{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_59995/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_59995","id":"gutenberg_59995","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/59995","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Ancient","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Psychiatry/Psychology","Memory (Philosophy) -- History","Thesis (Ph. D.)"],"text":"Produced by Richard Tonsing and the Online Distributed\nProofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was\nproduced from images generously made available by The\nInternet Archive)\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n                                   An\n                           Historical Sketch\n                                   of\n             The Conceptions of Memory among the Ancients.\n\n\n                         Submitted as a Thesis\n                                   by\n                          William H. Burnham,\n            Candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy\n                                   at\n                       Johns Hopkins University,\n                               Baltimore.\n                                 1888.\n\n\n\n\n                           Table of Contents.\n\n\n                                   I.\n\n Conceptions of Memory before Aristotle,                       pp.  1\u201311\n\n\n                                   II.\n\n Aristotle\u2019s Conceptions of Memory,                            pp. 12\u201340\n\n\n                                  III.\n\n Conceptions of Memory among the Stoics and Epicureans, and in\n   Cicero and Quintilian,                                      pp. 41\u201346\n\n\n                                   IV.\n\n Conceptions of Plotinus and St. Augustine,                    pp. 47\u201370\n\n\n                                   V.\n\n Diseases of Memory mentioned by ancient writers,              pp. 71\u201373\n\n\n                                   VI.\n\n Ancient Systems of Mnemonics,                                 pp. 74\u201376\n\n\n\n\n                                Memory.\n\n\n\n\n                                   I.\n\n\nMnemosyne, Hesiod tells us, was the mother of the Muses. Without\nspeculating as some have done about the reasons for this myth it is\ninteresting as showing an appreciation of the fundamental nature of\nmemory and some sort of crude introspective psychology dating back\npossibly to pre-historic times.\n\nBefore the art of writing was in common use men had to depend more\nlargely than to-day upon their memories for preserving and transmitting\ntheir knowledge. It is not surprising, therefore, that the ancients put\na high estimate upon memory before they began to theorize about its\nnature. There are, of course, allusions to memory in Homer and in the\nHebrew Scriptures.[1] And occasionally one of the early Greek\nphilosophers tries to explain some phenomenon of memory. But we find no\nscientific study of the subject before Aristotle.\n\nThe psychology of the Ionian school of philosophers, as far as they can\nbe said to have had any at all, was sensationalism. Their views of\nmemory must be conjectured from the fundamental principles of their\nphilosophy.\n\nThe doctrine of transmigration as held in the Pythagoreans is an\nanticipation of Plato\u2019s doctrine of reminiscence, but there is little\npsychology in it. Theophrastus tells us that Diogenes of Appollonia was\npuzzled by the phenomenon of forgetting things.[2] But he explained it\nin accordance with the principles of his philosophy by supposing that\nthe cause of forgetting was an arrest of the equal distribution of air\nthroughout the body. A corroboration of this explanation he found in the\neasier breathing that follows the recalling of what was forgotten.\n\nAmong the Eleatics, Parmenides is reported to have held that not only\nthought, but recollecting and forgetting depended upon the way the light\nor heat and the dark or cold are mixed in the body. If we may trust\nTheophrastus,[3] it may be assumed that, according to Parmenides, every\npresentation corresponded to a definite mixture or relation of these\nqualities, and with the destruction of that relation the presentation\ndisappeared, that is, was forgotten.\n\nHeraclitus, one might suppose, would study memory carefully, but in the\nfragments of his philosophy that have come down to us nothing is said\nupon the subject.\n\nIn Plato we find a more modern psychology. According to him the thinking\npower of the mind, the understanding, is above the mere power of sense\nperceptions. It is this power which compares and considers, notes\nsimilarities and contrasts, unity and plurality, and forms ideas of\nrelation between Being and Non-Being as well as relations of number and\nproportions. Among the elements of this power, recollection (\u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2)\nis of prime importance. This rests upon the association by similarity\nand simultaneity.[4]\n\nPlato distinguishes the passive retention (\u03bc\u03bd\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7) of perceptions from\nactive memory (\u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc@\u03bd@\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2),[5] and suggests as a definition of memory,\n\u201cthe power which the soul has of recovering, when by itself, some\nfeeling which it experienced when in company with the body.\u201d He attempts\nno explanation of memory \u00acof memory\u00ac; but in the Theaetetus puts the\nfollowing words into the mouth of Socrates:\n\n\u201cI would have you imagine, then, that there exists in the mind of man a\nblock of wax, which is of different sizes in different men; harder,\nmoister, and having more or less of purity in one than in another, and\nin some of an intermediate quality.... Let us say that this tablet is a\ngift of Memory, the mother of the Muses, and that when we wish to\nremember anything which we have seen or heard, or thought in our own\nminds, we hold the wax to the perceptions and thoughts, and in that\nreceive the impressions from them as from the seal of a ring; and that\nwe remember and know what is imprinted as long as the image lasts; but\nwhen the image is effaced, or cannot be taken, then we forget and do not\nknow.\u201d\n\nPlato carries out the same figure to explain different degrees of\nmemory. \u201cWhen the wax in one\u2019s soul is deep, abundant, smooth, and of\nthe right quality, the impressions are lasting. Such minds can easily\nretain and are not liable to confusion. But, on the other hand, when the\nwax is very soft, one learns easily and forgets as easily; if the wax is\nhard, the reverse is true; again, if the wax is hard or impure, the\nimpressions are indistinct; and still more indistinct are they when\njostled together in a little soul.\u201d[6]\n\nThis illustration must not be taken too seriously; for later on in the\nsame dialogue Socrates calls it a \u201cwaxen figment\u201d and substitutes for it\nthe figure of the aviary of all kinds of birds\u2014\u201csome flocking together\napart from the rest, others in small groups, others solitary, flying\nanywhere and everywhere.\u201d\n\nThe receptacle is empty when we are young. The birds are kinds of\nknowledge. Learning is the process of capturing the birds and of\ndetaining them in this enclosure. In acts of memory we re-catch them and\ntake them out of the aviary.\n\nPlato\u2019s views upon memory have a special interest on account of their\nconnection with his metaphysical doctrines. Perception and recollection\nare the occasion of the minds turning away from the world of sense to\nthe inner world of innate and universal ideas. These ideas we could\nnever get from sense-perception. That gives us only the immediate and\nthe individual. The ideas are of the essential and the universal. We\ncould not conceive them if we did not already know them. Hence the power\nto know the universal in the individual proves a previous existence in\nwhich we had the intuitions of universal truths; and, accordingly,\nlearning is but recollection.[7] The metaphysical aspects of memory,\nhowever, let us avoid as much as possible. They would soon lead far from\na psychological study. But this doctrine of recollection lies at the\nheart of the Platonic philosophy, and it is necessary to note carefully\nthe distinction between this and ordinary memory. The latter, as\ndefined by Plato in the passage quoted above is the memory or\nrecollection of what has been learned through the body, that is, through\nsense-perception, belongs to the world of appearances, and is liable to\nmany errors. The former, on the other hand, is not concerned with things\nof sense. It is recollection of that higher world where we had an\nantenatal vision of intelligible realities. Its highest manifestation is\nthe insight of the philosopher who sees the divine goodness, truth, and\nbeauty.[8]\n\n\n\n\n                                  II.\n\n\nThe difference in philosophic method between Plato and Aristotle is well\nillustrated by their treatment of memory. What Plato says of memory is\nincidental to the discussion of such profound matters as the nature of\nthe soul and the theory of knowledge. Memory, according to him, is one\nof the higher faculties and partakes of the eternal nature of the soul.\nAristotle makes a special study of memory in a less transcendental way.\nWith him it is no longer a function of the eternal _Nous_; but it has\nits seat in the passive Reason, is dependent upon a physiological\nprocess, and perishes with the body.\n\nAristotle seems to have been the first of ancient philosophers to write\na systematic treatise on psychology. But, rather curiously, in this work\non psychology there is no special treatment of memory. A special tract,\nhowever, was devoted to the subject.[9] This, so \nfar as we know, was the first scientific study of\nmemory; and for this reason, as well as for its intrinsic merits, the\ntract deserves special attention. But before passing to his doctrine of\nmemory, it is well to notice briefly his theory of sense-perceptions. On\noccasion of appropriate stimuli movements take place in the\nsense-organs. These movements, however, are not sense perception. In\nperception the mind must compare and distinguish disparate sensations;\nit must unite the sensations presented simultaneously by our double\nsense organs as of sight and hearing, and it must be conscious of\nsensation. This work of comparison, of psychic synthesis, and of\nself-conscious perception is performed by a central sense. The physical\nbasis of this sense is the heart. Through it the mind performs the act\nof sense perception. The functions now attributed to nervous substance\nare referred by Aristotle to the _pneuma_ connected with the blood. This\nis the medium by which the movements arising in the sense organs are\ntransmitted to the heart, and in this _pneuma_ the movements persist\nlong after the external stimuli have ceased to act. Incidentally, it is\ninteresting to note, that according to Aristotle\u2019s psychology, the brain\nhas very little to do with mental activity. To borrow a phrase from\nWallace, it serves simply as \u201ca cooling apparatus to counteract the\nexcessive warmth of the heart.\u201d When the movement occasioned in the\nsense organ by an external stimulus is propagated to the heart,[10] it\nbecomes a perception of the soul. Sense perception, then, is an act of\nthe soul by means of a physiological process. In the words of Aristotle\nit is \u201ca movement of the soul through the body.\u201d[11] Now this movement\nsometimes continues after the stimulus, which was the occasion of it,\nhas ceased to act. The extreme case is the well known phenomenon of a\nvisual after-image. The images of the imagination are such\nafter-sensations. Imagination is weak sensation, or in the words of\nHobbes, \u201cdecaying sense\u201d. So too, dreaming is the result of a movement\nin our bodily organs, caused either from without or from within. Again,\nthese persisting movements are the elements of memory.\n\nAt first, one wonders how Aristotle will distinguish those movements\nwhich constitute memory from those which are the basis of imagination.\nHe is not entirely satisfactory on this point; but he makes the\nfollowing distinction. The picture of the imagination, or the\ncorresponding movement does not refer to an external object, and is not\nlocated in the past. The memory picture, on the other hand, does refer\nto an object and carries with it the consciousness of a time in the\npast, when the perception remembered took place.[12] Memory, then,\ninvolves time, and both this and the sense of time are _dependent_ upon\nthe central sense. Memory, as we have seen, is dependent upon the\nresidua of sensations. The subjective side of a sensation is an image.\nThus memory belongs to the same part of the soul as the imagination, and\nthe proper objects @of memory@ are images (\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u1f70). The image\nis a condition (\u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2) of the central sense. Memory _per se_ is of the\noriginal image or perception, and only in an accidental manner does it\nrelate to matters of thought.[13]\n\nIn his special tract on memory, Aristotle in part repeats Plato\u2019s views,\nin part discusses the obvious facts of memory, which, having been\ncontinually repeated since his time, have become mere platitudes, and in\npart he tries to explain the phenomena of memory in accordance with his\ngeneral system of psychology. The essay, however, is of special\ninterest, because in it Aristotle sets forth very clearly the famous\ndoctrine of association of ideas. Some of the other points in the\ntreatise may be briefly mentioned and special consideration given to the\nportion relating to recollection and association. \u00b6 First Aristotle\ntakes considerable space to show what would seem to be apparent enough\nto everybody, that memory is of the past, as perception is of the\npresent, and hope and opinion of the future.\n\nThe central sense or sensorium must be in a condition suitable to\nreceive and retain impressions. If the sensorium is too hard, no\nimpression is made. If it is greatly agitated, the new movement is\nineffectual: on somewhat the same principle, one may suppose, as one\nsay in modern psychology, that a weak stimulus is washed out by a strong\none. Hence the very young and the very old have poor memories; for the\nformer are in the movement of growth, the latter in that of decay.\nAgain, the question arises: How is it that in recollection we recognize\nthe memory image as a picture of the absent object? A scholastic answer\nis given. \u201cAn animal painted in a picture, he says, is both an animal\nand a copy, and while being thus one and the same, it is nevertheless\ntwo things at once. The animal and the copy are not identical, and we\nmay think of the picture either as animal or as a representation. This\nis also true of the image within us; and the idea which the mind\ncontemplates is something, although it is also the image of something\nelse.\u201d[14]\n\nThe second chapter of the treatise on memory is devoted chiefly to\nrecollection and the association of ideas. Aristotle distinguishes\ncarefully \u00acbetween\u00ac the mere persistence and reproduction of a\npresentation (\u03bc\u03bd\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7) from voluntary recollection (\u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2). The latter\nis indirect reproduction. It is possible only by the association of\nideas. The former is an attribute of animals, while the latter is\npeculiar to man. Recollection occurs according to the sequence of\nideas.[15] What and how necessary the sequence shall be depends upon our\npast experience. \u201cIf the sequence be necessary\u201d, Aristotle continues,\n\u201cthen, when this movement occurs, that one will follow. If it is not\nnecessary, but a matter of habit, the latter movement will generally\nfollow.\u201d Sir W^m. Hamilton understands the word translated _movement_\n(\u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) to mean merely _change in quality_. The word, then, he thinks\nmay be fairly translated into modern nomenclature by his famous term\n_modification_. One hesitates to criticise such a profound scholar and\nsuch a diligent student of Aristotle as Sir W^m. Hamilton; but in the\nlight of what has been said it seems much simpler and more in accordance\nwith the psychology of Aristotle to understand his doctrine of\nrecollection as follows: The physiological movements originally\nconnected with a series of perceptions must occur again in the same\norder when we recall a true memory-picture.[16] Man is so constituted\nthat when one movement and the mental image connected with it occur,\nanother movement with its appropriate mental image is likely to follow.\nWhen we would recall anything, therefore, we must call up idea after\nidea until we arrive at one upon which the one we are in search of has\noften been sequent in our experience. Or in terms of physiology,\nmovement after movement must recur until we arrive at a movement upon\nwhich the movement corresponding to the idea desired has often been\nsequent.\n\nThis sequence or association of ideas is subject to certain laws. The\nremarkable passage in which Aristotle states these laws is translated by\nSir W^m. Hamilton as follows:\n\n\u201cWhen, therefore, we accomplish an act of Reminiscence we pass through a\ncertain series of precursive movements until we arrive at a movement, on\nwhich the one we are in quest of is habitually consequent. Hence, too,\nit is that we hunt through the mental train, excogitating [what we seek]\nfrom [its concomitant in] _the present_, _or some other time_ and from\nits _Similar_ or _Contrary_ or _Coadjacent_. Through this process\nReminiscence is effected. For the movements, [which and by which we\nrecollect] are, in these cases, \u00acand\u00ac sometimes the _same_,\nsometimes at _the same time_, sometimes _parts of the same whole_: so\nthat [having obtained from one or the other of these a commencement],\nthe subsequent movement is already more than half accomplished.\u201d[17]\n\nWallace quotes the same passage in the introduction to his Psychology of\nAristotle,[18] and gives the following somewhat different and probably\nmore accurate translation:\u2014\n\n\u201cWhen engaged in recollection we seek to excite some of our previous\nmovements until we come to that which the movement or impression of\nwhich we are in search was wont to follow. And hence we seek to reach\nthis preceding impression by starting in our thought from an object\npresent to us or something else whether it be similar, contrary, or\ncontiguous to that of which we are in search; recollection taking place\nin this manner because the movements are in one case identical, in\nanother case coincident and in the last case partly overlap.\u201d[19]\n\nWhichever translation we adopt it seems plain enough that Aristotle\nmaintained that voluntary recollection depended upon the laws of\nassociation by _similarity_, _contrast_ or _contrariety_, and\n_contiguity_. Very likely he meant to include simultaneity and sequence;\nbut any proof of this should rest upon the general import of the passage\nrather than upon any doubtful emendation like Hamilton\u2019s.[20]\n\nA more important question is whether Aristotle meant to limit the\napplication of these laws to voluntary recollection (\u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2), or\nwhether he intended to include spontaneous reproduction (\u03bc\u03bd\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7) as well.\n\nThe opinion commonly held by students of Aristotle, from Themistius\ndown, has been that he applied the law of association only to voluntary\nrecollection. Hamilton, however, argues forcibly that Aristotle taught\nthe universality of the law of association. It seems natural enough to\nsuppose that one who saw so clearly that in the voluntary train of\nthought the sequence conforms to the law of association, would have seen\nthat the same laws apply to the spontaneous activity of the mind. But\nwhile Aristotle states the law of association clearly for the former, he\nat most merely alludes to the latter, and obscurely enough at that.\nLater in the same treatise Aristotle gives an illustration that may\nserve to elucidate the principles of association that have just been\nstated. In recollection there are certain movements which serve as\nstandpoints or clues. Milk suggests whiteness, whiteness the clear\natmosphere, @the atmosphere moisture,@ this the rainy season.\nSo too, Themistius in commenting upon the passage quoted above, uses an\nillustration somewhat similar. \u201cI see a painted lyre, and moved by this,\nas the prior and leading image, I have the reminiscence of a _real\nlyre_; this suggests the _musician_, and the musician, the song I heard\nhim play.\u201d[21] Again, Aristotle uses an illustration somewhat as\nfollows: Let A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H. represent a series of ideas, one of\nwhich we will to recall. From D E, as a starting point we may be\nmoved forward by E or backward by D, by the association of ideas. If,\nthen, on the suggestion of D E, we do not find what we would recall, we\nmay find it by running over the series E ... H; if not, we shall at any\nrate find the desired idea by running over the series backward from D to\nA. Not much stress, however, should be put upon this last illustration;\nfor the text is so obscure that many different interpretations have been\ngiven by commentators. Perhaps Aristotle meant to illustrate something\nmore profound than the mere linkings of presentations in a series, and\nthe process of recollecting the mental train. But the illustration of\nsuch a simple matter as this was not unimportant in the first scientific\nstudy of memory.\n\nThe place of memory in the Aristotelian psychology in relation to the\nlower psychic activities is plain from what has been said. The relation\nof memory, as voluntary recollection, to the higher activity of the Nous\nis indicated by Aristotle when he says that recollection is a\nsyllogistic process. Thus it is that, while many animals have the lower\nkind of memory, man alone has the higher form. \u201cThe reason is\u201d, says\nAristotle, \u201cthat Reminiscence is, as it were, a kind of syllogism, or\nmental discourse. For he who is reminiscent, that he has formerly seen\nor heard, or otherwise perceived, anything virtually performs an act of\nsyllogism.\u201d[22] With Aristotle the higher functions of the soul are\nbased upon the lower. \u201cWithout nutrition, there is no sense; without\nsense there is no phantasy; without phantasy there is no cogitation or\nintelligence.\u201d[23] The place of memory among the soul\u2019s functions is,\nwith the phantasy or imagination, mediate between sensation and\nintelligence.\n\nIn connection with Aristotle\u2019s @doctrine@ of recollection, one\npassage in his Psychology is interesting, although its importance has,\nperhaps, been exaggerated. \u201cRecollection,\u201d he says, \u201cstarts from the\nsoul and terminates in the movements or impressions which are stored up\nin the organs of sense.\u201d[24] Siebeck interprets this passage as meaning\nthat the soul has the power by means of the heart to effect a sort of\nefferent movement towards the sense organs and thus to arouse anew the\npersisting residua of former motions. Recollection, then, with Aristotle\nas in modern psychology, is an excitation of the sense organs,\nreproduced in a less degree; and the same organs are excited and the\nsame movements repeated as in the original sensation.[25] This passage\nis certainly a remarkable anticipation of Bain\u2019s famous doctrine that a\nreproduced impression \u201coccupies the very same parts and in the same\nmanner\u201d as the original impression.[26]\n\nIn the foregoing sketch of Aristotle\u2019s view of memory the attempt has\nbeen made to give only what can fairly be found in Aristotle\u2019s text.\nMuch of his tract upon memory is obscure. Commentators have held very\nconflicting opinions in regard to the importance of what he wrote upon\nassociation and recollection. Sir W^m. Hamilton calls him \u201cthe founder\nand finisher of the theory of Association,\u201d looks upon the commentators\nas marvellously stupid in their interpretations, and deems it a proof of\nAristotle\u2019s genius that it took the world 2000 years to become\nintelligent enough to understand him. Indeed, in reading Hamilton\u2019s\nerudite discussion one may be led almost to believing that Aristotle was\nthe first Scottish philosopher. But while Hamilton\u2019s Scottish\napperception probably found too much in Aristotle\u2019s treatise, and while,\non the other hand, Lewes may be right in saying that \u201chere as in so many\nother cases modern knowledge supplies the telescope with its lenses\u201d,\nnevertheless Aristotle\u2019s doctrine of association was a valuable\ncontribution to science. And it is manifestly unfair to charge him with\nignorance of its importance, because he did not spin out as many volumes\nupon the subject as the English associationalists have done.[27]\n\n\n\n\n                                  III.\n\n\nThe Stoics took Plato\u2019s figure of the wax almost literally! They held\nthat the mind is originally a _tabula rasa_. Sensations are the first\nwriting upon this tablet. The object of sensation makes an impression\nupon the perceiving subject, as the seal impresses the wax. Memory\ndepends upon this impression. This was the view of Zeno. Chrysippus\nfound difficulties in such a crude materialistic theory. How could the\nmind receive and retain at the same time a number of different and\npartly incompatible impressions? Accordingly he replaced this view by\nthe theory that the sense impression consists in @a@\nqualitative change (\u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) of the passively receiving organ, the\nsoul.[28] The presentation (\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1) is a state of the soul. The\nrelation of memory to the general theory of knowledge with the Stoics\nwas briefly as follows:\u2014The lowest act of the soul is mere perception\n(\u03b1\u1f34\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2); the next is presentation (\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1), which adds conscious\nobservation, its function being to make a first test of the truth of\nthe material furnished by sense. If perception has offered a true\npicture of the external object, this presenting activity of the mind\nbecomes so intensive that the understanding is brought into action. The\nunderstanding or judgment approves or disapproves the presentations. If\nit approves, there arises the empirical fact, which bears upon it the\nmark of truth. These facts memory stores up. By combination of the\nseparate facts empirical concepts are formed which make up the treasure\nof memory or experience.[29]\n\nThe psychology of Epicurus and the other atomists was a simple kind of\nmechanical sensationalism. _Eidola_ or images from external objects\nenter the soul through the sense organs. The mind stores up a great\nmultitude of these _eidola_. Whenever we call up a picture of memory or of\nthe imagination, we turn the attention to one of these images. Thus the\nmind sees in the same way that the eye does, with this difference, that\nit perceives much thinner eidola.[30]\n\nCicero and Quintilian both dwell upon the importance of memory; and both\nseem to adopt the common theory of the time, that impressions are\nstamped on the mind as the signets are marked on wax. They are\nespecially concerned, however, with principles relating to the exercise\nof memory; and they give instructions for mnemonic aids in oratory.\nCicero lays special stress upon order as an aid to memory; and as sight\nis the most acute of the senses, those things are best remembered which\nare visualized by the imagination. In accordance with the ancient\nmnemonic systems he would have these imagined forms localized. The\nadvice of Quintilian in respect to memory is especially sensible.\nAccording to him, nothing can take the place of exercise and labor. Next\nin importance is the division and arrangement of one\u2019s subject. He\nnotices also the importance of good health; and says that for slow minds\nan interval of rest is a good thing, though he seems to be uncertain\nwhether the advantage is due to the rest, or whether it gives\nreminiscence time to mature.[31]\n\n\n\n\n                                  IV.\n\n\nThe Neo-Platonic psychology of memory is represented by Plotinus.[32] He\ndiscusses the subject at considerable length, and presents a somewhat\noriginal doctrine. Memory does not belong to God nor to the divine\nimmutable intelligence in man, which knows by direct intellectual\nperception. It is a function of the soul and first appears when the\nworld soul is individualized in bodies. Memory, however, has no basis in\nthe physical organism, nor does the soul impress the sensations upon the\nbody. The effects of sensations are not like impressions made by a seal,\nnor are they reactions (\u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2), or configurations (\u03c4\u03c5\u03c0\u03ce\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2), but\nin sense-perception as in thought the soul is active. In memory, too,\nthe soul is active, not passive. The influence of the body proves\nnothing against this. The changeable nature of the body may cause us to\nforget, but it cannot condition positive recollection. The body is the\nriver of Lethe, but memory belongs to the soul. The part of the soul to\nwhich memory belongs is the image-forming faculty. This holds sense\nimpressions as well as thought. Two souls, the higher and the lower, are\nconcerned in memory. When the soul leaves the body, the recollections of\nthe lower soul are soon forgotten in proportion as the higher soul rises\ntoward the intelligible world.[33]\n\nSt. Augustine developed the views of the Neo-Platonists in regard to\nmemory. With him memory is a faculty of animals, men, and angels. God,\nwhose immutable essence is above the sphere of movement and change, does\nnot remember. Everything is seen by him in one indivisible and\nunchangeable present.\n\nAugustine does not agree with Aristotle that some animals are devoid of\nmemory. He attributes memory even to fishes, and relates in confirmation\nof this opinion an incident that he had observed. There was a large\nfountain filled with fishes. People came daily to see them and often fed\nthem. The fishes remembered what they received; and as soon as any one\ncame to the fountain they crowded together expecting their accustomed\nfood. But Augustine does not suppose that animals have that higher\nmemory which is purely intellectual, although he probably failed to see\nhow purely mechanical and involuntary their so-called acts of memory\nare. Memory with St. Augustine, as in the psychology of Plotinus, is a\nfunction of the soul, not of the body. But @with@ Aristotle\n@he@ refers it to the central sense.[34]\n\nWhat is memory? It is thinking of what one knows. All the various\nmodifications of the soul cannot all be present to us at once. There is\na difference between knowing a thing and thinking of it. The musician,\nsays Augustine, knows music, but he does not think of it when he is\ntalking about Geometry.[35] The ideas relating to music are in the mind\nin a latent state. Augustine anticipates Leibnitz in discussing the\nunconscious modifications of our \u00acown\u00ac ideas; but he speaks\nespecially of their gradual decay, while Leibnitz considers the\nunconscious growth of them. \u201cMany numbers\u201d,[36] Augustine says, \u201care\ngradually effaced from memory; for they remain not an instant unaltered.\nIndeed what is not found in memory after a year is somewhat diminished\neven after one day. But this diminution is imperceptible; yet it is not\nwrongly inferred; for it does not suddenly all vanish the day before the\nyear is up. Hence we may conclude that from the moment it was engraved\nin memory it began to slip away.\u201d[37] This doctrine of unconscious\nmental changes and unconscious mental states is one of the most\nremarkable features of Augustine\u2019s psychology. With irresistible logic\nhe demonstrates the existence of such states in the following passage\nfrom another place:\u2014\n\n\u201cBut what when the memory itself loses anything, as falls out when we\nforget and seek that we may recollect? Where, in the end, do we search,\nbut in the memory itself? And there, if one thing be, perchance, offered\ninstead of another, we reject it, until what we seek meets us; and when\nit doth we say \u2018This is it\u2019; which we should not unless we recognized\nit, nor recognize it, unless we remembered it\u2014\u2014For we do not believe it\nas something new, but upon recollection, allow what was named to be\nright. But were it utterly blotted out of the mind, we should not\nremember it, even when reminded. For we have not as yet utterly\nforgotten that which we remember ourselves to have forgotten. What,\nthen, we have utterly forgotten, though lost, we cannot even seek\nafter.\u201d[38] It would not be difficult to find passages in modern\npsychologies that read almost like translations of this chapter of\nAugustine\u2019s Confessions.\n\nTwo kinds of memory\u2014sense memory and intellectual memory are\ndistinguished in the Augustinian psychology. The former preserves and\nreproduces not only the images of visible objects, but also the\nimpressions of sounds, odors and other objects which strike our\nsenses.[39] The images are not like the _eidola_ of Democritus, but are\nideal, formed by the mind from its own essence. Intellectual memory\ncontains our knowledge of the sciences, of literature, and dialectic,\nand of the questions relating to these subjects.[40] This memory, unlike\nthe memory of sense, contains not the images of things, but the things\nthemselves. These ideas which the intellectual memory stores up are in a\nsense innate. They never came to us through the senses. They could never\nhave been taught to us, unless we had already had them in our memories.\n\u201cWhen I learned them I gave not credit to another man\u2019s mind, but\nrecognized them in mine.\u201d Thus the memory contains the idea of truth and\nof God.\n\nAugustine points out, too, what has been repeated by Locke and others\nuntil it has become a platitude, that we do not remember objects\nthemselves, but the ideas which we have gained from them. And with his\nusual subtlety he shows that much of what is ordinarily attributed to\nperception is really the work of memory.\n\n\u201cWe see what importance St. Augustine attaches to memory. It is in his\nview the faculty which preserves the ideas relating @not@ only\nto the body, but to the soul, not only to eternal truths, but to the\nEternal Being himself\u2014\u2014. This memory, which is peculiar to man, and\nwhich animals do not possess\u2014this memory, which in a mysterious manner\ncontains in it intelligible realities, is, according to the Bishop of\nHippo, one of the three great faculties of man, and the origin of the\nother two. It is from it that intelligence arises, and the will proceeds\nfrom the one to the other and unites them. Thus, if it is allowed to\ncompare things human with things divine, we have in us an image of the\naugust Trinity. Memory, in which is the matter of knowledge, and which\nis as the place of intelligible things, offers some resemblance to the\nFather; the intellect, which is derived \u00acfrom\u00ac and formed from\nit, is not without analogy to the Son; and love or will, which unites\nthe intelligible (or memory) to the intellect has a certain resemblance\nto the Holy Spirit.\u201d[41] The phenomena of memory were also important\nwith Augustine as weapons against materialism. By memory the soul knows\nobjects of sense when it no longer perceives them, and, moreover,\ncombines the heterogeneous in ways inexplicable by means of a\nphys\u00acch\u00acical substance. And again the soul can form abstract\nconceptions of space and mathematical truths.\n\nThe well-known conditions of a good memory, such as acuteness of\nsensation, order, and repetition, Augustine notices only incidentally.\nMore attention is given to the relation of the will to memory and to the\nassociation of ideas.\n\nWhether we remember or not depends upon the will. By an act of will we\navert the memory from sense-perceptions, as, for example, when we hear a\nspeaker and do not notice what he says, or read a page and do not know\nwhat we have read, or walk with our attention upon something else. In\nall these cases we perceive, but do not remember our perceptions. So,\ntoo, recollection depends upon the will: \u201cAs the will applies the @sense\nto the@ body (or external object), so it applies the memory to the\nsense, and the eye of the mind of the thinker to the memory.\u201d[42]\n\nThis power of the will over memory is, however, limited by the\nassociation of ideas. In order to recall anything by a voluntary effort\nwe must remember the general notion of the thing or some associated\nidea. \u201cFor example, if I wish to remember what I supped on yesterday,\neither I have already remembered that I did sup, or if not yet this, at\nleast, I have remembered something about that time itself, if nothing\nelse; at all events, I have remembered yesterday and that part of\nyesterday in which people usually sup, and what supping is.\u201d[43] In\nanother place he says that, of a series of ideas the lost part is\nrecovered \u201cby the part whereof we had hold.\u201d\n\nMany since Augustine have marvelled at the miracle of memory. None have\nexpressed their admiration more eloquently. \u201cGreat is this force of\nmemory\u201d, he exclaims, \u201cexcessive great, O my God; a large and boundless\nchamber; who ever sounded the bottom thereof? Yet is this a power of\nmine, and belongs unto my nature; nor do I myself comprehend all that I\nam. Therefore is the mind too strait to contain itself. And where should\nthat be which it containeth, not of itself? Is it without and not\nwithin? How then doth it not comprehend itself. A wonderful admiration\nsurprises me, amazement seizes me upon this. And men go abroad to admire\nthe heights of mountains, the mighty billows of the sea, the broad tides\nof rivers, the compass of the ocean, and the circuits of the stars, and\npass themselves by; nor wonder that when I spake of all these things, I\ndid not see them with my eyes, yet could not have spoken of them, unless\nI then actually saw the mountains, billows, rivers, stars, which I had\nseen, and that ocean which I believe to be inwardly in my memory, and\nthat, with the vast spaces between, as if I saw them abroad. Yet did not\nI by seeing draw them into myself, when with mine eyes I beheld them;\nnor are they themselves with me, but their images only. And I know by\nwhat sense of the body, each was impressed upon me.\u201d\n\nIt is an interesting fact that Augustine noticed the possibility of\nillusions of memory. Certain rare phenomena\u2014the so-called recollections\nof Pythagoras and others who were said to have remembered objects\nperceived in a former state of existence\u2014he explains in a very modern\nfashion, except that he attributes @these@ beliefs to the\nagency of evil spirits. \u201cFor we must not\u201d, he says, \u201cacquiesce in their\nstory who assert that the Samian Pythagoras recollected some things of\nthis kind, which he had experienced when he was previously here in\nanother body; and others @tell@ yet of others, that they\nexperienced something of the same sort in their minds. But it may be\nconjectured that these were untrue recollections, such as we commonly\nexperience in sleep, when we fancy we remember, as though we had done or\nseen it, when we never did or saw at all; and that the minds of these\npersons, even though awake, were affected in this way at the suggestion\nof malicious and deceitful spirits, whose care it is to confirm, or to\nsow some false belief concerning the changes of souls, in order to\ndeceive men.\u201d[44] If they truly remembered such things, he argues, such\nphenomena would not be as rare; but many persons would experience the\nsame.\n\nPerhaps the most serious criticism of Augustine\u2019s psychology of memory\nis that he entirely neglects the physiological side of the subject. He\ndoes not even notice the relation of memory to states of health or\ndisease, and of youth or age. In one place, however, he states that\nmemory has its seat in one of the three ventricles of the brain, which\nis situated between that which is the seat of sensation and that which\npresides @over@ \u00acof\u00ac locomotion, so that our movements\nmay be coordinated.[45]\n\nThe criticism has also been made that Augustine seems to waver in his\nconception of memory, that he sometimes represents it as the source of\nall our intellectual activity comparing it among the other faculties to\nthe Father in the Trinity; that again he seems to limit this faculty to\nthe work of preserving knowledge acquired empirically. Certainly in some\npassages he seems to make memory contain a kind of innate ideas that may\nbe drawn forth by suggestion.[46]\n\nBut if Augustine is unsatisfactory in this, it must be remembered that\nhe is not writing a psychology and that he was, as Ferraz calls him, a\nphilosopher of transition. \u201cHe combats Plato\u2019s doctrine of\nreminiscence, and prepares the way for the innate ideas of Descartes,\nwithout positively enough rejecting the former, and without clearly\nenough admitting the latter.\u201d[47]\n\n\n\n\n                                   V.\n\n\nThe pathological side of memory seems to have been little studied by the\nancients. Augustine referred to the possibility of illusions of memory\nin the way already mentioned. Seneca tells of a certain Sabinus who had\nso bad a memory that he forgot the name of Ulysses, and again of\nAchilles, and sometimes of Priam, though he knew them as well as we\nremember our schoolmasters.[48] Some remarkable cases of amnesia were\nreported to the Elder Pliny. \u201cNothing whatever in man,\u201d he says, \u201cis of\nso frail a nature as the memory; for it is affected by disease, by\ninjuries, and even by fright; being sometimes partially lost and at\n@other@ times entirely so. A man who received a blow from a\nstone forgot the names of the letters (of the alphabet) only; while, on\nthe other hand, another person, who fell from a very high roof could not\nso much as recollect his mother or his relations and neighbors. Another\nperson in consequence of some disease forgot his own servants even; and\nMessala Corvinus, the orator, lost all recollection of his own\nname.\u201d[49] While these cases are good illustrations of certain diseases\nof memory, they are not reported with sufficient accuracy and detail to\nrender them of much scientific value. Ancient thinkers appear not to\nhave seen the importance of studying the pathological conditions of\nmemory.\n\n\n\n\n                                  VI.\n\n\nNo historical sketch of memory among the ancient Greeks and Romans is\ncomplete without some mention of their mnemonic systems. The art of\nmnemonics seems to have been much in vogue among them. There are\nfrequent allusions to this art in the works of Aristotle, Plato, and\nother classic writers. Aristotle is reported by some to have written a\nwork upon mnemonics. Every scholar of the classics is familiar with the\nstory that ascribes the invention of the art to Simonides.\n\nThe main principles of the ancient mnemonic systems according to Cicero\nand Quintilian were as follows. The thing to be remembered was localized\nby the imagination in some definite place\u2014say in a room of a real or\nimaginary house; and, if necessary, a concrete symbol as vivid as\npossible was associated with it. This method was used by the Romans as\nan aid in oratory; and it has been said that the phrases, \u201c_in the first\nplace_,\u201d \u201c_in the second place_,\u201d and the like, originated in this\nancient practice.\n\nThe ancient systems of mnemonics are inferior to the best modern\nsystems, that, @since@ the days of Pick[50] have been based\nupon sound psychological principles. But the ancient systems were\nprobably very helpful @to@ eye-minded people. The men with\nremarkable memories, mentioned by Cicero and other ancient writers very\nlikely owed much to mnemonic aids. It is of special psychological\ninterest to consider the ancient mnemonic devices in the light of such\nstudies as those of Galton upon mental imagery, number forms, and the\nlike.[51] The high estimate that many of the ancients placed upon the\nmnemonic art, may, perhaps, fairly be taken as evidence that what Galton\ncalls the faculty of visualisation was developed among them. Especially\nsome of the Roman orators seem to have possessed this faculty in a high\ndegree.\n\n\n\n\n                    Biographical Note of the Author.\n\n\nI was born at Dunbarton, N.H. on the 3d of Dec. 1855, and am the\nyoungest son of Samuel and Hannah Dane Burnham. I graduated at the High\nSchool at Manchester, N.H. in 1875. The next three years I spent in\nteaching and in study. In 1878 I entered Harvard College, and graduated\nin the Class of \u201982. The following year was spent in teaching in the\nPreparatory Department of Wittenberg College. The next two years were\nspent at the State Normal School at Potsdam, N.Y., where my work was the\nteaching of Latin and Rhetoric. In 1885 I entered the Johns Hopkins\nUniversity. In this university I have held the positions of Fellow in\nPhilosophy and Fellow by Courtesy. My work has been chiefly under the\ndirection of Prof. G. Stanley Hall and Dr. Richard T. Ely.\n\n                         William Henry Burnham.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n-----\n\nFootnote 1:\n\n  For reference see Carus: Geschichte der Psychologie, pp. 150 & 169.\n\nFootnote 2:\n\n  Theophrastus, 45.\n\nFootnote 3:\n\n  Theophrastus, 4. Cf. Siebeck: Geschichte der Psychologie. Erste\n  Abtheilung, p. 150.\n\nFootnote 4:\n\n  Phaedrus, 73.\n\nFootnote 5:\n\n  Philebus, 34.\n\nFootnote 6:\n\n  Jowett\u2019s Translation.\n\nFootnote 7:\n\n  For references see Zeller\u2019s Plato and the Older Academy, pp. 126 and\n  407. Cf. also Siebeck: Geschichte der Psychologie.\n\nFootnote 8:\n\n  For the many passages in which the words \u03bc\u03bd\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7, \u03bc\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u03cd\u03c9, \u03bc\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03c2,\n  \u03bc\u03b7\u03bc\u03c9\u03bd \u03bc@\u03bd@\u03ae\u03bc\u03c9\u03bd occur in Plato, \u00acconf\u00ac see _Ast_. _Lexicon\n  Platonicum_, II. pp. 356\u2013357. For \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03bc\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03ba\u03c9 and \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 cf. the\n  same, Vol. I. pp. 151\u2013152.\n\nFootnote 9:\n\n  De Memoria et Reminiscentia. For a list of commentaries, see\n  Hamilton\u2019s edition of Reid\u2019s Works, p. 891.\n\nFootnote 10:\n\n  Touch and Taste according to A. reside in the heart. Sight, Sound, and\n  Smell in the brain, but they are indirectly connected with the heart.\n\nFootnote 11:\n\n  De Somno. 1. 454.\n\n  \u1f21 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7 \u03b1\u1f34\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd\u03ad\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 \u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03af\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2\n  \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd.\n\nFootnote 12:\n\n  See Wallace; Aristotle\u2019s Psychology, Introduction, pp. 93 & 94.\n\nFootnote 13:\n\n  In other words, abstract ideas and the like are reproducible only so\n  far as they imply images.\n\nFootnote 14:\n\n  Quoted from G. H. Lewes\u2019s work on Aristotle, p. 257.\n\nFootnote 15:\n\n  \u03a3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03b4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f31 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2, \u1f10\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u1f74 \u03c0\u03ad\u03c6\u03c5\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd \u1f21 \u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f25\u03b4\u03b5 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9\n  \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03ae\u03bd\u03b4\u03b5.\n  This passage is obscure, but it is generally understood to refer to\n  the sequence of motions or the corresponding ideas, and this\n  interpretation agrees with the context. See Hamilton\u2019s Edition of\n  Reid, pp. 892\u2013893, and Themistius\u2019 paraphrase of De Memoria, quoted by\n  Hamilton, p. 893\u2013894; also Siebeck, Geschichte der Psychologie, Zweite\n  Abtheilung, p. 77; Grote\u2019s Aristotle, p. 215; Grant\u2019s Aristotle, p.\n  170; Wallace\u2019s Aristotle\u2019s Psychology, Introduction, p. 95.\n\nFootnote 16:\n\n  Cf. Siebeck, Geschichte der Psychologie, Zweite Abtheilung, p. 77.\n\nFootnote 17:\n\n  The Greek is as follows:\n\n  \u03b4\u03b9\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03c6\u03b5\u03be\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b8\u03b7\u03c1\u03b5\u03cd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03bd\u03bf\u03ae\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bd\u1fe6\u03bd \u1f22 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n  \u03b1\u03c6\u2019 \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03af\u03bf\u03c5, \u1f22 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03af\u03bf\u03c5, \u1f22 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b5\u03b3\u03b3\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f21 \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2.\n  \u03b1\u1f31 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b1\u1f31 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03b1\u03af, \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u2019 \u1f05\u03bc\u03b1, \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2\n  \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f65\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c0\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u03b9\u03ba\u03c1\u1f78\u03bd \u1f43 \u1f10\u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03ae\u03b8\u03b7 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u2019 \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u03bf.\n\nFootnote 18:\n\n  p. 95.\n\nFootnote 19:\n\n  @See also@ Grote, Grant, Siebeck, and Zeller: \u00acsee\u00ac\n  opp. cit.\n\nFootnote 20:\n\n  Hamilton\u2019s emendation is as follows:\n\n  After \u1f22 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 in the passage cited he would supply \u03c7\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 or\n  \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6.\n\nFootnote 21:\n\n  Quoted by Hamilton in his edition of Reid\u2019s Works, p. 901.\n\nFootnote 22:\n\n  Hamilton\u2019s translation. Edition of Reid\u2019s Works, Vol. II. p. 909.\n\nFootnote 23:\n\n  Grote, op. cit. p.\n\nFootnote 24:\n\n  Wallace: Aristotle\u2019s Psychology, p. 41.\n\nFootnote 25:\n\n  Siebeck: op. cit., pp. 78\u201379.\n\nFootnote 26:\n\n  Bain: Senses and Intellect, p. 338. 3d American ed.\n\nFootnote 27:\n\n  For passages where the words \u03bc\u03bd\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7, \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, etc., occur in\n  Aristotle see the Index in the Berlin edition of Aristotle\u2019s works,\n  Vol. V. In addition to the works cited see also Waddington-Kastus; De\n  la psychologie d\u2019Aristote, Chap. XIII.\n\nFootnote 28:\n\n  For reference see Siebeck\u2019s Geschichte der Psychologie, p. 209. See\n  also Ueberweg, History of Philosophy, Vol. I. p. 193.\n\nFootnote 29:\n\n  Cf. Stein; Die Erkenntnisstheorie der Stoa: Zeller; Stoics,\n  Epicureans, and Sceptics: and Ueberweg; Hist. of Philos. loc. cit.\n\nFootnote 30:\n\n  Lucretius, IV. 75 seqq.\n\nFootnote 31:\n\n  Cicero, De Oratore, II. 86 seq.\n\n  Quintilian, Instit. orat. XI. 2 seq.\n\nFootnote 32:\n\n  Cf. Enn. IV. L. III. C. XXV. XXX and L. VI.\n\nFootnote 33:\n\n  Cf. Siebeck: Geschichte der Psychologie, II. p. 314 seq.\n\nFootnote 34:\n\n  The central sense or sensorium, however, according to Augustine is\n  located in the brain, not in the heart as in Aristotle\u2019s psychology.\n\nFootnote 35:\n\n  De Trin. L. XIV. C. VII. See also Ferraz,\u2014Psych. de St. Augustin,\n  2^{nd} ed.\n\nFootnote 36:\n\n  Augustine does not mean to limit what follows to mathematical truths,\n  but according to @his@ psychology the same would be true of\n  anything that we are liable to forget.\n\nFootnote 37:\n\n  De Musica, L. VI. C. IV.\n\nFootnote 38:\n\n  Conf. L. X. C. XIX. Pusey\u2019s translation.\n\nFootnote 39:\n\n  Conf. L. X. C. VIII.\n\nFootnote 40:\n\n  Conf. L. X. C. IX. sqq.\n\nFootnote 41:\n\n  Ferraz.\u2014Psych. de St. Augustin, p. 178. Cf. also De Trin. L. XV. C.\n  XXI. XXII. XXIII. and L. XI. C. VII. and VIII.\n\nFootnote 42:\n\n  De Trin. L. XI. C. VIII. Pusey\u2019s translation.\n\nFootnote 43:\n\n  De Trin. L. XI. C. VII. Pusey\u2019s translation.\n\nFootnote 44:\n\n  De Trin., L. XII. 15.\n\nFootnote 45:\n\n  De Gen. ad Litt., L. VII. C. XVIII.\n\nFootnote 46:\n\n  Conf., L. X. C. X. and XI.\n\nFootnote 47:\n\n  Ferraz, op. cit., p. 192.\n\nFootnote 48:\n\n  Epistolae, 27.\n\nFootnote 49:\n\n  Nat. Hist., L. VII. C. 24.\n\nFootnote 50:\n\n  Cf. his work \u201cOn Memory and the Rational Means of Improving it.\u201d\n  London, 1862.\n\nFootnote 51:\n\n  Galton, Enquiry into Human Faculty, p. 83 seq.\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\n\n\n                          TRANSCRIBER\u2019S NOTES\n\n\n 1. P. 68, added a footnote anchor.\n 2. Silently corrected typographical errors and variations in spelling.\n 3. Retained anachronistic, non-standard, and uncertain spellings as\n      printed.\n 4. Footnotes have been re-indexed using numbers and collected together\n      at the end of the last chapter.\n 5. Enclosed underlined font in _underscores_.\n 6. Enclosed inserted text in @at signs@.\n 7. Enclosed deleted text in \u00acnot signs\u00ac.\n 8. Superscripts are denoted by a caret before a single superscript\n      character or a series of superscripted characters enclosed in\n      curly braces, e.g. M^r. or M^{ister}.","title":"An Historical Sketch of the Conceptions of Memory among the Ancients","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":8019}