{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_61651/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_61651","id":"gutenberg_61651","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/61651","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Ancient","Category: History - Medieval/Middle Ages","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Teaching & Education","Philosophy -- History"],"text":"A BEGINNER\u2019S HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY\n\n\n Illustration: SOCRATES\n\n\n \u250c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2510\n \u2502 \u2502\n \u2502 Transcriber\u2019s Notes \u2502\n \u2502 \u2502\n \u2502 \u2502\n \u2502 Punctuation has been standardized. \u2502\n \u2502 \u2502\n \u2502 Characters in small caps have been replaced by all caps. \u2502\n \u2502 \u2502\n \u2502 Non-printable characteristics have been given the following \u2502\n \u2502 Italic text: --> _text_ \u2502\n \u2502 bold text: --> =text=. \u2502\n \u2502 \u2502\n \u2502 This book was written in a period when many words had \u2502\n \u2502 not become standardized in their spelling. Words may have \u2502\n \u2502 multiple spelling variations or inconsistent hyphenation in \u2502\n \u2502 the text. These have been left unchanged unless indicated \u2502\n \u2502 with a Transcriber\u2019s Note. \u2502\n \u2502 \u2502\n \u2502 The symbol \u2018\u2021\u2019 indicates the description in parenthesis has \u2502\n \u2502 been added to an illustration. This may be needed if there \u2502\n \u2502 is no caption or if the caption does not describe the image \u2502\n \u2502 adequately. \u2502\n \u2502 \u2502\n \u2502 Index references have not been checked for accuracy. \u2502\n \u2502 \u2502\n \u2502 Footnotes are identified in the text with a number in \u2502\n \u2502 brackets [2] and have been accumulated in a single section \u2502\n \u2502 at the end of the text. \u2502\n \u2502 \u2502\n \u2502 Transcriber\u2019s Notes are used when making corrections to the \u2502\n \u2502 text or to provide additional information for the modern \u2502\n \u2502 reader. These notes are identified in the text by a \u2666 symbol, \u2502\n \u2502 and are accumulated in a single section at the end of the \u2502\n \u2502 book. \u2502\n \u2514\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2518\n\n\n\n\n A BEGINNER\u2019S HISTORY\n OF PHILOSOPHY\n\n\n BY\n\n HERBERT ERNEST CUSHMAN, LL.D., PH.D.\n\n _Sometime Professor of Philosophy in Tufts College_\n _Lecturer of Philosophy in Harvard College_\n _Lecturer of Philosophy in Dartmouth College_\n\n\n VOL. I\n\n\n ANCIENT AND MEDI\u00c6VAL PHILOSOPHY\n\n\n _Revised Edition_\n\n\n Illustration: (\u2021 Colophon)\n\n\n HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY\n BOSTON \u00b7 NEW YORK \u00b7 CHICAGO\n DALLAS \u00b7 SAN FRANCISCO\n\n The Riverside Press Cambridge\n\n\n COPYRIGHT, 1910 AND 1918, BY HERBERT ERNEST CUSHMAN\n\n ALL RIGHTS RESERVED, INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO REPRODUCE\n THIS BOOK OR PARTS THEREOF IN ANY FORM\n\n\n The Riverside Press\n CAMBRIDGE \u00b7 MASSACHUSETTS\n PRINTED IN THE U.S.A.\n\n\n TO\n\n GEORGE HERBERT PALMER, LITT.D., LL.D.\n ALFORD PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY\n IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY\n WHO HAS INTERPRETED LIFE TO\n MANY YOUNG MEN BY MAKING\n PHILOSOPHY A LIVING\n SUBJECT TO THEM\n\n\n\n\n PREFACE\n\n\nThis book is intended as a text-book for sketch-courses in the history\nof philosophy. It is written for the student rather than for the\nteacher. It is a history of philosophy upon the background of geography\nand of literary and political history.\n\nAs a text-book for sketch-courses it employs summaries, tables,\nand other generalizations as helps to the memory. The philosophical\nteaching is presented as simply as possible, so as to bring into\nprominence only the leading doctrines. My own personal criticism and\ninterpretation on the one hand, and explanations in technical language\non the other, have been avoided as far as possible. Sometimes I have\nhad to choose between interpretation and technicality, in which case\nthe limitations of space have determined my choice. Since the book\nis intended for the student rather than for the teacher, it makes\nthe teacher all the more necessary; for it puts into the hands of the\nstudent an outline and into the hands of the teacher the class-room\ntime for inspiring the student with his own interpretations. In making\nuse of geographical maps, contemporary literature, and political\nhistory, this book is merely utilizing for pedagogical reasons the\nstock of information with which the college student is furnished when\nhe begins the history of philosophy.\n\nA good many years of experience in teaching the history of philosophy\nto beginners have convinced me that students come to the subject\nwith four classes of ideas, with which they can correlate philosophic\ndoctrines: good geographical knowledge, some historical and some\nliterary knowledge, and many undefined personal philosophical\nopinions. Of course, their personal philosophical opinions form the\nmost important group, but more as something to be clarified by the\ncivilizing influence of the subject than as an approach to the subject\nitself. The only \u201cmemory-hooks\u201d upon which the teacher may expect\nto hang philosophic doctrines are the student\u2019s ideas of history,\nliterature, and geography. If the history of philosophy is treated\nonly as a series of doctrines, the student beginning the subject feels\nnot only that the land is strange, but that he is a stranger in it.\nBesides, to isolate the historical philosophical doctrines is to give\nthe student a wrong historical perspective, since philosophic thought\nand contemporary events are two inseparable aspects of history. Each\ninterprets the other, and neither can be correctly understood without\nthe other. If the history of philosophy is to have any significance for\nthe beginner, it must be shown to give a meaning to history.\n\nSo far as the materials that form any history of philosophy are\nconcerned, I have merely tried to arrange and organize them with\nreference to the student and with reference to the history of which\nthey form an integral part. I am therefore overwhelmingly indebted to\nevery good authority to whom I have had access, but in the main I have\nfollowed the inspiring direction of the great Windelband. Many willing\nfriends have read parts of the manuscript and offered suggestions and\ncriticisms. I am particularly indebted to Professors C. P. Parker,\nEphraim Emerton, A. O. Norton, and J. H. Ropes, and Dr. B. A. G.\nFuller of Harvard University; to Professor Mary W. Calkins of Wellesley\nCollege; to Professors C. S. Wade and D. L. Maulsby of Tufts College;\nand to my wife, Abby B. Cushman. However, for all the faults of the\nbook, which has been many years in preparation, I am alone responsible.\n\nInstead of lists of books for collateral reading, placed at the end\nof chapters or of the book, the student will find references in the\nfootnotes to the exact pages of many helpful books. I should like to\ncall the student\u2019s attention to an appendix to the discussion of Plato.\nThis is a complete selection of passages from Plato made by the late\nProfessor Jowett for English readers. This selection Professor Jowett\nwas accustomed to distribute to his Oxford class, of which I was once\nfortunate to be a member.\n\nPhilosophical terms have been defined either in the text or in the\nfootnotes. Such definitions must necessarily have as their aim their\nusefulness to the student, rather than their completeness.\n\nTUFTS COLLEGE, June, 1910.\n\n\n\n\n PREFACE TO THE REVISED EDITION\n\n\nThe only change which the reader will find in the revision of this\nvolume is in the form of presentation of the philosophies of the\nearlier cosmologists (Chapter II).\n\n HERBERT E. CUSHMAN.\n\n WEST NEWTON, February, 1918.\n\n\n\n\n CONTENTS\n\n\n INTRODUCTION\u2015\u2015THE THREE GENERAL PERIODS OF THE HISTORY OF\n PHILOSOPHY, 1\n THE COMPARATIVE LENGTHS OF THE THREE GENERAL PERIODS, 1\n THE REAL DIFFERENCES OF THE THREE GENERAL PERIODS, 1\n TABLE OF THE SUBDIVISIONS OF THE THREE GENERAL PERIODS, 4\n\n\n BOOK I. ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY\n (625 B. C.\u2013476 A. D.)\n\n CHAPTER I. THE EARLY GREEK IN ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY, 5\n THE DIVISIONS OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY, 5\n THE LITERARY SOURCES OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY, 6\n THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE EARLY GREEK, 7\n 1. His Geographical Environment 7\n 2. His Political Environment 7\n THE NATIVE TENDENCIES OF THE EARLY GREEK, AS SEEN\n (1) In the Development of his Religion, (2) in his\n Reflections upon Physical Events, and (3) in his\n Interest in Human Conduct, 9\u201311\n THE THREE PERIODS OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY, 12\n\n CHAPTER II. THE COSMOLOGICAL PERIOD: THE PHILOSOPHY OF\n NATURE, 15\n THE PERIL IN THE GREEK POLITICAL SITUATION: PERSIA AND\n CARTHAGE, 15\n THE PERIL IN THE NEW RELIGION: THE MYSTERIES AND PYTHAGORAS, 16\n CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COSMOLOGISTS, 18\n TABLE OF COSMOLOGISTS, 20\n HOW THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTION AROSE, 20\n MAP SHOWING THE CITIES WHERE THE COSMOLOGISTS LIVED, 21\n SUMMARY COMPARISON OF THE MONISTIC PHILOSOPHIES, 22\n 1. THE MILESIAN SCHOOL, 24\n THE MILESIAN PHILOSOPHY, 25\n 2. XENOPHANES, THE RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHER, 26\n THE PHILOSOPHY OF XENOPHANES, 27\n 3.\u2002HERACLEITUS, \u201cTHE MISANTHROPIST\u201d AND \u201cTHE OBSCURE,\u201d 28\n a. Heracleitus\u2019 Doctrine of Absolute and Universal\n Change, 28\n b. Fire is the Cosmic Substance, 29\n c. The Definite Changes of Fire, 30\n d. The Practical Philosophy of Heracleitus, 31\n 4. THE ELEATIC SCHOOL, 32\n a. PARMENIDES, 32\n (1) The Cosmic Substance is Being, 33\n (2) Other Things than the Cosmic Substance (Being)\n have no Real Existence, 34\n b. ZENO, 35\n THE PHILOSOPHY OF ZENO, 36\n THE RESULTS OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN HERACLEITUS AND\n PARMENIDES, 37\n\n CHAPTER III. PLURALISM, 39\n EFFORTS TOWARD RECONCILIATION, 39\n THE NEW CONCEPTION OF CHANGE OF THE PLURALISTS, 40\n THE NEW CONCEPTION OF THE UNCHANGING OF THE PLURALISTS\u2015\u2015THE\n ELEMENT, 40\n THE INTRODUCTION OF THE CONCEPTION OF THE EFFICIENT CAUSE, 41\n SUMMARY OF SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES IN THE THEORIES OF\n THE RECONCILERS, 41\n THE PLURALISTIC PHILOSOPHERS: EMPEDOCLES, ANAXAGORAS,\n LEUCIPPUS, AND THE LATER PYTHAGOREANS, 42\n THE PHILOSOPHY OF EMPEDOCLES, 44\n THE PHILOSOPHY OF ANAXAGORAS, 45\n THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ATOMISTS\u2015\u2015LEUCIPPUS AND THE SCHOOL\n AT ABDERA, 47\n THE LATER PYTHAGOREANS, 48\n 1. The Pythagorean Conception of Being, 49\n 2. The Pythagorean Dualistic World, 51\n 3. Pythagorean Astronomy, 52\n HISTORICAL RETROSPECT, 53\n\n CHAPTER IV. THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERIOD: THE PHILOSOPHY OF\n MAN, 55\n AN HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERIOD, 55\n THE PERSIAN WARS AND THE RISE OF ATHENS, 56\n THE GREEK ENLIGHTENMENT, 58\n 1. The Impulse for Learning, 58\n 2. The Practical Need of Knowledge, 59\n 3. The Critical Attitude of Mind, 61\n THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SOPHISTS, 64\n THE PROMINENT SOPHISTS, 67\n THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOPHISTS, 68\n 1. The Relativism of Protagoras, 69\n 2. The Nihilism of Gorgias, 70\n THE ETHICS OF THE SOPHISTS.\u2015\u2015THE APPLICATION OF THEIR\n CRITICAL THEORY TO POLITICAL LIFE, 71\n SUMMARY, 73\n\n CHAPTER V. SOCRATES, 74\n SOCRATES AND ARISTOPHANES, 74\n THE PERSONALITY AND LIFE OF SOCRATES, 75\n SOCRATES AND THE SOPHISTS, 80\n THE UNSYSTEMATIC CHARACTER OF THE SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY, 82\n THE IDEAL OF SOCRATES, 83\n WHAT THE SOCRATIC IDEAL INVOLVES, 85\n THE TWO STEPS OF THE METHOD OF SOCRATES, 88\n SOCRATES AND ATHENS, 91\n THE LOGICAL EXPEDIENTS OF SOCRATES, 92\n SOCRATES AND THE LESSER SOCRATICS, 93\n THE CYNIC SCHOOL, 95\n THE CYRENAIC SCHOOL, 96\n\n CHAPTER VI. THE SYSTEMATIC PERIOD, 98\n THE WANING OF THE GREEK NATIONAL SPIRIT, 98\n THE PLACE OF THE THREE SYSTEMATIC PHILOSOPHERS IN GREEK\n HISTORY, 98\n THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF THE SYSTEMATIC PERIOD, 100\n A SUMMARY OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY, 102\n GREEK PHILOSOPHY (OBJECTIVE), 103\n DEMOCRITUS AND PLATO\u2015\u2015THEIR SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES, 104\n THE LIFE OF DEMOCRITUS, 106\n THE COMPREHENSIVENESS OF THE AIM OF DEMOCRITUS, 108\n THE ENRICHED PHYSICS OF DEMOCRITUS\u2015\u2015HYLOZOISM BECOMES\n MATERIALISM, 109\n THE MATERIALISTIC PSYCHOLOGY OF DEMOCRITUS, 111\n DEMOCRITUS\u2019 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE\u2015\u2015THE WORLD OF TWOFOLD\n REALITY, 114\n THE ETHICAL THEORY OF DEMOCRITUS, 116\n\n CHAPTER VII. PLATO, 119\n ABDERA AND ATHENS, 119\n THE DIFFICULTIES IN UNDERSTANDING THE TEACHING OF PLATO, 120\n THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF PLATO, 121\n 1. Plato\u2019s Student Life, 121\n 2. Plato as Traveler, 122\n 3. Plato as Teacher of the Academy, 124\n CONCERNING THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO, 126\n THE FACTORS IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF PLATO\u2019S DOCTRINE, 128\n 1. His Inherited Tendencies, 128\n 2. His Philosophical Sources, 130\n THE DIVISIONS OF PLATO\u2019S PHILOSOPHY, 131\n SUMMARY OF PLATO\u2019S DOCTRINE, 132\n THE FORMATION OF PLATO\u2019S METAPHYSICS, 132\n THE DEVELOPMENT OF PLATO\u2019S METAPHYSICS\u2015\u2015THE DEVELOPMENT\n OF PLATO\u2019S IDEAS IN THE TWO DRAFTS, 136\n BRIEF COMPARISON OF THE TWO DRAFTS OF THE IDEAS, 137\n COMPARISON OF THE TWO DRAFTS OF IDEAS IN MORE DETAIL, 137\n 1. The Number of Ideas in the Earlier and Later Drafts\n compared, 137\n 2. The Relation of the Ideas and the World of Nature in\n the Two Drafts compared, 138\n 3. The Relation among the Ideas in the Two Drafts\n compared, 140\n PLATO\u2019S CONCEPTION OF GOD, 141\n PLATO\u2019S CONCEPTION OF PHYSICAL NATURE, 142\n PLATO\u2019S CONCEPTION OF MAN, 144\n PLATO\u2019S DOCTRINE OF IMMORTALITY, 146\n 1. The Immortality of Pre-Existence, 146\n 2. The Immortality of Post-Existence, 149\n THE TWO TENDENCIES IN PLATO, 150\n PLATONIC LOVE, 151\n PLATO\u2019S THEORY OF ETHICS, 153\n 1. Development of Plato\u2019s Theory of the Good, 153\n 2. The Four Cardinal Virtues, 154\n 3. Plato\u2019s Theory of Political Society, 155\n APPENDIX\u2015\u2015JOWETT\u2019S SELECTION OF PASSAGES FROM PLATO FOR\n ENGLISH READERS, 158\n\n CHAPTER VIII. ARISTOTLE, 166\n ARISTOTLE IN THE ACADEMY AND LYCEUM, 166\n BIOGRAPHY OF ARISTOTLE, 168\n BRIEF CHRONOLOGICAL SKETCH OF ARISTOTLE\u2019S LIFE, 168\n ARISTOTLE\u2019S BIOGRAPHY IN DETAIL, 169\n 1. First Period\u2015\u2015Early Influences, 169\n 2. Second Period\u2015\u2015Traveler and Collector, 171\n 3. Third Period\u2015\u2015Administrator of the Lyceum, 172\n THE WRITINGS OF ARISTOTLE, 173\n 1. The Popular Writings, published by Aristotle himself, 174\n 2. The Compilations, 175\n 3. The Didactic Writings, 175\n ARISTOTLE\u2019S STARTING-POINT, 176\n THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE IN ARISTOTLE\u2019S PHILOSOPHY, 177\n ARISTOTLE\u2019S LOGIC, 180\n ARISTOTLE\u2019S METAPHYSICS, 185\n 1. Development is Purposeful, 185\n 2. Aristotle\u2019s Two Different Conceptions of Purpose, 187\n 3. Aristotle\u2019s Conception of God, 190\n 4. Aristotle\u2019s Conception of Matter, 191\n 5. Aristotle\u2019s Conception of Nature, 192\n THE MECHANICAL SERIES,\u2015\u2015ARISTOTLE\u2019S THEORY OF PHYSICS, 194\n THE TELEOLOGICAL SERIES: THE QUALITATIVE CHANGES OF\n PHENOMENA, 196\n 1. The Psychology of Aristotle, 196\n 2. The Ethics of Aristotle, 199\n (a) The Practical Virtues, 200\n (b) The Dianoetic Virtues, 201\n THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE, 202\n\n CHAPTER IX. THE HELLENIC-ROMAN PERIOD, 204\n ITS TIME LENGTH, 204\n THE FALL OF THE GREEK NATION AND THE PERSISTENCE OF ITS\n CIVILIZATION, 204\n MAP OF THE EMPIRE OF ALEXANDER, SHOWING THE EXTENSION OF\n HELLENISM, 205\n THE TWO PARTS OF THE HELLENIC-ROMAN PERIOD, 208\n 1. The Ethical Period, 208\n 2. The Religious Period, 208\n THE UNDERCURRENT OF SKEPTICISM IN THE HELLENIC-ROMAN\n PERIOD, 209\n THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM OF THE HELLENIC-ROMAN PERIOD, 211\n THE CENTRES OF HELLENISM, 213\n 1. Athens, 213\n 2. Alexandria, 215\n GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ETHICAL PERIOD, 215\n 1. The Abandonment of Metaphysical Speculation, 216\n 2. The Growth of Science, 216\n 3. Ethics became the Central Interest, 217\n THE SCHOOLS, 218\n MAP OF ATHENS, SHOWING THE LOCATION OF THE FOUR SCHOOLS, 219\n THE OLD SCHOOLS\u2015\u2015THE ACADEMY AND THE LYCEUM, 220\n 1. The Academy, 220\n 2. The Lyceum, 221\n THE NEW SCHOOLS\u2015\u2015THE EPICUREANS AND THE STOICS, 222\n A SUMMARY OF THE AGREEMENTS AND DIFFERENCES OF THE STOICS\n AND EPICUREANS, 225\n\n CHAPTER X. EPICUREANISM, 227\n THE LIFE OF EPICURUS, 227\n THE EPICUREANS, 228\n SOME TYPES OF HEDONISM,\u2015\u2015ARISTIPPUS, EPICURUS, AND\n ROUSSEAU, 228\n THE EPICUREAN IDEAL, 230\n THE PLACE OF VIRTUE IN EPICUREANISM, 233\n THE EPICUREAN WISE MAN, 234\n THE EPICUREAN WISE MAN IN SOCIETY, 235\n THE GREAT OBSTACLES TO HAPPINESS, 236\n EPICURUS\u2019 CONCEPTION OF THE PHYSICAL WORLD.\u2015\u2015QUALIFIED\n ATOMISM, 238\n\n CHAPTER XI. STOICISM, 241\n THE POSITION OF STOICISM IN ANTIQUITY, 241\n THE THREE PERIODS OF STOICISM, 242\n 1. Period of Formulation of the Doctrine, 242\n 2. Period of Modified Stoicism, 242\n 3. Period of Roman Stoicism, 243\n THE STOIC LEADERS, 243\n THE STOIC WRITINGS, 246\n THE STOICS AND CYNICS, 246\n THE TWO PROMINENT STOIC CONCEPTIONS, 247\n THE CONCEPTION OF PERSONALITY, 248\n 1. The Stoic Psychology, 248\n 2. The Highest Good, 250\n THE CONCEPTION OF NATURE, 251\n 1. Nature is an All-pervading World-Being, 253\n 2. Nature is an All-compelling Law, 253\n 3. Nature is Matter, 254\n THE CONCEPTIONS OF NATURE AND PERSONALITY SUPPLEMENT EACH\n OTHER, 256\n THE STOIC AND SOCIETY, 257\n DUTY AND RESPONSIBILITY, 259\n THE PROBLEM OF EVIL AND THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM, 260\n THE MODIFICATIONS OF THE STOIC DOCTRINE AFTER THE FIRST\n PERIOD, 261\n\n CHAPTER XII. SKEPTICISM AND ECLECTICISM, 264\n THE APPEARANCES OF PHILOSOPHIC SKEPTICISM, 264\n THE THREE PHASES OF PHILOSOPHIC SKEPTICISM, 265\n 1. The First Phase of Philosophic Skepticism is called\n Pyrrhonism, 265\n 2. The Second Period of Philosophic Skepticism\u2015\u2015The\n Skepticism of the Academy, 266\n 3. The Third Period of Philosophic\n Skepticism\u2015\u2015Sensationalistic Skepticism, 268\n THE LAST CENTURY AND A HALF OF THE ETHICAL PERIOD,\n ECLECTICISM, 269\n\n CHAPTER XIII. THE RELIGIOUS PERIOD, 273\n THE TWO CAUSES OF THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS FEELING, 273\n THE NEED OF SPIRITUAL AUTHORITY, 275\n THE RISE OF THE CONCEPTION OF SPIRITUALITY, 277\n THE REVIVAL OF PLATONISM, 279\n THE DIVISIONS OF THE RELIGIOUS PERIOD, 280\n THE HELLENIC RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHIES, 282\n THE INTRODUCTORY PERIOD OF HELLENIC RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY.\n THE TURNING TO THE PAST FOR SPIRITUAL AUTHORITY, 282\n 1. The Greek-Jewish Philosophy of Philo, 282\n 2. Neo-Pythagoreanism, 285\n THE DEVELOPMENT PERIOD OF HELLENIC RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY.\n THE TURNING TO THE PRESENT FOR SPIRITUAL AUTHORITY.\n PLATONISM AND NEO-PLATONISM, 287\n NEO-PLATONISM AND THE TWO INTRODUCTORY PHILOSOPHIES, 288\n NEO-PLATONISM AND CHRISTIANITY, 288\n THE PERIODS OF NEO-PLATONISM, 290\n THE ALEXANDRIAN SCHOOL. THE SCIENTIFIC THEORY OF\n NEO-PLATONISM. THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF PLOTINUS, 290\n THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE TEACHING OF PLOTINUS, 291\n THE MYSTIC GOD, 292\n 1. The Supra-Consciousness of God, 292\n 2. The Conception of Dynamic Pantheism, 293\n THE TWO PROBLEMS OF PLOTINUS, 293\n THE WORLD OF EMANATIONS.\u2015\u2015THE METAPHYSICAL PROBLEM OF\n PLOTINUS, 294\n THE SPIRIT, 294\n THE SOUL, 295\n MATTER, 295\n THE RETURN OF THE SOUL TO GOD.\u2015\u2015THE ETHICAL PROBLEM OF\n PLOTINUS, 297\n THE SYRIAN SCHOOL.\u2015\u2015THE SYSTEMATIZING OF\n POLYTHEISMS.\u2015\u2015JAMBLICHUS, 298\n THE ATHENIAN SCHOOL.\u2015\u2015RECAPITULATION.\u2015\u2015PROCLUS, 299\n\n CHAPTER XIV. PATRISTICS.\u2015\u2015THE HELLENIZING OF THE GOSPEL, 302\n THE EARLY SITUATION OF CHRISTIANITY, 302\n THE PHILOSOPHIES INFLUENCING CHRISTIAN THOUGHT, 305\n THE PERIODS OF EARLY CHRISTIANITY, 306\n THE APOLOGISTS, 307\n THE GNOSTICS, 310\n THE REACTION AGAINST GNOSTICISM.\u2015\u2015THE OLD CATHOLIC\n THEOLOGIANS, 312\n ORIGEN AND THE SCHOOL OF CATECHISTS, 314\n\n\n BOOK II. THE MIDDLE AGES\n (476\u20131453)\n\n CHAPTER XV. CHARACTERISTICS AND CONDITIONS OF THE MIDDLE\n AGES, 319\n COMPARISON OF THE HELLENIC-ROMAN PERIOD AND THE MIDDLE\n AGES, 319\n THE MEDI\u00c6VAL MAN, 320\n HOW THE UNIVERSE APPEARED TO THE MEDI\u00c6VAL MAN, 322\n MAPS OF THE PTOLEMAIC COSMOGRAPHY, 323, 325\n THE MEDI\u00c6VAL MAN AT SCHOOL, 325\n A MEDI\u00c6VAL LIBRARY, 326\n 1. Books most commonly read, 327\n 2. Books that the scholars might use, 327\n 3. The Books most influential philosophically upon the\n time, 328\n THE THREE PERIODS OF THE MIDDLE AGES, 328\n SUMMARY OF THE POLITICAL AND EDUCATIONAL WORLDS OF THE\n MEDI\u00c6VAL MAN, 330\n\n CHAPTER XVI. THE EARLY PERIOD OF THE MIDDLE AGES, 334\n THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE EARLY PERIOD, 334\n AN EARLY MEDI\u00c6VAL GEOGRAPHICAL MAP, 335\n THE HISTORICAL POSITION OF AUGUSTINE, 335\n THE SECULAR SCIENCE, 339\n THE LIFE OF AUGUSTINE, 339\n THE TWO ELEMENTS IN AUGUSTINE\u2019S TEACHING, 340\n THE NEO-PLATONIC ELEMENT: THE INNER CERTAINTIES OF\n CONSCIOUSNESS, 341\n THE AUTHORITY OF THE CHURCH ACCORDING TO AUGUSTINE, 345\n THE DARK AGES, 347\n THE REVIVAL OF CHARLEMAGNE, 349\n JOHN SCOTUS ERIGENA: LIFE AND TEACHING, 350\n THE GREEK PRINCIPLE WHICH ERIGENA FORMULATED FOR THE\n MIDDLE AGES, 352\n THE LAST CENTURY OF THE EARLY PERIOD, 353\n\n CHAPTER XVII. THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, 354\n THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, 354\n WHAT IS SCHOLASTICISM? 355\n ANSELM: LIFE AND POSITION IN MEDI\u00c6VAL PHILOSOPHY, 359\n ANSELM\u2019S ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD, 361\n ROSCELLINUS: LIFE AND TEACHING, 361\n STORM AND STRESS, 362\n THE LIFE OF ABELARD, 363\n ABELARD\u2019S CONCEPTUALISM. UNIVERSALS EXIST IN THE\n PARTICULARS, 364\n ABELARD\u2019S RATIONALISM.\u2015\u2015THE RELATION BETWEEN REASON AND\n DOGMA, 365\n\n CHAPTER XVIII. THE PERIOD OF CLASSIC SCHOLASTICISM, 368\n THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF THIS LAST PERIOD, 368\n THE TWO CIVILIZATIONS, 369\n MAP SHOWING THE GROWTH OF MOHAMMEDAN CIVILIZATION IN THE\n MIDDLE AGES, 370\n THE FIRST CONTACT OF THE TWO CIVILIZATIONS, 372\n THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TWO CIVILIZATIONS.\u2015\u2015THE CRUSADES, 374\n THE REVIVAL OF LEARNING, 375\n DIAGRAM OF DANTE\u2019S POETIC CONCEPTION OF THE UNIVERSE, 376\n THE STRENGTH AND BURDEN OF ARISTOTLE TO THE CHURCH, 378\n 1. The Strength of Aristotle to the Church, 378\n 2. The Burden of Aristotle to the Church, 379\n THE PREDECESSORS OF AQUINAS, 379\n THE LIFE OF THOMAS AQUINAS.\u2015\u2015THE FOUNDER OF THE DOMINICAN\n TRADITION, 380\n THE CENTRAL PRINCIPLE OF THOMAS\u2019S DOCTRINE\u2015\u2015THE TWOFOLD\n TRUTH, 381\n THE PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUALITY\u2015\u2015THE RELATION OF PARTICULARS\n AND UNIVERSALS, 383\n THE PRIMACY OF THE WILL OR THE INTELLECT, 385\n DUNS SCOTUS, THE FOUNDER OF THE FRANCISCAN TRADITION\u2015\u2015LIFE\n AND PHILOSOPHICAL POSITION, 386\n DUNS SCOTUS\u2019S CONCEPTION OF THE TWOFOLD TRUTH.\u2015\u2015THE\n SEPARATION OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION, 387\n THE INSCRUTABLE WILL OF GOD, 388\n THE PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUALITY, 389\n AFTER DUNS SCOTUS, 390\n WILLIAM OF OCKAM: LIFE AND TEACHING, 391\n AFTER OCKAM, 393\n\n INDEX, 395\n\n\n\n\n ILLUSTRATIONS\n\n\n SOCRATES, _Frontispiece_\n\n MAP SHOWING WHERE THE COSMOLOGISTS LIVED, 21\n\n THE EMPIRE OF ALEXANDER, 205\n\n MAP OF ATHENS SHOWING THE LOCATION OF THE FOUR SCHOOLS, 219\n\n PTOLEMAIC COSMOGRAPHY SHOWING THE DIVISION OF THE UNIVERSE\n INTO SPHERES, 323\n\n PTOLEMAIC COSMOGRAPHY SHOWING THE EPICYCLIC MOVEMENTS OF\n THE PLANETS, 325\n\n MEDI\u00c6VAL GEOGRAPHY. THE COSMAS MAP, A. D. 547, 335\n\n GROWTH OF MOHAMMEDANISM DURING THE MIDDLE AGES, SHOWING\n ITS CONTACT WITH CHRISTIAN CIVILIZATION, 370\n\n DIAGRAM OF DANTE\u2019S POETIC CONCEPTION OF THE UNIVERSE, 376\n\n\n\n\n A BEGINNER\u2019S HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY\n\n\n\n\n INTRODUCTION\n\n THE THREE GENERAL PERIODS OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY\n\n\n=The Comparative Lengths of the Three General Periods:=\n\nAncient Philosophy, 625 B. C.\u2013476 A. D.\n\nMedi\u00e6val Philosophy, 476 A. D.\u20131453 A. D.\n\nModern Philosophy, 1453 A. D.\u2013the present time.\n\nThese are the three general periods into which the history of\nphilosophy naturally falls. The two dates that form the dividing lines\nbetween these three periods are 476, the fall of old Rome, and 1453,\nthe fall of new Rome (Constantinople). From this it will be seen that\n1000 years of medi\u00e6val life lie between antiquity on the one side and\n450 years of modern times on the other. Whatever value may be put upon\nthe respective intellectual products of these three periods, it is\nimportant to note the great difference in their time-lengths. It is\n2500 years since philosophical reflection began in Europe. Only 450 of\nthese years belong to modern times. In other words, after the European\nman grew to reflective manhood, two fifths of his life belong to what\nis known as ancient civilization, two fifths to medi\u00e6val, and only one\nfifth to modern civilization.\n\n=The Real Differences of the Three General Periods.= The differences\nbetween these three periods of the reflective life of the European\nhave been very real. They are not to be explained by merely political\nshiftings or economic changes; nor are they fully expressed as\ndifferences in literary or artistic productions. Their differences\nlie deeper, for they are _differences of mental attitude_. The history\nof philosophy is more profound, more difficult, and more human than\nany other history, because it is the record of human points of view.\nA good deal of sympathetic appreciation is demanded if the student\ntakes on the attitude of mind of ancient and medi\u00e6val times. One cannot\nexpect to be possessed of such appreciation until one has traversed\nthe history of thought through its entire length.\n\nThe history of philosophy is an organic development from an objective\nto a subjective view of life, with a traditional middle period in which\nsubjective and objective mingle. Ancient thought is properly called\n_objective_, the medi\u00e6val _traditional_, the modern _subjective_.\nCan we briefly suggest what these abstract terms mean? By the\n_objectivity of ancient thought_ is meant that the ancient, in making\nhis reflections upon life, starts from the universe as a whole. From\nthis outer point of view he tries to see the interconnections between\nthings. Nature is reality; men and gods are a part of nature. Man\u2019s\nmental processes even are a part of the totality of things. Even\nethically man is not an independent individual, but the member of a\nstate. When the ancient came to make distinctions between mind and\nmatter, he did not think of man as the knower in antithesis to matter\nas the object known, but he thought of mind and matter as parts of one\ncosmos. The antithesis in ancient thought is rather between appearances\nand essence, between non-realities and realities with differing\nemphasis. The ancient attempts speculatively to reconstruct his world,\nbut it is always from the point of view of the world.\n\nBy the _traditionalism of medi\u00e6val thought_ is meant that men are\ncontrolled in their thinking by a set of authoritative doctrines\nfrom the past. In the Middle Ages, as the medi\u00e6val period is called,\nthe independent thinking of antiquity had ceased. Men reflected and\nreflected deeply, but they were constrained by a set of religious\ntraditions. Authority was placed above them and censored their thinking.\nThe objective Christian church and its authority took the place of the\nobjective Greek cosmos. That church had certain infallible dogma, and\nthinking was allowed only in so far as it clarified dogma.\n\nOn the other hand, when we say that _modern thought is subjective_, we\nrefer to an entire change in the centre of intellectual gravity. The\nstarting-point is not the world, but the individual. The universe is\nset over against mind (dualism), or is the creation of mind (idealism).\nIn any case the modern man looks upon the universe as his servant, the\nstandard of truth to be found in himself and not in something external.\nThe subject as knower is now placed in antithesis to the object\nas known, and the object is not independent of the human thinking\nprocess. Reality is man rather than the cosmos. The political state\nis justifiable so long as it enforces the rights of the individual;\nreligious authority is the expression of the individual conscience;\nphysical nature is a human interpretation.[1]\n\nPlato, Dante, and Goethe are good representatives of these three\ndifferent historical periods of the human mind. How can they be\nunderstood without a philosophical appreciation of the periods in\nwhich they lived?\n\n =Table of the Subdivisions of the Three General Periods\n of Philosophy=\n\n \u250c \u250c\n \u2502 \u2502 Cosmological, 625\u2013480 (to\n \u2502 Greek, 625\u2013322 \u2502 Persian Wars).\n \u2502 B. C. (to \u2502\n \u2502 death of \u2524 Anthropological, 480\u2013399 (to\n \u2502 Aristotle). \u2502 death of Socrates).\n \u2502 \u2502 Systematic, 399\u2013322 (to death\n \u2502 \u2502 of Aristotle).\n \u2502 \u2514\n 1. Ancient 625 \u2524 \u250c\n B. C.\u2013476 A. D. \u2502 Hellenic-Roman \u2502\n \u2502 322 B. C.\u2013476 \u2502 Ethical, 322 B. C.\u20131 A. D.\n \u2502 A. D. (from \u2502 (to beginning of Christian\n \u2502 death of \u2524 era).\n \u2502 Aristotle to \u2502\n \u2502 fall of old \u2502 Religious, 100 B. C.\u2013476 A. D.\n \u2502 Rome). \u2502\n \u2514 \u2514\n \u250c\n \u2502 Early Medi\u00e6val, 476\u20131000 (from the fall of old\n \u2502 Rome to the beginnings of modern Europe).\n \u2502\n 2. Medi\u00e6val \u2524 Transitional Medi\u00e6val (1000\u20131200), (from\n 476\u20131453 \u2502 beginnings of modern Europe to Crusades).\n \u2502\n \u2502 Classic Medi\u00e6val, 1200\u20131453 (from the Crusades\n \u2502 to the fall of new Rome or Constantinople).\n \u2514\n \u250c \u250c\n \u2502 Renaissance, \u2502\n \u2502 1453\u20131690 \u2502 Humanistic, 1453\u20131600.\n \u2502 (to Locke\u2019s \u2502\n \u2502 Essay and \u2524\n \u2502 the English \u2502 Natural Science, 1600\u20131690.\n \u2502 Revolution). \u2502\n 3. Modern \u2502 \u2514\n 1453\u2013modern \u2524\n times \u2502 Enlightenment, 1690\u20131781 (from Locke\u2019s Essay to\n \u2502 Kant\u2019s Critique).\n \u2502\n \u2502 German Idealism, 1781\u20131831 (from Kant\u2019s Critique\n \u2502 to the death of Hegel).\n \u2502\n \u2502 Evolution, 1820 to the present time.\n \u2514\n\n\n\n\n BOOK I\n\n ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY (625 B. C.\u2013476 A. D.)\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER I\n\n THE EARLY GREEK IN ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY\n\n\n=The Divisions of Ancient Philosophy.= The history of ancient\nphilosophy falls naturally into two large divisions: pure Greek\nphilosophy and Hellenic-Roman philosophy (or Greek philosophy in\nthe Roman world). The date, 322 B. C., the death of Aristotle, which\nmarks the line between these two periods, is one of the milestones of\nhistory. Alexander the Great had died in 323 B. C. The coincidence of\nthe deaths of Aristotle and Alexander not only suggests their intimate\nrelations as teacher and pupil during their lives, but it throws into\ncontrast Greek civilization before and after them. Before Aristotle and\nAlexander culture was the product entirely of the pure Greek spirit;\nafter them ancient culture was the complex product of many factors\u2015\u2015of\nGreek and Roman civilizations, and many Oriental religions, including\nChristianity. Before Aristotle and Alexander, ancient culture was\ncharacterized by a love of knowledge for its own sake, by freedom from\nulterior ends either of service or of use; after these great makers of\nhistory, culture became attenuated to work in the special sciences and\nenslaved to practical questions. Before Aristotle and Alexander, the\nGreek city-states had arisen to political power; after Aristotle and\nAlexander, Greece declined politically and was absorbed into the Roman\nempire.\n\n=The Literary Sources of Ancient Philosophy.[2]= The literary sources\nof ancient philosophy are three: (1) the primary sources, or original\nwritings; (2) the secondary sources, or reports of the original writers\nobtained indirectly, or through other writers; (3) the interpretations\nof reliable modern historians of philosophy. The specialist in\nphilosophy will, of course, go to the first two sources for his\ninformation. Other students will find many accurate modern histories\nof ancient philosophy. The student should have at hand the translations\nof the histories of Zeller, Windelband, Weber, Eucken, Ueberweg; those\nof the Englishmen, Burnet and Fairbanks; of the Americans, Rogers and\nTurner.\n\n\u201cThe writings of the early Greek philosophers of the pre-Socratic\nperiod exist now only in fragments. The complete works of Plato are\nstill extant; so also are the most important works of Aristotle, and\ncertain others which belong to the Stoic, Epicurean, Skeptic, and\nneo-Platonic schools. We possess the principal works of most of the\nphilosophers of the Christian period in sufficient completeness.\u201d[3]\nThe secondary sources include quotations and comments upon earlier\nphilosophers found in the writings of Plato, Aristotle, the\nStoics, Skeptics, neo-Platonists, and the so-called doxographers.\nDoxography\u2015\u2015the commentating upon and collating of the works of former\ntimes\u2015\u2015developed enormously in Alexandria, Pergamos, and Rhodes just\nafter Aristotle. The founder of this work was Theophrastus, who was\na disciple of Aristotle and his successor in the Lyceum. Among the\nimportant doxographers were Plutarch, Stob\u00e6us, and Aetios.\n\n=The Environment of the Early Greek.= The biologist seeks to explain a\nliving creature by its previous environment and inherited instincts. So\nif we know the environment and inherited instincts of the early Greek,\nwe shall be able to understand better firstly, why European philosophy\nbegan with the Greeks and not with some other people; and secondly, why\nGreek philosophy took certain lines that it did take.\n\n(1). _His Geographical Environment._ The Greece into which philosophy\nwas born was much larger than the Greece of to-day. Ancient Greece\nconsisted of all the coasts and islands which were washed by the\nMediterranean Sea from Asia Minor to Sicily and southern Italy, and\nfrom Cyrene to Thrace. The motherland, the peninsula of Greece, at\nfirst played an insignificant r\u00f4le. The leadership was in the hands of\nthe Ionians, who had colonized the coasts of Asia Minor. In the seventh\ncentury B. C., when the first Greek philosophy appears, these Ionians\ncommanded the world\u2019s commerce among the three continents. Over the\ncoasts of the entire Mediterranean they had extended their trade and\nestablished their colonies. Miletus became the wealthiest of these\ncolonies and the cradle of Greek science. Its wealth afforded leisure\nto its people and therefore the opportunity for reflection.\n\n(2). _His Political Environment._ An understanding of the Greek\npolitical world, in which its first philosophy appeared, requires an\nhistorical explanation of its rise. It takes us back four centuries to\nthe age of the Epic (1000\u2013750 B. C.). During more than two centuries of\nthe age of the Epic two changes occurred which were to influence future\nGreek civilization: (1) The oligarchy which had supplanted the ancient\npatriarchal monarchy became firmly established; and (2) the Epic was\nformed. The importance of the Epic of Homer lies not so much in the\nfact that a great poem was constructed, as that it was the formulation\nof the Greek religion, the Greek \u00e6sthetic polytheism. Its writing\nindicates that the earlier unorganized, primitive, and savage forms\nof religion had given way, among the ruling classes at least, to an\n\u00e6sthetic polytheism, which in a general way was fixed by the Epic\nitself.\n\nThe period of more than a century, from 750 to 625 B. C., lying\nbetween the age of the Epic and Greek philosophy, may be called an\nage of political disturbances. The oligarchy had become oppressive\nto the rich and poor alike. There had grown up in Greece, especially\nin the colonies, a class of citizens who had become wealthy through\ncommerce. The result of the misgovernment by the oligarchy was that\n(1) migrations took place, and (2) many revolutions occurred. This was\nparticularly true of the colonies where the proletariat was powerful\nand the cities were full of adventurers. Plutocracy was at war with\naristocracy, and this was the opportunity for bold men. These political\ntroubles took form from 650 B. C. on, and the history of the Greek\ncities consists of the endeavor to establish popular government. About\nthe time of the first Greek philosophers there arose here and there\nfrom the ruins of these civil struggles the so-called tyrants, of whom\nThrasybulus at Miletus, Pittacus at Lesbos, Periander at Corinth, and\nPisistratus at Athens are examples. The courts of these tyrants became\ncentres of intellectual life. They patronized poets, writers, and\nartists. The universalism of the Epic had vanished, and in its place\ncame the individualism of the lyric and the satire. In many places the\naristocrat went into gloomy retirement, and often cultivated poetry,\nscience, and philosophy.\n\n=The Native Tendencies of the Early Greek.= Why were the Greeks\nthe first philosophers of Europe? Their geographical surroundings\nof sea and land had something to do with it. The passionate party\nstrife between the old, ruling \u2666families of nobles and the newly rich\ntrading-class, which took place during the seventh century B. C.,\nno doubt cultivated an early independence of opinion and strength of\npersonality. But, after all, genius was in the blood of the race, and\nwho can say that the true cause was not in the mixing of the blood\nof the virile Aryan invaders with that of the aboriginal inhabitants?\nWhatever may be the answer to that question, the Greek race in the\nseventh century B. C. had an extraordinary curiosity about the world\nof nature. It loved the concrete fact as no other race of the time\nloved it, and it loved to give a clear and articulate expression to the\nconcrete fact that it saw. It had an artistic nature that was hostile\nto all confusion. Let us point out three ways in which the Greek was\neven in this early time organizing his experiences, reflecting upon the\nworkings of social and nature forces, and thus preparing the way for\nconsideration of the more ultimate questions of philosophy.\n\n(1) This can be seen first in the development of his religion. The\nfirst step in the organization of his religion we have already seen,\nfor the Homeric epic was the expression of a well-defined, poetic, and\n\u00e6sthetic polytheism developed out of a primitive savage naturalism.\nThe Greek\u2019s sense of measure was shown in the way both gods and men\nwere placed as a part of the world of nature. He could accomplish this\nthe more freely because he had no hierarchy of priests and no dogma of\nbelief to cramp his imagination. The Greek priests did not penetrate\ninto the private life nor teach religion. \u201cThey were not theologians\nbut sacristans and liturgical functionaries.\u201d In the fifty years\nbefore philosophy appeared, this tendency toward scientific religious\norganizing showed the beginning of another advance. Monistic belief,\nof which signs may be found even in the earlier Greek writings,\ncame to the surface. This monism[4] was expressed or implied by the\nGnomic poets, \u201cwise poets,\u201d so called, because they made sententious\nutterances upon the principles of morality.\n\n(2) The early genius of the Greek is shown in his reflections upon\nphysical events. The Greek had been accumulating for a long time\nmany kinds of information, but, what is more important, he had been\nreflecting upon this information. The Ionian was a sea-faring man. He\nhad had much practical experience and had made many true observations\nabout the things he had seen. In his travels he had come in contact\nwith the Orientals and the Egyptians, and although his scientific\nconceptions were probably in the main his own, his knowledge was\nundoubtedly increased by his travels. In the seventh century B. C.,\nthe Greeks had a respectable body of physical science. It was mostly\ninorganic science, however,\u2015\u2015astronomy, geography, and meteorology.\nThe early Greek knowledge of organic phenomena was very meagre, as,\nfor example, medical and physiological knowledge. They also showed\nlittle genuine research in the field of mathematics, although they had\npicked up mathematical information here and there. Many of the first\nphilosophers were scientists.\n\n(3) Not only did the Greek early bring a religious system out of the\nchaos of his naturalism, not only did he early throw his physical\ninformation into scientific form; but also early did he show an\nespecial interest in human conduct. This can be seen first in Homer\n(800 B. C.), in a more developed form in Hesiod (700 B. C.), and with\nstill deeper reflection in the Gnomic poets. Although the Iliad is\na descriptive poem, it abounds in ethical observations. For example,\nHector says, \u201cThe best omen is to fight for one\u2019s country\u201d; and Nestor\nin council says, \u201cA wretch without the tie of kin, a lawless man\nwithout a home, is he who delights in civil strife.\u201d The poem by Hesiod\n(_Works and Days_) is intended to teach morals. It is distinctly a\ndidactic poem. Hesiod stands at the beginning of a long line of Greek\nethical teachers. His moral observations are, however, incoherently\nexpressed. They are not wide generalizations, but are only comments\nupon single experiences. The Gnomic poets appeared at the end of the\nseventh century B. C., as the moral reformers in the age of political\ndisturbances. This period was called by the Greeks the age of the\nSeven Wise Men; for among the men who were then exhorting the age to\ncome back to its senses, tradition early selected seven of the most\nnotable.[5] The spirit of Gnomic poetry was prominent in their reported\nsayings. They were fearful because of the common disregard of the\nconventions of the previous age, and because of the present excesses.\nTheir watchword was \u201cmoderation,\u201d and they were ever repeating \u201cnothing\ntoo much.\u201d By apothegm, riddle, epigram, and catchwords they tried to\nreform society. The names of all seven are not certain, and only four\nof them are known,\u2015\u2015Thales, Solon, Pittacus, and Bias. Their ethical\nreflections are not concerned, as in Hesiod, with the home, the village,\nand the rules of convention, but with the individual\u2019s general relation\nto society. Their knowledge of ethical matters is remarkable for their\ntime. Some of their sayings are as follows:\u2015\u2015\n\n\u201cNo man is happy; all are full of trouble.\u201d \u201cEach thinks to do the\nright, yet no one knows what will be the result of his doings, and no\none can escape his destiny.\u201d \u201cThe people by their own injustice destroy\nthe city, which the gods would have protected.\u201d \u201cAs opposed to these\nevils the first necessity is law and order for the state, contentment\nand moderation for the individual.\u201d \u201cNot wealth, but moderation, is the\nhighest good.\u201d \u201cSuperfluity of possessions begets self-exaltation.\u201d\n\n=The Three Periods of Greek Philosophy=, 625\u2013322 B. C. These are\n\n 1. The Cosmological Period, 625\u2013480 B. C.\n 2. The Anthropological Period, 480\u2013399 B. C.\n 3. The Systematic Period, 399\u2013322 B. C.\n\n1. _The Cosmological Period_ begins with the birth of Greek\nphilosophical reflection (625 B. C.) and has a nominal ending with the\nPersian wars (480 B. C.). This does not mean that the interest of the\nGreeks in cosmology stopped in 480 B. C., but that it was no longer\ntheir prominent interest. Cosmology is the study of the reality of the\nphysical universe (the cosmos). The particular cosmological question\noccupying the minds of the Greeks in this period may be stated thus:\nWhat, amid the changes of the physical world, is permanent? This will\nbe seen to be a philosophical question and not the same as a question\nin natural science. The theatre of philosophical activity was the\ncolonies and not the motherland. Two important aspects of this period\nmust be considered besides the philosophical,\u2015\u2015the political situation\nand the religious mysteries.\n\n2. _The Anthropological Period_ begins in the motherland before\nthe cosmological movement ended in the colonies. It starts with a\ngreat social impulse just after the victories of the Persian wars\n(480 B. C.) and ends with the death of Socrates (399 B. C.). Athens is\nthe centre. This period includes the most productive intellectual epoch\nof Greece as a whole, although not its greatest philosophers. Socrates\nis the most striking personality in the period. The period is called\nanthropological, because its interest is in the study of man and not of\nthe physical universe. The word anthropology means the study of man.\n\n3. _The Systematic Period_ begins with the death of Socrates (399\nB. C.) and ends with the death of Aristotle (322 B. C.). Alexander\nthe Great died 323 B. C. The period is called systematic because\nit contains the three great organizers or systematizers of Greek\nphilosophy. These were Democritus, Plato, and Aristotle. The spread of\nGreek culture beyond its own limits through the conquests of Alexander\nis of great importance for the history of thought in the Hellenic-Roman\nPeriod, which follows this period.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER II\n\n THE COSMOLOGICAL PERIOD (625\u2013480 B. C.):\n THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE\n\n\nWhen we enter upon the one hundred and fifty years of philosophical\nbeginnings of Greece, which are called the Cosmological Period, we find\nourselves confronted with an extremely interesting social situation,\nwhich has been brought about partly by the political and geographical\nenvironment of the Greek, partly by his inherited genius. On the one\nhand, during this century and a half, the political troubles of the\nGreeks became increasingly aggravated by the growth of Persia on the\neast and of Carthage on the west. On the other hand, we find that the\nGreek religion took a sudden turn to mysticism, and by its side a slow\nbut increasing interest in philosophical questions. All through this\nperiod Greek politics and Greek religion were a constant peril to Greek\nlife. Greek philosophy proved to be its safety.\n\n=The Peril in the Greek Political Situation: Persia and Carthage.= It\nmust be remembered that the Greek cities never united into a nation.\nThey were always fighting among themselves. We have already pointed\nout the civil disturbances between the oligarchy and the democracy\nthroughout the land. These internal troubles continued to the end\nof Greek history. In this period there was added to these internal\ntroubles a critical external situation which threatened the existence\nof Greece itself. The sixth century was a momentous one for Greece. In\nboth the east and the west there arose mighty empires that threatened\nto wipe out its civilization. \u201cThe expansion of the Persian power (on\nthe one hand) had suspended a stone of Tantalus over Hellas, and it\nseemed likely that Greek civilization might be submerged in an Oriental\nmonarchy.\u201d[6] Cyrus had laid the foundation of Persia by taking Media\nin 550 B. C., Lydia in 546 B. C., Babylonia in 538 B. C.; Egypt was\nadded by Cambyses in 528 B. C.; and Darius organized the great Persian\npossessions in his long reign from 528 to 486 B. C. On the west,\nCarthage was threatening the Greek cities of Sicily, and at the\nclose of this period was acting in conjunction with Persia to obtain\npossession of the Mediterranean.\n\n=The Peril in the New Religion: The Mysteries and Pythagoras.= Already\nin the seventh century B. C. the political society of Greece felt that\nit was under the wrath of the gods because of some unatoned guilt.\n\u201cThe earth is full of ills, of ills the sea,\u201d sang the poet. Religious\ndepression became universal. Dissatisfied with the old polytheism,\nespecially as expressed in the theogony of Hesiod, the Greek in the\nsixth century B. C. began to interpret it according to his present need.\nAmong the masses there appeared the craving for immortality and for\npersonal knowledge of the supernatural. The desire to solve the mystery\nof life by a short road became universal. Men looked to rites to purify\nthem from the guilt of the world and for gaining personal contact\nwith the world of shades. This new religion became pan-Hellenic. It is\ncalled the Mysteries or the Orgia. By Mysteries is not meant societies\nfounded on some occult intellectual belief, as the name might suggest.\nThe Mysteries were based on cult (ceremony), and not on dogma. The\nspecial ceremonies were those of initiation and purification. They\nwere supposed to purify the participant and put him in a new frame of\nmind. The soul would then be protected from the malicious spirits to\nwhich it was constantly exposed. The ceremonies are reported to have\nbeen attended sometimes by more than thirty thousand people. They\nconsisted of processions, songs, dances, and dramatic spectacles. The\nmost important of the Mysteries were the Orphic and the Eleusinian.\n\nThe Mysteries were the basis of the society of Pythagoreans.\nPythagoras of Samos was a remarkable man, who went to Italy and settled\nat Crotona. His sect is of double importance to us because in later\ntimes it developed a philosophy on its mathematical and astronomical\nsides. Pythagoras and his immediate following must be distinguished\nfrom the later Pythagoreans. Pythagoras and the early Pythagoreans\nwere not philosophers, but a sect like the Orphic society of Mysteries,\nyet the sect of Pythagoreans embraced much more in its scope. It tried\nto control the public and private life of its members and to evolve\na common method of education.[7] Pythagoras was an exiled aristocrat,\nand his sect was an aristocratic religious body in reaction against\nthe democratic excesses. The only doctrine upon which Pythagoras placed\nany emphasis was that of immortality in the form of metempsychosis\n(transmigration of the soul from one bodily form into another). The\nsect was dispersed as a religious body about 450 B. C. The scattered\nmembers formed a school of philosophy at Thebes until about 350 B. C.\nOf these later philosophical Pythagoreans and their number theory, we\nshall speak in the proper place.\n\nAt the time of the dispersion of the Pythagoreans there existed no\nlonger any peril from the new religion. The craze of the new religion\nwas passing away. During the sixth century B. C. it was a great peril\nto the future intellectual life of Greece. Had it then gained a little\nmore power it would probably have been admitted by the priesthood to\nthe temples. In the exercise of such enormous sacerdotal power, the\npriests would have enslaved the Greek mind to superstition, and the\npriesthood in turn would have become an easy tool for tyrants. There\nwould then have been no Socrates, no Plato, and no Aristotle. The\nMysteries were a reaction toward asceticism as a religious salvation\nfrom the political peril, but they were, however, equally as great\na peril to Greece. _The medium course along the line of a rational\nphilosophy, which the Greek genius actually took, proved its salvation._\n\n=Characteristics of the Cosmologists.= There are certain\ncharacteristics of this early philosophy that should be noted at the\nbeginning.\n\n(1) All the Cosmologists were physical scientists, and with few\nexceptions their scientific views were noteworthy. Aristotle calls\nthem physicists in distinction from their predecessors, whom he calls\ntheologians.\n\n(2) They often worked together in schools. Tradition has been common\nsince Bacon that philosophy centres in individuals; but history\nshows that frequently the Greeks worked in corporate bodies. These\nphilosophical scientists worked in schools; just as the Homerid\u00e6\ndeveloped the epic; the D\u00e6dalid\u00e6, a group of the earliest artists,\nthe secret of art; the Mysteries, religion. Philosophy now is in\nthe cloister, and the intellect of the time speaks from its retreat\nfrom public life. While the Milesian school was undisturbed, owing to\nthe long peace that Miletus enjoyed, we shall find that most of the\nphilosophers of the Cosmological period were in retirement on account\nof political persecution.\n\nWe must remember that by \u201cschool\u201d is not necessarily meant a group of\npupils under the established instruction of a teacher. A school at this\nearly period is a group of learned men at work on the same problems.\nLater on in history we shall find that one of the group more learned\nthan the others stands in the position of teacher: for example, Plato\nin the Academy.\n\n(3) All the Cosmologists were hylozoists. The etymological meaning of\nhylozoism is its true one\u2015\u2015matter is alive. This is the fundamental\ncharacteristic of these pre-Socratics from Thales down to Anaxagoras,\nalthough some authorities contend that those from the time of\nEmpedocles were not hylozoists. The meaning of hylozoism is simple\nenough, but the conception is a difficult one for the modern mind;\nfor to-day we are accustomed to think of an impersonal nature\nunder mechanical laws. To the Greek of the Cosmological period\nthe substantial constitution of the universe is impersonal living\nmatter; to us it is impersonal dead matter. Both these views are to\nbe contrasted with the religious belief involved in Greek polytheism,\nin which the cosmos is conceived to be living personal spirits; this\nHomeric polytheism is again to be contrasted with the animism of\nthe tribal period, in that it had organized into an \u00e6sthetic unity\nthe early savage animism. These hylozoistic philosophers did not,\nhowever, give up the Homeric gods, but they treated their existence in\na poetic way. They usually believed in their existence, but they always\nsubordinated them to the one living world-ground.\n\n(4) In common with all ancient peoples these Greek philosophers did not\nbelieve that the universe had unlimited space. On the contrary, they\nbelieved that it was limited and in the shape of an egg.\n\n=Table of Cosmologists.= The Cosmologists are divided into two classes:\n(1) the earlier were monists\u2015\u2015those who believe that the reality of\nthe universe is a simple, undifferentiated unity; (2) the later were\npluralists\u2015\u2015those who believe that the reality of the universe consists\nof several elements equally real. They are enumerated as follows:\u2015\u2015\n\n THE MONISTS\n\n { Thales }\n 1. The Milesian school { Anaximander } at Miletus.\n { Anaximenes }\n\n 2. Xenophanes at Colophon and Elea.\n\n { Parmenides }\n 3. The Eleatic school { Zeno } at Elea.\n\n 4. Heracleitus at Ephesus.\n\n\n THE PLURALISTS\n\n 5. Empedocles at Agrigentum.\n\n 6. Anaxagoras at Clazomen\u00e6.\n\n 7. The later Pythagoreans mainly at Thebes.\n\n 8. Leucippus at Abdera.\n\n=How the Philosophical Question Arose.= The interests of these\nphilosophical scientists sharply differentiate them from the preceding\ntheogonists, like Hesiod and Epimenides, as well as from the masses who\nwere absorbed in the religion of the Mysteries. They were, moreover,\nthe men of Greece to whom the emotional excitement of a religious\nrevival would not appeal as a refuge from the troubles of the time.\nTheir own experience in the political troubles had made paramount the\nquestion as to the permanence of things. Nevertheless, its answer must\nbe found in nature and in an intellectual way. When they turned to\nthe traditional theogonies they found no answer to their question, for\nthere was only a mythical chronicle of a succession of gods beginning\nwith the unknown. The question of the Cosmologists was not, therefore,\nwhat _was_ the original form of this changing world, but what _is_\nfundamental in the world _always_. The time factor is no longer\nimportant. Not the _temporal prius_ but the _real prius_ is what they\nseek. The idea of a temporal origin of things gives place to that of\neternal being, and the question finally emerges, _What is the real\nsubstance that constitutes the universe?_\n\n Illustration: MAP SHOWING WHERE THE COSMOLOGISTS LIVED\n\n (None of the Cosmologists, except the later Pythagoreans,\n lived in the motherland of Greece. Philosophical activity\n during this period took place in the colonies. The map shows\n the cities which were the centres of philosophy and the homes\n of the philosophers as indicated.)\n\n=The Greek Monistic Philosophies.= Turning back to our classification\non page 20, we see that the earliest Greek philosophers emphasized the\nmonistic tendency, which had become so prominent in Greek religion.\nThis group of monists was composed of the Milesians, Xenophanes, the\nEleatic School, and Heracleitus. The course of reasoning of these\nearly thinkers is na\u00efvely simple, and like all na\u00efve thought, it\ncontains such contradictions that the modern reader is likely to become\nimpatient with it. The value of the study of the philosophy of these\nearly Greeks is entirely historical. Its historical value, however, is\nvery great, for it is a revelation of the culture of the Greece of that\ntime, it throws light on many of the teachings of Plato and Aristotle,\nand most of all it contains the germs of modern metaphysical problems.\nThese first Greek philosophers raised the question, What is the\nconstitution of the substance of the universe? Their answers are na\u00efve\nsolutions to the historical metaphysical \u201criddle.\u201d\n\nThe Milesians, who form the earliest philosophical school in European\nhistory, seem to have assumed two facts as self-evident about the\nsubstance of the universe: (1) There is a single cosmic substance\nidentical with itself, which is the basis of all the changes in\nnature; (2) Moving matter is the same as life. The Milesians were\nquite unconscious that these two assumptions were contradictory, but\nthe contradiction impressed their successors\u2015\u2015Xenophanes, Heracleitus,\nand the Eleatics; and divided them in their development of philosophy.\nMatter which keeps identical with itself is the Unchanging[8] and is\nbrought into opposition with Life, the Changing, or matter which moves.\nThe question for Xenophanes, Heracleitus, and the Eleatics\u2015\u2015and indeed\nfor all future philosophy\u2015\u2015was: How can the changing processes of life\nbe explained by an unchanging substance?\n\nXenophanes, who was more of a religious reformer than a philosopher,\nwas so absorbed in the first of these assumptions that he developed\nit for his purpose in his practical social reformation to the entire\nneglect of the second assumption. The Eleatics, however, to whose city\nXenophanes had come, could not leave his doctrine in its one-sided\nand undeveloped form. They accepted his teaching of the divine\nUnchangingness of the universe, but this compelled these profounder\nthinkers to offer some explanation of the natural processes of change.\nChange to them cannot really exist. Heracleitus, on the other hand,\nwas impressed with the aspect of life that is expressed in the second\nassumption of the Milesians\u2015\u2015living matter is moving matter. He\ntherefore maintained in direct opposition to the Eleatics, that\nthe changing, living processes of nature alone are real. The two\ncontradictory assumptions that lay so mutually indifferent in the\nMilesian doctrine thus became the basis of a sharp metaphysical\ncontroversy between Heracleitus and the Eleatics. The substance of\nthe world is permanent, change is an illusion, said the Eleatics.\nThe substance of the world changes, permanence is an illusion, said\nHeracleitus. Either all things are permanent or all things change.\nThese early philosophers had no wealth of empirical knowledge nor of\npsychological reflection upon which to draw, and it is not strange\nthat they should take extreme positions and be blind to their practical\nconsequences.\n\n=1. The Milesian School.= Of all the Greek cities in the sixth century\nB. C. Miletus was the wealthiest and most prosperous. It was one of\nthe Ionian colonies and was situated on the coast of Asia Minor, and\nit alone was able to preserve its autonomy as neighbor of the warring\neastern empires. Not until the battle of Lade was it captured and\ndestroyed (494 B. C.). From two generations of philosophers history has\npreserved three names,\u2015\u2015Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes. The school\nis called indifferently the Milesian or the Ionic school. The proximity\nof Miletus to Ephesus, Colophon, and Clazomen\u00e6 (as a glance at the\nmap will show) explains the influence of the Milesian school upon the\ndoctrines of Heracleitus, Xenophanes, and Anaxagoras. Undoubtedly the\ncontact of the Milesians with the Orient and Egypt had brought to them\nknowledge and correct scientific observations of many sorts, especially\nastronomical.\n\nThales (b. 640 B. C.) was a member of one of the leading families of\nMiletus, and lived during the flourishing period of the city under the\ntyranny of Thrasybulus. He is counted among the seven Wise Men, and\nbelonged to the rich commercial class. He probably engaged in commerce\nand traveled in Egypt. He was versed in the current learning, predicted\nan eclipse, and was acute in mathematics and physics. Probably he never\ncommitted anything to writing. Aristotle\u2019s comments are the only data\nabout him.\n\nAnaximander (611\u2013545 B. C.?) was an astronomer and geographer; he made\nan astronomical globe, a sundial, and a geographical map. He was an\nintimate disciple of Thales and wrote _Concerning Nature_, which is\nreferred to as the first Greek philosophical treatise. Nothing is known\nof his life.\n\nAnaximenes (560\u2013500 B. C.?) was the disciple of Anaximander. One\nsentence is preserved of his writings.[9]\n\n=The Milesian Philosophy.= The Milesians lived upon the seacoast, and\nthe changes of the sea and air must have deeply impressed them. They\nhad an intellectual curiosity to find the cosmic matter which remained\nidentical with itself and at the same time moved. (See p. 22.) They\nwere not, therefore, interested to discover the chemical composition\nof matter, but to find what matter was most moving and therefore most\nalive. Thales said that it was water; Anaximenes, air; and Anaximander,\nthe Apeiron, or the Unlimited. Their respective choices were determined\nby what seemed to possess the most mobility and the greatest inner\nvitality. Thales thought water possessed this quality. Water is\nalways moving. Thales saw it moving. It therefore has life in itself.\nAnaximander felt that no object in our perceptual experience would\nfully explain the ceaseless mobility of nature, and he called it\nthe Unlimited or the Indeterminate\u2015\u2015the Apeiron. It is a mixture in\nwhich all qualities are lost. The changes in nature are endless, and\ntherefore the single cosmic substance, from which they come, must be\nendless as well, for \u201cfrom whatever source things come, in that they\nhave their end.\u201d We learn that this is just the reason for Anaximenes\nchoosing the air for the single underlying cosmic substance. The air is\nthe most changeable thing and is Unlimited.[9]\n\nBoth Thales and Anaximenes still held to the traditional polytheism\nof the Greek Epic. Anaximander rises above them in this respect. This\nconception of the Unlimited, to which his scientific search led him, is\nregarded by him as Deity. He calls it \u201cthe divine\u201d (\u03c4\u1f78 \u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd); although\nhe speaks of it in the neuter gender it is, nevertheless, the first\nEuropean _philosophical conception of God_. It is the first attempt to\nconceive of God as purely physical and yet without any mythical dress.\nIn Anaximander the Milesian monism has a religious aspect.\n\n=2. Xenophanes, the Religious Philosopher= (570 B. C.). The scientific\nmonism of Anaximander was after all only expressive of that religious\ndissatisfaction, first voiced by the Wise Men, against the Hesiod\ncosmogony and the immorality of the Homeric myths. Now for the first\ntime a positive conflict between religion and philosophy arose through\nXenophanes, the rhapsodist of Colophon. Colophon, an Ionian city near\nMiletus, was noted for its obscene and cruel religious practices,\nand when his native city capitulated to the Persians, Xenophanes\ncharged its feebleness to its immoral religion. He went to Magna\nGr\u00e6cia, and, disguised as a musician, he wandered about for sixty-seven\nyears through its length and breadth declaiming in song against\nthe anthropomorphism, the mystic ecstasies, and the general social\npractices of the Greeks. He finally settled in Elea, southern Italy\n(see map), and on this account he is sometimes called the founder of\nthe Eleatic school.\n\nXenophanes\u2019 influence upon the thought of Greece was threefold:\n(1) He preached the Milesian philosophical monism to the people of\nGreece in the form of a religious monism; (2) He carried this doctrine\nfrom eastern Greece (Asia Minor) to Western Greece (Magna Gr\u00e6cia);\n(3) He was the connecting link between the Milesian and the following\nEleatic school.\n\n=The Philosophy of Xenophanes.= Based on one of the Milesian\nassumptions, viz., a single cosmic substance remains identical with\nitself in nature, Xenophanes felt that he had a right to set down two\nprinciples about nature.\n\n1. The single primordial substance below the changes of nature is\nGod. The reality below nature which Thales conceived to be water,\nAnaximander to be unlimited substance without a name, Anaximenes to be\nair, was said by Xenophanes to be God. The important point here is that\nXenophanes has not given the Greeks a spiritualistic conception of God;\nbut that he has positively stated that the substance of the universe\nis an object of religious devotion. He calls the cosmic substance\nGod instead of calling it water, Apeiron, or air. It is a material\nthing, and yet it is an object of reverence. He ascribes to this God a\nspherical form, and yet also mental power of omniscience. God is \u201cone\nand all\u201d \u1f13\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd, and yet he is \u201cone god, the greatest among gods\nand men, neither in form and thought like unto mortals.\u201d The positive\nconception of God hangs confused in the mind of Xenophanes. He is\nscarcely a monotheist, nor yet a pantheist. He is a hylozoist, who\nconceives the underlying cosmic substance to be an object of religious\nreverence.\n\n2. The single cosmic substance below the changes of nature is\n_un_changeable. To the Milesians the more moving is matter, the more\nalive is it. Life and activity are the same thing. To Xenophanes\nthis is not the case, but, on the contrary, the opposite is true.\nHe conceives God to be a definite sphere that is unchangeable and\nhomogeneous. The material substance, God, always remains the same.\n\u201cHe has no need of going about, now hither, now thither, in order to\ncarry out his wishes; but he governs all men without toil.\u201d Xenophanes\nthus becomes the forerunner of the Eleatic school.\n\n=3. Heracleitus, \u201cthe Misanthropist\u201d and \u201cthe Obscure\u201d= (about\n563\u2013470 B. C.). Heracleitus was a native of Ephesus, belonged\nto the aristocracy, and suffered at the hands of the democracy.\nHe wrote a treatise that was difficult to understand even by the\nancients, some fragments of which are preserved. He was called the\n\u201cweeping philosopher\u201d because of his misanthropy, and also the \u201cdark\nphilosopher\u201d because of the obscurity of his writings. He was a\ntheorist rather than a physicist, and his doctrines foreshadow our\nmodern physical theories. His name is coupled with that of Parmenides\nin the deep impression he made upon Greek thought. From his complacent\nand gloomy retirement he looked forth upon the world around him with\nprofound contempt, as did the Stoics after him.\n\na. =Heracleitus\u2019 Doctrine of Absolute and Universal Change.= The wonder\nwhich the Ionians felt, that nature phenomena change into one another,\nfound its liveliest expression in Heracleitus. He not only found that\nmutability was the primal aspect of nature phenomena, but he also\npointed out that human experiences also had their rapid and complete\ntransitions. Especially was he fond of citing the changes of opposites\ninto each other. But what shows his development over the early Milesian\ndoctrine was his isolation of the aspect of change from the Milesian\nconception of the cosmic matter, thereby affirming that abiding\npermanence is an illusion. It is one thing to affirm that reality is\nessentially change; it is another to universalize change by affirming\nthat the permanent has no existence. The Milesian doctrine was too\nna\u00efve to go as far as that. Heracleitus piles up figures of speech\nto show that there is no permanence whatever. All existing things are\nonly \u201cbecoming\u201d-things, passing-away things. Being is always becoming,\nabout-to-be. The only unchanging thing is change. \u201cYou cannot step\ninto the same rivers, for fresh waters are ever flowing in upon you.\u201d\n\u201cGod is day and night, winter and summer, war and peace, satiety and\nhunger.\u201d \u201cAll things flow\u201d (\u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1fe5\u03b5\u1fd6). What abides and deserves the\nname of Deity is not thing, but motion\u2015\u2015Becoming.\n\nb. =Fire is the Cosmic Substance.= Here we come to a difficulty in\nexplaining the doctrine of Heracleitus because of the confusion in his\nown mind. He evidently goes a long way toward conceiving the cosmic\nsubstance as an abstraction\u2015\u2015as the process of change. But he could\nnot be wholly abstract. He stops and tells us that the cosmic substance\nis fire, and he probably means by fire just the same sort of thing\nas Anaximenes meant by air. Fire is the cosmic substance. It is the\nessence of all material things because it is the most mobile. But,\nafter all, the fire of which Heracleitus is thinking is not a localized\nthing, like the fire on the hearth. For the hearth fire in a sense is\never identical with itself. The fire which Heracleitus means is ever\ndarting, ever transforming material. To sum up: Heracleitus does not\nmean by fire an abstraction like the law of change; he does not mean,\non the other hand, a material ever remaining like itself: he does mean\na material, but a transforming material.\n\nc. =The Definite Changes of Fire.= Heracleitus makes some acute\nobservations about the characteristics of the changing fire. The\nMilesians had been content to observe atmospheric changes and to\nname condensation and rarefaction as the forms of cosmic change.\nHeracleitus goes farther and emphasizes definite relations of change.\nThe succession of changes always remains the same. Their definite\nrelation is the only permanence in the world, and Heracleitus\u2019\nconception foreshadows the modern conception of the uniformity of the\nlaw of nature. The changes are (1) fateful, (2) rational, and (3) just.\nThey show that the world is a destiny, a reason, and a justice. This\nidentification of ethical and logical qualities with the physical\nbetrays the undeveloped condition of the thought of Heracleitus.\n\nIn general, there are two characteristics to be noted with reference\nto Heracleitus\u2019 conception of a definite succession of changes:\n(1) the changes are always a harmony of opposites; (2) and the changes\nare in a closed circuit. The process of change is not a flow in one\ndirection like a river over its bed, but it is a movement in two\nopposite directions. By change Heracleitus means not only a passing\ninto something else but a passing into the opposite. Everything is the\nunion of opposites, and everything is the transition point of opposites\nabout to separate. The flux of things is thus poetically conceived as\na war of things, and this war is \u201cthe father of all things.\u201d This unity\nof opposites has an equilibrium that illudes us into thinking it is\npermanent. The universe is an invisible harmony, divided into itself\nand again united. Investigate life and there are antitheses everywhere.\nWar is life. The second general characteristic of the succession of\nchanges is their closed circuit. Fire changes into all things, and all\nthings are changing back into fire. These two movements are called the\n\u201cUpward Way\u201d and the \u201cDownward Way.\u201d Downward, fire changes through\nair and water into earth. Upward, earth changes back to water, air, and\nfire. With every change, there is counter-change, action is accompanied\nby a reaction. \u201cMen do not know how that which is drawn in opposite\ndirections harmonizes with itself. The harmonious structure of the\nworld depends upon opposite tension, like that of the bow and the lyre.\u201d\n\nd. =The Practical Philosophy of Heracleitus.= Heracleitus was more\nof a metaphysician than a physicist, and his chief concern was in the\nformation and the practical application of his theory of change. He\nlooked upon man as a bit of cosmic fire struck off and imprisoned in a\nbody of earth, water, and air. After death this fiery soul is released\nand absorbed in the cosmic fire. In his present state man has a divided\nexistence: the life of the soul, or the fire of the reason; and the\nlife of the senses of the imprisoning body. The reason retires from\nthe illusions of sense, and sees in its aristocratic isolation how\nillusory the sensations are. For the senses tell us that their objects\nare permanent, while the reason sees through this deception to the\nchangingness of the world. Thus the beginning is made by Heracleitus\nin distinguishing the reflections of the reason from sensations. Truth\nis for the first time systematically set over against opinion. The\nreasonable Wise Man resigns himself to whatever happens because he\nknows that it is fateful, wise, and just. The Wise Man recognizes\nthat all is change, and he is happy because he sees providence in the\nvicissitudes of his own life. Thus in the aristocratic hate, which\nHeracleitus holds against democracies, he makes conformity to law the\nonly way to happiness. The reason of Wise Men, and not the senses of\nthe multitude, must be the true guide of society.\n\nHeracleitus was a profound observer and theorist. His physical theory\nforeshadowed the modern theories of natural law and of relativity; his\npractical theories reappear in the psychology of Protagoras and the\nethics of the Stoics.\n\n=4. The Eleatic School.= The town of Elea to which Xenophanes came in\nthe course of his wanderings had been recently settled by the Ionian\nrefugees from Phoc\u00e6a, a great maritime city in Asia Minor, which had\nbeen conquered by the Persians (543 B. C.). Elea is now Castellamare\non the west coast of Italy. It is celebrated as the birthplace of\nParmenides and Zeno, who founded the so-called Eleatic school.\n\na. =Parmenides= (b. 515 B. C.).\n\nParmenides wrote about 470 B. C. He is represented as a serious and\ninfluential man, with a high moral character. He exercised strong\ninfluence upon such philosophers as Plato and Democritus, and was a\npolitical power in the city of Elea, of which he was a native. He was\nnot a stranger to the Pythagoreans. The large fragment of his poem is\nthe most ancient monument extant of metaphysical speculation among the\nGreeks.\n\nParmenides takes the doctrine of Xenophanes with great seriousness,\nand what Xenophanes says about the Godhead, Parmenides says about all\nthings. Xenophanes\u2019 religious weapon of an unchanging cosmic substance\nbecomes in the hands of Parmenides an academic doctrine of science\nand the basis of logical controversy. Parmenides used the conception\nof Xenophanes in his great didactic poem, _The Way of Truth and the\nWay of Opinion_, with the evident purpose of refuting the theory of\nHeracleitus. The fragment of the poem reveals the driest abstractions\ndressed in rich poetry. As a thinker Parmenides is the most important\nin this period. Zeno was the friend and pupil of Parmenides.\n\n(1) =The Cosmic Substance is Being.= The first assumption in the\nMilesian doctrine\u2015\u2015that there is a single matter that ever remains\nidentical with itself\u2015\u2015was so self-evident to Parmenides that he\ndoes not attempt to prove it. He assumes it, as if it were cogent to\neverybody. However, he explains what he means by Being in a negative\nstatement: Not-Being, or what is not, cannot be thought. Being and\nthought are so correlated that they are the same. Thinking always\nhas Being as its content, and there is no Being that is not thought.\n_Being_ \uff1d _Thought_. This explanation of Parmenides\u2019 identification of\nthought and Being may be put in this logical form:\u2015\u2015\n\n All thinking refers to something thought, and therefore has Being\n for its content;\n Thinking that refers to nothing, and is therefore contentless,\n cannot be;\n Therefore, not-Being cannot be thought, much less can it be.\n\nThese propositions look very abstract, and make us believe that we are\nto plunge immediately into a kind of German idealism. But Parmenides\nleaves us in no doubt that he is one of the hylozoists of his time.\nBeing is indeed thought, but Being is also matter. We may therefore\namend our equation to _Being_ \uff1d _Thought_ \uff1d _Matter_. Being is what\nfills space, and all Being has this and only this property. All Being\nis therefore exactly alike, and there is only one, single Being. There\nare no distinctions in Being. By not-Being Parmenides means empty space\nor that which is not material. So that Parmenides\u2019 assumption of Being\nas the cosmic substance means this: all that exists, including thought,\nfills space; and all that does not exist does not fill space.\n\nBeing, the cosmic substance, is one, eternal, imperishable, homogeneous,\nunchangeable, and material. When men see the world as it really is,\nwhen they see its cosmic substance, they see it to be one continuous\nmaterial block. The world is not made up of parts with intervals of\nnothing between them, but it is a solid, homogeneous whole. The cosmic\nBeing is a timeless, spaceless Being with no distinctions. The form of\nBeing is spherical. It is cosmic-body and cosmic-thought. This is the\nassumption of Parmenides, which is so self-evident and so cogent to him\nthat he does not attempt to prove but only to explain it.\n\n(2) =Other Things than the Cosmic Substance (Being) have no Real\nExistence.= If Being is space that is filled, not-Being is empty space.\nHowever, empty space has no existence. But the existence of a plural\nnumber of things depends upon the existence of empty spaces between\nthem. Furthermore, the motion of things and the change of things depend\nupon the existence of empty spaces in which they can move and change.\nSince empty space is not-Being and has no existence, the plurality of\nthings and the motion and change of things have also no existence. They\nare illusions. The nature-world, with its richness of qualities and\nvariety of motions, before the logic of Parmenides \u201cfolds up its tents\nlike the Arabs and silently steals away.\u201d\n\nThis logical drawing out of one of the aspects of the Milesian\nconception of the cosmic matter has a curious result. The Milesians and\nXenophanes sought to explain by the cosmic substance the many nature\nchanges. But when in the hands of Parmenides the cosmic substance is\nall of reality, then there is no reality to the changes. Consequently\nthe concept formed for the explanation of change has so developed as\nto deny the existence of change. The cosmic substance excludes all\norigination and decay, all space and time differences, all divisibility,\ndiversity, and movement. There is only one real, all else is illusion.\n\nBut what can we say of the varied world of nature as it appears to us?\nDo we see, hear, and touch many things and motions? In Part II of his\npoem he raises the question, Suppose man takes the world of change as\nreal how must he explain it? He answers by using the explanation of\nHeracleitus. But these changes of eye and ear belong to the world of\nsense, and Parmenides is talking, in Part I of his poem, about the real\nworld or that world known to thought. Parmenides insists as strongly\nas did Heracleitus that the reason and not the sense shall be our guide\nto what is real. Yet he arrives at exactly the opposite conclusion from\nHeracleitus as to what the reason sees as real. The senses show us only\nthe many and the changing. The reason shows us nothing of the sort, but\nonly permanence and unchangingness.\n\nb. =Zeno= (b. 490\u2013430 B. C.).\n\nZeno was born in Elea. He was contemporary with those who tried to\nreconcile the two sides of the metaphysical controversy,\u2015\u2015Empedocles,\nAnaxagoras, and the Atomists. He wrote in prose in the form of question\nand answer. This is the beginning of the dialogue literature, which\nin the time of the Sophists, Socrates and Plato, was richly developed\nand became known as dialectic. On the Greek stage during the time of\nPericles it came forth in dramatic form through \u00c6schylus, Sophocles,\nand Euripides.\n\n=The Philosophy of Zeno.= Zeno was the active controversialist of the\nschool of Elea, and he was not a constructive philosopher. He offered\nno contribution to advance the thought of Parmenides. He appeared\nrather as the master of logical argument in defense of his predecessor,\nby tearing to pieces the arguments of his opponents. The opponents\nthat Zeno is attacking are the Atomists of Abdera, who were his\ncontemporaries, rather than Heracleitus. His contribution was negative\nand formal, but it was nevertheless effective and searching. His\narguments and paradoxes will, however, lose their cogency unless\nit be kept in mind that he is trying to show how absurd magnitude,\nmultiplicity, and change would be in discontinuous space such as the\nAtomists describe. While his paradoxes have been attacked again and\nagain, they still have effectiveness against atomic theories.\n\nHis arguments are against magnitude, multiplicity, and motion. There\ncan be no magnitude, because a thing would then be both infinitely\nsmall and infinitely great. There can be no multiplicity of things,\nsince they would be both limited and unlimited in number. There can be\nno motion, because (1) it is impossible to go through a fixed space;\n(2) it is impossible to go though a space that has movable limits; and\n(3) because of the relativity of motion. The dilemmas which he proposed\nof Achilles and the tortoise, the flying arrow at rest, and the bushel\nof corn are classic.[10]\n\n=The Results of the Conflict between Heracleitus and Parmenides.=\n1. One important result of this final conflict between the inconsistent\nmotives in the Milesian teaching was that reason was contrasted with\nsense, reflection with experience. The more fully the philosophers\ndeveloped their doctrines, the more their doctrines became contrasted\nwith the opinions of unreflecting people. At first the contrast\nappeared in this na\u00efve form: that what they thought was right, and\nwhat others thought must be wrong, if others differed from them. Then\nthe contrast came in this form: that reflection gives the true and\nsensations the false. Thus reflection came to have such conclusiveness\nthat it gained independence. The philosopher began to feel the\nsupremacy of reason, to assert that he has truth, to call unreasoned\nbelief by the opprobrious name of \u201copinion.\u201d This is curiously\nillustrated in the case of Heracleitus and Parmenides. Their opposing\nconceptions of the cosmic substance are claimed to be the result of\nreason, while each calls the other\u2019s theory \u201copinion.\u201d\n\n2. Another result was that in the Greek thought the monistic theory was\nfound to be useless in the study of nature. These early monistic views\nled up as necessary steps to pluralism, but they were not in themselves\nserviceable. The imperfection in the Milesian teaching appeared in the\nimpassable gulf between Heracleitus and Parmenides. It now remained\nfor the last Cosmologists to see if, on the basis of pluralism, they\ncould not reconcile the preceding views and at the same time obtain a\nsatisfactory metaphysics of nature.\n\n3. The third result of the controversy between the Eleatics\nand Heracleitus was that the peril from the Orphic Mysteries was\naverted,\u2015\u2015not immediately, nor in a year\u2019s time, but after many years.\nPhilosophy became established. The Greek reason now had an object\nof interest, in a sharp scientific issue. Mystery was not crushed,\nbut subdued. The mental life of the future Greek had a topic for its\nreflection which supplanted, when the time came, its emotional interest\nin the supernatural.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER III\n\n PLURALISM\n\n\n=Efforts toward Reconciliation.= The theories of Heracleitus and\nParmenides were in part fantastic and in part abstract. They were the\ntwo motives of the Milesian school that had been developed so far as to\nreveal their inherent inconsistencies.\n\nPhysical theories now began to spring up which modified the\nmetaphysical theories; and these produced results which while not\nso logical, were less distant from the facts of life. The Eleatics\nhad so conceived Being as to deny the existence of changing phenomena\nperceived in the world of nature. On the other hand, Heracleitus had\nso emphasized the universality of change that there was little reality\nleft in the particular changes. The later Heracleitans were Heracleitus\ngone mad. \u201cWe not only cannot step into the same river twice, but\nwe cannot do it once.\u201d All the preceding philosophers had been\nmonists. The time had therefore come for thinkers to abandon monism\nif thought were to have any usefulness. Monism, whether in the form of\nHeracleitus\u2019 doctrine of universal change or of Parmenides\u2019 doctrine of\nuniversal permanence, had merely set aside the problem about the Many.\nOf course, a more satisfactory solution of this problem could come only\nwhen human life had become riper and had more experiences upon which to\ndraw. It was natural for the Greek philosopher to look now to pluralism\nfor his solution, when he turned away from monism. _At the outset\npluralism tried to reconcile the two extremes to which the Milesian\nmotifs had gone._ Its later development in the doctrine of Protagoras\nwas as extreme as that of the monists.\n\n=The New Conception of Change of the Pluralists.= Facing the fact that\nchange has to be explained and cannot be denied, change is conceived\nby the pluralists to be not a transformation but a transposition. It is\nan alteration in position of the parts of a mass. Birth, growth, death,\nare only such changes of transposition. Empedocles, to whom the origin\nof the doctrine is attributed, says, \u201cThere is no coming into Being\nof aught that perishes, nor any end for it in baneful death, but only\na mingling and a separation of what has been mingled. Just as when\npainters are elaborating temple offerings,\u2015\u2015they, when they have taken\nthe pigments of many colors in their hands, mix them in a harmony,\u2015\u2015so\nlet not the error prevail in thy mind that there is any other source\nof all the perishable creatures that appear in countless numbers.\u201d All\norigination, then, is a new combination, and every destruction only a\nseparation of the original parts. The Pluralists thus make Heracleitus\u2019\nconception useful in the explanation of nature.\n\n=The New Conception of the Unchanging of the Pluralists\u2015\u2015The Element.=\nBut there must be a permanence in order that there be change. This can\nonly be conceived by assuming that there are many original units that\nin themselves do not change. The mass of the world is ever the same;\nthere is no new creation. Being consists in many elements, and not in a\nsingle block. So to Empedocles in particular is accredited the priority\nof forming the conception of the element, which has occupied an\nimportant place in science. The element is conceived by the Pluralists\nas unoriginated, imperishable, and unchanging. It has all the qualities\nthat Parmenides attributed to his single Being, only the elements may\nchange their place and suffer mechanical division. The Pluralists thus\nmake the Eleatic conception useful in the explanation of nature.\n\n=The Introduction of the Conception of the Efficient Cause.= The\nEleatics had detached the quality of motion from Being. The Pluralists,\nin reintroducing it, were obliged to make it a separate force in order\nto get movement into their universe. The elements are changeless. How\ncan they move? They cannot move themselves. They are moved from without.\nHere in Empedocles is made a differentiation of great importance\u2015\u2015the\nconcept of the moving or efficient cause. However, this does not appear\nin this early time in conceptual but in mythical-poetic and undefined\nform. With this differentiated efficient cause, can Pluralism be\nconsidered to be hylozoism? Authorities differ. Certainly this new\nconcept shows the beginning of the breaking up of hylozoism and\nthe beginning of the formation of a mechanistic conception of the\nuniverse. But probably the Pluralists were as much hylozoists as their\npredecessors, the monists. Their efficient causes are material like\nthe elements, and they are poetically and indefinitely described. They\nare in every case conceived as the material which has a lively or an\noriginating motion. We must keep in mind that all the Cosmologists\nexcept the Eleatics believed movement to be life.\n\n=Summary of Similarities and Differences in the Theories of the\nReconcilers.=\n\nThe general common characteristics of the theories of the Reconcilers:\u2015\u2015\n\n 1. A plurality of the elements.\n\n 2. An efficient cause which explains the shifting of the elements\n in causing the origin, growth, and decay of the world of nature.\n\nThe general differences between the theories of the Reconcilers:\u2015\u2015\n\n 1. In the number and quality of the elements.\n\n 2. In the number and quality of the causes.\n\n=The Pluralistic Philosophers: Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Leucippus, and\nthe Later Pythagoreans.= With the Pluralists we pass completely out of\nthe sixth century B. C. The lives of the hylozoistic Pluralists span\nthe fifth century, and cosmological interest extends later. Even the\nEleatic Zeno lived from 490 to 430 B. C. Empedocles lived from 490 to\n430 B. C., Anaxagoras from 500 to 425 B. C., and the Pythagoreans and\nLeucippus later. When the cosmological movement was still virile in the\nGrecian colonies, and even before it had reached its systematic form\nin Democritus of Abdera, the anthropological movement had begun in the\nmotherland, in Athens. The Persian Wars are the dividing line between\nthe two periods, but only because they denote the beginning of the new\nmovement in Athens, not the end of the old movement in Asia Minor and\nMagna Gr\u00e6cia. Contemporaneous with the Pluralists was the brilliant Age\nof Pericles, when the Sophists were carrying education to the people\nand Socrates was teaching in the Athenian market-place. By the middle\nof the fifth century B. C. there was the liveliest interchange of\nscientific ideas throughout Greek society, and the contemporaneousness\nof the Pluralists with one another and with the Athenian philosophers\nshows this in many similarities in their doctrines and in many\npolemical references. There are four schools of Reconcilers, of which\nEmpedocles, Anaxagoras, Leucippus, and the later Pythagoreans are the\nrepresentatives.\n\n_Empedocles_[11] (490 to 430 B. C.) was the first Dorian philosopher, a\npartisan of the democracy, and belonged to a rich family of Agrigentum.\nHe became a distinguished statesman, but he later fell from popular\nfavor. Then, in the garb of a magician, he traveled as physician and\npriest through Magna Gr\u00e6cia. His political affiliations would prevent\nhis direct connection with the Pythagoreans, but he showed that the\nPythagoreans influenced him, and his career is an imitation of that of\nPythagoras. He was acquainted with the theory of Heracleitus, and he\nknew Parmenides personally. He was one of the first rhetoricians, and\nwas probably connected with a large literary circle. He is the first\nand most imperfect representative of the reconciliation. The story of\nhis suicide by leaping into Mt. \u00c6tna is supposed to be a myth.\n\n_Anaxagoras_ (500\u2013425 B. C.), a man of wealthy antecedents, was much\nesteemed, was born in Clazomen\u00e6 in a circle rich in Ionian culture,\nbut was isolated from practical life. He declared the heaven to be his\nfatherland and the study of the heavenly bodies to be his life\u2019s task.\nHe went to Athens about 450 B. C., where he formed one of a circle\nof notable men of culture. He lived in Athens under the patronage of\nPericles, but in 434 B. C. he was expelled. In Athens he was intimate\nwith such men as Euripides, Thucydides, and Protagoras. He represents\nthe first appearance of philosophy in Athens.\n\nThe life of _Leucippus_ is almost unknown. He was probably born in\nMiletus, visited Elea, and settled in Abdera.\n\n_The Later Pythagoreans._ After the Pythagoreans as a religious and\npolitical body had been defeated at Crotona, they lost their prestige\nand were scattered to the four winds. They were beaten in the battle\nof Crotona (510 B. C.) and dispersed about 450 B. C. Pythagoras died\n504 B. C. His scattered followers, these later Pythagoreans, formed\na school of philosophy which had its centre at Thebes. Destroyed as a\nreligious body the members lost their superstitions and turned their\nattention to philosophy, astronomy, mathematics, medicine, and physics.\nAs mathematicians and as astronomers they are the most notable among\nthe ancients. Philolaus is the probable originator of their philosophy\nof numbers. This school disappeared about 350 B. C. Pythagoreanism\nreappeared later under the name of neo-Pythagoreanism.\n\n=The Philosophy of Empedocles.= Empedocles conceived the number of\nelements to be four,\u2015\u2015earth, air, fire, and water,\u2015\u2015an arbitrary\nenumeration, which nevertheless persisted in the popular imagination\nthroughout the Middle Ages. He chose this number of elements because\nthey included all the elements in his predecessors\u2019 theories. By the\ntransposition and new arrangement of these elements he could account\nfor the variety of the world. The efficient causes that make these\ndifferent separations and mixtures are Love and Hate, two mythical and\nsensuous entities. Love is the cause of the union of things, Hate of\ntheir separation.\n\nThis is the general metaphysical theory that Empedocles uses to explain\nthe physical world and especially physiological phenomena; and he\nis probably best known as the author of the aphorism, \u201cLike attracts\nLike.\u201d For example, he conceives the physical world as continuously\nrepeating itself through four cosmic stages, each centuries long. The\nworld moves therefore in cyclical evolution, in which Love is bringing\nlike elements together only to be followed by stages of the separation\nof the like elements by Hate,\u2015\u2015an endless cosmic procession.\n\nBut Empedocles\u2019 interest in cosmology was only a part of his dominating\ninterest in the organic world. He held some interesting evolution\ntheories. His special interest in human physiology led him to frame the\nfirst theory of perception. Man is composed of the four elements, and\nhe can know the universe around himself because Like in him attracts\nLike in the external world. The earth forms our solid parts, water the\nliquid parts, air is the vital breath, and fire is the soul. The blood\ncontains the four elements, and is therefore the real carrier of life.\nIf we perceive anything, it is because we have qualities similar to\nthat thing. The element in us attracts the like element outside. He\nfancifully explained how parts of each element pressed upon parts of\nlike elements\u2015\u2015earth upon earth, air upon air; and how these clung\ntogether until sundered by Hate. The senses have only a partial number\nof elements, while the reason has them all; therefore sense knowledge\nis partial when compared with rational knowledge.\n\n=The Philosophy of Anaxagoras.= The pluralistic conception of the\nnature-substance, that was originated by Empedocles in this crude\nform, got a more complete character in the hands of Anaxagoras. For\nAnaxagoras took exception to the arbitrary assumption of Empedocles\nthat the elements were only four in number. How could this world of\ninfinite variety be derived from only four elements? We must postulate\nas many elements as there are qualities, if by merely shuffling\nthem\u2015\u2015by various combinings and separatings of them\u2015\u2015their infinite\nnumber is to be explained. _There are a plural number of elements\nqualitatively distinct._ Every perceptual thing is composed of these\nheterogeneous parts or qualities or elements. But how do you know an\nelement when you find one? Always by the fact that when you divide\nit, its parts are homogeneous. The elements are, therefore, those\nsubstances that divide into parts that are like one another; while the\nperceptual objects of nature can be divided into parts that are unlike\none another. They are called \u201cseeds\u201d by Anaxagoras, and designated\nas \u201chomoiomeriai\u201d by Aristotle and later philosophy. This was a time,\nit must be remembered, when chemical analysis had not developed, and\nwhen mechanical division and change of temperature were the only means\nof investigation. Form, color, and taste were the characteristics\nthat differentiated elements. So Anaxagoras was content to name as\nelements such things as bones, muscles, flesh, marrow, metals, etc.\nThe countless elements or qualities are present in a finely divided\nstate throughout the universe. Every perceptual object has present\nin it all elements, even opposite elements. It is, however, known and\nnamed by the element that prevails in it at any particular instant. For\nexample, fire contains an element of cold but the fire element prevails.\nOpposites attract, and the qualitative change in a thing consists in\nthe predominance of some other quality already present in it.\n\nFor the efficient cause of the combining and separating of the elements\n_Anaxagoras selected one of the elements_. He called it the Nous, the\nGreek word for mind or reason. Many historians have therefore concluded\nthat Anaxagoras is the author of an idealistic philosophy. Aristotle\nsays of Anaxagoras that he \u201cstood out like a sober man among the random\ntalkers that had preceded him.\u201d But both Plato[12] and Aristotle are\ndisappointed with the way in which Anaxagoras handles the conception\nof Nous and, as a matter of fact, the Nous, as Anaxagoras uses it,\nis not less hylozoistic than the Love and Hate of Empedocles. In the\nNous Anaxagoras threw out a thought that was too big for him. Its\nintroduction, however, marks the breaking up of pre-Socratic hylozoism.\nAnaxagoras wrote down the word, Nous, from which comes the contrast\nwith matter. He stripped the mythical dress from the efficient cause\nof Empedocles and substituted Nous, because he wished to emphasize the\nunity of the cosmic process. The Nous is one of the elements; it is\n\u201cthought-stuff,\u201d it is a corporeal substance. It differs from all the\nother elements in that it is the finest, the most mobile, and has the\npower of self-motion. If among the early schools motion is life, here\nwe find the new conception of self-motion as most alive. Instead of a\ndeparture from hylozoism, this is a rehabilitation of hylozoism in more\nperfect form. The Nous is the cause of the harmony and order of the\ncosmos.\n\n=The Philosophy of the Atomists\u2015\u2015Leucippus and the School at Abdera.=\nOnly circumstantial evidence is left to testify to the early beginnings\nof the school of atomists at Abdera. About 450 B. C., owing to the rise\nof Athens and the great victory of Cimon over the Persians, the Ionian\ncivilization on the coasts of Asia Minor had a new lease of life, and\nthere was a renewal of scientific activity in the cities. The influence\nof the Milesians appeared and Anaxagoras\u2019 doctrine, which had been\nwidely disseminated, began to have great vigor. Among the philosophers\nof this section was one about whom we know very little, except that\nhis name was Leucippus and that he was the father of atomism. Miletus\nwas probably his native place, and after visiting Elea he settled\nin Abdera in Thrace. We know that the polemic of Zeno was directed\nagainst contemporary atomism; and we know the theories of the pupils\nof Leucippus, of Protagoras, and of Democritus, in whom the doctrine\nof atomism culminated. Probably the theory of Leucippus was that\nthe cosmic substance is composed of _an infinite number of elements\nquantitatively distinct_, in opposition to Empedocles\u2019 theory of a\nfourfold division as well as against Anaxagoras\u2019 theory of an infinite\nnumber of qualities. Atomism in this early form represents one of the\nways that Greek thought took in reconciling the conflicting claims of\nHeracleitus and Parmenides. The doctrine of atomism will be presented\nfully in its greatest representative, Democritus.\n\n=The Later Pythagoreans.= Had the Pythagorean band remained what\nPythagoras had designed it, had it not had its political aspirations\ncrushed at the battle of Crotona and the members scattered far and wide,\nit would probably have for the historian of to-day only the importance\nof a local band of political and religious reformers. The adversity at\nCrotona was, however, a blessing in disguise for the Pythagoreans and\nfor Greece, for it turned the Pythagoreans from religious politics to\nscience and metaphysics. _In the first place_, they became the authors\nof an important metaphysical theory. This was the theory of numbers,\nwhich influenced Plato, became the foundation of a vigorous school in\nAlexandria in the Hellenic-Roman Period, flourished during the Middle\nAges, and united with the doctrines of the Jews in what is called the\nCabala. To-day the magic numbers persist in our superstitions. _In\nthe second place_, the Pythagoreans turned to science,\u2015\u2015especially\nto mathematics and astronomy,\u2015\u2015and in these two branches became very\ncelebrated in ancient times. Their astronomical theory had a most\nextraordinary history. With modifications it was preserved by Plato\nand Aristotle, and later became the basis of the Ptolemaic system\nof astronomy. This system was the scientifically accepted system\nfor fifteen hundred years, when it was supplanted by the Newtonian\ntheory. It is a most singular fact that the cosmological background\nof the Epics of Dante and Milton is the astronomical system of the\nPythagoreans as expressed in the Ptolemaic system.\n\nThe Pythagoreans, be it remarked, were \u201cReconcilers,\u201d but they were\nmore. The original ethical motive of Pythagoras influenced them as\nscientists. They did not attempt to formulate a science of ethics, but\nthe ethical motive was always back of their mathematics and astronomy.\n\n=1. The Pythagorean Conception of Being.= The Pythagorean conception\nof reality is the most advanced of any cosmological theory in this\nperiod. The Pythagoreans were hylozoists, but they come the nearest\nto transcending the hylozoism of their time. The influence of the\nlater Pythagoreans, whom Plato met in Italy, upon Plato shows that\nPythagorean philosophy forms a link between the cosmology of the\ncolonies and the following comprehensive systems of thought.\n\nThe important position in the evolution of Greek thought occupied\nby the Pythagoreans depends upon their conception of that Being that\nabides amid all change. Pythagoreanism is usually spoken of as \u201cthe\nnumber theory.\u201d This is, however, only a suggestion of its import. For\nnumbers are not to the Pythagoreans what the different kinds of cosmic\nmatter were to the early monists, or what the several elements were to\nthe pluralists,\u2015\u2015Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the atomists. Neither are\nthey abstractions merely, such as we use in scientific reckoning. The\nPythagoreans were pluralists and hylozoists whose plural numbers look\nbeyond hylozoism.\n\nThere are two kinds of reality in the Pythagorean teaching: (1) numbers,\nand (2) unlimited space. The essential nature of things, the Being\nthat abides, consists in the shaping of this unlimited space into\nmathematical forms. The numbers or the forms are the limited aspect of\nBeing; space is the unlimited aspect of Being. Actual Being consists\nin the union of the two aspects. Being therefore has two roots, each\nbeing necessary to the other. The later Pythagoreans, indeed, called\nattention to the fact that their numbers were not the same as the\ndifferent kinds of matter out of which the other Cosmologists conceived\nthe world to be fashioned. Numbers are not the stuff out of which\nthe world of nature-objects have arisen, but rather are forms of\nnature-objects. Numbers are the patterns or models of things; things\nare the copies or imitations of numbers. Unlimited space furnishes the\nmaterial; numbers or mathematical forms furnish the mould; the result\nis a material thing. Here we find the early basis of Plato\u2019s doctrine\nof Ideas, and the correlation in Aristotle of Form and matter. If we\nwere to draw an analogy between the Pythagorean conception of numbers\nand any part of the preceding cosmological teaching, we should find\nthe similarity between the numbers and the earlier efficient causes\nand not between the numbers and the elements. For example, Pythagorean\nnumbers have a function more nearly like Love and Hate than like the\nfour elements in Empedocles\u2019 teaching. On the other hand, Pythagorean\nunlimited space is analogous to the Empedoclean elements.\n\n=2. The Pythagorean Dualistic World.=[13] The Pythagoreans carried out\ntheir conception of this twofold reality both in their mathematical\nstudies and in their conceptions of natural objects. It was from such\ninvestigations that they were impressed by the dualism in everything\nand so reached their principle. They observed in mathematics that\nthe number-series consists of alternate odd and even numbers. The\nodd numbers are limited and the even unlimited (because they could\nbe divided). They explained the elements as determined by mathematical\nforms: fire has the form of a tetrahedron; earth, of the cube; air,\nof the octohedron; water, of the icosahedron; and an additional fifth\nelement, the \u00e6ther, of the dodecahedron. They carried this dualism\nfurther by identifying the limited form with the odd, with the perfect,\nand with the good; while the unlimited was identified with the even,\nthe imperfect, and the bad. Some of the Pythagoreans even sought to\ntrace out this dualism in the many realms of experience, and they\noriginated a table of ten pairs of opposites: limited and unlimited;\nodd and even; one and many; right and left; male and female; rest and\nmotion; straight and crooked; light and dark; good and bad; square and\noblong.\n\nThere is a system in the Pythagorean theory not to be found in the\nteaching of the other reconcilers. Although all the numbers, and with\nthem all the world, are divided into two opposing classes, these are,\nnevertheless, united in a harmony. The harmony of a dualism reminds us\nof Heracleitus\u2019 harmony of antitheses. All series of numbers have their\nunity and harmony in the odd-even number, One. To the Pythagorean the\nopposites of life\u2015\u2015the good and the bad, the limited and unlimited, the\nperfect and imperfect, the odd and even\u2015\u2015exist in an harmonious whole.\n\nAs the Pythagorean school grew in years, the realms to which it\napplied its theory increased. While we have stated its metaphysical\ntheory first in order to give it prominence, the school came to the\nformulation of its theory through its investigations in mathematics,\nmusic, and astronomy. Then it applied the theory to geometrical\nstructures and to other fields with a procedure that was arbitrary and\nunmethodical. Yet so universal was the application of the theory that\nit lived to have superstitious authority for the human mind in the\nMiddle Ages.\n\n=3. Pythagorean Astronomy.= The formation of the world-all began from\nthe One, or central fire, which attracted and limited the nearest\nportions of the unlimited. This fire became the centre of the world-all,\nwhich had the shape of a hollow globe. Around the central fire the\ncelestial bodies move in globular transparent shells. Their movements\nare concentric to the fire. This is the beginning of the astronomical\ntheory of the crystalline spheres. The world-all is divided into three\nconcentric portions. The periphery or outer rim is Olympus, where all\nis perfection and where the gods dwell. Between Olympus and the moon is\nCosmos, where all is orderly and all movements are in circles. Between\nthe moon and the central fire is the region called Uranus, where all\nis disorderly and the movements are up and down. The earth is in this\nlower section of disorder, and moves in a transparent globular shell\nlike the celestial bodies around the central fire. The number of the\nheavenly bodies is the perfect number, ten. The world-all is conceived\nas a heavenly heptachord, with the orbits of the seven planets as\nthe sounding strings. Upon this notion was founded the harmony of the\nspheres, which harmony is not heard by man because it is constant.\nIn modifying this astronomical theory and then accepting it, the most\nimportant change that Aristotle made was to conceive the earth as at\nthe centre of the world-all with the sun revolving about it. This was\nthe form in which the Ptolemaic astronomers received it.\n\n=Historical Retrospect.= In these many searchings of the Cosmologists\nfor a reality amid the changes of nature, what result can be found\nsignificant for the Cosmological Period and valuable as a bequest for\nthe following periods? Are these crude scientific speculations of the\nearly Greeks to be looked upon as out of connection with their own\nage and the age to come? The Cosmological philosophy had two definite\nresults. _In the first place_, with reference to its own century and\na half, it saved the intellectual world of Greece from the slavery of\na mystic religion. When we started with Thales in 625 B. C., we saw\nGreece confronted with two perils. One was political, and consisted\nof internecine troubles and of danger from its warlike neighbors. This\nperil grew still greater, until at the very end of the period it was\naverted at the battle of Salamis. Greek arms banished this political\nperil. But the other peril was subjective and therefore more menacing.\nThe mysteries of the Orphic religion would have quenched the Greek\ngenius had not its rational philosophy given the Greek intellectual\nlife new conceptions. _In the next place_, it bequeathed to the\nsucceeding period a fairly well-drawn contrast between a world of\nintellectual order and a world of sensuous disorder. The thought of an\norder in nature in conformity to law was developed into clearness in\nthe Cosmological Period. The order was obtained from the astronomical\nstudies of these scientists. Reasoning from the order that they saw, to\nan ordering principle, Anaxagoras and the Pythagoreans almost, but not\nquite, gave to that principle a teleological meaning. The principle of\npermanence that these nature scientists sought was found in the great\nand simple relations of the stars, whose revolutions are the expression\nof order and constancy. Impregnated as they were with their elemental\nhylozoism, the Greek Cosmologists were as yet not quite able to find\nan orderly permanence in the terrestrial world with its manifold\nand intersecting motions. Yet Greek thought was looking forward. The\nCosmologist had already contrasted the terrestrial as the imperfect\nwith the celestial as the perfect peace and permanence. The step was\nbut a short one from the contrast of the two realms to the effort to\nbring them into a unity. Thus in this astronomical and concrete form\na distinction of value was obtained that had lasting ethical and\n\u00e6sthetical significance, not only upon Plato and Aristotle, but upon\nmodern thought.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER IV\n\n THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERIOD (490\u2013399 B. C.):\n THE PHILOSOPHY OF MAN\n\n\n=An Historical Summary of the Anthropological Period.= The\nAnthropological Period begins with the Persian Wars, 490 and\n480 B. C. After the battle of Marathon there sprang up a distinct\nimpulse toward knowledge all over Greece; and detailed investigations\nwere begun in mathematics, astronomy, biology, medicine, history,\nand physics. Science, which had up to this time been unorganized and\nundifferentiated, now became sharply divided into the special sciences.\nBut what makes the Persian Wars of particular importance is that they\nare the starting-point in the motherland of the movement in the study\nof man and human relations. The battle of Marathon does not therefore\nmark the end of the Cosmological movement and the waning of the Greeks\u2019\ninterest in science; but it marks rather the beginning in Athens of\nthe Anthropological movement. The Cosmological and the Anthropological\nPeriods overlap.\n\nThe Anthropological Period easily divides itself into three epochs from\nthe point of view of its political affairs:\u2015\u2015\n\n 1. The Persian Wars, 490 and 480 B. C.\n 2. The Age of Pericles, 467\u2013428 B. C.\n 3. The Peloponnesian Wars, 432\u2013403 B. C.\n\nThe first epoch is the birth and the last epoch the decadence of pure\nGreek civilization, while the thirty-nine years of the supremacy of\nPericles cover the ripest period of Greek life. In this connection\nit is well to mention Hegel\u2019s thought that nations do not ripen\nintellectually until they begin to decay politically (\u201cThe owl of\nMinerva does not start upon its flight until the evening twilight\nhas begun to fall\u201d). Plato and Aristotle do not come until after this\nperiod, when Greek political life had begun to wane.\n\nThe following table is a partial list of the notable men of the period,\nwith the date of their _birth_:\u2015\u2015\n\n \u00c6schylus, 525 (dramatist before Pericles).\n Sophocles, 495 (dramatist during Age of Pericles).\n Phidias, 490.\n Euripides, 480 (dramatist of the Sophistic and the new learning).\n Herodotus, 475.\n Thucydides, 471.\n Xenophon, 430?\n Aristophanes, 444.\n Anaxagoras, 500.\n Empedocles, 495.\n Protagoras, 480.\n Democritus, 470.\n Sophists (many), 450\u2013350.\n Socrates, 469.\n Antisthenes, 440.\n Aristippus, 435.\n Plato, 427.\n\n=The Persian Wars and the Rise of Athens.= The blow that had been\nimpending over Greece during the sixth century had been struck,\nbut had been averted in the Persian Wars of 490 B. C. and 480 B. C.\nThe powerful and splendidly organized \u201cbarbaric neighbor,\u201d who had\nthreatened the civilization of the Greek cities of Asia Minor for so\nmany years, had swept over the Hellespont into Greece and had been\nturned back. It has been pointed out[14] that the Persian Wars were\nonly one of a series of conflicts between Oriental and Occidental\ncivilizations; and that the strip of Asia Minor along the Mediterranean\nhas always been a disputed borderland between irreconcilable\nhemispheres. First was the mythical invasion of Troy; then the Persian\nWars; then came the arms of Alexander conquering Persia; then the\ninvasion of the Mohammedans to the very walls of Tours; then the\nCrusades; and to-day we still have the eternal Eastern question with\nus. While each of these conflicts was momentous for Europe, none was\nmore important in its issues for the world than the Persian Wars. For\nthrough those wars did Greece first come to a consciousness of herself.\nNever before did she realize her united strength,\u2015\u2015the greatness of\nher inherited instincts. The fifth century B. C. was the most clearly\nconscious moment of Greece, if not of the world. Classic Greece\u2015\u2015the\nGreece whose thought became fundamental to western civilization\u2015\u2015was\nborn from the Persian Wars.\n\nThe centre of gravity of the Greek world was shifted after the Persian\nWars from Miletus to Athens, from the colonies to the motherland.\nIndeed, the history of classic Greece is almost entirely the history\nof Athens. Of the large cities of Greece,\u2015\u2015Corinth, \u00c6gina, Sparta, and\nThebes,\u2015\u2015Athens was naturally the locality where Grecian civilization\nwould centre when the commercial and maritime colonies fell. The Ionian\nrace, by whom it had been settled, was a mixed race, and by nature very\nversatile. Before the Persian Wars it had been under the wise tyranny\nof Pisistratus, who took the first steps toward the founding of an\nAthenian empire. In the period between the two wars, Themistocles had\nbuilt the Athenian fleet and thereby made Athens the great maritime\nand naval centre of Greece. There was, indeed, every reason why Athens\nand not some other Grecian city should become the new centre of classic\nGreece. The Spartans were oligarchical, stern, unintellectual, and\noffensive to strangers; the people of Thebes were held under a strict\naristocratic government, the people of Thessaly were aristocratic,\nluxurious, and stagnant; but the Athenians were democratic, social to\nstrangers, literary, liberal, frugal, and alert. After the Persian Wars\nthe power of the Delian confederacy became more and more centralized\nin the city of Athens. Controlling the fleet of the Confederacy for her\nown defense and using the rich treasury of the Confederacy for her own\nmunicipal improvements, Athens under the brilliant rule of Pericles,\nwho summoned scholars and artists from all Greece, was the only city\nof Greece where the Renaissance of Greece was possible. Athens had\nbecome the eye of Greece, and the following description of the Greek\nRenaissance is especially significant in regard to her.\n\n=The Greek Enlightenment.= Following the Persian Wars there arose\nthroughout Greece a great national intellectual movement. The years\nmark the Greek Renaissance, the Age of Pericles, and the time when\nthe Greek masterpieces in literature and plastic art were produced.\nPerhaps the greatest Greek production was Athens itself, whose cultural\ninfluence was personified in the scholar-politician, Pericles.\n\n1. _The Impulse for Learning._ In the first place there was a general\nimpulse throughout Greece for education. Everybody seemed to want to\nknow what the schools of Cosmologists had had to say about science. The\nGreeks now had wealth and therefore leisure; they had come into contact\nwith the Oriental peoples and therefore they had their curiosity\nexcited. Learning, which had been confined in the Cosmological Period\nto a few scholars in the schools, now came forth into the market place.\nLearning in the fifth century B. C. was drawn from the schools into\npublicity. The objects of interest had greatly widened and the learning\nof the scholars began to filter into the general consciousness. Whereas\nin the sixth century philosophy was a matter between learned men, in\nthe fifth century we find Socrates and the Sophists teaching whosoever\nwould listen.\n\n2. _The Practical Need of Knowledge._ But mere curiosity will not\nentirely explain the Greek intellectual movement. There had grown up\nan imperative practical need for knowledge. In Athens and other Greek\ncities the democracy of the fifth century B. C. had supplanted the\ntyranny of the sixth century. Duty and inclination together forced\nthe citizen into active participation in public affairs. In these\ndemocratic cities family tradition and character were no longer\nsufficient for success; but it became generally recognized that the\nmost useful and successful man was the educated man. The complex\nrelations existing between states and between the citizens in the\nstates made education absolutely necessary for the politician. Nowhere\nwas the need of an education more imperative than in Athens; nowhere\nwas the need more easily filled. In a very short time after the Persian\nWars the social position of science changed to one of power; and the\ninner character of science changed from the study of nature to the\nstudy of ethical and political problems. Scientists became teachers of\neloquence, for the citizen now needed to be an orator and a rhetorician.\nStatesmen and generals must know how to persuade. Courts of law were\npublic, their proceeding oral, and personal attendance was therefore\nrequired. There was no man in Athens who might not be condemned, if\nhe could not personally in court refute falsehoods and disentangle\nsophistries. Besides, to be beaten in debate was as disgraceful in the\neyes of the public as to lose one\u2019s cause.\n\nTwo classes of men, with an importance hitherto unknown, appear in\nGreek history,\u2015\u2015the rhetoricians and the dialecticians. _Rhetoric_ was\npublic oratory, necessary for the public defense of one\u2019s rights, or\nfor the maintenance of one\u2019s dignity, or for the gratification of one\u2019s\nambition. The _dialectic_ was, on the other hand, argument employed in\nprivate between two persons, usually friends, to unravel an obscurity,\nto reduce an opponent to silence, to exercise one\u2019s self in the mastery\nof a subject, or to sift evidence. The dialectic, therefore, became\na distinct mental pursuit for men who had a natural defect in public\nspeaking or rhetoric. Besides rhetoric and dialectic, there grew up\nsomewhat later what was called the eristic. _Eristic_ was polemical\nargument consisting of catch-phrases and logical subtleties. It was\ntaught as an art of adroit argument.\n\nThe great Greek tragedies occupy a place in the development of\nthe dialectic and the satisfying of the need of knowledge. Science,\nthrough the drama, transformed the old religious views and brought\nits new interpretation to the common people. The development of the\nfifth-century drama out of the epic of the sixth century was not merely\na change in architectonic, but a transformation of its ethical and\nreligious spirit. The germ was in the previous ethics, lyrics, and\ngnomics, yet it was fully amplified in the drama. Instead of a summary\nof deeds the tragic poet makes his characters talk, defend, refute,\naccuse, lament, etc. This gives rise to exigencies that require the\ndialectic. In the conflicting duties and in the justification of the\nwrong done by the wrong suffered, dialectical skill is called for in\nthe drama to weigh the ethical motives in a manner that the epic does\nnot demand. Thus the drama of \u00c6schylus, Sophocles, and Euripides was a\nlink between the lyric and gnomic poetry of the sixth century B. C. and\nthe dialogue literature of Plato.[15]\n\n3. _The Critical Attitude of Mind._ The most important characteristic\nof this period is neither the intensified social curiosity nor the\nincreased social needs. It is rather ethical in its character. It is\nthe \u201ccritical\u201d or \u201cindividualistic\u201d attitude of mind. This began with\nthe \u201cfree city feeling\u201d\u2015\u2015the consciousness of the free man in a free\nstate\u2015\u2015in the first half of the fifth century B. C., and developed\nrapidly into individualism and critical skepticism toward the end of\nthat century.\n\nIf one were to compare in a single word the history of Greece before\nthe Persian Wars with that after the Persian Wars, he would say that\nthe former was traditional and the latter was critical. Nevertheless,\nat the beginning of the Cosmological Period Greek traditional customs\nwere being weakened by attacks upon them. Religious ideas were\nthreatened by the Cosmologists. The subordination of the gods to the\ncosmic substance was an attack upon the established polytheism of the\nEpic, and the attack became direct in the hands of Xenophanes. It was\n\u201cthe divestiture of Nature of its gods by science.\u201d The Mysteries were\na part of this departure from the traditional religion. But the new\nand more critical scientific attitude toward traditional religion was\nonly incidental to the growing criticism of law. In the days of the\noligarchy there were two self-evident political assumptions: (1) that\nlaw has validity because it is law; (2) that obedience to law is for\none\u2019s advantage. When, however, the political disturbances began, a\nself-conscious individualism developed among the Greeks. The Gnomic\nPoets had been the first to appeal to the individual consciousness\nof the people. All through the sixth century B. C. Greece had stern\nexperiences, and the individual found himself questioning the sanctity\nof tradition and of time-honored laws. There was no longer a tacit\nacquiescence in established order, and the claims of authority were no\nlonger, as formerly, unchallenged. Confidence in political assumptions\nbegan to waver, and a critical attitude was taken toward laws which\nchanged from year to year. The appearance everywhere of the tyrant, the\nvigorous personality who could set up his will against the will of a\ntraditional aristocracy, impressed the age with the power of individual\negoism. The seat of authority was shifted from tradition to the\nindividual reason, and all institutions were brought under individual\ncriticism.\n\nThe Persian Wars mark the point of transition from the traditional\nattitude to the critical attitude of the Greek mind. In themselves the\nPersian Wars were a great moral uplift, and were a return for a time\nto the traditional institutions. The changes long since begun were\nsuspended for a time in the united effort of the Greek nation. But\nthe tendencies became more insistent when the danger was past. The\nPersian Wars had cleared the atmosphere of its pessimism and had given\nfreedom to the intellectual movement. Then later, in the heat of that\nintellectual movement, individualism and criticism came to fullest\nfruitage. Doubt grew into positive skepticism.\n\nIn the last part of the fifth century B. C., critical skepticism became\nuniversal. In religion the anthropomorphism of the Epic passes under\nridicule. Critias declares that the gods are the invention of shrewd\nstatecraft. In literature the Epic, in which the gods interfere in all\nhuman details, yields to the naturalistic descriptions of Herodotus\nand Thucydides, and to the personal note of lyric and satirical poetry.\nMore important than all was the change of attitude toward the laws.\nInstead of the law having a divine authority, the individual placed\nhimself above it and sat in judgment upon it. The tribal conception\nof guilt, that when a member of a tribe sinned the whole tribe would\nsuffer at the hands of the gods, had given way at the time of the\nPersian Wars to that of personal responsibility and retribution. It\nwas noted that laws change in the same state, that they differ in\ndifferent states, and that moral customs have a great variety. All laws\nseem therefore to be made by man, and the question then arose, Is there\nany law which has universal validity? Is there any real _prius_ or\n\u201cNature\u201d of laws? In the Anthropological Period, the important question\nwas about the real _prius_ or \u201cNature\u201d of human institutions, just\nas in the Cosmological Period the question was about the real _prius_\nor \u201cNature\u201d of the world of physical phenomena. Yet the question\nof the Anthropologists was a part of the Cosmological problem. The\nCosmologists had called the real _prius_ or \u201cNature\u201d (\u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2), that\nwhich ever remains like itself, and it is now asked if \u201cNature\u201d in\nitself contains any unchanging and eternal politico-moral law. The\ncontrast is thus drawn for all time between natural law and statute law,\nand the distinction dominates this period. Human legal institutions\nwere regarded as only makeshifts, and often even as contradicting the\ndivine law. The conflict between natural or divine law and human law\nappears worked out in the _Antigone_ of Sophocles.\n\nThe same interest in the foundations of morality and moral relations\nopened up the whole subject of the power of human consciousness to\ndiscern such relations. It was a logical necessity that turned thought\nfrom a review of man\u2019s relations with his fellows to a criticism of his\nown constitution. What is man? What are his faculties? Has he any that\ngive him the truth and the reality? Or do they all deceive him so that\nhe cannot detect the real from the sham of life? What are the mental\nfaculties used in disputation, and how are they to be trained so that\nman may rise to an eminence of culture among his fellows? The Greek\nthus turned to a criticism of his knowing faculties, and the positive\nsocial and moral demands made such a criticism necessary to his\nwell-being. Greek science took a strong anthropological direction, and\nlogic, ethics, psychology, rhetoric, etc., took the place of natural\nscience subjects. The Greek in the fifth century B. C. was interested\nin man\u2015\u2015in his inner activities, his ideations and volitions. Of\nthis critical and individualistic attitude Euripides is the literary\nexponent; Pericles is the political personification; Socrates and the\nSophists are its philosophical expression.\n\n=The Significance of the Sophists.= The Sophists were the direct means\nof bringing this intellectual change into Greek life. They were the\nbearers of this Greek Enlightenment, and they were the missionaries\nthat spread its influence far and wide. This significance of the\nSophists to the culture of Greece was never understood by the historian\nuntil Hegel set them in their true light. The dark side of their\ncharacter has been painted in blackest colors, so that the word\n\u201cSophist\u201d has carried an opprobrium with it. They were, however,\nthe exponents of the Greek illumination, and not the cause of it.\nThey therefore share all its weaknesses and its excellencies; and\nany judgment upon them is a judgment upon the time itself. The most\naccurate description of them is that they were the exponents of Greek\nculture in the age of Pericles; the worst that can be said of them\nis that they stimulated the Greek spirit in directions in which it\nshould have been controlled. Their true work was to carry the gospel\nof Greek individualism everywhere; their fault lay in the fact that\ntoo frequently they confused individualism with hypocrisy, and led\ntheir hearers to believe that appearance knowledge is the same as true\nknowledge.\n\nThe word \u201cSophist\u201d had a development among the Greeks. It first\nmeant a wise man (the Cosmologists, from Thales to Anaxagoras, were\nSophists); then a teacher of wisdom; then a paid teacher of wisdom.\nMoreover, among the Sophists there is a difference between the early\nSophists, who were inspired by a distinct desire to spread culture,\nand the later Sophists, who were mercenary teachers, and had on that\naccount degenerated into mere quibblers. In general, the ground of\nthe contemporary hostility to the Sophists was the hatred of the\nconservative and reactionary party, to which belonged Aristophanes\nthe satirist, \u00c6schylus \u201cthe father of tragedy,\u201d and the exponent of\ninstitutional morals, and Xenophon, who stood for a complete return to\na patriarchal state. This party was very bitter against the exponents\nof the new and radical spirit springing up in Greece. All the\nphilosophers of the new learning, including Socrates, suffered at the\nhands of those who would conserve the old traditions. In particular,\nthe accusations against the Sophists of this period were: they were\ncavilers; they taught for pay; they represented the universalizing of\neducation against the old aristocracy; they menaced institutions.\n\nThe Sophists were then primarily and, on the whole, the transmitters\nto the people of the culture of the time. They were the teachers of\nthe humanities to that age. They were not technically philosophers,\nbut were interested in philosophical questions. Protagoras was the only\nSophist who was the author of any fruitful philosophical conceptions.\nGorgias made occasional essays into philosophy. But besides Protagoras\nand Gorgias no other Sophists can be classed as philosophers, except\npossibly Hippias and Prodicus.\n\nThe Sophists introduced a profusion of knowledge among the people. They\nmade investigations in language, logic, and the theory of cognition.\nThey taught literature, history, grammar, the principles of the\ndialectic, the eristic, and rhetoric\u2015\u2015all subjects concerned with the\nart of human expression. They studied and taught the special subjects\nconcerned with human relations, like ethics, the theory of knowledge,\npsychology, and politics. Anything that had a place in Greek culture\nwas systematically and skillfully presented by such men as Protagoras,\nGorgias, Hippias, and Prodicus, who were men of encyclop\u00e6dic erudition.\nThe Sophist took the education of the Greek child at the age of sixteen,\nafter he had received his elementary training, first at home and then\nat the hands of the teacher at school. The Greek boy\u2019s education was\nnaturally divided into two parts: gymnastics for the body and music for\nthe soul. Under music was included geometry, performance on the lyre,\npronunciation, the chorus and poetry, astronomy, physics, and geography.\nAt the age of sixteen he got his instruction by meeting public men,\nsuch as the Sophists, in the street, in the Agora, and other public\nplaces. It was at this period of his life that the Sophist took\nhis education into those higher branches which were necessary for\nhis success in politics, society, and law. Thus the instruction of\nthe Sophist was usually for a specific purpose, and thus rhetoric,\ndialectic, and the mental sciences were in great demand.\n\n=The Prominent Sophists.= The list of Sophists is a long one. The first\nto call himself a Sophist and a teacher of public virtue was, according\nto Plato, Protagoras of Abdera. He was also probably the most eminent\nof the number. He was born about 480 B. C. Polus and Thrasymachus\nwere the last; and Aristotle mentions the Sophists as in the past.\nSo that we may conclude that as a band they existed only one hundred\nyears (450\u2013350 B. C.). Already at the beginning of the fourth century\n(400 B. C.) their importance had greatly diminished. In this hundred\nyears we find some fourteen or fifteen prominent Sophists. There is,\nfirst, Protagoras, whose theory of knowledge is not only in itself a\ncontribution to thought, but also of importance as a factor in forming\nthe materialist atomistic doctrine of the school of Abdera,\u2015\u2015the\nschool of Leucippus and Democritus; Gorgias of Leontini, the head of\nan embassy to Athens, a man of eloquence, whose style was imitated\nby Thucydides and whom we might have studied in connection with the\nEleatic school, for he carried out still further the doctrines of Zeno;\nProdicus, the pupil of Protagoras and Gorgias, a brilliant man and a\ntraveler, whose method of instruction was used by Socrates; Hippias,\ncontemporary of Prodicus, remarkable for his mathematical, physical,\nand historical erudition, and a man full of vanity; the brothers,\nEuthydemus and Dionysiodorus, teachers of eristic; the rhetorician\nThrasymachus and the rhetoricians of the school of Gorgias, viz., Polus,\nLycophron, Protarchus, and Alcidamus; Evenus, rhetorician, moralist,\nand poet; Critias, the leader of the thirty; Callicles and Hippodamus.\n\nMany of these men were reformers. Some (as Alcidamus) were opposed\nto the institution of slavery in Greece; some to marriage; some (as\nLycophron) to the nobility; some to the inequality of property; while\nHippodamus was the first to propose an ideal state.\n\nThe method of argumentation employed by the Sophists was first to\nperplex and confuse their opponents as to what had been taken in the\npast as valid. Then they made their opponents ridiculous by drawing out\nconsequences from their statements. Their conclusions were often verbal\nand their witticisms vulgar.[16]\n\n=The Philosophy of the Sophists.= The philosophy of the Sophists was\nonly the logical following out of the general attitude of the time\ntoward all traditions. The more the old physical theories fell into\ndisrepute, the more the changes of the world of politics seemed to\nindicate instability everywhere, the more opinions differed on the same\nsubject,\u2015\u2015so much the more did the possibility present itself to the\nSophists of taking two contradictories as equally true, and so much the\nfaster did the whole Greek world lose faith in any valid truth and in\nany certain knowledge. The dogmatism of the Cosmological Period is thus\nnaturally followed by the skepticism of the Anthropological. Beginning\nwith the cautious and enlightened relativism of Protagoras, there grew\nup a volume of criticism, until the later Sophists applied destructive\ndoctrines to everything. The best representatives of the philosophical\naspect of the Sophistic movement were Protagoras and Gorgias.\n\n=1. The Relativism of Protagoras.= Although theoretically skepticism\nis the centre and logical result of the Sophistic movement, the\nteaching of the greatest Sophist, Protagoras, cannot be strictly called\nskepticism. Philosophically, skepticism is not the denial of this\nor that particular belief as true, but the denial of the existence\nof any truth whatever. Protagoras refused to make any positive\nstatements\u2015\u2015either in denial or affirmation\u2015\u2015about ultimate truth,\nbecause, as he said, we have no insight whatever into the nature of\nabsolute truth. Our knowledge is confined to motions and the phenomena\nof motion. His teaching would be called in modern times relativism or\nphenomenalism. The fundamental principle beneath such a doctrine is\nthat knowledge is human\u2015\u2015never absolute, but always relative.\n\nThe relativism of Protagoras was based on two principles: the first\nis that of universal change, which he borrowed from Heracleitus;\nthe second is, so far as we know, original with Protagoras,\u2015\u2015that\nsense-perception is the only source and only kind of knowledge. In\nHeracleitus\u2019 doctrine change is universal, each term of a series of\nchanges passing into another. The senses are a part of this flux, and\nsince they are, according to Protagoras, the only source of knowledge,\nknowledge is ephemeral and unreal. Reason is extended and continued\nsensation. A movement external to the organism stimulates an organ of\nthe body and is met by a reacting movement of the organ. The result is\nperception. Perception being itself a process, each present moment of\nperception is the only knowledge. We cannot know things as they are\nin themselves; there is no insight into the Being of things over and\nabove our perceptions. On the contrary, reality is not only what it\nperceptually appears for each individual, but also what it appears at\neach individual momentary perception.\n\nWhat is the result of such a theory of knowledge? Protagoras expresses\nit well in his famous words, \u201cMan is the measure of all things.\u201d It is\nabsolute sensationalism. There is no truth except that of the present\nmoment. Each man sees the truth for himself at the moment of his\nperception. It does not matter if another has a different perception.\nIt does not matter if at the next moment his perception differs. Each\nperception exists at the moment, is true, and at that moment is the\nonly perception. There are as many truths as there are individuals,\nas many as there are moments in an individual\u2019s life. Each individual\nis the measure of the true, the beautiful, and the good; for a thing\nthat is good or true to one man may be harmful or false to another.\nMetaphysical discussions are vain, for the only reality to prove is\nthe content of the present moment. All causes and ultimate criteria are\nimpossible to be known.\n\n=2. The Nihilism of Gorgias.= As the philosophy of Protagoras\nteaches that everything is equally true, that of Gorgias teaches that\neverything is equally false. Gorgias declared that Being, knowledge,\nand the communication of knowledge are impossible. Starting from the\ndialectic of the Eleatic, Zeno (as Protagoras started from that of\nHeracleitus), Gorgias maintained: (1) Nothing is; (2) If anything\nis, it cannot be thought; (3) Even if it can be thought, it cannot be\ncommunicated. The knowledge of the thing is different from the thing;\nthe expression of the thought in words is different from the thought\nitself.\n\n=The Ethics of the Sophists.\u2015\u2015The Application of their Critical\nTheory to Political Life.= The ethical-political life was of paramount\nimportance to the Greek. When the later Sophists began to scrutinize\nit from the point of view of the individual, their skepticism became\na direct menace to Greek political institutions. The individual became\na law unto himself, and the citizen set himself up as superior to\nsociety. Since the time of the Gnomic poets the content of both moral\nand political laws had become more and more a subject of reflection;\nand at the time of the Sophists the whole foundation of law was called\nin question. When the individual man is declared to be the measure\nof all things, all legal and moral institutions hang in the balance.\nAll rules of conduct and all laws become then artificial and merely\nconventional products; and just as there is no standard of truth or\nerror in knowledge, so there is no standard of good citizenship or\nmorality. The good man is the prudent man; the good citizen is the\nsuccessful and powerful man. Might is right.\n\nThus the Sophists came to teach such doctrines as these: Laws are\nmade by the strongest, represent their will, and must be obeyed if\nthey cannot be disobeyed; it takes a strong man to make a law, but a\nstronger to break it; the laws are only conventions invented either\nby the many to restrain the powerful few, or by the few to enslave the\nmany. Even religions are devices of the crafty to enchain the people.\nObedience to law is therefore a matter of personal interest. Happiness\nis the most important consideration of the individual. Sometimes\npersonal interest conflicts with law and law does not then bring\nhappiness, for criminals are often the most happy. It is not obedience\nto law that brings happiness but (Polus) a shrewd calculation of ends\nwith no regard to right or law. The Sophists made no attempt to put\ntheir theories into execution. They expressed the sentiments of the\nGreek people, and Greek public opinion then pointed to segregation and\nindividualism. Plato said that, after all, the Greek public was the\ngreat Sophist.\n\nIt was thus that the distinction arose between positive law and natural\nlaw. Reflecting upon the differences among the constitutions of the\nGreek states and upon the constant alterations in these constitutions,\nthe Sophist concluded that the greater part of them were of human\ninvention. They were positive laws and were to be contrasted with\nnatural law, which was such law as is binding on all men equally.\nNatural law is therefore of greater worth than positive law, and is\nset in antithesis to it. Sir Henry Maine says in his _Ancient Law_ that\nthe Greeks did not found any system of jurisprudence, because natural\nlaw was always referred to by them in arguing any question. The only\nway to find natural law is to strip it of the mass of conventional laws.\nThe word \u201cnature\u201d has been in its history one of the most ambiguous\nof words; and Protagoras\u2019 teaching that \u201cnature\u201d consists of primary\nethical feelings is hardly a complete and satisfactory definition. The\nmore the theory of the Sophists limited \u201cnature\u201d to human nature, and\nto human nature in its capricious and individual aspects, so much the\nmore did statute laws appear antagonistic to natural law and seem to be\ndetrimental to it.\n\n\n Summary.\n\n1. Although a skepticism and a criticism, Sophistry was a relative\nadvance over the traditionalism and dogmatism of the Cosmologists.\n\n2. Sophistry turned the attention to man and his interests as the\nprincipal object of inquiry.\n\n3. The Sophists stood for freedom of thought by pointing to individual\nconsciousness as the final court of appeal.\n\n4. Although the Sophists differed very much in their teaching, they had\na mutual dependence and common presuppositions.\n\n5. The Sophists disregarded the likenesses and emphasized the\ndifferences among men.\n\n6. The Sophists built up their doctrines upon the basis of a\nsensationalist psychology.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER V\n\n SOCRATES (469\u2013399 B. C.).\n\n\n=Socrates and Aristophanes.= There were two ways in which the other\nelements in Greek society tried to meet the Sophists. One was led by\nAristophanes, the other by Socrates. Aristophanes was a rich nobleman\nwho looked back with pride upon the good old times. He would have a\ngovernment of the best rather than of the many. He would destroy the\nSophistic movement, and he wrote many satires upon Greek life with that\nend in view. His satire, _The Clouds_, is of especial interest in this\nconnection. Socrates represents the other way in which the Sophistic\nmovement was met. He accepted the Sophistic movement, but he read more\ndeeply into it than the Sophists themselves, and he tried to find its\ntruth.\n\nThe extraordinary personality of Socrates is the central figure in\nthis age of critical inquiry. For the first time do we find philosophy\ncentred in a great personality, and there is no more picturesque figure\nin history. The exposition of his doctrines is essentially a biography.\nHe wrote nothing himself, and the literary sources of his life and\nteaching are found in Xenophon\u2019s _Memorabilia_ and _Symposium_, in\nthe writings of Plato, and in those of Aristotle. They throw different\nlights upon his character, and together give a fairly complete picture.\nXenophon records the sober, practical, and popular side of Socrates,\ncaught in casual conversation. Plato idealizes Socrates, especially\nin his later writings, and he reveals Socrates\u2019 character on its\nimaginative and spiritual sides. Aristotle is more discriminating\nand less sympathetic, but always reliable because he is a generation\nremoved.[17]\n\n=The Personality and Life of Socrates.= Alcibiades described Socrates\nas like the little cases sold upon the streets of Athens, which\nwere made in the shape of Silenus and contained a carved image. The\ndescription was apt, for Socrates had a fine spiritual nature within\nan astonishing shell. He was short, stout, and thick-set, with his\nhead set upon his shoulders. His eyes were bulging, his nose flat with\nupturned nostrils, his mouth big and grinning, and his beard disordered.\nHis protruding belly was set upon slender legs, and his dress was\nslovenly. Nevertheless his geniality, his fine humor, the unselfishness\nwhich he manifested unstintedly toward his friends, exercised an\nirresistible charm upon all the remarkable personalities of his time.\nOver the Athenian youth his influence was very great, and he surrounded\nhimself with a large circle of admirers, to the neglect of his home\ncares and his wife Xantippe. While the habit of the Sophists was to\ntalk in private and for pay, Socrates was distinguished from all his\ncontemporaries by the fact that he would talk in the public places with\nany one, rich or poor, and without remuneration.\n\nHis life had its ascetic side. He was frugal in his needs. He went\nbarefoot, summer and winter, and his clothing was the scantiest. He was\nabstemious in food and drink. While on occasion at the feast he would\ndrink more wine than any one else, yet he never was seen intoxicated.\nThe ascetic side of his nature is seen in his refusal to cultivate\ngymnastics, because such training required much food. He tried to limit\nhis wants. He was a model of hardiness, self-denial, and self-mastery,\nas many an anecdote will show. \u201cNo one ever saw or heard anything\nwicked in Socrates,\u201d said Xenophon. \u201cSo pious was he that he never did\nanything without first consulting the Gods, so master of himself as\nnever to prefer pleasure to goodness, so sensible as never to err in\nthe choice between the better and the worse. In a word, he was the best\nand the most happy of men.\u201d\n\nAt times Socrates seems intellectually stiff and prosaic. This may\nhave been incidental to his asceticism, or the result of it. He was\nindifferent to the sensuous, and he explained the beautiful in terms\nof the useful. He refused to walk out because trees and flowers could\nteach him nothing. Art offered no suggestions to him, for it is useless\neven if it is inspired. His unpoetic and prosy nature was perhaps not\ndue so much to his lack of taste as to his original mind overflowing\nwith ideas. He was not perceptive, but reflective. He said that\nastronomy is a mystery, geometry is land measuring, which any man\ncan do, arithmetic is merely permissible, and physics something to be\nneglected. \u201cYe may judge how unprofitable these studies are by seeing\nhow men differ among themselves.\u201d He was once found dancing at home\nby himself when he was expected to be at a dance with others, and his\npractical nature is also revealed in the fact that at the feast he was\nreminded of its utility.\n\nThe influence of Socrates\u2019 d\u00e6mon or divine voice upon him is very\ninteresting. He felt himself divinely called by his d\u00e6mon (_Apology_,\n29, 33 f.) to unremitting labor in the moral perfecting of society\nthrough an examination of himself and his fellows. Socrates was moved\nby a deep religious feeling in all that he undertook. This divine\nleading is what he designates as his d\u00e6mon. He speaks of it as \u201cthe\nGod\u201d or \u201cthe gods\u201d which speaks to other men through the oracles. This\ndivine voice was ever with him, but as to specific actions it only\nwarned him against the injudicious action, never incited him to the\ncorrect action. Specifically it did not tell him what to do so much as\nwhat not to do. When he was about to prepare a defense beforehand that\nhe should make to the judges, his d\u00e6mon interposed, and so he relied\nupon the inspiration of the moment. On one of his campaigns he was\nobserved to stand in communion with the d\u00e6mon the whole day, unmindful\nof the weather.\n\nAs to the education and intellectual training of Socrates, one must say\nthat it formed a factor of less importance in his life. The uniqueness\nof Socrates\u2019 character is only in small measure to be accounted for by\nhis environment. He was one of those men who would have been great in\nany time. He got but little from his father, who was a sculptor, or\nfrom his mother, who was a midwife. He was not strictly an educated\nman, although he had the early education of an Athenian youth, and\nof course no one could grow up a citizen of Athens in the time of\nPericles without absorbing its culture. His formal education probably\nconsisted of music and gymnastics, and he was certainly familiar\nwith the preceding schools of philosophy. Socrates lived a long life\nof contented poverty, and he dedicated his life to the public. Two\ninherited instincts were strong within him, which alone will account\nfor his career: (1) his strong religious persuasion that he was acting\nunder a mission from the gods; (2) his great intellectual originality,\nas shown in his teaching and in his power over others.\n\nThere are few striking events in Socrates\u2019 career, except his death. He\nwas born in Athens in 469 B. C. He began his divinely appointed work of\nredeeming Athens from the dangerous tendencies of the Sophists at the\ncommencement of the Peloponnesian War. He served in three campaigns as\na soldier. He also acted, when called upon, as prytanis, or lawgiver,\nalthough he stood aloof from political activity. At the advanced age\nof seventy he was accused of corrupting the youth and denying the gods.\nHis life thus far would have seemed to be one of unimpeachable moral\nand brilliant intellectual monotony. But his death illuminates his\nlife and makes it heroic, because his death shows what in reality his\nlife was,\u2015\u2015the tragic epitome of the Athenian social situation. His\ndeath was not due to himself, although he could have escaped, nor to\nhis judges, although they could have acquitted him. It represents the\ninevitable conflict between the Greek ideal of universalism and Greek\nindividualism. Its value is therefore historic. His particular accusers\nwere actuated by personal animosity. Behind them were many others whom\nhis efforts at reform and his bitter irony had made hostile. Behind\nall was the voice of Athenian conservatism against the Athenian culture\nmovement. The charges against Socrates were in part true, and besides\nas a moral reformer he had been a public nuisance. Yet his death was a\njudicial murder. He was found guilty by his judges. To the sentence of\ndeath proposed by Meletus, one of his accusers, Socrates had the right\nto propose an alternative sentence, and the judges must choose between\nthe two. Had Socrates proposed a small fine, it would probably have\nbeen accepted by the judges. He proposed, however, that Athens provide\nfor him at the public expense, arrogant as he was in his complacent\nsense of virtue. The judges then could do nothing else than pronounce\nthe sentence of death. This was delayed thirty days on account of the\nsacrifice at Delos. Even then Socrates could have easily escaped from\njail. But he refused to do the law a wrong, and drank the hemlock in\nMay, 399 B. C.\n\nProfessor G. H. Palmer points out the irony that characterizes the\nlife and death of Socrates. He stands for the harmony of opposite\nqualities. He devoted himself to the good of Athens, and yet Athens\nput him to death. In the service of the eternal was he sacrificed.\nHis own personality is an exemplification of this irony. In appearance\nhis un-Greek physical ugliness is in contrast with his beautiful Greek\nsoul; he was the most austere and yet the most sensitive of men; he was\nalways a serious moralist and yet always a jester; he was scarcely out\nof Athens and yet he was a world\u2019s man; he was the world\u2019s philosopher\nand yet he had no system of thought and left no writings.\n\n=Socrates and the Sophists.= _In his point of departure_ Socrates is\nin entire agreement with the Sophists. He is a critical philosopher.\nCriticism is the starting-point of his philosophy as a whole, and he\nbegins each particular argument afresh with a critical examination\nof its grounds. This means that he, like the Sophists, turns to the\nindividual reason as the final court of appeal. Like them he refused\nto accept any traditional dogma unexamined, and he commenced a critical\ninquiry into all kinds of conceptions. Socrates and the Sophists are\none in the spirit of the Greek illumination in their critical attack\nupon intellectual problems. Socrates\u2019 famous saying that \u201cvirtue is\nknowledge\u201d could equally well be put into the mouth of Protagoras;\nand the doctrine of Protagoras that \u201cman is the measure of all things\u201d\ncould be ascribed to Socrates without inconsistency.\n\n_In his conclusions in one respect_ Socrates arrives at the same point\nas the Sophists,\u2015\u2015but in only one respect. He agrees with them as to\nthe worthlessness of the results of natural science. Natural science\ncannot be worth while, because it does not lead to moral excellence.\nThe meagre results of the Cosmologists show the worthlessness of\nnatural science to man. In this one respect Socrates\u2019 criticism leads\nhim to skepticism like the Sophists,\u2015\u2015to a skepticism of natural\nscience.\n\n_But in his conclusions as to the value of human nature_, Socrates set\nhimself entirely against the outcome of the reflections of the Sophists,\nand indeed of his time. In the absorbing anthropological topics of his\ntime, he laid the foundations of a constructive philosophy against the\nskeptical conclusions of the Sophists. In human matters he maintained\nthat there is a validity to truth and a possibility of absolute\nknowledge. He admitted with the Sophists that there are obscurities in\nhuman thought, and that obviously the standard of truth does not belong\nto any one man. But while the Sophists emphasized these contradictions\nand reasoned therefore that no valid truth existed, Socrates cut\nhis way through such contradictions and obscurities, emphasized\nthe identity in men, and maintained that the truth is in all men\ntogether,\u2015\u2015in humanity. It exists as an ideal to be striven for by men\ntogether. When Protagoras says that \u201cman is the measure of all things,\u201d\nhe means by \u201cman\u201d the individual man; while Socrates, if he had used\nthat expression, would have meant \u201chumanity.\u201d And Socrates means\nby his principle \u201cvirtue is knowledge\u201d that the knowledge of that\nsame humanity (_i. e._ insight, reason) is virtue; while Protagoras,\nagreeing as he did formally with the maxim that \u201cvirtue is knowledge,\u201d\nwould always define \u201cknowledge\u201d as the individual feelings. \u201cThe\nindividual man is the measure of all things,\u201d Protagoras would say;\n\u201cHumanity is the measure of all things,\u201d Socrates would reply. \u201cVirtue\nis knowledge gained by the feelings,\u201d Protagoras would say; \u201cVirtue\nis knowledge gained by the reason,\u201d Socrates would reply. Beneath the\nchanging capricious individual, beneath the variety of men, Socrates\nbelieved that there was a common humanity, one unchanging man, who\ncontained the ultimate truth. There are many opinions, ideas, and\nfeelings, but only one knowledge. This knowledge is rational; and human\nnature is a unity in the possession of this knowledge.\n\nThis is the principle that distinguishes Socrates from the other\nleaders of the Greek Illumination. While he was imbued with the motives\nof the Greek culture of his time,\u2015\u2015curious about its results, feeling\nits usefulness, and critical of all tradition,\u2015\u2015he nevertheless\nwithheld himself from its skeptical conclusions. Any culture\nillumination runs the danger of defeating itself and becoming skeptical\nof its own powers. This is what actually happened in the Sophistic\nphilosophy. But when Socrates set himself against this superficial\nand self-destructive outcome of his age, he became in his constructive\nphilosophy the clearest and most comprehensive expression of that age.\nBecause he grasped the principle of the Greek Enlightenment deeply\nand formulated it constructively, his intellectual reign became\nhistorically established. The fundamental principle of the philosophy\nof Socrates was therefore the real principle of classic Greek\ncivilization, and by saving that principle he saved Greek civilization\nfor modern Europe.\n\n=The Unsystematic Character of the Socratic Philosophy.= The casual\nreader is often troubled to know for what precisely Socrates is\nsearching. The vagueness of the Socratic quest is partly due to the\nfact that he had no system. Indeed, he had no groundwork for a system\nof thought. His psychology or theory of the human mind was undefined.\nHe speaks of sensations and perceptions, but they, with the feelings\nand the will, are considered by him to be unimportant factors in the\nconscious life. On the whole, the mind was thought by him to be an\naggregation of conceptions or ideas. The feelings cloud the activity\nof these conceptions, and the only feeling to which Socrates attached\nany importance was his d\u00e6mon or divine voice. This grew to be his\nmentor as he grew older. Socrates never made a scientific psychological\nanalysis. He began rather with three assumptions which amounted to\nconvictions. They were these: _that only by acquiring conceptions\nis true knowledge to be found_; _that virtue consists in acting\naccording to conceptions_; _that the world has been designed according\nto conceptions_. Conceptions were, so to speak, an obsession with\nSocrates.[18] They were his postulates, his instruments, and his goal.\nThe other factors of the mind were neglected by him.\n\n=The Ideal of Socrates.= The goal of the quest of Socrates is an\nideal, and in the nature of things had the vagueness of any ideal. The\ncontent of an ideal has to remain undefined until it has been gained\nby experience, and then of course it is no longer an ideal. Any ideal,\nhowever, can be stated formally, and the formal and deductive side of\nknowledge has had an important place both in practical conduct and in\nthe history of science. Socrates could state his ideal formally and to\nsome extent he could give it content; but it always remained for him\nan object to be sought. He believed that the ideal lay in conceptions\nand could be found if he got the truth of any one conception. So he\nundertook to define such conceptions as friendship, courage, prudence,\netc., but his search was never satisfied. Nevertheless, the search\nitself was scarcely less important to him than its accomplishment.\n\nThe ideal of Socrates was _Knowledge_ or _Wisdom_, and his formal\nstatement of the ideal was _Knowledge is Virtue_. The primal end to\nbe striven for is wisdom, that is, in conceptions and by conceptions.\nBut where are these conceptions to be found but in one\u2019s own mind?\nTherefore the region of the quest of Socrates was his own mind, and his\nmotto was, \u201cKnow thyself.\u201d And what is this Virtue of which knowledge\nor wisdom is the equivalent? It does not mean virtue in the narrow\nmodern meaning of the term, nor yet in the narrow original meaning, of\nwarlike prowess or valor. The Greek word which Socrates used was \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03ae,\nand is best translated excellence or ability. In the history of the\nword it had a variety of meanings, like the Latin word _virtus_, whose\nequivalent it is. It is derived from the same root as the word \u1f0c\u03c1\u03b7\u03c2,\nAres (or Mars), the name of the god of war. While therefore originally\nit meant military valor, it came to mean any kind of excellence.\nIn modern times there appeared a book called _The Greatest Thing in\nthe World_, which had as its aim to show that Christian love is the\n\u201cgreatest thing in the world.\u201d To Socrates not \u201cLove\u201d but \u201cWisdom\u201d\nis the \u201cgreatest thing in the world,\u201d and Greek civilization is thus\ncontrasted with that of Christianity.\n\nBut now the question comes, What kind of knowledge or wisdom does\nSocrates mean as the greatest excellence? In contrast to the Sophists,\nwho relied upon the sensations and impulses as wisdom, Socrates turned\nto that element which had been the decisive factor of the culture of\nthe time. This was _insight_. The greatest excellence is insight. He\nwho acts according to his feelings is not sure of his knowledge, but he\nwho acts according to insight has the greatest excellence in the world.\nBut Socrates restricts the meaning of knowledge still further. Not only\nis knowledge to Socrates insight, but it is _moral_ insight. For the\nproblems in which he was interested were the problems of human life and\nprincipally the problem of self-examination. Thus we can translate the\nconventional formal statement of Socrates, viz., _Knowledge is virtue_,\ninto this rather longer sentence, _Moral insight is the most excellent\nthing in the world_. For the first time in the history of thought\nphilosophy is founded upon a moral postulate.\n\n=What the Socratic Ideal involves.= We have now examined the meaning\nof the formal statement of the Socratic ideal. A further question along\nthis same line concerns what that ideal involves.\n\n1. In the first place, to possess knowledge is to act righteously.\nKnowledge \uff1d righteous conduct. Socrates does not mean that knowledge\nis merely the _condition_ of right conduct; he means that knowledge\nactually _constitutes_ moral conduct. The development of the reason is\nactually the same as the development of the will. Knowledge is virtue\nand virtue is knowledge. Vice is ignorance and ignorance is vice. To\nhave an insight into the truth is the principle of living. Not only is\ndeficient insight the cause of evil, but it is itself the greatest evil.\nNot only does a man act wrongly because he does not know the good, but\nnot to know the good is the greatest wrong that can happen to him.\n\n2. Not only is moral insight the same as virtuous activity, but this\ninsight is always accompanied by happiness. The will follows the\nrecognition of the good, and the appropriate action makes man happy.\nHappiness is the necessary result of moral excellence. The Wise Man\nknows what is good for him and does it; thus in his performance he\nbecomes happy. Socrates would subscribe to the proverb \u201cBe good and you\nwill be happy.\u201d Such teaching on the part of Socrates implies that he\nbelieved two things: (1) that man by unremitting earnest examination of\nhimself and others could gain such perfect happiness; and (2) that the\nworld is under providential guidance. Socrates never expressly denied\nthe existence of the Homeric gods and never expressly declared himself\na monotheist. He is, however, always referring to one over-ruling\nwisdom. He had a personal conviction of immortality, but he never\nattempted its proof. Although Socrates had little confidence in human\nknowledge about the world of physical nature, he was animated by a\nbelief that amounted to a conviction in the providential arrangement\nof the world. In such a divinely ordered world the good must be happy.\nOnly a perfect wisdom can, however, be certain that always the results\nof his actions will gain happiness in the environment in which he lives;\nbut still man can be sure that happiness increases proportionately with\nknowledge. Greek philosophy did go beyond this point in ethics, and\nthis is called, in technical language, _eud\u00e6monism_. _Eud\u00e6monism_ and\n_hedonism_ are pleasure theories that are similar. Eud\u00e6monism is the\ntheory that active well-being is the highest good in life and that that\ngood is always accompanied by pleasure. In hedonism pleasure _is_ the\ngood to be aimed at. In history eud\u00e6monism has easily degenerated into\nhedonism.\n\n3. Socrates makes moral insight the same as virtuous activity, and\nhe says that its inevitable accompaniment is happiness. Does he also\nmake moral insight the same as utility? According to Xenophon, Socrates\nregards moral excellence as that which is most useful. Indeed, in\nsome of the Platonic dialogues Socrates seems to define insight as\nthe art of measuring or prudence, and it is pointed out that Socrates\ndeveloped no virtue so fully as self-control. In the exigencies of\nthe argument Socrates also often resorted to the useful to define the\ngood. The question, What is the good? often resolves itself into the\nother question, What is the thing good for? Indeed, the form of the\nargument often assumes the vicious circle: Why is the act just? Because\nit is useful? Why is it useful? Because it is just. For the purposes\nof disputation, in which Socrates was always shrewd and not always\nscrupulous, he so frequently refers the good to what is suitable to\nmen\u2019s happiness and profit that his philosophy does not seem to rise\nabove the relativism of the Sophists. But it is certain that Socrates\nstrove to transcend this relativism, although not with full success and\nalthough his formulated teaching does not always go beyond it. However,\nthat he believed in an absolute rather than a relative good appears\nin many ways: in his doctrine that it is better to suffer wrong than\nto do it; in his strict conformity to law rather than to save himself\nfrom death by breaking the law; in his constant interpretation of life\nas right-doing, ethical improvement, and participation in the good.\nThe utility that is always in the background of his thought is _the\nusefulness for the soul_. We may conclude, therefore, that it was only\nsuperficially for the purposes of argumentation that Socrates made the\nuseful an equivalent of moral insight.\n\nThe purpose of Socrates was, after all, not to teach men to think\ncorrectly nor to become cultured but to become happy and useful\nAthenians. Moral excellence is the Socratic goal; and knowledge,\nhappiness, and usefulness are only aspects of that goal. Knowledge is\nthe essential means, happiness the essential result, and usefulness\nthe essential sign of moral excellence. It follows as a corollary\nfrom Socrates\u2019 philosophical ideal that he should also teach: (1) that\nvirtue is teachable, and (2) that the virtues are one. Virtue is\nobviously teachable if it is knowledge. It follows also, although not\nso obviously, that all the virtues are fundamentally the same, and that\na man cannot be virtuous in one thing without being virtuous in all.\nThe really temperate man is also courageous, wise, and just.\n\n=The Two Steps of the Method of Socrates.= The external form of the\nmethod of Socrates was conversation. Thinking was to him an inner\nconversation. The result of a conversation, external or internal, was\nevolvement,\u2015\u2015the implicit in thought made explicit. This was quite\nopposed to the method of the Sophists, which was the supplying of\nknowledge. Socrates did not propose to start from any kind of knowledge\nexcept the ideal to be striven for. Starting with the presupposition\nthat man contained knowledge, the end which Socrates attempted to reach\nby his method was a practical one. With so much in summary, let us\nexamine the two steps of the method of Socrates.\n\nThe first step that Socrates deems necessary for man in attaining\nthis ideal of moral excellence is negative. Indeed, it is more,\u2015\u2015it\nis complete abnegation on the part of the seeker for truth. One must\nconfess that he himself knows nothing, and come to a realization that\nhis untested individual opinions are not the truth. He must approach\nthe subject as a seeker and not as a teacher. This attitude of mind\nis the beginning of wisdom. Plato relates how the Delphic oracle\namazed Socrates by announcing that he was the wisest of the Greeks. In\nreflecting upon the statement of the oracle he came to agree with the\noracle because, as he said, he was ignorant and he knew it, while the\nother Greeks were ignorant and did not know it. Before Socrates began\nto examine any conception, he professed or assumed to profess absolute\nignorance of it. He is the modest inquirer. He is always described in\nthe r\u00f4le of the questioner who is seeking information and light.\n\nHe laid the same requirement upon others that he did upon himself. The\ndialectic conversation could not be successfully carried on unless his\ninterlocutors had the same recognition of self-ignorance,\u2015\u2015the same\nmeasure of self-knowledge. The Sophists with whom he often carried on\nhis discussions laid claim to knowledge on every known subject under\nthe Greek sun and were ready to teach anything to the Greek youth. To\nSocrates\u2019 mind nothing could more impede his undertakings than such an\naffectation of wisdom; to the Sophists nothing could be more repugnant\nthan such a confession which Socrates always obliged them to make.\nAlthough professing to be only a seeker for knowledge, he tried first\nby his questions to scrutinize and to break down with his exasperating\nlogic the half-formed conceptions of the egotist. This clear-cut\nanalysis for purely destructive purposes, which he used in preparation\nfor his later constructive conversation, is called the _Socratic irony_.\nAs he proved himself superior to any of his companions in the use of\nthe dialectic, he could begin his conversations in the most destructive\nfashion. His method was destructive of all prejudice and preconceived\nopinion that would in any way stand athwart perfectly free inquiry into\nthe truth. His wish was to begin _de novo_ with every one, so that all\ntraditional beliefs having been given up and the investigators having\nconfessed their ignorance, constructive study of the concept in hand\ncould be begun.\n\nThe second step in Socrates\u2019 method of dialectical inquiry follows\nupon the initial destructive criticism. It is in this part of the\nconversation that we find his own constructive theory. The dialogue is,\nof course, its necessary condition; for the truth is not in me nor in\nthee, but in us all. It is latent in the mind and not on the surface\nof any opinion. Let us rub our minds together. Let us sift our varied\nconcepts, unfold our real selves, and bring the unborn truth to the\nlight. Our ideas supplement one another and have a common ground.\nIntellectual intercourse is an intellectual and a personal need, for\nit reveals common sympathies and a oneness of life. Common love of\nknowledge makes friends, and this mutual intellectual helpfulness he\ncalls by the mythical term _Eros_. Inquiry is indefinite in duration;\nthe quest of truth is endless; and Socrates acknowledges by his fresh\nbeginnings again and again his failure to reach the ideal. Thus the\ntheoretical self-abnegation of Socrates had a twofold significance in\nhis constructive philosophy. On the one hand, it was an invitation to\nhis countrymen to help him in his search for the universal truth; on\nthe other, it was an acknowledgment that he had failed to attain that\nuniversal truth.\n\n=Socrates and Athens.= Socrates had a religious reverence for his own\nmission in the Athenian community. He was the \u201cgad-fly of the Athenian\npublic\u201d; he was the educator of the time; he was divinely appointed\nto the Athenian people. He felt himself so necessary to the Athenian\nState that at his trial he proudly suggested that instead of punishing\nhim the State keep him at the public expense in the Prytaneum. But the\neducator creates nothing; he only awakens and develops the germs of\nknowledge that lie latent. The human Athenian nature is big with truth;\nSocrates was divinely appointed to bring it forth. He called his method,\nafter the profession of midwifery of his mother, the _maieutic method_.\nIt was intellectual midwifery, and he was the intellectual midwife\nof Athens. Although he failed to find any concrete form of ultimate\ntruth, he never had any doubt about the correctness of his method\nand of undertaking the problem afresh. He believed that his failure\nwas due to the inherent weakness of human discernment; and so far as\nman\u2019s discernment or insight is clear, so far will he know the true\nsignificance of things.\n\nSocrates believed in man, and he believed that in man were contained\nall those elements that make up a firm, rational, and moral society.\nSince he failed to justify this belief in a theoretical way, his belief\nbecame largely a matter of faith. Humanity is something to be won,\nsomething to be developed. He was personally the embodiment of his\nfaith, and his large influence was due to his unswerving confidence in\nethical ideals that did not allow the least paltering.\n\n=The Logical Expedients of Socrates.= The examination of concepts\nby Socrates was an attempt to find a logical \u201cNature,\u201d just as the\nCosmologists had searched physical phenomena to find a physical\n\u201cNature.\u201d This makes Socrates the first to teach by induction and\none of the first to use definition effectively. In contrast to the\nSophists, he tried to give words exact meanings; for the Sophists fixed\nartificial meanings to words with reference to particular objects. In\nseeking for the exact meaning, Socrates was looking below the changing\nparticulars to the \u201cNature\u201d of the fact and the universal principle.\nThus he was making his hearers conscious of the logical dependence\nof the particular upon the universal. The universal is that which is\ncommon to all particular conceptions or opinions. It lies beneath them\nand binds them together. Thus, by logical analysis, Socrates is taking\nsteps in the educational process of gaining the universal. Provisional\ndefinition would be given by him in some dialogue; this definition\nwould be tried by many facts; thus an advance would be made toward\na true definition and a universal principle. This process is that of\ninduction. It leads to generic concepts by comparison of particular\nviews and individual perceptions, by bringing together analogous cases\nand allied relations. The subordination of the particular under the\nuniversal thus became a principle of science. However imperfect and\nchildlike was Socrates\u2019 method of procedure, whatever lack of caution\nin generalization and in the collection of material, however hasty\noftentimes his judgments, he nevertheless made the subordination of the\nparticular to the universal a principle of logical procedure. Xenophon\nsays that Socrates was untiring in his efforts to examine and define\ngoodness and wickedness, justice and injustice, wisdom and folly,\ncourage and cowardice, the state and the citizen.\n\n=Socrates and the Lesser Socratics.= The death of Socrates proved to\nbe his transfiguration. His influence, widespread and profound, came\nmore from his personality than from his formulated theory. He was a\nrevelator without a revelation. An absolutely true end of life, the\nGood, he firmly believed to exist; but it was an ideal to be won by\neach and all. After him, therefore, there was opportunity for various\ninterpretations of his doctrine, and several schools were founded by\nhis disciples. His truest and most discriminating pupil was Plato, who\nis in a class by himself as developing the philosophy of Socrates to\na systematic perfectness. The philosophy of Plato stands with that of\nDemocritus and Aristotle as one of the three systematic philosophies\nthat Greek civilization produced. Besides Plato there were the Lesser\nSocratics: Euclid (not the mathematician), Ph\u00e6do, Aristippus, and\nAntisthenes. Each of these was respectively the founder of a school.\nThese four Lesser-Socratic schools were that at Megara founded by\nEuclid, the Elean-Eretrian founded by Ph\u00e6do, the Cynic founded by\nAntisthenes, and the Cyrenaic founded by Aristippus. The influence of\nthe Megarian and Elean-Eretrian schools was unimportant. It may suffice\nto dismiss them by saying that Ph\u00e6do was the favorite pupil of Socrates,\nand that Plato was a member of the Megarian school for a short time\nafter the death of Socrates. The two other Lesser-Socratic schools had\nan important influence upon contemporary and later civilization and\nwill be mentioned here. These are the Cynic and Cyrenaic schools. In\nthese two schools two great types of ethical theory that have since\nexisted were formulated. All four of the Lesser Socratics pretended to\nbe the true development of the teaching of Socrates; and these two, as\nwell as the other two, differ in the accentuation that they place on\nsome phase of the master\u2019s doctrine.\n\nSocrates\u2019 own definition of ideal excellence being incomplete, the\nCynics and Cyrenaics tried to define it, to give it content and to show\na practical way of reaching it. They attempted\n\n(1) to answer affirmatively that there is a universal validity;\n\n(2) to show in what it consists;\n\n(3) to show how man must prepare himself in order to reach it.\n\nBoth schools are individualistic and eud\u00e6monistic. They maintained that\nto affirm that the Good is good for its own sake is to leave the Good\ncontentless; and to affirm that the Good is insight into the Good is to\ngo in a circle. The one unambiguous answer to the question of Socrates,\nWhat is ideal excellence or the Good? is this: Goodness is happiness.\nThis gives a content to the otherwise contentless ideal of Socrates.\nThe difference between the two schools consists in the ethical way in\nwhich this happiness may be obtained.\n\nIt will appear, therefore, that the Lesser Socratics were more\nSophistic than Socratic. They were diametrically opposed to Socrates\u2019\ntheory of the universality of truth. The excellent Good must be sought\nby each in his own way. This is individualistic virtue, and not that\nof humanity. Civilization was valued by them only as it satisfied\nindividual needs. The common problem of individualistic happiness\nlimited the efforts of both schools, while the results that they\nreached in solving it were quite different.\n\nThere are two ways of achieving happiness; one is by satisfying the\ndesires, the other is by cutting off the desires. For happiness is\nthe perfect proportion of desire and satisfaction. A living creature\nis happy if his desires are satisfied, whether those desires be few\nor many. In the theory of the Cyrenaic school, happiness is gained\nby increasing the satisfactions; in the theory of the Cynic school,\nhappiness is gained by decreasing the desires.\n\n=The Cynic School= was founded by Antisthenes, and numbered among its\nadherents Diogenes, about whom so many curious stories have been told,\nCrates of Thebes, his wife Hipparchia, and her brother, Metrocles.\nVirtue in the eud\u00e6monistic sense is the only end, and this school\nagreed with Socrates that this end is to be attained by knowledge. That\nis to say, virtue or knowledge is only a means of gaining happiness,\nand all other possessions the Cynics affected to despise. Virtue\nas knowledge is therefore to be sought; ignorance is to be shunned;\nall else is a matter of indifference. Riches, luxury, fame, honor,\nsense-pleasure and pain, and later with logical consistency all shame,\nconvention, family, and country were objects of contempt. Man must\nmake himself independent by cutting off the desires which he cannot\nsatisfy or the desires that seem superfluous. He should keep alive\nonly such desires as are necessary to existence. In independence of all\noutward circumstance the Cynic conceives himself to be the Wise Man,\nin contrast to whom the mass of men are fools. The Cynic is, therefore,\nthe equal of the undesiring gods. He has independent lordship and\ndoes not need the artificialities of civilization. Natural law was\ncontrasted by him in a Sophistic way with statutory law, and in the\nmidst of the refinements of society he preached a return to a state\nof nature.\n\n=The Cyrenaic School= was founded by Aristippus, who lived in Cyrene,\na luxurious city of northern Africa. Aristippus was a man of the\nworld. He was first a Sophist and later a disciple of Socrates. After\nSocrates\u2019 death he returned to Cyrene. Here he founded his school,\nwhich included three generations of his own family. The prominent\nmembers of it were Arete, his daughter; Aristippus, his grandson;\nTheodorus, Hegesias, Anniceris, and Euhemerus, the author of so-called\nEuhemerism, which taught that the gods were originally only great\nmen. In opposition to the brutal bareness of the Cynic school, the\nCyrenaics saw the true end of life in the pleasures of sense. Following\nProtagoras, Aristippus said that the sensations are always true and\ncan be defined in terms of motion. The school developed an elaborate\npsychology of sensation which summarizes its doctrine. It is as follows:\n(1) The intensity and not the duration of a sensation determines its\nvalue; (2) Bodily pleasures are of greater value than mental because\nthey are more intense; (3) I can know only my own sensations, and\ntherefore they are of greater value than another\u2019s; (4) Man has a\nreasonable insight which determines him in the choice of his sensations.\n\nThe practical problem of life for this, as it was for the Cynic school,\nwas how to become individually independent of the world. But the\nCyrenaic taught independence by enjoyment, in opposition to the Cynic\u2019s\nindependence by renunciation. The Cyrenaic Wise Man knows all the\npleasures of life thoroughly, from animal satisfactions to spiritual\necstasies. He uses them all, but never forgets himself. He is lord of\nhis appetites, never wishes the impossible, and has perfect and serene\npeace.\n\nIt is an interesting fact that this pleasure-loving school drew\npessimism as the consequence of its theory. If life fails to give\nenjoyment, it is a failure. That life alone is reprehensible that has\nmore pain than pleasure. It is on this ground that man should submit\nto law and custom rather than give up his pleasures. Yet some members\nof the school maintained that man is bound to be unhappy. While he\nshould have pleasure, he is so constituted that he cannot gain it. The\nbody of man is an inevitable sufferer. The highest that we can hope is\npainlessness.\n\nThe Cynic and Cyrenaic schools occupy an important position in\nthe history of philosophy. The Cynic doctrine was the basis of the\nteaching of the Stoic school, and the Cyrenaic was the legitimate\npredecessor of the Epicurean school. These great schools were founded\nin Athens seventy-five years later, and will be discussed under the\nHellenic-Roman Period.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER VI\n\n THE SYSTEMATIC PERIOD (399 B. C.\u2013322 B. C.)\n\n\n=The Waning of the Greek National Spirit.= The Systematic Period\nextends from the death of Socrates to the death of Aristotle. It\nis only seventy-seven years long\u2015\u2015about the same length as the\nAnthropological and half as long as the Cosmological Period. It begins\nwith those sorry days after the Peloponnesian War and ends with the\nsupremacy of Macedonian power. The period was filled with ferocious\nwars among the Grecian cities. First came the supremacy of Sparta, then\nof Thebes (371\u2013362 B. C.), then the invasion by Philip of Macedon and\nthe battle of Ch\u00e6ronea, 338 B. C. In 334 B. C. Alexander the Great\nbegan the conquest of the Orient, which he accomplished in two years.\nHe thought by this that he could reunite the Greeks in a common cause.\nHe failed for two reasons. In the first place, as a Macedonian the\nGreeks would not take him as a national representative. In the second\nplace, the Greek spirit was waning. The people had lost their glorious\nideals. Decay had set in. The worm was at the root of Greek life. Greek\nart, literature, and statesmanship had passed.\n\n=The Place of the Three Systematic Philosophers in Greek History.=\nNevertheless, when Greek national life was approaching dissolution,\nscience ripened its richest fruits and created its most comprehensive\nsystems of philosophy. These are connected with the names of Democritus,\nPlato, and Aristotle. These great systems evidently cannot be accounted\nfor by the social conditions in which they appear. Neither the need nor\nthe demand of the disrupted Greece of these years would be a sufficient\ncause to explain the appearance of a Plato or an Aristotle. The\ninterests of the Greek people became narrower as the interests of the\nGreek philosophers became more broadly human. The intellectual tendency\nof this short period was utilitarian and practical. The problems that\nnow interested the Athenians were the details of mechanics, physiology,\nrhetoric, and politics. The field of science was now for the first time\nsystematized to logic, ethics, and physics\u2015\u2015a classification which, we\nshall find, will exist for many centuries. Sparta and Macedonia, not\nAthens and Abdera, represent the spirit of the period.\n\nIf then Democritus, Plato, and Aristotle do not reflect the time in\nwhich they live, what relation do they bear to Greek civilization?\nThey are not isolated and out of all relation to the life of the\nGreek people. On the contrary, they are the most comprehensive and\nthe most profound expression of Greek life. One turns to them as the\nmost perfect representation of Greek culture. They are the intimate\nexpression of Greek thought, even if not of contemporaneous Greek\nthought. They are the final statements of the two preceding periods,\nprojected into a time that had other interests. Democritus brought the\nCosmological movement to a close, was its final expression, and gave\nit systematic form. Plato did the same for the Anthropological Period.\nIn Aristotle the systematic cosmology of Democritus and the systematic\nethics of Plato find a new meaning, in a closer union, under a more\nco\u00f6rdinating principle. Aristotle was the last possible word of Greek\nphilosophy, for he systematized every branch known to the Greeks. He\nnot only evolved a speculative theory of the whole, but he organized\nthe special sciences. It must be further said that no one of these\nthree great Greeks could have produced the results each did produce, if\neach had not been the leader of a school of many workers. Within each\nschool there must have been vigorous co\u00f6peration along lines according\nto the inclination of the individual members. Thus each school\ncollected a vast amount of material which was worked over according to\nthe method and purpose of the leader.\n\n=The Fundamental Principle of the Systematic Period.= At the beginning\nof this book attention was called to the difference between Greek,\nMedi\u00e6val, and Modern thought. Greek thought was characterized as\nobjective. It is important to reiterate this objective significance of\nGreek thought at this point, when we are about to discuss the teachings\nof Democritus, Plato, and Aristotle. Plato\u2019s theory is often called\nan idealism and Democritus\u2019 theory materialism, but they are not the\nidealism and materialism of modern times. No terms have fluctuated\nin their meanings more than such philosophical terms as these, as\ncan be judged from the fact that in the Middle Ages Plato\u2019s doctrine\nwas called realism. The Greeks were not idealists in the sense that\nBerkeley and Hegel were idealists. In general, it should be remembered\nthat when we speak of Greek art, Greek politics, Greek philosophy as\nidealistic, they are not idealistic in the modern sense.[19]\n\nThe open-minded Greek sought to picture, to ascertain, to present. He\nwas not dominated by the wish to show how things should be. To know and\nto understand, to explain by understanding the abiding reason in things,\nto find out the fundamental principle in things rather than to adjust\nit to the personal desires\u2015\u2015this was the objective attitude of mind of\nthe Greeks. The Greek saw before he reasoned; he visualized his thought\nin form before he subjected the form to rational analysis. The cosmos\nwas a harmony and an art before which he stood in contemplation rather\nthan in criticism. Human elements were found in it everywhere, but only\nas parts of that cosmos. \u201cThe unity of the spiritual and the natural,\nwhich Greek thought demands and presupposes, is the direct unbroken\nunity of the classic theory of the world.\u201d[20]\n\nBy whatever names the great theories of the Systematic Period are\ncalled, we must remember that they did not depart from this objective\nGreek point of view. At certain times the moorings of Greek thought\nseem about to be shifted, as when Plato passes beyond the ancient Greek\nattitude and anticipates Christian morality by flight from the world of\nsense, and when Aristotle elaborates his doctrine of a transcendent god.\nBut the tie never breaks, and the Systematic philosophers remain Greek\nand not modern. They have the Greek objective attitude of mind. The\ninner consciousness does not stand with its attestations over against\nall other things. The greatest of these philosophers never thought of\nhimself but as \u201cbone of the bone and flesh of the flesh\u201d of the world\nsurrounding him. In art the classic Greek \u201ccould obey but not surpass\nnature\u201d; in religion he worshiped beings that were only superior human\nbeings; in politics he was a member of a social whole. To \u00c6schylus,\nPericles, Socrates, Protagoras, Aristophanes, Democritus, Plato, and\nAristotle alike, human nature is a part of the world and not _vice\nversa_. The Greek mind interpreted nature rather than recreated it.\n\nWhat, then, is the nature of the development of Greek thought, and\nin what respect does the Greek Systematic philosophy differ from\nthe philosophy of the Greek Cosmologists? Greek philosophy in the\nCosmological Period starts with a conception of an objective harmony\nof nature and spirit which is called hylozoism. Step by step in the\nAnthropological and Systematic Periods that harmony becomes broken\ninto a dualism of mind and matter. The philosophy of this Systematic\nPeriod is a dualism of the parts of one objective world, not a\nsubjective-objective antithesis. The realm of spirit lies side by side\nwith that of nature, and the separation and alienation never reached\nthe complete form that it did in the Middle Ages. The great Greek\nSystematizers in part represent this dualistic tendency, in part are\na scientific effort to overcome it. \u201cIn spite of this tendency [to\na dualism] the original presupposition [a harmony between nature and\nspirit] asserts itself in decisive traits; and we shall find that\nthe true cause of its incapacity to reconcile these contradictions\nsatisfactorily lies in its refusal to abandon that presupposition.\nWhen that [unity] is canceled, there remains to it no possible way\nof filling up a chasm which, according to its own standpoint, cannot\nexist.\u201d[21]\n\n=A Summary of Greek Philosophy.= At this point a summary of Greek\nobjective philosophy will be helpful. The philosophical problem\nthat had been working itself out since Thales had been this: How may\nwe think the Being that abides amid the changes of phenomena? The\nCosmologists scrutinized physical nature and, without differentiating\nnature and spirit, conceived abiding Being to be living matter. The\nAnthropologists (except Socrates) doubted if there is any abiding\nBeing. Among the Systematic Philosophers a dualism for the first time\nappears. Nature and spirit are differentiated, but both remain entirely\nobjective. Democritus regarded the material universe as abiding Being,\nbut in so large a way as to be able to construct upon it a psychology\nand an ethics. Plato found abiding Being in the realm of the spirit, in\na group of moral and \u00e6sthetic entities. Aristotle attempts to overcome\nthe opposition between materialism and Platonism. To him abiding Being\nis neither physical nature nor the spirit apart from physical nature.\nAbiding Being to Aristotle is the spirit _in_ nature.\n\n=Greek Philosophy (objective).=\n\n 1. The Cosmologists\u2015\u2015Hylozoism.\n Abiding Being is living nature\u2015\u2015some form of living matter.\n\n 2. The Anthropologists\u2015\u2015Relativism (except Socrates).\n Being is not abiding, but consists of transitory mental states.\n This is a form of what was called by the schoolmen Nominalism,\n and summed up by the phrase _Universalia post rem_.\n\n 3. The Systematic Philosophers.\n Democritus\u2015\u2015Materialism.\n Being consists in material atoms, but regarded in so large\n a way as to furnish a basis for a psychology and an ethics.\n\n Plato\u2015\u2015Objective Idealism.\n Being consists of permanent moral and \u00e6sthetic concepts or\n types. In medi\u00e6val philosophy Platonism was called realism\n and was summed up by the phrase _Universalia ante rem_.\n\n Aristotle\u2015\u2015Conceptualism.\n The abiding Being does not consist of material atoms nor\n in spiritual types apart from matter, but is an unfolding\n essence _in_ matter. This was usually called conceptualism\n by the Schoolmen, and was summed up by the phrase\n _Universalia in re_. Aristotle\u2019s conception was as\n difficult as it was important. He was not always clearly\n a conceptualist, but sometimes appeared in the r\u00f4le of an\n \u201cobjective realist.\u201d\n\n=Democritus and Plato\u2015\u2015Their Similarities and Differences.= The\nmaterialism of Democritus and the idealism of Plato were as opposed as\nwas possible within the realm of Greek thought. We must not exaggerate\ntheir similarities, but they had at least four common characteristics.\n\n_Their Similarities._\n\n1. Both develop an outspoken rationalism,[22] which starts as a\nreaction from the perception theory of Protagoras. They agree with\nProtagoras that perception cannot yield truth, and so they turn away\nfrom perception to the reason to find true knowledge.\n\n2. Both develop a world of twofold reality. Perceptions are not\nregarded by them as illusions, although perceptions are transitory.\nBoth make a new estimate of perceptions, and give to the world of\nperceptions a relative value. There are therefore two kinds of reality:\nthe relative reality of the world of perceptions and the absolute\nreality of the world of reason. The result in both is a broad theory\nof knowledge.\n\n3. In both, reality consists in a plural number of objective norms.\nBoth reach their conception of these norms in the same way. The\nchanging qualities of things are stripped away and the true reality\nis discovered beneath. Both designate this true form by the same word,\nidea (\u1f30\u03b4\u03ad\u03b1). To both, the forms are objective entities.\n\n4. Both are attempts to overcome scientifically the dualism which had\nemerged from the former hylozoism of Greek thought.\n\n_Their Differences\u2015\u2015The Development of the Meaning of Idea._ 1. But the\nforms or ideas are so vitally different in the doctrines of these two\nphilosophers that they have nothing in common save the name. On the one\nhand, Democritus took the word \u201cidea\u201d just as he found it in popular\nspeech. It is the shape of a visible thing, the geometrical form of\nphysical objects. It gets no new content in his hands, but is merely\nthe physical atom. With Plato, however, the word gets a new meaning. He\nfills the form or idea with an ethical content. The idea as a quantity\nbecomes now a quality. The idea becomes an Idea. The forms of Plato are\nlogical species and teleological causes, while the forms of Democritus\nare atom-complexes.[23] In both philosophers they are the norms of\nreality. But while Democritus still keeps his forms as the realities\nof physical nature, Plato conceives his forms to be true realities of\nobjective human nature.\n\n2. This vital difference between the two philosophers may get some\nexplanation from the difference in the philosophical inheritance of\neach. To be sure, they were contemporaries, both being born in the\nAnthropological Period and both doing their most mature work in the\nSystematic Period. Both, too, were acquainted with the philosophy of\nthe preceding time. But the ethical teaching of Socrates dominated\nPlato, and through it he became the legitimate perfecter of the Greek\nenlightenment and the anthropological movement. But what was the\ninfluence of Socrates upon Democritus? It seems to have been nothing.\nWhy is Plato absolutely silent about Democritus when he mentions\nother Greek philosophers? No one has yet been able to say. Democritus\nstands at Abdera isolated from the ethical movement at Athens. The only\ninfluence upon him from that movement came from Protagoras, who was\na member of the school at Abdera. Democritus is the finisher of the\nCosmological movement.\n\n=The Life of Democritus= (460\u2013370 B. C.). Democritus was twenty years\nyounger than Protagoras, about ten years younger than Socrates, and a\ngeneration older than Plato. He was outlived by Plato; and Aristotle\nwas a young man when Democritus died. He was therefore contemporary\nwith the intellectual movement going on in Greece, with Athens as a\ncentre. While he does not appear to have come under the influence of\nSocrates, he was well acquainted with the destructive epistemology of\nthe Sophists. Abdera, where he lived, is in Thrace, and seems to have\nbeen outside the Anthropological movement at Athens. The school of\nLeucippus was at Abdera; and Democritus was instructed in the Sophistic\ndoctrine directly from Protagoras, who was a member of the Atomistic\nschool before going to Athens. The three Systematic philosophers\nwere wide travelers, Democritus not less than Plato and Aristotle. He\ntraveled extensively through Greece, Egypt, and the Orient. He then\nreturned to Abdera and began his scientific activity. He remained five\nyears in Egypt, and came to know the greater part of western Asia.\nHe returned to Abdera about 420 B. C., and therefore did not begin\nhis teaching before he was forty years old. The length of time that\nDemocritus, Plato, and Aristotle took for their apprenticeship, and\nthe advanced age before they began their mastership, is remarkable.\nDemocritus was the greatest investigator of nature in antiquity, and\nAristotle used much of Democritus\u2019 work for his own scientific writings.\nThe ancients admired the writings of Democritus, and the loss of them\nin the fourth century after Christ is one of the most lamentable that\nhas happened to the literary documents of antiquity. His works were\nextraordinary in number, and upon every known subject.\n\nDemocritus was the real exponent of the Atomistic school. The founder,\nLeucippus, belonged to the Cosmological Period; Protagoras, the Sophist,\nbelonged to the Anthropological Period, and had great influence in the\ndevelopment of the school at Abdera; but Democritus, in systematizing\nthe doctrines of Leucippus and in accepting the perception theory of\nProtagoras, became its most notable representative. He was the great\nsystematizer of the Cosmologists, and yet he differed from all the\nCosmologists in embodying in his theory the results of the Sophistic\nmovement.\n\n=The Comprehensiveness of the Aim of Democritus.= The reconstruction\nof the philosophy of Democritus has always been difficult for the\nhistorian because, from the originally great mass of his writings, only\nfragments remain. The fragments show, however, many interesting things:\nthat he covered the entire range of experience in his investigations;\nthat he was quite as much interested in psychical as in physical\nproblems; that his contribution to epistemology was even greater than\nto physics; and that he was interested in the atomic theory because\nhe believed that it was a working hypothesis for the explanation of\nexperience of every kind. This last characteristic shows the systematic\nnature of his work and his right to stand with Plato and Aristotle.\nDemocritus fully realized that the task of science was to explain\nexperiences through a conception of reality. So he constructed his\nconception of the atom in order that he might explain phenomena\nintelligibly. He saw that no conception strange to experience or\nagainst experience, like the Eleatic Being, would answer scientific\ndemands. A rational conception of absolute reality will have value only\nas experience testifies to it and, on the other hand, as it explains\nexperience. Democritus valued his theory of the atoms because it seemed\nto explain all phenomena. This construction of a single fundamental\nrational principle for all kinds of phenomena shows how much more of\na systematic scientist he was than the Cosmologists.\n\n=The Enriched Physics of Democritus\u2015\u2015Hylozoism becomes Materialism.=\nThere is so great enrichment in elaboration and generalization in the\nphysical doctrine of Democritus over that of Leucippus that it amounts\nto a change in principle. In all probability Leucippus, like other\nCosmologists, was a hylozoist, and did not differentiate matter and\nlife. He is to be grouped with the Reconcilers, or even with the\nEleatics, rather than with Democritus. Democritus was a materialist.\nThe period of forty years between himself and Leucippus had been the\nrich period of the introduction of psychological investigation and of\nthe discrimination of psychical from physical processes. Materialism or\nspiritualism is not possible in the historical development of the human\nmind until it passes through just such a period of differentiation as\nthe Sophistic Enlightenment. Before such a period there is animism and\nhylozoism; after such a period there is materialism and spiritualism of\nvarious sorts. Matter must be discriminated from spirit before one of\nthe terms can be reduced to the other. So the hylozoistic pluralism of\nLeucippus became in the hands of Democritus a realistic materialism,\npluralistic as well.\n\nThe reduction of all phenomena by Democritus to a _mechanics of\natoms_ was theoretically an enrichment of physics, for it anticipated\nthe underlying principle of modern physics. The apparent qualities\nof things and the qualitative changes of things are conceived by\nDemocritus to be in truth only a quantitative relation of atoms. He\nset before himself the task of explaining in detail how this or that\nquality consists of atoms in mechanical motion. The mental life of\nman must be explained in the same way. So too, wherever he could, he\nemphasized more sharply than his predecessors the mechanical necessity\nof the movement of atoms. Impact caused by contact of the atoms was\nthe cause of every occurrence and change. No event is to be explained\nas the manifestation of some spirit, or referred to some spiritual\nagency. Mechanical cause is behind every event; mechanical cause\nis the unifying principle of the doctrine of Democritus; mechanical\ncause is the reason for the chasm between the philosophy of Plato,\nof Aristotle, and that of Democritus. It is the reason, too, why the\ntheory of Democritus was obscured until modern times. All teleological\nconceptions and all hylozoistic and animistic ideas are expelled from\nthe theory of Democritus, on the assumption that spatial form and\nmotion are simpler and more comprehensible terms of explanation. Thus\nfor the first time we have a conscious _outspoken materialism_, and\nfor the first time the world is conceived to be a _universal reign of\nmechanical law_.\n\nThe physical theory of Democritus also yielded a rich scientific\n_explanation of the historical evolution of the universe_. The\nuniverse, according to Democritus,\u2015\u2015following the teaching of\nLeucippus,\u2015\u2015consists of two parts: the Plenum or self-moving,\nqualitatively similar atoms; and the Void or empty space, in which the\natoms move. The Plenum, or the atoms, is Being; the Void is not-Being.\nThe atoms differ only in form and size;[24] they are infinite in number\nand therefore are of an infinite number of forms and sizes; they are\nimperceptibly small. The perceptible qualities do not belong to them,\nbut to their motions. Motion is an irreducible function of atoms,\nand each atom, lawless in itself, is in flight through space. An\naggregation of atoms arises when the atoms meet in their cosmic flight.\nThe shock causes a vortex which draws more atoms into itself. Like\natoms are drawn together, and the heavy atoms press the fine fire-atoms\nto the periphery. Thus innumerable worlds are formed, for any place\nof the meeting of several atoms can be the beginning of a new world.\nSometimes small worlds are drawn into the vortices of large worlds,\nand sometimes large worlds disintegrate in fatal collisions. The worlds\nare therefore endless and in endless succession. The whole swings in\nspace like a ball; the rim of the whole consists of compact atoms; the\ncentre is filled with air. To much further length than we can go here\nDemocritus developed a theoretical description of cosmic evolution upon\nthe principle of mechanical necessity\u2015\u2015and the description is almost\nmodern.\n\n=The Materialistic Psychology of Democritus.= It is easy to understand\nan explanation of the physical universe as atoms in motion; for our\nmodern scientific theories of nature are set in these terms, even if we\nhave transformed the Democritan static atom into a dynamic entity. It\nis rather more interesting to follow such a materialist as Democritus\nin his extension of the materialistic principle over upon the realm of\nthe mental life.\n\nIn the first place, Democritus conceives man to be part and parcel of\nthe world of atoms. Man is composed of all kinds of atoms. His body\nconsists of earth, water, and air atoms. His mind is made up of fire\natoms, which differ from the others in being the finest, smoothest,\nand most mobile. On this account the fire atoms are the most perfect of\nall. Psychical activity is the motion of fire atoms. They are scattered\nthroughout the universe, and wherever they are, there is life. They are\nin plants and animals as well as in man. There is a larger collection\nof them in man, and this shows his superiority over other living things.\nIn man there is a fire atom between every two other atoms, and the\nwhole is held together by breathing. The different forms of mental\nactivity are simply different forms of atomic motion.\n\nIn the next place, our atomic make-up involves the presence of other\natomic complexes, if we are to have any psychical activity. External\nthings must stimulate us. But these external things are atoms in action.\nThey can, however, influence us only by coming into contact with our\nbodies. Only by impact on our bodies can they set in motion the fire\natoms which are scattered through our bodies. Every kind of knowledge\nor mental life involves the participation of the fire atoms in us. Thus\nmental activity involves two factors; the fire atoms within us and an\nexternal group of atoms without us.\n\nHow did Democritus explain the varied mental life as the resultant of\nthese two factors? He employed the theory of effluxes, belief in which\nhe shared with his time. This is a purely physiological assumption,\noriginated by such Cosmologists as Empedocles, that somehow external\nbodies send off emanations from themselves which strike upon our\nbodies. Most objects in the world influence us at a distance and only\nthrough the emission of these effluxes. Democritus conceived these\nemanations to be little copies or \u201ceidola\u201d of the thing that sends them\noff. To illustrate Democritus\u2019 meaning: a tree is seen by me because\nlittle trees, thrown off by it, hit my eye. This theory retained its\nposition in philosophical circles until after Locke. It persists in the\npopular mind to-day. It is a general belief that a thought is a copy,\nphotograph, or image of the thing. The words \u201cimage\u201d and \u201cimagination\u201d\nbetray their origin. It was believed by Democritus that such copies\nset in motion the sense organs and through them the fire atoms. The\neffluxes can, however, affect only those organs of the body that have\nsimilar formation and similar atomic motions.\n\nBut the effluxes vary very much in the degree of fineness of their\natomic structure. There are all sorts, from very fine to very coarse.\nSince the efflux must correspond to a particular sense if that sense\nis to be affected by it, the effluxes that can affect the senses\nvary respectively as to their fineness. Democritus was particularly\ninterested in the sensations of sight and hearing as examples of this.\nNone of the effluxes affecting the senses are as fine as those that\nstimulate the reason. Unless they were the finest of all the effluxes,\nthey could not affect the fine motions of the fire atoms of the reason.\nThese finest \u201ceidola\u201d or effluxes are the true copies of things, and\nthe reason therefore alone knows things truly. Thought, on the one hand,\nis precisely the atomic motion of the _direct_ impact of the finest\neffluxes upon the fine fire-atoms of the soul. Sensation, on the other\nhand, is atomic motion from the _indirect_ impact of the coarser grades\nof effluxes upon the fire atoms. The reason knows reality directly.\nSensations are aroused in a roundabout way by the coarse effluxes\nsetting in motion the corresponding sense organ, which in turn sets\nin motion the fire atoms. Thus does Democritus make the distinction\nbetween thought and sensation in quantitative terms. Thus does he\nreduce his psychology to a consistency with his metaphysical principle\nof materialism.\n\n=Democritus\u2019 Theory of Knowledge\u2015\u2015The World of Twofold Reality.=\nDemocritus would have been only one of the great Cosmologists, and he\nwould not have his place by the side of Plato and Aristotle, if his\nmaterialism had illuminated no other subject than physics. Indeed, it\nis doubtful if his physics would have been so grandly comprehensive\nand unqualified had it not been strengthened by his discriminating\ntheory of twofold knowledge. He might have extended and systematized\nhis materialism so that it explained to the satisfaction of his time\nboth physical and psychical phenomena, and still have been a hylozoist,\nlike Leucippus, the founder of the Atomistic school. The problem\nof knowledge\u2015\u2015the problem of estimating our mental states\u2015\u2015was as\nincomprehensible to Leucippus as to the Eleatics. Democritus, however,\nwas a rationalist and realist like Plato and Aristotle. He recognized,\nas did they, that there is a difference in epistemological values.\nHis universalized materialism did not prevent him from evaluating\nour experiences from the same general point of view as the leader\nof the Academy and the Stagirite. He felt that a twofold reality is\nas consistent with materialistic principles as with idealism. So he\nreduced all qualities to quantities, and then as quantities re-valued\nand classified them. His chief contribution was to the subject of\nepistemology and not to physics, and that is why he is treated among\nthe Greek Systematizers and not among the Cosmologists. Probably his\nchief interest lay where he did his chief work.\n\nThe perception theory of Protagoras was the starting-point of both\nDemocritus and Plato. Both adopted it in order to transcend it and\nmake it of real significance. Democritus, upon the basis of his\nmaterialistic psychology, admitted that sense-perception is only\na transitory process, and its knowledge must be as transitory. But\nhe did not agree with Protagoras that all knowledge is perceptual.\nSense-perception does yield only relative knowledge; but there is\nanother kind of knowledge that is not relative but absolute. This\nis knowledge of the reason. Human beings have reason as well as\nsense-perception. Thus is Democritus a rationalist, although a\nmaterialist.\n\nThe contribution of Democritus to the theory of knowledge consists\nin just this turn which he gave to Protagoras\u2019 doctrine of perception.\nThe relativity of perception becomes in the Democritan theory a\ndifferent thing from what it was in the doctrine of the great Sophist.\nTo Protagoras perceptual knowledge is relative, and therefore of no\nvalue in determining what is real. To Democritus perceptual knowledge\nis relative, but it has a value,\u2015\u2015a relative value. It gets this\nrelative value from the fact that the reason can determine absolute\nreality. Perception is the contributor to the reason, and also in\nturn is illuminated by the reason. In the same breath we may say that\nProtagoras was a contributor to the theory of Democritus, and in turn\nthat the Protagorean relativism was illuminated by the Democritan\nrationalism. The result was a twofold knowledge\u2015\u2015in the language of\nDemocritus, \u201cgenuine knowledge\u201d and \u201cobscure insight.\u201d\n\nThe objects corresponding to these two kinds of knowledge must be of\ntwo kinds. On the one hand, the objects of the reason, or \u201cgenuine\nknowledge,\u201d are the genuine, primary, or real properties of the\natoms\u2015\u2015for the atoms are reality to Democritus. These are form, size,\ninertia, density, and hardness.[25] A study of these properties of\nthings is, therefore, a study of real objects. On the other hand, the\nobjects of perception or \u201cobscure insight\u201d are the properties of atoms\nas perceived obscurely by the senses. These are color, sound, taste,\nsmell. They are the qualities or relative properties of things. A study\nof these is a study of only what is relatively real. When materialism\nwas revived by the Renaissance, the former group of objects were called\n\u201cprimary qualities\u201d and the latter \u201csecondary qualities.\u201d These terms\nhave become classic, and have rendered permanent Democritus\u2019 evaluation\nof the objects of the two kinds of knowledge. Out of the fragments of\nthe teaching of the Cosmologists and the one-sided epistemology of the\nSophists, Democritus constructed contemporaneously with Plato, perhaps\nantecedently to him, a theory of twofold knowledge.\n\n=The Ethical Theory of Democritus.= The ethics of Democritus is\nanother example of his general principle of a mechanism of atoms. His\nattempt to reduce all qualitative to quantitative relations, which\ngives his theory a unique place in Greek thought, reaches its highest\ndistinction in his ethics. The influence of his ethical doctrine upon\nthe Epicureans, and possibly upon the Cyrenaics, shows its importance\nin history. Furthermore, its high quality proves that a materialism\ncan offer inspiring ethical doctrines. Some have placed the ethics of\nDemocritus upon a level with the ethics of Socrates because, as it is\npointed out, he placed it upon an intellectual basis. The basal ethical\nprinciple of Democritus may be stated thus: As true knowledge is the\nideal object of the intellect, so true happiness is the ideal object\nof our conduct. The ethics of Democritus is eud\u00e6monistic, like that of\nSocrates.\n\nPleasures have fundamental differences. They are in every case the\nresults of atomic motions; but the atomic motions of the intellect\ndiffer from those of the senses, and those of the senses differ from\none another. The fire atoms of the intellect are small, and have a\ngentle, peaceful motion; the atomic motions of the senses are coarse\nand violent, caused by the coarse effluxes of the objects that excite\nthem. Sense-pleasures are relative, like the perceptions. As perception\nis obscure insight and gains the appearance and not the true reality,\nso the pleasures of sense are transitory, uncertain, violent, and\ndeceitful. Intellectual pleasures are, like the intellect, real, true,\npermanent, gentle, and peaceful. True happiness, the goal of human\nactivity, attends upon that right insight\u2015\u2015upon the gentle atomic\nmotions of the intellectual life. On the other hand, the coarse atomic\nmotions of the senses disturb the intellectual calm, and are often\nviolent explosions. Democritus believed that knowledge of the atoms,\nas the true explanation of the world, will give to the soul a measure\nand a harmony, will guard it from excitement and make it possessor\nof a peace which\u2015\u2015to use his happy simile\u2015\u2015is like the ocean calm.\nTwo ideals seem to stand before Democritus, which he did not try to\nreconcile. Sometimes before his mind\u2019s eye the ideal happiness is\npurely intellectual pleasure and points toward asceticism. Sometimes he\nspeaks of happiness as the life of perfect self-control and temperance.\nHe never positively denies all value to sense-pleasure, but he gives\nto sense-pleasure the relative value that he gives to the senses\nthemselves. In every case the ground of happiness is intellectual\nrefinement, and the ground of unhappiness the lack of it. The majority\nof men are sensualists and are to be contrasted with the Wise Man, who\nfinds his happiness either in his individual life or in his friendship\nwith other Wise Men.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER VII\n\n PLATO (427\u2013347 B. C.)\n\n\n=Abdera and Athens.= The materialism of Democritus was the natural\nconsummation of the thought of the Cosmological Period. The influence\nof the Sophistic psychology only enriched it, widened it, and brought\nits materialism into a systematic formulation. The Democritan system\nfrom the isolated centre of Abdera points only to the past. Upon the\ndeath of Democritus the school quickly disappeared. Its materialistic\ndoctrine reappeared from time to time in one form and another,\u2015\u2015in\nthe Skeptics, the Epicureans, and the Stoics. It was reintroduced\nas a system into Europe during the Renaissance. So far as Greece was\nconcerned, the school of Abdera was an early ripening and an early\ndying branch.\n\nThe school of Athenian immaterialism, the principal tendency of Greek\nthought, arose from the centre of Attic civilization and pointed to\nthe future. It drew its materials from practically the same sources\nas the philosophy of Abdera, but the materials were polarized about\nthe ethical teaching of Socrates. The life of Plato coincides with the\nunhappy history of Athens after the death of Pericles (429 B. C.). The\nPeloponnesian War began in 431 B. C., two years before the death of\nPericles and four years before the birth of Plato; and it did not end\nuntil 403 B. C. The event most disastrous to the Athenians during this\nwar was the Sicilian expedition in 413 B. C. Athens was captured by the\nSpartans in 403 B. C., and the great walls of the city were destroyed.\nThe remainder of Plato\u2019s life was contemporaneous with the devastating\nwars among the Greek cities, for there was no city strong enough to\nhold the balance of power after it left the hands of the Athenians.\nIn 359 B. C. Macedon began to loom up as a power in the north. The\nlife of Plato, the formulator of Athenian immaterialism, may be easily\nremembered as covering that period between the rise of Sparta and the\nrise of Macedon.\n\n=The Difficulties in Understanding the Teaching of Plato.= The theory\nof Plato is one of the most involved and one of the most difficult\nto understand in the whole history of philosophy. This difficulty of\ninterpreting Plato as a philosopher depends upon many factors: upon\nthe artistic literary form of the dialogue in which his philosophy is\npresented; upon the conflicting tendencies of thought in Plato himself;\nupon the fact that the composition of his dialogues extended over a\nperiod of more than half a century; upon the constant reshaping of the\ncontent as well as the form of his thought; and upon the uncertainty\nof the chronological order of his writings. This chronological\norder of Plato\u2019s dialogues is an important factor in determining his\nteaching. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century a vast amount\nof literature has been published on the subject, and many theories of\nthe dialogue-chronology have been proposed. There are three principal\ngroups of theories: (1) those based upon purely _a priori_ hypotheses,\nas, for example, that of Hermann, that each dialogue is a stage in\nthe development of Plato\u2019s thought; or that of Schleiermacher, that\nPlato had a systematic plan from the beginning; (2) those based upon an\nempirical study of the historical allusions in the dialogues themselves\n(Zeller, Windelband, _et als._); (3) those recent theories based upon\nthe \u201cstylometric test,\u201d _i. e._ by an examination of the peculiarities\nof the style of Plato. Lutoslawski is a prominent representative of\nthis method.\n\nThe result to the student is bewildering, on account of the differing\nconclusions. But since some choice must be made, we shall follow\nthe order laid down by Windelband,[26] because it is fairly orthodox\nand conservative. For convenience to the memory, the writings will\nbe grouped in the periods of Plato\u2019s life. Our interpretation will\ntherefore follow Windelband in respect to the character of Plato\u2019s\ntheory itself.\n\n=The Life and Writings of Plato.= Two important events divide Plato\u2019s\nlong life of eighty years into three periods. These events were the\ndeath of his master, Socrates, in 399 B. C., and Plato\u2019s return from\nSicily in 387 B. C., after having there come under the influence of the\nPythagoreans. His first period may be called his student life, and was\ntwenty-eight years long; the second period was that of the traveler,\nand was twelve years long; the third period was that of teacher of the\nAcademy, and was forty years long. The first half of his life therefore\ncovers the first two periods, and the second half covers his period as\nteacher. Probably he was engaged in the composition of the dialogues\nduring all these periods, and Cicero reports him to have died \u201cpen in\nhand\u201d (_scribens est mortuus_).\n\n=1. Plato\u2019s Student Life= (427\u2013399 B. C.). This period closes with the\ndeath of Socrates. His acquaintance with Socrates began when he was\ntwenty years old, and therefore lasted eight years.\n\nThe dialogues written during this period are presentations of the\ndoctrine of Socrates and do not contain the constructive theory of\nPlato. They are concerned either with Socratic subjects or with\nSocrates personally, and were written in part during Socrates\u2019 life,\nin part directly after his death.\n\n(a) Dialogues written under the influence of Socrates:\n\n _Lysis_, concerning friendship;\n _Laches_, concerning courage;\n _Charmides_, concerning moderation.\n\n(b) Dialogues written in defense of Socrates:\n\n _Crito_, concerning Socrates\u2019 fidelity to law;\n _Apology_, a general defense of Socrates;\n _Euthryphro_, concerning Socrates\u2019 true piety.\n\n=2. Plato as Traveler= (399\u2013387 B. C.). During this period Plato made\none short and two long journeys, and after each he returned to Athens.\nUpon the death of Socrates he went to Megara, where a former pupil\nof Socrates had a school. Upon this journey he was accompanied by\nother pupils of Socrates, who, as tradition has it, feared violence to\nthemselves after the death of their master. Plato remained in Megara\nbut a short time, and soon returned to Athens. Immediately upon his\nreturn to Athens he went to Cyrene and Egypt, and was away from Athens\nabout four years (until 395 B. C.). The Egyptian journey had little\ninfluence upon his thought, but must have stimulated his imagination.\nHe then remained at Athens four years (395\u2013391 B. C.), and during\nthis time he taught a small circle and wrote his polemics against the\nSophists.\n\nIn 391 B. C. Plato made his first Italian journey\u2015\u2015to Sicily and\nsouthern Italy. This marks the second critical point in his mental\ndevelopment. For at this time (1) he came under the influence of the\nItalian Pythagoreans, and (2) he attempted and failed in connection\nwith Dion[27] and Dionysius to erect his ideal state in Syracuse. He\nwas sold as a slave by Dionysius, redeemed by a friend, and returned\nto Athens in 387 B. C., having been away about four years.\n\nIt is to be noted that Democritus and Plato were wide travelers,\nconsidering the difficulties of locomotion of the time. Both Democritus\nand Plato went to Egypt, and Democritus spent several years in Asia\nMinor (see p. 107).\n\nThe dialogues written during this period may be divided into (a) the\ngroup of polemics against the Sophists, and (b) the _Meno_.\n\n(a) The polemics against the Sophists (written between his return from\nEgypt in 395 B. C. and his first Italian journey in 391 B. C.).\n\nThey are an attempt to present a solid front against the Sophists,\nand to show the weakness of the Sophistic doctrines. These polemical\ndialogues are:\n\n _Protagoras_, a criticism of the Sophistic assumption that virtue\n is teachable, because that assumption is incompatible with the\n Sophistic fundamental principle;\n\n _Gorgias_, showing how superficial the Sophistic rhetoric is when\n compared with true culture, which is the foundation of real\n statecraft;\n\n _Euthydemus_, an exposition of the fallacies in the Sophistic\n eristic;\n\n _Cratylus_, a criticism of the philological attempts of the\n Sophists;\n\n _The\u00e6tetus_, a criticism of the Sophistic theories of knowledge;\n\n The First Book of the _Republic_ (the \u201cDialogue concerning\n Justice\u201d), a criticism of the Sophistic naturalistic theory of\n the state.\n\n(b) _Meno_, which contains the first positive statement by Plato of\nhis own constructive theory. It is the first intimation of development\nbeyond the simple Socratic theory of knowledge. Plato states this,\nhowever, rather timidly, by suggestions and after the manner of a\nmathematician.\n\n=3. Plato as Teacher of the Academy= (387\u2013347 B. C.). These forty\nyears were spent by Plato in Athens as master and teacher of his\nschool, the Academy, with the exception of two journeys to Italy.\nHe undertook these journeys in the hope of realizing in a practical\nway his political ideals. He made his second Italian journey upon the\ninvitation of Dion, in the hope of influencing the younger Dionysius,\nand the third Italian journey in order to reconcile Dion and Dionysius.\nThis last journey brought him again into great personal danger.\n\nWhat was the Academy? It was a public grove or garden in the suburbs of\nAthens (see map, p. 219) that had been left to the city for gymnastics\nby a public-spirited man named Academus. It had been surrounded by a\nwall and had been adorned by olive trees, statues, and temples. Near\nthis inclosure Plato possessed by inheritance a small estate. It was\nhere that he opened his school, and few places could be more favorable\nfor the study of philosophy. Plato bequeathed this estate to the school,\nwhich held the property in a corporate capacity for several centuries.\nThe leader of the school was called scholarch, and he appointed his own\nsuccessor. The school was a kind of religious brotherhood based upon\nthe worship of the Muses.\n\nNote that Democritus, Plato, and Aristotle finished their education\nat an age much beyond what is supposed to be the limit in modern time.\nThey were, in fact, mature men before they began their life work. Plato\nwas 32 before he began to teach in Athens and 40 before he set himself\nabout his real life task in the founding of the Academy. Democritus\nwas 40 before he returned to Abdera from his travels in Asia Minor.\nAristotle was 41 when he undertook to act as tutor of Alexander, and\n49 when he began his administration of the Lyceum.\n\nThe dialogues of the third period of Plato\u2019s life contain his\nconstructive theory, and are his masterpieces of art. The topics with\nwhich they deal show the advance of his thought over the dialogues\nof his first period. The purely Socratic dialogues were ethical\ndiscussions; these are ethical, metaphysical, and physical.\n\n _Ph\u00e6drus_, Plato\u2019s delivery of his programme upon his entrance\n into active teaching in the Academy, in 386 B. C.\n\n _Symposium_, an exposition of his entire doctrine in \u201clove\n speeches.\u201d It is the most artistic of his writings, and\n represents the climax of his intellectual power (385 or\n 384 B. C.).\n\n _Republic_ (major portion). The composition of the _Republic_\n extended over a long period. It is a discussion: (1) concerning\n justice (written in the second period, see above); (2) concerning\n the ideal state which shall realize justice; (3) concerning the\n Idea of the Good and in criticism of the constitutions of states.\n It is Plato\u2019s masterpiece and his life work.\n\n _Parmenides_ and _Sophist_, written to express the objections to\n the theory of Ideas, and to discuss such objections. (Windelband\n holds these dialogues were not written by Plato, but by some\n member of his school. This is, however, not the consensus of\n opinion.)\n\n _Politicus_, a discussion of the field of knowledge and of action\n for a statesman.\n\n _Ph\u00e6do_, Plato\u2019s final will and testament to the school, written\n shortly before his third Sicilian journey, in 361 B. C. It is\n his completed conception of the Idea of the Good and of the\n relation of other Ideas to it. It contains Anaxagorean and\n Pythagorean elements.\n\n _Philebus_, concerning the ingredients of the Idea of the Good.\n\n _Tim\u00e6us_, Plato\u2019s conception of physical nature, expressed in\n mythical form.\n\n _Laws_, the work of Plato\u2019s old age, his revision of the ideal\n State.\n\n=Concerning the Dialogues[28] of Plato.= The early philosophers\npresented their philosophy in metrical form as poems \u201cconcerning\nnature\u201d; Socrates perpetuated his teachings through conversations\nwith men; Plato made his influence permanent by written dialogues;\nAristotle\u2019s philosophy, in the works that have been preserved, stands\nin the form of treatises whose sole purpose is that of exposition.\nPlato\u2019s dialogues therefore have a twofold place in the history of\nliterature. On the one hand, in the history of literature proper we\nhave already mentioned them as standing after the Greek drama in the\ndevelopment of Greek dialectics; on the other hand, in the development\nof philosophical instruction they stand between the conversations of\nSocrates and the scientific expositions of Aristotle.\n\nPlato was the first child of Fortune, and the complete preservation\nof his works was the most remarkable proof of it. \u00c6schylus was the\nauthor of at least 70 writings, of which 7 are preserved; Euripides\nwas the author of 95 writings, of which 18 are preserved; Sophocles\nhad 123 writings, aside from his lyric works, of which 7 are preserved.\nShakespeare wrote 36 plays, Plato wrote 35 dialogues that are genuine.\nAll of Plato\u2019s writings have come down to us. Why were the writings of\nPlato preserved from the destroying hand of time? There are at least\nthree causes of their preservation: (1) they had intrinsic beauty;\n(2) there was contemporary public interest in them; (3) the chief cause,\nPlato\u2019s school kept close guard over them.\n\nBy the dialogue Plato could employ the Socratic method, give dramatic\neffect, and idealize Socrates. The _Republic_ is his crowning literary\neffort, and the most complete statement of his mature political views.\nPerhaps the _Philebus_ is the best expression of his idea of goodness,\nand presents his most complete organization of the sciences. All\nPlato\u2019s dialogues have a transparent beauty and a purity of diction;\nand they may be taken as a revelation of himself. All are dialogues\nsave the _Apology_, but the dialogue element grows less and less in\nhis later works. Socrates is usually the spokesman in them, and to\nhim is usually given the deciding word. Only a few have a fixed plan\nof argument. One thread and then another is followed, and in many no\ndecision whatever is reached; for the dialogues must always be taken\nas artistic products in which philosophical experiences are idealized.\nPlato often employs myths or parables to illuminate his arguments. The\nsituations and the literary adornments show the human touch, and the\nconversation often moves to a dramatic close.\n\nIn the _Republic_ Plato sought to formulate theoretically certain\npolitical conceptions of the ideal State that were then in the air.\nIt is interesting to note that his conception influenced the political\nidealism of later time, as, for example, Cicero\u2019s _De Republica_,\nAugustine\u2019s _City of God_, More\u2019s _Utopia_, Campanella\u2019s _State of the\nSun_, Bacon\u2019s _New Atlantis_, Macchiavelli\u2019s _Il Principe_.\n\n=The Factors in the Construction of Plato\u2019s Doctrine.=\n\n=1. His Inherited Tendencies.= (a) In the first place Plato was by\ninstinct an aristocrat. His family was one of the most distinguished\nin Athens, and traced its descent from Solon and Codrus. In making\nan estimate of his philosophy one must take account of the caste of\nsociety in which he was born. His metaphysical theory of Ideas is\naristocratic, and in it he turns from all that is of the earth earthy\nto what is above the life of \u201copinion.\u201d His four cardinal virtues\nare possible only to the few. His political attitude was peculiar. He\nwas hostile to the democracy, and yet his political idealism diverged\nso far from the practical politics of Athenian aristocracy that he\ncompletely abstained from public life. With Plato, philosophy once\nmore retires to the school. Here we have the strange juxtaposition of\nSocrates, the teacher, who had been engaged in a practical reformation,\nwhose father was an artisan and whose mother a midwife, and Plato,\nhis adoring pupil and truest interpreter,\u2015\u2015Plato, the idealist, \u201cwhose\nspeculation is not like the Philistine, whose life is spent in the\nmarket place or the workshop, and whose world is measured by the narrow\nboundaries of his native town; it is the lord of the manor, who retires\nto his mansion, after having seen the world, and turns his gaze towards\nthe distant horizon; disdaining the noise of the cross-roads, he\nmingles only in the best society, where is heard the most elegant, the\nnoblest, and the loftiest language that has ever been spoken in the\nhome of the Muses.\u201d[29]\n\n(b) In the next place Plato had an instinctive love for the beautiful,\nand in this he was great, even in his time. Every Periclean Greek was\nartistic, but Plato was more than this. He is to be ranked among the\ngreat creators of the art of his day,\u2015\u2015with Phidias and Sophocles. He\nrepresented in his person everything ideally Greek. He was a man of\ngreat beauty, a human Apollo, a man endowed with every physical and\nmental talent, and his moral character was almost ideal in its purposes.\nHis real name was Aristocles, and he got his name Plato from his broad\nframe. The artistic development of the time appealed to him in his\nyouth, and he was early interested in the writing of epic and dramatic\npoetry. This artistic instinct determined in no small measure not\nonly the form of the presentation of his thought, but also the content\nof the thought itself. It determined his principle of conceiving the\nIdeas, the constitution of his State, his theory of pleasure, and his\nconception of the highest Good. The artistic form of the presentation\nof his writings was as important to him as the matter presented.\n\n=2. His Philosophical Sources.= Plato had received a careful education\nthat made him familiar with all the scientific theories of current\ninterest to the Athenians. The elements of the earlier philosophies,\nthat were fundamental to the mechanical atomism of Democritus, were\nrecombined in a different way by Plato under the influence of Socrates\u2019\nethical principle. Even Plato\u2019s political and artistic ideals are\nsubordinate to his entire absorption in the personality and teaching of\nSocrates. Heracleitus, Protagoras, Parmenides, and, later, Anaxagoras\nand the Pythagoreans, furnished him with his philosophical materials.\nWe may point out three of the preceding philosophies that had an\nespecially powerful influence upon him: those of (1) Socrates;\n(2) Parmenides; and (3) the Pythagoreans. His revered master, Socrates,\nfurnished Plato throughout with the conceptual principle, by which he\nworked over all his material into his daring system. The influence of\nParmenides upon him was also very great. He speaks of the Eleatic as\n\u201cParmenides, my father.\u201d Plato betook himself to the Eleatic school at\nMegara upon the death of Socrates, and this shows that he must already\nhave been hospitable to the philosophy which taught the conception of\nan absolute and eternal essence of things known by the human reason.\nThe influence of the Pythagoreans was felt by Plato on his first visit\nto Italy. This influence grew with him, and seems to dominate the\ndialogue of his old age, the _Laws_. The Eleatic Oneness was a single,\nimmutable block. In the Pythagorean doctrine of numbers he found\nthe conceptual divisions of that Oneness, and he also found that\nsuch conceptions would give a content to Socrates\u2019 conception of\nthe Good. Indeed, the numbers seemed to be the conceptual models for\nwhich Socrates was searching. Mathematical truths are independent\nof perception. They are innate ideas. They are eternal and immutable\nForms. They were the weapons needed against the Protagorean doctrine of\nperception. While Plato agreed with Heracleitus that the visible world\nis a changing world, and with Protagoras that our sense-perceptions of\nthat world can yield only relative truth, he developed his philosophy\nalmost entirely on its conceptual side; and this is due to the\ninfluence first of Socrates, second of Parmenides, and third of the\nPythagoreans. Plato\u2019s completed philosophy was the theory of Ideas,\nworked over in his mind a half-century or more, and is in itself a\nhistory of the development of pure concepts.\n\n=The Divisions of Plato\u2019s Philosophy.= Plato himself had no clear\nconception of an exact division of science, and did not confine\nhimself in a single dialogue to a single science. Aristotle, however,\ndistinguished in the philosophy of his master dialectic, ethics,\nand physics, and these divisions of Plato\u2019s teaching have been\ntraditionally adopted. The dialectic, as commonly used in his time,\nmeant \u201cthe dialogue or conversation employed as a means of scientific\ninvestigation.\u201d It was transformed by Plato to mean not logical but\nmetaphysical discussion. Plato was concerned with the laws of Being\nrather than the laws of logic, and, as Being to him consisted of\nIdeas, his dialectic interest was to reduce experience by division\nand induction to some unity. Plato\u2019s dialectic was not logical but\nmethodological,\u2015\u2015logical operations taken as a whole,\u2015\u2015by means of\nwhich the Ideas and their relations to one another were to be found.\nThe physics of Plato is of little value. It was an afterthought to\nsatisfy the demands of his school. The world of nature phenomena could\nnever be for Plato the object of true knowledge. Unfortunately, the\nteleological physics of Plato was regarded by the Hellenistic time\nand the Middle Ages as Plato\u2019s most important achievement. Plato wrote\nentirely in the spirit of the Enlightenment, and his works show a\ngreat interest in man as a moral being, but little interest in physical\nnature.\n\n=Summary of Plato\u2019s Doctrine.= The interpretation of Plato as set forth\nin what follows may be thus summarized: Plato began with the conceptual\nform of idealism, suggested by the logical method of Socrates, with\nthe purpose of solving logical and ethical problems. He advanced to a\nteleological idealism, conditioned by the doctrines of Anaxagoras and\nthe Pythagoreans, with the purpose of applying his doctrine to physical\nproblems.\n\n=The Formation of Plato\u2019s Metaphysics.= In his earliest period Plato\nmade these very clear statements: (1) virtue is knowledge; (2) by\nknowledge is not meant sense-perceptions. In his final statement of\nhis philosophy, as he bequeathed it to posterity, he only gave a new\nevaluation of these two early principles, although he expressed them in\na highly complex form. \u201cVirtue is knowledge\u201d is the basis of agreement\nbetween Socrates and the Sophists; and \u201cby knowledge is not meant\nsense-perceptions\u201d is the basis of their opposition. During Plato\u2019s\nearly period he was acting as a faithful transcriber of Socrates in the\npresentation of this first principle: virtue is knowledge, is teachable,\nis one. During Plato\u2019s second period he was called on to defend the\nsecond statement against the Sophists. Plato\u2019s formation of his own\ntheory begins at this point,\u2015\u2015at the point where his defense of his\nmaster was keenest. From this time, for a full half-century, Plato\ndeveloped the Socratic principles in a theory that went far beyond\nSocrates, but that was never untrue to him.\n\nThe simplest way of stating Plato\u2019s formation of his own doctrine\nis this: he accepted the Protagorean doctrine of a perceptual world\nof relative knowledge; he placed it beside the Socratic theory of\nconceptual reality; and as a result he conceived the world to be\ntwofold. Both Being and Becoming share in reality. There are, on the\none side, the immutable concepts that compose true reality; there\nare, on the other side, the changing perceptions that come and go. The\nworld of true reality _is_, but never _becomes_; the world of relative\nreality _becomes_, but never _is_. These two worlds are by nature\nseparate; one is the object of the reason, the other is the object\nof the senses; one is incorporeal, the other is corporeal. The first\nworld is the immutable One of the Eleatics presented by Plato as a\nplural number of Socratic concepts; the other world is the Heracleitan\nflux presented as perceivable things. There is true knowledge, but\nProtagoras is right in saying that it cannot be found in the perception\nof the material world. It is knowledge of an incorporeal world, and\nthat is precisely the world of Socratic concepts which now in Plato\u2019s\nhands become Ideas.\n\nIt would, however, be a mistake to suppose that Plato\u2019s conception\nof the world was an artificial eclecticism, obtained by putting two\nworlds side by side. To be sure, he never was able to bring them into\nan organic unity, and the dualism between them is often very marked.\nBut they do not lie like two drawers in a desk, each having no vital\ninfluence on the character of the other. In the juxtaposition of the\ntwo worlds each gets a new meaning, and the value of each becomes\ngreater.\n\nIn the first place, _perception[30] gets a new value_. The logic of\nthe Sophistic doctrine of perception was that perceptions are the only\nform of knowledge, and even perceptions have no share of truthfulness.\nProtagoras himself did not go so far as this absolute skepticism,\nbut this is the logic of his position. Perceptions can have no value,\nbecause each is a standard to itself. Plato incorporates the perception\ntheory into his own, and immediately gives it a new value. Perceptions\ndo not, to be sure, yield true knowledge, but they have a relative\nvalue. They have a value for the practical world, although the highest\nthey can give is Right Opinion. When we remember that the world of\nthat day was weary of its own speculations leading to nihilism, it is\nremarkable that Plato did not turn away entirely from the doctrine of\nthe Sophists. On the contrary, he took up the Sophistic doctrine into\nhis own and gave to it a value which it had not possessed by itself.\n\nIn the second place, _conception gets a new value_. What was conception\nto Socrates? It was the common content of opinions and perceptions;\nit was the universal that was developed inductively out of many\nparticulars. Socrates brought many particulars together in order to\nreveal their common qualities. The abode of conceptions was to Socrates\nthe half-formed individual opinions and experiences in which conception\nlay, as in an envelope; and the conversation was needed to bring it\nforth. The concept to Socrates was the logical \u201cnature\u201d of perceptions.\nBut now since Plato admitted the relative reality of all perceptions,\nhe was obliged to look elsewhere to account for conceptions. If\nthe conceptions are true reality, they cannot be the common quality\nin opinions, nor the logical \u201cnature\u201d of changing perceptions. The\ntrue conception cannot be contained in the perception. Accordingly\nthe conception must exist in an incorporeal world and possess an\nindependent reality. The concepts are hypostasized by Plato. They\nbecome Ideas. Thus the Socratic concept became the Platonic Idea,\nand _for the first time in European thought, reality is conceived\nas immaterial_. The conceptual world grows under Plato\u2019s hands to be\n\u201cother than\u201d the perceptual world, and this was his first step beyond\nSocrates. The conceptual world is the perfect reality that cannot be\ncontained in any material thing nor in the sum of all material things.\nThe immaterial Ideas are the object of thought, as nature phenomena\nare the objects of perception. Ideas are not the abstractions of\nperceptions, for the process of thought is not an analysis nor an\nabstraction, but an intuition of reality presented in single instances.\nIdeas are the reality of which perceptions are the copies or shadows.\nPerceptions do not contain the truth. They are only the suggestions or\npromptings by which the soul bethinks itself of the Ideas. Material\nthings merely hint to the soul of the existence of the Ideas.\n\nIt is important in this connection to point out that Plato\u2019s conception\nof immateriality is not to be taken as what we mean in modern times\nby the spiritual or psychical; for, according to Plato, our psychical\nfunctions belong to the world of Becoming, just as the functions of our\nbody and other perceptual things belong to it. Besides, even the Ideas\nof sense qualities have reality. Plato does not identify the human\nmind with the incorporeal world of Ideas, nor does he make the modern\ndualistic division of the world into mind and matter. The immaterial\nworld is \u201cother than\u201d the world of perception, and bears the relation\nto the material world of the unchanging to the changing, of the simple\nto the manifold, of Being to Becoming.\n\n=The Development of Plato\u2019s Metaphysics\u2015\u2015The Development of Plato\u2019s\nIdeas in the Two Drafts.= The twofold world with its new evaluation\nof the Socratic conception and of the Protagorean perception was,\nafter all, only Plato\u2019s point of departure for his constructive work.\nIt was his first and undeveloped apprehension of a theory of Ideas.\nIt appeared first in the _Meno_ in his doctrine of recollection and\nimmortality, which was written in his second period just after his\nseries of splendid polemics against the Sophists. From this time\nfor a full half-century Plato developed the conception of a twofold\nworld into a Theory of Ideas. In the course of time he found himself\nconfronted with three problems: (1) How many Ideas are there? (2) What\nis the relation between Ideas and physical things? (3) What is the\nrelation of the Ideas to one another? Plato\u2019s answers to these three\nquestions compose what is known as his Theory of Ideas. However, he\nanswers these three questions differently when he first considered\nthem than later, when his grasp upon the significance of his problem\nbecame more mature. Plato\u2019s Theory of Ideas, therefore, may be said to\nhave had a development in two stages. These two stages are called his\n\u201ctwo drafts\u201d (Windelband) of the Ideas. We shall now present, first\nin summary form and then in more detail, his answers to these three\nquestions in the two drafts, and thereby show how his theory developed\nto its final formulation.\n\n=Brief Comparison of the Two Drafts of the Ideas.=\n\n=1. The Earlier Draft of Ideas.=\n\n(a) _The Number of Ideas_ is infinite.\n\n(b) _The Relation of Ideas to Physical Things_ is similarity. The Ideas\non their side are spoken of as having a \u201cpresence\u201d in physical things,\nbut never fully appearing in them; the physical phenomena on their side\nare spoken of as \u201cparticipating\u201d in the Ideas.\n\n(c) _The Ideas are Related to One Another_ logically, as genera to\nspecies, but they are only roughly classified by Plato.\n\n=2. The Later Draft of Ideas\u2015\u2015Plato\u2019s Final Statement.=\n\n(a) _The Number of Ideas_ is limited to those of worth, mathematical\nrelations, and nature-products, but Plato never arrived at any definite\nselection.\n\n(b) _The Relation of Ideas to Physical Things_ is teleological. The\nIdeas are the ideal or purposeful ends of physical objects.\n\n(c) _The Ideas are Related to One Another_ teleologically. The Idea of\nthe Good stands at the head, and is the purposeful end of all the other\nIdeas.\n\n=Comparison of the Two Drafts of Ideas in More Detail.=\n\n=1. The Number of Ideas in the Earlier and Later Drafts compared.=\nWhen Plato first presented the Theory of Ideas to himself, he conceived\ntheir number to be infinite. There are Ideas of everything that is\nthinkable. There are as many as there are class concepts, as there\nare qualities of things in the universe, as there are common nouns\nin the language. But it was pointed out to Plato that he had only\nreproduced and paralleled in the immaterial world what exists in the\nmaterial world; that such a theory did not solve, but only doubled our\ndifficulties. Then there were technical difficulties in the conception\nof the Ideas of everything\u2015\u2015of things, qualities, relations,\u2015\u2015good, bad,\nand indifferent. But what probably appealed to him most cogently was\nthe raillery to which he found his theory subjected (see _Parmenides_),\nthat he as a Greek could think of ugly Ideas, like hair and filth,\nas real. The result was that in the later drafting of his theory the\nnumber of qualities worthy to be called Ideas becomes very much limited.\nPlato makes the elimination from no avowed principle except that of\nworth, because as a Greek it was absolutely repellent to him to regard\nanything as real except worth. Consequently in his later dialogues\nhe speaks of (1) Ideas having an inherent value, like the Good and\nthe Beautiful, (2) Ideas corresponding to nature products, (3) Ideas\nof mathematical relations. Norms of value thus take the place of\nclass-concepts, and in his selection of Ideas his choice is determined\nmore and more by their moral worth.\n\n=2. The Relation of Ideas and the World of Nature in the Two Drafts\ncompared.= Plato did not construct his world of Ideas in order to\nexplain the world of physical nature. His original purpose was to find\nan object for knowledge; and his Ideas were born out of his striving\nto give a reality to the conceptions of Socrates. In his evaluation\nof the doctrine of his master he had drawn a distinction between the\ntwo worlds, but he had not thought of explaining one by the other. They\nwere related and distinguished, but one threw no light upon the other.\nIn Plato\u2019s first draft of the Ideas he speaks of this relation as\n_imitation_. The phenomena are an imitation of reality. The Ideas are\nthe originals and physical objects are copies. To state the relation\nin modern terms, the laws of the growth of a tree are permanent, while\nthe tree changes. The lower world of Becoming has a similarity to the\nhigher world of Being. As the Pythagoreans had conceived things as\nimitations of numbers, Plato, strongly influenced by the Pythagoreans,\nthought that concrete things correspond to their class concepts only\nin a degree. On the one hand, the individual thing partakes of the\nuniversal of the Idea, and this is called \u201cparticipation\u201d in the Idea.\nOn the other hand, the word \u201cpresence\u201d describes the way the Idea\nexists in the thing, which means that the Idea is present in the thing\nso long as the thing possesses the quality of the Idea. The Ideas are\npresent and then withdraw, and thus the perception changes.\n\nIn the second drafting of the Ideas, Plato has become conscious\nof the need of explaining physical nature by the Ideas. He did not\nat first think of explaining the nature of the physical world by his\nmetaphysical reality. It was an afterthought, and arose out of the\ncompulsion of having a systematic theory. His conception of the world\nof Ideas as the world of true Being ultimately demanded that the world\nof physical nature should be not merely \u201cother than\u201d but dependent upon\nthe Ideas. The Ideas are unchanging; the phenomena are changing. If\nthe Ideas are the reality of the changing world, in what other sense\ncan they be its reality than as its cause? The _Meno_, _The\u00e6tetus_,\n_Symposium_, and _Ph\u00e6drus_ do not discuss this problem. The _Sophist_\nproposes it, and in the _Ph\u00e6do_ the thought is first expressed that the\nIdeas are the causes of physical phenomena appearing as they do appear.\nBut how can the Ideas be causes, when the very conception of them as\npure and immaterial realities denies to them all qualities of motion\nand change? The Platonic theory reached its zenith in its solution\nof this problem. The Ideas must be conceived as the causes of nature\nphenomena, and still as not moving nor suffering change. They are\nteleological causes. They are the realized ends of the phenomenal world.\nThe world of Ideas is the actual goal of perfection for _physical_\nnature. The world of Ideas is not only the truth of all knowledge;\nit is also the perfect teleological cause of all actual change. This\nthought is developed in the _Philebus_ and the _Republic_, where the\nIdeas as a whole, and in particular the Idea of the Good,\u2015\u2015to which all\nthe other Ideas are means,\u2015\u2015stand as the final cause of all occurrence.\nThe physical phenomena stand therefore in a teleological relation to\nthe Idea of the Good. From the Good all things get their meaning. It\npermeates and explains all.\n\n=3. The Relation among the Ideas in the Two Drafts compared.= It was\nnatural that the conception of a pluralism of Ideas should lead Plato\nto a consideration of the law of their relationship. A systematic\ntheory of a multiplicity of reals involves their orderly relationship.\nThey cannot exist independently in the same world. What is the\nrelationship among the Ideas? In the earlier drafting of his theory\nPlato was principally attentive to the relations of co\u00f6rdination and\nsubordination among the Ideas; in the possibility of the division of\nclass concepts into genera and species. The relationship that he sought\nwas logical relationship, the relationship that the scientist seeks to\nfind in the classification of plants or rocks. Just what result Plato\ntried to reach by such a logical classification of his realities, it\nis difficult to say. He was not successful. His attempt to erect a\nlogically arranged pyramid of conceptions with the most abstract at the\napex was not carried out.\n\nIn his second drafting of the Ideas, Plato felt the inadequacy of\na mere logical relationship among them, and conceived them to be\nteleologically related. His reduction of the number of Ideas had\nnaturally brought about a new conception of their relationship. There\nmust be some principle for their elimination, for the rejecting of some\nand the keeping of others. That principle was the principle of their\nethical worth. That is to say, the Idea of the Good, which had been the\nstandard for eliminating some concepts from the list of Ideas and for\nretaining others, now became for him the principle of the relationship\nof the Ideas among themselves. Plato turned from the logical to the\nteleological relation among Ideas. The Idea of the Good embraces and\nrealizes all the others. It is therefore the absolute end of all the\nother Ideas, and they bear the relation to it, not of particulars to a\ngeneral term, but of means to an end. The principle in their selection\nbecomes the principle of their arrangement.\n\n=Plato\u2019s Conception of God.= The above sketch of the formation and\ndevelopment of Plato\u2019s theory of Ideas shows how difficult it would\nbe to frame a short definition of them that would at the same time be\nadequate. As he finally defined them, they are immaterial archetypes\nor ideals, dominated by a moral purpose. This dominating moral purpose\nin the Ideas is the highest Idea of all, the Idea of the Good, which\nstands above all the others and gives to them and to everything else\ntheir value and indeed their actuality.\n\nIs this Idea of the Good the same as God? Plato calls the Good\n\u201cDeity\u201d and the \u201cWorld Reason,\u201d and ascribes to it the name of Nous.\nNevertheless the Idea of the Good is not the same as the Christian God,\nand Plato is only showing here the influence of Anaxagoras\u2019 conception\nupon him. (See p. 47.) The Idea of the Good is not a person or a\nspiritual being. It is merely the absolute ethical end and purpose of\nthe world. Plato did not attempt to give it a content, any more than\ndid his master, Socrates; but Plato presupposed it, because it was in\nitself the simplest and most comprehensible thing in the world.\n\n=Plato\u2019s Conception of Physical Nature.= Plato constructed a rough\nsketch of the philosophy of nature in his later years, in compliance\nwith the needs of his School, and perhaps with the urging of his pupil,\nAristotle. In his earlier period, he would have nothing of physics,\nand was in this respect quite in accord with the spirit of Socrates. To\nthe end of his life he maintained that there can be no true knowledge\nof the physical world; for it is a world of change, and therefore all\nscientific conclusions about it could be only probable. In a mythical\naccount in the _Tim\u00e6us_ he drew a picture of the constitution of the\nworld. He conceived a Demiurge or world-forming God to exist, and he\nthought that this God made the world out of not-Being or empty space\n\u201cwith regard to the Ideas.\u201d The world thus constructed is conceived\nby Plato as a huge living thing, composed of a visible body and an\ninvisible soul. The world-soul sets the world-body in a circular motion,\nwhich motion was considered by antiquity to be the most perfect of all\nmotions. In sharp opposition to the mechanical theory of the world,\nPlato conceived the world to be endowed with knowledge, of which the\nspherical motion in its return upon itself is the symbol. The world\nis unitary and unique, the most perfect and most beautiful world, and\nits origin can be traced only to a reason working toward ends. Plato\u2019s\nphysics, of which the above is an abbreviated account, will be seen\nto be of little importance; but it was unfortunately, as we have said,\nthis side of his doctrine that was emphasized in the Middle Ages.\n\nThis mythical account shows, however, the inherent dualism in Plato\u2019s\ndoctrine. The Idea never fully realizes itself in corporeal things, and\nPlato was called on to explain the cause of the evil and imperfection\nof the physical world. Moreover, the imperfection of the physical world\ngot new emphasis in the influence upon him of the Pythagorean doctrine,\nwhich had set the perfect and imperfect worlds in opposition. What\nprevents the Idea from fully appearing in phenomena? The more Plato\nconceived the world of Ideas as ethical Ideals and a kingdom of pure\nworth, and the more teleological the Ideas became, the less could he\nregard the Ideas as the cause of imperfection in nature. Ideas are\nBeing, and the essence of perfection. The cause of imperfection must\ntherefore be that which has no being whatsoever. The physical world as\n\u201cbecoming\u201d has participation, not only in that which has Being (Ideas),\nbut in that which has no Being (empty space). The physical world has a\ncomposite character. It has sprung from the union of the Ideas and an\nabsolutely negative factor, which Plato calls empty space. This eternal\nnegative is formless and unfashioned, but it is capable of taking on\nall possible forms. The physical universe is therefore neither Ideas\nsimply, nor matter simply, but a composition of the two. This non-Being\nis not like the matter, \u201cunformed stuff,\u201d of Aristotle, from which all\nsensible things are made; but it is that in which Ideas have to appear.\nThe Ideas are plunged into this empty non-Being, which they take on\nas a veil. And just this is the origin of imperfection; non-Being\nwithholds the Ideas from perfect expression. Non-Being, or empty space,\nis an indispensable auxiliary to the Ideas, for without it no physical\nuniverse would be possible. But at the same time it is the eternal\nfoe and obstruction of the Ideas. Its co\u00f6peration with the Ideas is\nat the same time a resistance to them. It is the perpetual negation of\nBeing, and the primary cause of imperfection, change, and instability.\nOn this account the universe can never be like the Ideas, but it\ncan approximate them. The soul of the world, for example,\u2015\u2015which was\nregarded by Plato in Pythagorean fashion as number subjecting chaotic\nspace to harmony,\u2015\u2015is the most perfect reproduction of the Idea of the\nGood. The existence of matter detracts from the perfection of the world,\nbut it does not detract from the majesty of the Ideas.\n\n=Plato\u2019s Conception of Man.= Plato needed a psychology of another sort\nfrom that developed by the Cosmologists. His analysis of the mental\nlife of man stands or falls with his metaphysical theory of Ideas,\nbut it has this importance: it is the first attempt to understand the\npsychical life from within.\n\nThe dualism of the two worlds appears in sharp outlines in the narrower\nfield of the life of man. The soul of man belongs to both worlds. On\nthe one hand, it belongs to the world of Becoming and partakes of that\nworld through its sense-perceptions, desires, and their pleasures. In\nthis lower world it is the principle of life and motion; it is that\nwhich moves itself and other things. On the other hand, it shares in\nthe world of Being through its intuitive reason or knowledge. It shares\nin the instability and change of psychical phenomena; it also possesses\nthe immutability of reality. Through its perceptions it constructs its\n\u201copinions\u201d or inferences of changing phenomena; through its reason it\nhas true knowledge of the eternal Ideas. Therefore the soul must bear\nin itself traits that correspond to the two worlds. Plato conceives\nman to have an irrational and a rational nature; and he divides the\nirrational nature into two parts,\u2015\u2015the noble irrational part and the\nignoble irrational part. The rational part of man is the reason, the\nnoble irrational part is the will, the ignoble irrational part is the\nsensuous appetites.\n\n { Rational nature \uff1d reason\n Man { Irrational nature { Noble \uff1d will\n { { Ignoble \uff1d sensuous appetites\n\nThis is the celebrated doctrine of the \u201cthree parts\u201d of the soul. Are\nthey three parts or three functions of the soul? Plato is not clear\nas to this point. He sometimes speaks of them as three divisions, and\ntreats them as separable in such a way that only the reason is immortal\nand the other two parts are mortal. Again, he speaks of the soul as\na unity, which carries with it in the next life all three functions.\nIn this latter meaning the three parts are three natures or three\ndifferent degrees of worth of the unitary soul.\n\n=Plato\u2019s Doctrine of Immortality.= Beginning with this conception of\nthe dual nature of the human soul, Plato reasons both backward and\nforward from it: backward to its pre-existence, and forward from its\npost-existence,\u2015\u2015its existence after death. In the _Ph\u00e6do_, Plato has\nput into the mouth of what has become his Platonized Socrates his final\nthought concerning the relation of this present life to its past and\nits future. It is plainly the doctrine of the transmigration of souls,\nwhich he got from the Pythagoreans. The soul has a reality that is\nimperishable, and the soul is rewarded or punished for its conduct in\none existence by the kind of existence into which it is metamorphosed.\nIn prison, on that fatal day when he drank the poison, Socrates\nexplained to those around him why he was so cheerful at the thought of\ndeath. Is not our present existence a kind of death? Is not the soul\nin the present life deterred from true knowledge by the trammels of\nthe bodily desires? The true philosopher is he who turns away from his\nbody\u2019s passions,\u2015\u2015dies to them, and tries to live the reality of the\nworld of Ideas. We shall have full knowledge when we pass beyond the\ngrave and then we shall be rewarded, if we have striven truly. But\nat present our body hampers and misleads us with its perceptions\nof changing mortality around us, and with its transitory desires.\nThis life itself is the reward or punishment for our conduct in our\npreceding state.\n\n=1. The Immortality of Pre-existence.= What proof does Plato offer\nfor our existence before this life? The Ideas, these testimonies of\nreality, form a part of the human soul. They are eternal, and have not\nbeen created by the soul. Knowledge is not the origination of a new\ntruth, but is the recognition of Ideas, whose presence the mind merely\nrecords. Greek psychology never got much farther than this. The modern\npsychological conception of the soul as a dynamic something, which\ncreates its own content, was quite foreign to the Greeks. To Plato, as\nto all other Greeks, the soul is as passive as the wax that receives\nthe impress of the seal. All Greek psychology was under this general\nlimitation: all ideas must be \u201cgiven\u201d to the soul. Therefore if the\nIdeas are not \u201cgiven\u201d by perception, because perception is of the\nchanging; if nevertheless the soul finds itself in possession of the\nIdeas on the occasion of perception; if the soul did not create the\nIdeas, because the soul is by nature passive; the logical and only\nconclusion is that the soul was already in possession of the Ideas in\na pre-existent state. Pre-existence is the only way of accounting for\nthe full-born knowledge of the soul, and it is interesting to note how\nimportant was the pre-existent state to the imagination of the ancient\nworld.\n\nPlato therefore advanced the doctrine of reminiscence, or as he\ncalled it, _Anamnesis_, as proof of our pre-existence. Knowledge is\nrecollection. The Ideas have always been present in the mind, and when\nwe recognize them we have knowledge. The Ideas have no past or future,\nbut they always exist. It is the mind that undergoes awakening\u2015\u2015an\nawakening to their existence in itself. When the mind sees the\nobjects of physical nature, it awakens in painful astonishment at the\ncontrast between the sense world and the Ideas of its native world of\nimmateriality. In a mythical representation in the _Ph\u00e6drus_, Plato\nsupposes that before the present life our souls have beheld the pure\nIdeas in their full reality, that the Ideas had been forgotten in\nour birth into the present life, but that the perception of similar\ncorporeal things calls the soul back to the Ideas themselves. Then the\n\u201cEros\u201d is awakened\u2015\u2015the native philosophical impulse or inborn love for\nthe Ideas, by which the soul is raised again to the knowledge of that\ntrue reality. Only the pure Ideas themselves will satisfy this longing;\nthe embodiment of the Ideas in art or personalities is not adequate.\nThe Eros ties us to the Ideas. God does not have this longing, for He\nfully knows the Good. The ignorant man does not have this longing, for\nhe does not suspect the existence of the Ideas in himself. The Eros is\nthe homesickness that the lover of the truth feels.\n\n Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting,\n The soul that rises in us, our life\u2019s star,\n Hath had elsewhere its setting,\n And cometh from afar;\n Not in entire forgetfulness,\n And not in utter nakedness,\n But trailing clouds of glory do we come\n From God, who is our home.[31]\n\nWhen, in the _Meno_, the Sophistic dilemma was proposed to Socrates,\n\u201cHow can inquiry be made into what we know or into what we don\u2019t know?\u201d\nSocrates pointed out that the only escape from the dilemma was the\nprocess of recollecting, and that knowledge is the thing recalled.\nSocrates then called a slave to him, and by skillfully questioning him\nfound that the slave recognized the mathematical relationship between\nthe square on the hypothenuse of a right triangle and the sums of\nthe squares on the other two sides. \u201cThe ignorant slave can only have\nbeen recollecting,\u201d says Socrates. Mathematical knowledge is extracted\nfrom the sense-perception of the slave only because the slave has\nthrough such perception the opportunity of recollecting Ideas present\nin himself and not hitherto suspected by himself. In Plato\u2019s system,\nmathematical forms have an important place. They are the links by means\nof which the Idea shapes space teleologically into the sense world.\n\n=2. The Immortality of Post-Existence.= Plato\u2019s ground for belief in\nthe existence of soul after death is practically the same as that for\nits previous existence. Its destiny hereafter depends upon how far it\nhas freed itself in this earthly life from the sensuous appetite. As\nproofs for future existence Plato mentions the soul\u2019s possession of the\nIdeas, the simplicity and unity of the soul, the soul as the principle\nof life, and the goodness of God. However weak Plato\u2019s arguments may\nbe for the existence of future immortality, his absolute belief in it\nis one of the chief points in his teaching. It is interesting to note\nthat the modern western world seems to have no concern in the previous\nstate of the soul, but through the influence of the Christian religion\nhas focused its attention upon the future life. Oriental religions\ncontain the doctrine of pre-existence and the transmigration of souls,\nbut not in the same sense as Plato. In Plato the soul possesses an\nidentity that persists. It has all the qualities of the Ideas, but\nis also an entity possessing these qualities. It has non-origination,\nindestructibility, unity, and changelessness. The doctrine of the\nimmortality of post-existence had appeared in the Greek religion, but\nthis is the first time that we have found it as a part of philosophic\nteaching. The student will, of course, feel the difficulties in Plato\u2019s\nconception as he has presented it. For how can the soul preserve its\nindividuality as a unity, when the soul belongs in part to a world\nwhich is temporal?\n\n=The Two Tendencies in Plato.= From the doctrine of the two worlds\nthere are two distinct tendencies running through the entire teaching\nof Plato. These are (1) the tendency to glorify nature, and (2) the\ntendency to turn away from nature to ascetic contemplation. On the one\nhand, Plato felt within himself the light heart-beat of the artist, and\nthe Hellenic love of life was strong within him. He felt that the Idea\nof the Good was realized even in the world of sense, that there was\npleasure in the sensuous imitation of the Idea, in practical artistic\nskill, and in an intelligent understanding of mathematical orderings.\nThese were at least preparations for the highest Good, which consisted\nin knowledge of the Ideas. On the other hand, one finds beside this\nthe ascetic tendency to be repelled by nature, a negative ethics\nthat would leave the world of sense and would spiritualize the life.\nThe _The\u00e6tetus_ sets up an ideal of retirement for the philosopher,\nand points out that he should find refuge as soon as possible from\nthe evils of the world in the divine presence. The _Ph\u00e6do_ pictures\nthe whole life of the philosopher as a dying, a purification of the\nsoul, an existence in prison, from which escape is only by virtue\nand knowledge. This ascetic tendency seems very anti-Greek; and yet\nis it foreign to Greek life? In Greek history do we not find, by the\nside of the Epic and the glorification of nature, the Mysteries and\nthe withdrawal of the individual from the world? Both these historic\ntendencies appear in Plato, and on the whole the ascetic tendency is\nstronger. The Ideas are contrasted with the nature world more often\nthan they transfigure it. The dualism of Heaven and earth is emphasized,\nand the contrast is strongly drawn between the reality of the Ideas and\nthe temporality of sense.\n\n=Platonic Love.= Described in technical terms, in both Socrates and\nPlato, Love (Eros) is the philosophic and not a purely intellectual\nimpulse. Its rather more didactic character in Socrates of an attempt\nto engender knowledge and virtue in others appears in Plato in a larger\nway as the personal and practical realization of the truth. Reduced to\nits simplest terms, Platonic Love is the longing of the human being in\nhis imperfectness for perfectness and completeness. It is the innate\ndesire for immortality.\n\nTrue love, according to Plato, takes its beginning in the astonishment\nor pain at the presentment of the Ideas through remembrance, and the\nstarting-point of Love in an individual is the principle fundamental\nin pre-existence. The philosophic impulse for the Ideas takes the form\nof Love, because visible beauty has a special brightness and makes a\nstrong impression on the mind. Love belongs only to mortal natures;\nfor they, since they do not possess the divine unchangeableness, have\nto propagate themselves continually. Love may be described therefore\nas the propagative impulse. On the one side it may be viewed as an\ninspiration from above, springing from the higher, divinely-related\nnature in man; on the other hand it may be viewed as an aspiration from\nbelow of the sensuous and human in man. On this side it is a yearning\nand not a possession; and it presupposes a want. Analyzed in this way,\nLove is the middle term between having and not having. It is the union\nof the higher and lower natures in man, and throughout the universe\nthere stirs this longing for the eternal and imperishable.\n\nWhat is the object of this Love,\u2015\u2015of this desire of the finite to fill\nitself with the eternal and to generate something enduring? That object\nis the possession of the Good, which is happiness. The possession\nof the Good is immortality. What is the external condition of Love\u2019s\nexistence? The presence of Beauty; for this alone, by its harmonious\nform, corresponds to our desire and awakens it. Does this Love appear\nfirst in its complete realization? No; there are many kinds of beauty,\nand Love is as various in degree and kind as beautiful objects. Love\nrises step by step, and is realized in a graduated series of forms.\nThere is Love for beautiful shapes, sexual love; Love for beautiful\nsouls, and this appears in works of art, education, and legislation;\nLove for beautiful sciences, the seeking of beauty wherever found; and\nfinally Love for the pure, shapeless, eternal, and unchangeable\u2015\u2015the\nIdea, which is immortality. All else is preliminary to the dialectical\nknowledge of the Ideas. In all this, man is reaching out from his sense\nof want for satisfaction, from his poverty to the completed riches of\nlife. Love bears him on from height to height until, in religion and\nLove of the Good, man gains his immortality. In Platonic Love all kinds\nof Love have place in pointing the soul onward to the divinely perfect.\nYet this Love for the divinely perfect is the soul\u2019s aspiration from\nthe beginning, and all the preliminary stages are only the uncertain\nattempts to seize the Idea in the copies. Love, therefore, is this\nuniversal struggle of the finite to inform itself with the Idea; and\ndelight in any one object of beauty is a stage in the development of\nthis impulse.[32]\n\n=Plato\u2019s Theory of Ethics.= Plato\u2019s Theory of Ideas is, after all,\nfundamentally only an outspoken ethical metaphysics, and his Ethics\nis his most fruitful accomplishment. Plato\u2019s ethical teaching is\ntherefore involved in all that we have said about him up to this\npoint. An understanding of his ethics includes an understanding of the\nformation and growth of his dialectic, an insight into his physical\ntheory, knowledge of the two tendencies which run through his teaching,\nand especially an understanding of his doctrine of Love. If some of\nthe previous exposition is repeated, it will be only to bring out\nmore fully his ethical teaching as a special science. We shall speak\nof three topics under this general subject of his ethics: (1) his\ndevelopment of his theory of the Good; (2) the four cardinal virtues;\n(3) his theory of political society.\n\n=1. Development of Plato\u2019s Theory of the Good.= Plato betrays his\nascetic tendency in his first drafting of the Ideas and, as we have\nsaid, the double-world theory is the cause of this. Only one of the two\nworlds is real and will appeal to the Wise Man. The soul belongs to the\nsupersensible world, and the knowledge, of which virtue consists, takes\nman away from the sensible world. Since earthly life is full of evil,\nthe soul should die to it and turn away as soon as possible to the\ndivine presence. This ascetic aspect of morality is set forth in the\n_Ph\u00e6do_ and the _The\u00e6tetus_.\n\nIn the general development of his metaphysics in the second drafting\nof his Ideas, Plato\u2019s ethical theory developed also. He not only\nwent beyond the abstract statement of Socrates, but beyond his own\noriginal asceticism. When he brought his two worlds into teleological\nrelationship, he was logically compelled to abandon his conception of\nascetic morals. The physical world has now a relative reality, and by\nthe same sign sense-life has a relative moral value. It was Plato\u2019s\nfirm conviction that moral conduct makes man truly blessed, in this and\nanother world. He still held, too, that this blessedness, this complete\nperfection of the soul, this sharing in the divine world of the Ideas,\nis the Highest Good. Yet he now came to recognize other kinds of\nhappiness as steps toward the ideal Good. There are varieties of Goods,\nas appeared in his doctrine of Love. Besides the intuition of knowledge\nand its pleasures, there are physical Goods and their pleasures.\nIntellectual pleasure may be unmixed with pain, but there are also\nsensuous pleasures unmixed with pain. Here is indeed Plato, the Greek,\nspeaking; Plato, the Greek artist, impelled by the charm of the Greek\nworld around him. Strongly as he combated the Cyrenaic hedonism, and\nclosely as he was allied to Socrates, his Greek nature gave way before\nthe manifestations of the Idea of the Good in the physical world.\nThe pleasure in nature objects, in educational development, in the\npractical and plastic arts, in mathematical sciences, and in the\norderliness of life\u2015\u2015all these became for him preliminary stages in\nthe full participation in the ethical Good. They came to have for\nhim a relative value, as expressed in the _Philebus_, _Republic_, and\n_Symposium_.\n\n=2. The Four Cardinal Virtues.= But Plato went farther, and was not\ncontent merely to point out the place of human conduct in the twofold\nworld. He developed his theory of ethics systematically. He classified\nthe virtues on the basis of his threefold division of the soul.\nNaturally enough, in his first draft of his theory, Plato followed\nSocrates in reducing the single virtues to one, viz., the virtue of\nknowledge. In his second drafting, however, in the later dialogues,\nhe assumed their distinct independence, and he reflected upon their\nrespective spheres. A virtue corresponds to each part of the soul. Each\npart has its own perfection, which is its virtue. Moreover, in so far\nas one or another part of the soul preponderates in different men, so\nfar are they suited to developing the corresponding virtue.\n\n { Rational nature\u2015\u2015in brain (Wisdom)\n Soul (Justice) { Irrational { Noble part\u2015\u2015in heart (Courage)\n { nature { Ignoble part\u2015\u2015in liver (Temperance)\n\nFrom the above scheme it will be observed that the rational nature has\nthe brain as its organ and reaches its perfection or virtue in Wisdom;\nthat the ignoble irrational nature has the liver as its organ, and\nreaches its virtue in self-control or Temperance. Finally, since the\nperfection of the whole soul consists in the orderly relation of its\nsingle parts, so subordinated and regulated that the soul can reach its\nhighest perfection, the fourth and highest virtue is Justice. _The four\ncardinal virtues are Temperance, Courage, Wisdom, and Justice._\n\n=3. Plato\u2019s Theory of Political Society.= The virtue, Justice, has\nlittle meaning in individual ethics, and as an ethical perfection can\nonly be attained in society. There is no English word that is quite the\nequivalent for the Greek term, but Justice is the usual translation.\nJustice, however, does not contain the moral spirit of the Greek word.\nConsistent with his conception of the Ideas in his metaphysics, Plato\u2019s\nideal of moral perfection is to be found, not in the individual, but\nin the species. Plato pictures less the perfect man than the perfect\nsociety. Perfect happiness is rather that of the social whole than\nof the individual, and this ideal of happiness can be reached only in\nthe ideal State. That is why the dialogue, the _Republic_, occupies\nso important a place in Plato\u2019s writings. It is an attempt to show how\nthe fourth and last virtue, Justice, can be attained. The first book\nwas written in Plato\u2019s early period, and was perhaps called a \u201cdialogue\nconcerning Justice.\u201d Justice is distinctly the social virtue found\nonly in a perfect society, and it will make possible the fulfillment\nof Wisdom, Courage, and Temperance. The individual man is a vital\nbeing whose heart is the central organ, whose characteristic virtue is\ncourage. His courage is indeed a combination of wisdom and temperance.\nThe picture is of the individual man, not amenable to society, but in\n\u201ca state of warfare.\u201d In such isolation Justice would not exist as a\nvirtue.\n\nThe political state is necessary if the Idea of the Good is to be\nmanifested in human life. The state is the true educator in Justice,\nand at the same time the ideal state will be the realization of Justice.\nThe task of the state everywhere is the same, to wit, to direct the\ncommon life of man so that every one may be happy through virtue. The\nresult may be attained only by so ordering the relations of society\nthat Justice may prevail. Plato\u2019s _Republic_ is a carefully worked-out\nplan of such an ideal society. The author made several attempts at\nSyracuse with the aid of Dion to get first the elder and then the\nyounger Dionysius to transform the tyranny into an ideal state. These\nattempts resulted disastrously. In the disappointment of his old age\nthat his ideal scheme had never succeeded, he wrote the _Laws_, which\nis a revised version of the _Republic_ with the Pythagorean number\ntheory as a basis.\n\nThe Spartan state is his model. The Platonic Republic is aristocratic.\nThere is paternal government in everything, censorship of everything.\nEach individual\u2019s course is marked out for him. When Greek political\nlife was undergoing dissolution, Plato raised the ideal of political\nunity as necessary to individual happiness as against the anarchism of\nsegregation. Yet even in this he was reflecting the current distrust of\npolitical institutions. The comparison of existing political conditions\nwith his own political ideal reinforced his aristocratic leanings,\nand made him the more distrustful of the political possibilities\nof a democracy. He believed that an intelligently worked out scheme\nof government was practicable, and should be forced upon people, if\nnecessary. In no other way was political salvation possible.\n\nSince the State is the man \u201cwrit large,\u201d it has three parts,\ncorresponding to the three parts of the human soul. There is (1) the\nworking or peasant class, which corresponds to the appetitive part of\nman; the only object of such a class is to furnish food for the State,\nand the highest virtue of this class is temperance. The peasant can\nonly work, eat, and drink, and the highest praise of him is that he\ncontrols his appetites. (2) The warrior class guards the State within\nand without; and its characteristic virtue is courage. The will must\nshow its highest efficiency in guidance of the emotions. (3) Highest\nof all is the cultured class of philosophers or rulers, who determine\nby their insight the laws that should rule the State. The virtue of\nthis class is wisdom, for is this class not the brain of the State?\nThe perfection of the entire State exists when the three classes have\ntheir proper distribution of power. Then does justice exist. The duty\nof the rulers is therefore to have the highest wisdom possible, of the\nwarriors to be unflinching in their devotion to duty, of the peasants\nto exercise self-control. Thus Plato\u2019s Republic is an aristocracy in\nthe hands of the carefully cultured, which consists of the two upper\nclasses. By means of community of wives, the exposure of deformed\ninfants, and the State\u2019s education of the children of the two upper\nclasses, a continuous selection can be made, the two upper classes can\nbe renewed, and all private ends can be renounced in favor of the State.\nThus the sole end of a community is moral education, and Plato arranges\nhis ideal community with reference to that. The two upper classes are\na great family, to whom this is intrusted. They have dedicated their\nlives to the furthering of science and to its administration.\n\n\n A SELECTION OF PASSAGES FROM PLATO FOR ENGLISH READERS.\n\nBy Professor Benjamin Jowett, late Principal of Balliol College,\nOxford.\n\n The figures refer to the pages in the margin of Professor\n Jowett\u2019s translation of Plato\u2019s Dialogues; the letters\n (A, B, C, D, E) to the subdivisions of these pages.\n\n\n FIRST VOLUME.\n\n CHARMIDES.\n\n Socrates prescribes for Charmides\u2019 headache.\n 156 D (... \u2018Such, Charmides, is the nature of the charm\u2019....)\n \u2013157 C (... \u2018my dear Charmides.\u2019)\n\n LYSIS.\n\n We only trust those who appear to know more than ourselves.\n 206 D (\u2018Upon entering\u2019 ...)\n \u2013210 B (\u2018He assented.\u2019)\n\n LACHES.\n\n (1) The art of fighting in armour is useless to the soldier.\n 182 E (\u2018I should not like to maintain\u2019 ...)\n \u2013184 C (... \u2018his opinion of the matter.\u2019)\n\n (2) The harmony of words and deeds.\n 188 C (\u2018I have but one feeling\u2019 ...)\n \u2013189 B (... \u2018the difference of our ages.\u2019)\n\n PROTAGORAS.\n\n (1) The Sophists at the house of Callias.\n 314 B (... \u2018And now let us go\u2019 ...)\n \u2013316 A (... \u2018rendered his words inaudible.\u2019)\n\n (2) Protagoras tells the story of Prometheus and Epimetheus.\n 320 D (\u2018Once upon a time\u2019 ...)\n \u2013322 D (... \u2018a plague of the state.\u2019)\n\n (3) The education of a Greek child.\n 325 D (\u2018Education and admonition\u2019 ...)\n \u2013326 E (... \u2018would be far more surprising.\u2019)\n\n EUTHYDEMUS.\n\n The doctrinaire politician and the true philosopher.\n 304 B (\u2018Such was the discussion, Crito\u2019 ...)\n \u2013to end (... \u2018and be of good cheer.\u2019)\n\n CRATYLUS.\n\n The significations of the various letters.\n 426 B (\u2018My first notions\u2019 ...)\n \u2013427 C (... \u2018and out of them by imitation compounding\n other signs.\u2019 ...)\n\n PHAEDRUS.\n\n (1) The philosopher must study the nature of man.\n 229 A (\u2018Let us turn aside,\u2019 ...)\n \u2013230 A (... \u2018a diviner and lowlier destiny?\u2019 ...)\n\n (2) The banks of the Ilissus.\n 230 B (... \u2018But let me ask you, friend,\u2019 ...)\n \u2013E (... \u2018in which you can read best.\u2019)\n\n (3) The soul in a figure and her transmigrations.\n 245 C (\u2018The soul through all her being\u2019 ...)\n \u2013257 A (... \u2018leave you a fool in the world below.\u2019)\n\n (4) The true orator.\n 269 E (\u2018I conceive Pericles\u2019 ...)\n \u2013272 C (... \u2018and yet the creation of such an art is not\n easy.\u2019)\n\n (5) The tale of Thamus and Theuth.\n 274 C (\u2018I have heard a tradition of the ancients\u2019 ...)\n \u2013275 C (... \u2018that the Theban is right in his view about\n letters.\u2019)\n\n (6) Speech better than writing.\n 275 C (\u2018I cannot help feeling\u2019 ...)\n \u2013277 A (... \u2018to the utmost extent of human happiness.\u2019)\n\n (7) The true art of composition.\n 277 B (\u2018Until a man knows the truth\u2019 ...)\n \u2013278 D (... \u2018poet or speech-maker or law-maker.\u2019)\n\n ION.\n\n The inspiration of the poet.\n 533 C (\u2018I perceive, Ion,\u2019 ...)\n \u2013536 C (... \u2018not by art, but by divine inspiration.\u2019)\n\n SYMPOSIUM.\n _The Character of Socrates._\n\n (1) His fit of abstraction in the porch.\n 174 A (\u2018He said that he met Socrates\u2019 ...)\n \u2013175 C (... \u2018Socrates entered.\u2019 ...)\n\n (2) His strange appearance and marvellous power of influencing\n others.\n 215 A (\u2018And now, my boys,\u2019 ...)\n \u2013216 G (... \u2018so that I am at my wit\u2019s end.\u2019)\n\n (3) His endurance, eccentricity, and bravery.\n 219 E (... \u2018All this happened\u2019 ...)\n \u2013222 A (... \u2018a good and honourable man.\u2019)\n\n\n SECOND VOLUME.\n\n MENO.\n\n Learning is only Recollection (\u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2): The Immortality of\n the Soul proved out of Pindar.\n 81 A (\u2018I will tell you why\u2019 ...)\n \u2013E (... \u2018active and inquisitive.\u2019 ...)\n\n APOLOGY, OR THE DEFENCE OF SOCRATES.\n\n The whole.\n\n CRITO, OR SOCRATES IN PRISON.\n\n The whole.\n\n PHAEDO, OR THE LAST DAY OF SOCRATES\u2019 LIFE.\n\n (1) Socrates in prison.\n 57\u201360 C (... \u2018pleasure appears to succeed.\u2019)\n\n (2) Why the philosopher is willing to die, although he will not\n take his own life.\n 60 C (\u2018Upon this Cebes said\u2019 ...)\n \u201369 E (... \u2018it will be well.\u2019)\n\n (3) The Description of the Other Life.\n 107 C (\u2018But then, O my friends,\u2019 ...)\n \u2013115 A (... \u2018after I am dead.\u2019)\n\n (4) The Death of Socrates.\n 115 A (\u2018When he had done speaking\u2019 ...)\n \u2013to end.\n\n GORGIAS.\n\n (1) The good man desires, not a long, but a virtuous, life.\n 511 A (\u2018You always contrive\u2019 ...)\n \u2013513 A (... \u2018their own perdition.\u2019 ...)\n\n (2) The Judgment of the Dead.\n 523 A (\u2018Listen, then,\u2019 ...)\n \u2013527 A (... \u2018any sort of insult.\u2019)\n\n (3) The Moral of the Tale.\n 527 A (\u2018Perhaps this may appear\u2019 ...)\n \u2013to end.\n\n\n [Appendix.]\n\n I _Alcibiades._\n\n Socrates humiliates Alcibiades by shewing him his inferiority\n to the Kings of Lacedaemon and of Persia.\n 120 A (\u2018Why, you surely know\u2019 ...)\n \u2013124 B (... \u2018ever desired anything.\u2019)\n\n II _Alcibiades._\n\n The Gods approve of simple worship.\n 148 C (\u2018The Lacedaemonians, too,\u2019 ...)\n \u2013150 B (... \u2018for me to oppose.\u2019)\n\n _Eryxias._\n\n The nature of money.\n 399 E (\u2018Then now we have to consider\u2019 ...)\n \u2013400 E (... \u2018of no use to us ... True.\u2019)\n\n\n THIRD VOLUME.\n\n REPUBLIC.\n\n _Book i._\n The commencement of the Dialogue: Cephalus on Old Age.\n 327\u2013331 B (... \u2018is, in my opinion, the greatest.\u2019)\n\n _Book ii._\n (1) The argument of Adeimantus.\n 362 E (... \u2018But let me add something more\u2019 ...)\n \u2013367 E (... \u2018seen or unseen by Gods and men.\u2019)\n\n (2) The true nature of God.\n 376 D (\u2018Come, then, and let us pass\u2019 ...)\n \u2013383 A (\u2018Your thoughts ... my own.\u2019)\n\n _Book iii._\n (1) Grace and beauty in art and education.\n 400 D (\u2018But there is no difficulty\u2019 ...)\n \u2013402 A (... \u2018made him long familiar.\u2019)\n\n (2) The good physician and the good judge.\n 408 C (\u2018All that, Socrates, is excellent,\u2019 ...)\n \u2013409 E (\u2018And in mine also.\u2019)\n\n (3) The true use of music and gymnastic.\n 409 E (\u2018This is the sort of medicine\u2019 ...)\n \u2013412 A (\u2018You are quite right, Socrates.\u2019)\n\n _Book iv._\n Virtue the health, Vice the disease, of the Soul.\n 443 C (\u2018Then our dream has been realized\u2019 ...)\n \u2013444 E (\u2018Assuredly.\u2019)\n\n _Book v._\n (1) The right treatment of enemies.\n 469 A (\u2018Next, how shall our soldiers\u2019 ...)\n \u2013471 C (... \u2018like all our previous enactments, are very\n good.\u2019)\n\n (2) The last wave:\u2015\u2015The Government of Philosophers.\n 471 C (\u2018But still I must say, Socrates.\u2019 ...)\n \u2013473 E (... \u2018is indeed a hard thing.\u2019)\n\n _Book vi._\n (1) The Parable of the Pilot.\n 487 A (\u2018Here Adeimantus interposed\u2019 ...)\n \u2013489 D (\u2018Precisely so, he said.\u2019)\n (2) The low estimation in which Philosophy is held by the World.\n 493 E (\u2018You recognize the truth of what I have been saying?\u2019\n ...)\n \u2013497 A (... \u2018as well as of himself.\u2019)\n\n _Book vii._\n The Allegory of the Cave.\n 514 A\u2013520 E (... \u2018present rulers of the State.\u2019)\n\n _Book viii._\n Democracy and the Democratic Man.\n 555 B (\u2018Next comes democracy\u2019 ...)\n \u2013562 A ( ... \u2018the democratic man.\u2019)\n\n _Book ix._\n { The Many-headed Monster. }\n { The City of which the Pattern is laid up in Heaven. }\n 588 A (\u2018Well, I said, and now\u2019 ...)\n \u2013to the end of the book.\n\n _Book x._\n The Vision of Er.\n 614 B (\u2018Well, I said, I will tell you a tale;\u2019 ...)\n \u2013to the end of the book.\n\n TIMAEUS.\n\n (1) The Tale of Solon.\n 20 E (\u2018Then listen, Socrates\u2019 ...)\n \u201326 D ( ... \u2018these ancient Athenians.\u2019 ...)\n\n (2) The Balance of Mind and Body.\n 87 C (\u2018There is a corresponding enquiry\u2019 ...)\n \u201390 D ( ... \u2018the present and the future.\u2019)\n\n CRITIAS, OR THE ISLAND OF ATLANTIS.\n\n The entire Dialogue.\n\n\n FOURTH VOLUME.\n\n PARMENIDES.\n\n The meeting of Socrates and Parmenides at Athens. Criticism of\n the Ideas.\n 126 A (\u2018We had come from our home\u2019 ...)\n \u2013136 C ( ... \u2018and see the real truth.\u2019)\n\n THEAETETUS.\n\n (1) Socrates, a midwife, and the son of a midwife.\n 148 E (\u2018These are the pangs of labour\u2019 ...)\n \u2013151 E ( ... \u2018by the help of God you will be able to tell.\u2019)\n\n (2) The Lawyer and the Philosopher.\n 172 B ( ... \u2018Here arises a new question\u2019 ...)\n \u2013177 C ( ... \u2018Let us go back to the argument.\u2019)\n\n SOPHIST.\n\n The Pre-Socratic Philosophers and their puzzles.\n 241 D (\u2018Will you then forgive me\u2019 ...)\n \u2013246 D ( ... \u2018but seekers after truth.\u2019)\n\n STATESMAN.\n\n The Reign of Cronos.\n 269 A (\u2018Again, we have been often told\u2019 ...)\n \u2013274 E (... \u2018and at another time in another.\u2019 ...)\n\n PHILEBUS.\n\n { The first Taste of Logic. }\n { The Art of Dialectic. }\n 15 C (\u2018Good; and where shall we begin\u2019 ...)\n \u201317 A (... \u2018and true dialectic.\u2019)\n\n\n FIFTH VOLUME.\n\n LAWS.\n\n _Book i._\n (1) The true nature of Education.\n 643 A (\u2018You seem to be quite ready to listen\u2019 ...)\n \u2013644 B (... \u2018of every man while he lives.\u2019)\n\n (2) Man a puppet of the Gods.\n 644 E (\u2018Let us look at the matter thus\u2019 ...)\n \u2013645 B (... \u2018more clearly distinguished by us.\u2019 ...)\n\n _Book iii._\n The Origin of Government.\n 676 A (\u2018Enough of this\u2019 ...)\n \u2013679 E (\u2018Very true.\u2019)\n\n _Book iv._\n (1) The virtuous Tyrant.\n 709 C (\u2018And does not a like principle\u2019 ...)\n \u2013712 A (... \u2018granting our supposition.\u2019)\n\n (2) The life of Virtue.\n 715 E (\u2018And now what is to be the next step?\u2019 ...)\n \u2013718 A (... \u2018for the most part in good hope.\u2019 ...)\n\n _Book v._\n (1) { The honour of the Soul. }\n { Precepts for a virtuous life. }\n 726 A\u2013732 D (... \u2018both in jest and earnest.\u2019)\n\n (2) The best and second-best state.\n 739 A (\u2018The next move\u2019 ...)\n \u2013741 A (... \u2018to fight against necessity.\u2019)\n\n (3) Riches and Godliness.\n 742 D (... \u2018The intention, as we affirm\u2019 ...)\n \u2013744 A (... \u2018the work of legislation.\u2019)\n\n _Book vii._\n (1) The good citizen must not lead an inactive life.\n 806 D (\u2018What will be the manner of life\u2019 ...)\n \u2013808 C (... \u2018to the whole state.\u2019)\n\n (2) The education of the young.\n 808 D (... \u2018When the day breaks\u2019 ...)\n { \u2013809 A (... \u2018according to the law.\u2019) }\n { 810 A (... \u2018A fair time\u2019...) }\n { \u2013812 A (... \u2018come to an end.\u2019) }\n\n _Book viii._\n The evils of licentiousness.\n 835 C (... \u2018There is, however, another matter\u2019 ...)\n \u2013841 E (... \u2018wrongly indulged.\u2019)\n\n _Book x._\n (1) { The three classes of unbelievers. }\n { Advice to the young. }\n 885 B (... \u2018For we have already said\u2019 ...)\n \u2013888 D (... \u2018the truth of these matters.\u2019)\n\n (2) God is not an idle ruler of the Universe; but orders all,\n even the smallest things, for our good.\n 899 D (... \u2018And now we are to address him\u2019 ...)\n \u2013905 D (... \u2018any understanding whatsoever\u2019 ...)\n\n (3) God cannot be propitiated by the gifts of the wicked.\n 905 D (... \u2018For I think that we have sufficiently proved\u2019 ...)\n \u2013907 D (... \u2018will not discredit the lawgiver.\u2019)\n\n _Book xi._\n (1) The evils of retail trade, and the cure of them.\n 918 A (\u2018After the practices of adulteration\u2019 ...)\n \u2013919 C (... \u2018shamelessness and meanness.\u2019)\n\n (2) The honour of parents.\n 930 E (\u2018Neither God, nor a man\u2019 ...)\n \u2013932 A (... \u2018to what has now been said.\u2019...)\n\n _Book xii._\n (1) The good state in its intercourse with the world.\n 949 E (\u2018Now a state\u2019 ...)\n \u2013951 C (... \u2018is ill-conducted.\u2019)\n\n (2) The Burial of the Dead.\n 958 C (\u2018Thus a man is born\u2019 ...)\n \u2013960 A (... \u2018a fitting penalty.\u2019...)\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER VIII\n\n ARISTOTLE (384\u2013322 B. C.)\n\n\n=Aristotle in the Academy and Lyceum.= Many notable pupils gathered\naround Plato during his mastership of more than forty years. Plato\u2019s\nnephew, Speusippus, succeeded him as leader of the Academy, and for\nthe next three hundred and fifty years the Academy is called by various\nnames. It is the Older Academy under Speusippus and later; then it is\nknown as the Middle Academy; and then, about 120 B. C., it is known as\nthe New Academy. The history of the Academy is, however, a part of the\nHellenic-Roman Period. It is sufficient to say here that the leaders\nsucceeding Plato in the Academy added but little to philosophical\nspeculation, although much to empirical research. The important fact is\nthat the sceptre in philosophy passed from the Academy when Plato died\nand his greatest pupil Aristotle left it. Just as Plato stood among\nthe pupils of Socrates as Socrates\u2019 most discriminating interpreter, so\namong the pupils of Plato there was one pre\u00ebminent pupil,\u2015\u2015Aristotle.\nAristotle was too great a man to be subordinated to the leadership of\nSpeusippus. Upon the death of Plato he left the Academy, and fourteen\nyears later he returned to Athens and founded the Lyceum, which became\nunder his mastership the most influential Athenian school. The Lyceum\nwas an inclosed space of ground, like the Academy. It was situated just\noutside the walls of Athens, on the right bank of the Ilissus. It was\ndedicated to Apollo, decorated with fountains, gardens, and buildings,\nand contained one of the great gymnasia of Athens. It was frequented\nby philosophers, and is known to have been the favorite walk of\nAristotle and his pupils, whence they got their name of Peripatetics.\nTheophrastus, the most eminent pupil of Aristotle, bought a property\nnear the grove and bequeathed it to the school. It was a religious\nfoundation, like the Academy. The method of choosing the scholarchs\nvaried at different times. The name Lyceum is from the same root as\nLycian, and was given to Aristotle\u2019s school from the fact that the\ngrove was dedicated to the Lycian Apollo.\n\nHere, in the Lyceum, Greek philosophy was brought to its most\ncomplete expression. Here all the threads of Greek cosmological and\nanthropological undertakings were finally woven together. Here an\nadjustment was accomplished between Aristotle\u2019s two great predecessors,\nPlato and Democritus; and materialistic and idealistic realism\ncrystallized in a theory of development. The great form of Aristotle\nrises to speak the final word of pure Greek civilization, at a time\nwhen the custody of Greece had passed from the hands of the Athenians,\nthe Spartans, the Thebans in succession to the Macedonians. He was the\nmost influential thinker that history had seen. In his formative power\nupon human thought he has scarcely a peer. Dante called him \u201cthe master\nof those who know.\u201d \u201cIn my opinion,\u201d said Cicero, \u201cAristotle stands\nalmost alone in philosophy.\u201d Eusebius said of him, \u201cAristotle, nature\u2019s\nprivate secretary, dipped his pen in thought.\u201d Goethe remarked, \u201cIf\nnow in my quiet days I had youthful faculties at my command, I should\ndevote myself to Greek, in spite of all the difficulties I know. Nature\nand Aristotle should be my sole study. It is beyond all conception what\nthat man espied, saw, beheld, remarked, observed.\u201d\n\nThe portrait that we draw of Aristotle is very different from that\nof Plato. Instead of the deeply poetic temper, the man who sees all\nthings in an ideal unity of infiniteness and vastness, we have before\nus now the scientist in search of facts, the accurate man of good\nsense, whose imagination does not soar above the clouds, but at the\nsame time has extraordinary fertility in historical and scientific\ntheoretical explanations. His was a life filled with the love of truth.\nHis learning took up into itself the entire range of human knowledge\nin such a way as to include its earlier development. And what is more,\nhe showed an equal interest in all departments. Aristotle was more of\na scientist than Plato, for the theoretical rather than the ethical\ninterest was fundamental in his work. He is the personification and\ncompletion of pure Greek learning.\n\n=Biography of Aristotle=, 384\u2013322 B. C.\n\n=Brief Chronological Sketch of Aristotle\u2019s Life.=\n\n First Period\u2015\u2015Aristotle the Student\u2015\u201537 years.\n 384\u2013347 B. C.\n\n 384 Born in Stagira in Macedonia.\n 367 Entered the Academy. Remained 19 years.\n 347 Left the Academy upon the death of Plato.\n\n Second Period\u2015\u2015Aristotle the Traveler\u2015\u201512 years.\n 347\u2013335 B. C.\n\n 347 Went to the courts at Atarneus and Mytilene in Asia Minor.\n 343 Returned to the court of Macedon at Pella, in response to the\n summons of King Philip, to teach the young prince Alexander.\n Remained 4 years.\n 340 Went from Pella to Stagira to engage in scientific work.\n Remained 5 years.\n\n Third Period\u2015\u2015Aristotle the Leader of the Lyceum\u2015\u201513 years.\n 335\u2013322 B. C.\n\n 335 Founded the Lyceum in Athens. Taught and administered the\n school 12 years.\n 323 Fled to Chalcis.\n 322 Died in Chalcis.\n\n=Aristotle\u2019s Biography in Detail.=\n\n=1. First Period=, 384\u2013347 B. C.\u2015\u2015=Early Influences=. Aristotle was\nborn in Stagira in Macedonia. His father was court physician to King\nAmyntas, the founder of the Macedonian power and the father of King\nPhilip. He came from a long line of physicians (the caste, Asclepiad)\nwho traced their origin to Asclepius. Little is known about the early\nyears of Aristotle except that his father and mother died, leaving him\nin the guardianship of Proxenus of Atarneus. (Atarneus is the state in\nAsia Minor which he later visited.) It can scarcely be doubted that he\nwas destined by his family to be a physician, and that the empirical\nworks of Hippocrates and Democritus were the first elements of his\nearly education. Aristotle grew up in this atmosphere of medicine of\nMacedonia, which explains his respect for the results of experience\nand his accuracy in details,\u2015\u2015all of which contrasts him with the Attic\nphilosophers.\n\nHe was sent by Proxenus to the Academy in 367 B. C., at the age\nof eighteen, and he remained there for nineteen years, or until he\nwas thirty-seven. He was not merely a pupil in the school, but his\nbrilliancy won for him immediately a prominent position there. He\nbecame a teacher, an attractive writer, and champion of the literary\nspirit of the school. Even while he was a member of the Academy he\nbecame a famous man. It is difficult to say just how much influence\nthe Academy had upon the casting of his thought. His scientific\ninclinations were formed before he went to the Academy; he got his\nimmense scientific erudition in Asia Minor and in Stagira later, after\nhe left the Academy. Probably the spirit of the Platonic school turned\nhis attention to ethical and metaphysical theories, and probably it was\ndue to his stay in the Academy that he became interested in rhetorical\nand purely cultural studies. At the same time his own influence must\nhave been very great in forming the policy of the Academy, and he\nwas probably responsible for its turning its attention to scientific\nmatters.\n\nThe sources from which Aristotle drew the material of his philosophical\nscience were therefore (1) his inherited taste for medicine and\nempirical science; and (2) the influence of the Academy in ethical,\nmetaphysical, and cultural subjects. Both these factors appear\nthroughout the philosophical development of Aristotle. On the other\nhand, it must not be forgotten that probably Aristotle\u2019s influence\nupon the Academy was as great as that of the Academy upon him. His\nown persistence along the line of empirical science shows itself in\nhis period at Atarneus, Mitylene, and on his return to Stagira. Much\nhas been said about an estrangement between Aristotle and his teacher,\nPlato. This is probably idle gossip. Aristotle held his master in\ngreat esteem, as he himself testifies in his _Ethics_. Aristotle was an\nindependent and original mind, and probably even in the school he would\npoint out defects in Plato\u2019s thought, when his aged teacher would lead\nhis theories upon mistaken lines. Plato said that his pupil Xenocrates\nneeded the spur, while Aristotle needed the bridle. Aristotle was\ncalled the brain of the Academy.\n\n=2. Second Period=, 347\u2013335 B. C.\u2015\u2015=Traveler and Collector=. When\nPlato died, and his nephew Speusippus became scholarch of the Academy,\nAristotle, in company with Xenocrates, went to the court of Hermeias,\nruler of Atarneus and Mitylene. Hermeias was another pupil of Plato\nat the Academy. Here Aristotle married twice, and here he resided for\nsix years. In 343 B. C. he obeyed the summons of King Philip to come\nto Pella and become the tutor of Alexander. He acted in this capacity\nfor four years, and seems to have been more fortunate than Plato as\ninstructor of a king. His influence upon Alexander was very great.\nWithout losing himself in the impracticable, Aristotle seems to have\nimpressed high philosophical ideals upon the noble spirit of his kingly\nward. Alexander says of Aristotle, \u201cTo my father I owe my life, to\nAristotle the knowledge how to live worthily.\u201d During the tedium of\nthe protracted campaign in Bactria, Alexander sent for the tragedies\nof Euripides, Sophocles, and \u00c6schylus. The _Ethics_ of his teacher\nwas always with him. The ideals of statesmanship, the wide purposes\nin political control, the greatness of the aims of the young conqueror,\nas well as his self-control, his aversion to meanness and petty\nthings, and his sublime moderation were due in part to the teachings\nof Aristotle. Never was there a more fortunate conjunction of two great\nminds than here.\n\nIn 340 B. C., when Alexander entered upon his administrative and\nmilitary duties, Aristotle became independent of the Macedonian court.\nHe spent the most of these four years (340\u2013335 B. C.) in scientific\nwork at Stagira, in intimate companionship with his young friend\nTheophrastus, who later succeeded him as scholarch of the Lyceum.\n\u201cAmong the special subjects of study in the school of Mieza and Stagira,\nnatural history formed a part.... Alexander at one time contributed\neight hundred talents to forward his former teacher\u2019s investigations\nin zo\u00f6logy, placed at his disposal a thousand men throughout Asia\nand Greece, with instructions to follow out Aristotle\u2019s directions\nin collecting and reporting details concerning the life, conditions,\nand habits of animals, and in every way made his campaigns serve the\npurpose of scientific investigation.\u201d[33] The reports of the ancients\nconcerning the vast sums placed at Aristotle\u2019s disposal for use in\nscientific investigation are of course exaggerated. That he made large\ncollections during this period, as well as later, is certain. This was\npossible to him, first, because he was a rich man himself, and second,\nbecause of his relations to the courts at Atarneus and Macedonia.\n\n=3. Third Period=, 335\u2013322 B. C.\u2015\u2015=Administrator of the Lyceum=.\nWhen Alexander entered upon his campaigns in Asia, and Aristotle\nfelt himself free from immediate duty to him, he went to Athens and\nfounded the Lyceum. This school very soon arose above the Academy,\nand became the model of later societies of scholars of antiquity. Its\ngreatness partook of the greatness of Aristotle,\u2015\u2015in the universality\nof its interests, in the orderliness of its administration, and\nin methodical co\u00f6peration. For twelve years he was the executive,\nteacher, administrator, and inspiration of this school\u2015\u2015developing\nhis philosophy, accumulating materials, and instructing his pupils.\nThe enormous product of the school could not have been the work of\none pair of hands. Nevertheless the writings, the immense collections,\nthe ethical and political treatises, show a unity that speaks of one\nmaster-mind that had them under direction. When the Athenians began\nto rise against the Macedonian rule, Aristotle\u2019s position in Athens\nas a friend of Alexander became unsafe. He fled to Chalcis, excusing\nhimself, so the tradition goes, because he wished to spare the\nAthenians a second crime against philosophy. He died in Chalcis the\nnext year (322 B. C.).\n\nA comparison of these three periods of Aristotle\u2019s life discloses\nthe uniformity of that life, from beginning to end. He was, from the\ntime he entered the Academy to the founding of the Lyceum, a teacher.\nEven as pupil of Plato his original mind was influencing the Platonic\nteaching into new channels. During his second period he was a traveler,\nto be sure; but he was more,\u2015\u2015a collector and a king\u2019s tutor. He was\nalways Aristotle, the philosophical teacher. Hence the periods of his\nlife cannot be so sharply marked as Plato\u2019s, and the lines that are\ndrawn point only to phases of a life that had unity, like his doctrine.\nHis life is a regular development from sources in his first period, and\nwith no later deviating influence.\n\n=The Writings of Aristotle.= On every page of Plato\u2019s dialogues you\nmeet Plato; in Aristotle\u2019s writings the personality of the author is\nsubordinated to his science. The collections of writings transmitted\nunder the name of Aristotle do not give even an approximately complete\npicture of the immense activity of the man. They form, indeed, a\nstately memorial, even after the spurious writings have been omitted,\nbut their bulk is small compared with what we know was the product of\nhis literary workshop. Forty treatises have been preserved. A catalogue\nof the library of Alexandria in 220 B. C. includes a list of one\nhundred and forty-six others, which have since been lost. Aristotle\nwas writer, lecturer, teacher, and the administrator of the Lyceum.\nHis leadership of that school, his careful direction of his co\u00f6perators\nin research and study, was not only an instruction but an impulsion\nto independent scientific study for all time. His great collections\nof scientific data can be explained only by their being the combined\nefforts of many different forces, guided and schooled by a common\nmaster. The world was ready to take an account of stock, and Aristotle\nwas the first encyclop\u00e6dic philosopher.\n\n=1. The Popular Writings, published by Aristotle himself.= These were\nintended for a circle of readers wider than his own school. No one of\nthese works is extant in complete form. They were written by Aristotle\nduring his life in the Academy. They were dialogues in form; in content\nthey were discussions of justice, wealth, wisdom, rhetoric, politics,\nlove, conduct, prayer, generosity, education, government, etc. They\nwere less artistic than Plato\u2019s dialogues, but more original and\nstriking; and they were full of happy inventions and rich thought,\nexpressed in florid diction. The ancients spoke often of Aristotle\u2019s\n\u201cgolden flow of thought,\u201d but this cannot truthfully apply to any save\nthese lost writings.\n\n=2. The Compilations.= These were excerpts from scientific works,\ncollections of zo\u00f6logical, literary, historical, and antiquarian data,\nwhich Aristotle and his pupils had gathered together. Only a few\nfragments of the total remain. There were critical notes upon the\nPythagoreans, reports of extracts of Plato\u2019s dialogues, a descriptive\nbasis for zo\u00f6logy with illustrations, collections of previous\nrhetorical theories and models, histories of tragedies and comedies,\ndiscussions about Homer, Hesiod, Archilochus, Euripides, and other\npoets; there were historical miscellanies and reports concerning one\nhundred fifty-eight Greek state constitutions.\n\n=3. The Didactic Writings.= These have in part been preserved, and\nthey make up the collection of what we have of Aristotle\u2019s writings.\nThey have a consistently developed terminology, but they are wanting\nin grace and beauty of presentation. The plan of the books is generally\nthe same: the problem is precisely stated; then follows a criticism of\nvarious attempted solutions; then a discussion of the salient points of\nthe problem; then a marshaling of the facts; and, finally, an attempt\nto get a conclusive result. The method is modern in its scientific\nprocedure and the contrast with Plato is striking. Yet it must not\nbe inferred that these books of Aristotle are orderly. There are\nrepetitions, haste, unequal development of parts, and unfulfilled\npromises. These books were nothing else than the written notes which\nhe had made the basis of his lectures and had intended to form into\ntext-books in some future time. Only parts of the Logic seem to have\nbeen completed for text-book purposes.\n\nThese didactic writings are simply arranged as follows (Wallace):\n\n 1. The treatise on Logic called _Organon_.\n 2. Speculative Philosophy.\n First Philosophy or Theology or Metaphysics.\n Mathematics (writings not extant).\n Physics (including the history of animals and the psychology).\n 3. Practical Philosophy.\n Ethics.\n Economics.\n Politics.\n 4. Poetic Philosophy.\n Art.\n Poetry.\n Rhetoric.\n\n=Aristotle\u2019s Starting-Point.= The two early influences in Aristotle\u2019s\nmental development offer an explanation for his philosophical point\nof view. These influences were his empirical training in medicine and\nhis conceptual training in the moral ideals of the Academy. Plato had\nconvinced him that if there were to be any true science, it must be\nfounded on concepts that are unchanging. His own scientific training,\nhowever, reinforced by the influence of Democritus, made him respect\nthe value of empirical facts. While the philosophical problem for\nAristotle was the same as that for Plato, the difference between\nthem was in the main a matter of emphasis due to their different\nstarting-points. Plato started with the refutation of the Protagorean\ntheory of perception, and consequently he emphasized the value of the\nconceptual world; Aristotle, however, felt that Plato had overestimated\nthe conceptual world, and he emphasized the importance of empirical\nfacts. Both when a member of the Academy and later, he strongly\ncontended against Plato\u2019s evaluation of the world of Ideas, because\nthey so transcended the sense world that they neither explained\nnor illuminated it. Aristotle\u2019s reaction against Plato\u2019s theory\nfurthermore gives us a more correct notion of what Plato really taught.\nIf conceptions are to enter into knowledge, they must not exist in\nthe clouds of abstraction. He maintained that Plato had increased\nthe difficulty of the problem by adding a second world of entities\nquite distinct from the world of nature. The same problem that Plato\nconfronted still exists unanswered, said Aristotle. It is the problem\nof the twofold world. If Ideas are apart from things, we could not\nknow that they existed, we should not be able to know anything about\nthem, nor should we be able to explain the world through them. It\nis true that Plato, in his later draft, had conceived Ideas to be\nteleologically related to the physical things, but how could this be if\nthey were apart from things? Thus in his reaction from Plato\u2019s theory\nof Ideas, Aristotle re\u00ebstablished the world of perceptual fact. This is\nthe starting-point of Aristotle.\n\n=The Fundamental Principle in Aristotle\u2019s Philosophy.= The first\nquestion then is, How did Aristotle re\u00ebstablish the perceptual fact?\nWhat means did he employ to give the perceptual fact a reality?\nThe answer to this question will be the statement of Aristotle\u2019s\nfundamental principle. It will show his advance over Plato by\nshowing his new estimate of the perceptual world. Plato accepted\nthe Protagorean doctrine of perception, but also gave it a new value\nby placing perceptions beside conceptions in the world of reality;\nAristotle developed Plato\u2019s teaching about perceptions by linking them\ninseparably with conceptions. Aristotle felt that Plato\u2019s difficulties\narose from the lack of close relationship between conceptual Being\nand perceptual fact. What is that linkage? What binds abiding reality\nand changing phenomena so closely? _The linkage is development._\nDevelopment is the relation between conception and perception. It is\nthe fundamental principle in the philosophy of Aristotle throughout\nand places a new estimate upon the value of perception. Perceptual\nfacts apart from conceptions have no reality; conceptions apart from\nperceptions are mere abstractions. In the world of reality conceptual\nBeing resides in the perceptual facts, and the perceptual facts express\nconceptions. They always exist together in a linkage or relationship\nthat is teleological, purposeful\u2015\u2015the linkage of development. An\nabstract statement of this relationship is, \u201cAristotle felt the\nconceptual necessity of the empirically actual.\u201d Perhaps the clearest\nstatement of this fundamental principle can be made in the terms of\nevolution. It is this: _true reality is the essence which unfolds in\nphenomena_. Notice that this sentence has two parts equally freighted:\n_reality is an unfolding essence_; _reality is in phenomena_. The true\nuniversal must be thought as realizing itself through its development\nin particulars; the true concept as realizing itself through its\ndevelopment in percepts; the true abiding Being as realizing itself in\nits development through change. On the one hand, reality is the essence\nof things; on the other, reality has existence only in things.\n\nTrue reality is the individual.\n\nThe individual consists of two aspects: (1) conceptual being, and\n(2) perceptual change.\n\nThese two aspects always stand in a relationship.\n\nThat relationship is developing purpose.\n\nHere is the key to the teaching of Aristotle that seems to open\nthe doors of its many chambers. In his metaphysics reality is the\nindividual developing from possibility to actuality. In physics\nindividual phenomena get a reality through their development from\nlower to higher types. In psychology the individual person is real when\nthe particulars, the physiological and psychological states, develop\ntoward the soul, which is their truth. So, too, in the great system of\nlogic in which Aristotle was pioneer, he is simply trying to give the\nparticular judgment a meaning by showing its linkage to the universal\njudgment. Everywhere the starting-point of Aristotle is the perceptual\nfact. Everywhere his purpose is to re\u00ebstablish it by showing its\nrelation to abiding conception in the individual.\n\nIt may be well to remark, however, that Aristotle does not altogether\nsucceed in constructing a consistent theory. In spite of his criticism\nof Plato\u2019s transcendent Ideas, in many places Aristotle does not\novercome Plato\u2019s dualism. Frequently he differs from Plato more in\nwords than in meaning. We shall observe some of his inconsistencies\nin their place. We shall see that Aristotle as he meant to be\nwas different from Aristotle as he was. Aristotle as he meant to\nbe\u2015\u2015Aristotle as the opponent of Plato\u2019s dualism\u2015\u2015develops a philosophy\nfrom a single fundamental principle. Aristotle as he was, reverts at\nmany critical points to Plato\u2019s dualism.\n\nAristotle\u2019s principle of development may appear at first blush very\nmuch like the modern principle of evolution. As a matter of fact it\nwas very different. In all Greek philosophy after Socrates the study\nof morals was fundamental. The ideal of Socrates, Democritus, Plato,\nAristotle, and the later Schools was a moral ideal. Being moral it was\nfixed, and it fixed all the changes of life to it as a centre. Nature\nwas to the Greek a museum of types oscillating around a perfect form.\nThere was no evolution in the sense of progress. There was development\nwithin the individual\u2015\u2015the boy becomes a man, the seed becomes a flower;\nbut there was no evolution from genus to genus. Indeed, any variation\nof the individual from its type was considered a defect.\n\n=Aristotle\u2019s Logic.= Aristotle felt that there must be a science of the\nmethods of science; and so successful was he in its formulation that it\nhas practically remained as he transmitted it. We are struck by the way\nin which he divided science into the special sciences, each with its\nwell-defined field. It was perfectly natural that he should also, with\nhis great power of abstract reasoning, discuss the body of rules for\nlegitimate thinking. In science there must be an art of investigation,\njust as in rhetoric there is an art of persuasion. At an early period\nthese logical writings were collected under the name _Organon_, because\nthe Lyceum regarded them so intimately connected with scientific\nprocedure as to be the instrument or \u201corgan\u201d of all knowledge. Certain\nparts of Aristotle\u2019s _Organon_ are of doubtful genuineness. The\nimportant sections are the _Analytics_, a masterly logical groundwork\nof the conclusion and proof, and the _Topics_, which treats of the\ninductive methods of probability. Aristotle therefore made logic a\npreliminary and separate study, as it should be. It became the preface\nto his scientific work.\n\nWe shall briefly discuss Aristotle\u2019s logic, because it is an\nexemplification of his general philosophical principle. Among the\nsubjects in the history of philosophy, logic is perhaps the only\none that has had no internal history. Aristotle was the pioneer\nin the subject. He left it so finished that scarcely any changes\nof consequence could be made in it. The external history of the\nAristotelian logic has, however, been notable. A portion of the\n_Categories_ and _De Interpretatione_ was most influential in the\nhistory of the Middle Ages. The _Logic_ had been misunderstood and\nmisapplied by Aristotle\u2019s own School, so that when it came into the\nhands of the Schoolmen it had acquired the reputation of being only an\nabstract formal logic. As thus interpreted it was used by the Schoolmen\nand attacked by the philosophers of the Renaissance. Such a view of\nAristotle\u2019s logic is unjust to the author. He had conceived logic\nin its wholeness to be the true method to be used in investigating\npractical scientific problems.\n\nThe Sophists had proposed rules of practical value in the study\nof individual cases; Socrates had tried to fix upon some universal\nprinciple as the basis of knowledge; Aristotle made a comprehensive\nstudy of the regular forms of thought and the rules that govern the\narrangement of these forms in right thinking. In true Platonic fashion\nhe conceived physical events in nature to be due to some universal\ncause. If, therefore, logical procedure be scientific, it must follow\nthe ways of nature: logic must deduce particular perceptions from\nsome universal idea. The necessary thought-relations in which the\nparticular stands will then appear. Deduction of the particular from\nthe universal is the true scientific method, used in the explanation\nof nature-phenomena; so in proof the same deductive reasoning should\nbe used. In scientific study we are trying to show the conceptual\nnecessity of an empirical fact; in proof we are showing the conceptual\nnecessity of the particular term. Whether we are explaining an event\nor proving a conclusion, we are employing the same logical process.\nAristotle thus regarded his logic as the true scientific method for\npractical service, not as a merely abstract discipline in verbal\nhair-splitting.\n\nSocrates and Plato confined themselves to the study of the concept or\nsimple term. Aristotle also studied the concept. Indeed, he tried to\nfind out what concepts are fundamental in our thinking, so fundamental\nthat they are our thought reduced to its lowest terms. He names ten\nof these fundamental concepts and calls them categories. But Aristotle\ngoes farther than Socrates and Plato, and makes his real point of\ndeparture the judgment. A single term does not express truth. For\ntruth we must have two terms connected by the verb \u201cis,\u201d _i. e._ some\n_relation_ must be shown between them. This is a judgment. Reasoning is\nstill more complex. It is the putting together or showing the relation\nbetween two judgments. This process takes the form of the syllogism.\nThe first task of deduction is to present the laws of the syllogism.\nThese will then be the laws of scientific investigation. According\nto these, particulars can be derived with certainty from universal\npropositions, provided such universals are established. The syllogism\nis in the form of two premises and a derived conclusion. It contains\nthree terms. The problem is to infer, from the relation that one\nof these terms bears to the two other terms, what the two bear to\neach other. The principle employed is that of subordination; and the\ndifferentiations of the syllogism can be many, depending on the quality\nand quantity of the premises and the distribution of the middle term.\nThe working of the syllogism in inference has a certainty so great that\nAristotle called it apodictic.\n\nBut there is another side to the syllogistic besides the deduction of\nproof or the explanation of empirical fact. This is the establishment\nof the premises. All deduction presupposes absolute premises. All\ndeduction is grounded on something not deduced; all proof on something\nnot proved; all explanation on something that has not been explained.\nThese presuppositions are universal propositions that can be known\nonly immediately through intuitions. Aristotle is not altogether\nclear as to what these intuitions are. He names such axioms as the\nlaw of contradiction and the law of the excluded middle, and some\nspecial propositions which apply only to particular sciences. Since\nthe premises which we actually use are not open to proof, but only\nstrengthened as to the validity of their application, we must use the\nmethod of induction in our search for them. We accumulate data from\nopinions and varied experiences, and then we ascend to a generalization\nwhich we take as a premise. The results of induction cannot therefore\nbe in themselves certain. The results are only probable, and can have\nthe character of knowledge only as they explain phenomena. Aristotle\nmeans by induction something different from the present use of the\nterm. Induction in modern times means a kind of proof; Aristotle\nmeans a method of discovery of _relatively_ universal terms where the\nabsolutely universal cannot be obtained.\n\nThere is an ideal involved in this conception of logic that is\ninteresting. In a perfectly intellectual society there would be a\nperfect science in which all particular facts could be derived with\nabsolute certainty from premises absolutely known. Life and logic would\nbe identical. We should then be certain not only as to our proof but as\nto our premises. Logic has sometimes been used very effectively in this\nway. When the medi\u00e6val church conceived its dogmas to be the ultimate\npremises of truth, it could deduce from them complete rules for living.\nTo the medi\u00e6val mind the perfect science was formulated by deducing it\nfrom the dogma of the church. The dogmas were the absolute premises.\nThe Renaissance did not doubt the infallibility of the traditional\ndogmas so much as the logical method, and Aristotle, who had been so\nlong artificially identified with the proof of ecclesiastical dogma,\nwas set aside.\n\nAristotle, moreover, showed great insight into the present relation\nof thought and reality. The sequence of facts in our experience, he\npointed out, is exactly the reverse of what it is in reality. What\nis first in reality comes last in our experience, and what is first\nin our experience is last in reality. To illustrate: the mission of\nthe Athenian State in the eternity of things did not appear until\nevery event in its history had occurred. A perfect being would see the\nuniversal ground before the historical particulars derived from it,\nwhile we look from the particulars to their universal causes. Logic and\nmetaphysics agree; but they stand in inverted parallelism to historical\nand psychological processes. Knowledge is a development from the senses\ninto the Ideas, and yet, on the other hand, Aristotle never fails to\nremind us that this development is the expression of an idea which has\nbeen present from the beginning.\n\n=Aristotle\u2019s Metaphysics.=\n\n=1. Development is Purposeful.= The conception of relation is, of\ncourse, quite as fundamental in Aristotle\u2019s theory of metaphysics as\nin his logic. In logic knowledge of the particular is possible through\nits relationship to the universal; in metaphysics the relationship is\nthe relationship of development\u2015\u2015the particular has significance and\nvalue through the universal essence that unfolds from within it. If\nAristotle shows genius for abstract thinking by becoming the \u201cFather of\nLogic,\u201d he shows equal genius for abstract thinking in his metaphysical\nconception of development. He believed that metaphysics applies the\nsame conditions to things that logic discovers in thought. But in\nmetaphysics the relationship is not the abstract relationship that\nAristotle saw in Plato, but the vital relation of development in the\nlife and change of nature.\n\nWe have already stated the fundamental principle in Aristotle\u2019s\nteaching as _an unfolding essence in phenomena_. The unfolding is the\nrelationship of development. Reality does not consist in the particular\nthings of nature, nor in something outside nature, but in this\nessential linkage of the perceptual and conceptual in nature. As the\nworld is spread out before us, it presents objects that are dynamic,\nhowever much they may appear to be static. Everywhere matter is in the\nprocess of forming. The world is a forming, not a formed nor a formless\nworld. So, also, if you undertook to describe any individual object in\nthe world, you would have to define it as a forming or developing thing.\nA tree, for example, would not be adequately defined or described by\nenumerating its parts at any one moment; but you must describe it as\na unitary organism developing from a seed. The reality of the world is\nthe development of its meaning in its history; the same is true of the\nreality of any individual thing in the world. The world and the things\ntherein have an unfolding essence.\n\nThe next point to be observed about Aristotle\u2019s conception is that the\n_relationship of development is between two terms_. The individual must\nhave two aspects: there must be that out of which the development is\npassing, and that into which it is passing. Aristotle calls these two\naspects of development respectively Matter and Form. Every object of\nnature consists of Form and Matter, and these two terms have passed\ninto history. To Aristotle everything is Matter becoming Form, or, in\nother words, Form realizing itself in Matter. The tree has its Matter\nwhich is becoming Formed, and its Form into which the Matter is growing.\nThe principle which unites the two is development,\u2015\u2015the principle\nof the individual. Matter, then, is the possibility or potentiality\nof an individual thing\u2015\u2015it is the thing given potentially; Form is\nits actuality or reality. If you emphasize merely the stages in the\ndevelopment, you are regarding merely the _occurrences_; if, however,\nyou emphasize the stages of development as aspects of a unity, you see\nits _essence_.\n\nThe relationship of development between two terms thus becomes under\nAristotle\u2019s hands _the relation of purpose_. Aristotle calls this\nself-realization of the essence in phenomena by the technical word\n_entelechy_, _i. e._ in opposition to the earlier conceptions of nature\nAristotle conceived nature teleologically. Teleology or purpose we\nfound Plato using in his second draft of the Ideas, but more as a\npostulate than as an efficient means of explanation. Aristotle uses\nteleology as his positive fundamental principle of nature.\n\n=2. Aristotle\u2019s Two Different Conceptions of Purpose.= Aristotle\nillustrated his conception of the purposeful relation in nature from\ntwo very different types: (1) the development of organisms; (2) the\ndevelopment that takes place when an artisan moulds plastic material.\nManifestly here are two different kinds of teleological activities.\nIn organic growth the Form that realizes itself in Matter is immanent\nin the organism; the artist, on the other hand, superimposes the\nForm upon the plastic material. In the case of organisms Matter and\nForm are separable only by abstraction, and are only two aspects of\na development which is identical from the beginning to the end; in\nthe case of artistic construction the Matter is first a possibility\nexisting by itself, and the purpose of the artist is later added unto\nit. In the case of organisms Aristotle speaks of two causes,\u2015\u2015the\nmaterial and the formal; in the case of artistic construction he\nemploys four causes,\u2015\u2015the material, the efficient, the formal, and\nthe final. Aristotle did not expressly formulate these two different\nconceptions of purpose, but he completely applied them in practice.\nOn the one hand he regarded individual things as self-realizing, and\non the other he looked upon them as realized in other things. This\nseemingly harmless difference is really very fundamental, for it is the\ndifference between Aristotle as he meant to be\u2015\u2015Aristotle as the critic\nof Plato\u2019s dualism\u2015\u2015and Aristotle who reverts to Plato\u2019s teaching.\nWe find therefore two Aristotles; one a dynamic monist, the other\na transcendent dualist. We cannot say that Aristotle as he meant to\nbe is the true Aristotle, for he is a dualist in very many important\ndoctrines.\n\nAristotle\u2019s conception of purpose as exemplified by organisms is his\noriginal conception, and is what he intended to be the basis of his\nphilosophy. Here the truly real is the individual determined by its\nown Form. It is the dynamic and not the artistic view of life. Activity\nis directed to an end not without but _within itself_. The individual\nis a complete organic unity at rest within itself. The individual\nis primarily the essence or substance. Of the ten categories which\nhe enumerates, substance from this point of view is to Aristotle the\nmost important. The nine other categories only describe the states\nor relations of the substance. The essence of the individual is the\nsubstance; and Aristotle conceives the substance as the species or\nuniversal in the thing. It is pointed out that even here Aristotle is\nguilty of a dualism in the double meaning in which he uses substance.\nBut the conception of Aristotle here is of an immanent, dynamic reality.\nHe has in mind the self-contained unity of the individual, whether that\nbe a tree, a man, or the universe.\n\nAristotle\u2019s conception of purpose as exemplified by artistic products\npreponderates over his original conception of purpose. When he regards\nthe individual objects in the world, not as self-contained but as\nrelative to one another, he has a different conception of the world.\nIn this case the individuals are not realities but have reference to\na reality transcending them. The world is still a developing world,\nbut the essence that unfolds itself is not _in_ phenomena. It is a\ngoal for which phenomena strive. The fulfillment of the purpose is\nbeyond. Individual things are only a scale of values relative to some\ntranscendent standard. To illustrate: the bud, the blossom, the fruit,\nhave not their realization in themselves, but as food; again, the\ngrowing tree, the timber lying on the ground, the timber in the house,\nhave their realization in the completed house; again, in the world at\nlarge, the original nebulous matter of the universe, the first-formed\nworlds, the early years of this earth, the succeeding centuries, the\n20th century of this world, are only a scale of values for something\nin the future.\n\nIn facing such facts, Aristotle had to depart from his original\nconceptualistic standard of the world as an organic unity and of\nindividual things having their meaning in themselves. View a thing\nby itself, and it seems to be a self-contained reality which unfolds\nfor itself alone. View a thing with reference to other things, and its\nreality is in something else. Here is Aristotle no longer as he meant\nto be, but as he really was. He is now Plato\u2019s pupil. Each thing now\nis to be regarded, not as containing in itself the two aspects of Form\nand Matter, but as the possibility of something and the actuality of\nsomething else. The blossom is the possibility or Matter of the fruit\nand the Form or actuality of the bud. The nineteenth century is the\nForm of the eighteenth and the Matter of the twentieth. But development\nhas a limit above and below, according to Aristotle: below, in Matter\nthat is without Form; above, in Form that is without Matter. Pure Form\nis God, who excludes from Himself all Matter or possibility, because He\nis perfect. Pure Matter is the lower limit, which is entire possibility,\nand exists only to be formed. Here is a dualism as distinct as Plato\u2019s,\nwhich Aristotle not only did not overcome but which he developed. In\nthe same way that Plato contrasted Ideas and empty space, Aristotle\ncontrasted God as pure Form and Matter as pure possibility.\n\nIn this final dualistic form in which Aristotle left his teaching,\nthere are three specific doctrines which the student must consider\ncarefully. They are important because they had great influence in later\northodox theology and in theories of nature. These special doctrines\nare (1) Aristotle\u2019s conception of God; (2) his conception of matter;\n(3) his conception of nature.\n\n=3. Aristotle\u2019s Conception of God.= In the Aristotelian system the\nassumption of an upper final term of pure Form was necessary, because\nMatter as the possible and potential is not endowed with the power of\nmotion and generation. To Aristotle development is not a process with\ntemporal beginning and ending, but is a kind of closed circuit. Since\nreality is in itself a developing essence, motion is as eternal as\nreality. We should not ask, therefore, When did the world begin, and\nwhen will it end? but we can legitimately ask, What is the nature of\nreality that keeps motion alive? When we examine individual things, we\nfind, according to Aristotle\u2019s explanation, that motion is the result\nof the influence of Form upon Matter. There is inherent in matter an\nimpulse to be formed, and there is inherent in Form an active forming\npurpose. But we may search individual things in vain for the causal\nexplanation of motion, since every Form is in turn the Matter for\na higher Form. The chain would be endless and not intelligible if\nthere did not exist a pure Form, which is unmoved. God as the unmoved\nmover is the cause of the world-motion, but God must be the cause in\na different sense from the physical causes, which are themselves moved.\nGod operates as a cause upon Matter, not as a mechanical cause but as\npure Form,\u2015\u2015as a final or teleological cause. God is the cause in the\nsense that God excites in Matter the impulse to be actual, like God.\n\nThis prime mover is similar to Plato\u2019s Idea of the Good. _As to its\nform_ it is eternal, unmovable, unchangeable, wholly independent and\nincorporeal, and yet the cause of all generation and change. God is the\nperfect Being in whom all possibility is actuality. _As to its content_\nGod is pure thought. But in respect to his thought God is not like\nhuman thought, which is concerned with external phenomena and changing\nthings. God is thought that has nothing else for its object than itself\nand its own unchanging content. God is \u201cthought of thought.\u201d God\u2019s\ncontemplation of himself is his own blessed life. Here in Aristotle\nis a momentous conception formed for the first time in the history\nof thought. Monotheism is for the first time conceptually framed and\nscientifically grounded. The monism of Aristotle\u2019s predecessors passes\nover into a theism. God is not only immaterial in the sense that Plato\ndefined the Ideas, but he is spiritual. In Aristotle\u2019s transcendent God,\nconceived as pure self-consciousness, we have the ripest fruit of Greek\nphilosophy.\n\n=4. Aristotle\u2019s Conception of Matter.= The other and lower limit of\nAristotle\u2019s dualism is Matter, \u201cfirst Matter,\u201d as Aristotle called it.\nIn itself it is wholly unformed and mere possibility. But it is unlike\npure Form in this respect,\u2015\u2015it never exists in itself. God exists\napart from Matter, but since Matter is mere possibility, Matter never\nexists apart from Form. Matter has a double character. On the one\nhand Matter is that which as an accessory cause makes the world of\nphenomena possible; on the other hand it is the source of the lawless\nand purposeless in nature. Through its seeking to be formed it makes\nthe presentation of the Idea possible, and yet it stands as a deterrent\nprinciple to the full presentation of the Form. On the one hand it is\nthe _sine qua non_ of physical nature, shows itself in real physical\neffects, and is the basis of mechanical causation, motion, and impact.\nOn the other hand it stands in the way of the Forms actualizing\nthemselves fully, and it prevents the universe from perfecting itself\nas God is perfect. While Matter is not an indifferent negative (as in\nPlato\u2019s teaching), but the necessary substratum of corporeal things,\nit is however the indeterminate, and the ground of the accidental and\npurposeless in nature. Matter is the infinite and unlimited, and is\nthe source of unusual phenomena, like monstrosities and abortions.\nBoth fate and accident are due to the retarding influence of Matter,\nbecause it obstructs the successful working out of Form. Quite in\naccord with Greek thought, Aristotle conceived necessity and chance to\nbe fundamentally the same, and the Greek custom of drawing lots shows\nthe universality of the notion.\n\n=5. Aristotle\u2019s Conception of Nature.= Nature is therefore to Aristotle\na far more complex world than Plato had conceived it. Nature has a\ndouble character to Aristotle, as his twofold conception of causation\nshows. Nature is composed of mechanical and teleological causes.\nPurpose and necessity are the two principles of motion in the world,\nand in this twofold conception of causation did Aristotle reconcile\nPlato and Democritus. However much Aristotle concedes to the Democritan\nidea of mechanical necessity, it is evident that in his conception of\nnature the principle of teleology predominates over the mechanical.\nThe highest actuality is God, and he is a final or teleological cause;\nand all results of value in nature come through final causes. Final\ncauses are primary causes; mechanical causes are secondary causes.\nThere would be no motion whatever in the universe but for the highest\nfinal cause, God. Yet God is the unmoved mover, and matter cannot move\nitself. Motion occurs because matter feels the impulse to form itself\nlike God. How different this Aristotelian conception of nature from our\nmodern scientific conception of an impersonal nature under a mechanical\ncausation that is universal! The teleological conception of nature and\nnatural events was very strongly intrenched in the human mind during\nthe Middle Ages, and was not dislodged easily by modern investigation.\nNature was a living thing to Aristotle. It was at once intrinsically\nspontaneous, and self-determined and uniform. Its spontaneity was not\nthat of capricious chance. Its uniformity was that of purpose and end.\nOn the other hand, the Aristotelian conception of nature is not the\nsame as either the Christian doctrine of created nature or Darwin\u2019s\ntheory of \u2666evolution. The world of Aristotle had always existed; it\nis a limited world in space, but not in time. Also the divine reason\nalways existed in it. Yet its evolution is not a progressive climbing\nsort, like the Darwinian, in which new species evolve. It means only\nthat there is a relationship of rank and value among nature objects.\nNature is a unity. Teleological change occurs within it.\n\nNature is therefore a connected system of living beings in the process\nof development from Form to Form, approximating the Deity and existing\nas the potentiality of the Deity. There is a graded scale of things\nof relative worth. But the double standard of estimating the worth of\nnature-objects\u2015\u2015that of mechanical necessity and that of teleological\ncause\u2015\u2015makes _two different series_, which find their union only at\nthe end in God. From our foregoing description of the nature of God,\nit will be seen that he has two essential characteristics: he is Being\nwho ever rests within himself and remains like himself; and he is a\npure reason. He therefore combines in himself the two nature series in\ntheir most ideal character. _Nature-objects in the series of mechanical\nnecessity_ have as their ideal character just that uniformity,\nregularity, and order that we find in the abiding Being of God. The\ngreater the uniformity, the more nearly like God. _Nature-objects,\nin the teleological series_, have as their ideal characteristic the\nreason of God. The more nearly rational such a living being is, the\nmore nearly is it like God. In the one line the series of phenomena\nascends from the disorder of the terrestrial universe to the absolute\nuniformity of the stars, which are close to God. In the other line\nthe series ascends in teleological values from the mechanical and\nvegetative characteristics of organisms to their rational activity.\nBoth series terminate in God. The stars have rational intelligence and\nthe most uniform motions. Aristotle conceived Physics as the science\nthat includes the first series, and the second series he conceived to\nbe included by Psychology, Ethics, and Politics.\n\n=The Mechanical Series,\u2015\u2015Aristotle\u2019s Theory of Physics.= The general\nastronomical assumptions of the time determined Aristotle\u2019s theory of\nthe physical world. He adopted the old Pythagorean conception of the\nlimited world-all: a hollow sphere made up of concentric crystalline\nspheres. In opposition to the Pythagoreans, he conceived the earth at\nthe centre. It is spherical and stationary. Around it the crystalline\nspheres revolve, in which the moon, sun, five planets, and fixed stars\nare placed. The fixed stars are in the rim of the great sphere, are\noutside all, and are nearest therefore to God, who animates all. God\nas it were holds the world-all in the hollow of his hand. He moves the\nwhole, which in turn moves the fifty-five concentric crystal spheres\nwithin. The principle of the movement of fixed stars is that of the\nDeity, while the principle of the other spheres is that of the spirits\nwhich reside in them. The movement of the planets have an influence\nupon terrestrial life. Aristotle made the usual Pythagorean division\nbetween the celestial and the terrestrial parts of the world-all, which\nhas had so much influence upon theology. The motion of the world-all is\nmost perfect, being a circle; its form is most perfect, being a sphere.\nThe celestial part of this world-all, which is the region lying near\nthe periphery, is most like God. The motion of this heaven is circular,\nand it is the place of uniformity, perfectness, and changeableness.\nThe stars do not change nor pass away. They are superhuman beings, who\nin their regularity are like the blessed gods. The terrestrial part of\nthe world-all below the moon has motions in straight lines. This is the\ntheatre of imperfection and irregularity, of increase and diminution.\n\nThere are many interesting discussions by Aristotle upon particular\nphysical matters, such as space, time, the elements. His conception of\nmotion shows how the series of uniform nature-motions lead up to the\nsecond series of teleological values. In nature there are three kinds\nof motion: change of place (mechanical); change in quality (chemical);\nchange in substance (organic). While change of place is the lowest\nkind of motion, it is necessary to chemical and organic changes. Yet\nAristotle refuses to allow that qualitative changes can be reduced to\nquantitative changes, but maintains that quality is self-subsistent.\nOrganic change, or change in substance, on the contrary, has a higher\nForm of reality than the lower changes. This stand taken by Aristotle,\nin refusing to reduce qualitative to quantitative determinations, shows\nhow comprehensive and sane a scientist he was. It introduces us to a\npsychology and an ethics that are intimately linked to physics, and at\nthe same time have realms of their own. Let us now turn to the series\nof qualitative nature changes, or to psychology, ethics, and politics.\n\n=The Teleological Series: The Qualitative Changes of Phenomena.=\n\n=1. The Psychology of Aristotle.= As the first experimental\npsychologist, Aristotle intimately connected his studies in psychology\nwith his studies in biology and medicine. Man is a part of the world\nof nature, and psychology is in part a comparative study. As we pass\nupward from the mechanical changes, we find chemical changes of quality,\nand then changes of organic life. Studying the organic realm, we\nfind \u2666organisms to consist of souls of relative ranking. There are\nvegetative souls, sensitive souls, and rational souls. Plants have\nvegetative souls with the powers of assimilation and propagation;\nbesides vegetative souls animals have sensitive souls, with the powers\nof appetition and locomotion; man possesses, besides both these souls,\nthe rational soul. Here is a series of teleological relationships,\nwhere the purpose of the organism is explained only by the activity\nof its soul. The soul builds up its body as a system of organs, and as\nan organology the theory of Aristotle has great significance. Nature\nstrives ever upward, even in the inorganic processes, through an\nunbroken series of creations to its highest Form in man. Each step in\nthe upward progress is the realization of an entelechy, or purpose, and\nconstitutes for the moment the goal of the impulse to strive. The whole\nworld is striving to realize the perfect Form. The lower ends, the\nmechanical and vegetable and appetitive Forms, are not lost but are\nutilized in the process; for they are the Matter upon which the Forms\nhigher than themselves are built. Every member is both Form and Matter\nin the whole series.\n\nThe psychology has therefore two parts: (1) the general theory of\nanimal souls, which possesses rich suggestions; (2) the doctrine of the\nNous as the distinctive characteristic of man. These are the empirical\nand speculative sides to Aristotle\u2019s psychology.\n\nMan is an epitome of all the changes in the universe. He has\nvegetative, appetitive, and rational souls. Yet there is unity in man,\nfor the lower souls are subservient to the reason and exist for it.\nThe appetitive soul is the Form of the vegetative soul, the Matter of\nthe Rational soul, etc. Accordingly, Aristotle defines the soul as the\nentelechy of the body, because bodily human activity is enlisted in the\nservice of the reason. Reality in man is an unfolding purpose, just as\nit is in nature. The real self is this unfolding rational self, whose\npossibility is the body; whose actuality is pure reason. The mind is\nactualized body, the body is potential mind.\n\nAristotle made many contributions to psychology about the origin\nand value of the several sensations, about the feelings of pleasure\nand pain and the desires. He shows his remarkable genius in pointing\nto the necessity of a unity of consciousness, which he calls the\n\u201ccommon-sensibility.\u201d His discussion of the Nous, or reason, is of\nimportance for two reasons: first, because it leads to and illuminates\nhis ethical theory; and second, because it is an example of his\ndeviation from his original conceptual position. The reason, according\nto his first intention, is the unfolding purpose of the body,\u2015\u2015it\nis the immanent essence of the body. As Aristotle finally left his\ndiscussion of the Reason, it is as transcendent as his God, or as\nany Idea of Plato. The Nous, or Reason, is not a Form of the body,\nbut a Form of the soul. It is purely immaterial, simple, unchangeable,\nand incapable of suffering. It does not originate with the body as a\nfunction. It comes from without as a godlike activity, and will remain\nafter the body passes away. Its fundamental activity is thought, and\nits object is those ultimate principles of Being which are the ultimate\npremises of logical thinking.\n\nAristotle\u2019s theory of the Reason is considerably complicated by his\ndivision of it into two parts,\u2015\u2015the active and the passive Reason.\nWithin itself, the Reason is to be distinguished as Form and Matter.\nThe passive Reason is the Matter for the active Reason, and the active\nReason is the Form for the passive Reason. By the passive Reason\nAristotle evidently means the individual and developing man. The active\nReason can alone persist after death, but whether absorbed in the Deity\nor not he does not say. Immortality to Aristotle in any case is not a\nperpetuation of the individuality.\n\n=2. The Ethics of Aristotle.= We have seen that nature phenomena are of\ntwo classes,\u2015\u2015those mechanically related, and those related as to their\npurposes or ends. Physics is concerned with the first class; psychology\nis concerned with the second class. But in a special way are ethics\nand politics sciences of the phenomena of the second class\u2015\u2015sciences\nof teleologically related phenomena. Moral life is an unfolding essence\nhaving a possibility and an actuality. The Possibility or Matter of\nthe ethical life is our feelings, temperament, disposition, impulses,\nand perceptions\u2015\u2015just those psychological factors that make up the\nendowment of the human personality. The ultimate Form or actuality of\nthe ethical life is the reason. The reason as the goal of the moral\nbeing determines its character. Man is distinctly a rational being.\nVirtue is the process of the ethical life from its possibilities to\nits actuality; it is the essence of the ethical life. Virtue is that\ncontinuous state of mind that makes rational activity possible. So much\nfor the factors that make the ethical situation; the natural endowments\nof the mind are its material, the reason is its goal, while the means\nof developing the natural endowments into rational activity is virtue.\n\nThe situation would be simple enough for us as moral beings if, in our\nstriving, each had only himself and his own development to consider.\nBut man lives in a world of men, and his highest good is determined\nsomewhat by his environment,\u2015\u2015by riches, bodily comforts, success.\nThese are not essentials but only accessories, and the lack of them\nis only a limitation. The essential factor is the rational activity.\nNevertheless, these modify the definition of what we mean when we\ndefine rational activity as the highest Good or Form of the moral life.\nFor the question which Aristotle proposes in his notable treatise of\nEthics is, What is the end or supreme good of human action? The highest\nGood for a man among men is Happiness, or well-being; that includes\nnot only rational activity, but also the pleasures that accrue to\nsuch activity. But what is happiness? It is an end in itself, and\nnot the means to anything else; it is the result of functioning, a\nstate of conscious vitality; it accords with the law of excellence of\nthat functioning. Perfect happiness is, therefore, partly the result\nof one\u2019s own individual effort, partly dependent on circumstance.\nWhile virtue is the measure of the worth of different pleasures, yet\npleasures do not always attend our acts in our present society. The\ngreatest Good is happiness, but since this depends in part on external\ngoods, the goal to which we should directly attend\u2015\u2015the factor within\nour control\u2015\u2015is rational activity.\n\nThere are two classes of virtues based on the two kinds of rational\nlife,\u2015\u2015the practical virtues and the dianoetic virtues. The practical\nvirtues are those of conduct based upon the rational control of the\nimpulses; the dianoetic virtues are those of intellectual activity\nbased upon the development of the perceptions. The perfect moral\ndevelopment of human nature will consist (1) in the perfect development\nand true regulation of the feelings and desires in moral excellence;\nand (2) a perfect development of the intellectual faculties for\nrational culture.\n\n(a) The Practical Virtues. The essential thing for the individual\nto regard, therefore, is the training of his will by right rational\ninsight. He should seek to direct his impulses by reason, and not only\nonce but so many times that the impulses will become rational habits.\nThis is what Aristotle means by training in virtue. It is continuity in\nrational activity; it is a permanent development toward reason; it is\nthe unfolding of the real Self. Aristotle had regard for the facts of\nlife when he differed from Socrates, who said that virtue is knowledge.\nAristotle did not conceive the will as psychological power independent\nof the reason. He doubted if rational insight was more powerful than\nthe impulses, when the test comes. Experience often shows that although\nwe may know what is right, an impulse will often drive us into habits\nnot guided by reason. This presupposes for Aristotle a will that is\nfree to choose among the desires that one which will lead him along\nthe path that reason points out.\n\nIt is impossible to formulate a rule for the acquirement of the\nparticular virtues. Each virtue must be treated by itself. The only\nprinciple for guidance is that the reason should always seek the\nmean between two extremes. Thus courage is the mean between cowardice\nand rashness; temperance between intemperance and insensibility;\nfriendliness between obsequiousness and brusqueness, etc. Moderation\nis the watchword in the cultivation of the practical virtues.\n\n(b) The Dianoetic Virtues are the means toward the attainment of pure\nrationality for one\u2019s self. The dianoetic virtues are higher than\nthe practical. They unfold the pure formal activity of the Nous, and\ngive the most noble and perfect pleasure. Man finds through them his\npossible participation in the divine happiness. These intellectual\nvirtues may be either theoretical or practical insight; in the latter\ncase, Aristotle means knowledge of the right in art, and knowledge\nof justice. But the purest is Wisdom (\u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03af\u03b1), which is knowledge for\nits own sake. It is the knowledge that God has of himself. Man may\napproximate this.\n\nIn Aristotle\u2019s ethical theory there appear three features that\nare distinctly Greek. (1) The leading question that he asks at the\nbeginning of the Ethics, What is the end or Supreme Good of human\naction? is Greek. The modern writer asks, What is the nature of duty?\n(2) The emphasis on the \u201cmean\u201d is Greek. The idea of the \u201cmean\u201d was the\nfundamental principle in Greek life, and appeared in such literature\nas Gnomic poetry and Plato. (3) The subordination of individual ethical\nconduct to the conception of the state is Greek. Aristotle says that\npolitics will have to settle the question of the Supreme Good, for the\nGood of the state and that of the individual are identical.\n\n=The Political Philosophy of Aristotle.= In the present real world\nrational activity rather than happiness is the chief concern of man.\nHappiness is, however, his highest Good, which he can attain if his\nenvironment favors him. The political environment is a moral factor\nto be considered. The state should be the fulfillment of the morals\nof the individual, and should also be his ethical trainer. That State\nis fulfilling its own possibilities most completely which brings to\nthe full its natural endowments. Every Constitution is right that has\nthe weal of the people at heart, so that we find Aristotle holding\nthis extraordinarily liberal position, that the external structure of\nthe State is not so much of consequence as that the State should be\nthe educator of its people and the actualization of its own inherent\npossibilities. Aristotle did not construct an ideal state, like Plato.\nHe merely pointed out some essentials necessary to the well-being\nof a state, like education and providence for the future life of the\nState. Although the State is the offspring of necessity, and arises\nout of the needs of utility, it is the Form or actuality of the inner\nself-realization of man from his savagery. Race, blood, soil, and\ngeographical position are all the Matter of the State; the rational\nperfection of these is the Form; the civic virtue is the permanent\nmeans of the social development. The individual in Aristotle\u2019s State is\nsubordinated, but not absorbed, in the State. He can participate in the\nintellectual virtues. Since his own enjoyment in wisdom approximates\nGod\u2019s, he himself has distinction. Aristotle was a stanch supporter\nof marriage and the family relations. No philosopher in ancient times\nso elevated the position of woman. He reluctantly consented to the\ninstitution of slavery because it seemed to him a necessity.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER IX\n\n THE HELLENIC-ROMAN PERIOD (322 B. C.\u2013476 A. D.)\n\n\n=Its Time Length.=\n\n Greek Period, 300 years.\n Hellenic-Roman Period, 800 years.\n Middle Ages, 1000 years.\n Modern Period, 450 years.\n\nWe ought to appreciate at the beginning the enormous time length\nof this period. It seems long since modern thought began, but it was\nonly about 450 years ago. The Hellenic-Roman Period was 800 years\nlong, or nearly twice as long as modern times. It is, furthermore,\ntwo and a half times as long as the period which we have just been\ndiscussing,\u2015\u2015the pure Greek period. Now the Hellenic-Roman Period\nand the Middle Ages together form the epoch of human history that is\nrelatively uncreative. This is an extent of 1800 years, a long interval\nwhen compared with the 750 years of creative history, which represents\nthe combined length of the pure Greek Period and modern times. In\nEuropean history the periods of productive thought have been less than\nhalf as long as those of the unproductive. Yet we must not be misled by\nsuch statistics. History is an organic growth. Its seedtime and growth\nare long; its harvest is short.\n\n=The Fall of the Greek Nation and the Persistence of its Civilization.=\nThe 800 years after the death of Aristotle are named the Hellenic-Roman\nPeriod, because Greek civilization burst its own national boundaries\nand became a part of Roman civilization. The Greek nation died;\nits culture remained. It is no longer pure Greek, but Greek in the\nenvironment of the Roman world\u2015\u2015it becomes Hellenism. With the death\nof Alexander in 323 B. C. the motherland of Greece became a prey to\nrevolutions for 200 years. It was often the battleground of foreigners\nand the object of their contentions. Its government and population sank\ninto hopeless decay. It was incorporated into the Roman empire in 146\nB. C. and shared in the depressing times of the Civil Wars of the first\ncentury B. C. By becoming a part of Rome Greece lost its uniqueness\nbut the world gained its culture as a common heritage. Its autonomy\nwas forever gone, but its people became the teachers of mankind. In\npolitical power Greece reached its height with Alexander, in creative\nthought with Aristotle; then by its own momentum its civilization\npersisted as a missionary force to the whole world.\n\n Illustration: THE EMPIRE OF ALEXANDER\n\n (Showing the spread of Hellenism eastward,\n beginning 334 B. C. with Alexander\u2019s Campaign)\n\nThe overflow of Greek civilization was first eastward, to the nations\nof Asia. Alexander, with his military and administrative genius,\nhad only made a preliminary conquest of these Oriental peoples. The\nconquest became permanent through Greek art, learning, and institutions.\nIn the century after Alexander the habits and customs of the East had\nbeen Hellenized. Greek schools, theatres, and baths were to be found in\nalmost every city of the East. In the East and Egypt an inexhaustible\nfield was opened for the founding of new centres of culture. In the\nkingdoms partitioned off from the old Alexandrian domain, the kings\nwere Greek, spoke Greek, adored Greek gods, and preserved Greek\nfashions. Amid Asiatics they sought to maintain Greek courts, have\nGreek administrative officers, and be surrounded with Greek scholars.\nGreek colonists, soldiers, and merchants were attracted to these\nkingdoms in such numbers that the natives adopted the costumes,\nreligions, manners, and even the language of the Greeks. The Orient\nceased to be Asiatic and became Hellenic. The Romans found there in\nthe first century B. C. peoples like the Greeks who spoke Greek.\n\nGreek civilization began to overflow upon the western world when,\nin the second century, Greece with all the other countries upon the\nMediterranean was absorbed by Rome. The conquest of Greece by Rome in\n146 B. C. gave currency to Greek art, letters, and morals in Roman life.\nThat Greek civilization was not lost in this great amalgamation shows\nhow deep and fundamental it was. The secondary nations disappeared and\nnone remained to compete with the Greek and Latin. The result was the\nsuperimposition of Greek culture upon Roman society. At the time of the\nconquest of Greece, Greek scholars went to Rome in great numbers and\nopened schools of eloquence and literature. Later the Roman youths\nwent to Athens to study. Art and science were gradually introduced into\nRome. The old Roman house got a Greek addition. Statues and paintings\nwere transported from Greece to Rome. Greek artists were commissioned.\nBy 100 B. C. the great Romans were living in Greek or Oriental style.\nThe coarsest Greeks, too, came into Italy and mingled with the Roman\nproletariat. Thus, with the complete Latinizing of the peninsula of\nItaly in the second century, an increasing Hellenism went hand in hand.\n\nBut the two civilizations never completely united. Roman adoption of\nGreek culture was never more than a veneer. Greek art and learning were\nrarely studied by the Roman except as a parade and luxury. As time went\non the Roman resorted less to the classic and more to the frivolous\nmodern products of the Greeks. For it must be remembered that when\nGreece was conquered by Rome, the Romans were still only peasants,\nsoldiers, and merchants, without science, art, or philosophy. Before\n150 B. C. the Roman children were taught nothing higher than reading,\nwriting, etc. But the Roman found a culture in Greece that he liked\nand imitated. He kept his costume, language, and political laws, but\nhe adopted Greek letters, art, morals, and incorporated many elements\nof the Greek religion into his own.\n\nTwo results came from this superimposition of Greek culture upon Roman\nsociety. On the one hand the Greek sought to create a philosophy which\nwould make him a citizen of the world, since it was no longer an honor\nto be a citizen of a Greek city. On the other hand, to the Roman there\ncame a mixed good. There was a gain to Roman literature and perhaps\nto jurisprudence, but a fatal loss to Roman faith and morals. On the\nwhole Roman vulgarity was only concealed by Greek culture, except in\nsuch spirits as Scipio, Paulus, and the Gracchi, in whom culture was\ngenuine. The Roman felt the need of rich intellectual life, and he\nsought it in the rich treasures and the filth of later Greek culture.\nThe Greek culture that he found was no longer pure Greek, but Hellenism,\nsometimes tinged with Orientalism. It acted as a poison on the Roman\nand often was bitterly opposed.\n\n=The Two Parts of the Hellenic-Roman Period.= We must not forget that,\nexcepting the first 175 years of this period, Rome is the background\nupon which all philosophical movements of the time are to be traced.\nUpon this background two general movements are prominent, which\ndivide the period into two parts: (1) the Ethical Period, and (2) the\nReligious Period.\n\n=1. The Ethical Period=, 322 B. C.\u20131 A. D., had its origin in the\nGreek culture that was superimposed upon Roman civilization. This\nepoch is notable for the rise and controversies of the four celebrated\nphilosophical Schools of Athens; the introduction of the teaching\nof these Schools into Roman society; and the final merging and\nreconciliation of these Schools in Eclecticism and Skepticism.\n\n=2. The Religious Period=, 100 B. C.\u2013476 A. D., arose out of\nthe Oriental religions that swept into Rome before the beginning\nof this era. They were modified by their Roman environment,\nand intellectualized and systematized by Hellenic culture.\nNeo-Pythagoreanism, the Alexandrian-Judaic theosophies in the first\npart, Christianity and neo-Platonism in the second part of this period,\nare the most important philosophical results.\n\nNote three things. (1) The spiritual life of Rome during these 800\nyears has its origin in imported foreign movements. The source of the\nethical movement is Greek, that of the religious movement is Oriental.\n(2) The two movements overlap. Indeed, each from its beginning to its\nend covers about 600 years. More precisely the ethical movement did not\ndisappear until about 200 A. D.; the religious movement began about 200\nB. C. Ethical considerations dominate the first and religious impulses\nthe second period. (3) The century and a half from 150 B. C. to 1 A. D.\nis a period of transition. It is the time when the emphasis changes\nfrom ethics to religion. It is a period of unsettled conditions both\npolitically and intellectually. Politically it is the time of the Civil\nwars and the formation of the empire. Intellectually it is the time of\nEclecticism and Skepticism.\n\n=The Undercurrent of Skepticism in the Hellenic-Roman Period.= If we\ngo beneath the surface of the chronological divisions of this period,\nwhich have been given above, we shall find their significance in\nthe undercurrent of Skepticism, which runs from the beginning to\nthe end of the period, and includes both its ethical and religious\nphases. \u201cSkepticism\u201d is a word with a history of its own, but, as\nphilosophically used, it means the disbelief in the possibility of true\nknowledge. Skepticism was the fundamental frame of mind that gradually\ngrew to conscious expression in the entire ancient world, although it\nwas entirely at variance with the spirit of the Greek culture that had\nbeen superimposed upon that world. As an undercurrent\u2015\u2015a widespread\nfeeling\u2015\u2015Skepticism pervaded the whole period, while at different times\nand places it appeared distinctly on the surface. These were 800 years\nof lack of confidence in the power of the human reason, but the really\nnegative character of the time is often concealed by dogmatic teachings\nof the philosophical Schools. Dogmatic Skepticism does not appear\nexcept with reference to the positive teachings of the Schools, and\nthen it appears conspicuously. The successive stages of Skepticism\ncan have their clear outline, therefore, only after the positive\nphilosophical teachings, contemporary with it and opposed by it, have\nbeen understood. This is the reason for treating the Skeptics after\nand not before the Schools. The reader will, however, lose the whole\nmeaning of the Hellenic-Roman Period if he does not see that it is\nfundamentally Skeptical; that in the Ethical Division the Schools\nfurnished the occasion of its appearance, and that in the Religious\nDivision religious faith rose because Skepticism had taken possession\nof the field of knowledge. The ethical Schools stood as the last\nrepresentatives of the old Greek rationalism of the Systematic Period,\nbut even they yielded to the Skeptical spirit of the time. Stoicism,\nEpicureanism, and Skepticism seek the same end,\u2015\u2015the withdrawal of the\nindividual from the world and his exaltation above his environment.\nAll three valued science only so far as it would help ethical conduct.\nSkepticism alone was avowedly antagonistic to intellectual ideals.\nThe strength of Skepticism appears more evident when we look at its\ngrowth during this period. At the end of the Ethical Period the Schools\nweakened and we find a century and a half (150 B. C.\u20131 A. D.) of\nSkepticism and Eclecticism. There then followed at the beginning of\nthis era the Religious Period. Man then turned to religion because he\nwas profoundly skeptical of the trustworthiness of the reason\u2015\u2015he felt\nthat it was so untrustworthy as to be unable to furnish him even a true\ntheory of moral conduct.\n\nThe Skeptical undercurrent of the Hellenic-Roman Period was the\nconcentration of all the negative results of the Greek Sophists. It\ntherefore had more than one point of departure,\u2015\u2015the philosophies\nof Protagoras, of the Megarian, Cynic, and Cyrenaic Schools. This\nSophistic undercurrent fed popular thought during the days of Plato\nand Aristotle. It took its formal beginning contemporary with the rise\nof the Stoic and Epicurean Schools; and in Athens, Alexandria, and\nRome there rose to the surface the problem of the possibility of human\nknowledge. Formally it modified its sweeping negations, when it came in\ncontact with the pressing needs of morality and of spiritual retirement,\nbut it was ever present as the significant attitude of the time. While\nthe nature of the Skeptical teaching stood in the way of its formation\ninto a School, the doctrine itself, nevertheless, developed into a\nsystem and had its historical growth and culmination. Weber points\nout that the first appearance of Skepticism marks in Greece the\ninauguration of the age of reason and its reappearance marks the\ndecline of the age of reason.\n\n=The Fundamental Problem of the Hellenic-Roman Period.= The fundamental\nattitude of this period being Skepticism, the fundamental problem\npresented to it was therefore a practical one. While at heart the age\ndoubted the validity of the human reason, it was consciously engaged in\nsolving a very practical problem. The period had an external side that\nwas positive. No age can be merely skeptical, especially for so long\na time as 800 years. To doubt the power of the human reason is usually\nthe occasion of shunting human energies along other lines. The form of\nthe practical problem of this time was, _What is the highest wisdom for\npractical life?_ This is consonant with the skeptical attitude of the\nGreek as indicated by these two facts: (1) he had no longer an interest\nin speculation except as it afforded a basis for practical wisdom, and\n(2) he had no longer an interest in special sciences except as they\nyielded practical results. To be sure, it will be found that theories\ntook to themselves airs of great importance during this period and that\nempirical sciences made rapid advances; but it will also be found that\nthey were always in the service of practical living. The Wise Man of\nthis age is he who has a scientific doctrine of the purposes and ends\nof human life.\n\nFor with his entrance into world-wide relations in the Ethical Period\nthe Athenian found himself confronted with a very different situation\nfrom that which had engaged him during the age of Pericles. His\nnational existence had gone and could no longer arouse his devotion,\nand with it his _ideal_ of a national life had crumbled to pieces.\nHis epic polytheism had become a dim thing of the distant past, and\nthere was no longer any external Greek institution to awaken his\nslumbering energies. He might, of course, go into retirement and engage\nin speculative inquiry, except that this was an age of pressing need.\nHe was forced to be awake and to adjust himself as an individual to\nthe many other peoples mixing and mingling in one common civilization.\nHis relations were enlarged, but his interests were circumscribed. His\nphilosophy was focused to one fundamental problem, _What, after all, is\nthe object of human life, and what can give happiness to the individual\namid the turmoil of the time?_ Philosophic studies were narrowed\nto ethics, logic, and physics in their practical bearing. How much\nnarrower, then, the scope of the intellectual life of this time than\nthat of those men of retired leisure, Plato and Aristotle!\n\nNor is the fundamental problem different when in the second part of\nthis period we enter the great sweep of the religious current. The\nrise of religious ideals and the shift from ethics to religion was only\nthe presentation of the practical problem of living with a different\nemphasis. Man was now in the dazzling glory of the empire, but that\nempire was unable to compensate the individual for the loss of his\npolitical importance. Rome had given to its conquered peoples an\norganized legal unity, but no spiritual ideal. It had none to offer.\nThe individual was the least important factor in the organization. The\npresent life offered little hope to the individual, except in the light\nof a future life. Practical wisdom thus became that which took account\nof the rewards and punishments that would come in the life beyond.\n\nThe Hellenic-Roman Period is kaleidoscopic and bewildering in its\nshiftings; but amid them all is this one conscious problem: \u201c_Show us\nthe man who is sure of his happiness, whatever the accidents of the\nworld may bring to him._\u201d\n\n=The Centres of Hellenism.=\n\n=1. Athens.= With the overflow of Hellenism to the east and west the\nactive history of Athens had ceased, but she became venerated for\nwhat she had been. Greece became hallowed and Athens became the shrine\nof Greece in the imaginations of men. Although the city was brutally\nravished, she exercised a charm over the human mind for eight hundred\nyears after Alexander. Athens remained the intellectual centre through\nthe entire period. It became the conservative university town, where\nphilosophy and rhetoric were taught. It is remarkable how many Oriental\nphilosophers came to Athens to teach, how many youths from the whole\nworld came to be taught. The rhetorical schools, such as that of\nIsocrates, did much toward making Athens the centre of culture, and\nthey offered for many years the highest practical training to Greek,\nRoman, and Oriental. Besides the rhetorical were the philosophical or\ndialectical schools, which debated privately questions of speculative\nmetaphysics. These did not offer public training, but groups of\nstudents were taught in the grounds attached to gymnasia. Four\nprincipal philosophical schools were thus formed,\u2015\u2015the Academy of Plato,\nthe Lyceum of Aristotle, the Porch of the Stoics, and the Gardens\nof Epicurus. In the first two we have had especial interest in the\nprevious period. All four, and especially the Stoic and Epicurean\nschools, will engage our attention in this period. They are known in\nhistory as \u201cthe Schools.\u201d (See map for their location in Athens.) There\nwere many minor schools in Athens which later became religious cults.\nThese Schools lost their original interest in speculative inquiry, and\nin this period devoted themselves to the exposition of the teaching of\ntheir respective founders on ethical lines. The University of Athens\nwas built upon the four Schools. Its chairs were endowed by Hadrian and\nthe Antonines in the second century A. D. It grew to have an elaborate\norganization. It was abolished by Justinian in 529 A. D.\n\n=2. Alexandria.= There were many other centres of Hellenism and of\nother learning at this time,\u2015\u2015Rhodes, Antioch, Alexandria, \u2666Pergamos,\nTarsus,\u2015\u2015but none of these could be said to rival Athens in the\nveneration of men. Some were much more active and creative than Athens.\nAlexandria surpassed Athens and all other cities as the centre of\nthe natural sciences in the Ethical Period and of religions in the\nReligious Period. Here, too, rather than at Athens, were to be found\nthe real interpreters of Plato and Aristotle. Nothing in ancient times\ncan be compared to the wonders of the museum of Alexandria, which was\nits university. Scholars of every nation were entertained here at the\npublic expense. A vast botanical garden, a zo\u00f6logical collection, an\nanatomical museum, an astronomical observatory, a library of seven\nhundred thousand volumes were here. Here Euclid (290 B. C.) wrote his\ngeometry, Eratosthenes pursued his astronomical, geographical, and\nhistorical labors, Apollonius wrote his treatise on conic sections;\nand here were made the observations that led to the discovery of the\nprecession of the equinoxes. Here Ptolemy and his school formulated\nthe system of astronomy which was authoritative for fifteen hundred\nyears. Here the Christian theologians were educated, and from this\ncity neo-Platonism sprang. Literature and art, history, philology and\ncriticism flourished. The Hebrew Bible was translated into Greek. All\nreligions were welcomed. Buddhist, Jew, Greek, and Egyptian mingled,\nand comparative theology rose to be a science.\n\n=General Characteristics of the Ethical Period= (322 B. C.\u20131\nA. D.)\u2015\u2015On the death of Aristotle the hitherto compact body of Greek\nthought disintegrated into its several elements. Theoretical and\npractical knowledge, which had been so successfully fused in the great\nsystems of Democritus, Plato, and Aristotle, became separated. The\nwhole tendency of the time was toward segregation.\n\n=1. The Abandonment of Metaphysical Speculation.= The theoretical\nside of philosophy, which had been so successfully completed by the\ngreat Greek masters, now became subordinated and almost completely lost\nto view. _Metaphysical speculation was neglected_ except as it threw\nlight on the practical sciences\u2015\u2015on ethics and the natural sciences.\nKnowledge was no longer loved for its own sake.\n\n=2. The Growth of Science.= Since theory was regarded as completed,\n_attention was naturally turned upon the details of erudition and the\nspecializing of science_. The natural sciences survived the systems\nof philosophy because of their usefulness. There was great interest\nin investigations in mathematics, natural science, grammar, philology,\nliterary history and general history\u2015\u2015and all with very rich results.\nIt was the time of commentaries, criticism, collaboration of the work\nof the past and completion of the special work begun by the past. By\nfar the greater number of the so-called \u201cphilosophers\u201d of this time are\nconnected with special science and literature, and not with metaphysics.\n\nIt was in the Greek Islands and Egypt (Alexandria) that this advance\nwas made. Nevertheless, it must be said that the advance in science\nwas a good deal restricted. The empirical sciences are dependent on\nobservation and experiment, and these opportunities were wanting at\nthis time. Good progress was, however, made in mathematics and the\nsciences dependent on reasoning. Reasoning alone is incapable of\nadvancing a science like physics, for physics depends on investigation.\nBut even the prevalent skepticism of the time could not doubt the\ntruths of mathematics.\n\n=3. Ethics became the Central Interest.= For the first time in the\nhistory of European thought ethics was no longer a part of politics.\nIn the time of the autonomous Greek states ethics and politics were\ntwo sides of the same question both in theory and practice. Ethics\nand politics were not disjoined even by the Sophists, who nevertheless\npaved the way for the divorce of the two. Now for the first time\nethical questions have become such that the individual must disregard\nthe iron-bound political situation and answer them entirely with\nreference to himself. The decadent Greek state was no longer a moral\nentity in the eyes of the people, nor could the concentration of\ngovernment in Rome raise the state to moral dignity. Moreover, life had\nbecome cosmopolitan. The nations were commingling. Ethics must meet the\nneeds of men as human beings, and not as Athenians, Spartans, or Romans.\nVices had become cosmopolitan and virtues must needs be cosmopolitan\nalso. But cosmopolitanism is in the last analysis only individualism.\nThe man who conceives his duty so large that it embraces the whole\nworld is usually cold to any special interests except his own. The\nRoman dictators and afterwards the emperor were the personification of\nthis cosmopolitan individualism which the subjects imitated so far as\nthey could.\n\nThus the public life was in danger of being swamped by private\ninterests and mere enjoyment, by gain and the struggle for existence.\nThe old belief in the gods, the vigorous political activity for great\nends, the pleasure in free scientific inquiry had disappeared. The\nonly refuge for the reflective mind was within itself and the study\nof its own moral problems. Yet for this a definite science of ethics\nwas necessary, if the individual was to be systematically independent\nof external things. Plato and Aristotle had prepared the way for such\nretirement, and the tendency toward ethical separation from the world\nof political events was an aspect of the cosmopolitanism of the time.\nEthical individuality and cosmopolitanism go together. The development\nof the inner life belongs to those individuals who dwell together\nin spiritual community. The same cosmopolitanism was sought by the\nskeptics of the period through the abandonment of all knowledge.\n\n=The Schools.= The beginning of the Ethical Period is marked by the\nrise of the Schools into prominence, the end of that period by the\nfusion of the Schools with one another through either eclecticism\nor skepticism. At the beginning of the period each School had its\ndistinctive doctrine and was in open controversy with the others;\nat the end their doctrines were much alike. The Epicurean School was\nan exception, for it always remained isolated from the other Schools.\nWhile each School had a host of notable representatives, it would be\ndifficult to find a creative thinker among them.\n\n Illustration:\n MAP OF ATHENS, SHOWING THE LOCATION OF THE FOUR SCHOOLS\n\n (The Academy was three quarters of a mile from the city,\n the Lyceum just outside the city, while the Porch was a\n colonnade on the market place (Agora). The location of\n the Gardens is not precisely known, but it was on the\n road to the Academy, just inside the walls.)\n\nWe have already given the names of the four Schools: the Stoic or the\nPorch, the Epicurean or the Gardens, the Aristotelian (Peripatetic)\nor the Lyceum, the Platonic or the Academy. The Stoic and Epicurean\nare called the New Schools in contrast with the Lyceum and the Academy,\nwhich are called the Old Schools. The New Schools were of Asiatic\nrather than Greek origin, and the Old Schools departed very much\nfrom the teaching of their founders; so that we find a very different\nkind of philosophy taught in all four Schools from that taught by the\ngreat Greek Systematizers. All the Schools were Sophistic rather than\nSocratic, and may be characterized as the revival of Greek Sophistry.\nBesides these Schools there was the group of Skeptics, which cannot be\nproperly called a School, for from the nature of its doctrine it could\nnot form an organization. In influence upon the period, the Stoics,\nEpicureans, and Skeptics are the most important. They eclipsed the\nAcademy and Lyceum because with partisan clearness they could formulate\nthe attitude of the age. The Stoic School made the most important\ncontribution to succeeding history. The Epicurean School had the most\nnumerous following. Although the four Schools were not endowed until\nthe Empire, their life was most vigorous before the Empire during\nthe Ethical Period. Succession in leadership of the Schools cannot\nbe completely traced\u2015\u2015even that of the Academy shows great gaps. All\nrecord of leadership in the Aristotelian, Stoic, and Epicurean Schools\nstops at the close of this period.\n\n=The Old Schools\u2015\u2015The Academy and the Lyceum.= The Academy and Lyceum\nhave a history which in these respects is the same: (1) both abandoned\nthe ideal of an ethical society and turned to that of individual\nhappiness; (2) both deviated to Skepticism; (3) both afterward had\na reaction from Skepticism; (4) both developed the Sophistic teaching\nrather than that of their founders; (5) both were in common opposition\nto the New Schools.\n\n=1. The Academy.= There were three Academies after Plato\u2015\u2015called three,\nbecause of the difference in their doctrines. Perhaps it is better to\nsay that there were three successive epochs of the Academy.\n\n(a) _The Older Academy_, lasting about seventy years, from 347 B. C. to\n280 B. C. The successive leaders of this were Speusippus, the nephew of\nPlato (d. 339 B. C.), Heracleides of Pontus, Xenocrates (d. 314 B. C.),\nPolemo, and Crates. This Academy emphasized at first the tendency\nbegun by Plato in the _Laws_ toward the Pythagorean numbers, and later\nyielded to the contemporary interest in morals.\n\n(b) _The Middle Academy_, lasting about one hundred and fifty years,\nfrom 280 B. C. to 129 B. C. Of this epoch Arcesilaus and Carneades were\nthe most prominent leaders. This Academy was a form of Skepticism.\n\n(c) _The New Academy_, lasting three hundred years from 120 B. C. to\n200 A. D. Among its leaders were Philo of Larissa, who was at Rome in\n87 B. C., and Antiochus of Ascalon, who had Cicero as a pupil in Athens\nin 79 and 78 B. C. This epoch of the Academy represented a return to\nthe dogmatism of Plato, but it shows the contemporary eclectic tendency\nby its including elements of Stoic and neo-Platonic teachings.\n\nOn the whole, the several epochs of the Academy failed to represent\nPlato\u2019s theory of the Ideas. The Academy was at first a School of\npractical ethics, then a Skepticism, then an eclecticism. It was\nrelated to Plato as the lesser-Socratic schools were to Socrates. The\ntrue developer of Plato was Aristotle and not the Academies.\n\n=2. The Lyceum.= From the death of Aristotle to 200 A. D. the\nLyceum was represented by individuals. The pupils of Aristotle were\ndistinguished from the master himself in being scientific specialists.\nTheophrastus (370\u2013287 B. C.), who followed Aristotle as leader of\nthe Lyceum, was the most complete representative of Aristotle, and\nan attempt to drive out the Schools in Athens in 306 B. C. failed\nsolely by reason of the respect in which he was held. His significance\nlay in natural science, and his two preserved botanical works are\nof great importance. Eudemus of Rhodes studied history, mathematics,\nand astronomy. Aristoxenes studied music, ethics, psychology, and\nhistory. Dic\u00e6archus showed the first yielding to the contemporary\nethical interest by writing history on its practical side. Science\nwas continued by the Aristotelians in Sicily, Alexandria, and the\nMediterranean islands. At Athens the School was most interested in\nlogic, dialectics, and eristics.\n\nThe history of the Lyceum was similar to that of the Academy. At\nfirst it was centred in Theophrastus, the brilliant disciple of the\nfounder,\u2015\u2015an administrator who knew how to give an eminent position\nto the Lyceum in the intellectual life of Athens. This was followed by\nthe naturalism and pantheism of Strato. The following generations of\nscholarchs were absorbed in empirical investigations. Then, as in the\nAcademy, came the reaction back to the original purpose of the founder\nof the Lyceum. This occurred under Andronicus (about 70 B. C.), the\neleventh head of the School, and under him the original teachings\nof Aristotle were reproduced and defended. This went on for several\ncenturies, until the School was merged in neo-Platonism.\n\n=The New Schools\u2015\u2015The Epicureans and the Stoics.= The Stoics,\nEpicureans, and Skeptics represent the dogmatic side of this period\nmore truly than the Platonists and Aristotelians, for they give a\nradical expression to its social aspects. The Epicureans had less\nphilosophical originality; but their doctrine had been born mature in\ntheir founder, and had in consequence a unity and compactness. Stoicism,\non the other hand, was an eclecticism composed of the successive\nphilosophizings of its champions through many centuries. Stoicism\nwas represented by many independent and notable thinkers, while\nEpicureanism had only one original thinker,\u2015\u2015its founder, Epicurus.\nStoicism developed by changing its essentials, while Epicureanism could\nchange only in its unessentials. Stoicism may be said to have been the\ncharacteristic philosophy of this period, from the fact that it was\ncreated and developed in Athens on the principles of Attic philosophy\nby men who had originated in the mixed races of the East, and by\nthe fact that it was easily accepted and developed by the Romans.\nConsistent with the spirit of the Hellenic-Roman Period, it was by\nnature an eclecticism that became more eclectic; and as time went on\nits teaching approached that of the Academy and Lyceum (second century\nB. C.). Epicureanism, however, always remained Epicureanism. Both\nStoicism and Epicureanism were centred at Athens. Epicurus opened his\nSchool in the Gardens in 307 B. C., and Zeno began his lectures in the\nPorch in 294 B. C. Both schools were introduced into Rome in the middle\nof the second century B. C., or just before the end of the Ethical\nPeriod.\n\nEpicureanism in Rome could easily be perverted into an excuse for\nthe luxurious tendencies of the time, and since it advocated absolute\ngovernment it voiced the feeling of the new Empire\u2015\u2015of the Emperor and\nthe people. As a philosophy it was opportune and popular and at the\nsame time easily misunderstood. It made no demands upon its disciples.\nOn the other hand, Stoicism was a discipline and demanded intellectual\nacumen. Its insensibility to art and culture was an insuperable\nobstacle to its progress in Greece, but on this account it found\ncongenial soil in Roman society. It made rapid progress among the\nnoble families, and was especially identified with those patrician\nreactionaries who stood for the old r\u00e9gime of the Republic.\n\nWe are not surprised to find that the Stoics and Epicureans were\nviolently opposed to each other. They were the New Schools and\ncontesting the same ground for favor. They had the same aim and, with\nso much in common, their differences were naturally accentuated. In an\nage which Adam Smith has likened to the Thirty Years\u2019 War in Germany,\nthey sought as rivals to offer as an ideal the individual independent\nof his surroundings. The Stoic presented one means of attaining this\nideal and the Epicurean another. Both tried to substitute a philosophic\ncreed for the old religion. And the crowds that still went to the\nAcademy and Lyceum, and were taught the old dogmatism, must have\nlooked askance at these new dogmatic Schools. Those crowds had become\nsecond-rate men. The New Schools had at first fewer numbers, but deeper\nthinkers. The Greek pupils in the New Schools listened to foreigners\nteaching strange creeds in strange tongues. But these new rivals made\ntheir way. Not only at Athens, but at Corinth, Elis, Colophon, and\nHeraclea in Pontus the elegant Platonic style was being superseded by\nthe crude aphorisms of Epicurus and the clumsy arguments of Zeno.\n\nIt will be asked, How far did these doctrines during these eight\nhundred years permeate the people? Did the New Schools reach the rank\nand file of the people to the same degree that the Sophistic teachings\nreached the Greeks? Are we to suppose that Stoicism and Epicureanism\nwere common and popular philosophies? By no means. These philosophies\nreached the people of the Roman world no farther than Greek culture\npermeated Roman society. Stoicism was consciously taken up by the\nlarge patrician class. The patricians were the cultivated Romans; and\nStoicism has so much in it like the Roman _gravitas_ that it formulated\nfor the patricians their attitude in this hopeless time. Epicureanism,\non the other hand, in its pure form as Epicurus taught it, or later\nas Lucretius poetically expressed it, could find less favor in Rome.\nBut Epicureanism was easily perverted, and no doubt the educated\nvoluptuaries of Rome would find in the vitiated doctrine a support and\nexcuse for their excesses.\n\n=A Summary of the Agreements and Differences of the Stoics and\nEpicureans.=\n\n _Their Agreements._\n\n 1. Both subordinated theory to practice.\n 2. Both had the same purpose in their practical philosophy:\n (a) to gain peace of mind for the individual,\n (b) to gain independence of the world for the individual.\n\n _Their Differences._\n\n _The Stoics._ _The Epicureans._\n\n 1. Universal law is supreme. The individual is supreme.\n\n 2. Man is a thinking being. Man is a feeling being.\n\n 3. Independence is obtained Independence is obtained by\n by suppressing the personal idealizing the feelings through\n feelings. serenity.\n\n 4. The Stoics were religious, The Epicureans were anti-religious,\n yet both schools accepted the popular gods.\n\n 5. The world is a moral order. The world is a mechanical order.\n\n 6. The universal determines The universal is the result of the\n the individual. functioning of the individual.\n\n 7. The world is the expression The world is the combination of\n of an immanent reason. atoms.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER X\n\n EPICUREANISM\n\n\n=The Life of Epicurus= (341\u2013270 B. C.). Epicurus was born in Samos\nin Asia Minor. He was a school-teacher in Mitylene and Lampsacus,\nand in 307 B. C. he established in Athens his Philosophical School,\nin a garden within the walls on the road to the Academy (see map).\nHis School was thereafter called the Gardens. He claimed to have been\nself-taught, and he probably did not have a thorough education. He\ndid, however, possess great personal charm and, as his doctrine made\nfew demands upon its disciples and expressed the refined and delicate\nhedonism of the time, it spread very wide. His disciples held him in\ngreat reverence, and long after his death the image of his personality\nwas a living influence with them. Indeed, it was the personal work of\nEpicurus that was the supreme influence with the sect. His formulas\npassed on from generation to generation and were called \u201cGolden\nMaxims.\u201d[34] He wrote three hundred separate treatises, and in the\namount of his writings was exceeded in antiquity only by the Stoic,\nChrysippus. His great work, _On Nature_, consisted of thirty-seven\nbooks. The other Schools joined in a bitter attack upon him, and in\nmodern times he has been called _Socrate doubl\u00e9 d\u2019un Voltaire_. Since\nneither polytheism nor Christianity had any reason for preserving his\nwritings, they have been almost entirely lost. Some have been found in\nHerculaneum, and many more are thought to be still in that buried city.\nThe mother of Epicurus was a priestess, and her superstitions probably\nset him against the superstitions of his age. His later acquaintance\nwith the philosophy of Democritus gave him a scientific basis for his\naggression against all religions.\n\n=The Epicureans.= The Epicurean body was a guild or sect that\nseemed to have been little affected by the vicissitudes of time.\nThe Epicureans proselyted vigorously, closely organized their\nsociety, and extended it throughout Greece. It was a state within\na state. With a fixed constitution it was held together by itinerant\npreaching, correspondence, and material assistance. It had an _esprit\nde corps_, and like religious communities it brought together into one\norganization the individuals that had been scattered by the breaking\nup of political institutions. The School had special protection from\nthe Roman emperors and existed as late as the fourth century A. D.,\nhaving outlived all the other systems. It had some famous literary\nrepresentatives,\u2015\u2015Metrodorus, Colotes, Philodemus,\u2015\u2015but especially\nthe Roman poet Lucretius, who popularized the doctrine for the Romans.\nAmafinius introduced Epicureanism into Rome during the middle of the\nsecond century B. C., and the teaching was received with great favor.\nIts numerous disciples in all antiquity changed the doctrine only in\nits unessentials. The charges of immorality and licentiousness are not\ntrue of the teaching or of the practices of the founder or of the early\nmembers of the School.\n\n=Some Types of Hedonism,\u2015\u2015Aristippus, Epicurus, and Rousseau.=\nEpicureanism was not a philosophy of pleasure for people without ideals\nor who were merely seeking indulgence. The question that Epicurus asked\nwas this: What enduring pleasure is possible to a man in these days\nof turmoil? He tried to give a rational answer to those of his day who\nwished to live and enjoy. His aim was to free man from responsibility\nin his share of the world\u2019s work and to provide for him a life of\nserenity. The pleasure theory of Aristippus, the Cyrenaic, was very\ndifferent. Aristippus, a voluptuary in a luxurious city, presented\na pleasure theory for the few who have fortunes. It is hardly more\nthan a grading of pleasures and the setting up of a criterion of their\nselection. Epicurus goes deeper than that. His pleasure theory is for\nthe few, not because they are fortunate, but because they are wise; not\nbecause they have fortunes to gratify their passions, but because they\nare independent of all fortune. The Cyrenaic was a man of the world;\nthe Epicurean was in the world, but not of it.\n\nThere is a superficial resemblance between the teaching of Epicurus and\nthe message of Rousseau to the French people of the eighteenth century.\nBoth sought an ideal of enduring pleasure. Both would discard the\nartificialities of society. But Rousseau was a political reformer and\nattempted to find his ideal in a newly constructed society. Epicurus,\non the other hand, was no political reformer, but would find his ideal\nin society as it existed. Rousseau appealed to the primitive feelings.\nHe felt \u201cthe call of the wild.\u201d Epicurus appealed to the refined and\nderivative feelings. He had no aggressive propaganda. He aimed at no\nexternal reform. His ideal was peace, and not the sword.\n\n=The Epicurean Ideal.= _The central principle of Epicurus is that\npleasure is a good and pain an evil._ In this he was in agreement with\nAristippus, and from this position he never receded. He offered no\nproof of this, but rested his central principle upon the conviction\nthat men pursue pleasure and avoid pain. He was convinced of the\nbiological fact. But he was not unobservant from the beginning that the\nsubject was complex. He saw that the individual has to make a selection\nof pleasure and often has to choose pain for the sake of a greater\npleasure. Pleasure is the only good, but Epicurus asks further, What is\npleasure? He finds that he must give a content to pleasure and evaluate\nthe pleasures in the interests of pleasure itself. This was to Epicurus\nno moral appraisal, but with reference to the pleasantest possible life.\n\nOf the two qualities of pleasure _Epicurus valued its duration_ and\nshowed his advance over the Cyrenaics, who had valued its intensity.\nIt was on this account that the Epicureans disclaimed all relationship\nwith the Cyrenaics, the earlier school. The difference is certainly\na radical one between them: to Epicurus true pleasure is that which\nendures; to Aristippus it is that which is most intense, however\nfleeting. There is this to be said of the Cyrenaic theory: it could\nbe easily understood. Aristippus could tell exactly what he meant by\npleasure. It is this or that gratification of sense. It includes every\npositive pleasure, and that which is intensest is best. One always\nknows when he is enjoying, and in flitting from pleasure to pleasure\nhe knows when he is intensely enjoying. But the Cyrenaic presented no\nideal. While the Epicurean theory is more difficult to understand, it\nis more mature and more profound because it presents a well-conceived\nideal. Indeed, the farther we follow Epicurus along this line of his\npursuit of the ideal of lasting pleasure, the more are we impressed\nwith his contribution to our knowledge of the nature of pleasure.\n\nIn this connection Epicurus shows his comprehensive grasp of the\nsubject in determining what are the lasting pleasures. Although he\nwas a materialist he regarded the pleasures of the mind as superior\nto those of the body. The inner pleasures, the spiritual joys, the\ncontrol of the mind so that it could enjoy without indulgence\u2015\u2015these\nwere to Epicurus the enduring pleasures. The pleasures of sense are\nprimary, for, in the last analysis, the mental life is a combination\nof sensations, and sensations are only material motions; nevertheless\nthe secondary and derivative pleasures of the mind were superior,\naccording to Epicurus, because they had duration. This estimate of\nthe superiority of the mental pleasures was probably reinforced by two\nother reasons: such pleasures were possessed by Epicurus; and such a\ndoctrine was in accord with the Greek \u00e6sthetic ideal of self-enjoyment\nof the refined egoist.\n\nThe most permanent state of mind is called by Epicurus _independence of\nthe world_, on the one hand, and _emotionlessness_, on the other. These\nare the positive and negative sides of one and the same thing\u2015\u2015the\nEpicurean ideal of pleasure. In ancient times the conception of\nthe \u201caffections,\u201d \u201cpassions,\u201d or \u201cemotions\u201d included all states of\nfeeling and will in which man is dependent on the outer world. To be\nemotionless is to be independent of the world. The Epicurean word is\n_ataraxia_, which is variously translated as serenity, peace, repose,\nimperturbability. Since man has no control over the world without\nhim, he must control its effects within himself. These effects are the\nfeelings and desires which are by nature only mental disturbances. In\nmastering these he becomes independent of the world.\n\nIf one will scrutinize his life, he will find, according to Epicurus,\nthat his experiences form a stream of mental disturbances. These may\nbe divided into two classes,\u2015\u2015desires and positive pleasures. Desires\nare wants and want is pain. Pain is therefore exciting. Positive\npleasure presupposes desire and want, and such pleasure is also an\nexcitement,\u2015\u2015the excitement that accompanies the removal of want. The\npositive pleasures are not, therefore, the goal of independence of\nthe outer world. There is another kind of pleasure\u2015\u2015the pleasure of\nrepose. Epicurus recognizes therefore both the pleasure of motion and\nthe pleasure of repose, but they do not have the same importance in\nhis system. Repose is the goal of all our experiences. It is a neutral\nstate, a state of freedom from bodily pain and mental excitement.\nThere is nothing higher than such a neutral state. We cannot advance\nbeyond it. If we seek new pleasures by gratifying new desires, we are\nonly returning to the old round of want, desire, and the pleasurable\nexcitement of removing the want. The pleasure of repose is the only\nescape from this round of experiences. Emotionlessness is the maximum\npleasure\u2015\u2015it is the repose in independence of the world. Any deviation\nfrom it may vary but it will not increase our pleasure.\n\nThis ideal of Epicurus looks very much like the Cynic doctrine of\nabsence of wants as constituting virtue and happiness. But Epicurus\nis far from renouncing pleasure. He is no ascetic. On the contrary,\nthe repose of the Epicurean will be the greater in proportion to\nthe compass of his needs that are satisfied. But he needs insight\ninto any given situation to tell him what positive pleasures should\nbe encouraged. Epicurus thus distinguishes three kinds of wants\nand their attendant positive pleasures: (1) wants natural and\nindispensable\u2015\u2015without the satisfaction of which we cannot exist;\n(2) wants artificial and dispensable, which ought always to be\ndisregarded; (3) wants natural and dispensable\u2015\u2015the great mass of wants\nwhich lie between the two other classes. Insight is necessary to decide\nabout this third class. In case of necessity they can be renounced, but\nsince they give happiness, the Wise Man will seek to satisfy them as\nfar as possible.\n\nThere are three steps leading to Epicurean happiness: (1) the desire or\nthe pain of unsatisfied craving; (2) the positive pleasure that removes\nthe pain of unsatisfied desire; (3) ataraxia, the repose of the soul or\ntrue happiness.\n\n=The Place of Virtue in Epicureanism.= Epicurus agreed with the\nstrictest Greek moralists that virtue and happiness go together. His\nopponents had to testify to the beneficial effects of his teaching\nupon the character of his disciples. Yet his conception of the place\nof virtue in life is in direct conflict with Stoicism. He felt that the\nStoic conception of virtue for its own sake is an ideal so imaginary\nthat it lacks all incentive to action. Pleasure, on the other hand,\nseemed to him to be a concrete and real object. It can be given a\ndefinite content. Virtue had for Epicurus a value only as a means to\nhappiness. Moreover, virtue by itself is not necessarily accompanied\nby happiness, but only when it is employed as a condition to happiness.\nThus wisdom may be employed to gain the pleasure of liberation from\nthe fear of the gods; self-control may be employed in order to get the\nmaximum of happiness.\n\n=The Epicurean Wise Man.= To what classes of people could this\nEpicurean ideal appeal? Is it an ideal possible only to the favorites\nof fortune, wealth, and rank? As presented by Epicurus it was not\nconditioned by external circumstances of any sort and its aim was to\ntranscend all conditions. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the theory\nwas restricted to those who had the desire to adopt it. On the whole,\nthe unreflecting common people of that time were not as a matter of\nfact influenced by the Epicurean philosophy. The proof of this is the\nease with which it was degraded into a simple pleasure theory without\nan ideal. Epicureanism as presented by its author was not an excuse for\nthe voluptuary or the prodigal, although it was easily corrupted into\nthat. It was, however, a philosophy of the individual. The individual\nmust rely upon his own common sense as to what among the particular\nsatisfactions will give him independence of the world. Sometimes\nrepose is attained by the satisfaction of all wants; sometimes the\nsatisfactions needed are few because the wants are few. True pleasure\nis possible to all reflective souls. \u201cWhen you come,\u201d says Seneca,\n\u201cto the gardens where the words are inscribed: Friend, here it will be\nwell for you to abide; here pleasure is the highest good;\u2015\u2015there will\nmeet you the keeper of the place, a hospitable kindly man who will set\nbefore you a dish of barley porridge and plenty of water and say, Have\nyou not been well entertained? These gardens do not provoke hunger,\nbut quench it; they do not cause a greater thirst by the drinks they\nafford.... In this pleasure I have grown old.\u201d Man can use much, but he\ndoes not need much. Even life itself under extreme circumstances is not\nnecessary. The pleasures to be sought are the permanent and gentle. In\none place Epicurus says with a somewhat forced sentiment that the Wise\nMan on the rack will smile in the midst of torture and say, \u201cHow sweet!\u201d\n\nThe Wise Man accepts the established order and accommodates himself to\nit. He is not like the Stoic Wise Man, indifferent to all pleasures,\nbut he is nevertheless independent of them. He is superior to the\nworld, a king and a god. Accidents cannot disturb him, for his virtuous\nhappiness lies within himself. He cannot control the world without, but\nhe can control the world within himself. He can be happy with few or\nmany satisfactions, and he is master over the world if he is master of\nthe effects of the world upon himself. To rest unmoved in one\u2019s inner\nself\u2015\u2015that is the Epicurean ideal of the Wise Man. In contrast to the\nCyrenaic happiness, the Epicurean happiness seems passive; in contrast\nto the Stoic happiness it is satisfaction.\n\n=The Epicurean Wise Man in Society.= Nevertheless the Wise Man is\nonly a spectator of the world. He does not enter the world\u2019s work nor\ndoes he enlist as a soldier to fight its moral battles. His individual\nindependence gives a peculiar character to his social relations.\nHe will have no ties on account of their complications. Moreover,\nhis inner world offers him no compensation for his loss of social\nrelationship, except that the good within is strong and the evil weak.\nHe looks upon political government as a matter of selfish convenience.\nHe is opposed to civic life, and therefore a supporter of absolute\ngovernment. He refuses the responsibility of marriage, but accepts\nfriendship as the only worthy social relationship, and only because\nfriendship is of mutual advantage. Friendship means intellectual\nintercourse, compassion, and forgiveness. While there were many famous\nEpicurean friendships, one must admit that the Epicurean took an unfair\nadvantage of the state. His happiness presupposed a highly developed\ncivilization of refined tastes and noble sentiments. He is a parasite\nupon the community and appropriates the labor of others. The Epicurean\nideal offers much to the individual, but nothing to society as a means\nof spiritual productivity.\n\n=The Great Obstacles to Happiness.= To universalize pleasure, however\nparadoxical it may seem, is to set up an individualism. It is to\nabandon all the claims of the society of other beings upon us. The\nlogic of any pleasure theory is anarchism. But Epicurus is no anarchist,\nfor anarchism would be too disturbing to repose. Epicurus stopped far\nshort of interfering with political conditions. His teaching did not\nhave as its end a logical theory, but a practical accomplishment. He\ntherefore accommodated his theory to the practical circumstances of his\ntime. He pointed out that in the seething times of the third century\nB. C. the individual could be happy if he banished from his world two\nobstacles. These were religion and culture.\n\nTo Epicurus the sorrow in man\u2019s heart and the evil in his practices\nare mainly due to religion. The chief source of the wretchedness of\nthe world is to be found in the crushing fears of religious belief.\nEpicurus has in mind the exaggerated ceremonies and mystical beliefs of\nthe Orient, where his mother had been a priestess. From this memory he\nwas reacting. Religion pollutes men\u2019s fancies, clouds the future with\nsuperstitious fears, and puts repose and happiness beyond our reach. In\nthe first place, religion carries with it the fear of death. In modern\ntimes the idea of life after death is an added consolation. In the time\nof Epicurus death meant the giving up of the present life for a dim,\nsunless region of flitting shades bordering on the edge of Tartarus. No\nphilosophical mind can be happy, according to Epicurus, if it contains\nthe religious conception of death and the future life. Again, religion\nconceives the world of nature as created and operated by the gods. It\nis forever explaining nature-phenomena as miraculous and supernatural.\nThe tranquil mind must believe in a nature world that is separated from\nmiraculous intervention, and freed from oversight. The world must be\na dependable world. Lastly, religion conceives of the gods as always\nbusying themselves with the affairs of men. Men must secure their favor\nand avert their wrath by constant offerings. The religious man wastes\nhis time and consumes his peace in the fear that the gods are not\npropitiated. The Epicurean seeks to build up the life of the individual.\nHe seeks a tranquillity that is independent of everything. Religious\nbelief with its interfering gods would thwart his ideal. Hence the\nchief concern of the Epicurean was to banish from life every conception\nof divine government. The gods exist, but they live quite apart from\nmen. Their dwelling is in inter-stellar space amid the numberless\nworlds. They have nothing to do with the events of this world,\nbut are only glorified actualizations of the philosophic ideal of\nsoul-satisfying peace. The more the teleological conception of nature\nbecame the common ground of the Academy, the Lyceum, and the Porch, the\nmore did the Epicureans isolate themselves by opposing the conception.\n\nThe other obstacle to the imperturbability of the soul is culture. The\nStoics subordinated theory to practice but Epicurus went so far as to\ndeprecate all culture. It was the philosophical protest of an Oriental\nagainst all for which Greece had stood. All knowledge is superfluous\nwhich does not promote happiness. Knowledge may indirectly promote\nhappiness, and that is the best you can say of it. Epicurus therefore\ndespised the researches of the grammarians, the lore of history, the\nscience of mathematics, the theory of music, poetry, rhetoric, oratory,\nlogic. Although he set greater store by the intellectual than the\nphysical pleasures, he placed as little value on knowledge for its\nown sake as upon virtue for its own sake. This teaching of Epicurus in\nAthens betrays the change that had come over Athenian society. Plato,\nwho had been the impersonation of Athenian culture, had been dead not\nmore than thirty years.\n\n=Epicurus\u2019 Conception of the Physical World.\u2015\u2015Qualified Atomism.= To\nthe cursory reader the science of physics seems to occupy a large place\nin the philosophy of Epicurus, and its presence appears inconsistent\nwith his polemic against culture. Upon further reading one finds\nthat physics, too, should be merely a servant of the happiness of\nthe individual. We need knowledge of physics because the knowledge of\nnatural causes will free us from the fears attending religion. Physics\nhas no independent importance.\n\nEpicurus undertook to support his doctrine of individualism by the\nscientific theory of Democritus. The materialistic theory of the\ngreat Abderite seems to loom large in the exposition of Epicurus.\nBut Epicurus was not interested in the science of physics\u2015\u2015not even\nin the physics of Democritus. He did not build his theory on the\nteaching of Democritus, but on the contrary he used the Democritan\ndoctrine to support his theory of moral conduct. Epicurus needed a\nwell-authenticated theory. On account of the influence of Lucretius\u2019\npoem, Epicurus has been called in modern times the scientist of\nantiquity. But his only contribution to science was that, finding the\natomism of Democritus ready at hand although unpopular, he made it\npopular by adjusting it to his own purposes.\n\nThe Democritan conception that Being is matter consisting of\ninnumerable uncreated and indestructible atoms furnished Epicurus this\nsupport for his moral atomism. He followed Democritus in his analysis\nof psychological, physiological, and astronomical phenomena\u2015\u2015all\nare atoms in combinations. But he lacked scientific insight and the\nDemocritan doctrine was emasculated in his hands. The central and\nfundamental principle of Democritus\u2019 theory was the universal reign\nof law. This the Stoics adopted and this Epicurus neglected. Epicurus\nwas impressed by the changes of the atoms in the Democritan theory; the\nStoics by the law of such change.\n\nThis appears in the teaching of Epicurus in two ways. The first\nexample is in his explanation of the origin of the cosmos. Democritus\nhad conceived that irregular motion was an inherent quality of the\natoms and that the universe was produced by their combinations in a\npurely mechanical way. Epicurus conceived that the original movement of\nthe atoms was in a straight line from above downwards. This he called\nthe \u201crain of atoms.\u201d To explain their intermingling he conceived them\nto be endowed with volition by which they arbitrarily deviated from\nthe direct fall. Secondly, this physical theory of Epicurus would be\nunimportant except that it afforded him a basis for his theory of the\nindividual as possessing free will. The doctrine of freedom of the will\nhad been since Aristotle a presupposition indispensable to the doctrine\nof moral accountability among the Greeks. The Stoic doctrine of fate\nis an exception. But determinism was opposed to Epicurus\u2019 conception\nof the Wise Man as an independent individual. The human will is\nself-determined, and Epicurus even said that he preferred the illusions\nof religion to a belief in our slavery to fate. He classed freedom\nand chance together as uncaused occurrence, and out of the combination\nbuilt his conception of freedom. The uncaused functioning of the will\nin man is the same as the causeless deviation of the atoms. Freedom\nis the choice between different possibilities and is determined by no\ncause. The Stoics alone among the philosophers of this time are the\nforerunners of the study of physics.\n\nEpicurus introduced the conception of volition of the atoms to\naccount for the origin of the cosmos. From that point he conceived the\nworld to develop in a mechanical way. Teleology in the nature world\nwas repugnant to him. By modifying the Democritan physics, he thus\nsucceeded in establishing the independence of the individual in the\nsocial world and, on the other hand, removing the gods from interfering\nin the physical world. This seemed to Epicurus to afford an absolute\ndeliverance from superstition. The important points of the physical\ntheory of Epicurus are these: (1) the freedom of the atoms in motion;\n(2) and yet their mechanical development; (3) the atomic character of\nthe gods; (4) the scattering of the atoms of the soul at death, which\nfrees us from the fear of Hades.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER XI\n\n STOICISM\n\n\n=The Position of Stoicism in Antiquity.= The Stoic School had a long\nhistory, and for five hundred years it was well-nigh the dominating\nsystem of thought. Its importance is shown in the attacks on all sides\nby which it was honored. It was subjected to a continued critical\ntesting by the Peripatetics, Epicureans, Skeptics, and the Academy. It\nwas without doubt the most comprehensive School of the Hellenic-Roman\nPeriod, and numbered as its adherents the most brilliant personalities\nof the time. In its importance to history its only rival was\nneo-Platonism, which came after it. Stoicism accomplished much\ntoward solving the problem of life, for it is one of the great inner,\nspiritual movements of humanity. It was a system of philosophy raised\nupon the ruins of polytheism\u2015\u2015a religion for the educated classes, who\ntried to harmonize the old religion with the new philosophic needs. In\nthe early Christian centuries it led the moral reform by reviving the\nclassic ideals. It became a retreat into the invisible order, a solace\namid unrest. Particularly at that time the Stoic felt the emptiness\nof human life, for his possession of eternity made earthly existence\nseem as nothing. Yet it was a movement of subjective reflection and\nindividual motive; but as such it could not prove itself adequate when\nthe structure of Roman society broke down.\n\nBut we must not take the _Roman_ Stoics as the representatives of\nthe sect. The Stoics stood for more than moral reflection. The great\nachievement came from the first three leaders\u2015\u2015_the achievement\nof giving a scientific basis to morals_. The Stoics made ethics an\nindependent science. Such an elaborate system of morals as that of\nthe Stoics had never before existed. Stoicism was morality with a\ntheoretical foundation, and the foundation was the most imposing part\nof the edifice. This appeared in Roman jurisprudence, and in later\ntimes in Grotius, Descartes, Spinoza, the Calvinists and Puritans,\nand in Kant and Fichte. The writings of the individual Stoics have\nbecome a part of the world\u2019s literature, and the Stoic view of life\nhas maintained itself as a dignified and independent type.\n\n=The Three Periods of Stoicism.= The five hundred years of the history\nof the Stoic School are usually divided into three periods. The first\nis about 90 years long, in which the doctrine was formulated; the\nsecond is 200 years long, when the doctrine was modified; the third was\n200 years long, when it became a popular moral philosophy. The first\ntwo periods were theoretical, the third was practical.\n\n=1. Period of Formulation of the Doctrine= (294 B. C.\u2013206 B. C.),\nsometimes called the period of Cynical Stoicism. This period contains\nthe three great leaders: Zeno (340\u2013265 B. C.), Cleanthes, leader of\nthe School from 264 to 232 B. C., and Chrysippus (280\u2013206 B. C.). Zeno\nof Tarsus, Diogenes of Seleucia, and Antipater of Tarsus were other\nimportant representatives.\n\n=2. Period of Modified Stoicism= (206 B. C.\u20131 A. D.). This was the\nperiod of transition. This period shows a modification of the original\nsevere Cynical character of the doctrine and also the spread of\nStoicism to Rome. This modification shows an approach to Plato and\nAristotle. The most important representative of this period is Pan\u00e6tius\n(180\u2013110 B. C.), who introduced the doctrine into Rome through his\nfriendship with Scipio Africanus. Other eminent Stoics of this period\nwere Posidonius and Bo\u00ebthus of Sidon.\n\n=3. Period of Roman Stoicism= (1\u2013200 A. D.). During this period\nStoicism became a popular moral philosophy. The theoretic teachings\nof the first two periods were successfully translated by the Roman\nStoics in an impressive way into practical observations. Furthermore,\nStoicism was being inspired with the rising religious feeling so that\nit expressed the noblest moral sentiments of antiquity. The chief\nrepresentatives were Seneca (4\u201365 A. D.), Epictetus (living 90 A. D.)\nthe philosophic slave, and the emperor Marcus Aurelius (121\u2013180 A. D.).\nOther Stoics of this period were L. Ann\u00e6us Cornutus, M. Ann\u00e6us Lucanus,\nPersius, and M. Musonius Rufus.\n\n=The Stoic Leaders.= One of the striking features of the Stoic School\nis that its leaders were not pure Greeks. Nearly all the members before\nthe Christian era belong by birth to the mixed races of Asia Minor and\nthe eastern archipelago. Moreover, the later Stoics were mainly Romans,\nled by the Phrygian, Epictetus. The Stoics who were Greeks were third\nor fourth rate men. The Stoic School contained so many eminent thinkers\nthat its doctrine was not framed once and for all, like the Epicurean\ndoctrine. During the five hundred years from Zeno to Marcus Aurelius,\ntheoretic changes went on within the School, and the changes were\nrather modifications than development. Fundamentally, Stoicism remained\nthe same, for it was a religious attitude of mind.\n\nAthens was the abiding-place of the Stoic School, but Athens of that\nday had little to say to it except to receive it. The great Stoic\nleaders, the first three Stoics, like the three tragic poets, formed\na group that is rarely equaled. They were Zeno, Cleanthes, and\nChrysippus. Zeno and Chrysippus came from Cyprus, and Cleanthes came\nfrom Assos, not far from Troy. Cyprus, Lycia, and Pisidia showed a\nstrong inclination for the Stoic teaching. Tarsus, which is in Cilicia,\nhad a strong Stoic School, and its influence on the training of\nSt. Paul is seen in his theology.\n\nThe founding of the Stoic School was the result of the experiences of\nZeno of Citium. Having lost much of his wealth in commerce, he turned\nto philosophy at Athens. Impressed with the character of Socrates,\nhe attached himself successively to the Cynic, Megarian, and Platonic\nSchools, but without much satisfaction. He made himself master of\nthe teachings of these Schools, and then founded a School of his own.\nIt is said that when he asked for admittance to the Academy, Polemo,\nthe leader, replied, \u201cI am no stranger to your Ph\u0153nician art, Zeno. I\nperceive your design is to creep slyly into my garden and steal away my\nfruit.\u201d In 294 B. C. he began to teach in the Painted Porch (see map,\np. 219), a painted colonnade in the Athenian market-place. The School\nthereafter went by the name of Stoa, or the Porch. His contemporary\nantagonists were Arcesilaus in the Academy, and Epicurus. Zeno\u2019s\nreputation throughout Greece was very high and well deserved. He was\na parsimonious man, simple and rude spoken. He used a bad dialect,\nforeign words, and taught a strange doctrine. He suffered a slight\nwound and, taking it as a hint of destiny, committed suicide, saying,\n\u201cI am coming, Earth, why do you call me?\u201d\n\nStoicism did not flourish under Cleanthes (who was leader of the School\nfor thirty-two years), although to-day he is the best known of these\nthree leaders on account of his _Hymn to Zeus_. He was originally a\npugilist, and was so poor that he had to work as a water-carrier by\nnight in order to attend the lectures of Zeno by day. He is said to\nhave had a heavy mind, but it was nevertheless the mind of an inspired\nprophet and a thoughtful man of science. When Cleanthes received\nthe Stoic doctrines from Zeno, they were still plastic. He made them\nmonistic and pantheistic, and introduced the doctrine of \u201ctension.\u201d\n\nUnder Chrysippus (280\u2013206 B. C.) Stoicism was revived and he saved\nit from extinction. Chrysippus was the systematizer of the School and\nits literary representative. He wrote five hundred and five separate\ntreatises, three hundred of which were on logical subjects. He is\nsaid to have seldom let a day pass without writing five hundred lines.\nHe was the moderating influence of the School, mediating between\nextremes and removing objections. He restated Zeno\u2019s doctrines, but his\ndiscourses abound in curious subtleties rather than argument. He was a\nmuch more scholarly man than his predecessors, and passed for the most\nlearned man in antiquity. \u201cGive me doctrines,\u201d he said to Cleanthes,\n\u201cand I will find arguments for them.\u201d His haughtiness created many\nadversaries, both in the Academy and among the Epicureans, and he had\ngreat contempt for men of rank. He said, \u201cIf I thought any philosopher\nexcelled me, I would myself become his pupil.\u201d It was a common saying\nin those days, \u201cNo Chrysippus, no Stoa.\u201d In the hands of Chrysippus the\nStoic teaching became a well-rounded system.\n\n=The Stoic Writings.= Nearly all the writings of the early Stoics\nhave been lost. Only fragments have been preserved from the writings\nof other men like Cicero, Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, and Diogenes\nLaertius, and these men do not always distinguish between early and\nlater Stoicism. The principal source of our knowledge of early Stoicism\nis Diogenes Laertius. The _Hymn to Zeus_ of Cleanthes is the most\nnoteworthy fragment extant of the early period. Of the later Stoics\nof the Empire many writings have been saved: the ethical treatises and\nepistles of Seneca, the _Diatribes_ and _Encheiridion_ of Epictetus,\nand the _Meditations_ of Marcus Aurelius. The later Stoic writings\ntransmit the teaching of the earlier leaders modified by many foreign\ninfluences. Such second-hand authorities as Cicero, Plutarch, Diogenes\nLaertius and Sextus Empiricus, and the Aristotelian commentators give\nreports so vitiated that it is doubtful if they report any element\nbelonging to the earlier teaching. The doctrine of the Stoics, since\nthe time of Chrysippus, however, is known beyond peradventure.\n\n=The Stoics and Cynics.= The Stoics tried to build up the life of the\nsoul after the pattern of the virtuous Wise Man, whose outlines they\nborrowed from the transfigured and lofty form of Socrates. (Noack.)\nTheir teaching is not merely a refinement and advance over the Cynic\nSchool as Epicureanism had been to the Cyrenaic School. Stoicism and\nEpicureanism used their sources in different ways. The Stoic would give\nup more than the Epicurean, and the negative side of his teaching is\ntherefore greater; but in recompense he offers more in the shape of a\ncomprehensive metaphysics. The Cyrenaic doctrine of pleasure became the\ncorner stone of Epicureanism. The Cynic sensualistic rigorism became\nin the Stoic teaching a negative and relatively unimportant doctrine.\nWhile the Stoic distinction of virtue was not unproductive, the most\ninfluential aspect of Stoicism was its dissemination of humane culture.\nThus, in contrast with the Cynics, the Stoics had a deep interest\nin scientific theory. The Stoic, less than the Cynic, contrasted the\nindividual with the world. The Stoics have a more intelligent, freer,\nand milder morality. To the Cynics, external things have no value; to\nthe Stoics, they have both a positive and a negative value. Beneath\nthese differences there is the same self-sufficiency in virtue, the\nsame withdrawal within, the same moral strength of will, the same\nantithesis between good and evil. Stoicism was original, but not enough\nso to mark the beginning of a new epoch.\n\n=The Two Prominent Stoic Conceptions.= There are two Stoic conceptions\nthat rise prominently above all the rest of their teaching. One is\nthe conception of personality, the other is the conception of Nature.\nEpicureanism built up the conception of personality, but it had no\nneed of an objective principle of Nature; and indeed the Epicurean\nconception of personality seems to be only a clever adjustment and an\navoidance of the problems of life, compared to the clear-cut, heroic,\nand vigorous Stoic conception of personality. Thus in Epicureanism\nthere is one prominent conception, in Stoicism there are two.\n\nThese two Stoic principles stand side by side. The Stoic builds them\nup together, even though he fails to make them entirely compatible.\nAll the essential difficulties and all the excellencies of Stoicism\nlie in the juxtaposition of the conceptions of personality and Nature.\nIn early Stoicism each conception is stated with great vigor. In later\nStoicism their harmony is approximated by the modification of each. The\nresult was an ethical dualism and a metaphysical monism.\n\n=The Conception of Personality.= Against Epicureanism the Stoic fought\nfor the dignity of the soul. The ideal personality of the Wise Man\nis the central point in Stoicism. Even more than Aristotle did the\nStoic emphasize the unity and independence of the individual soul as\ncontrasted to its particular states. For the first time in European\nthought does the soul become an independent factor to be reckoned with.\nThe Stoic picture of the ideal personality is of a life completely\nsundered from outward conditions, free from earthly trammels, but at\nthe same time the organ of universal law. Contemporaries asked the\nStoics, How can such an ideal be a person? How can he live among his\nfellow men? How can he reconcile himself to human want? After setting\nforth this ideal during the 175 years of their first period, it is\nnot strange that they were finally forced to modify it in response\nto practical demands. At this point we shall consider the original\nportrayal of the Wise Man.\n\n=1. The Stoic Psychology.= The Stoic built his conception of\npersonality upon a deep psychological analysis. The soul in the body\nis like the pneuma in the world (see p. 255). Not only does the soul\ntransform the excitations of the several sense organs into perceptions,\nbut its distinguishing faculty is its power of transforming the\nexcitations of the feelings into acts of will. This was called by the\nStoics _the assent of the reason, and is the distinguishing feature of\nthe Stoic conception of personality_. It established for the first time\nin history the independence of the personal soul. The Stoic felt keenly\nthe antagonism between the reason and the senses, and he also felt\nthat by estimating the senses as merely relative in value they would\nso much the more dignify the reason as the fundamental feature of the\npersonality. While, therefore, all knowledge comes from the senses, the\nStoic maintained that no knowledge exists in the senses by themselves.\nThe assent of the reason is necessary to transform the sensations into\ntrue knowledge. The reason is not an aggregate of sensations, but an\nindependent function of the personality. It transforms the sensations\ninto perceptions, the perceptions into acts of will. The reason is\ntherefore a kind of generating power of consciousness and is free from\neverything external. But in contrast to this free rational side is the\nirrational nature of man; for the reason is liable to suffer failure,\nwhen it allows itself to be hurried along to give assent to exciting\ncauses. Then emotions arise, and emotions are failures, mental\ndisturbances, and in chronic cases diseases. Man is not always able to\ndefend himself against the excitations of his environment, but he can\nrefuse to give the excitations his assent. He can refuse to allow the\nexcitations to become emotions and to pour forth his life in passion.\nMan may be in the world and not of it. He may govern the world by\ncontrolling himself. The Wise Man is free from the emotions, and virtue\nconsists in their absence. The virtuous man is self-sufficient in the\nproud consciousness that he can look upon pleasure as not a good and\npain as not an evil.\n\nWhat guide does the reason have in granting or refusing its assent\nto its perceptions from without? What is the criterion of the truth?\nThe clearness of the perception\u2015\u2015the clearness in the sense that the\npresentation lays hold of the mind and extorts its assent. The truth\nis the \u201cirresistible presentation\u201d or the \u201capprehending presentation.\u201d\nWho can know the truth? The Wise Man. By what means? By sensation and\npreconception. By what sign? By the sign of its irresistible power. The\nWise Man is perfectly free and perfectly necessitated\u2015\u2015he never gives\nassent except to what constrains assent.\n\n=2. The Highest Good.= What is then the Highest Good or happiness for\nsuch a personality? After such an analysis, what would the Stoic be\nlikely to conceive to be the true ends of life? The very nature of the\npersonality gives the answer. Personality is fundamentally rational\nactivity which seeks to preserve itself and to gratify its own nature.\nThe Highest Good is the law of its own rationality, and virtue consists\nin being rational. In reaching for the Highest Good man can transcend\nhis particular faculties in his free obedience to his own reason; and\nthe wholeness of his existence depends upon the wholeness of his deed.\nThus is the inner activity _whole_ in contrast to the partial outer\nactivities. Inwardness attains complete independence and finds the\ndepth of the soul. We are free and we are happy if the whole being\ngoes out in contemplation of the world reason which is our reason, and\nif all the feelings that make us dependent on the world are excluded.\nSince the emotions place a false value on things, happiness demands\na whole effort and ceaseless activity. We must not merely theorize,\nbut thought must become conduct. Thought-action yields happiness.\nIt does not matter whether man acts with reference to this or that,\nfor external objects are neither good nor bad. The whole question\nis whether the reason controls the passions or not. If the reason\ncontrols, the end is good; if the passions control, the end is evil;\nall other ends are indifferent. The reason either does or does not rule,\nand an act is either good or not. Good is not relative, but absolute;\nand such relative matters as wealth, honor, and riches are matters of\nindifference. Even life itself is one of the indifferent things and may\nbe taken when it does not serve the ends of reason. The Highest Good\nis that inner unity\u2015\u2015that disposition\u2015\u2015which is governed by a single\nprinciple.\n\nThe Stoic word for this ideal Good is apathy, just as the Epicurean\nword was ataraxy or imperturbability. Positively defined, it is virtue.\nNegatively defined, can we say it was passionlessness? This would not\nbe quite correct. By apathy the Stoic means not absence of all feeling,\nbut _absence of control by the feelings_. The Stoic was filled with joy,\ngratitude, serene confidence, and unwavering submission in regard to\nrational law. Apathy is not dull insensibility, but immovable firmness.\nIt is absence of the emotions that render the man dependent on the\nworld, but it is not absence of the reaching out of the soul for the\ndivine. The Highest Good or Apathy is (1) intellectual resignation to\nthe universe, (2) practical inner harmony, and (3) self-control. In\nseeking to be rational, man is following an impulse,\u2015\u2015the impulse of\nself-preservation.\n\n=The Conception of Nature.= In comparison with the Epicurean\nthe position of the Stoic was peculiarly involved. The ideal\nimperturbability of the Epicurean was simple in so far that it required\nnothing beyond itself. It was an individual matter and varied with the\nindividual. But the Stoic ideal personality is based upon the reason,\nthat is eternally one and the same. What is this absolute principle\nthat gives to the human reason its absoluteness? What is the extent\nof the law of the reason that the human reason itself implies? Thus\nthe Stoic needed to supplement his conception of personality and the\nEpicurean did not. Because his individualism was more rigorous, it\nneeded the more to be supported. The Stoic principle of morality had to\nhave its foundation in the absolute nature of things. This foundation\ncould not be the politico-moral principle of Greek national life, for\nthat existed no longer. It could not be a transcendent, supersensuous,\nor incorporeal principle, for his Cynic inheritance would forbid his\nlooking beyond experience. The supplementary absolute principle of the\nStoics must be an immanent principle, a living power in the world. A\npantheistic conception of Nature took its place side by side with the\nStoic conception of personality, and this conception of Nature became\nthe central point of the Stoic metaphysics. For this the Stoics adopted\nthe Logos doctrine of Heracleitus, which will be recalled as the\ndoctrine of primal matter as rational, just, and fateful changingness.\nThe Stoics were reinforced in this by Aristotle\u2019s teleological\nphilosophy of nature. Yet they tried to overcome the dualism of matter\nand Form as it existed in Aristotle\u2019s teaching, and one feels that\nthe Stoic pantheism was a conscious and avowed pantheism. The Stoic\nconception of Nature is that of a unitary, rational, and living whole,\nhaving no parts, but only determinate forms. Yet it cannot be called a\nhylozoism, like the doctrine of Heracleitus, for there Form and matter\nhad not been distinguished. In the intervening years Form and matter\nhad been separated, and the Stoic sought to put them together again. In\ncomparison with the doctrine of the Old Schools, the Stoic teaching was\n(1) monistic, as against their dualism, (2) materialistic, as against\ntheir idealism, but (3) like them, it was teleological.\n\n1. In the first place, _Nature is an all-pervading World-Being_. It\nis God, \u201cin whom we live and move and have our being.\u201d It contains in\nitself all cosmic phenomena, and processes, past, present, and future.\nIt is the World-ground and the World-mind, and yet it is all-in-all.\nIt is the productive and formative power, the vitalizing principle.\nIn general, it is the creative and guiding reason; in particular,\nit is Providence or divine government. It is the unswerving whole\nin which the single events of history take place. To the Stoics the\ncosmic Reason was so apparent in Nature that purpose appeared to them\nin everything. In their hands the great teleological conception of\nAristotle\u2019s immanent purposiveness sank to the petty purposiveness for\nhuman beings and for the gods. Yet it is no wonder that this conception\nof an all-pervasive deity became a religion to the Stoics and raised\ntheir moral code to the region of the sublime. The world is Fate so far\nas the minutest movements are determined. Nature is Providence so far\nas those determinations are full of purpose. Nature is in every part\nperfect and without blemish.\n\n2. In the second place, _Nature is an all-compelling law_. Nature\nis an inviolable necessity, an inevitable destiny, that holds all\nphenomena in complete causal connection. Yet this destiny only proves\nthe complete purpose of the whole. The Stoic seized upon the central\nprinciple of Democritus,\u2015\u2015which the Epicureans had overlooked,\u2015\u2015the\nsupremacy of law. \u201cThe doctrine of Democritus passed over to the\nEpicureans only so far as it was atomism and mechanism; with regard to\nthe deeper and more valuable principle of the universal reign of law\nin Nature, his legacy passed to the Stoics.\u201d[35] There is no such thing\nas chance; everything is caused. In Epicureanism one finds the doctrine\nof necessity, but the necessity comes from the atoms themselves. In\nStoicism the necessity resides in the living activity of the whole.\nA living activity! Herein the Stoic conception differs from the\nDemocritan teaching. The necessity is a living necessity, the destiny\na living destiny.\n\n3. In the third place, _Nature is matter_. On the theoretical side\nStoicism agrees with Epicureanism only at one point,\u2015\u2015both were\nmaterialistic. The materialism of both these New Schools got a\ndisproportionate prominence because it had to be defended against\nthe attacks of the Academy and the Lyceum. The materialism of the\nEpicureans was a mere adoption of a theory; the materialism of the\nStoics was only one aspect of its supplementary basis. Nevertheless,\nto the Stoic matter alone is real, because _it alone acts and is acted\nupon_. Everything is matter,\u2015\u2015nature-objects, God and the soul, and\neven the qualities, forces, and relations between material bodies. The\nStoics regarded the presence and interchange of the qualities of things\nas the appearance and intermingling of bodies in these things.\n\nThere can be no doubt about the materialism of the Stoic teaching,\nalthough both material and spiritual attributes are ascribed to God\nin a way that is startling. The Heracleitan conception of fire as\nthe primary substance is the Stoic conception of God. God is fire,\nair, ether, and most commonly the atmospheric currents which pervade\nall things. But God is also the World-soul, the World-mind, the\nCosmic-reason, the universal Law, Nature, Destiny, Providence. He is a\nperfect, happy, and kind Being. In single statements these aspects are\noften combined and God is described as the Fiery Reason of the world,\nthe Mind in matter, the reasonable Air-currents. The Stoic equation is\nNature \uff1d Matter \uff1d Fire \uff1d Reason \uff1d Fate \uff1d Providence \uff1d God.\n\nThe Stoics followed Heracleitus also in their conception of the\ndevelopment of the present world from the cosmic fire. \u201cIn all points\nof detail their views on what we call physical science are contemptible.\nThey contained not one iota of scientific thinking.\u201d[36] They followed\nAristotle, however, in their description of the elements and their\nteleological arrangements.\n\nThe primitive substance changes by its own inner rational law into\nforce and matter. Force is the World-soul, the pneuma or warm breath,\nwhich pervades all things. Matter is the World-body, and is water and\nearth. In cosmic periods the primitive fire is destined to re-absorb\nthe world of variety into itself and then consume it in a universal\ncatastrophe.\n\nThe most important feature in the Stoic materialism is the\nconception of pneuma, or the force into which the original substance\nis differentiated. This is the World-soul. Nature is thus conceived as\ndynamical. The Stoic word for the World-soul is translated by various\nexpressions, as \u201ccreative reason,\u201d \u201cgenerative powers,\u201d \u201cformative\nfire-mind.\u201d It penetrates all things and dominates all as their active\nprinciple. Through it the universe is one, not a plurality of parts.\nThe pneuma is the life of the universe. Its motion is spontaneous; its\ndevelopment is teleological. The pneuma is an extraordinarily condensed\nconception, containing as it does suggestions from Heracleitus\u2019 Logos,\nAnaxagoras\u2019 Nous, Democritus\u2019 fire-atoms, and Aristotle\u2019s Energeia.\n\nThe human being has a constitution analogous to the universe. Man is\nthe microcosm and the universe the macrocosm. The soul of man is the\npneuma which holds his body together, and it is an emanation from the\ndivine pneuma. Mental states\u2015\u2015thought and emotions\u2015\u2015are air currents.\nVirtue is the tension of the atmospheric substance of the soul. The\nmaterial, yet divine, pneuma constitutes man\u2019s reason, causes his\nactivities, is seated in his breast. Since the pneuma is a body,\nit disconnects itself from the human corpse at death, has a limited\nimmortality, and returns to the cosmic pneuma at the conflagration of\nthe world.\n\n=The Conceptions of Nature and Personality supplement each other.=\nThus fundamentally the personality is identical with the cosmos\u2015\u2015it is\nreason. To turn the matter about, by reason or \u201cnature\u201d the Stoic means\ntwo things that are essentially one. He means the reason of man, or the\nreason of the world; to \u201clive according to nature\u201d is to live according\nto the nature of man or according to the nature of the world. The life\nof the Wise Man as a harmony with physical nature is a harmony with\nitself as well. The antithesis to \u201cnature\u201d or \u201creason\u201d is sensuous\nnature. What we speak of as the natural impulses were not \u201cnatural\u201d\nat all in the Stoic teaching.\n\n\u201cNature\u201d as universal is the creative cosmic power acting for ends.\nCo\u00f6rdination with this constitutes morality. It is a willing obedience\nto eternal necessity. The \u201cfool\u201d acts according to his sensations\nand impulses, and therefore against \u201cnature.\u201d But the Wise Man, by\nwithdrawing within himself, is his own independent master because he\nis acting universally. \u201cNature\u201d is the life-unity of the human soul\nwith the world reason. True individual morality is therefore universal\nmorality, complete humanity, universal rationality. To obey \u201cnature\u201d is\nto develop the essential germ in one\u2019s self.\n\nThus these two points of view were obtained of life-unity: a\nuniverse rationally guiding in all its changes; the human individual\nepitomizing this universe in himself as a rule for his conduct amid his\nvicissitudes.\n\n=The Stoic and Society.= Men are divided into two classes,\u2015\u2015the\nentirely wise and virtuous, or the entirely foolish and vicious. There\nis no middle ground. If a man possesses a sound reason, he has all\nthe virtues; if he lacks this reason, he lacks all. There are only\na few Sages; the mass of men are fools. The Stoics were continually\nlamenting with Pharisaical pessimism the great baseness of men. From\ntheir sublime height they looked upon the Wise Man as incapable of\nsin, upon the fool as incapable of virtue. In thus denying the ordinary\ndistinctions between good and evil, they were dangerous in politics.\nTheir political perspective was not reliable. In general, they did\nnot enter the politics of the democracies where they lived. They were,\nhowever, often the advisers of tyrants, and often assisted in removing\nthem (as in the case of Julius C\u00e6sar). The Stoic School of Musonius\nRufus made a splendid Puritan protest against Nero and Domitian,\nand finally his disciples and friends controlled the empire for a\ncentury (second century A. D.).[37] The Stoic regarded his Wise Man as\nattaining the same independence that the Epicurean claimed for his Wise\nMan. He is lord and king. He is inferior to no other rational being,\nnot even to Zeus himself.\n\nThe Stoic differs from the Epicurean in his attitude toward the\npolitical state. The two Schools agree that the sufficient Wise Man\nneeds the state but little. The Epicurean teaches that society is\nnot natural and not inherent in human nature. The Stoic, however,\nmaintained that society is a divine institution, which gives way only\noccasionally to man\u2019s individual perfecting. Since man and the cosmic\nreason are identical, all men are essentially identical. When men\ntherefore lead a life of reason, they lead a social life. This realm\nof reason includes not Romans alone, but all men, gods, and slaves. But\nthe political government is only secondary, for the Stoic\u2019s ideal is\na universal empire. The Stoic\u2019s interest in practical politics was as\nweak as his ideal of a rational society was transcendent. His teaching\nof justice and love for man was, however, a forecasting of the coming\nreligious emancipation.\n\nThere are two antagonistic tendencies running through Stoicism. The\nfirst is to seek society with its virtues,\u2015\u2015justice, love of men,\nsociability or cosmopolitanism. The second dispenses with society to\ngain an inner freedom. Yet these two tendencies often coincide.\n\nThey may be presented as follows:\u2015\u2015\n\n _To seek society._ _To dispense with society._\n 1. Exaltation of justice and Exaltation of inner freedom\n love. and happiness.\n 2. World citizenship. The Wise Man.\n 3. Relations and degrees of Absolute virtue and absolute\n virtue. vice.\n 4. Virtue depends somewhat on Knowledge alone is virtue.\n conditions.\n 5. Individual should submit to Individual should make fate.\n fate.\n\n=Duty and Responsibility.= The Stoic\u2019s identity of human and cosmic\nreason elevated the law of human conduct into a strict, universal law\nof duty. It embodies, on the one hand, the Cynic\u2019s protest against\nexternal law, and on the other the construction of the inner moral\nlaw. The backbone of Stoicism is sense of responsibility. The Stoics\nbrought out as never before the contrast between what is and what ought\nto be. They were the most outspoken doctrinaires of antiquity, and\nformed a school of character building in stubbornness. As time went on\nthey substituted human nature for cosmic nature, and then accentuated\nhuman nature as conscience. The individual could then define the right\nfor himself, and this sort of individualism was developed with so\nmuch skill that it admitted great laxity of morals. Duty commands\nsome things and forbids others, but there are left a great mass of\nactivities that are ethically indifferent. These indifferent matters\noffered opportunity for these men of conscience to perform what in the\neyes of others were crimes (for example, Brutus). Baseness is only what\nis unconditionally forbidden.\n\nYet it must not be supposed that the Stoics generally employed\nthe indifferent as an excuse for moral license. On the contrary,\nthe concept of life as a struggle originated with the Stoics, and\nfrom them it passed into the common consciousness of man. There was\nbefore them (1) the struggle with environment dominated by a false\nevaluation, (2) the struggle with effete civilization, (3) the struggle\nparticularly with one\u2019s self. The Stoic hero of inner courage and\ngreatness of soul rises above his fellows, not because he gains\ndominion over the world, but because in indifference to it he isolates\nhimself. He exists in premeditation of doing rather than in the\nactual doing in which his power would be spent. Still, in the absolute\ncontrast between the good and the evil, in making life a disjunctive,\nan \u201cEither\u2015\u2015Or,\u201d duty got a definite and distinct meaning. Duty,\naccording to the Stoics\u2019 conception, had not so much the nature of\nan imperative as of what is suitable,\u2015\u2015an act adapted to nature, a\nconsistent and justifiable act. In a manner unknown to antiquity the\nethical nature of conduct was thus universalized in the new conceptions\nof philanthropy, of the universality of God and man, in the tendency\nto suppress slavery and care for the poor and sick. Nevertheless, as a\nmoral force Stoicism accepted the world as it found the world, and did\nnot attempt to make it over.\n\n=The Problem of Evil and the Problem of Freedom.= On the questions\nof moral freedom and evil, the Stoics suffered severe attacks from\nthe Academy and the Epicureans. Alone among the Schools of antiquity\nthe Stoics preached the doctrine of Fate. The demands of ethical\nresponsibility, however, required that the individual should determine\nhis own conduct. To suit these demands the Stoic did not modify his\nfundamental conception of Nature, but he tried to justify his position\non the ground that the individual expressed the law of nature. His\nargument may be stated thus: Man is like God; Man is one with God;\nMan is free. It was also stated on psychological grounds. Man can have\none of two attitudes toward the world-law: (1) his performance may\nbe through blind compulsion; (2) his performance may be through an\nintelligent understanding of the law, in which case he is free. The\noccurrence of his act is fateful, but it makes great difference to the\nman whether the occurrence is in spite of him or with his intelligent\nacquiescence. The occurrence is not an evil in itself; for physical\nevils are no evils, and things that appear to be moral evils are\n(1) subservient to the good; (2) merely relative to good; or (3) show\nthat God\u2019s ways are not our ways. My will is mine though necessary; my\nwill is mine though it be law. The soul is free when it fulfills its\nown destiny. God works through man\u2019s will. Outer circumstances are\nonly accessory causes, but the main cause is the assent of the will.\nAt the same time the Stoics did not shrink from the logic of their own\nfatalism. Chrysippus said that only on the basis of determinism could\ncorrect judgments of the future be made. Only on this ground could the\ngods foreknow. Only the necessary can be known.\n\n=The Modifications of the Stoic Doctrine after the First Period.= The\ninherent difficulties in the Stoic doctrine and the attacks upon it\ngave rise to later concession that only further complicated it. (1) The\nmoral ideal was lowered to make a set of rules for the mediocre man,\nand thereby the Stoics became the originators of the dangerous doctrine\nof a twofold morals.\n\n(2) By admitting any supposition instead of strict scientific deduction\ninto their theory they introduced probabilism. An absolute personality!\nAn absolute Nature! In order to make either practical the Stoics had\nto modify both. In the course of time, when new leaders represented the\nSchool, there came compromises according to practical exigencies. The\nteaching of the Wise Man was superseded by instruction how to become\nwise. The moral idealism was not renounced but the idea of progress was\nintroduced.\n\n(3) The doctrine of Goods was modified. From out the Goods, esteemed\nas indifferent, there appear Goods as desirable. Yet these were never\nthought to be Goods in themselves, but were only adapted to further the\nGood in itself. Such were, for example, the physical Good of health,\nenjoyment of the senses, etc. On the side of its ideals Stoicism thus\nwas brought into touch with practical life.\n\n(4) A distinction was made concerning those who were not Wise Men. It\nwas recognized that all \u201cfools\u201d are not the same distance from virtue.\nThere are then recognized progressive men,\u2015\u2015men who are improving.\nApathy is thus modified by a state of progress. Even the Wise Man has\nin common with others the affections of his senses, such as pain. The\nStoic ethical aristocracy became more humane. Nevertheless, the Stoic\nnever yielded this point, viz., that there is no gradual growth in\nvirtue. Virtue is not attained through a transition. It is a sudden\nturning about.\n\n(5) During the empire Stoicism became merely a moral philosophy, but\neven in this form it was an impressive presentation of the noblest\nconvictions of antiquity. It prepared moral feeling for Christianity.\nThe more Stoicism became mere moralizing, the more the Cynic element in\nit dominated it. In the first and second centuries Cynicism was revived\nby wandering, garbed preachers, who went about affecting beggary and\nteaching morals.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER XII\n\n SKEPTICISM AND ECLECTICISM\n\n\n=The Appearances of Philosophic Skepticism.= We have now traced the\nhistory of the positive and dogmatic aspect of the Hellenic-Roman\nPeriod through its Ethical Division and far into the Religious Division\nof the Period. The influence of the ethical movement did not disappear\nuntil at least two centuries after the beginning of this era, and\nthe Schools themselves did not disappear until they were abolished\nby Justinian in 529 A. D. But the Ethical Period may be said to close\nat the beginning of this era, and even a century and a half before\nthat\u2015\u2015about 150 B. C.\u2015\u2015its positive and dogmatic character had been\nlost. Eclecticism appeared in the Schools, and the last one hundred\nand fifty years of the Ethical Period was in character transitional and\neclectic. This was caused by the growth and power of Skepticism, which\nwe have already pointed out as the undercurrent of the entire period.\nSkepticism was the fundamental frame of mind of the eight hundred years\nof this time. It was the negative side of the period in contrast with\nthe Schools. Philosophic Skepticism appeared contemporaneously with the\nrise of the New Schools at the very beginning of the Period, and the\ncontroversy between the Schools and Skepticism reached its height about\n150 B. C. What was the result? Did philosophy turn, as in the Age of\nPericles, back to greater triumphs in speculation? No; the world was no\nlonger virile and no longer possessed the creative impulse. On account\nof the attacks of Skepticism upon the Schools, philosophy dissolved\nitself first into eclecticism, and then later by the introduction\nof new elements from the East was superseded by religion. In the\nphilosophical sense, religion and eclecticism are both skeptical\u2015\u2015both\nhave doubts of the ability of the reason to reach truth. Eclecticism\nshows its Skepticism by doubting any one dogmatic scheme, and therefore\nit constructs a compromise of all; religion crowns faith in place of\nreason.\n\nPhilosophic Skepticism in these times did not appear except with\nreference to the doctrines of the Schools. It arose as merely polemical\nand antagonistic to the Schools\u2019 teaching. While the Skepticism\nof antiquity busied itself with the problem of knowledge, it was\nsuperficial compared with modern Skepticism. Ancient Skepticism did\nnot doubt that the object of knowledge existed; it did not doubt that\nthe object of knowledge is external and even material. It assumed that\nthings exist which, to the modern Skeptic, is the problem at issue.\n\nWe shall look now at the appearances of philosophic Skepticism, and the\neffect of this Skepticism upon the Schools in their turning to\neclecticism.\n\n=The Three Phases of Philosophic Skepticism.= These are three somewhat\nloosely connected appearances of Skepticism, and are determined in\ntheir character in large measure by the doctrines which they attacked.\n\n=1. The First Phase of Philosophic Skepticism is called Pyrrhonism=\n(from about 300 to 230 B. C.). This was a Skepticism _directed against\nthe assumptions of the philosophy of Aristotle_. From the dates above\nit will be seen to be contemporary with the founding of the Stoic\nand Epicurean Schools, at the very beginning of the period. The two\nrepresentatives were Pyrrho (365\u2013275 B. C.) of Elis and his pupil Timon\n(320\u2013230 B. C.) of Phlius. When Zeno had begun to teach in the Painted\nPorch and Epicurus in the Gardens, when Theophrastus had succeeded his\nmaster in the Lyceum and Polemo led the Academy, the Skeptic Pyrrho\nbegan his personal instruction in the city of Elis. Pyrrho had but\nlittle influence. He left no writings, and his doctrine became known\nto the ancients through his pupil, Timon, who was the literary exponent\nof this Skepticism. The teaching may be stated in the three following\nsentences: (1) We can know nothing of the nature of things, but\nonly of the states of feeling into which they put us; (2) The only\ncorrect attitude of mind is to withhold all judgment and restrain all\naction; (3) The result of this suspense of judgment is ataraxia or\nimperturbability. The Skeptic therefore sought the same internal peace\nfor which Stoic and Epicurean were seeking, but he was skeptical of\nthe Aristotelian metaphysics as an instrument to gain it. The opposite\nof any conclusion being equally plausible, suspense of judgment is the\nonly peace of mind.\n\nPyrrhonism reminded the age after Aristotle that the problem of the\ncertitude of knowledge is fundamental and must be settled before any\nphilosophy can be constructed. The School was short lived, and people\ndisposed to be skeptical joined the Academy.\n\n=2. The Second Period of Philosophic Skepticism\u2015\u2015The Skepticism of the\nAcademy= (280\u2013129 B. C.). The Middle Academy and its Skepticism was\ndirected particularly against the Stoic teaching that an \u201capprehensive\npresentation\u201d guaranteed its own truth by the conviction of immediate\ncertainty. The two most distinguished representatives of this Skeptical\nperiod of the Academy were Arcesilaus (315\u2013241 B. C.) and Carneades\n(214\u2013129 B. C.). Carneades must be mentioned particularly as a genius\nand a philosopher of great personal influence. \u201cHe was the greatest\nphilosopher of Greece in the four centuries from Chrysippus to Plotinus;\nindeed, in ability and depth of thought he surpassed Chrysippus.\u201d[38]\nCarneades was the most formidable opponent of the Stoics. He had\nlistened to the Stoic lecturers, had studied their writings, and had\nrefuted them on their own grounds in brilliant lectures of his own.\n\nThe Skepticism of the Academy arose somewhat in this way. The rivalry\nof the Porch and the Older Academy had grown apace and had been a\nbattle between two dogmatic Schools. The Academy was being worsted, its\nancient spirit was waning, and it had gradually deserted speculation\nfor ethics. Under Arcesilaus it was provoked to new life by the\naggressive dogmatism of the Stoics. Speculation, which it had ignored,\nit now began to antagonize openly. Arcesilaus, in directing his attack\nagainst the doctrine of \u201capprehensive presentation\u201d of the Stoics,\ncame to conclusions but slightly different from Pyrrho. Carneades laid\nout for himself a twofold task: (1) to refute all existing dogmas,\nand (2) to evolve a theory of probability as the basis for practical\nactivity. He applied his Skepticism not only to speculation, like\nArcesilaus, but also to ethics and religion.[39]\n\nThe Academy did not fully adopt Skepticism, but used it as a weapon\nagainst the Stoics. The Platonic tradition was kept alive within the\nSchool, and Skepticism made no advance in the Academy after Carneades.\nIt did not even continue in the path marked out by him. In the next\ngeneration the Academy became eclectic.\n\n=3. The Third Period of Philosophic Skepticism\u2015\u2015Sensationalistic\nSkepticism= (during two centuries or more of the Christian era). The\nchief representatives were \u00c6nesidemus of Cnossus (first century A. D.),\nAgrippa (about 200 A. D.), and Sextus Empiricus (about 200 A. D.).\n\nThis phase of Skepticism was represented mainly by physicians,\nwith arguments based upon empirical physiological grounds. When the\nAcademy passed from Skepticism to eclecticism, Skepticism became\ncentred in Alexandria. For two centuries before Galen (131\u2013201 A. D.)\ngreat discoveries had been made in medicine, but the meaning of the\ndiscoveries had not been apprehended. There was a general feeling\namong physicians of that time that there is no such thing as scientific\ncertainty; and skeptical arguments were constructed; based on the\nempirical discoveries of the scientific circle of Alexandria. While\nthe arguments of the Academy were mostly formal attacks against the\nStoics, this Skeptical School of physicians returned to Pyrrhonism,\nimmensely reinforced with scientific material. It strove in vain to\ndisassociate itself from the Academy, for it used in one way or another\nthe formal arguments of the Skeptics of the Academy. In his eight books\non Pyrrhonism, \u00c6nesidemus developed the reasons which induced Pyrrho\nto call in question the possibility of knowledge. These are known in\nphilosophy as the ten \u201ctropes,\u201d or ten ways of justifying doubt.[40]\nThey were badly arranged by \u00c6nesidemus and reduced to five by\nAgrippa.[41]\n\n=The Last Century and a Half of the Ethical Period.= (150 B. C.\u20131\nA. D.). =Eclecticism.=\u2015\u2015About 150 B. C. the Ethical Period became\neclectic. After 150 years of passionate controversy the Schools began\nto compromise their differences and fuse into one another. They no\nlonger emphasized their differences, but began to point to their common\nground of unity. This tendency to fusion applies only to the Lyceum,\nthe Academy, and the Porch. The Epicurean School was never a party\nto this eclecticism and always remained relatively stationary. The\nfusion occurred only in the teaching of the Schools and not in their\norganization. Externally the Schools remained separate bodies for six\nhundred years longer. In the second century Hadrian and the Antonines\nendowed separate chairs for them in the University of Athens. They\nwere not abolished as Schools until 529 A. D., by Justinian. Internally\ntheir independent growth lasted only during the two centuries down\nto the year 150 B. C. At this time their theoretic mission had been\ncompleted. Their internal history from 100 B. C. to 529 A. D. was one\nof compromise and adjustment. The year 150 B. C. is therefore important.\nAt this time the records of the Schools stop, controversy abates,\nStoicism and Epicureanism are introduced into Rome, and fusion of\ndoctrines begins.\n\nThe Stoic School was the first to incline to eclecticism. Its own\ndoctrine was a kind of fusion of incoherent parts, and among the\nSchools it could most easily welcome new doctrines. About 150 B. C.,\nunder the lead of Pan\u00e6tius and Posidonius, it adopted many of\nthe Platonic and Aristotelian teachings, tempered its own ethical\nrigorism, and extended its scientific interests. At the same time\nthe Peripatetics of the Lyceum united the pantheism of the Stoics to\ntheir own theism. After the death of Carneades in 129 B. C. the Academy\nturned from Skepticism back to the Platonic tradition, but it was a\nmeagre Platonism adulterated with many foreign elements. For example,\nAntiochus of Ascalon taught Cicero from the Academy at Athens in the\nwinter of 79\u201378 B. C. that Platonism and Aristotelianism were only\ndifferent aspects of the same doctrine.\n\nThere were two factors that prepared an easy way for the rapid spread\nof eclecticism. One was the growing Skepticism that was so fundamental\nin Hellenism, and the other was the adoption of Hellenic culture by\nthe Romans. Eclecticism is, after all, only another form of Skepticism.\nBoth exhibit the spirit of undecided conviction. Neither has regard\nfor the bonds of tradition, for both regard the individual superior to\nevery tradition or system. Eclecticism, indeed, attempts to reconcile\ndiffering systems; but in doing this it casts a doubt upon the\ninfallibility of them all only to a lesser degree than Skepticism. The\nspread of eclecticism was therefore only an extension from Greece of\nthe skeptical spirit upon the world, and the Roman world gave a glad\nwelcome to such a spirit. The Roman character was naturally eclectic.\nAfter his first aversion the Roman was hospitable to all philosophies\nand religions. In his practical way, undisturbed by philosophical\nhair-splittings, he selected from the different systems what was suited\nto his practical needs. Eclecticism found fertile ground in Roman\ncivilization.\n\nIn the Schools after the year 150 B. C. there appear many notable\nnames\u2015\u2015notable not because they contributed to the theoretic advance\nof philosophy, but for some other reason. In the Stoic School were\nPan\u00e6tius, Posidonius, and Bo\u00ebthus; and later Seneca, Epictetus, and\nMarcus Aurelius. Among the Academicians are Philo of Larissa and\nAntiochus; among the Peripatetics of the same century is Andronicus;\nand among the eclectic Platonists Plutarch is especially to be named;\nthese were all eclectics. The only one in this group of eclectics whom\nwe shall have time for a passing examination of is Cicero.\n\nM. Tullius Cicero (106\u201343 B. C.) listened to Greek philosophy in\nall the Schools in Athens and Rhodes. He read a good deal of Greek\nliterature, so that he had much philosophical material at his command.\nHe did not show much discretion in his selection of his material,\nbut he displayed a good deal of tact in using what the Roman people\nwould receive. The Greek mind spoke to the Roman through Cicero\u2019s\nvoice almost as though the Roman were speaking for himself. It must\nbe admitted that Cicero\u2019s acquaintance with Greek philosophy was on\nthe whole superficial, yet he was able to express certain aspects of\nGreek philosophy with clearness for contemporary Latin readers and\nfor many generations succeeding them. He prided himself in his ability\nto discuss both sides of a question without himself arriving at a\ndecision\u2015\u2015after the manner of the Middle Academy, of which he inscribed\nhimself as a member. His books appeared in rather rapid succession.\n\nCicero does not therefore owe his prominence as a philosopher so\nmuch to his own profound independence of thought as to his skill in\ntranslating Greek thought to the Roman people. His metaphysics is an\neclecticism that is at bottom a skepticism. In view of the existing\nphilosophical warfare, he despaired of metaphysical or absolutely\ncomplete knowledge. Yet upon ethical and religious questions he spoke\nin no undecided manner, for in these realms he felt that we have more\nthan merely probable evidence. Since he was unable to refute Skepticism\nin a scientific way, he took refuge in the immediate certainty of\nconsciousness in all matters that pertain to morals and religion. There\nare certain ideas common to all men. These have not so much been taught\nto all men by nature as they are inborn in all. They are convictions\nimplanted in us; there is a common human consciousness from which they\nare derived, and they are confirmed by universal opinion. Ethical and\nreligious consciousness thus rests on immediate certainty. Man has\nthe innate ideas of duty, immortality, and God. Our belief in God\u2019s\nexistence is supported by the teleological argument for Providence\nand divine government. The high dignity of man rests upon this innate\nconviction of freedom and immortality. Cicero shows his eclecticism\nby moderating the Stoic doctrine of virtue: virtue in itself is _vita\nbeata_, but virtue plus happiness is _vita beatissima_. Unoriginal\nand eclectic as Cicero\u2019s philosophical position may be, it is of great\nimportance to the student of Roman history.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER XIII\n\n THE RELIGIOUS PERIOD (100 B. C.\u2013476 A. D.)\n\n\n=The Two Causes of the Rise of Religious Feeling.= There were two\ncauses for the turn of the time from its interest in individual\npractical ethics to religion. The first was an inner cause within\nthe nature of the ethical philosophy of the Schools. The rise of the\nreligious and the supernatural was the culmination of the undercurrent\nof skepticism in the validity of reason, which we found growing\nrapidly in the Ethical Period. The more the Schools grew alike in\ntheir teaching, the less were they able to assure their disciples\nof any certain insight into virtue and happiness. The Ethical Period\nended in eclecticism, and this was the impeachment of the authority\nof each School. The Schools examined their dogmatic assumptions.\nThe fundamental inner conviction grew stronger that the intellect of\nman is self-inconsistent: so inconsistent as to be undependable; so\ninconsistent as not to vouchsafe man the virtue and happiness which the\nSchools had promised. As Skepticism became more strongly intrenched,\nthe imperturbable self-certainty of the Wise Man became shaken, the\nEthical Period disappeared, and the Religious Period was born. Belief\nin the authority of the supernatural superseded belief in the authority\nof the reason.\n\nThe second cause may be called external, and was the introduction\nof many eastern religions into the empire. It has been common to\nexaggerate the vices of the Romans of the first Christian centuries,\nand to point to the corruption of the times as the cause of the great\nrise of religions.[42] No doubt, in the city of Rome and other large\ncities the populations were very licentious and corrupt. But this\nwas not the case with the people in the small municipalities and the\ncountry. The people were united in peace under one government. There\nwas great commercial prosperity and widespread travel. Education\nprospered. The religion of the Romans, however, long since decadent,\nhad become an object of derision. All faith in it had been lost,\nand magicians and romancers had a large patronage. The inner life of\nman demanded some external spiritual authority to satisfy it, and,\nfinding it could not be satisfied in the realm of sense, turned to\nthe supersensuous. It was an age of universal superstitions, reported\nmiracles, and the multiplying of myths. In the realm of the religious\nemotions everything was in flux. Even the Greek philosophies\u2015\u2015the Stoic,\nthe Platonic, the Cynic, and the neo-Pythagorean\u2015\u2015show it in their\nemphasis upon renunciation in practical life. In place of the Grecian\nlove for earthly existence, a longing for the mysterious was growing\ninto a feverish desire for strange and mysterious cults. A great\nreligious movement possessed the nations of the empire, and into\nRoman civilization of the first century A. D. there streamed many new\nreligions. From the Orient came the Mithra, Magna Mater, Star Worship,\nIsis and Osiris, and many others. These mingled with the western\nreligions, and their rivalry was energetic for the possession of men\u2019s\nspirits. The Roman people were hospitable to all religions, and Rome\nbecame a religious battleground. With the interest turned from earthly\nto heavenly things, salvation from trouble seemed to lie in the\nsupernatural.\n\n=The Need of Spiritual Authority.= Thus the complacent Ethical Period\ngave way to the cry for some authority in morals and science. Man\nwas no longer confident that he could attain present happiness or his\nsoul\u2019s salvation by his own strength. He turned for help both to the\nreligious tradition of the past and to the revelation that might come\nto him in the present. The authority in either was practically the same;\nfor the past was only the crystallization of an ever-present divine\nspirit. Yet present and past revelations differ in their credentials:\nthe present revelation is an immediate illumination of the spirit; the\npast is presented in historic records. The Alexandrian school accepted\nboth forms of revelation as the highest source of knowledge.\n\nThe demand for supernatural authority found expression in many\ncurious ways. It is notorious that at this time the writings and oral\ntraditions of the past were greatly interpolated. The philosophers of\nthe first century thought that they themselves could get a hearing only\nby inserting their own doctrines into the writings of Plato, Aristotle,\nand other heroes of the past. Thus the neo-Pythagoreans invented\na halo of wisdom for Pythagoras in order to give their own sect its\ncredentials. The demand for authority culminated in the attempt to\ntrace the entire civilization of the time to some religious source.\nPhilo on the one side, and the Gnostics on the other, found that Greek\nand Hebrew history have a common religious origin. Greek thought was\nfound in the Oriental writings. The Greek sages were placed by the\nside of the Old Testament heroes. The canon of the Christians is full\nof cross-references\u2015\u2015the Old Testament giving historical authority to\nthe New Testament, the New Testament giving to the Old Testament the\nsupport of immediate revelation. There came into vogue what was called\n\u201callegorical interpretation,\u201d according to which an historical document\ncould be given two interpretations (or more)\u2015\u2015a literal interpretation\nand a spiritual interpretation. The documents were supposed to have\na body and a soul. The literal interpretation was of the body of the\ndocuments and suitable for the people; the spiritual interpretation\nwas the more liberal interpretation of the soul of the document and\nsuitable for philosophers.\n\nAt the same time a vast number of writings appeared as historical\nrevelations. It was necessary to separate the true from the false,\nbut this could not be done by the individual without injuring the very\nprinciple upon which revelation was supposed to rest. Consequently all\nknowledge was generally regarded as revelation. For example, Plutarch\nand the Stoics divided revelation into three classes: poetry, law,\nand philosophy. Although Plutarch disclaimed open superstitions, he\nnevertheless accepted as true all sorts of miracles and prophecies.\nThe later neo-Platonists are also examples of the great body of those\nwho made no discrimination as to what revelation is true. The Christian\nchurch may be said to have been alone in making a criticism of the\nrecords, and in setting up as criteria tradition and historically\naccredited authority. As a result of its criticism the Christian\ncanon was finally decided upon, and the Old and New Testaments were\naccepted as alone inspired. The rivals of the church\u2015\u2015the Alexandrian\nphilosophies, especially neo-Platonism\u2015\u2015had no organization that could\ndecide upon a canon. They were consequently at a disadvantage, but they\nfelt no need of an infallible historical authority or of historical\ncriticism. Revelation to them was any immediate illumination of the\nindividual. The individual man who comes in contact with the Deity\nhas possession of the divine truth. Although only few attain the\ntruth, and these only at rare moments, there is nevertheless no way of\ndetermining what is fictitious and what is true. This difference in the\nconception of inspiration between the neo-Platonists and the Christians\nis important to note, for it marks an important difference in the\ntwo greatest intellectual movements of the next thousand years. The\nchurch fixed revelation on the basis of historical authority, and this\nrevelation became the source of the scholasticism of the Middle Ages;\nneo-Platonism left the individual man free to get revelation from any\nsource through his own personal contact with the divine, and this was\nthe basis of the mysticism of the Middle Ages.\n\n=The Rise of the Conception of Spirituality.= We have seen that out\nof the widespread cry for spiritual help came the demand for spiritual\nauthority. There is also another result,\u2015\u2015the increased importance\nin history of the spiritual personality. The men of the past became\nheroes, the great men sanctified and surrounded with myths. Hero\nworship, ancestor worship, the worship of the genius of the emperor\ninaugurated by Augustus, were part of this movement. Disciples began\nto have unconditional trust in their masters, and in neo-Platonism this\nworship culminated in veneration for the leaders of the School. This\nmovement appears in the grandest form in history in the impression of\nthe wonderful personality of Jesus Christ.\n\nThe next step was to regard personality as the revelation of the\ndivine Logos. Personality is the cosmic reason. Nature and history\nare kinds of general revelations, but special revelations require\ngreat personalities\u2015\u2015Moses, the prophets, the Greek scientists, and\nespecially Jesus who was the Messiah, the Son of God. The power that\nthese personalities exhibit must be a revelation, and not the working\nof the human reason, for the human unaided reason deals only with\nsensations, and is incapable of gaining divine truth. The reason needs\nthe divine to illuminate it. The great personalities are therefore\nthe repositories of powers that make them different from ordinary men.\nTheir revelations are above, and sometimes opposed to, the conclusions\nof ordinary reason. Thus personalities themselves are divided by\nreligious dualism, and in them the human and divine are far apart.\nMoreover, the more great personalities were apotheosized, the more\nthe common run of humanity was depreciated. Then distinction was\nmade between great personalities. At first, when authority was sought\neverywhere, all great personalities were supposed to have divine\nrevelation; later, when the lines were drawn between the Christian\nand other beliefs, only the Christian leaders were considered by the\nChristians to be instruments of the divine.\n\nThis spiritualizing of historical personalities laid the emphasis\nmore than ever before upon the dualism in all human beings. All men\nare ensnared in the world of sense, and they can attain knowledge\nof the higher world only through the illumination of their higher\nnatures. Aristotle alone among the Greeks had had a clear conception\nof spirituality, but he had conceived spirituality as applied solely to\nGod. He had not conceived God to be a person. But the Stoic antithesis\nof reason and what is contrary to reason, and the Platonic antithesis\nof the supersensuous and the sensuous, had marked off _in man_ the\ninner personal nature of man as withdrawn into itself and set over\nagainst his sensuous nature. The more this ethical dualism became a\nreligious dualism, the more the conception of spiritual personality was\nextended to all human beings. Its most refined expression was in the\nChristian conception of the soul.\n\n=The Revival of Platonism.= The Platonism of the Academy had had\nlittle influence in the Ethical Period and its tradition had been\nbarely kept alive. The Middle Academy had been skeptical and the\nNew Academy eclectic. The Religious Period, on the other hand, was\nthoroughly Platonic, and Plato from this time until the Crusades became\nthe ruling philosophical power. For three hundred years his influence\nhad been nothing; for the next twelve hundred he dominated men\u2019s\nminds, so far as any philosopher could in religious times. When the\nWise Man vanished from philosophy, and the expectation of spiritual\nblessedness took its place, when Skepticism drove men from ethics,\nfirst to eclecticism and then to theology, when philosophy passed\nto mysticism\u2015\u2015then did Platonism, with its antithesis between the\nsensible and the supersensible, come to its own. Of all the historical\nphilosophies it could best amalgamate all religions. Platonism\n(1) absorbed Oriental religions, (2) furnished a didactic form for\nChristianity, (3) recreated itself into the mystic neo-Platonism. The\nworld-longing for the supernatural found its best medium in Platonism.\nWhen the Wise Man vanished, the mystic priest appeared.\n\n=The Divisions of the Religious Period.= Out of the seething religious\ntimes at the beginning of this era, there emerged two distinct currents\nof thought that extended through the entire length of the Religious\nPeriod, and carried down into the Middle Ages all the culture that\nthe medi\u00e6val possessed. The two movements were (1) the religious\nphilosophies of the still persistent Hellenic civilization, and\n(2) the new-born Christian religion, which was destined to determine\nthe future of the western people. If we scrutinize these two movements\nwe shall find that each has its introductory and its development stages,\nand at the point of division in each stands a great leader who was\ninstrumental in bringing about the transition. The great neo-Platonist,\nPlotinus (204\u2013269), marks the division line in the Hellenic movement;\nthe Christian, Origen (185\u2013254), marks the division line in theological\nChristianity. While these men were contemporaries, we shall take,\nfor various reasons, the year 200 as the date of division of the\nChristian movement, and the year 250 as the date of division of the\nHellenic movement. The first stage of each movement we shall call its\nIntroductory Period, and the second its Development Period.\n\nDuring their Introductory Periods the two movements tried to draw\ntogether under the influence of the philosophical eclecticism which\ncolors this time. In their Development Periods the two movements\ndraw apart, become closed and mutually repellent. The historical\ndevelopments of the two movements from beginning to end are very\ndifferent. The tide of Hellenism floods with Plotinus, its greatest\nrepresentative, and after him there is a gradual ebb. On the other hand,\nChristianity shows a continuous growth, both internally and externally,\nand the mighty Origen only points to the mightier Augustine. Both\nmovements finally merge in Augustine.\n\n I. Hellenic Religious II. Christianity.\n Philosophy.\n 1. Introductory Period Introductory Period\n (100 B. C.\u2013250 A. D.). (31 A. D.\u2013200 A. D.).\n\n (1) Greek-Jewish philosophy (1) Period of simple faith (until\n of Alexandria. the 2d century A. D.).\n Philo (25 B. C.\u201350\n A. D.).\n\n (2) Neo-Pythagoreanism (2) Period of Earlier Formulation\n (100 B. C.\u2013150 A. D.). of Doctrine.\n Apologists (2d century).\n Gnostics (2d century).\n Old Catholic Theologians\n (2d and 3d centuries).\n\n 2. Development Period Development Period (200\u2013476).\n (250\u2013476).\n Neo-Platonism. (1) Period of Actual Formulation\n Plotinus (204\u2013269). of Doctrine.\n Jamblichus (d. 330 about). The School of Catechists.\n Proclus (410\u2013485). Origen (185\u2013254).\n\n (2) The \u0152cumenical Councils and\n the establishment of dogma.\n\n=The Hellenic Religious Philosophies.= Alexandria and not Athens was\nnow the intellectual centre of Hellenism. The position and history\nof the city, as well as the character of its population, were most\nfavorable for the mingling of religions and philosophies. In the\n\u201cuniversity\u201d of this great commercial metropolis the treasures of Greek\nculture were concentrated and scholastic work was vigorously pursued.\nHere all philosophies met, and all religions and cults were tolerated.\nExhausted Greek philosophy here came in contact with those fresh\nOriental ideas which previously, at a distance, had excited the\nimagination of the Greeks as something mysterious. The result was a new\nphase of philosophy,\u2015\u2015theosophy, comparative religion, or eclecticism\nof philosophy and religion.\n\nIn no instance were the authors of these religious philosophies Greeks.\nThe philosophy of Philo was a Hellenism, but the Hellenism of a Jew.\nNeo-Pythagoreanism seems to have had representatives from every country\nexcept the motherland of Greece. The author of neo-Platonism was\nborn in Egypt. Of the two introductory movements, the Greek-Jewish\nphilosophy accorded more with Oriental life, neo-Pythagoreanism with\nGreek life. Both go back to the principles that were fundamental in the\nPythagorean mysteries.\n\n=The Introductory Period of Hellenic Religious Philosophy= (100\nB. C.\u2013250 A. D.). =The Turning to the Past for Spiritual Authority.=\n\n=1. The Greek-Jewish Philosophy of Philo.= The Jews lived in great\nnumbers in Alexandria, and many of them were wealthy and influential.\nIn Alexandria the Old Testament had been translated into Greek, and\nthrough it the Greeks had become acquainted with the religion of the\nJews. While the Old Testament contained the philosophy of the Jews,\nthese Alexandrian Jews had learned in Alexandria to admire greatly the\nphilosophy of the Greeks. So great was their admiration that they soon\nconceived Plato to be in their Law and their Law in Plato. They argued\nthat since the Old Testament was their revelation, all the best Greek\nphilosophy must be in the Old Testament. The Alexandrian Jews used\nGreek conceptions wherever they found them; and this tendency toward\neclecticism appeared as early as 160 B. C. in Aristobulus and Aristeas.\nAt that time these Jews used Greek philosophy in interpreting the Old\nTestament and employed the \u201callegorical method of interpretation.\u201d\nThis eclectic tendency was brought to completion by Philo (25 B. C.\u201350\nA. D.), who was the most notable philosopher of this time. Philo was\nguided in his eclecticism by some such rules as these: (1) Revelation\nis the highest possible authority and includes the best of Greek\nthought; (2) Greek philosophy is derived from the fundamental\nprinciples of the Old Testament; (3) Jewish revelation is expressed\nin symbols, while Greek philosophy is expressed in concepts.\n\nPhilo\u2019s teaching contains, in unsymmetrical form, both Stoicism and\nPlatonism, and in it can be found the seeds of all that grew up in\nChristian soil. His philosophy was a bridge from the philosophy of\nJudaism to Christian theology. It has been called a \u201cbuffer\u201d philosophy.\n\nGod is the ultimate cause of the world, but He is so transcendent that\nHe can be described only in negative terms. This method of defining God\ngot the name in later times of \u201cnegative theology.\u201d It was the common\nmethod in these Alexandrian days. God is absolutely inconceivable and\ninexpressible to man; to Himself He is \u201cI am who am.\u201d The goodness of\nGod impelled Him, and His power enabled Him, to create the world. From\nthis point of view Philo is a monist. But in man reason and sense meet.\nMan\u2019s soul is from God, but his sense-body is from matter, and from\nthis point of view Philo is a dualist. Matter is outside God. God is\nso transcendent that He cannot come in contact with matter, and so He\ncreated the world and rules the world through mediators or \u201cpotencies.\u201d\nThese \u201cpotencies\u201d are the same as the Ideas of Plato, the \u201creasons\u201d\nof the Stoics, the numbers of the Pythagoreans, the angels of the Old\nTestament, or the d\u00e6mons of popular mythology. The sum-total of God\u2019s\nactivity in the world was called by Philo the Logos. Philo speaks of\nthe Logos in two ways: sometimes as the plural number of teleological\nforces in the world; sometimes as the unity of these forces, \u201cthe\nfirst begotten of God,\u201d \u201cthe second God,\u201d \u201cthe son of God.\u201d The Logos\nrepresents the first attempt to overcome the dualism between matter and\nGod. The Logos is the high priest standing between God and the world.\nIt is the everlasting revelation of God\u2019s presence. Philo\u2019s world is\nmade by God and not by others, and is the expression of God\u2019s thought\nin infinite forms and forces. God is not defiled by coming into contact\nwith matter. God gives orders, the Logos obeys. Philo believed in\ntransmigration of souls, and to him the most important problem is, How\nthe spirit can become like God. The answer is (1) by the acquirement of\nthe Stoic apathy, (2) by possessing the Aristotelian dianoetic virtues,\n(3) by complete absorption in God.\n\n=2. Neo-Pythagoreanism.= The history of Pythagoreanism is extremely\nvaried. Its body of doctrine from epoch to epoch was continually\nchanging. The only characteristic common to its entire history was\nits practical tendency toward asceticism and its affiliation with the\nMysteries. Let us review the history of Pythagoreanism down to the\ntime of neo-Pythagoreanism. In 510 B. C., at the battle of Crotona,\nthe early band of Pythagoreans was dispersed, and about 504 B. C.\nPythagoras died. His scattered followers formed a school centring at\nThebes around the philosophy of numbers, and this school lasted until\n350 B. C. In 350 B. C. Pythagoreanism no longer existed as a school,\nfor its members had either joined the Academy or formed one of the\nMysteries. In 100 B. C. Pythagoreanism again emerged under the name\nof neo-Pythagoreanism, and this is the body which we meet in the\nintroductory stage of the Religious Period. Alexandria was its centre,\nbut it drew its disciples from every part of the earth. Among them\nApollonius alone rises as a distinct figure. He was widely known,\nfor he traveled everywhere as a religious teacher and wonder-worker.\nOther neo-Pythagoreans were P. Nigidius Figulus, a friend of Cicero,\nSotion, a friend of the Sextians, Moderatus of Gades, and in later\ntimes Nicomachus of Gerasa and Numenius of Apamea. Another, and rather\nnumerous group, allied to the neo-Pythagoreans, should be mentioned\nhere. These were the so-called Eclectic Platonists, the representatives\nof whom were Plutarch (50\u2013125 A. D.), and Celsus (about 200 A. D.),\nthe opponent of Christianity. The only important difference between\nthe neo-Pythagoreans and the Eclectic Platonists was that the former\nreferred to Pythagoras as their religious model, and the latter to\nPlato. Both were mystical, ascetic, and eclectic.\n\nNeo-Pythagoreanism first became noticeable in the first century\nB. C., on account of the great number of writings appearing under the\nnames of Pythagoras and Philolaus. About these there arose a large\nneo-Pythagorean literature,\u2015\u2015about ninety treatises by fifty authors.\nThe writings under the name of Pythagoras were, for many centuries,\nthe cause of the misconception of the true teaching of the original\nPythagoras. The advent of the neo-Pythagorean literature marks\nthe return at Alexandria to the older systems of thought, and is\ncoincident with the learned literary investigations in the University\nof Alexandria. The particular revival of Pythagoreanism in the form\nof neo-Pythagoreanism came at the same time with the renewal of the\nHomeric form of poetry.\n\nNeo-Pythagoreanism, as its history shows, is the philosophy of\na half-religious sect with ascetic tendencies. Its transcendental\nphilosophy was better suited to a people under an autocratic government,\nand ruled by Oriental traditions, than was the ethical teaching of the\nfour Schools. The system of the ethical Schools arose out of the needs\nof the individual; but at this time the cry was for an absolute object\nwhich transcends both the individual and nature. The demand was for a\ngod who could be served not by sacrifice, but by silent prayer, wisdom,\nand virtue. There are many points of similarity between the doctrine of\nPhilo and neo-Pythagoreanism. The neo-Pythagoreans were monotheistic,\nbut at the same time they accepted within their monotheism the\nhierarchy of the gods. They held to the commonly accepted doctrines of\ntheir time, viz., the transmigration of the soul, the dualism of the\nmind and body, the mediation of a graded series of celestial beings\nbetween man and God. They interpreted God in a spiritual way, but they\nconceived the ideas in God\u2019s mind to be the Pythagorean numbers\u2015\u2015just\nas Philo conceived them to be the Old Testament angels.\n\n=The Development Period of Hellenic Religious Philosophy= (250\u2013476\nA. D.). =The Turning to the Present for Spiritual Authority. Platonism\nand Neo-Platonism.= Neo-Platonism is the final statement of Hellenic\nculture, and the question may be asked, In what form did it present\nHellenism? The answer is, It sets forth the Hellenic feeling as\n_mysticism_. The contribution of Plotinus was the destruction of\nthe classic Greek ideal with its definiteness of form, and was the\nsubstitution of a new ideal of soaring spiritual exaltation. One has\nonly to look back to the art, science, and philosophy of the Periclean\nAge to appreciate how far this last survival of Greek culture had\ndrifted from its original moorings. Nevertheless, neo-Platonism is\nnot so very far distant from that powerful ascetic principle in the\nGreek mysteries which is one aspect of the doctrine of Plato himself.\nNeo-Platonism was Platonism exaggerated on this mystic and ascetic\nside. Plotinus said that he was ashamed that he had a body; that the\nsoul looks on and weeps at the sinfulness of the body; that it is not\nenough to regulate the body, but that the body must be exterminated.\nAs the voice of Hellenism, neo-Platonism is speaking in an age when\nconsciousness is weighed down with the sense of the enormity of evil\nand the need of salvation. Neo-Platonism feels that the moral conflict\nin the human soul is repeated in the universe; that the eternal\nstruggle between matter and spirit goes on in the macrocosm as well\nas the microcosm. Plotinus held to the ancient Greek conception of\nthe personification of the powers of nature, of the derivation of\nhappiness from activity, of the supremacy of the intellect over the\nother faculties. But in accepting the ancient Greek doctrine of the\nsubordination of man to the universe, he conceived man to be absorbed\nby the universe.\n\n=Neo-Platonism and the Two Introductory Philosophies.= Neo-Platonism,\ntherefore, shares in the mysticism of the philosophies of Philo and\nthe neo-Pythagoreans. All three teach the transcendence of God; all\nthree were metaphysically monistic and ethically dualistic; all three\nconceive the existence of intermediaries between God and man. The\nintroductory philosophies sought to build eclectic doctrines, while\nneo-Platonism became eclectic only in its last phases. Plotinus\nconstructed a positive and original philosophy, and among the three\nsystems the teaching of Plotinus is carefully worked out. Indeed,\nPlotinus is by far the greatest thinker of this religious period. In\nthe philosophy of Plotinus the relations between man and God are given\na more \u00e6sthetic character, and the doctrine of immediate experience\nis more carefully discussed and has greater importance than in\nneo-Pythagoreanism and the teaching of Philo.\n\n=Neo-Platonism and Christianity.= Neo-Platonism and Christianity have\none thing at least in common. They have the same problem,\u2015\u2015how to\nspiritualize the universe. This was the problem that both Plotinus and\nOrigen attempted to work out. With the development of the consciousness\nof spiritual personality and the need of a revelation, the Divine\nseemed to both to be correspondingly farther away. God is unknown\nand incomprehensible, and so pure that He cannot come in contact with\nearthly existence. What, then, is the bond between the heavenly and\nthe earthly? From the point of view of cosmology and of ethics, neither\nsucceeded in overcoming the dualism. The sensuous was regarded as\nalien to God, and as a thing from which the spirit must free itself.\nMetaphysically their efforts to construct a spiritual monism were more\nsuccessful, but their efforts were along different lines. The Christian\nconceived the universe of God and matter to be bound together by the\nprinciple of love; the neo-Platonist, by a series of countless grades\nof beings in diminishing perfections from the All-perfect. Then again,\nto the neo-Platonist the question of the return of man to God was a\nquestion of the personal inner experience of the individual; to the\nChristian theologian it was included in the larger problem of the\nhistorical process by which the whole human race is redeemed. Thus the\nmetaphysical solution of each works out differently and with different\nfactors.\n\nBoth neo-Platonic and Christian theology tried to prove that their\nrespective religious convictions were the only true source of salvation.\nBoth originated in the Alexandrian School. Christian theology was\npreceded by the fantastic system of the Gnostics, as Plotinus was\npreceded by the Pythagoreans and Philo. In their development the\ndifferences between the two appear. Christianity was supported by a\nchurch organization which had an internal vitality and a regulative\npower; neo-Platonism was supported and regulated by individuals,\nwithout organization, who had assimilated every faith. Christian\ntheology was founded on a faith that had already expanded, while\nneo-Platonism was at the beginning an erudite religion that tried\nto develop an extended faith and, incidentally, later to assimilate\nother cults. Outwardly neo-Platonism, as the final stand of the pagan\nworld to save itself from destruction, was unsuccessful in that it\nfailed to perpetuate itself as an organization. Really it achieved a\nmarked success. Not only did it live a long life of two hundred and\nfifty years, but it also lived in the development of its antagonist,\nChristianity. For neo-Platonism, by the irony of fate, was one of the\nimportant factors that entered into the building up and strengthening\nof Christianity. In its lingering death-struggle Hellenism was creating\nthe conceptions that the Christian, Augustine, later employed in\nshaping Christian theology for the Middle Ages.\n\n=The Periods of Neo-Platonism.=\n\n (1) The Alexandrian School\u2015\u2015about 240.\n Neo-Platonism presented as a Scientific Theory.\n The leader was Plotinus (204\u2013269).\n (2) The Syrian School\u2015\u2015about 310.\n The Attempt to Systematize all Polytheisms.\n The leader was Jamblichus (d. about 330).\n (3) The Athenian School\u2015\u2015about 450.\n The Recapitulation of Greek Philosophy.\n The leader was Proclus (410\u2013485).\n\n=The Alexandrian School. The Scientific Theory of Neo-Platonism. The\nLife and Writings of Plotinus= (204\u2013269 A. D.). Plotinus was born in\nLycopolis in Egypt, and received his education in Alexandria, under\nAmmonius Saccas, who was Origen\u2019s teacher. He campaigned with the\nemperor, Gordian, against the Persians, in order to pursue scientific\nstudies in the East. He was especially interested in the Persian\nreligion. In this way Plotinus became acquainted at first hand\nwith the mysticism of the Orient. In 244 he appeared at Rome as a\nteacher, and was received with great \u00e9clat by the people, and in the\nhighest circles he gained the most reverent recognition. His school\ncontained representatives from all nations and from almost every\ncalling,\u2015\u2015physicians, rhetoricians, poets, senators, an emperor and\nempress. Plotinus lived in a country estate in Campania, and he almost\nsucceeded in inducing the emperor to found a city of philosophers\nin Campania. It was to be called Platonopolis and, with Plato\u2019s\nRepublic as a model, it was to be an Hellenic cloister for religious\ncontemplation. The literary activity of Plotinus occurred in his old\nage, and he wrote nothing until after he was fifty. His works consisted\nof fifty-four _Corpuscles_ which his pupil, Porphyry, combined into\nsix _Enneads_. For the next three hundred years his school became the\ncentre of the Hellenic movement\u2015\u2015the centre of science, philosophy,\nand literature. The literature of neo-Platonism was enormous, on\naccount of the many commentaries on the philosophy of Plato within the\nneo-Platonic circle.\n\n=The General Character of the Teaching of Plotinus.= There is a great\ndivision of opinion about the value of the teaching of Plotinus,\nfor he drew his philosophy only in the broadest outlines, and he\nmade no attempt to advance from a general view of the world to exact\nknowledge of it. Intellectually his philosophy is an abstraction; and\nyet emotionally, in an intimate way, it touched deeply an age weary\nwith culture. Thus one can see how the actual achievement of Plotinus\nwas small, but how at the same time its force and influence was very\ngreat. It was a religious teaching which rose to magnificent heights of\ncontemplation from miserable intellectual surroundings. Nevertheless,\nthe philosophy of Plotinus was an extreme form of intellectualism\u2015\u2015it\nwas an intellectual ennobling and transforming of religion. The earlier\nphilosophy had supported the happiness of the individual by offers of\ninfinitude; but Plotinus thought of the individual as never isolated\nfrom the Infinite, but as always longing for the Infinite. Fellowship\nwith God is knowledge of Him, but it is knowledge of a peculiar kind.\nIt is enthusiasm, intuition, ecstasy. There is a chasm between man and\nGod, which Plotinus would bridge by placing reality so deeply within\nconsciousness as to annihilate all antitheses and contradictions. Thus\nthis deep reality below consciousness is cosmic and not human; and the\nreligion of Plotinus is cosmocentric and not anthropocentric. Plotinus\nintensifies and summarizes Greek culture in order to consolidate and\ndefend it. But in thus thinking out the Greek conceptions to their\nlogical completeness, those conceptions collapse.\n\n=The Mystic God.= There are two characteristics that distinguish the\nmystic God of Plotinus.\n\n1. The first characteristic is the supra-consciousness of God. God\nis the indefinable, original Being who is above all antitheses. He is\n_supra_-everything, even _supra_-conscious. Nothing can be attributed\nto Him, not even thought or will, for these imply two elements and God\nis a unity. Any description of Him must be in negative terms (\u201cnegative\ntheology\u201d). If we speak of Him as the One, the First, the Cosmic Cause,\nGoodness, or as Light, we are only relatively and not really describing\nHim. God is present in all, yet He is not divided; He is the source\nof all, and yet He himself is perfectly finished. In his conception\nof God as compared to the world, Plotinus added the realm of the\nsupra-conscious and the sub-conscious to the conscious.\n\n2. In the second place Plotinus conceived God in His relation to the\nworld in the terms of _dynamic pantheism_. This is a pantheism of a\npeculiar type. God does not create the world; the world is not the\nact of His will; nor is the world the result of a transference of part\nof His nature. In ordinary pantheism the world is a diffusion of the\nsubstance of God and the whole is static. Not so in the teaching of\nPlotinus! God permeates the world by His activity, and the world is\ndynamic through and through. But this dynamic activity of God must not\nbe conceived as an historical or time process. _The process is timeless.\nIt is a process of essence or worth._ The grades in the process are\nthose of _significance or value_. All are within the all-embracing\nunity of God and each particular draws its life from Him. _This is\ncalled the theory of emanations._ Plotinus used the figure which\nmystics have always employed in this connection,\u2015\u2015the figure of the\nsun and its rays of light in the darkness. The rays become less and\nless intense with the increasing distance from the Godhead, until they\nend in darkness. The process is an overflowing from the Godhead in\nwhich the Godhead remains unchanged.\n\n=The Two Problems of Plotinus.= Starting with this conception of the\nGodhead as a dynamic contentless Being, Plotinus is bound to explain\nthe world of sense-phenomena. His problem is twofold: he must explain\nthe sequence of phenomena from the Godhead, which is the metaphysical\nproblem; he must explain how man, living in the world of sense, can\nrise to communion with the Godhead, which is the ethical problem.\nMetaphysics and ethics are to Plotinus in inverted parallelism.\n\n=The World of Emanations.\u2015\u2015The Metaphysical Problem of Plotinus.= The\naim of Plotinus in this is to construct a metaphysical monism out of\nthe dualistic factors which had so long been present in Greek thought.\nThe two fundamental principles upon which he raised his structure were\n(1) his dynamic series of emanations, and (2) his conception of matter\nas entirely negative. The highest Being, God, by an excess of energy\nor goodness, has the natural impulse to create something similar to\nhimself. This creative impulse exists in each creature in turn and the\nmovement propagates itself. Stage is added to stage in a descending\nseries, until the impulse dies out in non-Being as the limit. The\nordinary pantheism of co-existence of phenomena is transformed into\na succession of stages of values, and all make up a harmony of more or\nless distinct copies of God. There are three steps in which the process\nof emanation proceeds,\u2015\u2015spirit, soul, and matter.\n\n_The Spirit or Nous_ is the first emanation from the One in point of\nsignificance. It is the image of the One sent forth by its overflow of\nenergy. This image involuntarily turns toward its original, the One,\nand in beholding it becomes Spirit, Nous, or intellectual consciousness.\nIt turns to the One and recognizes itself as the image of the One. Thus,\nin the first degree away from God, the duality of thinker as subject,\nand of the thing thought as object, appears. The unconsciousness of\nthe One is thus contrasted with consciousness, and the dual nature\nof consciousness is thus brought out; and for the first time an exact\nformulation of the psychological conception of consciousness is given.\n\nThe Nous is a unitary function of the One, like the Logos of Philo. At\nthe same time the Nous contains within itself, as content, the Platonic\nIdeas or arch-types of individuals. These Ideas are not mere thoughts,\nbut have their own existence. The Nous is their unity, however, just\nas a unity exists for the theorems of a science. These Ideas are pure\nintellectual potencies and the final causes of the world of nature.\n\n_The Soul_ is the second degree removed from the One. It stands in the\nsame relation to the Nous as the Nous to the Godhead. The Soul belongs\nto the world of light, but it stands just on the boundaries of the\nworld of darkness. It is the image of an image and therefore doubly\ndual,\u2015\u2015it consists of a higher or world-soul and the lesser souls.\nThe world-soul is divided into two forces,\u2015\u2015the formative power of the\nworld, and the body of the world. Individual souls are divided into the\nsupersensible or intellectual soul (the part that has pre-existence\nand undergoes metamorphosis), and the sensible part which has built up\nthe body as an instrument of its working power. The soul is present in\nall parts of its body. The individual souls are called _plastic forces_.\n\n_Matter_ is the emanation which is most distant from the One. The\nNous is the emanation of the One, the world-soul is the emanation from\nthe Nous, individual souls are a kind of intermediate emanation from\nthe world-soul, and matter is the emanation of the individual souls.\nThat is to say, the world-soul, with the forces that are native to it,\ngenerates matter and then, by uniting itself through its forces with\nmatter, produces the world of corporeal things. _What is the character\nof matter_ with which the world-soul forms this union? _It is space._\nSpace conditions all earthly existence. It is the same as Plato\u2019s\nconception of the absolutely negative non-Being and the merely possible.\nIt is absolute sterility, entirely evil and devoid of good. Matter has\nno dualistic independence of the One. _What is the character of the\nnature world?_ It has the same character and quality as the formative\nforces that unite with this negative matter\u2015\u2015it is no more and no\nless eternal. The world of nature to Plotinus is one of magic, and\nnot merely teleological. He says that the heavens are the union of a\nperfect soul with matter; the stars are the visible gods united with\nmatter; the powers of the air and sky are d\u00e6mons, which mediate between\nthe stars and the souls of men, united with matter; the body of man\nis the human soul united with matter; inorganic nature is the lowest\nof the plastic forces united with matter. Wherever there is matter\n(space), there is found imperfection and limitation and evil. Man as\nan individual is sympathetically and mysteriously bound to all parts\nof the universe. Scientific investigation of nature is entirely ruled\nout by this neo-Platonic teaching. It never could be the instrument for\npenetrating a magical universe. Faith and superstition take the place\nof science, and prophecy alone undertakes to solve nature\u2019s riddle.\n\nThe world of nature is thus broken in two. In one sense it is bad, ugly,\nand irrational. In another sense it is good, beautiful, and rational,\nbecause it is formed by the souls that enter into it. In opposition\nto the Gnostics Plotinus praised the harmony and beauty of the world,\nand promulgated his metaphysics of the beautiful as a last farewell of\nHellenic civilization. Beauty is not composite, but the simple Idea of\nworth shining through the world of sense. Beauty is from the inner and\nfor the inner. Art does not imitate nature, but expresses the reason;\nit supplements the defects of nature and creates something new. Yet the\nworld of nature is beautiful, because down to the lowest deeps it is\npermeated by the divine.\n\n=The Return of the Soul to God.\u2015\u2015The Ethical Problem of Plotinus.=\nIn his discussion of moral conduct Plotinus started from the point\nopposite to that of his metaphysics. He looked from the point of view\nof man up the series which descended from the Godhead. Men immersed in\nmatter have nevertheless a share in the divine life, and their goal is\nindependence of the world. They must free themselves from sense. Man\u2019s\nethical task is to separate the two worlds and to turn away from the\nmaterial, not only in its abnormalities but in every way. The practical\nvirtues have little value in such a sublimation of the soul, for these\nonly bind the soul more closely to the world of matter. The political\nvirtues are only a preparation by which the soul learns how to be free\nfrom sense. The intellectual virtues are necessary, but the goal of\nsalvation is not reached by knowledge alone. \u201cThe wizard king builds\nhis tower of speculation by the hands of human workmen till he reaches\nthe top story, and then he summons his genii to fashion the battlements\nof adamant and crown them with starry fire.\u201d Out of the mental\ncondition of contemplation the soul will rise on the wings of ecstasy\nto the God from whom it came. The call of Plotinus is to the ascetic\nlife. The development required is that of spirituality. Ethically\nPlotinus\u2019 doctrine is dualistic, because it requires the rejection\nof matter as evil. The return is not an evolution nor an innovation\nin which reform of the old world is demanded. There is no individual\nprogress, but a penetration into the foundation of things. But what\nincentive has man to undertake this return? What arouses him from\nhis sleep? Not sense-perception nor reflection, but his love for the\nbeautiful. The innate impulse of Platonic love turns the soul away from\nmatter to the illuminating Idea. He who has an immediate recognition\nof the pure Idea is gaining the higher perfection. Only when man is\nin ecstasy\u2015\u2015an ecstasy which transcends every subjective state\u2015\u2015does\nhe get complete contact and union with God. In such a moment of\nconsecration he forgets himself and becomes God. This final step never\ncomes unless God himself illuminates the soul by a special light so\nthat it can see God. This final state comes only to few souls, and to\nthose but seldom.\n\n=The Syrian School.\u2015\u2015The Systematizing of Polytheisms.\u2015\u2015Jamblichus.=\nThis school existed about a generation after the death of Plotinus.\nIts founder was Jamblichus (d. about 330), whose teacher was Porphyry,\nthe pupil of Plotinus. Jamblichus was a Syrian, who got his instruction\nfrom Porphyry at Rome, and then went back to his native country to set\nup for himself a school of neo-Platonism. He soon became reverenced\nas teacher, religious reformer, and worker of miracles. He wrote\ncommentaries on Plato, Aristotle, and the theological works of the\nOrphics, Chaldeans, and the Pythagoreans. Among the crowd of his\nenthusiastic disciples, one notes the names of the Emperor Julian and\nHypatia.[43]\n\nThe neo-Platonism of Jamblichus contained no new point of view.\nMetaphysically and ethically his teaching was identical with that of\nPlotinus. He tried to complete the religious movement by co\u00f6rdinating\nall cults, excepting Christianity, into a unity. This was an\neclecticism by which Jamblichus came naturally, for Syria was a\nland where eclecticism thrived. It was here that Gnosticism had its\nstronghold. With free eclectic hand Jamblichus filled in all the\nintermediary grades between the Godhead and man with the multitude\nof gods of all religions. In his system he placed 10 supra-terrestrial\ngods, 365 celestial beings, 72 orders of sub-celestial beings, and\n42 orders of natural gods. To find places for them all, he had to\nincrease the number of intermediaries; and to systematize this complex\npolytheism, he employed the Pythagorean numbers. His theory shows how\npersistent was the Hellenic civilization.\n\n=The Athenian School.\u2015\u2015Recapitulation.\u2015\u2015Proclus.= The Syrian school\nfailed to restore the old religions, and we find neo-Platonism, after\nrevivals here and there, again at Athens. The city that had been\nthe original sanctuary of Greek culture was the last stronghold of\nHellenism.\n\nThe Athenian school made its appearance about 410, and its leading\nrepresentatives were Plutarch, Syrianus, and Proclus. Proclus\n(410\u2013485), the pupil of Syrianus, was the most important representative\nof the Athenian school, and he may be said to have uttered the last\nword of dying Hellenism. Born at Constantinople, of a Lycian family,\nhe received his education at Alexandria; and when he became leader\nof the school at Athens, he received the extravagant worship of his\npupils. Connected with the Athenian school were the great commentators,\nPhiloponus and Simplicius, whose works on Aristotle became of great\nvalue to later times. Their erudite compilations stand out sharply\nagainst the imaginative speculations of their age. In connection with\nthis school Bo\u00ebthius must not be overlooked. He was a neo-Platonist\nwho called himself a Christian, and he was an important figure in the\nhistory of education. His translations and expositions of Aristotle\u2019s\nlogic and of the _Isagoge_ of Porphyry were very influential in the\nMiddle Ages.\n\nProclus was a theologian like Jamblichus, excepting that he tried to\nput theology upon a philosophical basis. By means of the dialectic\nhe sought to systematize the entire philosophical thought of the\nGreeks. His insatiable desire for faith was accompanied by wonderful\ndialectical ability, with the result that his teaching was an intricate\nformalism united with mythology. He carried out his dialectical plans\nto the minutest detail. He drew the materials of his system from both\nbarbarians and Greeks, and he himself had been initiated into all\nthe Mysteries. Every superstition of the past and present influenced\nhim, and in framing a universal system he did not feel satisfied until\nevery transmitted doctrine had found a place in that system. He was\nthe systematizer of paganism and its scholastic. He conceived that the\nfundamental problem was that of the One and the Many, and that the One\nis related to the Many in three stages,\u2015\u2015permanence, going-forth, and\nreturn. The Many as a manifold effect is similar to the unity of the\noriginal cause and yet different from it. Development is the striving\nof the effect to return to the original cause, and this strife for\na return to God was illustrated by Proclus in every realm of life,\nand he repeated it again and again in application to every detail.\nHe conceived that the development of the world from the Godhead was\ncontinually going through this triad system of change. His philosophy,\nhowever, shows no originality other than being an ingenious formal\nclassification in which every polytheism found a place.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER XIV\n\n PATRISTICS.\u2015\u2015THE HELLENIZING OF THE GOSPEL\n\n\n=The Early Situation of Christianity.= The Orient was the source\nof the Gospel, as of the other religions of this time. The power\nof Christianity lay in the spontaneous force of its pure religious\nfeeling, with which it entered the lists for the conquest of the world.\nChristianity was not a philosophy, but a religion. It appealed to\na different class than did the Alexandrian schools. The lower class\nreceived it first, and so the questions of science and philosophy\noccupied the early Christians but little. They were neither the friends\nnor the foes of Hellenism, and they took no interest in political\ntheories. The Christian society was a spiritual cosmopolitanism, which\nwas inspired and united by belief in God, faith in Christ, and in\nimmediate communion with Christ. Conviction of the Second Coming of\nthe Lord determined the conduct of the early Christians. Indeed, that\nmoral reformation and moral conduct were the dominating aims of the\nChristian communities is proved by the following facts: the documents\ndealing with Christian life of that time are almost wholly moral; the\ndiscipline upon the members was for moral and not doctrinal reasons.\nStill these early Christians had some simple doctrines, which were\nseemingly taken for granted; and the danger is, to conceive the early\nChristians as either (1) too simple or (2) too ignorant. They believed\nthat there is one God, that man has personal relations to God, that\nhistory has a dramatic course, that right was God\u2019s command and\nabsolutely different from wrong, that the Last Judgment would surely\ncome.\n\nBut about the middle of the second century Christianity was obliged\nto change its attitude towards both science and the State. Between 150\nand 250 a great change took place among the Christians. The documentary\nrecords are full of doctrinal struggles, so that little room was\nleft for recording the struggles for moral purity. Morality became\nsubordinated to belief, and the intellectual side of Christianity\nwas emphasized at the expense of the ethical. The Second Coming of\nour Lord was less emphasized. This doctrine was either pushed into\nthe background or its realization was looked upon as not immediate.\nFurthermore, the Christian sect had spread over the empire and had come\ninto positive relations both with circles of culture and with political\naffairs. Various statistics of the numerical growth of the Christians\nare given; among them is the following statement: in 30 A. D. they\nnumbered 500, in 100 A. D. 500,000, in 311 A. D. 30,000,000. In\nthe second century the self-justification of Christianity could no\nlonger be put upon the basis of the feelings and inner convictions.\nIt must justify itself to the world without, and to its own cultured\ncommunicants as well. It was being attacked by philosophy, and, unless\nits own further growth were to be thwarted, it found that it must use\nthe weapons of philosophy. Its increase of power antagonized both the\nRoman state and Hellenistic culture, and from 150 to 300 the fight\nbetween Christianity and the old world of things was to the death.\nChristianity eventually conquered Rome and Hellenism; but this would\nhave been impossible if it had maintained its original attitude of\nindifference to culture. Its success was due to the wisdom that it has\nsince so often shown. It adapted itself to its new situation by taking\nover and making its own the culture of the old world, and by fighting\nthe old world with that culture. Christianity thereby shaped its own\nconstitution into such strength that it could obtain possession of the\nstate with Constantine in 300. From this impregnable political position,\nit was able to deal with its rivals on an entirely different footing.\nWhen old Rome fell in 476, the church did not fall with it, but on the\ncontrary it came into possession of the city.\n\nBut this political success was the result and not the cause of the\ngrowth of Christianity. It could never have conquered so intrenched a\ngovernment as Rome, if it had not first been victorious over the more\npersistent civilization of Greece. It made itself inherently strong\nby Hellenizing itself\u2015\u2015strong both for polemical and for constructive\npurposes. But it is obvious that little philosophical originality may\nbe expected during this period. When the church fathers began to employ\nHellenistic philosophy, they took it on the whole as they found it.\nThey varied it only to suit their own legitimate purposes. Christianity\nentered the religious controversies of the time when victory would\nbelong to the sect which could use Greek civilization most effectively\nin defending itself against the hostility of other religions, and in\nconstantly renewing the confidence of its devotees.\n\nBut in the adoption of Hellenistic culture the church created a new\ndanger to itself. It must guard its own conceptions lest they be\nsmothered by this same Hellenism. It must keep its fundamental beliefs\nin their integrity. Greek philosophy must be a servant so constrained\nas to bring out only the implicit meaning of the fundamental Christian\ndoctrines. Philosophy must not corrupt these doctrines and transmute\nthem into Hellenism. The simple faith of the first century and its\ndoctrines must be so formulated by Hellenic wisdom that it would be\nstated for all time. The church needed a dogmatic system, a creed that\ncould forestall any future innovations. The long series of \u0153cumenical\ncouncils of the church, beginning with the Council of Nic\u00e6a in 325,\nwere united efforts in this direction. After that first council, dogma\nbecame more gradually fixed and, from time to time, this and that group\nof men were separated from the church as heretical.\n\nPatristics is this philosophical secularizing of the Gospel which\naccompanied the internal and external development of the church body\nduring the two or three centuries after the year 150 A. D.\n\n=The Philosophies influencing Christian Thought.= The Greek\nphilosophies most influential upon the development of Christian\ndoctrine were Stoicism and neo-Platonism. The philosophy of Philo was\nalso influential, but it was really only a bridge from philosophical\nJudaism to Christian theology. It contained both Stoicism and Platonism\nin an unsymmetrical form, and Philo\u2019s writings \u201ccontain the seeds\nof nearly all that afterwards grew up on Christian soil.\u201d[44] Greek\nphilosophical influence upon the early Christian world was felt in two\nways: in ethical theory and practice; in the construction of theology.\nDuring the fourth century Stoic ethics of a Cynic type replaced the\nearly Christian ethics. The basis of Christian society was no longer\nthe ethics of the Sermon on the Mount, but rather that of Roman\nStoicism. This is shown by the character of that book on morals (_De\nOfficiis Ministrorum_) by St. Ambrose, Bishop of Milan (340\u2013397). In\ntheology the Christian doctrine had no need to borrow from the Greeks\nthe conception of the unity of God or that of the creation of the world\nby God. But the Greek influence is seen in the doctrines on subjects\nallied to these: mainly on the questions of _the mode of creation_ and\n_the relation of God to the material world_. In the discussion of these\nquestions the influence of the Stoic monism, tending toward dualism,\nand the influence of Platonic dualism, tending toward a threefold\nconception of God, Matter, and Form, will appear in the examples which\nsubsequently follow.\n\nThe most formidable opponent of Christianity during this time was\nneo-Platonism, but neo-Platonism and Christianity were not, however,\nlong separated. Although neo-Platonism met its fate at the hands of\nscholasticism, it influenced in a thousand ways both orthodox and\nheretical Christianity. The rivalry of these two bodies ended\u2015\u2015and with\nit came the ending of the Hellenic-Roman period of philosophy\u2015\u2015in a\ncomplete and original theology. This was the theology of St. Augustine,\nwho marks the end of antiquity and the beginning of the Middle Ages.\n\n=The Periods of Early Christianity= (30 A. D.\u2013476 A. D.).\n\n 1. Introductory Period, 30\u2013200.\n (1) Period of Primitive Faith (during the 1st century A. D.).\n With great simplicity of doctrine and ceremonies the\n Christians were preparing through faith and the practice\n of virtue for the Second Coming of our Lord.\n (2) Period of the Earlier Formulation and Defense of Christian\n Doctrine (during the 2d century A. D.).\n (a) The Apologists (2d century).\n (b) The Gnostics (2d century).\n (c) The Old Catholic Theologians (2d and 3d centuries).\n\n 2. Development Period (200\u2013476).\n (1) The Period of Actual Formulation of Doctrine (200\u2013325).\n The Catechetical School of Alexandria\u2015\u2015Origen (3d century).\n (2) The Period of the Establishment of Dogma (325\u2013modern\n times) as seen in the Council of Nic\u00e6a and other \u0153cumenical\n councils. It was a period in which church dogma was\n developed on the basis of doctrine already established.\n\nWhile the origin and development of the Christian church is an\ninteresting story in itself, only one aspect of it is germane to the\nhistory of philosophy. That is the influence of Hellenism upon the\nformation of the theology of the church. The origin and development of\nthe church organization lies beyond our field. Also the periods before\nthe influence of Hellenism\u2015\u2015the Period of Primitive Faith during the\nfirst century, and the period after dogma had become well established,\nthe time after the Council of Nic\u00e6a in 325\u2015\u2015will be omitted from our\ndiscussion here. Only the period of the Earlier Formulation and that\nof the Actual Formulation of Doctrine, that is, the one hundred and\nseventy-five years (150\u2013325), are of interest to us. This time is known\nin history by the name of the period of Patristics.\n\n=The Apologists.= Only such Christians as were trained in Greek\nphilosophy could rally to the first defense of the Christian doctrine.\nThe new faith was, on the one hand, on the defensive against the\nmockery of Greek wisdom, and, on the other hand, it was obliged to take\na positive stand to show that it was the fulfillment of the human need\nof salvation. The Apologists tried to make the Christian teaching as\nconsistent as possible with the results of Greek philosophy and, at the\nsame time, to read into Greek philosophy Christian meanings. They did\nnot at all intend to Hellenize the Gospel, but they wanted to make it\nseem a rational one to the cultured world. \u201cChristianity is philosophy\nand revelation. This is the thesis of every Apologist from Aristides\nto Minucius Felix.\u201d[45] Their very act of defense was unintentionally\nthe first step toward the incorporation of Greek philosophy as a\npart of Christian teaching. The most important Apologists were Justin\nMartyr (100\u2013166), Athenagoras (d. 180), and among the Romans Minucius\nFelix (about 200) and Lactantius (d. 320). The life of Justin Martyr is\ncharacteristic. He was born in Sichem, Samaria, but was Greek in origin\nand education. Having investigated several systems of philosophy and\nreligion, he came to the conclusion that the Christian religion was the\nonly true philosophy, and he died in defense of it at Rome.\n\nTo prove that Christianity is the only true philosophy, the Apologists\nasserted that it alone guaranteed correct knowledge and true holiness\nhere and hereafter. They proclaimed its pre\u00ebminence because it is a\nperfect revelation of God through Jesus Christ. Since man is imprisoned\nin the world of the senses and ruled by d\u00e6mons, he can never be saved\nexcept through a perfect revelation. To be saved is to become rational,\nand man can become rational only by divine aid. Revelation has not\nbeen restricted to Christianity, but God\u2019s inspiration has been at\nwork in all mankind. The truth in Socrates, Plato, and Pythagoras has\nnot been their own, but has sprung from this same divine inspiration,\nfor truth never is the product of man\u2019s unaided reason. Socrates and\nPlato got their truth in part from God\u2019s direct revelation to them, in\npart indirectly from reading the works of Moses and the prophets. But\nrevelation outside of Christianity has not been complete nor continuous.\nThe first perfect revelation was in Jesus Christ, for He is the first\nto reveal the divine Logos completely. He is the first in whom the\nLogos has become man. He is the Son of God because the complete essence\nof the inexpressible Deity is unfolded in Him.\n\nThe Apologists thus identified reason and revelation. The Logos is the\nsame in revelation, nature, or history. The Stoic conception of the\nLogos, which Philo had stripped of its materialistic character, was\nidentified with Christ and revelation. Justin could regard as inspired\nwhat the Greeks had looked upon as natural in their own doctrines.\nChrist is the world-reason, in whom the divine has been incarnated, and\nthe Apologists had the enormous advantage over the neo-Platonists of\nbeing able to point to Jesus as the definite and historical incarnation\nof God. The Apologists could summon the prevailing Platonic dualism of\nGod and matter to their aid in showing the need of such a revelation;\nfor matter is altogether without reason and goodness. Thus a summary of\ntheir doctrine is as follows: the world is bad and needs a revelation;\nthe Logos of God has always been present in history, but has especially\nappeared in Jesus Christ, the man, in order to redeem men from their\nsin and establish the kingdom of God.\n\n=The Gnostics.= Gnosticism is the name applied to a movement of hostile\nreconstruction of Old Testament tradition instead of a spiritual\ninterpretation of it. It was a great syncretic movement in the second\nand third centuries, which sought to form a world religion in which men\nshould be rated on the basis of what they intellectually and morally\nknew. The Gnostics tried to transform the Christian faith in a large\nway into knowledge that would still be Christian; and their efforts\nshow how strong the philosophical interest among the Christians\nwas beginning to be. The conditions for the development of such a\ndoctrine as Gnosticism were everywhere present in the empire, yet two\nprincipal centres are pointed out: one at Alexandria and the other\nin Syria. Gnosticism was a most fanciful mixture of Oriental and\nOccidental cults and mythologies, very much more fantastic than either\nneo-Pythagoreanism or neo-Platonism. It was a philosophy in which the\nessential Christian principles were lost under the weight of esoteric\nknowledge. The Gnostics themselves were steeped in Hellenic culture,\nand in many localities formed only bands of Mysteries. They finally\nlost all sympathy with the Christians, and were classed as heretics by\nthe church. The leading Gnostics were Saturninus, Carpocrates (about\n130), Basilides, Valentinus (about 160), and Bardesanes (155\u2013225). Only\na few fragments of their many writings remain, and about all that we\nknow of their doctrines is what their opponents say of them. Valentinus,\nthe most notable, was born at Rome and died at Cyprus. Bardesanes\nwas born in Mesopotamia. Carpocrates lived at Alexandria and was a\ncontemporary of Basilides, who was a Syrian. The records of their\ncareers are very meagre.\n\nThe Gnostics were the first philosophers of history.[46] They undertook\nto make Christianity a world religion by conquering Hellenic culture\nfor Christianity and Christianity for Hellenic culture. The only way\nthey could do this was by dislodging Christianity from its historical\nanchorage in the Old Testament. The Gnostics were in open hostility\nto Judaism. They transformed every ethical problem into a cosmological\nproblem, they regarded human history as the continuation of natural\nhistory, they viewed the Redemption as the last act in the cosmic drama.\nThis shows how closely related their teaching was to that of Philo\nand Plotinus and how consistent with the theoretic spirit of the time.\nSince the salvation of the world by Christ stands as the central point\nof their philosophy of history, their philosophy of history amounted to\na philosophy of Christian history.\n\nThe victory of Christianity over paganism and Judaism was conceived\nallegorically by the Gnostics as the battle of the gods of these\nreligions. The Redeemer was then conceived to appear at the\npsychological moment and to win the victory; and this appearance of\nChrist as Redeemer is not only the highest point in the development of\nthe human race, but it is the d\u00e9nouement in the drama of the universe.\nNature was therefore conceived by them to be a battle-ground of the\ngods and the strife to be waged between the forces of good and evil.\nThe good gets the victory by means of Christ. The battle was conceived\nin the neo-Pythagorean form of the dualism of matter and spirit, but\nwas expressed in mythical terms. The heathen gods and the god of the\nOld Testament, who took the form of the Platonic demiurge, were the\npowers in the world which the highest God had to overcome.\n\nThe dualism of good and evil was conceived to be the same as between\nspirit and matter, and was elaborated in a fashion true to the\nAlexandrian school. The space between God and matter was conceived to\nbe filled in by a whole race of d\u00e6mons and angels, arranged according\nto the Pythagorean numbers. The lowest was so far from the divine\nperfectness as to be in touch with matter, and he is the demiurge who\nformed the world. The battle then was between good and evil, light and\ndarkness, until the Logos, the Nous, Christ, the most perfect of the\nintermediary beings, came down and by incarnation released from matter\nthe imprisoned spirits of men and even of the fallen angels, like the\ndemiurge. This is, in brief, the Gnostic explanation of history.\n\nThis dualism was quite consistent with contemporary Christian ethics,\nwhich had then become Stoic. But this dualism was not consistent with\nmonotheism, the fundamental Christian principle. The internal danger\nin Patristics\u2015\u2015of swamping the fundamentals of Christianity through\nHellenizing them\u2015\u2015appears thus early. The early Christian found at\nthe beginning an antagonism between his fundamental monotheistic\nmetaphysics and Greek dualistic ethics.\n\n=The Reaction against Gnosticism.\u2015\u2015The Old Catholic Theologians.=\nWe have seen that the original position of the Christians was one\nof indifference to both politics and philosophy; that then came the\nemployment of Hellenism in the defense of the Gospel. This resulted\nin the extreme attempt of the Gnostics to transform Christianity into\na factor in a cosmic theosophy. Gnosticism had tried to capture the\nnew religion by force and make it subserve the interests of Hellenic\nand Oriental philosophy. This danger was averted only after years\nof controversy. Gnosticism was the gravest danger that the early\nchurch had to meet, and the Gnostics left their mark upon the church,\nalthough they were expelled; for the church never returned to its\noriginal simplicity of doctrine. Gnosticism, however, produced an\nextreme reaction, for a time, against the use of philosophy, and was\nrepresented by the \u201cOld Catholic Theologians,\u201d\u2015\u2015Iren\u00e6us (140\u2013200),\nTertullian (160\u2013220), and Hippolytus. These theologians stood against\nturning faith into a science and tried to limit dogma to the articles\nof the baptismal confession interpreted as a rule of faith. Tatian (170)\nsaw in Hellenism the work of the devil. Iren\u00e6us conceived a unity in\nthe process of creation and redemption,\u2015\u2015creation as a divine method of\nbringing humanity up into the church by way of redemption. Tertullian\nwent so far as to affirm that the Gospel is confirmed by its being in\na certain sense contradictory to reason. _Credo quia absurdum._ By this\nhe means, not that faith rests in things absurd, but that faith rests\nin things so far above reason as to make reason absurd. This reaction\nwas against Gnosticism and not against rationalism, for these men used\nboth philosophy and tradition to support their arguments.\n\nThe reaction against a systematic theology failed to establish itself,\nfor the need of Greek philosophy was found to be necessary. The result\nwas that a median position was taken by the help of Greek philosophy\nin the formulation of the dogma of the church. This was scientifically\nstated by the Alexandrian School of Catechists, of which Clement and\nOrigen were the leaders.\n\n=Origen (185\u2013254) and the School of Catechists.= Origen, whose surname\nwas Adamantine, was an early teacher in the School of Catechists, which\nhad been under the direction of Clement. Like Plotinus, Origen had been\na pupil of Ammonius Saccas. Origen endured much persecution on account\nof his teaching, and had to flee from Alexandria to C\u00e6sarea and Tyre,\nwhere he spent his old age. He was the most influential theologian\nof the Eastern church, and he was the father of Christian theological\nscience.\n\nIn manner of life Origen was a Christian; in his thought he was a Greek.\nHe was the Christian Philo, although he was a rival to the neo-Platonic\nphilosophers. His Christian theology competed with the philosophical\nsystems of his time. It was founded on both Testaments, and it also\nunited in a peculiar way toward a practical end the theology of both\nthe Apologists and the Gnostics. He was convinced that Christianity\ncould be expressed only as a science, and that any form of Christianity\nwithout scientific expression is not clear to itself. Although the\nchurch was offended at some of his doctrines, it made his philosophical\nprinciple and his theory of development its own. In trying to state\nChristianity in terms of intellectual knowledge, Origen did not make\nthe mistake of burying its principles under philosophy or mythology,\nas was the case with the Gnostics. The Gnostics had created a new\nChristianity; Origen developed Christianity from within itself. He was\nan orthodox traditionalist, a strong Biblical theologian and idealistic\nphilosopher. He maintained that there were several ways of interpreting\nthe Scriptures (allegorical interpretation). The masses see only\nthe somatic or outward meaning as it has been developed in history.\nA deeper or moral interpretation gives a psychical meaning to the\nGospel truth. More profound still is the spiritual interpretation,\nwhich gives to the Gospels a pneumatic or spiritually esoteric meaning.\nChristianity is superior to all other religions because it is a\nreligion for all classes, even for the common man. Christianity is the\nonly religion which, without being polytheistic, can have its truth in\nmythical dress.\n\nThe aim of Origen was less to show how the world came to be, than to\njustify the ways of God to men in the world\u2019s creation and history.\nThe central principle in his teaching is spiritual monotheism. God\nis an unchanging spirit, the author of all things, and He transcends\nhuman knowledge. What distinguishes Him most is the absolute causality\nof His will. He is essentially creative, and this creative activity\nis co-eternal with Himself. God can have no dealings with changing\nindividuals directly, since although creative He is unchanging. He has\ndirect connection only with the eternal revelation of His own image,\nthe Logos. The Logos is a person, a special hypostasis, the perfect\nlikeness of God with nothing corporeal about him. He is not _the_ God,\nbut still God, yet a second God, with no sharing of divinity.[47] The\nHoly Spirit bears the same relation to the Logos as the Logos to the\nFather. In his relation to the world the Logos is the Idea of Ideas,\nthe norm according to which things are created.\n\nOrigen followed Philo in believing that the original creation consists\nof a world of beings that are pure intelligences, and that the cause\nof creation is God\u2019s goodness. He further believed that the Logos or\nWisdom of God is God\u2019s Son. Both the creation of the ideal world of\nintelligences and the existence of the Son is from eternity. The origin\nof the visible world is to be contrasted with this eternal creation.\nThe visible world had its beginning in time and is only one of a series\nof worlds. It will finally return to God, and has in God its beginning\nand end. Thus man lives in a visible world of time with eternities on\neither side. Creation, viewed as a whole, is everlasting, and consists\nof an endless number of beings who are destined to become a part of\nthe divine holiness and to participate in the divine blessedness.\nThese beings are endowed with freedom of will, and they fall away from\nGod. The visible world of matter has been created to purify the fallen\nspirits, and in consequence we find materialized spirits graded into\nangels, stars, mankind, and evil d\u00e6mons.\n\nIn his emphasis on the will as the fundamental mental part of man,\nOrigen is distinctly Christian and opposed to Greek intellectualism.\nThe will of God and the will of man form the corner stone in his system.\nThe will of God is the eternal development of His being, but the will\nof spirits is their temporal free choice. The will of God is reality\nitself; the will of spirits is phenomenal and changing. Freedom of\nthe will of the spirits is the ground of their sin, and consequently\nof their materiality. Thus it is by the freedom of the spirits that\nOrigen explains evil and the existence of imperfect matter without\nimpeaching the eternal purity of God. Origen thus reconciled the\nethical transcendence of God as creator with his immanence in the\nmaterial world. God is the creator without being the creator of\nsin. _Through the conception of free-will Origen reconciled the two\nantithetical principles of Christian metaphysics: faith in divine\nomnipotence and consciousness of sin._\n\nThe function of the church is thus an important one in the divine plan.\nFor the fallen spirits try to rise by their own wills from the matter\nto which they are condemned for purification. They never lose their\ndivine essence, however low they may fall. They cannot rise alone, nor\nare they compelled to, but they always have the help of divine grace,\nwhich is always active within man and has also been perfectly revealed\nin Jesus Christ. After the manner of the Apologists, Origen makes use\nof the Stoic and Platonic conceptions, for the eternal Logos takes\nform in the divine-human unity of Jesus. Through His physical suffering\nredemption is made possible to all believers, and through His essence\nillumination has been brought to those especially inspired. There are\ndifferent grades of redemption: faith, or a religious understanding of\nthe perceptual world; knowledge of the Logos; final absorption in God.\nAll shall finally be saved through the combined forces of freedom and\nGrace, and then shall all material existence disappear.\n\nThe controversies within the church during the succeeding centuries\nover the theory of Origen are theological rather than philosophical,\nand so our account of the relation of Greek philosophy to Christianity\nin the Hellenic-Roman period closes here. Origen\u2019s undertaking was\na private one, approved at first in only limited circles and on\nthe whole disapproved by the church. In his scientific dogmatics\nthe particular changes which he planned pertain especially to the\nconception of salvation and the place of Christ in the universe. In\nhis teaching about Christ he emphasized more the cosmological than the\nsoteriological aspect, but neither was fully developed. The history of\nthe early church shows that Christianity seized the ideas of ancient\nphilosophy and insisted on revising them with its own religious\nprinciple before it used them. We shall find that the next period is\nintroduced by a greater than Origen, in whom again the Christian and\nthe ancient worlds will meet in new and richer combination,\u2015\u2015St.\nAugustine.\n\n\n\n\n BOOK II\n\n THE MIDDLE AGES (476\u20131453)\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER XV\n\n CHARACTERISTICS AND CONDITIONS OF THE MIDDLE AGES\n\n\n=Comparison of the Hellenic-Roman Period and the Middle Ages.= The\nMiddle Ages can be conveniently remembered as approximately the 1000\nyears between the fall of old Rome, in 476, and the fall of new Rome\n(Constantinople) in 1453. Together these two periods make a long and\na philosophically unproductive stretch of 1800 years. The intellectual\nmaterials which the two periods possessed, differ but little, although\nduring the first half of the Middle Ages such materials were very few.\nThere is, however, a decided difference in the way the two periods\nlook at things. The ancient had started with Aristotle\u2019s interest\nin knowledge for its own sake; the ancient had passed from that to\nthe need of knowledge in ethical conduct; he had finally made use of\nknowledge only in formulating religion. On the other hand, the history\nof thought in the Middle Ages was exactly the reverse. The medi\u00e6val\nman starts satisfied with religion as thus formulated by the preceding\nperiod, and seeks to regain pure knowledge. The perspective in the\ntwo periods is therefore different. Hellenic thought began in freedom\nand ended in tradition; medi\u00e6val thought begins in tradition and,\nborne by the youthful German, who brings with him few original ideas,\npushes forward toward freedom. No doubt one can discover in medi\u00e6val\ntimes many fresh transformations of ancient thought and a new Latin\nterminology, but, on the whole, all the problems of the Middle Ages,\nas well as their solutions, can be found in antiquity. One may find,\ntoo, the germs of modern thought in the Middle Ages, but they come\nfrom medi\u00e6val pupils and not from medi\u00e6val masters. In the Middle Ages\nhumanity is again at school; its problems appear in succession, but\nthey always are expressed in the conceptions of the ancients.\n\n=The Medi\u00e6val Man.= Antiquity had brought together three\ncivilizations,\u2015\u2015those of Greece, of Rome, and of Christianity. Greek\ncivilization in the form of an intellectual culture, called Hellenism,\nhad been superimposed upon Roman political society. The result\nwas a society with a twofold stratum, and in such a society the\nChristian church had grown as an organization of controlling cultural\nand political influence. It was into this society that the German\nbarbarians, by a series of invasions, entered during the first three\ncenturies of the Middle Ages.\n\nThe Middle Ages began and antiquity ended when these German tribes\nfinally broke down the barriers of the Roman empire. It was a new\nperiod; for a new race had taken upon itself the responsibility of\nbearing the burden of the future of western Europe. The German was of\ncourse unconscious of the magnitude of his self-imposed burden, for the\nGerman was young, vigorous, and moved by primitive instincts. He had\nleaped into the world\u2019s fields as a conqueror; he remained as a laborer.\n\nAt the beginning the German seemed likely to destroy the entire product\nwhich antiquity had bequeathed. He was quite unprepared to assimilate\nthe rich fruits of that ancient civilization. He had, indeed, less\nmind for the elaborate forms of Greek philosophy than for the lighter\nforms of Greek art. In his first contact he could understand neither.\nMoreover ancient society was so weak that it could not educate him,\nwho was its conqueror, into its culture. Nevertheless, there was one\nelement in that ancient society that did appeal to the German. That\nwas the spiritual power of the Christian church. Alone amid the ruins\nof antiquity the power of the church had grown so strong that the men\nof the north bowed before it, and religion accomplished through the\nemotions of the Germans what art, philosophy, and statecraft failed to\nachieve. The preaching of the Gospel laid hold of the feelings of these\nprimitive people, for the church in its pretensions, and sometimes in\nfact, represented the old Roman political unity. Moreover the church\nwas also the repository of what was left of Greek science. The church\nexpressed for the German his own ideal of the personal inner life.\nThe Germans became the supporters of the church, and in this way the\nprotectors of ancient culture. Medi\u00e6val history in western Europe\nis therefore the record of the development of the Germans under the\ninfluence of the Christian church. In contrast with the development\nof the Eastern church, which was the development of a state church,\nthe Western church was the development of an ecclesiastical state. The\nWestern church, and not the later empire, was the true successor of the\nRoman empire. Thus the early beginnings of the Middle Ages rested with\nthe church, but the later development of the Middle Ages rested with\nthe German people.\n\n=How the Universe appeared to the Medi\u00e6val Man.= The medi\u00e6val man had\nvery indistinct ideas about the world around him, since his interest\ndid not lie in the earthly realm, but in the spirit that controlled\nit. He was content in his sciences with conclusions without their\ndemonstrations. Although it is said that relations of space and number\nare never indistinct in the mind of the civilized man, the man of the\nMiddle Ages certainly did not possess such conceptions in so vigorous\na manner as to enable him to discover new truths. We must, furthermore,\nmake a sharper distinction between medi\u00e6val popular opinion and\nmedi\u00e6val scientific opinion than we should about popular and scientific\nopinion of modern times; for the results of science did not reach the\npeople then as now. To the ordinary medi\u00e6val man the world in which he\nlived was what it appeared to be to his eye. The earth was flat; the\nsky was a material dome, which sustained the waters of the world above\nit. Through this sky-floor the water sometimes breaks and the earth\nreceives showers of rain. These popular notions sometimes appeared in\nthe verse of the time.\n\nThe medi\u00e6val scientific opinion was based on the theory of Ptolemy and\nhis school of Alexandrian astronomers, who lived in the second century\nA. D., some details to the theory having been added by the Arabians.\nPtolemy says, \u201cThe world is divided into two vast regions; the one\nethereal, the other elementary. The ethereal region begins with the\nfirst mover, which accomplishes its journey from east to west in\ntwenty-four hours; ten skies participate in this motion, and their\ntotality comprises the double crystalline heaven, the firmament and\nthe seven planets.\u201d (See diagram.) The medi\u00e6val man of science thought\nthat, inasmuch as he was upon the earth, he was therefore standing\nat the centre of things. Directly above him was the cavity of the sky,\nruled by the moon; and below the moon were the four elements,\u2015\u2015fire,\nair, water, and earth. This region was the realm of imperfection.\nBut above the moon the scientist saw a series of nine other heavens,\neach with an orderly revolution of its own; and beyond all is God.\nThe universe was therefore to Ptolemy a great but a limited sphere,\nconsisting of ten spheres one inside another (like the rings of an\nonion). Each planet moved with the motion of its own heaven (or sphere),\nwhich was sometimes called \u201ccrystalline\u201d because it was transparent.\nThe movements of the heavenly bodies, each in its own revolving heaven,\nwere contained in the whole sphere, which revolved with a motion of\nits own. By ascribing other movements to the planets within their\nrespective heavens, the medi\u00e6val astronomers were able to predict every\nconjunction and eclipse to the minute. These separate movements of the\nplanets were called epicycles, the form of which is shown in the\ndiagram on the opposite page.\n\n Illustration: PTOLEMAIC COSMOGRAPHY\n\n A diagram showing the division of the universe\n into the ten spheres or heavens\n\n (From the private library of Professor R. W. Willson\n of Harvard University)\n\nSuch a scientific astronomy would easily lend itself to the theological\nconceptions of the time. The realm of perfection above the moon was\nsupposed to be under the direct supervision of God and to be inhabited\nby spirits. Thus the conjunction and relation of the heavenly bodies\nwere thought to have influence upon human life, and they furnished\nthe basis of the astrology, necromancy, and spiritism so common in the\nMiddle Ages. The ninth heaven embraced all the others. It swept around\nthem all, without interfering with their own special motions, and\ncompleted its revolution in twenty-four hours. The ninth heaven was\nboth the source and the limit of all motion and all change. Beyond it\nlies the eternal peace of God, which the Christian astronomer regarded\nas \u201cthe abode of the blessed.\u201d This was called the tenth heaven or the\nEmpyrean. This, in Dante\u2019s words, is \u201cthe heaven that is pure light;\nlight intellectual full of love, love of the good full of joy, joy that\ntranscends all sweetness.\u201d The tenth heaven is Paradise and is within\nthe life of God. It is important to note that the Ptolemaic conception\nof the universe is the background upon which Dante constructs his\n_Divine Comedy_ (see diagram, p. 376),[48] and appears in part at\nleast as the cosmological basis of the _Paradise Lost_ of Milton. For\nthirteen centuries\u2015\u2015from 200 to 1500\u2015\u2015conviction remained unshaken in\nthe Ptolemaic system of astronomy as an adequate explanation of the\nuniverse.\n\n Illustration: PTOLEMAIC COSMOGRAPHY\n\n (Showing the Epicyclic Movements of Saturn, Jupiter, and Mars\n in respect to the Earth)\n\n=The Medi\u00e6val Man at School.= In the eleventh and twelfth centuries\nthere was a revival in intellectual interests that was deep and broad,\nand the characteristics of this revival will be discussed subsequently\n(see Transitional Period, p. 329). Our curiosity, however, is aroused\nupon our entrance into the Middle Ages, as to what the man of the early\nMiddle Ages studied and how much he learned. We must remind ourselves\nat the outset of the oft-repeated fact that, on the whole, in western\nEurope, for the first five hundred years of the Middle Ages, the only\npeople who had any book-learning were the churchmen. Furthermore,\nwith them the learning was very meagre. Their purpose in study will\nshow this, for it was to enable them \u201cto understand and expound the\nCanonical Scriptures, the Fathers, and other ecclesiastical writings.\u201d\nThe training was as follows:\u2015\u2015\n\n1. Theological. Elementary instruction in the Psalms and church music,\nbut no systematic training in theology,\u2015\u2015just enough training to enable\nthe priest to understand the Bible and the Church Fathers.\n\n2. Secular training. Knowledge in the \u201cSeven Liberal Arts,\u201d _i. e._\nthe _trivium_\u2015\u2015grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic; and the more advanced\n_quadrivium_,\u2015\u2015music, arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy. These names\nare suggestive of a vast amount of knowledge, while, in truth, very\nlittle was known or taught in these subjects. Astronomy and arithmetic\nwere employed to find the time of Easter. Geometry included some\npropositions of Euclid without demonstrations. Music included plain\nsong and a mystic doctrine of number. More was made of grammar, the\nstudy of rhetoric from Latin classics, and dialectics. Dialectics was\nlogic in the Middle Ages, and its mysteries fascinated the medi\u00e6val man.\nBut even in logic there were only some remnants of the Aristotelian\nlogic known.\n\n=A Medi\u00e6val Library.= Here again is an interesting question: What did\nthis medi\u00e6val churchman read? But we must make a distinction between\nbooks most commonly read, books that the scholars might use, and books\nmost influential upon thought.\n\n=1. Books most commonly read.= These would be the text-books used in\ninstruction. They are as follows:\u2015\u2015\n\n The _Psalms_.\n\n The _Grammar_ of Donatus.\n\n The Christian poets: Prudentius, _Psychomachia_; Juvencus, _Gospels\n in Verse_; Sedulius, _Easter Hymn_.\n\n Dionysius Cato, _Disticha de Moribus_, a collection of proverbs\n (moral maxims) in rhyming couplets.\n\n Virgil, Ovid, and the rhetorical works of Cicero.\n\n \u00c6sop\u2019s _Fables_ (in Latin).\n\n=2. Books that the scholars might use.= It is difficult to say what any\nparticular scholar actually did read, for the libraries of monasteries\ndiffered enormously in the character and number of their books; some\nmonasteries had several hundred books, some none at all. Some libraries\nwere composed almost entirely of works of the Fathers; some possessed\na good many works of ancient classical writers. One _might_ expect to\nfind any one or more of the following works in a scholar\u2019s library:\u2015\u2015\n\n Aristotle, _De Interpretatione_ and the _Categories_ in Bo\u00ebthius\u2019\n translation.\n\nThis explains why the logical problems occupied the almost exclusive\nattention of the first schoolmen.\n\n Plato, the _Tim\u00e6us_.\n\nThis was known to the Irish monks perhaps in Greek, but on the\ncontinent in a translation by Chalcidius. The only other sources\nof knowledge of Plato were in the works of Augustine and the\nneo-Platonists.\n\n Commentaries on Aristotle,\u2015\u2015The _Isagoge_ by Porphyry, in a\n translation into Latin by Bo\u00ebthius, and some commentaries by\n Bo\u00ebthius himself on Aristotle\u2019s _De Interpretatione_ and\n _Categories_.\n\n Cicero, the rhetorical and dialectical treatises, such as the\n _Topica_, _De Officiis_.\n\n Seneca, _De Beneficiis_.\n\n Lucretius, _De Rerum Natura_.\n\n Augustine\u2019s works and some pseudo-Augustinian writings.\n\n The works of the Church Fathers, Clement of Alexandria and Origen.\n\n The _Pseudo-Dionysius_, translated from the Greek by Erigena.\n\n The encyclopedic collections of some of the last of the scholars\n of antiquity, like Cassiodorus, Capella, Bo\u00ebthius, and the\n _Etymologies_ of Isidore of Seville.\n\n=3. The Books most influential philosophically upon the time.= These\nwere not necessarily the books most widely read, but the epoch-making\nbooks, so to speak. They were as follows:\u2015\u2015\n\n Augustine, _City of God_.\n\n Bo\u00ebthius, _Consolation of Philosophy_.\n\n Aristotle, _De Interpretatione_ and the _Categories_ in translation\n by Bo\u00ebthius.\n\n _Pseudo-Dionysius_, translated by Erigena.\n\n Porphyry, _Isagoge_ translated by Bo\u00ebthius, an introduction to\n Aristotle\u2019s _Categories_.\n\n=The Three Periods of the Middle Ages.=\n\n1. Early Period, 476\u20131000.\n\n2. Transitional Period, 1000\u20131200.\n\n3. Period of Classic Scholasticism, 1200\u20131453.\n\nThere is one great natural division line of the Middle Ages, the year\n1200. At this time the surging of the western peoples eastward in the\nCrusades was at its height, and the works of Aristotle were coming\ninto western Europe from the East. These events mark a change in the\npolitical and intellectual situation in Europe. But this change did\nnot take place suddenly. There are intervening two centuries that are\nindeed transitional, but at the same time are animated by a distinct\nand independent philosophical motive. These two centuries may be set\napart as a period, different from the earlier and the later periods.\nWe shall call these three periods the Early Period, the Transitional\nPeriod, and the Period of Classic Scholasticism.\n\nThe Early Period takes us from the fall of old Rome (476) to the birth\nof modern political Europe (1000). It is a period of religious faith\ngoverned by the theology of Augustine. Mysticism has no independent\nfollowing, but on the contrary rules within the church. The Christian\nprinciple of individual personality and the Greek Platonic conception\nof universal realities are not fused, but they are held without\narousing controversy. This is because the human reason has no standard\ncode, nor does it yet feel the need of one. The only two philosophers,\nAugustine and Erigena, of the period are animated by neo-Platonism.\n\nThe Transitional Period extends from the birth of political Europe\n(1000) to the arrival of the works of Aristotle (about 1200). This\nepoch is one of logical controversy, in which the Christian and the\nGreek motives conflict. This controversy gives rise to the first group\nof great schoolmen, who discuss the reality of general ideas in their\napplication to dogma. Mysticism still rules the churchman, but now in a\nmodified form. Plato has become the standard of the reason in orthodox\ncircles and Aristotle in those inclined to heresy, but as yet only\nfragments of the works of either are known.\n\nThe Period of Classic Scholasticism extends from 1200 to the end of\nthe Middle Ages (1453). It is a period when a theological metaphysics\narises by the side of the logical controversy and predominates over\nthat controversy. The problem now concerns the respective scopes of\nthe reason and faith. The period is Aristotelian, and Aristotle\u2019s\nphilosophy is made the standard code for the churchman for all time.\nMysticism has now no place of authority in the church, but has an\nindependence. The period contains the greatest schoolmen of the Middle\nAges.\n\n Summary of the Political and Educational Worlds\n of the Medi\u00e6val Man.\n\n I. _Early Period_, 476\u20131000.\n\n 395 The Roman empire divided into (_Augustine_, 354\u2013430)\n Eastern and Western empires.\n\n 476 Fall of the Western empire, 476\u2013800 Disappearance of\n the Eastern empire lasting municipal and imperial\n about 1000 years longer. schools and rise of\n episcopal and monastic\n 375\u2013600 Northern barbarians overrun schools.\n the Western empire in series of\n invasions. 525 Bo\u00ebthius died, the last\n notable Roman scholar who\n knew Greek.\n\n 529 Closing of philosophical\n Schools at Athens; _founding\n of monastic school by\n St. Benedict_.\n\n 600 Roman power almost entirely in\n hands of barbarians.\n\n 622\u2013732 Mohammedans conquer Arabia,\n Northern Africa, and Spain.\n 476\u2013800 Dark Ages.\n 732 Mohammedans repulsed at the\n battle of Tours.\n\n 600\u2013800 Fusion took place among\n German and Roman peoples.\n\n 800 Empire of Charlemagne founded. 800\u20131000 Benedictine Age: _only\n Civilization higher than the period in Western Europe\n German, lower than the Roman. when education is entirely\n in hands of monks_. The\n Palace school; episcopal,\n cathedral, and monastery\n schools.\n (_Erigena_, 810\u2013880,\n _the forerunner of\n Scholasticism_.)\n\n 900\u20131000 Empire of Charlemagne 900\u20131000 Dark century with\n broken up. _Demoralization_. decline of learning.\n Invasions by Danes and Northmen\n from the north; Saracens IN THE EARLY PERIOD AND THE\n from south by sea; Slavs, TRANSITIONAL PERIOD LITTLE\n Hungarians, Russians, and Poles OF PLATO WAS KNOWN EXCEPT\n by land. The church demoralized, IN THE FORM OF NEO-PLATONISM\n Papacy temporarily disappears, AND LITTLE OF ARISTOTLE\n feudalism replaces empire. EXCEPT OF FRAGMENTS OF HIS\n LOGIC.\n\n II. _Transitional Period_, 1000\u20131200.\n\n 1000 France and Germany get their _First Scholasticism._\n first form as nations just (Anselm, 1033\u20131109)\n before this year; England just (Roscellinus, d. 1110)\n after. _Beginning of new birth (Abelard, 1079\u20131142)\n of Europe_, caused by\n conversions of northern nations, 1000 Passion for inquiry takes\n by enlightened rule of the the place of the old routine.\n Ottos, by regeneration of\n Papacy, by development of civic 1160\u20131200 Traces of the\n life. origination of the earliest\n _Beginning of political order, universities.\n ecclesiastical discipline, and\n social tranquillity._ 1150\u20131250 Translation into\n Revival of architecture Latin directly from Greek\n followed by renewal of art. The of the works of Aristotle,\n Romanesque appeared about 1000, previously unknown in Western\n the Gothic about 1150. Poetry Europe.\n of Trouv\u00e8res in north and of\n Troubadours in south.\n\n III. _Period of Classic Scholasticism_, 1200\u20131453.\n\n 1200 Crusades at their height. 1200 The Mendicant Friars.\n _Classic Scholasticism._\n 1200\u20131453 Commerce of Europe with (Thomas Aquinas, 1224\u20131274.)\n Asia begins to grow to large (Duns Scotus, 1270\u20131308.)\n proportions in countries on the (William of Ockam,\n Mediterranean. The Third Estate 1280\u20131349.)\n grows in strength, national\n governments prevail over the 1300\u20131453 The period is well\n feudal system. supplied with schools.\n\n 1350\u20131453 Deterioration of\n Scholasticism.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER XVI\n\n THE EARLY PERIOD OF THE MIDDLE AGES (476\u20131000)\n\n\n=The General Character of the Early Period.= It is no accident that\nthese five hundred years of the Middle Ages were spiritualistic. Both\nthe political disturbances and the intellectual inheritance from the\nHellenic-Roman period made the period such. The troubles during the\nlong death agony of the Roman empire had deprived the people of their\ninterest in this world. The world of kingdoms and material things\npresented no ideals; and the age would have been pessimistic had not\nthe Church through Augustine presented a heavenly ideal and the means\nto win that ideal. Both what the material world had taken away from\nman and what the spiritual seemed to offer him, made the age an age\nof faith. The principle of inner spirituality was moved to a central\nposition. All things pointed to the supernatural and the transcendent.\nMen dwelt upon the nature of God, the number and rank of the angels,\nthe salvation of the soul. In this, as in the Transitional Period\nfollowing, little was known of Aristotle except some fragments\nof his logic; and little was known of Plato except in the form of\nneo-Platonism. But in this period (before the year 1000) the pupil was\ninstructed in both Aristotle and Plato, and held them both together\nwithout controversy. Mysticism had little independence of church\ndoctrine, as appears in the case of Erigena, the consequences of whose\ndoctrine were not at first seen. The monastery became the fundamental\nsocial organization and the central social force. Organized ascetic\nlife permitted an absorbing contemplation of heaven. Prayer superseded\nthought; faith prescribed knowledge. The intellectual world was\ndominated by neo-Platonic idealism, and the all-important topic in\nmen\u2019s minds was that of God\u2019s grace. Augustine stood at the beginning\nof the period and organized its conception of grace for it. Erigena\nstood near the end and stated the neo-Platonism of the period in\nextreme form, presenting the issue for the scholasticism of the many\nyears to come. The presentation of the doctrine of these two men will\ntherefore be the philosophical exemplification of the attitude of the\ntime.\n\n Illustration:\n MEDI\u00c6VAL GEOGRAPHY. THE COSMAS MAP, A. D. 547\n\n =From J. Keane\u2019s _Evolution of Geography_=\n\n (Cosmas was an Egyptian monk who had once been a merchant\n and traveler. He did not use the records of his own travels to\n supplement the Greek and Roman plans, but he laid down as a fact\n that the earth is flat. Then he piously adduced evidence from\n the Scriptures to support his view. The maps drawn by Cosmas are\n the earliest Christian maps that have survived. Their crudeness,\n compared with the maps of the Romans and Arabs, reveals the low\n state of knowledge among the Christians.)\n\n=The Historical Position of Augustine.= The Middle Ages were\ninaugurated by a mind of the highest order,\u2015\u2015Augustine.[49] If one were\nto select the most influential figures in the history of philosophy,\nAugustine might be chosen to stand with Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza,\nand Kant. \u201cIn some respects Augustine stands nearer to us than Hegel\nand Schopenhauer.\u201d[50] For the church, but no less for the period, it\nwas a fortunate circumstance that Augustine should have lived just as\nantiquity was closing and the medi\u00e6val period beginning. Through him\nthe various influences of the past were gathered up and presented in\na scientific statement for the Middle Ages. \u201cThe history of piety and\nof dogma in the West was so thoroughly dominated by Augustine from the\nbeginning of the fifth century to the era of the Reformation, that we\nmust take this whole time as forming one period.\u201d[51]\n\nIn his relation to antiquity Augustine drew especially upon the\nfundamental teachings of St. Paul, the neo-Platonists, and the\nPatristics for the presentation of his own doctrine. He was familiar\nwith a great number of the doctrines of antiquity, and was the medium\nof their transmission to the Middle Ages. He does not seem to have\nknown the system of Aristotle, but the importance which he attached to\nthe dialectic in the explanation of the Scriptures contributed a good\ndeal to the use of the logic of Aristotle by the scholastics of the\nMiddle Ages. He had some knowledge of the Pythagoreans, the Stoics, and\nthe Epicureans through the writings of Cicero. But the most important\nphilosophical influence upon Augustine was the neo-Platonic teaching\nof Plotinus and Porphyry. Neo-Platonism, the Pauline theology, and the\nPatristic are the large factors in the doctrine of Augustine.\n\nIn his relation to the Middle Ages, what in brief was the position of\nAugustine? By means of neo-Platonism and a discriminating psychological\nanalysis _he transformed the previous belief in God as a \u2666judge into a\nbelief in the personal relations between God and man_. That is to say,\nhe carried out monotheism spiritually, and in doing this the influence\nof neo-Platonism is very strong in him. Augustine made one of the\ncentres of his teaching the living relation of the soul to God. He took\nreligion out of the sphere of cosmological science, where it had been\nplaced by Origen and the Gnostics, and made it personal. Furthermore,\nhe offered with this new ideal a plan of salvation; for Augustine made\nit his task to show (1) what God is, and (2) what the salvation of the\nsoul requires. Whereas before Augustine the only dogmatic scheme had\npresented the place and function of _Christ_ in salvation, Augustine\nwas interested in the place of _man_ in salvation. Thus he elaborated\nmonotheism into spiritual monotheism and delineated the inward\nprocesses of the Christian life, _i. e._ of sin and grace. This\nimportant advance made by Augustine must be attributed to the influence\nof philosophy\u2015\u2015neo-Platonism\u2015\u2015upon him.\n\nBut it must not be supposed that the total teaching of Augustine\nand the total influence of his thought is contained in this single\nchange in Christian piety, as we have stated it. The various Pagan and\nChristian elements, as they lie in his system, have little coherence;\nand Augustine does not settle the rival claims between them. As\nthe medi\u00e6val period advanced, what in his teaching had been a mere\nincoherence became in the hands of others positive discord. He gave\nthe church impulses of the highest spiritual quality, but he left no\nwell-organized capital. These impulses toward spiritual piety have\nnever been lost, but the profusion of ideas and views in Augustine,\nunharmonized by himself, were also a permanent bequest to posterity\nthat produced both vital movements and violent controversies. The legal\nand moral party of the church resisted his teaching at the beginning,\nand in the sixth century, under the influence of Gregory the Great,\ntoned down Augustine\u2019s teaching in the direction of a conception of\nthe church as a juristic organization.\n\nAugustine was thus the beginner of a new line of development by his\nincorporation of neo-Platonism into Christian doctrine and by his use\nof the dialectic to present, defend, and develop the doctrine of the\nchurch. Although the years of his life fall in antiquity, although he\nis the collector of all the threads of the neo-Platonic and Christian\nreligions, he belongs in the Middle Ages as the teacher of the Middle\nAges. His doctrine acted as an authoritative spiritual guide for the\nnew German peoples. They took up the problems of antiquity from the\nnew point of view of individual spirituality, and created out of them\nthe philosophy of the future. But philosophically Augustine was far\nin advance of his age, and in the intellectually torpid times that\nfollowed him little philosophical development could be expected. Not\nuntil after Charlemagne does philosophical development springing from\nAugustine appear. Later Luther and the Reformation reverted to him, and\nour modern philosophy is founded on the principle which he made central\nin his conception of piety.\n\n=The Secular Science.= At the same time it must not be supposed that\nthe teaching of Augustine was by any means the only source from which\nthis first period of the Middle Ages drew its materials of knowledge.\nA glance at the list of books in a medi\u00e6val library (see p. 327)\nwill not confirm such a supposition. Augustine does not include in\nhis doctrine\u2015\u2015massive as it is\u2015\u2015all the factors that finally made\nup medi\u00e6val civilization. Even at the beginning there was a tendency\ntoward secular science derived from Plato and Aristotle. Noticeable as\nthis was at first it became prominent later. Secular science tried at\nfirst to modify scholasticism, and then later to gain an independence\nfor itself. The doctrine of Augustine did not contain the germs of\nscience. But at the start the Middle Ages had writings on science in\nthe inadequate compendiums of Capella, Cassiodorus, and Bo\u00ebthius, and\nin the fragments of the logic of Aristotle.\n\n=The Life of Augustine= (354\u2013430). Aurelius Augustine, often called\n\u201cthe Plato of Christianity,\u201d was born in Thagaste, Numidia. His\nfather was a Pagan, his mother a Christian; and it was his mother\nwho contributed chiefly to the formation of his character. He was\na boy of brilliant gifts, and was educated in the schools of Madaura\nand Carthage. At Carthage his life was full of dissipation, which he\nhas described in his _Confessions_. He took up in succession all the\nscientific and religious problems of his time. He gave up the teaching\nof rhetoric, which he had practiced in several towns in Asia Minor and\nItaly, and began to study theology. He was troubled by his religious\ndoubts and tried to find relief first in Manich\u00e6ism, then in the\nskepticism of the Academy, and then in neo-Platonism. He was converted\nto Christianity through three influences: his study of Plato, the\neloquence of St. Ambrose, and the unremitting moral influence of his\nmother. He became a priest, then a bishop, and was untiring in his\nactivity both in the practical organization of the church and in the\ntheoretical construction of its doctrines. He was especially active\nin his literary attempts to refute the Pelagian and Manich\u00e6an heresies,\nwhose doctrines he had previously professed. His life falls at the time\nwhen the barbarian invasions were beginning and when Rome was crumbling.\nMoved by his Platonic idealism, he wrote his _City of God_, which, in\nan elaborate philosophy of history, shows that God\u2019s city is not on\nearth, but in heaven.\n\n=The Two Elements in Augustine\u2019s Teaching.= The great masses of thought\nin Augustine\u2019s mind reveal motion in two directions. On the one hand,\nhe is the theologian who holds on high the conception of the authority\nof the church. On the other hand, he is the philosopher who speaks\nfor the principle of immediate certainty for the individual. These\nare two foci about which his thought is in constant flux and often\nin contradiction. Augustine has, therefore, two criteria for truth:\nthe truth that comes from an authority without, and the truth that\ncomes from consciousness itself. _The authority of the church and the\nauthority of the immediate consciousness of the individual_\u2015\u2015these are\nthe two central thoughts in Augustinianism. Augustine\u2019s conception of\nthe authority of the church acted upon him as a lofty ideal which both\ninspired and at the same time constrained his speculations. As he grew\nolder he gravitated more and more toward it, and thereby became more\nconservative. But it was the other central thought\u2015\u2015the authority of\nimmediate consciousness\u2015\u2015which he made the basis of a philosophy of\noriginal power. Through this he transcended his own time and became\nhimself a modern, leading the Middle Ages up to him.\n\nAugustine did not define accurately the spheres of philosophy and\ntheology. He did not show whether reason or revelation had the\nhigher authority. He did not try to decide between the _intelligo ut\ncredam_ and _credo ut intelligam_, that is, between the respective\nauthorities of reason and faith. That became, in consequence, a central\nphilosophical problem for the schoolmen. Nevertheless, the great\ninheritance which Augustine left the world was along the philosophical\nline of _intelligo ut credam_ (of knowledge as the basis of faith\ninstead of faith as the basis of knowledge).\n\n=The Neo-Platonic Element: the Inner Certainties of Consciousness.=\nAugustine was not original in making the starting-point of his\nphilosophy the inner certainties of consciousness. That was the point\nof view of his time, and the starting-point of the ascetic tendency\nboth of Christianity and of neo-Platonism. He was dissatisfied with\nthe world without, and turned away from it to the world within to find\nreality. But this had been a growing tendency ever since the time of\nPlato. Augustine\u2019s originality lies in his psychological description\nof these certainties. He is the master of self-observation and\nintrospection. He can describe inner experiences as well as analyze\nthem. He puts his philosophy upon a solid anthropological basis by\ndeveloping a psychology of the certainties of consciousness. In doing\nthis he placed the inner experience in the central position of control.\nThus he reached a well-defined position of \u201cinternality\u201d for which\nthe Stoics, Epicureans, neo-Platonists, and the preceding Christian\ntheologians had been groping; thus he anticipated Descartes and modern\nphilosophy.\n\nMan clings to life in spite of all its evils. This shows that there\nis a reality for the soul. The material world may pass away, but the\nreality of soul-life is assured. Man\u2019s inner life is ever present and\ncannot be imaginary. The fact that there is such a thing as probability\nimplies the existence of certainty. Where shall I look for certainty?\nIn myself. Certainty is there as a fact of inner observation. There are\nmy inner mental states\u2015\u2015my sensations, feelings, etc., whose existence\ncannot be doubted even if the existence of the objects to which they\ncorrespond is doubted. I am certain also of my own consciousness\nat that moment. To doubt my existence is to assert my existence. To\ndoubt also implies that I will remember, live\u2015\u2015for doubt rests upon\nthese former ideas. The temporary character of the material world\nonly strengthens the reality of this inner world. The existence of the\nmaterial world cannot be demonstrated, and so man is driven inward to\nfind a basis for its reality. Thus by a deep insight, although without\nmuch logical reasoning, Augustine transcends Aristotle, and anticipates\nmodern thought by finding reality in the _unitary personality_, whose\nexistence is an inner certainty.\n\nBut Augustine is driven farther inward; for the certainty of the\nexistence of God is involved in this inner certainty. My doubt about\nthe character of the world of material things implies that their truth\nexists and that I have the capacity for measuring it. Such truths\nare universal. They transcend the individual consciousness, and their\nmutual agreement unites all rational beings in a common standard. On\nthe other hand, this unity of truths implies the existence of God.\nTruths are the Ideas (Platonic) in God\u2019s mind.[52]\n\nFull knowledge of God is denied to man in this life, but, nevertheless,\nall morality consists in love for God; all science is only an interest\nin the working of God in nature; all the beauty in the world around\nus points to the harmonious ordering of God; the history of the world\nis only the free act of God. Thus, in brief, does Augustine centralize\nthe principle of inner spirituality\u2015\u2015of \u201cinternality.\u201d Thus does he put\ninto control the certainty of consciousness.\n\nThis was Augustine\u2019s great contribution to the world both in the sphere\nof philosophy and religion. We shall see how important this principle\nis in our tracing of modern philosophy. Its importance upon the growth\nof religion was so very great that we cannot pass it by without remark.\n\u201cAugustine was the reformer of Christian piety.\u201d In the midst of\nreligion he discovered religion. He looked into the human heart and\nfound it to be the lower good; he looked to God and found Him to be\nthe higher good. In love for God, man becomes exalted to another being.\nThis is the \u201cnew birth.\u201d By this personal religion nature and grace are\nseparated, but morality and religion are united. Sin is the disposition\nto be independent by living in a state of unrest in the desires. Sin\nis a state of lust and fear. All is sin in the heart of the natural\nman\u2015\u2015in the heart apart from God. The pre-Augustinian religion of\nmorality and baptism, animated by hope and fear, was supplanted by him\nwith the conception of the desire to be happy by sharing in the bliss\nof God. Augustine passed from Christian pessimism to Christian optimism,\nto a confidence in pardoning grace. By faith and love God calls us\nback to himself and the soul acquires what God requires. Religion\nis personal and a thing of the heart. \u201cLove, unfeigned humility, and\nstrength to overcome the world, these are the elements of religion and\nits blessedness; they spring from the actual possession of the loving\nGod. This message Augustine preached to the Christianity of his time\nand of all times.\u201d[53]\n\nBut Augustine philosophically breaks with his own Platonism at one\npoint, and finds not in the intellect, but in the will, the primary\ncharacteristic of this consciousness of inner certainty. The will is\nthe inmost core of our being. All our mental states are formed under\nthe direction of the purposes of the will. The striking exception to\nthis is the cognition of the higher divine truth, in the presence of\nwhich the mind can be only passive. Revelation cannot be the production\nof the finite activity, but it is an act of grace before which the will\nis expectant and passive. Knowledge of the divine truths of the reason\nis the blessedness that results from the will of God and not of man.\nThe will of man is transformed into faith, and yet even then an element\nof the human will is present, although passive, for the appropriation\nof the truth is an act of will. Thus, in regard to this difficult\nsubject of the nature of the will, there are two observations to be\nmade: (1) Augustine conceives the will, memory, and intellect as so\nintimately related as not to be faculties of the personality like the\nproperties of a substance. They rather form an indissoluble unity of\nthe substance of the soul. (2) The will is theoretically free, and\nAugustine is one of the most forcible defenders of free-will because\nhe is also a defender of ethical responsibility and the justice of God.\nTheoretically the will is a force existing above sensuous nature and\nformally possesses the capacity of following or resisting inclination.\nActually it is never free to choose, but it has the higher function of\nbeing determined by the Good. Only the good will is free.[54]\n\n=The Authority of the Church according to Augustine.= With the fall\nof ancient Rome, the church was hard pressed, for the young peoples\nwho came into the church were Arian and the only German Catholic nation\nwas the Franks. Augustine was a man of vigor, but he seemed to lack the\npeculiar power of forcing the church to adopt as dogma the truths for\nwhich he stood. He always submitted himself absolutely to the tradition\nof the church, and yet in a general way he accomplished two things for\nthe church at large: (1) He established tradition as the authority and\nlaw of the church; (2) He offered the church a scientifically\nconstructed plan of salvation.\n\nThere now appears in Augustine\u2019s teaching the second centre\naround which the masses of his thought group themselves. This\nis his conception of the church in its authority and law. Here is\nthe principle of universality\u2015\u2015and historical universality\u2015\u2015and it\nruns counter to the principle of spiritual individualism which his\npsychological analysis had built up. Augustine is just as vigorous\na champion of the idea of the church as the means to salvation as he\nis champion of the individual certainty of truth. The two antithetical\npropositions lie together in his mind. As a pietist, he was an\nindividualist; as a priest, he was a loyal subject to dogma. We have\ndiscussed his teaching as it centred about man; now the discussion\ncentres about God as represented by His church. In practical life the\nwill of man is important, but in the eternal life the central influence\nis the grace of God. Between the will of man and the grace of God there\nis a chasm. This is felt the more by Augustine, and the necessity of\na God-centred doctrine seems the greater, when he beholds the contrast\nbetween the perfectness of God and the evil world of men. Evil now\nappears to him as a great stream flowing through the world. Humanity\nis by nature void of God. Theoretically man is free, but in the actual\nworld he is chained to his senses and to sin. Adam, the first man,\nalone could have possessed freedom; but Adam in his freedom sinned, and\nhis sin was that of the whole human race. Sin is therefore original to\nall men now living, and no man personally deserves salvation, however\nmeritorious his conduct. Moreover, as the result of Adam\u2019s sin, all men\nwould be damned were it not for the grace of God. The God-man by death\nbrought power to replenish empty humanity with divine love. Divine love\nis the beginning, middle, and end of salvation. Out of this love God\nhas sent His Son and founded His church. Universal man died, and only\nuniversal man can save. Belief in Christ is the only means of salvation,\nyet belief in Christ comes only by God\u2019s grace, and divine grace is not\nconditioned on human worthiness. Thus it is only by grace even now that\nman is saved; and no injustice would be done to men were all damned. On\nthe other hand, divine justice demands that some men at least should be\nexcluded from salvation in order that the punishment for Adam\u2019s sin be\npermanently maintained. The choice of the favored ones depends entirely\nupon the unsearchable decree of God. These are elected as monuments\nof His loving grace, while the others are elected to be damned as\nmonuments of His justice. The apparent calamity to the majority of\nmankind only shows the goodness of God the more. For, in the first\nplace, evil is not positive like the good. It is only negative and\nprimitive\u2015\u2015the absence of the good. The condemnation of the wicked is\ntherefore no defect in this theocratic system. In the second place,\nthe wicked only receive justice, for the salvation of only a few is a\ngratuitous act of love, which testifies to God\u2019s mercy. But, after all,\nit is the integrity of the whole spiritual imperial government of God\nthat is the important thing to consider. The King is law and goodness,\nand all His subjects are testimonies of His magnificent power.\n\n=The Dark Ages= (476\u2013800). The traditional estimate of the Middle Ages\nas altogether \u201cdark\u201d has been revised by modern scholars. The period\nnow called the Dark Ages has been restricted to the three hundred years\nbetween the fall of old Rome (476) and the founding of the empire by\nCharlemagne (800). Moreover, it is now thought that even in that period\nthe intellectual conditions were better in Italy than north of the\nAlps. In northern Italy the lay teacher seems always to have existed;\nand education never to have fallen entirely into the hands of the\nmonastery as it did in northern Europe between 800 and 1000. After\n800 the content of education north and south of the Alps seems to have\nbeen different. Everywhere, to be sure, education was comprised by the\n\u201cseven liberal arts,\u201d but the emphasis in the two regions was different.\nNorth of the Alps the dialectic was made important, and theology and\nlogic flourished. In Italy the emphasis was upon grammar and rhetoric,\nand \u201cliterary Paganism\u201d was always kept alive. Thus, when the revival\ncame in 1200, it appeared in the form of theological controversy north\nof the Alps, while in Italy in the form of legal science. The analysis\nin the summary of the Middle Ages given above (see p. 330) applies more\ntruthfully to the northern countries than to Italy. At the same time\nit is more pertinent to the history of thought, for in these northern\nregions, especially at Paris, medi\u00e6val philosophy was developed.\n\nNevertheless, it is easy for the modern scholar to go too far in trying\nto play fair with the Middle Ages. The first three centuries of this\ntime were a Dark Age everywhere in Europe. Wave after wave of barbarian\ninvasion swept over the land. It is not so much a matter of surprise\nthat four hundred years lie between the first two philosophers,\u2015\u2015but\nthe matter of surprise is that there were any philosophical fruits\nwhatever. In this respect the year 529 is significant\u2015\u2015significant\nboth in pointing backward to ancient culture and also in pointing\nforward to the feeble effort to retain some of that culture. In 529\nJustinian abolished the philosophical Schools at Athens; in 529\nalso, St. Benedict founded his monastic school at Monte Cassino (near\nNaples). These two events stand for the death of antiquity and the\nbirth of medi\u00e6val life. In this beginning of the monastic movement by\nSt. Benedict in western Europe was lodged, as it turned out, the hope\nof education for the medi\u00e6val man. During the two hundred years between\nthe year 800 and the year 1000 medi\u00e6val education was entirely in the\nhands of the monks.\n\n=The Revival of Charlemagne= (800\u2013900). The darkness of the\nEarly Period of the Middle Ages is broken by the somewhat abortive\nrenaissance of Charlemagne. Connected with this revival is the name\nof John Scotus Erigena (810\u2013880). Note that during these five hundred\nyears there are only two notable philosophers, Augustine and Erigena.\nNote that a span of four hundred years lies between them. Also note\nthat the first philosopher, Augustine, was a Roman and the second,\nErigena, was an Irishman. Thereby hangs a tale. During all those long\ncenturies of the Dark Ages after Augustine and until Charlemagne,\nthe light of science shone scarcely in northwestern Europe. In the\nwhole western hemisphere there were only three places where learning\nprospered: one was in the far east, among the Arabians; another was\nat Constantinople; the third was in the far west, in Britain. Thus it\nwas from Britain that Charlemagne had to call his educators, Alcuin and\nClement, to promote learning among the Franks; and it was from Britain,\ntoo, that his successor, Charles the Bald, called the Irishman, Erigena,\nfor the same purpose. During the renaissance of the great Charles\nand his successors, Irish scholars could be found in every monastery\nand cathedral in the empire. The teaching was soon called the \u201cIrish\nlearning.\u201d Still it must be said in qualification that the renaissance\nat the court of Charlemagne was a rather childish attempt to unite\nantiquity with theology. Excepting in the case of Scotus Erigena, the\nrevival was very feeble. It consisted of a new effort to understand\nAugustine, to master the simplest rules of logic, and to think out\ndogma by means of Hellenism. The period from 800 to 1000 is called\nthe Benedictine Age, because learning was entirely in the hands of the\nBenedictine monks. From the impulse given by the Irish scholars many\ncelebrated monastic and cathedral schools originated, like those of\nTours, Fulda, Rheims, Chartres, and the school at Paris. From the many\nmonastic schools emerge the names of Alcuin of York, Rhabanus Maurus of\nFulda, and Gerbert at Rheims. But among these scholars the only one of\nphilosophical importance is John Scotus Erigena.\n\n=John Scotus Erigena (810\u2013880): Life and Teaching.= When his\ncontemporaries were only lisping at philosophy and his immediate\nsuccessors were absorbed in disconnected problems, Erigena worked\nout a connected system. Like Augustine, Erigena stood far in advance\nof his age. He was not only the one great thinker of the revival of\nCharlemagne, but he was one of the most remarkable personalities of the\nMiddle Ages. Born in Ireland, he had the benefit of an education in the\nschools of that centre of learning, which he could not have obtained\non the continent of Europe. In 853 he was called by Charles the Bald\nto carry on the work begun by Alcuin under Charlemagne. Three centuries\nafter his death the church condemned him as a heretic (1209) on account\nof his writings on predestination and transubstantiation. His learning\nwas so great that he has been called \u201cthe Origen of the North.\u201d He\nread Greek, and this was a rare accomplishment in those days, for even\nAlcuin scarcely knew the Greek alphabet. His most notable original work\nis _De Divisione Naturae_, which was neo-Platonism in Christian dress.\nHis most influential work was his translation of the _pseudo-Dionysius,\nthe Areopagite._ It proved, in fact, to be one of the most influential\nbooks of this period, and was instrumental on account of its large\ncirculation in propagating neo-Platonism in the Middle Ages.\n\nErigena was neither a scholastic nor a dialectical theologian. He\nneither assailed nor defended church doctrine. He calmly pushed\nneo-Platonism to the borders of pantheism. He was an Irishman with\na Greek mind, a neo-Platonist under the veil of a Christian mystic.\nNo churchman ever expressed neo-Platonism so frankly. The writings\nfrom which Erigena got his doctrine are called the _Pseudo-Dionysius_\nwritings because the authorship was falsely attributed to a companion\nof St. Paul, Dionysius the Areopagite. They were, however, probably\nwritten in the fifth century, for they are essentially neo-Platonic and\nborder on pantheism. Erigena translated them at the request of Charles\nthe Bald, and their appearance produced great astonishment in Europe\n(858\u2013860). Erigena\u2019s own work, _De Divisione Naturae_, is an extreme\npantheistic statement of the doctrine in the _Pseudo-Dionysius_.\nBriefly stated Erigena\u2019s teaching is as follows. God is an\nincomprehensible being and can be described only in negative terms\n(negative theology). (See chapter on Philo.) God is the same as Being\nor Nature, and He unfolds Himself as a fourfold series. These are:\nGod, the world in God, the world outside God, God after the world\nhas returned to Him. God contains in Himself through the Logos all\nthe primordial types of things formed before creation. Creation is\nthe logical unfolding of particulars from the universal. Immortality\nconsists in the particulars again becoming universal. In the types\nof things God is creating Himself, and they are graded from God down\nto concrete objects. But all will finally return to God, and Erigena\nthought he found analogies of this return everywhere in nature.\n\n=The Greek Principle which Erigena formulated for the Middle Ages.=\nThese details of the teaching of Erigena are unimportant except as they\nthrow light upon that Greek underlying principle which he formulated\nfor the Middle Ages. _The Real is the Universal. The more universal a\nthing is, the more real and therefore the more perfect it is._ If we\nhave an idea of a universal, that universal has existence because it is\nuniversal. The idea of God is universal, therefore God exists. The idea\nof the world is a universal, but not so universal as the idea of God,\nand therefore not so surely existent. But the idea of the world has\nmore reality than the idea of a tree. Medi\u00e6val philosophy becomes from\nthis time on _a logical theism_. In the case of Erigena it is a logical\npantheism. The world is a logical mosaic. Real dependence is logical\ndependence, and what we in modern times call the causes and effects\nbetween natural objects are regarded by the Middle Ages as sufficiently\nexplained if put in logical arrangement. This is the core of medi\u00e6val\nthinking, and the student will fail to understand the civilization of\nthe Middle Ages unless he grasps this central principle.\n\nBut this realizing of the logical universal is Greek and betrays\nthe fundamentally Greek character of medi\u00e6val civilization. The\nobjective spiritual church has merely taken the place of objective\nnature. Medi\u00e6val history is a conflict between Greek universalism\nand the Christian conception of the individual. In Erigena the Greek\nelement appeared in overwhelming dominance. Erigena is a smaller\nAugustine\u2015\u2015Augustine uncontrolled by great masses of thought and\nuninspired by practical ideals of building up the church. Erigena is\na \u201cbelated Gnostic.\u201d Why was it that his neo-Platonic pantheism did\nnot overcome entirely the individualistic element in Christian dogma?\nWhy, on the contrary, did it bring out far-reaching issues of conflict\nwhen a century later the significance of his teaching was understood?\nBecause inherently and fundamentally in the nature of the German\npeoples, as appearing in their customs and laws, was the conviction\nof the rights of the individual personality. In the teaching of the\nChristian fathers the element of the spiritual personality found a deep\necho in the German nature. The German could tolerate and did actually\nlive under the later church doctrine of a moderate realism; but the\nmeasured calm of the Greek pantheistic conception of Erigena deprived\nthe German of all his inherited ideals. Thus when intellectual activity\nwas aroused a century later, the conflict became hot over the issue in\nErigena\u2019s doctrine. Erigena was the forerunner of the scholastics. It\nwas he who tossed the apple of discord among the thinkers of the Middle\nAges.\n\n=The Last Century of the Early Period= (900\u20131000). The century\nfollowing Erigena was one of demoralization. All learning declined with\nthe renewed invasions from the north, east, and west. The empire of\nCharlemagne was broken up and the Papacy temporarily disappeared. There\nis a persistent tradition that the Christians at this time believed the\nend of the world to be near. This has been proved to be a legend, but\nback of it lies the truth that there was a fresh rise of piety which\nlasted until 1300. With this movement we enter upon the next period of\nthe Middle Ages.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER XVII\n\n THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD (1000\u20131200)\n\n\n=The General Character of the Transitional Period.= The first century\nof the Transitional Period was as different from the last century of\nthe Early Period in its intellectual attitude and emotional tone as can\nbe imagined. It was the century of the new birth of Europe\u2015\u2015a century\nwhen the beginning of political order was accompanied by a passion for\ninquiry. The spirit of pietism took possession of all institutions\u2015\u2015and\nin the thirteenth century the medi\u00e6val system seemed to have reached\nits perfect form. The Transitional Period gives meaning to the Crusades.\n\u201cIf ever ideals were carried out in the world and gained dominion\nover souls, it happened then.\u201d[55] \u201cIt was as if the world had cast\naside its old garment and clothed itself in the white robe of the\nchurch.\u201d[56] The ardor of the Crusades was the specific expression\nof this religious revival. All the pent-up energies of the previous\nmedi\u00e6val life were passing through a rapid period of growth.\n\nPhilosophically this period is the time when neo-Platonic mysticism, as\nelaborated by Erigena, came into conflict with the Christian conception\nof the individual. These two motives had been held together without\ncontroversy in the Early Period; now they develop into controversy. The\nphilosophical theories evolved by this controversy go by the name of\nscholasticism. While theoretically secular studies were supposed to be\ndiscarded and ancient literature was considered to be the temptation\nof the devil, yet practically one is surprised to find a trained skill\nin the use of dialectic, and the employment of many of the materials of\nantiquity as a means of culture and the refutation of heresies. There\nwas a knowledge of the classics, of dialectic, of neo-Platonism, and\nof Augustine. The spirit of Platonic realism prevailed among the group\nof schoolmen of these two centuries. The problem before this group is\ndifferent from that presented to the schoolmen of the next period. The\nscholastics or schoolmen of this period whom we shall consider in some\ndetail are,\u2015\u2015\n\n Anselm, 1033\u20131109.\n Roscellinus, d. 1100 about.\n Abelard, 1079\u20131142.\n\n=What is Scholasticism?= In a general sense scholasticism is\nphilosophic thought, but historically the term is usually restricted\nto the philosophic thinking of the Middle Ages. It has been pointed\nout that scholastic philosophy does not differ from any other\nphilosophy. It had its prejudices, its dependence on authority, its\nemployment of deduction, its use of observation\u2015\u2015like all philosophy.\nThe scholasticism of this time, however, is distinguished by its\ngeneral reference to church dogma as authority and its imperfect use\nof experience. The scholasticism of the Middle Ages may therefore\nbe defined as the application of dialectic or logical methods to the\ndiscussion of theological problems. It was the attempt to present the\ndoctrine of the church in a scientific system of philosophy. Sometimes\nsuch an attempt resulted in heresy when the result was a changing of\ndogma. Generally, however, the scholastic was not so ambitious, for\nhe usually sought to keep within the authoritative doctrines of the\nchurch. He feared the anathema of the church. Scholasticism therefore,\nin general, had two characteristics: (1) It assumed that church dogma\nwas unquestionable and infallible; (2) It tried to clarify dogma by\nrational explanation, or to show that dogma was at least not contrary\nto reason. Dogma may in some cases be explained by the reason. In some\ncases it may be so far above reason that the only thing the reason\ncan say is, \u201cThe doctrine does not contradict me.\u201d In the words\nof an eminent churchman, \u201cDogma says, _Deus homo_ (God became man).\nScholasticism asks, _Cur deus homo?_ (Why did God become man?)\u201d\nRevelation is assumed; scholastic philosophy is permitted; independent\nrational science is denied. The remainder of the history of the Middle\nAges shows no conscious attempt to form a new body of doctrine for the\nchurch; and only here and there does there appear an effort to modify\nthe existing doctrine. The thinkers are employed in this scholastic\nclarifying of the doctrine. In this period scholasticism takes the form\nof the logical problem of the relation of universals and particulars.\nIn the period of Classic Scholasticism this logical problem changes\ninto the metaphysical one of the respective scopes of reason and faith.\n\nThe problem of the relation of universal conceptions to particular\nexperiences had become a central one to the Greeks after Socrates.\n(See summary, p. 103.) It was natural that the same problem should\narise with the new medi\u00e6val man and should delight him as an\nenigmatical question. But conditions were less favorable for the\nmedi\u00e6val scholastic than for the Greek. The medi\u00e6val had scanty\nliterary materials, no opportunity of testing his discussions by\nempirical observations, and his mind was untrained. In the Early Period\nscholasticism had the character of a mental game in logic. It consisted,\non the whole, in the subtle spinning out of logical questions with the\nfew fragments of Aristotle as a guide. This was dangerous to faith, but\nthe church could not prevent it, for it was the only mental diversion\nopen to monks of the schools of Charlemagne. The arguments often reveal\ngreat mental acuteness, although they have the appearance of triviality.\nThe schools of the ninth century were given over to barren formalism,\nand this threatened to submerge the vigorous movement inaugurated\nby Erigena. \u201cCan a prostitute become a virgin again through divine\nomnipotence?\u201d \u201cDoes a mouse that eats the sacrament eat the body of\nGod?\u201d \u201cHow many angels can stand on the point of a needle?\u201d These\nare examples of the prevailing verbal gymnastics of that time, and\nsuch problems can be found even in the works of Peter Lombard, Thomas\nAquinas, and Duns Scotus.\n\nLogically stated the problem is that of the relation of particulars to\nuniversals. It is usually called the problem of the reality of general\nideas. The question was started by a passage in that universally\nused text-book of the time\u2015\u2015the _Isagoge_ of Porphyry, which was\nan introduction to Aristotle\u2019s _Categories_. (See p. 102.) Porphyry\ndivides the problem into three parts: (1) Do genera and species exist\nin nature, or do they exist as mere products of the intellect? (2) If\nthey are things apart from the mind, are they corporeal or incorporeal\nthings? (3) Do they exist outside the individual things of sense, or\nare they realized in the latter? Upon the problem involved here the\nthinkers of the Middle Ages were divided into three schools,\u2015\u2015realists,\nconceptualists, and nominalists.[57] The realist maintained that the\ngeneral idea had reality, while the particular was only a defective\nimitation of it. The nominalist, on the contrary, held that the\nuniversal is only a name (_nomen_) or an abstraction derived from the\nreal particular thing. The conceptualist tried to mediate between the\ntwo by showing that reality exists only in the particular. To use the\nmedi\u00e6val phrases, realism is _universalia ante rem_; nominalism is\n_universalia post rem_; conceptualism is _universalia in re_. (See\np. 103 for table of comparison with Protagoras, Plato, and Aristotle.)\nThe question was of great practical importance to the church. Is the\nuniversal church real and therefore all its dogma authoritative, or are\nthe particular churches real and authoritative? This was a vital matter\nto the churchman of that day who was trying to establish the primacy\nof Rome among the separate churches. Furthermore, to show that humanity\nwas less real than the particular human beings would destroy the\nchurch doctrine of sin and redemption, for these dogmas depended on the\nassumption of the solidarity of the human race. The church universal\nand its universal dogma were not mere names to the schoolmen, and that\nis why the orthodox churchmen were nearly always realists. Religious\nprinciples were universals, while particulars were secular. Dogma had\nbecome fixed, with which traditionally the church had become identified.\nTo emphasize particular experiences would mean the continual correcting\nof tradition and a substitution of private judgment for church decrees.\nWhen nominalism is completely worked out, it will be found to conflict\nwith church dogma at every point. The result is skepticism. Still the\nchurchman later saw that there is great danger also in a thorough-going\nrealism like that of Erigena\u2019s. It became pantheism. Both realism and\nnominalism were dangerous doctrines for the church if they were driven\nto their logical conclusions.\n\n=Anselm (1033\u20131109): Life and Position in Medi\u00e6val Philosophy.=\nAnselm lived during the monastic revival which had begun in the\ntenth century. He was in fact the last of the monastic teachers, for\nduring his declining years occurred the first of the Crusades, and\nthe epoch following him witnessed the transference of learning from\nthe monasteries to the universities. He was born of a noble family\nin Aosta, Lombardy, and entered in early life the monastery of Bec.\nHere he succeeded Lanfranc as abbot, and again he succeeded Lanfranc\nin the archbishopric of Canterbury. He was a man of genuine piety, of\nspeculative bent, and of unswerving faith in the dogma of the church.\nAs primate of England he resisted with much sagacity the encroachments\nof the secular power. His _Cur Deus Homo_ was a treatise on the\ndoctrine of the redemption and atonement, and was one of the most\nimportant books of the Middle Ages.\n\nAnselm brought about a great change in theological teaching. Berengar\nof Tours had but recently made an attack upon the doctrine of the real\npresence of Christ in the Eucharist, and was the immediate cause of\nthe \u201cstorm and stress\u201d period of scholasticism that followed. Anselm\u2019s\nteacher and predecessor, Lanfranc, had defended the doctrine. The\ndoctrine had not yet been settled, and each side claimed the basis of\nauthority. Anselm was therefore a witness of the first attempt to apply\nphilosophy to dogma, and he was the first to use dialectics with the\nserious purpose of defending dogma. From this time on, dialectics\nwas no longer an intellectual diversion. He, the last of the monastic\nteachers, was the first to employ dialectics with the new purpose of\ninstructing the believer. His entire life was animated by the desire\nto add knowledge to faith by the means of philosophy.\n\nAnselm\u2019s scholasticism therefore circulates about the Patristic\ntheology as a centre; and his spirit and method is so similar to that\nof Augustine and the Apologists, that he has been justly called \u201cthe\nsecond Augustine\u201d and \u201cthe last of the Fathers.\u201d Beside the safe and\ntraditionally centralized teaching of Anselm, the imaginative pantheism\nof Erigena seems like a body that had been loosened from its natural\nplace and was floating away beyond control. Both Erigena and Anselm\nwere inspired by the Platonism that until the year 1200 dominated\nthe Middle Ages. That is, both were realists. The realism of Erigena,\nhowever, expressed in full the mystic element of Platonism. It\ndestroyed all grades of reality below God, and made unnecessary the\nchurch and its offices. Erigena was an extreme realist; Anselm was\nconsistent with the attitude of the church in being a moderate realist.\nThe _credo ut intelligam_ (faith as the basis of intellectual belief)\nwas the anchor which saved him and became the safeguard of all future\northodox scholastics. The world to Anselm is a hierarchy of universal\nreals, such as the sacraments, the church, and the Trinity. To such\ndogmas of the church he applied philosophy, not because they needed\nsupport, but in order to make them clear by analysis. Philosophy shall\nonly clarify dogma.\n\n=Anselm\u2019s Arguments for the Existence of God.= The so-called \u201cAnselmic\nArguments for the Existence of God\u201d are the best known parts of\nAnselm\u2019s teaching, and in the eyes of the churchman place his theodicy\nin the \u201cstatus of a finished science.\u201d To get their cogency we must\nremember the underlying thought of medi\u00e6val realism; the more universal\na thing is, the more real it is\u2015\u2015the more it exists and the more\nperfect it is. (See p. 352.) In his _Monologium_ he developed the\nso-called _cosmological argument_: A single perfect and universal being\nmust be assumed as the cause of all lesser beings. God\u2019s essence must\ninvolve his existence. Every other being can be thought as coming into\nexistence from some external cause, while God alone exists from the\nnecessity of his own nature. In his _Proslogium_ he elaborated his more\nfamous _ontological argument_: Man has the idea of a perfect being;\nPerfection involves among other qualities that of existence, otherwise\nwe could think of a more perfect being or one who did possess existence;\nTherefore God exists.\n\n=Roscellinus= (d. 1100 about): =Life and Teaching=. Roscellinus,\na canon of Compi\u00e8gne, was the first scholastic to attempt to modify\ndogma by the dialectic,\u2015\u2015not that there had not occurred throughout the\nhistory of the church many theological controversies. Before this time\nsuch controversies had on the whole arisen over doctrines that had not\nyet become dogma. The particular object of the attack of Roscellinus\nwas the dogma of the Trinity, and the base of his attack was none other\nthan philosophy. Roscellinus completely failed in getting the church\nto modify this particular doctrine, but he succeeded in a larger way\nthan he could have imagined. He brought out into distinctness the issue\nbetween reason and revelation. The fundamental question thereafter\nwas as to the rights of the human reason and the rights of divine\nrevelation. Roscellinus supplied a powerful shock to faith and awakened\nthe schools to the consequences of questions which had seemed before to\nbe merely logical problems.\n\nRoscellinus was a nominalist, and it was from the point of view of\nnominalism that he attempted to change the dogma of the Trinity. He\nmade a life-long defense of the doctrine that the Godhead was three\ndifferent substances, agreeing only in certain qualities. This is\ntritheism and not a Trinity. But this was only the most striking\nexample of his application of the general principle of nominalism.\nIn general, universals are only names and have an existence only in\nthe human mind. _Universalia post rem._ Individuals alone exist. The\ngroups formed out of many individuals by addition, or the parts of an\nindividual formed by division, are mental affairs and have no reality.\nRoscellinus was opposed by Anselm, condemned by the church, and obliged\nto recant. He fled to England, returned to France, and again preached\nhis doctrine.\n\n=Storm and Stress.= After the issue was brought to a head by the\nnominalism of Roscellinus, the twelfth century was torn in battle\nover the reality of general ideas. The realists, on the one hand,\ntried to grade universals and to show how universals are related to\nparticulars\u2015\u2015all of which Anselm had left to faith. How do universals,\nsuch as the persons in the Trinity, the church, the sacraments,\nexist in one universal God? Grotesque explanations were offered, like\nthe imaginative work of Bernard of Chartres and the symbolic number\ntheory of his brother, Theodoric. William of Champeaux, a teacher of\nAbelard, almost reduced realism to a pantheism. Nothing exists but\nthe universal; all individuals are accidental modifications of the\nuniversal. Pantheism was so inherent in the blood of realism that it\nwas always appearing here and there.\n\nSuch pantheistic deductions by the realists brought out nominalism in\nopposition, in spite of the repression of nominalism by the authorities\nof the church. The nominalists sought protection and authority under\nthe name of Aristotle, for his conceptualist doctrine was not known\nat this time. The few writings of Aristotle then known were very\nimperfectly interpreted. One of the most ironical situations in\nthe history of the Middle Ages is that, up to the Period of Classic\nScholasticism, Plato was the authority of the orthodox and Aristotle\nof the heterodox.\n\n=The Life of Abelard= (1079\u20131142). Abelard had both Roscellinus and\nWilliam of Champeaux as teachers. He quarreled with them both and set\nup a rival school of his own. He taught in various places and was, with\nsome interruptions, in Paris from 1108 to 1136. The university did not\nexist until a generation after him, but he was its true founder, for\nhe inaugurated the movement out of which the early universities sprang.\nHis method was transferred from philosophy to theology and thence to\nall studies. It was a _didactic method_ of drawing conclusions after an\nempirical enumeration of the _pros_ and _cons_. Abelard was acquainted\nwith no Greek writings except in Latin translations. His great talent\nas a teacher and his keen French intellect, that was impatient of all\nrestraint, made him, however, the most brilliant of the schoolmen. Two\nsynods condemned his teaching. Probably his modern popular reputation\nrests upon his unfortunate love-relations with Heloise.\n\n=Abelard\u2019s Conceptualism. Universals exist in the Particulars.=\nAbelard formed the storm-centre of the strife over the technical\nrelations between particulars and universals. His position has been\nmisunderstood because he, the pupil and opponent both of Roscellinus\nand of William of Champeaux, fought each with the weapons of the other.\nHe was repelled from pantheism, which appears to him to be the logic\nof realism, and he recoiled equally from the sensualistic outcome\nof nominalism. Universals are the indispensable forms of knowledge,\nand they must therefore have some existence in the nature of the\nthings which we know. This existence consists of the similarity of the\nessential characteristic of things. This likeness is not a numerical\nidentity, but a unity which makes our knowledge of the particular\nthings possible. This likeness or similarity between things is the\nsame as the types created by God. Thus the universal has no independent\nobjective existence, and on the other hand it is not a mere word\nout of all relation to things. The universals exist in three ways:\n(1) they exist before the things only as Ideas in the mind of God;\n(2) they coexist with the things as the essential likenesses of\nthings; (3) they exist after the things in the human mind, when it\nhas knowledge of things. Abelard developed his theory only polemically\nand never worked it out systematically. On the technical side of this\nquestion the preceding lines of thought come into an unsystematic\nunity. His theory was accepted by the Arabian philosophers and is\npractically that of Aquinas and Duns Scotus. With Abelard the problem\nwas not solved indeed, but it came to a preliminary stop in this\nstatement\u2015\u2015universals have an equal significance, _ante rem_ in the\nmind of God, _in re_ in nature, _post rem_ in human knowledge.\n\n=Abelard\u2019s Rationalism.\u2015\u2015The Relation between Reason and Dogma.=\nThe proud, self-reliant, self-conscious Abelard could be nothing else\nthan a rationalist. He was the type of the controversial metaphysician.\nHe was the fighting dialectician,\u2015\u2015intolerant of restraint, devoid\nof respect for authority, seeking the prize of victory at any cost.\nErigena, as a mystic, harmonized reason and dogma because they are\nequal; Anselm, as an orthodox scholastic, harmonized them because\nreason is subordinate to dogma and conforms to it; Abelard, as a\nrationalist, harmonized reason and dogma because dogma is subordinate\nto reason and conforms to reason. To Anselm reason merely clarifies\ndogma; to Abelard \u201cdogma is only a provisional substitute for reason.\u201d\nAnselm never questions dogma, while Abelard calls dogma before the\nbar of the reason and then acts as dogma\u2019s advocate. We must try all\ndogma in court, and, contrary to modern legal practice, we must doubt\nit until it proves its innocence. For \u201cit is through doubt we come to\ninvestigation, and through investigation to the truth.\u201d A good example\nof Abelard\u2019s attitude appears in his _Sic et Non_, a treatise in which\nhe sets the views of the Fathers over against one another so that the\nreason may decide upon the truth. Another example of his method appears\nin his examination of the doctrine of the Trinity, and in the third\nbook of _Christian Theology_ he cites twenty-three objections and\nin the fourth book answers them. This rationalizing spirit led him\nto advocate the doctrine of free-will, to place the responsibility of\nmoral conduct and theoretical belief upon the individual, to regard\nChristianity as the consummation of all religions and not as the\npresentation of anything new.\n\nIf in these discussions he was more brilliant than profound, if he\nwrote upon many questions without solving any, if the weight of his\npersonality could not prevail in his controversies, it was because the\nscience of the twelfth century offered him little empirical support\nagainst the actual power of the church and the mighty inward strength\nof faith of the people. What means had Abelard to support his position\nthat rational science should determine faith? Nothing but the hollow\nmethods of scholastic logic and the traditions of the church\u2015\u2015the\nvery things against which he was rebelling. Abelard set for himself\na problem, but he lacked the means of its solution. It was, however, a\nproblem that has never vanished from the memory of the European peoples.\n\nThe unrest in Abelard\u2019s teaching is representative of the last century\nof this period, which he brought to a close. There was growing a\ngeneral revolt from the unfruitful methods of the scholastic dialectic,\ncoupled with feverish desire for knowledge. There was, on the one\nhand, a great reaction toward mysticism with the Victorines, Bernard\nof Clairvaux and Bernard of Tours, and toward eclecticism with John\nof Salisbury and Peter the Lombard. On the other hand, there was\nan interesting growth in empirical science. But these theoretical\ninterests were but eddies in the great current of events. For Jerusalem\nand the Holy Land, the memorials in earthly form of all the ideals\nsacred to the medi\u00e6val mind, had fallen into the hands of the infidel!\nThe western world was preparing for the rescue, and the Crusades were\nthe last and the frenzied expression of the Platonic idealism of the\nMiddle Ages. They bring the first two periods to a spectacular climax.\nIs it a mere coincidence that Abelard brings to a close the dominance\nof idealism on the theoretic side at the time when earthly symbols of\nthat idealism were being destroyed?\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER XVIII\n\n THE PERIOD OF CLASSIC SCHOLASTICISM (1200\u20131453)\n\n\n=The General Character of this Last Period.= The first one hundred\nand fifty years of this period was the golden age of scholasticism;\nthe remaining one hundred years was a period of decline. The period\nof Classic Scholasticism was a natural growth from the Transitional\nPeriod. At the end of the Transitional Period the church, in spite of\nMohammedans, Jews, heretics, and the classics, outshone all else, and\nits life and dogma were the most worth while. In this period appeared a\ntheology, adequate to its life and dogma,\u2015\u2015a theology which was floated\nby the wave of piety of the Mendicant Orders. Acquaintance with the\ntrue Aristotle was the needed stimulus. The favorable conditions for\nthat stimulus were (1) the triumph of the church and papacy, (2) the\nintense piety of the Mendicants, (3) the general culture derived from\nan inner development of the church and from contact with the East in\nConstantinople, Palestine, and Spain. Aristotle and the Mendicants were\nthe new forces, and they achieved their position against the hostility\nof the old Orders, the universities, and the teachers. The triumph was\npossible because the new forces contributed nothing really new, but\nmerely completed the old scheme of things. The new Aristotle, as it\nwas understood, taught metaphysics, epistemology, and politics in a way\nto vindicate dogma as against the opposition of William of Champeaux\nand Roscellinus. The Mendicants on their part vindicated all dogma by\nblending it with faith on the one hand, and with reason on the other.\n\nThe scholasticism of the Transitional Period was predominantly\ncontroversial, while the character of this period, which we are now\nentering, is synthetic and constructive. The infusion of fresh blood\ninto culture, from not only the logical but the physical works of\nAristotle, resulted in the renewal of interest in the dialectic and in\nthe construction of systems of metaphysics and psychology. _The central\nproblem now concerns the respective scopes of reason and faith_, and\nto its solution logic and psychology are applied. A complete solution\nseemed to be made by Thomas Aquinas, which had its literary expression\nin Dante. Without the introduction of any new philosophical principle\nthe world of nature, as interpreted by Aristotle, was apparently\nbrought by Thomas into theoretical harmony with the Augustinian\nconception of the world of grace. But no sooner did Thomas seem to\nhave formulated scholastic philosophy for all time, than controversy\nbroke out afresh. For pantheistic mysticism gained its independence\nthrough one of Thomas\u2019s own brother Dominicans, Eckhart; then Duns\nScotus, a Franciscan, drew up a metaphysical programme based upon the\nAugustinian theory of the will, and gave a new direction to philosophy;\nand furthermore nominalism grew great upon Aristotle\u2019s logic and the\nnew empirical psychology. For the churchman, philosophy reached its\ncompleteness in Thomas Aquinas. The later tendencies are regarded by\nthe churchman as deteriorations, and even modern philosophy is looked\nupon as but temporizing with the classic system of Thomas.\n\n Illustration:\n GROWTH OF MOHAMMEDANISM DURING THE MIDDLE AGES,\n SHOWING ITS CONTACT WITH CHRISTIAN CIVILIZATION\n\n The Conquests of the Mohammedans during the different epochs are\n shown by the different shading and the dates placed on the map.\n\n=The Two Civilizations.= This is one of the periods of thought\nresulting from the shiftings of distinct civilizations. We have already\nnoted the influence of the struggles of the Orient and the Occident in\nthe Persian wars and in the campaigns of Alexander; and we have lately\nseen an entirely new epoch ushered in by the invasions of the northern\ntribes into Rome. With the new epoch before us, we find ourselves\nconfronted with another new ethnic situation. The civilization of the\nMohammedan had grown in mighty strength in the East, had possessed\nitself of Asia Minor, northern Africa, and Spain, and was now facing\nEurope from the east, west, and south. All through the First Period\nof the Middle Ages the Christian and Mohammedan civilizations had\nbeen contestants for supremacy. Only as late as 732 the Mohammedan\nclaim upon Europe had been defeated at the battle of Tours. Mohammed\n(570\u2013632) converted the whole of Arabia to Islam during the ten years\nbetween his Hegira (622) and his death. His successors took Palestine\n(637), Syria (638), Egypt (647), Persia (710), all north Africa\n(by 707), invaded Spain (711), and were repulsed at Tours (732).\nAll this occurred within a century, and for the next two hundred\nyears (800\u20131000) the Mohammedans harassed Rome and the islands of\nthe Mediterranean. With the two civilizations facing each other on\nthe Mediterranean, only mutual religious fanaticism could stand in\nthe way of their mutual cultural influence. In point of fact, because\nof fanaticism the cultures of the two civilizations during the first\ncenturies of the Middle Ages touched each other but little. In those\nfirst centuries of the Middle Ages, when western Europe was shrouded\nin darkness, the schools of the Arabs at Bagdad, Basra, Kufa, and other\ncities were enjoying a splendid intellectual life. From 850 to 1100\nthe centre of learning of the world was in the Arabian cities of the\nEast.[58] In 1100 the fanatical faction of the Arabians crushed this\nintellectual movement in the East, the scholars fled to Spain, and for\na century longer Saracen learning flourished in Spain, especially in\nCordova. In 1200 the Arabian orthodoxy made itself felt in Spain, and\nthe Arabian scholars there had to find refuge among the Jews or\nChristians.\n\n=The First Contact of the Two Civilizations.= From the beginning of\nthe Middle Ages the point of contact between the two civilizations was\neither war or commerce. The Jew was the globe-trotter of that day, and\nwas constantly bringing into Europe reports of Arabian civilization.\nHe was a philosopher, a monotheist, a Semite, like the Arab, and he had\nan interest in more than commercial matters. About the end of the Early\nPeriod of the Middle Ages he found it profitable to make first Hebrew\nand then Latin translations of Arabian learning, and to sell them in\nEurope. In this form, between 1000 and 1100, medical and astronomical\nknowledge entered Europe. Greek philosophical writings came next in\ntranslations from the Arabic, which had previously been translated from\nthe Syriac. Thus for the two hundred years, between 1000 and 1200, the\nChristian schools were beginning to read portions of Greek philosophy\nin Latin, which had previously passed through Syriac and Arabian\n(and sometimes Hebrew) translations. Before 1200, there were none\nbut these Arabic versions. A pertinent example of these was the works\nof Aristotle. Before 1200 all of Aristotle\u2019s writings, except the\n_Organon_, appeared in Europe in this form, and the _Organon_ as a\nwhole was not known until 1150. In 1125 some of Aristotle\u2019s physics was\nknown by the school of Chartres; in 1200 all the physics, metaphysics,\nand ethics were known in translations from the Latin and Hebrew. These\nwere accompanied by Arabian commentaries, which interpreted Aristotle\nas if he were a neo-Platonic pantheist. There were many churchmen\ninterested in the work of translation, as, for example, Gerbert,\nand Raymond of Toledo. Roger II of Sicily (d. 1154) and Frederick II\n(d. 1250) had their courts filled with Arabian philosophers. Frederick\nhad many translations made and presented to the Universities of Oxford,\nParis, and Bologna.\n\nThus the influence of the Arabian upon the Christian culture before the\nClassic Period of the Middle Ages was not inconsiderable. But this must\nbe said of Arabian culture\u2015\u2015it was mainly borrowed. Arabia[59] acted\nmerely as a transmitter of the materials of knowledge from the Greeks\nand Hindoos; and so far as philosophy was concerned, the Arab was\nreturning to Europe, in a perverted form, the Aristotle which had been\ndeposited with him centuries before. The Mohammedans were the world\u2019s\ncarriers of a considerable body of science and of many new agricultural\nproducts; and of the amount which they introduced into Europe only\na small portion was their own. At the end of the twelfth century the\nChristian at Rome and York was richer in the principles of discovery,\nbut poorer in the amount of traditional learning and of scientific\nwealth, than the Mohammedan at Bagdad and Cordova.\n\n=The Conflict between the Two Civilizations.\u2015\u2015The Crusades.[60]=\nThe rivalry between the two civilizations became intensified into an\nopen conflict about the year 1100. Up to the year 1000 the Mohammedan\nleaders were Arabians, but in the eleventh century these Arabians\nwere conquered by tribes of Turks or Mongolians from the north of\nAsia. These became converted to Mohammedanism, but they had no love\nfor culture nor reverence for the places in Palestine, which were\nsacred alike to the Christian and the Arab. From the fourth to the\ntwelfth century the pilgrimages of the Christians, individually or in\nmultitudes, largely increased, but in the eleventh century the new race\nof Mohammedan Turks made the access to Jerusalem more difficult. They\nbegan to subject the pilgrims to cruelties, so that the Christian was\nbeginning to find the door of his Holy Land closed to him. Then did\nPlatonic Christianity rush to the rescue of those sacred places that\nsymbolized its ideals. This onslaught upon the Mohammedans came in a\nseries of surges, traditionally spoken of as the eight Crusades.[61]\nThe Crusades resulted quite contrary to the expectations of the church,\nfor the Crusaders failed in permanently recapturing Jerusalem. But the\nCrusades accomplished the unexpected thing\u2015\u2015they awakened Europe. The\neffect of the Crusades upon Europe was far greater than upon the Orient.\nThe results may be enumerated as follows:\u2015\u2015\n\n1. The dormant European intellect was shaken up by contact with the\nheathen, whom the Europeans had previously despised, but whom they\nfound to be their superiors.\n\n2. A new national rivalry was aroused among the Christian soldiers.\nThis national spirit was helped negatively by the losses among the\nfeudal lords.\n\n3. Commercial activity was given an immense impulse. A new social\nclass was formed, which allied itself with the kings against the feudal\nlords. Trade was opened with the East, revealing new luxuries and new\nneeds. Venice, Pisa, and Genoa, and in a secondary way also the German,\nFrench, and English towns, became prosperous commercial centres.\n\n4. The power of the Latin church was extended.\n\n5. _The works of Aristotle were introduced in translations direct from\nthe original Greek._ In the fourth Crusade Constantinople was captured\nby the Crusaders (1204), and in this way the treasures of the Greeks\nwere opened to the western scholars. The complete works of Aristotle\nwere introduced into western Europe at a time when Aristotle was being\ninterpreted as a pantheist by the Arabian commentators.\n\n=The Revival of Learning.= The need of learning, that had been felt\nin the twelfth century, was now being satisfied. The entire logic\nof Aristotle and his entire natural science gave the new materials\nfor knowledge. These came into Europe within the century between\n1150 and 1250, (1) through translations from the Arabic, and then\n(2) directly through translations from the Greek. Aristotle\u2019s logic\nrevived scholasticism and his science became the foundation of\nmetaphysics. Medi\u00e6val thought was ready for this and _there was a\ncomplete readjustment without the introduction of a new philosophical\nprinciple_. The side of Augustine\u2019s teaching that emphasized the\nintellect rather than the will, gained by being confirmed by the\nsystematic intellectualism of Aristotle. The founder of this was\nAlbert of Bollstaedt; the organizer and literary codifier was Thomas\nAquinas; the poetic expression was Dante. The new centres of learning\nwere Paris and Constantinople. The centres of teaching were transferred\nfrom the monasteries to the new Universities (1100\u20131300). Salerno had\nits beginnings in the latter part of the eleventh century. Bologna in\nlaw, Oxford in general culture and theology, Paris in the same studies,\nshow traces of general organization between 1160 and 1200. There were\nestablished seventy-nine of these universities between 1150 and 1500.\nThey were not \u201cfounded,\u201d but grew up as part of this movement.[62]\n\n Illustration:\n DIAGRAM OF DANTE\u2019S POETIC CONCEPTION OF THE UNIVERSE\n\n From Rossetti\u2019s _Shadow of Dante_\n\n (Showing its divisions of Hell (at centre of the earth),\n Purgatory, and the nine heavens. The evident plan beneath\n this is the Ptolemaic cosmography.)\n\nNevertheless, the struggle was a full century long before official\nrecognition of Aristotle came. The name of Aristotle had been\nassociated with pantheism for many years, on account of the Arabian\nversions of his teaching. The neo-Platonic doctrine of emanations,\nwith its pantheism in the Arabian versions, was a tendency of which\nthe church had been shy since the days of Erigena. Until the theistic\ncharacter of Aristotle\u2019s teaching became assured by the direct Latin\ntranslations from the Greek, there was a powerful reaction against\nthe whole of the new learning. The church had condemned the _Physics_\nin 1209 and the _Metaphysics_ in 1215. But in 1254 Aristotle was\nofficially recognized, and fifty years later he became the guide of the\nchurch, whom no one could contradict without being accused of heresy.\n\nThe Catholic church never showed its ability to greater advantage than\nin its dealings with the new problems of this period. The people of\na purely religious epoch now came into possession of Aristotelianism.\nFor centuries the intellect had been starving on formal logic. An\nintellectual revolution was imminent. Here in Aristotle was presented\na rich theory of nature that the church had never considered. Yet it\nis doubtful if Aristotle would have been accepted, had the Mendicant\nFriars\u2015\u2015the Dominicans and Franciscans\u2015\u2015not succeeded in establishing\nchairs in the University of Paris. These monks did not love philosophy\nin itself. They saw, however, that philosophy must be able to defend\nitself against infidel philosophy by the weapons of philosophy.\nBut curiously enough, Aristotelianism, which was the spring of this\nrenaissance, became, by its incorporation into the church, the great\nobstacle to the real Renaissance two hundred and fifty years later.\n\n=The Strength and Burden of Aristotle to the Church.=\n\n=1. The Strength of Aristotle to the Church:= (1) Aristotle elaborated\nfor the church, with great clearness, the conception of a transcendent\nGod. This was a weapon for the church against neo-Platonism and\nmysticism. (2) Aristotle gave to the church a theory of nature that\nsupplemented its theory of grace. (3) Aristotle established a\nphilosophical standard for the truth of things. This proved of great\nvalue to the church because it was under the control of the church.\nIn the first two periods of the Middle Ages philosophical thought had\na relative independence because it was without a recognized standard;\nnow philosophy could be controlled by the standard of Aristotle. For\nexample, with the coming of Aristotle there came certain standard\ndefinitions of substance, person, nature, accident, mode, potency,\nand act.\n\n=2. The Burden of Aristotle to the Church:= (1) Aristotle encouraged\na taste for science and analysis. At first the Aristotelian influence\nin this direction was very small, but its growth was only a question\nof time. (2) Aristotle became for the church a second standard. The\nproblem for the churchman now became a double one: (a) Is my teaching\nconsistent with church dogma? (b) Is my teaching consistent with\nAristotle? \u201cMy son,\u201d was the reply to a youth who thought he had\ndiscovered spots on the sun, \u201cI have read Aristotle many times and\nI assure you there is nothing of the kind in him.\u201d Dogma, not now the\nonly standard, is not infallible. The reason need not follow dogma, but\nits own standard. Revelation became a realm of mystery which the reason\ncould not reach, but to which it pointed. A doctrine thus might be of\nsuch a nature that it might be philosophically true, but theologically\nnot true.\n\n=The Predecessors of Aquinas.= Many distinguished names stand at the\nclose of the Transitional Period and the beginning of the Classic\nPeriod. These express the transitional character of the thought of\nthe threshold of this time. They show, like Abelard, the tendency\ntoward rationalism. Alexander of Hales (d. 1264), William of Aubergne\n(d. 1249), Vincent of Beauvais (d. 1246), Albert of Bollstaedt, called\nAlbertus Magnus (d. 1280), show the influence of the new Aristotelian\nscience. Albert was the teacher of Thomas Aquinas. The attempt of\nThomas to form a theological system for the church was anticipated\nby the so-called _Sums_ of the twelfth century, of which the work of\nPeter the Lombard was the model. The four books of _Sums_ of Peter\nwere collections of opinions of the Fathers on questions of dogma. They\nshow the influence of Aristotle and the method of Abelard. The _Sums_\nof Peter became for several centuries the text-book of the schools\nand the subject of innumerable commentaries. It was the core of\nClassic scholastic literature, and around it grew up the problems of\nmetaphysics and psychology.\n\n=The Life of Thomas Aquinas (1224\u20131274).\u2015\u2015The Founder of the Dominican\nTradition.= Thomas belonged to a noble house which was related to the\nroyal family. He studied in the University of Naples, but at the age of\nnineteen, upon resolving to enter the Dominican order, he was captured\nand kept a prisoner by his brothers. After two years he made his\nescape, and, his family having consented to his taking orders, he went\nto Cologne under the instruction of Albert. He was then sent to Paris,\nwhere he obtained his degree in 1257. He was a successful lecturer at\nParis until 1261, when he was called by the Pope to teach philosophy\nin Rome, Bologna, and Pisa. During this period he composed his greatest\nwork, _Summa Theologiae_. He declined preferment and finally resided\nat Naples. He always enjoyed the highest consideration of the church\nauthorities.\n\nThomas, the founder of the \u201cDominican tradition,\u201d was the first to\nformulate Christian Aristotelianism and to draw for the church the\nline between the realms of reason and faith. He did not so much create\ndoctrine as he transformed and assimilated it. The sources from which\nhe drew were many: the Scriptures, the Fathers, Greek philosophy, and\nthe teaching of contemporary Arabians and Jews. If, as some historians\nmaintain, he was not a thinker of the first rank, he at least relieved\nthe church from a delicate situation by means of a conciliating\ntheology. Certainly his predecessors and contemporaries stand eclipsed\nby him. He satisfied the medi\u00e6val demand for order and he prevented\ndeterioration in the church doctrine. He did not rise above his age,\nalthough he stood at the head of its intellectual movement. He was,\non the contrary, the most perfect expression of scholasticism, and he\nwas affectionately regarded as _doctor angelicus_ and again as _doctor\nuniversalis_.\n\n=The Central Principle of Thomas\u2019s Doctrine\u2015\u2015The Twofold Truth.= The\nlife-purpose of Thomas was to bring Christianity into closer relation\nwith civilization and science. He sought to give all departments of\nknowledge their rights and at the same time to protect the ascendency\nof religion. This was to him the same as bringing Christianity and\nAristotle together, for Aristotle meant to him the entire product of\nancient civilization. To the medi\u00e6val world of grace he added a world\nof nature, and, fully dominated by the medi\u00e6val love of order, he\nunfolded so comprehensive a view of life that he included all its\nproblems. He felt that the natural and the revealed must not become\na contradiction.\n\nTo accomplish this Thomas found in Aristotle his own ideal estimate\nof things. Looking at Aristotle through his own neo-Platonism, he\nnaturally found in Aristotle more of the inner and religious estimate\nof nature than the facts will allow. Yet it was evident to Thomas that\nthere was in Aristotle a great interest in nature and a great reserve\non ultimate questions. Nature was, according to Aristotle, an essence\nunfolding in a system of grades. This became the central principle of\nAquinas in this form: _Nature is a sketch in outline of the world of\ngrace_. Before the eye of the religious mind these two truths should\nappear: (1) the world of faith and the world of nature are two properly\ndistinct worlds; (2) the world of faith is a continuation of the world\nof nature. The world of grace and the world of nature are two grades of\nthe whole of existence. Nature is the lower stage of development, and\nthe point of contact between it and the world of grace is the soul of\nman. Religion and philosophy thus have different spheres, but they are\nnot contradictory. Grace does not destroy, but it perfects nature.\nNature is subordinate to grace as man is subordinate to the Christian,\nthe state to the church, the Emperor to the Pope.[63]\n\nThe difference between philosophy and theology is not that theology\ntreats of God and divine truths, and philosophy does not. Philosophy\ndiscusses divine truths. But the difference lies here, that theology\nviews truths in the light of revelation, while philosophy views them\nin the light of reason. Yet there are truths that belong to philosophy,\ntruths that belong to theology, and truths that belong to both. The\nproblems of the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, and the\nrelation of the world to God are theological problems, yet they can\nalso be demonstrated by the reason of philosophy; but the mysteries of\nthe Trinity, the Incarnation, and the temporal creation are beyond the\nscope of the reason and belong to theology. Philosophy and theology are\ndistinct, yet they are in harmony. Theology supplements philosophy with\nfaith; philosophy supplements theology by (1) establishing preliminary\nmotives, (2) supplying analogies, (3) answering objections. Thomas\naccepts both propositions which had divided his predecessors: _credo\nut intelligam_ and _intelligo ut credam_.\n\nAbove historical revelation there is something even higher, which could\nbe called another realm, were it not more of a hope than a possession\nof man. Its appearance in the doctrine of Thomas shows the influence\nof Plato upon him. It is the immediate union of the individual with\nGod in mystic ecstasy.[64] It is the dome of the religious temple that\nThomas has built. But Thomas was careful to insist that this heavenly\nglory could not be gained except through the offices of the church.\nThe individual cannot reach God through his own unaided efforts, but\nthe sacraments of the church form the mysterious background of the\nreligious life.\n\n=The Problem of Individuality\u2015\u2015The Relation of Particulars and\nUniversals.= The all-absorbing question of the Transitional Period,\nof the relation of particulars and universals, became for Thomas and\nhis successors the problem of individuality. For the schoolman was\nobliged to define the individual and fix his place in his Aristotelian\nworld, if he was to be successful against the pantheism of the Arabian\nAristotelianism. What is the nature and standing of the individual?\nWhat constitutes the difference between individuals? The whole\ntheological edifice of Thomas would collapse in mystic unity, the\nimmortality of the soul would be lost and the offices of the church\nwould be nullified, unless Thomas showed the positive nature of the\nindividual. In this connection we must remember that on the whole\nthe Middle Ages had accepted Abelard\u2019s analysis of the problem of the\nrelation of universals and particulars: the universals exist in three\nways, _ante rem_ or in God\u2019s mind; _post rem_ or in man\u2019s mind; _in re_\nor in nature. To Thomas the universals as abstractions (_universalia\npost rem_) in the human mind cannot be individuals, for they have no\nreal existence. To have real existence the universal must exist _in re_,\nin the many, as the essence of things; not as abstraction _beside_ the\nmany.\n\nThe question of individuality therefore to Thomas concerns properly\nonly objects _in re_, or objects in the corporeal world.[65] These\nare objects of Form and Matter. The question is, whether the Form or\nthe matter of corporeal things is the principle of its individuality.\nThomas says that matter is this principle,\u2015\u2015not indeterminate matter,\nbut matter with quantitative determinations. The difference between\nearthly individuals is numerical\u2015\u2015a difference of time and space\nrelations. The Forms of nature objects change continually according\nto their material conditions, but these conditions do not change.\nNevertheless the quantitative determinations of individuals are not\nthe cause, but the condition, of their existence.\n\nBut the question about the status of beings in the spiritual world,\n\u201cseparate Forms,\u201d is a more difficult one for Thomas. This is the\nproblem about God, the angels, and the souls of men. They are evidently\nnot individualized by matter. What is the principle that distinguishes\nthem from one another? They are Forms without matter and they are\nindividualized through themselves, since they have no need of material\ndeterminations. Thus God is distinguished from everything else as\npure Form or pure actuality. He is the unique individual in whom\nall differences merge. But so also are the angels actualized through\nthemselves. What is the difference between God and the angels? God is\nan absolute genus; the angel is a relative genus, _i. e._ it is the\nonly one of its kind. But what is the condition of the souls of men?\nAre they all alike or do they have a principle of distinction? Yes,\nthey are distinguishable, for each soul upon separation from its body\ncarries with it a love for its former body, and that distinguishes it\nfrom other souls.\n\n=The Primacy of the Will or the Intellect.= Up to this time there\nhad been no psychological dispute as to which of the faculties was\nfundamental. Now the question appears in full force. Much of the\nliterature of this period is upon the question of the primacy of\nthe will or the intellect, and it appears to be almost the leading\nmotive of the time. Augustine had placed the will in the foreground\nof his teaching. His successors had never disputed the subject, but\nhad been engaged in discussing what products of the intellect are\nreal\u2015\u2015the particulars or the universals. With the introduction of the\nintellectualism of Aristotle, there almost immediately arose defenders\nof Augustine. To them Aristotelianism was too rationalistic. Thomas\nfollows Aristotle unconditionally, and with him stand the German\nmystics. Intellectualism becomes the central principle of what is known\nas the \u201cDominican tradition.\u201d Duns Scotus was a Franciscan monk. He\ntook up arms for the primacy of the will, and this became the central\nprinciple of the \u201cFranciscan tradition.\u201d On this point the nominalists\nwere his allies.\n\nThe problem of the will arose first with reference to the human will.\nThomas contended against Duns Scotus that man is free so far as he\nfollows his knowledge of the good. The intellect is therefore primal,\nfor it determines the will by showing the will what the good is.\n\nThe question next arose as to the priority of the faculties in God.\nDoes God\u2019s will dominate His intellect or His intellect dominate His\nwill? This was a vital point in the Augustinian theodicy. Does God will\nthe good to be good, or does His will act according to what He knows\nto be good? Here lies the point at issue between the Dominican Thomas\nand the Franciscan Scotus. Thomas maintained that the intellect of\nGod determines His will. The intellect is determined by the truth so\nlong as the intellect is true to itself. Why should not the will be\ndetermined by the truth in the same way? With God this freedom for the\ntruth is God himself. The world is the best possible world, for God has\nwilled it out of himself.\n\nThe world is determined by goodness and man\u2019s will is determined by\nthe same goodness. When the sense conquers the morally determined will,\nthere is sin. The senses, and not the will, are the cause of sin.\n\n=Duns Scotus (1270\u20131308), the Founder of the Franciscan Tradition\u2015\u2015Life\nand Philosophical Position.= Thus the Middle Ages did not come to a\nstandstill with Thomas. A greater movement existed after him than is\noften thought. The leading minds who succeeded Thomas refused to follow\nthe middle course which he had mapped out. New attempts were made to\nrelate the world of grace and the world of nature. One was mysticism,\nrepresented by Eckhart (d. 1372). The other was the reaction of the\nAugustinians against the intellectualism of the new Aristotelianism as\nrepresented by Thomas. The leader in this was Duns Scotus. The seat of\nthis movement was Oxford.[66]\n\nDuns Scotus was born in Ireland and at an early age he joined the\nFranciscan order. He graduated from Oxford, which at that time was\nanti-Thomistic. He then taught theology and philosophy at Oxford for\nten years. His lectures were largely attended and his fame spread over\nEurope. He went to Paris in 1304, where he taught for four years. He\nwas then transferred to Cologne, where he died.\n\nScotus was the Kant of scholasticism. The time of construction of\nscholasticism had passed, and the time of criticism and analysis had\ncome. Scotus was the intellectual knight-errant who refused to accept\nany theory without subjecting it to criticism. He was the acutest mind\nof the Middle Ages and was called the _doctor subtilis_.\n\n=Duns Scotus\u2019s Conception of the Twofold Truth.\u2015\u2015The Separation of\nScience and Religion.= The distinction between revelation, theology,\nand philosophy, that appears in this period of Classic Scholasticism,\nwas sharply drawn by Scotus. In Thomas\u2019s conception of a graded world\nof development the distinction between theology and philosophy was\nnot emphasized. Philosophy now in the hands of Scotus becomes science,\nhaving the marks of exactness that compel belief, but is, however,\nrestricted to its own realm. By philosophy Scotus means logic. In\nmatters of faith logic has nothing whatever to say, for at that extreme\nstands revelation possessing the absolute truth that compels faith.\nBetween revelation and philosophy Scotus squeezes theology\u2015\u2015the science\nthat his predecessors had used to clarify revelation. With Scotus it\nbecomes a domain that is poor indeed. Its objects are the highest, but\nit can never reach them. It has not the divine assurance of revelation\nnor the exactness of logical science. Its highest conclusions are only\nprobable, and it can help revelation only in a negative way. It cannot\nprove the doctrine of the Trinity, incarnation, creation, immortality,\nand even its proofs for the existence of God have no cogency.\nPhilosophy and revelation both profit at the expense of scholastic\ntheology. After Scotus scientific heresy frequently shielded itself\non the ground that its conclusions apply only to the realm of science,\nwhile the opposite may be true in revelation.\n\n=The Inscrutable Will of God.= Revelation is thus placed beyond the\nreach of the human reason because it rests on the inscrutable will\nof God. Revelation is God\u2019s free act. God must be free. If Thomas\u2019s\nconception of God\u2019s will as determined by his intellect were true, God\nwould not be free. The intellect in man or God must be the servant of\nthe will, if the will be free. In man consciousness produces at first\na number of indistinct and imperfect ideas. Those ideas become distinct\nupon which the will fixes its attention, while the others cease to\nexist because they are unsupported by the will.\n\nGod\u2019s will is more fundamental than the good. God makes the good to\nbe good. Both Thomas and Scotus say that the moral law is the command\nof God. Thomas conceives it to be God\u2019s command because it is in\naccord with the good; Scotus, for no other reason than that it is\nGod\u2019s command. The good might be different if God so created it. In\nopposition to Thomas, Scotus maintained that God does not have to\ncreate what He does create, and that this is not the best possible\nworld. God creates what He wills; He can, therefore, grant dispensation,\nand so can the church. If God\u2019s will were determined by His intellect,\nHe would have no independence, He would not even exist, He would be\nonly nature or one of its causes, there could be no evil nor accident.\nHe can supersede the moral law by a new law, just as He superseded the\nMosaic law by the Gospel. Individuality, revelation, salvation, and\nall objects of faith have their existence only in the groundless and\ninscrutable will of God. For this reason there can be no rational\ntheology.\n\nThis founder of the \u201cFranciscan tradition\u201d of practical piety and\nmeritorious action could not have other than the freedom of the will\nas his central principle. An Augustinian he refused, however, to follow\nAugustine in centralizing freedom in God. The object of faith is the\nwill of God, the subject of faith is the will of man. Human freedom\nconsists in co\u00f6peration with divine grace. Man can help in the work\nof God. His freedom is partly formal: he can will or not will. It is\npartly material: he can will A or B. There is no ulterior ground to\ndetermine the human will, and this undetermined freedom is the ground\nfor merit, provided the human will coincides with the divine.\n\n=The Problem of Individuality.= The problem of individuation was\na favorite one with Scotus. While Scotus agrees with Thomas as\nto the threefold existence of the universal, the individual and\nnot the universal is the ultimate fact. The individual cannot\nbe deduced from the universal, nor can it be constituted by the\nquantitative determinations of matter. It is already individualized\nand substantialized. Form, not matter, individualizes. The definite\nindividual form, the \u201cthisness\u201d (_h\u00e6cceitas_), is the ultimate fact.\nThe individual can only be verified as actual fact. The individual\nis irreducible, and no further explanation can be made than to say\nthat it is an individual. Thus the inquiry into the _Principium\nindividuationis_ has no meaning.\n\n=After Duns Scotus.= The church failed to canonize Scotus; for\nthough he claimed to be its most faithful son, he taught the dangerous\ndoctrine of freedom of the individual will. His doctrine also marks\nthe beginning of empirical investigation of nature and the decadence\nof formal logic. Although a most faithful follower of the church, he\nbrought scholasticism to the point where it no longer served the church.\nThe result was ultrarationalism\u2015\u2015not what Scotus intended. But when\nrevelation no longer rests upon rational ground, and when there exists\nby its side a philosophical science whose basis is rational, it is\nonly a question of time when revelation shall lose its authority for\nmen. When philosophy passed from Scotus to Ockam, Ockam\u2019s conception\nof the individual as the ultimately real and of the unrationality of\nrevelation gave him the old name of nominalist. This is a misnomer,\nfor the doctrine of Ockam is quite different from the nominalism of\nRoscellinus. The temper of the time was different from those days\nwhen Roscellinus followed upon Anselm, for the superior minds were\nnow turning away from orthodoxy. Disciples of both Thomas and Scotus\nwere becoming nominalists. It was an epoch when scholasticism was being\ndiscredited by the universities, when theology was less a study in the\ncurricula, when religion was being superseded by magic, when there were\nrival claimants for the Pope\u2019s chair, when there was strife between the\nchurch and the state. The spirit of the age was toward nominalism in\nevery form. The command, in 1339, to the University of Paris not to use\nOckam\u2019s works shows how powerful had become his following during his\nlifetime. Dominicans and Augustinians went over in crowds to nominalism.\nThis beginning of nominalism betrays the growth of European national\nlife, modern languages, art, and the sciences. It shows the beginning\nof Protestantism in all departments. The church attempted to crush it\nin the way that it had crushed Roscellinus. But this nominalism had too\ndeep root.\n\n=William of Ockam (1280\u20131349): Life and Teaching.= Ockam was called\n_Doctor Invincibilis_. He was born in Ockam, England, and studied\nat Oxford, where he probably had Scotus as a teacher. After teaching\nin Paris (1320\u20131325), he left Paris and joined the opponents of the\ntemporal power of the Pope. He was imprisoned at Avignon, but escaped\nto the court of Louis of Bavaria, where he died. To Louis he made his\ncelebrated promise, \u201cIf you will defend me with your sword, I will\ndefend you with my pen.\u201d He has been called \u201cthe first Protestant.\u201d\n\nThe nominalism of Ockam was more complex than that of Roscellinus, and\nyet it was essentially a tendency to simplification by discarding all\nmetaphysics and psychology as useless. \u201cOckam\u2019s razor\u201d was the nickname\nof his philosophy. He regarded concepts as subjective signs or \u201cterms\u201d\nof actual facts. Hence his philosophy was also called terminism. There\nwas also in it a naturalistic tendency which was the result of the\nscientific studies of the Aristotelian Arabians. With these logical and\nnaturalistic motives were united the Augustinian doctrine of the will.\nThese were the three factors of a nominalism that felt the conviction\nof the importance of the inner life as well as the need of an extended\ninvestigation of nature.\n\nIt is, moreover, no accident that Ockam was conservative, for he\nbelonged to the Franciscans, the most conservative of the monastic\nbodies. This nominalism was a reaction against scholasticism, in order\nto strengthen the supernatural character of dogma. Ockam felt that\nscholasticism had waxed too great\u2015\u2015that under the guise of serving\nreligion it had virtually subordinated religion. The reactionary\nFranciscans proclaimed the entire separation of religion and philosophy\nin order to make room for faith. Faith could be purified only by\nrenouncing scholasticism. The temporal power must be given up by the\nchurch, the state and the church must be separated. No new knowledge\nabout faith can be obtained. The dogma must be left impregnable, even\nthough scientifically men become skeptics.\n\nConsistent, therefore, was it for this movement to disjoin entirely\nthe parts of the twofold truth. Scotus had almost crowded out natural\ntheology; Ockam completed the work of Scotus. Scholasticism or natural\ntheology is a rubbish-heap of hypotheses. The church should abandon\nspeculation and emphasize faith. It should return to the simplicity\nand holiness of the Apostolic church. Ockam was devoted to the true\nupbuilding of the church and was a follower of St. Francis. It was his\nlove for the church that made him take sides against her pretensions to\ntemporal power.\n\nOckam was the natural precursor of his fellow countryman John Locke,\nand the English empirical school. Individual things have the reality\nof original Forms, for they come to us intuitively. Our ideas are\nonly signs of them. This is a relation of the \u201cfirst intention.\u201d As\nindividual ideas are related to individual things, so general ideas\nare related to individual ideas. This is the relation of the \u201csecond\nintention.\u201d The general idea referring thus indirectly to an individual\nthing is therefore arbitrary and capricious. Real science deals with\nthings intuitively observed; rational science only with the relations\nbetween ideas. Nevertheless real science deals only with an inner\nworld, even if its material is intuitively known. Intuitions are only\nrepresentatives of the real world. How much less real must the world of\nrational science then be, since it presupposes these inner intuitions\nof real science. The universal, therefore, has no reality. It is a name,\na sign of many things, a term. Only the individual is real.\n\n=After Ockam.= William of Ockam was the last schoolman. When his\ndoctrine of terminism was united with Augustine\u2019s powerful doctrine\nof the will,\u2015\u2015forming an extreme individualism,\u2015\u2015the glimmering of\nthe dawn of modern times appears. The movement was made still stronger\nby the study of the history of development psychologically, and it\nbecame a kind of idealism of the inner life. Already, too, there were\nbeginning investigations in natural science, based upon empirical study.\nModern subjectivism was at hand; scholasticism had run its course.\nThe representatives of the scholastic philosophy of the fifteenth and\nsixteenth centuries forgot the principle of the Classic Schoolmen and\nbecame mere commentators of the leaders of the tradition to which they\nbelonged. Their verbal subtleties were too refined to be understood.\nThe efforts of Nicolas Cusanus to bring secular science under a system\nof scholastic mysticism only promoted the modern movement. Cusanus\ntherefore belongs to the next period, and of him we shall subsequently\nhear.\n\n\n\n\n INDEX\n\n\n Abdera\n 107, 119.\n _See_ Atomists.\n\n Abelard\n life of, 363;\n his conceptualism, 364;\n his rationalism, 365\u2013367.\n\n Academy, the\n what it was, 124;\n after the death of Plato, 166;\n and Aristotle, 169\u2013171;\n Older, Middle, and New, 220, 221;\n the skepticism of, 266\u2013268;\n eclecticism in, 270.\n\n Adams, G. B.\n _Civilization during the Middle Ages_, 374 n.\n\n Adamson, Robert\n _The Development of Greek Philosophy_ quoted, 255.\n\n \u00c6nesidemus\n Skeptic, 268.\n\n Agrippa\n Skeptic, 268, 269.\n\n Albertus Magnus\n _See_ Bollstaedt.\n\n Alcidamus\n Sophist, 68.\n\n Alcuin\n 349, 350.\n\n Alexander of Hales\n 379.\n\n Alexandria\n a centre of Hellenism, 215;\n in the Middle Ages, 282.\n\n Alexandrian School of neo-Platonism\n 290\u2013298.\n\n Ammonius Saccas\n 290, 314.\n\n _Anamnesis_\n 147\u2013149.\n\n Anaxagoras\n his life, 43;\n his philosophy, 45\u201347.\n\n Anaximander\n 24, 25.\n\n Anaximenes\n 25.\n\n Ancient Philosophy\n length of, 1;\n underlying character of, 2;\n divisions of, 4, 5;\n literary sources of, 6.\n\n Animism\n 19.\n\n Anselm\n life and position in medi\u00e6val philosophy, 359\u2013361;\n his arguments for the existence of God, 361;\n on reason and dogma, 365.\n\n Anthropological period of Greek philosophy\n 12, 13;\n discussion of, 55\u201397;\n historical summary of, 55.\n\n Anthropologists\n 103.\n\n Anthropology\n defined, 13.\n\n Antiochus of Ascalon\n 270, 271.\n\n Antisthenes\n founder of the Cynic school, 93, 95.\n\n Apathy\n Stoic, 251.\n\n Apollonius\n neo-Pythagorean, 285.\n\n Apologists, the\n 307\u2013309.\n\n Aquinas, Thomas\n on the problem of reason and faith, 369, 377;\n the predecessors of, 379, 380;\n life of (founder of the Dominican tradition), 380, 381;\n the central principle of his doctrine, 381\u2013383;\n the problem of individuality according to, 383\u2013385;\n on the will and the intellect, 385, 386.\n\n Arabian\n schools, 371, 372;\n translations of Greek works, 372, 373.\n\n Arcesilaus\n 267.\n\n \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03ae\n meaning of, 84.\n\n Aristippus\n founder of the Cyrenaic school, 93, 96;\n and Epicurus, 229, 230.\n\n Aristophanes\n opposed the Sophists, 74.\n\n Aristotle\n his place in Greek history, 98\u2013100, 103;\n conceptualist, 104;\n advanced age at which he finished his education, 125;\n in the Academy and Lyceum, 166\u2013168;\n chronological sketch of his life, 168, 169;\n his biography in detail, 169\u2013173;\n the writings of, 173\u2013176;\n his starting-point, 176, 177;\n the fundamental principle in his philosophy, 177\u2013180;\n his logic, 180\u2013185;\n his metaphysics, 185\u2013194;\n development is purposeful, 185\u2013187;\n his two different conceptions of purpose, 187\u2013190;\n his conception of God, 190, 191;\n his conception of matter, 191, 192;\n his conception of nature, 192\u2013194;\n his theory of physics, 194\u2013196;\n his psychology, 196\u2013199;\n his ethics, 199\u2013202;\n his political philosophy, 202, 203;\n in the Middle Ages, 332, 363, 368, 369;\n Arabic versions of his works, 372, 373;\n works of, introduced into Western Europe, 375\u2013378;\n the strength and burden of, to the church, 378, 379;\n and Thomas Aquinas, 380, 381.\n\n Arnold, Matthew\n 43 n.\n\n Astronomy\n of the Pythagoreans, 49\u201352, 53;\n Ptolemaic, 322\u2013325.\n\n _Ataraxia_\n of Epicurus, 231, 233;\n of the Skeptics, 266.\n\n Athenian school of neo-Platonism\n 290, 299\u2013301.\n\n Athens\n rise of, 57, 58;\n and Socrates, 91;\n and Abdera, 119;\n a centre of Hellenism, 213\u2013215.\n\n Atomism of Epicurus, the\n 238\u2013240.\n\n Atomistic school, the\n 107.\n\n Atomists, the\n philosophy of, 47, 48.\n\n Atoms of Democritus, the\n 109\u2013114, 116, 117.\n\n Augustine\n the historical position of, 306, 318, 335\u2013338;\n the life of, 339, 340;\n the two elements in his teaching, 340, 341;\n the neo-Platonic element: the inner certainties of\n consciousness, 341\u2013345;\n the authority of the church according to, 345\u2013347.\n\n Aurelius, Marcus\n 243, 246.\n\n\n Bacon, Francis\n _Essay on Love_, 153 n.\n\n Bacon, Roger\n 387 n.\n\n Bardesanes\n Gnostic, 310.\n\n Basilides\n Gnostic, 310.\n\n Becoming\n word how used, 22;\n in Heracleitus\u2019s doctrine, 29;\n according to Plato, 133, 136, 139.\n\n Being\n word how used, 22;\n in Parmenides\u2019 doctrine, 33\u201335;\n Pythagorean conception of, 49\u201351;\n aspects under which it was conceived of, in Greek philosophy,\n 103, 104;\n according to Plato, 133, 136, 139.\n\n Benedictine Age, the\n 350.\n\n Berengar of Tours\n 359.\n\n Bo\u00ebthius\n 300.\n\n Bollstaedt, Albert\n 377, 379.\n\n Bologna\n University of, 377.\n\n Burnet, John\n _Early Greek Philosophers_ cited, 17 n.\n\n Bury, J. B.\n _History of Greece_ cited, 12 n.;\n quoted, 16.\n\n\n Carneades\n 267.\n\n Carpocrates\n Gnostic, 310.\n\n Carthage\n 15, 16.\n\n Catechists\n the School of, 314\u2013318.\n\n Catholic theologians\n the old, 312\u2013314.\n\n Cause\n teleological, final, mechanical, and efficient, 105 n.\n _See_ Final cause, Efficient cause.\n\n Causes\n Aristotle\u2019s, 187.\n\n Change\n Heracleitus\u2019s doctrine of, 28, 29;\n has no existence in Parmenides\u2019 philosophy, 34, 35;\n as conceived by the Pluralists, 40.\n\n Charlemagne\n the revival of, 349, 350.\n\n Christianity\n and neo-Platonism, difference in their conception of\n inspiration, 276, 277;\n rise of, 279, 280;\n summary of its history, 281;\n and neo-Platonism, 288\u2013290;\n the Hellenizing of, 302\u2013318;\n the early situation of, 302\u2013305;\n the philosophies influencing, 305, 306;\n early, the periods of, 306, 307;\n the Apologists, 307\u2013309;\n the Gnostics, 310\u2013312;\n the reaction against Gnosticism (the old Catholic theologians),\n 312\u2013314;\n Origen and the School of Catechists, 314\u2013318;\n and Mohammedanism, 371\u2013375.\n\n Chrysippus\n 242, 244, 245.\n\n Church\n authority of, according to Augustine, 345\u2013347;\n strength and burden of Aristotle to, 378, 379;\n and state, Aquinas\u2019s and Dante\u2019s views of, 382.\n\n Cicero\n on Aristotle, 167;\n his work, 271, 272.\n\n Civilizations\n Christian and Mohammedan, 369\u2013372;\n the first contact of, 372, 373;\n the conflict between, 374, 375.\n\n Classic Scholasticism\n period of, 333, 368\u2013394.\n\n Cleanthes\n 242, 244\u2013246.\n\n Clement\n 314.\n\n Conception\n and perception, 83 n.;\n importance of, to Socrates, 83;\n according to Plato, 134, 135;\n in Aristotle, 177\u2013179.\n\n Conceptualism\n of Aristotle, 104;\n in the Middle Ages, 358, 364, 365.\n\n Consciousness\n formulation of the psychological conception of, 294;\n the inner certainties of, according to Augustine, 341\u2013345.\n\n Constantinople\n an intellectual centre, 372 n.\n\n Cosmas map, the\n 335.\n\n Cosmological period of Greek philosophy\n 12, 13;\n treated, 15\u201354.\n\n Cosmologist\n characteristics of the, 18\u201320;\n table of, 20;\n their philosophical question, 20, 21;\n where they lived, 21;\n results of their philosophy, 53, 54.\n\n Cosmology\n defined, 13.\n\n Crates of Thebes\n 95.\n\n Critical attitude of mind\n among the Greeks, 61\u201364;\n of Socrates, 80.\n\n Crusades, the\n 374, 375.\n\n Cusanus, Nicolas\n 394.\n\n Cynic school, the\n 93\u201397.\n\n Cynics and Stoics\n 246, 247.\n\n Cyrenaic school, the\n 93\u201397.\n\n Cyrenaics\n their teaching, and Epicureanism, 229, 230.\n\n\n Dante\n on Aristotle, 167;\n used Ptolemaic conception of the universe, 324, 325;\n diagram of his poetic conception of the universe, 376;\n his view of the state and the church, 382 n.;\n placed the intellectual virtues above the practical, 383 n.\n\n Dark Ages, the\n 347\u2013349.\n\n Deduction\n 182.\n\n Definition\n Socrates one of the first to use it correctly, 92.\n\n Democritus\n his place in Greek history, 98\u2013100, 103;\n and Plato, their similarities and differences, 104\u2013106;\n life of, 106\u2013108;\n comprehensiveness of his aim, 108;\n the enriched physics of, 109\u2013111;\n the materialistic psychology of, 111\u2013114;\n his theory of knowledge, 114\u2013116;\n the ethical theory of, 116\u2013118;\n a wide traveler, 123;\n advanced age at which he finished his education, 125.\n\n Development\n according to Aristotle, 178, 179, 185\u2013187.\n\n De Wulf\n _History of Medi\u00e6val Philosophy_, 336 n., 384.\n\n Dialectic\n defined, 60, 131.\n\n Dill, Samuel\n _Roman Society_ cited, 274 n.\n\n Diogenes\n 95.\n\n Dionysiodorus\n 68.\n\n Dogma\n _See_ Reason.\n\n Dominican tradition\n Thomas Aquinas the founder of, 380, 381;\n intellectualism the central principle in, 385.\n\n Doxography\n 6.\n\n Drama\n the Greek, 60, 61.\n\n Dualism\n defined, 51 n.;\n the Pythagorean, 51, 52;\n of the Systematic period of Greek philosophy, 102, 103.\n\n Dynamic pantheism of Plotinus\n 293.\n\n\n Eckhart\n 369, 386.\n\n Eclectic Platonists, the\n 285.\n\n Eclecticism\n 264, 265, 269\u2013272.\n\n Efficient cause\n introduction of conception of, by the Pluralists, 41;\n defined, 105 n.;\n Aristotle\u2019s conception of, 187.\n\n Elean-Eretrian school, the\n 93.\n\n Eleatic school\n and Milesian school, Xenophanes the connecting link between, 26;\n lives of Parmenides and Zeno, 32, 35;\n teaching of, compared with that of the Milesians and\n Heracleitus, 22 f.;\n the philosophy of, 33\u201337;\n and Heracleitus, results of the conflict between, 37, 38.\n\n Element, the\n as conceived by the Pluralists, 40, 41.\n\n Eleusinian\n _See_ Mysteries.\n\n Emanations\n the world of, according to Plotinus, 294\u2013297.\n\n Emerson, R. W.\n _Essay on Love_, 153 n.;\n _Initial, D\u00e6monic, and Celestial Love_, 153 n.\n\n Emerton, Ephraim\n _Medi\u00e6val Europe_, 374 n.\n\n Empedocles\n his conception of change, 40;\n his conception of the element, 40;\n his doctrine of the efficient cause, 41;\n his life, 43;\n the philosophy of, 44, 45.\n\n Empiricism\n 104 n.\n\n End\n defined, 105 n.\n\n _Entelechy_\n 186.\n\n Epic, Greek\n importance of the, 8\u201310.\n\n Epictetus\n 243, 246.\n\n Epicureanism\n one of the New Schools, 222\u2013225;\n and Stoicism, summary of agreements and differences, 225, 226;\n and the teaching of Aristippus, 229;\n ideal of, 230\u2013233;\n the place of virtue in, 233;\n the Wise Man of, 234\u2013236.\n _See_ Epicurus.\n\n Epicureans, the\n 228.\n\n Epicurus\n life of, 227, 228;\n and Aristippus, 229;\n his ideal, 230\u2013233;\n his conception of the physical world, 238\u2013240.\n _See_ Epicureanism.\n\n Epistemology\n Democritus\u2019 contribution to, 114\u2013116.\n\n Erigena, John Scotus\n 349, 350;\n life and teaching of, 350\u2013352;\n the Greek principle which he formulated for the Middle Ages,\n 352, 353.\n\n Eristic\n defined, 60.\n\n Ethical period of the Hellenic-Roman period\n 208;\n general characteristics of, 215\u2013218.\n\n Ethics\n tendency toward, among early Greeks, 11, 12;\n of the Sophists, 71\u201373;\n of Democritus, 116\u2013118;\n Plato\u2019s theory of, 153\u2013158;\n of Aristotle, 199\u2013202;\n of Plotinus, 297, 298.\n\n Eucken, Rudolf\n _Problem of Human Life_, 336 n.\n\n Euclid\n founder of the school at Megara, 93.\n\n Eud\u00e6monism\n 87.\n\n Euhemerism\n 96.\n\n Eusebius\n on Aristotle, 167.\n\n Euthydemus\n 68.\n\n Evil\n the problem of, according to Stoicism, 260, 261.\n\n\n Fairbanks, Arthur\n _First Philosophers of Greece_, 6 n.\n\n Falckenberg, Richard\n _History of Modern Philosophy_, 3 n.\n\n Final cause\n defined, 105 n.;\n according to Aristotle, 187.\n\n Fire\n Heracleitus\u2019s doctrine of, 30\u201332.\n\n Form and Matter\n in Aristotle, 186\u2013192, 197\u2013199;\n in Thomas Aquinas, 384.\n\n Formal cause\n 187.\n\n Franciscan tradition, the\n 385\u2013387.\n\n Freedom\n the problem of, according to Epicurus, 240;\n according to Stoicism, 260, 261;\n according to Origen, 316, 317;\n according to Augustine, 345;\n according to Duns Scotus, 389.\n\n\n Gerbert\n 350.\n\n Glaber\n quoted, 354.\n\n Gnomic poets\n Greek, 10\u201312.\n\n Gnosticism\n 310\u2013312;\n the reaction against, 312\u2013314.\n\n God\n Plato\u2019s conception of, 141, 142;\n Aristotle\u2019s conception of, 190, 191;\n His will and His intellect, 386, 388, 389.\n\n Goethe\n quoted, 129, 167.\n\n Good\n Plato\u2019s Idea of the, 140\u2013142, 144;\n Plato\u2019s theory of the, development of, 153, 154;\n the, of the Stoics, 250, 251.\n\n Gorgias\n 66, 67;\n the nihilism of, 70, 71.\n\n Gospel\n the Hellenizing of, 302\u2013318.\n _See_ Christianity.\n\n Greece\n after the Persian Wars, 57\u201364.\n\n Greek Enlightenment, the\n 58\u201364, 82.\n\n Greek-Jewish philosophy of Philo\n 281\u2013284;\n and neo-Platonism, 288.\n\n Greek nation\n the fall of, and the persistence of its civilization, 204\u2013208.\n\n Greek national spirit\n waning of, 98.\n\n Greek philosophy\n three periods of, 12\u201314;\n summary of, 102, 103.\n\n Greek thought\n was objective, 2, 100, 101.\n\n Greeks, early\n geographical environment of, 7;\n political environment of, 8, 9, 15, 16;\n native tendencies of, 9\u201312;\n perils to, in the new religion, 16\u201318;\n monistic philosophies, 22 f.\n\n Grote, George\n _History of Greece_, 61 n.;\n _Plato_, 267 n.\n\n\n Happiness\n according to Socrates, 86;\n according to the Cynics and the Cyrenaics, 94\u201397;\n according to Democritus, 117, 118;\n according to Aristotle, 200;\n according to Epicurus, 233\u2013238.\n\n Harnack, Adolf\n _Outlines of the History of Dogma_ quoted, 308, 336, 344, 354;\n cited, 315 n., 345 n.\n\n Hatch, Edwin\n _Hibbert Lectures_ quoted, 305.\n\n Hedonism\n and eud\u00e6monism, 87;\n some types of, 228, 229.\n\n Hellenic-Roman period\n 204\u2013318;\n its time length, 204;\n the fall of the Greek nation and the persistence of its\n civilization, 204\u2013208;\n the two parts of, 208, 209;\n the undercurrent of skepticism in, 209\u2013211;\n the fundamental problem of, 211\u2013213.\n\n Hellenism\n 205\u2013208;\n the centres of, 213\u2013215.\n\n Hellenizing of the Gospel\n 302\u2013318.\n\n Heracleitus\n life, 28;\n his teaching compared with that of the Milesians and Eleatics,\n 22, 23;\n his philosophy, 28\u201331;\n and Parmenides, results of the conflict between, 37, 38;\n practical philosophy of, 31.\n\n Hesiod\n 11.\n\n Hicks, R. D.\n _Stoic and Epicurean_, 227 n.;\n cited, 267 n.\n\n Hipparchia\n 95.\n\n Hippias\n 66, 68.\n\n Hippodamus\n 68.\n\n Hippolytus\n 313.\n\n _Homoiomeriai_\n 46.\n\n Human nature\n value set upon, by Socrates, 81.\n\n Hylozoism\n defined, 19;\n and Pluralism, 41;\n the breaking up of pre-Socratic, 47;\n becomes materialism with Democritus, 109\u2013111.\n\n Hylozoists\n the Cosmologists were, 19.\n\n Hypatia\n 298.\n\n\n Idea\n development of the meaning of (Democritus and Plato), 105.\n\n Ideal of Socrates, the\n 83\u201385;\n what it involves, 85\u201388.\n\n Idealism\n of the Greeks, 100;\n objective, 104.\n\n Ideas\n of Plato, 133, 135;\n the development of, in the two drafts, 136, 137;\n brief comparison of the two drafts of 137;\n fuller comparison of the two drafts of, 137\u2013141;\n in the doctrine of _anamnesis_, 147, 148.\n\n Immortality\n Plato\u2019s doctrine of, 146\u2013150.\n\n Individuality\n the problem of, according to Thomas Aquinas, 383\u2013385;\n the problem of, in Duns Scotus, 389, 390.\n\n Induction\n 92, 183.\n\n Intellect or will\n the question of the primacy of, 385, 386, 388, 389.\n\n Ionic School\n _See_ Milesian school.\n\n Iren\u00e6us\n 313.\n\n Irish learning, the\n 349.\n\n Irony\n Socratic, 90.\n\n\n Jackson, H.\n article \u201cSophists,\u201d in _Encyclop\u00e6dia Britannica_, 68 n.\n\n Jamblichus\n 298, 299.\n\n Jewish (Greek-) philosophy of Philo\n 281\u2013284;\n and neo-Platonism, 288.\n\n Julian, Emperor\n 298.\n\n Justin Martyr\n 308.\n\n\n Kingsley, Charles\n _Hypatia_, 298 n.\n\n Knight, William A.\n _Life and Teaching of Hume_, 3 n.\n\n Knowledge\n in Socrates\u2019 ideal, 83\u201386, 88;\n according to the Cynics, 95;\n Democritus\u2019 theory of, 114\u2013116.\n\n\n Lanfranc\n 359.\n\n Law\n positive and natural, 72.\n\n Learning\n the impulse for, among the Greeks, 58, 59;\n the Revival of, 375\u2013378.\n\n Leucippus\n his life, 43, 44;\n his philosophy, 47, 48, 109, 110;\n founder of the Atomistic school, 107.\n\n Logic\n Aristotle\u2019s, 180\u2013185.\n\n Love\n Platonic, 151\u2013153.\n\n Love and Hate\n Empedocles\u2019 doctrine of, 44.\n\n Lucretius\n 228.\n\n Lyceum, the\n Aristotle in, 166, 167, 172, 173;\n after Aristotle, 220\u2013222;\n eclecticism in, 270.\n\n Lycophron\n 68.\n\n\n Maine, Sir Henry\n cited, 72.\n\n Man\n the philosophy of, 13, 55\u201397;\n Plato\u2019s conception of, 144\u2013146.\n\n Material cause\n 187.\n\n Materialism\n hylozoism becomes, with Democritus, 103, 109\u2013111;\n Stoic, 254, 255.\n\n Materialistic psychology of Democritus\n 111\u2013114.\n\n Matter\n and Form, in Aristotle, 186\u2013192, 197\u2013199, 384;\n of Plotinus, 295, 296.\n\n Mean, the\n Aristotle\u2019s doctrine of, 201, 202.\n\n Mechanical series of Aristotle\n 194\u2013196.\n\n Medi\u00e6val geography\n 335.\n\n Medi\u00e6val library, a\n 326\u2013328.\n\n Medi\u00e6val Man, the\n 320, 321;\n how the universe appeared to, 322\u2013325;\n at school, 325, 326;\n summary of the political and educational worlds of, 330\u2013333.\n\n Medi\u00e6val philosophy\n length of, 1;\n underlying character of, 3;\n divisions of, 4;\n treated, 319\u2013394.\n\n Megarian school\n 93.\n\n Mendicants, the\n 368.\n\n Metaphysical problem, the\n early formulation of, 22, 23.\n\n Metaphysics\n Plato\u2019s, the formation of, 132\u2013136;\n Plato\u2019s, the development of, 136\u2013141;\n Aristotle\u2019s, 185\u2013194;\n abandonment of, in Hellenic-Roman period, 216;\n of Plotinus, 294\u2013297.\n\n Metrocles\n 95.\n\n Middle Ages\n characteristics and conditions of, 319\u2013333;\n and the Hellenic-Roman period, comparison of, 319, 320;\n the medi\u00e6val man, 320, 321;\n how the universe appeared to the medi\u00e6val man, 322\u2013325;\n the medi\u00e6val man at school, 325, 326;\n a medi\u00e6val library, 326\u2013328;\n the three periods of, 328\u2013330;\n summary of the political and educational worlds of the\n medi\u00e6val man, 330\u2013333;\n the early period of, 330\u2013332, 334\u2013353;\n the transitional period of, 332, 354\u2013367;\n the period of classic scholasticism, 333, 368\u2013394.\n\n Milesian school\n 24;\n the members of, 24, 25;\n the philosophy of, 25, 26\n the teaching of, compared with that of Heracleitus and the\n Eleatics, 22, 23.\n\n Milton, John\n 325.\n\n Modern philosophy\n length of, 1;\n underlying character of, 3;\n divisions of, 4.\n\n Mohammedanism\n growth of, during the Middle Ages, 370\u2013372;\n first contact with Christianity, 372, 373;\n conflict with Christianity, 374, 375.\n\n Monism\n defined, 10 n.;\n of the early Greeks, 10;\n displaced by pluralism in Greek philosophy, 39.\n\n Monists\n list of early Cosmologists who were, 20;\n discussion of the, 22\u201338.\n\n Monotheism\n defined, 10 n.;\n for the first time conceptually framed, 191.\n\n Monte Cassino\n founding of the monastic school at, 348.\n\n Moral postulate\n philosophy for the first time founded upon, 85;\n of Socrates, 85\u201388.\n\n Motion\n according to Aristotle, 195, 196.\n\n Mysteries\n Orphic and Eleusinian, 16\u201318, 38;\n Orphic, dangers of, averted by Cosmologists, 54.\n\n Mysticism\n in neo-Platonism, 287.\n\n\n Natural Science\n _See_ Physics.\n\n Nature\n the philosophy of, 15\u201338;\n the word as used by the Sophists, 72, 73;\n a logical, Socrates\u2019 attempt to find, 92;\n physical, Plato\u2019s conception of, 142\u2013144;\n Aristotle\u2019s conception of, 192\u2013194;\n Stoic conception of, 251\u2013257.\n\n Neo-Platonism\n and Christianity, difference in their conception of\n inspiration, 276, 277;\n rise of, 279, 280;\n summary of its history, 281;\n and Platonism, 287, 288;\n and the philosophies of Philo and the neo-Pythagoreans, 288;\n and Christianity, 288\u2013290;\n the periods of, 290;\n the Alexandrian school (scientific theory of neo-Platonism,\n life and writings of Plotinus), 290\u2013298;\n the Syrian school (the systematizing of polytheism, Jamblichus),\n 290, 298, 299;\n the Athenian school (Proclus), 290, 299\u2013301;\n its influence on Christianity, 306.\n\n Neo-Pythagoreanism\n 281, 285\u2013287;\n and neo-Platonism, 288.\n\n Nominalism\n 103, 358, 362\u2013365, 391, 392.\n\n Norton, Arthur O.\n _Readings in the History of Education_, 377 n.\n\n _Nous_\n Anaxagoras\u2019 conception of, 47;\n of Plotinus, 294.\n\n Numbers\n Pythagorean conception of, 49\u201351.\n\n\n Objective character of Greek philosophy\n 2, 100, 101.\n\n Objective Idealism\n 104.\n\n Objective Realism\n 104.\n\n Ockam, William of\n 387 n., 390;\n the course of philosophy after, 393, 394.\n\n Order\n thought of, developed into clearness by Cosmologists, 54.\n\n Origen\n 280, 281, 314\u2013318.\n\n Orphic\n _See_ Mysteries.\n\n Oxford, University of\n 377.\n\n\n Palmer, G. H.\n on Socrates, 79.\n\n Pan\u00e6tius\n 270, 271.\n\n Pantheism\n defined, 10 n.;\n dynamic, of Plotinus, 293;\n of Erigena, 351\u2013353;\n of the realists, 363.\n\n Paris, University of\n 377.\n\n Parker, C. P.\n cited, 258 n.\n\n Parmenides\n life, 32;\n develops the doctrine of Xenophanes, 32 f.;\n his philosophy, 33\u201335;\n and Heracleitus, results of the conflict between, 37, 38.\n _See_ Eleatic School.\n\n Particulars and Universals\n according to Thomas Aquinas, 383\u2013385.\n\n Pater, Walter\n _Marius the Epicurean_, 227 n.\n\n Patmore, Coventry\n _Angel in the House_, 153 n.\n\n Patristics\n 302\u2013318.\n\n Perception\n and conception, 83 n.;\n according to Plato, 134;\n in Aristotle, 177\u2013179.\n\n Pericles\n 58.\n\n Periods\n of philosophy, the three general, 1\u20134;\n of Greek philosophy, 12\u201314.\n\n Peripatetics\n _See_ Lyceum.\n\n Persia\n 15, 16.\n\n Persian Wars\n their importance, 55\u201357, 62.\n\n Personality\n spiritual, increased importance of, in history, 277\u2013279.\n\n Pessimism\n result of theory of Cyrenaics, 97.\n\n Peter the Lombard\n 379, 380.\n\n Ph\u00e6do\n founder of the Elean-Eretrian school, 93.\n\n Philo\n Greek-Jewish philosophy of, 281\u2013284;\n and neo-Platonism, 288.\n\n Philoponus\n 299.\n\n Philosophic skepticism\n _See_ Skepticism.\n\n Physical universe\n early Greek tendency toward scientific explanation of, 10, 11.\n\n Physics\n Socrates\u2019 view of, 80;\n enrichment of, under Democritus, 109\u2013111;\n Plato\u2019s conception of, 142\u2013144;\n Aristotle\u2019s theory of, 194\u2013196;\n of Epicurus, 238\u2013240.\n\n Plato\n 104;\n parts of works to be read, 75 n.;\n his place in Greek history, 93, 98\u2013100, 103, 104;\n and Democritus, their similarities and differences, 104\u2013106;\n the period of his life, 119, 120;\n the difficulties in understanding the teaching of, 120, 121;\n the chronology of his dialogues, 119, 120;\n the life and writings of, 121, 126;\n his student life, 121, 122;\n as traveler, 122\u2013124;\n as teacher of the Academy, 124\u2013126;\n concerning his dialogues, 126\u2013128;\n the factors in the construction of his doctrine, 128\u2013131;\n his inherited tendencies, 128\u2013130;\n his philosophical sources, 130, 131;\n the divisions of his philosophy, 131, 132;\n summary of his doctrine, 132;\n the formation of his metaphysics, 132\u2013136;\n the development of his metaphysics (the development of his\n ideas in the two drafts), 136\u2013141;\n his conception of God, 141, 142;\n his conception of physical nature, 142\u2013144;\n his conception of man, 144\u2013146;\n his doctrine of immortality, 146\u2013150;\n the two tendencies in, 150, 151;\n Platonic love, 151\u2013153;\n his theory of ethics, 153\u2013158;\n development of his theory of the Good, 153, 154;\n the four cardinal virtues, 154, 155;\n his theory of political society, 155\u2013158;\n a selection of passages from, for English readers, 158\u2013165;\n in the Middle Ages, 331, 337, 338, 360, 363.\n\n Platonism\n the revival of, 279;\n and neo-Platonism, 287, 288.\n\n Platonists\n Eclectic, 285.\n\n Pleasure\n of Epicurus, 230\u2013233.\n _See_ Happiness.\n\n Plotinus\n 280, 287, 288;\n life and writings of, 290, 291;\n general character of his teaching, 291, 292;\n the mystic God of, 292, 293;\n the two problems of, 293;\n the metaphysical problem of, 294\u2013297;\n the ethical problem of, 297, 298.\n\n Pluralism\n tried to reconcile extremes of Milesian school, 39, 40;\n and hylozoism, 41.\n\n Pluralists\n list of later Cosmologists who were, 20;\n their new conception of change, 40;\n their new conception of the unchanging, 40, 41;\n introduction of conception of efficient cause by, 41;\n summary of similarities and differences in theories of,\n 41, 42;\n their lives span the fifth century, 42.\n _See_ Empedocles, etc.\n\n Plutarch\n neo-Platonist, 299.\n\n Political philosophy of Aristotle\n 202, 203.\n\n Political society\n Plato\u2019s theory of, 155\u2013158.\n\n Polytheism\n Homeric, 19.\n\n Polytheisms\n the systematizing of, 298, 299.\n\n Porphyry\n 291, 298, 357.\n\n Posidonius\n 270, 271.\n\n Primary and secondary qualities\n 116.\n\n Probabilism in Stoicism\n 262.\n\n Proclus\n 299\u2013301.\n\n Prodicus\n 66, 68.\n\n Protagoras\n 66, 67;\n the relativism of, 69, 70;\n his point of view compared with that of Socrates, 81.\n\n Psychology\n materialistic, of Democritus, 111\u2013114;\n Plato\u2019s, 144\u2013146;\n of Aristotle, 196\u2013199;\n the Stoic, 248\u2013250.\n\n Ptolemy\n his cosmography, 322\u2013325.\n\n Purpose\n Aristotle\u2019s conceptions of, 186\u2013190.\n\n Pyrrho\n 266.\n\n Pyrrhonism\n 265, 266.\n\n Pythagoras\n 17.\n\n Pythagoreanism\n neo-, 281, 285\u2013287;\n and neo-Platonism, 288.\n\n Pythagoreans\n the early, 17;\n the later, 44, 48, 49;\n their conception of Being, 49\u201351;\n their astronomy, 49, 52, 53;\n their dualism, 51, 52.\n\n\n Qualitative changes of phenomena\n 196\u2013202.\n\n\n Rationalism\n defined, 104 n.;\n of Plato and Democritus, 104;\n of Abelard, 365\u2013367.\n\n Realism\n 100, 104, 358, 362\u2013365;\n objective, 104.\n\n Reason and dogma\n the relation between, 355, 356, 360\u2013362, 365\u2013367.\n\n Reconcilers\n _See_ Pluralists.\n\n Relativism\n of Protagoras, 69, 70;\n represented by the anthropologists, 103.\n\n Religion\n of the Greeks, organization of, 8, 9, 10;\n the new, perils of, 16\u201318;\n in Epicurus\u2019s system, 236, 237;\n and science, the separation of, under Duns Scotus, 387, 388.\n\n Religious feeling\n two causes of the rise of, 272\u2013274.\n\n Religious period of the Hellenic-Roman period\n 208, 209;\n treated, 273\u2013301;\n the divisions of, 280, 281.\n\n Religious philosophies\n Hellenic, rise of, 280, 282;\n summary of history of, 281;\n introductory period of, 281\u2013287;\n development period of, 281, 287, 288.\n\n Revival of Learning, the\n 375\u2013378.\n\n Rhabanus Maurus\n 350.\n\n Rhetoric among the Greeks\n 60.\n\n Romans\n their conquest of Greece, 205\u2013208.\n\n Roscellinus\n life and teaching, 361, 362.\n\n Rossetti, Christina\n _Shadow of Dante_ cited, 325 n.\n\n Rousseau and Epicurus\n 229.\n\n\n St. Ambrose\n 306.\n\n Salerno, University of\n 377.\n\n Scholasticism\n what it is, 355\u2013359;\n of Anselm, 359\u2013361;\n of Roscellinus, 361, 362;\n of Abelard, 363\u2013367;\n classic, period of, 333, 368\u2013394.\n\n School\n in early Greek philosophy, meaning of, 19.\n\n Schools, the\n 214, 218\u2013226;\n fusion of doctrines in, 269;\n after 150 B. C., notable names in, 271.\n _See_ Academy, Lyceum, etc.\n\n Science\n early tendencies toward, among the Greeks, 10, 11;\n growth of, in Hellenic-Roman period, 216, 217;\n secular, of the age of Augustine, 339;\n and religion, the separation of, under Duns Scotus, 387, 388.\n\n Scotus, Duns\n gave a new direction to philosophy, 369;\n upheld the primacy of the Will, 385, 386;\n the founder of the Franciscan tradition (life and philosophical\n position of), 386, 387;\n his conception of the twofold truth, 387;\n the inscrutable will of God, according to, 388, 389;\n the problem of individuality, according to, 389, 390;\n the course of philosophy after, 390, 391.\n\n Secondary and primary qualities\n 116.\n\n Secular science of the age of Augustine\n 339.\n\n Seignobos, Charles\n _History of Medi\u00e6val Civilization_, 373 n.\n\n Seneca\n quoted, 234.\n\n Sensationalism\n defined, 104 n.\n\n Sensationalistic skepticism\n 268, 269.\n\n Sextus Empiricus\n 268.\n\n Sill\n _The Two Aphrodites_, 153 n.\n\n Simplicius\n 299.\n\n Skepticism\n what it is, 69;\n the undercurrent of, in the Hellenic-Roman period, 209\u2013211;\n philosophic, the appearances of, 264, 265;\n the three phases of, 265\u2013269;\n of the Academy, 266\u2013268;\n sensationalistic, 268, 269.\n\n Socrates, and Aristophanes\n opposed the Sophists, 74;\n works on, for reading, 75;\n personality and life of, 75\u201380;\n his d\u00e6mon, 77, 83;\n and the Sophists, 80\u201382;\n unsystematic character of his philosophy, 82, 83;\n the ideal of, 83\u201385;\n what his ideal involves, 85\u201388;\n the two steps of his method, 88\u201391;\n and Athens, 91;\n the logical expedients of, 92, 93;\n and the Lesser Socratics, 93\u201395.\n\n Socratics\n the Lesser, and Socrates, 93\u201395.\n\n Sophists\n significance of, 64\u201367;\n the prominent, 67, 68;\n the philosophy of, 68\u201371;\n the ethics of, 71\u201373;\n summary of their work, 73;\n met in two ways by Socrates and Aristophanes, 74;\n and Socrates, 80\u201382.\n\n Soul\n Plato\u2019s doctrine of, 145\u2013150;\n according to Aristotle, 196, 197;\n of Plotinus, 295, 297, 298.\n\n Spenser, Edmund\n _Hymn in Honor of Beauty_, 153 n.\n\n Spiritual authority\n the need of, 275\u2013277;\n the turning to the present for, 287, 288.\n\n Spirituality\n rise of the conception of, 277\u2013279.\n\n State\n Plato\u2019s doctrine of, 155\u2013158;\n and church, Aquinas\u2019s and Dante\u2019s views of, 382.\n\n Stoic school, the\n 222\u2013225;\n inclines to eclecticism, 269, 270.\n\n Stoicism\n and Epicureanism, summary of agreements and differences,\n 225, 226;\n position of, in antiquity, 241, 242;\n the three periods of, 242, 243;\n leaders of, 243\u2013246;\n writings of, 246;\n the two prominent conceptions of, 247, 248;\n the conception of personality, 248;\n the psychology of, 248\u2013250;\n the highest good, 250, 251;\n the conception of nature, 251\u2013256;\n conceptions of nature and personality supplement each\n other, 256, 257;\n and society, 257\u2013259;\n duty and responsibility, 259, 260;\n the problem of evil and the problem of freedom, 260, 261;\n modifications of, after the first period, 261\u2013263;\n its influence on Christianity, 305.\n\n Stoics and Cynics\n 246, 247.\n\n Storm and Stress\n 362, 363.\n\n _Sums_\n of Peter the Lombard, 379, 380.\n\n Syllogism, the\n 182.\n\n Syrian school of neo-Platonism\n 290, 298, 299.\n\n Syrianus\n 299.\n\n Systematic period of Greek philosophy\n 12\u201314;\n treated, 98\u2013203;\n the three philosophers of, their place in Greek history,\n 98\u2013100;\n the fundamental principle of, 100\u2013102.\n\n\n Tatian\n 313.\n\n Teleology\n defined, 105 n.\n\n Terminism\n 392.\n\n Tertullian\n 313.\n\n Teuffel, W. S.\n _History of Roman Literature_, 227 n.\n\n Thales\n 24, 25.\n\n Theological series of Aristotle\n 196\u2013202.\n\n Thrasymachus\n 68.\n\n Timon\n 266.\n\n Transitional period of Middle Ages\n 332, 354\u2013357.\n\n Turner, William\n _History of Philosophy_, 336 n.\n\n Twofold reality\n world of, Democritus\u2019 theory of, 114\u2013116.\n\n\n Ueberweg\n _History of Philosophy_, quoted, 6;\n cited, 269 n.\n\n Unchanging, the\n as conceived by the Pluralists, 40, 41.\n\n _Universalia ante rem_\n 104, 358, 362\u2013365, 384.\n\n _Universalia in re_\n 104, 358, 364, 365, 384.\n\n _Universalia post rem_\n 103, 358, 362\u2013365, 384.\n\n Universals and particulars\n according to Thomas Aquinas, 383\u2013385.\n\n Universe\n diagram of Dante\u2019s conception of, 376.\n\n Universities\n the establishment of, 377.\n\n Useful, the\n according to Socrates, 87, 88.\n\n\n Valentinus\n Gnostic, 310.\n\n Vincent of Beauvais\n 379.\n\n Virtue\n meaning of, 84;\n according to Socrates, 84\u201388;\n according to the Cynics, 95;\n according to Aristotle, 199\u2013202;\n place of, in Epicureanism, 233.\n\n Virtues\n the four cardinal, in Plato, 154, 155.\n\n\n Weber\n _History of Philosophy_ cited, 269 n.\n\n Wheeler, B. I.\n _Life of Alexander the Great_, cited, 56 n.;\n quoted, 172.\n\n Will\n freedom of. _See_ Freedom.\n\n Will or intellect\n the question of the primacy of, 385, 386, 388, 389.\n\n William of Aubergne\n 379.\n\n William of Champeaux\n 363.\n\n Windelband\n _History of Ancient Philosophy_, 37 n.;\n cited, 121 n., 311 n.;\n quoted, 254.\n\n Witte, Karl\n _Essays on Dante_, 325 n.\n\n Wordsworth, William\n _Dion_, 123 n.;\n _Ode on Intimations of Immortality_ quoted, 148.\n\n\n Xenophanes\n religious philosopher, 26 f.;\n philosophy of, 27 f.\n\n Xenophon\n parts of works to be read, 75 n.;\n on Socrates, 76, 93.\n\n\n Zeller, Edward\n _Pre-Socratic Philosophy_, 3 n., 100 n.;\n quoted, 101, 102;\n _Greek Philosophy_, 37 n.\n\n Zeno\n Eleatic, his life, 35 f.;\n his philosophy, 36, 37.\n _See_ Eleatic school.\n\n Zeno\n Stoic, 242, 244, 245.\n\n\n\n\n Footnotes.\n\n\n 1 \u2013 Read Knight, _Life and Teaching of Hume_, pp. 102 f.\n (Blackwood Series); Falckenberg, _Hist. Modern Phil._,\n p. 10; Zeller, _Pre-Socratic Phil._, vol. i, pp. 161 f.\n\n 2 \u2013 Read Fairbanks, _First Philosophers of Greece_, pp. 263\n ff., especially the r\u00e9sum\u00e9.\n\n 3 \u2013 Ueberweg, _Hist. of Phil._, vol. i, p. 7.\n\n 4 \u2013 Monism is the belief that reality is a oneness without\n any necessary implication as to the character of that\n oneness. Monotheism is a kind of monism, in which some\n definite character is ascribed to the oneness, like the\n active principle in the world or the cause of the world.\n Pantheism, on the other hand, is a kind of monism in\n which the emphasis is upon the all-inclusive character of\n reality. In pantheism God and nature are two inseparable\n aspects of reality.\n\n 5 \u2013 Bury, _Hist. of Greece_, p. 321, calls the tradition of\n the Wise Men a legend.\n\n 6 \u2013 Bury, _History of Greece_, p. 311.\n\n 7 \u2013 Burnet, _Early Greek Philosophers_, p. 104, for\n injunctions upon the private life of the early\n Pythagoreans.\n\n 8 \u2013 Note further that in future philosophical discussions\n of this problem, the technical word \u201cBeing\u201d is used for\n the Unchanging or the substance that remains forever like\n itself, and the technical word \u201cBecoming\u201d is used for the\n changing processes of Nature.\n\n 9 \u2013 \u201cJust as our soul, being air, holds us together, so do\n breath and air encompass the whole world.\u201d\n\n 10 \u2013 Read Windelband, _Hist. of Ancient Phil._, pp. 67 ff.;\n Zeller, _Greek Philosophy_, pp. 63 ff.\n\n 11 \u2013 Read Matthew Arnold, _Empedocles_ (a poem).\n\n 12 \u2013 Read Plato, _Phaedo_, 97, B.\n\n 13 \u2013 Dualism: the belief that the world is to be explained by\n two independent and coexistent principles.\n\n 14 \u2013 Wheeler, _History of Alexander the Great_.\n\n 15 \u2013 Read Grote, _History of Greece_, vol. viii, pp. 334\u2013347.\n\n 16 \u2013 Read H. Jackson in _Encyclop\u00e6dia Britannica_, article\n \u201cSophists\u201d.\n\n 17 \u2013 The student should read the following references\n in Plato\u2019s dialogues and Xenophon\u2019s _Symposium_ and\n _Memorabilia_. The translations referred to here are\n Jowett\u2019s Plato and Cooper, Spelman, etc., translation,\n _Whole Works of Xenophon_. (1851.)\n\n For the method of Socrates, read _Charmides_, _Lysis_, and\n _Laches_.\n\n For the personal appearance of Socrates, read Plato,\n _Symposium_, pp. 586 ff. and Xenophon, _Symposium_, p. 615.\n\n For the physical endurance of Socrates, read Plato,\n _Symposium_, p. 591.\n\n For Socrates\u2019 dislike of nature, read Plato, _Ph\u00e6drus_,\n p. 435, and Xenophon, _Memorabilia_, p. 521.\n\n For the charges, defense, and trial of Socrates, read\n Plato, _Apology_, pp. 116 and 129.\n\n For the confinement of Socrates in prison, read _Crito_,\n beginning and end of the dialogue.\n\n For description of the death scene of Socrates, read Plato,\n _Ph\u00e6do_, beginning and end of the dialogue.\n\n For description of the d\u00e6moniacal sign, read Plato,\n _Apology_, pp. 125\u2013126, and Xenophon, _Memorabilia_,\n pp. 531 ff., 585 ff.\n\n For the oracle\u2019s statement that Socrates is the wisest of\n men, read Plato, _Apology_, p. 114.\n\n 18 \u2013 What is the difference between perception and conception?\n We have heard a good deal about perceptions in the\n doctrine of Protagoras. We have now reached a point\n where many of the theories will involve a comparison\n of perception with conception. An understanding of\n the difference between perception and conception will\n be necessary for an understanding of the doctrines,\n especially of Democritus, Plato, and Aristotle. In general,\n perception is the consciousness of an object in which some\n actual sensation of it is present; a conception is the\n consciousness of an object in which no actual sensation\n of it is present. Thus I perceive a tree, when my retina\n is actually stimulated; I conceive a tree, when I turn\n my head away and no sense organ is actually stimulated,\n _i. e._ I do not touch, see, hear the tree. To the Greek\n the perception was particular and transient; the conception\n was, on the other hand, universal or general and permanent.\n\n 19 \u2013 Read Zeller, _Pre-Socratic Phil._, vol. i, pp. 138\u2013149,\n concerning the objective character of Greek morality, art,\n and philosophy.\n\n 20 \u2013 Zeller, _Pre-Socratic Phil._, vol. i, p. 162.\n\n 21 \u2013 Zeller, _Pre-Socratic Phil._, vol. i, p. 162.\n\n 22 \u2013 Rationalism and sensationalism refer to the sources\n from which knowledge is obtained. Rationalism is to be\n contrasted with sensationalism. Rationalism is the belief\n that the reason is an independent source of knowledge\n and has a higher authority than sense-perception.\n Sensationalism is the belief that all our knowledge\n originates in sensations. Empiricism is often used for\n sensationalism.\n\n 23 \u2013 Teleology is the doctrine that things exist for some\n purpose. A teleological cause, which is the same as \u201cfinal\n cause\u201d or \u201cend,\u201d is the purpose involved in an action.\n It is contrasted with mechanical or efficient cause.\n A trolley car is moving and a man runs to catch it.\n Electricity is the mechanical cause of the movement of the\n car. The purpose of the man is the teleological cause of\n his running; the strength in his legs is the mechanical or\n efficient cause of his running.\n\n 24 \u2013 Atoms differ primarily in form (\u1f30\u03b4\u03ad\u03b1); size is referred in\n part to form.\n\n 25 \u2013 These all reduce to form,\u2015\u2015see above.\n\n 26 \u2013 Windelband, _Hist. of Ancient Phil._, pp. 183\u2013189.\n\n 27 \u2013 Read Wordsworth, _Dion_.\n\n 28 \u2013 B. Jowett, _Dialogues of Plato_, trans. into English with\n analyses and introductions, 4 vols.\n\n See p. 158 for selections from the dialogues made by\n Jowett for English readers.\n\n 29 \u2013 Goethe.\n\n 30 \u2013 For the distinction between perception and conception, see\n p. 83.\n\n 31 \u2013 Read Wordsworth\u2019s _Ode on Intimations of Immortality_.\n\n 32 \u2013 Read Edmund Spenser, _Hymn in Honor of Beauty_; Emerson,\n _Essay on Love_, also the poem on _Initial, D\u00e6monic, and\n Celestial Love_; Bacon, _Essay on Love_; Patmore, _Angel\n in the House_; Sill, _The Two Aphrodites_.\n\n 33 \u2013 B. I. Wheeler, _Life of Alexander the Great_.\n\n 34 \u2013 Read Walter Pater, _Marius the Epicurean_; Hicks,\n _Stoic and Epicurean_, p. 184, for the _Golden Maxims_\n of Epicurus; Teuffel, _History of Roman Literature_,\n pp. 83\u201386.\n\n 35 \u2013 Windelband, _Hist. of Phil._, p. 183.\n\n 36 \u2013 Adamson, _The Development of Greek Philosophy_, p. 267.\n\n 37 \u2013 Professor C. P. Parker.\n\n 38 \u2013 A. Hicks, _Stoic and Epicurean_, pp. 322 ff.\n\n 39 \u2013 Read Grote, _Plato_, vol. iii, pp. 482\u2013490, for the\n interesting sophistical problems of the Liar, the Person\n Disguised under a Veil, Electra, Sorites, Cornutus, and\n the Bald Man.\n\n 40 \u2013 For a statement of these tropes, see Weber, _Hist. of\n Phil._, p. 153.\n\n 41 \u2013 Ueberweg, _Hist. of Phil._, vol. i, p. 216.\n\n 42 \u2013 Read Dill, _Roman Society_, first three chapters.\n\n 43 \u2013 Read Charles Kingsley, _Hypatia_, a novel.\n\n 44 \u2013 Hatch, _Hibbert Lectures_, 1888, p. 182.\n\n 45 \u2013 Harnack, _Outlines of the Hist. of Dogma_, p. 120.\n\n 46 \u2013 Windelband, _Hist. of Ancient Phil._, p. 357.\n\n 47 \u2013 Harnack, _Outlines of the History of Dogma_, p. 159.\n\n 48 \u2013 Read Rossetti, _Shadow of Dante_, pp. 9\u201314; Karl Witte,\n _Essays on Dante_, pp. 99 ff.\n\n 49 \u2013 Read Eucken, _Problem of Human Life_, pp. 219\u2013221, 232,\n 236, 245\u2013248; Turner, _Hist. of Philosophy_, p. 226;\n De Wulf, _Hist. of Medi\u00e6val Phil._, pp. 90\u201398; Harnack,\n _Hist. of Dogma_, vol. v, pp. 3\u20136.\n\n 50 \u2013 Eucken, _Problem of Human Life_, p. 247.\n\n 51 \u2013 Harnack, _Hist. of Dogma_, vol. v, p. 3.\n\n 52 \u2013 There is this difference between Augustine\u2019s position and\n that of Descartes. Augustine\u2019s _Quod si fallor, sum_ is a\n refutation of the doctrine of probability of the Academy,\n not a demonstration; Descartes\u2019 _Cogito, ergo sum_ is\n positive,\u2015\u2015a subtle but an important difference between\n the two thinkers.\n\n 53 \u2013 Harnack, _Hist. of Dogma_, vol. v, p. 337.\n\n 54 \u2013 Harnack, _Hist. of Dogma_, vol. v, p. 112, n. 4.\n\n 55 \u2013 Harnack, vol. vi, p. 7.\n\n 56 \u2013 Glaber, _Hist._, lib. III, 4.\n\n 57 \u2013 In this period the conceptualists were confused with\n nominalists and called nominalists.\n\n 58 \u2013 Historians are attaching more importance than formerly to\n Constantinople as an intellectual centre of that time.\n\n 59 \u2013 Read on this point Seignobos, _Hist. of Medi\u00e6val\n Civilization_, pp. 117 f.\n\n 60 \u2013 Read Emerton, _Medi\u00e6val Europe_, pp. 358\u2013397; Adams,\n _Civilization during the Middle Ages_, pp. 258\u2013278.\n\n 61 \u2013 THE CRUSADES\n\n _Major Crusades_\n\n First Crusade, 1096\u20131099\n Second Crusade, 1147\u20131149\n Third Crusade, 1189\u20131192\n Fourth Crusade, 1202\u20131204\n Children\u2019s Crusade, 1212\n\n _Minor Crusades_\n\n Fifth Crusade, 1216\u20131220\n Sixth Crusade, 1228\u20131229\n Seventh Crusade, 1248\u20131254\n Eighth Crusade, 1270\u20131272\n\n It will be noted that five of these nine Crusades occurred\n within thirty years of the year 1200. The First Crusade\n resulted in the capture of Jerusalem and the founding of\n a kingdom. The other Crusades were directly or indirectly\n concerned with the defense or recapture of that kingdom.\n\n 62 \u2013 Read Norton, _Readings in the Hist. of Education_,\n pp. 102\u2013103.\n\n 63 \u2013 Dante in _De Monarchia_ did not share in Thomas\u2019s\n subordination of the state to the church. Both Dante and\n Thomas believed that destiny lies in the race, but the\n great poet regarded man as destined equally for earthly\n and heavenly happiness. To Dante the church and the state\n are powers of like authority.\n\n 64 \u2013 Dante follows Thomas in placing the intellectual virtues\n above the practical, and in pointing to the intellectual\n intuition of God as the goal of human attainment. Beatrice\n is Dante\u2019s expression of this ideal.\n\n 65 \u2013 De Wulf, _Hist. of Medi\u00e6val Phil._, p. 323.\n\n 66 \u2013 Roger Bacon (1214\u20131292) lived at Oxford two generations\n before Scotus. He was so versatile that he was not able\n to dogmatize in any one field. He believed that theology\n was based on the will of God, all other science on the\n reason. He influenced both Scotus and Ockam to turn from\n authority to experience. Morality was to him the content\n of universal religion.\n\n\n\n\n Transcriber\u2019s Notes.\n\n\n The following corrections have been made in the text:\n\n Page 9:\n Sentence starting: The passionate party strife....\n \u2013 \u2018familes\u2019 replaced with \u2018families\u2019\n (old, ruling families of nobles)\n\n Page 193:\n Sentence starting: On the other hand,...\n \u2013 \u2018evolulution\u2019 replaced with \u2018evolution\u2019\n (Darwin\u2019s theory of evolution.)\n\n Page 196:\n Sentence starting: Studying the organic realm,...\n \u2013 \u2018organism\u2019 replaced with \u2018organisms\u2019\n (we find organisms to consist of)\n\n Page 215:\n Sentence starting: There were many other....\n \u2013 \u2018Pergamus\u2019 replaced with \u2018Pergamos\u2019\n (Rhodes, Antioch, Alexandria, Pergamos, Tarsus,)\n\n Page 337:\n Sentence starting: By means of neo-Platonism....\n \u2013 \u2018judye\u2019 replaced with \u2018judge\u2019\n (God as a judge )","title":"A Beginner's History of Philosophy, Vol. 1: Ancient and Medi\u00e6val Philosophy","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":114134}