{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_60068/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_60068","id":"gutenberg_60068","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/60068","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Biographies","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Ethics","Philosophy, Modern"],"text":"Transcriber\u2019s Notes\n\nObvious typographical errors have been silently corrected. Variations\nin hyphenation and accents have been standardised but all other\nspelling and punctuation remains unchanged.\n\nFootnotes are located at the end of the chapters.\n\nItalics are represented thus _italic_.\n\n\n\n\n AN ETHICAL\n PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE\n\n PRESENTED IN ITS MAIN OUTLINES\n\n BY\n FELIX ADLER\n\n\n\n\n D. APPLETON AND COMPANY\n NEW YORK LONDON\n 1920\n\n\n\n\n COPYRIGHT, 1918, BY\n D. APPLETON AND COMPANY\n\n\n Printed in the United States of America\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nThis book records a philosophy of life growing out of the experience\nof a lifetime. The convictions put in it are not dogmatic, for dogma\nis the conviction of one man imposed authoritatively upon others. The\nconvictions herein expounded are submitted to those who search, as the\nwriter has searched, for light on the problems of life, in order that\nthey may compare their experience with his, and their interpretations\nof their experience with his interpretation.[1]\n\nIt is a great hope that some of the readers of this book may find the\ngeneral world-view expounded congenial, and for them also real and\ntrue. It is believed that others may find the practical suggestions as\nto the conduct of life in which the theory issues helpful in part, if\nnot in whole, as many of us accept from the teachings of the Stoics, or\nof other thinkers, practical precepts, without on that account adopting\nthe philosophy from which these precepts are derived.\n\nThe book is divided into four parts: the first an autobiographical\nintroduction describing the various stations on the road by which\nthe author arrived at his present position, and offering incidental\nappreciations and appraisements of the Hebrew religion, of Emerson,\nof the ethics of the Gospels, of Socialism and of other social reform\nmovements.\n\nThe second part expounds the philosophical theory.\n\nThe third part contains the applications of the theory to the more\nstrictly personal life, under the captions of the Three Shadows of\nSickness, Sorrow and Sin, and also to the principal so-called Rights to\nLife, Property, Reputation.\n\nThe fourth part applies the theory to the social institutions, to the\nFamily, the Vocation, the State, the International Society, and the\nChurch, these institutions being considered as an expanding series\nthrough which the individual is to pass on his pilgrimage in the\ndirection of the supreme spiritual end.\n\nThe principal problems considered are:\n\n1. How to establish the fundamental ethical dictum that every human\nbeing ought to count, and is intrinsically worth while. This dictum has\nbeen denied by many of the greatest thinkers, who assert the intrinsic\ninferiority of some men, the intrinsic superiority of others. The\npractice of the world also runs most distinctly contrary to it. How\nthen is it to be validated?\n\n2. The problem of how to attach a precise meaning to the term\n\u201cspiritual,\u201d thereby divesting it of the flavor of sentimentality and\nvagueness that attaches to it.\n\n3. How to link up the world\u2019s activities in science, art, politics,\nbusiness, to the supreme ethical end.\n\n4. How to lay foundations whereon to erect the conviction that there\nverily is a supersensible reality.\n\nFor the repetitions that occur throughout the volume indulgence is\nrequested. In presenting an unfamiliar system of thought they may\nsometimes assist the reader in retaining the thread.\n\nThe work is conceived as a whole, and should be read through before any\npart of it is more minutely examined. The theory of Part II especially\nshould be read in the light of the applications submitted in Parts III\nand IV.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n BOOK I\n\n AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION\n\n CHAPTER PAGE\n\n I. PRELUDE 3\n\n II. THE HEBREW RELIGION 14\n\n III. EMERSON 27\n\n IV. THE TEACHINGS OF JESUS 30\n\n V. SOCIAL REFORM 43\n\n VI. THE INFLUENCE OF MY VOCATION ON INNER DEVELOPMENT 58\n\n\n BOOK II\n\n PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY\n\n I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS: CRITIQUE OF KANT 73\n\n II. CRITIQUE OF KANT (_Continued_) 82\n\n III. PRELIMINARY REMARKS ON WORTH, AND ON THE REASONS\n WHY THE METHOD EMPLOYED BY ETHICS\n MUST BE THE OPPOSITE OF THAT EMPLOYED BY\n THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES 91\n\n IV. THE IDEAL OF THE WHOLE 100\n\n V. THE IDEAL OF THE WHOLE AND THE ETHICAL MANIFOLD 114\n\n VI. THE IDEAL OF THE SPIRITUAL UNIVERSE AND THE GOD-IDEAL 125\n\n\n BOOK III\n\n APPLICATIONS: THE THREE SHADOWS, SICKNESS,\n SORROW AND SIN, AND THE RIGHT TO LIFE,\n PROPERTY AND REPUTATION\n\n I. INTRODUCTION 147\n\n II. THE THREE SHADOWS: SICKNESS, SORROW, SIN 154\n\n III. BEREAVEMENT 162\n\n IV. THE SHADOW OF SIN 171\n\n V. THE SPIRITUAL ATTITUDE TO BE OBSERVED TOWARDS\n FELLOW-MEN IN GENERAL, IRRESPECTIVE OF THE\n SPECIAL RELATIONS WHICH CONNECT US MORE\n CLOSELY WITH SOME THAN OTHERS 179\n\n VI. THE MEANING OF FORGIVENESS 202\n\n VII. THE SUPREME ETHICAL RULE: ACT SO AS TO ELICIT\n THE BEST IN OTHERS AND THEREBY IN THYSELF 208\n\n VIII. THE SUPREME ETHICAL RULE (_Continued_) 220\n\n IX. HOW TO LEARN TO SEE THE SPIRITUAL _Numen_ IN\n OTHERS 223\n\n\n BOOK IV\n\n APPLICATIONS: THE ETHICS OF THE FAMILY, THE\n STATE, THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, ETC.\n\n I. THE COLLECTIVE TASK OF MANKIND AND THE THREE-FOLD\n REVERENCE 241\n\n II. THE FAMILY 249\n\n III. THE VOCATIONS 260\n\n IV. THE PRACTICAL VOCATIONS 270\n\n V. THE VOCATION OF THE ARTIST: OUTLINE OF A THEORY\n OF THE RELATION OF ART TO ETHICS 277\n\n VI. EDUCATIONAL VOCATIONS, OR VOCATIONS CONNECTED\n WITH THE STATE 289\n\n VII. THE STATE 305\n\n VIII. THE NATIONAL CHARACTER SPIRITUALLY TRANSFORMED:\n THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY, OR THE\n ORGANIZATION OF MANKIND 324\n\n IX. RELIGIOUS FELLOWSHIP AS THE CULMINATING SOCIAL\n INSTITUTION 341\n\n X. THE LAST OUTLOOK ON LIFE 354\n\n\n APPENDIX\n\n APPENDIX I: SPIRITUAL SELF-DISCIPLINE 365\n\n APPENDIX II: THE EXERCISE OF FORCE IN THE INTEREST OF\n FREEDOM 369\n\n INDEX 375\n\n\n\n\n BOOK I\n\n AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nPRELUDE\n\n\nWhat this book offers is a system of thought and of points of view as\nto conduct, as these have jointly grown out of personal experience. It\nwill be useful to introduce them with an autobiographical statement.\nThe ideas which follow are such as have been found by me, the author,\nto be fruitful. Certainly I claim for them objectivity; but I do so\nbecause of what I have found them to mean in my own life. He who has\nbeen scorched by lightning knows that the effects of the lightning will\nbe felt by all who are exposed to the same experience. I narrate my\nexperience; let others compare with it theirs.\n\nThere is, however, a serious, and most embarrassing difficulty in\nthe way of discussing the phases and vicissitudes of one\u2019s ethical\ndevelopment. Self-appraisement is necessarily involved in the\nnarration. The outstanding subject of ethics is the self and its\nrelations. The physicist, the chemist, the biologist, however the\nmethods they use may differ in other respects, agree in the endeavor\nto eliminate the personal equation. The psychologist likewise does his\nbest to see the procession that moves across the inner stage like an\ninterested but detached spectator. In the case of ethics, however, the\npersonal factor cannot be eliminated, because the personal factor is\njust the Alpha and the Omega of the whole matter; and if this be left\nout of account, the very object to be studied disappears.\n\nEthical standards are exacting, separated often from performance by the\nwidest interval. To set up a standard, therefore, is to reflect upon\noneself, to expose oneself to the backstroke of one\u2019s own deliverances,\nto be plunged perhaps into deep pits of self-humiliation. How shall\nanyone have the courage to face so searching a test, or the hardihood\nto discuss with a lofty air, and to recommend to others ideals of\nconduct against which he knows that he daily offends? How can anyone\nteach ethics or write about it? The words of the Sermon on the Mount,\n\u201cJudge not that ye be not judged,\u201d seem to apply very closely. Do not\njudge others, do not lay down the law for others, because in so doing\nyou will be judged in the inner forum, becoming a repulsive object in\nyour own eyes, or standing forth a whited sepulcher. In brief, to touch\nthe subject of ethics is to handle a knife that cuts both ways, to cast\na weapon which returns upon him who sends it.\n\nThe difficulty then which confronts the ethical writer is that the\nattitude of detachment possible in other branches of investigation is\nfound to be impossible when one attempts to sound the profundities\nof that kind of inner experience which is called ethical. The self\nobtrudes itself at every point, and it instinctively refuses to be\nhumbled. What may be denominated the struggle for self-esteem has\nindeed played a leading r\u00f4le both in the outer and inner history of\nmankind. This struggle, whose immense importance is often overlooked,\naccounts for even more interesting facts than the biological struggle\nfor existence. The desire to exercise power over others, often ruthless\nin the means adopted, is frequently nothing more than a miserable\nattempt to save self-esteem by covering up the inner sense of the\nweakness of the self. But the same struggle penetrates also into the\nrealm of theoretical ethics with which we are concerned. Here it\ntampers with the standards which mortify self-esteem, by inventing\nsuch ethical theories as seem to make the problems of personality easy\nof solution, and by blinking the tragic facts of guilt, remorse, etc.\nVarious ethical systems that are in vogue at the present time are, at\nleast in part, exemplars of this process\u2014the theory for instance that\nethics is nothing more than a calculus of self-interest, or a matter\nof sympathetic feeling, or a balancing of the more refined against the\ngrosser pleasures. The instinct of self-preservation, in the shape of\nthe preservation of self-esteem, is quite incorrigible, and against its\ninsidious suggestion we have reason to be particularly on our guard in\nthe discussion which we are entering.\n\nAre we then to refrain, out of sheer regard for decency, from touching\non this subject at all? Is everyone who writes on ethics, or attempts\nto teach it, either a pedant or a hypocrite? But we cannot avoid\ndiscussing it, nor resist the impulse to teach and write about it, for\nit is the subject on which more than any other we and others sorely\nneed help and enlightenment. And we shall get help in the endeavor\nto afford it to others. This, then, is my position: I do not presume\nto lay down the law for anyone. I find that I can set forth the\nbetter standards which in the course of trial and error I have come to\nrecognize. I would not shamelessly expose mere private failures and\nfailings after the manner of Rousseau in the \u201cConfessions\u201d; for there\nis a tract of the inner life which ought to be kept from publicity and\nprying intrusion. I shall then deal with deflections only in so far as\nthey can be traced to false standards or principles, and as they tend\nto illustrate the flaw in those standards and principles.\n\nWhat I state as certain is certain for me. It has approved itself as\nsuch in my experience. Let others consult their experience, and see\nhow far it tallies with that which is here set forth. A distinction,\nhowever, I wish to call attention to between the theory as expounded\nin the second part of this volume, and the practical applications to\nbe found in the third and fourth parts. Persons who are not trained\nin metaphysical thinking or interested in it, may do well to omit the\nreading of the second part. To those who are competent in philosophical\nthinking, and who disagree with the positions there taken, I may\nperhaps be permitted to suggest that one can dissent from a philosophy\nand yet find help in the applications to which it leads. And, after\nall, it is the practice that counts.\n\nWith these preliminaries, I now proceed to delineate briefly the stages\nof inner development which have led me slowly and with much labor to\nthe system of thought described in the following pages.\n\nOne of the leading principles to which I early gave assent, and to\nwhich I have ever since adhered as a correct fundamental insight, is\nexpressed in the statement that every human being is an end _per se_,\nworth while on his own account.[2]\n\nEvery human personality is to be safe against infringement and is,\nin this sense, sacred. There is a certain precinct which may not be\ninvaded. The experience which served me especially as the matrix of\nthis idea was the adolescent experience of sex-life,\u2014the necessity\nfelt of inhibiting, out of reverence for the personality of women, the\npowerful instincts then awakened.[3]\n\nThe fact that I had lived abroad for three years in frequent contact\nwith young men, especially students, who derided my scruples, and in\nthe impure atmosphere of three capital cities of Europe, Berlin,\nParis and Vienna, where the \u201cprimrose path\u201d is easy, tended to make\nthe retention of my point of view more difficult, and at the same time\nto give it greater fixity, also to drive me into a kind of inward\nsolitude. I felt myself in opposition to my surroundings, and acquired\na confidence, perhaps exaggerated, to persevere along my own lines\nagainst prevailing tendencies.\n\nI ought next to mention the decay of theism which took place in my mind\nin consequence of philosophic reading. Already at an early age I had\nstumbled over the doctrine of Creation. I remember asking my Sunday\nSchool teacher\u2014How is creation possible? How can something originate\nout of nothing? The answer I received was evasive, and left me uneasy\nand unsatisfied. On another occasion I ventured to suggest to the same\nauthority\u2014a revered and beloved authority\u2014that the conception of God\nseemed to me too much like that of a man, too much fashioned on the\nhuman model; and he amazed me beyond words by replying that he himself\nsympathized more or less with the ideas of Spinoza. This chance remark\nset me thinking, and seemed to open wide spaces in which my mind felt\nfree to travel\u2014though I never tended in the direction of Spinoza.[4]\n\nMy thoughts were driven still further by reaction against the narrow\ntheology of the lectures on Christian Evidences as taught at that time\nin Columbia College, where I was a student. And all these influences\ncame to a head in the atmosphere of the German university at Berlin.\nThere I heard Zeller, Duhring, Steinthal, Bonitz. Above all I came into\ncontact with Herman Cohen, subsequently and for many years professor\nof philosophy at the University of Marburg, and undertook to grapple\nin grim earnest with the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. The net outcome\nwas not atheism in the moral sense,\u2014I have never been what is called\nan atheist,\u2014but the definite and permanent disappearance of the\nindividualistic conception of Deity. I was attracted by the rigor,\nthe sublimity, of Kant\u2019s system, and especially by his transcendental\nderivation of the moral law. The individualistic basis of his ethics,\nwhich is quite uncongenial to me, I ignored, and for a time simply\naccounted myself a follower of Kant. Very often since then I have\ndiscovered that men, unbeknown to themselves, are apt to sail under\nfalse flags, ranking themselves Kantians, Socialists, or what not,\nbecause the system to which they give their adherence attracts them\nat some one outstanding point, the point namely, where it sharply\nconflicts with views which they themselves strongly reprobate; and they\nare thus led to overlook other features no less important in which the\nsystem is really uncongenial to them. Thus a person who recognizes the\nevils of the present wage system may label himself a Socialist, simply\nbecause Socialism is most in evidence as an adversary of the wage\nsystem, while he may by no means agree with the positive principles\nthat underlie Socialism, when he comes to examine them dispassionately.\n\nI thought at that time of the Moral Law as that which answers to\nor should replace the individualistic God-idea. I believed in an\nunknown principle or power in things of which the Moral Law is\nthe manifestation, and I found the evidence of the moral law in\nman\u2019s consciousness. Matthew Arnold\u2019s \u201cthe power that makes for\nrighteousness\u201d is a phrase which at that time would have suited\nme,\u2014though perhaps not entirely even at that time. I have since come\nto see that \u201cmaking for righteousness\u201d is a conception inapplicable to\nthe ultimate reality, and is properly applied only to human effort;\nsince purpose implies that the end sought has not as yet been realized,\nand non-realization and ultimate reality are contradictory ideas. The\npower that only makes for righteousness cannot be the ultimate truth in\nthings. The utmost we can say is that the ultimate reality expresses\nitself in the human world as the power that inspires in men moral\npurpose.\n\nTo return to my personal experiences, there fell into my hands, while\nstill a student abroad, a book by Friedrich Albert Lange entitled\n_Die Arbeiterfrage_ (The Labor Question), which proved epoch-making\nin my life. Bacon says in his essay _Of Studies_: \u201cSome books are\nto be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and\ndigested.\u201d He might have added that there are books that make a man\nover, changing the current of his existence, or at least opening\nchannels which previously had been blocked.[5]\n\n_Die Arbeiterfrage_ is not a great book. In the literature of the\nsubject it has long since been superseded. Yet it opened for me a\nwide and tragic prospect, an outlook of which I had been until then\nin great measure oblivious, an outlook on all the moral as well as\neconomic issues involved in what is called the Labor Question. My\nteacher in philosophy, Cohen, once said to me sharply, that if there\nis to be anything like religion in the world hereafter, Socialism\nmust be the expression of it. I did not agree with his statement that\nSocialism spells religion, and have not seen my way to this day toward\nidentifying the two. But I realized that there was a measure of truth\nin what he said,\u2014and that I must square myself with the issues that\nSocialism raises. Lange helped me to do this.\n\nHe aided me in other respects as well. His _History of Materialism_\ndispelled some of the fictitious glamor that still hung about the\nmaterialistic hypothesis at that time,\u2014though the last chapter on the\nultimate philosophy of life, in which he identifies religion with\npoetry, is distinctly weak. I read his book on the Labor Question with\nburning cheeks; no work of fiction ever excited me as did this little\ntreatise. It was ethical in spirit, if not in its ruling ideas. It\nfavored productive co-operation, and seemed to point a way to immediate\naction, as Socialism did not.\n\nThe upshot of it was that I now possessed a second object, namely, the\nlaborer, to whom I could apply my non-violation ethics. I had always\nfelt an instinctive, idealizing reverence for women, and this had its\ninfluence in the first practical outcome of the philosophy of life with\nwhich I started on my career. I would go out as the minister of a new\nreligious evangel. Instead of preaching the individual God, I was to\nstir men up to enact the Moral Law; and to enact the Moral Law meant at\nthat time primarily to influence the young men with whom I came into\ncontact to reverence womanhood, and to keep inviolate the sacred thing,\nwoman\u2019s honor. And now I had a second arrow in my quiver. I was to go\nout to help to arouse the conscience of the wealthy, the advantaged,\nthe educated classes, to a sense of their guilt in violating the human\npersonality of the laborer. My mother had often sent me as a child\non errands of charity, and had always impressed upon me the duty of\nrespecting the dignity of the poor while ministering sympathetically\nto their needs. I was prepared by this youthful training to resent the\nindignity offered to the personality of the laborer, as well as the\nsuffering endured by him in consequence of existing conditions.\n\nAccordingly, on returning from abroad, my first action consisted in\nfounding among men of my own or nearly my own age a little society\nwhich we ambitiously called a Union for the Higher Life, based on\nthree tacit assumptions: sex purity, the principle of devoting the\nsurplus of one\u2019s income beyond that required for one\u2019s own genuine\nneeds to the elevation of the working class, and thirdly, continued\nintellectual development. A second practical enterprise attempted was\nthe establishment of a co-operative printing shop. This having failed\nbecause of the selfishness actuating the members, the Workingman\u2019s\nSchool was founded, with the avowed object of creating a truly\nco-operative spirit among workingmen.\n\nI must, however, pause at this point to explain how the development\ndescribed led me to separation from the Hebrew religion, the religion\nin which I was born, and to the service of which as a Jewish minister\nit was expected that I should devote my life.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[1] In view of the writer\u2019s connection with the Ethical Culture\nSocieties it is fitting to state expressly that the philosophical\npositions herein set forth are not to be taken as an official\npronouncement on behalf of the Ethical Culture Movement. The Ethical\nSocieties as such have no official philosophy. _See_ Book IV, Chapter 9.\n\n[2] Though I must at once mention the first great error which\naccompanied the true insight, the shadow which went alongside of the\nlight, namely, my understanding of the above principle mainly in a\nnegative sense. My ethics was largely what may be called non-violation\nethics.\n\n[3] The relation of chastity to the birth of the idea of personality\namong the Hebrews I have touched upon elsewhere. The Hebrew people\nabhorred promiscuity, or the dishonoring of oneself by indiscriminate\nmingling. It is instructive that this did not stand in the way of\npolygamy. Those persons whom the Hebrew received, so to speak, into\nthe sphere of his personality, did not imperil his sense of personal\nintactness. And personal intactness seems to have been the determining\nmotive in the severe attitude taken toward prostitution. The fact\nthat the worship of other gods, the worst of crimes in the eyes of\nthe Hebrew legislator, was described as \u201cwhoring after other gods\u201d is\nparticularly significant. The sacred, sensitive self, the holy thing\nwhatever it might be, which the Hebrew discovered within his own sex\nexperience, was thereafter attributed also to others, and especially to\nthose who had the same aversion to promiscuity as he. Hence perhaps the\nlimited ascription of holiness to members of the Hebrew people.\n\n[4] Pantheism has always seemed to me the least satisfactory of\ntheological or ethical solutions. The system of thought which will\nbe found later on in this volume may have a certain superficial\nresemblance to Pantheism, but in reality is as far from it in origin\nand purpose as pole from pole.\n\n[5] There are also passages in books that have the same revolutionizing\neffect (Cf. the passage quoted from St. Paul in St. Augustine\u2019s\n\u201cConfessions\u201d). However, it is curious to observe that the effect\nbrought about may be quite out of proportion to the cause. The book or\nthe passage may prove to be of inferior value, so far as its subject\nis concerned, and may yet serve suddenly to call attention to the\nsubject itself, and give rise to trains of thought that eventually\ngo far beyond the impetus that set them in motion. \u201cRipeness,\u201d says\nShakespeare, \u201cis everything,\u201d\u2014ripeness to receive the impetus.\nRelatedness to the state of mind of the recipient is the decisive\nfactor, and this accounts for the astounding changes that result.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nTHE HEBREW RELIGION\n\n\nThe separation was not violent. There was no sudden wrenching off.\nThere were none of those painful struggles which many others have had\nto undergo when breaking away from the faith of their fathers. It was\nall a gradual, smooth transition, the unfolding of a seed that had long\nbeen planted. I have never felt the bitterness often characteristic of\nthe radical, nor his vengeful impulse to retaliate upon those who had\nimposed the yoke of dogmas upon his soul. I had never worn the yoke. I\nhad never been in bondage. I had been gently guided. And consequently\nthe wine did not turn into vinegar, the love into hate. The truth is, I\nwas hardly aware of the change that had taken place until it was fairly\nconsummated. One day I awoke, and found that I had traveled into a new\ncountry. The landscape was different; the faces I encountered were\ndifferent; and looking casually into a mental mirror, as it were, I\nperceived that I too had become different. And I was sure also that I\nhad gained, not lost, that into my new spiritual home I had taken with\nme, not indeed the images of my gods, like \u00c6neas, fleeing from Troy,\nbut something for which those images had stood, and which in other ways\nwould remain for me a permanent possession.\n\nIt has been said that the science of today lives only in so far\nas it supersedes the science of yesterday. Whatever may be true\nof science (and the statement is certainly not true without large\nqualifications\u2014the science of Newton and Darwin has not been\n\u201csuperseded\u201d\u2014and it may even come to pass that outreachings of a more\nancient science frustrated at the time will hereafter be taken up anew\nwith fairer results than formerly were attainable), in religion at\nall events there is no such thing as the bare substitution of the new\nfor the old. The religions of the past, at least the more advanced\nreligions, are not simply to be cast on the scrap heap, or treated as\nexploded superstitions. There is in all of them a certain fund of truth\nwhich may not be allowed to perish, but should be rescued out of the\nwreck.\n\nOn the other hand, even the most advanced religions contain a large\nadmixture of error, survivals of primitive taboos, mythological\nelements having their root in polytheism, while the very truths which I\nhave just admitted to be infinitely precious require to be restated so\nas to fit them into a larger synthesis.\n\nIt is not easy to define my attitude toward the Old Masters, I mean\nthe Old Masters in religion, the incomparably great religious teachers\nof the past, who tower above us like giants. My attitude is one of\nprofoundest reverence\u2014toward the Hebrew prophets and Jesus especially.\nThe Hebrew religion first sounded the distinctively spiritual note.\nZoroaster had emphasized the struggle of the powers of Light and\nthe powers of Darkness, but the conception of light in his system\nremained to a considerable extent materialistic. Buddha emphasized\nEnlightenment in the sense of escape from Illusion, and in conjunction\nwith it sympathy for all who remain under the spell of illusion.\nConfucius endeavored to walk, and taught his followers to walk, with\nequipoise in the Middle Path; he emphasized what he thought to be the\ncosmic principle of balance or equilibrium. Plato, taking his stand on\nthe highest terrestrial platform, caught, or believed himself to have\ncaught, sight of transcendental beauty as the ultimate principle in\nthings. But the prophets of Israel assigned to the ethical principle\nthe highest rank in man\u2019s life and in the world at large. The best\nthing in man, they declared, is his moral personality; and the best\nthing in the world, the supreme and controlling principle, is the moral\npower that pervades it.\n\nThe predominance of the ethical principle in religion dates from the\nprophets of Israel. The religious development of the human race took\na new turn in their sublime predications, and I for one am certainly\nconscious of having drawn my first draught of moral inspiration from\ntheir writings.[6]\n\nBut nevertheless I found myself compelled to separate from the religion\nof Israel. Now why was it necessary for me to take this step? Why not\ncontinue along the path first blazed by the Hebrew prophets\u2014smoothing\nit perhaps and widening it? Why not separate the dross from the\ngold, the error from the truth, explicating what is implicit in that\ntruth, and adapting it to the needs and conditions of the modern\nage? The answer is that the truth contained in the Hebrew, and as I\nshall presently show, in the Christian religion, is not capable of\nsuch adaptation. It claims finality. I have mentioned that there is\nan element of permanent value in both the Hebrew and the Christian\nreligion, and that it should be restated and fitted into a larger\nsynthesis. But this is impossible unless the Hebrew or Christian\nsetting be broken, unless the element to be preserved is taken out of\nits context, and treated freshly and with perfect freedom. A religion\nlike the two I am concerned with is a determinate thing. It is a closed\ncircle of thoughts and beliefs. It is capable of a certain degree\nof change but not of indefinite change. The limits of change are\ndetermined by its leading conceptions\u2014the monotheistic idea in the one\ncase, and the centrality of the figure of Christ in the other. Abandon\nthese, and the boundaries by which the religion is circumscribed are\npassed.\n\nThe great religious teachers are men who see the spiritual landscape\nfrom a certain point of view, including whatever is visible from their\nstation, excluding whatever is not. The religion which they originate\nis thus both inclusive and sharply exclusive. What they see with\ntheir rapt eyes they describe with a trenchancy and fitness never\nthereafter to be equaled.[7] But in order to progress in religion it is\nnecessary to advance toward a different station, to reach a different,\na higher eminence, and from that to look forth anew upon the spiritual\nlandscape, comprehending the outlook of one\u2019s predecessors in a new\nperspective, seeing what they saw and much besides.\n\nReligious growth may also be compared to the growth of a tree. To\nexpect that development shall continue along the Hebrew or Christian\nlines is like expecting that a tree will continue to develop along\none of its branches. There is a limit beyond which the extension of a\nbranch cannot go. Then growth must show itself in the putting forth of\na new branch.\n\nBut let me now state with somewhat greater particularity the reasons\nthat compelled me to depart from the faith of Israel, and to leave my\nearly religious home, cherishing pious memories of it, but nevertheless\nfirmly set in my course towards new horizons.[8]\n\n1. The difficulty created by the claim that Israel is an elect people,\nthat it stands in a peculiar relation to the Deity. This claim, at\nthe time when it was put forth, was neither arrogant nor unfounded.\nIt was not arrogant because the mission was understood to be a heavy\nburden not a privilege: or if a privilege at all, then the tragic\nprivilege of martyrdom, a martyrdom continued through generations.\nAnd the claim was not unfounded or preposterous at the time when it\nwas put forth because the Hebrews were in reality the only people who\nconceived of morality in terms of holiness. It was not absurd for them\nto assert their mission to be the teachers of mankind in respect to\nthe spiritual interpretation of morality, since there was something,\nand that something infinitely important, which they actually had to\nteach. Moral thinking and moral practices of course had existed from\nimmemorial times everywhere, but the conception of morality as divine\nin its source, as spiritual in its inmost essence,\u2014this immense idea\nwas the offspring of the Hebrew mind. On the other hand, I asked\nmyself, has not the task of Israel in this respect been accomplished?\nHave not its Scriptures become the common property of the civilized\nnations? And does not that teacher mistake his office who attempts to\nmaintain his magisterial authority after his pupils have come to man\u2019s\nestate, and are capable of original contributions? The \u201cnations\u201d are\nnot to be looked upon in the light of mere pupils. The ethical message\nof Israel so far as it is sane is universalistic. It is founded on\nthe conviction that there is a moral nature in every human being, and\nthat the moral nature is a spiritual nature. And if this be so, then\nthe utterances, the insights, the new visions with which the spiritual\nnature is pregnant, cannot be supposed to be restricted to members of\nthe Jewish people. If the teaching function is to be maintained it\nmust be exercised by all who have the gift. If there is to be an elect\nbody (a dangerous conception, the meaning of which is to be carefully\ndefined), it must consist of gentiles and Jews, of men of every race\nand condition in whom the spiritual nature is more awakened than in\nothers, peculiarly vivid, pressing towards utterance.\n\n2. Aside from the spiritual interpretation of morality, the mission\nof the Jewish people has been said to consist in holding aloft the\nstandard of pure monotheism as against trinitarianism. But pure\nmonotheism is a philosophy rather than a religion. Taken by itself it\nis too pure, too empty of content to serve the purposes of a living\nfaith. The attributes of omniscience, omnipotence, etc., ascribed to\nDeity are highly abstract, too abstruse to be even thinkable, save\nindirectly, and they certainly fail to touch the heart. As a matter\nof fact it was the image of the Father projected upon the background\nof these abstractions, that made the object of Jewish piety. Jahweh\nis the heavenly spouse; Israel is to be his faithful earthly spouse.\nThe Children of Israel are pre-eminently his children. Other nations\nlikewise are his children,\u2014some children of wrath to be cast out\nand destroyed like the rebellious son in Deuteronomy, others to be\neventually gathered into the patriarchal household. But this view comes\nback to the same general conception of the relations of Israel to other\nnations which has just been discussed. Moreover, the Father image, as\nrepresenting the divine life in the world, even when extended so as to\ninclude all mankind on equal terms, is open to a serious objection.[9]\n\n3. If, nevertheless, the Jews have a mission, is it perhaps this: to\nrehabilitate the prophetic ideal of social justice? Is it not social\njustice that the world is crying for today? Were not the prophets of\nIsrael the great preachers of righteousness in the sense of social\njustice? Did they not affirm that religion consists in justice and in\nits concomitant mercifulness, but above all in justice? Did not Isaiah\nsay: \u201cWhen ye come to tread my courts, who has demanded this of you?\nGo wash you, make you clean. Put away the evil that is in your hands.\nCease to do evil; learn to do good.\u201d And later on, \u201cThat ye let the\noppressed go free, and that ye break every yoke.\u201d These are solemn,\nmarvelous words assuredly! They have been ringing down through the\nages, and still find their echo in our hearts. And yet the justice\nidea of the prophets is inadequate to serve the purpose of social\nreconstruction today. To go back to it would mean repristination, not\nrenovation. It is sound as far as it goes, but it does not go far\nenough. It is negative, rather than positive; it is based on the idea\nof non-violation. What we require today is a positive conception, and\nthis implies a positive definition of that holy thing in man that\nis to be treated as inviolable. To the mind of the prophets justice\nmeant chiefly resistance to oppression, since oppression is the most\npalpable exemplification of the forbidden violation. The prophets in\ntheir outlook on the external relations of their people stood for the\nweak, the oppressed, against the strong, the oppressor. They stood for\ntheir own weak little nation, the Belgium of those days, against the\ntwo over-mighty empires, Egypt and Assyria, that bordered it on either\nside. In the internal affairs of Israel they espoused the cause of\nthe weak against the rich and strong: \u201cWoe unto them that add house\nto house and field to field, that grind the faces of the poor.\u201d Ever\nand ever again the same note resounds, the same intense, passionately\nindignant feeling against violation in the form of oppression. But this\naspect of justice, as I have said, is the negative aspect,\u2014inestimably\nimportant, but insufficient. Where oppression does not occur, have the\nclaims of justice ceased? Is there not something even greater than\nmere non-infringement, greater than mercifulness or kindness, which in\njustice we owe to the personality of our fellows, namely, to aid in the\ndevelopment of their personality? Righteousness, yes, by all means,\u2014but\ndoes the righteousness of the prophets of Israel exhaust or begin to\nexhaust the content of that vast idea?\n\nThe universalistic ethical idea in the Hebrew religion is bound up with\nand bound down by racial restrictions. The issue between monotheism\nand trinitarianism is no longer a vital issue of our day. The Father\nimage as the symbol of Deity raises expectations which experience does\nnot confirm. The ideal of social justice as conceived by the prophets\nof Israel is a valid but incomplete expression of what is implied in\nsocial justice. These are weighty considerations that make it difficult\nto retain the belief in the elect character attributed to the people of\nIsrael. There is one other, of very deep-reaching importance, that must\nbe noticed. An elect people is supposed to be an exemplary people, one\nthat sets a moral example which other nations are expected to copy. But\nit has become more and more clear to me that the value of example in\nthe moral life has been overestimated and misunderstood. No individual,\nfor instance, can really serve as an example to others so as to be\ncopied by them. The circumstances are always somewhat different, the\nnatures are different, and the obligations, finely examined, are never\nquite the same. In fact, the best that anyone can do for another by his\nexample is to stimulate him to express with consummate fidelity his\ndifferent nature in his own different way. I do not of course deny that\nthere are certain uniformities, chiefly negative, in moral conduct, but\nI have come to think that the ethical quality of moral acts consists\nin the points in which they differ rather than in those in which they\nagree. The ideally ethical act, to my mind, is the most completely\nindividualized act.\n\nAnd what is true of individuals is no less true of peoples. No people\ncan really be exemplary for other peoples, and in this sense elect.\nEvery people possesses a character of its own to which it is to give\nexpression in ways which I shall indicate in the last part of this\nwork. But the way rightly adopted by one nation cannot be a law or a\nmodel for its sister nations. If the ideal of the modern Zionists were\nrealized, if the Jews were to return to Palestine, to speak once more\nthe language of the Bible, to cultivate their distinctive gifts, they\nwould not therefore produce a pattern which could be copied in Japan,\nor among the 400 millions of China, or in the United States, or among\nthe Slavic or Latin peoples.\n\nIn concluding these reflections, I may not conceal from myself or\nfrom others that the objection to the function of exemplariness, if\nsustained, affects at the root both the theology and the ethics of the\npast. If no individual can be in the strict sense an example to others,\nneither can an individual Deity be an example to be copied by men,\nneither can Christ be the perfect exemplar to be imitated. There can\nbe no single perfect exemplar. Virtues that bear the same name are not\ntherefore the same virtues. Often it is only the name that is the same,\nnot the substance; and where they are in a broad way the same, yet\nthere remains a difference of accent. The natures of men are unlike.\nTheir moral destiny is to work out the unlikeness of each in harmony\nwith that of the others. The moral equivalence of men, rather than\ntheir moral equality, is for me the expression of the fundamental moral\nrelation.[10]\n\nAt the early stage of my career to which I am still adverting it was\nurgently put to me that with all the changes that had taken place in\nmy inner life, I need not separate myself from the religion of the\nFathers, nay, that I might remain a servant and teacher of religion\nwithin the Jewish fold, gradually weaning away from the beliefs which\nthey held those whom I might contrive to influence, and drawing them\nup\u2014such was the phrase used\u2014to my own \u201chigher level.\u201d But this advice\nwas repelled by every inmost fibre of my being, and could not but be\nutterly rejected. I was to publicly represent a certain belief with\nthe purpose of undermining it. I was to trade upon the simplicity of\nmy hearers in order to rob them of what they, crudely and mistakenly\nperhaps, considered their most sacred truth, by feigning provisionally,\nuntil I could alter their views, to be in agreement with them. Would\nthis be fair to them or to myself? Was I to act a lie in order to teach\nthe truth? There was especially one passage in the Sabbath service\nwhich brought me to the point of resolution: I mean the words spoken\nby the officiating minister as he holds up the Pentateuch scroll, \u201cAnd\nthis is the Law which Moses set before the people of Israel.\u201d I had\nlately returned from abroad where I had had a fairly thorough course in\nBiblical exegesis, and had become convinced that the Mosaic religion is\nso to speak a religious mosaic, and that there is hardly a single stone\nin it which can with certainty be traced to the authorship of Moses.\nWas I to repeat these words? It was impossible. I was certain that they\nwould stick in my throat. On these grounds the separation was decided\non by me, and became irremediable.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[6] I still go back to that fountain-head for refreshment and\ninspiration, much as a modern poet may go back to Homer, without\nattempting to copy him, or as a modern sculptor or architect may go\nback to the Greek artists without relinquishing his right and his duty\nto help in producing a different kind of art, which perchance may one\nday culminate in masterpieces like theirs, though his own performance\nbe but the poor beginning.\n\n[7] Compare the ejaculatory deliverance of Isaiah, the Sermon on the\nMount, and the Parables of Jesus. Who can attempt in language to\nexpress what they saw as they did?\n\n[8] No seriously religious person will attempt to strike out into a\nnew path unless he be under inward coercion to do so. The advantages\nof what is commonly called historic continuity (I have just shown\nwherein real continuity consists, that of growth along the trunk, and\nnot of growth along the branch) are great. There is for one thing\nthe support derived from leaning on an ancient tradition, the proud\nhumility felt in passing on the torch that had been held by mighty\npredecessors, the self-dedication to that which is larger than self,\n_i.e._, to an institution and ideas that existed in the world before\none was born, and will exist after one is gone. There is the strength\ndrawn from contact with a large and powerful organization, powerful\nboth in sustaining one\u2019s efforts, and in restraining and correcting\nthem when need be. There are, on the other side, the perils of\ninnovation, the errors into which one is led for lack of restraint and\ncorrection, the too great dependence on self, the spiritual loneliness\nand the lack of many gracious and useful aids to the religious life\nsuch as a noble ritual, majestic music, the fit emotional expressions\nof religious feeling, which are not to be had for the asking, the\nfine embellishments that are precious in their way, and that, like\nthe fruits in the Gardens of the Gods, ripen slowly, and may not be\nextemporized or anticipated.\n\n[9] See Chapter IX on the Religious Society in Part IV of this volume.\nIt gives rise to the belief that men as individuals or collectively\nare the objects of a special Providence, and that the universe is\nso arranged as to be adapted to man\u2019s needs, not to say his wishes;\nwhereas the facts show that man must adapt himself to the universe,\nand find his physical safety and his ethical salvation in so doing.\nThe belief in the Father who allows not one hair of our heads to fall\nunnoticed raises expectations to which actual experience fails to\ncorrespond.\n\nAs to the issue between monotheism and trinitarianism, it has long\nsince become obsolescent, if not obsolete. The forward-looking men and\nwomen of our time are absorbed in far other issues\u2014Is the mechanical\ntheory propounded by science the ultimate account of things? Is the\nworld in which we live a blind machine? Is man a chance product of\nnature, like the beasts that perish? Not is God one in unity or is He\na Triune God, but, is there a God at all? Is there a supersensible\nreality? Is religion capable of a new lease of life, and of giving a\nnew lease of life to us who now are spiritually dead?\n\n[10] Of many ethical types of behavior no examples whatever as yet\nexist, for instance, of the ethically-minded employer or merchant,\nethically-minded in thought and in practice. The standard of ethical\nbehavior which we apply is at present higher and more exacting. The\nstandard itself indeed is in process of being defined, and there are\nno illustrations of it, or none but very imperfect ones, on which to\ndwell with satisfaction. But the same is true of other vocations. We\nare very thankful for any examples that can be found. They seem to\nprove that that which ought to be can be. But we may not lean on them\ntoo hard. They are never quite adequate, even in their limited sphere;\nand there is ever an Ought-to-be beyond that which has been even\npartially realized, beyond that which has even as yet been conceived.\nTo make too much of example is to check moral progress. Along with a\ndue appreciation of past moral achievements, there should be encouraged\na spirit of brave adventure, a certain intrepidity of soul to venture\nforth on voyages of discovery into unknown ethical regions, taking the\nrisks but bent upon the prize.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nEMERSON\n\n\nI find on looking backward that my development proceeded with the help\nof a series of definitions fixing my attitude toward teachers who made\na special appeal to me, and toward great historic tendencies past and\npresent. I was helped both by what I was able to appreciate in them,\nand, where I diverged, by what they forced me to think out for myself.\nHere let me acknowledge a passing debt to Emerson. As in the case\nof Kant, a strong attraction drew me toward Emerson with temporary\ndisregard of radical differences,\u2014although the spell was never so\npotent or so persistent in the latter instance as in the former. I made\nEmerson\u2019s acquaintance in 1875. I came into touch with the Emerson\ncircle and read and re-read the _Essays_. The value of Emerson\u2019s\nteaching to me at that time consisted in the exalted view he takes\nof the self. Divinity as an object of extraneous worship for me had\nvanished. Emerson taught that immediate experience of the divine power\nin self may take the place of worship. His doctrine of self-reliance\nalso was bracing to a youth just setting out to challenge prevailing\nopinions and to urge plans of transformation upon the community in\nwhich he worked. But I soon discovered that Emerson overstresses\nself-affirmation at the expense of service. For a time indeed I\nreconciled in my own fashion the two contrary tendencies. The divine\npower, I argued, flows through me as a channel\u2014hence the grandeur\nwhich attaches to my spiritual nature. But the divine power manifests\nitself in redressing the wrongs that exist in the world, and in putting\nan end to such violations of personality as the sexual and economic\nexploitations which disgrace human society. So for a time I continued\nto walk on air with Emerson, and had my head in the clouds,\u2014the clouds\nin which Emerson enveloped me.\n\nOut of this false sense of security, this quasi-pantheistic\nself-affirmation, the experiences of the next few years effectually\nroused me. I came to see that Emerson\u2019s pantheism in effect spoils his\nethics. Be thyself, he says, not a counterfeit or imitation of someone\nelse. Be different. But why! Because the One manifests itself in\nendless variety. Penetrating below the surface, however, one finds that\nin this kind of philosophy the value of difference, to which I attach\nessential importance on ethical grounds, is nothing more than that of\na foil. According to Emerson life is a universal masquerade, and the\ninterest of the whole business of living consists in the ever-renewed\ndiscovery that the face behind the different masks is still the same.\nDifference is not cherished on its own account. And here, as in the\ncase of the uniformity principle of Hebraism, I found myself dissenting.\n\nEmerson is a kind of eagle, circling high up in the ether\u2014_non soli\ncedit_.\n\nEmerson with his oracular sayings might have served as a priest at\nDodona or led the mysteries at Eleusis. Yet, withal, he is genuinely\nAmerican,\u2014a rare blend of ancient mystic and modern Yankee,\u2014a valued\npoet too, but as an ethical guide to be accepted only with large\nreservations.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nTHE TEACHINGS OF JESUS\n\n\nAt about this time I began to occupy myself more seriously than I\nhad done before, with the study of the New Testament. I had, I think\na great advantage in my approach to it, for the very reason that I\nhad not been brought up in the Christian tradition. I came from the\noutside, with a mind fresh to receive first-hand impressions. I had\nnot had instilled into me from childhood the kind of hesitant awe\nthat prevents impartial appraisement of excellences and of possible\ndeficiencies. On the other hand, as a searcher I was deeply interested\nto ascertain what Christianity could give me, and to what extent it\ncould further my spiritual development. I had not the enforcedly\napologetic attitude; I did not come prepared to accept without question\nnor yet to find fault; I came to test for my own use. Here am I, with\nlife and its problem before me\u2014how can the teachings of Jesus help me\nin my search, in my dire perplexities?\n\nI must say to begin with that I was particularly struck with the\noriginality of Jesus\u2019 teachings, a quality in them which to my\namazement I had found disputed, not only by Jews, but by representative\nChristians. In Jewish circles it is not uncommon to speak almost\ncondescendingly of Christianity as of a daughter religion commissioned\nto spread abroad the truths of Judaism, with such alloy as may be\nneeded to suit them to the apprehension of the gentiles. But Christian\nteachers likewise\u2014I remember particularly a recent sermon to that\neffect\u2014have taken the ground that Jesus added nothing new to the\nethical insight of mankind. His work, it is said, consisted merely in\nsupplying a sufficient motive for performing the duties which everyone\nknows, but which, lacking this motive, we are supposedly impotent to\npractice. This strange misapprehension of the intimate nature of Jesus\u2019\ncontribution to ethical progress is largely due, I take it, to the\npoverty of our moral vocabulary. Language puts at our disposal only\na few terms, such as Justice, Righteousness, Love,\u2014which must needs\nstand for a great variety of moral ideas. Thus Justice in Plato\u2019s use\nof the word, implies that \u201ca shoemaker shall stick to his last,\u201d that\nthose who perform the humble functions shall be content to perform\nthem in due subservience to their superiors. A very different meaning\nwas attached to justice by the Hebrew prophets as I have explained\nin the last chapter. Again, a quite different conception of justice\nis framed and stressed by modern social reformers. Now it is this\nambiguity of the moral vocabulary that conceals the novelty of Jesus\u2019\nprecepts. Thus, to mention only a single capital instance, it has been\nasserted that the Golden Rule as taught by Jesus is not original, but\nsubstantially the same rule that had been laid down by Confucius 500\nyears before the time of Jesus. But on closer scrutiny it will be seen\nthat the two Golden Rules are by no means the same. As propounded\nby the Chinese sage the rule appears to mean: Keep the balance true\nbetween thyself and thy neighbor; illustrate in thy conduct the\nprinciple of equilibrium. As impressed upon his disciples by Jesus it\nmeans: Look upon thy neighbor as thy other self; act towards him as if\nthou wert he.\n\nTo return to my point, the impression of novelty which I received\nin reading the Gospels was definite and striking. The mythological\nidealization of Jesus, indeed, I put aside as a thing that did not\nconcern me. On the other hand, to say with certain modern liberals\nthat he was just a man, an infinitely gracious personality, one who\nexemplified in his life the virtues of forgiveness and self-sacrifice,\ndid not satisfy me either. Buddha too had taught forgiveness: \u201cFor\nhatred is not conquered by hatred at any time; hatred is conquered by\nlove.\u201d It could not then be the bare precept of forgiveness that lets\nlight on the secret of Jesus. And self-sacrifice\u2014\u201cGreater love hath no\nman than this, that he should lay down his life for his friend\u201d\u2014had\nbeen practiced within and without the pale of Hebraism.\n\nThat he continued the work of his Hebrew predecessors I made no doubt.\nOn the Hebrew side he was a prophet, or rather, a saint in Israel. But\nI had just as little doubt that he took a step beyond his predecessors,\nthat his teachings bear upon them the signature of originality.\n\nTo put my thought briefly, I came to conclude that the ethical\noriginality of Jesus consists in a new way of dealing with the problem\nof evil, that is, of evil in the guise of oppression. The prophets, his\npredecessors, as we have seen, identified injustice with oppression;\nand in the first flush of their moral enthusiasm the more optimistic\namong them believed that justice as they conceived of it would\npresently triumph and that oppression would cease altogether\u2014\u201cArise,\nshine, for thy light is come.\u201d God would miraculously interfere, and\nbring about on earth a state of righteousness. But years and centuries\npassed by, and oppression, far from ceasing, became under the ruthless\nadministration of Rome ever more grinding and terrible. The yoke of\nRome weighed upon the Jews as it did upon other peoples; but perhaps,\nbecause they were more independent in spirit, it galled them more\nsorely. The fiery zealots among the Jews persisted in hoping that\nby supreme desperate efforts, God coming to their aid, they might\nyet succeed in shaking off this yoke\u2014efforts which culminated in the\nhorrors of the last siege of Jerusalem. Jesus was not of their way of\nthinking. He seems indeed to have believed that the end of the existing\norder was near. It was too incredibly bad to last. The world would\nbe consumed by fire. A new earth and a new heaven would appear. But\nin the meantime how accommodate oneself to the intolerable fact of\noppression? Jesus said, Resist not evil in the guise of oppression, it\nis irresistible. He mentions in particular three forms of intolerable\noppression: a blow in the face, the stripping of a man of his garment,\nand the coercing him to do the arbitrary bidding of another. He says,\nResist not evil, resist not oppression. Shall then evil triumph? Is the\nvictim helplessly at the mercy of the injurer? Shall he even be told\nthat in a servile spirit he must accept the indignities that are put\nupon him? No; this is not the meaning. Quite a different meaning is\nimplied. And here the teaching of Jesus takes its novel turn. There is\na way, he says to the victim, in which you can spiritually triumph over\nthe evildoer, and make your peace with irresistible oppression. Use\nit as a means of self-purification; pause to consider what the inner\nmotives are that lead your enemy, and others like him, to do such acts\nas they are guilty of, and to so violate your personality and that\nof others. The motives _in them_ are lust, greed, anger, wilfulness,\npride. Now turn your gaze inward upon yourself, look into your own\nheart and learn, perhaps to your amazement, that the same evil streams\ntrickle through you; that you, too, are subject, even if it be only\nsubconsciously and incipiently, to the same appetites, passions, and\npride, that animate your injurers. Therefore let the sufferings you\nendure at the hands of those who allow these bad impulses free rein in\ntheir treatment of you lead you to expel the same bad impulses that\nstir potentially in your breast; let this experience fill you with a\ndeeper horror of the evil, and prove the incentive to secure your own\nemancipation from its control. In this way you will achieve a real\ntriumph over your enemy, and will be able to make your peace with\noppression. There are other intolerable evils in the world besides\noppression which nevertheless must be tolerated. The method of Jesus\ncan be applied to these also. This method I regard as a permanent\ncontribution to the ethical progress of humanity.\n\nA second original trait in Jesus\u2019 teaching I found in his conception\nof the spiritual nature, and of his doctrine of love as dependent on\nthat conception. The conception or definition is still negative as\nin the non-violation ethics of the Hebrew prophets. The spiritual\nelement in man is hidden. It cannot be apprehended as to what it\nis substantively. The attributes ascribed to it are the effects in\nwhich it manifests itself; this goes without saying. To define the\nspiritual nature means to describe these effects, these manifestations.\nAccording to the Hebrew predecessors of Jesus the spiritual power is\nto be conceived of as that which prompts a man to respect the holy\nprecinct of personality in others and in himself. What the holy thing\nis remains unknown. This view leads to acts of justice and mercy, as\nabove explained. According to Jesus the spiritual essence in man bids\nhim expel the inner, impure impulses that lead to external violations.\nIn brief, the spiritual power is conceived of in terms of purity. It\nis the pure thing in man that thrusts out as alien to itself whatever\nis impure\u2014whatever is of the world, the flesh, and, in mythological\nlanguage, whatever is Satanic. In this sense I say that the definition\nis negative. It marks out, indeed, a definite line of conduct; and it\neven leads, as we shall presently see, to active efforts in a specific\ndirection. A negative principle may have certain positive results.\nBut in the main, nevertheless, the teaching of Jesus enlightens us as\nto what shall not be rather than as to what shall be. From the Hebrew\nprophets we learn that there shall not be violation of personality or\ninjustice, the positive concomitant being mercy; from Jesus\u2019 teachings\nwe learn that there shall not be impurity in the inner forum, the\npositive by-product being the doctrine of love.\n\nTaking over the Hebrew heritage, Jesus affirmed that the spiritual\nnature exists in all human beings. In every man there is presumed to\nbe this inner power to reject the unclean admixtures, to ward off and\nrepel the carnal solicitations, to withdraw from the \u201cworld,\u201d and to\nmove upward toward the source of purity, which is God. The spirituality\nof man consisting of purity, the Father-God, the Father of Lights,\nis likewise conceived as the absolutely pure, in this sense as the\nmost holy. In every man there is a ray of the eternal light emanating\nfrom the eternal luminary, and all men are one in so far as their\nrays converge at the focus of Godhead. To love men is to be conscious\nof one\u2019s unity with them in the central life, and to give effect to\nthis consciousness. Hence Christian love, the love that Jesus taught,\nis no earthly love, no mere sentiment, or outreaching of the human\naffections. On the contrary, the natural human ties are repeatedly set\naside in the _logia_. To love another is to love him in God. Later the\ncurrent phrase became, to love him in Christ; that is, to think of him,\nand act towards him, as if he possessed the same capacity for purity\nwith oneself.\n\nThe love of others in God or Christ encouraged a particular kind of\nearthly beneficence, and it especially inspired the followers of\nJesus with an unparalleled zeal in works of remedial (though never of\npreventive) charity. This may at first sight seem paradoxical. The\nyoung man is advised to dispossess himself of all he has, and in the\nsame breath is told to distribute his possessions among the poor.\nWhy not rather scatter them to the winds? Why should not the poor too\ncease to toil and spin and take heed for the morrow? For their simple\nnecessities God would provide. The two-fold attitude, however, is easy\nto understand if we remember that certain acts of helpfulness have a\nsymbolic significance, as attesting the value we set upon the person to\nwhose needs we minister, much as a flower offered to a beloved person\nemblematically intimates our sense of the beauty and worth of the one\nto whom the tribute is offered. Christian charity, on its earthly\nside, has a similar meaning and purpose. It is intended to efface the\nindignity to which human beings are subjected when reduced to extreme\nindigence or allowed to suffer without relief, for it is the disdain\nof the spiritual personality thus evinced which Jesus disallows. He\nbids his followers intimate by earthly tokens their consciousness of\nthe super-earthly worth of their fellow-beings. But the pursuit of\nriches as such he nowhere encourages\u2014quite the contrary. And it is\ncertainly a mistake to represent Jesus, as has recently been done, as\na kind of precursor of modern Socialism, and to think of him as one\nwho, if he had lived in our time, would have laid stress on equality\nof opportunity for all to gain earthly possessions. He who advocated\nwealth for none could not be supposed to have sympathized with a social\nmovement whose first object it is to secure wealth for all.\n\nIt is this interpretation of love that helped me to understand the\ninterior meaning of the doctrine of the forgiveness of enemies\nas taught by Jesus, and to perceive wherein it differs from the\napparently identical mode of behavior enjoined by Buddha and the Stoic\nSeneca. It plays a capital r\u00f4le in Jesus\u2019 teaching. As illustrated\nby the proto-martyr Stephen it probably effected the conversion of\nPaul. Jesus says: \u201cBless them that curse you.\u201d But how is it possible\nto bless those that curse us? How, for instance, was it possible for\nStephen to bless the men of blood at the very moment when they were\ncrushing him under stones? To bless them that curse you, to bless them\nthat despitefully use you, means to distinguish between the spiritual\npossibilities latent in them and their overt conduct, to see the human,\nthe potentially divine face behind the horrible mask, and to invoke the\ninfluence of the divine power upon them in order that it may change\nthem into their purer, better selves.\n\nWith complete and eager appreciation of the points of excellence\ncontained in these teachings, with a reverence which it is impossible\nto express in words for their incomparable Author, and with a large\nsense of the beneficent influence which they have exercised on human\nhistory, I still could not avoid the question, so vital for me, Have\nthese ethical teachings of the great Master the stamp of finality upon\nthem? Has Jesus really spoken the last word in ethics? Is nothing left\nfor us but further to expand and apply the truth which he laid down\nonce and for all? When theology goes, the last stand of apologetic\nwriters is apt to be made on the ethics. The instinct to claim finality\nfor the religion in which one has been brought up asserts itself in the\nclaim that the moral teachings at least are unexceptionable and valid\nfor all time to come. The searcher who is in great moral perplexities\nand who seeks help for others and himself, is bound to ask and will ask\nin no captious spirit, is this so?\n\nThe decisive point is whether the ethical teachings of Jesus supply\na principle which enables us to work with zest in the world, to take\nthe keenest interest in all the manifold activities of human society,\nto embrace the world with the view of penetrating it with a spiritual\npurpose and of thus transforming it. Do these teachings exhibit a\nway of making the world and the flesh instrumental to the spirit, or\ndo they serve to turn us away from the world and its interests, to\nabandon the world in despair? Is the conception of spirituality as\npurity adequate? Purity is certainly one aspect of morality; is it\nthe sole or the principal factor in it? The other-worldly attitude\nin the Gospels is certainly clearly marked. It is the background on\nwhich the ethical precepts stand forth. Tyrrel has argued as against\nHarnack for the close connection between the thought of Jesus and the\napocalyptic vision. I asked myself, Can the apocalyptic vision, that\nis to say the other-worldliness, be dissociated from the ethics, or\nis the relation between them necessary?[11] If the world is speedily,\nalmost immediately, coming to an end, then it is justifiable to prefer\ncelibacy to marriage, to ignore the state, to counsel disregard of the\ntoiling and the spinning. All of this is warranted on the assumption\nthat the order of things in which these institutions and activities\nhave their place is about to disappear.\n\nBut if this expectation is deceived, if things continue in their\nancient course, if the world and the flesh persist, taking on ever new\nand more baffling shapes, how is a system of ethics which is based on\nthe assumption of one state of things to be reconciled with a state\nof things exactly the opposite? How shall an ethical person conduct\nhimself in a world which his philosophy of life teaches him to reject,\nbut with which the necessities of his existence compel him to come to\nterms day by day and hour by hour? There must then be compromise. And\nthe history of Christianity up to the present moment is the record of\nsuch compromises. Monasticism was one of the earliest. A distinction\nwas made, so to speak, between perfect and imperfect Christians,\nbetween a class of men and women who lived in ascetic seclusion, as if\nthe world did not exist, and another class, the greater number, who\nmanaged ethically as best they could, dependent on the supererogatory\nmerits of the real Christians or saints to eke out their unholiness.\nAnother species of compromise is illustrated, especially in Protestant\ncountries. It appears as a division between the contracted sphere\nof holiness and the circumambient sphere of the practical life, in\nboth of which, however, the same individual has his place. Chastity,\nforgiveness of personal enemies, and the like virtues are to be\npracticed in the contracted sphere of private life, the ability to\npractice these virtues being derived from mystical identification\nwith Jesus. In the Christian\u2019s public life no such identification is\npossible, and he is left to be consciously or unconsciously unholy. As\na politician, as a competitor in the struggle for wealth, he remains\nwithout ethical direction. The ethical ideal of the Gospels requires\nfor its setting the apocalyptic vision. It derives its cogency from the\nbelief that the world is about to perish. Can it serve as a sufficient\nguide to those who must live in the world, and affirm their ethical\npersonality in dealing with it? In politics, in business, in science,\nin art, must we not somehow see our way to the conception that these\ngreat interests are not alien to the spiritual nature, introducing\nperchance impure admixtures into it, but rather can be made subservient\nor instrumental to it? Yes; but instrumental in what way? At this\npoint, not only the Christian system, but every one of the systems of\nethics that have arisen since then has failed. And it is, moreover,\nperfectly evident that the instrumental function of the sex relation\nor of the pursuit of knowledge or of patriotism cannot be determined\nunless we first answer the one question which the ethical writers are\nin the habit of evading\u2014Instrumental to what end? What is the ethical\nend? Instruments are means to ends\u2014how can the means be rightly\nappraised without a definite conception of the end? And if the end be\nthe affirmation of our ethical personality, of our spiritual nature, of\nthat holy thing in us without which man loses his worth (and without\nwhich the rule of non-violation itself falls to the ground, since where\nthere is nothing inviolable there can be no infringement), it is plain\nthat we must seek a positive definition of the spiritual nature which\nshall serve as a principle of regulation where the empty concept of\npurity has manifestly failed.\n\nChristian ethics has promoted the moral development of mankind in a\nthousand ways. It has helped even by its mythological embodiment of a\ntranscendental idea to place the individual more firmly on his feet. It\nhas emphasized the inner springs of conduct; it has given prominence to\ncertain principal virtues of the private life; but, like every product\nof the mind and aspirations of man, it exhibits the limitations of the\ntime and of the social conditions under which it arose. The conditions\nhave since changed. Society has become infinitely more complex, and\nin consequence new moral problems have forced themselves upon men\u2019s\nattention; and with the help of Christianity itself the human race has\nadvanced beyond the point of view for which Christianity stands.[12]\n\nSpeaking again only for myself I could not assent to the position\nthat finality appertains to the ethical teachings of the Gospel, that\nthey or their Author have spoken the last word in ethics. I could not\npersuade myself that this is so because I failed to get from these\nteachings, inestimably precious as they are, an answer to the question\nthat most pressed upon me\u2014Instrumental in what sense, instrumental to\nwhat end?\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[11] I am aware that a highly esteemed school of modern theologians\nmaintain that the apocalyptic element is a secondary and even an\nembarrassing feature for Jesus. But I am unable to convince myself of\nthe justice of this view.\n\n[12] See the similes used in the previous chapter on the growth of the\ntree as manifested in the putting forth of a new branch, and the ascent\nof an eminence which includes the part of the spiritual landscape\npreviously seen, but also that part which from the previous station was\nexcluded.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nSOCIAL REFORM\n\n\nMy position at that time may be summarized as follows: There is a\ndivine power in the world, not individual, manifest in the moral law\nas revealed in human experience. The moral law involves recognition\nof the presence of a something holy in each human being. Since the\nworld presents innumerable examples of the grossest violation of human\npersonality (e.g., prostitution and exploitation of laborers), the\nbusiness immediately in hand is to make an end of these violations.\nThere was as yet in my mind no positive definition of personality.\nClarification and further development were promoted by the necessity of\ngrappling with the problems of poverty and with the attempted solutions\nof the Socialists and of other social reformers. At this period, the\nnotion of personality in my mind being still without determinate\ncontent, empirical matter intruded, and a species of millennialism for\na time vitiated my thinking. In order to set up a goal for humanity, I\ndallied with Utopias, and flattered my imagination with the vision of\nsomething like a state of ultimate earthly felicity. The cheap cry of\n\u201cLet us have heaven on earth\u201d was also on my lips, though the delusion\ndid not last long and perhaps never penetrated very deeply.\n\nThe problem of poverty, as mentioned above, engrossed me early. I\nacted as chairman of the meeting at which Henry George was first\nintroduced to the public in New York City. But Henry George\u2019s\nremedy,\u2014a single draught of Socialism with unstinted individualism\nthereafter\u2014never attracted me, while his descriptions of the misery\nof the poor, eloquent as they were, and fitted to awaken persons\nunacquainted with actual conditions, conveyed to me no novel message. I\nhad before then been profoundly stirred by the chapters in Karl Marx\u2019s\n_Kapital_ in which he collects from the English Blue Books frightful\nevidence of the mistreatment of laborers and especially of children in\nthe early part of the nineteenth century. My errands in the tenement\nslums of New York had also made me fairly familiar with the bitter\nfacts, and throughout my life I have been in touch in a practical way\nwith the appalling complexus of misery and wrong which we abstractly\ndesignate as the Labor Question. I shall not here take time to discuss\nSocialism or other social reform movements in detail. My intention is\nto sketch a certain philosophy of life, and to trace the steps by which\nI reached it. My reaction against Socialism and related movements,\nhowever, was a prime factor in this inner development; and it is of\nthis reaction and the causes of it that I must speak.\n\nThe evils inherent in poverty are, in the first place, obviously, the\nprivations entailed by it; secondly, the fact that the greater part\nof the life of the poor is consumed in efforts to provide the bare\nnecessaries, the mind being thus kept in bondage to bodily needs and\nprevented from rising to other interests more appropriate to rational\nbeings; thirdly, the fact that the first two wrongs are caused,\nnot wholly it is true, but yet in a large measure, by fellow human\nbeings.[13] The sting in poverty is not so much the hardships suffered,\nas the contempt for the manhood of the poor, exhibited by their\nexploiters,\u2014the inequity being thus turned into iniquity.\n\nNow my reaction against Socialism was and is that it neglects the\nthird, the moral evil, and stresses only the first and second. I\nam now speaking of Marxian Socialism, with which in its rigid form\nI early acquainted myself. The Marxian Socialist does not deny the\npain felt in consequence of the inequity, nor the desire of those who\nsuffer to become the equals of their masters; but he regards this\ndesire as a fact of nature explicable on deterministic grounds, a\nconsequence of improvement in the technique or tools of industry. He\ndoes not deny that there are so-called moral ideas, but he considers\nthem epiphenomena or by-products of economic development. The tendency\ntoward equilibrium of power in human society, termed democracy, is to\nhim just a fact and nothing more. The mere desire for it apart from\nthe rightness of the desire is the efficient cause which leads to\nsocial readjustments. But evidently this account of the matter will\nbe persuasive only in case the efficient cause proves to be really\nefficient, that is to say, in case the desire for equilibration is\non the point of effectuating itself. If it is not, if the desire\nof the masses for power is thwarted, if the realization of their\nhopes is indefinitely postponed, then the foundations of the theory\nare undermined. Hence Marxian Socialism has been coupled with and\ndepends on a belief which is a kind of materialistic parallel of the\napocalyptic vision of Jesus,\u2014the belief that the end of the present\nworld (the world of the wage system) is close at hand, only with\nthe difference that the end is to be brought about not by divine\ninterference but automatically by the acquisition of power on the part\nof the masses.\n\nTo me neither hunger nor the bondage of the mind to physical\nnecessities nor the bare fact of inequity seem sufficient to justify\nthe demand for social reconstruction, apart from moral right. If there\nbe no such thing as morality, or if morality be but an epiphenomenon of\neconomic conditions, what warrant have the hungry or the disadvantaged\nfor complaining? Animals, too, hunger and sicken. If man be like them\na mere chance product of nature, why should he not share their fate?\nLet the weak succumb! Surely the bald fact that the democratic masses\ntoday chafe under the yoke of their masters and demand a better state\nof things, is no more a ground of obligation for the former than the\ntendency toward an ultimate equilibrium in nature of which scientists\nspeak can be a ground of obligation. The tendency will effectuate\nitself or not as the acting forces determine. There is in truth no such\nthing as obligation from this point of view. Then why not fold our arms\nand wait for what will happen? The notion of democracy currently held\nis obnoxious to the same criticism. Leave out the moral basis in the\nclaim to equity, and nothing remains but the brute fact that men, being\negotists, fret under the exercise of superior power by their fellow\negotists. But let Nietzsche or some one else demonstrate that certain\nhigher values, higher merely because subjectively relished as higher,\nare incompatible with equilibrium of power, and he will be justified\nat least in his own eyes in scoffing at equality and scourging the\ndemocratic dogs back to their kennels. No one denies that the masses\nhave the desire to be treated as the equals of their masters (very\ninconveniently for the latter), but it is quite another matter whether\ntheir desire ought to be gratified. Social reconstruction, in other\nwords, must be motivated by other considerations than those by which\naccording to Marx the great change is to come about.\n\nI have not stopped to consider whether the Socialistic scheme is\nworkable, whether the run of mankind are capable of co\u00f6perative effort\non a large scale without the pre\u00ebminent leadership of master minds;\nwhether Socialism, if carried out, would really breed, as it is\nexpected to, the sentiment of ideal brotherhood; whether the sentiment\nof brotherhood itself, unless it be rooted in the closer family and\nnational ties, is morally sound, whether the emotional forces that\nsweep through and overwhelm large aggregations of men, can be bridled\nand sufficiently enlightened to promote the ends of Socialism. All such\nquestions as these touch the feasibility of the ideal proposed; my own\nreaction was and is against the ideal _itself_. Instead of pronouncing\nas some do that mankind are not yet ripe to carry out so high an\nideal, I found myself seriously challenging and finally rejecting the\nvery ideal on the ground that it is not a genuine moral ideal at all.\nIt is ethically spurious, because it omits the notion of right and\nsubstitutes for it that of power.\n\nA different objection lies against certain modifications of Socialism\nand against many of the social reform movements of our time. In\nthese movements the idea of personality is not absent as in Marx\u2019s\ntheory. The inherent dignity of every human being is deeply felt, and\n_per contra_ the indignity of the present condition of the greater\nnumber. Man is worth while; and for the sake of the worth in him, the\nunfavorable circumstances which stifle the promise of his nature are\nto be changed. My objection in this case is that the higher spiritual\nnature of man, or the notion of personality, is left indefinite and\nremains vaguely in the background. It supplies indeed the initial\nmotive for practical efforts; but the instrumental relation of the\ngoods of life to the supreme good is not apprehended positively. And\nthus the door is left open, as we shall presently see, for corrupting\ninfluences to enter in.\n\nThere seems, it is true, at first sight, considerable warrant for\ndemanding certain instant reforms without troubling about ulterior\nspiritual ends. We are confronted in modern society with evils which\nseem to require immediate abolition. Exploitation is palpably one of\nthem. It is the clearest possible case of trespass on personality. Why\nnot then demand respect simply for personality in general, without\ninquiring into the nature of personality? Is it not beyond all\nquestion dishonoring to human nature that some should be on the verge\nof starvation while others are even themselves injured by excessive\npossessions; that the energies of children should be exhausted by\npremature toil; that adults should be worked like beasts of burden?\nWhy not leave in abeyance the definition of the supreme end, and\nconcentrate effort on the removal of these incontestable evils?\n\nMy answer to this is, in the first place, that we cannot gain the\nbest leverage even for these initial reforms without a high and\ndefined conception of man as a spiritual being. Efforts directed\ntoward improving even material conditions are apt to be fluctuating,\nspasmodic, and are ever in danger of dying down, unless material\nimprovement is seen in its relation towards something else that\ncommands the highest respect\u2014implicit respect. Sympathy alone is\naltogether inadequate. It often works grave harm; it is notoriously\nintermittent, at one time broadly expansive and then again contracting\nupon the nearest objects. Furthermore, we can at best sympathize\ngenuinely with only a very limited number of persons. If anyone were\nto open his heart to the sufferings of all the millions of human\nbeings at present engaged in conflict on the battlefields of Europe;\nif he were to try to realize the indirect consequences of this war; if\nhe were to take a still wider sweep and embrace in his imagination\nthe populations of India, China, and the races of Africa, the effect\nupon him would be simply paralyzing. The possible effect of one\u2019s\nsympathetic action upon this huge volume of human suffering would\nappear so insignificant as to make exertion on his part seem quite\nirrational. We are assisted by sympathy in the matter of social reform\nby the narrowness of our horizons; and even within these narrow\nboundaries the efficiency of the motive depends largely upon the\ntransciency of the sympathetic mood. Sympathy as a permanent attitude\nwould disintegrate the self.[14]\n\nThe second answer is that by ignoring the ultimate end we _install\nproximate ends in its place_. The reform movements of our day abstain\nfrom attempting to set up an ultimate good. They are content, as they\nsay, \u201cto evaluate the tangible goods ready at hand.\u201d In consequence\nthese tangible goods inevitably usurp the place of the supreme good.\nBegin as we may with the high notion of personality, we become\nmaterialists before we have proceeded very far, and we infect the\nlaboring masses with our materialism if we omit to define the relation\nof proximate ends to the ultimate aim. For remember that the ultimate\nend is that which prescribes the limits within which the nearer aims\nare to be sanctioned,\u2014the limit for each being the degree in which it\nconduces toward the highest end. Without a goal set up, without an\nexplicit conception of its regulative function, the proximate ends\nabound, and are likely to expand _ad indefinitum_. This is evident,\nfor instance, in the case of wealth-getting. The poor have not enough\nwealth, the rich have too much. \u201cLet us then redress the balance by\nat least securing enough for the poor. The necessary limitations\nwe can discuss after they shall have at least reached the limit of\nsufficiency.\u201d But we are thus kindling the desire for wealth; and this\ndesire and its possible gratifications are boundless. It is in the\nnature of desire to be prolific of new desire, and to aim unceasingly\nat new satisfactions. First, a decent dwelling, sufficient food,\neducation for the children, are wanted, then luxury, then millions,\nthen multi-millions. Secondary motives take the place of primary ones.\nWealth becomes a token; the satisfactions it gives are no longer\nrelated to actual wants or needs, but solely to a fantastic desire for\npre\u00ebminence. Has not this been the actual history of many of those\nwho have risen from poverty to great riches? But the same desires are\npresent, though suppressed, unsatisfied, in the masses, who look up to\nthe few with admiration or envy. And suppressed desires are often even\nmore insidiously poisoning, more contaminating in their effects than\nsatisfied desires.\n\nThe psychological fact is that human volition as expressed in action\nis always determined by some end. A means is never adopted without\nthere being some object or purpose in view. Leave out the ultimate aim\nand the means become themselves the ends. A decent subsistence should\nbe treated as related to the ultimate end,\u2014 a decent living, for\nexample, as a means to fit the worker for the duties of fatherhood and\ncitizenship.\n\nIt may again be urged that what has been said is true only of the\nambitious minority, and that the masses would be quite content with a\ndecent subsistence if only that much could be assured them. But the\nprevalence of cheap imitations of luxury among the poor points in the\nopposite direction. At least in a democratic community, the ambitions\nof the few are apt to be contagious. And where this is not the case, as\nin some of the older countries of Europe, a certain sordid Philistinism\nis apt to manifest itself. The life of the middle class in Europe is\nwithout the restless brilliance that characterizes the upward-striving\nclass in America,\u2014is not daringly but meanly materialistic. Redeeming\nfeatures are, of course, not wanting, yet how anyone can conceive the\nsocial ideal as a state of things in which the laboring people shall\nbe raised to the level at present occupied by the \u201cmiddle class\u201d is\ndifficult for me to understand. Nor is it a sufficient rejoinder to\nsay that the present complexion of the middle class, its narrowness\nand Philistinism, are due to isolation from the social classes\nbeneath them, and that the broad sentiment of universal fellowship\nand fraternity, when it shall have come to prevail, will purify the\natmosphere on the middle level. I have sufficiently indicated my doubts\nas to the efficiency and soundness of what is called fraternalism.\n\nIn brief, if we are to preserve a man\u2019s respect for himself as a moral\nbeing, we must find a ground on which he can maintain his self-esteem\napart from the material conditions in which he is placed, and in\nthe interval before the desirable material changes can possibly be\naccomplished. This interval is certain to be long. The betterment of\nsocial conditions is sure to be gradual. The slum ought to be abolished\nimmediately, but until it goes we must find a reason to respect the man\nin the slums even now, and a reason why he should respect himself even\nnow. This reason can only be derived from the spiritual nature of man,\nfrom the spiritual end for which he exists; and on this account, above\nall others, it is indispensable that the spiritual end be defined. How\npainfully social reformers may be led into error by slighting this\nconsideration is seen in the readiness with which some have subscribed\nto the amazing opinion that the issue between chastity and dishonor for\nthe working-girl depends ultimately on the amount of her wages.\n\nThere are two fallacies that affect the social reform movements of\ntoday. The substitution of power for right is one. What I venture to\ncall the fallacy of provisionalism is the second. This is the fallacy\nof the opportunist movements. \u201cLead the laboring classes provisionally\nup to the level of sufficiency, or of decent existence, and then we\nshall see.\u201d But man does not act without ends, and unless we define the\nultimate end, we give license to the proximate ends. In other words, we\nsimply cannot act provisionally. We cannot ignore our spiritual nature\nwithout offending against it. We may start with the idea of serving it,\nbut without explicit definition of it we shall presently find ourselves\ndisgraced in all sorts of idolatries.\n\nWhat I am trying to show is how I came to perceive the inadequacy\nof the non-violation ethics. Its formula is: \u201cAdmit the existence of\npersonality; do not infringe upon it. In your actions for the good of\nothers, try to abolish the manifest infringements or violations. Since\nthere must be some positive content to the idea of good, accept the\nmaterial or empirical goods as the provisional content with the general\nunderstanding that they are to be instrumental to the higher life but\nwithout troubling to define exactly how.\u201d\n\nThe aberrations to which this view leads on the side of action toward\nothers I have pointed out. A word now as to the injurious effect on\nself. Of these the following are the most important:\n\n1. The leader in social reform is apt to be regarded by his followers\nand to think of himself as a kind of savior. It is his sincere\nintention to save society from some of the glaring evils with which it\nis afflicted. But if salvation is sought in the betterment of external\nconditions, the social savior is apt to become the victim of a false\nsense of moral security. He is likely to be off his guard at the weak\npoints of his own character, and to fall abruptly from high levels into\nthe ditch.\n\n2. The social reformer who adopts the fallacy of provisionalism is apt\nto be absorbed in the _mechanical_ details of his work,\u2014the settlement\nor the municipal reform society, or the charitable association tend\nto become highly organized and efficient pieces of machinery. But\nmoral idealism declines in proportion as this kind of efficiency\nincreases,\u2014the salt loses its savor.\n\n3. The social reformer who sets his heart on external changes is apt to\nbecome _impatient_ to bring about those changes. For since he attempts\nto work from without inwardly, and not at the same time from within\noutwardly, he has nothing to show for his pains unless the desired\noutward changes are actually effected. In this way may be explained a\ncertain dictatorial manner, a certain arbitrariness sometimes observed\nin social workers of whose earnestness and devotion there can be no\nquestion, the preposterous outcome being that in attempting to carry\nout plans of reform in a democratic community such reformers offend\nagainst the very principle of democracy by over-riding the personality\nof others.\n\n4. The Social reformer who concentrates his attention on external\nchanges is apt to be ambitious of large results, to measure betterment\nby statistical standards. Though quality be not overlooked, _quantity_\nis likely to be over-emphasized.\n\n5. The painful spectacle is sometimes presented of a leader in social\nmovements who _goes to pieces morally in his private relations_\n(becomes a bad father, a worthless husband, an unscrupulous sponge on\nhis friends, etc.). Absorption in extensive public movements has this\ndanger in it that it often tends to make men neglectful of the nearer\nduties.\n\nFacts of this kind, which came repeatedly under my observation in\nthe course of years, drove home to my mind the conviction that the\nprovisional method in social reform (the method of working for external\nchanges without definition of the end) is morally perilous, both in its\neffects on those who are to be benefited, and in its reaction on the\ncharacter of the reformer himself. I parted company with opportunism in\nevery one of its forms; I became more and more imbued with the belief\nthat no one can really help others who in the effort to do so is not\nhimself morally helped, i.e., whose character is not improved in every\nrespect, who does not become a _better_ father, husband, citizen, a\nmore upright man in all his relations in and because of his endeavors\nto benefit society. I became convinced that the ethical principle must\nrun like a golden thread through the whole of a man\u2019s life, in a word,\nthat social reform unless inspired by the spiritual view of it, that\nis, unless it is made tributary to the spiritual, the total end of\nlife, is not social reform in any true sense at all.[15]\n\nThe fundamental question, therefore, echoed and re-echoed with ever\nintenser insistence: \u201cWhat then is the holy thing in others? What\nis the supreme end or good to which all the lesser goods should be\nsubordinate and subservient? And what is the holy thing in me?\u2014for\nI may not spiritually sacrifice myself. My own highest good must be\nachievable in agreement with that of others. What definition of the\nessential end is possible that shall reconcile egoism and altruism by\ntransforming and transcending them? And if there be such end thinkable\nand definable, how establish the applicability of this end to empirical\nman, either in the person of others or in my own?\u201d\n\nI shall have to dwell on this subject at length in the sequel. Here at\nthe outset I cannot forbear expressing my sense of the obliquities, the\nfolly, the meanness, the cruelties which human nature often exhibits\non the empirical side when dispassionately contemplated. That there\nare also finer traits in people, gleams of gold in the quartz, I do\nnot deny. But even in the best exemplars of the race the alloy is\nnot wanting. And it is an open question how far any human being, if\nhis whole make-up and all the circumstances that influenced him be\nconsidered, can be called predominantly good, assuming that goodness\nis a matter of desert and not of chance. How, therefore, a being that\nto actual, impartial observation reveals himself as so dubiously worth\nwhile, can be regarded as possessing the quality of transcendent worth\n(which seems to be implied in the idea of personality as inviolable\nand precious) will be the starting-point of my inquiry into the\nphilosophical first principle in the second part of this volume.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[13] I say _caused_, but perhaps not deliberately intended, although\nthere are instances of the latter. An act is diabolical when\nmaliciously designed to inflict a wrong on another; as rape for the\npurpose of dishonoring a family. It is cruelly selfish but not fiendish\nwhen it springs from scorn of others as if they were only fractional\nhuman beings. The Brahmin\u2019s attitude towards the lower castes, the\nattitude of the feudal lord toward the serf, of Shakespeare\u2019s nobility\ntoward the common citizens, and of some modern theorists toward the\ndemocratic multitude, are instances in point. In such cases the moral\nsense itself is astray, but there is perhaps no deliberate sinning\nagainst the light.\n\n[14] I have not touched upon the further question to what extent we can\nreally compass the happiness, except at rare moments, even of a single\nhuman being. The altruistic philosophy is apt to confound the removal\nof manifest evils with positive benefaction. But the removal of one\nkind of evil lets in new kinds; and wherein then consists the gain so\nfar as happiness is concerned?\n\n[15] To ward off the most serious misunderstanding, I must remind\nevery reader of the chapter on Social Reform, as well as on the Hebrew\nreligion and on the ethics of the Gospels, that I am narrating the\nphases of my own development. I am not attempting to do justice to\nall that is excellent in those great religions and in these great\nsocial movements; I am trying to show at what points, despite those\nexcellences, I myself felt compelled to diverge from them, to push\nbeyond them. In regard to Socialism I recognize the immense service\nit has performed in awakening the conscience of modern society to the\nsufferings of the working class. And in pointing out the dangers of\nopportunism, the fallacy of provisionalism, I am speaking of dangers\nfrom which I felt that I must escape, not casting a slur on the noble\npersonalities that have appeared in the field of social reform during\nmy own time and among my friends and acquaintances. Such personalities,\nbecause of their inbred fineness, may be immune against tendencies\nwhich yet undeniably exist, and which therefore require to be\nexplicitly apprehended.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\nTHE INFLUENCE OF MY VOCATION ON INNER DEVELOPMENT\n\n\nThe present chapter deals with my inner development as I believe it\nto have been furthered by my connection with the Society for Ethical\nCulture. The functions intrusted to me in this connection were, first,\nvarious forms of so-called philanthropic activity. The effects of the\nexperience gathered in them has been described in a preceding chapter;\nthey may be summed up in the formula: littleness in the external\nresults achieved, consciousness of moral danger to self.\n\nSecondly, the ministerial function of offering \u201cedification\u201d in public\naddresses to Sunday assemblies, the solemnizing of marriages, and\nthe conducting of funeral services,\u2014while in addition a large part\nof my vocational life consisted in the building up of an educational\ninstitution.[16]\n\n_The Public Addresses._ Edification, or building up, as I understood\nit, involved the profoundly difficult task of supplying a working\nphilosophy of life without traveling into the field of metaphysics,\nteaching the practicable counterpart of a connected system of thought\nconcerning the problems of life,\u2014the system being so firmly knit as to\nmake the appropriate feelings and impulses more or less natural to its\nexponent. In my case, not having fallen heir to such a system, the task\nof edification became doubly difficult. It meant from the beginning\nunceasing self-edification, with a view to edifying others.[17] Setting\nout with a general scheme along Kantian lines, I proceeded to fill in\nthe outline in the course of my public teachings, with the result that\nthe content filled in eventually disrupted the scheme, and compelled\na thoroughgoing reconstruction. The Holiness conception had been my\nstarting point. I never gave it up. I was attracted to Kant because\nhe affirmed it. I broke with him because he does not make good his\naffirmation.\n\nI began with Kantianism, which is predominantly individualistic, and I\nfound that in dealing with the problems of the family, with the labor\nquestion, and in the attempt to reach an ideal of democracy beyond\nthe materialistic conception of it which is at present current\u2014I\nwas introducing into my initial sketch elements incompatible with\nindividualism, and necessitating formulation in social terms. And since\nI retained and stressed the notion of personality, I had to seek a way\nof interpreting the term Social spiritually, as Kant had undertaken to\ninterpret the term individual spiritually. I certainly could not fall\nin with Darwinism or other evolutionary interpretations of sociality,\ninasmuch as they all leave out the concept of inviolable personality,\nthe indefeasible factor in my ethical thinking.\n\nThese things are here alluded to in order to emphasize the influence\nof the public Sunday addresses delivered by me regularly for more than\nforty years in stimulating, I had almost said forcing, my ethical\ngrowth. To care for anyone else enough to make his problem one\u2019s own\nis ever the beginning of one\u2019s real ethical development. To care for\na group of people in the sense of being challenged to suggest to\nthem ideas and ways of behavior that shall really be of use to them\nin the storm and stress of life, is the most searching incentive to\nself-development imaginable. It is more powerful than the desire to\nget truth for one\u2019s own sake. The closet philosopher may be serious\nenough in his search for truth, and he may succeed in constructing a\nsymmetrical system which at the time seems complete. Will it stand wear\nand tear? Will it in the bitter moments of his life hold together? If\nnot, he has failed; but then he only is the loser, it is only his ship\nthat has gone down. But the situation is different when a company of\npeople venture with you on the same voyage, and trust to you as in a\nway their pilot.\n\nThe challenge that comes from the expectant eyes of those who are in\ntrouble, of those whose relations to their friends or the members of\ntheir family have become tangled, the challenge that comes from the\nlarger public towards which every public speaker has a certain ethical\nduty\u2014all these challenges press home the question: are the things that\nyou believe true, so true that you may confidently expect them to be\nconfirmed by the experience of those who in some measure depend upon\nyou? Are they genuinely of use?\n\nThere is also another kind of challenge that in a way is even more\ntaxing and searching: the silent appeal that comes from those who are\nspiritually dead, from those who are sunk in sloth or sensuality, or\nwho waste their precious days in the pursuit of trivial, frivolous\nends, and from the insensitive consciences of the self-righteous and\nthe self-complacent. In the Bible we read that the prophet Elisha\nonce threw himself on the body of a dead child, in order with his own\nlife to kindle there the life that seemed extinct. In some such way\nin public addresses, in which it is not the word but the personality\nbehind the word that counts, the speaker is bound to throw himself\nbody and soul, as it were, upon those who are spiritually numbed, and\nto _enhance the life within himself_ in order to stir up life in them.\nAll of which means that the task of edifying others involves continuous\nefforts at self-edification.\n\n_The Solemnizing of Marriages._ In solemnizing marriages I had\nthe experience that some of those at which I had officiated ended\ndisastrously,\u2014there had been no real marriage at all. Though such\ninstances were not numerous in my own experience, yet the statistics\nof divorce prove that the number of unfortunate marriages in this\nand other countries is very large, and is increasing. What are\nthe foundations of a permanent relation such as would tend to the\ndevelopment of personality in and through marriage? was the question\nurged upon me. Here is a social tie in which two individuals, and later\nthe offspring, are combined in the closest propinquity. How can an\nethical theory of marriage be reached, that is, a theory dependent\non the idea of the joint realization of the highest end of life by\nthe members of the family group? This ethical theory of marriage will\nbe set forth in a subsequent part of this volume. Here I wish again\nto mark the retroactive effect of the function I was called upon to\nexercise in the Ethical Society on the development of theory. The most\nincisive effect of my practical experience, however, was the being\ncompelled to encounter the effect of _frustration_. How reluctant is\nthe natural man to face this fact! How he shrinks, and puts up screens\nbetween his face and the head of Medusa! In my earliest marriage\naddresses I remember how I used to describe the relation as one in\nwhich each of the partners receives the cup of happiness at the hands\nof the other. The second time I performed the ceremony, the bride\nwas the only child of excellent friends, whose life was completely\nwrapped up in their one daughter. She was a charming young girl, and\nthe bridegroom was a fine-grained person entirely devoted to her. That\nmarriage feast I shall never forget. A little less than a year after,\nthe young wife having died in child-birth, I was called in to speak\nat her bier. Where, then, was the exchange of happiness? How suddenly\nhad the house of bliss fallen into ruins! A similar experience that\ntouched me even more deeply was that of a friend, the first one among\nmy associates who believed with me in the possibility of a religious\nsociety without a dogmatic creed. The course of love in his case had\nnot run smooth. The marriage between himself and the lovely young\nwoman he wedded was the happy culmination of many trials, a haven\nof peace after storms. Hardly more than two years elapsed when he\nsuddenly developed a fatal form of mental disease, and lingered for\nten years in a long, slow, degrading decline. I thus became acquainted\nwith frustration in one of its most woeful shapes. I remember how the\npoor young wife, during those ten years, widow in all but name, sought\nalleviation in various directions for her intolerable grief. Work to\noccupy her mind was one; caring for the needs of the poor another. I\nremember also how futile these devices seemed. She had lived \u201con the\nheights\u201d; she must now descend to lower levels; she had had first best,\nshe must now put up with second or third best. Gladly indeed would she\nhave exchanged places with some of the poor women whom she assisted,\ncould she have kept her husband at her side as they had theirs. It was\nwell enough for her to try to alleviate the troubles of these people,\nbut what were their sorrows compared to hers? And to keep the mind\noccupied by work, what was it at best but a temporary anodyne? When\nthe work was over, in the still, lonely hours of the night, the storm\nof grief would break with all the greater violence. I had not taught\nthese my friends a really valid spiritual conception of the purpose\nof marriage: I had failed in that: and when they were in need of it\nthey did not have it to support them. They had looked on marriage as a\nscene of felicity; they had not been taught to make allowance for the\nfrustration.\n\nI had not made preparation for the palpable frustrations just\nmentioned, nor yet for others, for the discovery that the beloved\nperson is faulty, that the nimbus of divine personality does not\ncoincide with the character. And especially did the lack of any\nexplicit idea of personality prove fatal in those cases where the\nfrustration is most serious, where real or apparent incompatibilities\nappear, or where actual degeneration occurs, and the hope of\nregeneration becomes remote.\n\n_Bereavement_ was the second shape in which the fact of frustration\nmost often came home to me. Hundreds of times I have spoken to people\nin the moment of the last leave-taking. The usual consolations, aside\nfrom those that depend on mythological beliefs, are: Submit to the\ninevitable; clinch your teeth and face the storms of fate. Remember\nthe debt you owe to the living. There is work that remains for you\nto do. See to it that you do not by excessive grieving destroy your\ncapacity for work. Instead of indulging in sorrow for your own loss,\ntake upon yourself the sorrows of others. In particular it is uplifting\nfor one who has been more severely afflicted to take upon himself the\nsorrow of those whose burden is lighter. Be grateful for what you have\npossessed. Think not so much of what you have lost, as of what you were\nprivileged for a season to call your own. Make the virtues of those\nwho are no longer living a force for good in your own life. Paint the\nportrait of your friend incessantly. Retouch it. Eliminate what was of\nmerely transient value in him. Remember him in the light of his best\nqualities, and live so as to be able to endure his purified glance.\nOr, in the case of those whose lives were stained, seek to expiate\ntheir faults in your life. Purify and perpetuate them in this way\nin yourself. Memory is not a mere passive receptacle, it is rather\na creative faculty. Let it play upon the lives that are no longer\nsensibly present, and thus maintain the connection with them. A friend\nliving across the sea, whom you will never see again, may yet be a\nliving presence for you if you continue by the aid of memory to be in\ncommunication with him. In the case of the departed, likewise, their\neffectual influence may remain none the less real.\n\nThese various modes of consolation have each a certain value. To\nthe one last mentioned I attach the greatest value. Bereavement is\na challenge for a fresh start in spiritual development. It should\nnot mean putting up with the second best, but reaching out toward\nfirst best. The object to be achieved by the ethical teacher on such\noccasions is to help the bereaved to tie anew the threads that have\nbeen sundered, or rather to substitute a more ethereal but firmer tie\nfor the contacts mediated by the senses. But this task of the reweaving\nof ties, spiritually, not sensibly, depends entirely for its success\nupon a spiritual conception of personality. And if this be lacking, the\nattempt is hopeless. Frustration itself must be recognized as partial\nif it is to lead beyond itself. There must be found in man that which\ncannot be defeated if the defeat is not to be accepted as final.\n\nA third kind of frustration was brought home to me by the problem of\nspecialization, as it presented itself in the course of my efforts to\nwork out an ethical theory true to the facts of life. To discharge\ncompetently my own special function, I saw that I ought to be\nacquainted with the best ethical thought of the past. This meant an\nexhaustive study of the philosophical systems of which the ethical\nthought of the philosophers is the fruit. I ought further to be\nfamiliar with the great religions, in which so much of the ethical\ninsight of mankind is incorporated. I ought to acquaint myself with\nthe moral history of mankind in so far as it is accessible, including\nthat of the primitive races. I ought to gain a survey of the variations\nof moral opinion that have so staggered belief in the possibility of\nethical truth. I ought to master at least the general principles of the\nphysical and biological sciences, since it is impossible that the first\nprinciples of ethics should not be related to the governing principles\nthat obtain in other departments of knowledge. I ought in addition to\nmaster in their ethical aspect the economic and political problems of\nthe present day, as well as the psychology of individual and social\nlife, in order to be able to apply with some degree of competence the\ndirectives of ethics to actual conduct. There are in addition other\nsubjects, such as jurisprudence, poetry and the fine arts, that have\nultimate relation to ethics, and that may not safely be neglected.\nBehold, then, the problem of specialism in one of its most appalling\nforms. For how can any one individual hope to adequately fill out such\na programme? And what I have said is but my own personal illustration\nof a general problem that more and more besets every reflective person\nin our time. And it is a problem that has direct bearings upon the\nquestion of human personality. The personality is not a detached and\nisolated thing. It is a center that radiates out in every possible\ndirection, and depends for the release of its energy on the influences\nreceived in turn from all directions. On the one hand, to have a\nfooting at all in reality one must be a specialist, and the fields of\nspecialism are becoming more and more restricted. To know one thing\nwell is the indispensable condition of the sense of mastery, yes, of\nself-respect. And yet it seems to be becoming increasingly clear that\none cannot really master a single specialty without knowing of other\nspecialties whatsoever is related to one\u2019s own. Narrowness, and loss\nof power, and consequent decay of the special function itself, seems\nthe one alternative. Dilettantism, the other. But again I ask, who can\nactually fill out such a programme? The frustration of effort thus\nappears, in its intellectual guise, as one more manifestation of that\ngeneral fact of frustration which we meet with wherever we turn.[18]\n\nOn the side of character the same reflections occur. Unity in the\ndirection of distinctiveness or uniqueness is the end and aim.\nBut instead of unity of character, conflict of inner tendencies,\never-recurrent rupture of provisional harmonies, a duality of self\nor multiplicity of selves, are the facts attested by one\u2019s inner\nexperience. And frustration here, at the core of a man\u2019s being, is\nperhaps more painful and more seemingly contradictory of the very ideal\nand purpose of ethical development than in any of the forms previously\nrecorded.\n\nThe last instance of frustration that I will mention appears in\nconnection with the cosmic relation of our race. The thought of the\ndeath of the individual may be overcome by the idea of perpetuity in\nthe lives of successors. The death of the human race, its eventual\nextinction, is capable of no such assured compensation. We are ethical\nbeings, committed to the pursuit of an ideal end, yet the cosmic\nconditions are such as to make the end unattainable within the limits\nof a finite world. This unattainableness of the end it is true is the\nvery ground and foundation of the supersensible interpretation of\nethical experience. Yet this thought itself can only be made good by a\npositive interpretation of personality (of the spiritual nature), which\nwe are yet to seek. As viewed empirically, the human generations are\nbut accidents of nature, waves on the sea of life, passing shadows. And\nviewing ourselves in this manner our self-respect goes to pieces. The\nidea of obligation vanishes. Man\u2019s claim to infinite worth is bitterly\nmocked. Unless we can reach the spiritual view of life, the frustration\nof purpose in the large, that is, of humanity as a whole, is final.\n\nThese then, summarily stated, are the problems with which an ethical\nphilosophy of life has to deal.\n\n1. How to remedy the belittlement of man, the infinitesimal\ninsignificance of him as a creature of time and space, when compared\nwith the immensities of the world around him\u2014its spatial and temporal\nimmensities. What is man in the presence of these myriads of worlds, of\nthis unending procession of time that he should attribute to himself\nsignificance, nay, worth? Is he perhaps an infinitesimal member of an\nInfinite?\u2014preserving in this way the sense of his littleness, and of\nthe vastness that bears down upon him, and yet maintaining himself\nirrefragably at his station, as indispensable to the perfection of the\nwhole.\n\n2. How to discover a way of retaining the connection between man and\nthe lower forms of life that preceded him, not doing violence to the\nfacts which the evolutionists have brought out, and yet at the same\ntime assuring man\u2019s spiritual distinction? Does he perhaps possess in\nhis ethical nature a window, so to speak, through which he can catch at\nleast a glimpse of the ultimate reality, of the infinite life which is\nthe real life, behind the picture screen of sea and mountain, plants\nand animals?\n\n3. How to overcome the various types of frustration mentioned above:\nfrustration on its intellectual side, or the reconciliation of\nspecialist efficiency with breadth and relatedness; frustration on the\ncharacter side.\n\nFrustration in the social relations, as in marriage, or as in the case\nof defective children.\n\nFrustration through bereavement, or the privation suffered by the going\nout of our life of lives with which we are inseparably connected by\nethical as well as affectional ties.\n\nFrustration in the attempt to carry out projects of social betterment;\non what moral ground to assert the possible moral value of life in the\nslums today, and at the same time to put forth and to stimulate the\nmost assiduous efforts to abolish the slum; on what grounds to affirm\nthat the best life is possible under the worst conditions, and yet not\nto cease or for an instant relax the effort to change the conditions.\n\nThe problem of how to support and console the wretched multitudes\nof mankind in the interval that must elapse before the reform of\nconditions can take real effect; the problem of support and consolation\nin fatal sickness, on the deathbed, and in the harrowing recollection\nof irremediable and irrevocable wrong done to others; the problem\nraised by the prospective extinction, or the possible old age and\ndegeneration before extinction of mankind\u2014all these problems should be\ntaken together, not one, for instance the so-called social problem,\naccentuated, leaving the rest out of sight. From one peg they all\nhang, on one cardinal idea they all depend\u2014the idea of personality\nas positively defined, of the holy thing as not merely inviolable\nwithout regard to its content, but inviolable because of a certain\npositive content. The ascription of worth to man, in this sense, is the\nfundamental problem of all, and to the full discussion of this we shall\nturn in the constructive part of the volume which is now to follow.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[16] See the published accounts of the Ethical Culture School.\n\n[17] The word \u201cedification\u201d as commonly used has a sentimental flavor.\nIt does not as a rule convey the idea of constructiveness at all. It\nfrequently suggests a kind of warm, moist, semi-tropical atmosphere for\nthe emotions of the hearer to simmer in. But in its genuine meaning of\n\u201cbuilding up\u201d it is too valuable a word to lose.\n\n[18] A new conception of culture is needed, based neither on exclusive\nspecialism, nor on the ambition to know everything after the manner of\nGoethe in his early days, and such a conception of culture must supply\nthe foundation of an educational philosophy.\n\n\n\n\n BOOK II\n\n PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nINTRODUCTORY REMARKS: CRITIQUE OF KANT\n\n\nI begin my statement of the ethical ideal with a critique of Kant.\nThe reason for this is that Kant stands forth pre\u00ebminent among all\nphilosophers as the one who emphatically asserts that the attribute\nof inviolability attaches to every human being, in his formula that\n_every_ man is to be treated as an end _per se_, and never to be\nused as a mere tool by others. The formula as thus worded by him is\nsubject to grave objections which will be dealt with later on. But the\ngrand conception of the moral worthwhileness of all men is specially\nconnected with the name of Kant. Did he succeed, on the basis of his\nsystem, in establishing this conception? He seems to make it the\ncorner-stone of his ethics. Is the corner-stone secure?\n\nReferring again to my individual development, I should find it\ndifficult to express how much Kant\u2019s _Metaphysik der Sitten_ and\n_Kritik der praktischen Vernunft_ at one time meant to me.\n\nThe one ethical fact of which I was so to speak perfectly assured,\nthe \u201cinviolability\u201d so often mentioned in previous chapters, is\nextremely hard to justify to the thinking mind. The empirical school\nof philosophers scoff at the very notion of it. The practice of the\nworld is a perpetual, painful evidence of the small attention paid\nto it, and even idealistic philosophers from Plato down have found it\nquite possible to construct quasi-ethical systems based on the idea,\nnot of human equality, but of the inferiority of the greater number.\nIn Kant, however, one encounters an epoch-making philosopher who not\nonly accepts as a fact the idea of inviolability, and of the kind of\nequality that goes with it, but who undertakes to set it forth in such\na manner as to command the assent of the reason. For a long time I\nbelieved that he had succeeded in his great enterprise; and it was only\nafter years of discipleship, not indeed without suppressed misgivings,\nthat I began to see that I had been mistaken.\n\nMy eyes were opened when I realized certain extremely questionable\nmoral consequences to which his doctrine led him: for instance, his\nunspeakable theory of marriage, his defense of capital punishment,\nthe stiff individualism of his system, and his failure to establish\nan instrumental connection between the empirical goods, of wealth,\nculture, and the like, and the supreme good or supreme end as defined\nby him. I was forced by these unsound conclusions to ask myself whether\nthe foundations of the system are sound. Surely if it is true of any\nsystem of thought, it is true of an ethical system that it must be\njudged by its fruits. The Kantian system is indeed vastly impressive,\nand even sublime in some of its aspects. We travel on the road along\nwhich Kant leads with a certain sense of exaltation, but when at the\nend of our journey we find that we have reached a goal at which we\ncannot consent to abide, it is imperative to inquire whether the point\nof departure was well taken.\n\nThe point of departure in Kant\u2019s exposition is the existence in all men\nof a sense of duty. Moral relations subsist only between moral beings.\nAll men possess a sense of duty,\u2014therefore all men are moral beings,\ntherefore all are morally equal,\u2014therefore no one may be used as a mere\ntool for the benefit of others, but is to be treated as worth while on\nhis own account. Thus runs the argument.\n\nThe sense of duty is the consciousness of being bound to render\nimplicit obedience to a categorical imperative. Our rational nature\ntells us categorically what is right to do. Our rational nature issues\nabsolute commands. The sense of duty is man\u2019s response to them. Kant\ndoes not for a moment imply that either he or anyone else has ever\nadequately obeyed. The moral dignity, the moral equality of men, does\nnot depend on the obedience but on the consciousness of the obligation\nto obey\u2014on acknowledged subjection to the command. The actual moral\nperformances of some men are certainly better than those of others; but\nof no one, not even of the best of men, can it be shown that the moral\nprinciple in its purity, that is, unadulterated by baser incentives,\nwas ever the actuating motive of his conduct. The different members of\nthe human species differ morally in degree, but are of the same moral\nkind, being distinguished from the lower animals not because they obey\nthe moral law, but because they recognize the obligation to obey it.\nThis sort of consciousness may be dim in some, but it exists in all.\nThe most brutal murderer is dimly aware of the holy law which he has\ntransgressed.\n\nThe great dictum of the universal moral equality of mankind is thus\nmade to depend on an assumed fact. If this fact can be successfully\ndisputed, the dictum itself is imperilled. It has been disputed, not\nflippantly, but most seriously, and it is in my opinion obnoxious to\nfatal objections. I do not indeed believe it possible to establish the\nnegative, to wit, that the sense of duty does not lurk somewhere, is\nnot latent somewhere in the consciousness of persons morally the most\nobtuse; but I hold it to be impossible to prove the affirmative, to\nwit, that a sense of duty does exist in all human beings, even in the\nmost degraded. Kant\u2019s dictum of equality depends on making good the\naffirmative proposition, but this he has failed to do.\n\nOne circumstance especially which at first sight seems favorable to\nKant\u2019s contention turns against him. He has been assailed on the\nground that his categorical imperative is a fiction, that no such\nan imperative plays a r\u00f4le in the actual experience of men. On the\ncontrary, the actual experience of men is replete with categorical\nimperatives. Nothing in the life of man plays a greater r\u00f4le than these\nimperatives. The danger that threatens Kant\u2019s demonstration is due\nto the number of rival categoricals that compete with his, and from\nwhich the one he sets up is not with certainty distinguishable. To put\nthe matter simply, what is called in technical language a categorical\nimperative is nothing else than a way of acting somehow felt by the\nindividual to be obligatory upon him, whether he likes it or dislikes\nit. It is a constraint in which he is bound to acquiesce, a public rule\nof some sort which overrides his private propensities.\n\nConstraints of this sort are numerous. Many of them no one would think\nof designating as moral. Some are distinctly antimoral. I will mention\na few:\u2014for instance, the rules of behavior derived from the _tabu_\nnotion. Certain kinds of food may not be eaten; certain objects like\nthe Ark of the Covenant in David\u2019s time may not be touched.[19] Strict\n_tabus_ obtain in regard to marriage such as the rules of endogamy and\nexogamy. Certain persons may not even be looked at. A feeling of horror\nis felt toward those who transgress these rules; and the transgression\nof them is often considered far more reprehensible than a moral sin.\nIt would evidently be absurd to characterize a Hottentot or a Fiji\nIslander as the moral equal of a civilized man on the ground that, like\nthe latter, he possesses the sense of duty, consisting in his case\nof an unquestioning acknowledgment of the categorical imperative of\n_tabus_.\n\nGang loyalty is another instance in point. In one of our prisons a\ncertain convict is at present paying the penalty of a crime which was\nreally committed by one of his pals. He could have got off scot free\nif he had \u201csquealed.\u201d But \u201csquealing\u201d is contrary to the honor code of\nthe gang and he preferred to sacrifice his liberty rather than prove\nrecreant to the claims of gang loyalty. There are some writers who hold\nthat this is an instance of morality, genuine as far as it goes, but\nrestricted within too narrow a circle. The fact that it is restricted\nwithin too narrow a circle, that fidelity to a few is compatible with\nviolent hostility against the community at large, seems to me to\nprove that the moral quality is absent. Morality is either universal\nor nothing. Gang loyalty is a social phenomenon, but not an ethical\nphenomenon. The distinction between the two terms will be enforced\nlater on. In any event the sense of constraint is manifest. The moral\ncharacter of the constraint I deny.\n\nAnother example of an imperative which is categorical enough but\nat the same time non-ethical is furnished by Darwin\u2019s well-known\nexplanation of the original of conscience. He assumes that certain\nways of behaving which our ancestors found to be socially useful, have\nbecome registered as it were in our organisms, and constitute a kind\nof race-consciousness which persists in each individual. This latent\nconsciousness is potent as a tendency, though often not masterful\nenough to repress the recalcitrant egoistic impulses. A conflict\nensues. The deep ingrained tendency makes itself felt. And as social\nbeings we are aware that we ought to side with it. But the egoistic\nimpulses break out on the surface of consciousness and vehemently\nurge us in the opposite direction. The feeling of obligation, and\nthereafter of remorse, are the record of the inner struggle. I do not\nhere undertake to discuss at length the truth of Darwin\u2019s theory.\nThere are a number of weak spots in it, to which I shall merely allude\nin passing. First, he speaks of acts found to be socially useful in\nprimitive communities. Is it possible to show that the same or similar\nacts retain their utility in a developed industrial society like that\nof the present day? Is not the term \u201csocially useful\u201d extremely vague,\nand can the notion implied in it be expanded without the assistance\nof a truly ethical principle?[20] Then again, why should the thing\ncalled social utility overawe the individual mind and thwart individual\npurpose? Why should not the daring egotist affirm his right to be and\nflourish in the present hour, in the teeth of social utility? It will\nbe said that the claims are insistent, that the tendency is ingrained,\nthat it has become instinctive in him, and that he cannot release\nhimself from the control it exercises over him. But instincts can be\nweakened and in time extinguished, like the fear of the dark, when\nthe absence of an objective cause is recognized. Why should not the\naltruistic impulse likewise, by the method of Freudian analysis, if you\nplease, be exposed to the light, and the egotist thereby be enabled to\ndisembarrass himself of the interference of dead ancestors in his life\npurposes, and to proceed on his way undisturbed by any inward qualms?\n\nThese examples serve to illustrate the point with which we are here\nconcerned, namely, that the presence and operation of undoubted\nconstraints does not establish the existence in all men of the sense\nof duty on which Kant founds universal moral equality. Kant would\nindeed object that all these so-called constraints or imperatives are\nhypothetical, and not really categorical. By an hypothetical imperative\nhe understands one in which the command depends upon an \u201cif\u201d\u2014_if_ there\nbe invisible spirits such as primitive men imagined, then the rules of\n_tabu_ follow. _If_ the safety of the gang is an object of commanding\ninterest, then gang loyalty is obligatory. _If_ the preservation and\nprosperity of human society in general (a society superior to that\nof ants and of bees indeed but like them a product of nature and not\nradically distinct from them) be regarded as the supreme end of desire\nand endeavor, then the rules of social behavior are to be obeyed. But,\nhe would say, none of these objects are fit to rank so high. They all\nare optional ends. An hypothetical imperative is one in which the end\npursued is optional, the imperative extending only to the means. If the\nend be desired, then it is reasonable, and in so far imperative, that\nwe adopt the means that lead to its attainment. An imperative truly\ncategorical, however, is one in which the obligation extends to the end\nproposed as well as to the means. It is not left to our inclination to\nembrace or to refuse the end, it being of such a kind as absolutely to\nconstrain us to accept it.\n\nBut if this be so, then in this first part of our criticism we turn\nupon Kant and declare that he has nowhere given us reason to believe\nthat the acceptance of an absolute end is implied in the kind of\nconstraints to which the generality of men submit. And again if such\nacceptance cannot be proved, then the universal moral equality of men\nbased by him on the presence in all of the sense of duty disappears,\nand his lofty ethical structure breaks down at this point.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[19] See II Samuel, VI, 6, 7.\n\n[20] Primitive communities valued co\u00f6peration because it was socially\nuseful. But there are different kinds of co\u00f6peration. Which kind shall\nwe of today adopt? The mere idea of co\u00f6peration affords no clue. The\nself-sacrifice of the individual to the whole of which he is a part is\nsocially useful. But on what occasions and to what degree is it useful?\nAltruism is socially useful. We are to serve others. But what in them\nshall we serve? Their physical needs, their intellectual needs, all\ntheir needs together? Is that humanly possible? Here again an ethical\nprinciple is required to define the quality and the limits of the\nservice. The latent race-consciousness of which Darwin speaks affords\nno light on the ethical problems proper. The concept of social utility,\nif not valueless, is at best only of subsidiary value in any attempt to\nsolve these problems. So far from reading once and for all the riddle\nof conscience, Darwin has not read aright the terms of the riddle.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nCRITIQUE OF KANT (_Continued_)\n\n\nI now proceed to the second point of criticism, which strikes at the\nheart of Kant\u2019s ethics. Man according to Kant is worth while on his\nown account (an end _per se_), never to be used as a mere tool or\nthing. He is a person, an object towards whom we are bound to evince\nabsolute respect. Yet Kant immediately goes on to say that there is\nno object in all the world, neither man nor any other, that is worth\nwhile on its own account, that deserves such respect. Kant\u2019s views\nof actual human nature are tinged with somber pessimism. (Compare\nthe chapter on Radical Evil in his _Religion Within the Limits of\nPure Reason_.) A strange paradox is thus presented to us. Man is\nto be accepted as a worth while object, and yet there is no worth\nwhile object. How does Kant seek to escape from this predicament? He\nsays, not the man primarily, but something that happens in the man,\nis supremely significant: certain acts are worth while on their own\naccount,\u2014the agent only in so far as he performs such acts (or, let\nus add with a sigh, as he tries to perform them)\u2014namely, acts which\nhave as their sole motive respect for universal law. Then he informs\nus that similar processes occur in other agents, in fellow human\nbeings, or, more precisely, that these others are capable of trying to\nact as I myself feel bound to try to act. Consider how far fetched\nis the argument, on what wavering foundations has been placed the\nethical pronouncement of human worth and human equality in which our\ninterest is so profoundly engaged. We do wish to be assured of this\ncardinal truth. No other truth is practically and theoretically of\ngreater importance. As against the iniquitous practices of the world,\nas against the exploitation of labor, as against the degradation of\nwoman, as against political tyranny whether exercised by kings or by\nmobs, we raise up for our shield the indefeasible worth of men\u2014not of\nsome men but of all men. And now, behold! the thinker to whom we owe\nthe forcible expression of this truth seems to have left it in the air.\nI scrutinize my neighbors, and find in their behavior no sure sign of\nreal worth. I fall back on myself and I discover what? The idea of an\nact which, if I could perform it, would stand on its own merits (would\nbe self-justified). I then find that I am bound to try to perform such\nacts. I cannot affirm that in a single instance I have ever performed\nsuch an act. I next infer\u2014on what tenuous ground has been shown in\nthe last chapter\u2014that my fellow-beings have the same inner experience\nas mine. And it is for this reason that by a circuitous inference I\ndeclare them to be worth while objects.\n\nThat Kant has formulated a truth of the utmost importance for\nmankind (that no man is to be treated as a mere tool), seems to me\nincontestable. That he has not made good his own proposition is my\ncontention, and that the whole problem must therefore be taken up\n_de novo_. It will assist us in doing so to expose the flaw in his\ncategorical imperative, or the formal principle of universality and\nnecessity applied to human actions, which in his view imprints upon\nthem the character of absolute rightness.\n\nNote that Kant approaches the problems of ethics from the side of\nphysical science, and with the bias of the physical scientist. The\nethical principle he sets up, the bare idea of universal necessity or\nof law in general, is derived by way of abstraction from the particular\nlaws of nature. It is a physical principle in disguise. To understand\nKant\u2019s system, it is simply indispensable to keep this point in mind.\nHe was pre-occupied during the major portion of his life with profound\nspeculations on scientific subjects. The title of the _Critique of\nPure Reason_ might not be inappropriately changed into \u201cA treatise on\nthe fundamental assumptions of science, as handled by Newton and his\nsuccessors.\u201d He was undeniably interested in ethics. His ultimate aim\nwas to clear the way for the confident holding of ethical principles.\n(See the Preface to the _Critique of Pure Reason_.) But he could not\ndivest himself of the prejudice of his temperament and of his lifelong\npursuit. He is not singular in this respect. To borrow the first\nprinciple of ethics from some other field is a common and apparently\nineradicable error. Mechanics, \u00e6sthetics, and recently biology, have\nbeen laid under contribution for this purpose. A consistent attempt to\nstudy ethical phenomena on their own ground, to mark off what is really\ndistinctive in the data of ethical experience, and then to search for\nsome principle which shall serve to give a coherent account of them,\nhas to my knowledge never yet been undertaken. Always ethics has been\ntreated as an annex to some other discipline. Always we behold the\nattempt to assimilate before the distinctive traits and characteristics\nhave been carefully investigated. Never yet has the independence of\nthis wonderful aspect of human nature been truly acknowledged. Kant\nindeed freed ethics from its long tutelage to theology; but he left\nit still in subjection, subject to his own favorite study, physical\nscience.\n\nBut though the notion of necessity, together with that of universality,\nwhich he derived from physics was employed by him as a fundamental\nprinciple of rightness in conduct, the principle itself insensibly, and\nas it would seem unbeknown to himself, underwent a remarkable change\nin the course of his undertaking to give it a new application. The\nfollowing brief comments will serve to elucidate this point.\n\nIn physics, whenever an antecedent phenomenon has been exactly\ndescribed, and a sequent phenomenon is defined in the same fashion,\nthe connection is pronounced to be necessary\u2014as for instance the\ntransformation of mechanical energy into heat, and conversely. A\nsingle carefully guarded experiment may suffice to establish the\nnecessary nexus between two phenomena. And after having established\nthe necessity, we are confident of the universality. If exceptions\nshould occur and contravene the supposed law, the calculations or the\nobservations are to be corrected. But never in physical science do\nwe start from universality and predict necessity therefrom. Kant in\nhis ethics invariably couples together the two terms Universal and\nNecessary. But he reverses the procedure of science, he _begins with\nthe universality and thereupon affirms the necessity_.\n\nUniversality is for him the test of moral necessity. If an act can be\nuniversalized, the performance of it, according to him, is morally\nnecessary. For instance, the question is asked, Is it right to kill?\nLook at the act of killing, says Kant, and see whether it can be\nuniversalized, that is to say, whether if everybody felt at liberty to\nkill, the act of the murderer would or would not be self-defeating? He\nkills in order to affirm his life at the expense of another\u2019s. If his\naction were to be generally imitated, his own life would be forfeit,\nor at least in danger, and he would be annulling what he intends to\naffirm. Hence murder is morally wrong: to sacredly respect the life of\nothers is right.\n\nBut not only is the order reversed, so that necessity follows on the\nheels of universality, but the very meaning of the term necessity is\naltered. _A logical necessity is substituted for a physical necessity._\nThe idea of necessity as handled by physical science denotes the\nconnection between one thing and something else. It is not the thing\nitself but its relation to some other thing that is necessary. It is\nnot the phenomenon A nor the phenomenon B, in the case of a cause\nand its effect, that is declared to be necessary, but the sequence\nof B on A, the circumstance that B is tied up to A, must follow in\nits wake. But the term Necessity as used by Kant in his _Ethics_,\ndenotes a relation of a thing to itself. It is in fact equivalent to\nself-consistency, which is a logical notion derived from the principle\nof self-identity. A is A, and it is not thinkable that it should\nbe non-A. Similarly Kant says: If a man desires to affirm his life,\nthat is, to be self-preserving, it is not thinkable, it would not be\nrational or logical on his part, to perform an act which would be\nself-defeating. Kant does not say that a man might not irrationally\ntake another man\u2019s life, regardless of the consequences to himself; he\nsays that as a rational intelligence acting on purely logical motives\nhe could not do so.[21] To repeat, then, physical necessity is a\nrelation of one thing to another thing: the logical necessity involved\nin self-consistency is a relation of a thing to itself.\n\nMy next contention, and this touches the root of the matter, is\nthat the notion of end is incompatible with self-consistency as the\nparamount principle in ethics. For a self-consistent rational being\nis a being in harmony with himself, one who if this harmony should in\nsome unaccountable way ever be broken would by his own endeavor seek\nto return to himself. (Kant declares that the morality of any one man\ncannot be affected by his fellows, by any influence from the outside;\nit must be his own act.) But an end presupposes some outside object\nas a means: means and ends are inseparable correlatives. On the other\nhand, an entity which merely affirms itself, or if somehow alienated\nfrom self endeavors without assistance from beyond its sphere to\nreturn to itself, is no true end at all, and cannot be designated as\nsuch. It is no end because it employs no means.\n\nWhat warrant then has Kant for introducing the foreign notion of end\ninto a world of pure self-consistency? When we use the term Necessity\nin relation to physical phenomena, as of cause and effect, we assert\nunalterable sequence, unity of temporal and spatial differenti\u00e6.\nWhen we use the same term as Kant uses it, we assert the unity of a\nthing with itself. But this in the nature of the case does not admit\nthe intrusion of the alien concept of the outside. The spiritual\nsociety or pattern to which human society ought to be conformed, is\naccording to Kant a society of ends, of ends _per se_. This is his\ngreat pronouncement. But the very idea on which he lays so much stress,\nthe idea of end, on closer scrutiny of his premises disappears. The\nentities composing that society are self-sufficing, and moreover\nintrinsically unrelated to each other. Rational self-preservation is\nthe only character that can be predicated of any of them.\n\nI have laid stress on the fact that Kant derived his ethical principle\nfrom his physics. The passage in which he speaks of the ethical order\nas a universal and necessary order like that of nature is to my mind\nconclusive. I now urge in addition that this sort of second nature\nsuperimposed upon existing nature would not have to our contemplating\nminds a dignity superior to that of physical nature. The moral order\nas thus exhibited would not possess the worth we attribute to it as\nexalted above what is called the natural order. The falling stone is\na perfect illustration of physical necessity. Necessity passed through\nhuman consciousness, or bathed in human consciousness, is not on that\naccount a more eligible principle. Nay, since human consciousness\ninterferes and causes contingent actions, due to passion, appetite,\netc., the moral order constructed by men should be even less worth\nwhile than the physical order of nature, if indeed necessity be the\ntouchstone of worth.[22]\n\nTo summarize: according to Kant man as an object is unfit to warrant\nthe claim of unconditional obligation on the part of others toward\nhimself. An abstract principle must be sought. This principle is\nuniversality, and necessity based on universality. Respect for this\npurely abstract notion is that which alone imparts a moral quality to\nso-called moral acts. We start, according to Kant, with the declaration\nthat man is an end _per se_. But we reject him as an object, and take\nrefuge in a formal principle. We then assume that every human being is\nconscious of the working within himself of this formal principle and\nacknowledges his subjection to it, whether he is able to analyze it out\nor not. And thus indirectly we derive out of emptiness a ray of glory\nwhich we allow to fall upon each and every man.\n\nThe question now is, since this approach to the ethical problem\nmanifestly fails, must we not begin at the opposite end, and take the\nattribution of worth to men, however unworthy they may actually be, as\nour starting-point?\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[21] He also assumes a society not only of rational intelligences\ndetermined by the same rational motives, but equal in ability to carry\nout their motives. (See my article in _Mind_ [new series, Vol. XI, No.\n42, p. 162], reprinted in the volume dedicated to William James, by the\nPhilosophical Faculty of Columbia University.)\n\n[22] Surefootedness, or certainty in thinking and in acting seems\nto have been the chief desideratum at which Kant aimed. As against\nscepticism or mere empirical groping this element of the inner life is\nobviously of exceeding value. But it is far from being the only element\nto be taken into account.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nPRELIMINARY REMARKS ON WORTH, AND ON THE REASONS WHY THE METHOD\nEMPLOYED BY ETHICS MUST BE THE OPPOSITE OF THAT EMPLOYED BY THE\nPHYSICAL SCIENCES\n\n\nThe moral equality of men is a corollary of the attribution of worth\nto all men. Did we not ascribe worth to them, there is no reason why\nwe should not make servile use of them. But there are admittedly\nformidable difficulties in the way of attributing worth to human nature.\n\nThe first and most obvious of these is the existence of repulsive\ntraits in human beings, such as sly cunning, deceit, falsehood,\ngrossness, cruelty: _homo homini lupus_! Secondly, there is the\nprevalent error of employing ethical terms, like good and bad, to\ndenote the merely attractive and repellent traits.[23] Attractive\ntraits, such as gentleness, sweetness, kindness, a sympathetic\ndisposition, are, in those fortunate enough to possess them, pleasing\naccidents of nature. We delight in them, but have no reason to ascribe\nthe superlative quality of worth to those who possess them. If the evil\nthat men do revolts us, the so-called good in them does not give us the\nright to surround their heads with the nimbus of worth. Thirdly, and\nperhaps even more deterrent than the ever-present spectacle of evil\nand the inadequacy of so-called goodness, is the commonplaceness, the\ncheapness of men.\n\nIt must be admitted that, with rare exceptions, our estimates of others\nare apt to be low rather than lofty. Can we ascribe worth to those\nwhom we hold cheap? The reason of our habitual under-estimation of\nfellowmen I think is that we regard them from the standpoint of the\nuse to which we can put them, and do not see them from the inside,\nas it were, in the light of the marvelous energies of which human\nnature is the scene. The grossest matter, the most ordinary physical\nhappenings, reveal to the instructed eye of the scientist the play of\nforces which it taxes the most powerful intellects in some measure to\napprehend and describe. Yet these miracles escape the dull senses of\nthose of us who deal with the forces of nature from the point of view\nof their immediate use. We turn on the electric light, but have little\nmore than a crude surmise of the things that the word electricity\nmeant to Faraday, Clerk Maxwell, or Hertz. And as we turn on the\nelectric light, so we turn on our fellowmen, as it were, to use them.\nThe thought of the poet\u2014\u201cWhat a piece of work is man, how infinite\nin faculty!\u201d occurs to us only at scattered moments. And yet things\ntranspire in the inner life of human beings far more marvelous than the\nchemical processes or the flux of electric waves, did we but attend to\nthem. There is in particular one kind of energy to which the quality\nof worth may well attach itself. It is unlike the physical forces; it\nis not a transformed mode of mechanical energy. It is _sui generis_,\nunderivative, unique; it is synonymous with highest freedom; it is\npower raised to the Nth degree. It is ethical energy. To release it\nin oneself is to achieve unbounded expansion. Morality, as commonly\nunderstood, is a system of rules, chiefly repressive. Ethical energy,\non the contrary, is determined by the very opposite tendency; a\ntendency, it is true, never more than tentatively effectuated under\nfinite conditions. And because the energy is unique, it points toward\na unique, irreducible, hence substantive entity in man, from which it\nsprings. This entity is itself incognizable, yet the effect it produces\nrequires that it be postulated. The category of substance, which is\nalmost disappearing from science, is to be reinstalled in ethics.\nEthics cannot dispense with it. This, as a prelude, may suffice to\nindicate the path along which we shall proceed.\n\n\n_The Reason Why the Method of Ethics Must Be the Opposite of the Method\nEmployed by the Physical Sciences_\n\nPhysical science begins from the bottom and builds upwards. It analyzes\nphenomena into their elements, and thereupon seeks to combine these\nelements into structures that shall correspond to experience. In this\nbusiness it never comes to a finish. Its analysis of the elements is\nprovisional. Every element is hypothetical. Indeed it is plain in the\nnature of the case that no element can be ultimate. An element is a\nunit, and every empirical unit necessarily conceals in its bosom a\nplexus of which it is the unification. The very idea of unit requires\nfor its complement a manifold of some kind. In hypothetical units, or\nideal constructs that have for their purpose to lead to the discovery\nand arrangement of real phenomena, science abounds. Atoms, electrons,\nenergy conceived as a substance by Ostwald, Spencer\u2019s physiological\nunits, are examples.\n\nThe results achieved by science are never more than approximations in\nthe sense that the units, the bricks with which the house is built, are\nliable to be rejected, and the constructions achieved are subject to\nrevision.\n\nThe point however which I wish to emphasize is that the scientist is\nsatisfied of the truth, the reality of its partial results. Newton,\nfor instance, in formulating the law of gravitation has, so to speak,\nmarked off a strip of reality. The ground covered cannot be lost; when\nsome natural law is enunciated, the proper conditions for its discovery\nand verification having been observed, a sure footing in reality has\nbeen gained, science standing to this extent on _terra firma_, though\nbeyond the domain within which the law applies the phenomena may be\nheaving and billowing like the sea.\n\nNow the question I am intent upon is, Why is it possible for science\nto be content with partial acquisition? Why does it profess to know\npositively a part without knowing the whole? And why can ethics not\ntake a step without an ideal of the whole?\n\nKant\u2019s chief purpose in the _Critique of Pure Reason_ was to vindicate\nthe certainty of the physical knowledge of a part as being compatible\nwith total ignorance of the whole. The older metaphysics was engaged\nin the attempt to supply the whole, to sketch it out in order to\ngive certainty to the part that is within the reach of science. The\nolder metaphysics said to science: You have in hand the conditioned,\nbut remember the conditioned depends on the unconditioned. Unless,\ntherefore, you round out what you possess, with the help of the\nunconditioned, the certainty you seem to have within the field of the\nconditioned disappears. Again, science traces causes, and the older\nmetaphysicians insisted that the whole chain of causes hangs in air\nunless it be attached to a first cause. Now Kant\u2019s _Critique of Pure\nReason_ really amounts _in nuce_ to this: you do not require the whole\nin order to explain the part. Link the partial phenomena together in a\ncertain way, a way dependent on the joint action of the space and time\nintuitions and the categories, and you will gain the desired certainty.\nThe certainty is in the linkage. We may add link to link of the chain\nof reality without troubling to consider by what piers it is supported\nor on what shore the piers rest\u2014if indeed there be piers and shores at\nall. The bridge hangs over the River of Time and we can safely travel\non it. How we get on to this bridge we do not know, and where we shall\nleave it we cannot know either.\n\nIt is a mistake to speak of Kant as a rationalist pure and simple. When\nhe expelled the older metaphysics he antagonized pure rationalism.\nThe older metaphysics held that the mere existence of the conditioned\nproves the existence of the unconditioned, requires the unconditioned.\nIn Kant\u2019s answer to this lies the gist of his enterprise in philosophy:\nYou are quite right, he says, that the _idea_ of the conditioned\nrequires the idea of the unconditioned, logically, rationally. But\nobserve well, nature is not just logical or rational. There is an\nirrational element in it, namely, extended manifold and temporal\nsequence. Juxtaposition and sequence are irrational, because, if I\ninterpret him rightly, in the case of each the relation presented to\nthe mind is that of parts outside each other\u2014in the one case alongside,\nin the other before and after; while in the logical or rational\nrelation the parts are implicit in the whole as in the case of the\npremises of a syllogism and the conclusion, the relation of a genus to\nthe species, the universal to the particular.\n\nWe have in nature, according to Kant, a partnership between the\nirrational and the rational factors. And thereupon he proceeds to\nargue that we impose laws on nature, understanding thereby that we get\nhold of reality or objectivity in so far as we are able to imprint\nthe rational element upon the irrational. The positing of the thing\n_per se_, which has proved a stumbling-block to many, is no more than\na confession that we shall never succeed entirely in this business of\nsubjecting the irrational to the rational factor. The thing _per se_ is\nthe X that remains over when the rational function has done its utmost.\nA thing, a real object, is that which is imprinted with, penetrated\nwith, rationality. The manifolds of space and time, of juxtaposition\nand sequence are incapable of completely receiving this imprint, that\nis, of completely responding to our quest for reality, and this their\nincompetency is expressed in the notion of the thing _per se_.\n\nTo return to the main question as to the difference between the method\nby which science proceeds and the reverse method prescribed to ethics,\nI ask, Why is absolute knowledge of nature impossible? The answer\nis, Because absolute knowledge would mean the completely rational\nconstruction of nature, and this is prevented by the irrational element\nexisting in it. But why has the relative knowledge we possess the\ncharacter of certainty? Why are we sure of the law of gravitation? Why\nare we justified in saying that science within certain limits plants\nher foot on _terra solida_? Because at certain points the sense data do\ncoincide with the rational requirements. There are recurrent phenomena\nof such a kind, coupled together in such a way, that each is capable of\nmathematical measurement, and that the sequence of the one after the\nother can therefore be predicted.\n\nNature might have been arranged quite otherwise. The time spans might\nhave been so long, as to prevent our observing the recurrences. A\nday-fly cannot observe the periodicity of the earth\u2019s revolution around\nits axis. The fact however that there is this partial correspondence\nbetween human rationality and the unknown nature of things is a bare\nfact, incapable of explanation.[24] The answer, then, I take it, is:\nour knowledge of nature is relative, which means incompletely rational,\nbecause of the foreign element in nature unamenable to the operation\nof the rational, the synthetic, function. This relative knowledge is\nnone the less certain, that is, in some sense absolute, because of\nthe partial coincidence of the phenomena of nature and the synthetic\nprocesses of the mind.\n\nWith this degree of certainty we must perforce content ourselves, in\ndealing with outside nature. In trying to understand and interpret\nthat which is not ourselves, we hit upon barriers which cannot be\ntranscended, upon a foreign factor which opposes itself to our\nendeavors. But it is otherwise in the sphere of conduct. Here, if there\nis to be certainty at all, in regard to right as distinguished from\nwrong, if there is to be such a thing as right in the strict sense,\nwe cannot content ourselves with the paradoxical, relative-absolute\njust described. For here we not merely interpret but act, and we must\npossess an ideal plan of the whole if we are to be certain of our\nrightness in any particular part of conduct. _For in conduct there is\nno such partial coincidence between the rational and the irrational as\nin the case of physical law._ There is not a single partial rule of\nconduct, neither \u201cThou shalt not kill\u201d nor \u201cThou shalt not lie,\u201d nor\nany other that, taken by itself, is of itself ethically right. It may\nbe right, it may be wrong. It takes its ethical quality from the plan\nof conduct as a whole, and without reference to the whole it is devoid\nof rightness.[25]\n\nI have thus indicated the ground of the distinction between the method\nof science and the method of ethics, a distinction, it is true, to\nwhich Kant himself did not adhere. Partial coincidence of the rational\nwith the irrational is expressed in physical law; absence of such\nconcurrence destroys any attempt to build up an ethical theory on the\nempirical method. We cannot plant our feet on the part, gaining there\nthe sense of certainty: we must creatively conceive the ideal of the\nwhole and educe every partial mode of ethical conduct from that.\n\nBut how shall we proceed in the construction of such an ideal, for it\nis obvious that knowledge, in the scientific sense of the word, is\nentirely out of the question?\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[23] See the more extended remarks on this subject in Book III.\n\n[24] In Kant\u2019s view the rational element is projected on the\nirrational. In this way spatial juxtaposition is ideally transformed\ninto a spatial continuum. In the same manner temporal sequence is\nideally changed into a uniform temporal flux. Without the former,\ngeometry could not have established its propositions; without the\nlatter Galileo could not have measured the fall of the stone.\n\n[25] The ethical character of acts depends on the worth of the agent\nand the object. Is it right to kill or to enslave a fellowman? We do\nnot hesitate to kill an animal, or to harness horses to vehicles, or to\nuse them as beasts of burden. Why not kill men, or use them as beasts\nof burden in like manner?\u2014Only because they possess a worth which gives\nthem a different standing.\n\nIs it on grounds of sympathy that I should observe the so-called moral\nrules? But if I am not sympathetic by nature, why should I be subject\nto censure in case I refrain from displaying a tenderness which I do\nnot feel? Why should I sympathize with the pleasures and pains of\nfellow human beings any more than with the pleasures and pains of\ninferior sentient creatures, unless men have worth? And worth, as will\nappear in the subsequent chapters, signifies indispensableness in a\nperfect whole. No detached thing has worth. No part of an incomplete\nsystem has worth. Worth belongs to those to whom it is attributed in\nso far as they are conceived of as not to be spared, as representing a\ndistinctive indispensable preciousness, a mode of being without which\nperfection would be less than perfect.\n\nSo that morality depends on the attribution of worth to men, and\nworth depends on the formation in the mind of an ideal plan of the\nwhole\u2014or instead of a complete plan let me say more precisely a rule of\nrelations whereby the plan is itself progressively developed.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nTHE IDEAL OF THE WHOLE\n\n\nTo recapitulate and at the same time to enlarge somewhat the points\nthus far covered in Book II: Kant proclaims man an end _per se_. This\npromises a philosophic basis for an ethical world-view. The promise is\nnot kept. Kant takes as his point of departure absolute obligation, and\nattempts to deduce out of an empty formula a worthwhile object. Kant\u2019s\nformula is: Treat man never merely as a means, but also as an end _per\nse_. But how far man may be treated as a means, and what the relation\nof the means to the end may be is left undetermined. An upper crust of\nmorality is formed, as it were, upon the empirical flood of passions,\ndesires, etc. A straight line is drawn beyond which the under world in\nevery man may not emerge. But a truly instrumental view of the means as\nrelated to the end is not established. This is one of the great gaps\nin Kant\u2019s system. Note the almost puerile reason given for culture: we\nshould cultivate our talents _weil sie zu allerhand Zwecken n\u00fctzlich\nsein m\u00f6gen_.\n\nKant\u2019s ethical order is a duplicate of the physical order. The notion\nof law is taken from physics, and expanded into the concept of law\nin general. Ethical behavior is represented as behavior motivated by\nthe notion of lawfulness. Law is characterized by universality and\nnecessity. Chapter II, however, shows that in physics universality is\npredicated on the ground of an ascertained necessary connection. In\nphysics, necessity has its true meaning as pertaining to a relation\nbetween one thing and another. If the linkage can be established, the\nuniversality follows. In Kant\u2019s ethics, on the contrary, necessity is\ntaken as the consequence of the universality and the proper meaning of\nnecessity is lost. Self-consistency takes the place of the relation\nto something else. The ideal society, as described, would therefore\nbe a society of self-preserving rational intelligences, ethically\nsolipsistic.\n\nNext we began the investigation into the idea of worth. Why do men\nhold themselves and others cheap? They regard each other from the\npoint of view of the _use_ to be made of others and of their own life,\nand not from the point of view of the energies deployed. The turning\non of electric power was used as an illustration. Nevertheless, even\nexceptional men, men regarded as illustrating in the highest degree the\nmental energies implicit in human nature, would not possess the quality\nof worth, that is, of being ends _per se_, merely on the score of their\nscientific or their artistic activities. We cannot say that the world\nwould be less perfect if there were no scientists to discover its laws.\nThere is a supreme, a unique energy and it is to this that the quality\nof worth belongs.[26]\n\nThe ethical quality called worth is the supreme good, and must be\naccessible to all, even to those to whom the lesser goods are denied.\nEthics is a system of thought which stands or falls with the contention\nthat while the better may be within reach only of the exceptional few,\nthe best is within reach of all.\n\nIn attempting to approach the task of building up a world-view based\non ethical experience, it became unavoidable to consider the method\nby which the approach might be made, and for this purpose to contrast\nthe methods of science and the methods of ethics. Science, as we have\nseen, collects its bricks and builds its house by composition. Science\nanalyzes phenomena into units, which it then combines. The mystery is\nhow science can achieve certainty in respect to certain phenomena of\nnature without previous knowledge of the whole of nature. Kant\u2019s answer\nis that there is partial congruity between the mental functions and the\ndata that come to us from the unknown. Kant\u2019s _Critique of Pure Reason_\nfaces in two directions. It expels the older metaphysics which assumed\nthat the empirical world is rational throughout, or rationalizable, and\nwhich thence argued the existence of the unconditioned as necessarily\nimplied in the existence of the conditioned, and of a first cause as\nactually implied in the chain of causes and effects. Kant contends\nthat there is an irrational element, namely, bare juxtaposition\n(part outside part), and bare sequence (part before and after part),\nwhile the logical or rational relation implies that the part is to\nbe conceived as implicit in the whole. Juxtaposition and sequence,\ntherefore, can never be completely rationalized. On the other hand,\nKant undertakes to prove that whatever of reality we know is traceable\nto the projection of the rational factor upon the irrational. One\nmight even say that, according to Kant, the mind itself produces the\nirrational factor, since the intuitions of space and time are according\nto him, functions of the mind itself\u2014the mind setting up a manifold so\nconstituted as to receive sense impressions. At any rate the capital\npoint to which we were led up was that science puts her foot on _terra\nfirma_ in a restricted area, without reference to what lies beyond,\nwhile if we are to proceed in ethics at all, we must begin with some\nideal plan of the whole, since in ethics we are not interpreting a\nforeign nature, but act upon natures similar to our own; and since,\nin the case of conduct, there is no such partial concurrence of\nthe rational and irrational as in physics, no one of the so-called\nmoral modes of behavior being moral when taken separately. Hence the\nconclusion that there is no possibility of establishing the conception\nof worth unless we have some ideal of the whole in which and in\nrelation to which the incomparable worthwhileness of a human being can\nbe made good.\n\nWe need hardly again remind ourselves that this conception of worth,\nor of man as end _per se_, is not a mere abstraction, and that our\ninterest in it is not academic. Every outcry against the oppression\nof man by man, or against whatsoever is morally hideous, is but the\naffirmation of the cardinal principle that a human being as such is\nnot to be violated, is not to be handled like a tool, but is to be\nrespected and revered as an end _per se_. But what do we mean by end\n_per se_, and how account for this notion? Does it come into our mind\nlike a bolt from the blue, or is it revealed as prefigured in the human\nmind when we follow it into its intimate constitution?\n\nOur knowledge of the world we live in is extremely limited\u2014in its\ndetails it is confined to the planet we live on, extending to\nthe myriads of celestial bodies beyond us only by means of scant\ngeneralizations. If we have knowledge of only so small a portion, how\ncan we frame an ideal of the whole? At the same time we must remember\nthat the world we actually know, this earth and yonder starry myriads,\nis in very truth _our_ world, the world as it exists for us, a world\nwhich with the help of data coming to us from the unknown, we ourselves\nhave built up on certain constructive principles; and that these\nprinciples have been found, within certain limits, availing.[27] I\nsay availing within certain limits. The defeat they meet with beyond\nthose limits is due to the intractable elements of juxtaposition and\nsequence, of the time and space manifolds, which in themselves are\nincapable of being completely rationalized.\n\nNow the ideal of the whole is a plan or scheme in which the\nconstructive principles of the mind are conceived as having untrammeled\ncourse and unhindered application, and the task of world-building, or\nrather universe-building, is in idea carried out to completion.\n\nThe attempt to present an ideal forecast, or outline of the whole of\nreality, as it would satisfy a mind constituted like ours, an ideal\nlandscape of this sort, is not at all to be confounded with the\narrogation of _a priori_ knowledge. _A priori_ knowledge is supposed\nto be a kind of knowledge, and _knowledge_ of the whole is utterly\nand confessedly beyond our reach. The phrase _a priori_, too, is\nobjectionable and unfortunate for two reasons. First, as just said,\nbecause it has been supposed to be a kind of knowledge. By some\ntheologians men were supposed to possess _a priori_ knowledge of\nGod.[28] Secondly, because the word _a priori_ suggests precedence\nin time, and our knowledge of the human mind and of its irreducible\ncapacities comes out only in the course of experience. Much that has\nbeen called _a priori_, that is implicit in experience, did not become\nexplicit until after prolonged experience. The Greek thinkers before\nAristotle doubtless thought in terms of syllogism, but it was not until\nGreek science had attained a certain ripeness that Aristotle was able\nto dissect out the logic which had previously been employed more or\nless unconsciously.\n\nInstead, therefore, of using the term _a priori_, which gives rise to\nthe two-fold misapprehension of an _a priori_ knowledge and of temporal\nprecedence, and instead of throwing out the child with the bath, that\nis, of ignoring the independent part played by our mental constitution\nin building up experience, and in affording us the conviction of\ncertainty, and of reality, it is highly desirable that a new term be\nfound to take the place of _a priori_. The term \u201cfunctional finality\u201d\nsuggests itself to me for this purpose.[29]\n\nMy field is ethics. I am entirely desirous of sticking to my own last,\nthat is, dealing with such concepts as the data of my subject force\nupon me. I do not wish to trespass, or to seem to trespass, on the\ndomain of my neighbors. Hence in dealing with functional finalities I\nmust deal with them primarily as they appear in the field of ethics,\nthat is, in the domain of the actions and reactions of human beings\nupon one another. Irreducible _principia_ of ethics are the functional\nfinalities, which prescribe rules for such intercourse, or better which\ncreate a scheme of ideal intercourse whereby the conduct of men shall\nbe measured and determined.\n\nI must, however, glance for a moment at fields outside my own, for the\npurpose not of controversy but of elucidation; not to deal with the\nsubject matter of my neighbors, but to mark off my own more definitely.\nWhat then, I ask, is the most general expression by which to designate\nthe singularities of the human mind, the principles on which it acts,\nits immutable modes of behavior, the invariants that recur amid all\nthe complex varieties of its processes? The principal invariants are\nthe positing of a manifold of some kind, and the apprehending of\nthat manifold as coherent. The manifold is not given, but is posited\nby the mind. The positing is a mental function, just as much as the\napprehending of the plurality as coherent is a mental function. The\nparticular manifolds of space and time experience are said to be given,\nbut they would not be received by the mind were not the function of\nmanifold-positing prepared to apprehend them.\n\nIn recent physical science the notion of the manifold plays a\nconspicuous r\u00f4le. Subtle speculations are employed to define the\nkinds of manifold which the physicist finds opportune, and the kind\nof unity of which these manifolds are respectively capable. The two\nterms mentioned are themselves the most abstract conceivable, and\nnaturally, that which is here taken to underlie all the constructive,\nworld-building activity of the mind in every possible direction can\nonly be expressed in the most sublimated language. But the notions\nthemselves, or rather the acts of the mind, the functions designated,\nare rich and replete with concrete utility when applied to subject\nmatter in the different fields.\n\nWherever we turn we find that the assurance of reality depends on the\njoint use of the two principles mentioned, the joint operation of\nthe two kinds of mental action; that is to say\u2014on the positing of a\nmanifold and on the simultaneous apprehension of the subject matter to\nwhich it relates as coherent, as unified.\n\nThe simultaneity, the inseparableness of the two mental acts or\nfunctions in regard to the same subject-matter is the essential point\non which hangs the web of the argument here submitted. Thus in geometry\nspace must be regarded as a continuum, unbroken, uninterrupted at any\npoint, and at the same time the same space must be treated as capable\nof puncture, of linear and superficial delimitations; that is to say,\nof division. That which is one must yet be apprehended as divided;\nthat which is divided, or delimitated, must yet be apprehended as one.\nThe difficulties that arise spring from the vain endeavor to separate\nthe two inseparable acts\u2014the act of apprehending the manifold of space\n_sub specie pluralitatis_, and the act of apprehending it _sub specie\nunitatis_. Hence arises the puzzling question: How can that which is\ncontinuous be divided, how can chasms between the parts of space,\nhowever infinitesimal, be bridged? Witness the problem of Zeno, and\nthe pragmatist solution of it by a demonstration that satisfies us\nindeed as to the fact (which no one doubts), but leaves the mental\npuzzle as before; and also Bergson\u2019s Method of accounting for division\nby a comparison of the inner and the outer flux, wherein he seems to\noverlook the difficulty that for the purpose of comparison two points\nmust be fixed, one in each flux, that is to say, the division in the\nflux must be regarded as already existing.\n\nIn the physical sciences we are compelled to assume on the one hand\nthe atomic or granular constitution of matter, in other words,\nmanifoldness. On the other hand, if \u201caction at a distance\u201d is to be\nescaped, we are bound to assume a continuum of some sort like the\nether. Again, in the organic world there is the manifold of structures\nand functions, and the unity of organism. To whatever object of\ninquiry we give our attention, we find ourselves not only restricted\nfundamentally to the two functions described, but we discover that to\ntheir insunderable co-operation we owe whatever of truth we possess.\n\nNow the business of ethics is to define its own subject-matter, that\nis to say the particular kind of manifold with which it deals, and the\nkind of unity of which that manifold is susceptible. But as I approach\nthis first goal of my enterprise, there is one obstacle which I must\ntry to remove out of the way of the reader, before I can hope to win\nhim to a hospitable consideration of my conclusions. The jointness\nor inseparableness of the two acts out of which certainty or reality\nissues has created all the difficulties. The fact that the manifold\nmust be regarded as remaining a manifold, unaltered in its character\nas such, not derivative from the One (there is no such One), and that\nthe unity does not contrariwise result from the manifold in the sense\nof springing from or being derived from it;\u2014in other words that we\nmust see the same landscape of things and events both _sub specie\npluralitatis_ and _sub specie unitatis_\u2014has been the stumbling-block.\nThe history of philosophy might be written under the two headings: 1,\nmonistic systems that undertake, collapsing in their futile effort, to\nderive the world and its plurality from the One, as if there were such\nan One, out of whose bosom philosophy might evoke the many (creational\nsystems, pantheistic systems, emanation systems, evolution systems); 2,\npluralistic systems that essay, with equal lack of success, to explain\nthe unity as somehow the offspring of the plurality.\n\nWhy then have these systems flourished? Why are these vain undertakings\nstill renewed? The reason is that we cannot understand the joint action\nof the two functions, and the very point where enlightenment is needed\nis for us to recognize that no fundamental truths can be understood\nby us, that we can only look at them, contemplate and accept them.\nThe point, I say, where enlightenment is needed is that the habit of\ntrying to understand is due to a prejudice, to what may be called the\n_superstition of causality_.\n\nI shall have to explain this hardy assertion with some care to prevent\nmisconception. Causality, it will be objected, is the one thread that\nleads us through the labyrinth of nature. The search for causes enables\nus to become at home in our world by foreseeing events. In what sense\nthen can it be permissible to speak of the prejudice of causality,\nnay, of the superstition of it? With what warrant prescribe a limit to\nthe aspirations of the human intellect to push its inquiries to the\nfarthest limit, even so far as to understand the functional finalities\nthemselves, if such there be?\n\nThe answer, succinctly put, is this: explaining or understanding things\nmeans tracing effects to their causes, and this is only one mode, a\nsomewhat _disguised_ mode, of the joint functional activity of which\nI have spoken. The manifold in this case is that of the temporal\nsequence of phenomena, of differences due to change of position in\ntime; and the unity established between them (as for instance energy,\nof which the sequent phenomena represent the transformations) is an\nideal, fictive unity, mentally superimposed (real despite its ideal\nor imaginary character, because of the necessity we are under to view\nthe sequent phenomena _sub specie unitatis_). That there is nothing\nin the antecedent to compel the sequent to follow has been since the\ndays of Hume a commonplace in philosophy. That nevertheless there is\nsuch a thing as the prediction of eclipses was made by Kant the basis\nof his doctrine of synthesis _a priori_. Be the terms used what they\nmay, what counts is the fact that the _joint action of two functions,\nwhich itself is inexplicable_, not to be understood, that is, not to be\nreferred back to a preceding cause (as if there could be such a thing\nas a cause why we think in terms of causality) is the foundation of all\nso-called understanding.\n\nMoreover causality is an incomplete example of the fundamental\nfunctional process. We never do thoroughly understand; we gain a\ncertain relief, a certain increased ease of mind by pushing the problem\nback a step. And what I have called the prejudice of causality, is the\nunwillingness on our part to acknowledge the fact that we are face to\nface, in the case of causality, with the inexplicable; that that which\nhelps us partially to understand (and serves for practical purposes\nwell enough) is in its nature not to be understood, one of the modes in\nwhich the joint action of the functional finalities manifests itself.\n\nAn ultimate principle has been defined as one which is presupposed in\nevery attempt to account for it. The functional finalities of which I\nspeak bear the test of this definition. The upshot of it all is that\nthe constitutive principles of the human mind cannot be explained or\nunderstood, but can nevertheless be verified. And verification, in the\nlast analysis, means exemplification. If we look at these ultimate\ntruths, whether in geometry, in physics, or, as we shall later see, in\nethics and \u00e6sthetics, as enunciated abstractly, baldly, we confront\nthem blankly, we are as it were dumbfounded in their presence. They\nseem arbitrarily imposed upon us. And why? Because we are endeavoring\nto understand them. We have acquired the habit of trying to get hold of\ntruth by referring back to some antecedent. And therefore we are uneasy\nand disconcerted. But the moment we see them exemplified, as in the\nconstructions of the geometer, in the laws or uniformities established\nby the physicist, etc., we are convinced. The subject-matter of ethics\nis different. The kind of exemplification is likewise different. But\nverification is exemplification in ethics as elsewhere; and this will\nbe found to mean that the life, the ethical experience, must lead to\nthe certainty.\n\nAnd now we have reached the point where a brief discussion of the\nethical manifold and its mode of unification comes up in proper order.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[26] To rate anyone as an end _per se_ means that in a world conceived\nas perfect his existence would be indispensable. The world we know may\nnot be perfect, is not perfect, but we do conceive of an ideal world\nthat is. And to ascribe to anyone the quality of worth, to denominate\nhim an end _per se_, is to place him into that world, to regard him as\npotentially a member of it.\n\n[27] For a creature endowed with different senses, and having a mind\nunlike our own, the world would be a totally different world.\n\n[28] To deny such _a priori_ knowledge of the object called God is\nnot to deny that the production of this object is due to constructive\nprinciples of human thinking; while, in turn, to assert the functional\nderivation of the God-idea is not to validate that idea itself as\npermanent and inexpugnable. It may have owed its origin to a permanent\ndisposition of the mind, and yet be fallible because of the historical\nconditions under which it arose and the defective data in which it was\nexpressed. By way of illustration we might apply the same reflection\nto the Ptolemaic astronomy. The mathematical processes by which this\nastronomy was constructed may be traced to permanent singularities of\nhuman thinking, yet the astronomical theory of Ptolemy is not on that\naccount _a priori_ true.\n\n[29] It must, however, be understood that the formula in which a\nfinality is expressed is not itself a final formula. The business of\ndefinition is precarious, liable to error and dogmatic abuse, and\nthe formulas of finality are to be constantly subjected to revision.\nPossible and even probable abuse, however, does not warrant the\nnegative attitude at present taken; it does not justify the revulsion\nof feeling against _A Priorism_ which is just now general. Exasperation\nwith absolutism does not of itself justify recourse to the opposite\nextreme of pragmatism.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nTHE IDEAL OF THE WHOLE AND THE ETHICAL MANIFOLD\n\n\nThe ethical manifold, conceived of as unified, furnishes, or rather is,\nthe ideal of the whole. The ethical manifold is the true universe, not\n\u201cUniverse\u201d in the sense in which the word is too laxly used at present\nto designate those fragmentary and in many respects unconnected lines\nof experience which might better by way of discrimination be called\nWorld.\n\nThe ideal of the whole, as the terms imply, must fulfill two\nconditions: it must be a whole, that is, include all manifoldness\nwhatsoever; and it must be ideal, or perfectly unified. In such an\nideal whole the two reality-producing functions of the human mind would\nfind their complete fruition.\n\n Point 1.\u2014The totality of manifoldness must be comprised.\n\n Point 2.\u2014The connectedness must be without flaw.\n\nFrom point one it follows that the ethical manifold cannot be\nspatial or temporal, since juxtaposition and sequence lapse into\nindefiniteness, abounding without ceasing, but never attaining or\npromising the attainment of totality. Our first conclusion then is that\nthe ethical manifold is non-temporal and non-spatial.\n\nFurthermore it is necessary and decisive for the theoretical\nconstruction here attempted to keep sharply in view, that the\nmanifoldness may not be derived from the unity, or conversely. The\nmanifold remains forever manifold. This means that in the ethical\nmanifold each member[30] will differ uniquely from all the rest,\nand preserve his irreducible singularity. The member of the ethical\nmanifold was not created by _the_ One or any One. He is not derived\nas effect from any cause. Causality does not apply to the ethical\nmanifold, being a category of spatial sequence. The member of the\nethical manifold, or the ethical unit, as we may now call him (I say\nhim metaphorically and provisionally) is unbegotten, induplicable,\nunique. In the ethical manifold each infinitesimal member is\nindispensable, inasmuch as he is one of the totality of intrinsically\nunlike differenti\u00e6. A duplicate would be superfluous. Inclusion implies\nindispensableness; no member acquires a place within the ethical\nuniverse save on the score of his title, as one of the possible modes\nof being that are required to complete the totality of manifoldness.\n\nBut the reality-producing functions of the mind are two, and they\nact jointly. The same manifold that is regarded as the scene of\nirreducible manifoldness, is also regarded _sub specie unitatis_.\nThe immense practical importance of holding fast to diversity as\nindefeasible, and at the same time stressing the unity, will amply\nappear in the course of the third Book. It is this insistence on the\ntwo aspects _jointly_, that distinguishes the theory here worked out\nfrom preceding ethical philosophies, and will be found to open new\nethical applications to conduct. It is this insistence on the joint\naction of the two reality-producing functions that will enable us to\nsee in the ideal of the whole _a pattern traced_, and to derive from\nthis pattern of relations a supreme rule of conduct. If the differences\nthat exist among the members of the manifold be slurred over, if the\nindefeasible singularity of each member be overlooked, if the many be\nderived from the One, since the One is an empty concept, we shall gain\nno light upon the conduct to be followed by each of the many. It is\ntrue that our notion of the distinctive difference or the uniqueness of\neach ethical unit is also empty as far as knowledge goes. The unique\nis incognizable. Yet we are able to apprehend, and do apprehend, a\ndeterminate relation as subsisting between the ethical units, and this\nrelation supplies us with an ideal plan of the ethical universe and a\nfirst principle and rule of ethics. The relation is that of reciprocal\nuniversal interdependence.\n\nConsider that an infinite number of ethical entities is presented to\nour minds\u2014each of them radically different from the rest. In what\nthen possibly can the unity of this infinite assemblage consist? In\nthis\u2014_that the unique difference of each shall be such as to render\npossible the correlated unique differences of all the rest_. It is in\nthis formula that we find the key to a new ethical system, in this\nconception we get our hand firmly on the notion of right, and by means\nof it we discover the object which Kant failed to find, the object to\nwhich worth attaches, the object which is so indispensable to the ideal\nof the whole as to authenticate unconditional obligation or rightness\nin conduct with respect to it. It is as an ethical unit, as a member of\nthe infinite ethical manifold, that man has worth.[31]\n\nIn accordance with the above, the first principle of ethics may be\nexpressed in the following formulas:\n\nA. Act as a member of the ethical manifold (the infinite spiritual\nuniverse).\n\nB. Act so as to achieve uniqueness (complete individualization\u2014the most\ncompletely individualized act is the most ethical).\n\nC. Act so as to elicit in another the distinctive, unique quality\ncharacteristic of him as a fellow-member of the infinite whole.\n\nA and B are comprised in C. I am taking three steps toward a fuller\nexposition of the meaning of the principle. To act as a member\naccording to A is to strive to achieve uniqueness as declared in\nB. To achieve uniqueness as declared in C is to seek to elicit the\ndiverse uniqueness in others. The actual unique quality in myself\nis incognizable, and only appears, so far as it does appear, in the\neffect produced by myself upon my fellows. Hence, to advance towards\nuniqueness I must project dynamically my most distinctive mode of\nenergy upon my fellow-members.\n\nSince the finite nature of man is a clog and screen, clouding and\nchecking the action of man viewed as an ethical unit, it follows that\nno man will ever succeed in carrying out completely the rule which is\nderived from the ideal pattern. He will invariably meet with partial\nfrustration in his efforts to do so, and yet in virtue of his ethical\ncharacter he will always renew the effort. While in physical science\nthe recurrence of phenomena supplies the occasion for exemplification\nor verification, in conduct, or the sphere of volition, not recurrence\nbut the persistence of the effort after defeat is at least a help to\nverification, arguing in one\u2019s self a consciousness, however obscured,\nof the relation of reciprocal interdependence and of subjection to the\nurge or pressure thence derived.[32] It is our own reality-producing\nfunctions, exerted to their utmost, to which we are delivered over.\nHence the final formulation: So act as to raise up in others the ideal\nof the relation of give and take, of universal interdependence in\nwhich they stand with an infinity of beings like themselves, members of\nthe infinite universe, irreducible, like and unlike themselves in their\nrespective uniqueness.\n\nThe simile that may be used is that of a ray of light which has the\neffect of kindling other rays, unlike but complementary to itself.\nEach ethical unit, each member of the infinite universe, is to be\nregarded as a center from which such a ray emanates, touching other\ncenters, and awakening there the light intrinsic in them. Or we may\nthink of a fountain from which stream forth jets of indescribable\nlife-power\u2014playing out of it, playing into other life, and evoking\nthere kindred and yet unkindred life-waves, waves effluent and\nrefluent. Whatever the symbolism may be, inadequate in any case, the\nidea of the enmeshing of one\u2019s life in universal life without loss of\ndistinctness\u2014the everlasting selfhood to be achieved on the contrary,\nby means of the cross-relation\u2014is the cardinal point.\n\nI have here to answer one question. By what warrant do I ascribe worth\nto any human being? Where is the head deserving that this ray that\nstreams out from me shall light upon it? What man or woman merits that\nhe be invested with this glory? Does not the same objection opposed\nto Kant hold with respect to my own view? It is true that he found no\nobject at all, and sought indirectly to draw from the empty notion\nof obligation the inference that man is an end _per se_. Perhaps\nit will be admitted that the supremely worthwhile object has now\nbeen found, the holy thing (holy in two ways, as being inviolable,\nreverence-inspiring, holding at a distance those who would encroach:\nand intrinsically priceless as a component of the ethical manifold, as\nindispensable in a perfect whole). But this object, you will say, is\nin the air, or in the heavens, and how shall it be made to descend on\nempirical man?\n\nMy answer is that certainly I do not discover the quality of worth\nin people as an empirical fact. In many people I do not even\ndiscover value. Judging from the point of view of bare fact, many\nof us could very well be spared. Many are even in the way of what\nis called \u201cprogress.\u201d And the suggestion of some extreme disciples\nof Darwin that the degenerate and defective should be removed, or\nthe opinion of others that pestilence and war should be allowed to\ntake the unpleasant business off our hands, is, from the empirical\npoint of view, not easily to be refuted. I can also enter into, if\nI do not wholly share, the pessimistic mood with regard to actual\nhuman nature expressed by Schopenhauer and others. To the list of\nrepulsive human creatures mentioned by Marcus Aurelius in one of his\nmorning meditations,\u2014the back-biter, the scandal-monger, the informer,\netc.\u2014might be added in modern times, the white-slaver, the exploiter of\nchild-labor, the fawning politician, and many another revolting type.\nAnd even more discouraging in a way, than these examples of deepest\nhuman debasement\u2014the copper natures, as Plato calls them, or the\nleaden natures, as we might call them\u2014is the disillusionment we often\nexperience with regard to the so-called gold natures, the discovery of\nthe large admixture of baser metal which is often combined with their\ngold.\n\nIt is imperative to acquaint oneself, nay, to impregnate one\u2019s mind\nthoroughly with these contrary facts, if the doctrine of worth, the\nsanest and to my mind the most real of all conceptions, is to be saved\nfrom the appearance of an optimistic illusion.\n\nThe answer to the objection is that I do not _find_ worth in others\nor in myself, I _attribute_ it to them and to myself. And why do I\nattribute it? In virtue of the reality-producing functions of my own\nmind. I create the ethical manifold. The pressure of the essential\nrationality within me, seeking to complete itself in the perfect\nfruition of these functions, _i.e._, in the positing of a total\nmanifold and its total unification, drives me forward. I need an idea\nof the whole in order to act rightly, in such a way as to satisfy the\ndual functions within me. My own nature as a spiritual being urges me\nto seek this satisfaction. This ideal whole, as I have shown, is a\ncomplexus of uniquely differentiated units. In order to advance toward\nuniqueness, in order to achieve what in a word may be called my own\ntruth, to build myself into the truth, to become essentially real,\nI must seek to elicit the consciousness of the uniqueness and the\ninterrelation in others. I must help others in order to save myself;\nI must look upon the other as an ethical unit or moral being in order\nto become a moral being myself. And wherever I find consciousness of\nrelation, of connectedness, even incipient, I project myself upon\nthat consciousness, with a view to awaking in it the consciousness\nof universal connectedness. Wherever I can hope to get a response\nI test my power. Fields and trees do not speak to me, as Socrates\nsaid, but human beings do. I should attribute worth to stones and to\nanimals could they respond, were the power of forming ideas, without\nwhich the idea of relation or connectedness is impossible, apparent in\nthem. Doubtless stones and trees and animals, and the physical world\nitself, are but the screen behind which lies the infinite universe.\nBut the light of that universe does not break through the screen where\nit is made up of stones and trees and the lower animals. It breaks\nthrough, however faintly, where there is consciousness of relation: and\nwherever I discover that consciousness I find my opportunity. It is\nquite possible that the men and women upon whom I try my power will not\nactually respond. The complaint is often heard from moral persons, or\npersons who think themselves such, that what they call the moral plan\nof rousing the moral consciousness in others will not work. Perhaps the\nplan they follow is not the moral plan at all, but the plan of sympathy\nor of some other empirically derived rule. But be that as it may,\nthe question is not whether we get the response but whether we shall\nachieve reality or truth ourselves; in theological terms, save our own\nlife, by trying to elicit the response.\n\nAnd here one profoundly important practical consideration will come to\nour aid, namely, the sense of our own imperfection, coupled indeed with\nthe consciousness of inextinguishable power of moral renewal. Instead\nof attributing the lack of response to the hopeless dullness of the\nperson upon whom we labor, a sense of humility, based on the knowledge\nof our own exceeding spiritual variability\u2014best moments followed by\nworst moments, imperfect grasp on our own ideals, most imperfect\nfidelity in executing them\u2014will lead us to turn upon ourselves, and\nfar from permitting us to despair of others, will impel us rather to\nmake ourselves more fitting instruments of spiritual influence than\nobviously as yet we are.[33]\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[30] Say not _part_ or _element_, but _member_, to distinguish the\ncomponents of the ethical manifold from such concepts as are used in\nmathematics and physical science.\n\n[31] The distinction between value and worth must be stressed for\nit is capital. Value is subjective. The worth notion is the most\nobjective conceivable. Value depends on the wants or needs of our\nempirical nature. That has value which satisfies our needs or wants.\nWe possess value for one another, for the reason that each of us has\nwants which the others alone are capable of satisfying, as in the case\nof sex, of co\u00f6peration, in the vocation, etc. But value ceases when\nthe want or need is gratified. The value which one human being has for\nanother is transient. There are, in the strict sense, no permanent\nvalues. The value which the majority have for the more advanced and\ndeveloped members of a community is small; from the standpoint of value\nmost persons are duplicable and dispensable. Consider only the ease\nwith which factory labor is replaced, in consequence of the prolific\nfertility of the human race. The custom of speaking of ethics as a\ntheory of values is regrettable. It evidences the despair into which\nmany writers on ethics have fallen as to the possibility of discovering\nan objective basis for rightness.\n\n[32] But the verification itself is the clearer and more explicit\nvision of the ethical relation, as it ought to be.\n\n[33] The term \u201cethical unit\u201d used above should be found useful. The\nchemists have found the concept of the atom useful, though no one\nhas ever seen an atom. And all the sciences have recourse to similar\ninventions,\u2014such as the electron, or the ion, or energy regarded as\na substance, and in mathematics the sublimated, space-transcending\nconcepts. Looking through the eyes of science, we are taught to see,\nunderlying the grossest forms of matter, imaginary entities which are\nwell-nigh metaphysical in nature. Science starts from the realm of\nthe sensible, and constructs its super-rarefied devices on mechanical\nmodels. Then it leaves the field of the intuitively perceptible, and\nrises by the path of analogy into realms where the notions with which\nit operates are no longer imaginable. I do not wish, in speaking of an\nethical, invisible, and unimaginable entity, to derive the postulation\nof this conception from science. The ethical concept transcends wholly\nthe field of sensible experience. It is not discovered by way of\nanalogy. It is frankly and overtly supersensible. It is not exemplified\nin the effects it produces in the world of volition as the most\nnearly metaphysical concepts of science are exemplified in the field\nof phenomena by the recurrences or uniformities which they serve to\naccount for. The ethical concepts are not verified by their results\nat all, not by recurrences of phenomena, but by the persistence of\nthe effort to attain that which is finitely never attained, and _by\nthe more explicit perception of the ideal itself_ which follows the\npersistent effort; for as has been shown above, when face to face with\nfundamental truth, _seeing is believing_. But I allude to these matters\nin order to show that the movement in ethical thinking represented\nby the system which I propose is not contrary to the present-day\nmovement in science, but in line with it, though beyond it. It does\nnot ask leave of science; it does not base its certainty on scientific\nprecedent; but neither does it expect a veto from the lips of science.\nThe worthwhileness of scientific endeavor itself depends at bottom\non the sanction which the ideal of the complete carrying out of the\nreality-producing functions lends to their incomplete execution in the\nworld of the space and time manifold.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\nTHE IDEAL OF THE SPIRITUAL UNIVERSE AND THE GOD-IDEAL\n\n\nWe have seen whence the ideal of a spiritual universe arises. It is\nunnecessary to prove that the universe is moral. What it is necessary\nto verify is that a universe exists; for \u201cuniverse\u201d is an ethical\nideal, it is the ethical manifold, or, if we distinguish ethical as\nconcerning relations between man and man, then we may use the term\n\u201cspiritual\u201d to designate that infinite system of interdependence\nin which men as ethical units have their place. We begin with the\naffirmation\u2014Man is an end _per se_. This wonderful affirmation,\nwhich the democracies are darkly and confusedly trying to express in\npolitical and social arrangements, constitutes the problem of all\nproblems. It is the great datum of ethics, of which ethical theory\nmust give an account. All other data or problems that have been thrust\ninto the foreground\u2014freedom of the will, responsibility, altruistic\nself-sacrifice\u2014are secondary, in the sense that they depend for their\nsolution on a right conception of man as end _per se_. As possessing\nworth on his own account he is an ethical unit. Only as a member\nof the infinite spiritual universe does he possess the two-fold\nattributes implied in worth\u2014inviolability with respect to outsiders\nand indefeasible, intrinsic preciousness. Therefore I say that around\nthe individual, the ethical unit, we build up as a necessary postulate\nthe spiritual universe. Man ethically considered carries with him this\ninfinite environment.\n\nDoes this universe exist or is it a mere figment? It is the product of\nthe reality-producing functions in their ideal completion. It is the\nnecessary postulate required if the idea of right is to have validity,\nand the idea of right is required by man in so far as he is an agent\nand not merely a spectator of life. The ethical manifold, the spiritual\nuniverse, exists in so far as there is a right.\n\nHave we then reinstated the idea of God as existent? Not the idea of\nGod as an individual. We have on the contrary set aside that idea by\naffirming that manifoldness cannot be derived from unity, that the\npositing of plurality is just as much a primary function of the mind as\nthe positing of unity. We have discarded the God-idea as the _locus_ of\nunity, since the unity subsists in the relation of the units. Strictly\nspeaking, we have replaced the God-idea by that of a universe of\nspiritual beings interacting in infinite harmony.\n\nBut at this point I must go back for a moment to Kant, using his ideas\nonce more as a foil to make my own more explicit. Wilhelm von Humboldt\nsaid of Kant that some of the things he had destroyed would never\nbe rebuilt, and that some of the things he had built would never be\ndestroyed.\n\nFor more than a hundred years the impression has prevailed that among\nthe things forever destroyed by Kant are the proofs of the existence\nof God. He is represented as an intellectual giant whose blows have\nforever shattered the proofs on which the existence of a supersensible\nreality rested. Kant\u2019s mind was pre\u00ebminently scientific. He was the\nphilosopher who made explicit the principles underlying Newtonian\nscience as Aristotle had made explicit the logic underlying the Greek\nscience. His philosophy is essentially agnostic. The use that he\ncontinues to make of the God-idea can be dissociated from his system\nwith advantage to the latter.[34]\n\nBut did Kant indeed destroy the idea of a supersensible reality\nas existent, or are we warranted in undertaking to build anew the\nsupersensible world.[35] \u201c_Du hast sie zerst\u00f6rrt, die sch\u00f6ne Welt,\nIn deinem Busen baue sie wieder_\u201d\u2014not indeed in the realm of mere\nfeelings, but in the sphere of will. The spell of Kant\u2019s shattering\nattack still rests upon the intellectual world today. The notion of a\nsupersensible reality, if held at all, is held timidly, apologetically\nand is apt to be based on subjective emotional need. The wish is more\nor less admitted to be father to the faith\u2014the will to believe is\ndefiantly asserted in despair of sound foundations. A scientist like\nDubois-Reymond enumerates seven world riddles, or mysteries that cannot\nbe explained, and after saying that they cannot be explained, he seems\nto see that no alternative remains but to take refuge in resignation:\n\u201cIgnoramus, ignorabimus!\u201d\n\nThat \u201cexplanation\u201d is not the only avenue to truth, that the referring\nof effects to their causes is not the highest operation of the\nreality-producing functions, I have pointed out in a previous chapter.\nBut Kant, as has been said, is supposed to have utterly annihilated\nthe arguments intended to demonstrate the existence of God, and it\nwill clear up the matter at issue if we consider wherein he actually\nsucceeded and wherein he quite failed. As he himself declares, his\nmethod is regressive; he does not attempt the progressive method path.\nHe seeks to ascertain whether by going backward along the chain of\neffects and causes, or of conditions, he can somewhere find God as\nfirst cause or as unconditioned. He does not look forward looking to\nthe ideals of the will. He does not enter into the realm of ends, where\nthe necessity of determining action in obedience to some universal plan\nor scheme of relations might have forced itself on his attention. His\napproach, like his habit of mind, is scientific. He is not primarily\nan ethicist. Proceeding in this manner he shows that the notion of a\nfirst cause is untenable, and he attacks in particular the ontological\nargument by which every other argument supplements itself at the point\nwhere it breaks down.\n\nDid Kant, however, annihilate the Ontological Argument? Yes, in the\nscholastic form in which it was held. No, in a form, based on the idea\nof the ethical manifold, in which it can be restated. In the scholastic\nform it runs: \u201cThere is such a thing as the idea of a perfect being.\nExistence is an element of perfection. If the perfect being did not\nexist it would be less than perfect. But the _ens realissimum_, the\nperfect being, is present as an idea in the mind. Therefore it exists.\u201d\nThe disproof of this amounts to the curt statement that what exists in\nthe mind does not necessarily exist outside of it, or, as Kant put it:\n\u201cThe idea of 100 thalers in the head of a man is one thing, lacking no\nelement of conceptual integrity; while the existence of the 100 thalers\nin the man\u2019s purse is an entirely different matter.\u201d The evidence of\nexistence, in other words, depends on the synthesis of the data of\nsense as arranged in the space and time manifold in accordance with the\ncategories of the understanding. Existence is temporal and spatial. To\nprove that God exists we should have to prove that he exists in the\nworld of the senses. Of any other kind of existence we are agnostic.\nKant\u2019s disproof of the Ontological Argument thus depends on his\nagnosticism.\n\nBut suppose that on ethical grounds we find ourselves compelled to\naffirm that there is an object which has worth, and that to account for\nthe inviolableness, indispensableness and preciousness of this object\nwe are compelled to give free rein to the reality-producing functions,\nand to place this object having worth as a member in a manifold\nnot spatial and temporal but infinite: and suppose we say that the\nexistence of this worth-endowed object, of this ethical unit with its\ncompeers, is as certain as the notion of rightness is certain, have we\nnot then without blame widened the conception of existence, and placed\nthe Ontological Argument where Kant\u2019s disproof does not even touch\nit?[36]\n\nOne more important remark is here in place, suggested by Kant\u2019s\ndesignation of God as the ideal of reason, and by his designation of\nour highest nature as the rational nature.\n\nIs \u201crational\u201d equivalent to intellectual? If it be so, then feeling\nmust be classed as irrational, and impulse likewise, since neither\nfeeling nor impulse is subject to logical rules. And then the war will\nbe on between the intellectualists or rationalists and the champions of\nirrational conceptions of life, since feeling and impulse actually make\nup the major part of life, and can neither be left out of account nor\ncompressed into intellectualist formulas.[37]\n\nPlainly, there is a deep misunderstanding between the two parties. An\nerror is involved somewhere. It appears to consist in assuming that\nobjectivity can be supplied only by the intellect, in overlooking the\nfact that the feelings and still more the volition possess intrinsic\ncontrols and norms of their own, that Science, the work of the\nintellect, and art and ethics, spring from a common root, namely,\nthe reality-producing functions. The manifolds with which each of\nthe three respectively deals are different, the methods of synthesis\nare different, but the root principle, synthesis of the manifold, is\nidentical in all.\n\nTo describe our highest nature, therefore, as the rational nature is\nperilous, since the word rational suggests intellectual. Either we must\nstrain the signification of reason to include feeling and will, which\nis contrary to common usage, or we should select some other term, such\nas _spiritual_, to designate that nature within us which operates in\nscience and art and achieves its highest manifestation in producing the\nethical ideal.\n\nFinally, if what has been said regarding the ethical manifold holds\ngood, then a genuine philosophy of life can only be reached by the\nethical approach to the problems of life. This has never yet been\nconsistently attempted. The approach has been made from the scientific\nor the logical side, or as in the case of Plato from the \u00e6sthetic,\nor as in modern times from the biological. Yet the ethical approach\nis full of promise. A philosophy of physical nature may be feasible\nwithout it, a philosophy of art may be possible without it, but not so\na philosophy of life. It has not been tried because ethics has lain\nin the lap of theology, which was itself corrupted by the attempt to\napply to ethical problems the inadequate principle of causality in the\nform of creation theories, while again in recent times, by way of\nreaction against theology, the solution of ethical questions is sought\nfor in the empirical disciplines where a measure at least of objective\ncertainty has rewarded the investigators. Even Kant, who asserted\nthe independence of ethics, actually made it dependent on Newtonian\nscience. The great task now is, strictly to carry out the idea of the\nindependence of ethics, not indeed as if its principles were unrelated\nto those of science and art, but in the sense of independently\ninvestigating the problems _peculiar_ to ethical consciousness. I am\nwell aware that the attempt made in this volume to take the ethical\nline of approach to a general philosophy of life, is tentative and\ndefective in a hundred ways, nevertheless it is an attempt in a new\ndirection.\n\nIn the next book I shall take up the practical consequences that\nfollow from the theory here advanced. Having delineated the ethical\nideal, and discovered the invaluable fact that there is a structural\nplan contained in it, we shall see that our actual human duties\nmay be derived by applying this ideal scheme to the quasi-organic\ngroups already existing in human society. There are provocative\ncorrespondences to the ethical ideal in the social life of men;\notherwise it would be impossible to apply it. There are human groups\nin which a quasi-correlative membership in a common life already\nexists. In the case of each of these groups we find some sort of\nempirical multiplicity which must be studied scientifically, and also\nan empirical motive which may be utilized in the interest of developing\nthe ethical relation. The family is the first of these groups which\noffers a footing in the world of experience for the ideal. In the\nfamily natural affection is the motive; in the vocational group, the\ndesire to express a talent or special gift; in the state, patriotism;\nin the church, the need felt to integrate all human ideals.\n\nThus the things of earth are to be used as instrumentalities by\nwhich we are to become aware of the spiritual reality. Only that the\ndisparateness of the physical world and the ethical universe should\never be kept in the foreground. Every effort to solve the riddle by\nsomehow identifying the two has failed. To account for the existence of\na finite world of indefinite extensibility side by side with a universe\n_ex hypothesi_ infinite is impossible. Instead of seeking to explain\nlet effort go toward utilizing. Let the _world_ be used instrumentally\nfor the purpose of verifying the existence of _universe_.\n\nFor the average man, and indeed for all men, the test of the truth of\na theory is in the practice to which it leads. Abstract metaphysical\narguments appeal only to a few, and even for them the formula in its\nabstract guise is unconvincing. Look at the mathematical figure, and\nsee whether the axioms hold good. Look at the sequent phenomena and see\nwhether the so-called law of nature is exemplified. And so with respect\nto conduct: look at the ways of human behavior traced out in accordance\nwith the plan of the ethical manifold, and see whether such behavior\nwins the approval of the spiritual nature implicit within you.[38]\n\n\n NOTE I\n\n There are various points at which the system sketched in the text\n deviates from current opinion, but in regard to the underlying\n proposition the reader\u2019s particular attention is called to the remarks\n on the \u201cprejudice of causality\u201d and to the statement that verification\n is exemplification.\n\n How can ethical truth be verified? How can we be sure that ethical\n ideals are more than fine wishes, expressing subjective aspiration,\n but having no counterpart in the ultimate constitution of things? This\n is the dark doubt that haunts the minds of ethical writers, as well\n as of the average man. We ask to have the things we believe in, the\n objects of our supreme aspiration, verified. How can they be verified?\n\n I think that we shall see light in this matter once we have grasped\n the thought that verification, both in science and in ethics, is\n nothing more than exemplification. In the case of causality, in\n science, verification does not consist in mere recurrence. For if\n we find, even by a single carefully guarded experiment, that a\n given phenomenon A is the true antecedent of B, then we take leave\n to predict that B will always follow A, without regard to the\n repetition of the sequence in our experience.[39] Indeed, no amount\n of repetition would justify prediction. The problem in the case of\n causality is to determine the true antecedent and the true consequent.\n For at any moment there are innumerable phenomena that might possibly\n be antecedents of B. How obtain certainty that A is the causal\n antecedent? By the synthetic process. We assume a unity, say energy.\n We assume that there are differenti\u00e6, say a certain mathematically\n determined quantum of mechanical energy in A, and a determined\n quantum of thermal energy in B. No sooner have these differenti\u00e6\n been mathematically determined, than in virtue of the assumed unity\n of energy underlying the differences, we pronounce the nexus to be\n necessary. We predict that B will always follow A.\n\n Causality, therefore, is an example of a synthesis which over-arches\n sequences. The fact that the phenomena are sequent does not affect the\n principle involved. Whenever we contemplate an example of synthesis,\n that is, defined differenti\u00e6 of some sort, and a defined underlying\n unity of some sort, the mind affirms that reality exists. There\n are degrees of reality. The degree of completeness with which the\n synthetic function is carried out in any instance determines the\n degree.\n\n Ethical verification is likewise exemplification, though in another\n sense. When the ideal plan of ethical relations is presented, the\n ideal plan being a synthesis not of sequences but of all co-existent\n entities whatsoever, the mind assents to this ideal plan as\n representing the complete synthesis or the complete reality. The\n more explicitly and definitely the relation between the ethical\n units is conceived, the greater the conviction of reality resulting.\n Now frustration after partial achievement has the effect of making\n more explicit the idea of the plan of relations as it ought to be\n carried out in human life. And in this sense I would have the reader\n understand the main practical argument of the book\u2014that frustration\n is the condition of our intensified conviction as to the reality of\n the supersensible universe.\n\n In virtue of the constitution of our minds we cannot help\n acknowledging as real that which is synthesized. Synthesized and\n real are synonymous terms. Hence the idea of the completed synthesis\n necessarily is the idea of the ultimate reality.\n\n\n NOTE II\n\n The three principal respects wherein Kant has failed to justify his\n affirmation that every human being is to be regarded as an end _per\n se_, and not to be used as a tool, are:\n\n 1. Out of the bare experience of oughtness, absolute constraint, he\n seeks to derive personality. Out of the empty categorical imperative\n he seeks to draw a substantive entity\u2014a being possessed of worth.\n\n 2. The society of ends _per se_ described by him is not a true\n society, but a collection of atomic individuals juxtaposed. The\n capital flaw in his ethics is here. He begins by detaching the\n individual. He studies the individual, and discovers, or believes\n himself to have discovered, that something happens in him (the\n consciousness of absolute constraint) which entitles him to be\n considered worth while on his own account.\n\n Next, since the formula of university proposes imitability by others\n as the test of a moral act, all others are called in as concomitants\n of the detached atom first considered. Each of the concomitants in\n turn is an atomic entity. It is in this mechanical way that the\n conception of a kingdom of ends, or a holy community, is supposed\n to be validated. Kant\u2019s mistake is to assume that an individual\n regarded as an isolated being can be worth while, can be an end _per\n se_. The notion of end involves relation to others, not mechanical\n juxtaposition, but intrinsic connection. No one is worth while by\n himself. He has worth only as an organic member of a spiritual whole.\n The unique quality which lends him incomparable distinction is the\n creative life which emanates from him and quickens cognate but\n diversely modified life in his associates.\n\n 3. Kant\u2019s version of the ethical rule is strong on the side of\n interdiction, but quite inadequate on the positive side. He tells us\n that we are to look on others not merely as means to our own ends, but\n also ends _per se_. The vagueness is in the formula \u201cnot merely ...\n but also.\u201d Where the dividing line is to be drawn he does not tell. I\n am at liberty to use the services of others in the prosecution of my\n own interests, as they may use mine, since we are social beings and\n dependent on one another. But how far may I go in this direction? On\n this point we are left wholly in the dark. Kant admits into his system\n the so-called natural ends,[40] such as wealth, culture and the like,\n gives them leave to abound, only with the proviso that they may not\n overpass a certain limit,\u2014the limit beyond which they would interfere\n with the rights of fellowmen. An instrumental view of wealth, science,\n culture, as positively promoting the ethical end of man, he does not\n and cannot establish.[41] But the instrumental view is precisely that\n in which modern society has most at stake, on the working out of\n which the solution of our most pressing problems,\u2014such as the labor\n problem, the problem of the family, the problem of patriotism and\n international relations\u2014is entirely dependent. If Kant has failed at\n this point, as I believe he has, his usefulness as a guide in the\n reconstruction of modern life is seriously diminished. What he had\n set out to demonstrate, the inalienable worth of man, remains; but\n foundations other than his must be found. For the formula \u201cnot merely\n as a means but also as an end\u201d I would substitute: Treat every man\n as a spiritual means to thine own spiritual end and conversely ...\n treat the extent and the manner in which we are to use one another as\n means being determined by the criterion that our exchange of services\n shall conduce to the attainment of each other\u2019s ends as ethical beings\n conjointly.\n\n\n NOTE III\n\n I would also ask the reader to consider well the effect upon the\n philosophy of life of the position taken throughout this volume that\n there is no intellectual bridge between the finite order and the\n infinite order. This involves dropping creation at the beginning and\n immortality in its usual sense at the end. Creation is an attempt to\n show how the world, including man, proceeded out of the infinite.\n Immortality is an attempt to express how man returns to the infinite.\n In this volume man\u2019s dealings with the finite order are represented\n as having for their purpose the achievement of the conviction that\n there verily is an infinite life, a supersensible universe. Creation\n systems, pantheistic systems, certain evolutionary systems, also\n the Hegelian system, are futile attempts to explain the How. But\n explanation is impossible; for to explain means to understand, and to\n understand means to trace an effect to its cause. And causality is not\n the kind of synthesis applicable to a co-existent totality.\n\n Among practical consequences note the difference between the theistic\n attitude in fatal sickness and the spiritual attitude.[42] The theist\n presupposes that there is a God to whose will he must patiently\n submit. But theism is a principle of explanation, the God-idea being\n employed to account for the finite order. God is thus made responsible\n for the suffering of the sick as well as for all other evils in the\n world. Hence the very idea which is presupposed in order to produce\n patience raises up doubts and perplexities, which imperil patience.\n If God made the world why does he permit pain and evil? The spiritual\n attitude, on the contrary, ethically interpreted, does not presuppose\n the idea of a divine order as a dogma, but offers it as the product\n of the experience of suffering itself. The conviction that there is\n in man an essential spiritual self, a holy thing, and a spiritual\n universe, a holy community, are not gifts to which we fall heir at\n birth, or by some sort of revelation borrow from the experience of\n ancient teachers; they are a supreme good to be arduously worked out\n by ourselves. And the interpretation given to the facts of suffering\n and frustration is that they can be used as the means of bringing to\n birth in us that supreme conviction.\n\n In general it may be said that the purpose of existence, both of the\n individual and of the race, is so to work in the finite world as to\n become possessed with ever greater distinctness of the conviction\n of the reality of the wholly real world, the infinite supersensible\n universe.\n\n The attitude of the Christian is other-worldly. He shuns intimacy\n with the finite world and turns his face toward his \u201ctrue home.\u201d The\n attitude herein described is that of hearty attack upon the business\n of life, and close embrace of all the partial reality which finite\n experience contains, with a view of thus acquiring in some measure an\n appreciation of the utter reality of which these partial realities are\n hints and glimmerings.\n\n\n NOTE IV\n\n In the case of any new theory, it is true that one must live with it\n for a considerable time before acquiring the habit of thinking in\n accordance with it. The older habits constantly crop up and interfere\n with the correct understanding of any new point of view. This is\n especially so of a new attitude towards reality. The world seems\n topsy-turvy to one who learns for the first time that grass and the\n leaves of trees are not really green apart from the eye that sees\n them, that beings with different organs might interpret differently\n that which stimulates the human eye to its specific color reactions.\n The heliocentric theory, when first announced by Copernicus, outraged\n na\u00efve commonsense. It exacted a new habit of thinking in regard to\n the relation of the sun to the earth,\u2014the real relation, apprehended\n by intercalated mental processes being the direct opposite of the\n apparent relation. The sun evidently revolves around the earth,\n nevertheless the truth is that the earth revolves around the sun.\n\n Modern science reveals behind the palpable world around us\n unimaginable fluids, speeds, and physical units which are so\n sublimated in thought as to be barely distinguishable from\n metaphysical entities. The habit of penetrating with radium-like\n glance the concrete screen of things, and of seeing behind the screen\n the company of atoms, ions, etc., may be gradually acquired; but the\n older habit of regarding the palpable and visible as the truly real\n continues to assert itself in conflict with the new habit.\n\n The ethical unit in an ethical manifold postulated in the text as the\n closest, though still symbolic, reading of the ultimate reality, makes\n a similar demand upon the reader, and requires of him in like manner\n the formation of a new habit of thinking, against which the older\n habits will doubtless continue to protest.\n\n The most obstinate of the older habits that stand in the way has\n been dealt with in the note on causality, namely,\u2014the unscientific\n habit of ignoring the boundaries of science, and of taking the method\n employed in the physical sciences as the sole method that leads to\n certainty. The prejudice of causality is probably ineradicable, just\n as the illusion that the sun revolves about the earth persists. But\n we can at least reach the point of realizing that it is a prejudice,\n and to this extent overcome it. If it be synthesis, or the employment\n in inseparable conjunction of the two functions mentioned, that for\n the human mind spells reality, then one kind of synthesis called\n causality, that of sequent phenomena, does not exclude the ampler,\n though ideal synthesis, which is carried out in the mental production\n of the ethical manifold. So much I wish to add to the statements\n contained in the text in regard to the theory.\n\n But there is also a new habit to be acquired in regard to the\n practical ethical consequences of the theory. The chief of these is\n the prizing of distinctive difference above uniformity or sameness.\n The ethical quality is that quality in which a man is intrinsically\n unique. The ethical act is the most completely individualized act (I\n ought perhaps to say personalized, but the completely individualized\n act _is_ that of a unique personality). In brief, the emphasis is\n here put on that in which a man differs from all others, and not on\n the common nature which he shares with the rest; or rather, since the\n common nature is not denied, the stress is put on the intrinsically\n different mode in which the common nature is expressed in him.[43]\n\n The accentuation in current ethical discussion of the common nature of\n man, and the fallacious assumption that the common interests are the\n pre-eminently moral interests, that uniformity is the test of ethical\n quality, is easy to understand. It is the reaction of the modern world\n against feudalism, a social system not yet entirely outgrown, in\n which the empirical differences of rank and birth were made the basis\n of intolerably oppressive discriminations, and in which it was an\n accepted axiom that some men are baked of better clay than others. It\n is also a reaction against the capitalistic system that has taken the\n place of the feudal, in which wealth is to a considerable extent made\n the standard of social appraisement.\n\n It is against these false discriminations that the voice of humanity\n is now indignantly raised, affirming the moral equality of all men.\n But equality is mistakenly taken to mean likeness in the sense of\n sameness, not in the sense of that fundamental likeness on the\n background of which the desirable unlikenesses stand forth. And this\n notion of equality as identical with sameness leads to great practical\n aberrations. Thus, for instance, women are not only to be recognized\n as the equals of men, but are to be the same as men,\u2014their education\n patterned on that of men, their specific functions, as far as\n possible, ignored. For unlikeness is supposed to connote inferiority,\n and inferiority is justly repelled as morally intolerable. But aside\n from this one example, the stressing of the common nature, or of the\n basis of likeness at the expense of the outstanding unlikenesses,\n leads to other leveling tendencies of which modern democracies\n furnish many unpleasing illustrations. Thus uniform popular opinion,\n encompassing the individual on every side, penetrates into his inmost\n thinking, so that he hardly ventures to hold to his own judgment\n against the judgments of the majority. And the impulses of the mass\n tend also to threaten his independence in action. There is indeed a\n certain intoxication in the very sense of being submerged in a large\n whole, a certain glad loss of self in great impersonal movements, a\n certain strain of democratic pantheism, as it were, that takes the\n place with some of mystic absorption in Deity. But whatever the value\n that may attach to these upswellings of feeling, it is counterbalanced\n by the circumstance that in proportion as indiscriminate devotion to\n society as a whole becomes the paramount motive, the sub-organisms of\n society, the family, the vocation and the state, in which the ethical\n personality is ripened, are threatened with effacement. Instead of\n moral equality it were better to use the term \u201cmoral equivalence.\u201d The\n differences are to be stressed; they are the coruscating points in the\n spiritual life of mankind. That every man is the equal of his fellows\n means that he has the same right as each of the others to become\n unlike the others, to acquire a distinct personality, to contribute\n his one peculiar ray to the white light of the spiritual life.\n\n FOOTNOTES:\n\n [34] I do not however agree with those who regard the shreds of\n theology remaining in his system as a concession, not wholly\n ingenuous, to orthodoxy. He was brought up in the pietistic faith,\n and had probably not entirely outgrown the emotional impressions\n of those early teachings. The noumena, however, play a part in the\n system itself distinct from the theology, and are not to be taken as\n supersensible realities. They are limiting concepts intended to serve\n as incentives or lures, winning the mind to continue without cessation\n its advance along certain paths within the field of experience;\n but they are not supposed to give any clue as to what is beyond\n experience. That which is beyond the field of experience is simply\n unknowable. Thus the noumenon called \u201cthing _per se_\u201d is notice given\n to the mind not to be deterred in its proper business of unifying the\n space and time manifold by the difficulties which arise when the time\n and space manifold is taken as an ultimate account of reality. The\n thing _per se_ is a welcome to science and not a bar set up in its\n path.\n\n The noumenon of freedom is an incentive to man urging him to act\n as if he were capable of practicing the law of universality and\n necessity. In fact the phrase \u201cas if\u201d plays a leading r\u00f4le in the\n Kantian philosophy. The noumenon of God, as will presently be shown,\n is afflicted with this conditional \u201cas if\u201d character to even a higher\n degree. We are to assume God in order to look upon the vast field of\n possible experience as if it were unified, as if a being who himself\n stands for unity had been its creator. This assumption is supposed to\n be necessary in order to encourage the scientist in his search for\n the thread of unity, lest he flag by the way. As a matter of fact\n scientists have contented themselves with the simple assumption of\n the uniformity of nature as necessary to the prosecution of their\n investigations, and have as a rule troubled themselves little to\n hypostasize the notion of unity. Nor has recent progress in science\n been associated with and influenced by the belief in an individual\n Deity. The noumenon of God is unnecessary for science while in Kant\u2019s\n ethical application of it it is positively harmful. He introduces the\n God notion as an artificial device for linking together happiness and\n virtue, a device quite inconsistent with the noble austerity of his\n ethical system, whatever its other defects may be.\n\n The noumena, then, are apparitions that appear at the end of certain\n paths in the field of experience, far off where the sky and the ground\n seem to meet. These paths run off in different directions. At the\n end of each is one of these limiting apparitions, and the society of\n noumena is disconnected internally: there is no relation of unity\n between the unifiers.\n\n [35] The difference between \u201csupersensible\u201d and \u201csupernatural\u201d\n is capital. I do not encourage relapse into supernaturalism. The\n supernatural is the opposite of the supersensible. It is an attempt to\n represent in natural or _sensible_ guise what is supposed to be beyond\n the senses; and the naturalistic representation of the supersensible\n is then taken not metaphorically but literally.\n\n [36] He allows indeed the _Ens Realissimum_ to remain, and calls it\n the ideal of the reason, the ideal of unity hypostasized, centralized\n in an individual, and somehow harboring within itself all real\n properties whatsoever. But it is quite impossible to conceive how all\n real properties can belong to a single individual. For the properties\n as we know them are incompatible with each other. Surely an individual\n cannot be both great and small, beautiful and ugly, of all colors and\n sounds, etc., etc. Or again if all properties were somehow assembled\n in one individual, since that individual is conceived of as an\n hypostasized unity, it would be impossible to speak of a relation\n between them, and yet upon the relation of the differenti\u00e6 depends the\n ethical utility of the idea of a supreme reality.\n\n [37] Compare, for instance, the anti-intellectualistic philosophy\n of Bergson, with its emphasis on planless spurts of energy, the\n irrationalist philosophy of Schopenhauer, etc.\n\n [38] The above exposition is not a transcendental derivation of\n ethics. The ideal of the infinite society is a fulguration _out\n of_ ethical experience, to be ever renewed _in it_. We build not\n only our world, but our universe. The ethical principle is not a\n working hypothesis, like those provisionally used in science. It is\n the outgrowth of the functional finalities. It is a postulate. The\n specific moral laws, or expressions of the ethical principle indeed,\n are changeable, being the product of the principle with the varying\n empirical conditions of human society. The fundamental principle is\n unchangeable.\n\n The consciousness of universal interrelation is not to be described as\n mystical consciousness. The identity of the self remains intact; it is\n never lost in the One or the All. The ethical consciousness includes\n indeed the consciousness of other selves related to our own, in a kind\n of superindividual consciousness. But this is reached along the sunlit\n path of action (So _act_, etc.), and not along the dreamy flux of\n emotionalism or in the silent depths of quietism.\n\n [39] The frequent recurrence gives us a sense of safety in expecting\n the consequent on the appearance of the antecedent. But the sense of\n safety should not be confounded with the sense of the certainty. We\n expect that day will follow night, because it has followed innumerable\n times. But no amount of repetition can warrant the assertion that it\n will and must do so. The Pragmatist view explains the sense of safety\n in expectation, but does not appear to account for the certainty in\n prediction, as for instance in the astronomer\u2019s prediction of an\n eclipse.\n\n [40] A hybrid conception, since in nature there are only happenings,\n but no ends.\n\n [41] His efforts in some measure to remedy this defect in the Doctrine\n of Virtue are artificial and unconvincing.\n\n [42] See Book III for a fuller development of this point.\n\n [43] Difference in the ethical meaning is not to be confounded with\n mere idiosyncrasy, or originality, not to say eccentricity. It is\n the kind of difference which elicits correlated difference in all\n spiritual associates.\n\n\n\n\n BOOK III\n\n APPLICATIONS: THE THREE SHADOWS, SICKNESS, SORROW AND SIN, AND THE\n RIGHT TO LIFE, PROPERTY AND REPUTATION\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\nThree main thoughts should be kept clear: the end to be realized, the\nincongruity of the finite and the infinite order, and hence, thirdly,\nthe indispensable ministry of frustration in the realization of the\npurpose of life.\n\nIn regard to the so-called moral end of life, there has been much\nvariety and contrarity of teaching. I shall touch only upon that\naspect of the doctrine expounded in the previous book wherein it seems\nto resemble other doctrines, and where a distinct statement of the\ndifference is therefore imperative. \u201cSo act as to develop the faculties\nof thy fellowman\u201d is not the rule proposed. \u201cSo act as to develop\nthe so-called good qualities in the man\u201d is not the rule proposed.\nThe rule reads, \u201cAct so as to bring out the spiritual personality,\nthe unique nature of the other.\u201d Now, in putting the matter in this\nway, we incurred the danger of seeming to concentrate attention on\nthe individual as a detached being, we seemed to have him only in\nmind, though it is true, in respect to what is intrinsic in him, the\nirreducible ethical unit which he essentially is. We must, therefore,\nconstantly remind ourselves that the ethical unit, while unique, is\nat the same time an inseparable member of a society of differentiated\nunits; that its very distinctiveness consists in injecting, as it\nwere, streams of dynamic energy into its fellow-beings. Or, as I have\nelsewhere figuratively put it, the distinctiveness of any ethical\nbeing consists, so to speak, in emitting a ray the color of which is\nnowhere else to be found, the miraculous quality of which consists in\nacquiring this color at the very instant in which it causes counter or\ncomplementary colors to appear in its fellow-being. (I am using the\nwords \u201cinstant,\u201d \u201cmiraculous,\u201d \u201cray of light,\u201d etc., of course, in a\nwholly figurative sense.)\n\nWe have at last, this is my belief, achieved a positive definition of\nthe spiritual nature. The spiritual nature is that which forever is\nsocial in a supra-social sense, as embracing not only human society,\nbut a universal society of spirits. The spiritual nature is that\nof which the very life consists in starting up unlike but equally\nworthwhile life elsewhere, everywhere. The spiritual experience to get\nhold of, therefore, is the consciousness of this interrelation.\n\nThe moral end to be realized, in accordance with the deductions\nof Book II, is \u201cSo to act upon another as to evoke in him, and\nconjointly in oneself, in the same movement and counter-movement the\nconsciousness of the interlacedness of life with life, the reciprocal,\nuniversal, infinite interrelatedness.\u201d\n\nNow, as a fact, we never realize this end. If we did we should possess\nwhat alone is properly called freedom,\u2014freedom in the positive sense\nbeing the exercise of power peculiar to ourselves, welling up out of\nour veriest self, and executing the totality of its effects. Freedom is\nmarked by these two signs: energy coming unborrowed out of self, and\nproducing the totality of its effects. I am free when the thing I do\nis verily my own, when the power released is the power of my essential\nself; and when that power is nowhere checked, inhibited or interrupted,\nso that it produces its due, that is, its universal effects.\n\nAn ethical being in an ethical universe would be free. The dynamic\nenergy proceeding from it would be aboriginal. And since it would\nradiate upon every other member of the infinite society, it would also\nproduce the unstinted plenitude of its effects. Each ethical unit, at\nits station, would be at once the _producer and the recipient of the\ntotality of life_.[44]\n\nIt is apparent from what has been said that the superlative, sublime\nthing, freedom, is not realizable except in an infinite world. And\nhence that the supreme end to be realized by man as a finite being\ncannot be the full release of unique power in himself. But neither can\nthe end be approximation. In so serious a business as a philosophy of\nlife we ought not to play with words, nor delude ourselves with the\nimplication of proximity seemingly contained in the word approximation.\nFor it being admitted that we cannot reach the ideal, approximation\nseems to suggest that we come into its neighborhood. But the truth\nis that the more we advance the less do we arrive in the immediate\nneighborhood of the ideal, the distance at which it lies becoming ever\nmore remote. The moral end, therefore, for a finite nature, like that\nof man, is just to realize the unattainableness of the end. There must\nbe no heaven-on-earth illusions, no resting in the development of our\ninadequate human faculties, and no illusions as to approximation. The\nunattainableness of the infinite end in the finite world by the finite\nnature is the Alpha and Omega of the doctrine, as I propound it. Only\nafter this truth has been fully faced and recognized, shall we be in\na position to take in the vast significance of the fact that we are\nnevertheless under a certain coercion to persist in our efforts to\nattain the unattainable, and in inquiring into the source from which\nthis pressure comes, we shall be led to infer the influence in us of\nan infinite nature enshrined in this finite nature of ours. In other\nwords, to admit the unattainableness of the end in a finite world by\na finite being is the very condition of our acquiring the conviction\nthat there is an infinite world, and that we, as possessing an infinite\nnature, are included in it.[45]\n\nI have now covered the points mentioned: the end to be realized,\nthe incongruity of the two orders, and the cardinal importance of\nfrustration as a spiritual experience, as a means of spiritual\neducation.\n\nFrom this point of view the whole question of how to deal with the\nfrustrations of life assumes a new aspect. Lessing published his\nwell-known essay on the Education of the Race towards the close of the\neighteenth century.[46] Interest in the subject has since been obscured\nby the scientific movement, and especially by the evolutionary\nphilosophy. The latter excludes the idea of education in the proper\nsense, and substitutes for it a natural process, a genetic unfolding.\nThe education of the human race, and of the human individual from the\nspiritual point of view consists in a series of efforts never to be\nintermitted, but not necessarily following each other in an orderly\nseries, aiming to embody the infinite in the finite.\n\nBoth partial success and failure in these efforts are instrumental\nto the achievement of the task of mankind. Both serve to make more\nexplicit the character and extent of the ideal, while the ultimate\ninevitable failure painfully instructs man in the fact of the\nincongruity of the two orders. The only outcome of human history that\nwe can view with satisfaction on a large scale, is the same as that\nwhich we should regard as the best outcome of an individual life,\nnamely, the growing conviction and the clearer vision of the eternal\nspiritual universe as real. We might say that that man had lived best\nwho on his deathbed could declare with perfect truth: \u201cI have achieved\nthe certainty, and in through the vicissitudes of my life, that there\nis a universe.\u201d I here emphasize again the distinction between universe\nand world. To say that the universe is \u201cgood\u201d is equivocal. The term\n\u201cgood,\u201d as commonly used, describes the moral striving of a finite\nnature, and not the quality that belongs to the spiritual universe\nand its members, thinking of them as ideally we must, as freed from\nfinite limitation. Of the spiritual universe, we might use the term\n\u201csupra-good,\u201d only we should then be careful to add that the \u201cbeyond\ngood\u201d is to be conceived as lying in the direction of the good, while\ntranscending it. Thereby we avoid the pitfall of Nietzsche and of\nothers who speak in a totally different sense of the \u201cbeyond good and\nevil.\u201d We read of a man blessing his children on his deathbed. The\nhighest type of man is the one who _in articulo mortis_ can bless the\nuniverse.\n\nThe discrepancy of the finite and the infinite order appears on the\nphysical and moral sides. On the physical side it thrusts itself upon\nour attention in the circumstance that juxtaposition and sequence are\nincapable of being unified, or totalized. Space and time and that\nwhich fills them, matter, are by nature incongruous with spirit. On\nthe moral side the incongruity appears in the deflecting forces of\nappetite and passion which hinder us in the attainment of the spiritual\nend and in the fact that our so-called higher faculties are in\nirreconcilable conflict with one another. The harmonious union of all\nof them in any individual is a fiction. It is impossible to be fully\ndeveloped on all sides. And in addition the social substrata in which\nthe spiritual relation has to be worked out, are themselves too deeply\nbeset with internal contrarieties to serve their purpose adequately.\nThe sex relation, for instance, is to a certain extent favorable to the\nachievement of spirituality, that is, of living in the life of another;\nyet on the other hand there are elements in it that defeat this very\nobject.\n\nI write, therefore, at the head of such words of counsel as I can hope\nto give in respect to the conduct of life, the word _Frustration_.\nIt is understood that this word is not used in the pathetic sense.\nFirst because there is partial achievement, moments in life at which\nthe rainbow actually seems to touch the earth. Love and marriage, the\ncompleting of a beautiful work of art, the discovery of a new law of\nnature, the emancipation of an oppressed class, are examples. But these\npartial successes are presently seen to be partial; they are followed,\nor even in the moment of triumph, permeated, with the sense of\nincompleteness and the foreboding of new obscurities and perplexities\nadvancing upon the mind. Yet essentially the doctrine is not a\nmelancholy doctrine, because frustration, though a painful instrument,\nis yet a necessary instrument of spiritual development. We are not open\nto the reproach of dampening the zest and relish for life of those who\nare setting out to try the hazard of their fortunes. They shall put\nforth their best effort to succeed, but let them be so guided herein\nthat they may meet in the right attitude of mind the disillusionment\nwhich is the condition of the revelation. The shadows will and must\ndescend before they can be parted, disclosing the landscape of the\nspiritual universe.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[44] Incidentally it may be remarked that in introducing the category\nof interrelation we remove the objection against freedom which remains\nunmitigable so long as freedom is supposed to be a kind of causality,\ncompeting with natural causality. Causality is the unity of a temporal\nmanifold of sequent phenomena. The concept of interrelation is the\nconcept of the unity of co-existent entities.\n\n[45] See some fine remarks on the unattainableness in Tyrrel\u2019s\n_Christianity at the Cross-roads_.\n\n[46] _Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts._\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nTHE THREE GREAT SHADOWS: SICKNESS, SORROW, SIN\n\n\nHaving concentrated attention upon the point that the end is not the\ndevelopment of any particular faculty or assemblage of faculties,\nbut the awakening in man, in and through his development, of the\nconsciousness of interrelation, of life in life, we shall now turn to\nthe three great shadows: sickness, sorrow, sin. In the case of sickness\nthe suffering, however acute, must be made to pass over into action.\nThere is a certain work to be done, something to be accomplished on the\nsick bed. What is it? I shall briefly review a few of the answers that\nhave been given.\n\nFirst, the Stoic says: A man in pain is to resist the pain by an act\nof will, thereby demonstrating that his essential self is inaccessible\nto bodily suffering. \u201cIf there is a pain in thy limb, remember that\nthe pain is in thy limb, and not in thyself.\u201d Now the fortitude of the\nStoic is admirable as far as it goes; his counsels are bracing and\nmanly. But, because he is a materialistic pantheist, the reason he\ngives for his defiance of pain is not convincing. In effect his appeal\nis rather to the empirical than to the spiritual nature of man. The\nspiritual nature is characterized by humility; the appeal of the Stoic\nis to pride. Fate with all its sledgehammer blows shall not crush him.\nYet the Stoic\u2019s pride when put to the supreme test does not avail, and\nthe proof of it is that at the last it breaks down in suicide.\n\nWe come to a second answer. There is business in hand for the sufferer\non the sick bed. What is the business? To hide the expression of his\nsuffering, so that the cloud which rests on him may not cast its shadow\nupon others, obscuring their sunshine. But, we are bound to ask, are\nothers always worthy of such consideration? Is not our sympathetic\nregard for their pleasures, their sunshine, often misplaced? Are not\ntheir pleasures often selfish and frivolous? The Greeks believed that\noutcries in situations of great distress are perfectly legitimate,\nsince they seem to afford a kind of relief. Is it not cruel to forbid\nsuch outcries? In our age the view prevails that it is a proof of moral\ngrandeur to suppress the signs of suffering. But the cynical question\nobtrudes itself whether it may not be the collective selfishness of the\nmultitude that imposes this rule. The common run of men desire to go\non their way undisturbed by cries that emanate from the sick chamber,\nand perhaps it is on this account that they impose a rule of behavior\nbased, not on the principle of human worth, but on its opposite. The\nindividual forsooth is not to count; the unhappiness of one is not to\ninterfere with the happiness of the greater number!\n\nThere is, however, another view of the matter possible. Everyone\ncarries his own particular burden. When tortured by some painful\nmalady, we are apt to think that others, because they wear a smiling\nexterior, are therefore free from pain. But often those who seem in\nsound health are in fact as great sufferers as we, or even greater. And\nphysical pain is not the only kind of suffering. Why, then, should I,\nfor one, add to the troubles of others by imposing my own upon them?\nPut in this way, it is plain that there is an ethical element in the\nkind of behavior that is expected of a manly person. But the reason\nassigned, sympathy with the pleasures of others, is unconvincing.\nUnless there be some good to which grievous suffering can be made\ninstrumental, there is no warrant for enduring it. As for the Stoics,\nso for the philosopher of sympathy, the logical end would be suicide,\nat least when the pain is exceptionally intense.\n\nThere is a third answer. Something is to be worked out on the sick bed.\nWhat is it? To be purified in the furnace, to learn patience and humble\nsubmission to the inscrutable will of God. Patience is the supreme\nvirtue. \u201cBe patient, Oh, be patient,\u201d I once heard a dying man repeat\nwith touching accents. But patience for the sake of what? There must be\nsome object to be gained by the patience to make it commendable. I can\nbe patient in a storm at sea if I may entertain the hope of reaching\nport. I can be patient in conducting a difficult scientific experiment\nif I may hope that it will issue in an important discovery, or prepare\nthe way for such discovery by others. I can be patient in sickness if\nI have any reason to expect a return to health. But patience for mere\npatience\u2019s sake is absurd. Well, then, the third answer is,\u2014patience\nfor the sake of manifesting your faith and trust in a wise and\nbeneficent Deity. Why he has sent this suffering, why he has so made\nthe world that it is replete with the agony of sentient creatures we do\nnot know. We cannot know. But he knows. Trust him, have faith in him:\n\u201cThough he slay me yet will I trust him.\u201d\n\nHere a genuine characteristic of the spiritual attitude has been\nexpressed, but the ground on which it is put is once more unconvincing.\nHow do I know that there is such a being as this wise and loving Deity\nof whom you tell me? By the evidence of his works, by the testimony\nof the world he has created, by the life for which I am indebted to\nhim. But the world is the playground of good and evil forces. There\nis a semblance of design; there is on the other hand apparently the\nwildest disorder. The stars in their courses travel with incredible\ncelerity in every direction, but no astronomer has ever yet been\nable to discern a plan in their journeyings. Human life is full of\nsorrow as well as joy; and whether there be more sorrow or more joy\nin the lives of most persons, who will venture to say? There is\nkindness, but there is also cruelty. There is co\u00f6peration, and there\nis merciless competition. There is health and bloom, and there is\nmiserable physical decay. At present, in my case, suffering and sorrow\nare in the ascendant. The picture of the Deity as fashioned from the\nevidence of experience is dark and bright, cruel and kind. If he be\nomnipotent, why did he introduce the elements of discord and trouble\ninto his creation? Why, in particular, does he at present torture me\nso cruelly? In order that I may believe in him despite the evidence!\nBut how can I believe, seeing that in my own case the evidence on the\nbad side preponderates? Thus the mind of the sufferer on his couch\nof pain gropes in the labyrinth of argument and counter-argument\u2014for\nthe intellectual processes are often preternaturally acute in times of\nphysical suffering\u2014and there is no outlet. In a fine spiritual nature\nthere is something which pleads that the counter-arguments ought not\nto prevail. Desperately, by an act of faith, a man lays hold on his\nGod. But presently his faith again relaxes, his state of mind becomes\nconfused, and unless supported by strong impressions received in and\nretained from childhood on, the third answer will not avail him.\n\nThere is business in hand on the sick bed. What is it? The fourth\nanswer, the answer as it appeals to me, depends on the very incongruity\nof the finite and the infinite order. Every attempt to explain this\nincongruity breaks down, every theodicy is a fiction. To explain is to\nfind the cause of effects. But the notion of cause does not apply to\nthe relation between the finite and the infinite. And of the infinite\norder itself we possess only the plan or scheme of relations. The\nmembers of this ideal world are related to one another in such a manner\nthat the essential uniqueness of the one is to be provocative of the\ndiverse distinctiveness of the others. This, as I think, is a very\nfruitful formula, furnishing a rule of conduct to be applied to our\nfinite relations. But it sheds no light on the uniqueness itself, which\nis forever ideal. What in its ultimate constitution our spiritual being\nmay be, remains unknown. Did we know, were we capable of comprehending\nthe infinite order, and seeing things in that supersolar light, we\nmight then be able to solve the insoluble riddle, the coexistence\nside by side of the finite and the infinite. As it is, the problem of\nfiniteness especially in its human aspect of suffering and evil is\nimpenetrable, inexplicable. _But if we cannot explain suffering and\nevil, we can utilize them for a definite spiritual end._ And that end\nis to achieve through the ministry of frustration and the persistence\nof the effort toward the unattainable, the consciousness of the reality\nof the spiritual universe and of our membership in it.\n\nThe answer, therefore, which I should offer, is based on this pivotal\ndistinction between explaining and using. And thus the business in\nhand, the end to be gained, is the intensified realization of our\nspiritual interconnectedness with others, the life in life. To this end\nwe accept from the Stoic, though for a reason which he does not give,\nresistance to pain, and from the philosopher of sympathy the obligation\nof not clouding the life of others with our shadow, and from the\ntheologian the law of patience\u2014and we take a step beyond all three.\n\nLet me carry this out somewhat more in detail. To gain the\nconsciousness of interrelation, there must be an object outside of\nmyself of supreme interest to me, enabling me to transcend the ego.\nNow, pain has the opposite effect, that of concentrating attention\non the ego. Pain builds a prison around us, raises up high walls\nwhich shut us in. Anyone in great pain is incessantly reminded of his\nphysical state. In order that the mind may pass out of the prison\ncell and over the encompassing wall, there needs to be some object\nbeyond the wall appealing enough to solicit the outward movement.\nThis object is the spiritual self of my fellowmen. It is my concern\nfor their spiritual self which is their highest good, it is my eager\nwish to reinforce what is best in them that works the transcendence of\nthe ego and of its pains. In such supreme moments the lesser values\ndwindle into relative insignificance. And what is best in others is\nthe same consciousness on their part of the interrelation. It is this\nthat I am to awaken in them, to strengthen in them by the intensity\nwith which I myself realize it. In the case of loving kin and friends,\nthey, too, suffer with me. In vain I try to hide my sufferings. They\ndivine what I try to suppress; and the more I try to suppress it, the\nmore they suffer with me. They suffer not only with the suffering, but\nwith the attempt to conceal the suffering. I have seen this in the\ncase of a mother at the bedside of her dying daughter. They go with me\nto the brink of life. They enter into the anxieties and forebodings\nthat haunt my mind as I face death. There may be young children that\nstill need fostering care. Dangers to the family may arise after I am\ngone. The more my life is implicated in the lives around me, the more\nas I stand on the edge of life will my thoughts be occupied, not with\nthe obliteration of my empirical self, but with the future of those\nthat survive\u2014that best future of theirs which I long to assure. And\nthey, in turn, if they are fine natures, will pass through this inward\nexperience with me. Thus I descend into the darkness and the depths,\nand they descend with me; and I am also to rise out of the darkness and\nthe depths, and am to gain the force to do this in order that I may\nlift them with me.\n\nThis is the business in hand. I am to draw myself out of the depths,\nto overcome the centralizing, egotizing effects of physical and mental\npain, in order by my effort to make those around me realize the\nintensity with which I feel my interrelatedness with them, and thereby\nto reveal to them the same spiritual power in themselves. Plans for\nthe future education of the children, counsels of peace, by way of\nanticipation for the too lonely hours that await the most loving and\nthe most beloved,\u2014these things have value chiefly in so far as they are\ninsignificant of the indissoluble interlacing of life with life.[47]\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[47] I have spoken of the sick bed as surrounded by loving friends\nand near of kin. There are sick beds where the situation is quite\ndifferent,\u2014in the poor wards of hospitals for instance. Nevertheless,\nthe loneliest person is never without certain human relations. It may\nbe the pauper in the next bed, the nurse, or the physician, to whom his\nbehavior will be of lasting meaning.\n\nI would add a word as to the attitude of a person who is threatened\nwith insanity, and who is aware that the disease is approaching. His\nlast conscious act should be to honor the community to which he belongs\nby voluntarily putting himself out of the way of harming them. Not that\nthe physical harm is itself the principal thing, but that the wish not\nto harm physically is the sign of his sense of the ethical relation in\nwhich he stands to his fellows. Also a person threatened in this way\nought to be willing to put himself in the keeping of others, even of\nstrangers, as being no longer himself competent to judge rightly of\nwhat shall be done to him. It is true that in accepting the judgment of\nstrangers as a substitute for his own he is taking the risk of being\ntreated with insufficient consideration, and possibly even mistreated.\nYet the jeopardy in which he thus puts his future, the sacrificial act\nhe performs, is evidence of mental nobility at the very moment when\nmental night is about to set in for him.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nBEREAVEMENT\n\n\nWhen we reflect on what actually happens in cases of bereavement, we\nshall find great diversity in different situations. It may be that the\ndeceased person has led a worthless life, and that the grave is allowed\nto close over him without much regret. Nevertheless, the honor due to\nworth that _never appeared in him_ ought to be shown. In the worst\ncases we may not treat human beings like animals. Besides, there are\ngenerally one or more persons who seem to have an unreasoning natural\naffection for the wretched being, and so he does not go wholly without\nthe tribute of tears. Others, like sufferers from cancer, pass through\ndays, weeks, months of acute pain before they die. In their case it is\nsaid that death comes as a relief, and often the final relief from the\nsuffering obscures the loss.\n\nAgain, in most men\u2019s lives there is an upper and an under side. Though\nthe public career of statesmen, poets, artists may be dazzling, yet\ntheir faults or obliquities are probably well enough known to those\nwho have seen them at close range. Obituaries are seldom truthful.\nSometimes, however, the reverse happens; men whose names are held up\nto public obloquy are not always as black as they are painted. Their\nworst side becomes known to the public, yet they sometimes possess\nwonderfully fine traits.\n\nVery pathetic is the mourning for a baby, and its unfulfilled promise,\nor for a defective child, long a burden, yet strangely grieved for when\nits feeble little flame of life is extinguished.\n\nThe most poignant sorrow is that which cannot be communicated to others\nor shared by others, because the tie severed by bereavement, like\nthat of husband and wife, is between two only. The loss by death of\na beloved life companion is apt to lead to an inconsolable state of\nmind, because in this relation, when finely interpreted, the empirical\nand the spiritual appear almost to coincide. The ethical rule, Live\nin the life of another, live so as to enhance to the highest degree\nthe possibilities of another, seems almost no longer a counsel of\nperfection but an actual experience. Hence the utter grief into which\nthe sundering of the tie is apt to plunge the survivor. On the other\nhand, Jonathan Edwards said on his deathbed to his wife: \u201cOur relation\nhas been spiritual, and therefore is eternal.\u201d And there is indeed an\nelement of eternality in marriage, only it is not the sex relation as\nsuch that is or can be conceived of as eternal. It is not man and woman\nin their empirical form to which this attribute belongs. Marriage is\nthe sign; the spiritual relation that which is signified.[48]\n\nIt may be objected that marriage being a tie strictly between two, one\ncan hardly think without repugnance of an equally intimate, nay, far\nmore intimate, relation with all spiritual beings whatsoever. Yet the\nspiritual relation is one in which the ethical being is conceived to be\nin touch with each of the infinite beings that comprise the spiritual\nuniverse, pouring its essential life into them, and receiving theirs in\nreturn. Is not then the sign incompatible with and contradictory to the\nthing signified? But it is not of the multitude of mortal men and women\nsurrounding us that we think when we speak of the eternal hosts. From\nthis surrounding swarm of mortals, we retreat, taking refuge in the\ninmost privacy which we share with one other only. Yet this very inmost\nintimacy, so far as it is pure, is the emblem of that pure intercourse\nof essential being with essential being in which we are related to\nall.[49]\n\nFollowing up the subject of bereavement, we find the following\nconsolations employed:\n\nThe first to be mentioned is, \u201cBow to the inevitable.\u201d I include\nthis because frustration is inevitable, on account of the discrepancy\nbetween the finite and the infinite order, and because we are to use\ninevitable frustration for the purpose of experiencing the reality\nof the ideal. But without this use in mind, the inevitable presents\nitself as a mere blind necessity, in which we can see neither right nor\nreason, a hostile doom that simply crushes us. The psychological effect\nof the thought of an event as inevitable, it is true, is in any case\ncalming, but the tranquillity thus induced is a heavy and hopeless one.\nAnd those who accept the inevitable in this stupefying manner often\nbecome meaner in their way of living. The light of life is for them\nextinguished. They put up perhaps with creature comforts, or with work\nthat merely keeps the mind occupied, and prevents it from fretting the\nwound, thus allowing slow time to cicatrize it.\n\nThere is, however, a larger way in which a materialist may regard the\ninevitable. The world in his view being a vast machine, he may, as it\nwere, identify himself with the machine, and thereby rise in thought\nsuperior to the injury it inflicts on him. But though we can imagine\nsomeone thus deadening his feelings when he himself is the victim, we\ncannot well conceive of the same remedy applying when a beloved person,\nsay an only child, is being crushed under the Juggernaut car of the\nworld-machine. _The great test of one\u2019s philosophy of life is whether\nit helps us in the case of those whom we love, rather than in the case\nof the sufferings we experience in our own person._\n\nA second consolation is: Remember the universality of sorrow. Look\naround you, behold the vast multitude who are suffering like you;\nremember the countless generations who have suffered in the past,\nthink of the generations to come that will suffer in like manner. Such\nare some of the consolations of the choruses in the Greek tragedies.\nLatent perhaps in this mournful view of the facts of existence is\nanother aspect of the matter, namely, the uprising from frustration\ntoward ideal realization. And in so far as this other uplifting view is\nindeed latent or suggested, the thought of the universality of sorrow\nhas an ennobling effect. On the other hand, without the explication of\nwhat may be regarded as implicit in them the consolations of the Greek\nchoruses are inexpressibly saddening.\n\nA third and active variant of the former consolation is: Seek to\nmitigate the sorrow and trouble of thy fellow-sufferers. Appease the\npassion of thine own grief by compassion and the works to which it\nleads. And by as much as activity of any kind is better than passivity,\nor mere feeling, by so much is this third kind of consolation better\nthan the ones above mentioned. But at bottom the same criticism applies\nto it. It leaves still unanswered the question, To what end this\nsuffering both of others and of oneself? Not Why? is the question,\nbut To what end? How bereavement may be used so as to bring it into\nrelation with the final end of life?\n\nA fourth consolation is the popular belief in immortality. This\nis a resort to supernaturalism, and the supernatural should ever\nbe distinguished from the supersensible. Immortality as popularly\nheld involves the continued existence in some empirical form of the\nessential, central entity in man. For the suggestion that new organs\nmay replace the wornout terrestrial body does not alter the empirical\ncharacter of the conception. The new organs are still conceived in some\nvague fashion as similar to those with which we are acquainted.\n\nFinally, my own interpretation of consolation may be set forth in\ncontrast to all these. Again I say that for the bereaved, as for the\nsick, there is business in hand, there is a task to be performed, a\nwork to be done. What is it? Let me endeavor to explain. The spiritual\nnature of man is incognizable, only the plan of the relations between\nspirit and spirit being given. Yet to think of a relation at all\nwe must think of entities or objects between which it subsists. Of\nthe spiritual part of our fellow-beings, therefore, we are bound to\nfashion mentally a symbolic image, one that shall stand for the real\nobject, the spiritual nature, though we are well aware that it does not\nadequately express it.\n\nWhen the beloved person is no longer visibly present, the work we do\nupon the symbolic image of him is not to cease. We are to review, to\nsummarize the whole existence of a departed friend, as we have probably\nnever done while he was with us. We are to get the total perspective of\nhis life, to see the fine qualities standing out more distinctly; to\nseize the net result of his existence so far as those character traits\nare concerned which in him were most analogous to spiritual traits.\nThis image we can now ideally contemplate with the advantage that none\nof the actual infirmities of his nature can mar it, and that no future\nevents can henceforth alter our impression. The work of clarifying\nthe image of our friend goes on unimpeded. And our own activity in\nthe process of purifying his image of all that was merely fallible in\nhim benefits us in return. The effect of this activity of ours on the\ndatum of his life is our permanent gain. Thus both what he was and what\nhe was not is stimulative. While he lived we performed the function\nof elimination and concentration with a view of producing progress in\nhim and in ourselves jointly. Progress, induced by us, so far as he\nis concerned, for all we know is at an end. Progress so far as we are\nconcerned is assured by the activity we continue to expend as long as\nwe live on his memory. And the memory, or the image, stands for the\nbeloved person. There is real mental intercourse wherever there is a\nmovement of one mind towards the outgoings of another, even though the\nretroactive relation be suspended. The beloved person benefits me,\nthough I no longer benefit him, except indirectly so far as in my own\nlife I possibly expiate his shortcomings and in so far as I bestow on\nother living persons the advantage I receive from my mental intercourse\nwith him.[50]\n\nWhat, then, is the business in hand? What is the work to be done?\nPlainly to tie anew the threads that were broken, to bring it about\nthat the loss, infinitely painful though it be, shall lead to gain,\nto substitute for the mixed relation of touch and sight the purely\nspiritual relation.\n\nOne more remark must be made in connection with the above. There is\nat present a tendency to dishonor the past in comparison with the\nfuture. Interest seems to lie in what lies ahead. Hence a breathless,\nforward-urging mood. One consequence of this is that the dead are less\nhonored than of old. Within a single generation, for instance, I have\nseen not a few eminent persons in the city of New York pass away who\nup to the time of their death and in their obituaries were greatly and\njustly praised. I have hardly ever seen their names publicly mentioned\nsince. Already they seem practically forgotten. In our national history\nlikewise only a few of the most eminent are remembered. In like manner\nin families, the names even of father and mother are seldom mentioned\nby their surviving adult children, and ancestors at second remove\nare barely remembered. Now excessive reverence for the past, as in\nChina, is a mark of stationariness. A retrospective point of view\nis inconsistent with progress. Our face must necessarily be turned\ntoward the future. And yet forgetfulness of those human beings whom\nwe have known, and who represented to us while they lived much of the\nbest that life had to give, seems inhuman and incredible. It is true\nthat I have drawn a sharp distinction between the empirical selves\nand those spiritual selves which the former for a time enshrined. The\nempirical selves have now disappeared. The gleam of love in the eye,\nthe luster of beauty, whether of form or of expression, that touched\nfor a season the sacred features, have vanished. On the other hand, the\nspiritual self as a member of the spiritual universe is confessedly\npast knowing and past imagining. On what object then shall memory\ndwell? It may dwell on the empirical self in so far as it was the sign\nof the thing signified, in so far as the being we knew and loved was\nto us convincing of the reality of that spiritual world which itself\nis incognizable by sense or mind. The greatest boon any human being\ncan confer on another is to serve him in attaining the end for which\nhe exists; and the supreme end for us all is the realization of our\ninterrelation with the infinite community of spirits. The woman whom\nwe say we loved, we loved precisely because she revealed to us that\nspiritual galaxy\u2014because she was a Beatrice, ascending with us, and\nopening to our sight the eternal expanses.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[48] In the New Testament, despite the preference expressed for\ncelibacy, the relation of the bridegroom to the bride is used\nmetaphorically to represent that of Christ with the church, and among\nthe mystics the same figure represents the union of Christ with the\nbelieving soul.\n\n[49] I call attention to the difference between the view here expressed\nand that of Emerson in the last paragraphs of his _Essay on Love_,\nwhere he says: \u201cOur affections are tents of a night. Our warm loves\nare clouds that pass over the firmament of mind with its overarching\nvault, its galaxies of immutable lights. In the personal relations\nwe are put in training for impersonal submergence and absorption in\nGod.\u201d In my own view the infinite community of spiritual beings that\ntakes the place of God consists altogether of personalities. Godhead,\nif you choose to apply that name to this infinite society, is not a\nperson but a community of personalities. Personality is not drowned in\nthe impersonal. On the contrary, the individual becomes a personality\nthrough his relation to his associates in the eternal life.\n\n[50] I have real intercourse with Aristotle and Kant, as the outgoings\nof their minds are still effectual in me\u2014more vital intercourse than\nwith many of those who surround me.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nTHE SHADOW OF SIN\n\n\nIf any term in the moral vocabulary stands in need of strict\nredefinition, it is sin. Three elements combine to complete the idea\nof sin: first, that the deed was one that ought not to have been done,\nnot so much because of its painful consequences to others or to self,\nor to both, or, by repercussion on society as a whole; but because it\nwas opposed to what is intrinsically right: in other words, because it\ncontravened the kind of interrelation which would exist in its purity\nin the ethical manifold.\n\nSecondly, the idea of sin implies that the sinner himself is the doer\nof the deed, or that there is to this extent freedom of the will. I do\nnot say that he is the cause of which the deed is the effect. Causality\nappertains to sequent phenomena. As regards freedom of the will,\nthe distinction between the category of interdependence and that of\ncausality is vital. A long series of causes, such as bad heredity, bad\nenvironment, etc., may have led A to determine to murder B.[51]\n\nThe notion of the freedom of the will as here viewed signifies that\nno matter what the causal series may have been which leads up to the\nact, when the act itself is about to be performed, when B is about to\nexperience the effect of A as cause, in that moment the relation of\ninterdependence between A and B ought to arise before the mind of A and\nwithhold him from completing his evil purpose.\n\nThirdly, it is characteristic of sin that the fuller knowledge that the\nharmful deed is sinful _comes after the act_,\u2014that it is the Fruit of\nthe Tree, the enlightenment of the eyes. As the serpent said: \u201cIf ye\neat of the fruit ye shall be as gods.\u201d\n\nMany a man has done what is called evil, and done it most deliberately,\nknowing evil as evil. Remember the career of a C\u00e6sar Borgia, the\nextermination of the Caribbean Indians by the Spaniards, the outrages\non women perpetrated during the present war, the exploitation of human\nlabor practiced on a large scale among the civilized nations. That the\nblackest crimes may be committed with a full knowledge of the horrible\nconsequences to the victims seems hardly to admit of doubt. Evil is\nknown as evil.\n\nBut evil in its character as sin cannot be fully recognized prior\nto the act. In this respect the Greeks had a certain prescience of\nthe truth when they asserted that no one can knowingly commit evil;\nonly they failed to distinguish between evil and sin. A man _can_\nknowingly commit evil, but cannot with full consciousness commit sin.\nThe knowledge of the sin is the divine elixir which may be distilled\nfrom the evil deed (\u201cYe shall be as gods\u201d), and the object of every\nkind of punishment should be to extract that pain-giving but ultimately\npeace-giving elixir.\n\nAbove I mentioned the criminal as the extreme type. But evils in\nless formidable guise, though not on that account less evil, refined\ninvasions of the personality of others, spiritual oppressions,\nsometimes deliberate, often unwitting, are included in everyone\u2019s\nexperience. And the process of expiation, by which evil is transcended\nthrough the recognition of sin (with its prostrating effect at first,\nits strangely elevating effect later on) is alike applicable to all.\nThe best of men have to go through this ordeal as well as the worst.\nEspecially is unwitting transgression inevitable. Sophocles makes it\nthe text of his philosophy in the _\u0152dipus_, though the solution offered\nis that of Greek enlightenment and not that of the more profound\nethical consciousness.\n\nWe have next, in close connection with sin, to consider the tremendous\nquestion of responsibility, interpreted from the point of view of our\nethical principle. Responsible means answerable. Answerable to whom,\nand in what sense? As commonly understood, it means answerable to God\nthe Law-giver, to God regarded as the Author of the moral law. God is\nlikened to a sovereign. Any infraction of his law is an offense against\nthe sovereign. Answerable means subject to the pains and penalties\nwhich it suits the sovereign to annex to moral offences. There is no\nintrinsic connection implied between pain and redemption. The pain is\nsupposed to break the will of the offender, or to mellow him, so that\nhe will in future obey the mandates of the sovereign without a murmur.\n\nAgain, responsibility may mean responsibility to society. Crime is\ninfectious. A fissure opening at any one point in the dykes erected\nagainst crime may let in a flood. The social order as a whole is\nthreatened in every single violation of law. The offender must answer\nfor his defiance of the public will by being subjected to the pains or\npenalties which society annexes to his crime. The object is the same\nas before, to break him into submission, to fit or force him into the\nsocial mould, to make him harmless, or if possible what is called a\n\u201cuseful citizen.\u201d No internal redemptive change in the nature of the\nevildoer is contemplated, except as it may be necessary to lead him to\na useful or at least a harmless life. The antisocial attitude is to be\nreplaced by the social attitude. Appeals to enlightened self-interest,\nand to the sympathies are commonly thought sufficient for this purpose.\n\nThirdly, responsibility means responsible to oneself. There is an\ninner forum, a tribunal in which the spiritual self sits in judgment\non the empirical self. Conscience, the voice of this spiritual self,\npronounces the verdict. (Cf. the passages in Kant in which this figure\nof speech is used.) These are metaphorical expressions.\n\nTo grasp the meaning of responsibility from the ethical standpoint, we\nmust lift into view the concept of _the task of mankind as a whole_,\nand of the individual as a factor in the fulfilment of that task. This\nintroduces a momentous turn into the discussion of the subject.\n\nThe task of mankind is to arrive through its commerce with the finite\nworld, through its unremitting efforts to incorporate the infinite\nplan within the sphere of human relations, at an increasingly explicit\nconception of the ideal of the infinite universe; and through partial\nsuccess and frustration to seize the reality of that universe.\nResponsibility means _participation in this task_, sharing its doom,\nand attaining in oneself, in part, its sublime compensation. The\nevildoer is to achieve the knowledge that his evil deed is sin, that is\nto say, that it not only carries with it harm to others and indirectly\nto himself, but that it is _the defeat in him_ of the task which is\nset for the human race as a whole on earth. Instead of doing his share\nin fulfilling this task, in gaining a footing in the finite world for\nthe spiritual relation of living so as to enhance the life of others\nand thereby his own, he has miserably sought to enhance his life at\nthe expense of other life. The knowledge that he has so acted sears\nhis awakened soul like fire, but it is also the beginning of healing.\nThe transgressor, now sees what he did not see before. He sees by way\nof contrast the holy pattern of relations which in his act he has\ntravestied, the holy laws which he has infringed, and in imputing\nsin to himself for transgressing them, he at the same time proclaims\nhimself in his essential being holy, that is, capable of executing\nthem, or at least of striving unceasingly to do so. It is thus that\nhe opens within himself the sources of redemption, unseals the deeper\nfountains of spiritual energy.\n\nThat man is responsible means that he is answerable to do his share in\ndischarging the task of mankind. And when he is inwardly transformed\nby the consciousness of the holy laws, and of himself as intrinsically\ncommitted to holiness, he does thereby advance the business of his kind\non earth. In him humanity does take a step forward on the spiritual\nroad. In him one other member of our race has been lifted out of evil,\nbecoming perhaps, from the spiritual point of view, a more advanced\nmember of the forward-pressing host than those who have never passed\nthrough an experience like his, who have not been overtly tempted, who\nhave remained conventionally moral, who have not realized the evil\nthat remains unexpurgated within them, and have not passed through the\ncleansing process of self-condemnation and rebirth.\n\nThe incongruity between the finite and the infinite order is the basis\nof this doctrine of responsibility. Mankind is responsible for seeking\nto embody the infinite in the finite. It fails to do so, but gains\nits compensation. The individual shares this responsibility, but both\nmankind and the individual jointly take a step forward whenever an\nevil deed is recognized, branded and expiated as sinful. The object\nof punishment, whether inflicted by society or self-inflicted, is to\npromote this regeneration which is the expiation.[52]\n\n\n NOTE\n\n\n Evil in its ethical meaning presupposes worth as attaching to human\n beings. To do evil is to offend against worth. To assert the worth of\n man is to view him as one of an infinite number of beings, united in\n an infinite universe, each induplicable in its kind. Of this spiritual\n multitude ideally projected by us as enveloping human society only our\n fellow human beings are known to us. _The moral law is the law which\n reigns throughout the infinite spiritual universe applied within, the\n narrow confines of human society. It is applied within those confines,\n it is spiritual, universal in its jurisdiction._\n\n The task of humanity as a whole is to embody more and more the\n universal spiritual law in human relationships, and thus to transform\n and transfigure human society. In the New Testament we read the\n expression: \u201cthe light of God reflected in the face of Christ.\u201d The\n ideal here indicated may be expressed in the phrase, The spiritual\n universe with its endless lights reflected on the face of human\n society! The task of humanity is one which can never be completed, one\n from which mankind may never desist. To see evil as sin is to see it\n as contravening the collective task of mankind, the task of weaving\n the human groups more and more into the fabric of the spiritual\n relations.\n\n To see evil as sin is to see any single act or series of acts ideally\n in their infinite connections. This is what I mean when I say that the\n knowledge of sin comes after the act. I do not mean that there may not\n be before the act a vague consciousness of the ramified consequences\n of evil, but that the fuller knowledge of it as sin is the fruit\n of the act. Nor do I mean that evil in its deeper significance is\n revealed to every guilty person. The opposite is obviously true. What\n I mean is that it is possible after having eaten of the Fruit of the\n Tree to gain the enlightenment, in other words, to become aware of\n the intrinsic holiness of our nature in consequence of our offense\n against the holy laws. If anyone should ask \u201cMust I then do evil in\n order to gain the enlightenment?\u201d the answer is that this question\n is an idle one. No one can escape doing evil. If not in its grosser\n forms, then in ways subtler and more complex, but not therefore less\n evil, every one is bound to make acquaintance with guilt. He need not\n go out of his way to seek occasion, let him see to it that he improves\n the occasion when it comes, as inevitably it will, to his spiritual\n advantage.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[51] The category of interdependence implies that the lines of energy\nbetween A and B cross, so that A is subject to B\u2019s influence, B subject\nto A\u2019s influence, simultaneously. The simultaneity of the relation\ndistinguishes the category of interdependence from that of causality.\n\n[52] This implies that the evil deed shall not be lost sight of, simply\nforgotten. Compare the inadequate account of repentance as given by\nGoethe in _Faust_ and elsewhere.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nTHE SPIRITUAL ATTITUDE TO BE OBSERVED TOWARDS FELLOW-MEN IN GENERAL,\nIRRESPECTIVE OF THE SPECIAL RELATIONS WHICH CONNECT US MORE CLOSELY\nWITH SOME THAN OTHERS\n\n\n_The Right to Life_\n\nThe thoughts presented above on the subject of sin naturally lead over\nto the next topic, the obligations we are under regarding the life,\nthe property and the reputation of others. The ancient moral laws\nunquestionably remain: \u201cThou shalt not kill\u201d; \u201cThou shalt not steal\u201d;\n\u201cThou shalt not bear false witness.\u201d But their application is extended\nand their significance intensified by the positive definition which has\nbeen given to the term _Spiritual_.\n\nSo long as the mere inviolateness of the human personality is\nemphasized, without any defined conception of what it is that is\ninviolate (the inviolateness without the infinite preciousness),\nthere is danger that the physical part of man will be invested with\nthe sacred character that belongs to the spiritual, that the two, the\nspiritual and the physical parts, will be identified.\n\nThe result will be mischievous in two ways: First, while the act\nof killing will be reprobated, a kind of tabu being attached to\nbloodshed, the taking of the life of fellow-beings in more indirect\nways, or what may be called constructive murder, will be lightly\nregarded. The following case is mentioned by a recent writer. The\ndirectors of a railroad refused to vote the sum of five thousand\ndollars to provide a certain safety appliance for their cars. Soon\nafter an accident occurred, in which a number of men were killed.\nThe accident might have been prevented had the five thousand dollars\nrequired for the installation of the safety appliance been voted.\nNow the men were undoubtedly killed by the directors of the company.\nAs to the difference in the degree of guilt in the case of direct\nand indirect murder, there is room for casuistical debate. The\nconsequences it is true were not present to the directors\u2019 minds. But\nare they not responsible for the very fact that the consequences were\nexcluded from their view? They were intent on their dividends, and\nignored the endangered lives. But is not this the substance of their\nguilt? Does not moral progress lie in the direction of extending the\nsense of responsibility so as to cover the indirect taking of life?\nSimilarly the use of poisonous substances in industry, bad sanitation,\ninadequate fire protection, must be stigmatized as indirect murder. The\nCommandment \u201cThou shalt not kill\u201d must extend over a far wider area\nthan it has covered in the past.[53]\n\nSecondly, the positive definition of the spiritual nature enables us\nto perceive more distinctly that the physical part is the means and\nthe spiritual part the end, and to draw the necessary consequences.\nThat which is means is not to be cherished if to do so would defeat\nthe end itself; hence the physical life is _not_ to be preserved if by\npreserving it we deny or defeat the very purpose which the physical\npart is to serve. So long as men have the tabu feeling about bloodshed,\nthe fact that life ought of right to be taken in certain instances will\nseem a hopeless contradiction of the general rule against killing.\nKeeping in mind the spiritual end of existence on the other hand, we\naffirm unhesitatingly that it is better that a man should die than\ncommit a heinous crime. It was better for the young girl mentioned\nin a well-known tale, threatened with outrage, and seeing no other\npossible way of escape, to strangle herself with her own hair rather\nthan submit. According to the opinion of certain scholastic writers on\nethics, dishonor resides solely in the consent of the soul, and where\nthis is absent the mere physical infringement cannot leave a moral\nstain. This is a helpful point of view in regard to the victims of the\natrocities of war, the inmates of certain Belgian nunneries, and the\nhapless objects of unspeakable brutality in certain Polish villages.\nThe anguish of a pure-minded woman who becomes a mother under such\ncircumstances is hardly conceivable. And to discriminate between the\ninfamy done to her and her own unpolluted soul is a plain duty, as well\nas to relieve the innocent offspring of outrage from any participation\nin the guilt to which it owes its existence. But the case to which\nI refer is different. It is one in which the choice remains between\nvoluntary death and submission to intended violation. Submission in\nsuch a situation argues a kind of consent, or at least the absence of a\nsufficient revulsion.\n\nIt is right to kill an intending murderer supposing that there is no\nother way of preventing him from committing his crime, whether the\nintended victim be oneself or someone else. It is not only the life\nthus protected from attack that is saved, but the murderer in a sense\nis saved as well, so far as he can be saved, by the intervention. Also\nthe members of his family are saved, humanity is saved from moral\ndisgrace in his person. The same reasoning applies to the position\nof the extreme non-resistants. They will not, they tell us, do a\nwrong to prevent a wrong. In their eyes to take the physical life of\nanother is in every possible instance an absolute wrong. They fail to\ntake account of the instrumental relation between the physical and\nthe spiritual parts. And on the same grounds, a defensive war, a war\nto ward off aggression, may be theoretically justified. But here the\napplication of the theory is dubious as well as dangerous. Exceptional\ncases of high-handed aggression that ought to be resisted occur, but\naggression is rarely, if ever, one-sided. As a rule, there is more or\nless wrong on both sides, and the tangle of accusations and mutual\nrecriminations is almost impossible to unravel. Very rarely, indeed, if\never, is right altogether on one side, and wrong on the other, though\npredominant right may be on one side and predominant wrong on the\nother. And aside from this, the instruments of destruction in modern\nwarfare have become so monstrous, the efficiency notion applied to war\nhas led to such ruthlessness, the attempt to distinguish between the\ncivilian population and the armed forces has so nearly broken down,\nthat right-thinking persons everywhere are now eagerly intent on how to\nprevent aggression before it can take effect, rather than to resist it\nafter it has occurred.\n\n NOTE\n\n The casuistical question may be raised whether from this point of\n view we are not all murderers. The amount I spend on my house, food,\n recreation, might if divided prolong the life of many a child in the\n slums. Am I not then actually a parasite, that is, a murderer? It is\n this shocking scruple that has led fine people to live among the poor,\n and to try to equalize their mode of living with that prevailing in\n the environment. The motive is noble, though as a matter of fact they\n may never succeed in doing what they set out to do because they never\n actually touch bottom. There are always depths of poverty to which\n they can not descend. They may spend comparatively little, yet that\n little is far in excess of the spending of the most indigent. And had\n they stripped themselves of everything they would have been face to\n face with the _reductio ad absurdum_ of their method, for they would\n have abandoned civilization and degraded their human life to the level\n of the wayside tramp.\n\n What is inspiring in their example is just the immense compassion,\n the willingness to give up so much. But the method itself is not a\n solution.\n\n Are we then murderers, all of us? Perhaps a distinction may be drawn\n between acts which in themselves are hostile to the life of fellowmen,\n like overtaxing the worker, and acts which tend positively to maintain\n the higher values of life,\u2014such as the providing of decent shelter,\n support and education, for the members of one\u2019s family. It is true\n that, as Tolstoy warns us, we easily slip into indefensible luxury\n under the pretence of maintaining the higher values. But this does not\n affect the validity of the distinction itself.\n\n And yet the distinction does not relieve us of what may be called our\n share of the social or collective guilt. The exploiter is chargeable\n with individual guilt. I who am trying to keep up the standard of\n civilized living within my little sphere am nevertheless conscious of\n participating in the social guilt, the guilt of a society that has\n permitted and still permits such misery to exist. Well, it does exist,\n and I can do but a very little to change it. Can I then endure the\n contrast between my own lot and that of the greater number. Is it not\n true after all that if I give up the comforts, or let me say the helps\n to the maintenance of the higher values, I should be saving the lives\n of many children? Those children are dying because I am not dividing\n my possessions among the poor. Can I stand up and look at that fact,\n at those deaths?\n\n The only answer which it is possible to give at the point we have thus\n far reached in our exposition is: push on, perfect civilization, a way\n will eventually be found to uplift the masses and make them partakers\n of the future civilization. The other alternative, that of Tolstoy,\n is stagnation. Yet I cannot disguise from myself the fact that in the\n meanwhile, while we are trying to push on, millions are perishing.\n This is the true \u201cburden of world pain,\u201d not the sentimental world\n pain due to the fact that one is not having oneself the best kind of a\n time in the world, but the pain caused by the fact that while we are\n reaching forward to help the suffering masses, those masses, though\n composed of individuals morally as worth while as ourselves, and many\n of them doubtless better, if we only knew it, are perishing before\n our very eyes, and that we stand by and cannot save them. I have said\n that in the meanwhile while we are trying to push on, millions are\n perishing. The actual moral problem so often overlooked is underlined\n in the words \u201cin the meanwhile.\u201d\n\n There is one pathetic consolation. Envy is not the widespread vice\n which it is sometimes represented to be. Those who are in trouble take\n the will very largely for the deed. People in the worst conditions are\n grateful to anyone who shows a real desire to help, even if his actual\n performance does not go very far. And there is a still finer trait\n in ordinary human nature, namely, the tendency to find a certain\n vicarious relief in the joy of the few, provided that their joy be\n pure.\n\n\n_The Right to Property_[54]\n\n\u201cProperty,\u201d according to Blackstone, \u201cis the sole and despotic dominion\nwhich one man claims and exercises over the external things of the\nworld in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the\nuniverse.\u201d\n\nOrthodox jurisprudence, like orthodox religion, is characterized by the\nabsoluteness of its formula. It ignores the genesis of its concepts in\nthe long line of antecedent historical development, and it disdains to\nentertain the demand for modification, though the circumstances of the\ntime loudly call for it.\n\n\u201cThe sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises,\u201d\netc., may be a fact, but it is not a right. Property can only be\nregarded as a right if shown to be subservient to the ethical end,\u2014the\nmaintenance and development of personality. Orthodox jurisprudence\neffaces the end, and treats that which is or has been at one time a\nmeans as if it possessed a sanctity of its own. On the other hand, the\nempirical treatment of jurisprudence, in dismissing the supposedly\nabsolute means, tends to leave out of sight the ethical end, and to\ntreat the social institutions as subservient to mere convenience.\n\nThe following propositions will indicate the changes in the conception\nof the right of property required by our ethical theory.\n\n1. Property is a relation between a person or persons and things. There\ncan be no property right in persons, but only in things.[55]\n\n2. The right of property faces in two directions: Toward outside nature\nand toward fellow human beings. We have a right over the external\nthings of nature. We have a right to the services, though not to the\npersonality, of fellow human beings. These two aspects of the right of\nproperty must be kept apart and defined.\n\nIt is sometimes held that the human race as a whole, as over against\nnature, has the right of dominion. Nature, it is said, is our quarry,\nwe can take out of it the stones we need to construct the edifice\nof civilization. Nature is our tool. The laws of nature, as science\ndiscovers them, become our servants. Nature offers the raw material\nwhich we consume. Nature has no rights as against man. But I hold\nthat neither has man rights as against nature, except in so far as\nhe rightly defines the end in the interest of which he makes use of\nnature\u2014the maintenance and development of personality.\n\nTo suppose that the right of property as the extension of personality\nover things is tenable without regard to its instrumental use, to\nsuppose that bare appropriation of nature as of \u201ctreasure trove\u201d is\na prerogative of man, is to lend countenance to the false notion of\noccupation, or first appropriation, which has confused the ethics of\nthe subject in the literature of jurisprudence, and prevented a right\nunderstanding of it. If bare appropriation be the foundation, then the\nfirst comer has a right against his successors, since the extension\nof personality over the thing has been actually accomplished by him,\nand that is all there is to be said about it. Again, on this view, a\ncase may be made out for vested interests, that is to say, for those\nwho have successfully appropriated the earth, yes, and the fullness\nthereof, and who having thus effectually extended their personality\nover things without regard to the uses they make of their possessions,\nare then to be entitled to remain indefinitely in secure ownership of\nthem.\n\nWithout an ethical standard, without the notion of an end to be\nsubserved, stubborn possession will always be able to resist\nmodification, and on the other hand attempts at modification will be\nhaphazard. Neither the human species collectively nor the individual\nhas a right simply to appropriate the things of the external world.\nNeither the first occupier nor the last is entitled to his goods unless\nhe can make out a greater good in the interest of which he should be\nallowed to possess them.\n\nBut the case of primary occupation is academic. It occurs on Robinson\nCrusoe\u2019s island and in legal fiction. Even when the white race invades\nAfrica, it does not commonly take possession of unoccupied land, but\ndispossesses the natives. On what ground does it dispossess them?\nIs there an ethical standard by which the dealings of the civilized\nnations with the populations of Africa can be measured? Is the\nintroduction of the appliances of modern civilization, the opening up\nto trade, a sufficient ground for the subjection or the extermination\nof the inhabitants? In this connection it becomes clear how urgent a\nmore clarified conception of property rights is. False ideas of this\nso-called right are to no small extent responsible for the massacre\nof the inferior races, and the mutual slaughter of those who covet\ntheir lands. A proclamation of the Queen of England or of the Emperor\nof Germany, or the signature of an irresponsible chief to a treaty\nthe meaning of which he scarcely understands, transfers millions of\nsubjects and their territory to one or other of the European powers.\nWhat right of property have these European powers in the territory and\nthe peoples acquired by them in this fashion?\n\nThe last example shows that the right of ownership, except in very\nrare instances, is not in question in respect to the dealings of man\nwith nature, but comes into play chiefly in the relation of man to his\nfellows. There are competitors to be outstripped, thwarted. There are\nweaker fellow-beings to be subdued. The use of force and cunning in\nacquiring property is well nigh the general rule. Are there any ethical\nideals which, if they could be realized, might disclose a better way,\nmight bring order into this frightful chaos, and abate the conflicts?\nFrom the ethical ideal as outlined in previous chapters this follows:\n\nThe extension of personality over things is a right in so far as things\nare employed to maintain and develop potential personality. The use of\nthe services of a fellowman is a right in so far as his services are\nused in such a manner as to preserve and develop his personality as\nwell as that of the user.\n\nIn speaking of the use of the services of others we touch upon the\nsocial aspect of the property relation, and here is the crux of the\nwhole matter. It is coming to be affirmed more and more that property\nis a \u201csocial\u201d concept, that it cannot be explained either as implying\na relation of the individual to outside nature, save exceptionally,\nnor as a relation of the individual considered atomistically to other\natomic individuals. The social tie, it is held, is intrinsic. The\nnature of man as such is social, but the word \u201csocial\u201d in current\ndiscussion is very ill-defined, and is commonly understood to denote\nmerely the fact of the interdependence of men upon one another, without\nconveying the idea of a rule or standard by which the system of\ninterdependence may be regulated. Vague notions, such as that of social\nhappiness, are believed sufficient to take the place of such a standard.\n\nLet me then consider first the bare fact of interdependence, and see\nwhat follows from it, and how far it will take us.\n\nEvery man has manifold wants for the satisfaction of which he depends\non others. His wants are legion; his ability and opportunity to satisfy\nthem exceedingly limited. It is this cross relation that expresses\nthe so-called social nature of man. But the reciprocal dependence\nof men upon one another for the satisfaction of their wants by no\nmeans constitutes an ethical tie. The tie between the Greek master\nand the Greek slave, as described by Aristotle, was social, but not\nethical. The same is true of the tie that united the Southern planter\nto his negro slaves. The relation was indeed far more social than that\nbetween the modern mill-owner and the operatives in his factory, but\nstill it was not ethical. The reason is clearly stated by Aristotle\nhimself. According to him the slave is a living tool: the purpose of\nhis existence is not realized in himself but in his master. He fulfils\nthe end of his being by setting free the higher functions exercised by\nhis master. But from the ethical point of view no man may be regarded\nas the tool of another. Each human being is an end _per se_, and the\nhighest object of his existence is to be fulfilled, not in others, but\njointly in them and in himself.\n\nI have just said that the social and the ethical views are not\nsynonymous or coincident, as the loose use of language in current\nliterature would imply. I go farther and say that the social and the\nethical point of view are even on their face contradictory. It cannot\nbe denied that the natural system of interdependence resembles that of\nthe body and its members. A hierarchy of organs and of functions is\napparent in the human body, and likewise in the social body. Some men\ndo the lowest kind of work. Their function appears to be to produce\nfood, clothing and shelter, to satisfy the mere physical wants.\nSome are the hands, so to speak, of society, while only a very few\neffectually represent the brain. The simile has been carried out in\ndetail by well-known writers, in both ancient and modern times. It\nis quite true that the artist and the scientist are dependent on the\nmanual laborer, just as he in turn is dependent on them. But then,\nconsider the difference in the dignity of the services they render one\nanother. Was not the Greek, who saw things dispassionately as they are,\nright in asserting that, taking society in the large, the purpose of\nhuman life is fulfilled in the few, and that the greater number exist\nin order that by their inferior services they may enable these few to\nexpress humanity in its highest terms?\n\nIt seems to me that the kind of social arrangement contemplated by the\ngreat Greek philosophers, and by some of the medi\u00e6val publicists, as\nwell as by certain modern thinkers, is unquestionably social. The fact\nof interdependence is stressed by them. The ethical note of equality,\nor, as I should prefer to put it, equivalence, is left out.\n\nI have endeavored in a recent book to indicate how the ethical system\nmay be superinduced over the social system.[56] Here I am concerned\nchiefly to mark as strictly as possible the distinction between the\ntwo terms social and ethical. And I must, therefore, at once amend my\nprevious statement that property is a social concept by saying that it\nis the concept of a social relation considered as the substratum in\nwhich is to be worked out the ethical relation.\n\nThe general consequences of the property concept as defined are these:\n\n1. He who will not work, neither shall he eat; or better, he who will\nnot work if able-bodied shall be disciplined and trained in such a\nmanner that he will work. The fruits of nature do not fall into the lap\nof mankind. We are not living in a state of Paradise. The human race\nis engaged in the arduous labor of constantly renewing the capital on\nwhich it subsists. As a member of the race, everyone is bound to do his\npart.\n\n2. No one has a property right in harmful or superfluous luxuries,\nsince property is the control of external things for the maintenance\nand development of personality; and luxury, so far from maintaining,\nundermines personality, and hinders its development.\n\nNo one has ethically a right of property in great fortunes like those\naccumulated under the modern system of industry. Whatever is in excess\nof one\u2019s needs, rightly estimated, is not appropriate to one, not\nproper to one, not his property. Since the present system of ownership\ncannot be changed abruptly, the idea of the stewardship of wealth has\nbeen suggested to quiet the consciences of those who have come to\nrealize that they have no moral right to excessive wealth. But the idea\nof stewardship should be held with fear and trembling. It is at best\na makeshift, a bridge leading over to something more sound. It may be\nso taught and received as to seem to justify by philanthropic use the\npossession of great fortunes. But the power to dispose of vast funds\nfor philanthropic uses may come to be itself a badge of superiority.\nAnd even if this be not so, if surplus wealth be used modestly, and\nwith a sincere intention to apply it in the best possible way, there\nis yet no surety that any individual owner will have the breadth of\nvision, the experience, the insight, to discharge adequately the\nfunction of distributor. The defects of his early education, habits\ningrained in him in the course of his business career, may lead him to\nbestow lavishly in one direction while turning a deaf ear to the appeal\nof other needs even more urgent and fundamental. Nothing short of the\ncollective wisdom of the community, the collaboration of the best, can\nsafely direct the surplus wealth available for social benefaction.\n\n3. Everyone is ethically entitled to a share of the products furnished\nby nature and worked up into usable shape by his fellows, and also to\nthe direct services of fellow human beings, in so far as that share\nand those services are necessary in order to enable him to perform in\nthe best possible way the specific service which he in turn is capable\nof rendering. Our ethical theory here supplies us with a principle\nwhich takes the place of remuneration. There is no such thing as a just\nremuneration of labor, there is no such thing as a fair wage, if the\nwage be considered as the equivalent of, or the reward for the work\ndone. It is not possible by any process of calculation to construct\nan equation between labor and reward. The laborer is assuredly\nnot entitled to the product of his labor, as the current formula\nawkwardly puts it, for it is an entirely hopeless undertaking to try\nto ascertain what the product of any man\u2019s labor is. In the modern\nforms of industry, the contributions of the different factors engaged\nin production are intimately intermingled, play into one another, and\nare inseparable. Neither the so-called workers alone are the producers\nof wealth, nor the employers and capitalists, nor yet both together\nirrespective of the labors of past generations of which they enjoy the\nusufruct. The question, what is a fair wage, or a fair profit, is badly\nposed. There is no such thing as a fair wage or profit in the sense of\na fair compensation for the work performed.\n\nThe proper payment of the human factors engaged in production is\nunascertainable genetically, _i.e._, if one goes back to the origin\nof the product. It can only be approximately determined by fixing\nattention on the end to be served. And the end in each case is the\nmaintenance and development of personality. In other words, that is\na fair wage which suffices to enable the different functionaries\nco\u00f6perating in production each to perform his function, or render\nhis service, in the most efficient possible manner. The solution of\nthe labor question must be along teleological not genetic lines.\nAdequate nourishment as to quantity and quality, suitable dwellings,\neducational opportunities, etc., are all indispensable to the rendering\nof service, even by \u201ccommon laborers.\u201d Specific requirements come up\nfor consideration with respect to the different special functions, and\nthose who perform them.\n\nMy intention in this chapter is to indicate the bearings of the ethical\ntheory on living questions of the day. Nothing is more emphatic in the\nprogrammes of the working-class than this demand for social justice.\nNothing is more discouraging than to see the futile efforts made to\ndefine social justice by extemporizing a notion of fair adjustment\nwhich goes to pieces in every serious labor controversy.\n\nOne more remark should be made in regard to what is meant by property\nas a relation between persons and things considered as a means of\ndeveloping personality. A convenient illustration is the use of a block\nof stone by a sculptor. The sculptor\u2019s attempt at self-expression is\nan effort to combine two things in themselves uncongenial, an ideal\nimage, and an external tangible thing, the block of stone. The mental\nimage does not leap from the mind upon the stone and transform it\nmagically into its own likeness. The external thing, the stone, offers\nresistance, and the resistance limits the artist\u2019s effort. But the\nlimitation itself becomes in time an indispensable aid. For the ideal\nimage as at first it started up in the artist\u2019s mind was vague, and the\nlimitations imposed by the intractable nature of the material compel\nhim to articulate the image, to grasp more firmly its complex details,\nand thus to become more surely possessed of it. The same is true of the\nmental thing which we call the relation of cause and effect in the mind\nof the scientist, and of his endeavor to impose this mental relation\non the sequence of phenomena observed by him. And the same is again\ntrue of that supreme thing which we call the ethical ideal, and of the\neffort to embody it in the social relations. The attempt to express\nthe ethical ideal in human society inevitably hits on limitations, and\nleads to frustrations. We have in our heads fine schemes of universal\nregeneration. We find elements in human nature that resent and resist\nour Socialisms, our communisms. We desire to enlarge men\u2019s moral\nhorizon, the field of their moral interest, to lead out from the family\nto the nation, to fraternity in general. We presently discover that\nwe are losing the benefit of the closer ties. In the very process of\nbuilding we seem to be in danger of destroying the foundations, and to\nbe building in the air. In this way our formulations of the ethical\nideal are tested. We are compelled to recast them, and the frustrations\nwhich we meet with become the means of clarifying and articulating\nthe ideal itself, and of enabling us to experience more vividly the\ncoercive impulses that go out from it.\n\n\n_The Right to Reputation_\n\nThe ethical rule is to show a sacred respect for the reputation of\nothers. In the present discussion intellectual and moral reputation may\nbe considered separately.\n\nUnder the first head of intellectual reputation, certain points suggest\nthemselves, one of them in regard to controversies concerning priority\nof scientific discovery. What is the sense of such controversies? What\ndifference does it make whether the law of the conservation of energy\nwas first enunciated by Helmholtz or by Robert Mayer, or whether the\nmethod of fluxions was invented by Newton or Leibnitz,\u2014not to mention\nlesser contrarieties of claims? Would it not argue, on the part of\nthe scientists and their friends, a more entire devotion to objective\ntruth if they showed themselves indifferent to personal credit? The\ndiscovery, the invention, it may be said, is important, not the\nreputation of the discoverer or the inventor. Nevertheless, such\ncontroversies are carried on in a lively spirit. And it is usually felt\nthat something more than vanity is at stake, that a man is entitled to\nbe named in connection with the productions of his mind.\n\nSuch controversies resemble a suit at law undertaken to determine a\ndisputed title to some valuable property. Plagiarism is different. It\nis barefaced intellectual theft. The title to the property in this case\nis not disputed. The plagiarist just steals an idea or a form of words\nin which an idea has been happily expressed, and palms it off as his\nown, hoping to escape with his stolen goods undetected. In this case\ntoo, it seems, one might say the idea is important, not the authorship.\nNevertheless, a profound resentment is felt, not only by the author,\nbut by the general public, against a plagiarist.\n\nA rule is ethical when the conduct prescribed is instrumental to the\ndevelopment of personality. Respect for reputation is ethical because\nreputation is a help to the development of personality. A man projects\nhis mind outward, so to speak, into the productions of his mind. As\na thinking being he anchors himself in outside reality. He transfers\nhimself, as it were, into an external thing,\u2014a discovery, an invention,\nthe expression of an idea in apt language,\u2014each a thing that goes on\nexisting independently of himself. To deny his connection with it is to\ninfringe upon his personality, to efface his personality in so far as\nhis personality is enshrined in his mental product.\n\nAgain, a man\u2019s reputation as a scientist or scholar is a prop to his\npersonality as a thinker. A man can never be quite certain of the\nvalidity of his thinking until it is approved by the consensus of the\ncompetent. To win that approbation is to know that as far as he has\ngone he is on sure ground. He can thence proceed, can turn toward new\nproblems with a sense of power and a measure of self-confidence not\npreviously attained. To rob him of his reputation is to deprive him of\nthis invaluable aid to further mental development.[57]\n\nComing next to moral reputation, we find that the ethical rule\nrequiring respect for the moral character of others is even more\nexacting, and that any contravention of it deserves an even more\nstrenuous reprobation. The Decalogue prohibits the bearing of false\nwitness and this rule is extensible from courts of law to ordinary\nconversation, since the principle involved is the same. The Sermon on\nthe Mount menacingly warns against judging others: \u201cJudge not that ye\nbe not judged.\u201d Buddha enjoins his followers to refrain from malicious\ngossip, and includes a prohibition to this effect among the principal\npronouncements of his religion. All the great teachers of ethics and\nreligion insist on this point, perhaps because the natural propensities\nof men constantly tend in the opposite direction, and are so hard\nto restrain. To stab one\u2019s neighbor in the back, morally speaking,\nto insinuate base motives, to spread damaging reports about him, to\nsuggest as possibly and then as probably true rumors which one does not\npositively know to be untrue, to allow private repugnance to take the\nplace of evidence,\u2014are infringements of the moral reputation of others\nwith some of which notoriously many even of the so-called best people\nare chargeable. I do not here speak of the grosser attacks, attacks on\ncharacter inspired by envy, rivalry, and greed. The soundness of the\nrule is generally admitted, though its violations are past belief and\nwithout number.\n\nBut is the rule itself as to moral reputation tenable? There is a\ndifference between intellectual and moral reputation at which we must\nat least cast a glance. Intellectual reputation is a fairly safe index\nof merit; moral reputation is not. A man\u2019s mind is reflected in his\nintellectual performances. Is the same true of his moral character?\nIs not the moral character an interior, elusive thing? The real\ncharacter escapes the eye of the outside spectator and judge; and if\nthis be so, why should it be so important a matter to safeguard a man\u2019s\nmoral reputation, seeing that the reputation he deserves is past\nfinding out? A public official, for instance, is accused of corrupt\npractices. He is innocent, and his friends and he are indignant at the\ndamaging accusations brought against him. But if not guilty of the\npalpable derelictions with which he is charged, yet, in view of his\nopportunities and education, he may not be less blameworthy for other\nacts with which he has not been charged, and in his heart of hearts he\nknows that this is so. Why then, this outcry?\n\nOther examples might be adduced. The honor of a young woman is attacked\nby the circulation of atrocious rumors, and the reaction at this most\nsensitive point is certain to be extreme when the falseness of the\naccusation is exposed. But is outward decorum, correct behavior, always\na sure sign of inward purity?\n\nThere is this difference then between the intellectual and the moral\ncharacter. The one can be measured, the other cannot. But the reply\nto these sophistical objections is still the same as before. The\npurpose of the ethical rule is to furnish aids in the development\nof personality. The aim in view is not genetic, but teleological,\nnot to determine how far in analyzing a man\u2019s character down to the\nbottom he may be found to be already admirable, but to help him in\nattaining excellence, by progressively advancing toward strength and\nvirtue. And moral reputation is a great help to this end. It is a prop\non which he can lean. He who does right acts and has the credit for\nthem, is thereby encouraged to do other right acts. And if the inner\nvoice whispers, as it is sure to do in the finer natures, that the\ngood opinion of his fellows, founded on his correct deportment, is\nundeserved, the shame of it may lead him to more determined efforts\nto merit the character which, on however insufficient evidence, is\nattributed to him.\n\nReputation is sacred because it is an almost indispensable means to\nfurther mental and moral progress.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[53] _Vide_ note at the end of the Chapter.\n\n[54] A right is a claim of one person upon another or others, and the\njustification consists in its relation to personality. Rights exist\nbetween persons for the sake of the maintenance and development of\npersonality.\n\n[55] Animals, for the purpose now in hand, may be regarded as things,\nbeing devoid of personality, though certain modifications in the\ntreatment of animals are prescribed by the fact that they are sentient\ncreatures. But there is no moral interdiction of the involuntary\nservitude of animals.\n\n[56] See Chapter VII on \u201cAn Ethical Programme of Social Reform\u201d in _The\nWorld Crisis_, published by D. Appleton and Company, 1915.\n\n[57] A remark may here be in place regarding the erudition expended in\ndetermining which of the writings attributed to some great philosopher\nlike Plato are spurious, and which genuine. Is the time and labor spent\non such researches worth while? The object in this case is not so much\nto clear or vindicate the reputation of the philosopher, or to give him\nhis due, as to rescue for posterity, free from corruptions, a living\nand quickening thing to which he has given birth, and which the world\ncannot afford to lose. For the work of a great philosopher like Plato\nis alive, and is valuable because it is still quickening. And it is\nquickening, not because of any positive formulation of truth (like a\nscientific law), but because of the \u00e9lan of the human spirit with which\nit is vibrant in attacking the eternal problems of life and destiny.\nThe same applies to the industry of modern critics in collecting\nmaterial wherewith to facilitate the deeper understanding of some great\npoet like Dante or Goethe.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\nTHE MEANING OF FORGIVENESS\n\n\nIn the last chapter we treated the imputation of evil to the innocent.\nWe must now consider the right attitude toward actual evildoers.\n\nIn discussing sin, one of the points emphasized was that of the moral\nsolidarity between the individual and society. The moral interest of\nthe individual is always identical with the moral interest of society;\nand, on the other hand, the failure of the individual is a social\nfailure. The human race sags morally at the point of some particular\nmember of it.\n\nAgain, we defined the task of humanity as the incessant endeavor\nto embody the ideal spiritual order in the finite sphere of human\nrelations. This effort meets both with partial success and with\nfailure. The gain derived by the human race from its experiences,\nits labors, its sufferings, is that the spiritual universe in its\nunattainable elevation and sublimity is more and more revealed to\nthe inner eye; in other words, that by way of effort and recoil, and\nrenewed effort and renewed recoil from the finite, the infiniteness of\nthe infinite world is realized. The essential point is that the boon of\nrealization must be gained both through partial success and failure.\nNow sin is failure; everyone fails, everyone is convicted of sin. There\nis no exception. In insisting on this point the Christian account\nis exact. Only it should be remembered that sin or failure itself is\none of the instrumentalities by which the end of human existence is\nachieved. These preliminaries being understood, certain propositions\nmay be brought forward as to the treatment of sin, and in particular as\nto repentance, punishment and forgiveness.\n\nRepentance is recoil, recoil not from the bad act and its painful\nconsequences, but from the principle underlying the act. Every kind of\nsin is an attempt in some fashion to live at the expense of other life.\nThe spiritual principle is: live in the life of others, in the energy\nexpended to promote the essential life in others. Moral badness is\nself-isolation, detachment. Spirituality is consciousness of infinite\ninterrelatedness.\n\nPunishment, rightly regarded, is a name for the steps taken to lead the\nunrepentant up to the point of repentance, _i.e._, up to the recoil.\nPunishment is itself criminal when undertaken for any other object.\nPunishment on the vindictive _lex talionis_ theory, or on the bare\ndeterrent theory, is excluded. Reformatory punishment as commonly\nunderstood is no less inadequate, because it restricts the idea of\nreformation as a rule to the externals of conduct.[58]\n\nThe steps taken to lead the evildoer up to the point of repentance\nare to be criticised from this point of view. Transient or prolonged\nseparation from ordinary society may be necessary. Severe discipline\nmay be indispensable. Capital punishment, however, is wholly out of\nthe question, since the prevention of the crime now being impossible,\nthe achievement of the spiritual gain is the point to be aimed at. But\nthe most effectual aid in promoting repentance is faith in the better\nnature of the wrongdoer, in that spiritual principle resident within\nhim which no crime committed by him can wholly crush, and which in\nthe most apparently hopeless cases is still to be presumed. But faith\nin the good that persists in those whom we call bad must go hand in\nhand with the acknowledgment of the bad that remains unexpurgated in\nthose whom we call good. The prison reformer who poses as impeccable\nand righteous himself can never win the confidence of the poor human\nderelicts with whom he has to deal nor effect in them the desired\nchange. He must share with them the conviction of sin if he would\nimpart to them the power of the resilience which he experiences within\nhimself.\n\nFaith in the potential power of goodness resident in the evildoer is\noften confounded with forgiveness. The distinction between the two,\nhowever, should not be obliterated. Faith is help proffered from the\noutside to effectuate the inner change. Forgiveness is a record of the\nfact that the change has actually taken place, and belief that it is\nlikely to be permanent. Forgiveness, in the mind of spiritually-minded\npersons, takes place almost automatically when the conditions on which\nit depends are fulfilled. So long as he remains unrepentant a man\ncannot be forgiven, although we may have the conviction that it is in\nhis power to repent and the earnest desire to bring about the change\nin him. Jesus on the Cross says: \u201cForgive them, for they know not what\nthey do.\u201d Perhaps \u201copen their eyes so that they may see the Light\u201d may\nbe the more just interpretation of the meaning\u2014not \u201cforgive\u201d in the\nstrict sense, for forgiveness is not feasible while the heart of the\noffender remains closed.[59]\n\nBoth faith and forgiveness are factors in regeneration: the one to\nassist in accomplishing the change, the other to assist in making it\npermanent. But both the faith and the forgiveness are exceptionally\ndifficult in the case of our personal enemies. _Enemies in the\nspiritual sense there are and can be none._ Every human being, even\none who has done me the most cruel harm, is yet, from another point of\nview, a fellow member of the spiritual society. But to discriminate\nbetween the two relations in which the man stands to me\u2014that in which\nhe is my foe, and the other in which he is my fellow\u2014to be able to put\naside as less important the harm he has done, the suffering he has\nforced me to endure, and to desire with perfect sincerity that the\nrecoil, the transformation, may take place in him, that is the most\nsearching test of one\u2019s own ethical character.[60]\n\nThe forgiveness of personal foes, when complete, establishes a\nstrangely tender spiritual fellowship between the pardoner and the\npardoned. Both have transcended their normal empirical selves, both\nhave become partners in a sublime transaction: the one delivered from\nthe clinging of his baser desires, the other released from his first\ncrude reaction against evil. They will never forget what they thus owe\nto one another. They will continue to walk hand in hand, the one still\nleaning, the other supporting and himself unspeakably strengthened by\nthe support he gives.\n\nFinally, to forgive is not to forget\u2014quite the contrary. To forgive is\nto remember the past action, but to remember it as belonging to the\npast, as the act of one who has since undergone the great change. The\nmiracle of the change of water into wine at the feast of Cana would\nnot have seemed so wonderful to the guests had they not remembered\nthat what was turned into wine had before been water. To forgive is to\nremember that what was water has become wine. And he, too, who has\nbeen forgiven may not forget. The remembrance of the past he will need\nas a warning and a safeguard.[61] Not to see the essentially divine\nnature in others, and thus also in one\u2019s self is the essence of the\nwrong. To teach the guilty to see it is the object of punishment. To\nforgive is to declare that what before was ignored is now seen and\nknown.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[58] I mean that it is usually considered sufficient, for purposes\nof reformation, to bring the wrongdoer up to the average standard of\nlaw-abiding citizenship, to restore him to the bosom of society as a\nsafe and industrious member. Whereas a person who has had the searching\nexperience of deep guilt is a candidate for a higher station in the\nmoral scale. Humanity having fallen in him, he should be helped to rise\nto a higher than the average altitude. This at least should be the\naim. Consider the fact that Jesus selected some of his most spiritual\ncompanions from among publicans and harlots.\n\n[59] Compare the words addressed by Sir Thomas More to his judges\nwhen sentence of death had been pronounced upon him\u2014\u201cFor though you\nhave been my judges to condemnation, may we meet merrily hereafter in\neverlasting salvation.\u201d\n\n[60] Everyone admires a disinterested prison reformer, one who is able\nto see and to call out the good in a so-called bad man; but it is one\nthing to be disinterested and generous towards men who have acted badly\ntowards others, and quite another thing to take the ethical attitude\ntowards those who have acted wickedly towards oneself. Hence the\ntouchstone of the character of the prison-reformer is to be found in\nthe way in which he behaves and feels towards his personal enemies, for\ninstance, towards those who malignantly attack him and interfere with\nthe business of prison reform on which he has set his heart.\n\n[61] Perhaps I may add a word as to the forgiveness of those who,\nby an extension of meaning, may be called our intellectual enemies.\nBy intellectual enemies I understand those whose point of view is\nradically opposed to our own, whose principles and premises, if\naccepted, would render the entire theory of life on which we act,\nand on which we found our convictions, untenable. We are apt to be\nexasperated in listening to them, or in reading the works in which\nthey express their opinions. We are apt to feel that there is no room\nin the world in which we live for such ideas as theirs, that we and\nthey cannot exist side by side. The bitter feuds of rival religious\nfactions, the notorious _odium theologicum_, and in more recent times\nthe thinly veiled animus shown in the controversies of philosophical\nschools are all alike traceable to this source. Racial antagonisms,\ntoo, are partly to be accounted for on the same ground. There are\ncertain primary attitudes of mind, modes of feeling and directions of\nimpulse, the correctness of which we cannot demonstrate just because\nthey are primary, and which we all the more vehemently assert when we\nfind them disputed. Love your intellectual enemies, may usefully be\nadded to the stock of moral commandments; keep an open and hospitable\nmind to opinions and ways of acting, thinking and feeling which\nnaturally repel you. And it will help us to discipline ourselves in\nthis difficult behavior if we reflect that the views most contrary to\nour own are nevertheless sure to contain some element of truth which\nwe cannot afford to disregard, and which will serve the purpose of\ncorrecting and supplementing such truth as we may ourselves possess.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\nTHE SUPREME ETHICAL RULE: ACT SO AS TO ELICIT THE BEST IN OTHERS AND\nTHEREBY IN THYSELF[62]\n\n\nIt is difficult to see the potentially divine nature in men when masked\nby the forbidding traits which human beings so often exhibit.\n\nA number of vital considerations will now have to be emphasized as\npertinent to the subject we are dealing with.\n\nThe first point is that the character of every person contains contrary\nelements.[63] Let the two kinds of qualities be called the fair and\nfoul, or more simply still the plus and minus traits. The bright\nqualities, the plus traits, are undoubtedly more predominant in some,\nthe dark or minus traits in others. But potential plus qualities exist\nin the worst characters, and potential minus traits may be surmised,\nand on scrutiny will be found, in those whom the world most admires.\n\nA second point is mentioned as an hypothesis not indeed as yet\nverified, but I believe verifiable, namely, that certain defined minus\ntraits will be found to go with certain plus traits. Wherever bright\nqualities stand out we are likely to meet with _corresponding_ dark\nqualities or dispositions, and conversely. There are, I am persuaded,\nuniformities of correspondence between the plus and minus traits, and\nit would be of greatest practical help in judging others and ourselves\nif these uniformities could be worked out. A kind of chart might then\nbe made, a description of the principal types of human character,\nwith the salient defects and qualities that belong to each. Extensive\nstatistical treatment of a multitude of biographies would lay the\nfoundation for such an undertaking; also sketches of the prominent\ncharacteristics of nations, like those furnished by Fouill\u00e9e, would be\nutilized. Also the study of the character traits of primitive races as\npartially carried out by Waitz in his _Anthropology_ and the character\ntypes of animals, so far as accessible to observation, might be used\nfor comparison. Instructed in this manner, we should, on coming into\ncontact with others, either on their attractive or repellent side,\nbe prepared to expect and to allow for the opposite traits. And we\nshould learn to see ourselves in the same manner; we should see our\nempirical character as it really is, the dark traits side by side with\nthe bright. The courage to wish to know the truth about one\u2019s self is\nrare, and when the revelation comes or is forced upon us, it often\nbreeds a kind of sick self-disgust and despair. The saint at such times\nin moral agony declares himself to be the worst of sinners. He has\nstriven to attain a higher than the average moral level, and behold\nhe has slipped into only deeper depths. The minister of religion, the\nrevered teacher, the political and social leader, when abruptly shocked\ninto self-examination by some evidence of grossness or deviousness\nin themselves, no longer to be glossed over or explained away, are\nfated to go through the same ordeal. A profound despondency is the\nconsequence. It is not only the badness now exposed, but the previous\nstate of hypocrisy that seems in the retrospect intolerable. Some\npersons live what is called a double life in the face of the world.\nBut who is quite free from living a double life in his own estimate?\nAchilles said of himself \u1f04\u03c7\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2 (\u201ccumberer of the ground\u201d). Many\na man has echoed that cry with a bitterness of soul more poignant than\nthat which Achilles felt when he uttered the words.\n\nNow the principle of the duality[64] of character traits, or as we may\nalso designate it, the principle of the polarity of character, applies\nto our natural or empirical character, and our empirical character is\nnot our moral character. The distinction between the two will serve, as\nwe shall presently see, to rescue us from the state of moral dejection\njust described. But first it is indispensable to fix attention on the\nnatural character, to recognize that we are composite, each and every\none of us, and that the all-important thing to know is which of our\nplus qualities go with which of the minus. Here the psychologist\ncan help us. Here a great field is open for a practical science of\nethology. This would give us a more adequate knowledge of the empirical\ncharacter, the substratum in which ethical character is to be worked\nout.\n\nPoint three opens up a great enlightenment in regard to the whole\nsubject. It is that the distinction must be drawn, and ever be kept in\nmind, between the bright and dark qualities and the virtues and vices.\nThe bright qualities are not of themselves virtues. The dark qualities\nare not of themselves vices. To suppose that they are, to confuse the\nbright with virtue and the dark with viciousness, is the most prevalent\nof moral fallacies.[65]\n\nA person is found to be kind, sympathetic, gentle, and on this score is\nsaid to be virtuous or good. But gentleness, kindness, a sympathetic\ndisposition, while they lend themselves to the process of being\ntransformed into virtues, are not of themselves moral qualities at all,\nbut gifts of nature, happy endowments for which the possessor can claim\nno merit. And sullenness, irascibility, the hot, fierce cravings and\npassions with which some men are cursed, are not vices, though it is\nobvious how readily they turn into vices as soon as the will consents\nto them.\n\nThe question becomes urgent: What then is a virtue? The fair qualities\nare the basis, the natural substratum of the virtues, the material\nsusceptible of transformation into virtues. In what does the\ntransformation consist? When does it take place? The answer is, when\nthe plus quality has been raised to the Nth degree, and in consequence\nthe minus qualities are expelled. This result, of course, is never\nactually achieved. The concept here presented is a concept of limits.\nBut in the direction defined lies growth and continuous development\nnot of but toward ethical personality. In public addresses I have\noften said: Look to your virtues, and your vices will take care of\nthemselves. I can put this thought more exactly by saying: Change your\nso-called virtues into real virtues: raise your plus qualities to the\nNth degree. And the degree to which you succeed in so doing you can\njudge of by the extent to which the minus qualities are in process of\ndisappearing.\n\nOne or two examples will illustrate the pivotal thought thus reached\nin the exposition of our ethical system with respect to its practical\nconsequences. To raise to the Nth degree is to infinitize a finite\nquality, or to enhance it in the direction of infinity. I shall take\ntwo examples, one _self-sacrifice_, the other _justice_, both viewed\nin their finite aspect as plus traits requiring to be subjected to the\nprocess of transformation.\n\nThe empirical motive of self-sacrifice may be egocentric or altruistic.\nIn egocentric self-sacrifice, doing for others is a means of exalting\nthe idea of self to the mind of the doer. He uses others, not as sacred\npersonalities, worth while on their own account, but subtly exploits\nthem by benefiting them. He uses them as objects by means of which to\nachieve a finer self-aggrandizement. He may indeed go to the utmost\nlengths of devotion for his friends. He may perform for them the most\nrepulsive offices. He may give freely of his means, denying himself\nmeanwhile comforts and even necessaries in order perhaps to extricate\nthem from pecuniary difficulties. He may contribute in refined ways\nto their pleasure. As a physician he may watch night after night\nat the bedside of the sick, foregoing sleep though fatigued to the\npoint of exhaustion in order to be at hand to mitigate the pains of\nthe sufferer, jeopardizing his own health in order to assist others\nin recovering theirs. Yes, he may even give of his own blood to\nrenew their ebbing life. In all this he will look for no material\ncompensation. Gratitude, especially gratitude expressed in words, is\nrepugnant to him. The lofty image of self which he strives to create\nwould be marred if any such coarsely selfish motive were allowed to\nintrude. All that he requires, but this he does inexorably require,\nis that his beneficiaries shall silently confess their dependence on\nhim, that he shall see the exalted image of himself mirrored in their\nattitude, and that they shall move in their orbits as satellites\naround his sun. The egocentrism is veiled and easily confounded with\nthe purest moral disposition. But it is there all the same, and the\nproof of it is that the very same person who is thus friendly to his\nfriends, and an unstinting benefactor to those who pay him the kind\nof homage he exacts, is capable of behaving with almost inconceivable\nhardness and even cruelty toward others who will not stand in this\nsubordinate relation to him, or who in any way wound his self-esteem.\nSister Dora, serving enthusiastically in a small-pox hospital, while\nneglecting the nearer duties at home, intent on dramatic, histrionic\nself-representation, is likewise a palpable instance of egocentric\nself-sacrifice.\n\nThe self is precious on its own account. The non-self, the other,\nequally so. A virtuous act is one in which the ends of self and of\nthe other are respected and promoted jointly. It is an act which has\nfor its result the more vivid consciousness of this very jointness.\nEgocentric self-sacrifice errs on the one side, the personality of\nanother being made tributary to the empirical self, despite the actual\nbenefits conferred. Altruistic self-sacrifice errs in the opposite way.\nIn it the personality of the self is effaced or made servile to the\ninterests or supposed interests of another. Not, let me add, to the\nreal interests, for the spiritual interests are never achievable at the\nexpense of other spiritual natures. The wife or mother is an instance,\nwho slaves for husband or children, obliterating herself, never\nrequiring the services due to her in return and the respect for her\nwhich such services imply, degrading herself and thereby injuring the\nmoral character of those whom she pampers. An historic instance of the\naltruistic error on a larger scale is afforded by the Platonic scheme\nof scientific breeding under state supervision, a suggestion revived\nin modern times, in which freedom of choice between the sexes, and the\nintegrity of the personality of those concerned, is sacrificed to the\nsupposed interests of the community. Nietzsche\u2019s doctrine may possibly\nbe regarded as a compound of the two errors described, the Superman\nrepresenting the egocentrism, while altruistic self-sacrifice, entire\nannulment of their personalities is expected of the multitude.\n\nIt is easy to distinguish the plus and minus qualities in the\ncharacters of the egocentrist and the altruist: in the one case,\nbeneficence combined with hardness; in the other, service of others\ncombined with absence of self-respect.\n\nThe second example to be briefly considered is the finite trait\ncommonly mistaken for justice. A typical illustration of this is\npresented by the merchant who ascribes to himself a just character on\nthe ground that he is punctual in the payment of his debts, that his\nword is as good as his bond; or by the manufacturer who entertains\nthe same opinion of himself because he pays scrupulously the wages\non which he has agreed with his employees.[66] One wonders that so\ngreat and profound a notion as that of justice should be understood\nso superficially, restricted to such narrow limits, and that rational\nhuman beings should claim to possess so lofty a virtue on the score of\ncredentials so inadequate. The reason is that the empirical substratum\nof justice is mistaken for the ethical virtue itself. This substratum\nmay be described as an inborn propensity toward order in things\nand in relations, a natural impatience of loose fringes, a certain\nmental neatness. Hence insistence on explicitly defined arrangements\nand on simple, over-simple formulas. These are favored because they\nkeep out of sight the complex elements which if considered might\nintroduce uncertainty and possibly disorder into the situation. Thus\na manufacturer, impatient of looseness, over-rating explicitness,\nwill be led to grasp at a formula of justice which reduces it to the\nbare literal performance of a fixed agreement, no matter with what\nunfreedom, owing to the pressure of want, it was entered into by\nthe wage-earners, and no matter how deteriorating the effect of the\ninsufficient wage may prove to be on their standard of living.\n\nBut it is a far cry from this empirical predisposition to the sublime\nethical idea itself. The idea of \u201cthe just\u201d as exemplified in any act\nperformed by me includes the totality of all those conditions which\nmake for the development of the ethical personality of others in so far\nas it can be affected by my action. To do a just act is to act with the\ntotality of these conditions in view, in order to promote the end in\nview, which is the liberation of personality or at least the idea of\npersonality in others and in myself.\n\nIt is thus evident that a just act\u2014an ideally, perfectly just act,\u2014can\nbe performed by no man. First because the right conditions of human\ndevelopment are but very imperfectly known, and are only brought\nto light by slow degrees. Secondly because even as to the known\nconditions of justice, for instance the abolition of the evils of the\npresent industrial wage system, a single employer, or even a group of\nwell-intentioned employers can bring about the desired changes only to\na very limited extent.\n\nRaising the finite quality underlying justice to the Nth degree\ntherefore means opening an illimitable prospect. The ethical effort\nin this, as in all other instances, is destined to be thwarted. It is\nan effort in the direction of the finitely unattainable; the effort\nitself, with the conviction it fosters as to the reality of that\nwhich is finitely unattainable, being the ethically valuable outcome.\nThe just man, therefore, in any proper sense of the word, is one who\nis convinced of the fact that he is _essentially not a just man_,\nand a deep humility as to both his actual and possible achievements\nwill distinguish him from the \u201cjust man\u201d so-called, who arrogates to\nhimself that sublime attribute on the ground of the scrupulous payment\nof debts, or the fulfilment of contracts. Humility in fact will be\nfound to be the characteristic mark of those who have attained ethical\nenlightenment in any direction. It is the outward sign from which we\nmay infer that the finite quality in them is in process of being raised\nto the Nth degree.\n\nI have given these few specific illustrations of my meaning, but what\nhas been said applies equally to any of the plus qualities. The plus\nqualities are the ones which are favorable for transformation into\nthe infinitized ethical quality. The ethical principle itself is one\nand indivisible. Any one of the plus qualities, when ethicized, will\nconduce to the same result. From whatever point of the periphery of the\nethical sphere we advance toward the center we shall meet with the same\nexperience. Thus self-affirmation or egoism when in idea raised to the\nNth degree will reveal that the highest selfhood can be achieved only\nwhen the unique power of a spiritual being is deployed in such a way as\nto challenge the unique, distinctive power that is lodged in each of\nthe infinite multitude of spiritual beings that are partners with us in\nthe eternal life.\n\nAnd altruism, or care for others, at its spiritual climax, will\nconversely involve the recognition that true service to others can\nonly be perfectly performed when the power that is resident in\nourselves is exercised in its most vigorous, most spontaneous, and most\nself-affirming mode. And as the diverse empirical qualities which we\nobserve in one another all appear to be modes of or cognate with these\ntwo principal tendencies\u2014the self-affirming and the altruistic\u2014the\nmethod of transfiguring empirical qualities which has been set forth\nmay be found to apply in every instance.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[62] Or more exactly act so as to elicit the sense of unique\ndistinctive selfhood, as interconnected with all other distinctive\nspiritual beings in the infinite universe.\n\n[63] The conception underlying Robert L. Stevenson\u2019s sketch of Jekyl\nand Hyde is to be taken seriously, and applied without exception\n_mutatis mutandis_ to every human being whatsoever (but see footnote p.\n76). It is not original with Stevenson. The French, who are perhaps the\nkeenest psychologists, long ago invented the _apercu_ that everyone has\nthe defects of his qualities.\n\n[64] The use of the term duality is not intended to exclude the\npossibility of multiplicity, but only to call attention to one striking\nbifurcation of human character.\n\n[65] Stevenson falls into this error. He confounds Jekyl with the\nvirtuous and Hyde with the vicious side of character. In reality the\none should stand for the empirical plus traits, the other for the\nempirical minus traits.\n\n[66] Contract-keeping is peculiarly the moral rule applicable to\nmercantile transactions. To apply it without modification to the\ndealings of employers and wage-earners is to intrude the mercantile\nstandard into the industrial sphere. This is what we are now\nwitnessing. The industrial standard is only in process of development\nand clarification, and the accepted mercantile standard is really in\nconflict with it. Among merchants it is of the very essence of their\ntransactions that a contract shall not be invalidated, despite the\ninjurious consequences to one or the other party which it may turn\nout later on to involve. The security of commercial transactions\nwould be gone if revision of the contract should be permitted\nwhenever consequent loss appears. Again, and this is particularly\nimportant, merchants are assumed to be on a footing of equality in\ndealing with one another, equally free in accepting or rejecting a\nproposed contract, equally competent to take care of their respective\ninterests. The relation of employers to wage-earners however is not\nthat of economic equals, but of the economically stronger with the\neconomically weaker. And this difference is of cardinal importance in\ndetermining the rule of justice as it should obtain in the industrial\nsphere. I do not of course intend to imply that an agreement between\nemployer and wage-earners once made should not as a rule be kept as\nscrupulously as that between merchant and merchant. What I affirm is\nthat in view of the greatness of the injury possibly inflicted upon\nthe weaker, the economically stronger party is bound at least to share\nthe responsibility with the weaker for the essential fairness of the\nterms of the agreement before it is finally completed. Nay, I would go\na step farther, and say that despite the indispensable condemnation of\ncontract-breaking, provision should be made for possible revision in\ncases where it can be shown that exceptional hardships have appeared,\nunforeseen and unforeseeable at the time when the agreement was made.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\nTHE SUPREME ETHICAL RULE (_Continued_)\n\n\nWhatever the steps that have thus far been taken, they are preliminary\nto the final step. And the _method_ of \u201csalvation,\u201d the distinctive\nfeature wherein this ethical system differs from others, may now be\nbriefly stated. So act as to elicit the unique personality in others,\nand _thereby_ in thyself. Salvation is found in the effort to save\nothers! The difference in method consists in the joint pursuit of the\ntwo ends, that of the other and that of the self. The controlling\nidea is that the _numen_ in the self is raised out of potentiality\ninto actuality by the energy put forth to raise the _numen_ in the\nother,\u2014the two divinities greeting each other as simultaneously they\nrise into the light.\n\nIt is thus that both egoism and altruism are transcended. To be\negoistic is to assert one\u2019s empirical self at the expense of other\nempirical selves. To be altruistic is to prefer the empirical selves\nof others to one\u2019s own. It is not true that self-realization, keeping\nto the empirical signification of self, leads insensibly to altruistic\nconduct. The life of the great \u201cself-realizer,\u201d Goethe, may be cited\nin evidence of this. Nor is it true that preference for the empirical\nself of another necessarily involves maintaining the integrity of one\u2019s\nown empirical self. In the empirical field egoism and altruism are\nconflicting and mutually contradictory. It is in the spiritual field\nthat they cease to be so, because both disappear in an object of the\nwill which includes them both and transcends them both. If this be so,\nit may be asked why does the formula we have adopted read: So act as to\nelicit the unique personality in others, and thereby in thyself? Why\nnot conversely:\u2014So act as to realize the unique personality in thyself,\nand thereby in others?\u2014since in any case the ends in view are to be\nachieved conjointly. The answer is that in the pure spiritual field,\nin the world of ideal ethical units, it would make no difference from\nwhich point of view the relation were regarded. But when the spiritual\nformula is applied as a regulative rule to the mutual relations\nof empirical beings there is a difference. Thus applied, it must\nnecessarily be couched in such terms as will make the spiritual birth\nof the other the prime object, and the spiritual birth of the self its\nincidental though inseparable concomitant. This is so because ethics\nis a science of energetics, which has to do with the potencies of our\nnature in their most affirmative efferent expression. All our higher\nfaculties are active, and touch for good or ill the lives of those who\nsurround us. Even the secret thoughts which seem only to affect our own\nindividuality, inevitably project their influence upon our associates.\n\nNow ethics is a science of _right_ energizing. And since as a matter of\nfact we do inevitably energize in such a manner as to affect others,\nthe fundamental question in ethics is: how are we to regulate the\nincidences of our natures that fall upon other lives so that they shall\nbe right? Since we cannot help acting upon them and influencing them,\nhow can we act rightly toward them and rightly influence them? And the\nrule supplied by the ethical principle is: Act upon their empirical\nselves in such a manner as to draw from their empirical natures the\nhidden personality, or at least the consciousness of it. And the\nrepercussion of the rule is: in the attempt to do so you will convert\nyour own empirical self into a spiritual personality, or at least evoke\nin yourself the idea of yourself as a spiritual personality.\n\nIncontestably, in the attempt to change others we are compelled to try\nto change ourselves. The transformation undergone by a parent in the\nattempt to educate his child is an obvious instance. No parent is a\ntrue parent at the outset. As his perception deepens of the real needs\nof the child, which is so entirely dependent on his self-control, on\nhis wisdom as well as his love, he will realize more and more his\nown deficiencies, and seek to remedy them. The same is true of the\nprofessor in relation to his students, of a leader and his followers,\nof a religious teacher and those who look to him for advice and help.\nIn all such relations when rightly understood there is simultaneous\ngrowth on both sides. In the ethical sphere there is a law of\nlevitation, the contrary of the law of gravitation that obtains in the\nrealm of matter. We actually tend to rise from a lower to a higher\nlevel in proportion as we bend downward to lift those still lower than\nourselves.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\nHOW TO LEARN TO SEE THE SPIRITUAL _NUMEN_ IN OTHERS\n\n\nWe now have to consider how to acquire the faculty of seeing the light\nthat in our fellowmen is often so deeply hidden. We can love only that\nwhich is lovable. If we could see holiness, beauty concealed within our\nfellow-beings, we should be drawn towards them by the most powerful\nattraction, willingly living in their life, and permitting them to live\nin ours. We should then love all men, for we should see in all what is\nunspeakably lovable. But the empirical man stands between us and the\nspiritual man, and the empirical woman between us and the spiritual\nwoman; and very often the former are most repulsive, even when their\nugly traits do not affect us personally, even when as spectators merely\nwe observe how they behave.\n\nMuch more is it well-nigh insuperably difficult to worship, in the\nsense of holding worthy, those whose characteristic traits directly\noffend us, or are perpetual thorns in our side. We must somehow learn\nto regard the empirical traits, odious, harmful or merely commonplace\nand vulgar as they may be, as the mask, the screen interposed between\nour eyes and the real self of others. We must acquire the faculty of\nsecond sight, of seeing the lovable self as the true self. And how\nwithout self deception we can possibly succeed in doing so is the\nquestion.\n\nIn the first place, it is my own craving for resurrection out of that\ndeath in life to which I seem doomed that must impel me to penetrate to\nthe essential life in others. My own spiritual nature is in fetters,\nand to burst the fetters, to escape from the prison, there is but one\nway. The unique personality, which is the real life in me, I cannot\ngain, nor even approximate to, unless I search and go on searching for\nthe spiritual _numen_ in others.[67] The force which incites me to\npenetrate beyond the empirical traits of others, to surmount the walls\nwhich surround the shrine in them, is the consciousness that unless I\ndo so I am myself spiritually lost, I remain myself spiritually dead.\nFor it is only face to face with the god enthroned in the innermost\nshrine of the other that the god hidden in me will consent to appear.\n\nThe expression \u201cdeath in life\u201d means living, even living passionately\nand in a way efficiently, with a sense, nevertheless, underneath of the\nhollowness, the futility of the objects of pursuit. The death in life\nis the state of discontent that slowly gathers and augments in a man\u2019s\nmind as he pursues his customary ends, as he reviews his intellectual\nachievement, the books he has written, the pictures he has painted,\nthe meager outcome of his schemes of social reform, the uncertain\nresult of his efforts at moral self-development. It is the ensuing\ndistaste for what he has actually accomplished, the disallowance of\nit as in any way ultimately satisfying. And yet this death in life is\nitself the well-spring of resurrection, out of which is engendered\nan irrepressible yearning of the mind to attach itself to something\ngreater than all ephemeral interests, to something that has eternal\nworth, and is of such a kind as to communicate of its eternal nature to\nhim who touches it. The god in the other, the eternal personality in\nthe inner sanctuary of the other, is that object which must be sought\nand touched. The cry of my own soul for salvation is the impulse that\nleads me on to search for that object. Without the previous discontent,\nI shall not seek; without the appraisement of the temporal ends and\ninterests of man as in the last analysis unsatisfying, I shall not set\nout on my quest. Enmeshed in the jungle of the empirical world, I shall\nfind no exit. I shall remain the victim of the illusion that the peace\nI need can be found in the realm of temporal desire. I shall commit\nwhat the theologians called Original Sin, that is, the preferring of\n\u201cthe works of the Creator to the Creator himself.\u201d\n\nBut there is a second force that must act in conjunction with this keen\ndesire for personal liberation or highest personal self-affirmation.\nIt is the sense of the _dependence of others_ upon what I can do for\nthem. Notoriously it is the dependence of the child that evokes in the\nparent the noblest qualities of which he is capable, the self-denial,\nthe incessant willingness to labor for the good of the offspring. It is\nthe dependence of the student on the teacher, of the disciple on the\nmaster that elicits the latter\u2019s best thought. It is the dependence of\nthe multitude on the religious teacher that puts him on his mettle. But\nif the dependence of others upon oneself is to produce its appropriate\nresults, that dependence will have to be interpreted in a spiritual\nsense. We shall have to think of others as dependent on us not only for\nthe necessary empirical services we are bound to render them, but those\nempirical services themselves will have to be regarded as instruments\nby means of which we may render them the highest spiritual service.\n\nThis leads to a more _rigorous scrutiny of the notion of service_ than\nhas hitherto been customary.\n\nThe question we must answer, and it is one that has never been\nadequately met, is: What is it in the other that we are to serve,\nwhat is the true object of our service? Man is worth while on his own\naccount. Now no one can pretend that the welfare of the animal part of\nman is an object worth while on its own account. To satisfy the hunger\nor the thirst of another, or to promote his health is to serve his\nbody. But the body is the servant of a master. And I am not bound to\nserve a servant. If I am to serve the servant at all it must be for the\nsake of the master. Who then is the master?\n\nThe same argument applies also to the intellect. Human science is after\nall but a narrow littoral along the illimitable continent of nescience.\nNo one who compares the intellectual achievements of mankind with the\nproblems that remain unsolved will pretend that the accomplishments\nof the intellect are worth while on their own account. The mental no\nless than the physical part of us has a master. There is an object\nhigher than the acquisition of knowledge to be attained in the course\nof the mind\u2019s endeavors to acquire knowledge, namely the growth of the\nscientist towards unique personality, as will be shown in the chapter\non the Vocations in the last Book. Analogous considerations apply to\nart and its achievements.\n\nAnd if someone should say that neither the satisfaction of the body\nalone, nor of the intellect, nor of the \u00e6sthetic sense, nor of the\naffections, but of all of them taken together, is to be the object\nof our service, the answer is that this would be merely serving a\nwhole household of servants, and still not serving the master. This\nquite aside from the fact that the ideal of happiness as consisting\nin the harmonious gratification of the various elements enumerated is\nchimerical. Since some of the most indispensable elements of happiness,\nsuch as freedom from disease and from bereavement, are beyond our\ncontrol. While even the higher faculties are far from harmoniously\nco\u00f6perating, the one-sidedness of human nature being such that a marked\ndevelopment in one direction is actually incompatible with complete\ndevelopment in other directions.\n\nUnless, then, there be some master end in everyone\u2019s life, one\nparamount to all others, to which all others are subordinate (the\nsubordination and the renunciation involved being themselves means\nof spiritualizing one\u2019s nature) there is no point to the notion of\nservice. That master end I have defined as the attainment of the\nconviction of one\u2019s infinite interrelatedness, the consciousness of\noneself as a member of the spiritual universe, a \u1f04\u03c0\u03b1\u03be \u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd[68]\nin the eternal life, a source of energy induplicable in its kind,\nwhich radiates out and touches at the center each one of the infinite\nmultitude of spiritual associates, and receives from them the effect of\ntheir aboriginally diverse modes of energizing in return.\n\nI have mentioned two motives that impel me to search for the _numen_\nin others. The one, the craving for my own liberation from the death\nin life, my own desperate outreaching toward salvation; the other, the\nsense of the dependence of others upon me. Yes, but this dependence\nof theirs I must now interpret as spiritual dependence. I must look\nfor them also beyond the death in life to life itself. I must have\nthe courage and the truthfulness to look upon neighbor, friend, wife,\nhusband, son, daughter _sub specie \u00e6ternitatis_, that is, as primarily\nspiritual beings, and estimate any physical, intellectual or emotional\nhelp I can give them by the consideration whether it does or does not\nadvance them toward the master end of their being.\n\nCourage of this sort is rare, because precisely the physical, mental\nand emotional wants of those who depend on us are the most obvious\nand clamorous. I do not of course mean that we should not attend\neffectually to their immediate wants. How could we avoid doing so? How\ncould we neglect the health, the education, etc., of our children? What\nI say is that we should acquire the habit of looking upon the immediate\nends as instrumental, and keep in view the supreme end which they in\nturn are to serve, and that we should beware of what I have called the\nfallacy of provisionalism\u2014that of supposing that we are at liberty to\nprovide for the lower immediate necessities first, leaving the higher\nand the highest needs to be attended to later on.\n\nThe manner in which parents commonly plan for the future of their sons\nand daughters is perhaps the fittest illustration of the idea I am\nhere seeking to exclude. During the period of infancy they pilot the\nchild through the dangers that beset its physical existence. Later on,\nwhat is called education, the preliminary mental training required to\nfit the young for the business of life, is felt to be imperative. Then\ncomes the selection of a vocation with a view of assuring the material\nbasis of subsistence. Still later, the advancement of the sons or\ndaughters in their chosen vocations, or their social success occupies\nperhaps the parent\u2019s mind. Thoughts of a happy marriage flatter the\nparent\u2019s imagination. If the moral side receives attention, the\nutmost that as a rule is demanded is that the young person shall not\nfall below the average moral standard that happens to prevail in the\ncommunity. And it is in such ways as these that we are apt to respond\nto the claims of those spiritual beings for whose essential future\nwelfare we are to so large an extent responsible.\n\nTo widen this all too narrow conception of our responsibilities, the\nfollowing reflections may be found useful. A father in the last decade\nof his life realizes acutely the brevity of his own past existence.\nThe curve of his life is now rapidly descending. Supposing him to be\nnearing seventy, his adult sons and daughters may by this time have\nreached the age of thirty or forty. Looking back on the thirty or\nmore years that separate him from them, and remembering how like a\ndream the intervening years have glided by, it may come home to him\nwith sudden force how soon these, his sons and daughters too, though\nnow in their prime, will reach the point at which he has arrived. The\nerror of parents is to think of their grown sons and daughters only\nas moving on the upward curve of life. They stop short in imagination\nthere. They look forward to marriage, vocational success and the like,\nas finalities for those who are still young. We ought to remember\nthat the upward curve in the lives of our children will presently\ndescend just as ours has descended, that the few decades which separate\nthem from old age will pass as quickly for them as they have passed\nfor us,\u2014almost in the twinkling of an eye,\u2014and we ought to ask on\ntheir behalf as we must on ours,\u2014What is to be the result of it all?\nWhat does it all profit? And it is this thought that will turn our\nattention for them as for ourselves to the spiritual end which should\nbe dominant at all times,\u2014in the morning, at noon, and in the evening\ntwilight of a human existence.\n\nAll that has been said has to do with the arousing in us of the desire\nto see in others the god, the _numen_, the master end. The wish to\nescape from our own death in life, the sense of the dependence of\nothers on us as interpreted,\u2014these two are the means of stirring us up\nto go forth upon the quest, and the seeking is already more than half\nthe journey. Seek, and ye shall find. But what exactly is it that we\nare to seek? What are we to see in the other?\u2014The spiritual nature. But\nwhat is the spiritual nature? I have frequently urged that the lack of\na definite description of the spiritual nature is the chief defect in\nethics up to the present time. This defect I endeavor to supply. The\nspiritual nature is the unique nature conceived as interrelated with an\ninfinity of natures unique like itself. The spiritual nature in another\nis the fair quality distinctive of the other raised toward the Nth\ndegree. We are to paint ideal portraits of our spiritual associates. We\nare to see them in the light of what is better in them as it would be\nif it were transfigured into the best. We are to go on as long as we\nlive painting these ideal portraits of them. We are to retouch their\nportraits constantly. We are not indeed to obtrude or impose upon\nothers these sketches, these mental creations of ours, but to propose\nthem diffidently, reverently, to hold them up as glasses in which our\nassociates may possibly see themselves mirrored. It is for them to\naccept in whole or in part our rendering of their inner selves or to\nreject it. But we are not to desist from our labor in creating the\nideal portraits, for in this consists the spiritual artistry of human\nintercourse.\n\nOur friends we are to see in the light of these glorified sketches,\u2014our\nfriends and our enemies too. For only thus can we win them, and be\nessentially their benefactors. There is no power so irresistible,\nit has been said, as love. I do not quite accept the word Love. It\nsignifies the feeling that goes with the ideal appreciation of others;\nand mere feeling supplies no directive rule of conduct. But it is\ntrue that the power of ideally appreciating others, of seeing them in\nthe light of their possible best, and the feeling of love consequent\non this vision, is the mightiest lever for transforming evil into\ngood, and for sweetening the embittered lives of men. No greater boon\ncan anyone receive from another than to be helped to think well of\nhimself. Flattery is the base counterfeit of appreciation. Spiritual\nappreciation, appreciation of the inner self despite the mask, is\nthe greatest of gifts, to manifest it is the greatest of arts. In\nits supreme form it is the art of going down to the lowest of human\nbeings\u2014the man in the ditch, the woman on the street\u2014and making them\nthink well of themselves because of possibilities in their nature\nthey themselves hardly surmise. It is also the art of making the most\ndeveloped and advanced human beings realize in themselves something\nstill higher and better than they have ever reached. It is this art\nby which the supreme human benefactors have worked their spiritual\nmiracles, and it is an art which to the extent of our ability we must\neach acquire and practice, if human society is to be redeemed.\n\nThere are specially two points to be remembered: the one, that of\nseeing the unattained excellence in those who are already in the way of\nexcellence; the other, where there is or seems to be a complete absence\nof fine qualities or of the promise of development, as in the case of\nbackward children, that we should still not abate one jot of hope or\neffort, seeking to win even the smallest improvement, in the conviction\nthat the best possible under the circumstances is incalculably worth\nwhile. For, compared with the infinite ideal even the achievements of\nthe most advanced and most developed fall infinitely short, and what\nare they more than the best possible under the circumstances. The best\npossible under the circumstances represents for us the absolute best.\n\nNow a word in regard to those who resist the better influence which we\nmay seek to exercise over them, for instance, the so-called black sheep\nin families. Our chief concern should here be to prevent the resistance\nfrom infecting ourselves and provoking unethical reactions. Ethics is\na system of relations. The ethical point of view consists in seeing\nthe relation between the offending person and ourselves as it ought\nto be, in seeing with perfect objectivity the kind of conduct ideally\nrequired by the relation on both sides, seeing it and thereby assisting\nthe other to see it. But we shall never succeed in doing this until we\npurge from our thoughts and speech every trace of private irritation.\nIf we can point out to the one who has gone wrong how he has hurt\nanother, and has spiritually hurt himself; if while we do this we see\nthe fineness that is possible to him and make him realize that we see\nit, we shall not utterly fail. I am aware that other methods should\naccompany the spiritual appeal. In some cases, a temporary separation\nis indicated, in other cases, a prolonged change of environment, or\nthe gradual formation of new habits of industry and application, the\nawakening of interest in some pursuit that leads the mind away from\negocentric pre-occupation. Psychology and experience crystallized,\ninto commonsense have valuable counsels to give. But, along with the\ntechnical aids, the spiritual influence should never be lost sight of\nor relegated to the second place.\n\nAnd finally two ideas should be mentioned which are pertinent to broken\nrelations, as for instance to the unhappy marriage relation and to\ninterrupted friendships: One that the break is never complete. There\nremain certain threads unsundered, which should be most sedulously\npreserved intact. They may serve as points of attachment to weave the\ntie anew. Again, and this is still more important, thought that the\nbreak would never have occurred if the relation had been as finely\nconceived as it ought to have been on my side as well as on the others.\nTake friendship as an example. A friendship of many years\u2019 standing\nis suddenly wrecked. Why? What were the terms on which the friendship\nhad been based? What had friendship meant to me?\u2014A certain personal\nattraction, mutual aid and comfort, taking counsel together, sympathy\nin joy and sorrow. These are valuable elements of friendship, but\nthey do not even touch the essential point. They do not describe the\nprincipal function which a friend has to fulfil. The friend ideally\nis one who stands alongside another as the spectator of his spiritual\ndevelopment, as one who appraises his friend\u2019s advance toward the\nmaster end of life disinterestedly, and yet with deepest personal\nconcern. He is the mirror in which his friend may see the stages of\nhis spiritual progress reflected. Now I have lost my friend. Why have\nI lost him? Because he was never a true friend to me, and, I must add,\nbecause I was never a real friend to him. I have not really lost him,\nbecause I never really possessed him. And on making this discovery I\nshall have a new light shed on what friendship might mean. I may never\nbe so fortunate as to find the actual friend, but I shall know what he\nought to be, and what it is in me to be to him. And when I say, \u201cwhat\nit is in me to be to him,\u201d I think of resources of my inner being which\nhave never been called out; I think of the worth that belongs to me\nas a spiritual being capable of giving forth and receiving highest\nspiritual influence, and I am thereby immeasurably aggrandized in my\nown esteem, the self in me is lifted nearer as it were to its infinite\ncounterpart in the eternal life. I walk henceforth on a higher level, I\ndwell amid serener presences. And this aggrandizement of the self, not\non the ground of what I am but what I may be, and of others too, not on\nthe ground of what they are, but what they may be, is the compensation\nderived from the bitter experience of broken relations. And what has\nbeen said of friendship by way of example is true of frustration in\nmarriage as well, and of frustrations of every kind.\n\n\n NOTE TO BOOK III\n\n I may mention a certain test case for trying out the proposed rule,\n namely, to idealize the fair quality in others, and thereby achieve\n the concomitant transformation of the self. I mean the case of the\n victims of a cruel race prejudice, such as is entertained against the\n colored people of the South by the more brutal whites. I remember a\n long evening which I once spent in the company of a leader among the\n colored people, and one of the best men I have ever known. I looked\n that night deep into a suffering, sensitive human soul, and I tried\n to put myself in his place. I realized the hardships of his lot, the\n anguish that I myself should suffer if I were in his position. But\n would there be the spiritual equivalent? Would the way I had found\n in trials less poignant be the way of release? To make the situation\n clear, I selected two points in which the white man, my supposed\n oppressor, has the advantage, two fair qualities of which he can\n boast. His family life is purer on the average than that of a large\n number of the colored people. And he has also learned in the case\n of white men to distinguish between the criminal and the innocent.\n He will protect the latter, and give up the former to justice. Now\n my own people, putting myself in the place of the colored man, are\n backward in both these respects. In consequence of the long centuries\n of slavery their family relations are often unstable, while they are\n apt to shield the colored criminal from the arm of the law. In both\n respects I want to represent to myself the white man as he ought to\n act. He ought to help me lift up my race, first, by making their\n family life purer and more stable. But instead, many of the whites\n debauch the women of my race, while perhaps respecting those of their\n own race; moreover, by refusing decent accommodation on railroads they\n compel educated and refined colored women to travel in cars in which\n the coarsest men are herded together.\n\n Again, how can I, as a leader among my people, teach them to\n distinguish between the criminal and the innocent of their race so\n long as mobs of white men indiscriminately lynch the innocent and\n the criminal of my race alike on the barest suspicion? Against their\n actual behavior I set up in my mind a picture of how the superior\n race, superior in point of civilization, but still morally backward,\n ought to act. I can but suggest this picture, keep it in view as a\n constant protest, or still better as an imperative model.\n\n But I can do more. I can turn upon myself, and upon others of my own\n people who are in advance of the majority of them, and presently\n I shall be compelled to admit that amongst ourselves something\n of the same pride of superiority exists, something of the same\n prejudice against those who are lower in the scale. For there is\n also a stratification and a hierarchy of higher and lower among the\n oppressed. And the relatively higher are apt to behave toward the\n lower in the same fashion as their common oppressors behave toward\n them all. We find the same tendency among other oppressed races, as\n for instance in the attitude of certain of the Spanish and the German\n Jews toward the Polish and the Russian. Purge thyself, therefore, is\n the incisive monition; purify thine own nature of that pride which\n hurts so cruelly when it is directed upon thee from without. Let the\n sin committed against thee be the means of purifying thee from the\n like sin. This is the spiritual compensation, this the thought that\n leads to inward peace!\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[67] In a previous chapter I remarked that the cheap estimate of others\nand of oneself is due to the habit of regarding human beings from the\npoint of view of the use they can be put to, ignoring the wonderful\nand mysterious energies and potencies which are exhibited day by day\nin every human being. If the force stored in an infinitesimal particle\nof radium is calculated to excite admiration, how much more the forces\nexhibited in man, looking at him merely as the stage on which the\nspectacle of these forces is displayed. Consider the occurrence of such\na thing as thought, the sheer miracle of mentality, the working of the\nconstructive imagination in the artist, etc. If we sufficiently dwell\non these inward facts about men, instead of merely emphasizing their\nexternal utility to one another, we shall thereby be put in tune, as\nit were, for the higher spiritual view of man. The difference I have\nsaid is like that between understanding the theory of electricity and\nmerely turning on electric power in the workshop or the home. And yet\nthe scientific contemplation of the miracles of human nature as seen\nfrom within, while it serves as a prop\u00e6deutic, cannot actually bring\nus up to the ethical point of view. For this sort of contemplation\nreveals only the working of impersonal forces or powers, thought,\nfeeling, impulse in their endless actions and reactions, similar, in\nso far as they are impersonal, to the forces observed in nature. The\nethical point of view alone discloses a centrality, an underivative,\nirreducible core, a substantive being, personality.\n\n[68] An expression occurring once only.\n\n\n\n\n BOOK IV\n\n APPLICATIONS: THE ETHICS OF THE FAMILY, THE STATE, THE INTERNATIONAL\n RELATIONS, ETC.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nTHE COLLECTIVE TASK OF MANKIND AND THE THREE-FOLD REVERENCE\n\n\nThe social institutions, the family, the organs of education, the\nvocation, the political organization, the organization of mankind, the\nideal religious society are to be treated as a progressive series. The\nindividual is to pass successively through them, advancing from station\nto station toward ethical personality.\n\nIn designating the social institutions as an ethical series, care\nmust be taken not to confound the terms of the series as now existent\nwith the terms as they would be did they conform to their ethical\nfunctions. For instance, even the monogamic family is as yet only in\npart ethically organized. School and university are adrift as to their\nethical purpose. The majority of mankind are engaged in occupations\nwhich it would be absurd to call vocations, and the international group\nexists as yet barely in embryo. Hence when we speak of the social\ninstitutions as a progressive series through which the individual is\nto advance towards personality, we are describing the aim of social\nreconstruction, not the present state of things. The spiritual nature\nof man must create for itself appropriate social organs. It has been\npainfully engaged in the attempt to do so since the existence of our\nrace on earth.\n\nIn each of the social institutions we are to distinguish between the\nempirical substratum and the spiritual imprint which it is to receive.\nWe find in each ready to hand some natural non-moral motive or set of\nmotives of which we are to avail ourselves in the endeavor to evoke the\nspiritual result. Thus in the family the non-moral motive is affection\ndue to consanguinity; in the school sociality, the school society being\nthe first society into which the child enters; in the vocation there\nis the craving for mental self-expression, in the state, patriotism,\nor the feeling we have for the larger whole in which we are included\non the basis of similarity of language, historic tradition, etc. The\nnatural basis of the international group of society is the empirical,\nand as yet in no way ethical, fact of the commercial and industrial\ninterdependence of the different countries, a fact used by M. Bloch and\nhis more recent followers as an argument against war.\n\nIn popular literature the empirical substratum and the spiritual\nrelation to be produced by means of it are constantly confused. In any\ngenuinely ethical system they must be carefully discriminated.[69]\n\nIn each of the social institutions, or, as we may now call them, the\nphases of life experience through which the individual must pass on the\nway toward personality, the winning of the ethical result depends on\nobservance of _the three-fold reverence_. What I mean by the three-fold\nreverence must be explained in some detail, especially as the reader\nmight otherwise be led into identifying my view with that expressed by\nGoethe in _Wilhelm Meister_. The three modes of reverence mentioned\nby Goethe in his sketch of the \u201cpedagogical province\u201d have for their\nbackground the poet\u2019s pantheism. The view here set forth is based on\nethical idealism.\n\nIn order to introduce my thought let me go back to the phrase\nrepeatedly used in Book III\u2014\u201cthe task of humanity.\u201d Mankind as a whole,\nthe generations past, present and to come, have a certain work to do, a\ntask to accomplish. A collective obligation rests on our race, spanning\nthe generations.\n\nThe spiritual conception of the collective task is the basis of the\nthree-fold reverence. The spiritual result, as was said above, is in\nevery instance to be superinduced upon an empirical substratum. The\nempirical substratum in this case is mankind considered as a developing\nentity, which partially reproduces in the present the mental and moral\nacquisitions of ancestors, partially increases the heritage and passes\nit on to the newcomers. I, as an individual, am also inextricably\nlinked up backward and forward with those who come before and those who\nare to come after. I cannot take myself out of this web. The task laid\nupon human society as a whole is also laid upon me. I am a conscious\nthread in the fabric that is weaving, conscious in a general way of the\npattern to be woven.\n\nBut viewed empirically the development of humanity is haphazard. Much\nis preserved from the past that ought to be cast aside. Many traces\nof past error remain unexpunged in the life of the present. A mixed\nstream, compounded of good and evil, passes through our veins into\nour successors\u2019. The empirical fact is simply the fact of partial\nreproduction, partial augmentation and partial transmission. The\nethical conception of progress depends on the view that there is an\nideal pattern of the spiritual relation in the mind of man, destined\nto become more explicit as it is tested out and that the present\ngeneration ought to appraise the heritage of the past according to this\npattern, preserving and rejecting and adding its own quota in such a\nway as to enable the succeeding generations to sift the worthful from\nthe worthless more successfully, and to see the ideal pattern more\nexplicitly.\n\nThe three-fold reverence has been described as reverence towards\nsuperiors, equals and inferiors. For this inadequate description\nI would substitute the following: In place of reverence towards\nsuperiors, reverence for the valid work of ethicizing human relations\nalready accomplished in the past, reverence for the precious permanent\nachievements and for those who achieved them,\u2014the \u201cOld Masters.\u201d The\nhuman race has gained a certain ethical footing in the empirical\nsphere. The general task has not to be begun _ab initio_. In the act\nof separating what is worth while from what is worthless, in the very\nprocess of revision and reinterpretation, we manifest our reverence for\nthe past. It is thus that true historicity is distinguished from blind\nconservatism. And besides, by studying the old masters, we acquire\na certain standard of excellence. Since those who have contributed\nepoch-making advances in philosophy, in religion, in science, inspire\nus by the grandeur of their attack on the great problems; and the\nspirit of their attack, is unspeakably stimulating to us, even when we\nreject their solutions. We cannot too humbly sit as disciples at the\nfeet of the great masters if discipleship has this meaning.\n\nReverence of the first type prescribes the same attitude towards\npre\u00ebminent personalities among our contemporaries. They rank with the\ngreat predecessors inasmuch as they are in a way for us predecessors.\nThey are in advance of us. To revere them is to endeavor to come\nabreast of them, to obtain the advantage of the forward movement which\ntheir superior capacity enabled them to initiate, and to start where\nthey leave off, adding our small quota.\n\nThe second kind of reverence is directed toward those who are, in\nrespect to their gifts and opportunities, approximately on the same\nlevel with us, but whose gifts differ from and are supplementary\nto ours. In our relation to them we may learn the great lesson of\nappreciating unlikeness, and working out our own correlative unlikeness\nby way of reaction.\n\nThe third kind of reverence is directed toward the undeveloped,\namong whom I include the young, the backward groups among civilized\npeoples, and the uncivilized peoples. We are to reverence that which\nis potential in all of these individuals and groups, and we do so by\nfitting ourselves to help them actualize their spiritual possibilities.\nReverence of the third kind takes the highest rank among the three.\nThe spiritual life of the world is a deep mine as yet explored only\nnear the surface. The unrealized possibilities of mankind are the chief\nasset. But in order to effectuate our purpose with respect to the\nundeveloped, we must have reverence toward the great Old Masters, to\ngain a certain standard of excellence; and reverence towards unlikeness\nin others to become ourselves differentiated individualities, and in\norder to respect the unlikeness which we shall presently likewise find\nin the backward and the young. So that the three reverences play into\none another and are inseparable from one another, the first two being\nindispensable to the third. They are in truth a \u201ctrinity in unity.\u201d\nBut the third reverence is the supreme one. The chief objective must\nbe the undeveloped, because our face must be turned toward the future,\nbecause the task of mankind is as yet in its early stages. The third\nreverence is supreme. Now it is only when we have grasped the meaning\nof the triple reverence that we can fully appreciate the significance\nof the family as the first matrix in which the reverential attitudes\nare to be acquired. It is only then that we can rightly conceive of\nthe organs of education, and of the end upon which the activities of\nschool and university should converge. And similarly we shall find\nour interpretation of the vocation, the state, and the international\nsociety illuminated by this conception of the three-fold reverence.\n\nIn popular religious teaching the individual is thrust into the\nforeground. His salvation as a detached entity is the principal object.\nIn positivism and evolutionalism society in its empirical aspect is\nexalted, and the individual tends to be regarded as a stepping-stone.\nIn the spiritual interpretation of the collective task as outlined,\nthe individual remains integral and sacrosanct. The spiritual society\nof which the image is to be imprinted on human society is a society\nof indefeasible ethical personalities.[70] The individual even now at\nhis station in the present attributes to himself this lofty character\nand the various obligations which he already recognizes, and which he\nendeavors to fulfil, afford him ample opportunity to vindicate his\nspiritual selfhood. If in addition he looks forward longingly to the\nfuture, and to the greater spiritual fulfilment that may be expected\namong posterity, this expectation is founded on the belief that what he\nalready possesses in germ will then be more unfolded, that the ideal\nof the indefeasible worth of man of which he is already conscious\nin himself will then be more completely recognized and its infinite\nimplications be more fully understood.[71]\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[69] Thus the interdependence of nations in respect to their material\ninterests is often erroneously expatiated on as if it constituted an\nactually ethical bond between them.\n\n[70] While at the same time the ethical personality, unlike\nthe \u201cwindowless monads\u201d of Leibnitz is effectuated only in the\ncross-relations which subsist between each one and his spiritual\nassociates.\n\n[71] I may here point out the bearings of this general point of view\non the much-mooted and confused question of the value of the study\nof history. Ranke holds that the aim of the historian should be to\nreproduce factually the occurrences of the past. Robinson insists on\nthe uses of history. But uses to what end? The history of the past is\nfragmentary and full of gaps. The data with respect to some of the\nmost important periods are irrecoverable. The attitude of the human\nrace towards its own history, I take it, should be like that of an\nindividual towards his past. I cannot really resuscitate my past.\nMemory is treacherous. Much has been forgotten. The events of my youth\nare discolored when seen in the perspective of later years. I should\ntry to know myself as far as I can, but with a view of pressing on and\nrealizing with such light upon myself as I have, the ethical aim. The\nsame applies to mankind. And the important point is in the review to\ndisengage the ideas that controlled the principal social institutions\nin the past, and to appraise these ideas from the standpoint of our\npresent ethical insight. Thus, in treating the history of the family,\nwe should single out the ideas that controlled the family relation, the\nidea of the _patria potestas_, the feudal idea, or the connection of\nthe family with landed property. In writing the history of the organs\nof education, we should bring into view priestly education as among the\nBrahmins, musical or \u00e6sthetic education as among the Greeks, the idea\nof princely education, the idea of preparation for the government of\nan empire, which accounts for the system of the English universities,\nthe controlling idea of the German universities. And then at the end of\nour survey we shall be in a better position to discern what is to be\nthe ideal of school and university education in an ethical democracy.\nThe same applies to the controlling ideas of the state, and of the\nremaining social institutions.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nTHE FAMILY\n\n\nThe family is in process of change. We should fix attention on the kind\nof change that is desirable. The change desirable is the more perfect\nexpression of the ethical ideal in the life of the family. One striking\nfact is that in the past the family was never supposed to exist merely\nfor the \u201cbenefit\u201d of its individual members. The latter view is an\nindividualistic novelty of our age, and, as commonly understood, it is\nradically false.\n\nUnder the caste system the family subordinates the welfare of its\nmembers to the function of the caste. Society being stationary\nand stratified, the family is the organ for the reproduction of a\nstratified social system.\n\nA similar view prevails under feudalism. We of today resent the idea\nunderlying primogeniture. From the modern point of view we ask why the\neldest born should be preferred to his brothers. Primogeniture appears\nto us to assert the inequality of individual men; but from the feudal\npoint of view the eldest born was preferred, not as an individual, but\nas the steward of the family property. The family had a fixed place\nin the social hierarchy, and to maintain this place the estate was to\nremain undivided in the hands of one person.\n\nNow what is amiss with the modern family? This is profoundly amiss\u2014that\nthe idea of the family as serving a larger purpose is disappearing,\nand that the family is supposed to exist for the benefit of its\nindividual members, benefit meaning happiness. Frequent divorce and\ndisintegration are the natural consequences of this view, for if the\ntie exists solely for the happiness of those bound by it, then it ought\nindeed to be dissolved when the relation entails suffering.\n\nSociety has passed from status to contract, and many seem to hold\nthat contract is the last word, the true expression of freedom. We\nhave passed from status to contract, we must pass on from contract to\norganization, and thus to true freedom.\n\nStatus is based on the analogy of the animal organism. The caste\nsociety and the feudal society, ethically regarded, are spurious\norganisms. This spurious type of organization is no longer viable,\nand now bald individualism is taking its place. The malady with which\nthe family is afflicted is individualism. The desirable change is\ngenuine organization on the basis of the spiritual equivalence of all\nfunctions.[72] The relation of the family to the general social task of\norganization is two-fold. The family is the seminary in which shall be\nimplanted the germinal principle of organization, that principle which\nis destined to transform all the subsequent terms of the social series,\nthe instrumentality to be employed being the three-fold reverence.\nAgain, the family will reach its more perfect form in proportion as the\nsucceeding social institutions, the school, vocation, state, shall\nthemselves be essentially organized, the influence of the later terms\nretroacting on the first term.\n\nThe family, in the spiritual view of it which I am sketching, differs\nfrom the family of other days, and also from the modern family, in two\nparticulars. It does not recruit some one social class or stratum.\nIt does not direct the offspring into a single specific vocation. It\nis the vestibule that leads into all the different professions and\nvocations. And secondly, the family does not prepare the young to enter\ninto a vocation for the purpose of securing happiness. It does not\nregard the vocation as servile to the empirical ends of the individual,\nbut as a phase through which he is to pass on the road toward ethical\npersonality, the fulfilment of the objective aims of the vocation being\nthe means of acquiring the ethical development which the vocation is\ncompetent to furnish. Thus we regain, but on a much higher plane, what\nthe family possessed before it began to break down under the influence\nof modern individualism, namely, an ulterior greater purpose imbedded\nwithin itself and yet extending beyond itself.\n\nWhen we have grasped this relation of the family to the subsequent\nterms of the social series, and bear constantly in mind as we should\nthat the three-fold reverence is the instrument by which _organization_\nis to be effected, we shall then be able to give adequate reasons why\nthe monogamic ideal alone is the true ethical ideal, why the marriage\nrelation, if it is to be ethical, must be permanent between two and\nexclusive of all others.\n\nLet me briefly point out the relation of the monogamic family to\nthe three types of reverence. The third type ranks highest. The\ntie of consanguinity between parents and offspring supplies the\nempirical substratum. To be interested in the undeveloped, to surmise\npossibilities as yet wholly unapparent, to go to infinite pains to\nnurture and educate an immature being like a child, for all this\nnatural affection is almost indispensable. As a rule no one can so\nlove a child as its own parents do. The plan of state education for\ninfants to replace home education is advocated by some on the ground\nthat professional kindergartners and teachers are more competent to\ntrain the budding human mind than unpedagogical fathers and mothers.\nThe function to be performed by the scientific educator in co-operation\nwith the home is doubtless not to be missed; but taking children away\nfrom under the care of their parents, assembling them in what would be\nequivalent to state orphan asylums, is a procedure which precisely for\npedagogical reasons would be preposterous. For the parent supplies that\nconcentrated love for the individual child, that intimate cherishing\nwhich the most generous teacher, whose affections are necessarily\ndistributed over many, can never give. And the child needs this\nselective affection. The love of the parent is the warm nest for the\nfledgling spirit of the child. To be at home in this strange world\nthe young being with no claims as yet on the score of usefulness to\nsociety or of merit of any kind, must find somewhere a place where it\nis welcomed without regard to usefulness or merit. And it is the love\nof the parents that makes the home, and it is his own home that makes\nthe child at home in the world.\n\nIt does not follow that parents in general do reverence the spiritual\npossibilities latent in their children. The natural affection is there,\nbut the empirical substratum and the spiritual relation are not to be\nconfounded. The kind of reverence of which I speak is an ideal thing to\nbe worked towards, not something that as yet actually exists, save in\nexceptional cases. In the caste family and the feudal family the father\nincarnated, as it were, the social system so far as that stratum or\nclass was concerned to which he belonged. He inspired awe. He demanded\nimplicit obedience. It was the existing social system that spoke from\nhis lips. But this system itself had an arbitrary character, and the\nworship of the father was hardly ethical. The modern family goes to\nthe opposite extreme. In it the relations between parents and children\nare loose, and tend to become more and more so. Reverence is scarcely\nlooked for by the parent, and is not likely to be accorded. On the\nindividualistic theory the child at a very early age is treated as an\nequal, and whether encouraged to do so or not is apt to assert its\nindependence. The members of the family are not joined in an organic\nconnection, but resemble a collection of atomic units that easily\nfall apart. The ethical relation, the real reverence must spring from\nthe service the parent renders in bringing to light the specific\nindividuality of the child with an eye to the transmutation which it is\nto receive in the later terms of the social series. Not only highest\ngratitude but genuine reverence are due to the parent who performs\nthis office. \u201cYou have given me physical birth, you are now giving me\nspiritual birth,\u201d will be the child\u2019s response to the parent\u2019s efforts.\n\nThus much may be said as to the reason why the marriage relation should\nbe exclusive. The principal reason why it should be lifelong, is that\nthe office of the parent in furthering the spiritual development of\nthe children does not end when they reach the threshold of manhood or\nwomanhood. On the contrary, the finest touches are often added to the\nwork of education when the sons and daughters have become established\nin a business or profession, and have founded families of their\nown. The wisdom gathered from the experience of their elders, the\ndisinterested counsel inspired by love, will then be of the greatest\nuse to them. The young mother, especially, confronted with the problems\nof child-rearing, will naturally turn to her own mother for advice.\nThe son, who comes to close quarters with the difficulties of life,\nwill find in the father, who is detached from life and has the tranquil\nvision of old age, his best friend.\n\nIn speaking of the third type of reverence I have already included all\nthat need here be said of the first type. The reverential relation\nis mutual. The child will truly reverence the parent who on his side\nreverences the child\u2019s spiritual possibilities. The child does not\nunderstand the word Spiritual, but is unconsciously affected by the\nthing itself which I am here describing. A person who has the vision,\nwho has the gift of divining what is as yet unmanifested, will convey\nto others the illumination of his vision. The child will realize in his\nparent the presence of something higher, and will revere it, worship\nit. Certain looks, certain expressions of the countenance, certain\ngestures, though not understood in their meaning at the time, will be\nimprinted on memory to be recalled in later life and then understood.\nBut it is essential, in order to evoke reverence in the young, to have\nit oneself. He who does not steadfastly revere something, yes, someone\ngreater than himself, will never elicit reverence in others.\n\nThe second type of reverence, towards those who are unlike ourselves\nbut none the less our equals, can be inculcated in an elementary way\nin the family through the relations of brothers and sisters. Fraternal\nfeeling is an empirical means whereby to produce or at least prepare\nthe way for a very notable spiritual result\u2014the willingness not only to\nrespect difference in others, but to welcome it. In current teaching\nthe emphasis in fraternity is placed on likeness. It should rather be\nplaced on the unlikeness. These exist, and are sometimes very marked\nbetween brothers, and often cause discord and separation. The novices\nin life should therefore be taught betimes to overcome their repugnance\nto those who are unlike themselves, and the common relation of the\nbrothers to their parents will be helpful to this end. Naturally we\ndislike the unlike. Alienness is ever productive of disharmony. The\nfact, however, that the unlike person in the case of a brother is the\nchild of the same parents draws us powerfully toward him despite the\ntendency to recoil.\n\nI must not omit to mention that the triple reverence is most naturally\nand easily learned in the family, because of the simplicity of the\nrelations, and the limited number of persons involved.\n\nThe question may be raised whether the single family should remain the\nprimary social unit, or whether a group of families united in close\nco\u00f6peration would better fulfil the purposes for which the family\nexists. The privacy and separateness of each family would not need\nto be disturbed, co\u00f6peration might be limited to specific objects,\nsuch as simplifying the work of the household, providing kindergarten\neducation for the young children, better play facilities, separate\nstudy rooms for adolescents, common entertainments for all, and a\nservice of song at the beginning or close of the day. One obvious\ndifficulty in constituting such a group would be: the diversities of\ntastes and opinions, particularly such as are not perceived at the\noutset, but emerge on nearer acquaintance, and as the younger members\ngrow up and develop their idiosyncrasies. One great advantage, however,\nwould result if care were taken to include in the group persons\nbelonging to different vocations\u2014scientist, scholar, architect, lawyer,\nartist. Young persons as they mature would then have the benefit of\ncontact with those who are intimately familiar with different lines of\nvocational activity, and would be helped to know their own mind as to\ntheir future career better than they commonly do now. Personal contact\nwith one who is engaged in a certain line of work is a far better\ninstruction as to the nature of the work than reading about it or\nobservation from a distance.\n\nThe ethical theory of marriage has been developed in my published\naddresses.[73] But certain topics not there treated I would at least\nallude to here in passing, and among them the need of a more careful\nstudy of the causes that lead to infelicity in marriage. Kant mentions,\nas an instance of the discrepancy between the natural and the moral\norder, the fact that the sex passion is often at its height before\nthe period when marriage may be wisely entered into. There are other\nseemingly radical incongruities, for instance, that between the\nface, the features of a person and his real character. The one may\nbe borrowed so to speak from some ancestor, while the real nature is\nquite at variance with the impression created by the face, so that\none who thinks he marries A really marries B. There are diversities\nalso between partners in marriage that only show themselves in the\nlatter part of life, when the outlines of character are apt to stand\nforth bare. Besides, there is assumed to be, by some modern writers, a\ncertain fundamental sex antagonism.\n\nThe whole question of the characteristics of sex requires to be far\nmore carefully investigated than it has been. And here let me take the\nopportunity to express my positive appreciation of empirical science in\nconnection with ethical theory. The chief object of this volume is to\nwork out the general plan of the ethical relations, or the regulative\nprinciple in ethics, and this I am deeply convinced is supersensible\nand non-empirical. Applied ethics, however, is dependent not only on\nthe regulative principle but on empirical science, that is, on an\nextended and ever-increasing knowledge of physiology, psychology,\nand of the environmental conditions that influence human beings, and\nI am keenly desirous to ward off the possible misunderstanding that\nthe ethical theory here proposed is intended to replace the empirical\nscience of man, individual or social\n\n Without the way there is no going.\n Without the truth there is no knowing;\n\nsays Thomas \u00e0 Kempis. The way is the empirical knowledge, the truth is\nthe regulative principle. The way itself, as we proceed along it, will\nshed additional light on the truth. Nevertheless, without the outlines\nof the truth, without a goal in view, we should but be wandering\nblindly.\n\nIt is likely that the relations between persons in marriage will in\nfuture become more complex, and the difficulties of adjustment more\nserious, in proportion as under the influence of the new education\nthe individualities of men and women become more developed. Problems\nhardly as yet envisaged will then become pressing. But whatever the\ndifficulties, they can be overcome if the ideal purpose of marriage be\nkept in view, namely, that two beings of opposite sexes shall spend\ntheir lives in the spiritual reproduction of offspring. The relation is\ntriangular. Husband and wife are each to elicit the distinctive best\nin the other, incited, impelled to do so in order jointly to evoke\nthe distinctive best in the young. And the young represent posterity.\nWhat the parents do for their own children they do for posterity,\nsince children are that portion of posterity which comes under their\nimmediate influence. And in this sense it may be said that marriage is\nan organ for the spiritual reproduction and advancement of the human\nrace.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[72] Spurious or bastard organization was based on the empirical\npre\u00ebminence of some function like that of the priest or the warrior.\n\n[73] See _Marriage and Divorce_, D. Appleton & Co.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nTHE VOCATIONS\n\n\nThe next term in the series of social institutions is the school,\ninclusive of its higher departments. But for reasons which will\nsufficiently appear to anyone who carefully reads this chapter, it is\nadvisable to treat the vocations first.\n\nA more ludicrous mistake cannot be conceived than that of taking the\nideal for the fact, the wish for the deed, in matters touching the\nsocial institutions. Thus the term \u201cvocational guidance\u201d is often used,\nas if the occupations of the majority of men already answered to what\nis implied in the idea of a vocation as if, for instance, industrial\nlabor in a factory were a \u201cvocation\u201d into which the young only needed\nto be guided, whereas guidance means, in this case, being directed into\nsome mechanical _occupation_ not already overcrowded, or turned into\nother unvocational occupations when they happen not to be over-filled.\nBut what is true of monotonous, mechanical labor in factories is true\nin a greater or less degree of all human occupations. None of them at\nleast are as yet vocations in the highest sense.\n\nI dwell on this because, in describing the vocation as the third term\nin the series, I would not have the reader imagine that this third\nterm exists in any adequate manner. Rather is it to be the task of\nwhat is often loosely called \u201csocial reform\u201d _to create the ethical\nseries_,\u2014not only the third term (the vocation), but the whole\nseries from beginning to end, the family, the school, the state, the\ninternational society, the ideal religious society. The phrase \u201csocial\nreform\u201d is strictly correct only when used comprehensively in this\nway. To confine its usage to the more equable repartition of wealth,\nor to changes in economic conditions is unwarrantably to narrow its\nsignification. Social reform is the _reformation of all the social\ninstitutions in such a way that they may become successive phases\nthrough which the individual shall advance towards the acquisition of\nan ethical personality_.\n\nIn sketching the ideals of the different vocations, I have to\nconsider in what way each contributes to the formation of an ethical\npersonality. There is an empirical side to each vocation. Every\nvocation satisfies some one or more of the empirical human needs; but\nin the very act or process of doing so, it ought, in order to deserve\nthe name of a vocation, to satisfy also a spiritual need, to contribute\nin a specific way toward the formation of a spiritual personality.[74]\nAgriculture furnishes food. The different trades minister to a great\nvariety of wants. The scientist extends our knowledge of nature.\nWith this empirical aspect of the vocations, however, I am not here\nconcerned. A scientific classification of the vocations is not a task\nto which I need address myself. _My task is an ethical classification\nof the vocations._ As this has never been undertaken, the first\nattempt is difficult and perforce provisional.\n\nI outline my topics as follows:\n\n1. The theoretical physical sciences (including mathematics) considered\nfrom the point of view of the specific way in which the ethical\npersonality may be developed by those who pursue them.\n\n2. The practical counterparts of the theoretical sciences, _e.g._,\nengineering, and the industrial arts in so far as they depend on and\nillustrate and use principles and methods furnished by science. Work\nin factories, mines, and also in the fields, is to be regarded as the\nexecutive side of theoretical science.\n\n3. The historical sciences, those which have to do with mentally\nreproducing the life of the human race in the past, including history\nproper, philology, arch\u00e6ology, etc.\n\n4. The vocation of the artist.\n\n5. The vocation of the lawyer and the judge.\n\n The vocation of the statesman.\n\n The vocation of the religious teacher.\n\nThe three last mentioned are classed together as educational vocations,\nthat is, as vocations which, in respect to their highest significance,\nare branches of the _pedagogy of mankind_, having for their object\nto educate the human race; the ethical object of the lawyer being to\neducate society in the idea of justice; of the statesman to educate\nsociety in the idea of the state; of the religious teacher to educate\nsociety in the idea of the spiritual universe.\n\nThis conception of the lawyer, the politician, etc., as primarily\neducators, is a point to which particular attention is directed. The\nsignificance of it will appear further on. I shall now indicate in\nbare outline what I conceive to be the specific contribution of the\nvocations mentioned to the formation of a spiritual personality.\n\n\n_Science_\n\nConspicuously important in this connection is the question whether\nand by what means the pursuit of the physical sciences can be linked\nup to the supreme spiritual end of man. The scientist may develop\ninto a great thinker in the course of comprehensive and intricate\ninvestigations, but he does not thereby necessarily develop into a\npersonality. His mind will become in this way a mirror of the orderly\nprocession of nature\u2019s phenomena. He will be the accurate recorder of\nwhat happens, the knowing spectator of the play, whose eye recognizes\nthe actors, the forces, beneath their disguises. The pursuit of\nknowledge of this kind for the sake of knowledge, or it may be for the\nsake of exercising the faculty of cognition, represents the purely\nscientific conception of the aim of science. Whatever moral qualities\nare exacted of the scientist, such as accuracy or intellectual\nveracity, self-abnegation, scorn of mere vulgar pecuniary reward or\ncelebrity, and at least a provisional disregard of the practical\nbenefits to be derived by mankind from scientific discovery\u2014all these\nfine traits of character are prized as subordinate to the strictly\nscientific object. The ethical character of the man himself is\nnot regarded as the supreme end to be fostered by his scientific\noccupation, but as instrumental to his occupation the aims of which are\nsaid to be purely _impersonal_.\n\nThere is thus a scientific conception of the aim of science; on the\nother hand, there is an ethical conception of it. The former points\nin the direction of the indefinite extension of knowledge which never\nembraces a totality of the knowable, never reaches a limit, even in\nidea. The latter points to the _infinite_, not to the _indefinite_,\nsets up an ideal of the infinite as the goal, takes the man out of the\nflux, centralizes his individuality into a personality by relating him\nto the infinite, not as the mere spectator and scribe of nature, but\nthrough his action or other potential spiritual beings like himself.\n\nThe scientist, in brief, like every one else, becomes a personality\nby eliciting the potential spiritual nature in other human beings.\nBut be it noted that he is to perform this task _as a scientist_. His\nparticular occupation is to be the means of producing a particular\nspiritual result in others as well as in himself, and by this means his\noccupation is to be converted into a vocation.\n\nHow? Through partial success and frustration. Partial success in the\ncase of a scientist means for one thing, increased mental grasp, the\npower to hold before the mind ever more and more complex relations,\u2014a\nfaculty supremely serviceable in mastering complexities of relation in\nthe economic, in the political spheres, in the sphere of international\nintercourse, in the sphere of the social relations in general, and\nwherever the ethical principle has to be applied. The scientific\noccupation trains powers which are to be exercised so as to illuminate\nobscurities in the ethical field.\n\nThe frustration which the scientist meets with when he reflects in\nthoroughgoing fashion on the business he has in hand is the inevitable\nrealization that _Alles Verg\u00e4ngliche ist nur ein Gleichniss_, that the\nsphere of the finite in which he labors, though capable of indefinite\nextension, is forever incapable of being rounded out to a true\ninfinity, and hence that the complete unification of the manifold (in\nwhich alone the reality-producing functions of the mind can find repose\nand ultimate satisfaction), can never be carried out in the manifold\nof juxtaposition and sequence with which, as a physical scientist, he\ndeals. He will thus be led to face in thought the limits of what is\nfinitely attainable, not only by him as an individual scientist, but\nby physical science in general. And in proportion as his spiritual\nnature is energetic it will then assert itself all the more resiliently\nafter this defeat, and turn in a new direction, and towards another\nkind of truth, the truth which is discovered in the realm of _will_,\nin the sphere of intercourse with fellow human beings. The prop\u00e6deutic\nresult of science with respect to ethical personality is the training\nof the more complex mental faculties. The positive result following the\nfrustration is the new turn toward the spiritual, the escape from the\nspell wherewith the physical world enchains the mind, the dissipating\nof the widespread illusion that the truths of physical science are the\nonly kind of truth, the more determined setting of the face towards a\ndifferent kind of truth. The scientist, in brief, is to travel along\nthe paths of the finite in order to arrive and stand at the gate of the\ninfinite.\n\nI have said that the boon of personality is gained in intercourse with\nothers, through the influence which we exert on others. How does the\nscientist as a scientist spiritually affect others? The great specific\nservice, as I have just said, which he is to render is to destroy the\nillusion that the material world is a finality. And it is just he, the\nscientist, who works most successfully in the field of physical truth\nwho must assist the rest of us in escaping from the spell to which we\nare all subject. He is the one, he who more than others succeeds in\nunifying the manifold of juxtaposition and sequence, to whom we look to\nliberate others as well as himself from the deceptive belief that the\nreality-producing functions of the human mind can be satisfied in the\ntemporal and spatial manifold. Not from the tyro, not from the purveyor\nof \u201cpopular science\u201d can we hope to learn the profoundest lessons as to\nthe incapacity of physical nature to appease the spirit of man. It is\nfrom the familiar friend of nature, from one more deeply read than we\nare in her secrets, that we are to obtain this great instruction, to\nreceive this boon.\n\nEthics is a science of reactions. Each vocation reacts upon the others.\nThe general reaction of science I have mentioned. In addition the work\nof the scientist reacts upon agriculture, industry, etc. The industrial\narts, as has been stated, are to be regarded as the executive\nauxiliaries of science, receiving from it the knowledge of the\nuniformities of nature, and in turn setting for science new problems by\nattention to which scientific theory is advanced.\n\nThe relations of science to art also need to be considered at greater\nlength than is possible here. I have in mind inquiries into the\nscientific basis of music like those of Helmholtz, the scientific\ntheory of color and the like, and also detailed studies of the return\ngift which art confers on science, especially the value to the\nscientist of that cultivation of the imagination which is gained by\nthe contemplation and study of works of art. There are different kinds\nof imagination: the purely artistic, the scientific, the mechanical\nimagination, the ethical imagination. The function of the imagination\nin advancing science has been discussed by Tyndall and others, but the\nsubject is far indeed from being exhausted.\n\nThe scientist then may be defined as one who stands in reciprocal\nrelations to all other departments of human interest and activity, who\ngives to each from his specific standpoint as a scientist, and receives\nfrom each, from religion,[75] from art, from the practical vocations,\netc. Ideally speaking, every man participates in all the principal\ninterests and activities of the human mind. Every man is something of\nan artist, something of a practical or executive worker, scientist,\nreligious being. But in each individual the different interests are\ncolored by his special pursuit, and the influence he wields in return\nis modified in the same fashion.[76]\n\nThere are three great tasks that occupy human life:\n\n1. To build our finite world (science and its adjuncts).\n\n2. To create in the finite the semblance of the infinite, or spiritual\nrelation (art).\n\n3. To strive to realize the spiritual relation in human intercourse\n(ethics and religion).\n\nThis discussion of science affords me the opportunity to give an\nexact definition of the word \u201cinstrumental\u201d as I use it. And the word\n\u201cinstrumental\u201d is of decisive importance as to the entire ethical\nconception of life. Instrumental in what sense? The finite ends of man\nare to be the means used in the pursuit of the infinite end. But in\nwhat manner are they to be the means? To be a _cheerful world-builder_,\nto take an active and whole-hearted interest in the improvement of\nmaterial conditions, in political reforms, in the embellishment of\nearthly life\u2014how is it possible to do this and at the same time keep\nthe spiritual end in view as the supreme end?\n\nChristianity in its pristine form,[77] abandons the task in dismay.\nInstead of seeking action in the finite world as a means, it counsels\nrenunciation and withdrawal. Modern social reform movements, on the\nother hand, are devoted to finite ends, more or less ignoring the\nspiritual. How is it possible to work in the world, in the finite\nsphere, for an end beyond the finite? The answer, as I have shown in\nthe case of science (and the same applies to all other vocations), is\nto be found in the words \u201cpartial success and frustration.\u201d The finite,\nlesser ends, are means to the highest end in so far as we are partially\nable to embody the spiritual relation in the finite world, and in so\nfar as the inevitable defeat of our effort to do so serves to implant\nin us the conviction of the reality of the infinite ethical ideal.\n\nThe points contained in this chapter may be briefly summarized as\nfollows:\n\nWhat is the relation of science to the ethical end? We are seeking to\nlink up the world to spirit. Along what line can the connection be\nmarked out in the case of science? Science is instrumental in founding\nmore securely the empirical basis of self-respect, inasmuch as it\ngives to man to a certain extent a sense of mastery over nature. With\nthe help of science he feels himself no longer the helpless sport of\nnature\u2019s forces.\n\nThe training in complex thinking afforded by science is favorable to\nthe ethical reformer. Science also incidentally encourages the virtues\nof veracity, and the like.\n\nKnowledge for knowledge\u2019s sake cannot be the final end of the pursuit\nof science, since the world of space and time with which science\ndeals is not only not as yet rationalized but is not ultimately\nrationalizable.\n\nWhile in all the respects just mentioned the pursuit of science is\nindirectly instrumental to the spiritual end\u2014instrumental to the\ninstrument\u2014it is directly instrumental to it in so far as, at the hand\nof the supreme scientist, man is conducted through the finite as far as\nthe gate of the infinite.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[74] Just as the family is the organ of physical reproduction, but\nin that very capacity is ethically required to bring to birth the\nspiritual nature of its members.\n\n[75] All that I have said in the beginning as to the relation of the\nfinite and the infinite belongs under this head.\n\n[76] There is one point too obvious to be overlooked, but perhaps it\nhad better be expressly mentioned. The scientist helps us to build our\nworld, the physical nest in which we live, first by mastering nature\u2019s\nprocedures, then by making possible inventions, which increase the\nsecurity of our footing in the physical world; dispense us from the\nbrute task of pitting our merely physical strength against the forces\nof nature; render communication between distant peoples feasible, and\nthereby lay the first foundation for an international society.\n\n[77] _Vide_ Introduction to the First Book.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nTHE PRACTICAL VOCATIONS\n\n\nMedicine is the executive of the science of physiology, and the others,\non which it depends. The physician has a certain work to do, a certain\nneed to satisfy\u2014the need of health, the alleviation of pain. In\nendeavoring to satisfy this need he uses the sciences that underlie his\nvocation and in turn promotes those sciences.\n\nOn the lower levels of agriculture and the industrial arts the same\nholds true. Our physical necessities vociferously demand satisfaction.\nThey cannot wait. Men must have food or they perish. The agriculturist\nsupplies the food they need. But the spiritual view of life declares\nthat man, _while_ engaged in satisfying his material wants, shall in so\ndoing assert his spiritual nature. He is to hammer out his personality\non the anvil of his empirical necessities. Even as human beings do not\npartake of food like animals, but indicate by the manner in which they\ntake it the superior worth of the being who is dependent on food, so\nthe agriculturist who raises the food should testify to his spiritual\ncharacter. He does so in part at least by his reaction on the sciences\nwhich he applies, biology, chemistry, etc. The same holds good of the\nindustrial occupations. The work a man does should be the means of\npromoting the development of his mental and \u00e6sthetic nature, and of his\nwill. The mental and \u00e6sthetic development is acquired by mastering\nand reacting on the science and the art that enter into the trade. The\ndevelopment of the will, the most important of all, depends on the\norganic relations of the industrial workers among themselves and to\ntheir chiefs.\n\nThis raises the problem of the right organization of \u201cindustrial\nvocationalists\u201d from the ethical point of view, and the following\nquestions present themselves: Shall the present division into the two\nhostile camps of trade-unionists and employers continue? Or is it to be\nregarded as a makeshift, perhaps necessary during the present period\nof transition, but certainly untenable in the long run? Is the uniform\narrangement contemplated by Socialism desirable, the government of\nevery industry and indeed of every vocation by the representatives\nof the community as a whole? Shall what is called co\u00f6peration be\nadopted, that is, the formation of independent groups of workers on the\nvoluntary principle, associated for the purpose of equably dividing the\nprofits?\n\nThe three alternatives mentioned may be examined from various points of\nview. Here we consider them from the ethical point of view. Assuming\nthat the ethical end of life is to be supreme, what kind of industrial\nre-organization of society will be most in harmony with it? All three\nplans are open to the ethical objection that they concentrate attention\non the material gain to be derived from the industry instead of on the\nspecific service which those who follow the industry as a vocation are\nto render. Collective bargaining between unions and employers is after\nall just bargaining. Socialism differs from trade-unionism not in the\nobject so much as in the means. Instead of securing for the workers a\nlarger share it would secure for them at once an approximately equal\nshare. Co\u00f6peration aims at the same result as Socialism by voluntary\nassociation instead of by collective compulsion.\n\nNone of the three plans is ethically satisfying, and a fourth\narrangement should be contemplated. Its characteristics are the\nfollowing:\n\n1. The idea of service to be pre-eminent instead of the gain, the wage\nor salary to be apportioned as the means of sustaining the worker in\nthe best possible performance of the service.\n\n2. The work done by the workers to be the means of developing them\nmentally, \u00e6sthetically and volitionally, the educational features\ntherefore to be pre-eminent.\n\n3. The industrial group to be transformed into a social sub-organism\n(in the ethical sense a sub-organ of the larger organism of the\nnation). By this is meant that the employers cease to be employers and\nbecome functionaries, while each worker in his place and in his degree\nlikewise becomes a functionary. A common social service group will thus\nbe formed embracing the chiefs and the humbler workers. The chiefs\nwill be the executive and administrative functionaries, and will be\nsafeguarded in the due discharge of their proper functions. The workers\nwill not attempt to wrest from their chiefs as they do at present the\ndirective functions which properly belong to the latter (subject,\nhowever, to due control). To each of the lesser functionaries in turn\nwill be assigned a sphere within which a relative independence would be\nhis.\n\nThe industry as a whole will be an _organ_ of the _corpus sociale_, and\nthis its character will be expressed in its government. The workers,\nnot required to render implicit obedience to rules imposed upon them\nby masters and superintendents, will have a voice in the legislation\nof the industry, in framing the policy of the industry, in electing\nthe chiefs, and in this way the development of the will, upon which\nI lay the greatest stress, will be attained. The will of the worker,\nat present fettered, will be liberated by the opportunity given it to\nbecome enlightened and effectual.\n\nI am not here describing a scheme which is to be immediately launched\nin its completeness. I am illustrating the ethical principle as I see\nit as applied to this particular vocation. I am endeavoring to show\nhow an occupation can be changed into a vocation. The constitutional\ngovernment of industries would be an intermediate stage between the\npresent autocratic form, in which more or less absolute power is vested\nin the employer, and that organic constitution of industry which is\nethically desirable.\n\nThus far the following plans have been before the minds of social\nreformers:\n\nA. Competition, or life and death struggle.\n\nB. Modified competition, or raising the plane of competition, as it is\ncalled, that is, doing away with the more ferocious and unscrupulous\nmethods of competition.\n\nC. Socialism.\n\nD. Co\u00f6peration.\n\nI propose to add (E) organization in the ethical sense. The word\n\u201corganization\u201d is deplorably misused at present. It is commonly\nemployed as a synonym for aggregation, which is the very reverse of\norganization. Thus \u201corganized labor\u201d really means aggregate labor,\nlabor acting _en masse_.\n\nA further remark on the difference between industrial vocationalism as\noutlined and Socialism may be of use in clarifying the main idea. The\nrelative independence of the social sub-organism is the salient point.\nThis kind of independence is based on the general conception underlying\nmy entire ethical philosophy, that the ethical quality resides in\nuniqueness in distinctiveness, that ethical progress consists in\ndriving towards individualization in the sense of personalization.\nThis as opposed to those philosophies of life that see the ethical\nquality in uniformity. Socialism is on the side of uniformity. It is\nindeed an extreme expression of it. If sometimes it is urged that the\nrelative independence of the vocational groups might be recognized in\nthe socialistic state, the answer is that the tendency would be in the\nopposite direction. And besides, the all-important question is to what\nend the relative independence is to be used. Under socialism it would\nbe used for the purpose of increasing the quantity of valuable products\nat the disposal of the community as a whole. From the ethical point of\nview, the independence of the organic group would be used to insure\nreciprocal relations, and by means of these the development mentally,\n\u00e6sthetically and volitionally of _the producers_. The distinction\ncertainly is clear enough to its members, whichever way the reader may\nincline.[78]\n\n\n_The Historical Sciences_\n\nI refer now briefly to historical science. The ethical aim of history\nand its adjunct sciences is to redeem from oblivion as far as is\npossible the past of the human race, its documents, its monuments,\nthe knowledge of its political adventures, its customs, laws and\ninstitutions, its religious beliefs. In view of the lacunae in our\nknowledge a complete revival of the past is impossible. We must\ntherefore principally seek to understand the ruling ideas that have\ngoverned our ancestors, in the family, in the state, etc. The task of\nthe historian is to present these ideas as seen in the light of their\nconsequences, so as to help us revalue them from the point of view of\npresent experience and insight. The historian will thus enable us to\ncarry over from the past what is truly valuable, for the business we\nhave in hand.\n\nThere is just now a strong reaction against the kind of historical\nscience which deals principally with wars and the actions of princes or\nof great leaders. Detailed attention is being given to the more obscure\nlife of the people. But it must be remembered that mere penetration\ninto the lower strata of bygone societies, the mere heaping up of facts\nconcerning mass movements, is as unprofitable as the more picturesque\nrecitals with which works on history were formerly adorned. The mass\nmovements and _the ideas_ which gave rise to them should be set clear\nas far as possible; but without the evaluation and the revaluation, or\nthe ethical appraisement, the voluminous knowledge of details is merely\nstupefying, and leaves us as much at sea as ever.[79]\n\nMany men have read many books on history, and filled their minds with\ninformation on subjects like the Protestant Reformation or the French\nRevolution, without being in the least wiser themselves, or more fitted\nto enlighten others in respect to the religious and ethical problems\nwhich were involved in these great movements, and which still touch us\nso closely today. As to the ordinary high school or college student,\nwhat as a rule does he carry away from his study of past \u201chistory\u201d?\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[78] The vocational group must be independent because the expert\nfamiliar with the conditions under which a service is performed is\nspecially competent to decide on the improvements required to render\nthe conditions more favorable to the development of human nature, the\nservice more adequate. The representatives of the collective community,\nthat is of the inexpert, outside mass (inexpert in respect to this\nparticular service) can never perform the same office.\n\nWith regard to the present state of industry the gigantic obstacle in\nthe way of improvement is obviously the subjection of the man to the\nmachine. The great hardship which the millions of factory operatives\nsuffer is not only the insufficient wage, it is the depersonalizing\neffect produced by the substitution of the machine for the hand and the\nblind subjection of adult workers to the arbitrary will of superiors.\n(Compare what I have said on this subject in the chapter on \u201cAn Ethical\nProgramme of Social Reform\u201d in _The World Crisis_.)\n\n[79] Think of Mommsen, the author of a thousand treatises, whose\nknowledge of the facts of Roman history was unsurpassed and probably\nunequalled. Yet is his judgment on C\u00e6sar or C\u00e6sarism helpful as an\nethical appraisement?\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nTHE VOCATION OF THE ARTIST: OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF THE RELATION OF ART\nTO ETHICS\n\n\nThe three great directions of effort are: to work in the finite; to\ncreate in the finite the semblance of the infinite; to realize through\neffort the reality of the infinite. The vocation of the artist is to\ncreate the semblance of the spiritual relation between the parts of\nan empirical object. The object may be a vase or a lamp; it may be a\nhuman figure, it may be a group of _dramatis personae_. By introducing\ninto the discussion of art the idea that a semblance of the spiritual\nrelation is to be produced by the artist, we get rid at the outset of\nthe barren formula of unity in variety.\n\nLet me endeavor to elucidate the main ideas that flow from this\ndefinition of the spiritual aim of art.\n\n1. The two points to be discussed are: What is meant by semblance? and\nWhat is meant by the quasi-spiritual relation as subsisting between the\nparts of a work of Art?\n\nFirst, then, there is the semblance of _totality_. The spiritual\nrelation is characterized by the totality of the parts related. That\ntotality is realized only in the universal manifold. But a semblance of\ntotality is furnished in the case of colors by the circumstance that\nthe chromatic scale is cut off at the bottom and top in consequence\nof our inability to perceive the colors below and above; the musical\nscale likewise presents a quasi-totality, and the human figure in its\ncontours presents a thing cut off from its surroundings, and in so far\nrelatively complete in itself.\n\nBecause the spiritual relation involves the idea of the perfect\ntotality, a relative totality, due to the accidental limitations of our\nsensory organs and power of attention, may become a semblance of the\nspiritual totality. I say, _may become_. A certain relation must be\nestablished between the parts of the relative totality in order that\nthe semblance shall result.\n\nOne thing is clear; the subject of the work of art must possess\nrelative completeness, and be capable of being contemplated as\ncircumscribed and separated off. It must stand out like a tree, or like\nan oasis encircled by the desert, or like an island. The subject of art\ncannot be a mere length of cloth cut off from the fabric of things as\nthey reel unceasingly from the loom of time\u2014the mistake of Realism.\n\nThe point, emphasized in our third Book, namely, that an empirical\nsubstratum is to be spiritualized, and that ethics consists in\nspiritualizing this physical and psychical substratum, applies to\nart, but with the difference, that in the case of art the physical or\npsychical substratum cannot be spiritualized, but is to be made to take\non the semblance of spirituality.\n\nNow what is meant by this kind of transformation? I can perhaps\nexplain by using as an illustration the color scheme of a picture.\nThe transformation appears in the difference between the colors on\nthe palette and the colors on the canvas. The colors on the palette\nrepresent the empirical substratum, the natural colors; the colors seen\non the canvas show the same natural tints after they have taken on a\nnew or second nature.\n\nThe second nature,\u2014in what does it consist? In the circumstance that\neach color on the canvas, by its juxtaposition and its relation to the\nrest, is altered in tone and value, and that all the rest are altered\nby it. The spiritual relation is a give and take relation actually\ncarried out. The semblance produced in art is the illusive appearance\nof such a relation as seen by the beholder.\n\nWe have thus set down two points\u2014the apparent totality, and the\napparent give and take relation between the parts (the second nature\nassumed by the parts, the illusory transformation of the substratum).\n\nA third point involved in the second is that each part of a work of\nart shall remain invincibly individualized, despite the closeness\nof the relation which connects it with the rest. The individual\nmember of a work of art may never be submerged in the whole, may\nnever merely convey the abstract idea of unity amid variation. The\n\u201cunity in variety\u201d formula is not only empty but misleading, based\non the same misconception which we have noted in dealing with Kant\nand with the Pantheists. The unity of a work of art consists in the\nreciprocal effect produced by the members on each other. Hence the more\naccentuated, the more distinctive the members are, always provided that\nthe reciprocal relation is maintained, the more artistically satisfying\nwill be the result. In this manner the work of art will be true to its\nessential character as a semblance of the spiritual relation.\n\nI have thus far spoken of the form. In regard to content I have\nonly remarked that it must be capable of relative detachment. It\nmust also be capable of interior articulation. The idea that an\nempirical substratum is to be transformed will here be found helpful\nin determining what is and what is not a fit subject for art. A vase\nor a pitcher is a utensil. As such it is a detached thing. Is it\ncapable of articulation _without destroying_ its utility? If it is, as\nthe beautiful vases show, it is a fit subject for art to treat. The\nembellishment of utensils, of tables, chairs, etc., that is to say,\nthe giving of artistic form to objects with which we bodily come into\ncontact, is a means of casting the appearance of the spiritual relation\nover these objects, and thus in a fine sense making them congenial to\nourselves as spiritual personalities. This justifies the time spent by\nartist artisans on their handiwork, and also justifies our availing\nourselves of their products (provided that the store set by these\nsymbolic reminders of the spiritual relation do not divert us from the\nmain business of life, which is to attempt to _realize_ that relation\nin human intercourse). The war song sung by a primitive tribe is a\ndetachable, empirical thing, and possesses natural articulation. It has\nits slow beginning, its gradual rise, its paroxysmic culminations, its\nwild ecstasy, its final dying down.\n\nThe love passion expressed in lyric form has for its basis the natural\nups and downs, dejections and transports characteristic of that passion.\n\nThe theme of a tragedy, as Aristotle says, must have a beginning, a\nmiddle, and an end. Repetition (always with a difference), contrast,\napparent triumph, defeat, and somehow a triumph in defeat\u2014whatever\nmay be the elements with which the tragic poet deals, the crude\nsubstance of them is furnished by the theme itself. And the result\nbecomes artistic when the articulation is such that each part becomes\na member of an organized whole, that is, when each part exchanges its\nfirst nature for the second nature mentioned above in connection with\npainting.[80]\n\nThe next point of interest to consider is whether beauty is to\nbe regarded as the invariable object of art. Relative detachment\nand susceptibility to articulation in the manner described are\nindispensable. But if tragedy is to be included, beauty cannot be the\nexclusive object. Lear, on the heath, the harpy daughters, Lear and\nCordelia perishing together, are not beautiful objects. The task of\nthe artist is to produce the semblance of the spiritual relation in\nany material which is capable of bearing that imprint. In the great\ntragedies we are lifted into an exalted mood by the form of the work\neven though the subject treated evokes horror\u2014perhaps because of the\nvery contrast between the form and the subject-matter. Beauty, on\nthe other hand, is produced when both subject-matter and form are\nsatisfying to our needs or aspirations. A vase is beautiful when\nperfectly adapted to its use and at the same time perfect in form. For\nthis reason any kind of embellishment, for instance, in architecture\nnot structurally in place is offensive, while on the other hand mere\nstructural utility without the formal touch is mechanical. It is not\ntrue that utility itself inevitably flowers into beauty.\n\nIt should be added, however, that the artistic expression even of\nunsatisfied desires may come within the scope of beauty. The \u201cLycidas\u201d\nis beautiful, Wordsworth\u2019s \u201cLaodamia\u201d is beautiful, the Gothic form of\narchitecture is beautiful, and so is Keats\u2019 \u201cOde to the Nightingale,\u201d\nand Shelley\u2019s \u201cOde to the West Wind.\u201d In such productions the adequate\nexpression of the need itself affords relief and induces tranquillity.\nThe mind ceases to strive toward a beyond longed for, and rests\ntranquillized in the longing itself. That it should thus aspire and\nlong, in consequence of its higher nature, and the assurance of the\nexistence of this higher nature, as evidenced by the longing, is\npeace-giving.\n\nBut it is hardly possible to discuss even in the most cursory manner\nthe subject matter or content of a work of art without drawing\nattention to the ideals which at various times have been expressed in\nart, and to the function of art in respect to these ideals. For here\nthe _grandeur_ of the great art as connected with the ultimate aim and\npurpose of life appears.\n\nArt in its fictions has endeavored to present to men the solution of\nthe problem of life, the things most worth striving for. The ideals, of\ncourse, have varied. In the Greek epic the heroes contend around the\nwalls of wind-swept Ilion. They themselves are wind-swept apparitions.\nLife is short; presently they too will pass out of sight, yet their\nnames and deeds will live after them. Fate is inscrutable. There is no\nulterior meaning in things. To glitter for a time in shining armor, and\nthen to be remembered in the song of the rhapsodists is alone worth\nwhile. It is this ideal of life that Homer records.\n\nThe romantic ideal of feudalism is reflected in the poems of chivalry.\nThe ideal of the English Renascence is found in Shakespeare. The\nreligious ideals are expressed in the Hindu temples, in the Parthenon,\nin the medi\u00e6val cathedrals, and in the poems of Dante and Milton. The\nideals of the oriental monarchs are visibly embodied in the Assyrian\nand Babylonian palaces; the ideal of the merchant class in the stones\nof Venice, in the architecture of the German and Flemish cities, etc.\nThe plastic arts especially owe their rise and prosperity to the\nprincely and religious ideals\u2014to the demand for temples, churches and\npalaces suitable for monarchs or merchant princes to dwell and worship\nin. The aim of the artificer is to furnish a splendid setting for\nprinces and divinities.\n\nMankind at different periods is in labor to give birth to ideals\nrepresenting the purpose for which man exists, or the things that make\nlife worth while, and art _assists in bringing to the birth these\nideals_. It seeks to express them, and in the effort to do so it helps\nto develop and clarify them. This, and not merely to give pleasure, is\nits _grand_ function.\n\nIn an age like the present, in which a new ideal is in the early stages\nof formation, art is likely to become, as in fact it has become,\nuncertain of its function, and hence apt to lose its direction, either\nturning back to the servile reproduction of past art forms, or seeking\nto achieve progress in the perfection of technical detail, or in the\nways of subjective impressionism.[81]\n\nThe efforts of a serious artist today, in so far as he undertakes to\nassist in bringing to the birth a new ideal by his endeavor to express\nit, must necessarily be tentative, if not crude. But such as they are\ntheir worth, if wholly sincere, can hardly be overestimated.\n\nIn the vocation of the artist, as everywhere, the three-fold reverence\nis the capital point. Reverence for the great masters, as shown not in\nslavishly copying them, but in understanding the qualities that made\nthem great, and in delivering from past art the things that are to be\nreincorporated and to live on; reverence for those who in different\nfields are intent on the problem of art today\u2014all this to prepare the\nway for future artists, for the greater art that is to come.\n\nThe relation of art to ethics, or to the spiritual life, is now\nsufficiently clear. In general it is to produce the semblance of the\nspiritual relation, and thereby to rejuvenate the world\u2019s workers, to\ngive them the joy of relative perfection, and thus to stimulate them to\npersevere in the real business of life, which is to approximate toward\nactual perfection. The specific task of the artist _at its height_\nis to enshrine in his creation the ideals of the age with respect to\nthe ultimate purpose of human existence, and in the endeavor so to\nincorporate them as to assist in defining them.\n\nThe dangers of pre-occupation with art, however, must not be passed\nover. Just because it creates the illusion of perfection it is apt to\nencourage the indolence of our nature, which ever prefers to content\nitself with illusion, and to desist from effort. It is on this account\nthat periods in which art greatly flourishes are apt to lead to the\nhalting of progress and eventually to decay. A second danger is that\nthe artist, in applying the ideal of present perfection, is in danger\nof selfishly subordinating other persons to himself (cf. Goethe as\na notable example), or of setting up a special kind of morality for\nartists.[82]\n\nIn a full account of the matter, the different so-called fine arts\nshould be specifically treated from the point of view of this chapter.\nThe particular contribution of each to the general purpose of art\nshould be noted, the distinctions marked between painting, sculpture,\npoetry, etc., and in each case the kind of art which is favorable to\nthe spiritual development of man be discriminated from that which is\nhostile to it. Plato attempted to do this in the case of music.\n\nTo summarize: What has been attempted in this chapter is a theory\nnot of art but of the relation of art to ethics. The dominating\nthought is this: in a work of art each line, color, sound, word,\nmust be irreplaceable, and on that account convincing. Each member\nmust be indispensable in its place and the connection with the rest\ninevitable. Substitute for line, color, sound, etc., a life\u2014an ethical\nbeing,\u2014conceive the members to be not a few but in number infinite, and\nyou have the spiritual ideal, which is the reality whereof the art work\nis a semblance. This is the relation of art to ethics\u2014the quality which\nwe call in art \u201cconvincing,\u201d in ethics we call \u201cworth.\u201d\n\n\nNOTES\n\n As one example architecture may be mentioned. Architecture furnishes\n _the envelope for the social life_, the dwelling, the nest of the\n family, the workshops that house the vocational life, the public\n buildings that provide a habitation for the political life, the\n temples, the churches that enshrine the religious life. The relation\n of the enshrining dwelling to the inner social life should be the\n same as that of the body to the soul in sculpture. That which goes on\n within should be significantly indicated externally. The progress\n of architecture will depend on its holding fast to this idea, and\n changing the outside as the inner life changes. Thus, we have, or\n are beginning to have, a conception of the family very different\n from that which prevailed at the time when the princely mansions of\n the Renaissance were built. To reproduce these princely mansions\n because they beautifully expressed the princely idea is a mistake. To\n provide a proper dwelling-place for the modern family the architect\n should clearly apprehend what functions go on in the family, what the\n distribution of functions should be, and the rank to be assigned to\n the different functions. There is to be, for instance, in addition\n to the ordinary requirements, provision for separate study rooms,\n places of retirement, refuges of intellectual solitude for the adult\n members; a playroom for children, a place of reunion for the household\n religion. The formation of a number of families into a larger group\n (_vid. supra_) would help in the solution of this problem.\n\n In like manner the conception of what a religious society should be is\n changing. The church-building, the Mosque, the Synagogue, certainly\n no longer declare the spirit and the purpose that animate the new\n religious fellowships that are forming among us today. The progress of\n architecture will thus depend, not on the out of hand invention of new\n styles, but on a thorough understanding of _the new kind of life which\n is to be domiciled within buildings_, accepting this as the empirical\n substratum, and articulating it in accordance with the spiritual\n relation of give and take between the parts; and the architect will\n assist in clarifying the ideal of the new kind of life that is to\n be lived within the buildings by endeavoring to give it outward\n expression.\n\n One more remark: The limitations opposed to the artist, for instance\n to the sculptor, by the material in which he works, are a helpful\n illustration of one of the most important ethical truths. The material\n is found to be intractable to the idea. The hardness of the stone,\n the veins that run through the marble, the unpropitious qualities of\n the wood, are so many hindrances to execution. The value of these\n hindrances is that they compel the artist to achieve a more definite\n grasp of the ideal itself. Before the attempt to carry it out into\n stone, the idea is apt to be vague in the mind of the artist. The same\n is true of every ideal conception\u2014that of the author before he writes\n a book, that of the social reformer before he attempts to carry his\n scheme into practice. And it applies no less to the ethical ideal of\n life in general. The empirical analogue or substratum is ductile to a\n certain degree, else we could never achieve even partial success. But\n it is also hostile and mutinous in many ways, and the fact that it is\n so compels us to adapt our ideal to existing empirical requirements,\n and to make it more explicit in the process of adapting it.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[80] Aristotle regards the _\u0152dipus Rex_ as the most perfect example\nof tragedy; let it serve the purpose of illustrating the idea here\nproposed. Read the play and get the total impression of it. Analyze it\ninto its parts. Synthesize after the analysis. You will not fail to\nrealize how every character, every speech and act, contributes to the\ntotal effect, and how in turn every single factor in the play receives\na new significance from its relation to the rest, while still retaining\nits obvious meaning (the meaning it would have when taken out of the\ncontext of the play). Take the first speech of \u0152dipus as an example.\nHe is the king solicitous for the welfare of his subjects, to whom\nthey look up with admiration and gratitude. He is the father of his\npeople. Read this speech again after you have taken in the entire play,\nand note how its color is changed. How the firmness, the fatherly,\nprotective attitude is now seen to be the outward mask of a fugitive\nsoul, unsure of itself, haunted by hideous fears.\n\n[81] The use made of pageantry, the revival of English and other\nfolk-songs, the morris-dances and the like, the attempt to ennoble the\nleisure of the industrial workers by leading them back to forms of art\nwhich sprang up centuries ago in foreign countries, is evidence of the\nkeen desire for art rather than a step in a new direction.\n\n[82] Art, like science, is to be subordinate. The relation between\npersons and persons is mankind\u2019s supreme concern. The views above\nexpressed differ radically from those of Schiller. See his _\u00c6sthetic\nEducation of Man_.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\nEDUCATIONAL VOCATIONS, OR VOCATIONS CONNECTED WITH THE STATE\n\n\nEvery vocation on its ethical side is educational. The reason for\naccentuating the educational aspect of the vocations connected with the\nstate is that this educational significance is generally overlooked.\nThe vocations referred to are those of the lawyer, the judge, the\nstatesman, the teacher in the narrower sense of the word (the teacher\nin schools and universities).\n\n\n_The Vocation of the Lawyer_\n\nVocation, as I use the term, invariably means related to the spiritual\nend of life. A profession or occupation becomes a vocation when he\nwho follows it seeks to respond to the _call_ of the latent spiritual\npossibilities in his fellowmen. If this be not the common definition\nof calling or vocation, yet I think it will bear scrutiny. It is the\nvocation of the lawyer to be the _teacher of justice_ to his clients,\u2014I\nmean of justice in so far as it is already embodied in law,\u2014and at the\nsame time to promote a desire for and a preliminary understanding of\nthe justice which is not yet embodied in law.\n\nThe lawyer is commonly regarded as the learned _alter ego_ of his\nclient. The lawyer is the client as he would be if he were versed\nin the law, and skilled to employ it in his interest. The client is\nsupposed to be an egotist, intent solely on securing his advantage\nto the fullest extent possible under the existing system of social\nregulations. The lawyer is his expert substitute. The judge appears on\nthe scene as the impartial representative of the law.\n\nFrom the vocational point of view the lawyer is an assistant to the\njudge, the agent not so much of his client as of justice. He is as much\ninterested in the just issue of the suit as is his legal opponent. His\neducational function is to teach his client to take the same point\nof view. Another point, no less important, is the following: Law is\na system of general rules, at best a rude social mechanics. And even\nas such it is constantly deflected from its ostensible purpose by\nselfishness and prejudice. The discriminations against women, the\nconspiracy laws against combinations of laborers, the laws enacted in\nthe interests of landed aristocracies, are ample evidence in point.\nIn every country the law as it stands is still largely infected with\nunfair discriminations, and it is the special duty of those who follow\nthe legal vocation to open the eyes of their clients and of the public\nto these defects and to suggest remedies.\n\nEvery vocation has its special vice, that is, a kind of behavior\nthe very opposite of that prescribed by the particular ethical\nfunction with which it is charged. The vice of the lawyer is\n_blind_ conservatism (unless he is at the same time progressive and\nconservative he fails to fulfil his ethical function).\n\nThe judge, too, is a teacher, especially in criminal cases. The\nvoice of the judge, when he pronounces sentence on a criminal, should\nreverberate throughout the whole of society, awakening all men to the\nfact that society as such shares the guilt.\n\n\n_The Vocation of the Statesman_\n\nWhat I have to say on this subject will find its proper setting in the\nnext chapter. In general, it is the vocation of the statesman to teach\nthe citizens a sublime conception of the state. He is neither to be the\nobedient tool of the mass\u2014the docile \u201cpublic servant\u201d in that sense\u2014nor\nyet to impose his arbitrary will upon the people, consulting only his\nown genius. The one type is seen in the average American politician,\nwho is or affects to be a mere instrument executing the public will;\nthe other type is exemplified by the supermen statesmen of ancient and\nmodern times. The ethically-minded statesman is to evoke the spiritual\nconception of the State in the minds of his constituents, and in the\nprocess of doing so to become more essentially a citizen himself.\n\n\n_The Vocation of the Educator_\n\nIt was unavoidable to discuss the vocations and their aims before\nconsidering the school, college and university; for these institutions\nare orientated towards the vocations, are preparatory to the latter,\nand the true aim of school and university cannot possibly be defined\nunless the vocational outlook be first distinctly spread before our\neyes.\n\nIn dealing with the vocation of the teacher, I shall necessarily be\nled to define the purpose of the social institution in which he labors\nand I shall for the sake of brevity use the word school to designate\nthe social organs of education, which cover the period of childhood,\nadolescence and the beginning of manhood and womanhood.\n\nThe school is like the hundred-gated Thebes. It leads out into a\nhundred vocational avenues. But note the following: its aim is far\ngreater than merely to prepare the student for that future vocation to\nwhich he is best suited. It should no less supply the incentive for\ncreating new vocations, and for changing what are at present still\noccupations into vocations. The school searches out the individuality\nof its pupils. It undertakes to differentiate and to personalize\nindividualities. But when it has done its part, it sends the pupils\ninto a world where little account is taken of the finer differences\nof aptitude, where occupations predominate and vocations are few, and\nwhere most things, ethically speaking, are still in the rough. The\nschool cannot indeed transform society by merely raising its indignant\nvoice and asking society to pay heed to the finer things which it has\nfostered, and which often are subsequently crushed. But it can at least\ncontribute to the vocational evolution of society by reiterating its\nunsatisfied demands.\n\nTaking the three-fold reverence for my guide, I lay it down in the\nfirst place that the school is an organ of tradition. True conservatism\nhas its place in the school. In it are preserved the knowledges\nand the skills of the past. The heir of today comes to his own by\nappropriating the products of past thinking and past labor, and the\nschool superintends the process of appropriation and assimilation. At\nthe same time it sifts in tradition what is clean from what is unclean,\nwhat is true from what is false, what is usable from what is dead.\nReverence is shown in this very sifting process. To revere the past is\nto make the past live again; but only what is vital can go on living.\n\nThe teaching should be reverential in spirit. The business spirit,\nthe drive towards mere efficiency, cannot in the long run satisfy.\nEfficiency as commonly understood has in view the utilities of the\nmoment. It merely exploits the past for the sake of present interests,\nand as a rule is unmindful of the future. Industrial efficiency,\nin particular, reverses the right ethical relation between work\nand personality; instead of work being so contrived as to liberate\npersonality, it is mechanized so as to sacrifice personality.\n\nThe teacher should be reverent towards the great masters of his own\ncraft, his own art. No one is reverenced by others who does not himself\nhabitually revere someone. The teachers should be acquainted at first\nhand with the master educators, such as Plato, Comenius, Pestalozzi and\nthe others.\n\nI pass on to speak of the second type of reverence. This involves\ncordial reciprocally stimulating relations between the members of the\nteaching staff. It is generally agreed that no other factor counts for\nmore in shaping the character of the young than personal influence. The\nbest personal influence, however, is not unilateral, like that which\nradiates from a single teacher upon his class. The best is that which\nproceeds from cross-relations between a number of teachers. Just as in\nthe home it is not the father singly, nor the mother singly, but the\nreciprocal relations between the two that touch child life to finer\nissues and create a spiritual atmosphere in the learner, so also in\nthe school the best spirit is created by the relations of reciprocal\nfurtherance between the teachers, each doing his work in such a way as\nto make easier and more successful the work of his colleagues, with a\nstrong sense of partnership in the common work of man-building.\n\nThe teachers as an organized body should also relate themselves to an\norganized body of parents. Home and school should not merely co\u00f6perate\nbut interpenetrate. The interests and efforts of both are centered on\nthe same young lives. The home is supremely concerned in what goes on\nin the school, and the school in the kind of influence that prevails in\nthe home. An organized conference of parents is in a position to render\nsignal service to a school by appraising its ideals, by keeping tally\non the extent to which acknowledged standards are carried out, and by\njoining in the unceasing endeavor to advance the standards. Schools\nmust be backed by the interest and appreciation of the community.\nParents whose children are pupils of a school are for that particular\nschool the best representatives of the community.\n\nThe school is to prepare its charges, not only for vocational life, but\nfor citizenship. Teachers must be good citizens. They cannot give what\nthey do not possess. They must keep in living contact with the civic\nand social movements of the time.\n\nThe first and second types are instrumental to the third. Now here,\nif anywhere, a new departure in educational philosophy is called\nfor. For when we discuss this third kind of reverence, the question\nof all questions is raised: To what end do we educate? What is to be\nthe aim and outcome of all our effort? And our answer to this question\nwill depend on our philosophy, and if our philosophy is ethical our\nanswer must be distinctively ethical. Froebel was a pantheist, and his\npantheism colored his conception of the educational end. Pestalozzi was\nan eighteenth century humanitarian. Many modern writers on education\nare biological evolutionists. Others even expressly disclaim any\ngeneral outlook, and appear to be exclusively interested in perfecting\nthe technique of schoolmastering. Reverence of the third type is\nreverence for the undeveloped human being,\u2014for the new generation,\nfor our successors. What is it that we are to revere in a child? Its\nspiritual possibilities, its latent personality. To bring to birth its\npersonality is the supreme educational end. We show our reverence for\nthe child in the effort to personalize it. Let us consider in brief\nsome of the practical consequences of this idea.\n\nTo personalize the individual the first step is to discover the\nempirical substratum in his nature. There is ever an empirical\nsubstratum subject to ethical transformations. The empirical substratum\nof personality is individuality! Individuality manifests itself in a\nleading interest of some kind, a predominant bias which indicates the\nthing which the individual is fit to be and do. To discover the bent or\nbias is the first step, and the difficulties in the way of taking even\nthis first step are admittedly great. Children and even adolescents\noften show no marked intellectual preferences whatever. Many adults\ntoo appear to be neutral so far as their mental life is concerned.\nCircumstances ran them perhaps into a certain mould\u2014they might have\nbeen run into some other just as well. It is the task of the educator\nto discover the predominant interest where it exists, and to try to\nproduce such an interest where it does not. What nature has not done in\nsuch cases art must attempt.\n\nWhen the leading interest is found it should next be made the means\nof creating interest in subjects to which the pupil is naturally\nindifferent or even averse. I have illustrated the process here implied\nin a paper on the prevocational art school which is connected with\nthe Ethical Culture School. Young persons devoted to art are often\nunwilling to take up subjects which seem to them unrelated to what\nthey really care for, like science and history. They are obsessed by a\nsingle passionate ambition. They are all eagerness to become artists\u2014to\ndraw, paint, model, etc. Time spent on any other subject seems to them\nmisspent. If indulged in this one-sided activity, the chances are\nthat they will not even become competent artists. In any case they\nwill lack breadth and vision. They will lack a cultural background.\nThey will be inferior as human beings. They will not be personalized.\nFor personality, on its mental as well as on its social side, depends\non relatedness,\u2014depends not so much on what one does, as on the\ninterrelation between what one does and what other people do.\n\nIn order to expand the interest of the young art student, the method\nemployed in the school just mentioned is to present those subjects\nwhich appear to be alien in such a way as to bring out the art aspects\nof them, the contact points between them and art. Thus in history\nspecial prominence is given to the age of Pericles, the age of\nRembrandt. In science special attention is paid to the theory of color,\nthe chemistry of etching. And all other branches of knowledge are\ntreated similarly. The aim is not indeed to exploit the other subjects\nin the interest of art, but so to utilize the artistic interest as to\nlead the mind out to a larger comprehensive interest in other related\nbranches on their own account. Or rather, to put my thought precisely,\nand thus to connect it with the underlying ethical theory, the aim is\nto prepare the future artist for the give and take relation between his\nown pursuit and the activities of men in other vocations. He should be\nhelped to enrich his own life as an artist by drawing upon all that the\nsciences and the humanities can give him, with a view to eventually\nreturning with interest the profit he has derived. What the artist can\ndo for the scientist, the religious teacher, etc., I have indicated in\nthe previous chapter.\n\nPrecisely the same cultural idea should be worked out in prevocational\nschools of commerce, of technology, of science, etc. In each case the\nparamount interest should be the starting-point, the center from which\nlines of interest are to be made to radiate out into the correlated\nbranches.\n\nIf this ethical idea is carried out the whole educational system\nwill be remodeled. The c\u00e6sura in education will then fall about the\nsixteenth year. Before that the task will be to lay the general\nfoundations and to reconnoiter the individuality of the pupil. After\nthat there will be a system of _prevocational schools_. The college, a\nlegacy which has come to us from a type of society unlike our own, will\ndisappear, and the university will become an organism of vocational\nschools succeeding the prevocational.[83]\n\nI mentioned at the end of Book I the problem of specialization, the\nincreased necessity of restricting oneself to a limited field in\norder to achieve anything like the consciousness of mastery, and the\ninevitable fractionalizing of men which is the consequence of this very\ntendency toward specialization. In the idea of outreaching radiations\nof interest and of the give and take relation there is the promise of\nliberation from the narrowness of specialism without the calamity of\ndilettantism. That this idea cannot be fully realized, that no one\ncan actually extend his web of interest so far, that his reactions\nat best will be feeble, is perhaps a palmary instance of that law of\nfrustration which fatally besets all human effort. But the effort will\nbe in the right direction, and the effort counts.\n\n\n_The University_\n\nIn sketching the ethical or spiritual side of the University, initial\nstress is to be laid on the meaning of the word _universitas_. The term\nas at present used hardly suggests more than all-inclusiveness. A\nmodern university is an institution in which all the different schools,\nthe school of engineering, the school of science, the school of\nphilosophy, etc., _exist side by side_, under a single governing body,\nand in which the various branches of knowledge are pursued without any\nvisible systematic connection between them! The spiritual ideal of a\nuniversity is that of system, of organic connection, for this is what\nspiritual means.\n\nIn looking back on the history of the higher institutions of learning\none cannot but be struck by the close correspondence of those\ninstitutions to the general ideals of life of the people among whom\nthey flourished. I call to mind the Hindu education with its Brahmanic\nbackground; the Mandarin education, with Confucianism as its inspiring\nprinciple; the musical education of the Greeks; the theological\neducation of Jews and Mohammedans; then among the Western nations, the\nEnglish university a seminary for training rulers of the Empire; the\nGerman university, a training institution for the higher bureaucracy;\nthe French university, visibly reflecting the logical tendency of the\nFrench mind.\n\nWe in America, instructed by the survey of the past, are bound to face\nthe question: In what way shall the American university differ from\nuniversities elsewhere? What characteristic shape shall the American\nuniversity take on? _How can the American university correspond to\nthe American ideal of life?_ At present our notions in this respect\nare in a formative, not to say in a chaotic, condition. The college\nstill survives\u2014an institution designed for the education of gentlemen.\nPractical tendencies, looking toward materialistic success, prevail\nin many of our Western universities. The German research idea has come\nin as a third factor, penetrating deeply in some of our institutions,\nless deeply in others, but inharmonious everywhere with the rival\nconceptions that still persist.\n\nThe principal circumstance that retards our university development\ndoubtless is that the ideal of American life itself, which the\nuniversity is to express and to promote, is as yet undefined in the\nminds of the American people. But without presuming to anticipate what\nmust be the outcome of gradual and prolonged growth, it may still be\nserviceable to clear our minds as to the goal towards which we desire\nthat the development shall tend. The fundamental ideal of the American\npeople is that of freedom! The notion of freedom is crude as yet, but\nis capable of being ennobled and refined. To be free is to express\npower. To be free in the highest sense is to express the highest kind\nof power. The highest kind is that which is exercised in such wise as\nto elicit unlike yet cognate power in others. A people is to be called\nfree when all the different social or vocational groups of which it is\nthe integrated whole spontaneously react upon one another, and when in\neach group each member of it realizes some mental gift of his own. A\nfree people is not one which is merely released from the authority of\nautocrats. That is only a condition of freedom, not freedom itself. A\nfree people is not one in which strong individuals are permitted to\nthrive parasitically at the expense of the weak. Nor yet one in which\nmerely equal opportunity is afforded to all in the race for material\nwell-being. A free people is one in which the essential energies of\nall effectuate themselves unhindered, the life of each swelling the\nsurrounding tide of life, and being enriched in turn by the returning\ntide. This to my mind is liberty,\u2014the liberation of what is best in\neach. This is freedom,\u2014the free flow of life into life. The ideal\nAmerican University is one which expresses and promotes this ideal of\nfreedom.\n\nA university is a group of vocational schools. A truly democratic\nuniversity is an organic system of vocational schools, one which in\nthe relations that subsist between its schools affords a shining,\nstimulating example of the kind of relations that ought to subsist\nbetween the vocational groups in the state.\n\nThe aim of an American university should be to furnish leaders for\nall the various groups who will undertake the great business of truly\norganizing democracy.\n\n\n_Education for Adults_\n\nEducation should be continuous through life. The University Extension\nmovement is endeavoring to meet this demand. It has already to its\ncredit a considerable extension of knowledge, as well as the stirring\nup of interest in things of the mind among those whom it reaches. But\nfar greater tasks than it has yet attacked remain. The academic method\nis not suited to the instruction of adults. A method will have to be\nworked out for teaching a subject to mature minds different from that\nwhich is appropriate in introducing the subject to the relatively\nimmature minds of students. The student who has not yet entered\nvocational life needs to be put in possession of the principles by\nwhich he can lay hold of life. A mature person who is deficient in\ntheoretical education needs to be helped to interpret his vocational\nexperience in such a manner as to find his way back to the principles.\nIn the one case there is the outlook and the emptiness; in the other\ncase the fullness of content without the comprehensive outlook.\n\nSecondly, the stages of vocational development through which the\nworker has already passed in his vocation are to be borne in mind, and\nthe teaching adapted to the different stages. I have suggested four\ndivisions: that of apprenticeship, that of initial mastery, that of\nmore complete mastery, and the emeritus stage.[84]\n\nThirdly, it is getting to be increasingly difficult for a specialist in\nany one branch to keep abreast of the progress made in other branches.\nPopularization of the ordinary kind does not satisfy. It means, as a\nrule, diluting the subject-matter, not truly simplifying it. Provision\nshould be made, in any large and generous scheme of public education,\nfor enabling ripe minds to assimilate the ripest fruits produced by\ncontemporary thinkers and writers who work in other fields.\n\n\n NOTE\n\n\n A few outstanding points in regard to what is called Moral Education\n may be added to this chapter.\n\n There should be ethical teaching in the universities. The kinds of\n ethics taught should be adapted to the university period of life,\n emphasis being put on the experiences of the student at that time of\n life,\u2014on friendship, the sex relation, the vocational outlook, etc. be\n included in the programme for the education of adults.\n\n Systematic moral education in schools and high schools is advisable.\n It is frequently criticised on the ground that it is apt to be\n schematic and unreal. Moral counsels given as the occasion arises\n are believed to be more effective. They hit the nail on the head and\n drive it home. The reply to this is that incidental moral advice\n and exhortation is not excluded, but that it by no means adequately\n answers the purpose. The occasions for giving the necessary guidance\n simply do not arise. This kind of moral teaching is apt to be patchy.\n In the next place, ethical instruction, when rightly planned, has\n two objects: the one to bring into clear relief the life axioms that\n underlie the entire home and school experience of the pupil, and\n secondly, to give to the pupil a provisional chart and compass or\n ethical outlook upon his future life. Ethical teaching conceived of\n and conducted in this manner is neither schematic nor artificial. It\n does not drive home a nail here and there, it constructs a mental\n house in which the mind of the pupil can be at home,\u2014with windows in\n it, looking out upon a large landscape outside.\n\n The capital significance of right relations, ethical relations,\n between the members of the teaching staff has been noted in the text.\n In every school clubs should be formed consisting of pupils specially\n interested in any one subject and of the special teachers of that\n subject:\u2014or if not formal clubs, then at least more intimate personal\n relations should exist between the special teacher and those selected\n pupils, the object being through personal intercourse to introduce\n the young aspirant to a knowledge of the problems on which the older\n person is intent. There is nothing nearly so educative for the young\n as to be taken into the counsels of their elders.\n\n The more gifted pupils of the school should be invited to take a\n personal interest in helping the more backward students. In every\n school, high school and university there are social misfits,\u2014shy,\n sensitive, solitary youths who fail to come into easy touch with their\n fellows, and suffer acutely. They are objects of the most delicate,\n deferential charity, and the task of bringing them into fellowship\n offers one of the finest opportunities for ethical education.\n\n A vital system of self-government is to be used as a means of\n placing real responsibility upon the students under due advice. To\n exercise responsibility is to acquire character. Self-government is\n particularly important so far as it relates to the administration of\n justice in a school. Cases of discipline should be used as means to\n create the right conception of punishment, the right attitude towards\n those who have erred.\n\n The relation between the adolescent boy and girl and the parents is\n of prime significance as illustrating in a way that young persons\n can understand the general conception of the ethical relation as\n _reciprocal_. The youth should be shown that he can be not only the\n recipient but a giver of benefits, that he can be a real help to his\n parents, chiefly by sympathetically entering into the problems and\n difficulties with which they have to contend. The parents, instead\n of being regarded by the young as an earthly providence, existing\n only for the purpose of bestowing benefits, should be seen in their\n true light as struggling, and often heavily burdened human beings.\n At the same time the young son or daughter will in this way gain an\n invaluable preparation for comprehending the difficulties under which\n the effort to live must be carried on.\n\n In regard to patriotism, it is important that the errors and mistakes\n committed by one\u2019s nation in the past should not be overlooked or\n minimized.\n\n The school should furnish to the students various outlets for social\n service such as they in their period of life are capable of rendering.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[83] Compare with the spiritual conception of culture here outlined\nMatthew Arnold\u2019s \u201cknowing the best which has been thought and said\u201d;\nand a recent definition of culture by an eminent American as \u201cthe\nknowing one thing well and a little of everything else,\u201d without\ncorrelation of the little one knows of everything else with the one\nthing one is supposed to know extremely well.\n\n[84] See the chapter on \u201cEthical Development Extending Through Life\u201d in\n_The World Crisis_.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\nTHE STATE\n\n\nThe leading theories of the state should be kept in view for comparison\nwith the ethical theory here set forth\u2014the theories of Aristotle\nand Plato, St. Augustine and the medi\u00e6val schoolmen, Rousseau\u2019s\ncontract theory, and the German conceptions of the state propounded by\nKant, Fichte, Hegel. Moreover, since the ideas actually embodied in\ngovernments, in the Persian monarchy, for instance, in the Greek City\nState, Venice, etc., are not identical with the constructions of the\nphilosophers, the leading facts of the history of politics should be\nborne in mind as well as the leading theories.\n\nThe state has two aspects: (1) It is the balance wheel of the\nvocational groups included within it. (2) It is the political\nexpression of the national character, and its ethical purpose is to\ndevelop this empirical national character into a spiritual character. I\nshall speak of the first aspect in this chapter.\n\n1. The state exists in order to furnish increasingly from age to age\nthe conditions under which the reactions between the groups described\nabove can take place effectually. In concentrating attention upon the\nvocational groups as the entities to be harmonized with one another,\naccount is taken by implication of the family and of the individual.\nThe sub-organisms are embraced within the superior organisms. A\nmore general statement would be that the state supplies the external\nconditions required for development towards ethical personality by\nthose who pass through the institutions of the family, of the vocation,\netc.\n\nThe state possesses a spiritual character in so far as it supplies\nthese conditions, and in as much as it has a spiritual character it\nis not merely justified but ethically required to use force. Force is\nspiritualized when employed to establish the conditions indispensable\nto spiritual life. The conditions enforced must be such as in the\nopinion of the preponderant number of citizens indisputably make\nfor the development of personality. Examples of such conditions are\nprotection of life, property, reputation, compulsory education, the\nmaintenance of the monogamic family, protection against foreign\ninvasion, etc. All the functions of the state commonly enumerated\nfollow from the ethical principle. But over and above the recognized\nones, new and nobler functions of the state will appear.\n\nThe redeeming thought with respect to the use of force by the state\nconsists in regarding _force as ethical discipline_, and in making the\nextent to which it is favorable to spiritual freedom the measure and\ntest of its rightful use.[85] When men are compelled to spend the major\npart of their time in the protection of bare life, as was the case,\nfor instance, in the early days of feudalism, they are to that extent\nunfree. Freedom consists in energizing the highest and most distinctive\nhuman faculties.\n\n_The development of the state_ should proceed in two directions. It\nshould withdraw from many functions exercised by it in the past,\nnotably from such as properly belong to the sub-organisms. At the\nsame time, it should lay its coercive hands upon new matters,\nimposing new limitations on capricious freedom in the interest of\nspiritual freedom, as soon as the pertinency of such limitations\nto the ethical end becomes clear. For instance, the state may, and\ndoubtless will, interfere with marriage to a far greater extent\nthan it has yet done. It will forbid the marriage of the unsound.\nIf a study of character-types should ever become advanced enough\u2014a\nhazardous conjecture\u2014to make it predictable that the union of certain\ncharacter-types will lead to infelicitous marriage, the state will be\njustified in prohibiting such unions.\n\n_Law_, ideally defined, is the sum total of conditions, capable of\nbeing enforced, which are necessary or favorable to the development\nof personality. The purpose of law is two-fold: to maintain the more\ndeveloped members of society at the level they have reached, and, by\neducative penalties, to bring the backward up to the same level. In\nthe article on \u201cForce and Freedom\u201d referred to above, law is compared\nto such bodily actions as walking, which at first are superintended by\nconsciousness, and then become automatic, thereby setting consciousness\nfree to attend to new and more important business. Similarly, law is\ndesigned to render the conditions favorable to personality so explicit\nthat their observance shall become automatic, and that mankind shall be\nat liberty to discover new and more significant conditions which in\ntheir turn are again to become automatic.\n\nBecause of the lack of the ethical point of view, the exercise of force\nby the state has seemed purely arbitrary, and has given rise to a\nperverted and disastrous conception of _sovereignty_. The sovereignty\nof the state has two aspects: the one internal, the other external.\nSovereignty means supremacy. The state is sovereign, within limits,\nhowever, with respect to its citizens. The state is also sovereign,\nwithin limits, however, with respect to other outside states.\n\nWith respect to the internal aspect of sovereignty some writers hold\nthat citizens have no rights as against the state\u2014only rights accorded\nby the state. But this from the ethical point of view is a wholly\nuntenable position. There are rights of the individual, rights of\nthe family, rights of the vocational group, which the state does not\ncreate but is bound to acknowledge and which its power cannot properly\ninfringe. As against the state the individual has, for instance, the\nright which is commonly designated as \u201cthe freedom of conscience.\u201d The\nfamily has rights against the state; the law cannot interfere with\nthe intimacies of the marriage and parental relations. The vocational\ngroup likewise is only partially subject to public reglementation. I\nhave defined law as the sum total of the conditions. The state can\nprescribe the conditions, but cannot trace the ways of freedom within\nthe conditions. The state prescribes the enforceable conditions; it has\nno concern with unenforceable inner processes.\n\nIt thus appears that sovereignty or supremacy is an attribute not\npeculiar to the state, although it looms up larger and more impressive\nwhen exercised by the state. Supremacy belongs to the individual in\nhis private sphere, to the family in its proper province, to the\nvocation, etc. Sovereignty or supremacy belongs to each of the social\ninstitutions within its precincts, in so far as the supremacy within\nthat precinct is requisite for the accomplishment of the ethical end\nto be therein attained. But sovereignty is not absolute in any sphere;\nneither in that of the individual, nor of the family, nor yet of the\nstate. _The absolute conception of sovereignty is the result of the\nlack of an ethical conception of the social institutions._ The state is\nsovereign only so far as the exercise of its supremacy is necessary to\nthe spiritual end of citizenship. On this account and for this purpose\nit may rightfully constrain the sub-organisms within it, and may also\npronounce its _noli me tangere_ as against the larger group of states\nencompassing it. But so far as the spiritual ends to be achieved in\nthe international relations are concerned, the state with respect to\nthese is subject to international sovereignty,\u2014a new conception which\nmankind is striving to bring to the birth today. The false notion of\nstate sovereignty as arbitrary and absolute, is admittedly today a\nchief stumbling-block in the way of the formation of an international\norganization of peoples.\n\n\n_The System of Representation Which Is Required to Give Expression to\nthe Organic Idea of the State._\n\nThe ethical aim of political reformation and reconstruction may be\nput in a single word, Organization. _The state and especially the\ndemocratic state must be organized._[86] This means practically that\nthe basis of representation shall be the vocational group, that\nvocational representation shall replace representation by geographical\ndistricts.[87] The law-making body on this basis will consist of\nrepresentatives or delegates of the agricultural, the commercial, the\nindustrial, the scientific group, etc. Women belonging to these groups\nwill exercise the franchise within them. There will also be a distinct\ngroup of home-makers; motherhood will be recognized as a vocation.\n\nAttention may be called to certain practical advantages of the\nproposed rearrangement of the representative system. It will tend to\nbring forward in political life the best citizens, instead of the\nmediocre or the base. This is likely to come about because there is no\ndistinction that men more ardently covet than that of being considered\n_primus inter pares_; as, for instance, the first or one of the first\nof the city\u2019s merchants, or one of the most eminent scientists, or an\nartist whom his fellow-artists select as the fittest to represent them\nin the great council of city, state, or nation. And if only this much\ncan be gained by the new representative system, that the law-making\nbody shall consist of the most experienced, the most enlightened, the\nwisest, the actual leaders in the various walks of life, in brief,\nthat the elected shall be the elect, certainly one of the principal\nevils with which individualistic democracy is afflicted will tend to be\nremoved.\n\nBut other advantages will accrue. This, in particular, that the\nconstituencies, instead of merely delegating their powers, will\nshare in the business of law-making, will be in vital touch with\ntheir leaders or representatives, while the latter conversely will\npolitically educate the constituencies. The mode of procedure under the\nsystem here sketched will be somewhat as follows:\n\nTake, as an illustration, the group of industrial laborers. They will\nfirst meet in a primary assembly, and discuss measures deemed by them\nimportant in the interests of their group. The leader who represents\nthem in the legislature will take part in the initial discussions, and\nexercise no doubt a strong influence in bringing matter finally to a\nhead. He will then carry into the law-making body,\u2014which consists of\nrepresentatives of the various social groups,\u2014the sifted-out demands\nof the laborers, the measures which they desire to have enacted into\nlaw. He will bring forward these measures in the legislature. But\nthere objections are likely to be raised. The representatives of the\nother groups will discover what the laborers naturally failed to\nnote, that the proposed law or laws, if enacted, will have certain\ninjurious effects on the interests of the other groups. The sifting-out\nprocess, therefore, will now begin anew and be carried on on a higher\nlevel in the legislature. The representatives of all the various\ngroups will separate the wheat from the chaff in what is proposed\nby any one group. The next stop will be that the representative of\nthe laborers, returning to his constituency, will communicate to\nthem the difficulties that were raised, the decisions reached, and\nwill thus impart to them the wider vision which he himself gained\nin the discussions of the law-making body. In this way he will be\nthe instructor, the political teacher of his constituents. And the\nprinciple by which the value of any new measure will finally be judged\nwill be simply this: that the supposed interests of one group cannot be\nits true interests unless they are found to promote the interests of\nall the other vocational groups.[88]\n\nThe law-making body should be a council of the groups. It should not be\na \u201cParliament,\u201d or \u201ctalking body,\u201d but a sifting body. Nor yet a body\nof mandatories commissioned to merely give effect to a public opinion\nor a public sentiment already existing. In fact, public opinion or\npublic sentiment in the raw is apt to be a poor index of what is really\nfor the public good. Public opinion is apt to be unripe, haphazard,\nimpulsive rather than reflective. Besides, it is often contaminated\nat its very source, the facts on which the public depend for their\nopinions being deliberately falsified or placed in false perspective;\nwhile the opinions furnished in newspaper editorials are almost\ninevitably biased. Only on great occasions, when simple moral issues\nare presented, can the common sense and moral sense of the people be\nwholly depended on. But such occasions are episodical; and the orderly\nbusiness of government cannot be carried on by spurts. Government by\npublic opinion may be and in some respects is better indeed than class\ngovernment; in other important respects it is worse. A class at the\nhead of the state at least as a rule knows what it wants, and proceeds\nmethodically to carry out its purposes. Public opinion, on the other\nhand, like all opinion, is unsure, unsafe, as Plato has long since\nmade dialectically clear. And public sentiment, like all sentiment, is\nfluctuating. To build the state on public opinion and public sentiment,\nas many of our writers on politics would have us do, is after all a\ngood deal like building a house on sand.[89]\n\nInstead of \u201cpublic opinion\u201d and \u201cpublic sentiment\u201d let us say public\nreason and public will!\u2014reason and will to discover in conjunction\nwhat the public good really is. For what it really is no one as yet\nknows. The \u201cpublic good\u201d is a problem to be approximately solved. The\npublic good will be consummated when the conditions are furnished\nnecessary and favorable to the development of personality in each of\nthe constituent groups of the social body. To study these conditions is\nthe office of the law-making body, and therefore that body must be so\nconstituted as to include these groups in their capacity as groups.\n\nAnother advantage to be expected from vocational representation is that\nthe different interests of society,\u2014I stress the fact that they are\ndifferent, and often temporarily conflicting,\u2014will be compelled under\nthis plan to come out into the open. An industry, for instance, may\nrequire the assistance of a protective tariff, in its infant stages,\nand the agricultural group may rightly be asked to make the necessary\nsacrifices.\n\nIn the long run there will be compensation. The agriculturists will\neventually benefit by the diversification of the national life.\nBut \u201cin the long run\u201d means that the next generation will benefit,\nnot the present agriculturists, a distinction sometimes somewhat\ncavalierly ignored. The present generation will be called upon to make\na sacrifice, precisely as in the family some of the members may have\nto sacrifice a part of their income to provide for a weaker member.\nBut the circumstance that the sacrifice is recognized as a sacrifice\nwill serve to put an end to the protection when the special need for it\nhas ceased. Under the present system, on the other hand, the state is\nsupposed to have no concern with the special interests of any group.\nAll the same, there are the special interests, and in consequence\nthat which is for the interest of one group has to be advocated as\nif it were for the general interest of the entire community. And\nsince general interest is easily mistaken for perpetual interest, the\nprotection is apt to be continued long after its particular usefulness\nhas ceased.[90]\n\nI am earnestly concerned that vocational representation shall not\nbe regarded as a mere device in the mechanism of politics, like the\nsubstitution of the long for the short ballot, or the initiative\nand referendum. Innovations of the latter kind leave the prevalent\nconception of democracy untouched, they are merely intended to improve\nthe machinery by which that conception is to be worked out in practice;\nthey are mechanical contrivances, not fundamental reconstructions.\nVocational representation, in my view of it, is the appropriate\nexpression of the organic idea of the state. The state is the soul. The\nsoul must have a body. Vocational representation is that body.\n\nTwo remarks may here be added. One relates to a question which has\ngiven rise to considerable discussion, namely, the question where\nthe state resides? In a monarchy it seems to reside visibly in the\nperson of the king. Louis XIV is said to have declared \u201cI am the\nstate.\u201d But where does it reside in a democracy? The chief executive,\nthe law-making body, and even the constituencies, are organs of the\nstate. But where does the state itself have its habitation? The state\nhas no separate domicile. So far as it truly exists at all it exists\nin the minds of the individuals who truly conceive of it. The object\nof political life is to educate the citizen so that he may more and\nmore truly conceive of the state, so that he may give birth to the\nstate idea within himself. To do this is to pass through one of\nthe necessary phases on the road to personality. In the family the\nindividual is in reactive relations with a few, in the vocation with\na larger number. In the state or nation he may be one of a hundred\nmillions or more. Yet it is not the numerical extension as such that\nconstitutes the enlargement. It is rather the diversity of the points\nof contact, and the complexity of the relations by which the spiritual\nideal is more fully illustrated in the finite world in proportion as\nthe circle widens. To engender the idea of the state in oneself is to\nplace oneself ideally into reactive relations with the diverse groups\nembraced within one\u2019s nation. And to do this is a spiritual achievement\nof no mean order. I should prefer to use the word \u201cstateship\u201d instead\nof citizenship. Stateship is attained by one who brings to birth\nwithin himself the idea of the state, and in whom that idea becomes a\ncontrolling ethical force.\n\nA second remark concerns the perplexed subject of the conflict of\nduties. The nearer duties are sometimes preferred to the more remote,\nand at other times we are asked to sacrifice everything to the larger\nwhole. We owe our first devotion, it is said, to the members of our\nfamily; but then again we must be willing to sacrifice life itself and\nthe welfare of our family to our country when it calls upon us in its\nneed. Largeness alone certainly does not serve as an ethical ground for\npreference. The quantitative standard implied in such phrases as \u201cthe\ngreatest good of the greatest number\u201d is out of place when we deal with\nethical relations, which in their very nature are qualitative. Now\nthe account of the social institutions given in previous chapters as\nsuccessive stations on the road to the spiritual goal may throw some\nlight on this difficult subject. Normally, the claims of the anterior\nstations are to be preferred\u2014the claims of the family for instance\nto those of the vocation, because the family is the matrix of the\nthree-fold reverence, and the individual must pass under the ethical\ninfluence of family life before he is fit to use vocational life\nethically to good purpose. The anterior groups are not merely smaller,\nthey are germinal. The training received in them is the condition on\nwhich spiritual progress depends later on. On the other hand, the later\ngroups are the more complete and more explicated expressions of the\nspiritual ideal; hence if the very existence of one of the later groups\nis threatened, or is in danger of being denatured of its spiritual use,\nthen the later group is to be preferred to the earlier, the _terminus\nad quem_, precisely because it is the _terminus ad quem_, to the\n_terminus a quo_.\n\nTo give a familiar illustration. In our time, which is a time of\ntransition and doubt, many a religious teacher finds himself in sore\nstraits to decide between the claims of the vocation and the family.\nAs a religious teacher he is pledged to teach only what in his heart\nof hearts he believes to be true; he is especially under obligation to\nuse words in such a way as to convey to others the same meaning that\nhe attaches to them himself. But this may mean exposing his family to\nserious privations. The situation is full of perplexity and pain, but\nthe line of choice is plain enough. The claims of his high vocation\nmust in this case take precedence. In like manner, when the existence\nor the integrity of the state is at issue, the claims of the state as\nthe _terminus ad quem_ override those of the vocation, the family, and\nthe state, and may even demand the sacrifice of the physical existence\nof the individual himself.\n\n\n NOTES\n\n\n 1. The idea of democracy is often neatly put\u2014all too neatly, into the\n following formula: In antiquity the individual existed for the sake of\n the state, in modern democracy the state exists for the sake of the\n individual. Both of these statements as they stand are mischievous\n and misleading and require to be qualified. It is not true that in\n antiquity the individual existed for the sake of the state in the\n sense that his separate existence was extinguished. The citizen class\n in Aristotle\u2019s state, the rulers in Plato\u2019s state, and even a member\n of one of the inferior classes, each in his own way fulfilled a\n distinct function. He was not suppressed in the state, he expressed\n his function by the action appropriate to his station. The philosophic\n rulers might do the thinking and governing. They were the head of the\n body politic\u2014others the hands and feet. The underlying conception was\n what may be called spuriously organic, borrowed more or less from the\n animal type of organism.\n\n The second limb of the formula is no less superficial. In no modern\n nation does the state exist, or at bottom is it supposed to exist, for\n the benefit of the individuals who at any time compose it. If this\n were the ruling conception, how could the democratic state require its\n citizens to give up their lives in its defense? If the state existed\n for the benefit of the individuals, the state would be the means, and\n the so-called good of the individual the end. And in that case it\n would surely be irrational to sacrifice the end for the sake of the\n means, in other words to put an end to one\u2019s life in defense of the\n state, a mere instrument for the protection and prosperity of one\u2019s\n own life.\n\n To reply that the state exists for the sake not of one individual but\n of all (observe however that the formula says \u201cthe individual,\u201d and is\n ambiguous and slippery at this point), nor even only for the sake of\n all the individuals now living, but also for the sake of the millions\n yet unborn\u2014to say this is once more to introduce an ideal entity which\n it was the very object of the formula as quoted to banish. The formula\n was intended to give us, in place of \u201cthe metaphysical entities\u201d of\n the Greeks and the Germans, a very palpable thing\u2014the good of the\n individual. The good of the individual seemed to be a palpable thing,\n though in truth it is the most impalpable thing in the world. And by\n defining the state in this wise we were supposed to come onto solid\n ground. But now, behold, it is the good of unborn millions which is to\n be the object of our devotion, and who can imagine what this good of\n unborn millions is likely to be?\n\n The fact is that without ideal entities the conception of the state\n in any noble shape cannot be construed at all. The organic conception\n must now take the place of the individualistic. The organic conception\n indeed as it was worked out in antiquity, or as it lived on in the\n theories of medi\u00e6val writers, or as it survives in the works of\n certain German publicists, who use it to defend the feudalistic\n structure of society, has rightly fallen into discredit,\u2014not because\n it is organic, but because it is pseudo-organic, that is, based on the\n type of the animal organism. The individualistic conception of the\n state at present current in America and in all modern democracies,\n is a violent reaction against this false idea of organization. The\n inestimable germ of truth individualism contains is that no such\n distinction can be allowed as between head and hands or feet in\n political life, that all the multitudes of \u201chands\u201d who work in the\n factories, for instance, must be respected as personalities having\n not only hands but also heads and hearts. But individualism, though\n it affirms this idea, belies it in practice, as the actual state of\n society in America and elsewhere abundantly proves. And it is bound\n to do so, because personality implies more than material well-being,\n either for a single individual or for all individuals now living\n or for all future individuals. Personality implies truly organic\n relations to other fellow-beings\u2014and this can only be achieved by\n organizing the society in which men live.\n\n The way taken has been, by reaction from pseudo-organization, to\n extreme individualism and concomitant materialism. The way out lies in\n the direction of genuine organization.\n\n\n 2. Certain evils observable in the workings of American democracy may\n be traced to the following causes:\n\n (a) The people as a whole are still in the pioneer stage. A country\n enormously rich in material resources stimulates wealth-production.\n A host of immigrants escaped from poverty abroad are stung into\n wealth-getting here. The frontier line is now far to the West, but the\n influence of the pioneer movement still in progress flows back upon\n the Eastern states.\n\n (b) More important still are the evils due to the crude\n individualistic idea of democracy just characterized. If the state\n exists for the good of the individual, and if the good of the\n individual is conceived to be the acquisition of wealth, then private\n business will take precedence of the public business. Yet under the\n democratic system of frequent elections the public business demands\n constant attention. In consequence, a special class of professional\n politicians arises, comprising a minority of disinterestedly\n patriotic men, and a majority of persons whose private business\n is not sufficiently remunerative to divert them from the public\n service. The appearance of the political dictator called \u201cboss\u201d is\n the inevitable outcome of these conditions. This army of professional\n politicians, and in particular the vulgar figure at their hand, is the\n chief disgrace of the American democracy, and has been the target of\n incessant invective by American writers. But it is idle to stigmatize\n the effect and overlook the cause, to squander invective upon the\n symptom and at the same time to leave the malady untouched. The malady\n itself is the individualistic conception of democracy, and until this\n is replaced by a better one, the evil in question may be modified in\n form but will certainly not disappear.\n\n A way must be found for the citizen to attend to his private business,\n which is coming to be more and more exacting, and to the public\n business at the same time. The system of vocational representation\n offers an opportunity in this direction. Citizens will be voting\n in their vocational groups for measures intended to advance their\n vocational interests, but will be taught to advance them in such a way\n that the related interests of other groups, or the public interest,\n shall be thereby promoted.\n\n 3. Proportional representation, which is at present being tested\n abroad, and earnestly considered in France, England and Germany, may\n be a bridge leading over from the present plan of geographical to that\n of vocational representation. The proportional system itself, it is\n true, is still based on the individualistic idea. It is a movement\n on behalf of submerged minorities. It quarrels with the present\n arrangement for the reason that the will of the greater number of\n individuals, but not of all individuals, is brought to bear on public\n decisions. But if adopted it may well offer, without violent change, a\n way for the collective representation of vocational groups.\n\n 4. Citizenship should be graded. A youth of twenty-one is scarcely\n prepared to exercise the duties of the citizen intelligently. As\n long as the view prevails that the functions of the state are to be\n restricted to a minimum, it is perhaps not wholly absurd to admit a\n mere stripling to a share in the conduct of government. But the sphere\n of government is steadily enlarging, and its problems are becoming\n more and more intricate. Twenty-five would certainly be a better\n minimum age. Under vocational representation there is likely to be an\n Upper House consisting of members who have served in the Lower House.\n Citizens who have attained the age of twenty-five might be empowered\n to vote for members of the Lower House, those who have attained the\n age of thirty-five for members of the Upper House, but these are\n details upon which it is unfitting to expatiate here. The point I have\n in mind is that citizenship should be graded.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[85] _Vide_ Appendix II, on _Force and Freedom_.\n\n[86] I use the word Organize in its spiritual sense. The empirical,\nanimal organism is commonly taken as the type upon which the notion of\norganism is modeled. The animal organism, however, fails to express\nthe implicit idea, for the following reasons: The number of members\nis limited; the combination of organs is, so far as we can know,\naccidental, and the relation is hierarchical,\u2014there are inferior and\nsuperior organs. The spiritual conception differs in each of these\npoints. The number of members is infinite; the relation is necessary;\nand they are equal, that is, of equal worth. To distinguish the\nspiritual pattern from the animal type the term metorganic may be used\nfor the former, in analogy to such terms as metempirical, metaphysical,\netc., and the system of ethics expounded in this volume may be called\nthe _metorganic system of ethics_.\n\n[87] Representation by geographical districts is the logical outcome\nof the individualistic conception of democracy. Where this prevails,\nthe state is supposed to take account only of the common interests,\nthose in respect to which all individuals are alike, such as security\nof life and property, those interests being ignored in respect to\nwhich the groups that constitute society, the farmers, the merchants,\nthe industrial laborers, etc., differ. Hence any convenient number\nof citizens, pursuing their life purposes side by side within a\ncertain geographical area, may serve as a constituency. The absence\nof regard for the real diversity, and often the clash of interests,\nbetween persons belonging to such constituencies, is due to the\natomistic, individualistic notion of democracy just mentioned. But\nsheer individualism is everywhere on the wane, and is bound to become\nless and less dominant in the degree that the industrial evolution\nof society proceeds, and the various groups stand out distinctly as\ndifferent against one another in their functions and in the conditions\nsubservient to those functions. Society is in fact not an aggregate of\nhuman atoms. It is already an imperfect organism, destined to become\nmore and more adequately organized. And the system of representation\nhas got to be remodeled and adjusted to this fact and this ideal.\n\n[88] By \u201cinterests\u201d I understand fulfilment of the social function with\nwhich the group is charged.\n\n[89] And, as a matter of fact, because this is so, there is no state,\nno democracy, in which public opinion or public sentiment actually\ndoes rule, save by fits and starts. Government is usually in the hands\nof more or less selfish coteries, who operate behind the scenes, who\ndo know what they want and who, like the Piper of Hamelin, are past\nmasters of the art of leading the political children whither they will.\n\n[90] I am not of course discussing the merits or demerits of the\nprotective tariff as such, but am using it as illustration. As such it\nwill serve the purpose.\n\nThe practice of \u201clog-rolling\u201d may at first sight seem to resemble the\nproposed plan. But, in reality, the two are diametrical opposites. By\n\u201clog-rolling\u201d is meant the kind of concessions made by the shipping\ninterests to the manufacturers by the manufacturers to the farmers, or\nto the workingmen when the latter happen to be strong enough to enforce\ntheir demands. Each group persists in pursuing its selfish aims; only,\nin order to achieve them it makes concessions to the selfishness of the\nothers. Each follows the path into the Hades of egotism, and throws the\nnecessary sops to Cerberus on the way. The plan outlined in the text,\non the other hand, has for its object the interlocking of the various\nsocial interests, the fitting them reciprocally into one another; or\nbetter, the object is to cure each group as far as possible of its\nselfishness by so modifying its claims, that the granting of them shall\nbecome beneficial to the rest.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\nTHE NATIONAL CHARACTER SPIRITUALLY TRANSFORMED: THE INTERNATIONAL\nSOCIETY, OR THE ORGANIZATION OF MANKIND\n\n\nThere is such a thing as a national character.[91] The national\ncharacter is reflected in the language, literature, laws and customs,\narts, institutions and religion of a people. Even when the religion\nprofessed by different peoples is the same in name it is strongly\ntinctured in the different countries by the national differences.\nCompare for example the Christianity of Prussia with that of France, or\nthat of England with that of Russia.\n\nThe national character, like that of the individual, has its plus and\nminus qualities, its excellent and its repellent traits.\n\nThe national character is to be spiritualized by raising the plus\ntraits to the Nth degree.\n\nTo this end, as before, the three-fold reverence and especially the\nthird reverence is the means. _The backward peoples of the earth are\nthe paramount object of reverence._ The more advanced peoples are to\nbring to light the spiritual life latent in the backward. In order\nto do so, they are to carry out the principle of reverence toward\npast civilization, to sift out what is vital in the work of previous\ngenerations. And further, they are to conform to the second principle\nof reverence, that toward contemporaries approximately on the same\nlevel, _i.e._, toward the other civilized nations. No single nation is\nreally competent to undertake the great task of awaking the stationary\npeoples of India and China, of educating the primitive peoples of\nAfrica. A union of the civilized nations should be formed in order\nthat together they may jointly accomplish _the pedagogy of the less\ndeveloped_. The educational point of view once again appears as the\nethical. The relation of the less developed to the more advanced\npeoples should be analogous to that of the child towards the parents.\nJust as neither the father singly nor the mother alone can release\nspiritual life in the offspring, so the different civilized nations,\neach of which has its own gift, its own plus traits, are to interact\nfor the purpose of jointly awakening the creative energies within the\nslumbering souls of the undeveloped peoples.\n\nIt follows that a nation cannot even be defined ethically except as\na member of an international society, and we begin to see the help\nafforded by the spiritual conception in solving at least ideally the\nproblem of right international relations. Whereas hitherto the notion\nof the sovereignty of each nation has been a formidable impediment to\nthe formation of an overarching world society, the ethical conception\nnot only permits this expansion of sovereignty, but necessitates\nit. A nation, ethically defined, is a unique member of the _corpus\ninternationale_ of mankind. As unique it maintains of right its\nrelative independence, as a member it is bound by intrinsic ties\nto its fellow-members, and is subject to the greater sovereignty\nincluding them all alike.[92] A nation indeed cannot even maintain\nits independence against other nations except by sheer might if it\nacknowledges none but capricious ties between itself and them, such\nas treaties, or Hague Conference agreements which can be dissolved at\npleasure. There must be recognized an inner ethical tie between nation\nand nation, and it must receive legal formulation. This ethical tie is\nthe true _vinculum societatis human\u00e6_ and supplies what has hitherto\nbeen absolutely lacking,\u2014an ethical basis for international law.\n\nThe ethical relation between nations is founded on the fact that each\nnation represents a significant type of humanity, that each nation\nhas certain plus and minus qualities, that it is dependent on other\nnations to supplement its defects; and more than this, that it can\nexpurgate, as it ought, its minus qualities only by striving to evoke\nthe spiritual life in other peoples.\n\nOne salient point I must emphasize. The national character with its\nplus and minus traits is empirical, and the development of the\nempirical character is not itself the highest aim of the state. The\nspiritual transformation of this empirical character, as I must take\npains to repeat, is the aim.\n\nAnd herein appears the difference between the point of view taken in\nthis chapter and the political doctrine of the eminent Swiss publicist\nBluntschli. He too recognizes the development of the national character\nas the aim of the state; and in so far as he does this he is in advance\nof writers who limit the state\u2019s functions to the protection of life\nand property, to defense against foreign aggression, promotion of\nprosperity, and of power and prestige. Bluntschli has the insight to\nperceive that a nation is a collective entity, having a certain defined\ncharacter, and the development of the distinctive national gifts\nis in his eyes the supreme purpose of national life, the political\norganization of the state being a means to this end. But he falls into\na grave error by identifying the empirical with the spiritual character\nof the nation, and setting up the former as an end worthy on its own\naccount. The empirical character of a collective entity is in this\nrespect no more worthy of honor, and no more fit to be a ground of\nobligation, than the empirical character of the individual. And the\nconclusions at which Bluntschli arrives are a sufficient proof of the\nethical inadequacy of his vision. Some nations, a very few he thinks,\npossess political capacity, and they are to rule other peoples. Here\nwe have the \u201cWhite Man\u2019s Burden\u201d\u2014an obvious violation of the ethical\nprinciple of national independence. Further, the world state, which is\nto include all nations, is to concern itself only with their common\ninterests. Bluntschli thus accepts the uniformity principle in ethics,\nexcluding the idea of the reaction of differences which is of the very\nessence of the ethical relation; while the ideal future as he sees\nit is that of nations coexisting peacefully side by side, competing\npeacefully with each other, and doubtless borrowing from one another\nthe best fruits produced by each. But it is idle to expect peaceful\ncoexistence so long as the strong exist by the side of the weak without\nthere being acknowledged an _intrinsic_ spiritual tie between them;\nand competition between peoples will result, like competition between\nindividuals, in strife and exploitation; while the mere borrowing by\neach of the fruits produced by the rest omits the vital point, upon\nwhich I lay the greatest stress, of the eliciting of the fruits in each\nby the spiritualizing influence of the rest.\n\nSurveying Bluntschli\u2019s doctrine as a whole, it is clear that his\nempirical conception of the state leaves it a purely secular\ninstitution concerned with externals, and not really related to the\ninner life, certainly not a station in the development of personality.\nHe practically acknowledges as much when he says that the state is man\nwrit large, and the church woman writ large; that the state represents\nthe masculine principle, the church the feminine principle. For the\nfeminine, according to him, is the spiritual principle. The state deals\nwith externals; to the church is reserved the prerogative of entering\ninto and transforming the inner life.[93]\n\nBut what shall be the motive force for the creation of an international\nsociety? I hold that the sense of national sin, or of national guilt,\nmust supply the motive force. At present all the more advanced nations\nare to be censured because of their pride. Germany prides itself on\nits science and its efficiency, England on its political liberalism,\nFrance on its logical conception of equality, America on its democratic\nindividualism. Each of the great nations dwells complacently upon\nits fair traits, and vaunts its special type of civilization as that\nwhich should rightfully prevail among mankind generally. The national\ndefects, acknowledged perhaps by the critical few, are glozed over.\nIndeed the consciousness of a collective national character though\nlatent is not yet distinct. It must be evoked. National self-knowledge\nmust be promoted by the leaders and teachers of mankind, and with it\nmust come, as in the case of the individual, the conscious recognition\nof deep defects\u2014in the case of Germany the narrowness of the conception\nof the expert:[94] in the case of England the discrepancy between\npolitical liberalism as applied to the white inhabitants of the British\nIsles and of the self-governing dominions on the one hand, and the\n\u201cbenevolent despotism\u201d exercised over the subject millions of India on\nthe other; in America the effacement of true individualism under the\ncrushing pressure of mass opinion, etc.\n\nMoreover not only will the defects be admitted, but their detrimental\ninfluence on other peoples will have to be frankly avowed\u2014every nation\nmust cry its _Peccavi_\u2014the effect for instance on Europe of the French\nlove of glory, the effect of the efficiency notion of the Germans\nas it is at present penetrating all other nations,[95] and in the\nstill wider view the effect of Western civilization as a whole on the\nstationary civilization of China, on Egypt, on the myriads of Africa.\nThe civilized peoples of the earth have sinned their sins and are best\nseen when we consider:\n\nA. The spoliation and outrages perpetrated by the Western nations, for\ninstance at the time of the entrance of the Allies into Pekin, the\nwholesale destruction of human life and the mutilations of the natives\non the Congo. It has been stated that some ten millions of the natives\nof Africa perished as victims of the white race. If these acts do not\nwarrant our speaking of the sins of the civilized nations, what kind of\nhuman behavior does deserve that name?\n\nB. The effect of European example in practically forcing the peoples of\nthe Orient to adopt militarism and navalism.\n\nC. The effect of Western individualism in undermining the religious\nfoundation in Eastern civilization.[96] The spreading of Christianity\nitself, despite the exemplary influence of the higher type of\nmissionary, must yet be classed, in one important respect, among\nthe detrimental influences exercised by the West upon the East. For\nChristianity, in the form in which it is usually taught, tends to\nbreak up the sense of solidarity which is often strong among the less\ncivilized peoples, without supplying an adequate principle upon which\nsolidarity might be re\u00ebstablished on a higher plane. Hence Christian\nteaching in the Orient and in Africa, however friendly and merciful in\nintention, and however beneficent in many ways, is yet a disintegrating\ninfluence.\n\nThe great problem of the spiritual education of the lower races\nwill have to be taken up anew. Not only are individual missionaries\nof broader mental and moral horizons needed, the civilized nations\nas such must reach a common understanding and establish a union\namong themselves, the keynote of which shall be reverence for the\nundeveloped, that is to say divination of what, under right educational\ninfluence, they, the undeveloped, may come to mean for humanity. And\na union of this kind, consecrated to a noble object, will at the same\ntime be the means of leading the Western world out of the chaotic\ncondition in which it is at present weltering. The object for which\nnations combine may not be their own peace, their own prosperity.\nThe key to peace between the adult peoples is a common, effectual\nresolve to win new varieties of spiritual expression from the child\nand adolescent peoples of the earth. Peace must come incidentally.\nThe common object must be disinterested, spiritual, because there is a\nduty on the part of the civilized towards the uncivilized to exercise\na spiritual function. The task of humanity in general consists in\nextending the web of spiritual relations so as to cover larger and\nstill larger areas of the finite world. The family is only partly\nspiritualized. The vocations, the state, are not yet spiritualized. The\ninternational society hardly exists. But what I here endeavor to sketch\nis the human world as it would be in the light and under the influence\nof the spiritual ideal. And I set down as the saving task of the\ncivilized nations that of extending the spiritual realm so as to cover\nbackward, undeveloped peoples, so as to embody them in the _corpus\nspirituale_ of mankind.\n\n_Some of the Principal Obstacles That Stand in the Way of the\nOrganization of Mankind._\n\nThe first obstacle is to be found in the inadequate theories that\nunderlie international law. Seventeenth and eighteenth century thinking\nis still, strange to say, the theoretical foundation. Grotius and\nVattel remain the chief authorities. Grotius\u2019s theory is a system of\nempirical individualism with Christian individualism grafted upon it,\nto mitigate its harsher features. The right of conquest is admitted.\nA nation is allowed to punish another, punishment being taken in\nthe crude sense, while what has been permitted under natural law is\nsubsequently modified by counsels of perfection derived from Christian\nindividualism.\n\nVattel is the intellectual grandchild of Leibnitz. He derives from\nLeibnitz through Wolff. Vattel envisages the various states as so many\nindividual entities without intrinsic ties. Peaceful coexistence and\nunhindered pursuit by each people of its own perfection or welfare with\nmutual aid to be voluntarily rendered are the ultimate conceptions\nbeyond which this thinker does not venture. And if the root principles\nare thus infertile, small wonder that the fruit of the tree should be\nwhat it is. In any handbook of international law, the preponderant\nspace is allotted to the laws of war, and yet international law has\nproved impotent to restrain the passion of war, or even to prevent its\nexcesses. International law binds the Samson of war with green withes\nwhich the giant snaps in derision. It is plain that we are still in\nthe earliest stages, not only of international practice, but even of\ninternational thinking. The problem of the right ethical relations\nbetween the nations has hardly been broached.\n\nAnother conspicuous obstacle in the way of international progress is to\nbe seen in false hopes. Among the false hopes I class:\n\nA. The hope that increased facilities of intercourse will automatically\nbring about more friendly relations. To expect this is to forget that\ncloseness accentuates repugnances as well as congenialities, increases\nantipathy as well as amity. When nations come within short range of\neach other they resemble antipathetical kinsmen who are compelled\nto live together. The Czechs and Germans in Bohemia would not hate\neach other as they do were they not such near neighbors. Spatial\nrapprochement, for instance, between East and West will not of itself\nguarantee moral rapprochement\u2014far from it.\n\nB. The hope that science may be relied on to bring the nations\ntogether. Science is neutral. Science is subservient to evil as well\nas good. Science is at present distilling the poisonous gases used on\nthe European battlefields as well as inventing the improved methods\nof surgery. It has made possible instruments of destruction such as\nsavages might have shrunk from using. Moreover, scientific as well as\nartistic interests are partial manifestations of a people\u2019s life and\nthe ethical relation is between peoples as totalities or collective\nentities\u2014just as the ethical relation between man and man is between\nthe whole man and the whole man, and not between some partial aspect\nof the man and of his fellows. Hence it is easy to explain why the\nscientists and the scholars of the different belligerent peoples were\nswept away by the war passion like the rest, and in their utterance\nhave even carried animosity to greater lengths, expressing it in\nlanguage calculated to wound more deeply and to leave more permanent\nscars. They felt that they belonged to the people as a whole, and\nwhen the occasion came for them to choose between their scientific\nco-workers across the frontier and their fellow-nationals, they sided\nwith the latter.\n\nC. The hope that reliance can be placed on international trade to bring\nabout ethical relations between nations. But trade, like science,\nis ethically neutral. In its own interest it is favorable to order\nand security in colonies and dependencies, and when, sufficiently\nenlightened, to the impartial administration of justice. The European\nnations abolished the slave trade in Africa because it decimated the\nnative population, and decreased the supply of labor.[97] On the other\nhand England in the eighteenth century, even at that time the most\nliberal country of Europe, did not hesitate to wage war with Spain for\nthe maintenance of the monopoly of the hideous slave-trade, and the\nOpium War occurred in the \u201cfull light\u201d of the nineteenth century. But\nthe most striking example of the ethical neutrality of the commercial\nmind is to be found in the recent partition of Africa between England,\nFrance, the Congo Free State and Germany. The methods which these four\nnations adopted in the \u201cscramble for Africa\u201d were marked by a perfect\ndisregard of the rights of the native populations of the African\ncontinent. Two devices were used\u2014proclamations, and treaties with\nnative chiefs. The Queen of England proclaimed that a certain territory\nwould thenceforth be a British possession, as if proclamation could\nconvey a right to the territory. The German emperor indulged in the\nsame fiction. And there was a veritable race between French and English\nin the West; between Germans and English in the East, as to which of\nthe two could outdistance or outwit the other in treaty-making. Karl\nPeters came in disguise with a stock of blank treaties in his pocket.\nForty or fifty treaties were concluded by the French annually for\nseveral years in the West\u2014as if a treaty with a native chief, who\nmight be bribed or coerced into lending his signature, could be the\nfoundation of moral right to the territory occupied by his tribe. The\nEuropean nations artfully employed the fictions of sovereignty in\norder to varnish their acts of plunder with a semblance of legality.\nOf course these proclamations and treaties were not intended to\njustify exploitation in the eyes of the natives\u2014the natives were not\nconsulted or regarded\u2014but rather to base thereon the division of the\nspoils between the exploiters. A proclamation or the conclusion of a\ntreaty with a chief was notice given to rivals not to interfere with\nthe spoils reserved for the nation that had issued the proclamation or\nsecured the treaty. It meant \u201chands off\u201d to competing exploiters.\n\nIf it be asked whether this picture is not too dark? Whether the\ncivilized nations of the twentieth century in their dealings with the\nhelpless natives were merely selfish? Whether their motives are so\nsinister? Whether they are not animated by better, more moral aims?\nthe answer is that the commercial mind, and it is the commercial\nmind that chiefly rules the world today, allays its scruples and\njustifies its aggressions by the fallacy that to extend trade is to\nspread civilization, and to spread civilization is to contribute to\nthe advancement of the human race. The interests of trade and of\ncivilization are simply identified. To build railroads, to stretch\ntelegraph lines across the Dark Continent, to launch steamboats on\nlakes that never heard the whistle of a steam engine before, these\nare assumed to be the evidences of \u201cprogress.\u201d Besides are not the\nnatives disciplined in habits of industry, are they not encouraged to\ncultivate the raw products needed by Europe, and in return to receive\nthe overflow of European markets? The instruments of civilization are\nthus confounded with civilization itself; the means with the end; while\nthe real object, veiled by sophistry, is nevertheless the material\nbenefit to be secured by the white race. Even the humane treatment of\nthe natives, where it is humane, resembles somewhat too unpleasantly\nthe fattening of the calf prior to its consumption by the owner.\n\nFurthermore, the interests of Trade being supposed to be paramount,\nit is held that any country the people of which do not sufficiently\ncultivate the products desired by other peoples, or who close their\ndoors against the industrial surplus of Europe, may be annexed, the\nland forcibly seized, and the inhabitants subjugated, and moreover\nthat such action is right and proper and in the interests of humanity.\nSo long as this view obtains, there will be no peace on earth. The\ncompetition for foreign territories and foreign markets, the scramble\nbetween the \u201ccivilized\u201d exploiters, will be indefinitely provocative of\nnew wars.\n\nThe root disease that afflicts the world at the present day is the\nsupremacy of the commercial point of view. Intercourse and exchange\nof products is no doubt desirable. The education of backward peoples\nin agriculture and in industry for their own good and along their own\nline is indispensable. The fallacy of the commercial mind consists\nin erecting the means into the paramount end, in brusquing the love\nof independence which is so strongly entrenched, even among many\nprimitive peoples, and in preventing their development in the direction\nprescribed by their own natures. All this for the sake of the\nimmediate increase of material wealth. The white race shall have the\nlion\u2019s share of the wealth; the native population are to be accorded a\nlesser share, with which they must be content. This is the extent of\nthe concession to humanity. This is, in plain words, what is signified\nby the haughty phrase\u2014\u201cthe spread of civilization.\u201d\n\nThe commercial mind is neither benevolent nor malevolent\u2014as little as\nscience is. It seems at times to be beneficent; at other times it seems\nto be almost fiendish\u2014as in the case of the atrocities perpetrated on\nthe Congo. It is not fiendish, it is simply ethically neutral or blind.\n\nFrom this series of reflections, certain conclusions may be drawn as\nto fundamental points of view relating to international law. The main\nprinciple is respect for the total personality of peoples, recognition\nof them as potential members of the spiritual body of mankind.\n\nThe territory of a people is to be regarded as the body of that\npeople\u2019s soul. Their independence is to be strictly respected.\nExpropriation or annexation is to be characterized as outrage.\nIntrusion, except for purposes of education, is to be forbidden. The\nconception which underlies the scramble for Africa and for the Far\nEast\u2014that the material interests of the advanced nations entitle them\nto force the backward to become receptacles of the industrial overflow\nof the West, the producers of raw material for the factories of the\nWest must be abandoned.[98]\n\nAnd now the main point may once more be stated. The salvation of the\ncivilized peoples, their spiritualization in the effort to spiritualize\nthe less advanced demands a new turn in the history of humanity. _Union\nin a common sublime object will overcome the antagonisms and discords\nthat prevail among the civilized nations themselves._ The sword will\nnever be turned into a plow-share until the nations come to love the\nwork of the plow\u2014the work of spiritual _tilth in the human_ field. The\nstrong peoples will never cease to harm the weak, and in so doing to\nharm themselves, until they see in the weak, members of the _corpus\nspirituale_ of mankind, depositaries of potential spiritual life in\nliberating which they the strong themselves will find increased life.\nAnd the task of uplifting the lower peoples will never be successfully\nprosecuted until it is seen to be part of the task of humanity in\ngeneral, which is to spread the web of spiritual relations over larger\nand ever larger provinces of the finite realm.[99]\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[91] See Fouill\u00e9e\u2019s _Esquisse psychologique des Peuples europ\u00e9ens_,\nalso the Chapter on German, English and American Ideals in _The World\nCrisis_.\n\n[92] Each term in the series of social institutions is ethically\ndefined by referring to the succeeding terms. The family prepares for\nthe vocation, the vocation for the state or nation, the nation for\nthe international society, and all the successive terms receive their\nultimate definition from the infinite spiritual universe which includes\nthem, and broods over them and dwells in each, so that the expanding\nethical experience gained at the successive stations is spiritually the\n_ratio cognoscendi_, not the _ratio essendi_.\n\n[93] It is true that the state is concerned with those conditions of\nthe spiritual reactions that are capable of being enforced, but in\ninstituting such conditions the spiritual content is inevitably kept in\nview. And in the very process of fitting the body to the spirit, the\nform to the content, the content itself will be discerned more clearly\nand explicitly.\n\n[94] See the chapter in _The World Crisis_.\n\n[95] To myself as an individual I say: look to your radiations,\nconsider the effects you produce on others; if the effects are\nharmful trace them to faults in your character, and let your desire\nand obligation to influence others beneficently be the spur to lead\nyou to transform your own character. The same each people should\nsay to itself. For instance the obvious faults of our democracy\nhave retarded the progress of democracy in Europe. Our failure in\nmunicipal government is constantly quoted abroad as an argument against\ndemocracy. This should be a real incentive to rouse us out of our\nself-complacency.\n\n[96] Cf. Lord Cromer\u2019s remarks on this subject in his book on Egypt.\n\n[97] See, however, the importation of Indian and Chinese coolies, and\nthe surreptitious resurrection of the slave trade mentioned by Sir\nCharles Dilke in his _Problems of Greater Britain_.\n\n[98] As to practical steps that might be taken to give effect to\nthis conception of international law, see my published address \u201cThe\nGreat R\u00f4le of the United States After the War,\u201d in which is discussed\nthe creation of an international law-making body or a Parliament of\nParliaments. In connection with the latter, I should attach particular\nimportance to the institution of commissions which may serve as a\nlink between the international legislature and the less civilized\npeoples\u2014the commissions to study the needs and gifts of those peoples\nwith a view to securing their development along their own lines. In the\ncase of civilized peoples that have until recently been stationary,\nlike the Chinese, the commission representing the Western nations would\nsit in consultation with the most enlightened leaders of the Chinese\npeople themselves, the common object being to discover the points\nof attachment in Chinese civilization which may wisely be made the\nstarting point of a more modern and progressive evolution. For instance\nthe filial piety of the Chinese, the rectitude of their merchants, the\nabsence of an aristocracy, and their civil service resting on education\n(despite its defects). In this manner it may become possible to avoid\nthe abrupt, superficial, and infinitely destructive substitution\nof modern ideas for the system at present existing, and gradual\ndevelopment will take the place of intrusive and uncongenial change.\n\n[99] I add that this conception will react on the internal life of\ndemocracy. Democracy is at present regarded as a relation between\nequals. In fact, we have in America the negro population, the\nilliterate and backward immigrants. A truer conception of democracy\ndepends on our realizing that within each people as well as between\npeople and people there is the distinction of the more advanced and\nthe less advanced groups. Democracy rightly conceived will be found to\nconsist in the effort spent by the more advanced in each vocational\ngroup to uplift the less advanced, the more advanced themselves coming\ninto possession of their spiritual worth in the degree that they\nrealize this their task of leadership and its great responsibilities.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\nRELIGIOUS FELLOWSHIP AS THE CULMINATING SOCIAL INSTITUTION\n\n\nIn this chapter I shall undertake to sketch the plan of a religious\nsociety as determined by the spiritual ideal herein set forth.\nThe religious society is the last term in the series of social\ninstitutions, and its peculiar office is to furnish the principle for\nthe successive transformation of the entire series. It is to be the\nlaboratory in which the ideal of the spiritual universe is created\nand constantly recreated, the womb in which the spiritual life is\nconceived. No single religious society can adequately fulfill this\npurpose. The spiritual ideal itself must necessarily be conceived\ndifferently by different minds; but the great general purpose will be\nthe same, despite variations in shades of meaning and points of view.\n\nThe fellowship of the religious society must be based on the voluntary\nprinciple; membership must be a matter of free choice.[100] In\nantiquity the boundaries of the political and religious organizations\ncoincided. The citizen was under obligations as a part of his civic\nduty to worship the divinities of the state. In modern times a state\nchurch is still maintained in some countries and supported out of the\npublic funds, while dissenting and nonconformist bodies exist more\nor less on sufferance at its side. But this arrangement is harmful,\nespecially so to those whom it seems to favor. Erastianism paralyzes\nreligious spontaneity. The state, it is true, is profoundly interested\nin the flourishing of ethical idealism, and in the constant rebirth in\nits midst of spiritual ideals. But it is not competent to determine\nwhat the character of these ideals shall be. The moment they cease to\nbe freely produced they lose their life-giving power. The state within\nlimits may enforce actions; it may not even attempt to enforce beliefs.\n\nOn the other hand, the \u201csecularization of the state\u201d has given rise\nto the deplorable impression that the state exists only for so-called\nsecular purposes, and has stripped the idea of the state of the lofty\nattributes with which the greatest thinkers of antiquity had clothed\nit. It is the function of the religious society, dwelling uncoerced in\nthe midst of the state, to reinvest the state with the sacred character\nthat belongs to it. I do not of course intend to exalt the state after\nthe manner of Hegel, as if it were a kind of earthly god or to set it\nup as an object of religious or quasi-religious devotion. The object\nof religious devotion is the infinite holy community, the spiritual\nuniverse. The function of the religious society is to generate the\nideal of the infinite holy community, of the spiritual universe. The\nfamily, the vocation, the nation, are sub-groups of this, lesser\nentities. Even mankind itself is but a province of the ideal spiritual\ncommonwealth that extends beyond it. To concentrate worship upon the\nstate or nation as some propose, would be to usurp for the part the\npiety that belongs to the whole.\n\nIn describing a religious society three main aspects are to be borne in\nmind:\n\nThe teaching, the organization, the worship.\n\n\n_A. The Teaching_\n\nIn the religious society as here conceived there is to be worked out\na body of doctrine, and there is to be a body of specially designated\nteachers. An ethico-religious society cannot ignore or dispense with a\ngeneral philosophy of life and statements of belief. It cannot restrict\nitself to encouraging practical morality without regard to what are\ncalled metaphysical subtleties. A moral society of this kind would soon\nbecome ossified. On the contrary, an ethico-religious society should\nexcel in the fertility with which it gives rise to new metaphysical\nconstructions and original formulations of ethical faith. The will\ncannot be divorced from the intellect. The active volitional life\ncannot be successfully stimulated and guided without the assistance of\nthe mind as well as of the imagination.\n\nBut the relation between philosophy and formulas of belief on the one\nhand and volitional experience on the other should be the reverse of\nwhat it has been in the past. Here there must be a new departure. The\ndoctrine, the formulations, whatever they may be, must not be dogmatic\nbut flexible. Growing originally out of ethical experience, they must\never prove themselves apt to enlarge and deepen ethical experience.\nBy this test they will be judged and they must therefore ever be\nsubject to revision and correction. Every dogma, every philosophic or\ntheological creed, was at its inception a statement in terms of the\nintellect of a certain inner experience. But then it claimed for itself\neternal validity, compressing the spiritual life within its mold, and\nchecking further development. The body of doctrine which I desire and\nforesee will likewise be an interpretation of ethical experience,\nintended to make explicit the fundamental principles implicit in\nethical experience, and thereby clarifying it, and assisting its\nfurther unfolding. But it is not and should never be allowed to\nbecome dogmatic. The difference, I take it, is plain: in the one case\nexperience contracted in procrustean fashion into a rigid formula, in\nthe other case an elastic formula adapted to and subordinated to the\nexperience.\n\nThus much for the body of teachings. There should also be a body\nof teachers. A teacher in an ethico-religious society will retain\nsomething of the character of his predecessors\u2014priest, prophet, rabbi,\npastor. The priest is the mediator of grace; the prophet is the seer\nof visions; the rabbi is learned in the Divine law, and the pastor is\nthe helper of the individual in securing his individual salvation.\nBut these functions will now be seen in an altered light, and will be\nradically modified in their exercise. The magical attribute of the\npriest disappears. The confident prediction of future events, based\non the assumption that the moral order is to be completely realized\nin human society, has ceased to be convincing. The Divine law is no\nlonger identical with the Law revealed in the Scriptures and their\ncommentaries, and the salvation of the individual is to be accomplished\nby other means.\n\nThe religious teacher of the new kind is to resemble his predecessors\nin being a specialist. The word specialist in this connection may,\nperhaps, awaken misgivings, and these must be removed. He is not a\nspecialist in the sense of having a conscience unlike that of others,\nor in being the keeper of other men\u2019s consciences. Nor shall he impose\nhis philosophy of life or his belief authoritatively, but propose\nit suggestively. His best results will be gained if he succeeds in\nso stimulating those whom he influences that they will attain an\nindividualized spiritual outlook of their own, consonant with their\nown individual nature and need. But specialists of this kind are\nindispensable. The generality of men have neither the time nor the\nmental equipment to think out the larger problems of life without\nassistance, and the attempt on their part to do so leads to crudities\nand eccentricities of which one meets nowadays with many pathetic\nexamples among those who have severed their connection with the\ntraditional faiths, and have tried in their groping fashion to invent\na metaphysic or a creed of their own.[101]\n\nThe preparation of the ethical teacher for his special task consists in\nmaking himself thoroughly acquainted with the great religious systems\nof the past, in which much that is of permanent spiritual value is\nenshrined.[102] He is to fit himself to revitalize what is vital, not\nto repristinate what is obsolete. There is required of him a first-hand\nknowledge of the great ethical systems, and of their philosophical\nbackgrounds: furthermore acquaintance, so far as it is as yet\naccessible, with the moral history of mankind, as distinguished from\nthe history of ethical thinking; in addition, he should intensively\nstudy the economic, social and political problems of the time from\nthe ethical point of view, and the psychology both of individual\nand national character, so far as that fascinating and difficult\nsubject has been opened up by competent writers. Apprenticeship in\nthe social reform movements of the day, direct touch with the inner\nlife of people, on its healthful as well as on its sick side, is also\npresupposed.\n\nSince no single person can be adequately prepared in these various\nsubjects, and since a variety of gifts and talents is demanded, it\nfollows that the teaching function shall be exercised by a body\nor group of teachers, not by a single pastor at whose feet the\ncongregation are supposed to sit. Some of the persons engaged in this\nwork will excel as public speakers, others as writers, others as\nteachers of the young, others as leaders of vocational groups. But all\nthese different functionaries must learn to work, not only in harmony,\nbut in organic, reciprocal support, themselves illustrating in their\ngroup life the spiritual relation, the knowledge and the practice of\nwhich they are to carry out into the world. The guild or group idea\nmust be applied to the religious teachers of the future.\n\n\n_B. The Organization_\n\nEvery religion exhibits a certain form of organization peculiar to\nitself and derived from its controlling idea. The organization of the\nBuddhist fellowship is dependent on the Buddhist ideal of preparation\nfor absorption in Nirvana. The constitution of the Jewish synagogue\nreflects the conception of the relation of the Chosen People, as an\n_\u00e9lite_ corps of the divinity. The organization of the Christian church\nis characterized by its bifurcation into an _ecclesia militans_ and an\n_ecclesia triumphans_, and further by the idea of incorporation into\nthe body of Christ, a difficult mystical conception as of a typical\ndivine individual including within his body a multitude of other\nindividuals.\n\nThe organization of the ethico-religious society has been foreshadowed\nin the chapter on the vocations. The society is to be divided into\nvocational groups. In each vocational group is to be worked out the\nspecific ethical ideal of that vocation. In the groups the general\nethical philosophy of life is to be applied, tested and enriched.\nThe so-called ethical teachers will here come into fruitful contact\nwith those who are in touch at first hand with actual conditions,\nand are cognizant of the difficulties to be surmounted in ethicizing\nvocational standards. The members of the groups in democratic fashion\nwill contribute to the advancement, not only of ethical practice, but\nof ethical knowledge, and thus become on their side teachers of the\nteachers. The danger of the formation of an ethical clergy will be\naverted. The teachers will be in certain respects the pupils of the\ntaught, and the relation be reciprocal, that is, ethical.\n\nAmong the groups the vocational group of Mothers will occupy the\ncentral place. The influence of women, especially of the mother group,\nmust penetrate the religious society through and through, for the\npurpose of drawing the entire fellowship together into a coherent\nunity. Women henceforth will take a deeper interest in the ethical\ndevelopment of human society. A main factor, if not the only factor\nin the ethical development of human society, is the elevation of the\nvocational standards. The group of mothers will therefore be in close\ntouch with the other vocational groups in order to gain a knowledge of\nthe higher standards therein proposed, in order to appraise them, and\nto inspire the growing generation with the devoted purpose to carry\nthese standards out in practice.\n\n\n_C. The Worship or Public Manifestation of Religion_\n\nThe ideal of worship likewise must undergo transformation. It has\nmeant an act of homage toward a superior or supreme individual; it\nhas meant eulogistic affirmation of the power, wisdom, goodness, of\nthat individual; it has meant prayer or petition for help from that\nindividual. It has also meant spiritual edification.\n\nIn all these various modes, religious worship heretofore has focused\nattention on a single individual deity as one who embodies in himself\nthe sum of perfection. In thus presenting the ideal of perfection, it\nhas encouraged preference for unity at the expense of plurality. The\nsalient feature of the spiritual ideal sketched in this volume is the\naffirmation, on ethical grounds, that plurality is of equal dignity\nwith unity, and hence that the divine ideal is to be represented not as\nOne, but as manifold; not as an individual, however supereminent, but\nas an infinite holy community,\u2014every human being being in his essential\nnature a member of that community.\n\nBut can worship be offered to the members of a holy community? In a\ncertain sense one might say, Yes, pre\u00ebminently so, since worship may\nbe taken to mean Worthship, and the worth intrinsic in our fellowmen\nis the object of our unceasing homage. At the same time very different\nassociations have gathered about the word. Public worship consists\nlargely of eulogistic singing, prayer, adoration, genuflexion, and\nthese are appropriate only to deity conceived as an individual. We\ncannot even say with the Psalmist \u201cthe heavens declare the glory\nof God, and the firmament showeth his handiwork.\u201d For though the\nbeauty and order apparent in Nature is one aspect of nature on which\nwe delight to dwell, yet we cannot disingenuously suppress the\ncounter evidence of disorder, ugliness and suffering which Nature\nno less obtrudes on our sight. The argument from design implied in\nthe Psalmist\u2019s words is no longer tenable. Certainly we cannot any\nlonger pray for material assistance as our forefathers did, or invoke\nsupernatural intervention in situations where human science and human\nhelpfulness are impotent. But worship also aims at ethical edification,\nby holding up to the mind the moral ideal as an object of imitation,\nand as a rebuke to man\u2019s shortcomings. This indeed is its highest\nfunction. Nevertheless the moral ideal, as we conceive it, is incapable\nof being presented in the guise of an individual being, no matter by\nwhat superlative language the limitation inseparable from individuality\nbe concealed. The bare attributes of omniscience and omnipotence are\nabstract and convey no positive meaning whatever. In actual worship\na concrete image is invariably associated with the notion of the\nindividualized Deity, such as the Father image or the Christ image. And\nas soon as this is done, the vast ethical ideal tends to shrink to the\ndimensions of a human image; and instead of the ideal in its fullness,\nonly certain selected but inadequate aspects of ethical excellence are\npresented to the worshiper.\n\nAnd yet in an ethico-religious society also the public manifestation of\nreligion is indispensable. Of what elements shall it consist?\n\nFirst, there are to be the public addresses by the teachers, having\nfor their main object to arouse or intensify a certain kind of\nspiritual distress, and then as far as possible to appease it. Every\nreligion in my judgment originates in a particular kind of anguish,\nand is an attempt to assuage it. The spiritual distress in which the\nethico-religious society has its origin is the agonizing consciousness\nof tangled relations with one\u2019s fellow-beings, and the inexpressible\nlonging to come into right relations with them. He is fit to be a\npublic teacher of this religion who profoundly experiences this\ndistress, who desires nothing so much as to cease to be, for his part,\na thorn in his neighbor\u2019s side. We are that, each of us, inevitably.\nThe more this feeling is strong in him the more will he arouse similar\nfeelings in others, and thus awaken those who are spiritually asleep,\nthe self-righteous, the self-satisfied, and he will then indicate to\nthe utmost of his power, the way of relief.\n\nThe specific ethical ideals of life are also to be presented in public\nassemblies\u2014the ideals of private ethics, of marriage, friendship,\nand the rest. These expressions of the specific ideals, charged with\nfeeling, and taking on appropriate imagery, will gradually attain a\ncertain classical fitness\u2014classical at least for a time\u2014and may be used\nas public readings.\n\nBut is there a substitute for prayer?\n\nAmong the advantages of prayer is often mentioned this: that in it\nthe soul reaches out towards its source, and in so doing wonderfully\nrecruits its spiritual energy. It finds, ethically speaking, its second\nwind. It reaches down beneath its utmost strength to find an increment\nof strength not previously at its disposal. The question is whether\nthis increment of strength cannot be obtained more surely and to better\npurpose in another way, namely, by concentrating attention on the\nspiritual need of the fellow-beings with whom we are in daily touch,\nand by becoming aware to what an extent the finer nature imprisoned in\nthem is dependent for its release upon our exertions. The appeal of the\nGod in our neighbor is the substitute for the appeal in prayer to the\nGod in heaven, the call of the stifled spiritual nature in the men and\nwomen at our side, is to draw out of us our utmost latent force, the\nstrengths underneath the strength.\n\nThe common life we share with our fellow-members in the religious\nsociety demands expression in song and in responsive services. The\nhigh wave of this common life welling up in us, rising to the surface,\nmakes the glow of religious meetings, gives them fervor, and a touch of\nrapture, not indeed the common life conceived as a uniform life, but as\nthe life we live in others, and they in us.\n\nThe addresses that awaken and appease spiritual pain, the presentation\nof the various modes of right living, the songs that lift the\nindividual above his private self and help him to live, not indeed\nsubmerged, but rather spiritually accentuated in the life of the whole,\nthese are the public manifestations of ethical religion as I see them.\nThey will contribute to make of the society itself the symbol of its\nethical faith. We shall not have an external symbol like the cross: the\nfellowship itself will be our symbol.\n\nThere will also be festivals. Every religion must have its\nfestivals. In place of Baptism the solemn taking of responsibility\nfor the spiritual development of the child. A festival of vocational\ninitiation, like the ancient assumption of the _toga_. Festivals of\ncitizenship, inspired by the ideal of the national character as one to\nbe spiritually transformed. Festivals of humanity in connection with\nthe commemoration of great events in the history of our race and of\ngreat leaders who were inspired in some degree by the ideal task of\nhumanity. Festivals of the seasons, deriving their significance from\nthe spiritual interpretation of the corresponding seasons of human\nlife,\u2014youth, middle age, old age. And a solemn though not mournful\nfestival in commemoration of the departed.\n\nThe religious assembly should itself be organized; the members of the\ndifferent vocational groups should be allocated to different parts\nof the meeting hall, as were the Guilds in certain of the medi\u00e6val\ncathedrals.\n\nBesides the public manifestations, the private religion will receive\nattention. The religious society as a whole is to be the microcosm of\nthe spiritual macrocosm, a miniature model of the ideal society, but\ncare must also be taken for the private communion of the individual\nwith the spiritual presences which the ideal evokes. There should be a\nspecial breviary for the sick, a Book of Consolation for the bereaved,\na Book of Friendship, a Book of direction for those who pass through\nthe experience of sin, and a book of preparation for those who face the\nend.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[100] Among other ethical relations based on free election, friendship\nis the most important. In a separate _Book of Friendship_ which I hope\nto publish, I intend to review the ideals of friendship as they have\narisen from time to time in the history of civilized mankind\u2014the ideal\nof Pythagorean friendship, the ideals presented by Aristotle, Kant,\nEmerson. And I shall endeavor to show in each case the connection\nbetween the friendship ideal and the general philosophy of life. I\nshall then set forth that ideal of friendship which is the corollary\nof the spiritual conceptions outlined in this volume: the friend being\nin my view one who assists spiritual development as a spectator. He\nis the faithful mirror of his friend\u2019s progress toward personality,\nthe benevolent yet incorruptible recorder and appraiser. By this token\nfriendship is distinguished from the interlocking relations such as\nthat between partners in marriage, vocational co-workers, etc.\n\n[101] In certain Ethical Societies abroad, the fear of encouraging\nthe rise of a new clericalism led to the plan of drawing for ethical\nteachers on professors of universities, and others engaged in various\nlines of practical activity. These persons could of necessity give\nonly the leavings of their time and thought to the complex questions\nwhich they undertook to discuss; and the experiment, as might have been\nforeseen, proved disastrous.\n\n[102] It has been said that the science of today lives only in\nsuperseding the science of yesterday. Whether this be true of science\nor not it is not true of religion. The religions of the past are not\nmerely superseded. There is much in them that is to be reinterpreted,\nand thus perpetuated.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X\n\nTHE LAST OUTLOOK ON LIFE\n\n\nThe view of life that man has on leaving it is the final test of his\nphilosophy of life. These are my thoughts: It is time to detach thyself\nfrom this earth. The shadows are lengthening. Look around you and note\nthe strange changes that have taken place in the men and women of your\nacquaintance. Those that you once knew in their prime are now old and\nwrinkled,\u2014and how many already dead! As you survey the procession of\nlife, how many vacant places are there in it! How many true and loyal\ncomrades have been swept away! Or go into the busy streets of the\ncity, and look at the multitude passing through them. You are still\none of this multitude. Presently you will drop out. There will perhaps\nbe a little ripple on the surface, and then the stream will flow on\nas before. How curious is it to think that this frame of life which\nsustains such high faculties should crumble into a little heap of dust\nat the touch of the wand of death! Detach thyself, therefore, relax\nthy hold by anticipation as thou shalt soon relax it actually. But\ndetachment does not mean cold inattention or unnatural shrinking from\nthe earthly scene, like that of the monk in his cell. Relax thy hold\non what is earthly in the earthly scene, and fix thy loving attention\nall the more on what is _spiritually significant_ in it. Regard with\na friendly eye the beauty of the natural landscape around thee\u2014yonder\nlake and yonder noble mountain summit. They are earthly, yet are they\nalso hieroglyphs and symbols.\n\nStill more is this true of thy social relations. Detach thyself means\nrelax thy hold on what is transient in those relations. Cling all the\nmore firmly to what is spiritual in them. The earth is thy foundation,\nthou art Ant\u00e6us as long as thou remainest in contact with the earth.\nUntil the very last thou must lean for strength upon the earthly bases\nand substrata.\n\nConsider the drive of the human race through the time and space world,\nand its net result. Thou standest now on a high tower. Lean over\nthe parapet and peer as far out into the future as thou canst. Thou\nstandest as did Moses on Mount Pisgah. Strain thy eyes to catch sight\nof the Promised Land. But remember that the Promised Land turned out\nto be a land still of promise, not of fulfilment,\u2014a land in which the\nprophetic soul of Israel matured its visions of a fulfilment never on\nearth to be attained.\n\nRemember that as thou art linked to thy ancestry, so art thou linked\nto posterity. The future centuries of the human race are like the\nfuture years of an individual. Thou art keenly interested in what may\nhappen hereafter to the race with which thou art interlinked. But the\nrace, like the individual, will be cut off and become extinct before\never the ideal is reached. Remember, therefore, that the purpose for\nwhich humanity exists is achieved at every moment in everyone who\nappropriates the fruits of partial success and frustration. Whosoever\nstanding on the earth as a foundation builds up for himself the\nspiritual universe attains the purpose of human existence. There is\nindeed progress in the explicitness with which the spiritual ideal is\nconceived, and we are immeasurably interested in the greater light to\nbe attained by our posterity. But the essential fruition of the contact\nof the infinite that is in us with the finite world is achievable at\nevery moment in every human being. And this gives an entirely new\nmeaning to the spiritual gains achieved in solitude, which seem vain\nbecause there are no witnesses. But neither will there be witnesses\nwhen the last human beings perish on earth. The spiritual bravery of\nthe shipwrecked man who sinks on the lonely ocean springs from the\nconviction that though the sea can overwhelm him there is that in\nhim greater than ocean\u2019s immensity; a conviction achieved through\nthe experience of living in the life of others. The same is the gain\nachieved by the sick man who lies in solitude like a helpless log in\nthe darkened room. The altruistic philosophy fails in accounting for\nthe moral grandeur that attaches to the spiritual victories gained in\nsilence and solitude.\n\nFace the terrors of life before you leave life. Be resolute to the\nlast not to cherish illusions. Face the terrors of life, the absence\nof observable design, the cruelties, the ferocities. Think of William\nBlake\u2019s poem \u201cThe Tiger\u201d: \u201cDid he who made the lamb make thee?\u201d In your\nphilosophy there is no question any longer of a Creator. Creation is an\nattempt to explain the coexistence of the imperfect with the perfect,\nto account for a lower stage in terms of a higher. The ultimate\ninability of man to understand, to explain, is one of the principal\nfrustrations he meets with, is the crucifixion of man at the point of\nhis intellect.\n\nThe radical incompetence of man to grasp with his intellect the\nworld as a \u201cuniverse,\u201d is to be faced by him and accepted without\nqualification. It marks off this philosophy of life from those\nphilosophies and theologies which have attempted to explain the\nuniverse, and which, while affecting humility, are the dupes of an\nunwarranted self-confidence. Unqualified admission of the incompetence\nof the human intellect to resolve the world riddle is the determining\nfactor in the more profound humility which characterizes the religion\nof ethical experience. Agnosticism on the intellectual side is the very\ncondition of the transcending ethical conviction subsequently attained.\nWithout intellectual agnosticism there is no ethical certainty.\n\nConsider now frustration and its supreme outcome, or the various\npoints at which man is crucified. I have mentioned the intellectual\ncrucifixion, due to the incompetence of the mind to understand. I must\nnow speak of still more poignant experiences due to the incompetence of\nman adequately to fulfill the moral law, or to carry out the spiritual\nrelation in finite terms.\n\nI have reached the bourne, or am very near it. The shadows lengthen,\nthe twilight deepens. I look back on my life and its net results. I\nhave seen spiritual ideals, and the more clearly I saw them, the wider\nappeared the distance between them and the empirical conditions, and\nthe changes I could effect in those conditions. I have worked in\nsocial reform, and the impression I have been able to make now seems to\nme so utterly insignificant as to make my early sanguine aspirations\nappear pathetic. I have seen the vision of democracy in the air, and on\nthe ground around me I have seen the sordid travesty of democracy\u2014not\nonly in practice but in idea. I have caught the far outlook upon the\norganization of mankind, the extension of the spiritual empire over the\nearth by the addition to it of new provinces, and I do not find even\nthe faintest beginnings, or recognition of the task which the advanced\nnations should set themselves. I scrutinize closely my relations\nto those who have been closest to me,\u2014and I find that I have been\ngroping in the dark with respect to their most real needs, and that my\nfaculty of divination has been feeble. I look lastly into my heart,\nmy own character, and the effort I have made to fuse the discordant\nelements there, to achieve a genuine integrity there, and I find the\ndisappointment in that respect the deepest of all.\n\nThese are the various points of my life at which I have undergone the\ncrucifixion. I am like Arnold Winkelried, who gathered the sheaf of\nspears into his breast, and even pressed them inward, to make a way for\nliberty. So do I press the sharp-pointed spears of frustration into my\nbreast to make way for spiritual liberty. For these cruel spears turn\ninto shafts of light, radiating outward along which my spirit travels,\nbuilding its final nest\u2014the spiritual universe.\n\nConsider the new and profounder humility. In ethical experience is\nrevealed the plan of the spiritual relations, but the entities or\nsubstances which are thus related are incognizable, unknowable. Did\nI know them I should be able to solve the riddle of the universe. I\nshould know how it is that the finite exists side by side with the\ninfinite. But I cannot know. I cannot enter into the counsels of\nthe multiform godhead. There are the mighty powers that weave and\ninterweave behind the veil, but the veil between them and myself is\ndown, not to be lifted. Within the palace of light is the solemn and\nserene assembly of the gods: I, man, stand at the gate.\n\nThe world as we know it is itself the veil, the screen, that shuts out\nthe interplay, the weavings and the interweavings of the spiritual\nuniverse. But at least at one point, in the ethical experience of man,\nis the screen translucent. The plan of the spiritual relation is there\ntraced in outline. It is this plan that conveys the certainty as to\nwhat verily exists beyond, within, beneath.\n\nAs to my empirical self, I let go my hold on it. I see it perish with\nthe same indifference which the materialist asserts, for whom man is\nbut a compound of physical matter and physical force. It is the real\nself, of which the empirical was the substratum, upon which I tighten\nmy hold. I do not assert immortality, since immortality, like creation,\nis a bridge between the phenomenal and the spiritual levels. Creation\nis the bridge at the beginning; immortality the bridge at the end. Were\nI able to build the bridge, I should know. I do not affirm immortality.\nI affirm the real and irreducible existence of the essential self. Or\nrather, as my last act, I affirm that the ideal of perfection which\nmy mind inevitably conceives has its counterpart in the ultimate\nreality of things, is the truest reading of that reality whereof man is\ncapable. I turn away from the thought of the self, even the essential\nself, as if that could be my chief concern, toward the vaster infinite\nwhole in which the self is integrally preserved. I affirm that there\nverily is an eternal divine life, a best beyond the best I can think\nor imagine, in which all that is best in me, and best in those who are\ndear to me, is contained and continued. In this sense _I bless the\nuniverse. And to be able to bless the universe in one\u2019s last moments\nis the supreme prize which man can wrest from life\u2019s struggles, life\u2019s\nexperience._\n\nI look back upon my life once more, and am grateful for the eternal\nworth which it was permitted me in this frail vessel of my mortal\nexistence to hold, for the shimmer of the spiritual reality of things\nwhich I was permitted to see; grateful especially to those who loved\nme, and whom I was permitted to love, and who were to me in some\nmeasure revealers of the eternal life.\n\nConsider lastly the peace that passeth understanding. Now, if ever,\nthis peace should descend upon me. There is a kind of peace that is\naccessible to the understanding, and there is the peace that passeth\nunderstanding. The peace that can be understood is that which consists\nin the relief of pain. It arises in various ways. After an acute attack\nof physical pain how like balm is felt the succeeding absence of pain.\nAfter a prolonged sickness, when the convalescent takes his first walk,\nwhat a sweet tranquillity fills his mind! There is also the mental\nrelief that comes when some danger has been safely passed; the peace\nof the sheltered fireside to one who has passed through a storm. Again,\nthere is the peace that follows pecuniary anxiety, or the removal of\nsome carking care, as when an erring son is reclaimed, or an estranged\nwife or husband is found anew.\n\nBut the peace that passeth understanding is that which comes when the\npain is _not_ relieved, which subsists in the midst of the painful\nsituation, suffusing it, which springs out of the pain itself, which\nshimmers on the crest of the wave of pain, which is the spear of\nfrustration transfigured into the shaft of light.\n\nIt is upon those we love that we must anchor ourselves spiritually in\nthe last moments. The sense of interconnectedness with them stands\nout vividly by way of contrast at the very moment when our mortal\nconnection with them is about to be dissolved. And the intertwining of\nour life with theirs, the living in the life that is in them, is but\na part of our living in the infinite manifold of the spiritual life.\nThe thought of this, as apprehended, not in terms of knowledge, but in\n_immediate experience_, begets the peace that passeth understanding.\nAnd it is upon the bosom of that peace that we can pass safely out of\nthe realm of time and space.\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX I\n\nSPIRITUAL SELF-DISCIPLINE\n\n\nThe preceding volume in its entirety and in every part is nothing else\nthan a book of spiritual self-discipline. Every religion presents to\nits followers as real objects that the eye has not seen. The certainty\nof the existence of these objects, religious certainty, religious\nconviction, springs from one or other kind of need and distress. The\nobject that the eye has not seen is believed in because it corresponds\nto that need, and relieves that distress. Furthermore, the conviction\nis strengthened, the certainty intensified, by two methods: (1)\nelaboration of the ideas presented; (2) performing acts in the doing\nof which the existence of the objects is presupposed. Thus the idea of\nthe Heavenly Father corresponds to the childlike need of protection.\nThe elaboration of this idea in theological systems strengthens its\nhold, every idea being powerful as an active force in proportion as it\nis worked out in detail and linked up with other ideas. And ceremonies,\nprayers, acts of worship in the doing of which the reality of the\nFather-God is presupposed, strengthen the belief in him. Conduct is\none of the chief sources of belief. The more frequently a devout\nRoman Catholic prays to the Virgin Mary, the more firmly will he be\nconvinced that she exists and hears him. These features are common to\nall religion: unseen objects are presented as real; the belief in their\nreality is augmented by elaboration of the ideas; and above all their\nhold is reinforced by practice founded on and presuming the reality of\nthe ideas.\n\nThe unseen object which the religion of spiritual experience presents\nis the unique personality. The lines along which the ideas are to be\nelaborated have been sketched in the above. Conduct based on the\npresumption that the divine nature exists in every human being is the\nprincipal means of fortifying that conviction, and this presumption\nitself rests on the fundamental fact of worth.\n\nThe difference in rank between the various religions depends on the\nkind of need which they seek to satisfy. It may be physical, as when\nthe worshiper prays for large herds and fruitful crops. It may be the\nurging of a passion, as when a man prays for revenge on his enemies.\nAnd it may be ethical. And if ethical, it may be purely ethical, or\nethical with non-ethical elements admixed. A religion is neither\napproved nor condemned because it satisfies a need. The judgment passed\non it depends on the kind of need it undertakes to satisfy.\n\nSeek to raise the plus traits to the Nth degree. Seek through spiritual\nsex interaction to release the spiritual life in the child. Bring\nto birth in thyself the idea of the state, etc. Every chapter of\nthis volume contains some direction as to the lines of conduct to be\nfollowed. The principal self-discipline consists in the effort to\nfollow these lines.\n\nBut experience tells us that the effort may be hindered or helped in\ncertain ways. I shall mention a few of the helps and hindrances:\n\nPhysical and Mental _Athleticism_ are helps to Moral Athleticism.\nEthics is a science of energetics. Bodily and mental energy is\nfavorable to ethical energizing. By mental energy I understand\nespecially the habit of vigorously attacking complex and difficult\nmental problems.\n\nRight _Asceticism_ is related to Ethical Development. I exclude\nself-abnegation and self-repression practiced as drill apart from any\nparticular occasion requiring them, holding that self-repression should\nalways be incidental to self-expression. This applies especially to the\nhygiene of the sex passion. A positive ideal of the sex relation, as in\nmarriage, is an invaluable help in ennobling and thereby restraining\nthe passion.\n\nThe Ethical Life is the supremely Planful Life. There is a hierarchy of\nends of which the ethical is the apex. The ethical end is the supreme\nend to which all others are to be planfully subordinated. The habit of\nconducting one\u2019s life planfully is favorable to ethical behavior. I say\nplanfully, not pedantically, due regard being always had to spontaneity.\n\nAmong hindrances to Ethical development may be mentioned the tendency\nto be satisfied with the _minor perfections_. The better is the\ngreatest enemy of the best. The disproportionate value set on the\nembellishments of life is but one illustration of this point.\n\nA great hindrance to the spiritual life is the necessity under which\nwe lie of restricting our actual ethical relations to a _few persons_.\nWe cannot extend our influence to the millions of China and India.\nWe cannot even deeply influence a considerable number of our fellow\ncitizens. On ethical grounds we do acknowledge the claims of each\nindividual, of all these myriads of human beings. Yet as far as any\nactual good we can do them is concerned, we are powerless, and must\nleave them to their fate. The tragic aspect of life comes home to us\nsharply at this point. Intensity must take the place of extensity.\nIntensive spiritual relations with a few will teach us at least to\nconceive worthily of those personalities whom we cannot directly\naffect, and to invest them in idea with the honor which is their due.\n\nIntimate spiritual relations with a few will also counteract the\nunethical habit of labeling those with whom we come into casual\ncontact according to the special functions they happen to exercise.\nThus a letter-carrier is apt to be thought of as an animated machine\nto carry letters, a stenographer as a kind of animated machine to\ntake dictation, the servant in the house a machine to render physical\nservice. The more complete our appreciation of personality is in the\ncase of the few, the more we shall be impelled to transfer the concept\nof personality, at least in its outlines, to all others. In this way\nour friendships, our close relations, will not restrict our ethical\nhorizon. In the narrower circle we shall engender those ideas which\nin thought at least we can carry out to the farthest limits of human\nsociety.\n\nBut among the hindrances to ethical practice the two most conspicuous\nmust not be omitted. They are _pity_ and _terror_, pity for the pain\nsuffered by others, fear of pain for oneself. Aristotle regarded it\nas the high function of the tragic drama to liberate men from these\ndisturbing factors. The two are combined and in consequence exacerbated\nto an extreme degree in those situations where the pain suffered by\nanother person is at the same time poignantly felt as one\u2019s own pain.\nAnd the anguish felt in seeing the physical suffering of another is\neven exceeded in witnessing the moral degradation of another, as of an\nerring son or an apparently irreclaimable husband or wife. The doctrine\nof frustration as explained in this volume is intended to show the way\nof relief in such situations. But it is only by not shirking the pain,\nby permitting it fully to penetrate, by uncovering the breast entirely\nto the entrance of the pointed spear that we shall have the experience\nof the transformation of it into the shaft of light.\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX II[103]\n\nTHE EXERCISE OF FORCE IN THE INTEREST OF FREEDOM\n\n\nForce is a moral adiaphoron. The stigma attaching to the use of force\nbelongs rather to its abuse. The employment of force is good or bad\naccording as the ends for which it is used are good or bad.\n\nThe precept of non-resistance in the Sermon on the Mount is to be\nunderstood as a piece of ethical irony.\n\nThe right, or to be more explicit, the duty, of society to coerce\nindividual members of it rests on the same ground and holds within\nthe same limits as the duty of the individual to coerce himself.\nSelf-coercion depends on the difference in the quality of one\u2019s\nimpulses, on the choice one is bound to make between competitive ends.\nSelf-coercion is of two kinds: stimulative and repressive; stimulative\nto overcome inertia, repressive to subject wrong to right impulses.\n\nHe who denies the duty of self-coercion, to be consistent, must\nfall back on the position of the Cynics. For the Cynics were indeed\nconsistent. They asserted not only the right of the individual to be\nfree from outside compulsion, but also the right of each individual\nmoment of the individual\u2019s life to be lived without regard or\nsubjection to future moments. Hence they rejected civilization and\nits tasks, inasmuch as the prosecution of any task involves the\nsubordination of the present to the content of some future moment.\n\nBut if the coercion of a man by himself be admitted, it follows that\nthe exercise of force upon a man by society must in principle be\nlikewise admitted. For we are social by nature; we take an interest in\nthe achievement by each one of his ends, and we regard such achievement\nas a social-benefit.\n\nAs to the limits within which outside interference is to be permitted\nand welcomed, these can best be ascertained by fastening attention\nupon the end to be attained. And here the positive conception of\nfreedom seems to be the most helpful,\u2014freedom defined as the release\nin each one of his essential self, that is, of his distinctive gift\nand capability, or of that in him which is unique or most nearly so. A\nsociety in which such valuable contributions were elicited from each\nwould be the ideal society. Stimulative and repressive social coercion\nare justified in so far as they provoke energy and check disturbing\nimpulses,\u2014always of course without discouraging spontaneity, which is\nthe very good to be secured.\n\nThe antithesis of reason and force common in discussions of this\nsubject seems misleading and inadequate; since reason is a faculty of\ninference and not of preference, has to do with the adapting of means\nto ends, and does not of itself afford guidance in the choice of ends.\n\nThe concept of freedom as defined is more illuminating. Let freedom and\nforce be contrasted, not reason and force.\n\nThe idea of law that would follow from what has been said may be\nillustrated by comparing the action of law with that of automatism\nin the human body. The system of co-ordinations by which we learn to\nwalk, or acquire any kind of skill, such as that of performing on a\nmusical instrument, is at first painfully and consciously acquired.\nConsciousness superintends every step in the process. But after a\ntime the sequences reel off automatically. Consciousness retires from\nthe field, ascends to a higher plane, and devotes itself to more\ninteresting and significant business. Law, taking it in its broadest\nsense, may be regarded as the automatic machinery of freedom. It is\nthe system of stimulations and repressions which the experience of\nmankind at any given time has found conducive to the attainment of the\nsuperior ends of life. In the minds of the more advanced members of\nthe community repressive laws like the prohibitions of murder, theft,\netc., have already become automatic. Such a thing as questioning or\ntransgressing these laws never once in a lifetime occurs to them. (Of\nthe stimulative laws, such as the requirement to pay taxes in support\nof the progressive interests of society, the same is not yet true.) As\nregards the backward members of society, however, the repressive laws\nare educative. Just as in certain diseases the convalescent needs to\nacquire anew the art of walking, which his neighbors exercise without\nthinking, so the backward members of society have to learn painfully\nthose habits of repression which for others have sunk below the\nthreshold of consciousness.\n\nSocial compulsion therefore may be defined as discipline in the\ninterest of positive freedom. We may expect that in future this\nsalutary kind of compulsion will go to even much greater lengths than\nit has yet gone. Society as organized in the state has undoubtedly\nthe right to interfere in the choice of the sexes by prohibiting the\nmarriage of persons afflicted with infectious disease. If the study of\nhuman character could ever be so far developed as to determine what\nkind of temperaments are radically incompatible with one another (a\nbare throw in the air of course), it would be within the province of\nthe state to prohibit the conjugal union of such temperaments, and\nthus to prevent the disastrous effects on real freedom which such\nincompatibilities are apt to cause.\n\nI am well aware of the perils of this point of view. There is a\nbrutal factor in the action of society, as in that of individuals. A\ngiven community is apt to mistake its prejudices for principles, its\ntorpor for conservatism, its superstitions for spirituality. Such\napprehensions as those that weighed on the mind of John Stuart Mill as\nset forth in his _Essay on Liberty_ are not to be lightly dismissed.\nAnd yet the main trend of his argument was plainly determined by an\nindividualistic conception of liberty which many of us no longer share.\nIt is safe to say that on the whole the benefits of coercion outweigh\nthe detriments. We have only to picture to ourselves a state of society\nin which these coercions should not exist to realize that this is so.\nThe dangers are real, but are due to the abuse of force and not to the\nexercise of it under the controlling idea of positive freedom which is\nhere proposed.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[103] A paper read before the Fourth Conference on Legal and Social\nPhilosophy at Columbia University, November, 1915. (Reprinted from the\n_International Journal of Ethics_, April, 1916, pp. 420-423.)\n\n\n\n\nINDEX\n\n\n Achilles, 210\n\n Africa, exploitation of, 187f, 335\n\n Altruism, 79, 218, 220, 256\n\n Ant\u00e6us, 355\n\n \u1f04\u03c0\u03b1\u03be \u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, 228\n\n A priori knowledge, 105f, 111\n\n Architecture, 286n\n\n Aristotle, 105, 127, 168n, 190, 281, 305, 319, 365\n\n Ark of the Covenant, 77\n\n Arnold, Matthew, 10, 298\n\n Arnold von Winkelried, 358\n\n Art, relation to Ethics, 277f;\n limitations, 287n;\n students of, 296\n\n Asceticism, 363\n\n\n Bacon, _On Studies_, 10\n\n Baptism, 353\n\n Beatrice, 170\n\n Beauty, 281f\n\n Bereavement, 64, 162f\n\n Bergson, 108, 131n\n\n Blackstone, 185\n\n Blake, William, 356\n\n Bloch, 242\n\n Bluntschli, 327f\n\n Buddha, 16, 32, 199, 347\n\n\n C\u00e6sar Borgia, 172\n\n Cana, feast at, 206\n\n Categorical Imperative, 75f;\n and hypothetical, 80\n\n Causality, \u201cprejudice of,\u201d 110f, 136, 141, 171\n\n Christianity, an estimate of, 30-42;\n other-worldliness of, 140, 268;\n national, 321;\n forced on the East, 331\n\n Church, 347\n\n Citizenship, 322\n\n Confucius, 16, 31, 299\n\n Congo, atrocities in, 330, 335, 338\n\n Conscience, origin of, 78\n\n Copernicus, 141\n\n Creation, doctrine of, 139, 356\n\n Cromer, Lord, 331n\n\n Crucifixion, of man, 357f\n\n Cynics, 366\n\n\n Dante, 198n, 283\n\n Darwinism, 59, 78f, 120\n\n \u201cDeath in Life,\u201d 225\n\n Decalogue, 198\n\n Democracy, ethical aspect of, 125, 143;\n political, 319n;\n evils in, 321, 330n;\n new conception of, 340n\n\n Dependence, 226\n\n Dilke, Sir Charles, 335n\n\n Discipline, 244f\n\n Duality, of character traits, 208f\n\n Duty, in Kant, 75f;\n conflicts of, 317f\n\n\n Education, state, 252;\n as vocation, 291f;\n for adults, 301f;\n moral, 302n\n\n Edwards, Jonathan, 163\n\n Egoism, 220\n\n Elisha, the prophet, 61\n\n Emerson, estimate of, 27-29;\n _Essay on Love_, 164n\n\n Ends, proximate and ultimate, 50-51;\n in Kant, 74, 89;\n instrumental, 138, 166, 229f, 268;\n unattainable in finite world, 149f, 158;\n hierarchy of, 363\n\n Enemies, 205;\n intellectual, 207n\n\n Erastianism, 342\n\n Ethical Culture, Society for, 58, 346n;\n School, 58n, 276\n\n Ethics, as non-violation of personality, 7, 35, 54;\n individuality of, 24;\n as science of ends, 40, 50f;\n and social reform, 48;\n relation to other subjects, 66;\n Kantian, 73f;\n an independent discipline, 84f, 132f;\n energizing quality of, 93, 101, 135n, 221, 228, 274, 363;\n contrast with physical science, 93, 99;\n its peculiar manifold, 109f, 114f, 126, 132, 141;\n verification in, 112;\n and social structure, 191;\n and empirical traits, 212f, 223f, 242f;\n the law of levitation, 222;\n as science of relations, 233;\n and industry, 272f;\n and art, 277f;\n and nationality, 325f;\n historical systems of, 346;\n and worship, 349, 352\n\n Evil, problem of, 32-34;\n immediate reform, 49;\n contrasted with sin, 172f\n\n\n Family, as empirical group, 133, 249f;\n spiritual view of, 251f\n\n Festivals, religious, 353\n\n Feudalism, 142\n\n Force, as ethical discipline, 356f;\n and freedom, 366f\n\n Forgiveness, 202f\n\n Fouill\u00e9e, Alfred, 209, 324\n\n Freedom, 148f, 300, 306, 366f\n\n Freud, 79\n\n Friendship, 234f\n\n Froebel, 295\n\n Frustration, in marriage, 62f, 235;\n in bereavement, 64;\n in intellectual ambition, 65f, 227;\n cosmic, 67;\n in social betterment, 69;\n in achieving ethical uniqueness, 118;\n and ethical plan, 137, 140, 147, 150f;\n mission of, 152f, 165, 195, 365;\n in science, 265;\n in vocation, 269;\n final realization of, 356f\n\n \u201cFunctional Finalities,\u201d 106, 111f\n\n\n Galileo, 97n\n\n Gang Loyalty, 77\n\n George, Henry, 44\n\n Goethe, 67n, 176n, 198n, 220, 243, 285\n\n God, idea of, 136, 139, 362;\n submission to will of, 156;\n worship, 350\n\n Greek, art, 16n;\n philosophy, 105;\n treatment of suffering, 155, 166;\n idea of evil, 172;\n social system, 190f;\n epic, 283;\n education, 299\n\n Grotius, 332\n\n\n Hague Conference, 326\n\n Happiness, 227f\n\n Harnack, Adolf, 39\n\n Hebrews, sex purity, 7;\n religion, 14-26;\n as elect people, 19;\n their mission, 21f;\n and problem of evil, 33\n\n Hegel, 139, 343\n\n Helmholtz, 196, 267\n\n History, value of, 247n;\n ethical aim of, 275f\n\n Humboldt, William von, 126\n\n Hume, 111\n\n\n Ilion, 283\n\n Imagination, 267\n\n Immortality, 139, 166f, 359\n\n Individual, the, 246, 250, 295, 319f\n\n Industry, organization of, 271, 274;\n representation of, 312\n\n Insanity, 161n\n\n Intellect, 227\n\n Internationalism, 325f;\n obstacles to, 332f;\n organized, 338n\n\n Isaiah, 22\n\n\n Jerusalem, siege of, 33\n\n Jesus, as exemplar, 25;\n his teaching, 30-42;\n and the problem of evil, 33f;\n and socialism, 37;\n attitude toward sin, 204n, 205\n\n Jews, 347\n\n Justice, social, 194f;\n commercial, 215f;\n ethical, 217;\n legal, 289\n\n\n Kant, individualistic ethics, 9;\n and holiness idea, 59;\n Critique of Ethical Ideal, 73f, 137f;\n his pre-occupation with physical science, 84f, 88, 100, 133;\n doctrine of ends, 74, 80, 87, 100;\n _Critique of Pure Reason_, 84, 95, 102;\n not a pure rationalist, 95f;\n _a priori_ doctrine, 111;\n doctrine of worth, 119;\n and God idea, 126f;\n and ontological argument, 129;\n on marriage, 257\n\n Keats, 282\n\n\n Labor, remuneration of, 193\n\n Lange, Albert, _Die Arbeiterfrage_, 10;\n _History of Materialism_, 11\n\n Law, 290, 307;\n international, 332f;\n divine, 345;\n and freedom, 367\n\n Lawyer, vocation of, 289\n\n Lear, King, 282\n\n Leibnitz, 196, 247n, 332\n\n Lessing, 150\n\n Life, right to, 179f\n\n Louis XIV, 316\n\n \u201cLycidas,\u201d 282\n\n\n Manifold, of time and space, 96;\n in physical science, 107f;\n ethical, 109f, 132, 134, 141\n\n Marcus Aurelius, 120\n\n Marriage, and happiness, 61f;\n _tabu_ notion of, 77;\n spiritual relation in, 163, 258f;\n monogamic, 251, 254;\n infelicitous, 257;\n state control of, 307\n\n Marx, Karl, _Das Kapital_, 44;\n type of socialism, 45f\n\n Materialism, of middle class, 52\n\n Mayer, Robert, 196\n\n Mill, J.\u202fS., 368\n\n Mommsen, 276n\n\n Monasticism, 40\n\n Monotheism, 20f\n\n Moral Law, as worshipful, 10, 12;\n obligation to obey, 75;\n universality of, 177;\n and worship, 350\n\n More, Sir Thomas, 205n\n\n Moses, 26, 355\n\n\n National Character, 324;\n sins of, 330, 336f\n\n Nature, exploitation of, 186f\n\n Necessity, applied to ethics, 85f;\n Kantian, 88\n\n Newton, 84, 94, 196\n\n Nietzsche, 47, 152, 214\n\n Non-resistance, doctrine of, 182\n\n _Noumena_, Kantian, 127n\n\n _Numen_, spiritual, 220, 224, 228, 231\n\n\n _\u0152dipus Rex_, 173, 281n\n\n Ontological Argument, 129f\n\n Ostwald, 94\n\n\n Pantheism, 8n\n\n Paul, St., 38\n\n Peace, spiritual, 360\n\n Pekin, 330\n\n Personal Factor in Ethics, 3-6\n\n Personality, 197, 222, 247, 321\n\n Pestalozzi, 295\n\n Peters, Karl, 335\n\n Philistinism, 52\n\n Philosophy, monism and pluralism, 110\n\n Plagiarism, 197\n\n Plato, transcendent vision of, 16;\n his idea of justice, 31;\n ethics of, 74, 120, 132;\n influence of, 198n;\n and eugenics, 214;\n and art, 286;\n and the State, 305, 313, 319\n\n Poverty, evils of, 44f;\n relief of, 51\n\n Pragmatism, 106n, 136n\n\n Prayer, 351f\n\n Property, its rights, 185f;\n as a social concept, 189\n\n Ptolemy, 105n\n\n Public Good, 314\n\n Punishment, its object, 176, 203;\n capital, 204\n\n\n Race Prejudice, 236n\n\n Ranke, 247n\n\n \u201cReality-producing functions,\u201d 114f, 124n, 126, 130, 132, 265\n\n Religion, Types of, 363\n\n Religious Society, 341f;\n its teaching, 343f;\n organization, 347f;\n worship, 349f\n\n Repentance, 203f\n\n Representation, in State, 310n, 322;\n proportional, 322\n\n Reputation, right to, 196f\n\n Responsibility, definition, 173f;\n for others\u2019 life, 180;\n for poverty and suffering, 183f\n\n Reverence, three-fold, 241f, 250;\n in family, 253;\n in artist, 284f;\n in education, 292;\n among nations, 324\n\n Reymond, Dubois, 128\n\n Rousseau, _Confessions_, 6;\n idea of State, 305\n\n\n Schiller, 285n\n\n School, 292;\n and home, 294;\n objects of, 295f;\n prevocational, 298;\n moral education in, 303;\n self-government in, 304\n\n Schopenhauer, 120, 131n\n\n Science, as vocation, 263f;\n and internationalism, 334\n\n Self-discipline, 362f\n\n Self-sacrifice, 212f\n\n Sermon on the Mount, 4, 198, 366\n\n Service, 226f\n\n Shelley, 282\n\n Sin, 171f, 202f\n\n Social reform, 48f;\n fallacies of, 53f, 268;\n spiritual view of, 56;\n its object, 261;\n various schemes of, 273;\n ethical program of, 275n\n\n Socialism, 11, 37, 43f, 56n, 196, 271f, 274\n\n Socrates, 122\n\n Sophocles, 173\n\n Spencer, Herbert, 94\n\n Spinoza, 8\n\n Spiritual Nature, 148, 224, 231\n\n State, ethical conception of, 305f;\n sovereignty of, 308f;\n organization of, 310f;\n as lawmaker, 313;\n duty towards, 319;\n and individual, 319n;\n international relations, 326f;\n and religion, 342f\n\n Stephen, the Martyr, 38\n\n Stevenson, R.\u202fL., 208n, 211n\n\n Stoicism, 154, 159\n\n Suffering, various attitudes toward, 154f;\n ethical attitude, 159f\n\n Sympathy, as ethical motive, 49f, 99n, 156\n\n\n _Tabus_, 77, 179\n\n Tariff, 314, 315n\n\n Tasks of Life, 268\n\n Thomas \u00e0 Kempis, 258\n\n Tolstoy, 184\n\n Trade, international, 334f;\n slave, 335\n\n Tyndall, 268\n\n Tyrrel, Father, 39, 150n\n\n\n Universe, spiritual, 125f, 134;\n last blessing of, 360\n\n University, ideal of, 298f;\n American, 300f\n\n\n Value, _vs._ Worth, 117n\n\n Vattel, 332\n\n Verification in ethics, 112, 118, 135n\n\n Virtue, 211\n\n Vocation, influence on development, 58f;\n _vs._ occupation, 260f;\n an ethical classification, 262f;\n practical, 270f;\n educational, 289f;\n represented in State, 310f, 322\n\n\n Wages and wage-earners, 194, 215n, 216\n\n Waitz, _Anthropologie_, 209\n\n War, when justified, 182f\n\n Wealth, 51;\n stewardship of, 192\n\n Whole, ideal of, in ethics, 100f, 114f, 121\n\n Women, in State, 311;\n in religious societies, 348\n\n Wordsworth, 282\n\n Worship, religious, 349\n\n Worth, in human personality, 57, 68, 70, 224n, 247;\n Kant\u2019s doctrine of, 82f, 89f, 101;\n ethical justification of, 91f, 98n;\n attributed to man, 101n, 102f;\n as member of ethical manifold, 117, 119, 121;\n _vs._ value, 117n;\n homage to, 349, 360\n\n\n Zeno, 108\n\n Zionism, 24\n\n Zoroaster, 15","title":"An ethical philosophy of life presented in its main outlines","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":101299}