{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_58186/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_58186","id":"gutenberg_58186","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/58186","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Psychiatry/Psychology","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Soul"],"text":"Produced by Fritz Ohrenschall, Emmanuel Ackerman and the\nOnline Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n  AVICENA\u2019S OFFERING\n  _to the_\n  PRINCE\n\n\n                    \u00abE l\u2019anima umana la qual \u00e8 colla nobilt\u00e0 della\n                    potenzia ultima, cio\u00e8 ragione, participa della\n                    divina natura a guisa di sempiterna Intelligenza;\n                    perocch\u00e8 l\u2019anima \u00e8 tanto in quella sovrana potenzia\n                    nobilitata, e dinudata da materia, che la divina\n                    luce, come in Angiolo, raggia in quella; e per\u00f2 \u00e8\n                    l\u2019uomo divino animale da\u2019 Filosofi chiamato.\u00bb[1]\n\n                                          (=Dante=, _Convito_, III, 2.)\n\n\n\n\n  STAMPERIA DI NICOLA PADERNO\n  _S. Salvatore Corte Regia, 10_\n  VERONA, ITALIA\n\n\n\n\n  A\n  COMPENDIUM\n  ON THE\n  SOUL,\n\n\n  BY\n  _Ab\u00fb-'Aly al-Husayn Ibn 'Abdallah Ibn S\u00een\u00e2:_\n\n  TRANSLATED, FROM THE ARABIC ORIGINAL,\n  BY\n  EDWARD ABBOTT van DYCK,\n\n  WITH\n  Grateful Acknowledgement of the Substantial Help\n  OBTAINED\n  From Dr. S. Landauer\u2019s Concise German Translation,\n  AND FROM\n  James Middleton\n  MacDonald\u2019s Literal English Translation;\n\n  AND\n  PRINTED\n  AT\n  _VERONA, ITALY, in THE YEAR 1906_,\n  For the Use of Pupils and Students of Government Schools\n  IN\n  _Cairo, Egypt_.\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nSeveral sources out of which to draw information and seek guidance as\nto Ibn S\u00een\u00e2\u2019s biography and writings, and his systems of medicine and\nphilosophy, are nowadays easily accessible to nearly every one. Among\nsuch sources the following are the best for Egyptian students:\n\n1. Ibn Abi U\u00e7aybi\u00b4ah\u2019s \u201cTabaq\u00e2t-ul-Atib-ba,\u201d and Wuestenfeld\u2019s\n\u201cArabische Aertzte.\u201d\n\n2. Ibn Khallik\u00e2n\u2019s \u201cWaf\u00e2y\u00e2t-ul-A\u00b4ay\u00e2n.\u201d\n\n3. Brockelmann\u2019s \u201cArabische Literatur.\u201d\n\n4. F. Mehren\u2019s Series of Essays on Ibn S\u00een\u00e2 in the Periodical \u201cMus\u00e9on\u201d\nfrom the year 1882 and on.\n\n5. Cl\u00e9ment Huart\u2019s Arabic Literature, either in the French Original or\nin the English Translation.\n\n6. Carra de Vaux\u2019s \u201cLes Grands Philosophes: Avicenna,\u201d Paris, Felix\nAlcan, 1900, pp. vii et 302.\n\n7. T. de Boer\u2019s \u201cHistory of Philosophy in Isl\u00e2m,\u201d both in Dutch and in\nthe English translation.\n\nThe \u201cOffering to the Prince in the Form of a Compendium on the Soul,\u201d\nof which the present Pamphlet is my attempt at an English Translation,\nis the least known throughout Egypt and Syria of all Ibn S\u00een\u00e2\u2019s\nmany and able literary works: indeed I have failed, after repeated\nand prolonged enquiry, to come across so much as one, among my many\nEgyptian acquaintances, that had even heard of it.\n\nDoctor Samuel Landauer of the University of Strassburg published\nboth the Arabic text, and his own concise German translation, of\nthis Research into the Faculties of the Soul, in volume 29 for the\nyear 1875 of the Z.d.D.M.G., together with his critical notes\nand exhaustively erudite confrontations of the original Arabic with\nmany Greek passages from Plato, Aristotle, Alexander Aphrodisias, and\nothers, that Ibn S\u00een\u00e2 had access to, it would appear, second hand,\ni.e. through translations. Doctor Landauer made use also of a very rare\nLatin translation by Andreas Alpagus, printed at Venice in 1546; and\nof the Cassel second edition of Jehuda Hall\u00e9vy\u2019s religious Dialogue\nentitled Khusari, which is in rabbinical Hebrew, and on pages 385 to\n400 of which the views of \u201cphilosophers\u201d on the Soul are set forth,\nDoctor Landauer having discovered to his agreeable surprise that those\n15 pages are simply a word for word excerpt from this Research by Ibn\nS\u00een\u00e2. For the Arabic text itself, he had at his command only two\nmanuscript copies, the one, preserved in the Library at Leyden, being\nvery faulty; and the other, in the Biblioteca Ambrosiana at Milan,\nbeing far more accurate and correct.\n\nThis text was reprinted talis qualis, but with omission of every kind\nof note, in 1884 at Beir\u00fbt, Syria, by Khal\u00eel Sark\u00ees: this reprint is\nvery hard to find.\n\nJames Middleton MacDonald, M.A., made a studiedly literal English\ntranslation or rather a construe of it in 1884, of which he got a small\nnumber printed in pamphlet form at Beir\u00fbt, and by Khal\u00eel Sark\u00ees also:\nthis English Version too is very rare, and almost unknown.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nMy present English rendering of this Essay by Avicena on the Powers of\nthe Soul has been made directly and finally from the Arabic Original as\ngiven in the Landauer Text, with constant consultation however of both\nthe Landauer German translation and the MacDonald English construe: it\nhas been made not for European scholars and Arabists but solely for\npupil students in Egypt, which circumstance called in a great measure\nfor the use of two or more nearly synonymous words where the Arabic\noriginal often has but one only. Indeed I am not ashamed to say further\nthat in some places I have failed to follow the drift and understand\nthe purport of Ibn S\u00een\u00e2\u2019s argument; so that in such passages I am\nonly too conscious of how far my rendering may perhaps have wandered\nfrom the right and true sense. But the author himself declares that\npsychology is one of the deepest and darkest of studies; and he relates\nof himself in his autobiography that he had read one of Aristotle\u2019s\nwritings forty times over, until he had got it by heart, and yet had\nfailed to see the point. And he goes on to tell of how it was that\nhe one day stumbled across and then read over al-F\u00e2r\u00e2b\u00ee\u2019s \u201cMaq\u00e2\u00e7id\nAristotle,\u201d whereupon mental light dawned upon him as to the purport of\nthat writing.\n\nThose for whom I have made it now know why this my English version is\noften timid and wavering, nay sometimes even wordy and hazy.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe end of the next year\u2019s session will in all likelihood bring with it\nthe cessation of my connection with the Khedivial School of Law. More\nthan this: I am getting well on in life, so that this translation will\nmost likely be the last serious work that I shall ever perform in the\nservice of Young Egypt. Such reflections awaken in my inmost soul all\nsorts of feelings and thoughts about the shortness and fleetingness of\nthis earthly life, the happiness of childhood and youth, the darkness\nof the grave, and the utter despair that will surely engulf the soul\nat the last hours, unless--mark my words--unless the strong arm of our\nHeavenly Father lay hold upon this soul that is now within me, and\ntake it off and up, to be joined unto the millions of souls of all,\nall those who have gone before, whither too shall follow so many, many\nother millions; in a word, unless GOD have mercy upon me, even as He\nhas had mercy upon my forefathers and mothers since many generations.\nThis hope in His mercy and grace is my ever-strengthening prop and\nstay, the older and feebler I get. Nor will any of those for whom I\nwrite these lines ever find a stronger or a better. And the time will\nvery soon come when each and every one of them, however long may be his\nlife here below, will surely need it, to save him from sinking into the\nblack nothingness of doubt, indifference, and despair.\n\n                                                EDWARD ABBOTT van DYCK.\n\n          VERONA, _August, 1906_.\n\n    Wer fertig ist, dem ist nichts recht zu machen:\n    Ein werdender wird immer dankbar sein.[2]\n\n                                   [Lustige Person, in Goethe\u2019s Faust]\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[1] _Note added by transcriber_: From the translation of Dante's _Il\nConvito_ (The Banquet) by Elizabeth Sayer Price (in Project Gutenberg:\nhttps://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/12867):\n\n  And the Human Soul possessing the nobility of the highest power,\n  which is Reason, participates in the Divine Nature, after the manner\n  of an eternal Intelligence: for the Soul is ennobled and denuded of\n  matter by that Sovereign Power in proportion as the Divine Light of\n  Truth shines into it, as into an Angel; and Man is therefore called\n  by the Philosophers the Divine Animal.\n\n[2] _Note added by the transcriber_: From the translation\nof Goethe's _Faust_ by Bayard Taylor (in Project Gutenberg:\nhttps://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/14591):\n\n    A mind once formed, is never suited after;\n    One yet in growth will ever grateful be.\n\n[Funny Person, in Goethe\u2019s Faust]\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\nIn the Name of GOD, the Merciful, the Compassionate: May GOD bless\nour Lord Muhammad and his Kinsfolk, and give them peace. O my God\nfacilitate [this undertaking]; and make [it] end in good, O Thou\nBounteous Being!\n\nAbu-\u00b4Aly, Ibn S\u00een\u00e2, the chief elder, learn\u00e8d and erudite leader, the\nprecise and accurate researcher, Truth\u2019s plea against mankind, the\nphysician of physicians, the philosopher of Isl\u00e2m, may the Most High\nGOD have mercy upon him, saith:--\n\nThe best of beginnings is that which is adorned with praise to the\nGiver of strength for praising Him; and for invoking blessing and peace\nupon our Lord Muhammad, His prophet and servant, and upon his good and\npure offspring after him. And after this beginning, he saith further:--\n\nHad not custom given leave to the small and low to reach up to the\ngreat and high, it would be most difficult for them ever to tread those\npaths in going over which they need to lay hold of their upholding\narm[3] and seek the help of their superior strength; to attain to\na position in their service, and join themselves to their social\ncircle; to pride themselves on having become connected with them, and\nopenly declare their reliance upon them. Nay, the very bond which\njoins the common man to the man of \u00e9lite would be severed, and the\nreliance of the flock upon its shepherd would cease; the frail would\nno longer become powerful through the strength of the mighty, nor the\nlow-born rise through the protection and countenance of the high-born;\nthe foolish would not be able to correct his folly and ignorance by\nintercourse with the prudent and wise; nor the wise draw nigh to the\nignorant and foolish.\n\nAnd whereas I find that custom has trod along this highroad, and\nprescribed this usage, I avail myself of such a precedent and excuse\nto warrant my reaching up and aspiring to the Prince, GOD give him\nlong life, with an offering [an acceptable present]; and I have given\nprevalence to the thought that my choice ought to fall upon an object\nwhich will at once be most acceptable to him, and best calculated to\nattain my aim of ingratiating myself into his favor; and this, after\ncoming to the certain conclusion that the chief virtues are two,\nnamely 1. Love of wisdom as to the Articles of Faith, (i.e., Love of\nPhilosophy in theoretical principles); and 2. Choice of the most honest\nof deeds as to intention (i.e., the preference of pure purposes in\npractical life).\n\nAnd in this connection I find the Prince, God prolong his days, to have\ngiven to his intrinsically worthy character so much of the polish and\nlustre imparted by wisdom that he far outstrips his rivals among the\nprinces, and overtops all such as are of his kind. And hence I clearly\nperceive that of all presents the one he will appreciate most is such\nas conduces to the most precious of the virtues, to wit wisdom. I\nhad, however, so far profitted from a careful perusal of the books of\nthe learn\u00e8d as to find their researches into the spiritual faculties\namong the most abstruse and refractory against the mind\u2019s grasping\nwhat they mean, and the most bewildering, obscure and misleading as to\ntheir results. And yet I have seen it reported about a number of wise\nmen (philosophers) and pious[4] saints that they agree in this dictum\n(motto), viz: \u201cWhoso Knoweth himself, Knoweth his Lord\u201d; and I have\nalso heard the Chief of the Philosophers say, in agreement with their\nsaying: \u201cWhoso faileth to Know himself, is still more likely (apt) to\nfail of Knowing his Creator\u201d; and \u201cHow shall he, who is trusted as a\nreliable authority in a science, be deemed to have any views at all,\nwhen he is ignorant of himself?\u201d I see further the Book of the Most\nHigh GOD pointing to the measure of truth of this, where He says, when\nmentioning the distance separating the Erring from His mercy: Surah 59,\nal-Hashr, v. 19: \u201cthey forgot God, and He made them forget themselves\u201d;\nis not His making the forgetting of self to depend upon forgetting\nHim done so as to awaken the attention to His closely binding the\nremembrance of Him with the remembrance of self, and the knowledge\nof Him with the knowledge of self, scilicet of one\u2019s own soul?\nFurthermore, I have read in the books of the ancients that the hard\ntask of going deeply into the knowledge of self had been enjoined upon\nthem by an oracle that had descended upon them at one of the temples\nof the gods, which says: \u201cKnow thyself, O man, so shalt thou know thy\nLord.\u201d I have also read that this saying was engraved in the fa\u00e7ade\nof the temple of Aesculapius, who is known among them as one of the\nprophets, and whose most famous miracle is that he was wont to heal the\nsick by mere loud supplication; and so did all priests who performed\nsacerdotal functions in his temple. From him have philosophers got the\nscience of medicine.\n\nThus I have thought fit to make for the Prince[5] a book on the soul,\nin the form of a compendium; and I ask the Most High God to prolong\nhis life, to keep intact from the evil eye his frail and mortal body,\nto refresh through him wisdom after its fading, to revive it after\nits languishing, to renew its might through his might, and to give\nit length of days through length of days to him, in order that by\nhis prestige the advantages accruing from the prestige of its kin\nshall become all-embracing, and that the number of the seekers after\nits fullness shall abound. Nor shall I achieve this my ambition save\nthrough God: He is my all-sufficient stay, and best helper. I have\narranged the Book in sections, ten in all:--\n\n1. To Establish the Existence of the Faculties of the Soul, the\ndetailed analysis and explanation of which I have undertaken.\n\n2. Division and Classification of the Primary (Primitive) Faculties of\nthe Soul, and Definition of the Soul at large (or as a whole).\n\n3. That None of the Faculties of the Soul originates from the\nCombination (Blending) of the Four Elements, but on the contrary comes\nupon them from without.\n\n4. Detailed Statement concerning the Vegetable Powers (faculties), and\nMentioning the Need for Each One of them.\n\n5. Detailed Statement concerning the Animal Faculties (powers), and\nMentioning the Need for Each One of them.\n\n6. Detailed Statement concerning the External (Apparent) Senses, and\nHow they perceive, mentioning the Disagreement [of researchers] as to\nHow Seeing is performed.\n\n7. Detailed Statement concerning the Internal (Hidden) Senses, and the\nBody Moving Power.\n\n8. Memoir on the Human Soul from the Stage of its Beginning to the\nStage of its Perfection.\n\n9. Establishing the Proofs necessary for affirming the Essentiality of\nthe Speaking (Rational) Soul, by the logical method.\n\n10. Establishing the Argument for the Existence of an Intellectual\nEssence, distinct from Bodies, standing to the Rational (speaking)\nFaculties in the stead of a Fountain, and in the stead of Light to\nSight; and Showing that Rational (speaking) Souls remain united with\nIt after the death of the body, secure and safe from corruption and\nchange; and It is what is called Universal (generic) Intelligence.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[3] The figure of speech in the Arabic is \u00abloopholes\u00bb; compare Surah\n2:257, and 31:21, and Beyd\u00e2wi\u2019s Commentary.\n\n[4] The \u00abwaly\u00bb performs miracles only, whereas the \u00abnaby\u00bb performs\nmiracles, and also foretells future events.\n\n[5] Who was this prince; and why did the author stand in such need\nof his countenance as to dedicate to him this booklet in the humble\nand lengthy terms of apology which run through the greater part of\nthe Introduction? It is Doctor S. Landauer\u2019s opinion that, with this\nEssay, Ibn S\u00een\u00e2 began his career as a writer. After he had completed\nthe sixteenth year of his age, he was summoned to the bedside of the\nsuffering S\u00e2m\u00e2nid prince, N\u00fbh ibn Man\u00e7\u00fbr, who resided at Bukh\u00e2ra (See\nIbn Khallik\u00e2n\u2019s Biographies), and succeeded in curing him. Then,\nfollowed a long period during which Ibn S\u00een\u00e2 removed from the Court\nof one Ruler to that of another, and was successively engaged in the\nservice of various Petty Dynasties in Khuras\u00e2n. If then this Essay\nwas his maiden production--as Doctor Landauer assumes--the author was\nstill quite young, and stood in need of the patronage he so earnestly\nimplores. Furthermore there is a manuscript in Leyden, marked Codex\n958, and numbered 1968 in the Catalogue, which is a small treatise on\nthe soul by Ibn S\u00een\u00e2, closing as follows:\n\n\u00abI had produced a short essay on the exposition of the knowledge of\nthe soul, and what is connected therewith, at the beginning of my\ncareer forty years ago, after the purely philosophical method of\ninvestigation. Whoso wishes to know that method, let him peruse it, for\nit is adapted to the seekers of research.\u00bb\n\nThe \u00ab40 years ago\u00bb fit exactly, if students one assumes that the\nliterary production referred to is the one he dedicated to \u00abthe\nPrince.\u00bb Now, the first prince he came in contact with was N\u00fbh ibn\nMan\u00e7\u00fbr (ruled from 366-387 H. = 976-997 A.D., the Eighth of the\nS\u00e2m\u00e2nid Dynasty). Ibn Khallik\u00e2n relates that Ibn S\u00een\u00e2, at the age of 16\nyears, had begun to have a great reputation as a physician. Moreover\nthe Latin translation in Florence of this essay bears in express words\nthe dedication to N\u00fbh. Result:\n\n    Ibn S\u00een\u00e2 born in        370 H. = 980 A.D.\n\n    Earliest Age as\n    Treating Physician      386 H. = 996\n\n    Death of N\u00fbh in\n    Month of Ragab          387 H. = 997 Jule\n\n    Death of Ibn S\u00een\u00e2       428 H. = 1036\n\nBetween 386 and 428 lie the 40 years.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION FIRST\n\n  =To Establish the Existence of the Spiritual Faculties, the Detailed\n    Analysis of which I have undertaken.=\n\n\nWhoso wishes to describe anything whatsoever before proceeding to\nestablish first its [6]reality of existence, such a one is counted\nby the wise among those who deviate from the broad beaten track of\nperspicuous statement. It is incumbent upon us, therefore, to first\nset to work to establish the existence of the spiritual powers, before\nstarting to define each one of them singly, and enlarge upon it.\n\nAnd whereas the most peculiar characteristics of spiritual properties\nare two--one of them Setting in Motion (Impulsion), and the other\nPerception--it is incumbent upon us to show that to every moving body\nthere is a [A]moving cause (ground, reason, motive, pretence). Then it\nwill become evident to us therefrom that bodies moving in motions over\nand above the natural motions--an example of natural motions is the\nsinking of the heavy, and the rising of the light--have moving[B]\ncauses, which we call souls or spiritual powers; and that we further\nshow that any body, in so far as it shows signs (traces) that it is\nperceptive, such perception by it cannot be validly ascribed to its\nbody, except because of powers (faculties) in it that are capable of\nperception.\n\nWe now start by saying that not a shadow of doubt or perplexity\nhampers the mind, as to things, that some of them share some one thing\nin common, and differ in an other; and that that which is shared in\ncommon is other than that in which they differ. The mind encounters all\nbodies whatsoever as having this in common, viz. that they are bodies;\nand afterwards it encounters them as differing in that they move (in\ndifferent ways); otherwise there would be no such thing as rest of a\nbody, and not even such a thing as motion of a body, except along a\ncircle, seeing that of motion in a straight line it is established\nby its very form that it will not proceed save from stoppings and to\nstoppings (resting-places to resting-places). Hence it is evident that\nbodies are not to be clothed with the attribute of motion because they\nare bodies, but for reasons (causes) above and beyond their corporeity,\nfrom which causes their motions proceed, like the resulting of the\nfootprint from the walker (or, just as the effect proceeds from the\nagent).\n\nSo much having become clear to us, we say that we find, among bodies\ngenerated from the Four Elements,[7] such as moves, not by constraint,\nin two kinds of motion between which there is more or less difference:\nThe one kind inherent in its element by reason of the supremacy over\nit of the power of one of its constituents, and thus decreeing its\nmotion towards the position in space naturally appointed for it, as for\nexample a man\u2019s moving by the nature of the preponderating[8] heavy\nelement in his body downwards; nor will this kind of the motions of\nbodies be found to take place save in one direction and with a constant\ntendency; The second kind of motion going against the decree of its\nelement, which decree is either rest in the natural position as soon\nas it reaches that position, as for example a man\u2019s moving his body\nalong its natural home which is the Earth\u2019s surface; or else a moving\naway from the natural position when already separated from it, like\na flying bird\u2019s motion with its heavy body high up through the sky.\nIt has thus been made manifest [to the reader] that the two motions\nhave two accounting causes, and that they are quite different one from\nthe other: the one is called Natural, and the second called Soul or\nSpiritual Faculty. Hence it is quite sound, as to motion, to affirm\nthe existence of spiritual faculties.\n\nWhereas, in respect of Perception, because that bodies exist with this\nin common, viz. that they are bodies, and with this in distinction,\nviz. that they are repeatedly perceptive, it is quite manifest by the\nfirst (preceding) process of discrimination that perception will not\never differ from bodies through difference of their substance, but by\ncertain powers or faculties borne within those bodies. It therefore\nbecomes quite clear by this sort of exposition that spiritual faculties\nhave an existence: and this is what we wished to demonstrate.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[6] Reality of existence; or its whereabouts. Doctor S. Landauer thinks\nthat the word ayniyyat in the text must be wrong, because nowhere\nthroughout this section is the \u00abWhereabout\u00bb of the mental powers so\nmuch as hinted at; whereas the burden of the whole chapter is to prove\nmerely that such powers do exist, i.e., their inniyyat, which is a\nword used by Arab Logicians.\n\n[A] A Why and Wherefore moving it. Note the difference between\nsabab and `illah. _Transcriber addition:_ sabab (\u0633\u0628\u0628) and `illat\n(\u0639\u0644\u0651\u0629): Sabab means the general conditions that are conducive to\nsomething occuring, whereas `illat is the reason in cause-and-effect.\nTraditionally, `illat is used in logic or medicine, whereas sabab would\nbe more likely to be heard in common speech.\n\n[B] Ditto.\n\n[7] The four elements: earth, air, fire, water.\n\n[8] Here Ibn S\u00een\u00e2 seems to have had a rather clear premonition of\nNewton\u2019s Theory of Gravitation, seven hundred years before the falling\nof the famous apple.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION SECOND\n\n  =Of the Division of the Spiritual Faculties and their Classification\n    into Three Main Classes, and the Definition of the Soul in a\n    General Way.=\n\n\nSUB-SECTION A:\n\nIt has been clearly shown by us in the foregoing that of things there\nare some which have one thing in common and differ in an other, in that\nthe one in common is other than the one differed in. Then we found\ncompound ensouled bodies--I mean possessing souls--to have agreed\nand differed in the properties both of their impulsion and their\nperception. As to impulsion, they agree and differ, in that one and all\nof them has in common that they move in quantity the motion of growth;\nand they differ, in that one sett among them moves, together with that\ngrowth, in local motions according to the will; and one other sett\namong them does not so move, such as plants. Likewise living beings\nhave in common that they are both sentient and perceptive, up to a\ncertain sort of sensuous perception; and then afterwards they differ in\nthat one sett among them perceives, together with that sort of sensuous\nperception, by intellectual perception; and one other sett among them\ndoes not so perceive, such as the ass and the horse. We further found\nthe power of impulsion to be more widely embracing than the power of\nperception, in that we found plants to lack the latter utterly. Hence\nwe knew for certain that the faculty in which the animal agrees with\nthe plant is more general than this perceptive faculty, and than the\nimpelling faculty which is in the animal; and each one of them is more\ngeneral than the speaking (rational) faculty, which belongs to man.\nThus then, the spiritual faculties come forth (or stand out) before\nus set and ranged, in respect of the common and the peculiar, i.e.,\naccording to the general and special[C], under three classes or\nranks:[D]\n\nThe first of which is known as the plant or vegetable power, on account\nof the participation therein of the animal and plant;\n\nThe second is known as the animal power;\n\nThe third, as the speaking power, or rational faculty.\n\nTherefore, the primary parts of the soul, in contemplating it from the\nstandpoint of its powers, are three.\n\n\nSUB-SECTION B:[E]\n\nTo treat now of the definition of the Soul at large, I mean the\nuniversal, absolute, generic soul. This will become apparent, according\nto the tenets I hold, that among truths that are plainly manifest one\nis that every one of all natural bodies is compounded of \u201chyle\u201d I\nmean matter, and of form. As for hyle, one of its properties is that\nthrough it a natural body is affected (or acted upon) in its very self;\nseeing that the sword, for instance, does not cut through its iron, but\nthrough its sharpness, which is its form; whereas it gets jagged owing\nto its iron, and not owing to its form. Another of those properties\nis that bodies do not differ through it, I mean through the hyle; for\nearth does not differ from water through its matter, but through its\nform.[9] Still another property is that it--the hyle or matter--does\nnot afford (supply, furnish) natural bodies their characteristics\npeculiarly belonging to them, save potentially; since in man, e.g.,\nhis humanity--his being man--is not actually derived from the four\nelements, save potentially.\n\nAs for the form, its peculiarity is 1.^o that through it bodies put\nforth their actions (or perform their manifold deeds and workings);\nsince a sword does not cut through its iron, but through, its\nsharpness; and 2.^o that bodies differ one from the other only through\ntheir genus or kind, I mean the form, since earth does not differ from\nwater save through its form, whereas in its matter it does not; and\n3.^o that natural bodies get (derive, acquire) their being what they in\nfact are from the form, since as to man, his being a man (his humanity)\nis in fact through his form, and not through his matter, which is of\nthe four elements.\n\nLet us proceed a little further, and we shall say that a live body is\na natural compound body that discriminates the non-living through its\nsoul, and not through its body; and that performs multifarious animal\nworks through its soul, and not through its body; and is alive through\nits soul and not through its body; and its soul is within it. Now,\nwhat is within a thing, while this form of its continues, is its form\n[or, this its form being so and not otherwise, is etc.]. Thus then\nthe soul is a form; and forms are realized perfections (entel\u00e9chia),\nsince through them the features (identities, characteristics) of\nthings become perfect. The soul, therefore is a perfection (realized\nidentity). And perfections (entel\u00e9chias) come under two divisions:\neither the principles underlying the doings and their effects, or the\nvery doings and effects themselves. The one of the two divisions is\nfirst, and the other is second. The first is the principle (or source\nand origin), and the second is the doing and the effect (or trace). In\nthis sense the soul is a first perfection (or prime actuality); for\nit is a principle (source), not an outcome of a principle (source).\nAnd of perfections, there are such as belong to bodies, and such as\nbelong to incorporeal substances. In this sense the soul is a prime\nperfection attaching to a body. And among bodies, there are such as are\nartificial, and such as are natural. Now the soul is not a perfection\nof an artificial body; hence it is a prime perfection attaching to a\nnatural body. Again, among natural bodies there are such as perform\ntheir multifarious workings through organs (tools, instruments), and\nsuch as do not perform their workings through organs (tools); as, for\nexample the simple bodies, and those acting through the prevalence\n(constraint) of the simple forces. In other words we may say, if we\nlike, that among natural bodies there are those whose design is, among\nother things, that they produce of themselves [whose task or business\nis to perform animal acts voluntarily, of their own will,] manifold\nanimal actions; and there are those whose design is, among other\nthings, not so to produce. Hence again, the soul is not a perfection\nattaching to the two last divisions in both the foregoing manners of\nstatement. Therefore its full and finished definition is to say that--\n\nIt is a prime perfection (consummation, realization) attaching to\nan organic natural body; and, if we wish, to say further, a prime\nperfection attaching to a natural body having a life potentially\n(a first, perfection belonging to a natural body which body may\nhave life); that is to say, a source of the manifold animal actions\npotentially (it is the source and origin of the deeds done by such\nbeings as may be alive). Thus then we have divided (described) the\ngeneric soul, and defined it--which is what we had undertaken.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[C] Logical intension and extension.\n\n[D] In this section the soul-powers are at first separated into Three\nChief Classes; afterwards, in the following sections, each one of these\nis again sub-divided into several parts.\n\n[E] Doctor S. Landauer, in the Notes to his German Translation, quotes\nfully from the Greek text of Aristotle\u2019s \u00abDe Anima,\u00bb and comes to the\nconclusion that Ibn S\u00een\u00e2 has, in the first sub-section, given the\ncontents of de anima II, chap. 3, but has changed the order of the\nideas; and to the further conclusion that the second sub-section,\ndealing with the definition of the soul, is nothing more than an\nextract from de anima II, chap. 1.\n\n[9] \u00abdiffers, not through its matter, but through its form\u00bb: this\nresolves matter back to One Element; but he has already named Four,\nviz. Earth, Air, Fire, and Water; or rather he has declared the\nelements to be Four.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION THIRD\n\n  =To Establish that not One of the Faculties of the Soul Originates\n    out of a Combination (Blending) of the Elements, but on the\n    contrary Comes upon Them from Outside.=\n\n\nAll the various things that are, however composite they may be,\nand whatever form may have come about in the compound, will be (a)\neither inclining towards some one of the forms of the simples, or\nelse will not be so. And if they be not so inclining, they will be\n(b) either resulting from an aggregate (or mean) of the forms of the\nsimples, according to the degree of disproportion and deviation of the\nconstituents from equality, or else (c) they will not be assimilated to\nany one of the simples, but there will be made (generated, produced)\na form exceeding the requirement of the forms of the simples, both in\nregard to the measure of its simplicity and in regard to the measure\nof its complexity. An example of the first division is the bitterish\ntaste on compounding aloe, which is overpoweringly bitter, and honey,\nwhich is feebly sweet. An example of the second division is the color\ngrey, holding an equal relationship to both of the extremes (contrasts)\nblackness and whiteness, which results on compounding a white and a\nblack opposite. An example of the third of the said divisions is the\nseal\u2019s stamp (imprint) remaining in the clay (mortar, putty) which is\ncomposed of dry dust and liquid water on their being mixed up together;\nfor it is known that the imprint remaining in the putty is not in\npursuance to the requirement of the forms of the simples, neither\nwhether they be considered in respect of the resultant compound, nor\nwhether they be considered in respect of the simple constituents taken\nsingly.\n\nTo recapitulate:--it is known that the first division, if it be\nproduced, from simples whose forms are opposed (contrary) not through\nmechanical mixture (commingling) but through[10] blending (alloy,\namalgam)--it is clear I say in such cases that the overpowered\ncontraries will no longer have an existence of their own, nor an\nexistence of the effects peculiar to them, because of the impossibility\nof two contraries working together in one and the same carrier\n(medium), but the utmost effects they can exert will be to introduce a\ndecrease in the strength of the overpowering constituent, and nothing\nmore; and it is known that the second division, in what proportions\nsoever it be found, imposes reciprocity and equality both passive\nand active, that is to say the manifold workings that the forms of\nthe simples necessarily exert and the corresponding effects that\nthese forms suffer mutually one from the other must of necessity be\nreciprocal, and in the ratio of their respective proportions and\nstrengths; and lastly, it is known that the third division, if it\ncomes about, will not have resulted from the intrinsic (very) self\nof the compound, since it in no way at all belongs to it, neither in\nconsideration of its simple nor of its composite form. Hence it is\ngained (got, acquired) from without.\n\nIt is now necessary, since we have prefixed these premisses, that we go\ndeeper into our pursuit, so we say:--\n\nThat the soul has only come forth [for us through the foregoing\ncontemplations] in compound bodies whose forms are opposed and in\nnone others; nor will its manifestation in them be devoid (divested)\nof one of the three divisions; but it is not of the first division;\nelse it is heat or coldness, dryness or moisture (dampness), in any\nof which soever a decrease has more or less come about; and how shall\nany one of these powers be fit to put forth from itself multifarious\npsychical deeds, given the fact of the decrease (defect) occasioned\nin the very composition, and given also what it would have expended\nin that decrease out of its strength? nay, how shall any one of these\npowers cause motion save towards one direction alone? and wherefore\nhas it become necessary to effect mutual exclusion (displacement) among\npsychical movements so that their mutual exclusion (displacement)\nshall engender a dullness (or weariness), since in the effect\n(influence) of one identical thing there does not arise exclusion;\nnor is it of the second division, since the existence of the second\ndivision is an impossibility, and this because the elements, however\nmuch they may be compounded, under (proportionate) equality of the\npowers, this necessitates in them the stoppage (cessation) of all the\neffects attaching to each one of the two, and thus if the compound\nwere left alone (abandoned to itself) it would never have to move,\nneither upwards--else the heat is the overpowerer and the cold is\nthe one overpowered--nor downwards--else the cold is the overpowerer\nand the heat is the one overpowered--nay nor even would it remain at\nrest in one of the four spots of space (wherein dwell all the four\nelements)--else Nature which attracts towards itself is the overpowerer\ntherein--whereas it has been asserted that all of them are equal both\nto overpower and to be overpowered, and this is a contradiction:\nTherefore this body (such a body) is neither still nor moving,--whereas\nevery body which is surrounded by another body is either still\nor moving,--and this too is a contradiction; and what leads to\ncontradiction is itself a contradiction; so then our assertion that\nthe elements may possibly be compounded under equality of the powers is\na contradiction, and hence its opposite, to wit our saying that such is\nimpossible, is true [reduction ad absurdam]. Wherefore the coming forth\nof the soul, i.e., its combination with body, occurs only after the\nmethod of the third division; and it has been already said that what is\nafter the method of the third division is gained from outside: The soul\nthen is got from without--which is what we wished to show.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[10] Mechanical mixture, blending, combination, etc.: compare the Greek\nmixis, kr\u00e2sis, and synthesis.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION FOURTH\n\n  =Specification of the Vegetable (Plant) Powers, and Mention of the\n    Need there is for Each One of Them.=\n\n\nSouled bodies, I mean having souls, if considered from the side of\ntheir vegetable powers, are found to have in common the getting of\nnourishment, and to differ in growth and generation (reproduction of\noffspring); since, among nourishment-taking beings, there are such as\ndo not grow, for example a living individual that has reached full\ngrowth and the period of stand still, or that has declined therefrom\nthrough withering. Yet every growing thing gets nourishment. Again,\namong nutriment-taking beings there are such as do not propagate, as\nseeds that are not yet harvest-ripe, and an animal that has not yet\nreached puberty. Nevertheless, every propagating thing has inevitably\npassed through a preceding stage of nutrition; nor will the state\n(stage) of propagating ever be deprived of nutrition. Further, we find\nthem, beside having the getting of nourishment in common, to have\ngrowth also in common, but to differ in the propagation (of offspring)\nsince there are, among growing things, such as do not beget, as an\nanimal not yet arrived at puberty, and the worm.[11] Nevertheless every\nbegetter has already passed through a period of growth; nor will the\nstate (stage) of begetting be deprived of the power of giving growth\n[to the young that are being produced]. Hence the vegetable powers are\nthree:\n\n1. the nutritive; 2. the growth promoting; and 3. the propagating. Of\nthese the nutritive is as the starting-point; the propagating as the\naim and end; and the growth-promoting as the means binding the end to\nthe starting-place. Indeed the souled body stands in absolute need\nof these three powers for the following reasons: Whereas the Divine\nCommand came down upon Nature enjoining (imposing) upon her the task\nof forming a compound living being out of the four elements after such\nwise fashion as they called for in it; and whereas Nature of herself\nis unable to originate a souled body at one stroke, but can do so only\nby promoting its growth little by little;[F] and whereas an individual\nthat is put together after the manner of animal composition is\nsusceptible of being again decomposed and melting away by the natures\nof its constituents; and whereas a thing composed of opposites will\nnot keep up so protracted a duration and last so long a time as is\nexpected of it--therefore Nature is in want of a power by which she\ncan fabricate a living body by promotion of growth; so she has been\nsupplied by Divine Providence with the growth-giving power; and is in\nwant of a power whereby she can preserve the souled body at an even\nstandard[G] over against the waste which it undergoes in making up for\nwhat disintegration wears away from it; so she has been succoured by\nDivine Providence with the nutritive power; and is in want of a power\nthat shall mould, out of the living natural body, a piece that she\nshall dwell in, in order that if corruption permeate the body it shall\nhave sought for itself a successor as a substitute, whereby to arrive\nat the preservation of species; so she has been helped by the Divine\nProvidence with the propagating (generating) power.\n\nAnd we ought, in this connection, to bear in mind as a certain and true\nfact that the growth-giving power, although it has been found, from\nthe standpoint that we have mentioned, to be following close upon the\nnutritive, and the propagating (generating) to be following close upon\nthe growth-imparting (promoting), yet the precedence of the part played\nby each one of the three, in their undertaking the task of creating\nthe living body and preserving it through their special and peculiar\nworkings, is the other way about; for the first to enthrall the\nmaterial predisposed to receive life is the generating (procreating,\npropagating) power, since this power clothes the material at first\nwith the form (prototype) of that which is intended to be realized\nthrough the ministry (service) of the growth-promoting and nutritive\npowers; and as soon as it has achieved in that material a perfect form\nit delivers over the sway to the growth-promoting power, which assumes\nit through the ministry (service) of the nutritive power, and imparts\nto the material--all the time keeping up the form of the material\nwithin the due proportions of the [three] dimensions [length, breadth\nand thickness]--a motion (activity) of growth towards the end striven\nafter by it, the growth-promoting power aforesaid. Then this latter\nstops; and the nutritive power enthralls the material. Again, the\ngenerating (propagating) power is the one served, not the servant; and\nin comparison with it, the nutritive power is the servant, not the one\nserved. Thus too the growth-promoting power is served in one sense,\nand serving in an other sense. And the nutritive power, although it\ndoes not exist as the one served in the spiritual powers, yet it does\nsometimes employ the four forces of Nature--to wit, the attracting,\nthe holding, the digesting, and the excreting (repelling). And, even\nas that which is striven after in the process of form-making is solely\nthe bringing about of the [due] form in matter in the shape (kind,\ndesign) proposed, and not at all the bringing about of growth or of\nnutrition,--only that there is need for the two latter for the sake of\nrealizing the desired form, and not the converse--so also the final aim\nin the [several] powers is the procreating (propagating) power, to the\nexclusion of the growth-promoting and of the nutritive. Wherefore, the\nprocreating power is given precedence for a teliological reason.\n\nAnd through God is fitness to be achieved.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[11] Probably his view was that worms arise out of a germ of moist\nclay or mud, and are a sort of developed protoplasm. Compare \u00a76 of\nIbn Tufayl\u2019s \u00abHayy b. Yaqz\u00e2n,\u00bb and the Note thereto in the English\nTranslation about field-rats.\n\n[F] The germ of the Doctrine of Evolution as against Instantaneous\nCreation.\n\n[G] See Ibn S\u00een\u00e2\u2019s \u00ab_Q\u00e2n\u00fbn_,\u00bb Section 2, where he says: As to the\nnutritive power, it is that power which transforms the nutriment into\na resemblance with the nourishment-taker, in order that this nutriment\nmay succeed in the stead of what shall be wasted, and attach itself to\nthe taker instead of the waste.--See also \u00ab_Kit\u00e2b-ul-Naj\u00e2t_,\u00bb by Ibn\nS\u00een\u00e2.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION FIFTH\n\n  =Specification of the Animal Powers, and Mention of the Need there is\n    for Each One of Them.=\n\n\nI affirm that every animal is sentient, and hence it moves itself at\nwill, in some sort of motion; and that every animal moves itself in\nsome sort of motion at will, and hence it is sentient; since sensation\nin what does not move itself at will is wasted and useless, and the\nlack of it in what does move itself at will is harmful; whereas Nature,\nowing to that much of Divine Providence as has been joined to her,\ngives nothing whatever that is either wasted or harmful, nor witholds\neither the necessary or the useful. Perhaps some one may speak out here\nand object to us that shellfish are of such as feel (are sentient)\nand yet do not move themselves at will. This objection, however, will\nspeedily vanish on experiment; for shellfish, although they do not\nmove themselves from their places in a sort of organic (mechanical)\nlocomotion at will, yet they do more or less shrink themselves up and\nspread out inside of their shells, as I have witnessed with mine\nown eyes on having tried the experiment more than once, in that I\nturned the shell over onto its back, so that its position for drawing\nnourishment became separated from the ground; whereupon it ceased not\nto struggle until it had again stood in a position that made it easy\nfor it to draw in nourishment from the muddy bottom.\n\nAnd now that this has become surely certain for us, we shall further\nsay:\n\nThat whereas Divine Wisdom has decreed that an animal moving itself at\nwill shall be composed of the four elements, and as such animal would\nnot be secure against the evils of mishaps in its successive change\nof places during locomotion, it has been fitted out with the touching\npower (sense of touch), so as to flee through it from unfit places, and\nseek those that are fit. And whereas any such animal\u2019s constitution\n(make-up) cannot get on without the getting of nourishment; and as its\ngaining its food is a sort of free will effort; and as some articles\nof food suit it, and others do not,--it has been fitted out with the\ntasting power (sense of taste). These two powers (senses) are both\nuseful and necessary in life: the rest are useful, not necessary.\n\nNext after the Tasting, in degree of utmost need for it, comes the\nSmelling Sense, since odors will point the animal towards suitable\narticles of nourishment, with a strong indication; nor will the animal\nbe at all able to get on without nourishment, neither will its\nnourishment be got by it save through self-help. So Divine Providence\nhas deemed fit to impart the smelling power unto most animals. The\nnext after the smelling power in usefulness is the Seeing Power: the\nHow and Why of its usefulness, as to the animal, which moves itself\nat will, is that whereas its betaking itself to certain spots, such\nas fire-hearths, and away from certain spots, such as mountain peaks\nand seashores, is such as will lead to its hurt, therefore Divine\nProvidence has deemed fit to impart the seeing power unto most animals.\nThe next after the seeing power in usefulness is the Hearing Power.\nThe How and Why of its usefulness is that things harmful and things\nuseful may often be recognized as such, through it, by the peculiarity\nof their sounds and voices; so Divine Providence has deemed fit to\nimpart the hearing power unto most animals. Moreover, the use made\nof this power by the rational (speaking) species of the animal genus\nalmost surpasses the three [--is of all three nearly the highest]. This\nthen is an outline of the How and Why of the uses of the Five Outward\n(External) Senses.\n\nAnd whereas trustworthy arrival at a knowledge of the mutually\nsuitable and the mutually repellent will come about only through test\n(experiment, experience), Divine Providence has deemed fit to impart\nthe peculiar participating property (or sense)--I mean the picturing\npower--unto living beings (animals), in order that they shall through\nit preserve the forms of things perceived by the senses; and to impart\nthe remembering preserving power, in order that they shall through it\npreserve the meanings (significances) conceived out of things perceived\nby the senses; and to impart the imaginative power in order that they\nshall through it fit up (restore) what shall be wiped out from the\nmemory by a sort of motion; and to impart the conjecturing (surmising)\npower in order that they shall through it fix upon the sound (true) and\nthe weak (false) of what the imagination extracts, namely to fix upon\nthe true and false thereof with more or less presumption of certainty,\nuntil they [the living beings] shall review it in the mind.\n\nAs for the How and Why of need for the moving power, it is that whereas\nthe position of the animal is not the same as the position of the plant\nin its adaptation for attracting such foods as are useful and pushing\noff such as are harmful and incompatible, but on the contrary as this\nis brought about for the animal through a sort of earning by self-help,\nit needs a moving power for the purpose of drawing to itself the useful\nand driving away the harmful. Wherefore all the powers of the animal\nare either perceiving or motion-promoting. The motion-promoting is the\nyearning (desiderative, longing, craving) power: it is either urging\non to the search after a chosen object of animal good, and then it is\nthe lusting power; or else it is urging on to the warding off of an\nobject of animal dislike, and then it is the hating power (angry power).\n\nThe perceiving power too is either outward (apparent), such as the five\nsenses; or else inward (internal, hidden), such as the picturing, the\nimaginative, the conjecturing, and the remembering power.\n\nFurthermore, the motion-promoting power does not cause to move save on\na peremptory bidding from the conjecturing, through the agency (means)\n[or by the employment] of the imaginative. Also, the motion-promoting\npower, in animals other than the speaking (or rational) species, is\nthe aim and end; and this is so, because the motion-causing power is\nnot imparted unto them in order that they shall through it direct\naright the workings of sensation and imagination so as to adapt these\nworkings to the attainment of their own good, but on the contrary the\npower of sensation and of imagination are imparted to the non-speaking\nirrational animals solely in order to direct aright through them the\nworkings of motion, and to adapt these workings to the good of the\nanimals. Whereas, the speaking rational species of living beings is on\nthe reverse wise; because unto it was imparted the motion-causing power\nwholly and solely in order that through this power it shall be fitted\nto set aright the speaking self, i.e., the rational intelligent soul,\nnot the other way about.\n\nThus then, the motion-promoting power in the irrational animal is, as\nit were, the prince commander that is served; the five senses, the\nspies that are sent forth; the perceptive power, the post-master of\nthe prince commander unto whom the spies return; the imagining power,\nthe foot-messenger going to and fro between the post[H][12] and the\npost-master; the conjecturing power, the prince\u2019s adjutant minister;\nthe remembering power, the closet of state papers.\n\nAs for the starry firmament and plants, the feeling power and the\nimagining power have not been imparted unto them, even though each one\nof them has a soul and though it has life: the firmament has not these\npowers, because of its loftiness; plants have them not, because of\ntheir abasement in comparison to it.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[H] or wazir, minister.\n\nIn treating of the animal powers, he treats first of the fives senses,\nand then of the animal Powers. These latter he gives in this section\nthree times, and each time varies the order somewhat, thus:--\n\n1st. Order of mention:\n\n  a. participating, picturing\n  b. remembering, preserving\n  c. imaginative, restoring\n  d. conjecturing, surmising\n  e. moving\n\n2nd. Order of mention:\n\n  a. picturing, participating\n  b. imaginative\n  c. conjecturing, surmising\n  d. remembering\n\n3d Order of mention, in the final Allegorical Summing Up:\n\n  a. motion-promoting\n  b. feeling, sentient, 5 outward senses\n  c. perceptive\n  d. imagining\n  e. conjecturing\n  f. remembering.\n\n[12] Moreover, the Text seems in Doctor Landauer\u2019s opinion to need\nan emendation, in this Allegory, which is furnished by the Latin\nTranslation preserved in Florence. According to the text, we get a\nwholly superfluous intermediary notion, to wit the Post, which disturbs\nthe parallel and similitude of the allegory. Instead of _bar\u00eed_, we\nshould read _waz\u00eer_ = Latin, inter vicarium principis. If this is done,\nthe whole passage becomes clearer, and hangs together better. Yet, for\nall this, the _bar\u00eed_ was in those days a highly important branch of\nthe government service: witness, the office of _c\u00e2heb-ul-bar\u00eed_.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION SIXTH\n\n  =Treating in Detail of the Five Senses, and of How they perceive.=\n\n\nAs to the seeing power, philosophers have differed on the question of\nHow they perceive. Thus one set among them asserts that they perceive\nwholly and solely through a ray that shoots out beyond the eye, and so\nencounters the sensible objects that are seen. This is Plato\u2019s way.[13]\nOthers assert that the perceiving power itself encounters the sensible\nobjects that are seen, and so perceives them. Still others say that\nvisual perception consists in this:--When the intervening transparent\nbody becomes effectively transparent by light shining upon it, then an\nimpression of the outspread (flattened) individual of such sensible\nobjects as are seen is effected in the cristalline[14] lens of the eye,\njust such a pictorial impression as is effected in looking-glasses\n(mirrors); indeed the two effects are so similar that were mirrors\npossessed of a seeing power they would perceive the form imprinted in\nthem. This is Aristotle\u2019s way; and it is the sound reliable opinion.\nThat Plato\u2019s view is false, is quite clear. For, were it true that a\nray goes out from the seat of sight and encounters sensible objects,\nthen sight would be in no need of light, but would on the contrary\nperceive in the dark, and would rather illuminate the air on its exit\ninto the dark. Moreover such a ray will not fail of one of two modes:\neither it will subsist throughout the eye only, in which case Plato\u2019s\nopinion that it goes forth from the eye is wrong; or else it will\nsubsist throughout a body other than the material of which the eye is\ncomposed; for it must inevitably have a vehicle to carry it, seeing\nthat a ray is an accidental quality or mode, and furthermore seeing\nthat that body which is other than the eye will not fail, in its turn,\nof being, either, _firstly_, sent out from the eye, in which case it\nwill follow as a matter of course that the eye will not see all that is\nbeneath the clear blue of the sky, since one body will not penetrate\nthroughout the whole of another body, unless forsooth it moves the\nlatter away and occupies its place; and even should the disputer plead\na vacuum, not only does Plato deny the existence of a vacuum utterly,\nbut also if we accomodatingly yield this point and admit the existence\nof a vacuum, yet for all this the body that goes forth from the eye\nwill penetrate throughout the body of water, for example, into such\nof its pores as are empty only, and not into the whole of the water\u2019s\nbulk; so that even according to this opinion it will necessarily\nso be that the eye will see only some places of all that is under\nwater;--or else, _secondly_, that body which is other than the eye\nwill not fail of being an intervening body intermediate between the\nseer and the seen, in which case the light[I] which comes forth from\nthe eye will subsist through it; nevertheless this opinion too is\nunsound, for the reason that every thing whatsoever is, in proximity\nto its source, so much the stronger, and in this respect light has not\nits equal; whence it follows as regards the object seen that, however\nclosely and nearly it approaches to the eye, our perception will then\nbe stronger; and thus if we do away with the intermediary body, the\neye will still perceive the object felt by its sense of sight, and\nthus the intermediary which is the vehicle and carrier of light is no\nlonger needed, save accidentally (by chance); and then too there is no\nneed, in order to see, for an exit of light: this too is a falsehood.\nWherefore Plato\u2019s opinion is worthless.\n\nAs for such as hold that the perceiver of the thing seen is the\nimaginative power itself through the imprinting of the form (image)\nof the sensible object upon it, these render the absent on the same\nfooting as the present, since in the imaginative power there may exist\nthe image of a sensible object, notwithstanding the absence afterwards\nof the object that had been so felt: at which time however the living\nbeing so preserving that image will not be qualified with sight but\nwith imagination and memory. Furthermore these theorists (opiners)\nmake a greater blunder still, seeing that they render a thing of\nNature\u2019s make and composition wholly idle, useless, and unneeded in\nthe operation of visual perception; inasmuch as in their opinion the\nimaginative power itself meets immediately sensible objects, and thus\nspares Nature the task of adapting an instrument (organ), to wit the\ncomplex eye.\n\nWherefore the sound theory is that the configurations of things stand\nout in the transparent ambient--if it be effectively transparent on the\nshining of a luminant upon it--and hence they do not appear but in a\npolished body capable of receiving them, such as mirrors and the like;\nand so too there is in the eye a crystalline lens (or humor) into which\nthe forms (pictures) of things are imprinted, just as their impression\ninto mirrors; and in it, i.e., the lens or the eye, has been fitted\nup the seeing power; so that, if such forms are imprinted in it, it\nperceives them. Moreover, the objects of perception belonging in truth\nand deed to sight are the Colors.\n\nAs for the Hearing Power: it hears only sound. And sound is a motion\nof air that the ear feels on two hard smooth bodies coming quickly\nclose up one to the other, the escaping of the air from between them,\nits striking the ear, and its moving the air that is kept ready within\nthe instrument (organ) of hearing. Thus, if this inside air move the\ninstrument, and if this instrument\u2019s motion act upon the nerve of\nhearing, the hearing power (sense, faculty) perceives it in the measure\nof the strength or weakness of that motion. Indeed hardness is a\n_conditio sine qua non_; for, in the case of two soft bodies, the air\nwill not escape from them, but will dissipate itself throughout their\npores. Smoothness too is just such a condition; because, in the case\nof rough (unsmooth) bodies, not the whole of the air will escape from\nbetween them suddenly and violently, but will be witheld (shut up) in\nthe passages. And rapidity of contact also is a like condition; for if\nit come about gently and slowly, the air would not escape violently.\n\nThe echo too will arise from the rebound of the air escaping from\nbetween the two encountering bodies by reason of its hitting (slapping)\nagainst another hard, flat or hollow body filled with air, because of\nthe air that is within it hindering the penetration of the escaped air,\nand the latter\u2019s striking the ear [again] after the first stroke; on\nthe same wise as in the first instance.\n\nAs to the Smelling Power; it smells odors on the sniffing in of air\nthat has received its odor from an odoriferous body, as one body\nreceives its warmth from another warm body. Thus, if an animal snuffs\nup air like this into its nose until such air touches the front of the\nbrain, and alters it to its own odor, the smelling power feels it.\n\nAs for Taste, it arises only on the coming to pass of the following\nchange: When the moisture of the tasting instrument (organ)--to wit the\ntongue--becomes transformed into the juice of the newly-come food; and\nwhen the mass of this instrument (organ) has received that juice, the\ntasting power will perceive what has happened within the instrument.\n\nAs for Touch: it will only arise upon the organ\u2019s (instrument\u2019s)\nreceiving the quality of that which is touched, and upon the touching\npower\u2019s perceiving what has been thus presented (offered) within the\norgan.\n\nFurthermore, simple sensibles, that are at once primary and as such the\nbases of all others, are in pairs, of which there are eight; and if we\nmake each into singles, they become sixteen, to wit:--\n\n(a) Touch, four pairs:--1. heat and cold; 2. moisture and dryness; 3.\nroughness and smoothness; 4. hardness and softness. The four remaining\nsenses, each having a pair, viz.,\n\n(b) Smelling, one pair, which is fragrant odour, and fetid stinking\nodour,\n\n(c) Tasting, one pair, viz., sweet and bitter,\n\n(d) Hearing, one pair, namely, heavy sound and sharp sound (or dull and\nshrill),\n\n(e) Sight, one pair, to wit, white and black.\n\nAll other sensibles are made up from these simples, and are\nintermediates between some two of them, as for example grey (dusty\ncolor) from white and black, lukewarm from hot and cold. Moreover all\nsensibles are felt wholly and solely through a sort of gathering and\nsundering, shrinking and spreading; except sounds, which are felt only\nthrough sundering. Thus:--\n\n  1. [Warmth is felt through sundering]\n  2. Cold is felt through gathering\n  3. Moisture, through spreading\n  4. Dryness, through shrinking\n  5. Roughness, through sundering\n  6. Smoothness, through spreading\n  7. Hardness, through repelling, which is a sort of gathering and\n       shrinking\n  8. Softness, through being repelled, which is not devoid of spreading\n       and sundering\n  9. Sweetness, through spreading, devoid of sundering\n  10. Bitterness, through sundering and shrinking\n  11. Fragrant Odor, through spreading, devoid of sundering\n  12. Stinking Odor, through sundering and shrinking\n  13. Whiteness, through sundering\n  14. Blackness, through gathering\n  [15. and 16. Sounds: one pair, as above under \u201cd.\u201d]\n\nAs to the media (intermediaries) between the feeling powers and the\nfelt forms, they are themselves devoid of the forms of sensibles;\notherwise it would not be possible for them to be media, since their\nown forms--if they had any--would then so engage the apposite power\nas to divert it from perceiving any other forms. Such voidness or\nfreedom from forms is either voidness wholly and altogether, or else\nrelative voidness through equableness of the forms in the media, such\nas the equable proportion of the qualities touched in meat, which is\na medium between the touching power and the quality touched, although\nmeat is incontestably made up of qualities that are touched, yet\nnotwithstanding this the equableness of the qualities has annihilated\nthe forms in it. Examples of the first division--absolute voidness\nand freedom from form--are the freedom of air, of water, and of\nwhat resembles them among the various media of sight, from color;\nthe freedom of air and of water, both which are the two mediums of\nsmelling, from odor; the freedom of water, which is the medium of\ntasting, from flavor; and the steadiness of the air, which is the\nmedium of hearing, and its freedom from motion.\n\nFurther, each of these powers, to wit the five senses, if actually\nfunctionating, perceives only through coming into relation with the\nobject felt, nay rather it only perceives at first so much as has\nbeen traced in it of the form of the object felt. Thus, the eye only\nperceives that form which has imprinted itself in it of the object\nfelt; so also the remainder of the powers (or senses). Again, in the\ncase of strong wearying sensibles, such as a loud noise, a strong\nsmell, a shining and a flashing light, if they are repeated upon the\norgan (instrument), spoil and dullen it through their overworking it.\nAgain, each one of the five senses perceives, through the means of its\nown rightful perception and besides the same, five other things, to\nwit: 1. shape; 2. number; 3. size; 4. motion; 5. rest (quiet). That\nsight, touch, and taste perceive them, is evident. As to hearing, it\nperceives, in accordance (pursuance) with the variety of the number\nof sounds, the number of the sound-emitting objects; and, through the\nstrength of the sounds, it perceives the size of the two objects that\nare hitting against each other; and, in accordance with a kind of\nchange and fixedness of the sounds, it perceives motion and rest; and,\nin accordance with their volume around the sound-emitter, be the latter\nsolid or hollow, it perceives some sorts of shapes. As to smelling, it\nknows, in accordance with the change of directions whence the odors are\nemitted and reach it, and through the variety of these odors in their\nqualities, it knows I say the number of the things smelt; through the\nmeasure of abundance of the smells, the size of such things; through\nthe measure of proximity and distance, changeableness and fixedness,\nit recognizes their motion and their rest; and, in accordance with the\nsides on which their odor reaches it from one and the same body, it\nknows their shape. Still, these discriminations are very weak in this\npower among mankind, owing to the weakness of the power itself in the\nhuman race. [For all this, men have not the keen scent that many other\nanimals have, and therefore such discriminations are in men very weak.]\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[13] Plato\u2019s Dialogue entitled \u00abTimaeos,\u00bb 45.\n\n[14] The names of the different parts of the eye are:\n\n  a. al-tabaqah al \u00e7albah = sclerotica, hard-coat\n  b.  \u00bb    \u00bb    al-mash\u00eemiyyah = choroid, vascular skin\n  c. al-ghash\u00e2-al-shabaky = retina, net skin\n  d. al-rat\u00fbbah al-zaj\u00e2jiyyah = glassy moisture\n  e. al-rat\u00fbbah al-jal\u00eediyyah = crystalline lens\n  f.  \u00bb   \u00bb      \u00bb \u00b4ankab\u00fbtiyyah = ciliary, fibrous, hairy web\n  g. al-hadaqah = pupilla\n  h. al-tabaqah al-\u00b4inabiyyah = berry, grape coat\n  i. qarniyyah = cornea\n  k. al-multahimah = conjunctiva.\n\n[I] perhaps we ought to read \u00ab_the ray_\u00bb.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION SEVENTH\n\n  =Dealing in Detail with the inward Senses, (and the Motion-Promoting\n    Powers).=\n\n\nI. Not one of the outward senses unites within itself perception of\ncolor, odor, and softness; and yet, we often come upon a body that is\nyellow, and perceive at once so much about it, namely that it is honey,\nsweet, nice of smell, and fluid, although we have neither tasted, nor\nsmelt, nor even touched it; whence it is manifest that we possess a\npower wherein are assembled the perceptions of the four senses, and\nhave thus become summed up in it into one single form; and were it not\nfor this power we should not know that sweetness, for instance, is\nother than blackness, since the discriminator between two things is he\nwho has known them both. This is the power which is designated as the\ncommon-sense, and the picturing (or representing) power. And were it\none of the outward apparent senses, its sway (dominion) would limit\nitself to the state of wakefulness only; whereas ocular observation\nattests what is quite otherwise; for this power does at times perform\nits action in both the states of sleep and wakefulness.\n\nII. Furthermore, there is in animals a power which sets up such forms\nas have assembled in the common-sense, discriminates between them, and\ndifferentiates them, without the forms themselves disappearing from the\ncommon-sense. And this power is undoubtedly other than the aforesaid\npicturing power; since in the latter there are none but true (real)\nforms that have been acquired (obtained) from sense; whereas in this\npower the case may be otherwise, and it may imagine and picture wrongly\nand falsely, and what it had not received after such a [wrong and\nfalse] pattern (shape) from any one of the senses. This power is the\none named imagination.\n\nFurther, there is in animals a power that passes judgment, upon such or\nsuch a thing that it is so or not so, decisively, and through which the\nanimal flees away from shunned evil and seeks chosen good. It is also\nevident that this power is other than the imaginative, since this last\nimagines (pictures to itself) the sun, in accordance with what it has\ngot from the apposite sense, to be of the size of its disc; whereas the\nmatter stands in this power quite otherwise. So too the lion finds his\nprey from far off of the size of a small bird, yet its form and size in\nno way perplex him, but he makes for it. It is also evident that this\npower is other than the imaginative, and this because the imaginative\npower performs its manifold deeds without belief and conviction on its\npart that matters are in accordance with its imagining. This power is\nwhat is named the conjecturing or the surmising faculty (or judgment).\n\nIII. Further, there is in living beings a power that preserves\nthe purports (or thoughts and conceptions) of what the senses had\nperceived, such as, for instance, that the wolf is an enemy; the child,\na darling next of kin. Wherefore, so much at least if not more is\nevident, that this power is other than the common-sense (or picturing),\ninasmuch as in the latter there are no forms but such as it has gained\nfrom the senses; whereas, again, the senses did not feel the wolf\u2019s\nenmity, nor the child\u2019s love, but alone the wolf\u2019s image, and the\nchild\u2019s bodily shape; and as to love and fierceness, it is the mind\u2019s\neye alone that has got them, and then stored them up in this power. It\nis also clear that this power is other than the imaginative power, for\nthe reason that this last does at times imagine what is other than that\nwhich the mind\u2019s eye has deemed right, found true, and has derived from\nthe senses; whereas the former power, i.e., the one here dealt with,\nimagines none other than what the mind\u2019s eye has deemed right, has\nfound true, and has derived from the senses.\n\nThis power is also other than the conjecturing (surmising) power, for\nthe reason that this last does not preserve what some other has deemed\nto be true, but it of its own self deems to be true, whilst the power\nhere treated of does not itself pass judgment of truth or falsehood,\nbut only preserves what another has deemed to be true. This power is\ncalled memory, the preserving or keeping faculty.\n\nAgain, the imaginative power is called by this name--imagination--if\nthe conjecturing (or surmising) power alone use it: and if the speaking\n(rational) power use it, it is called the thinking (cogitative) power.\n\nThe heart is the source (spring) of all these powers (faculties), in\nAristotle\u2019s opinion; yet the sway over them is in different organs\n(instruments). Thus the sway over the outward (apparent) senses is in\ntheir known organs; whereas the sway over the picturing (representing\ncommon-sense) power is in the anterior hollow (ventricle) of the brain;\nthe sway over the imaginative, in the middle hollow thereof; the sway\nover the remembering, in the posterior hollow thereof; and the sway\nover the conjecturing, throughout all the brain, but above all in the\ncompartment of the imaginative within the brain [or, throughout the\nwhole of the brain, but more especially alongside of the imaginative\nthereof]. And in so far as these hollows (ventricles) suffer harm and\nhurt, so will the manifold workings of these powers suffer also;\nfor were they, (the powers,) standing independently, that is to say\nsubsisting in themselves, and efficient independently, that is to\nsay putting forth their workings of themselves, they would not need,\nfor their proper and peculiar actions, any sort of instrument or\norgan: in this wise one recognizes that these powers do not subsist\nin themselves, but that the undying power is the Speaking (Reasoning)\nSoul, as we shall hereafter set forth; yet for all this, the soul does\nmaybe at times seek out for itself after a fashion (so to speak) the\npurest quintessences of the kernels of these powers, and cause them\nto exist of themselves, the setting forth of which shall, D.v., soon\nfollow.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe following is the terminology of the five inward senses:\n\n    1. Common-Sense = hiss mushtarak, muta\u00e7awwirah.\n\n    2. Vis formans, imaginatio = khay\u00e2l, mu\u00e7awwirah, fantasia,\n      takhayyul, mutakhayyilah.\n\n    3. Vis cogitativa, vis imaginativa = mufakkirah, mutakhayyilah,\n      mutawahhimah, z\u00e2nnah, muta\u00e7arrifah, mutafakkirah, takhayyul.\n\n    4. Memory, remembering, preserving = h\u00e2fizah, mutazhakkirah,\n      zh\u00e2kirah, zhikr.\n\n    5. Vis existimativa, opinativa = wahm, mutawahhimah, zh\u00e2nnah,\n      takhayyul, wahmiyyah.\n\nHere follows an attempt to clear up this bewildering subject:\n\n1. Perception, through any one or more of the five outward senses, of\nthe outward concrete form.\n\n2. Conception of particular notions, over and beyond the concrete form\nperceived.\n\n3. Memory, which retains both outward forms perceived as well as\nrecalls inward particular forms conceived.\n\n4. Common-Sense, rises a step higher than the three preceding, in that\nit unites two or more of the products of any of the three preceding and\nderives from them a new conception.\n\n5. Opining, which rises higher still and passes judgment, or comes to a\ndefinite opinion as to the truth or falsehood of conceptions formed.\n\nIn respect of memory, Ibn S\u00een\u00e2 in his \u00abKanon\u00bb of Medicine, makes a\ndistinction. He says: \u00abAnd just here is a point for scrutiny and\njudgment as to whether the preserving power and the power recalling (to\nconsciousness) such notions as had been stored up by the opining power\nbut have passed away from it, are one power or two.\u00bb\n\nHere follows still another attempt:\n\n1. Perception, of the Five Senses, through organs.\n\n2. Sway of the Common-Sense, in the anterior hollow.\n\n3. Sway of the Imaginative Power, in the middle hollow.\n\n4. Sway of the Remembering Power, in the posterior hollow.\n\n5. Sway of the Conjecturing Power, throughout all the brain, and\nalongside of the imaginative compartment.\n\nNumber 1. has been dealt with in Section Six; number 5 belongs\nexclusively to Man, and will be further dealt with in the next Section;\nthe remaining three, to wit numbers 2, 3, and 4, are in all live\nanimals, and are dealt with in this Seventh Section. The theory is\nbeautifully clear and simple: thus, number 2 grasps and appropriates\nthe outward form brought to it by the senses; number 3 grasps and\nappropriates particular conceptions; and number 4 stores them up;\nthus also, the one dwelling in the front hollow is not influenced by\nthe action of the one occupying the middle or the hindermost hollow,\nwhereas conversely each succeeding faculty has recourse to the one\npreceding it in order of place. This theory arose after an acquaintance\nwith the division and arrangement of the brain into chambers had made\nconsiderable progress with the Arabs.\n\nThose who read German should not fail to study Dr. Samuel Landauer\u2019s\nerudite notes in vol. 29 for the year 1875 of the Z.d.D.M.G.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION EIGHTH\n\n  =A Sketch of the Human Soul from the Starting-Point whence it sets\n    out until the End-Point whither it reaches its Perfection.=\n\n\nNo doubt that the speaking (rational) species of the [genus] animal is\ndistinguished from the non-speaking (irrational species) by a power,\nthrough which it is enabled to imagine things rational, which power\nis called the speaking (rational) soul; and the custom has obtained\nof calling it the \u201chylik\u201d mind, that is to say the potential mind,\nthus likening it to the hyle, which is potential matter.[J] Moreover\nthis power is found in the whole human species; and it possesses in\nitself at the outset none of the mentally-grasped forms, but these\narise within it after two sorts of processes: The first is through a\nDivine guidance, without effort of study, and without profitting from\nthe senses, as for example the mentally-grasped self-evident axioms,\nlike our conviction that the whole is greater than the part, and that\ntwo contradictories (contrasts) do not come together at one time in\none and the same thing; so that sane-minded adults share equally in\nthe acquisition of such forms. The second sort of process is through\nearning [the mental thought or truth] by reasoning process, and by\narray of proof and demonstration, such as the conception of logical\ntruths, like genera, species, differentia, and properties, simple\nterms, and terms compounded in the various modes of compositions [of\nseveral ideas into one composite term], justly-moded syllogisms both\nvalid and false, propositions which if moded into syllogisms lead to\nnecessary demonstrated results, or to argumentative probable results,\nor to equally balanced rhetorical results, or to primary (axiomatical)\nsophistical results, or to impossible poetical results;[15] and\nsuch mentally-grasped forms as the recognition of the certainty of\nnatural realities, like hyle (primitive matter) and form, privation\n(non-existence) and Nature, place and time, rest and motion, bulky\nbodies of the sky-firmament and bulky elemental bodies, absolute\nuniversal being and absolute nothingness, generation absolute and\ncorruption absolute, origen of things generated that are within the\nsky, that are within the deepest depths of mines, and that are on the\nearth\u2019s crust, amongst which last-named are plant and animal, the true\nconception \u201cMan\u201d and the truth of the soul\u2019s conception of its own\nself; and still further such mentally-grasped forms as the conception\nof ideas mathematical, amongst which are number, pure geometry, stellar\ngeometry, harmonical or musical geometry, optical geometry; and\nagain, further still, such ideas as the conception of divine affairs,\nlike the knowledge of the principles of the absolute self-existent\nin so far as he exists _per se_, and of the principles consequently\nadhering to him, such as potentiality, power and efficiency, first\ncause and accounting cause, essence and accidens, genus and species,\nincompatibility and homogeneity, agreement and disagreement, unity and\nmultiplicity; and, still further, the fixing of the principles of the\nspeculative (theoretical) sciences, amongst which are the mathematical,\nthe natural and the logical--all which cannot be attained save through\nthis latter science;[16] and still further, such as proving the first\nCreator and the first Created, the universal (generic) soul and _how_\ncreation came about, the relative position of mind towards creation,\nand the relative position of soul towards mind, the relative position\nof hyle towards nature, and of forms towards the soul, the relative\nposition of the skies, orbs, planets and all existing things towards\nhyle and towards form, and why and wherefore they differ so widely as\nthey do as to forwards and backwards ([Greek: proteron kai hysteron:\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f51\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd]) of development; and the knowledge of the divine\ngovernment, universal nature, primal providence, prophetic inspiration,\nthe divine holy spirit, sublime angels, attaining to the certainty\nof the Creator\u2019s being beyond all partnership and similitude [i.e.\nrecognizing the truth that polytheism and anthropomorphism, are to be\nrejected]; and attaining to the knowledge of what rewards await the\nrighteous, and what punishments impend the wicked, of the delight and\nthe pain overtaking souls after their abandoning the bodies.\n\nFurther, this power which conceives these ideas does at times gain\nfrom sense forms mental, imaginative, and innate in (instinctive to)\nitself; and in such a case it does this in that it lays before itself\nthe forms that are in the conceiving power and in the remembering\n(preserving) power, by employing the imaginative and the conjecturing\npower, and then contemplates them, and finds them to have participated\nin some forms and to have differed in some other forms; and finds some\namongst the forms that are in these powers to be essential, and others\nto be accidental. And as to their participation in forms, it is like\nthe participation of the form Richard and an ass, in the conceiver\u2019s\nmind, in the idea of Life; and the differing of the two in the idea of\nspeaking (rational), and non-speaking (brute). As to the essential\nform, it is e.g. like the life that is in them both; as for the\naccidental, it is e.g. like their blackness and whiteness. So that\nif we find the two aforesaid on this wise--i.e., as stated,--[the\nmind] makes each one of these essential and accidental, participated\nand peculiar forms, one universal mental form singly and alone, and\nthus through this working-over process, it gets at mental genera,\nspecies, differentia, properties, accidens; then it combines these\nsingle notions into particular combinations; then into syllogistic\nargumentative combinations and deduces from them corollaries from the\nresults--all which it gets through the service of the animal powers,\nwith the help of universal mind, after the manner that we shall\nset forth later on, and through the intermediary of such necessary\nself-evident mental axioms as it has been endowed with.\n\nMoreover this power, although it derives help from the sensuous power\nwhen getting out single mental forms from the sensuous forms, yet it\ndoes not need the sensuous power for conceiving these ideas (notions)\nwithin itself and for setting up syllogisms out of them, neither\nwhen affirming, nor when conceiving the two dicta [of abstraction &\ngeneralization], as we shall afterwards explain. And to whatever extent\nit derives sensuous corollaries, for which there shall be need, through\nthe said working-over process, yet it dispenses with the employment\nof the sensuous powers, nay it is even sufficient for and in itself,\nfor the carrying on of all its manifold activities. And just as the\nsensuous powers perceive solely and wholly through an assimilation\nof that which is felt, so also do the mental powers perceive solely\nthrough and wholly through an assimilation of the mentally-grasped;\nand this assimilation is the abstraction of the form from matter,\nand the adhering to it; only that the feeling power does not get the\nsensuous form through willed motion and voluntary action on its part,\nbut through the arrival of the very thing felt unto it, either by\nchance or through the intermediary of the motion-promoting power, and\nlaying bare of the forms unto it (abstraction) through the help of\nthe media that connect the forms with it; whereas, in the case of the\nmental power, (Reason Understanding) this process is otherwise; for\nby and through itself it at times does itself perform the abstraction\n(laying bare) of the form from matter as often as it wills, and then\nclings unto it. And for this reason it is said that the sentient power\nis more or less passive in its conception [or, that the feeling power\nis after a fashion acted upon when it conceives], and that the mental\n(understanding) power is active; nay rather it is said, for this\nreason, that the sentient power cannot do without instruments (organs),\nand has in itself no efficiency; and how is it possible to apply such\na statement (proposition) to the mental (understanding) power?\n\nThe mind (Understanding, Reason) is in fact and deed wholly and\nsolely nothing else than the forms of mentally-grasped things, if\nthese be arrayed in the very mind potentially, and through it they\nare brought out to effective action; and hence it is said that the\nmind is in fact and deed at once both understanding and understood.\nAmongst the properties of the understanding power is this, that it\nunifies the many and multiplies the one through analysis and synthesis.\nAs to multiplication, it is such as the analysis of one man into\nessence, body, nourishment-getting, animal, speaking (rational). As to\nunification of the many, it is such as the composition (synthesis) of\nthis one man out of essence, body, animal, speaking (rational) into one\nnotion which is mankind (human being).\n\nMoreover the mind, although it applies its activity within a duration\nof time in arranging syllogisms, through using reflection, yet the\nresult itself, which this reflection obtains, and which is the fruit of\nthought and the end sought after, is not dependant upon time, nor is\nit obtained save at an instant; nay more than this, the mind itself is\nwholly above and beyond all time.\n\nAnd the reasoning (speaking) soul, if it engages itself upon the\nsciences, its activity is called mind or intellect, and it is\naccordingly called speculative or theoretical mind: which I have\nalready described. And if it engages itself upon overcoming blameworthy\npowers, that entice unto wrongdoing through their excess, unto folly\nthrough their abandonment, unto impetuosity through their agitation,\nunto cowardice through their indifference or lukewarmness, or unto\nwickedness through their excitement, or unto degeneration through\ntheir smouldering, and leads them over into the paths of wisdom,\nendurance, chastity--in short unto righteousness, then its activity\nis called ruling or governing, and it is accordingly called practical\nmind or reason. Again, the reasoning (speaking) power is sometimes\nso fitted out in a few persons through [K]vigils and conjunction with\nthe universal mind as to be quite independent of taking refuge unto\nsyllogistic argument and reflection, but rather is sufficiently stored\nwith inspiration and revelation to render it wholly absolved from\nsuch ordinary means as mental ratiocination: this peculiar property\nof the reasoning mind is called hallowedness or sanctity, and it is\naccordingly called Holy Ghost. Unto such a favoured rank and degree\nnone shall attain save prophets and apostles, upon whom be peace and\nblessing.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[J] Ibn S\u00een\u00e2 in his \u00ab_Kit\u00e2b-ul-Naj\u00e2t_\u00bb says: \u00abIndeed it has been called\n\u00abhylik\u00bb by way of likening it to primitive hylik matter, which in\nitself has no form at all and yet is the substratum of each and every\nform.\u00bb\n\n[15] This passage as to syllogisms and conclusions may be made clearer\nby rendering it thus:--\u00abwhich, if arranged syllogistically, allow of\ngetting to conclusions that are (a) necessarily true and valid, viz.\napodictic; (b) most always true, viz. dialectic; (c) both true and\nfalse, viz. rhetorical; (d) preponderantly false, viz. sophistical; and\n(e) merely false, viz. poetical.\u00bb\n\n[16] In his \u00ab_Naj\u00e2t_\u00bb Ibn S\u00een\u00e2 says of this science:\n\n\u00abLogic is the theoretical speculative science that teaches out of which\nforms and materials there will come about satisfying argumentation,\nof which argumentation that which is strong, and imposes an assertion\nresembling certainty, is called dialectic; and that which is weak\nthereof, and imposes a prevailing opinion, is called rhetorical.\u00bb\n\nHis compendious Essay on Logic remains to this day one of the clearest\nand best that beginners can find in the Arabic language on this\nabstract science of the Laws of Thought.\n\n[K] fasting, prayer, night-watchings.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION NINTH\n\n  =in which the Proofs of the Essentiality of the Soul, and of Its\n    Independence of Body in its Structure, are set forth in pursuance\n    of the Method of Logicians.=\n\n\nSUB-SECTION A:--One of the logical proofs for establishing this Claim:\n\nLet us however first preface it with premisses, among which are:--\n\n_First Premiss_: that man conceives universal (generic) notions wherein\na greater or less multitude participates, such as man at large, and\nanimal at large. And of these generic notions there are such as\nhe conceives through a particular [or partial, or an obligatory]\nsynthesis, and there are such others of these generic notions as he\ndoes not conceive by any synthesis, but singly and individually. And\nunless he shall have conceived the latter division (class, sett), it\nis not possible for him to conceive the former. Further, he conceives\neach one of these generic universal notions only under _one_ form,\nwholly stripped (abstracted) from all relationship to its concrete\nsensuous particulars, since the particulars of each one of the generic\nnotions are potentially endless [in variety and number] and no one of\nthe particulars has any right of priority over another particular in\nrespect of that _one_ form of the generic notion.\n\n_Second Premiss_: that a form, whatsoever body it detaches, reduces,\nand adorns, and in general whatsoever individual of divisible things\nit so takes hold of, it clothes the same and exactly fits the same\nin every one of its parts. And whatsoever clothes and exactly fits a\ndivisible thing in all its parts is itself divisible; and hence every\nform that has clothed and exactly fitted any body whatsoever is itself\ndivisible.\n\n_Third Premiss_: that in every generic (universal) form, if regard be\nhad, in the division of such form, purely and simply to its abstract\nself, then it will not at all validly follow that the parts into\nwhich it has been divided shall necessarily resemble the whole in its\ncomplete notion; otherwise it must follow that the generic form, whose\ndivision has been made in respect of its abstract self, has not been\nitself divided, but that it has been divided into its constituents,\nwhether these be its various species or its numerous individuals,\nwhereas multiplicity of species or of individuals does not necessarily\nentail division in the abstract generic notion itself. But it has been\nlaid down as a fact that such division has actually taken place, which\nis a contradiction. Hence our assertion that the parts of the generic\nform do not resemble it in its full and complete notion is a true\ndictum.\n\n_Fourth Premiss_: that in the mental form, if regard be had to its\ndivision, it will not validly follow that its parts are denuded\n(stripped) of the totality of its notion. This is so because, if we\nadmit such total denudation, and assert that these parts are utterly\naloof from the complete conception of the generic whole, then the form\nwill arise, in such parts, only upon their assembling together, so\nthat they are in fact things devoid of that form which will arise in\nthem on their being set together, which is a quality of the parts of\nmateria capax or passive matter which occupies space ([Greek: dektikon:\n\u03b4\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd]); [Note: The recipient is the acted upon, and it is called\nmatter, and also place.]; and hence the division has not been effected\nin the generic form, but in its objective concrete materials. But it\nhas been asserted that the division has come to pass in it: this too is\na contradiction. Therefore our assertion: \u201cIt will not validly follow\nthat its parts are stripped of the totality of its notion\u201d is a true\nstatement.\n\n_Fifth Premiss_: which is the result of the two preceding: that in\nthe generic form, if it be possible that divisibility be considered\nin it, then its parts are neither wholly devoid of the perfect form\nnor are completely exhaustive of it, and are as it were [component,\nconstituent] parts of its definition and outline (or description).\n\nGiven then these premisses, we shall further unquestionably say that\na mentally-grasped form--in short all knowledge--claims some abode\nsomewhere, which abode is both an essence itself and a part of man\u2019s\nself, so that such essence will not be devoid of being either a\ndivisible (material) body or a non-corporeal indivisible essence. I\nhowever say, that it is not licit that it be a corporeal body; because\na generic mentally-grasped form, if it abide in a body, then it is\ninevitably possible for divisibility to befall it, as we have shown\nabove. Nor is it licit that its parts be otherwise than resembling\nthe whole from one standpoint, and contrasting with it from another\nstandpoint, in a word each one of the parts contains somewhat of the\nnotion of the whole; whereas there is no generic form whatsoever but of\nwhose parts a compound can be formed that is partly like it and partly\nunlike it save genera and differentia; consequently these parts are\ngenera and differentia, and hence each one of them is in its turn a\ngeneric form; and thus the same assertion repeats itself as above.\n\nInevitably this will end in a form that is no longer divisible into\ngenera and differentia, owing to the impracticability of progression\nad infinitum into parts differing in notions, even if it be established\nthat corporeal bodies are so divided into parts ad infinitum.\n\nMoreover it is well-known that the generic (universal) form, concerning\nwhich it is held that it is divisible only into genera and differentia,\nif there be nevertheless some of these two that is not divisible into\ngenera and differentia, then _this some_ will be in itself utterly\nindivisible in every sense and respect; and consequently what is\ncompounded, of these two of that _some_, will also be indivisible,\nseeing that it is well-known, for example, that _man_ cannot be\nconceived except along with the two conceptions _living_ and _rational_\n(_speaking_). In short, it is not possible to conceive a generic\nuniversal form that has genus and differens save by conceiving them\nall together. Therefore, the form which we have described as having\ntaken up its abode in the body has not taken up its abode therein,\nwhich is a contradiction, and therefore the diametrically contrary to\nit is true, namely our assertion that a generic (universal) mental form\ndoes not abide in any corporeal body whatsoever; and consequently the\nessence in which a generic mental form abides is a spiritual essence,\nnot qualified with the qualities of bodies, which is what we call the\nRational Speaking Soul. And this is what we set out to show.\n\n\nSUB-SECTION B:--A second of the proofs, which corroborate this claim\nand confirm (correct) it, is what I am now going to set forth. I say\nthen that body of and through itself does not effect conception of\nmentally-grasped things, since all bodies have in common that they\nare body, and differ amongst each other in capacity for conceiving\nmentally-grasped things. Wherefore living (animal) bodies are qualified\nto conceive mentally-grasped things only by and through certain powers\nthat are put within them. And if these powers conceive by and through\nthemselves, without the cooperation of the body, it follows that they\nare in themselves fit and apt to be an abode for mental forms. And what\nis thus qualified is itself an essence; consequently if such conception\nis occurring, they, namely these powers, are essences. Now, it is clear\nthat this power conceives mentally-grasped things by and through itself\nonly, and not at all through cooperation of body; for, we contend,\nconcerning whatsoever perceives any thing through cooperation of body,\nthat the oftener wearying perceptibles are repeated upon it the more do\nthey tend towards ruining and spoiling it and producing dullness and\nexhaustion in it, it being nothing but a frail instrument and organ\nwhose strength has been reduced, owing to the over-tasking imposed\nupon it on the power\u2019s employing it; and for this cause the seeing\npower, for example, gets weaker the oftener it persists in looking\nat the sun\u2019s shape. So too the hearing power, if loud sounds reach it\nrepeatedly.\n\nWhereas this power, to wit the one that conceives mentally-grasped\nthings, the more it perceives wearying mental conceptions the stronger\nit becomes for its work [the more efficient it becomes], wherefore it\nhas no need for an instrument in its operation of perceiving, and hence\nit perceives of itself. Now, we have already shown that every power\nperceiving of its own self is an essence; so then this power is an\nessence, which is what we set out to show.\n\n\nSUB-SECTION C:--Among the proofs that guide to this claim is what I\nshall now show, so I say as follows.\n\nThe indwelling (immanence) of form in body is at once both passive\nand receptive--passivity of the form and receptivity of the body.\nAnd whereas one and the same thing excludes the possibility of its\nbeing both doer and done, it becomes clear unto us that a body is\nnot able of itself to dress itself in one mentally-grasped form and\nstrip off another. Yet nevertheless we see a man consciously and with\nforethought conceiving and proceeding from one mentally-grasped form\nunto another, which operation is not devoid of being either an act\npeculiar to body, or else an act peculiar to the rational speaking\npower, or finally an act commonly shared between them both. It has\nbeen already shown [perhaps he here refers to the Second Section\nof this Essay] that it is not licit to attribute action and doing\npeculiarly and specially to body; nay I will say and not even to body\nconjointly with the rational power; since body is a co-adjutor of that\npower, helping towards affording an abode for any form whatsoever\nin that body\u2019s own self, seeing that it has become known to us that\nbody along with the power will both become fit subjects for this form\nthat has thus arisen; a subject however is to be stigmatized with\nnothing beyond simple passivity alone, whereas both these two are\n[aggressive] acts and deeds. Consequently this is an act peculiar to\nthe power. And everything that, in its act which emanates from its\nown self, has had no need for another thing to help it, will not need\nin its own structure anything beyond its own self to help it, seeing\nthat independence or isolation in the structure of self precedes\nindependence or isolation in the putting forth of self-emanating\naction. Therefore this power is an essence standing of itself\n[independent of body]; and consequently the rational soul is an essence.\n\n\nSUB-SECTION D:--Among the proofs that guide (point) to the validity of\nthis contention is what I am now going to say.\n\nNo doubt a live body and live organs or instruments, if they accomplish\ntheir growing age and the age of standstill, begin to wither and\ndiminish, to lose power and waste away, which [in human beings] is on\npassing forty years. Now, were the rational reasoning power a corporeal\norganic power, then there would be found not one single individual of\nmankind at these years of his age but what this power of his would have\nbegun to diminish. But the case in most people is quite otherwise, nay\nindeed it is usual amongst the majority that as to intellectual power\nthey improve in cleverness and increase in insight. Hence the structure\nof the rational power is not upheld by the body nor by the organ; and\nhence this power is an essence standing of itself, which is what we\nwished to show.\n\n\nSUB-SECTION E:--Among the proofs for the validity of this contention is\nthe following also.\n\nSo much at least is clear, namely that not one of the bodily powers\nhas the strength for performing infinite multifarious actions; and\nthis is so because the strength of the one half of such a body will\ninevitably be found to be weaker than the strength of the whole; and\nthe weaker is less powerful to perform and overcome than the stronger;\nand whatsoever, other than the infinite, gets less is itself finite;\nhence the strength of each one of the two halves is finite; hence\ntoo their sum is finite, since that the sum of two finites is itself\nfinite, whereas it has been contended that it is infinite, which is a\ncontradiction. Hence the sound view is that the powers of bodies are\nnot powerful enough to perform infinite manifold deeds. The rational\npower however is powerful enough to perform many infinite deeds, seeing\nthat forms geometrical, arithmetical, and philosophical, which the\nrational power has to perform among other of its acts, are infinite.\nTherefore the rational power is not standing by and through the body,\nand hence therefore it stands of itself and is an essence of itself.\n\nFurther, so much at least is clear that the corruption of one of two\nconjoined essences does not entail and enjoin the corruption of the\nother: wherefore the death of the body does not render obligatory the\ndeath of the soul, which is what we wanted to show.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION TENTH\n\n  =To Establish that there is a Mental Essence, Distinct from Bodies,\n    which stands towards Human Souls in the stead of Light toward\n    Sight, and in the stead of a Source or Fountain; and To Establish\n    that Souls, if they leave the Bodies, unite therewith.=\n\n\nAs to the mental essence, we find it in infants devoid of every\nmental form. Then, later on in life, we find in it self-evident\naxiomatic mentally-grasped notions, without effort of learning and\nwithout reflection. So that the arising of them within it will not\nfail of being either through sense and experience, or else through\ndivine outpouring reaching to it. But it is not licit to hold that\nthe arising of such primary mental form will be through experience,\nseeing that experience does not afford and supply a necessary and\ninevitable judgment, since experience does not go so far as to believe\nor disbelieve definitively the existence of something different to\nthe judgment drawn from what it has perceived. Indeed experience,\nalthough it shows us that every animal we perceive moves on chewing\nthe lower jaw, yet it does not supply us with a convincing judgment\nthat such is the case with every animal; for were this true, it would\nnot be licit for the crocodile to exist which moves his upper jaw on\nchewing. Therefore not every judgment we have arrived at, as to things,\nthrough our sensuous perception, is applicable to and holds good of\nall that we have perceived or have not perceived of such things, but\nit may so be that what we have not perceived differ from what we have\nperceived. Whereas our conception that a whole is greater than a part\nis not [formed] because we have sensuously felt every part and every\nwhole that are so related, seeing that even such an experience will\nnot guaranty to us that there will be no whole and no part differently\nrelated.\n\nLikewise the dictum concerning the impossibility of two opposites\n(contrasts) coming together in one and the same thing, and that things\nwhich are equal to one and the same thing are equal to one another. And\nlikewise the dictum concerning our holding proofs to be true if they\nbe valid, for the belief in and conviction of their validity does not\nbecome valid by and through learning and effort of study; else this\nwould draw out ad infinitum [inasmuch as each proof rests upon given\npresuppositions, whose validity would in its turn have to be proved].\nNor is this gained from sense, for the reason that we have mentioned.\nConsequently both the latter as well as the former [certainty] are\ngained from a godly outflow reaching unto the rational soul, and\nthe rational soul reaching unto it; so that this mental form arises\ntherein. Also, as to this outflow, unless it have in its own self such\na generic (universal) mental form, it would not be able to engrave\nit within the rational soul. Hence such form is in the outflow\u2019s own\nself. And whatsoever Self has in it a mental form is an essence, other\nthan a body, and not within a body, and standing of itself. Therefore\nthis outflow unto which the soul reaches is a mental essence, not a\nbody, not in a body, standing of itself, and one which stands towards\nthe rational soul in the stead of light to sight; yet however with\nthis difference, namely that light supplies unto sight the power of\nperceiving only, and not the perceived form, whereas this essence\nsupplies, exclusively by and through its sole and single self, unto the\nrational power, the power of perceiving, and brings about therein the\nperceived forms also, as we have set forth above.\n\nNow, if the rational soul\u2019s conceiving rational forms be a source of\ncompletion and perfection for it, and be effected and brought about\non reaching unto this essence, and if worldly earthly labors, such\nas its thought, its sorrows and joy, its longings, hamper the power\nand withold it from reaching thereunto, so that it will not reach\nthereunto save only through abandoning these powers and getting rid of\nthem, there being nothing to stop it from continued Reaching save the\nliving body,--then consequently if it quit the body it will not cease\nto be reaching unto its Perfector and attached to Him.\n\nAgain, what reaches unto its Perfector and attaches itself to Him is\nsafe against corruption, all the more so if even during disconnection\nfrom Him it has not undergone corruption. Wherefore the soul after\ndeath shall ever remain and continue unwavering [and undying] and\nattached to this noble essence, which is called generic universal mind,\nand in the language of the lawgivers the Divine Knowledge.\n\nAs to the other powers, such as the animal and the vegetable: Whereas\nevery one of them performs its proper peculiar action only by and\nthrough the live body, and in no other way, consequently they will\nnever quit live bodies, but will die with their death, seeing that\nevery thing which is, and yet has no action, is idle and useless.\nYet nevertheless the rational soul does gain, by its connection with\nthem, from them their choicest and purest lye and wash, and leaves for\ndeath the husks. And were it not so, the rational soul would not use\nthem in consciousness. Wherefore the rational soul shall surely depart\n(migrate, travel) taking along the kernels of the other powers after\ndeath ensues.\n\nWe have thus made a clear statement concerning souls, and got at which\nsouls are [ever]lasting, and which of them will not be fitted out and\narmed with [ever]lastingness. It still remains for us, in connection\nwith this research, to show how a soul exists within live bodies, and\nthe aim and end for which it is found within the same, and what measure\nwill be bestowed upon it, in the hereafter, of eternal delight and\nperpetual punishment, and of [temporary] punishment that ceases after\na duration of time that shall ensue upon the decease of the live body;\nand to treat of the notion that is designated by the lawgivers as\nintercession (mediation), and of the quality (attribute) of the four\nangels and the throne-bearers. Were it not however that the custom\nprevails to isolate such research from the research whose path we have\nbeen treading, out of high esteem and reverence for it, and to make\nthe latter research precede in order of treatment the former, to the\nend of levelling the road and paving it solidly, I should (would) have\nfollowed up these [ten] sections with a full and complete treatment\nof the subject dealt with in them. Notwithstanding all this, were\nit not for fear of wearying by prolixity, I would have disregarded\nthe demands of custom herein. Thus then whatever it may please the\nPrince--God prolong his highness--to command as to treating singly of\nsuch notions, I shall put forth, in humble compliance and obedience,\nmy utmost effort, God Almighty willing; and may wisdom never cease to\nrevive through him after fainting, to flourish after withering, so that\nits sway may be renewed through his sway, and through his days its days\nmay come back again, and that through his prestige the prestige of its\ndevotees be exalted, and the seekers after its favor abound, so God\nalmighty will.\n\n\nIT IS ENDED.\n\n\n\n\nTRANSCRIBER\u2019S NOTE\n\n\nArchaic, obsolete, and unusual spellings and words have been\nmaintained. Obvious misspellings have been fixed, as detailed below.\nTransliterations in the original book have not been edited.\n\nChanges to the text from the original book follow:\n\n  Page 7\n  In this book:  and writings, and his systems of medicine\n  Originally:    and writings, and his systems of medecine\n\n  Page 13\n  In this book:  may the Most High GOD have mercy upon him,\n  Originally:    may the Most High GOD have mercy upom him,\n\n  Page 16\n  In this book:  science of medicine.\n  Originally:    science of medecine.\n\n  Page 32\n  In this book:  simple constituents taken singly.\n  Originally:    simple consituents taken singly.\n\n  Page 32\n  In this book:  (alloy, amalgam)--it is clear I say in such\n  Originally:    (aloy, amalgam)--it is clear I say in such\n\n  Page 52\n  In this book:  into such of its pores as are empty only, and\n  Originally:    into such of its its pores as are empty only, and\n\n  Page 72\n  In this book:  to the certainty of the Creator\u2019s being\n  Originally:    to the certainty ef the Creator\u2019s being\n\n  Page 76\n  In this book:  through their abandonment, unto impetuosity\n  Originally:    through their abandonnment, unto impetuosity\n\n  Page 86\n  In this book:  guide (point) to the validity of this contention is\n  Originally:    guide (point) to the validity of this contension is\n\n  Page 87\n  In this book:  validity of this contention is the following also.\n  Originally:    validity of this contension is the following also.\n\n  Page 90\n  In this book:  such an experience will not guaranty to us that\n  Originally:    such an experience will not garanty to us that","title":"A Compendium on the Soul","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":18054}