{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_58606/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_58606","id":"gutenberg_58606","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/58606","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Humour","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Psychiatry/Psychology","Laughter"],"text":"Produced by Turgut Dincer, RichardW, and the Online\nDistributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This\nfile was produced from images generously made available\nby The Internet Archive)\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nAN ESSAY ON LAUGHTER by JAMES SULLY\n\n\n\n\n _BY THE SAME AUTHOR._\n\n\n THE HUMAN MIND: a Text-book of Psychology. 2 vols. 8vo, 21_s._\n\n OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. Crown 8vo, 9_s._\n\n THE TEACHER\u2019S HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY. Crown 8vo, 6_s._ 6_d._\n\n STUDIES OF CHILDHOOD. 8vo, 10_s._ 6_d._\n\n CHILDREN\u2019S WAYS: being Selections from \u201cStudies of Childhood\u201d. With 25\n Illustrations. Crown 8vo, gilt top, 4_s._ 6_d._\n\n LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.,\n LONDON, NEW YORK, AND BOMBAY.\n\n\n\n\n AN ESSAY\n ON\n LAUGHTER\n\n ITS FORMS, ITS CAUSES, ITS DEVELOPMENT\n AND ITS VALUE\n\n BY\n JAMES SULLY, M.A., LL.D.\n AUTHOR OF \u201cTHE HUMAN MIND,\u201d \u201cSTUDIES OF CHILDHOOD,\u201d ETC.\n\n LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.\n 39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON\n NEW YORK AND BOMBAY\n 1902\n\n\n\n\n TO\n\n MY CHILDREN AND MY PUPILS\n\n IN THE HOPE\n\n THAT IF THEY CULTIVATE BOTH BRAIN AND HEART,\n\n AND HAVE A QUICK EAR FOR\n\n THE MUFFLED MOANINGS ALONG THE ROAD,\n\n THEY MAY HEAR ALSO,\n\n ABOVE THE DEEPER MUSIC,\n\n THE BLITHE NOTES OF LAUGHTER.\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE.\n\n\nThe present work is, I believe, the first attempt to treat on a\nconsiderable scale the whole subject of Laughter, under its various\naspects, and in its connections with our serious activities and\ninterests. As such, it will, I feel sure, lay itself open to the\ncriticism that it lacks completeness, or at least, proportion. A\nfurther criticism to which, I feel equally sure, it will expose itself,\nis that it clearly reflects the peculiarities of the experience of the\nwriter. The anticipation of this objection does not, however, disturb\nme. It seems to me to be not only inevitable, but desirable\u2014at least at\nthe present stage of our knowledge of the subject\u2014that one who attempts\nto understand an impulse, of which the intensities and the forms appear\nto vary greatly among men, of which the workings are often subtle, and\nof which the significance is by no means obvious, should, while making\nfull use of others\u2019 impressions, draw largely on his own experience.\n\nPortions of the volume have already appeared in Reviews. Chapter\nI. was published (under the title \u201cProlegomena to a Theory of\nLaughter\u201d) in _The Philosophical Review_, 1900; Chapter V., in the\n_Revue Philosophique_, 1902; and Chapter VIII., in _The International\nMonthly_, 1901. The parts of Chapters III. and VI. which treat of the\npsychology of tickling appeared in the _Compte rendu_ of the Fourth\nInternational Congress of Psychology (_IV_^{me} _Congr\u00e8s International\nde Psychologie_), Paris, 1901. Some of the ideas in Chapter X. are\noutlined in an article on \u201cThe Uses of Humour,\u201d which appeared in _The\nNational Review_, 1897.\n\nSome of my obligations to other writers and workers have been\nacknowledged in the volume. For friendly assistance in reading the\nproofs of the work I am greatly indebted to Mr. Carveth Read, Dr.\nAlexander Hill, Prof. W. P. Ker, Mr. Ling Roth, Dr. W. H. R. Rivers,\nMiss C. Osborn, and Miss Alice Woods.\n\n H\u00d4TEL DU WEISSHORN,\n VAL D\u2019ANNIVIERS, _August_, 1902.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n\n CHAPTER I.\n INTRODUCTORY.\n\n   Objections to serious study of laughter \u2022\u00a01\n\n   Previous treatment of subject by philosophers \u2022\u00a04\n\n   Their way of dealing with facts \u2022\u00a06\n\n   Examination of an illustration given by Dr. Lipps \u2022\u00a09\n\n   Common defects of theories \u2022\u00a017\n\n   Difficulties of attempt to treat subject scientifically \u2022\u00a019\n\n   Scope of inquiry \u2022\u00a020\n\n\n CHAPTER II.\n THE SMILE AND THE LAUGH.\n\n   Need of studying the bodily process in laughter \u2022\u00a025\n\n   Characteristics of the movements of the smile \u2022\u00a026\n\n   Expressive function of the smile \u2022\u00a027\n\n   Continuity of processes of smiling and laughing \u2022\u00a027\n\n   Characteristics of the movements of laughter \u2022\u00a030\n\n   Concomitant organic changes during laughter \u2022\u00a033\n\n   Physiological benefits of laughing \u2022\u00a034\n\n   Effects of excessive laughter \u2022\u00a037\n\n   The laugh as expression \u2022\u00a039\n\n   Relation of expression to feeling in laughter \u2022\u00a040\n\n   Interactions of joyous feeling and organic concomitants \u2022\u00a044\n\n   Deviations from the normal type of laugh \u2022\u00a048\n\n\n CHAPTER III.\n OCCASIONS AND CAUSES OF LAUGHTER.\n\n   1. Laughter as provoked by sense-stimulus: tickling \u2022\u00a050\n\n     Ticklish areas \u2022\u00a052\n\n     Characteristics of the sensations of tickling \u2022\u00a053\n\n     Motor reactions provoked by tickling \u2022\u00a056\n\n     How far attributes of sensation determine laughter of tickling\n     \u2022\u00a057\n\n     The mental factor in effect of tickling \u2022\u00a059\n\n     Objective conditions of successful tickling \u2022\u00a060\n\n     Tickling as appealing to a particular mood \u2022\u00a062\n\n   2. Other quasi-reflex forms of laughter \u2022\u00a064\n\n     Varieties of automatic or \u201cnervous\u201d laughter \u2022\u00a065\n\n     Common element in these varieties: relief from strain \u2022\u00a067\n\n   3. Varieties of joyous laughter \u2022\u00a070\n\n     Prolonged laughing fit \u2022\u00a073\n\n     The essential element in joyous laughter \u2022\u00a075\n\n     Occasions of joyous laughter \u2022\u00a076\n\n       (_a_) Play \u2022\u00a076\n\n       (_b_) Teasing as provocative situation \u2022\u00a077\n\n       (_c_) Practical joking and laughter \u2022\u00a078\n\n       (_d_) Laughter as an accompaniment of contest \u2022\u00a078\n\n       (_e_) Occasions of unusual solemnity as provoking laughter \u2022\u00a079\n\n   Physiological basis of laughing habit \u2022\u00a080\n\n\n CHAPTER IV.\n VARIETIES OF THE LAUGHABLE.\n\n   The objective reference in laughter \u2022\u00a082\n\n   Universal element in the laughable \u2022\u00a083\n\n   Groups of laughable things \u2022\u00a087\n\n     (1) Novelty and oddity \u2022\u00a087\n\n     (2) Bodily deformities \u2022\u00a088\n\n     (3) Moral deformities and vices \u2022\u00a091\n\n     (4) Breaches of order and rule \u2022\u00a094\n\n     (5) Small misfortunes \u2022\u00a096\n\n     (6) References to the indecent \u2022\u00a098\n\n     (7) Pretences \u2022\u00a0101\n\n     (8) Want of knowledge or skill \u2022\u00a0102\n\n     (9) Relations of contrariety and incongruity \u2022\u00a0107\n\n     (10) Verbal play and witticism \u2022\u00a0111\n\n          Co-operation of different laughable features \u2022\u00a0114\n\n     (11) Manifestations of playfulness in objects \u2022\u00a0116\n\n     (12) Spectacle of successful combat \u2022\u00a0117\n\n\n CHAPTER V.\n THEORIES OF THE LUDICROUS.\n\n   1. The Theory of Degradation \u2022\u00a0119\n\n     Aristotle\u2019s theory \u2022\u00a0120\n\n     Theory of Hobbes \u2022\u00a0120\n\n     Prof. Bain\u2019s theory \u2022\u00a0121\n\n     Criticism of theory of degradation \u2022\u00a0122\n\n   2. Theory of Contrariety or Incongruity \u2022\u00a0125\n\n     Kant\u2019s theory of nullified expectation \u2022\u00a0126\n\n     Criticism of Kant\u2019s theory \u2022\u00a0126\n\n     Function of surprise in effect of the ludicrous \u2022\u00a0129\n\n     Schopenhauer\u2019s theory of incongruity \u2022\u00a0130\n\n     Criticism of Schopenhauer\u2019s theory \u2022\u00a0132\n\n     Different forms of the incongruous \u2022\u00a0134\n\n   Summary of criticism of theories \u2022\u00a0135\n\n   Attempts to unify the two principles \u2022\u00a0136\n\n   The laughable as failure to comply with a social requirement \u2022\u00a0139\n\n   How primitive laughter comes into effect of the ludicrous \u2022\u00a0140\n\n   Relation of sudden gladness to release from constraint \u2022\u00a0141\n\n   Element of contempt in effect of the ludicrous \u2022\u00a0142\n\n   Laughter and the play-mood \u2022\u00a0145\n\n   The play-mood in the effects of the ludicrous \u2022\u00a0149\n\n   Summary of results of inquiry into theories \u2022\u00a0153\n\n\n CHAPTER VI.\n THE ORIGIN OF LAUGHTER.\n\n   Problem of the origin of laughter in the race \u2022\u00a0155\n\n   Supposed rudiments of mirth in animals \u2022\u00a0156\n\n   The dog\u2019s manifestations of a sense of fun \u2022\u00a0159\n\n   The mirthful displays of the ape \u2022\u00a0162\n\n   First appearance of laughter in child: date of the first smile\n   \u2022\u00a0164\n\n   Date of the first laugh \u2022\u00a0166\n\n   The laugh as following the smile \u2022\u00a0168\n\n   Order of the two in the evolution of the race \u2022\u00a0170\n\n   Conjecture as to genesis of the human smile \u2022\u00a0171\n\n   How the primitive smile may have grown into the laugh \u2022\u00a0173\n\n   Problem of the evolution of the laughter of tickling \u2022\u00a0176\n\n   Effects of tickling in animals \u2022\u00a0177\n\n   Date of first response to tickling in the child \u2022\u00a0177\n\n   Tickling as inheritance from remote ancestors \u2022\u00a0178\n\n   Value of evolutional theories of tickling \u2022\u00a0181\n\n   How laughter may have come into tickling \u2022\u00a0183\n\n\n CHAPTER VII.\n DEVELOPMENT OF LAUGHTER DURING THE FIRST THREE YEARS OF LIFE.\n\n   Problem of the early development of laughter in the individual\n   \u2022\u00a0186\n\n   Development of smile and laugh as movements \u2022\u00a0188\n\n   The general process of emotional development \u2022\u00a0189\n\n   Relation of laughter of joy to that of play \u2022\u00a0194\n\n   Development of laughter of joy \u2022\u00a0195\n\n   Emergence of laughter of surprise \u2022\u00a0197\n\n   First laughter of release from strain \u2022\u00a0197\n\n   Crude form of laughter of jubilation \u2022\u00a0198\n\n   Development of laughter as accompaniment of play \u2022\u00a0198\n\n   Early forms of laughing impishness \u2022\u00a0201\n\n   First manifestations of rowdyish laughter \u2022\u00a0203\n\n   Germs of roguish laughter \u2022\u00a0205\n\n   First crude perceptions of the laughable \u2022\u00a0207\n\n   The mirthful greeting of sounds \u2022\u00a0209\n\n   Early responses to the funny in the visible world \u2022\u00a0212\n\n   First enjoyment of pretences \u2022\u00a0214\n\n   Early laughter at the improper \u2022\u00a0215\n\n   Dim perceptions of the incongruous and the absurd \u2022\u00a0216\n\n   Early sense of verbal fun \u2022\u00a0217\n\n   Summary of results \u2022\u00a0218\n\n\n CHAPTER VIII.\n THE LAUGHTER OF SAVAGES.\n\n   Sources of our knowledge of savage laughter \u2022\u00a0220\n\n   Different views of travellers on the subject \u2022\u00a0220\n\n   Laughter as a salient characteristic of savages \u2022\u00a0223\n\n   Descriptions of their movements of laughter \u2022\u00a0227\n\n   Abundance of good spirits \u2022\u00a0228\n\n   Laughter as accompaniment of shyness \u2022\u00a0228\n\n   Laughter and fondness for teasing \u2022\u00a0229\n\n   Rough practical jokes \u2022\u00a0230\n\n   The way in which laughter is accepted \u2022\u00a0232\n\n   Laughter of superiority and contempt \u2022\u00a0233\n\n   Indecent character of jocosity \u2022\u00a0234\n\n   Appreciation of the laughably odd \u2022\u00a0235\n\n   Ridicule of foreign ways \u2022\u00a0237\n\n   Laughter at the doings of the white man \u2022\u00a0238\n\n   Laughter of the expert at the ignoramus \u2022\u00a0240\n\n   Savage society and the white man\u2019s _gaucherie_ \u2022\u00a0241\n\n   Germ of sense of the absurd \u2022\u00a0242\n\n   The ridiculing of fellow-tribesmen \u2022\u00a0244\n\n   Reciprocal laughter of the men and the women \u2022\u00a0245\n\n   Example of dry humour \u2022\u00a0246\n\n   Organisation of laughter as entertainment \u2022\u00a0247\n\n   Germs of the mimetic art \u2022\u00a0247\n\n   Differentiation of professional jesters, etc. \u2022\u00a0249\n\n   Amusing songs and stories \u2022\u00a0250\n\n   Co-existence of different levels of laughter \u2022\u00a0251\n\n   How to manage the savage by laughter \u2022\u00a0252\n\n\n CHAPTER IX.\n LAUGHTER IN SOCIAL EVOLUTION.\n\n   Connection between laughter and social life \u2022\u00a0254\n\n   Contagiousness of mirth as social quality \u2022\u00a0255\n\n   Social uses of laughter \u2022\u00a0256\n\n   Class-differentiation as condition of laughter \u2022\u00a0258\n\n   How social grouping widens the field of the laughable \u2022\u00a0259\n\n   Utility of reciprocal group-laughter \u2022\u00a0261\n\n   Screwing up members of other groups \u2022\u00a0261\n\n   Laughter of superiors at inferiors \u2022\u00a0263\n\n   Quizzing of authorities by subjects \u2022\u00a0264\n\n   Mirthful turning on task-masters \u2022\u00a0265\n\n   Woman\u2019s laughing retort \u2022\u00a0267\n\n   Corrective function of laughter of inferiors \u2022\u00a0268\n\n   Conciliatory service of group-laughter \u2022\u00a0269\n\n   Summary of social utilities of laughter \u2022\u00a0271\n\n   Laughter of other groups as corrective of self-importance \u2022\u00a0272\n\n   Social movements as influencing laughter \u2022\u00a0272\n\n   Changes of fashion \u2022\u00a0273\n\n   Fashion and custom \u2022\u00a0275\n\n   Merry aspects of movements of fashion \u2022\u00a0276\n\n   Droll side of descent of fashion to lower ranks \u2022\u00a0277\n\n   Laughter at the old-fashioned \u2022\u00a0279\n\n   The movement of progress \u2022\u00a0279\n\n   Mirthful greeting of new ideas and practices \u2022\u00a0280\n\n   Laughing away effete customs \u2022\u00a0281\n\n   Influence of mirthful spirit on social changes \u2022\u00a0283\n\n   Effect of evolution of culture groups \u2022\u00a0283\n\n   Effect of minuter subdivision of sets \u2022\u00a0285\n\n   Effect of progress in breaking down group-barriers \u2022\u00a0286\n\n   Droll aspects of transition of society to a plutocratic form \u2022\u00a0287\n\n   Refining effect of culture-movement on hilarity \u2022\u00a0288\n\n   Decline of older voluminous merriment \u2022\u00a0290\n\n   Conflict between popular mirth and authority \u2022\u00a0291\n\n   Combination of standards in popular estimate of laughable \u2022\u00a0293\n\n   Preparation for individual laughter \u2022\u00a0295\n\n\n CHAPTER X.\n LAUGHTER OF THE INDIVIDUAL: HUMOUR.\n\n   Definition of humour \u2022\u00a0297\n\n   Characteristics of humour \u2022\u00a0298\n\n   Intellectual basis of humorous sentiment \u2022\u00a0300\n\n   Humorous contemplation as binocular \u2022\u00a0301\n\n   The field of the laughable for the humorist \u2022\u00a0302\n\n   Modification of the conative attitude in humour\n   \u2022\u00a0304\n\n   Complexity of humour as feeling \u2022\u00a0305\n\n   Problem of fusion of dissimilar feelings \u2022\u00a0307\n\n   Facts explained by our analysis of humour \u2022\u00a0310\n\n   Variations of humour with race and nationality \u2022\u00a0311\n\n   Temperament and individuality in humour \u2022\u00a0313\n\n   Humour as enlarging range of laughing activity \u2022\u00a0315\n\n   The finer detection of the amusing in character \u2022\u00a0315\n\n   The appreciation of unfitness of men to circumstances \u2022\u00a0317\n\n   Character-study as a pastime \u2022\u00a0318\n\n   Laughter as permeating sphere of serious \u2022\u00a0319\n\n   Effect of kindliness in extending range of laughter \u2022\u00a0320\n\n   Scope for amusing form of self-scrutiny \u2022\u00a0321\n\n   Laughter as mode of self-correction \u2022\u00a0322\n\n   How humour aids a man in dealing with others \u2022\u00a0325\n\n   Laughing away the smaller troubles \u2022\u00a0326\n\n   Service of humour in the greater troubles \u2022\u00a0328\n\n   Humorous contemplation of social scene \u2022\u00a0330\n\n   Amusing aspects of the fine world \u2022\u00a0331\n\n   The journal as medium of amusing self-display \u2022\u00a0334\n\n   The social spectacle of the past and of the present \u2022\u00a0337\n\n   Humour in contemplation of social scene in seasons of stress \u2022\u00a0337\n\n   The manifestations of war-temper as humorous spectacle \u2022\u00a0338\n\n\n CHAPTER XI.\n THE LAUGHABLE IN ART: COMEDY.\n\n   Source of impulse of comic art \u2022\u00a0343\n\n   Scope for laughter in art as a whole \u2022\u00a0345\n\n   Origin of jocose literature \u2022\u00a0346\n\n   The dawn of comedy \u2022\u00a0346\n\n   Comic incidents as development of child\u2019s play \u2022\u00a0347\n\n   Comic value of repetitions \u2022\u00a0348\n\n   Elements of trickery and dupery \u2022\u00a0349\n\n   Comedy as reflecting movements of social laughter \u2022\u00a0351\n\n   Comic dialogue as display of wit \u2022\u00a0353\n\n   Theories of wit \u2022\u00a0354\n\n   Wit as intellect at play \u2022\u00a0354\n\n   Wit and word-play \u2022\u00a0356\n\n   Character as comic material \u2022\u00a0357\n\n   Mode of representation of character in comedy \u2022\u00a0358\n\n   Comic character as type \u2022\u00a0359\n\n   Development of character-drawing in classic comedy \u2022\u00a0359\n\n   Treatment of character in early English comedy \u2022\u00a0361\n\n   Moli\u00e8re as comic portrayer \u2022\u00a0364\n\n   His art of constructing character \u2022\u00a0364\n\n   Contrast of the anti-social person and the social world \u2022\u00a0365\n\n   The abstract and the concrete in Moli\u00e8re\u2019s characters \u2022\u00a0365\n\n   The comic d\u00e9nouement in Moli\u00e8re\u2019s plays \u2022\u00a0368\n\n   Moli\u00e8re\u2019s point of view \u2022\u00a0368\n\n   Characteristics of Comedy of Restoration \u2022\u00a0370\n\n   Lamb and Macaulay on moral aspect of comedy \u2022\u00a0371\n\n   Justification of Lamb\u2019s view of Restoration Comedy \u2022\u00a0373\n\n   The social as distinct from the moral point of view \u2022\u00a0373\n\n   Slackening of social restraints by comedy \u2022\u00a0376\n\n   Limitations of field of comic presentation \u2022\u00a0377\n\n   The comic point of view in fiction \u2022\u00a0378\n\n   Laughter of mixed tone in literature: satire \u2022\u00a0380\n\n   Different degrees of seriousness in satire \u2022\u00a0381\n\n   Method of virulent satire \u2022\u00a0382\n\n   Wit in satire \u2022\u00a0383\n\n   Contrast of satirical and humorous literature \u2022\u00a0384\n\n   The relation of wit to humour \u2022\u00a0385\n\n   Boundaries of satire and humorous literature \u2022\u00a0386\n\n   Humour as ingredient of prose fiction \u2022\u00a0387\n\n   The boundaries of humour of fiction and of philosophy \u2022\u00a0390\n\n   Humour in other species of literature \u2022\u00a0390\n\n\n CHAPTER XII.\n ULTIMATE VALUE AND LIMITATIONS OF LAUGHTER.\n\n   Need of bringing in philosophic point of view \u2022\u00a0392\n\n   Philosophy as completion of individual criticism of life \u2022\u00a0398\n\n   Room for laughter in philosophic contemplation \u2022\u00a0393\n\n   Philosophy as belittling our everyday world \u2022\u00a0394\n\n   Reasons why philosophers are not commonly humorists \u2022\u00a0395\n\n   Speculative Idealism as robbing our common world of interest \u2022\u00a0396\n\n   Relation of Optimism and of Pessimism to laughter \u2022\u00a0397\n\n   Possibilities of laughter in philosophic Scepticism \u2022\u00a0399\n\n   Conditions of development of philosophic humour \u2022\u00a0401\n\n   Humour in the final evaluation of life \u2022\u00a0402\n\n   Service of philosophic humour \u2022\u00a0403\n\n   Justification of the individual point of view \u2022\u00a0405\n\n   Legitimacy of an amused contemplation of one\u2019s world \u2022\u00a0405\n\n   Amused contemplation as favouring the survival of the unfit \u2022\u00a0408\n\n   The philosopher\u2019s preference for retirement \u2022\u00a0408\n\n   Point of view of contemplation of things by philosophic humorist\n   \u2022\u00a0409\n\n   The contemplator as held by his social world \u2022\u00a0409\n\n   Points of view of humorist, comedian and satirist \u2022\u00a0410\n\n   Question of total value of laughter \u2022\u00a0411\n\n   Alleged purifying function of comedy \u2022\u00a0411\n\n   Corrective function of social laughter to-day \u2022\u00a0413\n\n   Ridicule as a test of truth \u2022\u00a0414\n\n   Estimate of helpfulness of private laughter \u2022\u00a0415\n\n   Place of laughter among human qualities \u2022\u00a0416\n\n   Relation of laughter to social affections \u2022\u00a0417\n\n   Restraint of laughter by society \u2022\u00a0418\n\n   Control of laughter as part of moral self-regulation \u2022\u00a0420\n\n   Prudential reasons for controlling laughter \u2022\u00a0422\n\n   The promotion of a love of laughter in others \u2022\u00a0423\n\n   The claims of the agelast to be let alone \u2022\u00a0424\n\n   The cultivation of laughter in the young \u2022\u00a0426\n\n   The status of laughter to-day \u2022\u00a0427\n\n   Causes of decline of popular mirth \u2022\u00a0428\n\n   Characteristics of laughter of the hour \u2022\u00a0430\n\n   Possibility of death of laughter \u2022\u00a0431\n\n   How its conservation may be effected \u2022\u00a0432\n\n{1}\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nINTRODUCTORY.\n\n\nA writer who undertakes to discourse on laughter has to encounter more\nthan one variety of irritating objection. He finds to his dismay that a\nconsiderable part of his species, which has been flatteringly described\nas the laughing animal, has never exercised its high and distinguishing\ncapacity. Nay, more, he soon learns that a good many oppose themselves\nto the practice and are laughter-haters. This kind of person (\u1f41\n\u03bc\u03b9\u03c3\u03cc\u03b3\u03b5\u03bb\u03c9\u03c2) is so possessed with the spirit of seriousness that the\nopposite temper of jocosity appears to him to be something shockingly\nwrong. All audible laughter is for him an ill-bred display, at once\nunsightly as a bodily contortion, and, as a lapse from the gravity\nof reason, a kind of mental degradation. This estimate of laughter\nas something unseemly is well represented in Lord Chesterfield\u2019s\n_Letters_, in which the writer congratulates himself on the fact that\nsince he has had the full use of his reason nobody has ever heard him\nlaugh. In some cases this feeling of repugnance towards mirth and fun\ntakes on more of an ethical aspect. The laugher is identified with\nthe scoffer at all things worthy and condemned as morally bad\u2014a view\nillustrated in the saying of Pascal: \u201cDiseur de bons mots, mauvais\ncaract\u00e8re\u201d.\n\nNow it seems evident that one who discourses on laughter is bound to\nnotice this attitude of the laughter-hater. If {2} he believes that\nthe moods of hilarity and the enjoyment of the ludicrous have their\nrightful place in human experience, he must be ready to challenge\nthe monopoly of wisdom claimed by the out-and-out sticklers for\nseriousness, and to dispute the proposition that the open, honest laugh\nconnotes either a vulgar taste or a depraved moral nature.\n\nPerhaps, however, our discourser need not distress himself about these\nrather sour-tempered laughter-haters. In these days we have to confront\nnot so much opposition as indifference. Instead of the denouncer of\nmirth as vulgar or wicked, we have the refrainer from laughter, the\nnon-laugher pure and simple. As his Greek name \u201cagelast\u201d (\u1f00\u03b3\u03ad\u03bb\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2)\nsuggests, this rather annoying type was not unknown in ancient times.\nIn merry England, too, Shakespeare had met with the agelasts who would\n\n          Not show their teeth in way of smile,\n    Though Nestor swear the jest be laughable.\n\nYet it is only of late that the variety has appeared in its full force.\nTo what scanty proportions in these latter days the band of laughers\nhas dwindled is suggested by the name which is now commonly given them,\nfor \u201chumorist\u201d meant not so long ago an odd fellow or \u201ceccentric\u201d.\nIndeed, one of our living writers suggests that \u201cas the world becomes\nmore decorous humour becomes tongue-tied and obsolete\u201d.[1]\n\nEven if we grant that the \u201cgelasts\u201d are getting reduced to the\ndimensions of a petty sect, the consideration need not deter us from\nchoosing laughter as our theme. Those who have the perfect ear for\nmusic are probably but a tiny portion of the human family; yet nobody\nhas suggested {3} that this is an argument against the writing of books\non musical form, the science of thorough bass and the rest.\n\nThe friends of laughter have, however, always existed, and even in\nthese rather dreary days are perhaps more numerous than is often\nsupposed. In support of this idea one may recall the curious fact\nthat, as the essayist just quoted remarks, we all shrink from the\n\u201cawful imputation\u201d implied in the words \u201cYou have no sense of humour\u201d.\nThis recognition of the capacity for appreciating a joke as a human\nattribute which it is well not to be without is, of course, very\nfar from being proof of a genuine love of fun in the recognisers\nthemselves. Yet it at least attests the existence of this love in a\nrespectable number of their fellows.\n\nNow this true friend of laughter (\u1f41 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03b5\u03bb\u03c9\u03c2) may urge his own\nobjection to our proposed discussion, an objection less irritating\nperhaps than that of the zealous laughter-hater and of the indifferent\nagelast, but on the other hand of a more penetrating thrust. He not\nunnaturally dislikes the idea of his daily pastime being made the\nsubject of grave inquiry. He feels in its acutest form the resentment\nof the natural man on seeing his enjoyment brought under the scalpel\nand lens of the scientific inquirer. He urges with force that the\nchucklings of humour are the very lightest and flimsiest of human\nthings; and that to try to capture them and subject them to serious\ninvestigation looks much like the procedure of the child whose\nimpulsive hand would seize and examine his dainty soap bubbles.\n\nTo these objections from the true friends of the mirthful god one owes\nit to reply courteously and at length. Yet the answer cannot well be\ngiven at the outset. A discourse on laughter can remove this kind of\nobjection, if at all, only by showing in its own treatment of the\nsubject that serious thought may touch even the gossamer wing of the\nmerry {4} sprite and not destroy; that all things, and so the lightest,\nare things to be comprehended, if only we can reach the right points\nof view; and that the problems which rise above the mental horizon,\nas soon as we begin to think about man\u2019s humorous bent, have a quite\npeculiar interest, an interest in which all who can both laugh at\nthings and ponder on them may be expected to share.\n\nIt seems evident that one who is to probe the spirit of fun in man, and\nto extract its meaning, should have special qualifications. It is by\nno means sufficient, as some would seem to suppose, that he should be\nable to think clearly. He must couple with the gravity of the thinker\nsomething of the intellectual lightness and nimbleness of the jester.\nThat is to say, he must be in warm touch with his theme, the jocose\nmood itself, realising his subject at once vividly and comprehensively\nby help of a rich personal experience.\n\nNow it cannot be said that those who have offered to teach us the\nsecrets of laughter have commonly exhibited these qualifications\nin a conspicuous measure. It is a part of the whimsicality which\nseems to run through human affairs that the spirit of fun should be\nmisunderstood not merely by the avowedly indifferent and the avowedly\nhostile, but by those who, since they offer to elucidate its ways,\nmight be expected to have some personal acquaintance with it. The\ncombination of a fine feeling for the baffling behaviour of this\nspirit with a keen scientific analysis, such as is found in Mr. George\nMeredith\u2019s _Essay on Comedy_, seems to be a rarity in literature.\n\nThis want of the familiar touch is especially observable in a good\ndeal of the treatment of laughter by philosophic writers. It is not\nnecessary to dwell on the sublime subtleties of the metaphysicians\nwho conceive of the comic as a \u201cmoment\u201d in the dialectic process\nwhich the \u00e6sthetic \u201cIdea\u201d {5} has to pass through. The account of the\ngyrations which the Idea has to describe, when once it passes out of\nthat state of harmonious union with the sensuous image which we call\n\u201cthe beautiful,\u201d reads strangely enough. Having, for reasons that are\nnot made too clear, torn itself away from its peaceful companion (the\nimage), and set itself up as antagonist to this in \u201cthe sublime,\u201d the\naugust Idea encounters the unpleasant retaliation of the image it has\ndiscarded in \u201cthe ugly,\u201d where we see the determination of the injured\nparty to defy its late companion; though, in the end, it revives from\nthe \u201cswoon\u201d into which this rude behaviour of the image has plunged it,\nand recovers its legitimate claims\u2014with which it would seem it was at\nthe outset dissatisfied\u2014in what we call \u201cthe ludicrous\u201d.\n\nI have here tried to put the speculative subtleties of these Hegelian\nwriters, so far as I am able to catch their drift, into intelligible\nEnglish, and not to caricature them. Even favourable critics of these\ntheories have found it difficult not to treat them with some amount of\nirony; and, so far as I am aware, no rehabilitator of Hegelian thought\nin England has as yet been bold enough to introduce to our insular mind\na chapter of the sacred mysteries which, as they may well suspect, so\neasily lends itself to profane jesting.\n\nHow remote this kind of conception of the ludicrous is from the homely\nlaughter of mortals may be seen in such attempts as are made by these\nHegelian thinkers to connect the two. Hegel himself, in touching on\nthe nature of comedy, asserted that \u201conly that is truly comic in\nwhich the persons of the play are comic for themselves as well as for\nthe spectators\u201d. This seems to mean (it is always hazardous to say\nconfidently what a Hegelian pronouncement does mean) that a large part\nof what the world has {6} foolishly supposed to be comedy, including\nthe plays of Moli\u00e8re, are not so.[2]\n\nIt is, perhaps, too much to expect that the aspiring metaphysician,\nwhen, as he fondly thinks, he has gained the altitude from which the\ndialectic process of the World-idea is seen to unfold itself, should\ntrouble himself about so vulgar a thing as our everyday laughter. But\nlaughter has its mild retaliations for the negligent, and the comedian\nof to-day, as of old, is more likely to pluck from those who tread the\nspeculative cloud-heights material for his merriment than any further\nenlightenment on the mysteries of his craft.\n\nIt is, however, more to the purpose to refer to those theorists who\nmake some show of explaining what the ordinary man understands by the\nludicrous, and of testing their theories by an appeal to recognisable\nexamples. It is instructive to note the cautiousness with which\nthey will sometimes venture on the slippery \u201cempirical\u201d ground.\nSchopenhauer, for example, in setting out his theory of the ludicrous\u2014a\ntheory which we shall deal with later on\u2014in the first volume of his\nchief work, thought it \u201csuperfluous\u201d to illustrate his theory by\nexample. In the second volume, however, he comes to the help of the\n\u201cintellectual sluggishness\u201d of his readers and condescends to furnish\nillustrations. And what does the reader suppose is the first to be\nselected? The amusing look of the angle formed by the meeting of the\ntangent and the curve of the circle; which look is due, he tells us, to\nthe reflection that an angle implies the meeting of two lines which,\nwhen prolonged, intersect, whereas the straight line of the tangent\n{7} and the carve of the circle are able merely to graze at one point,\nwhere, strictly speaking, they are parallel. In other words, we laugh\nhere because the angle which stares us in the face is irreconcilable\nwith the idea of a meeting of a tangent and a curved line. With a\ncharming candour the writer proceeds: \u201cThe ludicrous in this case\nis, no doubt, extremely weak; on the other hand, it illustrates with\nexceptional clearness the origin of the ludicrous in the incongruity\nbetween what is thought and what is perceived\u201d.[3]\n\nThe significance of this invention of his own illustration by\nSchopenhauer is that he was not a metaphysical recluse, but knew the\nworld and its literatures. Other theorists have not shown the same\ndaring, but have contented themselves with _finding_ their instances.\nYet in too many cases the arbitrary way in which illustrations have\nbeen selected, while instances making against the theory have been\nignored, shows clearly enough that there has been no serious effort to\nbuild on a large and firm basis of observation. This may be illustrated\nnot only from the works of Germans, but from those of a people\nwhich has claimed, and with justice, to be the laughing nation _par\nexcellence_. In a recent volume, marked by great ingenuity, M. Henri\nBergson,[4] an accomplished thinker, attempts to reduce all forms of\nthe ludicrous to a substitution in our movements, speech and action, of\nthe rigidity (raideur) of a machine for the pliancy and variability of\nan organism. The writer has no difficulty in finding examples of the\nstiff mechanical effects which amuse us, say, in gestures and carriage.\nBut the astonishing thing is that he never refers to the complementary\ngroup of facts, the instances of excessive spontaneity and {8} freedom\nof movement where a certain repression and mechanical uniformity are\nlooked for. The exuberant childish boundings of the clown, an excess\nof emphasis or gesture in social intercourse, these and the like are\nsurely just as comical as the want of the signs of a full play of life\nmay be in other circumstances.\n\nPerhaps an even worse offence than ignoring facts is trying to twist\nthem into a shape that will fit an adopted theory. This occurs, too,\nand frequently, among writers on our subject. Here is an example among\nrecent theorists. According to a French essayist, when we laugh at a\nclown pushing hard against an open door, we do not laugh merely at\nthe absurd disproportion between the task to be accomplished and the\namount of effort put into it. We only laugh when our minds pass to\n_a second and reflective stage_, and recognise that the man does not\nperceive the door to be open, when, consequently, we are able to view\nthe disproportionate and quite needless exertion as natural.[5] A\nmore striking instance of inability to understand the swift movement\nof common men\u2019s laughter it would be difficult to find. As we shall\nsee, theories of laughter, like theories of Shakespeare\u2019s genius, have\nfrequently come to grief by projecting behind the thing which they seek\nto account for too much of the author\u2019s own habitual reflectiveness.[6]\n\nPerhaps we shall the better see how theorists have been wont to\nignore and to misunderstand the laughing experiences of the plain\nman if we examine at some length {9} the mode of dealing with the\nsubject adopted by a writer who holds a high place among contemporary\npsychologists. Prof. Lipps has recently elaborated a theory of the\nludicrous, illustrating it at some length.[7] This theory may be\ndescribed as a modification of Kant\u2019s, which places the cause of\nlaughter in \u201cthe sudden transformation of a tense expectation into\nnothing\u201d. According to Lipps, we have the \u201ccomic\u201d when \u201cthe little\u201d\nmeasures itself with something else and so steps into the daylight.\nThere is a mental movement (Vorstellungsbewegung) from a presentation\nrelatively great or important to one relatively little or unimportant;\nand the impression of the comic depends on the nullification of the\nlatter through its contrariety to the former and the disappointment\nwhich this involves. What may be called the belittling idea\u2014which the\nreader must bear in mind is the important one\u2014always comes first, the\nbelittled or nullified one, always second.\n\nIn order to illustrate his point he takes among other examples that\nof a hat on the wrong head. A man topped by a child\u2019s small cap,\nand a child covered with a man\u2019s big hat are, he tells us, equally\ncomical. But the reason is different in the two cases. In the first,\nstarting with the perception of the worthy man, we expect an adequate\nhead-covering, and this expectation is nullified by the obstinate\npresence of the tiny cap. Here, then, the funny feature, the belittled\nthing, is the diminutive cap. In the second case, however, the movement\nof thought is just the reverse. We here set out with the perception of\nthe headgear, not with that of its wearer. It is the dignified man\u2019s\nhat that now {10} first fixes our attention, and it is the obtrusion of\nthe child beneath when we expect the proper wearer which is the comical\nfeature. In other words, when a man puts on a baby\u2019s cap it is the cap\nwhich is absurd, when a baby dons his father\u2019s cylinder it is the baby\nwhich is absurd.\n\nThis is ingenious, one must confess, but does it not involve some\ntwisting of facts? Would the unphilosophic humorist recognise this\naccount of the ways of laughter? Has this account the note of\nfamiliarity with these ways? Let us see.\n\nAt the outset one may enter a modest protest against the quiet\nassumption that the two incidents here selected are laughable in an\nequal degree. It may be urged that, to the grown-up spectator at least,\nthe sight of the little one crowned with the whelming headgear of his\nsire is immeasurably more amusing than the other. Here the author\nstrikes one as proceeding rather hastily, as he seems to do also when\nhe assumes that an exceptionally big and an exceptionally little nose\nare equally palpable examples of the laughable. This is, to say the\nleast, disputable. One can hardly think of a comedy turning on the\nsmallness of a person\u2019s nose, as the _Cyrano de Bergerac_ of M. Rostand\nturns on its bigness. But this objection need not, perhaps, be pressed.\n\nPassing, then, to the explanation of his two examples offered by the\nauthor, we are first of all struck by the apparent arbitrariness of\nthe supposition, that the movement of thought which he assumes should\nin the one case take exactly the reverse direction of that taken in\nthe other. Seeing that both are instances of a grotesquely unsuitable\nhead-covering should one not expect the enjoyment of them to spring out\nof a similar kind of mental activity? {11}\n\nThe author probably means to say that we tend to fix the attention\non the more dignified feature in each case, the man beneath the tiny\ncap, and the man\u2019s hat above the tiny head. But that is far from being\ncertain. And in any case there are good reasons against assuming a\n\u201ccontrary motion\u201d of thought here. Dr. Lipps will no doubt allow,\nas a trained psychologist, that these intellectual movements are\nsubject to well-recognised laws. One deduction from these is that the\nsight of a hat will suggest the idea of the human figure to which it\nbelongs much more certainly and more powerfully than the sight of the\nfigure will suggest the idea of its appropriate covering. I believe\nthat everybody\u2019s experience will confirm this. A hat seen even in a\nshop-window starts the impulse to think of some wearer; but who would\nsay that seeing a human head, say across the dinner-table or in an\nadjoining stall at the theatre, prompts us to think of its proper\ncovering? Special circumstances, such as the presence of an exceptional\nbaldness appealing to pity, must be added before our thoughts flit to\nthe out-of-door receptacle. In other words, the whole interest and\nsignificance of a hat lie in a reference to a wearer, but not _vice\nvers\u00e2_.\n\nWe must, then, reject the idea of a double and opposed movement of\nthought here. If any movement takes place it must be assumed to be in\neach case a transition from the perception of the hat to the idea of\nits customary and proper wearer.\n\nNow, are we aware when we laugh at either of these odd sights of\ncarrying out this movement of thought? Keeping to the indisputable\ncase of the child\u2019s head under or in the man\u2019s hat, do we, before the\nagreeable spasm seizes us, first mentally grasp the hat and then pass\nto the idea of its rightful wearer? I, at least, cannot find this to\nbe true in {12} my own experience. But such inability may be due to the\nabsence of a sufficiently delicate introspection. Let us then try to\ntest the point in another way.\n\nIf the smile of amusement with which we greet this spectacle comes from\nthe dissolution of the idea of the adult male figure, we should expect\nthe enjoyment of the ludicrous aspect to be especially conspicuous when\nthe hat appears an instant before the child-wearer, and so thought is\ncompelled to travel in the required direction. Let us suppose that a\nchild in his nursery puts on his father\u2019s hat and stands on a chair,\nand that you enter the room and catch a glimpse of the hat first, say\nabove a piece of furniture, and for a brief moment expect to see an\nadult beneath. No doubt you will be aware of a definite movement of\nthought in the required direction and of the dissolution into nothing\nof the expectant idea. But will the element of clear anticipation\nand its annihilation intensify your feeling of the funniness of the\nspectacle, or even make the funniness more patent? You would, no doubt,\nin such a case, experience a little shock, the full excitement of\nsurprise, and that might add volume to the whole feeling of the moment.\nYou might, too, not improbably, laugh more heartily, for you would have\na sense of having been taken in, and there would be a side-current\nof hilarity directed against yourself. But I venture to affirm that\nthe spectacle as such would not impress you as being one whit more\nludicrous when seen in this way, first the hat and then the wearer,\nthan if your eye had lighted on the two together.\n\nWhat seems to happen when we are amused by this little comic scene\nin the nursery? Do we not at a glance perceive a grotesque whole,\n_viz._, a hat on the wrong head, and is not our amusement too\nswiftly forthcoming to allow of our singling out a part of what is\nseen and going through the {13} process of thought described by\nthe ingenious author of this theory? Science seems to bear out what\ncommon observation discovers, for the newer psychology teaches that\nin the first moment of perceiving an object we obtain not a distinct\napprehension of parts, but a vague apprehension of a whole into which\ndetail and definiteness only come later and gradually.\n\nAn _ensemble_, which can only be described as a whole made up of\nill-fitting parts, this seems to be the object on which our attention\nis focussed when we laugh at the child under the needlessly capacious\nhat. This intuition involves, no doubt, some rapid seizing of details:\nbut the attention to parts is not to separate objects, as the language\nof Dr. Lipps suggests, but to related parts, to the hat as worn in\nrelation to the wearer.\n\nThis seems to be an adequate account of what takes place so far as it\nis the palpable unfitness of dimensions which moves us to laughter. But\nit may be urged, and rightly urged, that the laughable spectacle is\nmore than this, that what tickles us is the uncustomary and topsy-turvy\narrangement of things. And here, it may be said, there certainly\nis implied a movement of thought, namely, to something outside the\nspectacle, to what is customary and in order.\n\nThe supposition is a highly plausible one. Since, moreover, what we\nperceive is a whole, it is reasonable to assume that if such a movement\noccurs it must be, not, as Dr. Lipps supposes, from one part of it to\nanother, but from the present whole as oddly and wrongly composed to\nsome other whole as rightly composed. Do we not, it may be asked, here\ncarry out a process fairly well described in Schopenhauer\u2019s theory of\nthe ludicrous, that is, conceive of \u201can incongruity between the real\nobject and its idea,\u201d and so, by implication, go back to this idea?\n{14}\n\nTo this I would reply that, so far as I can analyse my own mental state\nat such a moment, I do not find the presence of any idea of another\nand normal whole to be a necessary element in a full enjoyment of\nthe grotesque whole before my eyes. Such a second whole would, one\nsupposes, have to be either the same hat on the right head, or the same\nhead under its proper covering, and I find that I am perfectly well\nable to enjoy the comedy of the child crowned with the tall hat without\nmaking present to my mind either of these combinations.\n\nHere, again, I think, a better scientific theory bears out the result\nof one\u2019s individual self-examination. Psychology has made it clear that\nin recognising an object, say a weasel crossing the road on which we\nare walking, we do not need to have present to our mind (in addition\nto the perception of the object) a pictorial idea or image of a weasel\nas formed from past observations. Owing to the organising of a certain\nperceptual disposition\u2014a readiness to see an object as a familiar one,\nas of a particular \u201csort\u201d\u2014our mind instantly greets it as a weasel.\nIn other words, we recognise things by the help not of images present\nto the mind at the moment, but of certain ingrained \u201capperceptive\u201d\ntendencies or attitudes. All the higher animals seem to share with\nus this highly useful capability of immediate and instantaneous\nrecognition.\n\nNow I take it that there is another side to these apperceptive\ntendencies. Not only do they secure for us, without the necessity of\ncalling up distinct ideas, these instant recognitions of a sort of\nthing, they enable us as well as intelligent animals mentally to reject\npresentations which do not answer to \u201cthe sort of thing\u201d. I can say\nthat this wax figure is not a man without having any distinct image\nof the living man present to my consciousness. This ability {15} to\nrecognise what we see as not of a particular kind of thing, without\ncalling up a definite idea of this kind, extends to combinations and\narrangements of parts in a whole. When, after my servant has dusted my\nbooks and rearranged them on the shelves, I instantly recognise that\nthey are wrongly placed, I may at the moment be quite unable to say\nwhat the right arrangement was.[8]\n\nAccording to my view, the perceptions of the laughable which Dr. Lipps\nillustrates are instantaneous perceptions. As such, they may, and\ncommonly do, arise immediately, that is, without any reversion to the\nidea of what is the customary or normal arrangement.\n\nBut the reader may urge with force that the enjoyment of this charming\nbit of childish pretence involves more than a perception of the unusual\nand the irregular. Do we not at least apprehend the fact that the hat\nis not merely unfitting, and grotesquely wrong, but a usurpation of\nthe prerogative of the superior? Is not the behaviour of the child\nso deliciously whimsical just because we fix the mental eye on this\nelement of make-believe? And if so, does not this imply that we have\npresent to the mind the proper belongings of the hat, _viz._, the\nfather\u2019s head and figure?\n\nI readily agree that when we make our perceptions reflective, as we may\ndo, this idea is apt to emerge. As has been implied above, the sight\nof the tall hat does tend to suggest the idea of its usual wearer, and\nin lingering on this quaint bit of acting we may not improbably catch\nourselves imagining the hat on the right {16} head, especially as we\nsee that it is the child\u2019s playful aim to personate the privileged\nowner. And the same thing might occur in laughing at the father\ntopped with the small child\u2019s hat; for the laugher, who would in this\ncase more probably be a child, might naturally enough reinstate in\nimaginative thought the small child\u2019s head to which the cap belongs.\nThis combination seems at least to be much more likely to recur to the\nimagination than the other combination, which retaining the wearer\nsubstitutes the idea of the right hat.\n\nHow far any distinct image of the hat thus mentally transferred to the\nright wearer enters into the appreciation of this humorous spectacle,\nit would be hard to say. Different minds may behave differently here.\nJudging from my own experience I should say that at most only a vague\n\u201cschematic\u201d outline of the proper arrangement presents itself to the\nimagination. This seems to me to be what one might naturally expect.\nLaughter, as I conceive of it, fastens upon something human. It is\nthe living wearer that is emphasised in the comical juxtaposition;\nwe more naturally describe it as the child wearing his father\u2019s hat,\nthan as the father\u2019s hat on the child. And for the comic effect it is\nsufficient that we recognise the hat to be the father\u2019s. This we can do\nwithout mentally picturing the hat as worn by the father. The hat has\nbecome a symbol, and means for us the man\u2019s hat and the dignity which\nbelongs to this, though we may have at the time no mental image of it\nas worn by its rightful possessor.\n\nOur examination seems to show that this apparently simple example\nof the laughable is very inadequately accounted for by supposing a\nmovement of mind from one presentation or idea to another which\ncontravenes and {17} nullifies the first. It may be added that, with\nrespect to what is certainly present to our consciousness, when we look\nat this bit of child\u2019s play we do not find the relation of part to\npart to be merely one of contrariety. A curious fact, not as yet fully\nstudied by the psychologist, is what may be called the inter-diffusion\nof characters between the several parts of a complex presentation.\nThe figure of a finely dressed lady in a gathering of poor people may\neither throw the shabby look of the latter into greater relief by\ncontrast, or redeem it from its shabbiness by lending it some of its\nown glory. The latter effect is favoured by a certain contemplative\nattitude which disposes us to look at the whole as such, and with the\nleast amount of inspection of details and their relations. When we\nregard the child in the big hat a semblance of the dignity which lies\nin the meaning of the latter is transferred to the small head; and the\nmental seizure of this transferred look of dignity by the spectator is\nessential to a full enjoyment of the show as a bit of make-believe, of\ninnocent hypocrisy. Similarly, if we are disposed to laugh, a little\ncontemptuously, at the man in the child\u2019s hat, it is because the hat\nthrows for half a moment over the heavy and lined face something of the\nfresh sweet look of infancy.[9]\n\nIt has seemed worth while to examine at some length the attempt of\nDr. Lipps to deal with a simple instance of the laughable because, in\nspite of a recognisable effort to connect theory with concrete facts,\nit illustrates the common tendency to adapt the facts to the theory;\nand, further, the no less common tendency to overlook the rich variety\nof experience {18} which our laughter covers, the multiplicity of the\nsources of our merriment and the way in which these may co-operate\nin the enjoyable contemplation of a ludicrous object. As we shall\nsee, theories of the ludicrous have again and again broken down from\nattempting to find one uniform cause in a domain where the operation of\n\u201cPlurality of Causes\u201d is particularly well marked.\n\nIt may be added that such theories, even if they were not one-sided and\nforced accounts of the sources of our merriment, would still suffer\nfrom one fatal defect: as Lotze says of Kant\u2019s doctrine,[10] they make\nno attempt to show why the dissolved expectation or the failure to\nsubsume a presentation under an idea should make us _laugh_, rather\nthan, let us say, cough or sigh. Lotze, besides being a psychologist,\nwas a physiologist, and it may be added, a humorist in a quiet way, and\nthe reader of his lines who may have had the privilege of knowing him\nwill see again the ironical little pout and the merry twinkle of the\ndark eye behind the words.\n\nWe have agreed that the discourser on the comic, however gravely\nphilosophic he desires to be, must touch both finely and\ncomprehensively the common experiences of mankind. Yet it may well be\nthought, in the light of the attempts made in the past, that this is\ndemanding too much. The relish for things which feed our laughter is as\nwe know a very variable endowment. As the Master tells us, \u201cA jest\u2019s\nprosperity lies in the ear of him that hears it more than in the tongue\nof him that makes it\u201d. The faceti\u00e6 of earlier ages fall on modern\nears with a sound as dull as that of an unstrung drum. It may well be\nthat persons who pass a large number of their hours {19} in abstruse\nreflection grow incapable of enjoying many of the commoner varieties\nof laughter. Their capability of lapsing into the jocose vein becomes\ngreatly restricted and may take directions that seem out-of-the-way\nto the more habitual laugher. Schopenhauer\u2019s funny little attempt\nto extract a joke out of the meeting of the tangent and the circle\nseems to be a case in point. On reading some of the definitions of\nthe ludicrous contributed by the fertile German mind, one is forced\nto conclude that the writers had their own peculiar, esoteric modes\nof laughter. When, for example, Herr St. Sch\u00fctze, whose \u201cattempt at a\ntheory of the Comic\u201d is pronounced by the renowned Th. Vischer to be\n\u201cexcellent\u201d (vorz\u00fcglich), proceeds to define his subject in this way:\n\u201cThe comic is a perception or idea, which after some moments excites\nthe obscure feeling that nature carries on a merry game with man while\nhe thinks himself free to act, in which game the circumscribed liberty\nof man is mocked (verspottet) by a reference to a higher liberty,\u201d[11]\none seems to measure the scope of the worthy writer\u2019s sense of fun.\nThat the irony of things in their relation to our desires and aims\nhas its amusing aspect is certain: but who that knows anything of the\ndiversified forms of human mirth could ever think of trying to drag all\nof them under so narrow a rubric?\n\nA vivid perception of the variability of the sense of the laughable\nin man, of the modification, in the case of individuals and of races,\nof the range of its play, and of the standards to which it subjects\nitself, by a thousand unknown influences of temperament and habits\nof life, may well repel not merely the philosophic recluse who can\nhardly be expected perhaps to have followed far the many wild {20}\nexcursions of the laughing impulse, but others as well. Have we not, it\nmay be asked, in the appreciation of what is funny or laughable a mode\nof sensibility pre-eminently erratic, knowing no law, and incapable\ntherefore of being understood? Do not the more grotesque attempts to\nframe theories of the subject seem to mock the search for law where no\nlaw is?\n\nThe difficulty may be admitted whilst the practical conclusion drawn\nis rejected. Certainly no thinker will succeed in throwing light on\nthe dark problem who does not strenuously fight against the narrowing\ninfluences of his \u201csubjectivity,\u201d who does not make a serious effort\nto get outside the bounds of his personal preferences, and to compass\nin large vision the far-ranging play of the mirthful spirit, and\nthe endless differencing of its manifestations. But if a man can\nonly succeed in doing this without losing his head in the somewhat\nrollicking scene, there is nothing that need repel him from the task;\nfor reason assures us that here too, just as in other domains of human\nexperience where things looked capricious and lawless enough at the\noutset, order and law will gradually disclose themselves.\n\nA serious inquiry into the subject, such as we propose to make, must,\nit is evident, start from this scientific presupposition. We take the\nlanguage of everyday life to imply that human laughter, notwithstanding\nits variability, its seeming caprices, is subject to law. We speak\nof an objective region of \u201cthe laughable,\u201d that is of objects and\nrelations of objects which are fitted and which tend to excite laughter\nin us all alike. It will be one of our chief problems to determine\nthe characteristics of this field of the laughable, and to define its\nboundaries.\n\nBut a serious inquiry will take us farther than this. While we do well\nto insist that the lightness and {21} capriciousness of movement, the\nswift unpredictable coming and going, are of the essence of laughter,\nit will be one main object of this inquiry to show how our mirthful\nexplosions, our sportive railleries, are attached at their very roots\nto our serious interests. Laughter, looked at from this point of view,\nhas its significance as a function of the human organism, and as\nspreading its benefits over all the paths of life. We must probe this\nvalue of our laughing moments if we are to treat the subject adequately.\n\nIn thus proposing to give to laughter a purpose in the scheme of human\nlife, one must face the risk of offending its friends yet more deeply.\nTo these laughter is so precious and sufficing a good in itself, that\nto propose to connect it with some extrinsic and serious purpose\nlooks like robbing it of its delicious freeness and enslaving it to\nits traditional foe, excess of seriousness. To these objectors it may\nsuffice to say at the present stage that their apprehension appears to\nme to be groundless. To laugh away the spare moments will continue to\nbe to the laughter-loving the same delightful pastime even should we\nsucceed in showing that it brings other blessings in its train. On the\nother hand, to show that it does bring these blessings may turn out\nto be a handy _argumentum ad hominem_ in meeting the attacks of the\nlaughter-hater. He could not, one supposes, give himself quite so much\nof the look of flouted virtue if we could convince him that laughter,\nwhen perfect freedom is guaranteed it in its own legitimate territory,\nwill unasked, and, indeed, unwittingly, throw refreshing and healing\ndrops on the dry pastures of life. Perhaps some thought of these\nbenefits was present to the Greek philosopher\u2014the very same who was\nfor banishing Homer and other poets from his ideal commonwealth\u2014when\nhe uttered the pretty conceit that {22} the Graces in searching for a\ntemple which would not fall, found the soul of Aristophanes.\n\nOur subject is a large one, and we must endeavour to keep all parts of\nit steadily in view. To begin with, we will try to avoid the error of\nthose who in their subtle disquisitions on the comic idea forgot that\nlaughter is a bodily act, and not fear to allude to such unmetaphysical\nentities as lung and diaphragm, where they seem to be a central fact in\nthe situation. A careful examination of the very peculiar behaviour of\nour respiratory and other organs when the feeling of the comic seizes\nus, seems to belong to a scientific investigation of the subject.\nIndeed, it appears to me that in trying to get at the meaning of these\ngentle and enjoyable shakings of the mind, we shall do well to start,\nso to speak, with the bodily shakings, which are, to say the least,\nmuch more accessible to study.\n\nFurther, it seems desirable to study the utterances of the spirit of\nfun through the whole gamut of its expression. The _gros rire_, the\ncacophonous guffaw, must not be regarded as too vulgar to be admitted\nhere. The attempts in the past to build up a theory of the ludicrous\nhave commonly failed through a fastidious and highly artificial\nrestriction of the laughable attribute to the field of wit and refined\nhumour which the cultivated man is in the habit of enjoying.\n\nNor is this all. It may possibly be found that no satisfactory\nexplanation of our enjoyment of the laughable is obtainable without\ntaking a glance at forms of mirth which have preceded it. Among the\nstrange things said about laughter is surely the sentence of Bacon:\n\u201cIn laughing there ever precedeth a conceit of something ridiculous,\nand therefore it is proper to man\u201d. That the father of the inductive\nphilosophy should have approached the subject in this way {23} is one\nof the ironies that meet us in these discussions; for, allowing that he\nis right as to his fact that only man laughs, we must surely recognise\nthat his reason is hopelessly weak. The conceit which Bacon here\ntalks about is, we all know, by no means a universal accompaniment of\nlaughter; and, what is more important, even when it occurs it is wont\nto grow distinct rather in the form of an afterthought than in that of\nan antecedent. Among all things human, surely laughter ought least of\nall to be afraid of recognising its humble kinsfolk.\n\nThe importance of thus sweeping into our scientific net specimens of\nall grades of laughter will be seen when it is recognised that the one\npromising way of dealing with this subject is to trace its development\nfrom its earliest and crudest forms. If we begin at the top of the\nevolutional scheme, and take no account of the lower grades, we are\nvery likely to fail to penetrate to the core of the laughable, as\nso many of our predecessors have failed. But if we will only stoop\nto consider its manifestations at the lowest discoverable levels,\nand then confine ourselves to the more modest problem: How did the\nfirst laughter, mindless as it may well seem to us, get developed and\ndifferentiated into the variety of forms which make up the humorous\nexperience of civilised man? we may win a modest success.\n\nIt will be evident that any attempt to pursue this line of inquiry\nwill have to take note, not only of facts obtainable from the realm of\nprimitive laughter as represented by infancy and the savage state, but\nof those social forces which have had so much to do with shaping the\nmanifestations of mirth. The common directions of our laughter attest\nits social character and illustrate how it has insinuated itself into\nthe many movements of social life.\n\nFor a like reason we shall need to discuss to some extent {24} the\nplace of laughter in Art, and the treatment of the sources of merriment\nby the comedian.\n\nLastly, this larger consideration of the subject will, we shall\nprobably find, take us to an examination of certain ethical or\npractical questions, _viz._, the value which is to be assigned to the\nlaughing propensity, and the proper limits to be set to its indulgence.\n\nThe subject so conceived is a large and complex one, and it will be\nhard to deal with it at once thoughtfully and familiarly, with the\ngenuine ring of laughter ever present to the ear. The present writer\nwill account himself happy if, in a line where so many appear to have\nmissed success, he attain to a moderate measure of it. {25}\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nTHE SMILE AND THE LAUGH.\n\n\nTo treat the facts with proper respect seems to be more than ordinarily\nincumbent on us in dealing with the nature and the significance of our\nlaughter. This means, as already hinted, that some inquiry be made into\nthe act of laughing itself, the manner of it, and the circumstances\nwhich accompany it, and that this inquiry be carried out in the most\ncomprehensive way possible.\n\nWe grave elders are wont to think of laughing and smiling as something\nquite occasional, a momentary lapse once in a while from the persistent\nattitude of seriousness. This view is apt to be expressed in too\nunqualified a form. Simple types of humanity, the child and the savage,\nfrequently show us mirthful laughter filling a much larger space in\nthe day\u2019s hours than our view would suggest. A jolly boy, the subject\nof chronic high spirits, which are apt to try the patience of sedate\nseniors, might perhaps say\u2014if indeed he could be brought to frame a\ntheory of life\u2014that laughing is the proper way to pass the time, and\nthat seriousness is a tiresome necessity which can be tolerated only\nnow and again. And in any case such a view might be said to represent\nthe mental attitude of those happy idiots and imbeciles of whom we read\nthat they \u201care persistently joyous and {26} benign,\u201d and constantly\nlaughing or smiling, and that \u201ctheir countenances often exhibit a\nstereotyped smile\u201d.[12]\n\nYet, attractive as this theory may be for a lover of laughter, it\ncannot well adjust itself to stern physiological facts. The full\nprocess of laughter is, like coughing, sobbing and other actions, a\nviolent interruption of the rhythmic flow of the respiratory movements.\nAs such, its function in the human organism seems to be limited to that\nof an occasional spurt. Even a perpetual smile, quite apart from its\ninsipidity for others than the smiler, would, strictly speaking, hardly\nbe compatible with the smooth on-flow of the vital processes. What has\nbeen named the \u201ceverlasting barren simper\u201d does not really amount to\nthis.\n\nThe Smile and the Laugh, viewed as physiological events, stand in the\nclosest relation one to the other. A smile is, as we shall see, rightly\nregarded as an incomplete laugh. Hence we shall do well to study the\ntwo together.\n\nSmiling involves a complex group of facial movements. It may suffice\nto remind the reader of such characteristic changes as the drawing\nback and slight lifting of the comers of the mouth, the raising of\nthe upper lip, which partially uncovers the teeth, and the curving\nof the furrows betwixt the comers of the mouth and the nostrils (the\nnaso-labial furrows) which these movements involve. To these must be\nadded the formation of wrinkles under the eyes\u2014a most characteristic\npart of the expression\u2014which is a further result of the first\nmovements. The increased brightness of the eyes is probably the effect\nof their tenseness, due to the contraction of the adjacent muscles and\nthe pressure of the raised cheek, though {27} an acceleration of the\ncirculation within the eyeball may have something to do with it.\n\nThese facial changes are common to the smile and to the laugh, though\nin the more violent forms of laughter the eyes are apt to lose under\ntheir lachrymal suffusion the sparkle which the smile brings.\n\nAs a characteristic group of facial movements the smile is excellently\nwell suited for its purpose\u2014the primitive and most universal\nexpression of a pleasurable or happy state of mind. It forms, in\nrespect of certain of its features at least, a marked contrast to the\nexpression of opposite feelings. Thus it is far removed, and so easily\ndistinguishable, from the facial expression during weeping, _viz._, the\nfirmly closed eyelids and the wide opening of the mouth in the form\nof a squarish cavity; as also from the face\u2019s betrayal of low spirits\nand \u201ccrossness,\u201d in the depressed corners of the mouth, the oblique\neyebrows and the furrowed forehead.\n\nI have spoken here of the primitive unsophisticated smile as it may\nbe observed in children and those adults who have not learned to\ncontrol the primitive, and instinctive movements of the face. Among\nthe cultivated classes of a civilised community, this primitive smile\nis not only restrained and modified, but serves other uses than the\nconfession of the elemental experiences of pleasure and gladness. With\nthe contemptuous smile, the slightly ironical smile of the superior\nperson, the bitter, sardonic smile, we shall have happily but little\nto do here. It is enough to remark that these differentiations answer\nclosely to those of laughter, and so further illustrate the organic\naffinity of the two.\n\nWe may now pass to the larger experience of the audible laugh. That\nthis action is physiologically continuous with {28} the smile has\nalready been suggested. The facial expression is approximately the\nsame in the broad smile and the gentle laugh. It is only when laughter\ngrows immoderate that there is a marked addition of other features,\n_viz._, the strong contraction of the muscles about the eyes leading to\nfrowning, and the shedding of tears. How closely connected are smiling\nand moderate laughing may be seen by the tendency we experience when we\nreach the broad smile and the fully open mouth to start the respiratory\nmovements of laughter. As Darwin and others have pointed out, there is\na series of gradations from the faintest and most decorous smile up to\nthe full explosion of the laugh.[13]\n\nOne may, perhaps, go farther and say that the series of gradations here\nindicated is gone through, more or less rapidly, in an ordinary laugh.\nPersons who laugh slowly, finding it difficult to \u201clet themselves\ngo,\u201d can be seen to pass through these stages. It has been said by an\ningenious American inquirer that laughter may begin either with the\neyes or with the mouth, the frequency of the former mode, as compared\nwith the latter, in the instances examined being as 7 to 5.[14]\n\nIt may be added that, to this continuity of form in the actions of\nsmiling and laughing, there answers a community of function. As will\nbe shown more fully by-and-by, both are in their primitive forms\nmanifestations of pleasure, laughter being primarily the expression\nof the fuller measures of the happy or gladsome state, and varying in\nenergy and volume with the degree of this fulness.\n\nThe chronological relations of the reign of the smile and the laugh in\nthe life of the individual will occupy us {29} presently. Here it may\nbe enough to say that these relations allow us to think of smiling at\nonce as the precursor and as the successor of her kinsman. The first\nsmiles are a step away from the exceeding gravity of baby-hood towards\nfull hilarity, the last are a step back from this hilarity to the\nstolid composure of senile infancy.\n\nIt would seem to follow that the sharp distinction often drawn between\nsmiling and laughing is artificial. Society, led by its Chesterfield,\nmay emphasise the difference between the incipient and the completed\nprocess, allowing the one and forbidding the other; but the natural man\nis inclined to regard them as one.\n\nThe recognition of this identity of the two actions is evidenced by\nthe usages of speech. We see in the classical languages a tendency\nto employ the same word for the two, laughing like smiling being\nregarded\u2014primarily and mainly at least\u2014as an object of visual\nperception. This is particularly dear in the case of the Latin\n\u201cridere,\u201d which means to smile as well as to laugh, the form\n\u201csubridere\u201d being rare. This tendency to assimilate the laugh and\nthe smile as facial expressions was naturally supplemented by the\nemployment, both in Greek and in Latin, of a separate word for audible\nlaughter (\u201c\u03ba\u03b1\u03c7\u03ac\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u201d, \u201ccachinnare\u201d) in cases where it was needful to\nemphasise the fact of sound. In some modern languages the relation of\nsmiling to laughing is precisely indicated as that of a less full to a\nfuller action (Italian, \u201cridere\u201d and \u201csorridere\u201d; French, \u201crire\u201d and\n\u201csourire\u201d; German, \u201clachen\u201d and \u201cl\u00e4cheln\u201d). Possibly the existence\nof two unrelated words in our own and some other modern languages\npoints to the fact that certain races have been more impressed by the\ndissimilarity between the audible and the inaudible expression than by\nthe similarity of the visible manifestations. {30}\n\nIt is worth noting that even after the two expressions have been\ndistinguished by separate names there is a tendency to use the\nstronger metaphor \u201cto laugh,\u201d rather than the weaker one \u201cto smile,\u201d\nin describing the brighter aspects of nature\u2019s beauty, such as\nmeadows when in flower. A painter, whom Dante meets in Purgatory,\nand recognises as the first in the art of illumination, gracefully\ntransfers this distinction to a brother painter by saying that the\nleaves which the latter painted \u201claugh more\u201d (piu ridon) than his\nown.[15]\n\nWe may now turn to the distinguishing characteristics of laughing, that\nis, the production of the familiar series of sounds. Like sighing,\nsobbing and some other actions, it is an interruption of the natural\nrhythm of the respiratory process, in which inspiration and expiration\nfollow one another at regular intervals. The obvious feature of this\ninterruption in the case of laughter is the series of short, spasmodic,\nexpiratory movements by which the sounds are produced. These are,\nhowever, preceded by a less noticed inspiration of exceptional energy\nand depth. These interruptions of the ordinary respiratory movements\ninvolve an unusually energetic action of the large muscles by which the\nchest is expanded, _viz._, those which secure the contraction and so\nthe descent of the dome-shaped diaphragm, and those by the action of\nwhich the ribs are elevated.\n\nThe production of the sounds by the spasmodic expiratory movements\nshows that the passage from the trachea into the pharynx, _viz._, the\nglottis or chink between the vocal cords, is partially closed. The\nquality of the sounds is {31} explained by the particular arrangements,\nat the moment of the cachinnation, of the vocal apparatus, and more\nparticularly the shape of the resonance chamber of the mouth.\n\nFamiliar though we are with them, we should find it hard to give an\naccurate description of the sounds of laughter. To begin with, they\nseem to vary considerably in the case of the same person and still more\nin that of different persons. Laughter has not yet lent itself to the\nmethods of the experimental psychologist, and so has not been studied\nwith scientific precision. By-and-by, we may hope, the phonograph will\ncapture its sounds, and enable us to observe them at our leisure.\nMeanwhile, only a very rough account of them is possible.\n\nTaking the laughter of the adult male, which is perhaps more frank and\nbetter pronounced, we find the more common forms of iterated sounds to\nrange from the broad vowel sound _aw_ (in \u201claw\u201d) to the sharp _a_ (in\n\u201cbat\u201d). The long _o_ sound (as in \u201cgo\u201d), involving the rounded mouth\naperture, seems to me to be far less common. The same applies to the\nlong _ee_ and _ai_ sounds, and those which seem to be most closely\nallied to them.\n\nThese variations appear, so far as I can judge, to go with alterations\nof pitch. The broader sounds, _e.g._, _aw_, seem naturally to ally\nthemselves to the hardier deep-pitched explosion, the others to the\nmore cackle-like utterances in the higher parts of the register. This\nconnection shows itself, too, in the change in the vowel-quality when,\nas frequently happens, the laugh runs through a cadence of pitch from a\nhigher to a lower note.\n\nThese considerations will prepare us to find that the vowel-quality\nof the sound varies in general with sex and with age. According to\nHaller and Gratiolet the sounds of {32} the laughter of women and\nchildren, which correspond with their higher vocal pitch, approach in\nvowel-quality to the French _i_ and _e_.[16]\n\nConsiderable variations from these typical forms would seem to occur\nnow and again. In the American returns already referred to, the mode of\nlaughing described is represented by such odd symbols as \u201cgah! gah!\u201d\n\u201ciff! iff!\u201d \u201ctse! tse!\u201d etc. These singularities, if, as it seems, they\nare intended to represent habitual modes of voicing mirth, are, one\nsuspects, hardly referrible to natural differences of vocalisation, but\nare probably the result of the interfering agencies of nervousness and\naffectation which, as we know, have much to do with fixing the form of\nmirthful expression.\n\nThe description of laughter here offered applies only to the typical\nform. It would have to be modified considerably to suit the attenuated\nforms to which the expression is reduced in \u201cpolite society\u201d. Of\nthese, more presently. Even where the vocal outburst retains its\nprimitive spontaneity and fulness considerable variations are\nobservable, connected with differences in the whole respiratory and\nvocal apparatus. The intensity and volume of the sound, the pitch and\nvowel-quality, the rapidity of the successive expirations, the length\nof the series, the mode of commencing and of ending, may all exhibit\nvariations which help to make the laughter of one person or of one race\ndifferent from that of another.\n\nWe may now pass to some other accompaniments of the muscular movements\nof laughter. It is of importance to study these with care if we wish to\nestimate the precise value of the hilarious explosion in the economy of\nhuman life. {33}\n\nSince the movements of laughter are sudden and violent interruptions\nof the smooth rhythmic flow of the respiratory process, we may expect\nto find that they have important organic effects, involving not merely\nthe mechanism of respiration, but also that of the circulation of the\nblood. Here, it seems, we have to do with a double effect First of all\n(we are told), this series of spasmodic expirations\u2014during which, as\nwe have seen, the glottis is partially closed\u2014increases the pressure\nwithin the thorax or chest, and so impedes the entry of blood from\nthe veins into the heart. This effect is seen in the turgidity of the\nhead and neck which appears after prolonged and violent laughing.\nIn the second place, the exceptionally deep inspirations tend to\nexpand the lungs with air, and to drain off the blood from the veins\ninto the heart. The manner in which these two actions, the deepened\ninspiration and the prolonged expiration, alternate during a fit of\nlaughter, appears to secure a considerable advantage in respect both of\naccelerated circulation and more complete oxygenation of the blood. The\nbrisker movement of the blood after laughter has recently been observed\nin some experimental inquiries into the effects of emotional excitement\nof various kinds on the pulse.[17]\n\nIt is not improbable that this expedited circulation produces more\nremote effects on the organism. It has been suggested that one of\nthe advantages of a \u201cgood laugh\u201d is that it relieves the brain, and\nthis would seem to imply that it quickens the movement of the blood\nthrough the fine and readily clogged vessels which permeate the\nbrain-structures. {34}\n\nAnd here we find ourselves face to face with the question: What truth\nis there in the saying that laughter has beneficial physiological\neffects? A curious chapter might be written on the views propounded,\nboth by the light-hearted reveller and the grave and philosophic\nonlooker, on the wholesomeness of this form of \u201cbodily exercise\u201d. Only\na bare reference to this aspect of the subject can, however, be given\nhere.\n\nTo begin with, the unlearned, who know nothing of diaphragms or of\ncongested veins needing to be relieved, have had a shrewd conviction\nthat laughter sets the current of life moving briskly. Proverbs, such\nas \u201claugh and grow fat,\u201d attest this common conviction. Those who\nhave catered to the laughter-lovers have not unnaturally made much of\nthis salutary influence. The medi\u00e6val writers of the laughable story\nin verse (the \u201cfabliau\u201d or \u201cConte \u00e0 rire en vers\u201d) held firmly to the\nbelief in the \u201csanitary virtue\u201d (\u201cvertu saine\u201d) of a burst of laughter.\n\nThis popular view has been supported by the weight of learned\nauthority. Vocal exercises, of which laughing is clearly one, have\nbeen recommended by experts from the time of Aristotle as a means of\nstrengthening the lungs and of furthering the health of the organism as\na whole. By many, moreover, laughter has been specifically inculcated\nas a hygienic measure. The learned Burton (_b._ 1577) quotes a number\nof physicians in favour of the ancient custom of enlivening the feast\nwith mirth and jokes.[18] The reader may find references to the\nsalutary effects of laughter in the latest text-books of physiology.\nBoth by a vigorous reinforcement of the actions of the large muscles\nwhich do the work of respiration, and, still more, by the beneficial\neffects of these reinforced actions on the functions of the {35} lungs\nand the circulatory apparatus, laughter properly finds a place among\n\u201cbodily exercises\u201d.[19]\n\nThe beneficial effects of laughter have not been overlooked by the\npedagogue. Mulcaster, for example (born about 1530), gives a high\nplace to laughing among his \u201cphysical\u201d or health-giving exercises.\nThe physiological reasons adduced are sometimes funny enough: for\nthe author relies on Galen and the doctrine of \u201cspirits\u201d. He thinks\nthat laughter will help those who have cold hands and cold chests\nand are troubled with melancholia, since it \u201cmoveth much aire in the\nbreast, and sendeth the warmer spirites outward\u201d. Tickling under the\narmpits may well be added, seeing that these parts have a great store\nof small veins and little arteries \u201cwhich being tickled so become\nwarme themselves, and from thence disperse heat throughout the whole\nbodie\u201d.[20]\n\nHow far these benign effects on health, which are recognised by the\nmodern physician as well as by his predecessor, are due to the vigorous\nreinforcement brought by laughter to the work of respiration and of the\ncirculation of the blood, it is not easy to say. The latter process\nreminds one of the circulation of pedestrians and vehicles in our\nLondon streets. In a general way it manages itself fairly well. Yet now\nand again a lusty \u201cMove on!\u201d from a policeman seems to be distinctly\nbeneficial. Similar benefits may be extended to the organs of digestion\nand the rest.\n\nAt the same time we must not lose sight of the possibility that\nlaughter may act beneficially on our hard-pressed {36} frames in\nanother way. As has been suggested above, the lusty cachinnation is\nnature\u2019s way of voicing gladness, a sudden increase of pleasure. Now\nit has been held by psychologists that pleasurable feelings tend\nto further the whole group of organic functions, by adding to the\nnervous vigour which keeps them going. Laughter may owe a part of its\nbenign influence on our bodily state to the fact that it produces a\nconsiderable increase of vital activity by way of heightened nervous\nstimulation.[21]\n\nOne feature of the laughing outburst may pretty safely be ascribed to\nthis increase of nervous action under pleasurable excitement. In all\ngenuinely hilarious moods, the laugh is accompanied by a good deal of\ndiffused activity of the voluntary muscles. This is seen most clearly\nin the unsophisticated laughter of children and savages. The sudden\nglee which starts the laugh starts also movements of arm, leg and\ntrunk, so that arms flap wing-like, or meet in the joyous clap, and the\nwhole body jumps. In older people matters may not be carried so far,\nthough there are examples of the large shakings of laughter, notably\nthat of Carlyle\u2019s Teufelsdr\u00f6ckh, whose great laugh was one \u201cnot of the\nface and diaphragm only, but of the whole man from head to heel\u201d; and\nit is hard perhaps for any man taken by the \u201cstab\u201d of a good joke to\nkeep his arms down and his body vertical.\n\nIt may be added that this supplementing of the energetic {37}\nrespiratory actions by movements of the limbs gives to laughter its\nclear title to be called a muscular exercise. As such it is vigorous,\nvoluminous and bordering, so to speak, on the violent. Its salutary\ninfluence, like that of the surgeon\u2019s knife, will consequently depend\non the celerity of its operation.\n\nHere we come to the other column in the reckoning. If laughter does\ngood by its occasional irruption into a domain which otherwise\nwould have too much of drowsy monotony, its benefit is rigorously\ncircumscribed. Only too easily can it overdo the \u201cflushing\u201d part, and\ninundate and destroy when it should merely cleanse. In other words, the\nmirthful cachinnation, just because it is an irruption, a disorderly\nproceeding, must not be unduly prolonged.\n\nAt what moment in a prolonged fit of laughter the undesirable effects\nbegin to appear, it is not easy to say. It must be remembered that\na good part of what remains of modern laughter is by no means pure\nhilarity. There is in it from the first ejaculation something of a\nbiting sensation, or something of a melancholy pain. Yet, waiving\nthis and looking on what begins as genuine hilarity, we shall find\nthat it is not so simple a matter to determine the moment when\nfurther prolongation of the exercise will be weakening rather than\nstrengthening. The excitement of laughter, like that of wine, may in\nits measurements have to be adjusted to individual constitution. Among\nthe humiliations of life may be reckoned the discovery of an inability\nto go on laughing at the brilliant descriptions of a caricaturist, and\nan experience of aching exhaustion, of flabby collapse, while others\ncontinue the exhilarating chorus.\n\nIt is natural to look on the tears which often accompany boisterous\nlaughter as an unfavourable symptom. Things which do us good should\nnot, we argue, make us cry. Yet {38} we may reflect that men have\nbeen known to cry out of sheer happiness. With some laughers, too,\nthe moisture may come at an earlier stage than with others. Was\nShakespeare, one wonders, thinking of a violent laughter when he\nmade Iachimo tell Imogen that her lord Leonatus had mocked the\nFrench lover\u2019s lugubrious despondencies \u201cwith his eyes in flood with\nlaughter\u201d? Perhaps in Shakespeare\u2019s age, when laughter was held in with\nlooser rein, the tears came more readily.\n\nAccording to Darwin, who has made a careful study of laughter\u2019s tears,\ntheir appearance during a violent attack is common to all the races of\nmankind. He connects them with the contraction of the muscles round\nthe eyes which has for its purpose the compressing of the gorged\nblood-vessels and so the protection of the eyes. This is the meaning\nof the tears alike in the case of grief and of extravagant mirth. The\nparoxysm of excessive laughter thus approaches the other extreme of\nviolent grief; and this fact, Darwin thinks, may help us to understand\nhow it is that hysterical patients and children often laugh and cry\nalternately.[22]\n\nHowever it may be with the tears, there is no doubt that violent and\nprolonged laughter works mischief in other ways. The sigh that so\nfrequently follows the laugh, and has been supposed to illustrate the\nwider truth that \u201call pleasures have a sting in the tail,\u201d need not\nbe taken too seriously. It is the sign of restoration of equilibrium\nafter the hilarious upset. The prostrating effects of violent laughter\nwere well known to Shakespeare. Thus he speaks of being \u201cstabbed\u201d {39}\nwith laughter, of laughing oneself \u201cinto stitches\u201d\u2014an experience which\nMilton probably had in mind when he wrote of \u201claughter holding both\nhis sides\u201d\u2014of the heart being almost broken \u201cwith extreme laughing\u201d\nand of laughing oneself \u201cto death\u201d.[23] The American returns speak\nof a whole Iliad of evil after-effects: fatigue, weakness, sadness,\ngiddiness, breathlessness and so forth. It may, however, be urged\nthat these unpleasant experiences hardly justify us in applying to\nlaughter the rather strong epithet of \u201ckilling\u201d. They are, under normal\ncircumstances, temporary inconveniences only, and to the lover of fun\ndo not seriously count as against its substantial blessings. When\nlaughter kills, as it does sometimes, it is because it has degenerated\ninto something distinctly abnormal, allying itself to hysterical grief\nor to the unhinging effect of a great mental shock.\n\nAs already noted, the laugh, like the smile which is its beginning,\nis in general an expression of a pleasurable state of feeling. Among\nunsophisticated children and savage adults it is the common mode of\nexpressing all considerable intensities of pleasure when they involve\na sudden brightening of the pleasure-tone of consciousness, as in the\noverflow of gladness or good spirits. As such it stands in marked\ndissimilarity to the expression of opposite tones of feeling. To begin\nwith, it presents a striking contrast to states of suffering, sorrow\nand low spirits in general. It illustrates the broad generalisation\nlaid down by psychologists that a state of pleasure manifests itself\nin vigorous and expansive movements, whereas a state of pain involves\na lowering of muscular energy and a kind of shrinking into oneself.\nIn a more special way it forms an antithesis, in certain of its\nfeatures at least, to the expression of violent {40} suffering. Darwin\nremarks that in the production of screams or cries of distress the\nexpirations are prolonged and continuous and the inspirations short and\ninterrupted; whereas in the production of laughter we have, as we have\nseen, the expirations short and broken and the inspirations prolonged.\nThis is merely one case of the wider generalisation that \u201cthe whole\nexpression of a man in good spirits is exactly the opposite of that of\none suffering from sorrow\u201d.[24]\n\nThe value of this arrangement as helping us to understand one another\u2019s\nfeelings is obvious. Among the many mistakes which we are wont to\ncommit in reading our children\u2019s minds, that of confusing their joy and\ngrief cannot, fortunately, be a frequent one. It is only in exceptional\nand abnormal cases, where the extremes of boisterous mirth and grief\nseem to approach one another, that the language of the one can be\nmistaken for that of the other.\n\nA curious point, which the ingenuities of some later psychologists\ncompel us to consider, is whether the pleasure, of which laughter\nis popularly supposed to be the outcome or effect, really stands in\nthis relation to it. According to the theory here referred to, of\nwhich Prof. W. James is the best-known advocate in our language,\na blush cannot be attributed to an antecedent feeling of modesty\nor shamefacedness: but for the blush there would be no feeling of\nmodesty: in truth, it is the blush, _i.e._, the hot sensation of it,\nthat constitutes the feeling. The theory has done much to popularise\npsychology in these last days. It is, I have found, a plum in a pudding\nwhere plums are rare for many who read psychology for examinations. It\nseems to be {41} particularly dear to young women. It certainly has\nabout it the charm of a lively fancy.\n\nBut science has, alas! sometimes to do battle with liveliness of fancy;\nand it has to do this here. By trying to get all your emotions out of\nthe organic effects, you find yourself in the awkward situation of\nbeing unable to say how these organic effects themselves are brought\nabout. You must have something of the emotional thrill and of the\nnervous thrill which this involves before you get that interference\nwith the routine action of the muscles of the facial capillaries which\nbrings on the blush.\n\nNot only may the presence of an element of feeling at the very\nbeginning of an emotional experience be thus shown to be a necessary\nassumption, it can, in certain cases at least, be clearly observed.\nThis applies more particularly to such feelings as the admiration of a\nbeautiful landscape or a fine bit of harmonised melody. In these cases\nit must, one would suppose, be evident to all that the pleasurable\nemotion is started and sustained by numerous currents of agreeable\nsensation pouring in by way of eye or ear, and by the agreeable\nperceptions which grow immediately out of these. To say that all the\njoyous elevation in these experiences springs out of the secondary,\ninternally excited sensations, those which accompany the altered\ncondition of muscle and gland, the heightened pulse-rate, the bodily\nthrill and the rest, is surely to inflict an undeserved indignity on\n\u201cthe higher senses,\u201d and to exhibit the full depth of ludicrous paradox\nwhich lurks in this theory.[25]\n\nThe case of laughter is not quite so clear. It has, indeed, one\ncharacteristic which seems to favour the {42} view that the bodily\nresonance is everything, namely, that it is easily induced in a\nmechanical or quasi-mechanical manner. It is of all the expressive\nmovements the one most subject to the force of imitation. Children\u2019s\nlaughter, and that excited by the popular game, the \u201claughing chorus,\u201d\nclearly illustrate its contagious character.[26] Moreover, as we know,\na fit of laughter may be brought on, in part at least, by actions\nwhich presumably reinstate some of the physiological elements in the\nprocess. Thus my son tells me that he was overtaken by an irresistible\nimpulse to laugh when riding a horse without a saddle, and again when\nrunning a race; and my daughter had the same tendency at the end of\nher first mountain climb. It seems probable that the movements and the\nchanged condition of the breathing function are prime causes of the\nirresistible tendency in such cases.\n\nIt is, however, one thing to allow the indisputable fact that laughter\ncan be excited in this seemingly mechanical way, another thing to claim\nfor the reaction in such cases the value of the full joyous outburst.\nI believe that a person who watches his mental processes can observe\nthat a merely imitative laughter does not bring the whole delightful\npsychosis which arises when some agreeable impression initiates the\nmovements.\n\nTo this it must be added that in the cases here touched on the\nimitation is not wholly mechanical. When we laugh because others laugh,\ndo we not accept their laughter as a playful challenge and fall into\nthe gay mood? And are we not, commonly at least, affected by others\u2019\nvoluminous laughter as by a droll sight and sound, which directly\nstimulates the mirthful muscles? My son\u2019s laughter, {43} in the\ncircumstances just referred to, seemed to be directed to the movements\nof the horse\u2019s ears, and to those of the boy running just in front of\nhim. The movements of laughter have, in the case of some adults, come\nso completely under the initiative control of mental processes, that\neven when powerful organic forces prompt the movements, it is necessary\nto make a show of finding some cause of merriment.\n\nComing now to the ordinary case of the emotional reaction, we note\nfirst of all the swift, explosive character of the outburst. If the\nmotor discharge follow the first swell of joyous feeling, which is\npopularly said to excite it, it seems to do so with such electrical\nrapidity as to make it impossible to detect this initial swell as\ndistinctly preceding it. Yet this fact need not baffle our inquiry.\nWhen for example we laugh at some absurd incongruity in speech or\nmanners, can we not see that the perception which starts the laugh is\nan emotional perception, one which not only directs itself to something\nthat has emotional interest and value, namely, the incongruous features\nas such, but is flooded from the very first with the gladness of mirth.\nTo say that my perception of a big woman hanging upon the arm of a\nsmall man is a purely intellectual affair, like the perception of the\ninequality of two lines in a geometrical figure, is, one fears, to\nconfess either to a poverty of humorous experience or to a very scanty\nfaculty of psychological analysis.\n\nBut perhaps the clearest disproof of this quaint paradox in the realm\nof laughter is supplied by the situation already referred to, that\nof forced abstention from a choral laugh through fatigue. When thus\n\u201cdoubled up\u201d and impotent, we may be quite capable of seizing the funny\nturns of the good \u201cstory,\u201d and of feeling all the {44} force of the\nbugle-call of the others\u2019 laughter. In sooth it is just here that the\nmisery of the situation lies, that the joyous sense of fun in the air\nis now robbed of its sturdy ally and so reduced to a state of limp\ninefficiency. The comicality still makes full appeal: we feel it, but\nthe feeling is denied its full normal outflow.\n\nThis brings us face to face with the kernel, the valuable kernel, of\ntruth which lies in what seems at first an empty paradoxical nutshell.\nThough the \u201cbodily reverberation\u201d that is, the swiftly returning\ntidings of a raised or depressed nervous activity in outlying regions\nof the organism, is not everything in an emotion, it is a part, and\nan important part. The full experience of the joys of the comic, like\nother full emotional experiences, implies that the vents are clear,\nthat the nervous swirl started at the centres at the moment when we\ngreet the coming of fun with gladness can find its customary outflow\nalong the familiar channels. Not only so, but as suggested above,\nthis large expansion of the area of nervous commotion throughout the\nbodily system gives added life and a more distinctive character to the\nenjoyment of fun.\n\nI have here supposed a perfectly simple instance of laughter in which\na sudden increase of pleasure up to the point of gladness brings on\nthe reaction. Even in this case, however, there is some complication,\nsome reciprocal action between the out-pouring mental gladness and the\nin-pouring somatic resonance. In a good, prolonged laugh the bodily\nfactor does undoubtedly react upon the psycho-physical process which\nmakes up the mental gaiety, and this means that it precedes the later\nstages of this process. In all cases where this central psycho-physical\nfactor is complex and requires time for its {45} completion, the\ninteractions between it and the bodily factor become vital. As hinted\nin the preceding chapter, the reflective intuitions which are said by\ncertain theorists to be the cause, and so to precede laughter, are\noften after-thoughts. This means that when the laughing apparatus is\nset and ready to discharge, the first joyous perception of something\nfunny, though utterly vague with respect to the particular features\nand relations wherein lies the funniness, suffices to bring on the\nreaction, which instantly reinforces the gladsome mood. And the jollity\nmay sustain itself for a while mainly as a fit of laughter; though\nswift mental glances are all along being shot across the spasms at\nthe provoking \u201cobject,\u201d glances which make clearer and clearer the\nludicrous features, and by so doing raise the force of the mental\nstimulus.\n\nIf, as we have seen to be probable, laughter is within limits a good\nexercise, bringing a considerable increase of pleasurable activity and\nfurthering the sense of bodily well-being, we can easily understand\nhow essential it is to the full realisation of good spirits and the\nhilarious mood. Its explosive movements seem, indeed, to belong to the\nstate of exhilaration, of conscious expansion, and to give it much\nof its piquant flavour: whence the hardship of losing breath through\nexcessive indulgence, or having to stifle the impulse to laugh at\nits birth when exposed to the shocked look of the agelast. The deep,\nforcible chest-movements bring a sense of heightened energy, of a\nhigh-tide fulness of the life-current. The voluminous mass of sensation\nwhich they supply, partly in the stirring sounds which react on the\nlaugher\u2019s own ears, and partly in the large, exhilarating effects in\nthe viscera, is in itself a vast expansion of our consciousness. This\nsudden rise of the tide in our organic life is a part at least of that\nsense {46} of \u201csudden glory\u201d which the sight of the ludicrous is said\nto bring us.\n\nThat this organic swell is a large factor, is, I think, shown in\nmore ways than one. To name but one fact; we may begin a laugh with\nsomething of bitterness, something of malignity in our hearts; but end\nit having a freer, serener consciousness, as if the laughter had been\na sort of cleansing process, and, like another and widely different\n\u03ba\u03ac\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, substituted a happy and peaceful for a disturbed and unhappy\nstate of feeling. It will be seen presently that among the causes of\nlaughter, a moment\u2019s relaxation of strain\u2014muscular, intellectual or\nemotional tension\u2014is one of the most common, if it be not universal.\nThe delicious sense of relief which the collapse of the strained\nattitude brings us may no doubt be due to a consciousness of the\ntransition, the escape from pressure of the moment before. At the same\ntime, it is not improbable that the physiological processes of laughter\nthemselves, by securing organic relief and refreshment, contribute a\nlarge element to the whole mental state.\n\nA like remark applies to the element of disagreeable feeling which\nfrequently, at least, makes our laughter a mixed experience:\u2014\n\n    Our sincerest laughter\n    With some pain is fraught.\n\nShelley was hardly the person, one suspects, to judge of the quality\nof men\u2019s laughter: yet his couplet contains an element of truth.\nThis mixture of elements is, no doubt, largely due to the initiating\nperception itself; for, as we shall see, the laughable spectacle\ncommonly shows us in the background something regrettable. But it seems\nreasonable to say that the element of sadness in our hilarity has its\norganic support in the unpleasant feeling-tones {47} which accompany\nthe effects of all violent and prolonged laughter.[27]\n\nWhat may be the precise proportions between the initial or \u201ccerebral\u201d\njoy and the joy reverberated by the organism we have no data for\ndetermining. There seems something plausible in the contention that\nthe former, when it lacks the reinforcement of the latter, is but a\n\u201cthin\u201d and \u201cpale\u201d feeling. This view may be supported by the fact\nthat the response of the body is never wholly silenced. Even when\na man controls his laughter, say in church, he is aware of a swift\nspasm in the throat. But there are facts which tell powerfully in\nthe other direction. We never stifle the organic resonance without\nintroducing other and distinctly adverse influences. When by a forcible\neffort we hold back our laughter this effort itself, as an artificial\nand difficult attitude, does much to spoil the whole experience.\nThe conflict between the impulse to laugh and the curbing will is\ndistinctly disagreeable, and may readily grow into an acute suffering.\nAnd when the corporeal reverberation fails through sheer fatigue, this\nfatigue, both in itself and in its antagonism to the appeal to mirth,\nbecomes a large factor in the whole experience. We must consequently\nwait for this knowledge of the precise shares contributed by the two\nfactors, until some ingenious experimenter can succeed in exciting the\nmirthful mood and at the same time cutting off the bodily reverberation\nwithout inducing a new organic consciousness; or, on the other hand,\ncan devise a method of securing for us in some utterly serious moment\nthe full bodily reverberation of laughter, say by electrically {48}\nstimulating our respiratory muscles. It may be predicted with some\nconfidence that this waiting will be a long one.\n\nHere again, as in the case of the smile, we have to note various\ndeviations from the typical form of the expression. When laughter no\nlonger springs from pure joy, but has in it something of a sardonic\nbitterness, or something of a contemptuous defiance, the experience\nwill of course be complicated by a new ingredient of consciousness.\nWhether this change of experience is due merely to the difference in\nthe initial mental attitude may be doubted. It is not improbable that\nthe physiological processes, that is to say, the respiratory movements,\nthe vocalisation, and the more diffused organic effects, will be\naltered in such cases. A bitter laugh seems both to taste differently\nand to sound differently from a perfectly joyous one.\n\nIn these deviations from the typical laugh of the joyous mood we see\nthe beginning of the intrusion of a new factor, the will. There is more\nof intention to be heard in, say, the ironical laughter of one side of\nthe House of Commons than in the laughter of an unsophisticated child.\n\nThis intrusion of will serves both to restrain the natural process,\nreducing it to a degraded and rudimentary form, and to originate\nvarious affected counterfeits of the spontaneous outburst. This double\naction supports the idea that the conventions of polite society aim not\nmerely at suppressing the \u201cvulgar\u201d kind of explosion, but at evoking\nthe signs of amusement when an effort is being made to amuse. Hence\nthe multiplicity of weird utterances which cultivated humanity has\nadopted. The giggle, the titter, the snicker and the rest appear to be\nnot merely reduced or half-suppressed laughter, but substitutes which\ncan readily {49} be produced when the occasion asks for them.[28]\nThose who confine themselves to this debased laughter are naturally\ndespised by the much-laughing soul. Carlyle\u2014himself a voluminous\nlaugher at times\u2014when writing of Teufelsdr\u00f6ckh\u2019s great laugh hurls\ncontempt on these triflers with the big things of mirth in this wise:\nthey \u201conly sniff and titter and sniggle from the throat outwards; or\nat best produce some whiffling, husky cachinnation, as if they were\nlaughing through wool\u201d.[29] An accurate scientific record of these\nstrange perversions of laughter, even though it were less picturesque\nthan Carlyle\u2019s description, would be of considerable value. The\nlaughter-lover may at least console himself for the injury done him by\nthis kind of imitation with the reflection that it is empty of joy, and\neven of the refreshing sensations which issue from the genuine laugh.\nNay, more, as a forced performance, it presumably has a disagreeable\nfeeling of irksomeness as its accompaniment.\n\nIt is sad to reflect that these spurious varieties of laughter are apt\nto appear early in the life of the individual. Preyer tells us he was\nable to distinguish, in the third year of his boy\u2019s utterances, the\ngenuine laugh of hilarity from that of imitation, which was probably\nrather more forced. Possibly they all appear among that wondrous\ngathering of queer sounds for which infancy is famous, and may be\npermanently selected by a certain number of \u201chighly proper\u201d children in\npreference to the fuller sounds.\n\n{50}\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nOCCASIONS AND CAUSES OF LAUGHTER.\n\n\nIt seemed desirable to examine the process of laughter itself before\ntaking up the much-discussed question of its causes. In considering\nthis side of our subject, we shall, as already hinted, take a\ncomprehensive view of the occasions and modes of production of the\nmirthful outburst, and approach the narrower problem of the nature and\nmode of action of the ludicrous by way of this larger inquiry.\n\nAccording to the common assumption, laughter, in ordinary cases,\nis excited by some provocative, to speak more precisely, by some\nsense-presentation, or its representative idea, such as a \u201cfunny\u201d\nsensation, the sight of a droll human figure, or a quaint fancy. Yet we\nmust not assume that such an initial presentation occurs in all cases.\nAs is implied in what has been said above about the laughter of \u201cgood\nspirits,\u201d and as we shall see more clearly presently, there are cases\nwhere laughter takes on the appearance of a spontaneous or \u201cautomatic\u201d\ngroup of movements.\n\n1. It may be well, however, to begin our inquiry by touching on those\nvarieties of laughter in which the action of a sense-stimulus is\napparent. And it will be convenient to select a form of distinctly\nprovoked laughter in which the intellectual processes play only a\nsubordinate part. The effect of tickling is clearly of this kind, and\nas one of the {51} simplest modes of exciting laughter it seems to\nclaim our first attention here. Since, moreover, it is the mode of\nexciting laughter of which our knowledge has been rendered in a measure\nprecise by means of experiment, I propose to deal with it at some\nlength.\n\nThe experience of being tickled is best described in its entirety as a\nsensational reflex; that is to say, a motor reaction on a process of\nsensory stimulation which produces a well-marked variety of sensation.\nTo speak of titillation as if it were merely the production of a\ncertain kind of sensation is unscientific. It involves the excitation\nof certain movements, and where these are not forthcoming we must\ninfer, either that the sensory part of the process is defective, or\nthat the motor impulse is inhibited in some way.\n\nThe stimulation in this case is, as we all know, a light tactile one.\nThe agent commonly applied is the finger or a still softer body, such\nas a feather. The mode of contact is light, or at least does not\ncommonly rise to the point of heavy pressure. The manner of contact is\nusually intermittent, the finger or fingers giving a series of short\nand staccato impacts. Movements of the fingers from point to point\ncommonly accompany the series of contacts. In some cases, however, a\nsingle light touch, or even a continuous touch with movement from point\nto point, may suffice to induce the proper effect.\n\nThe precise nature of the sensations is not yet fully understood.\nIt is pretty clear that the \u201cminimal stimuli\u201d here employed do not\ngive rise to purely tactile sensations of low intensity. This seems\nto be established by the fact brought out by Dr. Louis Robinson that\nthe parts of the skin having the most acute tactile sensibility, the\ntips of the fingers and the tip of the tongue, are \u201cscarcely at\nall sensitive {52} to titillation\u201d.[30] It has been pointed out by\nWundt that the sensations in this case, as in that of some other skin\nsensations, tend to spread themselves out, other and even distant\nparts of the surface being engaged by means of the mechanism of reflex\nsensation.[31] This in itself suggests that the sensations of tickling\nare more allied to organic than to purely tactile sensations. It is\nsupposed that the light stimuli set up in the skin certain organic\nchanges, more particularly modifications of the circulation of blood in\nthe small vessels.[32]\n\nIt is well known that not all parts of the skin are equally susceptible\nof the effect of tickling. Certain areas, for example, the sole of the\nfoot and the armpit, are commonly said to be \u201cticklish places\u201d. In the\nanswers to questions sent out by Dr. Stanley Hall we find the order,\nas determined by most frequent naming of the part, to be as follows:\nthe sole of the foot, the armpit, the neck and part under the chin,\nthe ribs, and so forth. The inquiries brought out the fact that there\nare considerable differences of experience here, some saying that they\nwere ticklish in all parts, others only in one. The method adopted in\nthis inquiry clearly affords no accurate measurement of comparative\nsensibility.[33] {53}\n\nA more scientific attempt to measure this was made by Dr. Louis\nRobinson, who carried out a large number of experiments on children\nfrom two to four years of age with the definite purpose of testing the\ndegree of responsiveness by way of laughter. According to his results\nthe order of decreasing sensibility is as follows: (1) the region in\nfront of the neck; (2) the ribs; (3) axillae; (4) bend of elbow; (5)\njunction of ribs and abdominal muscles; (6) flanks; (7) region of the\nhip joint; (8) upper anterior part of the thigh.[34]\n\nA glance at these statements shows that the determination of the\nscale of ticklish sensibility over the surface is not yet completed.\nDr. L. Robinson, by the way, mentions neither the sole, a highly\nticklish spot in the popular creed, nor the palm, which, as we shall\nsee, is decidedly a ticklish region.[35] It is highly desirable that\nmore precise experimental inquiries should be directed to these\nlocal variations of ticklishness, and that, after the seats of the\nhigher degrees of the sensibility have been ascertained, the question\nshould be considered whether these are marked off by any definite\npeculiarities of structure.\n\nIt is probable that the sensations included under the head of\nticklishness are not all of the same quality. It seems safe to say\nthat in all cases the sensation is complex to this extent, that it\nis composed of a tactile and an organic factor. But we may see that\nthe complexity is often greater than this. An obvious instance is\nthe addition {54} of a peculiarly irritating effect when the orifice\nof the ear or nostril is tickled, an effect due to the action of the\nstimulus on the hairs, which are specially abundant here.[36] Some\nsurfaces, too, which are free from hair, appear to be endowed with a\nspecial modification of the ticklish sensibility. In my own case, at\nany rate, light touches on the sole, have, as long as I can remember,\nexcited sensations which seem to have almost a character of their own.\nA further complication probably occurs when the tickling grows rougher\nand approaches to a digging of the fingers into the soft parts of the\narmpits; for here the nerve-endings lying deeper are pretty certainly\nstimulated.\n\nLastly, it is important to add that prolongation of the tickling seems\nto introduce changes in the intensity, if not also in the quality of\nthe sensations. Hence it would appear that the sensations falling\nunder the head of ticklishness, though they have certain common\ncharacteristics, may vary considerably.\n\nSince we are here concerned with these sensations as provocatives of\nlaughter, it behoves us to look rather closely at their feeling-tones.\nAs largely organic sensations they may be expected to have a strongly\nmarked element of the agreeable or disagreeable; and this is what we\nfind. I, at least, cannot conceive of myself as having the proper\nsensational experience of tickling, and yet being wholly indifferent.\n\nWhen, however, we ask what is the precise feeling-tone of one of these\nsensations, we find no simple answer forthcoming. Some psychologists\nview them as having, in general, an unpleasant character.[37] On the\nother hand, children are {55} certainly fond of being tickled, ask for\nit, and make a pastime of it. This at once suggests that we have here\nto do with a complexity of feeling-tone, as, indeed, our study of the\nsensations would lead us to suppose.\n\nIt is, I think, a plausible supposition that no sensation coming under\nthe head of tickling is merely agreeable or disagreeable. It seems\nalways to be of a mixed feeling-tone: some sensational elements being\npleasant, others unpleasant, though analysis may be unable to attribute\nwith exactness their respective tones to the several elements.\n\nAdopting this hypothesis, we should expect that the differences in the\ncomposition of the sensations already dealt with would lead to the\nresult that, whereas some are preponderantly agreeable, others are\nrather disagreeable. And this, I believe, accords with the results of\nobservation. The tickling sensations excited by stimulating the hairy\norifices of the ear and the nostril are said by Dr. Louis Robinson to\nbe \u201cdistinctly distasteful\u201d. The sensations produced by tickling the\nsole of the foot are commonly held, at least by older children and\nadults, to be disagreeable in all degrees of their intensity. This\ncertainly accords with my own self-observation. The lightest touch, say\nfrom a shampooer\u2019s hand, is to me distinctly \u201cnasty,\u201d with an uncanny\nnastiness which I cannot hope to describe.\n\nAn example of a distinctly agreeable sensation of tickling is,\ncuriously enough, supplied by another hairless surface, closely\nanalogous to the sole, namely the palm. A lady, who is an excellent\nobserver of children and endowed with an exceptional memory of her\nearly experiences, tells me that when a child she loved to have her\nhands tickled. Her feeling was a kind of \u201cawful joy,\u201d the awfulness\ncoming {56} from a vague suspicion that the pastime was not quite\nproper. Other preponderantly agreeable varieties appear to be the\nsensations produced by the lighter stimulation of those parts which\nseem in a special way to be laughter-provoking areas, _e.g._, the\narmpits and ribs. This is, at least, suggested by the fact that younger\nchildren love to be tickled in these parts in moderation, and will ask\nto have the pastime renewed.\n\nAn important characteristic of these feeling-tones is their\nunsteadiness or changefulness. Although at a particular moment we may\nbe able to detect clearly a slight preponderance of the agreeable or of\nthe disagreeable aspect, it is only for a moment. An increase in the\ndegree of pressure, a further prolongation of the stimulation, or even\na slight variation in the mode of contact, may suffice to bring up and\nrender prominent the opposed feeling-phase.\n\nWe may now pass to the motor reactions, which are of more especial\ninterest in the present connection. Overlooking the less conspicuous\nelements, such as the contraction of the muscles of the hairs, we find\nthat there are two easily distinguishable groups of movements: (_a_)\na number of protective or _defensive_ reactions which are adapted to\nwarding off or escaping from the attack of the tickling stimulus; (_b_)\nmovements expressive of pleasure and rollicking enjoyment, from the\nsmile up to uproarious and prolonged laughter.\n\nThe defensive movements are such as the following:\u2014retraction of the\nfoot and leg when the sole is tickled; the bending of the head to the\nshoulder when the neck is tickled; the rendering of the body concave\non the side which is attacked; the thrusting away of the hand of the\ntickler; wriggling and fencing with the arms when a child is tickled\nlying on his back. These movements appear to {57} introduce important\nmodifications into the sensations excited by tickling. Dr. Louis\nRobinson tells us that the flexing of the foot when tickled transforms\nan unpleasant sensation into a rather pleasant one.\n\nWe may now pass to the point of chief importance for our present study,\nthe conditions of the laughter-reaction during a process of tickling.\nThis reaction is clearly the typical form of childish risibility.\n\nIt has been already more or less clearly implied, that we cannot mark\noff the laughter in this case as an effect determined by any assignable\ndifferences in the characteristics of the sensations involved. Dr.\nLouis Robinson thinks that the tickling which provokes laughter is a\nspecial variety involving the stimulation of the deeper-lying nerves.\nDr. Leonard Hill, who has specially tested this point for me, writes,\n\u201cThere is no difference in response to deep and superficial tickling\u201d;\nand again, \u201cI am sure that the most delicate superficial stimulation\ncan provoke laughter\u201d. This certainly seems to agree with ordinary\nobservation. One of the most laughter-provoking forms of tickling\nconsists of a series of pianissimo touches.\n\nAgain, in speaking of ticklish areas of the skin, we must be careful\nnot to restrict the titillation which calls forth laughter to any\nassignable region. It is undeniable that there are areas which more\nreadily respond, in the case of children generally, to the tickling\nprovocation. The armpits perhaps will occur to most readers; and it\nis noticeable that Darwin speaks of the anthropoid apes giving out\n\u201ca reiterated sound, corresponding with our laughter, when they are\ntickled, especially under the armpits\u201d.[38] This {58} fact, however,\ndoes not imply that the area of sensibility is circumscribed. Dr.\nLeonard Hill assures me, as a result of his investigations, that\nlaughter under favourable conditions may be excited by tickling _any\npart_ of the body. Dr. L. Robinson in a letter explains to me that he\nagrees with Dr. L. Hill here. He finds that if a child is in a ticklish\nmood, the tickling of any part or even the threat of doing so will\nsuffice to provoke laughter. On the other hand, we cannot speak of any\npart of the surface as one, the tickling of which will uniformly call\nforth laughter. Here again, as we shall see, the influence of mental\nagencies modifies the result.\n\nNow these facts suggest that even those varieties of tickling which\nproduce a sensation having a well-marked disagreeable tone may excite\nthe response of laughter. The tickling of the sole of the foot not only\nprovokes laughter in an infant; it tends to do so, I believe, in an\nadult, who may at the same time express his dislike of the sensation by\na grimace.\n\nIt seems impossible then to conclude that the laughter which\narises from tickling is a mere expression of the pleasure-tone of\na sensational process. Even if we supposed that in all cases the\nsensations were preponderantly agreeable, it would still be impossible\nto account for the energy of the reaction by the intensity of the\nsensuous enjoyment experienced.\n\nThat we have not to do here merely with the effect of agreeable\nstimulation is shown by the fact that when a child laughs under, and is\nsaid to enjoy, a process of titillation, _the laughter is accompanied\nby defensive movements_. When, for example, a child is tickled on its\nback, it will, says Dr. Robinson, \u201cwriggle about, fencing with its\narms and dodging the attacks of its playmate .\u00a0.\u00a0. _laughing all the\ntime_ {59} _with open mouth and teeth fully displayed_\u201d. This surely\nsuggests that the laughter is not merely the result of an agreeable\nsensation, but rather of a complex mental state, in which the agreeable\nand disagreeable elements of sensation appear to play only a secondary\n_r\u00f4le_.\n\nNor again does it seem as if the mere transition from an agreeable\nto a disagreeable sensation, or the reverse process, would account\nfor the laughter of tickling. A person highly sensitive to the effect\nof tickling can imitate the process by movements of his own fingers,\nand produce quite similar sensations of varying feeling-tone _without\nexperiencing the faintest impulse to laugh_. Again we know that other\nexperiences, such as scratching a sore place when it is healing up,\ninvolve an alternation of moments of agreeable and disagreeable\nfeeling-tone, and yet are not provocative of laughter.\n\nThese and other familiar facts point to the conclusion that the\nlaughter excited by tickling is not a net effect of the sensory\nstimulation. It is no doubt broadly determined by the characteristics\nof the sensations. Intensely disagreeable ones would certainly not\ncall forth the laughing response. But the determining conditions\ninclude, in addition to a sequence of sensations, _a higher psychical\nfactor_, namely, an apperceptive process or assignment of _meaning_\nto the sensations. This conclusion is borne out by the fact that the\nlaughter-reaction occurs first of all (to give the earliest date)\nin the second month\u2014presumably in the second half of this month.\nThe presence of such a psychical factor is more strongly supported\nby the fact, already referred to, that the reaction does not occur\nin the first three months save when mental agencies co-operate; and\nthat throughout the ticklish period an exactly similar process of\ntitillative stimulation applied to the same area of the {60} skin will\nnow produce laughter, now fail to do so, according to the varying mood\nof the child.[39]\n\nThat the interpretation of the sensation is the decisive element in\neliciting laughter may, I think, be seen by a simple experiment which\nany reader who is ticklish may carry out upon himself. The next time he\nhappens to have a subjective, creepy skin sensation, he will find that\nhe can bring on either laughter or a very different state of feeling by\nadopting one of two ways of mentally envisaging what is happening. The\nmerest suggestion of an invading parasite suffices, I believe, to set\nup a mental state which completely inhibits the impulse to laugh.\n\nWe may now seek to assign with more precision the mental conditions\nwhich induce the mode of apperception favourable to laughter.\n\nBeginning with the \u201cobjective\u201d characteristics, those which reside in\nthe tickling experience itself, we may observe how much apprehension\nof meaning has to do with the \u201cfunniness\u201d of the experience. It is to\nbe noticed at the outset that when we are tickled there is _an element\nof the unknown_ in the process. This seems to have been recognised by\nDarwin when he laid emphasis on the fact that the more ticklish parts\nare those rarely touched, at least on small areas, and, one may add,\nlightly.[40] The familiar fact that one cannot tickle oneself points to\nthe same conclusion. A person who tries to do this knows too much about\nwhat is going on. Dr. Ch. Richet observes, however, that one can tickle\noneself _by means of a feather_; and he, as I think {61} rightly,\nexplains this apparent exception by saying that in the attempt to\ntickle oneself with the finger, the double sensation, of the finger\nand the part tickled, seems to inhibit the effect, whereas, when the\nfeather is interposed this obstacle is eliminated.[41]\n\nOther facts, too, seem to point to the importance of an element of the\nunknown. The common way of tickling a child is by running the fingers\nwith discontinuous contact over the skin. Dr. L. Hill describes his\nmode of tickling in one case as running the fingers up the child\u2019s\narm _like a mouse_. This evidently brings in an element of _local_\nuncertainty as well as of change. The effect is increased when, as\nfrequently happens, there are pauses between the attacks of the fingers.\n\nThe invasion of the skin-territory, like that of larger territories,\nis, it would seem, likely to be more effective when it has an element\nof unpredictableness. The uncertainty is, I believe, sometimes\nincreased by half-voluntary variations in the direction and in the\nvelocity of the tickling movements. Whether the fact communicated by\nDr. L. Robinson, that a child is more ticklish when dressed than when\nundressed, is explained by the increased obscurity of the process in\nthe former case, I am not sure. It is worth noting, however, that some\nof the areas said to be most ticklish, _e.g._, the armpits and the\nneck, are inaccessible to sight. I believe, too, that when a child\ngives himself up to the full excitement of tickling he makes no attempt\nto see what is going on.\n\nNow touches of unknown origin at places not closely observable have\nsomething of a disturbing character. A touch is always an attack,\nand has, so to speak, to be {62} condoned. This disturbing element\nI regard as an essential element in the experience: it goes along\nwith the faintly disagreeable element of sensation, which, as we have\nassumed, is commonly, if not always, more or less clearly recognisable\nin the experience.[42] Yet it is certain that the disturbing effect\n(like the disagreeableness of the sensation) is limited. If the unknown\nbulks too largely and comes near the point of the alarming, the effect\nof laughter is wholly counteracted. This is a part of the explanation\nof the refusal of a child to be tickled by a stranger: for he knows\nhere _too little_ of what is going to happen, and consequently is\ndisposed to fear. Again, Dr. L. Hill informs me that \u201ctickling a child\nunexpectedly and from an unseen quarter will not provoke laughter\u201d: the\nelement of surprise would seem in this case to be too great. Possibly\nthe comparative difficulty of making a child laugh when naked may\nbe explained by the increased apprehensiveness which goes with the\ndefenceless state of nudity. The familiar fact that the readiness to\nlaugh increases with practice, points to the same need of a certain\ncomfortable assurance lying safely below the slight superficial\napprehensions which are excited by the stimuli.\n\nAll this suggests, that in order to call forth the glad response of\nlaughter, we must secure a certain adjustment of stimulus to mental\nattitude. The tickling must fit in with a particular mood, the state of\nmind which makes enjoyment of fun not only possible but welcome.\n\nNow it is clear that non-adjustment may arise, not only from\nthe presence of unsuitable characteristics in the mode {63} of\nstimulation, but from some antagonistic force in the child\u2019s previous\nstate of mind. The acceptance of the attack in good part depends on the\npreceding attitude. The dreadfully serious, \u201con-the-alarm\u201d attitude\nof the child when nursed by a stranger is an effectual bar to playful\novertures. A child when cross will not, says Dr. L. Hill, give genial\nresponse, even if the attacker be his familiar tickler, father or\nnurse; and the same is true, he adds, of a child when suffering from\nvaccination, or when mentally preoccupied with some hurt for which he\nis seeking for sympathy, or with a story which he wants you to tell\nhim. As Darwin puts it, the great subjective condition of the laughter\nof tickling is that the child\u2019s mind be in \u201ca pleasurable condition,\u201d\nthe state of mind which welcomes fun in all its forms. Possibly the\nposition of lying on the back, which, according to Dr. L. Robinson,\nmakes children more responsive to tickling, may, through a relaxation\nof the muscles, favour this compliant attitude of self-abandonment to\nthe tickling fingers.\n\nWe may perhaps sum up the special conditions of the laughter-process\nunder tickling as follows: when a child is tickled he is thrown into\nan attitude of indefinite expectancy. He is expecting contact, but\ncannot be sure of the exact moment or of the locality. This element\nof uncertainty would in itself develop the attitude into one of\nuneasiness and apprehensiveness; and this happens save when the child\nis happy and disposed to take things lightly and as play. In this case\nwe may suppose that the half-developed mild form of fear is each time\nswiftly dissolved into nothing by a recognition of the unreality of\nthe cause, of the fact that the touches are harmless and come from the\ngood-natured mother or nurse by way of play. This recognition becomes\nclearer as the process is continued, and so there supervenes a new\nattitude, that of play, in which all {64} serious interpretation is\nabandoned and the gentle attacks are accepted as fun or make-believe.\n\nIf this is a correct analysis of the experience of the tickling which\nexcites laughter, we seem to have in it at a very early age elements\nwhich are to be found, in a more fully developed form, in the later\nand more complex sorts of mirth, namely, relief from a serious and\nconstrained attitude, a transition from a momentary apprehension\ninduced by the presentation of the partially unknown, to a joyous\nsense of harmless make-believe. That this is so is further evidenced\nby the familiar fact that a child, when used to the game, will begin\nto laugh vigorously when you only threaten with the advancing fingers.\nAs a German writer observes, this is a clear case of Lipps\u2019 theory of\nannihilated expectation;[43] only he omits to note that the laughter\ndepends, not on the mere fact of annihilation, but on the peculiar\nconditions of it in this case, involving a slight shock at the approach\nof something partially unknown to a specially sensitive region of\nthe organism, and the instant correction of the apprehension by a\nrecognition of its harmlessness.\n\nMuch the same kind of stimulative process seems to be present in\nthe other and allied cases of reflex or quasi-reflex laughter. It\nis well known that certain sense-stimuli which excite sensations of\na disagreeable character, but which, though acute, are not violent,\nsuch as the application of a cold douche, are apt to provoke laughter.\nAccording to the German authority just quoted, the effect depends\nhere, too, on variation in respect of the intensity and the locality\nof the stimulation. He found further, in carrying out psychological\nexperiments, that whereas the introduction of a stronger stimulus than\nwas expected is apt to excite apprehension in {65} the subject, that\nof a weaker stimulus will excite laughter.[44] Here, too, we seem to\nhave a sensational reflex in which is present a distinctly mental\nelement, _viz._, a moment of mild shock and apprehension at the sudden\ncoming of something disagreeable and partially unknown, instantly\nfollowed by another moment of dissolution of shock in a pleasurable\nrecognition of the harmlessness of the assault.\n\n2. Laughter is not, however, always of this reflex form. It may arise\nwithout sensory stimulation in an \u201cautomatic\u201d manner as the result of\na cerebral rather than of a peripheral process. This is illustrated by\nthe seemingly causeless laughter which breaks out in certain abnormal\nstates and has an \u201cuncanny\u201d aspect for the sane observer. A well-known\nexample of this is the effect of the action on the brain centres of\nlaughing gas and other substances. Such \u201cautomatisms\u201d occur, however,\nwithin the limits of normal experience, as when a person laughs during\na state of high emotional tension. I propose to speak of such seemingly\nuncaused reactions as _nervous laughter_.[45]\n\nA common and simple variety of this nervous laughter is the spasmodic\noutburst that often succeeds a shock of fear. A child will laugh after\nbeing frightened by a dog; a woman often breaks out into a nervous\nlaugh after a short but distinctly shaking experience of fear, _e.g._,\nin a carriage behind a runaway horse, or in a boat which has nearly\ncapsized. And it does not seem that such laughter is preceded by a\nperception of the absurdity of the fear, or of any similar mode of\nconsciousness; it looks like a kind of physiological reaction after the\nfear. {66}\n\nThe same thing will show itself in circumstances which give rise to\na prolonged mental attitude, involving a feeling of apprehensiveness\nand of constraint. Thus a shy man, making his first essay as a public\nspeaker, will sometimes betray his nervousness on the platform by\nweird little explosions of laughter as well as by awkward gestures.\nI have noted the same thing in strangers to whom I have spoken at a\n_table d\u2019h\u00f4te_ abroad. The way in which little spasms of laughter are\napt to intrude themselves into situations which, by making us the\nobject of others\u2019 special attention, bring an awkward consciousness\nof insecurity, is further illustrated in the behaviour of many\nboys and girls when summoned to an interview with the Head, in the\nlaughter which often follows the going up to take a prize before a\nlarge assembly, and the like. The strong tendency to laugh which many\npersons experience during a solemn ceremony, say a church service,\nmay sometimes illustrate the same effect. When an enforced attitude,\ndifficult to maintain for the required length of time, brings on the\nimpulse, this will gather strength from the growth of a feeling of\napprehension lest we should not be equal to the test imposed.\n\nAnother variety, coming under the head of nervous laughter, is the\nsudden outburst which now and again occurs in a state of great\nemotional strain, having a distinctly painful character, especially\nwhen it includes something in the nature of a shock. The news of\nthe death of an acquaintance has been known to excite a paroxysm of\nlaughter in a company of young persons from nineteen to twenty-four\nyears of age.[46] One may assume here that the {67} outbreak is not\nthe direct result of the news, but depends on the effect of the shock,\nwith the abnormal cerebral tension which this involves.\n\nA like spasmodic outburst of laughter occasionally occurs during a\nmore prolonged state of painful emotional excitement. It sometimes\nintrudes itself into a bout of physical suffering. Lange speaks of a\nyoung man who, when treated for ulceration of the tongue by a very\npainful caustic, regularly broke out into violent laughter when the\npain reached its maximum.[47] Many persons when thrown into a prolonged\nstate of grief, accompanied by weeping, exhibit a tendency to break out\ninto laughter towards the end of the fit. Shakespeare illustrates this\ntendency when he makes Titus Andronicus, whose hand has been cut off,\nanswer the question why he laughed with the exclamation: \u201cWhy I have\nnot another tear to shed\u201d.[48]\n\nCan we find a common element in these different forms of nervous\nor apparently unmotived laughter? We appear to have in all of them\na preceding state of consciousness which is exceptionally intense\nand concentrated. The situation of fear, of constraint on being made\nthe object of others\u2019 unusual observation, of suddenly hearing news\nof deep import for which the mind is not prepared, of prolonged\nemotional agitation, these all involve an intensification of the\npsycho-physical processes which immediately condition our states of\nconsciousness. Looking at these intensified {68} forms of consciousness\nmore closely, we observe that they include something in the nature\nof psychical pressure, of the presence of forces which make for\ndisorder, whereas the situation calls for severe self-control. This\nspecial strain thrown on the volitional process is illustrated in\nthe demand for closer observation and calm reflection during a fit\nof fear, or other emotional excitement, which tends to bring about a\nstate of wild movement and of disorderly ideas. It is, I believe, _the\nspecially severe strain_ belonging to such an attitude which is the\nessential pre-condition of the laughter. It makes the attitude a highly\nartificial one, and one which it is exceedingly difficult to maintain\nfor a long period. As such, the attitude is eminently unstable, and\ntends, so to say, to break down of itself; and will certainly collapse,\npartially at least, if the demand seems, though only for a moment, to\ngrow less imperative. Hence the readiness with which such a means of\ntemporary relief as laughter undoubtedly supplies is seized at the\nmoment.\n\nIt remains to determine the character of this sudden relaxation of the\nstrain of attention more precisely. As a sudden collapse, it is clearly\nto be distinguished from the gradual breakdown due to \u201cmental fatigue\u201d\nand nervous exhaustion. The psycho-physical energy concentrated\nfor the special purpose of meeting the strain is by no means used\nup, but has to find some way of escape. Here, no doubt, we seem to\ncome across Mr. Spencer\u2019s ingenious idea that laughter is an escape\nof nervous energy which has suddenly been set free. It is no less\nevident that the redundant energy follows the direction of the risible\nmuscles because no other commanding object for the attention presents\nitself at the moment. The innervation of these muscles is not a mere\ndiversion of attention: it is a _dispersion_ of the energies which\nfor the maintenance of attention ought to {69} be concentrated. We\nare never less attentive during our waking life than at the moment of\nlaughter. Yet even here, I think, the theory of a convenient waste-pipe\narrangement is not adequate. There is, I take it, in the case a relief\nof sur-charged nerve-centres, which process would seem to be better\ndescribed by the figure of a safety-valve arrangement.\n\nIt is not difficult to surmise why the liberated energy should follow\nthis particular nervous route. There is no doubt that the motor\napparatus, by the disturbances of which all such interruptions of the\nsmooth flow of respiration are brought about, is very readily acted on\nby emotional agencies. Altered respiration, showing itself in altered\nvocalisation, is one of the first of the commonly recognised signs\nof emotional agitation; and this effect has been rendered more clear\nand precise by recent experiments. We should expect, then, that the\ncollapse of strained attitudes, with the great change in feeling-tone\nwhich this must carry with it, would deeply affect the respiration.\nWe know, however, more than this. Severe efforts of attention are in\ngeneral accompanied by a partial checking of respiration, an effect\nwhich seems to be alluded to in the French expression, an effort \u201cde\nlongue haleine\u201d. On the other hand, the termination of such an effort\nis apt to be announced by the sigh of relief. Now, though the movements\nof laughter are not the same as those of sighing, they resemble the\nlatter in their initial stage, that of deepened inspiration. May\nwe not conclude, then, that laughter is likely to occur as another\nmode of physiological relief from the attitude of mental strain? And\nsupposing, as seems certain, that laughter in its moderate degrees, by\nbringing a new briskness into the circulation, relieves the congested\ncapillaries of the brain, may we not go farther and say that nature has\n{70} probably come to our aid by connecting with the mental upheavals\nand the cruel strains here referred to, which pretty certainly involve\na risky condition of the cerebral system of capillaries, a mode of\nmuscular reaction which is peculiarly well fitted to bring the needed\nrelief?\n\nMore special conditions may favour the movements of laughter in\ncertain cases. As I have observed above, Darwin suggests that the\nrapid alternation of crying and laughing which occur among hysterical\npatients may be favoured by \u201cthe close similarity of the spasmodic\nmovements\u201d.[49] In other words, the motor centres engaged, when in the\nfull swing of one mode of action, may readily pass to the other and\npartially similar action. This would help to account for the short\noutbursts of laughter during a prolonged state of painful agitation,\nand to explain the fact noted by Descartes, that no cause so readily\ndisposes us to laughter as a feeling of sadness.[50]\n\nOur theory plainly requires that these sudden breakdowns or relaxations\nof strained mental attitudes should, even when only momentary\ninterruptions, be accompanied by an agreeable sense of relief. I\nbelieve that those whose experience best qualifies them to judge will\nsay that this is so. The dead weight of the fear, the poignancy of the\ngrief, and the constraining effect of the situation of _g\u00eane_, seem\nto yield at the moment when the \u201cawful laugh\u201d is snatched at. This\ncomforting sense of a lightened load, though in part the direct result\nof a cessation of cerebral strain, would, as we have seen, pretty\ncertainly derive added volume from the returning sense-reports telling\nof the ameliorated condition of the bodily organs.\n\n3. We have considered two of the varieties of laughter {71} which lie\noutside the region of our everyday mirth. We may now pass into this\nregion, and inquire, first of all, into the causes of those varieties\nwhich come under the head of joyous laughter.\n\nHere we shall best begin by touching on the simple and early form\nwhich may be called the overflow of good spirits. Darwin, as has been\nmentioned, rightly regards the full reaction of the laugh as the\nuniversal expression by our species of good spirits, of a joyous state\nof mind. We have now to examine the mode of production of this simple\ntype.\n\nIt is important to note that all experiences of pleasure do not bring\non laughter. There are quiet enjoyments of a soothing character which\nare far from generating the powerful impulse needed for the movements\nof diaphragm and rib. To lie on a summer day in a hammock in a wood\nand indulge in the sweets of _dolce far niente_ is to be out of reach\nof the tickling imp. States of enjoyment, too, which, though exciting,\nrequire a measure of close attention, such as those occasioned by\na glorious sunset, or stirring music, do not start the spasmodic\ncontractions of muscle.\n\nThe enjoyment that moves us to laughter must, it is evident, amount to\ngladness or joy. And this means, first of all, that the pleasurable\nconsciousness must come in the form of a large accession, and, for a\nmoment at least, be ample, filling soul and body. As the expression\n\u201cgood spirits\u201d suggests, the organic processes during such states of\njoyousness are voluminous and well marked. As a part of this heightened\ntide of vital activity, we have the characteristic motor expression\nof the gladsome mind, the movement of the limbs, the shouting and the\nlaughing.\n\nNot all risings of the vital tide, however, produce laughter. Gentle\nand gradual augmentations of the sense of well-being {72} and\nhappiness hardly tend to stir the muscles concerned. The joyous\noutburst marks a _sudden_ accession of happy consciousness. It has\nsomething of the character of a violent flooding of the spirit and the\ncorresponding bodily conduits.\n\nThere is a negative condition, also, to which it may not be superfluous\nto allude. The flood-like rise of the happy mood which is to produce\nlaughter must not be accompanied by any further demand on the\nattention. A girl reading a first love letter from the man whom her\nheart has chosen will be glad, and will grow gladder by leaps and\nbounds. But the fulness of laughter will not come while unread words\nstill claim the eye.\n\nThe laughter of joy is most noticeable, I think, under two sets of\nconditions. Of these the first is the situation of release from\nexternal restraint. The wild jubilant gladness of boys as they rush\nout of school, provided that they have the requisite reserve fund\nof animal spirits, is the stock example of this sort of laughter.\nThe explosion seems here to be a way of throwing off the constraint\nand the dulness of the classroom, and getting a deep breath of the\ndelicious sense of restored liberty. So far as the outflow of good\nspirits is thus connected with an escape from a serious and difficult\nattitude\u2014strenuous application of the energies of mind and body in\nwork\u2014it is plainly analogous to the nervous laughter already considered.\n\nBut the swift accession of joy may come in another way, from the sudden\ntransformation of one\u2019s world, from the arrival of some good thing\nwhich is at once unexpected and big enough to lift us to a higher level\nof happiness. With children and savages the sight of a new and pretty\ntoy is sometimes enough to effect this. The charming bauble will so\nfill sense and soul that the joy of living leaps to a {73} higher\nplane and bursts into a peal of mirth. The unexpected sound of the\nfather\u2019s voice at the end of a long day devoted to the things of the\nnursery was, we are told, enough to evoke a shout of laughter in a\nsmall American boy: it sufficed to bring back to the little fellow\u2019s\nconsciousness another and a glorious world. We older folk have, for the\ngreater part, lost the capacity of simply greeting delightful things\nin this way, a greeting in which there is no thought either of their\nmeaning or of their interest for us. Yet we may meet the unexpected\ncoming of friends with something of the child\u2019s simplicity of attitude.\nIt is hard not to smile on suddenly seeing a friend in a crowded London\nstreet: hard to keep the smile from swelling into a laugh, if the\nfriend has been supposed at the moment of encounter to be many miles\naway. Some of us, indeed, may retain the child\u2019s capacity of laughing\nwith a joyous wonder at a brilliant explosion of fireworks.\n\nIt remains to account for the persistent fit of laughter which\nfrequently accompanies a prolonged gladness. Does not the fact that\nthe child and the natural man, when taken with the mood of mirth, go\non venting their good spirits in renewed peals tell against our theory\nthat the outburst is caused by an accession of joy?\n\nIn order to answer this we must look a little more closely at\nthis so-called persistent laughter. The language of observers of\nunsophisticated human nature is sadly wanting in precision here. When,\nfor example, we are told by travellers that certain savages are always\nlaughing, we know that we are not to take the statement literally.\nIt means only what it means when a mother tells her visitor that her\nrogue of a boy is for ever laughing and shouting; that under certain\nfavourable conditions the laughing fit comes readily and persists\nlonger than usual. In a lasting {74} mood of jollity we are all\nstrongly inclined to laugh, and need very little to call forth a long\noutburst.\n\nThis preternaturally large output of laughter during a prolonged\nstate of high spirits finds its explanation in part in a kind of\nphysiological inertia, the tendency to go on repeating movements when\nonce these are started. The protracted iteration of laughter in a\nchild is closely analogous to that of his half-unconscious singing\nto himself. This tendency of movements to perpetuate themselves in a\nmechanical way probably accounts for the lengthening of the single\noutburst in the case of a child violently seized with mirth. As mothers\nknow, this reduction of laughter to a mechanical iteration of movement\nis apt to continue beyond the limits of fatigue and to bring on such\nunpleasant effects as \u201chiccup\u201d. It is probable, too, that the tendency\nduring a prolonged state of mirth to recommence laughing after a short\npause is referrible to a like cause: the physiological springs of the\nmovements being once set going, the explosive fit tends to renew itself.\n\nDiscounting this effect of physiological inertia, we seem to find\nthat in these periods of prolonged high spirits laughter retains its\nfundamental character as a comparatively short process which occurs\nintermittently. Where the laughing is not merely a trick played off by\nthe bodily mechanism, but holds a germ of mind in the shape of a happy\nconsciousness, it has its large and significant pauses.\n\nIf this is so, it seems reasonable to suppose that the mental\nantecedent which brings on some new explosion is analogous to the sense\nof \u201csudden glory\u201d which accounts for the single joyous peal. Owing to\nthe exceptionally strong disposition to laugh during such a period,\nthe antecedent feeling need not be a powerful one, a very slight {75}\nmomentary increase of the joyous tone sufficing to give a fresh start\nto the muscles.\n\nIt is not difficult to suggest possible sources of such slight\nsudden augmentations of the happy feeling-tone. No prolonged state\nof consciousness is, strictly speaking, of one uniform colour; in\nthe boisterous merriment of an old-fashioned dinner-party there were\nalternations of tone, brilliant moments following others of comparative\ndulness. The course of the bodily sensations in these prolonged\nstates of joy is in itself a series of changes, involving a sequence\nof exaltations upon relative depressions of the \u201cvital sense\u201d. The\ncourse of the presentations to eye and to ear in such a festive mood\nmust be subject to like fluctuations in respect of their action upon\nthe feeling-tone; and the same applies to the flow of ideas which can\nfind a place in the mind when thus affected. Lastly, it must not be\nforgotten that the movements of attention would of themselves always\nsecure a certain rise and fall of enjoyment. We all know how, when we\nare gladdened by some new and unexpected happiness, the mind after a\nshort digression returns to the delightful theme, and how, as a result\nof this return, a new wave of joyous feeling seems to inundate the\nspirit.\n\nThere seems much, then, to be said for the hypothesis that all\nvarieties of joyous laughter (when not reduced to a mechanical form)\nare excited by something in the nature of _a sudden accession of\npleasurable consciousness_. Where the laugh is a new thing, unprepared\nfor by a previous mood of hilarity, this rise of the spirits will, as\nwe shall see later, probably involve a transition from a mental state\nwhich was relatively depressed. Where, on the other hand, a joyous mood\nprolongs itself, all that seems needed for re-exciting the movements of\nlaughter (provided that the muscular {76} energies are equal to the\nexplosion) is the sudden increase by an appreciable quantity of the\npleasurable tone of the consciousness.\n\nWe may further illustrate and verify this generalisation respecting\nthe causes of joyous laughter by an examination of some of the more\nfamiliar circumstances in which this is wont to occur. Here we shall\nof course be dealing with the early and unsophisticated mind. Properly\ndrilled \u201cgrown-ups\u201d but rarely exhibit the phenomenon in its full\nintensity.\n\n(_a_) It is a matter of common observation that joyous laughter is a\nfrequent concomitant of the play-attitude, especially at its first\nresumption. We have already found this illustrated in the laughter of\n\u201chappy boys\u201d just liberated from school. Here the conditions indicated,\na relief from restraint and a sudden expansion of joyous activity, are\npatent to all.\n\nClosely related to this situation of released bodily energies is that\nof relieved mental restraint. During a nursery lesson\u2014if only the\nteacher is a fond mother or other manageable person\u2014the child is apt\nto try modes of escape from the irksomeness by diverting the talk, and\nespecially by introducing \u201cfunny\u201d topics; and the execution of the bold\nlittle man\u0153uvre is frequently announced by a laugh. By such familiar\ninfantile artifices the pressure is lightened for a moment, and the\nlaugh announces a moment\u2019s escape into the delicious world of fun and\nmake-believe.\n\nThe impulse to be gay and to laugh runs, moreover, through the\nenjoyment of play. No doubt this in its turn may often grow exceedingly\nserious, as when the illness of dolly, or the thrilling horrors of a\nbear\u2019s cave, or of an attack by scalping Indians, are realistically\nlived out. Yet we must remember that this playful tampering with {77}\nthe serious, even on its genuine side, is a part of the enjoyment. The\nmomentary terror is desired by healthy young nerves, because the thrill\nof it, when the certainty of the nothingness lies securely within\nmental reach, is delicious excitement. A fuller examination of the\nrelation of laughter to play belongs to a later stage of our inquiry.\n\n(_b_) Another situation which is closely related to play is that of\nbeing teased. By \u201cteasing\u201d is here understood those varieties of\nattack which have in them an element of pretence, and do not cross the\nboundary line of serious intention to annoy. As thus defined, teasing\nenters into a good deal of child\u2019s play. Tickling is clearly only a\nspecial modification of the teasing impulse. In some of the earliest\nnursery play, the game of bo-peep, for instance, there is an element of\nteasing in the pretence to alarm by a feigned disappearance, as also in\nthe shock of the sudden reappearance. The teaser of a child, whether\nhe threatens to pinch him or to snatch at his toy, carries out a\nmenace; but it is a make-believe menace\u2014a thing to be a wee bit afraid\nof for just a moment, yet so light and passing as to bring instantly\nthe delightful rebound of disillusion, if only the subject keeps good\ntempered. On the teaser\u2019s side (when it remains pure teasing) it is\nprompted by no serious desire to torment, by no motive more serious\nthan the half-scientific curiosity to see how the subject of the\nexperiment will take it.\n\nThe explosions of a good-humoured subject under such gentle teasing\nare closely analogous to those of a tickled child: they spring from\na sudden sense of relief, of elastic rebound, after repression. The\nswift alternations of moments of nascent fear and of joyous recognition\nof the fun of the thing are eminently fitted to supply the conditions\nof a sudden rising of the spirits. The child that likes to be {78}\nteased\u2014in the proper way of course\u2014is perfectly willing to pay for\nthese momentary delights by the momentary trepidations.\n\nOn the side of the teaser, the situation is also highly favourable to\noutbreaks of hilarity. If successful, he reaps the joy of the superior\nperson, and glories in the cleverness of his experiments. The swellings\nof the sense of power as he watches his victim give just those\nexperiences of \u201csudden glory\u201d which a philosopher places at the base\nof all enjoyment of the laughable; and, alas, in the less kindly these\nrisings of the pleasurable consciousness may continue and even increase\nafter the teasing has ceased to be play and becomes indistinguishable\nfrom the behaviour of a tormentor.[51]\n\n(_c_) Much the same kind of remark applies to practical joking, which,\nwhen it is not weighted with the serious purposes of punishment and\nmoral correction, is merely an expansion of this playful attack of\nthe tickler and the teaser. When the victim reaches the moral height\nof being able to enjoy the performance, his enjoyment comes under the\nhead of dissolved apprehension, or disillusion after taking things too\nseriously. By far the larger share of the pleasure of the practical\njoke certainly falls, however, to the perpetrator, who in this case,\ntoo, realises a \u201csudden glory,\u201d an increased sense of power.\n\n(_d_) Once more, laughter is a common accompaniment of all varieties of\ncontest or sharp encounter, both physical and mental. When, as in the\ncase of the savage, the schoolboy and the civilised soldier, it breaks\nout after bodily fight, it {79} has some of the characteristics of\nnervous laughter. It is a concomitant of a sudden remission of physical\nand mental strain, of a dissolution of the attitude of apprehensive\nself-protection. In most cases, since it is \u201cthey laugh that win,\u201d the\nfeeling of relief is reinforced by that of contemptuous exultation at\nthe first taste of victory.\n\nA prolonged combat, if not too unequal, offers on both sides frequent\nopenings for these reliefs of tension and upspringings of the exultant\nmood. A good fighter in the ring is, I understand, supposed to be able\nnow and again to relieve the grimness of the situation by a sweet\nsmile. This is certainly true of all mental contests. Nothing is more\nremarkable in the study of popular laughter than the way in which it\nseems to penetrate those relations and dealings of social life which\ninvolve sharp contest and crossing of wits. These will be illustrated\nmore fully by-and-by. It is enough here, to allude to the enormous\ninfluence of contests between the sexes on the development of wit and a\nlively sense of the ludicrous.\n\n(_e_) As a last group of situations favourable to the experience of\njoyous expansion we have those in which an unusual degree of solemnity\nis forced upon us. This has already been touched on. Extremes seem to\nmeet here. It might be expected that an impulse born of the play-mood\nwould find its natural dwelling-place in scenes of social gaiety and\nconviviality. And in the days when society was gay the festive board\nwas doubtless the focus of the activity of the mirthful spirit. In our\ntime it seems almost more natural to associate a laugh with a funeral\nceremony than with a dinner-party. Yet the art of extracting fun from\nsolemn things is not of to-day, as may be seen by a glance at the jokes\nof the church architect and the play writer of the Middle Ages. In such\nbizarre intrusions of the droll {80} into the domain of the solemn\nwe seem to find the struggling of an irrepressible gladness of spirit\nagainst the bonds which threaten to strangle it.\n\nWhether the invasion of the territory of the solemn by the jocose\nresults in a barely mastered impulse to laugh, depends on variable\nconditions. The frivolous mind, hardly touched by the gravity of the\noccasion, will, no doubt, often be the first to welcome the delivering\nhand. Yet it is an error to suppose that a tendency to laugh on a\nsolemn occasion shows want of genuine emotion. The sincerest worshipper\nin a church may, if he have the requisite sensibility, be moved to\nlaughter by some grotesque incident, such as the _mal \u00e0 propos_ remark\nof a garrulous child. For the point of our theory is that laughter in\nsuch cases is an escape from pressure; and the man who feels deeply at\nsuch a moment may experience an emotional pressure which equals, if it\ndoes not exceed, that of the external constraint which the non-reverent\n\u201cworshipper\u201d is experiencing. It is true, of course, that the deeper\nthe feeling the greater the inertia that will have to be overcome\nbefore the laughing impulse can make way for itself. Yet here, again,\nwe must remember that emotional temperaments vary, and that with some\na genuine awe and even an intense grief may yield now and again for a\nmoment to the challenge of the laughable when its note catches the ear.\n\nThe last remarks suggest that in any attempt to deal with the\nconditions favourable to laughter reference should be made to those\nphysiological characteristics which are supposed to determine the\nparticular temperament of a man: his special bent, say, towards jollity\non the one hand, or towards a brooding melancholy on the other.\nOur forefathers had pretty definite ideas about the sort of bodily\nconstitution which was the foundation of the {81} laughter-loving\ntemper. A full \u201chabit\u201d tending to obesity, as in Falstaff, was, and\nis, I believe, popularly supposed to be a mainstay of the laughing\nspirit. The saying \u201cLaugh and grow fat\u201d may imply a vague apprehension\nof this relation, as well as a recognition of the benefits of laughter.\nYet the precise organic substrate of this happy endowment is unknown.\nHealth and all that makes for \u201cgood spirits\u201d are no doubt favourable\nto a voluble laughter of the elemental kind. On the other hand,\nas we shall see, the laughing capacity frequently co-exists with\nphysiological conditions of quite another kind. Men are to be found\nof a lean habit, and with a strong bent to grave reflection, who are\nnevertheless able, not merely to provoke laughter from others, like the\n\u201cmelancholy Jaques,\u201d but themselves to contribute a sonorous laughter\nto the higher intellectual domains of mirth. It is conceivable that\nthe disposition to laugh may have its own restricted physiological\nconditions in a special instability of the mechanism concerned. This\nagain may presumably include some as yet undefinable property of the\nnerve-centres which favours rapid change in the mode of brain activity,\nand those sudden collapses of tension which seem to be the immediate\nphysiological antecedent of the motor discharge in laughter. {82}\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nVARIETIES OF THE LAUGHABLE.\n\n\nIn the preceding chapter we have examined those early and elementary\nforms of laughter which arise from the action of such causes as\ntickling, the attitude of play, and the sudden uplifting in a feeling\nof joy. These do not, it is evident, imply the existence of that\nspecific faculty which we call the perception of the laughable in\nthings, or what is commonly spoken of as the sense of the ludicrous.\nWe have now to inquire into the mode of operation of this more\nintellectual cause of laughter, and to connect it, if possible, with\nthat of the simpler processes of excitation.\n\nThe peculiarity in this case is that there is not only an external\nexcitant, such as tickling fingers, but an object of the laughter. A\ntickled child laughs because of the tickling, but not at this as an\nobject. The same is true of a good deal of the laughter of play: it is\nonly when play represents something funny, or when the play-illusion is\ninterrupted by a moment\u2019s critical glance at the poverty of the doll\nor other plaything, that it gives rise to a proper enjoyment of the\nlaughable; and a like remark holds good of the laughter which springs\nout of a relief of tension and a sudden transition from grave to gay.\nIn the laughter of educated men and women we see an intellectual\nelement, the perception of a laughable quality in an object, and the\njustification of the action by a reference to this. The examination\nof this intellectual type of laughter will bring {83} us to what is\nundoubtedly at once the most interesting and the most difficult problem\nin our study.\n\nThe objective reference in laughter implied in speaking of the\n\u201claughable\u201d may be illustrated by a glance at the contemptuous laughter\nof the victor surveying his prostrate foe. The boy of ten who danced\nand screamed and laughed after he had killed his playmate in a street\nfight[52] was hardly possessed with what we call a sense of the\ncomicality of things. The laughter, though directed _at something_,\nhad not, in the complete sense of the expression, _its object_. The\nboy himself would not have laughed at the spectacle at another time,\nbut viewed it with quite different feelings. And the object would not\nhave presented itself as laughable to others who chanced to see it. In\nother words, the laughter was not caused by a mere contemplation of\nan object, but was conditioned by a particular relation between the\nlaugher and this object.\n\nTo say that a thing is laughable, just as to say that a thing is\neatable, implies an element of permanence and of universality. This\nis true even when a person says about a spectacle, _e.g._, that of a\ndrunken man walking, \u201cIt is laughable to me,\u201d since he means that for\nhis experience at least it is a general rule that the sight of such\nmovements excites laughter. But the word laughable clearly connotes\nmore than this, a universality which embraces others as well as the\nindividual. A thing is only rightly so called when it is supposed to be\nfitted to provoke men\u2019s laughter in general. Language has been built\nup by men living the social life, and interested in common forms of\nexperience; and the word laughable and all similar words undoubtedly\nrefer to such common forms. {84}\n\nThese common forms of experience may be conceived of narrowly or\nwidely. Much of what is called laughable by a schoolboy, by a savage,\nor even by an educated Englishman, is made to appear so by the special\nhabits and correlated modes of thought of his community or his class.\nThis clearly holds good of laughter at strange forms of dress, language\nand the like. Its \u201cuniversality\u201d is thus strictly conditioned. In\ndealing with the laughable we shall have constantly to allude to its\nrelativity to particular customs and expectations. It will be a part of\nour problem to disengage from among the common excitants of laughter\nwhat seems to possess a truly universal character.\n\nIn speaking of an object of laughter as having universal potency, we\ndo not imply that it will, as a matter of fact, always excite the\noutburst. The expression means only that a man will be ready to laugh\nat it, provided that he has certain requisite perceptions with the\ncorrelated emotional susceptibilities, and that nothing interferes with\nthe working of these. Hence we shall have to speak of the laughable as\nanswering to a _tendency_ only, and to note the circumstances which are\napt to counteract it. It is obvious, for example, that the limitations\nof class-custom, so far as they make laughter relative, will render a\nman blind to what is \u201cobjectively\u201d laughable in his own customs. In\ntruth, the adoption of such relative and accidental standards, which\nmarks all the earlier stages in the growth of intelligence and of\n\u00e6sthetic sentiment, is the great obstacle to a clear recognition of\nwhat is laughable in a wider and more strictly universal sense.\n\nAgain, when we are considering the question of fact, \u201cWhat do men\nreally laugh at?\u201d it is important to bear in mind that the tendency\nto laugh may, on the one hand, be reinforced by a favourable\npsycho-physical condition at the {85} moment, as well as by previously\nformed tendencies to apperceive things on their laughable side; while,\non the other hand, it may be checked and wholly counteracted by\nunfavourable conditions, such as a sad mood, or an acquired habit of\nlooking at those aspects of things which excite feelings antagonistic\nto laughter. Owing to the action of these forces, we find, not only\nthat one man may fail to discern the laughable in an object which moves\nanother to a hearty outburst, but that in many cases in which two men\njoin in laughing at something they may not be touched by the same\nlaughable feature or aspect of the presentation. Nothing, indeed, has\nmore of that appearance of caprice which comes from the influence of\nuncertain subjective factors than the laughter of men, even of those\nwho have a normal sense of the ludicrous.\n\nA word more is needed on the language here used. The terms laughable\nand ludicrous may be employed interchangeably up to a certain point\nwithout risk of confusion. At the same time it is well to note that the\nsecond is used in a stricter sense than the first. The term ludicrous\nseems to denote particularly what is not only an universal object of\nlaughter, but an object of that more intellectual kind of laughter\nwhich implies a clear perception of relations. In everyday language we\nshould speak of incidents and stories, of which the fun is obvious and\nbroad, as \u201claughable\u201d rather than as \u201cludicrous\u201d. Closely connected\nwith this emphasis on an intellectual element in the meaning of the\nterm ludicrous, is its tendency to take on an ideal connotation, to\nmark off what we deem to be worthy of laughter. Here, as in the case\nof other objects of an \u00e6sthetic sentiment, there is a half-disguised\nreference to the regulative principles of art.\n\nThis control by an \u00e6sthetic principle or standard is more {86} clearly\nindicated in the use of \u201ccomic,\u201d a word, by the way, which is used more\nfreely in some European languages than in our own. A comic spectacle\nmeans, for one who uses language with precision, a presentation which\nis choice, which comes up to the requirements of art, and would be\nexcellent material for comedy.\n\nOur problem may now be defined as an analysis of the objects of our\ncommon perception and imagination which ordinary men tend to laugh at\nand to describe as laughable. This inductive inquiry into facts is, as\nimplied above, a necessary preliminary to a discussion of the nature of\nthe \u201cludicrous\u201d or \u201ccomic\u201d as an ideal or regulative conception.\n\nIn order to find our way with some degree of certainty to the general\ncharacteristics of laughable things, we should do well to take at least\na rapid survey of the objects of men\u2019s laughter as reflected in popular\njests, \u201c_contes pour rire_,\u201d \u201ccomic songs\u201d and amusing literature in\ngeneral; as also in what may be called the standing dishes in the\nrepasts of fun served up in the circus and other places where they\nlaugh. No assemblage of facts of this kind adequate for scientific\npurposes has, so far as I know, yet been made;[53] so that it must\nsuffice here to indicate some of the leading groups of laughable\nobjects which a brief inspection of the field discloses.\n\nIt may be assumed as a matter of common recognition that this field\nof laughable objects will lie in the main within the limits of the\nspectacle of human life. It is the situations, appearances and thoughts\nof men which yield to laughter the larger part of its harvest. At\nthe same time allusion will be made now and again to provocatives\n{87} lying outside these limits, which are certainly found in simple\nexamples of the laughable.\n\nIn attempting to form these groups one must give a warning. It is\nimplied in what has been said above, that the things we laugh at have\nin many cases, perhaps in most, more than one distinguishably amusing\nfacet. In trying to classify them, therefore, we must be guided by\nwhat seems the most massive and impressive feature; and, as already\nsuggested, it is not always easy to say what really is the main\ndeterminant of our laughter.\n\n(1) Among the things which are commonly said to be laughable we find\nmany objects distinguished by _novelty_. A presentation which differs\nwidely from those of the ordinary type, and so has a stimulating\nfreshness, may, as we have seen, when agreeable and of sufficient\nforce, excite to laughter by suddenly relieving the dulness of the\ncommon and oft-repeated, and raising the feeling-tone of the observer\nto the level of joyous excitement. The proper effect of a recognised\nlaughable aspect only appears when experience begins to be organised\nand the mind of the spectator to perceive, dimly at least, a certain\ncontrariety in the new presentation to the usual run of his perceptual\nexperience, in other words, the aspect of \u201cout-of-the-wayness\u201d or\n_oddity_. Much of the laughter of children, and, as we shall see, of\nsavages, at what is called \u201cfunny\u201d illustrates this. A child will laugh\nvigorously, for example, on first hearing a new and odd-sounding word,\nor on first seeing a donkey roll on his back, a Highlander in his kilt,\nhis sister\u2019s hair done up in curling-papers, and the like. In some\nof these cases, at least, the appreciation of the new object as odd\nor singular is aided by the agreeably lively character of the novel\nimpression. This is true also of the amusing effect of two strikingly\nsimilar faces seen together; for here the look {88} of oddity, which\nis explained by the circumstance that our ordinary experience is of\ndissimilarity between faces, is supported by the stimulative force of\nthe likeness itself.\n\nThis expansive effect of the new and the odd on our feeling may come\ntoo from the perception of things sub-human. The sight of a crab\nwalking sideways, of an oddly-marked dog, of an eddy of leaves in\nautumn, and so forth will excite laughter in a child.\n\nA glance at the language employed in describing laughable objects\nsuggests the large scope of the odd. Thus the \u201cwhimsical\u201d and the\n\u201cfantastic\u201d in the realm of ideas and tastes, the \u201cextravagant\u201d in the\nregion of sentiment\u2014these and the like seem to refer directly to what\nis peculiar, to the point of an amusing remoteness from life\u2019s common\nway.\n\nThis enjoyable appreciation of the odd is in a particularly obvious\nway subject to the condition of relativity. To begin with, the amusing\naspect is determined by, and so strictly relative to the manner of the\nhour; so that, as the word \u201cantic\u201d shows, the old-fashioned begins to\ntake on an amusing aspect as soon as it is so far displaced by a new\ncustom as to be an out-of-the-way thing.\n\nAgain, as already hinted, the odd is always relative to the custom of\na locality or a class. A savage and a civilised man alike are wont to\nlaugh at much in the appearance and actions of a foreign people; and\nthis because of its sharp contrast to the customary forms of their\nexperience.\n\nThe chief counteractive to be noted here is the impulse to distrust and\nfear the new and unfamiliar. A child may often be noticed oscillating\nbetween laughter and fear as some new strange sight bursts upon him.\nA savage must feel himself secure before he can freely indulge in\nlaughter at all the odd belongings and doings of the white man.\n\n(2) A special variety of the singular or exceptional which {89} is\nfitted, within certain limits, to excite laughter is _deformity_,\nor deviation from the typical form. It is certain that, for the\nunsophisticated palate of the child and the savage, bodily deformity is\na large source of mirth. The dwarf, the hunchback, the cripple, the man\nwith the big nose, and the like have been great entertainers of youth.\nThe tendency to regard such deviations from type as amusing extends,\nas we know, to our perceptions of animals and of plants. A limping\nquadruped or a tree with a wen-like excrescence seems to reflect a\nhuman deformity and to share in its laughable aspect. Even a lifeless\nobject may sometimes entertain us with its appearance of deformity. A\nhouse shored up affects us in the same way as a man on crutches, and\nthe back view of a rickety tilted cart, as it wobbles down a street,\nmay gladden the eye much as the sight of a heavy, ill-balanced human\nfigure attempting to run.\n\nWhile we may view the laughable aspect of bodily deformity as an\nexample of the odd or deviation from the common pattern of our\nexperience, we must not forget that it appeals to the more brutal\nelement in laughter. All ugly things had in them for the Greek mind\nsomething contemptible or disgraceful. Much of the point of men\u2019s\nlaughter at deformity lies in a recognition of its demeaning effect\non the person who is its subject. It is a clear manifestation of\nthe impulse to rejoice in the sight of what is degraded, base, or\ncontemptible. It is not difficult to detect this note of contemptuous\nrejoicing in the derisive laughter of the coarser sort of boy and\nsavage, the kind of laughter illustrated in Homer\u2019s description of\nthe merriment of the Ach\u00e6an chiefs at the sight of the misshapen\nThersites, with his hump, his sugar-loaf head crowned with stubble,\nand his persecuting squint.[54] Here we seem to have an unmistakable\ningredient {90} of malignant satisfaction, of rejoicing at another\u2019s\nills (Aristotle\u2019s \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c7\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03b5\u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03af\u03b1).\n\nRoughly speaking, we may say that the laughable force of a deformity\nvaries with its extent. The droll effect of an enlargement of the nose\nor of a reduction of the chin increases, within certain limits at\nleast, with the amount of the aberration from the normal dimensions.\nYet it would be difficult to establish any exact quantitative relation\nhere.\n\nAgain, all kinds of deformity are not equally provocative of laughter.\nIn general, perhaps, positive additions or extensions, such as a big\nnose or big ears, are more conducive to merriment than reductions and\nlosses; they seem to seize perception more aggressively. Then there are\nvarieties of the deformed which probably involve special kinds of droll\nsuggestiveness. Certain squints and twistings of the human face divine\nmay move us as expressions of the roguish; a red nose or a shock of\nred hair may owe its force to its supposed moral symbolism. Long ears\nand other deformities affect us through their undignified reminder of\naffinity to a lower animal species. Much, however, in these preferences\nof the ruder sort of laughter looks quite capricious, and can only be\nset down to habit and imitation.\n\nThe impulse to laugh at deformity has a narrower and a wider\ncounteractive. The first is pity, the second is the feeling of\nrepugnance at the sight of ugliness.\n\nThe inhibition of laughter at deformity by pity and kindly\nconsideration is one of the marks of a refined nature. Where the\nunsightly feature suggests suffering, whether physical or moral, such\nconsideration may completely counteract the impulse.\n\nSince deformity is a variety of the ugly, and the perception of the\nugly as such repels us, we have as a further counteractive a fine\n\u00e6sthetic shrinking from what is {91} unsightly. A person endowed with\nthis repugnance may have his capacity of enjoying the funny aspect\nof a deformity completely paralysed. At the other extreme, we have\na readiness to make fun of all bodily defects, even when they are a\nrevolting spectacle. The area of enjoyment for most men lies between\nthese extremes, when the displeasing element of the ugly is mitigated,\nso that its effect is lost in the stream of hilarity which its drollery\nsets flowing.\n\nIt may be added that where deformity has been turned into a laughable\nquality the impulse to \u201cmake fun\u201d has commonly been aided by other\nforces, more particularly a sense of relief from fear and a feeling of\nretaliation. This is clearly illustrated in the laughter of the people\nin the Middle Ages at the devil, the demons and the rest. Perhaps\nchildren\u2019s rather cruel laughter at the hunchback contains an element\nof retaliative dislike for a person who is viewed as vicious and\nhurtful.\n\n(3) Another group of laughable objects is closely related to the last.\nCertain _moral deformities and vices_ have always been a special dish\nin the feast of laughter. We have only to think of popular jokes, the\n_contes_ of the Middle Ages, and the large branches of literature known\nas comedy and satire, to see how eagerly the spirit of mirth has looked\nout for this source of gratification.\n\nSo far as this laughter directs itself against a vicious disposition,\nor deformity of character, such as vanity or cowardice, and not against\na lighter defect of external manners, it seems to involve a perception\nof something ugly, like a bodily blemish, and further some appreciation\nof its disgraceful or degrading aspect.\n\nIt is a view commonly held, and as we shall see supported by the\npractices of art, that all vices are not equally fit subjects for\nlaughter. Some kinds seem to have a specially {92} amusing aspect.\nThere may be peculiar features in the expression of the vicious\ndisposition which give it value for the laughing eye. This is obviously\ntrue of drunkenness, for example; and hardly less so of violence of\ntemper, which has a large and impressive drollness in its display.\nOther vices, such as cowardice and miserliness, have something choice\nfor the eye of laughter in the meanness of their display, the petty,\ncontemptible practices to which they commonly lead. The supreme place\ngiven to vanity among laughable moral failings seems to be explicable\nin part by this consideration. Nothing is more entertaining than the\ninflation in carriage and speech which comes from an overweening\nconceit. Hypocrisy, again, together with her kinswomen deceit and\nlying, seems to have a peculiar value for the mirthful eye by reason\nof her disguise, and the elemental joy which mortals young and old\nderive from a good peep behind a mask. As a last example we may take a\nporcine obstinacy over against the expression of others\u2019 wishes, the\nstupidity against which even \u201cthe gods contend in vain,\u201d a variety of\nthe amusing which seems to tickle our sensibilities by presenting to us\nthe rigidity of the machine in lieu of the reasonably pliant organism\nof the man.\n\nThis glance at the amusing side of what we call moral deformities\nsuggests that when we laugh at these we are by no means always at\nthe moral point of view, looking at actions and traits of character\nas immoral. This is seen, first of all, in the fact that, when we\nare laughing at what we view as vice, we do not, as some say, always\nrecognise its littleness and harmlessness, visiting it, so to speak,\nwith the merely nominal penalty of a laugh. Lying, or a display of\nbrutal appetite, may be turned into a subject of mirth when the least\nreflection would show that it is decidedly {93} harmful. It is seen,\nfurther, in the fact that the laughable in this case extends far beyond\nthe limits of what we commonly call vices. The excessive humility\nof the friend of our youth, Mr. Toots, is hardly less entertaining\na spectacle than excessive vanity. It seems rather to be want of a\ncertain completeness and proportion of parts in the moral structure\nwhich amuses here. This is yet more clearly illustrated by the fact\nthat comedy, as we shall see, holds up to a gentle laughter want\nof moderation even in qualities which we admire, such as warmth of\nfeeling, refinement of sentiment, and conscientiousness itself.\n\nHere again we may note that the \u201claughable\u201d will be relative to\nthe special experiences and standards adopted by the particular\nsociety. Contrast, for example, the fund of amusement which lies in\nthe spectacle of drunkenness for a people addicted to, and therefore\ntolerant of, deep drinking, with that available for another people\nby whom the vice is shunned and judged severely. It is evident,\nindeed, that our readiness to be entertained by the look of excess or\ndisproportion in a character will vary with the idea of the normal\npattern. The old Greek way of scanning character differed, in certain\nrespects, from that habitual, say in England to-day.\n\nIn the case of what are palpable vices we have as counteractive\ntendencies, not merely the finer shrinking from the ugly, but the\nrecoil of the moral sense in the distressed attitude of reprobation.\nHence it may be said that the immoral trait must not be of such volume\nand gravity as to call forth the moral sense within us. Here, too,\ndifferences of temperament and habit, and, one may add, of the mood\nin which the presentation finds us, will affect the result. It is\namazing to what an extent even reputable citizens are able to enjoy the\npresentment of moral failings, when they give {94} themselves up to\nthe mood which seems to belong to a seat before the comic stage.\n\n(4) We may pass to a group of laughable presentations in which the\nfeature specially fixated by the observer\u2019s mental eye is some _breach\nof order and rule_. Laughable displays of vice involve this element,\nof course, but in the cases now to be considered the violence done to\nrule is the more conspicuous feature. On the other hand, laughable\nviolations of rule are closely related to the oddities dealt with\nabove. The donkey rolling on his back may be said, for the child\u2019s\nintelligence, to break the rule of the donkey\u2019s normal behaviour; yet\nhere the laughableness seems to spring immediately out of the fresh\nstimulating character of the novelty of the spectacle. In order that\nan action may impress us as disorderly, we must recognise, vaguely at\nleast, that some custom or rule is disobeyed. The sight of a donkey\nstepping on to the pavement of a street, or quietly browsing in a\ngarden, would amuse as an exhibition of the disorderly. Perhaps we have\nthe boundary-line between what is merely odd and what is disorderly\nillustrated by the bizarre aspect of a boy in a class who deviates\nconsiderably in height from the approximately uniform height of the\nrest of the class. It has been pointed out by Dr. Lipps[55] that\neven a house in a row may assume an amusing appearance under like\ncircumstances. Here the general uniformity, immediately presented to\nthe eye, seems to supply the spectator with the idea of a rule which\nthe odd-looking individual is violating.[56] Under the present head we\nshall keep to examples of the laughable where the breach of rule is\npalpable. {95}\n\nTo begin with, disorderliness, the upsetting of the usual orderliness\nof life, is a great source of laughter to the young and even to many\nadults. All the more extravagant forms of jollity or \u201chigh spirits\u201d are\nwont to pass into the disorderly. This applies not merely to uproar,\nbut to such \u201cjocose\u201d proceedings as smashing windows, the enjoyment\nof which, as Addison reminds us, is by some laid down as the test of\nhumour.\n\nThis being so, we might expect that the appearance of the disorderly\nwould wear an amusing aspect for ordinary men. This is certainly what\nwe find. The crowd loves the spectacle of lawlessness and misrule\nin the harlequinade and elsewhere. The laughter-moving force of the\npresentment of a man always in a hurry, or continually changing his\npurpose, illustrates this effect of the disorderly. The comic value\nof the man in a rage depends too in part on this circumstance. All\nappearances of disorder where order is counted on, as in dress, are apt\nto provoke a smile of amusement. A squad of soldiers marching out of\ntime, or out of line, is a recognised stimulus to laughter. Even the\nsight of a room turned upside down for a cleaning, or of the confusion\nof a dinner-table after a meal, takes on something of this amusing\naspect of the disorderly.\n\nThe droll aspect of the disorderly becomes specialised in the breach\nof commonly-recognised rules of behaviour. The best marked cases are\noffences against the code of good manners, and the rules of correct\nspeech. Rude behaviour and _gaucheries_, solecisms, provincialisms, and\nconfusions in the use of language, amuse us as breaches of familiar\nrule, though they may no doubt entertain us also as manifestations of a\nna\u00efve ignorance.\n\nIt is hardly needful to point out that men\u2019s judgments of the laughable\nelement in breach of rule will be relative. {96} The code of manners\nwill vary with the community and with the particular class, and will\ntend to change with time in the case of the same group. One has only\nto think of the variations, from period to period, in the fashionable\nmodes of accost, of pronouncing words, and so on.\n\nThe great force which tends to counteract this direction of laughter is\nthe respect for order and rule, which has been formed slowly and with\nmuch difficulty, at least in the larger part of a community. It follows\nthat if men who are supporters of rule are to laugh at a violation of\nit, the act of lawlessness must not seem of a gravity sufficient to\noffend this respect. This condition will be satisfied if it is manifest\nthat the upsetting of rule, so far as it is intentional, is not serious\nbut a sort of make-believe; or that it is confined within the limits\nof the harmless, as in the case of the angry man vainly threatening\ndenunciation against all and sundry; or, again, that the failure to\ncomply with rule is not intentional but due to ignorance.\n\n(5) We may now pass to a group of presentations where the laughable\nfeature seems to reside in a situation or condition which is distinctly\nundesirable. _Small misfortunes_, especially those which involve\nsomething in the nature of a difficulty or \u201cfix,\u201d are for the ordinary\nonlooker apt to wear an amusing aspect. The loss of one\u2019s hat, a fall\ndue to a slip, or a tilting against another pedestrian, are recognised\ninstances of the amusing in the spectacle of the streets. Such sights\nas Ajax slipping in the foot-race and getting his mouth filled with\ndirt (_Iliad_, xxiii., 770\u201385), John Gilpin on his runaway steed, a\nparty in a boat left stranded on a sand-bank, the down in the circus\nvainly trying to stop a runaway horse by clinging to its tail; these\nand other illustrations will readily occur to one familiar with the\nways of laughter. The older popular entertainments, such as the {97}\nenjoyment of the performance of grinning through the horse-collar at\nthe country fair, owed something of their value to this delight in\nseeing a man in a fix\u2014if only that of being compelled to make a fool of\noneself\u2014especially when it was due to his lack of foresight.[57] A more\nrefined sense of the laughable seizes on the many \u201cawkward\u201d situations\nof social life, say the unconcealable _g\u00eane_ that overtakes a fine lady\nwhen she makes a meritorious but ill-judged attempt to get into touch\nwith one of the \u201clower class\u201d.\n\nIt is to be noted that many situations involving not only an irritating\namount of inconvenience but real suffering may excite this kind of\nlaughter in the vulgar. The spectacle of a cripple dragging his body\nalong has its amusing aspect, not only for jovial mortals but for\nsuperior beings. Homer represents the Olympian gods as dissolved in\nlaughter at the sight of the lame blacksmith trying to discharge the\ndainty office of the cup-bearer Ganymede. We see the same unfeeling\nrejoicing at mishap in the laughter of the savage and of the coarser\nproduct of civilisation at certain forms of punishment, particularly\nthe administration of a good thrashing to a wife, or to some ugly piece\nof mischief, as Thersites. Even \u201cpolite society\u201d seems to have a relish\nfor this form of amusement, if we may judge from the entertainment\nwhich the fashionable crowd on one side of the English Channel\nappears to find in scanning the gloomy figures and wan faces of the\npassengers as they land after a stormy passage. Here, again, the deep\nmalignity of man peeps out in a rejoicing at the sight of others\u2019 hurt\n(Schadenfreude).\n\nAmong these mirth-provoking misadventures, situations and incidents\nwhich manifestly involve loss of dignity fill a large space. The\nspectacle of a flying hat pursued by its {98} owner owes much of\nits \u201cfunniness\u201d to the fact that the loss of a symbol of dignity is\ninvolved. Possibly certain bodily deformities, especially a failure of\nthe nose or of the chin, may derive something of their laughableness\nfrom our perception of the loss of a dignified feature.[58] The\nlaughter which is wont to greet the sight of a man left with a baby\non his hands illustrates the same effect. The favourite situations in\nthe lighter popular comedy, as that of the man who is henpecked, and\nwho is subject to a mother-in-law, amuse so much because of the deep\ndescent of the \u201chead\u201d of the house which they involve. The stimulating\nforce of this kind of presentation is the greater where the undignified\nsituation overtakes one who is holding at the time an exalted position,\nas when a preacher in the pulpit is caught stumbling on too homely\nan expression, or a judge on the bench giving way to an oppressive\nsomnolence.\n\nAs in the other instances, we have here to note the limitations\nintroduced by the variable nature and circumstances of the spectator.\nMisfortune, the suffering of indignity, clearly appeals to a kind\nof feeling quite dissimilar to that of mirth. Where pity is strong\nand alert much of the laughter at mischances, at difficulties, and\nso forth, is restrained. On the other hand, this pity for men in\nmisadventure comes of knowledge and of insight; and where experience\nand training have not given these, the restraining influence on\nlaughter will be wanting. Hence the familiar fact that youngsters,\nthough not less capable of pity than their elders, will laugh at\nsights, such as the old lady slipping and falling, which touch the\nheart of those who know what they really mean.\n\n(6) We may now touch on a group of laughable objects {99} which has\na close kinship with more than one of the groups already illustrated,\nthough it stands apart by right of well-marked peculiarities. I\nrefer to laughter at _the indecent_ or obscene, whether in actual\npresentation or in suggestion.\n\nAny serious attempt to illustrate the variety of the sources of men\u2019s\nordinary laughter must, I think, find a place for this group. Among\nmen, and one may add the gods, the uncovering of that which decency\ninsists on hiding is a powerful provocative of laughter. In their more\ndirect and potent workings indecent presentations appeal to the loud\nmirthfulness of the coarse mind, to the _gros rire_ of the man tossing\nthe _gros sel_, as Mr. Meredith has it. They bulk among the jocosities\nof savage tribes\u2014or at least many of these\u2014and of the less refined\namong civilised societies. Culture is a great restraining influence\nhere. Yet it would be an error to suppose that educated men who are\nalso of the laughter-loving are destitute of this sensibility. The\nimpulse to greet merrily an allusion to the indecent, when it comes\nunexpectedly, taking us off our guard, so to speak, and when it is\nneither too pronounced nor enlarged upon, is, I believe, universal\namong men who laugh.\n\nThe laughter at a suggestion of what not only civilised but even\nsavage society seeks to veil from view would seem to be most naturally\nregarded as a case of the improper, or breach of accepted rule. To make\nreference to these matters is to break through a well-understood social\nconvention. This breach, moreover, carries with it a plump descent into\nthe depths of the undignified; for since society has willed to throw\nthe veil here any attempt to uplift it implies something shameful. The\ndisgrace falls on the person who is the subject of the allusion\u2014in\nall cases where there is a definable person concerned. In others,\nwhere {100} the allusion is directed to a common \u201cinfirmity\u201d of human\nnature, the indignity done is, of course, more widespread. Not only so,\nwe feel on hearing such an allusion that there is a lapse of dignity\nall round in speaker and hearers alike. The blush of the refined hearer\nattests this feeling of shame.\n\nYet to describe the effect here as due to breach of rule and lapse of\ndignity is certainly not to give a full account of the _modus operandi_\nof this variety of the laughable. If to speak of these things is\nforbidden and branded as an offence to good taste, on the other hand\nthat which is alluded to is a real and an inseparable part of our\nnature. The enjoyment of these allusions may accordingly be viewed\nunder another aspect as a rejection of the artificial in favour of\nsimple unadorned nature. The casting aside for the moment of the decent\nveil and the facing of what is customarily hidden away seems, indeed,\nto be attended by a distinct feeling of liberation from restraint and\nof joyous expansion. Hence, probably, the fact noted by historians\nof medi\u00e6val manners that the coarseness of the jocosity appeared\nto increase with the magnitude of the feast. The mood of exuberant\nhilarity favours the slackening of all artificial restrictions. The\nsame consideration may, perhaps, explain the hold which coarse jokes,\nif only they have just the right quantum of salt, maintain on the\nhumorous palate of the strong and virile among men of intellect.\n\nIn this brief account of the mirthful aspect of the indecent I have\nconfined myself to what discloses itself to consciousness in the\nmoderate forms of laughter, common among civilised men who practise\na certain self-restraint. Yet we know that the outbursts which are\nprovoked, in coarser men at least, by the uncovering of sexual matters\nhave a deeper {101} source in the obscure parts of our animal\norganisation. Our sources of knowledge with respect to the condition\nof men when they are seized with the sexual orgasm, including the\ntestimony of mythology, suggest that laughter here assumes the function\nof voicing a state of riotous self-glorification of the animal part of\nour nature, when fully released for a moment; and, further, that here,\nas in some forms of nervous laughter, it has an organic connection with\na condition of emotional paroxysm.\n\nIt is hardly necessary to point out that relativity has a large empire\nin this branch of the laughable. A man\u2019s idea of what is obscene\nwill be relative to the standards of his society, which may vary\nconsiderably. The Englishman living abroad is apt to be impressed by\nthe fact that men and women, otherwise as refined as his own people,\nhesitate less to call a spade a spade and to allude in conversation\nto subjects which are tabu at home. Similarly, the modern reader of\nShakespeare may be shocked by the freedom of speech of the cultivated\nwomen of another age.\n\nFurther, as implied above, the readiness to laugh here will be modified\nprofoundly by refinement of feeling. If it is true that all men are\ncapable of enjoying an allusion to the indecent, provided that it is\ndelicately executed, it is no less true that only coarse-minded men\nare able to drink frequently or deeply at this rather muddy spring of\nlaughter.[59]\n\n(7) Another group of laughable presentations has a certain analogy with\nthe last. Popular mirth has made a {102} prominent target of men\u2019s\n_pretences_. To peep behind the mask and seize the make-believe is a\nsure means of providing ourselves with laughter. So large, indeed, is\nthe part of affectation and disguise in social life, that not only the\nruder popular art, but comedy has made them one chief source of its\nentertainment. The flavour of the laughter varies greatly according to\nthe moral complexion of the pretence. Seeing through the transparent\nmake-believe of the child sets us laughing in one key; the detection\nof the half-unconscious humbug, in another; and that of the artful\nimpostor, in yet another.\n\nThat the appreciation of this embodiment of the laughable is relative,\nmay not be at once evident. Yet a glance at the numerous little\nhypocrisies not only allowed, but even exacted by polite society,\nwill suffice to show how the standard may vary. The dulling influence\nof use is exceptionally apparent here. The shams of life cease to\namuse us\u2014save a very few\u2014when they are numerous and ubiquitous. The\nEnglishman who laughs at the little pretences of society abroad, may\nbe quite incapable of discerning the amusing side of quite similar\nsimulations and dissimulations in the ways of his own society.\n\nHere, too, as in the case of moral blemishes generally, the impulse\nwill be restrained by the tendency to judge seriously, and by the\nhigher degrees of moral sensitiveness. Men of easy morals will laugh\ncynically, perhaps, at forms of imposture which would shock those of a\nfiner moral texture.\n\n(8) We may now pass to a species of the laughable which has a more\nmarkedly intellectual character. Among the exhibitions of human quality\nnone appears to have had its ludicrous mark more widely recognised\nthan that of _want of knowledge or of skill_. Here, again, our friend,\nthe clown {103} of the circus, comes to our aid. The spectacle of\nhis futile attempts to imitate the exploits of the skilled horseman\nand other experts stirs the risibility of the multitude to one of its\n_fortissimo_ outbursts. Ignorance of locality, especially when it\nlands a traveller in a mess, is a common source of merriment to the\nrustic onlooker. Children, savages, and all simple folk delight in\nsuch exhibitions of ignorance and incompetence. The more restrained\namusement of \u201csociety\u201d at the want of _savoir faire_ in the uninitiated\nshows that this enjoyment of the spectacle of ignorance by the\nwell-informed is widespread. The value of the spectacle is evinced\nby the fact that when in argument a man desires to win the laugh of\nonlookers to his side, he will do his best to show up a laughable\ndegree of ignorance in his fellow-disputant. The presence of the expert\nin a gathering of bucolics is a situation pregnant with possibilities\nof mirthful enjoyment. Let the delightful discussions of Mr. Hardy\u2019s\nWessex folk suffice as illustration.\n\nThese amusing uncoverings of ignorance and inability are a spicy\ningredient in the mutual quizzings of men belonging to distinct peoples\nor classes, such as the savage and the white man, the sailor and the\nlandsman. This will be illustrated later on.\n\nIn these cases the spectator may not count on the possession by\nothers of knowledge or skill. The man who laughs has at most a vague\nexpectation that outsiders should be equal to those of his own set. The\nlaugh at ignorance and incompetence takes on another and more ironical\nring when knowledge and competence are reasonably to be expected, as\nfor example when an official shows a striking incompetence for the\nduties of his office.\n\nThe spectacle of human ignorance grows particularly entertaining when\nit has to do with matters supposed to be {104} of common knowledge.\nM. Bergson gives us an example in the observation of a disappointed\ntraveller on hearing that there was an extinct volcano in the\nneighbourhood: \u201cThey had a volcano and allowed it to go out\u201d.[60] It\nis this element of ignorance of what is generally known which, in\npart, gives the amusing aspect to many breaches of rule, particularly\nthose of language. So firm is our assumption that everybody, even the\nforeigner, ought to be able to speak our language that we cannot hear\na gross mispronunciation or misapprehension of meaning without feeling\nit to be na\u00efve. Shakespeare in the same play makes us laugh at the bad\nEnglish of Dr. Caius and Sir Hugh Evans. Of course the fun is greater\nif the foreigner stumbles unwittingly into an observation which tells\nagainst himself; as when a German visitor to London, being asked how\nhis wife was, answered, \u201cShe is generally lying, and when she is not\nlying she is swindling,\u201d meaning to say \u201clying down\u201d and \u201cfeeling\ngiddy\u201d (\u201chat Schwindel\u201d).\n\nThe ludicrous side of the paradoxical, of what is violently opposed to\ncommon-sense\u2014a matter to be dealt with more fully presently\u2014illustrates\nthe effect of intellectual na\u00efvet\u00e9. All exaggeration in description and\nother extravagance of statement are laughed at, in part at least, as\nshowing ignorance of what is credible. On the other hand, insistence on\nthe well known and the obvious, especially when it is accompanied by\na laboured argument, amuses us by ignoring the circumstance that the\nhearer or reader is already quite familiar with the matter.\n\nA delightful exhibition of the na\u00efve intelligence is given by a\ngross misapprehension of what is happening or of what is being said\nat the moment. The Londoner may delight his country listener with\nhis misunderstandings of {105} what to the latter seems perfectly\nself-explanatory. The tickling force of such misapprehension is\nheightened when it involves an idea which is the very reverse of the\ntruth. The good story of the Yorkshire juryman who remarked that\n\u201cLawyer Scarlet gets all the easy cases\u201d turns on the delicious\ninversion of causal relations. When travelling once in a train I heard\na mother say to her little girl, who had been complaining of the heat,\n\u201cThe more you think of it the worse it will be\u201d; upon which the child\nremarked in a drily humorous tone, \u201cI should say the worse it is the\nmore I shall think of it\u201d. The mother\u2019s remark had probably seemed an\ninversion of the true relation.\n\nOther examples of what we call na\u00efvet\u00e9 come, in part at least,\nunder this head. The want of tact, the bringing in of that which\nhas no relevance to the circumstances or the ideas of the moment,\nis an excitant of laughter for men of all levels of culture. The\ninappropriate ways in which the kindly savage or child tries to\nminister to his visitor\u2019s comfort are a pretty example of such\nsimplicity. Irrelevances in conversation and discussion, such as _mal \u00e0\npropos_, mistakings of the issue, unfortunate suggestions of reasons,\nand the like, are among the recognised tributaries of the river of\nlaughter. These irrelevances make a large contribution to the lighter\nenjoyment of social intercourse. An irrelevance having a peculiarly\nbroad effect is a response to a question which wholly misses its point,\nas when one reads of a man on a descending balloon who asked a yokel,\n\u201cWhere am I?\u201d and received for answer only the absurdly obvious, \u201cIn a\nballoon\u201d.\n\nChildren\u2019s na\u00efvet\u00e9\u2014a mine of wealth to the discerning seeker after the\nlaughable\u2014illustrates this tickling property of a perfect simplicity\nof intelligence, and of those {106} irrelevances of behaviour and\nof utterance which by their mighty compass seize and occupy for the\ninstant the field of contemplative vision. One of its most valuable\nmanifestations is the habit of quietly substituting the child\u2019s point\nof view for the adult\u2019s. A large number of the \u201cfunny remarks\u201d of\nchildren illustrate this. Here is an example. An improver of occasions\nasked a child who had seduced her grandfather into a rather alarming\nromp, \u201cIsn\u2019t grandpapa very kind to play with you, dear?\u201d and received\nthe sharp correction, \u201cI\u2019m playing with _him_\u201d.\n\nA bare reference may be made to other illustrations of the intellectual\nsimplicity which entertains the mirthful eye. The effect of prejudice\nand passion in narrowing the mental outlook and setting up erroneous\nviews of things is a favourite subject of comic treatment. As we shall\nsee, the spectacle gains a higher value when the degraded intelligence\napproaches that of the disordered, and the amusing person, wholly\npreoccupied with his illusions, utters a string of remarks so widely\nirrelevant to the actual circumstances of the moment as to upset the\ngravity even of a serious spectator.\n\nThe limiting influence of relativity in the appreciation of this branch\nof the amusing has been pretty plainly illustrated in what has been\nsaid. The lack of skill or of knowledge which excites our merriment\nis the lack of that which is a familiar possession of our set, which\naccordingly we, at least, tend to look for in others. Hence, the man\nof society is amused at your not knowing one kind of thing, say, the\nhistory of the British Peerage, the bucolic at your ignorance of\nanother, say, the ways of calves, and so forth. The simplicity of a\nchild\u2019s mind only impresses us in relation to our own grown-up and\ncomplex ways of thinking. Even the absurdities of paradox are relative,\nfor what we are {107} pleased to regard as the stable, unalterable\nbody of common-sense is, in reality, subject to change.\n\n(9) We will now touch on a group of facts on which writers on the\nludicrous are accustomed to lay stress. The spectacle of a child\nwearing a man\u2019s hat, fully considered above, shows us the laughable\ndirectly and unmistakably as a juxtaposition of two foreign elements,\nthe semblance of a whole made up of incongruous parts. Here we see\nthe sense of fun fixing its eye on _relations_. It is recognised by\nall that the perception of certain relations, more particularly the\nunfitting, the disproportionate, the incongruous and the logically\ninconsistent, plays a large part in calling forth the more refined sort\nof laughter.\n\nIn dealing with this laughable aspect of relations we must draw a\ndistinction. When a person laughs, say, at the imbecile movements of\na skater as he tries to save himself from a fall, or at an outrageous\ncostume, or at the fantastic language of some _pr\u00e9cieuse_, he may\nbe aware of half-perceiving a relation; such as want of fitness,\nextravagant departure from the normal. He knows, however, that his\nmental eye is not focussed for this relation; on the contrary, he feels\nas if the presentation in itself, by giving the required jerk to his\napperceptive tendencies, were directly provocative of mirth.\n\nOn the other hand, he will, I believe, hold that there are cases where\nthe enjoyment of the laughable depends on the mental eye directing\nitself to a relation. The relation may not be apprehended in a\nperfectly precise way; but the point is that it is mentally seized,\nif only for the fraction of a second; and, further, that a degree of\ndefiniteness is given to the apprehension of the relation by a glimpse,\nat least, of the related terms.\n\nThis localising of the laughable in a relation is most {108} evident\nin the case of those complex presentations where lack of harmony and\nof mutual fitness\u2014what we call incongruity\u2014appear in the several\nparts of the whole which are present to the eye, and forces itself\non the attention in a thoroughly aggressive fashion. A country woman\ndisplaying in her dress or in her speech a bizarre mixture of the\npeasant and the fine lady, a proposal to climb a mountain in dainty\nhigh-heeled shoes, the couching of a vote of thanks in language far\nbelow or above the needs of the occasion, these pull at the muscles of\nlaughter because they strike us as a forcing together of things which\nhurtle and refuse to consort. The same holds true of cases in which\nthe incongruity lies between one presentation and another which has\npreceded and is still present to the imagination, as in the clown\u2019s\nutter failure to reproduce the model action of the expert which he sets\nout to equal.\n\nEven in cases where the laughable incongruity holds between things\nboth of which are not present at the same or nearly the same\nmoment, a direct glancing at the relation, involving at least a dim\nrepresentation of the absent member of the related twain, may be\nrequisite for a full enjoyment. It is probable, for example, that\nHomer\u2019s gods, when they laughed uproariously at the sight of the grimy\nand lame Vulcan essaying the part of Ganymede, mentally recalled the\nimage of the latter and carried out a comparison between the two.\nSimilarly in many of our nicer judgments of the amusingly excessive in\ndress, speech and so forth, we may, as suggested above, envisage the\nrelation to a standard of measure in this direct way.[61]\n\nIt may, no doubt, be a question whether the relation made \u201cfocal\u201d\nin consciousness in such cases lies between two parts of a complex\npresentation, or between the {109} presentation as a whole and a\nrepresented standard arrangement. When, for example, we laugh at the\nintrusion of a too lively gesture into the pulpit, do we mentally\nfixate the incongruity between the situation and the action, or\nmentally go back to the idea of the customary and suitable kind and\namount of gesture, and view the present performance as disagreeing with\nthese? This point may be reserved for later consideration.\n\nThe view that in the cases just illustrated we have to do with another\nvariety of laughter, that of the mind or intelligence, is confirmed by\nthe reflection that much of it is excluded from the popular category.\nThe masses can enjoy a palpable contradiction between profession\nand performance\u2014witness the enjoyment afforded to the populace of\nthe Middle Ages by the spectacle of the moral inconsistencies of\nthe monks.[62] But when it comes to the appreciation of inherent\ninconsistencies within the character, such as want of stability of\npurpose, fickleness in the affections and so forth, the need of\na certain acuteness in perceiving relations, and of quickness in\nmentally reinstating what is not present, may greatly restrict the\narea of the enjoyment. Gross and palpable inconsistencies, such as\nthose represented in the delightful monologue _L\u2019Ind\u00e9cis_, with which\nM. Coquelin (a\u00een\u00e9) rejoices us, are accessible to popular laughter,\nbut most of the self-contradictions with which a Moli\u00e8re, a George\nEliot, or a George Meredith refreshes our spirits are \u201ccaviare to the\ngeneral\u201d. Much the same is true of the laughter which gladdens the\nmeasuring eye when it lights on the unmeasured, the excessive, the\ndisproportionate. {110}\n\nOne subdivision of this domain of the laughable is the logically\nincongruous or _the absurd_. Here, again, we touch on a region into a\nlarge part of which culture must give the key of admission. An example\nof such a laughable absurdity is found in that which conflicts with our\ndeepest and most unalterable convictions. What is logically far-fetched\nor paradoxical is a familiar provocative of mirth. Since this case,\nlike that of laughing at an extravagant costume, does not imply a\ndirect and clear perception of relation, but only a kind of harmless\nshock to our firmly rooted apperceptive tendencies, we may expect to\nfind illustrations of it low down in the scale of intelligence. As we\nshall see later, children will be moved to mirth by the presentation\nof an idea that directly conflicts with their crude standards of\nthe possible; and savages show the same impulse to laugh at what is\nmanifestly opposed to their fixed traditional standards of truth. So\nit is with suggestions and proposals which strike the more mature\nintelligence as paradoxical, that is to say, as a kind of assault on\nits deeply fixed habits of belief, and what it is pleased to call\nits \u201ccommon-sense\u201d. Ideas which strike it as revolutionary, whether\nthey appear in the domain of social custom, of political activity,\nof morals, or of scientific explanation, are greeted by voluminous\nlaughter. Darwin\u2019s idea of man\u2019s descent from an ape-like ancestor,\nwhen first introduced, probably excited almost as much hilarity as\nindignation.\n\nMore restricted is the area for amusement supplied by logical\ninconsistencies. The spying out of amusing inconsequences in a man\u2019s\nvarious utterances is the work of an expert. A contradiction must be\nvery palpable, and the contradictory statements must be very near to\none another in time, in order that food for laughter may reach the\nmany. The best example of this laughter at contradiction in popular\n{111} mirth is, I suppose, the \u201cbull,\u201d where the incompatibility\nstares out at you from a single statement, and sets your sides shaking;\nas in the argument, attributed to an Irish statesman, that, in the\nprosecution of a certain war, \u201cevery man ought to be ready to give his\nlast guinea to protect the remainder\u201d.[63]\n\nOne might naturally suppose that in the appreciation of these more\nintellectual forms of the laughable there would be no room for the\nrestraining action of relativity. An incongruous relation would seem\nto be one and the same object for all men\u2019s intuitions, and the least\naffected by accidents of temperament and external circumstances. Yet\nthis supposition is not quite correct. Such incongruities as moral and\nlogical inconsistencies have, it must be remembered, their disagreeable\nand even their painful aspect. When discovered in the character or\nin the intellect of a person known to be of a high consistency, a\ncontradiction would naturally offend the admiring spectator. Here, too,\nthen, we have to add the qualification, \u201cprovided that there is nothing\ndisagreeable and repellant in the manifestation\u201d. Not only so, with\nrespect to much that is popularly called paradox it is to be remembered\nthat the standard of truth employed is far from being that of the\neternal verities. As the allusion to the ridicule poured on Darwin\u2019s\ntheory of natural selection shows, what one generation laughs at as\nplainly contradictory to fundamental notions may be quietly recognised\nas a familiar truth by its successor.\n\n(10) A group of laughable presentations making large appeal to the\nmore intellectual kind of laughter meets us in {112} _verbal play and\namusing witticism_. A closer examination of the nature of wit will come\nlater.\n\nWhat seems most manifestly characteristic of verbal forms of the\n\u201cfunny\u201d is the intrusion of the playful impulse. Children\u2019s word-play\nshows this clearly enough. New words are for them sounds to be reduced\nto familiar ones, and the funnier the results of this reduction the\nbetter are they pleased. This leads by a step to punning, where quite\nintelligible words or phrases are purposely altered so as to bring in\na new meaning; or where without any verbal alteration the substitution\nof a new meaning for the primary and obvious one effects the required\nchange. The playful impulse to get as far away as possible from\nrule and restriction, to turn things topsy-turvy, to seize on the\nextravagant and wildly capricious, is clearly enough recognisable here.\nMuch of this word-play, too, has a close kinship with make-believe; a\nnatural and obvious meaning is the pretence in this case, whereas the\nreality is the half-hidden meaning introduced by the inventive wag. All\nthe same it seems to me that this group of laughable objects has its\nplace close to that of the incongruous and absurd. A pun that claims\nany intellectual rank must have a point, a bite, and this would appear\nto be most naturally secured by introducing an element of irony and\nrendering the primary and obvious meaning of the sentence ludicrously\nfalse. When, for example, a preacher whose ponderous dulness had set\nhis congregation genteelly scuttling was said to have delivered \u201ca very\n_moving_ discourse,\u201d the point of the witty thrust lay in the complete\nopposition between the best and the worst result of eloquence brought\ntogether in the two meanings of \u201cmoving,\u201d an opposition which gives the\ntrenchant irony to the description.\n\nIn cases, too, where there is no verbal trickery the lighter {113}\nkind of wit shows the same tendency to a playful capriciousness\nof fancy. It delights in substituting for our ordinary points of\nview and standards of reference others which strike the hearer as\namusingly fanciful and extravagant. This is illustrated by much of our\nentertaining talk, which is wont to try to escape for a moment from the\nleading-strings of sober sense; as when a person _\u00e0 propos_ of a moon\nlooking wan and faint some hours after an eclipse observed that she\nseemed not yet to have got over the effects of the eclipse.\n\nIn this department of contemplative amusement we see once more the\nlimitations introduced by differences of temperament and mental\nattitude, as well as of experience and knowledge. Nowhere, perhaps, is\nthe habitual inclination of the balance between seriousness and love of\nfun in a man more clearly indicated than in his readiness to tolerate\nand enjoy word-play and the entertaining side of nonsense generally.\nOne to whom words and serious points of view are sacred things, will\nbarely suffer any form of this recreation. On the other hand a ready\nappreciation of these pranks of wit means that the listener\u2019s fancy\nhas the requisite speed of wing. It means, too, commonly, that his\nintelligence is in touch with the wit\u2019s standpoint, with his experience\nand circle of ideas. Bucolic wit is a sealed book to the superior\ngentleman from the town; the merry verbal sports of the judge, the\nstatesman, the theologian and so forth, reflecting like their dreams\ndaily types of experience and habits of thought, are apt to fall flat\non the ears of those who are not in touch with these.\n\nThe above may, perhaps, serve as a sufficiently full enumeration of\nthe more prominent of those attributes or aspects of laughable things\nwhich, some in some cases, others in others, make direct appeal to our\nmirth. {114}\n\nThat each of these may of itself thus start the currents of laughter\nwill, I believe, be admitted by those who are familiar with the field\nof human mirth. There is, I hold, ample evidence to show that what is\nembarrassing, what is contrary to rule, what is demeaning, what is\nunreal and pretentious, and the rest, do each, under certain limiting\nconditions, move men\u2019s laughter.\n\nIt is, no doubt, difficult to supply a perfect demonstration of the\nfact of the intrinsic laughableness of each of these features. It has\nalready been pointed out that in many of the most agreeable instances\nof the laughable different stimuli combine their forces. This is\nso much the case that it is sometimes difficult to decide which of\nthe co-operating attributes is the most prominent. For example, the\nspectacle of the lackey donning the externals of a fine gentleman\u2014a\nfavourite subject of mirthful treatment by Moli\u00e8re and others\u2014may amuse\nus as a transparent pretence, as a fine display of insolent vanity,\nor, again, as an amusing caricature of the extravagant absurdities of\nfine manners. Extravagance in dress and the like is frequently found in\nthe company of a deliciously erroneous idea of one\u2019s own importance.\nIntellectual na\u00efvet\u00e9 may peep out at us and a moral na\u00efvet\u00e9 look over\nits shoulder, as in the remark of a lady whom the astronomer Cassini\nhad invited to see an eclipse, when she found that she had arrived\ntoo late: \u201cM. de Cassini will be good enough to begin again for my\nsake\u201d.[64] As I have remarked, the unfitting is in a large number\nof cases an introduction of something unworthy; as when a man at a\ndinner-party almost suggests something of an animal violence in his\nmode of eating, or an orator resorts to a \u201cwooden\u201d manner of speech\nor gesture, or when an unhappy simile hurls {115} the hearer into\nthe lowest region of the commonplace, a proceeding satirised in the\nwell-known lines from Butler\u2019s _Hudibras_:\u2014\n\n    And like a lobster boil\u2019d, the morn\n    From black to red began to turn.\n\nAs a last example of the many-sidedness of the laughable we may name\naffectation, particularly when it takes the form of aping another\u2019s\nmanners; for this may amuse us as a bit of acting seen through, or\nas an incongruous intrusion of a foreign element into the natural\ncharacter of the imitator, or, again, as a weakness, a lack of\nintellectual or of moral initiative.\n\nNevertheless, the appearance of cross-division in our scheme is really\nno objection to it. By collecting a sufficient number of instances,\nand noting how the presentation of a certain feature affects us when\nit is plainly the preponderant stimulus, and how it will continue to\naffect us in much the same way when its concomitants vary, we may\nsatisfy ourselves that each of the aspects here named is effective as\na provocative of laughter. It will be for experimental psychology, if\never its methods are competent to grapple with the subject, to make\nthis clearer.\n\nThere is another objection, which, though related to the last, is to\nbe carefully distinguished from it. Even in cases where the laughable\nfeature is clearly localised there may seem something arbitrary in our\nmode of describing it. For example, it may be said, why distinguish\nthe relation of the unfit and kindred relations as a special group,\nsince in all cases they may be regarded as products and expressions of\na defective intelligence or taste? To raise this difficulty now is,\nhowever, to anticipate our theoretical problem, how far these several\nvarieties of laughable feature lend themselves to reduction to a {116}\ncommon principle. In naming each of the above groups I have sought to\nenvisage the laughable aspect as the natural man, innocent of theoretic\naims, would envisage it.\n\nWhat is important here is to emphasise both the frequent combination of\nentertaining features in the objects which excite our laughter, and the\nfact that one and the same feature may be envisaged in more than one\nway. These two circumstances throw an interesting light on the meaning\nof the long discussions and the want of agreement among theorists.\n\nIn drawing up this list of the laughable features in things I have said\nnothing about the connection between this part of the inquiry and that\nwhich preceded it. Yet the connection has not been wholly hidden. In\nthe entertaining effect of new things we have found an element of the\nlaughter which springs from a sudden expansion of joy. In the laughter\nexcited by the indecent we have noted a trace of the laughter of\n\u201csudden glory\u201d and of what I have called nervous laughter. Lastly, in\ndealing with the entertaining quality of the more sportive wit we seem\nto have got near the laughter of play.\n\nThis connection would appear the more clearly if we were to extend our\nlist by adding a pair of groups. These are (11) laughable objects which\naffect us as expressions of a merry mood; and (12) laughable situations\nwhich involve a relation akin to that of victor and vanquished. A word\nor two on each of these must suffice.\n\n(11) There is little doubt that all presentations which are instantly\ninterpreted as manifestations of a fun-loving disposition tend to\nexcite merriment. This is true of series of sounds, musical as well as\nnon-musical, which have in their rapid staccato movement a resemblance\nto those of laughter. It holds good also of play-like movements, such\nas the {117} freakish gambols of a just loosened pony, or of a circus\nclown. The expression of the mirthful temper in things awakens a\nsympathetic laughter in the observer. Here, perhaps it would seem to\nbe more correct to say that we laugh not _at_ or _over_, but, if one\nmay so say, _to_ the playful freak. Nevertheless, we shall find that\nwhat we recognise as objectively laughable cannot be understood save by\nreference to these appearances of playful challenge.\n\n(12) That the sight of a man winning in a struggle or getting the\nbetter of another in some way is fitted to furnish amusement, is\nindisputable. This obviously falls in part under the head of laughter\nat the spectacle of another\u2019s difficulty or scrape; but it certainly\ndeserves a separate place in an enumeration of the larger and popularly\ndistinguished sources of merriment.\n\nThere is no need to emphasise the fact that the social spectacle owes\nmuch of its interest to combat, competition, all that is understood\nby men\u2019s measuring their powers one against the other. The amusing\nside of this interest is found in the gleeful satisfaction which the\nimpartial spectator derives from each successful stroke, whether on the\none side or on the other. The attraction of all encounters of wit in\nthe market-place, in the political domain, on the stage and so forth,\nillustrates this. Popular literature will show that the plain man has\nfed his mirth bounteously from this source.\n\nThe situations which minister to this feeling of \u201csudden glory\u201d in\nan onlooker are not confined to those of contest. All displays of a\ncapacity to get the better of another seem to be entertaining to the\nmany. Just as the sight of a man chastising his wife is good sport for\nthe savage onlooker, so the spectacle of taking down, of discomfiture\nand humiliation\u2014especially if it involves an element of deception or\n{118} befooling, and so takes on the look of outwitting\u2014may yield\nexcellent fun to the civilised spectator.\n\nA more refined variety of the perception of the laughable occurs when\nwe look on Nature or fate as discomfiting man, playing tricks on him\nor outwitting him. So far as this idea of irony comes into our view of\nthings, any misfortune, especially if it involves disappointment of\nhopes and frustration of efforts, may excite a note of laughter which\nhas an \u201cover-tone\u201d of triumphant mockery.\n\nThe enjoyment of the spectacle of one man triumphing over another or\nshowing superiority to him will in all cases be limited by conditions\nalready sufficiently indicated. Since the laughter excited here is,\npresumably, in its characteristic ingredient a reflection by way\nof sympathetic imagination of the victors sudden glory, it must be\nincluded in the more brutal variety. If a lively sensibility produces\nquickly enough a sympathetic apprehension of the feelings of the\nvanquished, it will effectually check the impulse to laugh.\n\nFinally, a bare allusion may be made to the way in which the laughter\nof relief from emotional or other strain comes into our appreciation of\nthe laughable in things. The amusing aspect of all lapses from dignity\nin religious and other ceremonies cannot, I believe, be understood\nmerely as an illustration of an inconsequence and irrelevance, but\nmust be connected with the powerful tendency to throw off a heavy and\ndepressing mental load by a moment\u2019s mirth. The laughter at what is\nlawless, and still more at the indecent and the profane, certainly\nderives a part of its gusto from a sense of relief from restraint,\nwhich is a main ingredient in the enjoyment of all license. But the\nfuller discussion of the way in which the primal sources of laughter\ncontribute to the impressions we receive from laughable objects belongs\nto another chapter.\n\n{119}\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\nTHEORIES OF THE LUDICROUS.\n\n\nOur survey of laughable things has led us to recognise certain groups\nwhich appear to induce the laughing mood: each presenting its special\nvariety of laughable feature. One group may be said, _prim\u00e2 facie_,\nto exhibit mischances, another some form of human defect, another,\nagain, something of the misfitting or incongruous, and so forth. We may\nnow advance to the theoretic problem of unifying and explaining these\nvarieties of the laughable.\n\nHere, for the second time, we must touch on the views propounded by\nauthorities on the subject under the name of Theories of the Ludicrous.\nHappily, it is not necessary to burden the reader with a full account\nof these. We shall of course pass by all doctrines deduced from _a\npriori_ metaphysical conceptions, and confine ourselves to those which\nmake a show, at least, of grounding themselves on an analysis of facts.\nOf these I shall select two or three typical theories which come to us\nwith the claims of distinguished authorship. We shall test these by\nexamining how far they succeed in comprehending the diversity of fact\nnow before us.\n\n1. The first of these typical theories localises the secret force\nof the laughable in something unworthy or degraded in the object.\nAccording to this view, the function of laughter is to accompany and\ngive voice to what may be called the derogatory impulse in man, his\ntendency to look {120} out for and to rejoice over what is mean\nand undignified. This may be called the Moral Theory, or Theory of\nDegradation.\n\nAristotle\u2019s brief remarks on comedy in the _Poetics_ may be taken\nas illustrative of this way of envisaging the laughable. Comedy, he\ntells us, is \u201can imitation of characters of a lower type\u2014not, however,\nin the full sense of the word bad\u201d; and, again, the Ludicrous (\u03c4\u1f78\n\u03b3\u03b5\u03bb\u03bf\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd) is a subdivision of the ugly (\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03c7\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6), and consists in\n\u201csome defect or ugliness which is not painful or destructive\u201d.[65] Of\nan adequate theory of the subject there is here, of course, hardly\na pretence. It seems strange, indeed, that a great thinker with the\nworks of his compatriot Aristophanes before him should have placed the\nludicrous wholly in character, altogether overlooking the comic value\nof situation. Still, the reference of the laughable to the category of\nugly and disgraceful things\u2014for \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03c7\u03c1\u1f78\u03bd on its moral side connotes\nthe disgraceful (compare the Latin \u201cturpe\u201d)\u2014may be said to imply a germ\nof the principle of degradation.\n\nA more careful attempt to construct a theory of the ludicrous by a\nreference to something low or degraded in the object is embodied in\nthe famous doctrine of Thomas Hobbes. According to this writer, \u201cthe\npassion of laughter is nothing else but sudden glory arising from\nsudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the\ninferiority of others, or with our own formerly\u201d. In this theory our\nlaughter is viewed as arising, not immediately from a perception of\nsomething low or undignified, but only mediately from this perception,\nthrough a recognition of our own superiority and an accompanying\nemotional movement, namely, an expansion of the \u201cself-feeling,\u201d a\nsudden quickening of the sentiment of pride or power. Nevertheless, the\n{121} theory may be said to come under the principle of degradation,\nin so far as it makes the process of laughter start with a perception\nof some point of inferiority, that is to say of a comparative loss of\ndignity, in the laughable object.\n\nThe main point of this theory, that whenever we enjoy the ludicrous we\nare consciously realising our superiority to another, will, I think,\nhardly bear examination. That in this enjoyment there may be, and\noften is, an element of this agreeable sense of elevation I readily\nallow, and I shall try to show presently how it gets there. But it is\naltogether inadequate as an exhaustive account of the several varieties\nof our laughing satisfaction. Even in the groups of cases to which it\nseems to be most plainly applicable, for example, those of mischances\nand awkward situations, it is not a sufficient explanation. Is there\nany discoverable trace of the uplifting of pride, of the temper of\n\u201cSchadenfreude\u201d\u2014the malicious satisfaction of watching from the safe\nshore the tossings of mariners in a storm\u2014in the instantaneous response\nof our mirth to the spectacle of the skater\u2019s wild movements when for\na moment he loses equilibrium, or of the hat wind-driven far from its\nproper seat on the respectable citizen\u2019s head? Is there time here for\nmentally bringing in the contrasting idea of our own immunity? Has the\nlaugh the characteristic taste of the outburst of contempt which is\nexcited by the consciousness of victory, of taking somebody down?\n\nIn dealing with this type of theory, it seems only fair to test it in\nthe more mature form given it by a recent writer. Prof. Alexander Bain\ndefines \u201cthe occasion of the ludicrous\u201d as \u201cthe degradation of some\nperson or interest possessing dignity in circumstances that excite no\nother strong emotion\u201d. The most marked improvements here on Hobbes\u2019\nstatement are (1) that consciousness of our own superiority {122}\nneed not come in, since we may laugh sympathetically with another who\nscores off his adversary, and so forth; (2) that the object degraded\nneed not be a person, since human affairs in general, _e.g._, political\ninstitutions, a code of manners, a style of poetic composition, may be\ntaken down; and (3) that, as in Aristotle\u2019s theory, certain limiting\nconditions, namely, absence of counteracting emotions, such as pity\nor disgust, are recognised. These extensions on the one hand and\nlimitations on the other are clearly meant to safeguard the Hobbesian\nprinciple against the attacks to which it so dangerously exposes\nitself.[66]\n\nEven in this new and more guarded form, however, the theory will not\nbear the strain put upon it. It will account fairly well for some of\nthe forms of the laughable in our list, such as slight misfortunes or\nmischances, defects, moral and intellectual, which do not shock or\notherwise hurt our feelings, also certain forms of make-believe which\nare distinctly hypocritical and so capable of being regarded at once\nas moral defects, and (being seen through) as discomfitures. It _may_\napply also, as has been hinted above, to the effect of the obscene;\nthough I, at least, feel that without some forcing the effect cannot be\ninterpreted in this way. There seems to me to lurk in our laughter here\nsomething of the joy of the child, of the Naturkind, Walt Whitman, at\nthe sight of what is customarily hidden away.[67]\n\nLeaving this, however, as a more doubtful case, let us turn to\nother groups. Is it possible to regard all laughable exhibitions of\nincongruities as degradations? Is the {123} charming unsuitability\nof the \u201cgrown-up\u2019s\u201d coat and hat to the childish form viewed by the\nlaughing spectator as a degradation when he \u201clets himself go\u201d? Are we\nlaughing at the clothes as degraded by being thus transformed, or at\nthe child\u2019s na\u00efvet\u00e9 as a degradation of human intelligence? I confess\nthat such a way of interpreting the spectacle strikes me as grotesquely\nforced. The look of the whole thing in the complete unfitness of its\nparts seems to affect one as a delicious absurdity before the sweet\nsimplicity below the surface is detected.\n\nOur author does his best to show that mere incongruity, where nothing\nis degraded, does not raise the laugh. I readily grant that he has\nmade out his case, so far as to show that in most of the pungent and\npotently moving examples of the incongruous an element of degradation,\nof malicious detraction is present. But this is not enough. The\nquestion is whether it is always present, and whether in the cases\nwhere it is present it is the sole excitant of our mirth. I believe\nthat a finer analysis shows that this is not so. Where, for example, is\n\u201cthe degraded\u201d in a child\u2019s laughter at the sight of his nursery all\ntopsy-turvy on a cleaning day? Does he view the nurse as put to shame\nby the setting of chairs on tables and so forth, instead of observing\nthe proper local congruities? or does he think of the room as something\nquasi-human which takes on an improper look as he himself does when he\nmakes himself in a glorious mess? Slight movements of fancy of this\nkind may be present: but do they lie at the sources of his laughter and\nconstitute its main moving force?\n\nAs another way of testing the theory, we may glance at those examples\nof the odd or out of the way in which we find nothing of deformity, and\ndo not seem to focus our mental glance on any loss of dignity, but are\ncontent to be {124} amused at the queer spectacle for its own sake.\nI have seen a child of three or so go into a long fit of laughter at\nthe antics of a skittish pair of horses just turned loose on a common.\nDid the child see anything of the mean, disgraceful, undignified in\nthese new and lively movements? Were they not immensely, overpoweringly\nfunny, just because they were outrageous deviations from the customary\nproper behaviour of horses when saddled or harnessed to a carriage?\nI feel the impulse to laugh at a \u201cguy\u201d in the street who captures my\nroving nonchalant eye long before I reflect on any loss of dignity\nwhich the bizarre costume may signify. In sooth, if, in this first\nhappy moment, any distinct thought of the personality behind the wild,\nstartling figure floats up to the surface of consciousness, it is a\nfriendly one. I am disposed to like and feel grateful to the person\nwho thus for an instant relieves for me the insufferable dulness of\nthe spectacle of London citizens all dressed according to one stupid\nfashion.\n\nOr let us take another group: the relish for word-play and the lighter\nkinds of wit. Here, again, I concede to Bain that the taking down of\nsomething a good peg-interval intensifies our satisfaction: but it\nseems impossible to maintain that our mirth depends altogether on the\nrecognition of this. A good pun, a skilful turning of words so as to\ngive a new and startlingly disconnected meaning, can hardly be said\nto owe its instant capture of our laughing muscles to our perception\nof a degradation of language and the habits of serious speech. On the\ncontrary, I should say that any focussing of thought on this aspect\nwould considerably weaken and might altogether arrest the laughing\nimpulse. It is to the serious person who keeps his mouth firmly closed\nthat this feature of the case addresses itself. Is there not here, even\nin the case of mirthful men, some of the delight {125} of the playful\nchild who amuses himself by turning words and expressions into queer\nnonsense just for the fun of the thing?\n\n2. We may now pass to the second of the main types of theory which\nhave been proposed as explanations of the working of the laughable on\nour feeling and the correlated muscular mechanism. Its distinctive\nmark is that, instead of setting behind our enjoyment of the ludicrous\nan emotion, or a change in our moral attitude, namely, a sense of\nour own superiority or of something else\u2019s degradation, it sets a\npurely intellectual attitude, a modification of thought-activity. The\nlaughter, according to this second theory, results from a peculiar\neffect on our intellectual mechanism, such as the nullification of\na process of expectation or of an expectant tendency. It is this\nperfectly disinterested intellectual process which brings about the\n_feeling_ of the ludicrous and its expression in laughter. This\nmay be called the Intellectual Theory, or Theory of Contrariety or\nIncongruity. Since we have already touched on this mode of conceiving\nof the effect of the ludicrous in criticising the view of Dr. Lipps, a\nbrief examination of it may content us here.\n\nIt may be noted in passing that this way of dealing with the ludicrous\nis characteristically German. The dominant note in the philosophy\nof Kant and his successors has been to regard all determinations of\nexperience as fundamentally a rational process. Just as in the domain\nof ethics these thinkers conceive of what British Ethicists have been\nwont to call the Moral Sentiment as essentially a process of Reason,\nso in that branch of \u00c6sthetics which deals with the Comic we find them\ndisposed to regard the effect of the ludicrous, less as the excitation\nof a concrete and familiar emotion, such as Pride or Power, than as a\nspecial modification of the process of thought. {126}\n\nKant may be taken as the first great representative of this theory.\nAccording to him, wit\u2014the only variety of the ludicrous which he\ntouches on\u2014is a kind of play, namely, that of thought. In everything\nthat is to excite a lively laugh there must be something absurd. It\nis \u201can affection arising from the sudden transformation of a strained\n(_gespannte_) expectation into nothing\u201d. The transformation is, of\ncourse, not directly enjoyable to the understanding: it seems to induce\ngratification indirectly by means of a furthered _bodily_ process.\nThis, by the way, is a noteworthy concession by a German thinker to the\nclaims of the poor body to recognition in these high affairs of the\nunderstanding, a concession which his followers quickly struck out.\nHe gives as an example of his theory the story of a Hindoo who, when\nsitting at an Englishman\u2019s table, and seeing a bottle of beer turned\ninto froth, expressed astonishment. Being questioned as to the reason,\nhe remarked: \u201cI am not at all astonished that it should flow out, but I\ndo wonder how you ever got it in\u201d.\n\nI have enlarged on Kant\u2019s theory mainly because of the authority of the\nauthor. German critics themselves recognise how absurdly inadequate is\nthe little he says on the subject as an explanation of the effect of\nthe laughable.[68] A few words will perhaps make this plain.\n\nIt is evident that what Kant was thinking of under the head of the\nludicrous was merely those exchanges of witty words and amusing stories\nwhich naturally enough formed a principal pastime of the devoted\nK\u00f6nigsberg thinker. Yet, even when considered under this narrow aspect,\nhis theory shows itself to be palpably insufficient. It is noteworthy\n{127} that, in seeking to make it fit the remark of the Hindoo quoted\nabove, Kant feels himself called upon to contradict the suggestion that\nwe laugh \u201cbecause we deem ourselves cleverer than this ignorant man\u201d.\nThis objection, which could not fail to occur to one who remembers\nHobbes, cannot, however, be summarily dismissed by a bare assurance\nsuch as Kant gives us; and, as a recent writer remarks, \u201cthere is good\nreason to suppose that we laugh at the ignorance (better, \u2018at the\nna\u00efvet\u00e9\u2019) of the man who seeks the difficulty in a wrong place\u201d.[69]\n\nOne may go farther and venture the assertion that it is impossible to\nexplain any laughable incident, story or remark as due _altogether_ to\ndissolved expectation or surprise.\n\nIn examining the adequacy of Kant\u2019s theory to this purpose, I set out\nwith the natural presupposition that, when using the word expectation,\nhe does not mean a definite anticipation of some particular concrete\nsequel to what is presented to the mind at the moment. In the\nillustration given, he would not have meant that the questioner had\na well-defined expectant idea of another explanation of the Hindoo\u2019s\nastonishment. It is only fair to assume that he meant merely what the\nword \u201cexpect\u201d means when, on meeting a friend in a London street whom\nI had supposed to be out of England, I say \u201cI did not expect to see\nyou\u201d. In other words, \u201cexpectation\u201d stands here for a general attitude\nof mind, a mode of apperceptive readiness to assimilate any idea of\na certain order, that is to say, standing in a recognisable relation\nto what is presented. It is the attitude in which we appreciate the\nevolution of a plot in fiction when this appears natural and does not\ngive a shock to consciousness. {128}\n\nEmploying the word in this sense, one may say that, even when we\nlaugh on receiving the solution to a conundrum which has teased and\nbaffled us, it is not because of the dissipation of an expectant\nattitude. This conclusion is suggested by the familiar fact that,\nwhen at the end of our self-puzzling we are told that there is no\nsolution, and when consequently we are unmistakably the subjects of\nan annulled expectation, we are very likely not to laugh; or, if\nwe are good-natured enough to do so, it is as a result, not of any\ndisappointment, but of a discovery that we have been hoaxed. This laugh\nat one\u2019s befooled self\u2014which we shall not be disposed to repeat if the\ntrick is tried a second time\u2014so far from illustrating the principle of\nannulled expectation is a particularly clear example of that of lowered\ndignity.\n\nThe best kind of example of the laughable for Kant\u2019s purpose would\nseem to be something odd and fantastic in dress or manners. Here, as I\nhave allowed, a kind of shock is inflicted on our fixed apperceptive\ntendencies. But to speak of a process of dissipated expectation here\nseems to be hardly accurate. As I have hinted, the sudden appearance of\nthe unexpected moves us to laughter primarily as a delightful novelty.\n\nIt seems to follow that Kant\u2019s principle of nullified expectation\noffers no adequate explanation of those forms of the ludicrous which\nare most promising for his purpose. I may add that it fails because it\nmakes no serious attempt to mark off the domain of the laughable by\ncertain well-defined characteristics. We have seen that the objects\nwhich excite our laughter are things human, or akin to the human.\nThe theory of degradation evidently recognises this: by making the\nludicrous consist in a loss of dignity it points at once to the human\nsphere. But the theory {129} that the effect of the ludicrous comes\nfrom an annihilation of a strained expectation suggests that it has\nnothing specially to do with the spectacle of human life.\n\nAs I have not included the capability of dissipating expectation among\nthe laughable features of objects, I may indicate what I hold to be\nthe function of surprise in the effect of the ludicrous. Surprise,\nthe effect of a presentation for which the mind is not perfectly\npre-adjusted at the moment, seems to be a common condition of vivid\nand exciting impressions, certainly of those which induce a state of\ngladness. Hence we need not wonder that it should be found among the\nantecedents of that outburst of gladness which we call laughter.\n\nNevertheless, it seems probable that the part played by surprise in\nthe enjoyment of the laughable has been exaggerated. Does the Londoner\nwho laughs again and again at the rough jocosities of the Punch and\nJudy show, depend on annihilated expectation for his mirth? Dogberry\u2019s\nlove of a mildewy old story is by no means peculiar to him. A really\ngood joke continues to amuse long after the first effect of surprise\nhas worn off. A like conclusion is reached by remembering that even\nwhen a definite attitude of expectation for the coming of the ludicrous\nturn is assumed, laughter\u2019s greeting is none the less hearty. When\nracy stories are circulating and the lips move in anticipation of some\nnew joke it seems an odd way of describing the effect to say that it\nis due to a dissipation of expectation. There surely seems to be more\nof realisation than annihilation here, even though the precise form\nof the impending attack on our laughter is unknown. In certain cases,\nmoreover, as when we are watching with amusement the actions of one on\nwhom a practical joke is being played\u2014actions which we, being in the\nsecret of the plot, are able to {130} forecast with a considerable\ndegree of precision, the element of surprise dwindles to the vanishing\npoint. The essential condition of our laughter would thus appear to be,\nnot the meeting of the amusing presentation with a state of complete\nunpreparedness of mind at the moment, but such a degree of contrariety\nbetween the presentation and our fixed and irrepressible apperceptive\ntendencies as will, even in spite of a pre-adjustment, secure something\nof a mild, momentary shock.[70]\n\nA more carefully developed example of the mode of conceiving of the\nlaughable which finds its essence in the annihilation of a rational\nattitude is supplied by Schopenhauer. According to this writer,\nthe process which determines our laughter is describable as an\nintellectual effort and its frustration. \u201cIn every instance (he tells\nus) the phenomenon of laughter indicates the sudden perception of an\nincongruity between a conception (Begriff) and a real object, which\nis to be understood or \u2018thought\u2019 through (_i.e._, by means of) this\nconception.\u201d The incongruity between the perception and the conception\nunder which the understanding necessarily strives to bring it must\nbe of such a degree that the perception strikingly differs from the\nconception. The greater and the more unexpected the incongruity, the\nmore violent (heftiger) will be our laughter.\n\nThe author\u2019s example of the absurdity of the presentation of the\ncurve and straight line trying to force itself under the incongruent\nconception of an angle is intended to illustrate this theory.[71] Here\nis another which has a {131} more promising look. A man who has been\narrested by soldiers is allowed to join them in a game of cards. He is\nfound cheating and is kicked out, his playmates quite forgetting that\nhe is their prisoner. Here, according to Schopenhauer, we laugh because\nthe incident, the ejection of a prisoner just arrested, will not fit\ninto the general rule, \u201ccheats at the card-table should be thrust out\u201d.\n\nThis form of the Intellectual theory clearly avoids the objection to\nKant\u2019s version, that we frequently laugh at things when there is no\ndiscoverable trace of a preceding expectation involving something in\nthe nature of an idea; for we take it as meaning that the conception\narises after, and as a result of, the perception. It is further\nindisputable, as Kant has shown us, that in our explicit judgments, as\nwhen we say, \u201cThis painting is (or is not) a work of Rubens,\u201d a general\nform of representation or something in the nature of a concept may take\npart, the percept being (or refusing to be) subsumed under this.\n\nAt the same time, as was urged in the first chapter, the distinct\ncalling up of this general representation is occasional only, and,\ntherefore, not a pre-requisite of a perception of conformity or\nnon-conformity to the normal type. When I envisage a person as\ncorrectly or as oddly dressed, I do not in either case need to have a\nschematic representation of the proper typical style of dress. The same\nholds good of many cases in which a definite rule, say of language or\ngood manners, is felt to be complied with or to be broken: we do not\nneed to call up a distinct representation of the rule. At most we can\nspeak here of a conceptual _tendency_, of an apperceptive acceptance or\nrejection of a presentation, certain features of which are specially\nattended to as characteristic of the type or general form; or, on the\nother hand, as marks of deviation from this. {132}\n\nEven if we adopt this amended form of Schopenhauer\u2019s theory, we find\nthat it is not sufficient for explaining his examples. Of the funny\ntangential angle no more need be said. Nor will his illustration of the\nself-befooled warders bear close inspection. To begin with, one may\nnote a certain arbitrariness in the use of a mode of interpretation\nwhich plainly allows of an alternative. We can say equally well,\neither (with Schopenhauer) that the extrusion of a cheat who is also\na prisoner will not fit into the general rule \u201ccheats have to be\nejected,\u201d or that the extrusion of a prisoner who is also a cheat\nwill not fit into the rule that prisoners have to be confined.[72] It\nseems to be more fitting here also to regard the incongruity\u2014so far as\nthe perception of this is the direct cause of our laughter\u2014as holding\nbetween two aspects of the incident presented. The man is envisaged\nat once as a cheat and as a prisoner, and as such comes under two\n_r\u00e9gimes_ which directly conflict. The perception of the fun of the\nstory surely begins with a discernment of this mutual interference of\ntwo systems of rule.\n\nYet this is certainly not all or the chief part of the perception. The\nunstinting laugh comes only when we view the keepers as na\u00efvely \u201cgiving\nthemselves away\u201d to their prisoner by consenting to become playmates,\nand so putting themselves under a rule which wholly destroys their\n_r\u00f4le_ as custodians. Here, too, then, the principle of incongruity\nshows itself to be insufficient.\n\nIt only remains to add that if Schopenhauer\u2019s theory turns out to be\ninadequate even when applied to an example chosen by himself, it is\npretty certain to fail when applied to other groups of instances of\nthe laughable in our list, in which incongruity does not seem to be a\npotent {133} ingredient, if indeed it is present at all. To suggest,\nfor example, that our laughter at small and harmless vices, such as\nAristotle speaks of, is the outcome of a suddenly conceived incongruity\nbetween a \u201creal object\u201d or presentation and a conception sounds\nsufficiently forced. Would the author of the theory have been prepared\nto say that in these instances we have present to our mind the concept\nof a perfectly virtuous man, and that our laughter comes of our failing\nto bring the perception under this conception? Surely the intrusion\nof any such exalted \u201cconcept\u201d would be fatal to our enjoyment of the\nlaughable aspect of vice.\n\nFacts, moreover, contradict this view on every hand. It may suffice\nto allude to one of the world\u2019s great purveyors of laughter, Sir John\nFalstaff. According to this theory, we ought to laugh most at his vices\nwhen he first reveals them, since this is the moment when we should be\nmost likely to bring to bear on him the \u201cconcept\u201d of a proper decent\ngentleman. But is it not the fact that we laugh more freely when we\nhave quite ceased to think of him as a possible embodiment of sobriety\nand decency, and when we apperceive his behaviour by help of the\nconceptual tendency answering, not to the type of virtuous citizen, but\nto the general manner of behaviour or the character of John Falstaff\nhimself? The same is true in everyday life. We are, I think, most ready\nto laugh at a man\u2019s foibles, say, his vanity or his exaggerations of\nspeech, when we know the man and can say, \u201cOh, it is only So-and-So!\u201d\n\nNeither the theory of Kant nor of Schopenhauer seems, then, to be\ncompetent to do what it undertakes to do, to explain the various forms\nand impressions of the laughable. These two theories, in spite of\ntheir difference, agree in regarding the incongruity which excites\nour laughter as lying between what we perceive and what our previous\n{134} experience and our pre-existing ideas and apperceptive habits\nhave prepared us to accept as natural and proper. But our examination\nof the instance of the ill-matched hat and head supplied by Dr. Lipps,\nas also our fuller discussion of the relation of incongruity in the\npreceding chapter, has led us to recognise an amusing contrariety\nbetween different parts of a presentation, of what may be called\n_internal_ incongruity in contradistinction to the external dealt with\nby Kant and Schopenhauer. Hence we have to inquire how these two modes\nof apprehending incongruity are related.\n\nThat, _prima facie_, we have to do in this case with a real difference\nin the mode of perception, seems indisputable; let the reader compare\nthe effect of the two spectacles, a man wearing an extravagantly tall\nhat, and a small boy wearing a hat of the height of a man\u2019s; or,\nagain, a tiny man alone, and a short man by the side of a tall woman.\nIn some instances, indeed, we may see that there is an intrinsic\nrepugnance between the parts of a presentation, as when two colours\nin a woman\u2019s dress violently clash, or when a statement is palpably\nself-contradictory. Here there seems to be no reference, however\nvague, to previous experience or the customary. At the same time we\nmay easily see that this field of the internally incongruent is a\nvery narrow one. Much of what looks like this turns out, on closer\ninspection, to be, in part at least, externally determined. This is\ntrue of what we call a bizarre mixture of incongruent elements in\nmode of attire or in manners; for it is experience and the habits of\nsocial life which dispose our minds to regard them as foreign one to\nthe other. Much of our mirthful gratification at exhibitions of the\nincongruous arises through a perception of the intrusion of something\nforeign into a situation. When, for example, we observe a {135} rather\nsprightly gesture in the pulpit, we mentally view this action against\na background which is the situation of the moment. Now this situation\nis by no means wholly presented: it is a presentation greatly enlarged\nand profoundly modified by the addition of a general significance.\nThe attitude of the spectator\u2019s mind, face to face with the scene,\nis determined by apperceptive tendencies which imply a readiness to\nexpect _a certain kind_ of behaviour. And this, again, evidently means\nthat certain directions of imaginative activity, and something in the\nnature of a \u201cgeneric image\u201d and of conceptual thought, are stirring.\nThis effect of experience and apperceptive habits in modifying our\nperceptions is probably illustrated in all our appreciations of the\namusingly incongruous. To revert once more to the spectacle of the\nman\u2019s hat on the child\u2019s head, may we not say that in this case, also,\nwe envisage the hat as an interloper in the situation\u2014the sweet sanctum\nof the nursery?\n\nIt seems to follow that Kant and Schopenhauer were wise, when dealing\nwith incongruity, in emphasising the apperceptive factor. Contrariety\nto what we are accustomed to is undoubtedly the great determining\nelement in the ill-assortments of things which provoke our laughter.\nHence, in examining the theories of these two writers, we seem to\nhave dealt with the intellectual principle in its most comprehensive\nand most favourable form. Nor do I see how any transformation of this\nprinciple will make it an adequate theory. The entertaining instances\nof mischances and awkward situations, of takings down, of moral and\nintellectual failings, these and other varieties of the laughable dealt\nwith above steadily refuse to yield up their secret at the bidding of\nthis theory.\n\nLet us now sum up the results of our criticism of the theories. We\nseem to have found that, whereas neither of {136} the two chief\ntypes of theory covers the whole field of the laughable, each has its\nproper, limited domain. It is certain that in many cases we laugh at\nan incident, a situation, an action, where the provocative is best\ndescribed as a loss of dignity. It is equally certain that in many\nother cases our laughter springs directly out of a perception, more or\nless distinct, of incongruity.\n\nThat these principles have each a large sway over our laughter has\nbeen sufficiently illustrated in the preceding chapter: also that they\nfrequently co-operate in one and the same amusing presentation. Hence\nwe might expect that the advocate of each theory would be able to find\nhis illustrations, and would sometimes manage to pounce upon one just\nafter it had been carried off by his rival.[73]\n\nBut, it may be urged, even if both principles are shown to be valid\nthey may be unified. If by this is meant that the incongruous and the\nundignified or unworthy, considered as abstract ideas, are identical,\nor that logically each involves the other, I am not concerned to\ndiscuss the point. It is enough for our present purpose to urge that\nthe modes of perception and the shades of feeling involved are clearly\ndistinguishable.\n\nThe same fundamental distinction would nullify the attempt to subsume\none of these principles as a special case under the other. If we set\nout with the Intellectual principle, we may, without doubt, succeed\nin showing that many, if not all, amusing losses of dignity\u2014such as\na slight disgrace, or a bungling into a \u201cfix\u201d\u2014logically involve a\ncontrariety between what is presented and the normal custom or rule.\nBut our question is one not of the logical analysis of meaning but of\nthe psychological analysis of process, and I can find no evidence in\nfavour of the theory {137} that when we laugh at these things we have\nat the moment any apprehension of such a contrariety.\n\nIt is the same if we start with the other or Moral principle.\nIncongruities which are lapses from standard ideas may certainly, as\nalready conceded, be regarded as degradations. And it may be possible\nto show that in all cases of incongruity _some_ loss of dignity is\nlogically implied. Yet even if it be so, the psychological contention\nwill still stand that in many cases of incongruity, including our old\nfriend the child in the father\u2019s hat, we have a full sense of relishing\nthe incongruity and yet none at all of enjoying a degradation. Where\nis the degradation in the spectacle of a crow on a sheep\u2019s back which\nmay flood a child with mirth? In truth, if our theorists had only\ncondescended to take note of so small a matter as children\u2019s enjoyment\nof the world\u2019s fun, the hypothesis of degradation could never have\nstood its ground so long.\n\nYet another way of evading a glaring dualism may suggest itself.\nAllowing that the two principles are each valid, we might, at least,\nbe able to combine them in the form of a single generalisation. This\nis what is done by Hazlitt, for example, who, though he finds the\nessence of the laughable in the incongruous, defines the ludicrous\nas involving disappointment of expectation _by something having\ndeformity or (something) inconvenient_, that is _what is contrary to\nthe customary_ and desirable.[74] Herbert Spencer\u2019s expression, a\n\u201cdescending incongruity,\u201d is clearly a very similar mode of combining\nthe principles.[75] Lipps\u2019 theory of incongruity, with its distinction\nof a little, and a belittling presentation, might also, I think, easily\nbe made to illustrate another mode of such combination. More recently\nFouill\u00e9e {138} and others have urged that the one principle in a\nmanner supplements the other.[76]\n\nIt is evident, however, that this apparent mode of escape will not\navail us. The combined theory implies that all cases of the laughable\nare at once incongruities and degradations, that is to say, perceived\nand felt to be such. In dealing with the principles separately,\nhowever, we have seen that, in the case of each alike, there are\nwell-recognised examples of the laughable to which it does not apply.\nThis conclusion manifestly carries with it the proposition that there\nare cases to which a combination of the principles does not apply.\n\nA last attempt to escape this theoretic dualism would be to urge that\nthe two principles rule in distinct realms. In that of the _ludicrous_\nproper, it might be urged, we have to do with the intellectual\nprinciple: it is only when the sphere is enlarged to include all\nthat is laughable, and so the region of the _ridiculous_, that the\nprinciple of lowered dignity comes in.[77] Theorists may insist on such\ndistinctions, but it seems to me that they cannot be maintained as hard\nand fast boundaries. As has been shown above, laughable things do not\nall affect us in quite the same way. A spice of malice comes into much\nof the laughter that greets the spectacle, say of a bit of successful\ntrickery; yet this does not make the experience substantially different\nfrom that of enjoying some striking example of incongruity, say a good\nIrish \u201cbull\u201d. When the note of derision begins to sound clearly, there\nis of course no longer any suggestion of an effect of the laughable\npure and simple.\n\nThe attempt to analyse our perceptions of the laughable {139} in the\nhope of discovering some single uniting principle has proved to be\nabortive. We find in the end that two causes of laughter remain on our\nhands.[78]\n\nThe most promising way of bringing the several laughable qualities\nand aspects of things under one descriptive head would seem to be\nto say that they all illustrate a presentation of something in the\nnature of a defect, a failure to satisfy some standard-requirement,\nas that of law or custom, provided that it is small enough to be\nviewed as a harmless plaything. Much, at least, of our laughter at\nthe odd as opposed to the customary, at the deformed, at failure in\ngood manners and the other observances of social life, at defects of\nintelligence and of character, at fixes and misfortunes\u2014so far as the\nsituation implies want of foresight\u2014at the lack of a perception of the\nfitness of things, and at other laughable features, may undoubtedly be\nregarded as directed to something _which fails to comply with a social\nrequirement_, yet is so trifling that we do not feel called upon to\njudge the shortcoming severely.\n\nI am sure that to look at the laughable in this way is an indispensable\nstep in the construction of a theory of the subject. We must, as\nwe shall see presently, supplement the common mode of dealing with\nlaughter as an abstract psychological problem, by bringing into view\nits _social_ function. Yet this does not necessarily mean that the\nconsideration of this function will lead us straightway to a simple\ntheory of the ludicrous. As hinted in the preceding chapter, we may\neasily exaggerate the more serious function of laughter, and this point\nwill be made clearer in subsequent chapters.\n\nThat the effects of the laughable cannot all be brought under the head\nof means of social correction or improvement, {140} may, even at this\nstage of our inquiry, be seen by considering another point, to which\nwe will now turn. No analysis of the qualities of things in which the\nlaughable resides will enable us to account for the mirthful effects\nof these, even while we remain within the limits of what is commonly\nrecognised as the ludicrous. This has been illustrated in the preceding\nchapter, and a word or two more may suffice to make it clear.\n\nI have tried to show that some at least of the spectacles that shake\nus with laughter do so by satisfying something within us akin to the\nchild\u2019s delight in the gloriously new and extravagant. This, again,\nmeans that these spectacles make appeal to that primitive form of\nlaughter, already illustrated, which is called forth by some sudden\nincrease of joy. Our rejoicing at the sight of the clown\u2019s droll\ncostume and funny movements has in it something of the laughing joy of\nthe savage when he is shown some mechanical wonder of Europe, something\nof the laughing joy of the infant at the sudden invasion of his nursery\nwall by a dancing sunbeam.[79]\n\nA little more reflection on the groups of laughable things will show\nthat other ingredients of this primitive laughter are present in our\nappreciation of the ludicrous. Dr. Bain finds himself compelled to\neke out the deficiencies of the Hobbesian principle by urging that\nthe spectacle of degradation may move us to laughter, not merely by\nexciting the feeling of power or superiority (as Hobbes said), but by\nsupplying a sudden release from a state of constraint. The abandonment\nof the serious attitude in church when some trivial incident occurs is\nan instance of a lowering of the dignity of a thing, or an occasion,\nwhich refreshes {141} us with a sense of liberation.[80] This idea\ncarries us much farther than the author thinks. The joyous deliverance\nfrom pressure and constraint will, I think, be found to reinforce other\nmental agencies in many cases of ludicrous presentation in which no\ndegradation is discoverable. Sometimes the constraint is very severe;\nwitness the effect when the narrator of a funny story knows how to wind\nup the emotion of fear to just the right pitch in order to give us the\ndelicious run down of the mental works when the funny _d\u00e9nouement_\nbursts upon us. Here our laughter has a large support in the joyous\nrelief from nervous tension.\n\nIn other cases, again, the release comes as an interruption of a solemn\noccasion by the intrusion of something disconnected, and, by contrast,\ntrifling. The tittering in a church at a small _contretemps_ has\nbeen our illustration. There is incongruity here between two orders\nof ideas, if you like; or, as I should prefer to put it, between two\nlevels of interest. For the point is that the interruption must seem\nludicrous by exhibiting clearly a trifling character, by powerfully\nsuggesting a non-reverent point of view.\n\nAs hinted above, these two sources of laughter, a sudden oncoming\nof gladness and a relief from restraint, are closely connected. The\nunexpected presentation which gladdens us seems commonly to bring\na kind of relief. This is certainly true of all cases in which the\npreceding state was one of conscious depression and ennui. The laughter\nof the young, in response to our often cumbrous attempts to amuse them,\nmay be an escape from a certain strain which belongs to a state of\nennui, from the confinement or restraint which the poverty of their\nsurroundings at the moment imposes on them.[81] {142}\n\nThere is another conceivable way of bringing together the effect of\nsudden gladness and relief from restraint. It has been urged that all\nlaughable things affect us by way of a shock of surprise followed by\na sense of relief. Leigh Hunt, for example, thinks that when we laugh\nat something we receive a shock of surprise which gives _a check to\nthe breath_, a check which is in proportion to the vivacity of the\nsurprise; and that our laughter is a relief from this.[82] This theory\nembodies a sound physiological principle, one which we have already\nadopted, but it seems to go too far. As I have tried to show, a shock\nof surprise, as we ordinarily understand the expression, is not an\ninvariable antecedent of our response to laughable things. On the other\nhand, it may be urged with some reason that even in cases where this\nfull shock of the unexpected is wanting, there is a moment of strain as\nthe presentation affronts the custom-trained eye, and that the laughter\nis the expression of the condoning of this affront, the acceptance of\nit as harmless play.\n\nIn order to complete our psychological analysis of the tendencies which\ncombine in our enjoyment of ludicrous things, we need to glance at\none other variety of primitive laughter, that of contempt. In dealing\nwith this in Chapter III. we drew the line between it and the true\nenjoyment of the laughable as something \u201cobjective\u201d. Yet it would be a\nprofound error not to recognise the fact, that there is a real kinship\nbetween the two. To begin with, the laugh of contempt, say over a\nprostrate foe, or over one whom we have succeeded in teasing by playing\noff on him some practical joke, readily passes into an enjoyment of\nthe laughable proper. It is obviously in part a laugh _at_ something.\nNot only so, as a _laugh_ it may be presumed to involve a less {143}\nserious attitude in the successful spectator than a sneer, say, or\nthe hurling of opprobrious words. It will naturally direct itself to\nsomething in the undignified _look_ of the discomfited party which\nwould be likely to be recognised by others also as laughter-moving.\n\nAgain, though I hold that Hobbes\u2019 theory, as he himself formulates it,\nerrs by insisting on the swelling of the spectator\u2019s self-consciousness\ninto a feeling of superiority or power, it seems to me to be\nindisputable that all examples of the laughable which clearly fall into\nthe category of mild degradations do give us a sense of uplifting,\nsomething akin to Hobbes\u2019 \u201csudden glory\u201d. As we are reminded by Dr.\nBain, malevolence or malice has its protean disguises, and one of them\nis undoubtedly the joy of the laugher. The note of malicious crowing,\nof Schadenfreude, may, no doubt, be most distinctly heard in some\nof the laughter of satire and of the more brutal sort of joke. Yet\nI suspect that a trace of it lurks, like a beaten foe, inexpugnable\nthough greatly reduced in strength, in a large part of our laughter.\n\nThere are one or two facts which seem to me to point to the conclusion\nthat superiority is implied in, if not tacitly claimed by, the forms\nof laughter which have a distinctly personal aim. One of these is the\nfamiliar fact that anything in the shape of a feeling of inferiority\nto, or even of respect for, the laughable person inhibits the laughter\nof the contemplator. But other facts seem to me to be still more\nconclusive. Of these the first is that if a person finds himself\ndistinctly involved in the disgrace, the absurd situation, or whatever\nelse provokes laughter, he no longer laughs, or laughs in another key.\nI see my estimable fellow-pedestrian lose his hat at a street corner\nwhere the wind lies in ambush: my soul expands exultingly. The moment\nafter, I, too, may fall a victim to the ambuscade, in {144} which\ncase I probably stop laughing and become the subject of a different\nemotion. Or, if I am \u201claughing animal\u201d enough to keep up the hilarity,\nthe laugh will have changed. All the glory, the sense of uplifting,\nthe exultation will have fled, and the new laugh, which embraces\nmyself along with another unfortunate, will have in it something of\nhumiliation, will at most have shrunk into a \u201cchastened joy\u201d.\n\nThe second fact is still more decisive. If no superiority is implied\nin our common laughter at others, how does it come about that we all\nhave so very obstinate a dislike to be made its object? The most\namiable of men find it hard enough to rise to the level of a bare\ntoleration of others\u2019 laughter: the man who can reach the sublime\nheight of finding a real and considerable gratification in it must be\na hero, or\u2014as some would say\u2014a craven. There are men of a genuine and\nmost blameless humour who are hardly, if at all, less keenly sensitive\nto the attack of another laugher than the most serious of prigs. Is\nthis understandable unless we suppose that laughter at a person is\ninstinctively interpreted as an assertion of superiority over him?\n\nIt would seem then to be a reasonable view, that if laughter in\nordinary cases involves superiority, and is so regarded by its object,\nthe enjoyment of it by its subject will be very apt to bring with it\na taste of superiority. This, I conceive, is the element of truth in\nHobbes\u2019 theory.\n\nThe foregoing considerations seem to show clearly that the realm of\nthe ludicrous is not a closed and clearly bounded territory, as the\ntheorists for the most part assume it to be. Our enjoyment of its\namusing sights connects itself with, and indeed absorbs into itself,\ntendencies which we may observe in the laughter of children and\nuncivilised adults. And, if so, the fact seems to require us to go back\nupon those primitive tendencies in order to see how far the connection\n{145} holds, that is to say, how far the effects of the ludicrous can\nbe regarded as due to the play of those tendencies.\n\nAn analysis of the primitive forms of laughter, which precede its\nregulation by a reference to ideas, has disclosed the fact that it is\nthe expression of pleasure, yet not of all pleasure, but only of the\nsudden oncoming or increase of pleasure, of what we call gladness. It\nhas shown us, further, that this joy of laughter is, in many, if not\nin all cases, conditioned by a sudden relaxation of mental strain, and\nmay, indeed, be described by reference to this condition as a sense of\nrelief from pressure. This was seen to hold good alike in those graver\nsituations in which nervous laughter is apt to occur, in the lighter\nones, such as the escape of schoolboys from the classroom to the\nplayground, and in the still lighter ones in which the strain relaxed\nis momentary only, of which the laughter induced by tickling is the\nbest representative.\n\nNow it seems evident that we have in all these experiences something\nanalogous to play. The natural alliance of laughter with the play-mood\nhas already been touched on.[83] We may now go a step farther and say\nthat these spurts of joyous consciousness which, in simple natures\nuntrammelled by thought of appearances, express themselves in laughter\nare of the essence of Play. To be glad with the gaiety of laughter, to\nthrow off the stiff and wearing attitude of seriousness and to abandon\noneself to mirth and jollity is, in truth, to begin to play.\n\nThe deep kinship between laughter and play discloses itself as soon as\nwe begin carefully to compare them. Let us look at some of their common\ncharacteristics.\n\nPlay contrasts with work, not as rest or inactivity contrasts with\nit, but as light pleasurable activity contrasts {146} with the\nmore strenuous and partly disagreeable kind. The same holds good of\nlaughter. It is light pleasurable activity in contrast to the more\nburdensome activity of our serious hours.\n\nAgain, play is free activity entered upon for its own sake. That is to\nsay, it is not directed to any end outside itself, to the satisfaction\nof any want, save that of the play-impulse itself; and so it is free\nfrom external restraint, and from the sense of compulsion\u2014of a \u201cmust\u201d\nat the ear, whether embodied in the voice of a master or in that of a\nhigher self\u2014which accompanies the attitude of the worker. Similarly,\nwhen we laugh we are released from the strain and pressure of serious\nconcentration, from the compulsion of the practical and other needs\nwhich keep men, in the main, serious beings.\n\nIt follows at once that play is relative to work, that it is enjoyed as\na relief from graver occupations, and cannot be indefinitely prolonged.\nAnd, as has been hinted above, the same holds true of laughter and what\nwe appropriately describe as playing the fool.\n\nIn saying that play is spontaneous activity, freed from the imperious\nrule of necessity, I do not mean that it is aimless. The play-impulse\nprovides its own ends; for, without something to aim at, it could\nnot become conscious activity in the full sense. Thus in the case of\nchildren, at any rate, and possibly of young animals also, playing at\nsome form of combat implies, as Prof. Groos urges, a keen striving\nfor something akin to conquest. In other words, the instinct which\nunderlies the activity seems to bring with it the setting up of\nsomething like an end. Similarly with respect to those varieties\nof children\u2019s play which aim at the realisation of an idea, and so\nresemble art. In this case, too, an instinct, namely, imitative\nproduction, prompts to the semblance of a serious conative process, the\nstriving {147} after an end. The same applies to mirthful activity.\nIn playing off a joke on another we certainly have a definite aim in\nview. In neither case, however, is the end regarded as a serious or\nimportant one. Play ceases to be pure play just as soon as the end, for\nexample conquest, begins to be regarded as a thing of consequence to\nthe player; and, in like manner, laughter ceases to be pure mirth just\nas soon as the end, say the invention of a witticism, is envisaged as a\nsolid personal advantage, such as heightened reputation.[84]\n\nA like remark applies to the intrusion of the serious attitude into\nplay when this takes on an elaborate form requiring some concentration\nof attention. This does not destroy the playful character of the\nactivity so long as the end is not viewed as matter of serious import.\nIn this respect, too, laughter resembles play, for we may take\nconsiderable pains in shaping our practical joke without ever losing\nhold of fun as our end.\n\nThis brings us to another point of kinship between play and laughter.\nEach, though marked off from the things of the real serious world, has\nto do with these in a manner. The play both of animals and of children\nis largely pretence, that is to say, the production of a semblance\nof an action of serious life, involving some consciousness of its\nillusory character. This seems inferrible, in the case of animal play,\n_e.g._, the make-believe combats, from the palpable restriction of\nthe movements within the limits of the harmless.[85] And with regard\nto the play of the nursery, it {148} is probable that all through a\nplay-action there is, in spite of the look of absorbing seriousness, a\ndim awareness of the make-believe. It is fairly certain that we have to\ndo in this case with a double or \u201cdivided\u201d consciousness.[86] And, as\nhas been illustrated above, laughter is wont to hover about the domain\nof the serious. In both cases we find the love of pretence playing\npranks with the real world, divesting things of their significance and\nvalue for the serious part of our mind, and transmuting them by fancy\ninto mere appearances for our amusement.\n\nAnother point of similarity may be just alluded to. Recent discussions\non the nature of play have served to bring out its utility or\nserviceableness. Not only is the sportive activity of children and\nyoung animals of physiological benefit as wholesome exercise, it is now\nseen to be valuable as a preliminary practice of actions which later\non become necessary. Thus in play-combats children and young animals\nbegin to learn the arts of skilful attack and defence.[87] Much of\nthis benefit of play-activity is due to the circumstance that it is\na mode of organised co-operation and supplies a kind of training for\nthe serious social activity of later years. I shall hope to show later\nthat laughter has a like value, not merely as a source of physiological\nbenefit to the individual, but as helping us to become fit members of\nsociety. It seems hardly needful to point out that since the fact of\nthis utility is known neither to the player nor to the laugher, it\ndoes not in the least affect the truth of our contention, that their\nactivity is not controlled by external ends which have a practical or\nother serious value. {149}\n\nOur comparison justifies us in identifying play and mirth, so far as\nto say that when we play and when we laugh our mood is substantially\nthe same. Common language seems to support this view. \u201cFun,\u201d \u201cfrolic,\u201d\n\u201csport,\u201d \u201cpastime,\u201d these and the like may be said to cover at once all\njoyous play and all varieties of mirth. We are justified, therefore, in\nmaking the principle of play fundamental in our theory of laughter.[88]\nWe may now proceed to illustrate rather more fully the presence of\nthe play-attitude in the higher domain of laughter, the enjoyment of\nludicrous spectacle.\n\nTo begin with, much of the laughable illustrated above may be regarded\nas an expression in persons or things of the play-mood which seizes the\nspectator by way of a sympathetic resonance. Examples have been given\nin the laughter excited by the spectacle of aimless actions which have\nthe look of frolicsomeness. As our name \u201cword-play\u201d clearly suggests,\nverbal jokes are recognised as an outcome of the play-mood which throws\noff for the nonce the proper serious treatment of language. Again, the\nodd when it reaches the height of the extravagant has an unmistakable\nlook of play-license. Much of the amusing effect of disguise, of\npretence, including certain kinds of \u201caping,\u201d appears to involve some\nrecognition of the make-believe aspect of play. The disorderly, even\nwhen it applies to a room, is, to say the least, powerfully suggestive\nof the ways of rompish play. Many irregularities of thought and action\nreadily take on the look of a self-abandonment to play; for example,\nirrelevances and confusions of idea, droll, aimless-looking actions,\nsuch as going off the scene and coming back again and again, {150}\nsenseless repetitions of actions by the same person or by others\u2014a\ncommon entertainment of the circus and the popular play-house. As a\nlast example, we may instance the effect of the incongruous when it\nassumes a trifling aspect on a solemn occasion. This is surely amusing\nbecause it is so like the interruptions of child\u2019s play.\n\nHow far can this principle be carried? May not a good deal of\nthe amusingly incongruous in behaviour and in circumstances, of\nintellectual and of moral collapse, when this wears the aspect of\nfolly, be said to affect us as an expression of the play-mood? And is\nnot our amusement at the sight of certain mischances which have the\nlook of a tripping up, an outwitting or befooling, either by others\nor by circumstance or \u201cfate,\u201d traceable to a perception of something\nindistinguishable from playful teasing?\n\nYet we must not rely on this expression of the playful too much. There\nseem to be many cases of the laughable, for example, amusing vices,\nabsences of mind, and all irrelevances which bring in the solemn where\nit is out of place, where that which is expressed is a mood the very\nopposite of the playful. Nor do we need to push this principle to an\nextreme. Even if the laughable spectacle does not wear the look of a\nplay-challenge, it can bring up the playful mood in the spectator in\nanother way. It may so present its particular feature as to throw us\noff our serious balance, and by a sweet compulsion force us to play\nwith it rather than to consider it seriously. A brief reference to our\nstore of laughable things may suffice to illustrate this.\n\nTo begin with our laughter at novelties, the odd, the extravagant, what\nis it but the outcome of a play-impulse, a gay caprice which wills\nfor the instant not to take objects seriously, but to disregard their\nreal nature and significance, {151} practical, theoretical, and even\n\u00e6sthetic, for the joy of making them playthings for the eye? Or, if\nthe suggestion of a rule, broken by the newcomer into our field of\nperception, obtrudes itself, our laughter announces that the infraction\ndoes not matter, that the violation of custom\u2019s good law itself is\npassed over and turned into fun by the blithe play-spirit in us.\n\nIt is the same with mischances, awkward fixes, and all sorts of moral\nand intellectual shortcomings. These things obviously have in them\nwhat should appeal to our seriousness: they come up for judgment as\npitiable, as regrettable, often as distinctly culpable. Yet we laugh\nand cast aside our judicial responsibilities just because the mood of\nthe moment disposes us to be indulgent, and because the attitude we\ntake up in viewing the offence as a little one instantly brings up\nthe love of play, the impulse to turn the significant into enjoyable\nnonsense.\n\nOnce more, in our laughter at artful allusion to the obscene, it is\nthe same swift transition from the serious attitude to that of play\nwhich seems to be at the bottom of our merriment. Here again it is the\nlittleness\u2014a quantity, as pointed out, varying considerably with the\nquality of the laugher\u2014which disarms the serious attitude and allures\nit to play.\n\nIn pretences, both hypocrisies and less serious kinds, which raise the\nlaugh, we note the same swift lapse into the play-attitude. For, in\norder to enjoy these vain shows with perfect gaiety, we must be ready\nto bring a mental \u201cblind spot\u201d to bear on everything in them which has\nserious moral significance. Here, too, we take a leap into the world of\nthe player, transmuting what has something of seriousness, something\neven of offending hurtfulness, into a mere plaything. {152}\n\nThe more intellectual varieties of the ludicrous disclose the same\ndeep-seated characteristic. The incongruous, the absurd, the tricks of\nambiguous speech, these are things which offend us as serious mortals\nbent on having consistency of ideas and clearness of utterance in our\nsocial world. They evoke our laughter when they take such a form as to\nupset this serious attitude and to win us over to regarding them as\nnothing but entertaining show.\n\nIn all the more intellectual laughter at things we seem to find the\nperfect form of the mind\u2019s play. I say \u201cperfect\u201d because psychologists\nas well as others are wont to speak of poetic imagination as playful\nactivity, though this, as controlled by the ends of art, is seriousness\nitself compared with the freer movements of ideas when the sportive\ntemper takes us.\n\nOne other illustration of the _r\u00f4le_ of the playful spirit in the\nsphere of the laughable must not be overlooked. I have dealt with the\nintrusion of the trivial into solemn scenes as an expression of the\nchild\u2019s playfulness. But, as has been suggested above, it is more than\nthis. Scenes of great formality, where a degree of severe self-control\nis enforced which is trying to mortals of only a limited gravity, are\napt to throw us into a state of highly unstable equilibrium. Hence the\nwelcome we are disposed to give to anything which touches the playful\nsusceptibilities in us. Under such circumstances small occurrences,\nwhich at other times would pass wholly unmarked, are grasped at and\nbecome laughable things for us, just because of the great necessity of\nman to escape now and again into the freedom of play.\n\nAs already implied, this saturation of laughter with the spirit of\nplayfulness is characteristic only of the gayer kind, that which is\npurified from all tinge of seriousness. So far {153} as our jocose\nimpulses lend themselves to serious purposes, as for example in the\nlaughter of satire, the playful character tends to become less clearly\nrecognisable. Not that here, too, we are unable to find a resemblance\nbetween laughter and play; for, as we know, much of what we call play\nor sport has its serious interest, and the player, like the laugher,\nmay easily slip across the line which divides the playful from the\nserious attitude. Nevertheless, we shall need to insist on the point\nthat laughter is a thing of different tones, some more playful than\nothers, and that its nature and its function can only be clearly\ndetermined by distinguishing these.\n\nThe result of our inquiry is that the impressions of the laughable\ncannot be reduced to one or two principles. Our laughter at things\nis of various tones. It gathers up into itself a number of primitive\ntendencies; it represents the products of widely removed stages of\nintellectual and moral evolution. This is virtually admitted by all who\nrecognise the Intellectual and the Moral principle; for our laughter\nat seeing dignity unfrocked is presumably of more ancient origin than\nthe \u201claughter of the mind,\u201d which discoursers on the ludicrous are\nfor the most part thinking of. Our argument takes us farther, namely,\nto the conclusion that the effect of the laughable, even of what is\ngiven by philosophers as a sample of the ludicrous, is a highly complex\nfeeling, containing something of the child\u2019s joyous surprise at the new\nand unheard of; something too of the child\u2019s gay responsiveness to a\nplay-challenge; often something also of the glorious sense of expansion\nafter compression which gives the large mobility to freshly freed limbs\nof young animals and children.\n\nA consequence of this recognition of the relation of the laughable to\nour laughter as a whole is that we shall need to alter our method of\ntreating the subject. Our problem {154} naturally transforms itself\ninto the question: can we trace out the organic differentiation and\nintegration of the several psychical tendencies which our analysis has\ndisclosed? In other words, we find that we must resort to the genetic\nmethod, and try to explain the action of the ludicrous upon us in the\nmodest scientific fashion by retracing the stages of its development.\nSuch explanation may some day be crowned by a distinctly philosophical\none, if a finer logical analysis succeeds in discovering the essence of\nthe ludicrous; for the present it seems to be all that is available.\n\nIt will at once be evident that a large investigation into the origin\nand development of the laughing impulse will take us beyond the limits\nof pure psychology. We shall have to consider how the impulse grew\nup in the evolution of the race; and this will force us to adopt the\nbiological point of view, and ask how this special group of movements\ncame to be selected and fixed among the characters of our species. On\nthe other hand, laughter is more than a physiological and psychological\nphenomenon. As hinted above, it has a social significance, and we shall\nfind that the higher stages of its evolution can only be adequately\ndealt with in their connection with the movement of social progress.\n\nLastly, it will be by tracing the evolution of laughter in the human\ncommunity that we shall best approach the problem of the ideal which\nshould regulate this somewhat unruly impulse of man. Such a study would\nseem to promise us a disclosure of tendencies by which laughter has\nbeen lifted and refined in the past, and by the light of which it may\nconsciously direct itself in the future.\n\n{155}\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\nTHE ORIGIN OF LAUGHTER.\n\n\nTo attempt to get back to the beginnings of human laughter may well\nseem to be too ambitious a proceeding. Beginnings are small things, and\nmay easily escape detection, even when they lie well-lit not far from\nthe eye. How, then, can we hope to get at them when they are hidden in\nthe darkness of the remote past?\n\nIt is evident that our method here can only be the modest one of\nconjecture, a method which must do its best to make its conjecture look\nreasonable, while it never loses sight of the fact that it is dealing\nwith the conjectural. Our aim is to get an intelligible supposition,\nby the help of which we may explain how laughter broke on the earthly\nscene, adding one more to the many strange sounds of the animal world.\n\nThis bit of conjectural inquiry will begin by trying to answer the\nquestion: By what process did the laugh, from being a general sign of\npleasure, become specialised into an expression of the uprising of the\nmirthful, fun-loving or jocose spirit? It will then address itself to\nthe problem: What has been the course of development of the spirit of\nfun and of its characteristic mode of utterance?\n\nIt would not, of course, be possible to attempt even a conjectural\naccount of these far-off and unchronicled events, but for the new\ninstruments of hypothetical construction {156} with which the Theory\nof Evolution has furnished us. In attempting so hazardous a task we\nhave, at least, the example of one of the most modest of men to draw us\non. Charles Darwin has taught us how to be at once daring and cautious\nin trying to penetrate the darkness of the ages behind us; and one can\nwish nothing better than to be able to walk worthily in his steps.\n\nIt will be evident that in essaying an effort which can at best end in\nonly a plausible guess we must use every available clue. This means,\nnot merely that we try to trace back the history of mirthful utterance,\nalike in the evolution of the individual and of the species, to its\nrude inchoate forms, but that we search for vestiges of utterances\nvaguely resembling human laughter in the animal world.\n\nThis last suggestion may well seem to the reader like another blow\nto man\u2019s early pride of race. The worthy naturalist who called his\nspecies the \u201claughing animal\u201d did not probably trouble himself about\nthe question of the dignity of the attribute. Since laughing was one\nof the things that only man could do, it served as a convenient way of\ndescribing him. Yet, since the later evolutional psychology has led\nus to be more generous in recognising in the lower animals something\nclosely similar to our own processes of reasoning, we need not be\ngreatly shocked to hear that it is actually crediting other species\nthan our own with a simple sense of fun, and a characteristic manner of\nexpressing the feeling; that is to say, an utterance answering to our\nlaugh.\n\nNow here, if anywhere, we must be on our guard. In attempting to\ndetect traces of mirthful expression in animals we are exposed to\na two-fold danger: that common to all observation of animal ways\u2014a\ntoo anthropomorphic kind of interpretation; and that of mistaking in\nother beings, {157} whether human or sub-human, what we envisage as\nfunny, for their conscious fun. It is eminently natural, when we do\nnot screw ourselves up to the severely scientific attitude, to see\nsigns of chuckling glee in animals. I remember how I watched somewhere\nin Norway, in the early morning, a magpie as he stood for some time\nducking his head and throwing up his long tail, accompanying these\nmovements with chuckle-like sounds; and how I found it exceedingly\nhard not to believe that he was having a good laugh at something,\npossibly the absurd ways of the foreign tourists who visit his coast.\nYet, judged by the standard of scientific observation, this \u201cnatural\u201d\ninterpretation was scarcely satisfactory.\n\nSince our aim compels us to be scientific, we cannot accept common\nmodes of interpreting the \u201cmischievous\u201d performances of animals. Many\nof a monkey\u2019s tricks are \u201cfunny\u201d enough; yet we may seriously doubt\nwhether he enjoys them as practical jokes. His solemn mien certainly\ndoes not suggest it; but then it may be said that human jokers have a\nway of keeping up an appearance of gravity. A consideration of greater\nweight is that what looks to us much like a merry joke may be a display\nof the _teasing_ instinct, when this goes beyond the playful limit,\nand aims at real annoyance or mischief. The remark probably applies to\nsome of the well-known stories of \u201canimal humour,\u201d for example, that of\nCharles Dickens about the raven. This bird, it may be remembered, had\nto share the garden with a captive eagle. Having carefully measured the\nlength of this formidable creature\u2019s chain, he turned to good account\nthe occasion of the giant\u2019s sleep by stealing his dinner; and then,\nthe rightful owner having presumably woke up, made an impudent display\nof eating the same just safely outside the {158} eagle\u2019s \u201csphere of\ninfluence\u201d. This doubtless showed some cunning, and something of spite;\nbut it is not clear that it indicated an enjoyment of the fun of the\nthing.\n\nThat this teasing and playing of tricks by animals may now and\nagain approach the human attitude of malicious mirthfulness is not\nimprobable. A cat that \u201cplays\u201d with its captive mouse, half-pretending,\nas it seems, not to see the small thing\u2019s hopeless attempt to \u201cbolt,\u201d\nmay, perhaps, be enjoying something of the exultant chuckle of a human\nvictor. So, too, some of the mischievous behaviour of a lively and\nimperfectly domesticated monkey, which a simple-minded sailor has\nbrought to his mother by way of making her happy, may disclose a germ\nof the spirit of fun, of a malicious playfulness which is capable of\nenjoying its jokes as such.\n\nYet, while we may question the truth of the proposition that these\nmischievous actions are enjoyed as practical jokes\u2014in the way in which\nUncle Remus represents them\u2014we need not hesitate to attribute to\nanimals a simple form of the child\u2019s sense of fun. This trait appears\nmost plainly in the pastimes of the young of many familiar species,\nincluding our two domestic pets, pastimes which are quite correctly\ndescribed as animal play. The particular forms of this playful\nactivity, the tusslings, the attacks and retreats on both sides, the\nchasings and the rest, are pretty certainly determined by special\ninstincts.[89] But, as play, these actions are an expression of high\nspirits and of something analogous to a child\u2019s love of \u201cpretending\u201d.\nIs it not a bit of playful make-believe, for example, when a dog, on\nseeing the approach of a canine stranger, \u201clies low\u201d wearing the look\nof an alert foe; yet, as soon as the stranger approaches, \u201cgives {159}\naway the show\u201d by entering with an almost disgraceful celerity into\nperfectly friendly relations with him? It is the same when a dog teases\nanother dog by startling him, showing signs of enjoying the trick. H.\nM. Stanley writes: \u201cMy dog took the same delight in coming up quietly\nbehind a small dog and giving a terrifying bark as does the child in\njumping out from a corner and crying \u2018boo\u2019\u201d.[90]\n\nOwing, to no little extent, perhaps, to the fact of its education\nby man, the dog gives much the clearest indications of a sense of\nfun. No one can observe a dog during a walk with his child-comrades\nwithout noting how readily he falls in with their playful proposals.\nThe infectiousness of an announcement of the playful temper is clearly\nillustrated here. The dog imitates the gambols, and will even seem\nto respond to the vocal outbursts of his merry playmates. Darwin\nhas rightly recognised a germ of our \u201csense of humour\u201d in a dog\u2019s\njoining in the game of stick-throwing. You throw a bit of stick for\nhim to fetch, and having picked it up he proceeds to carry it away\nsome distance and to squat down with it on the ground just before\nhim. You then come quite close as if to take the stick from him, on\nwhich he seizes it and bears it off exultingly, repeating the little\nmake-believe with evident enjoyment.[91]\n\nI have tested a dog again and again when playing with him in this\nfashion, and have satisfied myself that he is in the play-mood, and\nknows perfectly well that you are too; so that if you pretend to be\nserious and to command him in your most magisterial voice to give up\nthe stick he sidles up with a hollow show of obedience which could\nimpose on nobody, as if to say, \u201cI know better: you are not really\nserious; so I am going on with the game\u201d. All {160} the notes of a\ntrue sense of fun seem to be present in this case: the gay and festive\nmood, a firm resolve _desipere in loco_, and a strong inclination to\nplay at \u201cpretending\u201d.\n\nProf. Lloyd Morgan gives an example of what certainly looks like a\ndog\u2019s merry make-believe in which man\u2019s lead takes no part. The writer\ntells us that he used at one time to take an intelligent retriever to\na sandy shore, where the dog engaged spontaneously in the following\npastime. He buried a number of small crabs in the sand, and then\nstood waiting till a leg or a claw appeared, \u201cupon which he would run\nbackwards and forwards giving short barks of keen enjoyment\u201d.[92]\n\nI find it hard to doubt that this was a genuine outburst of joyousness\nand of something indistinguishable from a love of fun, and that it was\nconnected with the \u201ccoming off\u201d of a practical joke. The repetitions\nof the burial when the dog had seen that it was ineffectual, points\nclearly to a consciousness of the make-believe character of the\nperformance.\n\nWhatever a dog\u2019s powers of jocosity when uninstructed by man, it seems\nsafe to set down a good share of his highly developed sense of fun\nto his profound susceptibility to man\u2019s educative influence; which\nagain (as the difference between the educability of the dog and of the\ncat at once shows) implies an unusual strength of those instincts of\nattachment to man which have made him almost the type of fidelity.\n\nHow far, one wonders, will this educative influence of man be likely\nto go in the case of the most companionable of our domestic pets? W.\nPreyer tells us, that the dog is capable of imitating the signs of\nhuman gaiety, that an {161} intelligent specimen, when confronted\nwith our laughter will draw back the corners of his mouth and leap\ninto the air with a bright lustre in the eye.[93] Here we seem to have\na rudiment of a genuine laugh, and may perhaps cease to speak rather\nconfusingly of a dog\u2019s \u201claughing with his tail\u201d. G. J. Romanes relates\nthat he had a dog who went some way towards qualifying himself for the\noffice of clown. This animal would perform a number of self-taught\ntricks which were clearly intended to excite laughter. \u201cFor instance,\nwhile lying on his side and violently grinning, he would hold one leg\nin his mouth.\u201d Under these circumstances \u201cnothing pleased him so much\nas having his joke duly appreciated, while, if no notice was taken of\nhim, he would become sulky\u201d.[94]\n\nThis animal must, one supposes, have been in an exceptional degree\na \u201cfunny dog\u201d. It seems a pity that the observer did not take a\n\u201csnapshot\u201d at that grin so that it might be a shade less abstract and\n\u201cin the air\u201d than the grin of the Cheshire cat, as treated by Mr. Lewis\nCarroll. What seems clear is, that the physiognomy of a dog manages to\nexecute a weirdly distorted semblance of our smile. With respect to the\nvocal part of the expression, we must not expect too much. The bark may\nnot be able to adjust itself to our quick explosions of gaiety. It is\ncommonly said that the dog has a special bark for expressing pleasure,\nand it seems likely that he employs this when he is said to be seized\nby the sense of the funniness of things.\n\nOn the moral side, the possibility of the dog\u2019s becoming a humorous\nbeast looks more promising. He certainly exhibits rudiments of feelings\nand mental attitudes which {162} seem in man to be closely related to\na reflective humour. As the inner circle of his human friends know, he\ncan be terribly bored. I saw, not long since, a small dog undergoing\nthe process of chaining by his mistress before she took him into a\nshop. He drew a long yawn, and his appearance was eminently suggestive\nof a keen sense of the absurdity of the shopping habits of ladies, a\nsense which only wanted the appropriate utterance to become a mild,\ntolerant kind of satire. Yet one must be mindful of one\u2019s own warning\nagainst a too hasty interpretation of such actions.\n\nWe may now turn to animals much nearer ourselves in the zoological\nscale. Among monkeys we obtain, undoubtedly, something more closely\nakin to our smile and laugh. Darwin has made a careful inquiry into the\nsimilarities between the two. He tells us that some of the essential\nfeatures of the facial expression during a laugh, the drawing backwards\nof the corners of the mouth, the formation of wrinkles under the eyes,\netc., are \u201ccharacteristic and expressive of a pleased state of mind in\nvarious kinds of monkeys\u201d.[95]\n\nWith respect to laughter-like sounds, Darwin gives us several pertinent\nfacts. A young chimpanzee will make a kind of barking noise when he\nis pleased by the return of any one to whom he is attached, a noise\nwhich the keeper interprets as a laugh. The correctness of this\ninterpretation is confirmed by the fact that other monkeys utter a kind\nof \u201ctittering sound\u201d when they see a beloved person. A young chimpanzee\nwhen tickled under the armpits produces a more decided chuckling\nor laughing sound. \u201cYoung ourangs, also, when tickled will make a\nchuckling sound and put on a grin.\u201d\n\nIt has been found by Dr. L. Robinson that the young of {163} the\nanthropoid apes are specially ticklish in the regions of the surface\nof the body which correspond with the ticklish regions in the case of\nthe child. Not only so, a young chimpanzee will show great pleasure\nwhen tickled, rolling over on his back and abandoning himself to the\npastime, much as a child does. When the tickling is prolonged he\nresembles a child further by defending ticklish spots. So, too, does a\nyoung ourang. It may be added that young apes, like many children, make\na pretence of biting when tickled.\n\nTo sum up: the young of the higher apes have something resembling our\nsmile and laugh, and produce the requisite movements when pleased.\nTheir attempt at laughter, as we might be disposed to regard it,\nappears as a sign of sudden joy in circumstances in which a child will\nlaugh, _e.g._, on the reappearance of a beloved companion after a\nconsiderable interval. It further occurs when the animal is tickled,\nalong with other manifestations which point to the existence of a\nrudiment of the child\u2019s capacity for fun and for the make-believe of\nplay.\n\nOne more fact should be added in order to bring out the similarity\nhere to the human attitude towards the laughable. It is probable, from\nthe testimony of several observers, that monkeys dislike being laughed\nat.[96] Now, it is true that the enjoyment of fun and the dislike to\nbeing made its object are not the same thing. Nor do they seem to vary\ntogether in the case of men; otherwise the agelast would not be so\noften found among those who keenly resent being the object of others\u2019\nlaughter. Nevertheless, they may be regarded in general as correlative\ntraits; creatures which show a distinct distaste for being made the\nobjects of laughter may be supposed to be capable of {164} the\nlaughing attitude, so far at least as to be able to understand it.\n\nTurning now from sub-human kinds of laughter to the full expression\nas we know it in ourselves, we may briefly trace the history of the\nsmile and laugh during the first years of life. Here the question\nof the date of the first appearance of these expressive movements\nbecomes important; and happily we have more than one set of careful\nobservations on the point.\n\nWith respect to the smile, which is commonly supposed to be the first\nto show itself, we have notes made by Darwin and by Preyer. According\nto the former, the first smile appeared, in the case of two of his\nchildren, at the age of forty-five days, and, of a third, at a somewhat\nearlier date.[97] Not only were the corners of the mouth drawn back,\nbut the eyes brightened and the eyelids slightly closed. Darwin adds\nthat the circumstances pointed to a happy state of mind. Preyer is\nmuch fuller here.[98] He points out the difficulties of noting the\nfirst true smile of pleasure. In the case of his own boy, it seems, the\nmovements of the corners of the mouth, accompanied by the formation of\ndimples in the cheek, occurred in the second week, both in the waking\nand in the sleeping state. The father thinks, however, that the first\nsmile of pleasure occurred on the twenty-sixth day, when after a good\nmeal the child\u2019s eyes lighted on the mother\u2019s face. This early smile,\nhe adds, was not an imitation of another\u2019s; nor did it imply a joyous\nrecognition of the mother. It was just the instinctive expression of a\nfeeling of bodily satisfaction. {165}\n\nOther observers differ, too, in respect of the date of the first\noccurrence of the true expressive smile. For example, Dr. Champneys\nputs it in the sixth, Sigismund in the seventh week, agreeing roughly\nwith Darwin; whereas Miss Shinn gives as the date the latter half\nof the first month, and so supports Preyer\u2019s observations. Another\nlady, Mrs. K. C. Moore, would go farther than Preyer and say that the\nfirst smile occurs on the sixth day of life.[99] It may be added that\nMiss Shinn is more precise than Preyer in her account of the early\ndevelopment of the smile. She tells us that, whereas the first smile\nof her niece\u2014whom we will henceforth call by her name, Ruth\u2014(latter\nhalf of first month) was merely the outcome of general comfort, a smile\noccurred in the second month which involved an agreeable perception,\nnamely, that of faces bending over the child in which she took great\ninterest. This smile of special pleasure, expressing much gaiety,\noccurred when she was lying fed, warm, and altogether comfortable.\n\nIt is fairly certain that these differences indicate some inequalities\nof precocity in the children observed. At the same time, it seems\nprobable that the several observers are dealing with different stages\nin the development of the smile. Preyer shows clearly that it undergoes\nconsiderable expansion, involving increased complexity of movement, and\nthe addition of the important feature, the brightening of the eye. Mrs.\nMoore gives no description of what she saw on the sixth and seventh\ndays, and is presumably referring to a vague resemblance to a rudiment\nof a smile which had no {166} expressive significance; and some things\nin Preyer\u2019s account lead us to infer that he is speaking of a less\nhighly developed smile than Darwin.[100]\n\nAll that can certainly be said, then, is that the movements of a smile,\nas an expression of pleasure, undergo a gradual process of development,\nand that an approach to a perfect smile of pleasure occurs some time in\nthe second month of life.\n\nIf we turn to the dates assigned to the first occurrence of a laugh, we\nfind the uncertainties are at least equal to those encountered in the\ncase of the smile. Darwin illustrates how a smile may gradually take on\nan accompaniment of sound which grows more and more laughter-like. One\nof his children, who, he thinks, first smiled at the age of forty-five\ndays, developed about eight days later a more distinct and impressive\nsmile, accompanied by a little \u201cbleating\u201d noise, which, he adds,\n\u201cperhaps represented a laugh\u201d. It was not, however, till much later\n(113th day) that the noises became broken up into the discrete sounds\nof a laugh. Another child of his, when sixty-five days old, accompanied\nhis smile by \u201cnoises very like laughter\u201d. A laughter, with all the\nindications of genuine fun behind it, occurred in the case of one of\nhis children on the 110th day, when the game was tried of throwing a\npinafore over the child\u2019s face and then suddenly withdrawing it, this\nbeing varied by the father\u2019s suddenly uncovering his own face and\napproaching the child\u2019s. He adds that, some three or four weeks before\nthis, his boy appeared to enjoy as a good joke a little pinch on his\nnose and cheeks.\n\nPreyer puts the date of the first laughter-like sounds, as {167} he\nputs that of the first smile, earlier than Darwin. He says he observed\na visible and audible laugh in his boy on the twenty-third day. This\nwas a chuckling at the view of a rose-tinted curtain. The sounds\nwere repeated in the following weeks at the sight of slowly swinging\ncoloured objects and at new sounds, _e.g._, those of the piano. At the\nsame time he tells us that a prolonged loud laughter, recognisable as\nsuch by a person not looking at what was going on, first occurred in\nthe eighth month when the boy was playing with his mother. Among the\nother observers it may suffice to refer to one of the most careful,\nMiss Shinn. This lady, who, it will be remembered, puts the date of\nRuth\u2019s first smile as early as the first month, assigns the child\u2019s\nfirst genuine laughter to the 118th day. It was excited by the sight of\nthe mother making faces. It is worth adding that Ruth reached her third\nperformance eleven days later.[101]\n\nIn this case, too, it is probable that we have to do, not merely\nwith differences of precocity in the children observed, but with the\ndifficulties of determining what is a clear example of the expression\nconcerned.[102] There is no doubt that the full reiteration of our\nlaughter is reached by stages. This is brought out fully by Darwin,\nand is allowed by Preyer. Yet how much of the series of more or less\nlaughter-like sounds produced by an infant during states of pleasure is\nto be regarded as entering into the development of laughter, it is not\neasy to say. Miss Shinn heard Ruth give out curious little chuckling\nsounds of two syllables on the 105th day, that is thirteen days before\nshe produced her {168} laugh. She adds under the date, 113th day, that\nis to say, five days before the laugh, that the child had developed new\nthroat sounds, crowing, croaking, etc., and showed a strong disposition\nto vary sounds in a pleasurable mood. It seems highly improbable that\nthese sounds were not preparatory stages in the development of the\nlaugh.[103]\n\nIt is fairly certain that laughing comes after smiling. Preyer\u2019s words\nmay no doubt seem to suggest that the first laugh (twenty-third day)\ncomes before the first smile (twenty-sixth day); but his account of\nthe development of the two shows plainly that this is not his meaning.\nHe distinctly says that laughter is only a strengthened and audible\n(laut) smile; and remarks, further, that \u201cin all (children) alike the\nutterance of pleasure begins with a scarcely noticeable smile, which\nquite gradually passes into laughter in the course of the first three\nmonths\u201d. He adds that this development depends on that of the higher\nbrain centres, and the capability of having perceptions.[104]\n\nThe first laughter is, like the smile, an expression of pleasure. As\nPreyer puts it, the laughter is a mere heightening of the look of\npleasure. It marks, however, a higher level of agreeable consciousness.\nWhereas the first clumsy experiments in smiling denote nothing but a\ncomfortable state of repletion, the first attempts at laughter are\nresponses to gladdening sense-presentations, such as swinging coloured\nobjects, and the new sounds of a piano. This laughter at new visual\nand aural presentations was followed, according to Preyer, between the\nsixth and the {169} ninth week by a laughter more distinctly joyous\nor jubilant, as the child regarded his mother\u2019s face and appeared\nto recognise it. This laughter of mental gaiety seems at an early\nage\u2014about the fourth month\u2014to ally itself with movements of the limbs\n(raising and lowering of the arms, etc.) as a complex sign of high\nspirits or gladness.[105]\n\nHow far the provocative of laughter mentioned by Darwin, namely,\nsuddenly uncovering the child\u2019s head (or his own) implied a rudiment\nof fun, I am not sure. It shows, however, the early connection between\nlaughter and agreeable surprise, that is to say, a mild shock, which,\nthough it borders on the alarming, is on the whole gladdening.\n\nOne other early form of laughter, which is found also in certain young\nanimals, is that excited by tickling. This has been first observed, in\nthe case of the child, in the second or the third month. Preyer\u2019s boy\nlaughed in response to tickling in the second month.[106] Dr. Leonard\nHill tells me that his little girl, who was by-the-bye specially\nsensitive to titillation, responded first by laughter in the tenth week.\n\nSince our analysis has led us to regard the effect of tickling as\nlargely mental, and as involving a playful attitude, this fact confirms\nthe conclusion that the specialised laughter which is the accompaniment\nof play occurs in a well-defined form within the first three months.\n\nTo sum up: We find, within the first two or three months, both the\nsmile and the laugh as expressions of pleasure, including sensations of\nbodily comfort and gladdening sense-presentations. We find, further,\nin the reflex reaction of laughter under tickling, which is observable\nabout the {170} end of the second month, the germ of a sense of fun,\nor of mirthful play; and this is indicated too in the laughter excited\nby little pinches on the cheek at the end of the third month.\n\nIt is certain that these tendencies are not learned by imitation. This\nis proved by the fact, established by Preyer, that imitative movements\ndo not occur in the normal child till considerably later, and by the\nfact that the child, Laura Bridgman, who was shut out by her blindness\nand deafness from the lead of companions, developed these expressions.\nWe must conclude, then, that they are inherited tendencies.\n\nHere the psychologist might well stop in his inquiries, if Darwin and\nothers had not opened up the larger vista of the evolution of the\nspecies. Can we, by carrying the eye along this vista, conjecture how\nthese instinctive movements came to be acquired in the course of animal\nevolution?\n\nThe first question that arises in this inquiry is whether the smile\nor the laugh was the earlier to appear in the course of racial\ndevelopment. The expressions of animals below man do not offer any\ndecisive clue here. The anthropoid apes appear both to produce a kind\nof smile or grin, and to utter sounds analogous to our laughter. It\nmay, however, be contended that this so-called laughter is much less\nlike our laughter than the grin is like our smile. In the absence of\nbetter evidence, the fact that the smile appears first in the life of\nthe child must, according to a well-known law of evolution, be taken as\nfavouring the hypothesis that man\u2019s remote ancestors learned to smile\nbefore they could rise to the achievement of the laugh. This is further\nsupported by the fact that, in the case of the individual, the laugh\nwhen it occurs announces a higher form of pleasurable consciousness,\nthe level of perception {171} as distinguished from the level of\nsensation which is expressed by the first smile. Lastly, I am informed\nthat among imbeciles the smile persists lower down in the scale of\ndegeneration than the laugh. Dr. F. E. Beddard writes to me: \u201cI\nremember once seeing a defective human monster (with no frontal lobes)\nwhose only sign of intelligence was drawing up the lips when music was\nplayed\u201d.[107]\n\nIt is commonly held that, since the expression of pain, suffering, or\napprehension of danger among animals is a much more pressing necessity\nfor purposes of family and tribal preservation than that of pleasure\nor contentment, the former is developed considerably earlier than the\nlatter. According to this view, we can understand why the adumbrations\nof a smile and a laugh which we find in animals closely related to man\nhave been so imperfectly developed and appear only sporadically.\n\nSupposing that the smile was the first of the two expressive movements\nto appear in the evolution of the human species, can we conjecture how\nit came to be the common and best-defined expression of pleasurable\nstates? In dealing with this point we may derive more definite aid from\nDarwin\u2019s principles.\n\nThe fact that the basis of a smile is a movement of the mouth at\nonce suggests a connection with the primal source of human as of\nanimal enjoyment; and there seems, moreover, to be some evidence of\nthe existence of such a connection. A baby after a good meal will,\nI believe, go on performing something resembling sucking movements.\nThe first smiles may have arisen as a special modification of these\nmovements when there was a particularly lively feeling of organic\ncontentment or well-being. I believe, further, {172} that an infant\nis apt to carry out movements of the mouth when food is shown to it. A\nsimilar tendency seems to be illustrated by the behaviour of a monkey\nwhich, when a choice delicacy was given it at meal-time, slightly\nraised the corners of the mouth, the movement partaking of the nature\nof \u201can incipient smile\u201d.[108] Again, our hypothesis finds some support\nin the fact that, according to Preyer and others, the first smiles of\ninfants were noticed during a happy condition of repletion after a good\nmeal.[109]\n\nSupposing the smile in its origin to have thus been organically\nconnected with the pleasurable experience of sated appetite, we can\neasily see how it might get generalised into a common sign of pleasure.\nDarwin and Wundt have made us familiar with the principle that\nexpressive movements may be transferred to states of feeling resembling\nthose of which they were primarily the manifestations. The scratching\nof the head during a state of mental irritation is a well-known\ninstance of the transference.\n\nThere are, I believe, facts which go some way towards verifying the\nsupposition of a transference of eating-signs to states of lively\nsatisfaction and pleasure generally. Savages are wont to express keen\npleasure by gestures, _e.g._, rubbing the belly, which seem to point\nto the voluminous satisfactions of the primal appetite. The clearest\nevidence, however, seems to be furnished by the account of a baboon\ngiven us by Darwin. This creature, after having been made furiously\nangry by his keeper, on making friends again, \u201crapidly moved up and\ndown his jaws and lips and looked pleased\u201d. {173} Darwin adds that a\nsimilar movement or quiver of the jaws may be observed in a man when he\nlaughs heartily, though with us the muscles of the chest rather than\nthose of the lips and jaws are \u201cspasmodically affected\u201d.[110]\n\nJudging from the interval between the occurrence of the first smile and\nof the first laugh in the life of the individual, we may conjecture\nthat laughter did not grow into a full reiterated sound in \u201cprimitive\nman,\u201d or his unknown immediate predecessor, till much later. We should\nexpect that a considerable development of vocal power would be a\ncondition of man\u2019s taking heartily to this mode of emotional utterance.\nThe study of the infant certainly supports this idea. The babble of\nthe second and third months, which is made up of a reiteration of many\nvocal and consonantal sounds, may prepare for laughter, as it certainly\ndoes for speech. The observations of Miss Shinn, quoted above, on the\nexpansion of the range of vocal sound before the occurrence of the\nfirst laugh are most significant here. They seem to point to the fact\nthat in the evolution of the species the first laughter was selected\nfrom among a great variety of sounds produced in pleasurable states.\n\nLet us now suppose that our immediate animal ancestor has reached the\nlevel of clear perceptions, and is given to the utterance of certain\nreiterated sounds during states of pleasure. Let us further conceive\nof him as having his sympathies developed up to the point of requiring\na medium for expressing not only pains but pleasures, and more\nparticularly for calling others\u2019 attention to the presence of cheering\nand welcome objects, _e.g._, of a member of the family who has been\nabroad for a time. Such an animal would need to improve on his primal\nsmiles and grins. He would require vocal utterances of some strength in\norder {174} to reach distant ears, something answering to the cackle\nof the hen when she has discovered some choice morsel and desires to\nbring her brood to her side. How is this improvement to be effected?\n\nOne may hazard the guess that the process may have been something\nof this kind. The position of the open mouth during a broad smile\nwas, we may reason, in itself favourable to the production of vocal\nsounds. We may, after the analogy of positions of the eyes, speak of\nit as the \u201cprimary position\u201d of the vocal chamber when opened. This\nprimary position would pretty certainly be specially favourable to\nthe utterance of a certain kind of sound, let us say that commonly\nindicated by \u201ceh,\u201d[111] together with something of the guttural or\nchuckling accompaniment of this in the sound of laughter. We may\nthen infer that, when some of the reiterated babble-like sounds were\nproduced during states of pleasurable satisfaction, the same (primary)\nposition would be taken up. We should thus get, as psycho-physical\nconcomitants of the sensed position of the opened mouth during a\nbroad smile or \u201cgrin,\u201d not only a disposition to reiterate the\n\u201ceh\u201d or some similar sound as a completion of the whole action, of\nwhich the opening of the mouth is the first stage, but a definite\nassociative co-ordination between the movement of opening the mouth\nand the reiterated actions of the muscles of the respiratory and vocal\napparatus. In this way we may understand how, when the pleasurable\nstate expressed by a smile increased in intensity, as, for example,\nwhen the happy feeling excited by the sight of a face passed into the\njoy of recognising a member of the family, the {175} movements would\nwiden out into those of a laughter-like utterance.\n\nIt appears to me that, in this connection, the observed course\nof development of laughter in the individual is not without its\nsuggestiveness. Miss Shinn remarks that Ruth\u2019s mouth was opened wide\non the 113th day\u2014five days before the first laugh\u2014while the child was\ntossed and tumbled. Under date of the 134th day, again, we read of\nmuch laughter of an inaudible kind, consisting of broad laughter-like\nsmiles; and these observations certainly show that about the date of\nthe first laughter an expanded smile, indistinguishable from a laugh\nsave by the absence of the respiratory and vocal adjunct, was frequent.\nIn other words, they tell us that about the time when she achieved her\nfirst laugh she was freely practising the intermediate facial step\nbetween the earlier smile and the true laugh.\n\nThis theory would plainly illustrate Mr. Herbert Spencer\u2019s principle,\nthat states of feeling affect the voluntary muscles in the order of\nincreasing calibre, the smaller being called into play by feelings\nof lower intensity, the larger by those of higher intensity. But\nthis theory is not enough. We must take into account also the order\nof frequency of use, and of consequent liability to discharge in the\nconnected nerve-centres. It seems probable that the muscles engaged\nin the movements of the mouth and those exercised in phonation would,\nfor these reasons, be specially liable to be acted upon. These wider\ntendencies would, according to the above hypothesis, be assisted\nby special associations. These would secure the combination of the\ntwo groups of movements, which I have assumed to have been employed\nindependently as utterances of pleasurable feeling: namely, those\ninvolved in smiling, and those underlying the first happy reiterated\nsounds of a quasi-infantile babbling. {176}\n\nOne element in the laugh, its explosive vigour, seems unaccounted for\non this hypothesis. Here, I think, the effect of relief from strain,\nwhich is so common a factor in human laughter, may be called in. The\nearliest laughter of the child seems to illustrate this element. For\nexample, that which occurs during tickling, in a game of bo-peep, and\nat the sight of the mother making faces may be said to arise from a\nserious attitude suddenly dissolved. Perhaps the first great laugh was\nproduced by man or by his proximate progenitor, when relief came after\nfear or the strain of battle. So far as primitive laughter was the\noutcome of such concentrated energy seeking relief, this circumstance\nwould help to account for the prolongation as well as for the strength\nof the sounds.\n\nOur conjecture cannot lay claim to be a hypothesis. It makes no attempt\nto explain the precise forms of the changes which enter both into the\nsmile and into the laugh. At best, it is only a rough hint as to a\npossible mode of genesis.\n\nI have here treated of the genesis of laughter under its more general\naspect as an expression of pleasurable states of feeling. We have seen,\nhowever, that within the first three months of life another and clearly\nspecialised variety of laughter emerges, namely, that called forth\nby tickling. It follows from our analysis of the effect of tickling\nthat it is one of the earliest manifestations, in a clear form, of the\nlaughter of fun or of play. As such, it demands special attention in\nany attempt to explain the development of laughter.\n\nAs a specialised reaction having a clearly marked reflex form, it\nis natural to ask whether laughter in response to tickling is not\ninherited, and, if so, how it arose in the evolution of the race. And\nwe find that suggestions have {177} been made for explaining the\ngenesis of this curious phenomenon. We will first glance again at the\nfacts, and then examine the hypotheses put forward for explaining them.\n\nHere, again, the question how far animals are susceptible of the effect\nbecomes important. I have already alluded to Darwin\u2019s remark, that if\na young chimpanzee is tickled, more particularly under the armpits, he\nresponds by a kind of laughter. The sound is of a chuckling or laughing\nkind. The emission of these sounds is accompanied by retraction of the\ncorners of the mouth, and sometimes by a slight amount of wrinkling in\nthe lower eyelids.[112] Dr. Louis Robinson publishes other observations\nof the effect of tickling on the young of anthropoid apes. He tells us\nthat a young chimpanzee when tickled for some time under the armpits\nwould roll over on his back showing all his teeth and accompanying\nthe simian grin by defensive movements, just as a child does. A\nyoung ourang at the Zoological Gardens (London) behaved in a very\nsimilar way. The young of other animals, too, betray some degree of\nticklishness. Stanley Hall remarks that a dog will retract the corners\nof his mouth and thus go some way towards smiling if tickled over the\nribs.[113] Dr. Robinson finds that horses and pigs are also ticklish;\nand he thinks that these animals have specially ticklish regions,\nwhich correspond to a considerable extent to those which have been\nascertained in the case of the child.\n\nWe may now refer to the first appearances of the tickling reflex in\nthe child. As pointed out above, the response by defensive movements\nappears shortly after birth, whereas {178} the earliest instance of a\nresponse by laughter occurs in the second, or in the first half of the\nthird month. It is to be noted that this date is distinctly later than\nthat of the first laughter of pleasure, though it is not far removed\nfrom that of the first clear appearance of the laughter of gaiety or\njubilation.\n\nThese chronological facts bear out the theory that the laughter of a\ntickled child has a distinct _psychical_ antecedent. On this point Dr.\nL. Robinson writes to me as follows: \u201cI have never been able to succeed\nin eliciting laughter from young infants under three months old by\nmeans of tickling, _unless one also smiled and caught their attention\nin some such way_\u201d. This evidently points to the influence of mental\nagencies even in the first stages of laughter from tickling.\n\nWith respect to the parts in which the tickling first excites laughter,\ndifferent observers appear to have reached dissimilar results. Preyer\ndistinctly speaks of the tickling of the sole of the foot as provoking\nlaughter in the second month. Whether he tried other parts he does not\nsay. Dr. Leonard Hill tells me that one of his children first responded\nto tickling when the titillation attacked the palm of the hand, or ran\nup the arm. Responses to the tickling of the neck and soles of the feet\ncame later.\n\nThe fact that the effect of tickling becomes so well defined by, or\nsoon after, the end of the second month, proves pretty conclusively\nthat it is an inherited reflex; and the evolutionist naturally asks\nwhat it means, what its significance has been in the life of our\nancestors.\n\nDr. Stanley Hall carries back evolutional speculation very far, and\nsuggests that in tickling we may have the oldest stratum of our psychic\nlife, that it is a survival of a process in remote animal progenitors\nfor which touch was the only {179} sense. He supposes that in these\ncircumstances even light or \u201cminimal\u201d touches, say those coming from\nthe movements of small parasites, being unannounced by sight or other\nfar-reaching sense, would be accompanied by disproportionately strong\nreactions. He does not attempt to explain how laughter grew out of\nthese reactions. He does indeed call them reactions \u201cof escape,\u201d but\nhe does not follow up the idea by hinting that the violent shakings of\nthe body by laughter, when it came, helped to get rid of the little\npesterers. In truth, this ingenious thinker hardly appears to make the\nexplanation of the laughter of tickling, as distinguished from the\nother reactions, the subject of a special inquiry.[114]\n\nA more serious attempt to explain the evolution of the laughter of\ntickling has been made by Dr. Louis Robinson. He, too, hints at the\nvestigial survival of experiences of parasites, but appears to think\nthat these account only for the disagreeable effects which are brought\nabout when the hairy orifices of the nostril and the ear are tickled.\nThis limitation strikes one as a little arbitrary. The reaction of\nlaughter, which Dr. L. Hill called forth when he made his fingers run\nup the arm of his infant, is surely suggestive of a vestigial reflex\nhanded down from ages of parasitic pestering.[115]\n\nWith regard to the laughing reaction, which, as we have seen, he\nconsiders to involve a distinct mode of stimulation, he suggests\nthat it is an inherited form of that common mode of play among young\nanimals, which consists in an exchange of good-natured and make-believe\nattacks and defences, or a sort of game of sham-fight. {180}\n\nIn support of this theory he lays stress on the fact that\nsusceptibility to tickling is shared in by the young of a number of\nspecies of animals standing high in point of intelligence, including\nnot only the higher apes, but the dog and the horse. He adds that, in\ngeneral, there is a concomitance between the degree of playfulness of\na young creature and that of its ticklishness, though lambs and kids\nwhich are not ticklish are allowed to be an awkward exception.\n\nIf tickling is a playing at fighting we may expect it, like other kinds\nof play, to mimic serious forms of assault. Now we know that the first\nrude attacks of man, so far as we can gather from the movements of a\npassionate infant, took the forms of striking, tearing with the nails\nand biting. Tickling may be said to be a sort of mild pretence at\nclawing. Dr. Robinson tells us that about 10 per cent. of the children\nhe has examined pretended to bite when they were tickled, just as a\npuppy will do.\n\nDr. Robinson goes a step farther and seeks to show that the areas of\nthe bodily surface which are specially ticklish in children are those\nlikely to be attacked in serious warfare. In nearly all of them, he\nsays, some important structure, such as a large artery, is close to the\nsurface and would be liable to injury if the skin were penetrated. They\nwould thus be highly vulnerable regions, and consequently those which\nwould be singled out for attacks by teeth or claws. He argues that the\nsame relation holds in the case of animals which attack one another in\nthe same way as man. The regions of special ticklishness in their case,\ntoo, appear to correspond, roughly at least, with vulnerable regions.\nIndeed, in the young chimpanzee and the young ourang these ticklish\nareas are approximately the same as in the child. {181}\n\nFrom all this he concludes that ticklishness, being bound up with the\nmimic warfare which fills so large a space in the life of many young\nanimals, has its utility. The strong liking to be tickled, which\nchildren and, apparently, some other young animals express, serves, in\ncombination with the playful impulse to carry out this gentle mode of\nattack, to develop mimic attacks and defences which are of high value\nas training for the later and serious warfare.\n\nThese applications of the evolution theory are certainly interesting\nand promising. I think the idea of relief from parasites might be\nworked out further. May it not be that the light touches given by the\nfingers of the parent, or other member of the ancestral family when\nhunting for parasites on the surface of the young animal, have, by\nassociation with the effects of relief from the troublesome visitors,\ndeveloped an agreeable feeling-tone? As we have seen, the laughter\nof tickling has a distinctly mental antecedent; it appears in the\nchild, only when he is beginning to enjoy laughingly little pinches\non the cheek, and otherwise to show a germ of a sense of fun. The\nlight touches, reminiscent at once of unpleasant settlers, and of\ndelivering fingers, would, one imagines, be exactly fitted to supply\nthat dissolution into nothing of momentary apprehension indicated by\nour analysis of the mental factor in tickling.\n\nWith respect to Dr. Robinson\u2019s hypothesis, it may be acknowledged\nungrudgingly to be a brilliant piece of hypothetical construction. But,\nas the writer frankly confesses, the facts, here and there, do not\npoint in its direction. A very serious objection is the fact that the\nsole of the foot and the palm of the hand are not taken into account in\nhis attempt to establish a correspondence between the ticklish areas\nof {182} the surface and a high degree of vulnerability. In Stanley\nHall\u2019s returns it is the sole of the foot which is most frequently\nmentioned as a ticklish area; and, as we have seen, it was the first to\ngive rise to laughter in the case of one child at least.[116]\n\nThere is another and more serious objection to Dr. Robinson\u2019s theory\nas an explanation of laughter. One may urge that the occurrence of\nsuch violent movements would, by shaking the body and by inducing\nfatigue much earlier than need be, pretty certainly be detrimental to\nthat prolonged practice of skill in attack and defence, to which Dr.\nRobinson attaches so much importance.\n\nThe supposition that tickling is a variety of play developed by natural\nselection among combative animals is, I think, highly probable. The\nplay of animals, like that of children, is largely a form of social\nactivity involving a playmate; and is apt, as we know, to take the form\nof attack and defence, as in chasing, throwing over, pretending to\nbite, etc. These playful attacks are, as we have seen, closely related\nto teasing; indeed, teasing may be viewed as merely a play-imitation\nof the first stage of combat, that of challenging or exciting to\ncontest.[117] Tickling pretty obviously finds a fitting place among\nthe simpler forms of playful combat which have a teasing-like\ncharacter. Moreover, these forms of social play all seem to show, in\na particularly clear manner, the utility referred to in the preceding\nchapter. {183}\n\nNow, this idea will, I think, help us to understand how loud and\nprolonged laughter came to join itself to the combative game of\ntickling and being tickled. If play\u2014pure, good-natured play\u2014was to\nbe developed out of teasing attacks, it would become a matter of the\nhighest importance that it should be clearly understood to be such.\nThis would mean, first of all, that the assailant made it clear\nthat his aim was not serious attack, but its playful semblance; and\nsecondly, that the attacked party expressed his readiness to accept the\nassault in good part as sport. It would be of the greatest consequence\nto the animal that chanced to be in the play-mood and wished to make\novertures of friendly combat that he should be sure of an equally\ngamesome attitude in the recipient of the challenge. One may see this\nby watching what happens when a dog, unwisely trying to force a frolic\non another dog, is met by a growl and possibly by an uncovering of\nthe canine teeth. Now, what better sign of good-temper, of readiness\nto accept the attack as pure fun, could nature have invented than\nthe laugh? The smile is, no doubt, a pretty good indicator in some\ncircumstances. Yet one must remember that the rudimentary smile of an\nape-like ancestor may, now and again, have been misleading, as our own\nsmiles are apt to be. A laugh would presumably be less easy to affect\nin such circumstances than a smile; and, in any case, it would be far\nless liable to be overlooked.\n\nIn saying that the laughter which accompanies tickling and other\nclosely allied forms of play in children owes its value to its being an\nadmirable way of announcing the friendly playful mood, I do not mean\nthat other signs are absent. Dr. L. Robinson reminds us that a tickled\nchild will roll over on his back just like a puppy. The laughter and\nthe rolling over seem to be two congenitally connected {184} modes\nof abandonment to the playful attack. In the young of other ticklish\nanimals, _e.g._, the puppy, the rolling over may of itself suffice to\ngive the friendly signal.\n\nIt seems not unlikely that this consideration, the utility of laughter\nas a guarantee to a playful challenger that his overtures will be\nreceived in the proper spirit, applies to the evolution of all\nlaughter which enters into such forms of social play as the pretence\nto attack, to frighten, and generally what we call good-natured\nteasing. It has been suggested that teasing might well be taken as the\nstarting-point in the evolution of play.[118] By adopting this idea,\nand by regarding laughter, in its elementary form, as essentially a\nfeature of social play, we might set out with this consideration of\nutility in constructing our theory of the evolution of laughter. One is\ntempted, too, to follow this course by the fact, recognised in common\nlanguage, that much, at least, of the later and more refined laughter\nis analogous to the effect of tickling.[119]\n\nNevertheless, as we have seen, the best evidence attainable points to\nthe conclusion that this simple form of the laughter of social play\nwas preceded by, and grew out of, a less specialised kind of laughter,\nthat of sudden accession of pleasure. We may conjecture that the\nlaughter provoked by tickling was reached in the evolution of our race\nsoon after this reaction passed out of its primal and undifferentiated\nform as a general sign of pleasurable excitement, and began to be\nspecialised as the expression of mental gaiety and of something like\nour hilarity. The fact, noted above, {185} that children only laugh\nin response to tickling when they are in a pleasurable state of mind\nseems to confirm the hypothesis that the love of fun, which is at the\nbottom of tickling and makes it perhaps the earliest clear instance of\nmirthful play with its element of make-believe, first emerged gradually\nout of a more general feeling of gladness.\n\n{186}\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\n\nDEVELOPMENT OF LAUGHTER DURING THE FIRST THREE YEARS OF LIFE.\n\n\nHaving examined the earliest and distinctly hereditary germs of the\nlaughing impulse in the child, we may pass to the consideration of its\nexpansion and specialisation during the first years. Although, so far\nas I am aware, the new child-study has not yet produced a methodical\nrecord of the changes which this interesting expression of feeling\nundergoes, we may by help of such data as are accessible be able to\ntrace out some of the main directions of its development.\n\nTwo closely connected problems are involved here: (_a_) how the\nexpressive movements, the laugh and the smile, themselves change\nand get differentiated; and (_b_) how the psychical process which\nprecedes and excites these expressive movements grows in complexity\nand differences itself into the various forms of gaiety or amusement\nenumerated above.\n\nIn dealing with these early manifestations we shall, of course, look\nfor reactions which are spontaneous, in the sense of not being due to\nimitation and the lead of others. Yet it will not always be easy to\ndetermine what are such. It has been pointed out above that laughter\nis one of the most contagious of the expressive movements. Children,\ntherefore, who are much given to imitation may be {187} expected to\nshow this contagiousness in a particularly clear manner.\n\nThe difficulties are, however, not really so formidable as they might\nat first seem to be. If a child is, on the one hand, highly susceptible\nto the contagion of laughter, there is, on the other, no expression\nof his feeling in which he is more spontaneous. The swift directness\nof the \u201cnatural\u201d or spontaneous laugh may be readily discriminated by\na fine observer. Not only so, but a difference may be detected in the\ntone of the laughter when it is perfectly natural and real, and when\nit is merely imitative and artificial. The note of affected laughter\nis well known to careful observers of children. It is particularly\nplain where a child is not merely reproducing the laughter of others\nat the moment, but has it suggested to him by others that a thing is\nlaughable. Miss Shinn\u2019s niece developed at the end of the second year a\nforced laugh on hearing the word \u201cfunny\u201d employed by others.\n\nThe best safeguard against this error is to choose an only child who is\nwell isolated from mirthful surroundings. This need not be so cruel an\nexperiment as it looks. In the social world of the merry little Ruth,\nnobody, we are told, was a \u201claughing person\u201d. This circumstance gives\ngreat value to the observations made on this child. Her laughter was\nprobably as purely self-initiated as anything in child-life can be.\n\nIt may be added that, even if we could not eliminate the imitative and\nthe artificial element, there would still be a pretty wide field for\ncareful observation in the child\u2019s own freer type of mirth. For, as\nall his friends know, his hearty laughter is frequently a response to\nthings which leave us dull \u201cgrown-ups\u201d wholly unaffected, or affected\nin quite another way. {188}\n\nWith regard to the development of the expressive movements themselves\nI can find but few data at hand. These are enough, however, to show\nthat the process of differentiation commences during the first year.\nMrs. Moore tells us that her boy in the thirty-third week acquired a\nnew form of smile \u201cwhich gradually but not entirely supplanted the\n(earlier) broad open-mouthed smile. .\u00a0.\u00a0. The nose was wrinkled up, the\neyes nearly closed. .\u00a0.\u00a0. This smile seemed to express an extreme and\nmore conscious enjoyment.\u201d[120] Preyer remarks that his boy developed\nin the last three months of the first year \u201ca more conscious movement\nof laughter,\u201d which, presumably, had a different character as an\nexpressive movement. In the case of the boy C., of whom I have written\nelsewhere, a new and clearly differenced note was detected in the laugh\nof defiance (to be referred to later) which appeared early in the\nsecond year. Mrs. Hogan says she noticed a \u201cmischievous laugh\u201d at the\nage of fifty-five weeks, whereas Preyer remarks that the first \u201croguish\nlaugh\u201d occurred in his boy\u2019s case at the end of the second year. A more\nprecise record of the phonetic changes in laughter during the first two\nor three years is greatly to be desired.\n\nThe movements of laughter are subject to the laws of movement in\ngeneral, Repetition and Habit. They tend to perfect themselves by\npractice; and the result probably involves a strengthening and an\nexpansion of the wide-ranging organic commotion which makes up the\nreaction. A child of four will laugh on being tickled much more\nvigorously than one of two.[121] Moreover, the effect of repeated\nexercises of the function would seem, as already {189} hinted, to\ninvolve the setting up in the motor-centres, from which the discharge\nin laughter issues, a condition of high instability, so that a very\nslight application of the stimulus, or (as in the case of tickling) the\nmere threat to apply this, suffices to evoke the reaction. Lastly, this\nwork of organisation will plainly involve a fixing of the connection in\nthe brain-centres between the effect of the stimulation and the motor\nreaction. We say that the impulse of laughter has become associated\nwith a definite kind of sense-presentation. The instant response of\na child to the threatening fingers is a clear example of the result\nof such an associative co-ordination. Other examples are seen when a\nparticular sight or sound takes on permanently a funny character. A\nchild that has come to regard a figure in a picture book or an odd\nsound made by the nurse as funny will laugh whenever this recurs or is\nspoken of, provided that the mood of the moment is favourable. This\nis a noteworthy illustration of the way in which the action of the\nnovel and unexpected\u2014which, as we all allow, has a large _r\u00f4le_ in\nthe excitation of laughter\u2014may be replaced by that of an antagonistic\nforce, namely, habit, which itself appears to secure the hilarious\nresponse.\n\nIt may be added that so far as Habit comes in, reducing the importance\nof the initial psychical stage, and rendering the reaction automatic,\nthe theory of Lange and James applies fairly well. The feeling of\ngenial hilarity is in this case largely the reflex mental effect of the\nmovements themselves, including the whole organic commotion brought\nabout.\n\nComing now to the development of the psychical element in laughter, we\nmay, by way of introduction, refer to certain principles which ought to\nbe useful.\n\n(_a_) To begin with, any variety of emotional reaction {190} excited\nby a particular kind of presentation appears, as it is repeated,\nto undergo a process of development, taking on more of fulness and\ncomplexity. A feeling of attachment to a person or to a place, or of\nadmiration for a cherished work of art, grows fuller and deeper with\nthe establishment of a relation of intimacy. Dimly realised resonances\nof former like experiences melt into, and deepen the feeling, and new\nelements are woven into it by associative complication, and by growing\nreflection. This increasing complexity affects both the ideational\nbasis of the emotion and the closely connected emotional tone\nitself.[122]\n\nAt first sight we might be disposed to think that the feeling of sudden\njoy at the back of a merry explosion would prove to be an exception\nto this law. Since an element of novelty, a sense of joyous mental\ncollapse under a sudden, yet harmless stimulus, runs through all our\nlaughter, there might seem to be no room for any increase of depth and\nvolume. But this is not so. A child\u2019s feeling of the \u201cfun of it\u201d at\nthe approach of the tickling hand seems to gain in volume and force\nwith the repetition of the experience. The zest of the enjoyment of a\nlaughing romp with the nurse, or, better, with the father, of watching\nthe funny ways of a kitten, and so forth, grows fuller because of the\nincreasing complication of the psychosis behind the laughter.[123]\n\n(_b_) In the second place the development of an emotion is essentially\na differentiation of it, not merely into a more definite kind of\nexperience as a whole, but into a number of {191} distinguishable\nsub-varieties of feeling. In other words, the reaction is called forth\nby new excitants and new modes of stimulation which give rise to\nmental complexes somewhat different from those caused by the earlier\nexcitants. Thus, as we mentally develop, admirations having a richer\nideational structure and more complexity of feeling-tone take the\nplace of the first simple ones, which last die out or survive only as\nrudimentary processes.\n\nThis enlargement of the field of exciting objects, with the concomitant\ndifferencing of the emotional state into a larger and larger number of\nshades, is the outcome of the whole process of mental growth. It means,\nfirst of all, the growing differentiation of the child\u2019s experience,\nthat is, of his perceptions and ideas, as well as the expansion of\nhis reflective processes. In this way a modified admiration attaches\nitself to a new kind of object, _e.g._, works of art, virtuous actions,\nwhen these come to be perceived and reflected on in such a way as to\ndisclose their admirable side.\n\nIn all such extensions the emotional reaction remains in its essential\nelements one and the same experience. We may say, if we like, that\nthe expression has been \u201ctransferred\u201d to a new situation or a new\nexperience, through the working of a force which has been called \u201cthe\nanalogy of feeling\u201d.[124]\n\nThis process of extension by analogy of situation and attitude may\nbe seen to be a constituent in the development of laughter. Taking\nits primitive form to be the expression of a sudden raising of the\nfeeling-tone of consciousness to the level of gladness\u2014which elevation\nmay be supposed to {192} involve at least an appreciable sense of\nrelief from a foregoing state of strain or oppressive dulness\u2014we may\nreadily see how the reaction is passed on, so to speak, to analogous\nmental attitudes which are developed later.\n\nLet us take as an example a child who, having reached a dim\napprehension of the customary behaviour of things begins to laugh at\ncertain odd deviations from this. Here the transition appears clearly\nto be a kind of transference mediated by the identity of the mental\nattitude with that of the laughter of an earlier stage, say at the\nsight of the new and entertaining baubles. Similarly when, after the\nconsciousness of rule is developed, a child roguishly \u201ctries it on\u201d by\npretending to disobey, we may regard the new outburst of the spirit\nof fun as a natural transition from an earlier variety, the laughing\npretence of running away from mother or nurse.\n\nNevertheless, we have to do here with more than a mere transference.\nSuch extensions always involve some amount of complication and\nenrichment of the mirthful experience. These later forms of mental\ngaiety depend on the development of more complex psychoses, both on\nthe intellectual and on the emotional side. The first amusement at the\nsight of the ill-matched, the inconsequent, implies the advance of an\nanalytic reflection up to the point of a dim perception of relations.\nA large part of the extension of the field of the laughable depends\non this intellectual advance, a finer and more precise apprehension\nof what is presented, in its parts and so as a whole, as also in\nits relations to other things. With respect to the other condition,\nexpansion of the emotional life, it is enough to remark that certain\nforms of laughter which fall within the first years of life arise\ndirectly out of a deepening of the emotional consciousness as a whole,\n_e.g._, the awakening of the \u201cself-feeling,\u201d as seen {193} in the\nlaughter of success or triumph; or, on the other hand, of tenderness\nand sympathy, as illustrated in the first rudiments of a kindly humour.\n\nWe see, then, that, as a feature in development, differentiation\ninto a multiplicity of forms is inseparably connected with another\nfeature, complication. The gradual appearance of a number of laughters\nvariously toned, such as that of slightly malicious elation at collapse\nof dignity, of entertainment at an intellectual inconsequence, and\nof a kindly amusement at a petty disaster, means that the elemental\nfeeling of joy is getting modified by accretions or absorptions of new\npsychical elements.\n\nA final remark is needed to prevent misapprehension. Among the several\nprocesses of complication which underlie this differentiation of the\nlaughing psychosis, some tend to arrest or tone down the reaction.\nIt is thus that, when sympathy comes to be united with the laughing\nimpulse, the gaiety of the latter is apt to become subdued into\nsomething between a smile and the gentlest of laughs. In addition to\nthis inhibitory effect of heterogeneous emotional elements we have that\nof new conative attitudes. A child soon finds out that a good deal of\nhis rollicking laughter is an offence, and the work of taming the too\nwild spirits begins.[125]\n\nWith these general considerations to help us, we may now look at the\ncourse of development of the laughing experience during the first three\nyears.\n\nIt may be premised that the smile and the laugh only become gradually\ndifferentiated as signs of qualitatively dissimilar attitudes. In the\ncase of Ruth the two expressions remained for a time interchangeable,\nand frequently {194} alternated in the same fit of joyous delight. But\nabout the 129th day the smile, it is remarked, began to take on one of\nits specialised functions, the social one of greeting.\n\nComing now to laughter, we have found that it begins at an early date\nto pass from a general sign of sudden increase of pleasure or good\nspirits into something akin to mirthful play. This has been illustrated\nin the early responses to tickling, and, a little later, to simple\nforms of a laughing game (_e.g._, bo-peep).\n\nBy what process of change, one may ask, does the impulse to laugh when\nthe heart suddenly grows glad pass into the laughter of play? Allowing,\nas seems certain, that the play-impulse is inherited, can we point out\nany psychological connection between the two?\n\nThe answer has already been given in substance in our general analysis\nof the causes of laughter. A sudden rise of pleasurable consciousness,\nwhen it possesses the mind and becomes gladness, say the infant\u2019s flood\nof delight at the swinging coloured baubles, necessarily dissolves, for\nthe time, the tense, serious attitude into a loose, play-like one. The\nchild\u2019s consciousness is now all gladness in face of his bauble; and\nplay is just another way of effecting this dissolution of the serious\nattitude into a large gladness. Not only so, but the elemental mood\nof laughter resembles the play-mood, since it finds its satisfaction\nin pretence or make-believe. The gladdening object divested of all\nserious interest becomes a play-thing, a mere semblance of the thing\nof practical account which the child observed in the serious moments.\nIts greeting by the senses may be described, indeed, as a kind of play\nof these senses. Hence, the specialisation of the primal laughter\nof delight into that of fun would appear to be one of the simplest\nprocesses in the whole development of the emotion. {195}\n\nWe may now briefly trace out some of the phases of development of these\ntwo primal forms of laughter.\n\nWith regard to the laughter of delight and jollity, we find, to judge\nfrom the careful record of Ruth\u2019s emotional utterances, that there\nis a rapid development during and after the fourth month.[126] In\nthis month, we read, the child was thrown into a state of vivacious\ndelight\u2014which expressed itself in smiles, in movements, in cooing and\ncrowing\u2014by the faces and voices which may be said to have \u201cplayed\u201d\nto her as she sat at table. The advent of the meal was that of a new\njoyous world, and, if the child could have spoken, she would probably\nhave exclaimed, \u201cOh, what fun!\u201d The large change effected by the return\nof a familiar face and voice after an absence was only another way of\ntransforming her world into a merry one.\n\nTowards the end of the fifth month, the note-book speaks over and\nover again of \u201cjollity\u201d and \u201chigh spirits,\u201d of the child\u2019s \u201claughing\nwith glee when any one smiled or spoke to her,\u201d of \u201cbeing exceedingly\njolly, smiling, kicking and sputtering,\u201d and so forth. This growing\ngleefulness seemed to be the outcome of new expansions of the\npleasurable consciousness, of a pure \u201cLebenslust\u201d. No doubt it had its\nobscure source in a pleasurable c\u0153naesthesis, the result of merrily\nworking digestive and other processes of organic life. Yet it had its\nhigher conditions, also, in the expansion of the life of the senses and\nin the growing range of the muscular activities. Laughter and shouts of\njoy would, we are told, accompany not merely the inrush of delightful\nsights and sounds, but the new use of bodily powers in exploring and\nexperimenting. {196}\n\nThis gaiety in taking possession of her new world showed itself in the\ngreeting of friendly faces. The new appearance of her grandfather after\nan absence excited her laughter on the 133rd day. By about the middle\nof the year, the child had, like Preyer\u2019s boy, developed a jubilant\ngreeting for her social belongings, nodding a friendly nod with all the\nsigns of huge delight.\n\nThese outbursts of laughing joy may sometimes be seen to have been\npreceded by a distinctly disagreeable state of feeling. In the case\nof Ruth, we are told that the fit of jollity broke out, on one or two\noccasions, upon \u201cinstantaneous relief from great general discomfort\u201d.\nAgain, on the 222nd day, having awoke and felt timid, she laughed with\njoy and a sense of relief when her mother came into the room. I have\nother evidence to show that this laughter of overflowing gladness is\noften to some extent a relief from constraint. Thus, a boy of one and\na half years who had a new nurse, and for some days behaved with great\ngravity when with her, was during the same period \u201cextremely hilarious\u201d\nwhen alone with his parents.\n\nThe gladness of the world grew larger to this happy girl when, towards\nthe end of the seventh month, she was taken into the open air, and,\nshortly after, allowed to lie on a quilt and roll on the ground. The\nwooing of the passing freshness, the play of sun and shadow, the large\nstir of life in moving and sounding things, all this possessed her and\nmade her \u201claugh and ejaculate with pleasure\u201d. With this may be compared\na note on a boy nine months old, who, lying in a clothes-basket in\na garden one summer\u2019s day, looked up at the leaves dancing in the\nsunshine and laughed with \u201ca hearty noisy laugh\u201d.\n\nThe development of bodily power in this same half-year brought our\nlittle maiden much gleeful laughter. {197} Any experience of movement,\npassive as well as active, filled her with noisy hilarity. To ride\non anybody\u2019s foot brought out, at the end of the fifth month, the\nunmistakable signs of hilarious rapture. A month later, the gleeful\nexplosion was called out by the new frolicsome experience of being\njumped and tossed. Similar expressions of mirth occurred when new\nactive movements were accomplished. In the record of the middle of the\nninth month, we are told of a medley of movements, tumbling on the\nfloor or lawn, sitting up and lying down, raising herself on the feet\nand hands, etc., which brought her \u201csingular joy\u201d.\n\nA part of the gleefulness of this widening experience of movement\nis due to its unexpected results. It seems probable that the first\nsuccessful experiments in crawling, climbing and the rest may give\nrise to new complexes of muscular and other sensations which come as\na joyful surprise. Such delightful surprises grow more varied and\nimpressive when the arms and hands begin to experiment. For example,\na little girl, aged two and a quarter years, happened when throwing a\nball at random to jerk it over her head, and was seized with a spasm of\nhilarity. The gleeful outburst is apt to occur, too, later on when a\nchild first achieves the feat\u2014half-wonderful, half-amusing\u2014of walking,\nof running and of jumping.[127]\n\nIn these expanding processes of jollity or gleefulness we may detect\nthe beginnings of more specialised forms of laughing enjoyment. Thus,\nin the outburst of merriment which winds up a successful attempt to\nclimb, we recognise the germ of that mode of reaction which is apt to\nfollow at the moment of sudden relaxation of tension on the attainment\nof an end. We may be sure that a child {198} of nine months finds the\neffort to stand a very serious and exhausting strain; and may infer\nthat the laughter which occurs in this case is largely due to momentary\nrelaxations of this strain.\n\nBut again, these experiences clearly supply conditions favourable to\nthe emergence of that \u201csudden glory\u201d which enters into successful\neffort. The \u201cshouting and laughing\u201d of little Ruth (forty-five weeks)\non completing the magnificent exploit of climbing the staircase\nhad, as her aunt\u2019s epithet \u201cexultant\u201d recognises, something of the\nfree-breathing jubilation of the successful mountain-climber. We are\ntold further that, in the tenth month, Ruth would break into the same\nexultant laugh after some successful mental effort, such as pointing\nout the right picture when this was asked for.\n\nHere, then, we have the laughter of a joyous feeling-tone complicated\nby new elements. These include, not merely the delightful feeling\nof relief after prolonged effort, but some dim form of an agreeable\nconsciousness of growing power and of an expanding self. In the glee\non mastering a new movement, _e.g._, riding on somebody\u2019s foot, we see\ntraces of a more distinctly playful mood. We may now follow out the\ndevelopment of this large variety of gamesome mirth.\n\nThe overflow of the health-filled reservoirs of muscular activity\nbegins at an early stage to wear an unmistakable aspect of playfulness.\nThe first exercises in crawling, accompanied by various sounds of\ncontentment and gladness, are indeed recognisable by all as a kind\nof play. As the forces of the organism establish themselves a more\nmanifest bent to a romping kind of game appears. This, as a game\nin which co-operation enters, involves a development of the social\nconsciousness, and its gleefulness comes {199} in part from the\nreverberations of mutual sympathy. A good example of the hilarity of\na romping game is Ruth\u2019s uproarious delight, in the seventh month,\nwhen dragged about on a carpet, an experience which involved, of\ncourse, much loss of equilibrium and some amount of awkward bumping.\nThat the bumps were of the essence of the enjoyment is confirmed by\nthe fact that, in the tenth month, she would like to stand, holding\non to a chair, and then deliberately to let herself go so as to \u201ccome\ndown sitting with a thud,\u201d winding up the performance by \u201clooking up\nlaughing and triumphant\u201d. Another game involving exciting jolts was\nliked in the middle of the twelfth month. The child was shot in her\ncarriage, now from the aunt to the mother, and now back, each little\nride ending up with a jolt, over which she grew very merry. Later on,\n(at the end of the twentieth month) she laughed heartily on being\nknocked down by her dog in a too pushful bit of play; and she enjoyed\nin like manner some pretty rough play at the hands of a nine-year-old\nboy companion.\n\nThis mirthful treatment of romps, which must have involved a palpable\namount of discomfort, is interesting as showing how laughter plays\nabout the confines of the serious. This little girl seems, up to the\nage of three, at least, to have been curiously indifferent to pain.\nYet she was not wanting in the common childish timidity. It looks,\nthen, as if the fun of these rather rough games turned on dissolutions\nof nascent attitudes of apprehension, and, consequently, the laughter\nexpressed something of a joyous contempt of fear. Indeed, it seems\nlikely that an element of this joyous rebound from a half-developed\nstate of fear entered into much of this child\u2019s laughter, already\nillustrated, on succeeding in a rather risky experiment, such as\nclimbing the staircase. We read that, like other vigorous {200}\nchildren, she was a keen pursuer of new experiences, even in cases in\nwhich she knew that some pain was involved. The passion for trying new\nexperiments seems to have urged her on, in spite of nascent fear; and\nthe final shouting and laughing may well have announced, along with\nthe joy of successful effort, a sense of triumph over the weaker timid\nself. The ability, illustrated in these hardy experiments, to turn\nsituations suggestive of danger into \u201clarkish\u201d play, was a singular\nproof of the firm foundation on which this child\u2019s prevalent mode of\ngaiety reposed.\n\nIn some cases Ruth\u2019s play would take on a form which clearly involved\na triumphing over fear. Thus, we are told that when, on the 429th day,\nshe was asked to find \u201cauntie\u201d in the dark she at first stood still\nand silent. Then, when her head was touched by somebody\u2019s hands, she\nbroke into laughter and started off by herself to explore in the dark.\nLater on, with the growth of a bolder spirit, this laughing triumph\nover fear extended itself, so that in the twenty-ninth month she played\nat bear with her uncle, going into a dark room, with her hand in her\naunt\u2019s, and enjoying \u201cthe exhilaration of unreal alarm\u201d; and when the\nuncle sprang out from his dark hiding-place, growling fearfully, she\n\u201claughed, shrieked and fled all in one\u201d. If the uncle went a little too\nfar in the use of the alarming she would check him by saying, \u201cDon\u2019t do\nthat again\u201d.\n\nIn these cases, it is evident, we have a complex psychosis with\nalternating phases. The awful delight which vents itself at once\nin a laugh and in a shriek and a flight is certainly of a mixed\nfeeling-tone. The laughter is the note of a triumphant spirit, and yet\nof one in which, in the moment of triumph, the nascent fear leaves its\ntrace.\n\nIn these laughing games we have clearly an element of {201}\nmake-believe. A firm persuasion, low down in consciousness, of the\nharmlessness of the coming bump and of the human bear in the blackness\nkeeps the little girl\u2019s heart steady and turns the adventure into fun.\nAt the same time, the play as \u201cpretending\u201d would seem to involve at\nleast a half-formed expectation of something, and probably, too, a\nfinal taste of delicious surprise at the fully realised nothingness of\nthe half-expected. In some forms of play-pretence this element of final\nannihilation of expectation becomes more conspicuous and the distinct\nsource of the hilarious exultation. When, for example, in the eleventh\nmonth, Ruth sitting on the floor held out her arms to be taken up, and\nthe mother, instead of doing this, stooped and kissed the child, there\nwas a perfect peal of laughter again and again.\n\nThe increase of muscular activity shown in the laughing romps leads\nto the extension of mirthful enjoyment in another way. A vigorous\nchild, even when a girl, grows aggressive and attempts various forms\nof playful attack. As we have seen, to tickle another is merely one\nvariety of a large class of teasing operations, in which the teased as\nwell as the teasing party is supposed to find his merriment. Regarding\nnow the child as teaser, we see that he very early begins to exercise\nat once his own powers and others\u2019 endurance. The pulling of whiskers\nis one of the earliest forms of practical jokes. Ruth took to this\npastime in the first week of the fifth month. By the end of the sixth\nmonth the little tormentor had grown aware of her power, and \u201cbecame\nmost eager to pull, with laughter and exultant clamour, at the nose,\near, and especially the hair, of any one that held her\u201d. The boy C.,\nat the same age, delighted in pulling his sister\u2019s hair, and was moved\nby her cries only to outbursts of laughter. As intelligence develops,\nthese practical jokes grow more cunning. Another little {202} girl,\nof whom I have written elsewhere under the initial M., when seventeen\nmonths old, asked for her father\u2019s \u201ctick-tick,\u201d looking very saucy;\nand as he stooped to give it, she tugged at his moustache, \u201cand almost\nchoked with laughter\u201d.\n\nWith this teasing of human companions we have that of animals. When\nsixteen months old, Ruth would chase the cat with shouts of laughter.\nAnother child, a boy, about the same age, went considerably further,\nand taking the toilet puff from its proper place went deliberately\nto \u201cMoses,\u201d the cat, who was sitting unsuspectingly before the fire,\nand proceeded to powder him, each new application of the puff being\naccompanied by a short chuckle.\n\nThere is no need of reading into this laughter the note of cruel\nexultation over suffering.[128] Ruth\u2019s mischievous doings would take\nforms which had not even the semblance of cruelty. There was merely\nimpish playfulness in the act of snatching off her grandmother\u2019s\nspectacles and even her cap, with full accompaniment of laughter, in\nthe twenty-second month when lifted to say good-night. In much the same\nspirit the other little girl, M., delighted, when two years old, in\nuntying the maid\u2019s apron strings and in other jocose forms of mischief.\n\nThe laughing mood in these cases is understandable as a rioting in\nnewly realised powers, a growing exultation as the consciousness\nof ability to produce striking effects grows clearer. Ruth, in her\neleventh month, blew a whistle violently and looked round laughing to\nher aunt and the others present. Here, surely, the laughter was that of\n{203} rejoicing in a new power. This sense of power implies a clearer\nform of \u201cself-feeling\u201d. A child may grow keenly conscious of the self\nin such moments of newly tried powers, as he grows in \u201cthe moments of\nintense pain\u201d. This laughter, then, furnishes a good illustration of\nthe sudden glory on which Hobbes lays emphasis.\n\nI have assumed that in this laughing mischief we have to do with a form\nof (playful) teasing. The little assailant enjoys the fun of the attack\nand counts on your enjoying it also. The indulgence of others, even\nif they do not show an equal readiness for the pastime, removes all\nthought of disobedience, of lawlessness.\n\nYet things do not commonly remain at this point of perfectly innocent\nfun. The gathering energies of the child, encouraged by indulgence\nin games of romp, are pretty certain to develop distinctly rowdyish\nproceedings. Ruth, for example, when about twenty-one months old,\nscrambled defiantly on to the table at the close of a meal, seized on\nthe salts, and scampered about laughing. About the same time this new\nspirit of rowdyism showed itself in flinging a plate across the room\nand other mutinous acts. Little boys, I suspect, are much given to\nexperiments in a violent kind of fun which they know to be disorderly.\nOne of them, aged two years eight and a half months, was fond of\n\u201ctrying it on\u201d by pulling hair-pins out of his mother\u2019s hair, splashing\nin the puddles in the road, and so forth, to her great perplexity and\nhis plainly pronounced enjoyment.\n\nIn these outbursts of laughing rowdyism we see more than an escape of\npent-up energies, more than a mere overflow of \u201chigh spirits\u201d; they are\ncomplicated by a new factor, something of the defiant temper of the\nrebel. A child of two has had some experience of real disobedience,\nand may be said to have developed simple ideas of order {204} and\nlaw. We may reasonably infer, then, that in this turbulent fun there\nis some consciousness of setting law at defiance. The presence of this\nnew psychical factor is seen in the alteration of the laughing sounds\nthemselves. In Ruth\u2019s case, we are told, they were \u201crough\u201d and unlike\nthe natural and joyous utterance. It is further seen in the method of\nthe fun, for, as Miss Shinn observes, Ruth \u201ctried repeatedly to see how\nfar she could go safely in roguish naughtiness\u201d.\n\nI think we find in this behaviour a clear instance of laughter becoming\nan ingredient in the attitude of throwing off a customary restraint.\nIt is the early analogue of the laughter of the rowdies bent on\nwindow-smashing, of the riotous enjoyment of the people at festal\nseasons when the lord of misrule holds sway.\n\nThe degree of conscious defiance of order may, no doubt, vary greatly.\nIn much of what we view as the disorderly mirth of a child this\ningredient of the laughing mood may be small and sub-conscious; yet\nat times it grows distinct and prominent. Thus, Ruth, in the eleventh\nmonth, developed a special expression for the attitude of defiance\nwhen disobeying, namely, a comical face with a wrinkling of the nose,\ntogether with laughter. The boy C., early in the third year, would give\nout a laugh of a short mocking ring on receiving a prohibition, _e.g._,\nnot to slap his dog companion. He would remain silent and laugh in a\nhalf-contemptuous way. Sometimes in his moods of defiance he would go\nso far as to strike a member of his family and then laugh. His laugh\nwas sometimes highly suggestive of the mood of derision.\n\nIn this note of warlike challenge we have a point of kinship with the\n\u201ccrowing\u201d laughter of the victor. Yet it is doubtful whether a child\nat this early age reaches the {205} mental attitude of a mocking\ncontempt. Preyer tells us that he has never observed scornful laughter\nwithin the first four years.[129]\n\nWhen the consciousness of the unruly in these \u201chigh jinks\u201d becomes\ndistinct and begins to be oppressive, the laughter will be less\nboisterous and express more of playful pretence. The child learns to be\nsatisfied with making a feint to rebel, with a make-believe unruliness.\nRuth, on the 236th day, laughed when pretending to disobey by biting\noff the petals of flowers, and on the 455th day, by stuffing buttons\ninto her mouth. The boy C., when about the same age, had his little way\nof turning disobedience into a game. In the seventeenth month, when he\nwas bidden by his mother to give up a picture he had got possession\nof, he walked up to her and made a show of handing over his unlawful\npossession, and then drew his hands back with much laughing enjoyment.\n\nA more complicated psychical attitude appears when such laughing\npretence at disobedience takes on a \u201croguish\u201d aspect. Here we have, not\nonly an element of slight uneasiness, but one of self-consciousness,\nwhich together give a distinct complexion to the whole mental attitude\nand to its expression.\n\nThis ingredient of a timid self-consciousness or shyness under the\nscrutiny of others appears, as we know, some time after the simpler\nforms of fear. In Ruth\u2019s case it seems to have showed itself on the\n123rd day in a distinctly \u201croguish\u201d attitude. When at dinner and spoken\nto by her grandfather, she turned her head as far as she could. On the\n141st day, too, when held in her nurse\u2019s arms, she {206} smiled at her\ngrandfather and others and then ducked her head. This expression of\nroguish self-consciousness had more of the look of a nervous explosion\nin the eleventh month, when the girl laughed on being set on her feet\nin a corner where she was much noticed; and again, in the thirteenth\nmonth, as she tumbled about and showed herself off. This laughter,\nwith something of the _g\u00eane_ of self-consciousness in it, was, we\nare told, not to be confounded with the expression of a complacent\nself-consciousness.\n\nThe element of an awkward shyness comes into much of the early playful\n\u201ctrying it on\u201d. In the case of the boy C., just mentioned, it was\nseen in the sly, upward look of the eyes and the short, half-nervous\nlaugh, when he was face to face with authority and disposed to play at\ndisobedience. The fuller roguish laugh occurs frequently along with a\nrisky bit of play, as when a boy of one and a half year would point to\nhimself when asked for a finger-recognition of somebody else. In such\ncases the laughter seems like an attempt to get rid of the element of\nrisk. When the masking of the impulse of fun by timidity is greater,\nthe expression reaching only to a tentative smile, the roguishness of a\nchild may easily wear a look of kinship with our grown-up humour.[130]\n\nA full account of the development of laughter during these first years,\nas an ingredient of the play-mood, would be of great value. It would,\nin particular, help us to see how the reaction comes to be definitely\nco-ordinated with the sense of make-believe, and the attitude of\nthrowing off the burdensome restrictions of reality. The vocal mirth\nof children, as they give reins to their fancy, attests to {207} the\nweight of this burden and to the intense delight which comes from its\nmomentary abandonment.\n\nIn seeking for the first traces of the laughter of play and of\ndefiance, we are not greatly troubled by the interfering influence of\nothers. No doubt this influence is at work even here. The nurse and\nthe parents are pretty certain to laugh at much of the roguish \u201ctrying\nit on\u201d; and this laughter will react upon the child\u2019s own merriment.\nIn play, too, in which others usually take some part, there is this\naction of older persons\u2019 laughter. Still, in the main, the utterances\nare spontaneous, and at most are reinforced by way of some sympathetic\nrapport with another.\n\nIt is otherwise when we come to consider the first instances of\nlaughing amusement at the presentation of \u201cfunny\u201d objects. The lead of\nothers now complicates the phenomenon to a much more serious extent.\nThe recognition of an object as \u201cfunny\u201d implies some detection of a\nquality which acts on others as well as on the self;[131] consequently,\nit presupposes a certain development of the social consciousness.\nHence, some cautiousness is needed in noting the first clear examples\nof a perception of the quality. Before language comes and supplies\na means of self-interpretation, we cannot safely say that because\na child laughs in presence of an object there is a recognition of\nsomething objectively \u201cfunny\u201d. As we have seen, such laughter may be\nfully accounted for by supposing that the object has an exhilarating\nor gladdening effect on the child\u2019s feeling. On the other hand, when\nlanguage is added we have to cope with the difficulty, already touched\non, that a child\u2019s pronouncements are apt to be controlled by what\nothers laugh at and call funny. Nevertheless, here, too, the child\u2019s\nspontaneity and his way of discovering his own {208} sources of\namusement may enable us to overcome the difficulties.\n\nOur study of the conditions of the perception suggests that a true\nenjoyment of presentations as oddities is not to be expected at a\nvery early date. And this, first of all, for the reason that the\nnew, especially if it is strange, even though fitted to draw forth a\njoyous laugh, may easily excite other and inhibitory attitudes. An\ninfant, during the first year of life, if not later also, is apt to\nbe disturbed and apparently alarmed at the approach of new objects,\nso as to be unaffected by its rejoicing aspect; or, if he feels this,\nthe laughter may be accompanied by signs of fear. Ruth, on her 254th\nday, greeted a kitten which her father brought to show her with \u201call\ngradations from laughter and joy to fear\u201d. In the second place\u2014and this\nis of more importance\u2014the recognition of an object as funny presupposes\nthe work of experience in organising a rudimentary feeling for what\nis customary. This, again, involves a development of the social\nconsciousness and of an idea of a common order of things.\n\nNow all this requires a certain amount of time. It hardly seems\nreasonable to look for a true apprehension of the laughable till some\ntime after the appearance of an imitation of others\u2019 laughter and\nplay-gestures, which was first observed, in the case of the boy C.,\nin the ninth month. Nor could it well be expected until after a child\nhad acquired some understanding of others\u2019 language, so as to note how\nthey agree in naming and describing certain objects as funny, which\nunderstanding only begins to be reached in the second half of the\nyear. Hence, I should hesitate to speak of a clear recognition of a\nlaughable object as such before the last quarter of the year. It seems\nto me, for example, a little rash to say that a boy of five months, who\nalways laughed inordinately when a very jolly-looking physician, {209}\nthe image of Santa Claus, paid him a visit, displayed a \u201csense of\nhumour\u201d.[132]\n\nWhen once the idea of objects of common laughter begins to grow clear a\nchild is, of course, able to develop perceptions of the funny along his\nown lines. This he certainly seems to do pretty briskly. The freshness\nof his world, the absence of the dulling effect of custom which is seen\nin the perceptions of older folk, renders him an excellent pioneer in\nthe largely unknown territory of King Laughter.\n\nAmong the sense-presentations which awaken the infantile laugh are new\nand queer sounds of various sorts; and they may well be selected for a\nstudy of the transitions from mere joyous exclamation to a hilarious\ngreeting of what is \u201cfunny\u201d. Early in the second half of the first\nyear, a child in good health will begin to surmount the alarms of the\near, and to turn what is new and strange into fun. About the 222nd day\nbrave little Ruth was able to laugh, not only at such an odd sound as\nthat produced when her aunt rattled a tin cup on her teeth, but at that\nof a piano. Preyer\u2019s boy, later in the year, was given to laughing at\nvarious new and out-of-the-way sounds, such as that of the piano, of\ngurgling or clearing the throat, and even of thunder.\n\nOdd sounding articulations appear to be especially provocative of\nlaughter about this time. As early as the 149th day, Ruth laughed at\nnew sounds invented by the aunt, such as \u201cPah! Pah!\u201d Queer guttural\nsounds seem to have a specially tickling effect.\n\nAfter words and their commoner forms have begun to grow familiar,\nnew and odd-sounding words, especially names, are apt to be greeted\nwith laughter. The child M., when one year nine months old, was much\nimpressed by the {210} exclamation \u201cgood gracious!\u201d made by her mother\non discovering that the water was coming through the ceiling of a room;\nand the child would sometimes repeat it in pure fun \u201cshaking with\nlaughter\u201d. When she was two years seven months old she laughed on first\nhearing the name \u201cPeriwinkle\u201d.\n\nIn these and similar cases of the hilarious response to sounds we\nseem to have, well within the first nine months, a germ of a feeling\nfor the odd or droll. The early development of this sense of the\nfunny in sounds is aided by their aggressive force for the infant\u2019s\nconsciousness, and by the circumstance that for the young ear they\nhave pronounced characteristics which are probably lost as development\nadvances, and they are attended to, not for their own sake, but merely\nas signs of things which interest us.\n\nThe psychical process involved in the transition may be described as\nfollows. Sounds, while by reason of their suddenness and unexpectedness\nthey are apt to take the consciousness off its guard and to produce a\nkind of nervous shock, are of all sense-stimuli the most exhilarating.\nThe sudden rousing of the consciousness to a large joyous commotion\nis the fundamental fact. Nor will the jar of the shock, when the\nsense-organ develops and becomes hardier, interfere with this. On\nthe contrary, it will add something in the shape of an agreeable\nrebound from a nascent attitude of uneasiness.[133] The laughter of\nthe child at the first sounds of the piano, which have frightened\nmany a child and other young animal, is, in part, a shout of victory.\nThere is here, too, an element of \u201csudden glory\u201d in the rejoicing, as\nthe new expanding self is dimly conscious of its superiority to the\nhalf-alarmed and shrinking self of the moment before. {211}\n\nIn this case, it is evident, we have to do with a greeting of the\nlaughable which will vary greatly according to the psycho-physical\ncondition of the child. The same child that laughs at a new sound\nto-day will to-morrow, when in another mood, be disturbed by a quite\nsimilar surprise of the ear.\n\nBut more is involved in this laughter. The sudden and slightly\ndisturbing attack of the ear by new sounds is apt to wear for the\nchild\u2019s consciousness a game-like aspect. We have only to think of\nthe nursery rhymes, alluded to by Miss Shinn, in which the excitement\nof fun is secured by an explosive shock at the end, games closely\nanalogous to the rides which terminated in a good bump. In these rhymes\nthe fun lies in the shock, though only half-unexpected\u2014a shock which\nhas in it the very soul of frivolous play, since it comes at the end of\na series of quiet orderly sounds. May not the new sounds, the guttural\nutterances and the rest, affect a child in a like manner as a kind of\ndisorderly play? For a child\u2019s ear, pitched for the intrinsic character\nof a sound, they may hold much which is expressive of the play-mood.\nThis will apply not only to utterances like the \u201cPah! Pah!\u201d which are\nclearly recognised as play, but to many others produced by a nurse or a\nmother who is given to entertaining. Perhaps the gurgling sounds which\nmoved the mirth of Preyer\u2019s boy appeared laughter-like.\n\nThis tendency to look on certain sounds as a kind of play seems to\nsupply a psychical link in the development of a feeling for the odd\nand out-of-the-way as such. We have seen how the play-impulse \u201ctries\nit on\u201d when the restraints of rule grow too irksome. I suspect that\nthe mirthful appreciation of the queer and out-of-the-way grows out of\nthis inclination to a playful disorderliness or law-breaking. A child\nis apt to feel oppressed with the rules of propriety {212} imposed on\nhim. By these rules quite a terrible multiplicity of noises is branded\nas \u201cnaughty,\u201d and the prohibition tends to fix the playful impulse\nprecisely in the direction of the forbidden sounds. Children have a\nway, moreover, of projecting their experiences and their inclinations\ninto things which we call lifeless. What more natural, then, that they\nshould feel these incursions of violent and quite improper-sounding\nnoises to be a kind of playful throwing aside of order and rule?\n\nIn the domain of the visible world, suddenness of presentation rarely\nreaches, perhaps, the point of shock or joltiness. Yet there is ample\nscope, here, too, for the working of the unexpected on the child\u2019s\nsensibilities. The first visual excitants of laughter, the sudden\nuncovering of the face in bo-peep, the unexpected return of the\nfamiliar face after an interval of absence, the instant transformation\nof the accustomed features when the mother \u201cmakes a face,\u201d show how\ndirectly the surprisingly new may act on the young muscles of laughter.\n\nHere, too, we may see how the hilarious enjoyment of the new and\nout-of-the-way emerges out of play-mirth. The distorted face of the\nmother produces a laugh when it has ceased to alarm and is taken as\nfun.[134] According to one observer, this making of faces grows into\na standing pastime towards the end of the second year.[135] Is not\nthe greeting of the baby-face in the mirror, which in Ruth\u2019s case\noccurred on the 221st day (eighth month), and in that of Preyer\u2019s boy\nat the end of the ninth month, a kind of accost of a newly discovered\nplaymate? Perhaps the laughter of a little boy, of one and a half\nyear, already referred to, at the jumping of a ping-pong ball and at\na {213} spring-blind going up or coming down with a run, expressed a\nrecognition of something play-like.\n\nThis co-operation of the play-inclination in the perception of the\nlaughable in visual presentations is still more plainly illustrated\nin the effect of actions and postures. The quickness of the eye of\nmirth for expressions of the mood of romping play is seen in a child\u2019s\nlaughter, already referred to, at the gambols of a horse or other\nanimal. Ruth was much entertained on her 441st day by the antics of\na dog. Especially enlivening is the appearance of quick, play-like\nmovements in grave elders addicted to decorous deportment. The girl\nM., at the age of eighteen months, broke into boisterous laughter on\nseeing her father as he ran to catch a train, with his handkerchief\nhanging out of his pocket. This sudden revelation of the playful temper\nmay come to the child by way of postures and expressions. The awful\nlaws of propriety soon tend to give the look of playful licence to\ncertain bodily postures, especially that of lying down. The boy C.,\nwhen twenty months old, laughed heartily on seeing his sister lying\non the ground out of doors. Making faces, pouting lips and the rest\nbecome playful just because they are felt to be improper, the sort of\nthing one only does in a disorderly moment, playful or other. May not\nthe drolleries\u2014to the child\u2019s consciousness\u2014of animal form, for example\nthe long neck of the giraffe, owe something to suggestions of improper\njocose actions, such as trying to stretch oneself into Alice-like\ndimensions?\n\nIn this blithe recognition of the irregular in others\u2019 behaviour we\nhave the rudiment of an appreciation of the laughable, not only as\na violation of rule but as a loss of dignity. This is apparent in\nsuch cases as the boy\u2019s laughter at the prostrate form of his sister,\nillumined as {214} it was by the observation that, at the age of\ntwenty-six months, he expressed great contempt at the spectacle of a\nJapanese gentleman stretched on the grass in the suburban Heath, which\nwas the child\u2019s daily resort, and which he seemed strongly disposed to\nsubject to his own code of manners. Possibly, too, there was a touch of\nthis appreciation of lowered dignity when the same boy, at the age of\ntwenty-eight months, laughed greatly on seeing his father batter in an\nold hat. The laughter, complicated now by a new element of conscious\nsuperiority, probably took on a crowing note, though our dull ears may\nnot be equal to a clear detection of the change. Not only so, it is\npossible that the laughter of children, common in the second year, at\nsigns of disorderliness in the hair or dress of others, and especially\nsuperiors, implies a perception of something like lowered rank.\n\nIn this effect of the new in the visible world different tones of\nmirth are no doubt distinguishable. As the higher forms of perception\nbegin to develop the primitive laughter of joy may persist and combine\nwith later and more specialised kinds. Ruth\u2019s voicing of merriment,\nin the thirteenth month, on having a new pair of mittens put on her,\nwas largely an outburst of joy, though some dim sense of the oddity of\nthe thing probably combined with this. On the other hand, the laughter\ncalled forth in the little girl M., at the age of twenty-one months, by\nthe spectacle of a doll that had lost its arms presumably had in it,\nalong with a sense of something weirdly absurd in the mutilated form, a\npretty keen sub-consciousness of dollish proprieties set at defiance.\n\nOther directions in the development of this early laughter at\nentertaining spectacles may be said to have their origin in the fun of\nplay with its pretence or make-believe. Mrs. {215} Hogan\u2019s boy, at the\nage of two years and two months, would laugh at his nurse\u2019s pretended\nefforts to put on his shoes, which, instead of getting on, flew away\nwildly into freedom. This laughter was evoked at the fun of the thing,\nand probably involved an interpretation of the nurse\u2019s action as play.\nYet it had in it also, I think, the trace of an appreciation of the\nabsurdity of the farcical collapse of effort. This is borne out by\nthe fact that the boy, about the same time, would also laugh when the\nnurse, not in play, tried by jumping to hang a garment on a nail just\ntoo high for her. He may, of course, have regarded this, too, as but\na continuation of the play. Yet it seems reasonable to suppose that\nthe merry current had one of its sources in the perception of the\namusing aspect of failure, of effort missing its mark and lapsing into\nnothingness.\n\nI confess to have been surprised at what looks like the precocity of\nsome children in the matter of honouring the proprieties of conduct.\nThe little girl M., when only fourteen months old, is said to have\nlaughed in an \u201cabsurdly conscious way\u201d at a small boy who stood by\nher perambulator asking for a kiss. That kiss, we are told, was not\nforthcoming. Was the laugh merely an incident in a mood of nervous\nshyness, or did it signify a dim perception of \u201cbad form\u201d on the part\nof the proposer? Much care is needed in the interpretation of such\nexpressive reactions. A small boy of eighteen months laughed when\nhis pants slipped down. But this may only have resulted from a sense\nof the fun of the irregularity of the proceeding, aided perhaps by\nothers\u2019 amusement. A true feeling of shame is, of course, not developed\nat this age; yet a child may have caught from instruction a feeling\nof the shocking impropriety of an ill-timed casting aside of the\nclothes-trammels. {216}\n\nWe may find in the laughter of the child, within the period of the\nfirst three years, pretty clear indications of the development of\na rude perception of amusing incongruities in dress and behaviour.\nThe young eye has a keen outlook for the proprieties in the matter\nof clothes. Ruth, who was in the thirteenth month amused at seeing\nher new mittens put on, showed amusement about the same date when\nher pink bonnet was put on her aunt\u2019s head. In this case, the\nplay-significance of the action for the child\u2019s consciousness is\napparent. It seems fairly certain, indeed, that this higher form of a\nrecognition of the laughable grows out of the play-interpretation. When\nat play children not only throw off rules of decorum and do improper\nthings, they put aside ideas of appropriateness and launch out into\nbizarre discontinuities and contrarieties of action and speech. The\nplay-attitude, as lawless and free, tends to inconsequence. Hence the\nreadiness with which a child interprets such inconsequences as play.\n\nIt is the same when a child laughs at droll stories of the doings of\nanimals and persons. He may take fables and other fancies seriously\nenough at times, but if his mind is pitched for merriment, he will\ngreatly appreciate the extravagant unsuitabilities of behaviour of the\nheroes of his nursery books. The little girl M., when two years seven\nmonths old, laughed gaily at a passage in a story about kittens, in\nwhich they are made to say, \u201cWaiter, this cat\u2019s meat is tough;\u201d asking\nin the midst of her merriment, \u201cDid you ever saw such funny tits?\u201d\n\nAlong with this rudiment of merry appreciation of the spectacle of\nthe incongruous, we have the first crude manifestation of the closely\nrelated feeling of amusement at the absurd. Children are said to have\nno measure of the probable and possible, and to accept the wildest\nfancies in {217} unquestioning faith. Yet experience begins her\neducative work during these first three years, and one may detect\nsporadic traces of a feeling for what is gloriously incredible. A boy,\nalready alluded to, aged about one and a half year, laughed as his aunt\nasked him what the waves, which he was gravely observing, were saying.\nThe boy C., when twenty-two months old, grew quite hilarious over the\nidea of flying up into the air. Some one had suggested his flying like\na bird, and he proceeded to cap the suggestion, adding, \u201cTit (sister)\nfy air,\u201d \u201cgee-gee (horse) fy air\u201d. The last idea of a flying horse\nespecially delighted one innocent, as yet, of Greek mythology.\n\nLastly, a bare allusion may be made to the early development of an\nappreciation of word-play and the lighter kind of wit. That this grows\nout of the play-element, the love of pretence, is at once evident.\nVerbal fun, \u201ctrying it on\u201d with an incorrect use of words and so forth,\nis a common outlet of the rollicking spirits of childhood. Mrs. Hogan\u2019s\nboy, at the age of one year eight months, developed a fancy for calling\nthings by their wrong names, a knife a \u201cfork,\u201d for example. Ruth did\nthe same towards the end of the third year. The fun derived from\npunning seems to be immense in the case of many children at the close\nof our period, as when a boy on hearing his mother say she had just\ncalled on Mrs. Fawkes asked, \u201cDid you call on Mrs. knives too?\u201d This\neasy childish mode of satisfying a jocose bent is seen also in the use\nof false statements, not seriously, but \u201cin fun,\u201d as the child has it.\nRuth had a fit of such merry fibbing at the end of the third year. A\nchild will often \u201ctry on\u201d this kind of verbal game, when called up for\na moral lesson.[136]\n\nThis same roguish impulse to \u201ctry it on\u201d with the {218} authorities\nleads to something like a play of wit in repartee. The merry\ninterchange of intellectual attack and defence, which relieves so many\nserious relations of adult life, grows naturally enough in the case\nof children out of their relation of subjection to the grown-ups. The\nplayful experiment in the direction of disobedience is frequently\naccompanied by pretty exercises in verbal fencing, the joke of which\nthe perpetrator himself, at any rate, greatly enjoys. Such sportive\ndialectic may arise, too, by way of meeting serious correction. A girl\nof two and a quarter years was told by a foolish nurse that if she put\nout her tongue she would get spots on her face. After listening gravely\nshe turned on her instructress and, putting her finger on a little\npimple on the latter\u2019s chin, asked with \u201ca most mirthful smile,\u201d \u201cHow\nLizzie (the nurse) det dat \u2019pot dere den?\u201d\n\nEnough has been said, perhaps, even in this slight examination of\nchildren\u2019s laughter, to show that within the first three years all the\nmain directions of the mirth of adults are foreshadowed. Humour itself,\nwhich is supposed only to come with maturity of feeling and reflection,\nbegins to announce itself in a modest way during this period. The boy\nC., in his twenty-first month, had managed to twist his india-rubber\nhorse, so that the head was caught between the tail and the legs. He\nlaughed out loudly at first, then waxed tender, saying in a pitiful\ntone, \u201cPoor Gee-gee,\u201d and so swung from the one emotional attitude to\nthe other.[137]\n\nThis appearance of the two feelings, distinct though contiguous, is,\nof course, a very different thing from the highly organised sentiment\nwhich we call humour. Miss Shinn {219} tells us that, in the case\nof Ruth, the period of infantile gaiety has been followed by one of\nserious practicality, into which humour does not enter. Perhaps it will\ncome later. In any case we have to recognise in this laughter of the\nfirst years something far removed from the humour of the adult. It is\na pure primitive gaiety, uncomplicated by reflection and sadness. It\nis enough for my purpose if it can be seen to disclose faint embryonic\ntracings of the main lines of differentiation in the development of\nhuman laughter.\n\n{220}\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\n\nTHE LAUGHTER OF SAVAGES.\n\n\nIn the last chapter we took a glance at the primitive forms of human\nlaughter as illustrated in children. We may now supplement this by a\nbrief inquiry into the merriment of the childhood of the race, so far\nas this is reflected in the laughter of those savage tribes which have\ncome under the direct observation of the civilised man.\n\nWe shall expect the two domains to disclose similar features,\nspontaneity, absence of reflection, whole-hearted simplicity. At the\nsame time we shall expect the study of the laughter of savages to\nbring us more directly in touch with the social conditions which help\nto determine the directions of mirth. The study of the savage mind is\nthe study of a collective mind, that is to say, of a typical form of\nideas, sentiments, and psychical tendencies generally, running through\na community. Its modes of merriment, like its more serious emotional\nmanifestations, have been observed as common traits of members of a\ntribal society.\n\nA word may be said at the outset with respect to the sources of our\ninformation. It is a commonplace that civilised man finds all his\npowers taxed when he tries to get into touch with the mind of a\nsavage. The difficulties of this access will naturally be greater\nwhen the trait to be observed is an emotion which, while it is wont\nto display itself with an instinctive directness so long as the {221}\nsurroundings secure freedom, tends to hide itself as soon as anything\nstrange appears which induces a feeling of _g\u00eane_. The presence of\nstrangers, so far removed from the plane of life of savages as the\nmissionaries or officials of a civilised nation, would, one supposes,\nact as such a check to their risible impulses. It is possible,\ntoo, that the stranger who visits a savage tribe may supply, quite\nunknowingly perhaps, in his look, dress, and manner of behaviour, a\nnumber of provocatives of laughter which are resisted from a feeling of\nwhat is due to a guest.\n\nThat there is some hiding of the merry mood here is not a mere matter\nof inference, since travellers distinctly testify to the fact. The\nundisciplined savage will now and again show a degree of self-restraint\ncomparable with that which an educated Frenchman will show when in\na Paris street he is addressed by a hardy British youth in what the\nlatter cheerfully supposes to be the language of the country. The\nfollowing story may serve as an example. A public meeting was being\nheld in a native village in Africa. An Englishman who was present got\nup on a recumbent trunk of a tree, which is used as a seat in native\nvillages. The log rolled and the Englishman fell heavily. Yet the\nwhole meeting looked as grave as if the accident had been a part of\nthe programme. An uninstructed observer might have hastily inferred\nthat the tribe was wanting in a \u201csense of humour\u201d. The narrator of\nthe incident knew better, and gives the incident as a proof of the\ngreat power of self-restraint displayed. The same writer observes that\nAfrican savages, while allowing a European traveller to humour them and\ntreat them as children, will \u201camuse themselves at his expense after he\nis gone, and, indeed, while he is present, if they know that he cannot\nunderstand their speech\u201d.[138] {222}\n\nThese considerations will prepare us to understand how some have\nregarded savages as dull creatures, who know not how to laugh. That\nthis view is commonly held by those who have not visited them is\nsuggested by a passage in one of Peacock\u2019s stories. In _Crotchet\nCastle_ Mr. MacQueedy puts forward the thesis that laughter is \u201can\ninvoluntary action developed in man by the progress of civilisation,\u201d\nand adds that \u201cthe savage never laughs\u201d.[139]\n\nIt is only fair to say that travellers themselves have not been so\nfoolish as to uphold this view. At the same time, some of them have\ndrawn hasty conclusions from the fact that they happened never to have\nheard members of a particular tribe indulge in laughter. A curious\nillustration of this reasoning from inadequate negative evidence is\nthe dispute that took place, not so long ago, as to whether a people\nof Ceylon, known as Weddas (or Veddas), came into the category of\nthe laughing animal. It was confidently asserted by a certain Mr.\nHartshorne that they never laughed, even when they were experimented\nupon, and were confronted with the spectacle of others convulsed.\nAnother visitor may help us to understand this by his remark that\nthey vary \u201cbetween a taciturn and almost morose mood when hungry, and\na laughing reckless mood when not hungry\u201d. Hartshorne must evidently\nhave observed them in a hungry mood. Could it have been that, unlike\nMary Kingsley, as some of us remember her playfully observing, he had\nsomething about him which kindled appetite?[140] {223}\n\nOther illustrations of a too confident basing of a conclusion on\nfailure to observe may be found. Thus it is said by one traveller,\nBates, that the Brazilian Indians are of a phlegmatic, apathetic\ntemperament. A more recent visitor, Von den Steinen, gives us a\ndifferent impression, remarking in one instance that \u201cthe silent Indian\nmen and women continually chattered, and Eva\u2019s laughter sounded forth\nright merrily\u201d (lustig heraus).[141]\n\nThese apparent discrepancies in the notes of different observers point,\nI suspect, to something besides such accidents as the particular mood\nin which the tribe is found. The ability to provoke laughter is not\npossessed by all: witness the failure of many meritorious attempts\nby adults to excite children\u2019s merriment. Something of the easy\ngood-nature which disarms timidity, of fraternal sympathy, and of\nthe knack of making your audience believe you are like themselves,\nseems needed to draw forth all the mirthfulness of these children of\nnature.[142] We must always allow for this factor in the personal\nequation of the observer of savage ways. It is refreshing to find that\nmissionaries have so often succeeded in getting at the lighter moods of\nthe heathen. It speaks well for their genial humanity.\n\nThe general impression one derives from these accounts is that\nsavage tribes are certainly not given over to a sullen despair, but\non the contrary have a large and abundant mirth. Like children, they\nappear to express {224} their emotions with great freedom, and their\nlaughter and other signs of good spirits are of the most energetic\nkind. Darwin tells us that his correspondents, missionaries and others,\nsatisfied him on this point. Loud laughter accompanied by jumping\nabout and clapping of the hands, and frequently carried to the point\nof a flooding of the eyes\u2014these are conspicuous characteristics to be\nmet with among the Australians and other savage tribes.[143] Other\ntestimony supports Darwin. Sturt, for example, tells us that the\nnatives of Central Australia are a merry people, and sit up laughing\nand talking all the night long.[144] The more recent observations of\nLumholtz support the view that the natives are \u201cvery humorous\u201d.[145]\nThe Maoris (of New Zealand) are said by one traveller to be \u201cremarkable\nfor their natural gaiety: they are merry fellows: always laughing\nand joking, especially during the adventures of a journey\u201d.[146] Of\nthe Tasmanians we read: \u201cThere is not a little love of fun in the\ndespised aborigine\u201d.[147] Similarly, the South Sea Islanders are \u201cmore\naccustomed to jesting, mirth and humour than irritating and reproachful\nlanguage\u201d.[148] The natives of Tahiti, again, \u201cjest upon each other\nwith greater freedom than the Europeans\u201d.[149] So, the Tongans have\n\u201ca strong sense of the ludicrous\u201d which they show in \u201cthe ordinary\nintercourse of life\u201d.[150] Mr. Ling Roth, writing of the natives of\nBorneo, speaks of \u201cthe chaff and fun so dear to the heart of every\nKanowit\u201d.[151] {225}\n\nIn other regions, too, and among other races we light on the same\nexuberance of mirth. This is true of the natives of Africa, when they\nare unspoiled by Europeans. The Kafirs were said, by one who knew them\nearlier, to be generally speaking a good-humoured people with a keen\nrelish for amusement, and ready to join in a jest.[152] Visitors to the\nGold Coast found that the natives dearly loved a joke, and had a most\nlively sense of the ludicrous.[153] Miss Kingsley, as is well known,\nfound in the West Africans a people still given to mirth and jokes. In\na letter to me she writes: \u201cI think the West African, unadulterated,\nthe most humorous form of human being there is, and this makes him\nexceedingly good company for me\u201d.\n\nNor is this joyous exuberance confined to the natives of warm climates.\nWe find examples of it in the chilly North. One who visited the Indians\nof the Canadian Red River (the Chippewas) about forty years ago\nsays, that they are \u201cfull of frolic and fond of relating anecdotes;\nthey laugh immoderately at any trifling joke or absurdity and seem\nthoroughly to enjoy existence\u201d.[154]\n\nThese recurring statements of travellers about the mirthfulness of\nsavages are to some extent supported by other evidence. The writer on\nthe Tasmanians, already quoted, gives us a number of their different\nlocal names for fun. When a people\u2014and especially a savage people\u2014has a\nname for a thing, it is a fair inference that it has some considerable\nacquaintance with the thing itself.\n\nTo say that this or that tribe is given to laughter and joking does\nnot, of course, imply that the merry temper is {226} the constant or\neven the predominant one. We are told, indeed, in certain cases that\nthe mood is a changeable one, and that these undisciplined men and\nwomen resemble children in their rapid transitions from grave to gay.\nThus one traveller to the Gold Coast remarks that the inhabitants\nwill change suddenly from reckless gaiety to despondency.[155] On the\nother hand, as may be seen from our quotations, the predominance of\nthe gay temper, as expressed in the habitual smile and readiness to\nlaugh, seems to be a distinguishing trait of certain savage peoples.\nOne traveller, writing of the Patagonians, tells us that their faces\nwere \u201cordinarily bright and good-natured,\u201d and that two of them in\nparticular, whom he knew intimately, \u201calways had a smile on their\nfaces\u201d.[156]\n\nOn the other hand, there is reason to think that some tribes stand\nout from the general run of good-natured, merry folk by a habitual\npreponderance of the grave and austere in their bearing. Rengger, for\nexample, remarks of the Indians of Paraguay that they are serious\nand gloomy (d\u00fcster), laugh only rarely, and never break into loud\nlaughter.[157] There are probably serious savage tribes, as there are\nserious children in England and other civilised countries. It would be\nstrange, too, if the treatment of American Indians and other aboriginal\nraces by their civilised conquerors should not have developed now and\nagain, even in naturally merry folk, something of a gloomy demeanour,\nat least in presence of the white man. Hence, these exceptional cases\ndo not seem to impair our general conclusion, that laughter has a large\ndwelling-place among the uncivilised peoples of the earth. {227}\n\nThe descriptions of the movements expressive of mirth, given by these\nvisitors to savage tribes, are not as a rule full or exact. This might\nbe taken to mean that the laughter of a savage is much like our own.\nYet this would be a rash inference; for we must remember that it is not\neasy for one untrained in the finer kinds of observation to note with\nprecision movements so complex and so rapidly changeful as those which\nexpress gladness and mirth. The apparatus of the photographic camera\nand of the phonograph has not as yet, I believe, been made use of for\nthe purpose of registering these presumably primitive forms of laughter\nere they vanish from the earth.\n\nDarwin, as we have seen, has satisfied himself as to the flooding\nof the eyes. The concomitant movements of hands and feet seem to be\ncommon. A more precise account of these movements is given by Ling\nRoth. The Tasmanians, he tells us, accompanied their loud bursts of\nlaughter with movements of the hands to the head and quick tapping\nmovements of the feet.[158] The loud, deep-chested character of\nthe men\u2019s laughter is sometimes specially noted. A recent visitor\nto Central Africa regrets that, under European influence, the\ndeep-chested, hearty laughter of men is being replaced by what is known\nas the \u201cmission giggle\u201d in the younger folk.[159]\n\nI have come across, too, one attempt to describe with some exactness\nthe expression of a happy mood when it flows on more quietly. The good\nspirits of the Andamanese, it appears, show themselves in a sparkling\nof the eyes, and a wrinkling of the surrounding skin, also in a drawing\nback of the corners of the mouth which remains partially open.[160] It\nmay be concluded that the facial movements and {228} other changes\ncorrespond broadly with what we have seen to be the characteristic\nexpression in the case of the children of civilised races; though\ndifferences of racial physique undoubtedly introduce a slight amount of\ndissimilarity into the expressive movements of laughter.[161]\n\nMuch of this savage laughter is just the outcome of a \u201cgladsome\nmind,\u201d a flow of good spirits undisturbed by the thought of care\nor trouble. This persistent \u201ccheerfulness,\u201d to describe it by our\ninadequate language, stands their possessors in good stead. The natural\ngaiety of the Maoris, we are assured, comes to their aid when they\nencounter hardship. They are full of fun even when short of food on a\njourney.[162]\n\nBut the laughter of savages does not appear merely as a general sign\nof gaiety and rollicking spirits. It has become specialised into the\nexpression of particular mental conditions and attitudes similar to\nthose which are expressed by the laughter of our own children.\n\nFor example, we find instances of laughter occurring as a recoil from\nsomething like timidity or shyness. Two boys, relates a missionary,\nhad had the small-pox and had not seen one another for a month. When\nthey met in the missionary\u2019s house they began by shyly hiding from one\nanother their disfigured faces. At last they summoned courage, and\nafter many side looks at one another they faced round and burst out\nlaughing, the elder boy saying, \u201cWe are alike marked\u201d.[163] Here escape\nfrom _g\u00eane_, from a feeling akin to shame, was the primary condition of\nthe laughter, though this was no doubt reinforced by a sense of triumph\nas each discovered that he was, at least, not worse off than the other.\nA writer tells us that in East Africa {229} \u201ca slave never breaks a\nthing without an instinctive laugh of pleasure\u201d.[164] This laugh is set\ndown to the love of destruction; yet it may be, in part at least, like\nthat of a naughty child, a laugh of bravado hiding a consciousness of\nnaughtiness, a mode of drowning a nascent sense of shame; for it is\npresumable, from what this same writer tells us, that an East African\nslave does not destroy his owner\u2019s property with impunity. At the same\ntime, one must allow that the process of destruction in itself may be\nto a savage, as alas it often is to an English boy, an easy way to the\nattainment of a \u201csudden glory\u201d.\n\nSavages appear to resemble children more clearly in their introduction\nof jocose attack into their play. Here we see an analogy between the\nmental attitude of a savage and that of an older child. Nothing comes\nout more plainly in the reports on these uncivilised peoples than their\nfondness for teasing, including practical jokes.\n\nThe love of teasing is testified to by more than one writer. A good\nauthority tells us that savages \u201ctease one another much more freely and\njokingly (scherzhaft) than Europeans\u201d.[165] This fondness for teasing\ncomes out strongly in their mimicries of one another\u2019s defects, a\npoint to be illustrated presently. In certain cases, the teasing, as\nwith our own boys, is apt to take on a decidedly rough form. A lady,\nwriting of the inhabitants of Funafuti, observes: \u201cIt is thought a good\npractical joke in Funafuti for a girl to saw an unsuspecting youth with\na pandanus leaf,\u201d which produces a very painful scratch: \u201ca good deal\nof laughter on the one side and volubility on the other is the usual\nresult of this joke\u201d.[166] {230}\n\nPractical jokes grow out of the teasing instinct: they are new\ninventions which take the victim by surprise, if they do not distinctly\nmislead. The savage intelligence is quite boyish in the fecundity of\nits invention in this domain.\n\nThe younger folk seem to practise rude jokes very like those carried\nout by our own youngsters. Here is an instance. A young African negro,\nseeing an old woman carrying a pumpkin, approached her and shouted that\nthere was something on her head. She forgot all about the pumpkin,\nshrieked at the thought of some hideous object on her head, and ran\nforward, allowing her tormentor laughingly to pick up the prize she had\nlet fall.[167] As is natural, these practical jocosities are sometimes\ndirected, with a certain caution, of course, against the European. A\nyoung savage of Tasmania once slyly removed a bag of shell-fish laid\ndown by a sailor at the foot of a rock, and let him search for it in\nvain, and, when tired of his joke, replaced the bag, showing himself\n\u201chighly diverted\u201d at the trick he had played the European.[168]\n\nAs with ourselves, these practical jokes are wont to be paid back, and\nwith \u201cinterest\u201d. A story is told of certain Hottentots who played off a\njoke on some sleeping companions by shooting a couple of arrows close\nto them, which made them start up and hurry for arms to their waggons,\nwhere they were received with a shout of laughter. The victims of this\nfalse alarm afterwards paid out the perpetrators. They succeeded in\nterrifying them by a skilful imitation of the roar of a lion, which\ndrove them into camp screaming with terror.[169] In other cases the\n{231} practical joke may be retaliative of some serious annoyance,\nand may even be inflicted on some European \u201csuperior\u201d. Miss Kingsley\nrelates how some of her West African \u201cladies\u201d had been piqued by the\nemployee of a trading company, who tried to get them apart, when\nplanting manioc, so as to hinder them from talking. They took their\nplayful revenge by making a haycock over their tyrant and shouting:\n\u201cGet along, white man! I \u2019spectable married woman,\u201d and so forth. She\ngives another instance of this disposition to playful punishment in her\nladies. A young black official had been rude to some of them, whereupon\nthey resorted to the broader joke of throwing him into \u201cthe batter that\npasses for \u2018water\u2019\u201d.[170]\n\nClosely connected with these modes of teasing, we have the practice of\ntaking off bodily defects by mimicry and by nicknames. These modes of\nplayful attack appear to be directed most commonly against outsiders,\nbut instances are given of a discreet mimicry of a fellow-tribesman\nin his absence. It seems probable, though I have not found the fact\nbrought out explicitly, that much of the amusement derived by these\nsimple folk from their nightly talks, which are made gay with laughter,\nconsists in teasing attacks on the bodily defects or peculiarities of\ncertain members; though, from the evidence forthcoming, one would infer\nthat a choral laughter over the stranger is the more usual feature in\nthese social entertainments.\n\nIn all this mirthful teasing it is easy to see much that strikes us as\ncruel, or, at least, as unfeeling. It is only natural that the hilarity\nof peoples low down in the scale of culture should now and again take\non this aspect; as when, for example, they are said to laugh exultantly\nat {232} the struggles of a drowning man.[171] Yet, on the whole, the\nmerriment of these peoples, when the butt is a fellow-tribesman, though\nundoubtedly rough and often very coarse, does not seem to be so brutal\nas one might expect.\n\nWe can understand the diversion of so large an amount of savage mirth\ninto these practical channels\u2014teasing, bantering and playing-off jokes\nupon members of ones tribe, by reflecting that laughter is a social\nprocess, and plays, as we shall see presently, a large part in the\nsmooth working, if not also in the very maintenance, of the social\nfabric.\n\nIn order to see the meaning of this teasing laughter, we must note the\nway in which it is accepted. There is no doubt, to begin with, that\nsavages have by nature a lively dislike to being laughed at. It would\nbe strange indeed if this were not so, seeing that both the monkeys\nbelow them and the white men above them display this aversion. This\nseems to have been specially noted in the case of certain races. The\nWeddas of Ceylon, who, as we have seen, have not impressed all visitors\nas laughter-loving, show a marked displeasure at being made the butt\nof a joke. We are told that they are much provoked (gereizt) when they\nare laughed at (ausgelacht). It is related of one of these men that,\nwhen during a dance he was thus treated by a European, he shot an arrow\nat the laugher.[172] Poor old folk among ourselves will, we know, do\nmuch the same when they are jeered at by {233} incautious boys, and\neven a youth has been known to shy a stone at a too robust jeerer. This\ndislike of being made the object of a facetious attention holds good\nof other savages as well. A writer tells us that a common fireside\namusement among certain savages is to tease the women till they become\nangry, which always produces great merriment. The teasing, it is added,\nis of a rough and not very decent kind.[173] Further evidence of this\ndistaste for the douche of a voluble laughter is supplied by the\ncurious ordeals of the Greenlanders, to be spoken of presently.\n\nOn the other hand, there is ample evidence to show that the rough\njocosities of the teasing game are, as a rule, accepted in good part.\nThe youth who bore the biting satire of the pandanus leaf seems to\ncompare favourably in this respect with a London policeman, who\nrecently complained in court of the soft attentions paid him by a lady\nof the East End in tickling some part of his official visage with her\ndainty feather. Sometimes we are distinctly told that jokes are taken\nin good part, so long as they are seen to be intended as such. So of\nthe African Hottentots and Kafirs, according to the authority already\nquoted.[174] Of the Tahitians it is said that the jests played off at\ntheir expense are never taken in ill part.[175]\n\nIt is evident that the rougher kinds of jocosity here described allow\nconsiderable scope for something of the spirit of superiority and\ncontempt. One fears that this was felt to be present, for example, by\nthe women victimised by the men\u2019s coarse teasing. As with boys, so with\nsavages, we may suppose that playful attack does not always respect its\nlimits, but that now and again it allows itself {234} to be infected by\nthe brutish element in man. Nor is this surprising when we remember how\nmuch of so-called humour in civilised men owes its piquancy to the same\nbrutish ingredient.\n\nThis attitude of superiority and contempt seems, as one might have\nexpected, to be more apparent in what may be called the extra-tribal\ndirection of jocosity, more particularly in the common laughter at\nmembers of other rival and possibly hostile tribes. In certain cases\nwe are told that this is of the nature of mockery and ridicule. Among\nsavages and early communities, writes one authority, when their\nchieftain sat in his hall with his warriors, they amused themselves\nby turning enemies and opponents into mockery, laughing at their\nweaknesses, joking on their defects, giving them nicknames, and so\nforth.[176] The savage\u2014again like a boy\u2014is apt to be a vain sort of\nfellow, and to think that his ways are a lot better than those of\nthe rest of mankind. Hence he will, with something of contempt in\nhis heart, laugh at the bungling efforts of men of another tribe to\nkill a turtle, and will give a nickname to the white man or take off\nwith admirable mimicry some of his crazes, such as his passion for\nroad-making or for bartering.\n\nYet it would, I think, be an error to treat this laughter at the\noutsider as a form of serious ridicule, with its feeling of the\ncorrective superior. It is, even when lightly touched with contempt,\nsavage play, and has for its chief ingredient the love of fun, and that\ndelight in the mere contemplation of what is foreign and odd which the\nsavage shares with his ethnic betters.\n\nOne characteristic of this savage jocosity is so frequently referred\nto by travellers that I cannot pass it by. We have seen that the\nteasing of the women is apt to take {235} on an indecent form. We are\ntold, again and again, that savage jokes are commonly low and immoral.\nThe coarser the joke, we are informed, the better it is liked by\nthe natives of the Gold Coast.[177] The jests of the natives of the\nislands in the Pacific are said to be \u201clow and immoral to a disgusting\ndegree\u201d.[178]\n\nPossibly the European is not permitted to know the worst of this\naspect of savage mirth. It is easy, however, to give it too serious\na significance. To the simpler feeling of savages, untrammelled by\nthe laws of decency as civilised people know them, there may be no\nsuggestion here of a delight in the immoral as such. Their laughter may\nwell indicate the fact that for them an undisguised reference to what\nwe insist on hiding up has in it nothing improper; that they are just\nwithin sight of the stadium of culture at which convention begins to\nbrand such references as obscene. Young children among ourselves will,\nI believe, often laugh at such open and direct mention of unmentionable\nthings and much in the same way. It is hardly more in many cases, I\nsurmise, than a little bravado, a glorying in doing something unusual\nwhich they are beginning to suspect is forbidden, though this is no\ndoubt apt to be accompanied by a perception of the indignity done by\nthis uncovering to the person involved.[179]\n\nWe may now turn to those forms of savage laughter which involve a more\ndisinterested contemplation of things, and a rudimentary sense of their\nludicrous phases. There {236} is no doubt that the enjoyment of the\ndroll side of their world fills a large place in the life of savages.\nOne may conjecture that it is a larger pastime in their case than in\nthat of most boys; for though the intellect of a savage may not surpass\nthat of a boy, his experience and matured good sense enable him to\njudge of the unseemly and the incongruous with considerable skill and\nquickness, and to derive much mirth from the contemplation of them.\n\nThe simplest form of this merriment, serving, as in the case of\nthe child, as a bridge from joyous expansion under a new sensuous\nexcitement to an appreciation of the odd, is the common laughter of\nsavages at what is strikingly new to them, and at the same time takes\ntheir fancy. For example, the natives of Borneo were very much amused\nat a piano, and when they saw the dampers of the keys jumping up and\ndown they \u201cfairly laughed aloud\u201d.[180] In like manner the Indians of\nHudson Bay took a compass for a toy and laughed at it, refusing to\naccept the owner\u2019s account of its use.[181] These are pretty clear\nexamples of a mirthful delight at something which is new, devoid\nof import, and appealing to the play-appetite. The later stages of\nthe laughter at the lively little compass-toy were, perhaps, more\nexpressive of a dim sense of the absurdity of the suggestion that a\ndear wee play-thing could do such marvels. This gleeful greeting of\nwhat is at once new and exhilarating to sense answers in the case of\nthese simple people to what in ourselves is joyous admiration. Thus,\nwe read of certain African ladies, wives of a king, who expressed\ntheir delight at European works of art by repeated loud bursts of\nlaughter.[182] Our own children show us now and again how the new, when\nit not only captures the sense by its novelty, {237} but holds it by\nits charm, may evoke this purely mirthful greeting, as free from the\nstiff attitude of curiosity as it is from fearsomeness.[183]\n\nIt is a good step from this childish abandonment to the fun of a new\ntoy-like thing to the recognition of something as foreign and opposed\nto the tribal custom. In these simple communities the unwritten laws\nof custom play a most important part. Violations of them on the part\nof any tribesman are apt to be dealt with seriously. This at once\ntends to limit the range of savage laughter; the pressure of custom is\ntoo tyrannical to allow of a full display of the odd and irregular in\nhuman behaviour. These elements of the amusing have accordingly to be\nsupplied from without; and they are supplied in good measure, partly by\nother neighbouring tribes whose manners are observable, and to a still\nlarger extent by the Europeans who visit them with a virtuous intention\nto reform and civilise.\n\nLet us first take a glance at the hilarious appreciation of the _other_\ntribe\u2019s ways. The spectacle of the foreigner will grow particularly\nentertaining when he seems to bungle in doing something which is\nperfectly familiar to the observer\u2019s own tribe. The Tahitians, it\nseems, are laughed at by the dwellers in the neighbouring islands\nwhen they try to kill a turtle by pinching its throat. As may be\nsupposed, the trick, so useful to the beast, of drawing in the head\ngives a veritable look of the absurd to these attempts. So, too, the\nenlightened people of one island drew voluminous amusement from the\nnews that those of another island who had just come into possession\nof the novelty, a pair of scissors, tried to sharpen them by baking\nthem.[184] These two illustrations show a dim apprehension of the\nfitness of things as {238} determined, not by the relative standard of\n\u201cmy way,\u201d but by an objective standard.\n\nThe field in which they cull most of their facetious enjoyment of\nthe doings of outsiders would seem to be the ways of their white\nvisitors. There the differences, the departure from \u201cour way\u201d and\nthe inability to acquire this are great enough to appeal strongly to\ntheir crude sense of the ludicrous. They see the odd white people\ndo a number of things which strike them as extraordinary and quite\nuseless. If the Englishman laughs at the foreigner for not taking\nhis morning tub, the simple savage will turn the tables by making\nmerry over our elaborate washings. Thus the Fuegians, though living\nmuch in the water, have no idea of washing themselves; accordingly\n\u201cwhen Europeans first came among them, the sight of a man washing his\nface seemed to them so irresistibly ludicrous that they burst into\nshrieks of laughter\u201d.[185] Here is an example of a rather more complex\nfeeling in presence of new-fangled European ways. It seems that a\nSouth African Prince, presumably as a compliment to the white man\u2019s\ncustom, wished to shave himself and, as our youths frequently do on\nfirst attempting the feat, cut himself. He then asked his European\nvisitor to perform the office for him. The natives present \u201cstood mute\nwith admiration during the whole performance, gazing with the utmost\neagerness in their countenances, and bursting at length into a general\npeal of laughter\u2014this being their customary mode of expressing delight,\nastonishment, nay even embarrassment and fear.\u201d[186] The last part of\nthis statement is a little loose, since, as we have seen, it is not so\nmuch the astonishment, the embarrassment, or the fear in itself, which\nlaughter expresses, as a relaxation of the strain involved in these\nattitudes. {239}\n\nThe laughter excited is of a rather more intellectual kind when the\naction of the white man presents itself as absurd, not merely because\nit rudely diverges from the customs of the natives, but because it\ninvolves something out of the range of their comprehension, and so\nappears incredible. It is then that the white man shows his superiority\nin evoking laughter: his arts, his apparatus\u2014when like the photographic\ncamera they do not excite fears\u2014are apt to evoke incredulous laughter.\nA traveller in South Africa had learned some sentences of the speech\nof a tribe (the Sichuana language) from his man. He then wrote them\ndown and read them off before the man. This simple fellow laughed\n\u201cmost heartily\u201d when his white master told him that it was the marks\nhe had made in the book which showed him what he was to say.[187] A\nchild would pretty certainly join the savage in laughing at the idea\nof getting sounds out of the inert, stupid-looking word-symbols, if it\nwere suddenly introduced to him in this way.\n\nWhen the white man\u2019s doings are not absolutely new, he may expose\nhimself to the laughter of these merry folk by the odd manner of them.\nOne would like to know all the jokes which the natives of South Africa,\nof Polynesia, and the other abodes of the mirthful \u201cNaturkind\u201d have had\nover the dress, the gestures, and the speech of their white visitors.\nYet this would be hard to get at. We do know, however, how they are\nwont to greet some of our highly civilised performances. This is the\nway in which some Tasmanian women behaved on a first introduction\nto the European manner of singing. They listened attentively while\nit lasted; then some applauded by loud shouts; others laughed to\nsplitting, while the young girls, {240} no doubt more timid, remained\nsilent.[188] This laughter was, presumably, more than the expression of\na wild delight. Those who laughed may be supposed to have been the most\nsusceptible to the absurdity of this unheard of manner of song. In the\ncase of the closely allied art of dancing, we are distinctly told that\nour highly approved style may appear ridiculous to the savage onlooker.\nThe Sumatrans, writes one authority, have very slow dances which are\nthought to be ludicrous by Europeans. Yet, funnily enough, they think\nour customary dances \u201cto the full as ludicrous\u201d. They compared our\nminuets to the fighting of two game cocks.[189] Did they also see a\ngalop, one wonders, and if so, what did the lovers of slow dances say\nabout this? The \u201crefinements\u201d of the arts of civilised men are ever apt\nto appear laughable to those lower down.\n\nThe laughter of these uninstructed people grows loud when the clever\nwhite man fails to achieve one of their own simple accomplishments.\nMore particularly, his inability to pronounce the sounds of their\nlanguage seems to be a prolific source of merriment. The Tasmanians,\nwrites one whom we have quoted more than once, often laughed to\nsplitting when, wishing to repeat their words, \u201cI made mistakes or\npronounced them badly\u201d.[190] Another traveller, speaking of the natives\nof the West Coast of Vancouver\u2019s Island, writes: \u201cThat they had some\nstandard of correct speech is evident from the readiness of the\nchildren to ridicule a stranger who mispronounces native words\u201d.[191]\nA third example comes from Borneo. The girls, a visitor reports, made\nEuropeans repeat sentences of their language after them, and burst\nout into loud laughter \u201ceither at our pronunciation or at the {241}\ncomical things they had made us utter\u201d.[192] Nothing, perhaps, more\nclearly exhibits the ludicrous value of the violation of a perfectly\nuniform custom than a mispronunciation of language.[193] Nor is this\nall. It seems absurd to a savage, just as it does to an average English\nchild, that the foreigner should fail to do what seems to him not\nmerely to require no effort, but to be something one cannot help doing,\nlike laughing itself or crying. No doubt some feeling of superiority\nto the foreign ignoramus enters into the enjoyment here. Perhaps the\nchildren of Vancouver\u2019s Island felt this superiority most of all. In\nsome cases, however, we are distinctly told that the ineptitude of\nEuropeans, when it provokes laughter, calls out also the soothing\naccompaniment of kindly encouragement.\n\nThe exhibition of another kind of incompetence to do the thing \u201cwe do,\u201d\nhighly provoking to the hilarious mood, is a breach of good manners;\nfor here there comes in something of the sense of social superiority,\nand something of the joyous momentary relief from the burden of rules\nof etiquette. Just as \u201cSociety\u201d gets nearest to a genuine laugh when\nconfronted with the vulgarities of Midas as he pushes into her inner\ncircle, so the savage keenly enjoys his opportunity of detecting\n_gaucherie_ and want of _savoir faire_ on the side of his white\nvisitors. Indeed, he seems ready, when he is sure of not offending,\nto treat these breaches of etiquette with good-natured merriment. A\ntraveller tells us that on visiting the house of an Indian chief in\nCanada he sat down on what he took to be a bundle of buffalo robes. The\ncomposure of mind proper to a guest of royalty must have been slightly\ndisturbed at the discovery that the robes began to move and undulate\nbeneath him, till to his utter confusion {242} he felt himself\nprojected into the middle of the tent among the embers. The chief, his\nthree wives and the other native people in the tent \u201cshrieked with\nlaughter\u201d at the catastrophe. The full measure of the good humour that\nlay behind this laughter revealed itself to the white visitor when he\nsaw emerging from the heap of robes the fourth and youngest wife of the\nchief, who, to her credit be it said, joined in the hilarity.[194]\n\nSomething of the reflective element seems to peep out in one variety\nof this laughter at the odd ways of the white man. A missionary, one\nof the discerning ones as it would seem, found the Sea Dyaks disposed\nto treat the idea of our religious services as a joke. They were\ncurious to learn what was required of the religious worshipper, and\nparticularly wanted to know whether he was forbidden to laugh; and\nthey explained their inquisitiveness by confessing that, like Mr.\nBarrie\u2019s \u201cHumorist,\u201d they were far from sure of being able to restrain\nthemselves.[195] Solemn ceremony with its severe demands will be apt,\nwhen its meaning is hidden, to provoke in savages and in children alike\na keen desire for the relief of a laugh.\n\nA palpable ingredient of mind appears in the laughter of savages at\nthe white man\u2019s ideas about the beginnings and the endings of things.\nThe inquirer into their beliefs may present himself to them as a\nquite unreasonable sceptic, grubbing at the very roots of things\nwhich sensible men accept as self-explanatory. The members of a tribe\nin Central Australia (Arunta tribe) were immensely tickled by the\nquestion how their remote ancestors came by the sacred stones or sticks\nwhich they had handed down to them. The idea, that anything could\nhave existed before these {243} original ancestors, struck them as\nridiculous. The ultimate explanation of any custom of the tribe was,\n\u201cOur fathers did it, and therefore we do it\u201d. To try to go behind\ntradition was to challenge its sufficiency, and so to put forward\nan absurd paradox.[196] Here we have a mental attitude at once like\nand unlike that of our children; for the latter are conservative of\ntradition and disposed to accept authority, but at the same time very\nenergetic in pushing back inquiry into \u201cwhat came before\u201d.\n\nIntelligence would seem not merely to be stirring, but to be capable\nof adroit play when the savage detects the ridiculous in the white\nman\u2019s ideas of the future of his race. How many of the simple savages\nwho are instructed in the dogmas of the Christian religion accept them\nunquestioningly it would be hard to say. Many, perhaps, fail to put\nany definite meaning into what they hear. Now and again, however, we\nmeet with an instance of a daring laugh at what strikes the hearer as\nutterly absurd. A teacher of the native Australians had once tried to\nexplain to an intelligent black the doctrine of the immateriality and\nimmortality of the soul. He afterwards learned that his pupil had gone\naway from the lesson to have a hearty fit of laughter at the absurdity\nof the idea \u201cof a man\u2019s living and going about without arms, legs,\nor mouth to eat\u201d.[197] The crass materialism of this tyro\u2019s effort\nto assimilate spiritual ideas was much the same as we observe in our\nchildren.\n\nIn this laughter at our ways and our ideas we superior people are\ninclined to see merely the ignorance and narrowness of mind of the\nlaughers. Yet it is possible that the savage may, once and again,\nin making merry at our {244} expense show himself really our\nsuperior. His good sense may be equal to the detection of some of\nthe huge follies in the matter of dress and other customs to which\nthe enlightened European so comically clings. And he has been known\nto strike the satirical note and to look down upon and laugh \u201cat the\nstupid self-satisfied Europeans who preached so finely but practised so\nlittle what they preached\u201d.[198]\n\nWe may now glance at the intra-tribal activity of the mirthful impulse.\nThat this fills some place in the life of savage communities has been\nillustrated in our account of their teasings. We must not expect to\nfind here a large field for the play of what we call the comic spirit.\nAs we shall see presently, this spirit only begins to fly bravely when\nthe movement of civilisation introduces more diversity of class, and,\nfurther, a greater liberty of utterance\u2014for women as well as for men.\n\nA pretty clear illustration of laughter directed to fellow-tribesmen\nis supplied by the merriment that is said to accompany athletic and\nother competitions in which skill is tested. Among the natives of\nVictoria, we are informed, a favourite amusement of the young men is\nthe throwing of the spear and other similar exercises. The trials of\nskill are accompanied by a good deal of laughter, notwithstanding that\nthe older men are present to instruct the boys and that some effort is\nmade to preserve discipline.[199] This merriment is no doubt largely\nthe counterpart of our schoolboys\u2019 laughter in the playground. It is\nthe expression of a keen enjoyment of the triumphs of the game. At\nthe same time {245} if, as one may assume, it is directed against\nblunders it has a sociological significance. It becomes a \u201csocial\nsanction,\u201d which urges a youth to do his best in the field. Another\nexample illustrates the impulse to laugh at a comrade\u2019s failure to\naccomplish a feat for which he is totally unprepared. A member of a\nEuropean party which was visiting the Weddas could move his ears. A\nnative was asked to do the same; and the others, knowing what was to be\ndone, watched him attentively. The man singled out for the feat looked\nblankly towards the sky, his ears remaining \u201cas if nailed to his head\u201d;\nat this moving spectacle one of the onlookers suddenly broke out into\nlaughter, the others at once joining in.[200] Here we have laughter at\na fellow-tribesman, in face of Europeans too, exactly similar to that\nwhich is directed against the European himself. Doubtless, there is\nmuch of this kind of laughter at those who make an exhibition of their\nlimitations, especially when the attempt is preceded by a display of\nvanity and boastfulness. In this respect, too, savage laughter has the\nring of the merriment of the playground and of the circus.\n\nOne of the first forms of a reciprocal mirthful attack or bantering\nbetween classes is that between the Sexes. Savage life supplies us\nwith clear cases of inter-sexual jocosity besides that of the teasing\nwhich, as we have seen, is a two-sided game. In a collection of sayings\nand stories of West Africa we find the following: A woman left her\nhusband to look after a \u201cpot-au-feu\u201d. On returning she found that he\nhad skimmed off the bubbling foam and hidden it in a calabash, na\u00efvely\nsupposing that this was the cream of the dish. She twits him with\nit and discovers to his slow wits that the savory scum has melted\ninto nothing.[201] This {246} reminds one of many a story of the\nMiddle Ages, and shows how wide-spread is the exposure of the male\nincompetence to the lash of woman\u2019s merry wit.\n\nThese jocose thrusts at the opposite sex are interesting as\nillustrating the differentiation of class-standards. If the male is\nlaughed at for his bungling at the mysteries of cooking, how much\nmore when he actually fails to keep up with the women folk in his own\ndomain! Mr. Ling Roth, whose eye seems to have been specially focussed\nfor records of the mirthful utterances of savages, tells us that a\nboat-load of women who had been gathering oysters rowed a race with a\nvisitors\u2019 crew and managed to beat them; whereupon there was a fine\noutburst of feminine hilarity and much quizzing of the men who had\nallowed themselves to be beaten by women.[202] Here, surely, was a\ntouch of a higher feeling, a dim perception at least of the permanent\nand universal forms of the fitness of things.\n\nThe clearest example, I have met with, of what we should call a dry\nhumour is to be found in the work just quoted. It seems that a stupid\nold soothsayer once called together a large concourse of chiefs to deal\nwith the problem of naming his children. These, he contended, were\nnot properly his, but had been begotten by certain spirits (the Antus\nor Hantus). One of the chiefs did not enjoy having to come many miles\nto listen to this sort of stuff, so \u201che pretended in the midst of the\nsoothsayer\u2019s discourse to faint away, and fell back gasping for breath,\nkicking his legs spasmodically in the air at the same time\u201d. This\ninterruption brought the tedious proceedings to an end, and so saved\nthe chief from further boredom. But this was not all: the disappointed\nhumbug had to pay the chief {247} who had spoilt his performance some\nfowls as a punishment for allowing the spirits to attack him.[203] The\nstory is instructive as illustrating the tendency, as soon as classes\nbegin to be marked off, to score off a man of another class. Perhaps,\nindeed, we have in this jocose imposition on the imposer a suggestion\nof the merry-making of kings and peoples at the expense of the clergy\nwhich was so marked a feature in medi\u00e6val hilarity.\n\nA word may well be expended on the subject of the organisation of the\nlaughing propensity into regular amusements among savage tribes. One of\nthe things which a white man can learn from these much-misunderstood\npeoples is the art of social entertainment. Without luxurious salons,\nwithout plate and rare wines, without the theatre and the concert\nhall, they manage to obtain a good deal of genuine, unpretentious\nconviviality. When, writes one traveller, they are relieved of the\npresence of strangers they have much easy social conversation. Round\ntheir own fires they sing and chat, and older men lie and brag about\nfeats in war and chase. \u201cJokes pass freely and the laugh is long if not\nloud.\u201d[204]\n\nA standard dish in these social entertainments is taking off the\npeculiarities of other tribes and of Europeans. Mimicry, the basis\nof the actor\u2019s art, is often carried to a high degree of perfection\namong these uncouth savages; and it is highly prized. When, writes a\nmissionary of the tribes of the remote part of Victoria, a native is\nable to imitate the peculiarities of some absent member of the tribe,\nit is very common to hear all in the camp convulsed with laughter.[205]\nThe Indians of Brazil hold the peculiarities, _e.g._, the beard, of\nother tribes up to laughter by means {248} of a lively pantomime.[206]\nThis mimicry, as might be expected, embraces the odd ways of the white\nman. The natives of New South Wales used to be so skilful in this\nart that one wrote of them: \u201cTheir mimicking of the oddities, dress,\nwalk, gait and looks of all the Europeans whom they have seen from\nthe time of Governor Phillips downwards, is so exact as to be a kind\nof historic register of their several actions and characters\u201d.[207]\nThe same authority tells us that the Tahitians are acute observers of\nthe manners, actions, and even looks of strangers; and if they have\nany singular imperfections or oddities, they will not fail to make\nthemselves merry at their expense.[208] Another traveller certifies\nto the fact that the aborigines of Victoria were splendid mimics, and\nwould, after attending the white man\u2019s church, \u201ctake a book and with\nmuch success imitate the clergyman in his manner, laughing and enjoying\nthe applause which they received\u201d.[209] A turn for mimicry is found\nalso among the North American Indians. The Californian Indians gave\nto the American whites the name \u201cWo\u2019hah,\u201d formed from \u201cwhoa-haw,\u201d the\nsound they heard the early emigrants produce when they drove their\noxen. \u201cLet an Indian see an American coming up the road, and cry out to\nhis fellows: \u2018There comes a wo\u2019hah,\u2019 at the same time swinging his arm\nas if driving oxen, and it will produce convulsive laughter.\u201d[210]\n\nAlong with this skill in mimicry, savages show considerable readiness\nin the verbal arts of descriptive caricature, witty sayings and\nrepartee. In practising these, we are told, they make ample use of the\ninstrument of irony.\n\nThe possession of these rudiments of talent naturally leads {249} to\na certain amount of specialisation. It is attested again and again\nthat our uncultured savage communities possess their professional\npantomists, jesters and wits. Indeed, we read of crude forms of a\ncomic art among savages so low in the scale as the Australians and\nthe Tasmanians. Thus, Lumholtz writes of the pantomimic dances of the\nAustralian blacks,[211] and Ling Roth assures us that the Tasmanians\nhave their drolls and mountebanks, who exhibit the peculiarities of\nindividuals with considerable force.[212] Among the Sumatrans, again,\nare to be found \u201ccharacters of humour,\u201d who by buffoonery, mimicry,\npunning, repartee and satire are able to keep the company in laughter\nat intervals during a night\u2019s entertainment.[213] In some cases jesters\nare appointed by a chief, just as a fool used to be selected by one of\nour kings. In Samoa every chief has his regular clown, a privileged\nperson who, among other liberties, is allowed that of taking the food\nout of the chiefs mouth.[214] A privileged buffoon in Kanowit, who had\nbeen given an old gun, told the Resident that he had killed fourteen\ndeer with one bullet. The Resident being puzzled, he explained that\nhe had cut the bullet out each time.[215] Here we have the exact\ncounterpart to the trick of the European clown of the circus.\n\nAmong the Eskimo of Greenland, it seems, there is a regular performance\nin which the aspiring \u201cfunny men\u201d compete for popular favour. After a\nrepast they get up, one after the other, each exhibiting his musical\nresources by beating a drum and singing, and adding a touch of the\nactor\u2019s art by making comical gestures, and playing ridiculous tricks\nwith the face, head and limbs.[216] Much the same kind of contest\ntakes place {250} in connection with their peculiar ordeals, already\nreferred to. Each of the two litigants tries to make the other\nridiculous, by singing satirical songs and relating misdeeds; and the\none who succeeds in getting the audience to laugh most at his jibes or\ninvectives is pronounced the conqueror. Even such serious crimes as\nmurder are often expiated in this merry fashion.[217]\n\nIn one or two cases we read of more elaborate entertainments. Thus,\nsome of the natives of the Western Pacific have a regular masquerade\nperformed before the King, into which may enter a histrionic\nrepresentation of a British sailor with his cutlass, acted by a leading\nbuffoon, who combines with the _r\u00f4le_ of a \u201cpremier\u201d the \u201cfool\u2019s\u201d\nprivilege of breaking through the strict laws of decorum by pointing\nto the King and asking ironically if that was the King\u2014amid shouts of\nlaughter.[218]\n\nOther traces of a rudimentary art of the comic are to be found in the\namusing songs and stories which can be traced to savage invention.\nThe Australians had songs in which the peculiarities of Europeans\nwere caricatured, the chorus being sung amid shouts of laughter.[219]\nAnother comic song, heard among some of the aborigines of Australia,\ntook off the bodily peculiarities of some men\u2014presumably of another\ntribe\u2014in the graceful lines:\u2014\n\n    Oh, what legs, oh, what legs!\n    The Kangaroo-rumped fellows.\n    Oh, what legs, oh, what legs![220]\n\nIn these crude forms of art we probably find traces of the influence\nof European models. There are, however, stories {251} which seem to\nbe a perfectly spontaneous growth. Of these it is enough to refer to\nthe originals of the delightful tales of Uncle Remus, the substance of\nwhich, as their author tells us, he obtained from the blacks in the\nAmerican plantations.[221] Miss Kingsley writes to me of these: \u201cI know\nthe tales are not made up. I struck the Tar Baby Stories in the Lower\nCongo\u201d. It may be added that the device of the tar baby is to be found\nin its essentials in a collection of African stories.[222]\n\nOur study seems to tell us that savage laughter is like our own in\nrepresenting different levels of refinement. Much of it is just na\u00efve,\nunthinking gaiety, like that of the little girl spoken about in the\npreceding chapter. Co-existing with this infantile gaiety we have the\ncoarse brutal forms of laughter which we associate with the rougher\nkind of schoolboy. Along with these lower forms we find higher ones,\nin which some amount of reference to social standards is discoverable.\nLastly, we may detect here and there, as in the story of the man\ntickled by the idea of dead men going about _sans_ arms, legs, etc.,\nand of him who jocosely stripped a humbug of his disguise, germs of\na more thoughtful laughter; and on the other hand, in the kindly\ntempering of the laughter of the girls at the Englishwoman\u2019s inability\nto make mats, a movement towards sympathetic laughter. In other words,\nwe detect the dim beginnings of that complex feeling or attitude which\nwe call humour. It seems probable that the quality, if not also the\nquantity, improves as we pass from the lowest and most degraded to the\nhigher savage tribes.[223] {252}\n\nHence, no doubt, the difficulty which has been felt by travellers\nin describing the common characteristics of the hilarity of savage\ntribes. Miss Kingsley writes to me with respect to the humour of the\nWest African: \u201cIt is peculiar, it is not child-like\u2014it is more feminine\nin quality, though it is very broad or coarse. It is difficult to\ndescribe. I can only say what seems to me an excellent joke seems\nso to him\u2014there are many jokes neither of us can see the point of:\nothers, we chuckle over, superior persons look down on and would call\nbuffoonery.\u201d[224]\n\nOne practical reflection to close with. Any civilised community which\nhas much to do in the way of managing the \u201clower races\u201d would surely\nbe wise to take some heed of their love of fun. And this, because it\nhas been found that appeals to this side have been more effective than\nthe harsher measures to which even a gentle Briton may think himself\nsometimes driven. An African missionary, already quoted, writes that in\ncases where a disposition to quarrel shows itself \u201cone joke is worth\nten arguments\u201d.[225] This is borne out by one who has not much good to\ntell of his savages, when he says of the East African that he delights\n{253} in a joke \u201cwhich manages him like a Neapolitan\u201d.[226] In a\nletter to me Miss Kingsley writes: \u201cI have always found I could chaff\nthem into doing things that other people could not get them to do, with\nblows\u2014I could laugh them out of things other people would have to blow\nout of them with a gun\u201d.\n\n{254}\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX.\n\nLAUGHTER IN SOCIAL EVOLUTION.\n\n\nIn the two preceding chapters we have followed the earlier stages of\nthe development of laughter in the individual and have glanced at\nits counterpart in the life of savage communities. If now we try to\npush the psychological inquiry farther, and ask how the mirth of the\nchild develops into that complex sentiment which in these days we call\nhumour, we find ourselves forced to pause. One thing is clear, however.\nNo one of us would ever have acquired this valuable endowment but for\nthe educative action of that advanced stage of social culture which\nis our intellectual and moral environment. It seems to follow that\nwe shall need to look for a moment at the movement of social culture\nitself, to consider the impulse of laughter as one of the features in\nthe life of a community, and to inquire how it has become transformed,\nalmost beyond recognition, by the movement of social progress.\n\nTo attempt to give an exhaustive account of these social changes would\nclearly lead us very far. It may be argued with force that every one of\nthe great directions of social evolution, such as that of intellectual\nconceptions, of moral sentiments, of political and social liberty, of\nwealth, of the differentiation of classes and ranks, has involved as\nits effect some change in the intensity, the mode of distribution,\nand the manner of expression in daily life and in {255} art, of the\nlaughing impulse. But we do not need to consider so deeply. It will\nbe enough if we briefly retrace those phases of social evolution\nwhich appear to carry with them as their immediate accompaniments\nconsiderable modifications of the mirthful spirit.\n\nWe must in this inquiry begin by defining the social aspect of\nlaughter. This was touched on in the last chapter in connection with\nour study of the mirth of savages. We have now to examine it more\nclosely.\n\nOne of its most obvious characteristics is its contagiousness, already\nreferred to.[227] The potent appeal of laughter to a mechanical\nimitativeness is significant in more ways than one. It suggests how\nlarge a part of human hilarity is nothing but a kind of surface\nresonance, as empty of ideas as the infectious yawn or cough. But\nit suggests also that laughter is social in the sense that it is\nessentially choral and so uniting. A gathering of yokels at a fair\nlaughing at a clown tends for the moment to become a coherent group;\nand the habit of laughing together will tend to consolidate the group.\n\nWhen the conjoint laughter is less automatic and issues from community\nof ideas and sentiments, the contagious property still plays a part. It\nis as if the swift response of others\u2019 laughter, the drowning of one\u2019s\nown outburst in the general roar, effaced for the time the boundaries\nof one\u2019s personality. To rejoice together in the full utterance of the\nlaugh, though it moves us less deeply than to weep together, is perhaps\nno less potent in cementing a lasting comradeship.\n\nThe social side of laughter comprehends, however, much more than this.\nIt is commonly recognised that the feeling expressed has something\nhuman for its object. Now those {256} who directly or indirectly serve\nas the butt are all the world over disposed, till the grace of a genial\ntolerance has been added, to dislike and resent the part thrust on\nthem. So far, then, laughter would seem to be anti-social and dividing,\nand, alas, the history of literature will furnish the student with\nnotable illustrations. Yet this hurtful edge in laughter becomes one\nof its valuable social properties. As the despised Greenlanders may\nteach us, laughter supplies a mode of punishment which combines with\neffectiveness, economy and humanity, a good deal of enjoyment for the\nonlookers. In all societies, if not exactly in the Greenland fashion,\nit has been accorded an important place among the agencies which, by\ncastigating vices and follies, seek to lower their vitality.\n\nThe sharp edge of laughter represents, however, only one of its\neffects on the sensibilities of the butt. Savage life has given us\nillustrations, not only of its disagreeable consequences turned to\njudicial purposes, but of its agreeable consequences in cajoling others\nout of attitudes of hostility and stubbornness. This curious effect, as\nit may seem, of a mode of treatment which is primarily hurtful is to be\nexplained in the main by its playful function. To substitute a joke for\nargument or coercive pressure is, like tickling, to challenge to play,\nand tends to call up the play-mood in the recipient of the challenge.\nThe mutual teasings of savages serve, as we have seen, as a training,\nan \u1f04\u03c3\u03ba\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, in simple and estimable virtues, such as the maintenance\nof good temper, toleration, and the setting of comradeship above one\u2019s\nprivate feelings.\n\nOne other social aspect of laughter illustrated by savage life needs to\nbe touched on. In the instinctive tendency of the savage to ridicule\nthe customs and ideas of outside folk we have one expression of the\nself-protective attitude of a {257} community against insidious\noutside influences. Just as the Hebrews ridiculed the religious ideas\nof the worshippers of Baal and so helped to keep their national faith\nintact, so these tribes low down in the culture scale have in their\nlaughter at what is foreign a prophylactic against any contamination\nfrom outside peoples. No doubt this tendency in laughter will help to\npreserve once useful tribal characters when altered circumstances,\nintroduced, for example, by the coming of the white man, require new\nadaptations. In this we see the essentially conservative function of\nlaughter in the life of societies. On the other hand, as we have seen,\nnovelties in dress introduced by the white man may attract and delight.\nIn dealing with the connection between social progress and laughter, we\nshall need to consider very carefully the attitude which the mirthful\nspirit takes up towards social changes.\n\nNow these aspects of laughter point, as we have seen, to a social\nutility in laughter. As offspring of the play-impulse, it might,\nindeed, be expected to share in those benefits which, as recent\nresearch has made clear, belong to play. In our study of its\ndevelopment and persistence in the life of progressive communities, we\nshall have occasion to illustrate this utility much more fully. That\nlaughing is good, physically and morally, for its individual subjects\nhas become a commonplace, at least to the student of literature. Here\nwe shall be concerned with its distinctly social advantages, such\nas the maintenance of customs which from the point of view of the\ncommunity, or of some class of the community, are to be regarded as\ngood, the keeping down of vices and follies, and the furtherance of\nsocial co-operation.\n\nThe question how far this utility extends is one which cannot be\nanswered simply. It will be found that societies, {258} so far from\nuniversally recognising laughter as a useful habit, have taken vast\npains to restrain it. Indeed, our study of the fortunes of mirth in\nthe advance of social life will show us that it has had throughout to\nstruggle for its existence.\n\nFrom what has just been said it will be clear that we shall have to\nconsider the history of laughter and the movement of social evolution\nas inter-connected. Not only does a change in ideas, sentiments or\ninstitutions tend to modify the expression of the mirthful mood, there\nis a reciprocal influence of laughter upon ideas, sentiments and\ninstitutions. Such interaction holds good generally between amusements\nand serious pursuits; the recreations of a community serve in important\nways to determine the measure of the vigour thrown into serious\nactivities. In the case of laughter this reciprocal influence is much\nmore marked, owing to the circumstance that mirth has been wont to play\nabout serious things, to make these the target for its finely tipped\nshafts, now and again going so far as to shoot one into the midst of\nthe solemnities of social life.\n\nIn the savage tribe we find but little of class division. The\nperception of what is unfit and the laughter which accompanies this\nare directed, for the most part, to members of other communities. The\nlaughter is choral because it is that in which the whole tribe joins\nor is prepared to join; but for that very reason it has a monotonous\nsound. Some differentiation of groups within the community seems\nnecessary, not merely for the constitution of a society, but for the\nfree play of the laughing spirit. Diversity in thought and behaviour is\na main condition of the full flow of social gaiety.\n\nThe germ of such diversity is present in the lowest {259} conceivable\ntype of human community. The institution of male and female in which\nNature, as if to combine divine work with human, at once joins together\nand puts asunder, has been with us from the beginnings of human\nsociety; and it might be an amusing pastime to speculate how the males\nof our ape-like ancestors first gurgled out their ridicule of female\ninferiority, and how the females managed to use their first rudiment\nof speech-power in turning the tables on their lords and masters. Some\ndifferentiation of rank, too, must have been found in the simplest\nhuman societies in the contrast between the old and the young, and the\nclosely connected opposition of the rulers and the ruled. But it would\nbe hazardous to reason that, in the early stages of social evolution,\nmuch in the way of exchange of fun passed between those who were\npresumably kept solemnly apart by the sense of their relative station.\n\nIt is only when we move on to a society with a considerable amount of\nclass differentiation that its relation to the nurture and distribution\nof the spirit of mirth grows apparent. In glancing at these divisions\nwe may conveniently adopt M. Tarde\u2019s expression, \u201csocial group\u201d.\nSuch a group may be either a class, the members of which have like\nfunctions and a common character connected with these, such as priests\nand traders; or it may be a set constituted merely by community\nof knowledge and taste, as the members of a society standing on a\nparticular level of culture. Although this double way of dividing\nsocial groups necessarily leads to overlapping, it seems desirable to\nadopt it here, so as to give an adequate account of the relation of\ngroup-formation to the particular directions of social laughter.\n\nThe development of distinct groups within a community influences the\nbehaviour of the laughing impulse, first of {260} all, by introducing\ndiversity of occupations, abilities and intelligence. In this way it\nenlarges the field for those relative judgments about competence and\nfitness with which, as savage laughter illustrates, simple forms of\nmirth have so much to do. Thus, the establishment of distinctions of\nemployment and mode of life between the sexes has contributed copiously\nto that mirthful quizzing of each by the other which seems to have\nbeen a prime ingredient in human jocosity from the lowest stages\nof culture. The slightly malicious laughter of the male at female\nincompetence, which is seen in the schoolboy\u2019s treatment of his sister,\nis illustrated throughout the course of literature. And good examples\nare not wanting of a turning of the tables by the female on the male.\nThe story of King Alfred\u2019s misadventure with the cakes\u2014of which we have\nfound the counterpart in savage life\u2014is an example of the more shrewish\ncriticism of the male ignoramus by the female expert. When the sense of\ninjury is less keen, and the impression of the folly of the performance\nfills the soul, the shrewish note is apt to fall to the genial pitch of\nlaughter. The differentiation of industrial and other employments, such\nas those of countryman and townsman, of landsman and seaman, of soldier\nand civilian, serve to develop new centres of concerted laughter, and\nnew points of attack.\n\nThe formation of social groups further enlarges the material and the\nopportunities for laughter by introducing noticeable and impressive\ndifferences of behaviour, dress and speech. In this way the field\nof the odd, the absurd, that which contradicts our own customs and\nstandards, has been made wide and fertile. A mere difference of\nlocality may suffice to generate such differences. Not so many years\nago, one could hear in the West of England the {261} jibes which the\npeople in one small town or district were wont to hurl at those in\nanother. We read that in the Middle Ages, when local differences of\ndress and speech were so much more marked than now, satires on people\nof particular localities were not uncommon\u2014though probably much more\nthan a perception of the laughably odd was involved in these rather\nfierce derisions.[228]\n\nThe immediate utility of this mirthful quizzing of other sets would,\nlike that carried out by one savage tribe on another, consist in the\npreservation of the characteristics of one\u2019s own set. But the play of\nlaughter about class-distinctions illustrates another of its benefits.\nWhen one set gets used to the distinctive ways of another, it tends to\nregard them as right and proper for the latter; and it may carry its\nregard for their propriety so far as to support the inner sentiment of\nthe other group by deriding those members who do not conform to their\ngroup-customs. Distinctive customs have been conserved not only\u2014to\nadopt ethical terms having a somewhat different meaning\u2014by \u201cinternal\nsanctions\u201d in the shape of serious penalties as well as ridicule\nadministered by fellow-members of the set, but by \u201cexternal sanctions\u201d\nin the shape of outside mockery. The imposing soldierly attitude has\nperhaps been kept up quite as much by the merry quizzing of civilians\nas by any military discipline and _esprit de corps_. A poor tottering\nhero in uniform could, one opines, never have escaped the eye of\ncitizens lying in wait for the laughable.\n\nThe finer opportunities for this mirthful screwing up of men of\nother groups to their proper moral height would occur when the\npeculiarities of the mode of life imposed a special rule of behaviour,\nand, particularly, when this rule was a severe one. The hollow hero,\ntrying to hide the {262} poverty of his courage in braggadocio, has\nbeen a favourite figure in comic literature, classic and modern. A\nnotable illustration of this situation is the laughter heaped on the\nclergy by the people during the Middle Ages. The caricatures of the\nmonk\u2014representing him, for instance, as a Reynard in the pulpit with a\ncock below for clerk, and the many _Contes_ which exposed his cunningly\ncontrived immoralities, and frequently visited them with well-merited\nchastisement, show pretty plainly that the popular laughter in this\ncase had in it something of hate and contempt, and was directed in\npart to the exposure and punishment of the celibate class. This may be\nasserted, even though it must not be forgotten that in these _Contes_\nthe holy man by no means infrequently emerges from his dangerous\nexperiment unscathed: a fact which suggests that in the popular\nsentiment there lurked, not merely something of the child\u2019s mirthful\nwonder at daring cunning, but a certain sympathetic tolerance for a\ncaste, on the shoulders of which was laid a somewhat weighty yoke. The\nmental attitude of the narrator rather suggests here and there that of\nan easy-going Englishman when confronted with the spectacle, say of a\ndrunken sailor or soldier.[229]\n\nAnother class having high pretensions, which has come in for much of\nthe \u201cscrewing-up\u201d kind of laughter, is the physician. Next to the\nhealer of the soul, he undertakes the most for mortals. In _Gil Blas_,\nin the comedies of Moli\u00e8re, and in other works, we may see how his\nancient methods and his pedantries were apt to affect the intelligent\nlayman with mirthful ridicule. {263}\n\nSo far nothing has been said of the rank of the groups thus formed.\nThe differentiating of a higher from a lower caste, with more or less\nof authority on one side and subserviance on the other, will turn out\nto be the most important feature in social grouping in its bearing on\nthe calling forth of social laughter. As we have seen, our merriment\nhas much to do with dignities, with the claims on our respect made\nby things above us; while, on the other hand, the contemptuous laugh\nwhich has had volume and duration implies a relation of superior\nand inferior\u2014if only the fugitive one created by the situation of\nquizzer. All stages of group-formation seem to involve something of\nthis distinction between an upper and a lower class. The simplest\nconceivable structure of society includes a head and ruler of family,\nclan or tribe, and subjects. Hence, the vast significance of social\ngrouping as a condition of choral laughter.\n\nHow far persons in positions of authority have gratified their sense\nof superiority by derisive laughter at those below them, it would, of\ncourse, be hard to say. When power is real and absolute there are other\nways of expressing contempt. Literature undoubtedly furnishes examples\nof the ridicule by the social superior of the ways of a lower class,\nas in the Proven\u00e7al poem of Bertran de Born (_c._ 1180) in which the\nvillains are treated contemptuously. Yet the larger part of literature,\nnot being produced for a ruling caste, does not throw much light on\nthis subject.[230] One can only infer with some probability, from\nthe relations of parents and adults, generally, to children, and of\nwhite {264} masters to their coloured slaves, that power has always\nbeen tempered by some admixture of good-nature, which composition has\nproduced a certain amount of playful jocosity, at once corrective and\ncementing.\n\nThe derisive laughter of the superior is particularly loud in certain\ncases where the authority is not so real as it might be. Man\u2019s ridicule\nof his not too obedient spouse may be said almost to shriek adown the\nages. We may read in papyri of Egypt of the fourteenth or thirteenth\ncentury B.C. of the misfortunes of a husband, named Anoupou.[231]\nThe Greek comedians thought no abuse of the sex too bitter or too\ncoarse.[232] In Latin literature we have satirical portraits of\ndifferent types of women, drawn under the figures of various brutes, a\nfox, a mare, etc.[233] In medi\u00e6val society, the low opinion of women\nentertained by their lords is illustrated in the firm persuasion that\nthe only way to treat them was to beat them\u2014watching them was quite\nvain\u2014so that they might be occupied all the day with crying.[234]\nSometimes, as in the _Arabian Nights_, this contempt takes the form\nof bitter denunciation; but, for the most part, it has laughed in the\nbrighter key of comedy. Even the satire here is wont to lose all trace\nof savageness, and to assume the tone of a good-natured acceptance of\nthe incurable.\n\nWhile the formation of social ranks has thus secured a wide range\nfor supercilious mocking of inferiors, it has guaranteed these ample\nopportunity of avenging themselves by laughter at the expense of the\nauthorities.\n\nHow soon in man\u2019s history any such laughter became {265} possible, it\nwould be hard to say. In the simpler types of community, the severe\nrestraints laid on youths by the men of the tribe must, one supposes,\nhave been fatal to any indulgence by sons in laughter at the expense of\nfathers, such as is illustrated in comedy both ancient and modern. The\npenalties attached to breach of ceremonial rule must have stifled any\nimpulse of laughter, if it happened to arise. It is said that when the\nchief of a certain tribe chanced to stumble, his subjects were bound to\npretend to stumble in order to cover up his defect.[235] The utility of\nthis quaint custom may have lain in its effectual suppression of the\nrisible impulse. This theory, however, postulates a kind of courtier\nwidely removed from the modern, of whom it seems safe to say that\nhe might be trusted to see stumblings and worse without feeling an\nover-mastering temptation to laugh.\n\nOne can only conjecture that men began to discern and enjoy the amusing\nside of authority and its solemn ways of asserting itself, in their\nfree moments, at a safe distance from tell-tale eyes.\n\nWhat is known of the hard-worked slave of antiquity is suggestive not\nmerely of play after toil, but of a safe turning on task-masters.\nWhen, as we read, the Egyptian workman got fun \u201cout of the smallest\nincident in the day\u2019s work\u2014an awkward apprentice cutting his finger,\na comrade sleeping over his task whom the overseer lashes to awaken\nhim,\u201d and so forth, did not something of a spirit of malicious crowing\nover the overseer express itself too? The analogy of the judiciously\nhalf-smothered laughter of the English schoolboy in playground or\ndormitory suggests the answer. We must not wonder if these dangerous\nexcursions of the spirit of fun have failed to be recorded. {266}\nStill more significant is another picture from the same hand,\nrepresenting a tussle between overseer and workmen in which \u201cthe stick\nvainly interferes,\u201d so that \u201cat least an hour elapses before quiet\nis re-established\u201d.[236] This looks like the rollicking laughter of\nschoolboys at the spectacle of an orderly ceremony suddenly turned\nto disorder. The interpretation is borne out by the fact that these\nsame Egyptians were able to enter into the fun of a loss of dignity\nin a solemn function, for example, the upsetting by a collision of\nthe richly supplied table in the funereal boat, and the falling\nof a mummy on a priest during the ceremony of conveying it to its\nresting-place.[237]\n\nThe return of contemptuous laughter from the slave to his master\nwas certainly allowed to some extent among the Romans. It became a\nwell-recognised privilege during one of the chief annual festivals\n(Saturnalia). The slaves in the plays of Plautus treat the tyranny\nunder which they live \u201cin a spirit of gay bravado\u201d.[238] Nor need\nwe be surprised at these liberties if we remember that the modern\nschoolmaster must almost be perfect if he does not find it expedient,\nnot merely to permit his pupils _desipere in loco_, but to allow them\nnow and again to have a mild joke at his expense. The cajoling by\nmeans of jokes, which Miss Kingsley found so serviceable for managing\nthe West African, may of course stop short of this, and its virtue\nlie in the substitution of a light, laughing treatment for bullying.\nYet genial laughter, when the contempt has been vaporised out of it,\nnecessarily tends at the moment to a levelling of planes, as is seen\nin the immediate assertion of {267} the right of reciprocity. This is\nperhaps the main reason why the schoolmaster is, in general, chary of\nintroducing the method of jocosity. His laughter is apt to sound as if\nit held some of the gritty deposit of contempt.\n\nThe really delightful illustration of the turning of the tables on\nmasters by those in subjection is to be found in woman\u2019s retort on\nman\u2019s contemptuous treatment. She has again and again managed to outwit\nhim, as we have found him dolefully admitting, and has had her full\nlaugh at his cumbrous attempts to manage her. The medi\u00e6val _fabliaux_\nare certainly disposed to award success in strategy to her, rather\nthan to her lord. Her ways of befooling him, too, have often been so\nsimple\u2014as when she persuades him that he has been dreaming what he\nfancies he has observed\u2014that the poor dupe ought, one supposes, to have\ndied of chagrin. And, when there has been a call for the finer sort of\nman\u0153uvring, she wins the unprejudiced reader to her side by displaying\nan admirable ingenuity and subtlety of invention, qualities which Mr.\nHerbert Spencer would probably regard as secondary sexual characters\nevolved during ages of marital tyranny. Of her modes of turning on\nhim in these latter days there is no need to speak. The shout of\ncontemptuous laughter seems to have passed from the one side of the\neternal fray to the other. But this hardly belongs to the present\ndivision of our subject.\n\nIt may be added that the laughter of the laity at the clergy\nillustrates, in addition to the impulse already dealt with, the itching\nof spirited mortals to turn on oppressors. The denunciations and\nanathemas of this class, backed, as they asseverate, by supernatural\nsanctions, have always been trying to untamed men and women. And the\nappetite of our ancestors for stories disgraceful to monks and priests\ndrew some of its keenness from this rebelliousness of {268} the\nnatural man against spiritual tyrannies. Here is an illustration of the\nfeminine retort: A woman was chatting with a gossip of hers in church:\nbidden by the preaching friar to hold her peace she exclaimed, \u201cI\nwonder which babbles most of the two?\u201d[239]\n\nStill another variety of social laughter springs out of this\ndistinction of superior and inferior groups. The impulse of exalted\npersons to assert themselves and to strike their inferiors with\nawe\u2014an impulse by the way which the peacock and other birds will\nbetray in the presence of their inferior, man\u2014is apt to be disallowed\nby those for whom the display is intended. It is one thing, they\nfeel, to acknowledge true authority, another to bow down to the\nexaggeration of its claim, to the boastful exhibition of power and\nrank. Hence, perhaps, some of the quickness of the mirthful eye\nfor the entertainment latent in all braggadocio. The soldier who\nneedlessly emphasises the fact that he possesses the height and spirit\nof his calling by strutting, by imposing vociferation and the rest,\nhas probably always been a source of comic merriment, as the _Miles\ngloriosus_ of Plautus and the Bobadil of Ben Jonson may remind us.\n\nIt will be evident that all this laughter of inferiors at superiors,\nwhether these are so really or merely in their own opinion, must, so\nfar as it has got home, have had a valuable corrective function. If\nthe derision of the lord helps to keep in place his inferior dame or\nvassal, much more does the laughter of his inferior serve to hold him\nto what befits his rank. _Noblesse oblige_ is a rule largely maintained\nby the demands of those below who are expected to pay homage. These,\nas we know, have been much employed in claiming modest rights from\ntheir \u201cbetters\u201d. The curbing of a king\u2019s tyrannies may have required\na rebellion {269} of his barons, or a riot of his people: yet a good\ndeal of checking of tyrannic propensities has been carried out by\nthe unalarming expedient of ridicule. Even in a free and enlightened\ncountry we may observe in officials a tendency now and again to inflate\ntheir dignity unduly; so that one infers that the restraining force of\nthe laughter of inferiors still counts.\n\nThe results of this spirited turning of the worm have been\nconsiderable. The impish spirit of mirth has taken up its abode with\nthe common people, and instructed them in the rich sources of the\nlaughable which lie in all rank and dignity. On the other hand, the\n\u201chigh and mighty\u201d have, from a true instinct of self-preservation,\nwaged fierce war with this irreverent attitude of the multitude. The\nstruggles between the two will be spoken of presently.\n\nThe scope for laughter which, given the disposition, these divisions\nof group and of rank bring with them is further widened by the vital\ncircumstance that, as groups in the same community, they have to\nenter into various relations with one another. A judicious mixture of\nopposition and harmony of interest seems to be most favourable to a\nrich production of mirth. This is illustrated even in such masterful\nrelations as that of the overseer and the commanding officer, who may\nfind that the compulsion of the rod is inadequate to the extraction\nof the required amount of work, and so have to cast about for other\ninstruments.\n\nThe good effect of a skilful use of the cajoling laugh has already\nbeen illustrated. It is seen with particular clearness in the relation\nof husband and wife; for the fun of the situation is that, in spite\nof profound differences of taste and inclination and of a sharp\nantagonism, the necessity of {270} common interests and ends holds\nthem together in daily association. This necessity, ever present to the\nwiser of them, has tempered the contempt and forced the derider to at\nleast a pretence of good humour. The same may be said of the relation\nof the sexes in general. The quality and range of the fun which is wont\nto lighten a talk between a young man and a young woman on a first\nintroduction are pretty closely determined by the consciousness of\nsexual relation on either side. Shyness, a disposition to regard the\nother suspiciously as opponent, together with the instinct to please\nand win admiration, and the desire to strike on points of sympathy\u2014all\nthis helps to bring about, and is reflected in the peculiar wrigglings\nin which the mirthful spirit expresses itself on such an occasion.\n\nOne of the best examples of the combined effect of hostility and a\ndesire to agree is to be found in the humours of the market place. The\nrelation of buyer and seller seems to be pregnant with opportunities\nfor merry fooling on either side. The direct and sharply felt\nopposition of interest is apt to beget a good deal of the rough sort of\n\u201ctaking down\u201d. Not only will the tongue be stirred to derisive attack,\nthe situation may even beget retaliations in the shape of practical\njokes. The merchant, as the expert, has always had the upper hand\nin the contest of wits. His customer has had to find consolation in\nsatires on the cheat, such as those which were common in the Middle\nAges.[240] On the other hand, the need of coming to an agreement\nhas served to bring into the haggling process a good deal of the\nconciliative kind of laughter. The vendor has always known the value\nof good-natured banter as an instrument {271} of persuasion. This\noverflow of the spirit of fun into the channels of serious business\nmay still be seen as a faint survival in front of a cheap-Jack\u2019s van.\nGeorge Eliot has given us a charming picture of the play of this spirit\nin the south in her chapter on \u201cThe Peasants\u2019 Fair\u201d in _Romola_.\n\nThe same intrusion of fun as an auxiliary into the business relations\nof groups is seen in many other cases where opposition has to be toned\ndown and a _modus vivendi_ arrived at, as in that of opposed political\nparties, religious bodies and the like. The appearance of the laughing\nimp, if only he behaves himself, in these rather warm encounters of\ngroups serves to cool the atmosphere and to temper animosity by at\nleast a momentary experience of genial contact. It does much, indeed,\nto tone down the uneasy and half-suspicious attitude which members of\nany group are apt to take up on first having to do with those of a\nstrange group, especially one of higher rank.\n\nWe may now summarise the chief social utilities of the reciprocal\nlaughter of classes at the ways of other classes. In the first place,\nit helps, like the laughter of the savage tribe at the ways of other\ntribes, to counteract any tendency to imitate the manners and customs\nof foreign groups. What we have laughed at, we are not likely to adopt.\nThis is the self-protective function of laughter. To laugh at the ways\nof another group is, moreover, in most cases at least, to indulge in a\nfeeling of our own superiority; and this attitude would have a further\nconservative tendency, especially when it is the laugh of the expert in\nhis own department at the outside ignoramus.\n\nLet us now glance at the effect on the group whose ways are being\nlaughed at. To be the object of another set\u2019s ridicule, especially when\nwe have the right of retort, so far from necessarily weakening our\nhold on that which is {272} ridiculed may strengthen it. When we are\nstrongly attached, others\u2019 laughter may make us cling the more firmly\nto what we cherish. Laughter in this case is, indeed, as we have seen,\nan excellent training in a good-natured suffering of others\u2019 ridicule,\na training which has in it the virtue of a moral tonic.\n\nYet this inter-groupal laughter is not wholly subservient to the\nmaintenance of characteristic differences. In all the higher forms of\nsociety, at least, such ridicule has an assimilative action as well.\nIt manages to some extent, by inducing self-criticism, to get rid of\nuseless excrescences. Thus, it helps to keep down class-vanity, the\nprofessional narrowness which cries, \u201cThere\u2019s nothing like leather!\u201d\na narrowness which is so delightfully satirised by Moli\u00e8re in the\nwranglings of M. Jourdain\u2019s professors.\n\nThe correction of this exclusive feeling of self-importance of a group\nby outside laughter has always been at work, helping to keep groups in\nfriendly touch, and hindering the sectional or professional _esprit de\ncorps_ from overpowering the larger social consciousness which we call\nnational sentiment, and the common-sense of the community. Of this last\nmore will be said presently.\n\nSo far, we have illustrated the bearing on the ways of laughter of what\nmay be called the structural features of societies. There has been no\nreference to the effects of social movements, of all that is meant by\nthe successive changes of fashion in manners, dress and so forth, and\nof those more persistent movements which make up what we call social\nprogress. The least reflection will show that in this continual flux\nof things social, the unceasing modifications of the head-covering and\nthe rest, and the trampling down of old beliefs and institutions by the\nresistless \u201cmarch of intellect,\u201d we have at least as large a field for\nthe gambols {273} of the laughing spirit as in the distinctions and\noddly combined relations of classes.\n\nWe may best begin by referring to the movements of fashion. These may\nbe defined as changes in dress, manners and so forth, which are marked\noff from the improvements entering into progress by two circumstances:\n(1) that they are capricious, not the products of a rational choice of\nthe best; and (2) that they are of comparatively short duration. When\nwe call a mode of doing a thing a fashion, we imply, quite unknowingly\nperhaps, that it has not the cachet of a change for the better, and\nthat as such it has no security of tenure.\n\nA fashion differs from a custom in being essentially communicable\nfrom one group to another, and even from one nation to another. Its\ndevelopment thus belongs to a comparatively late period of social\nevolution. Its hold on men and women is explained by the fact that it\nappeals to two of their strongest instincts, the craving for novelty\nand the impulse to imitate superiors.\n\nKeeping to the intra-national diffusion of manners, we note that\nthe movement of fashion is normally from the highest rank or ranks\ndownwards. This movement may well have commenced far back in the\nevolution of communities where class-distinctions were rigorously\nenforced. The attitude of reverence towards superiors has for its\npsychological concomitant the impulse to imitate. Just as children\nwill copy the voice and gestures of one whom they look up to, so\nsavages will copy the ways of Europeans who manage to make themselves\nrespected. In the ceremonies of primitive tribes and even of highly\ncomplex societies, _e.g._, church ritual, a good deal of scope is\noffered for this flattery of imitation. We may infer, indeed, that the\nimpulse to adopt the ways of exalted personages must always have {274}\nbeen at work. In the earlier stages of human history this impulse\nwas checked by the force of custom and of law, _e.g._, sumptuary\nlaws. This imitation from below must strike at the root of those\nexternal differences, such as style of dress, between group and group,\nobservance of which has helped greatly to maintain class-distinctions.\nIt could only have made way against these barriers gradually. So\ndifficult, in sooth, does the feat appear to be, that Mr. Herbert\nSpencer suggests that fashion, as the imitation of those of high rank\nand authority, began in a change of custom; as in the rule already\nalluded to that when the king slipped the onlooking courtiers should at\nonce imitate his awkwardness.\n\nIt is probable that the imitation of what is distinctive and fixed in\nthe costume and manners of the higher class preceded by some interval\nthe imitation of the changes we call fashion. How the two are connected\ndoes not seem to be quite clear. Did the rulers and those immediately\nabout them, piqued at the adoption of their ways by the vulgar, try\nto steal a march on imitation by changing their customs? To judge\nfrom what takes place to-day, one would answer \u201cyes\u201d. I am told that\nladies strongly object to go on wearing a fashionable hat as soon as\nit becomes generally worn by factory girls, or other inferior group.\nHowever this be, it seems certain that the \u201cleaders of society,\u201d while\nthey reserve for special ceremonial occasions a distinctive dress,\nmode of speech and the rest, choose to alter these from time to time\nfor other purposes. Such alterations may be the result of the caprices\nof a \u201cleader,\u201d guided by some inventor, or they may take the form of\nan assimilation of a foreign mode. Lastly, the leaders may include\nothers besides the Court people: the universities are accredited\nwith the origination of many of the pretty bits of slang, the use of\n{275} which is supposed to betoken a certain social altitude and\n\u201cup-to-dateness\u201d.\n\nIn the midst of these changes of fashion something of custom may be\nseen still to persist. Taking the dress of woman to-day, we note that\nin spite of experiments like those of the Bloomers, skirts continue to\nbe a permanent feature in female attire. Fashions in respect of width,\nand even of length, may come and go, but the skirt as skirt seems to go\non for ever.\n\nEven when the impulse to adopt the dress and behaviour of the upper\nclass was allowed a certain play, it was probably long before it acted\non all ranks. Each rank, whilst keen in its imitation of the ways of\nthe class above it, would naturally resist any further descent of the\nimitative movement.\n\nIn this descent of fashion from higher to lower ranks we see a mutual\nmodification of fashion and permanent custom. In some cases imitation\nfrom below may be stopped pretty early through lack of means for giving\neffect to it. The joy of wearing pearls, or other precious stones in\nfashion at the moment, is denied the young seamstress. Yet there are\nsolaces here in the shape of \u201cimitations\u201d. Again, the lower middle\nclass, not to speak of the cottagers, are, for obvious reasons, not\nlikely to be affected by a craze for the Queen Anne style in domestic\narchitecture. Even in the case of dress, fine limitations which\nthe \u201cmere male\u201d might find it hard to define, seem to be imposed,\nfor example, on the architecture of the hat, when a new style is\nassimilated by lower ranks. Here, again, fashion is clearly restrained\nby class-custom. Ideas of neatness, of an unaggressive quietness appear\nto be valued, in theory at least, in milliners, domestic servants, and\nothers who minister to the wants of the titled and the wealthy. The\nvery {276} expression \u201cthe fashionable world\u201d implies that the full\nmagnificence and luxury of fashion is a monopoly.\n\nThe imitation of the manners of high life by the middle class is in\nmost cases a pretty clear acknowledgment of a superior social quality.\nOne of the most amusing examples of this thinly-veiled snobbism is\nthe elevated hand-shake lately in vogue. A fashion like this easily\nreaches the eye of the vulgar, focussed for the first appearance of\na new characteristic of \u201chigh life,\u201d by way of the theatre or of the\nillustrated paper. A point worth noting here is the exaggeration of\nwhat the imitators regard as of the essence of the new \u201cmode\u201d. It would\nbe curious to hear what symbolism (if any) those who appeared so eager\nto get the hand-shake up to the level of the eyes assigned to this\nfashionable rite.\n\nThis eager and almost simian mimicry of the ways of society\u2019s leaders\nmust, it is evident, tend to the obliteration of recognisable\nclass-distinctions in ordinary life. We only need to compare the\nspectacle of a crowd in London to-day with that of a medi\u00e6val city\ncrowd, as represented in a drawing of the time, to see what a\ndepressing amount of assimilation in dress the forces of fashion have\nbrought about.\n\nThe connections between these movements of fashion and the spirit of\nlaughter are numerous and pretty obvious. Even the primal movement,\nthe adoption of a fashion by the head of a community from abroad,\noffers a rich spectacle for those who lie in wait for the coming of the\nludicrous. How finely the folly that lurks in a slavish submission to\nfashion grins out at us from the story of those New Zealand chiefs who,\ngoaded by the fashion set by others of giving great feasts, would often\npush their feast-givings to the point of causing a famine among their\npeoples![241] The following {277} of a foreign fashion by a court has\nin it, moreover, always something to prick the spirit of malicious\nlaughter in the subjects. Not so terribly long since, the importation\nof customs from one European court to another, and a reciprocation of\nthe loan, by way of family connections, was the subject of a rather\nmalicious laughter in each of the countries affected.\n\nIt is, however, in the downward rush of fashion from rank to rank, and\nthe incidents which attend it, that the seeker for the laughable will\nfind his satisfaction. The eagerness of persons to be in the van of\nthe movement will of itself produce a crop of ludicrous aspects: for\nthe first sudden appearance of a large and capturing novelty, say in\na high-branded bonnet or manner of speech, brings to us something of\nthe delightful gaiety which the sight of the clown brings to a child.\nIt is a huge folly, which we greet with the full, unthinking roar of\nhilarity. Never, indeed, does the inherent non-rationality of a large\npart of human behaviour reveal itself so directly and so unmistakably\nas when a fashion which has reigned long enough to become accepted\nas right is thus rudely thrust aside in favour of an interloper:\nwhence the laughing contempt poured on new fashions by comic poets and\nsatirists.[242]\n\nNor is this all, or the best. The behaviour of the ardent aspirant\nhas its absurd aspect even for dull souls. The form of self-assertion\nwhich consists in stepping out of one\u2019s rank is always viewed by\nthose of the deserted rank with an acidulated amusement; and those\nwho are too manifestly eager to appropriate a new fashion are wont to\nbe regarded as persons who are trying to get above their set. If the\n{278} fashionable cosmetic is laid on thickly, as it pretty certainly\nwill be by those seized with the more vulgar form of social ambition,\nthe fun will wax still greater. The display in this case adds to the\ndelightful transformation of the clown a touch of the bombast of the\nmountebank.\n\nNew possibilities of mirth arise out of the collision between the\nimitative impulse to be fashionable, and respect for the customs of\none\u2019s group. An exaggeration of something in dress or speech which\nsavours of an attempt to break through class-barriers cannot but amuse\nthe onlooker disposed to mirth. Middle-class house-wives are, one\nhears, wont to enliven the dulness of their Sunday afternoons by a\nstealthy quizzing of their \u201cmaids\u201d as they set out for their parade.\nThe maid\u2019s village acquaintance\u2014if it could succeed in stifling envious\nadmiration\u2014would doubtless draw a more rollicking enjoyment from the\nspectacle. In general, any appearance of craning one\u2019s neck so as to\novertop one\u2019s set is greeted by a slightly malicious laughter; and\nthe bold donning of fashionable array is the most easily recognisable\nmanifestation of the craning impulse. For a more purely disinterested\nspectator, too, the situation has its entertaining drollness. The\nstruggle in the panting bosom of a young woman, whether of white\nor of coloured race, as the passionate longing for some bewitching\nnovelty\u2014recommended, too, by the lead of her superiors\u2014is sharply\nconfronted with the sense of what befits her, and possibly a vague fear\nof being plunged by a fiery zeal into the morass of the laughable, has\nits comic pathos for the instructed eye.\n\nOne further contribution to the fun of the world made by this hot\neagerness to pay homage to rank is perhaps worth a reference. Like the\nverbal kind, the flattery of imitation is often visibly hollow. When\nthe soul of man or woman is held captive by the necessity of doing\nwhat is done by {279} others\u2014especially by others higher up\u2014there is\nno room for thought of sincerity: whence, among many results, this\none, that for him who can be pure spectator responsive to the amusing\naspects of things, the spectacle of a great national demonstration of\nloyalty cannot fail to have its diverting aspect.\n\nNo doubt the pushing worshippers of fashion, if they only wait long\nenough, get their chance of laughing back. As soon as the new thing, so\ncharged with rollicking gaiety at first, settles down to a commonplace\nhabit, there comes the moment for ridiculing the belated imitator. That\npopular figure on the stage, the \u201cold dowdy,\u201d is commonly represented\nas ridiculously behind the times in respect of attire. Yet the range of\njocosity inspired by respect for mere newness, on the value of which\nreason has had nothing to say, is evidently limited.\n\nWe may now turn to those deeper currents of change which together make\nup social progress; including all distinct advance from lower to higher\nforms of intelligence, sentiment and character, as well as from lower\nto higher types of social life; and, along with these, the growth of\ninstitutions in which these changes express themselves.\n\nWe may assume that these progressive changes arise, either from the\nadoption of the products of superior mental capacity appearing in\nindividuals who are members of the community, or from the propagation\nof ideas, inventions, institutions from one country to another.\n\nTo say precisely how the production and circulation of a social\nimprovement takes place is not easy. Men of imaginative minds, with an\nexceptionally large mechanical, legislative, or other insight, or with\na fine feeling for the subtle things of beauty or of the moral order,\nthere must be. Against all attempted innovation, however, whether {280}\nfrom within or from without, the attitude of conservatism sets itself\nas a serious obstacle. Here, too, we seem to perceive the charm and\ninfluence of rank. It is only when some recognised authority proclaims\nthe value of the new discovery that the multitude, which was perhaps a\nmoment before doing its best to trample on it, turns deferentially and\nkneels. The free adoption of it as true or as good commonly follows\nmuch later.\n\nA startlingly new idea, whether in science, religion, or the utilities\nof life, finds in its intrinsic reasonableness no defence against the\nattacks of malicious mirth. The ordinary mind when it laughs, just as\nwhen it is serious, judges things by the standard of what is customary.\nWhat violently jars with this is viewed as legitimate game for\nridicule. The history of ideas and of the social movements growing out\nof them is one long illustration of this truth. The idea of a larger\nfreedom and higher functions for women was treated by the theatre of\nancient Greece as matter for wild hilarity. The idea came up again and\nagain after this, thanks to the zeal and courage of isolated advocates.\nBut it continued to excite the loud laughter of the crowd. And less\nthan half a century ago, when J. S. Mill advocated the spiritual and\nlegal emancipation of women, the response was at first largely an\nexpression of amusement. Only to-day is a part of the civilised world\nbeginning to recognise the naturalness and fitness of the idea that\nwomen should have their share, both in the intellectual gains of the\nmore advanced education, and in the larger work of the world.\n\nWe may see by this illustration how mighty a force every new idea of\na large revolutionary character has to meet and to overcome. Darwin\u2019s\nidea of the evolution of man seemed in the sixties to the mass of\nEnglishmen, including a bishop {281} of Oxford and many another high\nup in the scale of intellectual culture, very much as some of the\nteachings of our missionaries strike a keen-witted savage. The figure\nof the monkey, which is, by the way, one of the oldest symbols of\ncaricature, rendered excellent service to those who, naturally enough,\ngreeted the proposed topsy-turvyness of Darwinism with boisterous\ncachinnations.\n\nIt is much the same with the attitude of the crowd towards the\nfirst use of practical inventions. Much merriment accompanied the\nintroduction from abroad by the gallants of the Restoration of\nso simple an innovation as the use of the fork[243]\u2014a fact to be\nremembered by the English tourist abroad when he is disposed to laugh\nat the sight of a too lavish use of the knife. In such cases, the first\nadopters of the novelty are laughed at very much as in the case of a\nnew fashion. The absurdity of the adoption in either case turns on the\ndelightful freshness and the glorious irregularity of the proceeding.\n\nOn the other hand, we meet here, too, with a recoil of laughter upon\nthe laugher. Though a respect for the customary prompts us at first\nto ridicule any sudden and impressive change in ideas or habits\nof life, yet, when the change is in a fair way of becoming fixed,\nthe same feeling will urge us to make merry over those who show an\nobstinate prejudice in favour of the old. Laughter finds one of its\nchief functions in ridiculing worn-out ideas, beliefs that have been\nproved illusory, and discarded habits of life. Nowhere, perhaps, is the\nelation of mirth more distinctly audible than in this ridicule by an\nadvancing age of survivals of the discarded ways of its predecessors.\nArt gives us many examples of this merriment over what is decaying and\ngrowing effete. Every age of stir and {282} commotion has probably\nhad its satirical literature, striking with boisterous mirth at the\ndisappearing phantoms. The broad and genial comedy of Aristophanes\npushed against the tottering mythology of his time, and the fall evoked\na large outflow of mirth. The great work of Cervantes and the satires\n(pasquins) of the same period poked fun at the sentimental clinging to\nthe decaying order of chivalry and feudalism.[244]\n\nMerry-making over the death of outworn ideas and institutions has\nfrequently been reinforced by the deep and refreshing expiration which\naccompanies relief from pressure. This elemental form of laughter\nhas entered into all those happy moments of national life when the\nwhole people has become closely united in a joyous self-abandonment.\nPlautus, the comedian of the people, reflects in his broad merriment\nthe rebound of the spirit after the second Punic War from a long\ncontinued state of tension, and the craving of the masses for a more\nunrestrained enjoyment of the pleasures of life.[245] The popular art\nof the Middle Ages, in which the demons seem to play the harmless part\nof the policeman in a modern pantomime, illustrates the rebound from\nan oppressive superstition. A like relief of tension and outburst of\npent-up spirits are recognisable in the literature of the Reformation\nand of the English Restoration.\n\nThe same exhilarant aspect of the vanishing of the outworn moves us\nin a quieter way when we ridicule the survivals of customs and rites\nwhich have lost their significance. This form of hilarious enjoyment,\nwhich implies a piercing through of appearances and a searching into\nmeanings, will be more fully considered later on.\n\nIt seems to follow from what has been said that laughter {283}\nreacts in a double manner upon changes of social habit. First of all,\nit resists the wildness of the craving for the new (neomania). As\nschoolboys are wont to treat a newcomer, it applies its lash vigorously\nto a proposed innovation, in order to see what \u201cstuff\u201d it is made of,\nand whether it can justify its existence. In this way it moderates the\npace of the movement of change. On the other hand, it completes the\nprocess of throwing off an outworn habit by giving it, so to speak,\nthe _coup de gr\u00e2ce_. It thus combines the service rendered to a herd\nof sheep on the march by the shepherd who walks in front, with that\nrendered by the sheep-dog which runs back again and again to the\nlaggards. It seems to be enforcing Goethe\u2019s maxim:\u2014\n\n    \u201cOhne Hast\n    Aber ohne Rast.\u201d\n\nWe may now glance at some of the workings of this complex movement\nof social progress on the formation of social sets, and on their\nreciprocal attitudes.\n\nIt is evident that, by introducing much more subdivision of employment\nand exclusive knowledge of experts, progress will tend to widen the\narea of mutual quizzing and chaffing, already dealt with. It is of more\nimportance to point out that the advance of a community in knowledge\nand culture will lead to the formation of new groups involving certain\ndifferences of rank. The importance of this kind of group-division\nshows itself in classic comedy. Juvenal expresses the lively contempt\nof the urban citizen for his provincial inferior,[246] and our own\ncomedy of the Restoration, taking town life as its standard, pours\nridicule on the country gentry.[247] It is illustrated also in the\nrelation of the clergy {284} as the learned class, to the ignorant\nlaity. As the _contes_ amusingly suggest, a large part of the authority\nof the clergy during the Dark Ages rested on this intellectual\nsuperiority. If we view culture widely we may speak of an indefinite\nnumber of levels composing a scale of intellectual dignity. These\nlevels are commonly supposed to coincide with such groups as the\nprofessional class, the man of business (Kaufman), and the lower\nclass. But no such coincidence can be assumed when once education has\nbecome a common possession. A large portion of our \u201cupper\u201d class\u2014which\nis determined no longer by descent but to a considerable extent by\nwealth\u2014is neither cultured nor even well-informed. A clerk will often\nbe found to have more general knowledge and literary taste than his\nwell-dressed employer, and a working man, in spite of the limitations\nof poverty, may know more about such subjects as philosophy and history\nthan the great majority of the middle class. We see then that the\nstrata representing gradations of culture are largely independent of\ncommonly recognised divisions. These older distinctions may, indeed,\nbe very much toned down by the culture-movement. The ancient line of\ndivision between the superior man and his inferior spouse has been half\neffaced by the admission of women into the higher culture circle. The\nculture divisions are real social groups, each being bound together by\na large community of ideas, tastes and interests; and their importance\nin the system of social grouping tends to increase.\n\nThe development of culture groups introduces a new and important change\nin the standards of fitness, to which laughter is, so to speak, tied.\nWhen superiority is lacking in a clearly recognisable basis of reason,\nits ridicule of inferiors can only have its source in a pride which\nmay be, and often is, of the most foolish. When, however, it resides\n{285} in the possession of greater spiritual wealth, more refined\nideas and a more acute sense of the fitting, the laughter itself\nshows a finer quality. It is less boisterous, more discerning, and\nmore penetrating. As such, we need not wonder that, though it is felt\nto be irritating, it is not understood. The _nouveau riche_, whose\nvulgarity reveals itself as soon as he appears in a society having\nrefined manners, may wince under the half-repressed smile, though he\nseems for the most part well protected by an insensitive tegument. As\nSchopenhauer has observed, the man of mediocre intelligence very much\ndislikes encountering his intellectual superior; and it so happens, for\nthe gratification of merry onlookers, perhaps, that social ambition not\ninfrequently precipitates its possessor into a sharp encounter with\nthose who have a whole world of ideas of which he knows nothing.\n\nNot but that the inferior here, too, may now and again have his chance\nof laughing back. The possession of ideas and of an exacting taste\nis apt to appear affected to one wanting in them. Midas, accustomed\nto measure values by incomes, and to identify intelligence with the\ncleverness of the money-maker, not unnaturally regards a habit of\nappealing to ideas as an eccentric superfluity; and so laughter may\ncome consolingly to him who is utterly beaten in the encounter of wits.\nThe \u201ccommon-sense\u201d of the average Briton scores many a loud laugh in\nits confident self-assertion against any proposed introduction of ideas\ninto the sphere of practical affairs.\n\nA further effect of the movement of culture on group-formation is seen\nin the divisions into sects, a phenomenon which seems to be conspicuous\nin the communities built up by our race. This tendency to a minute\nsubdivision of religious, political and other bodies introduces a new\nkind of relation. We cannot well say that one section surpasses {286}\nits rivals in intelligence. This may or may not be the case, but the\nrules of the social game require us to leave the question open. On the\nother hand, this differentiation of organised opinion into a number of\nparticular creeds or \u201cviews,\u201d the shade of opinion being often fine,\nleads to a new bifurcation of \u201chigher\u201d and \u201clower\u201d groups. The \u201chigher\u201d\nhere is the mass or majority which naturally laughs at tiny minorities\nas faddists and cranks. Yet again, the fine impartiality of the god\nof laughter, to whom, since mankind for the greater part is other\nthan wise, the difference of the many and the few may hardly count,\noccasionally gives the despised minority its chance; for minorities do\nsometimes represent ideas which are born for sovereignty.\n\nWhile the progress of a nation in ideas and institutions thus serves in\na manner to multiply groups, and so to introduce new opportunities for\nthe indulgence of group attack and retaliation, it tends on the whole\nto break down their barriers. It does this by means of the pulpit, the\npress, and the educational agencies which help to circulate new ideas\nthrough all classes. These conduce, both directly and indirectly, to\na certain assimilation of groups; and assimilative action is going\non rapidly to-day. Yet, as we have seen, it leaves ample room for\ndifferent grades of culture, since natural differences of coarseness\nand fineness in the intellectual fibre will always secure the broad\ncontrast of the cultured and the uncultured.\n\nThe spread of knowledge and culture through all classes acts indirectly\non group-distinctions by throwing open the occupations of one class to\nmembers of others, and more particularly of \u201clower\u201d ones. The workman\u2019s\nson who has a brain and cultivates it may, as we are often told, find\nhis way to the university and take his place unchallenged {287} among\nthe lawyers, the doctors, or the exalted \u201cdons\u201d themselves.\n\nNow all sudden changes in class, especially such as involve elevation,\nare apt to appear laughable. Even when promotion comes by royal favour,\nwe feel the leap into a higher sphere to be anomalous, and are wont to\nexamine the grounds of the new title with some care. The conservative\ninstincts of men oppose themselves laughingly to the appearance of\nnew dignitaries very much as they oppose themselves to the appearance\nof new ideas, and some temporary unfitness in the person for his new\nsocial niche is to be expected. In the comedy of the Restoration, we\nare told, \u201cno measure is kept in pouring contempt on the mushroom\ngrowths of yesterday, the knights of recent creation\u201d.[248]\n\nSomething of this impression of the incongruously new is produced for\na moment even in the case of a well-earned rise in the social scale.\nThe young aspirant\u2019s family and connections, living on in the less\nbrilliant light, will perforce laugh, though perhaps with something of\nsympathetic admiration, at the oddity of the sudden elevation; and the\nrising young man will be singularly fortunate if he does not now and\nagain betray an amusing unfamiliarity with the ways of the company he\nhas joined.\n\nYet the confusion of ranks due to the universalising of education is\nsmall and unimpressive when compared with that arising from another\ncause. The great destroyer of fixed class-boundaries is the force which\ntends to transmute a community into a plutocracy. This tendency may, no\ndoubt, illustrate in a measure the effect of a diffused education; for\nthe successful fortune-builder will sometimes have attained success by\nscientific knowledge skilfully {288} applied. Yet the presence\u2014or the\nabsence\u2014of other qualities than the intellectual seems to have much to\ndo in these days with sudden elevations in the plutocratic scale.\n\nAs the comedy of Moli\u00e8re may tell us, the spectacle of a man standing\nat the foot of the social ladder and looking up wistfully at its\nhigher region has something entertaining in it both for those on his\nactual level and for those on the level of his ambition. Later, when\nthe wistful glance is followed by actual climbing, the unrehearsed\nperformances may grow mirth-provoking even to the point of tearful\nmistiness. Nor does the attainment of the goal make an end of the fun,\nsince the maintenance of a decorous equilibrium at the new altitude may\nturn out to be even more precarious than the climbing, especially when\nrelatives and other accidents of the humbler state persist in their\nattachment.\n\nOn the other hand, these climbings exhibit much in the way of amusing\nimposture; for men, as Schopenhauer tells us, have been known to push\ntheir way, unqualified and impious, even into literary circles, and\nsnatch a kind of reflected distinction by the use of arts at once\nancient and vulgar.\n\nThe spectacle of changing one\u2019s class exhibits the amusing aspect of\nfraud in another way. When leaders high up in \u201csociety\u201d pay homage to\nthe deity of the climbing money-maker by betaking themselves to trade\nunder assumed names, the mirth of Midas and of his whole despised caste\nmay find its opportune vent.\n\nWe may now briefly indicate the general effect of the social movements\njust sketched upon the quality and the mode of distribution of the\nhilarious moods of a people.\n\n(_a_) To begin with, the advance and wider spread of the wave of\nculture will clearly tend to effect a general raising {289} of the\nstandard of taste, and to develop an appreciation of the quality of\nthe ludicrous. This result, though effected in part by the development\nof art and the extension of its educative influence, is in the main\nthe direct outcome of intellectual progress and of that increase in\nrefinement of feeling which seems to depend on this progress. One\nmay describe this change by saying that the standard of ideas tends\ngradually to gain ground, hemming in if not narrowing that of custom.\nThe primal laugh, void of intellectual content, becomes less general,\nthe laugh of the mind more frequent. This effect of an introduction\nof ideas holds good in the case of members of all classes in so far\nas they enter into the higher culture group. In this way particular\nstandards of locality and of social group begin to count less in our\nlaughter.\n\nThis effect of expansion of the intellectual view is reflected in all\nthe more refined varieties of comic art. Any manifest insistence on\ndignity of rank, more especially when the group is not of imposing\naspect, whether the _petite noblesse_ in a small \u201cResidency\u201d town on\nthe Continent or the families which compose \u201cSociety\u201d in an obscure\ntown in England, is felt to be on the verge of the ludicrous. On the\nother hand, a magnifying of the dignity of a person or a class by those\nbelow, when accompanied by a cringing demeanour, is apt to take on the\namusing aspect of flunkeyism, the due appreciation of which presupposes\na certain maturity of the laughter of the mind.\n\nThe general tendency of this advance of ideas is as yet very\nimperfectly realised. The march of mind, like some military marches,\nis not quite so uniformly triumphant as it is wont to be represented.\nA considerable part of the laughter among what are called the educated\nclasses is still {290} but little influenced by the finer and deeper\nperception of ludicrous quality; while, as for the uneducated majority\nof all social grades, it would be hard to find in their mirth any\ndistinct traces of a deposit from the advance of the culture-stream.\nOne might venture on the supposition that the appreciation of the\nludicrous shown to-day by the frequenters of a \u201chigh class\u201d Music\nHall in London is, both as to its intellectual penetration and as\nto its refinement of feeling, but little, if anything, above that\nof a medi\u00e6val crowd which gathered to see and hear the jokes of the\n_jongleur_. So slow a process is the infiltration of refining influence\nfrom the higher strata of culture downwards.\n\n(_b_) This change in the quality of social laughter through an\ninfusion of ideas has undoubtedly been accompanied by a change in its\nquantity, as seen in a decline of the older, voluminous merriment of\nthe people. This fall in the collective outburst, already touched on,\nand recognised by all students of the past, is largely due to a toning\ndown of the simpler and heartier utterances of the common people. This\nchange is so important as to call for a short investigation.\n\nIn simpler types of society, the more hearty and voluminous laughter\nprobably came from the lowest strata. It is enough to recall the mirth\nof the Egyptian and the Roman slave. Later on, the large scope for\nindulgence in laughter was supplied by an _organisation_ of mirth in\nthe shape of shows and other popular entertainments. There was possibly\nthe germ of such an organisation in the annual celebration \u201cin honour\nof the most jocund god of laughter\u201d referred to by Apuleius.[249] One\nmay instance the merry-makings at the harvest and vintage festivals\nout of {291} which Greek comedy took its rise, and the rollicking fun\nof the multitude at fairs and festivals during the Middle Ages. That\nthe people were the true experts in the secrets of laughter is further\nsuggested by the fact that slaves, both Greek and Roman, were selected\nas jesters and wits by well-to-do people. The fools kept by Orientals\nwere probably from the same class.[250] The later \u201cfools\u201d of European\ncourts were drawn from the simple folk.\n\nThe characteristics of this early type of popular mirth can be summed\nup in the word childishness. The slave or other oppressed worker\ncould without effort throw off ideas of toil and chastisement in his\nplay hour. Towards his master and his treatment of him, his attitude\nseems to have been on the whole the resignation of a life-long habit.\nHe might, not improbably, enjoy a quiet joke at the expense of his\noverseer, but he seems to have entertained towards him none of the\ndeeper animosity.\n\nThis na\u00efve form of popular laughter gave way to a less childish type\nwhen \u201cthe common people\u201d began to include a goodly number of free-men\nwho were able to form opinions of their own, and bold enough to\nassert the right of expressing these. It follows from what has been\nsaid above that the newly gained freedom would naturally give rise to\nsome laughter-bringing criticism of authorities. This tendency of the\nmirthful mood of the crowd was instantly perceived by the authorities\nwho waged war against it, using the weapons of a repressive censorship.\nWe have an example of this censorship in the police regulations which\nhampered the introduction of comedy from Athens into Rome. It was\nrequired by the authorities that the scene of the play should always\nbe laid outside Rome as if to guard against a direct attack on Roman\n{292} institutions and persons.[251] A like hostility to the pranks of\na free and quite unfastidious mirth was shown by the medi\u00e6val church.\nThis may well have been in part the outcome of honest moral reprobation\nof the scurrilities of the songs, the _contes_ and the rest. Yet it\nlooks as if the prohibitory enactments originated for the most part in\nthe alarm of the ecclesiastics for the security of their hold on the\nmind of the people.\n\nIt was not, however, an easy matter to silence popular laughter when\nthis had once heard itself and recognised its force. Aristophanes\nand his laughing public were, for a time at least, stronger than\nthe demagogue whom they ridiculed. No doubt the civil and the\necclesiastical power have again and again succeeded in half-stifling\nfor a time the ruder sort of laughter. Yet the complete suffocation\nof it in free communities has proved to be impossible. In the Middle\nAges, we are told, the atmosphere of fun would rise now and again to a\nkindling heat, so that holy men themselves would join in the not too\ndecent songs.[252] The modern history of Political Satire abundantly\nillustrates the force of popular laughter. Thus, in the Stuart period,\nsatires were produced which were a popular protest against the\ngrievance of monopolies.[253] How firmly it maintained its ground is\nillustrated by the fact that the politicians, when they have failed\nto oust it from the stage, have endeavoured to turn it to their own\nends.[254] If the more scurrilous sort has now been driven from the\nstage, political caricature {293} flourishes vigorously and has dared\nto attack royalty itself within a measurable period.[255]\n\nThe people has undoubtedly been the upholder of the wholesome custom of\nmirth. Taking the peasantry, the workmen, and the lower middle class as\nrepresenting the \u201cpeople\u201d of to-day, one has to confess that its merry\nnote seems to have been lost. The reservoir which in the past supplied\nthe stream of national gaiety has certainly fallen and threatens even\nto dry up. But of this more by-and-by.\n\n(_c_) As a last effect needing to be emphasised here, we have\nunderlying the laughter of a people a curiously composite attitude.\nBy this I mean an agglomeration of mental tendencies involving\ndifferent _mani\u00e8res de voir_, and different standards of the fit and,\nconsequently, of the laughable.\n\nIn the preceding chapter we saw how the choral laughter of the savage\nfollowed the directions of the self-conservative tendencies of his\ntribe. This unconscious self-adaptation of the mirthful mood to\nthe ends of the tribal life has persisted through all the changes\nintroduced by the play of fashion and by the movements of social\nevolution. We of to-day who travel so much more than our ancestors in\nforeign lands, and may even learn to speak their languages, retain the\ntendency to resist the importation of what strikes us as un-English. In\ncertain seasons, say when the war-temper heats the blood and foreigners\ncriticise, this feeling for what is national grows distinct and vivid,\nand reflects itself unmistakably in the manifestations of such mirth as\nseems to be compatible with the mood of the hour.\n\nThis point of view of the tribe has always coexisted with {294} the\nnarrower and more relative one of the group, illustrated above, though\nit has in ordinary circumstances been less prominent in men\u2019s mirthful\nutterances. The medi\u00e6val laughter at the priest, one may conjecture,\nwas now and again directed from the national or patriotic point of\nview, as the people began to discern in him the servant of a foreign\npower.\n\nNot only so, but in much of a people\u2019s laughter at what it deems the\n\u201cabsurd\u201d\u2014the laughter of \u201ccommon-sense,\u201d as we may call it\u2014it is the\npoint of view of the tribe or society which is still adopted: and\nthis holds good of the larger part, at least, of a community in the\nvan of the march of civilisation. When we smile at what appears to us\na far-fetched view, or a quaint habit of life, we are really guided\nby the standard, \u201cwhat people round about us say and do and expect\nus to say and do\u201d. This contented reference to a vaguely formulated\ncustom, without any scrutiny of its inherent reasonableness, holds\ngood, indeed, of the judgments passed by ordinary men on the laughable\naspects of the immoral. Promptness in paying one\u2019s debts, for example,\nwill for most men wear a reasonable or a foolish aspect according\nto the custom of their tribe\u2014though here two class-standards make\nthemselves distinctly felt; and so the laugh may be turned, as the\ncustom changes, from him whose tardiness in discharging liabilities\nsuggests straitened means otherwise carefully concealed, to him who\ndisplays an ungentlemanly haste in matters of a contemptible smallness.\n\nIt seems to follow that the adjustments of laughter to more universal\nnorms, to ideas of an inherent fitness in things, are a kind of\nartificial addition to deeper and more instinctive tendencies. The\nordinary man, even when he enjoys the spectacle of some laughable folly\nor vice, {295} hardly transcends the point of view of custom, from\nwhich what all men do is seen to be right. It is only when a higher\nculture has made apparent the universality of the laughable, as of\nits opposite the reasonable, that a conscious resort to ideas becomes\nfrequent. This clarifying of our laughter by the infusion of ideas is,\nin a special manner, the work of experts, namely, the moralist, the\nliterary critic, and, most of all, the artist whose business it is to\nillumine the domain of the ludicrous. This function of art will form\nthe subject of a later chapter.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIn this chapter we have dealt merely with what I have called choral\nlaughter, that of groups, smaller or larger. There is, however, another\nkind, the private laughter of the individual when alone, or in the\ncompany of sympathetic friends. This also has its pre-conditions in the\nprocesses of social evolution just touched upon.\n\nSuch independent laughter would, it is evident, be impossible in\nthe lowest stages of this evolution. In the savage or quasi-savage\nstate an oddly constituted member of a tribe\u2014if such a being were\npossible\u2014liable to be seized with a spasm of ridicule at the\nabsurdities of tribal ceremonies would certainly encounter serious\nrisks. It has needed ages of social progress to establish the\nconditions of a safe individual liberty in the indulgence of the jocose\ntemper.\n\nThis freedom in choosing one\u2019s own modes of laughter has gradually\nasserted itself as a part of all that we mean by individual liberty.\nPerhaps, indeed, it may be regarded as the highest phase and completion\nof this liberty.\n\nThis is not the place for a full inquiry into the complex conditions on\nwhich the development of a freer individual laughter depends. It may\nbe enough to point to the need {296} of an advance in ideas and the\ncapability, among the few at least, to form individual judgments, which\nthis advance implies. A man who would laugh his own laugh must begin by\ndeveloping his own perceptions and ideas.\n\nA fuller understanding of the pre-conditions of an independent\nlaughter will only be possible to one who has carefully examined its\ncharacteristics. In the following chapter I propose to analyse that\nvariety of the laughing temper which seems in a peculiar way to be\nan attribute of the developed individual. This attribute is what is\nspecially designated in these days by the term humour.\n\n{297}\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X.\n\nLAUGHTER OF THE INDIVIDUAL: HUMOUR.\n\n\nIn the preceding chapter we have seen how the advance of civilisation\nhas tended to still the louder choral voice of laughter. Yet man\u2019s best\nfriend is not of the sort to take an affront too seriously. Driven\nout from the crowd, he has known how to disguise himself and to steal\nback into the haunts of men, touching here and there a human spirit\nand moving it to a quieter and perfectly safe enjoyment of things\nlaughable. This new endowment, this last inspiration of the mortal by\nthe god, is what we mean by Humour.\n\nPerhaps hardly a word in the language\u2014and it seems to be exclusively\nan English word\u2014would be harder to define with scientific precision\nthan this familiar one. It is often used with the greatest degree of\nlooseness, as when a man is endowed with humour because he laughs\nreadily.[256] Yet any one who takes pains in using words knows how far\nthis is from being accurate. A chronic garrulity of laughter, typified\nin what Mr. Meredith calls the \u201chypergelast,\u201d stands, indeed, in marked\ncontrast to what careful speech indicates by \u201chumour\u201d. As its etymology\nmight teach us, the term connotes, not so much the common endowment of\n{298} \u201crisibility,\u201d as a certain kind of temperament, a complexion\nof sentiment, nay, more, a mode of psychical organisation. We cannot,\ntherefore, think of the race as humorous, and should even find it\ndifficult to generalise the endowment so far as to speak of humorists\nas a class. The humorous man or woman is so, primarily and essentially,\nby the unpurchasable possession of an individual mind.\n\nThis fact of a quite peculiar mixture of elements in the humorous\nperson must never be lost sight of. It dooms this person to a\ncomparative solitude in the vocal expression of a feeling which is\nprimarily social and communicative. The idea of a large unison of\nutterance among humorous persons is not entertainable. A man who has\ndeveloped his humorous bent will be thankful if he finds in his social\ncircle one or two who can understand, and, now and again, join in his\nquiet chuckle.\n\nYet, though essentially in every individual case a unique blend\nof elements, humour has certain common characteristics. What sort\nof temperament and mind are we thinking of when we agree to call\nShakespeare, Cervantes, Goldsmith, Sterne, Lamb, Dickens, and George\nEliot humorists?\n\nOne thing we can say confidently, that it is wanting in certain\ncharacteristics of the more diffused laughter. It is far removed from\nthe swift reflex gaiety of the child and the unthinking adult. Its\nlaughter is not only quieter but has a slower movement, and it is\ncharged with a deeper meaning. Again, its utterance differs in tone\nfrom the old brutal and contemptuous shout. It voices itself in low and\nalmost tender tones. It is the laughter altogether farthest removed\nfrom the standpoint of the interested person: there is in it nothing\nof the crowing over the vanquished, hardly anything of a consciousness\nof the {299} superiority to which the uplifting of laughter may at\nthe moment make valid claim. Hence, one may hesitate to apply the name\nhumorist to a writer in whose laughter\u2014though it is commonly spoken of\nas humour\u2014a note of derisive contempt begins to grow prominent.\n\nThese contrasts point clearly enough to certain positive\ncharacteristics of the moods of humour. A quiet survey of things, at\nonce playful and reflective; a mode of greeting amusing shows which\nseems in its moderation to be both an indulgence in the sense of fun\nand an expiation for the rudeness of such indulgence; an outward,\nexpansive movement of the spirits met and retarded by a cross-current\nof something like kindly thoughtfulness; these clearly reveal\nthemselves as some of its dominant traits.\n\nAt first it seems impossible to view this subtle and complex mental\nattitude as a development of the na\u00efve and rather coarse merriment of\nearlier times. Yet a slight examination of the choicest examples of\nwhat the discerning call humour would suffice to show that it finds its\npasturage very much where the Greek or the medi\u00e6val populace found it.\nTopsy-turvyness, especially when it involves the fall of things from\na height; stumbling and awkwardness of all kinds; human oddities when\nthey grow to provocative dimensions; all self-inflation with a view to\nforce a reluctant notice; the manifold masqueradings of mortals; the\nunfitnesses of things to the demands of circumstances; extravagances,\nperversities, and the multitudinous follies of men; these which move\nthe rough man to his unconsidered cachinnation move also the humorous\nman to his slower and _sotto voce_ note.\n\nAs our great woman humorist has it: \u201cStrange as the genealogy may\nseem, the original parentage of that wonderful and delicious mixture\nof fun, fancy, philosophy and {300} feeling, which constitutes modern\nhumour, was probably the cruel mockery of a savage at the writhings of\na suffering enemy\u2014such is the tendency of things towards the better and\nmore beautiful!\u201d[257]\n\nIn asserting that gentle humour has its descent from such an uncouth\nancestry, we must not be supposed to imply that its genesis has been\na sudden or a simple process. As has been suggested, the sentiment\nis highly complex. It presupposes in its possessor the presence of a\nparticular assemblage of qualities which may be expected to be rare;\nand a study of the development both of the individual and of the race\ntells us that this grouping of qualities is, of all the products of\nnature\u2019s laboratory, one of the most delicate, one exacting from her a\nvery special effort of preparation.\n\nAlthough humour is correctly described as a sentiment, its most\napparent, if not most important condition, is a development of\nintelligence. It is plainly an example of what Mr. Meredith calls\n\u201cthe laughter of the mind,\u201d an expression which makes the large\npresupposition that we have this mind. It thrives best at the level\nof ideas. Yet the element of intellect which is vital to humour does\nnot imply subtlety of mind, still less the presence of ideas remote\nfrom the plane of ordinary men\u2019s understanding. What is needed is a\nmind given to musing on what it observes\u2014it may be that of a shrewd\nhousewife\u2014having a sufficient life and independence of movement to rise\nabove the dull mechanical acceptance of things, to pierce these with\nthe ray of a fresh criticism.\n\nThe distinguishing intellectual element in humorous contemplation is\na larger development of that power of grasping things together, and\nin their relations, which is at {301} the root of all the higher\nperceptions of the laughable. More particularly, it is a mental habit\nof projecting things against their backgrounds, of viewing them in\ntheir complete settings\u2014so far as this involves those relations of\ncontrariety which, as we have allowed, are of the essence of the\nludicrous, in the stricter sense of the term. This comprehension of\nthe setting is dependent on a process of _imaginative reflection_; for\nthe background which humour requires is not the same as the visible\nbackground, but has, to a considerable extent, to be reinstated, or\nrather to be constructed.\n\nThis introduction into humour of something in the nature of a thinking\nprocess or reflection has this curious consequence, that it does not\nmerely play about the realm of the serious, as the earlier and simpler\nlaughter does, but comprehends, assimilates, and becomes toned down\ninto half-play by something of the weightier import of things, of their\nvalue and their bearing on our welfare. This is the paradox, the secret\nof the humour-loving soul, irritating at once to the merely serious\nperson and to the light-hearted trifler. In order to understand how\nthis is effected, we shall, as will be seen presently, need to look\nat other elements besides the intellectual. Yet we shall do well to\nnote the fact that the possibility of this meeting of the playful and\nthe serious in the mood of humour has its intellectual condition in an\nenlarged mental grasp of things.\n\nOur analysis of the objects which entice the laugh from man has\nsuggested that the risible aspect nearly always coexists with other\naspects. The kind of physical defect which is amusing may also be\nwrong \u00e6sthetically or hygienically, and so on of the rest. And though\nwriters from Aristotle to Bain have been careful to point out that the\nlaughable defect or degradation must in its magnitude be below the\nthreshold of the painfully ugly, the {302} blameworthy and so forth,\nit is perfectly clear that given a quick and comprehensive perception,\nand a turn for musing on what is perceived, the serious tendency in\nthat which amuses us will come into the margin of the field of vision.\n\nIn this way, in the case of those who have developed the requisite\ncombining organ, a kind of binocular mental vision has become possible.\nWe enjoy pensively the presentation of Don Quixote, of Uncle Toby,\nand the other great humorous characters, just because we are in a\nmood in which, while giving ourselves up to an amusing spectacle, we\nnevertheless embrace in our reflective survey, and are affected by,\nsomething of its deeper meaning.\n\nA full account of the humorous way of regarding things would trace\nout all the subtle interpenetrations of merry fooling and serious\ninspection, of a light and merry fancy and a sober reason. A hint,\nonly, on their modes of combination, can be given here.\n\nA finer appreciation of contrasts, and of relations generally, will\noften serve to enrich the impression given by a palpable instance of\nthe laughable. A small plump child falls on the floor with sonorous\neffect: the sudden flopping down is fraught with entertainment for\nall men. The observer who can contemplate thoughtfully, enjoys the\nfall also, but more quietly and with a larger process of mental\nassimilation. His mind discerns in the trivial incident such things,\nperhaps, as the compact sturdiness of nature re-establishing itself\nby vigorous efforts duly announced by grunts, and the harmlessness of\nfalls when bones and joints are young, as compared with those of the\nold, of which in many respects the child\u2019s fall may remind him. It is\na train of ideas of this kind, though only half-consciously pursued,\nwhich gives to the thumping fall much of its value for the humorous\nobserver. {303}\n\nAgain, the development of the intelligence to a large and varied\nactivity will, by quickening the faculty of seizing relations, open up\nnew and spacious fields for the humorist\u2019s quiet contemplation. To one\nbringing a mental eye focussed for the amusing juxtaposition, and a\ntemper disposed to muse on what he sees, how much of the entertaining\nmay reveal itself in common sights, such as that of a thin wheezy man\njoining in shouts of a full-blooded Jingo crowd, or that of a woman,\nwhose head has just been pommelled by her rightful lord, turning\nupon and \u201cslanging\u201d the bystander who has foolishly tried to curb an\nexcessive assertion of marital rights.[258] The possession of ideas,\nagain, will help a man at once sympathetically to realise and to\ntranscend limited points of view when they come into collision, and so\nto gather much ruminating amusement. How large a scope, for example,\nfor such quiet entertainment opens up in the rejoinder of Mrs. Flynn,\nan Irish lady who had been brought before a magistrate for assaulting\nher husband, and commiserated by that compassionate functionary on\nher sad plight with one eye closed and the head bandaged: \u201cOch, yer\nworship, just wait till yez see Flynn\u201d. The recognition of the real\nproportions of a zest for battle and a taste for compassion in the\nstalwart Irish dame, unsuspected by kindly magistrates, at once gives\nus the point of view for a half-serious, half-amusing contemplation of\nhuman relations.\n\nAs these illustrations suggest, the point of view of the humorous\nobserver is not a fixed one. Sometimes the freshness, the sense of\nliberation from the stupidly commonplace, will come by applying a\nrational idea to things which are not accustomed to the treatment. At\nother times, when the intelligence happens to be more sprightly, the\nnew point of {304} view is reached by a flight of fancy which loves\nto perch itself on some outlook far from that of a rational criticism.\nThe humorous sort of mind delights in the play of inverting ordinary\narrangements, say, of making man and beast, father and son, exchange\nplaces, or, as in Lewis Carroll\u2019s delightful instance of an ideal\nexperiment, of putting the sane people in asylums and allowing the\nlunatics to go at large.[259]\n\nIt follows that humorous contemplation will have many shades of\nseriousness. In some instances, the proportion of the rational element\nleads us to speak of it as wisdom laughing,\u2014\u201cridentem dicere verum\u201d;\nin others, in which the predominance of a capricious fancy brings the\nexpression near that of sportive wit, to describe it rather as laughter\nsobered by a word of wisdom. Yet it may be said that in every state\nwhich we describe as one of humorous enjoyment the rational element\nitself, affected by its alliance, puts on a half-festive attire, so\nthat after all the whole mind may be said to join in the play.[260]\n\nThe humorous state is, however, much more than a peculiar modification\nof the processes of intelligence. It cannot be constituted by a\nmere train of cold perceptions and ideas. It means that the whole\nconsciousness is for the time modified by the taking on of a new\nattitude or mood. The play of young fancy about the grave elderly form\nof reason, which is half-coaxed to play too, comes from this new tone\nof the whole mind.\n\nThis mental tone involves a peculiar modification of the conative\nprocesses. All laughing scrutiny of things, as a play-attitude, is\na sort of relaxation of the set concentration {305} of a conative\npurpose. Whenever we laugh, if it be only with a child at the\njocosities of a clown, we are freed from the constraining force of the\npractical and even of the theoretical interests which commonly hold and\nconfine our minds when we observe closely. In such moments we abandon\nourselves to the tickling play of the object on our perceptions and\nideational tendencies. In humour this self-abandonment takes on a shade\nof seriousness, not because the relaxation of the conative effort is\nless complete, but because the self-abandonment is that of a mind so\nhabitually reflective that, even when it is at play, it does not wholly\nlose sight of the serious import of the thoughts which minister to its\nentertainment; because it dimly recognises the worth of the standard\nideas, by the lightest allusion to which it is able to indulge in a\nplayful criticism of what is presented.\n\nThe deeper secret of the mood of humour, however, lies in a peculiar\nmodification of the feeling-tone of consciousness. In this, it is at\nonce evident, we have to do with a special example of complexity.\nThe laughter tinged with something akin to sadness is a mixture of\nfeeling-tones; of tones, too, which seem directly opposed and likely to\nbe mutually repugnant.\n\nThe gaiety of laughter begins to be complicated with an undertone by\nthe half-intrusion into consciousness of the serious import of things.\nTo be aware, however indistinctly, that the world has its serious\nside, is to lose the child\u2019s note of pure mirth, is to have a touch of\nsadness added to our laughter.\n\nThe more serious complication comes, however, when the regrettable side\nof the laughable object makes itself felt. The effect of this on the\nhumorous person has nothing in common with that of the exhibition of\nfolly on {306} the contemptuous person. It is the very opposite to the\nfeeling of one who rejoices in another\u2019s discomfiture as such. It is\na sense of the implicated \u201cpity of it\u201d. A person completely humorous\nis essentially sympathetic, skilled in the humane art of transporting\nhimself to others\u2019 standpoints, of comprehending men\u2019s doings and words\nin the warm light thrown by the human affections. By some, indeed,\nsympathy is regarded as the great distinguishing characteristic of\nhumour.[261] But it seems well to add that it is the infusion of a\nproportionate amount of the sympathetic into our blithe survey of\nthings which carries us far in the path of humorous appreciation. A\nsympathy of a step too quick for the sense of fun to keep abreast in\nfriendly comradeship will, as Flaubert says happened in his case in\nlater life,[262] make an end of laughter.\n\nIt is but a step from this recognition of the regrettableness of what\namuses us to a discernment of what, in its turn, tones down the sadness\nof regret, of the fine threads which attach the laughable defect to\nelements of real worth. Humour, of the richer kinds at least, certainly\nincludes something of consideration, of a detection, in the laughable\nquality or its attachments, of suggestions of what is estimable and\nlovable.\n\nThe disposition to think well of what amuses us may come in the first\ninstance from an impulse of gratitude. So ready are we in general to\nacknowledge another\u2019s entertainment of us that, even when the pleasure\nbestowed is known to have been given quite unwittingly, we cannot quite\ncheck the impulse to tender thanks. {307}\n\nAgain, that which amuses us will often, when thoughtfully considered,\nshow itself to be bound up with what is really estimable. It is\nexaggerations of good qualities which are so amusing, especially\nwhen through sheer obstinacy they tend to become the whole man, and\nto provoke while they entertain. Comedy will sometimes\u2014in the figure\nof Moli\u00e8re\u2019s Alceste, for example\u2014exhibit to us this clinging of the\nlaughable to the skirts of excellence. But it is only to the more\nreflective mood of humour, to which comedy, as we shall see, does not\nappeal, that this coexistence of the quality and its defects, fully\ndiscloses itself.\n\nSometimes, too, even though we fail to discern its partial redemption\nthrough an organic connection with a worthy trait, a laughable defect\nmay take on the appearance of a condonable and almost lovable blemish\nof character. Thus it is with the small imperfections seen in men\nrecognised to be substantially good, imperfections which bring them\nnearer to us and so make them comprehensible. Thus, too, is it with the\nignorances and simplicities of children, which, even while they bring\nthe smile, disclose their worth as pure expressions of child-nature.\n\nBy speaking of a sentiment of humour we imply that the kindly feeling\nsomehow combines with the gaiety of laughter in a new type of emotional\nconsciousness. This combination, again, seems to involve a simultaneous\npresence in consciousness of the two elements, and not merely a rapid\nalternation of two phases of feeling. It is this simultaneous rise and\npartial fusion of a gay and a sad tone of feeling which differentiates\nhumour proper from the feeling of ages to which the proximity of the\nlaughable and the pathetic in things was familiar enough, as we may\nsee, for example, from Pope\u2019s lines on Addison:\u2014 {308}\n\n    Who but must laugh if such a man there be?\n    Who would not weep, if Atticus were he?\n\nAgain, as a harmonious blending of elements the sentiment of humour\ncontrasts with that mere mixture of pleasurable and painful ingredients\nwhich Plato thought he detected in all laughter.[263]\n\nThe psychology of the emotions is still in a backward state, and we\nknow very little about the laws of their fusion.[264] One or two points\nmay, however, be touched on.\n\nIt must be remembered that two feelings simultaneously excited may\nclash and refuse to combine in a peaceful whole. This commonly happens,\nindeed, when they are repugnant in kind, _e.g._, pride and tenderness,\nand when both are powerfully excited. Emotional fusion means that this\nrepugnance is somehow overcome, that the constituent emotive processes\ncombine in some new current of consciousness. Not that the elements\nneed be wholly submerged in the product; they may remain as tones\nremain in a chord, half-disclosed, though profoundly modified by their\nconcomitants. Such a state of partial fusion may be illustrated in our\nmoods of memory, in which delight in the recovery of lost experiences\nis tempered with regret.\n\nThe conditions of such a peaceful, harmonious confluence of dissimilar\nfeelings are various. The effect may be furthered by the presence of\npoints of affinity among the elements; whence the sentiments which\ndignify their objects, such as love and admiration, readily combine.\nThis holds good to some extent of the constituents of humour, since\namusement and something like tender regard for him who amuses us are\nplainly allied. Yet this {309} consideration does not seem to help us\nin understanding how the two polar moods of hilarity and sadness should\nbe able to combine.\n\nWe may be helped here by setting out from the fact of a simultaneous\nappeal to the dissimilar feelings by the same presentation. When this\noccurs again and again, it is probable that organic modifications may\nbe effected by the simultaneous action of the double stimulus. Nobody\nbegins by feeling amused and sorry at the same moment. The boy and the\nsavage may have a moment of mild pity for an ugly piece of deformity;\nbut this moment comes after the laughing is over. The co-presentation\nof the sad and the amusing had, we may be sure, to be repeated during\nmany generations of men before the two currents could join in one\nsmooth flow.\n\nThose who find the core of an emotion in a widely diffused organic\nprocess may reason that such repetitions of a complex emotional\nstimulation may modify the nervous system in some way, so as to allow\nof the combination of some parts at least of the bodily resonances\ncharacteristic of the emotional constituents. For one thing, the fact,\nalready alluded to, that there is a certain community of physiological\nprocess in the case of laughter and of the expression of grief, may\nhelp us, to some extent, to understand the combination.[265] Yet\nmutual inhibition by the two sets of organic processes involved seems\nto be the principal agency in the case. The more energetic movements\nof laughter are without doubt restrained by an admixture of sympathy.\nPerhaps if we understood the physics of organic processes, we might\nspeak here of an \u201cinterference,\u201d or, at least, of some antagonistic\naction between the motor-impulses of the laugh and of the sigh. {310}\n\nOne other condition seems to be important. Where emotions are widely\ndissimilar and likely to be antagonistic, it is necessary that they\nshould not both be excited in a high degree. We may succeed in getting\na blend between a gentle laugh and a mild pity, though certainly not\nbetween a state of mirthful excitement and one of deep compassion. The\nmoods of humour run in low keys, laughter and kindly sentiment being\neach toned down as if for smoother confluence. This need of a reduction\nof the force of consorting emotions may, too, find its explanation in\nthe conditions of the organic processes which have to be combined.\nThis does not imply, however, that the two feelings which unite in\nhumour are of equal strength. As hinted above, humour seems always,\neven when an almost poignant sadness pierces it, to maintain itself at\nthe level of a quiet enjoyment. It answers to the mood which has been\ncalled the luxury of pity, in which the sense of pain has shrunk away\nto a scarcely heard over-tone, while the ground-tone of alleviating\ntenderness sounds out clear and full.\n\nThis analysis may help us to understand why Mr. Meredith has called\nthe laughter of Shakespeare and Cervantes \u201cthe richer laugh of heart\nand mind in one\u201d.[266] It may help us, too, to interpret some things\nsaid by the German metaphysicians about laughter. Kant, for instance,\nredeems the poverty of his general theory by a memorable passage on\nthe amusing aspect of a na\u00efvet\u00e9 of behaviour which does not know how\nto hide itself. He allows that in this case there is mingled with\nthe laughter\u2014which he supposes to arise from an annihilation of the\nexpectation of the customary\u2014something of earnestness and of respect,\nas we reflect that what is infinitely better than accepted codes\nof manners (Sitte), namely, purity of natural {311} disposition\n(Denkungsart), is not wholly extinguished in human nature.[267]\n\nOur analysis of humour may help us to understand some well-recognised\nfacts. It teaches us that a sentiment, at once complex and implying\na mature reflection, must not be looked for in the young; it is the\nprerogative of the years which have hoarded experiences and learned to\nreflect. Nor, as implied in what was said above, is it to be sought\nfor in the youth of the world. That humour is\u2014in its clearest and\nfullest utterance at least\u2014the possession of modern times, the period\nushered in by the appearance of the great trio, Rabelais, Cervantes and\nShakespeare, is explained by saying that, like music, it fits itself\ninto the ways of our new spirit.\n\nThe apprehension of this complex basis of humour helps us, further,\nto understand somewhat the curious variations of the attitude among\nraces and peoples. There are regions of civilisation where, so far as\nliterary expression gives us the key, laughter seems to remain at, or\nat most only a little above, the level of the child\u2019s simple merriment.\nThis appears to be true of certain portions of the East, where a\nconsiderable love of fun coexists with a predominant gravity of mind\nwithout interpenetration, almost without contact.[268] Among certain\nraces of Southern Europe, too, which have produced a rich literature of\namusement, the blending of the serious and the playful, which is of the\nessence of humour seems to be but very imperfectly reached. The gaiety\nof the medi\u00e6val _Conte_ is the gaiety of the Frenchman who, {312} in\nspite of one or two literary exceptions, likes to keep his thinking\nand his mirth distinct, in their original purity and _nettet\u00e9_.[269]\nFrenchmen, such as M. Taine and M. Scherer, have fully recognised the\nfact that what we mean by humour is a product of the _triste nord_.\nWhat racial characteristics have served to further its growth in this\nregion, it may not be easy to say. Perhaps, the closest approximation\nto an explanation may be found in the hypothesis that a vigorous germ\nof laughter fertilised by a disposition to brooding melancholy always\ntends to generate something of the nature of humour; and that, as we\nshall presently see, utility does something for its preservation.\n\nThe consideration of the complexity of the sentiment may throw\nlight, further, on its modifications among the peoples which are\ncorrectly spoken of as endowed with it. These differences are roughly\naccounted for by saying that the proportions of gravity and gaiety,\nof serious reflection and playful fancy vary indefinitely. They are\ncertainly different, let us say, in the case of the Englishman, the\nAmerican, the Scotchman and the Irishman. Yet this consideration does\nnot account for all the dissimilarity. Since humour is playfulness\nmodified by the whole serious temper of a man, we should expect it to\ndifferentiate itself into many shades according to the trend of the\nideas, interests, impulses and the rest which distinguishes one sort\nof mind or character from another. We can only fully understand the\ncontrast between American and English, or between Irish and Scotch,\nhumour, when we understand the differences {313} of character. An\namusing Irish or Scotch story, one, that is to say, which is produced\nfor home-consumption, seems to be redolent of the whole temperament,\nmind and character of the people. It is this complexity of the\nsentiment which makes the amiable effort to illustrate the humour of\nother peoples by published selections a pathetic futility. How can\none expect, for example, the ordinary Englishman to get into touch\nwith that fine product of child\u2019s fun, quick fancy, alert sympathy,\nopen-heartedness, and a deep brooding sentiment which meets him in the\nhumour of the Irishman? It is enough to remember how he is wont to\nlaugh his superior laugh at an Irish bull, as if this were necessarily\nan unconscious \u201chowler,\u201d whereas it may be, in reality, a charming\nexpression of a most amiable trait of character.[270]\n\nA due recognition of the complexity of the sentiment discloses to us a\npoint of capital importance: humour, in the sense of a perfect fusion\nof play and gravity, of the aggressiveness of laughter and kindly\nconsideration, is, as already hinted, pre-eminently an endowment of\nindividuals rather than of races. It presupposes a basis of temperament\nwhich, though it may be favoured by certain racial characters, is only\nrealised where nature hits upon a particular proportion among the\nelements by the mixing of which she produces an individual; and so nice\nan operation is this mixture, that humour, of the full rich quality at\nleast, is perhaps less frequently handed down from parent to child than\nspecific forms of talent.\n\nThe old writers treated humour by help of their general {314}\ntheory of temperaments as compounded of certain physical elements.\nThe learned Burton, for instance, in the chapter already quoted,\ndiscourses agreeably of pleasant vapours which break from the heart,\nand thinks that these may explain why the melancholy are witty, as\nAristotle suggested. The passage is valuable as indicating that\nantiquity recognised the connection between laughter and the melancholy\ndisposition. Modern testimony might be added. Thus Savage Landor\nremarks that genuine humour, as well as true wit, requires a sound and\ncapacious mind, which is always a grave one;[271] and Tennyson notes\nthat humour \u201cis generally most fruitful in the highest and most solemn\nhuman spirits\u201d.[272]\n\nThe need of this deep and massive seriousness, if not of a marked\ntendency to sombre reflection, seems to be borne out by what we know\nof the great humorists. Sainte-Beuve regards Rabelais, who was a grave\ndoctor, and who worthily represented in his public lectures at Lyons\n\u201cthe majesty of science,\u201d as writing with the quite serious purpose of\nthrowing out in advance certain ideas of deep import (_de grand sens_)\n\u201cdans un rire immense\u201d. Much the same is true of Cervantes, who is\nsaid\u2014though the assertion has been challenged\u2014to have conceived of his\ndelightful romance in the dreary surroundings of a sponging-house.[273]\nThe germination of a mirthful sense in the soil of a serious character\nhas been noted, indeed, in the case of some who represent the lighter\nmoods of comedy\u2014a fact which points to the more general relation of\nlaughter to seriousness spoken of in an earlier chapter. Thus {315}\nSainte-Beuve, writing of Moli\u00e8re, says that he was called \u201cthe\ncontemplative\u201d; and was wont to be taken with sadness (_tristesse_) and\nmelancholy when he was alone.[274] Victor Hugo has somewhere spoken of\nhim as \u201cce moqueur pensif comme un ap\u00f4tre\u201d. It was remarked of Sheridan\nand other dealers in the mirthful by those who knew them that they\nseldom even smiled.\n\nIt is easy to see that the transformation of laughter which we find\nin humour will carry with it a large modification of the range of\nenjoyment. While, as has been admitted, the changes of feeling and\nmental attitude involved will tend to restrain the earlier reckless\nmerriment, they will also add vast regions to the territory of the\namusing.\n\nWith regard to restriction, one must protest against the common\nmisapprehension, that the development of humour spoils the taste for\nsimple modes of mirth. I have known sad-looking humorists who were well\nendowed with the valuable capability of joining in children\u2019s fun. What\nhumour does undoubtedly restrain is any tendency in laughter which\nsmacks of the brute and the bully in man.\n\nOn the other hand, the field of objects over which humour wanders\nbee-like gathering its honey is vastly greater than any region known\nto the rougher and more brutal merriment. The introduction of a\nreflective element and of higher points of view expands the horizon to\nan incalculable extent.\n\nThis change in point of view means at once that we penetrate below\nthe surface of things, reaching the half-veiled realities, and that\nwe envisage them in a network of relations. The former is illustrated\nin the humorist\u2019s finer contemplation of behaviour as a revelation\nof character. {316} An amplitude of enjoyment is secured by the\ncircumstance that, even in the case of the self-vigilant, intellectual\nand moral weaknesses have a way of peeping out which is most convenient\nfor a humorous onlooker who has his mental eye duly accommodated.\nWhen, for example, a young teacher, asked by an examiner to explain\n\u201ccongenital tendency,\u201d wrote, \u201cIt is the tendency to be congenial and\npleasant: children vary in this characteristic,\u201d the entertainment\nof the error for the reader lay in the na\u00efve disclosure of the\npreoccupation of the writer\u2019s mind with the chequered fortunes of her\nprofession. Or again, when another candidate from the same class,\nin describing the qualifications of a teacher, wrote: \u201cHe should be\nas intimately acquainted with the workings of a child\u2019s mind as the\nengine-driver is with the engine,\u201d the fun of the comparison for the\nreader came from the detection of an unscientific habit of mind,\nnatural enough in an over-zealous worker, intruding, unobserved, into\ntheoretic reflection.\n\nThese innocent self-revelations meet the watchful eye of the humorist\neverywhere in the haunts of men. They lie like hoar frost in the sun\non his surroundings, on which he unwittingly casts a reflection of\nthe habits of his mind and of the directions of his taste; as when\nin a large town bizarre juxtapositions of the vulgar heroic strike\nthe observer\u2019s eye in the names of streets, or of loose engines on a\nrailway.\n\nTo this finer penetration the humorous faculty adds a vision for\nrelations which distinguishes the higher kind of judgment. What we call\nthe ludicrous in character is, indeed, always to some extent a matter\nof relations. As implied above, it is the view of some trait set in\na particular milieu which brings the smile. The hidden weakness may\nentertain because of its juxtaposition with something that {317} is\nworthy, or at least has an appearance of worth. In a certain kind of\nimpulsive person, for example, there discloses itself to the humorous\neye an almost admirable consistency in the recurring inconsistencies;\nwhile, on the other hand, in another sort of character, that eye will\nrather spy an inconsistency within the limits of a quality, as when\na person, on the whole generous, lapses into a kind of niggardliness\nin certain small particulars of expenditure, as if to show that even\na moral quality, firmly planted, needs the sunlight of intelligence.\nIn many cases the entertainment in observing character comes, not so\nmuch through a perception of the juxtaposition of something worthy and\nsomething slightly unworthy, as through a detection of some discrepancy\nbetween the character and the _r\u00f4le_ assumed at the moment, as when\na self-assertive sense of justice, in \u201ca child of larger growth,\u201d\nreveals itself in the quaint exaggeration of doing more than justice to\noneself. No better terrain, indeed, for a chase after the imperfectly\nmasked will be found than that of the manners of persons who are quite\nabove suspicion of serious fault. Perhaps it is a certain kind of woman\nwho shows the greatest skill in this humorous reading of character,\nas when she sets herself to decipher the palimpsest of manners in one\neducated rather late in life, detecting traces of the earlier cramped\nhand below the thin caligraphy of a later culture.\n\nTo a finer perception of relations, again, must we ascribe the\nreadiness to enjoy the large and variegated presentment of\nunsuitabilities of men to their circumstances. The situations in which\nthe merry god, who seems to arrange the puppet show, often chooses to\nplace us are pregnant of ironical suggestion to the contemplative eye\nof humour. The necessity of confronting what nature never intended\n{318} that we should confront makes us an amusing spectacle to the\ntwinkling eyes above us. How delightful for example is the variety of\nsocial juxtaposition which brings embarrassment to the encounterers.\nWhen it is not accident but a man\u2019s foolish impulse, unmindful of\nlimitations of capability, which pushes him into the awkward situation,\nas when his civility plunges him into discourse in a foreign language\nwith a fellow-traveller, or when the most undecided of men attempts\nto make a proposal of marriage, the value of the situation for the\nhumorous observer is greatly enhanced.\n\nAs with the topsy-turvyness of momentary situation, so with more\npermanent incongruities between character and surroundings. In this\ncase a more special gift of humorous insight is needed; for to the many\nwhat lasts grows seemingly right by its mere durability. You may make\na highly unsuitable person a bishop, or the editor of a comic journal,\nand you will find that, for most onlookers, time will soon begin to\ninvest the position with a sort of suitability. Even an ill-matched\nconnubial pair will take on something of mutual appropriateness through\nthis influence of the customary on human judgments. But the eye of the\nhumorous onlooker, guided by ideas, entertains itself with stripping\noff the trappings of convention and use.\n\nThis humorous quizzing of the characters and of the revealed mental\nprocesses of those about us has grown, in the case of a few, into a\nchief pastime. The development in these days of a keener interest in\ncharacter, which is partly reflected in, partly the product of, modern\nfiction, has led these few to something like a sustained and methodical\nsurvey of their acquaintances and their friends, in which the quiet\nlaughter of the humorist may find ample room. A part of the temperate\nmirth in this case springs out of the delightful surprises\u2014the result\nof the complexity of organic {319} products and of the limitations\nof our powers of prediction. The appearance of a moral metamorphosis\nwhen a man comes under the influence of some new force, say a wife, or\nthe invasion of his social world by a war-craze, may amuse a humorous\nobserver much as the semblance of a physical transformation amuses\nhim. In this habitual contemplation by a humorous person of those\nhe knows, there is, evidently, a blending of amusement with kindly\ninterest. That is, indeed, the note of much of the \u201cpsychologising\u201d at\nwhich many, instructed by the best fiction, now try their hand. The\ncombination of the playful with the respectful attitude is nowhere\nmore plainly seen than in our new estimates of diversity of character\nand of individuality. The contemplation of the result of some new\nexperiment of nature in the variation of the human type, will always\nbring something of the gaiety which is provoked by the sight of a fresh\noddity; yet our new regard for individuality, as discriminated from\neccentricity, brings down the mirthful utterance to the low tones of\nhumour.\n\nThere is another way in which the development of the humorous faculty\nenlarges the sphere of the risible. In the simple nature of children\nand uncultured adults, fun and seriousness tend to dwell apart. The\nintroduction of a serious element into the mood of amusement, which\nis at the basis of humour, makes a breach in the dividing wall. As a\nconsequence, the humorist, though a profoundly serious person, will\nshow a readiness in the midst of grave occupations to digress for a\nmoment at the prick of some ludicrous suggestion. Good talkers and\nletter-writers, including women with the quick ear for the bubblings of\nfun, are thus given to momentary interruptions of serious discourse by\nside-glances at amusing aspects, and many persons who take themselves\nto be humorists are apt to be shocked at {320} the proceeding. Yet, in\ntruth, the extent to which a man succeeds in making laughter permeate\nthe sphere of the serious, without loosening its deep-laid foundation\nof gravity, is one of the best measures of the vitality of his humour.\nIt is this resolute yet perfectly respectful invasion of the domain of\nthe serious by humour which has made a good deal of modern literature\npossible. Of this, more anon: it may suffice for the present to call\nattention to a work of a friend of mine dealing with a subject which\nmight well seem to be dismally serious\u2014logic itself, a work which\nattempts with conspicuous success, while maintaining the dignity of the\nscience, to relieve its heaviness by a good number of amusing remarks\nand illustrations.[275]\n\nYet the expansion of the range of enjoyment when mindless mirth gives\nplace to humour is not wholly due to the absorption of a serious\nelement. One chief limitation of the more common kind of laughter\narises from the circumstance that it is apt to be disagreeable to the\nperson who is its object. This dislike, again, is due, as we have seen,\nto a natural feeling of resentment at being taken down and treated as\nan inferior. So long as the laughter retains a distinct vibration of\nthe old note of contempt, we must resist it; but when it grows mellow\nand kindly we are ready to withdraw the objection. There is nothing\nso terrible in having fun poked at our foibles, or even at our petty\nmisfortunes, so long as we know that a friendly face is hiding behind\nthe laughing mask. If a person only gives the assurance in his way of\nlaughing that contempt is drowned in a more genial sentiment, he may\nlaugh at his children, aye at his parents, too, even when they grow old\nand infirm. Nor is a previous knowledge of friendly disposition always\nneeded. There are a few whose mellow {321} laughter will instantly\ndisarm resistance in a stranger\u2014in the street boy, for example, though\nhe has the double sensitiveness of the poor and of the young.\n\nFrom this frank acceptance of others\u2019 overtures of a friendly laughter\nto the practice of a humorous self-criticism, there would seem to\nbe but a step. If humour always involves some degree of sympathetic\nself-projection into the object of contemplation, it should not\nbe difficult to turn the humorous glance upon one\u2019s own foibles.\nSelf-inspection is a thing of various kinds, and there are varieties\nof it (for example, the performances of the \u201cmoi spectateur\u201d in\nthe case of that curious young lady, Marie Bashkirtseff) which are\nremoved by the amplitude of the sky from humorous self-quizzing. The\nlast is perhaps the most rarely practised. Before he can accomplish\nit, a person must not only have developed a \u201chigher ego\u201d capable of\ncriticism in the light of ideas, but have learned to see himself as\nothers\u2014especially humorous onlookers\u2014see him, a feat hardly less\ndifficult than that of getting a glimpse of the crown of one\u2019s head.\n\nThat the doings of the lower ego, or rather cluster of egos, are\nfitted to afford an ample supply of the amusing goes without saying.\nHuman nature is so oddly compounded, even in the best of us, that it\nonly needs the clear vision to detect incongruity and the masking of\nthe real. Thus, it is frequently easy to spy the stealthy advances of\nrudimentary tendencies which seem hardly to belong to us, and which we\nare disposed to disown; still more frequently, to light on a whole crop\nof little inconsequences which are due to the complexity of our soul\u2019s\nworkings, and to the irremovable circumstance that, however predominant\nsome better part of us seems to be for the moment, the suppressed\nforces turn out to be only half-suppressed. It is well when such {322}\nself-scrutiny can be carried on without any risk of encountering forms\nof ugliness and of ill omen, which would make speedy end of the amusing\nexercise.\n\nThe quiet fun that may be enjoyed by occasional glances at ourselves\nis so palpable, that it hardly seems conceivable how any true humorist\nshould fail to pluck the tempting fruit. Yet when one finds a man who\nis wholly incapable of accepting another\u2019s playful laughter, it seems\na fair inference that he will be found lacking in the disposition to\namuse himself with conning his own doings. The resentment which a\ndistinguished purveyor of mirthful entertainment will sometimes exhibit\nat being treated with a humorous freedom, say by a lady interviewer\nwhose overtures have been rejected with needless emphasis, suggests\nthat a mind may train itself in the detection of the ludicrous in the\nlarger show outside, and yet remain blind to all the comic aspects of\nthe microcosm within. Perhaps every humorous contemplator of things has\nsome \u201cblind spot,\u201d of the existence of which he is just as ignorant as\nof his retinal blind-spot; and if this failure of sensibility chances\nto render invisible the whole of the humorist\u2019s own behaviour, the\ncontraction of the field of vision is certainly a considerable one.\n\nWe have seen that the earlier forms of human laughter have their uses\nas contributing to the stability or the improvement of a society or\nsocial group. When, however, we turn to the milder and more complex\nsentiment of humour we appear to lose these social benefits. As has\nbeen implied, the development of the sense of humour in any vigorous\nand fruitful form is a rarity, so much so as to condemn its possessor\nin a large measure to a solitary kind of satisfaction. The change may\nbe expected to effect a transformation of the serviceable function of\nlaughter, to {323} make it, in the main, a thing wholesome, refreshing\nand edifying of character, to the individual himself.\n\nIt is true, no doubt, that a refined humour is capable of being turned\nat times to the same social uses as its ancestor, the elemental\nlaughter of the people. One may see, in the journalism and literature\nof the hour, foibles, exaggerations and other amusing things dealt\nwith in a humorous or quasi-humorous temper. The gentleness to which\nhumour inclines allows, indeed, of attacks on parties, schools and\npersonalities which would otherwise run the risk of being condemned as\n\u201cbad form\u201d. Yet something of a serious practical purpose, namely, to\nhold up to ridicule, can always be detected in this kind of writing:\nwhence it is correctly designated, not as humour, but as \u201csocial\nsatire\u201d.\n\nOn the other hand, the moods of humour are admirably fitted for that\n_indirect_ adaptation of the individual to social conditions which we\ncall self-criticism. This humorous self-quizzing may be started by the\nspectacle of comedy, as Lessing and others suggest; yet this, as we\nshall see later, is not to be counted on. If a man wants promptly to\ndetect the first flecks of dust on the bright surface of character, he\nmust be habitually ready to note this surface.\n\nThis office of humour in helping us to nip evil tendencies in the bud\nmay be viewed, in part, as the vicarious discharge by the critical self\nof the restraining function of the community on the individual. None of\nus can safely wander far and long from the point of wholesome contact\nwith the community, that is to say, with the good sense and the right\nfeeling embodied in a community. To master the not too easy art of\nseeing ourselves as others\u2014for whose judgment we should care\u2014see us is\nsurely {324} eminently fitting for those who desire to laugh at what\nis objectively laughable.\n\nNevertheless, it must not be supposed that in such private\nself-correction we are always at the social point of view. Humour is\nthe outgrowth of a pronounced individuality; its possession seems\nalways to imply that a person forms his own ideas of the value of\nthings, guided of course by the world\u2019s teachers, but caring little\nwhether his views agree with those which happen to obtain in his\ncommunity at the moment. Here, again, in the high service rendered by\na vigilant humour, we find the work of reflection carried out by the\nhelp of ideas or ideal conceptions, which are in part a product of\nthe individual mind. The laughing rebuke administered to some folly,\nwhich lifts its head once more after many repressive blows, comes from\nthe ideal self; which, though it must have nourished itself in some\n\u201ccommunion of saints,\u201d becomes in the end free and self-legislative.\n\u201cCorrection\u201d seems too strong a word to use for this prophylactic\nfunction; for, as we have seen, humour does not readily lend itself as\nan instrument to serious purposes. What the habit of a quick humorous\nperception does for its subject here is best described, perhaps, as\nthe fostering of a pure and wholesome atmosphere in the soul, in which\ndisease-germs must perforce die of inanition.\n\nWe may now turn to those uses of humour, into the conception of which\nthe thought of a practical aim can hardly intrude. Humour as amusement\nis something agreeable and cheering. It has the refreshing properties\nof primitive laughter and much more; for, as a mood that feeds itself\non reflective contemplation, it is consolatory and sustaining in a way\nin which mere gaiety, even when it persists as a temper of mind, cannot\nbe. Apropos of Voltaire\u2019s saying that heaven had given us two things to\ncounterbalance the many {325} miseries of life, hope and sleep, Kant\nremarks: \u201cHe could have added laughter, if the means of exciting it in\nreasonable men were only as easily attainable, and the requisite wit or\noriginality of humour were not so rare\u201d (as some other endowments).[276]\n\nWhen the humorous bent is lively and \u201coriginal,\u201d it will stand its\npossessor in good stead in more than one way, amid the toilings and\nmoilings of life. Seeing that laughter is always in a measure a\nthrowing aside of serious pressure, we should expect it to come to\nour aid in the workaday hours. But it is only when the eye for the\nsparkling of fun in things has been instructed by humorous reflection\nthat the alleviating service of mind-play is fully realised.\n\nFor one thing, the possession of a large humorous insight will\ngreatly extend the scope of the conciliative function of laughter.\nAll cajoling must be good-natured, or at least conceal the sting\nof laughter; but the finer disarming of men by banter requires the\nreflective penetration of the humorist. One may easily see this in the\nart of conciliating opponents, political and other. The winning force\nof a manifested good-nature will sometimes act on those who are far\nfrom appreciating the play of mind involved. The _g\u00eane_ introduced\nby an awkward situation,[277] the tendencies that make for loss of\ninterest, for weariness, for a falling away from a perfect sympathetic\ntouch, in all human relations\u2014these things find their most effective\ncounteractive in occasional intrusions of the humorous spirit. I think\nhere of one no longer among us, with whom I once had the privilege of\nco-operating in a long and difficult piece of public business; and of\nhow all weariness was kept out of {326} sight by laughing side-glances\nat threatening absurdities, frequent enough to have suggested a\npremeditated plan had they not been so delightfully spontaneous.\n\nPerhaps, the stoutest obstacle to the smooth flow of social intercourse\nis the tendency in men to lay stress on their personal importance.\nThe superior airs, which seem with some to be as much _de rigueur_ as\ntheir correct attire, are sadly inimical to companionship, whether the\nwould-be companion be a man\u2019s wife or a contributor to his journal. The\none sure safeguard against the stupid clogging of the social wheels,\nwhich this chronic stiffening of the figure introduces, is the gift\nof a lively humour, whose alert eye would at once note a possible\nlaughableness of deportment for onlookers. One may see this function\nof humour illustrated in that instinctive readiness of one who has had\na perfect social training to dismiss laughingly from conversation the\nfirst appearance of an allusion to himself and his claims.\n\nIn all this, though there may be no conscious aiming at an end, social\nutility is not wholly wanting. Yet just because it is an individual\ntemper, humour confers its chief benefits on its possessor in the\nprivacy of life. Its solacings and its refreshings come to him through\nthe channel of a new and genial manner of reflecting on his mishaps and\nhis troubles.\n\nMost men who have developed any appreciable fund of humour must know\nhow the petty annoyances of life can be laughed away, almost as soon\nas they are seen advancing. When, for example, your lost pencil is\ndiscovered in its hiding-place between the leaves of a rarely consulted\nbook; or, on the other hand, after endowing it with various sorts of\nmischievous flight, you perceive it lying close by you on the desk,\nwhere it has been dutifully {327} complying with its proper law of\ninertia; you may snatch a compensating laugh from a moment\u2019s reflection\non the small ironies of things, or on the vast wastefulness of the\nworld in the matter of hypotheses. Your vexation at the children who\nare at play in the road in front of your bicycle and refuse to retire\ntill your bell rings a third time, instantly gives way to an agreeable\nsmile as you sympathetically shift the point of view by recalling the\nfact that they are on their proper playground. The dreary ugliness of a\nLondon street in winter will now and again be lit up as with sunshine\nfor you if your eye is focussed for the amusing, as when the driver\nof a slow van goes on nodding in blissful ignorance, while the driver\nof your \u2019bus behind, justly proud of his vehicle\u2019s speed, pelts him\nmercilessly with the most awakening of epithets.\n\nIt is much the same with the small vexations inflicted by our social\nworld. We may no doubt feel hurt just for a moment when, at a concert,\nwe see a big hat thrust itself betwixt our eyes and a face which has\nheld them captive, wearing a look of the tragic muse as it leans\nyearningly over the violin from which it seems, like a mother\u2019s face,\nto draw the sobbing tones. Yet, even as the nerve smarts, we may\nhalf-seize the glorious absurdity of the hat and its bobbings. Or,\nagain, when an untimely call interrupts some bit of nice thinking and\nleaves the nerves tingling, we may smile for a moment as we catch a\nglimpse of the simple faith of the visitor in the supreme importance\nof the cause he pleads, a glimpse sufficient to make us half-aware of\na like \u201csubjectivity\u201d in our own estimation of selected tasks. Social\nbores are vexations which, perhaps, ought not to be called petty.\nHumorous persons, one suspects, are specially exposed to their attacks,\nsince they are a tolerant folk, preferring on the whole to suffer\nrather than to hurt others. {328} But here, also, the humorous have\ntheir remedies. It suffices, for example, to reflect for a short moment\non the droll pathos of the circumstance that persons, between whom and\nourselves we find no attaching sympathies, should select us for their\nimportunate attentions. Even when the destinies throw us together with\nmen and women from whom we instinctively recoil, as from creatures of a\nspecies at once closely akin to ours yet sundered from us by impassable\nboundaries, a reflective humour may devise alleviations. The aggressive\nself-assertion of a plutocrat, with his \u201cbuy-you-up\u201d sort of stare, and\nthe rest, may wound for half a moment; but a laughing solace comes on\nthe heels of worry; for there is a quiet pleasure in looking back and\ndiscovering the clumsy construction of the vulgar \u201csnub;\u201d and in any\ncase a playful half-glance at higher measures of worth restores the\nequanimity.\n\nEven greater troubles may, to the trained humorist, disclose amusing\naspects or accompaniments, so that refreshment reaches us even while\nthe blow still hurts. The relieving smile may come by way of a playful\ncontemplation of ourselves as pitted against our mighty superior,\ncircumstance; for it is possible to find something amusing, as well\nas irritating, in the ironies of destiny. The idea of a struggle\nwith fate, which gives the zest of life to brave hearts, helps, too,\nto bring the reflective mind back to the play-mood. The readers of\nMiss Kingsley\u2019s _Travels_ need not to be reminded of the fecundity\nof amusing reflection which her humour showed in circumstances which\nwould have depressed many a man.[278] It was with a like readiness to\nsmile that Goldsmith\u2019s genial spirit faced the blows of destiny, giving\nback, as his biographer has it, in cheerful {329} humour or whimsical\nwarning what it received in mortification or grief. In his celebrated\ncharacter, Mark Tapley, Dickens has no doubt illustrated how in the\nrough waters of his youth he learned to draw humorous entertainment\nfrom massive troubles. It is this playful shimmer of a light thrown by\nan entertaining idea on the surface of a misfortune which rids it of\nthe worst of its gloom.\n\nBy a line of humorous reflection already suggested, we may in all\ncases of worry and moral disturbance reach the consolatory idea that\nthe trouble has, in the first view of it, been grossly exaggerated. At\nthe moment when the sensitive tissue is lacerated the shock of pain\nblinds us to dimensions; our disappointment fills the outlook, like a\nthunder-storm. The healthy nervous organism will show its vitality in\nthe rapidity of the recuperative process; and this is often effected\nby a quick turning of the thoughts to other and brighter parts of\nthe scene which the trouble has for a moment blotted out, and to the\nproportions of the one to the other. A trouble\u2014like the all-enveloping\nthunder-storm\u2014begins to retire almost smilingly as soon as we discern\nits boundaries.\n\nIn much of this alleviating service of humour the laugh which liberates\nus from the thraldom of the momentary is a laugh at ourselves. Indeed,\none may safely say that the benefits here alluded to presuppose a\nhabit of reflective self-quizzing. The blessed relief comes from the\ndiscernment of a preposterousness in the forcing of our claims, of a\nfolly in yielding to the currents of sentiment which diffuse their\nmists over the realm of reality. The coming of the smile announces a\nshifting of the point of view; the mal-adjustment, which a moment ago\nseemed to be wholly on the side of our world, showing itself now to be\non our side as well. {330}\n\nHow far humour will help a man in throwing off troubles one cannot say.\nEven when the flash of bright reflection fails to dispel the darkness,\nit may secure a valuable moment of respite. When the trouble has real\nmagnitude, the dismissive smile grows hard for all save the elect. Few\nof us, perhaps, could rise to the height of serene irony attained by a\nGerman musician whose wife had eloped with his master.[279] Many might\nbe disposed to think that the woman who, after nursing her husband\nthrough a fatal illness, remarked that it was only a sense of humour\nwhich had kept her from failing, was less than human. Yet it is highly\nrisky to infer, from the fact of an intrusion of the humorous temper\ninto calamity, the existence of a low degree of moral sensibility. It\nmay rather be that those who suffer most are beholden in an exceptional\ndegree to this kind solacer of men\u2019s woes.\n\nThis service of humour, at once consolatory to suffering and corrective\nof one-sidedness of view, is perfected by a development of that larger\ncomprehensive vision which is reached when the standpoint of egoism\nis transcended. Even the beginning of humour implies some getting\naway from the point of view of the individual, so far as to gain a\nmomentary comprehension of others\u2019 points of view. The great educative\nvalue of being laughed at is that it compels attention to the fact of\na multiplicity of such points. How good a lesson, one thinks, it must\nhave been for the Scotch professor to hear his disgusted caddie remark:\n\u201cAnybody can teach Greek, but gowf needs a heid\u201d.\n\nThere remains for brief illustration another service which humour\nrenders its possessor, though in truth it may turn out to be only a\nfurther development of the one just dealt {331} with. Laughter at\nthings, being primarily an accompaniment of observation, remains in its\nhighest forms chiefly an amusement at outside spectacles. The resources\nof a mature faculty of humour may lend themselves to the end of an\nenjoyable contemplation of one\u2019s social world, both in its parts and\nas a whole. The value of humour to the individual can, indeed, only be\nrightly measured when the large possibilities of entertainment which\nlie in criticising one\u2019s surroundings are borne in mind.\n\nThe enjoyment which a humorous observer is able to gather from the\ncontemplation of the social scene implies that he make his own\nstandpoint, that he avoid the more turbulent part of the social world\nand seek the quiet backwaters where he can survey things in the calm\nlight of ideas. One who lives wholly in the giddy throng will never\nbe able to see things in the perspective which humorous appreciation\nrequires. Nor is this all; if he live, move and have his being in the\ncommotion, he will be forced to repress mirthful impulses and to show\nthe hurrying figures about him a certain respect, since any generous\nindulgence in the joys of laughter would be likely to bring him into\nunpleasant collisions.\n\nThat there is much in the social spectacle which falls only to the\neye of one half-retired is certain. The vagaries of \u201csociety,\u201d in the\nconventional sense of the term, are one of the traditional matters of\nlaughter; our comic journals have enlightened even dull minds on this\npoint. It is pleasant to a humorous contemplation to note the high\npretensions of the \u201cfine world\u201d; how na\u00efvely, for instance, it assumes\nthat it holds all the men of brains and all the good talkers in its\nservice;[280] pleasant, that is {332} to say, to one who bears in mind\nsome of the characteristics of this world, such as a certain emptiness\nin the matter of ideas, together with something of the readiness of\na certain kind of dog to follow any self-appointed leader, and an\namiable impartiality in crowning any sort of \u201chero\u201d that happens to be\ntrumpeted, whether potentate from the East or showman from the West. It\nis entertaining, too, to note how enclosed it remains within its purely\narbitrary standards, being rather shocked, for example, to find when it\ntravels that there can be such a thing as \u201csociety\u201d in Italy which is\nnot a \u201cdining society\u201d. This, and much more, will often draw the eye of\nhumour, oddly enough, in the same direction as that of an awe-struck\nflunkeyism.\n\nIt is an agreeable pastime, too, for our half-retired observer to\nwatch the fierce struggles of men and women in these days to gain a\nfooting within the charmed circle. Here, surely, the gyrations of the\nmoral figure reach the height of absurdity. Nowhere does there seem\nto reflection to be quite such a disproportion between effort and its\ndoubtful reward as in these labours of the hot and panting to win a\nfooting on the fashionable terrain.\n\nWhat makes the scene the more pathetically droll is that success never\nseems to satisfy; the necessity of getting in is followed by a no less\ndire necessity of keeping oneself visible in the tightly-packed crowd.\nThe sensitiveness of men of high position to the least sign of neglect\nin their goddess is something that cannot fail to tickle a humorous\nfancy. It is said that high officials once passed unhappy days and\nnights waiting for an invitation to dinner. The occasion was a national\nfestival, when some inventive dames, taking themselves apparently\nquite seriously as representative women of the age, proceeded each to\ninvite a representative male. So do the gods give {333} us harvest of\nlaughter by sowing vanity with its small spitefulnesses in the minds of\nmen, and setting \u201csociety\u201d to lure them to her thraldom.\n\nTo the dispassionate eye of reason, no \u201csociety\u201d which is founded on\nbirth or on a mixed basis of birth and wealth has seemed quite worthy\nof this servile attitude. Certainly in these days, when, as the Berlin\nHofschneider is said to have observed to Prince Bismarck at the Opera\nBall, society is rather mixed (_ein bischen gemischt_), rational men\nmight be expected to leave this kind of homage to the weak-minded. No\ndoubt men of mind caught in the snare have been ready to admit this;\nyet it may be questioned whether, when they set down their endurance\nof the boredom of the diner-out to the social ambition of their wives,\nthey evade the laughter of the gods.\n\nPity may find a place at the side of laughter when she visits these\nabsurd scenes. A peep behind the masks will, it has been said, show\nhere, too, the thinnest pretence of gaiety. Dull with something of the\ndulness of death are many of the older faces, even when they force\nthemselves to produce grimaces and spasmodic cacklings, thin and an\u00e6mic\nlike themselves. It looks as if it were a dram of excitement, and not\npleasure, which these loyal worshippers of society are seeking; only to\nfind, perhaps, that the hope of excitement itself has grown illusory.\n\nYet, in speaking of the entertaining aspects of the social spectacle,\none need not confine oneself to the fashionable scene. \u201cSociety,\u201d\ncharmingly irrational as she is, has no monopoly in the matter of the\nincongruities. The doings of the Great Middle Class and even of the\nMasses have their amusing aspects for the unprejudiced eye. All phases\nof social life, indeed, may yield rich entertainment to one who has the\nmental vision justly accommodated. {334}\n\nWhat first strikes the eye here, perhaps, is the fine display of\nhuman oddities. The newspaper, fully alive to the value of things\nnew, gives welcome to the self-revelations of human folly, perverted\ningenuity, and uncontrollable vanity. The struggle for its coveted\ncolumn seems hardly less violent than that for the fashionable\ngathering. Apparently, the supreme necessity is to show yourself,\nto win the pestered and rather jaded eye of a crowd, if only for an\ninstant. Many and wonderful are the movements and sounds to which\nchildren, feeling themselves overlooked, have been known to resort in\norder to compel notice: yet the frantic efforts of men and women to\nadvertise themselves to the public eye are, surely, not less numerous\nor less strange. Even when they have left the social scene these\nself-advertisers will sometimes still try to seize your eye by sending\nyou an autobiography, consisting largely, it may be, of an account of\nall the dinner parties attended\u2014a priceless thing for the historian,\nperhaps, if only the writer had happened to be a politician.\n\nThe vanity in this self-advertisement does not always lie on the\nsurface, a partial self-blinding being of the humour of it. A person\nmay be pushed on to the advocacy of a bottomless craze by a belief in a\nspecial mission so earnest, as completely to hide from him the inflated\nself-estimation which lurks in the attitude; and the recognition, by\nthe quiet onlooker, of this malicious way of Nature\u2019s, in hiding from\nmen so large a part of their own motives, draws back the corners of the\nmouth yet farther.\n\nThe absurdity of this forcing of oneself on the notice of the public,\nlike that of pushing one\u2019s way into \u201csociety,\u201d grows clearer when we\nreflect on the real value of the object of pursuit. It is the fashion\njust now to deify public opinion. Yet spite of the classical dictum,\nit is not always {335} flattering to the deity to identify the two\nvoices. A modern democratic society is apt to exhibit very much the\nsame plasticity to the hand of the crafty moulder as that on which\nthe wise Greek sprinkled his dainty irony. To be able to see through\nthe pretty pretence that the demos \u201cforms\u201d its opinions, and that its\nverdicts on statesmen, generals and other notabilities are consequently\nsacred, is to have one chief qualification for enjoying the fun of the\nshow. How entertaining, for instance, is the proceeding when an editor\ninvites a census of opinion on books, or other things which postulate\nsome discernment. In this case, too, the humour of it lies in the\ncircumstance that the good people who are lured into the trap honestly\nthink that they are giving their own individual judgments. Still more\ndelightful do these performances become when an editor, with his\nsense of the value of names fully awake, applies to celebrities, and\nentertains us, say, with a church dignitary\u2019s conception of the ideal\nMusic Hall, or with a popular jockey\u2019s views on the proper dimensions\nof a scientific manual.\n\nThese exhibitions of authority for the guidance of the public\nsufficiently testify to its docility before any kind of proffered\nleadership. The very bigness of the modern demos, assisted by its \u201choly\nsimplicity\u201d of mind, lays it open to the wiles of the charlatan. How\ncan one expect the worthy tradesman reading in the solitude of his\nback parlour to gauge the authority of his newspaper guide? It is more\nthan he can do, perhaps, to take the measure of his Sunday instructor.\nHe who reflects thus will find much to entertain him in the way of\nmake-believe, when he examines the foundations of imposing reputations,\nor of the proud boast of political leaders that they carry \u201cthe\nCountry\u201d with them.\n\nThe newspaper, highly respectable institution as it {336} undoubtedly\nis, entertains those in search of humorous enjoyment in other ways too.\nIts very standpoint as issuer of news leads to an amusing exaggeration\nof the importance of anything which happens to thrust its head up at\nthe moment. An idea, aye and a fallacy too, old as the ages, will\nsecure attention if only somebody with a name happen to bring it up\nanew. Whence comes the neomania which we see on all hands, the absurd\nexaltation of the latest novel and the rest. Yet more exhilarating to\nhumorous inspection is the na\u00efve assumption of the newspaper and its\nclients that everything happens in order to furnish them with news.\nI remember a paper, not of a low class, seriously contending, when a\ndisagreeable _cause c\u00e9l\u00e8bre_ had to be re-tried, that, since everybody\nhad made up his mind on the case, a new trial was most regrettable.\nThe frank suggestion that the proceedings of our law courts have their\nfinal cause in the satisfaction of a craving for news in readers of\njournals was, doubtless, an editorial slip; yet the assumption is often\ndiscoverable to a penetrating eye. The point of view reminds one of the\njoyous antics of the Italian children who follow the cavalcade of the\ndiligence and its \u201csupplements\u201d as it descends southwards to the level\nof the olive-groves, sure in their glee that the rattling procession,\nand the \u201csoldi\u201d too, have come for their delight. In view of the\nentertainment afforded by the press in these days, one may sometimes\nwonder whether the expression \u201ccomic journal\u201d is not growing into a\npleonasm.\n\nHumour will keep at our elbow, too, if we push deeper, and, lifting\nthe wrappings of convention, insist on seeing the realities. The\ninvolutions of public utterance when, say, a dubious appointment has\nto be defended, are in themselves no less entertaining an exhibition\nof na\u00efvet\u00e9 disclosed through elaborate wrappings than the romancings\nof a {337} naughty child beating about for an excuse. No kind of\nspectacle, perhaps, is more uplifting to a spirit given to the right\nsort of reflection, none too which has a larger promise of unwearying\nvariation, than the wrigglings of the human mind when tangled in\nawkward appearances, and forced to find something which looks like a\nway of logical escape.\n\nAs all who read are aware, the vagaries of \u201csociety\u201d and the drolleries\nof public life are no new spectacle. Other times and patterns of\nsociety have had their entertaining aspects fixed for us by the\nhalf-retired chronicler. Yet there is much to suggest that the social\nscene of to-day bears the palm, as illustrator of the volume and the\nmany-sidedness of the laughable. The bigness of our social scheme, its\ninstability and \u201cgo-aheadness,\u201d its reckless activity\u2014these and other\nfeatures, aided by the eagerness of people to gain publicity for their\ndoings and a corresponding readiness of journals to accord it, appear\nto secure for the quiet onlooker to-day the enjoyment of an exuberant\ncrop of personal oddities, pushful pretences, disparities between\nposition and qualification, and the other amusing features of the\nsocial scene.\n\nMuch of the drollery of the social spectacle here touched on may be\nenjoyed with a certain detachment, and even with a _soup\u00e7on_ of the\nmalice which characterises the laughter of those outside the social\ngroup, within which the merry showman is erecting his stage. The\nkindlier note of humour enters here only as a subordinate element,\nas a good-natured toleration of folly, supported by a more or less\ndistinct comprehension of it under the head of worthy qualities\nsadly perverted. It must be otherwise if the bizarre and provocative\nspectacle of folly\u2019s head obtrudes itself into a season of national\nstorm and stress, say of war-commotion, {338} when the observer of\nthings cannot, unless he be an unsocial cynic, any longer consent to\nbe detached. The very possibility of a laugh, or even of a smile,\nmight seem to be excluded as a desecration. If it is possible, it\ncan only be through the discovery of a _modus vivendi_ between the\nmirthful impulse and some of the deepest and most absorbing of our\nfeelings and impulses. Our analysis of humour has prepared us for a\nconsiderable penetration of the mellowed kind of mirth into the heart\nof the serious, for a fine and rapid detection by the practised eye of\namusing aspects of situations and experiences which appeal directly and\npowerfully to the acuter feelings and to the sterner attitudes. We may,\nperhaps, find the crowning illustration of this interpenetration of\nthe serious and the playful in the possibility of a humorous glance at\nthings which must stir the heart-depths of every true citizen.\n\nThe truth, that a state of war will develop in citizens much that is\ngood and admirable, has, perhaps, been sufficiently recognised; while,\non the other hand, its ravages and its sufferings have been a frequent\ntheme of the eloquent lip and pen. Less attention has, for pretty\nobvious reasons, been paid to those aspects and accompaniments of the\nstate which seem to some, when regarded from the point of view of the\nnormal type of consciousness, to illustrate human folly in one of its\nlarger manifestations. These aspects which, when seen if only for an\ninstant by the qualified observer, must entertain, may be said to grow\nin distinctness as a community rises in the scale of civilisation.\nSince, moreover, the humorous person has trained himself in the swift\ndetection of the accompaniments and the relations of the objects which\nhe inspects, and has a habit of looking at the neglected sides of\nthings, it may be expected that he will be found now and again among\nthose who in the troubled {339} atmosphere preserve something of the\nfaculty of clear observation.\n\nThe fundamental factor in the situation for a humorous observer is the\ntemporary hypertrophy of the most powerful of man\u2019s instincts, having\nits roots deeply seated in the primal impulse of self-conservation,\nappearing in the organic _milieu_ of a higher type of social\nconsciousness with its fixed habits of estimating and judging things.\nThe state of hypertrophy gives rise to a group of extravagances which\nhave something of the dimensions of a burlesque. The many expansions of\nthe boastful, self-sufficing temper, the exaggerated forms of hatred,\nwith its brood of suspicions, denunciations and vilifications, the\nswollen dimensions of credulity, and of a correlative incredulity, with\nregard to things which touch the patriotic passion\u2014this and much more\nis probably an inseparable accompaniment of the national psychosis,\ncertainly so if the dignity of \u201cour cause\u201d is challenged, whether from\nwithin or from without.\n\nIn these larger manifestations of the war-temper such organic _milieu_\nas the surviving normal consciousness can supply takes but a small\npart. What movements of intelligence are observable are pretty plainly\nof an intelligence subjugated by the dominant passion, and made to work\nfor it by foraging far and wide for food-stuffs to satisfy its appetite\nfor provocatives and solaces.\n\nYet this is but a small part of the humorous aspect of the situation.\nIt is the collision between the new temper and the habit of feeling\nand judging nursed into vigour and endurance by a long course of\ncivilisation which introduces the really amusing feature. For the\nquaint thing is that drowsy intelligence will now and again try to\nsit up and give a nudge to its rather noisy bed-fellow. It is the\njuxtaposition and interaction of two tendencies of widely removed\n{340} moral levels, and quite disproportionate in their strength\nwhich supplies the rich variety of the entertaining. In this way, for\nexample, we obtain the droll spectacle of an over-confident advocate\nof the cause suddenly brought to silence by a foggy suspicion that his\nhearer is not responsive enough, a suspicion which instantly brings to\nlight the residuum of the normal man\u2019s desire for others\u2019 support. Or\nagain, the powerful impulse to belittle the enemy\u2014older than the age of\nGoliath\u2014may, when it runs away with a patriot, carry him to the point\nfrom which he dimly discerns the edge of a dialectic precipice, the\nfatal concession that victory is robbed of all its glory. Or the fancy\nportrait of the enemy\u2014preferred to a study from life because it is so\ndear to the war-temper\u2014may bring its possessor into the quandary that\nhe finds himself quite incapable of carrying out the necessary business\nof understanding that enemy\u2019s aims and methods.\n\nA slight examination will show that the spectacle will illustrate most\nof the forms of the laughable recognised in a previous chapter. The\nwhole situation may tend to assume the look of a big \u201cmess,\u201d from which\nthe participators vainly seek to extricate themselves. The high-strung\nemotional and conative attitude is certain to lead to futilities, as\nwhen confident predictions strike against the hard substance of fact.\nThe situation will, further, be prolific of contradictions, including,\nnot only the fundamental one already dealt with, but the discrepancies\nof statement which arise as the ratio of the intensities of the normal\nand the abnormal varies within the limits indicated above.\n\nThat the psychological situation will give rise to a large display\nof pretence, has been already suggested. The survival of a partially\nstupefied intelligence in the bellicose patriot will, indeed, be\nchiefly manifested in the somewhat {341} onerous task of covering the\nunsightly faces of things with veils, bespangled ones if possible, in\ndignifiying the aims and the methods of the war. These efforts will\nplainly show themselves, to calm observation, for the most part, at\nleast, not as conscious hypocrisies, but as self-deceptions following\nfrom the interaction of the two selves so strangely forced to consort.\n\nIt is hardly needful to say that disorder, topsy-turvyness, confusions\nof _r\u00f4le_, and, generally, inversions of normal relations, form an\nessential feature of the spectacle. A world so altered from the\nnormal pattern that men given to a golden silence take to a speech\nwhich is hardly silver; that \u201cleaders\u201d assume the droll aspect of\nshepherds forced onwards by unruly flocks; that a certain kind of moral\ninconsistency appears to have won its place among the virtues; and\nthat those versed in the divine have to assume the inverted part of\njustifying the ways of men to God, cannot fail to look disordered to a\ncalm eye trained by the orderly. There would seem to be no room in such\na scene, where men are wont to divest themselves of their individual\ncharacteristics, for a display of personal oddity. Yet a closer\nobservation will show that, in spite of the powerful tendencies which\nmake for uniformity of behaviour, shreds of individuality survive. The\nprevailing temper seizes on men, as a fever seizes on them, according\nto their individual constitutions; and one may watch the process of\nassimilation of parties, sects, and individuals to the type of the\nhour, much as a shrewd physician might watch the quaint modifications\nof a malady in a case of strongly marked family or individual\npeculiarities.\n\nIt was said above that the possibility of this humorous observation\nimplied the discovery of a _modus vivendi_ with the serious and more\nsensitive part of us. This means that {342} the observation can be\nno quiet, prolonged pastime, but must rather resemble the momentary\nintuitions of the amusing side of things, which help us when we\nbattle with life\u2019s worries and encounter its greater troubles. Such\nappreciation of the laughable as is possible in the case is rightly\ncalled humorous when it accompanies a complex serious attitude which,\non the one hand, discerns both the hurtfulness and the pitifulness of\nthe folly that brings the smile, and on the other, makes an effort to\nhold fast to that which repels and to descry estimable qualities hidden\naway under it. The smile will bring a momentary relaxation of strain,\nas in other cases where mental and moral tension is high. The humorist\nwill suffer it to steal upon him because reflection enables him, in a\nsense, to comprehend, by recalling, for example, what Plato, Montaigne\nand others tell us as to what is likely to happen when men are captured\nby a crowd. He will be more inclined to be tolerant, if history comes\nto his aid, as the history of a patient may come to that of an anxious\nphysician, assuring him of recovery and resumption of normal functions;\nstill more, if a time of civic division, lacerating to the social part\nof him, has brought him near men and women whose gentleness seems to\nsweeten the ferment of the hour, and whose faces will henceforth appear\nto him in comforting vision\u2014earth\u2019s angel faces whose smile comes not\nwith the brightening morn but with the deepening blackness of night.\n\n{343}\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI.\n\nTHE LAUGHABLE IN ART: COMEDY.\n\n\nWe have traced the development of laughter in the individual and in\nthe community with as little reference as possible to the influence of\nArt. It has been assumed that the feelings which move us to laughter\nare primal, and capable of expanding and deepening independently of\nthis influence. At the same time, it is certain that the educative\nlead of the artist has been at work from a very early stage of human\ndevelopment. We have found even in savage life the figure of the\n\u201cfunny man,\u201d the expert in lifting the sluice gates of social laughter\nby means of jest and pantomime. Within the historical period, the\npractice of engaging jesters for banquets, and social entertainments\ngenerally, appears to go back to remote times and very simple social\nconditions.[281] The finer and more methodical exercise of men\u2019s gift\nof laughter by these skilled choragi must have been a potent factor\nin its development. We may now glance at the evolution of art on its\namusing and comic side.\n\nThis is no occasion for probing to its dark bottom the {344} problem\nof the function of art. If we keep to the beginnings of the art of\nministering to men\u2019s laughter, as we may study them among savages and\nour own children, the theories which look to art for the expression\nof an idea, or even of an emotion seeking for resonance, seem to have\nbut little relevance. It looks as if the amusing art grew out of that\nsimple social act which I have called a play-challenge, as illustrated\nin the game of reciprocal tickling. Hence, the play-theory of art\nserves particularly well for our present purpose. The quality of\nbeneficent productivity which is an essential of art may be supposed\nto have grown distinct, as soon as an individual of superior cunning\nin playing on the mirthful organ found himself _vis-\u00e0-vis_ with an\naudience. No social impulse of an art-like character strikes out its\nvisible and audible effect more directly and more impressively than the\ndesire to raise a laugh.\n\nTaking this view, we see that the art which moves us to mirth\nillustrates the conative process in art-production. To amuse men, to\nraise their spirits to the treble pitch of gaiety, pre-supposes the\ndesire to please. In all simple art-performance, this essentially\nsocial motive works consciously and directly: the partly unconscious\nart of the \u201cfool\u201d being here, of course, overlooked. In higher forms,\nthe will to move men merrily is, I believe, always present in normal\ncases, and controls the whole art-process, though it may not be\nconsciously realised at every moment. In the case of the comic actor,\nat any rate, a volitional control of his own feeling and its expression\nseems to be a prime necessity. This is sufficiently illustrated in the\nsolemn aspect commonly assumed by the popular jester, in order to add\nto the mirthful effect of his utterance.\n\nIt would be an interesting inquiry, if our limits allowed {345} of it,\nto examine the means which art, as a whole, possesses for moving us to\nlaughter. This would open up the curious question of the symbolism of\ncolours and tones, and of their combinations, as expressive of mirthful\nfeeling and of jocose intention.\n\nThat laughter has for its proper excitant men and their doings, at\nonce suggests that only those arts which represent human ideas and\nactions on a large scale have a considerable field for the exhibition\nof the ludicrous. Architecture, apart from sculpture, is heavily\nhandicapped here. Music, as the expressive art _par excellence_, has a\ncertain though narrowly limited range of effect, as may be seen in the\ncharacteristic rhythms, such as combinations of light staccato with\ndeep-pitched notes, incompleted phrases and so forth, which do duty\nin comic opera. Some of this tickling effect is certainly due, not\nto an expression of jocose feeling, but to the bizarre aspect of the\ncombination of sounds. And the same is probably true of the slightly\namusing effects of such grotesque combinations of colour as are common\nin the costume of the harlequin, of the prince of mockers, and of\nother more or less comic figures. The grotesque and amusing in dress,\nthat of the clown for example, is manifestly based on its suggestions,\nespecially those of wrong sex, wrong age and the like.\n\nPassing by the comic directions of pictorial art, including the\nhighly developed process of modern political and other caricature,\nthe great _r\u00f4le_ in stimulating men\u2019s laughing susceptibilities falls\nto literature, and pre-eminently to dramatic literature and its\ninterpreter, the stage. Here, only, can the procession of human follies\ndisplay something of its variegated amplitude. Hither must we come, if\nwe would fain laugh our fill and know what resources art possesses for\nplaying on the whole gamut of our \u201crisibility\u201d. {346}\n\nIt would be well if we knew the beginnings of jocose literature. It\nmay be that the jest-books preserve for us forms resembling those\nwhich these beginnings have taken. A short descriptive story of some\npractical joke, or of some smart bit of repartee, may have grown\nnaturally enough out of the evening fire-side talk and become fixed\nand handed down to new generations. The Medi\u00e6val Contes (fabliaux) may\nbe viewed as a slight expansion of such stories and fragments of talk.\nThis short anecdotal story would allow a certain scope for mimicry and\na crude art of elocution. A rudimentary form of comic acting, with its\nmimic gestures and its facetious dialogue, would naturally take its\nrise in the rehearsal of such a story by an acknowledged expert. The\nbits of dialogue, at least, would enforce a certain amount of mimicry\nof tones and gestures.\n\nThe beginnings of comedy, so far as we can get back to them, bear\nout these conjectures. The humble birthplace of Greek comedy was the\nvillage revel\u2014a sort of merry harvest home\u2014of the vintagers. At first,\nwe read, there was no actor, only a leader \u201cwho let off coarse and\nscurrilous impromptus\u201d.[282] Or, as another writer has it, Greek farce\nbegan with mocking songs and ironical speeches during processions, the\nGreeks being quick to mimic and to improvise.[283]\n\nThe dawn of our own comedy shows a somewhat similar process. It was in\nan atmosphere of mirth that the child, half-seriously quizzing things\nin order to laugh the more, was born. This may be seen by a reference\nto the mirthful societies and their riotings which were a feature of\nmedi\u00e6val English life. The \u201cfeast of fools\u201d was the great occasion for\nsatirical songs, and, later on, for dramas in which the {347} clergy\nwere more especially taken off. No doubt, as we shall see, there\nexisted in the old miracle-plays and moralities a simple dramatic form\ncapable of being transformed into comedy. Yet this transformation was\nmade possible by the spirit of mirth and revelry, which had some time\nbefore rudely broken into the solemnity of the miracle-play.[284]\n\nThe full rise of the comic drama has had its social conditions. Mr.\nMeredith has pointed to some of them, particularly the existence of an\nintelligent middle class, and the recognition of woman\u2019s status; to\nwhich one may add, that of her conversational wit.[285] To these social\nconditions might be added a national mood of gaiety, coming from some\nnew sense of lightened shoulders and a freer breathing.\n\nThe value of comedy as chief ministress to our laughter may be seen\nby a mere glance at its many resources. It seems able to present to\nthe eye and ear all varieties of the amusing. As a show, it carries\non the fun of children\u2019s make-believe play. It can set before us the\nmost grotesque aberrations of dress, carriage and manners. In its human\nfigures, again, it presents to us in forms of its own choosing the\nfull variety of laughable traits of mind and of character. Lastly, it\ncan exhibit in its plots the whole gamut of teasing and practical joke\nwhich amuses ordinary men in real life.\n\nWe may defer illustration of the comic treatment of laughable traits of\ncharacter, and look for a moment at the ways in which the incidents of\ncomedy carry on the movements of primitive fun.\n\nA glance will tell us that these incidents are woven out {348} of the\nplay and the practical jokes of merry youth. The boisterous fun of\nthe spectacle of a good beating, for which the lower savages have a\nquick sense, and which is a standing dish at the circus, is a frequent\nincident in comedy, both in the popular and boisterous variety of\nAristophanes and Plautus, and in the quieter and more intellectual one\nof Moli\u00e8re.[286]\n\nAnother variety of amusing incident drawn from child-play and the\npopular fun of the circus is a repetition of words, gestures or other\nmovements. These repetitions grow particularly funny when they take the\nform of an alternate going and coming, or of ending and recommencing\na discourse. Amusing already in their semblance of purposeless play,\nthey sometimes grow more droll by assuming a look of irrepressibility,\nas when the philosopher Pancrace in _Le Mariage forc\u00e9_ is again and\nagain pushed behind the coulisse and returns to renew his discourse. It\nhas been pointed out that such movements have something of the amusing\ncharacter of the toy known as Jack-in-the-box.[287]\n\nAnother class of repetitions, which we may call imitations, also\nfrequent on the comic stage, seems in like manner to reproduce easily\nrecognisable features of child\u2019s play. Nothing is more characteristic\nof the play-mood in young animals and in children alike than an\nimitative {349} propagation of movement. The child\u2019s game of making\nfaces is an excellent example. The liking of the stage for these\nimitations shows how closely it remains in touch with primitive fun.\nThis is plain enough when the action imitated is disorderly, as we may\nsee in the rebuffs and counter-rebuffs of the circus. The repeated\nbeatings of the wife-beater in _Le M\u00e9decin malgr\u00e9 lui_ have something\nof this diverting effect\n\nThe amusing repetitions wrought into the mechanism of comedy are, as\nMoli\u00e8re may tell us, commonly far less aggressive. The reproduction of\nthe series of exclamations of Cl\u00e9onte on the perfidy of his mistress by\nhis valet, Covielle, in _Le Bourgeois gentilhomme_, and the counterpart\nto this, the slightly varied repetitions of the reproaches of Cl\u00e9onte\u2019s\nmistress by her maid, are quite delightfully suggestive of a plot on\nthe part of Love to reduce his victims to one level of imbecility.[288]\n\nComedy, both ancient and modern, is full of trickery and dupery.\nA whole play may be one big piece of fooling, ending for the most\npart in a merry scene in which the deluded victim or victims come\nto their senses again. The spectator, who is in the secret, enjoys\nsympathetically the laughter of the plot-maker.\n\nOne of the simplest and earliest comic devices, another outgrowth from\nchild\u2019s play, seems to be a disguise. The figures of comedy towards\nwhom our laughter is guided are not gifted with the finest of visions,\nand a small amount of disguise, especially when it meets and flatters\ntheir desires, suffices for complete deception. Classic comedy and that\nof Shakespeare make large use of such trickery. {350}\n\nBut a strange dress and other means of disguise are by no means always\nnecessary for the befooling. When the credulous mood is on, the victim,\nwhether fish or man, will rise to the crudest of artificial imitations,\nand comedy fastens on its victims when they are in this mood, as in the\ncase of Malvolio, M. Jourdain and the rest.\n\nSometimes the comedian prepares for the needed deception by throwing\nits victim into a fit of absent-mindedness. A good example may be found\nin the scene between Arnolphe and the notary in Moli\u00e8re\u2019s _L\u2019\u00c9cole\ndes Femmes_, where the tongues of the two make a pretence of running\non together, while the two brains that move them remain in a state\nof perfect mutual misunderstanding. It is another kind of amusing\nself-deception when the comic figure, again showing his descent from\nthe clown, undertakes to do something, and instantly displays a\ncomplete inability to carry out his undertaking. This is illustrated in\na less obvious manner in _Le Bourgeois gentilhomme_ by the behaviour\nof Cl\u00e9onte, who, after quarrelling with his mistress, and begging his\nvalet to \u201clend a hand\u201d to his spite and to sustain his resolve to bear\ndown any remains of his foolish love, instantly afterwards protests\nagainst the obedient servant\u2019s depreciations of the lady.\n\nThe comic person must be mercilessly attacked now and again, if the\nspectator is to get his fill of merriment. Moli\u00e8re again gives us the\nillustration. The scene in which the miser\u2019s son, Cl\u00e9ante, playfully\nholds the father as in a vice, as he takes off the ring from the old\ngentleman\u2019s finger and offers it as if in his behalf to the lady they\nboth desire to wed, has the full flavour of the retaliative joke.\n\nThe laugh which is \u201cmalicieux\u201d though not \u201camer\u201d comes in a large\nwave when the deception is a kicking over of traces which have become\ngalling. The tricking of the {351} severe guardian, parental or other,\nillustrated by Terence in the _Adelphi_, and by Moli\u00e8re in _L\u2019\u00c9cole\ndes Femmes_, _L\u2019\u00c9cole des Maris_ and other works, yields a lusty\ngratification as a practical joke directed against an oppressor.\n\nA good deal of the fun of comedy may easily be seen to flow from\na bizarre placing of a person, especially the setting of him in a\nsituation where he has to do what he is not accustomed to do. If false\nappearances have to be kept up, so much the better. The tricks by\nwhich the sham doctor Sganarelle tries to play up to his part in _Le\nM\u00e9decin malgr\u00e9 lui_ are of the broadly comic. A diverting situation\nmay be obtained in other ways, as when lovers who have fallen out and\nare in the most doleful of moods have to meet. The subjection of the\narch-hypocrite Tartuffe to the watchful eye of Orgon\u2019s son is pregnant\nof comic effect.\n\nAs already hinted, comedy reflects those movements of social laughter\nwhich have been dealt with in a previous chapter. The works of\nAristophanes are a storehouse for one who seeks illustrations of\nthe popular attitude towards the new, when this lends itself to a\nbuffoonish inflation. The comic stage is conservative in the sense that\nit is ready to ridicule whatever wears the look of a bizarre novelty.\nThe importation of foreign dress and manners has been a well-recognised\nsource of merriment in modern plays.\n\nWith grotesque innovations may be set the affectations of superior\nmanners, fashions of speech and the rest, for which the laughter-loving\npublic has had a quick eye. The exposure of an excessive fondness\nfor using fine expressions, especially foreign ones, has always, one\nsuspects, had an exhilarating effect on an educated audience. The\npreciosity of Moli\u00e8re\u2019s dames lives as the great example of a culte\nof \u201cthe fine shades,\u201d carried to the point of the irresistibly droll.\n{352}\n\nThe well-recognised social antagonisms, again, lend to comedy all their\nstore of the amusing. The droll side of the bloodless feud between man\nand woman comes into view in all stages of the development of the art.\nIt will, of course, vary in its mode of presentment with the social\nconditions of the time it represents, and more especially with the\nstatus of woman. In the comedy of Aristophanes, the mutual chaff of\nthe sexes is a constant source of incidental effect and a main motive\nof two plays.[289] Yet the part taken by woman in the dialogue is\nexceedingly small.[290] The Greek assumption of her inferiority meets\nus with a charming frankness. The notion of her rising to a higher\nplace in civic life is handled with a buffoonish extravagance which\nmust have delighted conservative husbands. When the poet wishes to\nshow up the folly of the Athenian war-party he invents a revolt of\nthe dames, who by certain effective measures, connubial and other,\nmanage to the lasting shame of their betters to bring about peace.\nThe triumph of the inferior here reminds one of the hilarious victory\nwon by the savage women in the art of rowing. The Greek comedy as a\nwhole treated women, including hetaerae, with copious abuse;[291] yet\nin Latin comedy, at any rate, the woman now and again gets the better\nof the man. In the _Asinaria_ of Plautus, an amorous old man, one of\nthe favourite figures of comedy, is finely chastised by the wife who\nsurprises his secret.\n\nThe interminable contest of man and woman carries with it the rivalry\nof the home and the tavern\u2014or, as we should say to-day, the Club. In\nPlautus, who goes for a large {353} licence in pleasure, the opposition\nis emphasised. Terence, by introducing a more becoming conception of\nfeminine nature and married life, prepared the way for a more equal\nintercourse between man and woman. It is, however, only under the\nimproved conditions of modern family and social life that the verbal\nduel of the sexes in comedy has grown keen and brilliant.\n\nAnother and primitive relation, that of old and young, or, in its\nspecial form, of father and child, amply displays its possibilities\nof fun on the comic stage. In the newer Attic comedy, we are told,\nrepresentations of the old became frequent, now as austere and\navaricious, now as fond and tender-hearted.[292] The contrast of the\nsevere \u201cGovernor\u201d and the fond \u201cPapa,\u201d which we have seen illustrated\nin Terence and Moli\u00e8re, clearly points to the fact that comedy, as play\ndesigned expressly for merry youth, favours the son\u2019s case, and seeks\nto relax the paternal leading strings.\n\nJust as the too weighty rule of a father is apt to be laughingly pushed\naside by comedy, so is that of the master. The intriguing, cheating\nvalet of Latin comedy is the ancestor of many a domestic swindler,\ndown to the Mr. Morgan whose sudden disappearance was regretted by\nMajor Pendennis. The outwitted master, like the outwitted husband,\nis a comic figure that excites but little pity; perhaps, because the\ngetting the better of one in power by his subordinate is never wanting\nin the agreeable look of a merry equalising of things. Other \u201chumours\u201d\nof social groups, that of trader, money-lender, and their clients, for\nexample, are, as suggested in an earlier chapter, reflected in comedy.\n\nThe same flavour of fun, the same kinship to child\u2019s play, is\nrecognisable in the speech of the comic stage. {354} Word-play here\nis merely the lighter interlude in what as a whole has much of the\ncharacter of a game, the contest of rapier-like tongues in comic\ndialogue.\n\nMen have written weightily on the nature of wit and its relation to\nintellect in general and to humour. Their discourses seem hardly\nto capture its finer spirit. Locke started the discussion by his\nwell-known distinction between wit and judgment, the former consisting\nin a bringing together of ideas with quickness and variety wherein can\nbe found any resemblance or congruity; the latter in discriminating\nand separating ideas.[293] Addison, who accepts this definition in\nthe main, is bound to add that, though wit is generally produced by\nresemblance and congruity of ideas, it is very often produced by their\nopposition.[294] Hazlitt follows Addison in including likeness and\nopposition. Wit, according to him, \u201cis an arbitrary juxtaposition of\ndissonant ideas, for some lively purpose of assimilation or contrast,\ngenerally of both.\u201d[295] All this, though it hints at a distinctive\nmanner of intellectual activity, misses the mark by busying itself in\nthe main with the question of a particular kind of relation of ideas.\n\nThe rather solemn treatment of puns by these serious writers is\ncharacteristic. Addison deals with them under the head of false wit,\nand bravely attacks the ages for upholding the practice.[296] For thus\nspurning the humble pun, he was rendered blind by the god of laughter\nto the real nature of wit, as essentially a mode of intellectual play.\n\nAs the etymology of the word suggests, wit is not so much a special\nfaculty concerned with a particular class of relations, as an attitude\nor manner of behaviour of the {355} intelligence as a whole. It\nillustrates her most lively and agile gait, and is characterised by\nreadiness of mind, quickness of perception, ingenuity in following\nout hints of quite unexpected contrasts, similarities, aims, causes,\nreasons, and the other apparent belongings of an idea. As tending to\nsportiveness, it loves an intellectual chase for its own sake, and\nrevels in sudden transitions, doublings, and the whole game of verbal\nhide and seek.[297]\n\nAccording to this view, wit is a talent which has been especially\ndeveloped by a proper exercise of one of the chief functions of the\nsocial animal, conversation. This has its light and entertaining\nvariety, talk, which when it reaches the perfection of an art becomes\na kind of game. A subject is tossed out like a ball and each side then\ntries to strike it in turn and so keep the game going. Something of\nserious purpose may be behind, as a half wish to illumine the subject,\nbut the main interest lies in the game itself, in the exhilarating\npleasure of crossing the intellectual foils with a worthy opponent.\n\nYet, though a game, talk is commonly carried on by persons who are not\nmerely fellow-players. As we have seen, witty dialogue flourishes when\nsome force of repulsion as well as of attraction is involved, as that\nbetween a would-be seller and his needy yet stand-off buyer, or between\na wooer and a woman concerned not to make winning too easy. Where, as\nbetween two rivals, the situation is conducive to warmth, the wit will\nbe apt to grow pungent. As Addison reminds us, wit is often developed\nin an unequal game, between a \u201cbutt\u201d and his assailants, the butt\nknowing now and again, like Sir John Falstaff, how \u201cto get the laugh of\nhis side\u201d.[298]\n\nThe art of witty exchange, like that of using foils, clearly implies\nself-restraint; and in both cases the desirable {356} coolness is\ngreatly furthered by the presence of the impartial spectator. It is\npossible that husband and wife first learned to spar jocosely by having\nto carry on disputes in the presence of outside hearers.\n\nTaking this view of wit, we may see how word-play inevitably comes\ninto it. The pun of childish years, which merely tricks the ear by an\naccidental doubleness of meaning, need not be considered here. It is\nonly when the ambiguity has value for laughter, when it can be turned\nto some merry purpose, that it comes under the eye of art. Word-play\nclearly tends to run into thought-play. Some of the best-known \u201cmots\u201d\nwill be found to involve the double-sense of the pun, like the praise\nawarded by the witty King to one of his courtiers in the remark that\nhe was never in the way and never out of the way. It is the deep sense\ndiscernible through the verbal appearance of a self-contradiction which\ncharms and entertains here.[299]\n\nIt seems to follow that the laughter excited in spectator or reader by\na display of wit is slightly complex. It has in it something of the\nchild\u2019s laughter of admiration at what is new, rather startling, and\nfine, of his gay response to a play-challenge, and of a sympathetic\nrejoicing with the combatant who, by showing his skill, obtains an\nadvantage over his antagonist.\n\nThe dialogue of comedy and of the fiction which adopts the comic point\nof view will make use of these verbal sports, these doublings of\nthe intellectual chase, at the hint of ambiguous language. They are\nrefreshing, they enlarge the scope of the witty combat, and they help\nto maintain the mirthful temper of the spectator. Their use may be\n{357} illustrated throughout the history of comedy. Thus, we find in\nthe comedy of Aristophanes much chaffing of the sexes and punning. The\nsame is true of Plautus. In the merry comedy of Shakespeare we have\nstill an abundance of puns, also a great advance in the art of the\nverbal foils, especially as crossed by man and woman, more particularly\non the side of the latter. Moli\u00e8re\u2019s quieter and more thoughtful\ndiscourse, though now and then it finds room for a pun, illustrates the\nfiner art of witty combat, in which the foils seem to have been tipped\nwith a softer button.\n\nWe have so far dwelt on those elements of comedy which seem plainly\nderivable from simple forms of fun, as seen in child\u2019s play and the\nlaughter of primitive folk. There remains what is in some ways the most\ninteresting feature, the comic presentation of character in action and\nspeech.\n\nIt is customary to classify comedies into those of Incident, of Manners\nand of Character. Such a division must not, however, mislead us.\nThe three ingredients are present in every comedy. If Aristophanes\ndepends largely on incident, he only gets his fun by choosing comic\ncharacters\u2014the sophist, say, or the commercial explorer endowed with\nwings. In the so-called comedy of Manners of Congreve and his school,\nthe persons, such as they are, undoubtedly form a main support of the\nentertaining action. Moli\u00e8re, though he relies chiefly on character,\ncan only give us comedy by inventing situations in which his figures\nwill have flashed on them the droll light of the comic stage. What\nis meant by the above classification is pretty plainly that in some\ncomedies the characters are more central, are more finely evolved, and\nattract a much larger attention.\n\nThat the evolution of comedy has, in the main, been an advance in the\npresentment of character, as judged {358} both by the variety and\nthe complexity of the personalities depicted, and by the fulness and\ndefiniteness of the presentation, is just what we might have expected.\nIt seems certain that, with the progress of civilisation, men and\nwomen have grown more complex and more varied, both intellectually and\nmorally, and further that the interest in character and the capability\nof understanding it have developed concurrently.\n\nA word on the general conditions of a presentation of character in\ncomedy. For one thing, dramatic construction, as compared with that\nof prose fiction, has certain obvious limits set to the delineation\nof character. The art is too wise to attempt a full presentment of so\ncomplex a group of traits as we find in a developed individuality.\nIt illustrates, however, degrees of fulness in the presentation of\npersonality, and the finer art of drama may produce its impression\nof a concrete person very much as a skilful painter does within the\nlimits of a rough sketch by a few master strokes. Yet without the\nactor\u2019s visible embodiment of the part, the full impression of a\nconcrete individual would be difficult within the limits of dramatic\nconstruction.\n\nIn the case of comedy, moreover, there is another reason for the\nlimitation of the art of developing individual character. The\nsuperlative \u00e6sthetic value of the ludicrous aspect of character imposes\non the writer an unusual degree of simplification, of something like\na reduction of the concrete personality to an abstraction. The comic\nentertainment afforded by the presentation, say, of a swelling vanity,\nsprings from our keeping the mental eye fixed in merry expectation of\nthe coming developments of the laughable trait. If, then, only this\ncore of the character, as the mood of the spectator estimates it, is\nclearly presented and sufficiently illustrated, {359} both in its\nimmediate manifestations and in its effects on the rest of the man, a\nvery shadowy reinstatement of this remainder will suffice.\n\nThis conclusion seems clearly borne out by the common way of speaking\nof the great comic figures as \u201ctypes\u201d; for to view a character\nas typical means that we are interested in the person, less as a\nparticular individual, than as an example of a certain sort of person.\nThe common practice of writers of comedy, ancient and modern, of\nmarking their characters by appropriate names, the Braggadocio, the\nMiser, the Misanthrope, and so forth, shows that authors recognise this\ntypical function.\n\nSuch comic representation of type will always have in it something of\nthe nature of exaggeration. The laughable trait, in order to raise the\ntide of merriment to its full height, must itself be raised to a higher\npower and displayed in the hypertrophic volume it tends to assume when\nthe balancing forces of the normal man are greatly reduced. Yet, to\nsay this is not to say that the common distinction between a lifeless\nabstraction and a living character has no meaning in comedy. There\nis a vast difference between the rigid abstractions of early modern\ncomedy, before the art had extricated itself from the leading strings\nof the morality plays, and the relatively full and freely moving\nfigures which we encounter in Moli\u00e8re\u2019s plays. On the other side, the\nalways controlled expansion of an amusing trait in the comic character\nis to be clearly marked off from that forcing of expression up to the\ndimensions of a distortion which is the essence of caricature.\n\nA glance at the history of comedy will show us how, with its\ndevelopment, there has grown a finer recognition of the comic value of\ncharacter and a corresponding skill in the presentation of it. {360}\n\nThe comedy of Aristophanes illustrates the art of comic\ncharacter-drawing in its infancy. Here, where the comic muse has not\nyet left behind her the Bacchanalian rout; where the scene is apt to be\nviolently transported, now to mid-air, now to the abode of the gods,\nand now to Hades; where the boisterous fun in its genial onslaught\nspares neither deity, poet nor statesman; and where the farcical\nreaches such a pass as to show us competitors for the favour of Demos\noffering to blow that worthy\u2019s nose; there would seem to be no room for\nthe portrayal of character. And, in truth, the problem of constructing\ncharacter was in a way obviated by calling in living or historical\npersonages familiar to the spectators. Yet even in this riotous\natmosphere, where the eyes of the spectator must have been half-blinded\nby laughter, we may discern the dim beginnings of the art of comic\nportraiture. Not only have we now and again, as in the litigious old\ngentleman in the _Wasps_, hints of a typical comic figure, we have\nillustrated in the historical figures themselves, Socrates, Cleon,\nEuripides, a rude art of type-delineation.[300]\n\nIn the later Greek and the Latin comedy we find ourselves in a less\nturbulent scene where the air is clearer, and things can be viewed with\nsome steadiness. In Plautus, the poet of the masses and the taverns,\nthe spirit of riotous buffoonery proved itself to be still alive. Yet\nthe confinement of the scene not only to earth but to its familiar\nhaunts, and the introduction of the love-motive, even though in its\nbaser form, gave new scope for the exhibition of comic varieties of\ncharacter. Even in Plautus we find sketches, not, indeed, of a moral\ntype as we find elsewhere, but of a representation of some social\nclass or calling, with {361} its characteristics forcibly set forth,\nas in the boastful soldier, the cheating servant, and the stingy\nmoney-lender. An approximation to the illustration of a moral type may,\nperhaps, be detected in the amorous old man in the _Asinaria_. It is,\nhowever, in the work of Menander and his Roman adapter Terence that we\nmust look for the real advance. In the plays of Terence, written for\nthe educated Romans, the figures assume something of respectability.\nThus the father ceases, as with Plautus, to be a sort of football\nfor filial buffoons to kick about, and grows into a character worthy\nof study; and the contrast between a foolish excess of authority and\na wise lenience, given us in the two fathers in the _Adelphi_, has\nbeen the model for more than one modern writer. In Terence, too, the\nfamily begins to come by its own in its tussle with the rowdyism of\nthe tavern, and this is no small gain for the comic delineation of\ncharacter.[301]\n\nThe circumstance that modern comedy took its rise in the moralities,\nwith their personifications of evil and the rest, readily explains how\ncertain broad types of ignoble character were set in the forefront of\nits scene. These appear already in the later moralities, for example,\n\u201cLike will to Like\u201d. In the work which marks the full transition from\nthe interlude of the didactic morality to the comedy, \u201cRalph Roister\nDoister\u201d (_c._ 1550), we have outlined one of the valuable figures in\nthe comic world, the vainglorious cowardly man, the victim of the most\nentertaining of delusions.[302]\n\nIn the comedy of the Elizabethans, Ben Jonson and Massinger, it is\neasy to trace this influence, disguised though {362} it is sometimes by\nthat of classical comedy. In Jonson\u2019s \u201cEvery Man in his own Humour,\u201d\nsaid to be the first important comedy of character in our literature,\nthe source of entertainment is laid, not in a merry plot, but in the\npresentation of a variety of characters which display themselves in\nodd fashions and novelties of conduct. It may be roughly true, as\nTaine says, with Moli\u00e8re present to his imagination, that the method\npursued is to take an abstract quality and put together all the actions\nto which it gives rise.[303] In other words, the object-lesson of the\nmorality is still too near, and the dramatist has not learned how to\nmake his comic characters move and grow under the spectator\u2019s eye. Yet,\nif we compare Bobadil with a braggart of Plautus, we may see that real\nprogress has been made in the comic grasp and manipulation of character.\n\nIn the comedies of Shakespeare a superficial reader might, so far as\ndrawing of purely comic characters is concerned, suppose himself to\nbe moving backwards. The glowing air of romance, the removal of the\nscene from the workaday world, the partial abandonment to the moods of\npoetry and dream-delight, all this would seem to exclude the setting\nup of well-defined figures fitted to entertain the mood of a gay\ncontemplation. The supposition would not be utterly wrong. The \u201cmixture\nof tones,\u201d which comes into the poet\u2019s comedies as well as into his\ntragedies, does undoubtedly tend to limit the portrayal of purely\ncomic traits.[304] The romantic background cannot, like the fixed\narrangements of homely society, throw the follies and perversities\nof the figures into sharp relief. Think for a moment how different\n\u00e6sthetic significance and value {363} would have attached to the\nfigure of the melancholy Jaques, if it had been encountered, not in the\nsolitary forest, but in one of Moli\u00e8re\u2019s orderly homes.\n\nThe mixture of tones introduces a softening, transforming influence\nwhich affects our attitude towards the queer figures themselves.\nBenedick and the other men who are gently brought to reason by\nschooling women have in their very perversity something amiable. Even\nMalvolio and the other figures, whose folly is exposed with something\nof the unsparing extravagance of an older comedy, catch a saving\nray from the warm glow which is diffused over their world. We laugh\nheartily; yet the pre-dominant sentiment of the play moves us at the\nsame time towards tender condonation.\n\nMust we then say that because he rarely allows us to look on folly and\nvice in the pure attitude of amused observation, Shakespeare is no\ncomic poet? It does not greatly matter how we answer the question so\nlong as we reflect that in the world he has here created for us, at\nonce beautiful and touched with a tender melancholy, and yet charged\nwith the electric current of mirth, we possess something quite as\ndelightful as the well-defined comic scenes of a Moli\u00e8re. Now and\nagain, moreover, where the rosy warmth of romance gives place to the\ncolder light of realities, as in \u201cThe Merry Wives\u201d and \u201cThe Taming of\nthe Shrew,\u201d we see how keen an eye our poet could turn to the comic\npossibilities of character. Nor must we forget how great a contribution\nhe made to comic character-drawing in his dialogue, where the man and\nthe woman, at once attracted and repelled, use their witty tongues with\nexcellent effect, and where woman, though now and then chastised, has\na large part assigned her in curing man of his follies and developing\nwhat is best in him. {364}\n\nFor the comedy of character, in its highest and purest form, we are\ntold, and rightly told, to go to Moli\u00e8re. In his world, not only is the\nuproarious, dust-raising mirth of classic comedy silenced, but the fun\nof extravagant plot with its disguises and errors, though not absent,\nis kept within measure. It is the familiar domestic world, into which\nwe can readily transport ourselves. It is peopled for the most part\nwith the sober and sensible. Upon this orderly scene is brought one or\nmore of the great typical representatives of human folly. In some cases\nit is an old entertaining figure revived, the exacting and anxious\nmiser, for example, or the voluble braggart. But the comic idea also\nincarnates itself in a rich variety of new forms, such as the _faux\nd\u00e9vot_ and his victim, the critic of society who turns a sour face on\nits conventions, the wrong-headed educator of woman, the ready-tongued\nquack, the crazy pedant and the others.\n\nNor is the enlargement of the gallery of portraits the only or the\nchief advance in the comedy of Moli\u00e8re. The fineness of the drawing\nis what fixes the eye. All trace of the old rigid abstractions has\ndisappeared. Typical they all remain, as is their function: yet they\nare individualised in a way that satisfies all the conditions of the\nart.[305]\n\nMoli\u00e8re\u2019s supremacy in the comic use of character is seen, first of\nall, in the selection of his types, which have each a large amusing\naspect inherent in the character itself, and capable of being set\nforth in a sufficient variety of manifestation. We see this at once by\ncomparing his best-known characters with those of his predecessors. In\nMoli\u00e8re we have, what Coleridge tells us is wanting in Ben Jonson, the\npresentation of the laughable defect as \u201ca prominence {365} growing\nout of, and nourished by, the character which still circulates in\nit\u201d.[306] The simple-minded ambition of the Bourgeois gentilhomme,\nthe pious over-confidence of Orgon, the intractable misanthropy of\nAlceste\u2014these, as traits broad-based in the character, offer large\npossibilities of comic development.\n\nThe next point to be noted in this new art is the mode of presentation\nof the character which is to hold the eye in amused contemplation. The\npointing effect of contrast is present, as in all good art; what is\nnoteworthy is the admirable simplicity of the method of contrasting.\nThis is rendered possible by the type selected and the point of view\nadopted. To Moli\u00e8re, the man taken with vain conceit, the opinionated\nprig, the unsociable critic of society and the rest, are aberrations\nfrom a normal type, the socially adapted person. The Harpagons, the\nOrgons, the Arnolphes, the Alcestes, the Sganarelles and the others,\nhave their amusing lop-sidedness, their characteristic tendency swollen\nto the ridiculous proportions of a tumor, defined from the first by the\nantithesis in which they are set to the normal members of society. The\norderly world, pleading for a reasonable accommodation to the usages of\nmen, is sometimes represented by the judicious friend, _e.g._, Alceste,\nArnolphe; not seldom by the wife, _e.g._, Madame Jourdain; at other\ntimes by the brother, _e.g._, of Sganarelle; and, now and again, even\nby the privileged and saucy maid, _e.g._, of Orgon, of M. Jourdain.\n\nIn this juxtaposition the comic poet exhibits clearly enough the\nanti-social tendency of the inflated characteristic. The outrage\nto woman in the rigorous treatment of their wards by Arnolphe and\nSganarelle, the harshness of Alceste\u2019s demands on the high-spirited\ngirl he woos, {366} the menace in Jourdain\u2019s craze to the stability\nof the home, the cruel bearing of Harpagon\u2019s avarice on his son\u2014all\nthis is made quite plain to the spectator; and the exposure of this\nmaleficent tendency in the perverse attitude serves somehow to\nstrengthen the comic effect.\n\nIn thus presentating the hypertrophy of a moral tendency, Moli\u00e8re\ngives movement to the embodiment by disclosing the organic action of\nthe disordered part on other parts of the man. The avarice of Harpagon\nrenders him fearful of a theft, as if this would ruin him. He takes it\nas an insult that he should be called rich, asserting that \u201cnothing\nis more false\u201d. This points to that effect of perverted passion which\nMoli\u00e8re everywhere emphasises, intellectual blindness, the result\nof a mastery of the mind by compulsory ideas (_id\u00e9es fixes_). The\noften-quoted indication of mental deafness in Orgon, when, to the\nservant\u2019s announcement that his wife is ill, he dreamily iterates the\nejaculations \u201cEt Tartuffe?\u201d and \u201cLe pauvre homme!\u201d illustrates the full\ncomic value of such a detachment of mind from the realities which are\nseen by others to be rapping at the doors of sense.\n\nThis state of the intelligence reduced to something resembling\n\u201cmono-ideism\u201d carries with it a loss of the normally clear\nself-consciousness. The foolish Arnolphe, who, in order to guard\nhimself against the risk of a faithless spouse, subjects the girl he\nmeans to wed to intolerable restraints, has the delusion that he is a\ngreat reformer, striking the hyper-pedagogic note when he says that a\nwoman\u2019s mind is soft wax.[307] Here and elsewhere the spectator is made\nto see that the queer creature is acting like a somnambulist, quite\nunaware of the consequences of his actions. It thus {367} becomes an\nexhibition of human folly, and of the droll obliquity and bombastic\nextravagance which are folly\u2019s inseparable concomitants.\n\nThere is, no doubt, somewhat of abstraction here. To give a tendency\ncomplete dominance and to reduce intelligence to the menial position of\nits servant is to destroy the organic complexity of the man. All the\nsame, this method of uncovering the drollness of moral obliquity is not\nadequately judged when it is called abstract. The simplified mechanism\nstill lives, in a sense. One might say that the mature mind is reduced\nto the level of the child\u2019s. There is, indeed, something suggestive\nof the child in a lull of naughty temper in Harpagon\u2019s inquiry of his\ncoachman, what people are saying about him. A still more striking\napproach to the childish occurs when M. Jourdain shows off to his wife\nand his maid his newly acquired superiority through the discovery of\nthe meaning of \u201cprose\u201d.\n\nIt may be added that an escape from the rigidity of the abstract is\nsecured by the development of the obliquity itself. As long as things\nare seen to grow, they are taken to be alive. The expansion of the\nridiculous ambition of M. Jourdain endows him with a certain plenitude\nof life. It may all be very one-sided, and, by comparison with the life\nof a normal man, remind us of the inflexibility of a machine; yet it is\nstill a deranged organism that acts, and not a mechanism.[308]\n\nIt is to be noted, too, that though they resemble distinctly morbid\naberrations from the normal pattern, these characters do not reach to\nthe full height of mania. M. Jourdain, no doubt, gets near the boundary\nthat separates sanity from {368} insanity in the closing scenes of the\nplay;[309] but the comic intention is careful to keep the droll figure\non the right side of the boundary.\n\nA frequent termination of the action in this comedy is a climax,\nin which the folly of the comic character rises to an outburst so\nvoluminous and torrent-like as to throw the onlookers in his world into\nuproarious mirth. The final befooling of M. Jourdain is an example.\nMoli\u00e8re was too good an artist, and too wise a man, to try in every\ncase to compass the end of \u201cpoetic justice\u201d by giving to society in\nits struggle with a mighty and obstinate perversion of humanity more\nof a victory than the laugh. Unhappy Alceste has to rush into the\ndesert without his C\u00e9lim\u00e8ne amid the hilarity of onlookers. Arnolphe\nand Sganarelle are no doubt found out and disappointed; and Tartuffe is\nunmasked and gets into trouble. Yet there is no evidence of a general\nintention to punish. Orgon, though he is cured of his pious delusion\nby a rough surgical operation, receives no more chastisement than M.\nJourdain receives for having brought alien interests and an alien\nmaster into the home. Nor does even that embodiment of an ugly vice,\nHarpagon, get anything worthy of being called a trouncing.\n\nIn all this, the master shows us how well he knew how to keep at the\npoint of view which he had selected as the comic. Let us try to define\nthis after our study of his plays.\n\nWhen we contrast the world, quiet and orderly for the most part,\npresented in these comedies with the hurly-burly scenes of a play of\nAristophanes, we are tempted to say, as has been said, that Moli\u00e8re\nsets before our eyes the realities of everyday life. Yet the comic\nfigures blown out into {369} ridiculous volume are certainly not taken\nstraight out of our familiar world. They are always transformations,\nto this extent, that they are the simplified embodiments of fully\ndeveloped tendencies which only show themselves in germ-form, and\ncomplicated more or less by balancing tendencies, in the real world\nwhich is said to be imaged here. We seem thus to have an element of the\nunreal thrown against a background of the real.\n\nThere is no anomaly here when once we get at the comic point of view.\nIn Moli\u00e8re\u2019s plays, the source of laughter lies in this very intrusion\nof the ill-shapen into a community of well-rounded forms. It is the\nintruder on whom we fix the eye, for whose unpredictable antics in a\nworld for which he is not made our expectation is set. The serious\nbackground is there, but does not take a strong hold of our minds: we\nare not greatly moved, for example, by the spectacle of the sufferings\nof the daughters and the wards of testy old gentlemen, or even of the\nwearing housewifely anxieties of Madame Jourdain. The proper world,\ninto which the absurdly ill-fitted is here pitchforked, is but a\nbackground, rendering the valuable service of backgrounds by throwing\ninto relief and so sharply defining the form for which the spectator\u2019s\neye is accommodated.\n\nIt is hardly an exaggeration to say that the whole plot of one of these\ncomedies consists in the showing up of the grotesque unsuitability\nof the comic character to its environment. It groups its persons and\narranges its scenes as if with the intention of demonstrating the\nfutility of the attempt of this droll figure, lop-sided, and of an\nawkward gait, to move about in our ordered world. This helps us to\nunderstand why Moli\u00e8re, though, as observed above, he now and again\nresorts to older and more elemental sources of mirth, is able to be\nso economical in the use of disguise {370} of improbable encounters,\nand of the other mechanical devices of the entertaining show. The\nsituations themselves as well as the action seem to arise out of the\nfundamental facts, the given characters and their relations. Thus,\none is hardly surprised to find Harpagon in the ignoble part of a\nmoney-lender, to whom the son he has pinched betakes himself.\n\nThe enjoyment of the comedy here provided presupposes a trained\nfaculty. There must be the quick observant eye that catches in\nside-glance all the relations, and yet remains accommodated for the\nlaughable. There is no place for a mixed tone, for a blend of laughter\nwith melancholy sentiment. The serious is envisaged less as the\nserious, than as the framework within which the comic figure moves.\nThe mood is one of a purely gay observation, which has no room for\npity, indignation, or any other emotion; which is brightly and coldly\nintellectual; which is content with just looking and being amused.\n\nFor a right understanding of the scope of laughter in comedy, we need\nto glance at another of its developments. In the so-called \u201cComedy of\nManners,\u201d as illustrated in the English plays of the Restoration, we\nhave undoubtedly to do with a very special trend of the comic spirit.\n\nIn the art of Moli\u00e8re we have for the most part the presentation of an\nindividual grotesquely transformed from the common social type which\nsurrounds him. It is only in a few comedies, as _Les Femmes savantes_\nand _Les Pr\u00e9cieuses ridicules_, that we have spread out for mirthful\ncontemplation the characteristics of _a set_ of persons. In these, the\nmoderate sensible world, against which the cultivation of \u201cthe fine\nshades\u201d looks so entertaining, is still indicated, though, of course,\nless immediately and fully.\n\nIn the plays of Congreve and his contemporaries, we meet {371} with\na comic treatment of more widespread \u201cmanners\u201d of the hour. The\nsources of their fun are pretty obvious. There is something of the\nutter abandonment to disorder and revelry which we met with in the\nworks of Aristophanes.[310] The ordered world, with its interaction\nof normal characters, seems blotted out of existence. The plot is, as\nwith Plautus, a love-intrigue, and has much of the coarseness and the\ndegradation of situation which mark the popular Latin comedy. Yet it is\nat least marked off by the feature that it frees men from the sordid\nbusiness of sending menials to bid for the prize, and sets them face\nto face with the women they are bent on obtaining. The women, again,\nare not shy maids, but range from experienced wives to the would-be\nsimpletons fresh from the country. They are, moreover, while saucy\nand disposed to make good show of resistance, untrammelled by any\nsentimental or other attachment to their chains.\n\nIt seems undeniable that this \u201cartificial\u201d comedy can make good its\nclaims to be entertaining. It has vivacity and stirring movement, the\nfull frolicsomeness of the practical joke, and it abounds in scenes\nof voluminous gaiety. Its dialogue at its best has, along with its\ncoarseness, an unmistakable brilliance of wit.\n\nBut how are we to define the point of view where there is no ordered\nworld as background? There seems no question here of laughing at the\naffectations of a few, who are viewed as comic aberrations from a\nreasonable type. The whole world is affected with frolicsome disorder.\n\nWe are not now concerned with the mental attitude of the spectators\nfor whom these comedies were written. {372} To them, no doubt, the\nspectacle was a merry one as bringing a sense of relief from the gloom\nof the Puritan\u2019s reign. It may, as Taine suggests, have been served up\nas a kind of \u201cAppetitsbischen\u201d between meals, in order to stimulate\nthe palates of the gallants who frequented the theatre; though it is\ndifficult to attribute this function to what by common consent was\nintended to provoke mirthful laughter. What is of more importance is to\nget at the point of view of Charles Lamb and others who avow that they\nfind a true comedy here.\n\nLamb himself has told us what attitude a man should bring to the\nappreciation of this comedy. He is to regard these \u201csports of a witty\nfancy\u201d as \u201ca world of themselves almost as much as fairyland\u201d. His\nmoral feelings are left at home with his morning suit. He goes to\nthe play in order \u201cto escape from the pressure of reality\u201d. For him\nthe figures that pursue one another across the stage have no moral\nsubstance, and are proper subjects neither for approval nor for\ndisapproval. In other words, Lamb tells us that the comedy of Congreve\nand his school is to be taken as a pure show, holding no relations to\nthe real, everyday world.\n\nThis view has been spurned by Macaulay, in a well-known Essay, as\nsubversive of morals. To him, the comedy of the Restoration is a thing\nthat is inherently anti-moral in spirit and intention; and he proceeds\nto pound it with weighty invectives.\n\nThe argument would have been relevant if the question had been a\npractical one of this kind: shall we put this comedy on the stage\nto-day for our boys and girls to see it? As against Lamb\u2019s plea it\nseems to me to be a curious case of missing the point. When, for\nexample, Macaulay complains that in these comedies the husbands are\ntreated {373} as objects of contempt and aversion, whereas the\ngallants are decked out with all the graces, he might have remembered\nthe old _Contes_ and bethought him that this was an elementary\ncondition of the artificial world, which is created solely for\namusement. His answer to Lamb, that recollections of morality do steal\nnow and then into this fantastic world, does not touch the latter\u2019s\nmain contention, and only shows (so far as it is just) that the\ncreators were not perfect architects, and tried to combine incompatible\nstyles. The moral order is still in the background, dimly perceived,\neven here: the fun of the thing is at bottom, as Lamb says, a sense of\nmomentary escape from rules which we know cannot be set aside in the\nreal world. But this idea of an escape implies that what we fly from\nmust not be dragged into the show.\n\nOur study of comedy and of the sources of laughter has prepared us\nto accept Lamb\u2019s view. The comic spectacle appeals to the man in the\nplay-mood. When there, he may see the fun of the turbulent world of\nAristophanes and not be troubled by the thought of the undesirability\nof its realisation. Even when he is entertained by a play of Moli\u00e8re\nhe does not take the background quite seriously, waxing indignant,\nsay, in sympathy with Harpagon\u2019s ill-used son, or with M. Jourdain\u2019s\nill-used wife. The least swerving from the point of view of comedy, a\nturn of the mental \u201ceye-glass,\u201d would spoil all. He would begin, with\nRousseau, to protest against presenting so good a man as Alceste in a\nludicrous light. The Restoration comedy appeals to the same playful\nmood simplified by the temporary inhibition of all outside tendencies.\n\nIt is, I conceive, a profound error to suppose that either the writer\nof a comedy or his audience is at the moral point of view, envisaging\nbehaviour as morally {374} commendable or the opposite. Possibly, the\ninfluence of the didactic morality on early modern comedy may have\nhelped to foster this error. It is true that Moli\u00e8re finds his comic\nmaterial in certain defects of character. Yet the selections made by\ncomic art are not determined by degrees of moral turpitude. As hinted\nabove, very small and comparatively harmless vices may be preferred\nas having the drollest look on the stage.[311] Vanity, the richest of\nall moral blemishes in its comic possibilities, and therefore greatly\nemployed by comedy, both ancient and modern, is not judged as heinously\nimmoral, like hatred and cruelty, for example.[312] This may suffice to\nshow how wide an interval separates the point of view of the spectator\nof a comedy from that of the moral judge.\n\nIt seems to me to be much more correct to say, with M. Bergson, that\ncomedy takes up the social rather than the moral point of view. By\nthis I mean that the comic poet is thinking of the look of things to\nthe trained apperceptive organ of the social kind of person, according\nas they appear to be well or ill adapted to the common practices\nand opinions of society as discerned and interpreted by its more\nintelligent representatives. Yet, in speaking of the social point\nof view, I must not be taken to mean that either the author or the\nspectator of the comic scene is seriously judging of the behaviour of\nits figures by a reference to social values. There is, undoubtedly, an\napproach to this, not only in the early modern comedy, but in the later\nserious variety, including some plays of Moli\u00e8re; but the art-impulse\nof the writer, where it is clear, prevents the approximation {375} of\npoints of view from becoming a loss of distinctness. Comedy addresses\nitself to a mood of \u00e6sthetic contemplation which, though it has room\nfor keen penetration, and even for a dim discernment of a serious\nimport in the background of the puppet show, remains on the whole a\nplayful attitude. The spectator is agreeably occupied with the look of\nthings; and such social consciousness as is awake in him serves merely\nto give to his perceptions a precise measure of the seemly, or at most\nto enable him to glimpse something of a sharply corrective expression\nin the puckered visage of the comic showman.[313]\n\nIn comedy, the moral comes into view as \u201cmores,\u201d as a part, and a\nprincipal part, of the customary, as we have it in a civilised society.\nYet it is not disengaged and held up as moral. Moli\u00e8re, the Comedian\nof Society _par excellence_, shows us clearly enough that he is not\ntrying to distinguish the more permanent and universal basis of society\nin morality from the variable accidents which enter into the manners\nof a particular society at a given date. The \u201cgushing\u201d mode of accost\nadopted by mere acquaintances which irritates Alceste is accepted by\nthe poet as a standard of the fitting, just because as a fashion it is\na social institution, to be good-naturedly accepted by the social kind\nof person. When M. Jourdain tries to step out of his bourgeois rank,\nthe laughter he provokes depends primarily on the unseemliness of his\nambition. Yet, at the end of the nineteenth century in Paris or London,\nsuch ambition is so common and meets with so large a success that\nwe have almost forgotten to smile at it. Hence, when Taine talks of\nMoli\u00e8re as a \u201cphilosopher\u201d illustrating \u201cuniversal truths,\u201d he commits\nan error which may be pardoned, as due to the natural inclination to\nstretch the achievement of a great {376} compatriot.[314] What Moli\u00e8re\ndoes is to secure for the rather oddly formed group of customs and\npractices adopted by the particular society he is depicting, adequate\nexponents, who, in their advocacy of the social system against the\nsocially perverse, not only disengage and give clearness to the\nunwritten laws, but may\u2014so long as they do not raise the question of\ntheir deeper grounds\u2014seek to recommend them by the most enlightened\npresentment of the common-sense attitude.\n\nNow, in substituting the social for the moral point of view, the\nwriter of comedy necessarily tends to slacken the cords that bind us\nin society. Nothing comes out more plainly in Moli\u00e8re\u2019s plays than the\ngood-natured accommodation of social requirements to human infirmities.\nThe author distinctly rejects the idea of going above this standard, of\ntrying to improve on social customs\u2014for example, in the comic treatment\nof Alceste and of Arnolphe. At heart, like his Roman predecessors, he\ntakes sides with indulgence against all irksome restraint. He has the\nlarge tolerance, the readiness to excuse and to pass by, of the easy\nman of the world. C\u00e9lim\u00e8ne\u2019s coquetries, for example, are accepted as\nnatural in one who \u201cis twenty years old\u201d. So it must be; for comedy is\nwritten to put us into an easy frame of mind, in which we are perfectly\ncontent with the world as it is.\n\nFrom this point of view, we may see that the comedy of manners is\nnot, fundamentally, so different from that of character as is often\nmaintained. It breaks with the moral order of stable societies, no\ndoubt, and turns its back rather rudely on this order. Yet it may\nstill, in a sense, be said to adopt the social point of view. That is\nto say, it envisages {377} the seemly as that which falls in with\nthe code of manners which happens to obtain at the time. Its standard\nof fitness is, like that of the savage and of Moli\u00e8re, the customs of\nthe tribe. It is the sour-tempered and suspicious husband, for whom\nMacaulay expresses so droll a concern, who in this inverted world\nbecomes the anti-social kind of person. The large indulgence of this\nsociety is but an expansion of the indulgence common to Terence and to\nMoli\u00e8re. A sub-conscious awareness of the topsy-turvyness of things is\nwith us as we look; and the quaint fancifulness of the inversion\u2014if\nonly like Lamb we can refuse for a moment to take serious views\u2014is\ndistinctly refreshing.\n\nIn saying that we go to meet comedy in the play-mood, in which our\nhabits of moral approbation and disapprobation, and even of estimation\nof social values, are lulled to a sleep more or less profound, it is\nnot meant that these serious tendencies in us can be ignored by the\nwriter of comedy. As implied above, they mould our forms of the seemly,\nunknowingly to us perhaps, even as we look. And more, though inhibited\nby the play-like mood, they have force; and should the showman go too\nfar, say in the direction of stripping off the veil of decency, they\nmay wake up and make an end of the comic enjoyment. Just as tragic\nfear and pity may give way to physical revulsion when horror obtrudes\nitself, so when in comedy the unclean thrusts into view its ugly head,\na sort of physical revulsion may silence laughter. The latitude in\nthese matters conceded from time to time to comic art will, it is\nevident, vary greatly with the particular ratio between the vigours of\nthe mirthful and moral tendencies.\n\nThe presentation of the comic aspects of men\u2019s behaviour on the stage\nis narrowly limited. As Sainte-Beuve reminds us, a whole people may\nhave a fit (_acc\u00e8s_) of mania. If {378} this happen to be the war-fury\nwe shall have given us, as pointed out above, unmistakable elements of\ncomic situation and character. Indeed, if a person who has just been\nin the midst of a wild \u201cJingoism\u201d without losing his head will read\nMoli\u00e8re\u2019s plays he will not fail to be struck by numerous resemblances.\nAnd here, as in comedy, the figures have their comical contours and\nposes thrown into relief by a social background, as much superior to\nany single community at a particular moment, as a community to one\nof its members. Yet no national comedy could in these days follow\nAristophanes and use such promising material, nor are we likely as yet\nto have a comedy for the civilised world.\n\nBefore leaving comedy, we may glance at other forms of literature\nwhich seem to approach its point of view. Of certain kinds of the\nso-called serious comedy of recent times I do not propose to speak. It\nseems more important to remark that prose fiction may now and again\ndraw near the comic point of view. It sometimes presents us with a\ntexture of fantastic situations and adventures which reminds us of\nthe Aristophanean burlesque, as in the \u201cTartarin\u201d series of Alphonse\nDaudet. This type of fiction gives us elemental laughter, uncomplicated\nby anything in the nature of sad reflection\u2014though a little of the\ntenderness of humour may steal in. Or the tone of the story may\napproach that of the more sedate comedy, making, indeed, the one hardly\ndistinguishable from the other, save through the narrative form. This\nholds good, for example, of the novels of Miss Austen. The social\npoint of view is sharply defined and steadily adhered to, and critical\nreflection is confined to the _r\u00f4le_ of giving a fuller and more lucid\ninterpretation of the standards of the society illustrated.\n\nThe comic point of view may intrude, too, and tend to become supreme\nin fiction which has something of the {379} deeper and more thrilling\nimport. It seems to have been present, at times at least, to Balzac,\nand to Thackeray. But it is in Mr. Meredith\u2019s novels that we may study\na new and a finer employment of the comic attitude in connection with\nthe more enthralling kind of interest. The very subjects\u2014for example,\nthe egoist entangled in the situation which makes large demands\nfor consideration; the father with a pedagogic system of his own\nconcoction; the tailor more successful in soaring than his client M.\nJourdain, with certain consequences to his family; the gallant cadet of\nan ancient house affected with the zeal of radicalism\u2014these sound like\nthe titles of comedy. And though the writer may allow the reedy tone\nof humour to be heard now and again he gives prominence to the fluty\nnote of comedy, with its simplicity and clearness, and something of its\nsound of sharp correction, too. Occasionally indeed, as in _Beauchamp\u2019s\nCareer_, this characteristic note will be distinctly heard at the end\nof a story which closes on a tragic disaster.\n\nYet a closer inspection will show that though the point of view of\nthese writers may approximate to that of the comic poet, it remains\ndistinct. This distinctness, moreover, is not due merely to the\npresence of a large serious interest which gives gravity to the story.\nIt arises out of the circumstance that the writer of prose fiction, by\naddressing himself to the reflective mood of a solitary reader, and not\nto the apperceptive attitude of a spectator, will, even in presenting\nthe comic aspects of his subject, unavoidably tend to transcend the\nstandards of fitness adopted by a particular community, substituting\nfor these the ideal standards of a community of the wise and good.\n\nIn comedy we have the appeal to laughter in its purity, the child\u2019s\nlaughter at the funny show guided by an intelligent grasp of social\ncustoms. It addresses itself to the {380} many, united by common modes\nof judgment and a common standard of fitness. Literature gives us,\nhowever, appeals of another kind. The writer who amuses us may seem,\nat least, to be very far from the social point of view, and the mood\nhe induces may be by no means that of pure gaiety. After what has been\nsaid in the preceding chapter, a few words must suffice to indicate\nthese other literary expressions of the laughing spirit.\n\nWe may distinguish two main varieties of this mixed tone: (_a_) the\ncombination of laughter with the attitude of serious attack, as\nillustrated in satire; (_b_) its combination with mellowing feelings in\nwhat we have recognised as modern humour.\n\nThe distinguishing note of satire is the angry one of reprobation. Here\nvices and follies are no longer set before us as a diverting spectacle,\nbut emphasis is laid on their moral indignity. The satirist is at the\npoint of view of the moral judge; only, instead of the calmness of the\njudge, he has something of the fierce attitude of the prosecutor who\naims at exposing and denouncing the turpitude of an offence.\n\nThis being so, we see that laughter enters into satire as an expression\nof contempt and as an instrument of punishment. It assumes its most\npungent and most dreaded form, ridicule or derision. It is thus less a\nspontaneous feeling than a volitional process: the satirist wills to\nmock. As satirist he controls his personal indignation by an artistic\npurpose, such a presentment of his victim as will excite in his hearers\nor readers the full laughter of contempt. Hence, the large license he\ntakes, in the employment of exaggeration and the devices of caricature,\nin the invention of degrading situations, and in the appropriation of\nhumiliating comparison, figure of speech and the other resources of his\nart. {381}\n\nIt is clear that the mirthful spirit when it thus lends itself to\nthe purpose of damaging attack becomes modified to the point of\ntransformation. To laugh with Juvenal or with Swift is to feel more\nof a bitter malignity than of gaiety. We may say that satire takes us\nback to the brutal laughter of the savage standing jubilant over his\nprostrate foe. Or we may describe the laughter as a feeling of \u201csudden\nglory\u201d deeply tinged by the dominant angry attitude of the laugher.\n\nYet the intrusion of laughter into invective, just because it is the\nsolvent of all serious moods, tends, as we have seen, to develop, if\nonly for an instant, a lighter tone. Hence the gamut of dissimilar\ntones in satire, which at the one end is furiously denunciatory, at the\nother almost playful and good-temperedly jocular. The early popular\n\u201cfarce\u201d of the Greeks, with its mocking and ironical speeches, and the\nsatirical songs of the Middle Ages were apparently pieces of rollicking\nfun, like the comedy of Aristophanes, in which the satirical note was\nhalf-drowned in buffoonish laughter. Where, however, the composition is\npalpably a satire, the serious purpose may be seen to dominate and to\ncolour the whole expression.\n\nThe characteristics of satire, thus roughly indicated, hold good alike\nwhether the vices exposed be those of an individual, of a social class,\nof a society at a particular moment, or of mankind as a whole. In any\ncase, the point of view is clearly that of a supposed moral judge and\nsentencer.\n\nThe presence of a purpose of serious exposure is not by any means\nequally clear in all cases; whence the denotation of the term satire\nis not sharply bounded. Comedy itself has been said to have a strong\nsatirical element, and this seems certainly true of the compositions\nof Aristophanes, which, as Bergk remarks, contain in their mixture of\ntones {382} a \u201cbiting scorn\u201d and a \u201cbitter irony\u201d.[315] Romances, as\npictures of men and their manners, are often described as satirical,\npresumably because a free delineation of human vices is taken to imply\nthe condemnatory attitude and the intention to castigate. Yet here the\ncastigation may be of the mildest, as in _Gil Blas_, which, according\nto Sainte-Beuve, does not hold up men in the mass to ridicule as wicked\nand foolish, but rather exposes their meanness and dulness.[316] M.\nTaine finds the satirist\u2019s lash laid on heavily in the English school\nof fiction, even in the writings of Thackeray.[317] Yet judgments as\nto a writer\u2019s intention based on the prevailing tone of the world he\nportrays are apt to seem subjective and capricious.\n\nSatire proper, where the purpose of ridicule is confessed, is a\nvery different thing. We see this in the works of Juvenal, of whom\nProf. Tyrrell writes, \u201cHe is always in a rage and a laugh seems to\nsit strangely on his lips\u201d.[318] In this more serious and poignant\nsatire the laugh takes on a shrill note of malignity from its mental\n_entourage_. The virulence of the satire of antiquity has since been\nsoftened. This is frequently effected by allegorical disguise. The\nmedi\u00e6val satires, such as that on cunning and treachery in the fable\nof the Fox, are examples. The satires of Voltaire and of the English\nsatirists, including the bitter and unsparing Swift, illustrate the\nsame tendency.\n\nThis throwing of a fierce attack, whether political or moral, into\nthe form of an allegory, though it seems to veil the direction of the\nassault, really gives it more point. In the attacks of derision, at\nleast, a back-handed blow may often hurt more than one straight from\nthe shoulder. The reader\u2019s satisfaction includes no doubt an {383}\nelement of admiration for the finesse of art: yet more seems to be\ninvolved. Swift could not have shown us the absurdities in our social\nand political institutions half as well by any direct attack on them\nas he has shown us by the indirect attack in _Gulliver\u2019s Travels_. The\nindignity of a familiar vice or folly seems to be made palpable when\nit is thus ridiculed under the guise of some new semblance. Further,\nour laughter at the vice is reinforced by that which comes from the\ndetection of the make-believe of the allegory. The playful element\nprobably takes on something of malice from the prevailing tone of the\nsatire, and in the end we may laugh yet more cruelly at the victim who\nis ever being anew detected, so to speak, under the literary mask.\n\nMuch the same kind of remark applies to the effect of simile, innuendo,\nirony, and all that we mean by wit in satire. We have touched on\nthe playful side of wit under the head of Comedy. But this is only\na part of what the word commonly implies. Even in comic dialogue\nthere is something of attack, and the witty women of the Restoration\nand other writers have now and again a rasping tongue. Yet it is in\nsatire that we see the deep malignity of wit. The witty sarcasms of\nVoltaire and the rest seem to be imps of malice disguised as toys.\nThe sally of cruel meaning out of what looks harmless nonsense, or a\nmere verbal slip\u2014as in the polished rebuke of a Master of Trinity to a\ntoo confident Junior Fellow, \u201cwe are all fallible, even the youngest\nof us\u201d\u2014has a wounding force greater than that of a direct mode of\nstatement. The effect is still greater where failure and disgrace are\nexhibited under a thin ironical veil of glorious achievement, as in\nPope\u2019s lines on the Lord Mayor\u2019s Show\u2014said by Leigh Hunt to be the\nfinest piece of wit he knew:\u2014 {384}\n\n    Now night descending the proud scene is o\u2019er,\n    But lives in Settle\u2019s numbers one day more.\n\nIn all such ironical inversion the satirist manages by a suggestion\nof the worthy and honourable to drive home with added force the\nhumiliating truth; as in the remark of Cicero, apropos of an elderly\ndame who said that she was but forty years old: \u201cI must believe her,\nfor I have heard her say so any time these ten years\u201d.[319] The\npresentation in this case of something hidden, immediately followed by\nan uncovering, may evoke an echo of the \u201cbo-peep\u201d laugh of infancy,\nwhich should, one supposes, tend to introduce a milder and playful tone\ninto the attack; yet, owing to the predominance of the attitude of\nfierce derision, this very element of playfulness appears, somehow, to\ngive a new pungency to the satirical thrust.\n\nNothing could be more unlike the laughter of virulent satire than\nthat provoked by the expression of humour in literature. As our\nanalysis would lead us to expect, we find in the truly humorous writer\nthe mellowing influences of good nature and sympathy, and a large\nunderstanding and acceptance of that against which he pokes fun. While\nsatire, sarcasm and their kind seem to be trying to push things away,\nor at least to alter them, humour, curiously enough, looks as if it\nwere tenderly holding to the world which entertains it. Yet while all\nhumorous writings illustrate these tendencies, the subjective and\npersonal quality of humour is seen in the circumstance that every\nwriter brings to bear on what he sees a new temper and attitude.\n\nThe contrast of the satirical and the humorous point of view\nmay be conveniently studied by glancing at the current {385} and\nmuch-discussed distinction between wit and humour. That these do not\nlogically make a pair of contrasting species has been implied in our\nanalysis of the two. Perhaps nowhere do we find the human mind to\nhave been more strangely misled by the fact of the existence of two\nwords than in this case. Wit, as essentially a manner of deportment\nof the intelligence, can stand in no simple and direct relation to an\nemotional mood like humour.\n\nNo doubt there are facts which give colour to the idea of an opposition\nin this case. Thus, it is indubitable that whereas humour specially\nfavours certain kinds of imaginative and reflective activity, wit\nseems always to prefer, even in its play, something in the shape of an\nincisive logical process.[320] But I suspect that the deeper ground of\nthe distinction is to be found in the circumstance that the wit which\nis most brilliant, of keenest edge, and most effective in its stroke,\nappears always to grow out of, and so becomes associated with, those\nmoods of satire and mordant mockery, to which humour as good-natured\nand tolerant is directly opposed. So it is with the wit of Voltaire and\nof others of his century.\n\nA closer examination will, however, show that there is nothing\nincompatible between the humorous sentiment and the witty mode of\nbehaviour of the intellect. As play indeed, wit quite naturally allies\nitself to the attitude of humour. It will be found that much that is\ncommonly described as wit discloses the softening effect of humour, and\nmight, indeed, just as well be called an illustration of humour. Those\nwho really know the Irish will sometimes hesitate whether to speak of\ntheir wit or of their humour. The same applies, I feel sure, to a large\nnumber of {386} Shakespeare\u2019s \u201cwitticisms\u201d.[321] In all such cases,\nthe wit, which when set in the fierce mood of the satirist has a nasty\nsting, not only becomes harmless, but may take on something of positive\nkindliness when it is tempered by an infusion of genial humour. The\nremark apropos of a very correct person, \u201cHe has not one redeeming\nvice,\u201d may illustrate the point. It may even, in this harmless\nform, come into a laugh which tells against the humorist, as in the\nobservation of an idler, \u201cI don\u2019t like working between my meals\u201d.[322]\n\nYet though in their well-marked forms thus dissimilar, the satirical\nand the humorous mood may shade one into the other in a way that makes\nit difficult to draw the boundary line. Heine, in some of his writings,\n_e.g._, the poem _Deutschland_, tempers his mockery with sentiment\nand humour in such a way that one finds it hard to think of it as a\nsatire. In places, indeed, this genius, so simple-looking yet really\nso profound, seems to become a consummate humorist, bringing out with\na single touch all the laughter and all the tears of things. Was Lewis\nCarroll a satirist when he threw behind the fun of his children\u2019s\nstories some deeper meaning which for ever eludes us? or was this\nsemblance of a meaning a part of his fun, his playful way of punishing\nthe \u201cgrown up\u201d for reading a child\u2019s book? {387}\n\nIn modern literature, the interesting point to note is the growing\ninterpenetration of the laughing and the serious attitude, and the\ncoalescence of the mirthful spirit with sentiment. The two processes,\nthough distinct, may run on together, as we may see in Shakespeare\u2019s\nplays. The humorous element introduced by the fool in \u201cLear\u201d and\nelsewhere at once relieves the tragic tension, and gives a moment\u2019s\nplay to that disposition towards a lighter laughing criticism which is\nalways active when we survey colossal folly, even though the mental eye\nis at the moment focussed for its catastrophic effects. The laughter\nis controlled and kept tenderly humorous and half-sad by a large\nreflection, which does not lose sight, even at the relieving moment, of\nthe lamentable ruin. It is only another way of combining the \u201cfun\u201d and\nthe \u201cpity\u201d of it when the master brings a genial humour into comedy and\nmakes us, with his faithful follower Bardolph, half-love and more than\nhalf-pity the faulty knight who so merrily entertains us.\n\nAs we have seen, prose-fiction may illustrate the comic spirit and\nsomething of the fiercer temper of satire. Yet laughter comes into\nit in another form. It has to accommodate itself to the presence of\nserious interests, and of a plot which involves sympathetic fear and\nstrain. Hence it appears in stories which have a mixed tone, as it does\nindeed in comedy when this is not pure\u2014for example, \u201cheroic comedy,\u201d as\nillustrated by M. Rostand\u2019s _Cyrano_\u2014in the guise of humour. That is to\nsay, its gay treble note is complicated by an undertone, a resonance of\nthe sadness of its _milieu_. One needs only to think how one laughs at\nMoses and his purchase of spectacles in the _Vicar of Wakefield_, or at\nthe disfigurement of the hero in _Cyrano_.\n\nA novel may, of course, present the grave and the gay in mere\njuxtaposition, so that the interaction and {388} modification here\nspoken of are only very imperfectly realised. The notion of a good\nstory entertained by many is of one that bears the imagination of\nthe reader swiftly through a series of diverse scenes, now grave\nand pathetic, now gay and mirthful. A large part of modern fiction\nsatisfies this need. Stories of wild adventure from _Gil Blas_ to _Tom\nJones_ are \u201chumorous\u201d to the multitude in this sense. Even in the case\nof a real humorist like Dickens, whose amusing figures are there to\ntouch the heart as well as to entertain the imagination, the perfect\nharmonising of tones may sometimes seem to be wanting. A humorist of\nanother complexion, Laurence Sterne, seems to have missed the judicious\nmixture of laughter and sentiment in his _Sentimental Journey_.[323]\n\nThe art of humorous writing consists in part in selecting characters,\nincidents and the rest in such a way as to exhibit the intimate\nconnections between that which amuses and that which touches the\nserious sentiments, respect and pity; and to develop the reflective\nconsciousness which sustains the mood of humour. Goldsmith\u2019s history\nof the Vicar and his family is one of the best examples. Scott\u2019s\nAntiquary and Fielding\u2019s Parson Adams are characters which at once\nentertain and win us. Such humorous types involve, as Leigh Hunt has\npointed out, a striking contrast within the characters, _e.g._, the\ngullible and the manly in Parson Adams;[324] and the sharpness of this\ncontrast turns on that of the feelings excited by the constituents.\nThe characters selected by humorous fiction may be consciously\namusing, after the manner of the Merry Knight, or wholly unconscious\nof their laughter-provoking power. A valuable part of this amusing\nportraiture consists in bringing out {389} the fresh and odd-looking\ncharacteristics not only of individuals, but of classes and even of\nraces.\n\nIn addition to this objective presentation of the humorous aspects\nof character and its relations, the writer may further the effect\nby striking now and again undertones of quaint reflection and so\nintroducing an element of subjective humour. The notion that such\nreflection is out of place in narrative art seems strange to a student\nof the history of literature. If there was room for the comments of the\nonlooking chorus in Greek drama, and for the yet deeper reflections\nsupplied by the acting onlookers in Shakespeare\u2019s plays, there should\nbe room for it in a prose narrative. In truth, some of the best writers\nof fiction, Fielding, Thackeray and George Eliot among others, make\nexcellent use of this reflective accompaniment. In the best works of\nthe last-named writer we have something of Shakespeare\u2019s art of adding\na pregnant observation which, so far from disturbing, rather furthers\nthe mood needed for a due appreciation of the action.\n\nIn the great humorous writings, those of Rabelais, Cervantes\nand\u2014removed by an interval no doubt\u2014Sterne, we appear to find presented\na largeness of subject and of treatment which makes direct appeal as\nmuch to reflection as to perception. You must know the Middle Ages,\nwhich are being laughingly kicked aside, before you will even care for\nGargantua; you must envisage Don Quixote and his squire, not as two\nindividuals or even as two types of character, but as embodiments of\ntwo remote levels of culture, and more, of two opposed ways of looking\nat the world, before you will begin to feel all the humour of these\njuxtapositions. And so of the great contrast between Mr. Shandy and\nhis brother, the Captain. There is no need for the interpolation of\nreflection: the scale, the breadth {390} of treatment, the wealth\nof ideas poured out, these compel us to reflect. The laughter which\ncomes from the perceptions of the utter incongruity of the mental and\nmoral structures thus juxtaposed and attached is saturated with this\nreflection. And more, so right, so likeable, so estimable even is\neach of these contrasting characters, with its well-marked temper and\n_mani\u00e8re de voir_, that our sympathies go out towards both. Thus we\nleave the perceptual level and the relative point of view of comedy far\nbehind us, reaching a standpoint near that of the thinker who embraces\nall particular points of view, and yet may manage to have his own laugh\nin the end. When, as in Jean Paul\u2019s _Siebenk\u00e4s_, and yet more clearly\nin Carlyle\u2019s _Sartor Resartus_, the contrast seems to open up the great\ncollision in human experience between sentiment and prosaic reality,\nidealism and the earth-binding instincts of practical life, we stand,\nindeed, on the border-line between the humour of fiction and that of\nphilosophy.\n\nHumour has its place, a respectable one too, in essays and other forms\nof literature which deal directly with reality and are products not\nso much of imagination as of thought. In these, the contrast between\nthe serious and the playful appears in transitions from a perfectly\ngrave to a humorous kind of reflection. Marked differences of tone\nare observable here also. The humorous remark may be but a momentary\ndiversion of the attention, a playful side-glance, in a serious\nargument. In some writings, _e.g._, those of Sir Thos. Browne and of\nLamb, the humorous element hardly amounts to a digression, or even to\na momentary interruption, but is fused into and half lost to sight in\nthe serious argument.[325] Among more recent writers, too, including\nsome yet living, we have admirable examples of historical narrative\n{391} and criticism lit up here and there with soft glow-worm points\nof humour. In other cases, the humorous feature may be so large as to\nmodify the colour of the whole, as in Miss Kingsley\u2019s _Travels in West\nAfrica_. An Essay, again, may be as a whole a _jeu d\u2019esprit_ and the\nfun seem to preponderate, while the manner is throughout that of grave\nargument; or, in more subtle work, as some of Charles Lamb\u2019s, it may\nbe best described as fun sandwiched in between a look of seriousness\non the surface, and a real seriousness of meaning below. The fusion of\ntones leaves much to be desired in the case of many writers who are\npopularly regarded as skilled humorists. A mere interruption of serious\nthought by a sort of playful \u201caside\u201d does not prove the existence of\nthe gift of humour, which is essentially the power of playing on moods\nnot only dissimilar but usually antagonistic in a way that avoids all\nshock and sense of discontinuity.\n\n{392}\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII.\n\nULTIMATE VALUE AND LIMITATIONS OF LAUGHTER.\n\n\nOur study has taken us through various regions of research. In looking\nfor the germ of laughter we found ourselves in the wide and misty\nplains of biological speculation. In tracing its development we took\na dip into the pleasant vales of child-psychology and anthropology,\nand then tried to climb the winding paths of social evolution. Having\nreached in this way the heights of modern civilisation, we made a\nspecial investigation into the social organisation of laughter, as\nrepresented in the art of comedy, and into the gradual appearance of\na new type of laughter, essentially individual and independent of the\nsocial standard, to which is given the name of humour. Throughout this\nvoyage of discovery we have kept in view the question of the function\nof the laughing spirit in the life of the individual and of the\ncommunity. It remains to determine this function more precisely.\n\nIn order to assign its proper place and its value to a large spiritual\ntendency such as runs through human mirth, we must for a moment push\nour investigation into a yet more difficult and obscure region, that\nof philosophy. This is necessary for more than one reason. To begin,\nwe can hardly hope to reach a clear view of the worth of the laughing\nimpulse without the help of some clearly thought view of life as a\nwhole; and such a \u201cWeltanschauung\u201d {393} seems only to be attainable\nat the level of philosophic reflection. There is, however, a second\nreason for entering this more remote and private domain of knowledge.\nPhilosophy is a carrying forward to its highest point of development\nof that individual criticism of life, with which, as we have seen,\nthe quieter tones of laughter associate themselves. It would thus\nseem to be desirable to inquire how far along the road of philosophic\nspeculation this companionship of the mirthful spirit in her quieter\nmood is possible. This inquiry may conveniently be pursued at once as\nsupplementary to our discussion of humour.\n\nAs pointed out in the chapter on the subject, reflective humour grows\nout of a mutual approximation of two tendencies which seem to the\nunexamining person to be directly antagonistic, namely, the wholly\nserious turn for wise reflection and the playful bent towards laughter.\nIn philosophic humour, touched on in our survey of the laughable in\nliterature, this antagonism seems at first sight to be particularly\nsharp. The plain man, to whom philosophic speculation presents itself\nas something remote from all human interests as he conceives of them,\nmay well receive a shock when he hears that it holds potentialities\nof a smile at least, if not of a laugh\u2014for the person who engages in\nthe occupation, that is to say, and not merely for him who looks on.\nIt seems to be incumbent on us, therefore, to try to make this drawing\ntogether of impulses which look so hostile a little more intelligible.\n\nThe humorist, as we have viewed him, is able through the development of\nhis individuality to detach himself from many of the common judgments\nand much of the common laughter of the particular community of which\nhe is a member. He develops his own amusing mode of contemplation,\nwhich involves a large substitution for the standards {394} of custom\nand \u201ccommon-sense,\u201d of the ideal standards of reason. The habit of\nphilosophic thought may be said to complete this uplifting of the\nindividual to ideal heights, and its concomitant process, the expansion\nof the view of the irrational, the essentially unfitting, the amusing.\nA word must suffice to indicate the way in which it does this.\n\nPhilosophy, as we know, going boldly beyond the special sciences,\npushes on to a deeper knowledge of things, and of these in their\ntotality, of what we call the universe. In this effort it has to\nenvisage things in a way essentially different from that of everyday\nobservation. The modern philosopher may do his best to reach his\nconception of the reality of things by a careful analysis of\nexperience; yet in the end his theory seems to have transformed our\nfamiliar world beyond the possibility of recognition.\n\nIn this philosophic re-construction of the real world, man, his\nrelation to nature, and his history have to be re-considered. It\nillustrates a powerful tendency to view human life and experience as\na phase of a larger cosmic movement determined by an ideal end. The\nintroduction of ideal conceptions, by lifting us above the actual,\nseems to throw upon the latter an aspect of littleness, of futility,\nof something like the dishonour of failure. The ideal requirement\nproves hopelessly inapplicable to much, at least, of our everyday\nworld; so that, as long as we remain at its point of view, familiar\nthings\u2014say the persons we happen to be thrown with, and a good deal\nin ourselves, social experiments growing out of some passing trend of\n\u201cpopular thought,\u201d and even long periods of history\u2014take on the aspect\nof contradictions, of futile things that at least do not count, if they\ndo not actually delay the fruition of the ideal.\n\nSo, too, when philosophy becomes distinctly practical. {395} Whether\nwe take happiness or moral perfection or self-realisation as the\nideal end of men\u2019s conduct, a large part of the conduct which unfolds\nitself under our eyes, including much of our own, begins to look sadly\npoor and shabby, as soon as we venture seriously to apply an ideal as\ntest. Much at least of what men praise as virtue shows itself to be\nof doubtful value, and at any rate to have received a laudation quite\ndisproportionate to its true worth.\n\nLastly, this belittling effect of ideas on everyday realities is seen\nwhen philosophy constructs for us the ideal type of human society, and\nof that confederacy of civilised states of which, now and again, it has\nhad its dream. Under the searching rays of these ideal conceptions even\nthe \u201ccommon-sense\u201d to which \u201cadvanced\u201d communities hold so tenaciously\nmay begin to look something compacted rather of darkness than of light.\n\nThe situation would seem to offer room for some of those modes of\ntransforming the aspects of things which we have found to be excitants\nof laughter. If philosophic contemplation effects a reduction of\ngreat things to littleness, of substances to illusory shadows, of the\nelevated glories of men to the level of barely passable dignities,\nit should, one may reason, help men to laugh. Yet the fact that a\nphilosopher has been known to the ages as the laughing one suggests\nthat mirth has not been a common characteristic of his kind.\n\nIn order to understand this, we must recall one or two facts. For one\nthing, though seriousness _may_ combine with a taste for the laughable,\nit is and remains fundamentally opposed to the playfulness of mirth.\nPhilosophers are serious persons: their constructive thought is of\nthe most arduous of human activities, and imposes on those who {396}\nundertake it an exceptional amount of serious concentration. Little\nwonder, then, if we so rarely find in them a marked fondness for the\nplayful. The great and ineradicable gravity of the philosopher has been\nsufficiently illustrated in his theoretic treatment of our subject.\n\nIn addition to this general reason, there are others and variable\nones, differing with the kind of philosophic creed adopted, and with\nthe temperamental attitude of the individual towards it. To begin with\ndifferences of creed, we must remember that a philosopher\u2019s doctrine,\nwhile it may invest our common world and our common life with an aspect\nof indignity, may at the same time reduce these to mere semblances by\nsetting them in contrast to the ideal region which it regards as the\nsphere of the veritable realities. In this way, as in Plato\u2019s Idealism,\nwe may see a quasi-religious tendency to lift men above the follies,\ndeceptions and seeming evils of the world to the sublime verities.\nSuch a doctrine, if consistently held, reserves but a small place for\nlaughter\u2014save perhaps for the happy smile of release or escape. Plato,\nthe thinker of many moods, was able to adapt his doctrine to attitudes\nwidely different from the half-poetic, half-religious one to which on\nthe whole he leaned; and some of these proved to be compatible with a\ndelicate vein of mirth. Perhaps one may find in Plato a reflection of\nthe different attitudes of the gods\u2014to communion with whom his spirit\naspired\u2014towards luckless and erring mortals: the serene indifference\nof those on the height, and a mild good-natured interest in what is\nseen below, which lends itself to the softer kind of ironical banter.\nWhat is told us of the laughter of the deities is always, perhaps,\na little difficult to reconcile with their remote altitude and the\ndetachment of spirit which seems proper to this; being, either in its\nmocking virulence, or {397} in its good-natured familiarity, rather\ntoo suggestive of a close attachment to our race; for which reason, by\nthe way, philosophers, if they wish to soar god-wards and still to keep\na laughing down-glance on their fellows, should beware lest they soar\ntoo high.\n\nHow high-pitched speculation tends to silence laughter by withdrawing\nthe philosopher too far from the human scene may easily be seen by a\nglance at the historical schools. The Stoic and the Epicurean alike,\nwidely dissimilar as were their views of the good and their moral\ntempers, took into seclusion the philosophic life which Aristotle\nhad bidden them combine with a discreet participation in the social\nlife about them; seeking, each in his own manner, to realise its\nself-sufficiency and its consolations. There, no doubt, they reflected\nmuch on the follies of the unwise who remained in the crowd. Yet the\nStoical temper, with its striving after a passionless imperturbability,\nexcluded the idea of a laughing, quite as much as of a pitying, survey.\nOn the other hand, the Epicurean, though his theory of life accentuated\nthe value of the tranquil pleasures, did not apparently find in\nhis Garden a corner for the quiet amusement of a laughter-bringing\ncontemplation.\n\nIn this way philosophy, by substituting a new and ideal mode of\nthought and life for the common mode, is apt to dismiss it as void\nof significance and unreal, and so to be unable to laugh at ordinary\nhumanity just because it has ceased to be interested in it. Yet all\nphilosophising does not thus belittle the realm of reality, as common\nmen regard it. Philosophers have been known to regard as realities the\nsame particular things that Plato contemned as mere shadows, and to\nreconstruct and to justify as rational what the plain man accepts as\nhis world. When {398} this goes so far as to insist on the goodness of\nthings human, and to say that the world as a whole is as perfect as it\ncan be, and thus in a new way, as it would seem, to break away from the\ncommon view, it seriously threatens the _locus standi_ of the laugher.\nNothing, indeed, in the way of a theory of life would appear to be more\nfatal to a mirthful temper of the mind than an out-and-out optimism.\nAt most, laughter would take on the aspect of the serene gaiety of\na happy and thoughtless girl; as it does, I suspect, in the case of\nAbraham Tucker, for whom Sir Leslie Stephen claims the character\nof a \u201cmetaphysical humorist\u201d.[326] It is true, as I have elsewhere\nshown,[327] that a genial and tolerant laughter may predispose a man,\nshould he begin to philosophise, to adopt an optimistic theory of the\nworld. Nevertheless, I believe that a firm grasp of such a theory would\ntend to reduce very considerably the scope of his laughter. It is just\nas well, perhaps, that R. L. Stevenson\u2014whose predominant inclination to\na hopeful and cheerful view of things is clearly shown in his idea that\nevery man carries his ideal hidden away, as the Scotch boys used to\ncarry lanterns in a silent ecstasy\u2014did not go farther than his letters\nshow him to have gone, along the path of philosophic construction.\n\nIf, on the other hand, the manner of philosophic speculation at once\naccepts the common facts of life as real, and yet as inherently and\nhopelessly bad, laughter is even more effectually excluded. There\nmay, it is true, be room in the pessimist\u2019s creed for a grim irony,\nof which, indeed, we find a trace now and again in the writings of\nSchopenhauer and his followers; but for laughter pure and simple, or\neven for laughter mellowed by the compassion which the {399} pessimist\nbids us cultivate, there seems to be no breathing-space. The state of\nthings is too tragic to allow even of a smile.\n\nIt remains to determine the relation of one other tendency in this high\nthinking to the possibilities of laughter. In philosophic scepticism,\nwith its insistence on the relativity of our knowledge and on the\nimpossibility of attaining to rational certainty, we seem to find\na denial of all philosophy rather than a particular species of it;\nnevertheless, as the history of the subject shows, it is the outcome\nof a distinct and recurrent attitude of the philosophic mind. Now\nscepticism does undoubtedly seem to wear a rather malicious smile. This\nsmile may be said to express an amusement at the spectacle of illusions\npricked, which tells at least as much against the high-soaring thinker\nas against the man of common day who relies on the intuitions of his\n\u201ccommon-sense\u201d. The sceptic\u2019s attitude leans, indeed, more towards that\nof common-sense, in so far that, while destroying the hope of absolute\nknowledge, it urges the _practical_ sufficiency of such conjectural\nopinion as we are able to reach.\n\nScepticism thus introduces another standpoint for the laugher and adds\nto the sum of laughable things. This is the standpoint of the practical\nman and of what we call common-sense, so far as this is knowledge\nshaped for the guidance of men in the ordinary affairs of life. This\ncommon-sense, as its name plainly tells us, is essentially a social\nphenomenon. Here, then, within the group of tendencies underlying\nreflection\u2014that is to say, the kind of intellectual activity which\nmarks the highest development of the individual point of view\u2014we\nencounter the contrast between this and the social point of view.\nSo far as we are able in our philosophic moments to \u201csee the fun of\nit,\u201d as R. {400} L. Stevenson says apropos of a modern philosopher,\nwe join the choir of common-sense laughers\u2014the laughing realists as\ndistinguished from the laughing idealists.[328] From their point of\nview, as the history of comedy plainly illustrates, all highly abstract\nspeculation looks amusing because of its quaint remoteness from their\nfamiliar realities and interests; because, too, of a keen suspicion of\nits being a vain attempt to soar above the heads of common mortals. To\npull down the speculative soarer to his proper footing on our humble\nearthcrust is always a gratifying occupation to the lovers of mirth.\nEven the soarers themselves will sometimes give one another a kick\ndownwards, the man of science loving to have his joke at the expense\nof the unverifiable conceptions of the metaphysician, and the latter\nbeing sometimes lucky enough to turn the tables by showing how physical\nscience itself may, by its abstract methods, manage to strip material\nthings, the properties and laws of which it sets out to explain, of the\nlast shreds of reality.[329]\n\nA word may serve to define the relation of philosophic humour to the\ntendencies just indicated. Humour, we have found, is characterised by\nan inclination to reflect, and to take the large views of things which\nembrace relations; further, by a mirthful caprice of fancy in choosing\nfor play-ground the confines of issues felt all the time to be serious.\nIt grows distinctly philosophic when, as in Jean Paul or his disciple,\nCarlyle, the contemplation of things breaks through the limitations of\nthe viewer\u2019s particular world-corner, surmounts \u201crelative\u201d points of\nview, and regards humanity as a whole, with oneself projected into the\nspectacle, as nearly as possible as disinterested spectator. {401}\n\nWe need not look for the philosophic humorist among zealous adherents\nof the schools. In these, as elsewhere, a fervid devotion tends,\nthrough its narrowing effect on ideas and its rigid fixation of the\npoint of view, to shut out humour, which even in its most serious vein\nloves an ample reserve of space for free wanderings in search of new\naspects of things. The humorist is much more likely to be found among\nstudents of philosophy who retain a measure of scholarly impartiality\nin relation to the competing creeds.\n\nA full development of humour in the philosopher seems to be impossible,\nsave where the amusing aspects of speculative soaring are dimly\nrecognised. This may come through a study of the history of the\nsubject; for it is hard not to smile at the spectacle of a man\nrefurbishing and possibly adding a new handle to one of the \u201csystems\u201d\nwhich have had their day (and more, perhaps) and undertaking once\nmore to use it as a deadly weapon against the adversary. A dash\nof the sceptical spirit, also an ability now and again to see the\npretentiousness of it all, would appear to be needful for a large\nhumorous enjoyment. One should have, too, at least a side-glance for\nthe fun of the proceeding when the human pygmy tries the giant\u2019s stride\nby offering us a definition of the absolute.\n\nIt would seem, then, as if the philosophic humorist needed to combine\ntwo opposed points of view; that of the thinker who criticises actual\nlife in the light of ideas, and that of the practical man who takes his\nstand on the fact of primal human needs and seeks an interpretation of\nthings which will satisfy these. He should be able to soar with the\nPlatonist to the realm of Ideas, so as to enjoy the droll aspect which\nmen\u2019s behaviour assumes as soon as a glimmer of light is made to fall\non it from the Universal Forms; {402} and he should be no less capable\nof taking up the standpoint of everyday reality and common-sense, so\nfar as to discern the element of a practical irrationality which lurks\nin any undue insistence on these Ideas.\n\nThis combination in philosophic humour of two opposed tendencies is\nillustrated in its attitude towards the question of the worth of life.\nSince a humorist is characterised by a certain depth and range of\nsympathy, he is not likely to accept the optimist\u2019s easy way of getting\nrid of the sufferings of humanity. At this point, at least, he will\nbe alive to the obstinate and inexpugnable reality of our concrete\nexperiences. Yet, just because he insists on never losing his hold on\nhis buoyant laughter, he will not sink into the pessimists depths of\ncomplaint. He will see that even the large spectacle of human struggle,\nin which there is much to sadden a compassionate heart, begins to wear\nthe shimmer of a smile as soon as we envisage it as a sort of game\nplayed by destiny against our race. Just as a glimpse of the provoking,\nalmost malicious aspects of the circumstances which irritate us in our\nsmaller world may stifle the rising imprecation, by bringing up a smile\nor even a _sotto voce_ laugh; so, when a philosophic humorist looks out\nupon the larger human scene, he may find the starting sigh checked by a\nglance at the playful irony of things. The reflective mind will indeed\nreadily find in the scheme of the world traces of an impish spirit that\nmust have its practical joke, cost what it may. With a fair appearance\nof wise purpose, the destinies have contrived to combine just the\namount of bungling needed to convey an intention of playful though\nslightly malicious teasing.\n\nThus, in the final evaluation of the world, humour may find its place.\nPerhaps it is not too much to say that the {403} last word on man and\nhis destiny leaves an opening for the humorous smile. So quaintly do\nthe rational and the irrational elements seem to be interwoven in the\nstructure of our world, that a humorist, for whom, as we have seen,\nthe spectacle must always count as much, might almost construct a new\nTheodicy and say: \u201cThe world is at least the best possible for amusing\ncontemplation\u201d.[330]\n\nWe have spoken of philosophy as hovering aloof from our common life,\nand this idea might seem to exclude all possibility of a utility in\nthe exercise of a philosophic humour. Yet even when men philosophise\nand so appear to erect about them a new cosmos, they remain in their\nhuman world and are doing something towards shaping their relations to\nit; so that, after all, we may not unreasonably look here, too, for\nsome self-corrective function in laughter, some aid rendered by it to\nthat adjustment of the self to its surroundings, which is enforced\non us all\u2014the exalted thinker no less, let us say, than his faithful\nquadruped, whose world his master\u2019s strange habits make sadly complex.\n\nThe first service of such a philosophic humour is to complete the\nprocess of a laughing self-correction. It is only when we rise to the\nhigher point of view of a philosophic reflection and see our own figure\nprojected into the larger whole, that we are able to estimate ourselves\nand our concerns with some approximation to justness. As we look down\nthe vast time perspective we first fully discern our flitting part in\nthe world. And the glimpse of the dwarfed figure we cut in the vast\nassemblage of things, followed by the reflection how well it can work\nout its {404} hidden purpose whether or not we happen to be on the\nscene, may suffice fully to reveal to us the absurdity in the crude\nexaggerations of our dignity, of our usefulness and of our troubles,\nand bring to the lips the corrective smile, even if it fail to evoke\nthe yet more valuable self-purifying laugh.\n\nA like helpfulness is brought us by philosophic humour when we\ncontemplate the whole human lot. In estimating our world as a\ndwelling-place for man, there is surely room for the exaggeration\nwhich comes from a natural indignation at what hurts us, or from a\nnatural impatience at being able to do so little to better our estate.\nSimilarly, when we undertake to pronounce on the moral worth of our\nspecies. It is, after all, our world, and, so far as we know, our\nonly one; and a side-glance at the requirements of a practical wisdom\nmay suffice to bring the smile which instantly corrects a disposition\nto decry it overmuch. Such a glance may save us alike from the\nsentimentalities of the cultivator of _Weltschmerz_, from the foolish\nbitterness of the misanthrope, and from the sadly unbecoming vanity\nof the \u201cphilosopher\u201d who teaches that the world and the institutions\nof human society exist for the sake of the man of genius. A friend\nof Carlyle tells me that the gloomy sage would sometimes, after\npouring out one of his long and savage tirades against things in\ngeneral, suddenly hold breath, and then let himself be swiftly borne\ndownwards to more familiar levels on the rapid of a huge laugh, almost\nas voluminous, perhaps, as that of Teufelsdr\u00f6ckh, which he has so\nvividly described for us. In this way, one conjectures, there came to\nhim a moment of perfect lucidity, in which he saw the absurdity of\nthe overstrained attitude likely to be produced by undue violence of\nemotion, aided by an irrepressible turn for preaching to one\u2019s fellows;\n{405} a moment when, perhaps, the stubborn realities, which his\nwords had made a show of demolishing, were seen securely standing and\nironically smiling at his impotent rage.\n\nIn the foregoing account of laughter and its uses, we have sharply\nseparated the individual from the social point of view. Fifty years\nago, such a distinction would have required no justification. It\nseems, however, just now to be the fashion to think of the individual\nas merely an anatomical detail, too small to be really distinguished,\nof the \u201csocial organism,\u201d and of his part on the earthly scene as\nconsisting merely in making a small contribution, which at its best is\na negligible quantity, to the efficiency of this organism.\n\nThis is not the place to argue so serious a matter. At the risk of\nappearing unfashionable, one may venture to keep to the old notion that\nin counting human values we must assign a high one to individuality;\nthat, for the sake of the community itself, a proper freedom for\nthe full development of a man\u2019s own mind, tastes, and character, is\nsomething which should be secured even at great cost; and that, were\nthis not so, society\u2019s claims on the individual have well-defined\nlimits, beyond which every man has the right, and owes it to himself\nas a primal duty, to develop himself in the way which his natural\ninclinations enlightened by reflection may suggest to him. To insist\nfurther on this point would almost be to cast a slur on our literature,\nwhich contains some of the masterly pleadings for individual liberty.\n\nThis freedom for individual self-development clearly includes a\nperfect right to form one\u2019s own view of one\u2019s world, and to derive\nas much amusement as one can from a humorous contemplation of it.\nIt could only be something akin to an awe-struck flunkeyism which\nwould make a {406} person hesitate here. To one who has cultivated\nthe requisite observation and taste in the fellowship of one or two\ncongenial friends, the following of the tortuous movements of the\nlaughable in all domains of human industry and of human indolence is\none of the crowning felicities of life: the fun is always old in its\nessence, wherefore we respond so quickly; yet it is always new in its\nembodiments, wherefore we go on relishing it with an unabated keenness.\n\nThe indulgence in this mode of amusing contemplation is, I readily\ngrant, in a sense anti-social, that is to say, opposed to what the\nlaugher\u2019s community at the moment accepts as fitting and as good. When\na tranquil observer of his social world laughs at the pretences, at\nthe futilities, or it may be at the vagaries of its high dignitaries,\nhe may not improbably feel half-terrified at the sound of his laugh;\nso firmly has our early schooling set in us a tendency to regard as\ninsolent upstarts all small things when they challenge big ones:\nwhether a \u201ccheeky\u201d schoolboy standing up to his big senior, or a small\ncountry confronting a big one, or a \u201cpetty\u201d anti-war minority facing\na \u201cpractically unanimous\u201d people. Insolence it may be, yet perhaps to\nthe eye of reason not more contemptible than the genuine \u1f55\u03b2\u03c1\u03b9\u03c2 in which\ngreat things are wont to indulge freely as well within their right. It\nis indisputable, as urged above, that the verdicts of the many, when\nthey appear to fix the permanent demands of social life, or to store\naway some of the precious fruit of experience slowly maturing with\nthe ages, are entitled to respect; and a wise man will not hastily\ndismiss any popular opinion which promises to have persistence. On the\nother hand, it is no less clear that the views of minorities\u2014whether\nsingular or plural in number\u2014are exposed to special risks of their\nown. Yet this, and more, does not affect the contention that popular\nopinion, just because it is {407} popular, is almost completely\nrelieved of that necessity of finding reasons for its assertions which\npresses heavily upon a minority; and, what is more serious, is subject\nto various and potent influences which are just as likely to lead\nto error as to truth. An opinion which may be seen to result from a\nmental process palpably warped by prejudice does not grow valid merely\nby multiplying the number of those who adopt it; for the increase may\neasily be the result, either of the simultaneous working of a like\nprejudice, or of the contagion which propagates psychical states, as\nwell as physical, among perfectly inert members of a crowd.\n\nAt the risk of appearing insolent, then, one must urge that the\nindividual and the society have their reciprocal claims. The most\nextravagant adulator of his community would, perhaps, allow that she\nhas her favourites, and that some of the obscure \u201cJudes\u201d have no\nparticular reason for bearing her affection. The limbs of the body\npolitic which find themselves emaciated by under-feeding, while the\nbelly is bloated with over-feeding, may perhaps be forgiven for not\njoining in the p\u00e6ans on the glories of the social organism. Yet one\nneed not urge this line of remark. Little chance, alas, of our Judes or\nour starvelings betaking themselves to a laughter which even approaches\nthat with which we are now dealing. Those who would enter the gateway\nof this haunt of quiet amusement must leave outside all grudging and\nsense of failure. Happy he who having played the social game and lost\ncan, with a merry shrug of the shoulders, and at least half a laugh,\nbetake himself to such a calm retreat. He will find one into which the\ngarden of Epicurus may be said to open, where he can gather about him,\nat any rate, the congenial friends who are always ready to hold sweet\ndiscourse with him through their books; patient friends whom he cannot\noffend by an {408} unwise interruption, though unhappily they are out\nof reach of the gratitude which he would fain tender them. Here he may\nnow and again glance through the loopholes in the wall and see each new\nday enough of the drolleries of the social scene to deepen his content.\n\nThe evolutionist has accustomed us to the idea of the survival of\nthe socially fit, and the elimination of the socially unfit sort of\nperson. But more forces are at work in the world than our men of\nscience dream of. There is, oddly enough, a force which favours the\nsurvival of the unfit, widely different from that supplied by others\u2019\npreservative benevolence: the impulse to adapt one\u2019s environment to the\npeculiarities of one\u2019s organism by turning the world into a plaything.\nHow many men in one of the highly civilised communities of to-day may\nhave learned to keep their heads above the water by the practice of\na gentle laughter, no one knows or will ever know. It is enough to\nsay that there are such, and that after fully cultivating their gift\nof humour they have found a world worth coming back to, with their\npart in which they will be perfectly contented. Some of these, who\nwould probably be called social failures by the faithful adherent to\nconventional standards, have been known to me, and have been reckoned\namong the most delightful of my companions and most valued of my\nfriends. Society\u2019s neglect of them, or their neglect of society, has\nat least permitted them to develop the gift of a wise and entertaining\ndiscourse.\n\nI am far from suggesting, however, that this gay solitude\u2014_\u00e0 deux_,\nor _\u00e0 peu de gens_\u2014is only for the social failure. Even in our\nmuch-extolled age a philosopher will sometimes be found who is perverse\nenough to hold with Plato that the mass of society are wrongheaded, and\nthat he will best consult his well-being by seeking a wall for shelter\nfrom the {409} hurricane of wind and dust. Such an one may do worse\nthan betake himself to our retreat. And a wise man who, like Montaigne,\nfeels that he has lived \u201cenough for others\u201d and desires to \u201clive out\nthe small remnant of life\u201d for himself may appropriately draw towards\nits entrance, not minding the shouts of \u201cOld fogey!\u201d which come from\nbehind. Nay, more, as already hinted, a man who feels that his place\nis in the world may be advised now and again to enter the retreat, if\nhaply he may find admission as a guest.\n\nIt may, however, be objected that even when a man thus detaches himself\nas spectator from his society he perforce remains at the social point\nof view in this sense, that the critical inspection which brings the\ncoveted laugh involves a reference to an ideal community. The objector\nmight find colour for his statement in the fact that it is Frenchmen,\nthat is to say, members of the most sociable of modern races, who have\nchiefly dwelt on the delights of retirement from the crowd. I am not\ngreatly concerned to dispute with such an objector; it is enough for\nmy purpose to say that the point of view of our supposed contemplator\nis far-removed from that habitually adopted in any community which\none could instance. As such, it stands clearly enough marked off as\nindividualistic. To this it may be added that in that kind of laughter\nat the social spectacle which presupposes philosophic reflection, the\npoint of view is no longer in any sense that of a particular community:\nit has become that of a human being, and so a citizen of that system of\ncommunities which composes the civilised world.\n\nI do not doubt that during this laughing contemplation of the social\nwhole, of which at the moment he is not serious enough to regard\nhimself as a part, the individual will feel society pulling at his\nheels. The detachment {410} from his community, though it fall far\nshort of the abandonment of the recluse, will, as already hinted, be\nfelt to be a revolt. When, glancing back at the crowd wreathing itself\nin a dust-cloud, he laughs with his large laugh free from rancour, he\nmay catch a glimpse of the absurdity of his critical performances.\nHere, again, we meet the final contradiction between ideal conceptions\nand obdurate everyday facts. It is a droll encounter when the foot of\npure intellect, just as it is parting from the solid earth, strikes\nagainst the sturdy frame of philistine common-sense, of \u201cthat which\nsubdues us all,\u201d philosophers included. The individualism of the point\nof view in a laughing contemplation of one\u2019s social world is only\nsurmounted when a large philosophic humour thus draws the laughers self\ninto the amusing scene.\n\nWe may now better define the attitude of the humorist in its relation\nto that of the comedian and of the satirist. The comic spirit, placing\nitself at the social point of view, projects as laughable show an\neccentric individual, or group of individuals. Satire, when it attacks\nthe manners of an age, may be said to project the society, turning it\ninto an object of derision. Humour, as we have seen, sometimes does\nthe like, though in its laughter at the social scene it is neither\npassionately vindictive nor concerned with the practical problem\nof reforming a world. To this may be now added that as a sentiment\nnourished by sympathy it tends, when something of philosophic width of\ncontemplation is reached, to combine the social and the individual mode\nof projection by taking up the self into the spectacle of the whole.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nEnough has been said, perhaps, on the developments of individual\nlaughter. Its point of view seems on inquiry {411} to justify itself\nas a distinct and a legitimate one. With some idea of the ways of this,\nas well as of the larger laughter of societies and groups, we should be\nable to form an estimate of the final significance and utility of the\nlaughing impulse.\n\nLaughter, born of play, has been seen above to possess a social\ncharacter. Throughout the evolution of communities, from the first\nsavage-like tribes upwards, we have observed it taking a considerable\npart in the common life, helping to smooth over difficulties of\nintercourse, to maintain what is valued, and to correct defects. It\nremains to ask under this head, what is its whole value to-day as a\nsocial force, and what indications of the future can be discovered in\nthe tendencies which we note in its later social developments.\n\nThese questions appear to be best approached by a reference to the\nresults of our study of comedy. This, in its higher forms, has shown\nitself to be the clear expression of the attitude of a community,\nwhen it would laugh away something in its members which it sees to be\nunfitting, though it may not regard it as serious enough to call for a\nmore violent mode of ejection. That which is thus lightly dismissed is\nalways something which looks anti-social, whether or not it takes on\nfor moral reflection the aspect of a vice.\n\nA common tendency among writers on comedy is to claim for it the\nvalue of a moral purgative, to attribute to it the power of effecting\ndirectly a process of self-correction in the spectator. Even Congreve\nand Vanbrugh, in their defence of their plays against Jeremy Collier,\npretended that they were reformers of the world.\n\nThis agreeable supposition will not, one fears, bear critical\ninspection. One objection, just touched on, is that comedy {412} does\nnot deal a blow straight at the immoral, as the language of Aristotle\nand of some of his citers appears to suggest. This circumstance seems\nto stand seriously in the way of its effecting a moral purification.\nNor does the holding up to merry contemplation of the tendency of\nmen to stray too far from the customary social type, imply a serious\npurpose of correction behind. Though she may wear a shrewishly\ncorrective expression, the Comic Muse is at heart too gay to insist\non any direct instruction of her audience. A glance at her stern-eyed\nsister, Satire, will convince us of this. On the other side, we meet\nwith another and more fatal objection: the mental pose of the spectator\nat the comic show makes it extremely unlikely that he should at the\nmoment apply the object-lesson so as to discern the laughable side of\nhis own shortcomings. One remembers here that a man is all too slow in\nmaking such a self-application even in the serious surroundings of a\nchurch, where a remark, pointed perhaps with a significant turn of the\nfinger (I speak of ruder times), is recognised by all but himself as\nspecially aimed at him; and if so, how can we expect a spectator at a\ncomedy, in the playful mood which has no room for any serious thought,\nto rub in the moral medicament supplied him?\n\nSuch purification as is possible can, it is plain, be only indirect.\nWhen Lessing writes \u201cthe whole of morality has no more powerful and\neffective _preservative_ than the laughable\u201d he seems to imply this\nindirectness. So far as the provocative lurks in the immoral, we can\nsay that our laughter at the comic exhibition may serve as a useful\nprophylactic. By tracing out, with the guidance of the comic poet,\nthe unsuspected developments and effects of a failing, we may be\nfurthering our moral salvation through the setting up of a new internal\nsafeguard. If the tendencies should {413} later on thrust up their\nugly forms in ourselves, the fact of our having laughed at them may\nmake a considerable difference in the swiftness and energy of the\nmovement of repression. The fear of becoming ridiculous, which grows\nbetter defined and so more serviceable in one who has made acquaintance\nwith comedy, is a valuable side-support of what we call moderation and\nreasonableness in men; and comedy is entitled to her modest meed as one\nof our health-preservers.\n\nYet we may easily go wrong here, doing an offence to our gay\nenchantress by taking her words too seriously. She looks, at any\nrate, as if she wanted much more to please us than to improve us. In\nconsidering her aim one is reminded, through a relation of contrast, of\nwhat Aristotle said about the connection between pleasure and virtue.\nThe good man, he tells us, though aiming at virtue, will be the more\nsatisfied if pleasure comes by the way, giving a kind of unexpected\nfinish to the virtuous achievement. The art of comedy merely reverses\nthe order: she aims directly at pleasure, but is far too good-natured\nand too wise to object to furthering virtue if this comes as a\ncollateral result of her entertainment.[331]\n\nThe comedy, at once wise and gay, of a past age seems to have parted\nfrom us; and one would look in vain to newer developments of the art\nfor any considerable instruction in the lesser social obligations. Nor\nis the corrective function of a large communal laughter likely to be\ncarried on by such new forms of art as our \u201csocial satire,\u201d in so far\nas these can be said to keep at the point of view of the good sense of\na community. The tendency to-day seems to be rather to force a laugh\nfrom us at some bizarre extravagance of manners, which we could never\n{414} think of as a possibility for ourselves; or, on the other hand,\nto bring us near a cynical point of view, at which the current of our\nlaughter becomes shallow and slightly acidulated, a point of view which\nhas little, if any, promise of a moral stiffening of the self against\ninsidious attack.\n\nIn spite of this, laughter, or the potentiality of it, remains a social\nforce. A measure of faith enables one to believe that even a political\nleader is sometimes checked by the fear of laughter\u2014on the other\nside. It is probable that the men of good sense in every community\nare kept right more than they know by the faintly heard echo of the\n\u201cdread laugh\u201d. If there is a danger just now of a conspiracy between\na half-affected over-seriousness on the one side and an ignorant\npretentiousness on the other, in order to banish the full genial laugh\nof other days, we may be allowed to pray fervently for its failure.\n\nWe have seen a tendency to claim too much in the way of serious\nfunction for the laughter of comedy. This desire to emphasise its\npractical utility, which is to be looked for perhaps in a people too\npragmatic to seize the value of light things, is illustrated in a\ncurious and mostly forgotten dispute as to the fitness of ridicule\nto be a test of truth. The debate was opened by Shaftesbury, who\nmaintained its fitness, and was carried on by Warburton, Karnes and\nothers. Much of it reads quaintly na\u00efve to-day. Shaftesbury\u2019s paradox\nalmost sounds like a malicious attempt to caricature the theory of\nProf. W. James, referred to in an earlier chapter of this work. To\nsuggest that we know a piece of folly, say that of Malvolio, to be\nfolly because we laugh at it, is surely to be thrusting on our laughter\na dignity which is quite unmerited, and, one may add, does not become\nit. This point was not held to in the discussion, which, as I have\n{415} shown elsewhere, soon became a contest about the rights and the\nrestraints of laughter.[332]\n\nThere is a like risk of exaggerating the useful function in estimating\nthe service of laughter to the individual. No deep penetration of mind\nis needed for perceiving that a lively sensibility to the touch of the\nludicrous will expose a man to considerable loss. To all of us, so far\nas we have to live in the world and consort with those who, being both\nsolemn and dull, are likely to take offence, if not with those who,\nlike Mr. Meredith\u2019s entertaining ladies, cultivate the fine shades, a\nquick eye for drolleries is likely to bring situations of danger. This\ndrawback must be considered in appraising the total value of laughter\nto a man.\n\nWith respect to its function as aiding the individual in a healthy\nself-correction, enough has been said. It is, in truth, no small\nadvantage to be able to blow away some carking care with a good\nexplosion of mirth. And if the world is much with us, we shall be\nlikely to need laughter now and again as a protection from contact\nwith much that is silly and much that is unwholesome. Yet, in this\ncase, too, the chief value seems to reside in its immediate result, the\ngladdening and refreshing influence on the laugher, which has in it a\nvirtue at once conciliatory and consolatory. This it is which makes\nit so good to step aside now and again from the throng, in which we\ntoo may have to \u201cwink and sweat,\u201d so as to secure the gleeful pastime\nof turning our tiresome world for the nonce into an entertaining\nspectacle; amusing ourselves, not merely as {416} Aristotle\nteaches,[333] in order that we may be serious, but because our chosen\nform of amusement has its own value and excellence.\n\nIt is one thing to assign to laughter a definite ethical or logical\nfunction, another to ask whether it has its place among the\nworthier human qualities. We have seen how some have denounced it,\nindiscriminately as it would seem, as a thing irreverent if not\nunclean. That view does not come further into the present discussion.\nWe have only to ask what kind of dignity it has.\n\nIt is assumed here that we exclude the more malignant and the coarser\nsorts of laughter. A considerable capacity for the pure mirth which the\nchild loves\u2014and comedy may be said to provide for the man who keeps\nsomething of the child in him\u2014supplemented by a turn for the humorous\ncontemplation of things is, I venture to think, not merely compatible\nwith the recognised virtues, but, in itself and in the tendencies which\nit implies, among the human excellences. This is certainly suggested\nby the saying of Carlyle: \u201cNo man who has once heartily and wholly\nlaughed can be altogether irreclaimably bad\u201d.[334] We may not be\nable to rise to the point of view of R. L. Stevenson, when he wrote,\n\u201cAs laborare so joculari est orare;\u201d[335] yet we may be inclined to\nthink that it is impossible to construct the idea of a man who can be\ndescribed as decently complete without endowing him with a measure of\nhumour. Whatever our view of the \u201cGood,\u201d reasonable men of all schools\nappear to allow some value to a capacity for pleasure, especially the\nsocial pleasures, among which laughter, even when it seems to retire\ninto solitude, always keeps a high place. On its intellectual side,\nagain, as the {417} play of mind, the mirthful disposition has an\nintimate relation to such valuable qualities as quickness of insight\nand versatility.[336] In the light entertaining form of witty talk it\ntakes on a social quality of no mean value.\n\nBest of all, laughter of the genial sort carries with it, and helps\nto develop, kindly feeling and the desire to please. It is too often\nforgotten that a mirthful spirit, though it may offend, is a large\nsource of joy to others. He who produces a laugh of pure gladness\nbrightens the world for those who hear him. Fertility in jests may\nqualify a man to become one of the human benefactors; and it has been\nclaimed for Falstaff, with some reason, that he \u201chas done an immense\ndeal to alleviate misery and promote positive happiness\u201d.[337] It is\nthis implied wish to entertain which gives to laughter much of its\nvalue as an educator of the sympathies. Nothing, indeed, seems to\npromote sympathy more than the practice of laughing together. Family\naffection grows in a new way when a reasonable freedom is allowed to\nlaugh at one another\u2019s mishaps and blunders. One reason for this,\nperhaps, is that the consciousness of our having laughed at our friends\nand been laughed at by them, without injury to friendship, gives us\nthe highest sense of the security of our attachments. When a friend\nlaughs \u201cas love does laugh\u201d\u2014to quote Mr. Meredith\u2019s Rosamund\u2014with the\nlaugh which only half-hides a kindly sentiment, say, a wish to help\nyou to laugh away what will vex or harm you, it binds hearts yet more\nsecurely. Even our comparatively solitary laughter at things, when\nno appreciative sharer is at hand, {418} may, if only it has the\ntolerant good-natured tone, connect itself with and bring into play the\nsympathetic side of us.\n\nIf there is in laughter this element of a deeper humanity, we shall do\nwell to view jealously any undue imposition of restraints. The history\nof popular mirth points to the dangers of this.\n\nThat some regulation of the impulse, both external by social pressure\nand internal by a man\u2019s own self-restraint, is required, does not\nneed to be argued. The laughing impulse, when unchecked, has taken\non ugly and deadly forms. If men have endowed their deities with\nmirth they have also endowed their fiends. Society is right in her\nintuitive feeling that an unbridled laughter threatens her order and\nher laws. Specific injuries done by ribald jests, _e.g._, to religious\nconvictions, may have to be dealt with by the magistrate. This all\nmen know, as also that society acts wisely when she seeks to maintain\nthe dignity of social converse by putting down with a gentler hand\nall unworthy and unbecoming laughter, and to observe vigilantly the\n\u201chypergelast\u201d\u2014a species that includes others besides Aristotle\u2019s low\njesters (\u03b2\u03c9\u03bc\u03cc\u03bb\u03bf\u03c7\u03bf\u03b9)\u2014who, if he does not, either maliciously, or through\nsheer heaviness and awkwardness of gait, kick sharply against some\nsensitive place, will at least weary decent men with all the weariness\nof the bore and something more.\n\nYet it is well to bear in mind that such imposition of restraint by\nexternal authority should be also self-restraining. If laughter has\nits uses, not only for him who laughs but for him who is laughed at,\nthese should be borne in mind in determining the amount of restriction\ndesirable. This wise caution is especially needed when the laughter\nwhich authority seeks to repress is likely to be directed against\nitself. It would never do, for example, if the fine world {419} were\nat liberty to put down satires on its vulnerable manners. Divines of\nthe solemnity of Barrow and Warburton might do much harm, if they\ncould succeed in silencing the ridicule of the half-believers and the\nsceptics. Those in authority have a special reason for remembering\nhere the maxim \u201cnoblesse oblige\u201d; and even should they be lacking\nin a wise care for the well-being of the commonwealth, a measure\nof shrewdness will advise them that they will do well to pass a\nself-denying ordinance. Let them not be more afraid of laughter than\ntheir predecessors, but rather welcome it, not merely as a symptom\nof vitality in those who indulge in it, but as a sign of alertness\nin citizens against surprise by stealthy-footed evil. Perhaps when\nthe story of the modern \u201cemancipation of women\u201d comes to be written,\nit will be found that the most helpful feature of the movement was\nthe laughing criticism poured upon it; a criticism which seems not\nunnatural when one remembers how many times before men have laughed\nat something like it; and not so unreasonable to one who perceives\nthe droll aspects of the spectacle of a sex setting about to assert\nitself chiefly by aping the ways of the rival sex. A statesman, having\na large majority behind him, would probably best show his wisdom by\ndiscouraging the laughter of his own side and instructing it how to\nwelcome that of the despised minority. Yet the quaint look of such a\nsuggestion reminds one that the idea of adding wisdom to statesmanship\nis as far from realisation to-day as in the time of the Greek\nphilosophers.\n\nI have spoken of a community\u2019s self-restraint in relation to the\nlaughter of its individual members. Of the duty of controlling its\nown mirth in view of the feelings of other peoples who seem to have a\nright to their slices of the planet there should be no need to speak.\nIt may be enough to hint {420} that a comic journal will do well, when\ntouching on international matters of some delicacy, to exclude from\nits drawings irritating details, such as the figure of a monkey; not\nonly lest the foreigner consider himself to be insulted, but lest one\nof the very gentlemen for whom it writes, stung in some old-fashioned\nimpulse of chivalry, feel tempted to give a too violent expression to\nhis indignation.\n\nOf the control of laughter as a part of the self-government of a wise\nman, little need be said. A keen relish for jokes, especially one\u2019s\nown, may entangle the feet even of a kind-hearted man in a mesh of\ncruel consequences. The witty have been found to be trying to their\nfamilies, so importunate is the appetite of wit in its demand for\nregularity of meals. There are the duplicities of laughter which may\nsometimes impose even on one who is in general a kindly laugher, the\nnote of malice stealing in unnoticed. It is only when the lively\ntendency to mirthful utterance is found in a sympathetic nature, side\nby side with a cultured susceptibility to the pain of giving pain, that\nan adequate self-regulation may be counted on. Each of us, perhaps, has\nknown of one man, at least, deserving to be called a laugher in whose\nmirthful utterances one would look in vain for a trace of malice, and\nwho seemed never to be surprised by the temptation to risk a touch\non sore places. I cannot but recall here one already alluded to\u2014one\nwho seemed to embody the ideal of his teacher Aristotle not only as\nthe just man, who of set purpose acts justly, but as the refined and\ngentlemanly man who regulates his wit, being as it were a law to\nhimself\u2014from behind whose wistful eyes a laugh seemed always ready\nto break. If one knows of no such kindly laugher, one may study the\ncharacteristics of the species in the _Essays of Elia_.\n\nA perfect self-control in the matter of laughter {421} pre-supposes\nmuch more than a dread of inflicting pain upon the hearer, whether he\nbe the object of the laughter or ready to identify himself with that\nobject. It calls for a fine sense of the seemly, of what is fair. It\nis not too much to ask of one whose _r\u00f4le_ is the detection of the\nunseemly in others that he should himself avoid unseemliness. He will\ndo well to remember that nothing is worse than a jibe at the wrong\nmoment:\u2014\n\n    Risu inepto res ineptior nulla est.\n\nWhen serious things are being discussed the attempt to hide poverty\nof argument under what might flatteringly be called an \u201cargumentum ad\nrisum\u201d is one of the actions which belittle men.\n\nThe wariness proper to one who bears so keen-edged a weapon will go\nfarther and prompt him to ask whether the thing which entertains the\neye is meet for laughter. For example, our poor language being what\nit is, the use of a form of words which may be shown by another\u2019s\nelaborate dissection to hide under its plain meaning a second meaning\nderogatory to the speaker, does not, perhaps, make the latter quite\nlegitimate quarry for the former\u2019s ridicule. It needs a fine sense of\njustice to detect the line which divides what is fair from what is\nunfair in such a case.\n\nA perfectly wise direction of laughter will call for other fine\ndiscriminations. A word or action may be quite proper game for laughter\nwhen it smacks of conceit, though but for this it should have been\npassed by. So rampant indeed is conceit among men, so noxious is it,\nand so low a degree of sensitiveness in the moral integument does it\nconnote, that even the discreet laugher may allow himself unstinted\nindulgence in view of one of its unmistakable eruptions. On the other\nhand, a sense of the true values of things will {422} lead the wise\nto abstain from laughter where some manifestation of the beast in man\nobtrudes itself and requires a less gentle mode of expulsion.\n\nNor will a good man\u2019s self-regulation cease when there are no hearers.\nHe will see how the habit of a reckless mirth may have a bad reflex\neffect on his own nature; how, for example, it may rob him in one\nmoment of the perfection of an old reverence for something beautiful;\nhow, instead of sweetening the fountains of affection, it may introduce\na drop of bitterness; how it may smuggle in something of that pride and\nthat contempt which dissociate men.\n\nI have here emphasised the higher moral reasons which will urge the\ngood man to restrain his laughter. One might add certain prudential\nreasons. If, as has been maintained here, laughter is an escape from\nthe normal, serious attitude which living well imposes on us, its wise\ncultivation means that we keep it within limits. Only where there is\na real earnestness and good feeling at bottom, will our laughter be\nin the full sense that of the mind and the heart. To laugh in this\nfull way at a collapse of dignity means that we retain a respect for\nthe true dignities. If the laugh grows too frequent and habitual this\nrespect will be undermined, and, as one result of this moral loss,\nour laughter itself will shrink into something void of meaning and\nmechanical. The perpetual giggler, to whom nothing is sacred, never\nknows the flavour of a good laugh.\n\nThe impulse to laugh will always take its complexion from the moral\nnidus in which it germinates; and the good man, tender, and mindful\nof the dues of reverence, ennobles the mirthful temper. It seems,\nindeed, in such a moral _milieu_ to become an expression, one of the\nmost beautiful, of goodness. It assures us somehow of the genuineness\nof virtue, and brings it nearer to us as {423} something human to be\nloved. Free from all touch of pride and malice, it takes on the look of\na child\u2019s joyousness made large and beneficent by expansive sympathies.\n\nIt is to be maintained, then, not only that a full rich laughter may\nthrive in the soil of a good man\u2019s soul, but that this soul will remain\nincompletely developed without it. This doctrine seems flatly to\ncontradict great authorities, Pascal and the rest. Yet it may be shown\nthat there is really no contradiction here. The laughter which Pascal,\nAddison, and the others denounce, is not the genial and humorous\nkind, but the coarse and brutal sorts, and, what is hardly a jot more\nsufferable, the reckless output of \u201cthe vacant mind\u201d.\n\nLaughter, then, may be claimed to be one of the possessions of men to\nwhich they should jealously cling. It brings gaiety into what is always\ntending to grow a dull world, and of which at times the onlooker is\ndisposed to say what Walpole said of the doings of the fashionable\n\u00e6sthetes at Bath, \u201cthere never was anything so entertaining or so\ndull\u201d. It supplies diversion in youth and still more in age, and it may\nwith a few, as it did with Heine and R L. Stevenson, remain a bright\ncomrade on the sick-bed. It is the manna on which good fellowship\nloves to feed. And, so many-sided is it, it may be recommended as\na planer for moral ridges, and it may add the last touch to the\ncharacter-picture which every man is engaged in painting. It will\ngraciously accompany us when we visit the nursery and try our cumbrous\nhand at the art of entertaining childhood; and will not forsake\nus\u2014if we care for its company\u2014when we betake ourselves to the graver\noccupations.\n\nIf this is true it would seem as if, instead of trying to put it down,\nwe should seek to promote the laughing {424} habit in ourselves and\nin others. Yet here one must be careful. For one thing, the man to\nwhom it counts as a considerable ingredient of happiness can hardly be\nexpected to assist in an effort to render all men of an equal quickness\nin mirthful response. He knows better than any one else that the\nspectacle of folly, of make-believe and of self-inflation, on which his\nlaughter is fed, implies a lack of all the finer laughter of the mind\nin the great majority of his fellows. It would be an act of suicidal\nmadness, then, on his part, to try to transform his social world into a\nbody of laughter-loving men and women. Happily for the \u201cgelast,\u201d such\na transformation is beyond the powers of any conceivable society of\nlaughter-promoters. Humorous men must continue with perfect serenity of\nmind to put up with being a \u201ccontemptible minority\u201d.\n\nNot only in the interests of the lover of laughter is it well that\nhe cannot impose his merry habit on all men alike. The wise man will\nremember that it takes all sorts to make our social world, and that\nthe desirability of the laughing capacity varies greatly with a man\u2019s\ndisposition, habits of mind and circumstances. To those, for example,\nwho are of sensitive feeling and keen perception, especially if called\non to lead an oppressively dull life, or, like Goldsmith, to wrestle\nwith circumstance, a broad and quick appreciation of the laughable\nmay be a real need. Some hearts of many chords, resonant to all the\nnotes of life\u2019s music, might break but for the timely comings of the\nlaughter-fay with her transforming wand. On the other hand, many\nworthy people not only do very well without it, but might be at a\ndisadvantage by possessing the endowment. This seems to be true of many\nexcellent men and women whose {425} special bent is towards a rigorous\nconcentration of thought and moral energy on some mission. Such persons\nappear ever to dwell in the subduing shadow of their cause; they bear\nabout with them a special kind of self-consciousness, a sense of their\nindispensableness to the world. Laughter is not for these, we say\nwith half a sigh. Nor can it, one supposes, find the needed air and\nsunlight in persons who hold imposing rank or office, and have to be\ndaily concerned with maintaining a proper awe in others; or in those\nwho have a deep-placed and imperturbable self-complacency, or those who\nare solemnly preoccupied with the momentous business of raising their\nsocial dignity. Probably nobody, save perhaps a waiter, has to be set\nmore securely above the temptation to laugh than a man qualifying for\nhis first dinner parties.\n\nThe case of these hopelessly confirmed \u201cagelasts\u201d is a very strong\none. Those of us who prize the free circulation of laughter as that\nof a sea-air, and are disposed to object to the closeness of mental\natmosphere which seems to enfold the devoted, shall do well to remember\nhow much the world owes to a lack of humour in its citizens. If\nRousseau had been a great laugher we should certainly never have had\nhis picturesque and instructive attack on civilisation and all that\nflowed from it. Would Dante and Milton and the other builders of the\nvast and sombre architecture of verse have achieved their task if the\nlaughing imp had been pulling vigorously at their coat tails? How many\nof our valuable social institutions would have been built up if the\nbeginners had been keenly alive to the absurd aspects of the bunglings\nwhich are wont to characterise first attempts? Let those who laugh,\ntherefore, be ready, not only from an enlightened self-interest,\nbut from a becoming {426} esteem for alien virtues, to allow the\n\u201cagelasts\u201d their place in the world.\n\nThe foregoing considerations suggest that in any effort to promote\nlaughter we should move cautiously. A man may waste much precious\ntime in trying the experiment on a member of his family. A waggish\nschoolmaster, too\u2014and to the credit of the profession he is to be\nfound\u2014may, if he experiment in this direction, meet with nothing but\ndisappointment. Perhaps some good \u201ctests of humour\u201d would be helpful\nhere; but the daily papers have not yet succeeded in inventing a\nsatisfactory one, and the psychological laboratories have, wisely\nperhaps, avoided the problem. Moreover, the business of testing would\ncomprise some examination of the quality of the \u201chumour\u201d expressed,\nlest the pedagogue should be fostering in a boy a kind of growth which\nhe is much better without. Perhaps, indeed, this testing of quality,\nwere it possible, should be undertaken for more serious purposes: since\nthe saying of Goethe, that the directions taken by a person\u2019s laughter\nare one of the best clues to his character, may be found to apply,\ndifferences being allowed for, to the raw stripling. In undertaking\nany such investigation of youthful mirth, the investigator would need\nto note the quality of the expressive sounds themselves; for one may\nsuspect that in these days of early sophistication a young laugh, as\npure and clear of tone as it is full and unhindered, is a rarity. For\na first attempt at gauging a boy\u2019s humour the schoolmaster might,\nperhaps, do worse than select the following test, suggested by a\nremark of one of my most learned and most respected friends, that the\nsituation referred to is the one which, in his case, excites the most\nhearty merriment: \u201cSupposing you made a call, and having placed your\nhat on a chair inadvertently proceeded to sit on it; how would you\nfeel?\u201d {427}\n\nA more manageable problem for the pedagogue would seem to be to try,\nnow and again, to force back the bolts of discipline and approach the\nboy with a judicious overture of fun. It is refreshing to find that\nthis has recently been recommended by a highly respectable journal\nof the profession which writes: \u201cIt is no inherent dislike to work\nor to the teacher, but the absolute necessity of relieving a dull\nlesson by a bit of fun, that is accountable for many a difficulty\nin discipline\u201d.[338] Next to this, the aim would be to encourage\nboys to bear the discipline of others\u2019 laughter, so that they fall\nnot below the moral level of the estimable savage. This part of the\nschoolmaster\u2019s business is certainly not neglected in our country, and\nperhaps has even been a little overdone.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe gift of humour will save a man from many follies, among others that\nof attempting the office of prophet. This has its proper domain, for\nexample in astronomy, though even in certain ambitious departments of\nphysical science it begins to look like presumption. To bring it into\nthe region of human affairs smacks of a juvenile confidence which has\nnot begun to define its logical boundaries. Hence I shall not risk the\nillustrating of my subject by a forecast of the future of laughter.\n\nIt may be enough to say that, at the fraction of a second of the cosmic\nclock at which we happen to live, certain tendencies are observable\nwhich appear to have some bearing on this question. The most cheerful\nof men would perhaps hardly call the present a mirthful moment. We seem\nto have travelled during a century or more very far from the serene\noptimism which dwelt fondly on the perfectibility {428} of mankind. If\nwe grow enthusiastic about man\u2019s future at all, we let our minds run on\nthe perfectibility of his machines. This fact in itself suggests that\nwe are not likely to find an exceptional exuberance of the mirthful\nspirit. Writers, too, have emphasised the fact that the age, if not\ndull, is certainly not gay. An essayist, not long taken from us, has\nwritten sadly about the decline of the old frank social laughter;[339]\nand another, writing of Falstaff says that, though by laughter man is\ndistinguished from the beasts, the cares and sorrows of life have all\nbut deprived him \u201cof this distinguishing grace, degrading him to a\nbrutal solemnity\u201d.[340]\n\nThat the old merry laughter of the people has lost its full resonance\nhas been remarked above, and it may be possible, while avoiding\nyouthful dogmatism, to conjecture to some extent how this loss has come\nabout.\n\nTo begin, it seems fairly certain that the decline of popular mirth is\nonly a part of a larger change, the gradual disappearance of the spirit\nof play, of a full self-abandonment to the mood of light enjoyment.\nWe may see this not only in the rather forced gaiety supplied by the\ngorgeous \u201cup-to-date\u201d pantomime and other shows. It is illustrated in\nthe change that has come over our out-of-door sports. Where is the fun,\nwhere is the gaiety, in the football and the cricket matches of to-day?\nCould anything be less like an \u201camusement\u201d than a match at Lord\u2019s\u2014save\nwhen for a moment an Australian team, forgetful of its surroundings,\nbounds into the field? Even the clapping of hands by the solemn-looking\nspectators sounds stiff and mechanical.\n\nThis reduction of the full stream of choral laughter of a past age\nto a meagre rillet may readily be supposed to be due altogether to\na growing refinement of manners in all {429} classes. Leaders of\nthe \u201chigh society\u201d tell us, as we have seen, that loud laughter is\nprohibited by its code of proprieties. The middle class, in which\nthe imitation of social superiors grows into a solemn _culte_, has\nnaturally adopted this idea from the upper class: and the classes below\nmay be disposed on public occasions to consider Mother Grundy so far as\nto curb the froward spirit of fun. Still, the decline seems to be much\nmore than any such artificial restraint would account for. The evidence\navailable certainly favours the conclusion that, even when unfettered,\nthe people does not laugh long and loud as it once did.\n\nThis is not the place to attempt an explanation of a change which\nis perhaps too recent to be easily explained. Yet we may hazard the\nsuggestion that it is connected with other recent social tendencies\nwhich seem to be still operative. It is probably one phase of a whole\nalteration of temper in the mass of the people. It looks as if only\nthe more solid material interests now moved the mind, as if sport had\nto have its substantial bait in the shape of stakes, while comedy must\nangle for popularity with scenic splendours which are seen to cost\nmoney. Other forces lying equally deep may not improbably co-operate.\nThe mirth of Merry England was the outgoing of a people welded in\nbrotherhood. The escape from the priest, and later from his Spanish\nchampion, had begotten a common sense of relief and joyous expansion.\nNo such welding pressure has come in these latter days pushing all\nranks into a common service of mirth. The sharp class-antagonisms of\nthe hour, especially that of employer and employed, leave but little\nhope of the revival of such a choral laughter of a whole people.\n\nThis decline of the larger choral laughter, including the reciprocal\nlaughter of social groups, appears to have for one {430} of its\nconsequences a falling off in the part played by mirth as a tempering\nand conciliatory element in authority. Any gain arising from the\nintroduction of a \u201chumouring spirit\u201d into our government of the young\nis, one fears, more than neutralised by the loss which ensues from\nthe banishment of the cajoling laugh from the relations of master\nand workman and mistress and maid. Perhaps, too, in our terribly\nserious purpose of conferring the blessing of an incorporation into a\nworld-wide empire upon reluctant peoples of all degrees of inferiority,\nwe are losing sight of the conciliatory virtue of that spirit of\namicable jocosity, the value of which, as we have seen, was known to\nsome who had to do with savage peoples.\n\nThe seriousness of to-day, which looks as if it had come to pay a\nlong visit, may be found to have its roots in the greater pushfulness\nof men, the fiercer eagerness to move up in the scale of wealth and\ncomfort, together with the temper which this begets, the discontent\u2014\n\n    The weariness, the fever, and the fret\n\nwhich kill the capacity for a whole-hearted abandonment to simple\npleasures.\n\nSo far as this is the case, what laughter survives may be expected to\ntake on the tone of a forced utterance with something of a sigh of\nweariness behind it. It is as though men had no time to laugh. Even\nat a social entertainment you will find men and women who meet your\nplayful challenge only with a niggardly giggle which they instantly\nsuppress: poor distracted souls unable for a moment to free themselves\nfrom the chaos of social claims which haunts them.\n\nA yet more sinister characteristic of this later social laughter,\nreflected more or less clearly even in much of {431} what now passes\nfor comedy, is its cynicism. By this is meant more than the hollowness\nof the laughter of the world-weary: it implies a readiness to laugh at\na new sort of thing, or at least at the old sorts in a new way. Thus,\nwe may hear the unscrupulous member of a profession laughing at some\n\u201camusing\u201d bit of conscientiousness in another member. The laughter has\nits readily distinguishable tones: now the thin wiry note of contempt\nwhich issues from the superior person, now the rough brazen sound\nburred by the bolder lips of the rou\u00e9. Such laughter is in the case\nof an individual, of a class and of a nation alike, the revelation\nof the attitude of a mind which has not yet completed the process of\ndiscarding its old obligations.\n\nThe tendencies here touched on illustrate how closely the moral forces\nencompass our laughter, how directly they determine its key and the\ndepth of its sincerity. They suggest, too, how much more the evil\ninclinations menace the healthy vigour of our mirth than the good, even\nthough these should be cultivated up to the confines of the saintly.\n\nThese signs may well make the friend of laughter sad. There is nothing\nunreasonable in the idea of a death of all the more joyous and\nrefreshing mirth. The utilities\u2014on which, perhaps, I have insisted\ntoo much\u2014give us no pledge of a final survival of the merry impulse.\nHowever considerable its benefit to a society, we have examples of\nhighly efficient communities which seem to do very well without it. And\nthe like is probably true of individual laughter. A few persons may,\nas I have suggested, owe to it their persistence on the human scene;\nyet the evolutional efficacy of this utility is probably very narrowly\ncircumscribed.\n\nIn spite of these sinister indications, an eye patient in search may\ndescry others which point to the persistence of a wholesome laughter.\nEven if comedy and satire seem {432} tired and slumbering, the\nhumorous spirit is awake and productive. We have in the literature of\nmore than one country the promise of a development of new tones of\nquiet, reflective laughter. The growth of a wider appreciation of other\nliteratures than our own is overcoming the obstacles, already touched\non, to an international appreciation of flavours, so far at least as to\nallow of a _rapprochement_ of the larger-minded members of civilised\nnations in a reciprocal enjoyment of their humorous writings.\n\nFor the rest, we may put our trust in the growing volume of what I have\ncalled private laughter. It is not unlikely that in the future, men\nwho think will grow at once more tenacious of their ideals, and more\nalive to the ludicrous consequences which these introduce. If so, they\nwill become still less like gay-hearted children than they now are,\nand will have to brighten the chamber of life, as it loses the blithe\nmorn-given light, with the genial glow of humour. They will be able to\nkeep the flame alive with fuel drawn from the storehouse of literature.\nIn this work of conserving human laughter they will do well, while\ndeveloping the thoughtfulness of the humorist, to keep in touch with\nthe healthiest types of social laughter, the simple mirth of the people\npreserved in the _contes_ and the rest, and the enduring comedies. If a\nfew men will cultivate their own laughter in this way and do their best\nto make their private amusement that of an inner circle of friends,\nwe may hope that it will not die\u2014though the death of what we love\nwere less terrible to face than its debasement\u2014but be preserved by a\nfew faithful hands for a happier age. They will have their reward in\nadvance, since pure and honest laughter, like mercy, blesses him that\ngives, and him that takes.\n\n\n\n\nNOTES\n\n[1] Article on \u201cHumour\u201d in the _Cornhill Magazine_, vol. xxxiii., pp.\n318\u201326.\n\n[2] See B. Bosanquet, _History of \u00c6sthetics_, p. 360, where we are told\nthat serious modern comedy, such as Moli\u00e8re\u2019s _L\u2019Avare_, is, according\nto Hegel, wanting in this characteristic.\n\n[3] _Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_, Band II., Erstes Buch, Kap.\nviii.\n\n[4] _Le Rire_, published by F\u00e9lix Alcan, 1900.\n\n[5] See an article \u201cPourquoi rit-on?\u201d by Camille M\u00e9linaud, in the\n_Revue des deux Mondes_, 1895 (Tom. 127, p. 612 ff.). The theory of\nM. M\u00e9linaud seems to resemble closely that of Jean Paul Richter and\nothers, which Lotze criticises, _Geschichte der \u00c6sthetik_, p. 346.\n\n[6] M. Bergson furnishes some striking illustrations of the forcing of\na theory on reluctant facts in his treatment of the laughable aspect of\nthe red nose and the black skin, _op. cit._, p. 41 ff.\n\n[7] The references here are to one of a series of articles entitled\n\u201cPsychologie der Komik\u201d in the _Phil. Monatshefte_, Bd. XXIV. See p.\n399 ff. The articles have been elaborated in a volume, _Komik und\nHumor_. The point here dealt with is touched on in this volume in Kap.\niv., s. 558.\n\n[8] The point that when we judge two successive impressions to be\ndifferent we do not necessarily represent both simultaneously, has been\nrecently emphasised by G. F. Stout and T. Loveday, who quote the views\nof Wundt and Schumann. See _Mind_, N.S., ix. (1900), pp. 1\u20137, and p.\n386.\n\n[9] Dr. Lipps seems half to perceive this mode of interaction among\nparts of a complex presentation when he says that the cylinder appears\nto renounce its dignity (W\u00fcrde) as man\u2019s head-covering when it stoops\nto adorn the head of a child (_loc. cit._).\n\n[10] _Geschichte der \u00c6sthetik in Deutschland_, p. 343.\n\n[11] _Versuch einer Theorie des Komischen_ (1817), s. 23.\n\n[12] See Darwin, _Expression of the Emotions_, p. 199.\n\n[13] See among other authorities, Raulin, _Le Rire_, p. 28.\n\n[14] See art. \u201cThe Psychology of Tickling, Laughing and the Comic,\u201d by\nG. Stanley Hall and A. Allin, _American Journal of Psychology_, vol.\nix., p. 1 ff.\n\n[15] _Purgatorio_, Canto xi., lines 82\u20133; _cf._ Canto i., line 20,\nwhere the fair planet (Venus) is said to have made the whole East\nlaugh\u2014a figure copied by Chaucer, _The Knightes Tale_, line 636.\nAddison touches on this poetical use of \u201claughter,\u201d _Spectator_, No.\n249.\n\n[16] Gratiolet, _De la Physionomie_, p. 116. Benedick instances as\ninterjections of laughing \u201cha! ha! he\u201d! _Much Ado About Nothing_, IV.,\ni.\n\n[17] See an article on \u201cOrganic Processes and Consciousness,\u201d by J. R.\nAngell and H. B. Thompson, in the _Psychological Review_, vol. vi., p.\n55. According to these researches, a hearty laugh, causing sudden and\nviolent changes in the breathing curve, is accompanied by the sharpest\nand most marked vaso-dilation, as tested by capillary pulse drawing;\nthough in one case the opposite effect of constriction was produced.\n\n[18] _Anatomy of Melancholy_, Pt. 2, sec. 2, mem. vi. subsec. 4 (\u201cmirth\nand merry company\u201d).\n\n[19] Laughter is pronounced a \u201cgood exercise\u201d by Dr. Leonard Hill in\nhis useful work, _Manual of Human Physiology_ (1899), p. 236. The\nphysiological benefits are more fully treated of by Dr. Harry Campbell\nin his publication, _Respiratory Exercises in the Treatment of Disease_\n(1898), p. 125.\n\n[20] \u201c_Positions_,\u201d ed. by Quick, pp. 64, 65.\n\n[21] Angell and Thompson in the article quoted above suppose that the\nwhole dilation of the capillaries during laughter is a secondary effect\nof sudden changes in the breathing. This seems a reasonable conclusion.\nYet since, according to these writers, smiling as well as mild laughter\ncauses gentle changes of the same kind, it seems possible that we have\nhere, in a disguised form, the working of the general law stated by\nthese writers: that agreeable experiences are accompanied by dilation\nof the peripheral blood-vessels.\n\n[22] See _The Expression of the Emotions_, chap, vi., p. 163. It is\ncurious to note that Mulcaster and the recent physiologists referred\nto above claim a beneficial influence for \u201ca good cry\u201d as well as for\nlaughter. But they do not seem explicitly to put them on the same level\nas occasional exercises.\n\n[23] Maria\u2019s words in _Twelfth Night_, \u201cIf you desire the spleen,\u201d\nseem to point to some supposed organic disturbance due to immoderate\nlaughter.\n\n[24] _Op. cit._, pp. 207 and 213.\n\n[25] Prof. James seems to admit this in his smaller work, _Psychology_,\np. 384.\n\n[26] On the Contagion of Laughter, see Raulin, _Le Rire_, p. 98 ff.\n\n[27] It has been pointed out by an ingenious French writer, L.\nDugas\u2014whose work, _Psychologie du rire_, has appeared while my volume\nis passing through the press\u2014that even a wild, uncontrollable laughter,\n\u201cle fou rire,\u201d in spite of its elements of suffering, remains to a\nlarge extent a pleasurable experience (_see_ pp. 25, 26).\n\n[28] The French language is particularly rich in its vocabulary under\nthis head, including expressions like \u201crire du bout des dents\u201d and \u201cdu\nbout des l\u00e8vres\u201d (_cf._ Homer\u2019s expression, \u1f10\u03b3\u03ad\u03bb\u03b1\u03c3\u03c3\u03b5\u03bd \u03c7\u03b5\u03af\u03bb\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd), \u201crire\ndans sa barbe,\u201d and others like \u201crire jaune\u201d.\n\n[29] _Sartor Resartus_, Bk. I., chap. iv.\n\n[30] Article on \u201cTicklishness\u201d in the _Dictionary of Psychological\nMedicine_. He adds that ticklishness is not locally coincident with\nsensitiveness to pain. On the other hand, Dr. Charles Richet remarks\nthat the parts most sensitive to tickling are the parts richest in\ntactile nerves. Article \u201cChatouillement,\u201d _Dictionnaire de Physiologie_.\n\n[31] See Wundt, _Physiolog. Psychologie_ (4te Auflage), Bd. i., pp.\n434\u20135. According to this authority the propagation of the stimulation\nmay be either direct from one sensory fibre to another, or indirect,\ninvolving muscular contractions and muscular sensations.\n\n[32] See K\u00fclpe, _Outlines of Psychology_, p. 148.\n\n[33] See the article on \u201cThe Psychology of Tickling, Laughing, and\nthe Comic,\u201d by G. S. Hall and A. Allin, in the _American Journal of\nPsychology_, vol. ix., p. 1 ff. These returns do not make it quite\nclear whether \u201cticklishness\u201d is taken to mean the non-laughing as well\nas the laughing varieties.\n\n[34] My references to Dr. Robinson\u2019s views are partly to the article\nin the _Dictionary_ already quoted, and partly to notes of lectures\ngiven before the British Association and the West Kent Medical Society,\nwhich he has been so kind as to show me. I have made much use of his\ninteresting and often brilliant suggestions in dealing with the subject\nof ticklishness.\n\n[35] Both of these are included by Dr. Richet among the most sensitive\nparts (_loc. cit._).\n\n[36] How far the results are complicated by the action of the muscles\nwhich serve to erect the separate hairs on the body, and are said by\nLister to contract near a tickled surface, I am not sure.\n\n[37] _E.g._, K\u00fclpe, _op. cit._, 147.\n\n[38] _Expression of the Emotions_, p. 201.\n\n[39] In using the expression \u201cticklish period,\u201d I do not imply that\nticklishness necessarily disappears after a certain period of maximal\nintensity. Like play, it probably persists in a certain number of\npersons as a susceptibility to which the laws of propriety leave but\nlittle scope for exercise.\n\n[40] _Op. cit._, pp. 201, 202. The restriction I have added enables us\nto include the case of the sole of the foot.\n\n[41] _Loc. cit._ Dr. L. Hill confirms the observation and offers the\nsame explanation.\n\n[42] In this connection an observation sent me by Dr. L. Hill is\nsignificant. His little girl first responded with laughter to tickling\nunder the armpits at the same age (two and a half years) as she first\nshowed fear by crying on being put into the arms of a stranger.\n\n[43] G. Heymans, _Zeitschrift f\u00fcr die Psychol. und die Physiol. der\nSinne_, Bd. xi., ss. 31 ff.\n\n[44] Heymans, _loc. cit._\n\n[45] The abnormal forms of automatic laughter, including the effects of\nstimulants, are dealt with by Raulin, _op. cit._, 2^{\u00e8me} partie, chap.\niv., and 3^{\u00e8me} partie.\n\n[46] Given in the returns to Stanley Hall\u2019s inquiries. This explosion\nof laughter on receiving sad news occurs in cases of cerebral disorder.\nSee Dugas, _op. cit._, p. 16.\n\n[47] Quoted by Dugas, _op. cit._, p. 12.\n\n[48] Shakespeare makes Lady Macbeth perpetrate a pun in a moment of\nintense excitement when Macbeth\u2019s hesitation goads her into a resolve\nto carry out the murder herself:\u2014\n\n    \u201cI\u2019ll gild the faces of the grooms withal\n     For it must seem their guilt\u201d.\n\nDid he mean to illustrate by this the way in which emotional strain\ntends to lapse for a brief moment into laughter?\n\n[49] _Op. cit._, pp. 163, 208.\n\n[50] See _Les Passions de l\u2019\u00e1me_, 2^{\u00e8me} partie, art. 25.\n\n[51] Co-operative teasing, when it methodically \u201cnags\u201d a boy because he\nhappens, for example, to take the unfashionable side in some political\ndispute, making his school-life a torment, had\u2014with all deference to\napologetic headmasters, be it said\u2014better change its name.\n\n[52] Given by Stanley Hall in the article, \u201cThe Psychology of\nTickling,\u201d etc., already quoted.\n\n[53] Valuable beginnings may be found here and there; for example, in\nthe entertaining volume of a French comedian, _Le Rire_, par (B. C.)\nCoquelin, cadet.\n\n[54] _Iliad_, ii., 212 ff.\n\n[55] _Loc. cit._\n\n[56] There is, of course, often a reciprocal effect in these cases, the\nnon-compliant intruder serving to show up the absurd monotony of the\nrow.\n\n[57] See an article, \u201cThe Analytical Humorist,\u201d by H. D. Traill,\n_Fortnightly Review_ (N.S.), vol. lx., p. 141.\n\n[58] Mr. Kipling suggests that the want of a proper nose in a family is\nregarded as a disgrace among the Hindoos (_Kim_, p. 81).\n\n[59] It may be well to add, by way of caution, that the feeble\nsemblance of laughter which a modern theatre-goer is apt to produce\nwhen he sees something _risqu\u00e9_ is not a simple form of laughter at the\nindecent. It is the outcome of a highly artificial attitude of mind, in\nwhich there is an oscillation of feeling between the readiness of the\nnatural man to indulge and the fear of the civilised man that he may be\ncarried too far.\n\n[60] _Op. cit._, p. 45.\n\n[61] Compare above, pp. 13 ff.\n\n[62] As our mode of classification shows, we may regard these as\nprimarily instances of laughable degradation. Nevertheless, some\napprehension of contradiction is clearly involved.\n\n[63] From a speech delivered by Sir John Parnell in the Irish House of\nCommons, 1795. See W. R. Le Fanu, _Seventy Years of Irish Life_, ch.\nxvi. (\u201cIrish Bulls\u201d).\n\n[64] See Bergson, _op. cit._, p. 45.\n\n[65] _Poetics_, v. i. (Butcher\u2019s translation).\n\n[66] A further and most important enlargement of Hobbes\u2019 principle is\nmade by Bain when he urges that the spectacle of degradation works\nupon us, not merely by way of the emotion of power or glory, but by\nway of the feeling of release from constraint. This point will more\nconveniently be dealt with later.\n\n[67] Compare above, p. 100.\n\n[68] Kant\u2019s contribution to the theory of the ludicrous is contained in\na single \u201cRemark\u201d appended to a discussion of the Fine Arts and Taste.\nSee Dr. Bernard\u2019s translation of his _Kritik of Judgment_, pp. 221\u20134.\n\n[69] Article \u201cOn the Philosophy of Laughing,\u201d by the Editor, _The\nMonist_, 1898, p. 255.\n\n[70] I find after completing this paragraph that the point dealt\nwith, namely, that surprise, in the sense of the effect of mental\nunpreparedness, is not an invariable antecedent of our response to\nthe laughable, has been urged by a French writer, M. Courdaveaux. His\ncritic, M. Dugas, does not seem to me to have effectually combated it.\n(See Dugas, _op. cit._, p. 63 ff.)\n\n[71] See above, p. 6.\n\n[72] Compare what was said above _\u00e0 propos_ of the child and the hat,\np. 14.\n\n[73] _Cf._ above, p. 114; also the article in _The Monist_ already\nquoted.\n\n[74] _English Comic Writers_, lect. i., \u201cWit and Humour\u201d.\n\n[75] \u201cThe Physiology of Laughter,\u201d _Essays_, i., p. 206.\n\n[76] According to Fouill\u00e9e, contrast is the formal element, faultiness\n(\u201cle d\u00e9faut\u201d), the material. See Dugas, _op. cit._, p. 85 ff.\n\n[77] Hazlitt defines the ridiculous as the highest degree of the\nlaughable, which is \u201c_a proper subject for satire_,\u201d _loc. cit._\n\n[78] Compare Ribot, _La Psychologie des sentiments_, p. 344.\n\n[79] M. Bergson has a glimpse of the co-operation of \u201cchild\u2019s fun\u201d in\nour laughter, _op. cit._, p. 69; but he fails to see the magnitude of\nthis factor.\n\n[80] See _The Emotions and the Will_, \u201cThe Emotions,\u201d chap. xiv., \u00a7\u00a7\n38\u201340.\n\n[81] _Cf._ Dugas, _op. cit._, p. 128 ff.\n\n[82] _Wit and Humour_, p. 7.\n\n[83] See p. 76, ff.\n\n[84] Prof. Groos does not, I think, bring out clearly enough the\ndistinction here drawn, though he may be said to half-recognise it when\nhe speaks of \u201cjoy in conquest\u201d as the end of play combats (_Play of\nAnimals_, pp. 291, 292).\n\n[85] This restriction sometimes takes on a look of a conative process\nof self-control, _e.g._, when an older cat, not used to play, is\nimportunately challenged by a lively kitten.\n\n[86] On this \u201cdivided consciousness\u201d in play see Groos, _Play of\nAnimals_, p. 303 ff.\n\n[87] On the uses of animal play see Groos, _The Play of Man_, Part\nIII., sect. 2, and Lloyd Morgan, _Animal Behaviour_, chap, vi., sect. 2.\n\n[88] Among previous writers on the subject M. Dugas seems to be the\none who has had the clearest apprehension of the essentially playful\ncharacter of laughter (_op. cit._, chap. vi., especially p. 115 _seq._).\n\n[89] Karl Groos connects both the tusslings and the tearings of young\nanimals with the instinct of sex-competition (_Play of Animals_, p. 35\nff.).\n\n[90] _The Psychological Review_, 1899, p. 91.\n\n[91] _Descent of Man_, Part I., chap. iii.\n\n[92] _Animal Life and Intelligence_, p. 407. The author strikes me as\nalmost excessively cautious in accepting these evidences of canine\njocosity.\n\n[93] W. Preyer, _Die Seele des Kindes_, p. 197.\n\n[94] Quoted by Lloyd Morgan, _loc. cit._\n\n[95] _Expression of Emotions_, p. 208; _cf._ p. 132 ff.\n\n[96] See Darwin, _The Descent of Man_, Part I., chap. iii.\n\n[97] So in _The Expression of the Emotions_, pp. 211, 212. In the notes\ncontributed to _Mind_, vol. ii. (1877), p. 288, two infants are spoken\nof, one of which smiled when forty-five, the other when forty-six days\nold.\n\n[98] The references are to his work, _Die Seele des Kindes_, 4te\nAuflage.\n\n[99] Champneys and Sigismund are quoted by Preyer. Miss Shinn\u2019s\nobservations are given in her work, _Notes on the Development of a\nChild_, p. 238. Mrs. Moore\u2019s are to be found in her Essay, _The Mental\nDevelopment of a Child_, p. 37. Dr. L. Hill writes that he noted the\nfirst smile in his boy when he was three weeks old, and in his girl\nwhen she was some days older.\n\n[100] See especially what he says about an unusual expression,\nincluding \u201ca strongly sparkling eye\u201d which occurred in the eighth week,\n_op. cit._, p. 194.\n\n[101] I am indebted to Miss Shinn for a sight of her complete original\nnotes; and some of my references are to these.\n\n[102] It is regrettable that Preyer does not describe with some\nprecision the sounds produced by his boy on the twenty-third day.\n\n[103] Miss Shinn insists that the laugh did not develop out of the\nchuckle, since apparently it appeared, as many articulate sounds\nappear, with something of a sudden completeness. But this is just what\nwe should expect if the laugh is an inherited movement.\n\n[104] _Op. cit._, p. 197.\n\n[105] Preyer puts this at the end of the first half-year, which seems\nto me to be late.\n\n[106] _Op. cit._, p. 96.\n\n[107] On the point of the priority of the smile in the process of\nevolution see Th. Ribot, _La Psychologie des Sentiments_, p. 346.\n\n[108] Darwin, _Expression of the Emotions_, p. 133.\n\n[109] A. Lehmann, in his interesting account of the development of\nthe emotions and their expression in the individual, suggests that\nthe first imperfect smile of the infant, which expresses the pleasure\nof sweetness, is genetically related to the movements of sucking\n(_Hauptgesetze des menschl. Gef\u00fchlslebens_, ss. 295, 296).\n\n[110] Darwin, _Expression of the Emotions_, pp. 134, 135.\n\n[111] As pointed out above, the French _e_ sound seems to be the common\none in children\u2019s laughter. Preyer tells us that the corresponding\nsound in German (_\u00e4_) occurs in the first infantile babble\n(_Development of Intellect_, p. 239).\n\n[112] _Expression of the Emotions_, pp. 132\u20133.\n\n[113] See the article already quoted on \u201cThe Psychology of Tickling,\nLaughing,\u201d etc., p. 33.\n\n[114] See the article already quoted.\n\n[115] Dr. Robinson considers that another agreeable effect of tickling\nmay be an inherited echo of the caresses of man\u2019s progenitors.\n\n[116] Stanley Hall also suggests that the most ticklish parts, which,\naccording to his inquiries, are _the sole of the foot_, the throat,\netc., are the \u201cmost vulnerable\u201d. But he does not explain what he means\nby vulnerable here, and certainly does not appear to use the word in\nthe sense given it by Dr. L. Robinson.\n\n[117] Groos deals with the teasing of animals under the head of\n\u201cFighting Plays\u201d (_Play of Animals_, p. 136 ff.).\n\n[118] H. M. Stanley, _Psychological Review_, 1899, p. 87.\n\n[119] This idea, that when we laugh at ludicrous things the process is\nfundamentally analogous to that of being tickled, has been made the\nbasis of a curious and suggestive physiological theory of laughter,\ndeveloped by a German writer. See Ewald Hecker, _Die Physiologie und\nPsychologie des Lachens und des Komischen_.\n\n[120] _Loc. cit._, p. 39.\n\n[121] I am indebted for this fact to Dr. L. Hill. I believe a like\nremark applies to all the laughter of play.\n\n[122] The nature of the process of emotional development is more fully\ntreated, and the relation of its effect to that of the dulling action\nof repetition is indicated, in my work, _The Human Mind_, vol. ii., p.\n75 ff.\n\n[123] Of course, increase of volume might arise through a widening of\nthe sensational factor in the experience, due to the larger diffusion\nof somatic stimulation, which, as already remarked, is an element in\nthe expansion of laughter.\n\n[124] This expression is commonly used only where an expression is\npassed on to a palpably dissimilar feeling. But an essentially similar\nprocess takes place, according to my view, within the limits of\ndevelopment of what we call the same emotion.\n\n[125] The application of the principle of arrest to the changes in\nemotional states has been made with great success by Th. Ribot in his\nvolume, _Psychologie des Sentiments_, p. 260 ff.\n\n[126] Miss Shinn\u2019s observations are recorded in Parts III. and IV. of\nher _Notes_.\n\n[127] For a pretty reminiscent description of a first experience of\nrunning and jumping, see Pierre Loti, _Roman d\u2019un Enfant_, ii., p. 4 ff.\n\n[128] The nearest approach I have met with to a suggestion of a wish to\ninflict pain in this early practical joking is the following: The child\nM. when two years old stood on her mother\u2019s foot saying, \u201cOh, my poor\ntoe!\u201d But it seems reasonable to say that in such moments of frolic\npain is quite unrepresentable.\n\n[129] _Op. cit._, p. 196. I have heard of it occurring in a girl at the\nage of three and a half. The point should certainly be determined by\nmore precise observations.\n\n[130] Preyer first observed roguish laughter at the end of the\nsecond year (_op. cit._, p. 196). He does not define the expression\n\u201cschelmisches Lachen\u201d.\n\n[131] Compare above, p. 83.\n\n[132] See Mrs. Hogan\u2019s _Study of a Child_, p. 18.\n\n[133] _Cf._ what was said in chap. v., p. 142, apropos of Leigh Hunt\u2019s\ntheory.\n\n[134] Ruth\u2019s laughter at the mother\u2019s face was certainly very early.\n\n[135] Hogan, _op. cit._, p. 71.\n\n[136] See my _Studies of Childhood_, pp. 274\u20135.\n\n[137] Most of the observations here quoted, on the laughter of the\nboy C., have appeared before in a chapter of my volume, _Studies of\nChildhood_. The reader who is familiar with this chapter will, I feel\nsure, pardon the repetition.\n\n[138] Rev. Duff Macdonald, _Africana_ (1882), i., pp. 266\u20137.\n\n[139] It is true that this astounding proposition is answered somewhat\nironically by Rev. Dr. Folliott, who says, \u201cGive him modern Athens,\nthe learned friend (Brougham) and the sham intellect Society\u2014they will\ndevelop his muscles\u201d. Yet it seems odd that this confident assertor was\nnot taken to task for his amazing ignorance.\n\n[140] The dispute may be followed by the curious by turning up the\nfollowing: _Indian Antiquary_, vol. viii., p. 316; cf. E. Deschamps,\n_Pays des Veddas_, pp. 378\u20139; _The Taprobanian_, vol. i., p. 192\nff. The German visitor, Sarasin, upholds the writer in the latter\nperiodical, and says that the Veddas \u201clachen gerne,\u201d though some of\nthem are bad tempered, and laugh but little. _Naturforschungen auf\nCeylon_, pp. 378 and 540.\n\n[141] Carl von den Steinen, _Unter den Naturv\u00f6lkern\nZentral-Brasiliens_, p. 61.\n\n[142] This applies, of course, to the detection of the whole of the\nsocial qualities which make up good-nature. F. Nansen attacks the\nmissionary Egede for his misrepresentation of the Greenlanders in\ncalling them cold-blooded creatures. See _Eskimo Life_, pp. 100, 101.\n\n[143] _Expression of the Emotions_, p. 209.\n\n[144] _Central Australia_ (1833), ii., p. 138.\n\n[145] _Among Cannibals_ (1889), p. 291.\n\n[146] Angas, _Australia and New Zealand_ (1847), ii., p. 11.\n\n[147] Bonwick, _The Daily Life of the Tasmanians_ (1870), p. 174.\n\n[148] Ellis, _Polynesian Researches_ (1832), i., p. 96.\n\n[149] Turnbull, _A Voyage Round the World_ (1813), p. 372.\n\n[150] Erskine, _The Western Pacific_ (1853), p. 159.\n\n[151] _Natives of Sarawak and Brit. N. Borneo_, i., p. 84.\n\n[152] Rev. Jos. Shooter, _The Kafirs of Natal_ (1857), p. 232.\n\n[153] Cruickshank, _The Gold Coast of Africa_ (1853), ii., p. 253.\n\n[154] Hind, _Canadian Red River Exploring Expedition_ (1860), ii., p.\n135. Other examples of the mirthfulness of savages are given by Herbert\nSpencer, _Descriptive Sociology_, Div. I., Pt. 2\u2014A.\n\n[155] Cruickshank, _Gold Coast of Africa_, _loc. cit._\n\n[156] Musters, _At Home with the Patagonians_ (1873), p. 167.\n\n[157] _Saugethiere von Paraguay_ (1830), s. 10.\n\n[158] _Aborigines of Tasmania_ (2nd ed.), p. 38.\n\n[159] Johnston, _British Central Africa_ (1897), p. 403.\n\n[160] E. H. Man, \u201cAboriginal Inhabitants of the Andaman Islands,\u201d\n_Journal of Anthropol. Institute_, vol. xii., p. 88.\n\n[161] See Raulin, _op. cit._, p. 94 ff.\n\n[162] Angas, _loc. cit._\n\n[163] Ling Roth, _Natives of Sarawak_, etc., i., p. 81.\n\n[164] Burton, _Lake Regions of Central Africa_, ii., p. 331.\n\n[165] Waitz, _Naturv\u00f6lker_, 6ter Theil, s. 102.\n\n[166] Mrs. Edgeworth David, _Funafuti_, p. 230.\n\n[167] Shooter, _The Kafirs of Natal_ (1857), p. 232.\n\n[168] Ling Roth, _Aborigines of Tasmania_ (2nd ed.), p. 29.\n\n[169] Wood, _Natural History of Man_, i., p. 261.\n\n[170] From an article, \u201cWest African Women,\u201d contributed to the _Daily\nTelegraph_.\n\n[171] This is stated by Prof. Bain in his _English Composition and\nRhetoric_, p. 237. I have been unable to verify the statement; but Mr.\nLing Roth assures me that the statement is probably correct; and says\nthat he remembers having read recently an account of the amusement\nof Chinese bystanders on such an occasion, one man putting out a\nboat\u2014merely to save a hat!\n\n[172] Sarasin, _Forschungen auf Ceylon_, s. 537.\n\n[173] Sproat, _Scenes and Studies of Savage Life_ (1868), p. 51.\n\n[174] Wood, _op. cit._, i., p. 261, and Shooter, _op. cit._, p. 233.\n\n[175] Turnbull, _op. cit._, p. 372.\n\n[176] Wright, _History of Caricature and Grotesque_, p. 2.\n\n[177] Cruickshank, _loc. cit._\n\n[178] Ellis, _op. cit._, i., p. 97.\n\n[179] How easily one may overcharge this indictment of coarse\nimmorality is illustrated by what Von den Steinen says of the laughter\nof the Brazil Indian women when he asked them the names of the several\nbodily parts. Some would have taken this to be the low joking of\nbrazen-faced women. He distinctly tells us that it was \u201cjust simple\ninnocent laughter,\u201d _op. cit._, p. 65.\n\n[180] Ling Roth, _op. cit._, i., p. 72.\n\n[181] Barrow, _Hudson\u2019s Bay_, p. 32.\n\n[182] Lichtenstein, _Travels in Southern Africa_, ii., p. 312.\n\n[183] Compare above, pp. 72, 73.\n\n[184] Ellis, _op. cit._, i., p. 97.\n\n[185] Wood, _op. cit._, ii., p. 522.\n\n[186] Lichtenstein, _op. cit._, ii., p. 308.\n\n[187] Burchell, _Travels in Southern Africa_ (1822), vol. ii., p. 339.\n\n[188] Ling Roth, _op. cit._ (2nd ed.), p. 134.\n\n[189] Marsden, _History of Sumatra_, p. 230.\n\n[190] Ling Roth, _op. cit._ (2nd ed.), p. 36.\n\n[191] Sproat, _Savage Life_, p. 266.\n\n[192] Quoted by Ling Roth, _Sarawak and British North Borneo_, i., p.\n93.\n\n[193] Compare above, p. 104.\n\n[194] Hind, _Canadian Red River Expedition_, ii., p. 135.\n\n[195] See Ling Roth, _Sarawak and British North Borneo_, i., p. 75.\n\n[196] Spencer and Gillen, _The Native Tribes of Central Australia_, pp.\n136, 137.\n\n[197] Quoted from Gideon Lang by Bonwick, _Daily Life of the\nTasmanians,_ p. 174.\n\n[198] Nansen asserts this with respect to the attitude of the Eskimos\ntowards the Danes who settled in Greenland in 1728. See _Eskimo Life_,\npp. 106\u20137.\n\n[199] Brough Smyth, _Aborigines of Victoria_ (1878), ii., p. 278.\n\n[200] Sarasin, _op. cit._, iii., p. 540.\n\n[201] Burton, _Wit and Wisdom of West Africa_, p. 52.\n\n[202] Ling Roth, _Sarawak and British North Borneo_, i., p. 83.\n\n[203] Ling Roth, _op. cit._, i., pp. 83\u20134.\n\n[204] Sproat, _op. cit._, p. 51.\n\n[205] Quoted by Darwin, _Expression of the Emotions_, p. 209.\n\n[206] Von den Steinen, _op. cit._, p. 71.\n\n[207] Turnbull, _op. cit._, p. 88.\n\n[208] _Op. cit._, p. 372.\n\n[209] Brough Smyth, _op. cit._, i., p. 29.\n\n[210] _North American Ethnology_ (J. W. Powell), vol. iii., p. 410.\n\n[211] _Op. cit._, pp. 239, 291.\n\n[212] Ling Roth, _Tasmania_ (2nd ed.), p. 38.\n\n[213] Marsden, _op. cit._, p. 230.\n\n[214] Quoted by Waitz, _Naturv\u00f6lker_, 6ter Theil, p. 102.\n\n[215] Ling Roth, _Sarawak and British North Borneo_, i., p. 84.\n\n[216] Hans Egede, _Nat. Hist. of Greenland_, pp. 156\u20137.\n\n[217] F. Nansen, _Eskimo Life_, p. 187; _cf._ Egede, _loc. cit._\n\n[218] Quoted from Jackson\u2019s Narrative (1840) by Erskine, _Western\nPacific_, p. 468.\n\n[219] Bonwick, _op. cit._, p. 29.\n\n[220] Grey, _Two Expeditions in Australia_ (1841), ii., pp. 307\u20138.\n\n[221] J. Chandler Harris, _Uncle Remus and his Friends_.\n\n[222] R. E. Dennett, _Folklore of the Fjort_, pp. 92\u20133.\n\n[223] Mr. Ling Roth has pointed out to me that the laughter of the\nAustralian at the absurdity of the idea of a dead man going about\nwithout legs, etc., occurs in a race usually placed among the lowest in\nthe scale. Yet this apparent exception does not, I think, affect the\nvalidity of the generalisation in the text. The intellect displayed in\nthis ridicule is not of a high order; and, further, we are distinctly\ntold that the scoffer in the case was an \u201cintelligent\u201d native, that is\nto say, one of more than the average intelligence of his tribe.\n\n[224] Mr. Ling Roth writes me that he agrees with Miss Kingsley as\nto the difference between the laughter of savages and of children. I\nshould be quite ready to accept this view so far as it concerns the\nspecial forms and directions of the mirth. The differences of capacity,\nexperience and habit involved in the difference between the child\nand adult will, of course, introduce many dissimilarities into their\nmanifestations of the mirthful temper. I hold, however, that as regards\nthe fundamental psychical processes involved, the similarity is real\nand great.\n\n[225] Macdonald, _op. cit._, i., p. 266.\n\n[226] Burton, _op. cit._, ii., pp. 338\u20139.\n\n[227] See p. 42.\n\n[228] Wright, _History of Caricature and Grotesque_, p. 181.\n\n[229] M. Jos. B\u00e9dier in his interesting study, _L\u2019Esprit des Fabliaux_,\nthough he argues that the fabliaux in general had no social aim\n(\u201cport\u00e9e sociale\u201d), has to admit that in the case of the treatment of\nthe priests these \u201ccontes \u00e0 rire en vers\u201d betray a genuine hatred, a\nhatred which (he adds) runs through other forms of literature of the\nMiddle Ages.\n\n[230] B\u00e9dier points out in the work quoted that the writers of the\nfabliaux, which issue from the burgher class, and are written for this\nclass, take sides with the weak villains rather than with the strong\nknightly class (see p. 291 ff.). _Cf._, however, Wright, _op. cit._, p.\n114.\n\n[231] See Maspero, _Les Contes populaires de l\u2019\u00c9gypte_, Introduction\n(\u201cConte des deux fr\u00e8res\u201d).\n\n[232] Percy Gardner, _Greek Antiquities_, p. 353.\n\n[233] Tyrrell, _Latin Poetry_, p. 220.\n\n[234] B\u00e9dier, _op. cit._, p. 279 ff.\n\n[235] H. Spencer, _Principles of Sociology_, \u201cCeremonial Institutions,\u201d\npp. 205, 206.\n\n[236] Maspero, _Life in Ancient Egypt and Assyria_, chap. i.\n\n[237] Wilkinson, _Manners and Customs of Ancient Egyptians_, iii., pp.\n447, 429.\n\n[238] Simcox, _Hist. of Latin Liter._, i., p. 46.\n\n[239] Given in Hazlitt\u2019s _New London Jest Book_, pp. 31, 32.\n\n[240] Wright, _op. cit._, p. 133. A good story of a retaliative\npractical joke, carried out by a bachelor on a tavern keeper who had\nspilt some wine on serving him, is given by B\u00e9dier, _op. cit._, iii.,\np. 272 ff.\n\n[241] H. Spencer, _op. cit._, p. 208.\n\n[242] Curtius remarks of the Greek comic poets: \u201cIt was primarily\nagainst the novel fashion of the day that they aimed their blows\u201d\n(_Hist. of Greece_, ii., p. 539).\n\n[243] See Ward, _Engl. Dram. Poets_, ii., p. 401.\n\n[244] Wright, _op. cit._, chap. xix.\n\n[245] Sellar, _Roman Poets_, p. 167.\n\n[246] Tyrrell, _op. cit._, p. 52.\n\n[247] Ward, _Engl. Dram. Poets_, ii., pp. 398\u20139. The Restoration comedy\nalso made fun of the \u201ccit\u201d as the inferior of the West-end gentleman.\n\n[248] Ward, _op. cit._, ii., pp. 399, 400.\n\n[249] _The Golden Ass_, Bk. III., ch. 55.\n\n[250] Doran, _History of Court Fools_, pp. 18, 37, 75.\n\n[251] Tyrrell, _Latin Poetry_, p. 43 ff. The scurrility of the early\nGreek comedy led to its being discountenanced by Pisistratus. As\nProf. P. Gardner remarks, \u201cTyrants have no sense of humour, and dread\nridicule\u201d (_Greek Antiquities_, p. 666).\n\n[252] Wright, _op. cit._, p. 44 ff.\n\n[253] Ward, _Engl. Dram. Poets_, ii., pp. 392\u20133.\n\n[254] Colley Cibber\u2019s satire \u201cNon-Juror\u201d is said to have brought him\na pension and the office of Poet Laureate (Wright, _op. cit._, chap.\nxxii.).\n\n[255] George III. was caricatured again and again by Gillray (Wright,\n_op. cit._, chap. xxvii.).\n\n[256] This has no doubt arisen in part from the fact that no other\nsingle English word expresses directly and clearly the subjective\nfeeling or disposition which lies behind laughter.\n\n[257] George Eliot, _Essays_, pp. 82, 83.\n\n[258] The opening scene of _Le M\u00e9decin malgr\u00e9 lui_ shows that Moli\u00e8re\nhad observed this quaint form of wifely loyalty.\n\n[259] _Sylvie and Bruno_, Part II., p. 132.\n\n[260] Hence Addison\u2019s remark (_Spectator_, No. 35) that humour should\nalways be under the check of reason seems, in what one is tempted to\ncall a characteristic way, to miss the mark.\n\n[261] See, for example, H\u00f6ffding, _Outlines of Psychology_, pp. 294,\n295.\n\n[262] Quoted by Dugas, _op. cit._, p. 98. Flaubert here indicates,\nperhaps, one great limiting condition of the growth of the composite\nsentiment of humour.\n\n[263] _Philebus_, Jowett\u2019s translation, iv., p. 94 ff.\n\n[264] One of the best recent discussions of this subject will be found\nin the work of A. Lehmann, already referred to; _see_ pp. 247\u2013251 and\n259.\n\n[265] _Cf._ above, p. 70.\n\n[266] _Op. cit._, p. 95.\n\n[267] For the whole passage, written perhaps with an unconscious\nreminiscence of the Rousseau period, see the _Kritik of Judgment_, Dr.\nBernard\u2019s translation, p. 227.\n\n[268] The absence in the East of the comic spirit as expressing itself\nin the art of comedy, a point noted by Mr. Meredith, is of course not\nconclusive with respect to the existence of the humorous disposition.\n\n[269] M. B\u00e9dier has a delicate characterisation of this French spirit\nin the _Contes_; touching on its want of depth and _arri\u00e8re-pens\u00e9e_,\nits spice of malice, its joyous good sense, its irony, which though a\nlittle coarse is yet precise and just, _op. cit._, p. 278.\n\n[270] This redeeming quality of the Irish bull is indistinctly\nperceived by the Edgeworths in their essay on the subject, in which\nthey speak of the Irishman\u2019s habit of using figurative and witty\nlanguage. See _The Book of Bulls_, by G. R. Neilson (in which the\nEdgeworths\u2019 essay is included).\n\n[271] Quoted by Meredith, _op. cit._, p. 87.\n\n[272] See his son\u2019s _Life_, chap. vii. (vol. i., p. 167).\n\n[273] The question is left an open one by his biographer, J.\nFitzmaurice-Kelly. See _Life of Cervantes_, p. 207.\n\n[274] _Causeries du Lundi_, vol. iii., pp. 3, 4.\n\n[275] _Logic Deductive and Inductive_, by Carveth Read.\n\n[276] Bernard\u2019s translation of _The Kritik of Judgment_, p. 226.\n\n[277] Good illustrations will be found in the story of Mr. Bernard\nCapes, _The Lake of Wine_, chap. ii. and chap. xxxii.\n\n[278] See for one among many instances _Travels in West Africa_, chap.\nix. (\u201cThe Rapids of the Ogowe\u201d).\n\n[279] The story of Hans von B\u00fclow\u2019s almost superhuman behaviour under\nthese circumstances is told in the _National Observer_ of 17th Feb.,\n1894.\n\n[280] See, for example, a letter from a titled lady in _The Times_ of\nthe 1st June, 1894, in which this claim of \u201csociety\u201d to the services of\n\u201cthe pick of blood and brains\u201d is prettily assumed.\n\n[281] On the employment of buffoons and dwarfs in the palace of the\nEgyptian king see Maspero, _Dawn of Civilisation_, pp. 278, 279. On the\nGreek and Roman jesters (\u03b3\u03b5\u03bb\u03c9\u03c4\u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03af, \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9, mimi, scurr\u00e6) see P.\nGardner, _Greek Antiquities_, p. 835; [_cf._ Doran, _Court Fools_].\nOn the medi\u00e6val jester or fool see Wright, _op. cit._, chap. vii.;\nLacroix, _Middle Ages_, p. 238 ff.; and Jusserand, _English Wayfaring\nLife_, p. 187.\n\n[282] P. Gardner, _Greek Antiquities_, p. 666.\n\n[283] Bergk, Griech. _Literaturgesch._, iv., pp. 9, 10.\n\n[284] See Wright, _op. cit._, chaps. xii. and xiv.\n\n[285] _Essay on Comedy_, pp. 24\u20135 (on Moli\u00e8re\u2019s audience); pp. 8, 47\nand following (on the recognition of woman).\n\n[286] Examples will be found in _Le M\u00e9decin malgr\u00e9 lui_, _L\u2019Avare_\nand others. A delightful introduction of the all-round beating of the\ncircus is that of the Professors in _Le Bourgeois gentilhomme_.\n\n[287] M. Bergson, who gives a delightful account of these mechanical\naids to the effect of comedy, seeks to connect them with his theory\nthat the laughable consists in the substitution of the monotony of the\nmachine for the variety of the organism (_op. cit._, p. 72 ff.). I\nsuspect, however, that they owe much of the spell they cast over our\nlaughing muscles to suggestions of child\u2019s play.\n\n[288] Compare the breezy fun of the scene in _Le Tartuffe_, where the\nmaid, Dorine, has to tackle in turn each of a pair of lovers urging the\nsame grievances in almost the same words (Act II., Sc. iv.).\n\n[289] Moulton, _Ancient Class. Drama_, p. 344.\n\n[290] \u201cIn Aristophanes the very few maiden figures that appear are\ndumb\u201d (Neil, _The Knights of Aristophanes_, Introduction, p. xiv.).\n\n[291] P. Gardner, _Greek Antiquities_, p. 353.\n\n[292] Mommsen, _History of Rome_, vol. iii., p. 144.\n\n[293] _Essay_, Bk. II., chap. xi.\n\n[294] _Spectator_, No. 62.\n\n[295] _English Comic Writers_, Lect. I., \u201cWit and Humour\u201d.\n\n[296] _Spectator_, No. 6.\n\n[297] _Cf. supra_, pp. 112, 113.\n\n[298] _Spectator_, No. 47.\n\n[299] An elaborate classification of the various kinds of word-play may\nbe found in an article by Dr. Emil Kr\u00e4pelin, in Wundt\u2019s _Philosoph.\nStudien_, 2^{er} Band, s. 144 ff.\n\n[300] Bergk observes that these are at once individuals and types\n(_Griech. literaturgeschichte_, Bd. IV., s. 91).\n\n[301] Mommsen observes that in Terence we have a more becoming, though\nnot yet moral, conception of feminine nature and of married life\n(_Hist. of Rome_, Bk. IV., chap. xiii.).\n\n[302] Courthope, _Hist. of English Poetry_, vol. ii., pp. 345 ff., and\n356.\n\n[303] _Eng. Lit._, Bk. II., chap. iii.\n\n[304] On this mixture of tones see Moulton, _Shakespeare as Dramatic\nArtist_, p. 291.\n\n[305] Mr. Meredith touches on the way in which Moli\u00e8re developed his\ncharacters out of persons known to him (_op. cit._, p. 53).\n\n[306] _Lectures and Notes on Shakespeare_, p. 416.\n\n[307]\n\n    \u201cComme un morceau de cire entre mes mains elle est,\n    Et je lui puis donner la forme qui me pla\u00eet.\u201d\n\n\n[308] M. Henri Bergson (_op. cit._, chap, iii.) seems to me to push\nhis helpful idea of a mechanical rigidity (_raideur_) in Moli\u00e8re\u2019s\ncharacters a little too far.\n\n[309] The play closes with the \u201caside\u201d of Covielle: \u201cSi l\u2019on en peut\nvoir un plus fou, je l\u2019irai dire \u00e0 Rome\u201d.\n\n[310] Mr. Meredith remarks that it was \u201chere and there Bacchanalian\nbeyond the Aristophanic example\u201d (_op. cit._, p. 11).\n\n[311] See above, p. 92 f.\n\n[312] Coleridge saw clearly enough how far comedy is from making\nmorality its basis. He remarks that the new comedy of Menander and the\nwhole of modern comedy (Shakespeare excepted) is based on rules of\nprudence (_Lectures and Notes on Shakespeare_, Bell\u2019s Edition, 1884, p.\n191).\n\n[313] _Cf. supra_, p. 139.\n\n[314] _Hist. of Eng. Lit._, Bk. III., chap. i. Mr. Meredith is nearer\nthe mark when he speaks of the comic poet as being \u201cin the narrow\nfield, or enclosed square of the society he depicts\u201d (_op. cit._, p.\n85).\n\n[315] _Op. cit._, Bd. IV., s. 2.\n\n[316] See his \u201cNotice\u201d to _Gil Blas_, pp. xii, xiii.\n\n[317] _Hist. of Eng. Lit._, vol. iv., p. 173.\n\n[318] _Op. cit._, p. 240.\n\n[319] Quoted by Bacon, _Essays_, \u201cApothegms,\u201d 181.\n\n[320] This is well illustrated by George Eliot, who observes rightly\nthat wit is allied to ratiocination (_Essays_, \u201cGerman Wit,\u201d p. 81).\n\n[321] I remember discussing the point with the late Henry Sidgwick\u2014no\nmean authority\u2014who admitted that several quotations which he had\nproffered as examples of wit might with equal appropriateness he\ndescribed as humorous. The germ of the view put forward in the text is\ncontained in some pithy remarks by the late Professor Minto (_English\nProse Literature_, Introduction, p. 23).\n\n[322] The reference in the text is to humour and wit, regarded as\nsubjective, as elements in the writer. Considered objectively as an\nattribute of a character, wit of a kind may become one ingredient in\na humorous presentation, as in the homely and rather born\u00e9 wit of the\ncountryfolk in the novels of George Eliot and Mr. Hardy.\n\n[323] See Mr. Traill\u2019s criticism, _Sterne_, p. 156 ff.\n\n[324] _Wit and Humour_, p. 11.\n\n[325] See Canon Ainger\u2019s Introduction to _The Essays of Elia_, p. 8.\n\n[326] _English Thought in the Eighteenth Century_, vol. ii., p. 110.\n\n[327] See my work on _Pessimism_, p. 428.\n\n[328] See Dugas, _op. cit._, pp. 109, 110.\n\n[329] See, for an excellent example of this retort, Dr. James Ward\u2019s\n_Naturalism and Agnosticism_, vol. i., Part I.\n\n[330] M. Scherer may possibly mean something like this when he speaks\nof the humorist\u2019s point of view as the justest from which a man\u2019s world\ncan be judged (_Essays on English Literature_, p. 148).\n\n[331] On the moral function of comedy see Bergson, _op. cit._, pp. 201,\n202, and Dugas, _op. cit._, pp. 149\u2013159.\n\n[332] The reference is to an article, \u201cRidicule and Truth\u201d in the\n_Cornhill Magazine_, 1877, pp. 580\u201395. Lessing\u2019s plea, in his _Hamburg.\nDramaturgie_ (St\u00fccke 28 and 29), on behalf of a corrective virtue in\ncomedy owed something, I suspect, to the reading of Shaftesbury and the\nother English writers.\n\n[333] _Ethics_, Bk. x., 6.\n\n[334] _Sartor Resartus_, _loc. cit._\n\n[335] _Letters_, vol. ii., p. 302.\n\n[336] See what Aristotle says about the witty (\u03b5\u1f50\u03c4\u03c1\u03ac\u03c0\u03b5\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9, literally,\nthe easy turning, nimble-minded), _Ethics_, Bk. iv., 8.\n\n[337] Mr. Radford, in an article on _Falstaff_, in Mr. Birrell\u2019s\n_Obiter dicta_ (First Series).\n\n[338] _The Journal of Education_, Nov. 1901, p. 687.\n\n[339] Traill, _loc. cit._, p. 147.\n\n[340] Mr. Radford, _loc. cit._\n\n{433}\n\n\n\n\nINDEX.\n\n\nAbstraction, in representation of character in comedy, 358, 359, 367.\n\nAbsurd, the, as laughable, 110, 152, 216, 217, 239, 294.\n\nAddison, Jos., 30 _note_, 95, 304 _note_, 354, 355, 423.\n\nAffectation, in comedy, 351.\n\n\u201cAgelasts,\u201d 2, 425.\n\nAinger, Alfred, 390 _note_.\n\nAllin, A. See Hall, G. S.\n\nAnalogy of feeling, 191.\n\nAngas, G. F., 224, 228.\n\nAngell, J. R., 33 _note_, 36 _note_.\n\nAnimals; ticklishness of, 57 162, 163, 177; laughter of, 156, 161, 170,\n172, 177; tricks of, 157; sense of fun in, 158, 160; play of, 158 ff.\n\nApes. See Animals.\n\nApperception, 14, 59, 127, 130, 131, 135.\n\nApprehension, dissolved, as cause of laughter. See Fear.\n\nApuleius, 290.\n\nArabian Nights, 264.\n\nAristophanes, 282, 292, 348, 352, 357, 360, 371, 378.\n\nAristotle, 120, 412, 413, 416, 417 _note_, 418, 420.\n\nArt, amusing function of, 343 (Chapter XI.); origin of, 344; scope for\nexhibition of laughable in, 345; humour in essays, etc., 390, 391 (see\nFiction, Comedy).\n\nArtificial, comedy, 371; world of comedy, 373, 377.\n\nAssimilation in social evolution, 276, 286.\n\nAssimilative force of laughter, 272.\n\nAusten, Jane, 378.\n\n\nBacon, Francis, on laughter, 22.\n\nBain, Alexander, his theory of the ludicrous, 121\u2013124, 140, 143; on\ncruelty of savage laughter, 232 _note_.\n\nBalzac, H. de, 379. {434}\n\nBarrie, J. M., 242.\n\nBarrow, Isaac, 419.\n\n\u2014 John, 236 _note_.\n\nBashkirtseff, M., 321.\n\nBates, H. W., 223.\n\nBeating, as comic incident, 348.\n\nBeddard, F. E., 171.\n\nB\u00e9dier, Jos., 262 _note_, 263 _note_, 264, 270 _note_, 312 _note_.\n\nBelittling of idea, as cause of laughter, 9.\n\nBenevolent, mirthfulness as, 417.\n\nBergk, Th., 346, 360 _note_, 381.\n\nBergson, H., 7, 8 _note_, 104, 114, 140 _note_, 348 _note_, 367 _note_,\n374, 413 _note_.\n\nBonwick, Jas., 224, 243, 250.\n\nBorn, Bertran de, 263.\n\nBosanquet, B., 6 _note_.\n\nBridgman, Laura, 170.\n\nBrowne, Thomas, 390.\n\nBrutal laughter, 89, 97, 143, 231\u2013233, 315, 381.\n\n\u201cBulls,\u201d 111, 313.\n\nB\u00fclow, H. von, 330 _note_.\n\nBurchell, W. J., 239.\n\nBurton, R. F., 229, 245, 253.\n\n\u2014 Robert, 34, 314.\n\nButler, Samuel, 115.\n\nButt, of wit, 355.\n\nBuyer and seller, laughter between, 270.\n\n\nCampbell, Harry, 35 _note_.\n\nCapes, B., 325 _note_.\n\nCarlyle, T., 36, 49, 299, 390, 400, 404 416.\n\nCarroll, Lewis, 304, 386.\n\nCarus, Paul, 12 _note_.\n\nCervantes, S. M. de, 282, 310, 314, 389.\n\nChampneys, F. H., 165.\n\nCharacter, the laughable in, 133, 307, 315, 321; incongruity between\ncircumstances and, 318, 369; interest in, 318, 358; presentation of, in\ncomedy, 357\u2013370. {434}\n\nChaucer, G., 30 _note_.\n\nChesterfield, Earl of, 1.\n\nChild, development of laughter in (Chapter VII.); first laughter\nof triumph, 83, 198, 200, 204, 210; sayings of, as laughable, 106;\ndegradation theory applied to laughter of, 123, 124, 137; beginnings of\nsmile and laugh in, 164\u2013168, 188; spontaneous laughter of, 187, 207;\nextension of field of laughable, for, 191, 192; growth of self-feeling\nin laughter of, 192, 203, 205; growing complication of laughter of,\n192, 193; early laughter of joy, 194\u2013198; early laughter of play, 194,\n198\u2013207, 211, 212; early laughter of teasing, 201\u2013203; early defiance\nof order, 203, 204, 211, 213; first roguish laughter, 205, 206; early\nappreciation of the laughable, 207\u2013217; first laughter at sounds,\n209\u2013212; early feeling of propriety, 211\u2013215.\n\nChoral laughter, 247, 258, 295; decline of, 429.\n\nCibber, Colley, 292 _note_.\n\nCicero, 384.\n\nClass, differentiation of, 247, 258, 259; changes in, as laughable, 287.\n\nClergy, laughter at the, 109, 262, 267, 294, 346; laughter of the, 283.\n\nColeridge, S. T., 364, 374 _note_.\n\nCollier, Jeremy, 411.\n\nCombat, playful, as origin of laughter of tickling, 179\u2013181.\n\nComedy (Chapter XI.), Greek, 264, 291, 346, 353, 361, 389 (see also\nAristophanes); of the Restoration, 283, 287, 370\u2013373, 383; Roman,\n291, 376 (see also Plautus, Terence); conditions of the rise of, 347;\nelements of primitive laughter in, 348\u2013357, 379; of Incident, 357; of\nManners, 357, 370\u2013373, 376; of Character, 357\u2013370; Elizabethan, 361;\npoint of view of, 368\u2013377, 410; mood addressed by, 370, 373, 375, 377,\n412; attitude of, towards morality, 372\u2013377, 411; limits to, 377;\napproach to point of view of, in fiction, 378; satirical element in,\n381; humour in, 387; corrective function of, 411\u2013414; Modern, 413.\n\nComic art, rudiments of, in savage life, 250.\n\n\u2014 the, distinguished from the laughable, 86.\n\nCommon-sense. See Point of View.\n\nConcept, function of the, in laughter, 7, 13, 130\u2013133, 135.\n\nCongreve, W., 357, 370, 372, 411.\n\nConservative force of laughter, 257, 261. See Progress.\n\nContagiousness of laughter, 42, 186, 255.\n\n_Conte_, the medi\u00e6val, 34, 86, 91, 262, 267, 284, 292, 311, 346, 373.\n\nContempt, laughter of, 78, 83, 89, 97, 118, 142, 205, 234, 299, 320,\n380.\n\nContests, laughter in, 78, 83; laughter at the sight of, 117; of the\nsexes, see Woman, Laughter of Man and.\n\nContrariety, theory of. See Incongruity.\n\nContrast, effect of, in comic characters, 365.\n\nCoquelin, B. C., a\u00een\u00e9, 109.\n\n\u2014 cadet, 86 _note_.\n\nCorrective function of laughter. See Value of Laughter.\n\nCounteractives of laughter, 84, 88, 90, 93, 96, 98, 101, 102, 111.\n\nCourdaveaux, V., 130 _note_.\n\nCourthope, W., 361 _note_.\n\nCruickshank, B., 225, 226, 235.\n\nCulture, gradations of, 284; spread of, 286, 288.\n\nCurtius, Ernst, 277 _note_.\n\nCustom, effect of, on laughter, 84, 294, 318.\n\nCustomary, the, as standard in comedy, 375\u2013377.\n\nCynicism in modern laughter, 431.\n\n\nDante, Alighieri, 30, 425.\n\nDarwin, C., 26, 38, 40, 57, 60, 63, 70, 71, 156, 159, 162, 163, 164,\n169, 170, 171, 172, 177, 224, 227, 280.\n\nDaudet, A., 378.\n\nDavid, Mrs. F. W. E., 229.\n\nDeformity, as laughable, 89, 231.\n\n\u2014 moral. See Vice.\n\nDegradation, theory of (moral theory), 119\u2013125, 128, 137, 153.\n\nDennett, R. E., 251.\n\nDescartes, R., 70.\n\nDescending incongruity, 137.\n\nDeschamps, E., 222 _note_. {435}\n\nDetachment in humorous observation, 331, 337, 407\u2013409.\n\nDickens, C., 158, 329, 388.\n\nDifference, judgment of, 15 _note_.\n\nDignity, loss of, as laughable, 99, 119\u2013125, 128, 136, 213, 214, 266.\n\nDiscomfiture, the sight of, as laughable, 117.\n\nDisguise, in comedy, 349, 369.\n\nDisorder, as laughable, 94, 266, 342; in comedy, 371.\n\nDog, the. See Animals.\n\nDoran, John, 291.\n\nDugas, L., 47 _note_, 130 _note_, 149 _note_, 306 _note_, 400 _note_,\n413 _note_.\n\n\nEdgeworth, R. L. and M., 313 _note_.\n\nEducation, laughter in, 426.\n\nEgede, Hans, 223 _note_, 249.\n\nEgyptians, 264, 265.\n\nEliot, George, 109, 271, 298, 299, 385 _note_, 386 _note_, 389.\n\nEllis, W., 224, 235, 237.\n\nEmbarrassment, relief from, producing laughter, 228, 238.\n\nEmotions, James\u2019 theory of, 40; development of, 189; fusion of, 308\u2013310.\n\nEpicureans, 397.\n\nErskine, J. E., 224, 250.\n\nEstimable, the, in the laughable, 306, 310, 317.\n\nEvolutional utility of laughter, 408, 431.\n\nExcellence, laughter as an, 3, 416, 422, 423.\n\nExpectation, annulled, as cause of laughter, 9, 12, 18, 64, 125,\n126\u2013130.\n\n\n_Fabliau_. See _Conte_.\n\nFanciful world of comedy, 372, 373, 377.\n\nFantastic ideas, as laughable, 88.\n\nFashion, definition of, 273; movements of, 273; as restrained by\ncustom, 275; as laughable, 276\u2013279.\n\nFather and child, relation of, in comedy, 265, 353, 361.\n\nFear, relief from nascent, as element in tickling, 63; laughter as\nreaction from, 65, 176, 199; as inhibitory of laughter, 88.\n\nFeeling tone, of sensations of tickling, 54; of humour, 305, 310; of\ncomic mood, 370, 376.\n\nFiction, prose, comic point of view in, 378, 379; addressed to a\nreflective mood, 379; humour in, 387\u2013390.\n\nFielding, H., 388, 389.\n\nFitzmaurice-Kelly, J., 314 _note_.\n\nFlaubert, G., 306.\n\nFools, 249, 250, 291, 343; \u201cFeast of,\u201d 346.\n\nFouill\u00e9e, A., 137.\n\nFox, fable of the, 382.\n\nFrench, the, gaiety of, 311.\n\nFun, sense of, in children, 64, 76, 77, 87, 112, 125, 137, 140, 169,\n176, 181, 194, 315; in savages, 234, 252; in comedy, 347\u2013350, 353, 357,\n369.\n\nFuture of laughter, 427.\n\n\nGardner, P., 264, 292 _note_, 343 _note_, 346 _note_.\n\nGenetic method, necessity of, in studying the ludicrous, 154.\n\nGillen, F. J. See Spencer, B.\n\nGillray, Jas., 293 _note_.\n\nGladness, as expressed in laughter, 71, 195. See Pleasure.\n\nGoethe, J. W. von, 283, 426.\n\nGoldsmith, O., 298, 328, 387, 388, 424.\n\nGratiolet, L. P., 31.\n\nGrey, George, 250.\n\nGrief, as causing laughter, 66, 67; resemblance of manifestation of, to\nlaughter, 70, 309.\n\nGroos, K., 146, 147 _note_, 148 _note_, 158 _note_, 182 _note_.\n\n\nHabit, effect of, on child\u2019s laughter, 188, 190; effect of, on\nemotional reaction, 190. See Custom.\n\nHall, G. Stanley, and Allin, A., on laughter, 28, 52, 66, 83; on\ntickling, 177, 178, 182.\n\nHardy, Thos., 103.\n\nHarmful tendencies of laughter, 37, 46, 415, 418, 420, 422. See\nLaughter.\n\nHarris, J. C., 251.\n\nHartshorne, B. F., 222.\n\nHat, unsuitable, as instance of the ludicrous, 9\u201317.\n\nHazlitt, W. C., 137, 138 _note_, 268, 354.\n\nHecker, E., 184 _note_.\n\nHegel, G. W. F., 5.\n\nHegelians, on the comic, 4. {436}\n\nHeine, H., 386, 423.\n\nHeymans, G., 64.\n\nHill, Leonard, 57, 58, 61, 165 _note_, 169, 178, 179, 188.\n\nHind, H. Y., 225, 242.\n\nHobbes, T., his theory of the ludicrous, 120, 140, 143, 203.\n\nH\u00f6ffding, H., 306 _note_.\n\nHogan, Mrs. L. E., 188, 209, 212, 215, 217.\n\nHomer, 89, 96, 97, 108.\n\nHugo, Victor, 315.\n\nHuman, things, as object of laughter, 86, 122, 128, 345.\n\nHumour (Chapter X.), definitions of, 297; as individual, 298, 313,\n324, 326; rarity of, 298, 311, 322, 325; origin of, 299; reflection\nin, 300\u2013303, 324, 387, 393; as a sentiment, 300, 307; seriousness\nin, 301\u2013305, 314, 319, 338, 342, 387, 393, 395, 400; blend of sad\nand gay in, 305, 309, 387; kindly feeling in, 306, 307, 310, 342,\n388; corrective function of, 323, 324, 403\u2013405; consolatory force\nof, 325\u2013330, 342; relation of, to wit, 354, 385, 386; subjective and\nobjective, in literature, 386 _note_, 389; harmonising of tones in,\n388, 391 (see also Philosophic Humour).\n\nHunt, J. H. Leigh, his theory of laughter, 142; quoted, 383.\n\nHusbands, treatment of, in comedy, 373, 377.\n\nHypergelast, 297, 418.\n\n\nIdealism and Realism, in relation to laughter, 394, 396, 400, 401.\n\nIgnorance, as laughable, 102.\n\nImitation in fashion, 273\u2013276, 278; in comedy, 348.\n\nIncompetence, as laughable, 102, 240, 245.\n\nIncongruity, theory of, 7, 9, 13, 17, 125\u2013135, 136, 141, 150, 317, 318;\nas laughable, 107\u2013111, 152, 216, 236.\n\nIndecent, the, as laughable, 99, 151, 235.\n\nIndividual, the, laughter of, 295, 297 (Chapter X.), 393; value of\nlaughter to, 321, 323 ff., 403, 415; justification of point of view of,\n405.\n\nInferior, laughter of, at superior, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268.\n\nInferiority, feeling of, as inhibiting laughter, 143, 320.\n\nIntellectual theory, the. See Incongruity, also 153.\n\nInventions, as objects of ridicule, 281.\n\nIrish, humour of the, 312, 313, 385.\n\n\nJackson, John, 250 _note_.\n\nJames, William, his theory of emotions, 40, 189.\n\nJohnston, H. H., 227.\n\nJonson, Ben, 268, 361, 362, 364.\n\nJoy, laughter of, 71 ff., 116, 168, 194 ff., 228. See Pleasure.\n\nJusserand, J. A. A., 343 _note_.\n\nJuvenal, 283, 381, 382.\n\n\nKames, H. H., 414.\n\nKant, I., his theory of the ludicrous, 9, 18, 126\u2013129, 131; quoted,\n125, 134, 135, 310, 325.\n\nKeats, John, 430.\n\nKingsley, Miss M. H., 222, 225, 231, 251, 252, 253, 266, 328, 391.\n\nKipling, R., 98 _note_.\n\nKr\u00e4pelin, E., 356 _note_.\n\nK\u00fclpe, O., 52 _note_, 54 _note_.\n\n\nLack of humour, advantages of, 424, 425.\n\nLacroix, P., 343 _note_.\n\nLamb, C., humour of, 298, 390, 420; his view of Restoration comedy,\n372, 373, 377.\n\nLandor, W. Savage, 314.\n\nLang, Gideon, 243 _note_.\n\nLange, C., 67, 189.\n\nLanguage, poetical use of \u201claugh\u201d and \u201csmile,\u201d 30; terms for forms of\nlaughter in French, 49 _note_; misuse of, as laughable, 104, 240. See\nWit.\n\nLaughable, the (Chapter IV.), definition of, 82; universality of,\n83, 295; relativity of, 84, 88, 93, 95, 98, 101, 102, 106, 111, 113;\ndistinguished from the ludicrous, 85; complexity of, 87, 114, 153;\ngroups of laughable objects, 87; inhibitory concomitants of, 90, 93,\n96, 101, 111, 301, 306; relation of, to laughter as a whole, 153; field\nof, 260, 315, 319.\n\nLaughter, estimates of, 1, 416; scientific investigation of, 3 ff.,\n19, {437} 154; physiological characteristics of, 22, 26\u201328, 30,\n33\u201336, 69, 227, 309; varieties of, 22, 48, 188, 251; an intermittent\nmanifestation, 26, 74; sounds of, 31, 174, 227; bad effects of, 37, 46,\n415, 418, 420, 422; mechanically produced, 42, 64 ff., 74; occasions\nof, 50 (Chapter III.); nervous, 65\u201370, 116; counteractives to, 88,\n90, 93, 96, 101, 102, 111, 377; as sign of playful mood in animals,\n183\u2013184; as instrument of punishment, 250, 256, 262, 380; anti-social\ntendency in, 256, 406; regulation of, 418; promotion of, 423; as branch\nof education, 426. See also Child, Development of; Humour; Origin of\nLaughter; Primitive Laughter; Savages, Laughter of; Social Laughter;\nValue of Laughter.\n\nLe Fanu, W. R., 111 _note_.\n\nLehmann, A., 172 _note_, 308 _note_.\n\nLe Sage, A. R., 262, 382.\n\nLessing, G. E., 323, 412, 415 _note_.\n\nLichtenstein, M. H. C., 236, 238.\n\nLipps, Th., his theory of the ludicrous, 9\u201317, 64, 137; quoted, 94.\n\nLiterature. See Art.\n\nLocke, John, his definition of wit, 354.\n\nLoti, P., 197 _note_.\n\nLotze, H., 8 _note_, 18.\n\nLoveday, T., 15 _note_.\n\nLove-motive, in comedy, 360, 371.\n\nLudicrous, the, Schopenhauer\u2019s theory of, 6, 13, 130\u2013133; incongruity\ntheory of, 7, 9, 13, 17, 125\u2013136, 141, 150, 317, 318; as consisting in\nthe substitution of rigidity for spontaneity, 7, 92, 348 _note_, 367;\nLipps\u2019 theory of, 9\u201317, 64; as consisting in nullified expectation,\n9, 12, 18, 64, 125\u2013130; objectivity of, 83; distinguished from the\nlaughable, 85, 138; theories of, 119 (Chapter V.); degradation theory\nof, 119\u2013125, 128, 137; synthesis of theories of, 136\u2013139; no one theory\nof, 139, 153.\n\nLumholtz, Carl, 224, 249.\n\n\nMacaulay, T. B., 372, 377.\n\nMacdonald, Duff, 221, 252.\n\nMajorities and minorities, 406.\n\nMalice in laughter, 78, 83, 89, 97, 118, 142, 143, 231, 233, 381.\n\nMan, E. H., 227.\n\nMania, approach to, of comic characters, 367; of a whole people, 377.\n\nManners, in comedy, 370.\n\nMarsden, W., 240, 249.\n\nMaspero, G., 264, 266, 343 _note_.\n\nMassinger, P., 361.\n\nMaster and servant, relation of, in comedy, 353. See Slaves.\n\nM\u00e9linaud, C., 8 _note_.\n\nMenander, 361, 374 _note_.\n\nMeredith, G., 4, 99, 109, 297, 300, 310, 347, 364 _note_, 371 _note_,\n376 _note_, 379, 415, 417.\n\nMerry England, mirth of, 429.\n\nMill, J. S., 280.\n\nMilton, J., 39, 425.\n\nMinto, W., 386 _note_.\n\nMirthfulness, persistence of, 25, 73, 223\u2013226; effect of temperament\non, 80; expression of, as element in the laughable, 116, 149, 211\u2013213,\n348; decline of, 428 ff.\n\nMisfortunes, small, as laughable, 96.\n\nModern life, decline of choral laughter in, 427; seriousness of, 428\nff.; growth of individual laughter in, 432.\n\nMoli\u00e8re, J. B. P., 114, 272, 288, 303 _note_, 307, 315, 348, 349, 350,\n351, 353, 357, 359, 364\u2013370, 373\u2013378.\n\nMommsen, Th., 353 _note_, 361 _note_.\n\nMono-ideism in comic characters, 366.\n\nMontaigne, M. E. de, 342.\n\nMood, the ticklish, 62; of humour, 304; addressed by comedy, 370, 373,\n375, 377; addressed by fiction, 379, 380.\n\nMoore, Mrs. K. C., 165, 188.\n\nMoral deformity. See Vice.\n\n\u2014 sensitiveness, as inhibitory of laughter, 93, 101, 102.\n\n\u2014 theory. See Degradation.\n\nMorality, attitude of laughter towards, 92, 372\u2013377; attitude of comedy\ntowards, 372\u2013377; function of comedy in relation to, 411\u2013414.\n\n\u2014 plays, 347, 359, 361, 362.\n\nMorgan, C. Lloyd, 148 _note_, 160.\n\nMoulton, R. G., 352 _note_, 362 _note_.\n\nMulcaster, R., 35.\n\nMusters, G. C., 226.\n\nMystery plays, 347. {438}\n\n\nNa\u00efvet\u00e9, as laughable, 104, 127, 336; children\u2019s, 105.\n\nNansen, F., 223 _note_, 244 _note_, 250.\n\nNational feeling, 293.\n\nNationality. See Race.\n\nNeil, R. A., 352 _note_.\n\nNeilson, G. R., 313 _note_.\n\nNervous laughter, 65\u201370, 116.\n\nNewspaper, struggle for the, 334, 336.\n\nNovelty, as laughable, 87, 128, 150, 189, 208, 236, 281; in comedy, 351.\n\n\nObesity and laughter, 81.\n\nObject of laughter, 82, 142; dislike of being made the, 144, 232, 256,\n320. See Laughable, the.\n\nOdd, the, as laughable, 87, 150, 237; in comedy, 351.\n\nOld and young, relation of, in comedy, 353.\n\nOld-fashioned, laughter at the, 281.\n\nOptimism and pessimism. See also Philosophy, Worth of Life.\n\nOrder, breach of, as laughable, 94, 266, 342.\n\nOrganism, effects of laughter on, 33\u201336, 45, 69; resonance of, as\nfactor in laughter, 44, 47.\n\nOrigin of laughter, 155 (Chapter VI.); first appearance in child,\n166, 170; early laughter as expression of pleasure, 169; an inherited\ntendency, 170; first appearance in primitive man, 173; development out\nof smile, 173\u2013176; explosive vigour, explanation of, 176. See also\nSmile, Tickling.\n\n\nParadox, as laughable, 104, 106, 110.\n\nParasites, laughter of tickling as defensive against, 178, 179, 181.\n\nParnell, J., 111 _note_.\n\nPascal, B., 1, 423.\n\nPeacock, T. L., 222.\n\nPerception of the ludicrous, movement of thought in, 11, 13; as\nperception of relations, 13, 107, 192, 300, 302, 316\u2013318; necessity\nof distinct imagery to, 14, 131; as immediate, 15; as antecedent\nof laughter, 42, 50; as emotional, 43, 125; effect of subjective\nconditions on, 84, 88; as intellectual, 125; connection with primitive\nlaughter, 116, 140, 142, 144, 153.\n\nPhilosophic humour, characteristics of, 390, 400\u2013405, 407\u2013410; utility\nof, 403\u2013405; anti-social tendency of, 406.\n\nPhilosophy, theoretic treatment of laughter by, 4\u20136, 19, 396;\nphilosophic speculation, as laughable, 5, 400, 401; connection of\nhumour with, 390, 392\u2013410; point of view of, 393, 394, 396, 397;\nideal standard of, 394, 395; change in aspect of reality produced by,\n394, 395, 397, 398; seriousness of, 395; obstacles to union of humour\nwith, 396\u2013399; idealism and laughter, 396; optimism and laughter, 398;\npessimism and laughter, 398; scepticism and laughter, 399.\n\nPhysiological aspects of laughter. See Laughter.\n\nPity, as inhibitory of laughter, 90, 98.\n\nPlato, 308, 342, 396, 408.\n\nPlautus, 266, 268, 282, 348, 352, 357, 360, 371.\n\nPlay, tickling and, 63, 179, 182\u2013184; laughter as concomitant of mood\nof, 76\u201378, 198\u2013207; teasing as form of, 77, 201, 229; connection with\nwit, 112, 355; relation of laughter and, 145\u2013153, 194; utility of, 148,\n181, 182; of animals, 158; play-challenge, 184, 256, 344; rompish, 198,\n199; as make-believe, 201, 214; attacks as form of, 201; lawlessness\nof, 216; connection with comedy, 348, 349, 353, 373, 375, 377.\n\nPlayfulness, expression of. See Laughter and Mirthfulness.\n\nPleasure, as antecedent of laughter, 43, 71, 145; interaction of\nlaughter and, 44 ff.; sudden accession of, as cause of laughter, 72, 74\nff., 141, 145, 184.\n\nPoetic justice, 368.\n\nPoint of view, relativity of, in laughter, 84, 88, 93, 95, 101, 102,\n106, 111; of common-sense, 110, 294, 376, 395, 399, 400; tribal and\nnational, 238, 256, 271, 293, 294; of humour, 303, 315, 324, 330, 338,\n341, 403 _note_, 409, 410; social, 323, 374\u2013377, 380, 399, 405, 409,\n410; of comedy, {439} 372\u2013377, 410; of philosophy, 393, 394, 396, 397;\nindividual, 399, 405, 409, 410; of satire, 410.\n\nPope, Alex., 307, 383.\n\nPowell, J. W., 248 _note_.\n\nPractical joking, 78, 129, 160, 229\u2013231. See Teasing.\n\nPreciosity, in comedy, 351.\n\nPretence, as laughable, 101, 148, 151; in play, 147, 158.\n\nPreyer, W., 49, 160, 164\u2013170, 178, 188, 205, 206 _note_, 209, 211, 212.\n\nPrimitive laughter, necessity of considering, 23; forms of, tickling,\netc., 50 (Chapter III.); elements of, in appreciation of the ludicrous,\n140\u2013145, 153; humour as development of, 299; in comedy, 347 ff.\n\nProgress, as hindered and furthered by laughter, 257, 279\u2013283; social,\n279; as object of laughter, 280, 283.\n\nPublic opinion, deification of, 334.\n\nPunning, in children, 112, 217; and wit, 354; in comedy, 357.\n\n\nRabelais, F., 299, 314, 389.\n\nRaces, diversities of laughter and humour of, 311\u2013313.\n\nRadford, G. H., 417, 428.\n\n\u201cRalph Roister Doister,\u201d 361.\n\nRaulin, J. M., 228.\n\nRead, Carveth, 320.\n\nReal, the, in comedy, 368, 369, 372.\n\nReflection, in laughter, 8, 251; in humour, 301, 302, 393; appeal to,\nin humorous writing, 379, 389.\n\nRelations, as laughable, 13, 107, 300, 302, 316.\n\nRelief from strain, in nervous laughter, 65\u201370; laughter on solemn\noccasions as, 80, 118; in laughter at the indecent, 118; in laughter\nat degradation, 140; as explaining explosiveness of laughter, 176; in\nchildren\u2019s laughter, 196, 198, 204; in laughter of savages, 228; in\nlaughter of art, 282.\n\nRengger, J. R., 226.\n\nRepetition, effect of, on child\u2019s laughter, 188, 190; effect of, on\nemotional reaction, 190; as comic incident, 348.\n\nRespiration, laughter and, 30, 33\u201335, 42, 69, 142.\n\nRestoration, the, literature of, 282; comedy of, 283, 287, 370.\n\nRestraints on laughter, by the community, 418\u2013420; by the individual,\n420\u2013422.\n\nRetaliative joke, among savages, 230; in comedy, 350.\n\nRetirement. See Detachment.\n\nReverence, laughter as destructive of, 422.\n\nRibot, Th., 171 _note_, 193 _note_.\n\nRichet, Charles, 52 _note_, 53 _note_, 60.\n\nRichter, J. P., 8 _note_, 390, 400.\n\nRidiculous, the, distinguished from the ludicrous, 138.\n\nRobinson, Louis, 51, 53, 55, 57, 58, 61, 63, 162, 177, 178, 179\u2013182.\n\nRomanes, G. J., 161.\n\nRostand, Edmond, 10, 387.\n\nRoth, H. Ling, 224, 227, 228, 230, 232 _note_, 236, 240, 241, 242, 246,\n247, 249, 251 _note_, 252 _note_.\n\nRousseau, J. J., 373, 425.\n\n\nSadness, as disposing to laughter, 70, 314; in humour, 305, 309, 387.\n\nSainte-Beuve, C. A., 314, 377, 382.\n\nSalutary effects of laughter. See Value.\n\nSarasin, F., 222 _note_, 232, 245.\n\nSatire, playful element in, 153, 383, 384; among savages, 244; function\nof, 282, 380; political, 292; social, 323, 413; point of view of, 380,\n410; laughter in, 380, 382, 383; mood of, 381; in comedy, 381; in\nfiction, 382; allegory in, 382; wit in, 383; ironical inversion in,\n383, 384.\n\nSavages, laughter of (Chapter VIII.), 220; difficulty of understanding,\n220; self-restraint of, 221; amount of laughter of, 222\u2013226; nature\nof laughter of, 227, 252; primitive forms of laughter of, 228\u2013285;\nteasing and practical jokes of, 229\u2013233; brutal elements in laughter\nof, 231\u2013233; dislike of laughter among, 232, 233; appreciation of\nthe laughable by, 235 ff.; laughter of, at the foreigner, 238\u2013244;\nintra-tribal laughter of, 244 ff.; humour of, 246, 251; organisation\nof laughter among, 247\u2013251; use of laughter by, in expiation of {440}\ncrimes, 250; more thoughtful laughter of, 251.\n\nScherer, Edmond, on humour, 312, 403 _note_.\n\nSchopenhauer, A., his theory of the ludicrous, 6, 13, 130\u2013133; referred\nto, 135, 285, 288.\n\nSch\u00fctze, J. St., 19.\n\nScott, Sir W., 388.\n\nSelf-advertisement, the humour of, 334.\n\nSelf-criticism, humorous, 321\u2013324, 329.\n\nSelf-deception, in comedy, 350, 366.\n\nSelf, laughter at, 143, 272, 320\u2013322, 329; dislike of others\u2019 laughter\nat, 144, 232, 256, 320.\n\nSellar, W. Y., 282.\n\nSerious, the, as opposed to laughter, 21, 395; in play, 153; in comedy,\n369, 373, 375, 377; in fiction, 379, 387; in satire, 381; in humour,\nsee Humour.\n\nSeriousness, the, of modern life, 428 ff.\n\nSets. See Social Group.\n\nSex and laughter. See Woman.\n\nShaftesbury, third Earl of, 414, 415 _note_.\n\nShakespeare, W., 2, 32 _note_, 39 _note_, 67, 104, 298, 310, 311, 349,\n357, 362, 363, 386, 387, 389, 417.\n\nShelley, P. B., 46.\n\nShinn, Miss Milicent, 165, 167, 168, 173, 175, 195, 211, 218.\n\nShooter, Jos., 225, 230.\n\nShyness, recoil from, producing laughter, 205, 206, 228, 238.\n\nSidgwick, H., 386 _note_.\n\nSigismund, B., 165.\n\nSimcox, G. A., 266.\n\nSituation, as laughable, 96\u201398, 117, 120, 317; in comedy, 351.\n\nSlaves, laughter of, 265, 266, 291.\n\nSmile, the, physiological aspects of, 26, 165; relation of, to\nlaughter, 26, 28, 29, 168, 170, 174, 175, 193; in animals, 161\u2013163,\n170, 177; first appearance of, in child, 164\u2013166, 168; development of,\n165, 188; as expression of pleasure, 168, 183; an inherited tendency,\n170; origin of, 171\u2013173.\n\nSmyth, R. Brough, 244, 248.\n\nSocial failure, laughter as preservative of, 408.\n\nSocial group, 259 ff., 283.\n\n\u2014 laughter, organisation of, 247\u2013251, 290; conciliating force of, 255,\n256, 266, 269, 271; development of, 288\u2013291; censorship of, 291; force\nof, 292; attitude underlying, 293; reflected in comedy, 351.\n\n\u2014 scene, the modern, 337.\n\nSociety, failure to comply with social requirement as ludicrous, 139;\nlaughter in evolution of, 254 (Chapter IX.); progress of, effect on\nlaughter, 254; restraint of laughter by, 258, 269; differentiation of\nsocial groups in, 258 ff.; differentiation of ranks in, 263; ways of,\nas laughable, 331\u2013333; permanent basis of, in comedy, 375; individual\nand, 405\u2013410.\n\nSolemn occasions, laughter on, 79, 141, 152, 242.\n\nSpectator of comedy, attitude of, 371, 373, 412. See Comedy.\n\nSpencer, B., and Gillen, F. J., 243 _note_.\n\n\u2014 Herbert, 68, 137, 175, 265, 267, 274, 276.\n\nSproat, G. M., 233, 247.\n\nStanley, H. M., 159, 184.\n\nSteinen, C. von den, 223, 235 _note_, 248.\n\nStephen, Leslie, 398.\n\nSterne, Laurence, 298, 388, 389.\n\nStevenson, R. L., 398, 400, 416, 423.\n\nStoics, 397.\n\nStout, G. F., 15 _note_.\n\nStrain, relief from. See Relief.\n\nSturt, C. H., 224.\n\n\u201cSudden glory,\u201d 74, 78, 116, 117, 120, 143, 198, 203, 210, 229, 381.\n\nSuperior, laughter of, at inferior, 263, 264. See Inferior.\n\nSuperiority, feeling of, as cause of laughter, 78, 118, 120, 121, 143;\nlaughter as assertion of, 144, 241, 263, 320.\n\nSurprise, as cause of laughter, 9, 12, 18, 64, 125, 126\u2013130, 142, 169,\n197, 201.\n\nSwift, Jonathan, 381, 382, 383.\n\nSympathy, laughter through, 117, 118, 122, 149; in humour, 306;\nlaughter as promoting, 417.\n\n\nTaine, H., 312, 362, 372, 375, 382.\n\nTarde, G., 259.\n\nTears, laughter and, 37, 67, 70. {441}\n\nTeasing, 77, 157, 184, 201, 229. See Practical Joking.\n\nTemperament, as basis of laughing disposition, 80; as basis of humour,\n313.\n\nTennyson, Alfred, 314.\n\nTerence, 351, 353, 361.\n\nThackeray, W. M., 379, 382, 389.\n\nThompson, H. B. See Angell, J. R.\n\nTickling, as cause of laughter, 50 ff., 169, 177; sensations of, 51,\n53; feeling tone of, 54\u201356, 58; motor reactions to, 56\u201359, 163, 177,\n180, 183; mental conditions of, 59\u201363, 178, 181; as form of teasing,\n77; child\u2019s first response to, by laughter, 178; origin of laughter of,\n178\u2013184; as playful, 179\u2013184.\n\nTicklishness, relative, of parts of body, 51\u201353, 57, 177, 178, 180\u2013182;\nof apes, 57, 162, 163, 177, 180; of other animals, 177, 180.\n\nTolerance, of humour, 337, 342; of comedy, 376, 377.\n\nTraill, H. D., 388 _note_, 428.\n\nTrickery, in comedy, 349, 350.\n\nTriumph, laughter of, 78, 83, 118, 143, 198, 200, 204, 210, 381;\npresentation of, as laughable, 117.\n\nTruth, ridicule as test of, 414.\n\nTucker, A., 398.\n\nTurnbull, John, 224, 233, 248.\n\nTypes, characters of comedy as, 358\u2013361, 364.\n\nTyrrell, R. Y., 264, 283, 292, 382.\n\n\nUnfair laughter, 421.\n\nUtility of laughter. See Value.\n\n\nValue of laughter, as an excellence, 3, 416, 422, 423; its salutary\neffects, 34\u201336; its social utility, 139, 244, 245, 257, 268, 271, 283,\n419; as sign of playfulness, 183; its persuasive force, 252, 266, 269;\nits corrective value to the individual, 323, 324, 403; its evolutional\nutility, 408, 431. See also Comedy.\n\nVanbrugh, Jno., 411.\n\nVanity, as laughable spectacle, 92, 374.\n\nVice, as laughable spectacle, 91\u201393, 133; degrees of, in relation to\ncomic value, 91, 374; attitude of laughter towards, 92, 372\u2013377.\n\nVischer, T., 19.\n\nVoltaire, F. M. A. de, 324, 382, 383, 385.\n\n\nWaitz, Th., 229, 249.\n\nWalpole, Horace, 423.\n\nWar-temper, as laughable spectacle, 338\u2013341, 378.\n\nWarburton, W., 414, 419.\n\nWard, A. W., 281, 288, 287, 292.\n\n\u2014 James, 400 _note_.\n\nWilkinson, J. G., 266.\n\nWill, effect of, on laughter, 48; control of laughter by, 420.\n\nWit, as a form of the laughable, 111\u2013113; in children, 112, 217, 218;\nas play, 112, 355; word-play in relation to, 112, 356; Bain\u2019s theory\napplied to, 124; in savages, 248; relation of, to humour, 354, 385,\n386; animosity in, 355, 383; in comedy, 371; connection of, with\nsatire, 383\u2013385; subjective and objective, 386 _note_.\n\nWoman, laughter between man and, 245, 246, 259, 260, 264, 267, 269,\n352, 357, 363; treatment of, by comedy, 264, 352, 361 _note_, 363, 371;\nwit of, 267, 347; status of, 280, 284, 347, 352.\n\nWood, J. G., 230, 233, 238.\n\nWord-play, as a form of the laughable, 111\u2013113; Bain\u2019s theory applied\nto, 124; in children, 217; in comedy, 353, 356.\n\nWorth of life, philosophic question of, 398; relation of philosophic\nhumorist to, 402.\n\nWright, Thos., 234, 261, 263 _note_, 270, 282, 292, 293, 343 _note_.\n\nWundt, W., on tickling, 52.\n\n\nTHE ABERDEEN UNIVERSITY PRESS LIMITED.\n\n\n\n\nTRANSCRIBER\u2019S NOTE\n\nOriginal spelling and grammar have been generally retained, with\nsome exceptions noted below. Original printed page numbers are shown\nlike this: {52}. Original small caps are now uppercase. Italics\nlook _like this_. Superscripted \u2039me\u203a looks like this \u2039^{me}\u203a, on page\nviii, in the Preface. Footnotes have been converted to endnotes,\nrelabeled 1\u2013340, and moved to the end of the book, just before the\nINDEX. The transcriber produced the cover image and hereby assigns\nit to the public domain. Original page images are available from\narchive.org\u2014search for \u201cessayonlaughteri00sulluoft\u201d.\n\nPage 161. The comma was removed from \u2039we seem to, have a rudiment\u203a.\n\nPage 238. An extra _c_ was removed from \u2039acccordingly\u203a.\n\nPage 306. Full stop was added after \u2039human affections\u203a.\n\nPage 327. Full stop was added after \u2039rather than to hurt others\u203a.\n\nPage 339. Comma was added after \u2039brood of suspicions\u203a.\n\nPage 360n. The missing _l_ was restored in \u2039Griech.\nliteraturgeschichte\u203a.\n\nPage 375. Full stop was added after \u2039becoming a loss of distinctness\u203a.\n\nPage 386. The missing _s_ was restored to \u2039take on \u00a0omething of\u203a.\n\nPage 388. Changed \u2039glluible\u203a to \u2039gullible\u203a.","title":"An Essay on Laughter: Its Forms, Its Causes, Its Development and Its Value","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":142736}