{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_59792/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_59792","id":"gutenberg_59792","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/59792","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Economics","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Economics","Political science"],"text":"E-text prepared by RichardW and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team\n(http://www.pgdp.net) from page images generously made available by\nInternet Archive (https://archive.org)\n\n\n\nNote: Images of the original pages are available through\n      Internet Archive. See\n      https://archive.org/details/humespolitical00humeuoft\n\n      Some characters might not display properly in this UTF-8\n      text file (e.g., empty squares). If so, the reader should\n      consult the original page images noted above.\n\n\nTranscriber\u2019s note:\n\n      Text enclosed by underscores is in italics (_italics_).\n\n      Original small capitals are now uppercase (but some small\n      capital styling has been discarded).\n\n      Footnotes have been relabeled 1\u2013117, converted to endnotes,\n      and moved to the ends of the relevant chapters.\n\n\n\n\n\nThe Scott Library.\n\nHUME\u2019S POLITICAL DISCOURSES.\n\n\n\u2042 For Full List of the Volumes in This Series,\nSee Catalogue at End of Book.\n\n\nHUME\u2019S POLITICAL DISCOURSES.\n\nWith an Introduction by William Bell Robertson,\nAuthor of \u201cFoundations of Political Economy,\u201d\n\u201cSlavery of Labour,\u201d Etc.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nThe Walter Scott Publishing Co., Ltd.\nLondon and Felling-on-Tyne.\nNew York: 3 East 14th Street.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n\n Introduction                                            \u00a0vii\n\n Of Commerce                                               \u00a01\n\n Of Refinement in the Arts \u00a0                               15\n\n Of Money                                                 \u00a027\n\n Of Interest                                              \u00a039\n\n Of the Balance of Trade                                  \u00a051\n\n Of the Jealousy of Trade                                 \u00a067\n\n Of the Balance of Power                                  \u00a071\n\n Of Taxes                                                 \u00a078\n\n Of Public Credit                                         \u00a083\n\n Of some Remarkable Customs \u00a0                              98\n\n Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations                  \u00a0106\n\n Of the Original Contract \u00a0                               174\n\n Of Passive Obedience                                   \u00a0 192\n\n Of the Coalition of Parties                            \u00a0 196\n\n Of the Protestant Succession                           \u00a0 203\n\n Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth \u00a0                         214\n\n That Politics may be Reduced to a Science               \u00a0229\n\n Of the First Principles of Government                   \u00a0243\n\n Of Political Society                                    \u00a0247\n\n Alphabetical Arrangement of Authorities cited by Hume   \u00a0253\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION.\n\n\nRegretting the meagre records of the life of Adam Smith, the Right\nHon. R. B. Haldane, M.P.,\u200b[1] remarks:\u2014\u201cWe think of him, in the main,\nand we think of him rightly, as the bosom friend of David Hume\u201d (b.\n1711, d. 1777). Naturally, incidents in the life of a philosopher are\nneither numerous nor stirring. It is unreasonable to expect them, and\nsuch stories as are handed down regarding great thinkers are best not\nto be accepted unreservedly. I leave Hume, therefore, to present his\nown picture as drawn in _My own Life_\u2014the picture he wished posterity\nto have\u2014which consequently follows this introduction, and is itself\nfollowed by Adam Smith\u2019s celebrated letter to Mr. Strahan, Hume\u2019s\npublisher, giving an account of Hume\u2019s death.\n\nIt is chiefly as a political economist that Hume concerns us here,\nas it is in the _Political Discourses_, first published in 1752, his\neconomic principles are set forth. What the reader may expect to find\nin these _Discourses_ I prefer to let writers of renown tell. Thus Lord\nBrougham\u2014\n\n \u201cOf the _Political Discourses_ it would be difficult to speak in\n terms of too great commendation. They combine almost every excellence\n which can belong to such a performance. The reasoning is clear, and\n unencumbered with more words or more illustrations than are necessary\n for bringing out the doctrines. The learning is extensive, accurate,\n and profound, not only as to systems of philosophy, but as to history,\n whether modern or ancient. .\u00a0.\u00a0. The great merit, however, of these\n _Discourses_ is their originality, and the new system of politics\n and political economy which they unfold. Mr. Hume is, beyond all\n doubt, the author of the modern doctrines which now rule the world of\n science, which are to a great extent the guide of practical statesmen,\n and are only prevented from being applied in their fullest extent to\n the affairs of nations by the clashing interests and the ignorant\n prejudices of certain powerful classes.\u201d\n\nThus, again, J. Hill Burton,\u200b[2] Hume\u2019s biographer\u2014\n\n \u201cThese _Discourses_ are in truth the cradle of political economy; and\n much as that science has been investigated and expounded in later\n times, these earliest, shortest, and simplest developments of its\n principles are still read with delight even by those who are masters\n of all the literature of this great subject. But they possess a\n quality which more elaborate economists have striven after in vain,\n in being a pleasing object of study not only to the initiated, but to\n the ordinary popular reader, and of being admitted as just and true\n by many who cannot or will not understand the views of later writers\n on political economy. They have thus the rarely conjoined merit that,\n as they were the first to direct the way to the true sources of this\n department of knowledge, those who have gone farther, instead of\n superseding them, have in the general case confirmed their accuracy.\u201d\n\nThe _Discourses_, in Hume\u2019s own words, was \u201cthe only work of mine that\nwas successful on the first publication,\u201d and its success was great.\nTranslated into French immediately, \u201cthey conferred,\u201d says Professor\nHuxley, \u201ca European reputation upon their author; and, what was more\nto the purpose, influenced the later school of economists of the\neighteenth century.\u201d On the same head Burton says\u2014\u201cAs no Frenchman\nhad previously approached the subject of political economy with a\nphilosophical pen, this little book was a main instrument, either by\ncausing assent or provoking controversy, in producing the host of\nFrench works published between the time of its translation and the\npublication of Smith\u2019s _Wealth of Nations_ in 1776. The work of the\nelder Mirabeau in particular\u2014_L\u2019ami des Hommes_\u2014was in a great measure\na controversial examination of Hume\u2019s opinions on population.\u201d\n\nProfessor Knight of St. Andrews, again, echoes similar sentiments.\n\n \u201cThe merit of the _Discourses_,\u201d he remarks, \u201cis not only great, but\n they are unrivalled to this day; and it is not too much to affirm that\n they prepared the way for all the subsequent economic literature of\n England, including the _Wealth of Nations_, in which Smith laid down\n the broad and durable foundations of the science. .\u00a0.\u00a0. The effect\n produced by these _Discourses_ was great. Immediately translated into\n French, they passed through five editions in fourteen years. They\n were a distinctive addition to English literature, and were strictly\n scientific, though not technical. They at once floated Hume into\n fame, bringing him to the front, both as a thinker and as a man of\n letters; and posterity has ratified this judgment of the hour. .\u00a0.\u00a0.\n They contain many original germs of economic truth. The effect they\n had on practical statesmen, such as Pitt, must not be overlooked. It\n was perhaps an advantage that the economic doctrines, both of Hume and\n Smith, were published at that particular time, as they led naturally\n and easily to several reforms, without being developed to extremes, as\n was subsequently the case in France.\u201d\n\nAll this testimony as to the merits of the _Discourses_\u2014testimony from\nmen of widely divergent views\u2014is sufficient justification for offering\nthem in popular form to the public at a time like the present, when the\nfoundations of political economy are, one might say, being re-laid.\u200b[3]\n\nWe have already hinted at the friendship that existed between Hume and\nAdam Smith. Hume was Smith\u2019s senior by twelve years, and seems to have\nhad the latter brought under his notice by Hutcheson, Professor of\nMoral Philosophy at Glasgow University. In a letter to Hutcheson, dated\nMarch 4th, 1740, he says\u2014\u201cMy bookseller has sent to Mr. Smith a copy\nof my book,\u200b[4] which I hope he has received as well as your letter.\u201d\n\u201cThe Smith here mentioned,\u201d Burton says, \u201cwe may fairly conclude,\nnotwithstanding the universality of the name, to be Adam Smith, who was\nthen a student in the University of Glasgow, and not quite seventeen\nyears old. It may be inferred that Hutcheson had mentioned Smith as a\nperson on whom it would serve some good purpose to bestow a copy of\nthe _Treatise_; and we have here evidently the first introduction to\neach other\u2019s notice of two friends, of whom it can be said there was no\nthird person writing the English language during the same period who\nhas had so much influence upon the opinions of mankind as either of\nthese two men.\u201d\n\nHume\u2019s influence upon Adam Smith was great. Even in the ring of the\nphraseology of the _Wealth of Nations_ I sometimes fancy I can hear\nHume. Anyway, the book referred to in the above letter as sent to\nSmith, Mr. Haldane considers as \u201cin all probability\u201d the determining\nfactor in making Smith abandon his original intention of entering the\nChurch. \u201cWhether Hume could have been but for Smith we cannot now say;\nbut we know that, but for Hume, Smith could never have been.\u201d\u200b[5] While\nagreeing that \u201cbut for Hume Smith could never have been,\u201d I see no\nreason to question that Hume could have been without Smith. Hume had\nwithin him what may here be called the divine light, and it had to come\nout. That is why, \u201cin poverty and riches, in health and sickness, in\nlaborious obscurity and amidst the blaze of fame,\u201d his ruling passion\u2014a\npassion for literature\u2014never abated. No man can strike out for himself\nan original line and stick to it like this, \u201cthrough thick and thin,\u201d\nunless he have assurance of the truth of that that is in him. Hume had\nthis assurance. True, he sought fame\u2014and he achieved fame; not for its\nown sake\u2014that is inconceivable in so great a thinker, a thinker with\nsuch a true notion of the relation of things\u2014but for the sake of the\ntruths he had to promulgate; for the higher his eminence the wider and\nmore attentive would be his audience. Of course, he sought fame, and\nhe found gratification in it. It was not the gratification of vanity,\nhowever, that writers on Hume usually interpret it as; it was the\ngratification arising from the knowledge that one has hit the mark\u2014that\none has not laboured in vain. The petty vanity ascribed to Hume would\nnot have suffered him as \u201cthe parent of the first elucidations of\npolitical economy to see his own offspring eclipsed, and to see it with\npride\u201d\u2014his attitude, according to Burton, on the successful reception\nof _The Wealth of Nations_. Vanity, again, would have prevented between\nthese two men that unalloyed friendship so charming to contemplate.\n\nIn 1776, the year before Hume\u2019s death, _The Wealth of Nations_\nappeared, and here is how Hume writes to the author:\u2014\n\n \u201c_February_ 8, 1776.\n\n \u201cDEAR SMITH,\u2014I am as lazy a correspondent as you, yet my anxiety about\n you makes me write. By all accounts your book has been printed long\n ago; yet it has never been so much as advertized. What is the reason?\n If you wait till the fate of America be decided, you may wait long.\n\n \u201cBy all accounts you intend to settle with us this spring; yet we hear\n no more of it. What is the reason? Your chamber in my house is always\n unoccupied. I am always at home. I expect you to land here.\n\n \u201cI have been, am, and shall be probably in an indifferent state of\n health. I weighed myself t\u2019other day, and find I have fallen five\n complete stones. If you delay much longer I shall probably disappear\n altogether.\n\n \u201cThe Duke of Buccleuch tells me that you are very zealous in American\n affairs. My notion is that the matter is not so important as is\n commonly imagined. If I be mistaken, I shall probably correct my error\n when I see you or read you. Our navigation and general commerce may\n suffer more than our manufactures. Should London fall as much in its\n size as I have done, it will be the better. It is nothing but a hulk\n of bad and unclean humours.\u201d\n\nAt last the book appears, and Hume writes his friend, April 1st, 1776:\u2014\n\n \u201cI am much pleased with your performance; and the perusal of it has\n taken me from a state of great anxiety. It was a work of so much\n expectation by yourself, by your friends, and by the public, that I\n trembled for its first appearance, but am now much relieved. Not but\n that the reading of it necessarily requires so much attention, and\n the public is disposed to give so little, that I shall still doubt\n for some time of its being at first very popular. But it has depth\n and solidity and acuteness, and is so much illustrated by curious\n facts that it must at last take the public attention. It is probably\n much improved by your last abode in London. If you were here at my\n fireside, I should dispute some of your principles. I cannot think\n that the rent of farms makes any part of the price of produce,\u200b[6]\n but that the price is determined altogether by the quantity and the\n demand. .\u00a0.\u00a0. But these and a hundred other points are fit only to be\n discussed in conversation.\u201d\n\nHume, though he \u201ctook a particular pleasure in the company of modest\nwomen, and had no reason to be displeased with the reception he met\nwith from them,\u201d died unmarried. Adam Smith also died unmarried,\n\u201cthough he was for several years,\u201d according to Dugald Stewart,\n\u201cattached to a young lady of great beauty and accomplishment.\u201d Hume, in\nthe Essay \u201cOf the Study of History,\u201d speaks of being desired once by \u201ca\nyoung beauty _for whom I had some passion_ to send her some novels and\nromances for her amusement.\u201d David was a \u201ccanny\u201d man though. In these\ncircumstances the following playful sally in a letter from Hume to Mrs.\nDysart, of Eccles, a relative, may have interest:\u2014\u201cWhat arithmetic\nwill serve to fix the proportion between good and bad wives, and rate\nthe different classes of each? Sir Isaac Newton himself, who could\nmeasure the course of the planets and weigh the earth as in a pair of\nscales\u2014even he had not algebra enough to reduce that amiable part of\nour species to a just equation; and they are the only heavenly bodies\nwhose orbits are as yet uncertain.\u201d\n\nThe foregoing are mere glimpses of this truly great man, and are\noffered with a view to awakening and stimulating amongst general\nreaders a desire for first-hand knowledge of David Hume.\n\nW. B. R.\n\n_May_ 1906.\n\n\nMY OWN LIFE.\n\nIt is difficult for a man to speak long of himself without vanity;\ntherefore, I shall be short. It may be thought an instance of vanity\nthat I pretend at all to write my life; but this narrative shall\ncontain little more than the History of my Writings; as, indeed, almost\nall my life has been spent in literary pursuits and occupations. The\nfirst success of most of my writings was not such as to be an object of\nvanity.\n\nI was born the 26th of April 1711, old style, at Edinburgh. I was of a\ngood family, both by father and mother. My father\u2019s family is a branch\nof the Earl of Home\u2019s or Hume\u2019s; and my ancestors had been proprietors\nof the estate, which my brother possesses, for several generations. My\nmother was daughter of Sir David Falconer, President of the College of\nJustice; the title of Halkerton came by succession to her brother.\n\nMy family, however, was not rich; and, being myself a younger brother,\nmy patrimony, according to the mode of my country, was of course very\nslender. My father, who passed for a man of parts, died when I was\nan infant, leaving me, with an elder brother and a sister, under the\ncare of our mother, a woman of singular merit, who, though young and\nhandsome, devoted herself entirely to the rearing and educating of\nher children. I passed through the ordinary course of education with\nsuccess, and was seized very early with a passion for literature, which\nhas been the ruling passion of my life, and the great source of my\nenjoyments. My studious disposition, my sobriety, and my industry gave\nmy family a notion that the law was a proper profession for me; but\nI found an insurmountable aversion to everything but the pursuits of\nphilosophy and general learning; and while they fancied I was poring\nupon Voet and Vinnius, Cicero and Virgil were the authors which I was\nsecretly devouring.\n\nMy very slender fortune, however, being unsuitable to this plan of\nlife, and my health being a little broken by my ardent application, I\nwas tempted, or rather forced, to make a very feeble trial for entering\ninto a more active scene of life. In 1734 I went to Bristol, with some\nrecommendations to eminent merchants, but in a few months found that\nscene totally unsuitable to me. I went over to France, with a view of\nprosecuting my studies in a country retreat, and I there laid that plan\nof life which I have steadily and successfully pursued. I resolved\nto make a very rigid frugality supply my deficiency of fortune, to\nmaintain unimpaired my independency, and to regard every object as\ncontemptible except the improvement of my talents in literature.\n\nDuring my retreat in France, first at Rheims, but chiefly at La Fleche,\nin Anjou, I composed my _Treatise of Human Nature_. After passing three\nyears very agreeably in that country, I came over to London in 1737.\nIn the end of 1738 I published my Treatise, and immediately went down\nto my mother and my brother, who lived at his country-house, and was\nemploying himself very judiciously and successfully in the improvement\nof his fortune.\n\nNever literary attempt was more unfortunate than my _Treatise of Human\nNature_. It fell _dead-born from the press_, without reaching such\ndistinction as even to excite a murmur among the zealots. But being\nnaturally of a cheerful and sanguine temper, I very soon recovered\nthe blow, and prosecuted with great ardour my studies in the country.\nIn 1742 I printed at Edinburgh the first part of my Essays: the work\nwas favourably received, and soon made me entirely forget my former\ndisappointment. I continued with my mother and brother in the country,\nand in that time recovered the knowledge of the Greek language, which I\nhad too much neglected in my early youth.\n\nIn 1745 I received a letter from the Marquis of Annandale, inviting me\nto come and live with him in England; I found also that the friends\nand family of that young nobleman were desirous of putting him under\nmy care and direction, for the state of his mind and health required\nit. I lived with him a twelvemonth. My appointments during that time\nmade a considerable accession to my small fortune. I then received\nan invitation from General St. Clair to attend him as a secretary to\nhis expedition, which was at first meant against Canada, but ended\nin an incursion on the coast of France. Next year\u2014to wit, 1747\u2014I\nreceived an invitation from the General to attend him in the same\nstation in his military embassy to the courts of Vienna and Turin.\nI then wore the uniform of an officer, and was introduced at these\ncourts as aide-de-camp to the General, along with Sir Harry Erskine\nand Captain Grant, now General Grant. These two years were almost the\nonly interruptions which my studies have received during the course\nof my life. I passed them agreeably, and in good company; and my\nappointments, with my frugality, had made me reach a fortune, which I\ncalled independent, though most of my friends were inclined to smile\nwhen I said so; in short, I was now master of near a thousand pounds.\n\nI had always entertained a notion that my want of success in publishing\nthe _Treatise of Human Nature_ had proceeded more from the manner than\nthe matter, and that I had been guilty of a very usual indiscretion in\ngoing to the press too _early_. I, therefore, cast the first part of\nthat work anew in the _Inquiry concerning Human Understanding_, which\nwas published while I was at Turin. But this piece was at first little\nmore successful than the _Treatise of Human Nature_. On my return\nfrom Italy, I had the mortification to find all England in a ferment\non account of Dr. Middleton\u2019s _Free Inquiry_, while my performance\nwas entirely overlooked and neglected. A new edition, which had been\npublished at London, of my _Essays, Moral and Political_, met not with\na much better reception.\n\nSuch is the force of natural temper, that these disappointments made\nlittle or no impression on me. I went down in 1749 and lived two years\nwith my brother at his country-house, for my mother was now dead. I\nthere composed the second part of my Essays, which I called _Political\nDiscourses_, and also my _Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals_,\nwhich is another part of my Treatise that I cast anew. Meanwhile, my\nbookseller, A. Millar, informed me that my former publications (all\nbut the unfortunate Treatise) were beginning to be the subject of\nconversation; that the sale of them was gradually increasing, and that\nnew editions were demanded. Answers by Reverends and Right Reverends\ncame out two or three in a year; and I found, by Dr. Warburton\u2019s\nrailing, that the books were beginning to be esteemed in good company.\nHowever, I had a fixed resolution, which I inflexibly maintained, never\nto reply to anybody; and not being very irascible in my temper, I have\neasily kept myself clear of all literary squabbles. These symptoms of\na rising reputation gave me encouragement, as I was ever more disposed\nto see the favourable than unfavourable side of things; a turn of mind\nwhich it is more happy to possess than to be born to an estate of ten\nthousand a year.\n\nIn 1751 I removed from the country to the town, the true scene for\na man of letters. In 1752 were published at Edinburgh, where I then\nlived, my _Political Discourses_, the only work of mine that was\nsuccessful on the first publication. It was well received abroad\nand at home. In the same year was published at London my _Inquiry\nconcerning the Principles of Morals_; which, in my own opinion (who\nought not to judge on that subject), is of all my writings, historical,\nphilosophical, or literary, incomparably the best. It came unnoticed\nand unobserved into the world.\n\nIn 1752 the Faculty of Advocates chose me their Librarian, an office\nfrom which I received little or no emolument, but which gave me\nthe command of a large library. I then formed the plan of writing\nthe _History of England_; but being frightened with the notion of\ncontinuing a narrative through a period of seventeen hundred years, I\ncommenced with the accession of the House of Stuart, an epoch when,\nI thought, the misrepresentations of faction began chiefly to take\nplace. I was, I own, sanguine in my expectations of the success of\nthis work. I thought that I was the only historian that had at once\nneglected present power, interest, and authority, and the cry of\npopular prejudices; and as the subject was suited to every capacity, I\nexpected proportional applause. But miserable was my disappointment:\nI was assailed by one cry of reproach, disapprobation, and even\ndetestation; English, Scotch, and Irish, Whig and Tory, Churchman and\nSectary, Freethinker and Religionist, Patriot and Courtier, united in\ntheir rage against the man who had presumed to shed a generous tear for\nthe fate of Charles I. and the Earl of Strafford; and after the first\nebullitions of their fury were over, what was still more mortifying,\nthe book seemed to sink into oblivion. Mr. Millar told me that in a\ntwelvemonth, he sold only forty-five copies of it. I scarcely, indeed,\nheard of one man in the three kingdoms, considerable for rank or\nletters, that could endure the book. I must only except the Primate\nof England, Dr. Herring, and the Primate of Ireland, Dr. Stone, which\nseem two odd exceptions. These dignified prelates separately sent me\nmessages not to be discouraged.\n\nI was, however, I confess, discouraged; and had not the war been at\nthat time breaking out between France and England, I had certainly\nretired to some provincial town of the former kingdom, have changed\nmy name, and never more have returned to my native country. But as\nthis scheme was not now practicable, and the subsequent volume was\nconsiderably advanced, I resolved to pick up courage, and to persevere.\n\nIn this interval I published at London my _Natural History of\nReligion_, along with some other small pieces. Its public entry was\nrather obscure, except only that Dr. Hurd wrote a pamphlet against\nit, with all the illiberal petulance, arrogance, and scurrility which\ndistinguish the Warburtonian school. This pamphlet gave me some\nconsolation for the otherwise indifferent reception of my performance.\n\nIn 1756, two years after the fall of the first volume, was published\nthe second volume of my _History_, containing the period from the death\nof Charles I. till the Revolution. This performance happened to give\nless displeasure to the Whigs, and was better received. It not only\nrose itself, but helped to buoy up its unfortunate brother.\n\nBut though I had been taught, by experience, that the Whig party\nwere in possession of bestowing all places, both in the State and\nin literature, I was so little inclined to yield to their senseless\nclamour, that in about a hundred alterations which further study,\nreading, or reflection engaged me to make in the reigns of the two\nfirst Stuarts, I have made all of them invariably to the Tory side. It\nis ridiculous to consider the English constitution before that period\nas a regular plan of liberty.\n\nIn 1759 I published my _History of the House of Tudor_. The clamour\nagainst this performance was almost equal to that against the history\nof the two first Stuarts. The reign of Elizabeth was particularly\nobnoxious. But I was now callous against the impressions of public\nfolly, and continued very peaceably and contentedly in my retreat\nat Edinburgh, to finish, in two volumes, the more early part of the\nEnglish History, which I gave to the public in 1761, with tolerable,\nand but tolerable success.\n\nBut notwithstanding this variety of winds and seasons, to which my\nwritings had been exposed, they had still been making such advances\nthat the copy-money given me by the booksellers much exceeded anything\nformerly known in England; I was become not only independent, but\nopulent. I retired to my native country of Scotland, determined never\nmore to set my foot out of it; and retaining the satisfaction of never\nhaving preferred a request to one great man, or even making advances\nof friendship to any of them. As I was now turned of fifty, I thought\nof passing all the rest of my life in this philosophical manner, when\nI received, in 1763, an invitation from the Earl of Hertford, with\nwhom I was not in the least acquainted, to attend him on his embassy\nto Paris, with a near prospect of being appointed Secretary to the\nembassy, and, in the meanwhile, of performing the functions of that\noffice. This offer, however inviting, I at first declined, both because\nI was reluctant to begin connections with the great, and because I was\nafraid the civilities and gay company of Paris would prove disagreeable\nto a person of my age and humour; but on his lordship\u2019s repeating the\ninvitation, I accepted of it. I have every reason, both of pleasure and\ninterest, to think myself happy in my connections with that nobleman,\nas well as afterwards with his brother, General Conway.\n\nThose who have not seen the strange effects of Modes, will never\nimagine the reception I met with at Paris, from men and women of all\nranks and stations. The more I resiled from their excessive civilities,\nthe more I was loaded with them. There is, however, a real satisfaction\nin living in Paris, from the great number of sensible, knowing, and\npolite company with which that city abounds above all places in the\nuniverse. I thought once of settling there for life.\n\nI was appointed Secretary to the embassy; and in summer 1765, Lord\nHertford left me, being appointed Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. I was\n_charg\u00e9 d\u2019affaires_ till the arrival of the Duke of Richmond, towards\nthe end of the year. In the beginning of 1766 I left Paris, and next\nsummer went to Edinburgh, with the same view as formerly, of burying\nmyself in a philosophical retreat. I returned to that place, not\nricher, but with much more money, and a much larger income, by means\nof Lord Hertford\u2019s friendship, than I left it; and I was desirous\nof trying what superfluity could produce, as I had formerly made an\nexperiment of a competency. But in 1767 I received from Mr. Conway\nan invitation to be Under Secretary; and this invitation, both the\ncharacter of the person and my connections with Lord Hertford prevented\nme from declining. I returned to Edinburgh in 1769, very opulent (for\nI possessed a revenue of \u00a31000 a year), healthy, and, though somewhat\nstricken in years, with the prospect of enjoying long my ease, and of\nseeing the increase of my reputation.\n\nIn spring 1775, I was struck with a disorder in my bowels, which at\nfirst gave me no alarm, but has since, as I apprehend it, become\nmortal and incurable. I now reckon upon a speedy dissolution. I have\nsuffered very little pain from my disorder; and what is more strange,\nhave, notwithstanding the great decline of my person, never suffered\na moment\u2019s abatement of my spirits; insomuch, that were I to name the\nperiod of my life which I should most choose to pass over again, I\nmight be tempted to point to this later period. I possess the same\nardour as ever in study, and the same gaiety in company. I consider,\nbesides, that a man of sixty-five, by dying, cuts off only a few\nyears of infirmities; and though I see many symptoms of my literary\nreputation\u2019s breaking out at last with additional lustre, I knew that\nI could have but few years to enjoy it. It is difficult to be more\ndetached from life than I am at present.\n\nTo conclude historically with my own character. I am, or rather was\n(for that is the style I must now use in speaking of myself, which\nemboldens me the more to speak my sentiments)\u2014I was, I say, a man\nof mild dispositions, of command of temper, of an open, social,\nand cheerful humour, capable of attachment, but little susceptible\nof enmity, and of great moderation in all my passions. Even my\nlove of literary fame, my ruling passion, never soured my temper,\nnotwithstanding my frequent disappointments. My company was not\nunacceptable to the young and careless, as well as to the studious and\nliterary; and as I took a particular pleasure in the company of modest\nwomen, I had no reason to be displeased with the reception I met with\nfrom them. In a word, though most men anywise eminent have found reason\nto complain of calumny, I never was touched, or even attacked by her\nbaleful tooth: and though I wantonly exposed myself to the rage of both\ncivil and religious factions, they seemed to be disarmed in my behalf\nof their wonted fury. My friends never had occasion to vindicate\nany one circumstance of my character and conduct: not but that the\nzealots, we may well suppose, would have been glad to invent and\npropagate any story to my disadvantage, but they never could find any\nwhich they thought would wear the face of probability. I cannot say\nthere is no vanity in making this funeral oration of myself, but I hope\nit is not a misplaced one; and this is a matter of fact which is easily\ncleared and ascertained.\n\n_April_ 18, 1776.\n\n\nADAM SMITH\u2019S CELEBRATED ACCOUNT OF HUME\u2019S DEATH.\n\n\u201cKIRKCALDY, FIFESHIRE, _Nov._ 9, 1776.\n\n\u201cDEAR SIR,\u2014It is with a real, though a very melancholy pleasure, that\nI sit down to give you some account of the behaviour of our excellent\nfriend, Mr. Hume, during his last illness.\n\n\u201cThough, in his own judgment, his disease was mortal and incurable,\nyet he allowed himself to be prevailed upon, by the entreaty of his\nfriends, to try what might be the effects of a long journey. A few days\nbefore he set out he wrote that account of his own life which, together\nwith his other papers, he has left to your care. My account, therefore,\nshall begin where his ends.\n\n\u201cHe set out for London towards the end of April, and at Morpeth met\nwith Mr. John Home and myself, who had both come down from London to\nsee him, expecting to have found him in Edinburgh. Mr. Home returned\nwith him, and attended him during the whole of his stay in England,\nwith that care and attention which might be expected from a temper so\nperfectly friendly and affectionate. As I had written to my mother\nthat she might expect me in Scotland, I was under the necessity of\ncontinuing my journey. His disease seemed to yield to exercise and\nchange of air, and when he arrived in London he was apparently in much\nbetter health than when he left Edinburgh. He was advised to go to\nBath to drink the waters, which appeared for some time to have so good\nan effect upon him that even he himself began to entertain, what he\nwas not apt to do, a better opinion of his own health. His symptoms,\nhowever, soon returned with their usual violence, and from that moment\nhe gave up all thoughts of recovery, but submitted with the utmost\ncheerfulness, and the most perfect complacency and resignation. Upon\nhis return to Edinburgh, though he found himself much weaker, yet his\ncheerfulness never abated, and he continued to divert himself as usual,\nwith correcting his own works for a new edition, and reading books of\namusement, with the conversation of his friends, and, sometimes in the\nevening, with a party at his favourite game of whist. His cheerfulness\nwas so great, his conversation and amusements ran so much in their\nusual strain that, notwithstanding all bad symptoms, many people\ncould not believe he was dying. \u2018I shall tell your friend, Colonel\nEdmondstone,\u2019 said Doctor Dundas to him one day, \u2018that I left you\nmuch better, and in a fair way of recovery.\u2019 \u2018Doctor,\u2019 said he, \u2018as I\nbelieve you would not choose to tell anything but the truth, you had\nbetter tell him that I am dying as fast as my enemies, if I have any,\ncould wish, and as easily and as cheerfully as my best friends could\ndesire.\u2019 Colonel Edmondstone soon afterwards came to see him, and took\nleave of him; and on his way home he could not forbear writing him a\nletter bidding him once more an eternal adieu, and applying to him, as\na dying man, the beautiful French verses in which the Abb\u00e9 Chaulieu,\nin expectation of his own death, laments his approaching separation\nfrom his friend, the Marquis de la Fare. Mr. Hume\u2019s magnanimity and\nfirmness were such, that his most affectionate friends knew that they\nhazarded nothing in talking or writing to him as to a dying man,\nand that, so far from being hurt by this frankness, he was rather\npleased and flattered by it. I happened to come into his room while\nhe was reading this letter, which he had just received, and which he\nimmediately showed me. I told him that though I was sensible how very\nmuch he was weakened, and that appearances were in many respects very\nbad yet his cheerfulness was still so great, the spirit of life seemed\nstill to be so very strong in him, that I could not help\nentertaining some faint hopes. He answered\u2014\u2018Your hopes are groundless.\nAn habitual diarrh\u0153a of more than a year\u2019s standing would be a very bad\ndisease at any age: at my age it is a mortal one. When I lie down in\nthe evening, I feel myself weaker than when I rose in the morning; and\nwhen I rise in the morning, weaker than when I lay down in the evening.\nI am sensible, besides, that some of my vital parts are affected, so\nthat I must soon die.\u2019 \u2018Well,\u2019 said I, \u2018if it must be so, you have at\nleast the satisfaction of leaving all your friends, your brother\u2019s\nfamily in particular, in great prosperity.\u2019 He said that he felt that\nsatisfaction so sensibly, that when he was reading a few days before,\nLucian\u2019s _Dialogues of the Dead_, among all the excuses which are\nalleged to Charon for not entering readily into his boat, he could not\nfind one that fitted him: he had no house to finish, he had no daughter\nto provide for, he had no enemies upon whom he wished to revenge\nhimself. \u2018I could not well imagine,\u2019 said he, \u2018what excuse I could make\nto Charon in order to obtain a little delay. I have done everything of\nconsequence which I ever meant to do; and I could at no time expect\nto leave my relations and friends in a better situation than that in\nwhich I am now like to leave them; I therefore have all reason to die\ncontented.\u2019 He then diverted himself with inventing several jocular\nexcuses, which he supposed he might make to Charon, and with imagining\nthe very surly answers which it might suit the character of Charon\nto return to them. \u2018Upon further consideration,\u2019 said he, \u2018I thought\nI might say to him, good Charon, I have been correcting my works for\na new edition; allow me a little time that I may see how the public\nreceives the alterations.\u2019 But Charon would answer, \u2018When you have seen\nthe effect of these, you will be for making other alterations. There\nwill be no end of such excuses; so, honest friend, please step into the\nboat.\u2019 But I might still urge, \u2018Have a little patience, good Charon;\nI have been endeavouring to open the eyes of the public. If I live a\nfew years longer, I may have the satisfaction of seeing the downfall\nof some of the prevailing systems of superstition.\u2019 But Charon would\nthen lose all temper and decency. \u2018You loitering rogue; that will not\nhappen these many hundred years. Do you fancy I will grant you a lease\nfor so long a term? Get into the boat this instant, you lazy, loitering\nrogue.\u2019\n\n\u201cBut though Mr. Hume always talked of his approaching dissolution\nwith great cheerfulness, he never affected to make any parade of his\nmagnanimity. He never mentioned the subject but when the conversation\nnaturally led to it, and never dwelt longer upon it than the course of\nthe conversation happened to require; it was a subject, indeed, which\noccurred pretty frequently, in consequence of the inquiries which his\nfriends who came to see him naturally made concerning the state of his\nhealth. The conversation which I mentioned above, and which passed\non Thursday the 8th of August, was the last except one that I ever\nhad with him. He had now become so very weak that the company of his\nmost intimate friends fatigued him; for his cheerfulness was still so\ngreat, his complaisance and social disposition were still so entire,\nthat when any friend was with him he could not help talking more, and\nwith greater exertion than suited the weakness of his body. At his own\ndesire, therefore, I agreed to leave Edinburgh, where I was staying\npartly upon his account, and returned to my mother\u2019s house here, at\nKirkcaldy, upon condition that he would send for me whenever he wished\nto see me; the physician who saw him most frequently, Dr. Black,\nundertaking in the meantime to write me occasionally an account of the\nstate of his health.\n\n\u201cOn the 22nd of August the doctor wrote me the following letter:\u2014\n\n\u201c\u2018Since my last Mr. Hume has passed his time pretty easily, but is much\nweaker. He sits up, goes downstairs once a day, and amuses himself with\nreading, but seldom sees anybody. He finds that even the conversation\nof his most intimate friends fatigues and oppresses him; and it is\nhappy that he does not need it, for he is quite free from anxiety,\nimpatience, or low spirits, and passes his time very well with the\nassistance of amusing books.\u2019\n\n\u201cI received the day after a letter from Mr. Hume himself, of which the\nfollowing is an extract:\u2014\n\n\u201c\u2018EDINBURGH, _August_ 23, 1776.\n\n\u201c\u2018MY DEAREST FRIEND,\u2014I am obliged to make use of my nephew\u2019s hand in\nwriting to you, as I do not rise to-day.\n\n\u00b7\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00b7\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00b7\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00b7\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00b7\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00b7\n\n\u201c\u2018I go very fast to decline, and last night had a small fever, which I\nhoped might put a quicker period to this tedious illness; but unluckily\nit has, in a great measure, gone off. I cannot submit to your coming\nover here on my account, as it is possible for me to see you so small\na part of the day, but Dr. Black can better inform you concerning the\ndegree of strength which may from time to time remain with me. Adieu,\netc.\u2019\n\n\u201cThree days after I received the following letter from Dr. Black:\u2014\n\n\u201c\u2018EDINBURGH, _August_ 26_th_, 1776.\n\n\u201c\u2018DEAR SIR,\u2014Yesterday, about four o\u2019clock afternoon, Mr. Hume expired.\nThe near approach of his death became evident in the night between\nThursday and Friday, when his disease became excessive, and soon\nweakened him so much that he could no longer rise out of his bed. He\ncontinued to the last perfectly sensible, and free from much pain\nor feeling of distress. He never dropped the smallest expression of\nimpatience, but when he had occasion to speak to the people about him\nalways did it with affection and tenderness. I thought it improper to\nwrite to bring you over, especially as I heard that he had dictated a\nletter to you desiring you not to come. When he became very weak it\ncost him an effort to speak, and he died in such a happy composure of\nmind that nothing could exceed it!\u2019\n\n\u201cThus died our most excellent and never-to-be-forgotten friend,\nconcerning whose philosophical opinions men will, no doubt, judge\nvariously, every one approving or condemning them according as they\nhappen to coincide or disagree with his own; but concerning whose\ncharacter and conduct there can scarce be a difference of opinion.\nHis temper, indeed, seemed to be more happily balanced\u2014if I may be\nallowed such an expression\u2014than that perhaps of any other man I have\never known. Even in the lowest state of his fortune his great and\nnecessary frugality never hindered him from exercising, upon proper\noccasions, acts both of charity and generosity. It was a frugality\nfounded not upon avarice but upon the love of independency. The extreme\ngentleness of his nature never weakened either the firmness of his mind\nor the steadiness of his resolutions. His constant pleasantry was the\ngenuine effusion of good-nature and good-humour tempered with delicacy\nand modesty, and without even the slightest tincture of malignity\u2014so\nfrequently the disagreeable source of what is called wit in other men.\nIt never was the meaning of his raillery to mortify, and therefore, far\nfrom offending, it seldom failed to please and delight even those who\nwere the object of it. To his friends\u2014who were frequently the object of\nit\u2014there was not perhaps any one of all his great and amiable qualities\nwhich contributed more to endear his conversation. And that gaiety of\ntemper, so agreeable in society, but which is so often accompanied with\nfrivolous and superficial qualities, was in him certainly attended\nwith the most severe application, the most extensive learning, the\ngreatest depth of thought, and a capacity in every respect the most\ncomprehensive. Upon the whole, I have always considered him, both in\nhis lifetime and since his death, as approaching as nearly to the idea\nof a perfectly wise and virtuous man as perhaps the nature of human\nfrailty will permit.\n\n\u201cI ever am, dear sir, most affectionately yours,\n\n\u201cADAM SMITH.\u201d\n\n\u2042 \u201cIt is a usual fallacy,\u201d says Hume in \u201cOf the Populousness of Ancient\nNations,\u201d \u201cto consider all the ages of antiquity as one period.\u201d The\ndates given in the Appendix may serve as a corrective in this regard.\n\n\nNOTES, INTRODUCTION.\n\n[1] _Life of Adam Smith_, \u201cGreat Writers\u201d series.\n\n\n[2] _Life and Correspondence of David Hume_, 1846.\n\n\n[3] See _Foundations of Political Economy_, The Walter Scott Publishing\nCompany, Limited.\n\n\n[4] His _Treatise of Human Nature_, regarding the publication of which\nhe wrote in 1751 to Sir Gilbert Elliot, of Minto\u2014\u201cI was carried away\nby the heat of youth and invention to publish too precipitately. So\nvast an undertaking, planned before I was one-and-twenty, and composed\nbefore I was twenty-five, must necessarily be very defective. I have\nrepented my haste a hundred and a hundred times.\u201d\n\n\n[5] Haldane, _Life of Adam Smith_, \u201cGreat Writers\u201d series.\n\n\n[6] Hume\u2019s view is the juster here.\n\n\n\n\nHUME\u2019S POLITICAL DISCOURSES\n\n[Illustration, ornamental]\n\n\n\n\nOF COMMERCE.\n\n\nThe greatest part of mankind may be divided into two classes: that of\nshallow thinkers, who fall short of the truth; and that of abstruse\nthinkers, who go beyond it. The latter class are by far the most\nuncommon; and I may add, by far the most useful and valuable. They\nsuggest hints, at least, and start difficulties, which they want,\nperhaps, skill to pursue; but which may produce very fine discoveries,\nwhen handled by men who have a more just way of thinking. At worst,\nwhat they say is uncommon; and if it should cost some pains to\ncomprehend it, one has, however, the pleasure of hearing something that\nis new. An author is little to be valued who tells us nothing but what\nwe can learn from every coffee-house conversation.\n\nAll people of shallow thought are apt to decry even those of solid\nunderstanding, as abstruse thinkers, and metaphysicians, and refiners;\nand never will allow anything to be just which is beyond their own\nweak conceptions. There are some cases, I own, where an extraordinary\nrefinement affords a strong presumption of falsehood, and where no\nreasoning is to be trusted but what is natural and easy. When a man\ndeliberates concerning his conduct in any particular affair, and\nforms schemes in politics, trade, economy, or any business in life,\nhe never ought to draw his arguments too fine, or connect too long\na chain of consequences together. Something is sure to happen that\nwill disconcert his reasoning, and produce an event different\nfrom what he expected. But when we reason upon general subjects,\none may justly affirm that our speculations can scarce ever be too\nfine, provided they be just; and that the difference between a common\nman and a man of genius is chiefly seen in the shallowness or depth\nof the principles upon which they proceed. General reasonings seem\nintricate, merely because they are general; nor is it easy for the\nbulk of mankind to distinguish, in a great number of particulars, that\ncommon circumstance in which they all agree, or to extract it, pure\nand unmixed, from the other superfluous circumstances. Every judgment\nor conclusion, with them, is particular. They cannot enlarge their\nview to those universal propositions which comprehend under them an\ninfinite number of individuals, and include a whole science in a single\ntheorem. Their eye is confounded with such an extensive prospect; and\nthe conclusions derived from it, even though clearly expressed, seem\nintricate and obscure. But however intricate they may seem, it is\ncertain that general principles, if just and sound, must always prevail\nin the general course of things, though they may fail in particular\ncases; and it is the chief business of philosophers to regard the\ngeneral course of things. I may add that it is also the chief business\nof politicians; especially in the domestic government of the state,\nwhere the public good, which is, or ought to be, their object, depends\non the concurrence of a multitude of cases; not, as in foreign\npolitics, on accidents and chances, and the caprices of a few persons.\nThis therefore makes the difference between particular deliberations\nand general reasonings, and renders subtlety and refinement much more\nsuitable to the latter than to the former.\n\nI thought this introduction necessary before the following discourses\non commerce, money, interest, balance of trade, etc., where, perhaps,\nthere will occur some principles which are uncommon, and which may seem\ntoo refined and subtle for such vulgar subjects. If false, let them be\nrejected; but no one ought to entertain a prejudice against them merely\nbecause they are out of the common road.\n\nThe greatness of a state, and the happiness of its subjects, however\nindependent they may be supposed in some respects, are commonly allowed\nto be inseparable with regard to commerce; and as private men receive\ngreater security in the possession of their trade and riches from the\npower of the public, so the public becomes powerful in proportion to\nthe riches and extensive commerce of private men. This maxim is true in\ngeneral, though I cannot forbear thinking that it may possibly admit of\nsome exceptions, and that we often establish it with too little reserve\nand limitation. There may be some circumstances where the commerce,\nand riches, and luxury of individuals, instead of adding strength\nto the public, will serve only to thin its armies, and diminish its\nauthority among the neighbouring nations. Man is a very variable being,\nand susceptible of many different opinions, principles, and rules of\nconduct. What may be true while he adheres to one way of thinking will\nbe found false when he has embraced an opposite set of manners and\nopinions.\n\nThe bulk of every state may be divided into husbandmen and\nmanufacturers. The former are employed in the culture of the land;\nthe latter work up the materials furnished by the former, into all\nthe commodities which are necessary and ornamental to human life.\nAs soon as men quit their savage state, where they live chiefly by\nhunting and fishing, they must fall into these two classes; though\nthe arts of agriculture employ at first the most numerous part of the\nsociety.\u200b[7] Time and experience improve so much these arts, that the\nland may easily maintain a much greater number of men than those who\nare immediately employed in its cultivation, or who furnish the\nmore necessary manufactures to such as are so employed.\n\nIf these superfluous hands apply themselves to the finer arts, which\nare commonly denominated the arts of luxury, they add to the happiness\nof the state, since they afford to many the opportunity of receiving\nenjoyments with which they would otherwise have been unacquainted.\nBut may not another scheme be proposed for the employment of these\nsuperfluous hands? May not the sovereign lay claim to them, and\nemploy them in fleets and armies, to increase the dominions of the\nstate abroad, and spread its fame over distant nations? It is certain\nthat the fewer desires and wants are found in the proprietors and\nlabourers of land, the fewer hands do they employ; and consequently\nthe superfluities of the land, instead of maintaining tradesmen and\nmanufacturers, may support fleets and armies to a much greater extent\nthan where a great many arts are required to minister to the luxury of\nparticular persons. Here therefore seems to be a kind of opposition\nbetween the greatness of the state and the happiness of the subjects. A\nstate is never greater than when all its superfluous hands are employed\nin the service of the public. The ease and convenience of private\npersons require that these hands should be employed in their service.\nThe one can never be satisfied but at the expense of the other. As the\nambition of the sovereign must entrench on the luxury of individuals,\nso the luxury of individuals must diminish the force and check the\nambition of the sovereign.\n\nNor is this reasoning merely chimerical, but is founded on history and\nexperience. The republic of Sparta was certainly more powerful than any\nstate now in the world, consisting of an equal number of people, and\nthis was owing entirely to the want of commerce and luxury. The Helotes\nwere the labourers: the Spartans were the soldiers or gentlemen. It is\nevident that the labour of the Helotes could not have maintained so\ngreat a number of Spartans, had these latter lived in ease and delicacy\nand given employment to a great variety of trades and manufactures.\nThe like policy may be remarked in Rome. And indeed, through all\nancient history, it is observable that the smallest republics raised\nand maintained greater armies than states consisting of triple the\nnumber of inhabitants are able to support at present. It is computed\nthat in all European nations the proportion between soldiers and\npeople does not exceed one to a hundred. But we read that the city of\nRome alone, with its small territory, raised and maintained, in early\ntimes, ten legions against the Latins. Athens, whose whole dominions\nwere not larger than Yorkshire, sent to the expedition against Sicily\nnear forty thousand men. Dionysius the elder, it is said, maintained\na standing army of a hundred thousand foot and ten thousand horse,\nbesides a large fleet of four hundred sail,\u200b[8] though his territories\nextended no farther than the city of Syracuse, about a third part\nof the island of Sicily, and some seaport towns or garrisons on the\ncoast of Italy and Illyricum. It is true the ancient armies, in time\nof war, subsisted much upon plunder; but did not the enemy plunder in\ntheir turn? which was a more ruinous way of levying tax than any other\nthat could be devised. In short, no probable reason can be assigned\nfor the great power of the more ancient states above the modern but\ntheir want of commerce and luxury. Few artisans were maintained by the\nlabour of the farmers, and therefore more soldiers might live upon it.\nTitus Livius says that Rome, in his time, would find it difficult to\nraise as large an army as that which, in her early days, she sent out\nagainst the Gauls and Latins. Instead of those soldiers who fought for\nliberty and empire in Camillus\u2019s time, there were in Augustus\u2019s days\nmusicians, painters, cooks, players, and tailors; and if the land was\nequally cultivated at both periods, it is evident it could maintain\nequal numbers in the one profession as in the other. They added nothing\nto the mere necessaries of life in the latter period more than in the\nformer.\n\nIt is natural on this occasion to ask whether sovereigns may not return\nto the maxims of ancient policy, and consult their own interest in\nthis respect more than the happiness of their subjects. I answer that\nit appears to me almost impossible; and that because ancient policy\nwas violent, and contrary to the more natural and usual course of\nthings. It is well known with what peculiar laws Sparta was governed,\nand what a prodigy that republic is justly esteemed by every one who\nhas considered human nature, as it has displayed itself in other\nnations and other ages. Were the testimony of history less positive and\ncircumstantial, such a government would appear a mere philosophical\nwhim or fiction, and impossible ever to be reduced to practice.\nAnd though the Roman and other ancient republics were supported on\nprinciples somewhat more natural, yet was there a very extraordinary\nconcurrence of circumstances to make them submit to such grievous\nburdens. They were free states; they were small ones; and the age\nbeing martial, all the neighbouring states were continually in arms.\nFreedom naturally begets public spirit, especially in small states; and\nthis public spirit, this _amor patri\u00e6_, must increase when the public\nis almost in continual alarm, and men are obliged every moment to\nexpose themselves to the greatest dangers for its defence. A continual\nsuccession of wars makes every citizen a soldier: he takes the field\nin his turn, and during his service is chiefly maintained by himself.\nAnd notwithstanding that his service is equivalent to a very severe\ntax, it is less felt by a people addicted to arms, who fight for honour\nand revenge more than pay, and are unacquainted with gain and industry\nas well as pleasure.\u200b[9] Not to mention the great equality of\nfortunes amongst the inhabitants of the ancient republics, where every\nfield belonging to a different proprietor was able to maintain a\nfamily, and rendered the numbers of citizens very considerable, even\nwithout trade and manufactures.\n\nBut though the want of trade and manufactures, amongst a free and very\nmartial people, may sometimes have no other effect than to render the\npublic more powerful, it is certain that, in the common course of human\naffairs, it will have a quite contrary tendency. Sovereigns must take\nmankind as they find them, and cannot pretend to introduce any violent\nchange in their principles and ways of thinking. A long course of time,\nwith a variety of accidents and circumstances, is requisite to produce\nthose great revolutions which so much diversify the face of human\naffairs. And the less natural any set of principles are which support\na particular society, the more difficulty will a legislator meet with\nin raising and cultivating them. It is his best policy to comply with\nthe common bent of mankind, and give it all the improvements of which\nit is susceptible. Now, according to the most natural course of things,\nindustry, and arts, and trade increase the power of the sovereign as\nwell as the happiness of the subjects; and that policy is violent\nwhich aggrandizes the public by the poverty of individuals. This will\neasily appear from a few considerations, which will present to us the\nconsequences of sloth and barbarity.\n\nWhere manufactures and mechanic arts are not cultivated, the bulk of\nthe people must apply themselves to agriculture; and if their skill\nand industry increase, there must arise a great superfluity\nfrom their labour beyond what suffices to maintain them. They have no\ntemptation, therefore, to increase their skill and industry; since they\ncannot exchange that superfluity for any commodities which may serve\neither to their pleasure or vanity. A habit of indolence naturally\nprevails. The greater part of the land lies uncultivated. What is\ncultivated yields not its utmost, for want of skill or assiduity in\nthe farmer. If at any time the public exigencies require that great\nnumbers should be employed in the public service, the labour of the\npeople furnishes now no superfluities by which these numbers can be\nmaintained. The labourers cannot increase their skill and industry on\na sudden. Lands uncultivated cannot be brought into tillage for some\nyears. The armies, meanwhile, must either make sudden and violent\nconquests, or disband for want of subsistence. A regular attack or\ndefence, therefore, is not to be expected from such a people, and\ntheir soldiers must be as ignorant and unskilful as their farmers and\nmanufacturers.\n\nEverything in the world is purchased by labour, and our passions are\nthe only causes of labour. When a nation abounds in manufactures and\nmechanic arts, the proprietors of land, as well as the farmers, study\nagriculture as a science, and redouble their industry and attention.\nThe superfluity which arises from their labour is not lost, but is\nexchanged with the manufacturers for those commodities which men\u2019s\nluxury now makes them covet. By this means land furnishes a great\ndeal more of the necessaries of life than what suffices for those who\ncultivate it. In times of peace and tranquillity this superfluity goes\nto the maintenance of manufacturers, and the improvers of liberal arts.\nBut it is easy for the public to convert many of these manufacturers\ninto soldiers, and maintain them by that superfluity which arises from\nthe labour of the farmers. Accordingly we find that this is the case\nin all civilized governments. When the sovereign raises an army, what\nis the consequence? He imposes a tax. This tax obliges all the people\nto retrench what is least necessary to their subsistence. Those\nwho labour in such commodities must either enlist in the troops or\nturn themselves to agriculture, and thereby oblige some labourers to\nenlist for want of business. And to consider the matter abstractly,\nmanufactures increase the power of the state only as they store up so\nmuch labour, and that of a kind to which the public may lay claim,\nwithout depriving any one of the necessaries of life. The more labour,\ntherefore, is employed beyond mere necessaries, the more powerful is\nany state; since the persons engaged in that labour may easily be\nconverted to the public service. In a state without manufactures there\nmay be the same number of hands; but there is not the same quantity of\nlabour, nor of the same kind. All the labour is there bestowed upon\nnecessaries, which can admit of little or no abatement.\n\nThus the greatness of the sovereign and the happiness of the state\nare, in a great measure, united with regard to trade and manufactures.\nIt is a violent method, and in most cases impracticable, to oblige\nthe labourer to toil in order to raise from the land more than what\nsubsists himself and family. Furnish him with manufactures and\ncommodities, and he will do it of himself. Afterwards you will find it\neasy to seize some part of his superfluous labour, and employ it in the\npublic service, without giving him his wonted return. Being accustomed\nto industry, he will think this less grievous than if, at once, you\nobliged him to an augmentation of labour without any reward. The case\nis the same with regard to the other members of the state. The greater\nis the stock of labour of all kinds, the greater quantity may be taken\nfrom the heap without making any sensible alteration upon it.\n\nA public granary of corn, a storehouse of cloth, a magazine of arms;\nall these must be allowed real riches and strength in any state. Trade\nand industry are really nothing but a stock of labour, which, in time\nof peace and tranquillity, is employed for the ease and satisfaction of\nindividuals; but in the exigencies of state, may, in part, be turned\nto public advantage. Could we convert a city into a kind of fortified\ncamp, and infuse into each breast so martial a genius, and such\na passion for public good, as to make every one willing to undergo the\ngreatest hardships for the sake of the public, these affections might\nnow, as in ancient times, prove alone a sufficient spur to industry,\nand support the community. It would then be advantageous, as in camps,\nto banish all arts and luxury; and, by restrictions on equipage and\ntables, make the provisions and forage last longer than if the army\nwere loaded with a number of superfluous retainers. But as these\nprinciples are too disinterested and too difficult to support, it is\nrequisite to govern men by other passions, and animate them with a\nspirit of avarice and industry, art and luxury. The camp is, in this\ncase, loaded with a superfluous retinue; but the provisions flow in\nproportionately larger. The harmony of the whole is still supported,\nand the natural bent of the mind being more complied with, individuals,\nas well as the public, find their account in the observance of those\nmaxims.\n\nThe same method of reasoning will let us see the advantage of foreign\ncommerce, in augmenting the power of the state, as well as the riches\nand happiness of the subjects. It increases the stock of labour in\nthe nation, and the sovereign may convert what share of it he finds\nnecessary to the service of the public. Foreign trade, by its imports,\nfurnishes materials for new manufactures; and by its exports, it\nproduces labour in particular commodities which could not be consumed\nat home. In short, a kingdom that has a large import and export\nmust abound more with industry, and that employed upon delicacies\nand luxuries, than a kingdom which rests contented with its native\ncommodities. It is, therefore, more powerful, as well as richer and\nhappier. The individuals reap the benefit of these commodities, so far\nas they gratify the senses and appetites. And the public is also a\ngainer, while a greater stock of labour is, by this means, stored up\nagainst any public exigency; that is, a greater number of laborious\nmen are maintained, who may be diverted to the public service\nwithout robbing any one of the necessaries or even the chief\nconveniences of life.\n\nIf we consult history, we shall find that in most nations foreign trade\nhas preceded any refinement in home manufactures, and given birth to\ndomestic luxury. The temptation is stronger to make use of foreign\ncommodities, which are ready for use, and which are entirely new to\nus, than to make improvements on any domestic commodity, which always\nadvance by slow degrees, and never affect us by their novelty. The\nprofit is also very great in exporting what is superfluous at home,\nand what bears no price, to foreign nations, whose soil or climate is\nnot favourable to that commodity. Thus men become acquainted with the\npleasures of luxury and the profits of commerce; and their delicacy\nand industry, being once awakened, carry them to farther improvements\nin every branch of domestic as well as foreign trade. And this perhaps\nis the chief advantage which arises from a commerce with strangers.\nIt rouses men from their indolence; and presenting the gayer and more\nopulent part of the nation with objects of luxury, which they never\nbefore dreamed of, raises in them a desire of a more splendid way of\nlife than what their ancestors enjoyed; and at the same time the few\nmerchants who possess the secret of this importation and exportation\nmake exorbitant profits, and becoming rivals in wealth to the ancient\nnobility, tempt other adventurers to become their rivals in commerce.\nImitation soon diffuses all those arts; while domestic manufacturers\nemulate the foreign in their improvements, and work up every home\ncommodity to the utmost perfection of which it is susceptible. Their\nown steel and iron, in such laborious hands, becomes equal to the gold\nand rubies of the Indies.\n\nWhen the affairs of the society are once brought to this situation, a\nnation may lose most of its foreign trade, and yet continue a great and\npowerful people. If strangers will not take any particular commodity\nof ours, we must cease to labour in it. The same hands will turn\nthemselves towards some refinement in other commodities which may be\nwanted at home. And there must always be materials for them to\nwork upon; till every person in the state, who possesses riches, enjoys\nas great plenty of home commodities, and those in as great perfection,\nas he desires; which can never possibly happen. China is represented as\none of the most flourishing empires in the world, though it has very\nlittle commerce beyond its own territories.\n\nIt will not, I hope, be considered as a superfluous digression, if I\nhere observe, that as the multitude of mechanical arts is advantageous,\nso is the great number of persons to whose share the productions of\nthese arts fall. A too great disproportion among the citizens weakens\nany state. Every person, if possible, ought to enjoy the fruits of his\nlabour, in a full possession of all the necessaries, and many of the\nconveniences of life. No one can doubt but such an equality is most\nsuitable to human nature, and diminishes much less from the happiness\nof the rich than it adds to that of the poor. It also augments the\npower of the state, and makes any extraordinary taxes or impositions\nbe paid with much more cheerfulness. Where the riches are engrossed by\na few, these must contribute very largely to the supplying the public\nnecessities. But when the riches are dispersed among multitudes, the\nburden feels light on every shoulder, and the taxes make not a very\nsensible difference on any one\u2019s way of living.\n\nAdd to this, that where the riches are in few hands these must enjoy\nall the power, and will readily conspire to lay the whole burden on\nthe poor, and oppress them still farther, to the discouragement of all\nindustry.\n\nIn this circumstance consists the great advantage of England above\nany nation at present in the world, or that appears in the records of\nstory. It is true, the English feel some disadvantages in foreign trade\nby the high price of labour, which is in part the effect of the riches\nof their artisans, as well as of the plenty of money; but as foreign\ntrade is not the most material circumstance, it is not to be put in\ncompetition with the happiness of so many millions. And if there were\nno more to endear to them that free government under which they\nlive, this alone were sufficient. The poverty of the common people is\na natural, if not an infallible effect of absolute monarchy; though I\ndoubt whether it be always true, on the other hand, that their riches\nare an infallible result of liberty. Liberty must be attended with\nparticular accidents, and a certain turn of thinking, in order to\nproduce that effect. Lord Bacon, accounting for the great advantages\nobtained by the English in their wars with France, ascribes them\nchiefly to the superior ease and plenty of the common people amongst\nthe former; yet the governments of the two kingdoms were, at that time,\npretty much alike. Where the labourers and artisans are accustomed to\nwork for low wages, and to retain but a small part of the fruits of\ntheir labour, it is difficult for them, even in a free government,\nto better their condition, or conspire among themselves to heighten\ntheir wages. But even where they are accustomed to a more plentiful\nway of life, it is easy for the rich, in a despotic government, to\nconspire against them, and throw the whole burden of the taxes on their\nshoulders.\n\nIt may seem an odd position, that the poverty of the common people in\nFrance, Italy, and Spain is, in some measure, owing to the superior\nriches of the soil and happiness of the climate; and yet there want\nnot many reasons to justify this paradox. In such a fine mould or soil\nas that of those more southern regions, agriculture is an easy art;\nand one man, with a couple of sorry horses, will be able, in a season,\nto cultivate as much land as will pay a pretty considerable rent to\nthe proprietor. All the art, which the farmer knows, is to leave his\nground fallow for a year, so soon as it is exhausted; and the warmth\nof the sun alone and temperature of the climate enrich it, and restore\nits fertility. Such poor peasants, therefore, require only a simple\nmaintenance for their labour. They have no stock nor riches, which\nclaim more; and at the same time, they are for ever dependent on their\nlandlord, who gives no leases, nor fears that his land will be spoiled\nby the ill methods of cultivation. In England, the land is rich, but\ncoarse; must be cultivated at a great expense; and produces\nslender crops, when not carefully managed, and by a method which\ngives not the full profit but in a course of several years. A farmer,\ntherefore, in England must have a considerable stock and a long lease;\nwhich beget proportional profits. The fine vineyards of Champagne and\nBurgundy, that oft yield to the landlord above five pounds per acre,\nare cultivated by peasants who have scarce bread; and the reason is,\nthat such peasants need no stock but their own limbs, with instruments\nof husbandry which they can buy for twenty shillings. The farmers are\ncommonly in some better circumstances in those countries; but the\ngraziers are most at their ease of all those who cultivate the land.\nThe reason is still the same. Men must have profits proportionable to\ntheir expense and hazard. Where so considerable a number of labouring\npoor as the peasants and farmers are in very low circumstances, all\nthe rest must partake of their poverty whether the government of that\nnation be monarchical or republican.\n\nWe may form a similar remark with regard to the general history of\nmankind. What is the reason why no people living between the tropics\ncould ever yet attain to any art or civility, or reach even any police\nin their government, and any military discipline; while few nations\nin the temperate climates have been altogether deprived of these\nadvantages? It is probable that one cause of this phenomenon is the\nwarmth and equality of weather in the torrid zone, which render clothes\nand houses less requisite for the inhabitants, and thereby remove, in\npart, that necessity which is the great spur to industry and invention.\n_Curis acuens mortalia corda._ Not to mention that the fewer goods\nor possessions of this kind any people enjoy, the fewer quarrels are\nlikely to arise amongst them, and the less necessity will there be for\na settled police or regular authority to protect and defend them from\nforeign enemies, or from each other.\n\n\nNOTES, OF COMMERCE.\n\n[7] Monsieur Melon, in his political essay on commerce, asserts that\neven at present, if you divide France into twenty parts, sixteen are\nlabourers or peasants, two only artisans, one belonging to the law,\nchurch, and military, and one merchants, financiers, and bourgeois.\nThis calculation is certainly very erroneous. In France, England, and\nindeed most parts of Europe, half of the inhabitants live in cities;\nand even of those who live in the country, a very great number are\nartisans, perhaps above a third.\n\n\n[8] _Diod. Sic._, lib. 2. This account, I own, is somewhat suspicious,\nnot to say worse, chiefly because this army was not composed of\ncitizens, but of mercenary forces.\n\n\n[9] The more ancient Romans lived in perpetual war with all their\nneighbours; and in old Latin the term \u201chostis\u201d expressed both a\nstranger and an enemy. This is remarked by Cicero; but by him is\nascribed to the humanity of his ancestors, who softened, as much as\npossible, the denomination of an enemy by calling him by the same\nappellation which signified a stranger. (_De Off._, lib. 2.) It is,\nhowever, much more probable, from the manners of the times, that the\nferocity of those people was so great as to make them regard all\nstrangers as enemies, and call them by the same name. It is not,\nbesides, consistent with the most common maxims of policy or of nature\nthat any state should regard its public enemies with a friendly eye, or\npreserve any such sentiments for them as the Roman orator would ascribe\nto his ancestors. Not to mention that the early Romans really exercised\npiracy, as we learn from their first treaties with Carthage, preserved\nby Polybius, lib. 3, and consequently, like the Sallee and Algerine\nrovers, were actually at war with most nations, and a stranger and an\nenemy were with them almost synonymous.\n\n\n\n\nOF REFINEMENT IN THE ARTS.\n\n\nLuxury is a word of a very uncertain signification, and may be taken\nin a good as well as in a bad sense. In general, it means great\nrefinement in the gratification of the senses, and any degree of it\nmay be innocent or blameable, according to the age, or country, or\ncondition of the person. The bounds between the virtue and the vice\ncannot here be fixed exactly, more than in other moral subjects. To\nimagine that the gratifying any of the senses, or the indulging any\ndelicacy in meats, drinks, or apparel, is in itself a vice, can never\nenter into a head that is not disordered by the frenzies of enthusiasm.\nI have, indeed, heard of a monk abroad who, because the windows of\nhis cell opened upon a very noble prospect, made a covenant with his\neyes never to turn that way, or receive so sensual a gratification.\nAnd such is the crime of drinking champagne or burgundy, preferably to\nsmall beer or porter. These indulgences are only vices when they are\npursued at the expense of some virtue, as liberality or charity; in\nlike manner as they are follies when for them a man ruins his fortune,\nand reduces himself to want and beggary. Where they entrench upon no\nvirtue, but leave ample subject whence to provide for friends, family,\nand every proper object of generosity or compassion, they are entirely\ninnocent, and have in every age been acknowledged such by almost all\nmoralists. To be entirely occupied with the luxury of the table, for\ninstance, without any relish for the pleasures of ambition, study, or\nconversation, is a mark of gross stupidity, and is incompatible with\nany vigour of temper or genius. To confine one\u2019s expense entirely\nto such a gratification, without regard to friends or family, is an\nindication of a heart entirely devoid of humanity or benevolence. But\nif a man reserve time sufficient for all laudable pursuits, and money\nsufficient for all generous purposes, he is free from every\nshadow of blame or reproach.\n\nSince luxury may be considered either as innocent or blameable, one may\nbe surprised at those preposterous opinions which have been entertained\nconcerning it; while men of libertine principles bestow praises even on\nvicious luxury, and represent it as highly advantageous to society; and\non the other hand, men of severe morals blame even the most innocent\nluxury, and regard it as the source of all the corruptions, disorders,\nand factions incident to civil government. We shall here endeavour\nto correct both these extremes, by proving, first, that the ages of\nrefinement are both the happiest and most virtuous; secondly, that\nwherever luxury ceases to be innocent, it also ceases to be beneficial;\nand when carried a degree too far, is a quality pernicious, though\nperhaps not the most pernicious, to political society.\n\nTo prove the first point, we need but consider the effects of\nrefinement both on private and on public life. Human happiness,\naccording to the most received notions, seems to consist in three\ningredients: action, pleasure, and indolence; and though these\ningredients ought to be mixed in different proportions, according\nto the particular dispositions of the person, yet no one ingredient\ncan be entirely wanting without destroying, in some measure, the\nrelish of the whole composition. Indolence or repose, indeed, seems\nnot of itself to contribute much to our enjoyment; but, like sleep,\nis requisite as an indulgence to the weakness of human nature, which\ncannot support an uninterrupted course of business or pleasure. That\nquick march of the spirits which takes a man from himself, and chiefly\ngives satisfaction, does in the end exhaust the mind, and requires\nsome intervals of repose, which, though agreeable for a moment, yet,\nif prolonged, beget a languor and lethargy that destroy all enjoyment.\nEducation, custom, and example have a mighty influence in turning the\nmind to any of these pursuits; and it must be owned, that where they\npromote a relish for action and pleasure, they are so far favourable\nto human happiness. In times when industry and arts flourish,\nmen are kept in perpetual occupation, and enjoy, as their reward, the\noccupation itself, as well as those pleasures which are the fruits of\ntheir labour. The mind acquires new vigour; enlarges its powers and\nfaculties; and by an assiduity in honest industry, both satisfies its\nnatural appetites and prevents the growth of unnatural ones, which\ncommonly spring up when nourished with ease and idleness. Banish those\narts from society, you deprive men both of action and of pleasure; and\nleaving nothing but indolence in their place, you even destroy the\nrelish of indolence, which never is agreeable but when it succeeds to\nlabour, and recruits the spirits, exhausted by too much application and\nfatigue.\n\nAnother advantage of industry and of refinements in the mechanical arts\nis that they commonly produce some refinements in the liberal; nor can\nthe one be carried to perfection without being accompanied, in some\ndegree, with the other. The same age which produces great philosophers\nand politicians, renowned generals and poets, usually abounds with\nskilful weavers and ship-carpenters. We cannot reasonably expect that a\npiece of woollen cloth will be wrought to perfection in a nation which\nis ignorant of astronomy, or where ethics are neglected. The spirit of\nthe age affects all the arts; and the minds of men, being once roused\nfrom their lethargy and put into a fermentation, turn themselves on\nall sides, and carry improvements into every art and science. Profound\nignorance is totally banished, and men enjoy the privilege of rational\ncreatures, to think as well as to act, to cultivate the pleasures of\nthe mind as well as those of the body.\n\nThe more these refined arts advance, the more sociable do men become;\nnor is it possible that, when enriched with science and possessed of a\nfund of conversation, they should be contented to remain in solitude,\nor live with their fellow-citizens in that distant manner which is\npeculiar to ignorant and barbarous nations. They flock into cities;\nlove to receive and communicate knowledge; to show their wit\nor their breeding; their taste in conversation or living, in clothes\nor furniture. Curiosity allures the wise; vanity the foolish; and\npleasure both. Particular clubs and societies are everywhere formed,\nboth sexes meet in an easy and sociable manner, and the tempers of\nmen, as well as their behaviour, refine apace. So that, besides the\nimprovements which they receive from knowledge and the liberal arts, it\nis impossible but they must feel an increase of humanity from the very\nhabit of conversing together and contributing to each other\u2019s pleasure\nand entertainment. Thus industry, knowledge, and humanity are linked\ntogether by an indissoluble chain, and are found, from experience as\nwell as reason, to be peculiar to the more polished, and, what are\ncommonly denominated, the more luxurious ages.\n\nNor are these advantages attended with disadvantages which bear\nany proportion to them. The more men refine upon pleasure the less\nwill they indulge in excesses of any kind, because nothing is more\ndestructive to true pleasure than such excesses. One may safely affirm\nthat the Tartars are oftener guilty of beastly gluttony when they\nfeast on their dead horses than European courtiers with all their\nrefinements of cookery. And if libertine love, or even infidelity to\nthe marriage-bed, be more frequent in polite ages, when it is often\nregarded only as a piece of gallantry, drunkenness, on the other hand,\nis much less common\u2014a vice more odious and more pernicious both to\nmind and body. And in this matter I would appeal not only to an Ovid\nor a Petronius, but to a Seneca or a Cato. We know that C\u00e6sar, during\nCatiline\u2019s conspiracy, being necessitated to put into Cato\u2019s hands a\n_billet-doux_ which discovered an intrigue with Servilia, Cato\u2019s own\nsister, that stern philosopher threw it back to him with indignation,\nand, in the bitterness of his wrath, gave him the appellation of\ndrunkard, as a term more opprobrious than that with which he could more\njustly have reproached him.\n\nBut industry, knowledge, and humanity are not advantageous in private\nlife alone; they diffuse their beneficial influence on the public,\nand render the government as great and flourishing as they make\nindividuals happy and prosperous. The increase and consumption of all\nthe commodities which serve to the ornament and pleasure of life are\nadvantageous to society, because at the same time that they multiply\nthose innocent gratifications to individuals, they are a kind of\nstorehouse of labour, which, in the exigencies of state, may be turned\nto the public service. In a nation where there is no demand for such\nsuperfluities men sink into indolence, lose all the enjoyment of life,\nand are useless to the public, which cannot maintain nor support its\nfleets and armies from the industries of such slothful members.\n\nThe bounds of all the European kingdoms are at present pretty near the\nsame they were two hundred years ago; but what a difference is there\nin the power and grandeur of those kingdoms! Which can be ascribed to\nnothing but the increase of art and industry. When Charles VIII. of\nFrance invaded Italy, he carried with him about 20,000 men; and yet\nthis armament so exhausted the nation, as we learn from Guicciardin,\nthat for some years it was not able to make so great an effort.\nThe late King of France, in time of war, kept in pay above 400,000\nmen,\u200b[10] though from Mazarin\u2019s death to his own he was engaged in a\ncourse of wars that lasted near thirty years.\n\nThis industry is much promoted by the knowledge inseparable from the\nages of art and refinement; as, on the other hand, this knowledge\nenables the public to make the best advantage of the industry of its\nsubjects. Laws, order, police, discipline\u2014these can never be carried\nto any degree of perfection before human reason has refined itself by\nexercise, and by an application to the more vulgar arts, at least, of\ncommerce and manufactures. Can we expect that a government will be\nwell modelled by a people who know not how to make a spinning-wheel,\nor to employ a loom to advantage? Not to mention that all ignorant\nages are infested with superstition, which throws the government\noff its bias, and disturbs men in the pursuit of their interest and\nhappiness.\n\nKnowledge in the arts of government naturally begets mildness and\nmoderation, by instructing men in the advantages of humane maxims above\nrigour and severity, which drive subjects into rebellion, and render\nthe return to submission impracticable, by cutting off all hopes of\npardon. When the tempers of men are softened as well as their knowledge\nimproved, this humanity appears still more conspicuous, and is the\nchief characteristic which distinguishes a civilized age from times of\nbarbarity and ignorance. Factions are then less inveterate, revolutions\nless tragical, authority less severe, and seditions less frequent. Even\nforeign wars abate of their cruelty; and after the field of battle,\nwhere honour and interest steel men against compassion as well as fear,\nthe combatants divest themselves of the brute, and resume the man.\n\nNor need we fear that men, by losing their ferocity, will lose their\nmartial spirit, or become less undaunted and vigorous in defence\nof their country or their liberty. The arts have no such effect in\nenervating either the mind or body. On the contrary, industry, their\ninseparable attendant, adds new force to both. And if anger, which is\nsaid to be the whetstone of courage, loses somewhat of its asperity\nby politeness and refinement, a sense of honour, which is a stronger,\nmore constant, and more governable principle, acquires fresh vigour\nby that elevation of genius which arises from knowledge and a good\neducation. Add to this that courage can neither have any duration nor\nbe of any use when not accompanied with discipline and martial skill,\nwhich are seldom found among a barbarous people. The ancients remarked\nthat Datames was the only barbarian that ever knew the art of war.\nAnd Pyrrhus, seeing the Romans marshal their army with some art and\nskill, said with surprise, \u201cThese barbarians have nothing barbarous\nin their discipline!\u201d It is observable that as the old Romans, by\napplying themselves solely to war, were the only uncivilized\npeople that ever possessed military discipline, so the Italians are the\nonly civilized people among Europeans that ever wanted courage and a\nmartial spirit. Those who would ascribe this effeminacy of the Italians\nto their luxury or politeness, or application to the arts, need but\nconsider the French and English, whose bravery is as incontestable as\ntheir love for luxury and their assiduity in commerce. The Italian\nhistorians give us a more satisfactory reason for this degeneracy of\ntheir countrymen. They show us how the sword was dropped at once by\nall the Italian sovereigns; while the Venetian aristocracy was jealous\nof its subjects, the Florentine democracy applied itself entirely to\ncommerce; Rome was governed by priests, and Naples by women. War then\nbecame the business of soldiers of fortune, who spared one another,\nand, to the astonishment of the world, could engage a whole day in what\nthey called a battle, and return at night to their camp without the\nleast bloodshed.\n\nWhat has chiefly induced severe moralists to declaim against refinement\nin the arts is the example of ancient Rome, which, joining to its\npoverty and rusticity, virtue and public spirit, rose to such a\nsurprising height of grandeur and liberty; but having learned from\nits conquered provinces the Asiatic luxury, fell into every kind of\ncorruption, whence arose sedition and civil wars, attended at last\nwith the total loss of liberty. All the Latin classics, whom we peruse\nin our infancy, are full of these sentiments, and universally ascribe\nthe ruin of their state to the arts and riches imported from the East:\ninsomuch that Sallust represents a taste for painting as a vice no less\nthan lewdness and drinking. And so popular were these sentiments during\nthe latter ages of the republic, that this author abounds in praises of\nthe old rigid Roman virtue, though himself the most egregious instance\nof modern luxury and corruption; speaks contemptuously of the Grecian\neloquence, though the most eloquent writer in the world; nay, employs\npreposterous digressions and declamations to this purpose, though a\nmodel of taste and correctness.\n\nBut it would be easy to prove that these writers mistook the cause of\nthe disorders in the Roman state, and ascribed to luxury and the arts\nwhat really proceeded from an ill-modelled government and the unlimited\nextent of conquests. Refinement on the pleasures and conveniences\nof life has no natural tendency to beget venality and corruption.\nThe value which all men put upon any particular pleasure depends on\ncomparison and experience; nor is a porter less greedy of money, which\nhe spends on bacon and brandy, than a courtier, who purchases champagne\nand ortolans. Riches are valuable at all times, and to all men, because\nthey always purchase pleasures such as men are accustomed to and\ndesire; nor can anything restrain or regulate the love of money but a\nsense of honour and virtue, which, if it be not nearly equal at all\ntimes, will naturally abound most in ages of knowledge and refinement.\n\nOf all European kingdoms, Poland seems the most defective in the arts\nof war, as well as peace, mechanical as well as liberal; and yet it is\nthere that venality and corruption do most prevail. The nobles seem to\nhave preserved their crown elective for no other purpose but regularly\nto sell it to the highest bidder; this is almost the only species of\ncommerce with which that people are acquainted.\n\nThe liberties of England, so far from decaying since the improvements\nin the arts, have never flourished so much as during that period. And\nthough corruption may seem to increase of late years, this is chiefly\nto be ascribed to our established liberty, when our princes have found\nthe impossibility of governing without parliaments, or of terrifying\nparliaments by the phantom of prerogative. Not to mention that this\ncorruption or venality prevails infinitely more among the electors than\nthe elected, and therefore cannot justly be ascribed to any refinements\nin luxury.\n\nIf we consider the matter in a proper light, we shall find that\nimprovements in the arts are rather favourable to liberty, and have a\nnatural tendency to preserve, if not produce a free government.\nIn rude, unpolished nations, where the arts are neglected, all the\nlabour is bestowed on the cultivation of the ground; and the whole\nsociety is divided into two classes\u2014proprietors of land and their\nvassals or tenants. The latter are necessarily dependent, and fitted\nfor slavery and subjection; especially where they possess no riches,\nand are not valued for their knowledge in agriculture, as must always\nbe the case where the arts are neglected. The former naturally erect\nthemselves into petty tyrants, and must either submit to an absolute\nmaster for the sake of peace and order, or if they will preserve\ntheir independency, like the ancient barons, they must fall into\nfeuds and contests among themselves, and throw the whole society into\nsuch confusion as is perhaps worse than the most despotic government.\nBut where luxury nourishes commerce and industry, the peasants, by a\nproper cultivation of the land, become rich and independent; while\nthe tradesmen and merchants acquire a share of the property, and draw\nauthority and consideration to that middling rank of men, who are the\nbest and firmest basis of public liberty. These submit not to slavery,\nlike the poor peasants, from poverty and meanness of spirit; and having\nno hopes of tyrannizing over others, like the barons, they are not\ntempted, for the sake of that gratification, to submit to the tyranny\nof their sovereign. They covet equal laws, which may secure their\nproperty, and preserve them from monarchical as well as aristocratical\ntyranny.\n\nThe House of Commons is the support of our popular government, and\nall the world acknowledges that it owed its chief influence and\nconsideration to the increase of commerce, which threw such a balance\nof property into the hands of the commons. How inconsistent then is it\nto blame so violently a refinement in the arts, and to represent it as\nthe bane of liberty and public spirit!\n\nTo declaim against present times, and magnify the virtue of remote\nancestors, is a propensity almost inherent in human nature: and as\nthe sentiments and opinions of civilized ages alone are transmitted\nto posterity, hence it is that we meet with so many severe judgments\npronounced against luxury, and even science; and hence it is that at\npresent we give so ready an assent to them. But the fallacy is easily\nperceived from comparing different nations that are contemporaries,\nwhere we both judge more impartially and can better set in opposition\nthose manners with which we are sufficiently acquainted. Treachery\nand cruelty, the most pernicious and most odious of all vices, seem\npeculiar to uncivilized ages; and by the refined Greeks and Romans were\nascribed to all the barbarous nations which surrounded them. They might\njustly, therefore, have presumed that their own ancestors, so highly\ncelebrated, possessed no greater virtue, and were as much inferior to\ntheir posterity in honour and humanity as in taste and science. An\nancient Frank or Saxon may be highly extolled; but I believe every man\nwould think his life or fortune much less secure in the hands of a Moor\nor Tartar than in those of a French or English gentleman, the rank of\nmen the most civilized in the most civilized nations.\n\nWe come now to the second position which we proposed to illustrate\u2014viz.,\nthat as innocent luxury, or a refinement in the arts and conveniences\nof life, is advantageous to the public, so, wherever luxury ceases to\nbe innocent, it also ceases to be beneficial; and when carried a degree\nfarther, begins to be a quality pernicious, though perhaps not the most\npernicious, to political society.\n\nLet us consider what we call vicious luxury. No gratification,\nhowever sensual, can of itself be esteemed vicious. A gratification\nis only vicious when it engrosses all a man\u2019s expense, and leaves no\nability for such acts of duty and generosity as are required by his\nsituation and fortune. Suppose that he correct the vice, and employ\npart of his expense in the education of his children, in the support\nof his friends, and in relieving the poor, would any prejudice result\nto society? On the contrary, the same consumption would arise, and\nthat labour which at present is employed only in producing a slender\ngratification to one man, would relieve the necessitous, and bestow\nsatisfaction on hundreds. The same care and toil which raise a dish of\npeas at Christmas would give bread to a whole family during six months.\nTo say that, without a vicious luxury, the labour would not have been\nemployed at all, is only to say that there is some other defect in\nhuman nature, such as indolence, selfishness, inattention to others,\nfor which luxury in some measure provides a remedy, as one poison may\nbe an antidote to another. But virtue, like wholesome food, is better\nthan poisons, however corrected.\n\nSuppose the same number of men that are at present in Britain, with\nthe same soil and climate: I ask, is it not possible for them to be\nhappier, by the most perfect way of life which can be imagined, and\nby the greatest reformation which Omnipotence itself could work in\ntheir temper and disposition? To assert that they cannot appears\nevidently ridiculous. As the land is able to maintain more than all its\ninhabitants, they could never, in such a Utopian state, feel any other\nills than those which arise from bodily sickness; and these are not the\nhalf of human miseries. All other ills spring from some vice, either\nin ourselves or others; and even many of our diseases proceed from the\nsame origin. Remove the vices, and the ills follow. You must only take\ncare to remove all the vices. If you remove part, you may render the\nmatter worse. By banishing vicious luxury, without curing sloth and an\nindifference to others, you only diminish industry in the state, and\nadd nothing to men\u2019s charity or their generosity. Let us, therefore,\nrest contented with asserting that two opposite vices in a state may\nbe more advantageous than either of them alone; but let us never\npronounce vice in itself advantageous. Is it not very inconsistent for\nan author to assert in one page that moral distinctions are inventions\nof politicians for public interest, and in the next page maintain that\nvice is advantageous to the public?\u200b[11] And indeed it seems, upon any\nsystem of morality, little less than a contradiction in terms to talk\nof a vice which is in general beneficial to society.\n\nProdigality is not to be confounded with a refinement in the arts. It\neven appears that that vice is much less frequent in the cultivated\nages. Industry and gain beget frugality, among the lower and middle\nranks of men, and in all the busy professions. Men of high rank,\nindeed, it may be pretended, are more allured by the pleasures, which\nbecome more frequent. But idleness is the great source of prodigality\nat all times, and there are pleasures and vanities in every age, which\nallure men equally when they are unacquainted with better enjoyments.\nNot to mention that the high interest paid in rude times quickly\nconsumes the fortunes of the landed gentry, and multiplies their\nnecessities.\n\nI thought this reasoning necessary in order to give some light to a\nphilosophical question which has been much disputed in Britain. I call\nit a philosophical question, not a political one; for whatever may\nbe the consequence of such a miraculous transformation of mankind as\nwould endow them with every species of virtue and free them from every\nspecies of vice, this concerns not the magistrate, who aims only at\npossibilities. He cannot cure every vice by substituting a virtue in\nits place. Very often he can only cure one vice by another, and in that\ncase he ought to prefer what is least pernicious to society. Luxury,\nwhen excessive, is the source of many ills; but it is in general\npreferable to sloth and idleness, which would commonly succeed in its\nplace, and are more pernicious both to private persons and to the\npublic. When sloth reigns, a mean, uncultivated way of life prevails\namongst individuals, without society, without enjoyment. And if the\nsovereign, in such a situation, demands the service of his subjects,\nthe labour of the state suffices only to furnish the necessaries of\nlife to the labourers, and can afford nothing to those who are employed\nin the public service.\n\n\nNOTES, OF REFINEMENT IN THE ARTS.\n\n[10] The inscription on the Place de Vend\u00f4me says 440,000.\n\n\n[11] _Fable of the Bees._\n\n\n\n\nOF MONEY.\n\n\nMoney is not, properly speaking, one of the subjects of commerce,\nbut only the instrument which men have agreed upon to facilitate\nthe exchange of one commodity for another. It is none of the wheels\nof trade; it is the oil which renders the motion of the wheels more\nsmooth and easy. If we consider any one kingdom by itself, it is\nevident that the greater or less plenty of money is of no consequence,\nsince the prices of commodities are always proportioned to the plenty\nof money, and a crown in Henry VII.\u2019s time served the same purpose\nas a pound does at present. It is only the public which draws any\nadvantage from the greater plenty of money, and that only in its wars\nand negotiations with foreign states. And this is the reason why all\nrich and trading countries, from Carthage to Britain and Holland,\nhave employed mercenary troops, which they hired from their poorer\nneighbours. Were they to make use of their native subjects, they would\nfind less advantage from their superior riches, and from their great\nplenty of gold and silver, since the pay of all their servants must\nrise in proportion to the public opulence. Our small army in Britain of\n20,000 men is maintained at as great expense as a French army thrice\nas numerous. The English fleet, during the late war, required as much\nmoney to support it as all the Roman legions which kept the whole world\nin subjection during the time of the emperors.\u200b[12]\n\nThe greater number of people and their greater industry are serviceable\nin all cases\u2014at home and abroad, in private and in public. But the\ngreater plenty of money is very limited in its use, and may even\nsometimes be a loss to a nation in its commerce with foreigners.\n\nThere seems to be a happy concurrence of causes in human affairs which\nchecks the growth of trade and riches, and hinders them from being\nconfined entirely to one people, as might naturally at first be dreaded\nfrom the advantages of an established commerce. Where one nation has\ngot the start of another in trade it is very difficult for the latter\nto regain the ground it has lost, because of the superior industry and\nskill of the former, and the greater stocks of which its merchants are\npossessed, and which enable them to trade for so much smaller profits.\nBut these advantages are compensated, in some measure, by the low price\nof labour in every nation which has not an extensive commerce, and\ndoes not very much abound in gold and silver. Manufactures, therefore,\ngradually shift their places, leaving those countries and provinces\nwhich they have already enriched, and flying to others, whither they\nare allured by the cheapness of provisions and labour, till they have\nenriched these also and are again banished by the same causes. And, in\ngeneral, we may observe that the dearness of everything, from plenty\nof money, is a disadvantage which attends an established commerce, and\nsets bounds to it in every country by enabling the poorer states to\nunder-sell the richer in all foreign markets.\n\nThis has made me entertain a great doubt concerning the benefit of\nbanks and paper-credit, which are so generally esteemed advantageous\nto every nation. That provisions and labour should become dear by the\nincrease of trade and money is, in many respects, an inconvenience;\nbut an inconvenience that is unavoidable, and the effect of that\npublic wealth and prosperity which are the end of all our wishes. It\nis compensated by the advantages which we reap from the possession of\nthese precious metals, and the weight which they give the nation in\nall foreign wars and negotiations. But there appears no reason for\nincreasing that inconvenience by a counterfeit money, which foreigners\nwill not accept in any payment, and which any great disorder in the\nstate will reduce to nothing. There are, it is true, many people in\nevery rich state who, having large sums of money, would prefer paper\nwith good security, as being of more easy transport and more safe\ncustody. If the public provide not a bank, private bankers will take\nadvantage of this circumstance; as the goldsmiths formerly did in\nLondon, or as the bankers do at present in Dublin; and therefore it\nis better, it may be thought, that a public company should enjoy the\nbenefit of the paper-credit which always will have place in every\nopulent kingdom. But to endeavour artificially to increase such a\ncredit can never be the interest of any trading nation; but must lay\nthem under disadvantages, by increasing money beyond its natural\nproportion to labour and commodities, and thereby heightening their\nprice to the merchant and manufacturer. And in this view, it must be\nallowed that no bank could be more advantageous than such a one as\nlocked up all the money it received,\u200b[13] and never augmented the\ncirculating coin, as is usual, by returning part of its treasure into\ncommerce. A public bank by this expedient might cut off much of the\ndealings of private bankers and money-jobbers; and though the state\nbore the charge of salaries to the directors and tellers of this\nbank (for, according to the preceding supposition, it would have no\nprofit from its dealings), the national advantage, resulting from the\nlow price of labour and the destruction of paper-credit, would be a\nsufficient compensation. Not to mention that so large a sum, lying\nready at command, would be a great convenience in times of public\ndanger and distress; and what part of it was used might be replaced at\nleisure, when peace and tranquillity were restored to the nation.\n\nBut of this subject of paper-credit we shall treat more largely\nhereafter, and I shall finish this essay on money by proposing and\nexplaining two observations, which may perhaps serve to employ the\nthoughts of our speculative politicians, for to these only I all along\naddress myself. It is enough that I submit to the ridicule sometimes in\nthis age attached to the character of a philosopher, without adding to\nit that which belongs to a projector.\n\nIt was a shrewd observation of Anacharsis the Scythian, who had never\nseen money in his own country, that gold and silver seemed to him of\nno use to the Greeks but to assist them in numeration and arithmetic.\nIt is indeed evident that money is nothing but the representation\nof labour and commodities, and serves only as a method of rating or\nestimating them. Where coin is in greater plenty, as a greater quantity\nof it is required to represent the same quantity of goods, it can have\nno effect, either good or bad, taking a nation within itself; no more\nthan it would make any alteration on a merchant\u2019s books if, instead\nof the Arabian method of notation, which requires few characters,\nhe should make use of the Roman, which requires a great many. Nay,\nthe greater quantity of money, like the Roman characters, is rather\ninconvenient, and requires greater trouble both to keep and transport\nit. But notwithstanding this conclusion, which must be allowed just, it\nis certain that since the discovery of mines in America industry has\nincreased in all the nations of Europe, except in the possessors of\nthose mines; and this may justly be ascribed, amongst other reasons,\nto the increase of gold and silver. Accordingly, we find that in every\nkingdom into which money begins to flow in greater abundance than\nformerly everything takes a new face; labour and industry gain life,\nthe merchant becomes more enterprising, the manufacturer more diligent\nand skilful, and even the farmer follows his plough with greater\nalacrity and attention. This is not easily to be accounted for, if\nwe consider only the influence which a greater abundance of coin has\nin the kingdom itself, by heightening the price of commodities, and\nobliging every one to pay a greater number of these little yellow or\nwhite pieces for everything he purchases. And as to foreign trade,\nit appears that great plenty of money is rather disadvantageous, by\nraising the price of every kind of labour.\n\nTo account, then, for this phenomenon, we must consider that though the\nhigh price of commodities be a necessary consequence of the increase\nof gold and silver, yet it follows not immediately upon that increase;\nbut some time is required before the money circulates through the\nwhole state, and makes its effects be felt on all ranks of people. At\nfirst, no alteration is perceived; by degrees the price rises, first\nof one commodity then of another, till the whole at last reaches\na just proportion with the new quantity of specie which is in the\nkingdom. In my opinion, it is only in this interval or intermediate\nsituation, between the acquisition of money and rise of prices, that\nthe increasing quantity of gold and silver is favourable to industry.\nWhen any quantity of money is imported into a nation, it is not at\nfirst dispersed into many hands, but is confined to the coffers of a\nfew persons, who immediately seek to employ it to the best advantage.\nHere are a set of manufacturers or merchants, we shall suppose, who\nhave received returns of gold and silver for goods which they sent to\nCadiz. They are thereby enabled to employ more workmen than formerly,\nwho never dream of demanding higher wages, but are glad of employment\nfrom such good paymasters. If workmen become scarce, the manufacturer\ngives higher wages, but at first requires an increase of labour;\nand this is willingly submitted to by the artisan, who can now eat\nand drink better, to compensate his additional toil and fatigue. He\ncarries his money to market, where he finds everything at the same\nprice as formerly, but returns with greater quantity and of better\nkinds, for the use of his family. The farmer and gardener, finding\nthat all commodities are taken off, apply themselves with alacrity\nto the raising more; and at the same time can afford to take better\nand more clothes from their tradesmen, whose price is the same as\nformerly, and their industry only whetted by so much new gain. It is\neasy to trace the money in its progress through the whole commonwealth;\nwhere we shall find that it must first quicken the diligence of every\nindividual, before it increase the price of labour.\n\nAnd that the specie may increase to a considerable pitch before it have\nthis latter effect appears, amongst other instances, from the frequent\noperations of the French king on the money; where it was always found\nthat the augmenting the numerary value did not produce a proportional\nrise of the prices, at least for some time. In the last year of Louis\nXIV. money was raised three-sevenths, but prices augmented only one.\nCorn in France is now sold at the same price, or for the same number\nof livres it was in 1683; though silver was then at thirty livres the\nmark, and is now at fifty;\u200b[14] not to mention the great addition of\ngold and silver which may have come into that kingdom since the former\nperiod.\n\nFrom the whole of this reasoning we may conclude that it is of no\nmanner of consequence, with regard to the domestic happiness of a\nstate, whether money be in a greater or less quantity. The good\npolicy of the magistrate consists only in keeping it, if possible,\nstill increasing; because, by that means, he keeps alive a spirit of\nindustry in the nation, and increases the stock of labour, in which\nconsists all real power and riches. A nation whose money decreases is\nactually, at that time, much weaker and more miserable than another\nnation which possesses no more money but is on the increasing hand.\nThis will be easily accounted for if we consider that the alterations\nin the quantity of money, either on the one side or the other, are not\nimmediately attended with proportionable alterations in the prices of\ncommodities. There is always an interval before matters be adjusted to\ntheir new situation, and this interval is as pernicious to industry\nwhen gold and silver are diminishing as it is advantageous when these\nmetals are increasing. The workman has not the same employment from the\nmanufacturer and merchant, though he pays the same price for everything\nin the market; the farmer cannot dispose of his corn and cattle, though\nhe must pay the same rent to his landlord. The poverty, and beggary,\nand sloth which must ensue are easily foreseen.\n\nThe second observation which I proposed to make with regard to money\nmay be explained after the following manner. There are some kingdoms,\nand many provinces in Europe (and all of them were once in the same\ncondition), where money is so scarce that the landlord can get\nnone at all from his tenants, but is obliged to take his rent in kind,\nand either to consume it himself, or transport it to places where\nhe may find a market. In those countries the prince can levy few or\nno taxes but in the same manner; and as he will receive very small\nbenefit from impositions so paid, it is evident that such a kingdom\nhas very little force even at home, and cannot maintain fleets and\narmies to the same extent as if every part of it abounded in gold and\nsilver.\u200b[15] There is surely a greater disproportion betwixt the force\nof Germany at present and what it was three centuries ago, than there\nis in its industry, people, and manufactures. The Austrian dominions\nin the empire are in general well peopled and well cultivated, and are\nof great extent, but have not a proportionable weight in the balance\nof Europe; proceeding, as is commonly supposed, from the scarcity of\nmoney. How do all these facts agree with that principle of reason, that\nthe quantity of gold and silver is in itself altogether indifferent?\nAccording to that principle, wherever a sovereign has numbers of\nsubjects, and these have plenty of commodities, he should of course be\ngreat and powerful, and they rich and happy, independent of the greater\nor lesser abundance of the precious metals. These admit of divisions\nand subdivisions to a great extent; and where they would become so\nsmall as to be in danger of being lost, it is easy to mix them with a\nbaser metal, as is practised in some countries of Europe, and by that\nmeans raise them to a bulk more sensible and convenient. They still\nserve the same purposes of exchange, whatever their number may be, or\nwhatever colour they may be supposed to have.\n\nTo these difficulties, I answer that the effect here supposed to flow\nfrom scarcity of money really arises from the manners and customs of\nthe inhabitants, and that we mistake, as is too usual, a collateral\neffect for a cause. The contradiction is only apparent, but it\nrequires some thought and reflection to discover the principles by\nwhich we can reconcile reason to experience.\n\nIt seems a maxim almost self-evident that the prices of everything\ndepend on the proportion between commodities and money, and that any\nconsiderable alteration on either of these has the same effect, either\nof heightening or lowering the prices. Increase the commodities, they\nbecome cheaper; increase the money, they rise in their value. As, on\nthe other hand, a diminution of the former and that of the latter have\ncontrary tendencies.\n\nIt is also evident that the prices do not so much depend on the\nabsolute quantity of commodities and that of money which are in a\nnation, as in that of the commodities which come or may come to market,\nand of the money which circulates. If the coin be locked up in chests,\nit is the same thing with regard to prices as if it were annihilated;\nif the commodities be hoarded in granaries, a like effect follows. As\nthe money and commodities, in these cases, never meet, they cannot\naffect each other. Were we, at any time, to form conjectures concerning\nthe price of provisions, the corn which the farmer must reserve for\nthe maintenance of himself and family ought never to enter into the\nestimation. It is only the overplus, compared to the demand, that\ndetermines the value.\n\nTo apply these principles, we must consider that in the first and more\nuncultivated ages of any state, ere fancy has confounded her wants\nwith those of nature, men, contented with the productions of their\nown fields, or with those rude preparations which they themselves can\nwork upon them, have little occasion for exchange, or at least for\nmoney, which, by agreement, is the common measure of exchange. The wool\nof the farmer\u2019s own flock, spun in his own family, and wrought by a\nneighbouring weaver, who receives his payment in corn or wool, suffices\nfor furniture or clothing. The carpenter, the smith, the mason, the\ntailor are retained by wages of a like nature; and the landlord\nhimself, dwelling in the neighbourhood, is contented to receive his\nrent in the commodities raised by the farmer. The greatest part\nof these he consumes at home, in rustic hospitality; the rest, perhaps,\nhe disposes of for money to the neighbouring town, whence he draws the\nfew materials of his expense and luxury.\n\nBut after men begin to refine on all these enjoyments, and live not\nalways at home, nor are contented with what can be raised in their\nneighbourhood, there is more exchange and commerce of all kinds, and\nmore money enters into that exchange. The tradesmen will not be paid in\ncorn, because they want something more than barley to eat. The farmer\ngoes beyond his own parish for the commodities he purchases, and cannot\nalways carry his commodities to the merchant who supplies him. The\nlandlord lives in the capital, or in a foreign country, and demands\nhis rent in gold and silver, which can easily be transported to him.\nGreat undertakers, and manufacturers, and merchants arise in every\ncommodity; and these can conveniently deal in nothing but in specie.\nAnd consequently, in this situation of society, the coin enters into\nmany more contracts, and by that means is much more employed than in\nthe former.\n\nThe necessary effect is, that, provided the money does not increase in\nthe nation, everything must become much cheaper in times of industry\nand refinement than in rude, uncultivated ages. It is the proportion\nbetween the circulating money and the commodities in the market which\ndetermines the prices. Goods that are consumed at home, or exchanged\nwith other goods in the neighbourhood, never come to market; they\naffect not in the least the current specie; with regard to it they\nare as if totally annihilated; and consequently this method of using\nthem sinks the proportion on the side of the commodities and increases\nthe prices. But after money enters into all contracts and sales, and\nis everywhere the measure of exchange, the same national cash has a\nmuch greater task to perform: all commodities are then in the market;\nthe sphere of circulation is enlarged; it is the same case as if that\nindividual sum were to serve a larger kingdom; and therefore, the\nproportion being here lessened on the side of the money, everything\nmust become cheaper, and the prices gradually fall.\n\nBy the most exact computations that have been formed all over Europe,\nafter making allowance for the alteration in the numerary value or\nthe denomination, it is found that the prices of all things have only\nrisen three, or at most, four times, since the discovery of the West\nIndies. But will any one assert that there is not much more than four\ntimes the coin in Europe that was in the fifteenth century and the\ncenturies preceding it? The Spaniards and Portuguese from their mines,\nthe English, French, and Dutch by their African trade, and by their\ninterlopers in the West Indies, bring home six millions a year, of\nwhich not above a third part goes to the East Indies. This sum alone\nin ten years would probably double the ancient stock of money in\nEurope. And no other satisfactory reason can be given why all prices\nhave not risen to a much more exorbitant height, except that derived\nfrom a change of customs and manners. Besides that more commodities\nare produced by additional industry, the same commodities come more\nto market after men depart from their ancient simplicity of manners;\nand though this increase has not been equal to that of money, it has,\nhowever, been considerable, and has preserved the proportion between\ncoin and commodities nearer the ancient standard.\n\nWere the question proposed, Which of these methods of living in the\npeople, the simple or refined, is most advantageous to the state or\npublic? I should, without much scruple, prefer the latter, in a view to\npolitics at least; and should produce this as an additional reason for\nthe encouragement of trade and manufactures.\n\nWhen men live in the ancient simple manner, and supply all their\nnecessaries from domestic industry or from the neighbourhood, the\nsovereign can levy no taxes in money from a considerable part of his\nsubjects; and if he will impose on them any burdens, he must take his\npayment in commodities, with which alone they abound\u2014a method\nattended with such great and obvious inconveniences, that they need\nnot here be insisted on. All the money he can pretend to raise must be\nfrom his principal cities, where alone it circulates; and these, it\nis evident, cannot afford him so much as the whole state could, did\ngold and silver circulate through the whole. But besides this obvious\ndiminution of the revenue, there is also another cause of the poverty\nof the public in such a situation. Not only the sovereign receives less\nmoney, but the same money goes not so far as in times of industry and\ngeneral commerce. Everything is dearer where the gold and silver are\nsupposed equal, and that because fewer commodities come to market, and\nthe whole coin bears a higher proportion to what is to be purchased by\nit, whence alone the prices of everything are fixed and determined.\n\nHere then we may learn the fallacy of the remark, often to be met with\nin historians, and even in common conversation, that any particular\nstate is weak, though fertile, populous, and well cultivated, merely\nbecause it wants money. It appears that the want of money can never\ninjure any state within itself: for men and commodities are the\nreal strength of any community. It is the simple manner of living\nwhich here hurts the public, by confining the gold and silver to few\nhands and preventing its universal diffusion and circulation. On the\ncontrary, industry and refinements of all kinds incorporate it with\nthe whole state, however small its quantity may be; they digest it\ninto every vein, so to speak, and make it enter into every transaction\nand contract. No hand is entirely empty of it. And as the prices of\neverything fall by that means, the sovereign has a double advantage: he\nmay draw money by his taxes from every part of the state, and what he\nreceives goes farther in every purchase and payment.\n\nWe may infer, from a comparison of prices, that money is not more\nplentiful in China than it was in Europe three centuries ago; but what\nimmense power is that empire possessed of, if we may judge by the civil\nand military list maintained by it! Polybius tells us that provisions\nwere so cheap in Italy during his time that in some places the\nstated club\u200b[16] at the inns was a _semis_ a head, little more than a\nfarthing! Yet the Roman power had even then subdued the whole known\nworld. About a century before that period the Carthaginian ambassador\nsaid, by way of raillery, that no people lived more sociably amongst\nthemselves than the Romans, for that in every entertainment which, as\nforeign ministers, they received they still observed the same plate\nat every table. The absolute quantity of the precious metals is a\nmatter of great indifference. There are only two circumstances of any\nimportance\u2014viz., their gradual increase and their thorough concoction\nand circulation through the state; and the influence of both these\ncircumstances has been here explained.\n\nIn the following essay we shall see an instance of a like fallacy as\nthat above mentioned, where a collateral effect is taken for a cause,\nand where a consequence is ascribed to the plenty of money; though it\nbe really owing to a change in the manners and customs of the people.\n\n\nNOTES, OF MONEY.\n\n[12] A private soldier in the Roman infantry had a denarius a day,\nsomewhat less than eightpence. The Roman emperors had commonly 25\nlegions in pay, which, allowing 5000 men to a legion, makes 125,000.\n(Tacitus, _Ann._ lib. 4.) It is true there were also auxiliaries to\nthe legions, but their numbers are uncertain as well as their pay. To\nconsider only the legionaries, the pay of the private men could not\nexceed \u00a31,600,000. Now, the Parliament in the last war commonly allowed\nfor the fleet \u00a32,500,000. We have therefore \u00a3900,000 over for the\nofficers and other expenses of the Roman legions. There seem to have\nbeen but few officers in the Roman armies in comparison of what are\nemployed in all our modern troops, except some Swiss corps. And these\nofficers had very small pay: a centurion, for instance, only double a\ncommon soldier. And as the soldiers from their pay (Tacitus, _Ann._\nlib. 1) bought their own clothes, arms, tents, and baggage, this must\nalso diminish considerably the other charges of the army. So little\nexpensive was that mighty Government, and so easy was its yoke over\nthe world. And, indeed, this is the more natural conclusion from the\nforegoing calculations; for money, after the conquest of Egypt, seems\nto have been nearly in as great plenty at Rome as it is at present in\nthe richest of the European kingdoms.\n\n\n[13] This is the case with the bank of Amsterdam.\n\n\n[14] These facts I give upon the authority of Monsieur du Tot in his\n_Reflexions politiques_, an author of reputation; though I must confess\nthat the facts which he advances on other occasions are often so\nsuspicious as to make his authority less in this matter. However, the\ngeneral observation that the augmenting the money in France does not at\nfirst proportionably augment the prices is certainly just.\n\nBy the by, this seems to be one of the best reasons which can be given\nfor a gradual and universal augmentation of the money, though it has\nbeen entirely overlooked in all those volumes which have been written\non that question by Melon, Du Tot, and Paris de Verney. Were all our\nmoney, for instance, recoined, and a penny\u2019s worth of silver taken from\nevery shilling, the new shilling would probably purchase everything\nthat could have been bought by the old; the prices of everything\nwould thereby be insensibly diminished; foreign trade enlivened; and\ndomestic industry, by the circulation of a greater number of pounds and\nshillings, would receive some increase and encouragement. In executing\nsuch a project, it would be better to make the new shilling pass for\ntwenty-four half-pence, in order to preserve the illusion, and make it\nbe taken for the same. And as a recoinage of our silver begins to be\nrequisite, by the continual wearing of our shillings and six-pences,\nit may be doubtful whether we ought to imitate the example in King\nWilliam\u2019s reign, when the clipped money was raised to the old standard.\n\n\n[15] The Italians gave to the Emperor Maximilian the nickname of\nPochi-Danari. None of the enterprises of that prince ever succeeded,\nfor want of money.\n\n\n\n\nOF INTEREST.\n\n\nNothing is esteemed a more certain sign of the flourishing condition\nof any nation than the lowness of interest; and with reason, though\nI believe the cause is somewhat different from what is commonly\napprehended. The lowness of interest is generally ascribed to the\nplenty of money; but money, however plentiful, has no other effect, if\nfixed, than to raise the price of labour. Silver is more common than\ngold, and therefore you receive a great quantity of it for the same\ncommodities. But do you pay less interest for it? Interest in Batavia\nand Jamaica is at 10 per cent., in Portugal at 6; though these places,\nas we may learn from the prices of everything, abound much more\nin gold and silver than either London or Amsterdam.\n\nWere all the gold in England annihilated at once, and one-and-twenty\nshillings substituted in the place of every guinea, would money be more\nplentiful and interest lower? No surely; we should only use silver\ninstead of gold. Were gold rendered as common as silver, and silver as\ncommon as copper, would money be more plentiful and interest lower?\nWe may assuredly give the same answer. Our shillings would then be\nyellow, and our halfpence white; and we should have no guineas. No\nother difference would ever be observed; no alteration on commerce,\nmanufactures, navigation, or interest; unless we imagine that the\ncolour of the metal is of any consequence.\n\nNow, what is so visible in these greater variations of scarcity or\nabundance of the precious metals must hold in all inferior changes.\nIf the multiplying gold and silver fifteen times makes no difference,\nmuch less can the doubling or tripling them. All augmentation has no\nother effect than to heighten the price of labour and commodities; and\neven this variation is little more than that of a name. In the progress\ntowards these changes the augmentation may have some influence by\nexciting industry; but after the prices are settled, suitable to the\nnew abundance of gold and silver, it has no manner of influence.\n\nAn effect always holds proportion with its cause. Prices have risen\nabout four times since the discovery of the Indies, and it is probable\nthat gold and silver have multiplied much more; but interest has not\nfallen much above a half. The rate of interest, therefore, is not\nderived from the quantity of the precious metals.\n\nMoney having merely a fictitious value, arising from the agreement\nand convention of men, the greater or less plenty of it is of no\nconsequence, if we consider a nation within itself; and the quantity\nof specie, when once fixed, though never so large, has no other\neffect than to oblige every one to tell out a greater number of those\nshining bits of metal for clothes, furniture, or equipage, without\nincreasing any one convenience of life. If a man borrows money\nto build a house, he then carries home a greater load; because the\nstone, timber, lead, glass, etc., with the labour of the masons and\ncarpenters, are represented by a greater quantity of gold and silver.\nBut as these metals are considered merely as representations, there\ncan no alteration arise from their bulk or quantity, their weight\nor colour, either upon their real value or their interest. The same\ninterest, in all cases, bears the same proportion to the sum. And if\nyou lent me so much labour and so many commodities, by receiving 5 per\ncent. you receive always proportional labour and commodities, however\nrepresented, whether by yellow or white coin, whether by a pound or an\nounce. It is in vain, therefore, to look for the cause of the fall or\nrise of interest in the greater or less quantity of gold and silver\nwhich is fixed in any nation.\n\nHigh interest arises from three circumstances: A great demand for\nborrowing; little riches to supply that demand; and great profits\narising from commerce. And these circumstances are a clear proof of the\nsmall advance of commerce and industry, not of the scarcity of gold\nand silver. Low interest, on the other hand, proceeds from the three\nopposite circumstances: A small demand for borrowing; great riches to\nsupply that demand; and small profits arising from commerce. And these\ncircumstances are all connected together, and proceed from the increase\nof industry and commerce, not of gold and silver. We shall endeavour\nto prove these points as fully and distinctly as possible, and shall\nbegin with the causes and the effects of a great or small demand for\nborrowing.\n\nWhen the people have emerged ever so little from a savage state, and\ntheir numbers have increased beyond the original multitude, there\nmust immediately arise an inequality of property; and while some\npossess large tracts of land, others are confined within narrow\nlimits, and some are entirely without any landed property. Those who\npossess more land than they can labour employ those who possess none,\nand agree to receive a determinate part of the product. Thus\nthe landed interest is immediately established; nor is there any\nsettled government, however rude, in which affairs are not on this\nfooting. Of these proprietors of land, some must presently discover\nthemselves to be of different tempers from others; and while one would\nwillingly store up the product of his land for futurity, another\ndesires to consume at present what should suffice for many years. But\nas the spending a settled revenue is a way of life entirely without\noccupation, men have so much need of somewhat to fix and engage them,\nthat pleasures, such as they are, will be the pursuit of the greatest\npart of the landholders, and the prodigals amongst them will always\nbe more numerous than the misers. In a state, therefore, where there\nis nothing but a landed interest, as there is little frugality, the\nborrowers must be very numerous, and the rate of interest must hold\nproportion to it. The difference depends not on the quantity of money,\nbut on the habits and manners which prevail. By this alone the demand\nfor borrowing is increased or diminished. Were money so plentiful as\nto make an egg be sold for sixpence, so long as there are only landed\ngentry and peasants in the state, the borrowers must be numerous and\ninterest high. The rent for the same farm would be heavier and more\nbulky, but the same idleness of the landlord, with the higher prices of\ncommodities, would dissipate it in the same time, and produce the same\nnecessity and demand for borrowing.\n\nNor is the case different with regard to the second circumstance which\nwe proposed to consider\u2014viz., the great or little riches to supply\nthis demand. This effect also depends on the habits and ways of living\nof the people, not on the quantity of gold and silver. In order to\nhave in any state a great number of lenders, it is not sufficient nor\nrequisite that there be great abundance of the precious metals. It is\nonly requisite that the property or command of that quantity which is\nin the state, whether great or small, should be collected in particular\nhands, so as to form considerable sums, or compose a great moneyed\ninterest. This begets a number of lenders and sinks the rate of usury;\nand this, I shall venture to affirm, depends not on the quantity\nof specie, but on particular manners and customs, which make the specie\ngather into separate sums or masses of considerable value.\n\nFor suppose that, by miracle, every man in Britain should have five\npounds slipped into his pocket in one night: this would much more than\ndouble the whole money that is at present in the kingdom; and yet there\nwould not next day, nor for some time, be any more lenders, nor any\nvariation on the interest. And were there nothing but landlords and\npeasants in the state, this money, however abundant, could never gather\ninto sums; and would only serve to increase the prices of everything,\nwithout any further consequence. The prodigal landlord dissipates it\nas fast as he receives it; and the beggarly peasant has no means, nor\nview, nor ambition of obtaining above a bare livelihood. The overplus\nof borrowers above that of lenders continuing still the same, there\nwill follow no reduction of interest. That depends upon another\nprinciple, and must proceed from an increase of industry and frugality,\nof arts and commerce.\n\nEverything useful to the life of man arises from the ground; but few\nthings arise in that condition which is requisite to render them\nuseful. There must, therefore, besides the peasants and the proprietors\nof land, be another rank of men, who, receiving from the former the\nrude materials, work them into their proper form, and retain part\nfor their own use and subsistence. In the infancy of society, these\ncontracts betwixt the artisans and the peasants, and betwixt one\nspecies of artisans and another, are commonly entered into immediately\nby the persons themselves, who, being neighbours, are easily acquainted\nwith each other\u2019s necessities, and can lend their mutual assistance\nto supply them. But when men\u2019s industry increases, and their views\nenlarge, it is found that the most remote parts of the state can assist\neach other as well as the more contiguous, and that this intercourse of\ngood offices may be carried on to the greatest extent and intricacy.\nHence the origin of merchants, the most useful race of men in the\nwhole society, who serve as agents between those parts of the\nstate that are wholly unacquainted and are ignorant of each other\u2019s\nnecessities. Here are in a city fifty workmen in silk and linen, and a\nthousand customers; and these two ranks of men, so necessary to each\nother, can never rightly meet till one man erects a shop, to which all\nthe workmen and all the customers repair. In this province grass rises\nin abundance: the inhabitants abound in cheese, and butter, and cattle;\nbut want bread and corn, which, in a neighbouring province, are in\ntoo great abundance for the use of the inhabitants. One man discovers\nthis. He brings corn from the one province, and returns with cattle;\nand supplying the wants of both, he is, so far, a common benefactor.\nAs the people increase in numbers and industry, the difficulty of\ntheir intercourse increases: the business of the agency or merchandise\nbecomes more intricate, and divides, subdivides, compounds, and mixes\nto a greater variety. In all these transactions it is necessary, and\nreasonable, that a considerable part of the commodities and labour\nshould belong to the merchant, to whom, in a great measure, they are\nowing. And these commodities he will sometimes preserve in kind, or\nmore commonly convert into money, which is their common representation.\nIf gold and silver have increased in the state together with the\nindustry, it will require a great quantity of these metals to represent\na great quantity of commodities and labour; if industry alone has\nincreased, the prices of everything must sink, and a very small\nquantity of specie will serve as a representation.\n\nThere is no craving or demand of the human mind more constant and\ninsatiable than that for exercise and employment, and this desire\nseems the foundation of most of our passions and pursuits. Deprive a\nman of all business and serious occupation, he runs restless from one\namusement to another; and the weight and oppression which he feels from\nidleness is so great that he forgets the ruin which must follow from\nhis immoderate expenses. Give him a more harmless way of employing his\nmind or body, he is satisfied, and feels no longer that insatiable\nthirst after pleasure. But if the employment you give him be\nprofitable, especially if the profit be attached to every particular\nexertion of industry, he has gain so often in his eye that he acquires,\nby degrees, a passion for it, and knows no such pleasure as that of\nseeing the daily increase of his fortune. And this is the reason why\ntrade increases frugality, and why, among merchants, there is the same\noverplus of misers above prodigals as, among the possessors of land,\nthere is the contrary.\n\nCommerce increases industry, by conveying it readily from one member\nof the state to another, and allowing none of it to perish or become\nuseless. It increases frugality, by giving occupation to men, and\nemploying them in the arts of gain, which soon engage their affection\nand remove all relish for pleasure and expense. It is an infallible\nconsequence of all industrious professions to beget frugality, and make\nthe love of gain prevail over the love of pleasure. Among lawyers and\nphysicians who have any practice there are many more who live within\ntheir income than who exceed it, or even live up to it. But lawyers\nand physicians beget no industry, and it is even at the expense of\nothers they acquire their riches; so that they are sure to diminish the\npossessions of some of their fellow-citizens as fast as they increase\ntheir own. Merchants, on the contrary, beget industry, by serving as\ncanals to convey it through every corner of the state; and at the\nsame time, by their frugality, they acquire great power over that\nindustry, and collect a large property in the labour and commodities\nwhich they are the chief instruments in producing. There is no other\nprofession, therefore, except merchandise, which can make the moneyed\ninterest considerable, or, in other words, can increase industry, and,\nby also increasing frugality, give a great command of that industry to\nparticular members of the society. Without commerce, the state must\nconsist chiefly of landed gentry, whose prodigality and expense make a\ncontinual demand for borrowing, and of peasants, who have no sums to\nsupply that demand. The money never gathers into large stocks or sums\nwhich can be lent at interest. It is dispersed into numberless\nhands, who either squander it in idle show and magnificence, or employ\nit in the purchase of the common necessaries of life. Commerce alone\nassembles it into considerable sums; and this effect it has merely\nfrom the industry which it begets and the frugality which it inspires,\nindependent of that particular quantity of precious metal which may\ncirculate in the state.\n\nThus an increase of commerce, by a necessary consequence, raises a\ngreat number of lenders, and by that means produces a lowness of\ninterest. We must now consider how far this increase of commerce\ndiminishes the profits arising from that profession, and gives rise to\nthe third circumstance requisite to produce a lowness of interest.\n\nIt may be proper to observe on this head that low interest and low\nprofits of merchandise are two events that mutually forward each\nother, and are both originally derived from that extensive commerce\nwhich produces opulent merchants and renders the moneyed interest\nconsiderable. Where merchants possess great stocks, whether represented\nby few or many pieces of metal, it must frequently happen that when\nthey either become tired of business or have heirs unwilling or unfit\nto engage in commerce, a great deal of these riches will seek an\nannual and secure revenue. The plenty diminishes the price, and makes\nthe lenders accept of a low interest. This consideration obliges\nmany to keep their stocks in trade, and rather be content with low\nprofits than dispose of their money at an under value. On the other\nhand, when commerce has become very extensive, and employs very large\nstocks, there must arise rivalships among the merchants, which diminish\nthe profits of trade, at the same time that they increase the trade\nitself. The low profits of merchandise induce the merchants to accept\nmore willingly of a low interest, when they leave off business and\nbegin to indulge themselves in ease and indolence. It is needless,\ntherefore, to inquire which of these circumstances\u2014viz., low interest\nor low profits, is the cause, and which the effect. They both arise\nfrom an extensive commerce, and mutually forward each other. No\nman will accept of low profits where he can have high interest, and\nno man will accept of low interest where he can have high profits.\nAn extensive commerce, by producing large stocks, diminishes both\ninterest and profits; and is always assisted in its diminution of the\none by the proportional sinking of the other. I may add, that as low\nprofits arise from the increase of commerce and industry, they serve\nin their turn to the further increase of commerce, by rendering the\ncommodities cheaper, encouraging the consumption, and heightening the\nindustry. And thus, if we consider the whole connection of causes and\neffects, interest is the true barometer of the state, and its lowness\nis a sign almost infallible of the flourishing of a people. It proves\nthe increase of industry, and its prompt circulation through the whole\nstate, little inferior to a demonstration. And though, perhaps, it may\nnot be impossible but a sudden and a great check to commerce may have\na momentary effect of the same kind, by throwing so many stocks out of\ntrade, it must be attended with such misery and want of employment in\nthe poor that, besides its short duration, it will not be possible to\nmistake the one case for the other.\n\nThose who have asserted that the plenty of money was the cause of low\ninterest seem to have taken a collateral effect for a cause, since the\nsame industry which sinks the interest does commonly acquire great\nabundance of the precious metals. A variety of fine manufactures,\nwith vigilant, enterprising merchants, will soon draw money to a\nstate if it be anywhere to be found in the world. The same cause, by\nmultiplying the conveniences of life and increasing industry, collects\ngreat riches into the hands of persons who are not proprietors of\nland, and produces by that means a lowness of interest. But though\nboth these effects\u2014plenty of money and low interest\u2014naturally arise\nfrom commerce and industry, they are altogether independent of each\nother. For suppose a nation removed into the Pacific Ocean, without\nany foreign commerce, or any knowledge of navigation: suppose\nthat this nation possesses always the same stock of coin, but is\ncontinually increasing in its numbers and industry: it is evident that\nthe price of every commodity must gradually diminish in that kingdom,\nsince it is the proportion between money and any species of goods\nwhich fixes their mutual value; and, under the present supposition,\nthe conveniences of life become every day more abundant, without any\nalteration on the current specie. A less quantity of money, therefore,\namongst this people will make a rich man, during the times of industry,\nthan would serve to that purpose in ignorant and slothful ages. Less\nmoney will build a house, portion a daughter, buy an estate, support a\nmanufactory, or maintain a family and equipage. These are the uses for\nwhich men borrow money, and therefore the greater or less quantity of\nit in a state has no influence on the interest. But it is evident that\nthe greater or less stock of labour and commodities must have a great\ninfluence, since we really and in effect borrow these when we take\nmoney upon interest. It is true, when commerce is extended all over the\nglobe the most industrious nations always abound most with the precious\nmetals; so that low interest and plenty of money are in fact almost\ninseparable. But still it is of consequence to know the principle\nwhence any phenomenon arises, and to distinguish between a cause and\na concomitant effect. Besides that the speculation is curious, it\nmay frequently be of use in the conduct of public affairs. At least,\nit must be owned that nothing can be of more use than to improve, by\npractice, the method of reasoning on these subjects, which of all\nothers are the most important; though they are commonly treated in the\nloosest and most careless manner.\n\nAnother reason of this popular mistake with regard to the cause of\nlow interest seems to be the instance of some nations, where, after a\nsudden acquisition of money or the precious metals by means of foreign\nconquest, the interest has fallen not only among them but in all\nthe neighbouring states as soon as that money was dispersed and had\ninsinuated itself into every corner. Thus, interest in Spain\nfell nearly a half immediately after the discovery of the West Indies,\nas we are informed by Garcilasso de la Vega; and it has been ever\nsince sinking in every kingdom of Europe. Interest in Rome, after the\nconquest of Egypt, fell from 6 to 4 per cent., as we learn from Dion.\n\nThe causes of the sinking of interest upon such an event seem different\nin the conquering country and in the neighbouring states, but in\nneither of them can we justly ascribe that effect merely to the\nincrease of gold and silver.\n\nIn the conquering country it is natural to imagine that this new\nacquisition of money will fall into a few hands, and be gathered into\nlarge sums which seek a secure revenue, either by the purchase of land\nor by interest; and consequently the same effect follows, for a little\ntime, as if there had been a great accession of industry and commerce.\nThe increase of lenders above the borrowers sinks the interest, and so\nmuch the faster if those who have acquired those large sums find no\nindustry or commerce in the state, and no method of employing their\nmoney but by lending it at interest. But after this new mass of gold\nand silver has been digested, and has circulated through the whole\nstate, affairs will soon return to their former situation, while the\nlandlords and new money-holders, living idly, squander above their\nincome, and the former daily contract debt, and the latter encroach on\ntheir stock till its final extinction. The whole money may still be in\nthe state, and make itself be felt by the increase of prices, but not\nbeing now collected into any large masses or stocks, the disproportion\nbetween the borrowers and lenders is the same as formerly, and\nconsequently the high interest returns.\n\nAccordingly, we find in Rome that so early as Tiberius\u2019s time interest\nhad again mounted to 6 per cent., though no accident had happened to\ndrain the empire of money. In Trajan\u2019s time money lent on mortgages in\nItaly bore 6 per cent.; on common securities in Bithynia, 12. And if\ninterest in Spain has not risen to its old pitch, this can be ascribed\nto nothing but the continuance of the same cause that sunk\nit\u2014viz., the large fortunes continually made in the Indies, which come\nover to Spain from time to time and supply the demand of the borrowers.\nBy this accidental and extraneous cause more money is to be lent in\nSpain\u2014that is, more money is collected into large sums than would\notherwise be found in a state where there are so little commerce and\nindustry.\n\nAs to the reduction of interest which has followed in England, France,\nand other kingdoms of Europe that have no mines, it has been gradual,\nand has not proceeded from the increase of money, considered merely in\nitself, but from the increase of industry, which is the natural effect\nof the former increase, in that interval, before it raises the price of\nlabour and provisions. For to return to the foregoing supposition, if\nthe industry of England had risen as much from other causes (and that\nrise might easily have happened though the stock of money had remained\nthe same), must not all the same consequences have followed which we\nobserve at present? The same people would, in that case, be found in\nthe kingdom, the same commodities, the same industry, manufactures, and\ncommerce, and consequently the same merchants with the same stocks\u2014that\nis, with the same command over labour and commodities, only represented\nby a smaller number of white or yellow pieces, which, being a\ncircumstance of no moment, would only affect the waggoner, porter, and\ntrunk-maker. Luxury, therefore, manufactures, arts, industry, frugality\nflourishing equally as at present, it is evident that interest must\nalso have been as low, since that is the necessary result of all these\ncircumstances, so far as they determine the profits of commerce and the\nproportion between the borrowers and lenders in any state.\n\n\nNOTE, OF INTEREST.\n\n[16] Price for a meal.\n\n\n\n\nOF THE BALANCE OF TRADE.\n\n\nIt is very usual in nations ignorant of the nature of commerce to\nprohibit the exportation of commodities, and to preserve among\nthemselves whatever they think valuable and useful. They consider not\nthat in this prohibition they act directly contrary to their intention,\nand that the more is exported of any commodity the more will be raised\nat home, of which they themselves will always have the first offer.\n\nIt is well known to the learned that the ancient laws of Athens\nrendered the exportation of figs criminal, that being supposed a\nspecies of fruit so excellent in Attica that the Athenians esteemed it\ntoo delicious for the palate of any foreigner; and in this ridiculous\nprohibition they were so much in earnest that informers were thence\ncalled \u201csycophants\u201d among them, from two Greek words which signify figs\nand discoverer. There are proofs in many old Acts of Parliament of the\nsame ignorance in the nature of commerce, particularly in the reign\nof Edward III.; and to this day in France the exportation of corn is\nalmost always prohibited\u2014in order, as they say, to prevent famines,\nthough it is evident that nothing contributes more to the frequent\nfamines which so much distress that fertile country.\n\nThe same jealous fear with regard to money has also prevailed among\nseveral nations, and it required both reason and experience to convince\nany people that these prohibitions serve to no other purpose than to\nraise the exchange against them and produce a still greater exportation.\n\nThese errors, one may say, are gross and palpable; but there still\nprevails, even in nations well acquainted with commerce, a strong\njealousy with regard to the balance of trade, and a fear that all\ntheir gold and silver may be leaving them. This seems to me, almost in\nevery case, a very groundless apprehension, and I should as soon\ndread that all our springs and rivers should be exhausted as that\nmoney should abandon a kingdom where there are people and industry. Let\nus carefully preserve these latter advantages, and we need never be\napprehensive of losing the former.\n\nIt is easy to observe that all calculations concerning the balance\nof trade are founded on very uncertain facts and suppositions. The\ncustom-house books are allowed to be an insufficient ground of\nreasoning; nor is the rate of exchange much better, unless we consider\nit with all nations, and know also the proportion of the several sums\nremitted, which one may safely pronounce impossible. Every man who has\never reasoned on this subject has always proved his theory, whatever\nit was, by facts and calculations, and by an enumeration of all the\ncommodities sent to all foreign kingdoms.\n\nThe writings of Mr. Gee struck the nation with a universal panic when\nthey saw it plainly demonstrated by a detail of particulars that the\nbalance was against them for so considerable a sum as must leave them\nwithout a single shilling in five or six years. But luckily twenty\nyears have since elapsed, with an expensive foreign war, and yet it is\ncommonly supposed that money is still more plentiful among us than in\nany former period.\n\nNothing can be more entertaining on this head than Dr. Swift, an author\nso quick in discerning the mistakes and absurdities of others. He says,\nin his _Short View of the State of Ireland_, that the whole cash of\nthat kingdom amounted but to \u00a3500,000; that out of this they remitted\nevery year a neat million to England, and had scarce any other source\nfrom which they could compensate themselves, and little other foreign\ntrade but the importation of French wines, for which they paid ready\nmoney. The consequence of this situation, which must be owned to be\ndisadvantageous, was that in a course of three years the current money\nof Ireland from \u00a3500,000 was reduced to less than two; and at present,\nI suppose, in a course of thirty years, it is absolutely nothing. Yet I\nknow not how that opinion of the advance of riches in Ireland,\nwhich gave the Doctor so much indignation, seems still to continue and\ngain ground with everybody.\n\nIn short, this apprehension of the wrong balance of trade appears of\nsuch a nature that it discovers itself wherever one is out of humour\nwith the ministry, or is in low spirits; and as it can never be refuted\nby a particular detail of all the exports which counterbalance the\nimports, it may here be proper to form a general argument which may\nprove the impossibility of that event as long as we preserve our people\nand our industry.\n\nSuppose four-fifths of all the money in Britain to be annihilated in\none night, and the nation reduced to the same condition, with regard\nto specie, as in the reigns of the Harrys and Edwards, what would be\nthe consequence? Must not the price of all labour and commodities sink\nin proportion, and everything be sold as cheap as they were in those\nages? What nation could then dispute with us in any foreign market, or\npretend to navigate or to sell manufactures at the same price which\nto us would afford sufficient profit? In how little time, therefore,\nmust this bring back the money which we had lost, and raise us to the\nlevel of all the neighbouring nations? where, after we have arrived,\nwe immediately lose the advantage of the cheapness of labour and\ncommodities, and the further flowing in of money is stopped by our\nfulness and repletion.\n\nAgain, suppose that all the money of Britain were multiplied fivefold\nin a night, must not the contrary effect follow? Must not labour and\ncommodities rise to such an exorbitant height that no neighbouring\nnations could afford to buy from us, while their commodities, on the\nother hand, became so cheap in comparison that, in spite of all the\nlaws which could be formed, they would be run in upon us, and our money\nflow out till we come to a level with foreigners, and lose that great\nsuperiority of riches which had laid us under such disadvantages?\n\nNow, it is evident that the same causes which would correct these\nexorbitant inequalities, were they to happen miraculously,\nmust prevent their happening in the common course of nature, and must\nfor ever, in all the neighbouring nations, preserve money nearly\nproportionable to the art and industry of each nation. All water,\nwherever it communicates, remains always at a level. Ask naturalists\nthe reason: they tell you that were it to be raised in any one place,\nthe superior gravity of that part not being balanced, must depress it\ntill it meets a counterpoise; and that the same cause which redresses\nthe inequality when it happens must for ever prevent it without some\nviolent external operation.\u200b[17]\n\nCan one imagine that it had ever been possible, by any laws, or even\nby any art or industry, to have kept all the money in Spain which the\ngalleons have brought from the Indies? or that all commodities could\nbe sold in France for a tenth of the price which they would yield on\nthe other side of the Pyrenees, without finding their way thither, and\ndraining from that immense treasure? What other reason, indeed, is\nthere why all nations at present gain in their trade with Spain and\nPortugal, but because it is impossible to heap up money, more than any\nfluid, beyond its proper level? The sovereigns of these countries have\nshown that they wanted not inclination to keep their gold and silver to\nthemselves had it been in any degree practicable.\n\nBut as any body of water may be raised above the level of the\nsurrounding element, if the former has no communication with the\nlatter, so in money, if the communication be cut off by any material\nor physical impediment (for all laws alone are ineffectual), there\nmay, in such a case, be a very great inequality of money. Thus the\nimmense distance of China, together with the monopolies of our India\ncompanies, obstructing the communication, preserve in Europe\nthe gold and silver, especially the latter, in much greater plenty\nthan they are found in that kingdom. But, notwithstanding this great\nobstruction, the force of the causes above-mentioned is still evident.\nThe skill and ingenuity of Europe in general surpasses perhaps that of\nChina with regard to manual arts and manufactures, yet are we never\nable to trade thither without great disadvantage; and were it not for\nthe continual recruits which we receive from America, money would very\nsoon sink in Europe and rise in China, till it came nearly to a level\nin both places. Nor can any reasonable man doubt but that industrious\nnation, were they as near us as Poland or Barbary, would drain us of\nthe overplus of our specie, and draw to themselves a larger share of\nthe West Indian treasures. We need have no recourse to a physical\nattraction to explain the necessity of this operation; there is a moral\nattraction arising from the interests and passions of men which is full\nas potent and infallible.\n\nHow is the balance kept in the provinces of every kingdom among\nthemselves but by the force of this principle, which makes it\nimpossible for money to lose its level, and either to rise or sink\nbeyond the proportion of the labour and commodities which is in each\nprovince? Did not long experience make people easy on this head, what\na fund of gloomy reflections might calculations afford a melancholy\nYorkshireman while he computed and magnified the sums drawn to London\nby taxes, absentees, commodities, and found on comparison the opposite\narticles so much inferior? And no doubt, had the Heptarchy subsisted in\nEngland, the legislature of each state had been continually alarmed by\nthe fear of a wrong balance; and it is probable that the mutual hatred\nof these states would have been extremely violent on account of their\nclose neighbourhood; they would have loaded and oppressed all commerce\nby a jealous and superfluous caution. Since the Union has removed the\nbarriers between Scotland and England, which of these nations gains\nfrom the other by this free commerce? Or if the former kingdom\nhas received any increase of riches, can it be reasonably accounted for\nby anything but the increase of its art and industry? It was a common\napprehension in England before the Union, as we learn from L\u2019Abbe du\nBos, that Scotland would soon drain them of their treasure were an\nopen trade allowed; and on the other side of the Tweed a contrary\napprehension prevailed\u2014with what justice in both time has shown.\n\nWhat happens in small portions of mankind must take place in greater.\nThe provinces of the Roman empire no doubt kept their balance with each\nother, and with Italy, independent of the legislature, as much as the\nseveral counties of Britain or the several parishes of each county. And\nany man who travels over Europe at this day may see by the prices of\ncommodities that money, in spite of the absurd jealousy of princes and\nstates, has brought itself nearly to a level, and that the difference\nbetween one kingdom and another is not greater in this respect than it\nis often between different provinces of the same kingdom. Men naturally\nflock to capital cities, seaports, and navigable rivers. There we find\nmore men, more industry, more commodities, and consequently more money;\nbut still the latter difference holds proportion with the former, and\nthe level is preserved.\u200b[18]\n\nOur jealousy and our hatred of France are without bounds, and the\nformer sentiment at least must be acknowledged very reasonable\nand well-grounded. These passions have occasioned innumerable barriers\nand obstructions upon commerce, where we are accused of being commonly\nthe aggressors. But what have we gained by the bargain? We lost the\nFrench market for our woollen manufactures, and transferred the\ncommerce of wine to Spain and Portugal, where we buy much worse liquor\nat a higher price. There are few Englishmen who would not think their\ncountry absolutely ruined were French wines sold in England so cheap\nand in such abundance as to supplant, in some measure, all ale and\nhome-brewed liquors; but would we lay aside prejudice, it would not\nbe difficult to prove that nothing could be more innocent, perhaps\nadvantageous. Each new acre of vineyard planted in France, in order\nto supply England with wine, would make it requisite for the French\nto take the produce of an English acre, sown in wheat or barley, in\norder to subsist themselves; and it is evident that we have thereby got\ncommand of the better commodity.\n\nThere are many edicts of the French King prohibiting the planting of\nnew vineyards, and ordering all those already planted to be grubbed\nup, so sensible are they in that country of the superior value of corn\nabove every other product.\n\nMareschal Vauban complains often, and with reason, of the absurd duties\nwhich load the entry of those wines of Languedoc, Guienne, and other\nsouthern provinces that are imported into Brittany and Normandy. He\nentertained no doubt but these latter provinces could preserve their\nbalance notwithstanding the open commerce which he recommends. And it\nis evident that a few leagues more navigation to England would make no\ndifference; or if it did, that it must operate alike on the commodities\nof both kingdoms.\n\nThere is indeed one expedient by which it is possible to sink, and\nanother by which we may raise, money beyond its natural level in any\nkingdom; but these cases, when examined, will be found to resolve into\nour general theory, and to bring additional authority to it.\n\nI scarce know any method of sinking money below its level but those\ninstitutions of banks, funds, and paper-credit which are so much\npractised in this kingdom. These render paper equivalent to money,\ncirculate it through the whole state, make it supply the place of gold\nand silver, raise proportionally the price of labour and commodities,\nand by that means either banish a great part of those precious metals,\nor prevent their further increase. What can be more short-sighted than\nour reasonings on this head? We fancy, because an individual would be\nmuch richer were his stock of money doubled, that the same good effect\nwould follow were the money of every one increased, not considering\nthat this would raise as much the price of every commodity, and reduce\nevery man in time to the same condition as before. It is only in our\npublic negotiations and transactions with foreigners that a greater\nstock of money is advantageous; and as our paper is there absolutely\ninsignificant, we feel, by its means, all the ill effects arising from\na great abundance of money without reaping any of the advantages.\u200b[19]\n\nSuppose that there are twelve millions of paper which circulate in the\nkingdom as money (for we are not to imagine that all our enormous funds\nare employed in that shape), and suppose the real cash of the kingdom\nto be eighteen millions: here is a state which is found by experience\nable to hold a stock of thirty millions. I say, if it be able to hold\nit, it must of necessity have acquired it in gold and silver had we not\nobstructed the entrance of these metals by this new invention of paper.\nWhence would it have acquired that sum? From all the kingdoms of the\nworld. But why? Because, if you remove these twelve millions, money in\nthis state is below its level compared with our neighbours; and\nwe must immediately draw from all of them till we be full and saturate,\nso to speak, and can hold no more. By our present politics we are as\ncareful to stuff the nation with this fine commodity of bank-bills\nand chequer notes as if we were afraid of being overburdened with the\nprecious metals.\n\nIt is not to be doubted but the great plenty of bullion in France is,\nin a great measure, owing to the want of paper-credit. The French have\nno banks; merchants\u2019 bills do not there circulate as with us; usury or\nlending on interest is not directly permitted, so that many have large\nsums in their coffers; great quantities of plate are used in private\nhouses, and all the churches are full of it. By this means provision\nand labour still remain much cheaper among them than in nations that\nare not half so rich in gold and silver. The advantages of this\nsituation in point of trade, as well as in great public emergencies,\nare too evident to be disputed.\n\nThe same fashion a few years ago prevailed in Genoa which still has\nplace in England and Holland, of using services of china ware instead\nof plate; but the Senate, wisely foreseeing the consequence, prohibited\nthe use of that brittle commodity beyond a certain extent, while the\nuse of silver plate was left unlimited. And I suppose, in their late\ndistresses, they felt the good effect of this ordinance. Our tax on\nplate is, perhaps, in this view, somewhat impolitic.\n\nBefore the introduction of paper-money into our colonies, they had gold\nand silver sufficient for their circulation. Since the introduction of\nthat commodity, the least inconveniency that has followed is the total\nbanishment of the precious metals. And after the abolition of paper,\ncan it be doubted but money will return, while these colonies possess\nmanufactures and commodities, the only thing valuable in commerce, and\nfor whose sake alone all men desire money?\n\nWhat pity Lycurgus did not think of paper-credit when he wanted to\nbanish gold and silver from Sparta! It would have served his\npurpose better than the lumps of iron he made use of as money, and\nwould also have prevented more effectually all commerce with strangers,\nas being of so much less real and intrinsic value.\n\nIt must, however, be confessed that, as all these questions of trade\nand money are extremely complicated, there are certain lights in\nwhich this subject may be placed so as to represent the advantages of\npaper-credit and banks to be superior to their disadvantages. That they\nbanish specie and bullion from a state is undoubtedly true, and whoever\nlooks no farther than this circumstance does well to condemn them; but\nspecie and bullion are not of so great consequence as not to admit of\na compensation, and even an overbalance from the increase of industry\nand of credit which may be promoted by the right use of paper-money.\nIt is well known of what advantage it is to a merchant to be able to\ndiscount his bills upon occasion; and everything that facilitates this\nspecies of traffic is favourable to the general commerce of a state.\nBut private bankers are enabled to give such credit by the credit they\nreceive from the depositing of money in their shops; and the Bank of\nEngland in the same manner, from the liberty they have to issue their\nnotes in all payments. There was an invention of this kind which was\nfallen upon some years ago by the banks of Edinburgh, and which, as it\nis one of the most ingenious ideas that has been executed in commerce,\nhas also been found very advantageous to Scotland. It is there called\na bank-credit, and is of this nature: A man goes to the bank and finds\nsurety to the amount, we shall suppose, of five thousand pounds. This\nmoney, or any part of it, he has the liberty of drawing out whenever\nhe pleases, and he pays only the ordinary interest for it while it\nis in his hands. He may, when he pleases, repay any sum so small as\ntwenty pounds, and the interest is discounted from the very day of the\nrepayment. The advantages resulting from this contrivance are manifold.\nAs a man may find surety nearly to the amount of his substance, and his\nbank-credit is equivalent to ready money, a merchant does hereby\nin a manner coin his houses, his household furniture, the goods in his\nwarehouse, the foreign debts due to him, his ships at sea; and can,\nupon occasion, employ them in all payments as if they were the current\nmoney of the country. If a man borrows five thousand pounds from a\nprivate hand, besides that it is not always to be found when required,\nhe pays interest for it whether he be using it or not; his bank-credit\ncosts him nothing except during the very moment in which it is of\nservice to him, and this circumstance is of equal advantage as if he\nhad borrowed money at much lower interest. Merchants likewise from this\ninvention acquire a great facility in supporting each other\u2019s credit,\nwhich is a considerable security against bankruptcies. A man, when his\nown bank-credit is exhausted, goes to any of his neighbours who is not\nin the same condition, and he gets the money, which he replaces at his\nconvenience.\n\nAfter this practice had taken place during some years at Edinburgh,\nseveral companies of merchants at Glasgow carried the matter farther.\nThey associated themselves into different banks and issued notes so\nlow as ten shillings, which they used in all payments for goods,\nmanufactures, tradesmen, labour of all kinds; and these notes, from\nthe established credit of the companies, passed as money in all\npayments throughout the country. By this means a stock of five thousand\npounds was able to perform the same operations as if it were ten,\nand merchants were thereby enabled to trade to a greater extent, and\nto require less profit in all their transactions. In Newcastle and\nBristol, as well as other trading places, the merchants have since\ninstituted banks of a like nature, in imitation of those in Glasgow.\nBut whatever other advantages result from these inventions, it must\nstill be allowed that they banish the precious metals; and nothing\ncan be a more evident proof of it than a comparison of the past and\npresent condition of Scotland in that particular. It was found, upon\nthe recoinage made after the Union, that there was near a million of\nspecie in that country; but notwithstanding the great increase of\nriches, commerce and manufactures of all kinds, it is thought that,\neven where there is no extraordinary drain made by England, the current\nspecie will not now amount to a fifth of that sum.\n\nBut as our projects of paper-credit are almost the only expedient by\nwhich we can sink money below its level, so, in my opinion, the only\nexpedient by which we can raise money above its level is a practice\nwhich we should all exclaim against as destructive\u2014viz., the gathering\nlarge sums into a public treasure, locking them up, and absolutely\npreventing their circulation. The fluid not communicating with the\nneighbouring element may, by such an artifice, be raised to what height\nwe please. To prove this we need only return to our first supposition\nof the annihilating the half or any part of our cash, where we found\nthat the immediate consequence of such an event would be the attraction\nof an equal sum from all the neighbouring kingdoms. Nor does there seem\nto be any necessary bounds set by the nature of things to this practice\nof hoarding. A small city like Geneva, continuing this policy for ages,\nmight engross nine-tenths of the money of Europe. There seems, indeed,\nin the nature of man an invincible obstacle to that immense growth\nof riches. A weak state with an enormous treasure will soon become a\nprey to some of its poorer but more powerful neighbours; a great state\nwould dissipate its wealth in dangerous and ill-concerted projects,\nand probably destroy with it what is much more valuable\u2014the industry,\nmorals, and number of its people. The fluid in this case, raised to too\ngreat a height, bursts and destroys the vessel that contains it, and\nmixing itself with the surrounding element, soon falls to its proper\nlevel.\n\nSo little are we commonly acquainted with this principle that, though\nall historians agree in relating uniformly so recent an event as the\nimmense treasure amassed by Harry VII. (which they make amount to\n\u00a31,700,000), we rather reject their concurring testimony than admit\nof a fact which agrees so ill with our inveterate prejudices. It is\nindeed probable that that sum might be three-fourths of all\nthe money in England; but where is the difficulty that such a sum\nmight be amassed in twenty years by a cunning, rapacious, frugal, and\nalmost absolute monarch? Nor is it probable that the diminution of\ncirculating money was ever sensibly felt by the people, or ever did\nthem any prejudice. The sinking of the prices of all commodities would\nimmediately replace it, by giving England the advantage in its commerce\nwith all the neighbouring kingdoms.\n\nHave we not an instance in the small republic of Athens with its\nallies, who in about fifty years between the Median and Peloponnesian\nWars amassed a sum greater than that of Harry VII.?\u200b[20] for all the\nGreek historians and orators agree that the Athenians collected in the\ncitadel more than 10,000 talents, which they afterwards dissipated,\nto their own ruin, in rash and imprudent enterprises. But when this\nmoney was set a-running, and began to communicate with the surrounding\nfluid, what was the consequence? Did it remain in the state? No; for\nwe find by the memorable census mentioned by Demosthenes and Polybius\nthat, in about fifty years afterwards, the whole value of the republic,\ncomprehending lands, houses, commodities, slaves, and money was less\nthan 6000 talents.\n\nWhat an ambitious, high-spirited people was this, to collect and keep\nin their treasury, with a view to conquests, a sum which it was every\nday in the power of the citizens, by a single vote, to distribute among\nthemselves, and which would go near to triple the riches of every\nindividual; for we must observe that the numbers and private riches of\nthe Athenians are said by ancient writers to have been no greater at\nthe beginning of the Peloponnesian War than at the beginning of the\nMacedonian.\n\nMoney was little more plentiful in Greece during the age of Philip\nand Perseus than in England during that of Harry VII., yet these two\nmonarchs in thirty years collected from the small kingdom of\nMacedon a much larger treasure than that of the English monarch.\nPaulus \u00c6milius brought to Rome about \u00a31,700,000 sterling\u2014Pliny says\n\u00a32,400,000\u2014and that was but a part of the Macedonian treasure; the rest\nwas dissipated by the resistance and flight of Perseus.\n\nWe may learn from Stanyan that the Canton of Berne had \u00a3300,000 lent\nat interest, and had above six times as much in their treasury. Here,\nthen, is a sum hoarded of \u00a31,800,000 sterling, which is at least\nquadruple of what should naturally circulate in such a petty state;\nand yet no one who travels into the Pais de Vaux, or any part of that\ncanton, observes any want of money more than could be supposed in a\ncountry of that extent, soil, and situation. On the contrary, there are\nscarce any inland provinces in the countries of France or Germany where\nthe inhabitants are at this time so opulent, though that canton has\nvastly increased its treasure since 1714, the time when Stanyan wrote\nhis judicious account of Switzerland.\u200b[21]\n\nThe account given by Appian of the treasure of the Ptolemies is so\nprodigious that one cannot admit of it, and so much the less because\nthe historian says the other successors of Alexander were all so\nfrugal, and had many of them treasures not much inferior; for this\nsaving humour of the neighbouring princes must necessarily have checked\nthe frugality of the Egyptian monarchs, according to the foregoing\ntheory. The sum he mentions is 740,000 talents, or \u00a3191,166,666 13s.\n4d., according to Dr. Arbuthnot\u2019s computation; and yet Appian says that\nhe extracted his account from the public records, and he was himself a\nnative of Alexandria.\n\nFrom these principles we may learn what judgment we ought to form of\nthose numberless bars, obstructions, and imposts which all nations of\nEurope, and none more than England, have put upon trade, from an\nexorbitant desire of amassing money, which never will heap up beyond\nits level while it circulates; or from an ill-grounded apprehension of\nlosing their specie, which never will sink below it. Could anything\nscatter our riches, it would be such impolitic contrivances. But this\ngeneral ill effect, however, results from them, that they deprive\nneighbouring nations of that free communication and exchange which the\nAuthor of the world has intended, by giving them soils, climates, and\ngeniuses so different from each other.\n\nOur modern politics embrace the only method of banishing money\u2014the\nusing paper-credit; they reject the only method of amassing it, the\npractice of hoarding; and they adopt a hundred contrivances which\nserve to no purpose but to check industry, and rob ourselves and our\nneighbours of the common benefits of art and nature.\n\nAll taxes, however, upon foreign commodities are not to be regarded\nas prejudicial or useless, but those only which are founded on the\njealousy above mentioned. A tax on German linen encourages home\nmanufactures, and thereby multiplies our people and industry; a tax on\nbrandy increases the sale of rum, and supports our southern colonies.\nAnd as it is necessary imposts should be levied for the support of\ngovernment, it may be thought more convenient to lay them on foreign\ncommodities, which can easily be intercepted at the port and subjected\nto the impost. We ought, however, always to remember the maxim of Dr.\nSwift, that, in the arithmetic of the customs, two and two make not\nfour, but often make only one. It can scarcely be doubted but if the\nduties on wine were lowered to a third, they would yield much more to\nthe Government than at present; our people might thereby afford to\ndrink commonly a better and more wholesome liquor, and no prejudice\nwould ensue to the balance of trade, of which we are so jealous. The\nmanufacture of ale beyond the agriculture is but inconsiderable, and\ngives employment to few hands. The transport of wine and corn would not\nbe much inferior.\n\nBut are there not frequent instances, you will say, of states and\nkingdoms which were formerly rich and opulent, and are now poor\nand beggarly? Has not the money left them with which they formerly\nabounded? I answer, if they lose their trade, industry, and people,\nthey cannot expect to keep their gold and silver, for these precious\nmetals will hold proportion to the former advantages. When Lisbon\nand Amsterdam got the East India trade from Venice and Genoa, they\nalso got the profits and money which arose from it. Where the seat\nof government is transferred, where expensive armies are maintained\nat a distance, where great funds are possessed by foreigners, there\nnaturally follows from these causes a diminution of the specie. But\nthese, we may observe, are violent and forcible methods of carrying\naway money, and are in time commonly attended with the transport of\npeople and industry; but where these remain, and the drain is not\ncontinued, the money always finds its way back again, by a hundred\ncanals of which we have no notion or suspicion. What immense treasures\nhave been spent, by so many nations, in Flanders since the revolution,\nin the course of three long wars! More money perhaps than the half of\nwhat is at present in all Europe. But what has now become of it? Is it\nin the narrow compass of the Austrian provinces? No, surely; it has\nmost of it returned to the several countries whence it came, and has\nfollowed that art and industry by which at first it was acquired. For\nabove a thousand years the money of Europe has been flowing to Rome by\nan open and sensible current; but it has been emptied by many secret\nand insensible canals, and the want of industry and commerce renders at\npresent the papal dominions the poorest territories in all Italy.\n\nIn short, a government has great reason to preserve with care its\npeople and its manufactures. Its money it may safely trust to the\ncourse of human affairs, without fear or jealousy; or if it ever give\nattention to this latter circumstance, it ought only to be so far as it\naffects the former.\n\n\nNOTES, OF THE BALANCE OF TRADE.\n\n[17] There is another cause, though more limited in its operation,\nwhich checks the wrong balance of trade, to every particular nation to\nwhich the kingdom trades. When we import more goods than we export,\nthe exchange turns against us, and this becomes a new encouragement to\nexport, as much as the charge of carriage and insurance of the money\nwhich becomes due would amount to. For the exchange can never rise\nhigher than that sum.\n\n\n[18] It must carefully be remarked that throughout this discourse,\nwherever I speak of the level of money I mean always its proportional\nlevel to the commodities, labour, industry, and skill which is in the\nseveral states; and I assert that where these advantages are double,\ntreble, quadruple to what they are in the neighbouring states, the\nmoney infallibly will also be double, treble, quadruple. The only\ncircumstance that can obstruct the exactness of these proportions is\nthe expense of transporting the commodities from one place to another,\nand this expense is sometimes unequal. Thus the corn, cattle, cheese,\nbutter of Derbyshire cannot draw the money of London so much as the\nmanufactures of London draw the money of Derbyshire. But this objection\nis only a seeming one, for so far as the transport of commodities is\nexpensive, so far is the communication between the places obstructed\nand imperfect.\n\n\n[19] We observed in essay _Of Money_, that money, when increasing,\ngives encouragement to industry during the interval between the\nincrease of money and the rise of the prices. A good effect of this\nnature may follow too from paper-credit; but it is dangerous to\nprecipitate matters at the risk of losing all by the failing of that\ncredit, as must happen upon any violent shock in public affairs.\n\n\n[20] There were about eight ounces of silver in a pound sterling in\nHarry VII.\u2019s time.\n\n\n[21] The poverty which Stanyan speaks of is only to be seen in the most\nmountainous cantons, where there is no commodity to bring money; and\neven there the people are not poorer than in the diocese of Saltsburg\non the one hand, or Savoy on the other.\n\n\n\n\nOF THE JEALOUSY OF TRADE.\n\n\nHaving endeavoured to remove one species of ill-founded jealousy which\nis so prevalent among commercial nations, it may not be amiss to\nmention another which seems equally groundless. Nothing is more usual,\namong states which have made some advances in commerce, than to look on\nthe progress of their neighbours with a suspicious eye, to consider all\ntrading states as their rivals, and to suppose that it is impossible\nfor any of them to flourish but at their expense. In opposition to\nthis narrow and malignant opinion, I will venture to assert that the\nincrease of riches and commerce in any one nation, instead of hurting,\ncommonly promotes the riches and commerce of all its neighbours;\nand that a state can scarcely carry its trade and industry very far\nwhere all the surrounding states are buried in ignorance, sloth, and\nbarbarism.\n\nIt is obvious that the domestic industry of a people cannot be hurt\nby the greatest prosperity of their neighbours; and as this branch of\ncommerce is undoubtedly the most important in any extensive kingdom,\nwe are so far removed from all reason of jealousy. But I go farther,\nand observe that where an open communication is preserved among\nnations, it is impossible but the domestic industry of every one must\nreceive an increase from the improvements of the others. Compare the\nsituation of Great Britain at present with what it was two centuries\nago. All the arts, both of agriculture and manufactures, were then\nextremely rude and imperfect. Every improvement which we have since\nmade has arisen from our imitation of foreigners, and we ought so far\nto esteem it happy that they had previously made advances in arts and\ningenuity. But this intercourse is still upheld to our great advantage.\nNotwithstanding the advanced state of our manufactures, we daily\nadopt in every art the inventions and improvements of our neighbours.\nThe commodity is first imported from abroad, to our great\ndiscontent, while we imagine that it drains us of our money; afterwards\nthe art itself is gradually imported, to our visible advantage. Yet we\ncontinue still to repine that our neighbours should possess any art,\nindustry, and invention, forgetting that had they not first instructed\nus we should have been at present barbarians, and did they not still\ncontinue their instructions, the arts must fall into a state of\nlanguor, and lose that emulation and novelty which contribute so much\nto their advancement.\n\nThe increase of domestic industry lays the foundation of foreign\ncommerce. Where a great number of commodities are raised and perfected\nfor the home-market there will always be found some which can be\nexported with advantage. But if our neighbours have no art nor\ncultivation, they cannot take them, because they will have nothing to\ngive in exchange. In this respect, states are in the same condition\nas individuals. A single man can scarce be industrious where all his\nfellow-citizens are idle. The riches of the several members of a\ncommunity contribute to increase my riches, whatever profession I may\nfollow. They consume the produce of my industry, and afford me the\nproduce of theirs in return.\n\nNor need any state entertain apprehensions that their neighbours will\nimprove to such a degree in every art and manufacture as to have no\ndemand from them. Nature, by giving a diversity of geniuses, climates,\nand soils to different nations, has secured their mutual intercourse\nand commerce, as long as they all remain industrious and civilized.\nNay, the more the arts increase in any state, the more will be its\ndemands from its industrious neighbours. The inhabitants, having become\nopulent and skilful, desire to have every commodity in the utmost\nperfection; and as they have plenty of commodities to give in exchange,\nthey make large importations from every foreign country. The industry\nof the nations from whom they import receives encouragement; their own\nis also increased by the sale of the commodities which they give in\nexchange.\n\nBut what if a nation has any staple commodity, such as the woollen\nmanufacture is to England? Must not the interfering of their neighbours\nin that manufacture be a loss to them? I answer that when any commodity\nis denominated the staple of a kingdom, it is supposed that that\nkingdom has some peculiar and natural advantages for raising the\ncommodity; and if, notwithstanding these advantages, they lose such a\nmanufactory, they ought to blame their own idleness or bad government,\nnot the industry of their neighbours. It ought also to be considered\nthat by the increase of industry among the neighbouring nations the\nconsumption of every particular species of commodity is also increased;\nand though foreign manufactures interfere with us in the market, the\ndemand for our product may still continue, or even increase. And even\nshould it diminish, ought the consequence to be esteemed so fatal? If\nthe spirit of industry be preserved, it may easily be diverted from\none branch to another, and the manufactures of wool, for instance, be\nemployed in linen, silk, iron, or other commodities for which there\nappears to be a demand. We need not apprehend that all the objects\nof industry will be exhausted, or that our manufacturers, while they\nremain on an equal footing with those of our neighbours, will be in\ndanger of wanting employment; the emulation among rival nations serves\nrather to keep industry alive in all of them. And any people is happier\nwho possess a variety of manufactures, than if they enjoyed one single\ngreat manufacture, in which they are all employed. Their situation is\nless precarious, and they will feel less sensibly those revolutions and\nuncertainties to which every particular branch of commerce will always\nbe exposed.\n\nThe only commercial state which ought to dread the improvements and\nindustry of their neighbours is such a one as Holland, which enjoying\nno extent of land, nor possessing any native commodity, flourishes\nonly by being the brokers, and factors, and carriers of others. Such a\npeople may naturally apprehend that as soon as the neighbouring\nstates come to know and pursue their interest, they will take into\ntheir own hands the management of their affairs, and deprive their\nbrokers of that profit which they formerly reaped from it. But though\nthis consequence may naturally be dreaded, it is very long before it\ntakes place; and by art and industry it may be warded off for many\ngenerations, if not wholly eluded. The advantage of superior stocks\nand correspondence is so great that it is not easily overcome; and\nas all the transactions increase by the increase of industry in the\nneighbouring states, even a people whose commerce stands on this\nprecarious basis may at first reap a considerable profit from the\nflourishing condition of their neighbours. The Dutch, having mortgaged\nall their revenues, make not such a figure in political transactions\nas formerly; but their commerce is surely equal to what it was in the\nmiddle of the last century, when they were reckoned among the great\npowers of Europe.\n\nWere our narrow and malignant politics to meet with success, we should\nreduce all our neighbouring nations to the same state of sloth and\nignorance that prevails in Morocco and the coast of Barbary. But what\nwould be the consequence? They could send us no commodities, they could\ntake none from us. Our domestic commerce itself would languish for want\nof emulation, example, and instruction; and we ourselves should soon\nfall into the same abject condition to which we had reduced them. I\nshall therefore venture to acknowledge that not only as a man, but as a\nBritish subject, I pray for the flourishing commerce of Germany, Spain,\nItaly, and even France itself. I am at least certain that Great Britain\nand all these nations would flourish more did their sovereigns and\nministers adopt such enlarged and benevolent sentiments towards each\nother.\n\n\n\n\nOF THE BALANCE OF POWER.\n\n\nIt is a question whether the _idea_ of the balance of power be owing\nentirely to modern policy, or whether the _phrase_ only has been\ninvented in these latter ages. It is certain that Xenophon, in his\ninstitution of Cyrus, represents the combination of the Asiatic powers\nto have arisen from a jealousy of the increasing force of the Medes\nand Persians; and though that elegant composition should be supposed\naltogether a romance, this sentiment, ascribed by the author to the\nEastern princes, is at least a proof of the prevailing notions of\nancient times.\n\nIn all the politics of Greece the anxiety with regard to the balance\nof power is most apparent, and is expressly pointed out to us even by\nthe ancient historians. Thucydides represents the league which was\nformed against Athens, and which produced the Peloponnesian war, as\nentirely owing to this principle. And after the decline of Athens,\nwhen the Thebans and Lacedemonians disputed for sovereignty, we find\nthat the Athenians (as well as many other republics) threw themselves\nalways into the lighter scale, and endeavoured to preserve the balance.\nThey supported Thebes against Sparta, till the great victory gained by\nEpaminondas at Leuctra, after which they immediately went over to the\nconquered, from generosity as they pretended, but in reality from their\njealousy of the conquerors.\n\nWhoever will read Demosthenes\u2019 oration for the Megalopolitans may see\nthe utmost refinements on this principle which ever entered into the\nhead of a Venetian or English speculatist; and upon the first rise of\nthe Macedonian power, this orator immediately discovered the danger,\nsounded the alarm through all Greece, and at last assembled that\nconfederacy under the banners of Athens which fought the great and\ndecisive battle of Ch\u00e6ronea.\n\nIt is true the Grecian wars are regarded by historians as wars of\nemulation rather than of politics, and each state seems to have had\nmore in view the honour of leading the rest than any well-grounded\nhopes of authority and dominion. If we consider, indeed, the small\nnumber of inhabitants in any one republic compared to the whole,\nthe great difficulty of forming sieges in those times, and the\nextraordinary bravery and discipline of every freeman among that noble\npeople, we shall conclude that the balance of power was of itself\nsufficiently secured in Greece, and needed not to be guarded with that\ncaution which may be requisite in other ages. But whether we ascribe\nthe shifting sides in all the Grecian republics to jealous emulation or\ncautious politics, the effects were alike, and every prevailing power\nwas sure to meet with a confederacy against it, and that often composed\nof its former friends and allies.\n\nThe same principle\u2014call it envy or prudence\u2014which produced the\nostracism of Athens and petalism of Syracuse, and expelled every\ncitizen whose fame or power overtopped the rest\u2014the same principle, I\nsay, naturally discovered itself in foreign politics, and soon raised\nenemies to the leading state, however moderate in the exercise of its\nauthority.\n\nThe Persian monarch was really, in his force, a petty prince compared\nto the Grecian republics, and therefore it behoved him, from views of\nsafety more than from emulation, to interest himself in their quarrels,\nand to support the weaker side in every contest. This was the advice\ngiven by Alcibiades to Tissaphernes, and it prolonged near a century\nthe date of the Persian empire; till the neglect of it for a moment,\nafter the first appearance of the aspiring genius of Philip, brought\nthat lofty and frail edifice to the ground with a rapidity of which\nthere are few instances in the history of mankind.\n\nThe successors of Alexander showed an infinite jealousy of the balance\nof power, a jealousy founded on true politics and prudence, and which\npreserved distinct for several ages the partitions made after the death\nof that famous conqueror. The fortune and ambition of Antigonus\nthreatened them anew with a universal monarchy, but their combination\nand their victory at Ipsus saved them; and in after times we find that\nas the Eastern princes considered the Greeks and Macedonians as the\nonly real military force with whom they had any intercourse, they kept\nalways a watchful eye over that part of the world. The Ptolemies, in\nparticular, supported first Aratus and the Ach\u00e6ans, and then Cleomenes\nKing of Sparta, from no other view than as a counterbalance to the\nMacedonian monarchs; for this is the account which Polybius gives of\nthe Egyptian politics.\n\nThe reason why it is supposed that the ancients were entirely ignorant\nof the balance of power seems to be drawn from the Roman history more\nthan the Grecian, and as the transactions of the former are generally\nthe most familiar to us, we have thence formed all our conclusions.\nIt must be owned that the Romans never met with any such general\ncombination or confederacy against them as might naturally be expected\nfrom their rapid conquests and declared ambition, but were allowed\npeaceably to subdue their neighbours, one after another, till they\nextended their dominion over the whole known world. Not to mention\nthe fabulous history of their Italic wars, there was, upon Hannibal\u2019s\ninvasion of the Roman state, a very remarkable crisis which ought to\nhave called up the attention of all civilized nations. It appeared\nafterwards (nor was it difficult to be observed at the time\u200b[22]) that\nthis was a contest for universal empire, and yet no prince or state\nseems to have been in the least alarmed about the event or issue of the\nquarrel. Philip of Macedon remained neuter till he saw the victories\nof Hannibal, and then most imprudently formed an alliance with the\nconqueror, upon terms still more imprudent. He stipulated that he was\nto assist the Carthaginian state in their conquest of Italy, after\nwhich they engaged to send over forces into Greece, to assist him\nin subduing the Grecian commonwealths.\n\nThe Rhodean and Ach\u00e6an republics are much celebrated by ancient\nhistorians for their wisdom and sound policy; yet both of them\nassisted the Romans in their wars against Philip and Antiochus. And\nwhat may be esteemed still a stronger proof that this maxim was not\nfamiliarly known in those ages, no ancient author has ever remarked the\nimprudence of these measures, nor has even blamed that absurd treaty\nabove-mentioned made by Philip with the Carthaginians. Princes and\nstatesmen may in all ages be blinded in their reasonings with regard\nto events beforehand, but it is somewhat extraordinary that historians\nafterwards should not form a sounder judgment of them.\n\nMassinissa, Attalus, Prusias, in satisfying their private passions,\nwere all of them the instruments of the Roman greatness, and never seem\nto have suspected that they were forging their own chains while they\nadvanced the conquests of their ally. A simple treaty and agreement\nbetween Massinissa and the Carthaginians, so much required by mutual\ninterest, barred the Romans from all entrance into Africa, and\npreserved liberty to mankind.\n\nThe only prince we meet with in the Roman history who seems to have\nunderstood the balance of power is Hiero, King of Syracuse. Though\nthe ally of Rome, he sent assistance to the Carthaginians during the\nwar of the auxiliaries: \u201cEsteeming it requisite,\u201d says Polybius,\n\u201cboth in order to retain his dominions in Sicily and to preserve the\nRoman friendship, that Carthage should be safe; lest by its fall\nthe remaining power should be able, without contrast or opposition,\nto execute every purpose and undertaking. And here he acted with\ngreat wisdom and prudence; for that is never, on any account, to be\noverlooked, nor ought such a force ever to be thrown into one hand as\nto incapacitate the neighbouring states from defending their rights\nagainst it.\u201d Here is the aim of modern politics pointed out in express\nterms.\n\nIn short, the maxim of preserving the balance of power is\nfounded so much on common sense and obvious reasoning that it is\nimpossible it could altogether have escaped antiquity, where we\nfind, in other particulars, so many marks of deep penetration and\ndiscernment. If it was not so generally known and acknowledged as\nat present, it had at least an influence on all the wiser and more\nexperienced princes and politicians; and indeed, even at present,\nhowever generally known and acknowledged among speculative reasoners,\nit has not, in practice, an authority much more extensive among those\nwho govern the world.\n\nAfter the fall of the Roman Empire the form of government established\nby the northern conquerors incapacitated them in a great measure\nfrom further conquests, and long maintained each state in its proper\nboundaries; but when vassalage and the feudal militia were abolished\nmankind were anew alarmed by the danger of universal monarchy, from\nthe union of so many kingdoms and principalities in the person of the\nEmperor Charles. But the power of the house of Austria, founded on\nextensive but divided dominions, and their riches, derived chiefly from\nmines of gold and silver, were more likely to decay, of themselves,\nfrom internal defects, than to overthrow all the bulwarks raised\nagainst them. In less than a century the force of that violent and\nhaughty race was shattered, their opulence dissipated, their splendour\neclipsed. A new power succeeded, more formidable to the liberties of\nEurope, possessing all the advantages of the former and labouring under\nnone of its defects, except a share of that spirit of bigotry and\npersecution with which the house of Austria were so long and still are\nso much infatuated.\n\nEurope has now, for above a century, remained on the defensive against\nthe greatest force that ever perhaps was formed by the civil or\npolitical combination of mankind. And such is the influence of the\nmaxim here treated of, that though that ambitious nation in the five\nlast general wars has been victorious in four,\u200b[23] and unsuccessful\nonly in one,\u200b[24] they have not much enlarged their dominions,\nnor acquired a total ascendant over Europe. There remains rather room\nto hope that by maintaining the resistance some time the natural\nrevolutions of human affairs, together with unforeseen events and\naccidents, may guard us against universal monarchy, and preserve the\nworld from so great an evil.\n\nIn the three last of these general wars Britain has stood foremost in\nthe glorious struggle, and she still maintains her station as guardian\nof the general liberties of Europe, and patron of mankind. Beside her\nadvantages of riches and situation, her people are animated with such a\nnational spirit, and are so fully sensible of the inestimable blessings\nof their government, that we may hope their vigour never will languish\nin so necessary and so just a cause. On the contrary, if we may judge\nby the past, their passionate ardour seems rather to require some\nmoderation, and they have oftener erred from a laudable excess than\nfrom a blameable deficiency.\n\nIn the first place, we seem to have been more possessed with the\nancient Greek spirit of jealous emulation than actuated with the\nprudent views of modern politics. Our wars with France have been begun\nwith justice, and even, perhaps, from necessity; but have always\nbeen too far pushed from obstinacy and passion. The same peace which\nwas afterwards made at Ryswick in 1697 was offered so early as the\nninety-two; that concluded at Utrecht in 1712 might have been finished\non as good conditions at Gertruytenberg in the eight; and we might have\ngiven at Frankfort in 1743 the same terms which we were glad to accept\nof at Aix-la-Chapelle in the forty-eight. Here then we see that above\nhalf of our wars with France, and all our public debts, are owing more\nto our own imprudent vehemence than to the ambition of our neighbours.\n\nIn the second place, we are so declared in our opposition to French\npower, and so alert in defence of our allies, that they always\nreckon upon our force as upon their own, and expecting to carry on war\nat our expense, refuse all reasonable terms of accommodation. _Habent\nsubjectos, tanquam suos; viles, ut alienos._ All the world knows that\nthe factious vote of the House of Commons in the beginning of the last\nParliament, with the professed humour of the nation, made the Queen\nof Hungary inflexible in her terms, and prevented that agreement with\nPrussia which would immediately have restored the general tranquillity\nof Europe.\n\nIn the third place, we are such true combatants that, when once\nengaged, we lose all concern for ourselves and our posterity, and\nconsider only how we may best annoy the enemy. To mortgage our revenues\nat so deep a rate in wars where we are only accessories was surely the\nmost fatal delusion that a nation, who had any pretension to politics\nand prudence, has ever yet been guilty of. That remedy of funding\u2014if\nit be a remedy and not rather a poison\u2014ought, in all reason, to be\nreserved to the last extremity, and no evil but the greatest and most\nurgent should ever induce us to embrace so dangerous an expedient.\n\nThese excesses to which we have been carried are prejudicial, and\nmay perhaps in time become still more prejudicial another way, by\nbegetting, as is usual, the opposite extreme, and rendering us totally\ncareless and supine with regard to the fate of Europe. The Athenians,\nfrom the most bustling, intriguing, warlike people of Greece, finding\ntheir error in thrusting themselves into every quarrel, abandoned all\nattention to foreign affairs, and in no contest ever took party on\neither side, except by their flatteries and complaisance to the victor.\n\nEnormous monarchies are probably destructive to human nature\u2014in their\nprogress, in their continuance,\u200b[25] and even in their downfall,\nwhich never can be very distant from their establishment.\nThe military genius which aggrandized the monarchy soon leaves the\ncourt, the capital, and the centre of such a government; while the\nwars are carried on at a great distance, and interest so small a\npart of the state. The ancient nobility, whose affections attach\nthem to their sovereign, live all at court; and never will accept of\nmilitary employments which would carry them to remote and barbarous\nfrontiers, where they are distant both from their pleasures and their\nfortune. The arms of the state must therefore be trusted to mercenary\nstrangers, without zeal, without attachment, without honour, ready\non every occasion to turn them against the prince, and join each\ndesperate malcontent who offers pay and plunder. This is the necessary\nprogress of human affairs; thus human nature checks itself in its\nairy elevations, thus ambition blindly labours for the destruction of\nthe conqueror, of his family, and of everything near and dear to him.\nThe Bourbons, trusting to the support of their brave, faithful, and\naffectionate nobility, would push their advantage without reserve or\nlimitation. These, while fired with glory and emulation, can bear the\nfatigues and dangers of war; but never would submit to languish in the\ngarrisons of Hungary or Lithuania, forgot at court, and sacrificed to\nthe intrigues of every minion or mistress who approaches the prince.\nThe troops are filled with Cravates and Tartars, Hussars and Cossacks,\nintermingled perhaps with a few soldiers of fortune from the better\nprovinces; and the melancholy fate of the Roman emperors, from the same\ncause, is renewed over and over again till the final dissolution of the\nmonarchy.\n\n\nNOTES, OF THE BALANCE OF POWER.\n\n[22] It was observed by some, as appears from the speech of Agelaus of\nNaupactum, in the general congress of Greece. See Polyb., lib. 5, cap.\n104.\n\n\n[23] Those concluded by the Peace of the Pyrenees, Nimeguen, Ryswick,\nand Aix-la-Chapelle.\n\n\n[24] That concluded by the Peace of Utrecht.\n\n\n[25] If the Roman Empire was of advantage, it could only proceed from\nthis, that mankind were generally in a very disorderly, uncivilized\ncondition before its establishment.\n\n\n\n\nOF TAXES.\n\n\nThere is a maxim that prevails among those whom in this country we call\n\u201cways and means\u201d men, and who are denominated financiers and maltotiers\nin France, that every new tax creates a new ability in the subject to\nbear it, and that each increase of public burdens increases\nproportionably the industry of the people. This maxim is of such a\nnature as is most likely to be extremely abused, and is so much the\nmore dangerous, as its truth cannot be altogether denied; but it must\nbe owned, when kept within certain bounds, to have some foundation in\nreason and experience.\n\nWhen a tax is laid upon commodities which are consumed by the common\npeople, the necessary consequence may seem to be that either the poor\nmust retrench something from their way of living, or raise their wages\nso as to make the burden of the tax fall entirely upon the rich. But\nthere is a third consequence which very often follows upon taxes\u2014viz.,\nthat the poor increase their industry, perform more work, and live as\nwell as before without demanding more for their labour. Where taxes\nare moderate, are laid on gradually, and affect not the necessaries of\nlife, this consequence naturally follows; and it is certain that such\ndifficulties often serve to excite the industry of a people, and render\nthem more opulent and laborious than others who enjoy the greatest\nadvantages. For we may observe, as a parallel instance, that the most\ncommercial nations have not always possessed the greatest extent of\nfertile land; but, on the contrary, that they have laboured under many\nnatural disadvantages. Tyre, Athens, Carthage, Rhodes, Genoa, Venice,\nHolland are strong examples to this purpose; and in all history we\nfind only three instances of large and fertile countries which have\npossessed much trade\u2014the Netherlands, England, and France. The two\nformer seem to have been allured by the advantages of their maritime\nsituation, and the necessity they lay under of frequenting foreign\nports in order to procure what their own climate refused them; and as\nto France, trade has come very late into the kingdom, and seems to\nhave been the effect of reflection and observation in an ingenious and\nenterprising people, who remarked the immense riches acquired by such\nof the neighbouring nations as cultivated navigation and commerce.\n\nThe places mentioned by Cicero as possessed of the greatest\ncommerce of his time are Alexandria, Colchos, Tyre, Sidon, Andros,\nCyprus, Pamphylia, Lycia, Rhodes, Chios, Byzantium, Lesbos, Smyrna,\nMiletum, Coos. All these, except Alexandria, were either small islands\nor narrow territories; and that city owed its trade entirely to the\nhappiness of its situation.\n\nSince, therefore, some natural necessities or disadvantages may be\nthought favourable to industries, why may not artificial burdens have\nthe same effect? Sir William Temple,\u200b[26] we may observe, ascribes the\nindustry of the Dutch entirely to necessity, proceeding from their\nnatural disadvantages; and illustrates his doctrine by a very striking\ncomparison with Ireland, \u201cwhere,\u201d says he, \u201cby the largeness and plenty\nof the soil, and scarcity of people, all things necessary to life are\nso cheap that an industrious man by two days\u2019 labour may gain enough to\nfeed him the rest of the week. Which I take to be a very plain ground\nof the laziness attributed to the people. For men naturally prefer ease\nbefore labour, and will not take pains if they can live idle; though\nwhen, by necessity, they have been inured to it, they cannot leave\nit, being grown a custom necessary to their health, and to their very\nentertainment. Nor perhaps is the change harder from constant ease\nto labour than from constant labour to ease.\u201d After which the author\nproceeds to confirm his doctrine by enumerating as above the places\nwhere trade has most flourished in ancient and modern times, and which\nare commonly observed by such narrow, confined territories as beget a\nnecessity for industry.\n\nIt is always observed in years of scarcity, if it be not extreme, that\nthe poor labour more and really live better than in years of great\nplenty, when they indulge themselves in idleness and riot. I have been\ntold by a considerable manufacturer that in the year 1740, when bread\nand provisions of all kinds were very dear, his workmen not only made\na shift to live, but paid debts which they had contracted in\nformer years that were much more favourable and abundant.\n\nThis doctrine, therefore, with regard to taxes may be admitted to\nsome degree, but beware of the abuse. Exorbitant taxes, like extreme\nnecessity, destroy industry by producing despair; and even before they\nreach this pitch they raise the wages of the labourer and manufacturer,\nand heighten the price of all commodities. An attentive, disinterested\nlegislature will observe the point when the emolument ceases and the\nprejudice begins; but as the contrary character is much more common,\nit is to be feared that taxes all over Europe are multiplying to\nsuch a degree as will entirely crush all art and industry; though\nperhaps their first increase, together with circumstances, might have\ncontributed to the growth of these advantages.\n\nThe best taxes are such as are levied upon consumptions, especially\nthose of luxury, because such taxes are less felt by the people. They\nseem, in some measure, voluntary, since a man may choose how far\nhe will use the commodity which is taxed: they are paid gradually\nand insensibly, and being confounded with the natural price of the\ncommodity, they are scarcely perceived by the consumers. Their only\ndisadvantage is that they are expensive in the levying.\n\nTaxes upon possessions are levied without expense, but have every other\ndisadvantage. Most states, however, are obliged to have recourse to\nthem, in order to supply the deficiencies of the other.\n\nBut the most pernicious of all taxes are those which are arbitrary.\nThey are commonly converted by their management into punishments on\nindustry; and also by their unavoidable inequality are more grievous\nthan by the real burden which they impose. It is surprising, therefore,\nto see them have place among any civilized people.\n\nIn general, all poll-taxes, even when not arbitrary\u2014which they commonly\nare\u2014may be esteemed dangerous; because it is so easy for the sovereign\nto add a little more and a little more to the sum demanded, that these\ntaxes are apt to become altogether oppressive and intolerable. On the\nother hand, a duty upon commodities checks itself, and a prince\nwill soon find that an increase of the impost is no increase of his\nrevenue. It is not easy, therefore, for a people to be altogether\nruined by such taxes.\n\nHistorians inform us that one of the chief causes of the destruction\nof the Roman state was the alteration which Constantine introduced\ninto the finances, by substituting a universal poll-tax in lieu of\nalmost all the tithes, customs, and excises which formerly composed the\nrevenue of the empire. The people in all the provinces were so grinded\nand oppressed by the publicans that they were glad to take refuge under\nthe conquering arms of the barbarians, whose dominion, as they had\nfewer necessities and less art, was found preferable to the refined\ntyranny of the Romans.\n\nThere is a prevailing opinion that all taxes, however levied, fall upon\nthe land at last. Such an opinion may be useful in Britain, by checking\nthe landed gentlemen, in whose hands our legislature is chiefly lodged,\nand making them preserve great regard for trade and industry; but I\nmust confess that this principle, though first advanced by a celebrated\nwriter, has so little appearance of reason that were it not for his\nauthority it had never been received by anybody. Every man, to be sure,\nis desirous of pushing off from himself the burden of any tax which\nis imposed, and laying it upon others; but as every man has the same\ninclination, and is upon the defensive, no set of men can be supposed\nto prevail altogether in this contest. And why the landed gentleman\nshould be the victim of the whole, and should not be able to defend\nhimself as well as others are, I cannot readily imagine. All tradesmen,\nindeed, would willingly prey upon him and divide him among them if they\ncould; but this inclination they always have, though no taxes were\nlevied; and the same methods by which he guards against the imposition\nof tradesmen before taxes will serve him afterwards, and make them\nshare the burden with him. No labour in any commodities that are\nexported can be very considerably raised in the price without losing\nthe foreign market; and as some part of almost every manufactory\nis exported, this circumstance keeps the price of most species of\nlabour nearly the same after the imposition of taxes. I may add that it\nhas this effect upon the whole, for were any kind of labour paid beyond\nits proportion all hands would flock to it, and would soon sink it to a\nlevel with the rest.\n\nI shall conclude this subject with observing that we have with\nregard to taxes an instance of what frequently happens in political\ninstitutions, that the consequence of things are diametrically opposite\nto what we should expect on the first appearance. It is regarded as a\nfundamental maxim of the Turkish Government that the Grand Seignior,\nthough absolute master of the lives and fortunes of each individual,\nhas no authority to impose a new tax; and every Ottoman prince who\nhas made such an attempt either has been obliged to retract, or has\nfound the fatal effects of his perseverance. One would imagine that\nthis prejudice or established opinion were the firmest barrier in the\nworld against oppression, yet it is certain that its effect is quite\ncontrary. The emperor, having no regular method of increasing his\nrevenue, must allow all the pashas and governors to oppress and abuse\nthe subjects, and these he squeezes after their return from their\ngovernment; whereas, if he could impose a new tax, like our European\nprinces, his interest would so far be united with that of his people\nthat he would immediately feel the bad effects of these disorderly\nlevies of money, and would find that a pound raised by general\nimposition would have less pernicious effects than a shilling taken in\nso unequal and arbitrary a manner.\n\n\nNOTE, OF TAXES.\n\n[26] _Account of the Netherlands_, chap. vi.\n\n\n\n\nOF PUBLIC CREDIT.\n\n\nIt appears to have been the common practice of antiquity to make\nprovision in times of peace for the necessities of war, and to hoard\nup treasures beforehand as the instruments either of conquest or\ndefence, without trusting to extraordinary imposts, much less to\nborrowing, in times of disorder and confusion. Besides the immense sums\nabove mentioned\u200b[27] which were amassed by Athens, and by the Ptolemies\nand other successors of Alexander, we learn from Plato that the frugal\nLacedemonians had also collected a great treasure; and Arrian and\nPlutarch\u200b[28] specify the riches which Alexander got possession of on\nthe conquest of Susa and Ecbatana, and which were reserved, some of\nthem, from the time of Cyrus. If I remember right, the Scripture also\nmentions the treasure of Hezekiah and the Jewish princes, as profane\nhistory does that of Philip and Perseus, kings of Macedon. The ancient\nrepublics of Gaul had commonly large sums in reserve. Every one knows\nthe treasure seized in Rome by Julius C\u00e6sar during the civil wars,\nand we find afterwards that the wiser emperors, Augustus, Tiberius,\nVespasian, Severus, etc., always discovered the prudent foresight of\nsaving great sums against any public exigency.\n\nOn the contrary, our modern expedient, which has become very general,\nis to mortgage the public revenues, and to trust that posterity during\npeace will pay off the encumbrances contracted during the preceding\nwar; and they, having before their eyes so good an example of their\nwise fathers, have the same prudent reliance on their posterity, who at\nlast, from necessity more than choice, are obliged to place the same\nconfidence in a new posterity. But not to waste time in declaiming\nagainst a practice which appears ruinous beyond the evidence of a\nhundred demonstrations, it seems pretty apparent that the ancient\nmaxims are in this respect much more prudent than the modern; even\nthough the latter had been confined within some reasonable bounds, and\nhad ever, in any one instance, been attended with such frugality in\ntime of peace as to discharge the debts incurred by an expensive war.\nFor why should the case be so very different between the public and\nan individual as to make us establish such different maxims of\nconduct for each? If the funds of the former be greater, its necessary\nexpenses are proportionably larger; if its resources be more numerous,\nthey are not infinite; and as its frame should be calculated for a much\nlonger duration than the date of a single life, or even of a family,\nit should embrace maxims, large, durable, and generous, agreeable to\nthe supposed extent of its existence. To trust to chances and temporary\nexpedients is indeed what the necessity of human affairs frequently\nreduces it to, but whoever voluntarily depend on such resources have\nnot necessity but their own folly to accuse for their misfortunes when\nany such befall them.\n\nIf the abuses of treasures be dangerous, either by engaging the state\nin rash enterprises or making it neglect military discipline in\nconfidence of its riches, the abuses of mortgaging are more certain and\ninevitable\u2014poverty, impotence, and subjection to foreign powers.\n\nAccording to modern policy, war is attended with every destructive\ncircumstance: loss of men, increase of taxes, decay of commerce,\ndissipation of money, devastation by sea and land. According to ancient\nmaxims, the opening of the public treasure, as it produced an uncommon\naffluence of gold and silver, served as a temporary encouragement to\nindustry, and atoned in some degree for the inevitable calamities of\nwar.\n\nWhat then shall we say to the new paradox, that public encumbrances\nare, of themselves, advantageous, independent of the necessity of\ncontracting them; and that any state, even though it were not pressed\nby a foreign enemy, could not possibly have embraced a wiser expedient\nfor promoting commerce and riches than to create funds, and debts, and\ntaxes without limitation? Discourses such as these might naturally\nhave passed for trials of wit among rhetoricians, like the panegyrics\non folly and a fever, on Busiris and Nero, had we not seen such absurd\nmaxims patronized by great ministers and by a whole party among us; and\nthese puzzling arguments (for they deserve not the name of specious),\nthough they could not be the foundation of Lord Orford\u2019s\nconduct, for he had more sense, served at least to keep his partisans\nin countenance and perplex the understanding of the nation.\n\nLet us examine the consequences of public debts, both in our domestic\nmanagement by their influence on commerce and industry, and in our\nforeign transactions by their effect on wars and negotiations.\n\nThere is a word which is here in the mouth of everybody, and which I\nfind has also got abroad and is much employed by foreign writers\u200b[29]\nin imitation of the English\u2014and this is \u201ccirculation.\u201d This word serves\nas an account of everything, and though I confess that I have sought\nfor its meaning in the present subject ever since I was a schoolboy,\nI have never yet been able to discover it. What possible advantage is\nthere which the nation can reap by the easy transference of stock from\nhand to hand? Or is there any parallel to be drawn from the circulation\nof other commodities to that of chequer notes and India bonds? Where\na manufacturer has a quick sale of his goods to the merchant, the\nmerchant to the shopkeeper, the shopkeeper to his customers, this\nenlivens industry and gives new encouragement to the first dealer or\nthe manufacturer and all his tradesmen, and makes them produce more\nand better commodities of the same species. A stagnation is here\npernicious, wherever it happens, because it operates backwards, and\nstops or benumbs the industrious hand in its production of what is\nuseful to human life. But what production we owe to Change-alley, or\neven what consumption, except that of coffee, and pen, ink, and paper,\nI have not yet learned; nor can one foresee the loss or decay of any\none beneficial commerce or commodity, though that place and all its\ninhabitants were for ever buried in the ocean.\n\nBut though this term has never been explained by those who insist\nso much on the advantages that result from a circulation, there\nseems, however, to be some benefit of a similar kind arising from our\nencumbrances\u2014as, indeed, what human evil is there which is not\nattended with some advantage? This we shall endeavour to explain, that\nwe may estimate the weight which we ought to allow it.\n\nPublic securities are with us become a kind of money, and pass as\nreadily at the current price as gold or silver. Wherever any profitable\nundertaking offers itself, however expensive, there are never wanting\nhands enough to embrace it; nor need a trader who has sums in the\npublic stocks fear to launch out into the most extensive trade, since\nhe is possessed of funds which will answer the most sudden demand\nthat can be made upon him. No merchant thinks it necessary to keep by\nhim any considerable cash. Bank-notes or India bonds, especially the\nlatter, serve all the same purposes; because he can dispose of them or\npledge them to a banker in a quarter of an hour; and at the same time\nthey are not idle, even when in his escritoire, but bring him in a\nconstant revenue. In short, our national debts furnish merchants with\na species of money that is continually multiplying in their hands, and\nproduces sure gain besides the profits of their commerce. This must\nenable them to trade upon less profit. The small profit of the merchant\nrenders the commodity cheaper, causes a greater consumption, quickens\nthe labour of the common people, and helps to spread arts and industry\nthrough the whole society.\n\nThere are also, we may observe, in England and in all states which have\nboth commerce and public debts, a set of men who are half merchants,\nhalf stock-holders, and may be supposed willing to trade for small\nprofits; because commerce is not their principal or sole support, and\ntheir revenues in the funds are a sure resource for themselves and\ntheir families. Were there no funds great merchants would have no\nexpedient for realizing or securing any part of their profit but by\nmaking purchases of land, and land has many disadvantages in comparison\nof funds. Requiring more care and inspection, it divides the time and\nattention of the merchant; upon any tempting offer or extraordinary\naccident in trade, it is not so easily converted into money; and as it\nattracts too much, both by the many natural pleasures it affords\nand the authority it gives, it soon converts the citizen into the\ncountry gentleman. More men, therefore, with large stocks and incomes,\nmay naturally be supposed to continue in trade where there are public\ndebts; and this, it must be owned, is of some advantage to commerce\nby diminishing its profits, promoting circulation, and encouraging\nindustry.\n\nBut, in opposition to these two favourable circumstances, perhaps of no\nvery great importance, weigh the many disadvantages which attend our\npublic debts in the whole interior economy of the state; you will find\nno comparison between the ill and the good which result from them.\n\nFirst, it is certain that national debts cause a mighty confluence of\npeople and riches to the capital, by the great sums which are levied in\nthe provinces to pay the interest of those debts; and perhaps, too, by\nthe advantages in trade above mentioned, which they give the merchants\nin the capital above the rest of the kingdom. The question is, whether,\nin our case, it be for the public interest that so many privileges\nshould be conferred on London, which has already arrived at such an\nenormous size and seems still increasing? Some men are apprehensive of\nthe consequences. For my part, I cannot forbear thinking that though\nthe head is undoubtedly too big for the body, yet that great city is so\nhappily situated that its excessive bulk causes less inconvenience than\neven a smaller capital to a greater kingdom. There is more difference\nbetween the prices of all provisions in Paris and Languedoc than\nbetween those in London and Yorkshire.\n\nSecondly, public stocks, being a kind of paper-credit, have all the\ndisadvantages attending that species of money. They banish gold and\nsilver from the most considerable commerce of the state, reduce them to\ncommon circulation, and by that means render all provisions and labour\ndearer than otherwise they would be.\n\nThirdly, the taxes which are levied to pay the interests of these debts\nare apt to be a check upon industry, to heighten the price of\nlabour, and to be an oppression on the poorer sort.\n\nFourthly, as foreigners possess a share of our national funds, they\nrender the public in a manner tributary to them, and may in time\noccasion the transport of our people and our industry.\n\nFifthly, the greatest part of public stock being always in the hands\nof idle people, who live on their revenue, our funds give great\nencouragement to a useless and inactive life.\n\nBut though the injury which arises to commerce and industry from our\npublic funds will appear, upon balancing the whole, very considerable,\nit is trivial in comparison of the prejudice which results to the\nstate considered as a body politic, which must support itself in the\nsociety of nations, and have various transactions with other states,\nin wars and negotiations. The ill there is pure and unmixed, without\nany favourable circumstance to atone for it, and it is an ill too of a\nnature the highest and most important.\n\nWe have, indeed, been told that the public is no weaker upon account\nof its debts, since they are mostly due among ourselves, and bring as\nmuch property to one as they take from another. It is like transferring\nmoney from the right hand to the left, which leaves the person neither\nricher nor poorer than before. Such loose reasonings and specious\ncomparisons will always pass where we judge not upon principles. I ask,\nis it possible, in the nature of things, to overburden a nation with\ntaxes, even where the sovereign resides among them? The very doubt\nseems extravagant, since it is requisite in every commonwealth that\nthere be a certain proportion observed between the laborious and the\nidle part of it. But if all our present taxes be mortgaged, must we not\ninvent new ones? and may not this matter be carried to a length that is\nruinous and destructive?\n\nIn every nation there are always some methods of levying money more\neasy than others, agreeable to the way of living of the people and the\ncommodities they make use of. In Britain the excises upon malt and beer\nafford a very large revenue, because the operations of malting\nand brewing are very tedious, and are impossible to be concealed; and\nat the same time, these commodities are not so absolutely necessary to\nlife as that the raising their price would very much affect the poorer\nsort. These taxes being all mortgaged, what difficulty to find new\nones! what vexation and ruin of the poor!\n\nDuties upon consumptions are more equal and easy than those upon\npossessions. What a loss to the public that the former are all\nexhausted, and that we must have recourse to the more grievous method\nof levying taxes!\n\nWere all the proprietors of land only stewards to the public, must not\nnecessity force them to practise all the arts of oppression used by\nstewards, where the absence or negligence of the proprietor render them\nsecure against inquiry?\n\nIt will scarce be asserted that no bounds ought ever to be set to\nnational debts, and that the public would be no weaker were twelve or\nfifteen shillings in the pound land-tax mortgaged, with the present\ncustoms and excises. There is something therefore in the case beside\nthe mere transferring of property from one hand to another. In 500\nyears the posterity of those now in the coaches and of those upon the\nboxes will probably have changed places, without affecting the public\nby these revolutions.\n\nSuppose the public once fairly brought to that condition to which it\nis hastening with such amazing rapidity; suppose the land to be taxed\neighteen or nineteen shillings in the pound (for it can never bear the\nwhole twenty); suppose all the excises and customs to be screwed up\nto the outmost which the nation can bear, without entirely losing its\ncommerce and industry; and suppose that all those funds are mortgaged\nto perpetuity, and that the invention and wit of all our projectors\ncan find no new imposition which may serve as the foundation of a new\nloan; and let us consider the necessary consequences of this situation.\nThough the imperfect state of our political knowledge and the narrow\ncapacities of men make it difficult to foretell the effects\nwhich will result from any untried measure, the seeds of ruin are here\nscattered with such profusion as not to escape the eye of the most\ncareless observer.\n\nIn this unnatural state of society, the only persons who possess\nany revenue beyond the immediate effects of their industry are the\nstockholders, who draw almost all the rent of the land and houses,\nbesides the produce of all the customs and excises. These are men who\nhave no connections in the state, who can enjoy their revenue in any\npart of the world in which they choose to reside, who will naturally\nbury themselves in the capital, or in great cities, and who will sink\ninto the lethargy of a stupid and pampered luxury, without spirit,\nambition, or enjoyment. Adieu to all ideas of nobility, gentry, and\nfamily. The stocks can be transferred in an instant, and being in\nsuch a fluctuating state, will seldom be transmitted during three\ngenerations from father to son. Or were they to remain ever so long\nin one family, they convey no hereditary authority or credit to the\npossessors; and by this means, the several ranks of men, which form\na kind of independent magistracy in a state, instituted by the hand\nof nature, are entirely lost, and every man in authority derives his\ninfluence from the commission alone of the sovereign. No expedient\nremains for preventing or suppressing insurrections but mercenary\narmies; no expedient at all remains for resisting tyranny; elections\nare swayed by bribery and corruption alone; and the middle power\nbetween king and people being totally removed, a horrible despotism\nmust infallibly prevail. The landholders, despised for their poverty\nand hated for their oppressions, will be utterly unable to make any\nopposition to it.\n\nThough a resolution should be formed by the legislature never to impose\nany tax which hurts commerce and discourages industry, it will be\nimpossible for men, in subjects of such extreme delicacy, to reason\nso justly as never to be mistaken, or amidst difficulties so urgent,\nnever to be seduced from their resolution. The continual fluctuations\nin commerce require continual alterations in the nature of the taxes,\nwhich exposes the legislature every moment to the danger both\nof wilful and involuntary error; and any great blow given to trade,\nwhether by injudicious taxes or by other accidents, throws the whole\nsystem of the government into confusion.\n\nBut what expedient is the public now to fall upon, even supposing trade\nto continue in the most flourishing condition, to support its foreign\nwars and enterprises, and to defend its own honour and interests or\nthose of its allies? I do not ask how the public is to exert such a\nprodigious power as it has maintained during our late wars, where we\nhave so much exceeded, not only our own natural strength, but even that\nof the greatest empires. This extravagance is the abuse complained of,\nas the source of all the dangers to which we are at present exposed.\nBut since we must still suppose great commerce and opulence to remain\neven after every fund is mortgaged, those riches must be defended by\nproportionable power, and whence is the public to derive the revenue\nwhich supports it? It must plainly be from a continual taxation of\nthe annuitants, or, which is the same thing, from mortgaging anew\non every exigency a certain part of their annuity, and thus making\nthem contribute to their own defence and to that of the nation; but\nthe difficulties attending this system of policy will easily appear,\nwhether we suppose the king to have become absolute master or to\nbe still controlled by national councils, in which the annuitants\nthemselves must necessarily bear the principal sway.\n\nIf the prince has become absolute, as may naturally be expected from\nthis situation of affairs, it is so easy for him to increase his\nexactions upon the annuitants, which amount only to the retaining\nmoney in his own hands, that this species of property will soon lose\nall its credit, and the whole income of every individual in the state\nmust lie entirely at the mercy of the sovereign\u2014a degree of despotism\nwhich no oriental monarchy has ever yet attained. If, on the contrary,\nthe consent of the annuitants be requisite for every taxation, they\nwill never be persuaded to contribute sufficiently even to the support\nof government, as the diminution of their revenue must in that\ncase be very sensible, would not be disguised under the appearance of a\nbranch of excise or customs, and would not be shared by any other order\nof the state, who are already supposed to be taxed to the utmost. There\nare instances in some republics of a hundredth penny, and sometimes\nof the fiftieth, being given to the support of the state; but this is\nalways an extraordinary exertion of power, and can never become the\nfoundation of a constant national defence. We have always found, where\na government has mortgaged all its revenues, that it necessarily sinks\ninto a state of languor, inactivity, and impotence.\n\nSuch are the inconveniences which may reasonably be foreseen of this\nsituation to which Great Britain is visibly tending, not to mention\nthe numberless inconveniences which cannot be foreseen, and which must\nresult from so monstrous a situation as that of making the public\nthe sole proprietor of land, besides investing it with every branch\nof customs and excise which the fertile imagination of ministers and\nprojectors have been able to invent.\n\nI must confess that there is a strange supineness, from long custom,\ncrept into all ranks of men with regard to public debts, not unlike\nwhat divines so vehemently complain of with regard to their religious\ndoctrines. We all own that the most sanguine imagination cannot hope\neither that this or any future ministry will be possessed of such\nrigid and steady frugality as to make any considerable progress in the\npayment of our debts, or that the situation of foreign affairs will,\nfor any long time, allow them leisure and tranquillity for such an\nundertaking.\u200b[30] What then is to become of us? Were we ever so good\nChristians and ever so resigned to Providence, this, methinks, were\na curious question, even considered as a speculative one, and\nwhat it might not be altogether impossible to form some conjectural\nsolution of. The events here will depend little upon the contingencies\nof battles, negotiations, intrigues, and factions. There seems to be a\nnatural progress of things which may guide our reasoning. As it would\nhave required but a moderate share of prudence when we first began this\npractice of mortgaging to have foretold, from the nature of men and\nof ministers, that things would necessarily be carried to the length\nwe see, so now that they have at last happily reached it, it may not\nbe difficult to guess at the consequences. It must, indeed, be one\nof these two events\u2014either the nation must destroy public credit, or\npublic credit will destroy the nation. It is impossible they can both\nsubsist after the manner they have been hitherto managed, in this as\nwell as in some other nations.\n\nThere was indeed a scheme for the payment of our debts which was\nproposed by an excellent citizen, Mr. Hutchinson, above thirty years\nago, and which was much approved of by some men of sense, but never\nwas likely to take effect. He asserted that there was a fallacy in\nimagining that the public owed this debt, for that really every\nindividual owed a proportional share of it, and paid, in his taxes,\na proportional share of the interest, beside the expenses of levying\nthese taxes. Had we not better, then, says he, make a proportional\ndistribution of the debt among us, and each of us contribute a sum\nsuitable to his property, and by that means discharge at once all our\nfunds and public mortgages? He seems not to have considered that the\nlaborious poor pay a considerable part of the taxes by their annual\nconsumptions, though they could not advance at once a proportional\npart of the sum required; not to mention that property in money and\nstock in trade might easily be concealed or disguised, and that\nvisible property in lands and houses would really at last answer for\nthe whole\u2014an inequality and oppression which never would be submitted\nto. But though this project is never likely to take place, it is not\naltogether improbable that when the nation become heartily sick of\ntheir debts, and are cruelly oppressed by them, some daring projector\nmay arise with visionary schemes for their discharge. And as public\ncredit will begin, by that time, to be a little frail, the least touch\nwill destroy it, as happened in France; and in this manner it will die\nof the doctor.\u200b[31]\n\nBut it is more probable that the breach of national faith will be the\nnecessary effect of wars, defeats, misfortunes, and public calamities,\nor even perhaps of victories and conquests. I must confess, when I\nsee princes and states fighting and quarrelling, amidst their debts,\nfunds, and public mortgages, it always brings to my mind a match of\ncudgel-playing fought in a china-shop. How can it be expected that\nsovereigns will spare a species of property which is pernicious to\nthemselves and to the public, when they have so little compassion\non lives and properties which are useful to both? Let the time\ncome (and surely it will come) when the new funds created for the\nexigencies of the year are not subscribed to, and raise not the money\nprojected. Suppose either that the cash of the nation is exhausted,\nor that our faith, which has hitherto been so ample, begins\nto fail us; suppose that in this distress the nation is threatened\nwith an invasion; a rebellion is suspected or broken out at home; a\nsquadron cannot be equipped for want of pay, victuals, or repairs;\nor even a foreign subsidy cannot be advanced\u2014what must a prince or\nminister do in such an emergence? The right of self-preservation is\nunalienable in every individual, much more in every community; and\nthe folly of our statesmen must then be greater than the folly of\nthose who first contracted debt, or, what is more, than that of those\nwho trusted, or continue to trust this security, if these statesmen\nhave the means of safety in their hands and do not employ them. The\nfunds, created and mortgaged, will by that time bring in a large\nyearly revenue, sufficient for the defence and security of the nation.\nMoney is perhaps lying in the exchequer, ready for the discharge of\nthe quarterly interest. Necessity calls, fear urges, reason exhorts,\ncompassion alone exclaims; the money will immediately be seized for\nthe current service\u2014under the most solemn protestations, perhaps, of\nbeing immediately replaced. But no more is requisite; the whole fabric,\nalready tottering, falls to the ground, and buries thousands in its\nruins. And this, I think, may be called the natural death of public\ncredit; for to this period it tends as naturally as an animal body to\nits dissolution and destruction.\u200b[32]\n\nThese two events supposed above are calamitous, but not the most\ncalamitous. Thousands are hereby sacrificed to the safety of millions;\nbut we are not without danger that the contrary event may take place,\nand that millions may be sacrificed for ever to the temporary safety\nof thousands.\u200b[33] Our popular government perhaps will render it\ndifficult or dangerous for a minister to venture on so desperate an\nexpedient as that of a voluntary bankruptcy; and though the House of\nLords be altogether composed of the proprietors of lands, and the\nHouse of Commons chiefly, and consequently neither of them can\nbe supposed to have great property in the funds, yet the connections\nof the members may be so great with the proprietors as to render them\nmore tenacious of public faith than prudence, policy, or even justice,\nstrictly speaking, requires. And perhaps, too, our foreign enemies,\nor rather enemy (for we have but one to dread) may be so politic as\nto discover that our safety lies in despair, and may not therefore\nshow the danger open and barefaced till it be inevitable. The balance\nof power in Europe, our grandfathers, our fathers, and we, have all\njustly esteemed too unequal to be preserved without our attention and\nassistance. But our children, weary with the struggle, and fettered\nwith encumbrances, may sit down secure and see their neighbours\noppressed and conquered, till at last they themselves and their\ncreditors lie both at the mercy of the conqueror. And this may properly\nenough be denominated the violent death of our public credit.\n\nThese seem to be the events which are not very remote, and which reason\nforesees as clearly almost as she can do anything that lies in the womb\nof time. And though the ancients maintained that, in order to reach the\ngift of prophecy, a certain divine fury or madness was requisite, one\nmay safely affirm that, in order to deliver such prophecies as these,\nno more is necessary than merely to be in one\u2019s senses, free from the\ninfluence of popular madness and delusion.\n\n\nNOTES, OF PUBLIC CREDIT.\n\n[27] Essay _Of the Balance of Trade_.\n\n\n[28] Plut. in _Vita Alex_. He makes these treasures amount to 80,000\ntalents, or about 15 millions sterling. Quintus Curtius (lib. 5, cap.\n2) says that Alexander found in Susa above 50,000 talents.\n\n\n[29] Melon, Du Tot, Law, in the pamphlets published in France.\n\n\n[30] In times of peace and security, when alone it is possible to pay\ndebt, the moneyed interest are averse to receive partial payments,\nwhich they know not how to dispose of to advantage, and the landed\ninterest are averse to continue the taxes requisite for that purpose.\nWhy therefore should a minister persevere in a measure so disagreeable\nto all parties? For the sake, I suppose, of a posterity which he will\nnever see, or of a few reasonable, reflecting people whose united\ninterest perhaps will not be able to secure him the smallest borough\nin England. It is not likely we shall ever find any minister so bad a\npolitician. With regard to these narrow, destructive maxims of politics\nall ministers are expert enough.\n\n\n[31] Some neighbouring states practise an easy expedient, by which they\nlighten their public debts. The French have a custom (as the Romans\nformerly had) of augmenting their money, and this the nation has been\nso much familiarized to that it hurts not public credit, though it be\nreally cutting off at once, by an edict, so much of their debts. The\nDutch diminish the interest without the consent of their creditors;\nor, which is the same thing, they arbitrarily tax the funds as well\nas other property. Could we practise either of these methods, we need\nnever be oppressed by the national debt; and it is not impossible but\none of these, or some other method, may, at all adventures, be tried,\non the augmentation of our encumbrances and difficulties. But people\nin this country are so good reasoners upon whatever regards their\ninterest, that such a practice will deceive nobody, and public credit\nwill probably tumble at once by so dangerous a trial.\n\n\n[32] So great dupes are the generality of mankind, that notwithstanding\nsuch a violent shock to public credit as a voluntary bankruptcy in\nEngland would occasion, it would not probably be long ere credit would\nagain revive in as flourishing a condition as before. The present\nKing of France, during the late war, borrowed money at lower interest\nthan ever his grandfather did, and as low as the British Parliament,\ncomparing the natural rate of interest in both kingdoms. And though\nmen are commonly more governed by what they have seen than by what\nthey foresee, with whatever certainty, yet promises, protestations,\nfair appearances, with the allurements of present interest, have such\npowerful influence as few are able to resist. Mankind are, in all ages,\ncaught by the same baits. The same tricks, played over and over again,\nstill trepan them. The heights of popularity and patriotism are still\nthe beaten road to power and tyranny; flattery to treachery; standing\narmies to arbitrary government; and the glory of God to the temporal\ninterest of the clergy. The fear of an everlasting destruction of\ncredit, allowing it to be an evil, is a needless bugbear. A prudent\nman, in reality, would rather lend to the public immediately after\nthey had taken a sponge to their debts, than at present; as much as\nan opulent knave, even though one could not force him to pay, is a\npreferable debtor to an honest bankrupt; for the former, in order to\ncarry on business, may find it his interest to discharge his debts,\nwhere they are not exorbitant. The latter has it not in his power.\nThe reasoning of Tacitus (_Hist._ lib. 3), as it is eternally true,\nis very applicable to our present case: \u201cSed vulgus ad magnitudinem\nbeneficiorum aderat: Stultissimus quisque pecuniis mercabatur: Apud\nsapientes cassa habebantur, qu\u00e6 neque dari neque accipi, salva\nrepublica, poterant.\u201d The public is a debtor, whom no man can oblige to\npay. The only check which the creditors have on it is the interest of\npreserving credit; an interest which may easily be overbalanced by a\nvery great debt, and by a difficult and extraordinary emergence, even\nsupposing that credit irrecoverable. Not to mention that a present\nnecessity often forces states into measures which are, strictly\nspeaking, against their interest.\n\n\n[33] I have heard it has been computed that all the creditors of the\npublic, natives and foreigners, amount only to 17,000. These make a\nfigure at present on their income; but in case of a public bankruptcy\nwould in an instant become the lowest, as well as the most wretched of\nthe people. The dignity and authority of the landed gentry and nobility\nis much better rooted, and would render the contention very unequal,\nif ever we come to that extremity. One would incline to assign to this\nevent a very near period, such as half a century, had not our fathers\u2019\nprophecies of this kind been already found fallacious by the duration\nof our public credit so much beyond all reasonable expectation. When\nthe astrologers in France were every year foretelling the death of\nHenry IV., \u201cThese fellows,\u201d says he, \u201cmust be right at last.\u201d We shall\ntherefore be more cautious than to assign any precise date, and shall\ncontent ourselves with pointing out the event in general.\n\n\n\n\nOF SOME REMARKABLE CUSTOMS.\n\n\nI shall observe three remarkable customs in three celebrated\ngovernments, and shall conclude from the whole that all general maxims\nin politics ought to be established with great reserve, and that\nirregular and extraordinary appearances are frequently discovered\nin the moral as well as in the physical world. The former\nperhaps can we better account for after they happen, from springs and\nprinciples of which every one has within himself, or from obvious\nobservation, the strongest assurance and conviction; but it is often\nfully as impossible for human prudence beforehand to foresee and\nforetell them.\n\nI. One would think it essential to every supreme council or assembly\nwhich debates, that entire liberty of speech should be granted to\nevery member, and that all motions or reasonings should be received\nwhich can any way tend to illustrate the point under deliberation.\nOne would conclude, with still greater assurance, that after a motion\nwas made, which was voted and approved by that assembly in which the\nlegislative power is lodged, the member who made the motion must for\never be exempted from further trial or inquiry. But no political maxim\ncan at first sight appear more undisputable than that he must at least\nbe secured from all inferior jurisdiction, and that nothing less than\nthe same supreme legislative assembly, in their subsequent meetings,\ncould render him accountable for those motions and harangues which they\nhad before approved of. But these axioms, however irrefragable they may\nappear, have all failed in the Athenian government, from causes, and\nprinciples too, which appear almost inevitable.\n\nBy the \u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03c6\u03b7 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03c9\u03bd, or \u201cindictment of illegality\u201d (though it has\nnot been remarked by antiquaries or commentators), any man was tried\nand punished by any common court of judicature for any law which\nhad passed upon his motion in the assembly of the people, if that\nlaw appeared to the court unjust or prejudicial to the public. Thus\nDemosthenes, finding that ship-money was levied irregularly, and that\nthe poor bore the same burden as the rich in equipping the galleys,\ncorrected this inequality by a very useful law, which proportioned the\nexpense to the revenue and income of each individual. He moved for\nthis law in the assembly, he proved its advantages,\u200b[34] he\nconvinced the people, the only legislature in Athens, the law passed\nand was carried into execution; and yet he was tried in a criminal\ncourt for that law upon the complaint of the rich, who resented the\nalteration he had introduced into the finances. He was indeed acquitted\nupon proving anew the usefulness of his law.\n\nCtesiphon moved in the assembly of the people that particular honours\nshould be conferred on Demosthenes, as on a citizen affectionate and\nuseful to the commonwealth. The people, convinced of this truth, voted\nthose honours; yet was Ctesiphon tried by the \u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03c6\u03b7 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03c9\u03bd. It was\nasserted, among other topics, that Demosthenes was not a good citizen,\nnor affectionate to the commonwealth, and the orator was called upon to\ndefend his friend, and consequently himself, which he executed by that\nsublime piece of eloquence that has ever since been the admiration of\nmankind.\n\nAfter the battle of Ch\u00e6ronea a law was passed, upon the motion\nof Hyperides, giving liberty to slaves and enrolling them in the\ntroops.\u200b[35] On account of this law the orator was afterwards tried\nby the indictment above mentioned, and defended himself, among other\ntopics, by that stroke celebrated by Plutarch and Longinus. \u201cIt was not\nI,\u201d said he, \u201cthat moved for this law: it was the necessities of war;\nit was the battle of Ch\u00e6ronea.\u201d The orations of Demosthenes abound with\nmany instances of trials of this nature, and prove clearly that nothing\nwas more commonly practised.\n\nThe Athenian Democracy was such a tumultuary government as we can\nscarce form a notion of in the present age of the world. The whole\ncollective body of the people voted in every law without any limitation\nof property, without any distinction of rank, without control of any\nmagistracy or senate;\u200b[36] and consequently without regard to\norder, justice, or prudence. The Athenians soon became sensible of the\nmischiefs attending this constitution, but being averse to the checking\nthemselves by any rule or restriction, they resolved at least to check\ntheir demagogues or counsellors by the fear of future punishment\nand inquiry. They accordingly instituted this remarkable law, a law\nesteemed so essential to their government that \u00c6schines insists on\nit as a known truth, that were it abolished or neglected it were\nimpossible for the Democracy to subsist.\u200b[37]\n\nThe people feared not any ill consequence to liberty from the authority\nof the criminal courts, because these were nothing but very numerous\njuries, chosen by lot from among the people; and they considered\nthemselves justly as in a state of perpetual pupilage, where they had\nan authority, after they came to the use of reason, not only to retract\nand control whatever had been determined, but to punish any guardian\nfor measures which they had embraced by his persuasion. The same law\nhad place in Thebes, and for the same reason.\n\nIt appears to have been a usual practice in Athens, on the\nestablishment of any law esteemed very useful or popular, to prohibit\nfor ever its abrogation and repeal. Thus the demagogue who diverted\nall the public revenues to the support of shows and spectacles, made\nit criminal so much as to move for a repeal of this law; thus Leptines\nmoved for a law, not only to recall all the immunities formerly\ngranted, but to deprive the people for the future of the power of\ngranting any more; thus all bills of attainder were forbid, or laws\nthat affected one Athenian without extending to the whole\ncommonwealth. These absurd clauses, by which the legislature vainly\nattempted to bind itself for ever, proceeded from a universal sense of\nthe levity and inconstancy of the people.\n\nII. A wheel within a wheel, such as we observe in the German Empire, is\nconsidered by Lord Shaftesbury\u200b[38] as an absurdity in politics; but\nwhat must we say to two equal wheels which govern the same political\nmachine without any mutual check, control, or subordination, and yet\npreserve the greatest harmony and concord? To establish two distinct\nlegislatures, each of which possesses full and absolute authority\nwithin itself, and stands in no need of the other\u2019s assistance,\nin order to give validity to its acts, this may appear beforehand\naltogether impracticable as long as men are actuated by the passions\nof ambition, emulation, and avarice, which have been hitherto their\nchief governing principles. And should I assert that the state I\nhave in my eye was divided into two distinct factions, each of which\npredominated in a distinct legislature, and yet produced no clashing in\nthese independent powers, the supposition may appear almost incredible;\nand if, to augment the paradox, I should affirm that this disjointed,\nirregular government was the most active, triumphant, and illustrious\ncommonwealth that ever yet appeared on the stage of the world, I\nshould certainly be told that such a political chimera was as absurd\nas any vision of the poets. But there is no need for searching long in\norder to prove the reality of the foregoing suppositions, for this was\nactually the case with the Roman republic.\n\nThe legislative power was there lodged in the _comitia centuriata_\nand _comitia tributa_. In the former, it is well known, the people\nvoted according to their census; so that when the first class was\nunanimous, though it contained not perhaps the hundredth part of the\ncommonwealth, it determined the whole, and, with the authority of the\nsenate, established a law. In the latter, every vote was alike; and as\nthe authority of the senate was not there requisite, the lower\npeople entirely prevailed and gave law to the whole state. In all party\ndivisions, at first between the Patricians and Plebeians, afterwards\nbetween the nobles and the people, the interest of the aristocracy was\npredominant in the first legislature, that of the democracy in the\nsecond. The one could always destroy what the other had established;\nnay, the one by a sudden and unforeseen motion might take the start\nof the other and totally annihilate its rival by a vote, which, from\nthe nature of the constitution, had the full authority of a law. But\nno such contest or struggle is observed in the history of Rome: no\ninstance of a quarrel between these two legislatures, though many\nbetween the parties that governed in each. Whence arose this concord,\nwhich may seem so extraordinary?\n\nThe legislature established at Rome by the authority of Servius Tullius\nwas the _comitia centuriata_, which, after the expulsion of the kings,\nrendered the government for some time altogether aristocratical.\nBut the people, having numbers and force on their side, and being\nelated with frequent conquests and victories in their foreign wars,\nalways prevailed when pushed to extremities, and first extorted from\nthe senate the magistracy of the tribunes, and then the legislative\npower of the _comitia tributa_. It then behoved the nobles to be more\ncareful than ever not to provoke the people, for beside the force\nwhich the latter were always possessed of, they had now got possession\nof legal authority, and could instantly break in pieces any order or\ninstitution which directly opposed them. By intrigue, by influence, by\nmoney, by combination, and by the respect paid their character, the\nnobles might often prevail and direct the whole machine of government;\nbut had they openly set their _comitia centuriata_ in opposition to\nthe _tributa_, they had soon lost the advantage of that institution,\ntogether with their consuls, pr\u00e6tors, ediles, and all the magistrates\nelected by it. But the _comitia tributa_, not having the same reason\nfor respecting the _centuriata_, frequently repealed laws favourable\nto the aristocracy; they limited the authority of the nobles,\nprotected the people from oppression, and controlled the actions of\nthe senate and magistracy. The _centuriata_ found it convenient always\nto submit; and though equal in authority, yet being inferior in power,\ndurst never directly give any shock to the other legislature, either by\nrepealing its laws or establishing laws, which, it foresaw, would soon\nbe repealed by it.\n\nNo instance is found of any opposition or struggle between these\n_comitia_, except one slight attempt of this kind mentioned by Appian\nin the third book of his Civil Wars. Mark Antony, resolving to deprive\nDecimus Brutus of the government of Cisalpine Gaul, railed in the\nforum, and called one of the _comitia_ in order to prevent the meeting\nof the other which had been ordered by the senate; but affairs were\nthen fallen into such confusion, and the Roman constitution was so near\nits final dissolution, that no inference can be drawn from such an\nexpedient. This contest, besides, was founded more on form than party.\nIt was the senate who ordered the _comitia tributa_ that they might\nobstruct the meeting of the _centuriata_, which, by the constitution,\nor at least forms of the government, could alone dispose of provinces.\n\nCicero was recalled by the _comitia centuriata_, though banished by\nthe _tributa_\u2014that is, by a _plebiscitum_. But his banishment, we may\nobserve, never was considered as a legal deed, arising from the free\nchoice and inclination of the people. It was always ascribed to the\nviolence alone of Clodius, and to the disorders introduced by him into\nthe government.\n\nIII. The third custom which we proposed to observe regards England, and\nthough it be not so important as those which we have pointed out in\nAthens and Rome, it is no less singular and remarkable. It is a maxim\nin politics which we readily admit as undisputed and universal, that\na power, however great, when granted by law to an eminent magistrate\nis not so dangerous to liberty as an authority, however considerable,\nwhich he acquires from violence and usurpation; for, besides that\nthe law always limits every power which it bestows, the very\nreceiving it as a concession establishes the authority whence it is\nderived and preserves the harmony of the constitution. By the same\nright that one prerogative is assumed without law another may also\nbe claimed, and another with still greater facility; while the first\nusurpations both serve as precedents to the following, and give force\nto maintain them. Hence the heroism of Hampden, who sustained the whole\nviolence of royal prosecution rather than pay a tax of twenty shillings\nnot imposed by Parliament; hence the care of all English patriots to\nguard against the first encroachments of the crown, and hence alone the\nexistence at this day of English liberty.\n\nThere is, however, one occasion where the Parliament has departed from\nthis maxim, and this is in the pressing of seamen. The exercise of an\nillegal power is here tacitly permitted in the crown, and though it has\nfrequently been under deliberation how that power might be rendered\nlegal and granted under proper restrictions to the sovereign, no safe\nexpedient could ever be proposed for that purpose, and the danger\nto liberty always appeared greater from law than from usurpation.\nWhile this power is exercised to no other end than to man the Navy\nmen willingly submit to it from a sense of its use and necessity, and\nthe sailors, who are alone affected by it, find nobody to support\nthem in claiming the rights and privileges which the law grants\nwithout distinction to all English subjects. But were this power on\nany occasion made an instrument of faction or ministerial tyranny,\nthe opposite faction, and indeed all lovers of their country, would\nimmediately take the alarm and support the injured party. The liberty\nof Englishmen would be asserted; juries would be implacable; and the\ntools of tyranny acting both against law and equity would meet with the\nseverest vengeance. On the other hand, were the Parliament to grant\nsuch an authority, they would probably fall into one of these two\ninconveniences: they would either bestow it under so many restrictions\nas would make it lose its effects by cramping the authority of the\ncrown, or they would render it so large and comprehensive as might give\noccasion to great abuses, for which we could in that case have\nno remedy. The very illegality of the power at present prevents its\nabuses, by affording so easy a remedy against them.\n\nI pretend not by this reasoning to exclude all possibility of\ncontriving a register for seamen, which might man the Navy without\nbeing dangerous to liberty. I only observe that no satisfactory scheme\nof that nature has yet been proposed. Rather than adopt any project\nhitherto invented, we continue a practice seemingly the most absurd and\nunaccountable. Authority, in times of full internal peace and concord,\nis armed against law. A continued and open usurpation of the crown is\npermitted amidst the greatest jealousy and watchfulness in the people;\nnay, proceeding from those very principles, liberty, in a country of\nthe highest liberty, is left entirely to its own defence without any\ncountenance or protection; the wild state of nature is renewed in one\nof the most civilized societies of mankind; and great violences and\ndisorders among the people, the most human and the best-natured, are\ncommitted with impunity; while the one party pleads obedience to the\nsupreme magistrate, the other the sanction of fundamental laws.\n\n\nNOTES, OF SOME REMARKABLE CUSTOMS.\n\n[34] His harangue for it is still extant: \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9 \u03a3\u03c5\u03bc\u03bc\u03bf\u03c1\u03b9\u03b1\u03c2.\n\n\n[35] Plutarchus in _vita decem oratorum_. Demosthenes gives a different\naccount of this law. (_Contra Aristogiton, Orat. II._) He says that its\npurport was to render the \u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9 \u03b5\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9, or to restore the privilege\nof bearing offices to those who had been declared incapable. Perhaps\nthese were both clauses of the same law.\n\n\n[36] The senate of the Bean was only a less numerous mob chosen by lot\nfrom among the people, and their authority was not great.\n\n\n[37] _In Ctesiphontem._ It is remarkable that the first step after the\ndissolution of the Democracy by Critias and the Thirty was to annul the\n\u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03c6\u03b7 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03c9\u03bd, as we learn from Demosthenes \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03a4\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03ba. The orator\nin this oration gives us the words of the law establishing the \u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03c6\u03b7\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03c9\u03bd, p. 297, _ex edit._ _Aldi_. And he accounts for it from the\nsame principles we here reason upon.\n\n\n[38] Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour, part 3, \u00a7 2.\n\n\n\n\nOF THE POPULOUSNESS OF ANCIENT NATIONS.\u200b[39]\n\n\nThere is very little ground, either from reason or experience, to\nconclude the universe eternal or incorruptible. The continual and\nrapid motion of matter, the violent revolutions with which every part\nis agitated, the changes remarked in the heavens, the plain\ntraces as well as tradition of a universal deluge,\u2014all these prove\nstrongly the mortality of this fabric of the world, and its passage,\nby corruption or dissolution, from one state or order to another. It\nmust therefore, as well as each individual form which it contains,\nhave its infancy, youth, manhood, and old age; and it is probable that\nin all these variations man, equally with every animal and vegetable,\nwill partake. In the flourishing age of the world it may be expected\nthat the human species should possess greater vigour both of mind\nand body, more prosperous health, higher spirits, longer life, and\na stronger inclination and power of generation. But if the general\nsystem of things, and human society of course, have any such gradual\nrevolutions, they are too slow to be discernible in that short period\nwhich is comprehended by history and tradition. Stature and force of\nbody, length of life, even courage and extent of genius, seem hitherto\nto have been naturally in all ages pretty much the same. The arts and\nsciences, indeed, have flourished in one period and have decayed in\nanother; but we may observe that at the time when they rose to greatest\nperfection among one people they were perhaps totally unknown to all\nthe neighbouring nations, and though they universally decayed in one\nage, yet in a succeeding generation they again revived and diffused\nthemselves over the world. As far, therefore, as observation reaches\nthere is no universal difference discernible in the human species,\nand though it were allowed that the universe, like an animal\nbody, had a natural progress from infancy to old age; yet, as it must\nstill be uncertain whether at present it be advancing to its point of\nperfection or declining from it, we cannot thence presuppose any decay\nin human nature.\u200b[40] To prove, therefore, or account for the greater\npopulousness of antiquity by the imaginary youth or vigour of the world\nwill scarcely be admitted by any just reasoner; these general physical\ncauses ought entirely to be excluded from that question.\n\nThere are indeed some more particular physical causes of great\nimportance. Diseases are mentioned in antiquity which are almost\nunknown to modern medicine, and new diseases have arisen and propagated\nthemselves of which there are no traces in ancient history. And in\nthis particular we may observe, upon comparison, that the disadvantage\nis very much on the side of the moderns. Not to mention some others\nof less importance, the smallpox commits such ravages as would almost\nalone account for the great superiority ascribed to ancient times.\nThe tenth or the twelfth part of mankind destroyed every generation\nshould make a vast difference, it may be thought, in the numbers of the\npeople; and when joined to venereal distempers, a new plague diffused\neverywhere, this disease is perhaps equivalent, by its constant\noperation, to the three great scourges of mankind\u2014war, pestilence,\nand famine. Were it certain, therefore, that ancient times were more\npopulous than the present, and could no moral causes be assigned for so\ngreat a change, these physical causes alone, in the opinion of many,\nwould be sufficient to give us satisfaction on that head.\n\nBut is it certain that antiquity was so much more populous as is\npretended? The extravagancies of Vossius with regard to this subject\nare well known; but an author of much greater genius and discernment\nhas ventured to affirm that, according to the best computations which\nthese subjects will admit of, there are not now on the face of the\nearth the fiftieth part of mankind which existed in the time of Julius\nC\u00e6sar. It may easily be observed that the comparisons in this case\nmust be very imperfect, even though we confine ourselves to the scene\nof ancient history\u2014Europe and the nations about the Mediterranean. We\nknow not exactly the numbers of any European kingdom, or even city,\nat present; how can we pretend to calculate those of ancient cities\nand states where historians have left us such imperfect traces? For\nmy part, the matter appears to me so uncertain that, as I intend to\nthrow together some reflections on that head, I shall intermingle the\ninquiry concerning causes with that concerning facts, which ought never\nto be admitted where the facts can be ascertained with any tolerable\nassurance. We shall first consider whether it be probable, from what\nwe know of the situation of society in both periods, that antiquity\nmust have been more populous; secondly, whether in reality it was so.\nIf I can make it appear that the conclusion is not so certain as is\npretended in favour of antiquity, it is all I aspire to.\n\nIn general we may observe that the question with regard to the\ncomparative populousness of ages or kingdoms implies very important\nconsequences, and commonly determines concerning the preference of\ntheir whole police, their manners, and the constitution of their\ngovernment. For as there is in all men, both male and female, a desire\nand power of generation more active than is ever universally exerted,\nthe restraints which they lie under must proceed from some difficulties\nin their situation, which it belongs to a wise legislature carefully\nto observe and remove. Almost every man who thinks he can maintain a\nfamily will have one, and the human species at this rate of propagation\nwould more than double every generation. How fast do mankind\nmultiply in every colony or new settlement, where it is an easy\nmatter to provide for a family, and where men are nowise straightened\nor confined as in long established governments? History tells us\nfrequently of plagues which have swept away the third or fourth part of\na people; yet in a generation or two the destruction was not perceived,\nand the society had again acquired their former number. The lands which\nwere cultivated, the houses built, the commodities raised, the riches\nacquired, enabled the people who escaped immediately to marry and to\nrear families, which supplied the place of those who had perished.\u200b[41]\nAnd for a like reason every wise, just, and mild government, by\nrendering the condition of its subjects easy and secure, will always\nabound most in people, as well as in commodities and riches. A country,\nindeed, whose climate and soil are fitted for vines will naturally\nbe more populous than one which is only fitted for pasturage; but if\neverything else be equal, it seems natural to expect that wherever\nthere are most happiness and virtue and the wisest institutions, there\nwill also be most people.\n\nThe question, therefore, concerning the populousness of ancient and\nmodern times being allowed of great importance, it will be requisite,\nif we would bring it to some determination, to compare both the\ndomestic and political situation of these two periods, in order to\njudge of the facts by their moral causes, which is the first view in\nwhich we proposed to consider them.\n\nThe chief difference between the domestic economy of the ancients\nand that of the moderns consists in the practice of slavery which\nprevailed among the former, and which has been abolished for some\ncenturies throughout the greater part of Europe. Some passionate\nadmirers of the ancients and zealous partisans of civil liberty\n(for these sentiments, as they are both of them in the main extremely\njust, are found to be almost inseparable) cannot forbear regretting\nthe loss of this institution; and whilst they brand all submission\nto the government of a single person with the harsh denomination of\nslavery, they would gladly reduce the greatest part of mankind to\nreal slavery and subjection. But to one who considers coolly on the\nsubject it will appear that human nature in general really enjoys\nmore liberty at present, in the most arbitrary governments of Europe,\nthan it ever did during the most flourishing period of ancient times.\nAs much as submission to a petty prince, whose dominions extend not\nbeyond a single city, is more grievous than obedience to a great\nmonarch, so much is domestic slavery more cruel and oppressive than\nany civil subjection whatsoever. The more the master is removed from\nus in place and rank the greater liberty we enjoy, the less are our\nactions inspected and controlled, and the fainter that cruel comparison\nbecomes between our own subjection and the freedom and even dominion\nof another. The remains that are found of slavery in the American\ncolonies and among some European nations would never surely create a\ndesire of rendering it more universal. The little humanity commonly\nobserved in persons accustomed from their infancy to exercise so great\nauthority over their fellow-creatures and to trample upon human nature\nwere sufficient alone to disgust us with that authority. Nor can a more\nprobable reason be given for the severe, I might say barbarous manners\nof ancient times, than the practice of domestic slavery, by which\nevery man of rank was rendered a petty tyrant and educated amidst the\nflattery, submission, and low debasement of his slaves.\n\nAccording to the ancient practice, all checks were on the inferior, to\nrestrain him to the duty of submission; none on the superior, to engage\nhim to the reciprocal duties of gentleness and humanity. In modern\ntimes a bad servant finds not easily a good master, nor a bad master\na good servant, and the checks are mutual, suitable to the\ninviolable and eternal laws of reason and equity.\n\nThe custom of exposing old, useless, or sick slaves in an island of the\nTiber, there to starve, seems to have been pretty common in Rome, and\nwhoever recovered after having been so exposed had his liberty given\nhim by an edict of the Emperor Claudius, where it was likewise forbid\nto kill any slave merely for old age or sickness. But supposing that\nthis edict was strictly obeyed, would it better the domestic treatment\nof slaves or render their lives much more comfortable? We may imagine\nwhat others would practise when it was the professed maxim of the\nelder Cato to sell his superannuated slaves for any price rather than\nmaintain what he esteemed a useless burden.\n\nThe _ergastula_, or dungeons, where slaves in chains were forced to\nwork, were very common all over Italy. Columella advises that they be\nalways built under ground, and recommends it as the duty of a careful\noverseer to call over every day the names of these slaves, like the\nmustering of a regiment or ship\u2019s company, in order to know presently\nwhen any of them had deserted. A proof of the frequency of these\n_ergastula_ and of the great number of slaves usually confined in them.\n\nA chained slave for a porter was usual in Rome, as appears from Ovid\nand other authors. Had not these people shaken off all sense of\ncompassion towards that unhappy part of their species, would they have\npresented all their friends at the first entrance with such an image of\nthe severity of the master and misery of the slave?\n\nNothing so common in all trials, even of civil causes, as to call for\nthe evidence of slaves, which was always extorted by the most exquisite\ntorments. Demosthenes says that where it was possible to produce for\nthe same fact either freemen or slaves as witnesses, the judges always\npreferred the torturing of slaves as a more certain and infallible\nevidence.\u200b[42]\n\nSeneca draws a picture of that disorderly luxury which changes day\ninto night and night into day, and inverts every stated hour of every\noffice in life. Among other circumstances, such as displacing the meals\nand times of bathing, he mentions that regularly about the third hour\nof the night the neighbours of one who indulges this false refinement\nhear the noise of whips and lashes, and upon inquiry find that he is\nthen taking an account of the conduct of his servants and giving them\ndue correction and discipline. This is not remarked as an instance of\ncruelty, but only of disorder, which, even in actions the most usual\nand methodical, changes the fixed hours that an established custom had\nassigned them.\u200b[43]\n\nBut our present business is only to consider the influence of slavery\non the populousness of a state. It is pretended that in this particular\nthe ancient practice had infinitely the advantage, and was the chief\ncause of that extreme populousness which is supposed in those times.\nAt present all masters discourage the marrying of their male servants,\nand admit not by any means the marriage of the female, who are then\nsupposed altogether incapacitated for their service; but where the\nproperty of the servants is lodged in the master, their marriage\nand fertility form his riches, and bring him a succession of slaves\nthat supply the place of those whom age and infirmity have\ndisabled. He encourages, therefore, their propagation as much as that\nof his cattle, rears the young with the same care, and educates them\nto some art or calling, which may render them more useful or valuable\nto him. The opulent are, by this policy, interested in the being at\nleast, though not the well-being of the poor; and enrich themselves by\nincreasing the number and industry of those who are subjected to them.\nEach man, being a sovereign in his own family, has the same interest\nwith regard to it as the prince with regard to the state; and has not,\nlike the prince, any opposite motive of ambition or vainglory which may\nlead him to depopulate his little sovereignty. All of it is, at all\ntimes, under his eye, and he has leisure to inspect the most minute\ndetail of the marriage and education of his subjects.\u200b[44]\n\nSuch are the consequences of domestic slavery, according to the\nfirst aspect and appearance of things; but if we enter more deeply\ninto the subject, we shall perhaps find reason to retract our hasty\ndeterminations. The comparison is shocking between the management\nof human creatures and that of cattle; but being extremely just\nwhen applied to the present subject, it may be proper to trace the\nconsequences of it. At the capital, near all great cities, in all\npopulous, rich, industrious provinces, few cattle are bred. Provisions,\nlodging, attendance, labour are there dear, and men find better their\naccount in buying the cattle, after they come to a certain age, from\nthe remoter and cheaper countries. These are consequently the only\nbreeding countries for cattle; and by a parity of reason, for men too,\nwhen the latter are put on the same footing with the former.\nTo rear a child in London till he could be serviceable would cost much\ndearer than to buy one of the same age from Scotland or Ireland, where\nhe had been raised in a cottage, covered with rags, and fed on oatmeal\nor potatoes. Those who had slaves, therefore, in all the richer or more\npopulous countries would discourage the pregnancy of the females, and\neither prevent or destroy the birth. The human species would perish in\nthose places where it ought to increase the fastest, and a perpetual\nrecruit be needed from all the poorer and more desert provinces. Such a\ncontinued drain would tend mightily to depopulate the state, and render\ngreat cities ten times more destructive than with us, where every man\nis master of himself, and provides for his children from the powerful\ninstinct of nature\u2014not the calculations of sordid interest. If London\nat present, without increasing, needs a yearly recruit from the country\nof 5000 people, as is commonly computed, what must it require if the\ngreatest part of the tradesmen and common people were slaves, and were\nhindered from breeding by their avaricious masters?\n\nAll ancient authors tell us that there was a perpetual flux of slaves\nto Italy from the remoter provinces, particularly Syria, Cilicia,\u200b[45]\nCappadocia, and the Lesser Asia, Thrace, and Egypt; yet the number\nof people did not increase in Italy, and writers complain of the\ncontinual decay of industry and agriculture. Where then is that extreme\nfertility of the Roman slaves which is commonly supposed? So far from\nmultiplying, they could not, it seems, so much as keep up the stock\nwithout immense recruits. And though great numbers were continually\nmanumitted and converted into Roman citizens, the numbers even of these\ndid not increase till the freedom of the city was communicated to\nforeign provinces.\n\nThe term for a slave born and bred in the family was _verna_;\u200b[46] and\nthese slaves seem to have been entitled by custom to privileges and\nindulgences beyond others\u2014a sufficient reason why the masters would\nnot be fond of rearing many of that kind.\u200b[47] Whoever is acquainted\nwith the maxims of our planters will acknowledge the justness of this\nobservation.\u200b[48]\n\nAtticus is much praised by his historian for the care which he took\nin recruiting his family from the slaves born in it.\u200b[49] May we not\nthence infer that that practice was not then very common?\n\nThe names of slaves in the Greek comedies\u2014Syrus, Mysus, Geta, Thrax,\nDavus, Lydus, Phyrx, etc., afford a presumption that at Athens, at\nleast, most of the slaves were imported from foreign nations. The\nAthenians, says Strabo, gave to their slaves either the names of the\nnations whence they were bought, as Lydus, Syrus; or the names that\nwere most common among those nations, as Manes or Midas to a Phrygian,\nTibias to a Paphlagonian.\n\nDemosthenes, after having mentioned a law which forbid any man to\nstrike the slave of another, praises the humanity of this law, and adds\nthat if the barbarians from whom slaves were bought had information\nthat their countrymen met with such gentle treatment, they would\nentertain a great esteem for the Athenians. Isocrates, too, insinuates\nthat the slaves of the Greeks were generally or very commonly\nbarbarians. Aristotle, in his _Politics_, plainly supposes that a slave\nis always a foreigner. The ancient comic writers represented the slaves\nas speaking a barbarous language. This was an imitation of nature.\n\nIt is well known that Demosthenes, in his nonage, had been defrauded\nof a large fortune by his tutors, and that afterwards he recovered,\nby a prosecution of law, the value of his patrimony. His orations on\nthat occasion still remain, and contain a very exact detail of the\nwhole substance left by his father, in money, merchandise, houses,\nand slaves, together with the value of each particular. Among the\nrest were 52 slaves, handicraftsmen\u2014viz., 32 sword-cutlers and 20\ncabinet-makers,\u200b[50] all males; not a word of any wives, children,\nor family, which they certainly would have had had it been a\ncommon custom at Athens to breed from the slaves; and the value of the\nwhole must have depended very much on that circumstance. No female\nslaves are even so much as mentioned, except some housemaids who\nbelonged to his mother. This argument has great force, if it be not\naltogether decisive.\n\nConsider this passage of Plutarch, speaking of the elder Cato:\u2014\u201cHe\nhad a great number of slaves, whom he took care to buy at the sales\nof prisoners of war; and he chose them young, that they might easily\nbe accustomed to any diet or manner of life, and be instructed in any\nbusiness or labour, as men teach anything to young dogs or horses. And\nesteeming love the chief source of all disorders, he allowed the male\nslaves to have a commerce with the female in his family, upon paying a\ncertain sum for this privilege; but he strictly forbade all intrigues\nout of his family.\u201d Are there any symptoms in this narration of that\ncare which is supposed in the ancients, of the marriage and propagation\nof their slaves? If that was a common practice, founded on general\ninterest, it would surely have been embraced by Cato, who was a great\neconomist, and lived in times when the ancient frugality and simplicity\nof manners were still in credit and reputation.\n\nIt is expressly remarked by the writers of the Roman law that scarce\nany ever purchase slaves with a view of breeding from them.\u200b[51]\n\n\nOur lackeys and housemaids, I own, do not serve much to multiply\ntheir species; but the ancients, besides those who attended on their\nperson, had all their labour performed by slaves, who lived, many of\nthem, in their family; and some great men possessed to the number of\n10,000. If there be any suspicion, therefore, that this institution was\nunfavourable to propagation (and the same reason, at least in part,\nholds with regard to ancient slaves as well as modern servants), how\ndestructive must slavery have proved!\n\nHistory mentions a Roman nobleman who had 400 slaves under the same\nroof with him; and having been assassinated at home by the furious\nrevenge of one of them, the law was executed with rigour, and all\nwithout exception were put to death. Many other Roman noblemen had\nfamilies equally, or more numerous, and I believe every one will allow\nthat this would scarcely be practicable were we to suppose all the\nslaves married and the females to be breeders.\u200b[52]\n\nSo early as the poet Hesiod married slaves, whether male or female,\nwere esteemed very inconvenient. How much more where families had\nincreased to such an enormous size, as in Rome, and where simplicity of\nmanners was banished from all ranks of people?\n\nXenophon in his _Economics_, where he gives directions for the\nmanagement of a farm, recommends a strict care and attention of\nlaying the male and the female slaves at a distance from each other.\nHe seems not to suppose that they are ever married. The only slaves\namong the Greeks that appear to have continued their own breed were the\nHelotes, who had houses apart, and were more the slaves of the public\nthan of individuals.\n\nThe same author tells us that Nicias\u2019s overseer, by an agreement with\nhis master, was obliged to pay him an obolus a day for each slave,\nbesides maintaining them and keeping up the number. Had the ancient\nslaves been all breeders, this last circumstance of the contract had\nbeen superfluous.\n\nThe ancients talk so frequently of a fixed, stated portion of\nprovisions assigned to each slave, that we are naturally led to\nconclude that slaves lived almost all single, and received that portion\nas a kind of board-wages.\n\nThe practice, indeed, of marrying the slaves seems not to have been\nvery common even among the country-labourers, where it is more\nnaturally to be expected. Cato, enumerating the slaves requisite\nto labour a vineyard of a hundred acres, makes them to amount to\nfifteen\u2014the overseer and his wife (_villicus_ and _villica_) and\nthirteen male slaves; for an olive plantation of 240 acres, the\noverseer and his wife and eleven male slaves; and so in proportion to a\ngreater or less plantation or vineyard.\n\nVarro, citing this passage of Cato, allows his computation to be just\nin every respect except the last. \u201cFor as it is requisite,\u201d says he,\n\u201cto have an overseer and his wife, whether the vineyard or plantation\nbe great or small, this must alter the exactness of the proportion.\u201d\nHad Cato\u2019s computation been erroneous in any other respect it had\ncertainly been corrected by Varro, who seems fond of discovering so\ntrivial an inaccuracy.\n\nThe same author, as well as Columella, recommends it as requisite to\ngive a wife to the overseer in order to attach him the more strongly to\nhis master\u2019s service. This was therefore a peculiar indulgence granted\nto a slave in whom so great a confidence was reposed.\n\nIn the same place Varro mentions it as a useful precaution not to buy\ntoo many slaves from the same nations, lest they beget factions and\nseditions in the family; a presumption that in Italy the greatest part,\neven of the country-labouring slaves\u2014for he speaks of no other\u2014were\nbought from the remoter provinces. All the world knows that the\nfamily-slaves in Rome, who were instruments of show and luxury, were\ncommonly imported from the east. \u201cHoc profecere,\u201d says Pliny, speaking\nof the jealous care of masters, \u201cmancipiorum legiones, et in domo turba\nexterna ac servorum quoque causa nomenclator adhibendus.\u201d\n\nIt is indeed recommended by Varro to propagate young shepherds in the\nfamily from the old ones; for as grazing farms were commonly in remote\nand cheap places, and each shepherd lived in a cottage apart, his\nmarriage and increase were not liable to the same inconveniences as\nin dearer places and where many servants lived in a family, which was\nuniversally the case in such of the Roman farms as produced wine or\ncorn. If we consider this exception with regard to the shepherds, and\nweigh the reasons of it, it will serve for a strong confirmation of all\nour foregoing suspicions.\n\nColumella, I own, advises the master to give a reward, and even liberty\nto a female slave that had reared him above three children, a proof\nthat sometimes the ancients propagated from their slaves, which,\nindeed, cannot be denied. Were it otherwise the practice of slavery,\nbeing so common in antiquity, must have been destructive to a degree\nwhich no expedient could repair. All I pretend to infer from these\nreasonings is that slavery is in general disadvantageous both to the\nhappiness and populousness of mankind, and that its place is much\nbetter supplied by the practice of hired servants.\n\nThe laws, or, as some writers call them, the seditions of the Gracchi,\nwere occasioned by their observing the increase of slaves all over\nItaly, and the diminution of free citizens. Appian ascribes this\nincrease to the propagation of the slaves; Plutarch to the purchasing\nof barbarians, who were chained and imprisoned, \u03b2\u03b1\u03c1\u03b2\u03b1\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\n\u03b4\u03b5\u03c3\u03bc\u03c9\u03c4\u03b7\u03c1\u03b9\u03b1. It is to be presumed that both causes concurred.\n\nSicily, says Florus, was full of _ergastula_, and was cultivated by\nlabourers in chains. Eunus and Athenio excited the servile war by\nbreaking up these monstrous prisons and giving liberty to 60,000\nslaves. The younger Pompey augmented his army in Spain by the same\nexpedient. If the country-labourers throughout the Roman Empire were\nso generally in this situation, and if it was difficult or impossible\nto find separate lodgings for the families of the city-servants,\nhow unfavourable to propagation, as well as to humanity, must the\ninstitution of domestic slavery be esteemed.\n\nConstantinople at present requires the same recruits of slaves from\nall the provinces which Rome did of old, and these provinces are of\nconsequence far from being populous.\n\nEgypt, according to Monsieur Maillet, sends continual colonies of black\nslaves to the other parts of the Turkish Empire, and receives annually\nan equal return of white; the one brought from the inland parts of\nAfrica, the other from Mingrella, Circassia, and Tartary.\n\nOur modern convents are no doubt very bad institutions, but there is\nreason to suspect that anciently every great family in Italy, and\nprobably in other parts of the world, was a species of convent. And\nthough we have reason to detest all those popish institutions as\nnurseries of the most abject superstition, burdensome to the public\nand oppressive to the poor prisoners, male as well as female, yet may\nit be questioned whether they be so destructive to the populousness\nof a state as is commonly imagined. Were the land which belongs to a\nconvent bestowed on a nobleman, he would spend its revenue on dogs,\nhorses, grooms, footmen, cooks, and housemaids, and his family would\nnot furnish many more citizens than the convent.\n\nThe common reason why parents thrust their daughters into nunneries\nis that they may not be overburdened with too numerous a\nfamily; but the ancients had a method almost as innocent and more\neffectual to that purpose\u2014viz., the exposing their children in\nthe earliest infancy. This practice was very common, and is not\nmentioned by any author of those times with the horror it deserves, or\nscarce\u200b[53] even with disapprobation. Plutarch\u2014the humane, good-natured\nPlutarch\u200b[54]\u2014recommends it as a virtue in Attalus, King of Pergamus,\nthat he murdered, or, if you will, exposed all his own children\nin order to leave his crown to the son of his brother, Eumenes,\nsignalising in this manner his gratitude and affection to Eumenes, who\nhad left him his heir preferable to that son. It was Solon, the most\ncelebrated of the sages of Greece, who gave parents permission by law\nto kill their children.\n\nShall we then allow these two circumstances to compensate each\nother\u2014viz., monastic vows and the exposing of children, and to be\nunfavourable in equal degrees to the propagation of mankind? I doubt\nthe advantage is here on the side of antiquity. Perhaps, by an odd\nconnection of causes, the barbarous practice of the ancients might\nrather render those times more populous. By removing the terrors of too\nnumerous a family it would engage many people in marriage, and such is\nthe force of natural affection that very few in comparison would have\nresolution enough to carry into execution their former intentions.\n\nChina, the only country where this cruel practice of exposing children\nprevails at present, is the most populous country we know, and every\nman is married before he is twenty. Such early marriages could scarcely\nbe general had not men the prospect of so easy a method of getting rid\nof their children. I own that Plutarch speaks of it as a very universal\nmaxim of the poor to expose their children, and as the rich were then\naverse to marriage on account of the courtship they met with from those\nwho expected legacies from them, the public must have been in a\nbad situation between them.\u200b[55]\n\nOf all sciences there is none where first appearances are more\ndeceitful than in politics. Hospitals for foundlings seem favourable\nto the increase of numbers, and perhaps may be so when kept under\nproper restrictions; but when they open the door to every one, without\ndistinction, they have probably a contrary effect, and are pernicious\nto the state. It is computed that every ninth child born at Paris is\nsent to the hospital, though it seems certain, according to the common\ncourse of human affairs, that it is not a hundredth part whose parents\nare altogether incapacitated to rear and educate them. The infinite\ndifference, for health, industry, and morals, between an education in\nan hospital and that in a private family should induce us not to make\nthe entrance into an hospital too easy and engaging. To kill one\u2019s own\nchild is shocking to nature, and must therefore be pretty unusual;\nbut to turn over the care of him upon others is very tempting to the\nnatural indolence of mankind.\n\nHaving considered the domestic life and manners of the ancients\ncompared to those of the moderns, where in the main we seem rather\nsuperior so far as the present question is concerned, we shall now\nexamine the political customs and institutions of both ages, and weigh\ntheir influence in retarding or forwarding the propagation of mankind.\n\nBefore the increase of the Roman power, or rather till its full\nestablishment, almost all the nations which are the scene of\nancient history were divided into small territories or petty\ncommonwealths, where of course a great equality of fortune prevailed,\nand the centre of the government was always very near its frontiers.\n\nThis was the situation of affairs not only in Greece and Italy,\nbut also in Spain, Gaul, Germany, Africa, and a great part of the\nLesser Asia. And it must be owned that no institution could be more\nfavourable to the propagation of mankind; for though a man of an\novergrown fortune, not being able to consume more than another, must\nshare it with those who serve and attend him, yet their possession\nbeing precarious, they have not the same encouragement to marriage as\nif each had a small fortune secure and independent. Enormous cities\nare, besides, destructive to society, beget vice and disorder of all\nkinds, starve the remoter provinces, and even starve themselves by\nthe prices to which they raise all provisions. Where each man had his\nlittle house and field to himself, and each county had its capital,\nfree and independent, what a happy situation of mankind! How favourable\nto industry and agriculture, to marriage and propagation! The prolific\nvirtue of men, were it to act in its full extent, without that\nrestraint which poverty and necessity imposes on it, would double the\nnumber every generation; and nothing surely can give it more liberty\nthan such small commonwealths, and such an equality of fortune among\nthe citizens. All small states naturally produce equality of fortune\nbecause they afford no opportunities of great increase, but small\ncommonwealths much more by that division of power and authority which\nis essential to them.\n\nWhen Xenophon returned after the famous expedition with Cyrus, he hired\nhimself and 6000 of the Greeks into the service of Seuthes, a prince of\nThrace; and the articles of his agreement were that each soldier should\nreceive a daric a month, each captain two darics, and he himself, as\ngeneral, four; a regulation of pay which would not a little surprise\nour modern officers.\n\nDemosthenes and \u00c6schines, with eight more, were sent ambassadors to\nPhilip of Macedon, and their appointments for above four months\nwere a thousand drachmas, which is less than a drachma a day for each\nambassador. But a drachma a day\u2014nay, sometimes two, was the pay of a\ncommon foot-soldier.\n\nA centurion among the Romans had only double pay to a private man in\nPolybius\u2019s time, and we accordingly find the gratuities after a triumph\nregulated by that proportion. But Mark Anthony and the triumvirate\ngave the centurions five times the reward of the other; so much had\nthe increase of the commonwealth increased the inequality among the\ncitizens.\u200b[56]\n\nIt must be owned that the situation of affairs in modern times with\nregard to civil liberty, as well as equality of fortune, is not near\nso favourable either to the propagation or happiness of mankind.\nEurope is shared out mostly into great monarchies, and such parts of\nit as are divided into small territories are commonly governed by\nabsolute princes, who ruin their people by a mimicry of the greater\nmonarchs in the splendour of their court and number of their forces.\nSwitzerland alone and Holland resemble the ancient republics, and\nthough the former is far from possessing any advantage either of\nsoil, climate, or commerce, yet the numbers of people with which it\nabounds, notwithstanding their enlisting themselves into every service\nin Europe, prove sufficiently the advantages of their political\ninstitutions.\n\nThe ancient republics derived their chief or only security from the\nnumbers of their citizens. The Trachinians having lost great numbers\nof their people, the remainder, instead of enriching themselves by\nthe inheritance of their fellow-citizens, applied to Sparta, their\nmetropolis, for a new stock of inhabitants. The Spartans immediately\ncollected ten thousand men, among whom the old citizens divided the\nlands of which the former proprietors had perished.\n\nAfter Timoleon had banished Dionysius from Syracuse and had\nsettled the affairs of Sicily, finding the cities of Syracuse and\nSellinuntium extremely depopulated by tyranny, war, and faction,\nhe invited over from Greece some new inhabitants to repeople them.\nImmediately forty thousand men (Plutarch says sixty thousand) offered\nthemselves, and he distributed so many lots of land among them, to the\ngreat satisfaction of the ancient inhabitants; a proof at once of the\nmaxims of ancient policy, which affected populousness more than riches,\nand of the good effects of these maxims in the extreme populousness\nof that small country Greece, which could at once supply so large a\ncolony. The case was not much different with the Romans in early times.\n\u201cHe is a pernicious citizen,\u201d said M. Curius, \u201cwho cannot be contented\nwith seven acres.\u201d\u200b[57] Such ideas of equality could not fail of\nproducing great numbers of people.\n\nWe must now consider what disadvantages the ancients lay under with\nregard to populousness, and what checks they received from their\npolitical maxims and institutions. There are commonly compensations in\nevery human condition, and though these compensations be not always\nperfectly equal, yet they serve, at least, to restrain the prevailing\nprinciple. To compare them and estimate their influence is indeed\nvery difficult, even where they take place in the same age, and in\nneighbouring countries; but where several ages have intervened, and\nonly scattered lights are afforded us by ancient authors, what can we\ndo but amuse ourselves by talking, _pro_ and _con_, on an interesting\nsubject, and thereby correcting all hasty and violent determinations?\n\nFirst, we may observe that the ancient republics were almost in\nperpetual war, a natural effect of their martial spirit, their love\nof liberty, their mutual emulation, and that hatred which generally\nprevails among nations that live in a close neighbourhood. Now, war\nin a small state is much more destructive than in a great one, both\nbecause all the inhabitants in the former case must serve in the\narmies, and because the state is all frontier and all exposed to the\ninroads of the enemy.\n\nThe maxims of ancient war were much more destructive than those of\nmodern, chiefly by the distribution of plunder, in which the soldiers\nwere indulged. The private men in our armies are such a low set of\npeople that we find any abundance beyond their simple pay breeds\nconfusion and disorder, and a total dissolution of discipline. The very\nwretchedness and meanness of those who fill the modern armies render\nthem less destructive to the countries which they invade; one instance,\namong many, of the deceitfulness of first appearances in all political\nreasonings.\u200b[58]\n\nAncient battles were much more bloody by the very nature of the weapons\nemployed in them. The ancients drew up their men sixteen or twenty,\nsometimes fifty men deep, which made a narrow front, and it was not\ndifficult to find a field in which both armies might be marshalled and\nmight engage with each other. Even where any body of the troops was\nkept off by hedges, hillocks, woods, or hollow ways, the battle was\nnot so soon decided between the contending parties but that the others\nhad time to overcome the difficulties which opposed them and take part\nin the engagement. And as the whole armies were thus engaged, and each\nman closely buckled to his antagonist, the battles were commonly very\nbloody, and great slaughter was made on both sides, especially on the\nvanquished. The long thin lines required by firearms, and the\nquick decision of the fray, render our modern engagements but partial\nrencounters, and enable the general who is foiled in the beginning\nof the day to draw off the greatest part of his army, sound and\nentire. Could Folard\u2019s project of the column take place (which seems\nimpracticable\u200b[59]) it would render modern battles as destructive as\nthe ancient.\n\nThe battles of antiquity, both by their duration and their resemblance\nof single combats, were wrought up to a degree of fury quite unknown to\nlater ages. Nothing could then engage the combatants to give quarter\nbut the hopes of profit by making slaves of their prisoners. In civil\nwars, as we learn from Tacitus, the battles were the most bloody,\nbecause the prisoners were not slaves.\n\nWhat a stout resistance must be made where the vanquished expected so\nhard a fate! How inveterate the rage where the maxims of war were, in\nevery respect, so bloody and severe!\n\nInstances are very frequent in ancient history of cities besieged whose\ninhabitants, rather than open their gates, murdered their wives and\nchildren, and rushed themselves on a voluntary death, sweetened perhaps\nwith a little prospect of revenge upon the enemy. Greeks as well as\nbarbarians have been often wrought up to this degree of fury. And the\nsame determined spirit and cruelty must, in many other instances less\nremarkable, have been extremely destructive to human society in those\npetty commonwealths which lived in a close neighbourhood, and were\nengaged in perpetual wars and contentions.\n\nSometimes the wars in Greece, says Plutarch, were carried on entirely\nby inroads and robberies and piracies. Such a method of war must be\nmore destructive in small states than the bloodiest battles and sieges.\n\nBy the laws of the twelve tables, possession for two years\nformed a prescription for land; one year for movables;\u200b[60] an\nindication that there was not in Italy during that period much more\norder, tranquillity, and settled police than there is at present among\nthe Tartars.\n\nThe only cartel I remember in ancient history is that between Demetrius\nPoliorcetes and the Rhodians, when it was agreed that a free citizen\nshould be restored for 1000 drachmas, a slave bearing arms for 500.\n\nBut, secondly, it appears that ancient manners were more unfavourable\nthan the modern, not only in times of war but also in those of peace;\nand that too in every respect, except the love of civil liberty and\nequality, which is, I own, of considerable importance. To exclude\nfaction from a free government is very difficult, if not altogether\nimpracticable; but such inveterate rage between the factions and\nsuch bloody maxims are found, in modern times, amongst religious\nparties alone, where bigoted priests are the accusers, judges, and\nexecutioners. In ancient history we may always observe, where one\nparty prevailed, whether the nobles or people (for I can observe no\ndifference in this respect\u200b[61]), that they immediately butchered all\nof the opposite party who fell into their hands, and banished such as\nhad been so fortunate as to escape their fury. No form of process, no\nlaw, no trial, no pardon. A fourth, a third, perhaps near a half of\nthe city were slaughtered or expelled every revolution; and the exiles\nalways joined foreign enemies and did all the mischief possible to\ntheir fellow-citizens, till fortune put it in their power to take full\nrevenge by a new revolution. And as these were very frequent in such\nviolent governments, the disorder, diffidence, jealousy, enmity which\nmust prevail are not easy for us to imagine in this age of the world.\n\nThere are only two revolutions I can recollect in ancient history\nwhich passed without great severity and great effusion of blood in\nmassacres and assassinations\u2014viz., the restoration of the Athenian\ndemocracy by Thrasybulus, and the subduing the Roman republic by\nC\u00e6sar. We learn from ancient history that Thrasybulus passed a general\namnesty for all past offences, and first introduced that word as well\nas practice into Greece. It appears, however, from many orations of\nLysias, that the chief, and even some of the subaltern offenders in\nthe preceding tyranny were tried and capitally punished. This is a\ndifficulty not cleared up, and even not observed by antiquarians and\nhistorians. And as to C\u00e6sar\u2019s clemency, though much celebrated, it\nwould not gain great applause in the present age. He butchered, for\ninstance, all Cato\u2019s senate, when he became master of Utica; and these,\nwe may readily believe, were not the most worthless of the party. All\nthose who had borne arms against that usurper were forfeited, and, by\nHirtius\u2019s law, declared incapable of all public offices.\n\nThese people were extremely fond of liberty, but seem not to have\nunderstood it very well. When the Thirty Tyrants first established\ntheir dominion at Athens, they began with seizing all the sycophants\nand informers who had been so troublesome during the Democracy, and\nputting them to death by an arbitrary sentence and execution. \u201cEvery\nman,\u201d says Sallust and Lysias,\u200b[62] \u201crejoiced at these punishments;\u201d\nnot considering that liberty was from that moment annihilated.\n\nThe utmost energy of the nervous style of Thucydides, and the\ncopiousness and expression of the Greek language, seem to sink under\nthat historian when he attempts to describe the disorders which arose\nfrom faction throughout all the Greek commonwealths. You would\nimagine that he still labours with a thought greater than he can find\nwords to communicate, and he concludes his pathetic description with\nan observation which is at once very refined and very solid. \u201cIn\nthese contests,\u201d says he, \u201cthose who were dullest and most stupid,\nand had the least foresight, commonly prevailed; for being conscious\nof this weakness, and dreading to be over-reached by those of greater\npenetration, they went to work hastily, without premeditation, by the\nsword and poniard, and thereby prevented their antagonists, who were\nforming fine schemes and projects for their destruction.\u201d\u200b[63]\n\nNot to mention Dionysius the elder, who is computed to have butchered\nin cold blood above 10,000 of his fellow-citizens, nor Agathocles,\nNabis, and others still more bloody than he, the transactions, even in\nfree governments, were extremely violent and destructive. At Athens,\nthe Thirty Tyrants and the nobles in a twelvemonth murdered, without\ntrial, about 1200 of the people, and banished above the half of the\ncitizens that remained.\u200b[64] In Argos, near the same time, the people\nkilled 1200 of the nobles, and afterwards their own demagogues, because\nthey had refused to carry their prosecutions further. The people also\nin Corcyra killed 1500 of the nobles and banished a thousand. These\nnumbers will appear the more surprising if we consider the\nextreme smallness of these states. But all ancient history is full of\nsuch instances.\u200b[65]\n\nWhen Alexander ordered all the exiles to be restored through all the\ncities, it was found that the whole amounted to 20,000 men, the remains\nprobably of still greater slaughters and massacres. What an astonishing\nmultitude in so narrow a country as ancient Greece! And what domestic\nconfusion, jealousy, partiality, revenge, heart-burnings must tear\nthose cities, where factions were wrought up to such a degree of fury\nand despair!\n\n\u201cIt would be easier,\u201d says Isocrates to Philip, \u201cto raise an\narmy in Greece at present from the vagabonds than from the cities.\u201d\n\nEven where affairs came not to such extremities (which they failed not\nto do almost in every city twice or thrice every century), property was\nrendered very precarious by the maxims of ancient government. Xenophon,\nin the banquet of Socrates, gives us a very natural, unaffected\ndescription of the tyranny of the Athenian people. \u201cIn my poverty,\u201d\nsays Charmides, \u201cI am much more happy than ever I was while possessed\nof riches; as much as it is happier to be in security than in terrors,\nfree than a slave, to receive than to pay court, to be trusted than\nsuspected. Formerly I was obliged to caress every informer, some\nimposition was continually laid upon me, and it was never allowed me to\ntravel or be absent from the city. At present, when I am poor, I look\nbig and threaten others. The rich are afraid of me, and show me every\nkind of civility and respect, and I am become a kind of tyrant in the\ncity.\u201d\n\nIn one of the pleadings of Lysias, the orator very coolly speaks of it,\nby the by, as a maxim of the Athenian people, that whenever they wanted\nmoney they put to death some of the rich citizens as well as strangers,\nfor the sake of the forfeiture. In mentioning this, he seems to have no\nintention of blaming them, still less of provoking them who were his\naudience and judges.\n\nWhether a man was a citizen or a stranger among that people, it seems\nindeed requisite either that he should impoverish himself or the people\nwould impoverish him, and perhaps kill him into the bargain. The orator\nlast mentioned gives a pleasant account of an estate laid out in the\npublic service\u200b[66]\u2014that is, above the third of it in raree-shows and\nfigured dances.\n\nI need not insist on the Greek tyrannies, which were altogether\nhorrible. Even the mixed monarchies, by which most of the ancient\nstates of Greece were governed before the introduction of republics,\nwere very unsettled. Scarce any city but Athens, says Isocrates, could\nshow a succession of kings for four or five generations.\n\nBesides many other obvious reasons for the instability of ancient\nmonarchies, the equal division of property among the brothers in\nprivate families must, by a necessary consequence, contribute to\nunsettle and disturb the state. The universal preference given to the\nelder by modern laws, though it increases the inequality of fortunes,\nhas, however, this good effect, that it accustoms men to the same idea\nof public succession, and cuts off all claim and pretension of the\nyounger.\n\nThe new settled colony of Heraclea, falling immediately into factions,\napplied to Sparta, who sent Heripidas with full authority to quiet\ntheir dissensions. This man, not provoked by any opposition, not\ninflamed by party rage, knew no better expedient than immediately\nputting to death about 500 of the citizens. A strong proof how deeply\nrooted these violent maxims of government were throughout all Greece.\n\nIf such was the disposition of men\u2019s minds among that refined people,\nwhat may be expected in the commonwealths of Italy, Africa, Spain, and\nGaul, which were denominated barbarous? Why otherwise did the Greeks\nso much value themselves on their humanity, gentleness, and moderation\nabove all other nations? This reasoning seems very natural; but\nunluckily the history of the Roman commonwealth in its earlier times,\nif we give credit to the received accounts, stands against us. No blood\nwas ever shed in any sedition at Rome till the murder of the Gracchi.\nDionysius Halicarnass\u00e6us, observing the singular humanity of the Roman\npeople in this particular, makes use of it as an argument that they\nwere originally of Grecian extraction; whence we may conclude that the\nfactions and revolutions in the barbarous republics were usually more\nviolent than even those of Greece above mentioned.\n\nIf the Romans were so late in coming to blows, they made ample\ncompensation after they had once entered upon the bloody scene; and\nAppian\u2019s history of their civil wars contains the most frightful\npicture of massacres, proscriptions, and forfeitures that ever was\npresented to the world. What pleases most in that historian is that he\nseems to feel a proper resentment of these barbarous proceedings, and\ntalks not with that provoking coolness and indifference which custom\nhad produced in many of the Greek historians.\u200b[67]\n\nThe maxims of ancient politics contain, in general, so little humanity\nand moderation that it seems superfluous to give any particular reason\nfor the violences committed at any particular period; yet I cannot\nforbear observing that the laws in the latter ages of the Roman\ncommonwealth were so absurdly contrived that they obliged the heads of\nparties to have recourse to these extremities. All capital punishments\nwere abolished. However criminal, or, what is more, however dangerous\nany citizen might be, he could not regularly be punished otherwise than\nby banishment; and it became necessary in the revolutions of party to\ndraw the sword of private vengeance; nor was it easy, when laws were\nonce violated, to set bounds to these sanguinary proceedings. Had\nBrutus himself prevailed over the Triumvirate, could he, in common\nprudence, have allowed Octavius and Anthony to live, and have contented\nhimself with banishing them to Rhodes or Marseilles, where they might\nstill have plotted new commotions and rebellions? His executing C.\nAntonius, brother to the Triumvir, shows evidently his sense of the\nmatter. Did not Cicero, with the approbation of all the wise and\nvirtuous of Rome, arbitrarily put to death Catiline\u2019s associates\ncontrary to law and without any trial or form of process? And if he\nmoderated his executions, did it not proceed either from the clemency\nof his temper or the conjunctures of the times? A wretched security in\na government which pretends to laws and liberty!\n\nThus, one extreme produces another. In the same manner as excessive\nseverity in the laws is apt to beget great relaxation in their\nexecution, so their excessive lenity naturally produces cruelty and\nbarbarity. It is dangerous to force us, in any case, to pass their\nsacred boundaries.\n\nOne general cause of the disorders so frequent in all ancient\ngovernments seems to have consisted in the great difficulty of\nestablishing any aristocracy in those ages, and the perpetual\ndiscontents and seditions of the people whenever even the meanest\nand most beggarly were excluded from the legislature and from public\noffices. The very quality of freeman gave such a rank, being opposed\nto that of slave, that it seemed to entitle the possessor to every\npower and privilege of the commonwealth. Solon\u2019s laws excluded no\nfreeman from votes or elections, but confined some magistracies to a\nparticular census; yet were the people never satisfied till those laws\nwere repealed. By the treaty with Antipater, no Athenian had a vote\nwhose census was less than 2000 drachmas (about \u00a360 sterling). And\nthough such a government would to us appear sufficiently democratical,\nit was so disagreeable to that people that above two-thirds of them\nimmediately left their country. Cassander reduced that census to the\nhalf, yet still the government was considered as an oligarchical\ntyranny and the effect of foreign violence.\n\nServius Tullius\u2019s laws seem very equal and reasonable, by fixing the\npower in proportion to the property, yet the Roman people could never\nbe brought quietly to submit to them.\n\nIn those days there was no medium between a severe, jealous\naristocracy, ruling over discontented subjects, and a turbulent,\nfactious, tyrannical democracy.\n\nBut, thirdly, there are many other circumstances in which ancient\nnations seem inferior to the modern, both for the happiness and\nincrease of mankind. Trade, manufactures, industry were nowhere in\nformer ages so flourishing as they are at present in Europe. The only\ngarb of the ancients, both for males and females, seems to have been\na kind of flannel which they wore commonly white or gray, and which\nthey scoured as often as it grew dirty. Tyre, which carried on, after\nCarthage, the greatest commerce of any city in the Mediterranean\nbefore it was destroyed by Alexander, was no mighty city, if we credit\nArrian\u2019s account of its inhabitants.\u200b[68] Athens is commonly\nsupposed to have been a trading city; but it was as populous before the\nMedian War as at any time after it, according to Herodotus,\u200b[69] and\nyet its commerce at that time was so inconsiderable that, as the same\nhistorian observes, even the neighbouring coasts of Asia were as little\nfrequented by the Greeks as the Pillars of Hercules\u2014for beyond these he\nconceived nothing.\n\nGreat interest of money and great profits of trade are an infallible\nindication that industry and commerce are but in their infancy. We\nread in Lysias of 100 per cent. profit made of a cargo of two talents,\nsent to no greater distance than from Athens to the Adriatic. Nor is\nthis mentioned as an instance of exorbitant profit. Antidorus, says\nDemosthenes, paid three talents and a half for a house which he let at\na talent a year; and the orator blames his own tutors for not employing\nhis money to like advantage. \u201cMy fortune,\u201d says he, \u201cin eleven years\nminority ought to have been tripled.\u201d The value of twenty of the slaves\nleft by his father he computes at 40 minas, and the yearly profit of\ntheir labour at 12. The most moderate interest at Athens (for there\nwas higher often paid) was 12 per cent., and that paid monthly. Not to\ninsist upon the exorbitant interest of 34 per cent. to which the vast\nsums distributed in elections had raised money at Rome, we find that\nVerres, before that factious period, stated 24 per cent. for money,\nwhich he left in the publicans\u2019 hands. And though Cicero declaims\nagainst this article, it is not on account of the extravagant usury,\nbut because it had never been customary to state any interest on such\noccasions. Interest, indeed, sunk at Rome after the settlement of the\nempire; but it never remained any considerable time so low as\nin the commercial states of modern ages.\n\nAmong the other inconveniences which the Athenians felt from the\nfortifying Decelia by the Lacedemonians, it is represented by\nThucydides as one of the most considerable that they could not bring\nover their corn from Eubea by land, passing by Oropus; but were\nobliged to embark it and to sail about the promontory of Sunium\u2014a\nsurprising instance of the imperfection of ancient navigation, for the\nwater-carriage is not here above double the land.\n\nI do not remember any passage in any ancient author where the growth\nof any city is ascribed to the establishment of a manufacture. The\ncommerce which is said to flourish is chiefly the exchange of those\ncommodities for which different soils and climates were suited. The\nsale of wine and oil into Africa, according to Diodorus Siculus, was\nthe foundation of the riches of Agrigentum. The situation of the city\nof Sybaris, according to the same author, was the cause of its immense\npopulousness, being built near the two rivers, Crathys and Sybaris. But\nthese two rivers, we may observe, are not navigable, and could only\nproduce some fertile valleys for agriculture and husbandry\u2014an advantage\nso inconsiderable that a modern writer would scarcely have taken notice\nof it.\n\nThe barbarity of the ancient tyrants, together with the extreme\nlove of liberty which animated those ages, must have banished every\nmerchant and manufacturer, and have quite depopulated the state, had it\nsubsisted upon industry and commerce. While the cruel and suspicious\nDionysius was carrying on his butcheries, who that was not detained\nby his landed property, and could have carried with him any art or\nskill to procure a subsistence in other countries, would have remained\nexposed to such implacable barbarity? The persecutions of Philip II.\nand Louis XIV. filled all Europe with the manufacturers of Flanders and\nof France.\n\nI grant that agriculture is the species of industry which is chiefly\nrequisite to the subsistence of multitudes, and it is possible that\nthis industry may flourish even where manufactures and other\narts are unknown and neglected. Switzerland is at present a very\nremarkable instance, where we find at once the most skilful husbandmen\nand the most bungling tradesmen that are to be met with in all Europe.\nThat agriculture flourished in Greece and Italy, at least in some parts\nof them, and at some periods, we have reason to presume; and whether\nthe mechanical arts had reached the same degree of perfection may not\nbe esteemed so material, especially if we consider the great equality\nin the ancient republics, where each family was obliged to cultivate\nwith the greatest care and industry its own little field in order to\nits subsistence.\n\nBut is it just reasoning, because agriculture may in some instances\nflourish without trade or manufactures, to conclude that, in any great\nextent of country and for any great tract of time, it would subsist\nalone? The most natural way surely of encouraging husbandry is first to\nexcite other kinds of industry, and thereby afford the labourer a ready\nmarket for his commodities and a return of such goods as may contribute\nto his pleasure and enjoyment. This method is infallible and universal,\nand as it prevails more in modern government than in the ancient, it\naffords a presumption of the superior populousness of the former.\n\nEvery man, says Xenophon, may be a farmer; no art or skill is\nrequisite: all consists in the industry and attention to the execution.\nA strong proof, as Columella hints, that agriculture was but little\nknown in the age of Xenophon.\n\nAll our later improvements and refinements, have they operated\nnothing towards the easy subsistence of men, and consequently towards\ntheir propagation and increase? Our superior skill in mechanics, the\ndiscovery of new worlds, by which commerce has been so much enlarged,\nthe establishment of posts, and the use of bills of exchange: these\nseem all extremely useful to the encouragement of art, industry, and\npopulousness. Were we to strike off these, what a check should we give\nto every kind of business and labour, and what multitudes of families\nwould immediately perish from want and hunger! And it seems not\nprobable that we could supply the place of these new inventions\nby any other regulation or institution.\n\nHave we reason to think that the police of ancient states was any wise\ncomparable to that of modern, or that men had then equal security\neither at home or in their journeys by land or water? I question not\nbut every impartial examiner would give us the preference in this\nparticular.\n\nThus, upon comparing the whole, it seems impossible to assign any just\nreason why the world should have been more populous in ancient than in\nmodern times. The equality of property among the ancients, liberty,\nand the small divisions of their states, were indeed favourable to\nthe propagation of mankind; but their wars were more bloody and\ndestructive, their governments more factious and unsettled, commerce\nand manufactures more feeble and languishing, and the general police\nmore loose and irregular. These latter disadvantages seem to form a\nsufficient counterbalance to the former advantages, and rather favour\nthe opposite opinion to that which commonly prevails with regard to\nthis subject.\n\nBut there is no reasoning, it may be said, against matter of fact. If\nit appear that the world was then more populous than at present, we may\nbe assured that our conjectures are false, and that we have overlooked\nsome material circumstance in the comparison. This I readily own: all\nour preceding reasonings I acknowledge to be mere trifling, or, at\nleast, small skirmishes and frivolous rencounters which decide nothing.\nBut unluckily the main combat, where we compare facts, cannot be\nrendered much more decisive. The facts delivered by ancient authors are\neither so uncertain or so imperfect as to afford us nothing positive\nin this matter. How indeed could it be otherwise? The very facts which\nwe must oppose to them in computing the greatness of modern states are\nfar from being either certain or complete. Many grounds of calculation\nproceeded on by celebrated writers are little better than those of the\nEmperor Heliogabalus, who formed an estimate of the immense greatness\nof Rome from ten thousand pound weight of cobwebs which had been found\nin that city.\n\nIt is to be remarked that all kinds of numbers are uncertain in ancient\nmanuscripts, and have been subject to much greater corruptions than\nany other part of the text, and that for a very obvious reason. Any\nalteration in other places commonly affects the sense or grammar, and\nis more readily perceived by the reader and transcriber.\n\nFew enumerations of inhabitants have been made of any tract of country\nby any ancient author of good authority so as to afford us a large\nenough view for comparison.\n\nIt is probable that there was formerly a good foundation for the number\nof citizens assigned to any free city, because they entered for a share\nof the government, and there were exact registers kept of them. But as\nthe number of slaves is seldom mentioned, this leaves us in as great\nuncertainty as ever with regard to the populousness even of single\ncities.\n\nThe first page of Thucydides is, in my opinion, the commencement of\nreal history. All preceding narrations are so intermixed with fable\nthat philosophers ought to abandon them, in a great measure, to the\nembellishment of poets and orators.\u200b[70]\n\nWith regard to remote times, the numbers of people assigned are often\nridiculous, and lose all credit and authority. The free citizens of\nSybaris, able to bear arms and actually drawn out in battle, were\n300,000. They encountered at Siagra with 100,000 citizens of Crotona,\nanother Greek city contiguous to them, and were defeated. This is\nDiodorus Siculus\u2019s account, and is very seriously insisted on by\nthat historian. Strabo also mentions the same number of Sybarites.\n\nDiodorus Siculus, enumerating the inhabitants of Agrigentum, when it\nwas destroyed by the Carthaginians, says that they amounted to 20,000\ncitizens, 200,000 strangers, besides slaves, who, in so opulent a\ncity as he represents it, would probably be at least as numerous. We\nmust remark that the women and the children are not included, and\nthat therefore, upon the whole, the city must have contained near two\nmillions of inhabitants.\u200b[71] And what was the reason of so immense an\nincrease! They were very industrious in cultivating the neighbouring\nfields, not exceeding a small English county; and they traded with\ntheir wine and oil to Africa, which, at that time, had none of these\ncommodities.\n\nPtolemy, says Theocritus, commanded 33,339 cities. I suppose the\nsingularity of the number was the reason of assigning it. Diodorus\nSiculus assigns three millions of inhabitants to Egypt, a very small\nnumber; but then he makes the number of their cities amount to\n18,000\u2014an evident contradiction.\n\nHe says the people were formerly seven millions. Thus remote times are\nalways most envied and admired.\n\nThat Xerxes\u2019s army was extremely numerous I can readily believe, both\nfrom the great extent of his empire and from the foolish practice\nof the Eastern nations of encumbering their camp with a superfluous\nmultitude; but will any rational man cite Herodotus\u2019s wonderful\nnarrations as an authority? There is something very rational, I own,\nin Lysias\u2019s argument upon this subject. Had not Xerxes\u2019 army been\nincredibly numerous, says he, he had never built a bridge over the\nHellespont: it had been much easier to have transported his men over so\nshort a passage, with the numerous shipping of which he was master.\n\nPolybius says that the Romans, between the first and second Punic Wars,\nbeing threatened with an invasion from the Gauls, mustered all\ntheir own forces and those of their allies, and found them amount to\nseven hundred thousand men able to bear arms. A great number surely,\nand which, when joined to the slaves, is probably not less, if not\nrather more than that extent of country affords at present.\u200b[72] The\nenumeration too seems to have been made with some exactness, and\nPolybius gives us the detail of the particulars; but might not the\nnumber be imagined in order to encourage the people?\n\nDiodorus Siculus makes the same enumeration amount to near a million.\nThese variations are suspicious. He plainly, too, supposes that Italy\nin his time was not so populous, another very suspicious circumstance;\nfor who can believe that the inhabitants of that country diminished\nfrom the time of the first Punic War to that of the Triumvirates?\n\nJulius C\u00e6sar, according to Appian, encountered four millions of Gauls,\nkilled one million, and took another million prisoners.\u200b[73] Supposing\nthe number of the enemy\u2019s army and of the killed could be exactly\nassigned, which never is possible, how could it be known how often the\nsame man returned into the armies, or how distinguish the new from the\nold levied soldiers? No attention ought ever to be given to such loose,\nexaggerated calculations; especially where the author tells us not the\nmediums upon which the calculations were founded.\n\nPaterculus makes the number killed by C\u00e6sar amount only to 400,000: a\nmuch more probable account, and more easily reconciled to the history\nof these wars given by that conqueror himself in his _Commentaries_.\n\nOne would imagine that every circumstance of the life and actions of\nDionysius the elder might be regarded as authentic and free from all\nfabulous exaggeration, both because he lived at a time when\nletters flourished most in Greece and because his chief historian was\nPhilistus, a man allowed to be of great genius, and who was a courtier\nand minister of that prince. But can we admit that he had a standing\narmy of 100,000 foot, 10,000 horse, and a fleet of 400 galleys? These,\nwe may observe, were mercenary forces, and subsisted upon their pay,\nlike our armies in Europe. For the citizens were all disarmed; and\nwhen Dion afterwards invaded Sicily and called on his countrymen to\nvindicate their liberty, he was obliged to bring arms along with him,\nwhich he distributed among those who joined him. In a state where\nagriculture alone flourishes there may be many inhabitants, and if\nthese be all armed and disciplined, a great force may be called out\nupon occasion; but great numbers of mercenary troops can never be\nmaintained without either trade and manufactures, or very extensive\ndominions. The United Provinces never were masters of such a force by\nsea and land as that which is said to belong to Dionysius; yet they\npossess as large a territory, perfectly well cultivated, and have\ninfinitely more resources from their commerce and industry. Diodorus\nSiculus allows that, even in his time, the army of Dionysius appeared\nincredible; that is, as I interpret it, it was entirely a fiction, and\nthe opinion arose from the exaggerated flattery of the courtiers, and\nperhaps from the vanity and policy of the tyrant himself.\n\nIt is a very usual fallacy to consider all the ages of antiquity\nas one period, and to compute the numbers contained in the great\ncities mentioned by ancient authors as if these cities had been all\ncontemporary. The Greek colonies flourished extremely in Sicily during\nthe age of Alexander; but in Augustus\u2019s time they were so decayed that\nalmost all the product of that fertile island was consumed in Italy.\n\nLet us now examine the numbers of inhabitants assigned to particular\ncities in antiquity, and omitting the numbers of Nineveh, Babylon,\nand the Egyptian Thebes, let us confine ourselves to the sphere of\nreal history, to the Grecian and Roman states. I must own, the\nmore I consider this subject the more am I inclined to scepticism with\nregard to the great populousness ascribed to ancient times.\n\nAthens is said by Plato to be a very great city; and it was surely\nthe greatest of all the Greek\u200b[74] cities, except Syracuse, which\nwas nearly about the same size in Thucydides\u2019 time, and afterwards\nincreased beyond it; for Cicero\u200b[75] mentions it as the greatest of\nall the Greek cities in his time, not comprehending, I suppose, either\nAntioch or Alexandria under that denomination. Athen\u00e6us says that, by\nthe enumeration of Demetrius Phalereus, there were in Athens 21,000\ncitizens, 10,000 strangers, and 400,000 slaves. This number is very\nmuch insisted on by those whose opinion I call in question, and is\nesteemed a fundamental fact to their purpose; but, in my opinion, there\nis no point of criticism more certain than that Athen\u00e6us and Ctesicles,\nwhom he cites, are here mistaken, and that the number of slaves is\naugmented by a whole cypher, and ought not to be regarded as more than\n40,000.\n\nFirstly, when the number of citizens is said to be 21,000 by\nAthen\u00e6us,\u200b[76] men of full age are only understood. For (1) Herodotus\nsays that Aristagoras, ambassador from the Ionians, found it harder\nto deceive one Spartan than 30,000 Athenians, meaning in a loose way\nthe whole state, supposed to be met in one popular assembly, excluding\nthe women and children. (2) Thucydides says that, making allowance\nfor all the absentees in the fleet, army, garrisons, and for people\nemployed in their private affairs, the Athenian Assembly never rose to\nfive thousand. (3) The forces enumerated by the same historian,\u200b[77]\nbeing all citizens, and amounting to 13,000 heavy-armed infantry,\nprove the same method of calculation, as also the whole tenor\nof the Greek historians, who always understand men of full age when\nthey assign the number of citizens in any republic. Now, these being\nbut the fourth of the inhabitants, the free Athenians were by this\naccount 84,000, the strangers 40,000, and the slaves, calculating by\nthe smaller number, and allowing that they married and propagated at\nthe same rate with freemen, were 160,000, and the whole inhabitants\n284,000\u2014a large enough number surely. The other number, 1,720,000,\nmakes Athens larger than London and Paris united.\n\nSecondly, there were but 10,000 houses in Athens.\n\nThirdly, though the extent of the walls, as given us by Thucydides, be\ngreat (viz., eighteen miles, beside the sea-coast), yet Xenophon says\nthere was much waste ground within the walls. They seemed indeed to\nhave joined four distinct and separate cities.\u200b[78]\n\nFourthly, no insurrection of the slaves, nor suspicion of insurrection,\nare ever mentioned by historians, except one commotion of the miners.\n\nFifthly, the Athenians\u2019 treatment of their slaves is said by Xenophon,\nand Demosthenes, and Plautus to have been extremely gentle and\nindulgent, which could never have been the case had the disproportion\nbeen twenty to one. The disproportion is not so great in any of our\ncolonies, and yet we are obliged to exercise a very rigorous military\ngovernment over the negroes.\n\nSixthly, no man is ever esteemed rich for possessing what may be\nreckoned an equal distribution of property in any country, or\neven triple or quadruple that wealth. Thus, every person in England is\ncomputed by some to spend sixpence a day; yet is he estimated but poor\nwho has five times that sum. Now, Timarchus is said by \u00c6schines to have\nbeen left in easy circumstances, but he was master only of ten slaves\nemployed in manufactures. Lysias and his brother, two strangers, were\nproscribed by the Thirty for their great riches, though they had but\nsixty apiece. Demosthenes was left very rich by his father, yet he had\nno more than fifty-two slaves. His workhouse, of twenty cabinet-makers,\nis said to have been a very considerable manufactory.\n\nSeventhly, during the Decelian War, as the Greek historians call it,\n20,000 slaves deserted and brought the Athenians to great distress, as\nwe learn from Thucydides. This could not have happened had they been\nonly the twentieth part. The best slaves would not desert.\n\nEighthly, Xenophon proposes a scheme for entertaining by the public\n10,000 slaves. \u201cAnd that so great a number may possibly be supported\nany one will be convinced,\u201d says he, \u201cwho considers the numbers we\npossessed before the Decelian War\u201d\u2014a way of speaking altogether\nincompatible with the larger number of Athen\u00e6us.\n\nNinthly, the whole census of the state of Athens was less than 6000\ntalents; and though numbers in ancient manuscripts be often suspected\nby critics, yet this is unexceptionable, both because Demosthenes, who\ngives it, gives also the detail, which checks him, and because Polybius\nassigns the same number and reasons upon it. Now, the most vulgar\nslave could yield by his labour an obolus a day, over and above his\nmaintenance, as we learn from Xenophon, who says that Nicias\u2019s overseer\npaid his master so much for slaves, whom he employed in digging of\nmines. If you will take the pains to estimate an obolus a day and the\nslaves at 400,000, computing only at four years\u2019 purchase, you will\nfind the sum above 12,000 talents, even though allowance be made for\nthe great number of holidays in Athens. Besides, many of the slaves\nwould have a much greater value from their art. The lowest\nthat Demosthenes estimates any of his father\u2019s slaves is two minas a\nhead; and upon this supposition it is a little difficult, I confess,\nto reconcile even the number of 40,000 slaves with the census of 6000\ntalents.\n\nTenthly, Chios is said by Thucydides to contain more slaves than\nany Greek city except Sparta. Sparta then had more than Athens, in\nproportion to the number of citizens. The Spartans were 9000 in the\ntown, 30,000 in the country. The male slaves, therefore, of full age,\nmust have been more than 780,000; the whole more than 3,120,000\u2014a\nnumber impossible to be maintained in a narrow barren country such as\nLaconia, which had no trade. Had the Helotes been so very numerous,\nthe murder of 2000 mentioned by Thucydides would have irritated them\nwithout weakening them.\n\nBesides, we are to consider that the number assigned by Athen\u00e6us,\u200b[79]\nwhatever it is, comprehends all the inhabitants of Attica as well as\nthose of Athens. The Athenians affected much a country life, as we\nlearn from Thucydides, and when they were all chased into town by the\ninvasion of their territory during the Peloponnesian War, the city\nwas not able to contain them, and they were obliged to lie in the\nporticoes, temples, and even streets, for want of lodging.\n\nThe same remark is to be extended to all the other Greek cities, and\nwhen the number of the citizens is assigned we must always understand\nit of the inhabitants of the neighbouring country as well as of the\ncity. Yet, even with this allowance, it must be confessed that Greece\nwas a populous country and exceeded what we could imagine of so narrow\na territory, naturally not very fertile, and which drew no supplies of\ncorn from other places; for, excepting Athens, which traded\nto Pontus for that commodity, the other cities seem to have subsisted\nchiefly from their neighbouring territory.\u200b[80]\n\nRhodes is well known to have been a city of extensive commerce and of\ngreat fame and splendour, yet it contained only 6000 citizens able to\nbear arms when it was besieged by Demetrius.\n\nThebes was always one of the capital cities of Greece, but the number\nof its citizens exceeded not those of Rhodes.\u200b[81] Phliasia is said\nto be a small city by Xenophon, yet we find that it contained\n6000 citizens. I pretend not to reconcile these two facts. Perhaps\nXenophon calls Phliasia a small town because it made but a small figure\nin Greece and maintained only a subordinate alliance with Sparta;\nor perhaps the country belonging to it was extensive, and most of\nthe citizens were employed in the cultivation of it and dwelt in the\nneighbouring villages.\n\nMantinea was equal to any city in Arcadia, consequently it was equal\nto Megalopolis, which was fifty stadia, or sixty miles and a quarter\nin circumference. But Mantinea had only 3000 citizens. The Greek\ncities, therefore, contained often fields and gardens, together with\nthe houses, and we cannot judge of them by the extent of their walls.\nAthens contained no more than 10,000 houses, yet its walls, with the\nsea-coast, were about twenty miles in extent. Syracuse was twenty-two\nmiles in circumference, yet was scarcely ever spoken of by the\nancients as more populous than Athens. Babylon was a square of fifteen\nmiles, or sixty miles in circuit; but it contained large cultivated\nfields and enclosures, as we learn from Pliny. Though Aurelian\u2019s wall\nwas fifty miles in circumference, the circuit of all the thirteen\ndivisions of Rome, taken apart, according to Publius Victor, was only\nabout forty-three miles. When an enemy invaded the country all the\ninhabitants retired within the walls of the ancient cities, with their\ncattle and furniture and instruments of husbandry, and the great height\nto which the walls were raised enabled a small number to defend them\nwith facility.\n\n\u201cSparta,\u201d says Xenophon,\u200b[82] \u201cis one of the cities of Greece that has\nthe fewest inhabitants.\u201d Yet Polybius says that it was forty-eight\nstadia in circumference, and was round.\n\nAll the \u00c6tolians able to bear arms in Antipater\u2019s time, deducting some\nfew garrisons, were but ten thousand men.\n\nPolybius tells us that the Ach\u00e6an league might, without any\ninconvenience, march thirty or forty thousand men; and this account\nseems very probable, for that league comprehended the greatest\npart of Peloponnesus. Yet Pausanias, speaking of the same period, says\nthat all the Ach\u00e6ans able to bear arms, even when several manumitted\nslaves were joined to them, did not amount to fifteen thousand.\n\nThe Thessalians, till their final conquest by the Romans, were in all\nages turbulent, factious, seditious, disorderly. It is not, therefore,\nnatural to suppose that that part of Greece abounded much in people.\n\nWe are told by Thucydides that the part of Peloponnesus adjoining to\nPylos was desert and uncultivated. Herodotus says that Macedonia was\nfull of lions and wild bulls, animals which can only inhabit vast\nunpeopled forests. These were the two extremities of Greece.\n\nAll the inhabitants of Epirus, of all ages, sexes, and conditions, who\nwere sold by Paulus \u00c6milius, amounted only to 150,000. Yet Epirus might\nbe double the extent of Yorkshire.\n\nJustin tells us that when Philip of Macedon was declared head of the\nGreek confederacy he called a congress of all the states, except the\nLacedemonians, who refused to concur; and he found the force of the\nwhole, upon computation, to amount to 200,000 infantry and 15,000\ncavalry. This must be understood to be all the citizens capable of\nbearing arms, for as the Greek republics maintained no mercenary\nforces, and had no militia distinct from the whole body of the\ncitizens, it is not conceivable what other medium there could be of\ncomputation. That such an army could ever by Greece be brought into\nthe field, and could be maintained there, is contrary to all history.\nUpon this supposition, therefore, we may thus reason. The free Greeks\nof all ages and sexes were 860,000. The slaves, estimating them by\nthe number of Athenian slaves as above, who seldom married or had\nfamilies, were double the male citizens of full age\u2014viz., 430,000.\nAnd all the inhabitants of ancient Greece, excepting Laconia, were\nabout 1,290,000\u2014no mighty number, nor exceeding what may be found at\npresent in Scotland, a country of nearly the same extent, and very\nindifferently peopled.\n\nWe may now consider the numbers of people in Rome and Italy, and\ncollect all the lights afforded us by scattered passages in ancient\nauthors. We shall find, upon the whole, a great difficulty in fixing\nany opinion on that head, and no reason to support those exaggerated\ncalculations so much insisted on by modern writers.\n\nDionysius Halicarnass\u00e6us says that the ancient walls of Rome were\nnearly of the same compass with those of Athens, but that the suburbs\nran out to a great extent, and it was difficult to tell where the town\nended or the country began. In some places of Rome, it appears from\nthe same author, from Juvenal, and from other ancient writers,\u200b[83]\nthat the houses were high, and families lived in separate storeys,\none above another; but it is probable that these were only the poorer\ncitizens, and only in some few streets. If we may judge from the\nyounger Pliny\u2019s\u200b[84] account of his house, and from Bartoli\u2019s plans\nof ancient buildings, the men of quality had very spacious palaces;\nand their buildings were like the Chinese houses at this day, where\neach apartment is separated from the rest, and rises no higher\nthan a single storey. To which, if we add that the Roman nobility much\naffected porticoes, and even woods, in town, we may perhaps allow\nVossius (though there is no manner of reason for it) to read the famous\npassage of the elder Pliny\u200b[85] his own way, without admitting\nthe extravagant consequences which he draws from it.\n\nThe number of citizens who received corn by the public distribution\nin Augustus\u2019s time was 200,000. This one would esteem a pretty certain\nground of calculation, yet it is attended with such circumstances as\nthrow us back into doubt and uncertainty.\n\nDid the poorer citizens only receive the distribution? It was\ncalculated, to be sure, chiefly for their benefit; but it appears from\na passage in Cicero that the rich might also take their portion, and\nthat it was esteemed no reproach in them to apply for it.\n\nTo whom was the corn given\u2014whether only to heads of families, or to\nevery man, woman, and child? The portion every month was five modii to\neach (about five-sixths of a bushel). This was too little for a family,\nand too much for an individual. A very accurate antiquarian therefore\ninfers that it was given to every man of full years, but he allows the\nmatter to be uncertain.\n\nWas it strictly inquired whether the claimant lived within the\nprecincts of Rome, or was it sufficient that he presented himself at\nthe monthly distribution? This last seems more probable.\u200b[86]\n\nWere there no false claimants? We are told that C\u00e6sar struck off at\nonce 170,000, who had crept in without a just title; and it is very\nlittle probable that he remedied all abuses.\n\nBut, lastly, what proportion of slaves must we assign to these\ncitizens? This is the most material question, and the most uncertain.\nIt is very doubtful whether Athens can be established as a rule for\nRome. Perhaps the Athenians had more slaves, because they employed\nthem in manufactures, for which a capital city like Rome seems not so\nproper. Perhaps, on the other hand, the Romans had more slaves, on\naccount of their superior luxury and riches.\n\nThere were exact bills of mortality kept at Rome; but no ancient\nauthor has given us the number of burials, except Suetonius, who tells\nus that in one season there were 30,000 dead carried into the temple\nof Libetina; but this was during a plague, which can afford no certain\nfoundation for any inference.\n\nThe public corn, though distributed only to 200,000 citizens,\naffected very considerably the whole agriculture of Italy, a fact\nno way reconcilable to some modern exaggerations with regard to the\ninhabitants of that country.\n\nThe best ground of conjecture I can find concerning the greatness\nof ancient Rome is this: We are told by Herodian that Antioch and\nAlexandria were very little inferior to Rome. It appears from Diodorus\nSiculus that one straight street of Alexandria, reaching from port to\nport, was five miles long; and as Alexandria was much more extended in\nlength than breadth, it seems to have been a city nearly of the bulk of\nParis,\u200b[87] and Rome might be about the size of London.\n\nThere lived in Alexandria, in Diodorus Siculus\u2019s time, 300,000 free\npeople, comprehending, I suppose, women and children.\u200b[88] But what\nnumber of slaves? Had we any just ground to fix these at an equal\nnumber with the free inhabitants, it would favour the foregoing\ncalculation.\n\nThere is a passage in Herodian which is a little surprising. He says\npositively that the palace of the emperor was as large as all the rest\nof the city. This was Nero\u2019s golden house, which is indeed represented\nby Suetonius and Pliny\u200b[89] as of an enormous extent, but no power of\nimagination can make us conceive it to bear any proportion to such a\ncity as London.\n\nWe may observe that, had the historian been relating Nero\u2019s\nextravagance, and had he made use of such an expression, it would have\nhad much less weight, these rhetorical exaggerations being so apt to\ncreep into an author\u2019s style even when the most chaste and correct; but\nit is mentioned by Herodian only by the by, in relating the quarrels\nbetween Geta and Caracalla.\n\nIt appears from the same historian that there was then much land\nuncultivated and put to no manner of use, and he ascribes it as a great\npraise to Pertinax that he allowed every one to take such land either\nin Italy or elsewhere and cultivate it as he pleased, without paying\nany taxes. Lands uncultivated and put to no manner of use! This is not\nheard of in any part of Christendom, except perhaps in some remote\nparts of Hungary, as I have been informed. And it surely corresponds\nvery ill with that idea of the extreme populousness of antiquity so\nmuch insisted on.\n\nWe learn from Vopiscus that there was in Etruria much fertile land\nuncultivated, which the Emperor Aurelian intended to convert into\nvineyards, in order to furnish the Roman people with a gratuitous\ndistribution of wine: a very proper expedient to dispeople still\nfurther that capital and all the neighbouring territories.\n\nIt may not be amiss to take notice of the account which Polybius gives\nof the great herds of swine to be met with in Tuscany and Lombardy, as\nwell as in Greece, and of the method of feeding them which was then\npractised. \u201cThere are great herds of swine,\u201d says he, \u201cthroughout all\nItaly, particularly in former times, through Etruria and Cisalpine\nGaul. And a herd frequently contains a thousand or more swine. When\none of these herds in feeding meets with another they mix together,\nand the swineherds have no other expedient to separate them than to go\nto different quarters, where they sound their horn, and these animals,\nbeing accustomed to that signal, run immediately each to the horn of\nhis own keeper. Whereas in Greece, if the herds of swine happen to\nmix in the forests, he who has the greatest flock takes cunningly the\nopportunity of driving all away. And thieves are very apt to purloin\nthe straggling hogs which have wandered to a great distance from their\nkeeper in search of food.\u201d\n\nMay we not infer from this account that the North of Italy was then\nmuch less peopled and worse cultivated than at present? How could these\nvast herds be fed in a country so thick of enclosures, so improved by\nagriculture, so divided by farms, so planted with vines and\ncorn intermingled together? I must confess that Polybius\u2019s relation has\nmore the air of that economy which is to be met with in our American\ncolonies than the management of a European country.\n\nWe meet with a reflection in Aristotle\u2019s\u200b[90] _Ethics_ which seems to\nme unaccountable on any supposition, and by proving too much in favour\nof our present reasoning, may be thought really to prove nothing. That\nphilosopher, treating of friendship, and observing that that relation\nought neither to be contracted to the very few nor extended over a\ngreat multitude, illustrates his opinion by the following argument. \u201cIn\nlike manner,\u201d says he, \u201cas a city cannot subsist if it either have so\nfew inhabitants as ten, or so many as a hundred thousand, so is there\na mediocrity required in the number of friends, and you destroy the\nessence of friendship by running into either extreme.\u201d What! impossible\nthat a city can contain a hundred thousand inhabitants! Had Aristotle\nnever seen nor heard of a city which was near so populous? This, I must\nown, passes my comprehension.\n\nPliny tells us that Seleucia, the seat of the Greek empire in the\nEast, was reported to contain 600,000 people. Carthage is said by\nStrabo to have contained 700,000. The inhabitants of Pekin are not\nmuch more numerous. London, Paris, and Constantinople may admit of\nnearly the same computation; at least, the two latter cities do not\nexceed it. Rome, Alexandria, Antioch we have already spoke of. From the\nexperience of past and present ages one might conjecture that there\nis a kind of impossibility that any city could ever rise much beyond\nthis proportion. Whether the grandeur of a city be founded on commerce\nor on empire, there seems to be invincible obstacles which prevent\nits further progress. The seats of vast monarchies, by introducing\nextravagant luxury, irregular expense, idleness, dependence, and false\nideas of rank and superiority, are improper for commerce.\nExtensive commerce checks itself by raising the price of all labour and\ncommodities. When a great court engages the attendance of a numerous\nnobility possessed of overgrown fortunes, the middling gentry remain\nin their provincial towns, where they can make a figure on a moderate\nincome. And if the dominions of a state arrive at an enormous size,\nthere necessarily arise many capitals in the remoter provinces, whither\nall the inhabitants except a few courtiers repair for education,\nfortune, and amusement.\u200b[91] London, by uniting extensive commerce and\nmiddling empire, has perhaps arrived at a greatness which no city will\never be able to exceed.\n\nChoose Dover or Calais for a centre: draw a circle of two hundred miles\nradius; you comprehend London, Paris, the Netherlands, the United\nProvinces, and some of the best cultivated counties of France and\nEngland. It may safely, I think, be affirmed that no spot of ground\ncan be found in antiquity, of equal extent, which contained near so\nmany great and populous cities, and was so stocked with riches and\ninhabitants. To balance, in both periods, the states which possessed\nmost art, knowledge, civility, and the best police seems the truest\nmethod of comparison.\n\nIt is an observation of L\u2019Abb\u00e9 du Bos that Italy is warmer at present\nthan it was in ancient times. \u201cThe annals of Rome tell us,\u201d says he,\n\u201cthat in the year 480 A.U.C. the winter was so severe that it destroyed\nthe trees. The Tiber froze in Rome, and the ground was covered with\nsnow for forty days. When Juvenal describes a superstitious woman, he\nrepresents her as breaking the ice of the Tiber that she might perform\nher ablutions.\n\n    \u201c\u2018Hybernum fracta glacie descendet in amnem,\n    Ter matutino Tyberi mergetur.\u2019\n\n\u201cHe speaks of that river\u2019s freezing as a common event. Many passages\nof Horace suppose the streets of Rome full of snow and ice. We should\nhave more certainty with regard to this point had the ancients known\nthe use of thermometers; but their writers, without intending it,\ngive us information sufficient to convince us that the winters are\nnow much more temperate at Rome than formerly. At present the Tiber\nno more freezes at Rome than the Nile at Cairo. The Romans esteem the\nwinter very rigorous if the snow lies two days, and if one sees for\neight-and-forty hours a few icicles hang from a fountain that has a\nnorth exposition.\u201d\n\nThe observation of this ingenious critic may be extended to other\nEuropean climates. Who could discover the mild climate of France in\nDiodorus Siculus\u2019s description of that of Gaul? \u201cAs it is a northern\nclimate,\u201d says he, \u201cit is infested with cold to an extreme degree. In\ncloudy weather, instead of rain, there fall great snows, and in clear\nweather it there freezes so excessive hard that the rivers acquire\nbridges of their own substance, over which not only single travellers\nmay pass, but large armies, accompanied with all their baggage and\nloaded waggons. And there being many rivers in Gaul\u2014the Rhone, the\nRhine, etc.\u2014almost all of them are frozen over, and it is usual, in\norder to prevent falling, to cover the ice with chaff and straw at the\nplaces where the road passes.\u201d \u201cColder than a Gallic winter\u201d is used by\nPetronius as a proverbial expression.\n\n\u201cNorth of the Cevennes,\u201d says Strabo, \u201cGaul produces not figs and\nolives, and the vines which have been planted bear not grapes that will\nripen.\u201d\n\nOvid positively maintains, with all the serious affirmation of prose,\nthat the Euxine Sea was frozen over every winter in his time, and\nhe appeals to Roman governors, whom he names, for the truth of his\nassertion. This seldom or never happens at present in the latitude of\nTomi, whither Ovid was banished. All the complaints of the same poet\nseem to mark a rigour of the seasons which is scarce experienced at\npresent in Petersburg or Stockholm.\n\nTournefort, a Proven\u00e7al, who had travelled into the same\ncountries, observes that there is not a finer climate in the world;\nand he asserts that nothing but Ovid\u2019s melancholy could have given him\nsuch dismal ideas of it.\n\nBut the facts mentioned by that poet are too circumstantial to bear any\nsuch interpretation.\n\nPolybius says that the climate in Arcadia was very cold, and the air\nmoist.\n\n\u201cItaly,\u201d says Varro, \u201cis the most temperate climate in Europe. The\ninland parts\u201d (Gaul, Germany, and Pannonia, no doubt) \u201chave almost\nperpetual winter.\u201d\n\nThe northern parts of Spain, according to Strabo, are but ill inhabited\nbecause of the great cold.\n\nAllowing, therefore, this remark to be just, that Europe is become\nwarmer than formerly, how can we account for it? Plainly by no other\nmethod than by supposing that the land is at present much better\ncultivated, and that the woods are cleared which formerly threw a shade\nupon the earth and kept the rays of the sun from penetrating to it. Our\nnorthern colonies in America become more temperate in proportion as the\nwoods are felled,\u200b[92] but in general, every one may remark that cold\nstill makes itself more severely felt both in North and South America,\nthan in places under the same latitude in Europe.\n\nSaserna, quoted by Columella, affirmed that the disposition of the\nheavens was altered before his time, and that the air had become much\nmilder and warmer. \u201cAs appears hence,\u201d says he, \u201cthat many places now\nabound with vineyards and olive plantations which formerly, by reason\nof the rigour of the climate, could raise none of these productions.\u201d\nSuch a change, if real, will be allowed an evident sign of the better\ncultivation and peopling of countries before the age of Saserna;\u200b[93]\nand if it be continued to the present times, is a proof that\nthese advantages have been continually increasing throughout this part\nof the world.\n\nLet us now cast our eye over all the countries which were the scene\nof ancient and modern history, and compare their past and present\nsituation. We shall not, perhaps, find such foundation for the\ncomplaint of the present emptiness and depopulation of the world. Egypt\nis represented by Maillet, to whom we owe the best account of it, as\nextremely populous, though he esteems the number of its inhabitants\nto be diminished. Syria, and the Lesser Asia, as well as the coast of\nBarbary, I can really own to be very desert in comparison of their\nancient condition. The depopulation of Greece is also very obvious. But\nwhether the country now called Turkey in Europe may not, in general,\ncontain as many inhabitants as during the flourishing period of Greece\nmay be a little doubtful. The Thracians seem then to have lived like\nthe Tartars at present, by pillage and plunder; the Getes were still\nmore uncivilized, and the Illyrians were no better. These occupy\nnine-tenths of that country, and though the government of the Turks be\nnot very favourable to industry and propagation, yet it preserves at\nleast peace and order among the inhabitants, and is preferable to that\nbarbarous, unsettled condition in which they anciently lived.\n\nPoland and Muscovy in Europe are not populous, but are certainly much\nmore so than the ancient Sarmatia and Scythia, where no husbandry or\ntillage was ever heard of, and pasturage was the sole art by which\nthe people were maintained. The like observation may be extended to\nDenmark and Sweden. No one ought to esteem the immense swarms of\npeople which formerly came from the North, and overran all Europe, to\nbe any objection to this opinion. Where a whole nation, or even half\nof it, remove their seat, it is easy to imagine what a prodigious\nmultitude they must form, with what desperate valour they must make\ntheir attacks, and how the terror they strike into the invaded nations\nwill make these magnify, in their imagination, both the courage and\nmultitude of the invaders. Scotland is neither extensive nor populous,\nbut were the half of its inhabitants to seek new seats they\nwould form a colony as large as the Teutons and Cimbri, and would\nshake all Europe, supposing it in no better condition for defence than\nformerly.\n\nGermany has surely at present twenty times more inhabitants than in\nancient times, when they cultivated no ground, and each tribe valued\nitself on the extensive desolation which it spread around, as we\nlearn from C\u00e6sar, and Tacitus, and Strabo. A proof that the division\ninto small republics will not alone render a nation populous, unless\nattended with the spirit of peace, order, and industry.\n\nThe barbarous condition of Britain in former times is well known, and\nthe thinness of its inhabitants may easily be conjectured, both from\ntheir barbarity and from a circumstance mentioned by Herodian, that all\nBritain was marshy, even in Severus\u2019s time, after the Romans had been\nfully settled in it above a whole century.\n\nIt is not easily imagined that the Gauls were anciently much more\nadvanced in the arts of life than their northern neighbours, since they\ntravelled to this island for their education in the mysteries of the\nreligion and philosophy of the Druids.\u200b[94] I cannot therefore think\nthat Gaul was then near so populous as France is at present.\n\nWere we to believe, indeed, and join together the testimony of Appian\nand that of Diodorus Siculus, we must admit an incredible populousness\nin Gaul. The former historian says that there were 400 nations in that\ncountry; the latter affirms that the largest of the Gallic nations\nconsisted of 200,000 men, besides women and children, and the least\nof 50,000. Calculating therefore at a medium, we must admit of near\n200,000,000 of people in a country which we esteem populous at present,\nthough supposed to contain little more than twenty.\u200b[95] Such\ncalculations therefore by their extravagance lose all manner of\nauthority. We may observe that that equality of property, to which\nthe populousness of antiquity may be ascribed, had no place among the\nGauls. Their intestine wars also, before C\u00e6sar\u2019s time, were almost\nperpetual. And Strabo observes that though all Gaul was cultivated,\nyet it was not cultivated with any skill or care, the genius of the\ninhabitants leading them less to arts than arms, till their slavery to\nRome produced peace among themselves.\n\nC\u00e6sar enumerates very particularly the great forces which were levied\nat Belgium to oppose his conquests, and makes them amount to 208,000.\nThese were not the whole people able to bear arms in Belgium; for the\nsame historian tells us that the Bellovaci could have brought a hundred\nthousand men into the field, though they engaged only for sixty. Taking\nthe whole, therefore, in this proportion of ten to six, the sum of\nfighting men in all the states of Belgium was about 350,000; all the\ninhabitants a million and a half. And Belgium being about the fourth of\nGaul, that country might contain six millions, which is not the third\nof its present inhabitants.\u200b[96] We are informed by C\u00e6sar that the\nGauls had no fixed property in land; but that the chieftains, when any\ndeath happened in a family, made a new division of all the lands among\nthe several members of the family. This is the custom of Tanistry,\nwhich so long prevailed in Ireland, and which retained that\ncountry in a state of misery, barbarism, and desolation.\n\nThe ancient Helvetia was 250 miles in length and 180 in breadth,\naccording to the same author, yet contained only 360,000 inhabitants.\nThe Canton of Berne alone has at present as many people.\n\nAfter this computation of Appian and Diodorus Siculus, I know not\nwhether I dare affirm that the modern Dutch are more numerous than the\nancient Batavi.\n\nSpain is decayed from what it was three centuries ago; but if we step\nbackward two thousand years and consider the restless, turbulent,\nunsettled condition of its inhabitants, we may probably be inclined\nto think that it is now much more populous. Many Spaniards killed\nthemselves when deprived of their arms by the Romans. It appears from\nPlutarch that robbery and plunder were esteemed honourable among the\nSpaniards. Hirtius represents in the same light the situation of that\ncountry in C\u00e6sar\u2019s time, and he says that every man was obliged to\nlive in castles and walled towns for his security. It was not till its\nfinal conquest under Augustus that these disorders were repressed.\nThe account which Strabo and Justin give of Spain corresponds exactly\nwith those above mentioned. How much therefore must it diminish from\nour idea of the populousness of antiquity when we find that Cicero,\ncomparing Italy, Africa, Gaul, Greece, and Spain, mentions the great\nnumber of inhabitants as the peculiar circumstance which rendered this\nlatter country formidable.\u200b[97]\n\nItaly, it is probable however, has decayed; but how many great cities\ndoes it still contain? Venice, Genoa, Pavia, Turin, Milan, Naples,\nFlorence, Leghorn, which either subsisted not in ancient times,\nor were then very inconsiderable. If we reflect on this, we shall not\nbe apt to carry matters to so great an extreme as is usual with regard\nto this subject.\n\nWhen the Roman authors complain that Italy, which formerly exported\ncorn, became dependent on all the provinces for its daily bread, they\nnever ascribe this alteration to the increase of its inhabitants, but\nto the neglect of tillage and agriculture. A natural effect of that\npernicious practice of importing corn in order to distribute it gratis\namong the Roman citizens, and a very bad means of multiplying the\ninhabitants of any country.\u200b[98] The sportula, so much talked of by\nMartial and Juvenal, being presents regularly made by the great lords\nto their smaller clients, must have had a like tendency to produce\nidleness, debauchery, and a continual decay among the people. The\nparish-rates have at present the same bad consequences in England.\n\nWere I to assign a period when I imagine this part of the world might\npossibly contain more inhabitants than at present, I should pitch\nupon the age of Trajan and the Antonines, the great extent of the\nRoman Empire being then civilized and cultivated, settled almost in a\nprofound peace both foreign and domestic, and living under the same\nregular police and government.\u200b[99] But we are told that all\nextensive governments, especially absolute monarchies, are destructive\nto population, and contain a secret vice and poison, which destroy the\neffect of all these promising appearances. To confirm this, there is a\npassage cited from Plutarch, which being somewhat singular, we shall\nhere examine it.\n\nThat author, endeavouring to account for the silence of many of the\noracles, says that it may be ascribed to the present desolation of the\nworld, proceeding from former wars and factions, which common calamity,\nhe adds, has fallen heavier upon Greece than on any other country;\ninsomuch that the whole could scarce at present furnish three thousand\nwarriors, a number which, in the time of the Median War, were supplied\nby the single city of Megara. The gods, therefore, who affect works\nof dignity and importance, have suppressed many of their oracles, and\ndeign not to use so many interpreters of their will to so diminutive a\npeople.\n\nI must confess that this passage contains so many difficulties that\nI know not what to make of it. You may observe that Plutarch assigns\nfor a cause of the decay of mankind not the extensive dominion of the\nRomans, but the former wars and factions of the several nations, all\nwhich were quieted by the Roman arms. Plutarch\u2019s reasoning, therefore,\nis directly contrary to the inference which is drawn from the fact he\nadvances.\n\nPolybius supposes that Greece had become more prosperous and\nflourishing after the establishment of the Roman yoke;\u200b[100] and though\nthat historian wrote before these conquerors had degenerated\nfrom being the patrons to be the plunderers of mankind, yet as we find\nfrom Tacitus that the severity of the emperors afterwards checked the\nlicence of the governors, we have no reason to think that extensive\nmonarchy so destructive as it is so often represented.\n\nWe learn from Strabo that the Romans, from their regard to the Greeks,\nmaintained, to his time, most of the privileges and liberties of\nthat celebrated nation, and Nero afterwards rather increased them.\nHow therefore can we imagine that the Roman yoke was so burdensome\nover that part of the world? The oppression of the proconsuls was\nrestrained, and the magistracies in Greece being all bestowed in the\nseveral cities by the free votes of the people, there was no great\nnecessity for the competitors to attend the emperor\u2019s court. If great\nnumbers went to seek their fortunes in Rome, and advance themselves by\nlearning or eloquence, the commodities of their native country, many\nof them would return with the fortunes which they had acquired, and\nthereby enrich the Grecian commonwealths.\n\nBut Plutarch says that the general depopulation had been more sensibly\nfelt in Greece than in any other country. How is this reconcilable to\nits superior privileges and advantages?\n\nBesides, this passage by proving too much really proves nothing. Only\nthree thousand men able to bear arms in all Greece! Who can admit so\nstrange a proposition, especially if we consider the great number\nof Greek cities whose names still remain in history, and which are\nmentioned by writers long after the age of Plutarch? There are there\nsurely ten times more people at present, when there scarce remains\na city in all the bounds of ancient Greece. That country is still\ntolerably cultivated, and furnishes a sure supply of corn in case of\nany scarcity in Spain, Italy, or the South of France.\n\nWe may observe that the ancient frugality of the Greeks, and their\nequality of property, still subsisted during the age of Plutarch, as\nappears from Lucian. Nor is there any ground to imagine that\nthat country was possessed by a few masters and a great number of\nslaves.\n\nIt is probable, indeed, that military discipline, being entirely\nuseless, was extremely neglected in Greece after the establishment\nof the Roman Empire; and if these commonwealths, formerly so warlike\nand ambitious, maintained each of them a small city-guard to prevent\nmobbish disorders, it is all they had occasion for; and these, perhaps,\ndid not amount to three thousand men throughout all Greece. I own that\nif Plutarch had this fact in his eye, he is here guilty of a very gross\nparalogism, and assigns causes nowise proportioned to the effects. But\nis it so great a prodigy that an author should fall into a mistake of\nthis nature?\u200b[101]\n\nBut whatever force may remain in this passage of Plutarch, we shall\nendeavour to counterbalance it by as remarkable a passage in Diodorus\nSiculus, where the historian, after mentioning Ninus\u2019s army of\n1,700,000 foot and 200,000 horse, endeavours to support the credibility\nof this account by some posterior facts; and adds that we must not\nform a notion of the ancient populousness of mankind from the present\nemptiness and depopulation which is spread over the world. Thus an\nauthor, who lived at that very period of antiquity which is represented\nas most populous,\u200b[102] complains of the desolation which then\nprevailed, gives the preference to former times, and has recourse to\nancient fables as a foundation for his opinion. The humour of blaming\nthe present and admiring the past is strongly rooted in human nature,\nand has an influence even on persons endued with the most profound\njudgment and most extensive learning.\n\n\nNOTES, OF THE POPULOUSNESS OF ANCIENT NATIONS.\n\n[39] An ingenious writer has honoured this discourse with an answer\nfull of politeness, erudition, and good sense. So learned a refutation\nwould have made the author suspect that his reasonings were entirely\noverthrown, had he not used the precaution from the beginning to keep\nhimself on the sceptical side; and having taken this advantage of the\nground, he was enabled, though with much inferior forces, to preserve\nhimself from a total defeat. That reverend gentleman will always find,\nwhere his antagonist is so entrenched, that it will be difficult to\nenforce him. Varro, in such a situation, could defend himself against\nHannibal, Pharnaces against C\u00e6sar. The author, however, very willingly\nacknowledges that his antagonist has detected many mistakes both in\nhis authorities and reasonings; and it was owing entirely to that\ngentleman\u2019s indulgence that many more errors were not remarked. In this\nedition advantage has been taken of his learned animadversions, and the\nessay has been rendered less imperfect than formerly.\n\n\n[40] Columella says (lib. 3, cap. 8) that in Egypt and Africa the\nbearing of twins was frequent and even customary; _gemini partus\nfamiliares, ac p\u00e6ne solennes sunt_. If this was true, there is a\nphysical difference both in countries and ages, for travellers make\nno such remarks of these countries at present; on the contrary, we\nare apt to suppose the northern nations more fertile. As those two\ncountries were provinces of the Roman Empire, it is difficult, though\nnot altogether absurd, to suppose that such a man as Columella might be\nmistaken with regard to them.\n\n\n[41] This too is a good reason why the smallpox does not depopulate\ncountries so much as may at first sight be imagined. Where there\nis room for more people they will always arise, even without the\nassistance of naturalisation bills. It is remarked by Don Geronimo\nde Ustariz that the provinces of Spain which send most people to the\nIndies are most populous, which proceeds from their superior riches.\n\n\n[42] The same practice was common in Rome, but Cicero seems not to\nthink this evidence so certain as the testimony of free citizens. (_Pro\nC\u00e6lio_.)\n\n\n[43] Epistle 122. The inhuman sports exhibited at Rome may justly be\nconsidered too as an effect of the people\u2019s contempt for slaves, and\nwas also a great cause of the general inhumanity of their princes and\nrulers. Who can read the accounts of the amphitheatrical entertainments\nwithout horror? Or who is surprised that the emperors should treat\nthat people in the same way the people treated their inferiors?\nOne\u2019s humanity on that occasion is apt to renew the barbarous wish\nof Caligula, that the people had but one neck. A man could almost be\npleased by a single blow to put an end to such a race of monsters. \u201cYou\nmay thank God,\u201d says the author above cited (Epistle 7), addressing\nhimself to the Roman people, \u201cthat you have a master (viz., the mild\nand merciful Nero) who is incapable of learning cruelty from your\nexample.\u201d This was spoken in the beginning of his reign; but he fitted\nthem very well afterwards, and no doubt was considerably improved by\nthe sight of the barbarous objects to which he had from his infancy\nbeen accustomed.\n\n\n[44] We may here observe that if domestic slavery really increased\npopulousness, it would be an exception to the general rule, that the\nhappiness of any society and its populousness are necessary attendants.\nA master, from humour or interest, may make his slaves very unhappy,\nand yet be careful, from interest, to increase their number. Their\nmarriage is not a matter of choice with them, no more than any other\naction of their life.\n\n\n[45] Ten thousand slaves in a day have been often sold for the use of\nthe Romans at Delus in Cilicia.\u2014Strabo, lib. 14.\n\n\n[46] As _servus_ was the name of the genus, and _verna_ of the\nspecies, without any correlative, this forms a strong presumption\nthat the latter were by far the least numerous. It is a universal\nobservation which we may form upon language that where two related\nparts of a whole bear any proportion to each other in numbers, rank,\nor consideration, there are always correlative terms invented which\nanswer to both the parts, and express their mutual relation. If they\nbear no proportion to each other, the term is only invented for the\nless, and marks its distinction from the whole. Thus man and woman,\nmaster and servant, father and son, prince and subject, stranger and\ncitizen are correlative terms; but the words\u2014seaman, carpenter, smith,\ntailor, etc., have no correspondent terms which express those who are\nno seaman, no carpenter, etc. Languages differ very much with regard\nto the particular words where this distinction obtains, and may thence\nafford very strong inferences concerning the manners and customs of\ndifferent nations. The military government of the Roman emperors had\nexalted the soldiery so high that they balanced all the other orders of\nthe state; hence _miles_ and _paganus_ became relative terms, a thing\ntill then unknown to ancient, and still so to modern languages. Modern\nsuperstition has exalted the clergy so high that they overbalance\nthe whole state; hence clergy and laity are terms opposed in all\nmodern languages, and in these alone. And from the same principles I\ninfer that if the number of slaves bought by the Romans from foreign\ncountries had not extremely exceeded those bred at home, _verna_ would\nhave had a correlative which would have expressed the former species of\nslaves; but these, it would seem, composed the main body of the ancient\nslaves, and the latter were but a few exceptions.\n\n\n[47] _Verna_ is used by the Roman writers as a word equivalent to\n_scurra_, on account of the petulance and impudence of those slaves.\n(Mart., lib. 1, ep. 42.) Horace also mentions the _vern\u00e6 procaces_; and\nPetronius (cap. 24), _vernula urbanitas_. Seneca (_de provid._, cap.\n1), _vernularum licentia_.\n\n\n[48] It is computed in the West Indies that a stock of slaves grow\nworse five per cent. every year unless new slaves be bought to recruit\nthem. They are not able to keep up their number even in those warm\ncountries where clothes and provisions are so easily got. How much more\nmust this happen in European countries, and in or near great cities?\n\n\n[49] Corn. Nepos in _Vita Attici_. We may remark that Atticus\u2019s estate\nlay chiefly in Epirus, which being a remote, desolate place, would\nrender it profitable for him to rear slaves there.\n\n\n[50] \u03ba\u03bb\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9 \u03bf\u03b9, makers of those beds which the ancients lay upon at\nmeals.\n\n\n[51] \u201cNon temere ancill\u00e6 ejus rei causa comparantur ut pariant\u201d\n(_Digest._ lib. 5, tit. 3, _de h\u00e6red. petit._ _lex_ 27). The following\ntexts are to the same purpose:\u2014\u201cSpadonem morbosum non esse, neque\nvitiosum, verius mihi videtur; sed sanum esse, sicuti illum qui unum\ntesticulum habet, qui etiam generare potest\u201d (_Digest._ lib. 2, tit.\n1, _de \u00e6dilitio edicto_, _lex 6_, \u00a7 2). \u201cSin autem quis ita spado sit,\nut tam necessaria pars corporis penitus absit, morbosus est\u201d (_Id._\n_lex 7_). His impotence, it seems, was only regarded so far as his\nhealth or life might be affected by it; in other respects he was full\nas valuable. The same reasoning is employed with regard to female\nslaves. \u201cQu\u00e6ritur de ea muliere qu\u00e6 semper mortuos parit, an morbosa\nsit? et ait Sabinus, si vulv\u00e6 vitio hoc contingit, morbosam esse\u201d\n(_Id._ _lex_ 14). It has even been doubted whether a woman pregnant\nwas morbid or vitiated, and it is determined that she is sound, not on\naccount of the value of her offspring, but because it is the natural\npart or office of women to bear children. \u201cSi mulier pr\u00e6gnans venerit,\ninter omnes convenit sanam eam esse. Maximum enim ac pr\u00e6cipuum munus\nf\u0153minarum accipere ac tueri conceptum. Puerperam quoque sanam esse; si\nmodo nihil extrinsecus accedit, quod corpus ejus in aliquam valetudinem\nimmitteret. De sterili C\u0153lius distinguere Trebatium dicit, ut si natura\nsterilis sit, sana sit; si vitio corporis, contra\u201d (_Id._).\n\n\n[52] The slaves in the great houses had little rooms assigned them,\ncalled _cell\u00e6_; whence the name of cell was transferred to the monk\u2019s\nroom in a convent. See further on this head, Just. Lipsius, Saturn.\n1, cap. 14. These form strong presumptions against the marriage and\npropagation of the family slaves.\n\n\n[53] Tacitus blames it\u2014_De morib. Germ._\n\n\n[54] _De fraterno amore._ Seneca also approves of the exposing of\nsickly, infirm children (_De ira_, lib. i. cap. 15).\n\n\n[55] The practice of leaving great sums of money to friends, though one\nhad near relations, was common in Greece as well as Rome, as we may\ngather from Lucian. This practice prevails much less in modern times;\nand Ben Jonson\u2019s _Volpone_ is therefore almost entirely extracted from\nancient authors, and suits better the manners of those times.\n\nIt may justly be thought that the liberty of divorces in Rome was\nanother discouragement to marriage. Such a practice prevents not\nquarrels from humour, but rather increases them; and occasions also\nthose from interest, which are much more dangerous and destructive.\nPerhaps too the unnatural lusts of the ancients ought to be taken into\nconsideration as of some moment.\n\n\n[56] C\u00e6sar gave the centurions ten times the gratuity of the common\nsoldiers (_De bell. Gallico_, lib. viii.). In the Rhodian cartel,\nmentioned afterwards, no distinction in the ransom was made on account\nof ranks in the army.\n\n\n[57] Plin. lib. 18, cap. 3. The same author, in cap. 6, says, \u201cVerumque\nfatentibus latifundia perdidere Italiam; jam vero et provincias. Sex\ndomo semissem Afric\u00e6 possidebant, cum interfecit eos Nero princeps.\u201d In\nthis view the barbarous butchery committed by the first Roman emperors\nwas not perhaps so destructive to the public as we may imagine. These\nnever ceased till they had extinguished all the illustrious families\nwhich had enjoyed the plunder of the world during the latter ages\nof the republic. The new nobles who rose in their place were less\nsplendid, as we learn from Tacit. _Ann._ lib. 3, cap. 55.\n\n\n[58] The ancient soldiers, being free citizens above the lowest\nrank, were all married. Our modern soldiers are either forced to\nlive unmarried, or their marriages turn to small account towards the\nincrease of mankind\u2014a circumstance which ought, perhaps, to be taken\ninto consideration, as of some consequence in favour of the ancients.\n\n\n[59] What is the advantage of the column after it has broken the\nenemy\u2019s line? Only that it then takes them in flank, and dissipates\nwhatever stands near it by a fire from all sides; but till it has\nbroken them, does it not present a flank to the enemy, and that exposed\nto their musketry, and, what is much worse, to their cannon?\n\n\n[60] Inst. lib. 2, cap. 6. It is true the same law seems to have\nbeen continued till the time of Justinian, but abuses introduced by\nbarbarism are not always corrected by civility.\n\n\n[61] Lysias, who was himself of the popular faction and very narrowly\nescaped from the Thirty Tyrants, says that the democracy was as violent\na government as the oligarchy. Orat. 24, _de statu. popul._\n\n\n[62] Orat. 24. And in Orat. 29 he mentions the factious spirit of the\npopular assemblies as the only cause why these illegal punishments\nshould displease.\n\n\n[63] Lib. 3. The country in Europe in which I have observed the\nfactions to be most violent, and party hatred the strongest, is\nIreland. This goes so far as to cut off even the most common\nintercourse of civilities between the Protestants and Catholics. Their\ncruel insurrections, and the severe revenges which they have taken of\neach other, are the causes of this mutual ill-will, which is the chief\nsource of the disorder, poverty, and depopulation of that country. The\nGreek factions I imagine to have been inflamed still to a higher degree\nof rage, the revolutions being commonly more frequent, and the maxims\nof assassination much more avowed and acknowledged.\n\n\n[64] Diod. Sic., lib. 14. Isocrates says there were only 5000 banished.\nHe makes the number of those killed amount to 1500. Areop. \u00c6schines\n_contra Ctesiph._ assigns precisely the same number. Seneca (_De tranq.\nanim._ cap. 5) says 1300.\n\n\n[65] We shall mention from Diodorus Siculus alone a few which passed in\nthe course of sixty years during the most shining age of Greece. There\nwere banished from Sybaris 500 of the nobles and their partisans (lib.\n12 p. 77, _ex edit._ Rhodomanni); of Chians, 600 citizens banished\n(lib. 13 p. 189); at Ephesus, 340 killed, 1000 banished (lib. 13 p.\n223); of Cyrenians, 500 nobles killed, all the rest banished (lib. 14\np. 263); the Corinthians killed 120, banished 500 (lib. 14 p. 304);\nPh\u00e6bidas the Spartan banished 300 B\u00e6otians (lib. 15 p. 342). Upon the\nfall of the Lacedemonians, democracies were restored in many cities,\nand severe vengeance taken of the nobles, after the Greek manner. But\nmatters did not end there, for the banished nobles, returning in many\nplaces, butchered their adversaries at Phial\u00e6 in Corinth, in Megara,\nin Phliasia. In this last place they killed 300 of the people; but\nthese again revolting, killed above 600 of the nobles and banished the\nrest (lib. 15 p. 357). In Arcadia 1400 banished, besides many killed.\nThe banished retired to Sparta and Pallantium. The latter delivered up\nto their countrymen, and all killed (lib. 15 p. 373). Of the banished\nfrom Argos and Thebes there were 500 in the Spartan army (_id._ p.\n374). Here is a detail of the most remarkable of Agathocles\u2019 cruelties\nfrom the same author. The people before his usurpation had banished\n600 nobles (lib. 19 p. 655). Afterwards that tyrant, in concurrence\nwith the people, killed 4000 nobles and banished 6000 (_id._ p. 647).\nHe killed 4000 people at Gela (_id._ p. 741). By Agathocles\u2019 brother\n8000 banished from Syracuse (lib. 20 p. 757). The inhabitants of\n\u00c6gesta, to the number of 40,000, were killed\u2014man, woman, and child;\nand with tortures, for the sake of their money (_id._ p. 802). All the\nrelations\u2014viz., father, brother, children, grandfather, of his Libyan\narmy, killed (_id._ p. 103). He killed 7000 exiles after capitulation\n(_id._ p. 816). It is to be remarked that Agathocles was a man of great\nsense and courage; his violent tyranny, therefore, is a stronger proof\nof the manners of the age.\n\n\n[66] In order to recommend his client to the favour of the people, he\nenumerates all the sums he had expended. When \u03c7\u03bf\u03c1\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2, 30 minas; upon\na chorus of men, 20 minas; \u03b5\u03b9\u03c0\u03c5\u03c1\u03c1\u03b9\u03c7\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2, 8 minas; \u03b1\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c7\u03bf\u03c1\u03b7\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd, 50\nminas; \u03ba\u03c5\u03ba\u03bb\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff3 \u03c7\u03bf\u03c1\u1ff3, 3 minas; seven times trierarch, where he spent\n6 talents: taxes, once 30 minas, another time 40; \u03b3\u03c5\u03bc\u03bd\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1\u03c1\u03c7\u03c9\u03bd, 12\nminas; \u03c7\u03bf\u03c1\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03b9\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff3 \u03c7\u03bf\u03c1\u1ff3, 15 minas; \u03ba\u03bf\u03bc\u03bf\u03b4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c7\u03bf\u03c1\u03b7\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd, 18 minas;\n\u03c0\u03c5\u03c1\u03c1\u03b9\u03c7\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b1\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2, 7 minas; \u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u03b7\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9 \u1f01\u03bc\u03b9\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2, 15 minas;\n\u03b1\u03c1\u03c7\u03b9\u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2, 30 minas. In the whole, ten talents 38 minas\u2014an immense\nsum for an Athenian fortune, and what alone would be esteemed great\nriches (Orat. 20). It is true, he says, the law did not oblige him\nabsolutely to be at so much expense, not above a fourth; but without\nthe favour of the people nobody was so much as safe, and this was the\nonly way to gain it. See further, Orat. 24, _de pop. statu._ In another\nplace, he introduces a speaker who says that he had spent his whole\nfortune\u2014and an immense one, eighty talents\u2014for the people (Orat. 25,\n_de prob. Evandri_). The \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9, or strangers, find, says he, if they\ndo not contribute largely enough to the people\u2019s fancy, that they have\nreason to repent (Orat. 30, _contra Phil._). You may see with what care\nDemosthenes displays his expenses of this nature, when he pleads for\nhimself _de corona_; and how he exaggerates Midias\u2019s stinginess in this\nparticular, in his accusation of that criminal. All this, by the by, is\nthe mark of a very iniquitous judicature: and yet the Athenians valued\nthemselves on having the most legal and regular administration of any\npeople in Greece.\n\n\n[67] The authorities cited above are all historians, orators, and\nphilosophers whose testimony is unquestioned. It is dangerous to rely\nupon writers who deal in ridicule and satire. What will posterity, for\ninstance, infer from this passage of Dr. Swift? \u201cI told him that in the\nkingdom of Tribnia (Britain), by the natives called Langdon (London),\nwhere I had sojourned some time in my travels, the bulk of the people\nconsist in a manner wholly of discoverers, witnesses, informers,\naccusers, prosecutors, evidences, swearers, together with their several\nsubservient and subaltern instruments, all under the colours, the\nconduct, and pay of ministers of state and their deputies. The plots\nin that kingdom are usually the workmanship of those persons,\u201d etc.\n(_Gulliver\u2019s Travels._) Such a representation might suit the government\nof Athens, but not that of England, which is a prodigy even in modern\ntimes for humanity, justice, and liberty. Yet the Doctor\u2019s satire,\nthough carried to extremes, as is usual with him, even beyond other\nsatirical writers, did not altogether want an object. The Bishop of\nRochester, who was his friend, and of the same party, had been banished\na little before by a bill of attainder with great justice, but without\nsuch a proof as was legal, or according to the strict forms of common\nlaw.\n\n\n[68] Lib. 2. There were 8000 killed during the siege, and the whole\ncaptives amounted to 30,000. Diodorus Siculus (lib. 17) says only\n13,000; but he accounts for this small number by saying that the\nTyrians had sent away beforehand part of their wives and children to\nCarthage.\n\n\n[69] Lib. 5. He makes the number of the citizens amount to 30,000.\n\n\n[70] In general there is more candour and sincerity in ancient\nhistorians, but less exactness and care, than in the moderns. Our\nspeculative factions, especially those of religion, throw such an\nillusion over our minds that men seem to regard impartiality to their\nadversaries and to heretics as a vice or weakness; but the commonness\nof books, by means of printing, has obliged modern historians to be\nmore careful in avoiding contradictions and incongruities. Diodorus\nSiculus is a good writer, but it is with pain I see his narration\ncontradict in so many particulars the two most authentic pieces of all\nGreek history\u2014viz., Xenophon\u2019s Expedition and Demosthenes\u2019 Orations.\nPlutarch and Appian seem scarce ever to have read Cicero\u2019s Epistles.\n\n\n[71] Diogenes Laertius (in _vita Empedoclis_) says that Agrigentum\ncontained only 800,000 inhabitants.\n\n\n[72] The country that supplied this number was not above a third of\nItaly\u2014viz., the Pope\u2019s dominions, Tuscany, and a part of the kingdom\nof Naples; but perhaps in those early times there were very few slaves\nexcept in Rome, or the great cities.\n\n\n[73] Plutarch (in _vita C\u00e6s._) makes the number that C\u00e6sar fought with\namount only to three millions; Julian (in _C\u00e6saribus_) to two.\n\n\n[74] Argos seems also to have been a great city, for Lysias contents\nhimself with saying that it did not exceed Athens. (Orat. 34.)\n\n\n[75] Orat. _contra Verem_, lib. 4, cap. 52. Strabo, lib. 6, says it\nwas twenty-two miles in compass; but then we are to consider that it\ncontained two harbours within it, one of which was a very large one,\nand might be regarded as a kind of bay.\n\n\n[76] Demosthenes assigns 20,000.\n\n\n[77] Lib. 2. Diodorus Siculus\u2019s account perfectly agrees (lib. 12).\n\n\n[78] We are to observe that when Dionysius Halicarnass\u00e6us says that if\nwe regard the ancient walls of Rome the extent of the city will not\nappear greater than that of Athens, he must mean the Acropolis and high\ntown only. No ancient author ever speaks of the Pyr\u00e6um, Phalerus, and\nMunychia as the same with Athens; much less can it be supposed that\nDionysius would consider the matter in that light after the walls of\nCimon and Pericles were destroyed and Athens was entirely separated\nfrom these other towns. This observation destroys all Vossius\u2019s\nreasonings and introduces common sense into these calculations.\n\n\n[79] The same author affirms that Corinth had once 460,000 slaves,\n\u00c6gina 470,000; but the foregoing arguments hold stronger against these\nfacts, which are indeed entirely absurd and impossible. It is however\nremarkable that Athen\u00e6us cites so great an authority as Aristotle for\nthis last fact; and the scholiast on Pindar mentions the same number of\nslaves in \u00c6gina.\n\n\n[80] Demost. _contra Lept._ The Athenians brought yearly from Pontus\n400,000 medimni or bushels of corn, as appeared from the custom-house\nbooks; and this was the greatest part of their importation. This, by\nthe by, is a strong proof that there is some great mistake in the\nforegoing passage of Athen\u00e6us, for Attica itself was so barren in corn\nthat it produced not enough even to maintain the peasants. Tit. Liv.,\nlib. 43; cap. 6, Lucian, in his _navigium sive vota_, says that a ship,\nwhich by the dimensions he gives seems to have been about the size of\nour third rates, carried as much corn as would maintain all Attica for\na twelvemonth. But perhaps Athens was decayed at that time, and besides\nit is not safe to trust such loose rhetorical calculations.\n\n\n[81] Diod. Sic., lib. 17. When Alexander attacked Thebes we may safely\nconclude that almost all the inhabitants were present. Whoever is\nacquainted with the spirit of the Greeks, especially of the Thebans,\nwill never suspect that any of them would desert their country when it\nwas reduced to such extreme peril and distress. As Alexander took the\ntown by storm, all those who bore arms were put to the sword without\nmercy, and they amounted only to 6000 men. Among these were some\nstrangers and manumitted slaves. The captives, consisting of old men,\nwomen, children, and slaves, were sold, and they amounted to 30,000. We\nmay therefore conclude that the free citizens in Thebes, of both sexes\nand all ages, were near 24,000, the strangers and slaves about 12,000,\nThese last, we may observe, were somewhat fewer in proportion than at\nAthens; as is reasonable to imagine from this circumstance, that Athens\nwas a town of more trade to support slaves, and of more entertainment\nto allure strangers. It is also to be remarked that thirty-six thousand\nwas the whole number of people, both in the city of Thebes and the\nneighbouring territory; a very moderate number, it must be confessed,\nand this computation being founded in facts which appear undisputable,\nmust have great weight in the present controversy. The above-mentioned\nnumber of Rhodians, too, were all the inhabitants of the island who\nwere free and able to bear arms.\n\n\n[82] _De rep. Laced._ This passage is not easily reconciled with that\nof Plutarch above, who says that Sparta had 9000 citizens.\n\n\n[83] Strabo, lib. 5, says that the Emperor Augustus prohibited the\nraising houses higher than seventy feet. In another passage, lib. 16,\nhe speaks of the houses of Rome as remarkably high. See also to the\nsame purpose Vitruvius, lib. 2, cap. 8. Aristides the Sophist, in his\noration \u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03a1\u03c9\u03bc\u03b7\u03bd, says that Rome consisted of cities on the top of\ncities; and that if one were to spread it out and unfold it, it would\ncover the whole surface of Italy. Where an author indulges himself in\nsuch extravagant declamations, and gives so much in to the hyperbolical\nstyle, one knows not how far he must be reduced. But this reasoning\nseems natural: if Rome was built in so scattered a manner as Dionysius\nsays, and ran so much into the country, there must have been very few\nstreets where the houses were raised so high. It is only for want of\nground that anybody builds in that inconvenient manner.\n\n\n[84] Lib. 2, epist. 16; lib. 5, epist. 6. It is true Pliny there\ndescribes a country house; but since that was the idea which the\nancients formed of a magnificent and convenient building, the great\nmen would certainly build the same way in town. \u201cIn laxitatem ruris\nexcurrunt,\u201d says Seneca of the rich and voluptuous, epist. 114.\nValerius Maximus, lib. 4, cap. 4, speaking of Cincinnatus\u2019 field of\nfour acres, says: \u201cAugustus se habitare nunc putat, cujus domus tantum\npatet quantum Cincinnati rura patuerant.\u201d To the same purpose see lib.\n36, cap. 15; also lib. 18, cap. 2.\n\n\n[85] \u201cM\u0153nia ejus (Rom\u00e6) collegere ambitu imperatoribus, censoribusque\nVespasianis, A.U.C. 828, pass. xiii. MCC, complexa montes septem,\nipsa dividitur in regiones quatuordecim, compita earum 265. Ejusdem\nspatii mensura, currente a milliario in capite Rom. Fori statuto, ad\nsingulas portas, qu\u00e6 sunt hodie numero 37, ita ut duodecim port\u00e6 semel\nnumerentur, pr\u00e6tereanturque ex veteribus septem, qu\u00e6 esse desierunt,\nefficit passuum per directum 30,775. Ad extrema vero tectorum cum\ncastris pr\u00e6toris ab eodem Milliario, per vicos omnium viarum, mensura\ncollegit paulo amplius septuaginta millia passuum. Quo si quis\naltitudinem tectorum addat, dignam profecto, \u00e6stimationem concipiat,\nfateaturque nullius urbis magnitudinem in toto orbe potuisse ei\ncomparari.\u201d (Pliny, lib. 3, cap. 5.)\n\nAll the best manuscripts of Pliny read the passage as here cited, and\nfix the compass of the walls of Rome to be thirteen miles. The question\nis, what Pliny means by 30,775 paces, and how that number was formed?\nThe manner in which I conceive it is this: Rome was a semicircular\narea of thirteen miles circumference. The Forum, and consequently the\nMilliarium, we know was situated on the banks of the Tiber, and near\nthe centre of the circle, or upon the diameter of the semicircular\narea. Though there were thirty-seven gates to Rome, yet only twelve of\nthem had straight streets, leading from them to the Milliarium. Pliny,\ntherefore, having assigned the circumference of Rome, and knowing that\nthat alone was not sufficient to give us a just notion of its surface,\nuses this further method. He supposes all the streets leading from the\nMilliarium to the twelve gates to be laid together into one straight\nline, and supposes we run along that line so as to count each gate\nonce, in which case, he says that the whole line is 30,775 paces; or,\nin other words, that each street or radius of the semicircular area is\nupon an average two miles and a half, and the whole length of Rome is\nfive miles, and its breadth about half as much, besides the scattered\nsuburbs.\n\nP\u00e8re Hardouin understands this passage in the same manner, with regard\nto the laying together the several streets of Rome into one line in\norder to compose 30,775 paces; but then he supposes that streets led\nfrom the Milliarium to every gate, and that no street exceeded 800\npaces in length. But (1) a semicircular area whose radius was only\n800 paces could never have a circumference near thirteen miles, the\ncompass of Rome as assigned by Pliny. A radius of two miles and a half\nforms very nearly that circumference. (2) There is an absurdity in\nsupposing a city so built as to have streets running to its centre from\nevery gate in its circumference. These streets must interfere as they\napproach. (3) This diminishes too much from the greatness of ancient\nRome, and reduces that city below even Bristol or Rotterdam.\n\nThe sense which Vossius, in his _Observationes Vari\u00e6_, puts on this\npassage of Pliny errs widely in the other extreme. One manuscript of\nno authority, instead of thirteen miles, has assigned thirty miles for\nthe compass of the walls of Rome; and Vossius understands this only\nof the curvilinear part of the circumference, supposing that, as the\nTiber formed the diameter, there were no walls built on that side. But\n(1) this reading is allowed contrary to almost all the manuscripts.\n(2) Why should Pliny, a concise writer, repeat the compass of the\nwalls of Rome in two successive sentences? (3) Why repeat it with so\nsensible a variation? (4) What is the meaning of Pliny\u2019s mentioning\ntwice the Milliarium if a line was measured that had no dependence on\nthe Milliarium? (5) Aurelian\u2019s wall is said by Vopiscus to have been\ndrawn _laxiore ambitu_, and to have comprehended all the buildings\nand suburbs on the north side of the Tiber, yet its compass was only\nfifty miles; and even here critics suspect some mistake or corruption\nin the text. It is not probable that Rome would diminish from Augustus\nto Aurelian. It remained still the capital of the same empire; and\nnone of the civil wars in that long period, except the tumults on\nthe death of Maximus and Balbinus, ever affected the city. Caracalla\nis said by Aurelius Victor to have increased Rome. (6) There are no\nremains of ancient buildings which mark any such greatness of Rome.\nVossius\u2019s reply to this objection seems absurd\u2014that the rubbish would\nsink sixty or seventy feet below ground. It appears from Spartian (_in\nvita Severi_) that the five-mile stone _in via Lavicana_ was out of the\ncity. (7) Olympiodorus and Publius Victor fix the number of houses in\nRome to be between forty and fifty thousand. (8) The very extravagance\nof the consequences drawn by this critic, as well as Lipsius, if they\nbe necessary, destroys the foundation on which they are grounded\u2014that\nRome contained fourteen millions of inhabitants, while the whole\nkingdom of France contains only five, according to his computation, etc.\n\nThe only objection to the sense which we have affixed above to the\npassage of Pliny seems to lie in this, that Pliny, after mentioning\nthe thirty-seven gates of Rome, assigns only a reason for suppressing\nthe seven old ones, and says nothing of the eighteen gates, the\nstreets leading from which terminated, according to my opinion, before\nthey reached the Forum. But as Pliny was writing to the Romans, who\nperfectly knew the disposition of the streets, it is not strange\nhe should take a circumstance for granted which was so familiar to\neverybody. Perhaps, too, many of these gates led to wharves upon the\nriver.\n\n\n[86] Not to take the people too much from their business, Augustus\nordained the distribution of corn to be made only thrice a year; but\nthe people, finding the monthly distribution more convenient (as\npreserving, I suppose, a more regular economy in their family), desired\nto have them restored. (Sueton. August. cap. 40.) Had not some of the\npeople come from some distance for their corn, Augustus\u2019s precaution\nseems superfluous.\n\n\n[87] Quintus Curtius says its walls were only ten miles in\ncircumference when founded by Alexander (lib. 4, cap. 8). Strabo, who\nhad travelled to Alexandria, as well as Diodorus Siculus, says it was\nscarce four miles long, and in most places about a mile broad (lib.\n17). Pliny says it resembled a Macedonian cassock, stretching out in\nthe corners (lib. 5, cap. 10). Notwithstanding this bulk of Alexandria,\nwhich seems but moderate, Diodorus Siculus, speaking of its circuit as\ndrawn by Alexander (which it never exceeded, as we learn from Ammianus\nMarcellinus, lib. 22, cap. 16), says it was \u03bc\u03b5\u03b3\u03b5\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1,\nextremely great (_ibid._). The reason why he assigns for its surpassing\nall cities of the world (for he excepts not Rome) is that it contained\n300,000 free inhabitants. He also mentions the revenues of the\nkings\u2014viz., 6000 talents\u2014as another circumstance to the same purpose,\nno such mighty sum in our eyes, even though we make allowances for\nthe different value of money. What Strabo says of the neighbouring\ncountry means only that it was well peopled, \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03c9\u03c2. Might\nnot one affirm, without any great hyperbole, that the whole banks of\nthe river from Gravesend to Windsor are one city? This is even more\nthan Strabo says of the banks of the lake Mareotis, and of the canal\nto Canopus. It is a vulgar saying in Italy that the King of Sardinia\nhas but one town in Piedmont\u2014for it is all a town. Agrippa in Josephus\n(_de bello Judaie_, lib. 2, cap. 16), to make his audience comprehend\nthe excessive greatness of Alexandria, which he endeavours to magnify,\ndescribes only the compass of the city as drawn by Alexander, a clear\nproof that the bulk of the inhabitants were lodged there, and that the\nneighbouring country was no more than what might be expected about all\ngreat towns, very well cultivated and well peopled.\n\n\n[88] He says \u1f10\u03bb\u03b5\u03c5\u03b8\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9, not \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, which last expression must have\nbeen understood of citizens alone, and grown men.\n\n\n[89] He says (in _Nerone_, cap. 30) that a portico or piazza of it\nwas 3000 feet long; \u201ctanta laxitas ut porticus triplices milliarias\nhaberet.\u201d He cannot mean three miles, for the whole extent of the house\nfrom the Palatine to the Esquiline was not near so great. So when\nVopiscus, in _Aureliano_, mentions a portico of Sallust\u2019s gardens,\nwhich he calls _porticus milliariensis_, it must be understood of a\nthousand feet. So also Horace\u2014\n\n          \u201cNulla decempedis\n    Metata privatis opacam\n    Porticus excipiebat Arcton.\u201d (Lib. ii. ode 15.)\n\nSo also in lib. i. Satyr. 8\u2014\n\n    \u201cMille pedes in fronte, trecentos cippus in agrum\n    Hic dabat.\u201d\n\n\n[90] Lib. ix. cap. 10. His expression is \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2, not \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2;\ninhabitant, not citizen.\n\n\n[91] Such were Alexandria, Antioch, Carthage, Ephesus, Lyons, etc.,\nin the Roman Empire. Such are even Bordeaux, Toulouse, Dijon, Rennes,\nRouen, Aix, etc., in France; Dublin, Edinburgh, York, in the British\ndominions.\n\n\n[92] The warm southern colonies also become more healthful; and it is\nremarkable that in the Spanish histories of the first discovery and\nconquest of these countries they appear to have been very healthful,\nbeing then well peopled and cultivated. No account of the sickness or\ndecay of Cortes\u2019s or Pizarro\u2019s small armies.\n\n\n[93] He seems to have lived about the time of the younger Africanus.\n(Lib. i. cap. 1.)\n\n\n[94] C\u00e6sar, _De bello Gallico_, lib. 16. Strabo (lib. 7) says the Gauls\nwere not much more improved than the Germans.\n\n\n[95] Ancient Gaul was more extensive than modern France.\n\n\n[96] It appears from C\u00e6sar\u2019s account that the Gauls had no domestic\nslaves, who formed a different order from the Plebes. The whole common\npeople were indeed a kind of slaves to the nobility, as the people\nof Poland are at this day; and a nobleman of Gaul had sometimes ten\nthousand dependants of this kind. Nor can we doubt that the armies were\ncomposed of the people as well as of the nobility. An army of 100,000\nnoblemen from a very small state is incredible. The fighting men\namongst the Helvetii were the fourth part of the whole inhabitants\u2014a\nclear proof that all the males of military age bore arms. See C\u00e6sar,\n_De bello Gall._, lib. 1.\n\nWe may remark that the numbers in C\u00e6sar\u2019s commentaries can be more\ndepended on than those of any other ancient author, because of the\nGreek translation which still remains, and which checks the Latin\noriginal.\n\n\n[97] \u201cNec numero Hispanos, nec robore Gallos, nec calliditate P\u0153nos,\nnec artibus Gr\u00e6cos, nec denique hoc ipso hujus gentis, ac terr\u00e6\ndomestico nativoque sensu, Italos ipsos ac Latinos\u2014superavimus.\u201d (_De\nharusp. resp._, cap. 9.) The disorders of Spain seem to have been\nalmost proverbial: \u201cNec impacatos a tergo horrebis Iberos.\u201d (Virg.\n_Georg._, lib. 3.) The Iberi are here plainly taken by a poetical\nfigure for robbers in general.\n\n\n[98] Though the observations of l\u2019Abb\u00e9 du Bos should be admitted that\nItaly is now warmer than in former times, the consequence may not be\nnecessary that it is more populous or better cultivated. If the other\ncountries of Europe were more savage and woody, the cold winds that\nblew from them might affect the climate of Italy.\n\n\n[99] The inhabitants of Marseilles lost not their superiority over\nthe Gauls in commerce and the mechanic arts till the Roman dominion\nturned the latter from arms to agriculture and civil life. (See Strabo,\nlib. 4.) That author, in several places, repeats the observation\nconcerning the improvement arising from the Roman arts and civility,\nand he lived at the time when the change was new and would be more\nsensible. So also Pliny: \u201cQuis enim non, communicato orbe terrarum,\nmajestate Romani imperii, profecisse vitam putet, commercio rerum ac\nsocietate festae pacis, omniaque etiam, quae occulta antea fuerant, in\npromiscuo usu facta.\u201d (Lib. 14, pro\u0153m.) \u201cNumine deum electa [speaking\nof Italy] quae coelum ipsum clarius faceret, sparsa congregaret\nimperia, ritusque molliret, et tot populorum discordes, ferasque\nlinguas fermonis commercio contraheret ad colloquia, et humanitatem\nhomini daret; breviterque, una cunctarum gentium in toto orbe patria\nfieret.\u201d (Lib. 2, cap. 5.) Nothing can be stronger to this purpose\nthan the following passage from Tertullian, who lived about the age of\nSeverus:\u2014\u201cCerte quidem ipse orbis in promptu est, cultior de die et\ninstructior pristino. Omnia jam pervia, omnia nota, omnia negotiosa.\nSolitudines famosas retro fundi amoenissimi obliteraverunt, silvas arva\ndomuerunt, feras pecora fugaverunt; arenae seruntur, saxa panguntur,\npaludes eliquantur, tantae urbes, quantae non casae quondam. Jam nec\ninsulae horrent, nec scopuli terrent; ubique domus, ubique populus,\nubique respublica, ubique vita. Summum testimonium frequentiae humanae,\nonerosi sumus mundo, vix nobis elementa sufficiunt; et necessitates\narctiores, et quaerelae apud omnes, dum jam nos natura non sustinet.\u201d\n(_De anima_, cap. 30.) The air of rhetoric and declamation which\nappears in this passage diminishes somewhat from its authority, but\ndoes not entirely destroy it. The same remark may be extended to the\nfollowing passage of Aristides the Sophist, who lived in the age of\nAdrian. \u201cThe whole world,\u201d says he, addressing himself to the Romans,\n\u201cseems to keep one holiday, and mankind, laying aside the sword which\nthey formerly wore, now betake themselves to feasting and to joy.\nThe cities, forgetting their ancient contentions, preserve only one\nemulation, which shall embellish itself most by every art and ornament?\nTheatres everywhere arise, amphitheatres, porticoes, aqueducts,\ntemples, schools, academies; and one may safely pronounce that the\nsinking world has been again raised by your auspicious empire. Nor have\ncities alone received an increase of ornament and beauty; but the whole\nearth, like a garden or paradise, is cultivated and adorned; insomuch\nthat such of mankind as are placed out of the limits of your empire\n(who are but few) seem to merit our sympathy and compassion.\u201d\n\nIt is remarkable that though Diodorus Siculus makes the inhabitants of\nEgypt, when conquered by the Romans, amount only to three millions, yet\nJosephus (_De bello Jud._, lib. 2, cap. 16) says that its inhabitants,\nexcluding those of Alexandria, were seven millions and a half in the\nreign of Nero, and he expressly says that he drew this account from\nthe books of the Roman publicans who levied the poll-tax. Strabo\n(lib. 17) praises the superior police of the Romans with regard to\nthe finances of Egypt above that of its former monarchs, and no part\nof administration is more essential to the happiness of a people;\nyet we read in Athen\u00e6us (lib. 1, cap. 25), who flourished during the\nreign of the Antonines, that the town Mareia, near Alexandria, which\nwas formerly a large city, had dwindled into a village. This is not,\nproperly speaking, a contradiction. Suidas (August) says that the\nEmperor Augustus, having numbered the whole Roman Empire, found it\ncontained only 4,101,017 men (\u1f00\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1\u03b5\u03c2). There is here surely some great\nmistake, either in the author or transcriber; but this authority,\nfeeble as it is, may be sufficient to counterbalance the exaggerated\naccounts of Herodotus and Diodorus Siculus with regard to more early\ntimes.\n\n\n[100] Lib. 2, cap. 62. It may perhaps be imagined that Polybius, being\ndependent on Rome, would naturally extol the Roman dominion; but, in\nthe first place, Polybius, though one sees sometimes instances of his\ncaution, discovers no symptoms of flattery. Secondly, this opinion is\nonly delivered in a single stroke, by the by, while he is intent upon\nanother subject, and it is allowed, if there be any suspicion of an\nauthor\u2019s insincerity, that these oblique propositions discover his real\nopinion better than his more formal and direct assertions.\n\n\n[101] I must confess that that discourse of Plutarch concerning the\nsilence of the oracles is in general of so odd a texture, and so unlike\nhis other productions, that one is at a loss what judgment to form of\nit. It is written in dialogue, which is a method of composition that\nPlutarch commonly little affects. The personages he introduces advance\nvery wild, absurd, and contradictory opinions, more like visionary\nsystems or ravings of Plato than the solid sense of Plutarch. There\nruns also through the whole an air of superstition and credulity which\nresembles very little the spirit that appears in other philosophical\ncompositions of that author; for it is remarkable that though Plutarch\nbe an historian as superstitious as Herodotus or Livy, yet there is\nscarcely in all antiquity a philosopher less superstitious, excepting\nCicero and Lucian. I must therefore confess that a passage of Plutarch,\ncited from this discourse, has much less authority with me than if it\nhad been found in most of his other compositions.\n\nThere is only one other discourse of Plutarch liable to like\nobjections\u2014viz., that concerning those whose punishment is delayed by\nthe Deity. It is also written in dialogue, contains like superstitious,\nwild visions, and seems to have been chiefly composed in rivalship to\nPlato, particularly his last book, _De Republica_.\n\nAnd here I cannot but observe that Monsieur Fontenelle, a writer\neminent for candour, seems to have departed a little from his usual\ncharacter when he endeavours to throw a ridicule upon Plutarch on\naccount of passages to be met with in this dialogue concerning oracles.\nThe absurdities here put into the mouths of the several personages are\nnot to be ascribed to Plutarch. He makes them refute each other, and in\ngeneral he seems to intend the ridiculing of those very opinions which\nFontenelle would ridicule him for maintaining. (See _Histoires des\nOracles_.)\n\n\n[102] He was contemporary with C\u00e6sar and Augustus.\n\n\n\n\nOF THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT.\n\n\nAs no party, in the present age, can support itself without a\nphilosophical or speculative system of principles annexed to its\npolitical or practical one, we accordingly find that each of the\nparties into which this nation is divided has reared up a fabric of the\nformer kind, in order to protect and cover that scheme of actions which\nit pursues. The people being commonly very rude builders, especially\nin this speculative way, and more especially still when actuated by\nparty zeal, it is natural to imagine that their workmanship must\nbe a little unshapely, and discover evident marks of that violence\nand hurry in which it was raised. The one party, by tracing up the\norigin of government to the Deity, endeavour to render government\nso sacred and inviolate that it must be little less than\nsacrilege, however disorderly it may become, to touch or invade it\nin the smallest article. The other party, by founding government\naltogether on the consent of the people, suppose that there is a kind\nof original contract by which the subjects have reserved the power of\nresisting their sovereign whenever they find themselves aggrieved by\nthat authority with which they have, for certain purposes, voluntarily\nentrusted him. These are the speculative principles of the two parties,\nand these too are the practical consequences deduced from them.\n\nI shall venture to affirm that both these systems of speculative\nprinciples are just, though not in the sense intended by the parties;\nand that both the schemes of practical consequences are prudent, though\nnot in the extremes to which each party, in opposition to the other,\nhas commonly endeavoured to carry them.\n\nThat the Deity is the ultimate author of all government will never be\ndenied by any who admits a general providence, and allows that all\nevents in the universe are conducted by a uniform plan and directed\nto wise purposes. As it is impossible for the human race to subsist,\nat least in any comfortable or secure state, without the protection\nof government, government must certainly have been intended by that\nbeneficent Being, who means the good of all His creatures; and as it\nhas universally, in fact, taken place in all countries and all ages,\nwe may conclude, with still greater certainty, that it was intended\nby that omniscient Being, who can never be deceived by any event or\noperation. But since he gave rise to it, not by any particular or\nmiraculous interposition but by his concealed and universal efficacy,\na sovereign cannot, properly speaking, be called his vicegerent in\nany other sense than every power or force being derived from him\nmay be said to act by his commission. Whatever actually happens is\ncomprehended in the general plan or intention of providence; nor has\nthe greatest and most lawful prince any more reason, upon that account,\nto plead a peculiar sacredness or inviolable authority, than\nan inferior magistrate, or even a usurper, or even a robber and a\npirate. The same divine superintendent who, for wise purposes, invested\nan Elizabeth or a Henry\u200b[103] with authority, did also, for purposes\nno doubt equally wise, though unknown, bestow power on a Borgia or an\nAngria. The same causes which gave rise to the sovereign power in every\nstate, established likewise every petty jurisdiction in it, and every\nlimited authority. A constable therefore, no less than a king, acts by\na divine commission, and possesses an indefeasible right.\n\nWhen we consider how nearly equal all men are in their bodily force,\nand even in their mental powers and faculties, till cultivated by\neducation, we must necessarily allow that nothing but their own consent\ncould at first associate them together, and subject them to any\nauthority. The people, if we trace government to its first origin in\nthe woods and deserts, are the source of all power and jurisdiction,\nand voluntarily, for the sake of peace and order, abandoned their\nnative liberty, and received laws from their equal and companion.\nThe conditions upon which they were willing to submit were either\nexpressed, or were so clear and obvious that it might well be esteemed\nsuperfluous to express them. If this, then, be meant by the original\ncontract, it cannot be denied that all government is at first founded\non a contract, and that the most ancient rude combinations of mankind\nwere formed entirely by that principle. In vain are we sent to the\nrecords to seek for this charter of our liberties. It was not written\non parchment, nor yet on leaves or barks of trees. It preceded the\nuse of writing and all the other civilized arts of life. But we trace\nit plainly in the nature of man, and in the equality which we find in\nall the individuals of that species. The force which now prevails,\nand which is founded on fleets and armies, is plainly political, and\nderived from authority, the effect of established government. A man\u2019s\nnatural force consists only in the vigour of his limbs and the\nfirmness of his courage, which could never subject multitudes to the\ncommand of one. Nothing but their own consent, and their sense of the\nadvantages of peace and order, could have had that influence.\n\nBut philosophers who have embraced a party (if that be not a\ncontradiction in terms) are not contented with these concessions.\nThey assert, not only that government in its earliest infancy arose\nfrom consent or the voluntary combination of the people, but also\nthat, even at present, when it has attained its full maturity, it\nrests on no other foundation. They affirm that all men are still\nborn equal, and owe allegiance to no prince or government unless\nbound by the obligation and sanction of a promise. And as no man,\nwithout some equivalent, would forgo the advantages of his native\nliberty and subject himself to the will of another, this promise is\nalways understood to be conditional, and imposes on him no obligation\nunless he meets with justice and protection from his sovereign. These\nadvantages the sovereign promises him in return, and if he fails in\nthe execution, he has broke, on his part, the articles of engagement,\nand has thereby freed his subjects from all obligations to allegiance.\nSuch, according to these philosophers, is the foundation of authority\nin every government, and such the right of resistance possessed by\nevery subject.\n\nBut would these reasoners look abroad into the world they would meet\nwith nothing that in the least corresponds to their ideas, or can\nwarrant so refined and philosophical a theory. On the contrary, we\nfind everywhere princes who claim their subjects as their property,\nand assert their independent right of sovereignty from conquest or\nsuccession. We find also everywhere subjects who acknowledge this\nright in their princes, and suppose themselves born under obligations\nof obedience to a certain sovereign, as much as under the ties of\nreverence and duty to certain parents. These connections are always\nconceived to be equally independent of our consent, in Persia\nand China; in France and Spain; and even in Holland and England,\nwherever the doctrines above mentioned have not been carefully\ninculcated. Obedience or subjection becomes so familiar that most\nmen never make any inquiry about its origin or cause, more than about\nthe principle of gravity, resistance, or the most universal laws of\nnature. Or if curiosity ever move them, so soon as they learn that they\nthemselves and their ancestors have for several ages, or from time\nimmemorial, been subject to such a government or such a family, they\nimmediately acquiesce and acknowledge their obligation to allegiance.\nWere you to preach, in most parts of the world, that political\nconnections are founded altogether on voluntary consent or a mutual\npromise, the magistrate would soon imprison you, as seditious, for\nloosening the ties of obedience; if your friends did not shut you up,\nas delirious, for advancing such absurdities. It is strange that an\nact of the mind which every individual is supposed to have formed\u2014and\nafter he came to the use of reason too, otherwise it could have no\nauthority\u2014that this act, I say, should be so unknown to all of them,\nthat over the face of the whole earth there scarce remain any traces or\nmemory of it.\n\nBut the contract on which government is founded is said to be the\noriginal contract, and consequently may be supposed too old to fall\nunder the knowledge of the present generation. If the agreement by\nwhich savage men first associated and conjoined their force be here\nmeant, this is acknowledged to be real; but being so ancient, and being\nobliterated by a thousand changes of government and princes, it cannot\nnow be supposed to retain any authority. If we would say anything to\nthe purpose, we must assert that every particular government which is\nlawful, and which imposes any duty of allegiance on the subject, was at\nfirst founded on consent and a voluntary compact. But besides that this\nsupposes the consent of the fathers to bind the children, even to the\nmost remote generations (which republican writers will never allow),\nbesides this, I say, it is not justified by history or experience in\nany age or country of the world.\n\nAlmost all the governments which exist at present, or of which\nthere remains any record in story, have been founded originally either\non usurpation or conquest, or both, without any pretence of a fair\nconsent or voluntary subjection of the people. When an artful and bold\nman is placed at the head of an army or faction, it is often easy for\nhim, by employing sometimes violence, sometimes false pretences, to\nestablish his dominion over a people a hundred times more numerous\nthan his partisans. He allows no such open communication that his\nenemies can know with certainty their number or force. He gives them no\nleisure to assemble together in a body to oppose him. Even all those\nwho are the instruments of his usurpation may wish his fall, but their\nignorance of each other\u2019s intentions keeps them in awe, and is the sole\ncause of his security. By such arts as these many governments have been\nestablished, and this is all the original contract they have to boast\nof.\n\nThe face of the earth is continually changing by the increase of small\nkingdoms into great empires, by the dissolution of great empires into\nsmaller kingdoms, by the planting of colonies, by the migration of\ntribes. Is there anything discoverable in all these events but force\nand violence? Where is the mutual agreement or voluntary association so\nmuch talked of?\n\nEven the smoothest way by which a nation may receive a foreign master,\nby marriage or a will, is not extremely honourable for the people; but\nsupposes them to be disposed of, like a dowry or a legacy, according to\nthe pleasure or interest of their rulers.\n\nBut where no force interposes, and election takes place, what is this\nelection so highly vaunted? It is either the combination of a few great\nmen who decide for the whole, and will allow no opposition, or it is\nthe fury of a rabble that follow a seditious leader, who is not known,\nperhaps, to a dozen among them, and who owes his advancement merely to\nhis own impudence, or to the momentary caprice of his fellows.\n\nAre these disorderly elections, which are rare too, of such\nmighty authority as to be the only lawful foundation of all government\nand allegiance?\n\nIn reality there is not a more terrible event than a total dissolution\nof government, which gives liberty to the multitude, and makes the\ndetermination or choice of a new establishment depend upon a number\nwhich nearly approaches the body of the people; for it never comes\nentirely to the whole body of them. Every wise man, then, wishes to\nsee, at the head of a powerful and obedient army, a general who may\nspeedily seize the prize and give to the people a master, which they\nare so unfit to choose for themselves. So little correspondent is fact\nand reality to those philosophical notions.\n\nLet not the establishment at the Revolution deceive us, or make us so\nmuch in love with a philosophical origin to government as to imagine\nall others monstrous and irregular. Even that event was far from\ncorresponding to these refined ideas. It was only the succession,\nand that only in the regal part of the government, which was then\nchanged; and it was only the majority of seven hundred who determined\nthat change for near ten millions. I doubt not, indeed, but the bulk\nof these ten millions acquiesced willingly in the determination; but\nwas the matter left, in the least, to their choice? Was it not justly\nsupposed to be from that moment decided, and every man punished who\nrefused to submit to the new sovereign? How otherways could the matter\nhave ever been brought to any issue or conclusion?\n\nThe Republic of Athens was, I believe, the most extensive democracy\nwhich we read of in history. Yet if we make the requisite allowances\nfor the women, the slaves, and the strangers, we shall find that\nthat establishment was not at first made, nor any law ever voted, by\na tenth part of those who were bound to pay obedience to it; not to\nmention the islands and foreign dominions which the Athenians claimed\nas theirs by right of conquest. And as it is well known that popular\nassemblies in that city were always full of licence and disorder,\nnotwithstanding the forms and laws by which they were checked, how\nmuch more disorderly must they be where they form not the established\nconstitution, but meet tumultuously on the dissolution of the ancient\ngovernment in order to give rise to a new one? How chimerical must it\nbe to talk of a choice in any such circumstances?\n\nThe Ach\u00e6ans enjoyed the freest and most perfect democracy of all\nantiquity; yet they employed force to oblige some cities to enter into\ntheir league, as we learn from Polybius.\n\nHenry IV. and Henry VII. of England had really no other title to the\nthrone but a parliamentary election; yet they never would acknowledge\nit, for fear of weakening their authority. Strange! if the only real\nfoundation of all authority be consent and promise.\n\nIt is vain to say that all governments are, or should be, at first,\nfounded on popular consent, as much as the necessity of human affairs\nwill admit. This favours entirely my pretension. I maintain that human\naffairs will never admit of this consent; seldom of the appearance of\nit. But that conquest or usurpation\u2014that is, in plain terms, force\u2014by\ndissolving the ancient governments, is the origin of almost all the\nnew ones which ever were established in the world; and that in the few\ncases, where consent may seem to have taken place, it was commonly so\nirregular, so confined, or so much intermixed either with fraud or\nviolence, that it cannot have any great authority.\n\nMy intention here is not to exclude the consent of the people from\nbeing one just foundation of government where it has place. It is\nsurely the best and most sacred of any. I only pretend that it has very\nseldom had place in any degree, and never almost in its full extent;\nand that therefore some other foundation of government must also be\nadmitted.\n\nWere all men possessed of so inflexible a regard to justice that, of\nthemselves, they would totally abstain from the properties of others,\nthey had for ever remained in a state of absolute liberty without\nsubjection to any magistrates or political society; but this\nis a state of perfection, of which human nature is justly esteemed\nincapable. Again, were all men possessed of so just an understanding\nas always to know their own interest, no form of government had ever\nbeen submitted to but what was established on consent, and was fully\ncanvassed by each member of the society; but this state of perfection\nis likewise much superior to human nature. Reason, history, and\nexperience show us that all political societies have had an origin much\nless accurate and regular; and were one to choose a period of time\nwhen the people\u2019s consent was least regarded in public transactions,\nit would be precisely on the establishment of a new government. In a\nsettled constitution their inclinations are often studied; but during\nthe fury of revolutions, conquests, and public convulsions, military\nforce or political craft usually decides the controversy.\n\nWhen a new government is established, by whatever means, the people are\ncommonly dissatisfied with it, and pay obedience more from fear and\nnecessity than from any idea of allegiance or of moral obligation. The\nprince is watchful and jealous, and must carefully guard against every\nbeginning or appearance of insurrection. Time, by degrees, removes\nall these difficulties, and accustoms the nation to regard, as their\nlawful or native princes, that family whom at first they considered as\nusurpers or foreign conquerors. In order to found this opinion, they\nhave no recourse to any notion of voluntary consent or promise, which,\nthey know, never was in this case either expected or demanded. The\noriginal establishment was formed by violence, and submitted to from\nnecessity. The subsequent administration is also supported by power,\nand acquiesced in by the people, not as a matter of choice, but of\nobligation. They imagine not that their consent gives their prince a\ntitle; but they willingly consent because they think that, from long\npossession, he has acquired a title independent of their choice or\ninclination.\n\nShould it be said that by living under the dominion of a prince\nwhich one might leave, every individual has given a tacit consent to\nhis authority, and promised him obedience, it may be answered that\nsuch implied consent can only take place where a man imagines that\nthe matter depends on his choice. But where he thinks (as all mankind\ndo who are born under established governments) that by his birth he\nowes allegiance to a certain prince or certain government, it would be\nabsurd to infer a consent or choice, which he expressly, in this case,\nrenounces and abjures.\n\nCan we seriously say that a poor peasant or artisan has a free choice\nto leave his own country, when he knows no foreign language or manners,\nand lives from day to day by the same small wages which he acquires?\nWe may as well assert that a man, by remaining in a vessel, freely\nconsents to the dominion of the master, though he was carried on board\nwhile asleep, and must leap into the ocean and perish the moment he\nleaves her.\n\nWhat if the prince forbid his subjects to quit his dominions, as in\nTiberius\u2019s time it was regarded as a crime in a Roman knight that he\nhad attempted to fly to the Parthians, in order to escape the tyranny\nof that emperor? Or as the ancient Muscovites prohibited all travelling\nunder pain of death? And did a prince observe that many of his subjects\nwere seized with the frenzy of transporting themselves to foreign\ncountries, he would doubtless, with great reason and justice, restrain\nthem, in order to prevent the depopulation of his own kingdom. Would he\nforfeit the allegiance of all his subjects by so wise and reasonable a\nlaw? Yet the freedom of their choice is surely, in that case, ravished\nfrom them.\n\nA company of men who should leave their native country in order to\npeople some uninhabited region might dream of recovering their native\nfreedom; but they would soon find that their prince still laid claim to\nthem, and called them his subjects, even in their new settlement. And\nin this he would but act conformably to the common ideas of mankind.\n\nThe truest tacit consent of this kind which is ever observed is when\na foreigner settles in any country, and is beforehand acquainted with\nthe prince and government and laws to which he must submit; yet is his\nallegiance, though more voluntary, much less expected or depended on\nthan that of a natural born subject. On the contrary, his native prince\nstill asserts a claim to him. And if he punishes not the renegade when\nhe seizes him in war with his new prince\u2019s commission, this clemency\nis not founded on the municipal law, which in all countries condemns\nthe prisoner, but on the consent of princes who have agreed to this\nindulgence in order to prevent reprisals.\n\nSuppose a usurper, after having banished his lawful prince and royal\nfamily, should establish his dominion for ten or a dozen years in any\ncountry, and should preserve such exact discipline in his troops and so\nregular a disposition in his garrisons that no insurrection had ever\nbeen raised, or even murmur heard, against his administration, can it\nbe asserted that the people, who in their hearts abhor his treason,\nhave tacitly consented to his authority and promised him allegiance\nmerely because, from necessity, they live under his dominion? Suppose\nagain their natural prince restored, by means of an army which\nhe assembles in foreign countries, they receive him with joy and\nexultation, and show plainly with what reluctance they had submitted to\nany other yoke. I may now ask upon what foundation the prince\u2019s title\nstands? Not on popular consent surely; for though the people willingly\nacquiesce in his authority, they never imagine that their consent makes\nhim sovereign. They consent because they apprehend him to be already,\nby birth, their lawful sovereign. And as to that tacit consent, which\nmay now be inferred from their living under his dominion, this is no\nmore than what they formerly gave to the tyrant and usurper.\n\nWhen we assert that all lawful government arises from the people,\nwe certainly do them more honour than they deserve, or even expect\nand desire from us. After the Roman dominions became too unwieldy\nfor the republic to govern, the people over the whole known\nworld were extremely grateful to Augustus for that authority which,\nby violence, he had established over them; and they showed an equal\ndisposition to submit to the successor whom he left them by his last\nwill and testament. It was afterwards their misfortune that there never\nwas in one family any long, regular succession; but that their line\nof princes was continually broke, either by private assassination or\npublic rebellion. The pr\u00e6torean bands, on the failure of every family,\nset up one emperor, the legions in the East a second, those in Germany\nperhaps a third; and the sword alone could decide the controversy. The\ncondition of the people in that mighty monarchy was to be lamented,\nnot because the choice of the emperor was never left to them, for that\nwas impracticable, but because they never fell under any succession of\nmasters, who might regularly follow each other. As to the violence and\nwars and bloodshed occasioned by every new settlement, those were not\nblameable, because they were inevitable.\n\nThe house of Lancaster ruled in this island about sixty years, yet the\npartisans of the white rose seemed daily to multiply in England. The\npresent establishment has taken place during a still longer period.\nHave all views of right in another family been extinguished, even\nthough scarce any man now alive had arrived at years of discretion\nwhen it was expelled, or could have consented to its dominion, or have\npromised it allegiance? A sufficient indication surely of the general\nsentiment of mankind on this head. For we blame not the partisans\nof the abdicated family merely on account of the long time during\nwhich they have preserved their imaginary fidelity; we blame them for\nadhering to a family which, we affirm, has been justly expelled, and\nwhich, from the moment the new settlement took place, had forfeited all\ntitle to authority.\n\nBut would we have a more regular, at least a more philosophical,\nrefutation of this principle of an original contract or popular\nconsent, perhaps the following observations may suffice.\n\nAll moral duties may be divided into two kinds. The first are those to\nwhich men are impelled by a natural instinct or immediate propensity\nwhich operates in them, independent of all ideas of obligation and of\nall views, either to public or private utility. Of this nature are\nlove of children, gratitude to benefactors, pity to the unfortunate.\nWhen we reflect on the advantage which results to society from such\nhumane instincts, we pay them the just tribute of moral approbation and\nesteem; but the person actuated by them feels their power and influence\nantecedent to any such reflection.\n\nThe second kind of moral duties are such as are not supported by any\noriginal instinct of nature, but are performed entirely from a sense\nof obligation, when we consider the necessities of human society and\nthe impossibility of supporting it if these duties were neglected. It\nis thus justice or a regard to the property of others, fidelity or the\nobservance of promises, become obligatory and acquire an authority over\nmankind. For as it is evident that every man loves himself better than\nany other person, he is naturally impelled to extend his acquisitions\nas much as possible; and nothing can restrain him in this propensity\nbut reflection and experience, by which he learns the pernicious\neffects of that licence and the total dissolution of society which must\nensue from it. His original inclination, therefore, or instinct, is\nhere checked and restrained by a subsequent judgment or observation.\n\nThe case is precisely the same with the political or civil duty of\nallegiance as with the natural duties of justice and fidelity. Our\nprimary instincts lead us either to indulge ourselves in unlimited\nliberty or to seek dominion over others; and it is this reflection only\nwhich engages us to sacrifice such strong passions to the interests\nof peace and order. A very small degree of experience and observation\nsuffices to teach us that society cannot possibly be maintained without\nthe authority of magistrates, and that this authority must soon fall\ninto contempt where exact obedience is not paid to it. The observation\nof these general and obvious interests is the source of all\nallegiance, and of that moral obligation which we attribute to it.\n\nWhat necessity, therefore, is there to found the duty of allegiance or\nobedience to magistrates on that of fidelity or a regard to promises,\nand to suppose that it is the consent of each individual which subjects\nhim to government, when it appears that both allegiance and fidelity\nstand precisely on the same foundation, and are both submitted to by\nmankind, on account of the apparent interests and necessities of human\nsociety? We are bound to obey our sovereign, it is said, because we\nhave given a tacit promise to that purpose. But why are we bound to\nobserve our promise? It must here be asserted that the commerce and\nintercourse of mankind, which are of such mighty advantage, can have no\nsecurity where men pay no regard to their engagements. In like manner\nmay it be said that men could not live at all in society, at least in a\ncivilized society, without laws and magistrates and judges to prevent\nthe encroachments of the strong upon the weak, of the violent upon the\njust and equitable. The obligation to allegiance being of like force\nand authority with the obligation to fidelity, we gain nothing by\nresolving the one into the other. The general interests or necessities\nof society are sufficient to establish both.\n\nIf the reason is asked of that obedience which we are bound to pay\nto government, I readily answer, because society could not otherwise\nsubsist. And this answer is clear and intelligible to all mankind. Your\nanswer is, because we should keep our word. But besides that, nobody,\ntill trained in a philosophical system, can either comprehend or relish\nthis answer; besides this, I say, you find yourself embarrassed when it\nis asked why we are bound to keep our word, and you can give no other\nanswer but what would immediately, without any circuit, have accounted\nfor our obligation to allegiance.\n\nBut to whom is allegiance due? And who are our lawful sovereigns?\nThis question is often the most difficult of any, and liable to\ninfinite discussions. When people are so happy that they can answer,\n\u201cOur present sovereign, who inherits, in a direct line, from\nancestors that have governed us for many ages,\u201d this answer admits\nof no reply, even though historians, in tracing up to the remotest\nantiquity the origin of that royal family, may find, as commonly\nhappens, that its first authority was derived from usurpation and\nviolence. It is confessed that private justice, or the abstinence\nfrom the properties of others, is a most cardinal virtue; yet reason\ntells us that there is no property in durable objects, such as lands\nor houses, when carefully examined in passing from hand to hand, but\nmust in some period have been founded on fraud and injustice. The\nnecessities of human society, neither in private nor public life, will\nallow of such an accurate inquiry; and there is no virtue or moral duty\nbut what may with facility be refined away if we indulge in a false\nphilosophy, in sifting and scrutinizing it, by every captious rule of\nlogic, in every light or position in which it may be placed.\n\nThe questions with regard to public property have filled infinite\nvolumes of law and philosophy, if in both we add the commentators to\nthe original text; and in the end we may safely pronounce that many of\nthe rules there established are uncertain, ambiguous, and arbitrary.\nThe like opinion may be formed with regard to the successions and\nrights of princes and forms of government. Many cases no doubt occur,\nespecially in the infancy of any government, which admit of no\ndetermination from the laws of justice and equity; and our historian\nRapin allows that the controversy between Edward III. and Philip de\nValois was of this nature, and could be decided only by an appeal to\nheaven\u2014that is, by war and violence.\n\nWho shall tell me whether Germanicus or Drusus ought to have succeeded\nTiberius had he died while they were both alive without naming either\nof them for his successor? Ought the right of adoption to be received\nas equivalent to that of blood in a nation where it had the same effect\nin private families, and had already in two instances taken place in\nthe public? Ought Germanicus to be esteemed the eldest son because he\nwas born before Drusus, or the younger because he was adopted\nafter the birth of his brother? Ought the right of the elder to be\nregarded in a nation where the eldest brother had no advantage in the\nsuccession of private families? Ought the Roman Empire at that time to\nbe esteemed hereditary because of two examples, or ought it even so\nearly to be regarded as belonging to the stronger or present possessor\nas being founded on so recent a usurpation?\n\nCommodus mounted the throne after a pretty long succession of excellent\nemperors, who had acquired their title, not by birth or public\nelection, but by the fictitious rite of adoption. That bloody debauchee\nbeing murdered by a conspiracy suddenly formed between his wench and\nher gallant, who happened at that time to be Pr\u00e6torian Prefect, these\nimmediately deliberated about choosing a master to humankind, to speak\nin the style of those ages; and they cast their eyes on Pertinax.\nBefore the tyrant\u2019s death was known the Prefect went silently to that\nsenator, who, on the appearance of the soldiers, imagined that his\nexecution had been ordered by Commodus. He was immediately saluted\nEmperor by the officer and his attendants; cheerfully proclaimed by the\npopulace; unwillingly submitted to by the guards; formally recognised\nby the senate; and passively received by the provinces and armies of\nthe Empire.\n\nThe discontent of the Pr\u00e6torian bands soon broke out in a sudden\nsedition, which occasioned the murder of that excellent prince; and\nthe world being now without a master and without government, the\nguards thought proper to set the Empire formally to sale. Julian, the\npurchaser, was proclaimed by the soldiers, recognized by the senate,\nand submitted to by the people, and must also have been submitted to\nby the provinces had not the envy of the legions begot opposition and\nresistance. Pescennius Niger in Syria elected himself Emperor, gained\nthe tumultuary consent of his army, and was attended with the secret\ngood-will of the senate and people of Rome. Albinus in Britain found an\nequal right to set up his claim; but Severus, who governed Pannonia,\nprevailed in the end above both of them. That able politician\nand warrior, finding his own birth and dignity too much inferior to the\nimperial crown, professed at first an intention only of revenging the\ndeath of Pertinax. He marched as general into Italy, defeated Julian,\nand without our being able to fix any precise commencement even of the\nsoldiers\u2019 consent, he was from necessity acknowledged Emperor by the\nsenate and people, and fully established in his violent authority by\nsubduing Niger and Albinus.\n\n\u201cInter h\u00e6c Gordianus C\u00e6sar,\u201d says Capitolinus, speaking of another\nperiod, \u201csublatus a militibus, Imperator, est appellatus, quia non erat\nalius in pr\u00e6senti.\u201d It is to be remarked that Gordian was a boy of\nfourteen years of age.\n\nFrequent instances of a like nature occur in the history of the\nemperors; in that of Alexander\u2019s successors, and of many other\ncountries. Nor can anything be more unhappy than a despotic government\nof that kind, where the succession is disjointed and irregular, and\nmust be determined on every occasion by force or election. In a free\ngovernment the matter is often unavoidable, and is also much less\ndangerous. The interests of liberty may there frequently lead the\npeople in their own defence to alter the succession of the crown,\nand the constitution being compounded of parts, may still maintain a\nsufficient stability by resting on the aristocratical or democratical\nmembers, though the monarchical be altered from time to time in order\nto accommodate it to the former.\n\nIn an absolute government when there is no legal prince who has a title\nto the throne, it may safely be determined to belong to the first\noccupier. Instances of this kind are but too frequent, especially in\nthe Eastern monarchies. When any race of princes expires the will or\ndestination of the last sovereign will be regarded as a title. Thus the\nedict of Louis XIV., who called the bastard princes to the succession\nin case of the failure of all the legitimate princes, would, in such\nan event, have some authority.\u200b[104] Thus the will of Charles\nII. disposed of the whole Spanish monarchy. The cession of the ancient\nproprietor, especially when joined to conquest, is likewise esteemed\na very good title. The general bond of obligation which unites us\nto government is the interest and necessities of society, and this\nobligation is very strong. The determination of it to this or that\nparticular prince or form of government is frequently more uncertain\nand dubious. Present possession has considerable authority in these\ncases, and greater than in private property, because of the disorders\nwhich attend all revolutions and changes of government.\u200b[105]\n\nWe shall only observe, before we conclude, that though an appeal to\ngeneral opinion may justly, in the speculative sciences of metaphysics,\nnatural philosophy, or astronomy, be esteemed unfair and inconclusive,\nyet in all questions with regard to morals, as well as criticism, there\nis really no standard by which any controversy can ever be decided.\nAnd nothing is a clearer proof that a theory of this kind is erroneous\nthan to find that it leads to paradoxes which are repugnant to the\ncommon sentiments of mankind and to general practice and opinion. The\ndoctrine which founds all lawful government on an original contract,\nor consent of the people, is plainly of this kind; nor has the\nablest of its partisans in prosecution of it scrupled to affirm that\nabsolute monarchy is inconsistent with civil society, and so can be no\nform of civil government at all,\u200b[106] and that the supreme power in a\nstate cannot take from any man by taxes and impositions any part of his\nproperty without his own consent or that of his representatives.\u200b[107]\nWhat authority any moral reasoning can have which leads to opinions so\nwide of the general practice of mankind in every place but this single\nkingdom it is easy to determine.\u200b[108]\n\n\nNOTES, OF THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT.\n\n[103] Henry IV. of France.\n\n\n[104] It is remarkable that in the remonstrance of the Duke\nof Bourbon and the legitimate princes against this destination of\nLouis XIV., the doctrine of the original contract is insisted on, even\nin that absolute government. The French nation, say they, choosing\nHugh Capet and his posterity to rule over them and their posterity,\nwhere the former line fails, there is a tacit right reserved to\nchoose a new royal family; and this right is invaded by calling the\nbastard princes to the throne without the consent of the nation. But\nthe Comte de Boulainvilliers, who wrote in defence of the bastard\nprinces, ridicules this notion of an original contract, especially\nwhen applied to Hugh Capet; who mounted the throne, says he, by\nthe same arts which have ever been employed by all conquerors and\nusurpers. He got his title, indeed, recognized by the states after\nhe had put himself in possession. But is this a choice or contract?\nThe Comte de Boulainvilliers, we may observe, was a noted republican;\nbut being a man of learning, and very conversant in history, he knew\nthe people were never almost consulted in these revolutions and new\nestablishments, and that time alone bestowed right and authority on\nwhat was commonly at first founded on force and violence. (See _\u00c9tat de\nla France_, vol. iii.)\n\n\n[105] The crime of rebellion amongst the ancients was commonly\nmarked by the terms \u03bd\u03b5\u03c9\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, _novas res moliri_.\n\n\n[106] See Locke on Government, chap. 7, \u00a7 90.\n\n\n[107] Locke on Government, chap. 11, \u00a7 138, 139, 140.\n\n\n[108] The only passage I meet with in antiquity where the\nobligation of obedience to government is ascribed to a promise is in\nPlato\u2014_in Critone_, where Socrates refuses to escape from prison,\nbecause he had tacitly promised to obey the laws. Thus he builds a Tory\nconsequence of passive obedience on a Whig foundation of the original\ncontract.\n\nNew discoveries are not to be expected in these matters. If no\nman, till very lately, ever imagined that government was founded\non contract, it is certain it cannot, in general, have any such\nfoundation.\n\n\n\n\nOF PASSIVE OBEDIENCE.\n\n\nIn the former essay we endeavoured to refute the speculative systems\nof politics advanced in this nation, as well the religious system of\nthe one party as the philosophical of the other. We come now to examine\nthe practical consequences deduced by each party with regard to the\nmeasures of submission due to sovereigns.\n\nAs the obligation to justice is founded entirely on the interests of\nsociety, which require mutual abstinence from property, in order to\npreserve peace among mankind, it is evident that, when the execution\nof justice would be attended with very pernicious consequences, that\nvirtue must be suspended, and give place to public utility in such\nextraordinary and such pressing emergencies. The maxim, _fiat\nJustitia, ruat C\u0153lum_ (let justice be performed though the universe\nbe destroyed), is apparently false, and by sacrificing the end to\nthe means shows a preposterous idea of the subordination of duties.\nWhat governor of a town makes any scruple of burning the suburbs\nwhen they facilitate the advances of the enemy? Or what general\nabstains from plundering a neutral country when the necessities of\nwar require it, and he cannot otherwise maintain his army? The case\nis the same with the duty of allegiance; and common sense teaches\nus, that as government binds us to obedience only on account of its\ntendency to public utility, that duty must always, in extraordinary\ncases, when public ruin would evidently attend obedience, yield to\nthe primary and original obligation. _Salus populi suprema Lex_ (the\nsafety of the people is the supreme law). This maxim is agreeable to\nthe sentiments of mankind in all ages; nor is any one, when he reads\nof the insurrections against a Nero, or a Philip, so infatuated with\nparty-systems as not to wish success to the enterprise and praise the\nundertakers. Even our high monarchical party, in spite of their sublime\ntheory, are forced in such cases to judge and feel and approve in\nconformity to the rest of mankind.\n\nResistance, therefore, being admitted in extraordinary emergencies,\nthe question can only be among good reasoners with regard to the\ndegree of necessity which can justify resistance and render it lawful\nor commendable. And here I must confess that I shall always incline\nto their side who draw the bond of allegiance the closest possible,\nand consider an infringement of it as the last refuge in desperate\ncases when the public is in the highest danger from violence and\ntyranny; for besides the mischiefs of a civil war, which commonly\nattends insurrection, it is certain that where a disposition to\nrebellion appears among any people it is one chief cause of tyranny\nin the rulers, and forces them into many violent measures which they\nnever would have embraced had every one seemed inclined to submission\nand obedience. It is thus the tyrannicide or assassination,\napproved of by ancient maxims, instead of keeping tyrants and usurpers\nin awe, made them ten times more fierce and unrelenting; and is now\njustly, upon that account, abolished by the laws of nations, and\nuniversally condemned as a base and treacherous method of bringing to\njustice these disturbers of society.\n\nBesides, we must consider that, as obedience is our duty in the\ncommon course of things, it ought chiefly to be inculcated; nor can\nanything be more preposterous than an anxious care and solicitude in\nstating all the cases in which resistance may be allowed. Thus, though\na philosopher reasonably acknowledges in the course of an argument\nthat the rules of justice may be dispensed with in cases of urgent\nnecessity, what should we think of a preacher or casuist who should\nmake it his chief study to find out such cases and enforce them with\nall the vehemence of argument and eloquence? Would he not be better\nemployed in inculcating the general doctrine than in displaying the\nparticular exceptions, which we are, perhaps, but too much inclined of\nourselves to embrace and extend?\n\nThere are, however, two reasons which may be pleaded in defence of that\nparty among us who have, with so much industry, propagated the maxims\nof resistance\u2014maxims which, it must be confessed, are in general so\npernicious and so destructive of civil society. The first is that their\nantagonists carrying the doctrine of obedience to such an extravagant\nheight as not only never to mention the exceptions in extraordinary\ncases (which might perhaps be excusable), but even positively to\nexclude them, it became necessary to insist on these exceptions, and\ndefend the rights of injured truth and liberty. The second and perhaps\nbetter reason is founded on the nature of the British constitution and\nform of government.\n\nIt is almost peculiar to our constitution to establish a first\nmagistrate with such high pre-eminence and dignity that, though limited\nby the laws, he is in a manner, so far as regards his own person, above\nthe laws, and can neither be questioned nor punished for any injury\nor wrong which may be committed by him. His ministers alone,\nor those who act by his commission, are obnoxious to justice; and\nwhile the prince is thus allured by the prospect of personal safety\nto give the laws their free course, an equal security is in effect\nobtained by the punishment of lesser offenders, and at the same time a\ncivil war is avoided, which would be the infallible consequence were\nan attack at every turn made directly upon the sovereign. But though\nthe constitution pays this salutary compliment to the prince, it can\nnever reasonably be understood by that maxim to have determined its\nown destruction, or to have established a tame submission where he\nprotects his ministers, perseveres in injustice, and usurps the whole\npower of the commonwealth. This case, indeed, is never expressly put by\nthe laws, because it is impossible for them in their ordinary course\nto provide a remedy for it, or establish any magistrate with superior\nauthority to chastise the exorbitancies of the prince. But as a right\nwithout remedy would be the greatest of all absurdities, the remedy in\nthis case is the extraordinary one of resistance, when affairs come\nto that extremity that the constitution can be defended by it alone.\nResistance, therefore, must of course become more frequent in the\nBritish Government than in others which are simpler and consist of\nfewer parts and movements. Where the king is an absolute sovereign, he\nhas little temptation to commit such enormous tyranny as may justly\nprovoke rebellion; but where he is limited, his imprudent ambition,\nwithout any great vices, may run him into that perilous situation.\nThis is commonly supposed to have been the case with Charles I., and\nif we may now speak truth, after animosities are laid, this was also\nthe case with James II. These were harmless, if not, in their private\ncharacter, good men; but mistaking the nature of our constitution, and\nengrossing the whole legislative power, it became necessary to oppose\nthem with some vehemence, and even to deprive the latter formally of\nthat authority which he had used with such imprudence and indiscretion.\n\n\n\n\nOF THE COALITION OF PARTIES.\n\n\nTo abolish all distinctions of party may not be practicable, perhaps\nnot desirable, in a free government. The only parties which are\ndangerous are such as entertain opposite views with regard to the\nessentials of government, the succession of the crown, or the\nmore considerable privileges belonging to the several members of\nthe constitution; where there is no room for any compromise or\naccommodation, and where the controversy may appear so momentous as to\njustify even an opposition by arms to the pretensions of antagonists.\nOf this nature was the animosity continued for above a century between\nthe parties in England\u2014an animosity which broke out sometimes into\ncivil war, which occasioned violent revolutions, and which continually\nendangered the peace and tranquillity of the nation. But as there\nhas appeared of late the strongest symptoms of a universal desire to\nabolish these party distinctions, this tendency to a coalition affords\nthe most agreeable prospect of future happiness, and ought to be\ncarefully cherished and promoted by every lover of his country.\n\nThere is not a more effectual method of promoting so good an end than\nto prevent all unreasonable insult and triumph of the one party over\nthe other, to encourage moderate opinions, to find the proper medium\nin all disputes, to persuade each that its antagonist may possibly be\nsometimes in the right, and to keep a balance in the praise and blame\nwhich we bestow on either side. The two former essays, concerning\nthe original contract and passive obedience, are calculated for this\npurpose with regard to the philosophical controversies between the\nparties, and tend to show that neither side are in these respects so\nfully supported by reason as they endeavour to flatter themselves.\nWe shall proceed to exercise the same moderation with regard to the\nhistorical disputes, by proving that each party was justified by\nplausible topics, that there were on both sides wise men who\nmeant well to their country, and that the past animosity between the\nfactions had no better foundation than narrow prejudice or interested\npassion.\n\nThe popular party, who afterwards acquired the name of Whigs, might\njustify by very specious arguments that opposition to the crown, from\nwhich our present free constitution is derived. Though obliged to\nacknowledge that precedents in favour of prerogative had uniformly\ntaken place during many reigns before Charles I., they thought\nthat there was no reason for submitting any longer to so dangerous\nan authority. Such might have been their reasoning. The rights of\nmankind are so sacred that no prescription of tyranny or arbitrary\npower can have authority sufficient to abolish them. Liberty is the\nmost inestimable of all blessings, and wherever there appears any\nprobability of recovering it, a nation may willingly run many hazards,\nand ought not even to repine at the greatest effusion of blood or\ndissipation of treasure. All human institutions, and none more than\ngovernment, are in continual fluctuation. Kings are sure to embrace\nevery opportunity of extending their prerogatives, and if favourable\nincidents be not also laid hold of to extend and secure the privileges\nof the people, a universal despotism must for ever prevail among\nmankind. The example of all the neighbouring nations proves that\nit is no longer safe to entrust with the crown the same exorbitant\nprerogatives which had formerly been exercised during rude and simple\nages. And though the example of many late reigns may be pleaded in\nfavour of a power in the prince somewhat arbitrary, more remote reigns\nafford instances of stricter limitations imposed on the crown, and\nthose pretensions of the Parliament, now branded with the title of\ninnovations, are only a recovery of the just rights of the people.\n\nThese views, far from being odious, are surely large and generous and\nnoble. To their prevalence and success the kingdom owes its liberty,\nperhaps its learning, its industry, commerce, and naval power. By them\nchiefly the English name is distinguished among the society\nof nations, and aspires to a rivalship with that of the freest and\nmost illustrious commonwealths of antiquity. But as all these mighty\nconsequences could not reasonably be foreseen at the time when the\ncontest began, the royalists of that age wanted not specious arguments\non their side, by which they could justify their defence of the then\nestablished prerogatives of the crown. We shall state the question, as\nit might appear to them at the assembling of that Parliament, which by\ntheir violent encroachments on the crown, began the civil wars.\n\nThe only rule of government, they might have said, known and\nacknowledged among men, is use and practice. Reason is so uncertain\na guide that it will always be exposed to doubt and controversy.\nCould it ever render itself prevalent over the people, men had always\nretained it as their sole rule of conduct; they had still continued\nin the primitive, unconnected state of nature, without submitting\nto political government, whose sole basis is not pure reason, but\nauthority and precedent. Dissolve these ties, you break all the bonds\nof civil society, and leave every man at liberty to consult his\nparticular interest, by those expedients which his appetite, disguised\nunder the appearance of reason, shall dictate to him. The spirit of\ninnovation is in itself pernicious, however favourable its particular\nobject may sometimes appear. A truth so obvious that the popular party\nthemselves are sensible of it, and therefore cover their encroachments\non the crown by the plausible pretence of their recovering the ancient\nliberties of the people.\n\nBut the present prerogatives of the crown, allowing all the\nsuppositions of that party, have been incontestably established\never since the accession of the house of Tudor, a period which,\nas it now comprehends a hundred and sixty years, may be allowed\nsufficient to give stability to any constitution. Would it not have\nappeared ridiculous in the reign of the Emperor Adrian to talk of the\nconstitution of the republic as the rule of government, or to suppose\nthat the former rights of the senate and consuls and tribunes\nwere still subsisting?\n\nBut the present claims of the English monarchs are infinitely more\nfavourable than those of the Roman emperors during that age. The\nauthority of Augustus was a plain usurpation, grounded only on military\nviolence, and forms such an era in the Roman history as is obvious\nto every reader. But if Henry VII. really, as some pretend, enlarged\nthe power of the crown, it was only by insensible acquisitions which\nescaped the apprehension of the people, and have scarcely been remarked\neven by historians and politicians. The new government, if it deserves\nthe name, is an imperceptible transition from the former; is entirely\nengrafted on it; derives its title fully from that root; and is to be\nconsidered only as one of those gradual revolutions to which human\naffairs in every nation will be for ever subject.\n\nThe House of Tudor, and after them that of Stuart, exercised no\nprerogatives, but what had been claimed and exercised by the\nPlantagenets. Not a single branch of their authority can be said to\nbe altogether an innovation. The only difference is that perhaps the\nmore ancient kings exerted these powers only by intervals, and were not\nable, by reason of the opposition of their barons, to render them so\nsteady a rule of administration.\u200b[109] But the sole inference from this\nfact is that those times were more turbulent and seditious, and that\nthe laws have happily of late gained the ascendant.\n\nUnder what pretence can the popular party now talk of recovering the\nancient constitution? The former control over the kings was not\nplaced in the commons, but in the barons. The people had no authority,\nand even little or no liberty, till the crown, by suppressing these\nfactious tyrants, enforced the execution of the laws, and obliged all\nthe subjects equally to respect each other\u2019s rights, privileges, and\nproperties. If we must return to the ancient barbarous and Gothic\nconstitution, let those gentlemen, who now behave themselves with so\nmuch insolence to their sovereign, set the first example. Let them\nmake court to be admitted as retainers to a neighbouring baron, and by\nsubmitting to slavery under him, acquire some protection to themselves,\ntogether with the power of exercising rapine and oppression over their\ninferior slaves and villains. This was the condition of the commons\namong their remote ancestors.\n\nBut how far back shall we go, in having recourse to ancient\nconstitutions and governments? There was a constitution still more\nancient than that to which these innovators affect so much to appeal.\nDuring that period there was no Magna Charta. The barons themselves\npossessed few regular, stated privileges, and the House of Commons\nprobably had not an existence.\n\nIt is pleasant to hear a house, while they are usurping the whole\npower of the government, talk of reviving ancient institutions. Is it\nnot known that, though the representatives received wages from their\nconstituents, to be a member of their house was always considered as\na burden, and a freedom from it as a privilege? Will they persuade us\nthat power, which of all human acquisitions is the most coveted, and\nin comparison of which even reputation and pleasure and riches are\nslighted, could ever be regarded as a burden by any man?\n\nThe property acquired of late by the commons, it is said, entitles\nthem to more power than their ancestors enjoyed. But to what is\nthis increase of their property owing, but to an increase of their\nliberty and their security? Let them therefore acknowledge that their\nancestors, while the crown was restrained by the seditious barons,\nreally enjoyed less liberty than they themselves have attained,\nafter the sovereign acquired the ascendant, and let them enjoy that\nliberty with moderation, and not forfeit it by new exorbitant claims,\nand by rendering it a pretence for endless innovations.\n\nThe true rule of government is the present established practice of the\nage. That has most authority, because it is recent. It is also better\nknown for the same reason. Who has assured those tribunes that the\nPlantagenets did not exercise as high acts of authority as the Tudors?\nThe historians, they say, do not mention them; but the historians\nare also silent with regard to the chief exertions of prerogative by\nthe Tudors. Where any power or prerogative is fully and undoubtedly\nestablished, the exercise of it passes for a thing of course, and\nreadily escapes the notice of history and annals. Had we no other\nmonuments of Elizabeth\u2019s reign than what are preserved even by Camden,\nthe most copious, judicious, and exact of our historians, we should be\nentirely ignorant of the most important maxims of her government.\n\nWas not the present monarchical government to its full extent\nauthorized by lawyers, recommended by divines, acknowledged by\npoliticians, acquiesced in\u2014nay, passionately cherished\u2014by the people in\ngeneral; and all this during a period of at least a hundred and sixty\nyears, and till of late, without the least murmur or controversy? This\ngeneral consent surely, during so long a time, must be sufficient to\nrender a constitution legal and valid. If the origin of all power be\nderived, as is pretended, from the people, here is their consent in the\nfullest and most ample terms that can be desired or imagined.\n\nBut the people must not pretend, because they can, by their consent,\nlay the foundations of government, that therefore they are to be\npermitted, at their pleasure, to overthrow and subvert them. There\nis no end of these seditious and arrogant claims. The power of the\ncrown is now openly struck at; the nobility are also in visible peril;\nthe gentry will soon follow; the popular leaders, who will\nthen assume the name of gentry, will next be exposed to danger; and\nthe people themselves, having become incapable of civil government,\nand lying under the restraint of no authority, must, for the sake of\npeace, admit, instead of their legal and mild monarchs, a succession of\nmilitary and despotic tyrants.\n\nThese consequences are the more to be dreaded, as the present fury of\nthe people, though glossed over by pretensions to civil liberty, is in\nreality incited by the fanaticism of religion, a principle the most\nblind, headstrong, and ungovernable by which human nature can ever\npossibly be actuated. Popular rage is dreadful, from whatever motive\nderived, but must be attended with the most pernicious consequences\nwhen it arises from a principle which disclaims all control by human\nlaw, reason, or authority.\n\nThese are the arguments which each party may make use of to justify\nthe conduct of their predecessors during that great crisis. The\nevent has shown that the reasonings of the popular party were better\nfounded; but perhaps, according to the established maxims of lawyers\nand politicians, the views of the royalists ought beforehand to have\nappeared more solid, more safe, and more legal. But this is certain,\nthat the greater moderation we now employ in representing past events,\nthe nearer we shall be to produce a full coalition of the parties and\nan entire acquiescence in our present happy establishment. Moderation\nis of advantage to every establishment; nothing but zeal can overturn\na settled power, and an over-active zeal in friends is apt to beget a\nlike spirit in antagonists. The transition from a moderate opposition\nagainst an establishment to an entire acquiescence in it is easy and\ninsensible.\n\nThere are many invincible arguments which should induce the malcontent\nparty to acquiesce entirely in the present settlement of the\nconstitution. They now find that the spirit of civil liberty, though\nat first connected with religious fanaticism, could purge itself from\nthat pollution, and appear under a more genuine and engaging aspect\u2014a\nfriend to toleration, and an encourager of all the enlarged and\ngenerous sentiments that do honour to human nature. They may observe\nthat the popular claims could stop at a proper period, and after\nretrenching the exorbitant prerogatives of the crown, could still\nmaintain a due respect to monarchy, to nobility, and to all ancient\ninstitutions. Above all, they must be sensible that the very principle\nwhich made the strength of their party, and from which it derived\nits chief authority, has now deserted them and gone over to their\nantagonists. The plan of liberty is settled, its happy effects are\nproved by experience, a long tract of time has given it stability, and\nwhoever would attempt to overturn it, and to recall the past government\nor abdicated family, would, besides other more criminal imputations,\nbe exposed in their turn to the reproach of faction and innovation.\nWhile they peruse the history of past events, they ought to reflect,\nboth that the rights of the crown are long since annihilated, and that\nthe tyranny and violence and oppression to which they often gave rise\nare ills from which the established liberty of the constitution has now\nat last happily protected the people. These reflections will prove a\nbetter security to our freedom and privileges than to deny, contrary\nto the clearest evidence of facts, that such regal powers ever had\nany existence. There is not a more effectual method of betraying a\ncause than to lay the strength of the argument on a wrong place, and\nby disputing an untenable post inure the adversaries to success and\nvictory.\n\n\nNOTE, OF THE COALITION OF PARTIES.\n\n[109] The author believes that he was the first writer who advanced\nthat the family of Tudor possessed in general more authority than their\nimmediate predecessors\u2014an opinion which, he hopes, will be supported by\nhistory, but which he proposes with some diffidence. There are strong\nsymptoms of arbitrary power in some former reigns, even after signing\nof the charters. The power of the crown in that age depended less on\nthe constitution than on the capacity and vigour of the prince who wore\nit.\n\n\n\n\nOF THE PROTESTANT SUCCESSION.\n\n\nI suppose that a member of Parliament in the reign of King William\nor Queen Anne, while the establishment of the Protestant Succession\nwas yet uncertain, were deliberating concerning the party he would\nchoose in that important question, and weighing with impartiality\nthe advantages and disadvantages on each side. I believe the\nfollowing particulars would have entered into his consideration.\n\nHe would easily perceive the great advantages resulting from the\nrestoration of the Stuart family, by which we should preserve the\nsuccession clear and undisputed, free from a pretender, with such a\nspecious title as that of blood, which with the multitude is always\nthe claim the strongest and most easily comprehended. It is in vain to\nsay, as many have done, that the question with regard to governors,\nindependent of government, is frivolous and little worth disputing,\nmuch less fighting about. The generality of mankind never will enter\ninto these sentiments; and it is much happier, I believe, for society\nthat they do not, but rather continue in their natural prejudices and\nprepossessions. How could stability be preserved in any monarchical\ngovernment (which, though perhaps not the best, is, and always has\nbeen, the most common of any) unless men had so passionate a regard\nfor the true heir of their royal family, and even though he be weak in\nunderstanding, or infirm in years, gave him so great a preference above\npersons the most accomplished in shining talents or celebrated for\ngreat achievements? Would not every popular leader put in his claim at\nevery vacancy, or even without any vacancy, and the kingdom become the\ntheatre of perpetual wars and convulsions? The condition of the Roman\nEmpire surely was not in this respect much to be envied, nor is that\nof the Eastern nations, who pay little regard to the title of their\nsovereigns, but sacrifice them every day to the caprice or momentary\nhumour of the populace or soldiery. It is but a foolish wisdom which\nis so carefully displayed in under-valuing princes and placing them\non a level with the meanest of mankind. To be sure, an anatomist\nfinds no more in the greatest monarch than in the lowest peasant or\nday-labourer, and a moralist may perhaps frequently find less. But\nwhat do all these reflections tend to? We all of us still retain these\nprejudices in favour of birth and family, and neither in our serious\noccupations nor most careless amusements can we ever get entirely\nrid of them. A tragedy that should represent the adventures\nof sailors or porters, or even of private gentlemen, would presently\ndisgust us; but one that introduces kings and princes acquires in our\neyes an air of importance and dignity. Or should a man be able, by his\nsuperior wisdom, to get entirely above such prepossessions, he would\nsoon, by means of the same wisdom, again bring himself down to them for\nthe sake of society, whose welfare he would perceive to be intimately\nconnected with them. Far from endeavouring to undeceive the people in\nthis particular, he would cherish such sentiments of reverence to their\nprinces as requisite to preserve a due subordination in society. And\nthough the lives of twenty thousand men be often sacrificed to maintain\na king in possession of his throne, or preserve the right of succession\nundisturbed, he entertains no indignation at the loss on pretence that\nevery individual was perhaps in himself as valuable as the prince he\nserved. He considers the consequences of violating the hereditary right\nof kings\u2014consequences which may be felt for many centuries; while the\nloss of several thousand men brings so little prejudice to a large\nkingdom that it may not be perceived a few years afterwards.\n\nThe advantages of the Hanover succession are of an opposite nature,\nand arise from this very circumstance, that it violates hereditary\nright, and places on the throne a prince to whom birth gave no title\nto that dignity. It is evident to any one who considers the history\nof this island that the privileges of the people have during the last\ntwo centuries been continually upon the increase, by the division of\nthe church-lands, by the alienations of the barons\u2019 estates, by the\nprogress of trade, and above all by the happiness of our situation,\nwhich for a long time gave us sufficient security without any standing\narmy or military establishment. On the contrary, public liberty\nhas, almost in every other nation of Europe, been during the same\nperiod extremely upon the decline, while the people were disgusted\nat the hardships of the old feudal militia, and chose rather to\nentrust their prince with mercenary armies, which he easily turned\nagainst themselves. It was nothing extraordinary, therefore, that\nsome of our British sovereigns mistook the nature of the\nconstitution and genius of the people; and as they embraced all the\nfavourable precedents left them by their ancestors, they overlooked\nall those which were contrary, and which supposed a limitation in our\ngovernment. They were encouraged in this mistake by the example of all\nthe neighbouring princes, who, bearing the same title or appellation,\nand being adorned with the same ensigns of authority, naturally led\nthem to claim the same powers and prerogatives.\u200b[110] The flattery\nof courtiers further blinded them, and above all that of the\nclergy, who from several passages of Scripture, and these wrested too,\nhad erected a regular and avowed system of tyranny and despotic power.\nThe only method of destroying at once all these exorbitant claims and\npretensions was to depart from the true hereditary line, and choose\na prince who, being plainly a creature of the public, and receiving\nthe crown on conditions, expressed and avowed, found his authority\nestablished on the same bottom with the privileges of the people.\nBy electing him in the royal line we cut off all hopes of ambitious\nsubjects who might in future emergencies disturb the government by\ntheir cabals and pretensions; by rendering the crown hereditary in\nhis family we avoided all the inconveniences of elective monarchy;\nand by excluding the lineal heir we secured all our constitutional\nlimitations, and rendered our government uniform and of a piece. The\npeople cherish monarchy because protected by it, the monarch favours\nliberty because created by it. And thus every advantage is obtained\nby the new establishment, as far as human skill and wisdom can extend\nitself.\n\nThese are the separate advantages of fixing the succession, either in\nthe house of Stuart or in that of Hanover. There are also disadvantages\non each establishment, which an impartial patriot would ponder and\nexamine, in order to form a just judgment upon the whole.\n\nThe disadvantages of the Protestant Succession consist in the foreign\ndominions which are possessed by the princes of the Hanover line, and\nwhich it might be supposed would engage us in the intrigues and wars of\nthe Continent, and lose us in some measure the inestimable advantage we\npossess of being surrounded and guarded by the sea which we command.\nThe disadvantages of recalling the abdicated family consist\nchiefly in their religion, which is more prejudicial to society than\nthat established among us is contrary to it, and affords no toleration,\nor peace, or security to any other religion.\n\nIt appears to me that all these advantages and disadvantages are\nallowed on both sides; at least, by every one who is at all susceptible\nof argument or reasoning. No subject, however loyal, pretends to deny\nthat the disputed title and foreign dominions of the present royal\nfamily are a loss; nor is there any partisan of the Stuart family but\nwill confess that the claim of hereditary, indefeasible right, and the\nRoman Catholic religion, are also disadvantages in that family. It\nbelongs, therefore, to a philosopher alone, who is of neither party,\nto put all these circumstances in the scale and to assign to each of\nthem its proper poise and influence. Such a one will readily, at first,\nacknowledge that all political questions are infinitely complicated,\nand that there scarce ever occurs in any deliberation a choice which\nis either purely good or purely ill. Consequences, mixed and varied,\nmay be foreseen to flow from every measure\u2014and many consequences\nunforeseen do always, in fact, result from it. Hesitation, and reserve,\nand suspense are therefore the only sentiment he brings to this essay\nor trial; or if he indulges any passion it is that of derision and\nridicule against the ignorant multitude, who are always clamorous and\ndogmatical even in the nicest questions, of which, from want of temper,\nperhaps still more than of understanding, they are altogether unfit\njudges.\n\nBut to say something more determinate on this head, the following\nreflections will, I hope, show the temper, if not the understanding of\na philosopher.\n\nWere we to judge merely by first appearances and by past experience, we\nmust allow that the advantages of a parliamentary title of the house of\nHanover are much greater than those of an undisputed hereditary title\nin the house of Stuart, and that our fathers acted wisely in preferring\nthe former to the latter. So long as the house of Stuart reigned in\nBritain, which, with some interruption, was above eighty years,\nthe government was kept in a continual fever by the contentions between\nthe privileges of the people and the prerogatives of the crown. If\narms were dropped, the noise of disputes continued; or, if these were\nsilenced, jealousy still corroded the heart, and threw the nation into\nan unnatural ferment and disorder. And while we were thus occupied in\ndomestic contentions, a foreign power, dangerous, if not fatal, to\npublic liberty, erected itself in Europe without any opposition from\nus, and even sometimes with our assistance.\n\nBut during these last sixty years, when a parliamentary establishment\nhas taken place, whatever factions may have prevailed either among the\npeople or in public assemblies, the whole force of our constitution\nhas always fallen to one side, and an uninterrupted harmony has been\npreserved between our princes and our parliaments. Public liberty, with\ninternal peace and order, has flourished almost without interruption;\ntrade and manufactures and agriculture have increased; the arts and\nsciences and philosophy have been cultivated. Even religious parties\nhave been necessitated to lay aside their mutual rancour, and the glory\nof the nation has spread itself all over Europe; while we stand the\nbulwark against oppression, and the great antagonist of that power\nwhich threatens every people with conquest and subjection. So long\nand so glorious a period no nation almost can boast of; nor is there\nanother instance in the whole history of mankind that so many millions\nof people have during such a space of time been held together in a\nmanner so free, so rational, and so suitable to the dignity of human\nnature.\n\nBut though this recent instance seems clearly to decide in favour of\nthe present establishment, there are some circumstances to be thrown\ninto the other scale, and it is dangerous to regulate our judgment by\none event or example.\n\nWe have had two rebellions during the flourishing period above\nmentioned, besides plots and conspiracies without number; and, if none\nof these have produced any very fatal event, we may ascribe\nour escape chiefly to the narrow genius of those princes who disputed\nour establishment, and may esteem ourselves so far fortunate. But the\nclaims of the banished family, I fear, are not yet antiquated, and\nwho can foretell that their future attempts will produce no greater\ndisorder?\n\nThe disputes between privilege and prerogative may easily be composed\nby laws, and votes, and conferences, and concessions, where there is\ntolerable temper or prudence on both sides, or on either side. Among\ncontending titles the question can only be determined by the sword, and\nby devastation, and by civil war.\n\nA prince who fills the throne with a disputed title dares not arm his\nsubjects, the only method of securing a people fully, both against\ndomestic oppression and foreign conquest.\n\nNotwithstanding all our riches and renown, what a critical escape\ndid we lately make from dangers, which were owing, not so much to\nbad conduct and ill success in war, as to the pernicious practice of\nmortgaging our finances, and the still more pernicious maxim of never\npaying off our encumbrances? Such fatal measures could never have been\nembraced had it not been to secure a precarious establishment.\u200b[111]\n\nBut to convince us that an hereditary title is to be embraced rather\nthan a parliamentary one, which is not supported by any other views\nor motives, a man needs only transport himself back to the era of the\nRestoration, and suppose that he had had a seat in that Parliament\nwhich recalled the royal family, and put a period to the greatest\ndisorders that ever arose from the opposite pretensions of prince and\npeople. What would have been thought of one that had proposed at that\ntime to set aside Charles II. and settle the crown on the Duke of York\nor Gloucester, merely in order to exclude all high claims like those of\ntheir father and grandfather? Would not such a one have been\nregarded as a very extravagant projector, who loved dangerous remedies,\nand could tamper and play with a government and national constitution\nlike a quack with a sickly patient?\n\nThe advantages which result from a parliamentary title, preferably\nto an hereditary one, though they are great, are too refined ever to\nenter into the conception of the vulgar. The bulk of mankind would\nnever allow them to be sufficient for committing what would be regarded\nas an injustice to the prince. They must be supported by some gross,\npopular, and familiar topics; and wise men, though convinced of their\nforce, would reject them in compliance with the weakness and prejudices\nof the people. An encroaching tyrant or deluded bigot alone, by his\nmisconduct, is able to enrage the nation and render practicable what\nwas always perhaps desirable.\n\nIn reality, the reason assigned by the nation for excluding the race\nof Stuart, and so many other branches of the royal family, is not on\naccount of their hereditary title (which, however just in itself,\nwould, to vulgar apprehensions, have appeared altogether absurd),\nbut on account of their religion, which leads us to compare the\ndisadvantages above mentioned of each establishment.\n\nI confess that, considering the matter in general, it were much to be\nwished that our prince had no foreign dominions, and could confine all\nhis attention to the government of this island. For, not to mention\nsome real inconveniences that may result from territories on the\nContinent, they afford such a handle for calumny and defamation as is\ngreedily seized by the people, who are always disposed to think ill\nof their superiors. It must, however, be acknowledged that Hanover\nis perhaps the spot of ground in Europe the least inconvenient for a\nKing of Britain. It lies in the heart of Germany, at a distance from\nthe Great Powers which are our natural rivals; it is protected by the\nlaws of the Empire as well as by the arms of its own sovereign, and it\nserves only to connect us more closely with the house of Austria, which\nis our natural ally.\n\nIn the last war it has been of service to us, by furnishing us with a\nconsiderable body of auxiliary troops, the bravest and most faithful\nin the world. The Elector of Hanover is the only considerable prince\nin the Empire who has pursued no separate end, and has raised up no\nstale pretensions during the late commotions of Europe, but has acted\nall along with the dignity of a King of Britain. And ever since the\naccession of that family it would be difficult to show any harm we have\never received from the electoral dominions, except that short disgust\nin 1718, with Charles XII., who, regulating himself by maxims very\ndifferent from those of other princes, made a personal quarrel of every\npublic injury.\u200b[112]\n\nThe religious persuasion of the house of Stuart is an inconvenience\nof a much deeper dye, and would threaten us with much more dismal\nconsequences. The Roman Catholic religion, with its huge train of\npriests and friars, is vastly more expensive than ours. Even though\nunaccompanied with its natural attendants of inquisitors, and stakes,\nand gibbets, it is less tolerating; and not contented with dividing\nthe sacerdotal from the regal office (which must be prejudicial to\nany state), it bestows the former on a foreigner, who has always a\nseparate, and may often have an opposite interest to that of the public.\n\nBut were this religion ever so advantageous to society, it is contrary\nto that which is established among us, and which is likely to keep\npossession for a long time of the minds of the people; and though it\nis much to be hoped that the progress of reason and philosophy will,\nby degrees, abate the virulent acrimony of opposite religions all over\nEurope, yet the spirit of moderation has as yet made too slow advances\nto be entirely trusted. The conduct of the Saxon family, where the\nsame person can be a Catholic King and Protestant Elector, is perhaps\nthe first instance in modern times of so reasonable and prudent a\nbehaviour. And the gradual progress of the Catholic superstition does,\neven there, prognosticate a speedy alteration; after which it\nis justly to be apprehended that the persecutions will put a speedy\nperiod to the Protestant religion in the place of its nativity.\n\nThus, upon the whole, the advantages of the settlement in the family\nof Stuart, which frees us from a disputed title, seem to bear some\nproportion with those of the settlement in the family of Hanover,\nwhich frees us from the claims of prerogative; but at the same time\nits disadvantages, by placing on the throne a Roman Catholic, are much\ngreater than those of the other establishment, in settling the crown on\na foreign prince. What party an impartial patriot, in the reign of King\nWilliam or Queen Anne, would have chosen amidst these opposite views\nmay perhaps to some appear hard to determine. For my part, I esteem\nliberty so invaluable a blessing in society, that whatever favours its\nprogress and security can scarce be too fondly cherished by every one\nwho is a lover of humankind.\n\nBut the settlement in the house of Hanover has actually taken place.\nThe princes of that family, without intrigue, without cabal, without\nsolicitation on their part, have been called to mount our throne by\nthe united voice of the whole legislative body. They have, since their\naccession, displayed in all their actions the utmost mildness, equity,\nand regard to the laws and constitution. Our own ministers, our own\nparliaments, ourselves have governed us, and if aught ill has befallen\nus we can only blame fortune or ourselves. What a reproach must we\nbecome among nations if, disgusted with a settlement so deliberately\nmade, and whose conditions have been so religiously observed, we should\nthrow everything again into confusion, and by our levity and rebellious\ndisposition prove ourselves totally unfit for any state but that of\nabsolute slavery and subjection?\n\nThe greatest inconvenience attending a disputed title is that it brings\nus in danger of civil wars and rebellions. What wise man, to avoid this\ninconvenience, would run directly upon a civil war and rebellion? Not\nto mention that so long possession, secured by so many laws, must ere\nthis time, in the apprehension of a great part of the nation,\nhave begot a title in the house of Hanover independent of their present\npossession, so that now we should not, even by a revolution, obtain the\nend of avoiding a disputed title.\n\nNo revolution made by national forces will ever be able, without some\nother great necessity, to abolish our debts and encumbrances, in which\nthe interest of so many persons is concerned. And a revolution made\nby foreign forces is a conquest\u2014a calamity with which the precarious\nbalance of power threatens us, and which our civil dissensions are\nlikely, above all other circumstances, to bring upon us.\n\n\nNOTES, OF THE PROTESTANT SUCCESSION.\n\n[110] It appears from the speeches and proclamations and whole train\nof King James I.\u2019s actions, as well as his son\u2019s, that they considered\nthe English government as a simple monarchy, and never imagined that\nany considerable part of their subjects entertained a contrary idea.\nThis made them discover their pretensions without preparing any force\nto support them, and even without reserve or disguise, which are always\nemployed by those who enter upon any new project, or endeavour to\ninnovate in any government. King James told his Parliament plainly,\nwhen they meddled in State affairs, \u201cNe sutor ultra crepidam.\u201d He used\nalso at his table, in promiscuous companies, to advance his notions in\na manner still more undignified, as we may learn from a story told in\nthe life of Mr. Waller, and which that poet used frequently to repeat.\nWhen Mr. Waller was young, he had the curiosity to go to court; and\nhe stood in the circle and saw King James dine where, amongst other\ncompany, there sat at table two bishops. The King, openly and aloud,\nproposed this question: \u201cWhether he might not take his subjects\u2019 money,\nwhen he had occasion for it, without all this formality of Parliament?\u201d\nThe one bishop readily replied, \u201cGod forbid you should not, for you are\nthe breath of our nostrils.\u201d The other bishop declined answering, and\nsaid he was not skilled in Parliamentary cases; but upon the King\u2019s\nurging him, and saying he would admit of no evasion, his lordship\nreplied very pleasantly, \u201cWhy, then, I think your Majesty may lawfully\ntake my brother\u2019s money, for he offers it.\u201d In Sir Walter Raleigh\u2019s\npreface to the _History of the World_ there is this remarkable passage:\n\u201cPhilip II., by strong hand and main force, attempted to make himself\nnot only an absolute monarch over the Netherlands, like unto the kings\nand sovereigns of England and France, but, Turk-like, to tread under\nhis feet all their natural and fundamental laws, privileges and ancient\nrights.\u201d Spenser, speaking of some grants of the English kings to the\nIrish corporations, says: \u201cAll which, though at the time of their first\ngrant they were tolerable, and perhaps reasonable, yet now are most\nunreasonable and inconvenient. But all these will easily be cut off\nwith the superior power of her Majesty\u2019s prerogative, against which her\nown grants are not to be pleaded or enforced.\u201d (_State of Ireland_, p.\n1537, edit. 1706.)\n\nAs these were very common, if not perhaps the universal notions of\nthe times, the two first princes of the house of Stuart were the more\nexcusable for their mistake. And Rapin, suitable to his usual malignity\nand partiality, seems to treat them with too much severity upon account\nof it.\n\n\n[111] Those who consider how universal this pernicious practice of\nfunding has become all over Europe may perhaps dispute this last\nopinion, but we lay under less necessity than other States.\n\n\n[112] This was published in the year 1752.\n\n\n\n\nIDEA OF A PERFECT COMMONWEALTH.\n\n\nOf all mankind there are none so pernicious as political projectors, if\nthey have power, nor so ridiculous if they want it; as, on the other\nhand, a wise politician is the most beneficial character in nature if\naccompanied with authority; and the most innocent, and not altogether\nuseless, even if deprived of it. It is not with forms of government\nas with other artificial contrivances, where an old engine may be\nrejected, if we can discover another more accurate and commodious, or\nwhere trials may safely be made, even though the success be doubtful.\nAn established government has an infinite advantage, by that very\ncircumstance of its being established; the bulk of mankind being\ngoverned by authority, not reason, and never attributing authority\nto anything that has not the recommendation of antiquity. To tamper,\ntherefore, in this affair, or try projects merely upon the credit of\nsupposed argument and philosophy, can never be the part of a wise\nmagistrate, who will bear a reverence to what carries the marks of\nage; and though he may attempt some improvements for the public good,\nyet will he adjust his innovations as much as possible to the\nancient fabric, and preserve entire the chief pillars and supports of\nthe constitution.\n\nThe mathematicians in Europe have been much divided concerning that\nfigure of a ship which is the most commodious for sailing; and Huygens,\nwho at last determined this controversy, is justly thought to have\nobliged the learned, as well as commercial world; though Columbus had\nsailed to America, and Sir Francis Drake made the tour of the world,\nwithout any such discovery. As one form of government must be allowed\nmore perfect than another, independent of the manners and humours of\nparticular men, why may we not inquire what is the most perfect of all,\nthough the common botched and inaccurate governments seem to serve\nthe purposes of society, and though it be not so easy to establish a\nnew government as to build a vessel upon a new plan? The subject is\nsurely the most worthy curiosity of any the wit of man can possibly\ndevise. And who knows, if this controversy were fixed by the universal\nconsent of the learned, but in some future age an opportunity might be\nafforded of reducing the theory to practice, either by a dissolution\nof the old governments, or the combination of men to form a new one in\nsome distant part of the world? In all cases it must be advantageous\nto know what is most perfect in the kind, that we may be able to bring\nany real constitution or form of government as near it as possible,\nby such gentle alterations and innovations as may not give too great\ndisturbance to society.\n\nAll I pretend to in the present essay is to revive this subject of\nspeculation, and therefore I shall deliver my sentiments in as few\nwords as possible. A long dissertation on that head would not, I\napprehend, be very acceptable to the public, who will be apt to regard\nsuch disquisitions both as useless and chimerical.\n\nAll plans of government which suppose great reformation in the manners\nof mankind are plainly imaginary. Of this nature are the _Republic_ of\nPlato and the _Utopia_ of Sir Thomas More. The _Oceana_ is the only\nvaluable model of a commonwealth that has as yet been offered to the\npublic.\n\nThe chief defects of the _Oceana_ seem to be these\u2014First, its rotation\nis inconvenient, by throwing men, of whatever ability, by intervals,\nout of public employments. Secondly, its Agrarian is impracticable.\nMen will soon learn the art, which was practised in ancient Rome,\nof concealing their possessions under other people\u2019s names, till at\nlast the abuse will become so common, that they will throw off even\nthe appearance of restraint. Thirdly, the _Oceana_ provides not a\nsufficient security for liberty, or the redress of grievances. The\nsenate must propose, and the people consent; by which means the\nsenate have not only a negative upon the people, but, what is of\ninfinitely greater consequence, their negative goes before the votes\nof the people. Were the king\u2019s negative of the same nature in the\nEnglish constitution, and could he prevent any bill from coming into\nParliament, he would be an absolute monarch. As his negative follows\nthe votes of the Houses, it is of little consequence; such a difference\nis there in the manner of placing the same thing. When a popular bill\nhas been debated in the two Houses, is brought to maturity, all its\nconveniences and inconveniences weighed and balanced, if afterwards\nit be presented for the Royal assent, few princes will venture to\nreject the unanimous desire of the people. But could the king crush\na disagreeable bill in embryo (as was the case, for some time, in\nthe Scots Parliament, by means of the Lords of the Articles) the\nBritish Government would have no balance, nor would grievances ever\nbe redressed. And it is certain that exorbitant power proceeds not,\nin any government, from new laws so much as from neglecting to remedy\nthe abuses which frequently rise from the old ones. A government, says\nMachiavel, must often be brought back to its original principles. It\nappears then, that in the _Oceana_ the whole legislature may be said to\nrest in the senate; which Harrington would own to be an inconvenient\nform of government, especially after the Agrarian is abolished.\n\nHere is a form of government to which I cannot, in theory, discover any\nconsiderable objection,\n\nLet Great Britain and Ireland, or any territory of equal extent,\nbe divided into a hundred counties, and each county into a hundred\nparishes, making in all ten thousand. If the country purposed to be\nerected into a commonwealth be of more narrow extent, we may diminish\nthe number of counties; but never bring them below thirty. If it be of\ngreater extent, it were better to enlarge the parishes, or throw more\nparishes into a county, than increase the number of counties.\n\nLet all the freeholders of ten pounds a year in the country, and all\nthe householders worth two hundred pounds in the town parishes, meet\nannually in the parish church, and choose, by ballot, some freeholder\nof the county for their member, whom we shall call the county\nrepresentative.\n\nLet the hundred county representatives, two days after their election,\nmeet in the county-town, and choose by ballot, from their own body, ten\ncounty magistrates and one senator. There are, therefore, in the whole\ncommonwealth, one hundred senators, eleven hundred county magistrates,\nand ten thousand county representatives; for we shall bestow on all\nsenators the authority of county magistrates, and on all county\nmagistrates the authority of county representatives.\n\nLet the senators meet in the capital, and be endowed with the whole\nexecutive power of the commonwealth; the power of peace and war, of\ngiving orders to generals, admirals, and ambassadors, and, in short,\nall the prerogatives of a British king, except his negative.\n\nLet the county representatives meet in their particular counties, and\npossess the whole legislative power of the commonwealth; the greatest\nnumber of counties deciding the question; and where these are equal,\nlet the senate have the casting vote.\n\nEvery new law must first be debated in the senate; and though rejected\nby it, if ten senators insist and protest, it must be sent down to the\ncounties. The senate may join to the copy of the law their reasons for\nreceiving or rejecting it.\n\nBecause it would be troublesome to assemble all the county\nrepresentatives for every trivial law that may be requisite, the\nsenate have their choice of sending down the law either to the county\nmagistrates or county representatives.\n\nThe magistrates, though the law be referred to them, may, if they\nplease, call the representatives, and submit the affair to their\ndetermination.\n\nWhether the law be referred by the senate to the county magistrates\nor representatives, a copy of it, and of the senate\u2019s reasons, must\nbe sent to every representative eight days before the day appointed\nfor the assembling, in order to deliberate concerning it. And though\nthe determination be, by the senate, referred to the magistrates, if\nfive representatives of the county order the magistrates to assemble\nthe whole court of representatives, and submit the affair to their\ndetermination, they must obey.\n\nEither the county magistrates or representatives may give to the\nsenator of the county the copy of a law to be proposed to the senate;\nand if five counties concur in the same order, the law, though\nrefused by the senate, must come either to the county magistrates or\nrepresentatives, as is contained in the order of the five counties.\n\nAny twenty counties, by a vote either of their magistrates or\nrepresentatives, may throw any man out of all public offices for a\nyear. Thirty counties for three years.\n\nThe senate has a power of throwing out any member or number of members\nof its own body, not to be re-elected for that year. The senate cannot\nthrow out twice in a year the senator of the same county.\n\nThe power of the old senate continues for three weeks after the\nannual election of the county representatives. Then all the new\nsenators are shut up in a conclave, like the cardinals, and by an\nintricate ballot, such as that of Venice or Malta, they choose the\nfollowing magistrates:\u2014A protector, who represents the dignity of the\ncommonwealth and presides in the senate, two secretaries of state,\nthese six councils: a council of state, a council of religion and\nlearning, a council of trade, a council of laws, a council\nof war, a council of the admiralty, each council consisting of five\npersons; together with six commissioners of the treasury and a first\ncommissioner. All these must be senators. The senate also names all the\nambassadors to foreign courts, who may either be senators or not.\n\nThe senate may continue any or all of these, but must re-elect them\nevery year.\n\nThe protector and two secretaries have session and suffrage in the\ncouncil of state. The business of that council is all foreign politics.\nThe council of state has session and suffrage in all the other councils.\n\nThe council of religion and learning inspects the universities and\nclergy. That of trade inspects everything that may affect commerce.\nThat of laws inspects all the abuses of laws by the inferior\nmagistrates, and examines what improvements may be made of the\nmunicipal law. That of war inspects the militia and its discipline,\nmagazines, stores, etc., and when the republic is in war, examines into\nthe proper orders for generals. The council of admiralty has the same\npower with regard to the navy, together with the nomination of the\ncaptains and all inferior officers.\n\nNone of these councils can give orders themselves, except where\nthey receive such powers from the senate. In other cases, they must\ncommunicate everything to the senate.\n\nWhen the senate is under adjournment, any of the councils may assemble\nit before the day appointed for its meeting.\n\nBesides these councils or courts, there is another called the court\nof competitors, which is thus constituted:\u2014If any candidates for the\noffice of senator have more votes than a third of the representatives,\nthat candidate who has most votes next to the senator elected,\nbecomes incapable for one year of all public offices, even of being a\nmagistrate or representative; but he takes his seat in the court of\ncompetitors. Here then is a court which may sometimes consist of a\nhundred members, sometimes have no members at all, and by that means be\nfor a year abolished.\n\nThe court of competitors has no power in the commonwealth. It has\nonly the inspection of the public accounts and the accusing any man\nbefore the senate. If the senate acquit him, the court of competitors\nmay, if they please, appeal to the people, either magistrates or\nrepresentatives. Upon that appeal the magistrates or representatives\nmeet at the day appointed by the court of competitors, and choose in\neach county three persons, from which number every senator is excluded.\nThese to the number of three hundred meet in the capital, and bring the\nperson accused to a new trial.\n\nThe court of competitors may propose any law to the senate, and if\nrefused, may appeal to the people\u2014that is to the magistrates or\nrepresentatives, who examine it in their counties. Every senator who is\nthrown out of the senate by a vote of the court, takes his seat in the\ncourt of competitors.\n\nThe senate possesses all the judicative authority of the House of\nLords\u2014that is, all the appeals from the inferior courts. It likewise\nnominates the Lord Chancellor and all the officers of the law.\n\nEvery county is a kind of republic within itself, and the\nrepresentatives may make county-laws, which have no authority until\nthree months after they are voted. A copy of the law is sent to the\nsenate and to every other county. The senate or any single county may\nat any time annul any law of another county.\n\nThe representatives have all the authority of the British justices of\npeace in trials, commitments, etc.\n\nThe magistrates have the nomination of all the officers of the revenue\nin each county. All causes with regard to the revenue are appealed\nultimately to the magistrates. They pass the accounts of all the\nofficers, but must have all their own accounts examined and passed at\nthe end of the year by the representatives.\n\nThe magistrates name rectors or ministers to all the parishes.\n\nThe Presbyterian government is established, and the highest\necclesiastical court is an assembly or synod of all the presbyters of\nthe county. The magistrates may take any cause from this court, and\ndetermine it themselves.\n\nThe magistrates may try and depose or suspend any presbyter.\n\nThe militia is established in imitation of that of Switzerland, which,\nbeing well known, we shall not insist upon it. It will only be proper\nto make this addition, that an army of 20,000 men be annually drawn out\nby rotation, paid and encamped during six weeks in summer, that the\nduty of a camp may not be altogether unknown.\n\nThe magistrates nominate all the colonels and downwards. The senate all\nupwards. During war, the general nominates the colonel and downwards,\nand his commission is good for a twelvemonth; but after that, it must\nbe confirmed by the magistrates of the county to which the regiment\nbelongs. The magistrates may break any officer in the county regiment,\nand the senate may do the same to any officer in the service. If the\nmagistrates do not think proper to confirm the general\u2019s choice, they\nmay nominate another officer in the place of him they reject.\n\nAll crimes are tried within the county by the magistrates and a jury;\nbut the senate can stop any trial, and bring it before themselves.\n\nAny county may indict any man before the senate for any crime.\n\nThe protector, the two secretaries, the council of state, with any\nfive more that the senate appoints on extraordinary emergencies, are\npossessed of dictatorial power for six months.\n\nThe protector may pardon any person condemned by the inferior courts.\n\nIn time of war, no officer of the army that is in the field can have\nany civil office in the commonwealth.\n\nThe capital, which we shall call London, may be allowed four\nmembers in the senate. It may therefore be divided into four\ncounties. The representatives of each of these choose one senator\nand ten magistrates. There are therefore in the city four\nsenators, forty-four magistrates, and four hundred representatives.\nThe magistrates have the same authority as in the counties. The\nrepresentatives also have the same authority; but they never meet in\none general court. They give their votes in their particular county or\ndivision of hundreds.\n\nWhen they enact any city-law, the greatest number of counties or\ndivisions determines the matter; and where these are equal, the\nmagistrates have the casting vote.\n\nThe magistrates choose the mayor, sheriff, recorder, and other officers\nof the city.\n\nIn the commonwealth, no representative, magistrate, or senator, as\nsuch, has any salary. The protector, secretaries, councils, and\nambassadors have salaries.\n\nThe first year in every century is set apart to correct all\ninequalities which time may have produced in the representative. This\nmust be done by the legislature.\n\nThe following political aphorisms may explain the reason of these\norders.\n\nThe lower sort of people and small proprietors are good enough judges\nof one not very distant from them in rank or habitation, and therefore,\nin their parochial meetings, will probably choose the best, or nearly\nthe best representative; but they are wholly unfit for county-meetings\nand for electing into the higher offices of the republic. Their\nignorance gives the grandees an opportunity of deceiving them.\n\nTen thousand, even though they were not annually elected, are a large\nenough basis for any free government. It is true the nobles in Poland\nare more than 10,000, and yet these oppress the people; but as power\ncontinues there always in the same persons and families, this makes\nthem, in a manner, a different nation from the people. Besides, the\nnobles are there united under a few heads of families.\n\nAll free governments must consist of two councils, a less and a\ngreater; or, in other words, of a senate and people. The people, as\nHarrington observes, would want wisdom without the senate; the senate\nwithout the people would want honesty.\n\nA large assembly of 1000, for instance, to represent the people,\nif allowed to debate, would fall into disorder. If not allowed to\ndebate, the senate has a negative upon them, and the worst kind of\nnegative\u2014that before resolution.\n\nHere therefore is an inconvenience which no government has yet fully\nremedied, but which is the easiest to be remedied in the world. If the\npeople debate, all is confusion; if they do not debate, they can only\nresolve, and then the senate carves for them. Divide the people into\nmany separate bodies, and then they may debate with safety, and every\ninconvenience seems to be prevented.\n\nCardinal de Retz says that all numerous assemblies, however composed,\nare mere mob, and swayed in their debates by the least motive. This we\nfind confirmed by daily experience. When an absurdity strikes a member,\nhe conveys it to his neighbour, and so on till the whole be infected.\nSeparate this great body, and though every member be only of middling\nsense, it is not probable that anything but reason can prevail over the\nwhole. Influence and example being removed, good sense will always get\nthe better of bad among a number of people. Good sense is one thing;\nbut follies are numberless, and every man has a different one. The only\nway of making a people wise is to keep them from uniting into large\nassemblies.\n\nThere are two things to be guarded against in every senate\u2014its\ncombination and its division. Its combination is most dangerous, and\nagainst this inconvenience we have provided the following remedies:\u20141.\nThe great dependence of the senators on the people by annual election,\nand that not by an undistinguishing rabble, like the English electors,\nbut by men of fortune and education. 2. The small power they are\nallowed. They have few offices to dispose of. Almost all are given by\nthe magistrates in the counties. 3. The court of competitors which,\nbeing composed of men that are their rivals next to them in interest\nand uneasy in their present situation, will be sure to take all\nadvantages against them.\n\nThe division of the senate is prevented\u20141. By the smallness\nof their number. 2. As faction supposes a combination to a separate\ninterest, it is prevented by their dependence on the people. 3. They\nhave a power of expelling any factious member. It is true when another\nmember of the same spirit comes from the county, they have no power of\nexpelling him; nor is it fit they should, for that shows the humour to\nbe in the people, and probably arises from some ill-conduct in public\naffairs. 4. Almost any man in a senate so regularly chosen by the\npeople may be supposed fit for any civil office. It would be proper,\ntherefore, for the senate to form some general resolutions with regard\nto the disposing of offices among the members, which resolutions would\nnot confine them in critical times, when extraordinary parts on the one\nhand, or extraordinary stupidity on the other, appears in any senator;\nbut yet they would be sufficient to prevent intrigue and faction, by\nmaking the disposal of the offices a thing of course. For instance, let\nit be a resolution:\u2014That no man shall enjoy any office till he has sat\nfour years in the senate; that, except ambassadors, no man shall be in\noffice two years following; that no man shall attain the higher offices\nbut through the lower; that no man shall be protector twice, etc. The\nsenate of Venice govern themselves by such resolutions.\n\nIn foreign politics the interest of the senate can scarce ever be\ndivided from that of the people, and therefore it is fit to make\nthe senate absolute with regard to them, otherwise there could be\nno secrecy nor refined policy. Besides, without money no alliance\ncan be executed, and the senate is still sufficiently dependent. Not\nto mention that the legislative power being always superior to the\nexecutive, the magistrates or representatives may interpose, whenever\nthey think proper.\n\nThe chief support of the British Government is the Opposition of\ninterests; but that, though in the main serviceable, breeds endless\nfactions. In the foregoing plan, it does all the good without any of\nthe harm. The competitors have no power of controlling the senate; they\nhave only the power of accusing and appealing to the people.\n\nIt is necessary, likewise, to prevent both combination and division in\nthe thousand magistrates. This is done sufficiently by the separation\nof places and interests.\n\nBut lest that should not be enough, their dependence on the 10,000 for\ntheir elections serves to the same purpose.\n\nNor is that all: for the 10,000 may resume the power whenever they\nplease; and not only when they all please, but when any five of a\nhundred please, which will happen upon the very first suspicion of a\nseparate interest.\n\nThe 10,000 are too large a body either to unite or divide, except\nwhen they meet in one place, and fall under the guidance of ambitious\nleaders. Not to mention their annual election by the whole body of the\npeople that are of any consideration.\n\nA small commonwealth is the happiest government in the world within\nitself, because everything lies under the eye of the rulers; but it may\nbe subdued by great force from without. This scheme seems to have all\nthe advantages both of a great and a little commonwealth.\n\nEvery county-law may be annulled either by the senate or another\ncounty, because that shows an opposition of interest: in which case no\npart ought to decide for itself. The matter must be referred to the\nwhole, which will best determine what agrees with general interest.\n\nAs to the clergy and militia, the reasons of these orders are obvious.\nWithout the dependence of the clergy on the civil magistrates, and\nwithout a militia, it is folly to think any free government will ever\nhave security or stability.\n\nIn many governments the inferior magistrates have no rewards but what\narise from their ambition, vanity, or public spirit. The salaries of\nthe French judges amount not to the interest of the sums they pay\nfor their offices. The Dutch burgomasters have little more immediate\nprofit than the English justices of peace, or the members of the\nHouse of Commons formerly. But lest any should suspect that this\nwould beget negligence in the administration (which is little to be\nfeared, considering the natural ambition of mankind), let the\nmagistrates have competent salaries. The senators have access to so\nmany honourable and lucrative offices that their attendance needs not\nbe bought. There is little attendance required of the representatives.\n\nThat the foregoing plan of government is practicable no one can\ndoubt, who considers the resemblance it bears to the commonwealth of\nthe United Provinces, formerly one of the wisest and most renowned\ngovernments in the world. The alterations in the present scheme are all\nevidently to the better. 1. The representation is more equal. 2. The\nunlimited power of the burgomasters in the towns, which forms a perfect\naristocracy in the Dutch commonwealth, is corrected by a well-tempered\ndemocracy, in giving to the people the annual election of the county\nrepresentatives. 3. The negative, which every province and town has\nupon the whole body of the Dutch republic, with regard to alliances,\npeace and war, and the imposition of taxes, is here removed. 4. The\ncounties, in the present plan, are not so independent of each other,\nnor do they form separate bodies so much as the seven provinces; where\nthe jealousy and envy of the smaller provinces and towns against the\ngreater, particularly Holland and Amsterdam, have frequently disturbed\nthe government. 5. Larger powers, though of the safest kind, are\nentrusted to the senate than the States-General possess; by which means\nthe former may become more expeditious and secret in their resolutions\nthan it is possible for the latter.\n\nThe chief alterations that could be made on the British Government, in\norder to bring it to the most perfect model of living monarchy, seem to\nbe the following:\u2014First, The plan of the Republican Parliament ought\nto be restored, by making the representation equal, and by allowing\nnone to vote in the county elections who possess not a property of 200\npounds value. Secondly, As such a House of Commons would be too weighty\nfor a frail House of Lords like the present, the bishops and Scots\npeers ought to be removed, whose behaviour, in former Parliaments,\ndestroyed entirely the authority of that House. The number of the\nUpper House ought to be raised to three or four hundred; their\nseats not hereditary, but during life. They ought to have the election\nof their own members; and no commoner should be allowed to refuse a\nseat that was offered him. By this means the House of Lords would\nconsist entirely of the men of chief credit, ability, and interest\nof the nation; and every turbulent leader in the House of Commons\nmight be taken off and connected in interest with the House of Peers.\nSuch an aristocracy would be a splendid barrier both to the monarchy\nand against it. At present the balance of our Government depends in\nsome measure on the ability and behaviour of the sovereign, which are\nvariable and uncertain circumstances.\n\nI allow that this plan of limited monarchy, however corrected, is still\nliable to three great inconveniences. First, it removes not entirely,\nthough it may soften, the parties of court and country; secondly, the\nking\u2019s personal character must still have a great influence on the\nGovernment; thirdly, the sword is in the hands of a single person,\nwho will always neglect to discipline the militia, in order to have a\npretence for keeping up a standing army. It is evident that this is\na mortal distemper in British Government, of which it must at last\ninevitably perish. I must, however, confess that Sweden seems in some\nmeasure to have remedied this inconvenience, and to have a militia,\nwith its limited monarchy, as well as a standing army, which is less\ndangerous than the British.\n\nWe shall conclude this subject with observing the falsehood of the\ncommon opinion that no large state, such as France or Britain,\ncould ever be modelled into a commonwealth, but that such a form\nof government can only take place in a city or small territory.\nThe contrary seems evident. Though it is more difficult to form a\nrepublican government in an extensive country than in a city, there\nis more facility, when once it is formed, of preserving it steady and\nuniform, without tumult and faction. It is not easy for the distant\nparts of a large state to combine in any plan of free government; but\nthey easily conspire in the esteem and reverence of a single\nperson, who, by means of this popular favour, may seize the power,\nand forcing the more obstinate to submit, may establish a monarchical\ngovernment. On the other hand, a city readily concurs in the same\nnotions of government, the natural equality of property favours\nliberty, and the nearness of habitation enables the citizens mutually\nto assist each other. Even under absolute princes the subordinate\ngovernment of cities is commonly republican; while that of counties\nand provinces is monarchical. But these same circumstances, which\nfacilitate the erection of commonwealths in cities, render their\nconstitution more frail and uncertain. Democracies are turbulent. For\nhowever the people may be separated or divided into small parties,\neither in their votes or elections, their near habitation in a\ncity will always make the force of popular tides and currents very\nsensible. Aristocracies are better adapted for peace and order, and\naccordingly were most admired by ancient writers; but they are jealous\nand oppressive. In a large government, which is modelled with masterly\nskill, there is compass and room enough to refine the democracy from\nthe lower people, who may be admitted into the first elections or first\nconcoction of the commonwealth to the higher magistrates who direct all\nthe movements. At the same time, the parts are so distant and remote\nthat it is very difficult, either by intrigue, prejudice, or passion,\nto hurry them into any measures against the public interest.\n\nIt is needless to inquire whether such a government would be immortal.\nI allow the justness of the poet\u2019s exclamation on the endless projects\nof human race, \u201cMan and for ever!\u201d The world itself probably is not\nimmortal. Such consuming plagues may arise as would leave even a\nperfect government a weak prey to its neighbours. We know not to what\nlengths enthusiasm or other extraordinary motions of the human mind\nmay transport men, to the neglect of all order and public good. Where\ndifference of interest is removed, whimsical and unaccountable factions\noften arise from personal favour or enmity. Perhaps rust may grow to\nthe springs of the most accurate political machine and disorder\nits motions. Lastly, extensive conquests, when pursued, must be the\nruin of every free government; and of the more perfect governments\nsooner than of the imperfect, because of the very advantages which\nthe former possess above the latter. And though such a state ought\nto establish a fundamental law against conquests, yet republics have\nambition as well as individuals, and present interest makes men\nforgetful of their posterity. It is a sufficient incitement to human\nendeavours that such a government would flourish for many ages, without\npretending to bestow on any work of man that immortality which the\nAlmighty seems to have refused to his own productions.\n\n\n\n\nTHAT POLITICS MAY BE REDUCED TO A SCIENCE.\n\n\nIt is a question with many whether there be any essential difference\nbetween one form of government and another? and whether every\nform may not become good or bad according as it is well or ill\nadministered?\u200b[113] Were it once admitted that all governments are\nalike, and that the only difference consists in the character and\nconduct of the governors, most political disputes would be at an end,\nand all zeal for one constitution above another must be esteemed mere\nbigotry and folly. But, though a friend to moderation, I cannot forbear\ncondemning this sentiment, and should be sorry to think that human\naffairs admit of no greater stability than what they receive from the\ncasual humours and characters of particular men.\n\nIt is true, those who maintain that the goodness of all government\nconsists in the goodness of the administration, may cite many\nparticular instances in history where the very same government in\ndifferent hands has varied suddenly into the two opposite extremes of\ngood and bad. Compare the French Government under Henry III. and under\nHenry IV. Oppression, levity, artifice on the part of the rulers;\nfaction, sedition, treachery, rebellion, disloyalty on the part of the\nsubjects: these compose the character of the former miserable era.\nBut when the patriot and heroic prince who succeeded was once firmly\nseated on the throne, the government, the people, everything seemed\nto be totally changed; and all from the difference of the temper and\nsentiments of these two sovereigns. An equal difference of a contrary\nkind may be found on comparing the reigns of Elizabeth and James\u2014at\nleast with regard to foreign affairs; and instances of this kind may be\nmultiplied almost without number from ancient as well as modern history.\n\nBut here I would beg leave to make a distinction. All absolute\ngovernments (and such, in a great measure, was that of England till the\nmiddle of the last century, notwithstanding the numerous panegyrics on\nancient English liberty) must very much depend on the administration;\nand this is one of the great inconveniences of that form of government.\nBut a republican and free government would be a most obvious absurdity\nif the particular checks and controls provided by the constitution\nhad really no influence, and made it not the interest, even of bad\nmen, to operate for the public good. Such is the intention of these\nforms of government, and such is their real effect where they are\nwisely constituted: as, on the other hand, they are the sources of all\ndisorder and of the blackest crimes where either skill or honesty has\nbeen wanting in their original frame and institution.\n\nSo great is the force of laws and of particular forms of government,\nand so little dependence have they on the humours and tempers of men,\nthat consequences almost as general and certain may be deduced from\nthem on most occasions as any which the mathematical sciences\nafford us.\n\nThe Roman government gave the whole legislative power to the commons,\nwithout allowing a negative either to the nobility or consuls. This\nunbounded power the commons possessed in a collective, not in a\nrepresentative body. The consequences were\u2014when the people, by success\nand conquest, had become very numerous and had spread themselves to\na great distance from the capital, the city tribes, though the most\ncontemptible, carried almost every vote. They were, therefore, most\ncajoled by every one who affected popularity; they were supported\nin idleness by the general distribution of corn, and by particular\nbribes, which they received from almost every candidate. By this means\nthey became every day more licentious, and the Campus Martius was a\nperpetual scene of tumult and sedition: armed slaves were introduced\namong these rascally citizens, so that the whole government fell into\nanarchy, and the greatest happiness which the Romans could look for was\nthe despotic power of the C\u00e6sars. Such are the effects of democracy\nwithout a representative.\n\nA nobility may possess the whole or any part of the legislative power\nof a state in two different ways. Either every nobleman shares the\npower as part of the whole body, or the whole body enjoys the power as\ncomposed of parts which have each a distinct power and authority. The\nVenetian aristocracy is an instance of the first kind of government;\nthe Polish of the second. In the Venetian government the whole body of\nnobility possesses the whole power, and no nobleman has any authority\nwhich he receives not from the whole. In the Polish government every\nnobleman, by means of his fiefs, has a peculiar hereditary authority\nover his vassals, and the whole body has no authority but what it\nreceives from the concurrence of its parts. The distinct operations\nand tendencies of these two species of government might be made most\napparent even _\u00e0 priori_. A Venetian nobility is infinitely preferable\nto a Polish, let the humours and education of men be ever so\nmuch varied. A nobility who possess their power in common will preserve\npeace and order both among themselves and their subjects, and no member\ncan have authority enough to control the laws for a moment. The nobles\nwill preserve their authority over the people, but without any grievous\ntyranny or any breach of private property, because such a tyrannical\ngovernment promotes not the interest of the whole body, however it\nmay that of some individuals. There will be a distinction of rank\nbetween the nobility and people, but this will be the only distinction\nin the state. The whole nobility will form one body, and the whole\npeople another, without any of those private feuds and animosities\nwhich spread ruin and desolation everywhere. It is easy to see the\ndisadvantages of a Polish nobility in every one of these particulars.\n\nIt is possible so to constitute a free government as that a single\nperson\u2014call him doge, prince, or king\u2014shall possess a very large share\nof power, and shall form a proper balance or counterpoise to the other\nparts of the legislature. This chief magistrate may be either elective\nor hereditary, and though the former institution may, to a superficial\nview, appear the most advantageous, yet a more accurate inspection will\ndiscover in it greater inconveniences than in the latter, and such as\nare founded on causes and principles eternal and immutable. The filling\nof the throne in such a government is a point of too great and too\ngeneral interest not to divide the whole people into factions, from\nwhence a civil war, the greatest of ills, may be apprehended almost\nwith certainty upon every vacancy. The prince elected must be either a\nforeigner or a native; the former will be ignorant of the people whom\nhe is to govern, suspicious of his new subjects and suspected by them,\ngiving his confidence entirely to strangers, who will have no other\ncare but of enriching themselves in the quickest manner, while their\nmaster\u2019s favour and authority are able to support them. A native will\ncarry into the throne all his private animosities and friendships,\nand will never be regarded, in his elevation, without exciting the\nsentiments of envy in those who formerly considered him as\ntheir equal. Not to mention that a crown is too high a reward ever\nto be given to merit alone, and will always induce the candidates\nto employ force, or money, or intrigue to procure the votes of the\nelectors; so that such an election will give no better chance for\nsuperior merit in the prince than if the state had trusted to birth\nalone for determining their sovereign.\n\nIt may therefore be pronounced as a universal axiom in politics that\na hereditary prince, a nobility without vassals, and a people voting\nby their representatives form the best monarchy, aristocracy, and\ndemocracy. But in order to prove more fully that politics admit of\ngeneral truths which are invariable by the humour or education either\nof subject or sovereign, it may not be amiss to observe some other\nprinciples of this science which may seem to deserve that character.\n\nIt may easily be observed that though free governments have been\ncommonly the most happy for those who partake of their freedom, yet\nare they the most ruinous and oppressive to their provinces; and this\nobservation may, I believe, be fixed as a maxim of the kind we are\nhere speaking of. When a monarch extends his dominions by conquest he\nsoon learns to consider his old and his new subjects as on the same\nfooting, because, in reality, all his subjects are to him the same,\nexcept the few friends and favourites with whom he is personally\nacquainted. He does not, therefore, make any distinction between them\nin his general laws, and at the same time is no less careful to prevent\nall particular acts of oppression on the one as on the other. But a\nfree state necessarily makes a great distinction, and must always do\nso, till men learn to love their neighbours as well as themselves. The\nconquerors, in such a government, are all legislators, and will be sure\nso to contrive matters, by restrictions of trade and by taxes, as to\ndraw some private, as well as public advantage from their conquests.\nProvincial governors have also a better chance in a republic to\nescape with their plunder by means of bribery and interest; and their\nfellow-citizens, who find their own state to be enriched by\nthe spoils of the subject-provinces, will be the more inclined to\ntolerate such abuses. Not to mention that it is a necessary precaution\nin a free state to change the governors frequently, which obliges\nthese temporary tyrants to be more expeditious and rapacious, that\nthey may accumulate sufficient wealth before they give place to their\nsuccessors. What cruel tyrants were the Romans over the world during\nthe time of their commonwealth! It is true they had laws to prevent\noppression in their provincial magistrates, but Cicero informs us that\nthe Romans could not better consult the interest of the provinces\nthan by repealing these very laws. \u201cFor in that case,\u201d says he, \u201cour\nmagistrates, having entire impunity, would plunder no more than would\nsatisfy their own rapaciousness; whereas at present they must also\nsatisfy that of their judges, and of all the great men of Rome whose\nprotection they stand in need of.\u201d Who can read of the cruelties and\noppressions of Verres without horror and astonishment? And who is not\ntouched with indignation to hear that after Cicero had exhausted on\nthat abandoned criminal all the thunders of his eloquence, and had\nprevailed so far as to get him condemned to the utmost extent of the\nlaws, yet that cruel tyrant lived peaceably to old age in opulence\nand ease, and thirty years afterwards was put into the proscription\nby Mark Anthony on account of his exorbitant wealth, where he fell,\nwith Cicero himself, and all the most virtuous men of Rome? After the\ndissolution of the commonwealth the Roman yoke became easier upon the\nprovinces, as Tacitus informs us; and it may be observed that many of\nthe worst emperors\u2014Domitian, for instance\u2014were very careful to prevent\nall oppression of the provinces. In Tiberius\u2019s time Gaul was esteemed\nricher than Italy itself; nor do I find during the whole time of the\nRoman monarchy that the empire became less rich or populous in any\nof its provinces, though indeed its valour and military discipline\nwere always upon the decline. The oppression and tyranny of the\nCarthaginians over their subject-states in Africa went so far, as we\nlearn from Polybius, that, not content with exacting the half\nof all the produce of the ground, which of itself was a very high rent,\nthey also loaded them with many other taxes. If we pass from ancient\nto modern times, we shall always find the observation to hold. The\nprovinces of absolute monarchies are always better treated than those\nof free states. Compare the _Pa\u00efs conquis_ of France with Ireland, and\nyou will be convinced of this truth; though this latter kingdom, being\nin a good measure peopled from England, possesses so many rights and\nprivileges as should naturally make it challenge better treatment than\nthat of a conquered province. Corsica is also an obvious instance to\nthe same purpose.\n\nThere is an observation of Machiavel, with regard to the conquests of\nAlexander the Great, which I think may be regarded as one of those\neternal political truths which no time nor accidents can vary. It may\nseem strange, says that politician, that such sudden conquests as\nthose of Alexander should be settled so peaceably by his successors,\nand that the Persians, during all the confusions and civil wars of\nthe Greeks, never made the smallest effort towards the recovery of\ntheir former independent government. To satisfy us concerning the\ncause of this remarkable event, we may consider that a monarch may\ngovern his subjects in two different ways. He may either follow the\nmaxims of the eastern princes, and stretch his power so far as to\nleave no distinction of ranks among his subjects, but what proceeds\nimmediately from himself\u2014no advantages of birth; no hereditary honours\nand possessions; and, in a word, no credit among the people except from\nhis commission alone. Or a monarch may exert his power after a milder\nmanner, like our European princes, and leave other sources of honour,\nbeside his smile and favour: birth, titles, possessions, valour,\nintegrity, knowledge, or great and fortunate achievements. In the\nformer species of government, after a conquest, it is impossible ever\nto shake off the yoke, since no one possesses among the people so much\npersonal credit and authority as to begin such an enterprise; whereas,\nin the latter, the least misfortune or discord of the victors\nwill encourage the vanquished to take arms, who have leaders ready to\nprompt and conduct them in every undertaking.\u200b[114]\n\nSuch is the reasoning of Machiavel, which seems to me very solid and\nconclusive, though I wish he had not mixed falsehood with truth in\nasserting that monarchies governed according to the Eastern policy,\nthough more easily kept when once subdued, yet are the most difficult\nto subdue, since they cannot contain any powerful subject whose\ndiscontent and faction may facilitate the enterprises of an enemy. For\nbesides that such a tyrannical government enervates the courage of men\nand renders them indifferent towards the fortunes of their sovereign;\nbesides this, I say, we find by experience that even the temporary and\ndelegated authority of the generals and magistrates being always, in\nsuch governments, as absolute within its sphere as that of the prince\nhimself, is able, with barbarians accustomed to a blind submission, to\nproduce the most dangerous and fatal revolutions. So that, in every\nrespect, a gentle government is preferable, and gives the greatest\nsecurity to the sovereign as well as to the subject.\n\nLegislators, therefore, ought not to trust the future government of\na state entirely to chance, but ought to provide a system of laws to\nregulate the administration of public affairs to the latest posterity.\nEffects will always correspond to causes, and wise regulations in any\ncommonwealth are the most valuable legacy which can be left to future\nages. In the smallest court or office the stated forms and methods\nby which business must be conducted are found to be a considerable\ncheck on the natural depravity of mankind. Why should not the case be\nthe same in public affairs? Can we ascribe the stability and wisdom\nof the Venetian Government through so many ages to anything but the\nform of government? And is it not easy to point out those defects in\nthe original constitution which produced the tumultuous governments\nof Athens and Rome, and ended at last in the ruin of these two famous\nrepublics? And so little dependence has this affair on the humours and\neducation of particular men that one part of the same republic may be\nwisely conducted and another weakly, by the very same men, merely on\naccount of the difference of the forms and institutions by\nwhich these parts are regulated. Historians inform us that this was\nactually the case with Genoa; for while the state was always full of\nsedition, and tumult, and disorder, the bank of St. George, which had\nbecome a considerable part of the people, was conducted for several\nages with the utmost integrity and wisdom.\n\nThe ages of greatest public spirit are not always most eminent for\nprivate virtue. Good laws may beget order and moderation in the\ngovernment where the manners and customs have instilled little humanity\nor justice into the tempers of men. The most illustrious period of\nthe Roman history, considered in a political view, is that between\nthe beginning of the first and the end of the last Punic War; the\ndue balance between the nobility and people being then fixed by the\ncontests of the tribunes, and not being yet lost by the extent of\nconquests. Yet at this very time the horrid practice of poisoning was\nso common that, during part of the season, a pr\u00e6tor punished capitally\nfor this crime above three thousand persons in a part of Italy, and\nfound informations of this nature still multiplying upon him. There is\na similar, or rather a worse instance in the more early times of the\ncommonwealth; so depraved in private life were that people, whom in\ntheir histories we so much admire. I doubt not but they were really\nmore virtuous during the time of the two Triumvirates, when they were\ntearing their common country to pieces, and spreading slaughter and\ndesolation over the face of the earth merely for the choice of tyrants.\n\nHere, then, is a sufficient inducement to maintain, with the utmost\nzeal, in every free state, those forms and institutions by which\nliberty is secured, the public good consulted, and the avarice or\nambition of particular men restrained and punished. Nothing does\nmore honour to human nature than to see it susceptible of so noble\na passion, as nothing can be a greater indication of meanness of\nheart in any man than to see him devoid of it. A man who loves only\nhimself, without regard to friendship and merit, is a detestable\nmonster; and a man who is only susceptible of friendship, without\npublic spirit or a regard to the community, is deficient in the most\nmaterial part of virtue.\n\nBut this is a subject which needs not be longer insisted on at present.\nThere are enough of zealots on both sides who kindle up the passions\nof their partisans, and under the pretence of public good pursue the\ninterests and ends of their particular faction. For my part I shall\nalways be more fond of promoting moderation than zeal, though perhaps\nthe surest way of producing moderation in every party is to increase\nour zeal for the public. Let us therefore try, if it be possible, from\nthe foregoing doctrine to draw a lesson of moderation with regard to\nthe parties into which our country is at present divided; at the same\ntime, that we allow not this moderation to abate the industry and\npassion with which every individual is bound to pursue the good of his\ncountry.\n\nThose who either attack or defend a minister in such a government as\nours, where the utmost liberty is allowed, always carry matters to an\nextreme, and exaggerate his merit or demerit with regard to the public.\nHis enemies are sure to charge him with the greatest enormities, both\nin domestic and foreign management, and there is no meanness or crime\nof which, in their account, he is not capable. Unnecessary wars,\nscandalous treaties, profusion of public treasure, oppressive taxes,\nevery kind of mal-administration is ascribed to him. To aggravate the\ncharge, his pernicious conduct, it is said, will extend its baleful\ninfluence even to posterity, by undermining the best constitution in\nthe world, and disordering that wise system of laws, institutions,\nand customs by which our ancestors for so many centuries have been so\nhappily governed. He is not only a wicked minister in himself, but has\nremoved every security provided against wicked ministers for the future.\n\nOn the other hand, the partisans of the minister make his panegyric run\nas high as the accusation against him, and celebrate his wise, steady,\nand moderate conduct in every part of his administration. The honour\nand interest of the nation supported abroad, public credit\nmaintained at home, persecution restrained, faction subdued: the merit\nof all these blessings is ascribed solely to the minister. At the same\ntime he crowns all his other merits by a religious care of the best\nconstitution in the world, which he has preserved in all its parts, and\nhas transmitted entire to be the happiness and security of the latest\nposterity.\n\nWhen this accusation and panegyric are received by the partisans of\neach party, no wonder they beget a most extraordinary ferment on\nboth sides, and fill the nation with the most violent animosities.\nBut I would fain persuade these party-zealots that there is a flat\ncontradiction both in the accusation and panegyric, and that it were\nimpossible for either of them to run so high were it not for this\ncontradiction. If our constitution be really that noble fabric, the\npride of Britain, the envy of our neighbours, raised by the labour of\nso many centuries, repaired at the expense of so many millions, and\ncemented by such a profusion of blood\u2014I say, if our constitution does\nin any degree deserve these eulogies, it would never have suffered\na wicked and weak minister to govern triumphantly for a course of\ntwenty years, when opposed by the greatest geniuses of the nation,\nwho exercised the utmost liberty of tongue and pen, in Parliament\nand in their frequent appeals to the people. But if the minister\nbe wicked and weak to the degree so strenuously insisted on, the\nconstitution must be faulty in its original principles, and he cannot\nconsistently be charged with undermining the best constitution in the\nworld. A constitution is only so far good as it provides a remedy\nagainst mal-administration, and if the British constitution, when in\nits greatest vigour, and repaired by two such remarkable events as\nthe Revolution and Accession, by which our ancient royal family was\nsacrificed to it\u2014if our constitution, I say, with so great advantages\ndoes not, in fact, provide any such remedy, we are rather beholden\nto any minister who undermines it and affords us an opportunity of\nerecting in its place a better constitution.\n\nI would make use of the same topics to moderate the zeal of\nthose who defend the minister. Is our constitution so excellent? Then a\nchange of ministry can be no such dreadful event, since it is essential\nto such a constitution, in every ministry, both to preserve itself\nfrom violation and to prevent all enormities in the administration.\nIs our constitution very bad? Then so extraordinary a jealousy and\napprehension on account of changes is ill-placed, and a man should no\nmore be anxious in this case than a husband, who had married a wife\nfrom the stews, should be watchful to prevent her infidelity. Public\naffairs in such a constitution must necessarily go to confusion,\nby whatever hands they are conducted, and the zeal of patriots is\nmuch less requisite in that case than the patience and submission of\nphilosophers. The virtue and good intentions of Cato and Brutus are\nhighly laudable, but to what purpose did their zeal serve? To nothing\nbut to hasten the fatal period of the Roman government, and render its\nconvulsions and dying agonies more violent and painful.\n\nI would not be understood to mean that public affairs deserve no care\nand attention at all. Would men be moderate and consistent, their\nclaims might be admitted\u2014at least might be examined. The country-party\nmight still assert that our constitution, though excellent, will admit\nof mal-administration to a certain degree, and therefore, if the\nminister be bad, it is proper to oppose him with a suitable degree of\nzeal. And, on the other hand, the court-party may be allowed, upon the\nsupposition that the minister were good, to defend, and with some zeal\ntoo, his administration. I would only persuade men not to contend,\nas if they were fighting _pro aris et focis_, and change a good\nconstitution into a bad one by the violence of their factions.\u200b[115]\n\nI have not here considered anything that is personal in the present\ncontroversy. In the best civil constitution, where every man is\nrestrained by the most rigid laws, it is easy to discover either the\ngood or bad intentions of a minister, and to judge whether his personal\ncharacter deserves love or hatred. But such questions are of little\nimportance to the public, and lay those who employ their pens upon them\nunder a just suspicion either of malevolence or flattery.\n\n\nNOTES, POLITICS REDUCED TO A SCIENCE.\n\n[113]\n\n    \u201cFor forms of government let fools contest;\n    Whate\u2019er is best administer\u2019d is best.\u201d\n\n    _Essay on Man_, Book iii.\n\n\n[114] I have taken it for granted, according to the supposition of\nMachiavel, that the ancient Persians had no nobility, though there is\nreason to suspect that the Florentine secretary, who seems to have\nbeen better acquainted with the Roman than the Greek authors, was\nmistaken in this particular. The more ancient Persians, whose manners\nare described by Xenophon, were a free people, and had nobility. Their\n\u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03c4\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9 were preserved even after the extending of their conquests\nand the consequent change of their government. Arrian mentions them in\nDarius\u2019s time (_De exped. Alex._, lib. 2). Historians also speak often\nof the persons in command as men of family. Tygranes, who was general\nof the Medes under Xerxes, was of the race of Achm\u00e6nes (Herod., lib.\n7, cap. 62). Artach\u00e6as, who directed the cutting of the canal about\nMount Athos, was of the same family (_id._, cap. 117). Megabyzus was\none of the seven eminent Persians who conspired against the Magi. His\nson Zopyrus was in the highest command under Darius, and delivered\nBabylon to him. His grandson Megabyzus commanded the army defeated at\nMarathon. His great grandson Zopyrus was also eminent, and was banished\nPersia (Herod., lib. 3; Thuc., lib. 1). Rosaces, who commanded an army\nin Egypt under Artaxerxes, was also descended from one of the seven\nconspirators (Diod. Sic., lib. 16). Agesilaus (in Xenophon, _Hist.\nGr\u00e6c._ lib. 4), being desirous of making a marriage betwixt King Cotys,\nhis ally, and the daughter of Spithridates, a Persian of rank who had\ndeserted to him, first asks Cotys what rank Spithridates is of. One of\nthe most considerable in Persia, says Cotys. Ari\u00e6us, when offered the\nsovereignty by Clearchus and the ten thousand Greeks, refused it as\nof too low a rank, and said that so many eminent Persians would never\nendure his rule (_id._, _De exped._ lib. 2). Some of the families,\ndescended from the seven Persians above mentioned, remained during\nall Alexander\u2019s successors; and Mithridates, in Antiochus\u2019s time, is\nsaid by Polybius to be descended from one of them (lib. 5, cap. 43).\nArtabazus was esteemed, as Arrian says, \u03b5\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03c9\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u03c3\u03c9\u03bd (lib.\n3). And when Alexander married in one day eighty of his captains to\nPersian women, his intention plainly was to ally the Macedonians with\nthe most eminent Persian families (_id._, lib. 7). Diodorus Siculus\nsays they were of the most noble birth in Persia (lib. 17). The\ngovernment of Persia was despotic, and conducted in many respects after\nthe Eastern manner, but was not carried so far as to extirpate all\nnobility, and confound all ranks and orders. It left men who were still\ngreat, by themselves and their family, independent of their office and\ncommission. And the reason why the Macedonians kept so easily dominion\nover them was owing to other causes easy to be found in the historians,\nthough it must be owned that Machiavel\u2019s reasoning was in itself just,\nhowever doubtful its application to the present case.\n\n\n[115] What our author\u2019s opinion was of the famous minister here pointed\nat may be learned from that essay, printed in the former editions,\nunder the title of \u201cA Character of Sir Robert Walpole.\u201d It was as\nfollows:\u2014\u201cThere never was a man whose actions and character have been\nmore earnestly and openly canvassed than those of the present minister,\nwho, having governed a learned and free nation for so long a time,\namidst such mighty opposition, may make a large library of what has\nbeen written for and against him, and is the subject of above half the\npaper that has been blotted in the nation within these twenty years.\nI wish, for the honour of our country, that any one character of him\nhad been drawn with such judgment and impartiality as to have credit\nwith posterity, and to show that our liberty has, once at least, been\nemployed to good purpose. I am only afraid of failing in the former\nquality of judgment; but if it should be so, it is but one page more\nthrown away, after a hundred thousand, upon the same subject, that have\nperished and become useless. In the meantime, I shall flatter myself\nwith the pleasing imagination that the following character will be\nadopted by future historians:\u2014\n\n\u201cSir Robert Walpole, Prime Minister of Great Britain, is a man of\nability, not a genius; good-natured, not virtuous; constant, not\nmagnanimous; moderate, not equitable.\u200b[116] His virtues, in some\ninstances, are free from the alloy of those vices which usually\naccompany such virtues. He is a generous friend, without being a bitter\nenemy. His vices, in other instances, are not compensated by those\nvirtues which are nearly allied to them: his want of enterprise is not\nattended with frugality. The private character of the man is better\nthan the public, his virtues more than his vices, his fortune greater\nthan his fame. With many good qualities he has incurred the public\nhatred; with good capacity he has not escaped ridicule. He would have\nbeen esteemed more worthy of his high station had he never possessed\nit; and is better qualified for the second than for the first place in\nany Government. His ministry has been more advantageous to his family\nthan to the public, better for this age than for posterity, and more\npernicious by bad precedents than by real grievances. During his time\ntrade has flourished, liberty declined, and learning gone to ruin. As I\nam a man, I love him; as I am a scholar, I hate him; as I am a Briton,\nI calmly wish his fall. And were I a member of either House I would\ngive my vote for removing him from St. James\u2019s, but should be glad to\nsee him retire to Houghton Hall, to pass the remainder of his days in\nease and pleasure.\u201d\n\nThe author is pleased to find that after animosities are laid, and\ncalumny has ceased, the whole nation almost have returned to the\nsame moderate sentiments with regard to this great man, if they\nare not rather become more favourable to him, by a very natural\ntransition from one extreme to another. The author would not oppose\nthose humane sentiments towards the dead, though he cannot forbear\nobserving that the not paying more of our public debts was, as hinted\nin this character, a great, and the only great error in that long\nadministration.\n\n\n[116] Moderate in the exercise of power, not equitable in engrossing it.\n\n\n\n\nOF THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT.\n\n\nNothing is more surprising to those who consider human affairs with\na philosophical eye, than to see the easiness with which the many\nare governed by the few; and to observe the implicit submission with\nwhich men resign their own sentiments and passions to those of their\nrulers. When we inquire by what means this wonder is brought about, we\nshall find that, as force is always on the side of the governed, the\ngovernors have nothing to support them but opinion. It is therefore\non opinion only that government is founded, and this maxim extends\nto the most despotic and most military governments, as well as to\nthe most free and most popular. The Soldan of Egypt, or the Emperor\nof Rome, might drive his harmless subjects like brute beasts against\ntheir sentiments and inclination; but he must, at least, have led his\nmamalukes, or pr\u00e6torian bands, like men, by their opinion.\n\nOpinion is of two kinds\u2014viz., opinion of interest and opinion of\nright. By opinion of interest, I chiefly understand the sense of the\npublic advantage which is reaped from government, together with the\npersuasion that the particular government which is established is\nequally advantageous with any other that could easily be settled. When\nthis opinion prevails among the generality of a state, or among\nthose who have the force in their hands, it gives great security to any\ngovernment.\n\nRight is of two kinds\u2014right to power and right to property. What\nprevalence opinion of the first kind has over mankind may easily be\nunderstood by observing the attachment which all nations have to\ntheir ancient government, and even to those names which have had the\nsanction of antiquity. Antiquity always begets the opinion of right,\nand whatever disadvantageous sentiments we may entertain of mankind,\nthey are always found to be prodigal both of blood and treasure in\nthe maintenance of public justice. This passion we may denominate\nenthusiasm, or we may give it what appellation we please; but a\npolitician who should overlook its influence on human affairs would\nprove himself but of a very limited understanding. There is, indeed,\nno particular in which at first sight there may appear a greater\ncontradiction in the frame of the human mind than the present. When men\nact in a faction they are apt, without any shame or remorse, to neglect\nall the ties of honour and morality in order to serve their party;\nand yet when a faction is formed upon a point of right or principle,\nthere is no occasion where men discover a greater obstinacy and a more\ndetermined sense of justice and equity. The same social disposition of\nmankind is the cause of both these contradictory appearances.\n\nIt is sufficiently understood that the opinion of right to property is\nof the greatest moment in all matters of government. A noted author\nhas made property the foundation of all government; and most of our\npolitical writers seem inclined to follow him in that particular. This\nis carrying the matter too far; but still it must be owned that the\nopinion of right to property has a great influence in this subject.\n\nUpon these three opinions, therefore, of public interest, of right to\npower, and of right to property, are all governments founded, and all\nauthority of the few over the many. There are indeed other principles\nwhich add force to these, and determine, limit, or alter their\noperation; such as self-interest, fear, and affection. But\nstill we may assert that these other principles can have no influence\nalone, but suppose the antecedent influence of those opinions above\nmentioned. They are therefore to be esteemed the secondary, not the\noriginal principles of government.\n\nFor, first, as to self-interest, by which I mean the expectation of\nparticular rewards, distinct from the general protection which we\nreceive from government, it is evident that the magistrate\u2019s authority\nmust be antecedently established, or at least be hoped for, in order\nto produce this expectation. The prospect of reward may augment the\nauthority with regard to some particular persons, but can never give\nbirth to it with regard to the public. Men naturally look for the\ngreatest favours from their friends and acquaintance, and therefore the\nhopes of any considerable number of the state would never centre in any\nparticular set of men if these men had no other title to magistracy,\nand had no separate influence over the opinions of mankind. The same\nobservation may be extended to the other two principles of fear and\naffection. No man would have any reason to fear the fury of a tyrant\nif he had no authority over any but from fear; since as a single man\nhis bodily force can reach but a small way, and all further power he\npossesses must be founded either on our opinion or on the presumed\nopinion of others. And though affection to wisdom and virtue in a\nsovereign extends very far and has great influence, yet he must be\nantecedently supposed invested with a public character, otherwise the\npublic esteem will serve him in no stead, nor will his virtue have any\ninfluence beyond a narrow sphere.\n\nA government may endure for several ages, though the balance of power\nand the balance of property do not agree. This chiefly happens where\nany rank or order of the state has acquired a large share of the\nproperty, but from the original constitution of the government has no\nshare of the power. Under what pretext would any individual of that\norder assume authority in public affairs? As men are commonly much\nattached to their ancient government, it is not to be expected\nthat the public would ever favour such usurpations. But where the\noriginal constitution allows any share of power, though small, to an\norder of men who possess a large share of the property, it is easy for\nthem gradually to stretch their authority and bring the balance of\npower to coincide with that of property. This has been the case with\nthe House of Commons in England.\n\nMost writers who have treated of the British Government have supposed\nthat as the House of Commons represents all the commons of Great\nBritain, so its weight in the scale is proportioned to the property\nand power of all whom it represents. But this principle must not be\nreceived as absolutely true. For though the people are apt to attach\nthemselves more to the House of Commons than to any other member of the\nconstitution\u2014that House being chosen by them as their representatives\nand as the public guardians of their liberty\u2014yet are there instances\nwhere the House, even when in opposition to the Crown, has not been\nfollowed by the people; as we may particularly observe of the Tory\nHouse of Commons in the reign of King William. Were the members of the\nHouse obliged to receive instructions from their constituents, like the\nDutch deputies, this would entirely alter the case; and if such immense\npower and riches as those of the whole commons of Britain were brought\ninto the scale, it is not easy to conceive that the Crown could either\ninfluence the multitude of people or withstand that overbalance of\nproperty. It is true the Crown has great influence over the collective\nbody of Britain in the elections of members; but were this influence,\nwhich at present is only exerted once in seven years, to be employed in\nbringing over the people to every vote, it would soon be wasted, and\nno skill, popularity or revenue, could support it. I must, therefore,\nbe of opinion that an alteration in this particular would introduce a\ntotal alteration in our government, and would soon reduce it to a pure\nrepublic; and perhaps to a republic of no inconvenient form. For though\nthe people collected in a body like the Roman tribes be quite unfit for\ngovernment, yet when dispersed in small bodies they are more\nsusceptible both of reason and order; the force of popular currents\nand tides is in a great measure broken; and the public interest may be\npursued with some method and constancy. But it is needless to reason\nany further concerning a form of government which is never likely to\nhave place in Britain, and which seems not to be the aim of any party\namongst us. Let us cherish and improve our ancient government as much\nas possible, without encouraging a passion for such dangerous novelties.\n\n\n\n\nOF POLITICAL SOCIETY.\n\n\nHad every man sufficient sagacity to perceive at all times the strong\ninterest which binds him to the observance of justice and equity, and\nstrength of mind sufficient to persevere in a steady adherence to a\ngeneral and a distant interest, in opposition to the allurements of\npresent pleasure and advantage\u2014there had never, in that case, been any\nsuch thing as government or political society, but each man following\nhis natural liberty had lived in entire peace and harmony with all\nothers. What need of positive laws where natural justice is, of itself,\na sufficient restraint? Why create magistrates where there never arises\nany disorder or iniquity? Why abridge our native freedom when, in every\ninstance, the utmost exertion of it is found innocent and beneficial?\nIt is evident that if government were totally useless it never could\nhave place, and that the sole foundation of the duty of allegiance is\nthe advantage which it procures to society by preserving peace and\norder among mankind.\n\nWhen a number of political societies are erected, and maintain a\ngreat intercourse together, a new set of rules are immediately\ndiscovered to be useful in that particular situation, and\naccordingly take place under the title of \u201cLaws of Nations.\u201d Of this\nkind are the sacredness of the persons of ambassadors, abstaining from\npoisoned arms, quarter in war, with others of that kind, which are\nplainly calculated for the advantage of states and kingdoms in their\nintercourse with each other.\n\nThe rules of justice, such as prevail among individuals, are not\nentirely suspended among political societies. All princes pretend a\nregard to the rights of others; and some, no doubt, without hypocrisy.\nAlliances and treaties are every day made between independent states,\nwhich would only be so much waste of parchment if they were not found,\nby experience, to have some influence and authority. But here is the\ndifference between kingdoms and individuals. Human nature cannot by\nany means subsist without the association of individuals; and that\nassociation never could have place were no regard paid to the laws\nof equity and justice. Disorder, confusion, the war of all against\nall, are the necessary consequences of such a licentious conduct.\nBut nations can subsist without intercourse. They may even subsist,\nin some degree, under a general war. The observance of justice,\nthough useful among them, is not guarded by so strong a necessity as\namong individuals; and the moral obligation holds proportion with\nthe usefulness. All politicians will allow, and most philosophers,\nthat reasons of state may, in particular emergencies, dispense with\nthe rules of justice, and invalidate any treaty or alliance where\nthe strict observance of it would be prejudicial in a considerable\ndegree to either of the contracting parties. But nothing less than the\nextremest necessity, it is confessed, can justify individuals in a\nbreach of promise, Or an invasion of the properties of others.\n\nIn a confederated commonwealth, such as the Ach\u00e6an Republic of old, or\nthe Swiss Cantons and United Provinces in modern times; as the league\nhas here a peculiar utility, the conditions of union have a peculiar\nsacredness and authority, and a violation of them would be equally\ncriminal, Or even more criminal than any private injury or injustice.\n\nThe long and helpless infancy of man requires the combination of\nparents for the subsistence of their young, and that combination\nrequires the virtue of chastity or fidelity to the marriage-bed.\nWithout such a utility, it will readily be owned that such a virtue\nwould never have been thought of.\n\nAn infidelity of this nature is much more pernicious in women than in\nmen; hence the laws of chastity are much stricter over the one sex than\nover the other.\n\nThese rules have all a reference to generation, and yet women past\nchild-bearing are no more supposed to be exempted from them than those\nin the flower of their youth and beauty. General rules are often\nextended beyond the principle whence they first arise, and this holds\nin all matters of taste and sentiment. It is a vulgar story at Paris\nthat during the rage of the Mississippi a hump-backed fellow went\nevery day into the Rue de Quincempoix, where the stock-jobbers met in\ngreat crowds, and was well paid for allowing them to make use of his\nhump as a desk in order to sign their contracts upon it. Would the\nfortune which he raised by this invention make him a handsome fellow,\nthough it be confessed that personal beauty arises very much from ideas\nof utility? The imagination is influenced by association of ideas,\nwhich, though they arise at first from the judgment, are not easily\naltered by every particular exception that occurs to us. To which we\nmay add, in the present case of chastity, that the example of the old\nwould be pernicious to the young, and that women, continually thinking\nthat a certain time would bring them the liberty of indulgence, would\nnaturally advance that period and think more lightly of this whole duty\nso requisite to society.\n\nThose who live in the same family have such frequent opportunities of\nlicence of this kind that nothing could preserve purity of manners were\nmarriage allowed among the nearest relations, or were any intercourse\nof love between them ratified by law and custom. Incest, therefore,\nbeing pernicious in a superior degree, has also a superior turpitude\nand moral deformity annexed to it.\n\nWhat is the reason why, by the Athenian laws, one might marry a\nhalf-sister by the father but not by the mother? Plainly this:\u2014The\nmanners of the Athenians were so reserved that a man was never\npermitted to approach the women\u2019s apartment, even in the same family,\nunless where he visited his own mother. His step-mother and her\nchildren were as much shut up from him as the women of any other\nfamily, and there was as little danger of any criminal correspondence\nbetween them. Uncles and nieces, for a like reason, might marry at\nAthens, but neither these nor half-brothers and sisters could contract\nthat alliance at Rome, where the intercourse was more open between the\nsexes. Public utility is the cause of all these variations.\n\nTo repeat to a man\u2019s prejudice anything that escaped him in private\nconversation, or to make any such use of his private letters, is highly\nblamed. The free and social intercourse of minds must be extremely\nchecked where no such rules of fidelity are established.\n\nEven in repeating stories, whence we can see no ill consequences\nto result, the giving one\u2019s authors is regarded as a piece of\nindiscretion, if not of immorality. These stories, in passing from hand\nto hand and receiving all the usual variations, frequently come about\nto the persons concerned and produce animosities and quarrels among\npeople whose intentions are the most innocent and inoffensive.\n\nTo pry into secrets, to open or even read the letters of others, to\nplay the spy upon their words and looks and actions\u2014what habits more\ninconvenient in society? what habits, of consequence, more blameable?\n\nThis principle is also the foundation of most of the laws of good\nmanners, a kind of lesser morality calculated for the ease of company\nand conversation. Too much or too little ceremony are both blamed,\nand everything which promotes ease without an indecent familiarity is\nuseful and laudable.\n\nConstancy in friendships, attachments, and intimacies is\ncommonly very commendable, and is requisite to support trust and\ngood correspondence in society. But in places of general though\ncasual concourse, where the pursuit of health and pleasure brings\npeople promiscuously together, public conveniency has dispensed with\nthis maxim, and custom there promotes an unreserved conversation for\nthe time by indulging the privilege of dropping afterwards every\nindifferent acquaintance without breach of civility or good manners.\n\nEven in societies which are established on principles the most immoral\nand the most destructive to the interests of the general society there\nare required certain rules which a species of false honour as well as\nprivate interest engages the members to observe. Robbers and pirates,\nit has often been remarked, could not maintain their pernicious\nconfederacy did they not establish a new distributive justice among\nthemselves and recall those laws of equity which they have violated\nwith the rest of mankind.\n\n\u201cI hate a drinking companion,\u201d says the Greek proverb, \u201cwho never\nforgets.\u201d The follies of the last debauch should be buried in eternal\noblivion, in order to give full scope to the follies of the next.\n\nAmong nations where an immoral gallantry, if covered with a thin veil\nof mystery, is in some degree authorized by custom, there immediately\narise a set of rules calculated for the conveniency of that attachment.\nThe famous court or parliament of love in Provence decided formerly all\ndifficult cases of this nature.\n\nIn societies for play there are laws required for the conduct of the\ngame, and these laws are different in each game. The foundation, I own,\nof such societies is frivolous, and the laws are in a great measure,\nthough not altogether, capricious and arbitrary. So far is there a\nmaterial difference between them and the rules of justice, fidelity and\nloyalty. The general societies of men are absolutely requisite for the\nsubsistence of the species, and the public conveniency, which regulates\nmorals, is inviolably established in the nature of man and of the world\nin which he lives. The comparison, therefore, in these respects\nis very imperfect. We may only learn from it the necessity of rules\nwherever men have any intercourse with each other.\n\nThey cannot even pass each other on the road without rules. Waggoners,\ncoachmen, and postilions have principles by which they give way, and\nthese are chiefly founded on mutual ease and convenience. Sometimes\nalso they are arbitrary, at least dependent on a kind of capricious\nanalogy, like many of the reasonings of lawyers.\u200b[117]\n\nTo carry the matter further, we may observe that it is impossible for\nmen so much as to murder each other without statutes and maxims and\nan idea of justice and honour. War has its laws as well as peace, and\neven that sportive kind of war carried on among wrestlers, boxers,\ncudgel-players, gladiators, is regulated by fixed principles. Common\ninterest and utility beget infallibly a standard of right and wrong\namong the parties concerned.\n\n\nNOTE, OF POLITICAL SOCIETY.\n\n[117] That the lighter machine yields to the heavier, and in machines\nof the same kind, that the empty yields to the loaded\u2014this rule is\nfounded on convenience. That those who are going to the capital take\nplace of those who are coming from it\u2014this seems to be founded on\nsome idea of the dignity of the great city, and of the preference of\nthe future to the past. From like reasons, among foot-walkers, the\nright-hand entitles a man to the wall and prevents jostling, which\npeaceable people find very disagreeable and inconvenient.\n\n\n\n\nALPHABETICAL ARRANGEMENT OF AUTHORITIES CITED BY HUME.\n\n\n \u00c6MILIUS, PAULUS, Roman general, B.C. 230\u2013157. Defeated Perseus of\n Macedonia.\n\n AGATHOCLES, tyrant of Syracuse, born _circa_ B.C. 361, died 289.\n\n ALCIBIADES, Athenian general and statesman, born B.C. 450, died B.C.\n 404. A disciple of Socrates, and noted for dissoluteness.\n\n ALEXANDER the Great, born B.C. 356, died 323.\n\n ANACHARSIS, Scythian philosopher, B.C. 600. Much esteemed by Solon.\n\n ANTHONY, MARK, Triumvir, born _circa_ B.C. 85, died B.C. 30. Best\n known through his association with Cleopatra.\n\n ANTIGONUS, one of the greatest generals of Alexander the Great. Slain\n in 301 at Ipsus.\n\n ANTIPATER, minister of Philip of Macedon and Alexander the Great, died\n B.C. 319.\n\n APPIANUS (Appian), belonged to the time of Trajan, and wrote the\n history of Rome in Greek.\n\n ARATUS, general of the Ach\u00e6an League, born B.C. 271, died 213.\n\n ARBUTHNOT, JOHN, physician, born 1675, died 1735. Associate of Pope\n and Swift, and wrote on ancient measures, weights, and coins.\n\n ARISTOTLE, philosopher, the Stagirite, born B.C. 384, died 332. Tutor\n of Alexander the Great.\n\n ARRIANUS, Greek historian, resided at Rome in the second century, a\n disciple of Epictetus, died _circa_ A.D. 160.\n\n ATHEN\u00c6US, grammarian, born in Egypt in the third century.\n\n ATTALUS, King of Pergamus, died B.C. 197.\n\n AUGUSTUS, first Roman Emperor, born B.C. 63, grandnephew of Julius\n C\u00e6sar, died A.D. 14.\n\n C\u00c6SAR, CAIUS JULIUS, B.C. 100\u201344, Roman warrior and administrator,\n known to every schoolboy from his _Commentaries_.\n\n CAMILLUS, MARCUS FURIUS, died B.C. 365, Roman warrior, six times\n military tribune and five times dictator.\n\n CARACALLA, brother of Geta, whom he murdered A.D. 212.\n\n CATALINA, LUCIUS SERGIUS (Catiline), died B.C. 62, noted for his\n depraved habits and his conspiracy that drew from Cicero his famous\n orations.\n\n CATO, MARCUS PORCIUS, surnamed from Utica, his birthplace, Uticensis,\n died B.C. 46.\n\n CATO, the elder, born B.C. 234, died 149, noted for his courage and\n temperance.\n\n CICERO, MARCUS TULLIUS, Roman orator, born B.C. 106, died 43.\n\n CLAUDIUS, Roman Emperor, born B.C. 9, died A.D. 54. Visited Britain\n A.D. 43.\n\n CLEOMENES, King of Sparta, died B.C. 220.\n\n CLODIUS, enemy of Cicero, died B.C. 52. Used to go about Rome with an\n intimidating band of gladiators.\n\n COLUMELLA, native of Spain, resided at Rome in the reign of Claudius,\n A.D. 41\u201354.\n\n COMMODUS, Roman Emperor, son of Marcus Aurelius, born A.D. 161, died\n 192.\n\n CTESIPHON. In his defence Demosthenes delivered his famous oration \u201cOn\n the Crown\u201d in B.C. 330.\n\n DEMETRIUS PHALEREUS, Greek orator and statesman, born B.C. 345, died\n _circa_ 283.\n\n DEMOSTHENES, Greek orator, B.C. 385\u2013322, whose speeches against\n the encroachments of Philip of Macedon have given the general term\n \u201cphilippics\u201d to powerful invective.\n\n DION CASSIUS, _circa_ 200\u2013250, wrote history of Rome in Greek.\n\n DIONYSIUS HALICARNASS\u00c6US, Greek rhetorician and historian, born B.C.\n 29, died B.C. 7. Chief work, _Roman Arch\u00e6ology_.\n\n DIONYSIUS, the elder, tyrant of Syracuse, B.C. 430\u2013367; besides being\n a warrior, was a patron of literary men and artists. Built Lautumi\u00e6,\n the famous prison, called also the \u201cEar of Dionysius.\u201d\n\n DIODORUS SICULUS, wrote a universal history, flourished _circa_ B.C.\n 50.\n\n DRUSUS, Roman consul, born B.C. 38.\n\n EPAMINONDAS, Theban statesman and general, died B.C. 362.\n\n FLORUS, Roman historian, lived in the reigns of Trajan and Hadrian.\n\n FOLARD, JEAN CHARLES, military tactician, born at Avignon 1669, died\n 1752, published an edition of _Polybius_.\n\n GARCILASSO DE LA VEGA, called the Inca because descended from the\n royal family of Peru (1530\u20131620), wrote _History of Peru_ and _History\n of Florida_.\n\n GEE, JOSHUA, eighteenth-century London merchant, wrote _Trade and\n Navigation of Great Britain_ (1730).\n\n GERMANICUS, son of Nero, died A.D. 19, aged 34.\n\n GETA, second son of Emperor Severus, born A.D. 189, died 212.\n\n GUICCIARDINI, FRANCISCO, Italian historian (1482\u20131540).\n\n HANNIBAL, great Carthaginian general, born B.C. 247, died 183.\n\n HELIOGABALUS, Roman emperor, born _circa_ A.D. 205, died 222.\n\n HERODIAN, flourished in the third century, wrote in Greek a history of\n the period from the death of Marcus Aurelius to 238.\n\n HESIOD, one of the earliest Greek poets, supposed to have flourished\n in the eighth century B.C. \u201cWorks and Days\u201d is his best known poem.\n\n HIERO II., King of Syracuse, died B.C. 215, aged 92. Archimedes lived\n in his reign.\n\n HIRTIUS, Roman consul, contemporary with C\u00e6sar and Cicero; is said to\n be the author of the eighth book of C\u00e6sar\u2019s _Commentaries_.\n\n HYPERIDES, Athenian orator, died B.C. 322, disciple of Plato.\n\n ISOCRATES, Greek orator, born B.C. 436, died 338.\n\n JUSTIN, a Latin historian, lived in second or third century,\n epitomized _Histori\u00e6 Philippic\u00e6 of Trogus Pompeius, a native of Gaul_.\n\n LIVIUS, TITUS (Livy), historian of Rome (B.C. 59\u201317). Of his 142\n books, only 35 have been preserved.\n\n LONGINUS, DIONYSIUS, Greek philosopher, died B.C. 273. His extensive\n knowledge earned him the title of \u201cThe living library.\u201d\n\n LUCIAN, Greek writer, lived in the time of Marcus Aurelius.\n\n LYCURGUS, Spartan lawgiver, whose severe regulations made the Spartans\n a race of warriors, is said to have flourished in the ninth century\n B.C.\n\n LYSIAS, Greek orator, born B.C. 458, died 373, wrote 230 orations, of\n which only 35 remain.\n\n MACHIAVELLI, Florentine statesman and historian, born 1469, died 1527.\n\n MAILLET, French writer, born 1656, died 1738, consul in Egypt and at\n Leghorn.\n\n MARTIAL, Roman poet, born A.D. 43.\n\n MASSINISSA, King of Numidia, born B.C. 238, died 148.\n\n MAZARIN, JULES, cardinal, and first minister of Louis XIV. (1602\u201361).\n\n\n NABIS, Spartan tyrant, died B.C. 192, noted for his cruelty.\n\n NERO, Roman emperor, born A.D. 37, died 67.\n\n OCTAVIUS, became Emperor Augustus.\n\n OVIDIUS PUBLIUS NASO (Ovid), Roman poet, B.C. 43\u2013A.D. 18, enjoyed the\n patronage of Augustus until banished A.D. 8. Chief works\u2014_Amores_, _De\n Arte Amandi_, _Fasti_.\n\n PATERCULUS, Roman historian, born _circa_ B.C. 19, died A.D. 31.\n\n PAUSANIAS, Greek writer, flourished _circa_ A.D. 120\u2013140.\n\n PERSEUS, or PERSES, last King of Macedonia. Ascended the throne B.C.\n 178.\n\n PESCENIUS NIGER, became Roman Emperor in 193.\n\n PETRONIUS, died A.D. 66, Roman author, lived at the court of Nero, and\n acquired celebrity for his licentiousness.\n\n PHILIP of Macedon, born 382, assassinated 336.\n\n PLATO, born B.C. 429, died 347.\n\n PLAUTUS, Roman comedy writer, born _circa_ B.C. 255, died 184.\n\n PLINY. There were two Plinys\u2014one born A.D. 23, the other, nephew\n of the preceding, A.D. 62. The former was a naturalist; the latter\n a pleader and soldier, whose chief writings are his account of the\n Christians and _Epistles_.\n\n PLUTARCH, celebrated biographer, died _circa_ B.C. 120.\n\n POLYBIUS, Greek historian, B.C. 204\u2013122. His history deals with Greece\n and Rome during the period 220\u2013146, and is of great importance.\n\n POMPEY the younger, born B.C. 75.\n\n PRUSIAS, King of Bithynia, _circa_ B.C. 190.\n\n PYRRHUS, King of Epirus, B.C. 318\u2013272, one of the greatest warriors of\n ancient days.\n\n SALLUSTIUS, CRISPUS CAIUS, Roman historian, B.C. 86\u201335, excluded from\n the Senate on account of his debauchery.\n\n SENECA, LUCIUS ANN\u00c6US, Roman philosopher, A.D. 3\u201365, belonged to the\n Stoic school, and was believed to have been acquainted with St. Paul.\n\n SERVIUS TULLIUS, sixth King of Rome, changed the constitution so that\n the plebs obtained political power.\n\n SEVERUS, Roman Emperor, born A.D. 146, died at York 211. Wrote history\n of his own reign.\n\n SOLON, celebrated Athenian legislator, died _circa_ B.C. 558, aged\n eighty. Established the principle that property, not birth, should\n entitle to state honours and offices.\n\n STRABO, Greek historian and geographer, born _circa_ B.C. 50, died\n _circa_ A.D. 20. His chief work in seventeen books gives a description\n of different countries, manners and customs, particulars of their\n history, and eminent men.\n\n SUETONIUS, Roman historian, born _circa_ A.D. 75, died _circa_ 160.\n\n TACITUS, Roman historian, born _circa_ A.D. 54. His _Annales_ cover\n the period A.D. 14\u201368.\n\n THEOCRITUS, Greek poet, lived third century B.C., considered the\n father of pastoral poetry. Visited the court of Ptolem\u00e6us Soter.\n\n THRASYBULUS, Athenian naval commander, died B.C. 389.\n\n THUCYDIDES, Greek historian, born B.C. 471, died _circa_ 401. His\n great work, the history of the Peloponnesian War, is the first example\n of philosophical history.\n\n TIBERIUS, CLAUDIUS NERO, Roman Emperor, B.C. 42\u2013A.D. 37, succeeded\n Augustus A.D. 14.\n\n TIMOLEON, Greek general, born in Corinth _circa_ B.C. 400, died 337.\n Resided at Syracuse.\n\n TISSAPHERNES, Persian satrap, died B.C. 395. An intimate friend of\n Alcibiades.\n\n TRAJANUS, MARCUS ULPIUS (Trajan), Roman Emperor, A.D. 52\u2013117.\n Succeeded to the throne in 98, and surnamed by the Senate \u201cOptimus.\u201d\n\n VARRO, Roman writer, born B.C. 116, died 28. Reputed the most learned\n among the Romans, and wrote 490 books.\n\n VAUBAN, S\u00c9BASTIEN LE PRESTRE DE, Marshal of France and great military\n engineer, 1633\u20131707. Published works on sieges, frontiers, etc., and\n left twelve folio volumes of MS., and was pronounced the most upright,\n simple, true, and modest man of his age.\n\n VESPASIAN, TITUS FLAVIUS, Roman Emperor, born A.D. 9, died 79.\n\n VOPISCUS, Syracusan, flourished _circa_ A.D. 304. Wrote histories.\n\n XENOPHON, Greek historian, born circa B.C. 450, a disciple and friend\n of Socrates.\n\nTHE END.\n\nTHE WALTER SCOTT PUBLISHING CO., LTD., FELLING-ON-TYNE.\n\n\n\n\nADVERTISEMENTS, from the Walter Scott Publishing Company, Limited,\nLondon and Felling-on-Tyne.\n\n\nTHE WORLD\u2019S LITERARY MASTERPIECES.\n\nThe Scott Library.\n\nMaroon Cloth, Gilt. Price 1s. net per Volume.\n\nVOLUMES ALREADY ISSUED\u2014\n\n 1 Malory\u2019s Romance of King Arthur and the Quest of the Holy Grail.\n Edited by Ernest Rhys.\n\n 2 Thoreau\u2019s Walden. With Introductory Note by Will H. Dircks.\n\n 3 Thoreau\u2019s \u201cWeek.\u201d With Prefatory Note by Will H. Dircks.\n\n 4 Thoreau\u2019s Essays. Edited, With an Introduction, by Will H. Dircks.\n\n 5 Confessions of an English Opium-eater, Etc. By Thomas De Quincey.\n With Introductory Note by William Sharp.\n\n 6 Landor\u2019s Imaginary Conversations. Selected, with Introduction, by\n Havelock Ellis.\n\n 7 Plutarch\u2019s Lives (Langhorne). With Introductory Note by B. J. Snell,\n M.A.\n\n 8 Browne\u2019s Religio Medici, etc. With Introduction by J. Addington\n Symonds.\n\n 9 Shelley\u2019s Essays and Letters. Edited, with Introductory Note, by\n Ernest Rhys.\n\n 10 Swift\u2019s Prose Writings. Chosen and Arranged, with Introduction, by\n Walter Lewin.\n\n 11 My Study Windows. By James Russell Lowell. With Introduction by R.\n Garnett, LL.D.\n\n 12 Lowell\u2019s Essays on the English Poets. With a new Introduction by\n Mr. Lowell.\n\n 13 The Biglow Papers. By James Russell Lowell. With a Prefatory Note\n by Ernest Rhys.\n\n 14 Great English Painters. Selected from Cunningham\u2019s _Lives_. Edited\n by William Sharp.\n\n 15 Byron\u2019s Letters and Journals. Selected, with Introduction, by\n Mathilde Blind.\n\n 16 Leigh Hunt\u2019s Essays. With Introduction and Notes by Arthur Symons.\n\n 17 Longfellow\u2019s \u201cHyperion,\u201d \u201cKavanagh,\u201d and \u201cThe Trouveres.\u201d With\n Introduction by W. Tirebuck.\n\n 18 Great Musical Composers. by G. F. Ferris. Edited, with\n Introduction, by Mrs. William Sharp.\n\n 19 The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius. Edited by Alice Zimmern.\n\n 20 The Teaching of Epictetus. Translated from the Greek, with\n Introduction and Notes, by T. W. Rolleston.\n\n 21 Selections from Seneca. With Introduction by Walter Clode.\n\n 22 Specimen Days in America. By Walt Whitman. Revised by the Author,\n with fresh Preface.\n\n 23 Democratic Vistas, and Other Papers. By Walt Whitman. (Published by\n arrangement with the Author.)\n\n 24 White\u2019s Natural History of Selborne, with a Preface by Richard\n Jefferies.\n\n 25 Defoe\u2019s Captain Singleton. Edited, with Introduction, by H.\n Halliday Sparling.\n\n 26 Mazzini\u2019s Essays: Literary, Political, and Religious. With\n Introduction by William Clarke.\n\n 27 Prose Writings of Heine. With Introduction by Havelock Ellis.\n\n 28 Reynolds\u2019s Discourses. With Introduction by Helen Zimmern.\n\n 29 Papers of Steele and Addison. Edited by Walter Lewin.\n\n 30 Burns\u2019s Letters. Selected and Arranged, with Introduction, by J.\n Logie Robertson, M.A.\n\n 31 Volsunga Saga. William Morris. With Introduction by H. H. Sparling.\n\n\n 32 Sartor Resartus. By Thomas Carlyle. With Introduction by Ernest\n Rhys.\n\n 33 Select Writings of Emerson with Introduction by Percival Chubb.\n\n 34 Autobiography of Lord Herbert. Edited, with an Introduction, by\n Will H. Dircks.\n\n 35 English Prose, From Maundeville to Thackeray. Chosen and Edited by\n Arthur Galton.\n\n 36 The Pillars of Society, and Other Plays. By Henrik Ibsen. Edited,\n with an Introduction, by Havelock Ellis.\n\n 37 Irish Fairy and Folk Tales. Edited and Selected by W. B. Yeats.\n\n 38 Essays of Dr. Johnson, with Biographical Introduction and Notes by\n Stuart J. Reid.\n\n 39 Essays of William Hazlitt. Selected and Edited, with Introduction\n and Notes, by Frank Carr.\n\n 40 Landor\u2019s Pentameron, and Other Imaginary Conversations. Edited,\n with a Preface, by H. Ellis.\n\n 41 Poe\u2019s Tales and Essays. Edited, with Introduction, by Ernest Rhys.\n\n 42 Vicar of Wakefield. By Oliver Goldsmith. Edited, with Preface, by\n Ernest Rhys.\n\n 43 Political Orations, from Wentworth to Macaulay. Edited, with\n Introduction, by William Clarke.\n\n 44 The Autocrat of the Breakfast-table. By Oliver Wendell Holmes.\n\n 45 The Poet at the Breakfast-table. By Oliver Wendell Holmes.\n\n 46 The Professor at the Breakfast-table. By Oliver Wendell Holmes.\n\n 47 Lord Chesterfield\u2019s Letters to his Son. Selected, with\n Introduction, by Charles Sayle.\n\n 48 Stories from Carleton. Selected, with Introduction, by W. Yeats.\n\n 49 Jane Eyre. By Charlotte Bront\u00eb. Edited by Clement K. Shorter.\n\n 50 Elizabethan England. Edited by Lothrop Withington, with a Preface\n by Dr. Furnivall.\n\n 51 The Prose Writings of Thomas Davis. Edited by T. W. Rolleston.\n\n 52 Spence\u2019s Anecdotes. A Selection. Edited, with an Introduction and\n Notes, by John Underhill.\n\n 53 More\u2019s Utopia, and Life of Edward V. Edited, with an Introduction,\n by Maurice Adams.\n\n 54 Sadi\u2019s Gulistan, or Flower Garden. Translated, with an Essay, by\n James Ross.\n\n 55 English Fairy and Folk Tales. Edited by E. Sidney Hartland.\n\n 56 Northern Studies. By Edmund Gosse. With a Note by Ernest Rhys.\n\n 57 Early Reviews of Great Writers. Edited by E. Stevenson.\n\n 58 Aristotle\u2019s Ethics. With George Henry Lewes\u2019s Essay on Aristotle\n prefixed.\n\n 59 Landor\u2019s Pericles and Aspasia. Edited, with an Introduction, by\n Havelock Ellis.\n\n 60 Annals of Tacitus. Thomas Gordon\u2019s Translation. Edited, with an\n Introduction, by Arthur Galton.\n\n 61 Essays of Elia. By Charles Lamb. Edited, with an Introduction, by\n Ernest Rhys.\n\n 62 Balzac\u2019s Shorter Stories. Translated by William Wilson and the\n Count Stenbock.\n\n 63 Comedies of de Musset. Edited, with an Introductory Note, by S. L.\n Gwynn.\n\n 64 Coral Reefs. By Charles Darwin. Edited, with an Introduction, by\n Dr. J. W. Williams.\n\n 65 Sheridan\u2019s Plays. Edited, with an Introduction, by Rudolf Dircks.\n\n 66 Our Village. By Miss Mitford. Edited, with an Introduction, by\n Ernest Rhys.\n\n 67 Master Humphrey\u2019s Clock, and other Stories. By Charles Dickens.\n With Introduction by Frank T. Marzials.\n\n 68 Oxford Movement, The. Being a Selection from \u201cTracts for the\n Times.\u201d Edited, with an Introduction, by William G. Hutchison.\n\n 69 Essays and Papers by Douglas Jerrold. Edited by Walter Jerrold.\n\n 70 Vindication of the Rights of Woman. By Mary Wollstonecraft.\n Introduction by Mrs. E. Robins Pennell.\n\n 71 \u201cThe Athenian Oracle.\u201d A Selection. Edited by John Underhill, with\n Prefatory Note by Walter Besant.\n\n 72 Essays of Sainte-beuve. Translated and Edited, with an\n Introduction, by Elizabeth Lee.\n\n 73 Selections from Plato. From the translation of Sydenham and Taylor.\n Edited by T. W. Rolleston.\n\n 74 Heine\u2019s Italian Travel Sketches, etc. Translated by Elizabeth A.\n Sharp. With an Introduction from the French of Theophile Gautier.\n\n 75 Schiller\u2019s Maid of Orleans. Translated, with an Introduction, by\n Major-General Patrick Maxwell.\n\n 76 Selections from Sydney Smith. Edited, with an Introduction, by\n Ernest Rhys.\n\n 77 The New Spirit. By Havelock Ellis.\n\n 78 The Book of Marvellous Adventures. From the \u201cMorte d\u2019Arthur.\u201d\n Edited by Ernest Rhys. [This, together with No. 1, forms the complete\n \u201cMorte d\u2019Arthur.\u201d]\n\n 79 Essays and Aphorisms. By Sir Arthur Helps. With an Introduction by\n E. A. Helps.\n\n 80 Essays of Montaigne. Selected, with a Prefatory Note, by Percival\n Chubb.\n\n 81 The Luck of Barry Lyndon. By W. M. Thackeray. Edited by F. T.\n Marzials.\n\n 82 Schiller\u2019s William Tell. Translated, with an Introduction, by\n Major-General Patrick Maxwell.\n\n 83 Carlyle\u2019s Essays on German Literature. With an Introduction by\n Ernest Rhys.\n\n 84 Plays and Dramatic Essays of Charles Lamb. Edited, with an\n Introduction, by Rudolf Dircks.\n\n 85 The Prose of Wordsworth. Selected and Edited, with an Introduction,\n by Professor William Knight.\n\n 86 Essays, Dialogues, and Thoughts of Count Giacomo Leopardi.\n Translated, with an Introduction and Notes, by Major-General Patrick\n Maxwell.\n\n 87 The Inspector-general. A Russian Comedy. By Nikolai V. Gogol.\n Translated from the original, with an Introduction and Notes, by\n Arthur A. Sykes.\n\n 88 Essays and Apothegms of Francis, Lord Bacon. Edited, with an\n Introduction, by John Buchan.\n\n 89 Prose of Milton. Selected and Edited, with an Introduction, by\n Richard Garnett, LL.D.\n\n 90 The Republic of Plato. Translated by Thomas Taylor, with an\n Introduction by Theodore Wratislaw.\n\n 91 Passages from Froissart. With an Introduction by Frank T. Marzials.\n\n 92 The Prose and Table Talk of Coleridge. Edited by Will H. Dircks.\n\n 93 Heine in Art and Letters. Translated by Elizabeth A. Sharp.\n\n 94 Selected Essays of de Quincey. With an Introduction by Sir George\n Douglas, Bart.\n\n 95 Vasari\u2019s Lives of Italian Painters. Selected and Prefaced by\n Havelock Ellis.\n\n 96 Laocoon, and other Prose Writings of Lessing. A new Translation by\n W. B. R\u00f6nnfeldt.\n\n 97 Pelleas and Melisanda, and the Sightless. Two Plays by Maurice\n Maeterlinck. Translated from the French by Laurence Alma Tadema.\n\n 98 The Complete Angler of Walton and Cotton. Edited, with an\n Introduction, by Charles Hill Dick.\n\n 99 Lessing\u2019s Nathan the Wise. Translated by Major-General Patrick\n Maxwell.\n\n 100 The Poetry of the Celtic Races, and other Essays of Ernest Renan.\n Translated by W. G. Hutchison.\n\n 101 Criticisms, Reflections, and Maxims of Goethe. Translated, with an\n Introduction, by W. B. R\u00f6nnfeldt.\n\n 102 Essays of Schopenhauer. Translated by Mrs. Rudolf Dircks. With an\n Introduction.\n\n 103 Renan\u2019s Life of Jesus. Translated, with an Introduction, by\n William G. Hutchison.\n\n 104 The Confessions of Saint Augustine. Edited, with an Introduction,\n by Arthur Symons.\n\n 105 The Principles of Success in Literature. By George Henry Lewes.\n Edited by T. Sharper Knowlson.\n\n 106 The Lives of Dr. John Donne, Sir Henry Wotton, Mr. Richard Hooker,\n Mr. George Herbert, and Dr. Robert Sanderson. By Izaac Walton. Edited,\n with an Introduction, by Charles Hill Dick.\n\n 108 Renan\u2019s Antichrist. Translated, with an Introduction, by W. G.\n Hutchison.\n\n 109 Orations of Cicero. Selected and Edited, with an Introduction, by\n Fred. W. Norris.\n\n 110 Reflections on the Revolution in France. By Edmund Burke. With an\n Introduction by George Sampson.\n\n 111 The Letters of the Younger Pliny. Series I. Translated, with an\n Introductory Essay, by John B. Firth, B.A., Late Scholar of Queen\u2019s\n College, Oxford.\n\n 112 The Letters of the Younger Pliny. Series II. Translated by John B.\n Firth, B.A.\n\n 113 Selected Thoughts of Blaise Pascal. Translated, with an\n Introduction and Notes, by Gertrude Burford Rawlings.\n\n 114 Scots Essayists: from Stirling to Stevenson, Edited, with an\n Introduction, by Oliphant Smeaton.\n\n 115 On Liberty. By John Stuart Mill. With an Introduction by W. L.\n Courtney.\n\n 116 The Discourse on Method and Metaphysical Meditations of Ren\u00e9\n Descartes. Translated, with Introduction, by Gertrude B. Rawlings.\n\n 117 K\u00e2lid\u00e2sa\u2019s Sakuntal\u00e2, Etc. Edited, With An Introduction, by T.\n Holme.\n\n 118 Newman\u2019s University Sketches. Edited, with Introduction, by George\n Sampson.\n\n 119 Newman\u2019s Select Essays. Edited, with an Introduction, by George\n Sampson.\n\n 120 Renan\u2019s Marcus Aurelius. Translated, with an Introduction, by\n William G. Hutchison.\n\n 121 Froude\u2019s Nemesis of Faith. With an Introduction by William G.\n Hutchison.\n\n 122 What is Art? By Leo Tolstoy. Translated from the Original Russian\n MS., with Introduction, by Alymer Maude.\n\n 123 Hume\u2019s Political Essays. Edited, with an Introduction, by W. B.\n Robertson.\n\n\nOTHER VOLUMES IN PREPARATION.\n\n IN ONE VOLUME.\n\n _Crown 8vo, Cloth, Richly Gilt. Price 3s. 6d._\n\n Musicians Wit, Humour, and Anecdote: Being _on Dits_ of Composers,\n Singers, and Instrumentalists of All Times.\n\n By Frederick J. Crowest,\n\n Author of \u201cThe Great Tone Poets,\u201d \u201cThe Story of British Music\u201d; Editor\n of \u201cThe Master Musicians\u201d Series, etc., etc.\n\n Profusely Illustrated with Quaint Drawings by J. P. Donne.\n\n _WHAT THE REVIEWERS SAY_:\u2014\n\n \u201cIt is one of those delightful medleys of anecdote of all times,\n seasons, and persons, in every page of which there is a new specimen\n of humour, strange adventure, and quaint saying.\u201d\u2014T. P. O\u2019Connor in\n _T. P.\u2019s Weekly_.\n\n \u201cA remarkable collection of good stories which must have taken years\n of perseverance to get together.\u201d\u2014_Morning Leader._\n\n \u201cA book which should prove acceptable to two large sections of the\n public\u2014those who are interested in musicians and those who have an\n adequate sense of the comic.\u201d\u2014_Globe._\n\n\n_The Makers of British Art._\n\n_A NEW SERIES OF MONOGRAPHS OF BRITISH PAINTERS._\n\n Each volume illustrated with Twenty Full-page Reproductions and a\n Photogravure Portrait.\n\n _Square Crown 8vo, Cloth, Gilt Top, Deckled Edges, 3s. 6d. net._\n\n\n_VOLUMES READY._\n\nLandseer, Sir Edwin. By the Editor.\n\n \u201cThis little volume may rank as the most complete account of Landseer\n that the world is likely to possess.\u201d\u2014_Times._\n\nReynolds, Sir Joshua. By Elsa d\u2019Esterre-Keeling.\n\n \u201cTo the series entitled \u2018The Makers of British Art\u2019 Miss Elsa\n d\u2019Esterre-Keeling contributes an admirable little volume on Sir Joshua\n Reynolds. Miss Keeling\u2019s style is sprightly and epigrammatic, and her\n judgments are well considered.\u201d\u2014_Daily Telegraph._\n\nTurner, J. M. W. By Robert Chignell, Author of \u201cThe Life and Paintings\nof Vicat Cole, R.A.\u201d\n\nRomney, George. By Sir Herbert Maxwell, Bart., F.R.S., M.P.\n\n \u201cLikely to remain the best account of the painter\u2019s life.\u201d\u2014_Athen\u00e6um._\n\nWilkie, Sir David. By Professor Bayne.\n\nConstable, John. By the Right Hon. Lord Windsor.\n\nRaeburn, Sir Henry. By Edward Pinnington.\n\nGainsborough, Thomas. By A. E. Fletcher.\n\nHogarth, William. By Prof. G. Baldwin Brown.\n\nMoore, Henry. By Frank J. Maclean.\n\n\n_IN PREPARATION._\n\nMILLAIS\u2014LEIGHTON\u2014MORLAND.\n\n\nCrown 8vo, about 350 pp. each, Cloth Cover, 2/6 per Vol.; Half-Polished\nMorocco, Gilt Top, 5s.\n\n\nCount Tolstoy\u2019s Works.\n\nThe following Volumes are already issued\u2014\n\n A Russian Proprietor.\n\n The Cossacks.\n\n Ivan Ilyitch, and Other Stories.\n\n My Religion.\n\n Life.\n\n My Confession.\n\n Childhood, Boyhood, Youth.\n\n The Physiology of War.\n\n Anna Kar\u00e9nina. 3/6.\n\n What to Do?\n\n War and Peace. (4 vols.)\n\n The Long Exile, etc.\n\n Sevastopol.\n\n The Kreutzer Sonata, and Family Happiness.\n\n The Kingdom of God Is Within You.\n\n Work While Ye Have the Light.\n\n The Gospel in Brief.\n\n\n Uniform with the above\u2014\n\n Impressions of Russia. By Dr. Georg Brandes.\n\n Post 4to, Cloth, Price 1s.\n\n Patriotism and Christianity.\n\n To which is appended a Reply to Criticisms of the Work. By Count\n Tolstoy.\n\n\n1/\u2010 Booklets by Count Tolstoy.\n\nBound in White Grained Boards, with Gilt Lettering.\n\n Where Love is, There God is Also.\n\n The Two Pilgrims.\n\n What Men Live by.\n\n The Godson.\n\n If You Neglect the Fire, You Don\u2019t Put it Out.\n\n What Shall it Profit a Man?\n\n\n2/\u2010 Booklets by Count Tolstoy.\n\nNew Editions, Revised.\n\nSmall 12mo, Cloth, with Embossed Design on Cover, each containing Two\nStories by Count Tolstoy, and Two Drawings by H. R. Millar. In Box,\nPrice 2s. each.\n\nVolume I. contains\u2014\n\n Where Love is, There God is Also.\n\n The Godson.\n\nVolume II. contains\u2014\n\n What Men Live by.\n\n What Shall it Profit a Man?\n\nVolume III. contains\u2014\n\n The Two Pilgrims.\n\n If You Neglect the Fire, You Don\u2019t Put it Out.\n\nVolume IV. contains\u2014\n\nMaster and Man.\n\nVolume V. contains\u2014\n\nTolstoy\u2019s Parables.\n\n\n_Crown 8vo, Cloth, 3s. 6d. each; some vols., 6s._\n\n_The Contemporary Science Series._\n\nEdited by Havelock Ellis.\n\nIllustrated Vols. between 300 and 400 pp. each.\n\n Evolution of Sex. By Professors Geddes and Thomson. 6s.\n\n Electricity in Modern Life. By G. W. de Tunzelmann.\n\n The Origin of the Aryans. By Dr. Taylor.\n\n Physiognomy and Expression. By P. Mantegazza.\n\n Evolution and Disease. By J. B. Sutton.\n\n The Village Community. By G. L. Gomme.\n\n The Criminal. By Havelock Ellis. New Edition. 6s.\n\n Sanity and Insanity. By Dr. C. Mercier.\n\n Hypnotism. By Dr. Albert Moll (Berlin).\n\n Manual Training. By Dr. Woodward (St. Louis).\n\n Science of Fairy Tales. By E. S. Hartland.\n\n Primitive Folk. By Elie Reclus.\n\n Evolution of Marriage. By Ch. Letourneau.\n\n Bacteria and Their Products. By Dr. Woodhead.\n\n Education and Heredity. By J. M. Guyau.\n\n The Man of Genius. By Prof. Lombroso.\n\n Property: Its Origin. By Ch. Letourneau.\n\n Volcanoes Past and Present. By Prof. Hull.\n\n Public Health Problems. By Dr. J. F. Sykes.\n\n Modern Meteorology. By Frank Waldo, Ph.D.\n\n The Germ-plasm. By Professor Weismann. 6s.\n\n The Industries of Animals. By F. Houssay.\n\n Man and Woman. By Havelock Ellis. 6s.\n\n Modern Capitalism. By John A. Hobson, M.A.\n\n Thought-Transference. By F. Podmore, M.A.\n\n Comparative Psychology. By Prof. C. L. Morgan, F.R.S. 6s.\n\n The Origins of Invention. By O. T. Mason.\n\n The Growth of the Brain. By H. H. Donaldson.\n\n Evolution in Art. By Prof. A. C. Haddon, F.R.S.\n\n Hallucinations and Illusions. By E. Parish. 6s.\n\n Psychology of the Emotions. By Prof. Ribot. 6s.\n\n The New Psychology. By Dr. E. W. Scripture. 6s.\n\n Sleep: Its Physiology, Pathology, Hygiene, and Psychology. By Marie de\n Manac\u00e9\u00efne.\n\n The Natural History of Digestion. By A. Lockhart Gillespie, M.D.,\n F.R.C.P. Ed., F.R.S. Ed. 6s.\n\n Degeneracy: Its Causes, Signs, and Results. By Prof. Eugene S. Talbot,\n M.D., Chicago. 6s.\n\n The History of the European Fauna. By R. F. Scharff, B.Sc., Ph.D.,\n F.Z.S. 6s.\n\n The Races of Man: A Sketch of Ethnography and Anthropology. By J.\n Deniker. 6s.\n\n The Psychology of Religion. By Prof. Starbuck. 6s.\n\n The Child. By Alexander Francis Chamberlain, M.A., Ph.D. 6s.\n\n The Mediterranean Race. By Prof. Sergi. 6s.\n\n The Study of Religion. By Morris Jastrow, Jun., Ph.D. 6s.\n\n History of Geology and Pal\u00e6ontology. By Prof. Karl Alfred von Zittel,\n Munich. 6s.\n\n The Making of Citizens: A Study in Comparative Education. By R. E.\n Hughes, M.A. 6s.\n\n Morals: A Treatise on the Psycho-Sociological Bases of Ethics. By\n Prof. G. L. Duprat.\n\n Earthquakes, a Study of Recent. By Prof. Charles Davison, D.Sc.,\n F.G.S. 6s.\n\n\nSPECIAL EDITION OF THE CANTERBURY POETS.\n\n_Square 8vo, Cloth, Gilt Top Elegant, Price 2s._\n\nEach Volume with a Frontispiece in Photogravure.\n\n Christian Year. With Portrait of John Keble.\n\n Longfellow. With Portrait of Longfellow.\n\n Shelley. With Portrait of Shelley.\n\n Wordsworth. With Portrait of Wordsworth.\n\n Whittier. With Portrait of Whittier.\n\n Burns. Songs with Portrait of Burns, and View of \u201cThe Auld Brig o\u2019\n Doon.\u201d\n\n Burns. Poems with Portrait of Burns, and View of \u201cThe Auld Brig o\u2019\n Doon.\u201d\n\n Keats. With Portrait of Keats.\n\n Emerson. With Portrait of Emerson.\n\n Sonnets of this Century. Portrait of P. B. Marston.\n\n Whitman. With Portrait of Whitman.\n\n Love Letters of a Violinist. Portrait of Eric Mackay.\n\n Scott. Lady of the Lake, etc. with Portrait of Sir Walter Scott, and\n View of \u201cThe Silver Strand, Loch Katrine.\u201d\n\n Scott. Marmion, etc. with Portrait of Sir Walter Scott, and View of\n \u201cThe Silver Strand, Loch Katrine.\u201d\n\n Children of the Poets. With an Engraving of \u201cThe Orphans,\u201d by\n Gainsborough.\n\n Sonnets of Europe. With Portrait of J. A. Symonds.\n\n Sydney Dobell. With Portrait of Sydney Dobell.\n\n Herrick. With Portrait of Herrick.\n\n Ballads and Rondeaus. Portrait of W. E. Henley.\n\n Irish Minstrelsy. With Portrait of Thomas Davis.\n\n Paradise Lost. With Portrait of Milton.\n\n Fairy Music. Engraving from Drawing by C. E. Brock.\n\n Golden Treasury. With Engraving of Virgin Mother.\n\n American Sonnets. With Portrait of J. R. Lowell.\n\n Imitation of Christ. With Engraving, \u201cEcce Homo.\u201d\n\n Painter Poets. With Portrait of Walter Crane.\n\n Women Poets. With Portrait of Mrs. Browning.\n\n Poems of Hon. Roden Noel. Portrait of Hon. R. Noel.\n\n American Humorous Verse. Portrait of Mark Twain.\n\n Songs of Freedom. With Portrait of William Morris.\n\n Scottish Minor Poets. With Portrait of R. Tannahill.\n\n Contemporary Scottish Verse. With Portrait of Robert Louis Stevenson.\n\n Paradise Regained. With Portrait of Milton.\n\n Cavalier Poets. With Portrait of Suckling.\n\n Humorous Poems. With Portrait of Hood.\n\n Herbert. With Portrait of Herbert.\n\n Poe. With Portrait of Poe.\n\n Owen Meredith. With Portrait of late Lord Lytton.\n\n Love Lyrics. With Portrait of Raleigh.\n\n German Ballads. With Portrait of Schiller.\n\n Campbell. With Portrait of Campbell.\n\n Canadian Poems. With View of Mount Stephen.\n\n Early English Poetry. With Portrait of Earl of Surrey.\n\n Allan Ramsay. With Portrait of Ramsay.\n\n Spenser. With Portrait of Spenser.\n\n Chatterton. With Engraving, \u201cThe Death of Chatterton.\u201d\n\n Cowper. With Portrait of Cowper.\n\n Chaucer. With Portrait of Chaucer.\n\n Coleridge. With Portrait of Coleridge.\n\n Pope. With Portrait of Pope.\n\n Byron. Miscellaneous with Portraits of Byron.\n\n Byron. Don Juan with Portraits of Byron.\n\n Jacobite Songs. With Portrait of Prince Charlie.\n\n Border Ballads. With View of Neidpath Castle.\n\n Australian Ballads. With Portrait of A. L. Gordon.\n\n Hogg. With Portrait of Hogg.\n\n Goldsmith. With Portrait of Goldsmith.\n\n Moore. With Portrait of Moore.\n\n Dora Greenwell. With Portrait of Dora Greenwell.\n\n Blake. With Portrait of Blake.\n\n Poems of Nature. With Portrait of Andrew Lang.\n\n Praed. With Portrait.\n\n Southey. With Portrait.\n\n Hugo. With Portrait.\n\n Goethe. With Portrait.\n\n Beranger. With Portrait.\n\n Heine. With Portrait.\n\n Sea Music. With View of Corbi\u00e8re Rocks, Jersey.\n\n Song-tide. With Portrait of Philip Bourke Marston.\n\n Lady of Lyons. With Portrait of Bulwer Lytton.\n\n Shakespeare: Songs and Sonnets. With Portrait.\n\n Ben Jonson. With Portrait.\n\n Horace. With Portrait.\n\n Crabbe. With Portrait.\n\n Cradle Songs. With Engraving from Drawing by T. E. Macklin.\n\n Ballads of Sport. With Engraving from Drawing by T. E. Macklin.\n\n Matthew Arnold. With Portrait.\n\n Austin\u2019s Days of the Year, With Portrait.\n\n Clough\u2019s Bothie, and other Poems. With View.\n\n Browning\u2019s Pippa Passes, etc. With Portrait.\n\n Browning\u2019s Blot in the \u2019Scutcheon, etc. With Portrait.\n\n Browning\u2019s Dramatic Lyrics. With Portrait.\n\n Mackay\u2019s Lover\u2019s Missal. With Portrait.\n\n Kirke White\u2019s Poems. With Portrait.\n\n Lyra Nicotiana. With Portrait.\n\n Aurora Leigh. With Portrait of E. B. Browning.\n\n Naval Songs. With Portrait of Lord Nelson.\n\n Tennyson: In Memoriam, Maud, etc. With Portrait.\n\n Tennyson: English Idyls, The Princess, etc. With View of Farringford\n House.\n\n War Songs. With Portrait of Lord Roberts.\n\n James Thomson. With Portrait.\n\n Alexander Smith. With Portrait.\n\n\n_The Music Story Series._\n\n_A SERIES OF LITERARY-MUSICAL MONOGRAPHS._\n\nEdited by FREDERICK J. CROWEST, Author of \u201cThe Great Tone Poets,\u201d etc.,\netc.\n\nIllustrated with Photogravure and Collotype Portraits, Half-tone and\nLine Pictures, Facsimiles, etc.\n\n_Square Crown 8vo, Cloth, 3s. 6d. net._\n\n\nVOLUMES NOW READY.\n\n The Story of Oratorio. By Annie W. Patterson, B.A., Mus. Doc.\n\n The Story of Notation. By C. F. Abdy Williams, M.A., Mus. Bac.\n\n The Story of the Organ. By C. F. Abdy Williams, M.A., Author of \u201cBach\u201d\n and \u201cHandel\u201d (\u201cMaster Musicians\u2019 Series\u201d).\n\n The Story of Chamber Music. By N. Kilburn Mus. Bac. (Cantab.),\n Conductor of the Middlesbrough, Sunderland, and Bishop Auckland\n Musical Societies.\n\n The Story of the Violin. By Paul Stoeving, Professor of the Violin,\n Guildhall School of Music, London.\n\n The Story of the Harp. By William H. Grattan Flood, Author of \u201cHistory\n of Irish Music.\u201d\n\n The Story of Organ Music. By C. F. Abdy Williams, M.A., Mus. Bac.\n\n\nIN PREPARATION.\n\n The Story of the Pianoforte. By Algernon S. Rose, Author of \u201cTalks\n with Bandsmen.\u201d\n\n The Story of English Minstrelsy. By Edmondstoune Duncan.\n\n The Story of the Orchestra. By Stewart Macpherson, Fellow and\n Professor, Royal Academy of Music.\n\n The Story of Musical Sound. By Churchill Sibley, Mus. Doc.\n\n The Story of Church Music. By The Editor.\n\n Etc., Etc., Etc.\n\n\n\n\n      *      *      *      *      *      *\n\n\n\n\nTranscriber\u2019s note:\n\nOriginal spelling and grammar have been generally retained, with\nsome exceptions noted below.\n\nPage xi. The phrase \u2039Weath of Nations\u203a was changed to \u2039Wealth of\nNations\u203a.\n\nPage xiii. The phrase \u2039\u2018I am much pleased with\u203a was changed to \u2039\u201cI am\nmuch pleased with\u203a.\n\nPage xxiii. The phrase \u2039int his room while\u203a was changed to \u2039into his\nroom while\u203a.\n\nPage 144. The phrases \u2039Xerxes\u2019s army\u203a and \u2039Xerxes\u2019 army\u203a are both\nretained.\n\nPage 157n. The phrase \u2039much rom their business\u203a was changed to \u2039much\nfrom their business\u203a.\n\nPages 162\u2013163. The phrases \u2039\u201cthat in the year\u203a (p. 162) and \u2039north\nexposition.\u201d\u203a (p. 163) contain unbalanced quotation marks in the\noriginal. Two new double quotation marks have been inserted to balance\nthese, at \u2039\u201c\u2018Hybernum fracta\u203a and \u2039\u201cHe speaks of that river\u2019s\u203a.\n\nPage 254. The phrase \u2039SAMILLUS, MARCUS FURIUS\u203a was changed to\n\u2039CAMILLUS, MARCUS FURIUS\u203a.\n\nPage 258. This (originally unnumbered) page begins sixteen pages\nof advertisements from The Walter Scott Publishing Co. A new\nheading \u2039ADVERTISEMENTS\u203a was inserted. This new heading contains\nalso the footer text that was originally printed on each page of the\nads section. The ads were printed in several different styles with\nconsiderable variation. The styling has been herein greatly simplified.\nSeveral large curly brackets \u2039}\u203a that graphically indicate combination\nof information on two or more lines of text have been eliminated, by\nrestructuring the text. Ditto marks \u2039Do.\u203a were also removed.","title":"Hume's Political Discourses","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":103969}