in his tables,[122] in which three numbers\nare made use of.\n\n I.\n\n What God is beside nature and creation.\n\n II.\n\n Separability: _Mysterium The first _Principium_.\n God in Love. magnum._ God in Wrath.\n\n III.\n\n God in wrath and love.\n\nHere nothing definite to hold the moments asunder is shown, and we\nhave the sense of merely doing it by effort; now these and now other\ndistinctions are set forth, and as they are laid down disconnectedly,\nthey again come into confusion.\n\nThe manner and system which Boehme adopts must accordingly be termed\nbarbarous; the expressions used in his works prove this, as when, for\nexample, he speaks of the divine Salitter, Marcurius, &c. As Boehme\nplaces the life, the movement of absolute existence in the heart, so\ndoes he regard all conceptions as being in a condition of actuality; or\nhe makes use of actuality as Notion, that is to say he forcibly takes\nnatural things and sensuous qualities to express his ideas rather than\nthe determinations of the Notion. For instance, sulphur and such like are\nnot to him the things that we so name, but their essence; or the Notion\nhas this form of actuality. Boehme\u2019s profoundest interest is in the Idea,\nand he struggles hard to express it. The speculative truth which he\ndesires to expound really requires, in order to be comprehended, thought\nand the form of thought. Only in thought can this unity be comprehended,\nin the central point of which his mind has its place; but it is just\nthe form of thought that is lacking to him. The forms that he employs\nare really no longer determinations of the Notion at all. They are on\nthe one hand sensuous, chemical determinations, such qualities as acid,\nsweet, sour, fierce, and, on the other, emotions such as wrath and love;\nand, further, tincture, essence, anguish, &c. For him these sensuous\nforms do not, however, possess the sensuous significance which belongs\nto them, but he uses them in order to find expression for his thought.\nIt is, however, at once clear to us how the form of manifestation must\nnecessarily appear forced, since thought alone is capable of unity.\nIt thus appears strange to read of the bitterness of God, of the\n_Flagrat_, and of lightning; we first require to have the Idea, and\nthen we certainly discern its presence here. But the other side is that\nBoehme utilizes the Christian form which lies nearest to him, and more\nespecially that of the Trinity, as the form of the Idea: he intermingles\nthe sensuous mode and the mode of popularly conceived religion, sensuous\nimages and conceptions. However rude and barbarous this may on the one\nhand be, and however impossible it is to read Boehme continuously, or to\ntake a firm grasp of his thoughts (for all these qualities, spirits and\nangels make one\u2019s head swim), we must on the other hand recognize that\nhe speaks of everything as it is in its actuality, and that he does this\nfrom his heart. This solid, deep, German mind which has intercourse with\nwhat is most inward, thus really exercises an immense power and force in\norder to make use of actuality as Notion, and to have what takes place\nin heaven around and within it. Just as Hans Sachs represented God,\nChrist and the Holy Ghost, as well as patriarchs and angels, in his own\nparticular manner and as ordinary people like himself, not looking upon\nthem as past and historic, so was it with Boehme.\n\nTo faith spirit has truth, but in this truth the moment of certainty\nof self is lacking. We have seen that the object of Christianity is\nthe truth, the Spirit; it is given to faith as immediate truth. Faith\npossesses the truth, but unconsciously, without knowledge, without\nknowing it as its self-consciousness; and seeing that thought, the\nNotion, is necessarily in self-consciousness\u2014the unity of opposites\nwith Bruno\u2014this unity is what is pre-eminently lacking to faith. Its\nmoments as particular forms fall apart, more especially the highest\nmoments\u2014good and evil, or God and the Devil. God is, and the Devil\nlikewise; both exist for themselves. But if God is absolute existence,\nthe question may be asked, What absolute existence is this which has not\nall actuality, and more particularly evil within it? Boehme is hence\non one side intent on leading the soul of man to the divine life, on\ninducing the soul to pay attention to the strife within itself, and make\nthis the object of all its work and efforts; and then in respect of this\ncontent he strives to make out how evil is present in good\u2014a question\nof the present day. But because Boehme does not possess the Notion and\nis so far back in intellectual culture, there ensues a most frightful\nand painful struggle between his mind and consciousness and his powers\nof expression, and the import of this struggle is the profoundest Idea\nof God which seeks to bring the most absolute opposites into unity, and\nto bind them together\u2014but not for thinking reason. Thus if we would\ncomprehend the matter, Boehme\u2019s great struggle has been\u2014since to him\nGod is everything\u2014to grasp the negative, evil, the devil, in and from\nGod, to grasp God as absolute; and this struggle characterizes all\nhis writings and brings about the torture of his mind. It requires a\ngreat and severe mental effort to bring together in one what in shape\nand form lie so far asunder; with all the strength that he possesses\nBoehme brings the two together, and therein shatters all the immediate\nsignificance of actuality possessed by both. But when thus he grasps\nthis movement, this essence of spirit in himself, in his inward nature,\nthe determination of the moments simply approaches more nearly to the\nform of self-consciousness, to the formless, or to the Notion. In the\nbackground, indeed, there stands the purest speculative thought, but it\ndoes not attain to an adequate representation. Homely, popular modes of\nconception likewise appear, a free out-spokenness which to us seems too\nfamiliar. With the devil, particularly, he has great dealings, and him he\nfrequently addresses. \u201cCome here,\u201d he says, \u201cthou black wretch, what dost\nthou want? I will give thee a potion.\u201d[123] As Prospero in Shakespeare\u2019s\n\u201cTempest\u201d[124] threatens Ariel that he will \u201crend an oak and peg him in\nhis knotty entrails ... twelve winters,\u201d Boehme\u2019s great mind is confined\nin the hard knotty oak of the senses\u2014in the gnarled concretion of the\nordinary conception\u2014and is not able to arrive at a free presentation of\nthe Idea.\n\nI shall shortly give Boehme\u2019s main conceptions, and then several\nparticular forms which he in turn adopts; for he does not remain at one\nform, because neither the sensuous nor the religious can suffice. Now\neven though this brings about the result that he frequently repeats\nhimself, the forms of his main conceptions are still in every respect\nvery different, and he who would try to give a consistent explanation of\nBoehme\u2019s ideas, particularly when they pass into further developments,\nwould only delude himself in making the attempt. Hence we must neither\nexpect to find in Boehme a systematic presentation nor a true method\nof passing over into the individual. Of his thoughts we cannot say much\nwithout adopting his manner of expression, and quoting the particular\npassages themselves, for they cannot otherwise be expressed. The\nfundamental idea in Jacob Boehme is the effort to comprise everything\nin an absolute unity, for he desires to demonstrate the absolute divine\nunity and the union of all opposites in God. Boehme\u2019s chief, and one may\neven say, his only thought\u2014the thought that permeates all his works\u2014is\nthat of perceiving the holy Trinity in everything, and recognizing\neverything as its revelation and manifestation, so that it is the\nuniversal principle in which and through which everything exists; in such\na way, moreover, that all things have this divine Trinity in themselves,\nnot as a Trinity pertaining to the ordinary conception, but as the real\nTrinity of the absolute Idea. Everything that exists is, according to\nBoehme, this three-fold alone, and this three-fold is everything.[125]\nTo him the universe is thus one divine life and revelation of God in all\nthings, so that when examined more closely, from the one reality of God,\nthe sum and substance of all powers and qualities, the Son who shines\nforth from these powers is eternally born; the inward unity of this light\nwith the substance of the powers is Spirit. Sometimes the presentation is\nvague, and then again it is clearer. What comes next is the explanation\nof this Trinity, and here the different forms which he uses to indicate\nthe difference becoming evident in the same, more especially appear.\n\nIn the _Aurora_, the \u201cRoot or Mother of Philosophy, Astrology and\nTheology,\u201d he gives a method of division in which he places these\nsciences in proximity, and yet appears merely to pass from one to the\nother without any clear definition or determination. \u201c(1) In Philosophy\ndivine power is treated of, what God is, and how in the Being of God\nnature, stars and _Elementa_ are constituted; whence all things have\ntheir origin, what is the nature of heaven and earth, as also of angels,\nmen and devils, heaven and hell and all that is creaturely, likewise what\nthe two qualities in nature are, and this is dealt with out of a right\nground in the knowledge of spirit, by the impulse and motion of God. (2)\nIn astrology the powers of nature, of the stars and elements, are treated\nof, and how all creatures proceed from them, how evil and good are\nthrough them effected in men and animals. (3) In theology the kingdom of\nChrist is dealt with, as also its nature, and how it is set in opposition\nto hell, and how in nature it wars with the kingdom of darkness.\u201d[126]\n\n1. What comes first is God the Father; this first is at once divided\nin itself and the unity of both its parts. \u201cGod is all,\u201d he says, \u201cHe\nis the Darkness and the Light, Love and Anger, Fire and Light, but He\ncalls Himself God only as to the light of His love. There is an eternal\n_Contrarium_ between darkness and light; neither comprehends the other\nand neither is the other, and yet there is but one essence or substance,\nthough separated by pain; it is likewise so with the will, and yet\nthere is no separable essence. One single principle is divided in this\nway, that one is in the other as a nothing which yet exists; but it is\nnot manifest in the property of that thing in which it is.\u201d[127] By\nanguish is expressed that which we know as the absolute negativity\u2014that\nis the self-conscious, self-experienced, the self-relating negativity\nwhich is therefore absolute affirmation. All Boehme\u2019s efforts were\ndirected towards this point; the principle of the Notion is living in\nhim, only he cannot express it in the form of thought. That is to say,\nall depends on thinking of the negative as simple, since it is at\nthe same time an opposite; thus anguish [Qual] is the inward tearing\nasunder and yet likewise the simple. From this Boehme derives sources or\nsprings [Quellen], a good play on the words. For pain [die Qual], this\nnegativity, passes into life, activity, and thus he likewise connects it\nwith quality [Qualit\u00e4t], which he makes into Quallity.[128] The absolute\nidentity of difference is all through present to him.\n\na. Boehme thus represents God not as the empty unity, but as this\nself-separating unity of absolute opposites; one must not, however, here\nexpect a clearly defined distinction. The first, the one, the Father, has\nlikewise the mode of natural existence; thus, like Proclus, he speaks of\nthis God being simple essence. This simple essence he calls the hidden;\nand he therefore names it the _Temperamentum_, this unity of what is\ndifferent, in which all is tempered. We find him also calling it the\ngreat Salitter\u2014now the divine and now the natural Salitter\u2014as well as\nSalniter. When he talks of this great salitter as of something known to\nus, we cannot first of all conceive what it means. But it is a vulgar\ncorruption of the word _sal nitri_, saltpetre (which is still called\nsalniter in Austria), _i.e._ just the neutral and in truth universal\nexistence. The divine pomp and state is this, that in God a more glorious\nnature dwells, trees, plants, &c. \u201cIn the divine pomp or state two things\nhave principally to be considered; salitter or the divine power, which\nbrings forth all fruits, and marcurius or the sound.\u201d[129] This great\nsalitter is the unrevealed existence, just as the Neo-Platonic unity is\nwithout knowledge of itself and likewise unrecognized.\n\nb. This first substance contains all powers or qualities as not yet\nseparated; thus this salitter likewise appears as the body of God, who\nembraces all qualities in Himself. Quality thus becomes an important\nconception, the first determination with Boehme; and he begins with\nqualities in his work \u201cMorgenr\u00f6the im Aufgang.\u201d He afterwards associates\nwith this the conferring of quality, and in the same place says: \u201cQuality\nis the mobility, boiling, springing, and driving of a thing.\u201d These\nqualities he then tries to define, but the account he gives of them is\nvague. \u201cAs for example heat which burns, consumes and drives forth all\nwhatsoever comes into it which is not of the same property; and again\nit enlightens and warms all cold, wet, and dark things; it compacts and\nhardens soft things. It contains likewise two other kinds in it, namely\nLight and Fierceness\u201d (Negativity); \u201cof which the light or the heart of\nthe heat is in itself a pleasant, joyful glance or lustre, a power of\nlife ... and a source of the heavenly kingdom of joy. For it makes all\nthings in this world living and moving; all flesh, trees, leaves, and\ngrass grow in this world, as in the power of the light, and have their\nlight therein, viz. in the good. Again, it contains also a fierceness or\nwrath which burns, consumes and spoils. This wrath or fierceness springs,\ndrives, and elevates itself in the light, and makes the light movable. It\nwrestles and fights together in its two-fold source. The light subsists\nin God without heat, but it does not subsist so in nature. For all\nqualities in nature are one in another, in the same manner as God is all.\nFor God\u201d (the Father) \u201cis the Heart.\u201d On another occasion (Vom dreifachen\nLeben des Menschen, chap. iv. \u00a7 68, p. 881) the Son is the heart of God;\nand yet again the Spirit is called the heart (Morgenr\u00f6the, chap. ii.\n\u00a7 13, p. 29) \u201cor fountain of nature, and from Him comes all. Now heat\nreigns and predominates in all powers in nature and warms all, and is one\nsource or spring in all. But the light in the heat gives power to all\nqualities, for that all grow pleasant and joyful.\u201d Boehme goes over quite\na list of qualities: cold, hot, bitter, sweet, fierce, acid, hard, dense,\nsoft qualities, sound, etc. \u201cThe bitter quality is in God also, but not\nin that manner as the gall is in man, but it is an everlasting power, in\nan elevating, triumphing spring or source of joy. All the creatures are\nmade from these qualities, and live therein as in their mother.\u201d[130]\n\n\u201cThe virtues of the stars are nature itself. Everything in this world\nproceeds from the stars. That I shall prove to you if you are not a\nblockhead and have a little reason. If the whole _Curriculum_ or the\nwhole circumference of the stars is considered, we soon find that this\nis the mother of all things, or the nature from which all things have\narisen and in which all things stand and live, and through which all\nthings move. And all things are formed from these same powers and remain\neternally therein.\u201d Thus it is said that God is the reality of all\nrealities. Boehme continues: \u201cYou must, however, elevate your mind in\nthe Spirit, and consider how the whole of nature, with all the powers\nwhich are in nature, also extension, depth and height, also heaven and\nearth and all whatsoever is therein, and all that is above the heavens,\nis together the Body and Corporeity of God; and the powers of the stars\nare the fountain veins in the natural Body of God, in this world. You\nmust not conceive that in the Body of the stars is the whole triumphing\nHoly Trinity, God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. But we must not so\nconceive as if God was not at all in the _Corpus_ or Body of the stars,\nand in this world.... Here now the question is, From whence has heaven,\nor whence borrows it this power, that it causes such mobility in nature?\nHere you must lift up your eyes beyond nature into the light, holy,\ntriumphing, divine power, into the unchangeable holy Trinity, which\nis a triumphing, springing, movable Being, and all powers are therein,\nas in nature: of this heaven, earth, stars, elements, devils, angels,\nmen, beasts, and all have their Being; and therein all stands. When we\nnominate heaven and earth, stars and elements, and all that is therein,\nand all whatsoever is above the heaven, then thereby is nominated the\ntotal God, who has made Himself creaturely in these above-mentioned\u201d many\n\u201cBeings, in His power which proceedeth forth from Him.\u201d[131]\n\nc. Boehme further defines God the Father as follows: \u201cWhen we consider\nthe whole nature and its property, then we see the Father: when we behold\nheaven and the stars, then we behold His eternal power and wisdom. So\nmany stars as stand in the whole heaven, which are innumerable, so\nmanifold and various is the power and wisdom of God the Father. Every\nstar differs in its quality.\u201d But \u201cyou must not conceive here that every\npower which is in the Father stands in a peculiar severed or divided part\nand place in the Father, as the stars do in heaven. No, but the Spirit\nshows that all the powers in the Father,\u201d as the fountainhead, \u201care one\nin another as one power.\u201d This whole is the universal power which exists\nas God the Father, wherein all differences are united; \u201ccreaturely\u201d it,\nhowever, exists as the totality of stars, and thus as separation into\nthe different qualities. \u201cYou must not think that God who is in heaven\nand above the heaven does there stand and hover like a power and quality\nwhich has in it neither reason nor knowledge, as the sun which turns\nround in its circle and shoots forth from itself heat and light, whether\nit be for benefit or hurt to the earth and creatures. No, the Father\nis not so, but He is an All-mighty, All-wise, All-knowing, All-seeing,\nAll-hearing, All-smelling, All-tasting God, who in Himself is meek,\nfriendly, gracious, merciful, and full of joy, yea Joy itself.\u201d[132]\n\nSince Boehme calls the Father all powers, he again distinguishes these\nas the seven first originating spirits.[133] But there is a certain\nconfusion in this and no thought-determination, no definite reason for\nthere being exactly seven\u2014such precision and certainty is not to be\nfound in Boehme. These seven qualities are likewise the seven planets\nwhich move and work in the great Salitter of God; \u201cthe seven planets\nsignify the seven spirits of God or the princes of the angels.\u201d But they\nare in the Father as one unity, and this unity is an inward spring and\nfermentation. \u201cIn God all spirits triumph as one spirit, and a spirit\never calms and loves the others, and nothing exists excepting mere joy\nand rapture. One spirit does not stand alongside the others like stars\nin heaven, for all seven are contained within one another as one spirit.\nEach spirit in the seven spirits of God is pregnant with all seven\nspirits of God;\u201d thus each is in God itself a totality. \u201cOne brings forth\nthe other in and through itself;\u201d this is the flashing forth of the life\nof all qualities.[134]\n\n2. As what came first was the source and germ of all powers and\nqualities, what comes second is process. This second principle is a very\nimportant conception, which with Boehme appears under very many aspects\nand forms, viz. as the Word, the Separator, Revelation\u2014speaking generally\nthe \u201cI,\u201d the source of all difference, and of the will and implicit Being\nwhich are in the powers of natural things; but in such a way that the\nlight therein likewise breaks forth which leads them back to rest.\n\na. God as the simple absolute existence is not God absolutely; in Him\nnothing can be known. What we know is something different\u2014but this\n\u201cdifferent\u201d is itself contained in God as the perception and knowledge\nof God. Hence of the second step Boehme says that a separation must have\ntaken place in this temperament. \u201cNo thing can become manifest to itself\nwithout opposition; for if it has nothing to withstand it, it always\ngoes forward on its own account and does not go back within itself. But\nif it does not go back into itself as into that from which it originally\narose, it knows nothing of its original state.\u201d Original state [Urstand]\nhe makes use of for substance; and it is a pity that we cannot use this\nand many other striking expressions. \u201cWithout adversity life would have\nno sensibility nor will nor efficacy, neither understanding nor science.\nHad the hidden God who is one solitary existence and will not of His\nown will brought Himself out of Himself, out of the eternal knowledge\nin the _Temperamento_, into divisibility of will, and introduced this\nsame element of divisibility into an inclusiveness\u201d (Identity) \u201cso as\nto constitute it a natural and creaturely life, and had this element of\nseparation in life not come into warfare, how was the will of God which\nis only one to be revealed to Himself? How could a knowledge of itself\nbe present in a solitary will?\u201d[135] We see that Boehme is elevated\ninfinitely above the empty abstraction of the highest reality, etc.\n\nBoehme continues: \u201cThe commencement of all Beings is the Word as the\nbreath of God, and God has become the eternal One of eternity and\nlikewise remains so in eternity. The Word is the eternal beginning and\nremains so eternally, for it is the revelation of the eternal One through\nand by which the divine power is brought into one knowledge of somewhat.\nBy the Word we understand the revealed will of God: by the Word we\nmean God the hidden God, from whom the Word eternally springs forth.\nThe Word is the efflux of the divine One, and yet God Himself as His\nrevelation.\u201d \u039b\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 is more definite than Word, and there is a delightful\ndouble significance in the Greek expression indicating as it does both\nreason and speech. For speech is the pure existence of spirit; it is a\nthing which when once heard goes back within itself. \u201cWhat has flowed\nout is wisdom, beginning and cause of all powers, colours, virtue and\nqualities.\u201d[136]\n\nOf the Son Boehme says: \u201cThe Son is\u201d of the Father and \u201cin the Father,\nthe heart of the Father or light, and the Father beareth him ever, from\neternity to eternity.\u201d Thus \u201cthe Son is\u201d indeed \u201canother Person from\nthe Father, though no other,\u201d but the same \u201cGod as the Father,\u201d whose\nimage he is.[137] \u201cThe Son is the Heart\u201d or the pulsating element \u201cin\nthe Father; all the powers which are in the Father are the propriety of\nthe Father; and the Son is the heart or the kernel in all the powers in\nthe whole Father, and he is the cause of the springing joy in all powers\nin the whole Father. From the Son the eternal joy rises and springs\nin all the powers of the Father, as the sun does in the heart of the\nstars. It signifies the Son, as the circle of the stars signifies the\nmanifold powers of the Father; it lightens the heavens, the stars and\nthe deep above the earth, working in all things that are in this world;\nit enlightens and gives power to all the stars and tempers their power.\nThe Son of God is continually generated from all the powers of his Father\nfrom eternity, just as the sun is born of the stars; He is ever born and\nis not made, and is the heart and lustre shining forth from all powers.\nHe shines in all powers of the Father, and his power is the moving,\nspringing joy in all the powers of the Father, and shines in the whole\nFather as the sun does in the whole world. For if the Son did not shine\nin the Father, the Father would be a dark valley; for the Father\u2019s power\nwould not rise from eternity to eternity, and so the divine Being would\nnot subsist.\u201d[138] This life of the Son is an important matter; and\nin regard to this issuing forth and manifestation Boehme has likewise\nbrought forward the most important assertions.\n\nb. \u201cFrom such a revelation of powers in which the will of the eternal\nOne contemplates itself, flows the understanding and the knowledge of\nthe something [Ichts], since the eternal will contemplates itself in the\nsomething [Ichts].\u201d \u201cIchts\u201d is a play upon the word \u201cNichts\u201d (nothing),\nfor it is simply the negative; yet it is at the same time the opposite of\nnothing, since the Ich (Ego) of self-consciousness is contained in it.\nThe Son, the something, is thus \u201cI,\u201d consciousness, self-consciousness:\nGod is not only the abstract neutral but likewise the gathering together\nof Himself into the point of Being-for-self. The \u201cother\u201d of God is thus\nthe image of God. \u201cThis similitude is the _Mysterium magnum_, viz. the\ncreator of all beings and creatures; for it is the separator\u201d (of the\nwhole) \u201cin the efflux of the will which makes the will of the eternal One\nseparable\u2014the separability in the will from which powers and qualities\ntake their rise.\u201d This separator is \u201cconstituted the steward of nature,\nby whom the eternal will rules, makes, forms and constitutes all things.\u201d\nThe separator is effectuating and self-differentiating, and Boehme calls\nthis \u201cIchts,\u201d likewise Lucifer, the first-born Son of God, the creaturely\nfirst-born angel who was one of the seven spirits. \u201cBut this Lucifer has\nfallen and Christ has come in his place.\u201d[139] This is the connection\nof the devil with God, namely other-Being and then Being-for-self or\nBeing-for-one, in such a way that the other is for one; and this is\nthe origin of evil in God and out of God. This is the furthest point\nof thought reached by Jacob Boehme. He represents this Fall of Lucifer\nas that the \u201cIchts,\u201d _i.e._ self-knowledge, the \u201cI\u201d [Ichheit] (a word\nwhich we find used by him), the inward imagining of self, the inward\nfashioning of self (the being-for-self), is the fire which absorbs all\nthings. This is the negative side in the separator, the anguish; or it is\nthe wrath of God. This divine wrath is hell and the devil, who through\nhimself imagines himself into himself. This is very bold and speculative;\nBoehme here seeks to show in God Himself the sources of the divine\nanger. He also calls the will of the something [\u201cIchts\u201d] self-hood;\nit is the passing over of the something [\u201cIchts\u201d] into the nothing\n[Nichts], the \u201cI\u201d imagining itself within itself. He says: \u201cHeaven and\nhell are as far removed from one another as day and night, as something\nand nothing.\u201d Boehme has really here penetrated into the utmost depths\nof divine essence; evil, matter, or whatever it has been called, is the\nI = I, the Being-for-self, the true negativity. Before this it was the\n_nonens_ which is itself positive, the darkness; but the true negativity\nis the \u201cI.\u201d It is not anything bad because it is called the evil; it is\nin mind alone that evil exists, because it is conceived therein as it\nis in itself. \u201cWhere the will of God willeth in anything, there God is\nmanifested, and in that manifestation the angels also dwell; but where\nGod in any thing willeth not with the will of the thing, there God is\nnot manifested to it, but dwelleth\u201d (there) \u201cin Himself without the\nco-operating of the thing;\u201d in that case \u201cin that thing is its own will,\nand there the devil dwelleth and all whatever is without God.\u201d[140]\n\nBoehme in his own way sets forth the form further assumed in this process\nin a pictorial manner. This \u201c_Separator_ deduces qualities from itself,\nfrom which the infinite manifold arises, and through which the eternal\nOne makes itself perceptible\u201d (so that it is for others) \u201cnot according\nto the unity, but in accordance with the efflux of the unity.\u201d Implicit\nBeing and the manifold are absolutely opposed through the Notion, which\nBoehme did not have: Being-for-self implies Being-for-another and\nretrogression into the opposite. Boehme sways backwards and forwards\nin apparent contradictions, and does not well know how to find a way\nout of the difficulty. \u201cBut the efflux is carried on to the greatest\nextreme possible, to the generation of fire\u201d\u2014dark fire without light,\ndarkness, the hidden, the self;[141]\u2014\u201cin which fiery nature,\u201d however,\nsince this fire rises and shoots up, \u201cthe eternal One becomes majestic\nand a light,\u201d and this light which there breaks forth is the form which\nthe other principle assumes. This is the return to the One. \u201cThereby\u201d\n(through fire) \u201cthe eternal power becomes desirous and effectual\nand\u201d (fire) \u201cis the original condition\u201d (essence) \u201cof the sensitive\u201d\n(feeling) \u201clife, where in the Word of power an eternal sensitive life\nfirst takes its origin. For if life had no sensitiveness, it would have\nno will nor efficacy; but pain\u201d\u2014anguish, suffering\u2014first \u201cmakes it\u201d\n(all life) \u201ceffectual and endows it with will. And the light of such\nkindling through fire makes it joyous, for it is an anointment,\u201d joy and\nloveliness \u201cof painfulness.\u201d[142]\n\nBoehme turns this round in many ways in order to grasp the something\n[Ichts], the Separator, as it \u201crises\u201d[143] from the Father. The qualities\nrise in the great Salitter, stir, raise, and move [r\u00fcgen] themselves.\nBoehme has there the quality of astringency in the Father, and he then\nrepresents the process of the something [Ichts] as a sharpness, a drawing\ntogether, as a flash of lightning that breaks forth. This light is\nLucifer. The Being-for-self, the self-perception, is by Boehme called\nthe drawing together into a point. That is astringency, sharpness,\npenetration, fierceness; to this pertains the wrath of God, and here\nBoehme in this manner grasps the \u201cother\u201d of God in God Himself. \u201cThis\nsource can be kindled through great motion or elevation. Through the\ncontraction the creaturely Being is formed so that a heavenly _Corpus_\nmay be\u201d intelligibly \u201cformed. But if it\u201d\u2014the sharpness\u2014\u201cbe kindled\nthrough elevation, which those creatures only can do which are created\nout of the divine Salitter, then it is a burning source-vein of the wrath\nof God. The flash is the mother of light; for the flash generates the\nlight, and is the Father of the fierceness; for the fierceness abides in\nthe flash as a seed in the father, and that flash generates also the tone\nor sound\u201d\u2014the flash is, speaking generally, the absolute generator. The\nflash is still connected with pain; light is what brings intelligence.\nThe divine birth is the going forth of the flash, of the life of all\nqualities.[144] This is all from the Aurora.\n\nIn the _Qu\u00e6stionibus theosophicis_ Boehme makes particular use of the\nform of Yes and No for the separator, for this opposition. He says:\n\u201cThe reader must know that in Yes and No all things consist, whether\ndivine, devilish, earthly, or what they may be called. The One as the\nYes is pure power and life, and it is the truth of God or God Himself.\nHe would be unknowable in Himself, and in Him there would be no joy nor\nelevation, nor feeling\u201d\u2014life\u2014\u201cwithout the No. The No is a counterstroke\nof the Yes, or of the truth\u201d (this negativity is the principle of all\nknowledge, comprehension), \u201cthat the truth may be manifest and be a\nsomething wherein there is a _contrarium_ in which there is the eternal\nlove, moving, feeling, and willing, and demanding to be loved. And yet\nwe cannot say that the Yes is separated from the No, and that they are\ntwo things in proximity; for they are only one thing, but they separate\nthemselves into two beginnings and make two _centra_, where each works\nand wills in itself. Without those two, which are continually in strife,\nall things would be a nothing, and would stand still without movement.\nIf the eternal will did not itself flow from itself and introduce itself\ninto receptibility, there would be no form nor distinction, for all\npowers would\u201d then \u201cbe one power. Neither could there be understanding\nin that case, for the understanding arises\u201d (has its substance) \u201cin the\ndifferentiation of the manifold, where one property sees, proves and\nwills the others. The will which has flowed out wills dissimilarity, so\nthat it may be distinguished from similarity and be its own something\u2014and\nthat something may exist, that the eternal seeing may see and feel.\nAnd from the individual will arises the No, for it brings itself into\nownness, _i.e._ receptivity of self. It desires to be something and\ndoes not make itself in accordance with unity; for unity is a Yes which\nflows forth, which ever stands thus in the breathing forth of itself,\nbeing imperceptible; for it has nothing in which it can find itself\nexcepting in the receptivity of the dissentient will, as in the No which\nis counterstroke to the Yes, in which the Yes is indeed revealed,\nand in which it possesses something which it can will. And the No is\ntherefore called a No, because it is a desire turned inwards on itself,\nas if it were a shutting up into negativity. The emanated seeking will\nis absorbent and comprehends itself within itself, from it come forms\nand qualities: (1) Sharpness, (2) Motion, (3) Feeling. (4) The fourth\nproperty is Fire as the flash of light; this rises in the bringing\ntogether of the great and terrible sharpness and the unity. Thus in the\ncontact a _Flagrat_ [Schrack] results, and in this _Flagrat_ [Schrack]\nunity is apprehended as being a Flash or Gleam, an exulting joy.\u201d That\nis the bursting forth of the unity. \u201cFor thus the light arises in the\nmidst of the darkness, for the unity becomes a light, and the receptivity\nof the carnal will in the qualities becomes a Spirit-fire which has its\nsource and origin out of the sharp, cold astringency. And according to\nthat, God is an angry\u201d and \u201cjealous God,\u201d and in this we have evil.\n\u201c(_a_) The first quality of the absorption is the No; (_b_) Sharpness;\n(_c_) Hardness; (_d_) Feeling; (_e_) the source of fire, hell or\nhollowness, Hiddenness. (5) The fifth quality, Love, makes in the fire,\nas in pain, another _Principium_ as a great fire of love.\u201d[145] These\nare the main points under the second head. In such depths Boehme keeps\nstruggling on, for to him conceptions are lacking, and there are only\nreligious and chemical forms to be found; and because he uses these in a\nforced sense in order to express his ideas, not only does barbarism of\nexpression result, but incomprehensibility as well.\n\nc. \u201cFrom this eternal operation of the sensation the visible world\nsprang; the world is the Word which has flowed forth and has disposed\nitself into qualities, since in qualities the particular will has\narisen. The _Separator_ has made it a will of its own after such a\nfashion.\u201d[146] The world is none other than the essence of God made\ncreaturely.[147] Hence \u201cIf thou beholdest the Deep\u201d of the heavens, \u201cthe\nStars, the Elements and the Earth,\u201d and what they have brought forth,\n\u201cthen thou\u201d certainly \u201ccomprehendest not with thy eyes the bright and\nclear Deity, though indeed it is\u201d likewise \u201cthere and in them.\u201d Thou\nseest only their creaturely manifestation. \u201cBut if thou raisest thy\nthoughts and considerest ... God who rules in holiness in this government\nor dominion, then thou breakest through the heaven of heavens and\napprehendest God at His holy heart. The powers of heaven ever operate in\nimages, growths and colours, in order to reveal the holy God, so that He\nmay be in all things known.\u201d[148]\n\n3. Finally what comes third in these three-fold forms is the unity of the\nlight, of the separator and power: this is the spirit, which is already\npartially implied in what has preceded. \u201cAll the stars signify the power\nof the Father, and from them issues the sun\u201d (they make themselves a\ncounterstroke to unity). \u201cAnd from all the stars there goes forth the\npower which is in every star, into the Deep, and the power, heat and\nshining of the sun goes likewise into the Deep\u201d\u2014back to the stars,\ninto the power of the Father. \u201cAnd in the Deep the power of all stars,\ntogether with the heat and lustre of the sun, are all but one thing,\na moving, boiling Hovering, like a spirit or matter. Now in the whole\ndeep of the Father, externally without the Son, there is nothing but the\nmanifold and unmeasurable or unsearchable power of the Father and the\nLight of the Son. The Light of the Son is in the Deep of the Father a\nliving, all-powerful, all-knowing, all-hearing, all-seeing, all-smelling,\nall-tasting, all-feeling Spirit, wherein is all power, splendour, and\nwisdom, as in the Father and the Son.\u201d[149] That is Love, the softener of\nall powers through the light of the Son. We see that the sensuous element\nthus pertains to this.\n\nBoehme really has the idea that \u201cGod\u2019s essence\u201d (which has proceeded\nfrom the eternal deep as world) \u201cis thus not something far away which\npossesses a particular position or place, for\u201d essence, \u201cthe abyss of\nnature and creation, is God Himself. Thou must not think that in heaven\nthere was some manner of _Corpus_\u201d\u2014the seven spirits generate this\n_Corpus_ or heart\u2014\u201cwhich above all other things is called God. No; but\nthe whole divine power which itself is heaven and the heaven of all\nheavens, is so generated, and that is called God the Father; of whom all\nthe holy angels are generated, in like manner also the spirit of all men.\nThou canst name no place, either in heaven or in this world, where the\ndivine birth is not. The birth of the divine Trinity likewise takes place\nin thine own heart; all three persons are generated in thy heart, God the\nFather, Son and Holy Ghost. In the divine power everywhere we find the\nfountain spring of the divine birth; and there already are all the seven\nqualifying or fountain spirits of God, as if thou wouldst make a spacious\ncreaturely circumscribed circle and hadst the deity therein.\u201d[150] In\nevery spirit all are contained.\n\nTo Boehme this trinity is the complete universal life in each individual,\nit is absolute substance. He says: \u201cAll things in this world are\naccording to the similitude of this ternary. Ye blind Jews, Turks, and\nHeathens, open wide the eyes of your mind: I will show you, in your\nbody, and in every natural thing, in men, beasts, fowls, and worms, also\nin wood, stone, leaves, and grass, the likeness of the holy ternary in\nGod. You say, there is but one Being in God, and that God has no Son.\nOpen your eyes and consider your selves: man is made according to the\nsimilitude and out of the power of God in his ternary. Behold thy inward\nman, and then thou wilt see it most plainly and clearly, if thou art not\na fool and an irrational beast. Therefore observe, in thy heart, in thy\nveins, and in thy brain, thou hast thy spirit; and all the powers which\nmove in thy heart, in thy veins, and in thy brain, wherein thy life\nconsists, signify God the Father. From that power springs up [gebaret]\nthy light, so that thou seest, understandest, and knowest in the same\npower what thou art to do; for that light glimmers in thy whole body; and\nthe whole body moves in the power and knowledge of the light; this is the\nSon which is born in thee.\u201d This light, this seeing and understanding, is\nthe second determination; it is the relationship to itself. \u201cOut of thy\nlight goes forth into the same power, reason, understanding, skill, and\nwisdom, to govern the whole body, and to distinguish all whatsoever is\nexternally without the body. And both these are but one in the government\nof thy mind, viz. thy spirit, which signifies God the Holy Ghost. And the\nHoly Ghost from God rules in this spirit in thee, if thou art a child of\nlight and not of darkness. Now observe: in either wood, stone, or herbs\nthere are three things contained, neither can anything be generated or\ngrow, if but one of the three should be left out. First, there is the\npower, from which a body comes to be, whether wood, stone, or herbs;\nafter that there is in that\u201d thing \u201ca sap which is the heart of the\nthing. And thirdly there is in it a springing, flowing power, smell, or\ntaste, which is the spirit of the thing whereby it grows and increases.\nNow if any of these three fail, the thing cannot subsist.\u201d[151] Thus\nBoehme regards everything as this ternary.\n\nWhen he comes into particulars we see that he is obscure; from his\ndetailed explanations there is therefore not much to be derived. As\nshowing his manner of apprehending natural things I shall give one\nmore example of the manner in which, in the further working out of\nthe existence of nature as a counterstroke to the divine knowledge,\nhe makes use of what we call things as Notions (_supra_, p. 192).\nThe creaturely, he says, has \u201cthree kinds of powers or _Spiritus_ in\ndifferent _Centris_, but in one _Corpore_. (\u03b1) The first and external\n_Spiritus_ is the coarse sulphur, salt and _Mercurius_, which is a\nsubstance of four elements\u201d (fire, water, earth, air) \u201cor of the stars.\nIt forms the visible _Corpus_ according to the constellation of the\nstars or property of the planets and now enkindled elements\u2014the greatest\npower of the _Spiritus mundi_. The _Separator_ makes the signature or\nsign\u201d\u2014the self. The salt, the salitter, is approximately the neutral:\nmercury [Merk or Mark] the operating, unrest as against nourishment;\nthe coarse sulphur, the negative unity. (\u03b2) \u201cThe other _Spiritus_ is\nfound in the oil of sulphur, the fifth essence, viz. a root of the four\nelements. That is the softening and joy of the coarse, painful spirit\nof sulphur and salt; the real cause of growing life, a joy of nature\nas is the sun in the elements\u201d\u2014the direct principle of life. \u201cIn the\ninward ground of that coarse spirit we see a beautiful, clear _Corpus_\nin which the ideal light of nature shines from the divine efflux.\u201d The\noutward separator signs what is taken up with the shape and form of the\nplant which receives into itself this coarse nourishment. (\u03b3) \u201cWhat comes\nthird is the tincture, a spiritual fire and light; the highest reason\nfor which the first separation of qualities takes place in the existence\nof this world. _Fiat_ is the Word of each thing and belongs according\nto its peculiar quality to eternity. Its origin is the holy power of\nGod. Smell [Ruch] is the sensation of this tincture. The elements are\nonly a mansion and counterstroke of the inward power, a cause of the\nmovement of the tincture.\u201d[152] Sensuous things entirely lose the force\nof sensuous conceptions. Boehme uses them, though not as such, as thought\ndeterminations, that constitutes the hard and barbarous element in\nBoehme\u2019s representations, yet at the same time this unity with actuality\nand this present of infinite existence.\n\nBoehme describes the opposition in creation in the following way. If\nnature is the first efflux of the _Separator_, two kinds of life must\nyet be understood as in the counterstroke of the divine essence, beyond\nthat temporal one there is an eternal, to which the divine understanding\nis given. It stands at the basis of the eternal, spiritual world, in the\n_Mysterium Magnum_ of the divine counterstroke (personality)\u2014a mansion\nof divine will through which it reveals itself and is revealed to no\npeculiarity of personal will. In this _centrum_ man has both lives in\nhimself, he belongs to time and eternity. He is (\u03b1) universal in the\n\u201ceternal understanding of the one good will which is a temperament;\n(\u03b2) the original will of nature, viz. the comprehensibility of the\n_Centra_, where each _centrum_ in the divisibility shuts itself in one\nplace to egotism and self-will as a personal _Mysterium_ or mind. The\nformer only requires a counterstroke to its similarity; this latter, the\nself-generated natural will also requires in the place of the egotism\nof the dark impression a likeness, that is a counterstroke through its\nown comprehensibility, through which comprehension it requires nothing\nbut its corporality as a natural ground.\u201d Now it is this \u201cI,\u201d the dark,\npain, fire, the wrath of God, implicitude, self-comprehension, which is\nbroken up in regeneration; the I is shattered, painfulness brought into\ntrue rest\u2014just as the dark fire breaks into light.[153]\n\nNow these are the principal ideas found in Boehme; those most profound\nare (\u03b1) the generating of Light as the Son of God from qualities, through\nthe most living dialectic; (\u03b2) God\u2019s diremption of Himself. Barbarism\nin the working out of his system can no more fail to be recognized than\ncan the great depths into which he has plunged by the union of the most\nabsolute opposites. Boehme grasps the opposites in the crudest, harshest\nway, but he does not allow himself through their unworkableness to be\nprevented from asserting the unity. This rude and barbarous depth which\nis devoid of Notion, is always a present, something which speaks from\nitself, which has and knows everything in itself. We have still to\nmention Boehme\u2019s piety, the element of edification, the way in which\nthe soul is guided in his writings. This is in the highest degree deep\nand inward, and if one is familiar with his form these depths and this\ninwardness will be found. But it is a form with which we cannot reconcile\nourselves, and which permits no definite conception of details, although\nwe cannot fail to see the profound craving for speculation which existed\nwithin this man.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION TWO\n\nPERIOD OF THE THINKING UNDERSTANDING\n\n\nAfter Neo-Platonism and all that is associated with it is left behind,\nit is not until Descartes is arrived at that we really enter upon a\nphilosophy which is, properly speaking, independent, which knows that\nit comes forth from reason as independent, and that self-consciousness\nis an essential moment in the truth. Philosophy in its own proper soil\nseparates itself entirely from the philosophizing theology, in accordance\nwith its principle, and places it on quite another side. Here, we may\nsay, we are at home, and like the mariner after a long voyage in a\ntempestuous sea, we may now hail the sight of land; with Descartes\nthe culture of modern times, the thought of modern Philosophy, really\nbegins to appear, after a long and tedious journey on the way which has\nled so far. It is specially characteristic of the German that the more\nservile he on the one hand is, the more uncontrolled is he on the other;\nrestraint and want of restraint\u2014originality, is the angel of darkness\nthat buffets us. In this new period the universal principle by means of\nwhich everything in the world is regulated, is the thought that proceeds\nfrom itself; it is a certain inwardness, which is above all evidenced\nin respect to Christianity, and which is the Protestant principle in\naccordance with which thought has come to the consciousness of the\nworld at large as that to which every man has a claim. Thus because the\nindependently existent thought, this culminating point of inwardness,\nis now set forth and firmly grasped as such, the dead externality of\nauthority is set aside and regarded as out of place. It is only through\nmy own free thought within that thought can however be recognized and\nratified by me. This likewise signifies that such free thought is the\nuniversal business of the world and of individuals; it is indeed the duty\nof every man, since everything is based upon it; thus what claims to rank\nas established in the world man must scrutinize in his own thoughts.\nPhilosophy is thus become a matter of universal interest, and one\nrespecting which each can judge for himself; for everyone is a thinker\nfrom the beginning.\n\nOn account of this new beginning to Philosophy we find in the old\nhistories of Philosophy of the seventeenth century\u2014_e.g._ that of\nStanley\u2014the philosophy of the Greeks and Romans only, and Christianity\nforms the conclusion. The idea was that neither in Christianity nor\nsubsequently any philosophy was to be found, because there was no longer\na necessity for it, seeing that the philosophic theology of the Middle\nAges had not free, spontaneous thought as its principle (Vol. I. pp. 111,\n112). But though it is true that this has now become the philosophic\nprinciple, we must not expect that it should be at once methodically\ndeveloped out of thought. The old assumption is made, that man only\nattains to the truth through reflection; this plainly is the principle.\nBut the determination and definition of God, the world of the manifold as\nit appears, is not yet revealed as necessarily proceeding from thought;\nfor we have only reached the thought of a content which is given through\nordinary conception, observation, and experience.\n\nOn the one hand we see a metaphysic, and, on the other, the particular\nsciences: on the one hand abstract thought as such, on the other its\ncontent taken from experience; these two lines in the abstract stand\nopposed to one another, and yet they do not separate themselves so\nsharply. We shall indeed come to an opposition, viz. to that between\n_a priori_ thought\u2014that the determinations which are to hold good\nfor thought must be taken from thought itself\u2014and the determination\nthat we must commence, conclude and think from experience. This is\nthe opposition between rationalism and empiricism; but it is really\na subordinate one, because even the metaphysical mode in philosophy,\nwhich only allows validity to immanent thought, does not take what is\nmethodically developed from the necessity of thought, but in the old\nway derives its content from inward or outward experience, and through\nreflection and meditation renders it abstract. The form of philosophy\nwhich is first reached through thought is metaphysics, the form of the\nthinking understanding; this period has, as its outstanding figures,\nDescartes and Spinoza, likewise Malebranche and Locke, Leibnitz and\nWolff. The second form is Scepticism and Criticism with regard to the\nthinking understanding, to metaphysics as such, and to the universal\nof empiricism; here we shall go on to speak of representatives of the\nScottish, German, and French philosophies; the French materialists again\nturn back to metaphysics.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nTHE METAPHYSICS OF THE UNDERSTANDING\n\n\nMetaphysics is what reaches after substance, and this implies that one\nunity, one thought is maintained in opposition to dualism, just as Being\nwas amongst the ancients. In metaphysics itself we have, however, the\nopposition between substantiality and individuality. What comes first\nis the spontaneous, but likewise uncritical, metaphysics, and it is\nrepresented by Descartes and Spinoza, who assert the unity of Being and\nthought. The second stage is found in Locke, who treats of the opposition\nitself inasmuch as he considers the metaphysical Idea of experience, that\nis the origin of thoughts and their justification, not yet entering on\nthe question of whether they are absolutely true. In the third place we\nhave Leibnitz\u2019s monad\u2014the world viewed as a totality.\n\n\nA. FIRST DIVISION.\n\nWe here encounter the innate ideas of Descartes. The philosophy of\nSpinoza, in the second place, is related to the philosophy of Descartes\nas its necessary development only; the method is an important part of\nit. A method which stands alongside of Spinozism and which is also a\nperfected development of Cartesianism, is, in the third place, that by\nwhich Malebranche has represented this philosophy.\n\n\n1. DESCARTES.\n\nRen\u00e9 Descartes is a bold spirit who re-commenced the whole subject\nfrom the very beginning and constituted afresh the ground-work on which\nPhilosophy is based, and to which, after a thousand years had passed, it\nonce more returned. The extent of the influence which this man exercised\nupon his times and the culture of Philosophy generally, cannot be\nsufficiently expressed; it rests mainly in his setting aside all former\npresuppositions and beginning in a free, simple, and likewise popular\nway, with popular modes of thought and quite simple propositions, in his\nleading the content to thought and extension or Being, and so to speak\nsetting up this before thought as its opposite. This simple thought\nappeared in the form of the determinate, clear understanding, and it\ncannot thus be called speculative thought or speculative reason. There\nare fixed determinations from which Descartes proceeds, but only of\nthought; this is the method of his time. What the French called exact\nscience, science of the determinate understanding, made its appearance at\nthis time. Philosophy and exact science were not yet separated, and it\nwas only later on that this separation first took place.\n\nTo come to the life of Descartes\u2014he was born in 1596, at La Haye in\nTouraine, of an ancient and noble race. He received an education\nof the usual kind in a Jesuit school, and made great progress; his\ndisposition was lively and restless; he extended his insatiable zeal\nin all directions, pursued his researches into all systems and forms;\nhis studies, in addition to ancient literature, embraced such subjects\nas philosophy, mathematics, chemistry, physics, and astronomy. But the\nstudies of his youth in the Jesuit school, and those studies which\nhe afterwards prosecuted with the same diligence and strenuous zeal,\nresulted in giving him a strong disinclination for learning derived from\nbooks; he quitted the school where he had been educated, and yet his\neagerness for learning was only made the keener through this perplexity\nand unsatisfied yearning. He went as a young man of eighteen to Paris,\nand there lived in the great world. But as he here found no satisfaction,\nhe soon left society and returned to his studies. He retired to a suburb\nof Paris and there occupied himself principally with mathematics,\nremaining quite concealed from all his former friends. At last, after\nthe lapse of two years, he was discovered by them, drawn forth from his\nretirement, and again introduced to the great world. He now once more\nrenounced the study of books and threw himself into the affairs of actual\nlife. Thereafter he went to Holland and entered the military service;\nsoon afterwards, in 1619, and in the first year of the Thirty Years\u2019 War,\nhe went as a volunteer with the Bavarian troops, and took part in several\ncampaigns under Tilly. Many have found learning unsatisfying; Descartes\nbecame a soldier\u2014not because he found in the sciences too little, but\nbecause they were too much, too high for him. Here in his winter quarters\nhe studied diligently, and in Ulm, for instance, he made acquaintance\nwith a citizen who was deeply versed in mathematics. He was able to carry\nout his studies even better in winter quarters at Neuberg on the Danube,\nwhere once more, and now most profoundly, the desire awoke in him to\nstrike out a new departure in Philosophy and entirely reconstruct it;\nhe solemnly promised the Mother of God to make a pilgrimage to Loretto\nif she would prosper him in this design, and if he should now at last\ncome to himself and attain to peace. He was also in the battle at Prague\nin which Frederick the Elector-Palatine lost the Bohemian crown. Yet\nsince the sight of these wild scenes could not satisfy him, he gave up\nmilitary service in 1621. He made several other journeys through the rest\nof Germany, and then proceeded to Poland, Prussia, Switzerland, Italy\nand France. On account of its greater freedom he withdrew to Holland, in\norder there to pursue his projects; here he lived in peace from 1629 to\n1644\u2014a period in which he composed and issued most of his works, and\nalso defended them against the manifold attacks from which they suffered,\nand which more especially proceeded from the clergy. Queen Christina\nof Sweden finally called him to her court at Stockholm, which was the\nrendezvous for all the most celebrated men of learning of the time, and\nthere he died in 1650.[154]\n\nAs regards his philosophic works, those which contain his first\nprinciples have in particular something very popular about their method\nof presentation, which makes them highly to be recommended to those\ncommencing the study of philosophy. Descartes sets to work in a quite\nsimple and childlike manner, with a narration of his reflections as they\ncame to him. Professor Cousin of Paris has brought out a new edition of\nDescartes in eleven octavo volumes; the greater part consists of letters\non natural phenomena. Descartes gave a new impetus to mathematics as well\nas to philosophy. Several important methods were discovered by him, upon\nwhich the most brilliant results in higher mathematics were afterwards\nbuilt. His method is even now an essential in mathematics, for Descartes\nis the inventor of analytic geometry, and consequently the first to point\nout the way in this field of science to modern mathematics. He likewise\ncultivated physics, optics, and astronomy, and made the most important\ndiscoveries in these; we have not, however, to deal with such matters.\nThe application of metaphysics to ecclesiastical affairs, investigations,\netc., has likewise no special interest for us.\n\n1. In Philosophy Descartes struck out quite original lines; with him the\nnew epoch in Philosophy begins, whereby it was permitted to culture to\ngrasp in the form of universality the principle of its higher spirit in\nthought, just as Boehme grasped it in sensuous perceptions and forms.\nDescartes started by saying that thought must necessarily commence from\nitself; all the philosophy which came before this, and specially what\nproceeded from the authority of the Church, was for ever after set aside.\nBut since here thought has properly speaking grasped itself as abstract\nunderstanding only, in relation to which the more concrete content still\nstands over on the other side, the determinate conceptions were not\nyet deduced from the understanding, but taken up only empirically. In\nDescartes\u2019 philosophy we have thus to distinguish what has, and what\nhas not universal interest for us: the former is the process of his\nthoughts themselves, and the latter the mode in which these thoughts are\npresented and deduced. Yet we must not consider the process as a method\nof consistent proof; it is indeed a deep and inward progress, but it\ncomes to us in an ingenuous and na\u00efve form. In order to do justice to\nDescartes\u2019 thoughts it is necessary for us to be assured of the necessity\nfor his appearance; the spirit of his philosophy is simply knowledge as\nthe unity of Thought and Being. And yet on the whole there is little to\nsay about his philosophy.\n\na. Descartes expresses the fact that we must begin from thought as such\nalone, by saying that we must doubt everything (_De omnibus dubitandum\nest_); and that is an absolute beginning. He thus makes the abolition\nof all determinations the first condition of Philosophy. This first\nproposition has not, however, the same signification as Scepticism,\nwhich sets before it no other aim than doubt itself, and requires that\nwe should remain in this indecision of mind, an indecision wherein mind\nfinds its freedom. It rather signifies that we should renounce all\nprepossessions\u2014that is, all hypotheses which are accepted as true in\ntheir immediacy\u2014and commence from thought, so that from it we should in\nthe first place attain to some fixed and settled basis, and make a true\nbeginning. In Scepticism this is not the case, for with the sceptics\ndoubt is the end at which they rest.[155] But the doubting of Descartes,\nhis making no hypotheses, because nothing is fixed or secure, does not\noccur in the interests of freedom as such, in order that nothing should\nhave value except freedom itself, and nothing exist in the quality of\nan external objective. To him everything is unstable indeed, in so\nfar as the Ego can abstract from it or can think, for pure thought is\nabstraction from everything. But in consciousness the end is predominant,\nand it is to arrive at something fixed and objective\u2014and not the moment\nof subjectivity, or the fact of being set forth, known and proved by me.\nYet this last comes along with the other, for it is from the starting\npoint of my thought that I would attain my object; the impulse of freedom\nis thus likewise fundamental.\n\nIn the propositions in which Descartes gives in his own way the ground\nof this great and most important principle, there is found a na\u00efve and\nempirical system of reasoning. This is an example: \u201cBecause we were born\nas children, and formed all manner of judgments respecting sensuous\nthings before we had the perfect use of our reason, we are through many\npreconceived ideas hindered from the knowledge of the truth. From these\nwe appear not to be able to free ourselves in any other way but by once\nin our lives striving to doubt that respecting which we have the very\nslightest suspicion of an uncertainty. Indeed it is really desirable to\nhold as false everything in respect to which we have any doubt, so that\nwe may find more clearly what is most certain and most knowable. Yet\nthis doubt has to be limited to the contemplation of the truth, for in\nthe conduct of our life we are compelled to choose the probable, since\nthere the opportunity for action would often pass away before we could\nsolve our doubts. But here, where we have only to deal with the search\nfor truth, we may very reasonably doubt whether any thing sensuous and\nperceptible exists\u2014in the first place because we find that the senses\noften deceive us and it is prudent not to trust in what has even once\ndeceived us, and then because every day in dreaming we think we feel or\nsee before ourselves innumerable things which never were, and to the\ndoubter no signs are given by which he can safely distinguish sleeping\nfrom waking. We shall hereby likewise doubt everything else, even\nmathematical propositions, partly because we have seen that some err\neven in what we hold most certain, and ascribe value to what to us seems\nfalse, and partly because we have heard that a God exists who has created\nus, and who can do everything, so that He may have created us liable to\nerr. But if we conceive ourselves not to derive our existence from God,\nbut from some other source, perhaps from ourselves, we are all the more\nliable, in that we are thus imperfect, to err. But we have so far the\nexperience of freedom within us that we can always refrain from what is\nnot perfectly certain and well founded.\u201d[156] The demand which rests\nat the basis of Descartes\u2019 reasonings thus is that what is recognized\nas true should be able to maintain the position of having the thought\ntherein at home with itself. The so-called immediate intuition and inward\nrevelation, which in modern times is so highly regarded, has its place\nhere. But because in the Cartesian form the principle of freedom as such\nis not brought into view, the grounds which are here advanced are for the\nmost part popular.\n\nb. Descartes sought something in itself certain and true, which should\nneither be only true like the object of faith without knowledge, nor the\nsensuous and also sceptical certainty which is without truth. The whole\nof Philosophy as it had been carried on up to this time was vitiated by\nthe constant presupposition of something as true, and in some measure,\nas in the Neo-Platonic philosophy, by not giving the form of scientific\nknowledge to its matter, or by not separating its moments. But to\nDescartes nothing is true which does not possess an inward evidence\nin consciousness, or which reason does not recognize so clearly and\nconclusively that any doubt regarding it is absolutely impossible.\n\u201cBecause we thus reject or declare to be false everything regarding which\nwe can have any doubt at all, it is easy for us to suppose that there is\nno God, no heaven, no body\u2014but we cannot therefore say that we do not\nexist, who think this. For it is contradictory to say that what thinks\ndoes not exist. Hence the knowledge that \u2018I think, therefore I am,\u2019 is\nwhat we arrive at first of all, and it is the most certain fact that\noffers itself to everyone who follows after philosophy in an orderly\nfashion. This is the best way of becoming acquainted with the nature of\nspirit and its diversity from body. For if we inquire who we are who can\nset forth as untrue everything which is different from ourselves, we\nclearly see that no extension, figure, change of position, nor any such\nthing which can be ascribed to body, constitutes our nature, but only\nthought alone; which is thus known earlier and more certainly than any\ncorporeal thing.\u201d[157] \u2018I\u2019 has thus significance here as thought, and\nnot as individuality of self-consciousness. The second proposition of\nthe Cartesian philosophy is hence the immediate certainty of thought.\nCertainty is only knowledge as such in its pure form as self-relating,\nand this is thought; thus then the unwieldy understanding makes its way\non to the necessity of thought.\n\nDescartes begins, just as Fichte did later on, with the \u2018I\u2019 as\nindubitably certain; I know that something is presented in me. By this\nPhilosophy is at one stroke transplanted to quite another field and\nto quite another standpoint, namely to the sphere of subjectivity.\nPresuppositions in religion are given up; proof alone is sought for,\nand not the absolute content which disappears before abstract infinite\nsubjectivity. There is in Descartes likewise a seething desire to\nspeak from strong feeling, from the ordinary sensuous point of view,\njust as Bruno and so many others, each in his own fashion, express as\nindividualities their particular conceptions of the world. To consider\nthe content in itself is not the first matter; for I can abstract from\nall my conceptions, but not from the \u2018I.\u2019 We think this and that, and\nhence it is\u2014is to give the common would-be-wise argument of those\nincapable of grasping the matter in point; that a determinate content\nexists is exactly what we are forced to doubt\u2014there is nothing absolutely\nfixed. Thought is the entirely universal, but not merely because I\ncan abstract, but because \u2018I\u2019 is thus simple, self-identical. Thought\nconsequently comes first; the next determination arrived at, in direct\nconnection with it, is the determination of Being. The \u2018I think\u2019 directly\ninvolves my Being; this, says Descartes, is the absolute basis of all\nPhilosophy.[158] The determination of Being is in my \u2018I\u2019; this connection\nis itself the first matter. Thought as Being and Being as thought\u2014that\nis my certainty, \u2018I\u2019; in the celebrated _Cogito, ergo sum_ we thus have\nThought and Being inseparably bound together.\n\nOn the one hand this proposition is regarded as a syllogism: from thought\nBeing is deduced. Kant more especially has objected to this that Being\nis not contained in thinking, that it is different from thinking. This\nis true, but they are still inseparable, or constitute an identity;\ntheir difference is not to the prejudice of their unity. Yet this maxim\nof pure abstract certainty, the universal totality in which everything\nimplicitly exists, is not proved;[159] we must therefore not try to\nconvert this proposition into a syllogism. Descartes himself says:\n\u201cThere is no syllogism present at all. For in order that there should be\nsuch, the major premise must have been \u2018all that thinks exists\u2019\u201d\u2014from\nwhich the subsumption would have followed in the minor premise, \u2018now\nI am.\u2019 By this the immediacy which rests in the proposition, would be\nremoved. \u201cBut that major premise\u201d is not set forth at all, being \u201creally\nin the first instance derived from the original \u2018I think, therefore, I\nam.\u2019\u201d[160] For arriving at a conclusion three links are required\u2014in this\ncase we ought to have a third through which thought and Being should have\nbeen mediated, and it is not to be found here. The \u2018Therefore\u2019 which\nbinds the two sides together is not the \u2018Therefore\u2019 of a syllogism; the\nconnection between Being and Thought is only immediately posited. This\ncertainty is thus the _prius_; all other propositions come later. The\nthinking subject as the simple immediacy of being-at-home-with-me is\nthe very same thing as what is called Being; and it is quite easy to\nperceive this identity. As universal, thought is contained in all that\nis particular, and thus is pure relation to itself, pure oneness with\nitself. We must not make the mistake of representing Being to ourselves\nas a concrete content, and hence it is the same immediate identity which\nthought likewise is. Immediacy is, however, a one-sided determination;\nthought does not contain it alone, but also the determination to mediate\nitself with itself, and thereby\u2014by the mediation being at the same time\nthe abrogation of the mediation\u2014it is immediacy. In thought we thus have\nBeing; Being is, however, a poor determination, it is the abstraction\nfrom the concrete of thought. This identity of Being and Thought,\nwhich constitutes the most interesting idea of modern times, has not\nbeen further worked out by Descartes; he has relied on consciousness\nalone, and for the time being placed it in the fore-front. For with\nDescartes the necessity to develop the differences from the \u2018I think\u2019 is\nnot yet present; Fichte first applied himself to the deduction of all\ndeterminations from this culminating point of absolute certainty.\n\nOther propositions have been set against that of Descartes.\nGassendi,[161] for example, asks if we might not just as well say\n_Ludificor, ergo sum_: I am made a fool of by my consciousness, therefore\nI exist\u2014or properly speaking, therefore I am made a fool of. Descartes\nhimself recognized that this objection merited consideration, but he\nhere repels it, inasmuch as it is the \u2018I\u2019 alone and not the other\ncontent which has to be maintained. Being alone is identical with pure\nthought, and not its content, be it what it may. Descartes further says:\n\u201cBy thought I, however, understand all that takes place in us within\nour consciousness, in as far as we are conscious of it; thus will,\nconception, and even feeling are identical with thought. For if I say\n\u2018I see,\u2019 or \u2018I walk out,\u2019 and \u2018therefore I am,\u2019 and understand by this\nthe seeing and walking which is accomplished by the body, the conclusion\nis not absolutely certain, because, as often happens in a dream, I may\nimagine that I can see or walk even if I do not open my eyes nor move\nfrom my place, and I might also possibly do so supposing I had no body.\nBut if I understand it of the subjective feeling or the consciousness of\nseeing or walking itself, because it is then related to the mind that\nalone feels or thinks that it sees or walks, this conclusion is perfectly\ncertain.\u201d[162] \u201cIn a dream\u201d is an empirical mode of reasoning, but there\nis no other objection to it. In willing, seeing, hearing, &c., thought is\nlikewise contained, it is absurd to suppose that the soul has thinking\nin one special pocket, and seeing, willing, &c., in others. But if I say\n\u2018I see,\u2019 \u2018I walk out,\u2019 there is present on the one hand my consciousness\n\u2018I,\u2019 and consequently thought, on the other hand, however, there is\npresent willing, seeing, hearing, walking, and thus a still further\nmodification of the content. Now because of this modification I cannot\nsay \u2018I walk, and therefore I am,\u2019 for I can undoubtedly abstract from\nthe modification, since it is no longer universal Thought. Thus we must\nmerely look at the pure consciousness contained in the concrete \u2018I.\u2019 Only\nwhen I accentuate the fact that I am present there as thinking, is pure\nBeing implied, for only with the universal is Being united.\n\n\u201cIn this it is implied,\u201d says Descartes, \u201cthat thought is more certain to\nme than body. If from the fact that I touch or see the earth I judge that\nit exists, I must more certainly judge from this that my thought exists.\nFor it may very well happen that I judge the earth to exist, even if it\ndoes not exist, but it cannot be that I judge this, and that my mind\nwhich judges this does not exist.\u201d[163] That is to say, everything which\nis for me I may assert to be non-existent, but when I assert myself to be\nnon-existent, I myself _assert_, or it is _my_ judgment. For I cannot set\naside the fact that I judge, even if I can abstract from that respecting\nwhich I judge. In this Philosophy has regained its own ground that\nthought starts from thought as what is certain in itself, and not from\nsomething external, not from something given, not from an authority,\nbut directly from the freedom that is contained in the \u2018I think.\u2019 Of all\nelse I may doubt, of the existence of bodily things, of my body itself;\nor this certainty does not possess immediacy in itself. For \u2018I\u2019 is just\ncertainty itself, but in all else this certainty is only predicate; my\nbody is certain to _me_, it is not this certainty itself.[164] As against\nthe certainty we feel of having a body, Descartes adduces the empirical\nphenomenon that we often hear of persons imagining they feel pain in\na limb which they have lost long ago.[165] What is actual, he says is\na substance, the soul is a thinking substance; it is thus for itself,\nseparate from all external material things and independent. That it is\nthinking is evident from its nature: it would think and exist even if no\nmaterial things were present; the soul can hence know itself more easily\nthan its body.[166]\n\nAll else that we can hold as true rests on this certainty; for in order\nthat anything should be held as true, evidence is requisite, but nothing\nis true which has not this inward evidence in consciousness. \u201cNow the\nevidence of everything rests upon our perceiving it as clearly and\nvividly as that certainty itself, and on its so entirely depending from,\nand harmonizing with this principle, that if we wished to doubt it we\nshould also have to doubt this principle likewise\u201d (our _ego_).[167] This\nknowledge is indeed on its own account perfect evidence, but it is not\nyet the truth, or if we take that Being as truth, it is an empty content,\nand it is with the content that we have to do.\n\nc. What comes third is thus the transition of this certainty into\ntruth, into the determinate; Descartes again makes this transition\nin a na\u00efve way, and with it we for the first time begin to consider\nhis metaphysics. What here takes place is that an interest arises in\nfurther representations and conceptions of the abstract unity of Being\nand Thought; there Descartes sets to work in an externally reflective\nmanner. \u201cThe consciousness which merely knows itself to be certain now\nhowever seeks to extend its knowledge, and finds that it has conceptions\nof many things\u2014in which conceptions it does not deceive itself, so long\nas it does not assert or deny that something similar outside corresponds\nto them.\u201d Deception in the conceptions has meaning only in relation to\nexternal existence. \u201cConsciousness also discovers universal conceptions,\nand obtains from them proofs which are evident, _e.g._ the geometric\nproposition that the three angles of a triangle are together equal to two\nright angles is a conception which follows incontrovertibly from others.\nBut in reflecting whether such things really exist doubts arise.\u201d[168]\nThat there is such a thing as a triangle is indeed in this case by\nno means certain, since extension is not contained in the immediate\ncertainty of myself. The soul may exist without the bodily element, and\nthis last without it, they are in reality different; one is conceivable\nwithout the other. The soul thus does not think and know the other as\nclearly as the certainty of itself.[169]\n\nNow the truth of all knowledge rests on the proof of the existence of\nGod. The soul is an imperfect substance, but it has the Idea of an\nabsolute perfect existence within itself; this perfection is not begotten\nin itself, just because it is an imperfect substance; this Idea is thus\ninnate. In Descartes the consciousness of this fact is expressed by his\nsaying that as long as the existence of God is not proved and perceived\nthe possibility of our deceiving ourselves remains, because we cannot\nknow whether we do not possess a nature ordered and disposed to err\n(_supra_, p. 226).[170] The form is rather a mistaken one, and it only\ngenerally expresses the opposition in which self-consciousness stands to\nthe consciousness of what is different, of the objective; and we have\nto deal with the unity of both\u2014the question being whether what is in\nthought likewise possesses objectivity. This unity rests in God, or is\nGod Himself. I shall put these assertions in the manner of Descartes:\n\u201cAmongst these various conceptions possessed by us there likewise is\nthe conception of a supremely intelligent, powerful, and absolutely\nperfect Being; and this is the most excellent of all conceptions.\u201d This\nall-embracing universal conception has therefore this distinguishing\nfeature, that in its case the uncertainty respecting Being which appears\nin the other conceptions, finds no place. It has the characteristic that\n\u201cIn it we do not recognize existence as something merely possible and\naccidental, as we do the conceptions of other things which we perceive\nclearly, but as a really essential and eternal determination. For\ninstance, as mind perceives that in the conception of a triangle it is\nimplied that the three angles are equal to two right angles, the triangle\nhas them; and in the same way from the fact that mind perceives existence\nto be necessarily and eternally implied in the Notion of the most\nperfect reality, it is forced to conclude that the most perfect reality\nexists.\u201d[171] For to perfection there likewise pertains the determination\nof existence, since the conception of a non-existent is less perfect.\nThus we there have the unity of thought and Being, and the ontological\nproof of the existence of God; this we met with earlier (p. 63, _seq._)\nin dealing with Anselm.\n\nThe proof of the existence of God from the Idea of Him is in this wise:\nIn this Notion existence is implied; and therefore it is true. Descartes\nproceeds further in the same direction, in so far as after the manner\nof empirical axioms he sets forth: (\u03b1) \u201cThere are different degrees of\nreality or entity, for the substance has more reality than the accident\nor the mode, and infinite substance has more than finite.\u201d (\u03b2) \u201cIn the\nNotion of a thing existence is implied, either the merely potential\nor the necessary,\u201d _i.e._ in the \u2018I\u2019 there is Being as the immediate\ncertainty of an other-being, of the not-I opposed to the I. (\u03b3) \u201cNo\nthing or no perfection of a thing which really exists _actu_ can have\nthe Nothing as original cause of its existence. For if anything could\nbe predicated of nothing, thought could equally well be predicated of\nit, and I would thus say that I am nothing because I think.\u201d Descartes\nhere arrives at a dividing line, at an unknown relationship; the Notion\nof cause is reached, and this is a thought indeed, but a determinate\nthought. Spinoza says in his explanation, \u201cThat the conceptions contain\nmore or less reality, and those moments have just as much evidence as\nthought itself, because they not only say that we think, but how we\nthink.\u201d These determinate modes as differences in the simplicity of\nthought, had, however, to be demonstrated. Spinoza adds to this step in\nadvance that \u201cThe degrees of reality which we perceive in ideas are not\nin the ideas in as far as they are considered merely as kinds of thought,\nbut in so far as the one represents a substance and the other a mere\nmode of substance, or, in a word, in so far as they are considered as\nconceptions of things.\u201d (\u03b4) \u201cThe objective reality of Notions\u201d (_i.e._,\nthe entity of what is represented in so far as it is in the Notion),\n\u201cdemands a first cause in which the same reality is contained not merely\nobjectively\u201d (that is to say in the Notion), \u201cbut likewise formally or\neven _eminenter_\u2014formally, that is perfectly likewise: _eminenter_, more\nperfectly. For there must at least be as much in the cause as in the\neffect.\u201d (\u03b5) \u201cThe existence of God is known immediately\u201d\u2014_a priori_\u2014\u201cfrom\nthe contemplation of His nature. To say that anything is contained in\nthe nature or in the Notion of a thing is tantamount to saying that it\nis true: existence is directly contained in the Notion of God. Hence\nit is quite true to say of Him that existence pertains of necessity to\nHim. There is implied in the Notion of every particular thing either a\npossible or a necessary existence\u2014a necessary existence in the Notion\nof God, _i.e._ of the absolutely perfect Being, for else He would be\nconceived as imperfect.\u201d[172]\n\nDescartes likewise argues after this manner: \u201cProblem: to prove _a\nposteriori_ from the mere Notion within us the existence of God. The\nobjective reality of a Notion demands a cause in which the same reality\nis not merely contained objectively\u201d (as in the finite), \u201cbut formally\u201d\n(freely, purely for itself, outside of us) \u201cor _eminenter_\u201d (as\noriginal). (Axiom \u03b4.) \u201cWe now have a Notion of God, but His objective\nreality is neither formally nor _eminenter_ contained within us, and it\ncan thus be only in God Himself.\u201d[173] Consequently we see that with\nDescartes this Idea is an hypothesis. Now we should say we find this\nhighest Idea in us. If we then ask whether this Idea exists, why, this\nis the Idea, that existence is asserted with it. To say that it is only\na conception is to contradict the meaning of this conception. But here\nit is unsatisfactory to find that the conception is introduced thus: \u2018We\nhave this conception,\u2019 and to find that it consequently appears like an\nhypothesis. In such a case it is not proved of this content in itself\nthat it determines itself into this unity of thought and Being. In the\nform of God no other conception is thus here given than that contained\nin _Cogito, ergo sum_, wherein Being and thought are inseparably bound\nup\u2014though now in the form of a conception which I possess within me.\nThe whole content of this conception, the Almighty, All-wise, &c., are\npredicates which do not make their appearance until later; the content\nis simply the content of the Idea bound up with existence. Hence we\nsee these determinations following one another in an empirical manner,\nand not philosophically proved\u2014thus giving us an example of how in _a\npriori_ metaphysics generally hypotheses of conceptions are brought in,\nand these become objects of thought, just as happens in empiricism with\ninvestigations, observations, and experiences.\n\nDescartes then proceeds: \u201cMind is the more convinced of this when it\nnotices that it discovers within itself the conception of no other thing\nwherein existence is necessarily implied. From this it will perceive that\nthat idea of highest reality is not imagined by it, it is not chimerical,\nbut a true and unalterable fact which cannot do otherwise than exist,\nseeing that existence is necessarily involved in it. Our prejudices\nhinder us from apprehending this with ease, for we are accustomed to\ndistinguish in all other things the essence\u201d (the Notion) \u201cfrom the\nexistence.\u201d Respecting the assertion that thought is not inseparable\nfrom existence, the common way of talking is as follows: \u2018If what men\nthink really existed, things would be different.\u2019 But in saying this men\ndo not take into account that what is spoken of in this way is always a\nparticular content, and that in it the essential nature of the finality\nof things simply signifies the fact that Notion and Being are separable.\nBut how can one argue from finite things to the infinite? \u201cThis Notion,\u201d\nDescartes continues, \u201cis furthermore not made by us.\u201d It is now declared\nto be an eternal truth which is revealed in us. \u201cWe do not find in\nourselves the perfections which are contained in this conception. Thus\nwe are certain that a first cause in which is all perfection, _i.e._\nGod as really existent, has given them to us; for it is certain to us\nthat from nothing, nothing arises\u201d (according to Boehme God derived the\nmaterial of the world from Himself), \u201cand what is perfect cannot be the\neffect of anything imperfect. From Him we must thus in true science\ndeduce all created things.\u201d[174] With the proof of the existence of God\nthe validity of and evidence for all truth in its origin is immediately\nestablished. God as First Cause is Being-for-self, the reality which is\nnot merely entity or existence in thought. An existence such as this\nfirst cause (which is not what we know as a thing) rests in the Notion of\nthe not-I, not of each determinate thing\u2014since these as determinate are\nnegations\u2014but only in the Notion of pure existence or the perfect cause.\nIt is the cause of the truth of ideas, for the aspect that it represents\nis that of their Being.\n\nd. Fourthly, Descartes goes on to assert: \u201cWe must believe what is\nrevealed to us by God, though we cannot understand it. It is not to\nbe wondered at, since we are finite, that there is in God\u2019s nature as\ninconceivably infinite, what passes our comprehension.\u201d This represents\nthe entrance of a very ordinary conception. Boehme on the other hand says\n(_supra_, p. 212): \u2018The mystery of the Trinity is ever born within us.\u2019\nDescartes, however, concludes: \u201cHence we must not trouble ourselves with\ninvestigations respecting the infinite; for seeing that we are finite, it\nis absurd for us to say anything about it.\u201d[175] This matter we shall\nnot, however, enter upon at present.\n\n\u201cNow the first attribute of God is that He is true and the Giver of all\nlight; it is hence quite contrary to His nature to deceive us. Hence the\nlight of nature or the power of acquiring knowledge given us by God can\naffect no object which is not really true in as far as it is affected by\nit\u201d (the power of acquiring knowledge) \u201c_i.e._ as it is perceived clearly\nand distinctly.\u201d We ascribe truth to God. From this Descartes goes on to\ninfer the universal bond which exists between absolute knowledge and the\nobjectivity of what we thus know. Knowledge has objects, has a content\nwhich is known; we call this connection truth. The truth of God is just\nthis unity of what is thought by the subject or clearly perceived, and\nexternal reality or existence. \u201cThereby an end is put to doubt, as if it\ncould be the case that what appears quite evident to us should not be\nreally true. We can thus no longer have any suspicion of mathematical\ntruths. Likewise if we give heed to what we distinguish by our senses in\nwaking or in sleeping, clearly and distinctly, it is easy to recognize\nin each thing what in it is true.\u201d By saying that what is rightly and\nclearly thought likewise is, Descartes maintains that man comes to know\nby means of thought what in fact is in things; the sources of errors lie\non the other hand in the finitude of our nature. \u201cIt is certain, because\nof God\u2019s truth, that the faculty of perceiving and that of assenting\nthrough the will, if it extends no further than to that which is clearly\nperceived, cannot lead to error. Even if this cannot be in any way\nproved, it is by nature so established in all things, that as often as we\nclearly perceive anything, we assent to it from ourselves and can in no\nwise doubt that it is true.\u201d[176]\n\nAll this is set forth very plausibly, but it is still indeterminate,\nformal, and shallow; we only have the assertion made to us that this is\nso. Descartes\u2019 method is the method of the clear understanding merely.\nCertainty with him takes the first place; from it no content is deduced\nof necessity, no content generally, and still less its objectivity as\ndistinguished from the inward subjectivity of the \u2018I.\u2019 At one time we\nhave the opposition of subjective knowledge and actuality, and at another\ntheir inseparable union. In the first case the necessity of mediating\nthem enters in, and the truth of God is asserted to be this mediating\npower. It consists in this, that His Notion contains reality immediately\nin itself. The proof of this unity then rests solely upon the fact of its\nbeing said that we find within us the idea of complete perfection; thus\nthis conception here appears simply as one found ready to hand. With this\nis compared the mere conception of God which contains no existence within\nit, and it is found that without existence it would be imperfect. This\nunity of God Himself, of His Idea, with His existence, is undoubtedly\nthe Truth; in this we find the ground for holding as true what is for us\njust as certain as the truth of ourselves. As Descartes proceeds further\nwe thus find that in reality everything has truth for him only in so far\nas it is really an object of thought, a universal. This truth of God has\nbeen, as we shall see, expressed even more clearly and in a more concise\nway by a disciple of Descartes, if one may venture to call him so\u2014I mean\nMalebranche (who might really be dealt with here),[177] in his _Recherche\nde la v\u00e9rit\u00e9_.\n\nThe first of the fundamental determinations of the Cartesian metaphysics\nis from the certainty of oneself to arrive at the truth, to recognize\nBeing in the Notion of thought. But because in the thought \u201cI think,\u201d\nI am an individual, thought comes before my mind as subjective;\nBeing is hence not demonstrated in the Notion of thought itself, for\nwhat advance has been made is merely in the direction of separation\ngenerally. In the second place the negative of Being likewise comes\nbefore self-consciousness, and this negative, united with the positive\nI, is so to speak implicitly united in a third, in God. God, who before\nthis was a non-contradictory potentiality, now takes objective form to\nself-consciousness, He is all reality in so far as it is positive, _i.e._\nas it is Being, unity of thought and Being, the highest perfection of\nexistence; it is just in the negative, in the Notion of this, in its\nbeing an object of thought, that Being is contained. An objection to\nthis identity is now old\u2014Kant urged it likewise\u2014that from the Notion of\nthe most perfect existence more does not follow than that _in_ thought\nexistence here and now and the most perfect essence are conjoined, but\nnot _outside_ of thought. But the very Notion of present existence is\nthis negative of self-consciousness, not out of thought,\u2014but the thought\nof the \u2018out of thought.\u2019\n\n2. Descartes accepts Being in the entirely positive sense, and has\nnot the conception of its being the negative of self-consciousness:\nbut simple Being, set forth as the negative of self-consciousness,\nis extension. Descartes thus separates extension from God, remains\nconstant to this separation, unites the universe, matter, with God in\nsuch a way as to make Him its creator and first cause: and he has the\ntrue perception that conservation is a continuous creation, in so far\nas creation as activity is asserted to be separated. Descartes does\nnot, however, trace extension in a true method back to thought; matter,\nextended substances, stand over against the thinking substances which\nare simple; in as far as the universe is created by God, it could not\nbe as perfect as its cause. As a matter of fact the effect is less\nperfect than the cause, since it is that which is posited, if we are to\nremain at the conception of cause pertaining to the understanding. Hence\naccording to Descartes extension is the less perfect. But as imperfect\nthe extended substances cannot exist and subsist through themselves or\ntheir Notion; they thus require every moment the assistance of God for\ntheir maintenance, and without this they would in a moment sink back into\nnothing. Preservation is, however, unceasing reproduction.[178]\n\nDescartes now proceeds to further particulars, and expresses himself as\nfollows: \u201cWe consider what comes under consciousness either as things or\ntheir qualities, or as eternal truths which have no existence outside\nour thought\u201d\u2014which do not belong to this or that time, to this or that\nplace. He calls those last something inborn within us, something not\nmade by us or merely felt,[179] but the eternal Notion of mind itself\nand the eternal determinations of its freedom, of itself as itself. From\nthis point the conception that ideas are inborn (_innat\u00e6 ide\u00e6_) hence\nproceeds; this is the question over which Locke and Leibnitz dispute. The\nexpression \u201ceternal truths\u201d is current even in these modern times, and it\nsignifies the universal determinations and relations which exist entirely\non their own account. The word \u2018inborn\u2019 is however a clumsy and stupid\nexpression, because the conception of physical birth thereby indicated,\ndoes not apply to mind. To Descartes inborn ideas are not universal,\nas they are to Plato and his successors, but that which has evidence,\nimmediate certainty, an immediate multiplicity founded in thought\nitself\u2014manifold conceptions in the form of a Being, resembling what\nCicero calls natural feelings implanted in the heart. We would rather say\nthat such is implied in the nature and essence of our mind and spirit.\nMind is active and conducts itself in its activity in a determinate\nmanner; but this activity has no other ground than its freedom. Yet if\nthis is the case more is required than merely to say so; it must be\ndeduced as a necessary product of our mind. We have such ideas, for\ninstance, in the logical laws: \u201cFrom nothing comes nothing,\u201d \u201cA thing\ncannot both be and not be,\u201d[180] as also in moral principles. These are\nfacts of consciousness which Descartes however soon passes from again;\nthey are only present in thought as subjective, and he has thus not yet\ninquired respecting their content.\n\nAs regards things, on which Descartes now directs his attention, the\nother side to these eternal verities, the universal determinations\nof things are substance, permanence, order, &c.[181] He then gives\ndefinitions of these thoughts, just as Aristotle draws up a list of the\ncategories. But although Descartes laid it down formerly as essential\nthat no hypotheses must be made, yet now he takes the conceptions, and\npasses on to them as something found within our consciousness. He defines\nsubstance thus: \u201cBy substance I understand none other than a thing\n(_rem_) which requires no other something for existence; and there is\nonly one thing, namely God, which can be regarded as such a substance\nrequiring no other thing.\u201d This is what Spinoza says; we may say that it\nis likewise the true definition, the unity of Notion and reality: \u201cAll\nother\u201d (things) \u201ccan only exist by means of a concurrence (_concursus_)\nof God\u201d; what we still call substance outside of God thus does not exist\nfor itself, does not have its existence in the Notion itself. That is\nthen called the system of assistance (_systema assistenti\u00e6_) which\nis, however, transcendental. God is the absolute uniter of Notion and\nactuality; other things, finite things which have a limit and stand in\ndependence, require something else. \u201cHence if we likewise call other\nthings substances, this expression is not applicable both to them and\nto God _univoce_, as is said in the schools; that is to say no definite\nsignificance can be given to this word which would equally apply both to\nGod and to the creatures.\u201d[182]\n\n\u201cBut I do not recognize more than two sorts of things; the one is that\nof thinking things, and the other that of things which relate to what\nis extended.\u201d Thought, the Notion, the spiritual, the self-conscious,\nis what is at home with itself, and its opposite is contained in what\nis extended, spatial, separated, not at home with itself nor free.\nThis is the real distinction (_distinctio realis_) of substances: \u201cThe\none substance can be clearly and definitely comprehended without the\nother. But the corporeal and the thinking and creating substance can\nbe comprehended under this common notion, for the reason that they\nare things which require God\u2019s support alone in order to exist.\u201d They\nare universal; other finite things require other things as conditions\nessential to their existence. But extended substance, the kingdom of\nnature, and spiritual substance, do not require one another.[183]\nThey may be called substances, because each of them constitutes an\nentire range or sphere, an independent totality. But because, Spinoza\nconcluded, each side, the kingdom of thought as well as nature, is one\ncomplete system within itself, they are likewise in themselves, that is\nabsolutely, identical as God, the absolute substance; for thinking spirit\nthis implicit is thus God, or their differences are ideal.\n\nDescartes proceeds from the Notion of God to what is created, to thought\nand extension, and from this to the particular. \u201cNow substances\nhave several attributes without which they cannot be thought\u201d\u2014that\nsignifies their determinateness\u2014\u201cbut each has something peculiar to\nitself which constitutes its nature and essence\u201d\u2014a simple universal\ndeterminateness\u2014\u201cand to which the others all relate. Thus thought\nconstitutes the absolute attribute of mind,\u201d thought is its quality;\n\u201cextension is\u201d the essential determination of corporeality, and this\nalone is \u201cthe true nature of body. What remains are merely secondary\nqualities, modes, like figure and movement in what is extended,\nimagination, feeling and will in thinking; they may be taken away or\nthought away. God is the uncreated, thinking substance.\u201d[184]\n\nDescartes here passes to what is individual, and because he follows\nup extension he arrives at matter, rest, movement. One of Descartes\u2019\nmain points is that matter, extension, corporeality, are quite the same\nthing for thought; according to him the nature of body is fulfilled in\nits extension, and this should be accepted as the only essential fact\nrespecting the corporeal world. We say that body offers resistance, has\nsmell, taste, colour, transparency, hardness, &c., since without these\nwe can have no body. All these further determinations respecting what is\nextended, such as size, rest, movement, and inertia, are, however, merely\nsensuous, and this Descartes showed, as it had long before this been\nshown by the Sceptics. Undoubtedly that is the abstract Notion or pure\nessence, but to body or to pure existence, there likewise of necessity\npertains negativity or diversity. By means of the following illustration\nDescartes showed that with the exception of extension, all corporeal\ndeterminations may be annihilated, and that none can be absolutely\npredicated. We draw conclusions respecting the solidity and hardness\nof matter from the resistance which a body offers to our disturbance,\nand by means of which it seeks to hold its place. Now if we admit that\nmatter as we touch it always gives way to us like space, we should have\nno reason for ascribing to it solidity. Smell, colour, taste, are in\nthe same way sensuous qualities merely; but what we clearly perceive is\nalone true. If a body is ground into small parts, it gives way, and yet\nit does not lose its nature; resistance is thus not essential.[185] This\nnot-being-for-itself is however a quantitatively slighter resistance\nonly; the resistance always remains. But Descartes desires only to think;\nnow he does not think resistance, colour, &c., but apprehends them by the\nsenses only. Hence he says that all this must be led back to extension\nas being special modifications of the same. It is undoubtedly to the\ncredit of Descartes that he only accepts as true what is thought; but the\nabrogation of these sensuous qualities simply represents the negative\nmovement of thought: the essence of body is conditioned through this\nthought, that is, it is not true essence.\n\nDescartes now makes his way from the Notion of extension to the laws of\nmotion, as the universal knowledge of the corporeal in its implicitude;\nhe shows (\u03b1) that there is no vacuum, for that would be an extension\nwithout bodily substance, _i.e._ a body without body; (\u03b2) that there are\nno atoms (no indivisible independent existence), for the same reason,\nviz., because the essence of body is extension. (\u03b3) He further shows\nthat a body is set in motion by something outside of it, but of itself\nit continues in a condition of rest, and likewise it must, when in a\ncondition of movement, be brought to rest by another outside of it\u2014this\nis the property of inertia.[186] These are unmeaning propositions, for\nan abstraction is involved for instance in asserting simple rest and\nmovement in their opposition.\n\nExtension and motion are the fundamental conceptions in mechanical\nphysics; they represent the truth of the corporeal world. It is thus\nthat ideality comes before the mind of Descartes, and he is far elevated\nabove the reality of the sensuous qualities, although he does not reach\nso far as to the separation of this ideality. He thus remains at the\npoint of view of mechanism pure and simple. Give me matter (extension)\nand motion and I will build worlds for you, is what Descartes virtually\nsays.[187] Space and time were hence to him the only determinations of\nthe material universe. In this, then, lies the mechanical fashion of\nviewing nature, or the natural philosophy of Descartes is seen to be\npurely mechanical.[188] Hence changes in matter are due merely to motion,\nso that Descartes traces every relationship to the rest and movement\nof particles, and all material diversity such as colour, and taste\u2014in\nshort, all bodily qualities and animal phenomena\u2014to mechanism. In living\nbeings processes such as that of digestion are mechanical effects which\nhave as principles, rest and movement. We here see the ground and origin\nof the mechanical philosophy; but further on we find that this is\nunsatisfactory, for matter and motion do not suffice to explain life.\nYet the great matter in all this is that thought goes forward in its\ndeterminations, and that it constitutes from these thought-determinations\nthe truth of nature.\n\nIn his consideration of the system of the world and the movement of the\nheavenly bodies, Descartes has worked out the mechanical view more fully.\nHe thus comes to speak of the earth, the sun, &c., and of his conception\nof the circling motion of the heavenly bodies in the form of vortices:\nof metaphysical hypotheses as to how small particles pass into, out of,\nand through pores and act on one another; and finally to saltpetre and\ngunpowder.[189]\n\nUniversal reflections should have the first claim on our attention; but\non the other hand the transition to the determinate is accomplished in a\nsystem of Physics which is the result of observations and experiences,\nand this is done entirely by means of the understanding. Descartes thus\nmingles many observations with a metaphysic of this nature, and to us\nthe result is hence obscure. In this philosophy the thinking treatment\nof empiricism is thus predominant, and a similar method has been adopted\nby philosophers from this time on. To Descartes and others, Philosophy\nhad still the more indefinite significance of arriving at knowledge\nthrough thought, reflection, and reasoning. Speculative cognition, the\nderivation from the Notion, the free independent development of the\nmatter itself, was first introduced by Fichte, and consequently what\nis now called philosophic knowledge is not yet separated in Descartes\nfrom the rest of scientific knowledge. In those times all the knowledge\nof mankind was called philosophy; in Descartes\u2019 metaphysics we thus\nsaw quite empirical reflection and reasoning from particular grounds,\nfrom experiences, facts, phenomena, being brought into play in the\nnaivest manner, and one has no sense of speculation in the matter. The\nstrictly scientific element here really consisted mainly in the method of\nproof as it has long been made use of in geometry, and in the ordinary\nmethod of the formal logical syllogism. Hence it likewise happens that\nPhilosophy, which ought to form a totality of the sciences, begins with\nlogic and metaphysics; the second part is composed of ordinary physics\nand mathematics, mingled no doubt with metaphysical speculations, and\nthe third part, ethics, deals with the nature of man, his duties, the\nstate, the citizen. And this is the case with Descartes. The first part\nof the _Principia philosophi\u00e6_ treats _De principiis cognitionis human\u00e6_,\nthe second _De principiis rerum materialium_. This natural philosophy,\nas a philosophy of extension, is, however, none other than what a quite\nordinary physics or mechanics might at that time be, and it is still\nquite hypothetical; we, on the other hand, accurately distinguish\nempirical physics and natural philosophy, even though the first likewise\npertains to thought.\n\n3. Descartes never reached the third part, the philosophy of Mind, for,\nwhile he made a special study of physics, in the region of ethics he\npublished one tract only, _De passionibus_. In this reference Descartes\ntreats of thought and human freedom. He proves freedom from the fact of\nthe soul thinking that the will is unrestrained, and of that constituting\nthe perfection of mankind. And this is quite true. In respect to the\nfreedom of the will he comes across the difficulty of how to reconcile it\nwith the divine prescience. As free, man might do what is not ordained of\nGod beforehand\u2014this would conflict with the omnipotence and omniscience\nof God; and if everything is ordained of God, human freedom would thereby\nbe done away with. Yet he does not solve the contradiction contained\nin these two different aspects without falling into difficulty. But\nconformably to the method which he adopts, and which we pointed out\nabove (pp. 238, 239), he says: \u201cThe human mind is finite, God\u2019s power\nand predetermination are infinite; we are thus not capable of judging of\nthe relationship in which the freedom of the human soul stands to the\nomnipotence and omniscience of God\u2014but in self-consciousness we have\nthe certainty of it given us as a fact. And we must hold only to what\nis certain.\u201d[190] When he proceeds further much appears to him still\nincapable of explanation; but we see obstinacy and caprice likewise\nexhibited in his stopping short at the assertion as to the best of his\nknowledge. The method of knowledge as set forth by Descartes, takes the\nform of a reasoning of the understanding, and is thus without special\ninterest.\n\nThese, then, are the principal points in the Cartesian system. Some\nparticular assertions made by Descartes, which have been specially\ninstrumental in giving him fame, have still to be mentioned\u2014particular\nforms which have been formerly considered in metaphysics, and likewise\nby Wolff. For example, in the first place we gather that Descartes\nregarded animals and other organisms as machines moved by another,\nand not possessing the principle of the spontaneity of thought within\nthem[191]\u2014a mechanical physiology, a cut and dry thought pertaining\nto the understanding, which is of no further importance. In the sharp\nopposition between thought and extension, the former is not considered\nas sensation, so that the latter can isolate itself. The organic must as\nbody reduce itself to extension; any further development of this last\nthus only proves its dependence on the first determinations.\n\nIn the second place, the relation between soul and body now becomes an\nimportant question, that is, the return of the object within itself\nin such a way that thought posits itself in another, in matter. As to\nthis, many systems are offered to us in metaphysics. One of these is\nthe _influxus physicus_, that the relation of spirit is of a corporeal\nnature, that the object is related to mind as bodies are to one another\u2014a\nconception like this is very crude. How does Descartes understand the\nunity of soul and body? The former belongs to thought, the latter to\nextension; and thus because both are substance, neither requires\nthe Notion of the other, and hence soul and body are independent of\none another and can exercise no direct influence upon one another.\nSoul could only influence body in so far as it required the same, and\nconversely\u2014that is, in so far as they have actual relation to one\nanother. But since each is a totality, neither can bear a real relation\nto the other. Descartes consistently denied the physical influence\nof one on the other; that would have signified a mechanical relation\nbetween the two. Descartes thus established the intellectual sphere in\ncontradistinction to matter, and on it based the independent subsistence\nof mind; for in his _cogito_ \u2018I\u2019 is at first only certain of itself,\nsince I can abstract from all. Now we find the necessity of a mediator\nto bring about a union of the abstract and the external and individual.\nDescartes settles this by placing between the two what constitutes the\nmetaphysical ground of their mutual changes, God. He is the intermediate\nbond of union, in as far as He affords assistance to the soul in what\nit cannot through its own freedom accomplish, so that the changes in\nbody and soul may correspond with one another.[192] If I have desires,\nan intention, these receive corporeal realization; this association of\nsoul and body is, according to Descartes, effected through God. For\nabove (p. 239) we saw that Descartes says of God that He is the Truth of\nthe conception: as long as I think rightly and consistently, something\nreal corresponds to my thought, and the connecting link is God. God\nis hereby the perfect identity of the two opposites, since He is, as\nIdea, the unity of Notion and reality. In the Idea of Spinoza this is\nworked out and developed in its further moments. Descartes\u2019 conclusion\nis quite correct; in finite things this identity is imperfect. Only the\nform employed by Descartes is inadequate; for it implies that in the\nbeginning there are two things, thought or soul and body, and that then\nGod appears as a third thing, outside both\u2014that He is not the Notion of\nunity, nor are the two elements themselves Notion. We must not however\nforget that Descartes says that both those original elements are created\nsubstances. But this expression \u2018created\u2019 pertains to the ordinary\nconception only and is not a determinate thought; it was Spinoza,\ntherefore, who first accomplished this return to thought.\n\n\n2. SPINOZA.\n\nThe philosophy of Descartes underwent a great variety of unspeculative\ndevelopments, but in Benedict Spinoza a direct successor to this\nphilosopher may be found, and one who carried on the Cartesian principle\nto its furthest logical conclusions. For him soul and body, thought and\nBeing, cease to have separate independent existence. The dualism of\nthe Cartesian system Spinoza, as a Jew, altogether set aside. For the\nprofound unity of his philosophy as it found expression in Europe, his\nmanifestation of Spirit as the identity of the finite and the infinite in\nGod, instead of God\u2019s appearing related to these as a Third\u2014all this is\nan echo from Eastern lands. The Oriental theory of absolute identity was\nbrought by Spinoza much more directly into line, firstly with the current\nof European thought, and then with the European and Cartesian philosophy,\nin which it soon found a place.\n\nFirst of all we must, however, glance at the circumstances of Spinoza\u2019s\nlife. He was by descent a Portuguese Jew, and was born at Amsterdam in\nthe year 1632; the name he received was Baruch, but he altered it to\nBenedict. In his youth he was instructed by the Rabbis of the synagogue\nto which he belonged, but he soon fell out with them, their wrath having\nbeen kindled by the criticisms which he passed on the fantastic doctrines\nof the Talmud. He was not, therefore, long in absenting himself from the\nsynagogue, and as the Rabbis were in dread lest his example should have\nevil consequences, they offered him a yearly allowance of a thousand\ngulden if he would keep away from the place and hold his tongue. This\noffer he declined; and the Rabbis thereafter carried their persecution\nof him to such a pitch that they were even minded to rid themselves of\nhim by assassination. After having made a narrow escape from the dagger,\nhe formally withdrew from the Jewish communion, without, however, going\nover to the Christian Church. He now applied himself particularly to the\nLatin language, and made a special study of the Cartesian philosophy.\nLater on he went to Rhynsburg, near Leyden, and from the year 1664 he\nlived in retirement, first at Voorburg, a village near the Hague, and\nthen at the Hague itself, highly respected by numerous friends: he\ngained a livelihood for himself by grinding optical glasses. It was\nno arbitrary choice that led him to occupy himself with light, for it\nrepresents in the material sphere the absolute identity which forms the\nfoundation of the Oriental view of things. Although he had rich friends\nand mighty protectors, among whom even generals were numbered, he lived\nin humble poverty, declining the handsome gifts offered to him time after\ntime. Nor would he permit Simon von Vries to make him his heir; he only\naccepted from him an annual pension of three hundred florins; in the\nsame way he gave up to his sisters his share of their father\u2019s estate.\nFrom the Elector Palatine, Carl Ludwig, a man of most noble character\nand raised above the prejudices of his time, he received the offer of a\nprofessor\u2019s chair at Heidelberg, with the assurance that he would have\nliberty to teach and to write, because \u201cthe Prince believed he would not\nput that liberty to a bad use by interfering with the religion publicly\nestablished.\u201d Spinoza (in his published letters) very wisely declined\nthis offer, however, because \u201che did not know within what limits that\nphilosophic liberty would have to be confined, in order that he might\nnot appear to be interfering with the publicly established religion.\u201d\nHe remained in Holland, a country highly interesting in the history\nof general culture, as it was the first in Europe to show the example\nof universal toleration, and afforded to many a place of refuge where\nthey might enjoy liberty of thought; for fierce as was the rage of the\ntheologians there against Bekker, for example (Bruck. Hist. crit. phil.\nT. IV. P. 2, pp. 719, 720), and furious as were the attacks of Voetius\non the Cartesian philosophy, these had not the consequences which they\nwould have had in another land. Spinoza died on the 21st of February,\n1677, in the forty-fourth year of his age. The cause of his death was\nconsumption, from which he had long been a sufferer; this was in harmony\nwith his system of philosophy, according to which all particularity\nand individuality pass away in the one substance. A Protestant divine,\nColerus by name, who published a biography of Spinoza, inveighs strongly\nagainst him, it is true, but gives nevertheless a most minute and kindly\ndescription of his circumstances and surroundings\u2014telling how he left\nonly about two hundred thalers, what debts he had, and so on. A bill\nincluded in the inventory, in which the barber requests payment due him\nby M. Spinoza of blessed memory, scandalizes the parson very much, and\nregarding it he makes the observation: \u201cHad the barber but known what\nsort of a creature Spinoza was, he certainly would not have spoken of his\nblessed memory.\u201d The German translator of this biography writes under\nthe portrait of Spinoza: _characterem, reprobationis in vultu gerens_,\napplying this description to a countenance which doubtless expresses the\nmelancholy of a profound thinker, but is otherwise mild and benevolent.\nThe _reprobatio_ is certainly correct; but it is not a reprobation in the\npassive sense; it is an active disapprobation on Spinoza\u2019s part of the\nopinions, errors and thoughtless passions of mankind.[193]\n\nSpinoza used the terminology of Descartes, and also published an account\nof his system. For we find the first of Spinoza\u2019s works entitled \u201cAn\nExposition according to the geometrical method of the principles of the\nCartesian philosophy.\u201d Some time after this he wrote his _Tractatus\ntheologico-politicus_, and by it gained considerable reputation. Great as\nwas the hatred which Spinoza roused amongst his Rabbis, it was more than\nequalled by the odium which he brought upon himself amongst Christian,\nand especially amongst Protestant theologians\u2014chiefly through the medium\nof this essay. It contains his views on inspiration, a critical treatment\nof the books of Moses and the like, chiefly from the point of view that\nthe laws therein contained are limited in their application to the Jews.\nLater Christian theologians have written critically on this subject,\nusually making it their object to show that these books were compiled at\na later time, and that they date in part from a period subsequent to the\nBabylonian captivity; this has become a crucial point with Protestant\ntheologians, and one by which the modern school distinguishes itself from\nthe older, greatly pluming itself thereon. All this, however, is already\nto be found in the above-mentioned work of Spinoza. But Spinoza drew the\ngreatest odium upon himself by his philosophy proper, which we must now\nconsider as it is given to us in his Ethics. While Descartes published\nno writings on this subject, the Ethics of Spinoza is undoubtedly his\ngreatest work; it was published after his death by Ludwig Mayer, a\nphysician, who had been Spinoza\u2019s most intimate friend. It consists of\nfive parts; the first deals with God (_De Deo_). General metaphysical\nideas are contained in it, which include the knowledge of God and nature.\nThe second part deals with the nature and origin of mind (_De natura\net origine mentis_). We see thus that Spinoza does not treat of the\nsubject of natural philosophy, extension and motion at all, for he passes\nimmediately from God to the philosophy of mind, to the ethical point of\nview; and what refers to knowledge, intelligent mind, is brought forward\nin the first part, under the head of the principles of human knowledge.\nThe third book of the Ethics deals with the origin and nature of the\npassions (_De origine et natura affectuum_); the fourth with the powers\nof the same, or human slavery (_De servitute humana seu de affectuum\nviribus_); the fifth, lastly, with the power of the understanding, with\nthought, or with human liberty (_De potentia intellectus seu de libertate\nhumana_).[194] Kirchenrath Professor Paulus published Spinoza\u2019s works\nin Jena; I had a share in the bringing out of this edition, having been\nentrusted with the collation of French translations.\n\nAs regards the philosophy of Spinoza, it is very simple, and on the\nwhole easy to comprehend; the difficulty which it presents is due\npartly to the limitations of the method in which Spinoza presents his\nthoughts, and partly to his narrow range of ideas, which causes him in\nan unsatisfactory way to pass over important points of view and cardinal\nquestions. Spinoza\u2019s system is that of Descartes made objective in the\nform of absolute truth. The simple thought of Spinoza\u2019s idealism is this:\nThe true is simply and solely the one substance, whose attributes are\nthought and extension or nature: and only this absolute unity is reality,\nit alone is God. It is, as with Descartes, the unity of thought and\nBeing, or that which contains the Notion of its existence in itself. The\nCartesian substance, as Idea, has certainly Being included in its Notion;\nbut it is only Being as abstract, not as real Being or as extension\n(_supra_, p. 241). With Descartes corporeality and the thinking \u2018I\u2019 are\naltogether independent Beings; this independence of the two extremes\nis done away with in Spinozism by their becoming moments of the one\nabsolute Being. This expression signifies that Being must be grasped as\nthe unity of opposites; the chief consideration is not to let slip the\nopposition and set it aside, but to reconcile and resolve it. Since then\nit is thought and Being, and no longer the abstractions of the finite\nand infinite, or of limit and the unlimited, that form the opposition\n(_supra_, p. 161), Being is here more definitely regarded as extension;\nfor in its abstraction it would be really only that return into itself,\nthat simple equality with itself, which constitutes thought (_supra_, p.\n229). The pure thought of Spinoza is therefore not the simple universal\nof Plato, for it has likewise come to know the absolute opposition of\nNotion and Being.\n\nTaken as a whole, this constitutes the Idea of Spinoza, and it is\njust what \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f44\u03bd was to the Eleatics (Vol. I. pp. 244, 252). This Idea\nof Spinoza\u2019s we must allow to be in the main true and well-grounded;\nabsolute substance is the truth, but it is not the whole truth; in\norder to be this it must also be thought of as in itself active and\nliving, and by that very means it must determine itself as mind. But\nsubstance with Spinoza is only the universal and consequently the\nabstract determination of mind; it may undoubtedly be said that this\nthought is the foundation of all true views\u2014not, however, as their\nabsolutely fixed and permanent basis, but as the abstract unity which\nmind is in itself. It is therefore worthy of note that thought must\nbegin by placing itself at the standpoint of Spinozism; to be a follower\nof Spinoza is the essential commencement of all Philosophy. For as we\nsaw above (Vol I. p. 144), when man begins to philosophize, the soul\nmust commence by bathing in this ether of the One Substance, in which\nall that man has held as true has disappeared; this negation of all\nthat is particular, to which every philosopher must have come, is the\nliberation of the mind and its absolute foundation. The difference\nbetween our standpoint and that of the Eleatic philosophy is only this,\nthat through the agency of Christianity concrete individuality is in the\nmodern world present throughout in spirit. But in spite of the infinite\ndemands on the part of the concrete, substance with Spinoza is not yet\ndetermined as in itself concrete. As the concrete is thus not present in\nthe content of substance, it is therefore to be found within reflecting\nthought alone, and it is only from the endless oppositions of this last\nthat the required unity emerges. Of substance as such there is nothing\nmore to be said; all that we can do is to speak of the different ways\nin which Philosophy has dealt with it, and the opposites which in it\nare abrogated. The difference depends on the nature of the opposites\nwhich are held to be abrogated in substance. Spinoza is far from having\nproved this unity as convincingly as was done by the ancients; but what\nconstitutes the grandeur of Spinoza\u2019s manner of thought is that he is\nable to renounce all that is determinate and particular, and restrict\nhimself to the One, giving heed to this alone.\n\n1. Spinoza begins (Eth. P. I pp. 35, 36) with a series of definitions,\nfrom which we take the following.\n\na. Spinoza\u2019s first definition is of the Cause of itself. He says: \u201cBy\nthat which is _causa sui_, its own cause, I understand that whose\nessence\u201d (or Notion) \u201cinvolves existence, or which cannot be conceived\nexcept as existent.\u201d The unity of existence and universal thought is\nasserted from the very first, and this unity will ever be the question\nat issue. \u201cThe cause of itself\u201d is a noteworthy expression, for while we\npicture to ourselves that the effect stands in opposition to the cause,\nthe cause of itself is the cause which, while it operates and separates\nan \u201cother,\u201d at the same time produces only itself, and in the production\ntherefore does away with this distinction. The establishing of itself as\nan other is loss or degeneration, and at the same time the negation of\nthis loss; this is a purely speculative Notion, indeed a fundamental\nNotion in all speculation. The cause in which the cause is identical\nwith the effect, is the infinite cause (_infra_, p. 263); if Spinoza had\nfurther developed what lies in the _causa sui_, substance with him would\nnot have been rigid and unworkable.\n\nb. The second definition is that of the finite. \u201cThat thing is said to be\nfinite in its kind which can be limited by another of the same nature,\u201d\nFor it comes then to an end, it is not there; what is there is something\nelse. This something else must, however, be of a like nature; for those\nthings which are to limit each other must, in order to be able to limit\neach other, touch each other, and consequently have a relation to each\nother, that is to say they must be of one nature, stand on a like basis,\nand have a common sphere. That is the affirmative side of the limit.\n\u201cThus a thought is\u201d only \u201climited by another thought, a body by another\nbody, but thoughts are not limited by bodies nor\u201d conversely \u201cbodies by\nthoughts.\u201d We saw this (p. 244) with Descartes: thought is an independent\ntotality and so is extension, they have nothing to do with one another;\nthey do not limit each other, each is included in itself.\n\nc. The third definition is that of substance. \u201cBy substance I understand\nthat which exists in itself and is conceived by itself, _i.e._ the\nconception of which does not require the aid of the conception of any\nother thing for its formation (_a quo formari debeat_);\u201d otherwise it\nwould be finite, accidental. What cannot have a conception formed of it\nwithout the aid of something else, is not independent, but is dependent\nupon that something else.\n\nd. In the fourth place Spinoza defines attributes, which, as the moment\ncoming second to substance, belong to it. \u201cBy attribute I understand\nthat which the mind perceives as constituting the essence of substance;\u201d\nand to Spinoza this alone is true. This is an important determination;\nthe attribute is undoubtedly a determinateness, but at the same time it\nremains a totality. Spinoza, like Descartes, accepts only two attributes,\nthought and extension. The understanding grasps them as the reality of\nsubstance, but the reality is not higher than the substance, for it\nis only reality in the view of the understanding, which falls outside\nsubstance. Each of the two ways of regarding substance\u2014extension and\nthought\u2014contains no doubt the whole content of substance, but only in one\nform, which the understanding brings with it; and for this very reason\nboth sides are in themselves identical and infinite. This is the true\ncompletion; but where substance passes over into attribute is not stated.\n\ne. The fifth definition has to do with what comes third in relation to\nsubstance, the mode. \u201cBy mode I understand the affections of substance,\nor that which is in something else, through the aid of which also it\nis conceived.\u201d Thus substance is conceived through itself; attribute\nis not conceived through itself, but has a relation to the conceiving\nunderstanding, in so far as this last conceives reality; mode, finally,\nis what is not conceived as reality, but through and in something else.\n\nThese last three moments Spinoza ought not merely to have established\nin this way as conceptions, he ought to have deduced them; they are\nespecially important, and correspond with what we more definitely\ndistinguish as universal, particular and individual. They must not,\nhowever, be taken as formal, but in their true concrete sense; the\nconcrete universal is substance, the concrete particular is the concrete\nspecies; the Father and Son in the Christian dogma are similarly\nparticular, but each of them contains the whole nature of God, only under\na different form. The mode is the individual, the finite as such, which\nenters into external connection with what is \u201cother.\u201d In this Spinoza\nonly descends to a lower stage, the mode is only the foregoing warped\nand stunted. Spinoza\u2019s defect is therefore this, that he takes the\nthird moment as mode alone, as a false individuality. True individuality\nand subjectivity is not a mere retreat from the universal, not merely\nsomething clearly determinate; for, as clearly determinate, it is at the\nsame time Being-for-itself, determined by itself alone. The individual,\nthe subjective, is even in being so the return to the universal; and\nin that it is at home with itself, it is itself the universal. The\nreturn consists simply and solely in the fact of the particular being\nin itself the universal; to this return Spinoza did not attain. Rigid\nsubstantiality is the last point he reached, not infinite form; this he\nknew not, and thus determinateness continually vanishes from his thought.\n\nf. In the sixth place, the definition of the infinite is also of\nimportance, for in the infinite Spinoza defines more strictly than\nanywhere else the Notion of the Notion. The infinite has a double\nsignificance, according as it is taken as the infinitely many or as\nthe absolutely infinite (_infra_, p. 263). \u201cThe infinite in its kind\nis not such in respect of all possible attributes; but the absolutely\ninfinite is that to whose essence all belongs that expresses an essence\nand contains no negation.\u201d In the same sense Spinoza distinguishes in\nthe nine-and-twentieth Letter (Oper. T. I. pp. 526-532) the infinite of\nimagination from the infinite of thought (_intellectus_), the actual\n(_actu_) infinite. Most men, when they wish to strive after the sublime,\nget no farther than the first of these; this is the false infinite, just\nas when one says \u201cand so on into infinity,\u201d meaning perhaps the infinity\nof space from star to star, or else the infinity of time. An infinite\nnumerical series in mathematics is exactly the same thing. If a certain\nfraction is represented as a decimal fraction, it is incomplete; \u2150\nis, on the contrary, the true infinite, and therefore not an incomplete\nexpression, although the content here is of course limited. It is\ninfinity in the incorrect sense that one usually has in view when\ninfinity is spoken of; and even if it is looked on as sublime, it yet is\nnothing present, and only goes ever out into the negative, without being\nactual (_actu_). But for Spinoza the infinite is not the fixing of a\nlimit and then passing beyond the limit fixed\u2014the sensuous infinity\u2014but\nabsolute infinity, the positive, which has complete and present in itself\nan absolute multiplicity which has no Beyond. Philosophic infinity,\nthat which is infinite _actu_, Spinoza therefore calls the absolute\naffirmation of itself. This is quite correct, only it might have been\nbetter expressed as: \u201cIt is the negation of negation.\u201d Spinoza here also\nemploys geometrical figures as illustrations of the Notion of infinity.\nIn his _Opera postuma_, preceding his Ethics, and also in the letter\nquoted above, he has two circles, one of which lies within the other,\nwhich have not, however, a common centre.\n\n[Illustration]\n\n\u201cThe inequalities of the space between A B and C D exceed every number;\nand yet the space which lies between is not so very great.\u201d That is to\nsay, if I wish to determine them all, I must enter upon an infinite\nseries. This \u201cbeyond\u201d always, however, remains defective, is always\naffected with negation; and yet this false infinite is there to hand,\ncircumscribed, affirmative, actual and present in that plane as a\ncomplete space between the two circles. Or a finite line consists of\nan infinite number of points; and yet the line is present here and\ndetermined; the \u201cbeyond\u201d of the infinite number of points, which are not\ncomplete, is in it complete and called back into unity. The infinite\nshould be represented as actually present, and this comes to pass in the\nNotion of the cause of itself, which is therefore the true infinity. As\nsoon as the cause has something else opposed to it\u2014the effect\u2014finitude\nis present; but here this something else is at the same time abrogated\nand it becomes once more the cause itself. The affirmative is thus\nnegation of negation, since, according to the well-known grammatical\nrule, _duplex negatio affirmat_. In the same way Spinoza\u2019s earlier\ndefinitions have also the infinite already implied in them, for instance\nin the case of the just mentioned cause of itself, inasmuch as he defines\nit as that whose essence involves existence (_supra_, p. 258). Notion\nand existence are each the Beyond of the other; but cause of itself, as\nthus including them, is really the carrying back of this \u201cbeyond\u201d into\nunity. Or (_supra_, p. 259) \u201cSubstance is that which is in itself and is\nconceived from itself;\u201d that is the same unity of Notion and existence.\nThe infinite is in the same way in itself and has also its Notion in\nitself; its Notion is its Being, and its Being its Notion; true infinity\nis therefore to be found in Spinoza. But he has no consciousness of this;\nhe has not recognized this Notion as absolute Notion, and therefore has\nnot expressed it as a moment of true existence; for with him the Notion\nfalls outside of existence, into the thought of existence.\n\ng. Finally Spinoza says in the seventh place: \u201cGod is a Being absolutely\ninfinite, _i.e._ a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of\nwhich expresses an eternal and infinite essence.\u201d Does substance, one\nmight here ask, possess an infinite number of attributes? But as with\nSpinoza there are only two attributes, thought and extension, with which\nhe invests God, \u201cinfinite\u201d is not to be taken here in the sense of the\nindeterminate many, but positively, as a circle is perfect infinity in\nitself.\n\nThe whole of Spinoza\u2019s philosophy is contained in these definitions,\nwhich, however, taken as a whole are formal; it is really a weak point\nin Spinoza that he begins thus with definitions. In mathematics this\nmethod is permitted, because at the outset we there make assumptions,\nsuch as that of the point and line; but in Philosophy the content\nshould be known as the absolutely true. It is all very well to grant\nthe correctness of the name-definition, and acknowledge that the word\n\u201csubstance\u201d corresponds with the conception which the definition\nindicates, but it is quite another question to determine whether this\ncontent is absolutely true. Such a question is not asked in the case of\ngeometrical propositions, but in philosophic investigation it is the very\nthing to be first considered, and this Spinoza has not done. Instead of\nonly explaining these simple thoughts and representing them as concrete\nin the definitions which he makes, what he ought to have done was to\nexamine whether this content is true. To all appearance it is only the\nexplanation of the words that is given; but the content of the words is\nheld to be established. All further content is merely derived from that,\nand proved thereby; for on the first content all the rest depends, and\nif it is established as a basis, the other necessarily follows. \u201cThe\nattribute is that which the understanding thinks of God.\u201d But here the\nquestion is: How does it come that besides the Deity there now appears\nthe understanding, which applies to absolute substance the two forms\nof thought and extension? and whence come these two forms themselves?\nThus everything proceeds inwards, and not outwards; the determinations\nare not developed from substance, it does not resolve itself into these\nattributes.\n\n2. These definitions are followed by axioms and propositions in which\nSpinoza proves a great variety of points. He descends from the universal\nof substance through the particular, thought and extension, to the\nindividual. He has thus all three moments of the Notion, or they are\nessential to him. But the mode, under which head falls individuality,\nhe does not recognize as essential, or as constituting a moment of true\nexistence in that existence; for it disappears in existence, or it is not\nraised into the Notion.\n\na. The main point then is that Spinoza proves from these Notions that\nthere is only One Substance, God. It is a simple chain of reasoning,\na very formal proof. \u201cFifth Proposition: There cannot be two or more\nsubstances of the same nature or of the same attribute.\u201d This is implied\nalready in the definitions; the proof is therefore a useless and\nwearisome toil, which only serves to render Spinoza more difficult to\nunderstand. \u201cIf there were several\u201d (substances of the same attribute)\n\u201cthey must be distinguished from one another either by the diversity of\ntheir attributes or by the diversity of their affections\u201d (modes). \u201cIf\nthey are distinguished by their attributes, it would be directly conceded\nthat there is only one substance having the same attribute.\u201d For the\nattributes are simply what the understanding grasps as the essence of the\none substance, which is determined in itself, and not through anything\nelse. \u201cBut if these substances were distinguished by their affections,\nsince substance is by nature prior to its affections it would follow that\nif from substance its affections were abstracted and it were regarded\nin itself, _i.e._ in its truth, it could henceforth not be regarded as\ndistinct from other substances.\u201d \u201cEighth Proposition: All substance is\nnecessarily infinite. Proof: For otherwise it must be limited by another\nsubstance of the same nature, in which case there would be two substances\nof the same attribute, which is contrary to the fifth proposition.\u201d\n\u201cEvery attribute must be conceived for itself,\u201d as determination\nreflected on itself. \u201cFor attribute is what the mind conceives of\nsubstance as constituting its essence, from which it follows that it\nmust be conceived through itself,\u201d _i.e._ substance is what is conceived\nthrough itself (see the fourth and third definitions). \u201cTherefore we may\nnot argue from the plurality of attributes to a plurality of substances,\nfor each is conceived by itself, and they have all been, always and at\nthe same time, in substance, without the possibility of the one being\nproduced by the other.\u201d \u201cSubstance is indivisible. For if the parts\nretained the nature of the substance, there would be several substances\nof the same nature, which is contrary to the fifth proposition. If not,\ninfinite substance would cease to exist, which is absurd.\u201d[195]\n\n\u201cFourteenth Proposition: No other substance than God can either exist or\nbe conceived. Proof: God is the absolutely infinite substance, to whom\ncan be denied no attribute which expresses the essence of substance,\nand He exists necessarily; therefore if there were a substance other\nthan God, it must be explained by means of an attribute of God.\u201d\nConsequently the substance would not have its own being, but that of\nGod, and therefore would not be a substance. Or if it were still to be\nsubstance, \u201cthen there would necessarily follow the possibility of there\nbeing two substances with the same attribute, which according to the\nfifth proposition is absurd. From this it then follows that the thing\nextended and the thing that thinks\u201d are not substances, but \u201care either\nattributes of God, or affections of His attributes.\u201d By these proofs and\nothers like them not much is to be gained. \u201cFifteenth, proposition: What\nis, is in God, and cannot exist or be conceived without God.\u201d \u201cSixteenth\nproposition: By the necessity of the divine nature infinite things must\nfollow in infinite modes, _i.e._, all that can fall under the infinite\nunderstanding. God is therefore the absolute First Cause.\u201d[196]\n\nSpinoza then ascribes freedom and necessity to God: \u201cGod is the absolute\nfree cause, who is determined by nothing outside of Himself, for He\nexists solely by the necessity of His nature. There is no cause which\ninwardly or outwardly moves Him to act, except the perfection of His\nnature. His activity is by the laws of His Being necessary and eternal;\nwhat therefore follows from His absolute nature, from His attributes,\nis eternal, as it follows from the nature of the triangle from eternity\nand to eternity that its three angles are equal to two right angles.\u201d\nThat is to say, His Being is His absolute power; _actus_ and _potentia_,\nThought and Being, are in Him one. God has not therefore any other\nthoughts which He could not have actualized. \u201cGod is the immanent cause\nof all things, not the transient (_transiens_),\u201d _i.e._, external\ncause. \u201cHis essence and His existence are the same, namely, the truth.\nA thing which is determined to perform some action, is, since God is\ncause, necessarily determined thereto by God; and a thing which is thus\ndetermined cannot render itself undetermined. In nature nothing is\ncontingent. Will is not a free cause, but only a necessary cause, only a\nmode; it is therefore determined by another. God acts in accordance with\nno final causes (_sub ratione boni_). Those who assert that He does so,\nappear to establish something apart from God, which does not depend on\nGod, and which God in His working keeps in view, as though it were an\nend. If this view is taken, God is not a free cause, but is subject to\nfate. It is equally inadmissible to subject all things to the arbitrary\npleasure of God, _i.e._, to His indifferent will.\u201d[197] He is determined\nsolely by His own nature; the activity of God is thus His power, and that\nis necessity. He is then absolute power in contrast to wisdom, which\nsets up definite aims, and consequently limitations; particular aims,\nthoughts of what is about to come to pass, and the like are therefore put\nout of the question. But beyond this universal, no advance is made; for\nit must be noticed as specially singular, that Spinoza in the fiftieth\nLetter (Oper. T. I. p. 634) says that every determination is a negation.\nMoreover, if God is the cause of the world, it is implied that He is\nfinite; for the world is here put beside God as something different from\nHim.\n\nb. The greatest difficulty in Spinoza is, in the distinctions to which\nhe comes, to grasp the relation of this determinate to God, at the same\ntime preserving the determination. \u201cGod is a thinking Being, because all\nindividual thoughts are modes which express God\u2019s nature in a certain\nand determinate manner; there pertains therefore to God an attribute the\nconception of which all individual thoughts involve, and by means of this\nthey also are conceived. God is an extended Being for the same reason.\u201d\nThis means that the same substance, under the attribute of thought, is\nthe intelligible world, and under the attribute of extension, is nature;\nnature and thought thus both express the same Essence of God. Or, as\nSpinoza says, \u201cThe order and system of natural things is the same as\nthe order of the thoughts. Thus, for instance, the circle which exists\nin nature, and the idea of the existing circle, which is also in God,\nare one and the same thing\u201d (they are one and the same content), \u201cwhich\nis\u201d merely \u201cexpressed by means of different attributes. If we therefore\nregard nature either under the attribute of extension or of thought,\nor under any other attribute whatever, we shall find one and the same\nconnection of causes, _i.e._, the same sequence of things. The formal\nBeing of the idea of the circle can be conceived only by means of the\nmode of thought, as its proximate cause, and this mode again by means of\nanother, and so on infinitely; so that we must explain the order of the\nwhole of nature, or the connection of causes, by the attribute of thought\nalone, and if things are considered by the attribute of extension, they\nmust be considered only by the attribute of extension,\u2014and the same holds\ngood of other causes.\u201d[198] It is one and the same system, which at one\ntime appears as nature, and at another time in the form of thought.\n\nBut Spinoza does not demonstrate how these two are evolved from the\none substance, nor does he prove why there can only be two of them.\nNeither are extension and thought anything to him in themselves, or in\ntruth, but only externally; for their difference is a mere matter of the\nunderstanding, which is ranked by Spinoza only among affections (Eth. P.\nI. Prop. XXXI. Demonst. p. 62), and as such has no truth. This has in\nrecent times been served up again by Schelling in the following form:\nIn themselves, the intelligent world and the corporeal world are the\nsame, only under different forms; so that the intelligent universe is in\nitself the whole absolute divine totality, and the corporeal universe is\nequally this same totality. The differences are not in themselves, but\nthe different aspects from which the Absolute is regarded are matters\nexternal to it. We take a higher tone in saying that nature and mind\nare rational; but reason is for us no empty word, for it means the\ntotality which develops itself within itself. Again, it is the standpoint\nof reflection to regard aspects only, and nothing in itself. This\ndefect appears in Spinoza and Schelling in the fact that they see no\nnecessity why the Notion, as the implicit negative of its unity, should\nmake a separation of itself into different parts; so that out of the\nsimple universal the real, the opposed, itself becomes known. Absolute\nsubstance, attribute and mode, Spinoza allows to follow one another as\ndefinitions, he adopts them ready-made, without the attributes being\ndeveloped from the substance, or the modes from the attributes. And more\nespecially in regard to the attributes, there is no necessity evident,\nwhy these are thought and extension in particular.\n\nc. When Spinoza passes on to individual things, especially to\nself-consciousness, to the freedom of the \u2018I,\u2019 he expresses himself in\nsuch a way as rather to lead back all limitations to substance than\nto maintain a firm grasp of the individual. Thus we already found the\nattributes not to be independent, but only the forms in which the\nunderstanding grasps substance in its differences; what comes third,\nthe modes, is that under which for Spinoza all difference of things\nalone falls. Of the modes he says (Ethic. P. I. Prop. XXXII. Demonst. et\nCoroll. II. p. 63): In every attribute there are two modes; in extension,\nthese are rest and motion, in thought they are understanding and will\n(_intellectus et voluntas_). They are mere modifications which only exist\nfor us apart from God; therefore whatever refers to this difference and\nis specially brought about by it, is not absolute, but finite. These\naffections Spinoza sums up (Ethices, P. I. Prop. XXIX. Schol. pp. 61, 62)\nunder the head of _natura naturata_: \u201c_Natura naturans_ is God regarded\nas free cause, in so far as He is in Himself and is conceived by Himself:\nor such attributes of substance as express the eternal and infinite\nessence. By _natura naturata_, I understand all that follows from the\nnecessity of the divine nature, or from any of the attributes of God,\nall modes of the divine attributes, in so far as they are regarded as\nthings which are in God, and which without God can neither exist nor be\nconceived.\u201d From God proceeds nothing, for all things merely return to\nthe point whence they came, if from themselves the commencement is made.\n\nThese then are Spinoza\u2019s general forms, this is his principal idea. Some\nfurther determinations have still to be mentioned. He gives definitions\nof the terms modes, understanding, will, and of the affections, such\nas joy and sadness.[199] We further find consciousness taken into\nconsideration. Its development is extremely simple, or rather it is not\ndeveloped at all; Spinoza begins directly with mind. \u201cThe essence of\nman consists of certain modifications of the attributes of God\u201d; these\nmodifications are only something related to our understanding. \u201cIf we,\ntherefore, say that the human mind perceives this or that, it means\nnothing else than that God has this or that idea, not in so far as He\nis infinite, but in so far as He is expressed by the idea of the human\nmind. And if we say that God has this or that idea, not in so far as\nHe constitutes the idea of the human mind, but in so far as He has,\nalong with the human mind, the idea of another thing, then we say that\nthe human mind perceives the thing partially or inadequately.\u201d Truth\nis for Spinoza, on the other hand, the adequate.[200] The idea that\nall particular content is only a modification of God is ridiculed by\nBayle,[201] who argues from it that God modified as Turks and Austrians,\nis waging war with Himself; but Bayle has not a trace of the speculative\nelement in him, although he is acute enough as a dialectician, and has\ncontributed to the intelligent discussion of definite subjects.\n\nThe relation of thought and extension in the human consciousness is dealt\nwith by Spinoza as follows: \u201cWhat has a place in the object\u201d (or rather\nin the objective) \u201cof the idea which constitutes the human mind must be\nperceived by the human mind; or there must necessarily be in the mind\nan idea of this object. The object of the idea which constitutes the\nhuman mind is body, or a certain mode of extension. If, then, the object\nof the idea which constitutes the human mind, is the body, there can\nhappen nothing in the body which is not perceived by the mind. Otherwise\nthe ideas of the affections of the body would not be in God, in so far\nas He constitutes our mind, but the idea of another thing: that is to\nsay, the ideas of the affections of our body would not be likewise in\nour mind.\u201d What is perplexing to understand in Spinoza\u2019s system is, on\nthe one hand, the absolute identity of thought and Being, and, on the\nother hand, their absolute indifference to one another, because each\nof them is a manifestation of the whole essence of God. The unity of\nthe body and consciousness is, according to Spinoza, this, that the\nindividual is a mode of the absolute substance, which, as consciousness,\nis the representation of the manner in which the body is affected by\nexternal things; all that is in consciousness is also in extension, and\nconversely. \u201cMind knows itself only in so far as it perceives the ideas\nof the affections of body,\u201d it has only the idea of the affections of its\nbody; this idea is synthetic combination, as we shall immediately see.\n\u201cThe ideas, whether of the attributes of God or of individual things,\ndo not recognize as their efficient cause their objects themselves, or\nthe things perceived, but God Himself, in so far as He is that which\nthinks.\u201d[202] Buhle (Geschichte der neuern Philos. Vol. III. Section\nII. p. 524) sums up these propositions of Spinoza thus: \u201cThought is\ninseparably bound up with extension; therefore all that takes place in\nextension must also take place in consciousness.\u201d Spinoza, however, also\naccepts both in their separation from one another. The idea of body,\nhe writes (Epistol. LXVI. p. 673), includes only these two in itself,\nand does not express any other attributes. The body which it represents\nis regarded under the attribute of extension; but the idea itself is\na mode of thought. Here we see a dividing asunder; mere identity, the\nundistinguishable nature of all things in the Absolute, is insufficient\neven for Spinoza.\n\nThe _individuum_, individuality itself, is thus defined by Spinoza\n(Ethic. P. II. Prop. XIII. Defin. p. 92): \u201cWhen several bodies of the\nsame or of different magnitudes are so pressed together that they rest on\none another, or when, moving with like or different degrees of rapidity,\nthey communicate their movement to one another in a certain measure, we\nsay that such bodies are united to one another, and that all together\nthey form one body or individuum, which by this union distinguishes\nitself from all the other bodies.\u201d Here we are at the extreme limit\nof Spinoza\u2019s system, and it is here that his weak point appears.\nIndividuation, the one, is a mere synthesis; it is quite a different\nthing from the Ichts or self-hood of Boehme (_supra_, pp. 205-207), since\nSpinoza has only universality, thought, and not self-consciousness. If,\nbefore considering this in reference to the whole, we take it from the\nother side, namely from the understanding, the distinction really falls\nunder that head; it is not deduced, it is found. Thus, as we have already\nseen (p. 270) \u201cthe understanding in act (_intellectus actu_), as also\nwill, desire, love, must be referred to _natura naturata_, not to _natura\nnaturans_. For by the understanding, as recognized for itself, we do not\nmean absolute thought, but only a certain mode of thought\u2014a mode which is\ndistinct from other modes like desire, love, etc., and on that account\nmust be conceived by means of absolute thought, _i.e._ by means of an\nattribute of God which expresses an eternal and infinite essentiality\nof thought; without which the understanding, as also the rest of the\nmodes of thought, could neither be nor be conceived to be.\u201d (Spinoza,\nEthices, P. I. Propos. XXXI. pp. 62, 63). Spinoza is unacquainted with\nan infinity of form, which would be something quite different from that\nof rigid, unyielding substance. What is requisite is to recognize God as\nthe essence of essences, as universal substance, identity, and yet to\npreserve distinctions.\n\nSpinoza goes on to say: \u201cWhat constitutes the real (_actuale_) existence\nof the human mind is nothing else than the idea of a particular\u201d\n(individual) \u201cthing, that actually exists,\u201d not of an infinite thing.\n\u201cThe essence of man involves no necessary existence, _i.e._ according\nto the order of nature a man may just as well be as not be.\u201d For the\nhuman consciousness, as it does not belong to essence as an attribute,\nis a mode\u2014a mode of the attribute of thought. But neither is the body,\naccording to Spinoza, the cause of consciousness, nor is consciousness\nthe cause of the body, but the finite cause is here only the relation\nof like to like; body is determined by body, conception by conception.\n\u201cThe body can neither determine the mind to thought, nor can the mind\ndetermine the body to motion, or rest, or anything else. For all modes\nof thought have God as Cause, in so far as He is a thinking thing, and\nnot in so far as He is revealed by means of another attribute. What\ntherefore determines the mind to thought, is a mode of thought and not\nof extension; similarly motion and rest of the body must be derived from\nanother body.\u201d[203] I might quote many other such particular propositions\nfrom Spinoza, but they are very formal, and a continual repetition of one\nand the same thing.\n\nBuhle (Gesch. d. neuern Phil. Vol. III. Section 2, pp. 525-528),\nattributes limited conceptions to Spinoza: \u201cThe soul experiences in the\nbody all the \u2018other\u2019 of which it becomes aware as outside of the body,\nand it becomes aware of this \u2018other\u2019 only by means of the conceptions\nof the qualities which the body perceives therein. If, therefore, the\nbody can perceive no qualities of a thing, the soul also can come to\nno knowledge of it. On the other hand, the soul is equally unable to\narrive at the perception of the body which belongs to it; the soul knows\nnot that the body is there, and knows itself even in no other way than\nby means of the qualities which the body perceives in things which are\noutside of it, and by means of the conceptions of the same. For the\nbody is an individual thing, determined in a certain manner, which can\nonly gradually, in association with and amidst other individual things,\nattain to existence, and can preserve itself in existence only as thus\nconnected, combined and associated with others,\u201d _i.e._ in infinite\nprogress; the body can by no means be conceived from itself. \u201cThe soul\u2019s\nconsciousness expresses a certain determinate form of a Notion, as the\nNotion itself expresses a determinate form of an individual thing. But\nthe individual thing, its Notion, and the Notion of this Notion are\naltogether and entirely one and the same thing, only regarded under\ndifferent attributes. As the soul is nothing else than the immediate\nNotion of the body, and is one and the same thing with this, the\nexcellence of the soul can never be anything else than the excellence\nof the body. The capacities of the understanding are nothing but the\ncapacities of the body, if they are looked at from the corporeal point of\nview, and the decisions of the will are likewise determinations of the\nbody. Individual things are derived from God in an eternal and infinite\nmanner\u201d (_i.e._ once and for all), \u201cand not in a transitory, finite and\nevanescent manner: they are derived from one another merely inasmuch\nas they mutually produce and destroy each other, but in their eternal\nexistence they endure unchangeable. All individual things mutually\npresuppose each other; one cannot be thought without the other; that is\nto say they constitute together an inseparable whole; they exist side\nby side in one utterly indivisible, infinite Thing, and in no other way\nwhatever.\u201d\n\n3. We have now to speak of Spinoza\u2019s system of morals, and that is\na subject of importance. Its great principle is no other than this,\nthat the finite spirit is moral in so far as it has the true Idea,\n_i.e._ in so far as it directs its knowledge and will on God, for\ntruth is merely the knowledge of God. It may be said that there is no\nmorality loftier than this, since its only requisite is to have a clear\nidea of God. The first thing Spinoza speaks of in this regard is the\naffections: \u201cEverything strives after self-preservation. This striving\nis the actual essence of the thing, and involves only indefinite time;\nwhen referred exclusively to mind, it is termed will; when referred to\nboth mind and body together, it is called desire. Determination of\nthe will (_volitio_) and Idea are one and the same thing. The sense of\nliberty rests on this, that men do not know the determining causes of\ntheir actions. The affection is a confused idea; the more clearly and\ndistinctly, therefore, we know the affection, the more it is under our\ncontrol.\u201d[204] The influence of the affections, as confused and limited\n(inadequate) ideas, upon human action, constitutes therefore, according\nto Spinoza, human slavery; of the passionate affections the principal are\njoy and sorrow; we are in suffering and slavery in so far as we relate\nourselves as a part.[205]\n\n\u201cOur happiness and liberty consist in an enduring and eternal love to\nGod; this intellectual love follows from the nature of mind, in so far\nas it is regarded as eternal truth through the nature of God. The more\na man recognizes God\u2019s existence and loves Him, the less does he suffer\nfrom evil affections and the less is his fear of death.\u201d[206] Spinoza\nrequires in addition the true kind of knowledge. There are, according to\nhim, three kinds of knowledge; in the first, which he calls opinion and\nimagination, he includes the knowledge which we obtain from an individual\nobject through the senses\u2014a knowledge fragmentary and ill-arranged\u2014also\nknowledge drawn from signs, pictorial conceptions and memory. The second\nkind of knowledge is for Spinoza that which we derive from general\nconceptions and adequate ideas of the properties of things. The third\nis intuitive knowledge (_scientia intuitiva_) which rises from the\nadequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to\nthe adequate knowledge of the essence of things.[207] Regarding this\nlast he then says: \u201cThe nature of reason is not to contemplate things\nas contingent, but as necessary ... to think of all things under a\ncertain form of eternity (_sub quadam specie \u0153ternitatis_);\u201d _i.e._ in\nabsolutely adequate Notions, _i.e._ in God. \u201cFor the necessity of things\nis the necessity of the eternal nature of God Himself. Every idea of an\nindividual thing necessarily includes the eternal and infinite essence of\nGod in itself. For individual things are modes of an attribute of God;\ntherefore they must include in themselves His eternal essence. Our mind,\nin so far as it knows itself and the body under the form of eternity,\nhas to that extent necessarily the knowledge of God, and knows that it\nis itself in God and is conceived through God. All Ideas, in so far\nas they are referable to God, are true.\u201d[208] Man must trace back all\nthings to God, for God is the One in All; the eternal essence of God is\nthe one thing that is, the eternal truth is the only thing for man to\naim at in his actions. With Spinoza this is not a knowledge arrived at\nthrough philosophy, but only knowledge of a truth. \u201cThe mind can succeed\nin tracing back all affections of the body or images of things to God. In\nproportion as the mind regards all things as necessary, it has a greater\npower over its affections,\u201d which are arbitrary and contingent. This is\nthe return of the mind to God, and this is human freedom; as mode, on the\nother hand, the spirit has no freedom, but is determined from without.\n\u201cFrom the third kind of knowledge there arises the repose of the mind;\nthe supreme good of the mind is to know God, and this is its highest\nvirtue. This knowledge necessarily produces the intellectual love of\nGod; for it produces a joyfulness accompanied by the Idea of God as\ncause\u2014_i.e._ the intellectual love of God. God Himself loves Himself with\nan infinite intellectual love.\u201d[209] For God can have only Himself as aim\nand cause; and the end of the subjective mind is to be directed on Him.\nThis is therefore the purest, but also a universal morality.\n\nIn the thirty-sixth Letter (pp. 581-582) Spinoza speaks of Evil. The\nallegation is made that God, as the originator of all things and\neverything, is also the originator of evil, is consequently Himself evil;\nin this identity all things are one, good and evil are in themselves the\nsame thing, in God\u2019s substance this difference has disappeared. Spinoza\nsays in answer to this: \u201cI assert the fact that God absolutely and truly\u201d\n(as cause of Himself) \u201cis the cause of everything that has an essential\ncontent\u201d (_i.e._ affirmative reality) \u201cbe it what it may. Now if you can\nprove to me that evil, error, crime, etc., are something that expresses\nan essence, I will freely admit to you that God is the originator of\ncrime and evil and error. But I have elsewhere abundantly demonstrated\nthat the form of evil cannot subsist in anything that expresses an\nessence, and therefore it cannot be said that God is the cause of evil.\u201d\nEvil is merely negation, privation, limitation, finality, mode\u2014nothing\nin itself truly real. \u201cNero\u2019s murder of his mother, in so far as it had\npositive content, was no crime. For Orestes did the same external deed,\nand had in doing it the same end in view\u2014to kill his mother; and yet he\nis not blamed,\u201d and so on. The affirmative is the will, the intention,\nthe act of Nero. \u201cWherein then consists Nero\u2019s criminality? In nothing\nelse but that he proved himself ungrateful, merciless, and disobedient.\nBut it is certain that all this expresses no essence, and therefore\nGod was not the cause of it, though He was the cause of Nero\u2019s action\nand intention.\u201d These last are something positive, but yet they do not\nconstitute the crime as such; it is only the negative element, such\nas mercilessness, etc. that makes the action a crime. \u201cWe know that\nwhatever exists, regarded in itself and without taking anything else\ninto consideration, contains a perfection which extends as widely as\nthe essence of the thing itself extends, for the essence is in no way\ndifferent therefrom.\u201d\u2014\u201cBecause then,\u201d we find in the thirty-second letter\n(pp. 541, 543), \u201cGod does not regard things abstractly, or form general\ndefinitions,\u201d (of what the thing ought to be) \u201cand no more reality is\nrequired of things than the Divine understanding and power has given\nand actually meted out to them; therefore it clearly follows that such\nprivation exists only and solely in respect to our understanding, but\nnot in respect to God;\u201d for God is absolutely real. It is all very well\nto say this, but it does not meet the case. For in this way God and\nthe respect to our understanding are different. Where is their unity?\nHow is this to be conceived? Spinoza continues in the thirty-sixth\nletter: \u201cAlthough the works of the righteous (_i.e._ of those who have\na clear idea of God, to which they direct all their actions and even\ntheir thoughts), and\u201d also the works \u201cof the wicked (_i.e._ of those\nwho have no idea of God, but only ideas of earthly things,\u201d\u2014individual,\npersonal interests and opinions,\u2014\u201cby which their actions and thoughts\nare directed), and all whatsoever exists, necessarily proceed from God\u2019s\neternal laws and counsels, and perpetually depend on God, they are\nyet not distinguished from one another in degree, but in essence; for\nalthough a mouse as well as an angel depends on God, and sorrow as well\nas joy, yet a mouse cannot be a kind of angel, and sorrow cannot be a\nkind of joy,\u201d\u2014they are different in essence.\n\nThere is therefore no ground for the objection that Spinoza\u2019s philosophy\ngives the death-blow to morality; we even gain from it the great result\nthat all that is sensuous is mere limitation, and that there is only one\ntrue substance, and that human liberty consists in keeping in view this\none substance, and in regulating all our conduct in accordance with the\nmind and will of the Eternal One. But in this philosophy it may with\njustice be objected that God is conceived only as Substance, and not\nas Spirit, as concrete. The independence of the human soul is therein\nalso denied, while in the Christian religion every individual appears as\ndetermined to salvation. Here, on the contrary, the individual spirit is\nonly a mode, an accident, but not anything substantial. This brings us to\na general criticism of the philosophy of Spinoza, in the course of which\nwe shall consider it from three different points of view.\n\nIn the first place Spinozism is asserted to be Atheism\u2014by Jacobi, for\ninstance (Werke, Vol. IV. Section I. p. 216)\u2014because in it no distinction\nis drawn between God and the world; it makes nature the real God, or\nlowers God to the level of nature, so that God disappears and only nature\nis established. But it is not so much God and nature that Spinoza sets up\nin mutual opposition, as thought and extension; and God is unity, not One\nmade up of two, but absolute Substance, in which has really disappeared\nthe limitation of the subjectivity of thought and nature. Those who\nspeak against Spinoza do so as if it were on God\u2019s account that they\nwere interested; but what these opponents are really concerned about is\nnot God, but the finite\u2014themselves. The relationship between God and the\nfinite, to which we belong, may be represented in three different ways:\nfirstly, only the finite exists, and in this way we alone exist, but God\ndoes not exist\u2014this is atheism; the finite is here taken absolutely,\nand is accordingly the substantial. Or, in the second place, God alone\nexists; the finite has no reality, it is only phenomena, appearance. To\nsay, in the third place, that God exists and we also exist is a false\nsynthetic union, an amicable compromise. It is the popular view of the\nmatter that the one side has as much substantiality as the other; God\nis honoured and supreme, but finite things also have Being to exactly\nthe same extent. Reason cannot remain satisfied with this \u201calso,\u201d with\nindifference like this. The philosophic requisite is therefore to\napprehend the unity of these differences in such a way that difference\nis not let slip, but proceeds eternally from substance, without being\npetrified into dualism. Spinoza is raised above this dualism; religion is\nso also, if we turn its popular conceptions into thoughts. The atheism\nof the first attitude\u2014when men set up as ultimate the arbitrariness of\nthe will, their own vanity, the finite things of nature, and the world\ndwells for ever in the mind\u2014is not the standpoint of Spinoza, for whom\nGod is the one and only substance, the world on the contrary being merely\nan affection or mode of this substance. In the respect that Spinoza does\nnot distinguish God from the world, the finite, it is therefore correct\nto term his theory atheism, for his words are these: Nature, the human\nmind, the individual, are God revealed under particular forms. It has\nbeen already remarked (pp. 257, 258, 280) that undoubtedly Substance\nwith Spinoza does not perfectly fulfil the conception of God, since\nit is as Spirit that He is to be conceived. But if Spinoza is called\nan atheist for the sole reason that he does not distinguish God from\nthe world, it is a misuse of the term. Spinozism might really just as\nwell or even better have been termed Acosmism, since according to its\nteaching it is not to the world, finite existence, the universe, that\nreality and permanency are to be ascribed, but rather to God alone\nas the substantial. Spinoza maintains that there is no such thing as\nwhat is known as the world; it is merely a form of God, and in and for\nitself it is nothing. The world has no true reality, and all this that\nwe know as the world has been cast into the abyss of the one identity.\nThere is therefore no such thing as finite reality, it has no truth\nwhatever; according to Spinoza what is, is God, and God alone. Therefore\nthe allegations of those who accuse Spinoza of atheism are the direct\nopposite of the truth; with him there is too much God. They say: If\nGod is the identity of mind and nature, then nature or the individual\nman is God. This is quite correct, but they forget that nature and the\nindividual disappear in this same identity: and they cannot forgive\nSpinoza for thus annihilating them. Those who defame him in such a way\nas this are therefore not aiming at maintaining God, but at maintaining\nthe finite and the worldly; they do not fancy their own extinction and\nthat of the world. Spinoza\u2019s system is absolute pantheism and monotheism\nelevated into thought. Spinozism is therefore very far removed from being\natheism in the ordinary sense; but in the sense that God is not conceived\nas spirit, it is atheism. However, in the same way many theologians are\nalso atheists who speak of God only as the Almighty Supreme Being, etc.,\nwho refuse to acknowledge God, and who admit the validity and truth of\nthe finite. They are many degrees worse than Spinoza.\n\nThe second point to be considered is the method adopted by Spinoza for\nsetting forth his philosophy; it is the demonstrative method of geometry\nas employed by Euclid, in which we find definitions, explanations,\naxioms, and theorems. Even Descartes made it his starting-point that\nphilosophic propositions must be mathematically handled and proved, that\nthey must have the very same evidence as mathematics. The mathematical\nmethod is considered superior to all others, on account of the nature\nof its evidence; and it is natural that independent knowledge in its\nre-awakening lighted first upon this form, of which it saw so brilliant\nan example. The mathematical method is, however, ill-adapted for\nspeculative content, and finds its proper place only in the finite\nsciences of the understanding. In modern times Jacobi has asserted\n(Werke, Vol. IV. Section I. pp. 217-223) that all demonstration, all\nscientific knowledge leads back to Spinozism, which alone is a logical\nmethod of thought; and because it must lead thither, it is really of\nno service whatever, but immediate knowledge is what we must depend on.\nIt may be conceded to Jacobi that the method of demonstration leads\nto Spinozism, if we understand thereby merely the method of knowledge\nbelonging to the understanding. But the fact is that Spinoza is made a\ntesting-point in modern philosophy, so that it may really be said: You\nare either a Spinozist or not a philosopher at all. This being so, the\nmathematical and demonstrative method of Spinoza would seem to be only\na defect in the external form; but it is the fundamental defect of the\nwhole position. In this method the nature of philosophic knowledge and\nthe object thereof, are entirely misconceived, for mathematical knowledge\nand method are merely formal in character and consequently altogether\nunsuited for philosophy. Mathematical knowledge exhibits its proof on\nthe existent object as such, not on the object as conceived; the Notion\nis lacking throughout; the content of Philosophy, however, is simply\nthe Notion and that which is comprehended by the Notion. Therefore this\nNotion as the knowledge of the essence is simply one assumed, which falls\nwithin the philosophic subject; and this is what represents itself to\nbe the method peculiar to Spinoza\u2019s philosophy. Of this demonstrative\nmanner we have already seen these examples: (\u03b1) The definitions from\nwhich Spinoza takes his start\u2014as in geometry a commencement is made\nwith the line, triangle, &c.\u2014concern universal determinations, such as\ncause of itself, the finite, substance, attribute, mode, and so on,\nwhich are solely and simply accepted and assumed, not deduced, nor\nproved to be necessary: for Spinoza is not aware of how he arrives at\nthese individual determinations. (\u03b2) He further speaks of axioms, for\ninstance (Ethic. P. I. Ax. I. p. 36): \u201cWhat is, is either in itself or\nin another.\u201d The determinations \u201cin itself\u201d and \u201cin another\u201d are not\nshown forth in their necessity: neither is this disjunction proved, it\nis merely assumed. (\u03b3) The propositions have, as such, a subject and\npredicate which are not similar. When the predicate is proved of the\nsubject and necessarily combined with it, the discrepancy remains that\nthe one as universal is related to the other as particular: therefore\neven although the relation is proved, there is present at the same time\na secondary relation. Mathematical science, in its true propositions\nrespecting a whole, escapes from the difficulty by proving also the\nconverse of the propositions, in this way obtaining for them a special\ndefiniteness by proving each proposition in both ways. True propositions\nmay, therefore, be looked on as definitions, and the conversion is the\nproof of the proposition in the form in which it is expressed. But this\nmeans of escaping the difficulty Philosophy cannot well employ, since\nthe subject of which something is proved is itself only the Notion or\nthe universal, and the proposition form is therefore quite superfluous\nand out of place. What has the form of the subject is in the form of an\nexistent thing, as contrasted with the universal, the content of the\nproposition. The existent thing is taken as signifying existent in the\nordinary sense; it is the word which we use in every-day life, and of\nwhich we have a conception that has nothing of the Notion in it. The\nconverse of a proposition would simply read like this: The Notion is\nthat which is thus popularly conceived. This proof from the usage of\nlanguage\u2014that we also understand this to be the meaning in every-day\nlife, or in other words that the name is correct\u2014has no philosophic\nsignificance. But if the proposition is not one like this, but an\nordinary proposition, and if the predicate is not the Notion, but some\ngeneral term or other, a predicate of the subject, such propositions are\nreally not philosophic: we might instance the statement that substance\nis one and not several, but only that in which substance and unity are\nthe same. Or, in other words, this unity of the two moments is the very\nthing which the proof has to demonstrate, it is the Notion or the\nessence. In this case it looks as if the proposition were the matter\nof chief importance, the truth. But if in these really only so-called\npropositions, subject and predicate are in truth not alike, because one\nis individual and the other universal, their relation is essential,\n_i.e._ the reason for which they are one. The proof has here a false\nposition indeed, as if that subject were implicit or in itself, whereas\nsubject and predicate are, fundamentally even, moments in separation;\nin the judgment \u201cGod is One,\u201d the subject itself is universal, since\nit resolves itself into unity. On the other side it is implied in this\nfalse position that the proof is brought in from outside merely, as in\nmathematics from a preceding proposition, and that the proposition is not\ntherefore conceived through itself; thus we see the ordinary method of\nproof take its middle term, the principle, from anywhere it can, in the\nsame way as in classification it takes its principle of classification.\nThe proposition is then, as it were, a secondary affair; but we must\nask if this proposition is true. The result as proposition ought to be\ntruth, but is only knowledge. The movement of knowledge, as proof, falls\ntherefore, in the third place, outside of the proposition, which ought\nto be the truth. The essential moments of the system are really already\ncompletely contained in the presuppositions of the definitions, from\nwhich all further proofs have merely to be deduced. But whence have we\nthese categories which here appear as definitions? We find them doubtless\nin ourselves, in scientific culture. The existence of the understanding,\nthe will, extension, is therefore not developed from infinite substance,\nbut it is directly expressed in these determinations, and that quite\nnaturally; for of a truth there exists the One into which everything\nenters, in order to be absorbed therein, but out of which nothing comes.\nFor as Spinoza has set up the great proposition, all determination\nimplies negation (_supra_, p. 267), and as of everything, even of thought\nin contrast to extension, it may be shown that it is determined and\nfinite, what is essential in it rests upon negation. Therefore God alone\nis the positive, the affirmative, and consequently the one substance;\nall other things, on the contrary, are only modifications of this\nsubstance, and are nothing in and for themselves. Simple determination or\nnegation belongs only to form, but is quite another thing from absolute\ndeterminateness or negativity, which is absolute form; in this way\nof looking at it negation is the negation of negation, and therefore\ntrue affirmation. This negative self-conscious moment, the movement of\nknowledge, which pursues its way in the thought which is present before\nus, is however certainly lacking to the content of Spinoza\u2019s philosophy,\nor at least it is only externally associated with it, since it falls\nwithin self-consciousness. That is to say, thoughts form the content, but\nthey are not self-conscious thoughts or Notions: the content signifies\nthought, as pure abstract self-consciousness, but an unreasoning\nknowledge, into which the individual does not enter: the content has\nnot the signification of \u2018I.\u2019 Therefore the case is as in mathematics;\na proof is certainly given, conviction must follow, but yet the matter\nfails to be understood. There is a rigid necessity in the proof, to\nwhich the moment of self-consciousness is lacking; the \u2018I\u2019 disappears,\ngives itself altogether up, merely withers away. Spinoza\u2019s procedure\nis therefore quite correct; yet the individual proposition is false,\nseeing that it expresses only one side of the negation. The understanding\nhas determinations which do not contradict one another; contradiction\nthe understanding cannot suffer. The negation of negation is, however,\ncontradiction, for in that it negates negation as simple determination,\nit is on the one hand affirmation, but on the other hand also really\nnegation; and this contradiction, which is a matter pertaining to reason,\nis lacking in the case of Spinoza. There is lacking the infinite form,\nspirituality and liberty. I have already mentioned before this (pp. 93,\n94; 129-137) that Lullus and Bruno attempted to draw up a system of form,\nwhich should embrace and comprehend the one substance which organizes\nitself into the universe; this attempt Spinoza did not make.\n\nBecause negation was thus conceived by Spinoza in one-sided fashion\nmerely, there is, in the third place, in his system, an utter blotting\nout of the principle of subjectivity, individuality, personality, the\nmoment of self-consciousness in Being. Thought has only the signification\nof the universal, not of self-consciousness. It is this lack which has,\non the one side, brought the conception of the liberty of the subject\ninto such vehement antagonism to the system of Spinoza, because it\nset aside the independence of the human consciousness, the so-called\nliberty which is merely the empty abstraction of independence, and in\nso doing set aside God, as distinguished from nature and the human\nconsciousness\u2014that is as implicit or in Himself, in the Absolute; for\nman has the consciousness of freedom, of the spiritual, which is the\nnegative of the corporeal, and man has also the consciousness that his\ntrue Being lies in what is opposed to the corporeal. This has been\nfirmly maintained by religion, theology, and the sound common sense of\nthe common consciousness, and this form of opposition to Spinoza appears\nfirst of all in the assertion that freedom is real, and that evil exists.\nBut because for Spinoza, on the other hand, there exists only absolute\nuniversal substance as the non-particularized, the truly real\u2014all that is\nparticular and individual, my subjectivity and spirituality, has, on the\nother hand, as a limited modification whose Notion depends on another,\nno absolute existence. Thus the soul, the Spirit, in so far as it is\nan individual Being, is for Spinoza a mere negation, like everything\nin general that is determined. As all differences and determinations\nof things and of consciousness simply go back into the One substance,\none may say that in the system of Spinoza all things are merely cast\ndown into this abyss of annihilation. But from this abyss nothing comes\nout; and the particular of which Spinoza speaks is only assumed and\npresupposed from the ordinary conception, without being justified. Were\nit to be justified, Spinoza would have to deduce it from his Substance;\nbut that does not open itself out, and therefore comes to no vitality,\nspirituality or activity. His philosophy has only a rigid and unyielding\nsubstance, and not yet spirit; in it we are not at home with ourselves.\nBut the reason that God is not spirit is that He is not the Three in\nOne. Substance remains rigid and petrified, without Boehme\u2019s sources or\nsprings; for the individual determinations in the form of determinations\nof the understanding are not Boehme\u2019s originating spirits, which energize\nand expand in one another (_supra_, pp. 202, 203). What we find regarding\nthis particular then is that it is only a modification of absolute\nsubstance, which, however, is not declared to be such; for the moment of\nnegativity is what is lacking to this rigid motionlessness, whose single\nform of activity is this, to divest all things of their determination\nand particularity and cast them back into the one absolute substance,\nwherein they are simply swallowed up, and all life in itself is utterly\ndestroyed. This is what we find philosophically inadequate with Spinoza;\ndistinctions are externally present, it is true, but they remain\nexternal, since even the negative is not known in itself. Thought is the\nabsolutely abstract, and for that very reason the absolutely negative; it\nis so in truth, but with Spinoza it is not asserted to be the absolutely\nnegative. But if in opposition to Spinozism we hold fast to the assertion\nthat Spirit, as distinguishing itself from the corporeal, is substantial,\nactual, true, and in the same way that freedom is not something merely\nprivative, then this actuality in formal thought is doubtless correct,\nyet it rests only upon feeling; but the further step is that the Idea\nessentially includes within itself motion and vitality, and that it\nconsequently has in itself the principle of spiritual freedom. On the one\nhand, therefore, the defect of Spinozism is conceived as consisting in\nits want of correspondence with actuality; but on the other side it is to\nbe apprehended in a higher sense, I mean in the sense that substance with\nSpinoza is only the Idea taken altogether abstractly, not in its vitality.\n\nIf, in conclusion, we sum up this criticism that we have offered, we\nwould say that on the one hand with Spinoza negation or privation is\ndistinct from substance; for he merely assumes individual determinations,\nand does not deduce them from substance. On the other hand the negation\nis present only as Nothing, for in the absolute there is no mode; the\nnegative is not there, but only its dissolution, its return: we do not\nfind its movement, its Becoming and Being. The negative is conceived\naltogether as a vanishing moment\u2014not in itself, but only as individual\nself-consciousness; it is not like the _Separator_ we met with in\nBoehme\u2019s system (_supra_, p. 206). Self-consciousness is born from this\nocean, dripping with the water thereof, _i.e._ never coming to absolute\nself-hood; the heart, the independence is transfixed\u2014the vital fire is\nwanting. This lack has to be supplied, the moment of self-consciousness\nhas to be added. It has the following two special aspects, which we\nnow perceive emerging and gaining acceptance; in the first place the\nobjective aspect, that absolute essence obtains in self-consciousness\nthe mode of an object of consciousness for which the \u201cother\u201d exists, or\nthe existent as such, and that what Spinoza understood by the \u201cmodes\u201d is\nelevated to objective reality as an absolute moment of the absolute; in\nthe second place we have the aspect of self-consciousness, individuality,\nindependence. As was formerly the case with respect to Bacon and Boehme,\nthe former aspect is here taken up by the Englishman, John Locke, the\nlatter by the German Leibnitz; in the first case it did not appear\nas a moment, nor did it in the second appear as absolute Notion. Now\nwhile Spinoza only takes notice of these ordinary conceptions, and the\nhighest point of view he reaches in regard to them is that they sink\nand disappear in the one Substance, Locke on the contrary examines the\ngenesis of these conceptions, while Leibnitz opposes to Spinoza the\ninfinite multiplicity of individuals, although all these monads have one\nmonad as the basis of their Being. Both Locke and Leibnitz therefore came\nforward as opponents of the above-mentioned one-sidedness of Spinoza.\n\n\n3. MALEBRANCHE.\n\nThe philosophy of Malebranche is in point of matter entirely identical\nwith that of Spinoza, but it has another, a more religious and more\ntheological form; on account of this form it never encountered the\nopposition met with by Spinoza, and for the same reason Malebranche has\nnever been reproached with Atheism.\n\nNicholas Malebranche was born at Paris in 1638. He was sickly and\ndeformed in body, and was hence brought up with great care. He was\ndiffident and loved solitude; in his twenty-second year he entered the\n_congr\u00e9gation de l\u2019oratoire_, a sort of spiritual order, and devoted\nhimself to the sciences. In passing a bookseller\u2019s shop he happened\naccidentally to see Descartes\u2019 work _De homine_; he read it, and it\ninterested him greatly\u2014so much so that the reading of it brought on\nsevere palpitation and he was forced to cease. This decided his future\nlife; there awoke in him an irrepressible inclination for Philosophy. He\nwas a man of most noble and gentle character, and of the most genuine and\nunswerving piety. He died at Paris in 1715, and in the seventy-seventh\nyear of his age.[210] His principal work bears the title: _De la\nrecherche de la v\u00e9rit\u00e9_. One part of it is entirely metaphysical, but the\ngreater part is altogether empirical. For instance, Malebranche in the\nfirst three books treats logically and psychologically of the errors in\nsight and hearing, in the imagination and understanding.\n\na. What is most important in this book is his idea of the origin of our\nknowledge. He says: \u201cThe essence of the soul is in thought, just as that\nof matter is in extension. All else, such as sensation, imagination and\nwill, are modifications of thought\u201d. He thus begins with two sides,\nbetween which he sets an absolute chasm, and then he follows out in\ndetail the Cartesian idea of the assistance of God in knowledge. His main\npoint is that \u201cthe soul cannot attain to its conceptions and notions\nfrom external things.\u201d For when I and the thing are clearly independent\nof one another and have nothing in common, the two can certainly not\nenter into relation with one another nor be for one another. \u201cBodies are\nimpenetrable; their images would destroy one another on the way to the\norgans.\u201d But further: \u201cThe soul cannot beget ideas from itself, nor can\nthey be inborn,\u201d for as \u201cAugustine has said, \u2018Say not that ye yourselves\nare your own light.\u2019\u201d But how then comes extension, the manifold, into\nthe simple, into the spirit, since it is the reverse of the simple,\nnamely the diverse? This question regarding the association of thought\nand extension is always an important one in Philosophy. According to\nMalebranche the answer is, \u201cThat we see all things in God.\u201d God Himself\nis the connection between us and them, and thus the unity between the\nthing and thought. \u201cGod has in Him the ideas of all things because He has\ncreated all; God is through His omnipresence united in the most intimate\nway with spirits. God thus is the place of spirits,\u201d the Universal\nof spirit, \u201cjust as space\u201d is the universal, \u201cthe place of bodies.\nConsequently the soul knows in God what is in Him,\u201d bodies, \u201cinasmuch\nas He sets forth\u201d (inwardly conceives) \u201ccreated existence, because all\nthis is spiritual, intellectual, and present to the soul.\u201d[211] Because\nthings and God are intellectual and we too are intellectual, we perceive\nthem in God as they are, so to speak, intellectual in Him. If this be\nfurther analyzed it in no way differs from Spinozism. Malebranche indeed\nin a popular way allows soul and things to subsist as independent,\nbut this independence vanishes away like smoke when the principle is\nfirmly grasped. The catechism says: \u201cGod is omnipresent,\u201d and if this\nomnipresence be developed Spinozism is arrived at; and yet theologians\nthen proceed to speak against the system of identity, and cry out about\nPantheism.\n\nb. We must further remark that Malebranche also makes the universal,\nthought, the essential, by placing it before the particular. \u201cThe soul\nhas the Notion of the infinite and universal: it knows nothing excepting\nthrough the Idea which it has of the infinite; this Idea must hence come\nfirst. The universal is not a mere confusion of individual ideas, it is\nnot a union of individual things.\u201d According to Locke the individual from\nwhich the universal is formed precedes (_infra_, p. 299); according to\nMalebranche the universal Idea is what comes first in man. \u201cIf we wish\nto think of anything particular we think first of the universal;\u201d it is\nthe principle of the particular, as space is of things. All essentiality\nprecedes our particular conceptions, and this essentiality comes\nfirst. \u201cAll essential existences (_essences_) come before our ordinary\nconception; they cannot be such excepting by God\u2019s presence in the mind\nand spirit. He it is who contains all things in the simplicity of His\nnature. It seems evident that mind would not be capable of representing\nto itself the universal Notions of species, kind, and suchlike, if it\ndid not see all things comprehended in one.\u201d The universal is thus in and\nfor itself, and it does not take its rise through the particular. \u201cSince\neach existent thing is an individual, we cannot say that we see something\nactually created when, for example, we see a triangle in general,\u201d for\nwe see it through God. \u201cNo account can be given of how spirit knows\nabstract and common truths, excepting through the presence of Him who can\nenlighten spirit in an infinite way,\u201d because He is in and for Himself\nthe universal. \u201cWe have a clear idea of God,\u201d of the universal: \u201cWe can\nhave such only through union with Him, for this idea is not a created\none,\u201d but is in and for itself. As with Spinoza, the one universal is\nGod, and in so far as it is determined, it is the particular; we see\nthis particular only in the universal, as we see bodies in space. \u201cWe\nalready have a conception of infinite Being, inasmuch as we have a\nconception of Being without regard to whether it is finite or infinite.\nTo know a finite we must limit the infinite; and this last must thus\nprecede. Thus spirit perceives all in the infinite; this is so far\nfrom being a confused conception of many particular things that all\nparticular conceptions are merely participations in the universal Idea\nof infinitude\u2014in the same way that God does not receive this Being from\u201d\nfinite \u201ccreatures, but,\u201d on the contrary, \u201call creatures only subsist\nthrough Him.\u201d[212]\n\nc. As regards the turning of the soul to God, Malebranche says what\nSpinoza said from his ethical point of view: \u201cIt is impossible that God\nshould have an end other than Himself (the Holy Scriptures place this\nbeyond doubt);\u201d the will of God can only have the good, what is without\ndoubt universal as its end. \u201cHence not only is it essential that our\nnatural love, _i.e._ the emotion which He brings forth in our spirit,\nshould strive after Him\u201d\u2014\u201cthe will is really love towards God\u201d\u2014\u201cbut\nit is likewise impossible that the knowledge and the light which He\ngives to our spirit should make anything else known than what is in\nHim,\u201d for thought only exists in unity with God. \u201cIf God were to make\na spirit and give it the sun as an idea or as the immediate object of\nits knowledge, God would have made this spirit and the idea of this\nspirit for the sun and not for Himself.\u201d All natural love, and still\nmore knowledge, and the desire after truth, have God as their end. \u201cAll\nmotions of the will as regards the creatures are only determinations of\nmotion as regards the creator.\u201d Malebranche quotes from Augustine \u201cthat\nwe see God even from the time we first enter upon this life (_d\u00e8s cette\nvie_), through the knowledge that we have of eternal truths. The truth\nis uncreated, unchangeable, immeasurable, eternal above all things; it\nis true through itself, and has its perfection from no thing. It makes\nthe creator more perfect, and all spirits naturally seek to know it:\nnow there is nothing that has these perfections but God, and thus the\ntruth is God. We perceive these unchangeable and eternal truths, hence\nwe see God.\u201d \u201cGod indeed sees but He does not feel sensuous things. If\nwe see something sensuous, sensation and pure thought are to be found\nin our consciousness. Sensation is a modification of our spirit; God\noccasions this because He knows that our soul is capable of it. The Idea\nwhich is bound up with the sensation is in God; we see it, etc. This\nrelation, this union of our mind and spirit with the Word (_Verbe_) of\nGod, and of our will with His love, is that we are formed after the\nimage of God and in His likeness.\u201d[213] Thus the love of God consists in\nrelating one\u2019s affections to the Idea of God; whoever knows himself and\nthinks his affections clearly, loves God. We further find sundry empty\nlitanies concerning God, a catechism for children of eight years of age\nrespecting goodness, justice, omnipresence, the moral order of the world;\nin all their lifetime theologians do not get any further.\n\nWe have given the principal of Malebranche\u2019s ideas; the remainder of his\nphilosophy is composed partly of formal logic, and partly of empirical\npsychology. He passes to the treatment of errors, how they arise, how\nthe senses, the imagination, the understanding, deceive us, and how we\nmust conduct ourselves in order to effect a remedy. Then Malebranche goes\non (T. III. L. VI. P. I. chap. i. pp. 1-3) to the rules and laws for\nrecognizing the truth. Thus here the term Philosophy was even applied\nto the manner in which reflections on particular objects are drawn from\nformal logic and external facts.\n\n\nB. SECOND DIVISION.\n\nIt was Locke who became the instrument of setting forth this entire\nmanner of thinking in a systematic way, for he worked out Bacon\u2019s\nposition more fully. And if Bacon made sensuous Being to be the truth,\nLocke demonstrated the universal, Thought, to be present in sensuous\nBeing, or showed that we obtained the universal, the true, from\nexperience. From Locke a wide culture proceeds, influencing English\nphilosophers more especially; the forms adopted by this school were\nvarious, but the principle was the same; it became a general method of\nregarding things in a popular way, and calls itself Philosophy, although\nthe object of Philosophy is not to be met with here.\n\n\n1. LOCKE.\n\nWhen experience means that the Notion has objective actuality for\nconsciousness, it is indeed a necessary element in the totality; but\nas this reflection appears in Locke, signifying as it does that we\nobtain truth by abstraction from experience and sensuous perception,\nit is utterly false, since, instead of being a moment, it is made the\nessence of the truth. It is no doubt true that against the hypothesis\nof the inward immediacy of the Idea, and against the method of setting\nit forth in definitions and axioms, as also against absolute substance,\nthe demand that ideas should be represented as results, and the claims\nof individuality and self-consciousness, assert their rights to\nrecognition. In the philosophy of Locke and Leibnitz, however, these\nnecessities make themselves known in an imperfect manner only; the one\nfact which is common to both philosophers is that they, in opposition to\nSpinoza and Malebranche, take for their principle the particular, finite\ndeterminateness and the individual. According to Spinoza and Malebranche\nsubstance or the universal is the true, the sole existent, the eternal,\nthat which is in and for itself, without origin, and of which particular\nthings are only modifications which are conceived through substance. But\nhereby Spinoza has done an injury to this negative; he hence arrived at\nno immanent determination, for all that is determined and individual\nis merely annihilated in his system. Now, on the contrary, the general\ninclination of consciousness is to maintain the difference, partly\nin order to mark itself out as implicitly free in opposition to its\nobject\u2014Being, nature, and God, and partly in order to recognize the unity\nin this opposition, and from the opposition itself to make the unity\nemerge. But those who were the instruments of this tendency comprehended\nthemselves but little, they had still no clear consciousness of their\ntask, nor of the manner in which their claims could be satisfied. With\nLocke, this principle makes its first entrance into Philosophy in a\nmanner so completely at variance with the inflexible undifferentiated\nidentity of the substance of Spinoza, that the sensuous and limited, the\nimmediate present and existent, is the main and fundamental matter. Locke\ndoes not get beyond the ordinary point of view of consciousness, viz.\nthat objects outside of us are the real and the true. The finite is thus\nnot grasped by Locke as absolute negativity, _i.e._ in its infinitude;\nthis we shall not find until we come to deal in the third place with\nLeibnitz. It is in a higher sense that Leibnitz asserts individuality,\nthe differentiated, to be self-existent and indeed objectless, to be\ntrue Being. That is to say, it is not according to him finite, but is\nyet distinguished; thus, each monad is itself the totality. Leibnitz\nand Locke hence likewise stand in a position of mutual independence and\nantagonism.\n\nJohn Locke was born in 1632, at Wrington, in England. He studied for\nhimself the Cartesian philosophy at Oxford, setting aside the scholastic\nphilosophy which was still in vogue. He devoted himself to the study of\nmedicine, which, however, on account of his delicate health, he never\nreally practised. In 1664 he went with an English ambassador for a year\nto Berlin. After his return to England, he became acquainted with the\nintellectual Earl of Shaftesbury of that time, who availed himself of his\nmedical advice, and in whose house he lived without requiring to give\nhimself up to practice. When Lord Shaftesbury became Lord Chancellor\nof England, Locke received an office from him, which, however, he soon\nlost by a change of ministry. Owing to his dread of falling a prey to\nconsumption, he betook himself in 1675 to Montpellier for the benefit of\nhis health. When his patron came into power again he once more recovered\nthe place he had lost, only to be again deposed on a fresh overthrow of\nthis minister, and he was now compelled to flee from England. \u201cThe act by\nmeans of which Locke was driven from Oxford\u201d (what post he held there we\nare not told) \u201cwas not an enactment of the University, but of James II.,\nby whose express command, and by the peremptory authority of a written\nwarrant, the expulsion was carried out. From the correspondence that took\nplace, it is evident that the college submitted itself against its will\nto a measure which it could not resist without compromising the peace\nand quiet of its members.\u201d Locke went to Holland, which was at that time\nthe land wherein all who were obliged to effect their escape from any\noppression, whether political or religious, found protection, and in\nwhich the most famous and liberal-minded men were to be met with. The\nCourt party persecuted him even here, and by royal warrant he was ordered\nto be taken prisoner and sent to England; consequently he had to remain\nhidden with his friends. When William of Orange ascended the English\nthrone, after the Revolution of 1688, Locke returned with him to England.\nHe was there made Commissioner of Trade and Plantations, gave to the\nworld his famous treatise on the Human Understanding, and finally, having\nwithdrawn from public office on account of the delicacy of his health,\nhe spent his remaining years in the country houses of English nobles; he\ndied on the 28th day of October, 1704, in the seventy-third year of his\nlife.[214]\n\nThe philosophy of Locke is much esteemed; it is still, for the most part,\nthe philosophy of the English and the French, and likewise in a certain\nsense of the Germans. To put it in a few words, it asserts on the one\nhand that truth and knowledge rest upon experience and observation; and\non the other the analysis of and abstraction from general determinations\nis prescribed as the method of knowledge; it is, so to speak, a\nmetaphysical empiricism, and this is the ordinary method adopted in the\nsciences. In respect of method, Locke thus employs an exactly opposite\nsystem to that of Spinoza. In the methods of Spinoza and Descartes an\naccount of the origin of ideas may be dispensed with; they are accepted\nat once as definitions, such as those of substance, the infinite, mode,\nextension, etc., all of which constitute a quite incoherent list. But we\nrequire to show where these thoughts come in, on what they are founded,\nand how they are verified. Thus Locke has striven to satisfy a true\nnecessity. For he has the merit of having deserted the system of mere\ndefinitions, which were before this made the starting point, and of\nhaving attempted to make deduction of general conceptions, inasmuch as\nhe was, for example, at the pains to show how substantiality arises\nsubjectively from objects. That is a further step than any reached\nby Spinoza, who begins at once with definitions and axioms which are\nunverified. Now they are derived, and no longer oracularly laid down,\neven if the method and manner whereby this authentication is established\nis not the right one. That is to say, here the matter in question is\nmerely subjective, and somewhat psychological, since Locke merely\ndescribes the methods of mind as it appears to us to be. For in his\nphilosophy we have more especially to deal with the derivation of the\ngeneral conceptions, or ideas, as he called them, that are present in our\nknowledge, and with their origin as they proceed from what is outwardly\nand inwardly perceptible. Malebranche no doubt likewise asks how we\narrive at conceptions, and thus he apparently has before him the same\nsubject of investigation as has Locke. But firstly, this psychological\nelement in Malebranche is merely the later development, and then to him\nthe universal or God is plainly first, while Locke commences at once with\nindividual perceptions, and only from them does he proceed to Notions,\nto God. The universal to Locke is, therefore, merely a later result,\nthe work of our minds; it is simply something pertaining to thought,\nas subjective. Every man undoubtedly knows that when his consciousness\ndevelops empirically, he commences from feelings, from quite concrete\nconditions, and that it is only later on that general conceptions come\nin, which are connected with the concrete of sensation by being contained\ntherein. Space, for example, comes to consciousness later than the\nspacial, the species later than the individual; and it is only through\nthe activity of my consciousness that the universal is separated from\nthe particular of conception, feeling, etc. Feeling undoubtedly comes\nlowest, it is the animal mode of spirit; but in its capacity as thinking,\nspirit endeavours to transform feeling into its own form. Thus the course\nadopted by Locke is quite a correct one, but all dialectic considerations\nare utterly and entirely set aside, since the universal is merely\nanalyzed from the empirical concrete. And in this matter Kant reproaches\nLocke with reason, the individual is not the source of universal\nconceptions, but the understanding.\n\nAs to Locke\u2019s further reflections, they are very simple. Locke considers\nhow the understanding is only consciousness, and in being so is something\nin consciousness, and he only recognizes the implicit in as far as it is\nin the same.\n\na. Locke\u2019s philosophy is more especially directed against Descartes,\nwho, like Plato, had spoken of innate ideas. Locke likewise makes\nspecial examination of the \u201cinborn impressions (_notiones communes in\nforo interiori descript\u00e6_)\u201d which Lord Herbert assumes in his work _De\nveritate_. In the first book of his work Locke combats the so-called\ninnate ideas, theoretic as well as practical, _i.e._ the universal,\nabsolutely existent ideas which at the same time are represented as\npertaining to mind in a natural way. Locke said that we arrive first\nat _that_ which we call idea. By this he understands not the essential\ndeterminations of man, but conceptions which we have and which are\npresent and exist in consciousness as such: in the same way we all have\narms and legs as parts of our bodies, and the desire to eat exists in\neveryone. In Locke we thus have the conception of the soul as of a\ncontentless _tabula rasa_ which is by-and-by filled with what we call\nexperience.[215] The expression \u201cinnate principles\u201d was at that time\ncommon, and these innate principles have sometimes been foolishly spoken\nof. But their true signification is that they are implicit, that they are\nessential moments in the nature of thought, qualities of a germ, which do\nnot yet exist: only in relation to this last there is an element of truth\nin Locke\u2019s conclusions. As diverse conceptions essentially determined\nthey are only legitimatized by its being shown that they are implied in\nthe essential nature of thought; but as propositions which hold good as\naxioms, and conceptions which are immediately accepted as laid down in\ndefinitions, they undoubtedly possess the form of that which is present\nand inborn. As they are regarded they are bound to have value in and for\nthemselves; but this is a mere assertion. From the other point of view\nthe question of whence they come is a futile one. Mind is undoubtedly\ndetermined in itself, for it is the explicitly existent Notion; its\ndevelopment signifies the coming to consciousness. But the determinations\nwhich it brings forth from itself cannot be called innate, for this\ndevelopment must be occasioned by an external, and only on that does the\nactivity of mind react, in order that it may for the first time become\nconscious of its reality.\n\nThe grounds on which Locke refutes innate ideas are empirical. \u201cThere\nis nothing more commonly taken for granted than that there are certain\nprinciples, both speculative and practical, universally agreed upon\nby all mankind: which therefore, they argue, must needs be constant\nimpressions which the souls of men receive in their first Beings.\u201d\nBut this universal consent is not to be found. We may instance the\nproposition, \u201cWhatsoever is, is; and It is impossible for the same thing\nto be and not to be; which of all others I think have the most allowed\ntitle to innate.\u201d But this proposition does not hold good for the Notion;\nthere is nothing either in heaven or earth which does not contain Being\nand non-Being. Many men, \u201cAll children and idiots,\u201d says Locke, \u201chave\nnot the least apprehension of these propositions.\u201d \u201cNo proposition can\nbe said to be in the mind which it never yet knew, which it was never\nyet conscious of.... \u2019Tis usually answered, That all men know and assent\nto them\u201d (the propositions) \u201cwhen they come to the use of reason....\nIf it be meant that the use of reason assists us in the knowledge of\nthese maxims, it would prove them not to be innate.\u201d Reason is said to\nbe the deriving from principles already known unknown truths. How then\nshould the application of reason be required to discover supposed innate\nprinciples? This is a weak objection, for it assumes that by innate ideas\nwe understand those which man possesses in consciousness as immediately\npresent. But development in consciousness is something altogether\ndifferent from any inherent determination of reason, and therefore the\nexpression innate idea is undoubtedly quite wrong. Innate principles\nmust be found \u201cclearest and most perspicuous nearest the fountain, in\nchildren and illiterate people, who have received least impression from\nforeign opinion.\u201d Locke gives further reasons of a similar nature, more\nespecially employing those which are of a practical kind\u2014the diversity in\nmoral judgments, the case of those who are utterly wicked and depraved,\ndevoid of sense of right or conscience.[216]\n\nb. In the second book Locke goes on to the next stage, to the origin of\nideas, and seeks to demonstrate this process from experience\u2014this is\nthe main object of his efforts. The reason that the positive point of\nview which he opposes to any derivation from within, is so false, is\nthat he derives his conceptions only from outside and thus maintains\nBeing-for-another, while he quite neglects the implicit. He says:\n\u201cEvery man being conscious to himself, that he thinks; and that which\nhis mind is applied about, while thinking, being the ideas that are\nthere; \u2019tis past doubt, that men have in their minds several ideas,\nsuch as those expressed in the words, whiteness, hardness, sweetness,\nthinking, motion, man, elephant, army, drunkenness, and others.\u201d Idea\nhere signifies both the ordinary conception and thought; we understand\nsomething quite different by the word idea. \u201cIt is in the first place\nthen to be inquired, how he comes by them\u201d (these ideas)? Innate ideas\nhave already been refuted. \u201cLet us then suppose the mind to be, as we\nsay, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas; how comes it\nto be furnished?... To this I answer in a word, from Experience: in that\nall our knowledge is founded.\u201d[217]\n\nAs to the question in point we must in the first place say that it is\ntrue that man commences with experience if he desires to arrive at\nthought. Everything is experienced, not merely what is sensuous, but\nalso what excites and stimulates my mind. Consciousness thus undoubtedly\nobtains all conceptions and Notions from experience and in experience;\nthe only question is what we understand by experience. In a usual way\nwhen this is spoken of the idea of nothing particular is conveyed; we\nspeak of it as of something quite well known. But experience is nothing\nmore than the form of objectivity; to say that it is something which is\nin consciousness means that it has objective form for consciousness or\nthat consciousness experiences it, it sees it as an objective. Experience\nthus signifies immediate knowledge, perception, _i.e._ I myself must\nhave and be something, and the consciousness of what I have and am is\nexperience. Now there is no question as to this, that whatever we know,\nof whatever kind it may be, must be experienced, that rests in the\nconception of the thing. It is absurd to say that one knows anything\nwhich is not in experience. I undoubtedly know men, for instance, from\nexperience, without requiring to have seen them all, for I have, as man,\nactivity and will, a consciousness respecting what I am and what others\nare. The rational exists, _i.e._ it is as an existent for consciousness,\nor this last experiences it; it must be seen and heard, it must be there\nor have been there as a phenomenon in the world. This connection of\nuniversal with objective is however in the second place not the only\nform, that of the implicit is likewise absolute and essential\u2014that\nis, the apprehension of what is experienced or the abrogation of this\napparent other-being and the knowledge of the necessity of the thing\nthrough itself. It is now quite a matter of indifference whether anything\nis accepted as something experienced, as a succession of empirical\nideas, if one may so say, or conceptions; or whether the succession is a\nsuccession of thoughts, _i.e._ implicitly existent.\n\nLocke treats of the various kinds of these ideas imperfectly and\nempirically merely.\n\n\u03b1. According to Locke simple ideas arise partly from outward, and partly\nfrom inward experience. For experiences, he says, are in the first place\nsensations; the other side is reflection, the inward determinations\nof consciousness.[218] From sensation, from the organs of sight for\ninstance, the conceptions of colour, light, etc., arise; there further\narises from outward experience the idea of impenetrability, of figure,\nrest, motion and such like. From reflections come the ideas of faith,\ndoubt, judgment, reasoning, thinking, willing, etc.; from both combined,\npleasure, pain, etc. This is a very commonplace account of the matter.\n\n\u03b2. After Locke has presupposed experience, he goes on to say that it\nis the understanding which now discovers and desires the universal\u2014the\ncomplex ideas. The Bishop of Worcester made the objection that \u201cIf\nthe idea of substance be grounded upon plain and evident reason, then\nwe must allow an idea of substance which comes not in by sensation or\nreflection.\u201d Locke replies: \u201cGeneral ideas come not into the mind\nby sensation or reflection, but are the creatures or inventions of\nthe understanding. The mind makes them from ideas which it has got by\nsensation and reflection.\u201d The work of the mind now consists in bringing\nforth from several simple so-called ideas a number of new ones, by means\nof its working upon this material through comparing, distinguishing and\ncontrasting it, and finally through separation or abstraction, whereby\nthe universal conceptions, such as space, time, existence, unity and\ndiversity, capacity, cause and effect, freedom, necessity, take their\nrise. \u201cThe mind in respect of its simple ideas is wholly passive, and\nreceives them all from the existence and operation of things, such as\nsensation or reflection offers them, without being able to make any one\nidea.\u201d But \u201cthe mind often exercises an active power in making these\nseveral combinations. For it being once furnished with simple ideas\nit can put them together in several combinations.\u201d According to Locke\ntherefore thought itself is not the essence of the soul, but one of\nits powers and manifestations. He maintains thought to be existent in\nconsciousness as conscious thought, and thus brings it forward as a fact\nin his experience, that we do not always think. Experience demonstrates\ndreamless sleep when the sleep is profound. Locke quotes the example of a\nman who remembered no dream until he had reached his twenty-fifth year.\nIt is as in the Xenien,\u2014[219]\n\n Oft schon war ich, und hab\u2019 wirklich an gar nichts gedacht.\n\nThat is to say, my object is not a thought. But sensuous perception and\nrecollection are thought, and thought is truth.[220] Locke, however,\nplaces the reality of the understanding only in the formal activity of\nconstituting new determinations from the simple conceptions received\nby means of perception, through their comparison and the combination\nof several into one; it is the apprehension of the abstract sensations\nwhich are contained in the objects. Locke likewise distinguishes (Bk. II.\nchap. xi. \u00a7 15-17) between pure and mixed modes. Pure modes are simple\ndeterminations such as power, number, infinitude; in such expressions as\ncausality we reach, on the other hand, a mixed mode.\n\nLocke now explains in detail the manner in which the mind, from the\nsimple ideas of experience, reaches more complex ideas; but this\nderivation of general determinations from concrete perception is most\nunmeaning, trivial, tiresome and diffuse; it is entirely formal, an empty\ntautology. For instance we form the general conception of space from the\nperception of the distance of bodies by means of sight and feeling.[221]\nOr in other words, we perceive a definite space, abstract from it,\nand then we have the conception of space generally; the perception of\ndistances gives us conceptions of space. This however is no deduction,\nbut only a setting aside of other determinations; since distance itself\nis really space, mind thus determines space from space. Similarly we\nreach the notion of time through the unbroken succession of conceptions\nduring our waking moments,[222] _i.e._ from determinate time we\nperceive time in general. Conceptions follow one another in a continual\nsuccession; if we set aside the particular element that is present we\nthereby receive the conception of time. Substance (which Locke does not\naccept in so lofty a sense as Spinoza), a complex idea, hence arises\nfrom the fact that we often perceive simple ideas such as blue, heavy,\netc., in association with one another. This association we represent to\nourselves as something which so to speak supports these simple ideas, or\nin which they exist.[223] Locke likewise deduces the general conception\nof power.[224] The determinations of freedom and necessity, cause and\neffect, are then derived in a similar way. \u201cIn the notice that our senses\ntake of the constant vicissitude of things, we cannot but observe, that\nseveral particulars, both qualities and substance, begin to exist; and\nthat they receive this their existence from the due application and\noperation of some other being. From this observation we get our ideas\nof cause and effect,\u201d for instance when wax is melted by the fire.[225]\nLocke goes on to say: \u201cEvery one, I think, finds in himself a power to\nbegin or forbear, continue or put an end to several actions in himself.\nFrom the consideration of the extent of this power of the mind over the\nactions of the man, which every one finds in himself, arise the ideas of\nliberty and necessity.\u201d[226]\n\nWe may say that nothing can be more superficial than this derivation of\nideas. The matter itself, the essence, is not touched upon at all. A\ndetermination is brought into notice which is contained in a concrete\nrelationship; hence the understanding on the one hand abstracts and\non the other establishes conclusions. The basis of this philosophy is\nmerely to be found in the transference of the determinate to the form\nof universality, but it was just this fundamental essence that we had\nto explain. As to this Locke confesses of space, for example, that he\ndoes not know what it really is.[227] This so-called analysis by Locke\nof complex conceptions, and his so-called explanation of the same, has,\non account of its uncommon clearness and lucidity of expression, found\nuniversal acceptance. For what can be clearer than to say that we have\nthe notion of time because we perceive time, if we do not actually see\nit, and that we conceive of space because we see it? The French have\naccepted this most readily and they have carried it further still; their\n_Id\u00e9ologie_ contains nothing more nor less.\n\n\u03b3. When Locke starts by saying that everything is experience and we\nabstract for ourselves from this experience general conceptions regarding\nobjects and their qualities, he makes a distinction in respect of\nexternal qualities which was before this made by Aristotle (De anima,\nII. 6), and which we likewise met with in Descartes (_supra_, pp. 245,\n246). That is to say, Locke distinguishes between primary and secondary\nqualities; the first pertain to the objects themselves in truth, the\nothers are not real qualities, but are founded on the nature of the\norgans of sensation. Primary qualities are mechanical, like extension,\nsolidity, figure, movement, rest; these are qualities of the corporeal,\njust as thought is the quality of the spiritual. But the determinations\nof our individual feelings such as colours, sounds, smells, taste, etc.,\nare not primary.[228] In Descartes\u2019 case this distinction has however\nanother form, for the second class of these determinations is defined\nby him in such a way as that they do not constitute the essence of\nbody, while Locke says that they exist for sensation, or fall within\nexistence as it is for consciousness. Locke, however, no doubt reckons\nfigure, etc., as still pertaining to reality, but by so doing nothing is\nascertained as to the nature of body. In Locke a difference here appears\nbetween the implicit and being \u2018for-another,\u2019 in which he declares the\nmoment of \u2018for-another\u2019 to be unreal\u2014and yet he sees all truth in the\nrelation of \u2018for-another\u2019 only.\n\nc. Since the universal as such, the idea of species, is, according to\nLocke, merely a product of our mind, which is not itself objective, but\nrelates merely to objects which are germane to it, and from which the\nparticular of qualities, conditions, time, place, etc., are separated,\nLocke distinguishes essences into real essences and nominal essences;\nthe former of these express the true essence of things, while species\non the other hand are mere nominal essences which no doubt express\nsomething which is present in the objects, but which do not exhaust these\nobjects. They serve to distinguish species for our knowledge, but the\nreal essence of nature we do not know.[229] Locke gives good reasons\nfor species being nothing in themselves\u2014for their not being in nature,\nor absolutely determined\u2014instancing in exemplification the production\nof monstrosities (Bk. III. chap. iii. \u00a7 17): were species absolute no\nmonster would be born. But he overlooks the fact that since it pertains\nto species to exist, it thereby likewise enters into relationship with\nother determinations; thus that is the sphere in which individual things\noperate upon one another, and may hence be detrimental to the existence\nof the species. Locke thus argues just as one would who wished to prove\nthat the good does not exist in itself, because there are likewise evil\nmen, that the circle does not exist absolutely in nature, because the\ncircumference of a tree, for example, represents a very irregular circle,\nor because I draw a circle badly. Nature just signifies the lack of\npower to be perfectly adequate to the Notion; it is only in spirit that\nthe Notion has its true existence. To say that species are nothing in\nthemselves, that the universal is not the essential reality of nature,\nthat its implicit existence is not the object of thought, is tantamount\nto saying that we do not know real existence: it is the same litany which\nhas since been so constantly repeated that we are tired of listening to\nit:\n\n Das Innere der Natur kennt kein erschaffener Geist,\n\nand which goes on until we have perceived that Being-for-another,\nperception, is not implicit; a point of view which has not made its way\nto the positive position that the implicit is the universal. Locke is far\nback in the nature of knowledge, further back than Plato, because of his\ninsistence on Being-for-another.\n\nIt is further noteworthy that from the sound understanding Locke argues\n(Vol. III. Bk. IV. chap. vii. \u00a7 8-11) against universal propositions\nor axioms such as that A = A, _i.e._ if anything is A it cannot be B.\nHe says they are superfluous, of very little use or of no use at all,\nfor nobody yet has built up a science on a proposition which asserts a\ncontradiction. From such the true may be proved as easily as the false;\nthey are tautological. What Locke has further achieved in respect of\neducation, toleration, natural rights or universal state-right, does not\nconcern us here, but has to do with general culture.\n\nThis is the philosophy of Locke, in which there is no trace of\nspeculation. The great end of Philosophy, which is to know the truth,\nis in it sought to be attained in an empiric way; it thus indeed serves\nto draw attention to general determinations. But such a philosophy not\nonly represents the standpoint of ordinary consciousness, to which all\nthe determinations of its thought appear as if given, humble as it is\nin the oblivion of its activity, but in this method of derivation and\npsychological origination that which alone concerns Philosophy, the\nquestion of whether these thoughts and relationships have truth in and\nfor themselves, is not present at all, inasmuch as the only object aimed\nat is to describe the manner in which thought accepts what is given to\nit. It may be held with Wolff that it is arbitrary to begin with concrete\nconceptions, as when our conception of identity is made to take its\norigin from such things as blue flowers and the blue heavens. One can\nbetter begin directly from universal conceptions and say that we find\nin our consciousness the conceptions of time, cause and effect; these\nare the later facts of consciousness. This method forms the basis of\nthe Wolffian system of reasoning, only here we must still distinguish\namongst the different conceptions those that are to be regarded as most\nessential; in Locke\u2019s philosophy, this distinction cannot really be said\nto come under consideration. From this time, according to Locke, or in\nthis particular aspect of Philosophy, there is a complete and entire\nchange in the point of view adopted; the whole interest is limited to the\nform in which the objective, or individual sensations, pass into the form\nof conceptions. In the case of Spinoza and Malebranche, we undoubtedly\nlikewise saw that it was made a matter of importance to recognize this\nrelation of thought to what is sensuously perceived, and thus to know it\nas falling into relation, as passing into the relative; the main question\nhence was: How are the two related? But the question was answered to the\neffect that it is only this relation for itself that constitutes the\npoint of interest, and this relation itself as absolute substance is thus\nidentity, the true, God, it is not the related parts. The interest does\nnot lie in the related parts; the related parts as one-sided are not the\nexistent, presupposed and permanently established, they are accidental\nmerely. But here the related sides, the things and the subject, have\ntheir proper value, and they are presupposed as having this value.\nLocke\u2019s reasoning is quite shallow; it keeps entirely to the phenomenal,\nto that which is, and not to that which is true.\n\nThere is another question however: Are these general determinations\nabsolutely true? And whence come they not alone into my consciousness,\ninto my mind and understanding, but into the things themselves? Space,\ncause, effect, etc., are categories. How do these categories come into\nthe particular? How does universal space arrive at determining itself?\nThis point of view, the question whether these determinations of the\ninfinite, of substance, etc., are in and for themselves true, is quite\nlost sight of. Plato investigated the infinite and the finite, Being and\nthe determinate, etc., and pronounced that neither of these opposites is\nof itself true; they are so only as together constituting an identity,\nwherever the truth of this content may come from. But here the truth\nas it is in and for itself is entirely set aside and the nature of the\ncontent itself is made the main point. It does not matter whether the\nunderstanding or experience is its source, for the question is whether\nthis content is in itself true. With Locke, the truth merely signifies\nthe harmony of our conceptions with things; here relation is alone in\nquestion, whether the content is an objective thing or a content of\nthe ordinary conception. But it is quite another matter to investigate\nthe content itself, and to ask, \u201cIs this which is within us true?\u201d We\nmust not dispute about the sources, for the Whence, the only important\npoint to Locke, does not exhaust the whole question. The interest of the\ncontent in and for itself wholly disappears when that position is taken\nup, and thereby the whole of what is aimed at by Philosophy is given up.\nOn the other hand, when thought is from the beginning concrete, when\nthought and the universal are synonymous with what is set before us, the\nquestion of the relation of the two which have been separated by thought\nis destitute of interest and incomprehensible. How does thought overcome\nthe difficulties which itself has begotten? Here with Locke none at all\nhave been begotten and awakened. Before the need for reconciliation can\nbe satisfied, the pain of disunion must be excited.\n\nThe philosophy of Locke is certainly very comprehensible, but for that\nvery reason it is likewise a popular philosophy to which the whole of\nthe English philosophy as it exists at this day is allied; it is the\nthinking method of regarding things which is called philosophy carried\nto its perfection, the form which was introduced into the science which\nthen took its rise in Europe. This is an important moment in culture;\nthe sciences in general and specially the empiric sciences have to\nascribe their origin to this movement. To the English, Philosophy has\never signified the deduction of experiences from observations; this\nhas in a one-sided way been applied to physical and economic subjects.\nGeneral principles of political economy such as free-trade in the present\nday, and all matters which rest on thinking experience, the knowledge of\nwhatever reveals itself in this sphere as necessary and useful, signifies\nphilosophy to the English (Vol. I. pp. 57, 58). The scholastic method\nof starting from principles and definitions has been rejected. The\nuniversal, laws, forces, universal matter, etc., have in natural science\nbeen derived from perceptions; thus to the English, Newton is held to\nbe the philosopher \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f10\u03be\u03bf\u03c7\u03ae\u03bd. The other side is that in practical\nphilosophy regarding society or the state, thought applies itself to\nconcrete objects such as the will of the prince, subjects and their ends\nand personal welfare. Inasmuch as we have an object such as that before\nus, the indwelling and essential universal is made evident; it must,\nhowever, be made clear which conception is the one to which the others\nmust yield. It is in this way that rational politics took their rise in\nEngland, because the institutions and government peculiar to the English\nled them specially and in the first place to reflection upon their inward\npolitical and economic relationships. Hobbes must be mentioned as an\nexemplification of this fact. This manner of reasoning starts from the\npresent mind, from what is our own, whether it be within or without us,\nsince the feelings which we have, the experiences which fall directly\nwithin us, are the principles. This philosophy of reasoning thought\nis that which has now become universal, and through which the whole\nrevolution in the position taken up by mind has come to pass.\n\n\n2. HUGO GROTIUS.\n\nHugo Grotius was studying the laws of nations at the same time as\nLocke; and in him the very same methods may be found as those already\nmentioned, inasmuch as he also falls into a quite empirical system\nof associating nations with one another, combining with that an\nempirical mode of reasoning. Hugo van Groot, born 1583 at Delft, was a\nlawyer, fiscal general, and council pensionary; in 1619, however, he\nwas implicated in the Barneveldt trial, and was compelled to fly the\ncountry. For a long time he remained in France, but in 1634 he entered\nthe service of Queen Christina of Sweden. In 1635 he was made Swedish\nambassador in Paris, and in 1645 he died at Rostock, while on a journey\nfrom Stockholm to Holland.[230] His principal work, _De jure belli et\npacis_, he composed in 1625; now it is not read, but at one time it\nexercised a very great and important influence. In it Grotius presented a\ncomparative historical account, the material of which was partly derived\nfrom the Old Testament, of the manner in which nations in the various\nrelationships of war and peace have acted towards one another, and what\nusages they held to be binding. The following may serve as an example of\nhis empirical method of reasoning: Prisoners ought not to be killed; for\nthe object is to disarm the enemy, and if this end be attained nothing\nfurther should be done.[231] This empirical way of connecting facts had\nthe effect of bringing general comprehensible and rational principles\ninto consciousness, of making them recognized, and of causing them to be\nmore or less acceptable. Thus we see principles set forth, respecting\nthe righteousness of a king\u2019s power for instance; for thought applied\nitself to everything. We are unsatisfied by such proofs and deductions,\nbut we must not overlook what is thereby accomplished; and this is the\nestablishment of principles which have their ultimate confirmation in the\nobjects themselves, in mind and thought.\n\n\n3. THOMAS HOBBES.\n\nHobbes, who was celebrated and distinguished on account of the\noriginality of his views, was tutor to the Earl of Devonshire; he was\nborn in 1588 at Malmesbury, and died in 1679.[232] As a contemporary\nof Cromwell, he found in the events of that time, in the Revolution\nwhich then took place in England, an occasion for reflecting on the\nprinciples of state and law, and in fact he succeeded in making his way\nto quite original conceptions. He wrote much, including a treatise on\nPhilosophy, entitled \u201cThe Elements of Philosophy.\u201d The first section\n(_Sectio_) of this work, _De corpore_, appeared in London in 1655; in it\nhe first of all treats of Logic (_Pars_ I.), and secondly of _philosophia\nprima_ (_Pars_ II.); this last is an ontology and metaphysic. The\nnext sub-division (_Pars_ III.), \u201cOn the relation between motion and\nmagnitude,\u201d is a system of mechanism, a quite popular system of physics;\nand a study of the human organs. The second section was to treat of the\nnature of man (_De homine_), and the third of the state (_De cive_), but\nthe intellectual sections of the work Hobbes did not entirely finish.\nHe says in his preface that Copernicus first opened up astronomy, and\nGalileo physics, before them there was nothing certain in either science.\nHarvey worked out the science of the human body, and physics generally\nas well as astronomy were perfected by Keppler. All this was termed\nPhilosophy, in accordance with the point of view which has been already\ngiven (p. 313), since in it the reflective understanding desires to know\nthe universal. Hobbes further says concerning the philosophy of the state\n(_philosophia civilis_), that it only dates from the publication of his\nbook _De cive_.[233] This work, which appeared at Paris in 1642,[234]\nis, like his Leviathan, a much decried book; the second mentioned writing\nwas forbidden to be circulated, and is hence very rare. Both works\ncontain sounder reflections on the nature of society and government than\nmany now in circulation. Society, the state, is to Hobbes absolutely\npre-eminent, it is the determining power without appeal as regards law\nand positive religion and their external relations; and because he placed\nthese in subjection to the state, his doctrines were of course regarded\nwith the utmost horror. But there is nothing speculative or really\nphilosophic in them, and there is still less in Hugo Grotius.\n\nBefore this ideals were set before us, or Holy Scripture or positive law\nwas quoted as authoritative. Hobbes, on the contrary, sought to derive\nthe bond which holds the state together, that which gives the state\nits power, from principles which lie within us, which we recognize as\nour own. In this way two opposite principles arise. The first is the\npassive obedience of subjects, the divine authority of rulers, whose\nwill is absolute law, and is itself elevated above all other law. All\nthis is represented in close connection with religion, and proved by\nexamples from the Old Testament, by such stories as those of Saul and\nDavid. Criminal and marriage laws, too, for long derived their character\nfrom the Mosaic laws, or, speaking generally, from those the provisions\nof which possessed their value by the fact of being established by\nexpress divine command. On the other hand we have in the second place\nthe reasoning wherein we ourselves are the determining agents, and which\nwas called sound reason. In the movement which Cromwell made use of\nthere was allied with this a fanaticism, which from the written letter\ndrew opposite conclusions to the above, and this we see exemplified in\nthe equality of property, for instance. Hobbes, it is true, likewise\nmaintained passive obedience, the absolute freedom of the royal will\nand power; but at the same time he sought to derive the principles of\nmonarchical power, etc., from universal determinations. The views that\nhe adopts are shallow and empirical, but the reasons he gives for them,\nand the propositions he makes respecting them, are original in character,\ninasmuch as they are derived from natural necessities and wants.\n\nHobbes maintained that \u201cThe origin of all society is to be found in\nthe mutual fear of all its members;\u201d it is hence a phenomenon in\nconsciousness. \u201cEach association is thus formed in its own interest or\nfor its own renown, that is, from selfish motives.\u201d All such matters as\nsecurity of life, property, and enjoyment, are not to be found outside\nit. \u201cBut men have in all dissimilarity of strength a natural similarity\nas well.\u201d This Hobbes proves by a characteristic reason, viz. that \u201ceach\nindividual can make away with the other,\u201d each is the ultimate power\nover the others. \u201cEach can be supreme.\u201d[235] Thus their similarity is\nnot derived from the greatest strength; it is not, as in modern times,\nfounded on the freedom of the spirit, or on an equality of merit and\nindependence, but on the equal weakness of mankind; each man is weak as\nregards others.\n\nb. Hobbes further takes up the position that this natural condition is\nof such a nature that all possess the desire to rule over one another.\n\u201cAll in their natural condition are possessed of the will to injure\nothers,\u201d to tyrannize over other men; each has thus to fear the other.\nHobbes looks at this condition in its true light, and we find in him\nno idle talk about a state of natural goodness; the natural condition\nis really far more like that of the animals\u2014a condition in which there\nis an unsubdued individual will. All thus wish to \u201csecure themselves\nagainst the pretensions of others, to acquire for themselves advantages\nand superior rights. Opinions, religions, desires, arouse strife; the\nstronger bears away the victory. The natural condition is consequently\na condition of mistrust on the part of all towards all; it is a war of\nall against all (_bellum omnium in omnes_),\u201d and the endeavour of one to\noverreach another. The expression nature has a double significance: In\nthe first place the nature of man signifies his spiritual and rational\nBeing; but his natural condition indicates quite another condition,\nwherein man conducts himself according to his natural impulses. In this\nway he conducts himself in conformity with his desires and inclinations,\nwhile the rational, on the contrary, is the obtaining supremacy over the\nimmediately natural. \u201cIn the condition of nature a certain irresistible\npower grants the right to rule over those who cannot resist; it is absurd\nto leave those whom we have in our power to become free and strong\nagain.\u201d From this Hobbes draws the conclusion that \u201cman must go forth\nfrom the natural condition.\u201d[236] This is true; the natural condition is\nnot what it should be, and must hence be cast off.\n\nc. Hobbes finally passes to the laws of reason which preserve\ntranquillity. This condition of law is the subjection of the natural,\nparticular will of the individual to the universal will, which, however,\nis not that of all individuals, but is the will of the ruler; this is\nconsequently not responsible to individuals, but is directed against this\nprivate will, and to it all must be obedient.[237] Thus the whole matter\nis now placed on quite another footing. But because the universal will is\nmade to reside in the will of one monarch, there nevertheless proceeds\nfrom this point of view, which is really correct, a condition of absolute\nrule, of perfect despotism. The condition of law does not, however,\nmean that the arbitrary will of one man constitutes absolute law, for\nthe universal will is no despotism, being rational, inasmuch as it is\nconsistently expressed and determined in laws.\n\nRixner (Handbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie, Vol. III. p. 30) says:\n\u201cLaw to him is nothing but the sum of the conditions of peace extorted\nby iron necessity from the original wickedness of mankind.\u201d We might add\nthat in Hobbes we at least find this, that the nature and organism of the\nState is established on the principle of human nature, human desire, &c.\nThe English concerned themselves greatly with that principle of passive\nobedience, in accordance with which it is said that kings receive their\npower from God. This, in one aspect, is quite true, but in another it is\nfalsely taken to mean that they have no responsibility, that their blind\ndesires, their merely subjective will, is what must be obeyed.\n\n\n4. CUDWORTH, CLARKE, WOLLASTON.\n\nCudworth wished to revive Plato in England, but to do this after the\nmanner of the demonstrations which we met with in Descartes, and through\na trivial metaphysic of the understanding. He wrote a celebrated work:\n\u201cThe true intellectual System of the Universe,\u201d but the Platonic ideas\nexpressed are often in a clumsy form and mingled with the Christian\nconceptions of God and angels\u2014all regarded as particular existent things.\nWhat in Plato is mythical, is here taken as reality in the form of\nexistence; this is reasoned about just as we reason respecting a matter\nof ordinary fact, such as whether it is probable that the French seek to\neffect a landing in England, and if so, whether they will successfully\naccomplish it. The Christian intellectual world is dragged down to the\nform of ordinary actuality, and consequently it is ruined.\n\nThe name of Clarke is likewise famous in connection with his proof\nof the existence of God. There were quite a number of other English\nphilosophers, whom we do not, however, require to notice; for Clarke,\nWollaston, and others carry on their speculations within forms such\nas belong to a very commonplace metaphysic of the understanding.\nThe manifold systems of moral philosophy which we find taking their\nrise in England are drawn up from this same mental standpoint; in\nthem the implicitude of mind appears in a form of natural existence,\nnamely, of desires and feelings. Their principles are found in moral\nsentiments, benevolent desires, sympathy, &c. That form alone is\nworthy of notice which, on the one hand, represents duty as something\nwhich is not foreign, given, commanded, but as clearly belonging to\nself-consciousness, even while, on the other hand, it represents\nthis property as a natural, unconscious, unspiritual, and irrational\nexistence. Impulse is blind, a solid existence which cannot get beyond\nitself like thinking self-consciousness. It is indeed true of impulse\nthat its pure activity or its process, and the content, are, as in\nthought, immediately posited as the same; it has its content in itself,\nand this is not dead and passive, but self-acting and impelling. But that\nunity has the form of immediacy only as existent; in the first place\nit is not a knowledge, it is not necessary, for it is only taken from\ninward perception; in the second place, it is a determinate which does\nnot abrogate itself, beyond which we cannot get, and which thus is not a\nuniversal. Impulse is no more an infinite than is the fixed category of\nforce. Such reasoning takes the impulses in their determinate character\nfrom experience, and expresses the appearance of necessity in the same\nas an inward existence, as a force. For instance, the social instinct is\na moment which is found in experience, because man derives all manner\nof utility from society. Wherein does the necessity of the State, of\nsociety, find its basis? In a social desire. This is cause, just as in\nthe physical world a formal interpretation such as this is always to\nbe found. The necessity of any existent fact, such as what pertains to\nelectrical phenomena, finds its basis in a force which brings it forth;\nit is merely the form of returning from the external to an inward, of\npassing from the existent to what is thought, which is again in turn\nrepresented as an existent. Force is necessitated by reason of the\nmanifestation, we must argue from the latter to the former. On the other\nhand, the manifestation takes place through the force, for it is the\ncause of the manifestation; we hence have force in one place as reason,\nand in another as cause. But in all this there is no realization of\nthe fact that in respect of form there is a transition from the Notion\ninto Being and the other way, while in respect of content there is a\nperfect contingency of manifestation; we look at electricity in the same\nway as we look at the fact that men have social instincts, sympathetic\ninclinations, and so on.\n\n\n5. PUFFENDORF.\n\nIn the struggle to give to just and equitable relations in the State\nan independent basis of their own, and to found a judicial system of\ngovernment, reflective thought put forth its efforts; and this became to\nit a real interest and concern. And, as in the case of Grotius, it was\nalso true of Puffendorf, that the instinct of mankind\u2014that is, the social\ninstinct, &c.\u2014was made the principle. Samuel von Puffendorf was born\nin 1632 in Saxony; he studied public law, philosophy, and mathematics\nat Leipzig and Jena; in 1661, as a professor at Heidelberg, he made\nnatural and civil law for the first time academic studies; in 1668 he\nbecame tutor in a Swedish family, which office he later on exchanged\nfor the service of the House of Brandenburg, and in 1694 he died at\nBerlin as a privy councillor. He wrote several works on political law\nand history; we must specially mention his work, _De jure natur\u00e6 et\ngentium_, Libr. viii., Londin. Scan. 1672, 4; and also his compendium _De\nofficio hominis_, published at the same place in 1673, 8, and _Elementa\njurisprudenti\u00e6 universalis_.[238] While the divine right of kings was\nhere still recognized\u2014whereby they rendered account to God alone, or, at\nall events, were still bound to take counsel of the Church\u2014the impulses\nand necessities present in mankind were now considered as well. These\nwere regarded as the inward principles for private and political law, and\nfrom them the duties both of the government and of rulers were deduced,\nso that the freedom of mankind might not be interfered with. The basis\nof the state in Puffendorf\u2019s view is the social instinct: the highest\nend of the state is the peace and security of social life through the\ntransformation of inward duties as prescribed by conscience into external\nduties as compelled by law.[239]\n\n\n6. NEWTON.\n\nThe other side is that thought likewise applied itself to nature, and\nin this connection Isaac Newton is famous by reason of his mathematical\ndiscoveries and his work in physics. He was born in 1642 at Cambridge,\nmade a special study of mathematics, and became professor of the same at\nCambridge; later on he was made president of the Royal Society in London,\nand he died in 1727.[240]\n\nNewton was indisputably the chief contributor to the popularity of the\nphilosophy of Locke, or the English method of treating of Philosophy,\nand more especially did he promote its application to all the physical\nsciences. \u201cPhysics, beware of metaphysics,\u201d was his maxim,[241] which\nsignifies, Science, beware of thought; and all the physical sciences,\neven to the present day, have, following in his wake, faithfully\nobserved this precept, inasmuch as they have not entered upon an\ninvestigation of their conceptions, or thought about thoughts. Physics\ncan, however, effect nothing without thought; it has its categories and\nlaws through thought alone, and without thought it does not effect any\nprogress. Newton was mainly instrumental in introducing to physics the\ndeterminations respecting forces, which pertain to reflection; he raised\nscience to the standpoint of reflection, and set the laws of forces\nin the place of the laws of phenomena. Regarding matters as he did,\nNewton derived his conclusions from his experiences; and in physics and\nthe theory of colour-vision, he made bad observations and drew worse\nconclusions. He passed from experiences to general points of view,\nagain made them fundamental, and from them constructed the individual;\nthis is how his theories are constructed. The observation of things,\nthe discovery of the law immanent therein, and the universal which is\nfound within them, has become the real point of interest. In this way,\nNewton is so complete a barbarian as regards his conceptions that his\ncase is like that of another of his countrymen who was surprised and\nrejoiced to learn that he had talked prose all his life, not having\nhad any idea that he was so accomplished. This Newton, like all the\nPhysicists, indeed, never learned; he did not know that he thought in,\nand had to deal with Notions, while he imagined he was dealing with\nphysical facts: and he presented the extremest contrast to Boehme, who\nhandled sensuous things as Notions, and, by sheer force of mind, obtained\nentire possession of their actuality and subjugated them. Instead of\nthis Newton treated Notions like sensuous things, and dealt with them\njust as men deal with wood and stone. And this is even now the case. In\nthe beginnings of physical science we read of the power of inertia, for\ninstance, of the force of acceleration, of molecules, of centripetal and\ncentrifugal force, as of facts which definitely exist; what are really\nthe final results of reflection are represented as their first grounds.\nIf we ask for the cause of there being no advance made in such sciences,\nwe find that it is because men do not understand that they should\napply themselves to Notions, but make up their minds to adopt these\ndeterminations without sense or understanding. Hence in Newton\u2019s Optics,\nfor instance, there are conclusions derived from his experience which\nare so untrue and devoid of understanding, that while they are set forth\nas the finest example of how men can learn to know nature by means of\nexperiments and conclusions derived from experiments, they may also serve\nas an example of how we should neither experiment nor draw conclusions,\nof how nothing at all can be learned. A miserable kind of experience\nlike this itself contradicts itself through nature, for nature is more\nexcellent than it appears in this wretched experience: both nature itself\nand experience, when carried a little further, contradict it. Hence,\nof all the splendid discoveries of Newton in optics, none now remain\nexcepting one\u2014the division of light into seven colours. This is partly\nbecause the conception of whole and part come into play, and partly from\nan obdurate closing of the eyes to the opposite side. From this empirical\nmethod in Philosophy, we shall now pass on to Leibnitz.\n\n\nC. THIRD SECTION.\n\nThe third development of the philosophy of the understanding is that\nrepresented by Leibnitz and Wolff. If Wolff\u2019s metaphysics is divested of\nits rigid form, we have as a result the later popular philosophy.\n\n\n1. LEIBNITZ.\n\nAs in other respects Leibnitz represents the extreme antithesis to\nNewton, so in respect of philosophy he presents a striking contrast to\nLocke and his empiricism, and also to Spinoza. He upholds thought as\nagainst the perception of the English school, and in lieu of sensuous\nBeing he maintains Being for thought to be the essence of truth, just as\nBoehme at an earlier time upheld implicit Being. While Spinoza asserted\nthe universality, the oneness of substance merely, and while with Locke\nwe saw infinite determinations made the basis, Leibnitz, by means of\nhis fundamental principle of individuality, brings out the essentiality\nof the opposite aspect of Spinoza\u2019s philosophy, existence for self, the\nmonad, but the monad regarded as the absolute Notion, though perhaps\nnot yet as the \u201cI.\u201d The opposed principles, which were forced asunder,\nfind their completion in each other, since Leibnitz\u2019s principle of\nindividuation completed Spinoza\u2019s system as far as outward aspect goes.\n\nGottfried Wilhelm, Baron von Leibnitz, was born in 1646 at Leipzig, where\nhis father was professor of Philosophy. The subject that he studied in\nview of a profession was jurisprudence, but first, in accordance with the\nfashion of the day, he made a study of Philosophy, and to it he devoted\nparticular attention. To begin with, he picked up in Leipzig a large\nand miscellaneous stock of knowledge, then he studied Philosophy and\nmathematics at Jena under the mathematician and theosophist Weigel, and\ntook his degree of Master of Philosophy in Leipzig. There also, on the\noccasion of his graduation as Doctor of Philosophy, he defended certain\nphilosophical theses, some of which discourses are still contained in\nhis works (ed. Dutens, T. II. P. I. p. 400). His first dissertation, and\nthat for which he obtained the degree of doctor of philosophy, was: _De\nprincipio individui_,\u2014a principle which remained the abstract principle\nof his whole philosophy, as opposed to that of Spinoza. After he had\nacquired a thorough knowledge of the subject, he wished to graduate also\nas Doctor of Laws. But though he died an imperial councillor, it was his\nill fortune to receive from the Faculty at Leipzig a refusal to confer\nthe doctorate upon him, his youth being the alleged reason. Such a thing\ncould scarcely happen now-a-days. It may be that it was done because of\nhis over-great philosophical attainments, seeing that lawyers are wont\nto hold the same in horror. He now quitted Leipzig, and betook himself\nto Altdorf, where he graduated with distinction. Shortly afterwards he\nbecame acquainted in N\u00fcrnberg with a company of alchemists, with whose\nongoings he became associated. Here he made extracts from alchemistic\nwritings, and studied the mysteries of this occult science. His activity\nin the pursuit of learning extended also to historical, diplomatic,\nmathematical and philosophical subjects. He subsequently entered the\nservice of the Elector of Mayence, becoming a member of council, and in\n1672 he was appointed tutor to a son of Von Boineburg, Chancellor of\nState to the Elector. With this young man he travelled to Paris, where\nhe lived for four years. He at this time made the acquaintance of the\ngreat mathematician Huygens, and was by him for the first time properly\nintroduced into the domain of mathematics. When the education of his\npupil was completed, and the Baron Von Boineburg died, Leibnitz went on\nhis own account to London, where he became acquainted with Newton and\nother scholars, at whose head was Oldenburg, who was also on friendly\nterms with Spinoza. After the death of the Elector of Mayence, the salary\nof Leibnitz ceased to be paid; he therefore left England and returned to\nFrance. The Duke of Brunswick-L\u00fcneburg then took him into his service,\nand gave him the appointment of councillor and librarian at Hanover, with\npermission to spend as much time as he liked in foreign countries. He\ntherefore remained for some time longer in France, England, and Holland.\nIn the year 1677 he settled down in Hanover, where he became busily\nengaged in affairs of state, and was specially occupied with historical\nmatters. In the Harz Mountains he had works constructed for carrying\noff the floods which did damage to the mines there. Notwithstanding\nthese manifold occupations he invented the differential calculus in\n1677, on occasion of which there arose a dispute between him and Newton,\nwhich was carried on by the latter and the Royal Society of London in\na most ungenerous manner. For it was asserted by the English, who gave\nthemselves the credit of everything, and were very unfair to others, that\nthe discovery was really made by Newton. But Newton\u2019s _Principia_ only\nappeared later, and in the first edition indeed Leibnitz was mentioned\nwith commendation in a note which was afterwards omitted. From his\nheadquarters in Hanover, Leibnitz, commissioned by his prince, made\nseveral journeys through Germany, and also went to Italy in order to\ncollect historical evidence relative to the House of Este, and for the\npurpose of proving more clearly the relationship between this princely\nfamily and that of Brunswick-L\u00fcneburg. At other times he was likewise\nmuch occupied with historical questions. Owing to his acquaintance with\nthe consort of Frederick I. of Prussia, Sophia Charlotte, a Hanoverian\nprincess, he was enabled to bring about the foundation of an Academy of\nScience in Berlin, in which city he lived for a considerable time. In\nVienna he also became acquainted with Prince Eug\u00e8ne, which occasioned his\nbeing appointed finally an Imperial Councillor. He published several very\nimportant historical works as the result of this journey. His death took\nplace at Hanover in 1716, when he was seventy years of age.[242]\n\nIt was not only on Philosophy, but also on the most varied branches of\nscience that Leibnitz expended toil and trouble and energy; it was to\nmathematics, however, that he specially devoted his attention, and he is\nthe inventor of the methods of the integral and differential calculus.\nHis great services in regard to mathematics and physics we here leave out\nof consideration, and pay attention to his philosophy alone. None of his\nbooks can be exactly looked on as giving a complete systematic account of\nhis philosophy. To the more important among them belongs his work on the\nhuman understanding (_Nouveaux essais sur l\u2019entendement humain_) in reply\nto Locke; but this is a mere refutation. His philosophy is therefore\nscattered through various little treatises which were written in very\nvarious connections, in letters, and replies to objections which caused\nhim to bring out one aspect of the question more strongly than another;\nwe consequently find no elaborated systematic whole, superintended or\nperfected by him. The work which has some appearance of being such, his\n_Th\u00e9odic\u00e9e_, better known to the public than anything else he wrote, is\na popular treatise which he drew up for Queen Sophia Charlotte in reply\nto Bayle, and in which he took pains not to present the matter in very\nspeculative form. A Wurtemberg theologian, Pfaff by name, and others who\nwere correspondents of Leibnitz and were themselves only too well versed\nin philosophy, brought it as a charge against Leibnitz\u2014a charge which he\nnever denied\u2014that his philosophy was written in popular form.[243] They\nlaughed very much afterwards at Wolff, who had taken them to be quite\nin earnest; his opinion was that if Leibnitz were not perfectly serious\nin this sense with his _Th\u00e9odic\u00e9e_, yet he had unconsciously written\nhis best therein. Leibnitz\u2019s _Th\u00e9odic\u00e9e_ is not what we can altogether\nappreciate; it is a justification of God in regard to the evil in the\nworld. His really philosophic thoughts are most connectedly expressed in\na treatise on the principles of Grace (_Principes de la Nature et de la\nGrace_),[244] and especially in the pamphlet addressed to Prince Eug\u00e8ne\nof Savoy.[245] Buhle (Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, vol. iv. section\n1, p. 131) says: \u201cHis philosophy is not so much the product of free,\nindependent, original speculation, as the result of well-tested earlier\u201d\nand later \u201csystems, an eclecticism whose defects he tried to remedy in\nhis own way. It is a desultory treatment of Philosophy in letters.\u201d\n\nLeibnitz followed the same general plan in his philosophy as the\nphysicists adopt when they advance a hypothesis to explain existing data.\nHe has it that general conceptions of the Idea are to be found, from\nwhich the particular may be derived; here, on account of existing data,\nthe general conception, for example the determination of force or matter\nfurnished by reflection, must have its determinations disposed in such a\nway that it fits in with the data. Thus the philosophy of Leibnitz seems\nto be not so much a philosophic system as an hypothesis regarding the\nexistence of the world, namely how it is to be determined in accordance\nwith the metaphysical determinations and the data and assumptions of the\nordinary conception, which are accepted as valid[246]\u2014thoughts which\nare moreover propounded without the sequence pertaining to the Notion\nand mainly in narrative style, and which taken by themselves show no\nnecessity in their connection. Leibnitz\u2019s philosophy therefore appears\nlike a string of arbitrary assertions, which follow one on another like\na metaphysical romance; it is only when we see what he wished thereby\nto avoid that we learn to appreciate its value. He really makes use of\nexternal reasons mainly in order to establish relations: \u201cBecause the\nvalidity of such relations cannot be allowed, nothing remains but to\nestablish the matter in this way.\u201d If we are not acquainted with these\nreasons, this procedure strikes us as arbitrary.\n\na. Leibnitz\u2019s philosophy is an idealism of the intellectuality of the\nuniverse; and although from one point of view he stands opposed to Locke,\nas from another point of view he is in opposition to the Substance of\nSpinoza, he yet binds them both together again. For, to go into the\nmatter more particularly, on the one hand he expresses in the many\nmonads the absolute nature of things distinguished and of individuality;\non the other hand, in contrast to this and apart from it, he expresses\nthe ideality of Spinoza and the non-absolute nature of all difference,\nas the idealism of the popular conception. Leibnitz\u2019s philosophy is a\nmetaphysics, and in sharp contrast to the simple universal Substance of\nSpinoza, where all that is determined is merely transitory, it makes\nfundamental the absolute multiplicity of individual substances, which\nafter the example of the ancients he named monads\u2014an expression already\nused by the Pythagoreans. These monads he then proceeds to determine as\nfollows.\n\nFirstly \u201cSubstance is a thing that is capable of activity, it is compound\nor simple, the compound cannot exist without the simple. The monads are\nsimple substances.\u201d The proof that they constitute the truth in all\nthings is very simple, it is a superficial reflection. For instance,\none of Leibnitz\u2019s maxims is \u201cBecause there are compound things, the\nprinciples of the same must be simple, for the compound consists of\nthe simple.\u201d[247] This proof is poor enough, it is an example of the\nfavourite way of starting from something definite, say the compound, and\nthen drawing conclusions therefrom as to the simple. It is quite light\nin a way, but really it is tautology. Of course, if the compound exists,\nso does the simple, for the compound means something in itself manifold\nwhose connection or unity is external. From the very trivial category\nof the compound it is easy to deduce the simple. It is a conclusion\ndrawn from a certain premiss, but the question is whether the premiss is\ntrue. These monads are not, however, something abstract and simple in\nitself, like the empty Epicurean atoms, which, as they were in themselves\nlacking in determination, drew all their determination from their\naggregation alone. The monads are, on the contrary, substantial forms, a\ngood expression, borrowed from the Scholastics (_supra_, p. 71), or the\nmetaphysical points of the Alexandrian School (Vol II. p. 439), they are\nthe entelechies of Aristotle taken as pure activity, which are forms in\nthemselves (Vol II. pp. 138, 182, 183). \u201cThese monads are not material\nor extended, nor do they originate or decay in the natural fashion, for\nthey can begin only by a creative act of God, and they can end only\nby annihilation.\u201d[248] Thereby they are distinguished from the atoms,\nwhich are regarded simply as principles. The expression creation we are\nfamiliar with from religion, but it is a meaningless word derived from\nthe ordinary conception; in order to be a thought and to have philosophic\nsignificance, it must be much more closely defined.\n\nSecondly: \u201cOn account of their simplicity the monads are not susceptible\nof alteration by another monad in their inner essence; there is no\ncausal connection between them.\u201d Each of them is something indifferent\nand independent as regards the rest, otherwise it would not be an\nentelechy. Each of them is so much for itself that all its determinations\nand modifications go on in itself alone, and no determination from\nwithout takes place. Leibnitz says: \u201cThere are three ways in which\nsubstances are connected: (1) Causality, influence; (2) The relation of\nassistance; (3) The relation of harmony. The relation of influence is a\nrelation pertaining to a commonplace or popular philosophy. But as it is\nimpossible to understand how material particles or immaterial qualities\ncan pass from one substance into another, such a conception as this must\nbe abandoned.\u201d If we accept the reality of the many, there can be no\ntransition at all; each is an ultimate and absolutely independent entity.\n\u201cThe system of assistance,\u201d according to Descartes, \u201cis something quite\nsuperfluous, a _Deus ex machina_, because continual miracles in the\nthings of nature are assumed.\u201d If we, like Descartes, assume independent\nsubstances, no causal nexus is conceivable; for this presupposes an\ninfluence, a bearing of the one upon the other, and in this way the\nother is not a substance. \u201cTherefore there remains only harmony, a unity\nwhich is in itself or implicit. The monad is therefore simply shut up in\nitself, and cannot be determined by another; this other cannot be set\ninto it. It can neither get outside itself, nor can others get inside\nit.\u201d[249] That is also Spinoza\u2019s way of regarding matters: each attribute\nentirely represents the essence of God for itself, extension and thought\nhave no influence on each other.\n\nIn the third place, \u201chowever, these monads must at the same time have\ncertain qualities or determinations in themselves, inner actions,\nthrough which they are distinguished from others. There cannot be two\nthings alike, for otherwise they would not be two, they would not be\ndifferent, but one and the same.\u201d[250] Here then Leibnitz\u2019s axiom of the\nundistinguishable comes into words. What is not in itself distinguished\nis not distinguished. This may be taken in a trivial sense, as that there\nare not two individuals which are alike. To such sensuous things the\nmaxim has no application, it is _prima facie_ indifferent whether there\nare things which are alike or not; there may also be always a difference\nof space. This is the superficial sense, which does not concern us. The\nmore intimate sense is, however, that each thing is in itself something\ndetermined, distinguishing itself from others implicitly or in itself.\nWhether two things are like or unlike is only a comparison which we\nmake, which falls within our ken. But what we have further to consider\nis the determined difference in themselves. The difference must be a\ndifference in themselves, not for our comparison, for the subject must\nhave the difference as its own peculiar characteristic or determination,\n_i.e._ the determination must be immanent in the individual. Not only\ndo we distinguish the animal by its claws, but it distinguishes itself\nessentially thereby, it defends itself, it preserves itself. If two\nthings are different only in being two, then each of them is one; but the\nfact of their being two does not constitute a distinction between them;\nthe determined difference in itself is the principal point.\n\nFourthly: \u201cThe determinateness and the variation thereby established\nis, however, an inward implicit principle; it is a multiplicity of\nmodifications, of relations to surrounding existences, but a multiplicity\nwhich remains locked up in simplicity. Determinateness and variation\nsuch as this, which remains and goes on in the existence itself, is a\nperception;\u201d and therefore Leibnitz says all monads perceive or represent\n(for we may translate _perceptio_ by representation [Vorstellung]).\nIn other words, they are in themselves universal, for universality is\njust simplicity in multiplicity, and therefore a simplicity which is\nat the same time change and motion of multiplicity. This is a very\nimportant determination; in substance itself there is negativity,\ndeterminateness, without its simplicity and its implicitude being given\nup. Further, in it there is this idealism, that the simple is something\nin itself distinguished, and in spite of its variation, that it yet\nremains one, and continues in its simplicity. An instance of this is\nfound in \u201cI,\u201d my spirit. I have many conceptions, a wealth of thought\nis in me, and yet I remain one, notwithstanding this variety of state.\nThis identity may be found in the fact that what is different is at the\nsame time abrogated, and is determined as one; the monads are therefore\ndistinguished by modifications in themselves, but not by external\ndeterminations. These determinations contained in the monads exist in\nthem in ideal fashion; this ideality in the monad is in itself a whole,\nso that these differences are only representations and ideas. This\nabsolute difference is what is termed the Notion; what falls asunder\nin the mere representation is held together. This is what possesses\ninterest in Leibnitz\u2019s philosophy. Such ideality in the same way pertains\nto the material, which is also a multiplicity of monads; therefore the\nsystem of Leibnitz is an intellectual system, in accordance with which\nall that is material has powers of representation and perception. As\nthus representing, the monad, says Leibnitz, possesses activity; for\nactivity is to be different, and yet to be one, and this is the only\ntrue difference. The monad not only represents, it also changes; but in\ndoing so, it yet remains in itself absolutely what it is. This variation\nis based on activity. \u201cThe activity of the inner principle, by means of\nwhich it passes from one perception to another, is desire (_appetitus_).\u201d\nVariation in representation is desire, and that constitutes the\nspontaneity of the monad; all is now complete in itself, and the category\nof influence falls away. Indeed, this intellectuality of all things is a\ngreat thought on the part of Leibnitz: \u201cAll multiplicity is included in\nunity;\u201d[251] determination is not a difference in respect of something\nelse, but reflected into itself, and maintaining itself. This is one\naspect of things, but the matter is not therein complete; it is equally\nthe case that it is different in respect of other things.\n\nFifthly: These representations and ideas are not necessarily conscious\nrepresentations and ideas, any more than all monads as forming\nrepresentations are conscious. It is true that consciousness is itself\nperception, but a higher grade of the same; perceptions of consciousness\nLeibnitz calls apperceptions. The difference between the merely\nrepresenting and the self-conscious monads Leibnitz makes one of degrees\nof clearness. The expression representation has, however, certainly\nsomething awkward about it, since we are accustomed to associate it only\nwith consciousness, and with consciousness as such; but Leibnitz admits\nalso of unconscious representation. When he then adduces examples of\nunconscious representations, he appeals to the condition of a swoon or\nof sleep, in which we are mere monads: and that representations without\nconsciousness are present in such states he shows from the fact of our\nhaving perceptions immediately after awakening out of sleep, which shows\nthat others must have been there, for one perception arises only out of\nothers.[252] That is a trivial and empirical demonstration.\n\nSixthly: These monads constitute the principle of all that exists. Matter\nis nothing else than their passive capability. This passive capability it\nis which constitutes the obscurity of the representations, or a confusion\nwhich never arrives at distinction, or desire, or activity.[253] That\nis a correct definition of the conception; it is Being, matter, in\naccordance with the moment of simplicity. This is implicitly activity;\n\u201cmere implicitness without actualization\u201d would therefore be a better\nexpression. The transition from obscurity to distinctness Leibnitz\nexemplifies by the state of swooning.\n\nSeventhly: Bodies as bodies are aggregates of monads: they are mere heaps\nwhich cannot be termed substances, any more than a flock of sheep can\nbear this name.[254] The continuity of the same is an arrangement or\nextension, but space is nothing in itself;[255] it is only in another,\nor a unity which our understanding gives to that aggregate.[256]\n\nb. Leibnitz goes on to determine and distinguish more clearly as the\nprincipal moments, inorganic, organic, and conscious monads, and he does\nit in the following way.\n\n\u03b1. Such bodies as have no inner unity, whose elements are connected\nmerely by space, or externally, are inorganic; they have not an entelechy\nor one monad which rules over the rest.[257] The continuity of space as a\nmerely external relation has not the Notion in itself of the likeness of\nthese monads in themselves. Continuity is in fact to be regarded in them\nas an arrangement, a similarity in themselves. Leibnitz therefore defines\ntheir movements as like one another, as a harmony in themselves;[258]\nbut again, this is as much as saying that their similarity is not in\nthemselves. In fact continuity forms the essential determination of\nthe inorganic; but it must at the same time not be taken as something\nexternal or as likeness, but as penetrating or penetrated unity, which\nhas dissolved individuality in itself like a fluid. But to this point\nLeibnitz does not attain, because for him monads are the absolute\nprinciple, and individuality does not annul itself.\n\n\u03b2. A higher degree of Being is found in bodies with life and soul, in\nwhich one monad has dominion over the rest. The body which is bound up\nwith the monad, of which the one monad is the entelechy or soul, is\nwith this soul named a living creature, an animal. One such entelechy\nrules over the rest, yet not really, but formally: the limbs of this\nanimal, however, are again themselves such living things, each of which\nhas in its turn its ruling entelechy within it.[259] But ruling is\nhere an inappropriate expression. To rule in this case is not to rule\nover others, for all are independent; it is therefore only a formal\nexpression. If Leibnitz had not helped himself out with the word rule,\nand developed the idea further, this dominant monad would have abrogated\nthe others, and put them in a negative position; the implicitness of the\nother monads, or the principle of the absolute Being of these points or\nindividuals would have disappeared. Yet we shall later on come across\nthis relation of the individuals to one another.\n\n\u03b3. The conscious monad distinguishes itself from the naked (material)\nmonads by the distinctness of the representation. But this is of course\nonly an indefinite word, a formal distinction; it indicates that\nconsciousness is the very thing that constitutes the distinction of the\nundistinguished, and that distinction constitutes the determination\nof consciousness. Leibnitz more particularly defined the distinction\nof man as that \u201che is capable of the knowledge of necessary and\neternal truths,\u201d\u2014or that he conceives the universal on the one hand,\nand on the other what is connected with it; the nature and essence of\nself-consciousness lies in the universality of the Notions. \u201cThese\neternal truths rest on two maxims; the one is that of contradiction,\nthe other is that of sufficient reason.\u201d The former of these is unity\nexpressed in useless fashion as a maxim, the distinction of the\nundistinguishable, A = A; it is the definition of thinking, but not a\nmaxim which could contain a truth as content, or it does not express\nthe Notion of distinction as such. The other important principle\nwas, on the other hand: What is not distinguished in thought is\nnot distinguished (p. 333). \u201cThe maxim of the reason is that\neverything has its reason,\u201d[260]\u2014the particular has the universal\nas its essential reality. Necessary truth must have its reason in\nitself in such a manner that it is found by analysis, _i.e._ through\nthat very maxim of identity. For analysis is the very favourite\nplan of resolving into simple ideas and principles: a resolution\nwhich annihilates their relation, and which therefore in fact\nforms a transition into the opposite, though it does not have the\nconsciousness of the same, and on that account also excludes the\nNotion; for every opposite it lays hold of only in its identity.\nSufficient reason seems to be a pleonasm; but Leibnitz understood by\nthis aims, final causes (_caus\u00e6 finales_), the difference between\nwhich and the causal nexus or the efficient cause he here brings under\ndiscussion.[261]\n\nc. The universal itself, absolute essence, which with Leibnitz is\nsomething quite different from the monads, separates itself also into two\nsides, namely universal Being and Being as the unity of opposites.\n\n\u03b1. That universal is God, as the cause of the world, to the consciousness\nof whom the above principle of sufficient reason certainly forms the\ntransition. The existence of God is only an inference from eternal\ntruths; for these must as the laws of nature have a universal sufficient\nreason which determines itself as none other than God. Eternal truth is\ntherefore the consciousness of the universal and absolute in and for\nitself; and this universal and absolute is God, who, as one with Himself,\nthe monad of monads, is the absolute _Monas_. Here we again have the\nwearisome proof of His existence: He is the fountain of eternal truths\nand Notions, and without Him no potentiality would have actuality; He\nhas the prerogative of existing immediately in His potentiality.[262]\nGod is here also the unity of potentiality and actuality, but in an\nuncomprehending manner; what is necessary, but not comprehended, is\ntransferred to Him. Thus God is at first comprehended chiefly as\nuniversal, but already in the aspect of the relation of opposites.\n\n\u03b2. As regards this second aspect, the absolute relation of opposites, it\noccurs in the first place in the form of absolute opposites of thought,\nthe good and the evil. \u201cGod is the Author of the world,\u201d says Leibnitz;\nthat refers directly to evil. It is round this relation that philosophy\nspecially revolves, but to the unity of which it did not then attain;\nthe evil in the world was not comprehended, because no advance was made\nbeyond the fixed opposition. The result of Leibnitz\u2019s Th\u00e9odic\u00e9e is an\noptimism supported on the lame and wearisome thought that God, since a\nworld had to be brought into existence, chose out of infinitely many\npossible worlds the best possible\u2014the most perfect, so far as it could\nbe perfect, considering the finite element which it was to contain.[263]\nThis may very well be said in a general way, but this perfection is no\ndetermined thought, but a loose popular expression, a sort of babble\nrespecting an imaginary or fanciful potentiality; Voltaire made merry\nover it. Nor is the nature of the finite therein defined. Because the\nworld, it is said, has to be the epitome of finite Beings, evil could\nnot be separated from it, since evil is negation, finitude.[264] Reality\nand negation remain standing in opposition to one another exactly in the\nsame way as before. That is the principal conception in the Th\u00e9odic\u00e9e.\nBut something very like this can be said in every-day life. If I have\nsome goods brought to me in the market at some town, and say that they\nare certainly not perfect, but the best that are to be got, this is quite\na good reason why I should content myself with them. But comprehension\nis a very different thing from this. Leibnitz says nothing further than\nthat the world is good, but there is also evil in it; the matter remains\njust the same as it was before. \u201cBecause it had to be finite\u201d is then a\nmere arbitrary choice on the part of God. The next question would be: Why\nand how is there finitude in the Absolute and His decrees? And only then\nshould there be deduced from the determination of finitude the evil which\nno doubt exists therein.\n\nIt is true that Leibnitz has a reply to the above question: \u201cGod does\nnot will what is evil; evil comes only indirectly into the results\u201d\n(blind), \u201cbecause oftentimes the greater good could not be achieved if\nevils were not present. Therefore they are means to a good end.\u201d But why\ndoes not God employ other means? They are always external, not in and\nfor themselves. \u201cA moral evil may not be regarded as a means, nor must\nwe, as the apostle says, do evil that good may come; yet it has often\nthe relation of a _conditio sine qua non_ of the good. Evil is in God\nonly the object of a permissive will (_voluntatis permissiv\u00e6_);\u201d but\neverything that is wrong would be such. \u201cGod has therefore among the\nobjects of His will the best possible as the ultimate object, but the\ngood as a matter of choice (_qualemcunque_), also as subordinate; and\nthings indifferent and evils often as means. Evil is, however, an object\nof His will only as the condition of something otherwise necessary (_rei\nalioqui debit\u00e6_), which without it could not exist; in which sense Christ\nsaid it must needs be that offences come.\u201d[265]\n\nIn a general sense we are satisfied with the answer: \u201cIn accordance\nwith the wisdom of God we must accept it as a fact that the laws of\nnature are the best possible,\u201d but this answer does not suffice for a\ndefinite question. What one wishes to know is the goodness of this or\nthat particular law; and to that no answer is given. If, for example, it\nis said that \u201cThe law of falling bodies, in which the relation of time\nand space is the square, is the best possible,\u201d one might employ, as far\nas mathematics are concerned, any other power whatever. When Leibnitz\nanswers: \u201cGod made it so,\u201d this is no answer at all. We wish to know the\ndefinite reason of this law; such general determinations sound pious, but\nare not satisfying.\n\n\u03b3. He goes on to say that the sufficient reason has reference to the\nrepresentation of the monads. The principles of things are monads, of\nwhich each is for itself, without having influence on the others. If\nnow the Monad of monads, God, is the absolute substance, and individual\nmonads are created through His will, their substantiality comes to\nan end. There is therefore a contradiction present, which remains\nunsolved in itself\u2014that is between the one substantial monad and the\nmany monads for which independence is claimed, because their essence\nconsists in their standing in no relation to one another. Yet at the same\ntime, in order to show the harmony that exists in the world, Leibnitz\nunderstands the relation of monads to monads more generally as the\nunity of contrasted existences, namely of soul and body. This unity he\nrepresents as a relation without difference, and notionless, _i.e._ as a\npre-established harmony.[266] Leibnitz uses here the illustration of two\nclocks, which are set to the same hour, and keep the same time;[267] in\nthe same way the movement of the kingdom of thought goes on, determined\nin accordance with ends, and the movement onward of the corporeal\nkingdom which corresponds with it, proceeds according to a general\ncausal connection.[268] The case is the same as with Spinoza, that these\ntwo sides of the universe have no connection with each other, the one\ndoes not influence the other, but both are entirely indifferent to one\nanother; it is really the differentiating relation of the Notion that is\nlacking. In abstract thought that is without Notion, that determination\nnow receives the form of simplicity, of implicitude, of indifference\nwith regard to what is other, of a self-reflection that has no movement:\nin this way red in the abstract is in a position of indifference as\nregards blue, &c. Here, as before, Leibnitz forsakes his principle of\nindividuation; it has only the sense of being exclusively one, and of not\nreaching to and including what is other; or it is only a unity of the\npopular conception, not the Notion of unity. The soul has thus a series\nof conceptions and ideas which are developed from within it, and this\nseries is from the very first placed within the soul at its creation,\n_i.e._ the soul is in all immediacy this implicit determination;\ndetermination is, however, not implicit, but the reflected unfolding of\nthis determination in the ordinary conception is its outward existence.\nParallel with this series of differentiated conceptions, there now runs a\nseries of motions of the body, or of what is external to the soul.[269]\nBoth are essential moments of reality; they are mutually indifferent, but\nthey have also an essential relation of difference.\n\nSince now every monad, as shut up within itself, has no influence upon\nthe body and its movements, and yet the infinite multitude of their\natoms correspond with one another, Leibnitz places this harmony in God;\na better definition of the relation and the activity of the Monad of\nmonads is therefore that it is what pre-establishes harmony in the\nchanges of the monads.[270] God is the sufficient reason, the cause of\nthis correspondence; He has so arranged the multitude of atoms that the\noriginal changes which are developed within one monad correspond with\nthe changes of the others. The pre-established harmony is to be thought\nof somewhat in this style; when a dog gets a beating, the pain develops\nitself in him, in like fashion the beating develops itself in itself, and\nso does the person who administers the beating: their determinations all\ncorrespond with one another, and that not by means of their objective\nconnection, since each is independent.[271] The principle of the harmony\namong the monads does not consequently belong to them, but it is in God,\nwho for that very reason is the Monad of monads, their absolute unity.\nWe saw from the beginning how Leibnitz arrived at this conception. Each\nmonad is really possessed of the power of representation, and is as such\na representation of the universe, therefore implicitly the totality of\nthe whole world. But at the same time this representation is not in\nconsciousness; the naked monad is implicitly the universe, and difference\nis the development of this totality in it.[272] What develops itself\ntherein is at the same time in harmony with all other developments; all\nis one harmony. \u201cIn the universe all things are closely knit together,\nthey are in one piece, like an ocean: the slightest movement transmits\nits influence far and wide all around.\u201d[273] From a single grain of\nsand, Leibnitz holds, the whole universe might be comprehended in its\nentire development\u2014if we only knew the sand grain thoroughly. There is\nnot really much in all this, though it sounds very fine; for the rest of\nthe universe is considerably more than a grain of sand, well though we\nknew it, and considerably different therefrom. To say that its essence\nis the universe is mere empty talk: for the fact is that the universe\nas essence is not the universe. To the sand grain much must be added\nwhich is not present; and since thought adds more than all the grains\nof sand that exist, the universe and its development may in this way\ncertainly be comprehended. Thus according to Leibnitz every monad has\nor is the representation of the entire universe, which is the same as\nsaying that it is really representation in general; but at the same time\nit is a determinate representation, by means of which it comes to be\nthis particular monad, therefore it is representation according to its\nparticular situation and circumstances.[274]\n\nThe representations of the monad in itself, which constitute its\nuniverse, develop themselves from themselves, as the spiritual element\nin it, according to the laws of their own activity and desire, just as\nthe movements of their outer world do according to laws of bodies; hence\nliberty is nothing other than this spontaneity of immanent development,\nbut as in consciousness. The magnetic needle, on the contrary, has only\nspontaneity without consciousness, and consequently without freedom.\nFor, says Leibnitz, the nature of the magnetic needle is to turn to\nthe north; if it had consciousness it would imagine that this was\nits self-determination; it would thus have the will to move round in\naccordance with its nature.[275] But it is clear that in the course of\nconscious representations there is involved no necessary connection, but\ncontingency and want of sequence are to be found, the reason of this\naccording to Leibnitz (Oper. T. II P. I. p. 75) being \u201cbecause the nature\nof a created substance implies that it changes incessantly according to\na certain order, which order guides it spontaneously (_spontan\u00e9ment_)\nin all the circumstances which befall it; so that one who sees all\nthings recognizes in the present condition of substance the past also\nand the future. The law of order, which determines the individuality of\nthe particular substance, has an exact reference to what takes place in\nevery other substance and in the whole universe.\u201d The meaning of this is\nthat the monad is not a thing apart, or that there are two views of it,\nthe one making it out as spontaneously generating its representations,\nso far as form is concerned, and the other making it out to be a moment\nof the whole of necessity; Spinoza would call this regarding it from\nboth sides. An organic whole, a human being, is thus for instance the\nassertion of his aim from out of himself: at the same time the being\ndirected on something else is involved in his Notion. He represents\nthis and that to himself, he wills this and that; his activity employs\nitself and brings about changes. His inward determination thus becomes\ncorporeal determination, and then change going beyond himself; he appears\nas cause, influencing other monads. But this Being-for-another is only\nan appearance. For the other, _i.e._ the actual, in so far as the monad\ndetermines it or makes it negative, is the passive element which the\nmonad has in itself: all moments are indeed contained therein, and for\nthat very reason it has no need of other monads, but only of the laws of\nthe monads in itself. But if the Being-for-another is mere appearance,\nthe same may be said of Being-for-self; for this has significance only in\nreference to Being-for-another.\n\nThe important point in Leibnitz\u2019s philosophy is this intellectuality\nof representation which Leibnitz, however, did not succeed in carrying\nout; and for the same reason this intellectuality is at the same time\ninfinite multiplicity, which has remained absolutely independent,\nbecause this intellectuality has not been able to obtain mastery over\nthe One. The separation in the Notion, which proceeds as far as release\nfrom itself, or appearance in distinct independence, Leibnitz did not\nsucceed in bringing together into unity. The harmony of these two\nmoments, the course of mental representations and the course of things\nexternal, appearing mutually as cause and effect, is not brought by\nLeibnitz into relation in and for themselves; he therefore lets them\nfall asunder, although each is passive as regards the other. He moreover\nconsiders both of them in one unity, to be sure, but their activity\nis at the same time not for themselves. Every forward advance becomes\ntherefore incomprehensible when taken by itself, because the course\nof the representation as through aims in itself, requires this moment\nof Other-Being or of passivity; and again the connection of cause and\neffect requires the universal: each however lacks this its other moment.\nThe unity which according to Leibnitz is to be brought about by the\npre-established harmony, namely that the determination of the will of man\nand the outward change harmonize, is therefore brought about by means of\nanother, if not indeed from without, for this other is God. Before God\nthe monads are not to be independent, but ideal and absorbed in Him.\n\nAt this point the demand would come in that in God Himself there should\nbe comprehended the required unity of that which before fell asunder;\nand God has the special privilege of having laid on Him the burden of\nwhat cannot be comprehended. The word of God is thus the makeshift which\nleads to a unity which itself is only hypothetical; for the process of\nthe many out of this unity is not demonstrated. God plays therefore in\nthe later philosophy a far greater part than in the early, because now\nthe comprehension of the absolute opposition of thought and Being is\nthe chief demand. With Leibnitz the extent to which thoughts advance is\nthe extent of the universe; where comprehension ceases, the universe\nceases, and God begins: so that later it was even maintained that to be\ncomprehended was derogatory to God, because He was thus degraded into\nfinitude. In that procedure a beginning is made from the determinate,\nthis and that are stated to be necessary; but since in the next place the\nunity of these moments is not comprehended, it is transferred to God. God\nis therefore, as it were, the waste channel into which all contradictions\nflow: Leibnitz\u2019s Th\u00e9odic\u00e9e is just a popular summing up such as this.\nThere are, nevertheless, all manner of evasions to be searched out\u2014in the\nopposition of God\u2019s justice and mercy, that the one tempers the other;\nhow the fore-knowledge of God and human freedom are compatible\u2014all manner\nof syntheses which never come to the root of the matter nor show both\nsides to be moments.\n\nThese are the main moments of Leibnitz\u2019s philosophy. It is a metaphysic\nwhich starts from a narrow determination of the understanding, namely,\nfrom absolute multiplicity, so that connection can only be grasped\nas continuity. Thereby absolute unity is certainly set aside, but\nall the same it is presupposed; and the association of individuals\nwith one another is to be explained only in this way, that it is God\nwho determines the harmony in the changes of individuals. This is an\nartificial system, which is founded on a category of the understanding,\nthat of the absoluteness of abstract individuality. What is of importance\nin Leibnitz lies in the maxims, in the principle of individuality and the\nmaxim of indistinguishability.\n\n\n2. WOLFF.\n\nThe philosophy of Wolff is directly connected with that of Leibnitz,\nfor really it is a pedantic systematization of the latter, for which\nreason it is likewise called the Leibnitz-Wolffian system of philosophy.\nWolff attained to great distinction in mathematics and made himself\nfamous by his philosophy as well; the latter was for long predominant\nin Germany. In Wolff, as a teacher dealing with the understanding, we\nfind a systematic exposition of the philosophic element present in human\nconceptions as a whole. As regards his connection with German culture\ngenerally, great and immortal praise is more especially due to him;\nbefore all others he may be termed the teacher of the Germans. We may\nindeed say that Wolff was the first to naturalize philosophy in Germany.\nTschirnhausen and Thomasius likewise participated in this honour,\nfor the special reason that they wrote upon Philosophy in the German\nlanguage. In regard to the matter of the philosophy of Tschirnhausen and\nThomasius we have not much to say; it is so-called healthy reason\u2014there\nis in it the superficial character and the empty universality always\nto be found where a beginning is made with thought. In this case the\nuniversality of thought satisfies us because everything is present\nthere, just as it is present in a moral maxim which has, however, no\ndeterminate content in its universality. Wolff, then, was the first to\nmake, not exactly Philosophy, but thoughts in the form of thought, into\na general possession, and he substituted this in Germany for mere talk\noriginating from feeling, from sensuous perception, and from the ordinary\nconception. This is most important from the point of view of culture,\nand yet it does not really concern us here, excepting in so far as the\ncontent in this form of thought has caused itself to be recognized as\nPhilosophy. This philosophy, as a philosophy of the understanding, became\nthe ordinary culture of the day; in it determinate, intelligent thought\nis the fundamental principle, and it extends over the whole circle of\nobjects which fall within the region of knowledge. Wolff defined the\nworld of consciousness for Germany, and for the world in general, in the\nsame wide sense in which we may say that this was done by Aristotle. What\ndistinguishes him from Aristotle is that in so doing the point of view\nthat he adopted was that of the understanding merely, while Aristotle\ntreated the subject speculatively. The philosophy of Wolff is hence no\ndoubt built on foundations laid by Leibnitz, but yet in such a manner\nthat the speculative interest is quite eliminated from it. The spiritual\nphilosophy, substantial in a higher sense, which we found emerging first\nin Boehme, though still in a peculiar and barbarous form, has been quite\nlost sight of, and has disappeared without leaving any traces or effects\nin Germany; his very language was forgotten.\n\nThe principal events in Christian Wolff\u2019s life are these: He was the son\nof a baker, and was born at Breslau in 1679. He first studied Theology\nand then Philosophy, and in 1707 he became Professor of Mathematics\nand Philosophy at Halle. Here the pietistic theologians, and more\nespecially Lange, treated him in the basest manner. Piety did not trust\nthis understanding; for piety, if it is true, embodies a content which\nis speculative in nature, and which passes beyond the understanding. As\nhis opponents could make no headway by their writings, they resorted to\nintrigues. They caused it to be conveyed to King Frederick William I.,\nthe father of Frederick II., a rough man who took an interest in nothing\nbut soldiers, that according to the determinism of Wolff, free will was\nimpossible, and that soldiers could not hence desert of their own free\nwill, but by a special disposition of God (pre-established harmony)\u2014a\ndoctrine which, if disseminated amongst the military, would be extremely\ndangerous. The king, much enraged by this, immediately issued a decree\nthat within forty-eight hours Wolff should leave Halle and the Prussian\nStates, under penalty of the halter. Wolff thus left Halle on the 23rd\nof November, 1723. The theologians added to all this the scandal of\npreaching against Wolff and his philosophy, and the pious Franke thanked\nGod on his knees in church for the removal of Wolff. But the rejoicings\ndid not last long. Wolff went to Cassel, was there immediately installed\nfirst professor in the philosophic faculty at Marburg, and at the same\ntime made a member of the Academies of Science of London, Paris, and\nStockholm. By Peter the First of Russia he was made Vice-President of\nthe newly instituted Academy in St. Petersburg. Wolff was also summoned\nto Russia, but this invitation he declined; he received, however, an\nhonorary post, he was made a Baron by the Elector of Bavaria, and, in\nshort, loaded with public honours which, more especially at that time,\nthough even now it is the case, were very much thought of by the general\npublic, and which were too great not to make a profound sensation in\nBerlin. In Berlin a commission was appointed to pass judgment on the\nWolffian philosophy\u2014for this it had not been possible to eradicate\u2014and it\ndeclared the same to be harmless, that is to say, free from all danger\nto state and religion; it also forbade the theologians to make it a\nsubject of dispute, and altogether put an end to their clamour. Frederick\nWilliam now issued a recall in very respectful terms to Wolff, who,\nhowever, hesitated to comply with it owing to his lack of confidence in\nits sincerity. On the accession of Frederick II. in 1740 he was again\nrecalled in terms of the highest honour (Lange had meanwhile died), and\nonly then did he comply. Wolff became Vice-Chancellor of the University,\nbut he outlived his repute, and his lectures at the end were very poorly\nattended. He died in 1754.[276]\n\nLike Tschirnhausen and Thomasius, Wolff wrote a great part of his works\nin his mother tongue, while Leibnitz for the most part wrote only in\nLatin or French. This is an important matter, for, as we have already\nnoticed (pp. 114 and 150), it is only when a nation possesses a science\nin its own language that it can really be said to belong to it; and in\nPhilosophy most of all this is requisite. For thought has in it this\nvery moment of pertaining to self-consciousness or of being absolutely\nits own; when one\u2019s own language is the vehicle of expression, as when\nwe talk of \u201cBestimmtheit\u201d instead of \u201cDetermination,\u201d and \u201cWesen\u201d\ninstead of \u201cEssenz,\u201d it is immediately present to our consciousness\nthat the conceptions are absolutely its own; it has to deal with these\nat all times, and they are in no way foreign to it. The Latin language\nhas a phraseology, a definite sphere and range of conception; it is\nat once taken for granted that when men write in Latin they are at\nliberty to be dull; it is impossible to read or write what men permit\nthemselves to say in Latin. The titles of Wolff\u2019s philosophic works\nare perpetually of this nature: \u201cRational thoughts on the powers of\nthe human understanding and their right uses in the knowledge of the\ntruth,\u201d Halle, 1712, 8vo; \u201cRational thoughts on God, the world, and the\nsoul of man, likewise on all things generally,\u201d Frankfort and Leipzig,\n1719; \u201cOn the action and conduct of men,\u201d Halle, 1720; \u201cOn Social Life,\u201d\nHalle, 1720; \u201cOn the operations of Nature,\u201d Halle, 1723, and so on.\nWolff wrote German and Latin quartos on every department of Philosophy,\neven on economics\u2014twenty-three thick volumes of Latin, or about forty\nquartos altogether. His mathematical works make a good many more quartos.\nHe brought into general use the differential and integral calculus of\nLeibnitz.\n\nIt is only in its general content and taken as a whole that Wolff\u2019s\nphilosophy is the philosophy of Leibnitz, that is to say, only in\nrelation to the fundamental determinations of monads and to the\ntheodicy\u2014to these he remained faithful; any other content is empiric,\nderived from our feelings and desires. Wolff likewise accepted in their\nentirety all the Cartesian and other definitions of general ideas. Hence\nwe find in him abstract propositions and their proofs mingled with\nexperiences, on the indubitable truth of which he builds a large part\nof his propositions; and he must so build and derive his foundations if\na content is to result at all. With Spinoza, on the contrary, no content\nis to be found excepting absolute substance and a perpetual return into\nthe same. The greatness of Wolff\u2019s services to the culture of Germany,\nwhich now appeared quite independently and without any connection with\nan earlier and profounder metaphysical standpoint (_supra_, p. 350), are\nin proportion to the barrenness and inward contentless condition into\nwhich Philosophy had sunk. This he divided into its formal disciplines,\nspinning it out into determinations of the understanding with a pedantic\napplication of geometric methods; and, contemporaneously with the\nEnglish philosophers, he made the dogmatism of the metaphysics of the\nunderstanding fashionable, that is a philosophizing which determines the\nabsolute and rational by means of self-exclusive thought-determinations\nand relationships (such as one and many, simple and compound, finite\nand infinite, causal connection, &c.). Wolff entirely displaced the\nAristotelian philosophy of the schools, and made Philosophy into an\nordinary science pertaining to the German nation. But besides this he\ngave Philosophy that systematic and requisite division into sections\nwhich has down to the present day served as a sort of standard.\n\nIn theoretic philosophy Wolff first treats of Logic purified from\nscholastic interpretations or deductions; it is the logic of the\nunderstanding which he has systematized. The second stage is Metaphysics,\nwhich contains four parts: first there is Ontology, the treatment of\nabstract and quite general philosophic categories, such as Being (\u1f44\u03bd) and\nits being the One and Good; in this abstract metaphysic there further\ncomes accident, substance, cause and effect, the phenomenon, &c. Next\nin order is Cosmology, a general doctrine of body, the doctrine of the\nworld; here we have abstract metaphysical propositions respecting the\nworld, that there is no chance, no leaps or bounds in nature\u2014the law\nof continuity. Wolff excludes natural science and natural history. The\nthird part of the metaphysic is rational psychology or pneumatology, the\nphilosophy of the soul, which deals with the simplicity, immortality,\nimmateriality of the soul. Finally, the fourth is natural theology, which\nsets forth the proofs of the existence of God.[277] Wolff also inserts\n(chap. iii.) an empirical psychology. Practical philosophy he divides\ninto the Rights of Nature, Morality, the Rights of Nations or Politics,\nand Economics.\n\nThe whole is propounded in geometric forms such as definitions, axioms,\ntheorems, scholia, corollaries, &c. In mathematics the understanding is\nin its proper place, for the triangle must remain the triangle. Wolff on\nthe one hand started upon a large range of investigation, and one quite\nindefinite in character, and on the other, held to a strictly methodical\nmanner with regard to propositions and their proofs. The method is really\nsimilar to that of Spinoza, only it is more wooden and lifeless than his.\nWolff applied the same methods to every sort of content\u2014even to that\nwhich is altogether empirical, such as his so-called applied mathematics,\ninto which he introduces many useful arts, bringing the most ordinary\nreflections and directions into the geometric form. In many cases this\nundoubtedly gives his work a most pedantic aspect, especially when the\ncontent directly justifies itself to our conception without this form at\nall. For Wolff proceeds by first laying down certain definitions, which\nreally rest upon our ordinary conceptions, since these he translated\ninto the empty form of determinations of the understanding. Hence the\ndefinitions are merely nominal definitions, and we know whether they are\ncorrect only by seeing whether they correspond to conceptions which are\nreferred to their simple thoughts. The syllogism is the form of real\nimportance in this mode of reasoning, and with Wolff it often attains to\nits extreme of rigidity and formalism.\n\nUnder mathematics, which is the subject of four small volumes, Wolff also\ntreats of architecture and military science. One of the propositions in\nArchitecture is this: \u201cWindows must be wide enough for two persons.\u201d The\nmaking of a door is also propounded as a task, and the solution thereof\ngiven. The next best example comes from the art of warfare. The \u201cFourth\nproposition. The approach to the fortress must always be harder for\nthe enemy the nearer he comes to it.\u201d Instead of saying, because the\ndanger is greater, which would be trivial, there follows the \u201cProof.\nThe nearer the enemy comes to the fortress, the greater the danger. But\nthe greater the danger the greater the resistance that must be offered\nin order to defy the attacks, and, so far as may be, avert the danger.\nHence the nearer the enemy is to the fort the harder must the approach\nbe made for him. Q.E.D.\u201d[278] Since the increase of the danger is given\nas the reason, the whole is false, and the contrary may be said with\nequal truth. For if at the beginning all possible resistance is offered\nto the enemy, he cannot get nearer the fortress at all, and thus the\ndanger cannot become greater. The greater resistance has a real cause,\nand not this foolish one\u2014namely, that because the garrison is now at\ncloser quarters, and consequently operates in a narrow field, it can\noffer a greater resistance. In this most trivial way Wolff proceeds\nwith every sort of content. This barbarism of pedantry, or this pedantry\nof barbarism, represented as it is in its whole breadth and extent,\nnecessarily brought itself into disrepute; and without there being a\ndefinite consciousness of the reason why the geometric method is not\nthe only and ultimate method of knowledge, instinct and an immediate\nconsciousness of the foolishness of its applications caused this method\nto be set aside.\n\n\n3. THE POPULAR PHILOSOPHY OF GERMANY.\n\nPopular philosophy flatters our ordinary consciousness, makes it the\nultimate standard. Although with Spinoza we begin with presupposed\ndefinitions, the content is still profoundly speculative in nature,\nand it is not derived from the ordinary consciousness. In Spinoza\nthinking is not merely the form, for the content belongs to thinking\nitself; it is the content of thought in itself. In the speculative\ncontent the instinct of reason satisfies itself on its own account,\nbecause this content, as a totality which integrates itself within\nitself, at once in itself justifies itself to thought. The content in\nSpinoza is only without ground in so far as it has no external ground,\nbut is a ground in itself. But if the content is finite, a demand for\nan external ground is indicated, since in such a case we desire to\nhave a ground other than this finite. In its matter the philosophy of\nWolff is indeed a popular philosophy, even if in form it still makes\nthought authoritative. Until the time of Kant the philosophy of Wolff\nwas thus pre-eminent. Baumgarten, Crusius, and Moses Mendelssohn worked\neach of them independently on the same lines as Wolff; the philosophy\nof the last-mentioned was popular and graceful in form. The Wolffian\nphilosophy was thus carried on, although it had cast off its pedantic\nmethods: no further progress was however made. The question dealt with\nwas how perfection could be attained\u2014what it is possible to think\nand what not; metaphysic was reduced to its slightest consistency and\nto its completest vacuity, so that in its texture not a single thread\nremained secure. Mendelssohn considered himself, and was considered, the\ngreatest of philosophers, and was lauded as such by his friends. In his\n\u201cMorgenstunden\u201d we really find a dry Wolffian philosophy, however much\nthese gentlemen endeavoured to give their dull abstractions a bright\nPlatonic form.\n\nThe forms of Philosophy which we have considered bear the character\nwhich pertains specially to metaphysics, of proceeding from general\ndeterminations of the understanding, but of combining therewith\nexperience and observation, or the empiric method in general. One side\nof this metaphysic is that the opposites of thought are brought into\nconsciousness, and that attention is directed upon the solution of this\ncontradiction. Thought and Being or extension, God and the world, good\nand evil, the power and prescience of God on the one side, and the evil\nin the world and human freedom on the other: these contradictions, the\nopposites of soul and spirit, things conceived and things material, and\ntheir mutual relation, have occupied all men\u2019s attention. The solution\nof these opposites and contradictions has still to be given, and God is\nset forth as the One in whom all these contradictions are solved. This is\nwhat is common to all these philosophies as far as their main elements\nare concerned. Yet we must likewise remark that these contradictions are\nnot solved in themselves, _i.e._ that the nullity of the supposition is\nnot demonstrated in itself, and thereby a true concrete solution has not\ncome to pass. Even if God is recognized as solving all contradictions,\nGod as the solution of these contradictions is a matter of words rather\nthan something conceived and comprehended. If God is comprehended in His\nqualities, and prescience, omnipresence, omniscience, power, wisdom,\ngoodness justice, &c., are considered as qualities of God Himself,\nthey simply lead to contradictions; and these contradictions, Leibnitz\n(_supra_, p. 348) sought to remove by saying that the qualities temper\none another, _i.e._ that they are combined in such a way that one annuls\nthe other. This, however, is no real comprehension of such contradiction.\n\nThis metaphysic contrasts greatly with the old philosophy of a Plato or\nan Aristotle. To the old philosophy we can always turn again and admit\nits truth; it is satisfying in the stage of development it has reached\u2014a\nconcrete centre-point which meets all the problems set by thought as\nthese are comprehended. In this modern metaphysic, however, the opposites\nare merely developed into absolute contradictions. God is indeed given as\ntheir absolute solution, but only as an abstract solution, as a Beyond;\non this side all contradictions are, as regards their content, unsolved\nand unexplained. God is not comprehended as the One in whom these\ncontradictions are eternally resolved; He is not comprehended as Spirit,\nas the Trinity. It is in Him alone as Spirit, and as Spirit which is\nThree in One, that this opposition of Himself and His Other, the Son, is\ncontained, and with it the resolution of the same; this concrete Idea of\nGod as reason, has not as yet found an entrance into Philosophy.\n\nIn order that we may now cast a retrospective glance over the philosophic\nefforts of other nations, we shall apply ourselves to the further\nprogress of Philosophy. Once more we see Scepticism making its way\ninto this arid philosophy of the understanding. But this time it is,\nproperly speaking, in the form of Idealism, or the determinations are\nsubjective determinations of self-consciousness. In the place of thought\nwe consequently find the Notion now making its appearance. Just as with\nthe Stoics determinateness is held to be an object of thought, we have in\nmodern times this same manifestation of thought as the unmoved form of\nsimplicity. Only here the image or inner consciousness of totality is\npresent, the absolute spirit which the world has before it as its truth\nand to whose Notion it makes its way\u2014this is another inward principle,\nanother implicitude of mind which it endeavours to bring forth from\nitself and for itself, so that reason is a comprehension of the same, or\nhas the certitude of being all reality. With the ancients reason (\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2),\nas the implicit and explicit Being of consciousness, had only an ethereal\nand formal existence as language, but here it has certainty as existent\nsubstance. Hence with Descartes there is the unity of the Notion and\nBeing, and with Spinoza the universal reality. The first commencement\nof the Notion of the movement of fixed thoughts in themselves is found\nin this, that the movement which, as method, simply falls outside\nits object, comes within it, or that self-consciousness comes within\nthought. Thought is implicitude without explicitude, an objective\nmode bearing no resemblance to a sensuous thing; and yet it is quite\ndifferent from the actuality of self-consciousness. This Notion which\nwe now find entering into thought, has the three kinds of form which we\nstill have to consider; in the first place it has that of individual\nself-consciousness or the formal conception generally; secondly, that of\nuniversal self-consciousness, which applies itself to all objects whether\nthey be objects of thought, determinate conceptions, or have the form\nof actuality\u2014that is to say it applies itself to what is established in\nthought, to the intellectual world with the riches of its determinations\nand looked on as a Beyond, or to the intellectual world in as far as it\nis its realization, the world here and around us. It is in those two\nways, and in those ways alone, that the actual Notion is present in the\nsucceeding chapter; for not as yet is it in the third place to be found\nas taken back into thought, or as the self-thinking or thought-of Notion.\nWhile that universal self-consciousness is, on the whole, a thought which\ngrasps and comprehends, this third kind of thought is the Notion itself\nrecognized as constituting reality in its essence, that is to say as\nIdealism. These three aspects again divide themselves as before into the\nthree nations which alone count in the civilized world. The empirical and\nperfectly finite form of Notion pertains to the English; to the French\nbelongs its form as making an attempt at everything, as establishing\nitself in its reality, abolishing all determination, and therefore being\nuniversal, unlimited, pure self-consciousness; and, lastly, to the German\npertains the entering into itself of this implicitude, the thought of the\nabsolute Notion.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nTRANSITION PERIOD\n\n\nThe decadence which we find in thought until the philosophy of Kant is\nreached, is manifested in what was at this time advocated in opposition\nto the metaphysic of the understanding, and which may be called a general\npopular philosophy, a reflecting empiricism, which to a greater or less\nextent becomes itself a metaphysic; just as, on the other hand, that\nmetaphysic, in as far as it extended to particular sciences, becomes\nempiricism. As against these metaphysical contradictions, as against the\nartificialities of the metaphysical synthesis, as against the assistance\nof God, the pre-established harmony, the best possible world, &c., as\nagainst this merely artificial understanding, we now find that fixed\nprinciples, immanent in mind, have been asserted or maintained respecting\nwhat is felt, intuitively perceived and honoured in the cultured human\nbreast. And in distinction to the assertion that we only find the\nsolution in the Beyond, in God, these concrete principles of a fixed\nand permanent content form a reconciliation here and now, they adopt a\nposition of independence, and assume an intellectual standing-ground\nwhich they find in what has generally been termed the healthy human\nunderstanding. Such determinations may indeed be found to be perfectly\ngood and valid if the feelings, intuitions, heart and understanding of\nman be morally and intellectually fashioned; for in that case better\nand more noble feelings and desires may rule in men and a more universal\ncontent may be expressed in these principles. But when men make what we\ncall sound reason\u2014that which is by nature implanted in man\u2019s breast\u2014into\nthe content and the principle, the healthy human understanding discovers\nitself to be identical with a feeling and knowledge belonging to nature.\nThe Indians who worship a cow, and who expose or slay new-born children,\nand commit all sorts of barbarous deeds, the Egyptians who pray to a\nbird, the apis, &c., and the Turks as well, all possess a healthy human\nunderstanding similar in nature. But the healthy human understanding\nand the natural feeling of rude and barbarous Turks, when taken as a\nstandard, result in shocking principles. When we speak of healthy human\nunderstanding, however, of natural feelings, we always have before our\neyes a cultured mind; and those who make the healthy human reason, the\nnatural knowledge, the immediate feelings and inspirations found in\nthemselves, into a rule and standard, do not know that when religion,\nmorality, and rectitude are discovered to be present in the human breast,\nthis is due to culture and education, which are the first to make\nsuch principles into natural feelings. Here natural feelings and the\nhealthy human understanding are thus made the principle; and much may be\nrecognized as coming under these heads. This then is the form taken by\nPhilosophy in the eighteenth century. Taken as a whole, three points of\nview have to be considered; in the first place, Hume must be regarded on\nhis own account, then the Scottish, and, thirdly, the French philosophy.\nHume is a sceptic; the Scottish philosophy opposes the scepticism of\nHume, the French philosophy has in the \u201cenlightenment\u201d of Germany (by\nwhich expression is indicated that form of German philosophy which is\nnot Wolffian metaphysics) an appendage of a feebler form. Since from the\nmetaphysical God we can make no further progress in the concrete, Locke\ngrounds his content on experience. But that empiricism leads thought to\nno fixed standpoint, Hume demonstrates by denying every universal; the\nScottish philosophers, on the contrary, undoubtedly maintain universal\npropositions and truths, but not through thought. Hence in empiricism\nitself the fixed standpoint has now to be adopted; thus the French find\nthe universal in the actuality which they call _r\u00e9alit\u00e9_. They do not,\nhowever, find its content in and from thought, but as living substance,\nas nature and matter. All this is a further working out of reflecting\nempiricism, and some more details respecting it must still be given.\n\n\nA. IDEALISM AND SCEPTICISM.\n\nThought generally is simple, universal self-identity, but in the form\nof negative movement, whereby the determinate abrogates itself. This\nmovement of Being-for-self is now an essential moment of thought,\nwhile hitherto it was outside it; and thus grasping itself as movement\nin itself, thought is self-consciousness\u2014at first indeed formal, as\nindividual self-consciousness. Such a form it has in scepticism, but\nthis distinction marks it off from the older scepticism, that now the\ncertainty of reality is made the starting point. With the ancients, on\nthe contrary, scepticism is the return into individual consciousness in\nsuch a way that to it this consciousness is not the truth, in other words\nthat scepticism does not give expression to the results arrived at, and\nattains no positive significance. But since in the modern world this\nabsolute substantiality, this unity of implicitude and self-consciousness\nis fundamental\u2014that is, this faith in reality generally\u2014scepticism has\nhere the form of idealism, _i.e._ of expressing self-consciousness or\ncertainty of self as all reality and truth. The crudest form of this\nidealism is when self-consciousness, as individual or formal, does not\nproceed further than to say: All objects are our conceptions. We find\nthis subjective idealism in Berkeley,[279] and another form of the same\nin Hume.\n\n\n1. BERKELEY.\n\nThis idealism, in which all external reality disappears, has before it\nthe standpoint of Locke, and it proceeds directly from him. For we saw\nthat to Locke the source of truth is experience, or Being as perceived.\nNow since this sensuous Being, as Being, has in it the quality of being\nfor consciousness, we saw that it necessarily came to pass that in\nLocke\u2019s case some qualities, at least, were so determined that they were\nnot in themselves, but only for another; and that colour, figure, &c.,\nhad their ground only in the subject, in his particular organization.\nThis Being-for-another, however, was not by him accepted as the Notion,\nbut as falling within self-consciousness\u2014i.e. self-consciousness not\nlooked on as universal,\u2014not within mind, but within what is opposed to\nthe implicit.\n\nGeorge Berkeley was born in 1684 at Kilcrin, near Thomastown, in the\ncounty of Kilkenny, Ireland: in 1754 he died as an English Bishop.[280]\nHe wrote the \u201cTheory of Vision,\u201d 1709; \u201cA Treatise concerning the\nprinciples of human knowledge,\u201d 1710; \u201cThree Dialogues between Hylas and\nPhilonous,\u201d 1713. In 1784 his collected works were published in London in\ntwo quarto volumes.\n\nBerkeley advocated an idealism which came very near to that of\nMalebranche. As against the metaphysic of the understanding, we have\nthe point of view that all existence and its determinations arise from\nfeeling, and are constituted by self-consciousness. Berkeley\u2019s first\nand fundamental thought is consequently this: \u201cThe Being of whatever is\ncalled by us a thing consists alone in its being perceived,\u201d _i.e._ our\ndeterminations are the objects of our knowledge. \u201cAll objects of human\nknowledge are ideas\u201d (so called by Berkeley as by Locke), \u201cwhich arise\neither from the impressions of the outward senses, or from perceptions\nof the inward states and activities of the mind, or finally, they are\nsuch as are constituted by means of memory and imagination through their\nseparation and rearrangement. A union of different sensuous feelings\nappears to us to be a particular thing, _e.g._ the feeling of colour,\ntaste, smell, figure, &c.; for by colours, smells, sounds, something of\nwhich we have a sensation is always understood.\u201d[281] This is the matter\nand the object of knowledge; the knower is the percipient \u201cI,\u201d which\nreveals itself in relation to those feelings in various activities, such\nas imagination, remembrance, and will.\n\nBerkeley thus indeed acknowledges the distinction between Being-for-self\nand Other-Being, which in his case, however, itself falls within the\n\u201cI.\u201d Of the matter on which activity is directed, it is no doubt in\nregard to one portion allowed that it does not exist outside of mind\u2014that\nis to say, so far as our thoughts, inward feelings and states, or the\noperations of our imaginary powers are concerned. But in like manner the\nmanifold sensuous conceptions and feelings can only exist in a mind.\nLocke certainly distinguished extension and movement, for example, as\nfundamental qualities, _i.e._ as qualities which pertain to the objects\nin themselves. But Berkeley very pertinently points out inconsistency\nhere from the point of view that great and small, quick and slow, hold\ngood as something relative; thus were extension and movement to be\ninherent or implicit, they could not be either large or small, quick or\nslow; that is, they could not be, for these determinations rest in the\nconception[282] of such qualities. In Berkeley the relation of things\nto consciousness is alone dealt with, and beyond this relationship\nthey do not in his view come. From this it follows that it is only\nself-consciousness that possesses them; for a perception which is not in\na conceiving mind is nothing: it is a direct contradiction. There can\nbe no substance, he says, which neither conceives nor perceives, and\nwhich is yet the substratum of perceptions and conceptions. If it is\nrepresented that there is something outside of consciousness which is\nsimilar to the conceptions, this is likewise contradictory; a conception\ncan alone be similar to a conception, the idea to the idea alone.[283]\n\nThus, while Locke\u2019s ultimate point is abstract substance, Being generally\nwith the real determination of a substratum of accidents, Berkeley\ndeclares this substance to be the most incomprehensible assumption\nof all; but the incomprehensibility does not make this Being into an\nabsolute nullity, nor does it make it in itself incomprehensible.[284]\nFor Berkeley brings forward against the present existence of external\nobjects only the inconceivability of the relation of a Being to mind.\nThis inconceivability, however, is destroyed in the Notion, for the\nNotion is the negative of things; and this moved Berkeley and Leibnitz\nto shut up the two sides in themselves. There nevertheless remains a\nrelationship of what is \u201cother\u201d to us; these feelings do not develop from\nus as Leibnitz represents, but are determined through somewhat else.\nWhen Leibnitz speaks of development within the monads, it is nothing but\nempty talk; for the monads as they follow in succession have no inward\nconnection. Each individual is thus determined through another, and\nnot through us; and it does not matter what this external is, since it\nremains a contingent. Now in relation to the two sides of Leibnitz which\nare indifferent to one another, Berkeley says that such an \u201cother\u201d is\nquite superfluous. Berkeley calls the other the objects; but these, he\nsays, cannot be what we call matter, for spirit and matter cannot come\ntogether.[285] But the necessity of conceptions directly contradicts\nthis Being-within-self of the conceiver; for the Being-within-self is\nthe freedom of the conceiver; the latter does not, however, produce the\nconceptions with freedom; they have for him the form and determinateness\nof an independent \u201cother.\u201d Berkeley likewise does not accept idealism\nin the subjective sense, but only in respect that there are spirits\nwhich impart themselves (in the other case the subject forms his own\nconceptions), and consequently that it is God alone who brings to\npass such conceptions; thus the imaginations or conceptions which are\nproduced by us with our individual activity remain separate from these\nothers,[286] _i.e._ from the implicit.\n\nThis conception gives an instance of the difficulties which appear in\nregard to these questions, and which Berkeley wished to escape from in\na quite original way. The inconsistency in this system God has again\nto make good; He has to bear it all away; to Him the solution of the\ncontradiction is left. In this idealism, in short, the common sensuous\nview of the universe and the separation of actuality, as also the system\nof thought, of judgments devoid of Notion, remain exactly as before;\nplainly nothing in the content is altered but the abstract form that all\nthings are perceptions only.[287] Such idealism deals with the opposition\nbetween consciousness and its object merely, and leaves the extension\nof the conceptions and the antagonisms of the empirical and manifold\ncontent quite untouched; and if we ask what then is the truth of these\nperceptions and conceptions, as we asked formerly of things, no answer\nis forthcoming. It is pretty much a matter of indifference whether we\nbelieve in things or in perceptions, if self-consciousness remains\npossessed entirely by finalities; it receives the content in the ordinary\nway, and that content is of the ordinary kind. In its individuality it\nstumbles about amid the conceptions of an entirely empirical existence,\nwithout knowing and understanding anything else about the content: that\nis to say in this formal idealism reason has no content of its own.\n\nAs to what Berkeley further states in respect of the empirical content,\nwhere the object of his investigation becomes entirely psychological, it\nrelates in the main to finding out the difference between the sensations\nof sight and feeling, and to discovering which kind of sensations\nbelong to the one and which to the other. This kind of investigation\nkeeps entirely to the phenomenal, and only therein distinguishes the\nvarious sorts of phenomena; or comprehension only reaches as far as to\ndistinctions. The only point of interest is that these investigations\nhave in their course chiefly lighted on space, and a dispute is carried\non as to whether we obtain the conception of distance and so on, in short\nall the conceptions relating to space, through sight or feeling. Space\nis just this sensuous universal, the universal in individuality itself,\nwhich in the empirical consideration of empirical multiplicity invites\nand leads us on to thought (for it itself is thought), and by it this\nvery sensuous perception and reasoning respecting perception is in its\naction confused. And since here perception finds an objective thought,\nit really would be led on to thought or to the possession of a thought,\nbut at the same time it cannot arrive at thought in its completion, since\nthought or the Notion are not in question, and it clearly cannot come\nto the consciousness of true reality. Nothing is thought in the form of\nthought, but only as an external, as something foreign to thought.\n\n\n2. HUME.\n\nWe must add to what has preceded an account of the Scepticism of Hume,\nwhich has been given a more important place in history than it deserves\nfrom its intrinsic nature; its historic importance is due to the fact\nthat Kant really derives the starting point of his philosophy from Hume.\n\nDavid Hume was born in 1711 at Edinburgh and died there in 1776. He\nheld a librarian\u2019s post in that town for some time, then he became\nsecretary to the Embassy in Paris; for quite a long period, indeed,\nhe moved in diplomatic circles. In Paris he came to know Jean Jacques\nRousseau and invited him to England, but Rousseau\u2019s terribly distrustful\nand suspicious nature very soon estranged the two.[288] Hume is more\ncelebrated as a writer of history than through his philosophic works.\nHe wrote: \u201cA Treatise of human nature,\u201d 3 vols., 1739, translated into\nGerman by Jacob, Halle, 1790, 8vo; likewise \u201cEssays and Treatises on\nseveral subjects,\u201d 2 vols. (Vol. I. containing \u201cEssays moral, political\nand literary,\u201d printed for the first time in Edinburgh, 1742; Vol.\nII. containing an \u201cInquiry concerning human understanding,\u201d a further\ndevelopment of the Treatise, and first printed separately in London,\n1748, 8vo). In his \u201cEssays,\u201d which contributed most to his fame as far\nas the philosophic side is concerned, he treated philosophic subjects as\nan educated, thoughtful man of the world would do\u2014not in a systematic\nconnection, nor showing the wide range which his thoughts should properly\nhave been able to attain; in fact in some of his treatises he merely\ndealt with particular points of view.\n\nWe must shortly deal with the main aspects of Hume\u2019s philosophy. He\nstarts directly from the philosophic standpoint of Locke and Bacon,\nwhich derives our conceptions from experience, and his scepticism\nhas the idealism of Berkeley as its object. The sequence of thought\nis this: Berkeley allows all ideas to hold good as they are; in Hume\nthe antithesis of the sensuous and universal has cleared and more\nsharply defined itself, sense being pronounced by him to be devoid of\nuniversality. Berkeley does not make any distinction as to whether in his\nsensations there is a necessary connection or not. Formerly experience\nwas a mixture of the two elements. Hume tells us that all perceptions of\nthe mind may be divided into two classes or species, that of impressions,\n_i.e._ sensuous perceptions, and thoughts or ideas; the latter are\nsimilar in content to the former, but less forcible and lively. All\nobjects of reason are consequently either relations of thoughts such as\nmathematical axioms, or facts of experience.[289] Since Hume makes these\ninto the content he naturally rejects innate ideas.[290]\n\nNow when Hume goes on to consider more closely what is subsumed under\nexperience, he finds categories of the understanding present there, and\nmore especially the determination of the universal and of universal\nnecessity; he took under his consideration more particularly the\ncategory of cause and effect, and in it set forth the rational element,\ninasmuch as in this causal relationship necessity is especially\ncontained. Here Hume really completed the system of Locke, since he\nconsistently drew attention to the fact that if this point of view be\nadhered to, experience is indeed the principle of whatever one knows, or\nperception itself contains everything that happens, but nevertheless the\ndetermination of universality and necessity are not contained in, nor\nwere they given us by experience. Hume has thus destroyed the objectivity\nor absolute nature of thought-determinations. \u201cOur conviction of the\ntruth of a fact rests on feeling, memory, and the reasonings founded on\nthe causal connection, _i.e._ on the relation of cause and effect. The\nknowledge of this relation is not attained by reasonings _a priori_, but\narises entirely from experience; and we draw inferences, since we expect\nsimilar results to follow from similar causes, by reason of the principle\nof the custom or habit of conjoining different manifestations, _i.e._ by\nreason of the principle of the association of ideas. Hence there is no\nknowledge and no metaphysics beyond experience.\u201d[291]\n\nThe simple thought we have here is exactly what Locke says, that we must\nreceive the conception of cause and effect, and thus of a necessary\nconnection, from experience; but experience, as sensuous perception,\ncontains no necessity, has no causal connection. For in what we term\nsuch, that which we properly speaking perceive is merely the fact that\nsomething first of all happens and that then something else follows.\nImmediate perception relates only to a content of conditions or things\nwhich are present alongside of and in succession to one another, but not\nto what we call cause and effect; in time-succession there is thus no\nrelation of cause and effect, and consequently no necessity either.[292]\nWhen we say the pressure of the water is the cause of the destruction of\nthis house, that is no pure experience. We have merely seen the water\npressing or moving along in this direction, and subsequently the house\nfalling down; and so with other examples. Necessity is thus not justified\nby experience, but we carry it into experience; it is accidentally\narrived at by us and is subjective merely. This kind of universality\nwhich we connect with necessity, Hume calls custom. Because we have\noften seen results to follow we are accustomed to regard the connection\nas a necessary one; the necessity to him is thus a quite contingent\nassociation of ideas, which is custom.\n\nIt is the same thing in respect of the universal. What we perceive are\nindividual phenomena and sensations in which we see that this is now\none thing and now another. It may likewise be that we perceive the same\ndetermination frequently repeated and in manifold ways. But this is\nstill far removed from universality; universality is a determination\nwhich is not given to us through experience. It may be said that this is\nquite a correct remark on Hume\u2019s part, if by experience we understand\noutward experience. Experience is sensible that something exists, but\nnevertheless the universal is not as yet present in it. Indeed, sensuous\nexistence as such is something which is set forth as indifferent, not\ndifferentiated from anything else; but sensuous existence is likewise\nuniversal in itself, or the indifference of its determinateness is not\nits only determinateness. But since Hume regards necessity, the unity of\nopposites, as resting quite subjectively on custom, we cannot get any\ndeeper in thought. Custom is indeed so far a necessity in consciousness,\nand to this extent we really see the principle of this idealism in it;\nbut in the second place this necessity is represented as something quite\ndevoid of thought or Notion.\n\nThis custom obtains both in our perception which relates to sensuous\nnature, and in relation to law and morality. The ideas of justice\nand morality rest upon an instinct, on a subjective, but very often\ndeceptive moral feeling.[293] From a sceptical point of view the opposite\nmay likewise be demonstrated. From this side Hume considers justice,\nmorality, religious determinations, and disputes their absolute validity.\nThat is to say when it is assumed that our knowledge arises from\nexperience, and that we must consider only what we obtain thereby to be\nthe truth, we find indeed in our feeling, the sentiment _e.g._ that the\nmurderer, the thief, &c., must be punished; and because this is likewise\nfelt by others it is universally allowed. But Hume, like the sceptics of\nformer days, appeals to the various opinions of various nations: amongst\ndifferent nations and in different times various standards of right have\nbeen held.[294] There are those who in this case do not have the feeling\nof wrong-doing in respect of stealing, _e.g._ the Laced\u00e6monians or the\nso-called innocent inhabitants of the South Sea Islands. What is by\none nation called immoral, shameful and irreligious, is by another not\nconsidered so at all. Thus because such matters rest upon experience,\none subject has such and such an experience, finds, for instance, in his\nreligious feelings this determination which inclines him to God, while\nanother subject has different experiences altogether. We are in the\nhabit of allowing one thing to be just and moral, others have another\nmode of regarding it. Hence if the truth depends upon experience, the\nelement of universality, of objectivity, &c., comes from elsewhere,\nor is not justified by experience. Hume thus declared this sort of\nuniversality, as he declared necessity, to be rather subjectively than\nobjectively existent; for custom is just a subjective universality of\nthis kind. This is an important and acute observation in relation to\nexperience looked at as the source of knowledge; and it is from this\npoint that the Kantian reflection now begins.\n\nHume (Essays and Treatises on several subjects, Vol. III. Sect. 8, 11)\nthen extended his scepticism to the conceptions and doctrines of freedom\nand necessity, and to the proofs of the existence of God; and in fact\nscepticism here possesses a wide field. To such a system of reasoning\nfrom thoughts and possibilities another method of reasoning may again be\nopposed, and this reasoning is no better than the other. What is said to\nbe metaphysically established regarding immortality, God, nature, &c.,\nlacks a real ground for resting upon, such as is professed to be given;\nfor the inferences on which men ground their proofs are subjectively\nformed conceptions. But where a universality is found, it does not rest\nin the matter in itself, but is simply a subjective necessity which is\nreally mere custom. Hence the result which Hume arrives at is necessarily\nastonishment regarding the condition of human knowledge, a general state\nof mistrust, and a sceptical indecision\u2014which indeed does not amount\nto much. The condition of human knowledge regarding which Hume so much\nwonders, he further describes as containing an antagonism between reason\nand instinct; this instinct, it is said, which embraces many sorts of\npowers, inclinations, &c., deceives us in many different ways, and reason\ndemonstrates this. But on the other side it is empty, without content\nor principles of its own; and if a content is in question at all, it\nmust keep to those inclinations. In itself reason thus has no criterion\nwhereby the antagonism between individual desires, and between itself and\nthe desires, may be settled.[295] Thus everything appears in the form of\nan irrational existence devoid of thought; the implicitly true and right\nis not in thought, but in the form of an instinct, a desire.\n\n\nB. SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY.\n\nIn Scotland quite another school of thought developed, and the Scotch\nare the foremost of Hume\u2019s opponents; in German philosophy, on the other\nhand, we have to recognize in Kant another opposing force to that of\nHume. To the Scottish school many philosophers belong; English philosophy\nis now restricted to Edinburgh and Glasgow, in which places a number\nof professors belonging to this school succeeded one another. To the\nscepticism of Hume they oppose an inward independent source of truth for\nall that pertains to religion and morality. This coincides with Kant, who\nalso maintains an inward source or spring as against external perception;\nbut in the case of Kant this has quite another form than that which it\npossesses with the Scottish philosophers. To them this inward independent\nsource is not thought or reason as such, for the content which comes to\npass from this inwardness is concrete in its nature, and likewise demands\nfor itself the external matter of experience. It consists of popular\nprinciples, which on the one hand are opposed to the externality of the\nsources of knowledge, and, on the other, to metaphysics as such, to\nabstract thought or reasoning on its own account. This sort of reasoning\nunderstanding applied itself to ethics and to politics\u2014sciences which\nhave been much developed by German, French, and above all by Scottish\nphilosophers (_supra_, p. 320): they regarded morality as cultured men\nwould, and sought to bring moral duties under a principle. Many of their\nworks are translated into German; several of these on ethics or morality\nare translated by Garve, for instance, who also translated Cicero _De\nOfficiis_, and they are written in a manner similar to that of Cicero\nwhen he uses the expression _Insitum est a natura_ (Vol. I. p. 93). This\nmoral sentiment and the ordinary human understanding hereafter formed the\ncommon principle to a whole succession of Scots, such as Thomas Reid,\nBeattie, Oswald, and others; in this way they frequently made sagacious\nobservations, but with them speculative philosophy quite disappears. One\nspecial characteristic of these Scottish philosophers is that they have\nsought accurately to define the principle of knowledge; but on the whole\nthey start from the same point as that which was in Germany likewise\naccepted as the principle. That is to say they represented the so-called\nhealthy reason, or common-sense (_sensus communis_), as the ground of\ntruth. The following are the principal members of this school, each of\nwhom has some special feature distinguishing him from the rest.\n\n\n1. THOMAS REID.\n\nThomas Reid, born in 1710, died as a professor in Glasgow in 1796.[296]\nHe maintained the principle of common-sense. His endeavour was to\ndiscover the principles of knowledge, and the following are his\nconclusions: \u201c(a) There are certain undemonstrated and undemonstrable\nfundamental truths which common-sense begets and recognizes as\nimmediately conclusive and absolute.\u201d This hence constitutes an immediate\nknowledge; in it an inward independent source is set forth which is\nhereby opposed to religion as revealed. \u201c(b) These immediate truths\nrequire no support from any elaborated science, nor do they submit to\nits criticism;\u201d they cannot be criticized by philosophy. \u201c(c) Philosophy\nitself has no root other than that of an immediate, self-enlightening\ntruth; whatever contradicts such truth is in itself false, contradictory,\nand absurd.\u201d This is true for knowledge and \u201c(d) Morality; the individual\nis moral if he acts in accordance with the perfect principles of the\nperfection of the whole and with his own duty as it is known to him.\u201d[297]\n\n\n2. JAMES BEATTIE.\n\nJames Beattie, born 1735, was a professor of moral philosophy in\nEdinburgh and Aberdeen, and died in 1803. He likewise made common-sense\nthe source of all knowledge. \u201cThe common-sense of the plain human\nunderstanding is the source of all morality, of all religion, and\nall certainty. The confirmation of common-sense must be added to the\ntestimony of our senses. The truth is what the necessities of my\nnature call upon me to believe. Belief signifies conviction in the\ncase of truths which are certain, in that of those which are probable,\napprobation. The truth which is certain is known by means of intuition,\nthe probable truth by means of proofs.\u201d[298] Such convictions as are\nquite certain form the basis of actions.\n\n\n3. JAMES OSWALD.\n\nJames Oswald, a Scottish clergyman, made use of an expression which\nindicates that we have the principles just mentioned as facts existing\nwithin us.[299] \u201cThe existence of the Divine Being is (according to\nhim) a fact absolutely raised above all reasoning and all doubt, and\nimmediately certain for the common-sense of morality.\u201d[300] The same\nprinciple was likewise established in Germany at this time\u2014an inward\nrevelation, a knowledge of the conscience, and specially of God and His\nBeing.\n\n\n4. DUGALD STEWART.\n\nTo this school also belong Dugald Stewart, Edward Search,[301] Ferguson,\nand Hutcheson, most of whom have written on morals. The political\neconomist Adam Smith from this point of view is likewise a philosopher,\nand the best known of them all. This Scottish philosophy is now given\nforth in Germany as something new. It is a popular philosophy, which,\non the one hand, has the great merit of seeking in man, and in his\nconsciousness, for the source of all that should be held by him as\ntrue, the immanence of what should be by him esteemed. The content is\nat the same time a concrete content; in a certain degree, it is the\nantithesis of metaphysics proper, of the wandering about in abstract\ndeterminations of the understanding. Of these Scots, Dugald Stewart, who\nis living still,[302] appears to be the last and least significant; in\nthem all there is the same ground-work to be found, the same circle of\nreflection, namely, an _a priori_ philosophy, though not one which is to\nbe pursued in a speculative way. The general idea which pervades their\nprinciple is that of the healthy human understanding; to this they have\nadded benevolent desires, sympathy, a moral sense, and from such grounds\ncomposed very excellent moral writings. That is certainly all very well\nin order to understand approximately, up to a certain degree of culture,\nwhat universal thoughts are, in order to narrate their history, to appeal\nto examples, and to explain them; but further it does not extend.\n\nIn more recent times this Scottish philosophy has passed to France,\nand Professor Royer-Collard, now president of the Second Chamber,[303]\nas also his disciple, Jouffroy, in conformity with it, pass from the\nfacts of consciousness through cultured reasoning and experience, to a\nfurther stage in development. What by the French is called _Id\u00e9ologie_\n(_supra_, p. 308) has also its place here; it is abstract metaphysics,\nin so far as it is an enumeration and analysis of the most simple\nthought-determinations. They are not treated dialectically, but from our\nreflection, from our thoughts, the material is derived, and in this the\ndeterminations therein contained are demonstrated.\n\n\nC. FRENCH PHILOSOPHY.\n\nWe pass on to the French philosophy; the relation it bears to\nmetaphysics is this, that while man as a metaphysician stands to\nhimself in the attitude of a layman or outsider, French philosophy does\naway with the lay or outside position in regard alike to politics,\nreligion, and philosophy. Two forms have to be mentioned which are of\nthe greatest importance in respect to culture\u2014French philosophy and\nthe _Aufkl\u00e4rung_. With the English we saw a certain idealism only:\nthis was either formal, as the mere general translation of Being\ninto Being-for-another, _i.e._ into perceptibility, or else what is\nimplicit in this perceptibility, instincts, impulses, habits, &c.\u2014blind\ndeterminate forces; a return into self-consciousness, which itself\nappears as a physical thing. In that first idealism the whole finitude\nand extension of appearances, of sensations, and likewise of thoughts\nand determinate fixed conceptions, remain just what they are in the\nunphilosophic consciousness. The scepticism of Hume makes all that is\nuniversal sink into habits and instincts, _i.e._ it consists in a more\nsimple synthesis of the phenomenal world; but these simpler elements,\nthese instincts, impulses, and forces, are just as much a fixed present\nexistence in self-consciousness, unspiritual, and without movement. The\nFrench philosophy has more life, more movement, more spirit; it would\nperhaps be more correct to describe it as full of life and spirit. It\nis the absolute Notion, which revolts against the whole reigning system\nof prevalent conceptions and established ideas, which overthrows all\nthat has settled into fixity, and acquires the consciousness of perfect\nliberty. At the root of this idealistic activity lies the certainty that\nwhatever is, whatever counts for anything in itself, is all a matter of\nself-consciousness; and as to Notions (individual and isolated existences\nruling actual self-consciousness), such as the Notions of good and evil,\nof power and riches, and the fixed conceptions regarding faith in God\nand His relation to the world, His mode of government and, further, the\nduties of self-consciousness towards Him\u2014that all these are not truths\nin themselves, having validity beyond the bounds of self-consciousness.\nAll these forms, the real implicitude of the actual world and also of the\nsupersensuous world, are therefore set aside in this spirit conscious of\nitself. It does not trouble itself seriously about those who admit the\nvalidity of these conceptions just as they are, and accept them as true,\nrespecting them as independent and free apart from self-consciousness,\nbut it speaks of such conceptions with intelligence and spirit, that is\nto say, it asserts that self-consciousness by its activity is the first\nto make anything of them, and to make that a something very different\nfrom what they profess to be; for the self-conscious spirit only\nintellectual relations, these processes of formation and movement by\nmeans of its self-consciousness, possess validity and interest. This is\nthe character of the Notion in its actuality; what has reality for this\nall-perceiving and all-comprehending consciousness is held to be valid.\n\nWe must now consider what form existence takes for this absolutely\ncomprehending self-consciousness. In the first place this Notion is\nfixed as the negative movement of the Notion only; the positive and\nsimple, or existence, falls outside of this movement. There remains to\nthe Notion no distinction, no content; for all determinate content is\nlost in that negativity. This empty existence is for us pure thought\ngenerally, what the French call _\u00eatre supr\u00eame_, or if represented\nobjectively as existent, and as in opposition to consciousness, it\nis matter. Absolute Being is therefore determined as matter, as\nempty objectivity, through a Notion which destroys all content and\ndetermination, and has as its object this universal alone. It is a Notion\nwhich acts only destructively, and does not again construct itself\nout of this matter or pure thought or pure substantiality. We here\nsee so-called materialism and atheism freely emerge, as the necessary\nresult of the pure comprehending self-consciousness. From one point\nof view there perishes in this negative movement all determination\nwhich represents spirit as something beyond self-consciousness, and\nmore especially all determinations within the spirit, and also those\nwhich express it as spirit, indeed all the conceptions formed of it\nby faith, for which it has validity as an existent self-consciousness\nbeyond self-consciousness\u2014in short, all that is traditional or\nimposed by authority. There remains only a present, actual Being, for\nself-consciousness recognizes implicit existence only in the form which\nit has for self-consciousness, and in which it is actually known to\nitself; in matter, and matter as actively extending and realizing itself\nin multiplicity, _i.e._ as nature. In the present I am conscious to\nmyself of my reality, and consequently self-consciousness finds itself as\nmatter, finds the soul to be material, and conceptions to be movements\nand changes in the inner organ of the brain, which result from external\nimpressions on the senses. Thought is therefore a mode of the existence\nof matter. The One Substance of Spinoza, to which French materialism\nas naturalism is parallel, really finds its accomplishment here in\nthis object as in all respects the ultimate; but while in Spinoza this\ncategory is a possession which we find ready to hand, here it appears\nas the result of the abstraction of the understanding proceeding from\nempiricism.\n\nThe other form of the _Aufkl\u00e4rung_ is, on the contrary, when absolute\nBeing is set forth as something beyond self-consciousness, so that\nof itself, of its implicit Being, nothing whatever can be known. It\nbears the empty name of God. For though God may be determined in any\nway whatever, all these determinations fall away; He is, like _x_,\nthe altogether unknown quantity. This view is not therefore to be\ntermed atheism, in the first place because it still employs the empty,\nmeaningless name, and in the second place because it expresses the\nnecessary relations of self-consciousness, duties, &c., not as necessary\nin an absolute sense, but as necessary through relation to another,\nnamely to the unknown\u2014although there can be no positive relation to\nan unknown except by abrogating the self as particular. Yet it is not\nmatter, because this simple and empty something is negatively defined as\nnon-existent for self-consciousness. This all comes to the same thing,\nhowever, for matter is the universal, and is Being-for-self represented\nas abrogated. But the true reflection on that unknown is this, that it\nexists for self-consciousness simply as a negative of the same, _i.e._\nas matter, reality, the present; it is this negative for me, this is its\nNotion. The difference distinguishing this from what appears to be in its\nentirety something \u201cother,\u201d and in which any one side is not permitted\nto say that what it thinks is such is that particular thing, is the\ndifference which rests on this last abstraction.\n\nSince then the Notion is present only in its negative form, positive\nextension remains without a Notion; it has the form of nature, of an\nexistent, both in the physical and in the moral sphere. The knowledge\nof nature remains the ordinary, scientifically unspeculative knowledge,\nand as to its essence, in so far as it claims to be philosophy, it is a\ngeneral way of speaking that plays with the words, \u201cforces, relations,\nmanifold connections,\u201d but arrives at nothing definite. Similarly, in\nthe spiritual sphere, it is so far true that the metaphysic of the\nspirit is of such a nature that it is nothing more nor less than a\nparticular organization by means of which the powers which are termed\nsensation, perception, &c., come into existence; but this is a wearisome\nway of talking, which can make nothing intelligible, which accepts\nappearances and perceptions and reasons about them, but none the less\nreduces their implicit existence to certain determinate forces, of the\ninward nature of which we know nothing further. The determination and\nknowledge of the moral sphere has similarly for its object to bring\nman back to his so-called natural promptings; its essence has the form\nof a natural impulse, and this natural impulse is termed self-love,\nselfishness, or benevolence. It is required that man should live in\nconformity with nature; but this nature does not reach further than\ngeneral expressions and descriptions, such as the state of nature we\nfind depicted by Rousseau. What is called the metaphysic of ordinary\nconceptions is the empiricism of Locke, which seeks to show their origin\nto be in consciousness, in as far as it is individual consciousness;\nwhich, when born into the world, emerges out of unconsciousness in order\nto acquire knowledge as sensuous consciousness. This external origin\nthey confound with the Becoming and Notion of the matter in point. If\none were to ask vaguely what is the origin and genesis of water, and\nthe answer were to be given that it comes from the mountains or from\nrain, this would be a reply in the spirit of the above philosophy. In\nshort, it is only the negative aspect that is interesting, and as for\nthis positive French philosophy, it is out of the question. But even the\nnegative side of it belongs properly to culture mainly, with which we\nhave here nothing to do, and the _Aufkl\u00e4rung_ likewise belongs to the\nsame. In the French philosophic writings, which in this respect are of\nimportance, what is worthy of admiration is the astonishing energy and\nforce of the Notion as directed against existence, against faith, against\nall the power of authority that had held sway for thousands of years.\nOn the one hand we cannot help remarking the feeling of utter rebellion\nagainst the whole state of affairs at present prevailing, a state which\nis alien to self-consciousness, which would fain dispense with it, and\nin which self-consciousness does not find itself; there is a certainty\nof the truth of reason, which challenges the whole intellectual world\nas it stands aloof, and is confident of destroying it. French atheism,\nmaterialism, or naturalism has overcome all prejudices, and has been\nvictorious over the senseless hypotheses and assumptions of the positive\nelement in religion, which is associated with habits, manners, opinions,\ndeterminations as to law and morality and civil institutions. With the\nhealthy human understanding and earnestness of spirit, and not with\nfrivolous declamations, it has rebelled against the condition of the\nworld as legally established, against the constitution of the state, the\nadministration of justice, the mode of government, political authority,\nand likewise against art.\n\nContrasting with this barren content there is the other and fertile\nside. The positive is in its turn constituted by so-called immediately\nenlightening truths of the healthy human understanding, which contains\nnothing except this truth and the claim to find itself, and beyond\nthis form does not pass. But in so doing there arises the endeavour\nto grasp the absolute as something present, and at the same time as\nan object of thought and as absolute unity: an endeavour which, as it\nimplies denial of the conception of design both in the natural and in\nthe spiritual sphere\u2014the former involving the idea of life, and the\nlatter that of spirit and freedom\u2014only reaches to the abstraction of a\nnature undetermined in itself, to sensation, mechanism, self-seeking,\nand utility. It is this then that we shall have to make evident in the\npositive side of French philosophy. In their political constitutions\nthe French have, it is true, started from abstractions, but they have\ndone so as from universal thoughts, which are the negative of reality;\nthe English, on the other hand, proceed from concrete reality, from the\nunwieldy structure of their constitution; just as their writers even have\nnot attained to universal principles. What Luther began in the heart\nonly and in the feelings\u2014the freedom of spirit which, unconscious of its\nsimple root, does not comprehend itself, and yet is the very universal\nitself, for which all content disappears in the thought that fills itself\nwith itself\u2014these universal determinations and thoughts the French\nasserted and steadfastly adhered to: they are universal principles, in\nthe form of the conviction of the individual in himself. Freedom becomes\nthe condition of the world, connects itself with the world\u2019s history and\nforms epochs in the same; it is the concrete freedom of the spirit, a\nconcrete universality; fundamental principles as regards the concrete\nnow take the place of the abstract metaphysic of Descartes. Among the\nGermans we find mere chatter; they would have liked to offer explanations\nalso, but all they have to give is in the form of miserable phenomena\nand individualism. The French, from their starting-point of the thought\nof universality, and the German liberty of conscience starting from\nthe conscience which teaches us to \u201cProve all things,\u201d to \u201chold fast\nthat which is good,\u201d have, however, joined hands with one another, or\nthey follow the same path. Only the French, as though they were without\nconscience, have made short work of everything, and have systematically\nadhered to a definite thought\u2014the physiocratic system; while the Germans\nwish to leave themselves a free retreat, and examine from the standpoint\nof conscience whether a certain course is permissible. The French warred\nagainst the speculative Notion with the spirit, the Germans did so with\nthe understanding. We find in the French a deep all-embracing philosophic\nneed, different from anything in the English and Scotch and even in the\nGermans, and full of vitality: it is a universal concrete view of all\nthat exists, with entire independence both of all authority and of all\nabstract metaphysics. The method employed is that of development from\nperception, from the heart; it is a comprehensive view of the entire\nmatter, which keeps the whole ever in sight, and seeks to uphold and\nattain to it.\n\nThis healthy human understanding, this sound reason, with its content\ntaken from the human breast, from natural feeling, has directed itself\nagainst the religious side of things in various moments: on the one hand\nand first of all, as French philosophy, it did so against the Catholic\nreligion, the fetters of superstition and of the hierarchy; on the other\nhand, in less pronounced form, as the German \u201cillumination,\u201d against the\nProtestant religion, in as far as it has a content which it has derived\nfrom revelation, from ecclesiastical authority in general. On the one\nhand the form of authority in general was challenged, and on the other\nhand its matter. The content can be easily enough disposed of by this\nform of thought, which is not what we understand by reason, but which\nmust be termed understanding; it is easy for the understanding to show\nobjections to the ultimate principles of what can be comprehended only\nby means of speculation. The understanding has thus tried the content\nof religion by its standard, and has condemned it; the understanding\nproceeds in the same way against a concrete philosophy. What of religion\nhas in many theologies been very commonly left remaining is what is\ntermed theism, faith in general; this is the same content which is\nfound also in Mohammedanism. But along with this attack upon religion\non the part of the reasoning understanding there has been also a\nmovement towards materialism, atheism and naturalism. It is true that we\nshould not make the charge of atheism lightly, for it is a very common\noccurrence that an individual whose ideas about God differ from those\nof other people is charged with lack of religion, or even with atheism.\nBut here it really is the case that this philosophy has developed into\natheism, and has defined matter, nature, &c., as that which is to be\ntaken as the ultimate, the active, and the efficient. Some Frenchmen,\nRousseau for instance, are not, however, to be included with the rest;\none of this author\u2019s works, \u201cThe Confession of Faith of a Vicar,\u201d[304]\ncontains the very same theism which is found in German theologians.\nThus French metaphysics finds a parallel not only in Spinoza (_supra_,\np. 382) but also in the German metaphysics of Wolff. Other Frenchmen\nhave confessedly gone over to naturalism; among them is specially to be\nmentioned Mirabaud, to whom the _Syst\u00e8me de la Nature_ is attributed.\n\nIn what has been termed French philosophy, represented by Voltaire,\nMontesquieu, Rousseau, d\u2019Alembert, Diderot, and in what subsequently\nappeared in Germany as the _Aufkl\u00e4rung_, and has been also stigmatized as\natheism, we may now distinguish three aspects, first, the negative side,\nto which most exception has been taken; secondly, the positive side;\nthirdly, the philosophical, metaphysical side.\n\n\n1. THE NEGATIVE ASPECT.\n\nJustice must be done even to this negative side, as to everything else;\nwhat is substantial in it is the attack of the reasoning instinct\nagainst a condition of degeneracy, I may even say of utter and universal\nfalsehood; for instance, against the positive side of a religion that\nhas become wooden and lifeless. What we call religion is firm faith,\nconviction that there is a God; if this is faith in the doctrines of\nChristianity, it is more or less abstracted from. But in this attack\nagainst religion we have to think of something quite different from the\nabove; in what we find here, the positive of religion is the negative\nof reason. If we would understand the feeling of indignation to which\nthese writers give utterance, we must keep before our eyes the state of\nreligion in those days, with its might and magnificence, the corruption\nof its manners, its avarice, its ambition, its luxury, for which\nnevertheless reverence was claimed\u2014a state of contradiction present and\nexistent. We perceive into what a frightful condition of formalism and\ndeadness positive religion had sunk, as had the bonds of society as\nwell, the means employed for the administration of justice, the power of\nthe state. This French philosophy also attacked the state; it assailed\nprejudices and superstition, especially the depravity of civic life, of\ncourt manners and of Government officials; it laid hold of and brought to\nlight the evil, the ridiculous, the base, and exposed the whole tissue\nof hypocrisy and unjust power to the derision, the contempt and the\nhatred of the world at large, and thus brought men\u2019s minds and hearts\ninto a state of indifference to the idols of the world and indignation\nagainst them. Old institutions, which in the sense of self-conscious\nfreedom and humanity that had developed, no longer found a place, and\nwhich had formerly been founded and upheld by mutual good feeling and the\nobtuseness of a consciousness unconscious of self, institutions which\nwere no longer in harmony with the spirit that had established them,\nand now, in consequence of the advance that had been made in scientific\nculture, were bound to make good to reason their claim to be sacred and\njust,\u2014this was the formalism that those philosophers overthrew. In making\ntheir attacks, they wrote sometimes with reasoned argument, sometimes\nsatirically, sometimes in the language of plain common-sense, and they\ndid not wage war on what we call religion; that was left quite unharmed,\nand its claims were urged with words of choicest eloquence. Those who\nenforced these views were therefore agents of destruction against that\nalone which was in itself already destroyed. We place it to our credit\nwhen we reproach the French for their attacks upon religion and on the\nstate. We must represent to ourselves the horrible state of society, the\nmisery and degradation in France, in order to appreciate the services\nthat these writers rendered. Hypocrisy and cant, imbecility of mind\nand the tyranny which sees itself robbed of its prey, may say that\nattacks were made on religion, on the state, and on manners. But what a\nreligion! Not the religion that Luther purified, but the most wretched\nsuperstition, priestly domination, stupidity, degradation of mind, and\nmore especially the squandering of riches and the revelling in temporal\npossessions in the midst of public misery. And what a state! The blindest\ntyranny of ministers and their mistresses, wives and chamberlains; so\nthat a vast army of petty tyrants and idlers looked upon it as a right\ndivinely given them to plunder the revenues of the state and lay hands\nupon the product of the nation\u2019s sweat. The shamelessness, the dishonesty\nwere past belief; and morals were simply in keeping with the corruptness\nof the institutions. We see the law defied by individuals in respect to\ncivil and political life; we see it likewise set at nought in respect to\nconscience and thought.\n\nIn regard to practical politics, the writers in question never even\nthought of a revolution, but desired and demanded reforms alone, and\nthat these should be subjective mainly; they called on the Government to\nsweep away abuses, and appoint honourable men as ministers. The positive\nrecommendations made by them as to the course to be pursued were, for\nexample, that the royal children should receive a good upbringing, that\nprinces should be of frugal habits, &c. The French Revolution was forced\non by the stiff-necked obstinacy of prejudices, by haughtiness, utter\nwant of thought, and avarice. The philosophers of whom we are speaking\nwere able to give only a general idea of what ought to be done; they\ncould not indicate the mode in which the reforms were to be carried\nout. It was the Government\u2019s business to make arrangements and carry\nout reforms in concrete shape; but it did not perceive this. What the\nphilosophers brought forward and maintained as a remedy for this horrible\nstate of disorder was, speaking generally, that men should no longer be\nin the position of laymen, either with regard to religion or to law; so\nthat in religious matters there should not be a hierarchy, a limited and\nselected number of priests, and in the same way that there should not\nbe in legal matters an exclusive caste and society (not even a class\nof professional lawyers), in whom should reside, and to whom should be\nrestricted, the knowledge of what is eternal, divine, true, and right,\nand by whom other men should be commanded and directed; but that human\nreason should have the right of giving its assent and its opinion. To\ntreat barbarians as laymen is quite as it should be\u2014barbarians are\nnothing but laymen; but to treat thinking men as laymen is very hard.\nThis great claim made by man to subjective freedom, perception and\nconviction, the philosophers in question contended for heroically and\nwith splendid genius, with warmth and fire, with spirit and courage,\nmaintaining that a man\u2019s own self, the human spirit, is the source from\nwhich is derived all that is to be respected by him. There thus manifests\nitself in them the fanaticism of abstract thought. We Germans were\npassive at first with regard to the existing state of affairs, we endured\nit; in the second place, when that state of affairs was overthrown, we\nwere just as passive: it was overthrown by the efforts of others, we let\nit be taken away from us, we suffered it all to happen.\n\nIn Germany, Frederick II. allied himself with this culture, a rare\nexample in those days. French court manners, operas, gardens, dresses,\nwere widely adopted in Germany, but not French philosophy; yet in the\nform of wit and jest much of it found its way into this upper world,\nand much that was evil and barbarous was driven away. Frederick II.,\nwithout having been brought up on melancholy psalms, without having had\nto learn one or two of them every day by heart, without the barbarous\nmetaphysics and logic of Wolff (for what did he find to admire in Germany\nexcept Gellert?), was well acquainted with the great, although formal and\nabstract principles of religion and the state, and governed in accordance\ntherewith, as far as circumstances allowed. Nothing else was at that time\nrequired in his nation; one cannot ask that he should have reformed and\nrevolutionized it, since not a single person yet demanded representative\ngovernment and the publicity of courts of justice. He introduced what\nthere was need of, religious tolerance, legislation, improvements in\nthe administration of justice, economy in the revenues of state; of the\nwretched German law there remained no longer in his states even the\nmerest phantom. He showed what was the object and purpose of the state,\nand at the same time cast down all privileges, the private rights which\npertained to Germans, and arbitrary statute laws. It is foolish when\ncant and German pseudo-patriotism pounce down upon him now, and try to\ndisparage the greatness of a man whose influence was so enormous, and\nwould even detract from his fame by a charge of vanity and wickedness.\nWhat German patriotism aims at should be reasonable.\n\n\n2. THE POSITIVE ASPECT.\n\nThe affirmative content of this philosophy certainly does not satisfy\nthe requirements of profundity. A leading characteristic of its\nteaching, which is found also with the Scottish philosophers and with\nourselves, is the assumption of primitive feelings of justice which man\nhas in himself, as for example benevolence and social instincts which\nshould be cultivated. The positive source of knowledge and of justice\nis placed in human reason and the common consciousness of mankind, in\nthe healthy human reason, and not in the form of the Notion. It is\ncertainly wonderful to find truths expressed in the form of universal\nthoughts, respecting which it is of infinite importance that they should\nbe assumptions present in the human mind: that man has in his heart the\nfeeling of right, of love to his fellow-creatures: that religion and\nfaith are not matters of compulsion; that merit, talent, virtue are the\ntrue nobility, &c. An important question, especially among the Germans,\nwas what is the end and character of man, by which was meant the nature\nof his mind and spirit; and certainly, as far as the spiritual is\nconcerned, it is to this point that we must return. But in order to find\nthe nature of spirit, to discover what this determination is, a return\nwas made to perception, observation, experience, to the existence of\ncertain impulses. These are certainly determinations in ourselves, but\nwe have not known them in their necessity. Such an impulse is besides\ntaken as natural, and thus it is here indeterminate in itself, it has\nits limitation only as a moment of the whole. In regard to knowledge,\nvery abstract thoughts are to be found\u2014though of a truth they are quite\nas good as ours, and more ingenious\u2014which according to their content\nought to be concrete, and also were so. But so superficially were they\ncomprehended that they soon showed themselves far from sufficient for\nwhat had to be derived from them. They said, for instance, that Nature\nis a whole, that all is determined by laws, through a combination of\ndifferent movements, through a chain of causes and effects, and so on;\nthe various properties, materials, connections of things bring everything\nto pass. These are general phrases, with which one can fill whole books.\n\n\na. SYST\u00c8ME DE LA NATURE.\n\nTo this philosophy belongs the _Syst\u00e8me de la Nature_, the leading work\non the subject, written in Paris by a German, Baron von Hollbach, who was\nthe central figure of all those philosophers. Montesquieu, d\u2019Alembert,\nRousseau, were for a time in his circle; however much these men were\nmoved to indignation at the existing state of things, they were yet\nin other respects very different from one another. The _Syst\u00e8me de la\nNature_ may very easily be found tiresome to read, because it treats\ndiscursively of general conceptions, which are often repeated; it is not\na French book, for vivacity is lacking and the mode of presentation is\ndull.\n\nThe great Whole of Nature (_le grand tout de la nature_) is the ultimate:\n\u201cThe universe displays nothing but an immense collection of matter and\nmotion\u201d (as with Descartes), \u201can unbroken chain of causes and effects, of\nwhich causes some directly affect our senses, while others are unknown\nto us, because their effects, which we perceive, are too remote from\ntheir causes. The different qualities of these materials, their manifold\nconnections, and the effects which result therefrom, constitute essences\nfor us. From the diversity of these essences arise the different orders,\nspecies, systems, under which things fall, and whose sum total, the great\nwhole, is what we call Nature.\u201d[305] It is like what Aristotle (_vide_\nVol. I. p. 241) says of Xenophanes, that he gazed into the blue, _i.e._\ninto Being. According to Hollbach all is movement, matter moves itself:\nbeer ferments, the soul is moved by its passions.[306] \u201cThe manifold\nvariety of natural phenomena, and their incessant rise and disappearance,\nhave their sole ground in the variety of motions and of their material.\u201d\nThrough different combinations and modifications, through a different\narrangement, another thing is originated. \u201cMaterial substances have\neither a tendency to combine with one another, or else they are incapable\nof so combining. Upon this are based by physical scientists the forces of\nattraction and repulsion, sympathy and antipathy, affinity and relation;\nand the moralists base thereon hatred and love, friendship and enmity.\u201d\nSpirit, the incorporeal, contradicts or opposes itself to motion, to a\nchange of the relations of a body in space.[307]\n\n\nb. ROBINET.\n\nAnother work of importance is the still more \u201cdangerous\u201d treatise, _De la\nNature_, by Robinet. In it there reigns quite a different and a deeper\nspirit; one is frequently struck by the depth of earnestness which the\nwriter displays. He begins thus: \u201cThere is a God, _i.e._ a cause of the\nphenomena of that Whole which we call Nature. Who is God? We know not,\nand we are so constituted that we can never know in what order of things\nwe have been placed. We cannot know God perfectly, because the means of\ndoing so will always be lacking to us. We too might write over the doors\nof our temples the words which were to be read upon the altar which the\nAreopagite raised, \u2018To the unknown God.\u2019\u201d The very same thing is said\nnow-a-days: there can be no transition from the finite to the infinite.\n\u201cThe order which reigns in the universe is just as little the visible\ntype of His wisdom, as our weak mind is the image of His intelligence.\u201d\nBut this First Cause, God, is according to Robinet a creative God, He\nhas brought Nature into existence; so that for him the only possible\nknowledge is that of Nature. \u201cThere is only One Cause. The eternal Cause,\nwho so to speak had sown (_engrain\u00e9_) events one in the other, in order\nthat they might without fail follow one upon another as He chose, in\nthe beginning set in motion the endless chain of things. Through this\npermanent impression the Universe goes on living, moving and perpetuating\nitself. From the unity of cause there follows the unity of activity, for\neven it does not appear as something to be more or less admitted. By\nvirtue of this single act all things come to pass. Since man has made\nNature his study, he has found no isolated phenomenon, and no independent\ntruth, because there are not and cannot be such. The whole sustains\nitself through the mutual correspondence of its parts.\u201d[308] The activity\nof Nature is one, as God is One.\n\nThis activity, more particularly regarded, signifies that germs unfold\nthemselves in everything: everywhere there are organic Beings which\nproduce themselves; nothing is isolated, everything is combined and\nconnected and in harmony. Robinet here goes through the plants, the\nanimals, and also the metals, the elements, air, fire, water, &c.; and\nseeks from them to demonstrate the existence of the germ in whatever has\nlife, and also how metals are organized in themselves. \u201cThe example of\nthe polypus is convincing as to the animal nature (_animalit\u00e9_) of the\nsmallest portions of organized matter; for the polypus is a group of\nassociated polypi, each of which is as much a true polypus as the first.\nIt stands proved that from the same point of view the living consists\nonly of the living, the animals of minute animals, every animal in\nparticular of minute animals of the same kind, a dog of dog-germs, man of\nhuman germs.\u201d In proof of this Robinet states in a \u201cRecapitulation\u201d that\n\u201canimal sperm swarms with spermatic animalcules.\u201d Since he then connects\nevery propagation properly so-called with the co-operation of both sexes,\nhe alleges that every individual is inwardly or also in the external\norgans a hermaphrodite. Of the minerals he says: \u201cAre we not compelled\nto regard as organic bodies all those in which we meet with an inward\nstructure such as this? It presupposes throughout a seed, seed-granules,\ngerms, of which they are the development.\u201d In the same way the air must\nhave its germ, which does not come to reality until it is nourished by\nwater, fire, &c. \u201cThe air, as principle, is only the germ of the air;\nas it impregnates or saturates itself in varying degrees with water and\nfire, it will gradually pass through different stages of growth: it will\nbecome first embryo, then perfect air.\u201d[309] Robinet gives the name of\ngerm to the simple form in itself, the substantial form, the Notion.\nAlthough he seeks to prove this too much from the sensuous side, he yet\nproceeds from principles in themselves concrete, from the form in itself.\n\nHe speaks also of the evil and good in the world. The result of his\nobservation is that good and evil balance each other; this equilibrium\nconstitutes the beauty of the world. In order to refute the assertion\nthat there is more good than evil in the world, he says that everything\nto which we reduce the good consists only in an enjoyment, a pleasure,\na satisfaction; but this must be preceded by a want, a lack, a pain,\nthe removal of which constitutes satisfaction.[310] This is not only a\ncorrect thought empirically, but it also hints at the deeper idea that\nthere is no activity except through contradiction.\n\n\n3. IDEA OF A CONCRETE UNIVERSAL UNITY.\n\nThe result of the French philosophy is that it insisted on maintaining\na general unity, not abstract, but concrete. Thus Robinet now\npropounded the theory of a universal organic life, and a uniform mode\nof origination; this concrete system he called Nature, over which God\nwas set, but as the unknowable; all predicates which could be expressed\nof Him contained something inapplicable. We must admit that grand\nconceptions of concrete unity are to be found here, as opposed to the\nabstract metaphysical determinations of the understanding, _e.g._ the\nfruitfulness of Nature. But, on the other hand, the point of most\nimportance with these philosophers is that what is to be accepted as\nvalid must have presence, and that man in all knowledge must be himself\nthe knower; for, as we may see, those philosophers made war on all\nexternal authority of state and church, and in particular on abstract\nthought which has no present meaning in us. Two determinations found\nin all philosophy are the concretion of the Idea and the presence of\nthe spirit in the same; my content must at the same time be something\nconcrete, present. This concrete was termed Reason, and for it the\nmore noble of those men contended with the greatest enthusiasm and\nwarmth. Thought was raised like a standard among the nations, liberty of\nconviction and of conscience in me. They said to mankind, \u201cIn this sign\nthou shalt conquer,\u201d for they had before their eyes what had been done in\nthe name of the cross alone, what had been made a matter of faith and\nlaw and religion\u2014they saw how the sign of the cross had been degraded.\nFor in the sign of the cross lying and deceit had been victorious, under\nthis seal institutions had become fossilized, and had sunk into all\nmanner of degradation, so that this sign came to be represented as the\nepitome and root of all evil. Thus in another form they completed the\nReformation that Luther began. This concrete had manifold forms; social\ninstincts in the practical sphere, laws of nature in the theoretical.\nThere is present the absolute impulse to find a compass immanent\nin themselves, _i.e._ in the human mind. For the human mind it is\nimperative to have a fixed point such as this, if, indeed, it is to be\nwithin itself, if it is to be free in its own world at least. But this\nstriving after really present vitality took forms which as by-paths were\nthemselves one-sided. In this striving after unity, which was, however,\nconcrete unity, the further varieties of the content likewise lie.\n\nOn the theoretic side of their philosophy, therefore, the French\nproceeded to materialism or naturalism, because the requirements of the\nunderstanding, as abstract thought, which from a firmly fixed principle\nallows the most monstrous consequences to be drawn, drove them to set up\none principle as ultimate, and that a principle which had at the same\ntime to be present and to lie quite close to experience. Hence they\naccept sensation and matter as the only truth, to which must be reduced\nall thought, all morality, as a mere modification of sensation. The\nunities which the French propounded were in this way one-sided.\n\n\na. OPPOSITION OF SENSATION AND THOUGHT.\n\nTo this one-sidedness belongs the opposition between _sentir_ and\n_penser_, or else, if you like, their identity, making the latter\nonly a result of the former; there is not, however, any speculative\nreconciliation of this opposition in God, such as we find in Spinoza and\nMalebranche. This reduction of all thought to sensation, which in certain\nrespects took place with Locke, becomes a widely extended theory. Robinet\n(_De la Nature_, T. I. P. IV. chap. iii. pp. 257-259) lights also on this\nopposition, beyond which he does not get, that mind and body are not\nseparate, but that the manner in which they are united is inexplicable.\nThe _Syst\u00e8me de la Nature_ (T. I. chap. x. p. 177) is marked by an\nespecially plain reduction of thought to sensation. The leading\nthought is this: \u201cAbstract thoughts are only modes in which our inmost\norgan views its own modifications. The words goodness, beauty, order,\nintelligence, virtue, &c., have no meaning for us if we do not refer and\napply them to objects which our senses have shown to be capable of these\nqualities, or to modes of being and acting which are known to us.\u201d Thus\neven psychology passed into materialism, as for instance we may find in\nLa Mettrie\u2019s work _L\u2019homme Machine_: All thought and all conception have\nmeaning only if they are apprehended as material; matter alone exists.\n\n\nb. MONTESQUIEU.\n\nOther great writers have opposed to the above the feeling in the breast,\nthe instinct of self-preservation, benevolent dispositions towards\nothers, the impulse to fellowship, which last Puffendorf also made the\nfoundation of his system of law (_supra_, p. 321). From this point of\nview much that is excellent has been said. Thus Montesquieu, in his\ncharming book, _L\u2019Esprit des Lois_, of which Voltaire said it was an\n_esprit sur les lois_, regarded the nations from this important point of\nview, that their constitution, their religion, in short, everything that\nis to be found in a state, constitutes a totality.\n\n\nc. HELVETIUS.\n\nThis reduction of thought to feeling in the case of Helvetius takes\nthe form that if in man as a moral being a single principle is sought,\nthis ought to be called self-love, and he endeavoured to demonstrate by\ningenious analysis that whatever we term virtue, all activity and law and\nright, has as its foundation nothing but self-love or selfishness, and is\nresolvable thereinto.[311] This principle is one-sided, although the \u201cI\nmyself\u201d is an essential moment. What I will, the noblest, the holiest, is\n_my_ aim; I must take part in it, I must agree to it, I must approve of\nit. With all self-sacrifice there is always conjoined some satisfaction,\nsome finding of self; this element of self, subjective liberty, must\nalways be present. If this is taken in a one-sided sense, there may be\nconsequences drawn from it which overthrow all that is sacred; but it is\nfound in equal degree in a morality as noble as any possibly can be.\n\n\nd. ROUSSEAU.\n\nIn connection with the practical side of things this particular must also\nbe noted, that when the feeling of right, the concrete practical mind,\nand, speaking generally, humanity and happiness were made the principle,\nthis principle, universally conceived, had certainly the form of thought;\nbut in the case of such concrete content derived from our impulse or\ninward intuition, even though that content were religious, the thought\nitself was not the content. But now this further phase appeared, that\npure thought was set up as the principle and content, even if again there\nwas lacking to this content the true consciousness of its peculiar\nform; for it was not recognized that this principle was thought. We see\nit emerge in the sphere of will, of the practical, of the just, and so\napprehended that the innermost principle of man, his unity with himself,\nis set forth as fundamental and brought into consciousness, so that man\nin himself acquired an infinite strength. It is this that Rousseau from\none point of view said about the state. He investigated its absolute\njustification, and inquired as to its foundation. The right of ruling and\nassociating, of the relation of order, of governing and being governed,\nhe apprehends from his own point of view, so that it is made to rest\nhistorically on power, compulsion, conquest, private property, &c.[312]\n\nRousseau makes free-will the principle of this justification, and without\nreference to the positive right of states he made answer to the above\nquestion (chap. iv. p. 12), that man has free-will, because \u201cliberty is\nthe distinguishing feature of man. To renounce his liberty signifies to\nrenounce his manhood. Not to be free is therefore a renunciation of a\nman\u2019s rights as a human being, and even of his duties.\u201d The slave has\nneither rights nor duties. Rousseau therefore says (chap. vi. p. 21):\n\u201cThe fundamental task is to find a form of association which will shield\nand protect with the power of the whole commonwealth combined the person\nand property of every one of its members, and in which each individual,\nwhile joining this association, obeys himself only, and thus remains\nas free as before. The solution is given by the Social Contract;\u201d this\nis the association of which each is a member by his own will. These\nprinciples, thus abstractly stated, we must allow to be correct, yet\nthe ambiguity in them soon begins to be felt. Man is free, this is\ncertainly the substantial nature of man; and not only is this liberty\nnot relinquished in the state, but it is actually in the state that it\nis first realized. The freedom of nature, the gift of freedom, is not\nanything real; for the state is the first realization of freedom.\n\nThe misunderstanding as to the universal will proceeds from this, that\nthe Notion of freedom must not be taken in the sense of the arbitrary\ncaprice of an individual, but in the sense of the rational will, of\nthe will in and for itself. The universal will is not to be looked on\nas compounded of definitively individual wills, so that these remain\nabsolute; otherwise the saying would be correct: \u201cWhere the minority must\nobey the majority, there is no freedom.\u201d The universal will must really\nbe the rational will, even if we are not conscious of the fact; the\nstate is therefore not an association which is decreed by the arbitrary\nwill of individuals. The wrong apprehension of these principles does\nnot concern us. What does concern us is this, that thereby there should\ncome into consciousness as content the sense that man has liberty in his\nspirit as the altogether absolute, that free-will is the Notion of man.\nFreedom is just thought itself; he who casts thought aside and speaks of\nfreedom knows not what he is talking of. The unity of thought with itself\nis freedom, the free will. Thought, as volition merely, is the impulse\nto abrogate one\u2019s subjectivity, the relation to present existence, the\nrealizing of oneself, since in that I am endeavouring to place myself as\nexistent on an equality with myself as thinking. It is only as having\nthe power of thinking that the will is free. The principle of freedom\nemerged in Rousseau, and gave to man, who apprehends himself as infinite,\nthis infinite strength. This furnishes the transition to the Kantian\nphilosophy, which, theoretically considered, made this principle its\nfoundation; knowledge aimed at freedom, and at a concrete content which\nit possesses in consciousness.\n\n\nD. THE GERMAN ILLUMINATION.\n\nThe Germans were at this time quietly drifting along in their\nLeibnitzo-Wolffian philosophy, in its definitions, axioms and proofs.\nThen they were gradually breathed upon by the spirit of foreign lands,\nthey made acquaintance with all the developments which there came to\npass, and took very kindly to the empiricism of Locke; on the other hand\nthey at the same time laid aside metaphysical investigations, turned\ntheir attention to the question of how truths can be grasped by the\nhealthy human understanding, and plunged into the _Aufkl\u00e4rung_ and into\nthe consideration of the utility of all things\u2014a point of view which\nthey adopted from the French. Utility as the essence of existent things\nsignifies that they are determined as not being in themselves, but for\nanother: this is a necessary moment, but not the only one. The German\n_Aufkl\u00e4rung_ warred against ideas, with the principle of utility as its\nweapon. Philosophic investigations on this subject had degenerated into\na feeble popular treatment of it which was incapable of going deeper;\nthey displayed a rigid pedantry and an earnestness of the understanding,\nbut were unspiritual. The Germans are busy bees who do justice to all\nnations, they are old-clothesmen for whom anything is good enough, and\nwho carry on their haggling with everyone. Picked up as it was from\nforeign nations, all this had lost the wit and life, the energy and\noriginality which with the French had made the content to be lost sight\nof in the form. The Germans, who honestly sift a matter to its root, and\nwho would put rational arguments in the place of wit and vivacity, since\nwit and vivacity really prove nothing, in this way reached a content\nwhich was utterly empty, so much so that nothing could be more wearisome\nthan this profound mode of treatment; such was the case with Eberhard,\nTetens, and those like them.\n\nOthers, like Nicolai, Sulzer and their fellows, were excellent in\ntheir speculations on questions of taste and the liberal sciences;\nfor literature and art were also to flourish among the Germans.\nBut with all this they only arrived at a most trivial treatment of\n\u00e6sthetics\u2014Lessing[313] called it shallow chatter. As a matter of fact,\nindeed, the poems of Gellert, Weisse and Lessing sank almost, if not\nquite as much into the same poetic feebleness. Moreover, previous to\nthe philosophy of Kant, the general principle was really the theory\nof happiness, which we have already met with in the philosophy of\nthe Cyrenaics (Vol. I. p. 477), and the point of view of pleasant or\nunpleasant sensations held good among the philosophers of that time as an\nultimate and essential determination. Of this manner of philosophizing\nI will quote an example which Nicolai gives in the account of a\nconversation which he had with Mendelssohn: what is in question is the\npleasure in tragic subjects which is held to be awakened even by means of\nthe unpleasant emotions depicted in a tragedy:\n\n HERR MOSES.\n\n \u201cThe power of having an inclination for perfections and of\n shunning imperfections is a reality.\u201d Therefore the exercise\n of this power brings a pleasure with it, which, however, is in\n nature comparatively less than the displeasure which arises from\n the contemplation of the object.\n\n I.\n\n Yet even then, when the violence of passion causes us unpleasant\n sensations, the movement (what else is this movement than the\n power of loving perfections, &c.?) which it brings with it has\n still delights for us. It is the strength of the movement which\n we enjoy, even in spite of the painful sensations which oppose\n what is pleasant in the passion, and in a short time obtain the\n victory.\n\n HERR MOSES.\n\n In a stage play, on the contrary, as the imperfect object is\n absent, pleasure must gain the upper hand and eclipse the small\n degree of displeasure.\n\n I.\n\n A passion therefore which is not followed by these results must\n be altogether pleasant. Of this sort are the imitations of the\n passions which the tragedy affords.\u201d[314]\n\nWith such vapid and meaningless drivel they rambled on. In addition to\nthese, the eternity of punishment in hell, the salvation of the heathen,\nthe difference between uprightness and godliness, were philosophic\nmatters on which much labour was expended among the Germans, while the\nFrench troubled themselves little about them. Finite determinations\nwere made to hold good against the infinite; against the Trinity it was\nasserted that One cannot be Three; against original sin, that each must\nbear his own guilt, must have done his own deeds of himself, and must\nanswer for them; in the same way against redemption, that another cannot\ntake upon himself punishment that is due; against forgiveness of sin,\nthat what is done cannot be rendered undone; to sum up generally, the\nincommensurability of the human nature with the divine. On the one side\nwe see healthy human understanding, experience, facts of consciousness,\nbut on the other side there was still in vogue the Wolffian metaphysics\nof the dry, dead understanding; thus we see Mendelssohn take his stand by\nthe healthy human understanding, and make it his rule.\n\nSome movement was brought into this authority, which had settled into\nperfect peace and security and let no dreams of other matters cross its\npath, by the chance dispute of Mendelssohn with Jacobi, first as to\nwhether Lessing had been a disciple of Spinoza, and then regarding the\ndoctrines of Spinoza himself. On this occasion it came to light how much\nSpinoza was really forgotten, and in what horror Spinozism was held. But\nwhile Jacobi in this way once more unexpectedly brought to remembrance\nin connection with Spinozism a quite different content of philosophy,\nfaith, _i.e._ the simply immediate certainty of external, finite things,\nas well as of the divine (which faith in the divine he called reason)\nwas certainly placed by him, as an independent thinker, in opposition to\nmediating knowledge, which he apprehended as mere understanding. This\ncontinued until Kant gave a new impulse in Germany to philosophy, which\nhad died out in the rest of Europe.\n\nAs far as the transition to modern German philosophy is concerned, it\nis from Hume and Rousseau, as we have said (pp. 369, 374, 402), that\nit took its start. Descartes opposes extension to thought, as what is\nsimply one with itself. He is charged with dualism, but, like Spinoza\nand Leibnitz, he did away with the independence of the two sides, and\nmade supreme their unity, God. But, as this unity, God is first of all\nonly the Third; and He is further determined in such a way that no\ndetermination pertains to Him. Wolff\u2019s understanding of the finite, his\nschool metaphysics generally, his science of the understanding, and his\ndivergence into the observation of nature, after it has grown strong\nin its conformity with law and in its finite knowledge, turns against\nthe infinite and the concrete determinations of religion, and comes to\na standstill with abstractions in his _theologia naturalis_; for the\ndeterminate is his domain. But from this time an utterly different point\nof view is introduced. The infinite is transported into abstraction\nor incomprehensibility. This is an incomprehensible position to adopt.\nNowadays it is looked on as most pious, most justifiable. But as we see\nthe third, the unity of differences, defined as something which cannot\nbe thought or known, this unity is not one of thought, for it is above\nall thought, and God is not simply thought. Nevertheless this unity\nis defined as the absolutely concrete, _i.e._ as the unity of thought\nand Being. Now we have come so far that this unity is a unity simply\nin thought, and pertaining to consciousness, so that the objectivity\nof thought\u2014reason\u2014comes forth as One and All. This is dimly conceived\nby the French. Whether the highest Being, this Being divested of all\ndetermination, is elevated above nature, or whether nature or matter is\nthe highest unity, there is always present the establishing of something\nconcrete, which at the same time belongs to thought. Since the liberty of\nman has been set up as an absolutely ultimate principle, thought itself\nhas been set up as a principle. The principle of liberty is not only\nin thought but the root of thought; this principle of liberty is also\nsomething in itself concrete, at least in principle it is implicitly\nconcrete. Thus far have general culture and philosophic culture advanced.\nSince what is knowable has now been placed entirely within the sphere of\nconsciousness, and since the liberty of the spirit has been apprehended\nas absolute, this may be understood to mean that knowledge has entered\naltogether into the realm of the finite. The standpoint of the finite\nwas at the same time taken as ultimate, and God as a Beyond outside\nconsciousness; duties, rights, knowledge of nature, are finite. Man\nhas thereby formed for himself a kingdom of truth, from which God is\nexcluded; it is the kingdom of finite truth. The form of finitude may\nhere be termed the subjective form; liberty, self-consciousness [Ichheit]\nof the mind, known as the absolute, is essentially subjective\u2014in fact it\nis the subjectivity of thought. The more the human reason has grasped\nitself in itself, the more has it come down from God and the more has it\nincreased the field of the finite. Reason is One and All, which is at the\nsame time the totality of the finite; reason under these conditions is\nfinite knowledge and knowledge of the finite. The question is, since it\nis this concrete that is established (and not metaphysical abstractions),\nhow it constitutes itself in itself; and then, how it returns to\nobjectivity, or abrogates its subjectivity, _i.e._ how by means of\nthought God is to be again brought about, who at an earlier time and\nat the beginning of this period was recognized as alone the true. This\nis what we have to consider in the last period, in dealing with Kant,\nFichte, and Schelling.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION THREE\n\nRECENT GERMAN PHILOSOPHY\n\n\nIn the philosophy of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling, the revolution to which\nin Germany mind has in these latter days advanced, was formally thought\nout and expressed; the sequence of these philosophies shows the course\nwhich thought has taken. In this great epoch of the world\u2019s history,\nwhose inmost essence is laid hold of in the philosophy of history,\ntwo nations only have played a part, the German and the French, and\nthis in spite of their absolute opposition, or rather because they are\nso opposite. The other nations have taken no real inward part in the\nsame, although politically they have indeed so done, both through their\ngovernments and their people. In Germany this principle has burst forth\nas thought, spirit, Notion; in France, in the form of actuality. In\nGermany, what there is of actuality comes to us as a force of external\ncircumstances, and as a reaction against the same. The task of modern\nGerman philosophy is, however, summed up in taking as its object the\nunity of thought and Being, which is the fundamental idea of philosophy\ngenerally, and comprehending it, that is, in laying hold of the inmost\nsignificance of necessity, the Notion (_supra_, p. 360). The philosophy\nof Kant sets forth, in the first place, the formal aspect of the task,\nbut it has the abstract absoluteness of reason in self-consciousness\nas its sole result, and, in one respect, it carried with it a certain\ncharacter of shallowness and want of vigour, in which an attitude of\ncriticism and negativity is retained, and which, as far as any positive\nelement is concerned, adheres to the facts of consciousness and to mere\nconjecture, while it renounces thought and returns to feeling. On the\nother hand, however, there sprang from this the philosophy of Fichte,\nwhich speculatively grasps the essence of self-consciousness as concrete\negoism, but which does not reach beyond this subjective form pertaining\nto the absolute. From it again comes the philosophy of Schelling, which\nsubsequently rejects Fichte\u2019s teaching and sets forth the Idea of the\nAbsolute, the truth in and for itself.\n\n\nA. JACOBI.\n\nIn connection with Kant we must here begin by speaking of Jacobi, whose\nphilosophy is contemporaneous with that of Kant; in both of these the\nadvance beyond the preceding period is very evident. The result in the\ntwo cases is much the same, although both the starting point and the\nmethod of progression are somewhat different. In Jacobi\u2019s case the\nstimulus was given mainly by French philosophy, with which he was very\nconversant, and also by German metaphysics, while Kant began rather from\nthe English side, that is, from the scepticism of Hume. Jacobi, in that\nnegative attitude which he preserved as well as Kant, kept before him the\nobjective aspect of the method of knowledge, and specially considered it,\nfor he declared knowledge to be in its content incapable of recognizing\nthe Absolute: the truth must be concrete, present, but not finite.\nKant does not consider the content, but took the view of knowledge\nbeing subjective; and for this reason he declared it to be incapable of\nrecognizing absolute existence. To Kant knowledge is thus a knowledge of\nphenomena only, not because the categories are merely limited and finite,\nbut because they are subjective. To Jacobi, on the other hand, the chief\npoint is that the categories are not merely subjective, but that they\nthemselves are conditioned. This is an essential difference between the\ntwo points of view, even if they both arrive at the same result.\n\nFriedrich Heinrich Jacobi, born at D\u00fcsseldorf in 1743, held office first\nin the Duchy of Berg, and then in Bavaria. He studied in Geneva and\nParis, associating in the former place with Bonnet and in the latter\nwith Diderot. Jacobi was a man of the highest character and culture.\nHe was long occupied with State affairs, and in D\u00fcsseldorf he held a\npublic office which was connected with the administration of the finance\ndepartment in the State. At the time of the French Revolution he was\nobliged to retire. As a Bavarian official he went to Munich, there became\nPresident of the Academy of Sciences in 1804, which office he, however,\nresigned in 1812; for in the Napoleonic period Protestants were decried\nas demagogues. He lived at Munich till the end of his life, and died at\nthe same place on the 10th of March, 1819.[315]\n\nIn the year 1785, Jacobi published Letters on Spinoza, which were written\nin 1783, on the occasion of the dispute with Mendelssohn above-mentioned\n(p. 406); for in none of his writings did Jacobi develop his philosophy\nsystematically, he set it forth in letters only. When Mendelssohn wished\nto write a life of Lessing, Jacobi sent to ask him if he knew that\n\u201cLessing was a Spinozist\u201d (Jacobi\u2019s Werke, Vol. IV. Sec. 1, pp. 39,\n40). Mendelssohn was displeased at this, and it was the occasion of the\ncorrespondence. In the course of the dispute it was made evident that\nthose who held themselves to be professed philosophers and possessed of\na monopoly of Lessing\u2019s friendship, such as Nicolai, Mendelssohn, &c.,\nknew nothing about Spinozism; not only was there manifested in them the\nsuperficial character of their philosophic insight, but ignorance as\nwell; with Mendelssohn, for instance, this was shown respecting even the\noutward history of the Spinozistic philosophy, and much more regarding\nthe inward (Jacobi\u2019s Werke, Vol. IV. Sec. 1, p. 91). That Jacobi asserted\nLessing to be a Spinozist, and gave a high place to the French\u2014this\nserious statement came to these good men as a thunderbolt from the blue.\nThey\u2014the self-satisfied, self-possessed, superior persons\u2014were quite\nsurprised that he also made pretensions to knowledge, and of such a \u201cdead\ndog\u201d as Spinoza (_ibidem_, p. 68). Explanations followed upon this, in\nwhich Jacobi further developed his philosophic views.\n\nMendelssohn is directly opposed to Jacobi, for Mendelssohn took his\nstand on cognition, placed true existence immediately in thought and\nconception, and maintained: \u201cWhat I cannot think as true does not trouble\nme as doubt. A question which I do not understand, I cannot answer, it\nis for me as good as no question at all.\u201d[316] He continued to argue on\nthese same lines. His proof of the existence of God thus carries with\nit this necessity of thought, viz. that actuality must plainly be in\nthought, and a thinker must be presupposed, or the possibility of the\nactual is in the thinker. \u201cWhat no thinking Being conceives as possible\nis not possible, and what is thought by no thinking creature as actual\ncannot be actual in fact. If we take away from anything whatsoever the\nconception formed by a thinking Being that that thing is possible or\nactual, the thing itself is done away with.\u201d The Notion of the thing\nis thus to man the essence of the same. \u201cNo finite Being can think the\nactuality of a thing in its perfection as actual, and still less can\nhe perceive the possibility and actuality of all present things. There\nmust thus be a thinking Being or an understanding which in the most\nperfect way thinks the content of all possibilities as possible, and the\ncontent of all actualities as actual; _i.e._ there must be an infinite\nunderstanding, and this is God.\u201d[317] Here on the one hand we see a\nunity of thought and Being, on the other the absolute unity as infinite\nunderstanding\u2014the former is the self-consciousness which is apprehended\nas finite merely. Actuality, Being, has its possibility in thought, or\nits possibility is thought; it is not a process from possibility to\nactuality, for the possibility remains at home in the actuality.\n\nJacobi maintains against these demands of thought\u2014and this in one\nview is the chief thought in his philosophy\u2014that every method of\ntheir demonstration leads to fatalism, atheism, and Spinozism,[318]\nand presents God as derived and founded upon something else; for\ncomprehending Him signifies demonstrating His dependence. Jacobi thus\nasserts that mediate knowledge consists in giving a cause of something\nwhich has in its turn a finite effect, and so on; so that a knowledge\nsuch as this can all through relate to the finite only.\n\nJacobi further states upon this subject, in the first place, that\n\u201cReason\u201d\u2014later on when he distinguished reason and understanding (of\nwhich more hereafter[319]), he altered it to understanding[320]\u2014\u201ccan\nnever bring to light more than the conditions of what is conditioned,\nnatural laws and mechanism. We comprehend a thing when we can deduce it\nfrom its proximate causes,\u201d and not from the remoter causes; the most\nremote and quite universal cause is always God. \u201cOr\u201d we know the thing\nif we \u201cperceive its immediate conditions as they come in due succession.\nThus, for instance, we comprehend a circle when we can clearly represent\nto ourselves the mechanism of its origination or its physical conditions;\nwe know the syllogistic formul\u00e6 when we have actually come to know\nthe laws to which the human understanding is subject in judgment and\nconclusion, its physical nature and its mechanism. For this reason we\nhave no conceptions of qualities as such, but only intuitions. Even\nof our present existence we have a feeling only, but no conceptions.\nGenuine conceptions we have merely of figure, number, position, movement\nand the forms of thought; qualities are known and understood, if they\nare traced back to these and objectively annulled.\u201d This is undoubtedly\nreally finite knowledge, which is to give the determinate conditions\nof anything determinate, to demonstrate it as resulting from another\ncause, in such a way that each condition is again conditioned and finite.\nJacobi continues: \u201cThe business of reason is really progressive union\nand connection, and its speculative business is union and connection\nin accordance with the known laws of necessity, _i.e._ of identity.\nEverything that reason can bring forth by means of analysis, combination,\njudgment, conclusion, and re-conception, consists in nothing but things\nof nature\u201d (_i.e._ finite things), \u201cand reason itself, as a limited\nexistence, belongs to these things. But the whole of nature, the sum\nof all conditioned existence, cannot reveal more to the investigating\nunderstanding than what is contained in it, namely, manifold existence,\nchanges, a succession of forms\u201d (the conditioned), \u201cand not an actual\nbeginning\u201d (of the world), \u201cnor a real principle of any objective\nexistence.\u201d[321]\n\nBut Jacobi in the second place here accepts reason in a wider sense and\nsays: \u201cIf we understand by reason the principle of knowledge generally,\nit is the mind from which the whole living nature of man is constituted;\nthrough it man arises; he is a form which it has adopted.\u201d With this\nJacobi\u2019s view of the attempt to know the unconditioned is connected. \u201cI\ntake the whole human being, and find that his consciousness is composed\nof two original conceptions, the conceptions of the conditioned and the\nunconditioned. Both are inseparably bound up with one another, and yet\nin such a way that the conception of the conditioned presupposes the\nconception of the unconditioned, and can be given in this alone. We\nare just as certain of its existence as we are of our own conditioned\nexistence, or even more so. Since our conditioned existence rests on\nan infinitude of mediations, there is opened up to our investigation a\nvast field which, for the sake of our preservation even, we are forced\nto work upon.\u201d It would, however, be quite another thing to wish to know\nthe unconditioned apart from this practical end. However Jacobi here\nremarks, \u201cTo try to discover the conditions of the unconditioned, to find\na possibility for absolute necessity, and to construct this last in order\nto be able to comprehend it, is what we undertake when we endeavour to\nmake nature an existence comprehensible to us, _i.e._ a merely natural\nexistence, and to bring the mechanism of the principle of mechanism into\nthe light of day. For if everything which can be said to arise and be\npresent in a way comprehensible to us, must arise and be present in a\nconditioned way, we remain, so long as we continue to comprehend, in a\nchain of conditioned conditions. Where this chain breaks off, we cease\nto comprehend, and there the connection which we call nature likewise\nceases. The conception of the possibility of the outward existence of\nnature would thus be the conception of an absolute beginning or origin\nof nature; it would be the conception of the unconditioned itself in so\nfar as it is a conditioning of nature not naturally connected, _i.e._\na conditioning of nature unconnected and unconditioned for us. Now\nshould a conception of what is thus unconditioned and unconnected, and\nconsequently supernatural, be possible, the unconditioned must cease\nto be unconditioned, it must itself receive conditions; and absolute\nnecessity must commence to be possibility in order that it may allow\nitself to be constructed.\u201d[322] This is contradictory.\n\nJacobi then passes on from this point to the second of his main\npropositions, \u201cThe unconditioned is called the supernatural. Now since\neverything which lies outside the connection of what is conditioned, of\nwhat is naturally mediated, also lies outside the sphere of our clear\nand certain knowledge, and cannot be understood through conceptions,\nthe supernatural cannot be accepted in any other way by us than that\nin which it is given to us\u2014namely as a fact. It is! This supernatural,\nthis essence of all essence, all tongues join in proclaiming to be\nGod.\u201d[323] God as the universal, the true, is here taken in the sense\nof a spiritual generally, in the sense of power, wisdom, &c. That\nGod is, however, is to Jacobi not absolutely true; for to knowledge\npertains His objective absolute existence, but He cannot be said to be\nknown. It is thus merely a fact of my consciousness that God exists\nindependently apart from my consciousness; this, however, is itself\nmaintained through my consciousness; the subjective attitude of thought\nis thus to Jacobi the element of most importance. The consciousness of\nGod, which is in our consciousness, is, however, of such a nature that\nalong with the thought of God we have immediately associated the fact\nthat He is. The existence of the supernatural and supersensuous, to\nwhich the thought of man regarding the natural and finite passes on, is\njust as certain to Jacobi as he is himself. This certainty is identical\nwith his self-consciousness; as certainly as I am, so certainly is\nGod (Jacobi\u2019s Werke, Vol. III. p. 35). Since he thus passes back into\nself-consciousness, the unconditioned is only for us in an immediate way;\nthis immediate knowledge Jacobi calls Faith, inward revelation (Werke,\nVol. II. pp. 3, 4); to this appeal can be made in man. God, the absolute,\nthe unconditioned, cannot, according to Jacobi, be proved. For proof,\ncomprehension, means to discover conditions for something, to derive it\nfrom conditions; but a derived absolute, God, &c., would thus not be\nabsolute at all, would not be unconditioned, would not be God (Jacobi\u2019s\nWerke, Vol. III. p. 7). This immediate knowledge of God is then the point\nwhich is maintained in the philosophy of Jacobi. The faith of Kant and\nof Jacobi are, however, different. To Kant it is a postulate of reason,\nit is the demand for the solution of the contradiction between the world\nand goodness; to Jacobi it is represented on its own account as immediate\nknowledge.\n\nEverything which has been written upon God since Jacobi\u2019s time, by\nphilosophers such as Fries and by theologians, rests on this conception\nof immediate intellectual knowledge, and men even call this revelation,\nthough in another sense than the revelation of theology. Revelation as\nimmediate knowledge is in ourselves, while the Church holds revelation\nto be something imparted from without.[324] In the theological sense,\nfaith is faith in something which is given to us through teaching. It\nis a sort of deception when faith and revelation are spoken of and\nrepresented as if faith and revelation in the theological sense were\nhere in question; for the sense in which they are used, and which may be\ntermed philosophic, is quite a different one, however pious an air may be\nassumed in using the terms. This is Jacobi\u2019s standpoint, and whatever is\nby philosophers and theologians said against it, this teaching is eagerly\naccepted and disseminated. And nowhere is there anything to be found\nbut reflections originating from Jacobi, whereby immediate knowledge\nis opposed to philosophic knowledge and to reason; and people speak\nof reason, philosophy, &c., as a blind man speaks of colours. It is,\nindeed, allowed that a man cannot make shoes unless he is a shoemaker,\neven although he have the measure and foot, and also the hands. But when\nPhilosophy is concerned, immediate knowledge signifies that every man\nas he walks and stands is a philosopher, that he can dogmatize as he\nchooses, and that he is completely acquainted with Philosophy.\n\nBy reason, however, mediate knowledge merely is on the one hand\nunderstood, and on the other the intellectual perception which speaks of\nfacts (_supra_, pp. 413-415). In this respect it is true that reason is\nthe knowledge and revelation of absolute truth, since the understanding\nis the revelation of the finite (Jacobi\u2019s Werke, Vol. II. pp. 8-14,\n101). \u201cWe maintained that two different powers of perception in man have\nto be accepted: a power of perception through visible and tangible and\nconsequently corporeal organs of perception, and another kind of power,\nviz. through an invisible organ which in no way represents itself to\nthe outward senses, and whose existence is made known to us through\nfeeling alone. This organ, a spiritual eye for spiritual objects, has\nbeen called by men\u2014generally speaking\u2014reason. He whom the pure feelings\nof the beautiful and good, of admiration and love, of respect and awe,\ndo not convince that in and with these feelings he perceives something\nto be present which is independent of them, and which is unattainable by\nthe outward senses or by an understanding directed upon their perceptions\nalone\u2014such an one cannot be argued with\u201d (Jacobi\u2019s Werke, Vol. II. pp.\n74, 76). But by faith Jacobi likewise understands all that has immediacy\nof Being for me: \u201cThrough faith we know that we have a body, we become\naware of other actual things, and that indeed with the same certainty\nwith which we are aware of ourselves. We obtain all conceptions through\nthe qualities which we receive and accept, and there is no other way\nof attaining real knowledge; for reason, when it begets objects, begets\nphantoms of the brain. Thus we have a revelation of nature.\u201d[325] Hence\nthe expression faith, which had a deep significance in religion, is made\nuse of for different contents of every kind; this in our own time is the\npoint of view most commonly adopted.\n\nJacobi here brings faith into opposition with thought. Let us compare the\ntwo, and discover whether they are separated by so great a chasm as those\nwho thus oppose them think. On the one hand absolute existence is to\nfaith immediate; believing consciousness feels itself penetrated by this\nas by its essence: that existence is its life, believing consciousness\nasserts itself to be in direct unity with it. Thought thinks the\nabsolute existence; such existence is to it absolute thought, absolute\nunderstanding, pure thought; but that signifies that it is likewise\nimmediate itself. On the other hand to faith the immediacy of absolute\nexistence has also the significance of a Being: it _is_, and is another\nthan \u2018I.\u2019 And the same is true of the thinker; to him it is absolute\nBeing, actual in itself, and different from self-consciousness or thought\nas finite understanding, to use the common term. Now what is the reason\nthat faith and thought do not understand one another, and each recognize\nitself in the other? In the first place faith has no consciousness of\nbeing a thought, inasmuch as it asserts absolute consciousness to be\nidentical with it as self-consciousness, and has direct inward knowledge\nof the same. But it expresses this simple unity; in its consciousness\nit is only immediacy so to speak in the signification of Being, a unity\nof its unconscious substance. In the second place Being-for-self is\ncontained in thought; to this faith opposes the immediacy of Being.\nThought, on the contrary, has the immediate as absolute potentiality,\nas absolutely a thing of thought: and the immediacy belonging to this\nthing of thought is without the determination of Being, of life. On\nthe heights of this abstraction the two stand opposed to each other,\nas the _Aufkl\u00e4rung_ which asserts absolute existence to be a Beyond of\nself-consciousness, and as the materialism which makes it so to speak\npresent matter (_supra_, pp. 382, 383). In the one case it is in faith\nand thought as positive existence or thought, and in the other it is the\nnegative of self-consciousness, which is thus either only determined as\nnegative, as a Beyond, or likewise as existent for self-consciousness.\nHence faith and thought are both of them knowledge. We call universal\nknowledge thought, particular knowledge we call sensuous perception;\nand we term the introduction of external determinations understanding.\nThe universal element in man is thought, but to it likewise appertains\nreligious feeling for instance; the animal does not possess it, for it\nhas no human feeling; and in so far as this feeling is religious, it is\nthe feeling of a thinker, and what determines this feeling is not the\ndetermination of natural desire, &c., but a universal determination. Thus\nGod, even though He is only felt and believed in, is yet the universal\ntaken quite abstractly\u2014even in His personality He is the absolutely\nuniversal personality.\n\nAs thought and faith are thus one, the same is true of the antithesis\nbetween mediated and immediate knowledge. We must, it is true, keep\nbefore our eyes the fact that what is revealed in immediate knowledge\nis the universal. But abstract immediate knowledge is natural, sensuous\nknowledge; the immediate man in his natural condition, in his desires,\ndoes not know this universal. Children, the Esquimaux, &c., know nothing\nof God; or what the natural man knows of Him is not a real knowledge\nof Him. Thus the intuitive knowledge of the Egyptians told them that\nGod was an ox or a cat, and the Indians still possess similar sorts of\nknowledge. On the other hand when man has come so far as to know God\nas merely an object of the mind, _i.e._ as spiritual, it is easy to\nperceive that this knowledge which is asserted to be immediate is really\na result mediated through instruction, through a long continued culture.\nIt is only by means of being elevated above nature that man arrives at\na consciousness of what is higher, and at a knowledge of the universal;\nthere indeed his knowledge is immediate, but he has only arrived at this\nthrough mediation. I think, and thus I know the universal immediately,\nbut this very thought is just process in itself, movement and life. All\nlife is process within itself, is mediated, and this is all the more\ntrue of spiritual life; for it is the passing from one to the other,\nthat is, from the merely natural and sensuous to the spiritual. It thus\nindicates a deficiency in the most simple reflection not to know that the\nuniversal is not in immediate knowledge, but is a result of the culture,\nthe education, and the self-revelation of the human race. If immediate\nknowledge is to be allowed, everyone will be responsible merely to\nhimself: this man knows this, another that, and consequently everything\nis justified and approved, however contrary to right and religion. This\nopposition between immediacy and mediacy is thus a very barren and quite\nempty determination; it is a platitude of the extremest type to consider\nanything like this to be a true opposition; it proceeds from a most\nwooden understanding, which thinks that an immediacy can be something on\nits own account, without a mediation within itself. If Philosophy were\nto result in this it would be a poor affair; these determinations are\nmerely forms, none of which has intrinsic truth. The form into which\nPhilosophy has in Jacobi\u2019s case finally fallen, which is that immediacy\nis grasped as absolute, manifests a lack of all critical faculty, of\nall logic. The Kantian philosophy is critical philosophy, but from it\nthe fact has been omitted that we cannot constitute the infinite with\nfinite categories\u2014and immediacy is such an one. When we regard this\nopposition more closely all knowledge may be termed immediate, but all\nimmediate knowledge is likewise mediated in itself. This we know within\nour consciousness, and we may see it in the most general phenomena. I\nknow, for example, of America immediately, and yet this knowledge is very\nmuch mediated. If I stand in America and see its soil, I must first of\nall have journeyed to it, Columbus must first have discovered it, ships\nmust have been built, &c.; all these discoveries and inventions pertain\nto it. That which we now know immediately is consequently a result of\ninfinitely many mediations. Likewise when I see a right-angled triangle\nI know that the squares of the two sides are equal to the square of the\nhypotenuse: I know this immediately, and yet I have merely learned it and\nam convinced of it through the mediation of proof. Immediate knowledge\nis thus everywhere mediated, and Philosophy does nothing but bring this\nto consciousness\u2014demonstrating the mediation which in point of fact is\nalready present there, _e.g._ in religion, &c.\n\nThe philosophy of Jacobi, inasmuch as it says: \u201cThought cannot proceed\nfurther than to the feeling of God,\u201d has been accepted _utiliter_; it\nwas more easily arrived at than in the case of Kant. Knowledge, however,\nis something very different from what Jacobi calls such; against finite\nknowledge his arguments are quite correct. Immediate knowledge is not\nknowledge, comprehension, for that implies that the content is determined\nin itself, _i.e._ is grasped as concrete. But in immediate knowledge\nit is the case that the only fact known of God is that He exists. For\nshould there be determinations respecting God, they must, according to\nJacobi, be grasped as a finite, and the knowledge of them would again\nmerely be a progression from finite to finite. There thus remains only\nthe indeterminate conception of God, an \u201cAbove me,\u201d an indeterminate\nBeyond. This gives accordingly the same result as does the _Aufkl\u00e4rung_,\nviz. that the highest reality is ultimate: we find the same in French\nphilosophy and in Kant\u2014only here we still have the opinion that this\nemptiness is the highest philosophy possible. But if each standpoint has\nan aspect wherein it is justified, there always rests in the proposition\nthat the human mind knows God immediately, the important consideration\nthat we have here a recognition of the freedom of the human spirit: in\nit we have the source of the knowledge of God, and all externality of\nauthority is thus abrogated in this principle. The principle is hereby\ngained, but only the principle of freedom of spirit; and the greatness of\nour time rests in the fact that freedom, the peculiar possession of mind\nwhereby it is at home with itself in itself, is recognized, and that mind\nhas this consciousness within itself. This however is merely abstract,\nfor the next step is that the principle of freedom is again purified\nand comes to its true objectivity, so that not everything which strikes\nme or springs up within me must, because it is manifested in me, hold\ngood as true. It is only through thought, which casts off the particular\nand accidental, that the principle receives this objectivity which is\nindependent of mere subjectivity and in and for itself\u2014though in such a\nway that the freedom of mind still remains respected. One\u2019s own spirit\nmust bear witness to spirit that God is Spirit; the content must be true.\nBut this does not give authenticity to itself by its being revealed\nwith certainty to me. This is the standpoint, and we have thus seen its\ndeficiency and the greatness of the principle which is involved in it.\n\n\nB. KANT.\n\nThe philosophy of Kant, which we have now more particularly to consider,\nmade its appearance at the same time as the above. While Descartes\nasserted certainty to be the unity of thought and Being, we now have the\nconsciousness of thought in its subjectivity, _i.e._ in the first place,\nas determinateness in contrast with objectivity, and then as finitude\nand progression in finite determinations. Abstract thought as personal\nconviction is that which is maintained as certain; its contents are\nexperience, but the methods adopted by experience are once more formal\nthought and argument. Kant turns back to the standpoint of Socrates;\nwe see in him the freedom of the subject as we saw it with the Stoics,\nbut the task in respect of content is now placed on a higher level. An\nendless aiming at the concrete is required for thought, a filling up in\naccordance with the rule which completion prescribes, which signifies\nthat the content is itself the Idea as the unity of the Notion and\nreality. With Jacobi thought, demonstration, does not in the first\nplace reach beyond the finite and conditioned, and in the second place,\neven when God is likewise the metaphysical object, the demonstration is\nreally the making Him conditioned and finite; in the third place the\nunconditioned, what is then immediately certain, only exists in faith, a\nsubjectively fixed point of view but an unknowable one, that is to say\nan undetermined, indeterminable, and consequently an unfruitful one. The\nstandpoint of the philosophy of Kant, on the contrary, is in the first\nplace to be found in the fact that thought has through its reasoning\ngot so far as to grasp itself not as contingent but rather as in itself\nthe absolute ultimate. In the finite, in connection with the finite,\nan absolute standpoint is raised which acts as a connecting bond; it\nbinds together the finite and leads up to the infinite. Thought grasped\nitself as all in all, as absolute in judgment; for it nothing external\nis authoritative, since all authority can receive validity only through\nthought. This thought, determining itself within itself and concrete,\nis, however, in the second place, grasped as subjective, and this\naspect of subjectivity is the form which from Jacobi\u2019s point of view is\npredominant; the fact that thought is concrete Jacobi has on the other\nhand for the most part set aside. Both standpoints remain philosophies\nof subjectivity; since thought is subjective, the capacity of knowing the\nabsolute is denied to it. To Kant God cannot on the one hand be found\nin experience; He can neither be found in outward experience\u2014as Lalande\ndiscovered when he swept the whole heavens and found no God\u2014nor can He be\ndiscovered within; though no doubt mystics and enthusiasts can experience\nmany things in themselves, and amongst these God, _i.e._ the Infinite.\nOn the other hand Kant argues to prove the existence of God, who is to\nhim an hypothesis necessary for the explanation of things, a postulate\nof practical reason. But in this connection another French astronomer\nmade the following reply to the Emperor Napoleon: \u201c_Je n\u2019ai pas eu\nbesoin de cette hypoth\u00e8se._\u201d According to this the truth underlying\nthe Kantian philosophy is the recognition of freedom. Even Rousseau\nrepresented the absolute to be found in freedom; Kant has the same\nprinciple, but taken rather from the theoretic side. The French regard\nit from the side of will, which is represented in their proverb: \u201c_Il a\nla t\u00eate pr\u00e8s du bonnet._\u201d France possesses the sense of actuality, of\npromptitude; because in that country conception passes more immediately\ninto action, men have there applied themselves more practically to the\naffairs of actuality. But however much freedom may be in itself concrete,\nit was as undeveloped and in its abstraction that it was there applied\nto actuality; and to make abstractions hold good in actuality means to\ndestroy actuality. The fanaticism which characterized the freedom which\nwas put into the hands of the people was frightful. In Germany the same\nprinciple asserted the rights of consciousness on its own account, but\nit has been worked out in a merely theoretic way. We have commotions of\nevery kind within us and around us, but through them all the German head\nquietly keeps its nightcap on and silently carries on its operations\nbeneath it.\n\nImmanuel Kant was born at K\u00f6nigsberg in 1724, and there studied theology\nto begin with; in the year 1755 he entered upon his work as an academic\nteacher; in 1770 he became professor of logic, and in 1804 he died at\nK\u00f6nigsberg on the 12th of February, having almost attained his eightieth\nyear (Tennemann\u2019s Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie by Wendt, \u00a7\n380, pp. 465, 466), without ever having left his native town.\n\nWhile to Wolff thought as thought was merely positive self-identity\nand grasped itself as such, we saw the negative self-moving thought,\nthe absolute Notion, appear in all its power in France; and in the\n_Aufkl\u00e4rung_ it likewise made its way to Germany in such a manner\nthat all existence, all action, was called upon to serve a useful\npurpose, _i.e._ the implicit was done away with and everything had\nto be for another; and that for which everything had to be is man,\nself-consciousness, taken, however, as signifying all men generally. The\nconsciousness of this action in abstract form is the Kantian philosophy.\nIt is thus the self-thinking absolute Notion that passes into itself\nwhich we see making its appearance in Germany through this philosophy,\nin such a way that all reality falls within self-consciousness; it\nis the idealism which vindicates all moments of the implicit to\nself-consciousness, but which at first itself remains subject to a\ncontradiction, inasmuch as it still separates this implicit from itself.\nIn other words the Kantian philosophy no doubt leads reality back to\nself-consciousness, but it can supply no reality to this essence of\nself-consciousness, or to this pure self-consciousness, nor can it\ndemonstrate Being in the same. It apprehends simple thought as having\ndifference in itself, but does not yet apprehend that all reality rests\non this difference; it does not know how to obtain mastery over the\nindividuality of self-consciousness, and although it describes reason\nvery well, it does this in an unthinking empiric way which again robs\nit of the truth it has. Theoretically the Kantian philosophy is the\n\u201cIllumination\u201d or _Aufkl\u00e4rung_ reduced to method; it states that nothing\ntrue can be known, but only the phenomenal; it leads knowledge into\nconsciousness and self-consciousness, but from this standpoint maintains\nit to be a subjective and finite knowledge. Thus although it deals with\nthe infinite Idea, expressing its formal categories and arriving at\nits concrete claims, it yet again denies this to be the truth, making\nit a simple subjective, because it has once for all accepted finite\nknowledge as the fixed and ultimate standpoint. This philosophy made an\nend of the metaphysic of the understanding as an objective dogmatism,\nbut in fact it merely transformed it into a subjective dogmatism, _i.e._\ninto a consciousness in which these same finite determinations of the\nunderstanding persist, and the question of what is true in and for itself\nhas been abandoned. Its study is made difficult by its diffuseness and\nprolixity, and by the peculiar terminology found in it. Nevertheless this\ndiffuseness has one advantage, that inasmuch as the same thing is often\nrepeated, the main points are kept before us, and these cannot easily be\nlost from view.\n\nWe shall endeavour to trace the lines which Kant pursued. The philosophy\nof Kant has in the first place a direct relation to that of Hume as\nstated above (p. 370). That is to say, the significance of the Kantian\nphilosophy, generally expressed, is from the very beginning to allow\nthat determinations such as those of universality and necessity are\nnot to be met with in perception, and this Hume has already shown in\nrelation to Locke. But while Hume attacks the universality and necessity\nof the categories generally, and Jacobi their finitude, Kant merely\nargues against their objectivity in so far as they are present in\nexternal things themselves, while maintaining them to be objective in\nthe sense of holding good as universal and necessary, as they do, for\ninstance, in mathematics and natural science.[326] The fact that we\ncrave for universality and necessity as that which first constitutes\nthe objective, Kant thus undoubtedly allows. But if universality and\nnecessity do not exist in external things, the question arises \u201cWhere are\nthey to be found?\u201d To this Kant, as against Hume, maintains that they\nmust be _a priori_, _i.e._ that they must rest on reason itself, and on\nthought as self-conscious reason; their source is the subject, \u201cI\u201d in my\nself-consciousness.[327] This, simply expressed, is the main point in the\nKantian philosophy.\n\nIn the second place the philosophy of Kant is likewise called a critical\nphilosophy because its aim, says Kant, is first of all to supply a\ncriticism of our faculties of knowledge; for before obtaining knowledge\nwe must inquire into the faculties of knowledge. To the healthy human\nunderstanding that is plausible, and to it this has been a great\ndiscovery. Knowledge is thereby represented as an instrument, as a method\nand means whereby we endeavour to possess ourselves of the truth. Thus\nbefore men can make their way to the truth itself they must know the\nnature and function of their instrument. They must see whether it is\ncapable of supplying what is demanded of it\u2014of seizing upon the object;\nthey must know what the alterations it makes in the object are, in order\nthat these alterations may not be mixed up with the determinations of\nthe object itself.[328] This would appear as though men could set forth\nupon the search for truth with spears and staves. And a further claim is\nmade when it is said that we must know the faculty of knowledge before\nwe can know. For to investigate the faculties of knowledge means to know\nthem; but how we are to know without knowing, how we are to apprehend the\ntruth before the truth, it is impossible to say. It is the old story of\nthe \u03c3\u03c7\u03bf\u03bb\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2 who would not go into the water till he could swim. Thus\nsince the investigation of the faculties of knowledge is itself knowing,\nit cannot in Kant attain to what it aims at because it is that already\u2014it\ncannot come to itself because it is already with itself; the same thing\nhappens as happened with the Jews, the Spirit passes through the midst of\nthem and they know it not. At the same time the step taken by Kant is a\ngreat and important one\u2014that is, the fact that he has made knowledge the\nsubject of his consideration.\n\nOn the one hand this critique of knowledge applies to the empirical\nknowledge of Locke, which asserts itself to be grounded on experience,\nand, on the other hand, it also deals with what claims to be on the whole\na more metaphysical kind of philosophy\u2014the Wolffian and German\u2014which\nhad also taken up the line of proceeding on the more empiric method\nwhich has been depicted. But this last has at the same time kept itself\nseparate from the merely empiric method, inasmuch as its main efforts\nhave been directed towards making such categories of thought as those of\npotentiality, actuality, God, &c., have as their foundation categories of\nthe understanding, and then reasoning from them. The Kantian philosophy\nis in the first instance directed against both. Kant takes away the\nobjective significance of the determinations of the Wolffian metaphysics,\nand shows how they must be ascribed to subjective thought alone. At the\nsame time Jacobi likewise declared himself against this metaphysic, but\nsince he started more especially from the standpoint of the French and\nGermans, his point of view was different: he asserts that our finite\nthought can set forth finite determinations alone, and thus can only\nconsider God and Spirit in accordance with finite relationships. On\nthe practical side there reigned at that time the so-called happiness\ntheory, since man\u2019s inherent Notion and the way to realize this Notion\nwas apprehended in morality as a satisfaction of his desires. As against\nthis Kant has very rightly shown that it involves a heteronomy and not\nan autonomy of reason\u2014a determination through nature and consequently\nan absence of freedom. But because the rational principle of Kant was\nformal, and his successors could not make any further progress with\nreason, and yet morality had to receive a content, Fries and others must\nstill be called Hedonists though they avoid giving themselves the name.\n\nIn the third place, as regards the relation of the categories to the\nmaterial which is given through experience, there is according to\nKant already inherent in the subjective determinations of thought,\n_e.g._ in those of cause and effect, the capacity of themselves to\nbind together the differences which are present in that material. Kant\nconsiders thought as in great measure a synthetic activity, and hence\nhe represents the main question of Philosophy to be this, \u201cHow are\nsynthetic judgments _a priori_ possible?\u201d[329] Judgment signifies the\ncombination of thought-determinations as subject and predicate. Synthetic\njudgments _a priori_ are nothing else than a connection of opposites\nthrough themselves, or the absolute Notion, _i.e._ the relations of\ndifferent determinations such as those of cause and effect, given\nnot through experience but through thought. Space and time likewise\nform the connecting element; they are thus _a priori_, _i.e._ in\nself-consciousness. Since Kant shows that thought has synthetic judgments\n_a priori_ which are not derived from perception, he shows that thought\nis so to speak concrete in itself. The idea which is present here is a\ngreat one, but, on the other hand, quite an ordinary signification is\ngiven it, for it is worked out from points of view which are inherently\nrude and empirical, and a scientific form is the last thing that\ncan be claimed for it. In the presentation of it there is a lack of\nphilosophical abstraction, and it is expressed in the most commonplace\nway; to say nothing more of the barbarous terminology, Kant remains\nrestricted and confined by his psychological point of view and empirical\nmethods.\n\nTo mention one example only of his barbarous expressions, Kant calls\nhis philosophy (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p. 19) a Transcendental\nphilosophy, _i.e._ a system of principles of pure reason which\ndemonstrate the universal and necessary elements in the self-conscious\nunderstanding, without occupying themselves with objects or inquiring\nwhat universality and necessity are; this last would be transcendent.\nTranscendent and transcendental have accordingly to be clearly\ndistinguished. Transcendent mathematics signifies the mathematics in\nwhich the determination of infinitude is made use of in a pre-eminent\ndegree: in this sphere of mathematics we say, for instance, that the\ncircle consists of an infinitude of straight lines; the periphery\nis represented as straight, and since the curve is represented as\nstraight this passes beyond the geometric category and is consequently\ntranscendent. Kant, on the contrary, defines the transcendental\nphilosophy as not a philosophy which by means of categories passes beyond\nits own sphere, but one which points out in subjective thought, in\nconsciousness, the sources of what may become transcendent. Thought would\nthus be transcendent if the categories of universality, of cause and\neffect, were predicated of the object, for in this way men would from the\nsubjective element \u2018transcend\u2019 into another sphere. We are not justified\nin so doing as regards the result nor even to begin with, since we\nmerely contemplate thought within thought itself. Thus we do not desire\nto consider the categories in their objective sense, but in so far as\nthought is the source of such synthetic relationships; the necessary and\nuniversal thus here receive the significance of resting in our faculties\nof knowledge. But from this faculty of knowledge Kant still separates the\nimplicit, the thing-in-itself, so that the universality and necessity are\nall the time a subjective conditionment of knowledge merely, and reason\nwith its universality and necessity does not attain to a knowledge of\nthe truth.[330] For it requires perception and experience, a material\nempirically given in order, as subjectivity, to attain to knowledge.\nAs Kant says, these form its \u201cconstituent parts\u201d; one part it has in\nitself, but the other is empirically given.[331] When reason desires to\nbe independent, to exist in itself and to derive truth from itself, it\nbecomes transcendent; it transcends experience because it lacks the other\nconstituent, and then creates mere hallucinations of the brain. It is\nhence not constitutive in knowledge but only regulative; it is the unity\nand rule for the sensuous manifold. But this unity on its own account\nis the unconditioned, which, transcending experience, merely arrives at\ncontradictions. In the practical sphere alone is reason constitutive. The\ncritique of reason is consequently not the knowing of objects, but of\nknowledge and its principles, its range and limitations, so that it does\nnot become transcendent.[332] This is an extremely general account of\nwhat we shall now consider in its separate details.\n\nIn dealing with this matter Kant adopts the plan of first considering\ntheoretic reason, the knowledge which relates to outward objects. In the\nsecond place he investigates the will as self-actualization; and, in the\nthird place, the faculty of judgment, the special consideration of the\nunity of the universal and individual; how far he gets in this matter we\nshall likewise see. But the critique of the faculty of knowledge is the\nmatter of main importance.\n\n1. In the first place, as to the theoretic philosophy, Kant in the\nCritique of Pure Reason sets to work in a psychological manner, _i.e._\nhistorically, inasmuch as he describes the main stages in theoretic\nconsciousness. The first faculty is sensuousness generally, the second\nunderstanding, the third reason. All this he simply narrates; he accepts\nit quite empirically, without developing it from the Notion or proceeding\nby necessity.\n\na. The _a priori_ fact of sensuous existence, the forms of sensuous\nexistence, constitute the beginning of this transcendentalism. Kant\ncalls the judgment of the same the transcendental \u00e6sthetic. Nowadays\n\u00e6sthetic signifies the knowledge of the beautiful. But here the doctrine\nof intuition or perception is taken from the point of view of its\nuniversality, _i.e._ from what in it pertains to the subject as such.\nPerception, says Kant, is the knowledge of an object given to us through\nthe senses; sensuousness, however, is the capacity of being affected by\nconceptions as external. Now, according to Kant, in perception there\nare to be found all manner of contents, and in dealing with this he\nfirst of all distinguishes feeling as external, such as redness, colour,\nhardness, &c., and then as internal, such as justice, wrath, love, fear,\npleasurable and religious feelings, &c. He says content such as this\nforms the one constituent and pertains to feeling; all this is subjective\nand merely subjective. In this sensuous element there is, however, a\nuniversal sensuous element likewise contained, which as such does not\nbelong to feeling in so far as it is immediately determined; in such a\ncontent this \u2018other\u2019 consists in the categories of space and time, which\nof themselves are void and empty. The filling in is performed by the\ncontent, by colour, softness, hardness, &c., as regards space; while as\nregards time, the same content, so soon as it is something transient,\nor again some other content, and in particular inward feelings are what\ncauses the determination. Space and time are consequently pure, _i.e._\nabstract perceptions in which we place outside of us the content of\nindividual sensations, either in time as succeeding one another, or in\nspace as separate from one another. Here we thus meet with the division\nbetween subjectivity and objectivity, for if we isolate the \u2018alongside\nof\u2019 and \u2018after\u2019 we have space and time. It is the act of _a priori_\nsensuousness to project the content; the forms of intuition or perception\nconstitute this pure perception.[333] Now everything indeed is termed\nperception, even thought and consciousness; God, who certainly pertains\nto thought alone, is said to be comprehended by perception or intuition,\nthe so-called immediate consciousness.\n\nKant further remarks in this regard, (1) \u201cSpace is no empirical Notion\nwhich has been derived from outward experiences.\u201d But the Notion is\nnever really anything empiric: it is in barbarous forms like this that\nKant, however, always expresses himself: \u201cFor in order that I may relate\nmy sensations to something outside of me, I must presuppose space.\u201d Of\ntime Kant speaks in similar terms: \u201cIn order that something outside of\nme may be represented in separate space or time, the conception of space\nand time must come first, or it cannot be derived from experience, for\nexperience first becomes possible through this antecedent conception.\u201d\nThat is to say, time and space which may appear as objective, since their\nparticular filling in certainly belongs to subjective feeling, are not\nempirical; for consciousness has time and space first of all in itself.\n(2) \u201cSpace is a necessary conception which lies at the basis of all\nexternal perceptions. Space and time are conceptions _a priori_, because\nwe cannot represent things without space and time. Time is a necessary\nbasis for all phenomena.\u201d As _a priori_, space and time are universal\nand necessary, that is to say we find this to be the case; but it does\nnot follow that they must be previously present as conceptions. They\nare fundamental indeed, but they are likewise an external universal.\nKant however places the matter somewhat in this fashion: there are\nthings-in-themselves outside, but devoid of time and space; consciousness\nnow comes, and it has time and space beforehand present in it as the\npossibility of experience, just as in order to eat it has mouth and\nteeth, &c., as conditions necessary for eating. The things which are\neaten have not the mouth and teeth, and as eating is brought to bear\non things, so space and time are also brought to bear on them; just as\nthings are placed in the mouth and between the teeth, so is it with space\nand time. (3) \u201cSpace and time are not general Notions of the relations\nof things, but pure intuitive perceptions. For we can only represent\nto ourselves one space; there are not different component parts of\nspace.\u201d The same is the case with time. The abstract conception tree,\nfor example, is in its actuality a number of individual and separate\ntrees, but spaces are not such particulars, nor are they parts; for\none immediate continuity remains, and hence a simple unity. Ordinary\nperception has always something individual before it; space or time are\nalways however one only, and therefore _a priori_. It might however be\nreplied to Kant: The nature of space and time undoubtedly involves their\nbeing an abstract universal; but there is in like manner only one blue.\n(4) \u201cEach Notion or conception certainly comprises an infinite number\nof conceptions under itself, but not within itself; nevertheless this\nlast is the case in space and time, and they are therefore intuitive\nperceptions and not Notions or conceptions.\u201d[334] Space and time, then,\nare certainly not thought-determinations, if no thoughts are there\npresent, but a Notion, so soon as we have a Notion of them.\n\nFrom the transcendental point of view it is likewise maintained that\nthis conception of space and time contains synthetic propositions _a\npriori_, connected with the consciousness of its necessity. Examples of\nthese synthetic propositions are sought in statements such as that of\nspace having three dimensions, or in the definition of a straight line,\nthat it is the shortest distance between two points, and likewise in\nthe statement that 5 + 7 = 12.[335] All these propositions are however\nvery analytic. Kant nevertheless in the first place holds that such\npropositions do not take their rise from experience, or, as we might\nbetter express it, are not an individual contingent perception; this\nis very true, the perception is universal and necessary. In the second\nplace he states that we acquire them from pure sensuous perception, and\nnot through the understanding or Notion. But Kant does not grasp the\ntwo together, and yet this comprehension of them is involved in such\npropositions being immediately certain even in ordinary perception.\nWhen Kant then expresses himself (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p. 49)\nto the effect that we have many sensations which constitute \u201cthe real\nmatter,\u201d with which we externally and inwardly \u201coccupy our minds,\u201d and\nthat the mind has in itself in space and time \u201cformal conditions of the\nmode in which we place them\u201d (those manifold feelings) \u201cin our mind,\u201d\nthe question of how mind arrives at having just these special forms now\nforces itself upon us. But what the nature of time and space is, it does\nnot occur to the Kantian philosophy to inquire. To it what space and time\nare in themselves does not signify \u2018What is their Notion,\u2019 but \u2018Are they\nexternal things or something in the mind?\u2019\n\nb. The second faculty, the understanding, is something very different\nfrom sensuousness; the latter is Receptivity, while Kant calls thought\nin general Spontaneity\u2014an expression which belongs to the philosophy\nof Leibnitz. The understanding is active thought, I myself; it \u201cis the\nfaculty of thinking the object of sensuous perception.\u201d Yet it has\nthoughts merely without real content: \u201cThoughts without content are\nvoid and empty, sensuous perceptions without Notions are blind.\u201d The\nunderstanding thus obtains from the sensuous its matter, both empirical\nand _a priori_, time and space; and it thinks this matter, but its\nthoughts are very different from this matter. Or it is a faculty of\na particular kind, and it is only when both occur, when the sensuous\nfaculty has supplied material and the understanding has united to\nthis its thoughts, that knowledge results.[336] The thoughts of the\nunderstanding as such are thus limited thoughts, thoughts of the finite\nonly.\n\nNow logic, as transcendental logic, likewise sets forth the conceptions\nwhich the understanding has _a priori_ in itself and \u201cwhereby it thinks\nobjects completely _a priori_.\u201d Thoughts have a form which signifies\ntheir being the synthetic function which brings the manifold into a\nunity. _I_ am this unity, the transcendental apperception, the pure\napperception of self-consciousness. I = I; _I_ must \u2018accompany\u2019 all\nour conceptions.[337] This is a barbarous exposition of the matter.\nAs self-consciousness I am the completely void, general I, completely\nindeterminate and abstract; apperception is determination generally,\nthe activity whereby I transplant an empirical content into my simple\nconsciousness, while perception rather signifies feeling or conceiving.\nIn order that a content may enter this One, it must be infected by its\nsimplicity; it is thus that the content first becomes my content. The\ncomprehending medium is \u2018I\u2019; whatever I have to do with must allow\nitself to be forced into these forms of unity. This is a great fact, an\nimportant item of knowledge; what thought produces is unity; thus it\nproduces itself, for it is the One. Yet the fact that I am the one and,\nas thinking, the simplifier, is not by Kant satisfactorily set forth. The\nunity may likewise be called relation; for in so far as a manifold is\npresupposed, and as this on the one side remains a manifold while on the\nother side it is set forth as one, so far may it be said to be related.\n\nNow as \u2018I\u2019 is the universal transcendental unity of self-consciousness\nwhich binds together the empirical matter of conception generally,\nthere are various modes in this relationship, and here we\nhave the transcendental nature of the categories or universal\nthought-determinations. But Kant (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, pp. 70,\n77) approaches these modes of simplicity by accepting them as they\nare classified in ordinary logic. For he says that in common logic\nparticular kinds of judgment are brought forward; and since judgment is\na special kind of relationship of the manifold, the various functions\nof thought which \u2018I\u2019 has in it are shown therein. But the following\nkinds of judgment have been noticed, viz. Universal, Particular and\nSingular; Affirmative, Negative, Infinite; Categorical, Hypothetical,\nDisjunctive; Assertoric, Problematic and Apodictic judgments. These\nparticular modes of relationship now brought forward are the pure forms\nof the understanding. There are thus, according to Kant (Kritik der\nreinen Vernunft, pp. 75, 76, 78-82), twelve fundamental categories,\nwhich fall into four classes; and it is noteworthy, and deserves to be\nrecognized, that each species of judgment again constitutes a triad.\n(1) The first kind of categories are those of Quantity, viz. Unity,\nPlurality and Totality. Plurality is negation of the one, the assertion\nof difference; and the third, the bringing of the other two into one,\nplurality circumscribed, the indeterminate plurality comprehended as\none, is the Totality. (2) In the second series are the categories of\nQuality: Reality, Negation, Limitation. Limitation is as real or positive\nas negation. (3) The third series comprises the categories of relation,\nof connection; and first of all, indeed, the relation of Substantiality,\nSubstance and Accident: then the relation of Causality, the relation\nof Cause and Effect, and finally Reciprocity. (4) The categories of\nModality, of the relation of the objective to our thought, come fourth,\nviz. Possibility, Existence (actuality) and Necessity. Possibility should\ncome second; in abstract thought, however, the empty conception comes\nfirst. It betrays a great instinct for the Notion when Kant says that the\nfirst category is positive, the second the negative of the first, the\nthird the synthesis of the two. The triplicity, this ancient form of the\nPythagoreans, Neo-Platonists and of the Christian religion, although it\nhere reappears as a quite external _schema_ only, conceals within itself\nthe absolute form, the Notion. But since Kant says that a conception can\ndetermine itself in me as accidental, as cause, effect, unity, plurality,\n&c., we thereby have the whole of the metaphysics of the understanding.\nKant does not follow up further the derivation of these categories,\nand he finds them imperfect, but he says that the others are derived\nfrom them. Kant thus accepts the categories in an empiric way, without\nthinking of developing of necessity these differences from unity. Just\nas little did Kant attempt to deduce time and space, for he accepted\nthem likewise from experience\u2014a quite unphilosophic and unjustifiable\nprocedure.\n\nThinking understanding is thus indeed the source of the individual\ncategories, but because on their own account they are void and empty,\nthey only have significance through their union with the given, manifold\nmaterial of perception, feeling, &c. Such connection of sensuous material\nwith categories now constitutes the facts of experience, _i.e._ the\nmatter of sensation after it is brought under the categories; and this\nis knowledge generally.[338] The matter of perception which pertains to\nthe feelings or sensuous perception is not left in the determination of\nindividuality and immediacy, but I am active in relation to it, inasmuch\nas I bring it into connection through the categories and elevate it into\nuniversal species, natural laws, &c. The question of whether a completed\nsensuousness or the Notion is the higher may accordingly be easily\ndecided. For the laws of the heavens are not immediately perceived, but\nmerely the change in position on the part of the stars. It is only when\nthis object of immediate perception is laid hold of and brought under\nuniversal thought-determinations that experience arises therefrom, which\nhas a claim to validity for all time. The category which brings the unity\nof thought into the content of feeling is thus the objective element in\nexperience, which receives thereby universality and necessity, while that\nwhich is perceived is rather the subjective and contingent. Our finding\nboth these elements in experience demonstrates indeed that a correct\nanalysis has been made. Kant (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, pp. 119, 120)\nhowever connects with this the statement that experience grasps phenomena\nonly, and that by means of the knowledge which we obtain through,\nexperience we do not know things as they are in themselves, but only as\nthey are in the form of laws of perception and sensuousness. For the\nfirst component part of experience, sensation, is doubtless subjective,\nsince it is connected with our organs. The matter of perception is only\nwhat it is in my sensation. I know of this sensation only and not of the\nthing. But, in the second place, the objective, which ought to constitute\nthe opposite to this subjective side, is itself subjective likewise: it\ndoes not indeed pertain to my feeling, but it remains shut up in the\nregion of my self-consciousness; the categories are only determinations\nof our thinking understanding. Neither the one nor the other is\nconsequently anything in itself, nor are both together, knowledge,\nanything in itself, for it only knows phenomena\u2014a strange contradiction.\n\nThe transition of the category to the empiric is made in the following\nway: \u201cPure conceptions of the understanding are quite of a different\nnature from empiric, indeed from any sensuous perceptions;\u201d we have\nthus \u201cto show how pure conceptions of the understanding can be applied\nto phenomena.\u201d This is dealt with by the transcendental faculty of\njudgment. For Kant says that in the mind, in self-consciousness, there\nare pure conceptions of the understanding and pure sensuous perceptions;\nnow it is the schematism of the pure understanding, the transcendental\nfaculty of the imagination, which determines the pure sensuous perception\nin conformity with the category and thus constitutes the transition to\nexperience.[339] The connection of these two is again one of the most\nattractive sides of the Kantian philosophy, whereby pure sensuousness and\npure understanding, which were formerly expressed as absolute opposites,\nare now united. There is thus here present a perceptive understanding\nor an understanding perception; but Kant does not see this, he does not\nbring these thoughts together: he does not grasp the fact that he has\nhere brought both sides of knowledge into one, and has thereby expressed\ntheir implicitude. Knowledge itself is in fact the unity and truth of\nboth moments; but with Kant the thinking understanding and sensuousness\nare both something particular, and they are only united in an external,\nsuperficial way, just as a piece of wood and a leg might be bound\ntogether by a cord. Thus, for example, the conception of substance in the\n_schema_ becomes permanent in time,[340] _i.e._ the pure conception of\nthe understanding, the pure category, is brought into unity with the form\nof pure sensuous perception.\n\nIn as far as we have to deal with our own determinations only and as we\ndo not reach the implicit, the true objective, the Kantian philosophy\ncalled itself Idealism. But in this connection Kant (Kritik der reinen\nVernunft, pp. 200, 201) brings forward a refutation of empirical or\nmaterial idealism, thus: \u201cI am conscious of my existence as determined\nin time. But all time-determination presupposes something permanent in\nperception. This permanence cannot be\u201d a sensuous perception \u201cin me.\u201d\nFor all the determining grounds of my existence which are met with in\nme are conceptions, and as such themselves require a constant element\ndifferent from them, and in relation to which the change taking place\nin them\u2014consequently \u201cmy existence in time,\u201d in which they change, \u201cmay\nbe determined.\u201d Or I am conscious of my existence as of an empirical\nconsciousness which is only capable of being determined in relation to\nsomething which is outside of me; _i.e._ I am conscious of something\nexternal to me. Conversely it may be said: I am conscious of external\nthings as determined in time and as changing; these hence presuppose\nsomething constant which is not in them but outside of them. And this is\n\u2018I,\u2019 the transcendental ground of their universality and necessity, of\ntheir implicitude, the unity of self-consciousness. On another occasion\nKant regards it thus (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p. 101): These moments\nconfuse themselves, because the constant element is itself a category.\nIdealism, when we regard it as signifying that nothing exists outside of\nmy individual self-consciousness as individual, as also the refutation of\nthis, the assertion that things exist outside of my self-consciousness\nas individual, are the one as bad as the other. The former is the\nidealism of Berkeley, in which self-consciousness as individual is alone\nin question, or the world of self-consciousness appears as a number of\nlimited, sensuous, individual conceptions, which are as completely devoid\nof truth as though they were called things. The truth or untruth does not\nrest in their being things or conceptions, but in their limitation and\ncontingency, whether as conceptions or things. The refutation of this\nidealism is nothing more than calling attention to the fact that this\nempirical consciousness does not exist in itself\u2014just as those empiric\nthings do not exist in themselves. But the knowing subject does not\nwith Kant really arrive at reason, for it remains still the individual\nself-consciousness as such, which is opposed to the universal. As a\nmatter of fact there is described in what we have seen only the empirical\nfinite self-consciousness which requires a material from outside, or\nwhich is limited. We do not ask whether these facts of knowledge are\nin and for themselves true or untrue; the whole of knowledge remains\nwithin subjectivity, and on the other side there is the thing-in-itself\nas an external. This subjectivity is however concrete in itself; even\nthe determinate categories of the thinking understanding are concrete,\nand much more is experience so\u2014the synthesis of the sensation and the\ncategory.[341]\n\nc. The third faculty Kant finds in reason, to which he advances from\nthe understanding after the same psychological method; that is to say,\nhe hunts through the soul\u2019s sack to see what faculties are still to be\nfound there; and thus by merest chance he lights on Reason. It would\nmake no difference if there had been no Reason there, just as with\nphysicists it is a matter of perfect indifference whether, for instance,\nthere is such a thing as magnetism or not. \u201cAll our knowledge begins\nfrom the senses, thence proceeds to the understanding, and finishes\nup with reason; nothing higher than this is to be found in us, for\nit signifies the working up of the material of perception, and the\nreducing of it to the highest unity of thought.\u201d Reason is therefore,\naccording to Kant, the power of obtaining knowledge from principles,\nthat is, the power of knowing the particular in the universal by means\nof Notions; the understanding, on the contrary, reaches its particular\nby means of perception. But the categories are themselves particular.\nThe principle of reason, according to Kant, is really the universal,\ninasmuch as it finds the unconditioned involved in the conditioned\nknowledge of the understanding. Understanding is hence for him thought\nin finite relations; reason, on the contrary, is thought which makes\nthe unconditioned its object. Since Kant\u2019s time it has become customary\nin the language of philosophy to distinguish understanding and reason,\nwhile by earlier philosophers this distinction was not drawn. The product\nof reason is, according to Kant, the Idea\u2014a Platonic expression\u2014and he\nunderstands by it the unconditioned, the infinite.[342] It is a great\nstep forward to say that reason brings forth Ideas; with Kant, however,\nthe Idea is merely the abstract universal, the indeterminate.\n\nThis, the unconditioned, must now be grasped as concrete, and therein\nlies the main difficulty. For to know the unconditioned means to\ndetermine it and to deduce its determinations. Much has been written and\nsaid on the subject of knowledge, without a definition of it ever having\nbeen offered. But it is the business of Philosophy to see that what is\ntaken for granted as known is really known. Now on this point Kant says\nthat reason has certainly the desire to know the infinite, but has not\nthe power. And the reason which Kant gives for this (Kritik der reinen\nVernunft, pp. 277, 278), is on the one hand that no psychologically\nsensuous intuition or perception corresponds with the infinite, that it\nis not given in outward or inward experience; to the Idea \u201cno congruent\nor corresponding object can be discovered in the sensuous world.\u201d It\ndepends, however, on how the world is looked at; but experience and\nobservation of the world mean nothing else for Kant than a candlestick\nstanding here, and a snuff-box standing there. It is certainly\ncorrect to say that the infinite is not given in the world of sensuous\nperception; and supposing that what we know is experience, a synthesis\nof what is thought and what is felt, the infinite can certainly not be\nknown in the sense that we have a sensuous perception of it. But no one\nwishes to demand a sensuous proof in verification of the infinite; spirit\nis for spirit alone. The second reason for considering that the infinite\ncannot be known, lies in this, that Reason has no part in it except\nas supplying the forms of thought which we call categories; and these\ndoubtless afford what Kant calls objective determinations, but in such\na way that in themselves they are still only subjective. If therefore\nfor the determination of the infinite we employ these categories which\nare applicable only to phenomena, we entangle ourselves in false\narguments (paralogisms) and in contradictions (antinomies); and it is an\nimportant point in the Kantian philosophy that the infinite, so far as\nit is defined by means of categories, loses itself in contradictions.\nAlthough reason, says Kant, becomes transcendent by the exhibition of\nthese contradictions, it still retains its claim to trace perception,\nexperience, and knowledge pertaining to the understanding, back to the\ninfinite. This union of the infinite, the unconditioned, with the finite\nand conditioned as existing in the knowledge given by the understanding,\nor even in perception, would signify that the acme of concreteness had\nbeen reached.\n\nOf this Unconditioned there are several kinds, objects having special\nfeatures of their own and proceeding from reason, transcendental Ideas;\nthey are thus themselves particular in their nature. The manner in which\nKant arrives at these Ideas is again derived from experience, from formal\nlogic, according to which there are various forms of the syllogism.\nBecause, says Kant, there are three forms of the syllogism, categorical,\nhypothetical, and disjunctive, the Unconditioned is also three-fold in\nits nature: \u201cFirstly, an Unconditioned of the categorical synthesis in a\nsubject.\u201d Synthesis is the concrete; but the expression is ambiguous,\nsince it indicates an external association of independent elements. \u201cIn\nthe second place, an Unconditioned of the hypothetical synthesis of\nthe members of a series will have to be looked for; and in the third\nplace, an Unconditioned of the disjunctive synthesis of the parts in a\nsystem.\u201d We make the first connection, expressed as object of Reason or\ntranscendental Idea, when we conceive \u201cthe thinking subject;\u201d the second\n\u201cis the sum total of all phenomena, the world;\u201d and the third is \u201cthe\nthing which contains the supreme condition of the possibility of all that\ncan be thought, the Being of all Beings,\u201d _i.e._ God. When brought to an\nultimate point, the question which meets us is whether Reason can bring\nthese objects to reality, or whether they remain confined to subjective\nthought. Now, according to Kant, Reason is not capable of procuring\nreality for its Ideas\u2014otherwise it would be transcendent, its limits\nwould be overstepped; it produces only paralogisms, antinomies, and an\nideal without reality.[343]\n\n\u03b1. \u201cA. paralogism is a syllogism false in its form.\u201d Since Reason\ncredits with reality that mode of the Unconditioned which constitutes\nthe categorical synthesis in a subject, and therefore the thinking\nsubject, it is termed substance. Now is the thinking ego a substance,\na soul, a soul-thing? Further questions are whether it is permanent,\nimmaterial, incorruptible, personal and immortal, and such as to have\na real community with the body. The falsity of the syllogism consists\nin this, that the idea of the unity of the transcendental subject\nessential to Reason is expressed as a thing; for it is only in this way\nthat the permanency of the same becomes substance. Otherwise I find\nmyself permanent in my thought, of course, but only within perceiving\nconsciousness, not outside of that. The ego is therefore the empty,\ntranscendental subject of our thoughts, that moreover becomes known only\nthrough its thoughts; but of what it is in itself we cannot gather the\nleast idea. (A horrible distinction! For thought is nothing more or less\nthan the \u201cin-itself\u201d or implicit.) We cannot assert of it any present\nBeing, because thought is an empty form, we have a conception of what\nthinking Beings are through no outward experience, but only by means of\nself-consciousness,\u2014_i.e._ because we cannot take the \u201cI\u201d in our hands,\nnor see it, nor smell it. We therefore know very well that the ego is a\nsubject, but if we pass beyond self-consciousness, and say that it is\nsubstance, we go farther than we are entitled to do. I cannot therefore\nassign any reality to the subject.[344]\n\nWe here see Kant fall into contradiction, what with the barbarity of the\nconceptions which he refutes, and the barbarity of his own conceptions\nwhich remain behind when the others are refuted. In the first place, he\nis perfectly correct when he maintains that the ego is not a soul-thing,\na dead permanency which has a sensuous present existence; indeed, were\nit to be an ordinary thing, it would be necessary that it should be\ncapable of being experienced. But, in the second place, Kant does not\nassert the contrary of this, namely that the ego, as this universal or\nas self-thinking, has in itself the true reality which he requires as an\nobjective mode. For he does not get clear of the conception of reality in\nwhich reality consists in the possession of a sensuous present existence;\naccordingly, because the ego is given in no outward experience, it is\nnot real. For self-consciousness, the ego as such, is not, according to\nKant, reality; it is only _our_ thought, or in other words he regards\nself-consciousness as being itself simply and entirely sensuous. The form\nwhich Kant accordingly bestows on Being, thing, substance, would seem\nto indicate that these categories of the understanding were too high for\nthe subject, too high to be capable of being predicated of it. But really\nsuch determinations are too poor and too mean, for what possesses life is\nnot a thing, nor can the soul, the spirit, the ego, be called a thing.\nBeing is the least or lowest quality that one can assign to spirit, its\nabstract, immediate identity with itself; Being thus no doubt pertains\nto spirit, but it must be considered as a determination scarcely worth\napplying to it.\n\n\u03b2. In the second place we have the antinomy, _i.e._ the contradiction in\nReason\u2019s Idea of the Unconditioned, an Idea applied to the world in order\nto represent it as a complete summing-up of conditions. That is to say,\nin the given phenomena Reason demands the absolute completeness of the\nconditions of their possibility, so far as these constitute a series, so\nthat the unconditioned is contained in the world, _i.e._ the totality\nof the series. If now this completeness is expressed as existing, an\nantinomy is alone presented, and Reason is presented only as dialectic:\n_i.e._ in this object there is on every side a perfect contradiction\nfound.[345] For phenomena are a finite content, and the world is a\nconjunction of the limited; if this content is now thought by Reason, and\ntherefore subsumed under the unconditioned and the unlimited, we have two\ndeterminations, finite and infinite, which contradict each other. Reason\ndemands a perfectly complete synthesis, an absolute beginning; but in\nphenomena we have, on the contrary, a succession of causes and effects,\nwhich never come to an end. Kant here points out four contradictions\n(Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p. 320), which, however, is not enough; for\nin each Notion there are antinomies, since it is not simple but concrete,\nand therefore contains different determinations, which are direct\nopposites.\n\n\u03b1\u03b1. These antinomies in the first place involve our making the one\ndetermination, limitation, just as valid as non-limitation. \u201cThesis: The\nworld has a beginning and an end in time, and it is limited in regard to\nspace. Antithesis: It has no beginning and no end in time, and also no\nlimits in space.\u201d The one, says Kant, can be proved just as easily as\nthe other; and indeed he does prove each indirectly, though his are not\n\u201cadvocate\u2019s proofs.\u201d[346] The world, as the universe, is the whole; it\nis thus a universal idea, and therefore unlimited. The completion of the\nsynthesis in progression as regards time and space is, however, a first\nbeginning of time and space. If therefore the categories of limited and\nunlimited are applied to the world in order to attain to a knowledge\nof it, we fall into contradictions, because the categories are not\napplicable to things-in-themselves.\n\n\u03b2\u03b2. The second antinomy is that atoms, from which substance is composed,\nmust necessarily be admitted to exist, therefore simplicity can be\nproved; but just as easy is it to prove incompleteness, the endless\nprocess of division. The thesis is accordingly stated thus: \u201cEvery\ncompound substance consists of simple parts,\u201d and the antithesis is as\nfollows: \u201cThere exists nothing simple.\u201d[347] The one is here the limit,\na material self-existence, the point which is likewise the enclosing\nsurface; the other is divisibility _ad infinitum_.\n\n\u03b3\u03b3. The third antinomy is the opposition between freedom and necessity.\nThe first is the self-determining, the point of view pertaining to\ninfinity: causality according to the laws of freedom is the only\ncausality. The other is: Determinism alone is to be found: everything is\ndetermined by means of an external ground or reason.[348]\n\n\u03b4\u03b4. The fourth antinomy rests on what follows: On the one hand totality\ncompletes itself in freedom as a first beginning of action, or in\nan absolutely necessary Being, as the cause of the world, so that\nthe process is interrupted: but there is opposed to that freedom the\nnecessity of a process according to conditions of causes and effects,\nand to the necessity of a Being is opposed the consideration that\neverything is contingent. The absolute necessity of the conditioned world\nis therefore on the one hand maintained thus: \u201cTo the world belongs an\nabsolutely necessary Being.\u201d The opposite to this is, \u201cThere exists no\nabsolutely necessary Being, either as part of the world or outside of the\nworld.\u201d[349]\n\nOne of these opposites is just as necessary as the other, and it\nis superfluous to carry this further here. The necessity of these\ncontradictions is the interesting fact which Kant (Kritik der reinen\nVernunft, p. 324) has brought to consciousness; in ordinary metaphysics,\nhowever, it is imagined that one of these contradictions must hold good,\nand the other be disproved. The most important point involved in this\nassertion of Kant\u2019s is, however, unintentional on his part. For he indeed\nsolves these antinomies (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, pp. 385, 386), but\nonly in the particular sense of transcendental idealism, which does not\ndoubt or deny the existence of external things (_supra_, p. 442), but\n\u201callows that things are perceived in space and time\u201d (which is the case,\nwhether it allows it or not): for transcendental idealism, however,\n\u201cspace and time in themselves are not things at all,\u201d and therefore \u201cdo\nnot exist apart from our mind;\u201d _i.e._ all these determinations of a\nbeginning in time, and so on, do not really belong to things, to the\nimplicitude of the phenomenal world, which has independent existence\noutside of our subjective thought. If such determinations belonged\nto the world, to God, to free agents, there would be an objective\ncontradiction; but this contradiction is not found as absolute, it\npertains only to us. Or, in other words, this transcendental idealism\nlets the contradiction remain, only it is not Being in itself that\nis thus contradictory, for the contradiction has its source in our\nthought alone. Thus the same antinomy remains in our mind; and as it was\nformerly God who had to take upon Himself all contradictions, so now\nit is self-consciousness. But the Kantian philosophy does not go on to\ngrapple with the fact that it is not things that are contradictory, but\nself-consciousness itself. Experience teaches that the ego does not melt\naway by reason of these contradictions, but continues to exist; we need\nnot therefore trouble ourselves about its contradictions, for it can\nbear them. Nevertheless Kant shows here too much tenderness for things:\nit would be a pity, he thinks, if they contradicted themselves. But that\nmind, which is far higher, should be a contradiction\u2014that is not a pity\nat all. The contradiction is therefore by no means solved by Kant; and\nsince mind takes it upon itself, and contradiction is self-destructive,\nmind is in itself all derangement and disorder. The true solution\nwould be found in the statement that the categories have no truth in\nthemselves, and the Unconditioned of Reason just as little, but that it\nlies in the unity of both as concrete, and in that alone.\n\n\u03b3. Kant now goes on to the Idea of God; this third idea is the Being of\nBeings, which the other ideas presupposed. Kant says (Kritik der reinen\nVernunft, pp. 441-452), that according to the definition of Wolff, God is\nthe most real of all Beings; the object then comes to be to prove that\nGod is not only Thought, but that He is, that He has reality, Being.\nThis Kant calls the Ideal of Reason, to distinguish it from the Idea,\nwhich is only the sum of all possibility. The Ideal is thus the Idea as\nexistent; just as in art we give the name of ideal to the Idea realized\nin a sensuous manner. Here Kant takes into consideration the proof of\nthe existence of God, as he asks whether reality can be assigned to this\nIdeal.\n\nThe ontological proof proceeds from the absolute Notion, in order from it\nto argue up to Being. With Anselm, Descartes, and Spinoza the transition\nto Being is thus made; and all of them assume in so doing the unity\nof Being and thought. But Kant says (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, pp.\n458-466): To this Ideal of Reason just as little reality can be assigned:\nthere is no transition from the Notion to Being. \u201cBeing is not a real\npredicate,\u201d like any other, \u201ca Notion of something which might be added\nto the Notion of a thing. A hundred real dollars do not contain in the\nvery least more than a hundred possible dollars,\u201d they are the same\ncontent, _i.e._ the same Notion; they are also a hundred exactly. The one\nis the Notion, or rather the conception, the other is the object; Being\nis no new determination of the Notion, otherwise my Notion of a hundred\nreal dollars would contain something different from a hundred real\ndollars. But \u201cthe object, as real, is not contained in my Notion alone;\nor to my Notion the real hundred dollars are synthetically added.\u201d Being\ncannot therefore be derived from the Notion, because it is not contained\ntherein, but must be added to it. \u201cWe must go out of the Notion in order\nto arrive at existence. With regard to objects of pure thought, there are\nno means of coming to know of their existence, because it had to be known\n_a priori_; but our consciousness of all existence belongs entirely to\nexperience.\u201d That is to say, Kant does not attain to the comprehension of\nthat very synthesis of Notion and Being, or in other words, he does not\ncomprehend existence, _i.e._ he does not attain to the establishment of\nit as Notion; existence remains for him something absolutely different\nfrom a Notion. The content is no doubt the same for him in what exists\nand in the Notion: but since Being is not involved in the Notion, the\nattempt to derive the one from the other is unavailing.\n\nOf course the determination of Being is not found as positive and\nready-made in the Notion; the Notion is something different from reality\nand objectivity. If we therefore abide by the Notion, we abide by Being\nas something different from the Notion, and adhere to the separation of\nthe two; we then have conception, and not Being at all. That a hundred\npossible dollars are something different from a hundred actual ones is\na reflection of a very popular nature, so much so that no proposition\nhas been so well received as the assertion that no transition can be\nmade from the Notion to Being; for though I imagine to myself a hundred\ndollars, I do not possess them for all that. But in a like popular\nfashion it might be said that one must leave off imagining, for that is\nmere conception: _i.e._ what is merely imaginary is untrue, the hundred\nimaginary dollars are and remain imaginary. Therefore to believe in them\nis a proof of an unsound understanding, and is of no manner of use;\nand he is a foolish fellow who indulges in such fancies and wishes.\nOne possesses a hundred dollars, when they are real only; if a man has\ntherefore so great a desire to possess a hundred dollars, he must put\nhis hand to work in order to obtain them: _i.e._ he must not come to\na standstill at the imagination of them, but pass out beyond it. This\nsubjective side is not the ultimate or the absolute; the true is that\nwhich is not merely subjective. If I possess a hundred dollars, I have\nthem actually, and at the same time I form a conception of them to\nmyself. But according to Kant\u2019s representation we come to a deadlock\nat the difference; dualism is ultimate, and each side has independent\nvalidity as an absolute. Against this false idea of what is to be\nabsolute and ultimate, the healthy human understanding is directed; every\nordinary consciousness rises above it, every action aims at setting aside\na subjective conception and making it into something objective. There\nis no man so foolish as that philosophy; when a man feels hungry, he\ndoes not call up the imagination of food, but sets about satisfying his\nhunger. All activity is a conception which does not yet exist, but whose\nsubjectivity is abrogated. Moreover the imaginary hundred dollars become\nreal, and the real ones imaginary: this is a frequent experience, this\nis their fate; it depends on circumstances entirely outward whether a\nhundred dollars become my property or not. Of course the mere conception\nis of no good, if I obstinately hold by it: for I can imagine what I\nwill, but that does not make it exist. The only important point is what I\nconceive to myself, and then whether I think or comprehend the subjective\nand Being; by means of this each passes into the other. Thought, the\nNotion, of necessity implies that the Notion does not remain subjective;\nthis subjective is on the contrary abrogated and reveals itself as\nobjective. Now that unity is expressly affirmed by Descartes solely in\nreference to the Notion of God, for it is just that which is God; he\nspeaks of no hundred dollars, as these are not an existence which has\na Notion in itself. That opposition does away with itself absolutely\nand entirely, _i.e._ the finite passes away; it holds good only in the\nphilosophy of finitude. If, therefore, there is not a Notion of existence\nformed, we have in it a notionless, sensuous object of perception; and\nwhat is notionless is certainly not a Notion,\u2014therefore sensation,\nhandling, are not Notions. Such existence has of course no Absolute, no\nreal essence: or such existence has no truth, it is only a vanishing\nmoment. This useless thrashing of the empty grainless straw of the common\nlogic is termed philosophizing: it is like Issachar the strong ass, which\ncould not be made to move from the spot where it was (Gen. xlix. 14).\nPeople of this kind say: We are good for nothing, and because we are good\nfor nothing, we are good for nothing, and wish to be good for nothing.\nBut it is a very false idea of Christian humility and modesty to desire\nthrough one\u2019s abjectness to attain to excellence; this confession of\none\u2019s own nothingness is really inward pride and great self-conceit. But\nfor the honour of true humility we must not remain in our misery, but\nraise ourselves above it by laying hold of the Divine.\n\nThe fact to which Kant clings most strongly (Kritik der reinen Vernunft,\np. 467) is this, that Being cannot be extracted from the Notion. The\nresult of this is the proposition that to have the thought of the\nInfinite is certainly Reason; but that from the Idea of Reason is\nseparated determination in general, and especially the determination\nwhich is known as Being. The Ideas of Reason cannot be proved from\nexperience, or obtain from it their verification: if they are defined\nby means of categories, contradictions arise. If the Idea in general\nis to be defined as existent only, it is nothing more or less than the\nNotion; and the Being of the existent is still distinguished from it.\nThis result, however, so highly important with reference to knowledge of\nthe understanding, Kant does not, with reference to Reason, carry further\nthan to say that Reason has on its own account nothing but formal unity\nfor the methodical systematization of the knowledge of the understanding.\nAbstract thinking is adhered to; it is said that the understanding\ncan only bring about order in things; but order is nothing in and for\nitself, it is only subjective. There therefore remains nothing for Reason\nexcept the form of its pure identity with itself, and this extends no\nfurther than to the arranging of the manifold laws and relations of the\nunderstanding, the classes, kinds and species which the understanding\ndiscovers.[350] I, as Reason or conception, and the things external to\nme, are both absolutely different from one another; and that, according\nto Kant, is the ultimate standpoint. The animal does not stop at this\nstandpoint, but practically brings about unity. This is the critique\nof theoretical Reason which Kant gives, and in which he states the _a\npriori_ and determinate character of Reason in itself, without bringing\nit to the determinateness of individuality.[351]\n\nMention should still be made of the positive philosophy or metaphysics,\nwhich Kant sets _a priori_ above objective existence, the content of the\nobject of experience, nature; we have here his natural philosophy, which\nis a demonstration of the universal conceptions of Nature. But this is\non the one hand very scanty and restricted in content, containing as\nit does sundry general qualities and conceptions of matter and motion,\nand with regard to the scientific side or the _a priori_, as Kant calls\nit, it is likewise altogether unsatisfactory. For Kant assumes all such\nconceptions as that matter has motion and also a power of attraction and\nrepulsion,[352] instead of demonstrating their necessity. The \u201cPrinciples\nof Natural Philosophy\u201d have nevertheless been of great service, inasmuch\nas at the commencement of a philosophy of nature, attention was called\nto the fact that physical science employs thought-determinations without\nfurther investigation; and these determinations constitute the real\nfoundations of its objects. Density, for instance, is looked on by\nphysical science as a variable quantity, as a mere _quantum_ in space:\ninstead of this Kant asserted it to be a certain degree of occupation\nof space, _i.e._ energy, intensity of action. He demands accordingly\n(Metaphysische Anfangsgr\u00fcnde der Naturwissenschaft, pp. 65-68) a\nconstruction of matter from powers and activities, not from atoms; and\nSchelling still holds to this without getting further. Kant\u2019s work is an\nattempt to think, _i.e._ to demonstrate the determinations of thought,\nwhose product consists of such conceptions as matter; he has attempted\nto determine the fundamental Notions and principles of this science, and\nhas given the first impulse to a so-called dynamic theory of Nature.\n\n\u201cReligion within pure Reason\u201d is also a demonstration of dogmas as\naspects of Reason, just as in Nature. Thus in the positive dogmas of\nreligion, which the Aufkl\u00e4rung (the clearing-up)\u2014or the Auskl\u00e4rung (the\nclearing-out)\u2014made short work of, Kant called to remembrance Ideas of\nReason, asking what rational and, first of all, what moral meaning lies\nin that which men call dogmas of religion, _e.g._ original sin.[353] He\nis much more reasonable than the _Auskl\u00e4rung_, which thinks it beneath\nits dignity to speak of such matters. These are the principal points in\nrespect to the theoretical part of Kant\u2019s philosophy.\n\n2. The second subject of review in Kant\u2019s philosophy is the practical\nsphere, the nature and principle of the will; this subject is dealt with\nin the Critique of Practical Reason, in which Kant accepted Rousseau\u2019s\nconclusion that the will is absolutely free. Kant\u2019s idea of theoretic\nReason is that when Reason relates itself to an object, this object must\nbe given to it; but when the object is given by Reason to itself, it\nhas no truth; and Reason in knowledge of this kind does not arrive at\nindependence. As practical, on the contrary, Reason is independent in\nitself; as a moral Being man is free, raised above all natural law and\nabove all phenomena. As the theoretic Reason had in itself categories,\n_a priori_ distinctions, so practical Reason has in turn the moral law\nin general, the further determinations of which are constituted by the\nnotions of duty and right, lawful and unlawful; and here Reason disdains\nall the given material which was necessary to it on the theoretic side.\nThe will determines itself within itself; all that is right and moral\nrests on freedom; in this man has his absolute self-consciousness.[354]\nOn this side self-consciousness finds essential reality in itself, as\ntheoretical Reason found it in an \u201cother\u201d; and in the first place,\nindeed, the ego in its individuality is immediate reality, universality,\nobjectivity; in the second place subjectivity strives after reality, but\nnot after sensuous reality such as we had before, for here Reason holds\nitself to be the real. Here we have the Notion which is sensible of its\nown deficiency; this theoretic Reason could not be, as in it the Notion\nhad to remain the Notion. Thus we have the standpoint of absoluteness\nrevealed, since there is an infinite disclosed within the human breast.\nThe satisfying part in Kant\u2019s philosophy is that the truth is at least\nset within the heart; and hence I acknowledge that, and that alone, which\nis in conformity with my determined nature.\n\na. Kant divides will into lower and higher faculties of desire; this\nexpression is not inapt. The lower faculties of desire are impulses,\ninclinations, etc.; the higher faculty is the will as such, which has\nnot external, individual aims, but universal. To the question what the\nprinciple of will that should determine man in his actions is, all\nsorts of answers have been given; for instance, self-love, benevolence,\nhappiness, etc. Such material principles of action, Kant now says, are\nall reducible to impulses, to happiness; but the rational in itself\nis purely formal, and consists in the maxim that what is to hold good\nas law, must be capable of being thought of as a law of universal\napplication, without destroying itself. All morality of action now rests\nupon the conviction that the act is done with consciousness of the law,\nfor the sake of the law and out of respect for the law and for itself,\nwithout any regard to what makes for happiness. As a moral Being man has\nthe moral law in himself, the principle of which is freedom and autonomy\nof the will; for the will is absolute spontaneity. Determinations which\nare taken from the inclinations are heterogeneous principles as regards\nthe will; or the will is heteronomy if it takes such determinations\nas its end and aim; for in that case it takes its determinations from\nsomething else than itself. But the essence of the will is to determine\nitself from itself; for practical Reason gives itself laws. But the\nempirical will is heteronomous, for it is determined by desires; and they\nbelong to our nature, not to the realm of freedom.[355]\n\nIt is a highly important point in the Kantian philosophy that what\nself-consciousness esteems reality, law, and implicit Being, is brought\nback within itself. While a man is striving after this aim and that,\naccording as he judges the world or history in one way or the other,\nwhat is he to take as his ultimate aim? For the will, however, there is\nno other aim than that derived from itself, the aim of its freedom. It\nis a great advance when the principle is established that freedom is the\nlast hinge on which man turns, a highest possible pinnacle, which allows\nnothing further to be imposed upon it; thus man bows to no authority, and\nacknowledges no obligations, where his freedom is not respected. Great\npopularity has from one point of view been won for Kantian philosophy by\nthe teaching that man finds in himself an absolutely firm, unwavering\ncentre-point; but with this last principle it has come to a standstill.\nWhile the highest pinnacle of the theoretic Reason is abstract\nidentity, because it can furnish only a canon, a rule for abstract\nclassifications,[356] practical Reason, as law-giving, is immediately\nregarded as concrete; the law which it gives to itself is the moral law.\nBut even if it is stated that it is concrete in itself, there is the\nfurther consideration that this freedom is at first only the negative of\neverything else; no bond, nothing external, lays me under an obligation.\nIt is to this extent indeterminate; it is the identity of the will with\nitself, its at-homeness with itself. But what is the content of this\nlaw? Here we at once come back to the lack of content. For the sole form\nof this principle is nothing more or less than agreement with itself,\nuniversality; the formal principle of legislation in this internal\nsolitude comes to no determination, or this is abstraction only. The\nuniversal, the non-contradiction of self, is without content, something\nwhich comes to be reality in the practical sphere just as little as in\nthe theoretical. The universal moral law Kant therefore expresses thus\n(and the setting up of such a universal form was at all times the demand\nof the abstract understanding): \u201cAct from maxims\u201d (the law is also to be\nmy particular law), \u201cwhich are capable of becoming universal laws.\u201d[357]\n\nThus for the determination of duty (for the question which meets us is,\nwhat is duty for the free will) Kant has contributed nothing but the\nform of identity, which is the law of abstract Understanding. To defend\none\u2019s fatherland, to promote the happiness of another, is a duty, not\nbecause of the content, but because it is duty; as with the Stoics, what\nwas thought was true for the very reason that, and in so far as it was\nthought (Vol. II., pp. 254, 260, 263). The content as such is indeed not\nwhat holds good universally in the moral law, because it contradicts\nitself. For benevolence, for instance, enjoins: \u201cGive your possessions to\nthe poor,\u201d but if all give away what they have, beneficence is done away\nwith (Vol. I., pp. 417, 418). Even with abstract identity, however, we do\nnot get a step further, for every content which is put into this form is\nby being so put freed from self-contradiction. But nothing would be lost\nif it were not put into this form at all. With regard to property, for\ninstance, the law of my actions is this: Property ought to be respected,\nfor the opposite of this cannot be universal law. That is correct, but\nit is quite a formal determination: If property is, then it is. Property\nis here presupposed, but this determination may also in the same way be\nomitted, and then there is no contradiction involved in theft: If there\nis no such thing as property, then it is not respected. This is the\ndefect in the principle of Kant and Fichte, that it is really formal;\nchill duty is the final undigested lump left within the stomach, the\nrevelation given to Reason.\n\nThe first postulate in practical Reason is thus free, independent will\nwhich determines itself, but this concrete is still abstract. The second\nand third are forms which remind us that the will is concrete in a higher\nsense.\n\nb. The second point is the connection of the Notion of the will with the\nparticular will of the individual; the concrete is here the fact that\nmy particular will and the universal will are identical, or that I am a\nmoral human being. The unity, that man should be moral, is postulated;\nbut beyond the \u201cshould\u201d and this talk of morality, no advance is made.\nIt is not said what is moral; and no thought is given to a system of the\nself-realizing spirit. For really, as theoretic Reason stands opposed to\nthe objective of the senses, so practical Reason stands opposed to the\npractical sensuousness, to impulses and inclinations. Perfected morality\nmust remain a Beyond; for morality presupposes the difference of the\nparticular and universal will. It is a struggle, the determination of\nthe sensuous by the universal; the struggle can only take place when\nthe sensuous will is not yet in conformity with the universal. The\nresult is, therefore, that the aim of the moral will is to be attained\nin infinite progress only; on this Kant founds (Kritik der prakt.\nVernunft, pp. 219-223) the postulate of the immortality of the soul, as\nthe endless progress of the subject in his morality, because morality\nitself is incomplete, and must advance into infinitude. The particular\nwill is certainly something other than the universal will; but it is not\nultimate or really permanent.\n\nc. The third point is the highest concrete, the Notion of the freedom\nof all men, or the natural world has to be in harmony with the Notion\nof freedom. That is the postulate of the existence of God, whom Reason,\nhowever, does not recognize. Will has the whole world, the whole of the\nsensuous, in opposition to it, and yet Reason insists on the unity of\nNature or the moral law, as the Idea of the Good, which is the ultimate\nend of the world. Since, however, it is formal, and therefore has no\ncontent on its own account, it stands opposed to the impulses and\ninclinations of a subjective and an external independent Nature. Kant\nreconciles the contradiction of the two (Kritik der prakt. Vernunft,\npp. 198-200) in the thought of the highest Good, in which Nature is\nconformed to rational will, and happiness to virtue;\u2014a harmony which does\nnot enter into the question at all, although practical reality consists\ntherein. For happiness is only one\u2019s own sensuous consciousness, or the\nactuality of a particular individual, not universal reality in itself.\nThe unification spoken of itself therefore remains only a Beyond, a\nthought, which is not actually in existence, but only ought to be. Kant\n(Kritik der prakt. Vernunft, pp. 205-209) thus agrees entirely with\nthe talk which alleges that in this world it often fares ill with the\ngood, and well with the wicked, and so on; and he postulates further the\nexistence of God as the Being, the causality, through whom this harmony\ncomes to pass, on behalf both of the sanctity of the moral law, and of\nthe rational end to be attained in Nature, but only in infinite progress;\nwhich postulate, like that of the immortality of the soul, allows the\ncontradiction to remain as it is all the time, and expresses only in\nthe abstract that the reconciliation ought to come about. The postulate\nitself is always there, because the Good is a Beyond with respect to\nNature; the law of necessity and the law of liberty are different from\none another, and placed in this dualism. Nature would remain Nature no\nlonger, if it were to become conformed to the Notion of the Good; and\nthus there remains an utter opposition between the two sides, because\nthey cannot unite. It is likewise necessary to establish the unity of\nthe two; but this is never actual, for their separation is exactly what\nis presupposed. Kant employs popular language thus: evil ought to be\novercome, but yet must not have been overcome. God is to him, therefore,\nonly a faith, an opinion, which is only subjectively, and not absolutely\ntrue.[358] This result is also of a very popular character.\n\nThese postulates express nothing but the synthesis, devoid of thought, of\nthe different moments which contradict each other on every hand; they are\ntherefore a \u201cnest\u201d[359] of contradictions. For instance, the immortality\nof the soul is postulated on account of imperfect morality, _i.e._\nbecause it is infected with sensuousness. But the sensuous is implied in\nmoral self-consciousness; the end, perfection, is what really destroys\nmorality as such. Similarly the other aim, the harmony of the sensuous\nand the rational, to an equal extent abrogates morality; for that\nconsists in this very opposition of Reason to the sensuous. The actuality\nof the God who produces harmony is of such a character that it does not\nenter into consciousness at all; it is accepted by consciousness for the\nsake of harmony, just as children make some kind of scarecrow, and then\nagree with each other to pretend to be afraid of it. The ground on which\nGod is accepted\u2014that by the conception of a holy law-giver the moral\nlaw may acquire additional reverence\u2014contradicts the fact that morality\nreally consists in reverence for the law simply for its own sake.[360]\nIn Practical Reason self-consciousness esteems itself to be implicit\nBeing, as contrasted with theoretic Reason, which assigns implicitude to\nobjective existence, but the one, we see, attains just as little as the\nother to unity and actuality in itself. It is hard for man to believe\nthat Reason actually exists: but there is nothing real except Reason; it\nis the absolute power. The vanity of man aspires to have an ideal before\nhim, in order to be able to find fault with everything alike. We possess\nall wisdom, it is within us, but is not forthcoming. That is the ultimate\nstandpoint; it is a high standpoint, no doubt, but in it the truth is\nnever reached. The absolute Good remains \u201cwhat ought to be,\u201d or without\nobjectivity; and there it has to remain.\n\n3. There is still left for us to consider the third side in Kant\u2019s\nphilosophy, the Critique of the Faculty of Judgment, in which the demand\nfor the concrete comes in, the demand that the Idea of unity spoken of\nbefore should be established not as a Beyond, but as present; and this\nside is of special importance. Kant says that the understanding no doubt\nregulates in the theoretic sphere and produces categories; but these\nremain mere general determinations, beyond which lies the particular\n(the other element which belongs to every item of knowledge). The two\nare distinguished from one another for the understanding; for its\ndistinctions remain in universality. In the practical sphere Reason is\ncertainly the implicit, but its free independence, its law-giving freedom\nin higher form, is opposed to Nature in its freedom or to Nature\u2019s own\nlaws. \u201cIn the theoretic sphere Reason can draw conclusions from given\nlaws through syllogisms, only by means of the understanding, and these\nconclusions never get beyond Nature; it is only in the practical sphere\nthat Reason itself gives laws. Understanding and\u201d (practical) \u201cReason\nhave two different regulative systems on one and the same ground of\nexperience, without the one being detrimental to the other. For if the\nNotion of Nature has but little influence on the giving of laws by the\nNotion of Freedom, just as little does the latter interfere with the\nlegislation of Nature. The possibility of the existence side by side\nof the two regulative systems and of the powers belonging to them was\nproved in the Critique of pure Reason.\u201d (!?) \u201cNow if a unity is not\nconstituted by these two different spheres, which certainly do not put\na limit on each other in their regulative action, but do so incessantly\nin their operations in the sensuous world\u201d (_i.e._ where they encounter\neach other), \u201cthe reason is this, that the Notion of Nature represents\nits objects in perception, not as things in themselves, but as mere\nphenomena, while the Notion of Freedom, on the other hand, represents\nin its object a thing in itself, no doubt, but not in perception.\nConsequently neither of them can attain to a theoretic knowledge of its\nobject (and even of the thinking subject) as a thing-in-itself, which\nlast would be the supersensuous, an unlimited and inaccessible realm\nfor our whole faculty of knowledge. Now truly there is fixed a gulf\nover which the eye cannot reach, between the realm of the Notion of\nNature, as the sensuous, and the realm of the Notion of Freedom, as the\nsupersensuous, so that it is not possible to pass from the one to the\nother, since it is just as if there were two different worlds, the first\nof which could have no influence on the second. Nevertheless the latter\nis conceived as having an influence on the former, or, in other words,\nfreedom is conceived as having for its mission the realization in the\nsensuous world of the end indicated by the laws of freedom. Consequently\nNature must be so conceived that, while in form it realizes its own laws,\nthere may yet be a possibility of ends being realized in it according\nto the laws of freedom. Therefore there must surely be some ground for\nthe unity of the supersensuous which lies at the foundation of Nature\nwith that which the Notion of Freedom practically contains, the Notion\nof which ground of unity, although it attains neither theoretically nor\npractically to a knowledge of the same, and consequently has no peculiar\nprovince, yet makes possible the transition from the mode of thought in\naccordance with the principles of the one, to the mode of thought in\naccordance with the principles of the other. Between Understanding and\nReason there now comes the Faculty of Judgment, as between the powers\nof knowledge and desire there come pleasure and its opposite; in this\nfaculty must therefore lie the transition from the province of the\nNotions of Nature to the province of the Notion of Freedom.\u201d[361]\n\nAdaptation to ends has its place here, _i.e._ a particular reality, which\nis determined only through the universal, the end. The understanding\nis the ground of this unity of the manifold; the sensuous is therefore\nhere determined by means of the supersensuous. This idea of a universal\nwhich implicitly contains the particular is according to Kant the\nprecise object of the faculty of judgment, which he divides as\nfollows:\u2014\u201cIf the universal (the rule, principle, law) is given, the\nfaculty of judgment which subsumes the particular under that universal,\nis determinative,\u201d\u2014the immediate faculty of judgment. But here there\nis also a particular which is not determined by species. \u201cIf, however,\nonly the particular is given, for which the faculty of judgment has to\nfind the universal, it is reflective.\u201d The reflective judgment has as\nits principle the unity of particularity and the abstract universal of\nthe understanding, the idea of a legal necessity which is at the same\ntime free, or of a freedom which is directly one with its content.\n\u201cThis principle can be no other but the fact that since universal laws\nof Nature have their foundation in our understanding, which prescribes\nthem to nature, although only according to their general conception,\nthe particular, empirical laws, in so far as they are undetermined by\nuniversal laws, must be viewed as containing that unity which they\nwould contain if they had been given by some intelligence\u2014other, it may\nbe, than our own\u2014with express reference to our cognitive faculties, in\norder to render possible a system of experience according to particular\nnatural laws. It is not as if such an intelligence must be assumed (for\nit is only the reflective faculty of judgment to which this idea serves\nas principle): this faculty gives a law only to itself, not to Nature\nin addition. Now the conception of an object (if it at the same time\ncontains the ground of the reality of this object), the end, and the\nharmony of a thing with that quality of things which is only possible\nin conformity with ends, are termed the adaptation to purpose of the\nform; therefore the principle of the faculty of judgment in respect to\nthe form of the things of Nature under empirical laws in general is the\nadaptability to purpose of Nature in its multiplicity. That is to say,\nNature is represented by this Notion as if an intelligence contained the\nground of the unity in multiplicity of Nature\u2019s empirical laws.\u201d[362]\n\nAristotle already regarded Nature as in itself showing this adaptation\nto end, and as having in itself \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2, intelligence, the Universal, so\nthat in undivided unity one element is moment of another (_v._ Vol.\nII. pp. 156-162). Purpose is the Notion, and immanent; not external\nform and abstraction as distinguished from a fundamental material,\nbut penetrating, so that all that is particular is determined by this\nuniversal itself. According to Kant this is Understanding: no doubt the\nlaws of the Understanding, which it implicitly has in knowledge, leave\nthe objective still undetermined, but because this manifold itself\nmust have a connection in itself, which is yet contingent for human\nintelligence, \u201cthe faculty of judgment must assume as a principle for\nits own use that what is contingent for us contains a unity, which\nfor us indeed is not knowable, but yet thinkable, in the connection\nof the manifold with an implicitly possible experience.\u201d[363] This\nprinciple hereby at once falls back again into the subjectivity of a\nthought, and is only a maxim of our reflection, by which nothing is to\nbe expressed regarding the objective nature of the object,[364] because\nBeing-in-itself is once for all fixed outside of self-consciousness, and\nthe Understanding is conceived only in the form of the self-conscious,\nnot in its becoming another.\n\nNow this principle of the reflective faculty of judgment is in itself a\ntwo-fold adaptation to end, the formal and the material; the faculty of\njudgment is thus either \u00e6sthetic or teleological: of these the former has\nto do with subjective, the latter with objective, logical adaptation to\nend. There are thus two objects of the faculty of judgment\u2014the beautiful\nin works of art and the natural products of organic life\u2014which make known\nto us the unity of the Notion of Nature and the Notion of Freedom.[365]\nThe consideration of these works involves the fact, that we see a unity\nof the Understanding and the particular. But as this consideration is\nonly a subjective manner of representing such products, and does not\ncontain the truth of the same, such things are regarded only according to\nthis unity, and they are not in themselves of this nature; what they are\nin themselves lies beyond.\n\na. The Beautiful of the \u00e6sthetic faculty of judgment consists in the\nfollowing: \u201cPleasure and displeasure are something subjective, which\ncan in no way become a part of knowledge. The object has adaptation\nto end only to the extent that its conception is directly bound up\nwith the feeling of pleasure; and this is an \u00e6sthetic conception.\nThe taking up of forms into the imaginative faculty can never occur\nwithout the reflecting faculty of judgment at least comparing them,\neven unintentionally, by means of its power of relating perceptions\nto Notions.\u201d Now if in this comparison the imaginative faculty (as\na faculty of perceptions _a priori_?) \u201cis, by means of a conception\ngiven\u201d\u2014something beautiful,\u2014\u201cunintentionally placed in agreement with\nthe Understanding, as the faculty of Notions, and thereby a feeling of\npleasure is awakened, the object must then be looked on as in conformity\nwith end for the reflecting faculty of judgment. Such a judgment\nregarding the adaptability to end of the object, a judgment which is\ngrounded on no previous Notion of the object, and furnishes no Notion\nof it, is an \u00e6sthetic judgment. An object whose form (not the material\nof its conception as sensation) is judged to be a cause of the pleasure\nwhich springs from the conception of such an object, is beautiful,\u201d\u2014the\nfirst reasonable thing said about beauty. The sensuous is one moment\nof the Beautiful, but it must also express the spiritual, a Notion.\n\u201cThe Beautiful is what is conceived without\u201d subjective \u201cinterest,\u201d but\nsimilarly also \u201cwithout Notions\u201d (_i.e._ determinations of reflection,\nlaws) \u201cas object of a universal pleasure. It is related to no\ninclination, therefore the subject feels itself quite free therein. It is\nnot beautiful _for me_. The end is the object of a Notion, so far as the\nlatter is looked on as the cause of the former\u201d (the object); \u201cand the\ncausality of a Notion in respect to its object is adaptation to end.\u201d To\nthe ideal belongs \u201cthe Idea of reason, which makes the aims of humanity,\nas far as they cannot be sensuously conceived, the principle of judgment\nof a form through which these aims reveal themselves as their effect in\nthe phenomenon. The ideal we may expect to find revealed only in human\nform.\u201d\n\nThe sublime is the effort to give sensuous expression to an Idea in\nwhich the inconceivability of the Idea, and the impossibility of finding\nan adequate expression of it by means of the sensuous, are clearly\nevidenced.[366] Here in the \u00e6sthetic faculty of judgment we see the\nimmediate unity of the universal and the particular; for the Beautiful\nis this very unity, without Notion and immediate. Because Kant, however,\nplaces it in the subject, it is limited, and as \u00e6sthetic it also ranks\nlower, inasmuch as it is not the unity as Notion.\n\nb. The other manner of bringing harmony to pass is the teleological\nway of regarding Nature, which is found in the objective and material\nadaptation to end. Here the immediate unity of the Notion and reality is\nlooked upon as objective in the organic products of Nature\u2014this being\nthe purpose of Nature, containing in its universality the particular,\nin its particularity the species. But such a mode of consideration\nmust be practised not externally, but in conformity with internal\nteleology. In external adaptation to end one thing has its end in\nanother: \u201cSnow protects the sown crops in cold lands from frost, and\nfacilitates the intercourse of men by permitting of sleighing.\u201d[367]\nInternal adaptation to end signifies, on the contrary, that a thing is\nin itself end and means, its end is not therefore beyond itself. In the\ncontemplation of the living creature we do not remain at the point of\nhaving something sensuous before us, which according to the categories of\nthe Understanding is only brought into relation to something other than\nitself; for we regard it as cause of itself, as producing itself. This\nis the self-preservation of the living creature; as an individual it is\nno doubt perishable, but in living it produces itself, although for that\npurpose certain conditions are requisite. The end or purpose of Nature\nis therefore to be sought for in matter, to the extent that matter is an\ninwardly organized product of nature, \u201cin which all is end, and all in\nturn is means;\u201d[368] because all the members of the organism are at the\nsame time means and end, it is an end in itself. That is the Aristotelian\nNotion\u2014the infinite that returns into itself, the Idea.\n\nKant at this point calls to mind the following: \u201cWe should find no\ndifference between natural mechanism and the technique of Nature, _i.e._\nthe connection of ends in the same, were our Understanding not of such\na kind that it must pass from the universal to the particular, and the\nfaculty of judgment can therefore pronounce no determining sentences,\nwithout having a universal law under which it may subsume the particular.\nNow the particular as such contains a contingent element in regard to the\nuniversal, but nevertheless Reason also demands unity in the connection\nof particular laws of Nature, and consequently a regulative character,\nwhich character when found in the contingent is termed adaptation to end:\nand the derivation of particular laws from universal is, in regard to the\nelement of contingency which those particular laws contain, _a priori_\nimpossible through the determination of the Notion of the object; the\nNotion of the adaptation to end of Nature in its products becomes thus\na Notion necessary for the human faculty of judgment, but not affecting\nthe determination of the objects themselves, and therefore a subjective\nprinciple.\u201d[369] An organic Being is therefore, according to Kant (Kritik\nder Urtheilskraft, p. 354) one in which natural mechanism and end are\nidentical. We regard it as if there dwelt in the sensuous a Notion\nwhich brings the particular into conformity with itself. In the organic\nproducts of Nature we perceive this immediate unity of the Notion and\nreality; for in a living creature there is perceived in one unity the\nsoul, or the universal, and existence or particularity, which is not the\ncase with inorganic Nature. Thus there enters into the Kantian philosophy\nthe conception of the concrete, as that the universal Notion determines\nthe particular. But Kant took these Ideas again in a subjective sense\nonly, as guiding thoughts for the faculty of judgment, by which no\nBeing-in-itself can be expressed; and thus, although he expresses the\nunity of the Notion and reality, he yet lays fresh emphasis on the side\nof the Notion. He will not therefore throw off his limitations in the\nmoment in which he assumes them as limitations. This is the perpetual\ncontradiction in Kant\u2019s philosophy: Kant exhibited the extremes of\nopposition in their one-sidedness, and expressed also the reconciliation\nof the contradiction; Reason postulates unity, and this we have also in\nthe faculty of judgment. Kant, however, says (Kritik der Urtheilskraft,\npp. 355-363): This is only a mode of our reflecting faculty of judgment,\nlife itself is not so; we are merely accustomed so to regard it. In art\nit is thus certainly the sensuous mode which gives us the conception of\nthe Idea; reality and ideality are here directly in one. But at this\npoint also Kant says that we must remain at what is one-sided, at the\nvery moment when he is passing out beyond it. The wealth of thought\ntherefore still unfolds itself with Kant in subjective form alone; all\nfulness, all content, concentrates in conceiving, thinking, postulating.\nThe objective, according to Kant, is only what is in itself; and we know\nnot what Things-in-themselves are. But Being-in-itself is only the _caput\nmortuum_, the dead abstraction of the \u201cother,\u201d the empty, undetermined\nBeyond.\n\nThe reason why that true Idea should not be the truth is therefore that\nthe empty abstractions of an understanding which keeps itself in the\nabstract universal, and of a sensuous material of individuality standing\nin opposition to the same, are presupposed as the truth. Kant no doubt\nexpressly advances to the conception of an intuitive or perceiving\nunderstanding, which, while it gives universal laws, at the same time\ndetermines the particular; and the determination thus given is deep; it\nis the true concrete, reality determined by the indwelling Notion, or,\nas Spinoza says, the adequate Idea. For \u201cto knowledge there also belongs\nintuitive perception, and the possession of a perfect spontaneity of\nintuition would be a faculty of knowledge\u201d specifically \u201cdistinct from\nthe sensuous, and quite independent thereof, and therefore it would be\nunderstanding in the most universal sense. Consequently it is possible\nto think of an intuitive understanding which does not pass from the\nuniversal to the particular, and thus proceed through conceptions to the\nindividual\u2014an understanding in which we do not meet with the contingency\nof the harmony of Nature in her products, according to particular\nlaws, with the understanding, a contingency which makes it so hard for\nour understanding to bring\u201d together \u201cinto the unity of knowledge the\nmanifold of Nature.\u201d But that this \u201c_intellectus archetypus_\u201d is the\ntrue Idea of the understanding, is a thought which does not strike Kant.\nStrange to say, he certainly has this idea of the intuitive; and he does\nnot know why it should have no truth\u2014except because our understanding is\notherwise constituted, namely such \u201cthat it proceeds from the analytic\nuniversal to the particular.\u201d[370] But absolute Reason and Understanding\nin itself, as we have already seen (pp. 432, 461), are, in Kant\u2019s\nview, of such a nature that they have no reality in themselves: the\nUnderstanding requires material to work upon, theoretic Reason spins\ncobwebs of the brain, practical Reason has to allow its reality to come\nto an end with its postulates. In spite of their directly and definitely\nexpressed non-absoluteness, they are yet looked on as true knowledge; and\nintuitive Understanding, which holds Notion and sensuous perception in\none unity, is looked on as a mere thought which we make for ourselves.\n\nc. The highest form in which the conception of the concrete comes\ninto Kant\u2019s philosophy is this, that the end is grasped in its entire\nuniversality; and thus it is the Good. This Good is an Idea; it is my\nthought; but there exists the absolute demand that it should be realized\nalso in the world, that the necessity of Nature should correspond with\nthe laws of freedom, not as the necessity of an external Nature, but\nthrough what is right and moral in human life, through life in the\nState,\u2014or in other words that the world in general should be good. This\nidentity of the Good and reality is the demand of practical Reason; but\nsubjective Reason cannot realize this. In every good action a man no\ndoubt accomplishes something good, but this is only limited; universal\nGood, as the final object of the world, can be attained to only through\na third. And this power over the world, which has as its final object\nthe Good in the world, is God.[371] Thus the Critique of the Faculty\nof Judgment also ends with the postulate of God. Now, although the\nparticular laws of Nature, as independent individual relations, have no\nrelation to the Good, Reason consists in having and desiring unity as the\nessential or substantial in itself. The opposition of these two, the Good\nand the world, is contrary to that identity; Reason must therefore demand\nthat this contradiction should be abrogated, that there should be a power\nwhich is good on its own account, and is a Power over Nature. This is the\nposition which God assumes in Kant\u2019s philosophy: no proof is possible,\nhe says, of God\u2019s existence, but the demand is there. The deficiency\nhere is the impossibility of proving God\u2019s existence, and it consists in\nthis, that if we admit Kant\u2019s dualism, it cannot be shown how the Good\nas abstract Idea in itself is the abrogating of its Idea as abstract; and\nhow the world in itself is the abrogating of itself in its externality,\nand in its diversity from the Good\u2014this being done in order that both may\nreveal themselves to be their truth, which in respect to them appears\nas the Third, but is at the same time determined as the First. Thus,\ntherefore, according to Kant (Kritik der Urtheilskraft, pp. 460, 461),\nGod can only be believed in. We associate the faith of Jacobi with this;\nfor in this point Kant agrees with Jacobi.[372]\n\nIf now, in accordance with this standpoint of Kant and Jacobi, God is\nbelieved in, and we admit this standpoint for an instant, there is\ncertainly a return to the Absolute. But the question remains: What is\nGod? To define Him as supersensuous is not much, nor is it more to say\nHe is universal, abstract, absolute. What then is His determination?\nWere we here, however, to pass over to determinations of the Absolute,\nthe evil result would follow, as far as this standpoint is concerned,\nthat we should pass over to knowledge; for this signifies knowledge of\nan object which is in itself concrete, _i.e._ determined. But here the\nfurthest point reached is the general statement that God exists with the\ndetermination of being infinite, universal, indeterminate. God cannot be\nknown in this way; for in order to be known He must as concrete possess\nat least two determinations. In this way mediation would be established,\nfor a knowledge of the concrete is at once a mediate knowledge. But\nthis standpoint lacks mediation, and thus remains at the immediate.\nPaul, in speaking to the Athenians, appeals to the altar which they had\ndedicated to the Unknown God, and declares to them what God is; but the\nstandpoint indicated here takes us back to the Unknown God. All the life\nof Nature, as of Spirit, is mediation in itself; and to this mediation\nthe philosophy of Schelling now passed on.\n\nIf we sum up the Kantian philosophy, we find on all hands the Idea of\nThought, which is in itself the absolute Notion, and has in itself\ndifference, reality. In the theoretic and practical Reason it has only\nabstract difference, but in the Faculty of Judgment, as the unity of\nthe two, Kant goes so far as to establish the difference as actual,\nestablishing not only particularity, but also individuality. But, to\nbe sure, this Philistine conception proceeds from our human faculty of\nknowledge, which is valid for him in its empirical form, notwithstanding\nhis statement that it does not know the truth, and his further\ndescription of the true idea of the same as being merely a thought which\nwe possess. Therefore actuality counts as something sensuous, empirical,\nfor the comprehension of which Kant takes the categories of the\nUnderstanding, giving them the same validity as they have in every-day\nlife. This is a complete philosophy of the Understanding, which renounces\nReason: the reason why it became so popular was the negative one, that\nmen were once for all free from the old metaphysic. According to Kant\nsomething sensuous is produced, having thought-determinations, which,\nhowever, is not the thing, for if a man, for instance, feels something\nhard, Kant says: \u201cI feel hardness, but I do not feel Something.\u201d\nKant\u2019s philosophy thus ends with a dualism, with the relation which is\na plainly essential \u201cought,\u201d with the unreconciled contradiction. It\nis otherwise with Jacobi\u2019s faith; he finds the conception of God as\nimmediate existence, and all mediation is untrue for him. With Kant,\ntherefore, the result is: \u201cWe know only phenomena;\u201d with Jacobi, on the\nother hand, it is: \u201cWe know only the finite and conditioned.\u201d Over these\ntwo results there has been unmingled joy among men, because the sloth of\nReason (Heaven be praised!) considered itself liberated from every call\nto reflect, and now, being saved the trouble of penetrating to its own\ninward meaning and exploring the depths of Nature and Spirit, it could\nvery well leave itself alone. The further result attending this is the\nautocracy of the subjective Reason, which, seeing that it is abstract and\nwithout knowledge, has only subjective certainty and not objective truth.\nThe second cause of rejoicing was the concession to freedom of a perfect\nright, which I can neither understand nor justify, and need not do so; my\nsubjective liberty of conviction and certainty holds good all round. The\nthird cause of joy was added by Jacobi, who said that it amounted even to\na crime to seek to know the truth, because the infinite was thereby only\nrendered finite. Truth is in a bad way, when all metaphysic is done away\nwith, and the only philosophy acknowledged is not a philosophy at all!\n\nBut besides the general idea of synthetic judgments _a priori_, a\nuniversal which has difference in itself, Kant\u2019s instinct carried this\nout in accordance with the scheme of triplicity, unspiritual though\nthat was, in the whole system into which for him the entire universe\nwas divided. This he not only practised in the three critiques, but he\nalso followed it out in most of the sub-divisions under the categories,\nthe ideas of Reason, &c. Kant has therefore set forth as a universal\nscheme the rhythm of knowledge, of scientific movement; and has\nexhibited on all sides thesis, antithesis and synthesis, modes of the\nmind by means of which it is mind, as thus consciously distinguishing\nitself. The first is existence, but in the form of Other-Being for\nconsciousness; for what is only existence is object. The second is\nBeing-for-self, genuine actuality; here the reverse relation enters in,\nfor self-consciousness, as the negative of Being-in-itself, is itself\nreality. The third is the unity of the two; the absolute, self-conscious\nactuality is the sum of true actuality, into which are re-absorbed both\nthe objective and the independently existent subjective. Kant has\nthus made an historical statement of the moments of the whole, and has\ncorrectly determined and distinguished them: it is a good introduction\nto Philosophy. The defect of Kant\u2019s philosophy consists in the falling\nasunder of the moments of the absolute form; or, regarded from the\nother side, our understanding, our knowledge, forms an antithesis to\nBeing-in-itself: there is lacking the negative, the abrogation of the\n\u201cought,\u201d which is not laid hold of. But thought and thinking had become\nonce for all an absolute requisite that could no longer be set aside.\nIt was consequently in the first place demanded by consistency that\nparticular thoughts should appear as if produced of necessity from\nthe original unity of the ego, and in that way justified. But, in the\nsecond place, thought had spread itself over the world, had attached\nitself to everything, investigated everything, introduced its forms\ninto everything, and systematized everything, so that on every hand\nthought-determinations had to be followed, instead of any mere feeling\nor routine or practical common-sense, or what is evidenced in the\nextraordinary lack of understanding on the part of so-called practical\nmen. And therefore in theology, in governments and their legislation,\nin the object aimed at by the state, in trades and in mechanics, it\nis said that men ought to act according to universal determinations,\n_i.e._ rationally: and men even talk of a rational brewery, a rational\nbrick-kiln, etc. This is the requisite of concrete thought; while in the\nKantian result, which is that of phenomenon, an empty thought was alone\npresent. It is verily also the essence of revealed religion to know what\nGod is. There was, therefore, to be found a yearning desire for content,\nfor truth, since man could not possibly return to the condition of a\nbrute, nor yet sink to the form of sensation, so that this yearning\nwas for him the only thing that held good with regard to the higher\nlife. The first requirement\u2014consistency\u2014Fichte sought to satisfy; the\nother\u2014content\u2014Schelling strove to fulfil.\n\n\nC. FICHTE.\n\nFichte created a great sensation in his time; his philosophy is the\nKantian philosophy in its completion, and, as we must specially notice,\nit is set forth in a more logical way. He does not pass beyond the\nfundamentals of Kant\u2019s philosophy, and at first regarded his own\nphilosophy as no more than a systematic working out of the other.[373]\nIn addition to these systems of philosophies, and that of Schelling,\nthere are none. Any that pretend to be such merely pick out something\nfrom these, and over this they fight and wrangle among themselves. _Ils\nse sont battus les flancs, pour \u00eatre de grands hommes._ For in those\ntimes there were in Germany many systems of philosophy, such as those of\nReinhold, Krug, Bouterweck, Fries, Schulze, &c.; but in them there is\nonly an extremely limited point of view, combined with boastfulness\u2014a\nstrange medley of stray thoughts and conceptions or facts which I find\nwithin me. But their thoughts are all derived from Fichte, Kant, or\nSchelling\u2014that is in so far as there are thoughts there present at all.\nOr else some slight modification is added, and this for the most part\nmerely consists in making the great principles barren, what points in\nthem were living are destroyed, or else subordinate forms are changed,\nwhereby another principle is said to be set forth, though when we\nlook closer we find that these principles are but the principles of\none of those philosophies that have gone before. This may serve as a\njustification for my not speaking further of all these philosophies;\nany exposition of them would be no more than a demonstration that\neverything in them is taken from Kant, Fichte, or Schelling, and that the\nmodification in form is only the semblance of a change, while really it\nindicates a deterioration in the principles of those philosophies.\n\nJohann Gottlieb Fichte was born on the 19th of May, 1762, at Rammenau,\nnear Bischoffswerda, in Upper Lusatia. He studied at Jena, and for some\ntime was a private tutor in Switzerland. He wrote a treatise on Religion,\ntermed a \u201cCritique of all Revelation,\u201d where the Kantian phraseology is\nemployed throughout\u2014so much so that it was thought to be the work of\nKant. After this he was in 1793 summoned to Jena by Goethe as Professor\nof Philosophy, which appointment he, however, resigned in the year 1799,\non account of an unpleasantness which had arisen through his essay \u201cOn\nthe ground of our Belief in a Divine Government of the World.\u201d For Fichte\npublished a journal in Jena, and a paper in it which was by someone else\nwas regarded as atheistical. Fichte might have kept silence, but he\npublished the above-mentioned essay as an introduction to the article.\nThe authorities wished an investigation to be made into the matter. Then\nFichte wrote a letter which contained threats, and respecting it Goethe\nsaid that a Government ought not to allow itself to be threatened. Fichte\nnow taught privately for some time in Berlin; in 1805 he became professor\nat Erlangen, and in 1809 at Berlin, at which place he died on the 27th\nJanuary, 1814.[374] We cannot here deal more particularly with the\ndetails of his life.\n\nIn what is termed the philosophy of Fichte a distinction must be made\nbetween his properly-speaking speculative philosophy, in which the\nargument is most consistently worked out, and which is less well known,\nand his popular philosophy, to which belong the lectures delivered\nin Berlin before a mixed audience, and, for example, the work termed\na \u201cGuidance to a Blessed Life.\u201d These last have much in them that is\naffecting and edifying\u2014many who call themselves the disciples of Fichte\nknow this side alone\u2014and they are expressed in language most impressive\nto a cultured, religious temperament. In the history of Philosophy,\nhowever, such cannot be taken into consideration, although through their\nmatter they may have the highest possible value; the content has to be\nspeculatively developed, and that is done in Fichte\u2019s earlier philosophic\nworks alone.[375]\n\n\n1. THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FICHTE\u2019S PHILOSOPHY.\n\nAs we mentioned above (p. 478), the shortcoming in the Kantian philosophy\nwas its unthinking inconsistency, through which speculative unity was\nlacking to the whole system; and this shortcoming was removed by Fichte.\nIt is the absolute form which Fichte laid hold of, or in other words, the\nabsolute form is just the absolute Being-for-self, absolute negativity,\nnot individuality, but the Notion of individuality, and thereby the\nNotion of actuality; Fichte\u2019s philosophy is thus the development of form\nin itself. He maintained the ego to be the absolute principle, so that\nfrom it, the direct and immediate certainty of self, all the matter\nin the universe must be represented as produced; hence, according to\nFichte, reason is in itself a synthesis of Notion and actuality. But this\nprinciple he once more in an equally one-sided manner set aside; it is\nfrom the very beginning subjective, conditioned by an opposite, and its\nrealization is a continual rushing onward in finitude, a looking back\nat what has gone before. The form in which it is presented has also the\ndisadvantage, and indeed, the real drawback of bringing the empiric ego\never before one\u2019s eyes, which is absurd, and quite distracting to one\u2019s\npoint of view.\n\nThe claims of Philosophy have advanced so far that in the first place\nself-consciousness refuses any longer to regard absolute essence as\nimmediate substance which does not in itself possess difference, reality,\nand actuality. Against this substance self-consciousness ever struggled,\nfor it does not find its explicit Being there, and consequently feels\nthe lack of freedom. But besides this it demanded that this essence,\nobjectively presented, should be personal, living, self-conscious,\nactual, and not shut up in abstract metaphysical thoughts alone. On the\nother hand consciousness, for which the other is, demanded the moment of\nexternal actuality, Being as such, into which thought must pass, truth\nin objective existence; and this is what we more especially noticed in\nconnection with the English. This Notion, which is immediately actuality,\nand this actuality which is immediately its Notion, and that indeed in\nsuch a way that there neither is a third thought above this unity, nor\nis it an immediate unity which does not possess difference, separation,\nwithin it, is the ego; it is the self-distinction of opposites within\nitself. That whereby it distinguishes itself from the simplicity of\nthought, and distinguishes this other, is likewise immediately for it; it\nis identical with, or not distinguished from it.[376] Hence it is pure\nthought, or the ego is the true synthetic judgment _a priori_, as Kant\ncalled it. This principle is apprehended actuality, for the taking back\nof the other-Being into self-consciousness is just apprehension. The\nNotion of the Notion is from this point of view found in the fact that in\nwhat is apprehended self-consciousness has the certainty of itself; what\nis not apprehended is something foreign to it. This absolute Notion or\nthis absolutely existent infinitude it is which has to be developed in\nknowledge, and its distinction as the whole distinction of the universe\nhas to be represented from itself, and this has in its distinction to\nremain reflected within itself in equal absoluteness. Nothing other than\nthe ego anywhere exists, and the ego is there because it is there; what\nis there is only in the ego and for the ego.[377]\n\nNow Fichte merely set forth this Notion; he did not bring it to a\nscientific realization from itself. For to him this Notion maintains\nand asserts itself as this Notion; it has absoluteness for him in so\nfar as it is merely the unrealized Notion, and thus indeed comes once\nmore into opposition with reality. The Fichtian philosophy has the great\nadvantage of having set forth the fact that Philosophy must be a science\nderived from one supreme principle, from which all determinations are\nnecessarily derived. The important point is this unity of principle and\nthe attempt to develop from it in a scientifically consistent way the\nwhole content of consciousness, or, as has been said, to construct the\nwhole world.[378] Beyond this no progress was made.[379] But the great\nnecessity in Philosophy is to possess one living Idea; the world is a\nflower which is eternally produced from one grain of seed. Thus Fichte\ndoes not, like Kant, throw his work into narrative form because he begins\nwith the ego; but he has proceeded further, inasmuch as he sought to\nbring about a construction of determinations of knowledge from the ego.\nThe whole extent of knowledge in all the world must be developed, and\nfurther this knowledge must be the consequence of the development of\ndeterminations; but because Fichte says that what is not for us does not\nconcern us, he has not grasped this principle of the ego as Idea, but\nsolely in the consciousness of the activity which we exercise in knowing,\nand consequently it is still laid hold of in the form of subjectivity.\n\nThus as Kant treats of cognition [Erkennen], so Fichte sets forth real\nknowledge [Wissen]. Fichte states that the task of Philosophy is to\nfind a theory of knowledge; universal knowledge is both the object\nand the starting-point of Philosophy. Consciousness knows, that is\nits nature; the end of philosophic learning is the knowledge of this\nknowledge. Hence Fichte called his philosophy the Theory of Knowledge\n(Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre, p. 18), the science of knowledge.\nThat is to say ordinary consciousness as the active ego finds this and\nthat, occupies itself, not with itself, but with other objects and\ninterests, but the necessity that I bring forth determinations, and\nwhich determinations\u2014cause and effect, for example,\u2014lies beyond my\nconsciousness: I bring them forth instinctively and cannot get behind my\nconsciousness. But when I philosophize, I make my ordinary consciousness\nitself my object, because I make a pure category my consciousness: I know\nwhat my ego is doing, and thus I get behind my ordinary consciousness.\nFichte thus defines Philosophy as the artificial consciousness, as the\nconsciousness of consciousness.[380]\n\na. Where Fichte in his system has attained the highest degree of\ndeterminateness, he begins, as we saw Kant did before (pp. 437, 438),\nfrom the transcendental unity of self-consciousness; in it I\u2014as this\u2014am\none, this unity is to Fichte the same and the original. Ego is there\na fact, says Fichte, but not yet a proposition. As proposition, as\nprinciple, the ego must not remain barren, nor be accepted as one,\nfor to a proposition pertains a synthesis. Now Fichte proceeds in his\nsystem from the fact that Philosophy must begin with an absolutely\nunconditioned, certain principle, with something indubitably certain in\nordinary knowledge. \u201cIt cannot be proved or defined, because it must\nbe absolutely the first principle.\u201d[381] According to Wendt\u2019s account\n(Tennemann\u2019s Grundriss, \u00a7 393, pp. 494, 495) Fichte gives an exposition\nof the necessity of such a principle as follows: \u201cScientific knowledge\nis a system of cognition obtained through a supreme principle which\nexpresses the content and form of knowledge. The theory of knowledge is\nthe science of knowledge which sets forth the possibility and validity of\nall knowledge, and proves the possibility of principles in reference to\nform and content, the principles themselves, and thereby the connection\nexisting in all human knowledge. It must have a principle which can\nneither be proved from it nor from another science; for it is supreme.\nIf there is a theory of knowledge there also is a system; if there is\na system there is also a theory of knowledge and an absolute first\nprinciple\u2014and so on through an inevitable circle.\u201d[382]\n\nThe simple principle of this knowledge is certainty of myself, which is\nthe relation of me to myself; what is in me, that I know. The supreme\nprinciple, as immediate and not derived, must be certain on its own\naccount; that is, a determination of the ego only, for it is only from\nthe ego that I cannot abstract.[383] Fichte thus begins, like Descartes,\nwith \u2018I think, therefore I am,\u2019 and he expressly brings this proposition\nto mind. The Being of the ego is not a dead, but a concrete Being;\nbut the highest Being is thought. Ego, as an explicitly self-existent\nactivity of thought, is thus knowledge, even if it is only abstract\nknowledge, as in the beginning at least it cannot help being. At the\nsame time Fichte begins from this absolute certainty with quite other\nnecessities and demands; for from this ego not only Being but also the\nlarger system of thought has to be derived (_supra_, p. 230). According\nto Fichte, the ego is the source of the categories and ideas, but all\nconceptions and thoughts are a manifold reduced to a synthesis through\nThought. Thus while with Descartes in connection with the ego other\nthoughts appear which we simply find already in us, such as God, nature,\n&c., Fichte sought for a philosophy entirely of a piece, in which nothing\nempiric was to be admitted from without. With this reflection a false\npoint of view was at once introduced, namely that contained in the old\nconception of knowledge, of commencing with principles in this form and\nproceeding from them; so that the reality which is derived from such\na principle is brought into opposition with it, and hence in truth is\nsomething different, _i.e._ it is not derived: or that principle for this\nsame reason expresses only the absolute certainty of itself and not the\ntruth. The ego is certain, it cannot be doubted; but Philosophy desires\nto reach the truth. The certainty is subjective, and because it is made\nto remain the basis, all else remains subjective also without there being\nany possibility of this form being removed. Fichte now analyzes the ego,\nreducing it to three principles from which the whole of knowledge has to\nbe evolved.\n\n\u03b1. The first proposition must be simple, in it predicate and subject must\nbe alike; for were they unlike, their connection\u2014since in accordance\nwith their diversity the determinations are not directly one\u2014would have\nto be first of all proved by means of a third. The first principle\nmust thus be identical. Fichte now proceeds further to distinguish in\nthis first principle the form and content; but in order that this same\nmay be immediately true through itself, form and content must be again\nthe same, and the principle conditioned by neither. It signifies\nA = A, the abstract undetermined identity; that is the proposition of\ncontradiction, wherein A is an indifferent content. Fichte says, \u201cThought\nis by no means essence, but only a particular determination of Being;\nthere are outside of it many other determinations of our Being. I merely\nremark this, that when \u2018I am\u2019 is overstepped, Spinozism is necessarily\nreached. Its unity is something which ought to be produced through\nus, but which cannot be so; it is not anything that is.\u201d The first\nproposition is then that I am identical with myself, Ego = Ego;[384] that\nundoubtedly is the definition of the ego. The subject and the predicate\nare the content; and this content of the two sides is likewise their\nrelation, _i.e._ form. Relation requires two sides; the relating and the\nrelated are here, however, the same; for on account of the simplicity of\nthe ego, there is nothing but a relation of the ego to the ego. I have\nknowledge of myself; but in so far as I am consciousness, I know of an\nobject which is different from me, and which is then likewise _mine_.\nBut the ego is in such a way identical with its difference that what is\ndifferent is immediately the same, and what is identical is likewise\ndifferent; we have a difference without a difference. Self-consciousness\nis not dead identity, or non-Being, but the object which is identical\nwith me. This is immediately certain; all else must be as certain to\nme, inasmuch as it must be my relation to myself. The content must\nbe transformed into the ego, so that in it I have _my_ determination\nalone. This principle is at first abstract and deficient, because in\nit no difference, or a formal difference only is expressed; whereas\nthe principle should possess a content: a subject and a predicate are\nindeed distinguished in it, but only for us who reflect upon it, _i.e._\nin itself there is no difference, and consequently no true content. In\nthe second place, this principle is indeed the immediate certainty of\nself-consciousness, but self-consciousness is likewise consciousness,\nand in it there is likewise the certainty that other things exist to\nwhich it stands in an attitude of opposition. In the third place, that\nprinciple has not the truth in it, for the very reason that the certainty\nof itself possessed by the ego has no objectivity; it has not the form of\nthe differentiated content within it\u2014or it stands in opposition to the\nconsciousness of an \u201cother\u201d.\n\n\u03b2. Now in order that determination should come to pass, _i.e._ a content\nand difference, it is essential for Fichte that a second principle should\nbe established, which in regard to form is unconditioned, but the content\nof which is conditioned, because it does not belong to the ego. This\nsecond principle, set forth under the first, is, \u201cI assert a non-ego\nin opposition to the ego,\u201d and in this something other than absolute\nself-consciousness is set forth.[385] To this pertains the form therein\npresent, relation; but the content is the non-ego, another content\nfrom the ego. We might say that through this content the proposition\nis independent, since the negative therein is an absolute, as truly as\nthe reverse\u2014that it is independent through the form of opposition which\ncannot be derived from the original. Here, then, we have no more to do\nwith derivation, although this derivation of opposition from the first\nproposition was all the same demanded. Inasmuch as I posit another in\nopposition to the ego, I posit myself as not posited; this non-ego is\nthe object generally, _i.e._ that which is opposed to me. This other is\nthe negative of the ego; thus when Fichte called it the non-ego he was\nexpressing himself in a very happy, suitable, and consistent manner.\nThere has been a good deal of ridicule cast on the ego and non-ego;\nthe expression is new, and therefore to us Germans it seems strange at\nfirst. But the French say _Moi_ and _Non-moi_, without finding anything\nlaughable in it. In this principle the positing belongs, however, to\nthe ego; but because the non-ego is independent of the ego, we have two\nsides, and self-consciousness relates itself to another. This second\nproposition thus signifies that I posit myself as limited, as non-ego;\nbut non-ego is something quite new to be added. On the one side we thus\nhave before us a field which is merely appropriated from the ego; and in\nthis way we have before us the non-ego as our object.\n\n\u03b3. To these is added yet a third proposition, in which I now make this\ndivision into ego and non-ego: it is the synthetic principle, the\nproposition of ground, which in content is unconditioned, just as in the\nsecond was the case in regard to form. This third proposition is the\ndetermination of the first two through one another, in such a way that\nthe ego limits the non-ego. \u201cIn and through the ego both the ego and the\nnon-ego are posited as capable of being mutually limited by means of\none another, _i.e._ in such a way that the reality of the one abrogates\nthe reality of the other.\u201d In limitation both are negated, but \u201conly\nin part\u201d; only thus are synthesis and deduction possible. I posit the\nnon-ego, which is for me, in myself, in my identity with myself; thus I\ntake it from its non-identity, its not-being-I, that is to say I limit\nit. This limitation of the non-ego Fichte expresses thus: \u201cI place in\nopposition to the ego,\u201d and indeed \u201cto the divisible ego, a divisible\nnon-ego.\u201d The non-ego I destroy as a complete sphere, which it was\naccording to the second principle, and posit it as divisible; I likewise\nposit the ego as divisible in so far as the non-ego is present in it. The\nwhole sphere which I have before me is supposed indeed to be the ego,\nbut in it I have not one but two. The proposition of ground is thus the\nrelation of reality and negation, _i.e._ it is limitation; it contains\nthe ego limited by the non-ego, and the non-ego limited by the ego.[386]\nOf this synthesis there is nothing, properly speaking, contained in the\ntwo earlier propositions. Even this first presentation of the three\nprinciples does away with the immanence of real knowledge. Thus the\npresentation is here also subject to an opposite from the first, as it is\nwith Kant, even if these are two acts of the ego merely, and we remain\nentirely in the ego.\n\nNow that limitation may take place for me in two different ways: at\none time the one is passive, at another time the other is so. In this\nlimitation the ego may posit the non-ego as limiting and itself as\nlimited, in such a way that the ego posits itself as requiring to have\nan object; I know myself indeed as ego, but determined by the non-ego;\nnon-ego is here active and ego passive. Or, on the other hand, the ego,\nas abrogating other-being, is that which limits, and non-ego is the\nlimited. I know myself then as clearly determining the non-ego, as the\nabsolute cause of the non-ego as such, for I can think. The first is\nthe proposition of the theoretic reason, of intelligence: the second\nthe proposition of practical reason, of will.[387] The will is this,\nthat I am conscious of myself as limiting the object; thus I make myself\nexercise activity upon the object and maintain myself. The theoretic\nproposition is that the object is before me and it determines me. The ego\nis, since I perceive, a content, and I have this content in me, which is\nthus outside of me. This is on the whole the same thing as we meet with\nin the experience of Kant: it comes to the same thing whether it is by\nmatter or the non-ego that the ego is here determined.\n\nb. In the theoretic consciousness the ego, although the assertive\ngenerally, finds itself limited by the non-ego. But it is identical\nwith itself; hence its infinite activity ever sets itself to abrogate\nthe non-ego and to bring forth itself. Now the different methods whereby\nthe ego sets forth itself are the different methods of its activity;\nthese we have to understand in their necessity. But since philosophic\nknowledge is the consideration of consciousness itself (_supra_, p. 483),\nI can only know knowledge, the act of the ego. Fichte thus appeals to\nconsciousness, postulates ego and non-ego in their abstraction, and since\nphilosophic knowledge is the consciousness of consciousness, it is not\nsufficient that I should find its determinations in consciousness, for I\nproduce them with consciousness. Common consciousness, indeed, likewise\nbrings forth all the determinations of the ordinary conception and of\nthought, but without\u2014on the theoretic side at least\u2014having any knowledge\nof it; for it is the fact of being limited alone that is present to it.\nThus, when I see a large square object, such as a wall, my ordinary\nconsciousness accepts these determinations as they are given to it; the\nobject _is_. In so doing I do not think of seeing, but of the object;\nseeing, however, is my activity, the determinations of my faculty of\nsensation are thus posited through me.[388] The ego as theoretic is,\nindeed, aware in philosophic consciousness that it is the ego which\nposits; but here it posits that the non-ego posits somewhat in me. The\nego thus posits itself as that which is limited by the non-ego. I make\nthis limitation mine; thus is it for me in me, this passivity of the ego\nis itself the activity of the ego. As a matter of fact, all reality which\nappears in the object for the ego is a determination of the ego,[389]\njust as the categories and other determinations were in Kant\u2019s case. Thus\nit is here more especially that we should expect Fichte to demonstrate\nthe return of other-Being into absolute consciousness. However, because\nafter all the other-Being was regarded as unconditioned, as implicit,\nthis return does not come to pass. The ego determines the \u2018other,\u2019\nindeed, but this unity is an altogether finite unity; non-ego has thus\nimmediately escaped from determination once more and gone forth from this\nunity. What we find is merely an alternation between self-consciousness\nand the consciousness of another, and the constant progression of this\nalternation, which never reaches any end.[390]\n\nThe development of theoretic reason is the following-out of the manifold\nrelationships between the ego and non-ego; the forms of this limitation\nwhich Fichte now goes through are the determinations of the object.\nThese particular thought-determinations he calls categories, and he\nseeks to demonstrate them in their necessity; from the time of Aristotle\nonwards no one had thought of so doing. The first of these forms is the\ndetermination of reciprocity, which we already met with in the third\nproposition: \u201cBy the determination of the reality or negation of the\nego, the negation or reality of the non-ego is equally determined;\u201d the\ntwo in one is reciprocal action. In the second place, \u201cCausality is the\nsame degree of activity in the one as of passivity in the other.\u201d In so\nfar as something is considered as the reality of the non-ego, the ego is\nconsidered as passive, and, on the other hand, in so far as \u2018I\u2019 am real,\nthe object is passive; this relation, that the passivity of the object is\nmy activity or reality, and the opposite, is the conception of Causality.\n\u201cAs many parts of negation as the ego posits in itself, so many parts\nof reality it posits in the non-ego; it therefore posits itself as\nself-determining in so far as it is determined, and as suffering\ndetermination in so far as it determines itself. In so far,\u201d in the\nthird place, \u201cas the ego is regarded as embracing the whole absolutely\ndetermined realm of all reality, it is substance; on the other hand when\nit is posited in a not absolutely determined sphere of this realm, in so\nfar there is an accidence in the ego.\u201d[391] That is the first rational\nattempt that has ever been made to deduce the categories; this progress\nfrom one determination to another is, however, only an analysis from the\nstandpoint of consciousness, and is not in and for itself.\n\nThe ego is so far the ideal ground of all conceptions of the object;\nall determination of this object is a determination of the ego. But in\norder that it may be object, it must be placed in opposition to the ego,\n_i.e._ the determinations set forth through the ego are another, the\nnon-ego; this placing of the object in opposition is the real ground\nof conceptions. The ego is, however, likewise the real ground of the\nobject; for it is likewise a determination of the ego that the non-ego\nas object is set in opposition to the ego. Both, the real ground and the\nideal ground of the conception, are thus one and the same.[392] Regarding\nthe ego as ideal principle and the non-ego as real principle, Krug has\nlikewise talked a great deal of nonsense. Regarded from the one point\nof view, the ego is active and the non-ego purely passive; while from\nthe other side the ego is passive and the object active and operative.\nBut since the ego in the non-philosophic consciousness does not have\nthe consciousness of its activity in the conception of the object, it\nrepresents to itself its own activity as foreign, _i.e._ as belonging to\nthe non-ego.\n\nWe here see the opposition adopting various forms: ego, non-ego;\npositing, setting in opposition; two sorts of activity of the ego, &c.\nThe fact that I represent is undoubtedly my activity, but the matter\nof main importance is the content of the positing and its necessary\nconnection through itself. If one occupies oneself only with this\ncontent, that form of subjectivity which is dominant with Fichte, and\nwhich remains in his opposition, disappears. As the ego is affirmative\nand determining, there now is in this determination a negative likewise\npresent; I find myself determined and at the same time the ego is like\nitself, infinite, _i.e._ identical with itself. This is a contradiction\nwhich Fichte indeed endeavours to reconcile, but in spite of it all he\nleaves the false basis of dualism undisturbed. The ultimate, beyond\nwhich Fichte does not get, is only an \u2018ought,\u2019 which does not solve\nthe contradiction; for while the ego should be absolutely at home with\nitself, _i.e._ free, it should at the same time be associated with\nanother. To Fichte the demand for the solution of this contradiction thus\nadopts the attitude of being a demanded solution only, of signifying that\nI ever have to destroy the barriers, that I ever have to reach beyond\nthe limitation into utter infinitude, and that I ever find a new limit;\na continual alternation takes place between negation and affirmation,\nan identity with self which again falls into negation, and from this\nnegation is ever again restored. To speak of the bounds of human reason\nis, however, an unmeaning form of words. That the reason of the subject\nis limited is comprehensible from the nature of the case, but when we\nspeak of Thought, infinitude is none other than one\u2019s own relation to\nself, and not to one\u2019s limit; and the place in which man is infinite is\nThought. Infinitude may then be likewise very abstract, and in this way\nit is also once more finite; but true infinitude remains in itself.\n\nFichte further deduces the ordinary conception thus: the fact that the\nego in going forth at once finds its activity checked by a limitation,\nand returns once more into itself, brings about two opposite tendencies\nin me, between which I waver, and which I try to unite in the faculty\nof imagination. In order that a fixed determination may exist between\nthe two, I have to make the limit a permanent one, and we have that in\nthe understanding. All further determinations of the object are, as\ncategories of the understanding, modes of synthesis; but each synthesis\nis a new contradiction. New mediations are thus once more necessary, and\nthese are new determinations. Thus Fichte says: I can always continue to\ndetermine the non-ego, to make it my conception, _i.e._ to take from it\nits negation as regards me. I have to deal with my activity alone; but\nthere is always an externality therein present which still remains, and\nwhich is not explained by my activity. This Beyond which alone remains\nto the undetermined ego Fichte calls the infinite check upon the ego,\nwith which it ever has to deal, and beyond which it cannot get; thus the\nactivity which proceeds into infinitude finds itself checked and driven\nback by this repulsive force, and then it reacts upon itself. \u201cThe ego\nin its self-determination has been considered both as determining and\ndetermined; if we reflect on the fact that the absolutely determined\ndetermining power must be an absolutely indeterminate, and further, that\nego and non-ego are absolutely opposed to one another, in the one case\nego is the indeterminate and in the other case non-ego.\u201d[393]\n\nInasmuch as the ego here makes the object its conception and negates it,\nthis philosophy is Idealism, in which philosophy all the determinations\nof the object are ideal. Everything determinate which the ego possesses\nit has through its own positing; I even make a coat or a boot because I\nput them on. There remains only the empty repulsive force, and that is\nthe Kantian Thing-in-itself, beyond which even Fichte cannot get, even\nthough the theoretic reason continues its determination into infinitude.\n\u201cThe ego as intelligence\u201d ever \u201cremains dependent on an undetermined\nnon-ego; it is only through this that it is intelligence.\u201d[394] The\ntheoretic side is thus dependent. In it we have not therefore to deal\nwith the truth in and for itself, but with a contingent, because ego\nis limited, not absolute, as its Notion demands: intelligence is not\nhere considered as spirit which is free. This is Fichte\u2019s standpoint as\nregards the theoretic side.\n\nc. Practical reason comes next; the point of view from which it starts\nis that \u201cThe ego posits itself as determining the non-ego.\u201d Now the\ncontradiction has thus to be solved of ego being at home with itself,\nsince it determines its Beyond. The ego is thus infinite activity, and,\nas ego = ego, the absolute ego, it is undoubtedly abstract. But in order\nto have a determination, a non-ego must exist; ego is thus activity,\ncausality, the positing of the non-ego. But as with Kant sensuousness and\nreason remain opposed, the same contradiction is present here, only in a\nmore abstract form, and not in the rude empiricism of Kant. Fichte here\nturns and twists in all sorts of ways, or he gives the opposition many\ndifferent forms; the crudest form is that ego is posited as causality,\nfor in it another is necessitated on which it exercises its activity.\n\u201cThe absolute ego has accordingly to be\u201d now \u201cthe cause of the non-ego,\n_i.e._ only of that in the non-ego which remains when we abstract from\nall demonstrable forms of representation or conception\u2014of that to\nwhich is ascribed the check given to the infinitely operative activity\nof the ego; for the fact that the intelligent ego is, in accordance\nwith the necessary laws of the conception, the cause of the particular\ndeterminations of that which is conceived as such, is demonstrated in\nthe theoretic science of knowledge.\u201d[395] The limits of intelligence\nmust be broken through, the ego must alone be active; the other side,\nthe infinite repulsion, must be removed, in order that the ego may be\nliberated.\n\n\u201cAccording to our hypothesis the ego must now posit a non-ego absolutely,\nand without any ground, _i.e._ absolutely and without any ground it must\nlimit or in part not posit itself.\u201d This, indeed, it already does as\nintelligent. \u201cIt must therefore have the ground of not positing itself\u201d\nonly \u201cin itself.\u201d The ego is, however, just the ego, it posits itself,\n\u201cit must\u201d therefore \u201chave the principle of positing itself within it,\nand also the principle of not positing itself. Hence the ego in its\nessence would be contradictory and self-repellent; there would be in it a\ntwo-fold or contradictory principle, which assumption contradicts itself,\nfor in that case there would be no principle within it. The ego would\u201d\nconsequently \u201cnot exist, for it would abrogate itself. All contradictions\nare reconciled through the further determination of contradictory\npropositions. The ego must be posited in one sense as infinite, and in\nanother as finite. Were it to be posited as infinite and finite in one\nand the same sense, the contradiction would be insoluble; the ego would\nnot be one but two. In so far as the ego posits itself as infinite, its\nactivity is directed upon itself and on nothing else but itself. In so\nfar as the ego posits limits, and itself in these limits, its activity is\nnot exercised directly on itself, but on a non-ego which has to be placed\nin opposition,\u201d upon another and again upon another, and so on into\ninfinitude; that is the object, and the activity of the ego \u201cis objective\nactivity.\u201d[396] In this way Fichte in the practical sphere also remains\nat opposition, only this opposition now has the form of two tendencies in\nthe ego, both of which are said to be one and the same activity of the\nego. I am called upon to proceed to determine the other in relation to\nwhich I am negative, the non-ego, in accordance with my freedom; it has\nindeed all determinations through the activity of the ego, but beyond my\ndetermination the same non-ego ever continues to appear. The ego clearly\nposits an object, a point of limitation, but where the limitation is, is\nundetermined. I may transfer the sphere of my determination, and extend\nit to an infinite degree, but there always remains a pure Beyond, and the\nnon-ego has no positive self-existent determination.\n\nThe last point in respect of the practical sphere is hence this, that\nthe activity of the ego is a yearning or striving[397]\u2014like the Kantian\n\u201cought\u201d; Fichte treats this with great prolixity. The Fichtian philosophy\nconsequently has the same standpoint as the Kantian; the ultimate is\nalways subjectivity, as existent in and for itself. Yearning, according\nto Fichte, is divine; in yearning I have not forgotten myself, I have\nnot forgotten that I possess a superiority in myself; and therefore it\nis a condition of happiness and satisfaction. This infinite yearning\nand desire has then been regarded as what is highest and most excellent\nin the Beautiful, and in religious feelings likewise; and with it\nis connected the irony of which we have spoken before (Vol. I. pp.\n400, 401). In this return the ego is merely an effort, on its side\nit is fixed, and it cannot realize its endeavours. Striving is thus\nan imperfect or implicitly limited action. The ultimate result is\nconsequently a \u201ccircle\u201d which cannot be broken through, so that \u201cthe\nfinite spirit must necessarily posit an absolute outside itself (a\nthing-in-itself), and yet on the other hand it must recognize that\nthis same is only there for it (a necessary noumenon).\u201d[398] To put it\notherwise, we see the ego absolutely determined in opposition only, we\nsee it only as consciousness and self-consciousness which does not get\nbeyond this, and which does not reach so far as to Spirit. The ego is the\nabsolute Notion in so far as it does not yet reach the unity of thought,\nor in this simplicity does not reach difference, and in motion does not\nhave rest; that is to say, in so far as positing, or the pure activity\nof the ego, and setting in opposition, are not by it comprehended as the\nsame. Or the ego does not comprehend the infinite repulsion, the non-ego;\nself-consciousness determines the non-ego, but does not know how to make\nthis Beyond its own.\n\nThe deficiency in the Fichtian philosophy is thus firstly that the ego\nretains the significance of the individual, actual self-consciousness,\nas opposed to that which is universal or absolute, or to the spirit in\nwhich it is itself a moment merely; for the individual self-consciousness\nsimply signifies standing apart as far as another is concerned. Hence,\nif the ego was ever called absolute existence, the most terrible offence\nwas given, because really the ego only came before us as signifying the\nindividual subject as opposed to the universal.\n\nIn the second place, Fichte does not attain to the idea of Reason as the\nperfected, real unity of subject and object, or of ego and non-ego; it is\nonly, as with Kant, represented as the thought of a union in a belief or\nfaith, and with this Fichte likewise concludes (Grundlage der gesammten\nWissenschaftslehre, p. 301). This he worked out in his popular writings.\nFor because the ego is fixed in its opposition to the non-ego, and _is_\nonly as being opposed, it becomes lost in that unity. The attainment of\nthis aim is hence sent further and further back into the false, sensuous\ninfinitude: it is a progression implying just the same contradiction as\nthat found in Kant, and having no present actuality in itself; for the\nego has all actuality in its opposition only. The Fichtian philosophy\nrecognizes the finite spirit alone, and not the infinite; it does not\nrecognize spirit as universal thought, as the Kantian philosophy does not\nrecognize the not-true; or it is formal. The knowledge of absolute unity\nis apprehended as faith in a moral disposition of the world, an absolute\nhypothesis in accordance with which we have the belief that every moral\naction that we perform will have a good result.[399] As in Kant\u2019s case,\nthis Idea belongs to universal thought. \u201cIn a word, when anything is\napprehended it ceases to be God; and every conception of God that is set\nup is necessarily that of a false God. Religion is a practical faith\nin the moral government of the world; faith in a supersensuous world\nbelongs, according to our philosophy, to the immediate verities.\u201d[400]\nFichte thus concludes with the highest Idea, with the union of freedom\nand nature, but a union of such a nature that, immediately regarded,\nit is not known; the opposition alone falls within consciousness. This\nunion of faith he likewise finds in the Love of God. As believed and\nexperienced, this form pertains to Religion, and not to Philosophy,\nand our only possible interest is to know this in Philosophy. But with\nFichte it is still associated with a most unsatisfying externality of\nwhich the basis is the non-Idea, for the one determination is essential\nonly because the other is so, and so on into infinitude. \u201cThe theory\nof knowledge is realistic\u2014it shows that the consciousness of finite\nbeings can only be explained by presupposing an independent and wholly\nopposite power, on which, in accordance with their empirical existence,\nthey themselves are dependent. But it asserts nothing more than this\nopposed power, which by finite beings can merely be _felt_ and not known.\nAll possible determinations of this power or of this non-ego which can\ncome forth into infinity in our consciousness, it pledges itself to\ndeduce from the determining faculties of the ego, and it must actually\nbe able to deduce these, so certainly as it is a theory of knowledge.\nThis knowledge, however, is not transcendent but transcendental. It\nundoubtedly explains all consciousness from something independent of all\nconsciousness, but it does not forget that this independent somewhat is\nagain a product of its own power of thought, and consequently something\ndependent on the ego, in so far as it has to be there for the ego. Every\nthing is, in its ideality, dependent upon the ego; but in its reality\neven the ego is dependent. The fact that the finite spirit must posit\nfor itself somewhat outside of itself, which last exists only for it, is\nthat circle which it may infinitely extend but never break through.\u201d The\nfurther logical determination of the object is that which in subject and\nobject is identical, the true connection is that in which the objective\nis the possession of the ego; as thought, the ego in itself determines\nthe object. But Fichte\u2019s theory of knowledge regards the struggle of the\nego with the object as that of the continuous process of determining the\nobject through the ego as subject of consciousness, without the identity\nof the restfully self-developing Notion.[401]\n\nThirdly, because the ego is thus fixed in its one-sidedness, there\nproceeds from it, as representing one extreme, the whole of the progress\nthat is made in the content of knowledge; and the deduction of the\nphilosophy of Fichte, cognition in its content and form, is a progression\nfrom certain determinations to others which do not turn back into\nunity, or through a succession of finitenesses which do not have the\nAbsolute in them at all. The absolute point of view, like an absolute\ncontent, is wanting. Thus the contemplation of nature, for instance, is\na contemplation of it as of pure finitenesses from the point of view of\nanother, as though the organic body were regarded thus: \u201cConsciousness\nrequires a sphere entirely its own for its activity. This sphere is\nposited through an original, necessary activity of the ego, in which\nit does not know itself as free. It is a sensuous perception, a drawing\nof lines; the sphere of activity thereby becomes something extended in\nspace. As quiescent, continuous, and yet unceasingly changing, this\nsphere is matter, which, as body, has a number of parts which in relation\nto one another are called limbs. The person can ascribe to himself no\nbody without positing it as being under the influence of another person.\nBut it is likewise essential that I should be able to check this same\ninfluence, and external matter is also posited as resisting my influences\non it, _i.e._ as a tough, compact matter.\u201d[402] These tough matters must\nfurther be separated from one another\u2014the different persons cannot hold\ntogether like one mass of dough. For \u201cmy body is my body and not that of\nanother; it must further operate and be active without my working through\nit. It is only through the operation of another that I can myself be\nactive and represent myself as a rational being who can be respected by\nhim. But the other being should treat me immediately as a rational being,\nI should be for him a rational being even before my activity begins.\nOr my form must produce an effect through its mere existence in space,\nwithout my activity, _i.e._ it must be visible. The reciprocal operation\nof rational beings must take place without activity; thus a subtle matter\nmust be assumed in order that it may be modified by means of the merely\nquiescent form. In this way are deduced first Light and then Air.\u201d[403]\nThis constitutes a very external manner of passing from one step to\nanother, resembling the method of the ordinary teleology, which makes\nout, for instance, that plants and animals are given for the nourishment\nof mankind. This is how it is put: Man must eat, and thus there must be\nsomething edible\u2014consequently plants and animals are at once deduced;\nplants must have their root in something, and consequently the earth is\nforthwith deduced. What is altogether lacking is any consideration of the\nobject as what it is in itself; it is plainly considered only in relation\nto another. In this way the animal organism appears as a tough, tenacious\nmatter which is \u201carticulated\u201d and can be modified; light is a subtle\nmatter which is the medium of communication of mere existence, &c.\u2014just\nas in the other case plants and animals are merely edible. As regards a\nphilosophic consideration of the content there is nothing at all to be\nfound.\n\nFichte likewise wrote both a Science of Morals and of Natural Rights,\nbut he treats them as sciences pertaining to the understanding only, and\nhis method of procedure is destitute of ideas and carried on by means of\na limited understanding. The Fichtian deduction of the conceptions of\njustice and morality thus remains within the limitations and rigidity of\nself-consciousness, as against which Fichte\u2019s popular presentations of\nreligion and morality present inconsistencies. The treatise on Natural\nRights is a special failure, _e.g._ where he, as we have just seen (p.\n502), deduces even nature just as far as he requires it. The organization\nof the state which is described in Fichte\u2019s Science of Rights is\nfurthermore as unspiritual as was the deduction of natural objects just\nmentioned, and as were many of the French constitutions which have\nappeared in modern times\u2014a formal, external uniting and connecting, in\nwhich the individuals as such are held to be absolute, or in which Right\nis the highest principle. Kant began to ground Right upon Freedom, and\nFichte likewise makes freedom the principle in the Rights of Nature; but,\nas was the case with Rousseau, it is freedom in the form of the isolated\nindividual. This is a great commencement, but in order to arrive at the\nparticular, they have to accept certain hypotheses. The universal is\nnot the spirit, the substance of the whole, but an external, negative\npower of the finite understanding directed against individuals. The\nstate is not apprehended in its essence, but only as representing a\ncondition of justice and law, _i.e._ as an external relation of finite\nto finite. There are various individuals; the whole constitution of the\nstate is thus in the main characterized by the fact that the freedom of\nindividuals must be limited by means of the freedom of the whole.[404]\nThe individuals always maintain a cold attitude of negativity as regards\none another, the confinement becomes closer and the bonds more stringent\nas time goes on, instead of the state being regarded as representing the\nrealization of freedom.\n\nThis philosophy contains nothing speculative, but it demands the presence\nof the speculative element. As the philosophy of Kant seeks in unity its\nIdea of the Supreme Good, wherein the opposites have to be united, so\nthe Fichtian philosophy demands union in the ego and in the implicitude\nof faith; in this self-consciousness in all its actions makes its\nstarting-point conviction, so that in themselves its actions may bring\nforth the highest end and realize the good. In the Fichtian philosophy\nnothing can be seen beyond the moment of self-consciousness, of\nself-conscious Being-within-self, as in the philosophy of England we find\nexpressed\u2014in just as one-sided a way\u2014the moment of Being-for-another, or\nof consciousness, and that not as a moment simply, but as the principle\nof the truth; in neither of the two is there the unity of both\u2014or spirit.\n\nFichte\u2019s philosophy constitutes a significant epoch in Philosophy\nregarded in its outward form. It is from him and from his methods that\nabstract thought proceeds, deduction and construction. Hence with the\nFichtian philosophy a revolution took place in Germany. The public had\npenetrated as far as the philosophy of Kant, and until the Kantian\nphilosophy was reached the interest awakened by Philosophy was general;\nit was accessible, and men were curious to know about it, it pertained to\nthe ordinary knowledge of a man of culture (_supra_, p. 218). Formerly\nmen of business, statesmen, occupied themselves with Philosophy; now,\nhowever, with the intricate idealism of the philosophy of Kant, their\nwings droop helpless to the ground. Hence it is with Kant that we first\nbegin to find a line of separation which parts us from the common modes\nof consciousness; but the result, that the Absolute cannot be known, has\nbecome one generally acknowledged. With Fichte the common consciousness\nhas still further separated itself from Philosophy, and it has utterly\ndeparted from the speculative element therein present. For Fichte\u2019s\nego is not merely the ego of the empiric consciousness, since general\ndeterminations of thought such as do not fall within the ordinary\nconsciousness have likewise to be known and brought to consciousness;\nin this way since Fichte\u2019s time few men have occupied themselves with\nspeculation. Fichte, it is true, in his later works especially, wrote\nwith a view to meeting the popular ear as we may see in the \u201cAttempt to\nforce the reader into comprehension,\u201d but this end was not accomplished.\nThe public was through the philosophy of Kant and Jacobi strengthened in\nits opinion\u2014one which it accepted _utiliter_\u2014that the knowledge of God is\nimmediate, and that we know it from the beginning and without requiring\nto study, and hence that Philosophy is quite superfluous.\n\n\n2. FICHTE\u2019S SYSTEM IN A RE-CONSTITUTED FORM.\n\nThe times called for life, for spirit. Now since mind has thus retreated\nwithin self-consciousness, but within self-consciousness as a barren ego,\nwhich merely gives itself a content or a realization through finitenesses\nand individualities which in and for themselves are nothing, the next\nstage is found in knowing this realization of self-consciousness in\nitself, in knowing the content in itself as a content which, penetrated\nthroughout by spirit, is self-conscious and spiritual, or a spirit full\nof content. In his later popular works Fichte thus set forth faith, love,\nhope, religion, treating them without philosophic interest, and as for\na general public: it was a philosophy calculated to suit enlightened\nJews and Jewesses, councillors and Kotzebues. He places the matter in a\npopular form: \u201cIt is not the finite ego that is, but the divine Idea is\nthe foundation of all Philosophy; everything that man does of himself\nis null and void. All existence is living and active in itself, and\nthere is no other life than Being, and no other Being than God; God is\nthus absolute Being and Life. The divine essence likewise comes forth,\nrevealing and manifesting itself\u2014the world.\u201d[405] This immediate unity\nof the self-conscious ego and its content, or spirit, which merely\nhas an intuition of its self-conscious life and knows it as the truth\nimmediately, manifested itself subsequently in poetic and prophetic\ntendencies, in vehement aspirations, in excrescences which grew out of\nthe Fichtian philosophy.\n\n\n3. THE MORE IMPORTANT OF THE FOLLOWERS OF FICHTE.\n\nOn the one hand, in respect of the content which the ego reaches in\nthe philosophy of Fichte, the complete absence of spirituality, the\nwoodenness, and, to put it plainly, the utter foolishness therein\nevidenced, strike us too forcibly to allow us to remain at his\nstandpoint; our philosophic perception likewise tells us of the\none-sidedness and deficiencies of the principle, as also of the\nevident necessity that the content should prove to be what it is. But\non the other hand self-consciousness was therein posited as reality\nor essence\u2014not as a foreign, alien self-consciousness, but as ego\u2014a\nsignification which all possess, and which finds an answer in the\nactuality of all. The Fichtian standpoint of subjectivity has thus\nretained its character of being unphilosophically worked out, and arrived\nat its completion in forms pertaining to sensation which in part remained\nwithin the Fichtian principle, while they were in part the effort\u2014futile\nthough it was\u2014to get beyond the subjectivity of the ego.\n\n\na. FRIEDRICH VON SCHLEGEL.\n\nIn Fichte\u2019s case the limitation is continually re-appearing; but because\nthe ego feels constrained to break through this barrier, it reacts\nagainst it, and gives itself a resting-place within itself; this last\nought to be concrete, but it is a negative resting-place alone. This\nfirst form, Irony, has Friedrich von Schlegel as its leading exponent.\nThe subject here knows itself to be within itself the Absolute, and\nall else to it is vain; all the conclusions which it draws for itself\nrespecting the right and good, it likewise knows how to destroy again.\nIt can make a pretence of knowing all things, but it only demonstrates\nvanity, hypocrisy, and effrontery. Irony knows itself to be the master\nof every possible content; it is serious about nothing, but plays with\nall forms. The other side is this, that subjectivity has cast itself\ninto religious subjectivity. The utter despair in respect of thought, of\ntruth, and absolute objectivity, as also the incapacity to give oneself\nany settled basis or spontaneity of action, induced the noble soul to\nabandon itself to feeling and to seek in Religion something fixed and\nsteadfast; this steadfast basis, this inward satisfaction, is to be found\nin religious sentiments and feelings. This instinct impelling us towards\nsomething fixed has forced many into positive forms of religion, into\nCatholicism, superstition and miracle working, in order that they may\nfind something on which they can rest, because to inward subjectivity\neverything fluctuates and wavers. With the whole force of its mind\nsubjectivity tries to apply itself to what is positively given, to bend\nits head beneath the positive, to cast itself, so to speak, into the arms\nof externality, and it finds an inward power impelling it so to do.\n\n\nb. SCHLEIERMACHER.\n\nOn the other hand the ego finds in the subjectivity and individuality\nof the personal view of things the height of all its vanity\u2014its\nReligion. All the various individualities have God within themselves.\nDialectic is the last thing to arise and to maintain its place. As\nthis is expressed for philosophic self-consciousness, the foreign\nintellectual world has lost all significance and truth for ordinary\nculture; it is composed of three elements, a deity pertaining to a time\ngone by, and individualized in space and existence, a world which is\noutside the actuality of self-consciousness, and a world which had yet\nto appear, and in which self-consciousness would first attain to its\nreality. The spirit of culture has deserted it, and no longer recognizes\nanything that is foreign to self-consciousness. In accordance with this\nprinciple, the spiritual living essence has then transformed itself into\nself-consciousness, and it thinks to know the unity of spirit immediately\nfrom itself, and in this immediacy to be possessed of knowledge in a\npoetic, or at least a prophetic manner. As regards the poetic manner, it\nhas a knowledge of the life and person of the Absolute immediately, by an\nintuition, and not in the Notion, and it thinks it would lose the whole\nas whole, as a self-penetrating unity, were it not to express the same\nin poetic form; and what it thus expresses poetically is the intuition\nof the personal life of self-consciousness. But the truth is absolute\nmotion, and since it is a motion of forms and figures [Gestalten], and\nthe universe is a kingdom of spirits, the Notion is the essence of this\nmovement, and likewise of each individual form; it is its ideal form\n[Form] and not the real one, or that of figure [Gestalt]. In the latter\ncase necessity is lost sight of; individual action, life and heart,\nremain within themselves, and undeveloped; and this poetry vacillates\nbetwixt the universality of the Notion and the determinateness and\nindifference of the figure; it is neither flesh nor fish, neither poetry\nnor philosophy. The prophetic utterance of truths which claim to be\nphilosophical, thus belongs to faith, to self-consciousness, which indeed\nperceives the absolute spirit in itself, but does not comprehend itself\nas self-consciousness, since it places absolute reality above Knowledge,\nbeyond self-conscious reason, as was done by Eschenmayer and Jacobi.\nThis uncomprehending, prophetic manner of speech affirms this or that\nrespecting absolute existence as from an oracle, and requires that each\nman should find the same immediately in his own heart. The knowledge of\nabsolute reality becomes a matter pertaining to the heart; there are a\nnumber of would-be inspired speakers, each of whom holds a monologue and\nreally does not understand the others, excepting by a pressure of the\nhands and betrayal of dumb feeling. What they say is mainly composed of\ntrivialities, if these are taken in the sense in which they are uttered;\nit is the feeling, the gesture, the fulness of the heart, which first\ngives them their significance; to nothing of more importance is direct\nexpression given. They outbid one another in conceits of fancy, in ardent\npoetry. But before the Truth vanity turns pale, spitefully sneering\nit sneaks back into itself. Ask not after a criterion of the truth,\nbut after the Notion of the truth in and for itself; on that fix your\ngaze. The glory of Philosophy is departed, for it presupposes a common\nground of thoughts and principles\u2014which is what science demands\u2014or at\nleast of opinions. But now particular subjectivity was everything,\neach individual was proud and disdainful as regards all others. The\nconception of independent thought\u2014as though there could be a thought\nwhich was not such (Vol. I. p. 60)\u2014is very much the same; men have, it is\nsaid, to bring forth a particularity of their own, or else they have not\nthought for themselves. But the bad picture is that in which the artist\nshows himself; originality is the production of what is in its entirety\nuniversal. The folly of independent thought is that it results in each\nbringing forth something more preposterous than another.\n\n\nc. NOVALIS.\n\nSubjectivity signifies the lack of a firm and steady basis, but likewise\nthe desire for such, and thus it evermore remains a yearning. These\nyearnings of a lofty soul are set forth in the writings of Novalis.\nThis subjectivity does not reach substantiality, it dies away within\nitself, and the standpoint it adopts is one of inward workings and fine\ndistinctions; it signifies an inward life and deals with the minuti\u00e6\nof the truth. The extravagances of subjectivity constantly pass into\nmadness; if they remain in thought they are whirled round and round\nin the vortex of reflecting understanding, which is ever negative in\nreference to itself.\n\n\nd. FRIES, BOUTERWECK, KRUG.\n\nYet a last form of subjectivity is the subjectivity of arbitrary will and\nignorance. It maintained this, that the highest mode of cognition is an\nimmediate knowledge as a fact of consciousness; and that is so far right.\nThe Fichtian abstraction and its hard understanding has a repellent\neffect on thought; slothful reason allowed itself to be told the result\nof the philosophy of Kant and Jacobi, and renounced all consistent\nthought, all construction. This arbitrariness gave itself entire\nliberty\u2014the liberty of the _Tabagie_\u2014but in doing so it regarded itself\nfrom a poetic or prophetic point of view, as we have just seen (pp. 508,\n509). Then it was both more sober and more prosaic, and thus brought\nthe old logic and metaphysic once more into evidence, though with this\nmodification that they are made facts of consciousness. Thus Fries turns\nback to the faith of Jacobi in the form of immediate judgments derived\nfrom reason, and dark conceptions incapable of utterance.[406] He wished\nto improve the critique of pure reason by apprehending the categories\nas facts of consciousness; anything one chooses can in such a case be\nintroduced. Bouterweck speaks of \u201cThe virtue, the living nature of power;\nthe fact that subject and object are regarded as one, that is as absolute\nvirtue. With this absolute virtue we have all Being and action, namely\nthe eternal, absolute and pure unity; in one word we have grasped the\nworld within us and we have grasped ourselves in the world, and that\nindeed not through conceptions and conclusions, but directly through the\npower which itself constitutes our existence and our rational nature. To\nknow the All, or indeed to know God in any way, is, however, impossible\nfor any mortal.\u201d[407] Krug wrote a \u201cGroundwork of Philosophy,\u201d setting\nforth a \u201cTranscendental Synthesis\u2014that is a transcendental realism and a\ntranscendental idealism inseparably bound together,\u201d It is an \u201coriginal,\ntranscendental synthesis of the real and the ideal, the thinking subject\nand the corresponding outer world;\u201d this transcendental synthesis must\n\u201cbe recognized and asserted without any attempt being made at explaining\nit.\u201d[408]\n\n\nD. SCHELLING.\n\nIt was Schelling, finally, who made the most important, or, from\na philosophic point of view, the only important advance upon the\nphilosophy of Fichte; his philosophy rose higher than that of Fichte,\nthough undoubtedly it stood in close connection with it; indeed, he\nhimself professes to be a Fichtian. Now the philosophy of Schelling\nfrom the first admitted the possibility of a knowledge of God, although\nit likewise started from the philosophy of Kant, which denies such\nknowledge. At the same time Schelling makes Jacobi\u2019s principle of\nthe unity of thought and Being fundamental, although he begins to\ndetermine it more closely.[409] To him concrete unity is this, that\nthe finite is no more true than the infinite, the subjective idea no\nmore than objectivity, and that combinations in which both untruths are\nbrought together in their independence in relation to one another, are\nlikewise combinations of untruths merely. Concrete unity can only be\ncomprehended as process and as the living movement in a proposition. This\ninseparability is in God alone; the finite, on the other hand, is that\nwhich has this separability within it. In so far as it is a truth it is\nlikewise this unity, but in a limited sphere, and for that reason in the\nseparability of both moments.\n\nFrederick Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, born on the 27th January, 1775, at\nSchorndorf,[410] in Wurtemberg, studied in Leipzig and Jena, where he\ncame to be on terms of great intimacy with Fichte. In the year 1807 he\nbecame secretary of the Academy of Science in Munich. We cannot with\npropriety deal fully with his life, for he is still living.[411]\n\nSchelling worked out his philosophy in view of the public. The series of\nhis philosophic writings also represents the history of his philosophic\ndevelopment and the gradual process by which he raised himself above\nthe Fichtian principle and the Kantian content with which he began. It\ndoes not thus contain a sequence of separately worked out divisions of\nPhilosophy, but only successive stages in his own development. If we\nask for a final work in which we shall find his philosophy represented\nwith complete definiteness none such can be named. Schelling\u2019s first\nwritings are still quite Fichtian, and it is only by slow degrees that\nhe worked himself free of Fichte\u2019s form. The form of the ego has the\nambiguity of being capable of signifying either the absolute Ego or\nGod, or ego in my particularity;[412] this supplied the first stimulus\nto Schelling. His first and quite short work of four sheets which he\nwrote in 1795 at Tubingen, while still at the university, was called,\n\u201cOn the Possibility of any Form of Philosophy\u201d; it contains propositions\nrespecting the Fichtian philosophy only. The next work, \u201cOn the Ego as\nprinciple of Philosophy, or on the Unconditioned in Human Knowledge\u201d\n(Tubingen, 1795), is likewise quite Fichtian; in this case, however,\nit is from a wider and more universal point of view, since the ego is\ntherein grasped as an original identity.[413] We find, however, a summary\nof the Fichtian principle and the Kantian mode of presentation: \u201cIt is\nonly by something being originally set in opposition to the ego, and\nby the ego being itself posited as the manifold (in time), that it is\npossible for the ego to get beyond the unity which belongs to it of\nmerely being posited, and that, for example, it posits the same content\non more than one occasion.\u201d[414] Schelling then passed on to natural\nphilosophy, adopted Kantian forms and reflective determinations, such as\nthose of repulsion and attraction, from Kant\u2019s \u201cMetaphysics of Nature,\u201d\nand likewise dealt with quite empirical phenomena in expressions taken\nfrom Kant. All his first works on this subject come under this category,\nviz.: \u201cIdeas towards a Philosophy of Nature,\u201d 1797; \u201cOn the World-Soul,\u201d\n1798, the second edition of which possesses appendices which are entirely\ninconsistent with what goes before. In the writings of Herder and\nKielmeyer[415] we find sensibility, irritability, and reproduction dealt\nwith, as also their laws, such as that the greater the sensibility the\nless the irritability, &c.\u2014just as the powers or potencies were dealt\nwith by Eschenmayer. It was only later on in relation to these that\nSchelling first apprehended nature in the categories of thought, and made\ngeneral attempts of a more definite character in the direction of greater\nscientific development. It was only through what had been accomplished by\nthese men that he was enabled to come into public notice so young. The\nspiritual and intellectual side, morality and the state, he represented\non the other hand purely in accordance with Kantian principles: thus in\nhis \u201cTranscendental Idealism,\u201d although it was written from a Fichtian\npoint of view, he goes no further than Kant did in his \u201cPhilosophy\nof Rights\u201d and his work \u201cOn Eternal Peace.\u201d Schelling, indeed, later\non published a separate treatise on Freedom, deeply speculative in\ncharacter; this, however, remains isolated and independent, and deals\nwith this one point alone; in Philosophy, however, nothing isolated can\nbe worked out or developed. In the various presentations of his views\nSchelling on each occasion began again from the beginning, because, as we\nmay see, what went before did not satisfy him; he has ever pressed on to\nseek a new form, and thus he has tried various forms and terminologies\nin succession without ever setting forth one complete and consistent\nwhole. His principal works in this connection are the \u201cFirst Sketch of\na System of Natural Philosophy,\u201d 1799; the \u201cSystem of Transcendental\nIdealism,\u201d 1800, one of his most carefully thought-out works; \u201cBruno, a\nDialogue on the Divine and Natural Principle of Things,\u201d 1802; \u201cJournal\nof Speculative Physics,\u201d 1801; \u201cNew Journal of Speculative Physics,\u201d\n1802 _et_ In the second number of the second volume of his \u201cJournal of\nSpeculative Physics,\u201d Schelling made the commencement of a detailed\ntreatment of the whole of his philosophy. Here he likewise starts to\na certain measure, though unconsciously, from the Fichtian form of\nconstruction; but the idea is already present that nature equally with\nknowledge is a system of reason.\n\nIt is not feasible here to go into details respecting what is called the\nphilosophy of Schelling, even if time permitted. For it is not yet a\nscientific whole organized in all its branches, since it rather consists\nin certain general elements which do not fluctuate with the rest of his\nopinions. Schelling\u2019s philosophy must still be regarded as in process of\nevolution, and it has not yet ripened into fruit;[416] we can hence give\na general idea of it only.\n\nWhen Schelling made his first appearance the demands put forward by\nPhilosophy were as follows. With Descartes thought and extension were\nin some incomprehensible way united in God, with Spinoza it was as\nmotionless substance; and beyond this point of view neither of them\never passed. Later on we saw the form develop, partly in the sciences\nand partly in the Kantian philosophy. Finally, in the Fichtian\nphilosophy, the form was subjectivity on its own account, from which\nall determinations were held to develop. What is thus demanded is that\nthis subjectivity of infinite form which we saw dying into irony or\narbitrariness (pp. 507-510) should be delivered from its one-sidedness\nin order to be united with objectivity and substantiality. To put it\notherwise, the substance of Spinoza should not be apprehended as the\nunmoved, but as the intelligent, as a form which possesses activity\nwithin itself of necessity, so that it is the forming power of nature,\nbut at the same time knowledge and comprehension. This then is the object\nof Philosophy; it is not the formal union of Spinoza that is demanded,\nnor the subjective totality of Fichte, but totality with the infinite\nform. We see this developing in the philosophy of Schelling.\n\n1. In one of his earlier writings, the \u201cSystem of Transcendental\nIdealism,\u201d which we shall consider first of all, Schelling represented\ntranscendental philosophy and natural philosophy as the two sides of\nscientific knowledge. Respecting the nature of the two, he expressly\ndeclared himself in this work, where he once more adopts a Fichtian\nstarting-point: \u201cAll knowledge rests on the harmony of an objective with\na subjective.\u201d In the common sense of the words this would be allowed;\nabsolute unity, where the Notion and the reality are undistinguished in\nthe perfected Idea, is the Absolute alone, or God; all else contains an\nelement of discord between the objective and subjective. \u201cWe may give\nthe name of nature to the entire objective content of our knowledge;\nthe entire subjective content, on the other hand, is called the ego\nor intelligence.\u201d They are in themselves identical and presupposed as\nidentical. The relation of nature to intelligence is given by Schelling\nthus: \u201cNow if all knowledge has two poles which mutually presuppose\nand demand one another, there must be two fundamental sciences, and it\nmust be impossible to start from the one pole without being driven to\nthe other.\u201d Thus nature is impelled to spirit, and spirit to nature;\neither may be given the first place, and both must come to pass. \u201cIf the\nobjective is made the chief,\u201d we have the natural sciences as result, and\n\u201cthe necessary tendency,\u201d the end, \u201cof all natural science thus is to\npass from nature to intelligence. This is the meaning of the effort to\nconnect natural phenomena with theory. The highest perfection of natural\nscience would be the perfect spiritualization of all natural laws into\nlaws of intuitive perception and thought. The phenomenal (the material\nelement) must entirely disappear, and laws (the formal element) alone\nremain. Hence it comes to pass that the more that which is in conformity\nwith law breaks forth in nature itself, the more the outward covering\ndisappears; the phenomena themselves become more spiritual, and finally\ncease altogether. The perfect theory of nature would be that by which the\nwhole of nature should be resolved into an intelligence. The dead and\nunconscious products of nature are only abortive attempts on the part\nof nature to reflect itself, but the so-called dead nature is really\nan immature,\u201d torpid, fossilized \u201cintelligence\u201d; it is implicit only,\nand thus remains in externality; \u201chence in its phenomena,\u201d even though\n\u201cstill unconsciously, the character of intelligence shines through. Its\nhighest end, which is to become object to itself, is first attained\nby nature\u201d (instead of nature we should call it the Idea of nature),\n\u201cthrough its highest and ultimate reflection, which is none other than\nman, or, more generally, it is that which we call reason, through which\nnature for the first time returns completely within itself, and whereby\nit becomes evident that nature is originally identical with what is known\nin us as intelligence or the conscious. Through this tendency to make\nnature intelligent natural science becomes the philosophy of nature.\u201d\nThe intelligent character of nature is thus spoken of as a postulate\nof science. The other point of view is \u201cto give the subjective the\nforemost place.\u201d Thus here \u201cthe problem is how to add an objective\nelement agreeing with it. To start from the subjective as from the first\nand absolute, and to make the objective arise from it,\u201d signifies a new\ndeparture; its consideration forms the content of true Transcendental\nPhilosophy, or, as Schelling himself now named this science, \u201cthe\nother science fundamental to Philosophy.\u201d The organ of transcendental\nphilosophy is the subjective, the production of inward action. Production\nand reflection upon this production, the unconscious and conscious in\none, is the \u00e6sthetic act of the imagination.[417] Thus these two separate\nprocesses are as a whole very clearly expressed: the process which leads\nfrom nature to the subject, and that leading from the ego to the object.\nBut the true process could only be traced out by means of logic, for it\ncontains pure thoughts; but the logical point of view was what Schelling\nnever arrived at in his presentation of things.\n\na. In respect of the ego, as principle of the transcendental philosophy,\nSchelling sets to work in the same way as did Fichte, inasmuch as he\nbegins from the fact of knowledge \u201cin which the content is conditioned\nthrough the form, and the form through the content\u201d; this is formal\nA = A. But does A exist? The ego is \u201cthe point where subject and object\nare one in their unmediated condition\u201d; the ego is just Ego = Ego,\nsubject-object; and that is the act of self-consciousness wherein I am\nfor myself object to myself. In self-consciousness there is not to be\nfound a distinction between me and anything else; what are distinguished\nare directly identical, and there is so far nothing at all in opposition\nto this self-consciousness. How the case stands with regard to external\nobjects is the question which must be decided later, in the further\ncourse of development. It is only the Notion of the ego which is to be\nlaid hold of: \u201cThe Notion of the ego, that is the act whereby thought\nin general becomes object to itself, and the ego itself (the object)\nare absolutely one; independently of this act the ego is nothing.\u201d It\nis the act whereby thought makes itself objective, and wherein the ego\nis brought into harmony with the objective, with thought; and from\nthis standpoint it had to be demonstrated how the ego makes its way to\nobjectivity. \u201cThe ego, as pure act, as pure action, is not objective\nin knowledge itself, for the reason that it is the principle of all\nknowledge. If it is to be object of knowledge, this must come to pass\nthrough a very different kind of knowledge than the ordinary.\u201d The\nimmediate consciousness of this identity is intuition, but inwardly\nit becomes \u201cintellectual intuition\u201d; it \u201cis a knowledge which is the\nproduction of its object: sensuous intuition or perception is perception\nof such a nature that the perception itself appears to be different\nfrom what is perceived. Now intellectual intuition is the organ of all\ntranscendental thought,\u201d the act of pure self-consciousness generally.\n\u201cThe ego is nothing else than a process of production which ever makes\nitself its own object. Science can start from nothing objective,\u201d but\nfrom \u201cthe non-objective which itself becomes object\u201d as an \u201coriginal\nduplicity. Idealism is the mechanism of the origination of the objective\nworld from the inward principle of spiritual activity.\u201d[418]\n\nOn the one hand Schelling\u2019s system is related to the philosophy of\nFichte, and, on the other hand, he, like Jacobi, makes his principle\nimmediate knowledge\u2014the intelligent intuitive perception which all who\nwish to philosophize must have. But what comes next is that its content\nis no longer the indeterminate, the essence of essence, but likewise\nthe Absolute, God, the absolutely self-existent, though expressed as\nconcrete, _i.e._ as mediating itself within itself, as the absolute\nunity or indifference of subjective and objective. Intellectual intuition\nis the Fichtian imagination oscillating between two different points.\nWe have already spoken above (p. 417) of the _form_ of intellectual\nintuition; it is the most convenient manner of asserting knowledge\nrespecting\u2014anything one likes. But the immediate knowledge of God as\nspiritual is only in the consciousness of Christian nations, and not for\nothers. This immediate knowledge appears to be still more contingent\nas the intellectual intuition of the concrete, or the identity of\nsubjectivity and objectivity. This intuition is intellectual indeed,\nbecause it is a rational intuition, and as knowledge it is likewise\nabsolutely one with the object of knowledge. But this intuition,\nalthough itself knowledge, is not as yet known; it is the unmediated,\nthe postulated. As it is in this way an immediate we must possess it,\nand what may be possessed may likewise not be possessed. Thus since the\nimmediate presupposition in Philosophy is that individuals have the\nimmediate intuition of this identity of subjective and objective, this\ngave the philosophy of Schelling the appearance of indicating that the\npresence of this intuition in individuals demanded a special talent,\ngenius, or condition of mind of their own, or as though it were generally\nspeaking an accidental faculty which pertained to the specially favoured\nfew. For the immediate, the intuitively perceived, is in the form of an\nexistent, and is not thus an essential; and whoever does not understand\nthe intellectual intuition must come to the conclusion that he does not\npossess it. Or else, in order to understand it, men must give themselves\nthe trouble of possessing it; but no one can tell whether he has it or\nnot\u2014not even from understanding it, for we may merely think we understand\nit. Philosophy, however, is in its own nature capable of being universal;\nfor its ground-work is thought, and it is through thought that man is\nman. Schelling\u2019s principle is thus indeed clearly a universal; but if\na definite intuition, a definite consciousness is demanded, such as the\nconsciousness or intuition of the identity of subjective and objective,\nthis determinate particular thought is not as yet to be found in it.\n\nIt was, however, in this form of knowledge of the absolute as concrete,\nand, further, in the form of unity of subjective and objective, that\nPhilosophy as represented by Schelling more especially marked itself off\nfrom the ordinary conceiving consciousness and its mode of reflection.\nEven less than Fichte did Schelling attain to popularity (_supra_, pp.\n504, 505), for the concrete in its nature is directly speculative.\nThe concrete content, God, life, or whatever particular form it has,\nis indeed the content and object of natural consciousness; but the\ndifficulty lies in bringing what is contained in the concrete into\nconcrete thought in accordance with its different determinations, and\nin laying hold of the unity. It pertains to the standpoint of the\nunderstanding to divide and to distinguish, and to maintain the finite\nthought-determinations in their opposition; but Philosophy demands that\nthese different thoughts should be brought together. Thought begins\nby holding apart infinite and finite, cause and effect, positive and\nnegative; since this is the region of reflecting consciousness, the old\nmetaphysical consciousness was able to take part in so doing: but the\nspeculative point of view is to have this opposition before itself and\nto reconcile it. With Schelling the speculative form has thus again come\nto the front, and philosophy has again obtained a special character of\nits own; the principle of Philosophy, rational thought in itself, has\nobtained the form of thought. In the philosophy of Schelling the content,\nthe truth, has once more become the matter of chief importance, whereas\nin the Kantian philosophy the point of interest was more especially\nstated to be the necessity for investigating subjective knowledge. This\nis the standpoint of Schelling\u2019s philosophy in its general aspects.\n\nb. Since in further analysis the distinction between subject and object\ncomes into view and is accepted, there follows the relationship of the\nego to its other; with Fichte that forms the second proposition, in\nwhich the self-limitation of the ego is posited. The ego posits itself\nin opposition to itself, since it posits itself as conditioned by the\nnon-ego; that is the infinite repulsion, for this conditionment is the\nego itself. Schelling, on the one hand, says: \u201cThe ego is unlimited as\nthe ego only in so far as it is limited,\u201d as it relates to the non-ego.\nOnly thus does consciousness exist, self-consciousness is a barren\ndetermination; through its intuition of self the ego becomes finite to\nitself. \u201cThis contradiction only allows itself to be dissolved by the ego\nbecoming in this finitude infinite to itself, _i.e._ by its having an\nintuitive perception of itself as an infinite Becoming.\u201d The relation of\nthe ego to itself and to the infinite check or force of repulsion is a\nconstant one. On the other hand it is said: \u201cThe ego is limited only in\nso far as it is unlimited;\u201d this limitation is thus necessary in order to\nbe able to get beyond it. The contradiction which we find here remains\neven if the ego always limits the non-ego. \u201cBoth activities\u2014that which\nmakes for infinitude, the limitable, real, objective activity, and the\nlimiting and ideal, mutually presuppose one another. Idealism reflects\nmerely on the one, realism on the other, transcendental idealism on\nboth.\u201d[419] All this is a tangled mass of abstractions.\n\nc. \u201cNeither through the limiting activity nor through the limited does\nthe ego arrive at self-consciousness. There consequently is a third\nactivity, compounded from the other two, through which the ego of\nself-consciousness arises; this third is that which oscillates between\nthe two\u2014the struggle between opposing tendencies.\u201d There is essential\nrelation only, relative identity; the difference therein present thus\never remains. \u201cThis struggle cannot be reconciled by one such action,\nbut only by an infinite succession of such,\u201d _i.e._ the reconciliation\nof the opposition between the two tendencies of the ego, the inward and\nthe outward, is, in the infinite course of progression, only an apparent\none. In order that it may be complete, the whole inward and outward\nnature must be presented in all its details: but Philosophy can only\nset forth the epochs which are most important. \u201cIf all the intermediate\nlinks in sensation could be set forth, that would necessarily lead us to\na deduction of all the qualities in nature, which last is impossible.\u201d\nNow this third activity, which contains the union directly in itself,\nis a thought in which particularity is already contained. It is the\nintuitive understanding of Kant, the intelligent intuition or intuitively\nperceiving intelligence; Schelling, indeed, definitely names this\nabsolute unity of contradictions intellectual intuition. The ego here\nis not one-sided in regard to what is different; it is identity of the\nunconscious and the conscious, but not an identity of such a nature that\nits ground rests on the ego itself.[420]\n\nThis ego must be the absolute principle: \u201cAll philosophy starts from a\nprinciple which as absolute identity is non-objective.\u201d For if it is\nobjective, separation is at once posited and it is confronted by another;\nbut the principle is the reconciliation of the opposition, and therefore\nin and for itself it is non-objective. \u201cNow how should a principle such\nas this be called forth to consciousness and understood, as is required\nif it is the condition attached to the comprehension of all philosophy?\nThat it can no more be comprehended through Notions [Begriffe] than set\nforth, requires no proof.\u201d Notion to Schelling signifies a category of\nthe ordinary understanding; Notion is, however, the concrete thought\nwhich in itself is infinite. \u201cThere thus remains nothing more than\nthat it should be set forth in an immediate intuition. If there were\nsuch an intuition which had as object the absolutely identical, that\nwhich in itself is neither subjective nor objective, and if for such,\nwhich,\u201d however, \u201ccan be an intellectual intuition only, one could\nappeal to immediate experience,\u201d the question would be: \u201cHow can this\nintuition be again made objective, _i.e._ how can it be asserted without\ndoubt that it does not rest on a subjective deception, if there is\nnot a universal objectivity in that intuition, which is recognized by\nall?\u201d This intellectual principle in itself should thus be given in an\nexperience so that men may be able to appeal to it. \u201cThe objectivity of\nintellectual intuition is art. The work of art alone reflects to me what\nis otherwise reflected through nothing\u2014that absolute identical which has\nalready separated itself in the ego itself.\u201d The objectivity of identity\nand the knowledge of the same is art; in one and the same intuition the\nego is here conscious of itself and unconscious.[421] This intellectual\nintuition which has become objective is objective sensuous intuition\u2014but\nthe Notion, the comprehended necessity, is a very different objectivity.\n\nThus a principle is presupposed both for the content of philosophy and\nfor subjective philosophizing: on the one hand it is demanded that the\nattitude adopted should be one of intellectual intuition, and, on the\nother hand, this principle has to be authenticated, and this takes place\nin the work of art. This is the highest form of the objectivization of\nreason, because in it sensuous conception is united with intellectuality,\nsensuous existence is merely the expression of spirituality. The\nhighest objectivity which the subject attains, the highest identity of\nsubjective and objective, is that which Schelling terms the power of\nimagination. Art is thus comprehended as what is inmost and highest, that\nwhich produces the intellectual and real in one, and philosophizing is\nconceived as this genius of art. But art and power of imagination are not\nsupreme. For the Idea, spirit, cannot be truly given expression to in\nthe manner in which art expresses its Idea. This last is always a method\npertaining to intuitive perception; and on account of this sensuous\nform of existence the work of art cannot correspond to the spirit.\nThus because the point last arrived at is designated as the faculty of\nimagination, as art, even in the subject this is a subordinate point\nof view, and thus in itself this point is not the absolute identity\nof subjectivity and objectivity. In subjective thought, rational,\nspeculative thought is thus indeed demanded, but if this appears false to\nyou nothing farther can be said than that you do not possess intellectual\nintuition. The proving of anything, the making it comprehensible, is thus\nabandoned; a correct apprehension of it is directly demanded, and the\nIdea is thus assertorically pre-established as principle. The Absolute\nis the absolute identity of subjective and objective, the absolute\nindifference of real and ideal, of form and essence, of universal and\nparticular; in this identity of the two there is neither the one nor\nthe other. But the unity is not abstract, empty, and dry; that would\nsignify logical identity, classification according to something common\nto both, in which the difference remains all the while outside. The\nidentity is concrete: it is subjectivity as well as objectivity; the two\nare present therein as abrogated and ideal. This identity may easily be\nshown in the ordinary conception: the conception, we may for example\nsay, is subjective; it has, too, the determinate content of exclusion in\nreference to other conceptions; nevertheless, the conception is simple\u2014it\nis one act, one unity.\n\nWhat is lacking in Schelling\u2019s philosophy is thus the fact that the\npoint of indifference of subjectivity and objectivity, or the Notion of\nreason, is absolutely presupposed, without any attempt being made at\nshowing that this is the truth. Schelling often uses Spinoza\u2019s form\nof procedure, and sets up axioms. In philosophy, when we desire to\nestablish a position, we demand proof. But if we begin with intellectual\nintuition, that constitutes an oracle to which we have to give way, since\nthe existence of intellectual intuition was made our postulate. The true\nproof that this identity of subjective and objective is the truth, could\nonly be brought about by means of each of the two being investigated in\nits logical, _i.e._ essential determinations; and in regard to them,\nit must then be shown that the subjective signifies the transformation\nof itself into the objective, and that the objective signifies its not\nremaining such, but making itself subjective. Similarly in the finite,\nit would have to be shown that it contained a contradiction in itself,\nand made itself infinite; in this way we should have the unity of finite\nand infinite. In so doing, this unity of opposites is not asserted\nbeforehand, but in the opposites themselves it is shown that their truth\nis their unity, but that each taken by itself is one-sided\u2014that their\ndifference veers round, casting itself headlong into this unity\u2014while the\nunderstanding all the time thinks that in these differences it possesses\nsomething fixed and secure. The result of thinking contemplation would in\nthis former case be that each moment would secretly make itself into its\nopposite, the identity of both being alone the truth. The understanding\ncertainly calls this transformation sophistry, humbug, juggling, and\nwhat-not. As a result, this identity would, according to Jacobi, be\none which was no doubt conditioned and of set purpose produced. But we\nmust remark that a one-sided point of view is involved in apprehending\nthe result of development merely as a result; it is a process which is\nlikewise mediation within itself, of such a nature that this mediation is\nagain abrogated and asserted as immediate. Schelling, indeed, had this\nconception in a general way, but he did not follow it out in a definite\nlogical method, for with him it remained an immediate truth, which can\nonly be verified by means of intellectual intuition. That is the great\ndifficulty in the philosophy of Schelling. And then it was misunderstood\nand all interest taken from it. It is easy enough to show that subjective\nand objective are different. Were they not different, nothing could be\nmade of them any more than of A = A; but they are in opposition _as one_.\nIn all that is finite, an identity is present, and this alone is actual;\nbut besides the fact that the finite is this identity, it is also true\nthat it is the absence of harmony between subjectivity and objectivity,\nNotion and reality; and it is in this that finitude consists. To this\nprinciple of Schelling\u2019s, form, or necessity, is thus lacking, it is only\nasserted. Schelling appears to have this in common with Plato and the\nNeo-Platonists, that knowledge is to be found in the inward intuition\nof eternal Ideas wherein knowledge is unmediated in the Absolute. But\nwhen Plato speaks of this intuition of the soul, which has freed itself\nfrom all knowledge that is finite, empirical, or reflected, and the\nNeo-Platonists tell of the ecstasy of thought in which knowledge is the\nimmediate knowledge of the Absolute, this definite distinction must be\nnoticed, viz., that with Plato\u2019s knowledge of the universal, or with\nhis intellectuality, wherein all opposition as a reality is abrogated,\ndialectic is associated, or the recognized necessity for the abrogation\nof these opposites; Plato does not begin with this, for with him the\nmovement in which they abrogate themselves is present. The Absolute is\nitself to be looked at as this movement of self-abrogation; this is the\nonly actual knowledge and knowledge of the Absolute. With Schelling this\nidea has, however, no dialectic present in it whereby those opposites may\ndetermine themselves to pass over into their unity, and in so doing to be\ncomprehended.\n\n2. Schelling begins with the idea of the Absolute as identity of the\nsubjective and objective, and accordingly there evinced itself in the\npresentations of his system which followed, the further necessity of\nproving this idea; this he attempted to do in the two Journals of\nSpeculative Physics. But if that method be once adopted, the procedure\nis not immanent development from the speculative Idea, but it follows\nthe mode of external reflection. Schelling\u2019s proofs are adduced in such\nan exceedingly formal manner that they really invariably presuppose the\nvery thing that was to be proved. The axiom assumes the main point in\nquestion, and all the rest follows as a matter of course. Here is an\ninstance: \u201cThe innermost essence of the Absolute can only be thought of\nas identity absolute, altogether pure and undisturbed. For the Absolute\nis only absolute, and what is thought in it is necessarily and invariably\nthe same, or in other words, is necessarily and invariably absolute. If\nthe idea of the Absolute were a general Notion\u201d (or conception), \u201cthis\nwould not prevent a difference being met with in it, notwithstanding\nthis unity of the absolute. For things the most different are yet in the\nNotion always one and identical, just as a rectangle, a polygon and a\ncircle are all figures. The possibility of the difference of all things\nin association with perfect unity in the Notion lies in the manner in\nwhich the particular in them is combined with the universal. In the\nAbsolute this altogether disappears, because it pertains to the very idea\nof the Absolute that the particular in it is also the universal, and\nthe universal the particular; and further that by means of this unity\nform and existence are also one in it. Consequently, in regard to the\nAbsolute, from the fact of its being the Absolute, there likewise follows\nthe absolute exclusion from its existence of all difference, and that at\nonce.\u201d[422]\n\nIn the former of the two above-named works, the \u201cJournal of Speculative\nPhysics,\u201d Schelling began by again bringing forward the Substance\nof Spinoza, simple, absolute Existence, inasmuch as he makes his\nstarting-point the absolute identity of the subjective and objective.\nHere, like Spinoza, he employed the method of geometry, laying down\naxioms and proving by means of propositions, then going on to deduce\nother propositions from these, and so on. But this method has no real\napplication to philosophy. Schelling at this point laid down certain\nforms of difference, to which he gave the name of potencies, adopting\nthe term from Eschenmayer, who made use of it (p. 514);[423] they are\nready-made differences, which Schelling avails himself of. But philosophy\nmust not take any forms from other sciences, as here from mathematics.\nWith Schelling, the leading form is that which was brought into\nremembrance again by Kant, the form of triplicity as first, second, and\nthird potency.\n\nSchelling, like Fichte, begins with I = I, or with the absolute\nintuition, expressed as proposition or definition of the Absolute, that\n\u201cReason is the absolute indifference of subject and object\u201d: so that\nit is neither the one nor the other, for both have in it their true\ndetermination; and their opposition, like all others, is utterly done\naway with. The true reality of subject and object is placed in this\nalone, that the subject is not posited in the determination of subject\nagainst object, as in the philosophy of Fichte; it is not determined\nas in itself existent, but as subject-object, as the identity of the\ntwo; in the same way the object is not posited according to its ideal\ndetermination as object, but in as far as it is itself absolute, or\nthe identity of the subjective and objective. But the expression\n\u201cindifference\u201d is ambiguous, for it means indifference in regard to\nboth the one and the other; and thus it appears as if the content of\nindifference, the only thing which makes it concrete, were indifferent.\nSchelling\u2019s next requirement is that the subject must not be hampered\nwith reflection; that would be bringing it under the determination of\nthe understanding, which, equally with sensuous perception, implies\nthe separateness of sensuous things. As to the form of its existence,\nabsolute indifference is with Schelling posited as A = A; and this\nform is for him the knowledge of absolute identity, which, however, is\ninseparable from the Being or existence of the same.[424]\n\nThus, therefore, opposition, as form and reality or existence, no doubt\nappears in this Absolute, but it is determined as a merely relative\nor unessential opposition: \u201cBetween subject and object no other than\nquantitative difference is possible. For no qualitative difference as\nregards the two is thinkable,\u201d because absolute identity \u201cis posited as\nsubject and object only as regards the form of its Being, not as regards\nits existence. There is consequently only a quantitative difference\nleft,\u201d _i.e._ only that of magnitude: and yet difference must really be\nunderstood as qualitative, and must thus be shown to be a difference\nwhich abrogates itself. This quantitative difference, says Schelling,\nis the form _actu_: \u201cThe quantitative difference of subjective and\nobjective is the basis of all finitude. Each determined potency marks\na determined quantitative difference of the subjective and objective.\nEach individual Being is the result of a quantitative difference of\nsubjectivity and objectivity. The individual expresses absolute identity\nunder a determined form of Being:\u201d so that each side is itself a relative\ntotality, A = B, and at the same time the one factor preponderates in\nthe one, and the other factor in the other, but both remain absolute\nidentity.[425] This is insufficient, for there are other determinations;\ndifference is undoubtedly qualitative, although this is not the absolute\ndetermination. Quantitative difference is no true difference, but an\nentirely external relation; and likewise the preponderance of subjective\nand objective is not a determination of thought, but a merely sensuous\ndetermination.\n\nThe Absolute itself, in so far as the positing of difference is taken\ninto account, is defined by Schelling as the quantitative indifference of\nsubjective and objective: in respect to absolute identity no quantitative\ndifference is thinkable. \u201cQuantitative difference is only possible\noutside of absolute identity, and outside of absolute totality. There\nis nothing in itself outside of totality, excepting by virtue of an\narbitrary separation of the individual from the whole. Absolute identity\nexists only under the form of the quantitative indifference of subjective\nand objective.\u201d Quantitative difference, which appears outside of\nabsolute identity and totality, is therefore, according to Schelling, in\nitself absolute identity, and consequently thinkable only under the form\nof the quantitative indifference of the subjective and objective. \u201cThis\nopposition does not therefore occur in itself, or from the standpoint of\nspeculation. From this standpoint A exists just as much as B does; for A\nlike B is the whole absolute identity, which only exists under the two\nforms, but under both of them alike. Absolute identity is the universe\nitself. The form of its Being can be thought of under the image of a\nline,\u201d as shown by the following scheme:\n\n + +\n A = B A = B\n -----------------\n A = A\n\n\u201cin which the same identity is posited in each direction, but with A or B\npreponderating in opposite directions.\u201d[426] If we go into details, the\nmain points from an elementary point of view are the following.\n\nThe first potency is that the first quantitative difference of the\nAbsolute, or \u201cthe first relative totality is matter. Proof: A = B is\nnot anything real either as relative identity or as relative duplicity.\nAs identity A = B, in the individual as in the whole, can be expressed\nonly by the line,\u201d\u2014the first dimension. \u201cBut in that line A is posited\nthroughout as existent,\u201d _i.e._ it is at the same time related to B.\n\u201cTherefore this line presupposes A = B as relative totality throughout;\nrelative totality is therefore the first presupposition, and if relative\nidentity exists, it exists only through relative totality,\u201d\u2014this is\nduplicity, the second dimension. \u201cIn the same way relative duplicity\npresupposes relative identity. Relative identity and duplicity are\ncontained in relative totality, not indeed _actu_, but yet _potentia_.\nTherefore the two opposites must mutually extinguish each other in\na third\u201d dimension. \u201cAbsolute identity as the immediate basis of\nthe reality of A and B in matter, is the force of gravitation. If A\npreponderates we have the force of attraction, if B preponderates we have\nthat of expansion. The quantitative positing of the forces of attraction\nand expansion passes into the infinite; their equilibrium exists in the\nwhole, not in the individual.\u201d[427] From matter as the first indifference\nin immediacy Schelling now passes on to further determinations.\n\nThe second potency (A\u00b2) is light, this identity itself posited as\nexistent; in so far as A = B, A\u00b2 is also posited. The same identity,\n\u201cposited under the form of relative identity,\u201d _i.e._ of the polarity\nwhich we find appearing \u201cin A and B, is the force of cohesion. Cohesion\nis the impression made on matter by the self-hood\u201d of light \u201cor by\npersonality, whereby matter first emerges as particular out of the\nuniversal identity, and raises itself into the realm of form.\u201d Planets,\nmetals and other bodies form a series which under the form of dynamic\ncohesion expresses particular relations of cohesion, in which on the\none hand contraction preponderates, and on the other hand expansion.\nThese potencies appear with Schelling as north and south, east and west\npolarity: their developments further appear as north-west, south-east,\n&c. He counts as the last potency Mercury, Venus, the Earth, &c. He\ncontinues: \u201cCohesion outside of the point of indifference I term passive.\nTowards the negative side\u201d (or pole) \u201cfall some of the metals which\nstand next to iron, after them the so-called precious metals,\u201d then the\n\u201cdiamond, and lastly carbon, the greatest passive cohesion. Towards the\npositive side, again, some metals fall, in which the cohesive nature of\niron gradually diminishes,\u201d _i.e._ approaches disintegration, and lastly\n\u201cdisappears in nitrogen.\u201d Active cohesion is magnetism, and the material\nuniverse is an infinite magnet. The magnetic process is difference in\nindifference, and indifference in difference, and therefore absolute\nidentity as such. The indifference point of the magnet is the \u201cneither\nnor\u201d and the \u201cas well as\u201d; the poles are potentially the same essence,\nonly posited under two factors which are opposed. Both poles depend \u201conly\nupon whether + or - preponderates\u201d; they are not pure abstractions. \u201cIn\nthe total magnet the empirical magnet is the indifference point. The\nempirical magnet is iron. All bodies are mere metamorphoses of iron\u2014they\nare potentially contained in iron. Every two different bodies which touch\neach other set up mutually in each other relative diminution and increase\nof cohesion. This mutual alteration of cohesion by means of the contact\nof two different bodies is electricity; the cohesion-diminishing factor\n+E is the potency of hydrogen,-E is the potency of oxygen. The totality\nof the dynamic process is represented only by the chemical process.\u201d[428]\n\n\u201cBy the positing of the dynamic totality the addition of light is\ndirectly posited as a product. The expression, the total product,\ntherefore signifies light combined with the force of gravitation; by the\npositing of the relative totality of the whole potency, the force of\ngravity is directly reduced to the mere form of the Being of absolute\nidentity.\u201d Thus is the third potency (A\u00b3), the organism.[429] Schelling\nlaunched out into too many individual details, if he desired to indicate\nthe construction of the whole universe. On the one hand, however, he\ndid not complete this representation, and on the other hand, he has\nconfined himself mainly to implicit existence, and has mixed therewith\nthe formalism of external construction according to a presupposed scheme.\nIn this representation he advanced only as far as the organism, and did\nnot reach the presentation of the other side of knowledge, _i.e._ the\nphilosophy of spirit. Schelling began time after time, in accordance\nwith the idea implied in this construction, to work out the natural\nuniverse, and especially the organism. He banishes all such meaningless\nterms as perfection, wisdom, outward adaptability; or, in other words,\nthe Kantian formula, that a thing appears so and so to our faculty of\nknowledge, is transformed by him into this other formula, that such and\nsuch is the constitution of Nature. Following up Kant\u2019s meagre attempt\nat demonstrating spirit in nature, he devoted special attention to\ninaugurating anew this mode of regarding nature, so as to recognize in\nobjective existence the same schematism, the same rhythm, as is present\nin the ideal. Hence nature represents itself therein not as something\nalien to spirit, but as being in its general aspect a projection of\nspirit into an objective mode.\n\nWe have further to remark that Schelling by this theory became the\noriginator of modern Natural Philosophy, since he was the first to\nexhibit Nature as the sensuous perception or the expression of the\nNotion and its determinations. Natural Philosophy is no new science; we\nmet with it continually\u2014in the works of Aristotle, for instance, and\nelsewhere. English Philosophy is also a mere apprehension in thought of\nthe physical; forces, laws of Nature, are its fundamental determinations.\nThe opposition of physics and Natural Philosophy is therefore not the\nopposition of the unthinking and the thinking view of Nature; Natural\nPhilosophy means, if we take it in its whole extent, nothing else\nthan the thoughtful contemplation of Nature; but this is the work of\nordinary physics also, since its determinations of forces, laws, &c.,\nare thoughts. The only difference is that in physics thoughts are formal\nthoughts of the understanding, whose material and content cannot, as\nregards their details, be determined by thought itself, but must be\ntaken from experience. But concrete thought contains its determination\nand its content in itself, and merely the external mode of appearance\npertains to the senses. If, then, Philosophy passes beyond the form of\nthe understanding, and has apprehended the speculative Notion, it must\nalter the determinations of thought, the categories of the understanding\nregarding Nature. Kant was the first to set about this; and Schelling has\nsought to grasp the Notion of Nature, instead of contenting himself with\nthe ordinary metaphysics of the same. Nature is to him nothing but the\nexternal mode of existence as regards the system of thought-forms, just\nas mind is the existence of the same system in the form of consciousness.\nThat for which we have to thank Schelling, therefore, is not that he\nbrought thought to bear on the comprehension of Nature, but that he\naltered the categories according to which thought applied itself to\nNature; he introduced forms of Reason, and applied them\u2014as he did the\nform of the syllogism in magnetism, for instance\u2014in place of the ordinary\ncategories of the understanding. He has not only shown these forms in\nNature, but has also sought to evolve Nature out of a principle of this\nkind.\n\nIn the \u201cFurther Exposition of the System of Philosophy\u201d which the \u201cNew\nJournal for Speculative Physics\u201d furnishes, Schelling chose other forms;\nfor, by reason of incompletely developed form and lack of dialectic,\nhe had recourse to various forms one after another, because he found\nnone of them sufficient. Instead of the equilibrium of subjectivity\nand objectivity, he now speaks of the identity of existence and form,\nof universal and particular, of finite and infinite, of positive and\nnegative, and he defines absolute indifference sometimes in one and\nsometimes in another form of opposition, just according to chance. All\nsuch oppositions may be employed; but they are only abstract, and refer\nto different stages in the development of the logical principle itself.\nForm and essence are distinguished by Schelling in this way, that\nform, regarded on its own account, is the particular, or the emerging\nof difference, subjectivity. But real existence is absolute form or\nabsolute knowledge immediately in itself, a self-conscious existence in\nthe sense of thinking knowledge, just as with Spinoza it had the form\nof something objective or in thought. Speculative Philosophy is to be\nfound in this assertion, not that it asserts an independent philosophy,\nfor it is purely organization; knowledge is based on the Absolute. Thus\nSchelling has again given to transcendental Idealism the significance of\nabsolute Idealism. This unity of existence and form is thus, according\nto Schelling, the Absolute; or if we regard reality as the universal,\nand form as the particular, the Absolute is the absolute unity of\nuniversal and particular, or of Being and knowledge. The different\naspects, subject and object, or universal and particular, are only ideal\noppositions; they are in the Absolute entirely and altogether one. This\nunity as form is intellectual intuition, which posits Thinking and\nBeing as absolutely alike, and as it formally expresses the Absolute,\nit becomes at the same time the expression of its essence. He who has\nnot the power of imagination, whereby he may represent this unity to\nhimself, is deficient in the organ of Philosophy. But in this consists\nthe true absoluteness of all and each, that the one is not recognized as\nuniversal, and the other as particular, but the universal in this its\ndetermination is recognized as unity of the universal and particular,\nand in like manner the particular is recognized as the unity of both.\nConstruction merely consists in leading back everything determined and\nparticular into the Absolute, or regarding it as it is in absolute unity;\nits determinateness is only its ideal moment, but its truth is really\nits Being in the Absolute. These three moments or potencies\u2014that of the\npassing of existence (the infinite) into form (the finite), and of form\ninto existence (which are both relative unities), and the third, the\nabsolute unity, thus recur anew in each individual. Hence Nature, the\nreal or actual aspect, as the passing of existence into form or of the\nuniversal into the particular, itself again possesses these three unities\nin itself, and in the same way the ideal aspect does so; therefore each\npotency is on its own account once more absolute. This is the general\nidea of the scientific construction of the universe\u2014to repeat in each\nindividual alike the triplicity which is the scheme of the whole, thereby\nto show the identity of all things, and in doing so to regard them in\ntheir absolute essence, so that they all express the same unity.[430]\n\nThe more detailed explanation is extremely formal: \u201cExistence passes into\nform\u2014this taken by itself being the particular (the finite)\u2014by means of\nthe infinite being added to it; unity is received into multiplicity,\nindifference into difference.\u201d The other assertion is: \u201cForm passes into\nexistence by the finite being received into the infinite, difference into\nindifference.\u201d But passing into and receiving into are merely sensuous\nexpressions. \u201cOtherwise expressed, the particular becomes absolute\nform by the universal becoming one with it, and the universal becomes\nabsolute existence by the particular becoming one with it. But these two\nunities, as in the Absolute, are not outside of one another, but in one\nanother, and therefore the Absolute is absolute indifference of form and\nexistence,\u201d as unity of this double passing-into-one. \u201cBy means of these\ntwo unities two different potencies are determined, but in themselves\nthey are both the exactly equal roots of the Absolute.\u201d[431] That is a\nmere assertion, the continual return after each differentiation, which is\nperpetually again removed out of the Absolute.\n\n\u201cOf the first absolute transformation there are copies in phenomenal\nNature; therefore Nature, regarded in itself, is nothing else than\nthat first transformation as it exists in the absolute (unseparated\nfrom the other). For by means of the infinite passing into the finite,\nexistence passes into form; since then form obtains reality only by\nmeans of existence, existence, when it has passed into form without form\nhaving (according to the assumption) similarly passed into existence,\ncan be represented only as potentiality or ground of reality, but not\nas indifference of possibility and actuality. But that which may be\ndescribed thus, namely as existence, in so far as that is mere ground of\nreality, and therefore has really passed into form, although form has not\nin turn passed into it, is what presents itself as Nature.\u2014Existence\nmakes its appearance in form, but in return form also makes its\nappearance in existence; this is the other unity,\u201d that of mind. \u201cThis\nunity is established by the finite being received into the infinite. At\nthis point form, as the particular, strikes into existence, and itself\nbecomes absolute. Form which passes into existence places itself as\nabsolute activity and positive cause of reality in opposition to the\nexistence which passes into form, and which appears only as ground. The\npassing of absolute form into existence is what we think of as God, and\nthe images or copies of this transformation are in the ideal world, which\nis therefore in its implicitude the other unity.\u201d[432] Each of these\ntwo transformations, then, is the whole totality, not, however, posited\nand not appearing as totality, but with the one or the other factor\npreponderating; each of the two spheres has, therefore, in itself again\nthese differences, and thus in each of them the three potencies are to be\nfound.\n\nThe ground or basis, Nature as basis merely, is matter, gravity, as the\nfirst potency; this passing of form into existence is in the actual world\nuniversal mechanism, necessity. But the second potency is \u201cthe light\nwhich shineth in darkness, form which has passed into existence. The\nabsolute unification of the two unities in actuality, so that matter is\naltogether form, and form is altogether matter, is organism, the highest\nexpression of Nature as it is in God, and of God as He is in Nature, in\nthe finite.\u201d On the ideal side \u201cKnowledge is the essence of the Absolute\nbrought into the daylight of form; action is a transformation of form, as\nthe particular, into the essence of the Absolute. As in the real world\nform that is identified with essence appears as light, so in the ideal\nworld God Himself appears in particular manifestation as the living form\nwhich has emerged in the passing of form into essence, so that in every\nrespect the ideal and real world are again related as likeness and\nsymbol. The absolute unification of the two unities in the ideal, so that\nmaterial is wholly form and form wholly material, is the work of art;\nand that secret hidden in the Absolute which is the root of all reality\ncomes here into view, in the reflected world itself, in the highest\npotency and highest union of God and Nature as the power of imagination.\u201d\nOn account of that permeation art and poetry therefore hold the highest\nrank in Schelling\u2019s estimation. But art is the Absolute in sensuous form\nalone. Where and what could the work of art be, which should correspond\nto the Idea of the spirit? \u201cThe universe is formed in the Absolute as\nthe most perfect organic existence and the most perfect work of art: for\nReason, which recognizes the Absolute in it, it possesses absolute truth;\nfor the imagination, which represents the Absolute in it, it possesses\nabsolute Beauty. Each of these expresses the very same unity,\u201d regarded\n\u201cfrom different sides; and both arrive at the absolute indifference point\nin the recognition of which lies both the beginning and the aim of real\nknowledge.\u201d[433] This highest Idea, these differences, are grasped as a\nwhole in a very formal manner only.\n\n3. The relation of Nature to Spirit, and to God, the Absolute, has\nbeen stated by Schelling elsewhere, _i.e._ in his later expositions,\nas follows: he defines the existence of God as Nature\u2014in so far as God\nconstitutes Himself its ground or basis, as infinite perception\u2014and\nNature is thus the negative moment in God, since intelligence and\nthought exist only by means of the opposition of one Being. For in one\nof his writings, directed on some particular occasion against Jacobi,\nSchelling explains himself further with regard to the nature of God and\nHis relation to Nature. He says: \u201cGod, or more properly the existence\nwhich is God, is ground: He is ground of Himself as a moral Being.\nBut\u201d then \u201cit is ground that He makes Himself\u201d\u2014not cause. Something\nmust precede intelligence, and that something is Being\u2014\u201csince thought\nis the exact opposite of Being. That which is the beginning of an\nintelligence cannot be in its turn intelligent, since there would\notherwise be no distinction; but it cannot be absolutely unintelligent,\nfor the very reason that it is the potentiality of an intelligence. It\nwill accordingly be something between these, _i.e._ it will operate\nwith wisdom, but as it were with an innate, instinctive, blind, and\nyet unconscious wisdom; just as we often hear those who are under a\nspell uttering words full of understanding, but not uttering them with\ncomprehension of their meaning, but as it were owing to an inspiration.\u201d\nGod, therefore, as this ground of Himself, is Nature\u2014Nature as it is in\nGod; this is the view taken of Nature in Natural Philosophy.[434] But\nthe work of the Absolute is to abrogate this ground, and to constitute\nitself Intelligence. On this account Schelling\u2019s philosophy has later\nbeen termed a Philosophy of Nature, and that in the sense of a universal\nphilosophy, while at first Natural Philosophy was held to be only a part\nof the whole.\n\nIt is not incumbent on us here to give a more detailed account of\nSchelling\u2019s philosophy, or to show points in the expositions hitherto\ngiven by him which are far from satisfactory. The system is the latest\nform of Philosophy which we had to consider, and it is a form both\ninteresting and true. In the first place special emphasis, in dealing\nwith Schelling, must be laid on the idea that he has grasped the true\nas the concrete, as the unity of subjective and objective. The main\npoint in Schelling\u2019s philosophy thus is that its interest centres round\nthat deep, speculative content, which, as content, is the content with\nwhich Philosophy in the entire course of its history has had to do.\nThe Thought which is free and independent, not abstract, but in itself\nconcrete, comprehends itself in itself as an intellectually actual\nworld; and this is the truth of Nature, Nature in itself. The second\ngreat merit possessed by Schelling is to have pointed out in Nature the\nforms of Spirit; thus electricity, magnetism, &c., are for him only\nexternal modes of the Idea. His defect is that this Idea in general,\nits distinction into the ideal and the natural world, and also the\ntotality of these determinations, are not shown forth and developed as\nnecessitated in themselves by the Notion. As Schelling has not risen to\nthis point of view, he has misconceived the nature of thought; the work\nof art thus becomes for him the supreme and only mode in which the Idea\nexists for spirit. But the supreme mode of the Idea is really its own\nelement; thought, the Idea apprehended, is therefore higher than the work\nof art. The Idea is the truth, and all that is true is the Idea; the\nsystematizing of the Idea into the world must be proved to be a necessary\nunveiling and revelation. With Schelling, on the other hand, form is\nreally an external scheme, and his method is the artificial application\nof this scheme to external objects. This externally applied scheme\ntakes the place of dialectic progress; and this is the special reason\nwhy the philosophy of Nature has brought itself into discredit, that it\nhas proceeded on an altogether external plan, has made its foundation a\nready-made scheme, and fitted into it Nature as we perceive it. These\nforms were potencies with Schelling, but instead of mathematical forms\nor a type of thought like this, by some other men sensuous forms have\nbeen taken as basis, just as were sulphur and mercury by Jacob Boehme.\nFor instance, magnetism, electricity, and chemistry have been defined to\nbe the three potencies in Nature, and thus in the organism reproduction\nhas been termed chemistry; irritability, electricity; and sensibility,\nmagnetism.[435] In this way there has crept into Natural Philosophy\nthe great formalism of representing everything as a series, which is a\nsuperficial determination without necessity, since instead of Notions\nwe find formulas. Brilliant powers of imagination are displayed, such\nas were exhibited by G\u00f6rres. This mistake of applying forms which are\ntaken from one sphere of Nature to another sphere of the same has been\ncarried a long way; Oken, for example, calls wood-fibres the nerves and\nbrain of the plant, and is almost crazy on the subject. Philosophy would\nin this way become a play of mere analogical reflections; and it is not\nwith these but with thoughts that we have to do. Nerves are not thoughts,\nany more than such expressions as pole of contraction, of expansion,\nmasculine, feminine, &c. The formal plan of applying an external scheme\nto the sphere of Nature which one wishes to observe, is the external\nwork of Natural Philosophy, and this scheme is itself derived from the\nimagination. That is a most false mode of proceeding; Schelling took\nadvantage of it to some extent, others have made a complete misuse of it.\nAll this is done to escape thought; nevertheless, thought is the ultimate\nsimple determination which has to be dealt with.\n\nIt is therefore of the greatest importance to distinguish Schelling\u2019s\nphilosophy, on the one hand, from that imitation of it which throws\nitself into an unspiritual farrago of words regarding the Absolute; and,\non the other hand, from the philosophy of those imitators, who, owing to\na failure to understand intellectual intuition, give up comprehension,\nand with it the leading moment of knowledge, and speak from so-called\nintuition, _i.e._ they take a glance at the thing in question, and having\nfastened on it some superficial analogy or definition, they fancy they\nhave expressed its whole nature, while in point of fact they put an\nend to all capacity for attaining to scientific knowledge. This whole\ntendency places itself, in the first place, in opposition to reflective\nthought, or to progress in fixed, steadfast, immovable Notions. But\ninstead of remaining in the Notion and recognizing it as the unresting\nego, they have lighted on the opposite extreme of passive intuition,\nof immediate Being, of fixed implicitude; and they think that they can\nmake up for the lack of fixity by superficial observation, and can\nrender this observation intellectual by determining it once more by some\nfixed Notion or other; or they bring their minds to bear on the object\nof consideration by saying, for instance, that the ostrich is the fish\namong birds, because he has a long neck\u2014fish becomes a general term, but\nnot a Notion. This whole mode of reasoning, which has forced its way\ninto natural history and natural science, as well as into medicine, is a\nmiserable formalism, an irrational medley of the crudest empiricism with\nthe most superficial ideal determinations that formalism ever descended\nto. The philosophy of Locke is not so crude as it is, for it is not a\nwhit better in either its content or its form, and it is combined with\nfoolish self-conceit into the bargain. Philosophy on this account sank\ninto general and well-deserved contempt, such as is for the most part\nextended to those who assert that they have a monopoly of philosophy.\nInstead of earnestness of apprehension and circumspection of thought,\nwe find in them a juggling with idle fancies, which pass for deep\nconceptions, lofty surmises, and even for poetry; and they think they\nare right in the centre of things when they are only on the surface.\nFive-and-twenty years ago[436] the case was the same with poetic art; a\ntaste for ingenious conceits took possession of it, and the effusions\nof its poetic inspiration came forth blindly from itself, shot out as\nfrom a pistol. The results were either crazy ravings, or, if they were\nnot ravings, they were prose so dull that it was unworthy of the name of\nprose. It is just the same in the later philosophies. What is not utterly\nsenseless drivel about the indifference-point and polarity, about oxygen,\nthe holy, the infinite, &c., is made up of thoughts so trivial that we\nmight well doubt our having correctly apprehended their meaning, in the\nfirst place because they are given forth with such arrogant effrontery,\nand in the second place because we cannot help trusting that what was\nsaid was not so trivial as it seems. As in the Philosophy of Nature men\nforgot the Notion and proceeded in a dead unspiritual course, so here\nthey lose sight of spirit entirely. They have strayed from the right\nroad; for by their principle, Notion and perception are one unity, but in\npoint of fact this unity, this spirit, itself emerges in immediacy, and\nis therefore in intuitive perception, and not in the Notion.\n\n\nE. FINAL RESULT.\n\nThe present standpoint of philosophy is that the Idea is known in its\nnecessity; the sides of its diremption, Nature and Spirit, are each of\nthem recognized as representing the totality of the Idea, and not only as\nbeing in themselves identical, but as producing this one identity from\nthemselves; and in this way the identity is recognized as necessary.\nNature, and the world or history of spirit, are the two realities; what\nexists as actual Nature is an image of divine Reason; the forms of\nself-conscious Reason are also the forms of Nature. The ultimate aim\nand business of philosophy is to reconcile thought or the Notion with\nreality. It is easy from subordinate standpoints to find satisfaction\nin modes of intuitive perception and of feeling. But the deeper the\nspirit goes within itself, the more vehement is the opposition, the\nmore abundant is the wealth without; the depth is to be measured by\nthe greatness of the craving with which spirit seeks to find itself\nin what lies outside of itself. We saw the thought which apprehends\nitself appearing; it strove to make itself concrete within itself. Its\nfirst activity is formal; Aristotle was the first to say that \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 is\nthe thought of thought. The result is the thought which is at home\nwith itself, and at the same time embraces the universe therein, and\ntransforms it into an intelligent world. In apprehension the spiritual\nand the natural universe are interpenetrated as one harmonious universe,\nwhich withdraws into itself, and in its various aspects develops the\nAbsolute into a totality, in order, by the very process of so doing, to\nbecome conscious of itself in its unity, in Thought. Philosophy is thus\nthe true theodicy, as contrasted with art and religion and the feelings\nwhich these call up\u2014a reconciliation of spirit, namely of the spirit\nwhich has apprehended itself in its freedom and in the riches of its\nreality.\n\nTo this point the World-spirit has come, and each stage has its own form\nin the true system of Philosophy; nothing is lost, all principles are\npreserved, since Philosophy in its final aspect is the totality of forms.\nThis concrete idea is the result of the strivings of spirit during almost\ntwenty-five centuries of earnest work to become objective to itself, to\nknow itself:\n\n _Tant\u00e6 molis erat, se ipsam cognoscere mentem._\n\nAll this time was required to produce the philosophy of our day; so\ntardily and slowly did the World-spirit work to reach this goal. What we\npass in rapid review when we recall it, stretched itself out in reality\nto this great length of time. For in this lengthened period, the Notion\nof Spirit, invested with its entire concrete development, its external\nsubsistence, its wealth, is striving to bring spirit to perfection, to\nmake progress itself and to develop from spirit. It goes ever on and on,\nbecause spirit is progress alone. Spirit often seems to have forgotten\nand lost itself, but inwardly opposed to itself, it is inwardly working\never forward (as when Hamlet says of the ghost of his father, \u201cWell said,\nold mole! canst work i\u2019 the ground so fast?\u201d[437]), until grown strong\nin itself it bursts asunder the crust of earth which divided it from the\nsun, its Notion, so that the earth crumbles away. At such a time, when\nthe encircling crust, like a soulless decaying tenement, crumbles away,\nand spirit displays itself arrayed in new youth, the seven league boots\nare at length adopted. This work of the spirit to know itself, this\nactivity to find itself, is the life of the spirit and the spirit itself.\nIts result is the Notion which it takes up of itself; the history of\nPhilosophy is a revelation of what has been the aim of spirit throughout\nits history; it is therefore the world\u2019s history in its innermost\nsignification. This work of the human spirit in the recesses of thought\nis parallel with all the stages of reality; and therefore no philosophy\noversteps its own time. The importance which the determinations of\nthought possessed is another matter, which does not belong to the history\nof Philosophy. These Notions are the simplest revelation of the World\nspirit: in their more concrete form they are history.\n\nWe must, therefore, in the first place not esteem lightly what spirit has\nwon, namely its gains up to the present day. Ancient Philosophy is to be\nreverenced as necessary, and as a link in this sacred chain, but all the\nsame nothing more than a link. The present is the highest stage reached.\nIn the second place, all the various philosophies are no mere fashionable\ntheories of the time, or anything of a similar nature; they are neither\nchance products nor the blaze of a fire of straw, nor casual eruptions\nhere and there, but a spiritual, reasonable, forward advance; they are of\nnecessity one Philosophy in its development, the revelation of God, as He\nknows Himself to be. Where several philosophies appear at the same time,\nthey are different sides which make up one totality forming their basis;\nand on account of their one-sidedness we see the refutation of the one by\nthe other. In the third place we do not find here feeble little efforts\nto establish or to criticize this or that particular point; instead of\nthat, each philosophy sets up a new principle of its own, and this must\nbe recognized.\n\nIf we glance at the main epochs in the whole history of Philosophy, and\ngrasp the necessary succession of stages in the leading moments, each of\nwhich expresses a determinate Idea, we find that after the Oriental whirl\nof subjectivity, which attains to no intelligibility and therefore to no\nsubsistence, the light of thought dawned among the Greeks.\n\n1. The philosophy of the ancients had the absolute Idea as its thought;\nand the realization or reality of the same consisted in comprehending the\nexisting present world, and regarding it as it is in its absolute nature.\nThis philosophy did not make its starting-point the Idea itself, but\nproceeded from the objective as from something given, and transformed the\nsame into the Idea; the Being of Parmenides.\n\n2. Abstract thought, \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2, became known to itself as universal essence or\nexistence, not as subjective thought; the Universal of Plato.\n\n3. In Aristotle the Notion emerges, free and unconstrained, as\ncomprehending thought, permeating and spiritualizing all the forms which\nthe universe contains.\n\n4. The Notion as subject, its independence, its inwardness, abstract\nseparation, is represented by the Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics: here\nwe have not the free, concrete form, but universality abstract and in\nitself formal.\n\n5. The thought of totality, the intelligible world, is the concrete\nIdea as we have seen it with the Neo-Platonists. This principle is\nideality generally speaking, which is present in all reality, but not\nthe Idea which knows itself: this is not reached until the principle\nof subjectivity, individuality, found a place in it, and God as spirit\nbecame actual to Himself in self-consciousness.\n\n6. But it has been the work of modern times to grasp this Idea as spirit,\nas the Idea that knows itself. In order to proceed from the conscious\nIdea to the self-conscious, we must have the infinite opposition, namely\nthe fact that the Idea has come to the consciousness of being absolutely\nsundered in twain. As spirit had the thought of objective existence,\nPhilosophy thus perfected the intellectuality of the world, and produced\nthis spiritual world as an object existing beyond present reality,\nlike Nature,\u2014the first creation of spirit. The work of the spirit now\nconsisted in bringing this Beyond back to reality, and guiding it into\nself-consciousness. This is accomplished by self-consciousness thinking\nitself, and recognizing absolute existence to be the self-consciousness\nthat thinks itself. With Descartes pure thought directed itself on\nthat separation which we spoke of above. Self-consciousness, in the\nfirst place, thinks of itself as consciousness; therein is contained\nall objective reality, and the positive, intuitive reference of its\nreality to the other side. With Spinoza Thought and Being are opposed\nand yet identical; he has the intuitive perception of substance, but\nthe knowledge of substance in his case is external. We have here the\nprinciple of reconciliation taking its rise from thought as such, in\norder to abrogate the subjectivity of thought: this is the case in\nLeibnitz\u2019s monad, which possesses the power of representation.\n\n7. In the second place, self-consciousness thinks of itself as being\nself-consciousness; in being self-conscious it is independent, but\nstill in this independence it has a negative relation to what is\noutside self-consciousness. This is infinite subjectivity, which\nappears at one time as the critique of thought in the case of Kant, and\nat another time, in the case of Fichte, as the tendency or impulse\ntowards the concrete. Absolute, pure, infinite form is expressed as\nself-consciousness, the Ego.\n\n8. This is a light that breaks forth on spiritual substance, and shows\nabsolute content and absolute form to be identical;\u2014substance is in\nitself identical with knowledge. Self-consciousness thus, in the third\nplace, recognizes its positive relation as its negative, and its negative\nas its positive,\u2014or, in other words, recognizes these opposite activities\nas the same, _i.e._ it recognizes pure Thought or Being as self-identity,\nand this again as separation. This is intellectual perception; but it\nis requisite in order that it should be in truth intellectual, that it\nshould not be that merely immediate perception of the eternal and the\ndivine which we hear of, but should be absolute knowledge. This intuitive\nperception which does not recognize itself is taken as starting-point as\nif it were absolutely presupposed; it has in itself intuitive perception\nonly as immediate knowledge, and not as self-knowledge: or it knows\nnothing, and what it perceives it does not really know,\u2014for, taken at its\nbest, it consists of beautiful thoughts, but not knowledge.\n\nBut intellectual intuition is knowledge, since, in the first place, in\nspite of the separation of each of the opposed sides from the other, all\nexternal reality is known as internal. If it is known according to its\nessence, as it is, it shows itself as not existing of itself, but as\nessentially consisting in the movement of transition. This Heraclitean\nor Sceptical principle, that nothing is at rest, must be demonstrated of\neach individual thing; and thus in this consciousness\u2014that the essence of\neach thing lies in determination, in what is the opposite of itself\u2014there\nappears the apprehended unity with its opposite. Similarly this unity is,\nin the second place, to be recognized even in its essence; its essence\nas this identity is, in the same way, to pass over into its opposite, or\nto realize itself, to become for itself something different; and thus\nthe opposition in it is brought about by itself. Again, it may be said\nof the opposition, in the third place, that it is not in the Absolute;\nthis Absolute is existence, the eternal, &c. This is, however, itself an\nabstraction in which the Absolute is apprehended in a one-sided manner\nonly, and the opposition is apprehended only as ideal (_supra_, p.\n536); but in fact it is form, as the essential moment of the movement\nof the Absolute. This Absolute is not at rest, and that opposition is\nnot the unresting Notion; for the Idea, unresting though it is, is\nyet at rest and satisfied in itself. Pure thought has advanced to the\nopposition of the subjective and objective; the true reconciliation of\nthe opposition is the perception that this opposition, when pushed to\nits absolute extreme, resolves itself; as Schelling says, the opposites\nare in themselves identical\u2014and not only in themselves, but eternal life\nconsists in the very process of continually producing the opposition and\ncontinually reconciling it. To know opposition in unity, and unity in\nopposition\u2014this is absolute knowledge; and science is the knowledge of\nthis unity in its whole development by means of itself.\n\nThis is then the demand of all time and of Philosophy. A new epoch has\narisen in the world. It would appear as if the World-spirit had at last\nsucceeded in stripping off from itself all alien objective existence,\nand apprehending itself at last as absolute Spirit, in developing\nfrom itself what for it is objective, and keeping it within its own\npower, yet remaining at rest all the while. The strife of the finite\nself-consciousness with the absolute self-consciousness, which last\nseemed to the other to lie outside of itself, now comes to an end. Finite\nself-consciousness has ceased to be finite; and in this way absolute\nself-consciousness has, on the other hand, attained to the reality which\nit lacked before. This is the whole history of the world in general up\nto the present time, and the history of Philosophy in particular, the\nsole work of which is to depict this strife. Now, indeed, it seems to\nhave reached its goal, when this absolute self-consciousness, which it\nhad the work of representing, has ceased to be alien, and when spirit\naccordingly is realized as spirit. For it becomes such only as the result\nof its knowing itself to be absolute spirit, and this it knows in real\nscientific knowledge. Spirit produces itself as Nature, as the State;\nnature is its unconscious work, in the course of which it appears to\nitself something different, and not spirit; but in the State, in the\ndeeds and life of History, as also of Art, it brings itself to pass with\nconsciousness; it knows very various modes of its reality, yet they are\nonly modes. In scientific knowledge alone it knows itself as absolute\nspirit; and this knowledge, or spirit, is its only true existence. This\nthen is the standpoint of the present day, and the series of spiritual\nforms is with it for the present concluded.\n\nAt this point I bring this history of Philosophy to a close. It has been\nmy desire that you should learn from it that the history of Philosophy is\nnot a blind collection of fanciful ideas, nor a fortuitous progression.\nI have rather sought to show the necessary development of the successive\nphilosophies from one another, so that the one of necessity presupposes\nanother preceding it. The general result of the history of Philosophy is\nthis: in the first place, that throughout all time there has been only\none Philosophy, the contemporary differences of which constitute the\nnecessary aspects of the one principle; in the second place, that the\nsuccession of philosophic systems is not due to chance, but represents\nthe necessary succession of stages in the development of this science;\nin the third place, that the final philosophy of a period is the\nresult of this development, and is truth in the highest form which the\nself-consciousness of spirit affords of itself. The latest philosophy\ncontains therefore those which went before; it embraces in itself all the\ndifferent stages thereof; it is the product and result of those that\npreceded it. We can now, for example, be Platonists no longer. Moreover\nwe must raise ourselves once for all above the pettinesses of individual\nopinions, thoughts, objections, and difficulties; and also above our\nown vanity, as if our individual thoughts were of any particular value.\nFor to apprehend the inward substantial spirit is the standpoint of the\nindividual; as parts of the whole, individuals are like blind men, who\nare driven forward by the indwelling spirit of the whole. Our standpoint\nnow is accordingly the knowledge of this Idea as spirit, as absolute\nSpirit, which in this way opposes to itself another spirit, the finite,\nthe principle of which is to know absolute spirit, in order that absolute\nspirit may become existent for it. I have tried to develop and bring\nbefore your thoughts this series of successive spiritual forms pertaining\nto Philosophy in its progress, and to indicate the connection between\nthem. This series is the true kingdom of spirits, the only kingdom of\nspirits that there is\u2014it is a series which is not a multiplicity, nor\ndoes it even remain a series, if we understand thereby that one of its\nmembers merely follows on another; but in the very process of coming to\nthe knowledge of itself it is transformed into the moments of the one\nSpirit, or the one self-present Spirit. This long procession of spirits\nis formed by the individual pulses which beat in its life; they are the\norganism of our substance, an absolutely necessary progression, which\nexpresses nothing less than the nature of spirit itself, and which\nlives in us all. We have to give ear to its urgency\u2014when the mole that\nis within forces its way on\u2014and we have to make it a reality. It is my\ndesire that this history of Philosophy should contain for you a summons\nto grasp the spirit of the time, which is present in us by nature,\nand\u2014each in his own place\u2014consciously to bring it from its natural\ncondition, _i.e._ from its lifeless seclusion, into the light of day.\n\nI have to express my thanks to you for the attention with which you have\nlistened to me while I have been making this attempt; it is in great\nmeasure due to you that my efforts have met with so great a measure of\nsuccess. And it has been a source of pleasure to myself to have been\nassociated with you in this spiritual community; I ought not to speak of\nit as if it were a thing of the past, for I hope that a spiritual bond\nhas been knit between us which will prove permanent. I bid you a most\nhearty farewell.\n\n * * * * *\n\n(The closing lecture of the series was given on the 22nd March, 1817; on\nthe 14th March, 1818; on the 12th August, 1819; on the 23rd March, 1821;\non the 30th March, 1824; on the 28th March, 1828; and on the 26th March,\n1830.)\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n\n[1] Neander. Genet. Entwickelung d. vornehmsten gnost. Systeme, p. 43.\n\n[2] Neander. Genetische Entwickelung, &c., pp. 87-91.\n\n[3] Tennemann, Vol. VIII Section I. p. 366; Buhle: Lehrb. d. Gesch. d.\nPhil. Part V. p. 36; Brucker. Hist. crit. phil. T. III. pp. 23, 24; 28,\n29.\n\n[4] Moses Maimonides: More Nevochim, P. I. c. 71, pp. 133, 134 (Basil.\n1629).\n\n[5] Abulphar. Dynast. IX. pp. 153, 171, 208, 209; Brucker. Hist. crit.\nphil. T. III. pp. 27-29, 44.\n\n[6] Moses Maimonides: More Nevochim, P. I. c. 73, pp. 152-155, 157-159.\n\n[7] Pocock. Specim. hist. Arab. pp. 78, 79; Hottinger. Biblioth. orient.\nc. 2, p. 219; Brucker. Hist. cr. phil. T. III. pp. 65, 66; Tennemann,\nVol. VIII. Section I. p. 374.\n\n[8] Hottinger. Biblioth. orient. c. 2, p. 221; Gabriel Sionita: De\nmoribus Orient. p. 16; Brucker. Hist. cr. phil. T. III. pp. 73, 74;\nTennemann, Vol. VIII. Section I. pp. 374, 375.\n\n[9] Leo Africanus: De illustrib. Arabum viris, c. 9, p. 268; Abulphar.\nDynast. IX. p. 230, Tiedemann, Geist. d. spec. Phil. Vol. IV. p. 112,\n_sqq._, Brucker. Hist. cr. phil. T. III. pp. 80-84.\n\n[10] Leo Afric. De illustrib. Arabum viris, c. 12, p. 274; Brucker. Hist.\ncr. phil. T. III. pp. 93-95; Tiedemann, Geist. d. spec. Phil. Vol. IV.\npp. 120-126, Tennemann, Vol. VIII. Section I. pp. 383-396.\n\n[11] Brucker. Hist. cr. phil. T. III. p. 97.\n\n[12] Brucker. Hist. cr. phil. T. III. p. 101; Tennemann, Vol. III.\nSection I. pp. 420, 421.\n\n[13] Brucker. Hist. cr. phil. T. II. p. 857; Tennemann, Vol. VIII.\nSection I. pp. 446, 447.\n\n[14] Moses Maimonides: More Nevochim, P. I. c. 51, pp. 76-78; c. 57, 58,\npp. 93-98; II. c. 1, 2, pp. 184-193; III. c. 8, pp. 344-350; &c., &c.\n\n[15] Tennemann, Vol. VIII. Pt. I. p. 49.\n\n[16] Brucker. Hist. crit. phil. T. III. pp. 614-617; Bul\u00e6us: Hist.\nUniversitatis Parisiensis; T. I. p. 184.\n\n[17] Bul\u00e6us: Hist. Univ. Paris. T. I. p. 182. (Tennemann, Vol. VIII. pp.\n71, 72.)\n\n[18] De pr\u00e6destinatione. Pro\u0153mium (Veterum auctorum, qui IX. s\u00e6culo de\npr\u00e6destinatione et gratia scripserunt, opera et fragmenta, cura Gilb.\nMauguin. Paris, 1650. T. I. p. 103.)\n\n[19] Tennemann, Vol. VIII. Sec. I. pp. 115, 117.\n\n[20] Anselmi Epistol. XLI. I. 11 (Tennemann, Vol. VIII. Sec. I. pp. 159,\n160.)\n\n[21] Tennemann, Vol. VIII. Sec. I. p. 116; Eadmerus: De vita Anselmi\n(subjuncta operibus Anselmi editis a Gabr. Gerberon. 1721. Fol.), p. 6.\n\n[22] Gaunilo: Liber pro insipiente, c. 5; Tennemann, Vol. VIII. Sec. I.\np. 139; Brucker, Hist. crit. phil. T. III. p. 665.\n\n[23] Tiedemann: Geist d. specul. Philos. Vol. IV. p. 277; Brucker. Hist.\ncrit. phil. T. III. p. 762.\n\n[24] Tennemann, Vol. VIII. Sec. II. pp. 457, 458.\n\n[25] Brucker. Hist. crit. phil. T. III. pp. 764-768.\n\n[26] Tennemann, Vol. VIII. Sec. I. pp. 317, 325; Brucker, Hist. crit.\nphil. T. III. p. 688; Thomas Aquinas: in IV. libros sentent. L. II. Dist.\n17, Qu. I. Art. I; Alberti Magni: Summa Theol. P. I. Tract. IV. Qu. 20\n(Oper. T. XVII. p. 76).\n\n[27] Tennemann, Vol. VIII. Sec. II. pp. 550-553; Brucker, Hist. crit.\nphil. T. III. p. 802.\n\n[28] Tennemann, Vol. VIII. Sec. II. pp. 554-561.\n\n[29] Brucker. Hist. crit. phil. T. III. pp. 825-828; Bul\u00e6us: Hist. Univ.\nParis. T. IV. p. 970.\n\n[30] Duns Scotus in Magistrum sententiarum. Pro\u0153mium (Tennemann, Vol.\nVIII. Sec. II. p. 706).\n\n[31] Brucker. Hist. crit. phil. T. III. p. 828; et not. from Sancrutius.\n\n[32] Trithemius: Annal. Hirsaugiens, T. I. p. 135.\n\n[33] Brucker. Hist. crit. phil. T. III. pp. 779, 697; Tennemann, Vol.\nVIII. Sec. I. pp. 353-359, and in the same place, note 3 (cf. Jourdain,\nGesch. d. Arist. Schriften im Mittelalter, ubersetzt von Stahr pp.\n165-176); Bul\u00e6us: Hist. Univers. Paris, T. III. pp. 82, 142; Launoius, De\nvaria Arist. fortuna in Academ. Paris, c. IX. p. 210.\n\n[34] Hegel erroneously mentions this event as occurring to \u201cWilliam\nof England\u201d instead of to William of Holland, King of the Romans.\n[Translator\u2019s note.]\n\n[35] Brucker. Hist. cr. phil. T. III. pp. 788-798.\n\n[36] Anselmus: De fide trinitatis, c. 2, 3; Epist. XLI. 1. 11; Tennemann,\nVol. VIII. Section I. p. 158.\n\n[37] Rixner: Handbuch der Geschichte der Philos., Vol. II. p. 26 (1st\ned.); Anselmus De fide trinitatis, c. 2; Buhle: Lehrbuch d. Geschichte d.\nPhilosoph., Part V. p. 184; Ab\u00e6lard, Epist. XXI.; Tennemann, Vol. VIII\nSection I. pp. 162, 163.\n\n[38] Tennemann, Vol. VIII. Section I. p. 339; Joh. Sarisberiensis:\nMetalogicus, L. II. c. 17.\n\n[39] Tiedemann: Geist d. specul. Philos. Vol. V. pp. 401, 402; Suarez.\nDisputationes metaphysic\u00e6, Disp. I Sectio 6.\n\n[40] Tiedemann; Geist d. specul. Philos. Vol. IV. pp. 490, 491; Thomas\nAquinas: De ente et essent. c 3 et 5.\n\n[41] Tiedemann: Geist d. spec. Philos. Vol. IV. pp. 609-613; Scotus:\nin Magistrum sententiar. L. II. Dist., 3. Qu. 1-6; Occam: in libr. I.\nsentent. Dist. II. Qu\u00e6st. 6 (Tennemann, Vol. VIII. Section II. pp. 852,\n853.)\n\n[42] Rixner: Handbuch der Geschichte der Philos. Vol. II. p. 110.\n\n[43] Brucker. Hist. crit. phil. T. III. pp. 846-848, 911, 912; Tennemann,\nVol. VIII. Section II. pp. 903, 944, 945, 925, 939, 940; Bul\u00e6us: Hist.\nUnivers. Paris, T. IV. pp. 257, 265.\n\n[44] Tennemann, Vol. VIII. Section II. pp. 914-919, 945-947; Bul\u00e6us:\nHist. Univ. Paris. T.V. pp. 706, 739, 740.\n\n[45] Tennemann, Vol. VIII. Section I. p. 61; Cramer, Fortsetzung von\nBossuet, Part V. Vol. II. p. 88.\n\n[46] Tennemann, Vol. VIII. Section I. p. 61; Bul\u00e6us: Hist. Univ. Paris.\nT. I. p. 169.\n\n[47] Rixner: Handbuch d. Gesch. d. Phil. Vol. II. p. 153.\n\n[48] Tennemann, Vol. VIII. Section I, pp. 236, 237.\n\n[49] Brucker. Hist. crit. phil. T. III. p. 878.\n\n[50] Tennemann, Vol. VIII. Section II. pp. 955, 956.\n\n[51] Rixner: Handbuch d. Geschichte d. Philos. Vol. II. p. 157;\nTennemann, Vol. VIII. Section II. p. 964 _seq._; Tiedemann: Geist d.\nspec. Phil. Vol. V. p. 290 _seq._\n\n[52] Tennemann, Vol. VIII. Section II. pp. 824-829.\n\n[53] Rixner: Lehrbuch d. Gesch. d. Philos. Vol. II. p. 126; Tennemann,\nVol. VIII. Section II. pp. 829, 833.\n\n[54] Tennemann, Vol. VIII. Section II. pp. 834-836; Rixner: Handb. d.\nGesch. d. Phil. Vol. II. Appendix, pp. 86-89; Jordanus Brunus Nolanus: De\ncompendiosa architectura et complemento artis Lullii, Sectio II. (Bruni\nscripta, qu\u00e6 latine confecit, omnia; ed. Gfr\u00f6rer, Stuttgardi\u00e6 1835,\nFasciculus II. pp. 243-264).\n\n[55] Buhle: Lehrb. d. Gesch. d. Phil., Part VI. Section I. pp. 125\u2014128;\nTennemann, Vol. IX. pp. 22, 23.\n\n[56] Pomponatius: Tractatus de immortalitate anim\u00e6, c. VII., VIII. p. 35;\nc. IX. pp. 57, 58; c. XII. pp. 89, 90; c. XV. p. 142.\n\n[57] Ficinus: Pro\u0153mium in Plotinum, p. 2, Pomponatius, l. l. c. III. p.\n9; c. IV. 12; Tennemann, Vol. IX. pp. 65-67.\n\n[58] Bruck. Hist. crit. phil. T. IV. P. I. p. 164.\n\n[59] Brucker. Hist. crit. phil. T. IV. P. I. pp. 44, 45.\n\n[60] Ficinus: Pro\u0153mium in Plotinum, p. 1; Brucker. I. 1, p. 49, 55, 48.\n\n[61] Proclus: Theologia Platonis, Appendix, pp. 503-505; Tennemann, Vol.\nIX. p. 149.\n\n[62] Tennemann, Vol. IX. pp. 164, 165; Tiedemann: Geist d. Spec. Phil.\nVol. V. p. 483; Brucker. Hist. crit. phil. T. IV. P. I. pp. 358, 365,\n366; Rixner: Handbuch d. Gesch. d. Phil. Vol. II. p. 206.\n\n[63] Tennemann, Vol. IX. pp. 228-230; Brucker. 1. 1, p. 721.\n\n[64] Brucker. Hist. crit. phil. T. IV. P. II. pp. 63, 64, 66-68; Buhle:\nLehrb. d. Gesch. d. Phil. Part VI. Section I. pp. 360, 362; Cardanus: De\nvita propria, c. 4, pp. 9-11; Tiedemann, Geist d. spec. Philosophie, Vol.\nV. pp. 563, 564.\n\n[65] Buhle: Lehrb. d. Gesch. d. Phil. Part VI. Section I. pp. 362-365;\nTiedemann, Geist. d. Spec. Phil. Vol. V. p. 565; Brucker. Hist. crit.\nphil. T. IV. P. II. pp. 71-74; Cardanus: De vita propria, c. 26, p. 70.\n\n[66] Cardanus: De genitur. XII. p. 84; Buhle: Lehrbuch d. Gesch. d. Phil.\nPart VI. Section I. pp. 363, 364; Tiedemann: Geist. d. Spec. Phil. Vol.\nV. pp. 564, 565.\n\n[67] Brucker. Hist. crit. phil. T. IV. P. II. pp. 108, 114-120;\nTennemann, Vol. IX. pp. 290-295.\n\n[68] Giordano Bruno: De la causa, principio et uno, Venetia 1584, 8,\nwhich was certainly not really printed at Venice, since both it and\nthe following work, De l\u2019infinito, Universo e Mondi, Venetia 1584, 8,\nappeared at Paris. Both these works are dialogues.\n\n[69] Brucker. Hist. crit. phil. T. IV. P. II. pp. 15-29.\n\n[70] Lectures of 1829-30.\n\n[71] Opere di Giordano Bruno Nolano, ora per la prima volta raccolte e\npubblicate da Adolfo Wagner in due volumi. Lipsia, Weidmann 1830.\n\n[72] Cf. Opere di Giordano Bruno pubbl. da Wagner. Introduzione, pp.\nxxiv., xxv.\n\n[73] v. Hegel\u2019s Werke, Vol. VII. Section II. p. 10.\n\n[74] Lectures of 1805-6.\n\n[75] Jacobi: Werke, Vol. IV. Section II. pp. 7-18; Tennemann, Vol. IX.\npp. 391-394; Giordano Bruno: De la causa, principio et uno, Dialog. II.\n(Opere pubbl. da Ad. Wagner, Vol. I.), pp. 235-243.\n\n[76] Jacobi: Werke, Vol. IV. Section II. pp. 19-23, 28-31; Tennemann,\nVol. IX. pp. 394-396, 398, 399; Giordano Bruno: De la causa, principio et\nuno, Dial. III. pp. 251-257; Dial. IV. pp. 269-274.\n\n[77] Jacobi: Werke, Vol. IV. Section II. pp. 23-25; Tennemann, Vol. IX.\np. 396; Giordano Bruno: De la causa, principio et uno, Dial. III. pp.\n260, 261.\n\n[78] Jacobi: Werke, Vol. IV. Section II. pp. 25, 26; Tennemann, Vol. IX.\np. 397; Giordano Bruno: De la causa, principio et uno, Dial. III. p. 261.\n\n[79] Jacobi: Werke, Vol. IV. Section II. pp. 32, 45; Tennemann, Vol. IX.\npp. 399, 403, 404; Giordano Bruno: De la causa, principio et uno, Dial.\nIV. p. 275; Dial. V. p. 291.\n\n[80] Jordanus Brunus: De Minimo, pp. 10, 16-18; Jacobi: Werke, Vol. IV.\nSection II. pp. 34-39; Tennemann, Vol. IX. pp. 400-402; Giordano Bruno:\nDe la causa, principio et uno, Dial. V. pp. 281-284.\u2014On this opposition\nof the minimum and the maximum Bruno wrote several special works,\nfor example, De triplici Minimo et Mensura libri V. Francofurti apud\nWechelium et Fischer, 1591, 8; the text is hexameters, with notes and\nscholia; Buhle gives the title as De Minimo libri V. Another work bears\nthe title: De Monade, Numero et figura liber; Item De Innumerabilibus,\nImmenso et Infigurabili: seu de Universo et Mundis libri VIII. Francof.\n1591, 8.\n\n[81] Bruno wrote many such topico-mnemonic works, of which the earliest\nare the following: Philotheus Jordanus Brunus Nolanus De compendiosa\narchitectura et complemento artis Lullii, Paris. ap. \u00c6g. Gorbinum, 1582.\n12.\u2014J. Brunus Nol. De Umbris idearum, implicantibus Artem qu\u00e6rendi, &c.,\nParis. ap. eund. 1582. 8. The second part has the title: Ars memori\u00e6.\u2014Ph.\nJord. Bruni Explicatio XXX sigillorum &c. Quibus adjectus est Sigillus\nsigillorum, &c. It is evident from the dedication that Bruno published\nthis work in England, therefore between 1582 and 1585.\u2014Jordanus Brunus\nDe Lampade combinatoria Lulliana, Viteberg\u00e6 1587. 8. In the same place\nhe wrote De Progressu et lampade venatoria Logicorum, Anno 1587, which\nhe dedicated to the Chancellor of the Wittenberg University.\u2014Jordanus\nBrunus De Specierum scrutinio et lampade combinatoria Raym. Lullii,\nPrag\u00e6, exc. Georg. Nigrinus 1588. 8; also printed in the works of Raymund\nLullius.\u2014Also De imaginum, signorum et idearum compositione Libri III.\nFrancofurti ap. Jo. Wechel. et Petr. Fischer. 1591. 8.\n\n[82] Buhle: Geschichte der neuern Philos. Vol. II. Section II. p. 715\n(717); Jordanus Brunus: De compendiosa architectura et complemento artis\nLullii (Jordani Bruni Nolani scripta, qu\u00e6 latine confecit, omnia. ed. A.\nFr. Gfr\u00f6rer, Stuttgard, 1835, Fasc. II.), c. 1, p. 238.\n\n[83] Buhle: Geschichte der neuern Philos. Vol. II. Section II. pp. 717,\n718 (719, a-718, b); Jord. Brunus: De compend. architect. c. 5, p. 239.\n\n[84] Buhle: Gesch. d. neuern Philos. Vol. II. Section II. p. 717 (719,\na); Jord. Brun. De compend. architect. c. 2, 3, pp. 238, 239.\n\n[85] Buhle: Gesch. d. neuern Philos. Vol. II. Section II. pp. 723, 724;\nJordani Bruni De Umbris idearum (Jord. Bruni Nolani scripta, ed. A. Fr.\nGfr\u00f6rer, Fasc. II.): Triginta intentiones umbrarum, Intentio I-IV. pp.\n300-302.\n\n[86] Buhle: Gesch. d. neuern Philos. Vol. II. Section II. pp. 724-726;\nJordanus Brunus: De Umbris idearum, Intentio V-IX. pp. 302-305.\n\n[87] Buhle: Gesch. d. neuern Philos. Vol. II. Section II. pp. 727, 731;\nJordanus Brunus: De Umbris idearum, Intentio XXI. p. 310; De triginta\nidearum conceptibus: Conceptus X. p. 319.\n\n[88] Buhle: Gesch. d. neuern Philos. Vol. II. Section II. pp. 730-734;\nJordani Bruni De Umbris idearum: De triginta idearum conceptibus,\nConceptus VII. X. XIII. XXVI. pp. 318-320, 323, 324.\n\n[89] Buhle: Gesch. d. neuern Philos. Vol. II. Section II. p. 745; Jordani\nBruni Explicatio triginta sigillorum: Sigillus Sigillorum, P. II. \u00a7 11.\n\n[90] Buhle: Gesch. d. neuern Philos. Vol. II. Section II. p. 734; cf.\nJordan. Brun. De Umbris Idearum: Ars Memori\u00e6, I.-XI. pp. 326-330.\n\n[91] Buhle: Gesch. d. neuern Philos. Vol. II. Section II. pp. 734, 735;\nJordan. Brun. De Umbris Idearum: Ars Memori\u00e6, XII. pp. 330, 331.\n\n[92] Brucker. Hist. crit. phil. T. IV. P. II. pp. 671-677; Buhle: Gesch.\nd. neuern Phil. Vol. II. Section II. pp. 866-869.\n\n[93] Buhle: Lehrbuch. d. Gesch. d. Phil. Part VI. Section I. pp. 410-415;\nBrucker. Hist. crit. phil. T. IV. P. II. pp. 677-680; Buhle: Gesch. d.\nneuern Philos. Vol. II. Section II. pp. 870-878.\n\n[94] Buhle: Gesch. d. neuern Philos. Vol. II. Sec. II. pp. 670-680;\nBrucker. Hist. crit. phil. T. IV. P. II. pp. 548-562.\n\n[95] Buhle: Gesch. d. neuern Philos. Vol. II. Section II. pp. 950-954;\nBrucker. Hist. crit. phil. T. IV. P. II. pp. 91-95.\n\n[96] The _Quarterly Review_, Vol. XVII., April, 1817, p. 53.\n\n[97] Bacon, De augmentis scientiarum, II. c. 1 (Lugd. Batavor, 1652. 12),\npp. 108-110 (Operum omnium, pp. 43, 44, Lipsi\u00e6, 1694)\n\n[98] Ibidem, c. 2, p. 111 (Operum, p. 44); c. 4, pp. 123, 124 (p. 49), c.\n11, pp. 145-147 (pp. 57, 58).\n\n[99] Bacon. De augmentis scientiarum, IV. c. 2, pp. 294, 295 (p. 213)\n(Ellis and Spedding\u2019s translation, Vol. IV. p. 394).\n\n[100] Bacon. Novum Organon, L. I. Aphor. 11-34, pp. 280-282 (Operum).\n\n[101] Bacon. De augm. scient. V. c. 4, p. 358 (p. 137). (Ellis and\nSpedding\u2019s translation. Vol. IV. p. 428.)\n\n[102] Bacon. De augmentis scientiarum, V. c. 2, pp. 320, 321 (pp. 122,\n123).\n\n[103] Bacon. Novum Organon, L. I. Aphor. 105, p. 313; De augmentis\nscientiarum, V. c. 2, pp. 326, 327 (pp. 124, 125).\n\n[104] The _Quarterly Review_, Vol. XVII., April, 1817, pp. 50, 51: cf.\nBacon silva silvarum sive historia naturalis, Cent. IV., Sect. 326, 327\n(Operum, pp. 822, 823).\n\n[105] Bacon. De augmentis scientiarum, III. c. 5, pp. 245, 246 (p. 95).\n\n[106] Ibid. IV. c. 2, p. 293 (p. 112).\n\n[107] The _Quarterly Review_, Vol. XVII., April, 1817, pp. 51, 52; cf.\nBacon. De augmentis scientiarum, III. c. 3, 4, pp. 200-206 (pp. 78-80).\n\n[108] Bacon. Novum Organon, L. II. Aphor. 2. (Ellis and Spedding\u2019s\ntranslation, Vol. IV. p. 119.)\n\n[109] Bacon. Novum Organon, L. II. Aphor. 2; cf. the _Quarterly Review_,\nVol. XVII. April, 1817, p. 52.\n\n[110] Bacon. De augmentis scientiarum, III. c. 4; p. 237 (p. 92).\n\n[111] Bacon. De augm. scient. III. c. 4, p. 239 (p. 92).\n\n[112] Bacon. De augmentis scientiarum, I. p. 46 (p. 19); III. c. 4, pp.\n211-213 (pp. 82, 83); Novum Organon, L. I. Aphor. 85, p. 304.\n\n[113] Bacon. De augmentis scientiarum, III. c. 4, pp. 231-234 (pp. 89,\n90).\n\n[114] The _Quarterly Review_, Vol. XVII. April, 1817, p. 52.\n\n[115] Bacon. Novum Organon, L. II. Aphor. 17, pp. 345, 346.\n\n[116] Bacon. Novum Organon, L II Aphor. II pp. 325, 326 (Tennemann, Vol.\nX. pp. 35, 36); Lib I. Aphor. 51, p. 286, L. II Aphor. 9; Aphor. 3, p.\n326.\n\n[117] Bacon. Novum Organon, L II. Aphor. 35, p. 366.\n\n[118] The _Quarterly Review_, Vol. XVII. April, 1817, p. 52. Cf. Bacon.\nDe augmentis scientiarum, III. c. 4, p. 236 (p. 91).\n\n[119] Jacob B\u00f6hme\u2019s Leben und Schriften (in his Works, Hamburg, 1715, 4),\nNo. I. \u00a7 18, pp. 11, 12; No. V., \u00a7 2, p. 54 and the title-page; No. I. \u00a7\n57, pp. 27, 28.\n\n[120] Jacob B\u00f6hme\u2019s Leben und Schriften, No. I. 2-4, pp. 3, 4; \u00a7 6, 7, p.\n5; \u00a7 10, 11, pp. 7, 8; \u00a7 28, 29, pp. 17, 18.\n\n[121] Jacob B\u00f6hme\u2019s Leben und Schriften, No. VI. \u00a7 3-8, pp. 81-87; No. I.\n\u00a7 12-17, pp. 8-11.\n\n[122] Theosophische Sendbriefe, 47th Letter (Werke, Hamburg, 1715, 4), p.\n3879.\n\n[123] Trostschrift von vier Complexionen, \u00a7 43-63, pp. 1602-1607.\n\n[124] Act I. Scene 2.\n\n[125] Von Christi Testament der heiligen Taufe, Book II. chap. i. \u00a7 4-5,\npp. 2653, 2654.\n\n[126] Morgenr\u00f6the im Aufgang, Preface, \u00a7 84, 85, 88, p. 18.\n\n[127] Von wahrer Gelassenheit, chap. ii. \u00a7 9, 10, p. 1673.\n\n[128] Von den drei Principien g\u00f6ttlichen Wesens, chap. x. \u00a7 42, p. 470.\n\n[129] Von der Gnadenwahl, chap. i. \u00a7 3-10, pp. 2408-2410; chap. ii. \u00a7 9,\np. 2418; \u00a7 19, 20, p. 2420; Schl\u00fcssel der vornehmsten Puncten und W\u00f6rter,\n\u00a7 2, p. 3668; \u00a7 145, 146, pp. 3696, 3697; Morgenr\u00f6the, chap. iv. \u00a7 9-21,\npp. 49-51; chap. xi. \u00a7 47, pp. 126, 127, etc.\n\n[130] Morgenr\u00f6the, chap. i. \u00a7 3-7, 9-24, pp. 23-27; chap. ii. \u00a7 38-40,\npp. 34, 35; \u00a7 i. p. 28 [see Law\u2019s translation].\n\n[131] Morgenr\u00f6the, chap. 11. \u00a7 8, 14-18, 31-33, pp. 29-34 [see Law\u2019s\ntranslation].\n\n[132] Morgenr\u00f6the, chap. iii. \u00a7 2, 8-11, pp. 36-38.\n\n[133] Morgenr\u00f6the, chap. iv. \u00a7 5, 6, p. 48; chap. viii. \u00a7 15-chap. xi. \u00a7\n46, pp. 78-126.\n\n[134] Morgenr\u00f6the, chap. iii. \u00a7 18, p. 40; chap. x. \u00a7 54, p. 115; \u00a7 39,\n40, p. 112; chap. xi. \u00a7 7-12, pp. 119, 120.\n\n[135] Von g\u00f6ttlicher Beschaulichkeit, chap. i. \u00a7 8-10, p. 1739.\n\n[136] Von g\u00f6ttlicher Beschaulichkeit, chap. iii. \u00a7 1-3, pp. 1755, 1756.\n\n[137] Morgenr\u00f6the, chap. iii. \u00a7 33-35, p. 44 (cf. Rixner: Handbuch d.\nGesch. d. Philos. Vol. II. Appendix, p. 106, \u00a7 7).\n\n[138] Morgenr\u00f6the, chap. iii. \u00a7 15, 18-22, pp. 39-41.\n\n[139] Von g\u00f6ttlicher Beschaulichkeit, chap. iii. \u00a7 4, 5, p. 1756, \u00a7 12,\np. 1758; Morgenr\u00f6the, chap. xii. \u00a7 99-107, p. 149, 150; chap. xiii. \u00a7\n92-104, 31-52, pp. 166-168, 157-160; chap. xiv. \u00a7 36, p. 178; Von den\ndrei Principien g\u00f6ttlichen Wesens, chap. iv. \u00a7 69, p. 406; chap. xv. \u00a7 5,\npp. 543, 544.\n\n[140] Morgenr\u00f6the, chap. xiii. \u00a7 53-64, pp. 160-162; Vierzig Fragen von\nder Seele, XII. \u00a7 4, p. 1201; Von sechs theosophischen Puncten, V. 7,\n\u00a7 3, p. 1537; Von wahrer Gelassenheit, chap. i. \u00a7 1-7, pp. 1661-1663;\nVon g\u00f6ttlicher Beschaulichkeit, chap. i. \u00a7 23-26, pp. 1742, 1743; Von\nder Geburt und Bezeichnung aller Wesen, chap. xvi. \u00a7 49, p. 2391; Vom\n\u00fcbersinnlichen Leben, \u00a7 41, 42, p. 1696 [see Law\u2019s translation].\n\n[141] Von der Menschwerdung Jesu Christi, Pt. I. chap. v. \u00a7 14, p. 1323;\nVon den drei Principien g\u00f6ttlichen Wesens, chap. x. \u00a7 43, p. 470.\n\n[142] Von g\u00f6ttlicher Beschaulichkeit, chap. iii. \u00a7 11, p. 1757.\n\n[143] _Infra_, p. 213.\n\n[144] Morgenr\u00f6the, chap. viii. \u00a7 15-20, pp. 78, 79; chap. x. \u00a7 38, p.\n112; chap. xiii. \u00a7 69-91, pp. 162-166; chap xi. \u00a7 5-13, pp. 119, 120.\n\n[145] 177 Fragen von g\u00f6ttlicher Offenbarung, III. \u00a7 2-5, 10-16, pp.\n3591-3595.\n\n[146] Von g\u00f6ttlicher Beschaulichkeit, chap. iii. \u00a7 12, 14, pp. 1757, 1758.\n\n[147] Rixner: Handbuch d. Gesch d. Philos. Vol. II. Appendix, p. 108, \u00a7 5\n(from Boehme\u2019s Morgenr\u00f6the, chap. ii. \u00a7 16, pp. 30, 31, \u00a7 33, p. 34).\n\n[148] Morgenr\u00f6the, chap. xxiii. \u00a7 11, 12, pp. 307, 308 (cf. Rixner:\nHandb. d. Gesch. d. Philos. Vol. II. Appendix, p. 108, \u00a7 5),\nTheosophische Sendbriefe, I. \u00a7 5, p. 3710.\n\n[149] Morgenr\u00f6the, chap. iii. \u00a7 29, 30, p. 43 [see Law\u2019s translation].\n\n[150] Von g\u00f6ttlicher Beschaulichkeit, chap. iii. \u00a7 13, p. 1758;\nMorgenr\u00f6the, chap. x. \u00a7 55, 60, 58, pp. 115, 116 (chap. xi. \u00a7 4, p. 118).\n\n[151] Morgenr\u00f6the, chap. iii. \u00a7 36-38, 47, pp. 44-46 [see Law\u2019s\ntranslation].\n\n[152] Von g\u00f6ttlicher Beschaulichkeit, chap. i. \u00a7 33, p. 1745; chap. ii. \u00a7\n29, p. 1754, chap. iii. \u00a7 15, 18-24, 27, 29, pp. 1758-1761; Von den drei\nPrincipien g\u00f6ttlichen Wesens, chap. viii \u00a7 5, p. 433, Mysterium Magnum,\noder Erklarung des ersten Buchs Mosis, chap xix \u00a7 28, pp. 2830, 2831.\n\n[153] Von g\u00f6ttlicher Beschaulichkeit, chap. i. \u00a7 23-39, pp. 1742-1746;\nchap. ii. \u00a7 1-13, 15-30, pp. 1747-1754.\n\n[154] Brucker. Hist. crit. phil. T. IV. P. II. pp. 203-217; Cartes. De\nMethodo, I-II (Amstelod. 1672, 4), pp. 2-7 (\u0152uvres compl\u00e8tes de Descartes\npubli\u00e9es par Victor Cousin, T. I.), pp. 125-133; Notes sur l\u2019\u00e9loge de\nDescartes par Thomas (\u0152uvres de Descartes publi\u00e9es par Cousin, T. I.), p.\n83, et suiv.; Tennemann, Vol. X. pp. 210-216.\n\n[155] Spinoza: Principia philosophi\u00e6 Cartesian\u00e6 (Benedicti de Spinoza\nOpera, ed. Paulus. Jen\u00e6, 1802, T. I.), p. 2.\n\n[156] Cartes. Principia philosophi\u00e6, P. I. \u00a7 1-6 (Amstelod. 1672, 4), pp.\n1, 2 (\u0152uvres, T. III. pp. 63-66); cf. Meditationes de prima philosophia,\nI. (Amstelod. 1685, 4), pp. 5-8 (\u0152uvres, T. I. pp. 235-245); De Methodo,\nIV. p. 20 (pp. 156-158).\n\n[157] Cartes. Principia philosophi\u00e6, P. I. \u00a7 7, 8, p. 2 (pp. 66, 67).\n\n[158] Cartes. De Methodo, IV. pp. 20, 21 (p. 158); Spinoza: Principia\nphilosophi\u00e6 Cartes, p. 14.\n\n[159] Cartes. De Methodo, IV. p. 21 (p. 159); Epistol. T. I. ep. 118\n(Amstelod. 1682, 4), p. 379 (\u0152uvres, T. IX. pp. 442, 443).\n\n[160] Cartes. Responsiones ad sec. objectiones, adjunct\u00e6 Meditationibus\nde prima philosophia, p. 74 (p. 427); Spinoza: Principia philosophi\u00e6\nCartes., pp. 4, 5.\n\n[161] Appendix ad Cartes. Meditationes, continens objectiones quint. p. 4\n(\u0152uvres, T. II. pp. 92, 93).\n\n[162] Cartes. Principia philosophi\u00e6, P I \u00a7 9, pp. 2, 3 (pp. 67, 68).\n\n[163] Ibid. P I \u00a7 11, p. 3 (pp. 69, 70)\n\n[164] Cartes. Respons. ad sec. object.: Rationes more geometr. dispos.,\nPostulata, p. 86 (pp. 454, 455); Spinoza: Principia philosophi\u00e6, Cartes.,\np. 13.\n\n[165] Cartes. Princip. philos., P. IV. \u00a7 196, pp. 215, 216 (pp. 507-509);\nMeditation. VI. p. 38 (pp. 329, 330); Spinoza: Principia philos. Cartes.,\npp. 2, 3.\n\n[166] Cartes. Respons. ad sec. object.: Rat. more geom. dispos.,\nAxiomata V., VI. p. 86 (p. 453), et Propositio IV. p. 91 (pp. 464, 465);\nMeditationes, II. pp. 9-14 (pp. 246-262).\n\n[167] Cartes. De Methodo, IV. p. 21 (pp. 158, 159); Spinoza: Principia\nphilosoph. Cartes., p. 14.\n\n[168] Cartes. Principia philosophi\u00e6, P. I. \u00a7 13, pp. 3, 4 (pp. 71, 72).\n\n[169] Cartes. Respons. ad sec. object. Rationes more geom. dispos.,\nDef. I. p. 85 (pp. 451, 452), et Proposit. IV. p. 91 (pp. 464, 465),\nMeditationes, III. pp. 15-17 (pp. 263-268).\n\n[170] Cartes. Principia philos., P. I. \u00a7 20, p. 6 (pp. 76, 77);\nMeditationes, III. pp. 17-25 (pp. 268-292); De Methodo, IV. pp. 21, 22\n(pp. 159-162); Spinoza: Principia philos. Cartes., p. 10.\n\n[171] Cartes. Principia philos. P. I., \u00a7 14, p. 4 (pp. 72, 73.)\n\n[172] Cartes. Resp. ad sec. obj.: Rat. more geom. disp., Ax. III.-VI.,\nX., Prop. I. pp. 88, 89 (pp. 458-461); Spinoza: Princ. phil. Cart., pp.\n14-17.\n\n[173] Spinoza: Princip. philos. Cart., p. 20; Cartesii Resp. ad sec.\nobj.: Rat. more geom. dispos., Propos. II. p. 89 (pp. 461, 462).\n\n[174] Cartes. Principia philosophi\u00e6, P. I. \u00a7. 15, 16, 18, 24, pp. 4, 5, 7\n(pp. 73-75, 78, 79).\n\n[175] Cartes. Principia philosophi\u00e6, P. I. \u00a7 24-26, p. 7 (pp. 79, 80).\n\n[176] Ibid. P. I. \u00a7 29, 30, 35, 36, 38, 43, pp. 8-11 (pp. 81-86, 89);\nMeditationes, IV. pp. 25, 26 (pp. 293-297).\n\n[177] In the Lectures of 1829-1830 the philosophy of Malebranche is\ninserted here. (Editor\u2019s note).\n\n[178] Cartes. Principia philos. P. I. \u00a7 22, 23, pp. 6, 7 (pp. 77, 78);\nResponsiones quart\u00e6, p. 133 (p. 70); Spinoza: Princip. philos. Cart. pp.\n30, 31, 36, 38; Buhle: Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, Vol. III. Sec.\nI. pp. 17, 18.\n\n[179] Cartes. Principia philos. P. I. \u00a7 48, p. 12 (p. 92); Meditationes,\nIII. p. 17 (pp. 268, 269).\n\n[180] Cartes. Principia philosophi\u00e6, P. I. \u00a7 49, p. 13 (p. 93).\n\n[181] Ibid. P. I. \u00a7 48, p. 12 (p. 92).\n\n[182] Cartes. Princip. philosophi\u00e6, P. I. \u00a7 51, p. 14 (p. 95)\n\n[183] Ibid. P. I. \u00a7 48, pp. 12, 13 (p. 92); \u00a7 60, p. 16 (p. 101); \u00a7 52,\np. 14 (p. 95); Ration. more geometr. dispos., Definit. X. p. 86 (p. 454).\n\n[184] Cartes. Principia philosophi\u00e6, P. I. \u00a7 53, 54, p. 14 (pp. 96, 97).\n\n[185] Cartes. Princip. philos., P. I. \u00a7 66-74, pp. 19-22 (pp. 107-117);\nP. II. \u00a7 4, p. 25 (pp. 123, 124).\n\n[186] Cartes. Principia philos. P. II. \u00a7 16, 20, 37, 38, pp. 29-31, 38,\n39 (pp. 133, 134, 137, 138, 152-154).\n\n[187] Buhle: Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, Vol. III. Sec. I. p. 19;\ncf. Cartes. Princip. phil., P. III. \u00a7 46, 47, p. 65 (pp. 210-212).\n\n[188] Cf. Cartes. Principia philos., P. II. \u00a7 64, p. 49 (pp. 178, 179).\n\n[189] Cartes. Principia philos., P. III. \u00a7 5-42, 46 _sqq._ pp. 51-63, 65\n_sqq._ (pp. 183-208, p. 210 _et suiv._); P. IV. \u00a7 1 _sqq._, 69, 109-115,\np. 137 _sqq._, 116, 178-180 (p. 330 _et suiv._, 388, 420-425).\n\n[190] Cartes. Principia philosoph, P. I. \u00a7 37, 39-41, pp. 10, 11 (pp.\n85-88).\n\n[191] Cartes. De Methodo, V. pp. 35, 36 (pp. 185-189).\n\n[192] Cartes. De Methodo, V. p. 29 (173, 174).\n\n[193] Collectanea de vita B. de Spinoza (addita Operibus ed. Paulus Jen\u00e6\n1802-1803, T. II.), pp. 593-604, 612-628 (Spinoza Epist. LIII-LIV. in\nOper. ed. Paul. T. I. pp. 638-640) 642-665; Spinoz\u00e6 Oper. ed. Paul. T.\nII. Pr\u00e6f. p. XVI.\n\n[194] Collectanea de vita B. de Spinoza, pp. 629-641; Spinoz\u00e6 Ethic.\n(Oper. T. II.) pp. 1, 3 et not., 33.\n\n[195] Spinoz. Ethices, P. I. Prop. V. VIII. X. et Schol., XIII. pp.\n37-39, 41, 42, 45.\n\n[196] Spinoz. Ethices, P. I. Prop. XIV. et Coroll. II. Prop. XV. XVI. et\nCoroll. I. pp. 46, 51.\n\n[197] Spinoz. Ethices, P. I. Prop. XVII., Coroll. I., II., et Schol,\nProp. XVIII., Prop. XX, et Coroll. I. Prop. XXI., XXVI., XXVII., XXIX.,\nXXXII., XXXIII. Schol. II. pp. 51-57, 59, 61, 63, 67, 68.\n\n[198] Spinoz. Ethices, P. II. Prop. I., II., VII. et Schol. pp. 78, 79,\n82, 83.\n\n[199] Spinoz. Ethic. P. I. Prop. XXX-XXXII. pp. 62, 63; P. III. Defin.\nIII. p. 132; Prop. XI. Schol., p. 141.\n\n[200] Spinoz. Ethices, P. II. Prop. XI. Demonst. et Coroll. pp. 86, 87;\nDefin. IV. pp. 77, 78.\n\n[201] Dictionnaire historique et critique (\u00e9dition de 1740, T. IV.),\nArticle Spinosa, p. 261, Note N. No. IV.\n\n[202] Spinoz. Ethices, P. II. Prop. XII., XIII. et Schol. Prop. XIV.,\nXXIII., V. pp. 87-89, 95, 102, 80, 81.\n\n[203] Spinoz. Ethices, P. II. Prop. XI. (Axiom I. p. 78) et Demonstr.\nProp. X. pp. 85-87; Prop. VI. p. 81; P. III. Prop. II. pp. 133, 134.\n\n[204] Spinoz. Ethices, P. III. Prop. VI.-VIII. Prop. IX. Schol. pp. 139,\n140; P. II. Prop. XLIX. Coroll. p. 123; P. III. Prop. II. Schol. p. 136;\nP. V. Prop. III. Demonst. et Coroll. pp. 272, 273.\n\n[205] Spinoz. Ethices, P. III. Prop. I. p. 132; Prop. III. p. 138; P. IV.\nPr\u00e6f. p. 199; P. III. Prop. XI. Schol. pp. 141, 142; P. IV. Prop. II. p.\n205; P. III. Prop. III. et Schol. p. 138.\n\n[206] Spinoz. Ethices, P. V. Prop. XXXVI. Schol. Prop. XXXVII. Demonstr.,\nProp. XXXVIII. et Schol. pp. 293-295.\n\n[207] Spinoz. Ethices, P. II. Prop. XL. Schol. II. pp. 113, 114.\n\n[208] Spinoz. Ethices, P. II. Prop. XLIV. et Coroll. II. pp. 117, 118;\nProp. XLV. p. 119; P. V. Prop. XXX. p. 289; P. II. Prop. XXXII. p. 107.\n\n[209] Spinoz. Ethices, P. V. Prop. XIV. p. 280; Prop. VI. p. 275; Prop.\nXXVII. pp. 287, 288; Prop. XXXII. Coroll.; Prop. XXXV. pp. 291, 292.\n\n[210] Buhle: Gesch. d. neuern Philosophie, Vol. III. Sec. 2, pp. 430, 431.\n\n[211] Malebranche: De la recherche de la v\u00e9rit\u00e9 (Paris, 1736), T. II.\nL. III. Part I. chap. i. pp. 4-6; T. I. L. I. chap. i. pp. 6, 7; P. II.\nchap. ii. pp. 66-68; chap. iii. p. 72; chap. iv. p. 84; chap. v. p. 92;\nchap. vi. pp. 95, 96.\n\n[212] Malebranche: De la recherche de la v\u00e9rit\u00e9, T. II. L. III. Part II.\nchap. vi. pp. 100-102.\n\n[213] Malebranche: De la recherche de la v\u00e9rit\u00e9, T. II. L. III. P. II.\nchap. vi. pp. 103-107, 109-111.\n\n[214] Buhle: Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, Vol. IV. Sec. 1, pp.\n238-241; Quarterly Review, April, 1817, pp. 70, 71; The Works of John\nLocke (London, 1812), Vol. I.: The Life of the Author, pp. xix.-xxxix.\n\n[215] Locke: An Essay concerning human Understanding (The Works of John\nLocke, Vol. I.), Book I. chap. ii. \u00a7 1; chap. iii. \u00a7 15, \u00a7 22.\n\n[216] Locke: An Essay concerning human Understanding (Vol. I) Book I.\nchap. ii. \u00a7 2-9, \u00a7 27; chap. iii. \u00a7 1-15.\n\n[217] Locke: An Essay concerning human Understanding (Vol. I.) Bk. II.\nchap. i. \u00a7 1, 2.\n\n[218] Locke: An Essay concerning human Understanding (Vol. I.), Bk. II.\nchap. i. \u00a7 2-5.\n\n[219] v. Schiller\u2019s Xenien.\n\n[220] Locke: An Essay concerning human Understanding (Vol I.), Bk. II.,\nchap. ii. \u00a7 2, not.; chap. xii. \u00a7 1; chap. xxii. \u00a7 2; chap. i. \u00a7 10-14.\n\n[221] Locke: An Essay concerning human Understanding (Vol. I), Bk. II.\nchap. xiii. \u00a7 2; chap. iv. \u00a7 2.\n\n[222] Ibidem (Vol. I.), Bk. II. chap. xiv. \u00a7 3.\n\n[223] Locke: An Essay concerning human Understanding (Vol. II.), Bk. II.\nchap. xxiii. \u00a7 1, 2.\n\n[224] Ibidem (Vol. I.), Bk. II. chap. xxi. \u00a7 1.\n\n[225] Ibidem (Vol. II.), Bk. II. chap. xxvi. \u00a7 1.\n\n[226] Ibidem (Vol. I.), Bk. II. chap xxi. \u00a7 7.\n\n[227] Ibidem (Vol. I.), Bk. II. chap. xiii. \u00a7 17, 18.\n\n[228] Locke: An Essay concerning human Understanding (Vol. I.), Bk. II.\nchap. viii. \u00a7 9-26.\n\n[229] Locke: An Essay concerning human Understanding (Vol. II.), Bk. III.\nchap. iii. \u00a7 6; \u00a7 13, 15.\n\n[230] Brucker. Histor. critic. philos. T. IV. P. 2, pp. 731-736, 743-745.\n\n[231] Hug. Grot. De jure belli ac pacis, B. III. chap. xi. \u00a7 13-16 (Ed.\nGronov. Lipsi\u00e6, 1758, 8vo), pp. 900-905; chap. iv. \u00a7 10, pp. 792, 793.\n\n[232] Buhle: Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, Vol. III. Sec. 1, pp.\n223, 224, 227.\n\n[233] Hobbes. Epistola dedicatoria ante Elementor philos Sectionem primam\n(Thom\u00e6 Hobbesii Opera philosophica, qu\u00e6 latine scripsit omnia, Amstelod,\n1668, 4to), pp. 1, 2.\n\n[234] Cf. Brucker. Histor. crit. philos. T. IV. P. II. p. 154.\n\n[235] Hobbes, De cive, chap. i. \u00a7 2, 3 (Oper. phil. etc. Amstel. 1668),\npp. 3, 4.\n\n[236] Hobbes, De cive, chap. i. \u00a7 4-6, 12-14, pp. 4-8; Leviathan, chap.\nxiii. (Oper.), pp. 63-66.\n\n[237] Ibidem, chap. v. \u00a7 6-12, pp. 37-38; chap. vi. \u00a7 12-14, pp. 44-46.\n\n[238] Buhle: Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, Vol. IV. Sec. 2, pp.\n519-523; Rixner: Handbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie, Vol. III. p. 29.\n\n[239] Rixner: Handbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie, Vol. III. p. 31;\ncf. Puffendorf. De jure natur\u00e6 et gent. II. 2, \u00a7 5-7 (Francof. ad Moenum,\n1706, 4), pp. 157-161; VII. 1, \u00a7 3-7, pp. 900-909.\n\n[240] Buhle: Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, Vol. IV. Sec. 1, pp. 107,\n108.\n\n[241] Buhle, Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, Vol. IV. p. 115, cf.\nNewtoni Optices. P. III (Londini, 1706, 4) p. 314.\n\n[242] La vie de Mr. Leibnitz par Mr. le Chevalier de Jaucourt (Essais de\nTh\u00e9odic\u00e9e, par Leibnitz, Amsterdam, 1747, T. I.), pp. 1-28, 45, 59-62,\n66-74, 77-80, 87-92, 110-116, 148-151; Brucker. Hist. crit. phil., T. IV.\nP. II. pp. 335-368; Leibnitzii Opera omnia (ed. Dutens), T. II., P. I.\npp. 45, 46.\n\n[243] Vie de Mr. Leibnitz, pp. 134-143; Brucker. Hist. crit. philos. T.\nIV. P. II. pp. 385, 389; Tennemann, vol. xi. pp. 181, 182.\n\n[244] Leibnitzii Opera, T. II. P. I. pp. 32-39.\n\n[245] Ibidem, Principia philosophi\u00e6, pp. 20-31.\n\n[246] cf. Leibnitz: Essais de Th\u00e9odic\u00e9e, T. I. P. I. \u00a7 10, p. 86.\n\n[247] Leibnitz, Principes de la nature et la grace \u00a7 1, p. 32.\n(Recueil de diverses pieces par Des Maiseaux, T. II. p. 485, Principia\nphilosophi\u00e6, \u00a7 1, 2, p. 20.)\n\n[248] Leibnitzii De ipsa natura sive de vi insita actionibusque\ncreaturarum (Oper. T. II. P. II.), \u00a7 11, p. 55, Principia philosophi\u00e6, \u00a7\n3-6, 18, pp. 20-22; Principes de la nature et de la grace, \u00a7 2, p. 32.\n\n[249] Leibnitzii Principia philosophi\u00e6, \u00a7 7, p. 21; Troisi\u00e8me\n\u00e9claircissement du syst\u00e8me de la communication des substances (Oper. T.\nII. P. I.), p. 73 (Recueil, T. II. p. 402).\n\n[250] Leibnitzii Principia philosophi\u00e6, \u00a7 8, 9, p. 21; Oper. T. II. P. I.\npp. 128, 129, \u00a7 4, 5: Il n\u2019y a point deux individus indiscernables. Un\ngentilhomme d\u2019esprit de mes amis, en parlant avec moi en pr\u00e9sence de Mad.\nl\u2019Electrice dans le jardin de Herrenhausen, crut qu\u2019il trouverait bien\ndeux feuilles enti\u00e8rement semblables. Mad. l\u2019Electrice l\u2019en d\u00e9fia, et il\ncourut longtemps en vain pour en chercher. Deux gouttes d\u2019eau ou de lait\nregard\u00e9es par le microscope se trouveront discernables. C\u2019est un argument\ncontre les Atomes (Recueil, T. I. p. 50).\u2014Cf. Hegel\u2019s Werke, Vol. IV. p.\n45.\n\n[251] Leibnitzii Principia philosophi\u00e6, \u00a7 10-16, pp. 21, 22; Principes de\nla nature et de la grace, \u00a7 2, p. 32.\n\n[252] Leibnitzii Principia philosophi\u00e6, \u00a7 19-23, pp. 22, 23; Principes\nde la nature et de la grace, \u00a7 4, pp. 33, 34; Nouveaux essais sur\nl\u2019entendement humain (\u0152uvres philosophiques de Leibnitz par Raspe), Bk.\nII. chap. ix. \u00a7 4, p. 90.\n\n[253] Leibnitzii De anima brutorum (Op. T. II. P. I.), \u00a7 2-4, pp. 230,\n231.\n\n[254] Leibnitzii Oper. T. II. P. I. pp. 214, 215, \u00a7 3; De ipsa natura\nsive de vi insita, \u00a7 11, p. 55; Syst\u00e8me nouveau de la nature et de la\ncommunication des substances (Op. T. II. P. I.), pp. 50, 53.\n\n[255] Leibnitzii Oper. T. II. P. I. pp. 79, 121, 234-237, 280, 295;\nNouveaux essais sur l\u2019entendement humain, Bk. II. chap. xiii. \u00a7 15, 17,\npp. 106, 107.\n\n[256] Leibnitz: Nouveaux essais sur l\u2019entendement humain, Bk. II. chap.\nxii. \u00a7 7, pp. 102, 103; chap. xxi. \u00a7 72, p. 170; chap. xxiv. \u00a7 1, p. 185.\n\n[257] Leibnitzii Oper. T. II. P. I. p. 39; Nouveaux essais sur\nl\u2019entendement humain, Bk. III. chap. vi. \u00a7 24, p. 278; \u00a7 39, p. 290.\n\n[258] Leibnitzii Oper. T. II. P. II. p. 60; Nouveaux essais sur\nl\u2019entendement humain, Bk. II. chap. xxiii. \u00a7 23, p. 181.\n\n[259] Leibnitzii Principia philosophi\u00e6, \u00a7 65-71, p. 28; Principes de la\nnature et de la grace, \u00a7 3, 4, pp. 32, 33.\n\n[260] Leibnitzii Principia philosophi\u00e6. \u00a7 29-31, p. 24; Principes de la\nnature et de la grace, \u00a7 5, p. 34; Essais de Th\u00e9odic\u00e9e, T. I. P. I. \u00a7 44,\np. 115.\n\n[261] Leibnitz. Principes de la nature et de la grace, \u00a7 7, p. 35.\n\n[262] Leibnitz: Principes de la nature et de la grace, \u00a7 8, p. 35;\nPrincipia philosophi\u00e6, \u00a7 43-46, p. 25.\n\n[263] Leibnitz: Essais de Th\u00e9odic\u00e9e, T. I. P. I. \u00a7 6-8, pp. 83-85;\nPrincipes de la nature et de la grace, \u00a7 10, p. 36.\n\n[264] Leibnitz: Essais de Th\u00e9odic\u00e9e, T. I. P. I. \u00a7 20, pp. 96, 97; \u00a7 32,\n33, pp. 106, 107; T. II. P. II. \u00a7 153, pp. 57, 58; \u00a7 378, pp. 256, 257.\n\n[265] Leibnitzii Causa Dei asserta per justitiam ejus (Essais de\nTh\u00e9odic\u00e9e, T. II.), \u00a7 34-39, pp. 385, 386.\n\n[266] Leibnitz: Principes de la nature et de la grace, \u00a73, p. 33; Premier\n\u00e9laircissement du syst\u00e8me de la communication des substances, p. 70.\n\n[267] Leibnitz: Second et troisi\u00e8me \u00e9claircissements du syst\u00e8me de la\ncommunication des substances, pp. 71-73.\n\n[268] Leibnitzii Principia philosophi\u00e6, \u00a7 82, p. 30; Principes de la\nnature et de la grace, \u00a7 11, p. 36.\n\n[269] Leibnitz: Syst\u00e8me nouveau de la nature et de la communication des\nsubstances, pp. 54, 55.\n\n[270] Leibnitzii Principia philosophi\u00e6, \u00a7 90, p. 31; Principes de la\nnature et de la grace, \u00a7 12, 13, pp. 36, 37; \u00a7 15, pp. 37, 38.\n\n[271] Leibnitzii Oper. T. II. P. I. pp. 75, 76.\n\n[272] Leibnitzii Principia philosoph., \u00a7 58-62, p. 27; Oper. T. II. P. I.\npp. 46, 47.\n\n[273] Leibnitz: Essais de Th\u00e9odic\u00e9e, T. I. P. I. \u00a7 9, pp. 85, 86.\n\n[274] Leibnitz: Principes de la nature et de la grace, \u00a7 12,13, pp. 36,\n37; Oper. T. II. P. I. p. 337.\n\n[275] Leibnitz: Essais de Th\u00e9odic\u00e9e, T. II. P. III. \u00a7 291, pp. 184, 185;\nT. I. P. I. \u00a7 50, p. 119.\n\n[276] Buhle: Geschichte der neuern Philosoph., Vol. IV. Sec. II., pp.\n571-582; Tiedemann: Geist der speculativen Philos., Vol. VI. pp. 511-518;\nRixner: Handbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie, Vol. III. \u00a7 79, pp. 195,\n196.\n\n[277] Wolf\u2019s Vern\u00fcnftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des\nMenschen (Halle, 1741), Pt. I. chap. ii. \u00a7 114, 120, pp. 59, 60, 62, 63;\nchap. iv. \u00a7 575-581, 686, pp. 352-359, 425; chap. v. \u00a7 742, p. 463; \u00a7\n926, p. 573; chap vi. \u00a7 928, p. 574, _seq._\n\n[278] Wolff\u2019s Anfangsgr\u00fcnde aller mathematischen Wissenschaften, Pt. I.:\nAnfangsgr\u00fcnde der Baukunst, Pt. II. Prop. 8, p. 414; Problem 22, pp. 452,\n453; Pt. II.: Anfangsgr\u00fcnde der Fortification, Pt. I. p. 570.\n\n[279] In the lectures of 1825-1826 and 1829-1830 Berkeley was passed\nover by Hegel; in both courses Hume follows directly after the Scottish\nand French philosophers, and thus comes immediately before Kant; in the\ncourse of 1825-1826 the French philosophy precedes the Scottish also.\n\n[280] Nachrichten von dem Leben und den Schriften des Bischofs Berkeley\n(in Berkeley\u2019s philosoph. Werk. Pt. I. Leipzig, 1781), pp. 1, 45, Buhle:\nGeschichte der neuern Philosophie, Vol. V Sect. 1, pp. 86-90.\n\n[281] Buhle: Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, Vol V. pp. 90, 91; The\nWorks of George Berkeley, Prof. Fraser\u2019s edition (Dialogues between Hylas\nand Philonous), Vol. I. p. 264, _seq._ _et passim_.\n\n[282] Buhle, Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, Vol. V. Sect. 1, pp. 92,\n93; The Works of George Berkeley, Vol. I. p. 279 _seq._\n\n[283] Buhle, _ibidem_, pp. 91, 92; Berkeley, _ibidem_, pp. 288 _seq._,\n300 _seq._ _et passim_.\n\n[284] Buhle, _ibidem_, pp. 93, 94; Berkeley, _ibidem_, pp. 289, 308,\n_seq._\n\n[285] Buhle: Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, Vol. V. Sect. 1, pp. 91,\n95; The Works of George Berkeley, Vol. I. pp. 308, 335.\n\n[286] Buhle, _ibidem_, pp. 96-99; Berkeley, _ibidem_, p. 325, _seq._ _et\npassim_.\n\n[287] Cf. Berkeley, _ibidem_, _passim_.\n\n[288] Buhle: Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, Vol. V. Sect. 1, pp.\n193-200.\n\n[289] Tennemann\u2019s Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie von Wendt\n(Leipzig, 1829), \u00a7 370, pp. 439, 440; Hume: Essays and Treatises on\nseveral subjects, Vol. III. containing an Inquiry concerning human\nunderstanding (London, 1770), Sect. 2, pp. 21, 22, Sect. 4, P. I. p. 42,\nTennemann, Vol. XI pp. 433, 434.\n\n[290] Hume: Essays and Treatises on several subjects, Vol III. Not. A,\npp. 283, 284.\n\n[291] Tennemann\u2019s Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie von Wendt, \u00a7\n370, p. 440; Hume, Essays and Treatises on several subjects, Vol. III.\nSect. 4, Pt. I. pp. 43-45; Sect. 5, pp. 66, 67; Buhle: Geschichte der\nneuern Philosophie, Vol. V. Sect. 1, pp. 204, 205; Tennemann, Vol. XI.\npp. 435, 436.\n\n[292] Hume: Essays and Treatises on several subjects, Vol. III. Sect.\nvii. Pt. 1, pp. 102, 103; Pt. 2, pp. 108, 109; Sect. viii. pp. 118, 119.\n\n[293] Hume: Essays and Treatises on several subjects, Vol. IV. containing\nan Inquiry concerning the principles of morals, Sect. 1, p. 4; Appendix\nI. p. 170.\n\n[294] Buhle: Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, Vol. V. Sect. 1, pp. 230,\n231; cf. Hume, _ibidem_, Vol. III. Sect. 12, P. II. p. 221; Vol. IV.; An\nInquiry, &c., Sect. 4, pp. 62-65; A dialogue, pp. 235, 236, &c., &c.\n\n[295] Hume: Essays and Treatises on several subjects, Vol. III. Sect. 12,\nPt. I. pp. 217, 218; Not. N. pp. 296, 297; Buhle: Geschichte der neuern\nPhilosophie, Vol. V. Sect. 1, p. 210.\n\n[296] Tennemann\u2019s Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie von Wendt, \u00a7\n371, p. 442.\n\n[297] Rixner: Handbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie, Vol. III. \u00a7\n119, p. 259; cf. Thomas Reid; An Inquiry into the human mind on the\nprinciples of common sense (Edinburgh, 1810), chap. i. Sect. 4, pp. 19,\n20 (translated into German, Leipzig, 1782, pp. 17, 18); chap. vi. Sect.\n20, pp. 372-375 (pp. 310, 311), &c.\n\n[298] Rixner: Handbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie, Vol. III. \u00a7 120,\npp. 261, 262; cf. James Beattie: Essays on the nature and immutability\nof Truth, &c. (Edinburgh, 1772), Pt. I., chap, i., pp. 18-31 (translated\ninto German, Copenhagen and Leipzig, 1772, pp. 24-42); chap. ii. Sect. 2,\npp. 37-42 (pp. 49-55), &c.\n\n[299] Cf. James Oswald: An Appeal of common-sense in behalf of religion\n(Edinburgh, 1772), Vol. I. Book I. Introduction, p. 12 (translated by\nWilmsen, Leipzig, 1774, p. 11).\n\n[300] Rixner, _ibidem_, \u00a7 121, p. 262; cf. James Oswald, _ibidem_, Vol.\nII. Book II. chap. i. pp. 50, 51 (pp. 54, 55).\n\n[301] The name assumed by Abraham Tucker.\u2014[Translator\u2019s note.]\n\n[302] Lectures of 1825-1826.\n\n[303] Lectures of 1829-1830.\n\n[304] Emile ou de l\u2019\u00e9ducation. T. II. (Paris, 1813, \u00e9l. st\u00e9r\u00e9otype), Book\nIV., Profession de foi du vicaire savoyard, p. 215 _seq._\n\n[305] Buhle: Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie, Pt. VIII. pp. 62,\n63: Syst\u00e8me de la Nature par Mirabaud (Londres, 1770), T. I. chap. i. p.\n10; chap. ii. p. 28.\n\n[306] Buhle: Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie, Pt. VIII. pp. 63,\n64. Syst\u00e8me de la Nature, T. I. chap. ii. pp. 18, 16, 21, et 15.\n\n[307] Buhle, _ibidem_, pp. 64, 65, 70; Syst\u00e8me de la Nature, T. I. chap.\nii. pp. 30, 31; chap. iii. pp. 39, 40; chap. iv. pp. 45, 46; chap. vii.\npp. 90, 91.\n\n[308] Robinet: De la Nature (Troisi\u00e8me \u00e9dition, Amsterdam, 1766), T. I.\nP. I. chap. iii. iv. pp. 16, 17.\n\n[309] Robinet, De la Nature, T. I. P. II. chap. ii. pp. 156, 157; chap.\nvii. pp. 166, 168; chap. ix.-xi.; chap. xv. pp. 202, 203, chap. xix. p.\n217.\n\n[310] Robinet: De la Nature, T. I. P. I. chap. xxviii. p. 138; chap.\nxiii. p. 70.\n\n[311] Helvetius: De l\u2019esprit (Oeuvres compl\u00e8tes, T. II. Deux-Ponts,\n1784), T. I. Discours II. chap. i. pp. 62-64; chap. ii. pp. 65, 68, 69;\nchap. iv. p. 90; chap. v. p. 91; chap. viii. p. 114; chap. xxiv. pp. 256,\n257.\n\n[312] Rousseau: Du contrat social (Lyon, 1790), Book I. chap. iii. pp. 8,\n9; chap. iv. pp. 10, 11, 13-16.\n\n[313] S\u00e4mmtliche Schriften, Vol. XXXIX. (Berlin u. Stettin, 1828), pp.\n111, 112.\n\n[314] Lessing\u2019s S\u00e4mmtliche Schriften, Vol. XXIX. pp. 122, 123.\n\n[315] Tenneman\u2019s Grundriss von Wendt, \u00a7 406, p. 531; Rixner: Handbuch der\nGeschichte der Philosophie, Vol. III. \u00a7 145, p. 317; Jacobi\u2019s Werke, Vol.\nIV. Sec. 1, p. 3.\n\n[316] Jacobi: Briefe \u00fcber die Lehre des Spinoza (second edition, 1789),\npp. 85, 86 (Werke, Vol. IV. Sec. 1, p. 110).\n\n[317] Buhle: Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie, Part VIII. pp. 386,\n387; Mendelssohn\u2019s Morgenstunden (second edition, 1786), pp. 293-296.\n\n[318] Jacobi: Briefe \u00fcber die Lehre des Spinoza, IV. Prop. pp. 225, 223\n(pp. 223, 216).\n\n[319] _Infra_, pp. 418, 419.\n\n[320] Jacobi\u2019s Werke, Vol. II. pp. 7 _seq._; p. 221, note.\n\n[321] Jacobi: Briefe \u00fcber die Lehre des Spinoza, supplement vii. pp.\n419-421, and note (Werke, Vol. IV. Sec. 2, pp. 149-151).\n\n[322] Jacobi: Briefe \u00fcber die Lehre des Spinoza, supplement vii. pp.\n422-426 (pp. 151-155).\n\n[323] Ibidem, pp. 426, 427 (pp. 155, 156).\n\n[324] Cf. Jacobi\u2019s Werke, Vol. III. p. 277.\n\n[325] Jacobi: Briefe \u00fcber die Lehre des Spinoza, pp. 216, 217 (p. 211).\n\n[326] Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft (sixth edition, Leipzig, 1818),\npp. 4, 11, 13, 93.\n\n[327] Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft, pp. 3-5.\n\n[328] Ibidem, Preface, pp. xviii., xix.\n\n[329] Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft, pp. 8, 9, 75, 77, 15.\n\n[330] Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft, pp. 255, 256.\n\n[331] Ibidem, p. 107.\n\n[332] Ibidem, pp. 497, 498; Kritik der prakt. Vernunft (fourth edition,\nRiga, 1797), p. 254; Kritik der Urtheilskraft (third edition, Berlin,\n1799), Preface, p. v.\n\n[333] Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft, pp. 25-27.\n\n[334] Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft, pp. 29, 30; 34-36.\n\n[335] Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft, pp. 30, 31, 41; 12, 13, 150.\n\n[336] Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft, pp. 54, 55.\n\n[337] Ibidem, pp. 59, 97-104.\n\n[338] Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft, pp. 105-110.\n\n[339] Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft, pp. 129-132.\n\n[340] Ibidem, p. 134.\n\n[341] In the lectures of 1825-1826 the philosophy of Fichte on its\ntheoretic side is interpolated here, while its practical side is only\nshortly mentioned after an account is given of the Critique of Practical\nReason.\n\n[342] Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft, pp. 257-259, 264, 267, 268, 273.\n\n[343] Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft, pp. 261, 262, 274, 275, 284, 288,\n289.\n\n[344] Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft, pp. 289-299.\n\n[345] Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft, pp. 312-314.\n\n[346] Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft, pp. 317, 318, 328, 329, 332.\n\n[347] Ibidem, pp. 318, 336, 337.\n\n[348] Ibidem, pp. 319, 346, 347.\n\n[349] Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft, pp. 319, 354, 355.\n\n[350] Kritik der reinen Vernunft, pp. 497, 498.\n\n[351] Here there is inserted in the lectures of 1825-1826 an examination\nof what the philosophy of Jacobi has to say on this point.\n\n[352] Kant: Metaphysische Anfangsgr\u00fcnde der Naturwissenschaft (third\nedition, Leipzig, 1800), pp. 1, 27.\n\n[353] Kant: Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft\n(second edition, K\u00f6nigsberg, 1794), pp. 20-48.\n\n[354] Kant: Kritik der prakt. Vernunft (fourth edition, Riga, 1797), pp.\n3-11, 29-32.\n\n[355] Kant: Kritik d. prakt. Vernunft, pp. 40, 41, 56, 126-135, 58, 38,\n77.\n\n[356] Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft, pp. 62, 500.\n\n[357] Kant: Kritik d. prakt. Vernunft, pp. 54, 58 (35).\n\n[358] Kant: Kritik d. prakt. Vernunft, pp. 223-227.\n\n[359] Cf. Kant\u2019s Kritik d. reinen Vernunft, p. 471.\n\n[360] Kant: Kritik der prakt. Vernunft, p. 146.\n\n[361] Kant: Kritik der Urtheilskraft (third edition, Berlin, 1799),\nEinleitung, pp. xvii.-xx. xxiv., xxv.\n\n[362] Kant: Kritik der Urtheilskraft, Introduction, pp. xxv.-xxviii.\n\n[363] Kant: Kritik der Urtheilskraft, Einleitung, pp. xxvi.-xxxiii.\n\n[364] Ibidem, p. xxxiv.\n\n[365] Ibidem, pp. xlviii.-lii.\n\n[366] Kant: Kritik der Urtheilskraft, pp. xliii.-xlv., 16-19, 32, 56, 59,\n77.\n\n[367] Ibidem, pp. 279-283.\n\n[368] Kant: Kritik der Urtheilskraft, pp. 286-288, 292-296.\n\n[369] Ibidem, pp. 343, 344.\n\n[370] Kant: Kritik der Urtheilskraft. pp. 347, 348 (351).\n\n[371] Kant: Kritik der Urtheilskraft, pp. 423, 424.\n\n[372] What falls under this heading in Jacobi\u2019s philosophy is inserted\nhere in the lectures of 1825-1826.\n\n[373] Fichte: Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre (Leipzig, 1794),\nPreface, p. xii.\n\n[374] Fichte\u2019s Leben und Briefwechsel, edited by his son, Pt. I. pp. 3,\n6, 24 _seq._; 38 _seq._; 142, 189; 337, 338, 348, 349, 353, 354, 358-364;\nPt. II. pp. 140-142; Pt. I. pp. 370-372, 442-448, 455; 518, 540; 578.\n\n[375] Fichte\u2019s posthumous works, which were not published until after\nHegel\u2019s death, nevertheless show that the writer in his lectures at the\nBerlin University likewise worked out scientifically this newly developed\npoint of view in his philosophy; Fichte made a beginning in this regard\nbrocheven in the ure which appeared in 1810: \u201cDie Wissenschaftslehre in\nihrem allgemeinen Umrisse\u201d (v. Michelet: Geschichte der letzten Systeme\nder Philosophie, Pt. I. pp. 441, 442). [Editor\u2019s note.]\n\n[376] Fichte: Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, pp. 10-12.\n\n[377] Fichte: Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, pp. 13, 14.\n\n[378] Fichte: Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre (Weimar, 1794), p.\n12.\n\n[379] Fichte: Grundlage der ges. Wissenschaftsl., Preface, pp. x., xi.\n\n[380] Fichte: Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, pp. 184, 185.\n\n[381] Fichte: Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, p. 3.\n\n[382] Cf. Fichte: Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre, pp. 13-17,\n19-39, 50-52.\n\n[383] Fichte: Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, pp. 4, 5.\n\n[384] Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, pp. 23, 5, 15, 17, 8.\n\n[385] Fichte: Grundlage der ges. Wissenschaftslehre, pp. 17, 19-22.\n\n[386] Fichte: Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, pp. 34, 31, 23,\n27-30 (52), 14, 18.\n\n[387] Ibidem, pp. 52-56, 74.\n\n[388] Fichte\u2019s Anweisung zum seligen Leben, pp. 80-82.\n\n[389] Fichte: Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, p. 57.\n\n[390] Fichte: Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, pp. 78, 79.\n\n[391] Fichte: Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, pp. 60, 67, 59,\n76.\n\n[392] Ibidem, pp. 121, 122.\n\n[393] Fichte: Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, pp. 194-197,\n204, 221, 222.\n\n[394] Ibidem, p. 228.\n\n[395] Fichte: Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, pp. 225, 229,\n232.\n\n[396] Fichte: Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, pp. 233, 238,\n239.\n\n[397] Fichte: Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, pp. 302, 246,\n247.\n\n[398] Ibidem, p. 273.\n\n[399] Fichte: Ueber den Grund unseres Glaubens an eine g\u00f6ttliche\nWeltregierung (Fichte\u2019s Leben, Part II.), p. 111.\n\n[400] Fichte: Verantwortungsschreiben gegen die Anklage des Atheismus,\npp. 51, 53.\n\n[401] Fichte: Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, pp. 272-274.\n\n[402] Fichte: Grundlage des Naturrechts (Jena und Leipzig, 1796), Part I.\npp. 55-71.\n\n[403] Ibidem, pp. 78-82.\n\n[404] Fichte: Grundlage des Naturrechts, Part II. p. 21.\n\n[405] Rixner: Handbuch d. Gesch. d. Phil. Vol. III., \u00a7 192, p. 416;\nFichte: Ueber das Wesen des Gelehrten (Berlin, 1806), pp. 4, 5, 15, 25-27.\n\n[406] Rixner: Handbuch d. Gesch. d. Phil. Vol. III. \u00a7 158, pp. 350, 351;\nFries: Neue Kritik d. Vernunft (First edition, Heidelberg, 1807), Vol. I.\npp. 75, 281, 284, 343; 206.\n\n[407] Rixner: Handbuch d. Gesch. d. Phil. Vol. III. \u00a7 156, pp. 347, 348;\ncf. Bouterweck\u2019s Apodiktik (1799), Part II. pp. 206-212.\n\n[408] Krug: Entwurf eines neuen Organon der Philosophie (Meissen, 1801),\npp. 75, 76; Rixner: Handbuch d. Geschichte d. Philosophie, Vol. III. \u00a7\n157, p. 349.\n\n[409] Schelling\u2019s philosophische Schriften (Landshut, 1809, Vol. I. Vom\nIch als Princip der Philosophie, pp. 1-114), pp. 3, 4 (first edition,\nTubingen, 1795, pp. 4-7).\n\n[410] His birthplace is usually stated to have been Leonberg, a short\ndistance from Schorndorf.\u2014[Translators\u2019 note.]\n\n[411] Lectures of 1816-1817. [Translators\u2019 note.]\n\n[412] Schelling\u2019s philosophische Schriften: Vom Ich als Princip der\nPhilosophie, p. 99 _seq._ (p. 178 _seq._).\n\n[413] Ibidem, pp. 23, 24 (pp. 38-42).\n\n[414] Ibidem, p. 83 (p. 150).\n\n[415] Schelling\u2019s System des transcendentalen Idealismus, p. 257, not.\nZeitschrift f\u00fcr speculative Physik, Vol. II. No. 2, p. 92.\n\n[416] Lectures of 1805-1806.\n\n[417] Schelling: System des transcendentalen Idealismus, pp. 1-7, 17-21.\n\n[418] Schelling: System des transcendentalen Idealismus, pp. 24-46,\n49-52, 55-58, 63-65.\n\n[419] Schelling: System des transcendentalen Idealismus, pp. 69, 70,\n72-79.\n\n[420] Schelling: System des transcendentalen Idealismus, pp. 85, 86, 89,\n98, 442-444.\n\n[421] Schelling: System des transcendentalen Idealismus, pp. 471, 472,\n475.\n\n[422] Schelling: Neue Zeitschrift f\u00fcr speculative Physik, Vol. I. Part I.\npp. 52, 53.\n\n[423] Kritisches Journal der Philosophie, published by Schelling and\nHegel, Vol. I. Part I. p. 67; Schelling: Zeitschrift f\u00fcr speculative\nPhysik, Vol. II. No. II. Preface, p. xiii.\n\n[424] Schelling: Zeitschrift f\u00fcr speculative Physik, Vol. II. No. II. \u00a7\n1, pp. 1, 2; \u00a7 4, p. 4; \u00a7 16-18, pp. 10-12.\n\n[425] Ibidem, \u00a7 22-24, pp. 13-15; \u00a7 37, 38, pp. 22, 23; \u00a7 40-42, pp. 25,\n26.\n\n[426] Schelling: Zeitschrift f\u00fcr speculative Physik, Vol. II. No. II. \u00a7\n25, 26, 28, 30-32, pp. 15-19; \u00a7 44, 46, pp. 27-29.\n\n[427] Schelling: Zeitschrift f\u00fcr speculative Physik, Vol. II. No. II.\n\u00a7 50, Note I, \u00a7 51, pp. 34-36; \u00a7 54, p. 40; \u00a7 56, Appendix 2, \u00a7 57 and\nnote, pp. 42-44.\n\n[428] Schelling: Zeitschrift f\u00fcr spec. Phys., Vol. II. No. II. \u00a7 62-64,\npp. 47, 48; \u00a7 92, 93, pp. 59, 60; \u00a7 67-69, pp. 49, 50; \u00a7 95, pp. 64-68;\n(Neue Zeitschrift f\u00fcr speculative Physik, Vol. I. Part II. pp. 92, 93,\n98, 117-119; Erster Entwurf eines Systems der Nutur-philosophie, p. 297);\n\u00a7 76-78, p. 53; \u00a7 83 and Appendix, p. 54; \u00a7 103, Note, p. 76; \u00a7 112, p.\n84.\n\n[429] Ibidem, \u00a7 136, 137, pp. 109, 110, \u00a7 141, Appendix I. p. 112.\n\n[430] Schelling: Neue Zeitschrift f\u00fcr speculative Physik, Vol. I. Part I.\npp. 1-77; Part II. pp. 1-38.\n\n[431] Schelling: Ibidem, Vol. I. Part II. p. 39.\n\n[432] Schelling: Ibidem, Vol. I. Part II. pp. 39-41.\n\n[433] Schelling, Ibidem, Vol. I. Part II. pp. 41-50.\n\n[434] Schelling: Denkmal der Schrift von den g\u00f6ttlichen Dingen, pp. 94,\n85, 86 (Philosophische Untersuchungen \u00fcber das Wesen der menschlichen\nFreiheit in den Philosophischen Schriften, Vol. I. Landshut, 1809, p.\n429). 89-93.\n\n[435] Cf. Schelling\u2019s Erster Entwurf der Natur-philosophie, p. 297.\n\n[436] From the lectures of 1805-1806.\n\n[437] Hamlet, Act I. Scene V.\n\n\n\n\nINDEX\n\n\n Abelard, III. 67, 68, 78, 79, 82.\n\n Absolute, the, I. 91, 94, 102, 108, 109, 154, 178-180, 193, 279, 301,\n 374; II. 30, 378; III. 4, 6, 410, 551;\n of Bruno, III. 127;\n of Schelling, III. 525 _seq._\n\n Abstraction, I. 97.\n\n Academies of Science, II. 402.\n\n Academy and Academics, II. 5, 236;\n Old, II. 232, 311;\n Middle, II. 311;\n New, I. 107, 167, 474; II. 117, 232, 310-328;\n subjectivity of New, II. 327;\n 15th cent. Platonic, I. 46; III. 112.\n\n Achilles the Swift, I. 272.\n\n Achilles, I. 443.\n\n Adam, II. 392; III. 3, 9, 18.\n\n \u00c6nesidemus, II. 337.\n\n \u00c6schines, I. 450.\n\n \u00c6sculapius, I. 78.\n\n Agrippa, II. 346.\n\n Ahriman, I. 83-85, 118.\n\n Air, spirit of, I. 86;\n as Principle, I. 189, 190.\n\n Albertus Magnus, III. 71, 75-77, 86.\n\n Albordi, I. 84.\n\n Alchemy, III. 326.\n\n Alcibiades, I. 390, 395, 421, 427, 438, 447.\n\n Alem\u00e6on, I. 207, 215.\n\n Aldobrandini, I. 183.\n\n Alexander, II. 121-127, 210, 335, 336.\n\n Alexander of Hales, III. 73-75.\n\n Alexandria, Alexandrians, I. 53, 82.\n\n Alfarabi, III. 34.\n\n Algazel, III. 35.\n\n Alkendi, III. 34.\n\n Amalrich, III. 70, 75.\n\n Aminias, I. 249.\n\n Ammonius Saccas, II. 403, 404.\n\n Anabaptists, I. 443.\n\n Anaxagoras, I 102,165,169,170,183, 186, 187, 190, 311, 313, 352, 373,\n 384, 386, 390, 432, 441;\n life and teaching, I. 319-349;\n \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2, I. 319 _seq._, 350, 351;\n the Good, I. 332, 346;\n hom\u0153omeri\u00e6, I. 334 _seq._; II. 178, 345.\n\n Anaximander, I. 44, 169, 170, 175, 194, 196, 203, 241, 249;\n life and teaching, I. 185-189.\n\n Anaximenes, I. 169, 170, 175, 196, 321;\n age and teaching, I. 189-191.\n\n Anniceris the Cyrenaic, I. 469, 478, 479.\n\n Annihilation, I. 98.\n\n Anselm, III. 61-67, 98, 235, 452.\n\n Antigone, I. 441.\n\n Antisthenes the Cynic, I. 280, 450, 481-486.\n\n Antoninus, Marcus Aurelius, II. 26, 242, 243, 264, 272, 274, 372.\n\n Anytus, I. 435, 436, 438.\n\n Apelles, II. 342.\n\n Apellicon of Teos, II. 127, 128.\n\n Aphorisms (Sutras), I. 128.\n\n Aphrodisiensis, Alexander, III. 111.\n\n Apollodorus, I. 299.\n\n Apollonius of Tyana, I. 200.\n\n Aquinas, Thomas, III. 39, 71, 76, 86.\n\n Arabians, I. 110; II. 395; III. 1, 27, 29, 37, 45, 76.\n\n Aram\u00e6ans, III. 27, 28.\n\n Arcesilaus, II. 280, 311, 321, 325;\n life and teaching, 313-319.\n\n Archelaus, I. 191, 390.\n\n Archytas of Tarentum, II. 5, 7.\n\n Arians, III. 20.\n\n Aristides, II. 25.\n\n Aristippus of Cyrene, I. 469-475, 484-486;\n principle of pleasure, I. 470 _seq._\n\n \u201d the Younger, I. 469.\n\n Aristophanes, I. 401, 426-430; II. 14; III. 113.\n\n Aristotle, I. 44, 46, 51, 88, 113, 128, 163, 165-168, 174, 175, 180-186,\n 192-195, 198, 208, 216, 220, 221, 229-232, 234, 237, 239, 240, 244,\n 245, 248, 257, 258, 260, 266, 269, 272, 278, 282-284, 286, 288, 292,\n 303, 304, 308, 314-316, 318, 319, 321, 329, 335, 350, 378, 380, 382,\n 387, 412-414; II. 1, 4, 11, 17, 38, 232, 234, 237, 244, 255, 270,\n 289, 296, 297, 312, 339, 350, 369, 380, 381, 383, 401, 403, 407,\n 410, 413, 429, 431, 450, 452; III. 29, 40, 42, 59, 63, 73-75, 81,\n 85, 86, 90, 99, 100, 110, 111, 120, 126, 137, 159, 181, 185, 243,\n 308, 349, 350, 358, 393, 467, 492, 535, 546, 548;\n life and philosophy, II. 117-231;\n Manuscripts, II. 127;\n Poetics, II. 128;\n Metaphysics, I. 166, 167, 211-215, 220, 225, 282, 285, 300, 301, 311,\n 316, 334, 340, 348; II. 128, 137-153;\n exoteric and esoteric writings, II. 129;\n Aristotelian Idea, II. 134, 139, 229, 230;\n knowledge and conception of end, II. 135, 156 _seq._, 258;\n ontology, II. 138;\n potentiality and actuality, II. 138;\n principle of individualization, II. 140;\n principle of activity, II. 141 _seq._;\n sensuous substance, II. 141, 142;\n understanding, II. 143;\n the Absolute, II. 143;\n organization of the universe, II. 152;\n philosophy of nature, 153-179;\n Physics, I. 189, 251, 252, 255, 259; II. 153 _seq._; III. 76, 139;\n movement and change, II. 153 _seq._, 163 _seq._, 173-175;\n treatises, II. 154, 155, 180;\n _entelecheia_, II. 159, 182; III. 71, 124, 331;\n place, II. 165, 166;\n empty space, II. 166;\n time, II. 170 _seq._;\n elements, deduction of, II. 176, 177;\n philosophy of mind, II. 180-210;\n psychology, II. 180-202;\n body and soul, II. 182 _seq._;\n sense-perception, II. 186-194;\n thought and understanding, II. 194 _seq._;\n practical philosophy, II. 201-210;\n happiness as principle of morality, II. 203 _seq._;\n Politics, II. 207-210;\n Logic, II. 210-231; III. 144;\n the categories, II. 212-217;\n interpretation, II. 217;\n Analytics, II. 217;\n Topics, I. 358; II. 217; III. 129;\n Sophistical elenchi, I. 457, 464; II. 218, 219;\n commentators of, II. 403; III. 34, 35;\n organon, III. 34, 44;\n dialectic, III. 145;\n deduction of, III. 179;\n Notion of, III. 471.\n\n Arnold of Brescia, III. 148.\n\n Arrian, II. 242, 243.\n\n Art, I. 67, 69, 393; III. 540, 542, 552;\n poetic, III. 544.\n\n Asclepigenia, II. 433.\n\n Asia, Asiatics, I. 22, 150, 206; II. 123.\n\n Asia Minor, I. 169; II. 123.\n\n Aspasia, I. 328, 441.\n\n Assistance, Descartes\u2019 system of, III. 243 _seq._, 291, 332, 361.\n\n Ast, I. 114, 400, 401.\n\n Atheism, I. 41, 328; III. 280, 282, 381, 384, 387, 413.\n\n Athenian and Athenians, I. 49, 79, 100, 168, 169, 328, 407, 408;\n democracy, I. 280;\n golden age, I. 322;\n mode of life, I. 396;\n spirit of, I. 426;\n the State, I. 439;\n law, I. 440, 442;\n subjective principle opposed by, I. 444, 445, 447.\n\n Atomic Theory, I. 37; II. 174;\n of Leucippus, I. 300 _seq._, 384;\n of Epicurus, II. 288-290, 299; III. 449.\n\n Aufkl\u00e4rung, III. 379, 382, 384, 386, 387, 403-408, 420, 422, 426.\n\n Augustine, III. 37, 69, 74, 291, 294.\n\n Authority, I. 60, 93, 142; III. 386.\n\n Averro\u00ebs, III. 35, 86, 111, 138.\n\n\n Bacon, Lord, I. 110; III. 189, 289, 295, 370;\n life and philosophy, III. 171-188;\n treatment of science, III. 174;\n works, III. 177 _seq._;\n natural history, III. 182 _seq._;\n final causes, III. 184 _seq._\n\n Bacon, Roger, III. 92.\n\n Basilides, II. 397.\n\n Baumgarten, III. 356.\n\n Bayle, I. 269; III. 140, 271, 329.\n\n Beattie, James, III. 376, 377.\n\n Becoming, I. 404, 451; II. 60, 427;\n of Heraclitus, 279 _seq._\n\n Being, I. 57, 73, 106, 107, 125, 174, 278, 282, 294, 301, 378, 383, 408,\n 451; II. 177; III. 98, 506;\n of Eleatics, I. 240 _seq._;\n and non-Being, I. 382; II. 32, 393; III. 301;\n Being-in-self, I. 24;\n Being-in-itself, I. 20; III. 472, 506;\n Being-for-self, I. 21, 24, 76, 302, 334, 451; III. 346, 363, 365, 419;\n as sensation, II. 276;\n opposed to Thought, II. 317, 318; III. 63, 160;\n of Plotinus, II. 414, 415;\n in unity with Thought, III. 224, 228 _seq._, 256, 271 _seq._,\n 452 _seq._;\n Being-for-another, III. 302, 308 _seq._, 346, 504;\n for Thought, III. 325 _seq._;\n Other-Being, III. 365.\n\n Bekker, III. 254.\n\n Berkeley, Bishop, III. 364-369, 370, 442.\n\n Berosus of the Chaldeans, I. 86, 87.\n\n Bessarion, III. 112.\n\n Beza, III. 120.\n\n Bias, I. 156, 157.\n\n Bible, III. 12, 14, 114.\n\n Boccaccio, III. 114.\n\n Bockh, II, 81.\n\n Boehme, Jacob, I. 110; III. 161, 170, 224, 238, 273, 238, 289, 324, 325,\n 330, 542;\n life and teaching, III. 188-216;\n doctrine of Evil, III. 194 _seq._;\n doctrine of God, III. 197-202;\n process, III. 202, 211;\n the Spirit, III. 211.\n\n Boethius, III. 37, 74.\n\n Bonaparte, III. 104.\n\n Brahma, I. 118, 128-133.\n\n Brahmins, I. 137.\n\n Brandis, Prof., I. 242, 248.\n\n Brucker, I. 43, 112, 185; II. 400.\n\n Bruno, Giordano, I. 113;\n III, 116, 119-137, 139, 155, 194, 228, 287.\n\n Buddha, Buddhiste, I. 124, 125; II. 125.\n\n Buffon, I. 188.\n\n Buhle, I. 113; II. 200; III. 121, 272, 274, 329.\n\n Buridan, III. 85, 86.\n\n Byzantine world, III. 11, 46.\n\n\n Cabala, II. 394-396; III. 25, 113, 118.\n\n Cagliostro, I. 438.\n\n Caius Acilius, II. 320.\n\n Calculus, differential and integral, III. 327, 328, 352.\n\n Calvin, III. 120.\n\n Campanella, III. 116, 119.\n\n Canade, I. 141, 143, 144.\n\n Canning, I. 58.\n\n Capila, I. 128, 137.\n\n Cardanus, III. 116-119, 138.\n\n Carneades, II. 211, 311, 319-327;\n doctrine of sensation, II. 322;\n of conception, II. 322 _seq._\n\n Cassiodorus, III. 37, 74.\n\n Caste, I. 98.\n\n Cato the Elder, II. 320.\n\n Cause, Causality, I. 41, 138, 139, 192;\n first, I. 174;\n final, I. 345;\n of Plato, I. 342, 343.\n\n Cesava, I. 143.\n\n Charlier, John, III. 91.\n\n Charondas, I. 201.\n\n Charpentier, III. 145.\n\n Charron, III. 146.\n\n Chilon, I. 156, 161.\n\n Chinese, I. 89, 119, 125; II. 123, 124.\n\n Christ, I. 14, 17, 67, 71, 72, 71, 105, 117, 446; III. 4, 5, 14, 15, 54,\n 103.\n\n Christians, Christianity, I. 8, 9, 46, 49, 79, 111, 117; II. 114, 226,\n 374, 377-379, 383, 390, 391, 448; III. 1, 4, 8, 10-14, 22, 21,\n 40-46, 49, 57, 90, 103, 142, 157, 158, 194, 217, 218, 258, 319, 439;\n influenced by Plato, II. 2;\n ideal man, II. 94;\n idea of, III. 2, 5, 7.\n\n Chrysippus the Stoic, I. 460; II. 240, 241, 249, 250, 256, 258, 280.\n\n Church, the, I. 8, 53, 92, 110, 117, 149; III. 21, 45, 50-53, 55-58,\n 102, 103, 106, 142, 147 _seq._;\n Christian, III. 60, 61;\n faith of, III. 417;\n dogma of, I. 60.\n\n Cicero, I. 16, 92, 93, 121, 167, 183-185, 189, 228, 233, 242, 279, 364,\n 388, 455, 479; II. 12, 130, 225, 243, 244, 246, 248-251, 259, 262,\n 267, 278, 280, 305, 314, 319, 375; III. 38, 110, 175, 242, 376.\n\n Citizenship, I. 361-363.\n\n Clarke, III. 319, 320.\n\n Cleanthes, II. 240, 244.\n\n Clement of Alexandria, I. 212, 289, 294.\n\n Cleobulus, I. 156, 161.\n\n Clothing, dress, I. 201, 207, 483, 481; III. 168.\n\n Colerus, III. 254.\n\n Colebrooke, I. 127, 128, 131, 137-139, 141.\n\n Concrete, the, I. 20, 23-28, 33, 34, 40, 79, 122; II. 13, 84;\n world of thought, I. 178.\n\n Condensation and Rarefaction, I. 180-182, 187.\n\n Confucius, I. 120-124.\n\n Conscience, I. 98.\n\n _Consensus gentium_, I. 59, 93.\n\n Constitution (of a nation), II. 96-98.\n\n Contingency, I. 11, 36.\n\n Continuity of Space (of Zeno), I. 268 _seq._;\n (of Leucippus) I. 306, 307.\n\n Copernicus, Copernican Theory, III. 140, 315.\n\n Corceo, Robert, III. 74.\n\n Cousin, II. 434, 450; III. 223.\n\n Cramer, III. 39.\n\n Crates, II. 314.\n\n Crates of Thebes, I. 487.\n\n Cratylus, II. 4.\n\n Creuzer, I. 82, 281; II. 406, 434.\n\n Criterion, the, as principle, II. 234, 235, 250, 254, 257, 267, 281,\n 285, 287, 313, 316, 318, 321-324, 374, 408.\n\n Critias, I. 438, 447; II. 2, 3.\n\n Critolaus, II. 242.\n\n Cr\u0153sus, I. 155, 157, 161, 163, 171.\n\n Crusades, Crusaders, III. 53, 104, 109.\n\n Crusius, III. 356.\n\n Cudworth, III. 319.\n\n Culture, I. 205, 356;\n French, I. 359;\n European, I. 365, 366.\n\n Custom (of Hume), III. 372 _seq._\n\n Cynics, Cynicism, I. 126, 452-454; II. 22, 236, 237, 239, 276, 308;\n principle of the, I. 453, 469;\n school of the, I. 479-487.\n\n Cyrenaics, I. 452-454, 480; II. 22, 236, 277, 303, 304; III. 404;\n principle of the, I. 453;\n school of the, I. 469-479.\n\n Cyrus, I. 155, 157, 171.\n\n\n D\u00e6mon (of Socrates), D\u00e6monic influences, I. 421-425, 431, 434, 439.\n\n Dalai Lama, II. 125; III. 15, 103.\n\n D\u2019Alembert, III. 387, 393.\n\n Damascius, II. 450.\n\n Dante, III. 105, 114.\n\n Darius Hystaspes, I. 280.\n\n Darkness, principle of, I. 84, 85, 135.\n\n David of Dinant, III. 70, 75.\n\n Delphic problem, II. 4.\n\n Demetrius, I. 281.\n\n Democritus, I. 169, 170, 298, 335, 336;\n life and teaching, I. 299-310; II. 277, 278;\n atoms of, II. 288.\n\n Demosthenes, I. 157.\n\n Descartes, I. 38, 59, 110, 308; III. 166, 217, 219, 255, 256, 259, 260,\n 282, 300, 308, 319, 332, 352, 359, 385, 393, 406, 423, 452, 454,\n 486, 515, 549;\n life and teaching, III. 220-252;\n _cogito ergo sum_, III. 228 _seq._;\n mechanical point of view, III. 246 _seq._\n\n Development, I. 20-24, 27, 28, 33, 34, 37, 41, 44; II. 158, 383.\n\n Dialectic, I. 37, 141, 385; III. 180, 508, 527;\n of Zeno, I. 261-278;\n of Heraclitus, I. 278;\n false, II. 63;\n of Proclus, II. 435 _seq._;\n formal, III. 86-90;\n of Being, III. 98.\n\n Dic\u00e6archus, I. 156; II. 225.\n\n Diderot, III. 387.\n\n Diochartes the Pythagorean, I. 249.\n\n Diodorus, I. 455, 457.\n\n Diogenes (of Apollonia), I. 191.\n\n \u201d (of Crete), I. 169, 175.\n\n \u201d (of Sinope) the Cynic, I. 267, 471, 484-486; II. 29.\n\n Diogenes Laertius, I. 156, 159-161, 167, 171-173, 183, 185, 186, 189,\n 190, 195, 196, 199, 233, 237-242, 249, 257, 262, 279, 280, 289, 290,\n 294, 299, 300, 309, 311, 313, 321, 326, 387, 450, 464, 465, 471,\n 481; II. 7 not., 120, 126, 127, 239, 241, 243, 258, 260, 267, 278,\n 280, 288, 301, 303, 309, 346, 400.\n\n Diogenes of Seleucia, II. 241.\n\n Dion, II. 5-7.\n\n Dionysius, I. 471, 472.\n\n \u201d (of Syracuse), I. 52; II. 5-8, 121.\n\n \u201d the Areopagite, III. 59, 76.\n\n Disputations of Schools, III. 145.\n\n Diversity, Difference, principle of, I. 25, 34, 181;\n of Leucippus, I. 307.\n\n Divination, II. 89.\n\n Divisibility of Space (of Zeno), I. 267 _seq._\n\n Docet\u00e6, III. 17.\n\n Dogmas, Dogmatism, I. 79; II. 230-373, 383, 429.\n\n Don Quixote, I. 460.\n\n Doubt, I. 144, 406; II. 332, 333.\n\n Duns Scotus, III. 39.\n\n Duty, II. 206.\n\n\n Eberhard, III. 403.\n\n Eclectics, Eclecticism, I. 163; II. 400, 401.\n\n Education, I. 237; III. 10.\n\n Egypt, Egyptians, I. 63, 66, 150, 154, 172, 206, 233; III. 104, 362, 420;\n mysteries of, I. 79.\n\n Eleatics, I. 166, 170, 335, 371, 378, 454; II. 4, 140; III. 36, 257, 258;\n their School, I. 239-278;\n dialectic of, II. 12, 54, 65.\n\n Elenchi, I. 457 _seq._;\n the Liar, I. 459;\n the Concealed one and Electra, I. 461, 462;\n Sorites and the Bald, I. 462, 463.\n\n Eleusinian mysteries, I. 79.\n\n Empedocles, I. 169, 170, 186, 223, 298, 320, 334, 336, 378; II. 158;\n life and teaching, I. 310-319;\n synthesis, I. 313;\n elements, I. 314;\n friendship, strife, I. 314 _seq._\n\n Empiricism, III. 176, 219, 361.\n\n England, the English, I. 57, 58; III. 164, 172, 173, 298, 313, 360, 379,\n 385, 386, 410, 504, 535.\n\n Enunciation, I. 141.\n\n Epictetus, II. 242, 243.\n\n Epicurus, Epicureanism, I. 14, 102, 103, 106, 164, 167, 304, 454, 469,\n 471, 480, 482; II. 225, 235, 236, 248, 261, 312, 313, 321, 322, 325,\n 327, 331, 339, 350, 358, 359, 374, 384, 408; III. 42, 110, 112, 186,\n 189, 331, 548;\n life and teaching, II. 276 311;\n doctrine of Happiness, II. 276;\n Canonical Philosophy, II. 281-286;\n metaphysics, II. 286-292;\n theory of knowledge, II. 288;\n physics, II. 292-300;\n doctrine of the Soul, II. 299;\n ethics, II. 300-311;\n death, II. 307;\n doctrine of impulses, II. 307.\n\n Erasmus, III. 89, 114.\n\n Erigena, John Scotus, III. 58-60, 74, 91.\n\n Eristics, I. 454, 455, 457.\n\n Erudition, I. 12.\n\n Eschenmayer, III. 509, 514, 529.\n\n Eubulides, I. 455-464;\n sophism of, I. 457 _seq._\n\n Euclides, I. 448, 452, 454-456; II. 4.\n\n Eud\u00e6monism, I. 162.\n\n Eunapius, II. 450.\n\n Euripides, I. 90.\n\n Europe and Europeans, I. 120, 146, 149.\n\n Eusebius, I. 85, 86, 188, 290.\n\n Euthydemus, I. 416, 417.\n\n Experience, III. 170, 175, 179, 180, 182, 219, 265, 303 _seq._\n\n Extension (of Descartes), III. 241 _seq._\n\n\n Fabricius, I. 86.\n\n Faith, I. 73, 74; II. 10;\n and Reason, I. 78, 108; II. 44;\n of Jacobi, III. 417;\n in relation to Thought, III. 419 _seq._\n\n Fall, the, I. 105, 274, 447; II. 40, 321, 395; III. 165.\n\n Fathers, the, I. 91, 149; II. 76; III. 11, 13, 15, 16, 20, 22, 45, 69,\n 70, 159.\n\n Fear, I. 96, 97.\n\n Feeling, I, 40;\n nature of, II. 45.\n\n Ferguson, III. 378.\n\n Fichte, I. 47; II. 188, 360; III. 228, 230, 248, 408-410, 478, 512-522,\n 529, 550;\n life and teaching. III. 479-506;\n Ego as principle, III. 481 _seq._;\n theory of knowledge, III. 484 _seq._;\n unity of self-consciousness, III. 484-490;\n Ego limited by non-Ego, III. 490-496;\n categories, III. 492 _seq._;\n practical reason, III. 496-499;\n defects, III. 499-505;\n natural rights, III. 503;\n followers, III. 506 _seq._\n\n Ficinus, Marsilius, I. 46; III. 112.\n\n Finitude, I. 96;\n finite world, I. 179;\n in Infinitude, II. 78;\n Finite point of view, III. 407;\n finite knowledge, III. 414.\n\n Fire, principle of, I. 191, 193;\n Stoic principle of, II. 246.\n\n Formalists, III. 81.\n\n France, French, the, II. 133, 401; III. 164, 219, 221, 298, 360, 389,\n 403, 405, 407.\n\n Francis of Assisi, II. 238.\n\n Frederick II., philosopher king, II. 26; III. 391.\n\n Freedom, I. 26, 94, 95, 99, 100, 146, 150, 206, 324, 386, 481; II. 209,\n 385, 451; III. 105, 150, 154, 164, 249, 287, 385, 402, 407, 503, 504;\n subjective, I. 407, 423; II. 99, 109; III. 390;\n concrete, I. 482 _seq._;\n in thought, II. 71;\n inward, II. 235;\n and necessity, III. 6, 374;\n of spirit, III. 423;\n Kantian, III. 459, 462 _seq._\n\n Freemasonry, I. 89.\n\n Freewill, II. 115; III. 401.\n\n Fries, II. 55; III. 417, 430, 479, 510, 511.\n\n\n Galileo, III. 140, 315.\n\n Garve, III. 376.\n\n Gassendi, I. 46, 303;\n III, 77, 112. 230.\n\n Gaunilo, III. 66.\n\n Gellert, III. 391, 404.\n\n Genus, the, I. 345, 346.\n\n Geometry, geometric figures, I. 88, 172.\n\n Germany, Germans, I. 149; III. 105, 191, 349, 360, 385, 386.\n\n Germs, doctrine of, III. 395, 396.\n\n Gerson, _see_ Charlier.\n\n Getans, I. 196.\n\n Gnostics, II. 396-399, 427, 428; III. 17.\n\n God, I. 41, 65-68, 70-79, 101, 108, 117, 132, 154, 177, 184, 243, 375,\n 467;\n Eleatic conception of, I. 244-246;\n actions universal, I. 434;\n nature of, as Reason, II. 39;\n as the Good, II. 72, _seq._;\n as Process, II. 77;\n as identity of identical and non-identical, II. 80;\n Greek idea of, II. 125;\n Aristotle\u2019s idea of, II. 136;\n Jewish conception of, II. 379;\n as Self-limiting, II. 382;\n as Concrete, II. 384-387;\n as Light, II. 395;\n as self-conscious Spirit, II. 401;\n Nature of, III. 63;\n unity in, III. 196, 347;\n existence of, III. 164, 233 _seq._;\n in unity with existence, III. 240;\n assistance of, III. 251;\n as One Substance, III. 264 _seq._;\n Idea of, III. 294;\n as absolute Monad, III. 339;\n as Beyond, III. 361, 382, 407;\n as Supernatural, III. 416;\n indeterminate conception of, III. 422;\n immediate consciousness of, III. 434, 505.\n\n Gods, Greek, I. 41, 71, 74, 117, 154, 178, 248, 431, 432, 435; II. 304,\n 305;\n Roman, I. 117.\n\n Goethe, I. 27, 90, 113; II. 337.\n\n Good, Evil, I. 83-85; III. 164, 194, 340 _seq._\n\n Gorgias, I. 170, 371, 372, 481;\n life and teaching, I. 378-384.\n\n G\u00f6rres, III. 543.\n\n Gospels, I. 149.\n\n Gotama, I. 141, 142, 144.\n\n Goveanus, III. 144.\n\n Greece, the Greeks, I. 22, 52, 77, 100, 101, 119, 125, 119-164, 206,\n 207, 234, 322, 366, 423, 458; II. 25, 234, 274, 376, 377, 382, 451;\n III. 4, 24, 27-29, 96, 109, 160, 167, 218, 548;\n disintegration of Greece, I. 350;\n culture in Greece, I. 355;\n constitutions of Greece, II. 209.\n\n Gregory, Pope, III. 75.\n\n Grotius, Hugo, I. 59; III. 313, 314, 321.\n\n Gymnosophists, I. 126.\n\n\n Harmony of music, II. 69;\n pre-established (of Leibnitz), III. 342-344, 347, 350, 361.\n\n Harvey, III. 315.\n\n Hegesias the Cyrenaic, I. 469, 477, 478, 480.\n\n Helmont, III. 113.\n\n Helvetius, III. 400.\n\n Heraclitus, Heraclitics, I. 167, 169, 170, 191, 211, 262, 302, 313, 316,\n 317, 320, 330, 331, 336, 352, 377; II. 4, 12, 54, 140, 239, 244-246,\n 334, 402; III. 132, 550;\n life and teaching, I. 278-298;\n obscurity of, I. 281;\n doctrine of Becoming, I. 283 _seq._;\n time as first principle, I. 286 _seq._\n\n Herbert, Lord, III. 300.\n\n Herder, III. 514.\n\n Hermias, II. 120, 121, 123, 126.\n\n Hermippus, I. 156.\n\n Hermotimus of Clazomen\u00e6, I. 320, 321.\n\n Herodotus, I. 69, 79, 115, 157, 158, 161, 168, 171, 196, 198, 233.\n\n Hesiod, I. 69, 205, 248; II. 107, 278.\n\n Hieronymus, I. 172.\n\n Hipparchia the Cynic, I. 487.\n\n Hippasus, I. 191.\n\n Hippias, I. 116.\n\n Hippocrates, I. 358-361.\n\n History, I. 1, 2, 5, 6, 110, 151, 152;\n of religion, I. 8;\n political, I. 115;\n conception of, II. 24;\n philosophy of, III. 7, 8, 16.\n\n Hobbes, I. 59; III. 313, 315-319.\n\n Hollbach, Baron von, III. 393.\n\n Holy Ghost, sin against, I. 74.\n\n Homeliness, I. 150, 151.\n\n Homer, Homeric, I. 69, 120, 178, 179, 205, 248, 413; II. 15, 72, 107,\n 153, 334, 388.\n\n Homonyms, II, 212.\n\n Hom\u0153omeri\u00e6, I. 334, 335 _seq._\n\n Hugo, Master, II. 276.\n\n Hume, III. 362-364, 369-375, 380, 406, 410, 427.\n\n Huss, III. 148.\n\n Hutcheson, III. 378.\n\n\n Iamblichus, I. 197, 221, 226; II. 409.\n\n Idea, the, I. 20, 24, 25, 27-31, 33-35, 41, 42, 61, 82, 83, 101, 103-106,\n 134, 146, 163-165, 183, 216, 282, 324, 345, 346, 350, 387, 406; II.\n 84, 96, 136, 140, 188, 232, 233, 318, 344, 370, 374, 380, 402, 407,\n 418; III. 8, 10, 16, 21, 29, 49, 100, 123, 131, 161, 175, 176;\n of Plato, II. 17 _seq._;\n of Aristotle, II. 17;\n of Proclus, II. 440;\n of Bruno, III, 128;\n of Kant, III. 444;\n self-determinate, II. 68;\n abstract, II. 331;\n the True, II. 113;\n speculative, II. 152, 222, 367 _seq._; III. 152;\n concrete, III. 3;\n nature of, II. 79;\n determination of, II. 74;\n of reality, II. 379;\n as thought, II. 383;\n of Philosophy, II. 358, 400;\n of spirit, III. 101, 549;\n of Absolute, III. 410;\n in its necessity, III. 545.\n\n Ideal, Idealism, I. 102; II. 1, 43, 95, 361, 364; III. 163, 358, 360,\n 363-368, 516 _seq._\n\n Ideas, Innate, II. 42; III. 242, 300 _seq._, 370;\n complex, III. 306 _seq._\n\n Identity, Eleatic doctrine of, I. 245.\n\n _Id\u00e9ologie_, III. 308.\n\n I-H-W, I. 125 _seq._\n\n Immortality, I. 233; II. 35-37, 39, 41-43, 225; III. 111.\n\n Indians, I. 66, 90, 97, 119, 154; III. 105, 362, 420;\n religion of, I. 64, 91, 126-129;\n poetry of, I. 120.\n\n Individual, place of the, I. 45;\n self-determination of the, I. 448.\n\n Individuality, principle of, I. 323, 345, 444, 445;\n false form of, I. 444.\n\n Indra, I. 129, 133.\n\n Induction, III. 181.\n\n Inference, conclusion from, I. 130, 142.\n\n Ionia, Ionians, I. 155-158, 168-170.\n\n Isidorus, II. 450.\n\n Iswara, I. 132, 137, 138.\n\n Italy, I. 117, 169; III. 105, 109.\n\n\n Jacobi, I. 87, 107; III. 119, 122, 280, 282, 283, 406, 424, 427, 429,\n 475, 477, 505, 509, 511, 512, 519, 526, 540;\n life and teaching, III. 410-423;\n dispute with Mendelssohn, III. 411, 412.\n\n Jesuits, I. 121.\n\n Jews, I. 94, 110; II. 377, 388; III. 1, 22, 35, 36, 429, 506;\n Platonic, II. 380.\n\n Josephus, I. 86.\n\n Jouffroy, III. 379.\n\n Julian of Toledo, III. 87, 88.\n\n Justice, II. 91-93, 99, 100, 103-106, 113, 115; III. 105.\n\n\n Kant, I. 135, 374, 377, 384; II. 223, 265, 273, 331, 360; III. 62,\n 64-66, 124, 241, 300, 356, 361, 369, 374, 375, 402, 404, 406,\n 408-410, 417, 422, 479, 482, 483, 490, 491, 496, 498-500, 503-505,\n 511-514, 521, 523, 529, 534, 549;\n life and teaching, III. 423-478;\n his antinomies, I. 277, III. 44 _seq._;\n life end in itself, II. 160;\n his philosophy a subjective dogmatism, III. 427;\n critical philosophy, III. 428 _seq._;\n transcendental philosophy, III. 431;\n theoretic reason, III. 432-457;\n transcendental \u00e6sthetic, III. 433-436;\n space and time, III. 434 _seq._;\n understanding, III. 436-443;\n logic, III. 437 _seq._;\n categories, III. 438 _seq._;\n philosophy as idealism, III. 441 _seq._;\n faculty of reason, III. 443;\n Idea of God, III. 451 _seq._, 463;\n practical reason, III. 457-464;\n faculty of judgment, III. 464-476;\n the Beautiful, III. 468-470;\n teleology in nature, III. 470-474;\n the good as God, III. 474-476;\n thing-in-itself, III. 495.\n\n Kepler, I. 231; II. 80; III. 162, 315.\n\n Kielmeyer, III. 514.\n\n Knowledge, II. 21, 22, 27, 31-35, 41, 44;\n immediate, I. 107; III. 418;\n and mediate, III. 420 _seq._;\n of Spinoza, III. 276-278.\n\n Krug, III. 479, 493, 510, 511.\n\n\n Laced\u00e6mon, Laced\u00e6monians, I. 323, 391, 408, 448.\n\n Lalande, III. 425.\n\n Lambertus Dan\u00e6us, III. 39.\n\n La Mettrie, III. 399.\n\n Lange, III. 351.\n\n Launoi, III. 39.\n\n Lavoisier, I. 291.\n\n Law, I. 60, 149;\n as sublated, 418, 419;\n as having a conscience, I. 443.\n\n Learning, I. 352, 410; II. 21, 33, 35, 42, 44.\n\n Leibnitz, I. 120, 235, 342; II. 188, 331; III. 188, 219, 220, 242, 290,\n 296, 297, 350, 358, 366, 367, 403, 406, 436;\n life and teaching, III. 325-348;\n Monads of, III. 330 _seq._, 549.\n\n Lessing, III. 404, 406, 411, 412.\n\n Leucippus, I. 169, 170, 277, 298, 335; II. 29, 144, 225, 278;\n life and teaching, I. 299-310;\n atomic theory, I. 300 _seq._; II. 288;\n principle of the One, I. 302 _seq._;\n plenum and vacuum, I. 305 _seq._;\n principle of diversity, I. 307.\n\n Liberty of speech, I. 439.\n\n Life, its ends, I. 332, 333.\n\n Light principle, I. 84, 85.\n\n Limitation, I. 153, 260;\n of Parmenides, I. 253;\n of Zeno, I. 274.\n\n Lipsius, I. 46; III. 112, 113.\n\n Livy, I. 115.\n\n Locke, II. 119, 289; III. 188, 219, 220, 242, 290, 292, 325, 328, 330,\n 363, 364, 366, 370, 371, 383, 399, 403, 427, 429, 541;\n life and teaching, III. 295-313;\n doctrine of reality, III. 296 _seq._;\n innate ideas, III. 300;\n origin of ideas, III. 302 _seq._\n\n Logos (Reason), II. 244, 381, 391 _seq._, 397, 407;\n of Plotinus, II. 416; III. 4, 10, 359.\n\n Lombard, Peter, III. 69-71, 89.\n\n Longinus, II. 404.\n\n Lullus, Raymundus, III. 92-94, 287;\n His Art, III. 93, 123, 129, 134, 136.\n\n Luther, III. 12, 54, 114, 148, 150, 158, 159, 385, 389, 398.\n\n Lutheran faith, I. 73; III. 149.\n\n Lyceum, II. 126\n\n Lycurgus, I. 158; II. 8.\n\n\n Macchiavelli, III. 146.\n\n Magna Gr\u00e6cia, I. 169, 206.\n\n Maheswara, I. 131, 135.\n\n Mahomed, Mahomedanism, I. 71; III. 24, 26, 28, 30, 387.\n\n Malebranche, III. 219, 220, 240, 296, 299, 311, 364, 399;\n life and teaching, III. 290-295;\n origin of knowledge, III. 291 _seq._\n\n Manich\u00e6ism, III. 17-20.\n\n Marcus the Gnostic, II. 397.\n\n Marinus, II. 433, 434, 450.\n\n Materialism, II. 62; III. 125, 381, 387, 398.\n\n Mathematics, I. 10.\n\n Mauritius, III. 75.\n\n Mayer, Ludwig, III. 255.\n\n Medabberim, III. 27, 30-33.\n\n Medici, Cosmo de\u2019, I. 46; III. 112.\n\n Megarics, the, I. 452-469;\n dialectic of, I. 453, 454.\n\n Melancthon, III. 114.\n\n Melchisedec, I. 47.\n\n Melissus, I. 240, 241, 249, 250, 263, 380;\n life and teaching, I. 257-260.\n\n Melitus, I, 435.\n\n Mendelssohn, Moses, II. 55; III. 356, 357, 404-406, 411, 412.\n\n Menedemus, I. 455, 461.\n\n Messemans, I. 100.\n\n Messina, I. 241.\n\n Metaphysics, II. 137 _seq._, 283 _seq._; III. 61 _seq._, 220 _seq._\n\n Metrodorus, II. 279.\n\n Michael of Montaigne, III. 146.\n\n Middle Ages, I. 110;\n thought of the, II. 227;\n standpoint of the, III. 160.\n\n Miletus, I. 171.\n\n Miltiades, I. 157.\n\n Mimansa, I. 128.\n\n Mind, I. 22, 23, 26, 27, 32-36, 46-48, 50-55, 62, 63, 68, 70, 75, 76,\n 81, 88, 95-97, 102-108, 144, 152, 153, 353, 354; II. 17, 18, 33-36,\n 41, 83, 388; III. 6;\n universal, I. 3, 77;\n principle of, II. 275;\n reconciling mind, II. 382;\n as concrete, II. 384-386.\n\n Mirabaud, III. 387.\n\n Miracles, I. 72; II. 410.\n\n Mithra, I. 85.\n\n Moderatus, I. 209.\n\n Moisture, principle of, _see_ Water.\n\n Monads of Leibnitz, III. 330 _seq._\n\n Montesquieu, III. 387, 393, 399.\n\n Morality, I. 153, 156, 408, 409; II. 90, 108;\n objective and subjective, I. 387, 388, 411;\n shaking of, I. 414;\n Greek, I. 415; II. 98;\n reflective, II. 98;\n traditional, II. 99, 100;\n Stoic, II. 275.\n\n Mortagne, Walter of, III. 80-82.\n\n Moses Maimonides, III. 27, 30, 31, 35, 36.\n\n Motion, principle of, I. 193;\n Zeno\u2019s dialectic of, I. 266-277.\n\n Mysticism, II. 448; III. 91-94.\n\n Mythology, I. 6, 56, 73, 78, 81-88, 93, 133 _seq._; III. 160.\n\n\n Nature, I. 29, 32, 36, 93, 96, 103, 107, 130-132, 140, 152, 154, 155,\n 315; II. 376, 383, 386; III. 107, 309, 383, 397;\n state of, II. 92;\n _syst\u00e8me de la_, III. 393, 394.\n\n Neander, II. 397.\n\n Necessity, I. 26, 36, 106; II. 248, 275; III. 6, 374;\n of Heraclitus, I. 293, 294.\n\n Nemesis, I. 328; II. 73, 135.\n\n Neo-Platonists, Neo-Platonism, I. 53, 78, 82, 104, 109, 163, 202, 208;\n II. 313, 374-453, 381, 382; III. 1-3, 11, 17, 23, 29, 36, 40, 59,\n 61, 91, 110, 131, 217, 227, 439, 527, 548.\n\n Neo-Pythagoreans, I. 194, 208; II. 380.\n\n Newton, I. 59, 275; III. 162, 313, 322-325, 327.\n\n Nicolai, III. 404, 411.\n\n Nicomachus, I. 221.\n\n Nominalists, III. 77-86.\n\n Notion, Notions, I. 20, 29-31, 54, 78-80, 82, 85, 89, 102-104, 106, 108,\n 109, 135, 178, 181, 182, 185, 194, 208-211, 239, 268, 284, 290-293,\n 306, 339, 344, 352, 355, 415; II. 133, 227-230, 237, 279, 429; III.\n 189, 197, 324, 359, 366, 380, 381, 409, 544;\n of Plato and Socrates, I. 367; II. 18-20, 74;\n of Aristotle, II. 132;\n of Stoics, II. 248;\n of Proclus, II. 438;\n of Philosophy, I. 452;\n of universal, II. 33;\n nature of Notion, II. 61;\n subjective and objective identical, II. 233;\n logical, II. 330;\n as self-movement, II. 369;\n of absolute essence, II. 411;\n absolute, III. 175;\n as essence, III. 412:\n Notion or Being, III. 452 _seq._\n\n _Nous_, I. 102, 104, 165, 293, 319, 329 _seq._, 350, 351, 406, 451; II.\n 381, 444, 446; III. 123;\n of Plotinus, II. 413 _seq._;\n of Aristotle, III. 467, 546.\n\n Novalis, III. 510.\n\n Numbers, I. 89;\n of Pythagoreans, I. 195, 208-238, 278.\n\n Nyaya, I. 128, 141, 142, 144.\n\n\n Occam, Occamists, III. 81, 82-85.\n\n Oceanus, I. 176.\n\n Oken, III. 543.\n\n Oldenburg, III. 327.\n\n Om, I. 137.\n\n Opinion, Opinions, I. 11-15, 31, 62, 99, 247, 254, 255, 259, 353; II.\n 31, 32, 283, 284, 318.\n\n Oriental, Orientals, I. 96, 98; II. 390; III. 33;\n theory of identity, III. 252.\n\n Origen, II. 404.\n\n Origination and Decease (of Parmenides), I. 252, 253;\n of Aristotle, II. 176, 178.\n\n Ormuzd, I. 83, 85, 118.\n\n Orpheus, II. 434.\n\n Oswald, James, III. 376-378.\n\n \u201cOther,\u201d principle of, II. 85.\n\n\n Palestine, I. 74.\n\n Panaetius, II. 242.\n\n Pantheism, II. 381; III. 3, 120, 123, 170, 292.\n\n Paracelsus, III. 191.\n\n Parents and children, relation between, I. 437, 438, 440.\n\n Parmenides, I. 169, 240-242, 247, 249-258, 261-264, 279, 302, 311; II.\n 14, 78, 390, 402, 413;\n Being of, II. 53; III. 548.\n\n Pascal, I. 93.\n\n Paul, III. 475.\n\n Paulus, Prof., III. 256.\n\n Pausanias, I. 423.\n\n Pedantry, I. 353.\n\n Pelagians, III. 20.\n\n Pelopideans, I. 155.\n\n Peloponnesus, I. 168.\n\n Pentecost, III. 16.\n\n Perception, I. 130, 142;\n of Berkeley III. 365 _seq._\n\n Periander, I. 156, 160.\n\n Pericles, I. 157, 325, 326, 328, 357, 361, 372, 393, 394, 427, 441;\n II. 126.\n\n Peripatetics, I. 167, 479; II. 126, 130, 225, 226, 337.\n\n Persians, I. 83, 118, 155, 171.\n\n Peter, Apostle, I. 17; II. 387.\n\n Petrarch, III. 110, 114.\n\n Pfaff, III. 329.\n\n Pherecydes, I. 185, 190, 191, 233.\n\n Philetas of Cos, I. 460.\n\n Philip of Macedon, II. 119, 121.\n\n Philo, II. 397; III. 17, 36;\n life and teaching, II. 387-394;\n doctrine of ecstasy, II. 389;\n _logos_, II. 391 _seq._;\n man as Wisdom, II. 392;\n ideas of II. 392;\n matter as negative, II. 393.\n\n Philo of Biblus, I. 86.\n\n Philolaus, I. 207; II. 5.\n\n Philosophers, lives and calling of, III. 166-169.\n\n Philosophos, I. 199.\n\n Philosophy, General idea of History of, I. 1-7, 29, 31, 49, 108, 110;\n as the true and eternal, I. 38, 39;\n systems of, I. 18, 19, 35, 37, 38, 45;\n particular form of, I. 53;\n beginning of, I. 178, 254;\n natural, I. 173, 180;\n doubt essential in, I. 406;\n its one reality, II. 13;\n its meaning, II. 24, 25;\n its object, II. 134;\n its essence, II. 351;\n its objectivity, III. 22;\n idea of, III. 23;\n as physics, III. 162;\n its history, III. 176;\n new epoch in, III. 223 _seq._;\n its nature, III. 248;\n its aims, III. 545 _seq._;\n one philosophy, III. 553.\n\n Philosophy, Alexandrian, I. 103; II. 130, 373, 380-382, 399-453;\n III. 17, 118, 123, 152, 160, 331.\n\n \u201d Arabian, III. 26-35.\n\n \u201d Aristotelian, II. 117-231, 400; III. 353.\n\n \u201d Atomic, I. 37, 143, 300-310, 384; II. 174, 288-291, 299;\n III. 449.\n\n \u201d Christian, I. 63.\n\n \u201d Ciceronian, III. 113-115.\n\n \u201d of Fathers, I. 64.\n\n \u201d French, III. 219, 362, 363, 375, 379-402, 409, 423, 425,\n 426, 429.\n\n \u201d German, III. 219, 356-360, 375, 403-408, 425, 426, 429, 504;\n recent, III. 409 _seq._\n\n \u201d Gnostic, I. 117.\n\n \u201d Greek, I. 52, 55, 78, 103, 104, 107, 109, 111, 155;\n in Roman world, I. 163.\n\n \u201d Indian, I. 63, 99, 125-146, 162.\n\n \u201d Ionic, I. 52, 58, 155, 171-194, 208, 320, 384.\n\n \u201d Kantian, I. 277, 388; III. 421, 423-478, 505.\n\n \u201d of Middle Ages, I. 109; III. 1-155.\n\n \u201d Modern, I. 109; III. 157-554\n\n \u201d Neo-Aristotelian, II. 381.\n\n \u201d Oriental, I. 63, 96-99, 117-147.\n\n \u201d Platonic, II. 1-117, 400; III. 38, 110, 111.\n\n \u201d Popular, I. 92, 93, 389.\n\n \u201d Pythagorean, I. 194-239; III. 113.\n\n \u201d Scholastic, I. 64; II. 130, 395; III. 25, 37-107, 114, 115,\n 138, 142, 146, 151, 162, 180;\n language of, III. 38;\n name, III. 39.\n\n \u201d Scottish, III. 219, 362, 363, 375-379, 392.\n\n \u201d of the Sophists, I. 107, 352-384.\n\n \u201d Teutonic, I. 101, 109.\n\n \u201d Western, I. 99.\n\n Ph\u0153nicians, I. 85.\n\n Physiocratic system, III. 386.\n\n Picus, III. 112.\n\n Pindar, II. 35.\n\n Pisistratus, I. 158-160.\n\n Pittacus, I. 156, 160.\n\n Plato, I. 14, 46, 48, 52, 87, 88, 91, 135, 163, 165-167, 195, 206-209,\n 213, 215, 228, 249, 250, 262, 342, 350, 354, 365-368, 374-376, 386,\n 387, 396, 401-406, 410-414, 431, 443, 448, 457, 459, 464, 471, 474,\n 486; II. 118-121, 134-136, 140, 210, 232, 234, 244, 274, 311, 314,\n 317, 338, 350, 364, 383, 388, 401-403, 407, 410, 413, 429, 434, 435,\n 441, 445, 452; III. 29, 59, 85, 95, 110, 161, 242, 257, 300, 310,\n 312, 319, 358, 527;\n life and teaching, II. 1-117;\n disciple of Socrates, II. 1, 3, 4;\n studied Heraclitus, I. 282, 283; II. 4;\n difficulty of his philosophy II. 10;\n dialogues, II. 12 _seq._;\n Symposium, I. 284, 285, 390, 394, 395;\n Ph\u00e6do, I. 340, _seq._; II. 41, 55;\n Tim\u00e6us, I. 38, 143, 233, 252; II. 14, 20, 22, 49, 62, 71, 73, 81, 106,\n 134, 312;\n Parmenides, I. 88, 166, 249, 261, 264, 266; II. 49, 56, 59, 60, 64,\n 437;\n Republic, I. 323; II. 22, 23, 27, 44, 46, 49, 51, 90, 93, 95-99, 109,\n 122, 405; III. 48;\n The\u00e6tetus, I. 249;\n Protagoras, I. 358-364;\n Meno, I. 406; II. 33, 34;\n Ph\u00e6drus, II. 14, 36, 41, 74;\n Critias, II. 49;\n Philebus, II. 56, 68, 70, 442;\n Sophist, II. 56, 62;\n Laws, II. 104;\n aim of dialogues, II. 50, 51;\n Ideas of, I. 220, 278; II. 21, 29 _seq._, 56, 59, 139, 140, 228, 229,\n 419, 451;\n inert ideas, II. 144;\n myths, II. 19 _seq._;\n conception of Philosophy, II. 21 _seq._;\n knowledge and opinion, II. 31, 32;\n doctrine of recollection, II. 33 _seq._;\n immortality of the soul, II. 36 _seq._;\n idealism of, II. 43;\n sensuous and intellectual distinguished, II. 46;\n dialectic, II. 48-71, 257, 436, 438;\n speculative dialectic, II. 52, 53;\n logical side of dialectic, II. 54;\n natural philosophy, II. 49;\n mental philosophy, II. 49, 90-117;\n theory of virtue, II. 52;\n Being and Non-Being, II. 58 _seq._;\n indifference in difference, II. 65;\n esoteric and exoteric elements, II. 11, 12, 68;\n truth identity of opposites, II. 69;\n philosophy of nature, II. 71-90;\n numbers, II. 80, 81;\n physics and physiology, II. 87 _seq._;\n conception of justice, II. 91, 92;\n State and individual the same, II. 99;\n classes in the State, II. 100 _seq._, 109 _seq._;\n cardinal virtues, II. 102-105;\n Idea of the State, II. 105, 113;\n education, II. 107;\n private property, II. 110;\n marriage. II. 111, 112;\n \u00e6sthetics, II. 115, 116;\n Universal of Plato, III. 548.\n\n Platonists, I. 46.\n\n Pliny, II. 125, 126.\n\n Plotinus, I. 109, 253, 254; II. 432, 435, 443, 444, 446; III. 2, 17, 85;\n life and teaching, II. 404-431;\n condition of ecstasy, II. 408 _seq._;\n principle of reason, II. 412;\n doctrine of matter, II. 422-425;\n of evil, II. 425-427.\n\n Plouquet, I. 184.\n\n Plutarch, I. 83, 183, 187, 189, 190, 257, 290, 310, 325, 326, 394, 468.\n\n \u201d Pseudo, I. 176.\n\n Politics, I. 361 _seq._; II. 96 _seq._, 207 _seq._; III. 389.\n\n Polycrates, I. 185, 196, 198.\n\n Pomponatius, III. 111, 140.\n\n Porphyry, I. 200, 209, 221; II. 219, 403-405, 409; III. 37;\n writings, II. 431, 432.\n\n Posidonius, II. 242.\n\n Potamo, II. 400.\n\n Proclus, I. 109, 224, 252, 280; II. 60; III. 1, 2, 4, 29, 59, 70, 85,\n 112, 124, 132, 134, 135, 198;\n life and writings, II. 432-450;\n his principle and dialectic, II. 435 _seq._;\n his triads, II. 443 _seq._\n\n Prodicus, I. 371, 390.\n\n Protagoras, I. 371, 379, 385, 386; III. 63;\n life and teaching, I. 372-378;\n man a measure, I. 373 _seq._;\n doctrine of truth, I. 375; II. 32, 45.\n\n Protestantism, III. 114, 152.\n\n Proverbs of Solomon, I. 161.\n\n Proxenus, II. 119, 120.\n\n Ptolem\u00e6us, II. 398.\n\n Ptolemaic Library, II. 127, 402.\n\n Ptolemies, I. 458, 478; II. 399.\n\n Puffendorf, III. 321, 322, 399.\n\n Pulleyn, Robert, III. 69.\n\n Pyrrho, II. 314, 335-337, 342, 343.\n\n Pyrrhonian, II. 337.\n\n Pythagoras, I. 58, 63, 71, 89, 169, 170, 173, 185, 191, 241, 321; II.\n 14, 402, 409, 427, 432;\n life and teaching, I. 194-239;\n numbers of, I. 195, 208-238;\n doctrine of soul, I. 231-235;\n morality, I. 235-237;\n order of, I. 198, 201-206, 236, 279;\n harmony of sounds, I. 58, 225-228.\n\n Pythagoreans, I. 122, 194, 239, 240, 255, 313; II. 4, 12, 54, 71, 78,\n 129, 375, 380, 398, 400, 403, 405; III. 331, 439;\n numbers of, II. 80, 140; III. 137;\n Order, II. 279.\n\n Pythia, I. 434, 435.\n\n\n Quakers, I. 443; II. 95.\n\n\n Radbertus, Paschasius, III. 88.\n\n Ramayana, I. 128.\n\n Ramists, III. 145.\n\n Ramus, Peter, III. 116, 143-146, 155.\n\n Rarefaction, I. 180-182, 187.\n\n Rationalism, I. 80; III. 219.\n\n Raymundus of Sabunde, III. 91, 92.\n\n Realism, Realists, III. 77-86, 162, 163, 522.\n\n Reason, I. 13, 21, 35, 62, 71, 78, 83, 108, 125, 220; III. 43, 64, 140,\n 142, 397, 407, 408;\n imaginative, I. 81;\n _logos_, I. 294, 295;\n as going forth from state of nature, I. 327;\n as end, I. 374;\n what it is, I. 399;\n development of, I. 403;\n demands of, II. 10;\n Aristotle\u2019s conception of, II. 149;\n thinking itself, II. 151;\n sufficient, III. 339;\n as contentless, III. 368;\n healthy, III. 376, 392;\n of Jacobi, III. 413 _seq._;\n of Kant, III. 443 _seq._\n\n Reconciliation, doctrine of, III. 3.\n\n Reformation, the, II. 130; III. 12, 111, 146-155, 158, 398.\n\n Reid, Thomas, III. 376, 377.\n\n Reinhold, II. 324; III. 479.\n\n Religion, I. 6, 50, 52, 56, 59-92, 96, 105, 106, 117, 118; II. 25; III.\n 103, 388, 389, 507;\n history of, I. 9; III. 8;\n subjective, III. 508.\n\n Religion, Indian, I. 64, 91, 126, 129.\n\n \u201d Greek. I. 65, 74, 90, 117, 118.\n\n \u201d Persian, I. 64.\n\n \u201d Popular, I. 77, 82.\n\n \u201d Roman, I. 117.\n\n R\u00e9musat, Abel, I. 124.\n\n Reuchlin, III. 113.\n\n Revival of Learning, I. 59, 112; III. 108 _seq._\n\n Revolution, French, III. 48, 390.\n\n Rhetoric, I. 358, 359.\n\n Rights, natural, II. 208.\n\n Ritter, Professor, I. 43.\n\n Rixner, I. 114; III. 39, 319.\n\n Robinet, III. 394-397, 399.\n\n Romans, the, I. 22, 49, 101, 115, 149, 150; II. 128, 234, 235, 242, 274,\n 276, 320, 372, 375-377, 382, 386; III. 11, 37, 45, 46, 167, 218;\n their Republic, I. 441;\n their Empire, I. 14, 52, 110; II. 405;\n their jurists, II. 276.\n\n Roscelinus, III. 78-80, 82.\n\n Rousseau, II. 115; III. 369, 383, 387, 393, 400-402, 406, 425, 457, 503;\n Social Contract, III. 401.\n\n Royer-Collard, III. 379.\n\n\n Sachs, Hans, III. 90, 193.\n\n Sages, Seven, I. 156, 279.\n\n Sakontala. I. 126.\n\n Salitter (of Boehme), III. 198 _seq._\n\n Sanchumathonic Cosmogony, I. 85, 86.\n\n Sanc\u2019hya, I. 128-141.\n\n Scaliger, I. 86.\n\n Scepticism, Sceptics, I. 103, 104, 106, 107, 161, 246, 286, 378,\n 380-382, 455, 464; II. 313, 328-373, 376, 383, 429, 452; III. 38,\n 224, 225, 245, 358, 363-375, 548, 550;\n signification of, II. 328 _seq._;\n doctrine of appearance, II. 328;\n dialectic of determinate, II. 330;\n modern, II. 331, 368;\n history of, II. 333;\n doctrine of imperturbability, II. 342;\n tropes, II. 346-365;\n knowledge of negative, II. 365;\n directed against finite, II. 367.\n\n Schelling, I. 114; III. 269, 408-410, 456, 478, 479;\n life and teaching, III. 512-545;\n the ego, III. 513, 518 _seq._;\n transcendental idealism, III. 516-527, 536;\n intellectual intuition, III. 520 _seq._;\n Notion of, III. 523 _seq._;\n art of, III. 524, 525, 540;\n the Absolute, III. 525 _seq._;\n potencies of, III. 529 _seq._;\n indifference of, III. 529 _seq._;\n natural philosophy, III. 535 _seq._;\n conception of God, III. 539-541;\n concrete nature of Philosophy, III. 541.\n\n Schiller, I. 90; II. 337.\n\n Schlegel, F. von, I. 61, 127, 400; III. 507, 508;\n Irony of, III. 507.\n\n Schleiermacher, I. 281; II. 10; III. 508-510.\n\n Scholasticism, Scholastics, I. 59, 80, 91, 92, 110, 127, 146; II. 143;\n III. 25, 29, 94 _seq._, 109, 111, 178, 331.\n\n Schuking, I. 123.\n\n Schultz, II. 143.\n\n Schulze, II. 331; III. 479.\n\n Scioppius, III. 121.\n\n Scotists, III. 80.\n\n Scotus, John Duns, III. 72, 73, 81.\n\n Search (Abrahams Tucker), III. 378.\n\n Seneca, I. 175; II. 242, 243, 264, 272, 273, 302, 309.\n\n Sensation as opposed to Thought, III. 398, 399.\n\n Sensuality, I. 97.\n\n Sextus Empiricus, I. 167, 195, 208, 212, 214, 216, 223, 225, 242,\n 247-250, 278, 284, 291, 297, 310, 321, 348, 372, 379, 380; II. 3,\n 243, 252-255, 280, 315, 321, 332, 335, 338-341, 343-347, 350,\n 353-357, 362, 365, 367, 369, 370.\n\n Simon, the shoemaker, I. 450.\n\n Simplicius, I. 168, 189, 250-252, 254, 259, 265, 299, 467; II. 450.\n\n Sin, original, III. 9.\n\n Siva, I. 118, 135.\n\n Slavery, I. 21, 99, 100.\n\n Sleep, I. 295.\n\n Smith, Adam, III. 378.\n\n Socinians, III. 20.\n\n Socrates, I. 14, 52, 71, 78, 79, 102, 165, 174, 211, 249, 250, 281, 297,\n 340, 344, 350, 351, 354, 359, 364, 366-368, 370, 374, 453, 459, 469,\n 470, 474, 481, 483; II. 1-4, 12 _seq._, 23, 29, 32, 41, 43, 51, 54,\n 114, 135, 141, 205, 238, 267, 451; III. 66, 175, 424;\n life and teaching, I. 384-448;\n universality of thought, I. 385;\n theory of the Good, I. 385 _seq._;\n ethics, I. 387 _seq._;\n character, I. 392 _seq._;\n method, I. 397 _seq._;\n irony, I. 398 _seq._;\n questioning, I. 402 _seq._;\n friends, I. 421 _seq._;\n genius or \u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd, I. 421, _seq._;\n guilt, I. 440;\n death, I. 443, 448;\n principle of knowledge, I. 447;\n schools proceeding from, I. 449;\n Socratics, I. 448-487; II. 239.\n\n Solomon, I. 35, 487; II. 239.\n\n Solon, I. 156, 158-162, 324; II. 8.\n\n Sophists, Sophistry, I. 165, 240, 253, 262, 265, 277, 278, 349-387, 390,\n 398, 406, 432, 439, 454, 457; II. 3, 4, 12, 17, 45, 48, 51, 54, 65,\n 131; III. 44;\n culture of, I. 355, 356;\n reflection of, I. 357;\n teachers of oratory, I. 358;\n lives of Sophists, I. 366;\n principle of Sophistry, I. 353, 367-369.\n\n Sophocles, I. 388, 427.\n\n Sosicrates, II. 314.\n\n Soul, the, I. 129-133, 142, 330; II. 21, 33-36, 41, 83;\n idea of, II. 37-39;\n as universal, II. 42;\n harmony of (Plato), II. 43, 83.\n\n Space determination, I. 103, 270, 271, 329;\n as conceived by Plato, II. 86.\n\n Spartans, I. 100, 324.\n\n Speech, III. 150, 204, 351, 352.\n\n Speusippus, I. 209; II. 120.\n\n Spinoza, I. 73, 252, 297; II. 245, 364; III. 64, 119, 120, 131, 169,\n 219, 220, 235, 243, 244, 296, 298, 299, 306, 311, 325-327, 333, 343,\n 346, 353, 354, 356, 359, 382, 387, 399, 406, 411, 412, 452, 473,\n 487, 515, 516, 526, 528, 529;\n life and teaching, III. 252-290;\n idea of, III. 251, 257;\n ethics, III. 255 _seq._;\n definitions, III. 258 _seq._;\n axioms, III. 264 _seq._;\n system of morals, III. 275 _seq._;\n doctrine of evil, III. 278;\n geometric method, III. 282 _seq._;\n substance of, III. 330.\n\n Spinozism, I. 244; III. 31, 91, 123, 126, 292, 413.\n\n Spirit, I. 67, 72-75, 93, 101; III. 16, 46, 49, 147, 153, 392;\n teaching of, I. 410;\n of the people, I. 420;\n substantial, III. 288;\n Notion of, III. 546.\n\n Spirituality, I. 180, 386.\n\n Stanley, Thomas, I. 111, 112; III. 218.\n\n State, the, I. 53, 153, 409, 443;\n spiritual nature of, I. 439;\n foundation of, III. 401.\n\n Stephanus, I. 280.\n\n Stewart, Dugald, III. 378, 379.\n\n Stilpo, I. 455, 464-469; II. 238;\n maintained the Universal, I. 465 _seq._\n\n Stob\u00e6us, I. 188; II. 225, 240, 246.\n\n Stoics, Stoicism, I. 102-106, 164, 167, 454, 474, 480, 482; II. 91,\n 235-276, 277, 292, 295, 297, 301-304, 309-317, 321, 322, 327, 343,\n 350, 358, 359, 372, 380, 381, 398, 400, 401, 408, 452; III. 42, 110,\n 113, 186, 358, 424, 548;\n physics, II. 243-249;\n superstitions of the, II. 248, 249;\n logic, II. 249-257;\n morality, II. 257-276;\n conception of virtue, II. 259 _seq._;\n harmony of virtue and happiness, II. 262 _seq._\n\n Strabo, I. 242, 255.\n\n Strato of Lampsacus, II. 225.\n\n Strepsiades, I. 429, 430.\n\n Sturz, I. 310, 311.\n\n Subjectivity, I. 41, 48, 70, 102, 104, 105, 108, 145, 152, 153, 165,\n 285, 294, 304, 325, 332 _seq._, 350 _seq._; III. 48, 49, 148-151,\n 408, 508, 510, 511;\n of Socrates, I. 374 _seq._, 384, 387, 407, 410-413, 420-423, 444, 449;\n of Plato, II. 33, 80, 108 _seq._;\n of lack of, in Greek moral Idea, II. 114, 139;\n Aristotle, II. 140, 221;\n of the Academy, II. 311;\n of the Sceptics, II. 328 _seq._, 341, 350, 374;\n of Descartes, III. 240;\n lack of in Spinoza, III. 287;\n of Hume, III. 372-374;\n of Kant, III. 410, 430-434, 440-443, 453, 454, 468, 477;\n of Jacobi, III. 416, 423-425;\n of Fichte, III. 481, 486, 507.\n\n Substance, I. 73, 98, 105, 106, 127, 143, 150, 153, 174; III. 243, 244,\n 257, 259, 288-290, 299, 306, 363.\n\n Substantial, the, I. 70, 76, 77, 97, 104-106, 144-146, 150, 152, 386.\n\n Sulzer, III. 404.\n\n Supernatural, the, I. 80.\n\n Supper, the, I. 74; III. 54.\n\n Syllogism, the, II. 75, 213, 214, 223; III. 179, 180, 445, 446, 464.\n\n Syncellus, I. 86.\n\n Syria, Syrians, I. 149, 150; III. 26-29, 104.\n\n Syrianus, II. 433.\n\n\n Talk, idle, I. 202, 203.\n\n Tennemann, I. 111, 113, 114, 181, 196, 206, 241, 243, 250, 278, 290,\n 297, 299, 311, 322, 394, 430, 440, 465; II. 11, 19, 53, 130; III.\n 39, 67, 68, 85.\n\n Tertullian, III. 8.\n\n Testament, Old, II. 108; III. 163;\n New, III. 12.\n\n Tetens, III. 403.\n\n Teutons, I. 105, 109; III. 24, 56.\n\n Thales, I. 41, 43, 44, 58, 109, 120, 156, 157, 163, 165, 196, 197, 203,\n 236, 248, 278, 286, 336; II. 350; III. 1;\n life and teaching, I. 168-185.\n\n Theism, I. 41; III. 387.\n\n Themistocles, I. 157; II. 25.\n\n Theodicy, III. 7, 546.\n\n Theodorus the Cyrenaic, I. 469, 475-477; II. 3.\n\n \u201d the Mathematician, II. 4.\n\n Theogony, I. 69, 179.\n\n Theology, I. 14, 60, 64, 80.\n\n Theon of Smyrna, I. 214.\n\n Theophrastus, I. 256; II. 127, 224, 225, 277, 314.\n\n Theurgy, II. 432, 449.\n\n Thirty Tyrants, II. 2.\n\n Thomas of Strasburg, III. 89.\n\n Thomasius, III. 349, 351.\n\n Thomists, III. 80, 82.\n\n Thought, I. 4, 5, 13, 21, 35, 67, 76, 77, 83, 89-92, 94, 95, 102, 103,\n 106-109, 145, 146, 153-155, 320, 347, 349; II. 2, 20, 36, 151,\n 316-318, 321, 419; III. 41, 43, 153, 218, 219, 249, 305, 359, 423;\n in union with Being, I. 451;\n as activity of the Universal, II. 37;\n as harmony between objective and subjective, II. 150;\n as self-identity, II. 254; III. 550;\n as absolute, II. 1, 375;\n as divine, II. 411;\n as ultimate, III. 424.\n\n Thrasyllus, I. 299.\n\n Thucydides, I. 115, 159, 168, 199, 322, 373; II. 15.\n\n Tiedemann, Dietrich, I. 112, 176, 181, 183, 379; II. 60; III. 39.\n\n Time, I. 32, 118; II. 22;\n spirit of the, I. 54;\n principle of, I. 191; II. 84, 85.\n\n Timon of Phliasis, II. 337.\n\n Tradition, I. 2, 3, 69, 130.\n\n Tragedy, real, I. 446.\n\n Transmigration of Souls (of Pythagoras), I. 233.\n\n Trinity, the, I. 89, 125, 135, 222; II. 418; III. 2, 4, 20, 22, 53, 78,\n 193, 196, 212, 238, 405;\n of Plato, II. 76;\n Christian, II. 383;\n of Proclus, II. 440;\n Abelard\u2019s proof of, III. 68.\n\n Tropes, II. 346;\n earlier, II. 347-357;\n later, II. 357-365.\n\n Truth, I. 8, 9, 13-15, 17-20, 62, 71, 78, 108, 109, 277, 450; II. 30,\n 31, 45, 50, 65-67, 69, 95-97, 148-150, 201, 220-223, 233, 249-254,\n 276, 277, 281-286, 287, 311, 315-319, 321-333, 335-347, 350, 384,\n 386-388; III. 271, 477;\n as simple, I. 459;\n Notion of, III. 509.\n\n Tschirnhausen, III. 349, 351.\n\n Tyrannion, II. 128.\n\n Tyrants, Tyranny, I. 158-160.\n\n\n Understanding, the, III. 158, 304;\n healthy, I. 379; III. 386.\n\n Universal, Universality, I. 95, 96, 98, 102, 108, 147, 177, 178, 179,\n 347, 386; II. 29, 228, 231; III. 339, 372;\n Anaxagoras\u2019 view of, I. 320;\n spiritual, I. 387;\n of Socrates, I. 411;\n fixed nature of disappears, I. 418.\n\n Uranus, I. 118.\n\n\n Valentinus, II. 397.\n\n Valerius Maximus, I. 299, 322.\n\n Vedas, I. 126-130.\n\n Vespasian, I. 86.\n\n Virtue, I. 412, 414. _seq._; II. 32, 52, 102, 103, 204-207, 259-263,\n 265-268, 272, 319, 427, 428; III. 52, 147;\n the teaching of, I. 363;\n political, I. 361-364;\n as perception, I. 411;\n as whole heart, I. 413.\n\n Vishnu, I. 118, 127, 128, 131.\n\n Voetius, III. 254.\n\n Voltaire, III. 143, 340, 387, 399.\n\n\n Water, as Principle, I. 175-185, 187.\n\n Weigel, III. 326.\n\n Weisse, III. 404.\n\n Wendt, A., I. 111, 114.\n\n Western Church, III. 17.\n\n Windischmann, I. 123.\n\n Wisdom, worldly, I. 60, 61, 65.\n\n Wise Man, the Doctrine of the, I. 474, 475; II. 233, 267 _seq._, 301,\n 309, 314-316, 318, 319.\n\n Wit, I. 427, 428.\n\n Wolff, August, I. 119, 311; II. 72, 325; III. 219, 250, 310, 311, 325,\n 329, 357, 387, 391, 403, 405, 406, 426, 429;\n life and teaching, III. 348-356.\n\n Wollaston, III. 319, 320.\n\n Worcester, Bishop of, III. 304.\n\n Word, the, III. 202 _seq._\n\n World-spirit, the, I. 36, 79, 109; II. 378.\n\n Worship, I. 62, 63, 74, 76, 129;\n spiritual, III. 150.\n\n Wycliffe, III. 148.\n\n\n Xeniades, I. 278.\n\n Xenocrates, II. 238, 277.\n\n Xenophon, I. 390, 396, 402, 414-416, 422-424, 431, 432, 436, 441, 450;\n II. 15.\n\n Xenophanes, I. 77, 169, 240, 249, 250, 257, 258, 263; II. 334; III. 393;\n life and teaching, I. 241-248.\n\n\n Zaleucus, I. 201.\n\n Zalmoxis, I. 196.\n\n Zeno, I. 169, 240-242, 249, 250, 279, 282, 284, 354, 380; II. 14, 174,\n 219, 334, 413;\n life and teaching, I. 261-278.\n\n Zeno the Stoic. II. 238-240, 244, 245, 250, 251, 313, 314.\n\n Zervane Akerene, I. 83, 118.\n\n Zeus, I. 191, 362.\n\n Zoroaster, I. 81.\n\n\n\n\nCORRIGENDA IN VOLS. I. & II.\n\n\nVOL. I.\n\n Page xii., line 32, _for_ \u201cnever ... completely\u201d _read_ \u201cnever\n have emptiness and conceit swum so persistently on the surface.\u201d\n\n \u201d 12, \u201d 26, _for_ \u201cis in\u201d _read_ \u201cis not in.\u201d\n\n \u201d 56, \u201d 9, _for_ \u201csound\u201d _read_ \u201cfound.\u201d\n\n \u201d 60, \u201d 17, _for_ \u201cwherever, etc.\u201d _read_ \u201cbe this positive\n character derived from whence it may.\u201d\n\n \u201d 70, \u201d 29, _for_ \u201cAnd Mind ... implicit,\u201d _read_ \u201cAnd Mind is\n implicitly not that.\u201d\n\n \u201d 71, \u201d 2, _for_ \u201cFinality\u201d _read_ \u201cFiniteness.\u201d\n\n \u201d 72, \u201d 7, _for_ \u201cinvolve\u201d _read_ \u201cinvolves\u201d; line 22, _omit_\n \u201cthrough\u201d; line 24 _omit_ \u201cof.\u201d\n\n \u201d 73, \u201d 26, _for_ \u201cand\u201d _read_ \u201call.\u201d\n\n \u201d 81, \u201d 11, _for_ \u201cWhat ... evidence\u201d _read_ \u201cThe essential truth\n contained in the testimony.\u201d\n\n \u201d 82, \u201d 9, _for_ \u201csymbolism\u201d _read_ \u201chis _Symbolik_.\u201d\n\n \u201d 85, \u201d 36, _omit_ \u201cthe.\u201d\n\n \u201d 86, \u201d 3, _omit_ \u201cthe.\u201d\n\n \u201d 90, \u201d 29, _for_ \u201cthought\u2014determination\u201d _read_\n \u201cthought-determination.\u201d\n\n \u201d 112, \u201d 24, _for_ \u201cTiedmann\u201d _read_ \u201cTiedemann\u201d; line 30, _for_\n \u201cPlato of Brucker\u201d _read_ \u201cBipontine edition of Plato.\u201d\n\n \u201d 113, \u201d 21, _for_ \u201coverthrown by\u201d _read_ \u201cconverted into;\u201d line\n 27, _for_ \u201ca correct\u201d _read_ \u201ca more correct.\u201d\n\n \u201d 114, lines 5 and 8, _for_ \u201cAft\u201d _read_ \u201cAst;\u201d line 18,\n _for_ \u201cRirner\u201d _read_ \u201cRixner\u201d; line 33, _for_ \u201cand hence ...\n philosophers\u201d _read_ \u201cgiving also biographical sketches of the\n principal philosophers.\u201d\n\n \u201d 117, line 9, _for_ \u201cEast\u201d _read_ \u201cWest\u201d; line 20, _for_ \u201cand\n approximates\u201d to end of sentence _read_ \u201cwhich is very liable to\n be taken for Philosophy, and we must indicate the main reason why\n the Oriental idea of religion is so liable to be regarded as a\n religious philosophy.\u201d\n\n \u201d 118, \u201d 10, _for_ \u201cCiva\u201d _read_ \u201cSiva\u201d; line 16, _for_ \u201cZeroane\u201d\n _read_ \u201cZervane.\u201d\n\n \u201d 119, \u201d 6, _for_ \u201clawlessness\u201d _read_ \u201cabsence of individual\n rights\u201d; line 20, _for_ \u201cTo that ... substance\u201d _read_ \u201cThis\n finite can only come to be true when absorbed in substance.\u201d\n\n \u201d 120, \u201d 16, _for_ \u201clast\u201d _read_ \u201carise\u201d; line 26, _for_\n \u201cLiebnitz\u201d _read_ \u201cLeibnitz.\u201d\n\n \u201d 122, \u201d 6, _for_ \u201csensuous\u201d _read_ \u201cthoughtful.\u201d\n\n \u201d 123, \u201d 32, \u201d \u201d \u201d \u201d\n\n \u201d 135, \u201d 11, \u201d \u201d \u201d \u201d\n\n \u201d 128, \u201d 23, _for_ \u201cvery extensive\u201d _read_ \u201cwidely diffused.\u201d\n\n \u201d 129, \u201d 5, _for_ \u201cit must ... again\u201d _read_ \u201cit must be\n separated from nature in order that it may not come back.\u201d\n\n \u201d 154, \u201d 5, _for_ \u201cconnoisseurs\u201d _read_ \u201cmasters.\u201d\n\n \u201d 169, \u201d 4, _for_ \u201cof\u201d _read_ \u201cin.\u201d\n\n \u201d 173, \u201d 5, _for_ \u201c; and it carries ... weight\u201d _read_ \u201cwith a\n very important air.\u201d\n\n \u201d 174, \u201d 2, _for_ \u201cfor he speaks ... them\u201d _read_ \u201c; he speaks of\n them in general terms for the most part\u201d\n\n \u201d 176, \u201d 6, _for_ \u201cTiedmann\u201d _read_ \u201cTiedemann.\u201d\n\n \u201d 181, \u201d 9, \u201d \u201d \u201d \u201d\n\n \u201d 183, \u201d 29, \u201d \u201d \u201d \u201d\n\n \u201d 214, \u201d 15, _for_ \u201cposited as\u201d _read_ \u201cadded to\u201d; line 16, _for_\n \u201cas\u201d _read_ \u201cto.\u201d\n\n \u201d 231, lines 32 and 33, _for_ \u201csolar corpuscles\u201d _read_ \u201cmotes.\u201d\n\n \u201d 244, line 19, _for_ \u201cSpinozaism\u201d _read_ \u201cSpinozism.\u201d\n\n \u201d 249, \u201d 23, _for_ \u201cTh\u00e6tetus,\u201d _read_ \u201cThe\u00e6tetus.\u201d\n\n \u201d 280, \u201d 23, _for_ \u201cif\u201d _read_ \u201ceven though;\u201d line 24, _omit_\n \u201calso\u201d; line 34, _for_ \u201cuntil modern time\u201d _read_ \u201cuntil a late\n period of antiquity.\u201d\n\n \u201d 281, \u201d 8, _for_ \u201cknowledge of language\u201d _read_ \u201cphilological\n learning\u201d\n\n \u201d 323, \u201d 18, _for_ \u201cwe find, it held among\u201d _read_ \u201cas we have\n seen, was held by.\u201d\n\n \u201d 359, \u201d 23, _for_ \u201cwe have a desire to go on\u201d _read_ \u201clet us go\n on\u201d\n\n \u201d 384, \u201d 25, _for_ \u201cFor a mental turning-point ... thought\u201d\n _read_ \u201cFor there exhibited itself in him a turning-point of\n spirit in the guise of philosophic thought.\u201d\n\n \u201d 388, \u201d 24, _for_ \u201cyield itself up ... that\u201d _read_ \u201cmake\n concessions, and therefore achieved no substantial result by\n its study, praised Socrates as he has often enough been praised\n since, in that.\u201d\n\n \u201d 390, \u201d 33, _for_ \u201cmaintaining that it was given\u201d _read_ \u201cbut\n succeeded in having it given.\u201d\n\n \u201d 393, \u201d 31, _for_ \u201cevery\u201d _read_ \u201cthat.\u201d\n\n \u201d 394, \u201d 1, _omit_ \u201calone.\u201d\n\n \u201d 406, \u201d 7, _omit_ comma after \u201cthat.\u201d\n\n \u201d 427, \u201d 9, _for_ \u201chappy\u201d _read_ \u201cfrivolous\u201d; line 18, _for_\n \u201crefute\u201d _read_ \u201cestablish.\u201d\n\n \u201d 429, \u201d 31, _for_ \u201csuprem\u201d _read_ \u201csupreme\u201d; line 35, _for_\n \u201cexecrations\u201d _read_ \u201cexecration.\u201d\n\n \u201d 472, \u201d 33, _for_ \u201cthat ... other\u201d _read_ \u201cin this way that one\n stone would not be sitting on another.\u201d\n\n \u201d 478, \u201d 28, _for_ \u201cthe Ptolemies\u201d _read_ \u201cby the Ptolemy.\u201d\n\n\nVOL. II.\n\n Page 59, line 1, _omit_ \u201ceither of.\u201d\n\n \u201d 98, \u201d 16, _for_ \u201cto be\u201d _read_ \u201cas.\u201d\n\n \u201d 160, lines 13 and 14, _for_ \u201cIn the Kantian philosophy ...\n have\u201d _read_ \u201cNot until we come to the Kantian philosophy have\n we.\u201d\n\n \u201d 204, line 27, _for_ \u201cvirtue\u201d _read_ \u201creason.\u201d\n\n\nTRANSCRIBER\u2019S NOTES:\n\n\u2014Obvious print and punctuation errors were corrected.\n\n\u2014The transcriber of this project created the book cover image using the\ntitle page of the original book. The image is placed in the public domain.","title":"Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 3 (of 3)","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":192207}